The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

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Establishing who was the first one to use the phrase ethnic cleansing poses quite a problem to a researcher. There are certain indications that the term might originate as a part of the Nazi vocabulary. The German word *Judenrein*, "clean of Jews", was used to designate areas from which all Jews had been deported (Bell-Falkoff, 1993:114); whereas *Judenreinigung* is a derivative encompassing actions and processes leading to the completion of *Endlösung*, the final solution. *Judenreinigung* could serve as a springboard for the more general expression *Rassenreinigung* which rather predates the English coinage ethnic cleansing which seems to be quite recent as it is not featured in the 1990s editions of generally accessible dictionaries of the English language. However, on the basis of the SilverPlatter 3.1 CD ROM Social Sciences Index (2/83-11/93), it may be conveniently determined that the phrase was first used in a headline of an article published in a mass-circulation periodical on August 1, 1992; namely, in two contributions to *The Economist* entitled: "Out of Bosnia: Serbia Engages in Ethnic Cleansing" and "Brutalised Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims".

Thus, it is appropriate to propound that the coinage was prompted by the horrors of the Yugoslav conflict the first fully-fledged war waged on the European continent after the messy closing of the Second World War with the Greek Civil War. Soon the term gained wide-spread currency and secure footing in contemporary English usage since journalists, scholars and statesmen started using it in order to describe gruesome developments in the ex-Soviet Union, Africa, Iraq, Turkey, etc.

Using the above linguistic analysis of the etymology of the phrase, one could wrongly infer that ethnic cleansing is peculiar to the modern Twentieth-century world. The acts which aimed at homogenizing population were first recorded in connection to the Assyrian ruler Tiglath-Pileser III (747-727 BC) (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993:III). Similar policies were pursued and implemented by the Babylonians, Greeks and Romans (cf. the case of the Jewish nation) in Antiquity. The Middle Ages commenced the period of massacres and expulsions of the Jews and Muslims, and sparked off religious wars and persecutions which intensified especially after 1530 when the Confession of Augsburg had explicitly laid down the principle of religious homogeneity as the basis of political order (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 112). However, only in the Nineteenth century did the complete destruction of an ethnic group manifest itself as the goal of a state. The most notable examples are extermination of the Native Americans, and the Afrikaners during the Boer Wars. The Twentieth century, on the other hand, saw the rise of scientific race theories which augmented by contemporary technology allowed Turkey to obliterate more than half of the Armenian populace in 1915 and provided the Third Reich with the tools to annihilate the European Jews. Subsequently, since the middle of the Twentieth century ethnic cleansing has been carried out on purely ethnic grounds in numerous cases, and it is apparent that the trend dangerously escalates at the end of the Second Millennium following the collapse of the post-Second-World-War status quo, which has produced new states and broken the carefully worked-out grid of borders in Europe and Asia opening the way to uncertainty and insecurity.

In the context of this volatile situation, it is important to understand the nature and mechanisms of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing, nonetheless defies easy definition. Bell-Fialkoff delimits the semantic field of the term to "the expulsions of undesirable population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of these" (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993: 110). Should one espouse this definition one may overlook subtler forms of ethnic cleansing which are virtually indistinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange, as well as the other extreme of ethnic-based harassment, which merges with deportation and genocide. Hence, the argument to be presented in this thesis is going to use the latter open-ended description for the sake of better a depiction of the problem announced in the title.
Additionally, some preliminary techniques, which precede first instances of ethnic cleansing, will be probed into. This approach will let the author to present the necessary background without which clear comprehension of the origins and causes of ethnic cleansing in Silesia may be difficult if not sheerly impossible. Among others the methods include: discriminatory legislation, customary discrimination, lower social status pegged to ethnic origin, less or more forced assimilation, gradual destruction of culture and language dialect with the means of institutionalized education, conscript army and centralized state bureaucracy.
**Introduction**

Silesia (Czech Slezsko, Polish Isk, German Schlesien) is a rich land which used to be, and still, to a certain extent, is ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously heterogenous. It was an attractive meeting point for the Czech/Moravian, German and Polish spheres of influences which formed the specific identity of Silesia which, in turn, acted as an interface among the three facilitating contacts and commerce which led to quicker development of the province and the adjacent regions. Unfortunately though, despite its aspirations, Silesia has never managed to found its own state leaving itself vulnerable to territorial ambitions of the states on which it has bordered. Consequently, it was often changing hands and belonged to the Great Moravian State, Bohemia, Hungary, Austria, Prussia, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the German Democratic Republic during the last eleven centuries.

The frequent border changes exposed the local populace to different state bureaucracies. The process of adjustment to them was rather painless before the onset of the Nineteenth century though marred by prolonged warfare which had tendency to stall advancement of this land. The quantum leap in this respect was staged by rapid industrialization. Silesia on the par with the Ruhrgebiet was one of the first areas on the European landmass to undergo this dynamic course of modernization. In the aftermath, this region being an engine of industry became the object of contest among the neighboring countries, which flared up especially in the Twentieth century in the form of serious conflicts involving Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

As empirically proved by Gellner, industrialization opened the age of nationalism precipitating ethnic polarization among the multicultural (or at least bilingual) Silesians. Invariably, the group of Silesians identifying themselves with the dominant nationality governing a given part of Silesia, was favored while the rest was more or less harshly discriminated. On the other hand, the segment of Silesians advantaged by legislation and authorities was by and large mistrusted because perceived as turncoats and nationally an uncertain element. Anyway, the underprivileged section of the population tended to change their national orientation in order to adjust to the new environment. However, they hardly ever surpassed their status of the second class citizens, and the more they were successful the more they suffered in cases of political upheavals bringing Silesia under the rule of a different nation-state.

It is a common fate of borderlands. Its most famous illustration in the Twentieth century was presented by the life of Robert Schuman, one of the fathers of the ongoing process of European integration. He was an indigenous inhabitant of Alsace-Lorraine; and accordingly, he had to experience, at the human level, the poignant destiny of his land which changed hands several times between Germany and France in this century. He fought in the German army during the First World War while another World war presented him with a French military uniform.

These ironic occurrences made him acutely aware of the problems of small borderland homelands suppressed by centralistic governments for the sake of strengthening unitarian nation-states without any respect for people and their local traditions. Thus, together with Monnet, he conceived the idea of European union as the mechanism to prevent intra-European warfare by coaxing nation-states to devolve, and ensuingly to transfer some prerogatives to regions and supra-European institutions. He trusted that in future Europe would be not a continent of struggling nation-states but of regions, Heimaten, which would follow the peaceful tradition of cooperation and argument-solving painstakingly worked out by the Swiss cantons.

Western Europe has largely fulfilled his hopes, especially with the positive settlements reached in South Tyrol, Schlezwig-Holstein and Catalonia; though the victim-claiming conflicts, notably in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, are the proof that there is still much to be done in this field. The end of Communism, however, poses new challenges for European integration. Central and Eastern Europe has never managed to give a birth to strong nation-states, whereas the Soviet domination also quelled local nationalisms for almost five decades. Therefore, the outbreak of nationalistic feelings and tensions in the wake of the 1989 events presents with itself a serious logistic
problem to the European institutions the Central and Eastern European countries have not undergone
the full process of nation-state development like their Western European counterparts.

Providing regions and ethnic minorities with rights is an outright sacrilege to advocates of
nationalist centralism and homogeneity, who consider it to be an exercise in state dismantling. Such
an attitude may be altered by cautious and truthful presentation of dangers and advantages of
centralist nation-state and devolved region-oriented federal models, and by widening the scope of
mutually beneficial power-sharing between centers and regions. But it is possible only after having
come to terms with various white spots in history of relations between dominant groups and
minorities.

The best way to exorcise specters of the past is to expose them in an objective way devoid of
nationalistic jingoism. Ergo, the thesis intends to present the dynamics of the policies of ethnic
cleansing in Silesia from the outbreak of nationalistic tensions in the Nineteenth century till the
present day.

To facilitate this purpose, a concise presentation of the geographical location, peopling and
history of Silesia constitutes the basis for the background explication of ethnic tensions in this region
and the ensuing policies of ethnic cleansing. The successive chapters are an overview of exemplars of
ethnic cleansing during the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries in relation to the growing national
polarization and the rise of aggressive nationalisms which engendered dramatic political changes in
Europe. The conclusive remarks concentrate on the possibility of amicable settlement of ethnic-based
controversies and wrongdoings, which was created by the fall of Communism in 1989 and the
ratification of the two treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland,
namely on confirmation of the existing border between the states (November 14, 1990), and on good
neighborliness and friendly cooperation (June 17, 1991).}

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1 The latter is the first inter-state legally-binding document in the post-Second-World-War history where the
term minority is widely and explicitly used, cf. Article 20 (Anon., 1991: 44-49). Previously the term was only
mentioned in Article 14 of The European Convention on Human Rights for, in this respect, European statesmen
were extremely cautious having had observed centrifugal forces partially unleashed by the minority treaties and
conventions inspired by the League of Nations, which did contribute to the outbreak of the Second World War.
Chapter one

Silesia and its past

History of Silesia is the ground of contest for the modern nationalist historiographies of Poland and Germany especially, but also of the Czechs. Its richness and unusual complicatedness typical of borderlands lend themselves easily to contradictory interpretations. Consequently, when one reads works on the past of this land one should bear it in one’s mind that they are to a greater or lesser extent biased in their implicit or overt manipulation of facts striving to prove primordial Czechness, Germaness or Polishness of this land which could decide (at least at the pseudo-scientific plane) on national ownership of Silesia.

It was the ideology of nationalism which harnessed historiography to serve the goal of constructing ethnically homogenous nation-states. This prescriptive use or rather abuse of history can be traced back, in the case of Central Europe, to the 1871 Prussian victory over France. It facilitated bringing about of the last stage of German unification, and gave an economic and strategic boost to the newly established German state through the annexation of France’s territories of Alsace and Lorrain (Czapinski, 1990: 526-530). The Germans tried to justify this move with their historical rights to the provinces. Thus, the nationalist tenets of ethnographically and archaeologically motivated political claims entered the repertoire of legitimate tools with which loyal diplomats of their own nation-states endeavored to re-create, but truly-speaking, to invent their states in such a way that they would be congruent with their corresponding ethnic groups or would-be nations (Krzemiński, 1996: 66). Furthermore, the political instruments have proved also to be useful in single-minded pursues of greater nation-states such as, for instance, Greater Germany, Greater Poland, Greater Serbia, etc.

This appropriation of history by the ideology of nationalism has not omitted Silesia since its past can give a wealth of evidence to nationalist politicians and historians from Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, as well as from Austria, Hungary and Slovakia in order to enable them to claim this land as solely their nation-state’s.

Comprehensibly, because nationalism wishes an ideal union between a territory and its population, the oldest efforts of Polish, Czech and German historians were aimed at proving that the first inhabitants of Silesia were Slavs or Germans respectively. In consequence, the archeological cultures which happened to occur in Silesia, were ascribed with a desired ethnic provenance which would conform with a political need rather than with historical facts which till nowadays, hardly ever allow us to attach an exact ethnic label to a population group about which we have no written documents at our disposal. However, it is a tricky task even when such documents are available since their authors: travelers, monks or Roman imperial historians often cooked up their descriptions using secondand often third-hand materials, had a very cursory and simplistic knowledge of the people and the land they were passing through having no command of local languages, or, as in the case of church servants, they engineered their reports of a given reality in such a way as to make a land seem more attractive for prospective Christianization.

Following this line of thought, German scholars used all kinds of specious arguments to convince the public at large that Silesia is ein urgermanisches Land, i.e. a Germanic land from times immemorial (Sommer, 1908: 3). Slavic scholars replied in kind claiming that Silesia was part of the ancestral homeland of all the Slavs (Davies: I 39-41). They moved even to identifying the archeological Lusatian culture (which also comprised the territory of Silesia) with a western branch of the Slavs whom, in turn, they also identified with the people of Weneds known from written sources which originated in late Antiquity (Zak, 1976: 39, 42/43, 49, 53; & Anon, 1987: 672). Having established the link Polish historians identified the Weneds Slavs with later archeological cultures creating an illusion of unbroken territorial continuum of Slavdom till the creation of the medieval states of Bohemia and Poland (Zak, 1976: 58-77; Zak, 1976a: 78-87). This fact is reinforced among the contemporary Polish and Czech society with the deceptively self-explanatory proof of Lusatia. Although the land is in Germany, a significant part of its population is formed by the western Slavic
Sorbs. However, rarely does anybody remember or emphasize that it was contemporary Lusatia that gave its name to the aforementioned archeological culture which cannot prove that the people whose material artifacts are described as the Lusatian culture, were Slavs.

Another curious exemplar of nationalistically motivated historiography is visible in the German discussion on the incursions of the Indo-Europeans from Asia to Europe in the Fourth and Third Millennia BC. German scholars preferred to dub them as the Indo-Germans (Kleemann, 1983: 40), thus, implicating that the people or peoples, being insofar undifferentiated, had among themselves a fully-formed Germanic population segment, who immediately after having settled in Europe could be known as the archaic Germans. The example is not immediately connected to the historiographic battle over Silesia but served a many German academic as a springboard to put forward theories which proved that Germanic peoples had continuously populated Silesia at least from the dawn of the Indo-Europeans in Europe till the time of Völkerwanderung, the Barbarian Migrations (Sommer, 1908: 3/4).

This nationalistic struggle also includes etymology of the very name of the region. German philologists claim that it is derived from a Vandal tribe, the Silings, which inhabited the fertile plain south of Wrocław (Breslau, Vratislav) from the Second through Fourth century A.D. (Vetter, 1992: 15; Birke, 1968: 5). Their Polish polemicians maintain it stems from the Slavic tribe of lanians who settled in the same area at a later stage; all linguistic connections of the name Silings to the ethnonym are refuted and its origin is attributed to the Slavic root l,g which means wetness, wateriness (Anon., 1991: 140; Vetter, 1992: 15).

The three nation-states most involved in the ideological struggle over Silesia, i.e. Poland, Germany and the Czech Republic, after 1918 started founding research institutes which were to provide respective governments with scholarly support to their claims to Silesia or to parts of the land’s territory (as in the case of the Czechs). The academic strife smacking of Swift’s Battle of the Books intensified following the changes brought about the end of World War II, when the German ownership of Silesia had been transferred into the Polish hands leaving Germany with just a tiny westernmost tip of the land, and on the other hand, not satisfying the Czech claims to some southern parts of Silesia.

This postwar abuse of historiography in the name of nationalism was carried out by the Slezský ústav (Silesian Institute), Opava (Troppau) in Czechoslovakia; the Instytut Śląski (Silesian Institute), Opole (Oppeln) in Poland, and in the FRG, by the Landsmannschaft Schlesien (Homeland Organization of the Silesians), Bonn; the Stiftung Haus Oberschlesien (Foundation of the Upper Silesian House), Ratingen; the Stiftung Kulturwerk Schlesien (Foundation for Contributions to Silesian Culture), Würzburg; the Gerhard-Möbus-Institut für Schlesienforschung (Gerhard Möbus Institute for Silesian Studies), Würzburg; the Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen (Cultural Foundation of the German Expellees), Bonn and many others. The Czech and Polish institutions were financed by their respective states, and, being linked by the Soviet overlordship, were together to counter even the smallest remarks which presented the German past of Silesia. Especially, in the case of Poland this ad nauseam continued production of publications proving primordial Polishness of Silesia served the very raison d’être of the state which had been shifted by the Allies 300 km westward rather irrespectively of any linguistic, historic or cultural in order to quench Stalin’s thirst for new territories in Europe. Regarding Germany, its Silesian institutions were established mainly by political organizations of Germans who had to leave or were expelled from Silesia after World War II, without much state support for the FRG owing its existence to the western Allies had to concentrate on building an economy which would meet the needs of the rapidly crowded German population rather than to challenge the postwar status quo.

Researchers in the centers, and their publications usually made use only of periodicals and books on Silesia which were brought out in their respective nation-states, and nation languages. So the three contending Silesian historiographies fell into the pit of intellectual solipsism. The state of affairs...
pleased all the three nationalisms as they managed to turn scholars into passive tools of ideology, which was made even easier by the lack of regular exchange of publications between Germany, and Poland and Czechoslovakia; and by the fact that the vast majority of academics dealing in matters Silesian had no or limited command of languages used by their adversaries. However, if a scholar happened to know a language of a neighbor state contending for Silesia, and to possess some books published across the border, he used such sources just to support statements favorable for his respective nationalism, and to discredit his scholarly enemies and their work. This aim was most often achieved through quotations taken out of their proper contexts, intended mistranslations or ridiculing invectives, e.g. nationalistic German science (Lis, 1993: 15) (which implied, to the Polish reader, that Polish science must be objective and the only true one).

First, the situation started changing in the FRG with the rapid economic and political improvements in the 1970s and because the German centers of Silesian studies did not have to be subservient to any state ideology unlike those in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the two latter countries researchers specializing in Silesian studies went on with their nationalist production till 1989 when the fall of communism deprived the institutes of state subsidies and control. Many researchers deprived of perks and any clearly delineated modus operandi quit looking for better paid jobs. Some continued to do their research even in a more nationalist vein which since then has not been able to be checked by the tenets of internationalism previously imposed by the Soviet Union. Another group of scholars decided to do away with historiography’s subservience to ideology as unworthy of true historians. Hence, nowadays, these specialists in matters Silesian strive to approach Silesia in an objective, descriptive way, as any other object of research. It is clearly visible in recent publications on Silesian historiography and its new methods (Bieniasz, 1992; Bach, 1995; Bobowski, 1990; Conrads, 1994; & Trierenberg, 1991).

Having presented the pervasive Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century clash over the past of Silesia between the ideal of scholarly objectivity and goals of the ideology of nationalism, it is clear that one must be circumspect while attempting an objective synopsis of history of Silesia not to base it solely and uncritically on works belonging to one national historiography. Ideally, one should acquire knowledge of Latin, German, Polish and Czech in order to conduct one’s research in Silesian history relying on original documents and source texts. Such a titanic task, however, would take decades, nay, lifetimes of generations of historians so the author decided to use Polish, Czech and German materials together completed with relevant publications available in English, striving for objectivity and impartiality the values for the case of which the author actually decided to embark on writing this work.

Silesia extends over an area of approximately 380 by 120 kilometers in a northwesterly-southeasterly direction along the fertile valley of upper and middle Odra (Oder) River. Its area roughly coincides with the southern part of the Odra’s (Oder) drainage basin delimited by its right tributaries: the Lubina, Ostravice (Ostrau, Ostrawica), Olśa (Olsa, Olza), Rudna (Rautdener Wasser), Bierawka (Birawka), Klodnica (Klodnitz), Malapanew (Malapane), Stobrawa (Stober), Widawa (Wiede) and Barycz (Bartsch), and the left ones: the Opava (Oppau, Opawa), Troja, Psina (Goldener AderCzinna Bach), Osobloga (Hotzenplotz), Nysa Klodzka (Glatzer Neiße), Olawa (Ohle), Sleza (Lohe), Bystrzyca (Weistritz), Kaczawa (Katzbach) and Bóbr (Bober) with Kwisa (Queis).

Lower Silesia occupies rolling Silesian Lowland which in Upper Silesia changes into Silesian Upland. The former is overlooked by the mountain of Sleza (Zobtenberg, 718 m) with the remnants of a site of supposedly pagan rituals, and the latter by Góra Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg, 400 m) with its Baroque St. Ann Church and Franciscan Monastery encircled by stations of the Cross. The mountains are considered to be the centers of spiritual life of the two respective subregions of Silesia, especially in the case of Góra Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg) that still attracts numerous pilgrimages of devout Catholic Upper Silesians, as well as, Polish and German nationalists because it is the place where the most ferocious battle over national ownership of Silesia was waged between the Poles and the Germans in 1921.
Silesia has almost no natural borders which sometimes allowed extensive territorial changes at its edges. In the north-west it converges on German Plain, in the east on the almost flat drainage basins of the Prosná and the Obra, while in the south-east Silesian Upland merges with the Beskids. The Sudets, which are located roughly parallel south to the Oder, can be considered as a natural frontier but only in the belt of the Iizerskie Mountains (Isergebirge) and the Karłosce Mountains (Riesengebirge, Karłosce), because in other places the mountains are cut with easily accessible passes as, for instance, those ones leading to the Klodzko (Glatz, Kladsko) Syncline which apart from being an interesting rock formation is also a historically, culturally and politically distinctive part of Silesia. Furthermore, the wide gap between the Sudets and the Beskids, known as the Moravian Gate, has always been invitingly open to any incursions which may come to Silesia from the south. The overall geographical situation, so typical for many other regions in Central and East Europe, resulted in fluctuations of the territory of Silesia through the ages but the changes has never seriously truncated the main body of the region having been limited to the peripheries.

The climate is cold in the Sudets and the Beskids but Lower Silesia is the warmest part of contemporary Poland and prior to World War II there were vineyards in the vicinity of Zielona Góra (Grünberg). On the other hand, Upper Silesia is rather colder and winter lasts there longer. It was one of the coldest places of prewar Germany.

Human settlement in Silesia dates back to the early Paleolithic Age (230,000-100,000 BC). The second oldest human settlement on the territory of contemporary Poland was found in Konradowka (Konradswalde) in Lower Silesia (Czapliński, 1993: 1; Zak, 1976: 14/15). Later Silesian findings of human remains (especially frequent in southern Upper Silesia) cover the period between 100,000-8,000 BC and constitute c. 50% of similar findings in Poland which indicates that the region between the upper Odra (Oder) and upper Vistula was the northern limit of human wanderings in this region of Europe at the time of the last glaciation (Czapliński, 1993: 1; Wolski, 1992: 1/2).

In the Mesolithic and Neolithic Silesia found itself under the influence of a succession of the so-called archeological cultures whose ethnic provenance cannot be clearly determined, thus, the populations who created the artifacts which gave names to the cultures (e.g. Linear Pottery or Cord-impressed ware cultures) are dubbed as indigenous or the first inhabitants of Europe (Kinder, 1978: 14/15). During the seventh, sixth and fifth millennia BC the farmers of southeastern Europe evolved a unique cultural pattern, contemporary with similar developments in the Fertile Crescent, i.e. Anatolia, Mesopotamia, Syro-Palestine and Egypt. In contemporary archeology it is known under the designation of Civilization of Old Europe. Undoubtedly, its northwestern extent reached southern Silesia (Gimbutas, 1982: 17).

The dawn of Europe as we know it must be associated with the long-lasting onslaught of the Indo-European groups from Asia. Almost all the modern Europeans may date back their lineage to them with the exception of the Basques. The first wave of steppe pastoralists infiltrated Europe c. 4400-4300 BC causing disruption of the Civilization of Old Europe. Its northwestern group known as the Lengyel Culture seems to have tried to escape these pressures and moved across the Sudets and the Beskids into the region between the upper Odra (Oder) and upper Vistula in 3900-3800 BC (Gimbutas, 1977: 277 & 311; Zak, 1976: 25). The most significant Polish site with Lengyel artifacts was uncovered in Jordanów (Jordansmühl) in Lower Silesia (Gimbutas, 1989: 341/342). This populational movement did transform the Funnel Necked Beaker Culture which was prevalent on the northern side of the Sudets and the Carpathians. It evolved into the Globular Amphora Culture which at c. 3000 BC extended from Ukraine to Denmark (Gimbutas, 1977: 302/303 & 331). With the two subsequent thrusts of the Indo-Europeans (3400-3200 BC and 3000-2800 BC), they genetically merged with the indigenous European population but introduced their own way of life which finally suppressed the significantly different Civilization of Old Europe (Gimbutas, 1977: 278 & 283). This gradual change is identified with the Unetice Culture which, from Bohemia across the Sudets, brought the technology of bronze smelting to Silesia at c. 1800-1700 BC (Zak, 1976: 35/36; Kinder, 1978: 18/19). The Silesian population of that time is identified by some Polish scholars
with the Weneds (Zak, 1976: 36) and as such with the Slavs (cf. above) which is quite unsubstantiated as in the case of the succeeding Lusatian Culture which was not Slavic (Davies, 1991 I: 41).

Leaving aside the projections of the present-day ideology of nationalism on the prehistoric past, one can observe that in the 7th-6th cc. BC, through the Moravian Gate the Hallstatt group arrived to Silesia and southern Great Poland bringing along the technology of iron smelting which had originated in the region east of the Alps (Kinder, 1978: 20; Zak, 1976: 48). In the middle of the First Millennium BC predatory nomads, the Scythians invaded Silesia from the south using the very same gaping opening between the Sudets and the Beskids. At Witaszkowo (Vettersfelde, Sorb. Wětškow), Lower Silesia, a dead Scythian chieftain was buried with all his treasure (Kinder, 1978: 20; Zak, 1976: 57). The Celts took the Moravian Gate as well as passes across the Sudets to infiltrate southern Silesia in 3rd–4th cc. (Czapliński, 1993: 2).

Some German scholars intended to place early Germans (Frühgermanen) in Silesia immediately after the Celtic period or even during it (Kleemann, 1983: 61/62). However, it is a tricky task to try to match archeological remains with specific ethnic groups without any support in the form of written sources. The very first information on the basis of which one may use to infer a Germanic presence in Silesia at the turn of the 1st c. BC and 1st c. AD is Strabo’s Geographica where he mentioned the Lugii who occupied the territories of Lusatia, Silesia and maybe even the Vistula valley (Strzelaćzyk, 1992: 24/25; Wolski, 1993: 5). The information was confirmed and made more detailed by Ptolemy in his Geographica. The Nahanaarvals, a tribal group of the Lugii had its cult center in Silesia, and most probably it was placed on Sleza (Zobtenberg) (Strzelaćzyk, 1992: 26-28) which some authors believe that had also been home to a holy grove of druidic rites during the Celtic time (Korta, 1988: 78). Furthermore, it may be tentatively determined that the Przeworsk Culture should be identified with the Germanic people of the Vandals, whose subgroup the Silings lived in Silesia and most probably gave its current name to Silesia in spite of some reservations raised by Polish academics (Strzelaćzyk, 1992: 55, 59, 60). The presence of the Silings is at best attested by the three rich graves which were excavated in Zakrzów (Sackrau, today part of Wrocław, Breslau) (Strzelaćzyk, 1992: 76/77, Czapliński, 1993: 2). It is worthwhile mentioning that in the Romanian period the Amber Trail led through Silesia (Czapliński, 1993: 2; Zak, 1976: 60) which must have enriched its inhabitants of that time, as well as, exposed them to the Roman culture which soon was to become the attraction for prospective invaders.

In 375 the Huns destroyed the Ostrogoth Kingdom on the Black Sea thus the opening the period of the Völkerwanderung, Barbarian Migrations. The retreat of the Ostrogoths and the westward advance of the Huns probably contributed to triggering off the process in Europe (Kinder, 1978: 112-115; Mcevedy , 1992: 10-15). The Vandals (i.e. also the Silings) left their settlements in Silesia and Lusatia, and together with other Germanic peoples crossed the Rhine on 31st December 406 (Strzelaćzyk, 1992: 806). Consequently, the land was largely vacated or, at least deprived of any controlling force capable of taking it into possession and defending it. Perhaps an upper hand was gained here by the Huns who reached the peak of their power in the reign of Atilla. After the Huns the Avars rose to supremacy in Central Europe but they lost control of their tributary lands (probably also Silesia) north of the Carpathians after their failure at the gates of Constantinople in 626 (Davies, 1991 I: 46; Mcevedy , 1992: 26/27).

From that point onwards, the expansion of the Slavic peoples could proceed without serious hinderance but they might be moving in Silesia in the period when the Hunnic Empire ebbed under the crippling force of the Ostrogoths and the Avars had not managed to extend their realm to its maximum limit yet. It is also propounded that the Slavs might be coming into Silesia as partner troops of the Huns (Kinder, 1978: 111). Anyway the rich ethnic mix which was established by

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2 This fragment on the presence of the Silings, which has been so strongly contested by Polish historians, is based on the work by Prof Jerzy Strzelaćzyk. He is a renowned Polish medievalist who seems to have got disentangled from the paradigm of nationalist historiography and now reconstructs the past using facts not wishes as guidelines.
Völkerwanderung does not allow one to speak about those times with any certainty to which the modern man is given intoxicated by the illusion of supposedly tangibly existence of the borders delimiting European nation-states.

Considering the slow emergence of the Slavs at the political stage of post-Roman Europe it may be inferred that they were included in the sphere of influence of Samo’s Realm which lasted from c. 624 to 659 with its center in Moravia (Krejci, 1990: 213; Magocsi, 1993: 9) and might control southern Silesia (Kleemann, 1983: 89; Wolski, 1992: 30/31). The lost momentum of the first Slavic state was regained in the Ninth century by the Great Moravian State which also comprised Silesia (Magocsi, 1993: 11; Wachowski, 1991) with its Slavic tribes of the Dedosizes (Dziadoszanie), Trebowans (Trzebowianie), Opolans (Opolanie), Golensizes (Golszyce), Slenzans (lanie) and Bobrans (Bobrzanie) (Czapliski, 1993: 35) whose names were recorded by a Frankish monk, the so-called Bavarian Geographer, in the middle of the Ninth century (Samsonowicz, 1995: 19; Vetter, 1992: 15).

The Great Moravian State fell victim to the assault of the Magyars in c. 907 and the center of political gravity shifted to Bohemia³. Vratislav I (ruled 912-921) and his heirs united Bohemia and Moravia, and started bringing parts of Silesia under the Czech rule (Britannica: 915; Vaníček, 1993: 34/35 & 40). At the well situated Odra (Oder) ford he might establish a fortified border settlement which was named after him as Vratislavia and in future was destined to become the Silesian capital (Vratislav, Breslau, Wrocaw) (Deus, 1977: 39).

The first Christianizing efforts in Silesia are connected to the missionary work of Cyril and Methodius in the Great Moravian State (Kopiec, 1991: 15). Their achievements were frustrated by the destruction of the realm and were probably renewed after establishment of the Prague and Olomouc (Olmütz) bishoprics in 973⁴ (Tyszkiewicz, 1991: 139). The Bohemian clergy seem not to have attempted broadening of the Church administration into the land which might be thwarted by the rivalry between the House of Přemysl and the House of Slavniks (Vaníček, 1993: 38). However, it was Bohemia where Polanian prince Mieszko I (ruled c. 960-992) was converted to Christianity in 966. The fact is documented by a plethora of Czech loan words in Polish Church terminology (Davies, 1991: I 69). Moreover, the first historically acknowledged ruler of Poland was accepted into the circle of European dynasties through his marriage with Dubravka daughter of Bohemian prince Boleslav I (ruled 929-967). This tight bond between Poland and Bohemia was fortified through the missionary efforts of exiled Prague Bishop Vojtěch (Adalbert) in Poland and among the heathen Prussians on the shores of the Baltic where he suffered a martyr’s death (Britannica: 915) in consequence becoming one of the most important Polish and Czech saints. Later on the Bohemian missionary clergy in Poland was followed by Czech influences in other spheres, and it was from Prague that the Polish rulers learned the subtleties of the German association, Bohemia having become an invested electoral kingdom of the Empire in 1041 (Davies, 1991: I 85 & Kinder, 1974: I 146). Hence some historians have stressed that at this stage the Poles and Czechs should not be seen as separate peoples as in the first half of the Eleventh century there was a real chance that a united West Slavonic state might have been permanently established under Czech or Polish leadership (Davies, 1991: I 85).

³ The Czechs brought much of Bohemia under under their control before 800. Although they could not effectively defeat the tribes in the east and northeast, and, on the other hand, succumbed to the overwhelming military power of Charlemagne in 805 their domain was not exposed to war and devastation (Britannica: 914) but was gradually incorporated in Great Moravia beginning with the rule of Rostislav (846-870) until it became an integral part of the state under his son Svatopluk (Vaníček, 1993: 28-30).
⁴ The Prague bishopric was subordinated to the Archbishop of Mainz (Britannica: 915), thus continuing the tradition of initially lose dependence links with the Germanic states which had started in about 796 when Charlemagne rewarded the Moravians for their help in the destruction of the Avar Empire by giving them a part of it, which they had held as a fief from him (Britannica: 914). These influences were not to the liking of Great Moravian rulers when they built a strong state of their own, and consequently they decided to loosen the ties by accepting Christianity from Byzantium in the Slavonic rite (Vaníček, 1993: 28/29)
Silesia as a transitory land between Poland and Bohemia stayed in the Czech sphere of influence till 989/990 when it was seized by Mieszko I who expanded its Polanian state concentrated in Wielkopolska southward also to include the Vistulian land around Cracow (Davies, 1991: I 85 & Tyszkiewicz, 1991: 152). He was helped in this scheme by the power struggle between the Slavniks and Přemyslids in Bohemia. Although in 995 Boleslav II (ruled 972-999) moved against the Slavniks and broke their power he could not attempt to take Silesia and Malopolska back his state having been weakened by the prolonged rivalry and facing increasing German influence (Britannica: 915). Meager chances of regaining Silesia diminished after the death of Boleslav II as struggles among his descendants plagued the country for thirty years and even more reduced its power (Randt, 1983: 101; Britannica: 915).

In the context of those volatile years Silesia was not mentioned in written documents. However, it is surmised on the basis of the hagiographies devoted to St Vojtěch (Adalbert) that in 983 the would-be Saint delivered a sermon in the Upper Silesian city of Opole (Oppeln) (Pater, 1992: 54). In 1000 there was the meeting between Otto III and Mieszko’s successor Boleslaw Chrobry held at Gniezno where the idealistic Emperor invited the Polanian prince to take a part in the former’s brief dream of *Renovatio Imperii*. The ambitious effort did not bring any fruit especially due to the premature death of Otto III in 1003 and the subsequent wars between the new Emperor Henry II and the Polanian Prince (Davies, 1991: I 82). However, in 1000 Emperor Otto III founded the archbishopric in Gniezno, Poland, and also the Vratislavia (Vratislav, Wrocław, Breslau), Kolobrzeg (Colberg) and Cracow bishoprics initiating the Polish ecclesiastical structure which would last largely unchanged through the Middle Ages (Pater, 1992: 54). It was the beginning of stable and rather clearly circumscribed Polish ownership of Silesia.

The land was the main theater of Polish-German wars after the death of Otto III and allowed Boleslaw Chrobry to shortly dominate Lusatia, Miško (would-be part of Meissen) and even Moravia. Silesia also served him as the launching pad for his 1002 invasion of Bohemia and Prague. This Polish ruler who gained the title of king in the year of his death (1025) did overstrain the power of his young state with constant warfare and another invasion against Kiev, hence in effect the Polish boundaries did recede after his death (Czapliński, 1993: 4; Miškiewicz, 1976: 104/105 & Randt, 1983: 104), whereas in 1033 his heir Mieszko II (ruled 1025-1034) had to submit to Emperor Conrad II, and turned Poland into an imperial fief (Davies, 1991: I 71). After Mieszko II’s demise his son was too young to start ruling which gave an impetus to the heathen uprising of 1037-1038. This disadvantageous commotion in Central European relations coupled with the death of Conrad II in 1039 encouraged Bohemian Prince Břetislav I (ruled 1034-1055) in his efforts to rebuild the Czech state as it had been during the times of Boleslav II (ruled 972-999). After having regained part of Moravia in 1039 he embarked on his highly successful invasion against Poland during which he won dominance over Silesia. Although the Czechs often sided with the Empire during its wars with Poland, Břetislav I’s incursion against another imperial vassal during the interregnum in the Empire and a danger to continued existence of Christianity in Poland incurred the indignation of Emperor Henry III (ruled 1039-1056) who forced his Czech vassal to evacuate the conquered territory. So in 1050 Poland regained Silesia though according to the 1054 Quedlinburg Treaty had to pay the Czechs an annual tribute of the land Randt, 1983: 104/105). However, the land of the would-be principalities of Opava (Troppau, Opawa) and Krmov (Jägerndorf, Karniów) which had been taken by Břetislav I before 1038 did remain with Bohemia and in 1229 were included in the Olomouc (Olmutz) bishopric (Orzechowski, 1971: 59).

The Bohemian-Polish conflict flared up anew at the close of Kazimierz I’s reign and at the beginning of the rule of his heir Boleslaw II the Bold (ruled 1058-1079) as strengthened Poland refused to pay the tribute of Silesia. The strife was finished in 1062 with the marriage of Bohemian King Vratislav II (ruled 1061-1092) with Boleslaw II’s daughter. The war was renewed in 1070 with

\[5\] In the same year Polish King Kazimierz I the Restorer (ruled 1034-1058) restored the Vratislav (Breslau, Wrocław) bishopric which had ceased to function after the Bohemian invasion (Cetwiński, 1992: 9).
the Polish-Bohemian struggle for the dominance over Lusatia, and additionally complicated by the uprising of German princes against Emperor Henry IV (ruled 1056-1105) and the investiture confrontation of the Emperor with the Pope. The Poles sided with the Pope and while Henry IV was distracted Boleslw II was crowned by the Pope in 1076. In turn the Emperor vested Vratislav II with the title of the King of Bohemia and Poland in 1085 and in 1986 re-joined the westernmost part of Silesia and the areas north-west of Vratislavia (Breslau, Wroclaw) with the Prague bishopric (Ćetwiński, 1992; 9; Randt, 1983: 105 & Vaniček, 1993a: 51).

Deposed Boleslaw II was followed by his brother Władysław I Herman (ruled 1079-1092) who sought rapprochement with the Empire and married Henry IV’s sister in 1088. He stopped paying the Silesian tribute in 1092 when the succession troubles engulfed Bohemia after the death of Vratislav II in the same year. However, Bretislaw II (ruled 1092-1100) successfully assumed power in Bohemia and dynamically warred against Władysław who had to pay all the tribute and to submit to the Emperor then. What is the more, the Czechs and Vratislaw (Wroclaw, Breslau) magnates supported Zbigniew in his rebellion against his father Władysław II so that the latter had to relinquish Silesia to his son. Afterwards Zbigniew chose to continue questioning his father’s sovereignty making Władysław I to transfer dominance over Silesia to his brother Boleslaw who was a predatory warrior and after their father’s death fought against and deposed his elderly brother Zbigniew (ruled 1102-1107), despite the Emperor’s support, to become the sole ruler of Poland known as Bolesław III Wrymouth (ruled 1102-1138) (Ćetwiński, 1992: 9/10; Davies, 1991: I 71-72 & Lis, 1993: 19/20).

Bolesław III stopped paying the tribute again which triggered off the long Bohemian-Polish war (1102-1115). In 1108 he seized Silesia finally ousting Zbigniew which gave Emperor Henry V (ruled 1105-1125) the pretext to attack Poland in 1109. He was successfully repulsed but intermittent strife with Bohemia continued and were terminated only with the Kłodzko (Glatz, Klodzko) Peace Treaty in 1137 which reaffirmed the status quo, i.e. Bohemia’s ownership of the Kłodzko (Glatz, Klodzko), Křnov (Jägerndorf, Karniów) and Opawa (Troppau, Opawa) lands. The Kłodzko land was encompassed by the Prague bishopric and the Olomouc (Olmütz) bishopric renewed in 1063 claimed the other lands thus finishing the process of approximation of Bohemia’s territorial expanse with its ecclesiastical structure (Hosnedl, 1989: 339; Lis, 1993: 20 & Randt, 1983: 108).

The conflict over Silesia between Bohemia and Poland with sometimes active participation of the Empire lasted for a century and a half. The fairly detailed presentation of this issue serves to show that this land though quite rich and significant, since its very emergence in history continued to be a border area open to contentious claims, and a temporary prize to a state which proved to be hegemonic as compared to its neighbors in a given period of time. Besides, comprehension of the multifaceted struggle contextualized against the background of volatile politics of the Empire, Poland and Bohemia is vital as the base for lucid display of subsequent changes in ownership of Silesia.

In 1138 after the demise of Bolesław III, Poland was divided among his four sons, and thus the system of principate was initiated. The eldest son Władysław II the Exile (ruled 1138-1146) inherited Małopolska (Little Poland) with the throne in Cracow, and Silesia and was to rule Poland as the

Principus. In 1146 because of contentions with his brothers he had to escape with his family to Germany where he stayed at the court of his brother-in-law Emperor Conrad III of Hohenstaufen (ruled 1138-1152) in Thuringia where he died in 1159. In the very year of Władysław II’s deposition Conrad III led an unsuccessful expedition to endorse the former to the Piast principate. Conrad III’s successor Frederick Barbarossa (ruled 1152-1190) repeated the exercise with the same result as he had to retreat from Poland in order to secure the interests of the Empire in Italy. After the end of the

6 Also the Hungarians supported the Papacy against the Emperor which indicates the emergence of significant dichotomy between Hungary and Poland in contrast to Bohemia. The Czechs began to be firmly drawn into the structure of the Empire whereas Poland and Hungary opted to stay out with the aid of the loose link with the Pope. Poland had already started this policy in 991 when Mieszko I in the Dagome Iudex asked that his realm be placed under the direct protection of the Pope, presumably to avoid the closer patronage of of one or other of his Christian neighbors (Davies, 1991: I 67 & Sansonowicz, 1995: 36).
Italian war (1158-1162) he could pressure Poland’s Boleslav IV the Curly (ruled 1146-1173) more effectively and the two sons of Wladyslaw II, thanks to the agreement with their father’s brothers were reinstated in their Silesian inheritance in 1163. Thereafter, Silesia was regarded in Germany as an imperial fief and as other Polish principalities was obliged to pay tribute to the Empire. On the other hand, the post-1146 status quo continued as Boleslaw IV retained his title of the Polish Principus (Davies, 1991: I 83, Lis, 1993: 20/21 & Randt, 1983: 111-113).

In 1169 Wladyslaw II’s sons divided Silesia. The elder Boleslaw I the Tall received the western part of this province, which was to become Lower Silesia, and Mieszko the Teschen-Ratibor (Cieszyn-Racibórz) Principality which roughly coincided with the area of would-be Upper Silesia. Thus, the very important regional division of Silesia was introduced and has shaped its history till nowadays (Orzechowski, 1971a: 85). The fragmentation of Silesia deepened after 1177 when the struggle over the Cracow throne flared up between brothers Mieszko III the Elder (ruled 1173-1177) and Kazimierz II the Just (ruled 1177-1194). The strife was reflected in Silesia through the rebellion of Boleslaw the Tall’s son Jaroslaw and brother Conrad against him. Hence, Conrad received the western half of Lower Silesia whereas Jaroslaw was granted the would be Opole (Oppeln) Principality (Gasiorowski, 1976: 183 & Orzechowski, 1971a: 85/86). Moreover, in 1179 Silesia’s Mieszko broadened his realm thanks to Kazimierz II’s gift of Malopolska lands of Bytom (Beuthen), Siewierz (Sewerin), Chrzanow and OŚwiecim (Auschwitz) (Orzechowski, 1971: 59).

The system of principate crumbled down at the close of the Twelfth century which brought about further decentralization of state power in Poland and concomitant political fragmentation (Gasiorowski, 1976: 145). The process was temporarily reverted in Silesia after 1202 when Henry I the Bearded began to dominate almost the whole of Silesia (Orzechowski, 1971a: 86/87). This strong economic base and weakness of other Polish principalities allowed him to lay claim to the principate. Thus Henry (ruled 1228/29 & 1232-1238) ascended the throne in Cracow and managed to unite Wielkopolska and Malopolska under his rule (Czapliński, 1993: 8 & Pogonowski, 1993: 71). Silesia attained the peak of its prosperity in the Polish state.

Here I have to interrupt the narration of the past of Silesia in order to scrutinize the phenomenon of colonization which is so frequently misused by nationalistic ideologies under the highly symbolic name of Drang nach Osten (yearning for the East). The label having been in use since the 1860s (Lemberg, 1992: 23) evokes in minds of Slavic inhabitants of Central Europe clear associations of the medieval and later waves of West European settlers with German colonialism directed to achieve cultural and physical assimilation of Slavic peoples. This meaning was worked out through the Panslavic reading or rather distorting of history in order to prove that this socio-economic process was a planned millennium-long German aggression (Marvey, 1943). In the epoch of intensified nation-building after the disintegration of Austro-Hungary and the defeat of Germany in 1918 this misconception was instilled in respective citizenries of newly-established Slavic states in Central Europe. The legend of Drang nach Osten was deftly utilized by the wartime propaganda. The Allies used it for rationalizing the aggressive behavior of the Germans who sought to broaden their Lebensraum (living space) eastward, whereas German politicians clothed the medieval process of settlement in the glorious garment of the German mission which had been and still was to civilize the barbaric East. Unfortunately, the propaganda usage of the notion continued to be imparted at schools in communist Central Europe, and was one of instruments serving to maintain the feeling of enmity towards the Germans. Yet after the fall of communism in 1989 the legacy has haunted the German-Slavic relations at the popular plane.

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7 Drang nach Osten, originally meaning yearning for the East, has also come to mean expansion, a push towards the East, with the sense of breaking out of a restricted area into a place where there will be more space and freedom, or Lebensraum (living space) (Bugge, 1995: 93). This semantic change was brought about in the acrimonious discourse of the ideologies of the German and Slavic nationalisms which became the barbaric other for each other, thus reinforcing the dividing line between Germandom and Slavdom, and, in result, creating a possibility of conquest and being conquered across the imagined border of ethnicity, language and culture.
Leaving aside the propaganda considerations population shifts and waves of settlers are as old as known European history. Initially during Völkerwanderung the Indo-Europeans moved westward, from Asia to Europe. Afterwards various peoples decided to travel in different directions inside Europe. For instance, the Goths went southward from their Scandinavian home. Then they continued into the region of today’s southern Russia before they were ejected westward until their established their kingdoms in the Iberian Peninsula. Or the Vandals after a longish trip first southward, westward, southward and eastward they settled down in North Africa (Mcevedy, 1992: 11-31; Strzelczyk 1984 & Strzelczyk, 1992).

The medieval and later German colonization in the East cannot be analyzed separately from the overall development of the European continent. Usually setting out of settlers must be preceded by a relative overpopulation of an area which deprives the young and ambitious of career paths which were available to their parents, and makes them to emigrate. In Western Europe this phenomenon took place in 8th and 9th centuries, and was repeated on a larger scale from the turn of 10th and 11th to 14th c. In the latter period (which is more relevant for Silesian history) the first settlers stemmed from Catalonia in the middle of 10th century and were succeeded by some more from Flanders. The first significant wave of settlers came out of France. They settled first in Spain and then turned eastward (Moraw, 1994: 91-93).

Similar developments could be observed in Central and Eastern Europe. Already in 7th and 8th centuries, when the Kievan state was established, East Slavic settlers went north-eastward colonizing the current heartland of Russia, centered around Moscow (Halecki, 1994: 115). Moreover, when relative overpopulation began to pop up in Central and Eastern Europe the Poles expanded into the Ukraine in 16th and 17th centuries (Davies, 1991 I: xxxi) whereas the Russians across the Urals into Siberia and farther on to the Pacific shores. It seems that the retreat of the Russians started only after 1991 when there had been no Soviet Union left to support and finance the venture. And coming back to earlier times one should not forget the westward push of the Mongols and other Turkic peoples into Europe in 13th century or the 15th and 16th centuries northward drive of the Turks after the fall of the Constantinople which had sent a considerable wave of refugees to Italy (Kinder, 1978: Vol. I).

Following the indispensable overview of settling processes in Europe I will have a look at the preconditions of largely Germanic settlement in Silesia. In Central Europe not only were the prospective colonizers interested in colonization but also local rulers (e.g. German march lords) who wished to populate their empty lands, and princes of Bohemia, Poland and Hungary who strove to reform the economies of their realms through attracting settlers with developed Western European technological know-how, in order to increase their revenues. Also an element of ecclesiastical propaganda could be seen among the activities. In 1108 the Magdeburg Archbishop appealed for colonization of the pagan lands in the East which according to him was doubly beneficial because Saxon, Frankish, Lorrain and Flemish settlers would save their souls through securing the territories for Christianity and would be able to start farming on newly acquired fertile lands (Samsonowicz, 1995: 44).

Considering Silesia, the sons of Wladyslaw II spent their youth in Germany which must have firmly set them in the sphere of Western civilization. Since that time the majority of Silesian rulers had married German princesses (Neubach, 1992: 3) and German became the language of the Silesian courts8 which spread the cultural influence among the nobility. The return of Wladyslaw II’s sons opened a significant chapter in Silesian history which was to add to the Polish-Czech/Moravian biculturality of Silesia the German element. In 1163 they brought along Cistercian monks from Thuringia, who founded their famous monastery in Leubus (Lubi) near Liegnitz (Legnica) in 1175, as well as German knights and courtiers. The Westernizing efforts were fostered by the monks. Their monastery became the center of cultural and monastic life, which branched out with new monasteries

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8 Henry IV Probus (ruled in Silesia 1266-1290 and as the Polish Principus 1288-1290), grandson of Henry II the Pious (ruled 1238-1241), is considered to be a notable minnesinger of German literature under the name of Heinrich von Pressela (Schulz, 1991: 2).
in Silesia and Malopolska. The monks most probably invited the first colonists who came from Flanders (Birke, 1968: 5/6; Lis, 1993: 27 & Menzel, 1977: 277/278). The colonization gained momentum in Silesia during the reign of Boleslaw the Tall’s son Henry I the Bearded (1201-1238) and his Bavarian wife St. Hedwig (W. Jadwiga) (Prem, 1989) who is the patron saint of Silesia and has played an important role in Christianizing and unifying the Silesian consciousness.

The territories seeking prospective settlers, were presented in the West as resembling Promised Land with an abundance of agricultural produce and natural resources. It was even claimed that there were beers better than the best Italian wines. In the case of Silesia its attraction was heightened by the quick spread of the news about gold which was found in the region of Goldberg (Zlotoryja) at the beginning of the 13th century (Samsonowicz, 1995: 44 & Weczerka, 1977a: 139). Goldberg (Zlotoryja) in 1211 and Löwenberg (Lwówek Śląski) in 1217 were the first two Silesian towns which were founded on the basis of German municipal law (Moraw, 1994: 102). The process was also reflected in the countryside where German peasants were allowed to organize their villages and economic life using the regulations of ius teutonicum. The process of colonization and the use of the provisions of the German law accelerated after 1221 (Moraw, 1994: 115-117).

More Cistercian and other orders monasteries were erected and more immigrants arrived from the nearby March Meissen, Main-Franconia, Hesse and the Low German Countries attracted by special privileges and escaping poverty of overpopulated Western Europe (Birke, 1968: 7 & Neubach, 1992: 3). They introduced improved agricultural techniques and tools which allowed them to achieve economic success in numerous Waldenhufendörfer (small villages in woodland clearings). Towns also grew up encouraged by the fact that they were provided with the old-established municipal rights of mainly Magdeburg and Neumarkt (Środa Śląska) (Magocsi, 1993: 40/41). In turn even more craftsmen, merchants, miners, knights and monks came from Germany.

Ius teutonicum considerably altered the social and economic reality of Silesia making it largely compatible with those of Western Europe and Bohemia. The most important quality was self-governing urban and countryside counties. People started establishing local self-governments which had jurisdiction over civil and economic matters. They could also inherit and trade their plots of lands and started to more often use money in their economic activities (Samsonowicz, 1995: 44/45).

The systematic settlement led to development of farming and silver and gold mining, consolidation of the sparse population, clearing of extensive forests and to rapid economic growth⁹ (Samsonowicz, 1995: 45). From 1200 to 1350 120 towns were incorporated and over 1,200 villages established (March, 1991: 11). It must be also noted that over 450 parishes sprang into being during 13th century (Kopiec, 1991: 19). Progressive Western legal, social, economic and working conditions, coupled with the tenacious industry of the colonists, increased the production of foodstuffs fivefold (Birke, 1968: 9). On the basis of these accomplishments Henry I the Bearded and his son Henry II the Pious (ruled 1238-1241) could attempt to unify fragmented Poland under their rule as legitimate descendants of the first Polish Principus. Their efforts were frustrated by the Golden Horde Mongol invasion in 1241 and the death of the latter in the battle of Liegnitz (Legnica) on April 9. Although the Mongols retreated due to the sudden demise of their Great Khan Batu¹⁰ (Kinder, 1978: 179) the damage to the dynasty proved to be permanent. Wielkopolska and Malopolska gained independence already in 1241. Lower Silesian magnates successfully defied the power of Henry II’s juvenile sons who subsequently decreased their prestige through the division of Lower Silesia among themselves into three principalities. However, the Upper Silesian principality remained unified for the time being (Lis, 1993: 23 & Orzechowski, 1971a: 87/88).

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⁹ The effects of colonization were evaluated very positively by contemporary sources, e.g. a 13th-century Silesian chronicle maintains that the economic and social changes brought about by settlers made Silesia into terra opulenta et bene locatā (In: Menzel, 1989: 29).

Paradoxically, after 1241 the wave of colonization greatly intensified and by some authors were even compared to an explosion (Moraw, 1994: 102). Already in 1242 Breslau (Vratislav, Wroclaw) was incorporated under the German law (Četwiński, 1992: 11) in order to attract new settlers who could re-build the devastated land and replace the casualties\(^{11}\). Reconstruction and rapid development, among other factors, were made possible by county and municipal self-governments which flourished without strong dynastic control over them and thanks to the support of magnates interested in increasing their personal incomes through dynamic involvement in colonization. Early development of civil society brought Silesia more closely into the Western European sphere of civilization.

The post-1241 colonization reached its pinnacle under the Prince Henry IV Probus (ruled in Silesia 1270-1290, as *Principus* 1288-1290) (Moraw, 1994: 102). In his youth he cooperated with Bohemian King Přemysl Ottokar II the Great (ruled 1253-1278) continuing the policy of his father Henry III the White (ruled 1248-1266). He was opposed by his uncle Boleslaw II Rogatka (ruled 1248-1278) who sought support among imperial magnates. In 1278, after the deaths of Přemysl Ottokar II and Boleslaw II Rogatka Habsburg Emperor Rudolf I (ruled 1273-1291) gave him the Kladsko (Glatz, Klodzko) land. Henry IV Probus continued to broaden its realm: in 1279 he purchased the Crossen (Krosno) land from Brandenburg, and later on he gained Malopolska with the Polish throne in Cracow (Snoch, 1991: 13 & 46/47).

It was the beginning of the time of the reconstruction of the Holy Roman Empire which sparked off rivalry among the Houses of Habsburg, Wittelsbach and Luxembourg who wanted to achieve dominance over the Empire through enlarging their respective hereditary lands. They struggled for control over Tyrol, Carinthia, Brandenburg, after the extinction of the ruling Houses of Přemysl and Arapad in Bohemia and Hungary respectively also over these countries, as well as the Polish principalities, and the Silesian ones among them (Samsonowicz, 1995: 58). Thus in 1280 in Vienna Emperor Rudolf I pressed Henry IV Probus to pay homage to him but without success (Menzel, 1989: 30). After a long break the Silesian prince was the first Polish ruler with appropriate capacity and ambition to try to unite Poland. He even appealed the Papacy for a crown but his endeavors were terminated by poison which was the cause of his death (Gasiorowski, 1976: 149 & Snoch, 1991: 47).

During the same time one could also observe proliferation of Silesian principalities which numbered eleven in 1281 (Orzechowski, 1971a: 88). They were very weak and insignificant because of their minute size and inner fragmentation which meant that the numerous petite territories of a principality were often sprawled all over Silesia, in certain cases divided even by hundreds of kilometers\(^{12}\) (Orzechowski, 1971b). At that time Poland was a cluster of practically sovereign principalities whereas Bohemia had been united since the middle of 13th century and after temporary territorial successes in the south turned its attention northward (Britannica: 916). In 1289 Beuthen (Bytom) prince Kazimierz II, who felt threatened by other Silesian princes, came to Prague to pay voluntary homage to Bohemian King Václav II (ruled 1278-1305) (Gasiorowski, 1976: 144 & Randt, 1983: 172). Also the Oppeln (Opole) and Teschen (Cieszyn, Těšín) princes sided with Václav II. After Václav II seized control of Malopolska and Cracow in 1291 (Vaniček, 1993b: 89) all the three Silesian princes took part in Václav II’s 1292 invasion against Władysław II Łokietek (ruled 1306-1333), the would-be King of Poland who had striven to unite the whole country for a long time (Lis, 1993: 23/24). Eventually Václav II obtained the Polish crown in 1300 at Gniezno. Most importantly the Czech lands and the Polish lands (without Mazovia and Lower Silesia) of his realm\(^{13}\), were connected by the very three Upper Silesian principalities of Oppeln (Opole), Beuthen (Bytom) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (Vaniček, 1993b: 89-91).

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\(^{11}\) German law was started to be applied to Polish peasants as early as in 1229 (Ko torturej, 1992: 1).

\(^{12}\) It clearly resembled the situation in Germany which was riddled with some three hundred odd political organisms after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 (Czapliński, 1990: 313 & Wolski, 1992: 78).

\(^{13}\) He also controlled parts of Hungary (Britannica: 916 & Vaniček, 1993b: 90).
The dying out of the Přemyslids in 1306 and the ensuing struggle for their patrimony caused rapid disintegration of their vast domain before the firm control over Bohemia was taken over by the House of Luxembourg in 1310. The situation was used by Władysław II Łokietek who seized the Polish possessions of the Přemyslids in 1305-1314. Throughout his reign he had to fight against the Luxembourgs (aided by the Teutonic Order in the north) who wished to actualize their claims to the Polish crown. Hence Władysław II sided with the House of Anjou who took over Hungary in 1307 (Gasiorowski, 1976: 150-153 & Vaníček, 1993c: 103-105).

After the death of Henry IV Probus fragmentation of Silesia continued. ever smaller independent principalities engaged in internecine wars and presented clear power vacuum to the renewed Empire and Bohemia (Menzel, 1989: 30 & Orzechowski, 1971b). In 1311 Władysław II Łokietek’s loose ties with Silesia were strengthened by the marriage of his daughter with Schweidnitz (Swidnica) Prince Bernard. Thus he ensured neutrality of the Silesian princes on the time of his coronation in 1320. However, engaged in the prolonged efforts to affirm his dominance in other Polish principalities he could not effectively engage in Silesia unlike Bohemian King John the Blind (ruled 1310-1346) who had to find satisfaction in military expeditions as a powerful aristocratic faction effectively excluded him from domestic politics in Bohemia (Britannica: 916 & Gasiorowski, 1976: 152).

Moreover, through the economic links Silesia was more tied with Bohemia and the Empire than with relatively backward and still disunited Poland. Consequently, Silesian towns were quite pro-Bohemian which had to be reflected in the policies of the multitude of weak Silesian princes (Gasiorowski, 1976: 152). More or less willingly majority of Silesian princes paid homage to Bohemian King John the Blind in 1327 and 1329 (Gasiorowski, 1976: 152) though he had to annex the Głogau (Glogów) Prince Przemko’s domain after the latter’s death in 1331. Further Silesian principalities were subdued on different conditions by John the Blind in the 1330s and the Church principality of Nysa (Neisse) 1342. The only one of the seventeen Silesian principalities which temporarily remained independent was the Schweidnitz-Jauer (Swidnica-Jawor) principality in Lower Silesia (Menzel, 1989: 31/32, Orzechowski, 1971b: 87/88; Schieche, 1983: 206 & Vanícek, 1993c: 126).

The gradual subduing of the Silesian principalities by Bohemia was opposed by Władysław II Łokietek’s son Kazimierz III the Great (ruled 1333-1370). At the beginning of his reign he effectively ruled only Malopolska and Wielkopolska but was endangered by an impending attack of Bohemia and the Teutonic Order after an expiration of an earlier truce. Under such conditions he prolonged the truce with the Teutonic Order, and, subsequently, requested his brother-in-law Hungarian King Charles I (ruled 1307-1342) to mediate between him and John the Blind. All the three rulers met in 1335 in Trentschin (Trenčín) at Visehrad in Hungary. Because of indebtedness the Bohemian King and his son Charles waived their claims to the Polish throne14. In return, the Polish King Kazimierz III confirmed, expressly and for all time the severance of Silesia from the newly-unified Kingdom of Poland which had failed to include this land15. In 1337 John the Blind weakened the political clout of the Silesian princes by having nominated his governor of Silesia with the seat in Vratislav (Breslau, Wroclaw). The Czech dominance in Silesia was accepted by Charles I in the following year. Thus, Kazimierz III whose realm was endangered by the Teutonic Order ratified the 1335 Trentschin Agreement in 1339 for support in his efforts to gain territories north of his kingdom. In moments of respite from danger he chose not to respect this agreement and in Silesia he managed to hold the land around the towns of Namyslau (Namysłów), Kreuzburg (Kluczbork) and Pitschen (Byczyna) from 1341 to 1356 and in 1343 gained the Silesian-Wielkopolska borderland territory of Fraustadt (Wschowa). However in 1347 Emperor Louis IV (Ruled 1314-1347) died, thus, terminating the

14 From 1300 to 1305 Poland was connected to Bohemia in the personal union under the rule of the Czech King Vaclav II.
15 The Silesian principalities continued to be included within the territory circumscribed by the notion of Regnum Poloniae (Czapliński, 1993: 12/13)
alliance of Kazimierz III and the House of Wittelsbach against the House of Luxembourg. He was succeeded by John the Blind’s heir Charles IV (ruled 1346-1378, emperor since 1355) who with the document of 1348 transformed his patrimony consisting from the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia, Silesian principalities, and Upper and Lower Lusatia into the lands of the Czech Crown. Having no power to question the incorporation of Silesia Kazimierz III accepted it later this year in the Peace of Namyslau (Namysłów). From this time onward the economic, technological and cultural distinctiveness of Silesia (vis-a-vis other Polish provinces) brought about by the colonization was deepened by its gradual inclusion in the territorial and political structure of the Empire while Poland remained independent of its western neighbor and started to expand eastward. (Czapliński, 1993: 12/13; Gasiorowski, 1976: 186; Grünhagen, 1881: 3-6; Samsonowicz, 1995: 72-75 & Vaniček, 1993c: 107 & 112/113).

The cultural attraction of Prague as the capital of Bohemia, and soon the very center of the Empire was increased in the very year of the incorporation of Silesia when Charles IV founded the university in the city. The university’s members were grouped into four gentes: Bohemian, Bavarian, Saxon and Silesian-Polish (Britannica: 916 & Wandycz, 1995: 1348). Majority of the highly educated stratum in Silesia went through the Prague University before others were opened in the vicinity of Silesia, namely in: Cracow (1364), Vienna (1365), Erfurt (1392) and Leipzig (1409) (Macek, 1965: 4).

Furthermore, in 1353 Charles rounded up his dominance over Silesia through his marriage with the heiress of Schweidnitz-Jauer (Swidnica-Jawor) principality. In 1356 the fact was unwillingly accepted by Kazimierz III as Charles IV renounced his claim to Mazovia, and Bohemia’s right to Silesia was reaffirmed in 1372 by Kazimierz III’s successor Louis the Great (ruled 137-1382), King of Hungary and Poland from the House of Anjou. At the practical level, the separation of Silesia from Poland was marked by the belt of fortresses in Malopolska on the border with Silesia (Gasiorowski, 1976: 186 & 190).

In 1356 Charles IV promulgated the Golden Bull which readjusted the problems of the Empire, especially the election of the emperor. This virtual constitution remained in force until the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire by Napoleon in 1806 (Anon., 1990: 31). He completed the construction of the new order in Central Europe after the period of commotion caused by the disorganization of the Empire and extinction of the Přemyslids in Bohemia and the Arpads in Hungary. The golden age of his peaceful and prosperous reign was shared by Silesia but not by Piast princes in their tiny principalities. They were quite insignificant in the Empire or in the Czech Crown and it soon proved

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16 The policy of expansion of their patrimony was facilitated by their friendly relations with the popes at Avignon. In 1344 Clement VI elevated the See of Prague into an archbishopric, and in 1246 promoted the election of Charles as the king of the Romans (Britannica: 916).
17 In 1182 the ties of Moravia with Bohemia were loosened by Frederick I Barbarossa (ruled 1152-1190) who wanted to weaken the position of Bohemian rulers within the Empire (Britannica: 915).
18 In 1373 he also incorporated Brandenburg into the Czech Crown (Vaniček, 1993c: 113).
19 Around 1350 colonization was largely over in Silesia. The amazing dynamics of the process is clearly exemplified by the fact that in 1300 the population density of this land was 6 inhabitants per km$^2$ and 8-11 per km$^2$ only half a century later (Moraw, 1994: 94, 102 & Samsonowicz, 1995: 61). In 1400 it rose to 20 persons per km$^2$ in the valley of the Oder (Odra) and in the part of Silesia left of the river though in some areas of Lower Silesia the population density reached the notch of 27-29 inhabitants per km$^2$ while only 14 per km$^2$ in eastern Upper Silesia (Lis, 1993: 27).
20 The Vratislav (Breslau, Wroclaw) bishopric remained subjected to the See of Gniezno, as well as the north-eastern part of Upper Silesia (carved from Malopolska and added to Silesia by Kazimierz II in 1179) which stayed attached to the Cracow bishopric (Davies, 1991: 1169 & Szaraniec, 1985: 5).
21 Interestingly, the dynastic politics of Charles IV predates that of the Habsburgs in their use of marriages for peaceful expansion (Polšínský, 1991: 34). The principality effectively became part of Charles IV’s patrimony in 1368 after the death of his wife Anna who was the only Silesian princess to attain the titles of Bohemian and German Queens as well as of Empress (Menzel, 1989: 32 & Weczerka, 1977: 593).
that after the dying out of the direct line of the House of Piast with the demise of Kazimierz III in 1370, they could not be considered as prospective candidates for the Polish throne being vassals of the Bohemian King, and their domains an integral part of the Empire (Menzel, 1989: 32/33).

From the beginning of the 13th century the Silesian Piast princes and their courts stopped using and understanding Polish (Menzel, 1989: 33). At the turn of 13th and 14th centuries, and in Upper Silesia the middle of 14th century, Latin was replaced with German in offices (Lis, 1993: 29). As vassals of Bohemia, and then of the Habsburgs, they were drawn into the politics of Prague and Vienna, and presided over the division of their domain into ever smaller and more insignificant fragments. The Silesian Piasts survived in Oels (Olešnica) to 1492; in Sagan (Zagań) to 1504; in Oppeln (Opole) to 1532; and in Teschen (Cieszyn, Těšín) to 1625. The final extinction of the ruling Piasts came in 1675 with the death of Prince Georg Wilhelm von Liegnitz-Brieg-Wohlau (Legnica, Brzeg and Wolów). By the time, the name of Piast was little more than an ancient legend in Poland. It was used as a political label at Polish Royal Elections for any candidate who could claim to be a native-born Pole. Paradoxically, it could not be used by the last Silesian Piasts who were largely unknown to and perceived as Germans by their contemporaries in Poland because they spoke German not Polish and were Protestant (Davies, 1991: 104 & Menzel, 1989: 33).

Considering the issue from the administrative point of view, the Silesian Piasts principalities were fiefs and as such were granted to new lords after the gradual dying out of the Piasts though some were converted into hereditary principalities of the Czech Crown (Erbfürstentümer) directly subjected to the Bohemian King (Orzechowski, 1971b: 89). Silesia as a strong political unit which could influence Central European politics was largely over. After the fragmentation in 13th century and the loss of independence by the Silesian principalities in 14th century, different dynasties, aristocratic families or the Church and the Czech Crown started to control the Silesian principalities in the 15th century whereas the same century also heralded creation of free estate states (freie Standesherrschaften). Hence, Silesia changed into a mere administrative unit unable to undertake any actions on its own which was the very goal of the absolutist state of the Habsburgs where it was included in 1526 (Cornej, 1993: 221; Lis, 1993: 45; Orzechowski, 1971b: 105; Orzechowski, 1972: 5, 8 & Szaraniec, 1985: 5/6).

The Silesian links with Poland disappeared only gradually, and they were still quite strong though not significant at the turn of 14th and 15th centuries. The process can be exemplified by the person of Opole (Oppeln) Prince Władysław Opolczyk (ruled 1356-1401) who considerably broadened his lands with purchase of other Upper Silesian territories. After the death of Kazimierz III in 1370, the Kingdom of Poland was tacked onto the domain of Hungarian King Louis of Anjou (ruled 1342-1382), grandson of Władysław I Lokietek. Władysław Opolczyk participated in the funeral of the Polish King and took care of the interests of Louis before he claimed the Polish throne. Louis rewarded him with the adjacent Wielkopolska land of Wielun and with the title of the Palatine of Hungary. He even shortly acted as Louis’s governor of Halych (Halicz) Ruthenia and was granted with the Polish territories of the Dobrzyn land and a part of Kujawy. Following the demise of his protector he hoped for the Polish throne, and when in 1386 Louis’s daughter Jadwiga (ruled 1383-1399) married Władysław II Jagiello (ruled 1386-1434), thus initiating the Jagiellonian dynasty in Poland, he supported the claim of the House of Luxembourg to the Hungarian throne which was contrary to the Polish interest as the Luxembourgs ruled Bohemia too. eventually, Sigismund of Luxembourg (ruled 1387-1437, king of Bohemia 1419) was crowned as the King of Hungary, but Władysław Opolczyk still opposed the Polish King. In 1392 he even proposed a partition of Poland among the Teutonic Order Brandenburg and Hungary which sealed his unmaking. He was deprived of all his territories outside Silesia and his Silesian lands were divided among his nephews. The only significant remnant of his rule is the most important Polish shrine of Częstochowa which he founded in 1382 (Anon., 1983: 554; Davies, 1991: 164/65 & 109; Lis, 1993: 33/34 & Snoch, 1991: 157).

22 Some authors maintain that Latin was not superseded by Polish because there had been no Polish suitable for bureaucratic use developed then (Lis, 1993: 29).
On the whole, Silesian princes and nobility did not indicate any eagerness for renewed inclusion of Silesia in Poland. It was commonsensical acceptance of the incorporation of the land in Bohemia, and its political and economic place within the Empire. In 15th century north-western Silesia was thoroughly dominated by the German language and culture as well as the urban population though in the south the Czech influence could be observed. Participation of Silesian princes and chivalry in wars against Poland or on the Polish side was dictated only by personal and dynastic interests or by decisions of suzerains controlling Silesia. A certain degree of Polish cultural influence was exerted on Silesia through the Cracow University\(^{23}\) where 14% of its students (i.e. 2,487 persons) were Silesians in the period 1433-1510. The attraction of the university declined but the last significant Silesian scholar Andreas Schonaeus of Glogau (Glogów) remained there till his death in 1615. (Brückner, 1990: II 636/637 & Lis, 1993: 29 & 34/35).

The close of the 14th century was marked by the growing criticism of the clergy and the Catholic Church, especially after the Great Schism in 1378. Elements of John Wycliffe’s reform thought were picked up in Bohemia and rather independently developed by Jan Hus in his writings which, when he arrived at the council in Constance, brought about his execution at the stake (1415) despite the letter of safe conduct from the king of the Romans Sigismund (ruled 1410-1437, crowned emperor 1433). Sigismund’s brother King of Bohemia Wenceslas IV (ruled 1378-1419) did not effectively oppose the reform movement which among other demands also stressed that preaching should be also done in Czech. Moreover, because the German scholars and students at the Prague University did not sympathized with him on the issue of the deposition of the two popes and the election of Alexander V, Wenceslas IV reversed the traditional distribution of votes at the university in 1409. Thereafter, the three non-Bohemian gens had one vote and the Bohemian gens had three. The alienated (especially German) scholars moved to Leipzig and a certain degree of an ethnic tension was added to the unfolding religious conflict as the Hussite movement was formed on the news of burning of Jan Hus. After the death of Wenceslas IV in 1419 the Hussites opposed Sigismund, but the Czech Catholics and the Germans were willing to recognize him as the King of Bohemia (Britannica: 918; Ćornej, 1993a: 153-166).

In the ensuing struggle Sigismund also sought support among the Silesian princes. In 1420 he convened the Reichstag (imperial diet) at Breslau (Vratislav, Wroclaw) in order to discuss ways of extinguishing Hussitism. In reply the Bohemian nobility repeatedly offered the Bohemian throne to Wladyslaw II Jagiello in 1421-1422 but he refused not wishing to be accused of supporting heretics. However, in 1422 the crown was accepted by Wladyslaw II’s cousin Great Lithuanian Duke Witold. This act drew Poland into the Hussite Wars. Though Wladyslaw II did not espouse the Hussitic ideology, it did not deter him from siding with the Hussites against the Teutonic Order or from supporting them against the House of Luxembourg. The social and political commotion divided the Silesian rulers and some of them even supported the Hussites. Since 1425 Silesia was the theater of major war activities. The Hussites sacked and burned over 40 towns in Silesia (i.e. more than in Bohemia or Moravia) (Schieche, 1983: 250) and the agriculture and commerce suffered severely at their hands. The war finished in Silesia with the withdrawal of the last troops of the Taborites in 1434. They were subsequently defeated in the fratricidal battle of Litomyšl, Bohemia by the less radical Hussites Utraquists with the aid of the Bohemian Catholics who together took over the control of Bohemia (Birke, 1968: 11; Britannica: 918; Ćornej, 1993a: 166-178; Gasiorowski, 1976: 197; Lis, 1993: 36/27 & Neubach, 1992: 4).

The Compacta espousing some of the Hussites moderate demands were promulgated in 1436 and the same year were followed by an agreement with Sigismund who, thus, finally gained his power over Bohemia, but died already in 1437. The Hussitic Bohemian magnates who had been enriched in the revolutionary era by the secularization of church properties and had grown accustomed to the

\(^{23}\) It is interesting to observe that Silesian scholars who formed a separate gens at the Prague University identified themselves as Silesians not Poles, cf. the signature of medical doctor Anselm Ephorinus: \textit{Silesius, non Polonus} (Brückner, 1990: II 637).
absence of monarchy wished to crown Władysław II’s younger son Kazimierz IV (ruled 1446-1492) but, eventually, the conservatives got the upper hand and accepted Sigismund’s son-in-law Albert of Habsburg (ruled 1437-1439) who ascended the Bohemian throne. His death in 1439 ushered in another interregnum. (Britannica: 918). In 1440 an assembly was held to set up provincial administration for Bohemia. It resulted in establishing the estate structure but failed to elect governor of Bohemia leaving governance of the country in the hands of numerous factions who controlled counties where they were based (Ćornej, 1993a: 179). The problem of succession became urgent when Albert’s widow, Elizabeth, gave birth to a boy called Ladislas Posthumous. Several foreign princes showed an interest in the throne but not the brothers and subsequent Polish Kings Władysław III (ruled 1434-1444, King of Hungary 1440) and Kazimierz IV (ruled 1446-1492) who engaged in the struggle to secure the Hungarian throne. The Bohemian estates recognized Ladislas’s claims in 1443 but he remained at the court of his guardian the German King Frederick III (ruled 1440-1493, crowned Emperor 1452). Meanwhile Jiří z Poděbrad as the leader of the Utraquist majority furthered his position as the most significant of the factious lords. As such in 1451 he was designated by Frederick III to be governor of Bohemia because the German King (though a Catholic) realized that this unseemly alliance would improve Ladislas’s chances to ascend the Bohemian throne. His prediction was right as in 1453 Ladislas (ruled 1453-1457) was crowned king and Jiří served as his chief adviser. Earlier he had become the King of Hungary (1445) so Jiří hoped that with the clout the King could reestablish Bohemia’s connection with the incorporated provinces, especially the populous and rich Silesia which remained staunchly Catholic (Britannica: 918; Ćornej, 1993b: 178/179; Lis, 1993: 38).

Following the sudden death of Albert in 1439 the Silesian princes governed their small realms independently as before the incorporation of the Silesian principalities a century earlier. The Hussite Wars left the land devastated though its internal political system had been ameliorated under the outside pressure, mainly with the new post of \textit{Landeshauptman} (provincial governor) which was created in 1422 (Birke, 1968: 11). The interregnum in Bohemia encouraged some centrifugal tendencies in the lands of the Czech Crown, for instance in 1441 Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Prince Wenzel paid homage of his Auschwitz (OŚwięcim) principalities to the Polish King, and in 1443 he sold the Sewerien (Siewierz) principality to the Cracow bishop (Lis, 1993: 38 & Orzechowski, 1971b: 98). Although the Silesian princes paid homage to Ladislas in 1453 and 1454 (Lis, 1993: 38) he did not actualize Jiří’s hope that he would firmly anchor the province in the Czech Crown as he died already in 1457. The difficult task was passed to Jiří who had already secured a foothold in Silesia during the years as governor of Bohemia because in 1453 he gained Kłodzko (Glatz, Klodzko), Münsterberg (Ziębice) and Frankenstein (Ząbkowice) (Orzechowski, 1971b: 104). Following the example of Hungary where the native Matthias I Corvinus (Ruled 1458-1490) was elected to succeed

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In 1438 the Polish nobility who wanted to further this tentative claim maneuvered him and his brother - still juvenile King Władysław III to undertake an invasion against Bohemia. The majority of the Silesian princes did not support this move so the Polish army had to retreat from Troppau (Opava, Opawa) where it was getting ready to start an onslaught (Gaśiorowski, 1976: 198 & Lis, 1993: 38).
\item In 1445 a part of its territory was turned into the Sator (Zator) principality. The remaining Auschwitz (OŚwięcim) principality became a fief of the Polish King Kazimierz IV in the years 1454-1456, who bought it in 1457. The territory was linked with Poland through the person of the Polish King, and finally was incorporated in the Polish Kingdom in 1564 (Anon, 1985: 425). The Sator (Zator) principality was purchased by the Polish King Jan Olbracht (ruled 1492-1501) in 1494. It was granted with the Polish laws in 1564 and entered Cracow Voivodeship retaining its principality status and considerable autonomy (Anon., 1987a: 839 & Snoch, 1991: 74).
\item The person of the Cracow bishop as its ruler linked the Siewierz (Sewerien) principality with Poland before it was eventually incorporated in the territory of the Polish Crown 1790 (Anon. 1968: 302).
\item Raised at the German imperial court he was a German-speaking Catholic and as such a ruler who would be accepted by the Silesian princes.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Ladislas, the estates of Bohemia reaffirmed the elective principle and decided unanimously for Jiří (ruled 1458-1471) in the same year (Britannica: 918).

He was anxious to ensure legitimacy of his rule through sticking to the coronation rites prescribed by Charles IV. He also considered the Compacta the most significant political and moral basis of his power and accordingly strove to rule as a king of two peoples: the Utraquists and the Catholics. He was mostly successful in affirming his power in the Czech crown, but though the Silesian princes (with the exception of the Oppeln (Opole) prince Nikolaj I (Nikolaus)) paid homage to him (Lis, 1993: 38) he had to accept the help of papal envoys to get at least a provisional recognition by Breslau (Wroclaw), the staunchly Catholic and predominantly German capital of Silesia (1459) (Britannica: 919). With its 20,000 inhabitants and membership in the Hanseatic League (Deus, 1977: 44 & Neubach, 1992: 4) the city had to be reckoned with especially because in 1457 it had refused to pay homage to Jiří and had successfully warred against him (Četwiński, 1992: 16).

During the next three years Jiří enhanced his prestige both in Bohemia and abroad. Feeling that no lasting peace could be achieved without the speedy settlement of religious issues, he attempted in 1462 to have the Compacta sanctioned by Pope Pius II. Instead of approving the Compacta, the Pope declared them null and void. The King did not retreat from his position but armed conflict was not inevitable till the 1464 election of the new pope, Paul II who soon adopted an aggressive policy that encouraged Jiri’s foes, especially the city of Breslau (Wroclaw). The rebellion spread to Bohemia where an anti-Utraquist league was formed in 1465. Its leaders entered into negotiations with Breslau (Wroclaw) and other Catholic centers. Their efforts were largely frustrated in 1466 when Jiří defeated the Breslau (Wroclaw) troops (Četwiński, 1992: 16) which allowed him next year to launch an attack against the rebel forces in Bohemia. His position became awkward when in 1468 Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary and Jiří’s son-in-law brought support to the rebels under the slogan of struggle against the heretic, and, subsequently, in 1469 at Olomouc (Olmutz), Moravia was proclaimed the King of Bohemia. A number of Silesian princes paid homage to the new ruler, but Jiří fought back and convinced the Utraquist estates of Bohemia to elect the Polish King Kazimierz IV’s eldest son Wladyslaw (ruled 1471-1516, King of Hungary 1490) to succeed him after his death which took place in 1471. In the same year Wladyslaw was crowned at Prague where he was accompanied by two Upper Silesian princes. His rule was limited to Bohemia only as the other parts of the Luxembourgs patrimony were dominated by Matthias Corvinus. The ensuing conflict between the two kings was mainly played out in Silesia and was finished with the agreement of 1474 which confirmed the status quo which could not be challenged by Oppeln (Opole) prince Nikolaj (Nikolaus) who continued to refuse to pay homage to Matthias until he and his brother were incarcerated by the new ruler of Silesia. Thus, Matthias’s kingdom fortified with the acquisitions of Moravia, Silesia and the Lusatias was the strongest realm of Central Europe at that time. In 1479 his position was acknowledged by the Treaty of Olomouc (Olmutz) in which Wladyslaw and Matthias retained their rights to the title of King of Bohemia whereas Silesia and the other lands of the Czech Crown would be returned to Bohemia on the payment of 400,000 florins to Hungary (Četwiński, 1992: 17; Čornej, 1993a: 181-185; Lis, 1993: 39 & Orzechowski, 1972: 6).

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28 Some authors simplistically identify the two confessional groups with the Czechs and the Germans. Although the language question was part of the Hussite ideology religion was paramount. It is an anachronism to apply such an anachronistic interpretation from the age of nation-states to medieval Bohemia. Moreover, the language border did not coincide with the confessional divisions: the Czech-speaking Moravians remained largely Catholic whereas a number of German-speaking Bohemians were Hussites too.

29 In 1462, during this difficult for Jiří situation Kazimierz IV put forward a tentative claim to the throne in Prague and subsequently concluded an agreement with Jiří in which the Polish King renounced his pretension in exchange for Jiří’s final relinquishment of his rights to the Silesian principalities of Auschwitz (Oswiecim), Sator (Zator) and Sewerien (Siewierz) which had begun to fall in the Polish sphere of influence (Lis, 1993: 38).

30 Thoughtfully he broadened his power base in Silesia with the Opava (Troppau, Opawa) principality whose parts he gained in 1460 and 1464 (Orzechowski, 1971b: 104).
The rule of Matthias Corvinus is crucial for the modernizing reform of Silesia’s administrative and political organization. Till that time the province had been a disunited cluster of independent and semi-independent principalities and fiefs with some Erbfürstenämter which allowed but weak imposition of the suzerain’s power in Silesia (Orzechowski, 1971b: 88/89). In 1480 he effectively curbed the broad prerogatives of Breslau (Wroclaw) and its city council (Cetwinski, 1992: 17), and meanwhile instituted the Silesian Diet (Fürstentag) and the position of the Superior Governor (Landesoberhauptmann). Having centralized and homogenized the governance of Silesia, he also won loyalty of the estates through authorizing their regular assemblies, and, thus, could effectively maintain peace and order in the whole province though he was rather disliked because of his heavy exploitation of Silesia’s finances for the sake of securing the continued existence of his extensive realm (Birke, 1968: 11). On the other hand he pursued the policy of consolidate Silesia territorially. Per fas et nefas he seized and concentrated under his direct control more than a half of Silesia (Orzechowski, 1971b: 97 & Orzechowski 1972: 5/6). Moreover, he weakened the power of hereditary princes even more by introducing the novel form of administrative organization freie Standesherrschaften (Orzechowski, 1971b: 105).

Although Matthias rarely visited Silesia reigning over the province through his Landesoberhauptmann, he did indicate keen interest in matters Silesian as was shown above. After his death in 1490 the Bohemian King Wladyslaw regained effective control over Silesia and the other parts of the patrimony of the Luxembourgs, and he also succeeded Matthias as the King of Hungary. The new ruler showed little interest in Silesia as he visited it only in 1511 (Lis, 1993: 40) and managed its affairs through the new Landesoberhauptmann the Teschen (Cieszyn, Těšín) and Glogau (Glogów) prince Kazimierz (Casimir) who had supported the King’s claims to the Bohemian throne back in 1470/1471 (Snoch, 1991: 60). His contemporaries dubbed Wladyslaw as rex bene (Orzechowski, 1972: 5) as his reign in Bohemia was a rarely broken chain of aristocratic feuds and rivalries which marked a decline of royal authority. He had been brought up as a Catholic and made no secret of his dislike of the Utraquist rites. Although to be eligible for the throne he had had to obligate himself to respect the Compacta he stood aloof when the religious factions were struggling or reaching consensuses. Actually after 1490 he spent more time at the Catholic court of Buda in Hungary than in Bohemia (Carter, 1992: 919).

His resent for the Czech Crown deepened political and institutional laxity in Silesia. The Silesian princes did not swear allegiance to Wladyslaw (Lis, 1993: 40). The influence of the estates grew again, and for their negotiations with the crown they formed a superior court (Birke, 1968: 12). Wladyslaw also reversed, though not completely undid, Matthias’s reforms. He reinstated majority of the Silesian princes who had been removed from their properties by Matthias and started to transfer governance of the Silesian lands subjected directly to the royal authority, into the hands of his brothers (Orzechowski, 1972: 5). This policy allowed him to secure his right to the Hungarian throne in exchange for the Glogau (Glogów) principality which on the basis of the 1491 agreement became the property of would-be kings of Poland Jan Olbracht (ruled 1492-1501) and Zygmunt I the Elder (ruled 1506-1548). The latter was even a de facto Landesoberhauptmann of Silesia but returned Silesia to Wladyslaw on his election to the Cracow throne in 1506 (Lis, 1993: 40).

The question of ownership of Silesia was clarified in 1522 when Wladyslaw’s son and successor Ludwik (ruled 1516-1526), King of Bohemia and Hungary. He reincorporated the province with Moravia and the Lusatias to Bohemia (Lis, 1993: 41). In 1526 the juvenile King fought with inadequate forces against the Turks at the battle of Mohács and drowned in the nearby marshes31 without leaving a heir. It was the end of the short reign of the House of Jagiellon in Bohemia and in Silesia. In 1515 in Vienna he had concluded a dynastic accord with the Habsburgs with the provision that in the case of his heirless death the latter dynasty would succeed him. Accordingly, in 1526 the Bohemian estates approved the ascension of Louis’s brother-in-law and Emperor Charles V’s brother

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31 Ludwik shared his sad fate with his grandfather Kazimierz IV’s brother Polish King Wladyslaw III (ruled 1434-1444) who perished at the hands of the superior Ottoman forces near Varna.
Chapter one

Ferdinand I (ruled 1526-1564, emperor 1558) commencing the union of the Czech Crown with the Habsburg lands\(^{32}\) which also, piecemeal, brought Silesia into the sphere of the direct imperial and German influence (Cornej, 1993: 215/216; Lis, 1993: 41 & Morby, 1994: 156).

In spite of the relaxation of royal power in Silesia during the Jagiellonian times the number of the Silesian principalities tended to decrease\(^{33}\) (Orzechowski, 1972: 6). Though the Jagiellonian kings did not pursue a conscious policy of consolidating various principalities and lands in Silesia gradual extinction of local Silesian dynasties released a growing number of Silesian fiefs into the direct jurisdiction of the Crown. This trend continued under the Habsburgs and at the close of 17th century there were only four hereditary principalities of Sagan (Zagań), Oels (Olešnica), Münsterberg (Ziębice) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) and few insignificant freie Ständesherrschaften. The emperors directly ruled the rest of the Silesian territory (Orzechowski, 1972: 13-15). The process was accompanied by changes in economic structure which marked the transition from the medieval period into modernity. It can be best illustrated in Silesia by Breslau (Wroclaw) which left the Hanseatic League in 1515 having expressed such an intention already in 1474 (Cetwiński, 1992: 18).

At the end of 1526 the Silesian estates assembled at Leobschütz (Hlubčic, Glubczyce) accepted Ferdinand I as their King on the condition that he would not revoke their privileges (Lis, 1993: 45) which had become quite numerous under the Jagiellons. Ferdinand I had to comply with the requirements in order to reaffirm his rule in all the provinces of Bohemia and Hungary, however, his intention was to reduce the broad prerogatives of the estates later on (Cornej, 1993: 216), and the quite independent Landesoberhauptmann of Silesia to the position of the loyal follower of the King (Birke, 1968: 12). He had to actualize his plan at a slow pace because the Empire was troubled by Reformation and the Turks.

Reformation which started in 1517 at Wittenberg with Luther’s attack on indulgences increased tensions in Bohemia and Silesia (Carter, 1992: 919). A degree of prosperity attained after the Hussite Wars led to rapid population of the relatively empty of settlers region of the Sudets. They set up glass-works and manufactures producing linen\(^{34}\) which gave a boost to wood industry (Birke, 1968: 13/14). The newly-established economic and political strength of the Silesian cities allowed more people to study, and finally was used as leverage on Władysław to found a Silesian university at Breslau (Wroclaw) to which he agreed in 1505. The effort was thwarted by the objection of the Cracow University which was afraid to losing Silesian students (Cetwiński, 1992: 17/18) who had constituted half of its scholars in the 15th century. However Cracow lost its appeal as an academic center to the Silesians as Prague a century earlier and an increasing number of Silesians began to undertake university studies at the Protestant-oriented universities of Wittenberg, Frankfurt an der Oder and Leipzig (Wünsch, 1994). At the universities the young Silesian burghers received humanistic education which was channelled through the medium of German newly perfected and unified thanks to Luther’s translation of the Bible. Their academic endeavors and heated discussions on religious

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\(^{32}\) Ferdinand I also became the King of Hungary but his power was challenged by John Zápolyai (ruled 1526-1540) and his son John Sigismund (ruled 1540-1570). Zápolyai was supported by the Turks, Ferdinand by the majority of the Hungarian nobles. After a prolonged strife, the Habsburgs eventually obtained a footing in Hungary leaving Transylvania and the Transdanubian district of the country to the Zápolyais (Gunszt, 1908: 6 & Topolski, 1976: 267).

\(^{33}\) The reduction was facilitated by the exclusion of the Crossen (Krosno) principality from the political boundaries of Silesia and from vassal allegiance to the Bohemian King in 1517. Matthias Corvinus had ceded it to the Margrave of Brandenburg and Ferdinand I reaffirmed Brandenburg’s possession of the principality in 1538 (Orzechowski, 1972: 6 & Snoch, 1991: 72). The territorial change brought about one complication in the form of the Schwiebus (Świebodzin) enclave which since that time on existed separated from Silesia by Brandenburg till the moment the irregularity was liquidated during the sweeping reforms of the Prussian state in 1815 (Orzechowski, 1972b: 10).

\(^{34}\) In the two following centuries they were known all over Europe under the name of Silesian linen (Birke, 1968: 14).
questions were accompanied by an outburst in book production which at last started reaching a wide range of people in the whole of Empire and in Silesia (Kinder, 1978: 230/231).

The events opening the age of Reformation in Germany and the open criticism against the excesses of the Catholic Church brought home by Silesian graduates started to rapidly transform the confessional make-up of Silesia though in 15th century there had been pride, in the larger Silesian cities (especially Breslau (Wroclaw)), at the fact that the land had withstood the so-called Czech heresy and the heretic king Jiří (Birke, 1968: 11 & Machilek, 1992). Already in the year when Luther posted his 95 theses several Catholic orders were expelled or left their monasteries in Breslau (Wroclaw) due to the anti-Catholic disturbances (Četwiński, 1992: 18). Subsequently Protestantism started spreading all over Silesia, first in the towns and also in the countryside which was radicalized by the peasants revolts especially in Bohemia (1514) (Kinder, 1978: 232/233). In the 1520s and 1530s the reformed faith attained a firm foothold in the principalities of Sagan (Zagań), Lower Silesia, and of Jägerndorf (Knov, Karniów) in Upper Silesia (Gundermann, 1994 & Kinder, 1978: 234). Johannes Hess delivered the first Protestant sermon in Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1523 (Četwiński, 1992: 18). Besides dominating Lutheranism in Lower Silesia also Anabaptism appeared in southern Upper Silesia and in the Margravate of Glatz (Kłodzko) with its distinctive form which was developed by Kaspar Schwenkfeld von Ossig (Kinder, 1978: 232). The Schwenkfelders in Silesia declined after 1529 when their leader fled the province scorned by Protestants and Catholics (Anon., 1990a: 211). Significantly, Catholicism remained the predominant confession in central Upper Silesia because of underrepresentation of bourgeoisie in this relatively sparsely inhabited and underdeveloped region (Lis, 1993: 46/47). Shortly it also regained the upper hand in the Margravate of Glatz (Kłodzko) and in the Upper Silesian-Moravian borderland as Moravia became one of the centers of Counter-Reformation (Kinder, 1978: 234). This trend was fortified by Upper Silesian graduates of the strongly Catholic universities of Vienna, Graz, and especially Olomouc (Olomütz) (Wünsch, 1994), and by Polish Dominicans who operated there (Śtępán, 1994).

At the beginning stages of Reformation its spread in Silesia was not curbed by Louis who was fully occupied with Hungarian affairs struggling against the Ottoman Empire (Carter, 1992: 919). Moreover, in Charles V’s Edict of Worms (1521) placing Luther under the ban of the Empire proved to be ineffectual and he had to negotiate with Protestant princes faced with the dysfunctional institutional and political structure of his possessions straggled all over Europe. In 1530 at the Diet of Augsburg the Emperor endeavored to preserve the unity of the Christian faith. Moreover, he rejected Protestantism and confirmed the Edict of Worms. In response to these acts, the Protestant imperial estates formed then Schmalkaldick League which was joined by the Sagan (Zagań) Prince in Silesia whereas the other Silesian princes distanced themselves from the armed struggle (Gundermann, 1994 & Kinder, 1978: 234/235). The League repeatedly defeated Charles V in political and armed strife until 1548. Afterwards it declined, and, finally, in 1555 the Religious Peace of Augsburg was concluded. The peace was valid only for Lutheranism and Catholicism, and its most significant provision was that subjects were obliged to follow the confession of the prince (cuius regio, eius religio). It regulated the relations of both the confessions until the end of the Thirty Years War and rejected the idea of a universal empire. The dualism within the Empire was decided in favor of the princes and confessional discord was perpetuated (Eickels, 1994 & Kinder, 1978: 235 & 237).

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35 Schwenkfelders continued to be persecuted and many escaped to the Low Countries, England and North America. They still survive in southeastern Pennsylvania (Anon., 1990a: 212).

36 They also contributed to Polonization of the Troppau (Opava, Opawa) principality and, generally speaking, to Slavicization of whole Upper Silesia where Germandom had been considerably weakened after the Hussite Wars (Śtępán, 1994). The basis of the phenomenon may be found in the consequent use of Czech as the official language in Upper Silesia from 15th century until 18th century (Birke, 1968: 13) and also in the instances of the official use of Polish in the 15th-century Silesia during the Jagiellonian rule in the Czech Crown (Lis, 1993: 42).

37 This retreat from universalism was one of the factors which contributed to the later rise of nation-states.
The over two-century long period of the Habsburg rule in Silesia was quite peaceful (with the ominous exception of the Thirty Years War) in contrast to the Hussite Wars and the struggle for the Luxembourg patrimony which devastated Silesia in 15th century. There could be some social disturbances observed when members of Catholic monastic orders had to leave Protestant principalities where the Catholic Church’s properties were confiscated. On the whole the introduction of Protestantism to Silesia was a calm and steady process though initially its onset was actively opposed by some princes and the Bohemian King Ferdinand I (Lis, 1993: 46). The King, however, never subjected Silesia to violent repressions which he used in Bohemia. It was caused by an ongoing controversy about the decisive interpretation of Silesia’s place in the legal and political structure of the Empire which left Bohemian Kings as suzerains of Silesia largely impotent. Consequently, they did not even try the spread of Protestantism in Silesia. The decisions of the Council of Trent (1545-1563) (which commenced Counter-Reformation) were implemented rather leniently in Silesia too, because Breslau Bishops acted also as Landesoberhauptmänner of Silesia and had to maintain proper relations with Protestants. Eventually, at the close of 16th century c. 90% of the Silesian population were Protestant (Eickels, 1994 & Lis, 1993: 46).

16th century also marked very last and rather limited instances of Poland’s interest in Silesia. After the extinction of the House of Jagiellon there was a tentative proposal to renew the House of Piast through election of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) prince Waclaw (Wenzel) III as Polish was the language of his court (Lis, 1993: 47) but he was a Protestant and rather insignificant. Also another descendant of the Piasts, notorious Liegnitz (Legnica) prince Heinrich (Henryk) XI strove to force his candidacy on some faction of Polish nobility but without any chance of success as besides being a Protestant he spoke German and was quite extravagant (Boras, 1985). Ferdinand I’s son Emperor Maximilian II (ruled 1564-1576) had a sound support among the Polish magnates as a candidate to the Polish throne in the first (1573) and second (1576) elections. During the third election (1587) the Habsburg candidate Archduke Maximilian was indeed elected by one magnate faction in opposition to the election of Swedish King John III’s son Sigismund III Vasa (ruled 1667-1632, King of Sweden 1592-1599). The two kings elect strove to ascend to the throne. Sigismund III could not act as quickly as Maximilian having to arrive from Sweden. Maximilian decided to seize Cracow militarily but to no avail as his advances were repelled by the Polish magnate faction supporting Sigismund III. In the end Maximilian was defeated in the battle of Pitschen (Byczyna), Silesia (1588) and incarcerated. The Archduke regained his freedom on the terms of the Beuthen (Bytom) treaty of 1589 committing himself to give up his claim to the Polish crown. He finally ratified the treaty in 1598 closing the last possibility of forging direct relations between Poland and Silesia under a Habsburg ruler (Kaczorowski, 1988; Lis, 1993: 47/48 & Weczerka, 1977b: 406).

The period of relative calm and economic prosperity in Silesia which followed the provisional settlement of the religious discord continued to the first two decades of 17th c. However, elsewhere the developments in Bohemia began to strain the status quo earlier. After the Peace of Augsburg Emperor Maximilian II approved the Bohemian Confession of the Czech Neo-Utraquists in 1575, but only orally. It was assumed that his eldest son, Rudolf, who was present at the session would respect his father’s pledge. Though as Rudolf II (ruled 1576-1612) he initially did but having been brought up by Jesuits in Spain he had sympathy only for Catholicism. In order to further the Counter-Reformation and be better shielded against the Turkish menace he transferred his court from Vienna to Prague. With the support of the Emperor the Catholics sought to create a breach between the Bohemian Confession and the Czech Brethren who though numerically weak exercised a strong influence on the Czech religious and cultural life. Moreover, by a succession of new appointments, Catholic radicals around 1600 occupied the key positions in the provincial administration of Bohemia.

38 During his reign Protestantism reached its widest expansion so in order to retain his political clout Maximilian II had to refuse to have the decisions of the Council of Trent proclaimed, and to remain neutral in questions of religion (Kinder, 1978: I 251).

39 Significantly they produced a Czech translation of the Bible from the original languages (known as the Karlice Bible) thus forming the literary Czech and giving a basis to would-be Czech nationalism (Carter, 1992: 920).
In 1602 Rudolf II issued a rigid decree against the Czech Brethren. The Czech Protestants realized that the days of peaceful coexistence were gone and closed their ranks under the leadership of one of the prominent Czech Brethren. Dissatisfaction with eccentric Rudolf II’s regime was growing in other Habsburg domains. This opportunity was used by his brother Matthias (ruled 1612-1619) who made contacts with the Austrian and Hungarian opposition, and also joined by the Moravian estates seized the crown deposing his brother (Carter, 1992: 920; Kinder, 1978: I 251).

Before the seizure was effected Rudolf had striven to oppose by having granted the Bohemian estates with his Letter of Majesty (in Czech Majestát) (1609) which guaranteed religious liberty. Matthias had replied conferring them with the right freely to elect their king (Kinder, 1978: 253). The situation had been reflected in Silesia which besides Bohemia had been the only province where Rudolf II had managed to retain his control during the strife with his brother. In 1608, using the weakness of imperial rule, the Silesian estates had requested Rudolf II to be granted with religious freedom and to revoke the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop from the position of Silesia’s Landesoberhauptmann. Rudolf vacillated and the Silesian estates had secured the Bohemian estates support when the former had been obtained the Letter of Majesty. So also in 1609 Rudolf had had to issue a separate Letter of Majesty for Silesia where he had guaranteed the position of Landesoberhauptmann for a hereditary Silesian prince and abolished forced conversion (Snoch, 1991: 81).

At the broader Central European level, the inter-dynastic conflict played out in the imperial House of Habsburg coincided with a surge in the re-Catholicizing endeavors at the beginning of 17th century. The renewal of the confessional discord which could not be resolved by the Emperor caused establishment of the Protestant Union (1608) with links to France, England and the United Provinces. A year later it was countered by the Catholic League led by Bavaria in association with Spain. The two organizations were involved in some minor factions before the break out of the Thirty Years War (Kinder, 1978: I 251).

In Silesia (which did not belong to any of the Confessional organizations (Kinder, 1978: I: 252)) popular anti-Catholic feeling was fortified by dynamic re-Catholicization carried out in agreement to the provisions of the Peace of Augsburg in the Silesian principalities with Catholic rulers. The Counter-Reformation was strongest in Upper Silesia, especially in the principalities of: Neisse-Ottmachau (Nysa-Otmuchów) (which belonged to the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop), Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (governed by converted to Catholicism Adam Wenzel (Adam Waclaw)) and Oppeln-Ratibor (Opolce-Racibórz) (particularly in the region of Oberglogau (Glogówek) where re-Catholicization was spearheaded by its owners the von Oppersdorfs) (Lis, 1993: 48).

In 1617 Matthias, who was childless, caught the Protestant nobility in the Diet of Bohemia unprepared, and they acquiesced to the choice of his nephew Ferdinand of Styria as his successor. But already in 1618 opposition grew quickly to Ferdinand as he was an ardent Catholic suspected of cooperation with the opponents of the Letter of Majesty. The Protestant estates of Bohemia decided to preclude the possibility of Ferdinand’s ascension to the throne in Prague. Following the Defenestration in 1618, the estates replaced the royal Catholic governors with their own 30 directors, who assembled troops for defensive purposes and gained allies in the predominantly Lutheran Silesia, and in the Lusatias and rather reluctant Moravia. The tension became acute with the death of Matthias in 1619 because the estates of Bohemia decided not to recognize Ferdinand II (ruled 1619-1637) as their king. At a general assembly of all five provinces, a decision was made to form a federal system (Cornej, 1993: 230-233) and the confederation was supported by Upper and Lower Austria (Eickels, 1994). Subsequently, Ferdinand II was deposed and staunchly Protestant Frederick V, elector of the Rhine Palatinate and son-in-law of James I, King of England an Scotland, was elected the King of Bohemia in 1619 (Carter, 1992: 920). The Silesian princes paid homage to Frederick V in Breslau.

40 For instance, in 1608 in Breslau (Wroclaw) Lutherans attacked St. Adalbert’s Church belonging to the Dominicans, and made the order’s abbot leave the city (Cetwiński, 1992: 19).

41 He had successfully completed re-Catholicization of Styria (Cornej, 1993: 229).
The new King of Bohemia began to broaden religious tolerance and issued a letter of Majesty for Silesian Calvinists (Eickels, 1994). Governance of Silesia was handed over to Landesoberhauptmann Johann Christian, prince of Brieg (Brzeg) and Johann Georg Hohenzollern as Commander-in-Chief. The short interlude in the Habsburg control over Silesia and the Czech lands was over with the Battle on the Bílá Hora (White Mountain) in 1620. Frederick fled to Holland and the estate Union of the Czech lands was dissolved (Kinder, 1978: I 253; Lis, 1993: 48).

In the subsequent years the existence of Bohemia as a separate political unit was obliterated along with the political clout of its nobility half of whose landed property was confiscated in 1623. Ferdinand rescinded the Letter of Majesty, so concurrent re-Catholicization and re-Germanization sent away c. 150,000 emigrants, and, thus, Bohemia devoid of its Protestant elites was turned into a mere hereditary Habsburg possession in 1627 (Kinder, 1978: I 253). The introduction of Habsburg absolutist rule was more gradual in the incorporated provinces of the Czech Crown (Carter, 1992: 921). The Lusatias were pledged to Saxony for its aid which had made the imperial counterattack possible (Kinder, 1978: I 253) but Silesia retained its status quo and repressions occurred there only sporadically because in 1621 the Saxon Elector negotiated an agreement between the Emperor and the Silesian estates. The Protestants were guaranteed liberty of religion and amnesty was proclaimed for all the rebels with the exception of Johann Georg Hohenzollern who had to leave Silesia and whose lands were seized by the Habsburgs (Lis, 1993: 49).

In that time the swelling waves of the Thirty Years War began reaching Silesia. It remained peripheral in this conflict nevertheless it sustained quite heavy losses (Conrads, 1994: 276). Whereas military preparations had been conducted against the Emperor in Lower Silesia, Upper Silesia was raided and plundered by several thousands of the extremely effective Polish mercenaries (known as Lisowczycy in Polish or Liechtensteiner Dragoner in German) in the Habsburg service (Sn och, 1991: 81; Weczerka, 1977: LXI/XI). Re-Catholicization regained its lost momentum after 1622 when Jesuits established their gymnasium in Neisse (Nysa) and were granted possessions in the Oppeln-Ratibor (Opole-Racibórz) principality as well as in the Beuthen (Bytom) land (Lis, 1993: 49). In the winter of 1626-1627 Silesia supported the troops of the Protestant Union led by Count Ernst von Mansfeld who led an onslaught from Silesia to Hungary (Weczerka, 1977: LXI/LXII). After Albrecht von Wallenstein repulsed the Protestant forces, severe penalties were exacted particularly in Upper Silesia where Mansfeld’s troops had stationed (Eickels, 1994: 60/61). Compulsory Catholicism was imposed on the population in the principalities of Oppeln-Ratibor (Opole-Racibórz), Troppau (Opava, Opava) and Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) (Lis, 1993: 50) and Protestantism was weakened in the whole of Silesia as elsewhere in the Empire in 1629 with the Edict of Restitution which returned all ecclesiastical territories which had come into Protestant possession after 1552 (on the basis of the Convention of Passau) (Kinder, 1978: I 235 & 253).

Ferdinand II’s winning streak lasted until 1630 when Gustav Adolph of Sweden (ruled 1611-1632), a zealous Lutheran decided to intervene having received appeals from the hard-pressed North German Protestants (Anon., 1990b: 325). He was supported by the rulers of Pomerania, Brandenburg and Saxony (Anon., 1990b: 325/326; Weczerka, 1977: LXII). In 1632 the Brandenburg troops seized the north-western part of Silesia and the Saxony divisions seized Glogau (Glogów). After the death of Gustav Adolph at the battle of Lützen in 1632 the imperial army under command of Wallenstein struck repeated blows against the Protestant strongholds in Silesia during 1633 and the province was

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42 The phenomenon on the basis of the prior Hussite movement was utilized by would-be Czech nationalism as a foundation for Czech nation-building and the main instrument of differentiating between the Czechs and the Germans.

43 It had been the most important institution of learning in Silesia till the founding of the university at Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1702. Interestingly, the gymnasium survives as a secondary school still its original name of Carolinum.

44 He entered the Thirty Years War also prompted by the Swedish ambitions for hegemony in dominium maris Baltici (the Baltic region) (Halecki, 1994: 87).
largely cleared of the Protestant forces at the end of the year (Snoch, 1991: 158). The epidemic which broke out in Silesia in 1633 deepened tribulations suffered by the population but did not deter the Liegnitz-Brieg (Legnica-Brzeg) and Oels (Oleśnica) princes, and the city of Breslau (Wroclaw) from establishing a confederation\(^\text{45}\) to defend religious liberty of the Silesian Protestants under protection of the Saxon Elector (Ćetwiński, 1992: 21). However, following the devastating defeat inflicted on the Protestants at Nördlingen in 1634, the Elector along with other Protestant rulers signed the Peace of Prague (1635) and gave up Silesia to the Emperor in exchange for the Lusatias and certain concessions for the Saxon Lutherans (Anon., 1990b: 326/327; Ćetwiński, 1992: 21). Religious liberty was retained only in the principalities of Liegnitz-Brieg (Legnica-Brzeg), Wohldau (Wolów) and Oels (Oleśnica) whereas the rest of Silesia was to become Catholic in the span of the following three years (Snoch, 1991: 158; Weczerka, 1977: LXII). The process was overseen and facilitated by the adamantly Catholic new Silesian \textit{Landesoberhauptmann} Georg Ludwig von Stahremberg who had been nominated to the position by Emperor Ferdinand III (1637-1657) (Snoch, 1991: 158). Moreover, Breslau (Wroclaw) lost the seat of \textit{Landesoberhauptmann} of Silesia, and the renewed persecutions sent a wave of refugees to the tolerant lands of Saxony’s Lusatias, Brandenburg and Poland\(^\text{46}\) (Weczerka, 1977: LXII).

In the year of the Peace of Prague France allied with Sweden and various German Protestant leaders declared war against Spain in an effort to weaken the political and territorial clout of the Habsburgs in Europe (Anon., 1990b: 327). Silesia was offered to Margrave Georg Wilhelm of Brandenburg but he was too weak to take it, then the proposal was extended to the Polish King Władysław IV Vasa (ruled 1636-1648) but he was not eager to enter the war facing opposition of the Polish nobility and being more interested in securing the Swedish crown for himself (Przewlocki, 1986: 30; Snoch, 1991: 158). In 1639 Lower Silesia was seized by the Swedish troops and became the scene of incessant warfare with concomitant plundering, epidemics and famines. In the years 1641-1642 the control over Silesia was regained by the imperial armies but the Swedish divisions started gaining the upper hand in the province under the command of general Lennart Torstenson until the moment when Denmark attacked Sweden and he had to go to the north in order to preserve Sweden’s stance vis-a-vis Denmark. Having achieved the goal he returned to Silesia in 1645 triggering off protracted marches of enemy armies without any decisive battles fought in the province. This deadlock was broken in 1648 when the Austro-Bavarian army was defeated, the Swedish troops laid siege of Prague and together with French soldiers of Munich, and France defeated the Habsburg forces at Lens, which forced Ferdinand III, confronted with the threat of an assault on Vienna, to agree to the peace conditions of the victors (Anon., 1990b: 327; Snoch, 1991: 61 & 158).

The Peace of Westphalia signed at Münster (1648), in addition to establishing Switzerland and the Dutch Republic (the Netherlands) as independent states, permanently and gravely weakened the Holy Roman Empire and the Habsburgs by recognizing the sovereignty and independence of the constituent states of the Empire, various territorial concessions to France and Sweden, as well as by granting the two states with the right to vote in the imperial diet. Thus, the peace ensured the emergence of France as the chief power on the Continent, and retarded the political unification of Germany (Anon., 1990b: 327; Anon., 1990c: 257). With the respect to ecclesiastical affairs, the peace provided the interdiction of all religious persecution in Germany and the confirmation of the Treaty of Passau and the Peace of Augsburg, hence continued validity of the principle: \textit{cuius regio, eius religio} in the case of Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism. On the other hand, the spread of Protestantism was checked by the provision that demanded a prince to forfeit his lands if he changed his religion (Anon., 1990c: 257).

\(^{45}\) Almost the whole of central Silesia participated in the confederation (Ćetwiński, 1992: 21).

\(^{46}\) The religious (predominantly Protestant but also Catholic) refugees and expellees started leaving Silesia with the increase in the Catholic-Protestant tension even before the outbreak of the Thirty Years War and their number rapidly soared in the years when one side of the conflict was victorious. The refugees were usually noblemen and well-to-do burghers nonetheless a smaller number of priests, monastic order members and pastors could be observed among them (Kopiec, 1991: 44; Weczerka, 1977: LXII).
At the Central European plane, it is estimated that no less than half of the population of the Empire perished during the war, countless cities, towns, villages, and farms were totally destroyed; and approximately two-thirds of the industrial, agricultural, and commercial; facilities were in ruins. In Silesia the losses were not as heavy but the province’s population diminished by one third (from 1.5 mln to 1 mln) (Snoch, 1991: 158) though in western Lower Silesia and the freie Standesherrschaft Pleß (Pszczyna) the percentage of population decrease was higher that 66% whereas in the region of the Sudets it was lower than 15% (Darby, 1978: 129; Lis, 1993: 51). There were 36 towns, 1095 villages and 118 castles totally destroyed. Especially the towns were ravaged by the war as the local centers on which heavy contributions were levied and where pillaging, executions of confessional opponents, epidemics, starving became the daily fare causing serious depopulation and seriously hampering if not bringing to a standstill economic activities (Snoch, 1991: 158). It is noteworthy to remember that many of the devastated towns have never regained the prewar population level while some only in 19th century (Weczerka, 1977: LXIV).

Religious freedom for the Protestants was guaranteed in the principalities of Liegnitz-Brieg (Legnica-Brzeg), Wohlau (Wolów), Oels (Oleśnica), and in Breslau (Wroclaw), and the other Protestants from Catholic principalities in Lower Silesia were granted three Friedenskirchen (peace churches) at Glogau (Głogów), Jauer (Jawor), and Schweidnitz (Swidnica). Elsewhere the policy of re-Catholicization was introduced. Confiscations of Protestant churches (including those built by the Protestants themselves and seized from the Catholics) which had started as early as 1627/1628 in Upper Silesia (Kopiec, 1991: 48) continued after 1648. Pastors were expelled and Protestant churches which could not be staffed with Catholic priests (due to their shortage) were closed down. The Protestant expellees and refugees with their coreligionists from Bohemia and Moravia tentatively settled in the region of the Sudets (where the warfare was not so intensive) in the 1630s, and after 1648 in the neighbor tolerant states where they established thriving settlements in the southern part of Wielkopolska bordering on Silesia (e.g.: Bojanowo, Rawitsch (Rawicz), Fraustadt (Wschnowa), Schlichtingsheim (Szlachtynowa), Unruhstadt (near today’s Karowa (Karge))), and in the border areas of Brandenburg (e.g. Rothenburg/Oder and Christianstadt (Krzyżtowice)) and the Lusatias (e.g. Halbau (Iowa), Goldentraum (Złotniki Lubańskie) and Wigansthal (Pobiedna)). The Protestants who decided to stay in the Catholic principalities of Silesia attended celebrations hold in the churches (Zufluchtskirchen) built across the Silesian borders by the Protestant refugees and expellees or in the churchen which were constructed specifically for this purpose (Grenzkirchen, border churches). Reduction of the number of Protestant chapels in the Habsburg hereditary principalities was carried out in 1653/1654 and in 1668 in the Sagan (Zagań) principality. In 1675 with the extinction of the Piast princes in Liegnitz-Brieg (Legnica-Brzeg) and Wohlau (Wolów) their principalities as imperial fiefs passed under the direct control of Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705) who retained religious freedom for the Protestants but also intensified the Catholic propaganda of the Counter-Reformation which found its crowning in 1702 when the Jesuits were allowed to transform their college into the Breslau (Wroclaw) University named Leopoldina after the Emperor. The administrative measures directed against Protestantism pushed the confession underground and fortified anti-Catholic and Protestant feelings in Silesia (Birke, 1968: 14/15; Kopiec, 1991: 48; Weczerka, 1977: LXII).

Such estimates, however, have been challenged as greatly exaggerated by some modern scholars, who believe the destruction to have been far less (Anon., 1990b: 327).

The college had opened the way for the university, having conferred its first MA degree in 1662 (Cetwiński, 1992: 22).

Despite the Habsburgs efforts to fully re-Catholicize Silesia the confessional borders established by the Thirty Years War in Silesia remained stable until 1945. Upper Silesia, and the Margravate of Glatz (Kłodsko, Klodzko) and the counties of Frankenstein (Ząbkowice) and Münsterberg (Ziębice) in Lower Silesia were in 90% Catholic whereas the rest of Lower Silesia was Protestant. The percentage of the Protestant population reached the figure of 85% in the western part of Lower Silesia (Neubach, 1992: 5).
After the conclusion of the Thirty Years War, understandably, Austria was reluctant to enter into another military conflict, however, in 1658, it had to intervene in the war between Sweden and Poland in order to prevent the collapse of the latter country as it could fortify the Franco-Swedish alliance to the point where the Habsburgs would not have been able to oppose it (Ehrich, 1992: 514). The Polish-Swedish War (1655-1660) which was waged by Charles X Gustavus (ruled 1648-1668) had had a lien on the Oppeln-Ratibor (Opole-Racibórz) principality for the Habsburgs unpaid debts. Although it had been a dynastic possession of the Vasas which could not be claimed by Poland their sheer presence had reestablished some links between Upper Silesia and Poland. In the time of the Swedish Deluge the Polish Royal court resided at Oberglogau (Głogówek) and the Polish Senate hold its meetings at Oppeln (Opole). Upper Silesia together with Breslau (Wroclaw) became the centers where Polish emigrants and guerrillas prepared the successful repulsion of the Swedes (Czapliński, 1993: 27; Lis, 1993: 51; Snoch, 1991: 155). The Vasas ownership of the largest Upper Silesian principality was terminated in 1666 when it was bought out by Emperor Leopold I (Libiszowska, 1986: 144) but Polish sympathies were refreshed in 1683 when the Polish troops under command of Polish King Jan III Sobieski (ruled 1674-1696) marched through eastern Upper Silesia in succor of Vienna besieged by the Turks. During a brief stopover in Upper Silesia Jan III Sobieski met the delegates of the Silesian nobility and the Emperor’s envoys at Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry), and his visit was well remembered due to the subsequent victory in the battle of Vienna (Lis, 1993: 52). The Polish link was continued by Jan III Sobieski’s son Jakub who married the Empress’s sister and received the town of Ohlau (Olawa) and the adjacent lands as a dowry. He lived there till 1734 when he left for Poland. After the death of Jan III Sobieski in 1696 Elector of Saxony Augustus II the Strong (ruled 1697-1704 & 1709-1733) was elected to the Polish throne. He negotiated with the French King against the Emperor hoping to secure for himself Silesia or at least the Sagan (Zagań) and Glogau (Głogów) principalities in order to forge a direct territorial link between Saxony and Poland, but to no avail (Przewlocki, 1986: 32).

Development of the Silesian industry did anchor Silesia in Germany directing its economic links towards the north-west especially after the completion of the Oder (Odra)-Spree (Friedrich-Wilhelm) Canal in 1668 which allowed dynamic development of linen industry which became the backbone of the Silesian economy in the 1670s. The state supported commerce and industry through the founding of the College of Commerce (Kommerzkolleg) in Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1716, and the province’s economic and financial output were needed by Emperor Charles VI (ruled 1711-1740) to implement his mercantilist and physiocratic policies (Cetwiński, 1992: 23; Weczerka, 1977: LXVI). However, the destructive effects of the Thirty Years War had not been overcome for at least a century after its end, and were especially visible in the neglected region of Upper Silesia overburdened by heavy taxation for financing Austria’s dynastic struggles and wars with Turkey (Ehrich, 1992: 515; Fuchs, 1995: 12). Certain recuperation could be oserved in the 1720s when the new centers of textile industry were established in Breslau (Wroclaw), Brieg (Brzeg) and Neustadt (Prudnik). The developments were not equaled in the field of mining which seriously declined and stagnated in Lower Silesia though thanks to granting of imperial privileges some new mines were constructed in Upper Silesia marking the modest beginnings of the future second Ruhr. Moreover, mining picked up

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50 In 1656 the delegates of the Wielkopolska nobility assembled at Breslau (Wroclaw) in order to work out a plan of freeing Poland from the Swedish occupation (Cetwiński, 1992: 22).
by the middle of 18th century in the Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko) Margravate where there were 19 ore and 18 coal mines exploited. The few steel mills which had existed in Lower Silesia since the Middle Ages, were soon outnumbered by those constructed in Upper Silesia where in 1740 there were 12 blast furnaces, 28 smelting furnaces, 34 iron smelting furnaces and 27 forging shops were in operation. In the 1730s industry which had hardly developed (besides some aforementioned exceptions) came to a virtual standstill and started declining, especially in mining. First of all, Silesia though significant, was a peripheral province in which Austria did not show too much economic interest having decided to support development of mining industry in closer to Vienna Styria. On the other hand, commercial links tied the province more tightly with Leipzig and Magdeburg than with Austria. Another factor which contributed to the stagnation of the Silesian industry was the rapid decline of Poland in 18th century (Fuchs, 1995: 12-14).

Regarding the political organization of Silesia in 1700, two thirds of its territory was constituted by the Habsburgs hereditary principalities. The rest was composed from the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop’s principality of Neisse-Grottkau (Nysa-Grodków), other hereditary princes principalities of Münsterberg (Ziębice), Oels (Oleśnica), Sagan (Zagań) and Troppau-Jägerndorf (Opava-Krnov, Opawa-Karniów), Freien Standesherrschaften of Beuthen/Oder (Bytom Odrzański), Carolath (Siedlisko), Trachenberg (Z.migród), Militsch (Milicz), Groß Wartenberg (Syców), Beuthen (Bytom) and Pleß (Pszczyna) as well as from a plethora of Minderstandesherrschaften (status minores) (Orzechowski, 1972: 13 & 16; Weczerka, 1977: LXIV). The consolidation of the majority of the Silesian territory in the hands of the Emperor as well as the fragmentation of the rest into numerous and legally differentiated entities allowed the Habsburgs to effectively control the province and use its parts for financial and political purposes without risking the danger of dismembering it. The Habsburgs policy of re-Catholicization and discrimination against Protestants, for instance, in nominations in civil service or town councils (Weczerka, 1977: LXIII) caused a growing unease in Silesia which resulted in some concessions at the beginning of 18th century. It was difficult time for the Habsburgs faced with the War for the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) which coincided and overlapped with the Great Northern War (1700-1721) in Central Europe. In the former war Poland in the personal union with Saxony joined forces with Brandenburg-Prussia, Hannover, Denmark and Russia against Sweden which led by Charles XII (ruled 1697-1718) had set out to conquer the whole of Baltic region, whereas in the latter war Austria supported by Hannover and Brandenburg-Prussia formed an alliance with other Protestant rulers against France which was to inherit the Spanish possessions of the Habsburgs. The new Emperor Joseph I (ruled 1705-1711), as an ally of Protestant states pragmatically distanced himself from religious quarrels. Charles XII was victorious through 1706 when he deposed Augustus II, seized Poland and plundered Saxony. On the other hand being an ardent Lutheran he wanted to further the Protestant cause in Silesia. Joseph I struggling with France, the traditional ally of Sweden and not wishing to alienate his Protestant supporters agreed to the suggestion (Anon., 1990d: 344; Anon., 1990e: 246/247; Anon., 1990f: 46; Ehrich, 1992: 514; 52)

51 The most modern industrial innovations were introduced to Upper Silesia in a rapid succession. The pioneer of Upper Silesian industry Saxon Count Heinrich Jakob Fleming constructed the first blast furnace near Kieferstädtel (Sos’nicowice) in 1703, and in Jakobswalde (Kotlarnia): the brass furnace in 1709, which was the beginning of his works where sheet brass, wire and mirrors were produced. In 1709 his exemplary iron works was opened in Blechhammer (Blachownia) (Fuchs, 1995: 14)

52 Minderstandesherrschaften (status minores) were a specific form of feudal ownership which did not give their owners such prerogatives as Freien Standesherrschaften (status majores) which, at the political and administrative plane, were equal to principalities (Orzechowski, 1972: 13).

53 The anti-Catholic feeling may be exemplified with the outbreak of the anti-Jesuit riots in Breslau (Wroclaw) (1648) or with the spreading of the Protestant movement of praying children which emanated from western Silesia and led to violent events at the beginning of 1708 in the Silesian capital (Cetwiński, 1992: 22 & 24). On the other hand, during the years of intensified persecutions the Protestant confession did not disappear supported by Protestant preachers who hid in forests where they held celebrations for their coreligionists (Kopiec (1991: 48).
In 1707 the Convention of Altranstädt was signed considerably improving the situation of the Protestants in Silesia and affirming the specific position of the province as the only multiconfessional land among the Habsburgs hereditary lands (Eickels, 1994). The Emperor as the guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia obliged himself to retract the anti-Protestant measures which had been introduced after 1648. Apart from the Friedenkirchen the Silesian Protestants were allowed to build five new so-called Gnadenkirchen (mercy churches) in Lower Silesia: Freystadt (Koz.uchów), Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra), Landeshut (Kamienna Góra), Militsch (Milicz), Sagan (Zagań), and only one in Upper Silesia: Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn). Besides, 128 churches (which they had received during Reformation) were returned to the Protestants (Neubach, 1992: 5; Weczerka, 1977: LXIII; Pitronowa, 1992: 47).

The confessional situation in Upper Silesia considerably differed in Upper Silesia and in the Glatz (Kłodzko) Margravate which previously had not been staunchly Protestant and underwent thorough re-Catholicization during the Counter-Reformation. The process was facilitated by the pilgrimage movement which countered Protestant pietism. The two most significant destinations of Silesian pilgrims were the Jasna Góra shrine at Czestochowa, Poland very near the Silesian border and another one in Albendorf (Wambierzyce), Glatz (Kłodzko) Margravate. Some local pilgrimage destinations survived the Reformation but majority of them were founded during the Counter-Reformation. The dense network of churches constituting such pilgrimage centers covered the whole of this region. Moreover, the shrine at St. Annaberg (Góra Sw. Anny) with its famous stations of the Cross became the spiritual capital of Upper Silesia (Hanich, 1985: 12/13; Kopiec, 1991: 61/62; Wrabec, 1994). Regarding Lower Silesia, Breslau (Wroclaw), however, remained a great Catholic center with under the authority of Poland’s archbishopric of Gniezno (Gnesen) near Poznań (Posen). Its Baroque buildings expressed the Catholic spirit of the age unlike in Upper Silesia where the development of Baroque style was curbed by successful early re-Catholicization, certain cultural and economic backwardness of the region, as well as by the unfavorable ground conditions (sandy soil, marshes) which did not allow construction of sumptuous grand churches and monasteries (Wiskemann, 1956: 23; Wrabec, 1994).

Silesia being a peripheral and partly Protestant land of the Habsburg possessions, Vienna’s interest in it was slim. The direct connections, be they confessional, commercial, educational or industrial, were quite loose and since Ferdinand II’s journey of homage in 1617, no ruler had set foot on Silesian soil (Birke, 1968: 17). What is the more, the House of Habsburg suffered a serious crisis in the first half of the 18th century as Emperor Charles VI (ruled 1711-1740) did not have a male heir and his brother Joseph I (ruled 1705-1711) had died without leaving any male offspring. Hence, in 1713 Charles VI decided to issue a decree according to which any of his and Joseph I’s daughters should be eligible for the succession. Afterwards the Austrian diplomacy had to concentrate on coaxing European states and the constituent countries of the Empire to recognize the Pragmatic Sanction as the imperial pronouncement became known. He secured this order of succession by making broad concessions to foreign powers and German princes and died expecting a smooth

54 They were called mercy churches because their erection on the Silesian hereditary lands of the Habsburgs was possible thanks to the Emperor’s mercy (Weczerka, 1977: LXIII).
55 Interestingly, the former shrine catered for the pilgrims mainly in Polish whereas the other in Czech which lucidly illustrates the fact that Silesia, and especially Upper Silesia used to be and still is the meeting point of the Polish, German and Czech/Moravian culture and languages.
56 The stations of the Cross were popularly dubbed as New Jerusalem by the Upper Silesians (Marek, 1985: 120).
57 It was only in 1821 that the bishopric of Breslau (Wrocław) was placed directly under Papal authority, Berlin being made dependant on Breslau (Wrocław) (Wiskemann, 1956: 23) though for all practical reasons the ties between Breslau (Wrocław) and Gniezno (Gnesen) were severed already in 1748 (Davies, 1991: 1169).
succession for Maria Theresa. The poor state of Austria’s military defense during the last years of Charles VI’s reign vitiated his careful diplomatic maneuvers, and it was of particular importance that four month’s prior to the Emperor’s death young ruler Frederick II the Great (ruled 1740-1786), had succeeded to the throne of Prussia, which he wanted to raise to great power status. Thus it was that a major German state, which previously had been consistently loyal to the Austrian and imperial cause, became throughout Maria Theresa’s entire reign the most determined foe of the Habsburg Empire (Ehrich, 1992: 515-516).

When Charles VI died three other claimants to the imperial throne appeared: Charles Albert (ruled as Emperor 1740-1745), Elector of Bavaria, Augustus III (ruled 1733-1763), Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, and Philip V (ruled 1700-1746), King of Spain, despite the fact that they previously had acknowledged Maria Theresa’s right to rule (Ehrich, 1992: 516). The rival claims for the hereditary domains of the Habsburg family caused the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) (Anon., 1990h: 121). King of Prussia Frederick II offered Maria Theresa his support in exchange for Silesia which he needed to boost the political clout of his kingdom (Lis, 1993: 53).

He propped his supposed right to Silesia with the Hohenzollerns old claims to several Silesian principalities. In the case of the principality of Ratibor-Oppeln (Racibórz-Opole), during the reign of Vladislav II of Bohemia his nephew Margrave Georg von Brandenburg-Ansbach (known as Georg the Pious), obtained from his uncle in exchange for some pecuniary claims a promise of the succession to the principality. The transaction was not legal, and, though it does not seem to have been seriously questioned for some time, yet in 1546 the son and successor to the Margrave, Georg Friedrich, was deprived of the principality, which was held to have escheated to Bohemia. Notwithstanding the flaws in his title, Georg Frederick claimed to dispose of this property by his will, leaving it to Joachim Friedrich (ruled 1598-1608), afterwards Elector of Brandenburg. This was the sole ground to the Hohenzollerns claims to the principality these were, therefore, of the most dubious character, and were in abeyance until 1642.

Considering the principality of Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów), it was purchased by Margrave Georg von Brandenburg-Ansbach, and passed without question to his son, Georg Friedrich. When, however, the latter included this principality in the territory which he left to Brandenburg by his will, the Emperor disputed the validity of the will on the ground that the original enfeoffment of Margrave Georg von Brandenburg-Ansbach could not be extended to include persons who were not his direct descendants. Notwithstanding this objection, the principality in fact passed according to the terms of the will, and from 1608 to 1623 was held by Johann Georg, the second son of the original beneficiary, Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg. In 1623, however, in consequence of the part played by Johann Georg in the Bohemian Revolution (which opened the Thirty Years War) the principality was confiscated, and bestowed by the Emperor on a member of another family. Claims to the principality were asserted by Friedrich Wilhelm (ruled 1644-1680), Great Elector of Brandenburg in 1642, on the death of Johann Georg’s son, and were thenceforward persisted in.

Another claim was laid to the principalities of Liegnitz (Legnica), Brieg (Brzeg) and Wohlaun (Wołów). The three principalities had been made in 1537 the subject of a covenant of succession between Liegnitz (Legnica) prince Friedrich, who was son-in-law of Georg von Brandenburg-Ansbach, and the Hohenzollerns. By the terms of the agreement, it was provided that on failure of heirs to Liegnitz (Legnica) the three principalities should pass to Brandenburg, while correspondingly,

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58 Until the election of her husband Francis I of Lorrain (ruled 1745-1765) as emperor, Maria Theresa was referred to only as Queen of Bohemia and Hungary. Although her husband was the Emperor she was the factual ruler and retained ultimate authority for herself even after Francis I’s demise. She recognized his son Joseph II (ruled 1765-1790) only as a coregent but not earlier than his mother died in 1780 was he able to start ruling in earnest (Anon., 1990g: 443; Ehrich, 1992: 516).

59 In this he went against his deceased father who had recognized the Pragmatic Sanction in 1728 (Prothero, 1920: 13).
if the Brandenburg succession should fail, the Bohemian possessions of the Hohenzollerns should pass to Liegnitz (Legnica).

Liegnitz (Legnica) being a fief of the Bohemian Crown, such an arrangement was clearly *ultra vires*, and in 1546 it was declared invalid by the estates of Silesia, and it was ordered that the two copies of the deed should be destroyed. With this order the Liegnitz (Legnica) prince complied, but the Brandenburg counterpart was preserved in defiance of imperial orders; and on the death of Georg Wilhelm, the last of the Piast princes of Liegnitz (Legnica), in 1675, a claim to the principalities was immediately put forward by Great Elector Friedrich Wilhelm, though he shortly afterward made an unsuccessful endeavor to commute this claim for the recognition of his title to Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów), which was perhaps the least shadowy of the Hohenzollern pretensions in Silesia.

In 1685, on reconciliation with Emperor Leopold I, Great Elector Friedrich Wilhelm agreed to abandon all his Silesian claims in return for the cession of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin). This arrangement was adopted and continued in force from 1686 to 1694. On the death of the Great Elector, however, in 1688, negotiations were started for the restoration of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin) to the Habsburgs, which took effect in 1694; whereupon Friedrich III (ruled 1688-1713), who became King of Prussia in 1701, tentatively revived his Silesian claims. These were, however, not admitted by the Emperor, and remained in abeyance up to the death of Emperor Charles VI in 1740. In 1732 King Friedrich Wilhelm I (ruled 1713-1740) of Prussia in whom the claims were vested, actually consented to be the Emperor’s guest in Liegnitz (Legnica) and Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) (Honzák, 1995: 458-459; Prothero, 1920: 11-13).

The above-presented claims as well as the status of Prussia (alongside Sweden) as a guarantor of observance of the Convention of Altranstädt (Herzig, 1995: 62), allowed Friedrich II to help himself to Silesia even though Maria Theresa did not wish to accept his proposal to support her against the claimants to the Viennese throne in exchange for this land (Lis, 1993: 53). He invaded the Austrian province on December 16, 1740. The Silesian Protestants were probably willing to welcome Prussian rule because even after the Convention of Altranstädt (1707) they had suffered from repressive measures, including, for instance, burning of heretical books were on court orders, and heavy fines upon converts to Protestantism, though the penal laws had been relaxed in practice since 1737 (Četwiński, 1992: 25; Prothero, 1920: 13/14). Besides, Silesia being a peripheral region of Austria seemed to have more direct economic and cultural links with Saxony and Prussian Berlin. It had allowed a shoemaker Johann Christian Döblin to organize a demonstration of Breslauers in favor of Prussian rule two days before Friedrich II ordered the actual invasion. At that time the Prussian state was quite popular among the Silesian populace due to its efficient economy and administration, and, not the least, to the consistent application of confessional tolerance (Četwiński, 1992: 25). After several months of wading off the Austrian counterattacks and having won the decisive battle of Molwitz (Malujowice) (June 19, 1741), Friedrich II was left in virtual control of Silesia by the Truce of Klein Schnellendorf (October 9, 1741). On November 7, 1741 the Silesian Estates paid homage to Friedrich II at the Breslau (Wroclaw) city hall. After further warfare from December 1741 to June 1742 when also Bavaria, Saxony and France declared war on Austria, Maria Theresa decided to make peace with Friedrich II, ceding in the Treaty of Breslau (Wroclaw) (June 11, 1742) all of Silesia (as well as the Moravian exclave of Katscher (Kietrz)) except the southern parts of the principalities of Neisse (Nysa), Troppau (Opava, Opawa) and Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów), and all of the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) principality. The Second Silesian War (1744-1745), climaxed by a series of Prussian victories, again confirmed Friedrich II’s conquest of Silesia which was acknowledged by

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60 In 1726 such an event took place in Breslau (Wroclaw) for the last time (Četwiński, 1992: 25).

61 It was only in 1617 when the Habsburg suzerain - Emperor Matthias arrived to accept homage of the Silesian estates for the last time before Friedrich II annexed the land (Weber, 1995: 111).

62 Interestingly, though Polish was not much spoken in towns, Friedrich II, nevertheless, considered it worthwhile to publish a proclamation in Polish in Breslau in December 1744 in order to warn the inhabitants against the Viennese machinations (Wiskemann, 1956: 23).

It must be, however, remarked that though thanks to Friedrich II the Silesian Protestants could feel at home as fully accepted subjects\(^64\), the Prussian rule was not so much welcomed especially by the Slavic-speaking Catholics of Upper Silesia. In the First Silesian War they carried on a guerrilla warfare against the Prussian army. These risings were suppressed with great severity and any Silesian bearing arms was treated as a spy. For a moment there was even a possibility that they would have been supported by Polish troops because, dwelling on the principle of friendship between Poland and the Habsburgs, the Polish Sejm urged Polish King and Elector of Saxony Augustus III to take up arms on behalf of the Silesian Catholics, who were threatened with subjection to a Protestant ruler. On the other hand, as the Protestant population of Silesia did not strongly identify themselves with Austria, they did not quickly develop attachment to the new dynasty. Thus, at the opening of 1740, Breslau (Wroclaw) showed no indication to hold out in defence of Maria Theresa, and it showed no greater desire to suffer on Friedrich II’s behalf in 1757 when during the Seven Years War, the Silesians of the Breslau (Wroclaw) garrison who had been pressed into the Prussian service, went over to the Austrians after the fall of the city (Lis, 1993: 53; Prothero, 1920: 14).

The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was the last major conflict before the French Revolution to involve all the great powers of Europe. Generally, France, Austria, Saxony, Sweden, and Russia were aligned on one side against Prussia, Hannover, and Great Britain on the other. It was played out in Europe but its theater was also constituted by the overseas French and English colonies. A significant part of the conflict was limited to a struggle for dominance in Silesia, and as such is sometimes referred to as the Third Silesian War. On May 1, 1756 Austro-French alliance was concluded with the Treaty of Versailles which was joined by Tsarina Elizabeth (ruled 1741-1762), Saxony, Sweden, and the Empire (with the exception of the territorial states of Hanover, Hesse-Kassel and Brunswick). In the Treaty the parties involved agreed that Austria would regain Silesia, Russia would obtain Courland, and Saxony East Prussia. Friedrich II faced with an opposition twenty times superior (according to population figures) had to struggle for continued existence of Prussia in a series of the classical battles in the history of warfare. With the preemptive attack of August 1756 he made Saxony capitulate at Pirna, and the country became the base for Prussian operations. Although outnumbered two to one he defeated the Franco-German army at Rossbach in Thuringia on November 5, 1757. He then turned to meet the Austrians in Silesia and, again heavily outnumbered, won his greatest victory at Leuthen (Lutynia) on December 5, 1757. Meanwhile Russia entered the war, and on August 12, 1759 Friedrich II suffered a disastrous defeat by a joint Austro-Russian force at Kunersdorf (Kunowice). The victors disunity, however, saved Prussia and in 1760 let Friedrich with the British financial support defeat his enemies in the battles of Liegnitz (Legnica) and Torgau. The low point of the war came in December 1761. Friedrich II, his armies all but exhausted by the war that had forced them into a series of rapid maneuvers against multiple enemies, was near despair. But at the point, Austria was not interested in prolonging the war as its staggering public debt rose threefold, and on the death of Tsarina Elizabeth in 1762 she was succeeded by Tsar Peter III (ruled 1762), who as an admirer of Friedrich II not only made peace with Prussia but also mediated a peace between it and Sweden, and finally joined Friedrich II in an effort to oust the Austrians from Silesia. Though Peter III was soon afterwar assassinated, his successor, Catherine II the Great (ruled 1762-1796), did not renew hostilities against Prussia. Friedrich II then drove the Austrians from Silesia defeating them at Schweidnitz (Swidnica) (November 10, 1762) (Radler, 1977: 495) while his ally, Ferdinand of

\(^63\) The two Silesian Wars formed parts of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) which was fought by an alliance of Bavaria, Spain, Sardinia, Prussia, and Saxony against Austria, allied with the Netherlands and Great Britain (Anon., 1990h:121),

\(^64\) Freedom of religion was granted not only to the Silesian Lutherans but also to the Calvinists. Afterward, the Silesian Protestants built 212 churches by 1756 making Protestantism an integral part of Silesian heritage, but, on the whole, the status quo between Catholicism and Protestantism was maintained largely unchanged until 1945 (Weber, 1995: 110).
Brunswick, won victories over the French at Wilhelmsthal and over the Saxons at Lutterberg and captured the important town of Göttingen. A lack of resources forced France and Sweden to discontinue the war, and Austria had to initiate negotiations. By the Franco-British Treaty of Paris (February 10, 1763) Britain won North America and India, and became the chief power in overseas colonization. On February 15, 1763 a peace was signed between Austria, Saxony, and Prussia at the Saxon castle of Hubertusburg, confirming Prussian possession of Silesia and elevating Prussia to the status of fifth major European power. The only minor concession made by Friedrich II was a pledge to cast the electoral vote of Prussian Brandenburg in the next imperial elections in favor of Maria Theresa’s oldest son, Joseph (Anon., 1992a: 666/667; Ehrich, 1992: 517; Kinder, 1978: 282/283; Snoch, 1991: 85 & 157; Weczerka, 1977: LXX-LXXII).

Before venturing into describing the reforms and changes which were implemented by Friedrich II in Silesia it is useful to observe Prussia’s quick ascent to power. On January 18, 1701 Great Elector Friedrich III (ruled 1688-1713) crowned himself as King of Prussia Friedrich I at Königsberg. Thereafter, the other Hohenzollern possessions, though theoretically remaining within the Empire and under the ultimate overlordship of the Emperor, soon came to be treated in practice rather as belonging to the Prussian Kingdom than as distinct from it. Friedrich I’s son Friedrich Wilhelm I (ruled 1713-1740) endowed the Prussian state with its military and bureaucratic character. He raised the army to 80,000 men (equivalent to 4% of the population) and geared the whole organization of the state to the military machine. One half of his army consisted of hired foreigners, and the other half was recruited from the King’s own subjects. This system made all young Prussian men of the lower classes mostly peasants liable for military service. The close coordination of military, financial, and economic affairs was moreover complemented by Friedrich Wilhelm I’s reorganization of the administrative system, and he came to control the whole life of the state. Thus, complete absolutism was introduced in the state, and Friedrich Wilhelm I left to his son and successor Friedrich II the best-trained army in Europe, a financial reserve of 8 million thalers, productive domains, provinces developed through large-scale colonization (particularly East Prussia), and a hardworking, thrifty and conscientious bureaucracy. These advantages were crucial preconditions for Friedrich II’s spectacular and successful tour de force in the world of European power politics (Anon., 1992b: 752; Anon., 1992c: 552; Muirhead, 1908: 466).

Absolutism and efficient governance demanded a simple administrative organization of the state. It was achieved by Friedrich Wilhelm I in 1723. Henceforth, the highly centralized Prussian state was divided into departments (Kriegsund Domainen-Kammern-Departements, which, subsequently, were subdivided into counties (Kreise). The entities were territorially coherent as the numerous enclaves (so common all over Europe until the middle of the 18th century) had been liquidated. The new division largely disregarded prior administrative entities such as principalities, freie Standesherrschaften etc. On the other hand, the unity of the new division was unbalanced by the different systems of tax inspections (Steuerrätliche Departements) and cantons (Kantonbezirke) which were used for conscription. The organization of the Prussian state was the basis for administrative reforms in Silesia which was to become another province of Prussia. Friedrich II started to implement the changes in Silesia already in 1741. In the official Prussian documents Silesia was referred to as the Principalities of Lower Silesia before Friedrich II gained Upper Silesia, and then the dual term the Sovereign Duchy of Silesia and the Margravate of Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko) was used. With time the longish name was replaced with a shorter one the Silesian Province. The

65 Although so late as 1866 the recovery of Silesia was made one of the objects of a proposed alliance between Austria and Napoleon III, Prussia remained in an undisturbed possession of those parts which were won by Friedrich II until 1918 (Prothero, 1920: 13). The much larger part of Silesia belonging to Prussia was denoted as Prussian Silesia, whereas the part which remained with Austria as Austrian Silesia or Restschlesien (Remaining Silesia) (Kofalka, 1995: 18).
province was divided into two departments of Breslau (Wrocław) and Glogau (Głogów), however, they were not subjected to the General Directory as other Prussian departments, but directly to the Silesian Minister (Landesminister) in the Prussian government. The counties (subdivisions of the departments) were to be of equally the same size and controlled by Landraten. On the other hand, the main traditional estate institutions of Silesia were liquidated in line with the introduction of absolutist governance (Orzechowski, 1972a). The same fate met municipal self-governments which were superseded with municipal offices subjected to one of the two department offices. Breslau (Wrocław), however, retained its privileged position elevated to the status of a capital and residence city (Hauptund Residenzstadt). Thus, as Königsberg (Kaliningrad) and Berlin, it became a Prussian capital, but was the wealthiest of them, as in 1803 Breslau’s (Wrocław’s) revenue was three and a half times bigger than Berlin’s and four than Königsberg’s (Kaliningrad’s). The economic importance of the city for Prussia was acknowledged and fortified in 1765 when the newly-established branch of the Royal Prussian Bank started issuing bank notes (Cetwiński, 1992: 25-27).

Thanks to the conquest of Silesia the territory of the Prussian state increased by a little less than 50%, and to the Prussian population of 2,240,000, 1,160,000 Silesians were added. In 1785 60% of the Prussian industry was concentrated in Silesia. The province’s share in the Prussian commerce reached well over 50% in 1750; in that year Prussia’s all exports amounted to 12.6 mln thalers but Silesia’s share 9.9 mln thalers, and the corresponding import figures are 9.4 mln and 7.5 mln thalers (Cetwiński, 1992: 25; Herzig, 1995: 63; Kinder, 1978: I 282). On the other hand, Austria though weakened, remained a great power, and compensatory acquisitions for the loss of Silesia were impending. But, taking a long-range view, the Prussian victory represented a decision in the first round of the struggle for supremacy in Germany between the Habsburg Empire and Prussia, a conflict that the Habsburg Empire was to lose decisively within a century.

The part of Silesia which remained with Austria was cut into two separate pieces by the oddly protruding north-eastern salient of Moravia (bounded by the Oder (Odra) and the Ostrawica (Ostravice) Rivers) which came up to the new Prusso-Austrian border. The western part was called Troppau (Opava, Opawa) Silesia and eastern Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Silesia. The former constituted of the larger parts of the Troppau (Opava, Opawa) and Jägerndorf (Krnov, Kamiłów) principalities as well as of the southern section of the Neisse (Nysa) principality and was separated from Prussian Silesia by the River Oppe (Opava, Opawa). The eastern part of Austrian Silesia was formed by the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) principality. The total area of Austrian Silesia amounted only to 5,147 sq km which was just one eighth of Silesia’s before the Prussian annexation. Already in 1742 Maria Theresa organized Austrian Silesia as a separate crown land with its capital in Troppau (Opava, Opawa) from where it was administered by a royal governor. However, since 1782, for the sake of efficiency, collection of taxes was conducted by two separate offices in Troppau (Opava, Opawa) and

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66 Initially, the departments were of equal size as they had been predicted to contain only Lower Silesia, however, when in 1742 Friedrich II seized Upper Silesia, he simply incorporated it into the Breslau (Wrocław) department making it two times bigger than the Glogau (Głogów) department (Orzechowski, 1972a: 31/32).

67 The recommendation was not fully implemented as some counties were based on the subdivision of former principalities, several included not liquidated enclaves, and there still remained two Silesian enclaves immersed in the territories of Brandenburg and Saxony (Orzechowski, 1972a: 30 & 32).

68 From the total area of Silesia - 40,625 sq km Prussia gained 35,786 sq km, and, besides, the Glatz (Kłodzko, Klodzko) Margravate of 1,136 sq km, and the Moravian exclave of Katscher (Kietrz) of 58 sq km. Austria was left with just one eighth of Silesia’s original territory, i.e. 4,849 sq km (Weber, 1995: 106).

69 Troppau (Opava, Opawa) Silesia was also referred to as West Silesia (Westoberschlesien or Westschlesien) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Silesia (Ostoberschlesien or Ostschlesien) (Snoch, 1991: 140-143).

70 The southeastern corner of West Silesia was invaded by the narrow Moravian salient marked by the two towns of Walterstadt (Valterovice) and Fulnek (Fulnek), as well as by the two Moravian exclaves centered around Neu Würben (Nove Vrbno) and Botenwald (Butovice) (Scobel, 1909: III/IV). The anachronistic remanant of medieval territorial organization survived until 1918 when the province passed onto the newly-formed state of Czechoslovakia.
Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn), which were supervised by the royal office in Troppau (Opava, Opawa). In contrast to Prussian Silesia Maria Theresa retained estate institutions, and, thus, the Assembly of the Estates of Austrian Silesia was established. This arrangement was disturbed by the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778/1779). In 1777 the Bavarian dynasty came to an end, and Joseph II decided to become a heir to Bavaria. Friedrich II opposed such an development because it would much more than offset the loss of Silesia and would have given the Habsburgs renewed predominance in Germany. The conflict once again pitted Maria Theresa and Friedrich II against each other, but in their old age they were reluctant to fight another major war, and negotiated the Treaty of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) in May 1779 which maintained the status quo between Austria and Prussia with some minor adjustments with no bearing on Silesia. Faced with the apparent lack of success, in 1782 (after Maria Theresa’s death), Joseph II united the Austrian fragments of Silesia with Moravia. Henceforth, administration of the Moravian-Silesian province was conducted from the Moravian capital of Brünn (Brno) until the decision was partially reversed by Joseph II’s successor Leopold II (ruled 1790-1792) in 1790. He re-established West Silesia and East Silesia as departments of the Moravian-Silesian crown land. Afterwards Austrian Silesiá71 existed as a separate administrative entity from 1849 by the breakup of the Habsburg monarchy in 1918 except for a brief period of several months in 1860/1861 when it was merged with Moravia (Anon., 1905: 388/389; Ehrich, 1992: 518; Gawrecki, 1993: 48; Pitronowa, 1992: 52; Snoch, 1991: 140; Turner, 1992: 99; Weczerka, 1977: LXXI; Wiskemann, 1938: 114).

During the reigns of Friedrich II and Joseph II the dynastic interests took precedence over confession and quite pragmatically not to alienate his Catholic subject in the case of Prussia and Protestant ones in Austria, both of them instituted freedom of conscience though the latter only in 1781 after the death of his mother Maria Theresa in 1780. The move marked the end of confessional conflicts and shifted Central Europe onto the plane of struggles for dominance within the European framework of political organization based on the concept of balance of power. Guaranteed freedom of religion let Austria retain territorial coherence and the status of a declining European power until the violent outbreak of nationalist tensions at the beginning of 20th century. Prussia, quite differently, used it as an instrument to bring the various churches together for the purpose of unifying the state and furthering its power. Obviously the new political approach contributed to lessening of confessional animosities in Prussian and Austrian Silesiá72 (Anon., 1992d: 752; Muirhead, 1908: 466; Pitronowa, 1992: 53).

In order to close the outline of Silesian political history in 18th century it is indispensable to comment on the plight of Poland. Since the 1710s the state had been in a sorry state of affairs, and in the course earned its label of The Republic of Anarchy. The Polish Sejm was hamstrung by the Liberum Veto which demanded unanimity of all the deputies to pass any act. The unreformed constitution still permitted the formation of confederations. Despite a population of 11 million and a territory larger than either France or Spain there was still no central treasury, and in practice a royal army of only 12,000 men. The last Polish King Stanislaw August Poniatowski (ruled 1764-1795) was virtually powerless. Magnates and their retainers petty nobility did control whole regions of the country with their armies and huge financial power, contracted agreements with foreign rulers, considered themselves to be of equal rank as the King and openly defied the royal or any central

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71 During the rule of Maria Theresa, the part of Silesia which remained with Austria was referred to as Czech Silesiá in contemporary documents reflecting the medieval status of Silesia as an incorporated land of the Czech Crown. The label Austrian Silesiá became widespread only after 1849 (Gawrecki, 1993: 49).

72 Certain forms of discrimination against Protestants in Austrian Silesia and Catholics in Prussian Silesia continued. The situation was unbearable enough for East Silesian Protestants that they joined Czech Protestants on their trek to settle down in Prussian Silesia where they were welcomed by the Protestant-dominated administration and state (Weber, 1995: 109). On the other hand, Catholic civil servants could not be nominated to managerial positions in Prussia and after 1871 in the Reich by 1918 (Neubach, 1992: 6).
power let alone reform efforts which could limit their Golden Freedom. The position of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to rapidly deteriorate vis-a-vis the neighbor absolutist monarchies. The strongest of them Russia had governed Poland as its protectorate since the beginning of 18th century. On the other hand, Prussia after having finally established its dominance in Silesia in 1763 remained with drained finances. Moreover, the two largest constituent parts of the Prussian state: Brandenburg with Silesia and Ducal (East) Prussia, were still separated by the broad Polish province of Royal (West) Prussia. In order to consolidate his territorial gains and strengthen Prussia economically, in 1768, Friedrich II produced a plan of partitioning Poland. It was taken up by Catherine the Great (ruled 1762-1796) as further indirect control over Poland was becoming ungainly. Maria Theresa opposed the partition because Poland had been a traditional ally of the Habsburgs by then. On the other hand, she could not allow Russia to have Poland as an undivided satellite as it would have meant a further shift of the balance of power to Austria’s disadvantage so she had to take part in the first partition of 1772. Due to political difficulties it had to abstain from the second one in 1793 but once again was party to the third partition which took place in 1795 and finally dismembered the whole truncated Poland. All in all Austria seized only 17.57% of the Polish territory, Prussia 19.27% whereas Russia 63.15%. Leaving aside further implications of the partitions one can observe that Prussia nicely rounded up its possessions having joined Brandenburg with East Prussia, and filled up the void between its northern territories and Silesia with Posnania (South Prussia) and New East Prussia (Mazovia). Austria gained more land to administer which could not be easily absorbed as the country’s resources were strained through its vast underdeveloped stretches of land and renewed warfare with the Ottoman Empire. Considering Silesia, its Austrian and Prussian parts gained direct and unhindered by any borders neighborhood of the Polish provinces of Galicia (Malopolska) and Posnania, respectively. It was to be of significance, in the coming epoch of rising nationalisms, for the development of national relations as a considerable part of the populace of Upper Silesia and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Silesia was constituted by speakers of Polish dialects. Moreover, in 1790 the principality of Siewierz (Sewerien) was added to Prussian Silesia. After the last partition in 1795 the principality together with the adjacent territories of the Pilica county and Dabrowa (Dombrowa) region was turned into the new administrative entity New Silesia (Neu-Schlesien) which lasted until Napoleon Bonaparte annexed it in 1807 and subsequently attached to the Duchy of Warsaw. New

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73 The events of this period in Polish history strongly contributed to creation of two stereotypical notions through which Poland has been perceived until today in the German-speaking countries and in Silesia. They are: polnische Wirtschaft (Polish economy) denoting utmost disorder, inefficiency and slovenliness, and polnische Reichstag (Polish parliament) symbolizing a long, stormy and chaotic assembly eventually unable to produce any result. The first use of the former term is attested in 1785, and the other as early as 1712 but in its Swedish form polsk riksdag. Both the expressions entered numerous German dictionaries where still persist and thus continue instilling old stereotypes (Orlowski, 1992).

74 The staggering costs of and destruction wreaked by the three Silesian Wars overburdened the Silesian economy and population. With time the financial squeeze did not ebb but was maintained by the necessity of constructing numerous fortresses and fortification to prevent Austria from recapturing the land. The key complex of forts erected in the Sudets near Silberberg (Srebrna Góra) even earned an appropriate nickname: Silesian Gibraltar (Bein, 1983: 11). The situation also required maintaining a 35,000-troop-strong army in Silesia whereas the Austrian garrison in Silesia had been ten times smaller (Herzig, 1995: 63; Weber, 1995: 106/107).

75 Prussia had been party to abortive plans for dismembering Poland already in 1656, 1720 and 1752 (Davies, 1991: I 515).

76 Even before the partition Austria annexed the small territories of Spisz (Zips, SpiSV) (1769), Nowy Sącz (Neusandez) and Nowy Targ (1770) which had been a bone of contention between Poland and Hungary (Davies, 1991: I 512).

77 Despite the mere decade of existence of New Silesia the Prussian state left an indelible imprint on it. In 1785 coal was discovered in the region, and the Prussians gave the starting impetus to the new mining industry in this region by having built two coal mines and explored the geological formation of the district. In future the south-
Chapter one

Silesia contained an area of 2,230 sq km and its northern border was only 1.5 km away from Częstochowa (Czemps, 1990: 3/2; Davies, 1991: 1 511-523; Ehrich, 1992: 517/518; Kinder, 1978: 285; Snoch, 1991: 99).

The second half of 18th century was marked by numerous reforms and onset of industrialization in Austrian and Prussian Silesia, however, the changes in Prussia rather fortified the state whereas modifications in Austria seemed only to maintain the status quo within the Habsburg Empire overburdened with administration of its vast and highly diversified lands and the struggle against the Turks.

In Austrian Silesia, before and after the Seven Years War there were peasant riots directed against nobility and the institution of serfdom. This coupled with similar social turmoils in the Empire made Maria Theresa alleviate the lot of unfree peasants by strictly defining service obligations of the peasantry. She also implemented a new state-controlled educational system (beginning with 1774), and introduced restrictions on the largely arbitrary patrimonial jurisdiction of the lords on their estates, and started the administrative reforms which were to transform the estate system into a partially bureaucratic administration based on civil service rules. She preserved the external shell of the estates structure but Joseph II started a series of new reforms in 1781. He largely abolished the estates structures and the various privileges of the nobles and the Church. He also loosened the craft guild restrictions and annulled customs duties for exports to other crownlands. He also supported new Swabian settlers in Hungary, Galicia and Bukovina. Moreover, he abolished serfdom and introduced German as the official language in the entire Empire. He wished to overhaul the struggling Empire into a modern centralized and homogenous state with effective administration and economy in order to successfully compete with the absolutist monarchies of France, Russia and Prussia. In the so much ethnically and economically diversified Empire and in the charged atmosphere of the approaching French Revolution, which was to open the age of nationalisms, there had to be a cautious retreat from the ambitious reforms under the reign of Joseph II’s brother Leopold II (ruled 1790-1792). The latter’s son Francis II (ruled 1792-1835) completely reverted many of these reforms introducing the policy of extreme conservatism and outright reaction in line with the counter-revolutionary spirit of the times, and, thus, leaving Austria largely unreformed until 1848. The reversion of the reforms, changing economic conditions and the Polish Kościuszko Insurrection (1794) directed against the partition powers triggered off a social uprising in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Silesia. It broke out in 1795 and lasted until 1800 also due to the news of the French Revolution. Following the period of reaction after the Napoleonic Wars there had been no much interest on the part of the state in the welfare of the peasantry until 1848 despite recurring famines and epidemics which became quite tragic in their sweeping scope in the 1830s and 1840s (Ehrich, 1992: 520/521; Kinder, 1978: 286/287; Pitronowa, 1992: 50/51, 53 & 58).

western part of New Silesia was to become known as Dąbrowa (Dombrowa) industrial basin and rival the Upper Silesian industry (Ziembą 1983: 42/43).

The territory of c. 41 sq Prussian miles was divided into two counties of Sewerien (Siewierz) and Pilica. Their respective territories amounted to 27 sq m and 24 sq m, and added up to the total of 51 sq m, as for administrative reasons the Imielin sliver of Silesian land (34 sq km) was added to the new acquisition. During the Prussian rule New Silesia boasted c. 74,630 inhabitants.

After the Prussian defeat at the dual battle of Jena and Auerstädt (October, 14, 1806) the Polish insurrectionist authorities seized control of the territory, which though left with Prussia by the Treaty of Tilsit (Sovetsk) (July 9, 1807), was formally attached to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw on the basis of the Treaty of Elbing (Elbląg) (November 10, 1807). However, in 1817/1818 the Imielin area was recovered by Prussia which did not wish to renounce its rights to the sliver (Pisarski, 1990: 253; Weczerka, 1977c: 204).

In Teschen (Tes’n, Cieszyn) Silesia the document instituting the changes was read to the public in churches and at market squares in German, Czech and Polish (Pitronowa, 1992: 51).

Interestingly, the Prussian reforms in Silesia had a direct bearing on Austria, as Austrian Minister Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz (who came from Silesia) initiated the modernizing changes in the Habsburg Empire, preparing ground for the Josephine reforms (Bein, 1983: 17; Conrads, 1995: 39).
The industrial development of Austrian Silesia was not so dynamic as of Prussian Silesia but there were considerable achievements. First of all, one could observe intensification of the traditional Silesian industry, i.e. linen production which concentrated in the country and cloth production which was limited to towns. The continental blockade during the Napoleonic Wars shifted entrepreneurship towards wool industry especially in East Silesia which with Bielitz (Bielsko) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyń) became a significant hub of textile industry in the first half of 19th century. While West Silesia stuck to traditional branches of industry such as linen making and beer brewing due to its unfavorable mountainous location, in East Silesia and in the Moravian wedge dividing Austrian Silesia local nobles attempted to utilize the wealth of iron ore and coal deposits in 17th and 18th centuries but without lasting effects. But already in 1772 the first ironworks was established in Ustron (Ustronv), and was followed by great iron furnaces in Witkowitz (Vítkovice) (1828), Leskowetz (Leskovec, Liskowiec) (1833) and Trzenietz (Trzyniec, Trzyniec) (1838) giving a boost to ore mining and a definite impulse to coal mining. Thus, already in the 1850s coal and coke were used for blast furnaces the Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrawa)-Karwin (Karwina) industrial basin started to develop in earnest (Bein, 1983: 17; Pitronowa, 1992; Szaraniec, 1995; Wiskemann, 1938: 114).

Development of Prussian Silesia, which in the 1740s was fully incorporated in the institutional framework of the Prussian state, seemed to be more dynamic than that of Austrian Silesia. At the very beginning of Friedrich II’s reign in Silesia he started the policy of attracting settlers into the province in order to fill up the relatively empty regions with populace. The settlers were Germans, Poles, Czech and Moravians. During Friedrich II’s life 304 settlements were established with c. 62,000 settlers. After his death 100 more settlements came into being. The settlers contributed to the spread of new agriculture techniques, and development of food production was actively supported by the state which also strove to raise the education level of its Silesian subjects, e.g. in 1765 the special School Ordinance for Silesia was introduced (Bein, 1983: 12). First of all, though, the peasantry as the potential pool of conscripts and tax-payers was protected by specific regulations limiting amount of free work exacted through the serfdom system, and in 1770 the system of agricultural credit was established. However, serfdom was not abolished until 1807, whereas noble owners found ways to avoid compliance with the rules which were to deter them from exploiting the peasants. As in Austrian Silesia it had to lead to peasant riots which, among others flared up in different parts of Silesia in 1765-1768, 1780, 1781, and in the period 1793-1811 including the 1793 weavers uprising in

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81 It was the so-called policy of Peuplierung which the Hohenzollerns traditionally used in order to strengthen their territorial possessions economically and militarily. The colonizers were mainly settled in the woodlands around Oppeln (Opole), in the regions around Groß-Wartenberg (Syców), Rosenberg (Olesno) and in the Glatz (Kłodsko, Kłodzko) Margravate. Czech Protestants, who had emigrated from Austria because of confessional problems, concentrated in Groß-Wartenberg (Syców) and Strehlen (Strzelin). They became farmers and artisans. Also some Polish-speaking Protestants came to Upper Silesia from Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyń) Silesia. The colonizers from west and central Germany established settlements linked with metallurgical works and woodcutting. Similar communities were founded by local nobles who manned them with Silesians or Czech Brethren. The latter colonies sprang up in Gnadenfrei (Ober Peilau, Piława Górna), Gnadenfeld (Pawlówitzke, Pawłowiczki) and Neusalz (Nowa Sól) - the only Silesian town established during Friedrich II’s reign (Bein, 1983: 11; Weber, 1995: 109/110).

82 In agreement with the homogenizing efforts of the Prussian state, German colonists were settled down in the Slavic-speaking areas whereas Slavic settlers in German-dominated areas. The tacit assumption was that this policy would improve knowledge of the German language especially among the Slavic-speakers in Upper Silesia (Lis, 1993: 65), as homogenization was indispensable for building effective modern educational and administration systems.

83 Friedrich II’s colonization plans for Silesia were not carried out in full due to the shortage of prospective settlers who could be attracted to come to such remote parts of Prussia as Upper Silesia. How desperate the effort was can be exemplified by Friedrich II’s futile appeals to the Schwenkfelders to return from Pennsylvania where their last remnants had gone from Goldberg (Złotoryja), Łowenberg in Schlesien (Lwówek Śląski) and Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra) before the outbreak of the First Silesian War (Herzig, 1995: 62; Hildebrand, 1995: 47).
the Sudetic region in which c. 20,000 persons participated. Especially the Upper Silesian peasantry was destitute and exploited due to the peripheral location of this region in Prussia and inability of the peasants to defend their rights in courts as being mainly Polish and Czech/Moravian-speakers they had almost no education and no knowledge of German. However, even in Lower Silesia the relatively better situation of the peasantry was worse than in Brandenburg. As in Austria the growing social tension was deepened by industrialization and the nationalist cleavage which was summoned up by further centralization and homogenization of the state which was reflected in the introduction of German as the official language in administration, courts and education. There were also attempts to Germanize the Catholic Church but without much success. However, the German language as the sole medium of instruction coupled with tentative introduction of compulsory education had to breed discontent in largely Slavic-speaking Upper Silesia though Prussia’s intent was just to emulate the English and French models of state organizations in order to enable the country to compete with other power contenders in Europe (Abmeier, 1983: 29; Adams, 1992: 28; Birke, 1968: 19; Bokajlo, 1993: 330/331; Fuchs, 1995: 15; Herzig. 1995: 64; Lis, 1993: 62-65; 68-70; Prothero, 1920: 15).

In order to round up the picture of Prussian Silesia prior to the Napoleonic Wars, it is necessary to have a look at the development of modern industry in Prussian Silesia. Leaving aside the sustained development of linen production which continued to generate the wealth of Silesia (Herzig, 1995: 63) a shy attempt at developing coal and iron industry was made by the Prussian government who was interested in exploiting the rich mineral resources of Silesia and creating armaments industry. Accordingly in the 1760s the state introduced the bureaucratic system of legal regulations and economic incentives to control and steer development of the industries (Weber, 1995: 109) leading to establishment of the royal metallurgical works which were followed by royal coal pits at the end of the 18th century. In 1753-1755 the first royal iron works came into being in Malapane (Ozimek) and Kreuzburg (Kluczbork) (Lis, 1993: 71; Stutzer, 1983: 23). The emerging industrial center was fortified by 33 colonies of German workmen who were sent to the region as workforce between 1770 and 1774 (Volz, 1920:13). However, the turning point in Silesian economy came about in 1777 with the nomination of Baron Friedrich Anton von Heynitz to the position of the Director of the Departments of Mining and Metallurgy (Bergund Hüttendepartements). From this year a continuous growth in these industries could be observed, and it was made possible also thanks to the work of Friedrich Wilhelm von Reden who in 1779 became Senior Mining Councillor (Oberbergrat) and Director of Mining and Metallurgical Works in Silesia. They modernized the metallurgical and mining industries according to the latest English technology and English economic measures presented in 1776 by Adam Smith in his seminal work The Wealth of Nations. In this way the dynamized industrial development through introduction of competition and free market though without resigning from the instrument of subsidies and general protectionism (Fuchs, 1995: 16). Thus, Upper Silesia which had not been noticed much during the first 40 years of the Prussian rule, became the center of general interest as a new industrial basin in making which was to compete with the Ruhr (Lüer, 1995: 80). In 1784 the state-owned lead ore foundry was commenced near Tarnowitz.

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84 German became the sole language of Prussian courts in Silesia already in 1744 (Kopiec, 1991: 65).
85 German being the official language of the Prussian state and the medium of instruction at Prussian schools, Slavic-speaking students who did not master the language in elementary schools, could not pursue further education (Marek, 1996: 18). Understandably, it was difficult to learn literary German in mainly Slavic-speaking Upper Silesia which, on the other hand, was a remote underdeveloped and poor region (Conrads, 1995: 64).
86 The actual boom in the Silesian textile production in 1786 was followed by gradual decline in favor of the rapid development of coal and metallurgy industry, e.g. the first steam engines were introduced to Silesia in 1786, but they were used in the textile industry for the first time only in 1815 (Fuchs, 1995: 16). In the first half of the 19th century wool production was still significant in Silesia but with the advance of heavy industry, formerly world-renowned Silesian textile industry belonged to the past by 1860 (Stutzer, 1983: 25).
87 The first iron bridge on the European continent was constructed in this locality, and has survived there till today.
(Tarnowskie Góry), and two years later the lead metallurgical works in Friedrichshütte (Strzybnica) (Lis, 1993: 71). In 1786 the first steam engines on the European continent, were installed at the Friedrichsgrube mine in Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry) (Lüer, 1995: 80). Soon afterwards, in 1789, for the first time, coke was used in iron smelting at the iron works in Malapane (Ozimek) (Stutzer, 1983: 25). The first Prussian steel-mill was erected in the 1780s in the Ruhr, and in 1794 in Silesia (Davies, 1991: II 118). In the wake of these achievements more steam engines and requisite engineers arrived from England, and coking process was learned these were the key to the rich coal deposits in Upper Silesia. In 1791 the royal coal pits were opened near Beuthen (Bytom), and in 1794 the royal iron and steel works at Gleiwitz (Gliwice); in 1802 the first blast furnace at Königshütte (Królewská Huta) was inaugurated (Rose, 1936: 38). Upper Silesia was at this stage ahead of the Ruhr (Wiskemann, 1956: 24). Around 1800 the old industrial center of Styria produced 16,000 t of pig iron whereas the nascent Upper Silesian industrial basin already 15,000 t, or, in other words, almost 50% of Prussia’s pig iron production. In the period 1752-1815 the number of coal pits in Upper Silesia rose from 5 to 20, and coal production grew from mere 1,140 t in 1785 to 90,000 t in 1815. In this field Upper Silesia was still surpassed by the old Lower Silesian mining center around Waldenburg (Walbrzych) and Neurolde (Nowa Ruda) as its coal production amounted to 33,000 t in 1785 and in 1815 the output of its 39 pits reached the level of 240,000 t (Stutzer, 1983: 23-25). The intensifying industrial output of Upper Silesia and the Waldenburg (Walbrzych) region required improved transportation links with the rest of the Prussian state and Western Europe. Therefore, the Oder (Odra) was made navigable from Ratibor (Racibórz) to its estuary, where it meets the Baltic, and the Klodnitz (Klodnica) Canal was constructed (1792-1812) in order to connect the Oder with the Upper Silesian industrial basin (Ende, 1977: 231; Weber, 1995: 108). One should not though forget about the consequences which appeared with the rapid industrialization of thoroughly agricultural Upper Silesia. The growing number of serfs had to comply with their duties working not only on their lords land but also in the mining pits and other industrial works. Frequent accidents deprived whole families of sustenance whereas the 12-13 hour long shifts brought wages allowing just bare existence (Lis, 1993: 71). The tragic social situation contributed to emergence of utmost poverty, widespread alcoholism and appallingy unhygienic living conditions which were accompanied by an increase in crime rate (Lüer, 1995: 80). The authorities strove to ameliorate the alarming phenomena and partially succeeded, e.g. in 1769 they inaugurated the first self-help insurance company for the hands employed at royal enterprises (Lis, 1993: 71).

Summing up the first 50 years of the Prussian rule in Silesia, one can observe that frequent visits of Friedrich II in the province and his keen interest in the economic, administrative and social development of Silesia evoked quite a strong identification of the populace with the new King though it had been largely non-existent at the beginning of his reign. The identification of the subjects with their rulers was gradually transposed to the Prussian state as can be seen in the 1796 speech of Breslau (Wroclaw) philosopher Johann Christian Garve on the tenth anniversary of the King’s death:

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88 During his 1790 sojourn in Silesia the most famous German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe decided to visit Upper Silesia almost exclusively for getting acquainted with the latest invention working at the Friedrichgrube mine (Maliszewski, 1993: 100-106), because in general he considered the region as backward and devoide of educated people (Lüer, 1995: 80).

89 The Waldenburg (Walbrzych) industrial center lies within the Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko) Margravate. The region as well as the rest of the Sudetic area was quite considerably developed in earlier centuries thanks to gold and silver mining, and development of various workshops. The beginnings of coal mining there date back to the second half of the 16th century. The industrial basin was of paramount importance for Silesia in the 18th century and during the first half of the 19th century, but though iron works sprang up there and china production started, its significance declined in comparison with Upper Silesia because the Waldenburg (Walbrzych) region is quite mountainous and without abundant supplies of water which are clear deterrent to development of modern heavy industry. Interestingly, industrial production in the region has continued till nowadays (Köhler, 1977: 558).
Silesia was completely integrated with the Prussian state organism [...], there are no more national differences between [the Silesians] and the inhabitants of other [Prussian] provinces. [...] So we Silesians [...] now come from one family, we were brought up in the same way and were taught the same way of thinking [...] (Garve in Weber, 1995:112).

The reconstruction of Silesia which started after the Silesian Wars led to comprehensive development of the land, and also to visible heightening of the level of culture and well-being in the province. These were the very aims of the integrationist Prussian state policy known as Retablissement. Having met the goals allowed Friedrich II and his successors to fortify unity and military strength of their state as well as emotional attachment of the subjects to the state which was manifested not only by the majority of the population but also by renowned scholars and artists (Weber, 1995: 112). Prevailing homogeneity of the state structures and population, coupled with economic prosperity and the beginning of the new feeling of patriotism among people, facilitated development of the idea of Prussiandom, which strengthened by the anti-French sentiment among the populace and modernizing efforts on the part of Friedrich Wilhelm III (ruled 1797-1840) during the disruptive period of the Napoleonic Wars, became the core of German nation-building. The process was as pronounced in Silesia as in other parts of Prussia.

After the death of Friedrich II, his nephew Friedrich Wilhelm II (ruled 1786-1797) ascended the Prussian throne. In October 1786 he received homage paid by Silesia but did not do much to overhaul the state bureaucratic system which grew rather ungainly and stifled civic initiative with high taxes and other dues. Moreover, his management of the Prussian economy was less prudent and finally brought the state’s finances into disorder. On the other hand, speeding-up industrialization brought about mass production which gradually reduced prices of crafted products, thus, making agricultural production less profitable as farming still generated the same amount of revenue. Thus, the landowners became impoverished in comparison to industrialists with their geometrically growing incomes. Some landowners with enough financial resources strove to overcome this predicament through introduction of harvesters and agricultural engineering, but the majority of them (especially in Upper Silesia) decided to maintain their economic status by demanding higher duties from their serfs. The policy had to cause outbreaks of frequent peasant turmoils and a general unrest among the workers involved in the declining textile industry. The shaky situation was not stabilized by the French Revolution which had been triggered off by the effects of industrialization and financial bankruptcy of French the state. Its catchy slogan: *Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite* spread around Europe becoming popular among workers, peasants and bourgeoisie who wished to wrench more political power from the absolutist state and its aristocratic bureaucracy, as well as to overhaul the fossilized estate structure of society, which hindered development of industry and capitalism. The ideas also reached Silesia, but they were not readily accepted by the Silesian bourgeoisie disquieted by peasant and artisan disturbances in Silesia. Refugees from revolutionary France and danger of destruction of the traditional social order may have also contributed to prevalence of rather conservative opinion among the Silesian bourgeoisie. In this situation, the Prussian state administration shied away from attempting any serious reform, and the long-serving Silesian *Provinzialminister (Landesminister)* Count Carl Georg Heinrich von Hoym90 busied himself with suppressing the rural unrest (Bein, 1983: 12; Anon., 1992b: 752; Bein, 1983: 12; Cetwiński, 1992: 30; Kinder, 1978: II 16/17).

At that time European politics was dominated by the quickly changing situation in France, and especially Austria expressed its concern as French Queen Marie Antoinette was sister of Emperor Leopold II. New Emperor Francis II (ruled 1792-1835) fought against the revolutionary spirit which in 1793 had led to beheading of his aunt and her husband French King Louis XVI (ruled 1774-1792). The first coalition of European states led against France by Austria was weakened in 1795 when

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90 He administered the province of Silesia from 1770 until 1806 when after having not been able to stop the combined French, Bavarian and the Confederation’s of the Rhine forces from overrunning the land he capitulated and was removed from his office in December 1806 following the Prussian defeat at Jena and Auerstädt (Baumgart, 1994: 462-464).
Prussia dropped out of the war in 1795 to prepare for the third partition of Poland. Moreover, by the Peace of Basel (1795) Friedrich Wilhelm II consented to France’s eventual annexation of the German lands west of the Rhine. The Prussian policy of neutrality with respect to France and Napoleon was conducted by Friedrich Wilhelm II’s son Friedrich Wilhelm III (1797-1840). In the meantime Austria persevered in its struggle against France. Deserted by all its allies but Great Britain, in October 1797 it had to accept the Peace of Campo Formio, in which, among others, Francis II agreed to the surrender of the left bank of the Rhine. The subsequent struggle left Austria exhausted and repeatedly defeated. The Austrian army encircled at Ulm in 1805 surrendered and in November 1805 the French entered Vienna unopposed. The imperial troops retreated to Moravia. The ill Empress stayed at Friedek (Frýdek) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) became the headquarters of the Austrian government, as well as haven for the Prussian, English and Russian ambassadors. After Napoleon’s brilliant victory over Austrian and Russian troops at Austerlitz (Slavkov) (December 2, 1805), the harsh Peace of Pressburg (Bratislava, Pozsony) (December 25, 1805) was imposed on Austria. In the meantime the process of dissolution of the Empire started. Under the Russo-French pressure, in 1803 all ecclesiastical territories (excluding Mainz) were divided, as were 45 of the 51 imperial cities, small principalities and counties totalling 112 imperial states with a population of 3 mil. The main beneficiaries were Baden, Prussia, Württemberg and Bavaria. In 1804 Napoleon proclaimed himself Emperor of the French, and Emperor Francis II proclaimed himself Emperor of Austria on August 14, 1804, to maintain Austria’s position and to preserve the imperial title for his house. In 1806 16 south and west German states committed open treason to the Empire by forming the Confederation of the Rhine under a Napoleonic protectorate. Finally on August 6, 1806, resolving that no other should wear the crown that he was powerless to defend, Francis II resigned the old imperial dignity sealing the end of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation which had begun in 1232. (Anon., 1992b: 752; Barraclough, 1992: 634; Ehrich, 1992: 519; Kinder, 1978: II 22-29; Pitronowa, 1992: 56; Turner, 1992: 102).

In the emerging new political order in Europe, Prussia was the only country in Central Europe which was not dominated by France. The peaceful attitude of Prussia changed when Napoleon, after the defeat of his enemy English Prime Minister William Pitt, offered Hanover to England breaking his treaty with Prussia. Prussia formed a coalition with Russia and Saxony to counteract this arbitrary action, and sent Napoleon an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of all French troops east of the Rhine and the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine. However, it was too late to avert catastrophe Napoleon had already planned an onslaught against Prussia wishing to expand his possessions eastward, and Friedrich Wilhelm III was not prepared to wrench his ultimatum militarily. On October 14, 1806 the obsolete Prussian and Saxon armies suffered a disastrous defeat in the dual battle of Jena and Auerstädt. England and Sweden broke diplomatic relations with Prussia as they were not prepared to go to war. The royal residence was transferred to Königsberg (Kaliningrad), and Napoleon entered Berlin unopposed. At that time the French forces under the command of Napoleon’s brother Je’rome went into Silesia. There were no Prussian divisions left able to face the invader though c. 30,000 Prussian troops remained inside the Silesian fortresses. The fortresses at Breslau (Wroclaw), Glogau (Glogów), Schweidnitz (Swidnica) surrendered without fighting; Brieg (Brzeg) and Neisse (Nysa) fought briefly, but only the fortresses at Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko), Sielberberg (Srebrna Góra) and Cosel (Koźle) were not defeated until the Peace of Tilsit (Sovetsk) on July 9, 1807. With the exception of beleaguering the fortresses there was little military activity in the province. Notably the Polish-Italian Legion supported Je’rome. It seems that the Polish troops who seized New Silesia for the would-be restituted Polish state promised by Napoleon, were rather readily accepted by the Polish-speaking population in eastern Upper Silesia. It is interesting to observe that the Polish question which reappeared during the Napoleonic Wars also tentatively included Silesia. Already in 1804 the controversial Russian Foreign Minister (in office 1804-1806) of Polish aristocratic extraction Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski striving to reestablish a Polish state with a Russian help proposed in 1804 that Austria should be given Silesia in exchange for Galicia which would be incorporated into such a restituted Poland. The plan was never actualized. Another Polish trace, following the aforementioned seizure of New Silesia in 1806, was imprinted by Bielitz
Prince Jan Sulkowski, who serving Napoleon attempted to annex Upper Silesia for a planned Polish state. He led a military invasion in the direction of Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry) and Gleiwitz (Gliwice) but was quickly defeated in a skirmish near the latter town at the beginning of January 1807 (Anon., 1983a: 537; Anon., 1992b: 752; Kinder, 1978: II: 24/25 & 28/29; Neubach, 1992: 7; Pisarski, 1990: 249-252; Przewlocki, 1986: 36/37; Vaniček, 1959).

The dissolution of Prussia was prevented only by Russia’s intervention. On the basis of the Peace of Tilsit Prussia lost its territories west of the Elbe and the formerly Polish territories with the exception of West Prussia, which together with Austria’s West Galicia were turned into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Danzig (Gdańsk) was made a French-controlled republic. Thus, Prussia was deprived of c. 50% of its land and population. Pending substantial reparations it remained under French occupation, and the Prussian army was limited to 42,000 men. In Silesia, the eight Silesian fortresses remained in the Prussian hands, but French governors took over administration of cities and towns, whereas the countryside was controlled by military commissars. On the other hand, the General Committee busied itself with regular collection of reparations. The concomitant plundering and maltreatment of the Silesian population made the French quite unpopular in the province.¹¹ (Kinder, 1978: II 28/29; Pisarski, 1990: 250).

The Prussian monarchy reduced after the catastrophic defeat in 1806 to Brandenburg, Silesia, the Pomeranian provinces, northern West Prussia (without Danzig (Gdańsk)), and East Prussia had to be thoroughly reformed in order to prevent further dismembering and alienation of the subjects which might have severed the links of homogenizing and unifying identification between the diverse populace and the House of Hohenzollern. The clearly overdue administrative, social and military reforms started to be introduced by the King’s Chief Minister Baron Heinrich Friedrich Carl vom und zum Stein. His basic (and quite liberal) idea was to evoke a positive consciousness of solidarity with the state by allowing the citizens to take a more active part in public affairs. This idea underlay the emancipation of the serfs (begun in 1807) and the measures for local self-government, and the reshaping of the central government (1808), which allowed creation of active civil society granting independence to the judicial system, administration, provinces, and municipal government from the direct control of the monarch. He was also responsible for extirpating monopolies and hindrances to free trade, and supported general Gerhard Johann von Scharnhorst in his schemes of army reform. To bolster Prussia’s military strength limited by the Treaty of Tilsit (Sovetsk) Scharnhorst introduced the short-service system: the permitted number of men (42,000) was called for a rigorous, few-month-long training, then the majority of them was released while a new complement was called up. The general was also responsible for transforming the Prussian army from a largely mercenary force into a national organ, without which it would have been impossible to lead the War of Liberation against Napoleon by using nationalist appeals to the populace. The reforms were not stopped by the dismissal of Stein on Napoleon’s behest in November 1808 but were continued by Karl August von Hardenberg, who as a Prussian minister had been dismissed under Napoleon’s influence in 1806,⁹³ at the beginning of 1809 Stein withdrew to Austria. In 1812 he went to St Petersburg and built up the coalition against. From the battle of Leipzig to the Congress of Vienna he was the main opponent of French imperialism. Besides liberalizing the Prussian state, it is maintained that, at the same time, Stein was responsible for fostering German nationalism and the myth of German destiny (Thorne, 1975: 1214).

¹¹ In Poland Napoleon is an idealized figure who is even mentioned in the Polish national anthem. He agreed to create a rump Poland as a modest price for complete loyalty of his Polish troops whom he used to suppress anti-French uprisings in Spain and Dominica. For the Silesians and Germans, in general, Napoleon was a foreign oppressor and an overhauler of the feudal order in the German countries of the toppled Empire. Today, he is rather forgotten in Germany though his legend is still alive in Poland (Olschowsky, 1992).

¹² Homogenization of the Prussian army along the national lines marks the onset of nation-building in Prussia and Germany, which was reinforced by the unifying institutions of conscription (introduced in the period 1807-1813) and compulsory popular education.

Significantly, the military forces of the Habsburg Empire remained multiethnic and multinational; actually, it was the glue that held the highly disparate empire together until 1918 (Deák, 1992).

⁹³ At the beginning of 1809 Stein withdrew to Austria. In 1812 he went to St Petersburg and built up the coalition against. From the battle of Leipzig to the Congress of Vienna he was the main opponent of French imperialism. Besides liberalizing the Prussian state, it is maintained that, at the same time, Stein was responsible for fostering German nationalism and the myth of German destiny (Thorne, 1975: 1214).
however, already in 1810 he was appointed Prussia’s chancellor of state. In 1810 he issued new regulations instituting reforms in the Prussian army and freedom of trade, and in 1811 he commenced emancipation of Jews. Moreover, in 1811 emancipation of peasants furthered despite the robust opposition of landowners, and in 1814 military service was made compulsory for all men in Prussia. Also the educational system was reformed along humanistic principles by scholar and minister of education (1809-1810) Wilhelm von Humboldt which resulted in 1810 in establishment of Berlin University as an institution of academic freedom and the unity of research, teaching and learning in all disciplines; and in 1812 in establishment of the public Gymnasia, secondary schools organized to provide for an education in the liberal arts with an emphasis on classical languages and humanistic values. In the same year also reformation of the elementary schools was carried out in order to develop the natural gifts of the children along the lines of the Swiss educational pioneer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. The reforms were not comprehensive and despite overhauling the administrative and social structure of the state did leave Prussia still largely feudal and absolutist though adapted to the requirements of industrialization and capitalism (Anon., 1992b: 752; Anon., 1992c: 552; Bein, 1983: 14/15; Birke, 1968: 20; Herzig, 1994: 466-477; Kinder, 1978: II 33; Lis, 1993: 76; Orzechowski, 1972b: 5; Pisarski, 1990: 251/252; Sommer, 1908: 112-114; Thorne, 1975: 1138, 1214, 601/602).

The Prussian reforms were also reflected in significant alterations in Silesia. Development of town and cities in the province was facilitated not only by the edict on municipal self-government but also thanks to systematic destruction (on Napoleon’s order) of the fortifications around Breslau (Wrocław), Brieg (Brzeg), Neisse (Nysa) and Schweidnitz (Swidnica) which was completed by the Prussian administration. At last urban growth was released from this medieval architectural constraint (Pisarski, 1990: 248). With the edict of October 30, 1810 secularization was carried out in Silesia terminating the special position of the Catholic Church in the province (as it held more property there than in any other part of Prussia), and thus making it uniform with other parts of the Prussian state. Profits gained in this manner facilitated implementation of the reforms (Bein, 1983: 14) and financing of the state which was bankrupt (Prothero, 1920: 16/17). On the other hand, with the state decision Leopoldina the Jesuits tertiary college in Breslau (Wrocław) was merged with Viadrina the Brandenburg University from Frankfurt an der Oder into a full university (based on Wilhelm von Humboldt’s modern concept of university) which was inaugurated in Breslau (Wrocław) on October 19, 1811 under the name of Viadrina Wratislaviensis. The university was instrumental in homogenization of the Prussian academia as it was the first interconfessional university in the whole of Germany, with both a Protestant and a Catholic theological faculty; and grouped Silesian Catholic scholars of Leopoldina, Brandenburg Protestant professors from Viadrina and young aspiring academics from all the German countries (Birke, 1968: 20; Herzig, 1995a: 124/125). In 1808 the position of Provinzialminister was abolished and replaced with Oberpräsident (Chief Administrator).

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94 every man was drafted to three years of active military service, and to two years of less strenuous service in the reserve (Lis, 1993: 76).
95 Military importance of the four remaining Silesian fortresses of Glogau (Głogów), Glatz (Klodzko, Kladsko), Cosel (Koz’le) and Silberberg (Srebrna Góra) declined by the middle of the 19th century when their fortifications were demolished completely or in part, allowing delayed advancement of the towns (Pisarski, 1990: 248).
96 Secularization accompanied by the sale of the royal domains was to raise funds enough to avert the possibility of the cession of Silesia to Austria or France as compensation for the indemnity payable to Napoleon. The sale of Church and royal property brought comparatively small results, for no one was rich enough to offer a large price, but any further talk about separation of Silesia from Prussia was stopped with Napoleon’s failed Russian campaign in 1812/1813 which was followed by the War of Liberation in Prussia (1813) (Prothero, 1920: 16/17).
97 It was founded in 1506 (Deus, 1977: 50).
98 The university was renamed as Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität in 1911 in order to commemorate its founder Friedrich Wilhelm III, and functioned under this name until 1945 (Deus; 1977: 50).
The altered administrative role of Breslau (Wroclaw) and Glogau (Glogów)99 departments (Kriegsund Domainen-Kammeren-Departments) was reflected in their new name as regencies (Regierungsdepartments) which now were led by Präsidenten (Administrators) (Lis, 1993: 75/76; Orzechowski, 1972b: 7/8).

The ideas of human rights and nationalism which were explicitly embodied in the political structures of the French state triggered off similar processes in the German states, and especially in Prussia (Alter, 1994: 39-41). The tendencies strengthened by Johann Gottfried Herder’s philosophy identifying peoples (nations) or their spirits (Volksgeist) with their respective vernaculars were developed, among others, by Friedrich Hölderlin who glorified independence of peoples and death for fatherland, the Silesian theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher who roused feelings of national community especially among the Protestants100, Heinrich von Kleist whose Hermannsschlacht (1808) became the model for a national uprising. The gradual construction of German nationalism and German nation resulted in a rather vague concept of nation which was a mixture of the three following ideas which equalized nation with a cultural community, the Volk (basis for preordained national union), and a political community of free men. However, the notions were picked up by students and wide groups of intelligentsia and bourgeoisie who, in turn, started to call the population to form a mass movement against the French occupants (cf. Hroch, 1994: 5, for the different phases of national movements). In the Rheinischer Merkur Joseph Görres established the most aggressive anti-Napoleonic journal and Ernest Moritz Arndt phrased the national aim in popular language: to be one people is the religion of our day. Theodor Körner and Max von Schenkendorf made the genre of national songs popular and the national idea was also furthered among the youth through the gymnastic movement established by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (Kinder, 1978: II 32).

Now when the relations between the state and the inhabitants were reformed, and the ideology of nationalism became an effective instrument for mobilizing vast number of people ready to die for the constructed concepts of fatherland and nation it was only necessary to await an opportune moment for enticing a national uprising against the French which would fortify Germandom and reestablish a strong link between the Prussians and the Hohenzollerns. Encouraged by continued British resistance and by the guerilla warfare of the Spanish against the French occupation, Austria, on April 9, 1809, and though Napoleon defeated it by October 1809 (Ehrich, 1992: 519), hence unpopular French occupation forces had to take part in the campaigns and their number thinned in Silesia whereas Silesian guerilla forces swelled. They almost disappeared during Napoleon’s ill-fated Russian campaign (Pisarski, 1990: 250; Przewlocki, 1986: 38). Following Napoleon’s disastrous retreat from Moscow military cooperation between Russia and Prussia was undertaken in December 1812. Apprehensive of French reprisals, on January 25, 1813 Friedrich Wilhelm III shifted his residence to Breslau (Wroclaw) which became the center of the German uprising against Napoleon. On February 28, 1813 Prussia concluded with Russia the Treaty of Kalisz. Russia was to obtain Poland in exchange for agreement to the restoration of Prussia and incorporation of Saxony into the latter’s territory. Under pressure from Scharnhorst and Hardenberg Friedrich Wilhelm declared war on France in March 1813. Also utilizing the practical tenets of nationalist ideology he issued the appeal An Mein Volk (To My People) (March 17, 1813)101 and established the Iron Cross as a military decoration. The German Silesians showed enthusiasm in contributing recruits (with the exception of the Polish-speakers in Upper Silesia who apparently did not share the devotion of their German-speaking fellowmen), and among many also the most significant poet of late German Romanticism young Silesian Joseph Freiherr von Eichendorff joined the Freikorps Lützow (one of the numerous

99 In 1809 the seat of the department was shifted from Glogau (Glogów) to more centrally located Liegnitz (Legnica) which brought about the change in the name of the department (Orzechowski, 1972b: 8).
100 He was the soul of the movement which led to the union in 1817 of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Prussia (Thorne, 1975: 1141).
101 Two days earlier the appeal was preceded by the meeting of Friedrich Wilhelm III with Tsar Alexander I (ruled 1801-1825) where the impending warfare had been discussed (Weczerka, 1977: LXXVIII).
voluntary formations of independent mounted riflemen) who brandished the red/black/gold colors of the would-be German flag. Thus, the basic German national symbols were created, and, significantly, the Iron Cross was crafted at Gleiwitz (Gliwice) which was not a coincidence as the Upper Silesian industry forged weapons used against Napoleon in the War of Liberation (Ćetwiński, 1992: 31/32; Keil, 1987: 177; Kinder, 1978: II 36/37; Neubach, 1992: 7; Prothero, 1920: 17; Weczerka, 1977: LXXVIII; Wiskemann, 1956: 24).

After Russia Prussia carried the main burden of the war which was possible only to the spontaneous mood for sacrifice in the populace. Donations of money and material helped to transform reservists and volunteers into troops of the line so that 6% of Prussia’s inhabitants saw active service in the army. The largely improvised Prussian and French proto-conscription armies met during the spring campaign at Lützen (May 2, 1813) and Bautzen (May 20/21, 1813) in Saxony. Napoleon drove the allied Prusso-Russian forces in the direction of Silesia regaining Saxony but did not achieve any significant success as his rear was endangered by the Swedish troops who in May 1813 landed in Pomerania and by Britain who joined the coalition in June 1813. The armistice of Pläswitz (Pielaszków), signed on June 4th, 1813102, closed the first period of the campaign. The region around the locality extending from the Southern border of Silesia to the Oder (Odra) was proclaimed the armistice line by Brandenburg and then continued along the Elbe to French-held Lübeck. For the time being Austria remained neutral because Austrian Emperor Francis I’s daughter Marie Louise had been married to Napoleon in 1810. However, the seemingly morganatic marriage was not a deterrent to Francis I in his attempts to rebuild the power of Austria utilizing the downfall of his son-in-law. When Napoleon rejected Austria’s proposal of mediation and other minor territorial demands, the armistice was declared at an end on the night of August 10 to 11, 1813 and the Austrian troops joined the allies. The subsequent victory of the allies over Napoleon in the battle at the Katzbach (Kaczawa) River (August, 26, 1813) builded the momentum which was not neutralized by Napoleon’s crushing victory over the Austrian army at Dresden (August 27, 1813) and allowed the allies (with the help of the countries from the dissolved Confederation of the Rhine) to defeat the French Emperor in the battle of the Nations at Leipzig (October, 16-19, 1813). Afterwards the theater of military activities was shifted to France (though the French-held fortress of Glogau (Głogów) did not capitulate until April 1814) and Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo on June 17, 1815 (Clayton, 1908: 392-394; Kinder, 1978: II 36/37; Przewlocki, 1986: 38; Weczerka, 1977: LXXVIII; Weczerka, 1977e: 408).

Silesia, which had suffered with the rest of Prussia in the period of Napoleon’s conquest, suffered also during the campaign of 1813. But during the War of Liberation only the westernmost part of Silesia was damaged, where there was little industry, so the economic recovery of the province could start at once. Mines and other industries recommenced operations in 1814; and in the same year the agricultural credit associations resumed payment of interest, though some years had to elapse before the landed classes again became prosperous. In 1817 it was still almost impossible to find purchasers for Silesian manors (Prothero, 1920: 17). On the other hand, it ought not to be forgotten that the would-be economic significance of Silesia was prepared in the period 1806-1813 when the introduction of the continental system by Napoleon in order to starve Britain economically brought about intensification of production in Prussia and especially in Silesia with the extensive use of ersatz materials in place of unavailable goods from colonies. Among many economic achievements of that time one can enumerate first industrial production sugar from beet sugar in Kunern (Konary) near Wohlau (Wolów) and Krain (Krajno), and development of the Silesian breed of sheep in Ullersdorf (Oldrzychowice). In consequence Silesia became more than self-sufficient in food production which coupled with improved farm management, and new agricultural techniques and engineering turned the province into the economic base for the whole of Prussia (Pisarski, 1990: 255-257).

102 The armistice was ratified a day later at nearby Poischwitz (Paszowice) which, sometimes, is mistakenly given as the place of signature of the armistice. Moreover, the confusion is deepened by the use of the erroneous form of its placename Pleisswitz (Weczerka, 1977d: 414; Weczerka, 1977e: 408).
The war against Napoleon and its successful conclusion which reversed the fate of Prussia strengthened the feeling of Prussiandom and Germandom in the whole state which firmly anchored Silesia in the country (Weczerka, 1977: LXXVIII). The link was continually reaffirmed by relative economic prosperity of Silesia which enjoyed the long period of lasting peace until 1945 (Pisarski, 1990: 258). The province shared in Prussia’s position as one of the most significant European powers, which was established by the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). Prussia recovered nothing of its gains under the Third Partition of Poland and regained only Danzig (Gdańsk) and a few other towns under the Second. But the rest of what Prussia had possessed in 1803 was restored practically entirely by the Congress, with considerable additions of new territories. Thus, after 1815, Prussia stretched uninterrupted from the Memel (Niemen) River in the east, and west of the Elbe it possessed large (if discontinuous) territories in western Germany. Significantly, the region of Rheinland and Westphalia, destined to develop into the Ruhr the greatest industrial center on the Continent, became a Prussian province. When at the urge of Tsar Alexander I Friedrich Wilhelm III agreed to cede the bulk of his Polish possessions to Russia, Prussia, which at the end of the 18th century had been in the process of becoming a binational state, was thrust back into Germany and given a strategic position on the both frontiers of the German nation-in-making. However, also a significant confessional tension was introduced to the state with the acquisition of its new western provinces which had never been Prussian before and, being Catholic, were alien to Prussian in outlook which, subsequently, often produced a fierce conflict between the Church and the state (Anon., 1992b: 752; Kinder, 1978: II 38/39; Turner, 1992: 104/105).

Austria led by Foreign Minister Prince Clemens Metternich managed to recover its position as a European power, but its gravity shifted eastward with the loss of its possessions in Western Europe which were compensated by additions in Galicia and Dalmatia. As a multinational state in the age of nascent German nationalism it became alienated from Germany. But, nevertheless, it claimed the leadership of the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund) which in line with Francis I’s wishes gave Austria, though only jointly with Prussia, far-reaching-control over German affairs. The Confederation had 39 members\(^{103}\) and replaced the Holy Roman Empire of more than 240 states. This was a loose political association with no central executive or judiciary, and only a federal Diet meeting in Frankfurt am Mein. The Confederation was in theory empowered to adopt measures strengthening the political and economic bonds but in fact remained a stronghold of conservatism and particularism, and, thus, an instrument to defend the interests of the secondary states and the Habsburgs. However, the Confederation did not enable Metternich to stop the reform movement that had begun under the impact of the French hegemony. That influence was strongest in southern Germany where there was observed widespread readiness to accept civic institutions and liberal theories. In Prussia the followers of Stein were still influential in the court pressurizing Friedrich Wilhelm III to fulfill the promise he made in 1815 to establish constitutional government. The agitation for political reorganization was loudest among university students who formed nationalist groups known as Burschenschaften. They demanded the abandonment of the confederal system, the establishment of greater unity, and the achievement of national (i.e. German) power. In 1817 they gathered at the Wartburg castle near Eisenach where they challenged traditional authority in their speeches. The possible espousal of liberalism and nationalism coupled with the establishment of centralized authority in Germany would have seriously impeded the policies which Austria pursued in Hungary, Italy and the Balkans. When on March 23, 1819, an unbalanced student, Karl Ludwig Sand, assassinated the conservative playwright and publicist August von Kotzebue, Metternich persuaded the princes of the Confederation that they were facing a dangerous attempt to overthrow the established order in central Europe. The result was a series of repressive measures called the Carlsbad (Karlovy Vary) Decrees, which the federal Diet adopted on September 20, 1819. In Prussia the liberal members of the ministry were forced to resign, and the plan to promulgate a constitution for the kingdom was rejected. By the end of 1820 the German reform movement, which had begun some 15

\(^{103}\) Significantly, the non-German countries of the Habsburg Empire did not belong to the Confederation, nor did Posnania (Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań), South Prussia), and West and East Prussia (Kinder, 1978: II 38).
years before, came to a complete halt. Conservatism triumphed, and though the liberal alterations in the political and economic structure of society were not reversed, German nationalism was quenched delaying the establishment of the German nation-state for half a century (Anon., 1992b: 752; Ehrich, 1992: 520; Kinder, 1978: II 38/39; Turner, 1992: 104).

An instrument Metternich used to enforce his conservative policies in Europe was the Holy Alliance. The first supranational organization to preserve peace in modern history, was established in September 1815 by the rulers of Orthodox Russia, Catholic Austria and Protestant Prussia. Unclearly organized around the principles of the Christian faith. Hence, the members of the alliance derived their right of intervention against all liberal and national from their responsibility to God. Although it was joined by almost all the European monarchs the principle of intervention secured by Metternich in 1820 at the Congress of Troppau (Opava, Opawa) alienated Britain which withdrew from the alliance. Consequently, the Holy Alliance ceased to have any real significance after the 1820s but resulted in splitting the European powers into the liberal western bloc with Britain and France, and into the conservative eastern bloc with Russia, Austria and Prussia (Anon., 1990i: 163; Kinder, 1978: II: 39, 45).

The reactionary order which was established in Central and Eastern Europe after the downfall of Napoleon was only briefly challenged by the July Revolution of 1830 in France. The volatile situation coupled with the influence of the Polish November Uprising (1830-1831) against Russia brought about a meeting of southern German radicals at Hambach Castle in the Palatinate in May 1832. They expressed approval of national unification, republican government, and popular sovereignty. When a group of militant students launched a foolhardy attempt to seize the city of Frankfurt am Mein, dissolve the federal Diet, and proclaim a German republic, the princes of the German Confederation recovered from their initial fear of the revolutionary movement and began to oppose it. Under leadership of Metternich they crashed liberalism and nationalism which was expressed by the repressive measures adopted by the federal Diet, reinforcing the position of the crown in state politics, limiting the power of the legislature, restricting the right of assembly, enlarging the authority of the police, and intensifying the censorship. Thus, the anti-absolutist movement was effectively subdued until Völkerfrühling in 1848, and, subsequently, the significance of the Confederation gradually declined104 (Turner, 1992: 105). Another blow was dealt to it by Prussia with its pro-capitalist policy which through the 1818 simplified tariff, and establishment of the Commercial and Craft Union (Handelsund Gewerbeverein) in 1819 led to the signature of the act instituting the German Customs Union (Zollverein). Metternich could not oppose the development strengthening the political stance of Prussia in Germany at the cost of gradual marginalization of Austria as since 1824 his power had been checked by the more liberal-minded minister of state Count Franz Anton von Kolowrat. Austria wished to check Prussia by supporting rival customs unions but the struggle for hegemony in Germany was gradually won by Prussia and by 1852 the German Customs Union included all the German states except Austria and Hamburg (Anon., 1992b: 753; Ehrich, 1992: 522; Kinder, 1978: II 47; Koenen, 1992; Lang, 1989).

The decisive victory of Prussia and the final unification of Germany was to come only in the wake of Völkerfrühling. In the meantime rapid industrialization took its toll especially on the rural population who had to exist in the largely absolutist socio-political framework with little hope for economic advancement. Actually their situation in Prussian and Austrian Silesia deteriorated considerably in the 1840s. Famines and epidemics swept the countryside radicalizing the populace. In the Vormärz period revolutionary ideas were also disseminated by the Prussian and Austrian universities and educational systems and their spread was facilitated by Friedrich Wilhelm IV (ruled 1840-1861) who aspiring to revive in Prussia his imaginary conception of the Middle Ages called off the conflict with the Catholic Church and even sponsored a national Diet. The circulation of the ideas was speeded up by the development of the railway network in Germany. Before 1848 its lines

104 It was finally dissolved in 1866 (Czapliński, 1990: 443).

Prior to closing this background chapter on Silesian history it is indispensable to scrutinize the administrative structure of Silesia after 1815 as it was to remain largely unchanged until the 1930s. Austrian Silesia will be left out from the presentation as almost no changes were implemented here before 1848. This fossilized absolutist system was the answer to the problem of multiple nationalities and the unequal state of education and development in the various parts of Austria which necessitated preferential treatment of the nobility (at the cost of other social classes) as they held the state together (Kinder, 1978: II 33). Quite on the contrary, Prussian Silesia underwent a far-reaching structural overhaul which aimed at making the province an integral part of Prussia within the framework of the reformed and more centralized and homogenous state. The last discontinuity in Silesia’s territory the exclave of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin) was incorporated into the province of Brandenburg whereas in 1815 and 1825 the Upper Lusatian part of Saxony (which had been gained by Prussia at the Congress of Vienna) was added to Silesia considerably extending the province westward. Now Prussian Silesia’s area amounted to c. 40,700 sq km\textsuperscript{106} (Muirhead, 1908: 461; Weczerka, 1977: LXXVIII). With the edict issued on April 30, 1815 Prussia was divided into ten provinces of equal administrative status, and 25 regencies which were the subdivisions of the former. Silesia was divided into the four regencies: the Middle Silesian one with the seat in Breslau (Wroclaw), the Mountainous one with the seat in Reichenbach (Dzierzoniow)\textsuperscript{107}, the Lower Silesian one with the seat in Liegnitz (Legnica), and the Upper Silesian one with the seat in Oppeln (Opole)\textsuperscript{108}. The geographical names of the regencies were soon replaced with names derived from their respective capitals. In 1820, due to economic reasons the Reichenbach (Dzierżoniów) Regency was liquidated and its counties were divided between the regencies of Breslau (Wroclaw) and Liegnitz (Legnica). In the same year, to the Oppeln Regency, which included the Lower Silesian counties (Kreise) of Neisse (Nysa) and Grottkau (Grotków), the Lower Silesian county of Kreuzburg (Kluczork) was added. In 1825 there were 19 counties in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency, 22 in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency and 16 in the Oppeln Regency. Their total number of 57 increased due to development of industrialization in the region of Glatz (Kłodzko) and Upper Silesia. Subsequently, in 1854 a new county was created in the former area, and in 1873 in the latter the Beuthen (Bytom) county was divided into four smaller ones, so the number of the Silesian counties rose to 61. In 1875 urban counties were created from the cities of Breslau (Wroclaw), Liegnitz (Legnica) and Görlitz (Zgorzelec). Later on such urban counties multiplied especially in the industrial basin in Upper Silesia. The provinces and regencies of Prussia, were administered by Oberpräsidenten and Presidenten respectively whereas Landraten took care of the counties (Orzechowski, 1972b: 7-11).

Considering the social and political situation in the wake of the Vienna settlement, the population of the province amounted to 1,992,598 inhabitants in 1817\textsuperscript{109} (Rhode, 1990: 76ff) which constituted one fifth of the total population of Prussia (Popiolek, 1972: 159). The Oberpräsident still had very wide powers (though not so many as the Provinzialminister). The first holder of the office in

\textsuperscript{105} The first railway line in Prussian Silesia and simultaneously east of the Oder-Neisse line linked Breslau (Wroclaw) and Ohlau (Olawa) and was commenced in 1842 (Koziarski, 1993: 13). In Austrian Silesia Oderberg (Bohumin, Bogumin) gained the direct railway access to Vienna in 1847 (Pitronowa, 1992: 58).

\textsuperscript{106} Silesia was the largest Prussian province closely followed by Brandenburg (Muirhead, 1908: 461).

\textsuperscript{107} The regency was established in order to counteract the negative consequences of the decline of the traditional textile industry in this region, which was accelerated by the end of exports to Latin America (Orzechowski, 1972b: 8).

\textsuperscript{108} The regency was created due to economic, social, confessional and language issues which made Upper Silesia pronouncedly different from the rest of the province (Weczerka, 1977: LXXVIII).

\textsuperscript{109} By the time of Völkerfrühling the Silesian population rose by 80% to 3,061,593 in 1849 (Popiolek, 1972: 158/159), and to 3,707,167 in 1871 - the year of the unification of Germany (Herzig, 1994: 478).
Silesia, Friedrich Theodor Merckel\textsuperscript{110}, had considerable popularity among the German-speaking Silesians. The deepened integration of the province within the new framework of the more homogenous Prussian state was not wholly successful in relation to the Silesian identity as there remained a strong local feeling\textsuperscript{111}. The Silesian nation is a phrase of frequent occurrence, and provincial independence was fostered by cultural societies\textsuperscript{112}, and by the prevalence of intermarriage among the Silesian families. Confessional differences accentuated provincial feeling, for the Catholic nobility avoided intimacy with the Brandenburg and Prussian Junkers, and found their associates in Vienna rather than in Berlin. These Austrian friendships assisted the rise of a strong Catholic (i.e. ultramontane) party, led by Breslau (Wrocław) bishop Emanuel Schimouski (Szymoński). A division of opinion among the Protestants was brought about by the attempt of Friedrich Wilhelm III to unite Calvinists and Lutherans. This effort, especially the introduction of a new liturgy, was distasteful to the Silesian Lutherans, and from 1827 onwards there were serious difficulties with the government. Lutheran pastors were imprisoned, and orthodox Lutherans migrated from Silesia at the very time when the King was engaged in settling in Silesia persecuted Lutherans from Tyrol. In 1841 the recalcitrant Lutherans founded a separate Church (Prothero, 1920: 18).

Another cause of internal trouble was the failure of Friedrich Wilhelm III to fulfill the promise of a constitution. This breach of faith was specially resented in Silesia, where Merckel was a follower of the liberal policies introduced by Stein and Hardenberg, and where industrialization produced a rapid growth of liberal opinion. When the system of provincial estates was established, the Silesian notables urged that the peasants of Upper Silesia were not yet ready for political rights, but the government did not accept their view. In 1823, therefore, the Silesian Diet (Provinzial-Landtag) was constituted on the usual principle of division of nobles, towns, and peasants; but in Silesia, the estate of the nobility was subdivided into nobles and gentlemen, the nobles sitting in person, and the gentry, like the towns and the peasants, electing representatives\textsuperscript{113}. The growth of liberal opinion continued, and the repression of Silesian reformers created, even in Breslau (Wrocław) a sympathy with the Polish November Uprising against Russia (1830/1831), a sympathy which Prussian historians attributed to a general desire to offer opposition to the Prussian government. Political unrest persisted in Silesia through the second quarter of the 19th century. A sudden fall in wages, unemployment and high prices caused by an economic crisis contributed to the outbreak of the insurrection of the weavers in Langenbielau (Bielawa) and Peterswaldau (Pieszyce) (June 1844)\textsuperscript{114}. It was brutally suppressed by the Prussian army, but the worsening economic situation exemplified by numerous famines and epidemics in the second half of the 1840s prepared a fertile ground for the revolutionary events of 1848 (Prothero, 1920: 18/19; Snoch, 1990: 113; Sommer, 1908: 119).

In the situation where no history of Silesia had been published in English yet, the background chapter intends to familiarize the Anglophone reader with the volatile past of this significant Central European region. The presentation of Silesian history is contextualized against the background of Polish, Czech, German and European past as the author believes that concentrating solely on regional events might lead the reader to the false conclusion that Silesia was a clear-cut entity which was not much influenced by the outer world. Such approach has been used by national historiographies of Europe in order to reinforce the dividing force of respective nationalisms which have wished to turn the nation-states, they spawned, into hermetic geographical and ideological containers tightly

\textsuperscript{110} He remained the Oberpräsident of Silesia by 1845 (Herzig, 1994: 478).

\textsuperscript{111} This local identification dated back at least to the 15th century when the inhabitants of Silesia were commonly referred to as a gens (group of common origin) or even natio Silesiatarum (Pietraszek, 1995: 36).

\textsuperscript{112} The most noted of them was the Schlesische Gesellschaft für Vaterländische Cultur (Silesian Society for Patriotic Culture) which existed from 1803 to 1945 (Gerber, 1988).

\textsuperscript{113} The first session of the Diet was commenced in Breslau (Wrocław) on October 2, 1825 (Sommer, 1908: 119).

\textsuperscript{114} On the basis of this uprising Gerhart Hauptmann wrote his most famous play The Weavers in 1892. He wrote it in the Silesian dialect of German (De Waber) and in the same year translated into literary German (Die Weber). This play is one of the most important works produced by German naturalism (Keil, 1987: 195/196).
enclosed by the imaginary lines of detailedly delimited borders. Explicit political expediency of this method, or should I say strategy, ought not to be emulated by the emerging field of regional studies, as the region like any other political entity interacts with similar neighbor organisms and is influenced by decisions taken at the levels of the state, the continent and the world not without a possibility of feedback.

Due to the fact that the work deals with the dynamics of the policies of ethnic cleansing in the 19th and 20th centuries, the chapter necessarily gives a brief overview of Silesian history only until the end of the Napoleonic Wars with a concise sketch of their effects. It is still rounded up with the depiction of the general situation prior to the revolutionary year of 1848, but indispensable elements of later history of Silesia are included in the further chapters whose main thrust, though, is depicting the central issue of the work.

In this way the Silesian intellectual life was oriented towards German universities and Charles University in Prague though also Jagiellonian University in Cracow was attended by many Silesians. Settlement got enlivened especially after the sweeping epidemics in 1333, and chains of new towns were established along the right bank of the Oder. Silesia actually became a source of settlers at the close of the Fourteenth century, so, for instance, in 1405 Silesians constituted the majority of the 4,000 German population of Lvov whose total population amounted to 5,000 (Koodziej, 1992: 3). Thanks to the good location at the crossroads of commercial routes leading from Germany via Cracow to the Ukraine, and from the South to the Baltic, Breslau became a Hanseatic city. The German character of the land seemed to be stabilized but northern and eastern parts of Silesia, with their less favorable natural potential, were influenced less by German settlement than the area to the left of the Oder. Moreover, the Piast princes of Silesia were left the status of principes Poloniae. They became princes of the Empire only under the Emperor Rudolph II.

After 1420 the Emperor Sigismund held the Reichstag (imperial diet) in Breslau and Silesia participated in the crusade against the Bohemian Hussites (1425-1435). The latter were victorious which led to devastation and the general decline of the province. The German element suffered severely because the Hussitic movement was staunchly anti-German. The situation was worsened by the war of Breslau against the Czech King Georg of Podebrad (1459-1460), and the power struggle between Ladislaus II Jagiellon and Matthias Corvinus (1471-1474). Consequently, economic development and Germanization were impeded.

The Peace treaty of Olmütz (Olomouc, Oomuniec) in 1479 ceded Silesia to Hungary. King Matthias Corvinus instituted the Silesian Diet (Fürstentag) and the position of the Superior Governor (Landesoberhauptmann). The institutional reform was completed under the Jagiellonians who established the Silesian Supreme Court in 1498.

A certain degree of stabilization attained at the close of the Fifteenth century allowed continuation of slow Germanization in the west and south, whereas in the eastern parts the Germanspeaking population was peacefully Slavicized (Birke, 1968: 12/13). Furthermore, numerous dynastic lines of Piast princes became extinct and the last Piast George William died in 1675. Their territories were transferred into possession of the Premislids, Podebrads and Hohenzollerns, or were incorporated into the Habsburg realm.

After the death of Louis II Jagiellon the Silesian estates accepted without demur the succession of Ferdinand of Habsburg (husband of Louis’s sister Anna) on December 5, 1526. In this manner the inclusion of Silesia in the sphere of German culture was strengthened when the seat of the suzerain of Silesia shifted from Prague to Vienna. The continued economic development of Silesia during the 200-year-long rule of the Habsburgs was seriously hampered only by the Thirty Years War.

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115. He was killed in a battle with the Turks.
In 1609 Rudolph’s II Letter of Majesty guaranteed equal rights for Catholics and Protestants in all of Silesia. However, after the Defenestration of Prague in 1618, predominantly Lutheran Silesia sided with Bohemia which had backed the Winter King Frederick V and thus was strongly affected by his defeat at the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620. Ferdinand II gradually regained his grasp on Bohemia and Silesia in the course of years. His unwavering policy of enforcing Counter-Reformation in his realm was somewhat less severe in Silesia than in Bohemia as a result of the intervention of Protestant Saxony. Anyway, trade and industry were brought to a standstill and a high proportion of the population either lost their lives or emigrated. Only the Peace and Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 provided that freedom of religion should prevail in parts of Silesia, and three Protestant churches were left to the population. At the Peace of Altränstadt in 1707, Charles XII of Sweden forced Joseph I of Austria to restore to the Protestants 128 churches with permission to build more. Silesia was again the most Protestant part of the Emperor’s Austrian dominions. The Peace of Westphalia set boundaries between Protestantism and Catholicism in Silesia which stayed valid till 1945.

Meanwhile, the land had been making an economic recovery which for some time was very slow, but the Austrian mercantilist reforms of the late Seventeenth century and early Eighteenth century made the development of its mining and textile industries the cornerstone of their plans, and before long Silesia counted as the richest of all the Austrian provinces, while Breslau was now one of the largest and richest cities of the Empire. The Hapsburg rule exerted its indelible imprint on Silesia in the form of numerous Baroque buildings. The field of education was unfortunately quite neglected and in the framework of the Catholic reforms only the Jesuit High School Leopoldiná was founded in Breslau. In spite of this shortcoming, Silesia found itself the very leader in the sphere of German literature with its two famous schools of poetry, Schlesische Dichterschule (e.g. Martin Opitz, Andreas Gryphius, Friedrich von Logau, Johann Christian Günther) and mystical writers: Angelus Silesius, Jacobus Böhme.

Notwithstanding, the direct connections with Vienna were quite loose; since Ferdinand II’s journey of homage in 1617, no Hapsburg ruler had set foot on the Silesian soil (Birke, 1968: 17). In addition, the ponderous administration often delayed necessary reforms and there was discrimination against the non-Catholic population until 1740. Thus, it is not surprising that Frederick the Great’s conquest of Silesia met with little local resistance (Birke, 1968: 18).

Silesia became Prussian after the war in 1740-1742. The status quo was reaffirmed by the Second Silesian War (1744-1745) and the Seven Years War (1756-1763). The Hubertzburg Peace of February 15, 1763 left with Austria the southern parts of the Neisse (Nysa) diocese and the principalities of Jägendorf (Kmnov) and Troppau (Opava), as well as with all of the Teschen (Tesen, Cieszyn) land. Troppau became the capital of the truncated Austrian Silesia which in 1782 was united with Moravia for the purpose of imperial administration by Joseph II who resigned to the conquests of Frederick the Great more than his mother Maria Theresa. This arrangement was reversed by his successors except for a second brief period from 1860 to 1861. So Austrian Silesia gained the status of a separate land of the Austrian Empire and its own diet.

\[116\] Many protestants were expelled by the local rulers who also authorized seizure of Protestant property and churches (Kopiec, 1991: 48).

\[117\] Opava Silesia belonged to the Moravian Margravate till the Thirteenth century. It had become a separate province of Moravia already in the Twelfth century and at the end of the Thirteenth century it was a separate principality. In 1315 Opava Silesia was considered to be a separate land equal to Moravia. The Prince Mikulas II received the Silesian Principality of Ratibor (Racibórz) in the 1330s which commenced incorporation of the Opava land into Silesia. For a long time it was subjected to the ecclesiastical power of the bishopric in Olomouc (Olmütz, O_omuniec) in Moravia (Bakala, 1992: 1).
It must be also mentioned that in 1742 Prussia also seized the Margravate of Glatz (Kladsko, Kodzko). It was officially added to Prussian Silesia in 1807 and in the same year the whole land was formally incorporated in Prussia as the Duchy of Silesia. In 1807 Prussia also obtained the part of Upper Lusatia east of the Spree. It was incorporated in Silesia in 1815 by the Peace of Vienna, and further enlarged by the part west of the Spree in 1825.

Moreover, in 1790 the principality of Sewerien (Siewierz, which had been separated from Silesia in the Fifteenth century, was seized by Prussia as new Silesia. Its Prussian ownership was legalized by the Second Partition of Poland in 1793. The whole northern frontier of Silesia was only an internal Prussian division after the Third Partition of Poland in 1795 when Prussia gained the rest of Wielkopolska (Great Poland) and renamed it South Prussia. Although the conquest was partially reverted by the war with Napoleon in 1806-07, when the Principality of Siewierz (Sewerien) was lost to the would-be Congress Kingdom of Poland and South Prussia limited to Posnania, the incorporation of the latter into Prussia allowed free migration from ethnically Polish Posnania to Germanized Silesia which was to influence and complicate ethnic relations in the latter.

The consolidation of integrity of Silesia was also conducted in the ecclesiastical sphere. In 1811 the districts of Beuthen (Bytom) and Pless (Pszczyna), which had belonged to the Cracow bishopric, were transferred to the bishopric of Breslau. The latter was disconnected from the Gniezno (Gnesen) archbishopric in 1821, and placed directly under the Papal authority, Berlin being made dependant on Breslau (Wiskemann, 1956: 23).

Considering economic and administrative development of Silesia under the Prussian rule it is worth mentioning that following the damages caused by the Silesian wars, Frederick the Great invited tens of thousands of Prussian citizens to repopulate the land. He devoted much attention to his new acquisition, which was placed under a special Landesminister. The old estates were abolished and a more efficient administration introduced. He also prepared to develop the rich mineral resources of Silesia and to create armaments industry; for this purpose thirty-three colonies of German workmen were sent to the Malapane (Ozimek) region between 1770 and 1774 commencing rapid industrial revolution in Upper Silesia (Volz, 1920: 13). The first Prussian steel-mill was erected in the 1780s in the Ruhr, and in 1794 in Silesia (Davies, 1981: II 118). In the wake of these achievements steam engines and the requisite engineers arrived from England, and coking process was learned. these were the key to the rich deposits of coal in Upper Silesia. In 1791 the royal coal pits were opened near Beuthen (Bytom), and in 1794 the royal iron and steel works at Gleiwitz (Gliwice); in 1802 the first blast furnace at Königshütte (Królewská Huta, now a part of Chorzów) was inaugurated (Rose, 1936: 38). Upper Silesia was at this stage ahead of the Ruhr (Wiskemann, 1956: 24).

The Napoleonic Wars displayed weaknesses of Prussia in confrontation with France and prompted the Stein-Hardenbergsche reforms of 1807-12 (Vetter, 1992: 51). Peasantry was gradually freed from the bondage of serfdom (which had been strengthened and made extremely strict in the time of the religious wars). Delayed upon the Prussian seizure of Silesia, secularization of Church properties was conducted in 1810 and in 1811, Breslau was made the seat of Schlesische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität (the result of the fusion of the Leopoldina and the Viadrina University of Frankfurt on the Oder) based on Humboldt’s modern concept of university.

Silesia’s ties to Prussia were reaffirmed in the spring of 1813 when Breslau became the focal point of the uprising against Napoleon, thus, the most important political center of Prussia if not of all of Germany. The eventual success of the uprising was possible only thanks to the sustained production of weapons by Upper Silesian industry. In Breslau Frederick Wilhelm announced his "Proclamation to My Nation" and founded the Iron Cross which was produced in Gleiwitz (Gliwice).
Also here young Eichendorff of Lubowitz (Lubowice) (the greatest poet of late German Romanticism), Ernest Moritz Arndt, Theodor Körner and other poets joined the Voluntary Corps of Lützow to fight for freedom (Neubach, 1992: 7).

History of Silesia and its crucial role in history of Germany prompted the Germans to regard the land at the time to be part of Germany. It was included in the German League from 1815 to 1866 unlike the Grand Duchy of Posen, and West and East Prussia which only in 1834 were accepted into the Zollverein, the German Custom Union, and in 1867 into the North German Confederation (Davies, 1981: II 112). The Nineteenth century, though, also saw the unprecedented rise of nationalism overshadowing the earlier religious conflicts. Thus the multinational state of Prussia like the Austrian Empire was gradually subjected to the centrifugal forces of growing emergent ethnic loyalties. The image of the law-obeying Prussian or Austrian citizen looking towards and complying with decisions made in their respective capitals, was gradually giving way to the bifurcated perception which classified the populace according to its ethnic origin as dependable through and through German patriots, and the nationally suspicious and vacillating element. Rapid nationalistic polarization reinforced by popular education, suffrage, military conscription and all-embracing bureaucracy, the products of industrialization, did not exclude Silesia evincing heterogeneity of this land, especially of its westernmost, easternmost and southeasternmost reaches. This situation was more shocking than in Posnania which was given to Prussia by the Partitions of Poland at the end of the Eighteenth century and was predominantly Polish in its character. Silesia had been considered purely German and awareness of its Slavic past was lost to the Nineteenth century German public opinion which ascribed the awakening of national feelings, especially in Upper Silesia, to unwanted influences from Posnania and the adjacent regions of the Russian and Austrian partitions of Poland.

This experience was of traumatic value for forming Germandom and was dealt with by the means of various restrictive measures which in their extreme exemplars resulted in movements of population, preceding later actions in the Twentieth century, which can be unmistakably labeled as ethnic cleansing.
Chapter two

The notion of Silesia

(Part 1: from the beginnings till 1918)

Before delving into the intricacies of the study it is necessary, for the sake of clarity, to delimit the meaning of the descriptive label of Silesia. As any other region or land Silesia is a construct. It has developed for a millennium under the influence of changes in settlement patterns, political and institutional developments, various administrative divisions as well as mythological concepts which, first, aimed at linking it with Antiquity and then left Silesia pray to nationalist mythologizers in the 19th and 20th centuries, sadly, not without heavy involvement on the part of German, Polish and Czech historiographies which only nowadays try to free themselves from the straitjacket of nationalism, in search of objective descriptions of this land which would truly constitute slesiographia rather then contributions for the sake of any interests be they national, state or other.

The watershed of the upper and middle Oder (Odra) formed the welcoming area for early settlement as well as the axis of Silesia positioning it along the river’s course from north-west to south-east. Observing the fortified castles which dotted Silesia in the 10th century it is clear that settlers preferred locations along the Oder and the river’s tributaries (Birke, 1968: 6). The two settlement areas which were to be identified with Lower and Upper Silesia, respectively, were divided by the Przesieka strip of woods which extended from the Sudetic Mountains in the south, along the Nysa Kłodzka (Glatzer Neisse), and across the Oder (Odra) to today’s towns of Namysłów (Namsau) and Byczyna (Pitschen) in the north. The division separated the tribal territories of the Slenci and the Opolians and continued to function as a strategic and political border until the 13th century (Snoch, 1990: 117).

The two settlement areas were limited by the Lusatian swamps in the west, the Sudetic Mountains in the south and the westernmost tip of the Carpathian range of the Beskids in the south-east and, too, by the watershed of the upper Vistula. Silesia has no firm natural borders in the east and north, which would conveniently differentiate it from other lands. However, the would-be Silesian/German-Polish boundary which mainly ran along swamps, woods and small rivers and streams used to be one of the most stable ones in Europe (Conrads, 1994: 14).

The name Silesia, whose earlier Latin forms are Slesia and Zlesia, first was used to denote the territory inhabited by the Slenci (Snoch, 1990: 140) and was congruent with the later name of Middle Silesia (Brückner, 1990: 632). In 1202, with the first division of Silesia between the two most significant lines of the Silesian Piasts of Vratislavia (Breslau, Wrocław) and Ratibor (Reitbórz)/Opole (Oppeln) the name began to cover the whole of today’s Lower Silesia, i.e. the part of Silesia west of the Przesieka, whereas the territories east of it were known as the Opole (Oppeln) land or the Opole (Oppeln) principality (which contained majority of Upper Silesia) \(^{119}\) (Orzechowski, 1971: 37). This dualism within the forming province fossilized and gave rise to the parallel name of Upper Silesia for the Opole (Oppeln) land. Its first testified use is connected to a document from 1462 (Snoch, 1990: 140). Consequently, in official context one began to speak about both Silerias (utraque Slesia, beide Schlesien). The term was mentioned for the first time in 1458 and counterpoised the two constituent parts of the land sanctioning the use of the two names Lower Silesia (Slesia Inferior) and Upper Silesia (Slesia Superior). The dualism continued until the mid-18th century as by that time the Silesian estates predominantly used the name of utraque Slesia for the whole land. But already in the

\(^{119}\) Considering the territorial development of this part of Silesia which was to become Upper Silesia it is interesting to note that the rulers of the Cieszyn (Teschen, Těšín) principality referred to their realm as a Polish principality until the 14th century when it became common to dub it a Silesian principality (Lesiuč, 1995: 21). However, since the forming of Silesia as a separate land and hereditary domain of the Polish House of Piast, the principality had been its part (Orzechowski, 1971: 55).
16th century the royal office started using Silesia for the same purpose giving rise to the modern use of the term (Orzechowski, 1971: 57).

Leaving aside the question of terminology it is interesting to see what territories constituted Silesia in the course of centuries. Some of these changes in this respect were cursorily mentioned in the previous chapter which presents an overview of Silesian history. It is indispensable, however, to scrutinize the territorial issue comprehensively in order to visualize Silesia as a political entity.

When in c. 990 the state of the Polanians acquired Silesia from Bohemia the land of Kladsko (Glatz, Klodzko) as an important strategic border area surrounded by mountain ranges was contested by the Přemislids who repossessed it in 1096. The Breslau (Wrocław) Prince Heinrich (Henryk) IV Probus regained it in 1278 and kept it by the time of his death in 1290 when it was acquired by the Schweidnitz (Świdnica) Prince. Without going into the intricacies of the interSilesian ownership relations, the territory was bought by Bohemia in 1322. In 1462 the region was made into a margravate by Jiří z Poděbrad, and the privileges of 1472 and 1578 reaffirmed its status as an integral part of the lands of the Czech Crown. Besides the strong link with Bohemia, the Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko) Margravate had vibrant relations with Silesia. Following the Prussian conquest of Silesia in 1742, the margravate was gradually integrated into the Prussian province, but its inhabitants retained separate, non-Silesian identity until their expulsion in 1945 (Honzák, 1995: 232).

The Opava (Troppau, Opawa) land annexed to Silesia by Boleslaw II Chrobry was regained by Břetislav I before 1038. This land which bordered almost on the town of Ratibor (Racibórz) became part of the Moravian Margravate and the fact that it was part of the Bohemian Kingdom was reaffirmed in 1229 by the outcome of the border dispute between the dioceses of Breslau (Wrocław) and Olomouc (Olmütz), when the land under the name of *provincia Golessicensis* entered the Olomouc (Olmütz) diocese, together with the town of Neustadt (Prudnik). In 1348 Charles IV reaffirmed its status as the fief of the Czech Crown but since 1336 the ruler of this land had simultaneously been the prince of Ratibor (Racibórz) so the links between the Opava (Troppau, Opawa) principality and Silesia gradually grew stronger. In the 14th century the principality was divided into the principalities of Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) which in the 15th and 16th centuries became accepted parts of Silesia though some separatist tendencies continued in the principalities. Following the Breslau (Wrocław) peace of 1742 Prussia gained the northern part of the principalities whereas the smaller southern part remained with Austria, and was included in Austrian Silesia (Honzák, 1995: 346; Orzechowski, 1977: 59).

Turning to the eastern border of Silesia one rarely is conscious that it is actually the Silesian-Malopolska borderland. It was 1179 when Kazimierz II transferred the castelanies of Bytom (Beuthen), Siewierz (Sewerien) (together with the town of Chrzanów [Krenau]), and OŚwięcim (Auschwitz) into the possession of the Ratibor (Racibórz) prince. In 1274 the then Silesian castellany of OŚwięcim (Auschwitz) was expended farther eastward and even crossed the Vistula’s tributary the Skawa. This state of affairs continued until the 15th century when in 1443 the Sewerien (Siewierz) land was purchased by the Cracow bishop (and later re-incorporated into the Polish territory), in 1457 the Polish King bought the Auschwitz (OŚwięcim) principality and in 1494 the Zator principality which had been separated from the former. Thus, from all the Malopolska territories only the Beuthen (Bytom) land remained in Silesia while the eastern border of Silesia stabilized along the Jablunka.

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120 Kladsko (Glatz, Klodzko) is the first Silesian locality which was mentioned in documents. Until 1945 it has continued to be a significant fortress (Webersinn, 1977: 116-123).

121 This part of Silesia or rather of the Silesian-Moravian borderland was inhabited by the tribe of Golensizi (Weczerka, 1977: 142/143).

122 It is quite understandable as the two principalities remained included within the borders of the Olomouc (Olmütz) diocese, and from the territorial point of view they were riddled with numerous Moravian salients and enclaves which despite gradual simplification and integration remained (Mrass, 1995: maps Nos. 7, 8) until 1927 when Austrian Silesia was made into one province together with Moravia within the borders of the Czechoslovak state.
(Jablonkowska) pass and the peaks of the Beskid range (after the southern strip of land denoted as Czadca (Čadca, Czacza) had passed onto Hungary in 1772\(^1\) (Gotkiewicz, 1939: 33-36), the most upper Vistula, the Przemsza and Brynitz (Brynica) to Woischnik (Woźniki) (Honzák, 1995: 503; Orzechowski, 1971: 59/60).

The Silesian-Wielkopolska border underwent considerable changes in the 13th century. In the years 1224-1238 the Breslau (Wroclaw) prince Heinrich (Henryk) I conquered Wielkopolska by the line of the Warta (Warthe) River, and granted the Oppeln (Opole) prince with the lands of Ruda and Kalisz. In the period of 1244-1249 not only were all the territories regained by the Wielkopolska princes but they also seized the Silesian territory of Schildberg (Ostrzeszów) land west of the Prosna River, which was permanently annexed by Wielkopolska. Wielkopolska and Silesia also contested the borderland of Fraustadt (Wschowa) which finally was detached from Silesia in 1343 (Orzechowski, 1971: 60; Rogall, 1993: 23).

Considering the western border of Silesia: the Breslau (wroclaw) princes extended it to the west after having acquired the land of Lebus (Lubusz) before 1217. It was lost to the Archbishop of Magdeburg already in 1249 (Ludat, 1995: 256) and later on became the basis of Brandenburg’s transorder expansion against the lands of Wielkopolska and Pomerania (Ludat, 1995a: 252). However, part of the Lebus (Lubusz) land, namely Schwiebus (Swiebodzin) remained a Silesian territory. When in 1482 Matthias Corvinus sold the Silesian towns of Crossen (Krosno) and Züllichau (Sulechów) to the Brandenburg margrave, the area of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin) became a Silesian enclave, but remained firmly attached to Silesia until the administrative reform of the Prussian state in 1816, when it was included in the province of Brandenburg (Orzechowski, 1971: 60; Snoch, 1990: 72; Stütten, 1976: 118).

More recent changes of Silesian borders were treated at length in the previous chapter, but it is appropriate to mention them here to conclude the issue of territorial changes. Thus, in 1742 almost all Silesia was seized by Prussia with the exception of the southern parts of the Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) principalities, and the principality of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyzn) which henceforth constituted Austrian Silesia. The border between the Silesias was finally demarcated along the Oppa (Opava, Opawa), Olsa (Olše, Olza) and Vistula rivers in accordance with the Hubertusburg Peace of 1763. Moreover, following the third partition of Poland in 1795 Prussia annexed the territory of the former principality of Siewierz (Sewerien) with the adjacent land into Silesia under the name of New Silesia. After Napoleon’s seizure of Silesia New Silesia was transferred to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807. In the wake of the success of the War of Liberation Prussia gained Upper and Lower Lusatia from Saxony in accordance with the decisions of the Congress of Vienna (1815). Most of the newly acquired territory was included in the province of Brandenburg but in 1816 c. two thirds of Upper Lusatia, namely the counties of: Lauban (Lubań), Görlitz (Zgorzelec) and Rothenburg (Rozbork) together with a part of the county of Zittau (Zytawa), and in 1824/1825 the county of Hoyersweda (Wojercy) were added to Silesia’s Liegnitz (Legnica).

\(^{123}\) It seems that in this area Silesia originally extended to the streams of Kisuca (Kysuca, Kisuca) and Csaca (Čadca, Czacza) not containing the settlement of Csaca (Čadca, Czacza) on the southern bank of the former. The settlement gave name to the whole disputed strip of land between the streams and the Beskid range which was sparsely populated by some peasants from the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyzn) principality, the Polish region of Zywiec (Saybusch) and Malopolska beginning with the 13th century. The colonization intensified in the 16th century with more Polish-speaking settlers from the Ruthenian villages destroyed by the Tatars and Cossacks in 1564, and the coming of the Góral (Goralen, Highlander) population, i.e. pastoralists of various Slavic-Wallachian (-Valachian) descent from the South along the Carpathian arc (Svatava, 1994: 262). The Slovak-speaking settlers were also present by presumably their number diminished in the 17th century when some left for Lower Hungary regained from the Ottoman Empire. Regarding the Silesian-Hungarian border, thanks to the settlers it was moving northward and was demarcated by the southern edge of forests which gradually retreated northward felled by the settlers. The moving border bred discontent and was finally settled in 1772 by the commission appointed by Maria Theresa. Thus almost all the disputed land was included in Upper Hungary (Gotkiewicz, 1939: 28/29, 33, 36, 41).
Regency in exchange for the county of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin) and some parts of the Sagan (Zagań) county which were incorporated in Brandenburg (1816) (Lesiuk, 1995: 24-26; Stüttgen, 1976: 118/119). The subsequent status quo was maintained until the end of World War I and the new territorial changes introduced by the Peace of Versailles.

Consequently, well over one and a half century without any external border alterations brought about development and stabilization of geographic and historiographic terminology used to describing the land. It is necessary to get acquainted with the names as they are the basis for later and current discussion on Silesia. So to reiterate, beginning with 1815 Prussian Silesia was turned into one of the ten provinces of the Prussian state, and was divided into the four regencies of: Liegnitz (Legnica), Reichenbach (Dzierżoniów), Breslau (Wroclaw) and Oppeln (Opole). Then Lower Silesia was identified with the Liegnitz (Legnica) regency until 1820 when the Reichenbach (Dzierżoniów) regency was dissolved and its counties divided between the Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wroclaw) regencies (Stüttgen, 1976: 266). Subsequently, Lower Silesia corresponded to the so extended Liegnitz (Legnica) regency whereas one started speaking about Middle Silesia (Mittelschlesien, Śląsk średni) in relation to the Breslau (Wroclaw) regency (Snoch, 1990: 140/141). The name Middle Silesia lost its currency in 1919 when the Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wroclaw) regencies together formed the newly-established province of Lower Silesia. Understandably, since then on the territories of both the regencies are spoken about as Lower Silesia. On the other hand, Upper Silesia was easily identified with the Oppeln (Opole) regency. Between 1825 and 1918 Prussian Silesia’s area amounted to 40,319 sq km (Anon., 1905: 366).

The name of Austrian Silesia came into being in 1763 at the Peace of Hubertusburg. In the period 1742-1763 one spoke about Czech Silesia. Austrian Silesia’s area of 5,135 sq km was divided into two chunks by the Moravian salient. The western part of Austrian Silesia consisted from the principalities of Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) which however were riddled with numerous Moravian enclaves which amounted to 316 sq km124. This part of Austrian Silesia was known as Troppau (Opava, Opawa) Silesia, West Upper Silesia or simply West Silesia. Besides the principalities West Silesia also comprised several freie Standesherrschaften and Minderherrschaften, and a similar situation was observed in East Silesia which was identified with the eastern part of Austrian Silesia constituted by the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) principality (Güssefeld, 1818)125. East Silesia was sometimes referred to as East Upper Silesia. East and West Silesia constituted two administrative regions of Austrian Silesia and continued their function even when Austrian Silesia was merged with Moravia in 1771. However, Austrian Silesia retained its own parliament throughout the merger which was terminated in 1849 and repeated for several months in 1869/1861. It was the smallest crown country in the Austrian Empire, and its another specific feature was that it retained certain administrative links with Prussian Silesia as some parts of West Silesia which had formed the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop’s former Neisse (Nysa) principality remained within the boundaries of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese, and the bishop was even one of the five members of the Austrian Silesian estate convent (Anon., 1905: 368, 388/389).

The Catholic Church which was predominant in the Habsburg Empire and quite significant in Prussian Silesia did leave a clear imprint on the province’s past so it is necessary to scrutinize the Church’s administrative organization in Silesia because it tended to reflect some bygone loyalties. They showed that the Church did not really accept the Protestant state of Prussia’s seizure of Silesia which was wrestled away from Catholic Austria. Moreover, the administrative divisions which crystallized at the beginning of the 19th century continued largely unchanged until the disruptive year of 1945.

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124 The area of the Moravian exclaves was not included in the aforementioned area of Austrian Silesia.

125 The first president of the royal office at Troppau (Opava, Opawa) Friedrich Haugvitz bought the freie Standesherrschaft of Bielitz (Bi’lsko, Bielsko) in 1743, and in 1752 it was made into a principality which was directly subjugated to the Austrian Crown (Anon., 1905: 388).
As mentioned above, the Austrian Silesian part of the former Neisse (Nysa) principality centered around Jauernig (Jawornik, Jawornik) and Freiwaldau (Frywaldow, Frywaldów) remained included within the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese, not unlike the Glatz (Kladsko, Kłodzko) Margravate which stayed with the Prague diocese, and Prussian Silesia’s northern parts of the Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) principalities, i.e. the areas of Leobschütz (Hlupčic, Głubczyce) and Katscher (Kietrz), and Hultschin (Hlučín, Hulczyn) respectively, which were not detached from the Olmütz (Olomouc) diocese (Babychwolski, 1995: [7]). This intersecting of state and Catholic Church boundaries in these regions continued until 1945 but the post-1945 changes were recognized by the Church only in 1972 in the case of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese (Scheuermann, 1994: I 103), and in 1977 in the case of the Prague and Olomouc (Olmütz) dioceses (Korbelářova, 1995: 194).

Now it is necessary to turn our attention to history of the Breslau diocese in order to depict its territorial function within Silesia. Since 1000 the diocese had been subordinated to the Gnesen (Gniezno) metropolis but with the weakening links of Silesia with Poland the diocese actually had become gradually independent of the Gniezno (Gnesen) Archbishop from the 16th onwards. In 1722 the members of the Breslau (Wroclaw) cathedral chapter decided that if a candidate to the chapter did not come from Silesia he must be of noble origin. In 1732, the year of nomination to the position of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Bishop for Cardinal Count Philipp Ludwig Sitzendorf, Pope Clemens XII sent him a document stating that the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese was directly subjected to the Apostolic See. In 1748 all the links between the diocese and Gniezno (Gnesen) were severed (Davies, 1991 I: 169), and, finally, in 1821 the bull De salute animarum which established the two new Church provinces of Cologne and Gnesen-Posen (Gniezno-Poznań) in Prussia also regulated this aforementioned fait accompli reaffirming that the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese was under the Pope’s authority (Pater, 1992: 57; Scheuermann, 1994: 100, 103). The bull also confirmed the 1811 inclusion of the Cracow diocese’s Upper Silesian deaneries of Beuthen (Bytom) and Pleß (Pszczyna)126 (Orzechowski, 1972: 11), partially regulated the southern fragment of Wielkopolska’s Schildberg (Ostrzeszów) land by transferring two thirds of the area concentrated around Kempen (Kępno) to the Gnesen-Posen (Gniezno-Poznań) Church province. Moreover, not recognizing the administrative changes carried out within the Prussian state, the bull provided for considerable expanding the diocese’s borders to the west in order to comprise Prussia’s gain of Upper and Lower Lusatia, as well as the county of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin) which earlier had been transferred to the province of Brandenburg. Moreover, in the south the Lower Silesian area centered around Grüssau (Krzeszów), which had belonged to the Prague diocese, was added to the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishopric (Babuchowski, 1995: 7; Orzechowski, 1972: 11/12).

The territory of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese was quite regularly divided into the almost equal 11 commissariats with the exception of the two westernmost commissariats of Głogów (Głogów) and Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra) which covered unproportionally larger areas than the other commissariats. It was due to predominance of Protestants living there as Catholics were quite rare in western Silesia. This situation was reflected in the territorial organization of the Silesian Protestants whose two most significant Churches, i.e. the Lutheran Church and the Reformed Church of Augsburg creed were united in 1817, under the state’s pressure, into the evangelic Church. The unified Church’s administrative organization almost perfectly coincided with the borders of the Silesian province, and its regencies and counties. However, the counties could not be an appropriate basis for the evangelical Church’s administration in the Oppeln (Opole) regency which was overwhelmingly populated by Catholics, so there were only five extensive evangelic Church counties covering the whole regency (Orzechowski, 1972: 12-14).

126 This inclusion reflected the acceptance of the fact that the ex-Młopolska land of Beuthen (Bytom) had become an integral part of Prussian Silesia and was carried out in exchange for the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese’s cession of New Silesia (which was lost by Prussia in 1806/1807) to the ecclesiastical power of the Cracow Bishop (Kus’nierczyk, 1996: 18; Orzechowski, 1972: 11).
Having observed the alterations of the borders comprising Silesia be they political, administrative or ecclesiastical now some attention will be given to Silesia as an entity included within bigger political organisms. The land though comparatively rich and populous in the premodern age never developed its own state, and being the meeting point of the ethnic groups of the Germans, Poles, Czech/Moravians and even Slovaks it was fated to become a cornerstone (Zivier in: Szramek, 1992: 7) of states, religions, and, recently, of nations. Usually, its destiny was to be exploited by its owner, but he could not be too sure of being able to keep the land permanently, so changing hands often Silesia and its population were marginalized in political and economic life unless they were of some immediate use. The relative insignificance of Silesia for the states in which it was incorporated, and its borderland character are most clearly visualized by maps of these states, where it is placed as a distant province near an edge of the area which is presented by a cartographer.

When Silesia began to emerge as a region at the turn of the first and second Millennia the Slavic tribes which inhabited it did not establish any political system covering the whole land. Earlier, as shown in the previous chapter, the territories which had been to become Silesia, had been, at least in part, included in the Realm of Samo, the Moravian Realm and Bohemia. The state of the Polanians which came into being in the mid-tenth century, seized Silesia from Bohemia at the close of the first Millennium. It formed one of the Polish realm’s five provinces and occupied the south-western corner of the state. After 1138 when the feudal fragmentation of the state into gradually smaller principalities was commenced, Silesia ceased its character of a province. In 1169 there were two Silesian principalities, in 1177 four, in 1202 once again two, and in 1255 four, but in 1286 already eight. Subsequently, due to individual policies of the Silesian princes and various marriage schemes the territories of the principalities widely fluctuated (Orzechowski, 1971a: 84-86, 88/89) and in the 14th century many principalities started to consist from a plethora of separate territories (Orzechowski, 1971b). Later the mosaic was even more complicated by internal administrative divisions of larger principalities and appearance new political divisions in the form of freie Standesherrschaften and Minderherrschaften which together formed well over twenty entities prior to the Prussian efforts to modernize the administrative/political organization of Silesia (Conrads, 1994: 16). Actually one cannot speak about the political borders of Silesia from 1138 until the subjugation of the Silesian princes to the Bohemian Crown in the 20s and 30s of the 14th century because the Silesian principalities did not add up to some Silesian political organism but were separate statelets. They warred against each other and pursued different dynastic policies also contracting alliances with non-Silesian rulers against other Silesian princes. Even after the 1330s the principalities of Jauer (Jawor) and Schweidnitz (Swidnica), and the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop’s principality of Neisse (Nysa) retained their relative independence and continued to pursue their own international policies (Orzechowski, 1971: 59; Orzechowski, 1971b: 88).

During the period of independent Silesian states the Breslau (Wroclaw) princes Heinrich (Henryk) I the Bearded and his son Heinrich (Henryk) II the Pious strove to unite the Polish state which a century earlier had disintegrated into a cluster of principalities. They managed to build a state consisting from the three of the original five Polish provinces, namely: Silesia, Malopolska and Wielkopolska, which lasted from 1201 to 1241. By that time Pomerania had left the sphere of the Polish state becoming an imperial fief, and the Mazovian princes wanted to pursue an independent policy. The policy of the Breslau (Wroclaw) princes aiming at reconstructing the Polish state disappeared with the sudden decline of their power brought about by the devastating onslaught of the Mongols in 1241 (Czapliński, 1993: 8). Their efforts were renewed by Heinrich (Henryk) I’s great grandson Heinrich (Henryk) IV who from 1288 to 1290 maintained a territorially discontinuous state consisting from majority of Lower Silesia and the Cracow land with the Polish throne at Cracow (Snoch, 1990: 47). Finally, the Polish state was tentatively reestablished by Wladyslaw I, at first the insignificant Prince of Łęczyca and Kujawy.

Wladyslaw I and his successor never achieved reincorporation of Silesia in the Polish state, and the Silesian principalities having become Bohemian fiefs were gradually turned into administrative divisions of Bohemia’s Silesian province. It returned to the hands of the Bohemian rulers three and
a half centuries after the Polish Duke Mieszko had wrestled it away from them. Easy integration of the Silesian principalities with Bohemia was stalled by stronger princes who still wished to retain their independence. The most successful one in this respect was the Schweidnitz (Swidnica) and Jauer (Jawor) Prince Bolko II who added to his two independent principalities extensive Lower Silesian territories and Upper Lusatia. However, after his death in 1368 all his lands became fiefs of the Bohemian Crown as on this condition his heiress niece Anna married Charles IV, the King of Bohemia and Germany and the Emperor (Orzechowski, 1971b: 89; Snoch, 1990: 14).

In 1348 Charles incorporated Silesia in the Czech Crown as a third province after the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Margravate of Moravia, and before Lusatia. After the incorporation of Brandenburg in 1373, Silesia with Lusatia constituted almost one third of the territory of the lands of the Czech Crown (Orzechowski, 1971: 64). Besides becoming part of the Czech Crown, Silesia also entered the Holy Roman Empire and since that time on, in a way, was the easternmost part of Western Europe in political127, economic, historical and cultural sense (Barraclough, 1992: 631; Jähnig, 1991: 45). However, being placed on the rim of the Western European core Silesia was less developed than more central regions of the Empire and of Western Europe, and even less than Bohemia and Moravia (Moraw, 1994: 4). On the other hand, it presented a higher degree of development in comparison to Poland and the rest of East-Central Europe which together with Eastern Europe, the westernmost areas of the Iberian Peninsula and the south of Italy are considered to be the periphery of the European civilization and economy. Consequently, Silesia may be considered to have been a go-between, transitory Central European region between the European core and the periphery. It also seems that the intermediary function of Silesia has continues until this day in relation to Poland as a peripheral country aspiring to join the economic powerhouse of Europe represented by Germany.

In the 15th century Silesia as a part of the Czech Crown found itself united with the Austrian countries through the personal union embodied by Albert of Austria (1437-1439). Later from 1469 (though legally only after the Olomouc (Olmiütz) Peace of 1479) together with Moravia and Lusatia, it was united with Hungary by the person of Matthias Corvinus. He was responsible for the final curbing of special prerogatives enjoyed by the Silesian princes, and though he did not liquidate their realms he started the process of turning them into mere administrative divisions as well as changing Silesia into a province with homogenous legislation and central government directly subjected to the King128. After Matthias’s death in 1490 the union of the Czech Crown and Hungary was maintained until 1526 by Vladislav (Ulászló II) I and his son Ludvík (Lajos II) of House of Jagiellon. Silesia with Lusatia constituted the northernmost part of the Czech lands129 this Czech-Hungarian state (Orzechowski, 1971: 64/65; Orzechowski, 1971b: 88).

After the death of Ludvík (Lajos II) at the battle of Mohacs (1526) the Czech-Hungarian state was united with the Austrian lands in the person of Emperor Ferdinand I of Habsburg. Silesia remained a Czech land within the Habsburg realm and the northernmost march (together with Lusatia130) of the newly-expanded empire until 1742 when Silesia was annexed by Prussia. In the crescent-shaped state of Friedrich II the Great Silesia was situated in its south-eastern corner, and conveniently connected to Brandenburg unlike East Prussia which until the first partition of Poland in 1772 was separated from Brandenburg by Poland’s West Prussia. For the Prussian kings Silesia constituted a much-sought basis for further expansion in central and southern German which also...
allowed them to check the Austrian influence in northern German and the Polish lands it was the first act of the developing conflict between Prussia and Austria who wished to dominate Germany. After the defeat in 1806 Prussia lost majority of South Prussia and much of New East Prussia which had formed a broad land bridge filling in the territorial void between East Prussia and Silesia. But already at the Congress of Vienna (1815) the losses were recompensed with northern Saxony and once again Silesia was a handy territory which with Brandenburg allowed Prussia to easily integrate this gain, and later to use it as a link with Prussia’s west German possessions. As it can be inferred from these examples the cornerstone character of Silesia continued, and was picturesquely embodied, after Austria’s annexation of the Republic of Cracow (1846), in the almost-mythic Drei Kaisers Ecke (corner of the three emperors) where the borders of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and German empires met at the southern outskirts of the Upper Silesian city of Myslowitz (Myslowice)\textsuperscript{131} and, thus, expressed presumable solidity of the rather fragile Central European world until 1918 (Anon., 1889: map bet. pp. 362/363; Anon., 1993: 10; Orzechowski, 1971: 66-68).

Having observed development of Silesia as a geographical and political entity it is time to examine how loyalties of the inhabitants of the land were bound to it by disseminating consciousness of Silesia as a separate region in an effort to construct the Silesian identity. The most obvious means to achieve this end were coats-of-arms, maps and legends which allowed to instantly visualize a region with its mythic origin in the eye of a beholder. In reality he did not see the land, because getting to know a region demands many days if not weeks of travel and studying works about it, but only a group of symbolic objects or, in other word, logos which gained a certain kind of semantic identity with a land they claimed to represent. This popular process of logoization of a land was the first step to building an identity which surpassed one’s immediate environs of his kin and locality. In Europe one of the earliest pioneers of logoization was the Church thanks to which we can equalize Christianity with the symbols of fish and cross. It was followed by feudal suzerains and their vassals striving with their coats-of-arms to ensure loyalty of their realms inhabitants to the lords and the regions themselves. At present in the age of nation-states members of nations swear the oath of fealty to the banners and coats-of-arms representing their countries. And the bond between the state and the citizen constantly reinforced by frequent use of these symbols and maps at schools, in offices, in mass media and in the army, is still fortified by national anthems and proliferation of secondary state symbols and symbolisms in commercial and culture products. The logos allow the inhabitants to identify themselves with a region/state and to be able to differentiate it from another. Thus, outsiders with residence in other regions become the Others creating a sharp ethnic/national border between us and them, which is superimposed on and identified with the political customs borders of a state. However, the border is mental and travels with an individual wherever he is recognizable as one of us or them. The divide between us and them is also deepened by historiography which invents/appropriates the past of a region/state in an effort to make it better/older than the histories of neighbor regions/states. Moreover, the dynamics of logoization gets complicated and multilayered in cases of annexations when the winners wish to coalesce the traditions/identities of the defeated with the hegemonical one or together with the latter into a new one. Another dimension to the phenomenon is added by the recent process of European integration in the framework of which there are some endeavors undertaken to construct a common European identity (Anderson, 1994: 155-211; Eriksen, 1993: 20-22, 36-44; Hobsbawm, 1983).

The process of logoization of in Silesia can be traced back to the 13th-century origins of the Silesian coat-of-arms. It was Oppeln-Ratibor (Opole-Racibórz) Prince Kazimierz (Kasimir) I who as first used an eagle for his coat-of-arms. Two years later an eagle appeared on the seal of Breslau (Wroclaw) Prince Heinrich (Henryk) II the Pious. The Lower Silesian eagle differed from the former with a crescent-shaped band placed on the eagle’s breast and wings with a small cross in the middle of the arc. The additional elements were taken from the first known Silesian coat-of-arms used by

\textsuperscript{131} The Prusso-Russo-Austrian border was delimited here by the stream of Weiß Przemsa (Biała Przemsza) (north of which there was Russia, and on its southern bank Austria) flowing into the Schwarz Przemsa (Czarna Przemsza) (east of which there was Prussian Silesia, and on its eastern bank Austria and Russia).
Heinrich (Henryk) II’s father Heinrich (Henryk) I the Bearded. The two different eagles constituted the bases for springing up of similar ones in the coats-of-arms created by the Piast rulers of the Silesian principalities which, in the 14th century, did proliferate in Lower and Upper Silesia respectively. Similarity of the Oppeln (Opole) prince’s plain eagle to the one in Poland’s coat-of-arm led to some confusion among heraldists because some of them described the Oppeln (Opole) principality in their armorials, as situated in Poland. In 1487 the Oppeln (Opole) eagle appeared on the coat-of-arms brandished by the rulers of the second largest Upper Silesian principality of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn). The first attested information on the colors of the two respective coats-of-arms come from the 14th century. The Oppeln (Opole) eagle was golden and placed on a blue shield, whereas the Breslau (Wroclaw) eagle was black with the silver crescent band and the small cross on its arc, on the golden shield. The coats-of-arms of Upper Silesian rulers were based on the former and of Lower Silesian rulers on the latter (Hupp, 1993: 73; Kaganiec, 1991).

This Upper-Lower Silesian dualism which permeates the land’s past and present, was tentatively resolved in the case of its coat-of-arm in 1335, the year of death of the last Breslau (Wroclaw) Prince from the House of Piast, Heinrich (Henryk) VI. He bequeathed his principality and all other legacy to the Bohemian King John of Luxembourg. Subsequently, John also took over Heinrich (Henryk) VI’s coat-of-arms which started to be used by his governor of Silesia. Thus, the Lower Silesian coat-of-arms was identified with all of Silesia and its Upper Silesian counterpart lapsed into relative obscurity surviving in the coats-of-arms of Upper Silesian principalities and towns. In 1532 the last Oppeln (Opole) Prince of the House of Piast, Johann (Jan) II died. Notably, in his last will he endowed the Oppeln (Opole) principality’s estates with his coat-of-arms. However, already in 1528 it was agreed that the Silesian troops would be fighting under the banner with the Lower Silesian eagle. The tradition continued during the Habsburg time and was taken over by Prussia when it gained Silesia in 1741, possibly due to the fact that the Lower Silesian eagle was quite similar to the black eagle of the Prussian Kingdom. The Upper Silesian eagle emerged from oblivion only in 1919 when the Upper Silesian province was established. It was a little altered, however, to reflect the province’s industrial character, so the in the middle base the legs of the golden Upper Silesian eagle were replaced with the scythe blade and the crossed hammer and pick under it, also golden as the eagle (Conrads, 1994: 22; Hupp, 1993: 23, 167-179; Kaganiec, 1991).

Quite early Silesia became an interesting object of research for cartographers. The very first map of Silesia was published in 1544 by Sebastian Münster at Zurich in his Cosmographiae universalis. But it was not made on the basis of first-hand data so it is accepted that the first modern map of the land was created by the learned inhabitant of Neisse (Nysa) Martin Helwig. In 1561 Johann Creutzig brought it out at Neisse (Nysa). Unlike modern maps, the upper margin of the map faced toward the south and the down one toward the north, but in such an outlay, more intelligibly, Upper Silesia was placed in the upper half of the map and lower Silesia near the map’s bottom. Helwig’s map was reissued more or less altered as the basis of all the maps of Silesia which appeared until the mid-18th century when after Prussia’s annexation of Silesia Friedrich II’s mapmakers started measuring the land in a systematic manner preparing the ground for issuance of topographical maps so much needed for the effective administration and industrial development of, and military control over the province. The activity of Prussia in this field was reflected by Austria in the context of Austrian Silesia (Conrads, 1994a: 254; Pustelnik, 1994: 4/5).

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132 At that time when the Silesian princes ruled independently some of them tended to add a crown to the eagle in their coats-of-arms as a symbol of their suzerainty. The tendency continued for at least two centuries after the Silesian principalities had been made Bohemian fiefs (Kaganiec, 1991: 7/8).

133 Austria maintaining its claim to Silesia granted the crownland of Austrian Silesia with an coat-of-arms identical with Prussian Silesia’s (cf. Anon., 1889a: 496/497).

134 The tools symbolized the mixed economy of Upper Silesia, namely: the scythe blade stood for agriculture, the pick for mining and the hammer for metallurgy.
Other logos bolstering the Silesian identity were the two saint mountains of Silesia: Zobten (Sobótka) (718 m) in Lower Silesia and St. Annaberg (Góra Sw. Anny) (385 m) in Upper Silesia. From the 8th-5th centuries before Christ Zobten (Sobótka) continued to function as an important cult center until the coming of Christianity to Silesia in the 9th/10th centuries. Due to its extreme importance for pagan believes and pre-Christian social organization, significance of the place must have lingered in the consciousness of the inhabitants of the area of the mountain as at the beginning of the 12th century a monastery was erected here to exorcise the heathenish spirit (Korta, 1988; Snoch, 1990: 144). The cloister was abandoned due to the harsh climatic conditions and possibility of Bohemian raids. Although heathendom was not recreated at the mountain whose previous functions had been taken over by the nearby city of Breslau (Wrocław), it has remained a mysterious Silesian pyramid (Conrads, 1995: 15). On the other hand, St. Annaberg (Góra Sw. Anny) was an insignificant mountain or rather a big hill until the beginning of the 17th century when a miraculous figure of St Ann was placed in a chapel at the mountain commencing the cult of Holy Virgin Mary’s mother. The cult was reinforced by the Franciscans who settled there in 1657 and built the whole pilgrimage complex which has attracted the faithful from Upper Silesia and further afield until this day (Hanich, 1985: 12/13).

The mountains are connected by Silesia’s blood artery of the Oder (Odra) which flows near them also creating the waterway which has been used for easy transportation. This function of the river contributed to joining all the regions of Silesia into one land. In the middle of Silesia the Oder (Odra) is straddled by Breslau (Wrocław). It was a ford settlement which developed into a bridge city, and which, in turn, thanks to its location at the crossroads of important European commercial routes became the Silesian capital and the land’s political, ecclesiastical and economic center. The Oder (Odra) also forms a convenient link with the Baltic Sea, and as such made it possible for Breslau (Wrocław) to join the Hanseatic League in 1387 as an end station of the commercial trail from the Flanders via Cologne, Thuringia and Merseburg (Scheuermann, 1994: I 512). When significance of the League declined with gradual creation of more centralized states in the post-medieval period, Breslau (Wrocław) left the Hansa in 1515 (Cetwiński, 1992: 18), but the economic ties which had developed between Northern Europe/Germany and Breslau (Wrocław)/Silesia persisted and did not allow the Habsburgs to treat the province as a straightforward part of their patrimony centered on Vienna.

From the Middle Ages Silesia has been strongly intertwined with its local Catholic Church despite the weakening of the bond during the period of religious wars. Heinrich (Henryk) I the Bearded who with his son commenced many a phenomenon which was to result in the growth of Silesian identity, married Hedwig, the daughter of Berthold IV, the prince of Andechs-Meranien in Bavaria. She led a pious life and established the monastery at Trebnitz (Trzebnica) where she died in 1243. In 1276 Pope Clemens IV canonized her and the cloister became the center of her cult which spread all over Silesia so that St Hedwig (Jadwiga) was soon accepted to be the patron saint of the whole land (Scheuermann, 1994: I 546/547). However, the homogenous pattern a little diverged in Upper Silesia where the cult of Holy Virgin Mary developed early and was bolstered by the later reverence paid by the faithful to her mother at the St. Annaberg (Góra Sw. Anny) shrine. The Upper Silesian cult of Holy Virgin Mary is connected to the person of Oppeln (Opole) Prince Władysław (Władyslaus) II who in 1382 founded the Pauline monastery at Jasna Góra (Clara Montana), Częstochowa, not far from the north-eastern corner of Upper Silesia (Hanich, 1985: 13). In the course of time, the Częstochowa cloister developed into a Marian cult center and the Polish shrine, and one of the most important Polish national symbols. It was visited by Upper Silesian pilgrims (Kopiec, Prior to the coming into being of St. Ann’s shrine at the mountain, it was known as Chelm (Chelm). The special status of Częstochowa and the monastery in the Polish nationalist iconography, despite their peripheral location in the pre-1945 Poland, was ensured by the ceremonial coronation of the monastery’s Black Madonna painting of Holy Virgin Mary in 1717 (i.e. in the period of growing Russian dominance over Poland) (Davies, 1991: II 172), and by the special nationalist role which was ascribed to the town and cloister in the
1991: 61) who also found a closer destination at Deutsch Piekar (Piekar). In 1303 a small wooden church dedicated to St. Bartholomew the Apostle was erected in Deutsch Piekar (Piekar). The painting of Holy Virgin Mary from the side altar which safely survived two profanations carried out by Lutherans and Hussites was transferred to the main altar in 1659, and according to the contemporary Catholics the Piekar Holy Virgin Mary was responsible for stopping the epidemics in Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry) (1676) and in Prague (1680), where it was sent on Emperor Leopold I’s request. Subsequently, Piekary grew into the Holy Virgin Mary pilgrimage center and her shrine was relocated to the specially built new church (1849) (Babuchowski, 1995: 4; Kopiec, 1991: 61).

Apart from Holy Virgin Mary the Upper Sileans have also revered St. Jacek, St. Brabara, and St. Folrian. All the cults are quite recent, except this of St. Jacek and date back to the beginnings of industrialization in Upper Silesia. Jacek (Hyacinth) from the Odrowąż family was born in c. 1180 in Groß Stein (Kamień Śląski), Upper Silesia, and as a dominican he was an active missionary in Ruthenia, Prussia and Danzig (Gdańsk). He died in 1257 and was canonized already in 1594. Many Silesian pilgrims visited his tomb in Cracow but the trend waned (Kopiec, 1991: 34), and only when he was accepted as a patron saint of the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese which was established in 1925 his cult was revived in eastern Upper Silesia though, certainly, cannot match significance of Holy Virgin Mary who together with St. Ann are the patron Saints of Upper Silesia. (Babuchowski, 1995: 5; Mazur, 1989, Wyrozumski, 1989).

St. Barbara as a patron saint of dangerous occupations, is revered by the Upper Silesian miners, and on December 4th, St. Barbara’s day apart from them the whole of industrialized Upper Silesia is involved in the festivities. Often she is said to be an Upper Silesian patron saint equal to Holy Virgin Mary and St. Ann, but she holds sway in the eastern half of Upper Silesia. On the other hand, the cult of St. Florian is limited to the workers employed in the metallurgical sector of the Upper Silesian industry (Babuchowski, 1995: 5).

Furthermore, the religious pattern of Silesia was complicated in the south of Upper Silesia which belonged to the Olomouc (Olmütz) diocese. The Moravian Czech-speaking faithful of this borderland area of Silesia, which partly was retained by Austria after the Prussian conquest of 1742, did share the reverence for Holy Virgin Mary as other Upper Sileans, but by the virtue of long-lasting ties of this region with Moravia and Bohemia its inhabitants continued to express their strong attachment to St John (Jan, Johann) Nepomuk (1330-1393). He was one of the most important figures of his times in the Bohemian Church. He did not want to reveal what the Queen told him during her confession despite King Wenceslas IV’s threats, and, thus, was drowned in the Vltava (Moldau). His martyrdom triggered off a strong cult of his person and John Nepomuk was canonized by Pope Benedict XIII in 1729. He is the patron saint of Bohemia and of the drowned, unjustly suspected and libeled, as well as of bridges (Anon., 1889b: 53). Numerous chapels devoted to John Nepomuk dot the landscape of southern Upper Silesia and one also comes across them in the north of the region. On the other hand, his cult was also spread in the Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko) Margravate which retained its semipolitical independence from Silesia even when it was conquered and administered by Prussia together with Silesia, e.g. until the 19th century the Silesian province was denoted in Prussian officialese as the Sovereign Duchy of Silesia and the Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko) Margravate (Orzechowski, 1972a: 30). Despite the 1810s administrative reforms in Silesia the margravate remained a separate in the consciousness of its inhabitants and the Silesians by the 1945/1946 expulsions thanks to the mountain ranges which isolated it from the outer world, and due to the fact that this area continued to be part of the Prague diocese. Moreover, the margravate considerably differed from Lower Silesia on which it borders, as the latter was Protestant and Catholic in character whereas the former overwhelmingly Catholic like Upper Silesia (Anon., 1996: 11). Moreover, as in Upper Silesia the influence of the Czech language and culture was felt quite strongly in the margravate unlike in Lower Silesia. In the margravate there is also one of the most important Czech pilgrimage places Albendorf (Wambierzyce) better known as Jerusalem of the German lands.

historical novels by Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1916) who thus attempted to facilitate construction of the ideology of Polish nationalism at the close of the 19th century.
Since the 16th century it had been the center of the Holy Virgin Mary cult in the margravate, but at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries the village’s owner, having found a map of Jerusalem, turned the church and its environs into an allegoric Jerusalem complete with all the places connected to Jesus. the pilgrimage complex survives till this day and is frequented by many faithful from the Czech Republic (Gottschalk, 1977: 1/2).

Apart from this Silesian Jerusalem there were also other symbolic places in Silesia which drew on the Catholic tradition in the time of the Counter-Reformation. The most renowned are: Neisse (Nysa) dubbed as little or Silesian Rome and Breslau’s (Wrocław’s) Dominsel (Ostrów Tumski) often called Silesian Vatican. Neisse (Nysa) was the capital of the principality which belonged to the Breslau (Wrocław) bishop until secularization in 1810. As such it was also the education, economic and administrative center of the Breslau (Wrocław) diocese and consequently supported a staggering number of many churches and other ecclesiastical buildings which astounded the visitor with their Baroque architecture\(^{137}\) (Ronge, 1977). Dominsel (cathedral island) is the name of the Oder (Odra) islet in the center of modern Breslau (Wrocław). Actually the city as a ford and old market place originated at the islet which subsequently became the center of the ecclesiastical power in Breslau (Wrocław) with a multitude of churches and majority of the buildings belonging to the Breslau (Wrocław) diocese (Schueermann, 1994: I 221/222).

The above-described logos of Silesian identity which have developed until this day, were not enough especially at the onset of modernity. In Renaissance people started asking questions about the origin of the world and their local environs, and did not wish to accept the medieval answers based on the Bible. The fad of that time was Antiquity which was claimed to be the model which should be emulated by the current reality. Not surprisingly, did scholars scrutinize Ptolemy’s map of the world known to him in search for ancient counterparts of their localities. In 1503 the Breslau (Wrocław) humanist Sigismundus Fagilucus (Sigismund Buchwald) identified Breslau (Wrocław) with the Ptolemaic town of Budorgis\(^{138}\). The Oder (Odra) was found identical with the Ptolemaic Viadrus, and the Sudetic Mountains received their name from the Sudetes which at Ptolemy’s map seem to be the border mountains separating Bohemia from Silesia. When no original ancient name could be found for a smaller town the learned resorted to translating town names into Latin or Greek, e.g. Ziegenhals (Glucholazy) became Civitas Capricollis, and Grünberg (Zielona Góra) Prasia Elysiorum or Thalloris\(^{139}\). Also Tacitus’s Germania proved to be a useful source for the 16th-century historiography which as elsewhere in Europe aimed at finding some ancient roots for Silesia. In 1558 Philipp Melanchton, known as Praeceptor Germaniae, identified the Silesians (or in the earlier form the Silesii) with the Elysii from Tacitus’s work. Consequently, since the time onwards the name Elysium\(^{140}\) was used to denote Silesia until the waning of the usage at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (Conrads, 1994: 19; Conrads, 1994a: 251; Malicki, 1987: 8/9). The superimposition of classical models on the Silesian reality intensified in the 18th century under the influence of rapid administrative changes, the Prussian conquest, and spread of literacy which gave access to an ever-growing circle of Silesians to the printed word bringing about establishment of the first Silesian papers. Moreover, the varied geographical configuration of the land facilitated such comparisons. Thus Silesia known as Elysium was often likened to Arcadia especially in the context of the sheep

\(^{137}\) After the wanton destruction of 1945 little survives from the bygone splendor with the exception of the cathedral.

\(^{138}\) The widespread usage of the Ptolemaic name was opposed by the Breslau (Wrocław) aldermen championing the Latin form Wratislavia which finally was recognized as official by Emperor Charles V in 1530 (Conrads, 1994a: 252/253).

\(^{139}\) The Latin or Greek names of Silesian towns were often used by students at their matriculation certificates (Conrads, 1994a: 251).

\(^{140}\) In Greek mythology Elysium, or Elysii Campi [is] a place or island in the infernal regions, where [...] the souls of the virtuous were placed after death. There happiness was complete [and] the pleasures were innocent and refined (Lempriere, 1963: 223).
Inhabited by shepherds, Arcadia was a landlocked country in the middle of Peloponnesus, with wooded mountains full of game - not unlike the idyllic picture of the Sudets. There were numerous swamps and lakes in its southeastern part which could be easily identified with the marshy character of Upper Silesia. Greek poets hailed Arcadia as a primeval happy land and such a picture must have been appealing to educated Silesian observing the onset of modernity which started quickly changing (or corrupting - according to them) their homeland (Lempriere, 1963: 66; Piszczek, 1990: 78).

142 Helicon is a mountain in Beotia. It was sacred to the muses who had a temple there. They were companions of Apollo whose famous oracle at the town of Delphi was placed on the slopes of Parnassus (Lempriere, 1963: 198, 269; Piszczek, 1990: 180). The mountainous area where the places are located one can easily picture as similar with the Sudets and its highest summit of Schneekoppe (Śnieżka)

143 A mountain spirit whose name of obscure origin means one who counts turnips. At first he was associated with the westernmost part of the Sudets (where he usually resided at the highest Sudetic peak of Schneekoppe (Śnieżka)) and the area around Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra) but later people began to speak about him in the context of the whole Sudets. Initially he was a rather unkempt spirit probably of Slavic mythology. Later German-speaking writers presented him as a malicious demon or the prince of Sudetic gnomes (shaping him more according to better known to them Germanic folklore models), who in Upper Silesia was known as Rzepiór (Peuckert, 1995: 251/252; Plancy, 1993: 162; Snoch, 1991: 80). Enlightenment humanists toned down his coarse features making him more similar to tamed Pan or Apollo playing rough though in a refined manner in the mountainous terrain of Phocis where there were Delphi and Parnassus located.

144 Thermopylae as a small pass famed by the staunch resistance of only 300 Spartans against Xerxes’s Persian armies in 480 (Lempriere, 1963: 623) lent itself as a good counterpart to the Jablunka (Jablonkowska) pass which was an easy and strategic way between Upper Silesia and Moravia/Upper Hungary (Slovakia), across which many an army marched.

145 Martin Opitz von Boberfeld sometimes is termed as the father of German literature in recognition for his theoretical and poetical contribution to German literature and language (Hargreaves-Mawdsley, 1968: 398).

146 The name terra Quadorum was popularized in Silesia and Europe through the works of renowned German poet Andreas Gryphius (1616-1664) and lesser writer Melchior Joppich among others (Malicki, 1987: 11).

147 Faber was wrong placing the Quadri in Silesia as they lived on the borders of the Danube in modern Moravia (Lempriere, 1963: 540) but was near the truth with the person of Maroboduus (Marbod). The Marcomanni king subjected some Germanic tribes known under the group name of Lugii. They inhabited the regions of southern Poland and northern Moravia, and it is most probable that one of the tribes - the Naharvali (with their cult center at Ślęz (Zobten)) lived in Silesia in the first centuries after Christ. It is hard to decide if the Naharvali were identical with the Sillings (Sillingi) as the latter name appears only in the 5th century in the context of a loose
The Germanic-oriented Silesian historiography replaced a trend which earlier sought some legitimizing links with the Polish Kingdom. The *Chronicon Principum Polonae* (Chronicle of the Polish Princes, written in c. 1385) and the *Chronicon Polono-Silesiacum* (Polish-Silesian Chronicle, written in the 13th/14th century), which originated in Silesia (Snoch, 1990: 69), maintain that the Czechs and Poles are of common origin as they sprang up from the two mythical brothers: Czech (the father of the former) and Lech (the father of the latter) (Malicki, 1987: 5). Naturally, Silesia as a borderland between the two peoples was to be perceived as theirs. This view was opposed by Enea Silvio de Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II from 1458 to 1464) who in his *Historia de Europa* propounded that Silesia with its Germanic inhabitants had been conquered by Slavic invaders. Maciej of Miechów and Marcin Bielski argued against this opinion trying to prove that the Slavs had been the earliest inhabitants of Silesia in order to bolster the Polish-Silesian political ties which became quite lose if not yet non-existent in the 15th century (Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 138/139; Lubos, 1995: 68; Malicki, 1987: 5/6). Thus the Polish/Slavic-German dispute for the eternal right to the land came into being, or, in other words, ideologization of the past and appropriation of the Silesian history in order support certain political goals.

Consequently, Polish humanists, who identified Poland with ancient Sarmatia, opined that Silesia was a part of the ancient, early Polish (according to the 16th-century Polish historiographers) land. This claim was ridiculed by Konrad Celtis (1459-1508) (Conrads, 1994a: 253). Moreover, the identification of Poland with Sarmatia which was placed partly in Europe and partly in Asia, according to Ptolemy (Lempričre, 1963: 559; Piszczek, 1990: 661), gave some anti-Polish writers a basis to say that the Poles do not belong in Europe but in Asia and as such are enemies of Christian civilization. The clash of state ideologies smacked short of nationalism which though unthinkable in the universal ecumene of the Middle Ages based on Christianity and Latin was considered by some as a possible tenet of social organization which brought a sharp rebuke in the famous 12th-century saying: *unius lingue uniusque moris regnum inbecille et fragile est* (Dralle, 1991: 173). This principle was still esteemed in Silesia in the transitory period between the Middle Ages and Renaissance, because, for instance, in 1589 the first Polish abess of the Trebnitz (Trzebnica) monastery was elected (effectively Polonizing the convent for the next century and a half) despite the fact that there appeared a tendency to limit the official use of languages other than Latin and German. But one can also find examples to the contrary: at that time the students of the Goldberg (Zlotoryja) school abused their Polish classmates calling them *Schelmen Pollacken* (Polackish rogues) (Conrads, 1994a: 253). On the other hand, the common Polish/Slavic stereotype of the German was that he is dumb, cf. the Slavic word for German: *Niemiec* in Polish or *Němec* in Czech which denotes someone who cannot speak or speaks in an unintelligible manner. It was retaliated with the popular Western European phrase: *Die Slawen sind Sklaven* or Slavs are Slaves. These kinds of believes were a fertile ground for development of some sort of ethnic uneasiness if still not an antagonism, even in absence of any serious military conflicts between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Empire in the post-medieval period. The fact can be illustrated by the German and Polish sayings, namely: *Denn die

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148 In this work he also described Breslau (Wroclaw) as a German city and put forward the thesis that the Polish language dominates only east of the Oder (Odra) (Lubos, 1995: 68). This statement was much repeated later and largely aptly presented the state of Silesian German-Polish/Slavic biculturality until 1945.

149 De Piccolomini was right saying that the Slavic element replaced the Germanic one in Silesia, but one can hardly speak about a conquest because in the period of Völkerwanderung the Sillings as a part of the Vandals must have started their westward trek to Northern Africa leaving this area open for gradual settlement by the Slavs pressed from the east by various migrating peoples.

150 In 1555 a ban on the use of Polish language among the Breslau (Wroclaw) canons was introduced as one of the steps directed at limiting the influence of the Gniezno (Gnesen) Archbishop in the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese. In 1571 Breslau (Wroclaw) Polish Masses were transferred to the small church of St. Martin which contemporary Polish scholars perceive as an example of discrimination (Malicki, 1987: 9), but probably the decision was dictated by a decreasing number of Polish-speaking faithful in the city itself.
Polen sind von Natur der Deutschen Feind (the Poles are natural enemies of the Germans) (Conrads, 1994a: 253) and Nie będzie nigdy Niemiec Polakowi bratem (A German will never become a Pole’s brother) (Wink, 1995: 4). The examples of ethnic antagonisms and stereotypes thinly dotting history of largely peaceful coexistence were consolidated in the 19th century by the German national movement and Slavic nationalisms (forming in reply to the German one) which wished to compromise each other with since then widely spread, and largely false and simplistic stereotypes of polnische Wirtschaft and German Drang nach Osten (which were explained in the previous chapter).

In the 19th century Silesia was a peripheral Prussian/German province in the 19th century and an area of little significance for Polish nationalists who rather wanted to construct a Polish nation within the boundaries of a restituted Poland before the first partition than to consolidate the would-be nation strictly along the ethnic lines. Interestingly, at that time the nascent Czech nationalism, emulating the Polish model, began to claim Silesia as one of the traditional Czech lands (cf. Anon., 1905: map bet. pp. 368-369, where larger Silesian towns and cities are provided with Czech names) because it had constituted an integral part of the Czech state from the time of Charles IV’s incorporation of the province in 1348 until the destruction of the Czech political nation after the battle of Bíla Hora (Weiβ Berg, White Mountain) in 1620, when Silesia even more deeply were submerged in the Habsburg empire though still as a part of the Czech and Austrian land groups (Ländersgruppe). The 19th-century Czech historians tended to talk about Silesia as a Czech land also in result of the 16th-century ideology of the Czech Crown (Kronenideologie) which was reinforced by the 1547 revolt of the Bohemian Protestant estates against Catholic Ferdinand I (Čornej, 1993: 218). Even earlier, in 1504 the Silesian courts were prohibited to submit appeals at the Magdeburg court (Ćetwiński, 1992: 19), and drawing on the Hussitic tradition the Bohemian estates declared the lands of the Czech Crown the region of the Czech language (jazyk Český). Moreover, the Prague assembly of all the Czech lands strove to reaffirm its hegemony over the Silesian assembly. Consequently, the moves alienated Silesia and Lusatia whose ties with Prague did wane after 1620 though Czech continued to be used as an official language in Upper Silesia throughout the 17th century.

The geographic and political borders, history, logos and historiographic strifes (which in the 19th century changed into nationalistic ones) were used to delimit Silesia as a clear separate entity and create a common identity for all its inhabitants, which, after having been achieved, were to be continuously maintained by the former through constant reaffirming togetherness/sameness of the land and its inhabitants within the Silesian borders as opposed to the Others outside the borders. Besides, the concept of Silesia is also delineated and reinforced, though more vaguely, by some nebulous myths on the character of the land and its inhabitants. Although they are not so tangible as the aforementioned components which constitute the construct presented under the name of Silesia, the myths have been an integral part of common thinking on the land and as such it is necessary to complete the chapter with their presentation.

One of the very first myths which does not hold sway anymore is expressed in the icon of Elysium identified with Silesia. The edenic associations of the label were easily linked with the medieval colonization of this province by German and other Western European settlers. They had been attracted by Lower Silesian gold and vast stretches of uncultivated land which was to become theirs. The opportunities offered by Silesia at that time were certainly frequently overpublicized by the entrepreneurs involved in the process. However, regular toil turned at least Lower Silesia with its central industrial areas of Breslau (Wroclaw) and of the Sudetic Mountains into a prosperous region (especially in comparison to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) which together with the identification of Silesia with Elysium allowed poets and historians to present the province as a land of opulence and well-being. Although the Silesian Elysium was turned into Hades with the national

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151 This saying which is very well known in Poland comes from a poem by Polish Baroque poet Waclaw Potocki (1621-1696) (Wink, 1995: 4).
socialist extermination of the Silesian Jews and pro-Polish activists and the postwar expulsion of the German and German-speaking population, this undercurrent in thinking about Silesia is still present in a many description of the land which commences with a praise of the land as fertile and rich without too much subsequent fact-finding to substantiate this claim.

Another myth whose origin seems to predate the aforementioned is centered on the April 9th, 1241 battle between the Mongols and the Silesian troops at Wahlstatt (Legnickie Pole/Dobre Pole) during which Silesia was laid waste, and the German and Polish-speaking Silesian chivalry defeated whereas Heinrich (Henryk) II the Pious lost his life and chance to unite the Polish state under his rule. Actually, the Breslau (Wroclaw) princes became gradually more insignificant and their dynastic line went extinct as soon as 1335. However, in later centuries Heinrich (Henryk) II was hailed as the defender of Christianity which was facilitated by his own devotion to the Church and canonization of his mother Hedwig who as St. Hedwig (Sw. Jadwiga) is the patron saint of Silesia. The lost battle was presented as a kind of moral victory and a strategic ploy which allowed the Silesian troops to stop the advance of the Mongol armies. Thus, it was inferred, Silesia saved Western Europe from the Mongol yoke which had been imposed on the Russian principalities for two and a half centuries. The logic of this argument was incorporated in the Silesian tradition and iconography making the battle the symbol of Silesia’s steadfast adherence to Christianity as the bulwark of the Western world against Asian hordes. However, from the European and Mongol point of view the battle was quite insignificant as the main Mongol forces were directed against Hungary and the troops which attacked Malopolska and Silesia were just an adjacent army which after having neutralized the Christian chivalry of Poland, Silesia and Bohemia, was to traverse Moravia and to join the main Mongol troops in Hungary in the final onslaught to dominate the country and Wallachia. Moreover, that failed attempts at stopping the Mongols staged by the German-Polish troops at Liegnitz (Legnica) and the Hungarians at the battle of the Sajo River were not the cause of the Mongolian retreat, but the death of the Great Khan Batu of the Golden Horde alone (Kinder, 1978: I 167, 169, 179).

However, the Mongolian attack and later struggles with the expanding Ottoman Empire especially after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 contributed to the development of the icon of antemurale christianitis (the bulwark of Christianity) which became a synonymic name for Poland, Hungary and the Habsburg Empire as the frontier states who warred against the Turks most. The honorific title was lost to Hungary when it was subjugated to the Ottoman rule following the lost battle of Mohacs (1526) but some splendor of defending Christianity was passed over to the Habsburgs when they seized truncated Hungary in the second half of the 16th century. However, Poland used the ideology of antemurale at most, especially after its glorification in 1683 when the Polish-Lithuanian troops under the command of King Jan III Sobieski strongly contributed to the spectacular defeat of the Ottoman armies at Vienna (Anon., 1983; Davies, 1991: I 159/160).

In Silesia the symbol of the Wahlstatt (Legnickie Pole/Dobre Pole) battle, which can be easily interpreted as a specific actualization of the general antemurale ideology, had to be used to different ends in Silesia than the ideology in Poland, because following 1241 the province have not been endangered by another Mongol or Ottoman attack. First of all, the battle and Heinrich (Henryk) IV were glorified in church iconography (cf. Kiersnowski, 1977: back of the jacket). Interestingly, the Mongols began to be depicted as contemporary Turks (as can be seen on the frescos in the Wahlstatt (Legnickie Pole/Dobre Pole) church, which were commissioned in 1733) during the Habsburg time in Silesia, in an endeavor to attract more resources for the neverending wars against the Ottoman Empire during that period. Moreover, Silesian noble families strove to associate their coats-of-arms with the famous battle, and often, in family sagas, they placed their distant ancestors in the field fighting the Mongols as such a connection lent them more splendor. The unhappy Breslau (Wroclaw) prince was likened to Leonidas but was not canonized, as this privilege was reserved for his mother St. Hedwig (Sw. Jadwiga), nor was a monument erected in his memory unlike in the case of Hermann who

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152 Leonidas was a king of Lacedaemon who together with 300 Spartans for a long time opposed the overwhelming Persian armies at Thermopylae in 480 BC (Lempriere, 1963: 326).
obtained his in Teutoburger Wald in the 19th century. The latter was deftly utilized by nascent German nationalism which could not easily espouse the figure of Heinrich (Henryk) II who was a member of Polish royal House of Piast and aspired to unite Poland. Anyway, for centuries German poets sang praises of Heinrich (Henryk) II (Conrads, 1994: 23).

Another transformation of the myth of Wahlstatt (Legnickie Pole/Dobre Pole) took place during the Seven Years War when people started referring to Russian and Cossack troops as Tatars. The simile also stuck to Napoleon who as Frankish Khan with his new Mongols attacked Silesia and Prussia, and in 1813 was defeated by Prince Blücher in the battle at the Katzbach (Kaczawa) river, not far from Liegnitz (Legnica). It started a reversal of the 1241 defeat which was continued by the graduate of the Liegnitz (Legnica) Officer School general Paul von Hindenburg who in 1914 defeated the Russian Narew Army at Tannenberg (Grunwald) in East Prussia exorcising the 1410 defeat which had been suffered at the same place by the Teutonic Order at the hands of the Polish-Lithuanian armies (Meyhöfer, 1966: 218/219), as well as the battle of Mohacs (1526) which opened for the Turks the way to Vienna. In 1941 the commencement of the German offensive against the Soviet Union coincided with the 700th anniversary of the battle of Liegnitz (Legnica) and the national socialist propaganda did make use of it. In 1945 Lower Silesian Gauleiter Karl Hanke drew on the myth in his New Year speech (only two weeks before the Soviet armies invaded Silesia) saying that the Russians would suffer the fate of Mongols (i.e. that they would have to retreat), and when it became apparent that there would not be any easy victory over the Soviet troops, Breslau (Wroclaw), among other Silesian cities, was declared a fortress and endowed by propaganda with the master task of withstanding the attack of the Asiatic hordes in order to preserve light of European culture.

Due to the final defeat Soviet occupants moved into Silesia and were followed by Polish soldiers, settlers and expellees. All of them were popularly classified as Asians/barbarians/the others by the common Silesian, as German propaganda tended to lump all the Slavs under this heading. However, this label in the context of the Poles was developed as a pejorative slur even earlier. Its source must be looked for in the 16th-century identification of Poland with the semi-Asian land of Sarmatia, and the eastward expansion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which became a kind of Eurasian state in a cultural if not geographic sense, for instance the Commonwealth’s military leaders thought nothing of recruiting Tatar auxiliaries for action against other Christian princes when occasion demanded (Davies, 1991: I 164/165). Thus, the much hailed victory of the Commonwealth over the Teutonic Order in 1410 was perceived by the Germans as a defeat suffered by civilization at the hands of Asiatic hordes (Conrads, 1994: 24; Korta, 1991).

When Silesia became part of Poland after 1945 the myth of Legnickie Pole (Dobre Pole, Wahlstatt) was rendered obsolete since it could not be used by the Polish propaganda due to the Soviet dominance over Poland. In order to legitimize taking into possession the former German territories after 1945, the Polish propagandists invented the myth of return to the original Polish and Piast lands. The myth is dealt with in detail later in the work, but it should be mentioned that in the context of the new mythical framework another appropriation of Silesian history took place in order to replace the myth of Legnickie Pole (Dobre Pole, Wahlstatt). After the premature death of Emperor Otto III in 1003, the Polish prince Boleslaw battled the Saxons for possession of Lusatia and Milzi (Miłski). In reply, in 1017 Emperor Henry II laid siege to Niemcza (Nimtsch) which withstood it for three weeks. Ninety years later, in 1109 Emperor Henry V again attempted to cross the Oder (Odra), but was thwarted by the resistance of Głogów (Glogau). The royal fortress situated on an island in the river, continued to resist, even, when Polish hostages were suspended from the walls of the siege.

153 In 9 AD the Germanic troops under the command of Arminius annihilated the three Roman legions in Teutoburger Wald (the low mountains in today’s north-western Germany), and Hermanan killed their commander Publius Quintilius Varus, thus, becoming a hero and subsequently an icon of German nationalism in the 19th century (Anon., 1889b: 614; Anon., 1890: 54).

154 The Officer School was erected in 1838 at Wahlstatt (Legnickie Pole/Dobre Pole) (Conrads, 1994: 23).

155 The Soviets had to be presented as the light of civilization, and not as Asiatic barbarians.
towers (Anon., 1985: 262; Davies, 1991: 182/83). The resistance of the two towns was modeled into one of the more potent symbols of Polish struggle against the evil drive of the Germans to the East. It was congruent with the postwar policy of the Soviet Union which through breeding irreconcilable animosity between Poland and Germany wanted to make the former solely dependent on the USSR. The story of the German sieges of the two towns entered Polish textbooks as an integral part of the nationalist indoctrination (cf. Bunsch, 1979), not unlike the horrors of the Wahlstatt (Legnickie Pole/Dobre Pole) battle (Conrads, 1994: 21).

After the decades of nationalist confrontation in Silesia the notion of Silesian tolerance was reintroduced to Silesian historiography in 1953 by Joachim Konrad (1903-1979), German historian who researched history of Protestant Churches. His thesis is that already in the Middle Ages the coming of settlers to Silesia and their coexistence with the indigenous Slavic population was peaceful and that the tradition was carried over into the period of Reformation when one could not observe too many a conflict and, actually, arising of the specific Silesian branch of irenics156. However, he sees the Counter-Reformation as the time of radical intolerance which is only terminated with the freedom of religion instituted in Silesia after the Prussian annexation of the land. But it is clear that during Reformation members of Catholic orders fled Silesia fearing persecution and that Lutherans made life difficult for the Protestants of a slightly different opinion, e.g. the Schwenkfelders or the Anabaptists. On the other hand, the Counter-Reformation measures were somewhat leniently implemented by some Silesian princes whereas the period of Habsburg rule in Silesia, so much criticized by Prussian historians as the time of denominational hatred, haughtiness of the nobility, and craving for titles (Menzel in Conrads, 1994: 26), was perhaps more justly assessed by the first historian of Silesian Protestantism Johann Adam Hensel (1689-1778), according to whom the situation of the Silesian Protestants was difficult then but, anyway, relatively better than elsewhere in the Habsburg hereditary lands (Conrads, 1994: 26).

It seems though that the ideal of Silesian tolerance is denied by the sad fate of the Silesian Jews. Following the 14th and 15th century persecutions, pogroms and expulsions when they were found guilty of epidemics and other disasters, in 1558 Emperor Ferdinand I issued the de non tolerandis Judaeis act which was espoused by numerous towns in Silesia. But throughout the period till Emperor Charles VI’s tolerance edict of 1713, the towns of Zülz (Biala) and Glogau (Glogów) accepted presence of Jews. The Breslau (Wroclaw) aldermen and merchants brought about annulment of the edict in 1738, and the decision was reaffirmed by Maria Theresa in 1740 just before Prussia’s annexation of Silesia (Heitmann, 1995: 52). Thus, the Silesian Jews turned their hopes to the young Prussian king who quickly dashed their expectations tolerating their presence on limited grounds, i.e. to the extent for which they were indispensable for Prussia’s economy. Only in 1812 the emancipation edict opened the way for the Silesian Jews to town and Prussian citizenship in Silesia (Heitmann, 1995: 54), and the process of increasing tolerance was rounded up with the universal emancipation edict issued in 1871, the year when the German state was established (Kinder, 1978: II 62).

Considering the question of the Jews it seems that Silesia was much less tolerant than the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in this respect, as the latter became the main area of Jewish settlement in the world during the 18th and 19th centuries in the wake of the numerous expulsions of the Jews from Western Europe (Kinder, 1978: I 154). It could be claimed, thus, that Silesian tolerance hardly provided any examples reaffirming its existence, especially if one takes into consideration the general discrimination of Protestants in access to public posts by the Habsburg monarchy and Catholics by the Prussian state respectively. This much hailed Polish tolerance was not absolute either, for instance, in the 1650s the Arians (Polish Brethren) were expelled together with some Czech Brethren who had escaped persecution in Bohemia (Davies, 1991: I 189), and on July 17, 1724 the

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156 Irenics is another name for irenic theology as distinguished from polemic theology. Irenics is concerned with securing Christian unity (Gove, 1966: 1193). It was the ground for coming into being of the idea of ecumenism in the 19th century, which was turned into a worldwide movement by Protestants of varying denominations (Anon., 1990: 36).
anti-Protestant tumult took place at Thorn (Toruń) (Davies, 1991: I 180). On the whole though the thesis may be risked that religious dissent and ethnic variety were more readily accepted in the region extending from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth via Silesia and Bohemia to Transylvania than in Western Europe where the ideology of absolutism was used to promote more homogeneity at the cost of limiting the individual and his/her freedoms. However, it seems that this Central European zone of tolerance took place only due to the sheer impossibility of carrying out the policies of homogenization in these states without destroying their economic and political frameworks as no ethnic/religious group formed an absolute majority in any of the states. So there was no homogenous population segment big enough which could serve as an economic and political backbone for such a policy, and the guarantor of survival of the state during the disentanglement of the different minorities, the others. Homogenization made no sense for Central Europe which was economically weak and faced the repeated incursions of the Ottoman and Russian empires, and before industrialization and coming into being of nationalism which has successfully used the former as the basis for the comprehensive 20th-century ethnic cleansing of the region.

Thus, bearing in mind all the examples of various ethnic cleansings which were quite intense in Silesia in the 20th century, it must be remembered that irenics together with some urging on the part of the Prussian state led to union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Prussia (1817) with the considerable contribution of the Silesian theologian F.E.D. Schleiermacher who was the soul of the unification movement (Thorne, 1975: 1141); as well as to the establishment of, side by side, the departments of Protestant and Catholic theology at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University which was the second (after Heidelberg) German university which could boast of such an achievement (Herzig, 1995: 126/127). The latter development might have been possible also thanks to Silesian tolerance as in the 1807 expert opinion supporting creation of the university the Silesians well-known tolerance had been praised (Conrads, 1995: 27).

Another myth which Silesia shares with the rest of Central Europe is the claim that the land lies in the very center of Europe, and by the virtue of the location is Europe’s heart (Anon., 1996a: 7). The mythology of the heart of Europe dates back to the 16th century when Europe started to be portrayed as a woman wearing a crown. She alone thus is crowned, while the other continents are not. The Habsburgs with their vast lands in Central Europe and in Spain turned this emerging ideology of Eurocentrism to their own ends. In 1537 a curious map of Europe was produced. It is a portrayal of Europe such as to please the Habsburgs, Spain is the crowned head and Bohemia the heart; Italy forms one of her arms, and she holds Sicily as an orb. In her other hand she has a scepter which touches Scotland and England. The icon was popularized in Sebastian Münster’s Cosmographia Universalis published in 1588. It was used to decorate the silver bowl made in Nuremburg in 1589 for the intended marriage of the Emperor Rudolf II and the Infant Isabella, which was to strengthen the ties binding the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs. Nuremburg was depicted as the heart of Europe (Boer, 1995: 48-53). In consequence the idea of centrality and pivotal significance of the Austrian Empire for Europe has continued to be upheld by the Habsburgs until the break-up of the empire in 1918. Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) tried to salvage the idea in his concept of Mitteleuropa (Mid-Europe, Central Europe) which foresaw the construction of a peaceful German-Slavic federation in the middle of Europe (Boer, 1995: 90-92), but to no avail. The successor states, subsequently, took up the pieces of the shattered imperial ideology of the Habsburgs in order to use them to their own ends. It is the source of the current mutually exclusive claims on the part of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Austria and such regions as Silesia to be the heart of Europe.

However, one of the most potent and adaptable concepts used to abstract about and invent a role for Silesia as a borderland region is the icon of bridge. Following the establishment of new Slavic state at the territorial cost of Germany and Austro-Hungary in 1918, German nationalism grew stronger in the face of the setback. Silesia was likened to a march and hailed to be the German bulwark (Conrads, 1994: 27). The siege mentality was taken over by the new Slavic states too, as they being new were not sure of their continued existence feeling endangered by the longer-established neighbors, and displeased with only partial actualization of their vast and conflicting territorial claims.
Thus, in interwar Poland it became popular to speak about the Polish part of Upper Silesia as a cornerstone of nations (Szramek, 1992: 7) which could be any time assaulted by the milling others during some rush hour on the political highway.

Other thinkers considered Silesia to be a land of contrasts or a specific island whose inhabitants were naturally accreted with the heart of the adjacent peoples (Szramek, 1992: 7), the crucial European bridge linking the south of the continent to the north and the east to the west, the intellectual bridge of academic exchange between the west and the east, or, simply put, the bridge connecting the two cultural areas of the Slavic and Germanic peoples (Conrads, 1994: 27/28). All these notions striving to invent a positive linking role of Silesia after 1918, revolved around the Habsburg idea of the heart of Europe and Naumann’s Mitteleuropa. However, as it was shown by World War II, nationalisms took the upper hand and supplanted the intellectual discourse with political decisions which turned Silesia into a bastion. The Poles conceptualized it as the western march (Kresy) and a watchtower against Germanom, appropriating the post-Napoleonic Prussia’s major task which was epitomized by the slogan of Wacht auf Rhein (guard on the Rhine) directed against possible future incursions of the French on the German soil\footnote{Appropriation of the Prussian/German symbol of struggle against French expansionism, was deftly employed by Polish intellectualists in the second half of the 19th century in order to evoke the national feeling among the Polish-speaking population. However, their endeavors were concentrated rather in the German partition of the Polish territories, i.e. in the province of Posen (Poznań) as at that time Silesia was not perceived as part of a restituted Poland. A literary picture of the Polish not giving up to German expansion was provided by Boleslaw Prus (1847-1912) in his Placówka (Outpost) (Miłosz, 1993: 339/340).}. National socialist propaganda turned it into the central part of the German lands, the one which ensured the territorial continuity between Prussia and Sudetenland; and into Germandom’s central pillar of the east front which was supported in the north by Prussia and in the south by Austria with Sudetenland. Moreover, with the disentanglement of the German-speaking islets in Eastern Europe, many of the uprooted ethnic Germans were transferred to Silesia announcing another picture of Silesia as a new settlement bridge (Conrads, 1994: 28). On the other hand, during the wartime cooperating Czechoslovak and Polish politicians perceived Silesia as the bridge necessary for sealing a postwar Polish-Czechoslovak federation which would effectively contain German Drang nach Osten.

The plan of a Polish-Czechoslovak union was frustrated by the Soviet Union which ruled its satellites in accordance with the principle of divide et impera, whereas Germany lost all the three pillars of its eastern front with the truncating of the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Hence in the period of stability imposed by the terms of the Cold War, German and Slavic nationalisms could not use the bridge of Silesiá to promote their visions of populationalterritorial expansion up to some naturally just borders with a disregard for the neighbor countries. Moreover, with the movement toward European integration it seems that the nationalist slogans of expansion lost their immediate appeal, and one can observe that Silesia is being changed into a symbolical bridge of reconciliation among the Germans, the Czechs and the Poles. After 1989 this overemphasized bridge function of the land crops up frequently in the press and books on German-Polish-Czech relations (cf.: Bieniasz, 1992: 541; Mis, 1996: 4; Trierenberg, 1991: 3), presumably facilitating the gradual integration of Central Europe with the EU, NATO and the western part of the continent without alienating the eastern European countries.

This chapter focuses on the emergence of the concept of Silesia and its subsequent development up to c. 1918 though for the sake of clarity some much later events had to be included too. The post-1918 changes in thinking on Silesia are presented in detail further in the work, in order to correlate them, as indispensable background knowledge, with the chronological arrangement of the argument.

Moreover, it is appropriate to conclude with asking the question how well the construction of the concept of Silesia as a separate region and political entity, was translated into the creation of Silesian identity.
In the Middle Ages such symbols as coats-of-arms were not used to promote loyalty to Silesia as a land, but rather to particular principalities which the rulers conceived rather as independent states than parts of some larger whole. The nobility who were vassals of their suzerains followed and obeyed the princes thus correlating their identities with the boundaries and interests of the principalities. The situation lasted largely unchanged until the time when Matthias Corvinus introduced some central institutions in Silesia, which constituted the beginning of future legal and bureaucratic homogenization of the land.

Apart from the politicians, i.e. the princes, the first to promote and grasp the concept of wider regional identity are scholars, but in this respect no full-fledged university having been established in Silesia before 1811, Silesians had to study at Prague, Cracow and German universities. Such disparity of experience could not be easily translated into some kind of all-Silesian unity. However, experience of being the other outside Silesia must have been present among Silesian scholars since at the Prague University they were organized in the Silesian (Polish) gens (Carter, 1992: 917) and one of the renowned Silesian scholars working at the Cracow University, Anselmus Ephorinus, chose to clarify in his letter to Erasmus of Rotterdam, in 1531, that he was Silesius, non Polonus (Brückner, 1990: II 638; Conrads, 1994a: 251). However, after the Hussitic Wars, when almost exclusively the representatives of the Bohemian gens remained at the Prague University, and the decline of the Cracow University in the 16th century, gradually more Silesian students were attracted to German universities where they easily blended with the locals usually being the offspring of the Silesian nobility and burghers who predominantly already spoke German then.

A more conscious attempt at creating Silesian identity is connected to Martin Helwig’s well-known map of Silesia (1544) which shortly predated the first history of Silesia Gentis Silesiae Annales written in 1571 by Joachim Cureus (1532-1573) from Glogau (Glogów). However, Cureus did not show too much interest in advocating identification with Silesia rather than delineating its position within the Holy Roman Empire. His attitude is clearly exemplified by the fact that he dedicated his work to Emperor Maximilian II. In this manner Cureus though a Protestant, did declare his loyalty to the Catholic emperor, but anyway his positive portrayal of the development of Protestantism in Silesia as well as his unfriendly remarks on Poland were not too diplomatic and did not comply with the Habsburgs raison d'être, even in this period of relative peace between the Catholics and the Protestants when Protestantism reached its widest expansion. His opinions which smacked of German-centeredness vis-à-vis Poland the Habsburgs Catholic ally, did not immediately give a boost to the development of German or Silesian identity as they were expressed in the universal language of Latin. Only when in 1585 Heinrich Rätel (1529-1594) translated Cureus’s work into German, he added some ideology to it saying that his translation should promote love for the whole fatherland of Silesia being available to the average reader in a good German rendering. Not unlike Helwig’s map, the first history of Silesia reworked and reedited continued to serve the Silesian learned as the source of information on their homeland until the 18th century despite some efforts on the part of the Catholic Church to produce a history of Silesia written from a Catholic point of view (Conrads, 1994a: 256; Lubos, 1995: I/1 111; Kinder, 1978: I 251).

Could it be said, however, that the ideological action of Rätel and Cureus’s views constructing and reaffirming the difference between the Germans and Poland, brought about emergence of Silesian identity? The answer must be no as at that time the majority of the Silesian population were peasants firmly tied to their localities by various loyalties to their place of birth, family, estate, lord and parish which, in turn, formed the bases for their various though interlinked identities. The people physically experienced the approximate boundaries of their local homeland as the area within which they could see the tower of their parish church, and inside such a delineated zone most of their life-long experiences were firmly placed. The otherness of people living in these relatively isolated (from an actor’s point of view, who had no chance and urge to travel) local homelands in Silesia, was still exacerbated by differences in speech, custom and faith which appeared due to this form of separateness. On the other hand, scholars, like Cureus, and skilled craftsmen who had to wander in order to earn their living, were not limited in their travels to nor to Silesia and neither to the Holy
Roman Empire. Sharing Latin and Christianity they were Europeans, members of the Renaissance Republic of Letters who chose to identify themselves and their fatherland with the Christian ecumene not unlike the Silesian poet Daniel von Czepko (1605-1660) who wrote: *wo Freiheit ist und Recht, da is mein Vaterland* (Conrads, 1994b: 257; Lubos, 1995: I/1 160). Should the educated individuals turn their attention to their homelands, they usually tended to identify them in the terms espoused by the Silesian peasants, as it can be easily inferred from the fact that the arguably most prominent German and Silesian Baroque man of letters Martin Opitz (1597-1639) dedicated his groundbreaking *Buch von der deutschen Poeterei* to his Bunzlau (Boleslawiec) fatherland and its town council (Conrads, 1994b: 256; Lubos, 1995: I/1: 138).

At that time there was no political entity which would demand absolute loyalty to itself with complete disregard for other political organisms as it is the case with nation-states. It would be impractical as pre-modern states were onion-like, i.e. bigger entities consisted from smaller ones. Considering Silesia, the basic political horizon was delineated by towns and villages which were organized in counties (circula, Weichbilder) within larger principalities composing the Silesian province, which, in turn, was part of the lands of the Czech Crown embraced by the Holy Roman Empire. Further cohesion on the scale of the whole continent was ensured by Christianity if not by the Catholic Church after the spread of Reformation. In spite of the all-inclusive, hierarchical medieval organization of Europe which still survived in the premodern time, it happened that Silesians of different local homelands (principalities) who met abroad started referring to Silesia as their fatherland (Conrads, 1994a: 257) in the company of foreigners who perhaps knew where Silesia was but could hardly grasp its inner divisions. If such two Silesians striking up an acquaintance at Padua insisted on their identification with their different local homelands within Silesia it would be rather meaningless (though comprehensible) to their non-Silesian colleagues. This feeling of closeness toward other inhabitants of Silesia developing abroad gave rise to associations of Silesian students established at universities abroad (Conrads, 1994a: 257).

One can speak about wider identification of the Silesian population with their region only after the Napoleonic Wars when the others invaded them at home in one moment destroying and overhauling the ancien régime (notably, in 1807 the process of liquidating the institution of serfdom began (Lis, 1993: 73)), and allowing all the Silesians to tangibly experience that they are closer to one another than to the aggressors. The basis of this unity in need had been prepared by the special treatment and political status which Friedrich II had granted to Silesia within the Prussian state, and was fortified by the success of the War of Liberation. The war, which started in Silesia, also linked the province with the emerging feeling of Prussiandom, giving the Silesians the necessary myth that it was them who contributed most to saving the Prussian state and free Europe. Inside Prussia Silesian identity grew thanks to development of the press and education as well as to the construction of railway lines. But all the new means of intensified and quickened communication and transportation also contributed to immersing Silesian identity within Prussiandom not without the assistance of such paramount homogenizing and nation-building institutions as: the conscription army, compulsory popular education and ubiquitous state administration. They were inextricably intertwined with industrialization which caused mass population movements inside Prussia (and after 1871 in Germany) as well as across international borders when people started looking for better work and living conditions elsewhere. These phenomena largely supplanted Silesian identity with Prussiandom.

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158 Where there is freedom and law, there is my fatherland [my translation].
159 This critical work by Opitz is considered to be the source of modern German poetry and, probably, he conceived of it having got acquainted with the English writer Philip Sidney’s (1554-1586) opus, and especially with his *Apology for Poetry (Defence of Poesy)*, which was not so much important for English literature as Opitz’s *Buch von der deutschen Poeterei*. Moreover, with his life Opitz gave a testimony to his wide identification with Europe’s Christian ecumene for he studied at Heidelberg and in the Netherlands, served Silesian and Transylvanian princes, became historiographer to King Władysław IV of Poland, and translated from English, Latin and Greek (Hargreaves-Mawdsley, 1968: 398; Ousby, 1988: 34, 912).
160 Significantly, the full-fledged university was commenced at Breslau (Wrocław) in 1811 (Herzig, 1995: 124).
and later with attachment to the German state. Identification with Prussia became the most prevalent but did not obliterate attachment to Silesianity which remained in the background, whereas it seems that the Silesians identified themselves with the newly-established German state inasmuch as Germany and the German nation was Prussified (Lüer, 1995: 82).

The situation lasted in this rather unchanged form until the last quarter of the 19th century when newly-consolidated German nationalism found itself at the loggerheads with its Polish counterpart. Here, certain duality of the concept of Silesia must be scrutinized in the context of the identity of its inhabitants. The Upper Silesians in contrast to the largely Protestant Lower Silesians were Catholics and at least 50 per cent of them spoke Polish (and much fewer Moravian Czech) dialects which rendered them in the period of intensified building of the German nation as the other, and a potentially disruptive element endangering cohesion of a striven for Germandom. Earlier, Upper Silesia had been differentiated from Lower Silesia by the virtue of its geographic, political, denominational and cultural specificity deepened by the long use of Czech as the office language. Thus, in the wake of the Prussian conquest, Upper Silesia had been hardly noticed by the officialdom in the second half of the 18th century, suspected of disloyalty due to its Catholicism, close links of the Upper Silesian nobility with Austria, and linguistic affinity of its peasant population with the Poles. This negative thinking about the Upper Silesians had been reaffirmed during the War of Liberation when not many of them volunteered to join the Prussian army. A change of heart came when the coal fields of Upper Silesia were transformed into the second most important German industrial basin after the Ruhr, because new cities attracted many industrialists, public servants, teachers and internal migrants from Germany who altered the ethnic make-up of this region in favor of Germandom, at least in the urban areas (Lüer, 1995: 79-82). Further consolidation of the new state carried out, in the 1870s, under Chancellor Bismarck as an attempt at subjugating the Catholic Church to the will of the state, triggered off hostility on the part of the Upper Silesian Catholics who perceived this policy as an attack on the very framework of their value system and of daily life. Consequently, Catholicism was disassociated from Prussiandom/Germandom and negatively contrasted with loyalty of the Protestants. Bavaria and Upper Silesia as the most Catholic regions of Germany were united within the Catholic Zentrum (Center) party which opposing the anti-Catholic measures found itself as a political force puzzlingly excluded from the process of German nation building. Moreover, in Upper Silesia the majority of the sympathizers of the party happened to be Polish-speakers and the fact was deftly used by aspiren nation builders especially from Wielkopolska to entice a national Polish feeling among the Upper Silesians. They were not much successful until the end of World War I when many an Upper Silesian got radicalized due to the overall tragic postwar state of affairs.

Similarly the Glatz (Kłodzko) margravate as a Catholic enclave of many bygone cultural and political links with Bohemia, was perceived as somehow unGerman within Prussian Lower Silesia, but its otherness was not exacerbated by linguistic difference of its inhabitants as the majority of the Glatz (Kłodsko, Kłodzko) inhabitants had stopped speaking Czech and became regular German-speakers. Nevertheless they remained attached to their local homeland rather than to Silesia.

It bore resemblance to the case of Austrian Silesia whose two separate parts were small and generally coincided with the Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) principalities in West Silesia and the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) principality in East Silesia. Thus the crown land did not demand much alteration in its inhabitants identification with their local homelands, first of all, because the institutional and administrative change was carried out at a more relaxed pace (and retaining many traditional, premodern forms of organization) in the Habsburg empire than in Prussia, and, secondly, due to the discontinuous existence of Austrian Silesia in the spatial and temporal

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161 This policy was rather inadequately dubbed as Kulturkampf (Kultur war) and many a scholar overemphasized its side effect in the form of official decisions taken against the use of the Polish language. However, It was rather a logical conclusion of German nation building effort undertaken by the German state whose politicians wished to turn it into an ideally homogenous nation-state (cf. Lis, 1993: 91/92).
meaning of the term. However, with the continued presentation of Prussia as the intruder who had detached the majority of Silesia from its true owner at Vienna a certain anti-Prussian feeling was observed in Austrian Silesia though clerks from the vicinity of Oderberg (Bohumin, Bogumin) tended to sympathize with Prussia as the Catholic character of the Habsburg monarchy was not to the liking of the East Sileans, many of whom were Protestants. This denominational cleavage was resolved with the introduction of freedom of religion in Austrian Silesia earlier than in the rest of the monarchy. So later a certain societal cohesion was achieved which facilitated identification of the inhabitants as Austrian Sileans or Austrians in the case of public servants and the educated. This identification was encouraged by the construction of the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) museum (whose beginnings date back to the 18th century) which was followed by another one in Troppau (Opava, Opawa) which also boasted its town theater (Gawrecki, 1993).

At that time contemporary scholars considered the Prussian and Austrian Sileans to be one nation (more in the sense of the medieval gens than the national-age nation) despite noticeable linguistic and ethnic differences. Peaceful coexistence of the groups in Austrian Silesia continued despite gradual Germanization of education and the state bureaucracy, which, nevertheless, was not so thorough as in Prussian Silesia. Only during the revolutionary year of 1848 national ideas started infiltrating the crown land. The Austrian Silesian deputies to the German constituent assembly at Frankfurt got interested in the idea of all German unity which had to spark opposition on the part of the Slavic inhabitants of the Habsburg empire. Not surprisingly, was the all Slav Congress at Prague attended by Czech and Polish-speaking delegates from Austrian Silesia. In the subsequent decades German-speaking Austrian Sileans continued to consider the crown land as German and thought Panslavism to be a disruptive idea endangering unity of the whole monarchy. Consequently the Austrian Silesian Assembly consistently voted against any proposals aiming at national emancipation of the Czechs who wished to attain a status similar to that enjoyed by the Magyars, complete with their own autonomous state comprising the historical lands of the Czech Crown. Although the Czech language and culture were recreated in the second half of the 19th century their spread in West Silesia was checked by the local German-speaking population, while in West Silesia by the Polish-speaking population which were prodded towards Polish nationalism by the activists from Cracow after Galicia had gained broad autonomy in 1859. Polishdom, Germandom and Czechdom were immensely fortified in the north-western part of East Silesia due to the rapid industrialization of the Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrawa) region, with the inflow of German-speaking engineers from Austria proper and Czech and Polish-speaking workforce from Bohemia and Moravia, and Galicia respectively. German, Polish and Czech nationalist activists used this volatile amassment of migrants to spread their propaganda, often under the cover of socialist slogans. The uneasy equilibrium supported by the Austrian bureaucracy lasted until 1918 but could not leave the identities of the Austrian Sileans unchanged. The German-speaking population of Austrian Silesia (but especially in West Silesia) vacillated among the identities

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162 Austrian Silesia was cut in two by a Moravian salient which reached the Prussian Silesian border, and was merged with Moravia from 1782 to 1849 (Gawrecki, 1993: 48).

163 As noted above the nobility of Prussian Silesia retained many a tie with Austria, Johann Ignaz von Felbiger (1724-1788) was one of the most renowned Prussian Sileans in the Austrian civil service (Gawrecki, 1993: 52; Scheuermann, 1994: 1 296), and the famous German and Prussian Silesian Romantic poet Joseph von Eichendorff (1788-1857) expressed his sympathy for Austria in his writings (cf. Eichendorff, 1966: 103).

164 Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) was the only Upper Silesian city which received the right to construct its Protestant church (Gnadekirche) in 1710, and was the organizational basis for the Upper Silesian Protestant parish up to the Prussian conquest. After 1742 it was the only Protestant parish in the whole of Austria. Following issuance of the edict on tolerance (1781) the city became the center of the Protestant Church until 1784 when its seat was transferred to Vienna. The Protestant gymnasium, established just one year after the Gnadekirche, was the forerunner of the department of Protestant theology (1821) at the Vienna University (Kuhn, 1977: 532/533).

165 It is the oldest museum on the territory of the Czech Republic (Hosnedl, 1989: 343).

166 The Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrawa) industrial basin was a geological continuation of the Upper Silesian coal field in Prussia, and grew to one of the most important industrial centers of Austro-Hungary.
delineated by such labels as: Austrian Silesian, Austrian and German which eventually brought to existence the Sudetic Germans (Sudetendeutsche). Some Czech-speaking population in West Silesia assimilated with the Sudetic Germans and the rest retained loyalty to their local homeland(s) or became Czechs especially in the case of these ones who were educated in Prague where the Czech national movement was obviously strongest. In East Silesia the much less numerous German-speaking population behaved like those in West Silesia, but the Polish and Czech-speakers who were educated or could experience their otherness on a daily basis as workers in the Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrawa) industrial basin, predominantly opted for their respective national movements with their centers in Cracow and Prague. However, a large group of peasant, migrant workers and unskilled industrial hands who spoke a variety of Silesian Polish, Silesian Czech Moravian and transitory Czech-Polish dialects did retain their attachment to their local homeland(s) and started to speak about themselves as Silesians167. They were repulsed from Polish nationalism due to its concurrence with Catholicism (while they were predominantly Protestants), and by the fact that German and Czech nationalisms were not too ready to accept their linguistic and cultural specificity which the Silesians did not want to reject as Silesianity was the very fabric of their everyday existence. Others akin to the Silesians, who did not wish to express their identity at the political level stuck to talking about themselves as the tutejsi, ones from here, i.e. locals, natives (Buszko, 1989: 1; Carter, 1992: 922/923; Gawrecki, 1993; Nowak, 1995: 26-32; Pokorny, 1993: 111).

The final part of this chapter focused on the problem of Silesian identity as experienced by the Silesian population especially in the 19th century. The argument obviously could not be presented without some reference to the ethnic and linguistic make-up of the land, however, a broader treatment of this subject of utmost significance for the research in the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing is included in the next chapter.

[addition on the Sorbs buy the book on them]

[Protestant-Prussiandom, Catholicism-locality.]

167 They should be distinguished from the Upper Silesians (Oberschlesiern, [Górnorn] Ślązacy). In German the Silesians of West Silesia were referred to as the Slonzaeken, and in Czech as the Slezacy. The Polish nationalists dubbed them as the Ślązakowcy, which is a rather pejorative label. It can be inferred from the fact that the name starts with a minuscule instead of a capital as it is the case with ethnonyms in Polish.
Chapter three

The ethnic composition of Silesia and the policies of ethnic cleansing up to the revolutionary year of 1848

The two previous chapters sketched a panorama of Silesian history in the context of peopling of the land as well as of its emergence as a political entity. Silesia has invariably constituted a rich/strategic and distant border region in every of the states to which it has belonged. Not surprisingly so, has the land been a strongly hybrid organism which though being part of the Holy Roman Empire had seemed remote and unfamiliar to the West until the 18th century when nationalist passions started to be felt in this part of Europe. However, even later comprehension of the problems of this land has remained limited and obfuscated by the conflicting interests of the nationalisms which have vied for ownership of Silesia. Thus the outside world has had the possibility to observe the situation of this land only via nationalistically-tinted presentations produced under the close supervision of Prague, Warsaw or Berlin.

In the struggle over Silesia all kinds of arguments have been used. The Poles maintain that when the first Polish state was created in the 10th century, Silesia was included within its boundaries so by the virtue of the fact it should belong to Poland. The Germans retort that Poland possessed it only for a short time and that for a longer period it constituted a province of the Holy Roman Empire and Prussia, and add that Silesia is a primordially Germanic land which was repossessed by the Slavic conquest only in the 6th century. Following the logic the Poles say that it is not true and even if it is true, the Germanic tribes resided in Silesia quite briefly because Polish and other Slavic scholars proved that the Lusatian archeological culture, which encompassed Silesia in the first Millennium BC, was created by some early Slavs who were the ancestors of the Sorbs, Poles and Bohemians. The Germans disagree with the theory and state that almost no Polish or Slavic-speakers lived in Silesia in 1945 so that Silesia was a naturally German land before the unjust and artificial act of the expulsion of the Silesian Germans after 1945. The Poles reply that it is another example of German imperialism Drang nach Osten, because the Germans massaged the statistics and that many more people spoke Polish, Czech and Sorbian and that time. Moreover, they opine that the Germans overestimate the influence of the medieval German colonization on Silesia, which, according to Polish scholars, did not alter the basically Polish/Slavic character of the land. They say that in ethnic terms Silesia used to be Polish/Slavic and was turned into a German land only through the planned Germanizing effort of the Prussian/German state; however, this Germanized surface is quite thin and underneath pure Slavic/Polishness can be seen.

This Slavic-Germanic conflict over ownership of Silesia or in other words a remnant of the 19th/20th-century quarrelsome discourse of Panslavism with Pangermanism, is appended by a less noticed Czech-Polish clash over the land. The Czechs claim that the Slavic tribes of Silesia were more Czech than Polish and that they were included in the Great Moravian Realm as well as the Vistulians who lived around Cracow. The Poles disagree pointing to the Sudets which, according to them, were an insurmountable barrier marking the southernmost extent of the Polish tribes, and that even if Great Moravia possessed the lands actually the Czechs first should give freedom to the Moravians and their country. The Czechs retort that the Czech language was widely used as a literary standard in Silesia or rather in Upper Silesia until the 17th century, and, moreover, Silesia was one of the integral lands of the Czech Crown from the 14th century to the Prussian conquest in 1740 while Czech Silesia still remains within the Czech Republic. The Poles while agreeing that the Czech influence hindered Germanization of Silesia, are eager to say that Czechization was as bad, and that even from 10th century the Kingdom of Bohemia was actually working toward spread of Germandom being immersed in the political structures of the Holy Roman Empire, and after its demise in 1806, within the Austrian Empire until 1918. The Czechs emphasize the distinctiveness of the Kladsko (Klodzko, Glatz) Margravate to the rest of Silesia and are bitter about the fact that after 1945 the Soviets gave it to Poland as well as the southernmost strip of Prussian Upper Silesia populated by Czech/Moravian-speakers. They also say that from the historical point of view all of Austrian Silesia should belong to
the Czechs whereas the Poles are unhappy with the part of Cieszyn (Těšín, Teschen Silesia) they got, because some Polish-speakers were left out.

As the reader can see all the arguments presented above are a chaotic mixture of linguistic, ethnic, archeological, historical and political facts which may or may be not true. The ideal of objectivity was not of any significance in this game unless it could be used as one of instruments to defeat the adversary. In this manner nationalist ideologies appropriated the past and reality in order to shape them into such propagandistic packages which would serve their interests best.

The two main aims of this argumentation are proving that the ethnic ancestors of a nation claiming a territory to erect its nation-state on it, have continuously lived there from times immemorial; and that though a claimed area may be inhabited an alien ethnic element nowadays it used to constitute an integral part of a state which a national movement strives to re-establish as its own nation-state. Both the approaches are used intermittently but the former seems to be more often taken up in Central and Eastern Europe where there was no continuous existence of states from the Middle Ages until this day unlike in Western Europe where due to this fact nationalists tend to espouse the latter attitude more eagerly. When a Central Eastern European movement embarks on building its nation-state basing it on the extent of some medieval political organism with a disregard for the present-day situation, it leads to establishment of Greater Serbias, Polands, Bohemias or Germanies with large minorities. Despite lip service paid to the ideals of democracy the minorities are discriminated against and forcefully assimilated. eventually when they develop their own national movements the host nation starts perceiving them as a danger to its continued existence, and to its very nation-state. Such a conflict may be resolved only through a break-up of such a self-proclaimed nation-state along the ethnic lines and/or with the use of ethnic cleansing. On the other hand, when a nation-state is constructed to coincide with the territorial extent of a language and/or ethnie of its nation, the method demands consolidation of islets containing nation members and simultaneous assimilation/expulsion of minority members who happen to pop up within the borders of such a state. Moreover, the effort to gather all the members of a nation under the wings of a nation-state may lead to numerous conflicts with neighbor nation-states and states not based on the national principle.

Having observed possible results of nationalist mobilization it is necessary to see how specious and one-sided nationalist propaganda can be. Let us use the example of Silesia. First of all, it is anachronical to speak about Silesia as a region before it emerged as a separate entity during the 10th-12th centuries. By the virtue of its past belonging to various political organisms it could be claimed today not only by Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic, but also by Hungary and Slovakia as the successor state to Upper Hungary, Austria, and the Moravian nationalist movement which appropriated history of Great Moravia as its own. Moreover, Silesia and its principalities having enjoyed independent existence in the 12th-14th centuries, the land itself and its constituent parts could claim independence too. Besides the past governance of Slesian principalities by various princes from the Holy Roman Empire, Hungary and Poland could provide various German and Austrian Länder, Luxembourg, as well as regions of other European countries with ample reasons to claim some chunks of Silesia’s territory. However, should we decide to determine rightful ownership of Silesia relying on its ethnic provenances we reach even more interesting solutions. Besides, the obvious links with the Polish, Czech/Moravian and German ethnies, because a group of Celts resided here the land could be given to Ireland. Also the Scythians overrun it at one point so the fact could be used by some Central Asian republic to ask for handing over of Silesia. And last but not least, on the basis of languages majority of European peoples are associated with the Asian Indo-Europeans who invaded Europe several thousands of years ago. So truly speaking Silesia as well as the rest of Europe should be returned to the Basques the only non-Indo-European ethnic group surviving in modern Europe.

As it can be seen, in the case of Silesia primordialization of their claims to this land by Polish/Czech and German nationalisms are achieved by a plethora of various arguments. The ones referring to territorial divisions of Silesia and its inclusion in larger political entities are dealt with in detail in the two previous chapters of the work so there is no need to reiterate them. However, more
attention must be devoted now to the issues of language and ethnicity. The two areas of human and social existence covered by the two terms are so nebulous and difficult to pin point without an extensive body of written and recorded oral material that they very easily lend themselves to manipulation. Moreover, nationalist propagandists tend to further obfuscate the matter simplistically equalizing the results of researches carried out by historical linguists with descriptions of ethnic changes during the past centuries though it is a commonsensical truth than one does not have to be an ethnic Russian to speak excellently in the Russian language. Only today when the idea of nation-state has reached its apex (especially in Europe) one can observe such a tight and largely unambiguous correlation between one’s ethnicity (=nationality) and the language one speaks. The situation was quite different in the past when the language of documents was Latin along some dominant vernacular (as German/Czech in Silesia) whereas local and regional dialects as well as various creoles and pidgins were used during everyday situations which demanded verbal contact. And to wrap up the preliminary deliberations, chauvinism triggered off by a deft interplay of linguistic and ethnic facts may be superimposed on the biological, i.e. genetic make-up of a certain group of human beings delimited in linguistic and ethnic terms, resulting in the development of scientific racism (as it happened in the Third Reich) which is anything but scientific. Modern genetics shows clearly that genetic variation within any ethnic/linguistic group is larger than between its members and vast numbers of non-members (Cavalli-Sforza, 1994). All humans have about 99.8 per cent of their genes in common. Of the remaining 0.2 per cent, 85 per cent can be found within any ethnic group, and racial differences account for only 9 per cent of 0.2 per cent, which is 0.012 per cent difference in genetic material. Finally, quite a bit of this racial variation is unrelated to physical appearance. For example, many human groups when adult lack the enzyme lactase, which is necessary for digesting milk. Following this criterion, North Europeans must be classified together with Arabs and some West African peoples such as Fulani, while South European belong with most Africans and East Asians (Eriksen, 1995: 31/32).

Although recent genetic research which reveals the ways along which humanity spread all over the world correlates with appropriate anthropological and archeological findings which are easily translatable into the development of large linguistic and ethnic groups, the results are valid only at the macro-level. In the micro-scale the tremendous variation in culture, which is the basis for ethnic/linguistic differentiation among numerically quite small groups of humans, cannot be correlated with any systematic change in biological traits (Cavalli-Sforza, 1988; Cavalli-Sforza, 1991). Though majority of ethnic groups have tended, to a larger or smaller extent, to be endogamous due to custom, sentiment and geographical limitations, the rule against incest seems to be universal (Eriksen, 1995: 83), and as such has promoted spatial and social mobility of individuals. This universal socially/biologically forced exchange of genes among different kin/ethnic groups has facilitated maintenance of almost absolute homogeneity of human genotype in the world. From others factors which have contributed to this prevalent state of affairs one must enumerate migratory movements and war. In the latter case it seems that rape has been used as a weapon from times immemorial (Anon., 1995: 22/23).

Having presented the nationalist and scholarly approaches toward the issue of ethnicity and variation, the chapter focuses on the alterations in the ethnic make-up of Silesia and on the use of languages/dialects in this land until the mid-19th century. In this context some examples of early ethnic(religious) cleansings are mentioned as well as the rise of nascent nationalism which has brought about the first instances of policies which in a planned manner aimed at achieving its goal nation-state through assimilation/expulsion of minorities.

The first settlements of beings belonging to the genus Homo discovered on the territory of Silesia date back to the early Paleolithic Age (230,000-100,000 BC). Later findings of human remains are especially frequent in southern Upper Silesia and cover the period 100,000-8,000 BC. This area between the upper Odra (Oder) and upper Vistula was the northern limit of human wanderings in this region of Europe at the time of the last glaciation (Czapliński, 1993: 1; Wolski, 1992: 1/2). Antiquity of the first European settlements of anatomically modern Homo sapiens (who arrived there from
Africa via the Middle East or the Caucasus region) is estimated at 35,000 BC (Cavalli-Sforza, 1991: 107). In the Mesolithic and Neolithic Ages Silesia (or fragments of its territory) found itself under the influence of a succession of the so-called archeological cultures whose ethnic provenance cannot be determined. The populations who created the specific artifacts which gave names to the cultures are dubbed as indigenous or the first inhabitants of Europe (Kinder, 1978: I 14/15). The agricultural way of life developed in the Fertile Crescent was transferred into southeastern Europe during the 7th-5th Millennia BC. Thus created Civilization of Old Europe, undoubtedly, reached southern Silesia (Gimbutas, 1982: 17). The downfall or rather changed evolution of Old Europe was brought about by the successive waves of Asian steppe pastoralists (i.e. the Indo-Europeans) who infiltrated Europe in the period 4400-2800 BC. They merged with the indigenous European population but introduced their own way of life which suppressed the different cultural pattern of Old Europe (Gimbutas, 1977: 277/278 & 283). The final dominance of the Asian intruders is also exemplified by the fact that today all the native languages of Europe belong to the Indo-European family with the outstanding exception of Basque\(^{168}\) (Majewicz, 1989: 33-39, 167).

The Sudets and the Beskids barring access to Silesia from the south, are not insurmountable, moreover, the Moravian gate placed between them opens the region of today’s Upper Silesia to easy penetration from this direction. In the 7th-6th centuries BC the opening allowed an inflow of some ethnically unidentified but certainly Indo-European groups (of Hallstatt archeological culture) who came from the region of the Alps and brought the art of iron smelting to Silesia and southern Wielkopolska (Kinder, 1978: 20; Zak, 1976: 48). In the middle of the First Millennium BC a northern group of the predatory Scythian nomads invaded Silesia (Kinder, 1978: 20; Zak, 1976: 57). They are believed to have migrated to southeastern Europe from the region of the Altaic Mountains, on the border of China, during the 8th century BC. They spoke a form of Iranian, one of the branches of the Indo-European languages. Shortly after the middle of the 4th century BC the Scythians of southeastern Europe were subdued by and largely assimilated with the Sarmatians (Anon., 1990: 262), who also spoke an Iranian language and being pastoralists could not be much different from the Scythians considering their culture. By the 3rd century BC their territory extended from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and from the Vistula River to the Volga River. So it may be easily inferred that after having mingled with the Scythians some of them resided at least on the territory of today’s Upper Silesia. The Sarmatian influence was felt in this region by the 3rd century AD when they were overpowered by the Goths and the Huns from Asia in the 4th century (Anon., 1990a: 143).

The homeland territory of the Celts which stabilized in the 8th century BC and extended from the Alps to the north was the basis for their later travels/invasions all over Europe and in Asia Minor (Strzelczyk, 1987: 12). In the 5th century BC the Celtic tribe of the Boii settled down in Bohemia\(^{169}\) and Moravia (Polišenský, 1991: 12). Not surprisingly did some Celtic groups cross the Sudets and establish their settlements in southern Lower Silesia in the 4th century BC while a century later some Celts from Moravia took the easy passage offered by the Moravian gate in order to find their home in the south of Upper Silesia. The region of the Moravian Gate was also visited by the Celts in the 2nd-1st centuries BC before they settled down in northern and eastern Malopolska (Czapliński, 1993: 2). Around the time of Christ’s birth the development of the Celtic culture south of the Carpathians was hindered by the increasing pressure of the Romans and the defeats the Celts suffered at the hands of the Thracians, and was finally stopped by the expansion of the Germanic tribes. Probably in the 2nd century BC the Teutons and the Cimбри reached the central Carpathians. In the 1st century BC the Lugii became predominant to the north of the Sudets whereas in the 1st century AD the Germanic tribes of Marcomanii and Quadi replaced the Celts in Bohemia and Moravia respectively (Rada, 1993: 16; Weczerka, 1977: XXVI).

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\(^{168}\) Most probably the extinct Etruscan language which was used in Italy from 7th century BC to 4th century AD also belonged to the unknown group of indigenous European languages (Majewicz, 1989: 167).

\(^{169}\) The name of Bohemia is derived from the name of the Boii (Carter, 1992: 914).
The Przeworsk archeological culture is identified with the Lugii (Weczerka, 1977: XXVII) who are considered to be a thoroughly Germanic people. But it may be more objective to say that they were a federation of Germanic and Celtic tribes at least during the first stage of their existence (Strzelczyk, 1992: 36). Leaving aside the problem of exact location of various Lugii tribes on the territory of Silesia, I have to add that it is almost sure that the Nahanarvals lived around Sobótka (Zobtenberg) (Strzelczyk, 1992: 37). It is not sure if the Vandals were part of the Goths (later the archenemies of the former) or vice versa (Strzelczyk, 1992: 56). However, they must have migrated to the south from the Jutland Peninsula (Strzelczyk, 1992: 60) before entering the Lugii federation (Strzelczyk, 1992: 56). The Lugii were broken down into their constituent parts by the pressure of the Goths who leaving their settlements in the basin of the Vistula River, by the 3rd century migrated as far south as the Lower Danube around the Black Sea (Anon., 1990b: 75; Strzelczyk, 1992: 57). It is difficult to say if the Nahanarvals are identical with the later Sillings, however, the latter were the same people as the Hasidings who are better known because of their involvement in the Danubian basin. Both the tribes belonged to the Vandals, but the Sillings who resided in Silesia, are mentioned more frequently only at the beginning of the 5th century AD as a member of the loose confederation of the Germanic peoples and the Sarmatian tribe of the Alani who started travelling to the West ravaging the Roman Empire (Strzelczyk, 1992: 59/60).

After the Huns destroyed the Ostrogoth Kingdom in 375, they started moving westward and in the mid-5th century the empire of Attila covered majority of central and eastern Europe including Silesia. The Huns were a nomadic Asian people, probably of Turkish, Tataric or Ugrian origins\(^\text{170}\). At the height of their power they absorbed a number of different ethnic groups in their armies and assimilated the characteristics of the populations of their environment, so that in Europe they gradually lost their distinct Asian character\(^\text{171}\) (Anon., 1990c: 301; Mcevedy , 1992: 16/17). After the death of Attila in 453 his empire declined and before it disappeared in the first half of the 6th century, the Huns had lost control of their tributary lands in Central Europe (Mcevedy , 1992: 19/21). It is probable that during this time the Slavs started migrating to the west (Mcevedy , 1992: 21) as partners of or prompted by the Huns (Cygański, 1995: 15) but no exact information is available about this period and thus the oblique origin of the numerically largest language/ethnic family inhabiting Europe nowadays, is left to speculation if not conscious manipulation.

Because the Slavs are not mentioned under their own name and nothing sure is known about them prior to the 6th century (Tyszkiwicz, 1993: 423) it seems that at the earlier stages their ethnogenesis must be linked to some kind of their symbiotic relationships with various ethnically different peoples such as the Germanic tribes, Huns, the Sarmatian tribe of the Alani and Turkomans\(^\text{172}\). Further, the matter is complicated by the fact that as late as the 6th century the Byzantine writers Procopius and Jordanes were the first to speak about the Sklavenoi (Kinder, 1978: 111). Some contemporary historians claiming that the Slavs have lived in the region between the Elbe and the Odra (Oder), identify them with the Venedi or Veneti who are located in this area by Pliny the Elder, Tacitus and Ptolemy. But the Venedi were a people of unclear ethnic provenance whose name was transposed onto the later Slavic inhabitants by Germanic observers as in their eyes the Slavs seemed to be a continuation of the Venedi. The early confusion contributed to a later identification of the Slavs with the Vandals and the mistaken terminology survives in the name of the Lusatian Sorbs

\(^{170}\) In modern linguistics the Turkic languages which belong to the Altaic family, are commonly divided into the West and East Hunnic branches (Majewski, 1989: 48/49).

\(^{171}\) Even in their pre-European period the Huns were highly variable in their ethnic and linguistics characteristics (Anon., 1992c: 301).

\(^{172}\) The Turkomans or Turkmens a Turkic people who spoke an Altaic language closely related to Hunnic. Their descendants populate Turkmenistan and some regions in north Afghanistan, north Iran, and in Turkey (Anon., 1987: 558).
who in German are known as the Wenden (Veneds)\textsuperscript{173} (Strzelczyk, 1992: 313/314). Even more difficulties arose when the findings of historical linguistics were used to shed more light on the ethnogenesis of the Slavs. It seems that the names of the Croats, Serbs/Sorbs and Antes are of Iranian origin which means that the Slavs intermingled with the Sarmatians, or in the case of the last name (which some researchers apply to the Eastern Slavs) that it is rather difficult to determine the limits of the Slavic and Sarmatian ethnies (Tyszkiewicz, 1993: 422/423).

Following the Huns, the Avars were the people who were to dramatically alter the situation in Central and Eastern Europe. They were a Mongolian people, who about 461 conquered the Uighurs, a Turkic tribe sometimes called the pseudo-Avars. The Avars with the Uighurs formed a confederation on the Volga steppes but in the middle of the 6th century they were almost annihilated by the Turkoman tribes. The survivors, mostly Uighurs led by Avar chiefs, took the name of Avar and split into two bodies. One part remained in eastern Europe\textsuperscript{174} while the other reinforced by Huns and Bulgars\textsuperscript{175} moved westward, eventually reaching the Danube where together with the Antes and Sklavenoi established the Slavic-Avar community which was the basis of the powerful Avar Khanate. (Kinder, 1978: I 110-113). However, north and west to the Pannonian Plain the Slavic tribes successfully resisted the Avars having been united by the Frankish merchant Samo in an extensive state. The realm might contain or control southern Silesia and survived from c. 624 to 659 (Carter, 1992: 914; Kleeman, 1983: 89). The power of the western Avars declined under the blows struck by the Slavs and the Bulgars. In 795/796 they were crushed by Charlemagne, and they were almost completely exterminated by the Moravians while the survivors were absorbed by the Slavs (Anon., 1990d: 144).

At that time Silesia had already become a home to Slavic tribes which had settled in this land absorbing remaining Germanic inhabitants (Weczkerka, 1977: XXVII). Charlemagne rewarded the Moravians for their aid with a part of the Avar Khanate which they turned into the core of their state. By mid-9th century the Moravian Realm might take control at least over southern (Upper) Silesia (Kleeman, 1983: 89; Wolski, 1992: 30/31). In 892 the Carolingian Emperor Arnulf attempted to assert his authority over the Moravian Duke Svatopluk and called in the help of the Magyars. They were a Finno-Urgic people whose early homes had been on the upper waters of the Volga and Kama rivers. In the 9th century they were based on the lower Don, ranging over the steppes to the west of that river. They formed a federation which also some different ethnic elements such as the three hordes of Turkic Khazars (Kavars). Having been hard pressed by the westward expansion of the Turkic Pechenegs they accepted Arnulf’s proposal and destroyed the Moravian Realm in 906. They settled in Pannonia absorbed the Pannonian Slavs, started dominating the Slavic tribes of Croatia and Slovakia (Upper Hungary) and continuously defied German forces sent against them. Only in 955 they were finally defeated by the Emperor Otto I on the Lechfeld opening the way to Christianization of the Magyars and the establishment of the Hungarian state (Kinder, 1978: I 113; Macartney, 1992: 700).

The Prince of Bohemia Bořivoj I (ruled 870-895) made an accord with Emperor Arnulf (895) and warded off the danger of invasion. Thanks to the West Frankish protection the Bohemian tribes were not overrun by the Magyars and probably maintained close links with the Slavs who lived in

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\textsuperscript{173} The unclear terminology which hinders research into the ethnic/linguistic origins of the Slavs was also the result of the lack of appropriate names for the peoples residing east to the Germanic territories. For instance, the Germanic peoples who had become an integral part of the late Roman world did not know what a name to give to the Polanians. Due to the language barrier and few formal contacts in the age of \textit{Völkerwanderung}, the scholars drew on the works of ancient authors in order to describe their contemporary world which, in fact, had changed so much since the 2nd-4th centuries AD. Thus the Polanians were dubbed the Vandals before 1000 when the names Poloni (Poles) and Polani (Polanians) became current (Strzelczyk, 1992: 314).

\textsuperscript{174} The eastern European branch of the Avars most probably survives as the modern Avars, i.e. one of the 27 Lezghian tribes of Dagestan in the Caucasus, Russia (Anon., 1990d: 144).

\textsuperscript{175} The Bulgars, usually identified as a Turkic people, were remnants of the Huns who retreated into the steppes of southern Russia, where, mixing with the Uighrians, they established a Bulgarian state which was destroyed in the 7th century by the Turkic tribes of the Khazars (Anon., 1990e: 243; Anon., 1990f: 23; Kinder, 1978: I 113).
Silesia (at least in the vicinity of the Moravian Gate) though initially probably without any formal control over them. However, since the beginning of the 10th century such Bohemian rulers from Vratislav I (ruled 912-921) to Boleslav I (ruled 929-972) had gradually subjugated Silesia which was a clearly Bohemian territory when in 990 or 999 the Polanian Prince Mieszko I wrested it away from his brother-in-law Boleslav II (ruled 972-999) (Carter, 1992: 915; Davies, 1991: I 85; Jähnig, 1991: 23; Lubos, 1995: I/1 9; Tyszkiewicz, 1991: 152).

Having perused the brief presentation of the changing ethnic/linguistic situation on the territory of would-be Silesia in the context of Central Europe from the dawn of human settlement until the beginning of the Second Millennium AD, one can see that it is a complicated and multidimensional process. In the past its picture was reduced by nationalism and Eurocentrism just to a simplistic succession of invasions during which one ethnic group (tribe) was thoroughly supplanting another one. The vanquished were completely exterminated or all of them left looking for a new homeland and thus dislodging other peoples. In the line with this simplistic thinking on the past determined by the patterns and categories of the contemporary political and ethnic situation, many historians and archaeologists strove to fit the ancient ethnic groups onto the territories of countries and regions delimited by modern borders in order to primordialize and absolutize existence of the relatively new political organisms. In this manner they were able to produce arguments for nationalist movements which somehow had to justify their historic and/or ethnic claims to some territories on which they wanted to build their nation-states.

Modern politicians and their electorates perceive states as a sovereign entities unquestionably demarcated by continuous state borders. In this mode of thinking (nation-)states are free atoms flowing in the universe of politics where now and then they collide in the form of interstate conflicts. The abstract lines which we call frontiers cut all the continents only on political maps. However, they do not exist in the real world but only in the modern political thinking which conditions one to perceive them as insurmountable gaping chasms larger than the states they purport to separate. Thus (nation-)states suspended in the ethereal void of borders are digital, discrete which excellently agrees with the rational, Cartesian paradigm of thinking based on binary oppositions. Politicians attempt to further this pattern of political organization of the world by superimposing it on such par excellence analogous phenomena as languages and ethnicity.

Without such superimposition nation-states cannot be established but it obfuscates the real nature of languages and ethnicity which in the period 1945-1989 started to be perceived as separate and unambiguous like states, distorting not only popular but also scientific thinking about these phenomena. Languages and ethnic groups which tend to but do not always correlate, have no clear spatial or temporal limits. They are certain continua, spectra which rise and ebb in time and space. At the synchronic plane languages and ethnic groups are usually concentrated around some cultural/administrative centers but attraction of such centers is felt less intensively in the borderland areas where languages and ethnies merge with one another or rather gradually change from one to another through a continuous spectra of degrees losing features characteristic of one center while acquiring visages of another. Similar processes can be observed at the diachronic level when through the process of differentiation earlier ethnies and languages are transformed or split into new ones which leads to their multiplication. But in the course of time the number of languages and ethnies also happens to decrease when they go extinct or are assimilated into larger entities.

Nationalisms want to do away with the incessant changability of languages and ethnies standardizing the former and transforming the latter into nations. Simultaneously they oblige the individual to acquire his standard national language through compulsory schooling, and merge citizenship and nationality into one which is the only identification allowed to an inhabitant of a nation-state. This fossilization of languages and ethnies ideally contained within the borders of

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176 Vratislav I built a border fort Vratislavia (Wrocław, Breslau) at the Odra (Oder) ford which besides marking the northern extent of his power also secured the important commercial route from the south to the southern Baltic (Lubos, 1995: I/1: 9).
nation-states covering the whole territory of the planet is carried out with the use of many an instrument, but one of the most significant ones, which in no time alters human perception so that it complies with the demands imposed by nationalist ideologues, is cartography. Maps are the source of easily digestible information whose attraction comparable to television, is dramatically increased by their widespread use in science. Looking at a map one forgets that it is not reality but its mere representation, inescapably to a bigger or smaller extent biased due to some fixed opinions of and methods used in creation of the map by cartographers. Dangerously, maps bring false clarity to one’s view of the world because the earth and humankind are very complicated phenomena/processes which constantly defy academic and commonsensical comprehension. For instance, though the environs somehow determine development of languages and ethnies the only entity which can actively express its ethnic and linguistic identity(ies) is man. Hence the maps which diachronically or synchronically allege to portray the ethnic/linguistic situation of a certain geographic area, considerably distort the picture of reality through simplification treating ethnic/linguistic identities as abstract ideas with no explicit link to and no need for man who expresses them. If one takes in one’s hand a map of a land painted into several distinctively and unambiguously colored areas it becomes obvious that the nationalist mode of thinking pops up from such an exemplar. Human beings are not a mass, and do not cover land like seas, dunes or grass fields. Moreover, they are not rooted in soil and immobile as trees though nationalism promotes such pervasive metaphors. They do not lend themselves to cartographic presentation moving from place to place, changing alliances and passports, marrying persons of different ethnic/linguistic backgrounds, renouncing some identities/languages while learning others. In this context it is clear that linguistic/ethnic purity (often equalized with genetic homogeneity) is just an unattainable imaginary Holy Grail of nationalists. Using nationalist jargon one can say that, ironically, all of us are just bastards of pure blood, a result of ceaseless miscegenation so necessary for warding off the danger of degeneration of the human genotype.

The theoretical reflection on the problem of objectivity in scholarly approach to the issues of ethnicity and language is intended to caution the reader and the author that nicely-looking simplifications of processes and phenomena in their scientific portrayal are distortions which may have been conditioned in us by nationalism through education and mass media. Understandably, subsequent description of the further ethnic and linguistic changes in Silesia aims at overcoming the widespread stereotypes which, for decades, have been propagated by Polish, German and Czech nationalisms. An interesting example of a similar endeavor is given by the most recent synthesis of the Silesian past Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas: Schlesien produced in 1994 by a team of German historians. Although the vast volume (not unlike others in the series which consider other areas with sizeable German minorities/settlement) concentrates on German history of Silesia intended to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the postwar expulsions of the Germans from the East, it strives to remain objective through the method of omission. First of all, its story of Silesia starts with the Polish takeover of this land when it had been already though only preliminarily formed as a separate political and ethnic entity. And rightly so because prior to the 10th century there was no Silesia but only the largely indistinguishable territory which had been to become the specific land yet. Moreover, on the book’s over 800 pages no single map is used with the exception of a photograph of the very first map of Silesia (cf. Conrads, 1994). Appreciating the care of the German scholars, in his work the author prefers to summarize the pre-Silesian history of the territory which later was made into Silesia, hopefully without simplifying it too much in order to present a facet of the Silesian past without which it is impossible to comprehend various nationalist approaches to this land be they historiographic, political or literary.

Considering the process of human migration into Europe until the end of the First Millennium AD, archeological discoveries and incidental references in written sources indicate that the movements of ethnic groups were not always abrupt and turbulent but that the new settlers began to enter, for instance, the territory of Silesia before the earlier inhabitants had left it (Carter, 1992: 914). The so-called invasions are just an imposition of the picture of modern warfare which mobilizes vast masses of human beings, onto the pre-modern past when the lands of Eurasia supporting hunter-gatherers or steppe pastoralists were sparsely populated and many of them uninhabited. The landmass
of Eurasia affords unobstructed passage extending in the form of North European Plain from the Urals to the Pyrenees. Moreover, the lowlands between the southern Urals and the Caspian Sea opens a wide route between Central Asia and Europe whereas the Caucasus, and the Straits of Bosphorus and Gibraltar rather than obstacles proved to be bridges connecting Northern Africa, Asia Minor and South Asia with Europe. Comprehensibly, various ethnic groups seeking sustenance roamed freely in the vast areas let alone some strayed individuals moving from group to group or alone. The ethnic groups organized in closely knit tribes/clans were not numerous and ranged from several tens to tens of thousands of members readily reminding one about the situation the first European explorers came across in Northern America. At that time migrations were rather slow and gradual as can be inferred from the moving of Indo-European peoples into Europe which proceeded in the three waves which lasted 100-200 years each and extended between 4400 and 2800 BC (Gimbutas, 1977: 277, 311). Although from the historical perspective the movements produced dramatic effects, from the point of view of an individual they were almost imperceptible because hardly ever they were completed during one’s lifetime. Certainly some violent conflicts which did occur must have made the participants aware of the end of a given status quo and the beginning of a new one, but could not be observed from a global or continental perspective as one’s perception was usually limited to one’s immediate community. There were almost no political organizations with fixed structure and borders which, would have been able to react to slow-pace migrations. The changing population patterns were reflected in territorial spread of specific language and ethnic groups with concomitant alterations in economy and technology. They were largely devoid of any conflicts in the modern meaning of this word which assumes intensive involvement of vast numbers of people mobilized by ideology/interest, who are decided to devote their lives and belongings for some common sake. To conclude, the author believes that it is obvious, in the light of the aforementioned facts, that it is almost impossible to say about any ethnic group in Europe that it is (primordially) indigenous to the area where its members live.

To reiterate the early human history in Silesia, some pre-Indo-European or indigenous European groups resided in the Moravian Gate at the end of the last glaciation 8000 BC. This area was slightly touched by the agricultural revolution and the cultural and technological developments of the Civilization of Old Europe which declined due to the immigration of the Indo-European peoples who reached Silesia in 3900-3800 BC (Gimbutas, 1977: 277, 311; Zak, 1976: 25). Nothing sure is known about ethnic and linguistic provenances of the two different population groups which gradually intermingled. During the process the general characteristic of the Indo-European culture seems to have prevailed over the Old European one that is why Indo-European languages are spoken in Europe and European civilization has been organized around the patriarchal values. The further alterations in the overall population patterns which also influenced Silesia, provide some clues about ethnic and linguistic features. Generally speaking, they were constituted by an intermingling of various groups which spoke Indo-European, Altaic and Urgo-Finnic languages.

The above-mentioned early linguistic and ethnic changes of relevance for Silesia should be also observed from the perspective of the Roman Empire in the First Millennium AD as Silesia happens to be located close to the Danubian basin. The Roman influence was mostly limited to Upper Silesia and eastern Lower Silesia as the amber route described by Ptolemy went from the Danube via Olomouc (Olmütz) in Moravia, the Jablunka (Jablonków) Pass, Silesia, and Calissia (Kalisz, Kalisch) to the mouth of the Vistula. Another one originated in the region of present-day Vienna and traversed Silesia before reaching the estuary of the Odra (Oder). Merchants of all kinds of ethnic and linguistic backgrounds existing at that time in the Roman Empire, must have frequented the routes and it is not unthinkable that they added some small elements to the ethnic variety on the Silesian territories sometimes settling down, taking barbaric mistresses and occasionally siring offspring. The trade

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177 I thank Mr Bernard Linek, a historian of the Instytut Śląski, Opole, Poland, for this enlightening remark.
178 For instance, it is estimated that the Vandals, so renowned in early medieval history of Europe, amounted just to 80,000 people at that time when they crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to establish their kingdom in Northern Africa (Zientara, 1996: 48).
which slackened due to the decrease of the demand for foreign products in the declining Roman Empire, and also to the rise in insecurity on the roads caused by Völkerwanderung, picked up after the establishment of the Carolingian Empire which re-introduced a degree of political and economic stability in Western and Central Europe. Merchants once again reappeared in this region adding new unheard-of influences, as can be exemplified by the case of the Jewish traveller Ibrahim ibn Jaqub who in 973 took the important Regensburg-Prague-Cracow-Kiev route which led through the territory of the later Kladsko (Klodzko, Glatz) Margravate (Kleemann, 1983a; Weczerka, 1977: XXXI).

Because the beginnings of Silesia as a formed region date back to the times when the Slavic peoples dominated in and around it, at this stage it is indispensable to scrutinize the development of various Slavic languages and ethnic identities of relevance to this region. Nothing is known about the Slavs up to the 6th century when some written sources on them appeared. Prior to this date their history is inferred on the basis of mainly highly speculative linguistic research. However, it must be understood that development of languages only may coincide with general ethnic changes. In the 4th Millennium BC a largely undifferentiated Indo-European community existed. After the 3rd millennium BC a protodialect developed that in the Baltic and Slavic areas that had many features peculiar only to these two branches of Indo-European. In the course of gradual differentiation under the influence of western Indo-European protodialects the dialects of the Slavic protolanguage began to be spoken in the intermediate zone situated between the Germanic, Celtic, Italic and other western Indo-European dialects. In addition to Baltic and Slavic in the north, this intermediate zone included the Indo-European languages of the Balkans (Illyrian, Thracian, Phrygian). The exact geographical borders of the Balto-Slavic domain appear impossible to determine, but they may well have been located in Eastern Europe around present-day Lithuania and to the east and south of it. It seems that in c. 1000 BC the Slavs emerged as a distinct ethnic group and resided in Podolia and Volhynia. The Scythians who came to this area in 700 BC left an imprint on the Slavic language. Their language was influenced also by other Indo-European languages including their Iranian branch. In the context of the Germanic-Slavic borderland it is important to note that the Slavs accepted more Germanic words and structures than vice versa. Until the middle of the 1st millennium AD, the Slavs were known to other people as the inhabitants of the vast territories between the Dnepr and the Vistula. In the 6th century they expanded to the Elbe River and the Adriatic Sea and across the Danube River to the Peloponnese. In the period the Slavs already were divided into several groups, but their language was uniform in its phonological and grammatical structure, with important dialectal variations occurring only in the vocabulary. At that time Slavic tribes started coming to Silesia from the south via the Moravian Gate and from the north-east along the Carpathians (Hamp, 1992: 695; Tyszkiewicz, 1993: 423/424; Vaníček, 1993: 24).

The differentiation of the Slavic dialects into the three main (West, South and East Slavic) groups took place at the turn of 8th and 9th centuries. Since then the tendencies to differentiate and to reintegrate cognate dialects have been continuously at work, bringing about a remarkable degree of uniformity in the different Slavic dialects especially in their respective groups. The continuum was broken between the West and South Slavic groups by the inflow of the Magyars to Pannonia in the 10th century. On the other hand, the close links of the West and East Slavic groups have continued to this day but not without increasing differentiation caused by strong cultural links of the West Slavic group with the Catholic Church and Western Europe, and the Byzantine influence on the other (Hamp, 1992: 693, 695/696).

Silesia was situated almost in the center of the West Slavic group surrounded by the Bohemian, Moravian and Slovak tribes in the south, Polanian and Vistulian in the east and north and Sorbian in the west (Czapliński, 1993: 3). It seems that all the dialects have remained easily mutually comprehensible at least through the 15th century when the Czech language was still identified with the whole Western Slavic community (šmahel, 1969: 191ff). Even nowadays a speaker of one West

179 This unequal influence in the case of the Slavic and Germanic dialects is reflected in the profound effect the Slavic language had on its Baltic counterpart (Tyszkiewicz, 1993: 424).
Slavic language can understand simple utterances in other languages from the group and can acquire a good working knowledge of any of them after having intensively practised it for a week. Leaving aside the current standardization of the Western Slavic languages, conditioned by the 20th-century development of nation-states based on the languages, from the linguistic point of view it is possible to classify them as dialects of the West Slavic language which has not been so far (and possibly will never be) codified (cf. Voegelin, 1977: 146). By the same token, if one takes into consideration the dialectal differences which exist within West Slavic languages, maintained by the users conscious of their own ethnic/regional distinctiveness, it is possible to grant the status of a separate language to Silesian, Moravian, Highlander Polish/Slovak or even Lachian \(^{180}\) (cf. Meier, 1979: 83).

Thus, from the ethnic and linguistic perspective it is a fallacy to say that the Slavic tribes of Silesia were Polish, Bohemian or Moravian, as some scholars maintain. They were simply Silesian in the absence of some strong homogenizing factors (Malczyn’ski, 1960: 160). Undoubtedly, from the political point of view subordination of at least southern Silesia to the will of Bohemia must have developed a link between the state and the land though the barrier of the Sudets surely hindered communication between Prague and the Silesian tribes which facilitated Mieszko’s annexation of the land into his newly-established state. However, the cultural prevalence of Bohemia as the successor state to Great Moravia enhanced by the use of the Bohemian variant of the Old Church Slavonic as the official language (Hamp, 1992: 696) was so great that even today some scholars dub the non-existent common West Slavic language as Old Czech (Gove, 1966: 1153). Later on dominance of the Czech language in West Slavic community continued. After the Polish ruler Mieszko I accepted Latin Christianity from the Bohemian hands in 966 a multitude of church and state administration vocabulary, previously domesticated in the Czech language, entered the Polish language as Czech loanwords. The linguistic influence was spread by Bohemian clergy who started a Christianizing effort in the Polanian state (Davies, 1991: 67, 69; Rospond, 1966: 82). However, when Silesia passed under the control of the Polish rulers Latin had begun to prevail as the official language in accordance with the situation in the rest of Latin Christian Europe whereas the Polish dialects following new lords must have swayed the Silesian dialects to the Polanians cultural center at Gniezno (Gnesen) with the exception of the Kladsko (Glatz, Klodzko), Opava (Troppau, Opawa) and Kmnov (Jägerndorf, Karniów) lands which remained with the Bohemian state after Mieszko I’s conquest. Although documents in the Bohemian variant of Old Church Slavonic ceased to be issued in the 12th century, continued existence of Bohemian culture based on the vernacular was ensured by the first Czech verses written in various dialects at the end of the 13th century which gave a rise to the rich poetic literature in Old Czech that appeared in the 14th century (Hamp, 1992: 696).

Czech as the first standardized literary West Slavic language became the model to be emulated by other West Slavic educated persons who wished to elevate their own dialects from the position of oral vernaculars unworthy of being committed to paper. In the 14th-15th centuries it was a matter of good taste for Poles of influence to speak in Czech or at least stylize their Polish in such a way that it would sound Czech. The situation continues until the first half of the 16th century when the first Polish vernacular writers extensively mixed Polish and Czech features in their writings (cf. Jan Sandecki-Malecki) (Ziomek, 1980: 57) or at least use a plethora of Czech loanwords (cf. Mikolaj Rej). Although in the other half of the century Polish poets (cf. Jan Kochanowski) started using Polish largely devoid of Bohemian influences (Rospond, 1966: 82), the fashion still continued among the nobility and aristocracy until the end of the century which can be inferred from the statement by Lukasz Górnicki who complained in 1567 that when a Pole crosses the Polish-Silesian border he wants to speak Czech only (Zielonka, 1994: 347).

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\(^{180}\) Lachian is the transitory dialect between Polish and Czech and as such possesses features of both the languages which makes it impossible to state that it is a dialect of one of them (Maleczyński, 1960: 160). Ondra Lysohorsky (or in Lachian O’ndra Lysohorsky’) wrote in Lachian and championed establishment of an independent Lachian state in the first half of the 20th century (Lubos, 1974: III 622; Zielonka, 1994: 70)
At that time Silesia had been already under the control of Prague for more than two centuries which ensured strong German and Bohemian influences on this land. When literacy became more widespread in the final period of the Middle Ages, there was a tendency to supplant Latin with vernacular languages in the case of documents of less significance. In a regard to Silesia the Lower Silesian urban patriciate and the ruling stratum predominantly spoke German in contrast to Upper Silesia where Polish was generally used by the majority of inhabitants with the exception of the Opava (Troppau, Opawa) and Krnov (Jägerndorf, Karniów) principalities because Czech was the medium of everyday communication there like in the Kladsko (Glatz, Kłodzko) Margravate. Thus besides Latin German attained the status of the official language in Lower Silesia whereas Czech was introduced in the same capacity in the Slavic-speaking areas of the land. In the Polish-speaking areas of Upper Silesia the oldest Czech document dates back to 1426, and Czech had become the official language there already by 1470. This status of the language was reaffirmed in 1560 and 1573 when the rulers of the Oppeln (Opole) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn, respectively, decided that the proceedings of land courts must be carried out in Czech or a language similar to it (i.e. in a Polish/Czech dialect) (Dziewulski, 1974: 59/60). The subsequent Czechization of the ruling strata in Upper Silesia was not thorough and apart from the examples of promoting this language there were also cases when noblemen had a very poor command of it. The situation was due to the fact that with the exception of few clerks and settlers there was no inflow of the Czech-speakers to Upper Silesia though certain amelioration came with development of the educational system where Czech was used as the language of instruction. Moreover, in the period of the Counter-Reformation c. 35 per cent of the students at the Jesuit seminary at Olomouc (Olmutz), came from Silesia (Dziewulski, 1974: 63-65).

In the 16th century German was put on equal footing with Czech because of the inflow of German settlers in Upper Silesia and the fact that beginning with the King of Bohemia and Emperor Ferdinand I the royal and imperial documents considering Silesia were issued in German. Moreover, Polish began to be more often used in official contexts in the Upper Silesian part of the Cracow diocese, especially in smaller towns though already at the beginning of the 17th century the aldermen of the cities in the east of Upper Silesia started to use Polish as the official language. After the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), during which the political nation of the Bohemian Kingdom was largely destroyed or neutralized following the crushing defeat in the Battle of the White Mountain, 1621, German gradually replaced Czech in offices and documents. In 1675 Emperor Leopold I accepted German as the language of courts, and at the end of the 17th century it started to dominate in all the Upper Silesian offices. However, the tradition to produce documents in Czech survived until the mid-18th century, where the last Czech documents were produced in the 1760s. Also Polish did not disappear from the official use right away after the Prussian annexation of Silesia. In Prussian Upper Silesia town registers were still written in the language at few towns, e.g. in Peiskretscham (Pyskowice) till 1752 and Myslowitz (Myslowice) till 1770. Moreover the language was used in the proceedings of few Upper Silesian trade guilds until the beginning of the 19th century (Dziewulski, 1974: 65-76).

Now it is time to leave the issue of the Czech influences on Silesian culture in order to concentrate on the development of the ethnic make-up of the province. Thus the relatively central position of Silesia in the West Slavic community changed with the eastward expansion of the German Empire which in the course of the 10th century subjected the Slavic peoples living between the Elbe

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181 Usually the replacement of Czech with German was correlated with the overhaul of the administrative apparatus in the 1740s after the Prussian conquest of Silesia (Dziewulski, 1974: 70).
182 It is interesting to note that the Upper Silesian institutions of the Catholic Church almost never used Czech as the official language (Dziewulski, 1974: 71).
183 In the Teschen (Tesí, Cieszyn) principality the Austrian authorities granted Polish with the status of an auxiliary official language, and some ordinances were published in this language between 1749 and 1766 (Chlebowczyk, 1966: 425; Kapras, 1909: 100/102, 115).
and the Odra (Oder) annexing the old easternmost sphere of influence of the Carolingian Empire (Jähnig, 1992: 13, 22/23; Kinder, 1978: 1 122/123, 142/143). In the 11th and 12th centuries the marches were thoroughly absorbed by the Holy Roman Empire (Dralle, 1991: 44-46) and naturally German settlement was developed in this area especially from the mid-12th to mid-13th century (Kinder, 1978: I 170). Some Slavic population survived in the area of the middle and upper Elbe until the mid-16th century (Strzelczyk, 1987a: 341/342), but only the Sorbs in Lusatia have lasted as a self-conscious ethnic group to this day (Cygański, 1995). In consequence the ethnically heterogeneous population of Germanic and West Slavic origins became largely German-speaking. The situation developed similarly in Upper Hungary (i.e. present-day Slovakia). The Slavic tribes entered Slovakia probably in the 6th or 7th century from Silesia. After a period of disorder following the fall of Great Moravia, Slovakia became one of the lands of the Hungarian Crown in the 11th century. The main ethnic frontier between Magyars and Slovaks ran along the line where the foothills merge into the plain, though there were also Magyars settled in the larger valleys. Later, the landlord class and much of the urban population in the whole area was Magyar. On the other hand, as the country suffered from chronic overpopulation so a constant stream of Slovak peasants moved south into the plains of Hungary proper, where they were usually Magyarized in tow or three generations (Carter, 1992: 915). Due to a lack of intensive settlement on the part of the Magyars the land remained largely Slavic especially in the center and north, though a Hungarian influence was occasionally felt in south-eastern Silesia. Thus, ethnically speaking the central position of Silesia in the West Slavic community was limited to a bridge between the neighbor West Slavic populations south and north to it with the German and Magyar ethnies at its eastern and southern flanks, respectively.

The basically Slavic ethnic picture of Silesia started to change already at the end of the 12th century. It is probable that already in the year of his return exile in Altenburg to Silesia (1163) Boleslaw (Boleslaus) I (ruled 1163-1201) was accompanied by some German courtiers, and a few Cistercians from the monastery at Pforte on the Saal River, where his mother Princess Agnes (Agnieszka) von Österreich was buried. The complete Cistercian convent arrived from Germany at Lubiąz (Leubus) in 1173, and the earlier Benedictine monastery was transferred to them already in 1175 when Boleslaw (Boleslaus) I issued the Cistercian monks with a comprehensive privilege, also allowing them to bring German settlers in order to develop the monastery and its lands. Thus, it is hard to determine when the first settlers actually did come. On the basis of the earliest documents available it is known that there were some German settlers living in the vicinity of the monastery in 1202. There survive further 12 documents recording presence of German settlers in Silesia before 1250. In this period 58 German law villages were established, and on this basis German scholars calculate the number of German settlers while Polish researchers emphasizing the role of Polish peasants in the process claim that the German settlers constituted population only of one quarter of the villages (Lukas, 1990: 1; Maleczyński, 1960a: 291-293; Menzel, 1977: 277).

The author believes that asking such questions as: When did the first German colonists really come to Silesia? or How many Poles and Germans did live in German law settlements? presupposes that an intended answer may be used as an argument in the present-day discourse of nationalisms in

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184 The strong monastic center which sprang up at Lubiąz (Leubus) prevailed in the early period of Silesian Christianity because it caused foundation of other influential Cistercian monasteries in this land, at: Heinrichau (Henryków) (1222) (Lukas, 1990: 9), Grüssau (Krzeszów) (1294) (Rose, 1977: 165), Kamenz (Kamien Ząbkowicki) (1246/1248) (Menzel, 1977a: 214), and in 1127 at Mogila near Cracow (Gross, 1995: 5). Another line of Cistercian monasteries in Silesia is connected to the mother monastery at Morimund in Burgundy. In 1146 the Morimund Cistercians founded a monastery at Jędrzejów in Malopolska. In turn, the new institution gave the beginning to its sister monasteries at Gross Rauden (Rudy) in 1252 and at Himmelwitz (Jemielnica) in 1282 (Sabisch, 1977: 186) in Silesia. The Cistercians besides spreading the Christian faith, were also responsible for changing it economic and ethnic picture by bringing first German settlers to Silesia (Gross, 1995: 663).

185 On the basis of their research German scholars established that the first German law village with Slavic peasant was established only in 1248 (Moraw, 1994: 115).
which they try to determine which of the nation-states surrounding Silesia has the greatest right to claim ownership of this land. In the Middle Ages ethnicity as it is understood nowadays, rarely came to the fore as one’s ethnic identity was rather subjected to the far more significant confessional and estate interests. The German poetry of Minnesängers was as popular as modern Anglo-American poetry and music (Zielonka, 1994: 362), so it did not influence one’s identity, while the unity of the Latin Christian ecumene was underlined by unity of the Western Church and the Latin civilization based on the lingua franca of Latin (Dralle, 1991: 100/101; Vaníček, 1993a: 83/84). Thus to stay objective it is better not to play with onomastics and fragmentary sources to establish some kind of ethnic/national statistics for the time when they never existed. For instance, on the basis of linguistic origins of names used by the inhabitants of German law towns German scholars found out that in 1326 there was only 1.4 per cent of city dwellers with Slavic names in Lower Silesia, and 2.2 per cent in Upper Silesia (Moraw, 1994: 111). German nationalists may use the results as a support for their thesis that already in the Middle Ages almost all the urban population of Silesia was German. On the other hand, Polish nationalists may retort that the sources mention only the richest social strata which consisted from Germans and Germanized Slavs (they took German names and the language because it was fashionable then as the indicator of one’s social position), while no documents were preserved on the more numerous common people who must have been altogether Polish/Slavic (Maleczyński, 1960b: 443. The groundless discussion is just another exemplar of appropriation of the past in order to promote some political goals. The author leaves it here in order to continue the outline of development of Silesia into a typical of that time, polyethnic and multilingual region of Europe (Zielonka, 1994: 345).

Not much is known about travellers and clergymen who visited Silesia prior to the arrival of settlers to this land. However, bearing in mind the fact that the borders were not any obstruction to free movement of persons, services, capital and goods (as it is expected to come true in the finally integrated Europe) at that time, actually it is possible to infer that then Europeans of all ethnic backgrounds could have settled there. To make this opinion more focused it is good to concentrate on Christianization of the land. It probably started already when Silesia was included in Great Moravia and continued under the Bohemian and Polish control with the involvement of the Church structures of the German Empire and later of its successor the Holy Roman Empire. Thus the clergymen were Slavs as well as Germans. It is also quite possible that in the wake of their missionary efforts some Irish/Scottish monks settled down in the Wroclaw (Breslau) monastery in the 1170s (Strzelczyk, 1987: 420). On the other hand, the wave of settlers who came to Silesia in the 13th century was not through and through German as it is commonly thought. Among them there were French-speaking Walloons (Kiersnowski, 1977: 31), Flemings (Birke, 1968: 7), and a few Frenchmen and Italians (Maleczynski, 1960: 446). At the turn of the 13th and 14th centuries also some Czech settlers found their homes in central Silesia (Maleczyński, 1960: 446; Zielonka, 19994: 345). Two centuries later the settlers of various ethnic backgrounds were Germanized or more rarely Polonized whereas Czechization occurred in the Kłodzko (Glatz, Klodzko), Krnov (Jägerndorf, Karniów) and Opava (Troppau, Opava) regions (Kiersnowski, 1977: 31; Maleczyński, 1960: 446).

There was no unified German state at the time when the settlers left for Silesia but when scholars talk on them they happen to take the present-day structure of the European state system as a reference, and thus they forget that the German-speaking immigrants who came, mainly from the Mark Meissen, Thuringia, Main-Franconia and Hesse (Birke, 1968: 7), cherished their regional

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186 Curiously, the German law village of Wilmesau (Wilamowice) founded by probably the Flemish or Dutch settlers in the mid-13th century, which was ruled first by princes of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) princes, and later of Auschwitz (Oświęcim), has supported the specific identity of its inhabitants, 60 of whom still speak their own ethnolect Wymysjoerjysh in which the name of their village sounds as Wymysau. The indigenous villagers without having any clear proof state that they are of a Flemish decent though in the past some of them, mainly from the local upper class, preferred to regard themselves as descendants of Anglo-Saxons on the basis that the surname Fox is quite widespread among them. However, the surname was rather introduced to the village by a 15th-century newcomer from Scotland (Karwat, 1996; Wicherkiewicz, 1993).
identities and felt to be as different to one another as to the Flemings. The process of the so-called German eastward colonization gained momentum after the havoc wreaked on Silesia and the rest of Central Europe by the Mongols in 1241. New German law villages and towns sprang up all over Silesia while many of the existing ones began functioning under the law. In the course of the colonization, one could not observe any serious ethnic tensions between the local population and the settlers (Malczyński, 1960b: 446/447) which can be explicated by the fact that German migrants settled down in uninhabited regions, where they built new villages, or in newly-founded towns (Kołodziej, 1992: 3). There was no bone of contention which could trigger off a conflict. Quite on the contrary settlers facilitated advancement of economy and culture, and the rulers and their respective administrations, prior to the rise of nationalism in the 19th century, did not try to alter the existing legal, linguistic and cultural status quo and did not try to alter it (Menzel, 1993: 5).

In the result of the colonization, the formerly uninhabited region of the Sudets became one of the most developed and densely populated regions of Silesia swaying the character of Lower Silesia toward German culture in contrast to rather underdeveloped Upper Silesia where few settlers ventured and many of them got Polonized (Lis, 1993: 26/27). The positive advancement of the whole process, in turn, produced enough people and wealth to continue the colonization eastward which was especially evident in the 14th-century Poland (Magocsi, 1993: 40). For instance, in 1405 Silesians constituted the majority of the 4,000-strong German population of Lwów (Lviv, Lvov, Lemberg) out of the total number of the city’s inhabitants estimated at 5,000 (Kołodziej, 1992: 3). A certain degree of stabilization attained at the close of the 15th century allowed continuance of slow Germanization in the west and south of Silesia, whereas in the eastern and north-eastern parts of the province the German-speaking population was peacefully Slavicized (Birke, 1968: 12/13). It should be added that the establishment of German law settlements at the feet of the Carpathians in the 15th/16th century (Kołodziej, 1992: 3) facilitated emergence of the specific culture and pastoralist economy of the Carpathian Highlanders (cf. Eriksen, 1995: 190/191). Due to the territorial extent of Silesia only the westernmost tip of the North Carpathians, i.e. the Silesian Beskids fall in the scope of the study. The first people who decided to live in the mountains, were peasant escapees from Upper Silesia and Poland’s region of Zywiec (Saybusch). In the 16th century the considerably Slavicized Wallachians (Vlachs) who had travelled to the north along the arch of the Carpathians due to the badly-felt effects of the wars with the Turks in the south, arrived in this area and intermingled with the Polish-speaking peasants giving the rise to the specific Silesian Highlanders. They survive to this day with their specific dialect close to the Polish language but richly interlaced with Slovak and Czech elements (Lipok-Bierwiaczonek, 1996: 11/12).

Having considered the ethnic origins of the small ethnic of the Silesian Highlanders the work focuses on other small ethnic groups which influenced Silesia up to the mid-19th century, before shifting its attention to the multidimensional Polish/Slavic-German relations in the land.

Out of the multitude of minorities which have been present in Silesia to this day, the strongest enduring influence exerted on this land belongs to the Jews. However, their role may be a little overemphasized as other minorities which have populated Silesia hardly enjoyed any comparable scrutiny which has been applied to the history of the Silesian Jews by numerous researchers. Jewish merchants (often slave traders) frequented Silesia already in the 10th century (Brückner, 1990: II 1025). The first Jewish settlers who must have arrived in Silesia during the 10th and 11th centuries (Weiser, 1992: 15) were refugees from the Crusades though the earliest documentary evidence for their presence in this land dates from the 12th century (Anon., 1971: 1636; Bobowski, 1989: 5). The first Silesian Jews settled down in the vicinity of Breslau (Wroclaw), in Liegnitz (Legnica), Głogau (Glogów), Bunzlau (Bolesławiec), Görlitz (Zgorzelec), Löwenberg (Lwówek Śląski) in Lower Silesia, and fewer in some Upper Silesian villages and market towns of some commercial consequence. Intensive economic development of Silesia and its consequent need for capital brought about a Jewish monopoly in moneylending. Thus in the 14th and 13th centuries, concomitant to the German colonization, Jewish immigration to Silesia from Germany significantly increased the population of Jewish communities. Although synodal legislation in Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1267 sought to limit their
contacts with Christians, a privilege of Prince Heinrich (Henryk) IV (ruled 1270-1290) in 1270
granted them a measure of autonomy as well as physical protection. Over the course of five centuries
more than 50 Jewish communities were established in Silesia (Anon., 1971: 1536; Kwak, 1989: 65;
Weiser, 1992: 17). Initially, there was no antagonism between the local population and the Jews but
their the difference so clearly visible in religion and custom deepened by the economic cleavage as on
the whole the Jewish community enjoyed a better standard of life than their Christian neighbors,
flared up in anti-Jewish persecutions in the times of famine or epidemics (Bobowski, 1989: 9).

The Jews being the pronounced Other of the Middle Ages, were easily turned into the
scapegoat by the Church and rulers who thus mobilized their subjects against the Jews in order to
meet some politicoeconomic goals. Consequently the earliest exemplars of ethnic conflict in Silesia
were the anti-Jewish excesses, but they were inspired by religion and cultural difference rather than
by any ethnic-centered, let alone national, ideology. In 1226 Jews were expelled from Breslau
(Wroclaw), and in 1319 another wave of anti-Jewish persecution broke out in the city. The largest
pogroms of the Jews in Europe were triggered off by the Black Death, but in Silesia they were also
accused of arson. Anti-Jewish excesses recurred quite often then: 1348, 1349, 1351, 1360 (Breslau
(Wroclaw)), 1362 (numerous cities in Lower Silesia), 1401 (Glogau (Glogów)), 1410 (Striegau
(Strzegom)) (Anon., 1971: 1536; Bobowski, 1989: 9/10; Heitmann, 1995: 52). In the first half of the
15th century theft of individual Jewish property, and economic exploitation of Jews, aided by law and
administration, became quite widespread in Silesia. The Hussite Wars (1419-1436) also took a heavy
toll on the Silesian Jews and the recuperation from all these blows was cut short in 1453 by the arrival
to Silesia of Giovanni Capistrano, a renowned Franciscan mystic and preacher born in Italy. He
conducted an unremitting campaign against heretics and especially against Jews. In his Latin sermons
simultaneously interpreted into German he incited anti-Jewish persecutions in Breslau (Wroclaw) and
numerous towns of Lower Silesia which continued through 1455. Only in the Silesian capital in 1454
41 Jews were tortured to death or burnt at the stake and the whole Jewish population of the city (c.
3,000) were expelled\textsuperscript{187}. Such expulsions occurred in almost every Silesian town with a Jewish
community and were facilitated by Emperor Ferdinand. By the 15th century majority of Silesian
principalities and towns did not accept any Jews on their territories sticking to the de non tolerandis
Judaes\textsuperscript{1} law in spite of the fact that absence of Jews seriously hindered development of the Silesian

Many of the Jews expelled from Silesia as well as from all over Western Europe, settled down
in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Kinder, 1978: I 154/155). The process of expelling the
Silesian Jews was rounded up in the second half of the 16th century. They were still accused of ritual
murders, blasphemy, arson, causing epidemics, and a new addition to this pile was the allegation that
they cooperated and spied for the Turks. In 1558 Emperor Ferdinand I coaxed the Silesian Parliament
(Fürstentag) decree which sanctioned the expulsion of the remaining Silesian Jews. When there was
almost no Jews left in Silesia Emperor Rudolf II reaffirmed his father’s decision by issuing, in 1582,
the edict to the effect the very last Upper Silesian Jews must leave their homes. Since that time
onwards only the two Jewish communities of Glogau (Glogów) in Lower Silesia, and Zülz (Neustadt,
Biała) in Upper Silesia survive in this land, protected by some local noblemen of influence at the
imperial court, who were interested in keeping the Jews there mainly in their own economic interest.
Emperor Ferdinand II endeavored to mitigate the anti-Jewish policies of his grandfather Ferdinand
I but the situation was not ripe for such a decision as the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) contributed to
strengthening the general sentiment against Jews (Gawlik, 1994: 12). Anyway even before the end of

187 Unfortunately, despite the enormous suffering instigated by Giovanni Capistrano and other anti-Jewish
measures which he brought about by his activities in Venice, Naples, Ancona, Bavaria and Poland, he was
canonized in 1690 (Anon., 1971a: 141; Scheuermann, 1994: I 165/166). Moreover, the burning of the Jews in
Breslau (Wroclaw) was commemorated by the iron cross which remained at the Blücher-Platz (Plac Solny) until
the end of the 19th century (Heitmann, 1995: 52). The infamous tradition was picked up after 1990 when one of
the Wroclaw (Breslau) streets was named after him as ulica Św. Jana Kapistraná, i.e. St. Giovanni Capistrano
St. (Rybińska-Tybel, 1993: 61, 95).
the war some noble entrepreneurs (especially from Upper Silesia) interested in multiplying their fortunes did accept Jews on their territories and granted them with protection. In the mid-1650s several hundred of Jews escaped to the towns of northern Silesia from Wielkopolska where in the Swedish-Polish conflict they suffered at the hands of the Swedish occupiers and Polish troops who accused them of treason and cooperation with the Swedes (Guldon, 1995: 26/27). Even more followed in their footsteps leaving the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth where numerous pogroms were instigated against them during Chmielnicki’s Revolt (1648-1657) in the Ukraine. Many of the newcomers settled especially in this part of Upper Silesia east of the Oder (Odra) as, in a way it was similar to their previous home areas, with Polish spoken by the populace and good contacts maintained with Poland thanks to the fact that the local Church administration was subjected to the Cracow bishopric. Moreover, the extensive freie Standesherschaften readily welcomed Polish Jews. Subsequently, in the course of the second half of the 17th century the presence of Jews was gradually reestablished in Silesia which can be easily inferred from the fact that the Jewish press of Dyhernfurth (Brzeg Dolny) (founded in 1689) was after Prague the second most important center of production of Hebrew books in Central Europe. The books were one of the most valued commodities in the Silesian trade with Poland and Germany. (Anon., 1971: 1537; Chmielewska, 1994: 60; Kwak, 1989: 67/68; Weiser; 1992: 21-23).

By 1700 there were approximately 200 Jewish families in Silesia, the greater part of whom still lived in Glogau (Głogów) and Zülz (Neustadt, Biala). In 1713 Emperor Charles VI eager to improve the economic situation of Silesia with the aid of well-to-do Jews introduced a Toleranzsteuer (tolerance tax) for Silesian Jews. Due to the opposition of the Breslau (Wroclaw) city council and merchants the measure was rescinded in 1738. At that time there were about 800 such tolerance taxpayers in Silesia, in addition to those, who like the Jews of Glogau (Głogów) and Zülz (Neustadt, Biala), were exempt from the tax. Prior to the Prussian conquest of Silesia it was decided that all the Jews without the privilege to stay in Silesia must leave. Maria Theresa demanded strict observation of the decree so not surprisingly the Jews expected an improvement of their lot under the rule of Friedrich II. However, the Silesian Jews (amounting to c. 1100 families in 1751) who prayed for health and success of Friedrich II were not to be much treated as enlightened tolerance of the king did not extend to them. Friedrich II did not think too well about the Jews and he decided to tolerate only the richest of them who could actively contribute to development of Silesian and Prussian economy. To the rest of them all kinds of economic and social restrictions were applied in order to decrease the number of these unneeded Jews\footnote{As of 1730, in Prussia, Jews were excluded from almost all professions and expressly prohibited from brewing, innkeeping, and farming. Trade in livestock, wool, leather, and most local produce was prohibited to them whereas the permitted occupations were few: moneylending, and dealing in luxury wares and old clothes. The strictures against peddling were made more severe, as were those against beggars. In 1748 Friedrich II prohibited Jews from cutting off their beards, so that they may be distinguished easily (Anon. 1971b: 1290/1291). After the first partition of Poland (1772) the number of the Prussian Jews grew by 15,000 so in 1773 Friedrich II proposed to expel 13,000 of the newly-acquired Jews, as unnecessary, to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Only half of the number were removed. However, the situation was aggravated by the second and third partitions of Poland, due to which over 73,000 Polish Jews found themselves inside Prussia. Consequently, in the 1790s the Prussian administration issued many regulations which discriminated Jewish immigrants, and also aimed at limiting Jewish procreation (Trzeciakowski, 1995: 119-121).}. However, the number of Jews in Prussia grew geometrically after every partition of Poland where many a Jew lived. After the third partition in 1795 when New Silesia was added to Silesia proper, the total Silesian Jewish population which had amounted to c. 9000 at the end of the 18th century\footnote{Excluding from the consideration the newly-acquired Polish territories, Silesia contained the largest number of Jews of all the Prussian provinces. The second largest Jewish minority lived in Brandenburg (c. 7,300 persons) (Trzeciakowski, 1995: 118/119).} (Trzeciakowski, 1995: 119) grew by c. 2,900 persons (Czempas, 1990: 4). It was understood at that time that more restrictive regulations can hardly solve the situation so some proposals amounting to equal treatment of Jews were put forward. In 1791 the first Jewish family received Naturalisationspatent, which granted them full citizenship but no liberal Jewry law was
Chapter three

drafted as the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars began to preoccupy the
Prussian administration far more than domestic issues. However, the ground for some reform had
been prepared whereas more Jews started espousing the values promoted by the Haskalah\(^{190}\) which
enabled them to integrate or assimilate with the Prussian society more readily (Anon., 1971: 1537;

In the wake of the reforms which followed the crushing defeat of Prussia in 1806, municipal
citizenship and offices were opened to all, irrespective of religion; and on March 11, 1812, the
emancipation edict gave the Silesian Jews freedom on the economic and personal level. Now they
were free to city or state citizenship which they progressively did. However, appointment as a civil
servant was difficult because of the unofficial religious barrier, which allowed only baptized Jews to
be given such positions. Some restrictive measures proposed by Friedrich Wilhelm IV were to single
out the Jews from the actualization of his ideal in the form of corporationist Christian state, but they
were nullified by the 1848 revolution before they could have been introduced. With the economic
development of Silesia the Jewish population also increased from 11,500 in 1803 to 52, 682 in 1880.
Already in the 1840s Jewish industrialists and financiers were active building and investing in the
industry of Upper Silesia\(^{191}\). In 1869 the North-German confederation reconfirmed the principles of
religious freedom and equality for all. And when the united Germany was established during the
Franco-German War in 1871 Jewish conscripts did participate in the warfare as their ancestors who
had fought in the War of Liberation against Napoleon. By that time majority of them had become
regular German citizens in all aspects but religion, which due to the overall small number of Jews,
could not distort the confessional pattern of the German state in any meaningful way. Rapid
integration or assimilation of the Silesian Jewry can be exemplified by the decline of their traditional
communes accompanied by the development of synagogal districts (comparable to parishes) and
founding of institutes and associations (predominantly at Breslau (Wroclaw) devoted to research and
propagation of Jewish culture and Judaism\(^{192}\) (Anon., 1971: 1537; Anon. 1971b: 1291-1293;

In 1871 from the administrative point of view 15,697 Jews resided in the Oppeln (Opole)
Regency, 19,189 in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency while only 4,211 in the Liegnitz (Legnica)
Regency. By 1905 the number of Jews fell down in the Oppeln (Opole) and Liegnitz (Legnica)
Regencies to 18,268 and 3,860, respectively. The decrease shows clearly that Silesian Jews not unlike

\(^{190}\) In his works Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) endeavored to acquaint the Jews of Central Europe with
Western culture and thus initiated the movement known as the Haskalah (Enlightenment) (Thorne, 1975: 876).
In Silesia the movement was popularized by Mendelssohn’s friend David Friedländer (1750-1834) (Heitmann,
1995: 54).

\(^{191}\) Notably, already in the 1780s/1790s, probably French engineer Solomon Isaacs as a Prussian civil servant
looked for appropriate for mining coalfields in Upper Silesia. In 1840 Moritz Friedländer from Gleiwitz
(Gliwice), Simon Levy from Beuthen (Bytom) and David Löwenfeld from Breslau (Wroclaw) constructed the
Friedens-Eisenhütte (ironworks) near Beuthen (Bytom). Later the works were sold but the influence of the
Friedländer continued to be felt upon Upper Silesian industry. In 1866 Emanuel Friedländer established the
Kohlen-Großhandlung Emanuel Friedländer & Co. (coal wholesale company), and his son Fritz developed it
into an international coal and chemical industrial group which was estimated to be worth nearly as much as all
the property of one of the most renowned Upper Silesian industrialist families - the Counts Henckel von
Donnersmarck. In 1898 Fritz Friedländer converted to Protestantism and in 1906 he was knighted as von
Friedländer-Fuld.

From other significant Upper Silesian industrialists of Jewish extraction one can enumerate the Huldschinskys,
the Caros, the Pringsehims (the daughter of Nathanael Pringsheim, Katja, married the writer Thomas Mann),
Sigismund Goldstein, Samuel Fränkel and the Pinkuses (Herzig, 1994: 510; Jaros, 1988: 59/60, 79-81; Weiser,

\(^{192}\) From the most significant institutions of Jewish learning and research, which had world-wide influence, one
can enumerate: the Jüdisch-Theologischen Seminar (Jewish Theological Seminary, 1854) and Hochschule für
die Wissenschaft Judentums (Institute for the Study of Jewry, 1872), both of which were established in Breslau
other German-speaking Silesians did take part in *Ostflucht* (flight from the East) looking for improved life opportunities in Berlin and in the Ruhr industrial basin or even in North America and South Africa. Although the Jewish population of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency grew to 23,564 in 1905, it was too little to offset the overall decline in the number of the Silesian Jews, and by 1905 Breslau, the second largest Jewish city in Germany after Berlin, had lost almost 3,000 Jewish inhabitants in comparison to its 1871 Jewish population of 13,916 (Kokot, 1973: 76/77; Weiser, 1992: 40-43). Before moving the issue of the Jewish population of Austrian Silesia, it is interesting to remark that prior to the outbreak of World War I, the Silesian authorities were alarmed by the inflow of Jewish migrants to eastern Upper Silesia from Galicia, Russian Poland and even farther provinces of the Russian Empire. Many of them did not know German but, nevertheless, they quickly acquired or understood the language as they spoke Yiddish (a Germanic language). On the other hand, they also spoke various Slavic languages and dialects which allowed them to function as middlemen between the Slavic-speaking population of Upper Silesia and the German-speaking population of Silesia. The Jewish newcomers, however, were different in custom to their assimilated German brethren as they were Orthodox or Hassidic Jews, which clearly set them apart as a distinctive ethnic group (Weiser, 1992: 43).

The Prussian Silesian Jews progressed from the position of tolerated pariahs to the level of regular German citizens though of the Jewish faith which barred them from participation in the government of the country. Other forms of discrimination included usual exclusion from the appointment to official positions, nor could they become officers in the army. Despite the drawbacks they felt to be German and as conscripts fought as loyally as other German soldiers in all the German wars between 1871 and 1918 (Anon., 1971e: 480). Now it is time to have a cursory look at how the situation of the Austrian Silesian Jewry developed after 1740.

After the partition of Silesia the Jews of the Austrian part started to be seen as a whole with the Moravian Jewry. The hostile policies of Charles VI and Maria Theresa culminated in 1745 when the latter threatened the Moravian and Austrian Silesian Jewry with expulsion, but the order was rescinded, permitting them to remain for another ten years. In 1748, however, she raised the toleration tax from a total of 8,000 florins to 87,700, which in 1752 was increased to 90,000 florins. The edict of 1752 imposed limitations on Jewish economic activities. The anti-Jewish sentiment so openly expressed by Maria Theresa in 1777: *Ich kenne keine ärgere Pest für den Staat als diese Nation, wegen Betrug, Wucher und Geldvertragenv* (Maria Thresa *in* Wieser, 1992: 34) did not prevent the Austrian authorities from issuing such regulations on the Jews in 1753 and 1764, that made their situation comparable to their brethren in Prussian Silesia. Thus, official recognition for the significant role the Jews played in the Austrian economy paved the road for Joseph II’s Toleranzpatent (Tolerance Act) which, in 1781, became valid for Austrian Silesia. The minor setback of the 1798 edict of Francis II, which limited the Moravian and Silesian Jews rights of settlement to an area of 52 Jewish communities, was reverted in the revolutionary year of 1848 which brought the abolition of most legal and economic restrictions. The process of legal emancipation was completed in the Austrian constitution of 1867. Moreover, in conformity with the new municipal laws (passed temporarily in 1849 and definitively in 1867) 27 of the 52 Jewish communities in Moravia and Austrian Silesia, were constituted as Jewish municipalities, and existed as such until the end of the

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193 *Ostflucht* most affected Silesia from the 1870s to 1914. In the first half of the 19th century Silesia was the recipient of migrants especially under the colonization policies of Friedrich II. Later in central Silesia, the agrandizement of the large estates and the growth of the number of rural landless laborers developed rapidly after 1850, so the area sent large numbers of people usually westward to other parts of Germany. This phenomenon was dubbed *Landflucht* (flight from the land). Coupled with the westward migration of Upper Silesian workers in search of better work and wage conditions, it became known as Ostflucht, and according to various estimates in the period 1840-1939 it incurred the total population loss of 3-4.5 mln in the German territories east of the Oder (Odra) (Brožek, 1966: 28; Schofer, 1974: 20-22).

194 I do not know any worse plague for the state than the nation, because of their swindling, usury and money contracts [my translation].
Habsburg monarchy, in striking contrast to the abolition of Jewish municipal autonomy in Prague in 1850 and in Galicia in 1866. The legalization of the Jewish religious autonomy, a longer process, was not completed until 1890, when 50 Jewish religious communities were recognized in Moravia and Austrian Silesia\(^\text{195}\) (Anon., 1971d: 300-302; Kinder, 1978: II 62/63; Weiser, 1992: 33-35).

With the growing acceptance of the Jewish presence the number of the Austrian Silesian Jews did grow. In 1754 there were 575 Jews in the total Austrian Silesian population of 154,200, and in 1770 900 as opposed to 240,000 Christian inhabitants of the crown land (Weiser, 1992: 34). However, the fact that most of the restrictions imposed on the Jews by Charles VI and Maria Theresa remained in force until the second half of the 19th century, led some Austrian Silesian Jews to leave the country, mainly for Upper Hungary (Slovakia) and later for Austria. After equal rights and freedom of movement were granted the new Jewish community of Mährisch Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrowa) was established in Moravia but on the border with West Silesia. It became the center of the Ostrau-Freistadt (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin whose development rivaling Prussia’s Upper Silesian industrial basin, was closely connected to Jewish entrepreneurship. The brothers Wilhelm and David Gutmann developed jointly with the Rotschilds the coal mines of Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrowa) and established the great iron and steel works there. The Rotschilds also built the Kaiser Ferdinand Nordbahn, a railway linking Vienna and Galicia via Moravia and Silesia. Consequently there was a substantial number of Jewish railway engineers, employees, engine drivers, licensees of railway restaurants, etc. The positive integration of the Jewish population in Austrian Silesia led to their assimilation with the Austrian Germans which is clearly indicated by the fact that in the 1910 census they are distinguished only as a religious group in this crown land. At that time they constituted 1.3 per cent of the Austrian Silesia’s population which in 1921 (after the division of West Silesia between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and adding formerly Prussian Hultschin (Hulčín, Hluczyn) land to then Czech Silesia) amounted to 622,738 (Anon., 1971d: 302/303; Roucek, 1945: 174; Leff, 1988: 21).

Considering other ethnic groups which were of some influence on the ethnic make-up of Silesia, the Gypsies\(^\text{196}\) should not be overlooked. They are a diaspora people not unlike the Jews but in the contrast to that latter, the Gypsies has rarely become an object of research due to the fact that their culture is oral and as such used to be largely impenetrable to the traditional scholar who could deftly delve into the Jewish world after having learned how to read Hebrew and speak Yiddish, but was not able to conduct sociologicalanthropological research on peoples who did not record their history and lore in writing.

On the basis of linguistic research it was established that the Gypsies are an Indo-European ethnic group who travelled from the present-day northern India to the Caucasus and Asia minor in the period 3rd century BC-11th century AD (Anon., 1990h: 309; Mirga, 1994:85). They appeared at Constantinople about 810 and 1050, at Crete in 1322 and prior to 1370 in Wallachia (Groome, 1908: 485), in 1399 they were sighted for the first time in Upper Hungary, and at the beginning of the 15th century via Croatia and Bohemia they travelled to Western Europe where they were noticed in the majority of the countries before 1430. At the beginning of the 16th century some Gypsy groups reached Lisbon, England and the Scandinavia. The group of Gypsies from Upper Hungary (Slovakia) traveled to Cracow in 1401 and Gleiwitz (Gliwice) in 1427 (Mirga, 1994: 50/51). The presence of the

\(^{195}\) In 1908 there was no Jewish community with full municipal independence in Austrian Silesia. The only community which had enjoyed such rights before 1867, was Hotzenplotz (Osoblaha) in West Silesia. The religious communities numbered ten: Freiwaldauf (Jesenik), Horzenplotz (Osoblaha), Jägerndorff (Krnov, Karmílow), Troppau (Opava, Opawa) and Wagstadt (Bi’lovec) in West Silesia, and Freistadt (Karviná, Fryštát), Skotschau (Skoczów), Bielitz (Bielsko), Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) and Friedek (Frydek) in East Silesia (Anon., 1971d: 297/298).

\(^{196}\) The name Gypsies is used in this work to the currently preferred Roms, as the Roms is just one group of the Gypsies and the Sinti or the Manush do not identify with them (Mirga, 1994: 20).
Gypsies in Silesia and elsewhere in the Holy Roman Empire was curtailed by a string of ant-Gypsy acts which were issued in 1469, 1497, 1500, 1530, 1544, 1548, 1551, 1557. Thus they were expelled from the Empire and in the process many of them were persecuted sharing the sad of the Jews at that time. Those who dared to return, were hanged and burnt at the stake. In the first half of the 16th century Gypsies started streaming from and via Silesia into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth where life was not unbearable. Some Polish documents dating back to the mid-16th century accuse Silesian Gypsies of theft and arson in the vicinity of Będzin (Anon., 1990h: 309; Ficowski, 1985: 21/22). Gypsies started going back to Western Europe from their exile in the 16th and 17th centuries. It seems that they were used as spies by Albrecht von Wallenstein and Friedrich II. However, their fate was sad because unlike the Jews they were falsely charged with all kinds of crimes, e.g. cannibalism and child-stealing. In Germany so late as the first half of the 18th century, they were hunted down like wild beasts; in one Rhenish principality, says Gustav Freytag, the record of a day’s bag included, among other game, a Gypsy woman with her suckling-child. In 1872 42 German Gypsies were imprisoned for child-stealing but the charge proved false. At the beginning of the 20th century it was estimated that there were c. 15,000 thousand settled Gypsies in Prussia (Groome, 1908: 485/486). It is hard to say how many of them resided in Silesia as there are no studies on the ethnic group in this land, and, moreover, Gypsies having largely preserved their nomadic way of life until 1945, were a transient population which was not recorded in any Silesian statistics. It may be inferred that the Silesian Gypsies were Sinti as other German Gypsies though it cannot be excluded that some Roms from Poland resided in Upper Silesia. Their history in Silesia (as largely elsewhere) has not been researched so far which is the proof of negligence of this ethnic group on the part of Eurocentric historiography which is not interested in peoples with oral culture and who cannot exert their power through government, education or capital. As an underclass, European pariahs, though they have constituted part of everyday life in Europe, they have slipped into oblivion when it came to present their cause in academic studies. In case of Silesia not unlike the whole of Europe, they found themselves in the limelight only in the period 1933-1945 when they were systematically exterminated as Jews. The Auschwitz concentration camp, situated in the Silesian-Malopolska borderland, is the single place where the highest number of Gypsies perished (Cygański, 1995a: 204).

Besides, Jews and Gypsies Silesia gave home to other members of ethnic groups which did not border on the land. The Walloonian, Flemish and Italian settlers mentioned above, belong to the early period of Silesian history. With time the migration patterns of Europe changed. The growth of the Catholic Church in Silesia demanded improved contacts with its center at Rome, so many Church officials of Italian extraction visited Silesia to settle some ecclesiastical matters of significance or to collect Peter’s pence especially beginning with the 14th century. Giovanni Capistrano who contributed to the expulsion of the Silesian Jews came from Italy. In the 15th century grew the number of Italian merchants who visited Silesia and Italian miners who worked in the land’s mining industry (Brückner, 1990: II 906; Kiersnowski, 1977: 165). In the 16th and 17th centuries largely peaceful Silesia with the exception of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) attracted a many Italian artist who flocked there helping to introduce Renaissance which is best exemplified in the castle of Brieg (Brzeg). Such artists as Giovanni Battista Quadro, Giacomo de Pari and Giovanni Ricci were active not only in Silesia but also in Poland (Dobrowolski, 1965: 120). This Italian influence spilled over into literature: Italian writings were translated into German and Silesian authors modeled their poems according to the rules of the Italian taste (Lubos, 1995: I/1 193). Some Italian noblemen also settled in Silesia, and it was this group which spawned the Collonas the family of great land owners in Upper

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197 It is interesting to observe that the northward treks of the Gypsies from the Balkans coincided with the coming of the Wallachians (Vlachs) to the northern Carpathians (Brückner, 1990: I 184).

198 Gustav Freytag (1816-1895), a renowned German writer dubbed as a German/Silesian Dickens. His most important work Soll und Haben (1855) was translated into English as Credit and Debit.

199 In 1943-1944 there were 20,795 Gypsies in the camp, and about 40-60 per cent of them did not survive the ordeal. It is estimated that c. 350-520 thousand Gypsies perished during World War I (Cygański, 1995: 204/205).
Silesia. Count Philipp Colonna (1755-1807) was an early Upper Silesian entrepreneur not unlike Bartolomeo Galli (1732-1796) whose family came to Silesia in the 17th century from Como in Italy and produced merchants and industrialists. Another Silesian family of Italian extraction which should be mentioned is this of the Counts von Ballestrem. In 1742 Count Giovanni Baptista Angelo Ballestrero di Castellengo left Savoy for service in the Prussian army. His son acquired large tracts of land in Upper Silesia, and his descendants became powerful Upper Silesian industrialists and influential German politicians such as Count Franz von Ballestrem (1834-1910) (Gross, 1995: 57-60; 184-188; Jaros, 1988: 16).

From the 16th to the 18th century Silesia was visited by English merchants and Scottish itinerary traders. The latter had to leave their homeland due to poverty and widespread persecutions which caused emigration of Puritans under Mary Stuart and Catholics under Elizabeth. At that time Scottish peddlers were a common sight in Europe (Brückner, 1990: II 584). Their presence abated with the economic progress of the British Empire. However, Count Friedrich von Reden responsible for the development of Upper Silesian industry attracted into the Prussian civil service John Baildon (1772-1846) who was born in Larbert near Edinburgh. With his on-hands knowledge of English iron and steel industry he pioneered development of this industrial field in Upper Silesia before becoming an industrialist himself (Gross, 1995: 231/232; Snoch, 1990: 9).

Due to its geographic location Silesia had been the crossroads of trade routes from the Roman times. In the late Middle Ages the main routes led from the Netherlands and the Holy Roman Empire via Silesia to Kiev, and from Austria, Hungary and the Czech Crown via Silesia to Poland and the south Baltic. In the period 1387-1474 when Breslau (Wroclaw) belonged to the Hanseatic League, the Oder (Odra) was frequented by merchants from all the lands around the Baltic and the North Sea (Scheuermann, 1994: I 512). In the 15th and 16th centuries some Hungarians and Slovaks came to Silesia following the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus who ruled Silesia until his death in 1490. He was survived by his illegitimate son who ruled in the Troppau (Opava, Opawa) principality until the beginning of the 16th century (Orzechowski, 1972: 11). During the Hussite Wars (1419-1436) and the later religious conflicts of the 16th century, as well as in the Thirsty Years War (1618-1648), many troops of various ethnic provenances visited Silesia and left the usual imprint on the ethnic composition of the land in the form of illegitimate children. Apart from the Czech and German-speaking armies one has to remember the Swedes who in 1639 occupied the whole of Silesia (Snoch, 1990: 158). After 1620 some Protestant exiles from Austria settled in Silesia (Kinder, 1978: I 240), and the slow migration of groups of Czech Brethren continued even after 1740 (Maleczyński, 1963: 26) prompted by the 1548 victory of Emperor Ferdinand I over the Schmalkaldic League and the defeat of the Bohemian troops at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. Majority of them crossed Silesia en route to Wielkopolska in, at that time, the more tolerant Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Sliźni, 1976: 45). But some settled down in Silesia as after the intensive re-Catholicization, it was the only Habsburg province with large presence of Protestants. Thus, Vienna had to learn to tolerate Silesia’s heterogenous confessional character especially when Sweden wrenched a more relaxed attitude towards the Silesian Protestants in the Altranstädt Convention of 1707. The Czech settlements were established in Lower Silesia: around Strehlen (Strzelin) and in the vicinity of Gross Wartenberg (Syców), and in Upper Silesia, mainly in the Oppeln (Opole) principality. In 1727 Bohemian Brethren from Moravia and Bohemia, who resided in Saxony, reconstituted themselves into the Renewed Church of the Unity of the Brethren usually known as the Moravian Church. Subsequently, in the 18th century, some Moravian Brethren (who were already German-speaking at that time) established four of their religious communities in Silesia. The most renowned one was active in Neusalz (Nowa Sól). Moreover, in the 17th century Bohemian priests described as Boemi or Boemi pure Germani were active especially in the parishes of the Glogau (Glogów) principality, and at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries some Czech settlers got involved in the colonization of the underdeveloped regions in Lower but especially in Upper Silesia, which was started by Friedrich II. For instance, in 1805 there were 2 Czech and 3 German-Czech settlements in the Oppeln (Opole) principality (Anon., 1990h: 71; Ladogórski, 1966: 54-56; Maleczyński, 1963: 26). After a long interval of peace which followed the end of the Thirty Years War, the same story of various troops crossing Silesia, repeated itself in the
case of the Napoleonic Wars. The French occupation and administration of Silesia persisted from 1806 to 1813 though the massive presence of French troops abated in 1812 the year of the ill-fated Russian campaign. In consequence the War of Liberation (1813-1815), also some Russian troops marched through Silesia. They were constituted from subjects of various East Slavic ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, with the most distinctive group of Cossacks who later guarded the Russian (i.e. Congress Polish)-Prussian border including its Silesian part (Niemcewicz, 1990: 49). To round up the brief survey of more exotic ethnic variety introduced to Silesia, the process started again with the rapid development of the Upper Silesian and Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrawa) industrial basins in the second half of the 19th century. The former attracted workers as far afield as from Lithuania, Bukovina and eastern Galicia (Ruthenians and Ukrainians), Croatia, Russia, Austria, Slovakia, Bohemia, East and West Prussia (Mazurs and Kashubs) and Lusatia (Sorbs)\textsuperscript{200} (Brozek, 1966a: 70, 82-85, 197-201; Brozek, 1969: 105/106), and a similar situation was observed in the latter though its workers usually came from all the lands of the Dual Monarchy, but in the highest numbers from Slovakia and Hungary.

Having sketched the influence of a variety of ethnic groups and languages on Silesia the focus of the chapter turns to the four predominant ethnic groups which used to constitute the Silesian population, i.e. to Germans, Czech, Sorbs and Poles though in case of the Poles and Czechs/Moravians of Upper Silesia it is more appropriate to speak about the Czech/Moravian and Polish-speakers as language was not the axis of their identity. It was a mere part of it whereas religion and locality seem to have held the sway on par with loyalty to the King in Prussian Upper Silesia and the Emperor in Austrian Silesia, respectively. Although it is repeatedly denied the Slavic-speakers were Silesian Prussians and Silesian Austrians and/or \textit{tutejsi} (i.e. people from here, locals) before German, Czech and Polish national movements began to shape them into their likeness.

The survey starts with the smallest ethnic groups the Sorbs, whose past is not presented here in detail as their history more linked to Bohemia, Saxony and Brandenburg than to Silesia, does not easily fall into the scope of the work. Delving into the ethnic past of the Sorbs it may be inferred that originally they were a Sarmatian people who spoke a north Iranian language. In the 4th century they were subjugated by the Huns who shifted them from the north shores of the Black Sea to the westernmost reaches of their empire, i.e. to their present homeland of Lusatia (\textit{Lausitz} in German) in the 5th century. The rest of these early Sorbs settled down in the Balkans giving the beginning to the present-day Serbs. It seems that before and/or during their travels both the groups of Sorbs were Slavicized. After having defeated the Thuringians the Sorbs had to accept dominance of the Kingdom of the Franks in 531. It is the earliest certain date in history of the Slavs. Their later history is marked by temporary switches of allegiance between the Slavic states of Samo, Great Moravia and the Carolingian Empire. In the 10th century the Slavic peoples between the Elbe and the Oder (Odra) were largely subjugated to the German Empire and their territories were organized in the Marches of the Billungers, Lusatia, Meissen, Zeitz and in the Northern March (Kinder, 1978: I 144). The Marches of Lusatia and Meissen were intermittently dominated by the Polanian state from 102 to 1031 (Jähnig, 1991: 23). The Margrave of Meissen controlled Lusatia until 1076 when the German King Heinrich IV ceded the territory to the Bohemian Prince Vratislav II (of course, within the confines of the German Empire as Bohemia had been an imperial fief since 895/929). After 1081 he lost Lower Lusatia. At that time Lower and Upper Lusatias were organized as separate margravates. Subsequently, Lusatia was changing hands among the Silesian princes, the Brandenburg Margrave and the rulers of Bohemia. In 1319 it was given to Bohemia and with the exception of the years 1478-1490 when it was governed by the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus, Lusatia constituted part of the Czech Crown up to 1635 when it was repossessed by Saxony with the exception of the counties of Storkow and Cottbus (Choše buz) which had belonged to Brandenburg since 1571/1575 and 1426 respectively. By the Congress of Vienna (1815) the whole of Lower Lusatia and the half of Upper

\textsuperscript{200} There were also plans to bring Swedes, Estonians, Finns, Byelorussians, Germans from Hungary and even Chinese to boost the Upper Silesian employee pool depleted by the 1880s and 1890s restrictions imposed on Polish and Polish-speaking workers from outside Germany (Schofer, 1974: 24).
Lusatia were given to Prussia. Thus the Lower Lusatian counties of Lübben (Lubin), Lübbenau (Lukow), Calau (Kalawa), Cottbus (Chošebeuz), Spremberg (Grodk), Guben (Gubin) and Sorau (Zary, Žary) became part of the Frankfurt an der Oder Regency within the Province of Brandenburg, whereas Prussian Upper Lusatia was divided into the counties of Sagan (Zagań, Žagań), Görlitz (Zgorzelec, Zhorjelc), Rothenburg (Rózbork) and Hoyerswerda (Wojercy). The first three were included in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency, whereas the county of Hoyerwerda (Wojercy) was transferred from Brandenburg to the Regency in 1825 (Stüttgen, 1976: 119). Moreover, another Upper Lusatian county of Bad Liebenwerda (Rukow) was incorporated in the Merseburg Regency within the Prussian Province of Saxony. The southern part of Upper Lusatia remained with the diminished Kingdom of Saxony, i.e. the counties of Kamenz (Kamjenc), Bautzen (Budyšin) and Löbau (Lubji) were included in the District of Bautzen (Budyšin) (Anon., 1908: 745; Anon., 1984: 812; Cygański, 1995: 15-61, 114; Jaworski, 1995: 7; Mincer, 1995: 63).

With the gradual disappearance of the Polabian (Elbe) Slavs between the Elbe and the Oder (Odra) due to assimilation with the Germans, the Sorbs preserved their identity inhabiting a marshy region of slight appeal to German settlers. Moreover, the three-century long incorporation of Lusatia within the Czech Crown discouraged the use of German in favor of Latin and Slavic languages. Thus the first document written in Sorbian (or more exactly in Lower Sorbian) dates back to the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries. At that time Sorbian was consistently spoken in the Lower and Upper Lusatian countryside (Cygański, 1995: 32/33), i.e. also across the Oder (Odra) and Neisse (Nysa) to the Bober (Bóbr) in the east and the Pleiske (Pliszka) in the north. So the territory coincided with the western reaches of the Crossen (Krosno) and Sagan (Zagań) principalities (Cygański, 1995: 32), however, it must be remembered that at that time most of the territory belonged to Brandenburg in the north and Bohemia (and since 1635 to Saxony) in the south. The Silesian principality of Sagan (Zagań) was left just with a narrow salient which reached the Neisse (Nysa) and expanded westward in the three small enclaves (Jähnig, 1991: 74/75; 86/87; Ladogórski, 1966a), which altogether supported the minuscule Sorbian population of about 900 in 1787 (Ladogórski, 1966: 59). According the 17th-century Catholic sources lingua Wandalica (i.e. Sorbian) was spoken in the Lower Silesian counties of Grünberg (Zielona Góra), Sorau (Zory) and Sagan (Zagań), while in the 18th century there were still five Sorbian villages in the community of Priebus (Przewóz). However, at the same time it is possible that in Brandenburg’s Crossen (Krosno) principality Sorbs might constitute 85 per cent of its population against 12 per cent going to Germans and 3.5 to Polish-speaking populace (Maleczyński, 1963: 27). Altogether because Lusatia was cut by the important Central European transportation routes from Guben (Gubin) to Magdeburg and from Görlitz (Zgorzelec) to Leipzig, as well as the waterways of the Spree, Elbe and Oder (Odra)-Neisse (Nysa) the German influence began to be felt quite distinctly here, especially in the cities and was intensified by the ongoing continued conflict between Saxony and Brandenburg which in the 1850s strove to dominate Lusatia in order to further their strategic interests (Jaworski, 1995a: 13, 17). The rapid diminishing of the area where Sorbian was spoken could not be offset by the Lower Sorbian translation of the New Testament (1548) and the publication of the first Lower Sorbian hymnal with Luther’s Small Catechism (1574) and the Upper Sorbian Bible (1728) as the Protestant and Catholic Churches tended to limit ecclesiastical use of Sorbian. Moreover, Reformation and the Counter-Reformation which left Lower Lusatia Protestant and Upper Lusatia Catholic could not facilitate common confessional activities which would extend to the whole Sorbian population. Still the inner divisions of the Sorbian ethnie were exacerbated by political divisions though a modicum though Protestantism contributed to the development of the feeling of own ethnic distinctiveness among the educated and more influential Sorbs. In the 17th and 18th centuries the role of Lusatian estates was limited in favor of the absolutist rule of Saxony and Brandenburg. Hence, Germanization of the Sorbian nobility and bourgeoisie progressed more quickly as more decisions narrowing the use of Sorbian in governance, education and publications were issued while, on the other hand, German settlers were attracted to Lower Lusatia especially by Friedrich II. In consequence, Sorbian stopped to be spoken in northern and

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201 It survived in a manuscript only and was published in 1967 (Cygański, 1995: 35).
eastern Lower Lusatia. The process was mitigated by the commercial and educational contacts of the Sorbs with Wielkopolska and Bohemia as well as thanks the spread of Enlightenment. In the second half of the 18th century quite a few Sorbian books and handbooks were published and three Sorbian periodicals appeared in 1766, 1790 and 1809-1812, which heralded the beginning of the Sorbian national movement (Cygański, 1995: 34-51, 59-61). To reiterate: the written version of Sorbian came into being in the 16th and 17th centuries before the two literary standards: Lower and Upper Sorbian were forged in the 18th century (Lewaszkiewicz, 1995: 105).

After the new division of Lusatia between Saxony and Prussia in 1815 c. 20 per cent of the Sorbs were left with the former, and c. 80 per cent passed under the Prussian rule (Jaworski, 1995a: 17) which amounted to 50,000 in Saxony and 200,000 in Prussia (Cygański, 1995: 62) in 1840 to 24,000 and 96,000, respectively (Bensykiewicz, 1995: 114). The total number of the Sorbs was estimated at 160,000 (including 150,000 Protestants and 10,000 Catholics) in 1884 (Cygański, 1995: 123). The wide discrepancy between the figures may be explained by the fact that the numbers from 1815 and 1884 come from Sorbian authors whereas the 1840 estimate was produced by Saxon and Prussian civil services. Thus it is clear that both the Prussian and Saxon states aimed at assimilating their Sorbian populations but Sorbian nationalists strove to preclude such a possibility. In regard to the Province of Silesia, in the 1840s, it supported the Sorbian population of c. 30-35 thousand, which was concentrated in the counties of Rothenburg (Rózbork) (14,000), Hoyerswerda (Wojercy) (16,000) and Görlitz (Zgorzelec, Zhorjelc), with some tens of individuals in the counties of Lauban (Lubań) and Bunzlau (Boleslawiec). By 1890 the total Sorbian population in Silesia had decreased to a little over 26,000, and to mere 16,693 in 1925. At that time the Silesian Sorbs could be found only in the counties of Rothenburg (Rózbork) (11,232) and Hoyerswerda (Wojercy) (15,110) (Kokot, 1973: 75). Administrative autonomy of Upper and Lower Lusatias was liquidated in the 1830s. The decision was somewhat more slowly implemented in Saxony whose liberal constitution retained some estate and traditional privileges whereas the modernizing reforms in Prussia fully replaced the old structures with the institutions of the new organization of the state (Cygański, 1995: 62/63). The 1848 revolution gave a boost to the Sorbian national movement, as to other national movements all over Europe, but its development was hindered by industrial revolution especially based on exploitation of brown coal. The industry attracted large numbers of workers from all over Germany, after the country came into being in 1871, decreasing the percentage of the Sorbian population in relation to the total population of Lusatia (Jaworski, 1995a: 14). Thus by 1884 the area where Sorbian was spoken shrank west of the Neisse (Nysa) and extended in the form of the 40 km-wide strap from Bautzen (Budyšin) to Cottbus (Chošebuz). In the 1890s the improved economic situation in Lusatia led to lesser support for Panslavism, autonomy or independence, and the majority of Sorbian organizations expressed their loyalty to Prussia and Germany. The moment got radicalized before the outbreak of World War I. The economic and social situation worsened due to prolonged warfare which contributed to such separatist demands as: a union of Lusatia with Bohemia or independence for a Sorbian Lusatia. The demands were scaled down into the direction of a cultural autonomy, but the voice of the Sorbs was not heard by the big powers or the League of Nations. At the beginning of the 1920s the Sorbian nationalists turned to socialist ideas and consequently alienated majority of the Sorbs. In the interwar period, in absence of help from the German state the Sorbian movement drew on Czechoslovak subsidies and loans infuriating the German authorities afraid of disloyalty especially in the light of the widespread thesis about the encirclement of Silesia by the Slavs. According to it, the Poles and Czechs who took large slices of Upper Silesia after World War I, could use the Sorbs as a kind of an ethnic bridge to cut off Silesia from Germany, and, subsequently, to obliterate the land by dividing it between Poland and Czechoslovakia (Broz ek, 1966a: 101-119). Thus propelled anti-minority policy of Hitler (1933-1945) largely suppressed the Sorbs and their language (Cygański, 1995: 114, 148, 153, 175/176, 186-189) which is clearly seen in the case of Silesia, where according to the official statistics there were only 7,451 Sorbs left in 1939 (Kokot, 1973: 75).

The presentation of the situation and geographical distribution of the Sorbian ethnic group in Lusatia and Silesia crosses the time limit of the chapter set on the year 1848 since the Sorbs are not central to the work and not much more place is devoted to them on the farther pages. However, they
reappear as a background to the development of the ethnic and national situation in Silesia, thus the author hopes that the above information is helpful in pursuing the argument of the study in a clear manner, without having to resort to breaking the narration with some sidelights on Lusatia and its inhabitants.

Having dealt with the outside ethnic and linguistic influences on Silesia, now the attention of the work turns to the principal issues responsible for the overall ethnic and linguistic characteristic of the land which came into being through a complicated interplay of Polish, German and Czech elements.

The process of German settlement of Silesia and incorporation of the land in the Holy Roman Empire, which resulted in the profound ethnic, cultural and economic changes, has often been presented by Slavic sources as a one-thousand-year-old, planned and unrelenting Germanizing effort epitomized in the icon of Drang nach Osten (cf. Marvey, 1943). Such a picture instilled in the minds of the Czechs and Poles by schooling and mass media, is false in this respect that it promotes the picture of history customized to the needs and aims of Polish and Czech national movements. National leaders and parties appropriate history in order to create nations which in this way are made to appear as primordial. On the other hand, current conflicts largely induced by clashing nationalisms are also primordialized giving the beginning to great myths of injustice. It is purported by one national movement that such injustices have been continuously done to its nation by neighbor nations, which, now, allows to turn all its hatred against them. Such a nationalistic presentation or rather manipulation of history allows to mobilize vast masses of nationals who have been indoctrinated to believe the doctrine and act in accordance with it. In this manner, the nation-state may turn all the might of its citizenry against another nation-state with a minimal amount of disloyalty on the part of its subjects who tend not to ask questions as primordial hatred toward neighbor nation states is natural and self-explicable. There is no way out from this vendetta-like vicious circle, if one questions logic of the ideology one is against one’s nation which is one big family; but one should not betray one’s family even if its aims do not coincide with individual goals. One must sacrifice oneself for the sake of one’s nation which is presented as one’s family. Hence, the nation state is vitally interested in maintaining general belief in such myths because they largely constitute the ideology of nationalism and guarantee its efficiency.

Because it is also the case with the issue of German settlement in Silesia, it is necessary to analyze this medieval phenomenon from the ethnic and linguistic points of view which are obviously overexposed by national historiographies at the cost of other aspects of life such as economic and religious, which used to be of far vital importance for pre-national societies than ethnicity (Armstrong, 1982: 4/5).

Around 1000 the population of Silesia is estimated at c. 250,000 and grew to c. 330,000 in the second half of the 12th century, i.e. in the period prior to the inflow of settlers from West Europe (Maleczyński, 1960: 159). Immigration to the province swelled especially after the Mongol troops had ravaged Silesia in 1241, and lasted unabated until the mid-14th century. The colonization concentrated mainly in the Lower Silesian lowland forests, which clearly shows that there could not be an economic conflict between the locals and the newcomers, as the latter settled in the largely uninhabited regions of the land, while merchants who settled in towns and cities facilitated development of the Silesian economy along the Western guidelines (Maleczyński, 1960:246). This brought more revenue in tax money for the Silesian princes, Church and the entrepreneurs responsible for attracting the settlers from the West. Thus the phenomenon, in its various aspects, must have been viewed positively by majority of the Silesians. Moreover, because the first wave of settlers had come during a century and a half, it was not sudden and allowed the locals to get used to the new situation, especially when many existing Polish and Czech-speaking villages and towns were reorganized in accordance with the German municipal law giving the locals the same rights and privileges which were enjoyed by the settlers. Thus, the social and legal organization of the province was simultaneously overhauled, homogenized and made compatible with the Western European solutions.
The question arises if there was a communication barrier between the locals and the settlers. But such an approach is anachronistic as it presupposes, in accordance with the tenet of modern national thinking, that the basis of a community and its polity within which it is organized, is a common language; and that there always is a tension when creation of a community consisting from individuals speaking incomprehensible languages is attempted. It is a fallacy, as we know that the usual situation for an individual is when one speaks many languages not just one which is the standard of the nation-states in modern Europe. Moreover, mutual comprehension may be guaranteed by a *lingua franca* or the fleeting forms of pidgin developing on the spur of moment in usually commercial situations which demand from the participants of radically different linguistic backgrounds to communicate effectively. A *lingua franca* may a widely-known language or a pidgin. Pidgin is a highly adaptable and thus changeable, amalgamate of two or more languages. It disappears when the situation, which caused it to come into being, occurs no more while prolonged use of pidgin coupled with the growing number of social contexts in which it is spoken leads to its creolization. In brief, a creole is a pidgin which became a mother tongue to some populace (Crystal, 1987: 334-339; McArthur, 1992: 270-272, 778-781).

In Silesia as elsewhere in Central and West Europe Latin was the *lingua franca*. For the people of the Middle Ages it played a role comparable to English today. Latin with the active support of the Catholic Church, assured homogeneity of West Christian ecumene within which it was possible to move rather freely without coming across daunting cultural or legal differences. In a way the present-day dream of an integrated Europe based on the principle of free movement of goods, persons, capital and services was there as borders of medieval political entities were not the multilayered and strictly guarded frontiers of the nation-sates. Hence, the Silesian clergy and authorities as well as the entrepreneurs organizing coming of settlers could communicate in Latin and shared the same Christian culture. Certainly, knowledge of Latin was rather limited among the poor city dwellers and peasants but there was always a neighbor who could interpret between a German-speaking Silesian and his Polish-speaking counterpart (Dralle, 1991: 101). It is also possible to infer that some forms of Polish-German pidgin must have appeared (as it is recorded in the 17th/18th centuries (Dlugoborski, 1966: 399)) but we have no clear record of them due to the fact that exclusively Latin was used for writing then whereas the two vernaculars as others in Europe were limited only to the oral context. Perhaps some of the Polish-German pidgins got creolized and through the process of relexicalization contributed to the rise of various Silesian dialects of German and Polish.

It seems that colonization of Silesia was not the only factor responsible for the dramatic alteration of its linguistic and ethnic characteristic as it is simplistically claimed by some German and Polish scholars. According to the rather high estimates c. 150,000 German-speaking peasants had arrived to Silesia by the mid-14th century (Maleczyński, 1960: 253) which could not too easily alter the linguistic customs of the Slavic inhabitants of Silesia who were twice as numerous in the mid-11th century. So rather less than one-third of the Silesian population of c. 490,000 in the mid-14th century (Kokot, 1973: 71) should have been of Germanic ethnic origin. However, the Silesian princes maintaining strong dynastic contacts with German courts since the first half of the 12th century got quite Germanized. So they attracted German-speaking chivalry, artists, craftsmen and bureaucrats. Consequently, German became the court language in the Silesian principalities and the development was paralleled in the majority of Lower Silesian monasteries and churches where. For instance, the German-speaking Cistercians who established a network of their monasteries in Silesia in the 12th and 13th centuries tended to accept German-speakers into novitiate as not to lose the German-

202 After a period of separate existence a creole/pidgin may come into an intensive contact with one of its parent languages, and thus it disappears having been engulfed by, i.e. relexicalized into such a language. Certainly, it is possible that some speakers of a creole/pidgin start speaking one parent language while others another one. A creole/pidgin may also be lexicalized into a third language which was not its parent language. In all the cases though, creole/pidgin elements linger in the speech of the creole/pidgin-speakers as well as in the speech of their children, and in this manner add to the dialectical variation of the languages spoken by ex-creole/pidgin-speakers and their offspring.
speaking character of their convents (Lukas, 1990: 1). Moreover, because the German-speaking colonizers were settled in territorially continuous groups (Snoch, 1991:104) the Church, in accordance with the decisions of the Fourth Lateran Synod of 1215, catered for them in German (Menzel, 1993: 5). The growing status of German *vis-a-vis* official Latin, stabilized the stance of the former especially in Lower Silesia. The position of German in Silesia, was further fortified when the province was subjugated by Bohemia in the first half of the 14th century, because then Silesia, as a part of the Czech Crown, was included within the predominantly German-speaking Holy Roman Empire simultaneously losing the last political links with the Polish Kingdom which officially relinquished its claims to the land, and turned its attention to eastward expansion which left the Polish-German border stable until the time of partitions in the second half of the 18th century.

The linguistic change facilitated by the aforementioned factors came at a slow pace attracting a growing number of Polish-speakers to learn German. Eventually, the Silesian courts, Church and urban patriciate became German-speaking especially in Lower Silesia while the plebs and peasants with no many opportunities of social/spatial mobility, tended to remain entrenched in their respective linguistic environments. Sometimes meeting or coming to terms with the others bred discontent but such cases were limited to individuals or some institutions and as such cannot be compared with national conflicts mobilizing through slogans and stereotypes generalized hatred of one ethnic group against another. Moreover, any conflict which could arise then through the use of different languages was moderated by Latin as the official language. Thus, only as late as 1327 it was mentioned that translating decisions of the Breslau (Wroclaw) princes from Latin to German creates confusion, so that, later, the prince issued documents in German. Also in that year German was introduced as an official language in courts when debt cases were adjudicated. Thus, it started slowly replacing Latin in non-ecclesiastical official contexts in the second half of the 14th (Maleczyński, 1960: 252/253). The process was not so visible in Upper Silesia which was less developed only with the population of 130,000 in the mid-14th century against 360,000 inhabitants of Lower Silesia (Kokot, 1973: 71). The Polish Gniezno (Gnesen) Archbishop Jakub Swinka disliked these developments especially in the case of maintaining the German character of Silesian monasteries, and he appealed the Holy See against the practice in 1285 (Anon., 1984a: 327; Dralle, 1991: 175). They were hindered by such decision as this one of 1331 when the Breslau bishop announced that only teachers with a sound command of Polish can teach at Silesian schools (Maleczyński, 1960: 485/486). However, the lack of linguistic or ethnic-based conflict was the prevalent situation (Maleczyński, 1960: 292), and if such controversies arose they were solved in a way to please both the sides, e.g.: in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Lent disagreement of 1248, the legate decided that the Polish and German Lent rituals are equal and of the same relevance (Menzel, 1993: 5).

Sometimes it is attempted to present the Hussite Wars as an early ethnic conflict which is a gross simplification popularized by the 19th and 20th-century Czech national movement which appropriated this event in order to promote its anti-German policies as the basis for reaffirming the border between the German and Czech ethinies. Without such a border, a mental line differentiating between us and them nationalism would not be possible (Armstrong, 1982: 6-9). However, the Hussite Wars (1919-1436) should not be interpreted from such an anachronic point of view. The movement was predated by the 1409 humiliation of the three non-Czech gentes who chose to leave the Prague University. It considered only a small number of students and had nothing to do with nations as they did not exist then, unless political nations are meant. Moreover, the decision not unlike the wars were more influenced by religious issues than anything else, and confessional cleavages did not coincide with the ethnic lines. Although it is simplistically said that the Hussites were Czechs and their opponents, it is well-known that there were German-speakers among the former, and that the Hussites fought against Catholic forces irrespectively of their ethnic provenance. Some effects of the wars may look as ethnically-motivated but the fact that Bohemian cities became more Czech-speaking due to depopulation and the flight of the German-speaking bourgeoisie to safer areas, proves only that the richer strata are more mobile and tend to curb economic losses incurred by warfare by moving away their businesses (Anon., 1990i: 312; Anon. 1990h: 313; Hemmerle, 1992: 209). Thus with the decrease in the number of German-speakers in Bohemia the status of the Czech language was
upgraded opening the way for its dominance in the lands of the Czech Crown, which was specially visible in Upper Silesia where Czech was used as the official language for over two centuries.

The Hussite Wars stopped the advance of the German language and culture in Silesia and caused re-Slavicization of parts of Lower Silesia and consolidation of the Slavic character of Upper Silesia, which was a reflection of war damages to the Silesian economy and depopulation\textsuperscript{203} brought about migrations and heavy death toll wreaked by the warfare, and subsequent epidemics (1438, 1460) and famines (1431, 1456, 1472) (Kiersnowski, 1977: 20/21; Snoch, 1991: 61). With the close of the wars in 1443 one fifth of arable land was left uncultivated in central Silesia, and in some villages even half of it. The results of the warfare were still felt in the 16th century as the population amounted only to 80-85 per cent of its prewar state in the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese’s land in central Silesia or even to 60 per cent in the border county of Militsch (Milicz). The economy was reinvigorated by renewed colonization which regained its lost momentum in the 16th century. Not many new settlements came into being in the fertile lowland part of Silesia where only depleted population was boosted up with the newcomers. However, this colonization led to peopling of the marshy Silesian-Wielkopolska borderland, the Sudets with the Kladsko (Glatz, Klodzko) Margravate and the Carpathians including its only Silesian range the Silesian Beskids, where the first Highlander (Wallachian) villages (among others Istebne (Istebna)) were established prior to 1577. At that time the population of Silesia amounted to 1,270,000 whereas in the mid-16th century Breslau (Wroclaw) housed 23,000 people and could not be matched by any town in Poland (Maleczyński, 1961: 11/12, 15, 17/18). By the 18th century the not very hospitable regions of Silesia at the feet of the Sudets and the Carpathians had become most densely populated as agriculture, mining and textile industry concentrated there (Komaszyski, 1966). The growth of population and economic output began to support more sophisticated economy and bureaucracy. After 1526 when Silesia with the other Czech lands became a hereditary territory of the Habsburgs, the position of German as the other official language of Silesia, by still dominating Latin, became more pronounced before its dominance was sealed after the defeat of the Czech nobility in the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 which degraded the Czech language to the level of a mere vernacular during the next two centuries.

Before the introduction of modern censuses in the 19th century there were no comprehensive data sources which would enable the researcher to exactly pinpoint the extent of dominance of German and Slavic languages in Silesia. Moreover, bearing in mind the above remarks on dangerous simplifications generated by cartographic presentations, and the fact that the idea of unilinguality is quite modern; it must be understood that any estimates of the linguistic situation in Silesia prior to the 19th century may reflect more their authors national biases than any historical reality\textsuperscript{204}. However, at least in broad terms, the question must be dealt with in order to sketch the early linguistic pattern of Silesia. Enea Silvio de Piccolomini (1405-1464) later Pope Pius II, assessed the language pattern of Silesia writing in the 34th chapter of his \textit{Europa}, entitled De Silesia provincia that German

\textsuperscript{203} The occurrence of the Black Death in Silesia in the second half of the 14th century was not so devastating as in West Europe. Thus the serious epidemics which took place in 1348-1350, 1360, 1371-1372 and the earlier one of 1317 did not withhold growth of the Silesian population (Kiersnowski, 1977: 20/21; Kinder, 1978: I 154; Snoch, 1991: 61).

\textsuperscript{204} For instance, the statement that in 1315 there could be c. 300,000 German-speakers in the total Silesian population of 430,000 (Lubos, 1995: I/1: 24), can be easily reversed by Polish scholars that at that time there were 300,000 speakers but of Polish. In such an academic-cum-political strife one often forgets that contacts between two radically different languages are not a zero-sum game. Closely related languages change from one into another through a continuum of dialects; and in the cases of prolonged contacts between two radically different languages the dialectal continuum is emulated by a continuum consisting from various pidgin/creole forms, and by bi- or multilinguality. Thus regarding the above number, it would be more realistic to say that the majority of the Silesian population had to deal with foreign language contexts, and did it with different degrees of competence demanded by these usually oral-exchange situations. Hardly anything more can be deduced about the linguistic situation in Silesia unless vast medieval archives devoted to language questions are discovered which is most unlikely, because religion and philosophy were the areas of intellectual effort in the Middle Ages, not nationality, ethnicity and identity with which modern social sciences are so much preoccupied.
predominated west of the Oder (Odra), and Polish east of the river (Lubos, 1995: I/1: 68). This overgeneralization which remained popular by 1945, was corrected by the Silesian geographer Bartholomäus Stein who in 1512 considered the Oder (Odra) combined with the Glatzer Neisse (Klodzka Nysa) a better division of the extent of both the languages. Obviously there were some Polish-speaking settlements west of the line as some German-speaking ones east of it (Maleczyński, 1961: 21/22). If one is to imagine the southernmost spread of Polish/northernmost spread of German in Silesia in the terms of border towns the line should run through: Löwen (Lewin Brzeski), Brieg (Brzeg), Strehhau (Strzelen), Breslau (Wrocław), Wohlau (Wólów), Gruhau (Góra), Glogau (Głogów), Neusalz (Nowa Sól) and Grünberg (Zielona Góra) (Ladogórski, 1971: 317). In the 17th century the line shifted a little to the north and east and can be visualized as going through the following localities: Matzkirch (Maciówkrze), Schönau (Szonów), Parmsen (Pręzyńa), Falkenberg (Niemodlin), Dambrau (Dąbrówka Niemodlińska), Norok (Wolfsgrund, Narok), Stoberau (Stobrawa), Brieg (Brzeg), Ohlau (Olawa), Strethlen (Strzelen), Breslau (Wrocław) Trebnitz (Trzebnica) and Trachenberg (Zmigrod) (Lesiuk, 1992: 82). However, there were still islets with a sizeable percentage of Polish-speakers around Grünberg (Zielona Góra), and west of Breslau (Wroclaw) and Strehtau (Strzelen) while areas inhabited predominantly by German-speaking settlers appeared east of the line around Wirschkwowitz (Hochweiler, Wierzchowice), Kostenthal (Gościęcin), Schönwal (Bojków, Szywald) and Bielitz (Bielsko) (Ladogórski, 1963). After the Prussian conquest of Silesia in 1741, the planned colonization creates numerous German-speaking islets in Upper Silesia, and the birth of modern state with intensified exchange of non-contextual written information contributes to the heightened importance of German as the official language of the Prussian Kingdom. Thus at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries the line dividing the areas with the predominant numbers of German and Polish-speakers moves farther eastward and can be visualized as running through: Deutsch Neukirch (Altstett, Nowa Cerekwia), Bauерwitz (Baborów), Zühl (Biala), Falkenberg (Niemodlin), Brieg (Brzeg), Ohlau (Olawa), Namslau (Namysłów) and Militsch (Milicz). There were, of course, many Polish-speaking islets remaining west of Ohlau (Olawa), around Trachenberg (Zmigrod), and still in the vicinity of Grünberg (Zielona Góra) (Kokot, 1973: 16/17; Ladogórski, 1966).

Now it can be asked if there were any conscious language policies pursued in the prenational era, which aimed at diminishing the area where Polish was spoken in Silesia as it is claimed by some Polish scholars who strive to explain the eastward shift of the Polish-German line. The opinion that Polish is an incomprehensible and low language of deaf people205 was recorder as early as the first half of the 15th century by Abbot Ludolf of the Augustinian monastery at Sagan (Zagań). Since then the bias had become quite entrenched especially among the educated who had no command of Polish. For instance, in Baroque it is repeated by renowned late Baroque German Silesian poet Johann Christian Günther (1635-1697)206. The very first exemplar of official policy striving to regulate language use is provided by the decision of the Breslaü (Wroclaw) Bishop Johannes IV Roth, who, in 1495, ordered that the inhabitants of the village Woitz (Eichenau, Wójcice) should learn German and stop using the foreign language of Polish under the threat of banishment207. There were, of course, many Polish-speaking islets remaining west of Ohlau (Olawa), around Trachenberg (Zmigrod), and still in the vicinity of Grünberg (Zielona Góra) (Kokot, 1973: 16/17; Ladogórski, 1966).

205 This negative feeling about Polish as the domain of the barbaric other, was clearly reflected in the Slavs approach to German whose users they dubbed as Niemcy in Polish or Němci in Czech, which means the dumb.
206 The negative opinion about Polish expressed by some German-speaking Silesians is paralleled by renowned Polish writer Lukasz Górnicki (1527-1603, who was born in the Silesian principality of Auschwitz (Oswiecim) which was incorporated into the Polish Kingdom in 1564) who was against the Czech influence in Polish (Lubos, 1974: III 478).
207 There is no information on the final result of the action or carrying out of the punitive measure. It may be inferred that in absence of any comprehensive school system for serfs and peasants let alone language education, the effort must have largely failed, and that banishment of no or very few persons was proceeded because at that time the number of serfs was directly related to the economic output a landowner could get from his property. Probably, the Polish-speaking peasants of the village managed to learn some German responses to usual communications they were getting from the ecclesiastical administration and direct overseers in the limited range of formal situation.
Breslau (Wroclaw) chapter. Yes, the bishop introduced some restrictive policies pertaining to language and ethnicity, but, firstly, they were not consistently pursued by his successors; secondly, they were territorially and institutionally limited to the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop's principality of Neisse (Nysa) and the most significant offices of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Church; and, thirdly, the Polish church also introduced similar limitations to non-Polish candidates to cathedral chapters (Dralle, 1991: 101; Kokot, 1973: 18; Lubos, 1974: III 478). However, in the Polish capital of Cracow German was still spoken in the 16th and 17th centuries as in other towns of Malopolska and Wielkopolska with sizeable German settlements. Even in Lwów (Lemberg, Lvov, Lviv) there were Holy Masses celebrated in German until the end of the 16th century, and the language survived in some villages at the feet of the Carpathians in the 18th century (Kołodziej, 1992: 1, 3). So without denying some conflicts arising during the decisions on granting an official status to this or that vernacular, it must be remembered that they were limited to a handful of single cases, and that the whole situation was moderated by continued use of Latin, which in turn fostered inviting environment for multilinguality at least up to the 18th century which heralded the coming of the modern state and industrialization to Central Europe and Silesia.

Before having a look at the emergence of the policy of unilinguality which later led to inextricable intertwining of nationalism and language in Central Europe, it is worthwhile to have a glance at the character of Silesian multilinguality. The very first Polish sentence was jotted down in Silesia by a German Cistercian in the 13th century Liber fundationis claustri Sanctae Mariae Virginis in Heinrichow (The Book of the Foundation of the Holy Virgin Mary Monastery in Heinrichau (Henryków)). Notably, it was uttered by a Czech-speaking Silesian to his Polish-speaking wife which aptly reflects the multifaceted ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity of Silesia (Lukas, 1990: VIII; Snoch, 1991: 71). Beginning with the mid-13th century Latin religious songs began to be translated into Polish and German (Snoch, 1991: 81) and first German manuscripts of pharmacopoeias and Latin-German glossaries appear at that time (Schulz, 1991: 2). The tradition of Minnässingers developed in Germany in the 12th century spread to Silesia a century later and resulted in German poetry of Heinrich von Pressela who is identified with the Breslau (Wroclaw) prince Heinrich (Henryk) III or IV (Lubos, 1995: I/1: 26/27). Witelo (Erasmus Witelo, Vitellio), who was born c. 1220-1230 in the area between Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wroclaw) and became the medieval authority on optics thanks to his Perspectiva (1270) did not have any qualms about saying that he belonged to gentes polonica et germanica (Kloskowska, 1996: 235; Lubos, 1995: I/1 53). Nikolaus (Mikolaj) of Kosel (Kożle) (1385-1431) wrote in Latin, Czech and German. He also recorded the oldest frivolous Polish song (Lubos, 1995: I/1: 43; Zielonka, 1994: 137). The Psalterz floriański/Florianer Psalter (St. Florian Psalter) is the oldest Polish manuscript found in Silesia. It was probably composed in the Kladsko (Glatz, Klodzko) Margravate at the close of the 14th century or in the first half of the 15th century. Notably, besides Polish texts it also includes parts in Latin and German (Lubos, 1974: III 478). Johann Gutenberg had mastered the movable type by the mid-15th century and the new technology was quickly transplanted to Silesia which resulted in the publication of the first Polish text. It was printed at Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1475 in the work entitled Statuti synnodalis episcopi Conradi (The Synodal Statutes of Bishop Conrad). Among other items in Latin a section of the book was devoted to parallel text of basic prayers in Latin, German and Polish. In this manner all the subsequent Breslau (Wroclaw) printing shops were trilingual, and some Upper Silesian presses

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208 Warsaw became the seat of the royal court and the central authorities of the Polish Kingdom only in 1611.
209 His opinion was given a more sophisticated edge by the German printer from Cracow, Hieronymus Viertor (Büttner), who in 1541 said that he was a Pole by the virtue of abode but not a born Pole (Rogall, 1993: 27). In these words he expressed the idea of naturalization which proves so useful, nowadays, in extending citizenship to foreign nationals.
210 The book’s present title is derived from the fact that it was found in the Augustinian monastery of St. Florian near Linz, Austria (Lubos, 1974: III 479).
211 The text of the Statutes was composed in a manuscript form by the Breslau (Wroclaw) Bishop and Oels (Oles’nica) Prince Konrad in 1446 (Maleczyński, 1961: 458; Scheuermann, 1994: I 99).
published works even in four languages including Czech (Menzel, 1993: 5; Zielonka, 1994: 305). In the 15th and 16th centuries many scholarly books were published in German and Latin. Olbrycht Strumiński (1540-1602) from Mysłowicz (Myslowice) wrote the first such Silesian book in Polish, it considered fish ponds and was published in 1573 at Kraków (Snoch, 1991: 81; Zielonka, 1994: 179). Walenty Rożdżenieński from Rosdzin (Rożdżeń) wrote an unusual Polish poem on mining and metal smelting which was published in 1612 also at Kraków (Snoch, 1991: 81; Zielonka, 1994: 246). Moreover, the preserved municipal books of Woischnik (Woźniki) were written in Polish since 1521, as well as some guild books from Falkenberg (Niemodlin) (1512-1514), Gross Wartenberg (Syców) (1559) and Kreuzburg (Kluczborz) (1583). In the 16th century, due to the development of the Polish language for official purposes along Latin in the Polish Kingdom, many documents were issued in this language by the chancellery of the Oppeln (Opole) prince (Maleczyński, 1961: 461/462) besides others in Latin, Czech and German. From the renowned figures of German culture who came from Silesia of that period, one should enumerate world-renowned mystic Jakob Böhme (1575-1624) from Görlitz (Zgorzelec)\(^{212}\), known German lyricist Johannes Heermann (1585-1646) from Raudten (Rudna), and the picturesque figure of Martin Opitz\(^{213}\) (1597-1639) from Bnizu (Boleslawiec). As it can be inferred from their birth places the writers who used German came from Lower Silesia while these who used Polish from Upper Silesia, and especially its eastern part which belonged to the Kraków diocese up to 1821. Also in the light of the earlier remarks on the use of the Czech language in Upper Silesia, it should be added here that the art of modern printing developed in the Bohemian Kingdom as early as in Silesia. The first press was installed in 1468 at Plzeň (Pilsen) and was followed by further ones which among other cities were placed also at Olomouc (Olomütz). The city as the center of the diocese to which the southern reaches of Upper Silesia as well the Moravian enclaves spread in the land belonged, provided the regions with first documents printed in Czech. A similar situation developed in the Kladsko (Glatz, Klodzko) Margravate which was contained within the Prague diocese. Hussitism which emphasized the use of a language intelligible to a given populace contributed to the rapid growth of writing and printing in Czech along Latin and German. The Bible was translated into Czech by Protestants (1579-1593) and published at Kralice (Kralitz) in Moravia but this significant event did not lead to a bigger number of works published in this language as after the defeat at White Mountain (1620) Czech culture was supplanted with texts in Latin and German (Anon., 1990k: 422; Čornej, 1993: 197; Čornejova, 1993: 249/250). Subsequently, the official Czech of Upper Silesia was limited to documents only\(^{214}\).

Economic and cultural decline of Silesia brought about by the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) also caused depopulation of the province, aggravated by the concurrent epidemics and famines of 1625, 1630, 1633, 1693 and 1696 (Snoch, 1991: 61). The number of Silesia’s inhabitants fell down by one third from 1.5 to 1 mln (Snoch, 1991: 158). Consequently, influence of the German language was hindered for several decades before the Silesian economy and administration was reconstructed. However, with the gradual withdrawal of Czech from official contexts following the defeat of the Czech political nation at the Battle of White Mountain in 1621, German became the unrivaled second official language of the Holy Roman Empire along Latin. The political change tilting the language

\(^{212}\) At that time Görlitz (Zgorzelec) was not part of Silesia but Lusatia, but the region is aptly dubbed as a Lusatian-Silesian borderland, and due to the fact German scholars consider Böhme to be a Silesian writer (cf. Lubos, 1995: I/1 127/128; Schulz, 1991: 8/9).

\(^{213}\) As mentioned in earlier chapters, he strongly contributed to upgrading German from the level of vernacular to the official status of Latin in the field of poetical endeavor. He wrote in Latin and German, and translated from Italian and Polish. He travelled widely in the Holy German Empire, the Netherlands, sojourned in Transylvania and served as the court historiographer of the Polish King Władysław IV (Kotarski, 1994: 37-46).

\(^{214}\) Notably, Jan Amos Komenský (John Amos Comenius) (1592-1670), born at Uherský Brod (Ungarisch Brod) in southern Moravia, belonged to the Moravian brethren and was active as a minister at Fulnek (Fulnek) (placed in a Moravian salient thrust against Opava (Troppau, Opawa) Silesia) until 1621 when his property and library was seized by the imperial forces and he emigrated. He wrote in Latin, Czech and German. He lived in Wielkopolska, England, Hungary and the Netherlands where he died at Naarden (Anon., 1990l: 35; Thorne, 1975: 301/302).
relations in Silesia in favor of German seems to have been facilitated by Reformation and the Counter-Reformation during which the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* was forged. Observing implementation of the rule it may be said that in some cases it was appended by the third clause *eius lingua* (Maleczyński, 1963: 405). The Peace of Westphalia (1648) left Silesia the only confessionally heterogeneous province of the Habsburg lands with Lower Silesia largely Protestant and Upper Silesia Catholic. This simplification was superimposed on another generalization which held that Upper Silesia was a Polish land whereas Lower Silesia a German one. Using this equation 19th and 20th-century Polish and German nationalists claimed that the Silesian Protestant was simply a German and his Catholic counterpart a Pole. Obviously this simplification so useful for forging Polishdom and Germandom in Silesia, was wrong. Although Upper Silesia was predominantly Catholic there were some Protestants there especially in the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) principality. Moreover, Catholics in southern Upper Silesia spoke Moravian Czech and German in the south-western corner of this land. On the other hand, the Glatz (Kłodsko, Klodzko) Margrave commonly associated with Lower Silesia, remained largely Catholic, while Protestants of the north-eastern reaches of Lower Silesia spoke Polish.

Protestant and Catholic Clergy who catered for their faithful in Silesia, as well as teachers in church and Protestant schools had to know German and Polish in the Polish-speaking areas, and German and Czech in the Czech-speaking areas. In Upper Silesia there were also cases of persons who were able to use all the three languages besides Latin. Obviously, there were gradually less Holy Masses celebrated in Polish and Czech in the areas where the percentage of Slavic-speakers declined. Phasing out of the Masses in these languages is, at present, often interpreted as an instance of planned Germanization conducted by the Church. However, it would be more correct to say that it was pragmatism in the light of the limited number of bilingual clergymen who were predominantly of German origin with the exception of the relatively small regions in eastern and southern Upper Silesia where priests were locals educated at Cracow and Olomouc (Olomütz) or Polish and Czech clergymen who were given posts in these Upper Silesian parts of the Cracow and Olomouc (Olomütz) dioceses. It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the German-speaking segment of the Silesian population, due to its knowledge of German an official language of life and the Holy Roman Empire, was better suited to influence the legal structure and political life of the province than its Polish-speaking counterpart, so there were cases when groups of the Polish-speaking urban poor and peasants were deprived of Polish Masses whereas German Masses were guaranteed for equally insignificant German-speaking groups in the Polish-speaking areas by default, as the highest echelons of the ecclesiastical institutions in Silesia were German-speaking (Maleczyński, 1961: 27, 407).

A certain change in the language situation in churches and at schools occurred during the period of the religious strife. Silesia was the battlefield of Catholicism and Protestantism which divided the land so deeply, and the proponents of both the sides involved in the strife strove to make their arguments audible to as many Silesians as possible. In brief, the Catholic Church wanted to achieve this aim through the introduction of the Baroque style in architecture, whereas the Protestants concentrated on producing explanatory treaties. This led also to the development of Polish Protestant literature in the north-eastern corner of Lower Silesia in the 17th and 18th centuries. The centers of Protestant Polish writing and publishing industry in Silesia, were above all Kreuzburg (Kłuczborc) followed by Pitschen (Byczyna), Oels (Olešnica) and Brieg (Brzeg). There were also Polish presses at Breslau (Wrocław) and Liegnitz (Legnica). The Polish character of these Lower Silesian areas, besides aforementioned factors, was fortified by the 17th-century wave of Polish immigrants who fled

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215 Until the commencement of the period Hardneberg and Stein reforms there were hardly any other schools in Silesia than these organized by ecclesiastical institutions. Besides being confessional, they also followed the lines of estate divisions (Burda, 1992: 46/47).

216 The question of language in Catholic Masses should not be too much overemphasized (as it is by some authors) because prior to the decisions of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) all the liturgy was conducted in Latin (Anon., 1990m: 414), and only sermons were preached in vernacular.
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the devastating Polish-Swedish Wars, and the 17th/18th
inflow of settlers from the southern Wielkopolska county of Rawicz (Rawitsch). Moreover, many
German-speaking pastors who sought refuge in Wielkopolska during recurrent anti-Protestant
persecutions instigated in Silesia by the pro-Habsburg administration, learned Polish in exile and,
subsequently, contributed to the development of Silesian Protestant writings in Polish and to the
spread of the knowledge of the language among their German-speaking coreligionists in north-eastern
Lower Silesia. Usually their first language was German and they became Polish writers due to having
translated some treatises into the language. On the other hand, pastors of Polish-speaking stock
acquired German so all of them were functionally bilingual and united by their confession which was
of higher significance than any language or ethnic considerations. The most renowned Protestant
writers of this region who wrote in Polish include: Adam Gdaciūnas (1609-1688), Jerzy Bock
(1621-1690), Christian Rohrmann (1733-1804), Pawel Twardy, and Robert Fiedler (1810-1877). Besides writing in Polish and German they also used Latin and the last three had some command of Czech. From the 1770s to the mid-19th century Brieg (Brzeg) functioned as a significant center of Protestant publishing industry in Polish. In 1768 the Protestant Bible in Polish was printed there. After 1709 when the Protestant Gnadekirche was established in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) there was an ongoing interfertilization between it and the Lower Silesian center of Polish-speaking Protestantism. For instance, Pawel Twardy and J. Ch. Bockhammer were pastors who came to Lower Silesia from the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) principality. (Gajda, 1987: 11, 16; Ladogórski, 1971: 318; Lubos, 1974: 349/495; Snoch, 1991: 32, 81; Zielonka, 1994: 18/19, 363). After the decline of Protestant publishing industry in Polish at Brieg (Brzeg) and Kreuzburg (Kluczbork) in the mid-19th century, their role was, in a way, taken over by Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) which survives as a strong center of Protestantism and Polishdom until this
day. Leaving the sphere of religion, it must be noted that everyday life demanded of Lower Silesian
merchants a knowledge of Polish if they wished to conduct their businesses effectively without
disregarding the large part of the Silesian market which could be accessed only through the medium
of the language. Thus in the 17th and 18th centuries Polish grammars, textbooks and Polish-German
glossaries were published for German learners and there were also Polish elementary schools at
Breslau (Wroclaw), Brieg (Brzeg) and Oels (Olešnica) which were attended by Polish and German
speaking Silesians. Polish was also taught as a separate subject in the Silesian towns close to the
Polish border, and some Polish textbooks were exported especially from nearby Częstochowa in the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Considering Silesian secondary schools and the tertiary school of
Leopoldina (located at Breslau (Wroclaw), there was a tendency to use Latin as the medium of
instruction until the Enlightenment reforms in the 18th century when this language was gradually
superseded by German. At that time there were no Polish schools of this kind in the province, but
Polish occurred as a subjects at some secondary schools (Burd, 1992: 63-67).

The first inklung of state intervention in the field of language relations in Silesia is provided by
the Habsburgs who after having suppressed Protestants in their hereditary lands, championed German
as the second official language of the Holy Roman Empire at the cost of Czech in the lands of the
Czech Crown. Since the mid-17th century the Habsburg administration strove to appoint German-
speaking priests to Catholic parishes all over Silesia. When in 1653 many Protestant churches were
turned into Catholic ones all of them were staffed with German-speaking clergymen. Next year the
nobility of the Breslau (Wrocław) principality asks the diocese not to send Polish-speaking priests to
village parishes in the principality (Maleczyński, 1963: 15). Thus the decisions led to the gradual
reduction of the number of Polish Holy Masses in the vicinity of Breslau (Wrocław) and elsewhere
east of the Oder (Odra) and the Glatzer Neisse (Nysa Klodzka) (Maleczyński, 1963: 25) but did not
significantly influence the language relations in Upper Silesia where priests from among the locals,
and Moravians and Poles who arrived there from the Cracow and Olmütz (Olomouc) dioceses which
were also the main centers of education for Upper Silesian ecclesiastical students. On the whole, the

217 Those who wish to appropriate him for Polishdom dubbed him as a Silesian Rej. Mikolaj Rej (1505-1569)
was a Polish writer who is held to be the father of Polish literature.
Habsburg policy was not so much to influence the linguistic situation in Silesia as to staff the Catholic Church in Silesia with reliable Catholic priests from these Habsburgs lands which were untouched by Protestant heresy.

In the veritable flood of Polish and Polish-German Protestant literature produced at Brieg (Brzeg), Oels (Oleśnica) and Kreuzburg (Kluczbork) since the 17th century, the last remarkable Polish lay text the picaresque play entitled Posel krotochwilny Mac Lac [The Facetious Deputy Mac Lac] was published anonymously in 1666 at Oels (Oleśnica) (Lubos, 1974: III 489; Zielonka, 1994: 197). However, the father of German poetry Martin Opitz was followed by the two so-called Schlesische Dichterschule (Silesian Schools of Poetry). The first one included such distinguished German poets as: Friedrich von Logau (1604-1655) and Andreas Gryphius (1616-1664), while the second one: Christian Hofmann von Hofmannswaldau (1617-1679), Daniel Casper von Lohenstein (1635-1683) and Johann Christian Günther (1695-1723). Hence the term schlesische Barock (Silesian Barock) is found in every history and anthology of German literature, as besides poets it also spawned renowned mystics: Johann Scheffler (Angelus Silesius, 1624-1677) and Daniel von Regiersfeld Czepko (1605-1660). The importance of the province for German Baroque poetry cannot be overemphasized as in many anthologies German scholars divide German Baroque poetry into Silesian and non-Silesian (außerschlesische) (Glaser, 1981: 83-104; Höntsch, 1992: 19-23; Schulz, 1991: 10-12). Some suppose that this veritable eruption of German poetical genius was possible only to the fact that the poets had the advantage of having been born and lived in a confessionally, linguistically and ethnically heterogenous land. Some pro-Polish and Slavic elements surface in their poetry. Moreover, Opitz’s surname can be a Germanized form of the Polish surname Opec. Czepko is a Slavic surname and his mother Kreczińska-Mokra was indeed Polish. Angelus Silesius’s father Stanislaw Szeffler (Scheffler) was a child of a Polonized German noble family at Cracow (Lubos, 1974: III 492). However, all the aforementioned poets were born in Lower Silesia where the position of the German language and culture had already been well established. Finally, the Polish cultural link continued to be cultivated in Silesia by the Breslau (Wroclaw) Wilhelm Gottlieb Korn-Verlag (publishing house) which since the mid-18th century has brought out works in Polish and German translations of Polish authors (Lubos, 1974: III 497).

A certain change in the field of language relations in Silesia came with the Prussian conquest of this land in 1740, which eventually brought modern statehood to this land, for which increased influence of bureaucracy on more and more aspects of subjects life was characteristic. Such an approach is directed at thorough homogenization of territorial, administrative and legal structures in a radical contrast to medieval plurality in these spheres. Thanks to it a state achieves a high degree of internal cohesion which allows it to pursue its external and internal polices more robustly and with a greater involvement on the part of its subjects who have developed an attachment to their state as it gives them some initial advantages of modern citizenship, in return, demanding unflinching loyalty and sacrifice of one’s life for preserving the state’s continued existence. Growing identification of the subjects with their state (represented by the icon of a monarchy) coupled with economic progress facilitated by the process of structural homogenization, increases the state’s revenue and the standard of living which fortifies the bond between the subject and the state. Bigger economic output permits the state to increase its sphere of influence and to acquire more lands which usually generates more income unless the advantage is offset by too high a cost of warfare which dooms some states to stagnation or disappearance promoting expansion of the other at the expense of the former. The mechanism evolved in absolutist states and after intensification under guidance of ministerial cabinets, which finally replaced monarchs or limited their sole power to issue decisions to the sphere.

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218 From a comparative point of view it is a convincing statement, because, for instance, the greatest figures of Polish literature such as Adam Mickiewicz or Nobel Prize Winner Czeslaw Milosz come from the eastern part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth where Polish culture interbred with its Lithuanian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian counterparts. And one should not forget that one of the most renowned English writers - Joseph Conrad (Teodor Józef Konrad Korzeniowski) was born in this area.

219 After 1945 the publishing house moved its head quarters to Munich and recently to Würzburg.
of largely toothless representation of the state at official functions, paved the way for their nation-state where a homogenous state and homogenous citizenry became one. The process was commenced in Silesia by Prussian annexation, which, in a quick succession, was followed by territorial, administrative and legislative reforms in order to achieve the aforementioned goals. This growth of state was secured in Prussia by one of the largest and best trained standing armies in Europe of that time which besides guarding the ungainly elongated borders demanded establishment of a variety of highly efficient industries to cater for tremendous needs of such a large sophisticated military structure closely interconnected with the state itself. Not surprisingly, was the Habsburgs Silesian garrison of 3,000 replaced by a tenfold larger Prussian force. The mass of soldiers was followed by a proportionally big number of Prussian clerks as the local Silesian cadres were not sufficient or could prove disloyal to the new ruler. Obviously, the soldiers and Prussian bureaucrats could not present a big percentage of the population of Prussian Silesia which amounted to about: 373,000 in Upper Silesia and 1,467,000 in 1784\(^{220}\) (Kokot, 1973: 71), but they formed the elite whose decisions could exert an unproportionally bigger influence on the province than the rest of the Silesians. On the other hand, the authorities also encouraged inflow of settlers because the Silesian Wars (1740-1742, 1744-1745, 1756-1763) claimed well over 115,000 victims (Snoch, 1991: 84, 159) slightly depopulating the province. In the period 1742-1805 the so-called friedrizianische (i.e. of Friedrich II) colonization resulted in the establishment of 446 new settlements and involved over 60,000 people. Although more than 52.5 per cent of the settlements sprang up in sparsely populated Upper Silesia it is hard to say that it significantly contributed to Germanization of the region as 40.6 per cent of the settlers came from Bohemia and Poland\(^{221}\). Moreover, Polish-speaking Silesians were also involved in this action, thus it is visible that ethnic or language considerations were rather absent at the advantage of simple economic and civilizational advancement of backward regions in Silesia (Baumgart, 1994: 388-389; Lis, 1993: 64/65; Maleczyński, 1963: 40-44; Snoch, 1991: 63).

Nevertheless there were some efforts to have Slavic-speaking settlers settling down in German areas and vice versa (Lis, 1993: 64). But Friedrich II as a pragmatic ruler interested in improving organization and position of its state in the world, was largely indifferent to ethnic, language and confessional issues\(^{222}\) (Dlugoborski, 1966: 390), for instance, in December 1744 in Breslau (Wroclaw) he published a proclamation in Polish in order to warn the inhabitants against Viennese machinations (Wiskemann, 1956: 23). Comprehensibility was his goal so the question is why there were some administrative decisions undertook to further knowledge of German among the Polish-speaking Silesians. It seems that this policy went along with Friedrich II’s efforts to make his state cohesive and equally developed throughout. However, it could not be done without integration of the Polish-speaking Silesians. If they did not know the official language of the state they would remain disadvantaged and hardly any German-speaking Prussians would decide to settle in mainly Polish-speaking Upper Silesia which would dash the chances of economic development of this area without significant local know-how. Moreover, poor knowledge of the official language of the state would

\(^{220}\) Before the beginning of the 19th century a quarter of all the Silesians lived in the region of the Sudets which was one of the Leading centers of textile industry in Europe at that time (Snoch, 1991: 84).

\(^{221}\) It was difficult to attract overwhelmingly German-speaking Lower Silesians to settle down in the backward and Polish-speaking Upper Silesia of the 18th century, but many of them chose to improve their lot by emigrating westward or to southern Wielkopolska where at around that time many towns became bilingual as well as thriving centers of textile industry. The level of Lower Silesian emigration roughly equalled the inflow of settlers involved in friedrizianische colonization (Maleczyński, 1963: 44).

\(^{222}\) Nationalistic presentation of Friedrich II as an arch-Germanizer of Polish lands finds no support in reality, for instance his preferred language of discourse, as elsewhere at European courts of that time, was French. Thus he could not be a German nationalist, and the above argument is anachronic. Perhaps he perceived language difference as a barrier to keep the aristocracy and the other estates apart in order to preserve the traditional social order in Prussia. From this standpoint his lukewarm initiatives to spread knowledge of German among his Polish-speaking subjects in Silesia may be interpreted as an effort at liquidating an unnecessary cleavage among the Silesian population mores seriously divided (in the contemporary opinion influenced by the tragedy of still recent religious wars and conflicts) along confessional lines.
impede the Polish-speaking subjects comprehension of the government’s decisions and the process of carrying them out by such subjects. Thus spreading knowledge of German among the Polish-speaking Silesians was dictated by the civilizational urge propagated as one of the ideals of the Enlightenment (Kosler, 1984: 11). This attitude continued to be espoused by many Germans until the revolutionary year of 1848 which is visible in Goethe’s Vorschlag zur Einführung der deutschen Sprache in Polen (The Proposal of Introducing the German Language in Poland) which he composed in the 1820s probably also under the influence of his 1790 visit to Upper Silesia where having been confronted with otherness of the region he could come to the conclusion that its state would be improved by direct access to the latest technological and scientific developments, afforded only by the medium of German (Maliszewski, 1993: 175, 199).

It was understood that improvement of command of German among the Polish-speaking Silesians of Upper Silesia especially, may be effected only through a comprehensive educational system. Not much though could be given to this area before Prussian ownership of Silesia was reaffirmed with the victory in the Seven Years War (1757-1763). Even afterwards schools remained largely denominational and the state limited itself to some minor decisions aimed at promoting employment of German-speaking teachers who would further knowledge of the language among the Polish-speakers of Upper Silesia. Only four decisions of this kind were issued in the 1750s but already 14 in the 1760s which was due to the end of the Seven Years War and development of popular education in the whole of Prussia. There were 1,552 schools in Silesia in 1752 but already 3,500 in 1798, and by the end of the 18th century more than 50 per cent of children aged 6-12 attended schools which led to disappearance of illiteracy which earlier was quite widespread in Upper Silesia. The positive trend was stopped at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries due to the internal crisis of the old Prussian state and the Napoleonic onslaught. At that time Polish remained the predominant medium of instruction at Upper Silesian elementary schools though German was one of the main subjects. Moreover if one did not master German one could not proceed to a secondary school as all of them were German-speaking or to the first two vocational mining and metallurgical schools established in 1803 at Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry) and Königshütte (Królewská Huta), which were open to German-speakers only. The ongoing development of popular education and emphasis on German as the medium of instruction in Silesia was reaffirmed by the 1794 act which stated that one had to attend school until one had not acquire skills deemed necessary for one’s estate, and by the sweeping Hardenberg-Stein reforms. In 1810 Friedrich Wilhelm III prohibited holding Protestant celebrations in Polish. Prior to the War of Liberation (1813-1814) the Prussian army was transformed from a largely multiethnic force into a national organ in a way heralding the rise of early nationalism in Central Europe under the impact of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars which engulfed the whole continent spreading the tenets of moderns state and social organization (Anon., 1992: 752; Długoborski, 1966: 397, 413, 428-431, 434, 438-441).

On the ground of postcolonial studies, the specifically European idea of the mission to civilize the others is connected to the colonial expansion of Europe in the wake of Columbus’s discovery (only from the point of view of the Europeans) of America. The inhabitants of the New World (i.e. new only to the Europeans) and other colonized lands were to become the same as Europeans in order to become civilized and eligible for salvation preached by Christian churches. However, in the process of their civilizing and Christianizing they have never become equal with the Europeans but just their subordinates. Certain similarities can be seen between the situation of the Amerindians who for centuries were subjected to the practically enslaving institution of encomienda (presumably for their own good as to prevent them from sloth and slovenliness) and especially the rural parts of Upper Silesia east of the Oder (Odra) where elements of serfdom and patriarchal attitude of usually German great land owners toward their Polish-speaking peasants survived until 1918 (Davies, 1993; Weber, 1913: 21).

The Prussian authority considered it more worthwhile to conduct teaching in high Polish than in the Silesian Polish (which often occurred in southern Upper Silesia, as teachers and priests educated at Olmütz (Olomouc) preferred the dialect) so in 1768 they supported publication of the Bible in Polish (Długoborski, 1966: 402, 441).
Still the authorities understood that without accepted use of Polish it would not be possible to
govern or civilize the Polish-speaking Silesians effectively. The realization was made acute especially
after Prussia’s annexation of the vast Polish ethnic territories in the three partitions of Poland (1772,
1793, 1795). It is possible that if Napoleon would not have had detached majority of the lands in 1806
Prussia would have had to become a bilingual and biethnic state. Hence in the context of Silesia it is
important to note that the monthly Schlesische Volkszeitung zum Nutzen und Vergnügen (Silesian
Popular Newspaper of Useful and Entertaining Information) was published also in Polish as Gazety
Sąskie dla Ludu Pospolitego (Silesian Newspapers for everybody) from 1789 to 1806 and reached
the staggering circulation of 10,000 copies which were mainly distributed free of charge in Upper
Silesia (Glensk, 1992: 17; Gröschel, 1993: 317). The tradition was revived after the reorganization of
the Prussian state following the decisions of the Congress of Vienna (1815). When the Oppeln
(Opole) Regency was established in 1816 from the beginning its government gazette was published in
the German and Polish versions though the latter was eventually phased out in 1838 (Michalkiewicz,
1970: 424). The termination of the publication is connected to the speeded up process of
homogenization of the Prussian society, which after the Napoleonic Wars was carried out in a
gradually more conscious manner by the authorities. With the emancipation of the peasants and the
introduction of conscription and improved popular education mobility and, consequently,
homogeneity of the Silesian society grew which also applies to largely Polish/Slavic-speaking Upper
Silesia (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 407). Moreover, the merely formal subjugation of the Breslau
(Wroclaw) diocese to the Polish Gnesen (Gniezno) archbishopric was terminated in 1821 as well as
the inclusion of eastern Upper Silesia in the Cracow Diocese. Thus it became plausible to replace
Polish elementary schools in Upper Silesia with bilingual ones. Hence, after the reaffirmed
reintroduction of compulsory education in Prussia in 1825 (Kielbasa, 1992: 48), in 1827 there were
497 bilingual elementary schools, 230 German and 20 Polish or Moravian Czech in the Oppeln
(Opole) Regency (Kosler, 1984: 279). The development of bilingual education in Upper Silesia
(Michalkiewicz, 1970: 417) was facilitated by the introduction of Polish as a subject at the Breslau
(Wroclaw) University when it was established in 1811 (Zielonka, 1994: 317) and the growth of coal
and steel industries which attracted no less than 40,000 German-speaking emigrants to eastern Upper
Silesia in the period 1816-1849 (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 107). The policy of bilinguality in Upper
Silesia was reflected in gradual phasing out of Polish celebrations in the Protestant churches of north-
eastern Lower Silesia and elsewhere in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency in the period 1818-1840.
The policy was reflected in Upper Silesia where in 1824 Polish Holy Masses were held in 219 (49%) 
churches, Polish and German in 32 (7%), German in 162 (36.7%), Czech in 24 (5.5%), and Czech and
German in 8 (1.85) (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 411, 419). In 1831 the Silesian authorities declared that
both the Churches should cooperate with the administration to improve command of German among
the Silesians (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 406), in accordance with the overall Prussian policy of language
homogenization. Since the 1820s the Government Office for Statistics, Berlin had been busy
gathering information on the linguistic diversification in Prussia in order to provide the government

225 Besides curtailing the Polish influence and smoothing the ecclesiastical divisions with the political ones, it
had the symbolic meaning as Breslau (Wroclaw) had achieved the status of an archbishopric with the Berlin
diocese subjugated to it, and from the political point of view it would have been most ungainly if the Prussian
capital had been subordinate to the Polish spiritual capital of a non-existent state, even in the ecclesiastical field.
Moreover, the streamlining of the ecclesiastical borders with the Cracow diocese was dictated by the fact that
besides the Congress Kingdom of Poland the Republic of Cracow remained another semi-independent Polish
state which existed from 1815 to 1846. The political considerations are clearly visible as contextualized against
lack of any changes in the ecclesiastical borders between the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese and the Prague and
Olmütz (Olomouc) dioceses though they intersected the political boundaries. Briefly speaking Prussia and the
Habsburg Empire perceived each other as culturally and ethnically basically the same.

226 Considering the whole Silesian Protestant Church, in 1840 Polish celebrations were held in 2 churches
(0.2%), German and Polish in 59 (4.3%), Czech in (0.3%), Czech and German in 2 (.2%), Sorbian and German
in 28 (2.5%), German in 1094 (92.5%) (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 412).
with a comprehensive picture of the situation on the basis of which state language planning could be developed (Pater, 1991: 13).

At this moment language nationalism (cf. Hroch, 1994) was commenced in Prussia, and it is worthwhile to observe the degree of initial incomprehension on the part of persons who were educated in the universal mode by the Enlightenment, and now had to reply the earliest linguistic questionnaires produced at Berlin. For instance, the squire of Langenau (Legowo) in East Prussia, penned the following in return:

On these properties, there are 52 persons of the male kind and 59 of the female kind, who have command of both the Polish and German languages. 8 persons of the male kind and 11 of the female kind, who can speak properly in Polish only, but who can mouth a few words in German. 15 persons of the male kind and 12 of the female kind, who speak exclusively in German. One male who speaks German, Polish, Latin, French and Hebrew, and another who speaks Russian and 16 persons of male kind and 19 of the female kind who as yet neither speak nor read any language at all, but merely shriek and babble (In: Martuszewski, 1974: 8/9).

The new approach of the state made the non-German-speakers in Silesia and elsewhere in Prussia realize their otherness especially in the situation of intensified contacts with state institutions and people from all over Silesia and Prussia which was afforded by the process of industrialization and urbanization227. This realization engendered second class Prussian subjects who were faced with a dilemma if to become Germans or to remain entrenched in the culture and language of their forefathers or to do both, which still was a tolerated option at that time. Anyway too novel a policy equalizing the civilizational endeavor with intensified assimilation brought about discontent in the second half of the 1830s (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 410). The authorities may have come to, at that time still unclearly realized, conclusion that staunch pursuing of this line could lead to a conflict or worse, to a birth of an ethnic/national movement which would rival the nascent German/Prussian one. This view was justified by the coming into being of Illyrism228 in the southern Slavic provinces of the Habsburgs in the 1830s, which was to become a predecessor of Austroslavism229 and Panslavism230. Moreover, since the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries there had been a scholarly trend in Bohemia which aimed at reestablishing Czech as a written language equal to the official Austrian speech, i.e. German231, and the Polish November Uprising (1830-1831), which was a regular Russo-Polish war, could have spilt over onto the Polish lands of the Prussian partition and into the Polish-speaking areas of Silesia232 according to the pessimistic scenarios of Prussian officialdom (Dziewulski, 1971). On the other hand, since the 18th century, more Polish travellers who

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227 In the years 1816-1849 the Breslau (Wroclaw) population increased from 68,700 to 104,200 (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 108).

228 Illyrism spread in Croatia and Slavonia, and it claimed that all the southern Slavs came from the ancient Illyrians, and as such should get liberated from the Ottoman rule with the aid of the Habsburgs and, subsequently, live in a common state under the protection of the Austrian Empire.

229 According to the Austroslavists all the Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy should establish a common state which would be an integral a tripartite empire also constituted by the German and Magyar parts.

230 Panslavism came into being at the All Slav Congress in 1848 at Prague where it was decided that all the Slav peoples should be united in a common state with its capitol in Carogrod (i.e. Istanbul).

231 Majority of works striving to upgrade the position of the Czech language and culture were written first in Latin and later in German while the first anthology of Czech literature was published in English: Bowring, John, ed. 1832. Cheskian Anthology. London: Rowland Hunter (Polišenský, 1991: 90).

232 The ill-prepared Polish insurrectionists were so thrashed by the Russian troops that they did not even think about starting warfare against the two other partition powers, Prussia and Austria, and were rather eager to ensure neutrality or even support on the states part. Moreover, the Prussian fear of some support for the uprising by Polish-speaking Silesians had never actualized as only 23 Upper Silesians joined the Polish insurrectionists. And there were Polish- and German-speakers among them which does not give one an argument to say that this minuscule aid was ethnically or nationally motivated (Dziewulski, 1971: 87).
crossed Silesia noticed that the Polish language is spoken here (cf. Zieliński, 1974). At that time no serious thought was given to some ethnic unity of Silesia with Poland which should be actualized in a common state. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was the state of Polish citizens, and Polish-speakers outside it were subjects of other monarchs. The approach changed after the partition of the Commonwealth and the establishment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Polish thinkers started devising shape of a new Polish state. The strongest trend promoted a straightforward reestablishment of Poland within the pre-partition boundaries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but as early as 1807 and 1808 opinions appeared that all the territories with Polish-speaking populations (including Silesia) which had not been included in the Commonwealth, a new Polish state should contain. Eventually the two trends merged giving birth to the idea of greater Poland which would extend from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from the Oder (Odra) to the Dnepr 233 (Kollątaj, 1990: 41/42; Staszic, 1990: 41). Its proponents became less vociferous if not completely silent until 1848, but the possibility of reestablishment of Poland at the cost of Prussia had left an indelible impression on the Prussian officialdom. Moreover, the first Polish student organization Polonia (grouping Polish-speaking Upper Silesians but also some Germans) was active at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University in 1820-1822 (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 363), and the German-wide sympathy for the November Uprising and for the wave of Polish emigrants who had to emigrate after the defeat 234 (Lang, 1989), was preceded by the July Revolution of 1830 in France and succeeded by the rise of the Young national movements in the 1830s throughout Europe. In this potentially revolutionary atmosphere endangering the post-1815 concert of Europe masterminded by Metternich, Prussia was not interested in alienating its non-German-speaking subjects to a point where they would think about creating their own national movements. Thus, the policy of cultural and educational bilinguality especially in Upper Silesia was furthered and facilitated by the Department of Slavic Literatures which was established at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University in 1841 235 (Zielonka, 1994: 318). It was allowed to publish quite a lot of Polish books in Silesia in the 1840s (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 424, 471-473), the first Polish calendar was brought out annually from 1846 to 1850 (Kossakowska-Jarosz, 1994: 23; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 424) and finally a Polish newspaper Tygodnik Polski (Polish Weekly) was established at 1845 at Pless (Pszczyna) where it appeared in 300-500 copies until 1847 (Gröschel, 1993: 224). Józef Lompa (1797-1863) wrote for this paper as one of the first Upper Silesian pro-Polish activists (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 461), who was seconded in his educational efforts by the Catholic priest Alojzy Ficek (1790-1862) from the pilgrimage center at Deutsch Piekar (Piekar), where in 1844 he started an unprecedented temperance movement which led to almost complete teetotalism among the Upper Silesian populace ravaged by the drink, until the pre-1840 economic and social troubles. Not surprisingly, the mass appeal of the movement frightened the authorities who were afraid that Rev. Ficek could try to channel its pent-up energy into nationalism (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 427). This possibility did not come true.

233 From the initial discussion two opposed schools of thinking about Polish statehood emerged. One championed reestablishment of Poland within its pre-partition borders whereas the other espoused the tenet of nationalism appealing for an ethnic Poland. Presumably the latter’s idea is embodied by the present-day Polish Republic.

234 Polish insurrectionists were received as heroes in all German countries. Many poems were composed to support the Polish cause by German poets and the festive mood following a Polish national tragedy culminated in 1832 at the castle in Hambach where a German-Polish celebration centered on the ideals of the French Revolution was held. The German sympathy was triggered off by the apparent lack of a united German state in the context of the nation-states of France and England. Ironically, no much thought was given to the fact that besides Slavic Russian Poland was partitioned by two German states of Prussia and Austria (Lang, 1989).

235 Not surprisingly at first it was headed by the two renowned Czech scholars: Jan Evangelista Purkyně and Ladislav Celakovský (Zielonka, 1994: 318) as the Slavic academic studies were pioneered at the Charles University in Prague, where the Department of the Czech Language and Literature was established in 1792 (Szyjkowski, 1948: 8).
A radical change was to be introduced to this situation largely free of ethnic discord (as many, especially Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians still did not differentiate between themselves and the German-speaking Silesians along the linguistic lines sticking to the centuries-old religious cleavages) only in the wake of the revolutionary upheaval of 1848. This momentous event is tackled with in the next chapter, so in order to conclude it is worthwhile to observe Silesia’s linguistic/ethnic and confessional pattern in the first half of the 19th century. However, one should take statistics with a grain of salt. First of all, prior to the mid-19th century usually they are modern interpolations of fragmentary contemporary estimates, and later in state censuses numbers of members of specific ethnic groups were divined on the basis of various criteria, such as: language of discourse with a census interviewer, mother tongue, individual declaration and the like. Obviously, the censuses were modelled along the national lines of thinking according to which it was possible to unambiguously pin point one’s nationalethnic identity though it equalled to trimming the complicated linguistic and ethnic situation (cf. the above-quoted fragment of the linguistic survey by the squire of Langenau (Legowo)) to the needs of the nationalist ideology. It is clear so that the early estimates and censuses were not only to describe the ethnic situation but also to reconstruct and influence it in a manner which would facilitate/justify subsequent assimilation of minority groups in an effort to construct a nation-state. On the other hand, modern studies of the ethnic/linguistic situation in the 19th-century Silesia willy-nilly have to use such statistics as the point of departure, and they do but not without adjusting the results in accordance with some latest historiographic findings which more often than not prove to be the means of overemphasizing membership of one of the ethnic groups because the majority of scholars conducting research on Silesia are Germans, Poles and Czechs. As such they are products of their respective nation-states where they were conditioned to support the nationalist ideologies of the states through the educational systems, national cultures and the institutions of the states which permeate almost all the aspects of social life in the three countries. Thus any statistics given in this work are to serve the sake of illustrating multiethnicity and multilinguality of Silesia as well as the dynamics of subsequent changes under the impact of nationalist ideologies or some other factors (e.g.: migration, epidemics, warfare and the like), and not to give the exact and objective picture of the situation, which is rather impossible if one remembers that an individual may speak several languages and identify with different ethnic groups in various interpersonal contexts.

Bearing the warnings in mind one can more safely quote this information that in 1787 Prussian Silesia had 1,747,000 inhabitants, i.e.: 1,303,300 (74.6%) German-speakers, 401,900 (23.0%) Polish-speakers, 32,600 (1.9%) Czech and Moravian Czech-speakers, 8,900 (0.51%) Jews and 900 (0.05%) Sorbs (Maleczyński, 1963: 59). In 1840 Prussia’s Silesian population totalled 2,827,000, i.e.: 2,066,000 German-speakers (73.1%), 646,000 (22.8%) Polish-speakers, 53,000 (1.9%) Czech and Moravian Czech-speakers, 35,000 Sorbs (1.2%) and 27,000 Jews (1.0%) (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 124). Considering the territorial distribution of ethnic groups in Silesia in 1840, Lower Silesia with

236 The data about the 1840 population numbers disregard Prussian soldiers who resided in many garrisons and manned numerous fortresses in Silesia. However, their presence did have influence on the ethnic make-up of the areas of their stationing. Let us consider the case of the Upper Silesian town of Cosel (Koz’le) which from 1742 to 1875 was a fortress. In 1745 the garrison counted 700 soldiers, in 1807 67 officers and 4,249 soldiers, in 1832 980 soldiers, in 1864 1,000 soldiers, and in 1874 12 uncommissioned officers and 111 soldiers (Weltzel, 1888: XIV, 383, 431, 438, 443, 656), while the number of the town’s inhabitants totalled 598 in 1756, 1383 in 1812, 1973 in 1836, 3,006 in 1854 and 3,441 in 1879 (Weltzel, 1888: 626/627). It is clearly visible that at times the military population surpassed the number of the urban inhabitants, and remained a significant percentage of the town’s total population until the 1860s. Consequently, even though the town was located in a largely Polish-speaking area of Upper Silesia, the influx of the military personnel for whom the town had to cater, did transform Cosel (Koz’le) into a German-speaking town and led to the construction of a Protestant garrison church changing the Catholic character of the town and the vicinity (Weltzel, 1988: 527-538). Thus, according to the statistics excluding the military population Cosel (Koz’le) seemed to be a predominantly Polish-speaking Catholic town, but a completely different picture emerges if one takes into consideration the impact of the stationing military force which predominantly consisted from Protestant German-speakers (or hardly distinguishable Polish/Slavic-speaking conscripts who had to accept German as the language of command in the Prussian army and its other homogenizing customs).
the total population of 1,930,000 was overwhelmingly German-speaking with 1,796,000 (93.1%) inhabitants using this language. Still, especially the north-eastern corner of Lower Silesia supported the largely Protestant Polish-speaking population of 80,000 (4.1%). The Sorbs concentrated in the westernmost counties of the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency constituted 1.8 per cent of the Lower Silesian population with their number of 35,000. The 7,000 (0.4%) Czech-speakers lived in 8 isolated settlement of Czech Brethren in Lower Silesia and in the so-called Český koutek (Czech corner), i.e. the seven villages in the vicinity of Bad Kudowa (Kudowa-Zdrój) the only part of the Glatz (Kłodsko, Kłodzko) Margravate which was not Germanized thanks to its location which afforded it physical continuity with the Czech-speaking area across the Silesian-Bohemian border (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 124).

The akin Moravian Czech-speaking population amounted to 46,000 (5.1%) of the Upper Silesian population of 897,000 in 1840. They lived in the southwestern part of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county concentrated around Hultschin (Hlučín, Hulczyn), Beneschau (Benešov) and Kranowitz (Křenovice, Kranstädt, Krzanowice), and their cultural identity was maintained thanks to the fact that this territory belonged to the Olmütz (Olomouc) diocese, and that priests tended to use the Moravian Czech dialect in church and at school. The rough line separating them from the Polish-speaking area extended from Oderberg (Bohumin, Bogumin) via Tworkau (Tvorkov, Tworków) to Bauerwitz (Bavorov, Baborów), while the limit of Moravian Czech-speaking territory may be traced from Bauerwitz (Bavorov, Baborów) via Deutsch Neukirch (Němečka Čerokvie, Nowa Cerekwia) to Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów). At that time Upper Silesia was more Slavic than Germanic at that time as its Polish-speaking population amounted to 566,000 (63.1%) as opposed to 270,000 (30.1%) German-speakers whose number was boosted by Jews who usually spoke German. There were 15,000 (1.7%) Upper Silesian Jews in 1840 (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 124). The German-speakers were concentrated in south-western corner of Upper Silesia with a plethora of islets constituted by German settlement and urban centers where German had become the medium of official communication especially with the influx of migrants attracted by development of coal and steel industry in eastern Upper Silesia.

Because the confessional cleavage had been of the greatest significance before it was replaced by the nationalist one in the second half of the 19th century it is necessary to describe the confessional situation in Silesia during the first half of the 19th century. In 1822 Catholics constituted 45% of the Silesians, Protestants 54% and Jews almost 1%. In 1846 there were 48% Catholics and 51% Protestants among the Silesians. Roughly speaking Lower Silesia was predominantly Protestant whereas Upper Silesia and the Glatz (Kłodsko, Kłodzko) Margravate Catholic. There were some Protestant enclaves in Upper Silesian towns and settlements which came into being due to Friedrich II’s initiative. The most outstanding included Pless (Pszczyna) with 41 per cent of its inhabitants Protestant, Schurgast (Skarogoszcz) with 41 per cent, and Falkenberg (Niemodlin) with 36 per cent. Also the north-western corner of Upper Silesia centered around Konstadt (Wolczyn) was predominantly Protestant. Central Silesia was quite mixed but with predominance of Protestants, but the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency was almost through and through Protestant. There was quite a number of Catholic enclaves in Lower Silesia constituted by monasteries and ecclesiastical lands and villages. Interestingly, after the secularization of 1810 almost all of them retained their confessional character with the most significant areas centered on Grüssau (Krzeszów), Leubus (Lubiąż), Schmogrow (Smogorzów), Thiemendorf (Tymowa), Seitsch (Siciny), and between Schönau am Katzbach (Swierzawa) and Jauer (Jawor) (Janczak, 1970; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 125/126).

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237 The Silesian Protestants were overwhelmingly constituted by Lutherans. From the minuscule rest more than 4,000 belonged to the Reformed evangelical Church and less than 2,000 to the Unity of Czech Brethren (mainly Czechs) (Maleczyński, 1963: 60).
The national and confessional situation developed a little differently in Austrian Silesia which was established in 1742 as the direct result of Prussia’s seizure of the majority of Silesia in 1740\textsuperscript{238}. The territorially disjointed area contained just 5,153 sq km, i.e. West Silesia with 2871 sq km and East Silesia with 2282 sq km (Anon., 1905: 368, 388; Fazan, 1991: 5), with the population of 220,000 in 1742, which grew to 260,000 in 1778 (Maleczyński, 1963: 13). Thus, it was the smallest crown land of the Habsburg Empire, amounting just to 1.72 per cent of Austro-Hungary’s territory at the beginning of the 20th century (Anon., 1905: 368). Maria Theresa established it because she believed that she would regain the rest of Silesia soon. However, the failure at struggle with Prussia clearly shown by the defeats suffered in the three Silesian Wars and in the War of Bavarian Succession cut this illusion short. She was left just with her fence the garden taken by Friedrich II. Consequently, in 1782 this land as too small to function effectively on its own was merged with the Margravate of Moravia in the wake of the modernizing and economizing reforms of Joseph II (Baumgart, 1994: 383). However, the estate institutions of Austrian Silesia continued to maintain its separateness before the crown land was reestablished in 1849. The consciousness of distinctive Silesianity was so strong among them that in 1790 they protested against this merger with Moravia arguing that Silesia as a land of the Czech Crown should be placed under the protection of the Bohemian king and not the Moravian margrave. And interestingly, during the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Maria Theresa used the argument that the then Polish principalities of Zator and OŚwięcim (Auschwitz) ought to become part of the Habsburg Empire because they had been part of Silesia and as such, of the Czech Crown. Subsequently, the estates of Austrian Silesia demanded incorporation of the principalities into the crownland. Although they did not succeed, the principalities were mentioned in the Viennese documents of 1818 and 1828 as belonging to the Czech Crown, and only after the renewed requests aired by the Austrian Silesian Assembly in 1848/1849, the two principalities were finally and unambiguously incorporated into Galicia (Gawrecki, 1993: 48-51).

Paradoxically, Austrian Silesia thanks to its diminutive size was of crucial importance for introduction of sweeping reforms in the Habsburg Empire, which proved to be backward and weak as it was indicated by the repeated defeats suffered at the hands of Prussia, which though smaller and with less population rapidly gained the rank of a major European power during the reign of Friedrich II. Already Maria Theresa understood that without homogenizing and modernizing changes her straggling and multiethnic empire would eventually lose its lessening impact of European politics and even might be obliterated from the political map of the continent. An impetus to such necessary alterations was, in part, afforded by Austrian Silesia, which after 1740 was the only place within the Habsburg Empire with a Protestant church. Teschen with its Gnadenkirche (church of mercy) constructed in 1710 had been the center of the Protestant parish which had contained the whole of Upper Silesia from 1709 to 1742. The Protestant parish with its infrastructure which included the Protestant secondary schoolseminary (established in 1711), was benevolently tolerated by Vienna (Weczerka, 1977a: 532/533) and thus a modicum of religious freedom was present in Austrian Silesia before Joseph II issued the Tolerance Patent in 1781 (Bělina, 1993: II 15) and afterwards the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Protestant church and parish were the beginning of the Protestant Church and institutions in the Habsburg Empire (Weczerka, 1977a: 533). Moreover, the situations of the serfs was improved after the uprising of 1766, i.e. several years earlier than elsewhere in the Empire (Gawrecki, 1993: 50).

\textsuperscript{238} Notably, due to absence of nationalism in Silesia before the 1840s, there was no wave of refugees/emigrants/expellees in the wake of the division of Silesia between the Habsburgs and Prussia after 1740. Such a phenomenon was also prevented by Friedrich II’s policy of religious tolerance, and the fact that Prussia and the Habsburg Empire were then perceived as basically German countries so almost no changes were triggered off at the plane of culture, language and ethnicity. The only estranged group included the Silesian nobility and Austrian civil servants who gradually switched their loyalty to Friedrich II though few left for the Habsburg Empire to continue serving their Emperor as in the case of Count Friedrich Wilhelm von Haugwitz (1702-1765) started his career in the Silesian administration at Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1825, and from 1742 acted as the first governor of Austrian Silesia (Baumgart, 1994: 380).
Prior to 1848 the Silesians were considered to be one nation in the medieval meaning of this word, i.e. *gens*, and this consciousness persisted at least until the end of the 1830s as up to that moment the division of Silesia between Prussia and the Habsburgs was interpreted as the splitting of one people (Gawrecka, 1993: 65; Ens in Gawrecki, 1993: 53/54). The feeling of community and otherness toward strangers originated in the intensified contacts of all the Silesians with troops of various tongues during the Silesian and Napoleonic Wars (Belina, 1993: II 52). By the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, due to increased mobility and modernization brought about Joseph II’s reforms the Austrian Silesian population gradually stopped identifying themselves with their immediate locality for the sake of their crownland even slightly predating Bohemianism which emerged in the first decades of the 19th century (Rak, 1993: 60). This land identity took no heed of language/ethnic difference and persisted by the 1840s ensuring consistency of the Habsburg Empire additionally fortified by loyalty to the throne/monarchy which bound together the land patriotisms of the crown lands constituting the Empire (Rak, 1993: 78/79). In Austrian Silesia the symbols of regional identity such as the land museum (at the end of the 18th century in Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn), and in 1814 in Troppau (Opava, Opawa)) and the land theater (Troppau, 1805), came into being earlier than their Bohemian counterparts as the Patriotic (today’s National) Museum was established at Prague only in 1818 and the National Theater in 1868-1881 (Gawrecki, 1993: 53; Kafka, 1991: 125; Rak, 1993: 78; Weczerka, 1977a: 533).

Thus the modern studies which aim at elevating ethnic/linguistic background of the Austrian Silesians as their identity are rather anachronic prior to 1848. The background was to become the springboard for forming various national movements in this region in the second half of the 19th century, so it must be scrutinized here.

Due to settlement patterns German colonizers usually travelled in southern Silesia north of the Sudets before venturing into the mountains and across them into Bohemia where they also established considerable settlements. But the German settlers who came to southern Upper Silesia, which was to become Austrian Silesia, arrived differently via Prague and Olomouc (Olmütz) and constructed their homes mainly in the Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) principalities (Lubos, 1967: II 450/451 fig, 93). In West Silesia the German-speaking population occupied the western and northern part of this area and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) as opposed to the Moravian Czech-speaking population who lived to the east and south of this land, and also around Troppau (Opava, Opawa). The German-speaking population zone continued across the border in south-western Prussian Upper Silesia, the Glatz (Kladsko, Klodzko) Margravate and in south-eastern Lower Silesia. The area occupied by Moravian-Czech speakers extended southward into Moravia, northward into the above-described Moravian Czech-speaking zone in southern Prussian Upper Silesia, and eastward across the Moravian salient (which divided Austrian Silesia into two separate parts) into East Silesia. Due to the fact that the Silesian dialects of the Moravian Czech were extremely close to or even overlapped with some of the Silesian dialects of Polish it is extremely difficult to establish any line which would divide the Polish-speakers from Moravian Czech speakers. In this case it is more appropriate to speak about a transitory area. It seems that this vague line dividing East Silesia from north to south may be placed several kilometers to the west of the Olsa (Olšė, Olza) though Moravian Czech-speakers predominated across the river in the vicinity of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (Gawrecka, 1993: 65). The west of East Silesia was populated by Polish-speakers and the zone occupied by them extended northward into Prussian Upper Silesia, eastward into Galicia and slightly southward across the border of Upper Hungary (Slovakia) into the region of Csacza (Čadca, Czadca). On the whole the area south of Silesia was a transitory zone between Silesian dialects of Moravian Czech, Silesian dialects of Polish and north-western dialects of Slovak. Moreover, the mountainous south-eastern corner of East Silesia was populated by the specific Silesian Highlander population of Wallachian (Vlach), Slovak and Polish ethnic background. They spoke their own dialects which merged with Silesian dialects of Polish to the west and north, and with north-western dialects of Slovak to the east and south. Moreover, the area of Bielitz (Bielsko, Bílsko) and its vicinity formed a German-speaking islet (Anon., 1905: 370/371; Scobel, 1909: 31, IV).
The official surveys which were to provide the administration with clear-cut answers on the linguistic/ethnic affiliation of the subjects, could not effectively describe the West Silesian transitory area of Western Slavic dialects because thanks to some features the dialects could be only more or less arbitrarily ascribed to the Polish, Czech or Slovak languages but, truly speaking, they were closer to one another than to the three standardized literary languages. Besides, the linguistic tools of that time were quite crude then, and having been developed to conduct researches which would serve the official goal of ordering the population in accordance with the novel tenet of nationality, they were largely prescriptive and as such largely unsuitable for objective description of the linguistic situation. Consequently, the ethnic estimates distinguished only among the Austrian Silesian Slavs, Germans and Jews\(^\text{239}\); the first group contained all the users of various Western Slavic dialects in Austrian Silesia. Thus according to the 1857 estimate Austrian Silesia’s population of 462,051 was constituted by 235,650 (51\%) Slavic-speakers, 221,780 (48\%) German-speakers and 4,600 (1\%) Jews. The first census which attempted at distinguishing between Moravian Czech-speakers and Polish-speakers was carried out in 1880, and the total population of 663,740: 302,735 inhabitants lived in West Silesia and 361,005 in East Silesia. The former contained 240,329 German-speakers, 60,712 Moravian Czech-speakers and only 1,603 Polish-speakers, whereas the latter: 56,249 German-speakers, 85,646 Moravian Czech-speakers and 218,768 Polish-speakers. It is visible that German-speakers predominated in West Silesia in the virtual absence of Polish-speakers, but the latter held sway in East Silesia though checked by the sizeable presence of German and Moravian Czech-speakers. Regarding the confessional situation, in 1900 in the total population of 680,422 there were 576,408 (84.73\%) Catholics, 91,264 (13.48\%) members of the evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession, 477 members of the Reformed evangelical Church and 11,988 (1.76\%) Jews\(^\text{240}\). The Protestants concentrated around Bielitz (Bielsko, Bílsko) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn), however with almost all the members of the Reformed evangelical Church in Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów). The Protestants were usually German and Polish-speakers. In other areas Catholics predominated. The Jewish population concentrated in towns, especially in: Bielitz (Bielsko, Bílsko), Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) and Freistadt (Fryštat, Frýštat) (Anon., 1905: 370/371; Gawrecka, 1993: 62/63).

Considering development of the ethnic/linguistic situation in Austrian Silesia one has to scrutinize the patterns of official language use. As elsewhere in Catholic Europe Latin dominated as the language of documents in the principalities of Jägerndorf (Krnov, Karniów), Troppau (Opava, Opava) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) from the medieval times. With the influx of German settlers especially in the two first principalities and in the area of Bielitz (Bielsko, Bílsko) in the last one, their language gained significance in the light of the fact that it was the language of the Silesian princely courts, and that governance of the province was conducted from Prague and Vienna in the medium of Latin and later more often in German. However, beginning with the 16th century (and even earlier on the later territory of Austrian Silesia) Czech was gradually introduced as the official language of Upper Silesia and became predominant in the overwhelmingly Slavic-speaking Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) principality. Because of the specific attitude of the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) court and Church administration elementary literacy spread even among the richer peasants of the principality already at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries (Broda, 1992: 132). In the period of religious discord the Catholic Church strove to reaffirm its dominance in Upper Silesia vis-a-vis Protestantism so the Olomouc (Olomütz) seminary educated its students not only in Latin and German but also in Latin. So as ecclesiastical subjection of eastern Upper Silesia to the Cracow diocese (up to 1825) ensured the continued and widespread use of Polish in that area, the Olomouc (Olomütz) seminary served a similar

\(^{239}\) Usually as city dwellers they spoke German. Especially, the Haskalah and the introduction of emancipation in 1866 hastened their assimilation with other German-speakers in the Austrian Empire.

\(^{240}\) In the first half of the 19th century Jews were recorded in statistics as a separate ethnic group, but after the introduction of emancipation rather as a confessional minority which in linguistic surveys was lumped together with the German-speakers.
role toward the Jägerndorf (Krmov, Karniów) and Troppau (Opava, Opawa) principalities which belonged to the Olomouc (Olomütz) diocese. Although the southern reaches of the Neisse (Nysa) principality and the whole of Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) principality were included in the Breslau (Wrocław) diocese, the physical closeness of Olomouc (Olomütz) made the territories also susceptible to the Czech influence, especially the Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) principality, because in the Neisse (Nysa) principality, whose prince was the Breslau (Wrocław) bishop, German prevailed. All in all, the Church hierarchy wishing to thoroughly reCatholicize southern Upper Silesia had to cater to the local population not in the official Czech but in the Silesian (Polish and Czech) dialects which were also used as the medium of instruction at majority of elementary schools there (Długoborski, 1966: 425), as the education system was predominantly maintained and controlled by the Catholic Church.

The developments were paralleled by the Protestant church after the establishment of the Upper Silesian Protestant parish with the seat in Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) in 1709. The pastors, like Catholic priests, used language spoken by the faithful in order to reach with their message to as many as possible. In case of Austrian Silesia Protestantism was concentrated in the eastern part of East Silesia which meant that the locals spoke Silesian dialects usually of Polish and German if they lived in towns and especially in the German-speaking islet of Bieltz (Bielsko, Bílsko). It is not necessary to have a look at German Protestant literature which thanks to the fact that Austrian Silesia was a part of the Holy Roman Empire, was rather readily available to the faithful. Some Polish Protestant books were brought to West Silesia at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries but they were few and rather difficult to read for East Silesian Protestants as printed in Roman letters as the faithful were used to the Gothic type (i.e. black letters) used almost by all the German printers up to the mid-19th century. However the Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) Protestant church and gymnasium were staffed, among others, with pastors from north-eastern Lower Silesia where Polish Protestant literature had developed since the 16th century. The books printed there, used the Gothic type and were brought in considerable numbers to East Silesia as recommended literature for the faithful. The early pastors Johann Muthmann (1685-1747) and Samuel Ludwig Sassadius (Zasadius) (1695-1756) had good command of Polish and emulating the north-eastern Lower Silesian model, they started writing religious books in Polish, or translating German/Latin ones into Polish, as well as facilitating publication of (German-)Polish textbooks. So the first Polish book was published for Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) Protestants in 1716 and next year it was followed by the first textbook. The books intended for Protestant perusal were printed in north-eastern Lower Silesia and also at Troppau (Opava, Opawa) (Długoborski, 1966: 305/306) before effective publishing centers were established in the Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) principality. Because Muthman and Sassadius were involved in the movement of the Pietists which was not to the liking of the Lutheran Orthodoxy nor to the Catholic authorities of the Habsburg Empire, they were banned from the Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) principality in 1730 and 1722, respectively. However, the school of Polish Protestant writing started by the two pastors has continued until this day, and in the 19th century it even took over the role of the Protestant Polish-language publishing center from north-eastern Lower Silesia (Lubos, 1974: III 495; Zaremba, 1971: 30-39). The Polish language was also used at Protestant elementary schools in East Silesia besides German and Czech (Długoborski, 1966: 427), so coupled with the sustained promotion of literacy (since the 16th century), it led to emergence of peasant writers who wrote their various notes and diaries in the East Silesian dialects of Polish from the end of the 18th century to the end of the 19th century (Broda, 1992; Broda; 1993).

The afore-mentioned developments were paralleled by the situation of the Czech language, for it was gradually supplanted in the official contexts by Latin and German so after the battle of White Mountain (1620) it declined as the medium of literary work until it was completely replaced in this field by German during the 18th century (Bělina, 1993: 43). Czech continued to be used in religious books. The process of limiting the use of Czech in Austrian Silesia was speeded up after Maria Theresa’s repeated failures at regaining Silesia from Friedrich II. To compete with the enlarged Prussia she began to modernize the Habsburg lands emulating the Prussian model. It meant
centralization and homogenization of administration and education which became compulsory for children aged 6-12 by the end of the 18th century. The reforms were furthered by Joseph II and shortly stopped by the Napoleonic Wars when the structure of the Habsburg monarchy had to be reorganized into the Austrian Empire under the French modernizing impact (Długoborski, 1966: 425, 441). Although Czech as a subject entered the curricula of the Prague University in 1747 and the Viennese University in 1752 the purpose of teaching it was just to equip imperial civil servants with a knowledge of a language which would facilitate their would-be contacts with various Slavic-speaking populations of the Empire (Bělina, 1993: 54). In 1777 the number of secondary schools with Czech as the language of instruction in all the lands of the Czech Crown, was limited pushing the language to elementary schools whereas promoting the use of German in secondary and tertiary education (Bělina, 1993: 46). Absence of Czech in tertiary education was sealed in 1784 with the act which elevated German at the cost of Latin and Czech as the official language of the Czech Crown though Czech was retained as an auxiliary language (Bělina, 1993: 45, 54). In Austrian Silesia German started to predominate after 1790 also in the state institution at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) though Czech remained as the language of administration in Friedeck (Frýdek) and Königsberg (Klimkowice) up to 1817 (Gawrecka, 1993: 65). A slight reversal of the general trend was effected after 1773 when Pope Clement XIV issued a brief which suppressed the Society of Jesus (i.e. the Jesuits). Some Jesuits of the order’s Bohemian province were then sent to East Silesia in order to check the spread of Protestantism. Because many Protestants thanks to the efforts of the local Protestant Church became conscious Polish-speakers after having attended Protestants schools, the Jesuits efforts to curb the Protestant influence, among others, amounted to the introduction of the Czech language to a bigger number of elementary schools (Długoborski, 1966: 426). The reemergence of Czech as a language of literature may be dated back to 1785 when Václav Thám published his collection of poetry. In 1791 the Department of Czech was commenced at the Prague University and scholarly voices appeared in defence of Czech as a language of literature and administration. Obviously, due to the severed tradition of education in Czech, and to be heard, the apologias were written in Latin or German. eventually, the activists aimed at using the language to replace specific land identities within the Czech Crown with the concept of a nation which would be organized around the Czech language and/or the state structures of the Czech Crown. To achieve this goal they drew on the Hussitic tradition and the 16th century ideology which claimed that the Czech Crown was a community of lands, and peoples united by the Czech language. This appropriation of the past heralded the birth of the Czech national movement, which at first was quite royalist, as for instance, its members compared Archduke Charles (Emperor Francis II’s brother) to Jan Žižka (one of the most significant Hussite military and political leaders), in order to obtain a special status for the lands of the Czech Crown within the Habsburg monarchy (Bělina, 1993: 54/55).

Many peoples of the Habsburg Empire realized their difference vis-a-vis others during the Napoleonic Wars when many of them were displaced or served in military forces which brought them to various regions of Europe. The realization coupled with the spread of nationalist ideas spawned by

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241 Although homogenization meant introduction of German as the official language, it was a gradual process which could not be carried out in one go lest led to misunderstanding of the decisions of the administration. It is especially true of East Silesia, where due to its particular linguistic situation important documents were published in German, Czech and Polish to ensure comprehension on the part of the subjects (Długoborski, 1966: 55; Pitronowa, 1992: 51).

242 He also wanted to emulate the Prussian program of bringing settlers to underdeveloped areas, but in the case of Austrian Silesia he did not progress much. For instance, in East Silesia merely 18 settlements sprang up but only in three of them German-speakers predominated (Długoborski, 1966: 43) which was too little to significantly influence ethnic relations in this region.

243 Königsberg (Klimkowice) is a small town which was located in the Moravian salient splitting Austrian Silesia, 15 km away south-west from Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrowa).

244 The ground for this development was prepared by the spread of literacy and the establishment of German, Czech and German-Czech book clubs in the 1770s and 1780s (Bělina, 1993: 43).
the French Revolution led to emergence of the first activists who wished to construct their own nation and nation-state, especially among the German-speakers. In the 1810s, in response of the first surveys into numbers of the ethnic groups in Bohemia, the German-speaking thinker Bernhard Bolzan appealed that the inhabitants of the lands of the Czech Crown should not differentiate among themselves along the linguistic lines as Germans and Czech, but should consider themselves as Bohemians (Rak, 1993: 79). The effort to reshape earlier land identity (Bohemianism) into an all-embracing state identity failed: Czech nationalists started to perceive German-speaking Bohemians as Germanized Czechs and discard Bohemianism as an alternative to nationalism (Bělina, 1993: 56; Rak, 1993: 84). By the 1830s the Czech national movement was firmly established. In 1831 the Matice Česká (Czech School Organization) came into being to spread the knowledge of Czech among the inhabitants of the lands of the Czech Crown (Rak, 1993: 81). This development coupled with the rapid construction of railways led to the spread of the Czech nationalist ideology to Austrian Silesia which got its railway connection with Prague and Vienna in 1847 (Rak, 1993: 75).

The development of the German and Czech national movements was so strong that by 1848 almost no Polish was used as the medium of instruction at East Silesian elementary schools. All the Slavic-speaking pupils had to learn from Czech textbooks produced at Brünn (Brno) the capital of the Moravian-Silesian province (Fazan, 1991: 29). Direct contacts with Polish-speaking Galicia did not result in producing a national movement in East Silesia before 1848. The first Polish nationalist organization Złączenie Polskie (Polish Association) was established by Pawel Stalmach (1824-1891) in 1842 at the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Protestant gymnasium in response to similar German and Czech nationalist organizations which existed at the gymnasium. Its members mainly learned Polish, but the organization was discontinued when Stalmach finished the school in 1843. Andrzej Cinciala (1825-1898) established a similar organization the Towarzystwo Uczących sie, Języka Polskiego (Association of Those Who Learn Polish) at the same gymnasium in 1847, and this one existed up to 1850 (Fazan, 1991: 40-46).

The development of German, Polish and Czech national movements in Prussian and Austrian Silesia led to gradual disappearance of identification with one’s village/vicinity and the locals inhabiting such an area, as well as of identification with one’s province in favor of a national identification construed as coincidence of state borders with territorial extent of an ethnic group with blatant disregard for cohesion and existence of political entities which do not subscribe to this principle. This specific Central European strain of nationalism stood in a methodological opposition to its Western European counterpart where the states of England and France homogenized their citizenries without changing their borders. Germans and Italians could not follow this track as the territories inhabited by German and Italian-speakers were divided into myriads of contending statelets whereas some of the states encompassed large numbers of non-German and non-Italian-speakers. Hence, language and culture became one’s homeland in Central Europe. Their being more a process than stable objects, demanded active participation on the part of the interested to further or prevent diminishing of the territorial extent of their language/culture. In case of Silesia development of German nationalism alienated the Slavic segment of the province’s population who began to be perceived by German-speaking Silesians as others: Poles, Czechs and Sorbs. The rapid change from some common though vague Silesianity into the nationalist rhetoric created cleavages which were widened by the administrations of the Prussian and Habsburg states which through homogenization and modernization favored German-speakers. The facilitatory role played by the Habsburg and

245 The first Bohemian line linking Budweis (České Budějovice) and Linz was opened in 1832, and serviced by horse-drawn trains (Rak, 1993: 75).
246 Before 1848 also two Czech associations of readers were established in West Silesia, i.e. in Troppau (Opava, Opawa) and its vicinity (Gawrecka, 1993: 66).
247 The organization came into being after the Cracow Jacquerie of 1846, which was the first major social turbulence in the Austrian Empire before the outbreak of the 1848 revolution. Moreover, the Jacquerie led to the incorporation of the Cracow Republic into the Empire, and the city, as the center of the Polish national movement equal to Warsaw, exerted an enduring national impact on East Silesia after 1848.
Prussian officialdoms was largely invisible to the bureaucrats before they started consciously espousing national ideals propagated by Romanticism especially after the revolutionary events of 1848. However, the discriminatory effects generated by modernization in relation to Slavic-speaking Silesians brought about discontent which was to be utilized by Polish and Czech national movements to their own ends. The Czech and Polish national movements in Silesia were reactive to the German one, but the fact should not be overlooked that development of nationalisms in Silesia was much slower than in other Central European regions, due to that the province being rather peripheral its backward inhabitants had to be convinced through educational and intellectual contacts with their compatriots at Berlin, Cracow/Posen (Poznań) and Prague that they belong to some ethnic nations’ than to the Silesian gens.

Nationalism in the very meaning of the word started spreading in Silesia in the second half of the 19th century, especially after the founding of the united German state in 1871, and intensified to the point of rabid chauvinism at the close of World War I. The next chapter provides a sketch of the process, but now the question must be asked if any cases of ethnic cleansings had taken place in Silesia prior to 1848. The answer is no, and the above thesis on virtual lack of national identification in Silesia of this period is supported by the instances of considerable groups of Silesians who left the province due to religious persecution. Hence up to 1848 religious identity was most institutionalized in Silesia, and as such could mobilize quite a number of people who could be also a target for some hostile measures sometimes applied against these confessions which opposed policies of the ruling strata of different denomination.

The first modern religious minority who left Silesia due to persecution and discrimination were the Schwenkfelders who started leaving for the Low Countries and England in the 16th and 17th centuries. The Jesuit mission established in Silesia in 1719 persecuted the remnant still further, and some joined other Protestant Churches, some fled to Saxony, where they were protected by Count Nicolas Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1700-1760). In 1734 forty families emigrated to England, and finally thence to Pennsylvania, where, as Schwenkfelders, they have maintained a distinct existence to this day, and in 1890 numbered 306 members, with six churches (Anon., 1908a: 229; Anon, 19900; Weigelt, 1985). They were one of the earliest German-speakers who settled in North America and heralded coming of the overseas emigration from Silesia. Even earlier, because in the 17th and 18th centuries Germans were employed by the Dutch East India Company in the Cape Colony (i.e. the kernel of future South Africa). Usually they were Lutherans persecuted by Catholic princes (so some could be Silesians), and by 1806 14,000 of them had arrived (mainly from western Germany) constituting more than half of the white population at the Cape. However, they were largely Dutchified, and the origin of the present-day German minority in South Africa is dated back to the immigration of the Old Lutherans who were persecuted after the unification of the Lutheran and

248 Count Zinzendorf also invited the Moravian Brethren to his Lusatian estates, Saxony and there founded for them of Herrnhut (the Lord’s keeping’) in 1727. Because the denomination was active in Bohemia and Moravia it also included among its members some Silesians especially from the Glatz (Kladsko, Kłodzko) Margravate and the principalities of later Austrian Silesia. Due to problems with the local authorities many Brethren left for other German countries, Britain and North America. Also a group of them, like the Schwenkfelders, went to America in 1734 where they settled in Savannah, Georgia, and moved to Pennsylvania six years later. About 1740 other Brethren, immigrating in groups, settled Bethlehem, Nazareth, and other Pennsylvanian towns. Another group founded Salem (now part of Winston-Salem), North Carolina, in 1766. For a full century, residence in Moravian communities was closed to outsiders, but this policy was abandoned after 1856. The Moravians have maintained numerous missions throughout the world and in 1900 the church had 131 congregations in the foreign mission field, with a total of 95,424 members and 32,464 communicants. In the mid-1980s the Moravian Church in America reported c. 54,000 members and 155 separate churches (Anon., 1908b: 303/304; Anon., 1992p: 72; Thorne, 1975: II 1394).

249 Despite Friedrich II’s appeals they did not decide to return to Silesia after the province was seized by Prussia in 1740.
Reformed Churches which was carried out in 1817 in Prussia\(^{250}\) (Pletsen, 1989: 69/70; Trümpelmann, 1972: 176) though some individuals who came to South Africa from Prussia in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars were impoverished soldiers, and after 1848 people looking for better economic prospects overseas. Certainly, some of them were Silesians predominantly German-speaking but also Slavic-speaking\(^{251}\) (Zukowski, 1994: 106, 109). In 1912 there were German-speaking persons in South Africa (Trümpelmann, 1972a: 186).

Emigration became a plausible option in Central Europe during the first half of the 19th century with industrialization and development of means of transport on one hand, and thanks to increased mobility of rural population after abolition of serfdom, on the other. Between 1838 and 1841, when the Old Lutherans became a legally recognized ecclesiastical body in Prussia, many groups left for the United States, Canada and Australia (Anon., 1908c: 748; Anon., 1990n: 401; Smith, 1979). Consequently, in the 1840s many Silesians became interested in overseas emigration especially in south-west Lower Silesia which had been the most densely populated industrial center of the province specializing in manufacturing of textiles and glass products. After the Napoleonic Wars it steadily declined which resulted in high rates of unemployment. The social and economic problems were deepened by the 1848 revolution and its aftermath which contributed to the emigration rash which lasted until the end of the 1850s (Brozek, 1969a: 1/2). Considering Australia, a considerable group of Old Lutherans from Silesia, Brandenburg and the Province of Posen left for South Australia in 1836 under the leadership of Rev. August Kavel from the village of Klemzig (Klüpsk), Brandenburg. They established a village called Klemzig 8 km from Adelaide. By 1845, over 1,200 Germans had arrived in the colony and in 1901 they numbered 26,000 (Harmstorf, 1988: 478/479, 481). In 1847 the emigration agent William Westgarth recruited Germans in Silesia and Saxony. The first arrivals in 1849 numbered 451, and by 1850 750 had arrived, many settling together at Germantown (Grovedale), south of Geelong. However, especially in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution Germans and German-speaking Jews started arriving in Victoria attracted by the discovery of gold. In 1861 there were 10,148 Germans in Victoria, 5,467 in New South Wales, and 2,124 in Queensland\(^{252}\) (Jeffries, 1988: 484). Moreover, it is reckoned that in the 1838 group of Old Lutherans brought to South Australia by Rev. Kavel there was at least one Polish-speaking family. Four years later a Silesian Catholic settlement named Sevenhill was established about 120 km north of Adelaide, including some Polish-speaking families. 25 more families arrived in 1856 and mostly occupied Hill River Valley, later named Polish Hill River. This community reached about 65 families or 400 people in the 1880s (Paszkowski, 1988: 735). The ethnic mix represented by Silesian immigrants, after 1848 was enriched by c. 400 Sorb families, and undoubtedly some of them came from Silesia (Burger, 1988: 846).

The early emigration from Silesia was limited in numbers because at that time few people had at their disposal necessary means to cover their travel expenses and the costs of starting a new life overseas. It was a viable option only for richer individuals and religious dissenters supported by monied aristocrats. Although Silesian emigrants started leaving their homeland later than inhabitants of the west German countries and West Europe the economic center of the continent, they placed themselves in the forefront of emigrant waves from the Polish territories and East-Central Europe which were to surge only in the second half of the 19th century due to the eastward growth of the railway network and late abolishment of serfdom (e.g. in 1864 in Congress Poland). It is difficult to

\(^{250}\) The Old Lutherans were the members of the Lutheran Church who did not accept the union (Anon., 1908c: 748).

\(^{251}\) Among the first Polish-speaking Silesians who ventured into South Africa in the 16th century one should enumerate the traveller Count Pawel Palczowski (died after 1609) from the Oswiecim (Auschwitz) principality (Zukowski, 1994: 61). He probably was born in Silesia as the principality was incorporated into the Polish territory only in 1564.

\(^{252}\) The presence of Germans in Queensland dates back to 1838 when under the auspices of Rev. J. Dunmore Lang, a brotherhood of Moravian missionaries sailed from Scotland to Sydney, and established the first free settlement in the inhospitable shores of the Moreton Bay penal outpost (Corkhill, 1988: 486).
assess the ethnic background of the early Silesian emigrants because national ideologies had not homogenized their identities yet. However, it is safe to assume that the majority of them as coming from south-west Silesia, had to be German-speaking but there must have been among them Polish-speakers, Sorb-speakers and Czech-speakers who also inhabited this part of the province and were attracted by the example of their German-speaking neighbors, family members or coreligionists.

The chapter being devoted to the question of ethnicity and the early forming of national identities (or rather conditions which were to facilitate the development of various national identities in the second half of the 19th century), it is rounded up with a brief survey of the linguistic situation in Silesia, which remained largely unchanged until 1945. The territorial distribution of languages and their dialects was used to determine/impose nationalethnic identity on the Silesians in the second half of the 19th century and in the 20th century largely discarding the opinion of an individual if one wants to espouse such an identity or not. Thus the inclusive land/regional identity was supplanted with linguistic cleavages which were to generate vast ethnic cleansings in later times.

Having sketched the territorial distribution of the German and Slavic-speakers in Silesia as well as the problem of biand multilinguality in pre-national times earlier in this chapter, there is no need to reiterate the arguments here, which allows the author to concentrate on the linguistic description of the languages and dialects used in Silesia.

Silesian German was formed on the basis of the dialects from Thuringia and Meissen, with additional contributions from Hesse-Franconia and other Low and High German sources. Before the standardization of the German language and enforcement of the use of the standard version through education and mass media, Silesian German not unlike Bavarian German was a whole spectrum of dialects varying from the mountains to the lowlands, and in the west, north and south (Birke, 1968: 16). The Silesian dialect belongs to the Middle German subgroup of High German. In the first decades of the 20th century it was spoken in: Prussian and Austrian Silesia, the south-west of the province of Posen (Poznań), south-eastern Lusatia, and in the extreme north of Bohemia and Moravia (i.e. in the so-called northern Sudetenland) (Anon., 1990r: 319; Glück, 1993: 136; König, 1978: 138). Obviously, in many parts of Lusatia, Wielkopolska, Upper Silesia and West Silesia the use of German and Silesian German was limited to towns and German settlement areas. By the same

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253 The regional Silesian identity was a real factor in the first half of the 19th century and was successfully used by Friedrich Wilhelm III to mobilize the Silesians for the struggle against Napoleon. In his famous address An mein Volk (To My People), delivered on March 17, 1813, on the occasion of Prussian re-entry into the war, he specifically appealed to the separate regional peoples of his Kingdom: the Brandenburgers, Prussians, Silesians and Lithuanians for a common effort against the common oppressor. The effectiveness of this appeal proves that nationalist loyalty to the people sharing the same language was still to be developed while at that time the citizen preferred to be identified with his locality, his small homeland, his Heimat. At that time the King’s Polish-speaking subjects thought of themselves, not as Prussian Poles but as Polish Prussians - a phrase which in later times would have been considered a contradiction in terms (Davies, 1991: II 131/132).

254 In the simplified linguistic survey the term language encompasses all the dialects which show some peculiar features which allow to classify them as its dialects. So in the light of this model the Polish language consists from Wielkopolska Polish, Silesian Polish, Mazovian Polish, Lvovian Polish etc., while German from Silesian German, Bavarian German, Allemannic German, Low German etc. However, Silesian German or Polish is not a single homogenous dialect but rather a whole spectrum of dialects which gradually change from village to village. One usually speaks about dialects from the point of view of regions as their separate histories tended to shape a language in coherently distinctive ways, hence such an abstract category is useful for general descriptions as this one attempted in this study. But the reader is urged to remember that there is not any Silesian German or Polish but numerous dialects of Silesian towns and villages which due to some shared features are brought under the umbrella of the sweeping terms. Lastly, when the literary, written form of a language is mentioned it is dubbed as standard German/Polish.

255 The province of Posen (Poznań) as well as the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) and Posnania are the German administrative/traditional names for the region of Wielkopolska.
token German and Silesian German were spoken in the few settlements in western Malopolska256 and south-western Congress Poland. The area of German Silesian crossed many political and language borders, hence its dialects were quite varied (cf.: Lubos, 1967: II maps bet. pp. 450/451) and even turned into pidgins/creoles interlaced with Slavic loan words, phrases and syntax, especially in Upper Silesia (cf.: Kaluza In Höntsch, 1992: 196/197). In the north-west there was a considerable transitional area between Silesian and Brandenburgian German, which was paralleled by the linguistic borderland between Silesian and Upper Saxon (Lusatian) German in the south-west (Glück, 1993: 136) while on the Bohemian and Moravian side of the Sudets, linguists distinguish North Bohemian, East Bohemian and Moravian dialects of Silesian German257 (Hemmerle, 1992: 302).

Despite emergence of the standard German language, German dialects were encouraged by the existence of a plethora of German states and satelets up to the unification of Germany in 1871 where regionalism was not suppressed and survives to this day as the guarantor of democracy against centralizing authoritarianism. In this situation it was possible for Karl von Holtei (1798-1880) to write and publish his Schlesische Gedichte (Silesian Poems, 1829/1830) in the dialect on the direct encouragement from Goethe (Maliszewski, 1993: 192/193). Since that time onward, Silesian German was viewed as a recognized medium of literary expression. It was commonly used to depict the speech of the Silesian everyman, and in 1892 Gerhart Hauptmann (1862-1946) published his most famous play The Weavers258 in Silesian German before translating it into standard German (Lubos, 1974: III 107). At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and especially in the first half of the 20th century, Hauptmann and Holtei were followed by a multitude of poets and humorists who wrote in Silesian German and even in some very specific dialects of Silesian German. The most renowned are Ernst Schenke, Hans Rößler, and Hermann Kittelman. In the Silesian German literature there is a distinctive branch of writers who employed Sudetenland (i.e. North Bohemian, North Moravian and Austrian Silesian) Silesian German in their writings. They are represented by Erwin Weiser, Fritz Eichler, and Ferdinand Hanusch among many others (Hemmerle, 1992: 303; Lubos, 1974: III 438-452).

This elevation of dialect did not take place in the case of Slavic dialects spoken in Silesia. In the time when German prevailed as the official language in Silesia, automatically the status of other languages became lower and their use limited to the circle of one’s family, friends and neighbors. The stigma attached to the Slavic dialects/languages in Silesia was deepened by and reaffirmed by the social division which showed up among urban population in ethnically/linguistically mixed areas where the rich and the middle class spoke German whereas the poor were Slavic-speakers. However, before delving into the question of linguistic prejudices and stereotypes it is necessary to have a look at the interrelations of the dialects of Polish, Czech and Sorbian which were used in Silesia.

Silesian Polish as the vernacular of the province of Silesia obviously interfered with Wielkopolska and Malopolska Polish. The linguistic borderland of transitory dialects between Silesian and Wielkopolska Polish is constituted mainly by the southern Wielkopolska counties, i.e.:
Wschowa (Fraustadt), Rawicz (Rawitsch)\textsuperscript{259}, Ostrów (Ostrowo), Ostrzeszów (Schildberg) and Syców (Gross Wartenberg) though it seems that at the beginning of the 20th century the borderland extended farther north from Kalisz (Kalisch), via Ostrowo (Ostrów), Krotoschin (Krotoszin), Gostyn (Gostyń), to Lissa (Leszno), and even to Wollstein (Wolsztyn)\textsuperscript{360} and Bomst (Babimost)\textsuperscript{361}. At present, due to the postwar migrations, some features of Silesian Polish infiltrated Wielkopolska farther north (Gruchmanowa, 1981: 5-10). However, considering the present northern extent of Silesian Polish, it extends in the form of a narrow strip north-east of Międzybórz (Neumittelwalde) and east of Syców (Gross Wartenberg), southward along the Wielkopolkska border east of Rychtal (Reichthal) and Namysłów (Namslau), and reaches the Odra (Oder) north of Brzeg (Brieg) near the mouth of the Stobrawa (Stober). It continues up the Odra (Oder) to the mouth of the Nysa Klodzka (Glatzer Neisse), and then the border of Silesian Polish runs east of Niemodlin (Falkenberg) (Bąk In: Pluta, 1993: 69). The western border of Silesian Polish was delimited by the fluctuating areas predominantly inhabited by German and Polish-speaking Silesians. The alterations from the 10th to the 19th century are dealt with in detail in this chapter, but regarding the present-day western and southern border of Silesian Polish: running east of Niemodlin (Falkenberg) it approaches Prudnik (Neustadt) and Głubczyce (Leobschütz, Hlupčic) to Jablunka (Jablonków). West of the strip Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech is spoken, and east of it Silesian Polish. Moreover, in the south of East Silesia and across the border in northern Slovakia (i.e. in the region of Čadca (Csaca)), there is another transitory area among Silesian Polish, Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech and North-Western Slovak. The meeting point between Silesian Polish and North-Western Slovak resulted in the development of specific Highlander Silesian spoken by the inhabitants of the Silesian Beskids (Gren, 1995: 3/4; Lipowski, 1992: 115-118; Pluta, 1993: 69; Rospond, 1984: 418). Regarding the Silesian transitory areas among various Western Slavic languages it is worthwhile mentioning the borderland between Silesian and Wielkopolska Polish, and Sorbian. Probably up to the 17th century the transitory dialects ranged from Zbąszyń (Bentschen) in the south-western Wilekopolska and the vicinity of Grünberg (Zielona Góra) to the eastern limit of Lower Sorbian dialects running from the mouth of the Pleiske (Pliszka) to Crossen (Krosno) and along the

\textsuperscript{259} Several villages in this county have been populated to this day by the so-called Chazaks who have spoken their specific dialect of Silesian Polish. They may be descendants of the 16th-century north Silesian settlers who used to fell forests in this area (Gruchmanowa, 1981: 9; Pluta, 1993: 69).

\textsuperscript{260} In the mid-18th century a group of Silesians and Bohemians settled there which is proved by the fact that in 1785 they established their own Protestant school (Gruchmanowa, 1981: 9).

\textsuperscript{261} It seems that this enclave of Silesian Polish in the region of Bomst (Babimost) or more exactly in the village of Altreben (Chwalim) came into being before the Prussian conquest in 1740, when the Polish-speaking Protestants from the vicinity of Grünberg (Zielona Góra) started crossing the Polish-Habsburg border to participate in Protestant celebrations. Some of them must have settled there (especially in the 17th century) Silesianizing the features of the Wielkopolska Polish dialect spoken there. Now the Silesian Polish dialect of Chwalim (Altreben) is extinct (Gruchmanowa, 1981: 7/8; Pluta, 1993: 69).

\textsuperscript{262} The longish label Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech is used here to appropriately depict the linguistic situation of Austrian Silesia. From the commonsensical point of view the dialects of Czech spoken in Austrian Silesia should be described as Silesian, however the crownland being so diminutive in size and cut in two by the Moravian wedge, there are often no major differences between Silesian and Northern Moravian dialects of Czech.
Bober (Bóbr) (Gruchmanowa, 1981: 11). Obviously with the disappearance of Slavic-speakers in this region the transitory Slavic dialects also passed into oblivion.

From the synchronic point of view Silesian Polish developed separately from other Polish dialects since the 14th/15th century, therefore, it retained some peculiar linguistic features which do not occur in modern standard Polish though were still common in the 16th-century standard Polish. On the other hand, because Czech and German were used as official languages of Silesia, many loanwords and loan phrases entered Silesian Polish from these two languages. Most loans from Czech can be observed in Silesian Polish spoken in southern Upper Silesia and former East Silesia as the area of intensive interaction between Czech and Polish. By the same token many a Polish loanword and loan phrase entered Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech spoken in former West and East Silesia, and in the Moravian wedge between them. At present the influence of standard Czech and standard Polish furthered by education and mass media altered the situation in this manner that the native inhabitants of former East Silesia on the Polish side of the border tend to speak in Polonized standard Czech and in Czechized standard Polish on the other side of the border (Lipowski, 1992: 13).

More German loanwords, loan phrases and even syntactical loans (Brückner, 1991: 174; Miodek, 1991: 21-25) were observed in Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech spoken in West Silesia and southern Upper Silesia, and in Silesian Polish in the whole of Upper Silesia but especially in the industrial cities where German interference furthered by the educational system, mass media, and the state, municipal and factory administrations was the strongest. Standard German prevailing as the medium of intercourse degraded the social status of Silesian Polish and Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech. They were labelled as kitchen languages not worth speaking by the educated. The disrespect connected to speaking them and the necessity to be able to communicate in German were so strong in cities that Slavic-speakers became functionally bilingual. However, lack of sustained formal education in German led to the coming into being of numerous Slavic-German pidgins which got rapidly creolized. Usually they used Silesian Polish and Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech syntax and inflection with a plethora of German loanwords loan phrases, and elements of German syntax. Such Silesian creoles where the base were Slavic or German dialects were observed in earlier centuries but only in the 19th century their presence was so definitely felt due to rapidly increasing urban groups who used them. The Polish Silesian-German and Northern Moravian (Silesian) Czech-German creoles became the butt of ridicule and prejudice as the language of barbarians who would not be understood if they spoke in Cracow or Brünn (Brno) (Pallas, 1972: 91). The two groups of creoles were named as Wasserpolnisch and Mährisch (Moravian) while their users as Wasserpolen and Mährer/Morawzen (Pallas, 1972: 89, 98). There were efforts to translate German poetry into Silesian Polish-German creoles (Brückner, 1991: 174/175; Pallas, 1972: 95) which could have led to the

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263 Silesian creoles with German as the base disappeared with the firm introduction of German as the official language in the place of Latin, and with development of popular education with German as the medium of instruction. Anyway it seems that because German had been a high status language in Silesia since 13th/14th century rarely any German pidgins were creolized, and even if it happened, they were usually rapidly relexicalized.

264 Wasserpolen became Wasserpolacken when it was used as the term of abuse. Interestingly, until this day there is no consensus what is the origin of the word Wasserpolnisch. Probably, it was used for the first times in 1664 by north-eastern Lower Silesian pastor Adam Gdaczus (Gdaczus) (Pallas, 1972: 89). Some researchers claim that the term is derived from the phrase verwässerter Dialekt (watered-down, i.e. diluted dialect) (Niekrawietz In: Wopiński, 1970: 110), others that it was speech used by Upper Silesian raftsmen who ventured into the German-speaking areas by the waterway of the Oder (Odra) and due to their otherness were dubbed as Wasserpolen (Water Poles) (Pallas, 1972: 90). More recent explanations maintain that early observers might name Silesian Polish dialects in Latin as idioma quadico-polonicum because in the medieval manner the Silesians were considered to be descendants of the Germanic people of Quadi, hence it would be the vernacular of the Polish-speaking Silesians. Later there could be a mistake in the transcription of the term which would lead to a new coinage idiom aquatico-polonicum, i.e. Wasserpolnisch (Pallas, 1972: 90/91). However, only the existence of the latter Latin label is attested because it was used in 1705 (Rospond, 1972: 139). Thus all the explanations are just tentative hypotheses.
emergence of standard Silesian as a pivot around which the Upper Silesian nation would have been built (Kloskowska, 1996: 234), but the possibility was not appealing neither to the German nor Polish nationalists and they its consistent use. A little different situation prevailed in the case of Northern Moravian (Silesian) Czech dialects and Northern Moravian (Silesian) Czech-German creoles which were allowed to be used in church at schools and in papers under the name of Moravian by the Austrian authorities (Nowak, 1995: 27, 37; Pallas, 1972: 99; Zahradnik, 1989: 20). When it was noticed that the support of the creoles and dialects may trigger off the establishment of some standard Moravian, in 1873 the authorities limited its use at school to religion lessons only (Pallas, 1972: 99). However, unlike the Prussians the Austrians were not too strict with abolishing Moravian as it let them counterbalance the influence of Polish and Czech nationalisms in East Silesia. This policy allowed reaffirmation of the West Silesian identity after the break-up of Austro-Hungary leading to failed attempts at preserving West Silesia as an autonomous homeland within Poland, Czechoslovakia or Germany, or even at turning the whole of Austrian Silesia into an independent state of the postulated Lachian nation. In the process West Silesians who spoke West Silesian Polish dialects and West Silesian Polish-German creoles also wanted to emphasize their identity and started to refer to their speech as Schlonsakisch and to themselves as Schlonsaken\(^{265}\) (Nowak, 1995; Pallas, 1972: 101). In the period of intensified nationalist struggle in Silesia (1916-1948) Wasserpolnisch\(^ {266}\), Mährisch and Schlonsakisch were used by German propaganda as the linguistic tools of separating their speakers from the Poles and Czechs while promoting their unity with Germandom where they were invited as eigensprachige Kulturelle Deutsche (Germans from the cultural point of view, but with their own language)\(^ {267}\) (Pallas, 1972: 97).

To recapitulate, the linguistic situation in Silesia was as normally complicated\(^ {268}\) as elsewhere in Europe before the rise of homogenizing states and national ideologies. The initial interplay of Latin, German and Czech as official languages of the province left Prussian and Austrian Silesia with the distinctive dominance of German in official life and state offices. The ethnic relations in Silesia were distinctly altered due to the process of colonization and to the high social status of German Lower Silesia became inhabited almost solely by German-speaking Silesians. Various Silesian German dialects were submerged if not suppressed by the dominance of standard German whereas dialectical differentiation continued among Polish-, Czechand Sorbian-speaking Silesians. The first had not had any direct link with standard Polish since the 14th/15th century, the second lived in the periphery of the Czech-speaking area and their standard language was suppressed after the Battle of White Mountain (1620), and the last also lived on the edge of the Sorbian-speaking zone while the Sorbs as the ethnic group could not develop a standard Sorbian being divided among many political entities. Speakers of the diversified Slavic dialects had to communicate and coexist with German-speaking Silesians so the cases of Slavicization and Germanization took place whereas frequent situations demanding communication at the business level gave rise to fleeting German-Slavic and Slavic-German pidgins, some of which were creolized and usually quickly relexicalized. Only with industrialization and urbanization especially of eastern Upper Silesia in the second half of the 19th century, German-Slavic creoles became distinctly visible not unlike similar creoles and some Slavic

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\(^{265}\) Schlonsak (pl. Schlonsaken) is the Polish word Ślązak (Silesian) spelled phonetically in German.

\(^{266}\) Pradoxically, the Prussian and German authorities argued that Polish-speaking Silesians should attend German schools because they spoke Wasserpolnisch not standard Polish, while in 1918 when Polish nationalists started canvassing for incorporation of Upper Silesia into the would-be Polish state, there were proposals forwarded that Wasserpolnisch ought to be introduced to Upper Silesian schools (Pallas, 1972: 97), obviously in order to lessen the influence of Polish nationalism in Upper Silesia.

\(^{267}\) The same functional approach was used towards other linguistic minorities inhabiting Germany, e.g.: the Mazurs, Kashubs, Sorbs, Frizians and Danes (Pallas, 1972: 97).

\(^{268}\) The oxymoron is used intentionally to make the reader realize that the majority of those steeped in Euro-American/global culture have internalized the idea of unilingual nation-state as natural, and that plurality of languages and language forms on the territory of a state seems abnormal and backward (as usual of non-Western countries) to them.
dialects in Austrian Silesia where their use was encouraged by the state and Church. The creoles and dialects were pre-standard languages as due to their elevation as identity axes for some groups of the Silesian population, they stood a chance of becoming standard languages (or more appropriately ethnolects) with their own literatures, on the bases of which autonomous regions and even distinctive nation-states could have been constructed. Their role was limited by educated biand even multilingualism and the conscious homogenizing language planning policies of Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the linguistic and ethnic make-up of Silesia was tragically altered by the division of Austrian and Prussian Silesia after 1918, Hitler’s population policies during World War II, and especially by the expulsion of German-speaking Silesians after 1945. But many stereotypes developed in the past still prevail determining Silesia’s present linguistic situation and thinking about it.

Although the chapter was intended to describe the ethnic make-up of Silesia only up to 1848, it was indispensable to present some later facts and developments not to lose lucidity of the argument. For instance, there were no nationwide/ethnic statistics based on censuses in the first half of the 19th century, because it became the standard procedure to carry them out as one of the methods of nationalist struggle only at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Moreover, it was more advisable to present some issues (especially those pertaining to language use) in wider time brackets in order not

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265 It is assumed that languages are mutually unintelligible unlike dialects of a language. However, a language as a political entity, may be made from a dialect to support existence of a some newly-established state. For instance, Romanian and Moldavian are considered to be two languages at the political plane, but in the terms of linguistic they are dialects of one language. On the other hand, Chinese dialects actually are languages which are united through the same system of writing and unitary language policy of state. In the case many dialects of Silesian Polish and Northern Moravian/Silesian Czech are closer to each other than to standard Polish and standard Czech, respectively. Moreover, remaining German-Silesian Polish creoles in Upper Silesia are so different that they may appear different languages to a standard-Polish-speaker (cf.: Szymutko, 1996: 15). Thus, in linguistics one distinguishes between dialects using the commonsensical though often subjective yardstick of intelligibility, but when a linguist wishes to describe the political role of a language/dialect, he speaks about ethnolects. Ethnolect is a language, dialect or creole which is used to emphasize the ethnic difference. In this way, the fruitless application of political and propagandistic terminology is avoided in the field of linguistics.

270 Educated bi- or multilingualism means that a person is able to speak/use two or more standard languages. In the cases where a person attended a school with one language of instruction different than his own, usually he acquires the language of instruction as the standard language whereas his home tongue - a dialect or creole is pushed aside as uncultured or not facilitating his career in the world of modern state and business bureaucracy based on non-contextual messages. In such a situation one can speak about mixed uneducated and educated bi- or multilingualism because different language forms used by a person has unequal statuses. Consequently, the standard language introduced by the educational system, if it even is not a person’s mother tongue, may eventually replace the dialects/creoles he spoke when he is successful in his career made possible by the medium of the standard language. However, if a person fails to enter the world of the standard language and stays at its edge, his knowledge of the standard language gets creolized if not completely forgotten. This situation may be dubbed as uneducated bi-multilingualism, where a person speaks no standard language but various dialects/creoles belonging to the spheres of different standard languages. Certainly, these are the ideal model and in real life one can observe interferences between all the cases. For example, at present when the Silesian has to do predominantly with standard languages only, through the educational system and the mass media, he tends not to speak in dialects but rather in standard languages. However, usually he does not know the standard languages well enough due to the lack of bi- or multilingual schools, so he is proficient only in one standard language, e.g. Polish, while the other standard languages he attempts to use (Czech, German and Slovak) are often more or less heavily Polonized in the spheres of syntax, lexemes or accentuation, and vice versa. The same phenomenon applies to dialects and creoles. The present-day educated Silesian uses them in versions less or more heavily influenced by the standard language of his education or just superficially stylizes his standard language to look like a dialect with a few unsystematic changes in pronunciation and vocabulary.

271 Silesian German, Silesian Polish, Northern Moravian /Silesian czech, Lachian, as well as largely relexicalized German-Slavic creoles are still used as the medium of expression by few writers who employ them in poetry, but mainly for producing anecdotes and local color stories.
to distort coherence of further chapters with too frequent resorting to explaining some technical matters which constitute the background of the study, and not its core.
**Chapter four**

The failure of Metternich’s concert of Europe and the coming into being of nationalisms in Silesia in the period 1848-1871

The uneasy calm which followed the turbulence of the French Revolution whose ideas were disseminated over Europe by the Napoleonic troops, was kept through the mutual endeavors of the European powers united for the task in the Holy Alliance. The tentative attempts at improving the fate of peasantry and education of wider strata of society coupled with growing discord among the states and empires which Metternich wished to maintain the power balance on the continent, resulted in deterioration and finally in dismantling of the elaborate system in 1848.

In the case of Central Europe, gradual termination of serfdom and the onset of industrialization increased human mobility. The changes were possible thanks to the growing role of the state whose influence on the life of the individual became dominant after the introduction of the conscript army and popular education. On the other hand the state bureaucracy grew to support and serve the two previous institutions. Thus the individual was thrown away from the post-medieval paradise of stability where one’s place under the sun was guaranteed by tradition or, the divine right in the eye of the beholder, into the completely man-made world of flux where one has to find or construct one’s own niche which, in turn, must change constantly in order to adapt to and keep up with the change.

The cataclysmic alteration overhauled the political system of Europe dismantling and transforming the old states and giving the birth to new ones, and also reorganized the manner in which the states were governed. The new dimensions of governance which appeared in the process of modernization proved to be decision-intensive, and the old government structures centered in the hands of the monarch and his coterie were not enough in number or qualifications to cope with a plethora of issues begging solution which flooded royal palaces. Willy nilly, state power (usually separated from the Church) was rigorously divided into the three branches, and had to be devolved, so that the state would not be outdistanced or absorbed by its neighbors, first into the hands of the increasing bureaucratic apparatus, and subsequently into wider societal strata in agreement of the theses of liberalism which was to pave the road for the electoral democracy as practised today. Concomitantly, growing numbers of educated people who had to use the skills of reading and writing to function in the complicating and largely interactive society, first, started aspiring to participate in governance and politics having espoused some liberal tenets, and, second, became consciously aware of their own place in the state and society vis-a-vis the Others with whom they were quite often confronted in the process of mass migrations triggered off by emancipation of serfs, industrialization and the Napoleonic Wars. The encounters with otherness appeared to be so decisive since they did not take place in the confines of the safe haven of one’s own place in the premodern world. Previously, when a Jewish merchant, Armenian tradesman, Scottish peddler, Italian itinerary craftsman, or a group of Romas had entered a village they had not posed a challenge to one’s identity as the villagers interpreted the visitors as people of different but also of their own established place in the society. On the other hand, it had not been so much significant for the peasant that his neighbor spoke a Germanic dialect and he himself a Slavic one whereas their lord Hungarian. Although he had not been unaware of speech differences (which had not too severely impede everyday communication conducted at ease through the means of creoles, pidgins and Latin in more official contexts) he had not differentiate among people on the linguistic basis but had rather used the social organization for this purpose. It changed with modernization, as the swift communication among and control over the bureaucracy, conscript army, industrial workers and the popular educational system was practical only with the conscious choice and imposition of some more widely used/intelligible idiom which would subsequently be standardized and made into a literary language with its normative lexicography and grammars, the bulk of written literature, and the status of an official language of a state.

To illustrate the process of constructing standard languages (i.e. later national languages) from local idioms it is good to remember that in 1789 50% of Frenchmen did not speak French at all, and only 12-13% spoke it correctly, at the moment of Italy’s unification (1860) only 2.5% of the
population used Italian for everyday purposes, whereas the administration of the multiplicity of German principalties and states before the unification in 1871 demanded not too many officers who together with their families and academics constituted at most 300-500 thousand readers of works in the literary vernacular, and almost certainly a much smaller number of them spoke Hochdeutsch for everyday purposes (Hobsbawm, 1990: 60/61). The rather arbitrary choice of local dialects for standardization conducted by various power centers keen on homogenizing their states (cf. the United Kingdom and France) or constructing new homogenous states (cf. Italy and Germany) was easy to accept for these segments of population who spoke akin dialects, but posed a difficult problem for those who used completely different languages. Usually, everybody who graduated from a secondary school/university or became an officer agreed to switch to the standard language, but people who stayed entrenched in their local idiom often starkly different from the standard speech and did not progress beyond elementary education, were confronted at school, in office and industrial centers with the growing linguistic otherness of their environs which was accepted and supported by the state at the cost of the different-than-the-standard-language-speakers. The latter without an appropriate command of the standard language increasingly felt to be left out, discriminated against and pushed down to the level of the underclass of second class citizens. This inability on their part to access the mainstream of society in a nation-state-in-construction, influenced by: Herder’s romantic idea that peoples unique spirits (Volksgeister) manifesting in vernaculars should be protected against disappearance and impoverishing human culture in general; and by the rise of nationalisms pegged on the standard languages often resulted in establishment of nationalist movements which sought to upgrade the social stance of the disadvantaged linguistic groups by standardizing their specific idioms in an endeavor to construct new nations who presumably would be better off in their own nation-states.

The author realizes that there are other elements which can be used as spring-board for national movements but the specificity of Central Europe where language has been most often than not equalized with nationality, largely justifies the narrow approach in the case of Silesia.

Subsequently, having presented the general pattern of modernization in the Europe of the first half the 19th century it is evident that its three constituent elements: democratization/liberalization/emancipation, industrialization/capitalism and nationalism distinguished for the analytic purpose, in reality are closely intertwined as well as their effects. Thus, although the study is most concerned with the third concept, it is indispensable to exemplify all the three with a general overview of modernization of the world and Europe in the first half of the 19th century as a broad background for better comprehension of the changes which quite dramatically hit Silesia after 1848.

Economically, militarily and politically declining Spain and Portugal which could not keep pace with the modernizing changes in the Northern European states, could exert only lax control on their New World possessions where dissent grew due to the metropolises decisions changing economic and social relations within the colonies against the will of the upper class Creoles who also were treated as the second-class citizens of the two empires in comparison to Spaniards and Portuguese born on the Iberian Peninsula (Anderson, 1994: 47-66). Moreover, the exemplars of the American and French Revolutions coupled with liberal ideals set out a course of action for the Creoles who in the period 1810-1828 established the majority of independent states in continental Latin America, as they are today (Kinder, 1978: II 52/53).

A similar process of establishment of nation-states took place in the Balkans. However, economic and social issues were not there of so much igniting character as in Latin America, and emergence of Greece and Serbia from the fold of the Ottoman Empire was predominantly based on the experience of ethnic and confessional difference as defined by the French Revolution and Herder’s language/folklore-oriented romantic philosophy whose ideas were disseminated by Serbian and Greek-speaking intellectualists and aristocrats who sojourned or received education in Western Europe and decided to construct their own respective nations and nation-states upon their return to their homelands governed by the Sublime Porte. From the chronological point of view,
Serbian nationalism which utilized memories of the medieval Greater Serbian Kingdom preserved by the Serbian Orthodox Church and of anti-Ottoman guerilla warfare of the Hajduks, was crystallized in the two popular uprisings against the Porte (1804-1812, 1815-1817) which achieved domestic autonomy for the Principality of Serbia which since that time managed to stay largely independent. The first Greek national activists having learned about the heritage of classical Greece and Byzantium from works by Western European historians appropriated it as the past of a would-be Greek nation. Later thanks to the support of Great Britain, Russia and France their initially destined for failure War of Liberation (1821-1829) ended in the establishment of the independent Republic of Greece in the wake of the 1829 Peace of Adrianople which, notably was mediated by Prussia (Anon., 1990: 309; Anon., 1990a: 178/179; Kinder, 1978: II 45).

In 1830, in agreement with the absolutist principles of the Holy Alliance, France, Great Britain and Russia issued the London Protocol, which negated the Greek constitution and declared Greece an autonomous kingdom under their united protection (Anon, 1990a: 179). However, due to the Austrian-Russian conflicts over the spheres of influence in South-Eastern Europe the Alliance ceased to have any real significance after the turn of the 1820s and 1830s (Anon. 1990b: 163; Kinder, 1978: II 45). The elaborate political system established at the Congress of Vienna (1815) started to unravel with the emergence of new states, growing weakness of the Ottoman Empire which opened the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions as well as the Middle East for European penetration, and increasing discord among Austria, Russia and Prussia. In the situation of relaxed control liberal forces manifested themselves in the French Revolution of 1830 (July 26-29) which was caused by Charles X’s (ruled 1824-1830) who strove to limit the prerogatives of the Chamber of Deputies, and civic freedoms stemming from the time of the French Revolution. Consequently, he was deposed and the status quo of the restoration monarchy was reintroduced by Louis Philippe I (ruled 1830-1848) (Anon., 1990c: 440) but not without new concessions for the propertied bourgeoisie which broadened the suffrage (Kinder, 1978: II 49). Moreover, under the influence of the July Revolution the United Kingdom of the Netherlands split into Belgium and Holland when on October 4, 1830 the former declared its independence which amounted to a major breach of the decisions reached at the Congress of Vienna. In the face of the fait accompli Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain decided to recognize the new state instead of trying to reestablish the congress system status quo (Anon., 1990d: 407). Moreover, the July Revolution triggered off unrest in various German states which in the period 1830-1831 caused the establishment of constitutions in Saxony, Hanover, Brunswick and Hesse-Kassel, as well as, in 1832, moved the Geonese Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) to establish the secret society Giovane Italia (Young Italy) which sought to bring about unification of Italy. In turn liberal and national elements in Austria and Prussia received a renewed impetus after the period of increasing absolutism (1815-1830) (Kinder, 1978: II 51).

The influence of the French events of 1830 was also felt in western Russia where the Congress Kingdom of Poland staged the November Uprising (1830-1831) against the Russian dominance. It was suppressed and after Pope Gregory XVI (1831-1846) explicitly condemned it in his encyclical Cum primum of 1832, the Holy Alliance was given a new lease of life when, in 1833, Russian and Austrian negotiators attended the conference at Münchengrätz (Mnichovo Hradiště) in Bohemia, in order to make common provisions for the common suppression of any future Polish troubles. The Prussians were not slow to join them (Morley, 1952). However, the popular support for the uprising was shown especially in the less absolutist western German states (Kinder, 1978: II 44) where widely-circulated so-called Polish poems were composed and the fleeing insurrectionists found hospitality and aid on their way to France, Switzerland or Great Britain (Lang, 1989). This expression of German sympathy for the plight of the Poles reflected their hopes for a united German state which had been born during the War of Liberation (1813-1815) and not fully actualized at the Congress of Vienna, as well as expectations of liberal reorganization of the political, economic and social systems especially
in Austria and Prussia. Thus the beginning of the 1830s marks the onset of *Vormärz*\(^{272}\) which preceded the 1848 Revolution in the German Confederation.

In Silesia the years from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to 1842 were relatively uneventful. Article 13 of the Viennese Act (1815) which established the German Confederation did not provide for some common representation contrary to Count Karl vom Stein’s suggestion, but stipulated establishment of representative organs for lands and provinces. The first province parliament (*Provinziallandtag*) of Silesia convened in the Autumn of 1825. The body assembled every 2-4 years and in general was quite powerless in the post-1815 atmosphere of staunch absolutism guarded by the Holy Alliance. During the second province parliament (1828) a deputy tabled a motion to discuss the gradual suppression of Count vom Stein’s progressive reforms by Friedrich Wilhelm III (1797-1840) and his administration, and only thanks the efforts of *Oberpräsident*\(^{273}\) (Over President) Theodor von Merckel\(^{274}\) this attack against the king did not have any further repercussions. But it necessitated censorship of all motions before they could be presented before the parliament. Thus the deputies were effectively silenced and only enthronement of the new King Friedrich Wilhelm IV (1848-1861) stirred some hopes for change among Silesian liberals. Consequently, the City of Breslau (Wrocław) proposed to the sixth province parliament (1841) that the King should be reminded of the royal promise of 1815 when Friedrich Wilhelm III (ruled 1797-1840) in his *Verfassungsversprechen* (Constitutional Speech) had pledged to grant his subjects with a constitution. The motion was obviously turned down but information about it did reach the new King, and he decided to placate the anti-royal tendencies in the province by visiting the city. He came to Breslau in 1841 the centenary of Prussia’s annexation of Silesia. The King was warmly welcome by inhabitants but never came to the Silesian capital again deeming it too little loyal. It is no surprise as some of the Silesian nobility still continued to be pro-Austrian whereas Silesia and Breslau (Wrocław) had been a source of democratic impulses in Prussia not only during *Vormärz*\(^{275}\) (Neubach, 1995: 153/154).

The so far unrealized expectations of democratic reorganization of the Prussian Kingdom and unification of Germany which dated back to the War of Liberation found explicit expression among the liberals, whereas, on the other hand, lack of systemic and political reform vis-a-vis speeding-up

\(^{272}\) *Vormärz*, i.e. the period before March of 1848 when the revolutions broke out in Berlin and Vienna. In other words the term may be also translated as the prelude to the 1848 Revolution, and its consistent use in German historiography emphasizes the fact that the events which took place from 1830 to 1848 did prepare the outbreak which opened the way for new nation-states and more democracy in Europe (Neubach, 1995: 155).

\(^{273}\) After 1815, the Prussian provinces were headed by *Oberpräsidenten* (Over Presidents) while regencies by *Präsidenten* (Presidents).

\(^{274}\) He was the longest-serving *Oberpräsident* (1816-1845) in history of Silesia (Stütgen, 1976: 28), and his career may be likened to that of Metternich, as during his incumbency Merckel strove to keep law and order in the province in accordance with the principles worked out at the Congress of Vienna not unlike the Austrian statesman at the level of the continent.

\(^{275}\) The Prussian King could consider Silesia as not fully loyal also due to the existence of the Old Lutherans in the province. They were a splinter group who decided to stay away from the state-enforced union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Prussia (1817), and as such somewhat thwarted the state endeavors to homogenize Prussia which was of special significance in Silesia - a heterogenous bi-confessional, Catholic and Protestant land. Thus, it comes as no surprise that for the sake of balance the King welcome the establishment of the German Catholic Church in 1844/1845, as it a little weakened the Catholic (therefore suspect of pro-Austrian sympathies) Church in Prussia and especially in Silesia. At its apex in 1847 about 80,000 people belonged to the German Catholic Church, and it is interesting to know that the dissent which led to the emergence of the Church had predominantly come from Silesia. In 1826, Joseph Neukirch, a later Breslau (Wrocław) canon and deputy of the Silesian Provincial Parliament, sent the Breslau (Wrocław) Bishop Emanuel von Schimonsky (1824-1832) a petition in which he appealed for changes in celibacy and church ceremonies, and, most importantly, for the use of mother tongue in masses instead of Latin. In 1842 a serious critique of the Breslau (Wrocław) chapter was aired by the Grottkau (Grotków) priest Johannes Ronge, and brought about his excommunication by Breslau (Wrocław) Bishop Leopold Sedlnitzky (1836-1840). This event gave a definite impetus to establishing the German Catholic Church (Neubach, 1995: 155/154; Thorne, 1975: 1141).
industrialization and agricultural revolution led to the rapid deterioration of the social and economic situation of vast strata of the Silesian population at the beginning of the 1840s not unlike as in many other areas of the German Confederation. From the close of the 18th century the initial reforms aiming at limiting and abolishing serfdom gradually led to serious stratification of the Silesian peasantry without changing the structure of land ownership which remained largely feudal276, so that in 1840 50% of the Silesian peasants were poor or landless (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 163, 171, 178). The agricultural season workers who emerged from the poor and landless were paid poorly and their wages did not increase in pace with the rise in the cost of living brought about by mass production. It started providing one with previously luxurious goods which due to their cost previously were available only for the rich before the onset of industrialization, however, the improvement in quality of one’s life offered by new methods of production could be afforded only by reasonably well-off peasants and the middle class of clerks, teachers and qualified workers. It was them whose standard of living was really ameliorated while the poor peasants and regular workers conditions of life stayed the same or, in the eye of the beholder, rapidly worsened in comparison to the growing well-being of the better-off layers of the Silesian society.

The relative impoverishment of the Silesian countryside and workers (whose number steadily grew in the mining centers of Upper Silesia and Waldenburg (Walbrzych) but stagnated at the feet of the Sudets where the famous Silesian textile industry had been concentrated since the 16th century) became absolute when mechanization made many farm and factory hands redundant. The tense social situation where many people were left destitute and penniless was worsened by crop failures which led to a rapid hike in prices of staples in 1842 (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 341/342). In 1843, the early socialist Wilhelm Wolf from the county of Frankenstein (Ząbkowice Śląskie) described, in a series of uncensored articles published by Schlesische Zeitung, the fate of thousands of poor workers who had to succumb to living in the casemates of the fortifications surrounding the Silesian capital, which had not been used since their partial destruction by Napoleon. Under the influence of the articles new charitable societies came into being in Breslau (Wrocław) in order to alleviate the tragic poverty (Neubach, 1995: 157). However, one could come across similar situations all over the German Confederation, hence, it became clear that the wide-spread social problem overwhelmed any grass roots initiatives and demanded a systemic reform on the part of the state, especially if one took into consideration the fact that analogous circumstances, which had earlier developed in more developed areas of Europe, had led to worker and agricultural unrest in England, France and Bohemia (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 343).

In the face of this events, Friedrich Wilhelm IV seems to have trusted too much in the stability of the post-1815 Europe, masterminded by Metternich, and in the divine right of the monarch to rule not unlike other Central and East European rulers which was a contributing factor to triggering off the outbreaks of 1848. An early warning came from Silesia with the Weaver Uprising of 1844 which took place in June at the feet of Sudets in the two Lower Silesian villages of Peterswaldau (Pieszyce) and Langenbielau (Bielawa)277 in answer to the gradually more lavish lifestyle of the owners of factories, which stood in sharp contrast to the miserable poverty of their suppliers and workers the local weavers. The uprising broke out on June 3rd and was suppressed on June 5th leaving 11 killed and about 200 wounded weavers, and only 3 wounded soldiers. 87 of the c. 150 arrested insurrectionists

276 The feudal character of land ownership in Silesia remained in the province largely unchallenged up to 1848 though the distinction must be made between Lower Silesia where it was less so, and Upper Silesia where it was more so (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 163). Therefore, even after the introduction of numerous reforms reorganizing economic relations in the Silesian agriculture some remnants of feudal relations (especially great land owners) survived in Upper Silesia east of the Oder (Odra) until 1945.

277 The villages were, in reality, industrial towns, for instance, Langbielau (Bielawa) for a long time remained the largest village of Prussia with its population of 7,840 in 1825 and 12,939 in 1861 (an probably c. 14,000 in the 1840s) (Weczerka, 1977: 267/268) which, at that time, did surpass the population of the largest Upper Silesian town Oppeln (Opole) which amounted to 5,978 in 1825, 6,969 in 1840, and to c. 10,000 in 1861 (Steinert, 1995: 319).
were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment up to 9 years, and almost all of them were flogged. Despite the fact that it lasted just for three days and did not spread too widely its repercussions were heard all over Europe. The uprising gave a boost to later worker and peasant movements in Silesia and elsewhere in Germany, and started a different tradition of dissent than luddites in Great Britain, as the machines were not the target of protest (Czapliński, 1990: 463; Herzig, 1994: 506; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 341-344).

The difficult economic situation worsened by the inflexible manner of still largely absolutist governance one by one culminated in worker strikes and turbulences in Glogau (glogów) (1845), Breslau (Wrocław) (1846, 1847), Neurode (Nowa Ruda) (1847) and Königshütte (Królew ska Huta) (1847) (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 347-350). Thus, especially in the mid-1840s a few pro-worker and early socialist organizations came into being in Silesia (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 351-353) which could not be of no influence on Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), who attended a gymnasium in his native city of Breslau (Wrocław) before moving to Berlin where in 1863 he established and provided with the theoretical framework the Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeitsverein (Universal German Workingmen’s Association) which a forerunner of the later SPD (Scheuermann, 1994: I 910; Thorne, 1974: 765).

The intellectual base for Lassalle’s writings and thought was prepared in Silesia in the years 1842-1844 by such revolutionary journalist as: Johannes Ronge, Hoffmann von Fallersleben, Wilhelm Wolff, Heinrich Simon and Karl Friedrich Wilhelm Wander (except Von Fallersleben all of them were born in Silesia) who during this time vehemently criticized lack of intellectual, political, social and confessional freedom in their articles (Neubach, 1995: 158). The political-cum-social tension which swelled in Lower Silesia was not so clearly articulated in backward and predominantly Slavic-speaking Upper Silesia where the tragic poverty of the agricultural population became known to the outer world only when worsened by the recurrent incidence of famine and epidemics especially acute in 1843 and 1846 (Herzig, 1994: 494; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 391-393) which, in 1847/1848, culminated in the hunger-induced typhus epidemic. It ravaged especially the counties of Pleß (Pszczyna) and Rybnik (Rybnik) where c. 80,000 people contracted the disease and 16,000 died. Mortality was highest in the Pleß (Pszczyna) region and reached 20% (Neubach, 1995: 159; Snoch, 1991: 61). Moreover, probably a new degree was added to the radicalization of the mood among the Upper Silesian peasants instilled by the tragic conditions of life, with the news of the Cracow Uprising (February 20–March 4, 1846). It was just a pale apparition of a general Polish uprising which due defective planning and preventive arrests took off only in the Republic of Cracow and the neighbor Galician areas. The noble insurrectionists wished to show the partition powers that their aim of re-establishing the Polish state would be unanimously supported by peasantry but their armed effort was dashed by popular Jacquerie. In sum in the relatively small area of the counties of Tarnow (Tranów), Neu Sandez (Nowy Sącz), Bochnia and Sanok peasants killed c. 1,100 noble insurrectionists with their staff including six clergymen. They robbed 470 manors and 52 presbyteries, blood was shed in more than 200 localities. The peasantry suffering comparable poverty to those in Upper Silesia and East Silesia, did turn against their own lords trusting rather the Emperor to abolish serfdom than their direct oppressors. Some insurrectionists fled to Prussian Silesia but they did not receive such a warm welcome as their brethren after the November Uprising. It seems that more German intellectuals began to perceive possible re-emergence of the Polish state as a danger to the efforts aiming at unifying Germany. Fortunately, the last piece of independent Poland bordering directly on Prussia’s Upper Silesia the Republic of Cracow was scrapped with the Austro-Russian treaty of November 16, 1846 and the borders of Prussia, Austria and Russia converged in the vicinity of the Upper Silesian town of Mysłowitz (Myslowice), and this point remained the symbol of stability (and oppression in the eyes of Polish thinkers) by 1914/1918 (Davies, 1991: II 336-338; Kracik, 1996: 8; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 389).

The motive of the uprising was so appealing that it appeared several times in literature and art. It is still remembered thanks to the Silesian Nobel-prize-winner Gerhart Hauptmann’s play Die Weber (The Weavers), and to Käthe Kollwitz who immortalized the event in the series of six prints entitled The Weaver Uprising (Herzig, 1994: 505).
Similar economic, social and political problems also beset Austrian Silesia. The social, economic and political reforms which Joseph II started were carried on on a limited scale by his brother Leopold II, but the son and successor to the latter Francis II, faced with seemingly destructive effects of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars strove to maintain unity of his empire through reestablishing and reaffirming the feudal ownership of land and absolutist manner of governance, and this traditional order was to be guarded at the international arena by the Holy Alliance and its joint decisions engineered by Metternich. Therefore, discontent with freezing dismantling of the serfdom system increased especially in East Silesia (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 159/160), for instance, even after 1848 44% of all the land there was still owned just by 55 great land owners (Grobelny, 1992: 68). Pragmatically, in 1781 Joseph II united Austrian Silesia and Moravia into one crownland with the capital in Brünn (Brno) which sparked discontent in the political stratum of Austrian Silesia though some autonomous prerogatives were still preserved separately for East and West Silesia. The political pressure exerted on Vienna to separate Austrian Silesia from Moravia as a crownland on its own (Bein, 1995: 140) became more stronger with the economic and political growth of this land. East Silesia though not predominantly it was strongly Protestant and the accepted Austrian Protestant Church originated from the Upper Silesian parish of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn), and the process led to the establishment of the Department of Protestant Theology at the Vienna University in 1821 (Bein, 1995: 140). Moreover, industrialization set in especially in the north-western corner of East Silesia where the would-be Ostrau (Ostrava, Ostrowa)-Karwin (Karviná, Karwina) industrial basin was to start blooming with its numerous mining shafts and steel works in the second half of the 19th century as the largest industrial basin of the Dual Monarchy. Besides, the tradition of Silesian weaving and linen production gave rise to the biggest Austrian center of textile production at Bielitz (Bílsko, Bielsko) on the eastern border of East Silesia (Bein, 1995: 144; Pitronova, 1992: 57-58). Due to industrialization and technological advances in agriculture the Austrian Silesian population grew from 295,436 in 1798 to 443,912 in 1857 (Bein, 1995: 141) but such an increase must have led to sharp economic stratification and deprivation of the peasantry; many landless peasants appeared and the class of workers started emerging not unlike in Prussian Silesia (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 173). Poverty was somewhat mitigated in West Silesia which was largely German-speaking and better socially developed than Slavic-speaking East Silesia. The contrast between two parts of Austrian Silesia can be likened to that between Lower and Upper Silesia in Prussia. Hence it is not surprising that following the onset of the economic crisis of 1845-1848 (Prinz, 1995: 311) West Silesia fared better than especially the south-eastern mountainous and backward regions of East Silesia. Beginning from the mid-1830s recurrent potato blight started repeatedly depriving the Austrian Sileilians of their staple. Moreover, from 1844 onwards the blight was coupled with recurrent total crop failures and rinder pest. Ensuing hunger and typhus could not be relieved with outside food supplies because of the economic crisis and lack of quick means of transportation as the railroad from Vienna to Oderberg (Bohumín, Bogumin) was completed only in 1847. Mortality was highest and led to visible depopulation in the west and south of West Silesia (Pitronova, 1992: 58).

The similar concoction of social, economic and political problems developed in Prussian and Austrian Silesia, though in the latter on a smaller scale and without the presence of early socialist/worker movement. However, the ignition which was to free the pent-up tension in the revolutionary disturbances of 1848, was to come from outside, i.e. from Berlin and Vienna respectively. The unstoppable quickness with which the revolution spread to the two Silesias was possible only thanks to the construction of the above-mentioned line Vienna-Oderberg (Bohumín, Bogumin), and the railroad which between 1842 and 1848 connected Berlin with Mysłowice (Myslowice) on the Russian border in Upper Silesia via Görlitz (Zgorzelec), Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wroclaw) in Lower Silesia, and Oppeln (Opole), Gleiwitz (Gliwice) and Kattowitz (Katowice) in Upper Silesia (Koziarski, 1993: 194)\textsuperscript{279}. It was to become the economic backbone of

\textsuperscript{279} The development of railways in Austrian and Prussian Silesia was quite rapid if one takes it into consideration that the first railroad between Manchester and Liverpool was opened in 1830, and the first one on
Prussian Silesia as the Oder (Odra) had been, and majority later economic initiatives were connected more or less directly to the transportation route.

The impulse to various uprisings and unrests in Central Europe came from Paris. The prohibition of a banquet sponsoring reforms unleashed the February Revolution (February 22-24, 1848). On February 24 Louis Philippe abdicated and a group of republican leaders proclaimed the Second French Republic. The constitution adopted in November established a presidential republic with a single assembly, both president and assembly to be chosen by universal male suffrage (Anon., 1990c: 440; Kinder, 1978: II 55). Although the democratic changes were partially overturned by the creation of the Second Empire in 1852, their influence on Central Europe immersed in slightly concealed absolutism was lightening. Moreover, in the case of the Habsburg Empire it should not be forgotten that another democratizing stimulus came from Italy. In January 1848 the people of Palermo rose and drove out the forces of Ferdinand II (ruled 1830-1859), king of the Two Sicilies, who thereupon granted his Italian subjects a constitution and summoned a separate parliament for Sicily. At the same time Leopold II (ruled 1824-1859), grand duke of Tuscany, issued a constitution for his duchy, and Pope Pius IX (1846-1878) consented to a constitution for the Papal States (Anon., 1990c: 346). In the time there were also unrests in Milan, Venice and Naples (Kinder, 1978: II 55).

Considering the German-speaking states, the first sign of coming changes could be seen in Switzerland where the conflict between autocratic and democratic elements, as well as between the Protestant and Catholic areas was resolved in the domestic war of 1847 which, in the next year, coaxed the republic to adopt a new constitution based on the American model (Anon., 1990f: 69; Kinder, 1978: II 55). The first state of the German Confederation which espoused democratic ideals was Baden. Already on February 12, 1848 Friedrich Basserman spoke in the Baden parliament on unifying Germany in the form of a federal state similar to the United States. Afterwards there were aired demands of a common German parliament, freedom of speech and press as well as of reorganization of the judiciary system. It culminated in the mass rally at Manheim (February 27). The grand duke and his government vacillated and the Austrian envoy advised concessions which encouraged the subjects. The revolution facilitated by the railway network spread swiftly all over south and west Germany predominantly constituted by constitutional monarchies (Kinder, 1978: II 56) like Baden. In Baden, Württemberg, Hessen-Darmstadt, Hessen-Nassau, Hessen-Kassel, Bavaria and Saxony liberals were let into the local governments, as they were supported by peasants, artisans and workers. The freedoms of press, speech and assembly were guaranteed by newly-formed national guards. The judiciary systems were overhauled, and the liberal leaders promised all male suffrage and unification of Germany the so far unfulfilled dream born out of the War of Liberation (1813-1815). The first phase of the March Revolution was crowned with the meeting at Heidelberg (March 5), where south German liberals resolved to convene the Constituent National Assembly in Frankfurt am Mein (Czapliński, 1990: 472). So albeit the radicals (petit bourgeoisie and peasants along the Rhine, in Baden, Saxony and Silesia) and the liberal bourgeoisie of property and culture disagreed in their demands, the former aspiring to a democratic republic whereas the latter limited their aims to moderate petitions, they had in common the wish for national unification. The ad hoc assembly of the German Confederation abolished censorship, but its plans for reform came too late. The revolution spread to the larger states of Prussia and Austria (Kinder, 1978: II 57; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 489).

On March 13 students unleashed the first rising in Vienna. Metternich was forced out of his office and fled to England. Nothing could save his concert of Europe any more and his last success suppression of the Cracow Uprising had proved to be a harbinger of his unmaking. The Habsburg court expected that aged Metternich’s resignation would facilitate quick restoration of order, but quite on the contrary the revolution spread across the empire (Ehrich, 1992: 522). On the same day the first revolutionary rally took place in Berlin. On March 17 Friedrich Wilhelm IV promised concessions and the next day the demonstrators before the royal palace were shot at. Under public pressure the King withdrew the troops from the capital, paid tribute to the 230 victims of March, and promised

the continent between Linz and Budweis (České Budějovice) in 1832. However, trains were initially horse-drawn on the latter (Kinder, 1978: II 43).
a national assembly to debate the draft for a constitution and the solution to the national question. Moreover, Prussia was to become part of larger Germany (Czapliński, 1990: 474; Kinder, 1978: II 57). An unexpected unfolding came on March 20, when the revolutionaries freed the political prisoners from the notorious Moabit fortress in Berlin, and among them 254 Polish conspirators, who in 1845/1846 under the leadership of Ludwik Mierosławski (1814-1878), had got prepared to start the Prussian partition leg of the general Polish uprising which would have taken place in all the partitions. They had been condemned to harsh sentences after the gigantic trial which had lasted from August 1847 to December. Berliners answered their freeing with enthusiasm as there was a danger that Russia not touched by the revolutionary developments might decide to intervene. And Mierosławski came to fore proposing that a restored Poland would ensure security of a united Germany acting as an antemurale against the expansionist pressure from Asiá. Thus he came back to the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) where he organized a voluntary force of 10,000 Polish troops. However, two royal decisions were issued in April which divided the duchy into two parts one of which was to be given under the Polish self-government. The Polish part was rather small and, unfortunately, did not contain the capital of the duchy Posen (Poznań). Moreover, it was resolved that the duchy would be included in the German Confederation which worked against the expectations of Mierosławski and his supporters and led to the outbreak of the Wielkopolska Uprising of 1848, which was suppressed in April 1848, and the capitulation was signed on May 9 when the insurrectionists had not managed to incite the Posen (Poznań) peasantry into rebellion (Anon., 1985: 717; Czapliński, 1990: 474/475, 478; Dralle, 1991: 188/189; Jakóbczyk, 1989: 15; Neubach, 1996: 217).

In May 1848 the Constituent National Assembly was commenced in St. Paul’s Cathedral at Frankfurt am Main as well as Prussia’s National Assembly in Berlin. Both the bodies were electoral. The former was to work out the framework and a constitution for a united Germany and the latter to reorganize Prussia in accordance with the liberal ideals. On the other hand, the Habsburg Empire which had to deal with the revolutionary/nationalist unrest in its Italian provinces, Croatia, Bohemia and Hungary (which had been commenced by the March events), as well as renewed turbulences in Vienna (May) decided to convene the first elected Reichstag (Imperial Diet) in the same month. Under the leadership of the youngest deputy Hans Kudlich (1823-1917)²82, the Reichstag carried out

²⁸⁰ Preparing the uprising Mierosławski considered carrying out some military actions in Silesia in order to engage as many Prussian troops as possible hoping that in this manner he would stop/obstruct a Prussian intervention against the planned uprising. He also intended to conscript soldiers from Silesia and to establish a Silesian corps. In the Polish National Government which came into being as the result of the abortive Cracow Uprising of 1848, there was a seat reserved for a representative from Silesia but this position remained vacant (Lis, 1993: 78).

The renowned Polish nationalist, ironically (but maybe not surprisingly) was half-Polish only, as his mother was French. The fact can also explicate his militant approach to the idea of the restitution of the Polish state: via his mother he must have learned about the French Revolution which forged the French nation, and thanks to his noble father (who used to belong to the Polish political nation before the final dissolution of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795) he probably internalized the idea of starting a struggle through which an independent Poland would be reestablished. Under these influences he became a professional nationalist/democratic revolutionary and took part in the Polish November Uprising (1830/1831), incited the Cracow Uprising (1846), participated in the Wielkopolka Uprising (1848), in the anti-Habsburg rising in Sicily at the end of 1848, fought against reaction in Baden (1849), and was Commander-in-Chief during the first months of the Polish January Uprising (1863/1864) (Namier, 1992: 15).

²⁸¹ Hence the body is sometimes referred to as the Frankfurt Parliament or Assembly.

²⁸² Hans Kudlich was born on October 25, 1823 in Lobenstein (U’valno), West Silesia, as the third of eight children of a peasant family. He studied in Vienna in the years 1842-1848. In the year 1848 he was active as the member of the revolutionary Wiener Akademischen Legion (Viennese Academic Legion) and was the youngest deputy of the Reichstag (significantly, a quarter of all the deputies were peasants) where he ceaselessly appealed for full emancipation of peasants which entially was guaranteed by the imperial patent of November 7, 1848. Due to his actions and this success he was hailed Bauerbefreier (liberator of peasants). But after the suppression of the Reichstag on March 7, 1849 he escaped to Prussian Silesia where he arrived two days later.
the definitive emancipation of the peasantry which was the crucial issue for the underdeveloped (or unevenly developed) and large by large agricultural Habsburg Empire if it was to keep pace with the development of Prussia and be able to strive for hegemony in Germany. The effective solution to the peasant question lessened support of peasantry for the revolution giving the Austrian government needed breathing space. So it could deal with the uprisings in various parts of the straggling empire, which were suppressed by the end of 1848 with the exception of the Hungarian one which continued by August 1849 when it was put out with aid of the Russian troops. On October 3, 1848 the mutinous troops meant to fight in Hungary instigated the outbreak of the third uprising in Vienna. The court fled to Olmütz (Olomouc) but Windischgrätz broke the resistance of the national guard. In November the Reichstag was transferred to the provincial town of Kremsier (Kroměříž). On December 2 a further boost was given to the monarchy when mentally unbalanced Ferdinand I abdicated in favor of his nephew Francis Joseph I (ruled 1848-1916). Then on March 7, 1849 Austrian troops dispersed the Reichstag and in the same month an imposed constitution was introduced opening the way for recreation of a semblance of the pre-revolutionary status quo. In a similar but less violent manner the revolutionary movement was extinguished in Prussia. The liberal March cabinet fell in June and was replaced by a moderate one, and, in September, finally by the rather conservative cabinet of gen. Ernst von Pfuel. The storming of Vienna reinforced reactionary attitudes and the last government moved the National Assembly from Berlin to the town of Brandenburg on November 9. On November 10 gen. Wrangel placated the revolutionary mood by having stationed his 13,000 troops in Berlin. The National Assembly was dissolved on December 5, and, finally, the King imposed a constitution by decree in the same month setting the framework of the political system which, with some minor changes, survived in Prussia by 1918. Unlike Austria’s Reichstag Prussia’s National Assembly did not manage to abolish serfdom which was done away with only on March 2, 1850 with the act of the Prussian Parliament (Anon., 1992: 753; Czapliński, 1990: 486/487; Kinder, 1978: II 58-59; Lis, 1993: 83; Macartney, 1992: 706; Plaček, 1996: 19).

The revolution was concerned most with the social (mainly peasant), democratic liberal and national issues. In the Habsburg Empire and Prussia it was recognized that it was not feasible to continue the institution of serfdom at the cost of depriving newly-emerging labor-hungry industrial centers of needed workers. The second question was dealt differently in both the states. In Prussia a semblance of parliamentarian democracy was introduced whereas the Habsburg Empire opted for neo-absolutism which, with hindsight, it may be inferred that weakened the state just postponing carrying out of necessary political reforms by 1867 when the empire was transformed into the Dual Monarchy, and its political framework was based on the principles of parliamentarian democracy. Last but not least the third issue brought about by academicians and intellectuals who appealed for adopting the ideology of nationalism as the state-organizing principle, remained largely unresolved. The idea of establishing a united German state and forging a single German nation from the multitude of the Silesians, Prussians, Hessians, Austrians, Badenians, Württembergers, Saxons... (cf. Czapliński, 1990: 462; Bunsen, 1858: vii) was instigated by the general experience of otherness when following the War of the Second Coalition (1799-1802) French troops started streaming eastward gradually subduing majority of the German states. It was clearly formulated during the War of Liberation (1813-1815) when unity of the German states facilitated the defeat of Napoleon and political reorganization of the continent at the Congress of Vienna. Already then the creation of a united

Later he studied in Zurich before moving to the United States. After the amnesty of 1867 he wanted to come back to the political scene in Austro-Hungary but without any success so he returned to the United States. He died on November 11, 1917 in Hoboken near New York (Plaček, 1996; Prinz, 1995: 325).

283 It was abolished in 1851 commencing the era of neo-absolutism in the Habsburg Empire (Kinder, 1978: II 61).

284 In effect Prussia received a two-chamber parliament. The First, or Upper, Chamber, officially named the Herrenhaus (House of Lords) in 1854, was composed of representatives of the great landed proprietors (Junkers) and of the large towns, and of members nominated by the King, some for life and some with hereditary right. The Second, or Lower, Chamber was elected by all taxpayers, divided into three classes according to the taxes paid (Anon., 1992: 753; Czapliński, 1990: 487).
German state was put forward but the idea took on only the shape of the lose German Confederation which was rather Metternich’s instrument of maintaining the peaceful status quo than of forging a German nation. However, from the 1830s onwards under the influence of the nationalist ideals propagated by the secret society Giovane Italia (Young Italy) the poets of the Young Germany movement (e.g. Börne, Heine and Gutzkow) began to appeal for creating a common German state with its own German nation. The Frankfurt Parliament recognized urgency of the problem and after its commencement on May 18, 1848 started working toward establishing common bodies for the whole of the German Confederation. Already on June 29, Archduke Johannes Habsburg was chosen to the post of the Reichsverweser (Imperial Administrator). He nominated the common German government which started sending its ambassadors who were accepted just in less significant states (e.g. in the United States). The government was not supported by the largest German states which clearly indicated its unimportance on July 16, 1848 when Prussia, Austria, Hanover and Bavaria refused to hand control of their respective armies into the hands of the Frankfurt government. (Czapliński, 1990: 482; Kinder, 1978: II 51, 57; Ehrich, 1992: 526).

The fact proved that the German states were not prepared to give up prerogatives of their sovereignty to some federal body. Moreover, there were some other obstacles. First of all, the Hungarian part of the Danubian Monarchy was not included in the German Confederation at all, and the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań), and East and West Prussia were accepted into it only in 1848 (Jähnig, 1991: 121). On the other hand, in the Frankfurt Parliament there was an unusually high percentage of professors and professionals 285, thus it seems that, at the time, the idea of German unification and building a German nation was intelligible and appealing only to the highly educated who espoused the ideals of nationalism worked out by the Young movements in Italy and Central Europe. Moreover, trying to build a German state based on the tenets of nationalism was overlooking the large non-Germanic minorities in Prussia and the Habsburg Empire. The German speakers in the latter, actually, were a minority, and the ethnic composition of both the states was reflected by the members of Prussia’s National Assembly and Austria’s Reichstag. Thus, a bitter dispute ensued in which the supporters of the Großdeutsch (Great German) movement favored a federation which would include the whole of the Habsburg Empire under the leadership of a Catholic Habsburg dynasty or a unitary-democratic state (republic) which would include only German Austria; whereas those of the Kleindeutsch (Small German) movement wanted a nation-state (with exclusion of Austria) under a Protestant Prussian dynasty. Should the projects of the Großdeutsch faction been implemented the result would have been a multi-national state because even the Austrian part of the empire contained a sizeable Italian minority and also the whole ethnic groups of the Czechs and Slovenes. The Kleindeutsch faction which offered a vision of a unified German state which would comply with the tenets of nationalism, began to prevail at the end of 1848. On March 28, 1849 the Parliament passed the constitution which organized the would-be German state as an empire and offered the imperial crown to Friedrich Wilhelm IV, hence embracing the Kleindeutsch solution. The Prussian King declined the offer on April 21 (as among other considerations such a decision might legitimize the revolution and pit against Francis Joseph I), and, subsequently, Prussia and Austria recalled their deputies from the parliament which had to move to Stuttgart (May 30) where it was dispersed on June 18. Riots in defence of the constitution flared up in various German cities in May 1849. The confrontation between the pro-revolutionary and conservative forces lasted for the longest time in Bavaria’s Palatinate and in Baden 286 before Prussian troops tipped the balance in favor of the latter at

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285 Among the 586 representatives there were 223 members of the legal profession, 106 professors, 46 industrialists, 3 craftsmen and only one peasant, namely Christian Minkus from the Upper Silesian county of Rosenberg (Olesno) (Kinder, 1978: II 57; Neubach, 1995: 160; Snoch, 1991: 92).

286 Ludwik Mieroslawski, who seems to have turned a professional revolutionary, led the revolutionary troops in Baden (Czapliński, 1990: 489).

Besides making it clear how a unified German state should look like, the Frankfurt Parliament also spawned the ideals of Pangermanism in its two basic forms, namely: a multinational German state which would contain Central Europe and maybe also the Balkans with Constantinople, and a state which would contain all the Germanic peoples, i.e. apart from the German states of the German Confederation, also the Scandinavia, The Netherlands and Switzerland (Anon., 1992a: 103; Czapliński, 1990: 483). All the trends of Pangermanism and German nationalism were felt quite tangibly though in more nebulous forms even before the commencement of the Frankfurt Parliament, and brought about negative reaction of the Czechs who living in the compact area located in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia the two most developed provinces of the Danubian Monarchy, were well suited to build their own nation. They wanted reorganization of the empire where the unity of the historical provinces of the Czech Crown: Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia would be recognized (Waldenberg, 1992: 40), and espousal of the principle of equality of all nationalities within the empire. The Czech provinces were included in the German Confederation perceived in 1848 as a German proto-state. The unwillingness to come to terms with the wishes of the Czechs and Prussia’s decision to incorporate the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) in the confederation in May 1848 appeared to the Czech nationalist leaders as a danger to Slavdom, especially when it had become clear that the Frankfurt Parliament would seek to establish a German nation-state or a German-dominated state. Thus František Palacký rejected the participation of Czech representatives in the parliament, and as a counterforce he organized the Slav Congress\textsuperscript{288} (Ehrich, 1992: 522; Kinder, 1978: II 59).

In order to clearly grasp the meaning of this event, it is necessary to observe the unfolding of the Czech national movement. As sketched in the previous chapter, the decline of the use of Czech as a written language after the defeat of the Czech political nation at the Battle of White Mountain (Bíla Hora) was somewhat reverted in the second half of the 18th century with the efforts to reestablish the language as a medium of polite discourse, equal to German (Waldenberg, 1992: 40). The mainly literary endeavors underwent transformation after 1790 when the Königlich-Böhmische Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften (Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences) was established. The society was responsible for spreading the ideals of Herder, Goethe, Leibniz and Rousseau which prepared Bohemia for developing the romantic mode of writing and thinking, which, in turn, became the springboard for the nascent Czech nationalist movement. The scholar Josef Dobrovský\textsuperscript{289} (1753-1829) published his Geschichte der Böhmischen Sprache und Literatur (History of the Czech Language and History) in 1792 and in 1800 the Deutsch-böhmische Wörterbuch (German-Czech Dictionary). Josef Jungmann (1773-1829) is credited with the creation of the Czech literary language with his numerous translations from the Western European languages (cf. his model Czech translation of Milton’s Paradise Lost). In his theoretical writings he established the language as the foundation on which the Czech nation must be built. Besides, at the same time he propagated the necessity of a common Slavic language which would make the vague ideas on Panslavism into a real movement\textsuperscript{290}. Jan Kollár (1793-

\textsuperscript{287} The negative outcome of 1848 for the liberal forces triggered off massive emigration which headed rather for America than the usual havens in France, Switzerland and England. In this manner political emigration evened out the route for the subsequent economic emigration to the New World. Considering the scale of the post-1848 emigration let us consider the most striking example of Baden which was left by c. 80,000 people, i.e. 5% of its population. Obviously the percentage of the emigrants to the total population was much smaller in the bigger and less pro-democratic German states (Czapliński, 1990: 489; Kinder, 1978: II 59).

\textsuperscript{288} By the virtue of the fact that the term Pangermanism appears as Pangermanismus or Alldeutschtagt (Anon., 1992a: 103) in German, the event was also dubbed as the Panslav or All Slav Congress.

\textsuperscript{289} It seems that Josef Dobrovský pursued his research in agreement with Herder’s principle which says that all languages and cultures pegged on them, are equally valuable and should be preserved. Considering his identity Josef Jungmann called him a german of Slavic sympathies (Jungmann In Szyjkowski, 1948: 13).

\textsuperscript{290} The project of creating a common Slavic language dates back to the 16th c. In his De origine successoribusque Slavorum (On the Origin of the Present-Day Slavdom) published at Venice in 1525, V.
1852) a Slovak writing in Czech, composed original poetry, collected peasant songs, and, most importantly, believed in a union of all the Slavic peoples, of which Russia should be the head, Poland the body, Bohemia the arms and other peoples, limbs
P. J. Šafařík (1795-1861), another Slovak writing in Czech, published his Geschichte der slawischen Sprache und Literatur nach allen Mundarten (History of the Slavic Language and Literature Based on All the Dialects) at Budin in 1826 and Slovanske starozitnosti (Slavonic Antiquities, the first historical study of all the Slavic peoples) at Prague in 1836/1837, which, understandably, were used as the theoretical framework of Panslavism. František Palacký (1798-1876) is dubbed as the father of the Czech nation as his contribution to the Czech national movement was of crucial significance. After the founding of the Royal Bohemian Museum (which was based on the model of Johannem at Graz) at Prague in 1818, he together with Jungmann caused, in 1827, the Monatsschrift der Gesellschaft des vaterländische Museums in Böhmen (Journal of the Association of the Regional Museum in Bohemia) also to be published in a Czech version entitled Časopis společnosti vlasteneckého musea v Čechách. Thus the Czech language started to be noticed at the international scholarly arena. On January 1, 1831 he established Matice Česká (Czech Mother) as a scholarly institution of the Association of the Regional Museum in Bohemia. It was based on a similar institution in Serbia, and propagated the Czech language and culture through publishing numerous books and textbooks. The Matice Česká proved to be the main initial forger of the Czech national feeling and as such became a model for similar institutions in the Slavic northern areas of the Habsburg Empire in the second half of the 19th century. Thanks to its existence Jungmann could have its five-volume Czech-German dictionary published in 1835, and Palacký his monumental Geschichte von Böhmen (History of Bohemia) in 1839-1845. Palacky’s thoroughly researched and based on primary sources work, despite some short-comings, became the Bible of Czech nationalism as an ideological weapon in a nationalist strife which has been conducted by some Czech/Slavic and German historians/ideologues by this day (Alter, 1994: 44; Polišensky, 1991: 91; Schenk, 1993: 62/63; Szyjkowski, 1948: 38/39, 50, 55, 58, 60, 63/64).

Bearing in mind the development of the Czech national and Panslavic movements, which, must have been influenced by the quicker establishment of Pangermanism and the German national movement, it is no surprise that a united German state or centralized Habsburg Empire did not attract the Czech nationalists as going against their interests. In the letter of April 11, 1848 Palacký rejected

Přibojevič as well as J. Mączyński in his Lexicon latino-polonicum (Latin-Polish Dictionary) published at Königsberg (Kaliningrad) in 1564, propounded unity of all the Slavic peoples as indicated by affinity of their respective vernaculars. In 1667 the Croatian theologian Juraj Križan (1618-1683) sent a letter to Tsar Alexis (ruled 1645-1676) in which he wrote that it was necessary and quite possible to unite all the Slavs in a common state, where they would speak a common language. Later he worked out such artificial common Slav and even wrote his Polityka (Politics) in it. The idea was picked up again by S. B. Linde who presented it in the preface to his six-volume Słowik języka polskiego (Dictionary of the Polish Language) (Warsaw, 1807-1814). The next propagator was Jungmann who, like Linde in the case of Polish, introduced several thousands of Slavic loan words to his literary Czech to make it more Slavic. In sum there were at least nine projects of creating an artificial common Slavic language put froward between 1800 and 1914 (Lewaszkiewicz, 1995: 102-103).

291 The picture readily reminds one of the earlier depiction of Europe as a Christian queen, which was to promote the interests of the Habsburgs, so that in the latter Spain was the head and Bohemia the heart within the main bulk of the body - the Habsburg Empire.

292 After the clear manifestation of Czech nationalism in 1848, Palacký started broadening and translating his work into Czech. Its final eleven volumes were published between 1848 and 1876 under the tale-telling title Dějiny národa Českého v Čechách a na Moravě (History of the Czech Nation in Bohemia and Moravia) (Szyjkowski, 1948: 55).

293 For instance, quite gullibly or maybe intentionally, he used as a genuine source Vaclav Hanka’s (1791-1861) most famous forgery in the form of 12 parchment pages with epic and erotic poems in Czech from the end of the 13th century. Hanka published it in 1819, and the poems were to be a proof of high Czech literary culture in the Middle Ages which presumably surpassed in excellence the Germanic one which produced the Nibelungenlied. The forgery reaffirms the point that ancient history of modern nations has been to large extent constructed/invented by respective national movements (Schenk, 1993: 63; Szyjkowski, 1948: 43, 47).
that Slavic deputies from the Habsburg Empire should be sent to the Frankfurt Parliament, as well as the idea that the Danubian Monarchy could become part of a united German state. He rather wanted to see Vienna as the protector of Slavic peoples against Pangermanism and the westward expansion of Russia. When Eberhard von Wächte-Spittler and Ignaz Kuranda met Palacký on April 28 in order to convince him that also deputies of Slavic origin should participate in the Frankfurt Congress, he explained that Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia as the historical lands of the Czech Crown were not German and should not belong to the German Confederation. The negative attitude of the Czech nationalist movement which could endanger appropriate representation from the crownlands at Frankfurt made the medical doctor Ludwig von Löhner establish the Verein der Deutschen aus Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien zur Aufrechterhaltung ihrer Nationalität (Society of the Germans from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia for Maintenance of their Nationality) in Vienna. The organization thanks to the grass roots support managed to secure representation from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia at Frankfurt, and on the other hand, coaxed many German-speaking Bohemians, Moravians and Austrian Silesians into accepting the view that they are Germans as opposed to the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of the crownlands, which unavoidably contributed to worsening the nationalist cleavage after 1848. (Carter, 1992: 922; Ehrich, 1992: 522; Schenk, 1993: 65/66).

Palacký organized the Slav Congress with assistance of Karel Havlíček Borovský, a journalist, and František Rieger, a student of political science and economics. It commenced on June 2, 1848 at Prague. It was attended by representatives of all the Slavic peoples living in the Danubian Monarchy as well as by some Poles, Serbs, Bulgars, and the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, in sum, by 340 participants, two thirds of whom came from Bohemia and Moravia. Due to the widely varying interests propounded Palacký could not make the congress adopt his moderate program of supporting the empire as the guarantor of historical rights of its Slavic peoples. The majority passed a romantic appeal to the rulers that an all-people congress should be convened at which all the international questions would be solved, and that the Slavs of the Danubian Monarchy should be given equal rights in a reorganized empire. The congress had not reached any final resolution when its debates were disturbed by the outbreak of the Pentacost uprising at Prague (June 12). The insurrectionists fought in support of the ideals put forward by the congress but clearly against the wishes of its leaders who did not wish to attain their goals with illegal means. The unnecessary disturbance played in the hands of the Germans and the Magyars who viewed the congress with a displeasure as a danger to their own nation-building efforts. Therefore they did welcome the speedy suppression of the rising by Windischgrätz, and the capitulation of June 17 meant also the end of the congress. At that time the political manifestation of the congress was underestimated but soon in the second half of the 19th century it became clear that various Slavic national movements and Panslavism turned into the interest of Russia as Panrussianism were a distinct force which could disrupt the Danubian Monarchy as it finally happened in 1918. For the time being though Panslavism was thought to be an unrealistic utopia, among others, because the official language of the congress was German which indicated that the Slavic languages were not so close as popularly believed and/or the Slavic leaders were rather more versed in German than in their respective vernaculars. Moreover, Palacký firmly espoused only legal means of changing the status of the Czechs within the empire since he clearly did not want its dissolution. He wrote: If the Austrian state had never existed, we should, in interest of Europe and even of Humankind, try to create it. And even in 1865 just before overhauling the empire into the bipartite Austro-Hungary (without giving any concessions to the Czechs) he was convinced that the Slavs would accept the proclamation of Austro-Hungarian dualism with a regret but without fright as they had existed before Austria and would after it. He believed that the Czechs and other Slavic peoples/nations of the Habsburg Empire would be finally granted an appropriate place in its framework, and that the Danubian Monarchy with its numerous flaws is a safer place for Slavs than the world outside it. His stance was dubbed as Austroslavism (Anon., 1908: 735; Carter, 1992: 922; Czapliński, 1990: 484; Ehrich, 1992: 522; Kinder, 1978: II 59; Schenk, 1993: 66/67).

In 1849 with the suppression of the remnants of the revolutionary movements of 1848, the inner-German conflict between Austria and Prussia came to the fore. Friedrich Wilhelm IV on the advice of his aide von Radowitz strove to marginalize the significance of the Habsburg Empire for
matters German. He proposed establishing a looser confederation with Austria on the basis of a Central European customs union, within which a Kleindeutsch state would guarantee Prussia supremacy. In May 1849 at the Potsdam conference Bavaria rejected the project but Prussia together with Saxony and Hanover formed the alliance of the three kings to pursue the idea. By the end of the summer majority of the German states (with the exception of Württemberg and Baden) joined the alliance. Austria engaged in the military operation in Hungary Prussia was able to gradually carry out its union project. However, after the meeting of the emperors at Warsaw in May 1849 Tsar Nicholas I (ruled 1825-1855) promised aid to Francis Joseph I in crushing the Hungarian Uprising. And on July 10, 1849, under pressure of Russia, Great Britain and France Prussia had to conclude an armistice with Denmark in its seemingly victorious war to conquer Schleswig-Holstein. After the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising in August 1849, the Habsburg Empire was free to oppose Prussia more actively. However, on March 20, 1850, the latter state still managed to convene the Erfurt Union parliament which deliberated the draft of a constitution for a Northern German Union proposed by Prussia. Schwarzenberg representing the Danubian Monarch counteracted winning many representatives of the German states for reestablishing the German Confederation. In May they assembled in Frankfurt. The open Austro-Prussian conflict pushed Germany to the brink of a civil war but following the arbitration of the Tsar who favored Austria, Prussia had to accept the Olmütz (Olomouc) Punctuation (November 29) under the terms of which it agreed to the restitution of the German Confederation with the Habsburg Emperor at its helm294 (Czapliński, 1990: 490/491; Ehrich, 1992: 523; Kinder, 1978: II 59-61; Turner, 1992: 108).

Thus it seemed that the continent had returned to the times of Metternich, that his concert of Europe once again would prevail guaranteeing peace and stability. This point of view overlooked political mobilization of large numbers of peoples brought about by the events of the revolutionary year of 1848, as well as fortifying divisions and conflicts articulated along the ethnic lines by various nationalist movements. And last but not least, with abolishment of serfdom peasants started streaming to towns which was to give a boost to industrialization which having satiated its hunger for cheap labor force was to increase its production manifold in the next two decades. Nothing would be in Central Europe as it had been.

The broad treatment of the events of 1848 in relation to the social and political (re)organization of the German states has been indispensable as they shaped the reality of Central Europe up to 1914/1918, and Prussian and Austrian Silesia were an inseparable part of the world. The author believes that without this background it would have been necessary to mention some general German developments while explicating some fine points connected to the various nascent nationalist movements which would ethnically start polarizing Silesia by 1918. Hence in the course of the subsequent zooming the focus of the work on the land the hurdle should not impede the narrative.

Before coming to the analysis of the effects of the 1848 revolutions on Silesia, some attention, in agreement with the main theme of the book, must be devoted to the roots of the German, Polish and Czech nationalist movements in the land prior to the date.

German nationalism, which is of the oldest standing in Silesia, arrived in this province in the period following Prussia’s annexation. The first ideas defining the German nation in terms of common (peasant) culture and language started seeping to Silesia from central and western Germany. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) tentatively delimited the ethnic border between the Germans and their western neighbors fighting against French influence (which he perceived as alien) on German literature. Justus Möser (1720-1794) pitted German tradition against foreign, alien ones by praising ancient roots of the former. Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (1724-1803) celebrated love of the fatherland. They, among others, were the inventors of a vague concept of the German nation and its fatherland (at that time uneasily embodied by the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation) vis a vis

294 Schwawrzenberg would in fact have liked to create a Central European union including the whole of the Habsburg Empire. But this goal, which would have made Austria supreme in the whole of Central Europe, was unobtainable (Ehrich, 1992: 523).
the nationalizing policies more or less consciously pursued in France and England by the state. The most tangible effects of their pro-national work was the establishment of the first German national theaters mainly in response to the Théâtre-FranÇais (1680) one of the very symbols of the French (nation-)state. The earliest ones came into being at Hamburg (1767), Vienna (1776), Mannheim (1779) and Berlin (1796-1814) (Anon., 1889f: 4). A preliminary theoretical framework was lent to the nebulous concepts of the German nation by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) in his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man) (1784-1791; translated into English in 1800). He introduced the notion of Volksgeist (spirit of the people, national character) which he defined as an unconsciously creative entity manifested in vernaculars and folk songs. To translate it into the modern terminology: his ideas gave a birth to this strain of nationalism295 which concentrates on language and its manifestations as the most crucial coefficients of the nation. In agreement with his views German folk songs started to be collected and published296 translating the oral tradition into the literary one as the ancient past of the German nation under construction. However, Herder praised the value of all the vernaculars and various traditions pegged on them, so many a German scholar who brought out collections of folk songs in other languages than German297, unconsciously created the bases of other Central European nationalist movements. Simultaneously, with the development of the press and popular education in the second half of the 18th century, the literate stratum indispensable for the spread of the nationalist ideology, grew. They became the readership of the works by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). Thus national German literature in the modern meaning of the term, came into being through the mutually fortifying feedback between the increasing number of readers and multiplying production of printed texts, which at the same time spawned and standardized the literary (i.e. national) German language which started to be used by writers and readers, and enforced as the proper medium of intercourse and written expression by the school system. Under the influence of the romantic ideas propagated by the philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854) many later German romantic poets turned their attention to the sources of folk culture thought to develop in organic fashion, to possess values rooted in historical uniqueness and to be beyond all laws of reason. Subsequently, the romantic principles were transferred to music, art, literature, history, legal studies, political theory, and to new disciplines which came into being thanks to espousal of the romantic worldview by academia, i.e. philology, ethnography and religious studies (Kinder, 1978: II 32).

In this manner the idea of nation became internalized and enshrined in the general intellectual framework of the growing number of literate German-speakers at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. It started to appear natural. German thinkers strove to give it a specific meaning which would suit the goals of the nascent German nationalism best. Therefore, they clung to the familiar-

295 Notably, Herder was the first one (or one of the very first) to commit the term nationalism to the paper which he did already in 1774 (Alter, 1994: 3).

296 One of the first German collections of this kind, based on Thomas Percy’s Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (1765, 3 vols.), was published in 1777/1778, Berlin, Prussia entitled Eyn feyner kleyner Almanach voll schönnerr liblicherr Volkslieder (A Fine Small Almanach Full of Beautiful Charming Folk Songs, 2 vols.). It was followed by another one Volkslieder (Folk Songs, Leipzig, Prussia, 1778/1789, 2 vols) directly inspired by Herder. Many subsequent volumes more or less consciously exposed the idea of the German nation in their titles, e.g.: Sammlung deutscher Volkslieder (A Collection of German Folk Songs, Berlin, Prussia, 1807, with tunes) and Volkslieder der Deutschen (Folk Songs of the Germans, Mannheim, Hesse, 1834-1836, 5 vols.). First collections of folk songs in German dialects started appearing after 1817 and Schlesische Volkslieder mit Melodien (Silesian Folk Songs with Tunes) was brought out at Leipzig, Saxony in 1842 (Anon., 1890: 266/267; Drabble, 1985: 753).

297 For instance, Polish folk songs from Upper and East Silesia were published in 1863 by Julius Roger in his collection Pies’ni Ludu Polskiego w Górnym Słąsku z muzyka, (Songs of the Polish People in Upper Silesia, with Tunes, Breslau (Wroclaw)), and by Erbrich in 1869 (Breslau (Wroclaw)), and Hoffmann von Fallersleben in 1865 (Kassel, Kurhesse) (Anon., 1890: 267; Roger, 1991: LXIX).
sounding term *Volk* rather than *Nation*, derived from Latin and more at home in French than German, and as such not ideologically appropriate for a would-be German nation which had been being formed against the already established French nation. At the beginning of the 19th century, *Volk* described a political expectation of the future, when Germans including the various nations’ (or more appropriately gentes) such as Prussians, Austrians, Bavarians, Danes, Poles etc. would become a nation in its own sovereign nation-state (Woolf, 1996: 15). It is clearly visible that at that time German intellectuals did not divide the gentes of the Holy Roman Empire into the two groups of identities based on language and region as modern scholars and researchers tend to. First of all, it would be against the interest of a planned German nation-state as it would bifurcate sought unity of such a state and probably lessen its territory and population whereas on the other hand, the non-German-speaking inhabitants of the crumbling Holy Roman Empire still had not developed their respective national movements. Consequently, they were not visible as alien in the eye of the German-speaking nationalist unlike the French whose state turned in the nation-state during the French Revolution posed an immediately felt danger of a foreign, alien onslaught on the states and gentes of the Holy Roman Empire. Not unlike the German national movement which was evoked by the expansionist policies of the French nation-state under Napoleon, national movements of non-German speakers living inside the German Confederation, were to come to fore only under the homogenizing pressure of the German states which endangered the ethnic, preor rather non-national identities of the groups who used their own non-German vernaculars. Obviously, some groups of non-German speakers inhabiting the German states (such as Polish-speakers or Danish-speakers), who used vernaculars similar to those spoken by some populations outside the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire, and later the German Confederation, were, in due course, influenced by the nationalist movements established by the outside populations.

Prior to the Napoleonic onslaught, the biggest German states strove to be remodelled more in the likeness of their more politically and strategically successful western neighbors: France and England. The Prussian national anthem which was used for the first time in 1793 was based on the English original God Save the King, and the same route was followed by the Habsburgs who adopted a similar one in 1797. Subsequently, other European countries and Central European national movements developed their own national anthems which were original compositions or often adoptions of the English one in the case of monarchies (Anon., 1908c: 406). Quick development of the state structures accompanying industrialization in England and France spawned the vast stratum of bureaucrats who in turn had to be produced by increasingly popular education. This growing involvement of the state in the matters of the individual and local communities had to be translated in figures which could be processed by royal accountants to plan and balance expenditures and income of kingdoms. The most useful method was offered by statistics which was developed as a separate branch of study predominantly by German scholars at the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries. The discipline entered the service of states in 1796 when the first statistical office commenced in France in

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298 Indirectly, popularity and national correctness of the term *Volk vis a vis Nation* is clearly illustrated by the number of pages devoted in the authoritative encyclopedia *Meyers Konversations-Lexikon* (published in 1888-1890 by the Verlag des Bibliographischen Instituts at Leipzig and Vienna) to the compounds based on the words. *Volk* scores 18 pages, i.e. 4.5 times ahead of *Nation* with only four pages. The phenomenon continues to this day though it seems that after World War II compounds based on *Nation* were favored in the stead of *Volk* compromised by its too close an association with the national socialist ideology. The widely used bilingual *Oxford Duden German Dictionary* (1990, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press) records 52 collocations and compounds pegged on the former and 130 on the latter. So the usage ratio of 1:4.5 in 1890s decreased to 1:2.5 in the 1990s.

299 The very English anthem is also relatively recent as it started to be widely performed only in the early 1740s. Considering the German versions of this anthem used in Prussia and Austria, they were predated by the 1790 German translation which was carried out by Heinrich Harries, a Holstein clergyman, and sung to the original air at a birthday celebration to the honor of the King of Denmark in the same year (Anon., 1908c: 406).

300 It seems that the name of the discipline was invented by Achenwall of Göttingen (1719-1772) who wrote *Die Statistik* (Statistics) (Anon., 1908b: 695).
1796 and after the initial failure firmly reestablished in 1800. Having been espoused by France the archetypic nation-state, not unlike the national anthem, statistics became a national symbol along the national flag and coat-of-arms. The first national symbols embodied by the flag, coat-of-arms and anthem evoked symbolic unity whose nebulous center started to attract more and more individuals who learned the standardized (i.e. national) form of a vernacular through participating in the national system of popular education and in the national army, as well as by migrating, on a massive scale, to the homogenizing mills of urban industrial centers. The process was reinforced by the growth of the national press and book production in a standardized idiom, and one of its early crownings was the national statistical office which, besides fulfilling its symbolical role, became an instrument of mass control and planning. Thus, rulers aspiring to building nation-states obtained a flexible yardstick with which they could measure ethnic purity of their nations-in-construction and delimit (i.e. cut and expand) their borders so that they would converge on the state frontiers. Bavaria created its own statistical office in 1801, the Kingdom of Sardinia (i.e. the kernel of future Italy) in 1803, Prussia in 1805 and Austria in 1810. Beginning with the 1830s the practice was followed by other European states. In turn the national statistical offices ironed out the basis for modern censuses which were conducted in Sweden (since 1749), the United States (since 1790), England (since 1801), France (since 1801), Prussia (since 1816), and in the core of Kleindeutschland the German Customs Union (Zollverein) since its establishment in 1834 (Anon., 1889a: 243; Anon., 1890a: 275; Anon., 1908a: 61; Anon., 1908b: 696).

More pro-nationand pro-nation-state-building changes were forced on the German states by the attack of the revolutionary-cum-imperial France. The struggle destroyed the Holy Roman Empire and reorganized the system of the 300-odd German states whose number was reduced to about 50. Moreover, the Habsburg Empire and Prussia the two strongest members of the empire suffered crushing defeats which brought about sweeping reforms within their borders. The direct clash with the national forces of the French nation-state tangibly proved to the German states that they are a bundle of ineffective post-feudal organisms which must be overhauled to escape absorption by France. An immediate boost to this process was provided by the usually backwater and immobile (due to lingering of the serfdom system) German-speakers very experience of otherness vis-a-vis Frenchmen and dissemination of the French national thinking over the conquered territories. The shock was most felt in Prussia which after having succumbed to Napoleon in 1806 was endangered with dissolution. The ensuing reforms introduced by Karl vom Stein and his successor Karl von Hardenberg, as well as vigorous diplomatic maneuvers spared Prussia the sad fate of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. One of the most important changes was applied to the Prussian army which from a multi-ethnic force was turned into a regular national (i.e. with soldiers who were Prussian subjects) army based on the system of conscription. In this manner another element of a nation-state was added to Prussia’s nation-state-building repertoire. At the level of ideas conceptions of liberty were applied to the problems of the Germans under the impact of French dominance, which resulted in Friedrich Schiller’s (1759-1805) Jungfrau von Orleans (1801) and Wilhelm Tell (1804). Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1834) glorified the free people of Greece in their struggle against the Ottoman Empire and death for the fatherland. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) demanded freedom of thought for the sake of political renewal in the series of his lectures dubbed as the Address to the German Nation (1807-1808), and in nationalistic exaggeration, he equated Germanness with genuine morality and culture (or rather Kultur). Patriotic sermons preached by the Silesian Protestant

301 For the first time, the conscription system was instituted in France in 1803, but its Prussian version developed in the years 1807-1813 became the model for the states of Europe (Anon., 1992b: 552).

302 Not unlike in preference for Volk over Nation, the German nationalist thought did not internalize the notion culture in the form used in Western Europe, but gave it a specific meaning embodied in the concept of Kultur. In the second half of the 19th century it emphasized efficiency as the tool to improvement of human/national life and subordination of the individual to a highly organized state; and also denoted culture/civilization unique to Germany, which should be emulated especially by colonial and Slavic and other eastern European peoples who were considered only to be emerging from a pre-cultured/barbarous epoch. This conviction about uniqueness of German Kultur led, in the first half of the 20th century, to the widespread use of such derivative coinages as:
theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) roused feelings of national community, and Heinrich von Kleist (1777-1811) gave way to his hatred of the French occupiers of Prussia in Die Hermannsschlacht (1808) which became the model for a national (or, in the German case, rather nation-creating) uprising. In the Rheinischer Merkur, Joseph Görres (1776-1848) established the most aggressive anti-Napoleonic journal indicating the way for the German press in which it could contribute to expelling French troops from the German states. Ernest Moritz Arndt (1769-1860) translated the vague aims of the forming German national movement in popular direct and inciting-to-act language, e.g.: to be one people is the religion of our day. Moreover, he popularized the idea of the German nation as a community of the German language which would converge with the borders of a future German nation-state, in his fiery song Was ist des deutschen Vaterland (What is the German Fatherland):

What is the German fatherland?
So name me thus my land!
Wherever rings the German tongue
And God in Heaven sings,
So shall it be, so shall it be,
It shall be all Germany

(Arndt In: Fishman, 1996: 166; my emphasis)

Other national songs aimed at moving the German-speaking gentes to get united in the struggle against Napoleon were composed by Max von Schenkendorf (1783-1817) and Karl Theodor Körner (1791-1813). All the diverse ideas produced three different notions of the German nation. Firstly, under the influence of Enlightenment, it was seen as a cultural community. Secondly, it was conceived as a preordained national union under the influence of the romantic concept of the Volk and the medieval Holy Roman Empire. Thirdly, Under the influence of the French nation-state, it was conceived of as a political community of free men. The confusing array of various and often conflicting lines of thought were very difficult to be overcome in the interest of German unity, and, so far, have not produced a satisfying definition of the German nation (Kinder, 1978: II 32; Hargreaves-Mawdsley, 1968: 23, 188, 263, 296, 484, 481, 487; Thorne, 1975: 54, 745).

Popular support for the nation-forming struggle against the French was guaranteed: by Napoleon’s dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire and the multitude of the German states supplanted with the French-ordained order which deprived the German-speaker of his traditional (or rather post-medieval) place under the sun pushing into the ever-changing modern world, by abolishment of serfdom which started turning peasants into regular citizens who would aspire to belong to a German nation, and by Humboldt’s reform of German universities which became genuinely modern and German institutions of higher educations and as such were responsible for spreading the ideas of German nation and nation-state among the intellectuals, i.e. would-be national leaders. On the other hand, the beginnings of massive German national movements were based on riflemen’s’ Kulturstaat (a civilized country) and Kulturträger (an upholder, defender of civilization). The national socialist ideology of the Third Reich was happy to use the vague connotations to justify its expansionist and genocidal policies as spread and defense of European culture/civilization in its racially pure, un tarnished form represented by German Kultur (Anon., 1888a: 293; Gove, 1966: 1257; Simpson, 1991: 929).

\[303\] This model was emulated by such romantic poets of the Polish national movement as: Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), Juliusz Słowacki (1809-1849) and Zygmunt Krasiński (1812-1859), and actually enacted in the failed risings of 1830/1831, 1846 and 1863/1864.

\[304\] Riflemen’s associations (Schützengesellschaften or Schützengilden) originally were groups of richer burghers (usually of the same trade) banded together and obliged by the city council to defend a specific section of the city walls. Later with the increased availability of firearms various festivities organized around marksmanship competitions came into being in the 15th-17th centuries especially in the Netherlands. In the 18th century they
and gymnasts associations especially active after 1811. Of the three different kinds of associations, it seems that the gymnastic movement was the one to embrace the German national idea most consciously and completely. It was established in the German states by Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852) under the influence of J. J. Rousseau’s ideas presented in his *E’mile* (1762) and supported by other educators in the second half of the 19th century who considered physical education an indispensable complement of intellectual growth, without which a cultured and healthy person could not develop. Jahn established the first gymnasium in Berlin (1811) and later many more especially in connection to or at the universities in Halle, Jena and Breslau (Wroclaw). Having gathered larger numbers of youth he propagated the idea of German unity and struggle for freedom, i.e. against the French besides improving their brawn. Moreover, with the aid of strategic games he educated physically skillful and highly motivated would-be soldiers of the War of Liberation. The students after having participated in the War of Liberation also developed the German national movement through a network of *Burschenschaften* (fraternities)\textsuperscript{306} which unlike *Landsmannschaften* (associations of students from the same regions, i.e. belonging to the same regional gentes) gathered students from all the German states, irrespectively of their origin. (Anon., 1888: 133; Anon., 1989b: 943/944; Alter, 1994: 47; Czapliński, 1990: 453; Kinder, 1978: II 33; Thorne, 1975: 692).

The War of Liberation commenced in Silesia (or rather in Breslau (Wroclaw) and Lower Silesia as the largely rural and Slavic-speaking population of Upper Silesia with strong local identity remained predominantly indifferent to the conflict\textsuperscript{307} as they would also to the Polish nationalist risings across the border), which, at that time, together with its capital became the center of renewed Prussian statehood and German national movement. It was not important that only 65 years had elapsed from the Prussian takeover and that the Catholic Silesian nobility was traditionally more at home in Vienna than in Protestant Berlin: Prussia and Austria used to be parts of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Napoleonic onslaught was not against one of them but against all the German states, so no conflict of interest could arise and loyalty of the nobility along with the majority of the Silesians was guaranteed. The idea of German unity was quite strongly felt among the educated in Silesia already at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries which led to the establishment of the *Gesellschaft zur Beförderung der Naturkunde und Industrie* (Society for Forwarding Natural Sciences and Industry) in Breslau (Wroclaw) (1803). At the beginning it adhered more to the universal ideas of the Enlightenment but a change came with the French expansion and the society, under the new tale-

306 Singers associations (*Sängergesellschaften*) originally were church choirs which with publication of collections of German folk songs broadened their repertoires and often turned in non-ecclesiastical groups which promoted German unity through popularization of German folk and patriotic songs by Arndt, Kröner etc.

307 The first one - Teutonia Burschenschaft was organized in Autumn 1814 at Halle, and numerous others came into being in 1815 in answer to the Metternich system which shattered the hopes of speedy unification of Germany. The *Burschenschaft* members wore the imperial colors of black, red and gold and adhered to the motto Honor, freedom and fatherland. The tricolor they popularized became one of the symbols of German unity and today is represented in the German national flag (Czapliński, 1990: 453; Kinder, 1978: II 47).

308 In 1813 quite a number of Slavic-speaking Upper Silesians fled from their usual places of abode to avoid draft (Herzig, 1994: 497/498) which sparked a German discussion on their loyalty, whereas later Polish and Slavic scholars tended to assess this event as conscious choice in favor of Polishdom or Slavdom. The researchers seem not to notice that these people having had not developed a national attachment/presentiment were not interested in the perspective of fighting and dying for some incomprehensible ideas and, in effect, possibly leave their families fatherless and unattended, especially when it is borne in mind that family and kin in the context of the locality/village where one was born was the very crux of their identity.

Anyway conscription lost its appeal even to many young Breslauers championing German unity and freedom from French control, as it was clearly indicated in the 1817 tumult against the introduction of regular draft (Scheuermann, 1994: II 1781).
telling name as the *Schlesische Gesellschaft für Vaterländische Kultur* (Silesian Society of Fatherland Culture), began to undertake tasks of the so-called patriotic societies (*Patriotischen Gesellschaften*) active in other German cities (Herzig, 1994: 523/524; Scheuermann, 1994 I 408). This process rapidly accelerated in 1811 when the universalistic, Catholic-dominated Jesuit College of Leopoldina was reestablished as a modern (i.e. national) university in 1811 (Herzig, 1995: 124). Consequently, students from all German states appeared at Breslau (Wroclaw) and started establishing numerous *Burschenschaften* (fraternities) which were reinforced in their efforts for the sake of German unity by the gymnastic movement which arrived at the Silesian capital quite early before it was firmly rooted in 1815 when in March/April Jahn opened its first gymnasium in the city. Actually in 1813 when Ludwig von Lützow (1782-1834) came to Silesia to organize the renowned (due to its symbolic meaning for the tradition of the German national movement) corps of volunteer (later known as the Black or Lützowsche Jäger), Jahn was the first one to leave Berlin in answer to the king’s appeal *Am mein Volk* (To my People) in order to join the corps with his gymnasts. The voluntary force was joined by many other renowned activist of the nascent German national movement as well as by numerous students mobilized by Jahn’s *Turnidee* (the [patriotic] idea of the gymnastic movement) and the *Burschenschaften*. However, it is good to indicate initial vagueness of the German national movement at that time using the person of the late German romantic poet from Silesia, Joseph von Eichendorff (1788-1857). After the period of attending the university at Vienna, he and his older brother Wilhelm joined the Lützowsche Jäger and not unlike his fellow soldiers he participated in no battle as the corps was not considered as a dependable force by Prussian officers. Although his poetry and person have been used for boosting German nationalism, in reality he was a singer of nature and Catholicism, not of the German unity or nation. The concepts of the German fatherland (i.e. nation-state) seems not to have evoked any emotional attachment on his part unlike his regional homeland which he delineates in his poem *Heimat* (Homeland). Interestingly, it is not even Silesia but the locality of the Lubowitz (Lubowice) palace and the surrounding forests where he spent his childhood. Thus the construction of his identity is similar to that of the non-German-speaking Upper Sileans at that time, and probably to the majority of the uneducated Sileans. The difference though, lies in the fact, that having received extensive schooling he also identified with the totality of European culture: he knew Latin, translated from Spanish and read in French. Moreover, he fluently spoke in the Upper Silesian dialects of Polish and Czech (which were used by the peasantry inhabiting the countryside around Lubowitz (Lubowice)) so for him it was quite impossible to espouse Arndt’s idea based on the convergence of the German nation-state with the area inhabited by German-speakers only. Thus, when in the Prussian civil service, in 1841 he wrote a memorandum in which he emphasized the need to allow Polish to be used as the medium of instruction in the tertiary and secondary educational systems in the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań). Moreover, his brother who entered the Habsburg civil service must have had similar ideas about identity as Joseph because when the first language censuses were conducted in the Danubian Monarchy, Wilhelm indicated Polish as his home language in spite of the fact that by the time having had few occasions to practice his Polish he probably spoke German better. It was not important as Polish was the language of his Lubowitz (Lubowice) homeland (Anon., 1888: 133; Anon., 1888b: 1031; Kinder, 1978: II 32; Kęprowski, 1995; Pawlicki, 1995; Scheuermann, 1994: I 1245, II 1781, 1785; Stein, 1993: 43, 98; Thorne, 1975: 818).

In 1815 the anti-French feeling was running still high, for instance, in 1815 during the second anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig which had sealed the end of Napoleon, one speaker said: If you want to teach your daughter French equally well you can educate her as a tart (Czapliński, 1990: 452/453). However, the Congress of Vienna set the new order in Europe, and with the Union Act of June 8, 1815 established the German Confederation under the Austrian hegemony, which supplanted the dissolved Holy Roman Empire. Seemingly it should have satisfied everybody but the activists of the German national movement perceived it as a very contradiction of the ideals of the War of Liberation. They in unison with the German princes stood for a united Germany, and now were offered a loose confederation of more than 40 sovereign states (Jähnig, 1991: 125). Metternich recreated a semblance of the pre-Napoleonic order, so princes saw active political involvement of their subjects as redundant in the time of peace, and, moreover, a direct danger to their absolutist
power. The Wartburg Festival (1817) of the academic youth from all the German states celebrating the tercentenary of the beginning of the reformation worried the princes deeply (Ehrich, 1992: 522). In 1818/1819 in Breslau (Wroclaw) the gymnastic movement was criticized as responsible for immature behavior of its members as well as for the high rate of school absenteeism among them. The argument between supporters and adversaries of gymnastics continued till 1819 when the journalist and poet August von Kotzebue (1761-1819) known for his staunch opposition to the gymnastic movement and Burschenschaften was murdered as an alleged Russian spy by a radical student in Mannheim. It gave the conservative powers the opportunity for which they had been waiting. The 80 Prussian gymnasia were closed immediately, and the Carlsbad (Karlsbad, Karlovy Vary) Decrees were passed in August 1819. These put the German and Austrian universities under strict government control. Burschenschaften and other student organizations (i.e. the gymnastic movement) were forbidden and censorship was strengthened. An investigatory commission was set in Mainz, and students suspected of liberalnational views were blacklisted throughout the German states. New oppressive measures on an even larger scale were again introduced at Metternich’s behest by the German Confederation as answer to the demonstrations appealing for German unity and liberal reforms which took place at Hambach, Palatinate in 1832 and at Frankfurt am Main in 1833 (Ehrich, 1992: 522; Scheuermann, 1995: II 1782/1783).

Therefore, to avoid retribution support for German unity had to be expressed at different than directly political planes. From 1819 onwards Karl vom Stein steered through publication the multi-volume Monumeta Germaniae Historica (Monuments of German History), the first authoritative collection of sources of medieval german history, to inspire interest in the past which was hoped to become history of the German nation-in-construction. Significantly, each volume bore the motto Sanctus amor patriae dat animum (holy love of the fatherland inspires us) (Alter, 1994: 45). In 1822 the first congress of German natural scientists and medical doctors convened, in 1828 the first congress of German natural scientists, in 1838 the first congress of German classicists, in 1845 the first congress of German writers, and in 1846 the first congress of German writers and German philologists. Also participants from all the German states attended the quartercentenary of printing at Leipzig (1840), the first German industrial exhibition at Mainz (1842) and many others (Czapliński, 1990: 464). Moreover, in 1842 one of the first great national monument of the would-be Germans was erected in Regensburg, Bavaria the Valhalla on the Danube a pseudo-Germanic temple with the monumental feminine figure of Germania (similar to the Frenchmen’s popular representation of their own state based on Joan d’Arc) surrounded by the figures of the most renowned Germanic chiefs and the 163 busts of distinguished Germans (Anon., 1890b: 360). Thus by the time of the 1848 revolutions the new generation of historians who had been members of Burschenschaften and the gymnastic movement had managed to appropriate various histories of different German and Germanic states as the national history of the German nation which was still to be delivered by the German national movement. Other scholars (emulating their French and English colleagues) started speaking about German national art, literature, music, theater and so on, providing the German national movement activists with more elements which they could use to construct the German nation and delimit its ethnic border vis a vis other nations. In case of Silesia, this land’s past was remodelled to fit the pattern of national German history with the aid of the Verein für Geschichte Schlesiens (Association for the Study of Silesian History) established in Breslau (Wroclaw) (1846) (Herzig, 1994: 524).

308 In Germanic mythology, the heaven of the brave - Vallhöll, i.e. the hall of the fallen in battle (Anon., 1890b: 359).
309 The inspiration for the Bavarian King Ludwig I to order the construction of this monumental structure, a veritable symbol of Germanness in itself, was the German (with the obvious disregard for the contributions of other states) victory over the Napoleonic France (Anon., 1890b: 360).
310 The association’s periodical the Zeitschrift des Vereins für die geschichte Schlesiens appeared from 1855 to 1943 (Herzig, 1994: 524).
In the meantime, the rivalry between Prussia and Austria to dominate the German Confederation did weaken this political organization but unexpectedly transferred the process of German unification to the sphere of economy. The post-medieval organization of the German states did not correspond to the needs of the modern economy. So following the crisis of 1815 all custom tariffs were abolished in Prussia east of the Elbe in 1816, and in 1818 in all the state. However, the remaining 38 customs borders and dozens of incommensurable coins seriously hindered trade and industry within the German Confederation putting it disadvantage in relation to France and England. It was Friedrich List (1789-1846) who translated the idea of German unity into economics having introduced the concept of national economy and gave the definitive touch to his economic thought in his *National System of Political Economy* (1841). In 1819 he founded the *Deutscher Handelsund Gewerbeverein* (German Commerce and Craft Union). In 1828 the Prussian-Hessian, Central German and South German customs unions came into being. In 1834 Prussia outbid all the contenders which could have become potential centers of German nation building establishing the German Customs Union in 1834. Almost all the German territories which were to be comprised by the *Kleindeutsche* state of 1871, had been included in the union by 1867. Moreover, the monetary convention of 1838 regulated the currency system in the German Confederation, and gave a further boost to the economic unity within the borders of the German Customs Union. Although Austria still retained the political control over the German states with the aid of the German Confederation and Metternich’s concert of Europe, it was Prussia which gained most using the leeway of economy which was perceived as not very important by the Austrian decision-makers. In this way, Prussia was free to develop a modern unified and quickly industrialized economy which progressively got integrated with the economies of other members of the German Customs Union. Thus, the Prussian Kingdom gradually turned into an economic juggernaut with which the absolutist, the unequally developed and sticking to premodern (post-medieval, post-feudal) forms of state, economic, legal and property organization Habsburg Empire could not effectively compete in the second half of the 19th century (Czapliński, 1990: 450; Kinder, 1978: II 47; Thorne, 1975: 797).

The weakening of Austria’s control over Central Europe which came with the half-hearted rebirth of liberal ideas in the wake of the July Revolution in France (1830) and the establishment of the German Customs Union, was accelerated by the Rhein crisis. In 1840 the French Prime Minister Louis Thiers (1797-1877) sought to gain prestige by advances in Egypt a border on the Rhein. The French expansionist policies fired nationalist fervor throughout the middle class in the German states, i.e. among senior civil servants (many of whom belonged to *Burschenschaften*), the commercial and propertied bourgeoisie (especially active in the singers movement), academics and artisans. Subsequently, many nationalist songs were composed, such as: *Die Wacht am Rhein* (The Guard on the Rhein), *Deutschlandlied* (German Song), or Arndt’s *Der Rhein, Deutschlands Strom* (The Rhein, Germany’s River), which indicates that simultaneously the Rhein was made into another significant German national symbol and interest in German unity became a widespread phenomena giving the German national movement increasingly massive support. The ascension of Friedrich Wilhelm IV to the Prussian throne in that year also reawakened hopes for introduction of policies which would bring about liberal reforms and more efforts for unification of Germany. In 1842 he was the first Prussian monarch to participate in a Catholic mass as he attended the celebration of the resumption of work on the Cologne cathedral (which was completed shortly afterwards). In result, he indicated that was a prospective monarch of all the Germans irrespective of their confessional adherence. He successfully bridged the post-medieval cleavage gaping between the Catholic and Protestant German states, and this symbolic union elevated the cathedral to another national symbol of German unity. In the same year with the royal edict of June 6 he legalized the gymnastic and *Burschenschaft* movements, and, moreover, granted amnesties to the demagogues (i.e. liberal activists) who, in the wake of the July Revolution, had been incarcerated or had to emigrate in accordance with the final decisions worked out by the German Confederation ministers at the Vienna meetings of 1834 which had been presided by Austria. Singers, riflemen’s and gymnasts associations together, along with societies supporting the cathedral project, lent a broad popular base to the German national movement which he consolidated, in 1843, with the celebration of the millennium of the [German] Empire. The
first apex was reached in 1848. The National Assembly (Frankfurt Parliament) was greeted by a guard of honor formed by gymnasts, as it entered the Paulskirche (St. Paul’s church) in Frankfurt am Main. Numerous national guards modelled on a similar force from the French Revolution were formed in various German states and the Burschenschaften’s black, red and gold tricolor was widely accepted as the German national flag. Despite the failure to unify Germany in 1848/1849 which would be against the interest of the multi-ethnic Danubian Monarchy, the activist of the German national movement firmly settled for Kleindeutschland whose preliminary framework worked out by the Frankfurt Parliament was to be fulfilled by the German Empire of 1871. Although the German national movement still failed to win solid backing from either the lower class or the peasants, most of whom were firmly attached to local dynasties and their narrow home environments, the definitive end of serfdom sealed during the Völkerfrühling and accelerating industrialization increased mobility of the social strata, and also the level of their education thanks to gradually more comprehensive systems of popular education, and compulsory military service. The Prussian school and army were responsible for popularizing the national idea, and, consequently, the broadly based bourgeois movement of German unity started attracting massive adherence from all the layers of society from the end of the 1840s onwards (Alter, 1994: 51/52; Anon., 1898c: 3; Hargreaves-Mawdsley, 1968: 23; Kinder, 1978: II 47, 49; Scheuermann, 1994: II 1783; Thorne, 1975: 1264).

The post-1848 reaction severely dashed the expectations of the proponents of liberalization of absolutist regimes in the German states, and of unity of Germany. Rejuvenated with its recent victories over the various revolutionary/nationalist risings and disturbances inside the empire, the Danubian Monarchy also won the contest for hegemony among the German states after having subjugated Prussia through the Punctuation of Olmütz (Olomouc) (1850), and reestablished the German Confederation. One of the first acts of the new German Confederation liquidated the nation-and state-building decisions of the Frankfurt Parliament. In 1851 the all-German black, red and gold banner was lowered from the Thurn und Taxis palace, Frankfurt am Main, which was to be the seat of the all-German government, and in 1855 the fleet of a would-be German state was sold on auction. However, Prussia supporting the idea of a unified Kleindeutsch state regained the lost ground in the next two decades by having become a major economic power vis-a-vis the increasingly backward Habsburg Empire. Prussia scored a major success political success in 1853 when the founding treaties of the German Customs Union expired after 20 years of its existence. Austria strove to dominate the union or supplant it with its own vision of economic order in Central Europe, but a majority of the German states economically gravitated toward Prussia, so that the treaties were swiftly renewed without major changes and even more states joined the union so that it gained direct access to the North Sea. Moreover, after the Crimean War (1853-1856) the Danubian Monarchy was left by Russia (Austria’s ally for well over a century) which moved into the camp of the Vienna’s enemies. Afterwards Russia supported the cause of the Italian unification, and in 1859 Austria, weakened even more by the economic crisis of 1857, lost the confrontation with the Franco-Sardinian forces in the Italian War of Unification. In consequence, Francis Joseph II ceded Lombardia to Sardinia which became the kernel of united Italy when in March 1861 the Sardinian King Victor Emanuel II (ruled 1849-1878) ascended the throne of the Italian Kingdom in March 1861. (Czapliński, 1990: 492, 497; Ehrich, 1992: 524/525; Kinder, 1978: II 61, 72/73).

At that time the political stagnation brought on Prussia by Friedrich Wilhelm IV’s mental disease which worsened in 1857 was solved when the king’s brother Prince Wilhelm became the regent in 1858. Due to the fact that Prussia gradually grew to the position of a major world powerhouse, its economy as well as the economies of the German Customs Union members received more direct links with the more liberal economies of the Western European states, which resulted in more liberal economic policies of the Prussian Kingdom. This relaxation spilled over into the sphere of politics when the Prussian government did not suppress the liberal opposition during the 1858

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311 This instance of giving up a part of its territory reaffirmed the myth that the Habsburg Empire is a prison of nations which began to be formulated by the nascent non-German national movements in the Danubian Monarchy after 1848.
elections. Among others it meant more space for the activities of the German national movement promoting the Kleindeutschland solution. The leeway was promptly used to establish more all-German organizations such as: the Kongress deutscher Volkswirte (Congress of German Economists) (1858), the Deutscher Handelstag (German Economic Organization) (1861), the Deutsche Abgeordnete-Tage (Organization of German Parliamentarians) (1862); and popular support for German unity was expressed during the gymnastic festivals organized by the growing Vereinsturnwesen (Gymnastic Association)\(^\text{312}\) in 1860 at Koburg, at Berlin in 1861 and at Leipzig in 1863. The Riflemen and gymnastic festival at Gotha (1861) led to the establishment of the all-german Bundesschießen (Union of Riflemen’s Associations). The saying from the early 1860s aptly commented the events: Die Turner und die Schützen sind des Reiches Stützen (Gymnasts and riflemen hold the Reich steady) (In Alter, 1994: 52). Moreover, in 1863 the German nation-in-construction obtained another national symbol, the Hall of Liberation at Kelheim near Ratisbona. It glorified the War of Liberation during which the idea of German unity had been forged. The general growth of the German national movement and its activities at the turn of the 1850s and 1860s crystallized in the establishment of the Deutscher Nationalverein (German National Society) in 1859 at Frankfurt am Main the symbolic seat of the 1848 German National Assembly. The organization was modelled on the Italian Societa Nazionale (1857) and grouped middle and upper bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, smaller factory owners and several significant industrial captains, from among whom, Count Guido Henckel von Donnersmarck ought to be mentioned as his capital and property were concentrated in Upper Silesia. The German National Society’s membership soared to 25,000 in 1862, it collected money for the construction of an all-German fleet and openly propagated establishment of a Kleindeutschland state under the leadership of Prussia. The Prussian government did not want to isolate Austria so in 1865 declared that the goals of the society had never been those of Prussia’s as the proposed unification would mean subjugation of Prussia to some all-German institutions (Alter, 1994: 47, 51; Anon., 1889: 671; Anon., 1889b: 945; Anon., 1889d: 4; Czapliński, 1990: 499-501).

The Deutscher Nationalverein was officially dissolved in 1867, but its Kleindeutschland program supported by many German historians in their academic writings was not discarded. The historians claimed that Germany could not be united by any popular mass movement but only by Prussia through systematic enlargement of its territory. The theory was tacitly espoused by Regent Wilhelm (king 1861-1888, German emperor 1871) who ascended the Prussian throne after the demise of Friedrich Wilhelm IV in 1861, and by his Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898) who was nominated to the post in 1862 and deftly solved the budget crisis in defiance of the constitution and the Prussian parliament which allowed him to forestall abdication of the king. Having stabilized the monarchy and reinforced the army (which received a privileged position in society\(^\text{313}\)), Bismarck with the rapidly increasing economic might of Prussia\(^\text{314}\) could devote more attention to foreign policy in

\(^{312}\) In 1868 it was turned into a more structured organization under the name Deutsche Turnerschaft (Organization of German Gymnasts) (Anon. 1889b: 945).

\(^{313}\) In 1863 43% of the Prussian budget (i.e. 40.7 mln thalers) was allocated to military expenses (Bialy, 1990: 265).

\(^{314}\) Since the 1850s industrialization made striking advances in Prussia. The Ruhrgebiete became a gigantic center of mining and metallurgy. Also the number of various heavy industry factories in the coal mining areas of Upper Silesia and Waldenburg (Walbrych)-Neurode (Nowa Ruda), Lower Silesia multiplied. The coal output of the Upper Silesian industrial basin increased from 204,796 tons in 1822 to 612,974 in 1842, 1,370,200 in 1852 and 5,555,333 in 1869, and in the Lower Silesian mining center went up from 199,539 tons in 1822 to 301,558 in 1842, 454,414 in 1852 and 1,411,140 in 1869. Also the production of pig iron went up steeply in the German Customs Union/Germany from mere 210,000 tons in 1850 to 1,759,000 in 1875. The number of steam machines working in Prussia rose from 1,139 in 1846 to 1,398 in 1866. The length of railways inside the German Customs Union amounted just to 6 km in 1836. They rapidly expanded to 2,304 in 1845, 6,044 (out of it 5,800 in Prussia alone) in 1850, 11,660 in 1860 and to 19,694 in 1870, and as such were the longest in Europe. These rapid developments let the Prussian government (since 1857) equip the army in modernized rifles (i.e. breech-loading needle guns) and cannons. Moreover, the telegraphic system which was developed on a larger scale in Prussia by E. W. Siemens after 1848, began to serve the railway network and the Prussian army...
order to devise a way in which Prussia could snatch hegemony in the German Confederation from the Habsburg Empire. Prussia supported Russia in its suppression of the Polish January Uprising (1863/1864) through the bilateral Military Convention of Alvensleben (1863), and in this manner gained a powerful ally and considerable weakening of the Polish national movement which could have endangered the territorial integrity of Prussia by infiltrating and demanding integration of the Province of Posen with a restituted Polish state. In 1863 urged by Bismarck Wilhelm I stayed away from the Fürstentag (Assembly of the Princes the supervising body of the German Confederation). The same year the Danish King Christian IX (ruled 1863-1906) approved the Danish November Constitution which sanctioned annexation of Schleswig (Slesvig) and its separation from Holstein. The German national movement demanded independence for the duchies. Bismarck confined himself to emphasizing the violation of the London Protocol (1852) which had settled the previous German(Prusso)-Danish conflict over the status of the duchies (1848-1850) declaring them autonomous entities in a personal union with Denmark, and thereby he assured the neutrality of the Great Powers. At the end of 1863 in the face of growing Franco-Austrian enmity Bismarck offered the Danubian Monarchy a chance of improving its stance in Europe through a Prusso-Austrian intervention in Slezwig (Schleswig)-Holstein. The common German victory over Denmark gave a further boost to the German national movement though created problems with the joint administration of the condominium by the Habsburg Empire and Prussia which renewed the old conflict over hegemony in the German Confederation. The differences were temporarily settled by the Convention of Gastein (1865) which granted the Danubian Monarchy with the administration of Holstein and Prussia with the administration of Slezwig (Schleswig). All the above-mentioned events contributed to consolidation of the German national movement in Silesia as elsewhere in Prussia and other German states. Allied Austrian forces going up north to Slezwig (Schleswig)-Holstein via Silesia were spontaneously welcomed by the local population at railway stations. Members of various Silesian organizations arranged aid for front soldiers, and in April 1864 the first train transports with Danish POWs arrived in Silesia. Most of them (386) were interned at the Glogau (Glogów) fortress (Anon., 1889d: 4; Bialy, 1990: 265; Czapliński, 1990: 501/502, 504; Kinder, 1978: II 75).

The stalemate over control and the status of Schleswig (Slezwig)-Holstein incited Prussia to propose the reform of the German Confederation through an elected parliament which offended the Austrians who appealed to the Assembly of the Confederation to decide the Schlezwig (Slezvig)-Holstein question. Prussia responded to this violation of the Convention of Gastein by invading Holstein and leaving the German Confederation. The confederation under the Austrian leadership mobilized against Prussia. Majority of the German states stood firmly in support of the Danubian Monarchy but the Thuringian states (with the exception of Solingen), Oldenburg, both Mecklemburgias, Anhalt and the Hanseatic cities sided with Prussia. The Seven Weeks War, the final war for supremacy in Germany began on June 16, 1866. Four days later Italy joined in the hostilities as Prussia’s ally making the Vienna to have to fight on the two fronts. The Prussian forces, in accordance with the superior strategy of the chief of staff, Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), launched a three-pronged attack on Bohemia from Lower Silesia and from Dresden after having defeated Saxony, an Austrian ally. The Austrian armies were defeated on July 3 at Sadowa (Sadová) near Königgrätz (Hradec Králové) and the rapid advance of the technologically and numerically superior Prussian force would have reached Vienna in no time. But Bismarck refused being dazzled by the brilliance of the victory and concluded the preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg (Mikulov) (July 26) in order to forestall a possible French intervention. The terms of capitulation were confirmed by the permanent Treaty of Prague (August 23): Austria would have to recognize the dissolution of the German Confederation and reorganization of Germany without without its participation. Austria’s rights in Schleswig (Slezwig)-Holstein were transferred to Prussia. Yet no territorial cessions were demanded, and as a point of honor it was allowed to secure the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Habsburg Empire’s most faithful allies, Saxony and Hesse Darmstadt. All the other opposing states north of the River Main were annexed by Prussia. Considering the Italian dominions of the dramatically improving communication; and ferro-concrete started to be used in constriction of fortifications (Anon., 1989g: 431; Bialy, 1990: 264/265; Davies, 1996: 1296; Fuchs, 1990: 142).
Habsburgs, the Italians were defeated at Custozza in Lombardy as well as in the naval Battle of Lissa (Vis), but due to the Prusso-Italian alliance, in the Peace of Vienna (October 3), the Danubian Monarchy ceded Venetia to Italy. Since the 1st and 2nd Prussian armies had congregated in Lower Silesia before the attack, and also due to the fact that majority of the military operations during the Seven Weeks War had taken place just south of the Silesian border in Bohemia, money and other donations had been collected throughout Silesia for the sake of Prussian soldiers and their families. Also civic guards had been formed in localities near the border, and, later, field hospitals had been organized for the wounded. The news of the Prussian victory at Sadowa (Sadová) had electrified the Silesians. On their own initiative, local governments and various associations had organized patriotic rallies and Prussian flags had been hung at public buildings. The demonstration of support and of joy of victory was overwhelming. Subsequently, thousands of Austrian POWs were transported to Silesia, and majority of them (5,400) were interned in the Glogau (Glogów) fortress. Last but not least, the Catholic Church in Silesia, and the pro-Austrian Silesian nobility did realize that there was no hope of Silesia returning under the Habsburg rule and that they had to work out a better consensus with the Prussian government, which would guarantee them an acceptable form of coexistence (Bialy, 1990: 266; Czapliński, 1990: 514; Ehrich, 1992: 525; Kinder, 1978: II 73, 75; Turner, 1992: 110).

The victorious war of 1866 gave Prussia absolute dominance in northern Germany. Consequently, following the break-up of the German Confederation Prussia overhauled the economic organization of the German Customs Union into the political one of the North German Confederation (Norddeutscher Bund) which came into being on the basis of the Federal Treaty of August 18, 1866 which finally was signed by 22 states. Importantly, majority of the south German states which had sided with Austria in the 1866 war stayed away from the new confederation (namely: The Palatinate, Baden, Hesse, Württemberg and Bavaria). The North German Confederation was effectively controlled by Prussia as the Hohenzollern kingdom constituted four-fifths of the territory and population of the confederation. Executive authority was vested in a presidency held in accordance with hereditary right by the rulers of Prussia, who were to exercise the powers of their office with the assistance of a chancellor responsible only to them. There was no absolute majority of Prussian representatives in the legislature, composed from the Bundesrat and the lower chamber of Reichstag, but the relative majority and the dominant stance of Prussia always allowed Bismarck to piece together a workable majority for his policies. The federal constitution of the North German Confederation provided no bill of rights, no ministerial responsibility, and no civilian supervision over military affairs. But it introduced uniformity in currency, weights, measures, commercial practices, industrial laws, and financial regulations. In short, it created the economic unity long demanded by the middle class. Moreover, this homogenous space was expected to be the prelude to the creation of a German nation-state in the Kleindeutsche form. This aim congruent with the hopes of the German national movement could be effectively sought by Bismarck only after September 3, 1866 when the Prussian parliament voted in favor of the indemnity proposal, and thereby retroactively approved of Bismarck’s unconstitutional measures. Now acquitted from the accusations of illegal decision-making and with comfortable control of Prussia and the North German Confederation via democratic procedures he could go about unification of Germany in a more decided manner (Czapliński, 1990: 519; Kinder, 1978: II 75/76; Turner, 1992: 111).

The North German Confederation was the first German political organization which accepted a common black, white and red flag which was to become the initial national flag of the Germans. It was a deft blending of the black and white (silver) Prussian flag together with the red, black and silver royal standard of the Prussian monarch. The black, red and gold flag of the Burschenschaften which had been accepted as the German national flag by the Frankfurt Parliament represented too liberal a trend in the German national movement, and as such rather detached from the dynastic background which Bismarck had chosen as the appropriate basis for unification of Germany by Prussia (Anon., 1889e: 3; Anon., 1889h: plate II bet. pp. 334/335). On February 12, 1867 the first elections to the parliament of the North German Confederation took place and on April 16 the parliament, with the absolute majority of votes (230:53) passed the constitution, the first all-German constitution which was to be used in practice unlike its predecessor passed by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1849. Among
those deputies who voted against the new symbol\footnote{Constitutions, besides national flags, coats-of-arms and anthems, have been significant national symbols since the first one went into force in the United States (1789). Apart of having the symbolic value, such a document also sets out the legal foundations of the nation-in-construction defining what it is and what its privileges and duties are vis-a-vis the state. It is a dynamic homogenizing link which is to produce the nation-state.} of the forming German nation-state there were 13 Poles from the Province of Posen (Poznań), 3 Danes from Schleswig (Slezvig), 18 clericalists and particularists, and one socialist. The opposition vote clearly indicates that the national minorities perceived the confederation as a preliminary form of a German nation-state where their rights would be limited unless they got assimilated or joined their own nation-states. On the other hand, though the liberals were displeased with the somewhat singlehanded style of Bismarck’s governance, a sizeable group of them formed the National Liberal Party \((\text{Nationalliberale Partei})\) in February 1867, because they considered the aim of establishing a united German nation-state as liberal in itself. Moreover, at the turn of 1866 and 1867 the conservative camp was split on the issue of German unity as the east German landed gentry \(\text{Junkers}\) considered it as a possible endangering of their prominent social and political stance which they had enjoyed in Prussia. However, majority of the conservatives dismissed these fears and established the Free Conservative Party \((\text{Freiekonservative Partei})\) which stood for Bismarck’s unifying policies, and, subsequently, became the governing party \(\text{Anon., 1889i: 650; Bialy, 1990: 266; Czapliński, 1990: 519; Turner, 1992: 111}\).

The effects of the brief Seven Weeks War of 1866 had the most far-reaching effect on the Habsburg Monarchy. Having been banished from the rank of the genuine first-rate powers, the Austrian Empire had to completely resign from its ambitions to dominate Germany. The \(\text{Großdeutschland}\) solution was definitively dead, and the introduction of the ideas of nation and nation-state into Central Europe with the ongoing unification of Italy and Germany under the leadership of Prussia seriously jeopardized the very existence of the multiethnic empire constructed from territorially and legally heterogenous parts which stood in stark opposition to the homogenizing juggernaut of national ideology. Hence, from 1866 onwards the Habsburgs had to devote majority of their efforts to preserve their empire rather than try to extend its influence abroad. Thus, the constitutional reorganization of the Habsburg monarchy, under discussion since 1859, was brought to an early conclusion. On February 17, 1867, Francis Joseph I restored the Hungarian constitution of 1848, and in May 1867 Law XII was approved by the parliament, legalizing the \(\text{Ausgleich}\) (compromise) which turned the empire into Austro-Hungary where the Germans and the Hungarians attained the dominant status in their respective parts of the bipartite monarchy. The stabilization of the domestic political scene which had been regularly disrupted by obstructionist measures used by deputies of different than German background, allowed adoption of the Fundamental Laws in December 1867, which under the name of the December constitution lasted until 1918. It granted equality before the law and freedom of press, speech, and assembly and protected the interests of the various ethnic groups turning into nationalities, stating that

all nationalities in the state enjoy equal rights and each one has an inalienable right to the preservation and cultivation of its nationality and language. The equal rights of all languages in local use are guaranteed by the state in schools, administration, and public life \(\text{In Echrich, 1992: 526}\).

But the stipulations did not guarantee the same level of privileges for all ethnic and national groups in the empire as enjoyed by the Germans and the Hungarians. Especially, the Czechs were angered by this development as all their lands were included in the Austrian part of Austro-Hungary and, consequently, in 1868 they demanded a similar compromise which was granted to the Hungarians. Acceptance of their demands would have altered the monarchy into a tripartite empire, but the danger of federalism was that such a step could have incited similar demands from other national and ethnic groups, so the Czech petition was strongly opposed especially by the Hungarians. However, the Poles from Galicia issued a declaration similar to the Czech one, also in 1868. There was a difference though. The Poles asked for an autonomy not for recognition of their nation-state inside the framework of the Habsburg Empire as majority of the territory of the pre-partition Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth lay beyond the borders of the Danubian Monarchy. The Polish resolution was never fully actualized but the Austrian government who badly needed Polish votes in the Vienna Parliament in order not to be stalled by the Czech opposition (especially in the years 1869-1873), seized the opportunity and, in 1869, granted Galicia with Polish as the official language of administration, the police and courts. Gradually Polish became the language of instruction in schools as well as at the universities and other tertiary educational institutions in Cracow and Lemberg (Lvów, Lviv, Lvov). In 1871 the ministry of Galicia headed by a Pole, was established as well as the Akademia Umjętności (Polish Academy of Sciences in Galicia)\(^{316}\). On the other hand, the Austrians checked the political clout of the Polish politicians by promoting development of the Ukrainian/Ruthenian national movement in eastern Galicia (i.e. Red Ruthenia or western Ukraine) (Buszko, 1989: 1-6; Ehrich, 1992: 526/527; Polišenský, 1991: 98/99).

The internal political and economic weakness of Austro-Hungary compelled the south German states to establish tighter links with Prussia but they stayed away from the North German Confederation bent on preserving their sovereignty. A clear opportunity of amending this state of affairs was given to Bismarck by behavior of Napoleon III (ruled 1852-1870). The latter sought to regain both in France and abroad the prestige lost as a result of numerous diplomatic reverses, particularly those brought about by the Seven Weeks War which had not led to weakening of Austria and Prussia but gave a definitive boost to the idea of German unity through the establishment of the North German Confederation under the leadership of Prussia. The political advance of Prussia coupled with its military strength constituted a threat to French dominance in Europe so Napoleon III sought to mitigate the discomfiture by seeking compensation in the Rheinland, Luxembourg, or Belgium. But Berlin succeeded in frustrating these plans and in this manner Bismarck expressed dislike for France’s influence in the south and west German states. Thus in Berlin as well as in Paris there were reasons for seeking a test of strength. The immediate occasion came in the spring of 1870 when under pressure from Bismarck Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen accepted the candidacy for the Spanish throne rendered vacant by the Spanish revolution of 1868. The French government alarmed at a possibility of a Prusso-Spanish alliance which would flank France from the west and east, demanded Wilhelm IV to order Leopold to withdraw his candidacy, which he did. But, for reasons of prestige, Napoleon III asked for an official guarantee that the candidacy would not be renewed. In an interview with the French ambassador at Ems, Wilhelm IV rejected. The same day, Bismarck obtained Wilhelm IV’s authorization to publish the French demands and the Prussian rejection contained in the Ems Dispatch. Bismarck edited the document in a manner calculated to aggravate the tension and reinforce national enthusiasm for a war against France (Czapliński, 1990: 522-529; Kinder, 1978: II 75; Turner, 1992: 111).

France declared war on Prussia on July 19, 1870. The south German states, in fulfillment of their treaties with Prussia, immediately joined Wilhelm IV in a common front against France. The German force of 535,000 troops could not be matched by the French army of 238,000 soldiers. The Prussian army, which constituted the core of the German troops, was better organized and equipped with superior artillery. Moreover one of the most experienced European strategists Helmuth von Moltke commanded it, so the French troops could not hold out for long even with their state-of-art rifles and quick-firing guns. In result the French lost one battle after another and the military operations were unusually bloody. The turning point of the Franco-Prussian War was marked by the Battle of Sedan (September 2) which was lost by the French. The victory, in the eyes of the Germans, became a symbolic redress for France’s expansion in the Rheinland and all the German defeats suffered at the French hands, especially at Jena (1806). During the existence of the Second German Empire (1871-1918) the date was celebrated as a significant national holiday consciously and

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\(^{316}\) National academies of sciences not unlike universities and other national centers of learning were of special significance for national movements in Central and Eastern Europe. Scholars of the institutions busied themselves with inventing national traditions and histories. The national movements presented the data as proof of primordiality of their respective nations-in-construction which should justify granting them with independent states.
explicitly pegging German unity and identity on enmity towards France. The French defeat at Sedan brought about an explosion of national enthusiasm throughout Germany which contrasted with sadness of Poles in Posen (Poznań) who did not cheer or illuminate their windows. Simply, according to the Polish national thinking Napoleon was a great Polish national hero since he had restituted the Polish state in the form of the Duchy of Warsaw (1807-1813/1815). Not surprisingly, did many Polish national activists expect Napoleon III to do the same should he defeat Prussia. Anyway the war seemed to lead to establishment of a closely-knit homogenous German nation-state where would be no place for the Polish language or culture. The neutral Polish attitude towards the common German victory at Sedan ignited some anti-Polish excesses in Posen (Poznań) (Bialy, 1990: 267; Czapliński, 1990: 525; Kinder, 1978: II 81).

After the defeat at Sedan Napoleon III was captured by the Germans together with 83,000 troops. Paris rose in rebellion the French Emperor was deposed and the Third Republic was proclaimed. At the close of September Paris was completely surrendered by the German forces. After a long and bitter siege the French capital capitulated on January 28, 1871, and on May 10 the Treaty of Frankfurt brought the war officially to a close. The Third Republic had to cede Alsace-Lorraine (Elssas-Lothringen)317, pay an indemnity of five billion francs, and accept an army of occupation. It was a Carthaginian peace designed to crush a dangerous rival for influence in Europe. The Franco-German War got mythologized by both the German and French national movements reinforcing them by the mutual enmity incited by the conflict. The enthusiasm aroused in the German states by the victory over France proved too much for the defenders of particularism. After having successfully negotiated unifying treaties with the parliaments of the North German Confederation and the four south German states at the end of 1870, Bismarck saw to the completion of his and the German national movement’s dream: on the symbolic date of January 18, 1871 (the 170th anniversary of the coronation of the first King of Prussia Friedrich I), the Second German Empire was founded in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, and Wilhelm IV became the German Emperor (deutsche Kaiser) as Wilhelm I. At last a unified German state came into being which would forge the German nation from the multitude of Prussians, Silesians, Bavarians, Hessians... . It was hoped to be a German nation-state but it was not as it did not contain the German territories of Austria, and comprised Danish and Slavic minorities with some nascent national aspirations. Wilhelm I also recognized the nuance because he did not become an emperor of the Germans or of Germany. It was just the beginning of nation-state-building which was to be logically completed in the years 1938-1939 only with the Anschluß of Austria and annexations of Bohemia, Moravia and the German territories which had been ceded to Poland in the years 1919-1921 (Czapliński, 1990: 527-529; Kinder, 1978: II 75; Turner, 1992: 111).

In Silesia the national Prussian (and more rarely German) national feeling and enthusiasm rose high during the Franco-Prussian War with every German victory. In all the localities of the province aid was organized for the families of the mobilized and of the professional soldiers. Emergency hospitals were prepared for the wounded as well as medicines and medical equipment were collected. The press appealed for a popular war loan. Only in the town of Glogau (Głogów) the army raised 22,000 thalars. Profits gained from numerous artistic performances and exhibitions of the captured French military equipment were transferred to the army. every Prussian victory produced outbursts of national enthusiasm all over Silesia, before it culminated when the news on the French defeat at Sedan reached the province and on the proclamation of the Second German Empire (Bialy, 1990: 267). The ardor was also due to the vast economic improvements which had taken place after 1848. Silesia was

317 The province was turned into the touchstone of French national unity one day in 1670 when the French army seized the Rhein bridge at Strassburg (Strasbourg), and burned it. The French were not content with the part of Elsass (Alasace) acquired by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), and would not rest until Strassburg (Strasbourg) itself was theirs, though, at that time, it was the second city of the Holy Roman Empire, and its language the same Alemannic dialect spoken on the other side of the Rhine. Subsequently, it was seized by the French Kingdom and remained a French foothold in the Rheinland which began to be despised by the Germans when their national movement crystallized in the course of the Napoleonic wars (Davies, 1996: 622, 1281).
not the poor man of Prussia any more. Already in 1860 Silesia with its 10% of Prussia’s total production scored a good place among the Prussian provinces as it was surpassed only by Rheinland (13%), Brandenburg-Saxony (12%) and Westphalia (11%). The gap between the developed western and eastern provinces of Prussia had been bridged at last (Herzig, 1994: 552). And inside the Second German Empire Silesia did retain its significance not only due to its geographical proximity to the imperial seat at Berlin. Although between 1850 and 1860 Rheinland supplanted Silesia as the most renowned powerhouse of Germany, Upper Silesia (still before the Ruhr industrial basin) was considered to be the black diamond in the crown of Prussia. The Upper Silesian magnates, princes von Fürstenberg, Henckel von Donnersmarck, Pleß or von Hohenlohe were not satisfied with playing the usual aristocratic roles at the royal or imperial courts but also acted as veritable captains of industry forging large industrial groups (Fuchs, 1994: 554). From the point of view of the Silesian everyman the overall situation also looked much better in 1871 than 30 years earlier. Rapid economic development triggered off general civilizational advance brought about by improved popular education, standard of hygiene, spread of railways and shift of population from the countryside to cities. The Silesians were not decimated by epidemics and famines any more. More children grew up to become adults and less women died in childbirth. The change in standard of life was most dramatic in Upper Silesia which had been the most backward part of the province. The general framework for the improvements was laid out by the state which with special acts of 1769, 1811 and 1854 guaranteed old age and disability pensions for miners and metallurgical workers in Silesia as well as widow pensions for their families (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 405-408). The state was also concerned with the physical fitness of recruits. On the behest of the military authorities which had advocated protective legislation from 1828, child labor under the age of 9 was prohibited in 1839, and under 12 years in 1854. After 1871 Germany took the lead in social politics, which beginning with 1872 was championed by the influential Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) (Kinder, 1978: II 67).

From the vantage of economy, there was no reason why the Silesians should not remain firmly loyal and supportive of Prussia and the German Empire. But logic of nation and nation-state building was to decide otherwise at least in the case of some non-German-speaking Silesians. The ideas of Herder placing the spirit, essence of Volk in its language were brought to the Prussian administration by officers who graduated from German universities in the first two decades of the 19th century. They strove to translate the philosophical ideas into the language of bureaucracy and state practice, and decided that statistic would be the most appropriate tool for this purpose. Consequently, in the 1830s and 1840s the first trial linguistic surveys were conducted in Prussia (Martuszewski, 1974: 8/9). The German philologist Richard Böckh argued that language was the only adequate indicator of nationality and his article Die statistische Bedeutung der Volkssprache als Kennzeichen der Nationalität (The Statistical Importance of Vernacular as the Indicator of Nationality) (1866), followed in 1869 by the full-fledged academic work entitled Der Deutschen Volkszahl und Sprachgebiete in den europäischen Staaten (The Number of Germans and the Areas where Their Language is Used in the European States) became accepted standard elaborations on the problem all over Europe. Not surprisingly, the principle of measuring nationality through language was generally accepted at the international Statistical Congress at St. Petersburg in 1872 which recommended to use it for this purpose in censuses, because, according to the congress participants, language was the only aspect of nationality which could be at least objectively counted and tabulated. This conclusion pegging nationality on language have continued to be prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe to this day, but not necessarily was understood and espoused in Western Europe. For instance, France the first country in Europe which allowed emancipation of Jews (1791) contained Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jews who spoke medieval Spanish and Yiddish, respectively. Should one take language as the indicator of their identity they could have been considered Spanish and German, however, in the light of the French law stemming from the basic nation-creating principles introduced by the French revolution, both the linguistic groups of Jews were equally French, once they accepted the conditions of French citizenship, which also included speaking French. Hence it is clearly visible that language was turned into a political tool by insistence that it is the same as nationality or ethnicity.
This argument suited the German national movement well since German-speakers were so widely distributed over Central and eastern Europe, and what is more it allowed to include the Ashkenazic Jews in the boundaries of the postulated German nations as they spoke Yiddish, a German dialect/ Germanic language not more different from standard German than the Allemanic dialect. Besides, thanks to it German politicians and decision-makers could also justify annexations of Holstein and Elssas (Alsace) (Anon., 1889a: 243; Hobsbawm, 1990: 21/22, 98/99; Kinder, 1978: II 62; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 44).

After having settled on language as the measurable emanation of the ever elusive nationality, there was no agreement what was to be counted. Ficker, the Austrian statistician, as a scholar rejected choosing the language of public life, which might be imposed on individuals by state or party, though this was entirely acceptable to his French and Hungarian colleagues. For the same reason he rejected the language of church and school. The Habsburg statisticians also tried to make room for the flux and change of language by asking the citizens not for their mother tongue (i.e. the very first language acquired in the earliest childhood), but for family tongue, i.e. the language usually spoken at home, which might be different. eventually, different Central and Eastern European governments used various aspects of language in their censuses usually in an effort to arrive at results which would be most pleasing to the national movement dominating the state. The principle was a hot potato which could disrupt the Danubian Monarchy, and this aspect of the whole matter was readily recognized in the 1860s the decade when the empire underwent a thorough overhaul in the face of formation and activation of non-German national movements. Cautiously, the Habsburgs put off the language question until the census of 1880. What nobody quite appreciated was that asking such a question would in itself generate linguistic nationalism. Each census was to become a battlefield between nationalities, and asking the language question for the first time forced everyone to choose not only nationality, but a linguistic nationality. This state-ordained ground-breaking event pushed the Central and Eastern European ethnic groups into the age of nationalism and nationalist conflicts necessarily arising with numerous populational and territorial claims and counterclaims which have accompanied the processes of nationand nation-state building (Hobsbawm, 1990: 99/100; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 45). The limited trial language censuses were carried out in Prussian Silesia in the period 1828-1858 and the first full-fledged comprehensive census during which the Silesians were asked the language question took place in 1861 (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 44; cf. Triest, 1984). Due to the aforementioned disinclination on the part of the Habsburg authorities to measure nationality this question was asked for the first time in Austrian Silesia as elsewhere in Austro-Hungary only during the census of 1880 (Zahradnik, 1992: 160). In consequence, well before the end of the 19th century the principle of nationality as espoused by the Prussian/German and Austro-Hungarian states did enter the political and social life of Silesia in the form of language planning318, and started dismantling the integrating prenational identity based on the region and locality in favor of the national one pegged on language, which shortly was to destroy the social cohesion since Prussian and Austrian Silesia were par excellence multiethnic lands as it was described in the previous chapters.

The development of German nationalism was analyzed above up to 1871 at a rather general level without devoting much attention to Silesia as a separate political and geographical entity. One may consider this approach as contradictory to the subject of this work, but at that time most of Silesia formed part of the Prussian Kingdom, and not unintelligibly its German national movement was intrinsically linked with the overall German national movement. Consequently, it is impossible to coherently describe the movement from the regional viewpoint unlike the Polish and Czech ones which formed in Silesia after 1848. However, the author realizes that the two latter national movements, to some degree, also developed due to outside material and ideological aid flowing from

318 The term denotes totality of the nation-state’s linguistic policies aimed at homogenizing and standardizing language use within its borders. The usual instruments singled out for introducing such an alteration, are: the educational system, mass media, army, publishing industry, and national academy of sciences which often is made responsible for devising official language standards and guarding purity of the national language (Crystal, 1987: 364-367).
Posen (Poznań) and Cracow, respectively, whereas the German one, in the form of an intellectual influence, spread into Silesia from the universities in central and western Germany as well as from those at Berlin and Königsburg (Kaliningrad). The statement is quite valid in the case of Austrian Silesia but must be qualified since regarding Prussian Silesia the latter was the place where the War of Liberation commenced. This event did form German nationalism giving it its first martyrs and its initial royalist shape. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the Slavic national movements came into being predominantly as a reaction to the assimilating policies of German nationalism, which, in Prussian Silesia, were actively promoted by the German state especially after 1871. The focus of this chapter, however, is mainly the period 1848 to 1871, so now it is time to turn to the roots and establishment of Polish and Czech national movements in Prussian and Austrian Silesia vis-a-vis maturing German nationalism.

The beginnings of the Polish national movement in Silesia can be associated with the modicum of bilingual education introduced in the second half of the 18th century in the areas with the Polish-speaking populations in Upper Silesia and north-east Lower Silesia. This school subsystem was to upgrade general education of the inhabitants of these usually backward areas and hopefully prepare them for secondary and university education which was provided exclusively via the media of German and Latin. Such bilingual schools were organized and run predominantly by the Catholic and Protestant Churches and due to this fact drew on the earlier tradition of publishing religious and prayer books in Polish, which still flourished. The crowning of these two trends directed at bettering comprehension of matters religious and economic situation in the Polish/Slavic-speaking areas of Silesia came with the publication of the Polish-language monthly Gazety Szląskie dla Ludu Pospolitego (Silesian Papers for the Common Folk, 1899-1806). It was published by the Korn publishing house, Breslau (Wroclaw), in, at that time, a tremendous number of copies (c. 10,000) which were distributed free of charge in the predominantly Polish/Slavic-speaking counties of Prussian Silesia (Gröschel, 1993: 317; Snoch, 1991: 35). Moreover, the presence of the Polish language and culture began to be felt quite directly in Lower and Upper Silesia after the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the course of which the border disappeared between Silesia and the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) and New Silesia since the last two, among other Polish provinces, had become part of Prussia transforming it into a virtually bilingual state until 1806 when Napoleon deprived the Prussian monarchy of majority of its Polish gains (including New Silesia) with the notable exception of the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) which continued to exert its increasing Polish influence on Silesia especially after 1848. This undeniable fact was recognized by the Korn Verlag which established its branches in Posen (Poznań), Warsaw, Lemberg (Lwów, Lviv), Wilna (Vilnus, Vilno) and St. Petersburg. Since the mid-18th century Korn brought out works on Polish culture and literature in German and Latin as well as Polish originals and German translations of renowned Polish writers. It had also produced brochures, textbooks and various books in Polish especially by the mid-19th century. This fostering environment for publishing books in Polish and on matters Polish in Silesia, had been prepared by general German interest in the situation of Poland which had been being dismembered then (cf.: Johann Josef Kausch Nachrichten über Polen (News on...)}

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319 It was a Polish version of the German periodical Schlesische Volkszeitung zum Nutzen und Vergnügen (Silesian Folk Paper for Use and Fun) (Snoch, 1991: 35).

320 Johann Jacob Korn established the Korn publishing house in Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1732. After the Prussian annexation Friedrich II granted him with the exclusive privilege to publish papers in Silesia so in 1742 Korn was able to take over the first full-fledged Silesian paper Schlesischer Nouvellen-Courier (Silesian News Courier; it had been established in 1708 as Nouvelles-Courier Breslau and its name had been changed in 1712. As a matter of fact though, the earliest known Silesian periodical had been published in Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1619 or 1629). In 1848 the paper’s name was changed and later it was brought out as Schlesische Zeitung (Silesian Paper) until 1945. The publishing house flourished under Johann Jacob’s son Wilhelm Gottlieb who secured for his enterprise the privilege to publish Silesian handbooks and Silesian Protestant song books. It became the most significant publishing house of Silesia and remained as such until 1945. Nowadays it survives at Würzburg in Germany as the Bergstadverlag Wilhelm Gottlieb Korn (Scheuermann, 1994: 838/839, 2001; Schulz, 1991).
Poland), 1793), and by acknowledgement of the culture and language of the Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians which had stemmed from the espousal of Herder’s philosophy (cf. Johann Gottlieb Schummel’s *Reise durch Schlesien* (A Travel Through Silesia, 1792). In 1802 Korn published the young Polish scholar (who studied and worked in Breslau (Wroclaw)) Jerzy Sameul Bandtke’s (or Bandtkie; born in 1768 at Lublin, died in 1835 at Cracow) first work *Historische-kritische Analecten zur Erläuterung der Geschichte des Ostens von Europe* (The Historical-Critical Analects Explaining the History of the East of Europe) which included a ground-breaking treatise Über die polnische Sprache in Schlesien (On the Polish Language in Silesia). In 1803 his Polish-German dictionary was brought out and it was followed by the *Polnische Grammatike für Deutsche* (Polish Grammar for Germans, 1808) and the *Handbuch der gebräuchlichen Wörter in deutscher, französischer und polnischer Sprache* (Handbook of the Most Needed Words in the German, French and Polish Languages, 1809) (Lubos, 1974: 496-499; Scheuermann, 1994: 838/839; Sosnowski, 1948: I/2 35).

Also some interest in Silesia and its Polish/Slavic-speaking population was boosted by Polish travellers who described their Silesian experiences in the second half of the 18th century and in the first half of the 19th century. After the final erasure of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from the map of Europe in 1795, first Polish national thinkers and activists strove to formulate the notions of the Polish nation and state in accordance with the national postulates forwarded by the French Revolution. After Napoleon defeated Prussia in 1806 and established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw Stanislaw Staszic (1755-1826) and Hugo Kollątaj (1750-1812) in 1807 and 1808, respectively, defined the Polish state in historic and ethnic terms demanding for it the territories between the Black and Baltic Sea and the Oder (Odra) as the western border with the inclusion of Silesia (Kulak, 1990: 41/42). The defeat of Napoleon in 1815 and subsequent subjection of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as the Congress Kingdom to Russia with the Tsar crowned as the Polish King (Davies, 1996: 1264) frustrated the intellectual activity of the nascent Polish national movement for almost a decade. In 1821 the Polish writer Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz (1758-1841) was one of the first to propound the medieval rule of the House of Piast in Silesia as the proof that the land is Polish and should belong to a would-be Polish state (Niemcewicz, 1990: 49). Thus the so-called Piast myth of Silesia was born.

In Tomasz Ujazdowski defined the Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians as brethren of the Poles through the same speech, custom and garb but he shied away from calling them Poles and settled on describing them as a nation which is most favorably disposed to the Poles from all the Slavic nations’ (Ujazdowski, 1990: 51). The *Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie* (Polish Democratic Society) (1832-1862), which was established in France as the result of the Polish political emigration after the failure of the November Uprising, published its manifesto in 1836. It postulated a greater Polish nation-state extending from the Oder (Odra) and the Carpathians beyond the Dnepr and the Dvina rivers, and from the Baltic to the Black Sea (Kulak, 1990: 54). So it meant that the whole of Silesia or its part was to be included in such a Polish state as earlier claimed by Staszic and Kollątaj. In 1837 a similar postulate was published by the periodical *Polak* (Pole) in Paris (Kulak, 1990: 55). In 1846 Ludwik Mieroslawski planned to involve the Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians in the all-Polish uprising which was to take place in the Prussian, Russian and Austrian partitions of the Polish territories but was quenched before it broke out. The Cracow Uprising of 1846 was a splinter of this effort, and the organizers of this rising even reserved a place for an Upper Silesian representative in their provisional national government but conspicuously it remained vacant (Lis, 1993: 78).

Thus, Silesia began to be present at the fringes of the Polish national movement as a vaguely possible addition to a future Poland though the land had never belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The above-presented views of early Polish nationalists most probably never reached

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321 Bandtke dedicated it to Friedrich Wilhelm III (Lubos, 1974: 499).
322 The activists chose to overlook the fact that language was of no significance for medieval rulers and for the Silesian Piasts as well. The only true language to them was Latin, and others just vernaculars unworthy committing to expensive parchment. Moreover, Germanization of Silesia caused by the steady influx of Germanic settlers was initiated by the Piasts alone who welcomed the colonizers to come to Silesia in order to develop this potentially rich province.
the Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians but must have influenced Polish national activists in the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznan) and Galicia who started to perceive Upper Silesia and East Silesia, respectively, as potential directions of expansion for the Polish national propaganda which could not be barred from Silesia by then the non-existent boundaries of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On the other hand, bilingual education and use of Polish in Catholic churches in Upper Silesia and Protestant churches in north-eastern Lower Silesia generated a number of usually bilingual priests and trained teachers. Some of them came under the influence of Herderian thought and were impressed by German nationalist activists, and also together with Polish students from various regions of the then defunct Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth must have belonged to the Polish student fraternity Polonia (1817) which as a member of the Allgemeine deutschen Burschenschaften (Association of German Student Fraternities) was abolished in 1819. Polish had been taught at Leopoldina and then at the Friedrich Wilhelm University since 1798 which led to the establishment of the Towarzystwo Literacko-Slowiańskie (Association of Literary Slavic research, 1836-1850) under the leadership of the renowned Czech philologist and panslavist Jan Evangelista Purkyně (1787-1869). Due to his efforts the Slavistisch Institut (Institute of Slavonic Studies) was established at the university in 1841 (Lubos, 1974: 500/501; Snoch, 1990: 118; Zielonka 1994: 317).

At the same time after the Congress of Vienna and prior to the revolutionary events of 1848 modernization of the Prussian state brought about homogenization which was also expressed in the growing dominance of the German language as the official medium of communication. In 1817 it was prohibited to embark on pilgrimage to the Catholic shrine of Jasna Góra at Częstochowa in Congress Poland which led to severing some links between the Upper Silesian Catholic Church and the Congress Polish Catholic Church and predated the papal bull of 1821 which pushed eastward the western border of the Cracow diocese so that it would coincide with the Silesian-Galician border. In the 1820s and 1830s number of masses and celebrations conducted in Polish and other Slavic languages was limited by the Catholic and Protestant Churches on behast of the Prussian government which aimed at changing bilingual schools into German monolingual ones and Polish monolingual schools into bilingual ones. It was an example of conscious use of language planning for advancing homogeneity in Silesia. Both the Churches were the main institutions to be manipulated by the state because they controlled and staffed the educational system. The Policy was especially successful towards the Silesian Protestants. In 1840 Polish celebrations took place in 2 (0.2%) churches, German and Polish in 59 (4.3%), Czech in 3 (0.3%), Czech and German in 2 (0.2%), Sorbian and German in 28 (2.5%) and German in 1,094 (92.5%) though German-speaking Protestants constituted 89/90% and the Polish-speaking ones 5-7% of the total Protestant population of Silesia. These proportions must have been reflected in the Protestant educational system. In the Catholic schools which dominated in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency 49% of the total of 647 schools were bilingual, 31% German and 20% Polish at the end of the 1830s (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 412-416). In 1819 German became a compulsory subject in Upper Silesian schools which forced bilingualism in some of the schools where teachers and parents had steered the system into the direction of Polish monolingualism. The bilingual primary educational system was started to be supplanted with its monolingual German version in 1839 when German (due to its official status and the pivotal unifying factor of the Prussian state) was introduced as the medium of instruction in all the primary schools of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency (Lis, 1993: 78; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 416). Moreover, in 1838 Polish was banned from the bilingual weekly Amts-Blatt der Königlichen Oppelnschen Regierung (Government Gazette of the Oppeln Regency) which since its inception in 1816 had also reached the Polish/Slavic-speaking Upper Silesians due to its considerable c. 6,000 copies per issue (Gröschel, 1993: 192). The changes which followed the logic of homogenization and language planning favored the German language as the unifying element of the postulated German nation and nation-state to the detriment of all other linguistic minorities. In Upper Silesia this attitude led to lessening the level of education which became virtually unintelligible to Polish/Slavic-speaking pupils and consequently worsened comprehension of religious issues among the younger faithful which could not be well appreciated by the then still universalistic Catholic Church. However, no overt opposition against this trend emerged in this period when the European powers excelled in suppressing any dissent which could endanger
the absolutist prerogatives of the Central and Eastern European rulers. But the decisions had some unexpected consequences, for instance, the need to produce more bilingual teachers who would be able to lead the Polish/Slavic-speaking first-graders to fluency in German in the last forms of the primary school, caused introduction of Polish to the Glogau (Glogówek) seminary in 1844 (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 417).

The problem of official limiting of the use of Polish was recognized by the Catholic and Protestant Churches and also by private entrepreneurs who perceived it as a potentially profitable market niche. In 1834 the Korn publishing house brought out the only volume of Marzanna the literary and genealogical yearbook for the fairer sex (Gröschel, 1993: 318). From the 1840s onwards Korn did not publish so many Polish publications and translations from Polish originals as previously increasingly limiting its interest with Polish books to importing them from Congress Poland and Galicia. Korn’s role was taken over by the Schletter publishing house which brought out 135 Polish publications in the period 1835-1855. Few Polish books were also published at Oppeln (Opole) where in 1833 Edmund Baron established the only Polish bookshop (Zielonka, 1994: 201, 310/311). Publication of Protestant religious books and sermons in Polish (but printed in the German Gothic type) continued at Breslau (Wroclaw), Oels (Oleśnica), Gross Wartenberg (Syców) and Brieg (Brzeg).

The last renowned representative of this trend was Rev. Robert Fiedler (1810-1877) who in the years 1839-1872 published his Polish sermons, Polish language textbooks, articles and treatises in Polish and German on the Silesian dialect of the Polish language as well as on customs and tradition of the Polish/Slavic-speaking population of Lower and Upper Silesia (Gajda, 1987: 48-53; Snoch, 1990: 32; Zielonka, 1994: 19/20). Priest Jan Ficek (Fietzek) (1790-1862) was active at the pilgrimage center at Piekar (Piekary) and in 1842 brought about publication of the Silesian editions of Piotr Skarga’s Zywoty Świętych (Hagiographies) and Florian Jaroszewicz’s Matka Świętych Polski (Mother of Poland’s Saints). Notably the latter book with hagiographies of Polish Catholic saints was commenced with biographies if the first two historical rulers of the Polanian state (i.e. Mieszko I and Boleslaw Chrobry) which can indicate an early attempt at transplanting Polish nationalism as pegged on the Catholic faith into Upper Silesia. In 1844-1847 Ficek as a charismatic priest organized the wide-spread temperance movement in eastern Upper Silesia which led to virtual emptying of inns and strengthening, through the pastoral advice in Polish, of the Church influence in Upper Silesia. Although the movement was unmade by the epidemics and famines which set in before the outbreak of the revolutionary events of 1848 it indicated the potential degree of authority the Church could muster among the Polish/Slavic-speaking Upper Sileans should it use the language spoken by them and not official German (1992: 63; Snoch, 1990: 32; Zielonka, 1994: 66). However, the Catholic Church which was responsible for implementing the Prussian homogenizing policies at schools had to follow the official line so that in 1849 out of 354 priests catering for the Polish-speaking Upper Sileans 59 (16.6%) of them spoke only German whereas the rest were still bilingual in accordance with the earlier prenatal integrating policies of the Prussian state (Surman, 1992: 70).

One of the earliest and the most significant of the early amateurs who were to invent and establish the notions of the Polish national movement in Silesia, was Józef Lompa (1797-1863) from the county of Rosenberg (Olesno) which directly bordered on the Congress Kingdom of Poland. He worked as a teacher and an organist in Lubschau (Lubsza) and Woischnik (Woźniki), close to the border with Congress Poland. He wrote c. 50 books and brochures (among them novels and collections of poetry) as well as c. 250 articles (in Polish and German) on a wide variety of subjects. He predominantly used Polish and in 1843 he published Krótki rys jeografii Szląska (A Short Outline of Silesian Geography) which emphasized primordial links of this land with Polishdom. From 1844 he became a member of various cultural and scholarly societies operating on the territories of the ex-Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and closely cooperated with the opposition weekly Rosenberger-Creutzburger Telegraph (1844-1850) which also published some official announcements in Polish partly taking over the role of the aforementioned Amts-Blatt der Königlichen Oppelnschen Regierung which had been begun to be published exclusively in German in 1838. Thanks to this connection Lompa became the deputy editor of the Polish version of Rosenberger-Creutzburger Telegraph which was published during the revolutionary period (1848/1849) as Telegraf Górno-Szelski (Upper Silesian
Telegraph). Notably this Polish weekly was written in Polish strongly influenced by the Upper Silesian dialect of Polish and the Upper Silesian creole (Anon., 1984: 763; Gröschel, 1993: 246; Snoch, 1990: 83; Zielonka, 1994: 196/197). In 1844 the first Polish language calendar *Kalendarz Postny* (Lent Calendar) was brought out in Beuthen (Bytom) (Kossakowska-Jarosz, 1994: 23/24) and it was followed by the *Kalendarz Katolicki* (Catholic Calendar) (1846-1850, Gleiwitz (Gliwice), Beuthen (Bytom)) published by Father Antoni Stabik (1807-1887). He was based at Michalkowice (Michalkowice, today part of Siemianowice (Siemianowitz)) just several kilometers away from the border of Congress Poland. His *Opis Ziemi Świętej* (A Description of the Holy Land) (1847) was the first one of this kind published in Polish in Silesia. He also brought out a collection of his poetry in 1848 (Snoch, 1990: 133). Another priest furthering knowledge of the Polish language among the faithful was Father Józef Szafranek (Josef Schaffranek) (1807-1874) who since 1839 had been active in Beuthen (Bytom), then the very center of the Upper Silesian industrial basin which had had close ecclesiastical links with Cracow before 1821. He appealed for a wider use of Polish at Upper Silesian schools and in 1848 entered the political scene as a deputy to the Prussian National Assembly at Berlin (Lubos, 1974: 515; Snoch, 1990: 135; Zielonka, 1994: 83). Moreover, the county of Pless (Pszczyna) with arguably the largest percentage of Polish-speakers in Upper Silesia was served by *Tygodnik Polski* (Polish Weekly) (1845-1847) established by the local publisher Christian Schemmel who owned the weekly *Plesser Kreisblatt* (Pless County Paper) (1841-1922) where he started publishing some Polish pieces beginning with 1844. Another Polish periodical *Gwiazdka dla Ludu Górnośląskiego* (Small Star for the Upper Silesian Folk) (1846-1848) was published at Beuthen (Bytom) (Gröschel, 1993: 35, 224; Zielonka, 1994: 29). These cultural-commercial and religious trends championing some form of reintroduction of Polish to the educational system at the primary level as well as boosting production of periodicals and books in this language underwent unexpected development in 1848.

The difficult and sometimes tragic economic and social situation prior to 1848 which manifested itself in worker and peasant riots prepared ground for the spread of popular dissent. When the revolution broke out in Berlin on March 18, 1848, thanks to the direct railway link the news incited the inhabitants of Breslau (Wroclaw), (significantly the second largest Prussian city (Herzig, 1994: 542)) to start building barricades the very next day and demanded liberal reforms. Unrest appeared for the first time in Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra) on March 20 and at the end of March 1848 disturbances spread to other towns of south-western Lower Silesia, i.e. to Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra), Schmiedeberg (Kowary), Lauban (Lubań) and Greiffenberg in Schlesien (Gryfów Śląski). The local authorities successfully contained the riots and concomitant widespread plunder and disturbances in the countryside where peasants demanded scrapping of the remnants of serfdom. But the same revolutionary pattern of events was repeated in Upper Silesia where peasants also started demanding freeing from serfdom obligations (which were preserved there in a more oppressive form than in Lower Silesia) and even forced their lords to grant them this privilege. On March 22 workers and artisans demonstrated in Ratibor (Racibórz) and unrest spread to the counties of Ratibor (Racibórz), Kreuzburg (Kluczibork), Rosenberg (Olesno), Rybnik (Rybnik), Grottkau (Grodków) and Neisse (Nysa). Due to the separatist strife in the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) and the danger of a conflict with Russia, the revolutionary disturbances were suppressed in April with the use of military force, first in Lower Silesia and later in Upper Silesia. Moreover, convening of the Frankfurt *Vorparlament* (Preliminary Parliament) (March 30-April 4) also channelled popular descent into the sphere of politics so that parties of the conflict began to get prepared for the elections to the German National Assembly, Frankfurt which were scheduled for May 1. The beginning of May, in case of Prussian Silesia, was also marked by the elections to the Prussian National Assembly at Berlin. The developments did not prevent demonstrations of unemployed miners and metallurgical workers in Gleiwitz (Gliwice), Beuthen (Bytom) and Nikolau (Mikolów) and general unrest in Oppeln (Opole) and Cosel (Koźle) which continued throughout May until participation of wide strata of society in political life, promises of liberal reforms (including complete abolishment of serfdom) and field works delayed any further riots by the autumn (Czapliński, 1990: 477; Kinder, 1978: II 54; Lis, 1993: 79/80; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 488-500; Snoch, 1990: 120).
Participation in the first free elections\(^{323}\) to the assemblies at Frankfurt and Berlin invoked considerable interest as 30-50% of the eligible participated in them. In result for the first time the voice and concerns of the Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians was to be directly heard in the power centers. 24 deputies from Upper Silesia were elected to the Prussian Assembly and c. 9 of them were bilingual Upper Silesians, mainly peasants but also one industrial worker and the Beuthen (Bytom) vicar Józef Szafranek. On the other hand, the goals of the Frankfurt Parliament which was to deal with the questions of economic and political unification of Germany were not of any immediate interest to the rural population of the Polish/Slavic-speakers in Upper Silesia. Their first priority was to do away with the last remounts of serfdom in order to improve their lot. Hence, the national ideals of the Frankfurt Parliament were of no significance to them if not completely unintelligible and a similar attitude prevailed throughout the German states as professors, lawyers, industrialists, professionals and craftsmen, i.e. upper middle class, dominated in the body. It is worth mentioning though that the only peasant deputy to this assembly was Krystian Minkus from the Upper Silesian village of Marienfeld (Osv) in Lompa’s home county of Rosenberg (Olesno) (Lis, 1993: 80/81).

The political and social unrest coupled with the rapid development of the German national movement striving to unite Germany through the actions of the Frankfurt Parliament also caused repeated demands for Polish language in Upper Silesian schools and stirred some of the first propagators of the Polish language in Silesia, to put forward some Polish national theses. The German public opinion and Polish activists in the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) were shocked by Szafranek’s petition lodged with the Prussian Assembly on August 24, 1848. Among others, he demanded bilingual courts and administration for Upper Silesia, Polish as the sole medium of instruction in primary schools and as an equal one in secondary schools and at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University. He also asked for proceedings of the assembly to be translated and published in Polish (Szafranek, 1990: 65/66). His demands were rejected as impractical but this petition marked the tentative beginning of the Polish national movement in Silesia. Remarkably the Liga Polska (Polish League), established in Berlin by activists from the Grand Duchy of Posen, (Poznań) supported Szafranek’s position. This nationalist society organized local branches in Upper Silesia and its theoretician Karol Libelt included Upper Silesia within the postulated boundaries of a Polish nation and nation-state claiming, on the basis of Arndt’s thesis regarding Germany, extent of Polish use should be reflected in the borders of a restituted Polish state. This link also facilitated distribution of Polish periodicals from the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) in Silesia. One of them Gazeta Polska (Polish Paper) emphasized that Polish national activists from the Grand Duchy and Galicia should support development of Polish national movement in Upper Silesia (Wanatowicz, 1992: 24/25). The preliminary base of such a movement was created and catered for by the following Polish Upper Silesian periodicals: Dziennik Górnó Szlaski (Upper Silesian Daily) (1848-1849), Telegraf Górnó-Szlaski (Upper Silesian Telegraph) (1848-1849), Tygodnik GórnóSzlaski (Upper Silesian Weekly) (1848-1852), Tygodnik Katolicki (Catholic Weekly) (1848-1850), and Gazeta Wiejska dla Górnego Szląska (Village Paper for Upper Silesia) (1849-1850). The first of them was openly nationalist. It was financed by the Liga Polska and published by Aleksander Mierowski (1823-?), Józef Lepkowski (1826-1896) (an activist from Cracow, and later Rector of the Jagiellonian University) and Emanuel Smolka (Smolka) (1820-1854). Also Lompa cooperated with them. The two further periodicals tried to serve the commercial and everyday needs of the Polish-speaking population not unlike the two last Catholic Church initiatives which obviously concentrated more on matters religious. But even in these periodicals relatively free from nationalist agitation Ficek represented a pro-Polish stance in Tygodnik

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\(^{323}\) It was the beginning of male suffrage in Prussia and Germany. It became universal when the German Empire was created in 1871, but women obtained the right to vote only in 1919 (Davies, 1996: 1295).

\(^{324}\) This demand might be influenced by the difficult situation of another Upper Silesian deputy to the Prussian national Assembly - Kiolbassa (Kiolbassa) who had difficulties to follow the proceedings not having a good command of German. There was even an attempt at excluding him from the assembly on the basis of this fact (Brozek, 1969: 4/5).
Katolicki whereas Telegraf... and Gazeta Wiejska... seem to have been pro-German (Glensk, 1995: 89; Gröschel, 1993: 65/66 195, 225, 247; Lis, 1993: 89).

In 1848/1849 Polish language and Polish national life concentrated in Beuthen (Bytom) and the vicinity (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 517/518; Zielonka, 1994: 29). The number of people involved in it was considerable because it wished to be clothed in some organizational framework which was provided by Lompa with his Towarzystwo Pracujących dla OŚwiaty Ludu GórnoŚląskiego (Society for Education of the Upper Silesian Folk, later renamed as Towarzystwo Nauczycieli Polaków Society of Teachers who are Poles) (1848) and the Klub Narodowy (National Club) established in Beuthen (Bytom) on October 28, 1848. It was chaired by the Upper Silesian Polonophile Carl von Koschützki (Karol Kosicki) (1788-1863) and grouped the intellectualists involved in publishing Dziennik Górno-Szlaski (Brozek, 1995: 55; Snoch, 1991: 61, 67/68, 83). Three days before founding the Klub Narodowy the radical paper published an article which on the linguistic basis appealed the Upper Silesian Polish-speakers that they should not identify themselves as Germans or Prussians because they were Poles and ought to serve their fatherland. Thus it indirectly pointed that Upper Silesia was part of the Polish fatherland and that should be included in a future Polish state (Kulak, 1990: 66/67; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 513). Another institution worth mentioning is the Klub Niedziełny (Sunday Club) (1848/1849) established by Jan Gajda and Lompa in Lubetzko (Lubecko). Although it was a local venture it supported an amateur theater troupe which started the tradition of using the theater as a tool of nationalism which began to be clearly visible in Upper Silesia beginning with the 1870s (Mykita-Glensk, 1988: 5). And last but not least, with aid flowing from Posen (Poznań), in 1848/1849, Polish reading rooms were organized in Beuthen (Bytom), Lublinitz (Lubliniec), Wischnik (Woźniki), Rybnik (Rybnik) and Myslowitz (Myslowice) (Lepkowski, 1990: 70). They disappeared in the 1850s but beginning with the 1880s, the institution of the reading room became the core of the early national movement in Upper Silesia (Snoch, 1991: 148/149).

However, it was already a decline of the revolutionary movement. The unprovoked massacre of the liberal protesters at Schweidnitz (Swidnica) on July 31, 1848 commenced a renewed wave of unrest in all of Silesia in the autumn but the absolutists rulers of the German states gradually regained control which contributed to quenching the radical branch of the Silesian revolutionary movement by the end of 1848. General calming of the situation was achieved with the full abolishment of serfdom and granting of the constitution. Repressions came with the ultimate putting out of the revolutionary flame in 1849 (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 524, 532-535). All the Polish-language Upper Silesian periodicals mentioned above were closed shortly afterwards and Polish activists who were not Prussian citizens (cf. Lepkowski) had to leave Silesia. Many political activists of the main German scene emigrated outside Europe and those who remained had to keep low profile. Interestingly, they set out routes which later were taken by Prussian and Silesian peasants who decided to start new life.

325 He decided to support the Polish national movement because he had discovered that his family descended from Polish nobility (Snoch, 1991: 67/68), and probably due to the received education which at that time imbued students with Herderian philosophy. More similar, but by no account numerous, figures appeared among Silesian nobility in the second half of the 19th century. A dramatic example is provided by Alfred von Olschewski (Olszewski) from Eichholz (Waramątowice) near Liegnitz (Legnica). Under influence of the writings of the national Polish writer Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1916), who glorified the Polish and Polish-Lithuanian past appropriating it for the Polish national movement, von Olschewski made the writer one of his heirs unless his children did not learn Polish language and culture and did not become Polish patriots before they turned 30. Sensibly Sienkiewicz renounced his right to the legacy in 1909 (Lis, 1988: 18/19). The crowning of this Herderian strain came with Alexander (Aleksander) Brückner (1856-1939), born to a German family at Tarnopol in eastern Galicia, who was the Head of the Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures at the Berlin University. At the beginning of the 20th century he started writing in Polish and produced an immense amount of books and articles including the very works on history of Polish language, culture and literature, many of which remain basic textbooks unsurpassed in excellence to this day. Notably, his etymological dictionary of Polish is still the only one so it is still frequently reissued (Anon., 1983: 370). eventually, Brückner became an honorary Pole and even demanded to be buried in Poland but due to the overall political situation in 1939 and opposition of his children his mortal remains stayed at Berlin (Kosman, 1989: 5-18).
abroad due to the excessive individual cost of the abolishment of serfdom and to the continued poor shape of the economy shaken by systemic reforms. The factors did not allow any immediate improvement of the lot of the Silesian peasantry, which was especially difficult in Upper Silesia. Other reasons for emigration were more personalized, e.g. evasion of conscription. In 1850 emigration to the US, and especially Texas which had been annexed by the US in 1845, became popular in Lower Silesia. The first Upper Silesian group under leadership of their vicar Rev Leopold Moczygemba arrived in Texas in 1854. In the 1860s a considerable number of Prussian citizens emigrated to Brazil and the first Upper Silesians joined in in 1867. About 1,000 Upper Silesians went to Brazil in all and in the 1880s overseas emigration was passe due to the rapid development of the German Empire because of which Silesians rather migrated to the western German industrial centers instead of going abroad (Brozek, 1969; Brozek, 1985: 21; Miś, 1969).

In the years following the 1848 revolution there were attempts at reviving some Polish-language periodicals which would not face the danger of immediate closure due to their political aspirations. Carl von Koschützki supported publication of the weekly *Poradnik Górnó-Szlaski* (Upper Silesian Magazine of Advice) (1851-1853/1854) and in the years 1848-1851 and 1857-1859 some Polish texts were brought out in *Amts-Blatt der Königlichen Oppelnschen Regierung*. Also Poles and Polish-speaking students at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University established the weekly *Marcholt* (1851) and the yearly *Znicz* (Eternal Flame) (1851/1852) but they shortly went defunct too. The Very Polish language became a political issue in the eyes of the governance and no significant Polish periodicals were published in Silesia until the 1860s. Only *Penelope: Nowy Zurnal Deseniowy Robót i Mod Damskich* (Penelope: A New Journal of Knitting and Female Fashion) (1853-1862) as devoted to a politically neutral subject and directed mainly at the Polish female readership in the Province of Posen (Poznań), could be published at Glogau (Glogów), Lower Silesia, i.e. safely far away from Upper Silesia (Gröschel, 1993: 66/67, 192, 318/319, 393). In the period of the dynamic development of the German press in Silesia there was lack of its Polish/Slavic-language counterpart in multiethnic and multilingual Upper Silesia. Polish nationalists from Posen (Poznań), who a priori appropriated the Polish-speaking Silesians for their movement openly considering them to be Poles (Kulak, 1990: 71), strove to ameliorate this situation by facilitating Silesian subscriptions to Polish-language periodicals from their province. The most popular of them were *Wielkopolanin* (Inhabitant of Wielkopolska), and in the 1860s especially the weekly *Przyjaciel Ludu* (Friend of the People) published at Culmhof (Chelmno) near Bromberg (Bydgoszcz). In 1867 the latter’s 249 copies were distributed in 35 Upper Silesian localities (Glensk, 1992: 17). In the period, however, Pawel Stalmach’s *Gwiazdka Cieszyńska* (Cieszyn Small Star) (1851-1920) from East Silesia, held sway among Polish national activists in Prussian Silesia (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 278; Pater, 1991: 204; Snoch, 1991: 45; Zahradnik, 1989: 85).

After the 1848 events, however, a qualitative change came with the specific stance of the Catholic and Protestant Churches which remaining fully loyal to the Prussian Kingdom, anyway demanded wider use of Polish and other Slavic vernaculars in order to spread Gospel in the manner

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326 The first group of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians, under leadership of Rev. Leopold Moczygemba, arrived in Texas in 1854 and established their own town Panna Maria (Holy Virgin Mary) hailed as the first Polish settlement in the United States. The town survives to this day with a considerable percentage of inhabitants speaking the Silesian dialect of Polish interlaced with Anglicisms (Brozek, 1972: 13, 232-237).

327 To illustrate this fact one can glance at the statistics. In 1845 Silesians constituted 5% (19,000) of Berlin’s total population and 7.1% (142,215) in 1907. Even an appropriate saying was composed: *Jeder zweite Berliner stammt aus Schlesien* (every second Berliner comes from Silesia) (Düspohl, 1995: 190, 193/4). In 1907, in all, c. 730,000 Silesians lived outside their homeland but still within the borders of the German empire (Wrzesiński, 1995: 181).

328 Female suffrage was introduced only after the fall of the Second German Empire in 1918.

329 In 1848-1851 it was published under the title *Tygodnik Cieszyński* (Cieszyn Weekly) and was overtly pro-Polish. The weekly together with Stalmach’s national activities helped create the Polish national movement in East Silesia (Snoch, 1991: 45; Zahradnik, 1989: 200).
which would suit their faithful best. This universalistic goal clashed with the homogenizing policies of Berlin but at that time Prussia could ill afford rejecting cooperation with the Churches as their strong influence on the wide strata of displeased peasantry and workers contributed to attaining a modicum of stability during the period of reintroduction of enlightened absolutism (with elements of parliamentarian democracy) and implementation of systemic reforms after 1848. Moreover, in the eyes of the Prussian decision-makers and intellectuals the Upper Silesian was an epitome of good savage who had to be civilized in order not to degenerate and imperil the task of nation-building in this far-flung corner of the Prussian Kingdom (Ring in Lüer, 1995: 82). From this vantage it appeared unrealistic to enforce use of German without preparing this backwater population for appropriate reception of the German language and culture through the instrument of a bilingual educational system. The significance of the task was illustrated by the sheer number of the Polish-speaking populace: in 1861 there were 416,000 or 666,000 Polish-speakers in Upper Silesia, and c. 54,000 in Lower Silesia. The lower number in the case of Upper Silesia is the official German figure and the higher one a modern Polish estimate includes bilingual persons whom Prussian statisticians considered to be German (Pater, 1991: 119). Confessionally, majority of Polish-speaking Protestants concentrated in north-east Lower Silesia. Their number including the Polish-speaking Protestants from Upper Silesia amounted to 120,000 in 1857 (Kokot, 1973: 20; Pater, 1991: 119/120).

The subsequent reform reintroducing bilingual educational in Prussian Silesia is connected to the person of Rev. Bernhard Bogedein (1810-1860). He was born in the village of Fröbel (Wróblin) near Glogau (Głogów) quite close to the border of the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) so knowledge of Polish was nothing unusual in this Lower Silesian area. His uncle was a vicar in Wielkopolska and thanks to his backing Bogedein was ordained by the Gnesen-Posen (Gniezno-Poznań) archbishop Marcin Dunin and found employment in the latter’s archdiocese. Having noticed poor quality of Polish-language primers and prayer books in the Grand Duchy, Bogedein compiled the popular Pieśni nabożne dla użytku katolików w archidiecezji gnieźnieńskiej (Church Songs for the Catholics of the Gniezno Archdiocese). On May 15, 1848 he was nominated to the position of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency School Councillor and on February 5, 1849 he was elected to the National Assembly at Berlin where he supported Rev. Szafranek’s stance on the use of Polish in Upper Silesia (Swierc, 1990: 3-7). He argued that fluency in German was necessary for improving one’s standard of life but that Upper Silesians should be allowed to praise God in their mother tongue Polish, and use their language at primary school because without formal knowledge of Polish they would not be able to learn German properly (Herzig, 1994: 498). He started introducing the proposed change through supporting knowledge of standard literary Polish. Apparently Bogedein came to the conclusion that as German children were taught Hochdeutsch and not the local dialects spoken at home, Upper Silesian schoolchildren should not use their specific Polish/Slavic dialects or creoles at school. Inadvertently, the decision improved Upper Silesians comprehension of publications imported from Posen (Poznań) and created a linguistic difference vis-a-vis East Silesia where majority of Polish publications were brought out in the local dialect(s) of Polish exactly for the sake of better understanding among the readership unknowledgable of standard Polish. At first, Bogedein carried out his policy by publishing the conservative weekly Gazeta Wiejska dla Górnego Szląska which was sponsored by the government of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency (Gröschel, 1993: 15). Obviously, the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop Melchior von Dipenbrock (1845-1953) and the Prussian government favored Bogedein’s efforts (Pater, 1991: 122) and with the beginning of the 1850s Polish as the medium of instruction and Polish-language textbooks were introduced in primary schools of the predominantly Polish-speaking areas of Upper Silesia so that in 1857 there were 491 bilingual and 182 Polish-language schools in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 467). This decision was consequently accompanied

330 It is clearly visible that the colonial thought, according to which Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and other western European colonial powers were to carry the white man’s burden civilizing (i.e. Europeanizing) the good savages in overseas dependencies, seeped into the German states which started yearning for colonies as an indispensable attribute of progress and modernity. Not surprisingly did many German intellectuals start perceiving non-German-speaking subjects of the Prussian monarch as good savages who must be saved from their backward state of existence by being transformed into Germans.
by reforming the teacher seminaries at Peiskretschan (Pyskowice), Oberboglaue (Glogówe) and Pilchowtz (Pilchowice) to produce competent specialists for these bilingual schools. But knowledge of Polish among Upper Silesian priests was hindered by the fact that after finishing primary education they had to continue learning in secondary schools where Polish was just an elective subject (Kraszewski, 1990: 85; Lis, 1993: 89; Surman, 1992: 73; Swiere, 1990: 8). Because the authorities supported the reformatory ideas of Bogedein, the change was also implemented by the Protestant Church in relation to the Polish/Slavic-speaking population in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency. In 1850 (the year of reintroduction of Polish to Protestant primary schools), for instance in the county of Gross Wartenberg (Syke) there were 34 Polish-language schools, 2 Czech and 14 Polish-German (Pater, 1991: 122/123, 195). At the end of the 1850s the Protestant teacher seminary came into being at Kreuzburg (Kluczbork) in order to turn out Polish language teachers for the Protestant bilingual educational system (Brozek, 1995: 56). Similarly, the Prussian government which was eager to improve the level of agriculture in Upper Silesia rich in good soils, had established the Agricultural Academy (1847-1880) at Proskau (Proszków) near Oppeln (Opole). During its existence many local and Polish students (407, mainly from Wielkopolska) attended it and spread interest in the Polish language and culture. Polish students subscribed to Posen (Poznań) periodicals and with pecuniary aid flowing from the Polish national circles in Posen (Poznań) they organized the Polish-language library in 1856. It was open to the local population. Moreover, the students also established the Towarzystwo Literacko-Rolnicze (Literary-Agricultural Society) within whose framework the Komisja Ludowa (People Commission) was active its goal being to spread education and [Polish] national feeling among the locals (Pater, 1991: 211). At that time also some Polish students from Congress Poland and the Province of Posen (Poznań) were active at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University developing cultural and national initiatives in the then at last unmolested Towarzystwo Literacko-Slowianskie (1836-1886). Thanks to their efforts the Towarzystwo Przemysłowców Polskich (Society of Polish Industrialists) came into being in 1866, and in 1868 they managed to legalize their social academic club and its provident fund. Interestingly Polish-speaking Upper Silesian students332 did decline any invitations to join the bodies and were grouped in their own academic club Towarzystwo Akademików Górnoślązaków (Society of Polish Upper Silesian Students)333 (Kraszewski, 1990: 86/87). They mainly studied Catholic theology to become priests so along with the universalistic line of the Church334 they did not dabble with the Polish national movement. Their goal was to become dexterous shepherd of the faithful in the bilingual and Polis/Slavic-speaking parishes and not to turn Poles335. At the level of

331 In the respect of the elementary education in whole Silesia there were 128,288 Polish-speaking pupils in 1864 and 159,441 in 1871, 11,662 Czech-speaking ones in 1864 and 10,396 in 1871, and 5,103 Sorbian-speaking in 1864 and 5,376 in 1871. Bilingual pupils included 22,333 Polish-and-German-speakers, 2,516 Czech-and-German-speakers and 1,322 Sorb-and-German-speakers in 1864, and in 1871 the figures for these three categories were 22,074, 1,026 and 1,452, respectively (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 484/485).

332 There were about 40 of them at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University at the end of the 1860s (Kraszewski, 1990: 87).

333 There were, certainly, some exceptions to the rule. For instance Father Konstanty Damrot (1841-1895) belonged to this Upper Silesian academic club and to the Towarzystwo-Literacko Slowianskie. He is considered the most outstanding Polish lyricist of the 19th-century Upper Silesia and though he wrote equally well in Polish and in German he chose to consider himself a Pole and this conviction caused him to steer the Towarzystwo Akademików Górnoślązaków toward the Polish national tendency in 1866/1867. Unofficially, its members called it the Towarzystwo Polskich Górnoślązaków (Society of Polish Upper Silesian) and it had been established in 1862/1863 (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 351; Snoch, 1991: 25).

334 This universalistic tendency in the Catholic Church is known under the name of ultramontanism. Though present since the Middle Ages, its resurgence was closely associated with the catholic revival of the early 19th century. The ultramontane sought to reduce the authority of the individual diocese and to centralize all authority in the Pope. No one was more ultramontane than Pius IX (1846-1878) himself, and the policy culminated during his reign when the Pope was declared infallible (Bokenkotter, 1977: 297; Deist, 1984: 179).

335 Obviously, this traditional predilection among the Polish-speaking Upper Sileans who still cling to the beliefs of the prenational age was carefully guarded by the Church. For instance, in 1852 the Breslau (Wroclaw)
national declarations they remained loyal bilingual Polish/Slavic and German-speaking of the Prussian king and with the development of the officially espoused German national movement some of them began to feel to be Germans too. In short, their prenational multidimensional complimentary identities can be adequately described with the medieval-like label in Latin: *gente poloni natione Pruteni et/vel Germani* (Surman, 1992: 72/73). Lompa decried their attitude as neutral to the pursues of the Polish national movement and as such playing in the hands of the Prussian state and the German national movement (In Surman, 1992: 72). As a convinced Pole and Polish nationalist activist\(^\text{336}\) he could not understand the universalistic stance of the Silesian clergy, and that language and national identity were secondary phenomena for them which they could not revere more than Gospel. Traditionally, the Breslau (Wrocław) bishop nominated a Polish/Slavic-speaking adjacent bishop to look after multilingual Upper Silesia (Swierc, 1990: 13) but it did not facilitate spread of Polish national feeling there in the period 1850-1871 as the Polish-speaking Upper and Lower Silesians preferred to identify themselves with the Prussian Kingdom and Germany\(^\text{337}\) (Malinowski, 1990: 93) as represented by the North German Confederation due to radical improvements in economy, standard of life, agriculture and political position of Prussia in Europe and the world. On the other hand, why should they have identified with the Polish-speakers and their elusive non-existent state? Also Upper Silesians living next to the border with Congress Poland and Galicia were appalled by low standard of living and economy of the Polish-speaking populations across the frontier, and certainly could not aspire to common identification with them (Kulak, 1993: 107). Moreover, Upper Silesians were not pressed to abandon their own Polish/Slavic heritage and dialects so that they preserved their prenational complimentary identities speaking to family members and neighbors in Polish/Slavic dialects, to strangers and officers in German\(^\text{338}\), and to teachers and priests in literary Polish. On the whole they took pride in the Prussian military victories of 1864, 1866 and 1870/1871 and remained staunchly loyal to the king. Polish national agitation emanating from Posen (Poznań) and Galicia fell on deaf ears in Upper Silesia despite fears of the Prussian officialdom to the contrary. Hence, they did not express any interest in the January Uprising (1863/1864) which was played out in Congress Poland or in the endeavors to unite Germany (Pater, 1991: 210, 221/222, 226/227). They still felt secure in their homeland entrenched in prenational multilingual and multicultural tradition as well as in Catholicism and Protestantism. Nationalism was still no appealing option for them. However, Lompa and his successors strove to change it.

The starting ground for the Polish national movement was prepared by the ecclesiastical links between Cracow and east Upper Silesia which had continued despite the severance of this area from the Cracow bishopric in 1821 and became quite strong beginning with the 1840s when the temperance

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\(^{336}\) Due to his pro-Polish, i.e. anti-Prussian activities the Prussian school authorities discharged Lompa from the position of teacher without right to receive his pension. He died in poverty (Snoch, 1991: 83) and his sad fate was glorified by Polish historians who made him into a martyr, legendary figure of the Polish national movement in Silesia which, in fact, was almost non-existent in Prussian Silesia prior to 1871.

\(^{337}\) The relative strength of this identity is illustrated by the fact that many of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesian settlers in Texas and their descendants identified themselves as Prussians in as late as 1874 in an answer to the moves to establish a Polish organization at their locality of Panna Maria. It did not though preclude a feeling of animosity toward German-speakers as well as being labeled as Silesian Poles by English-speaking neighbors. So their identity was still prenational and multidimensionalized by the everyday contact with the Texan multilingual and multicultural environment (Borek, 1979: 57/58; Brożek, 1995: 57).

Moreover, it is interesting to notice that at the end of the 1860s the word Pole was considered to be a slur term (not unlike English Polack’) by Polish-speaking Upper Silesians since it was associated with poor vagabonds from Congress Poland who, in Silesia, were perceived as potential criminals and, on the whole, did not constitute a good advertisement of Polish national ideology and Polishdom (Malinowski, 1990: 94).

\(^{338}\) Notably, Upper Silesian men mastered their command of the language during their compulsory military service when they were stationed far away from home, all over Prussia and even abroad.
movement was successfully initiated in Upper Silesia by Galician clergy. Actually, after 1848, the Silesian-Galician borderland unfolded into a kind of common market integrated by the transportation infrastructure, economic interests and mobile labor. Some Upper Silesians also participated in pilgrimages to Catholic shrines at Cracow and Czestochowa (Congress Poland). Moreover, religious books printed there and at Posen (Poznań) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) often found their way to Upper Silesia where besides locally produced Polish-language publications on similar subjects also popular books containing fantastic tales and doggerel poetry were perused by Polish-speaking Upper Silesians who acquired the habit of reading at the bilingual primary school. Literacy as one of the preconditions of developing a national movement was quite wide-spread in Upper Silesia in contrast to the territories of the ex-Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (with the exception of Wielkopolska) where illiteracy was very common up to 1950 (Pater, 1991: 202, 210; Wanatowicz, 1992: 30/31). Some political turbulence to this prenational Upper Silesian calm was added by Stalmach’s Gwiazdka Cieszyńska but the leading role was reserved for Polish national activists from the province of Posen (Poznań) which being part of Prussia was not barred from Silesia by any international border, and thanks to the economic development within the Prussian Kingdom, had at its disposal enough wealth to try to project Polish national movement into Upper Silesia. The ideology of Polish nationalism was shaped in the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań) in 1827-1848 and got fortified afterwards in reaction to the liquidation of autonomy of the Grand Duchy which was turned into a regular Prussian province and included within the borders of the German Confederation. Ongoing modernization of the province’s economic system in the 1850s allowed the Polish national movement to adopt an organizational framework similar to its German counterpart so that to successfully compete with the latter (Jakóbczyk, 1989: 1-23). The Posen (Poznań) Polish national movements contacts with the Polish-speaking population of Upper Silesia were started by Mieroslawski already in the 1840s and continued in the 1850s with the flow of Polish press and books into this region as well as with the activities of the Polish students at the Agricultural Academy in Proskau (Pruszków) whose leaders usually were colleagues from the Posen (Poznań) province. In the 1860s the Polish movement from Posen (Poznań) was strong enough to get actively involved in spreading the Polish national ideology in Upper Silesia. Posen (Poznań) Polish activists foresaw Silesia as part of a restituted Poland and declared necessity to attract the Polish-speaking Silesian everyman to the Polish struggle against the partition power of Prussia. The most renowned from the Wielkopolska agitators were Józef Chociszewski (1837-1914), Ignacy Danilewski and Father Franciszek Bazýński (1801-1876) (Wanatowicz, 1992: 31, 32).

It was quite an opportune moment for them to step in because some displeasure must have been brought among the Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians by the decisions limiting the role of Polish as the medium of instruction at primary schools. In 1859 the Oppeln (Opole) Regency obliged teacher to actively support knowledge of German among their students and from 1863 Polish was to be used as a medium of instruction only in the first grade. In higher grades German was to take over with the

339 The date of the first provincial parliament of the Grand Duchy (Jakóbczyk, 1989: 2).
340 It was a typical ideological message because from the historical point of view only the province of Posen (Poznań) had formed a part of the pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth so that Prussia could be considered a partition power by the Polish-speaking inhabitants of Wielkopolska not by Silesians whose exclusion from Poland was firmly affirmed by the Polish king in the 15th century. However, from the 1860s onwards many Polish national activists started to consider at least Upper Silesia part of the Prussian partition of Poland. This new notion was mainly introduced by the Polish national writer Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (1812-1887) (Wanatowicz, 1992: 36).
341 As a journalist and publisher he actively supported and organized the Polish national movement. In 1868-1871 he managed a Polish bookshop at Culmhof (Chelm), and he was an editor of many periodicals including Gwiazdka Cieszyńska in 1861/1862 (Anon., 1883a: 468).
342 He was an editor of Przyjaciel Ludu, the most popular Polish-language Posen (Poznań) periodical in Silesia.
343 In 1848-1852, a deputy to the Prussian National Assembly. Beginning with 1863 he started publishing at Posen (Poznań) cheap Polish books which were distributed also in Silesia (Anon., 1883b: 243/244).
exception of religion classes and Polish could function only as an auxiliary language\textsuperscript{344} (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 468/469). Teaching of Polish in secondary schools was also reduced in whole Silesia and it was finally phased out in 1874 (Pater, 1978: 239). On this situation in the educational fold and lack of Polish-language periodicals the successors to Lompa, a new generation of Polish activists in Upper Silesia capitalized. Lompa seems to have been the first Polish-speaking Silesian who decided to become a Pole which is indirectly indicated by the fact that in 1848 he established the Society of Teachers who are Poles (Brozek, 1995: 55). The Prussian successful reforms discouraged the Polish national identification in Silesia, and ultramontanism of the Catholic Church discouraged any national identification. The land-based identity of Silesians gradually was enriched by a new element of attachment to Prussia, and the teacher Karol Miarka (1825-1882) who met Bogedein in 1853 and accepted the need of Polish as the medium of instruction at primary schools (Swierc, 1990: 5) continued to identify himself as a German by 1862. Only under influence of Paweł Stalmach who serialized Miarka’s novel in \textit{Gwiazdka Cieszyńska}, Miarka became a convinced Pole. In 1862 he appealed the Prussian Ministry of Home Affairs for allowing publication of a Polish periodical which would be loyal to Prussia but to no avail (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 282/283). In 1863 \textit{Gwiazdka Cieszyńska} published his article which criticized limitation of use of Polish at schools, and, significantly, contained an overt statement/appeal: We [Polish-speaking Upper Silesians] are Poles (Brozek, 1995: 59). During his academic studies at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University in the first half of the 1860s the same kind of sudden realization that he was a Pole, descended on the aforementioned Konstanty Damrot (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 352). However, they and some other of their Polish-speaking Upper Silesian followers who decided to identify as Poles largely remained loyal subjects of the Prussian monarch. Their number in comparison to the total Polish/Slavic-speaking population of Silesia was scanty not unlike their political clout. For instance, Ignacy Danilewski, the editor of \textit{Przyjaciel Ludu} decided, in 1867, to stand in Upper Silesia for an election to the Parliament of the North German Confederation. He advertised his candidature in his paper but he lost having received only c. 350 votes which is the function of the strength of the Polish national movement in Silesia at that time (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 278/279).

Anyway, a qualitative change came at the end of the 1860s. In 1868 the first full-fledged Polish-language periodical after the demise of the 1848 ones, the weekly \textit{Zwiastun GórnoSzlaski} (Upper Silesian Announcer) (1868-1872) appeared at Piekar (Piekary). In 1869 there was a failed attempt at publishing \textit{Gazeta Mikolowska} (Mikolów Paper) at Nikolai (Mikolów) so the Polish-language press in Upper Silesia was ephemeral until Miarka, who, in 1864, had established good contacts in the province of Posen (Poznań) via Chociszewski, purchased and transplanted, in 1869, from Culm (Chelmno) to Upper Silesia the weekly \textit{Katolik} (Catholic) (1868-1931). It made a difference since in 1869 it had 1,000 readers, 2,500 in 1871 and over 4,000 in 1872 in contrast to several hundreds attracted by \textit{Zwiastun GórnoSzlaski} and \textit{Poznań} periodicals. In 1870 Miarka also started to publish the popular yearly \textit{Katolik. Kalendarz Górno-Szlaski} (Catholic: An Upper Silesian Calendar) (1870-1932). In 1870 the Towarzystwo Polskich GórnoSzlasków (Society of Polish Upper Silesians) at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University published one issue of \textit{Gazeta Piwna} (Beer Paper), and together with the academic club of Polish students began to publish pro-Polish \textit{Poczwary} (Monsters) (1870-1886) in hand-written copies. In 1869 some Upper Silesian representatives along with Polish participants from all the partitions took part in the national rally\textsuperscript{345} which was held at Schwibitz (Sibice, Sibica) near Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) as the Poles of Galicia enjoyed cultural autonomy at that time and were active in East Silesia too. Drawing on Posen (Poznań) experiences, in the same year Miarka together with Juliusz Ligoń organized the \textit{Kasyno Katolickie} (Catholic Club) at Königshütte (Królewska Huta). It was to spread culture and education in Polish though in the overall

\textsuperscript{344} Initially, the limitations were not staunchly enforced and teachers often lapsed into the old ways striving to reach their Polish/Slavic-speaking students effectively (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 469).

\textsuperscript{345} Czech national activists pioneered the use of rally to popularize national ideology at a mass level in the nice outdoors scenery. They called such rallies \textit{tabors} (i.e. camps) drawing on the Hussitic tradition (Waldenberg, 1992: 41).
framework of the Catholic faith. Similar clubs sprang up in Beuthen (Bytom), Myslowitz (Myslowice), Pless (Pszczyna), Siemianowitz (Siemianowice) and Sohrau (Zory). Tireless Miarka also opened a Polish bookshop at Königshütte (Królewska Huta) in 1869 and next year commenced in earnest the Polish-language amateur theater in Upper Silesia which became quite popular in the following decades. Provident funds had become popular in Upper Silesia since 1861 and eventually they were used to develop Polish national movement too when leaning on their tradition Juliusz Szaflik (1844-1918) and Juliusz Ligon founded, in 1869, the Towarzystwo Pozyczkowe dla Zawadzkiego i Okolic (Loan Society for Zawadzki (Zawadzki) and its Vicinity) with the involvement of the Polish co-operative movement from Posen (Poznań) and Pomerania. They closely cooperated with Miarka who became the leader of the Polish-language movement in Upper Silesia at that time. The Towarzystwo ku Wspieraniu Moralnych Interesów Ludności Polskiej pod Panowaniem Pruskim (Society of Support for the Moral Interests of the Polish Population under Prussian Rule), which was established at Thorn (Toruń), West Prussia in 1869 founded several Polish reading rooms in Upper Silesia in the same year. Also some Polish peasant circles came into being in Upper Silesia at the same time (Broz, 1995: 59/60; Gröschel, 1993: 67; 143/144, 226, 321/322; Kossakowska-Jarosz, 1994: 24; Lis, 1993: 91; Mykita-Glensk, 1988: 6/7; Pater, 1991: 205; Rajman, 1990: 32/33; Wanałowicz, 1992: 30).

Now a question may be asked why the Polish national movement erupted so suddenly in Upper Silesia at the end of the 1860s after almost two decades of inactivity after 1848. The answer is that the change came about with active canvassing for Polish national ideology emanating from Posen (Poznań) and also East Silesia and Galicia which was targeted at the Polish-speaking Upper Silesian population. They had got a reasonable grasp of literary Polish in the 1850s thanks to Bogedein’s school reforms so some of them were prepared to espouse this ideology especially after the establishment of the North German Confederation in 1866. The more educated felt that their language and tradition were endangered by the homogenizing policies of the Prussian state which promoted unification of Germany in its Kleindeutsch form. It meant limitation of the use of Polish at primary schools and progressive assimilation through increasingly pervasive German-language administration and the conscription army. Such policies might be uncomfortable for the Upper Silesian Polish/Slavic-speaking everyman but not unbearable (unlike for the educated ones who had espoused Polish nationalism) unless homogenization would not have extended to the sphere of Catholic religion. The Catholic Church during the reign of Pius IX (1846-1878) was most ultramontane in its history. He continued his policy of intransigence toward modern secular liberal culture and showed clearly that he was unable to adapt the Church to profound social and political transformations going on around him. On the other hand, he centralized and fortified the structures of the Catholic Church throughout the world which culminated in the dogma of infallibility of the pope (1870). In the German states, the Catholic Church was consequently negative about the Kleindeutsch solution which would give supremacy to Protestantism and secularism, and canvassed for the Großdeutsch option under leadership of Vienna with close relations to the Vatican. However, the latter possibility was

346 The Polish artisan association in Myslowitz (Myslowice) staged one play in 1868 and a Cracow troupe of professional actors gave there three Polish-language productions in one day next year but these events did not lead to creation of sustained tradition of Polish theater performances (Mykita-Glensk, 1988: 5).

347 He was a smith, poet and playwright as well as the Upper Silesian correspondent of Przyjaciel Ludu (Pater, 1991: 203; Snoch, 1991: 80).

348 The movement of Kółka włościańskie (peasant circles) came into being at the beginning of the 1860s in the province of Posen (Poznań). They formed loose decentralized structures which drew peasantry to the Polish national movement through the means of cultivating traditional customs and songs, disseminating some information on scientific and technological issues. Members of the circles met on Sundays after mass and in case of neighbor conflicts they often pitted parties along the Polish-German ethnic line not without the aid of the homogenizing Prussian law which gradually limited use of the Polish language and culture (Jakóbczyk, 1989: 31-34). The circles helped Polish national activists to gradually turn many of the peasants into Poles who identified and supported the goals of the Polish national movement. The fact that the movement did not distance itself from the Catholic Church also facilitated such an identification on the part of the peasants.
clearly out of question after the Battle of Sadowa (Sadova) in 1866. In Silesia which was more than 50% Catholic the struggle had to generate a gaping cleavage, and especially in staunchly Catholic Upper Silesia. This ultramontane Catholic movement established its Silesian organ Schlesische Volkszeitung (Silesian People’s Paper) in 1869 one year before the founding of the all-German party of Zentrumspartei (Center Party) 349. The party went against the Kleindeutsch nationalism as the Kleindeutsch state which was being forged in the Franco-Prussian War (1870/1871). Its natural bastion was Upper Silesia where to retain support of the local population it had to accept the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of its population. From the universalistic, non-national point of view it was easily done so that Miarka with his Katolik torn between loyalty to the Prussian state and Catholicism entered an alliance with the Zentrumspartei. The conflict festered. The state supported the Old Catholic movement 350 which did not accept the dogma of infallibility of the pope so in result majority of the teaching staff at Upper Silesian secondary schools were Old Catholics. In an 1870 article in Katolik Miarka expressed his sympathy to Catholic France which did not go well with Bismarck. During the first Reichstag elections in 1871 he supported a Zentrum candidate in Upper Silesia who successfully eliminated a conservative one. The success was soon to be overshadowed by the resultant Kulturkampf 351 which Bismarck used to further integrate the German Empire by subordinating the Catholic Church to the state interest. However, the loyalistic movement for the Polish language and culture in close conjunction with Catholicism, spearheaded by Miarka, at last, gained some political clout through its alliance with the Zentrumspartei and was destined to grow into a force with which the government of the German Empire would not be able to overlook too easily (Bokenkotter, 1977: 308; Brozek, 1995: 60; Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 181/182; Fuchs, 1994: 597/598; Kopiec, 1991: 85; Lis, 1993: 91/92).

Having sketched the origins of the Polish national movement in Upper Silesia, and the beginning of national polarization triggered off by the homogenizing policies of German nationalism and its Polish counterpart which penetrated especially Upper Silesia from Posen (Poznań), Galicia and East Silesia, it is necessary to observe how this process unfolded in Austrian Silesia. In the Habsburg Monarchy nationalism was not accepted as a state ideology until its demise in 1918, due to the multiethnic character of its population; perhaps with the exception of the Ausgleich (1867) in effect of which Austro-Hungary came into being. Consequently, Magyar nationalism held sway in the Hungarian part but German nationalism never achieved such a privileged status having to

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349 Its informal ideological and political origins date back to 1852. The deputies of the Prussian parliament who did not espouse liberalism or conservatism belonged to this faction, and after 1859 they started opposing Protestant homogenizing policies in culture and education (Kinder, 1978: II 61).

350 Because the movement played into Bismarck’s hands who wanted to weaken the Catholic Church in order to integrate the German Empire around civil values and to exclude any papal or Austrian influences, he readily recognized the movement as the Old Catholic Church. Due to the breach with the papacy the Church had to rely on the state and gradually became a state Church. The movement reached Silesia quite early because already in April 1870 Father Jeltsch from Liegnitz (Legnica) criticized the new dogma in Schlesische Zeitung (Silesian Paper). In 1878 there were 122 Old Catholic parishes in Germany with over 52,000 faithful. Eight of their parishes were located in Silesia in: Breslau (Wroclaw), Katowice (Kattowitz), Gleiwitz (Gliwice), Groß Strehlitz (Strzeczce Opolskie), Neisse (Nysa), Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra), Sagan (Zagór) and Gottesberg (Boguszów) and counted 1,100 faithful in Silesia. One third of them lived in Upper Silesia. Interestingly, one of the supporters of the movement was Miarka’s collaborator Father Pawel Kamiński. He even started publishing the Polish-language weekly Prawda (Truth) (1871-1877) at Kattowitz (Katowice) which was quite popular with its 2,500 copies in 1871. But the staunchly Catholic Upper Sileans sided with the ultramontane position of the Catholic Church and Miarka’s Katolik was against him. So Kamiński’s Kattowitz (Katowice) parish of 1,500 in 1872 (its members were mainly German liberal Catholic intelligentsia, and French and Italian workers employed in Upper Silesia) steadily dwindled to 300-400 in 1895 and was politically and socially insignificant after the 1870s (Gröschel, 1993: 115; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 293-298; Piątek, 1993: 17-19).

351 Basically, a conflict between the homogenizing ideology of Kleindeutsch nationalism and universalism of the Catholic Church played out in the fields of education, publishing industry and state administration (Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 299).
accommodate some aspirations of the various Slavic nationalisms. It is the general ideological framework within which the ethnic difference which was subordinated to the overall land identity prior to 1848 gave way to the rise of various national identities in Austrian Silesia.

As described in previous chapters, the Czech language had been quite popular among all the Slavic-speaking inhabitants of Silesia since the 15th century because Polish had not developed as a written language of royal and princely chancelleries so early. Subsequently, when Silesia became a land of the Czech Crown, the position of Czech became stabilized when it was introduced as an official language of Upper Silesia. With the advance of German after the Prussian annexation of Silesia, the use of Czech was limited to Austrian Silesia and southern Upper Silesia (especially the counties of Ratíbor (Racibórz) and Leobschütz (Glubczyce)). The facts were used by Czech activists to build a Czech national on them with the aid of the usual instrument of anachronic appropriation of the past for contemporary goals. So as the Polish national movement made some Silesian authors who had happened to write something in Polish into their own precursors German and Czech national activists also followed the path. Czech historians promoted Mikuláš z Kožlí (1385-1431/1432) as the father of Czech literature in Silesiá. At that time, however, national differentiation based on language made no much sense since people identified with their immediate environs, regions, kingdoms as subjects of its ruler and with the Church as the faithful. Language was of no importance. everybody knew that Latin was the real language and all the rest were but vernaculars unworthy of being committed to expensive parchment. Mikuláš was one of the intellectually enterprising persons who jotted down some songs in local vernaculars and placed them in his variegated manuscript. Here, the nationalist researcher should stop because looking deeper into the author’s writings could endanger his easily reached a priori conclusions. For the Polish nationalist Mikuláš is known as Mikolaj z Koźla and is considered to be the father of Polish literature in Silesiá because he also put down some pieces in Polish. By the same token, the German nationalist who knows him under the name of Nikolaus aus Kosel, may consider him one of the early German Silesian authors (Lubos, 1974: 588; Zielonka, 1994: 137). The problem arises as who this Nikolaus/Mikolaj/Mikuláš identified himself. As emphasized above, language was not a core of one’s identity as it often is in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, and multilingualism was the course of the day in the multiethnic, premodern states of medieval Europe. Consequently, the author being a clergyman most probably would swear allegiance to the Catholic Church and the Pope. His other pick should be Wenceslas IV who then ruled the lands of the Czech Crown (including Silesia) and the Holy Roman Empire; and, last but not least, Nikolaus’s own homeland Silesia and his place of birth the town of Cosel (Koźle). If the line of questioning were maintained by a nationalist he would ask Nikolaus which language was of greatest import to him. Nikolaus would reply that Latin and the nationalist interviewer would have to pigeon hole his interlocutor as a citizen of the no more existing Roman Empire.

This absurd treatment of the past at the hands of various nationalist movements was extremely intensive in the case of Austrian Silesia for Polish, German and Czech movements vied for ownership of this land and its inhabitants whereas a group of Austrian Silesians made an effort to maintain this region Silesian rather than national, and some Slovak and Hungarian influences were felt there too. Nowadays it often happens that Polish works on Silesia stress imagined Polishness of some Silesian historical figures, German ones their Germanness and Czech ones their Czechness without realizing that they commit the basic error of anachronism. Bearing this warning in mind it is safe to present early Silesian authors who wrote some significant pieces in Czech usually besides their other corpus of writings in Latin and German. Kundrát of Benešov (Beneschau) (born in c. 1350) translated 73 Church hymns into Czech. Rev. Martinus Philadelphus Zámorský (1550-1592, born at Zamrsk (Zámrsk)) to serve his Slavic-speaking parishioners better, wrote a collection of sermons and religious

352 The educated of the Middle Ages, and also of later epochs through the Enlightenment signed their names in Latin and the current spelling games carried out by the linguistic traditions of the various vying national movements too easily overlook the fact bent on achieving their goals by proving this or that person belonged to this or that specific nation though it is obvious that the nation had not existed at the time when the person concerned had lived.
songs in Czech. Mikuláš Albrecht of Kamitz (Kame’ňka) (died in 1617) participated in the translation of the Bible into Czech. Georg Tarnoscius (Jiří Taňnovský in Czech, Juraj Tranovsky in Slovak, Jerzy Trzanowski in Polish) (1592-1637, born at Trzanowitz (Tršnovce)) contributed to development of Protestantism among the Slovak-speakers and translated Latin and German religious texts and songs into Czech. Jan Liberta (1701-1742, born at Trzytniec (Stritecz)) edited the Czech translation of the New Testament which had been carried out by the Bohemian Brethren. Joseph Nowak (born at Groß-Pohlon in Velká Polom in 1766) wrote a German textbook for Czech-, Moravian and Slovak-speakers. Father Leopold Johann Scherschnik (Scherschnick in German, Szersznik in Polish, šeršník in Czech) (1747-1814, born at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn)) organized at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) the biggest Austrian Silesian library which gave the beginning to the oldest museum of the lands of the Czech Crown in 1802 (Lubos, 1974: 589-601; Myška, 1993: 92/93).

After the Prussian annexation of Silesia Czech was superseded with German as the official language in Prussian Upper Silesia its use was limited to the southern part of this region inhabited by Silesian Czech-speaking population who called themselves Moravians. Consequently, it is estimated that their number dropped by one third (mainly in the county of Leobschütz (Glubczyce) to c. 45,500 in 1840 (Kokot, 1973: 74). The official role of Czech steadily declined in Austrian Silesia in the second half of the 18th century, and especially after 1782 when Austrian Silesia was merged with Moravia for administrative purposes. After 1790 German dominated in this region though for practical reasons official announcements were often published in the two languages (Gawrecka, 1993: 65; Gawrecki, 1992: 58; Knop, 1992: 112). Joseph II who tried to imitate Friedrich II’s policy of infusing underpopulated regions with colonists to boost their developments, started a similar action toward Austrian Silesia. By the beginning of the 19th century 103 new settlements had been created in this manner mainly in West Silesia which undoubtedly contributed to fortifying the dominating role of German in this region of Austrian Silesia (Bein, 1995: 141). The linguistic situation was more complicated in East Silesia where in the 16th century and at the beginning of the next one Protestantism was spread there mainly by Czech-speaking pastors and preachers. However, later in the first half of the 17th century when the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Prince Adam Wenzel (Waclaw) was converted to Catholicism the balance was tipped by the arrival of Polish-speaking Catholic priests from the Cracow diocese. But West Silesia being part of the Habsburg Monarchy not of the disintegrating Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Czech prayer and song books dominated as for the sake of convenience the state and Church authorities used Czech as the means of communication with all the Slavic-speaking subjects in the northern segment of the empire. With the Habsburgs tacit acceptance of Protestantism in Silesia, strong links developed between the Protestant parish of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (which at that time served all of Upper Silesia) and the north-eastern Lower Silesian Protestant parishes with Polish-speaking faithful. After 1742, when Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) was left the only Protestant parish in the Danubian Monarchy, the local Protestants inevitably maintained the contacts with their coreligionists in then Prussian Silesia where their religion received a little privileged position vis-a-vis Catholicism in stark opposition to indignities they still suffered at the hands of the Austrian authorities in East Silesia. Therefore, pastors (often German-speaking) plied between East Silesia and north-eastern Lower Silesia frequently bringing Polish-language religious prints from Brieg (Brzeg), Kreuzburg (Kluczbork), Wohlau (Wołów) and Gross Wartenberg (Syców).

With the decline of the north-eastern Lower Silesian center of Polish-language Protestantism due to the increasing dominance of German, and with increasing acceptance of Protestantism in the Habsburg empire, Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) took over the role of the Polish-language stronghold of Protestantism in Lower Silesia, and became a center of Polish-language Protestant publishing. In the period 1716-1848 71 Polish-language books were brought out in East Silesia slowly contributing to later differentiation of its Slavic-speaking population into Polish-speaking Protestants and Czech-speaking Catholics. In reality the Silesian transitory dialects between Polish and Czech which the Slavic-speaking East Silesians spoke were so close to one another that no communication problems arose. Difficulties started with the spread of popular education in the second half of the 18th century.

353 He signed his surname using this spelling (Myška, 1993: 92).
Initially church teachers used languages of their parishes (i.e. German and Slavic dialects) at primary schools (any further education was conducted in German) but soon the process of education was supported with the formal instrument of textbooks. For practical reasons, the Austrian authorities promoted the use of German and Czech textbooks in this region, and when, in 1807, the school inspector Sherschnik appealed also for introduction of Polish textbooks the answer of Brünn (Brno) that it would be unfeasible to produce Polish textbooks for only a handful of schoolchildren. However, a German-Polish dictionary published at Brieg (Brzeg) and the Polish translation of the Protestant new Testament started to be used at some Protestant primary schools in East Silesia. Eventually in 1817, the Brünn (Brno) authorities permitted the use of a Polish religious textbook of Protestantism. In 1828 it was followed by a Polish-German dictionary and by two further Protestant religious textbooks in 1823 and 1833 (Zahradník, 1992a: 18-21). It is estimated that in 1846 222,000 (47.7%) German-speakers, 147,000 (31.5) Polish-speakers and 94,000 (20%) Czech-speakers lived in Austrian Silesia. On the basis of the fragmentary school statistics on the medium of instruction 54.4% of the schools in Austrian Silesia were Slavic-speaking, 36.5% German-speaking and 9.2% bilingual (Gawrecka, 1993: 62; Prinz, 1995: 309).

It is enlightening to observe that the German-speaking Austrian Silesians had 10% schools less than they should have according to their share in the population of this land. It clearly indicates that at that time nationalism could not have been a guideline for the policies of the Habsburg authorities because the situation would have been the other way around. Moreover, the broad description of the non-German-speaking Austrian Silesians as Slavic-speakers shows that, yet, language had not become an issue worth official attention which rather continued to be concentrated on the religious cleavage. Now the question arises what the identity of the inhabitants of Austrian Silesia was. Before 1740 the Silesians in the whole of the yet undivided province felt the essentially medieval attachment to the localities where they lived and the provincial ties were quite loose because religious differences predominated pitting larger groups against one another. Only with modernization of Austrian and Prussian Silesia after the division of 1742 the two specific land identities emerged. So at the end of the 18th century one can speak about the Prussian Silesians and Austrian Silesians. However, the memory of united Silesia lasted as well as attachment to religious convictions continued. Many Catholic noblemen from Prussian Silesia entered the civil service of the Habsburg empire distrustful of Protestant Prussia, whereas numerous Protestant civil servants in the East Silesian town of Oderberg (Bohumín) on the border with Prussian Silesia, sympathized with the Protestant Prussian monarch weary of the injustices suffered at the hands of the Habsburg Catholic authorities. The land identity arose or got fortified in Austrian Silesia in a way as a reaction to the centralistic policies of the Habsburgs. It is proved by the fact that in the period 1782-1849 when Austrian Silesia was merged with Moravia, the Austrian Silesian estate parliament continued to assemble and protests against the subjection of Austrian Silesia to Brünn (Brno) were regularly repeated. At the beginning of the 19th century this land identity received its outward symbols (which later were to be appropriated by national movements), namely: the public museum354 in Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) (1802), the land theater in Troppau (Opava) (1805) and the land museum355 in the same town (1814). Consequently, prior to the 1840s land identity dominated in Austrian Silesia and some educated authors even chose to describe the inhabitants of Austrian and Prussian Silesia as the one Silesian nation which had been unjustly torn apart by the Habsburgs and Prussia in 1742 (Gawrecki, 1992: 56; Gawrecki, 1993: 50-53).

Under the influence of Herderian philosophy and the ideals of the French Revolution which were brought to Austrian Silesia by locals who studied at German universities and by French troops who also had confronted the Austrian Silesians with the Other making them perceive their own distinctiveness more clearly, nationalism started timidly seeping to Austrian Silesia in the 1840s. Because German was the official language of Austrian Silesia and the discussion on unifying

354 It is the oldest museum of all the lands of the Czech Crown. At present it is located in Poland (Myška, 1993: 93).

355 It is the oldest museum in the Czech Republic (Gawrecki, 1993: 53).
Germany in answer at the creation of the French nation-state, initiated by the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire and the elation of the victorious War of Liberation, continued in Austrian Silesia as elsewhere in the German states the first tenets of German nationalism were present in this land even before 1848 (Gawrecki, 1992: 59; Gawrecka, 1993: 67). In case of the Czech national movement its beginnings in Austrian Silesia are associated with father Jan Alois Zabranský (died in 1842) from Jaktař who propagated knowledge of literary Czech among the Czech-speaking schoolchildren and with father Cyprian Lelek (1812-1883). The latter was active among the Czech-speakers who lived in the region of Hultschin (Hlučín), i.e. on the border of Austrian Silesia in the south of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county, Prussian Upper Silesia. During his studies at Breslau (Wroclaw) came under the Panslav influences of the Czech lecturer Jan Evangelista Purkyně who established the Literary-Slavic Society at the Breslau (Wroclaw) University. When development of Slavic-language classes became less restrained in Prussian Silesia after 1842 Lelek published his Czech primary in 1844 and Opis Sle'zka (Description of Silesia) in 1846. In the same year he established the Czech monthly Holubice (The Dove) but only its one issue appeared. In this early period his role for the future Czech national movement in Austrian Silesia (and, to a lesser extent in Prussian Silesia) was similar to Lompa’s in relation to the later Polish national movement in Upper Silesia. Both of them descriptions of Silesia in Polish and Czech, respectively, appropriating this land for the national movements which were to be pegged onto these languages, and through their activities they also influenced the educational systems emphasizing Polish and Czech as media of instruction (Gröschel, 1993: 235; Lubos, 1974: 606/607; Myška, 1994: 74/75; Plaček, 1996a: 6/7).

Prior to 1848 only small groups of Austrian Silesians dedicated their efforts to the ideals of Polish and Czech nationalisms. In Katharein (Kateřinky) the rich peasant Filípek organized a Czech library and the two Czech reading circles existed in Krawarn (Kravaře) (1825-1839) and Troppau (Opava) (1845). Another Czech reading circle was organized in the 1840s at the Protestant gymnasium at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn), and at the same gymnasium Pawel Stalmach (1824-1891) and Andrzej Cinciala (1825-1898) organized two Polish reading circles which existed in 1842/1843 and 1847-1850, respectively. Also in the 1840s Jan Winkler (1794-1874), a teacher in the gymnasium, who had good contacts with young František Palacký, organized another reading circle through which he propagated the ideas of Slavic reciprocal aid which was a forerunner of Panslavism (Fazan, 1991: 44-45; Gawrecki, 1992: 59; Myška, 1994: 137).

The social and economic situation in Austrian Silesia was as difficult in the 1840s as in Prussian Silesia. Crop failures due to the occurrence of potato blight in 1844-1849 caused hunger and death of 5,000 people in 1847 and 16,000 in 1848 only in East Silesia. This period was aptly dubbed as the hunger years. Also the Weavers Uprising in Lower Silesia as well as worker and social unrests in the whole of Prussian Silesia resounded in Austrian Silesia evoking similar tumults of which one should enumerate those at Wagstadt (Bílovec) in 1845 and 1846. The tension was increased by the remnants of serfdom and the unbalanced land structure, especially in East Silesia where 50 land owners possessed 44% of all the arable land. When the 1848 revolutions broke out at Berlin and Vienna the news travelled fast with Austrian Silesian students (to support the goals of the revolutionary movement they immediately formed the Association of Austrian Silesians at Vienna) who brought it quickly home travelling by train. The Demokratische Gesellschaft (Democratic Society) came into being at the largest Habsburg textile center of Bielitz (Bielsko), and peasants demanded abolishment of the remainder of serfdom legislation throughout Austrian Silesia. It was one of the springboards thanks to which the peasant liberator Hans Kudlich could force through the Reichstag such a bill which was passed on September 7, 1848. It heaved the costs of phasing out of serfdom on peasantry against which protests were staged in the countryside during the autumn of 1848. In the western part of West Silesia regular riots erupted and hungry people hunted game in the forests belonging to large land owners. They had to be suppressed by soldiery. In this region also house weavers protested against the exploitative conditions of their work. The general commotion was additionally influenced by the dramatic events just across the Prussian border in the Hultschin (Hlučín) region where two palaces were attacked (Gawrecki, 1992: 57/58; Grobelny, 1992: 68/69; Lis, 1993: 83/84).
The emergence of the Association of Austrian Sileans indicated that land identity was quite strong and that many (especially educated) inhabitants of Austrian Silesia felt to be Austrian Sileans or Silesian Austrians (Gawrecki, 1993: 54; Grobelny, 1992: 61). The popular support for detaching Austrian Silesia from Moravia was so strong that on June 19, 1848 the Austrian Silesian Estate Assembly was transformed into the provisional land Austrian Silesian assembly and started canvassing for establishing a separate crownland under the name of the Herzogtum Ober und Niederschlesien (Principality of Upper and Lower Silesia) which, at last, came true on December 30, 1949 on the basis of the appropriate imperial patent (Bein, 1995: 142). The national (i.e. Austrian Silesian) revolutionary guards attracted many volunteers: 780 in Bielitz (Bieszko) and 800 in Troppau (Opava). However, it was a swan song of the pre-national complex identities. Austrian Silesia sent seven deputies to the Frankfurt Parliament which aimed at establishing a united German (nation-) state fulfilling the postulates of the German national movement. None of them championed causes of Czech or Polish national movements, and though it can be inferred that they were bound with their homeland most of all, in a long run they contributed to development of the German national movement in Austrian Silesia having attended the German National Assembly at Frankfurt am Mein. A little different position was maintained by Father Cyprian Lelek who thanks to the 1849 by-election in the county of Ratibor (Racibórz), Prussian Silesia entered the Frankfurt Parliament. In the ultramontane manner (not unlike Schaffranek and Bogedein in the Prussian National Assembly at Berlin), he appealed for the wider use of Czech in teaching and religious life of his Moravian faithful in the Hultschin (Hlučín) region. Obviously his stance had to make an impression across the border in Austrian Silesia but could not directly reinforce the incipient Czech national movement because Lelek stood on the position of loyalty to the Prussian state and the Catholic Church which was clearly stated in his paper Holubice (Gawrecki, 1992: 59; Gröschel, 1993: 235).

Palacký and his circle in Bohemia developed the concept of unity of the historical lands of the Czech Crown (which should function as a separate entity within the Habsburg empire overhauled into a federal state) as basis of the Czech national movement. It was not readily accepted in Moravia and even less so in Austrian Silesia. This program reached Austrian Silesia with the few copies of the Czech papers Národní noviny (National News) from Prague and Moravské noviny (Moravian News) (1848-1852) from Moravia. The Moravian lawyer Jan Kozánek (1819-1890) regularly contributed to these periodicals and supported the idea of unity of the historical lands of the Czech Crown. He also had belonged to the Troppau (Opava) Czech reading circle and maintained contacts with Lelek which facilitated his agitation for the goals of the Czech national movement in West Silesia. He distributed there a leaflet with an article form Národní noviny entitled Bratři Moravané a Slezané (To Brothers Moravians and Silesians) and incited some Moravian students from Olmütz (Olomouc) to help him propagate Czech nationalism at Troppau (Opava) (Gawrecki, 1992: 60; Myška, 1993: 67). But when the Slav Congress was convened at Prague in reaction to the Frankfurt Parliament no one represented West Silesia there and many Czech-speaking Austrian Silean (e.g. J. Filípek who supported knowledge of the Czech language and culture through his Czech library) actually agitated against the congress which they considered to be a dangerous event whose somewhat anti-state Panslav ideology could, in future, submerge Austrian Silesia in an all-Czech autonomous state. These Czech-speaking Austrian Sileans as their German-speaking countrymen preferred to advocate for the cause of the Frankfurt Parliament because it did not foresee doing away with distinctive lands, and, consequently, they propped the activities of the Verein der Deutschen aus Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien zur Aufrechterhaltung ihrer Nationalität which strove to offset the Czech national propaganda which appealed for electing no representatives to the German national Assembly from the historical lands of the Czech Crown (Gawrecki, 1992: 60; Gawrecki, 1993: 54; Schenk, 1993: 66).

This line of thought was also espoused by the ultramontane East Silesian Polish-language weekly Nowiny dla Ludu Wiejskiego (News for the Rural Folk) (1848/1849). Besides, from the stance of loyalty toward the Danubian Monarchy and the Catholic Church, this periodical spoke against the Polish national movement whose mouthpiece Tygodnik Cieszyński (Cieszyn Weekly) (1848-1851) was established by Paweł Stalmach with cooperation of Andrzej Cienciala. The paper was founded with the aid of Congress Polish Prince Jan Lubomirski (1826-1908) and the Czech-speaking East
Silesian lawyer Ludvík Kludsky (Ludwik Klucki in Polish) who was the mayor of Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) at that time. Initially, the weekly was an organ of the group of the East Silesian Slavic-speaking intellectuals centered around Jan Winkler who propagated the need of cooperation and mutual aid among all the Slavic inhabitants of the Habsburg empire in order to unite them as a separate political entity within the framework of the monarchy. On this basis they sympathized with the emergence of the Polish national movement in East Silesia and did not readily went for the idea of unity of the historic lands of the Czech Crown as too particularist. In a longer run though, the Polish activists Stalmach and Cienciala began to dominate the paper (Fazan, 1991: 38, 170/171; Gawrecki, 1992: 60; Grobelny, 1992: 71; Snoch, 1991: 151; Zahradnik, 1989: 122, 200). Actually, Stalmach and another Polish activist Andrzej Kotula from East Silesia were the only official delegates to the Slav Congress from Austrian Silesia. The program they represented at Prague was clearly pro-Polish and openly went against the ideals of Panslavism, and the Czech and German national movements, as well as opposed unity of Austrian Silesia as a separate crownland. (Gawrecki, 1992: 60). In his memorial submitted at the congress on June 8, 1848, Stalmach described all the Slavic-speaking Silesians as Poles (drawing on the fact that in the past Silesia had been part of the Polish Kingdom), and on the basis of his statement he demanded that Austrian Silesia be merged with Galicia and Prussian Silesia with the Grand Duchy of Posen (Poznań), as well as introduction of the Polish language to schools and offices in the Polish-speaking areas of Prussian and Austrian Silesia. He concluded that the Silesians expect to receive all the constitutional freedoms of faith, press, speech, the right of equality before law and abolishment of serfdom through linking the lot of [whole] Silesia with the lot of Poland (Stalmach, 1990: 63/64). Stalmach also demonstrated his identification with Polishness at the beginning of the congress when he said: We, Silesians, as Poles which and can belong only to the Polish section. Subsequently, all the delegates from East Silesia continued to work at the congress in the joint Polish-Ruthenian section which the Czech representatives did not oppose (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 544).

The sudden emergence of the Polish national movement in East Silesia came as a shock to the Galician press and intelligentsia who rather expected such developments in the eastern territories of the ex-Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth than in the western regions which had stretched beyond the commonwealth’s western border prior to the partitions (Fras, 1992: 24/25). Only later researchers were to associate the roots of this movement with the Habsburg annexation of the Republic of Cracow in 1846 which had removed the border between East Silesia and Galicia facilitating low-key train travels to Cracow which some Polish-speaking students of the Protestant gymnasium at Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) had undertaken in search of Polish books as well as moral and financial support (Fazan, 1991: 46). With the onslaught of absolutist reaction after 1851, the Polish movement was to some degree reunited with its Czech counterpart on the ground of Austroslavism and many Polish activists supported the program of unity of the historical lands of the Czech Crown (but rather in words than deeds) at least to the 1860s though only partially and with reservations. Postulated unity of the Czech lands gradually became a more distant prospect due to the Habsburg policy of liquidating administrative ties among the crownlands in favor of bounding them more fast to the imperial hub at Vienna (Gawrecki, 1993: 55). Moreover, majority of the Slavic-speaking Austrian Sileans spoke against the Slavic national movements and the ideology of Panslavism with which they associated the former. This ideology was perceived by the authorities as anti-state and playing into the hands of Russia and the Austrian Silesian everyman shared the opinion and somewhat sided with the German national movement attracted by the social reforms worked out at Frankfurt and Vienna which were the real issue for them. Such considerations were absent from the Czech national

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356 It is one of the first declarations of the Polish-speaking East Sileans in which they identified themselves as Poles. They can be compared to the similar declarations aired in 1848 by Lompa and his collaborators in Prussian Silesia, and later by Miarka and Damrot.

357 Though the symbiosis of the Polish and Czech national movement was over in the 1870s, various forms of cooperation between these movements often united by their opposition to German national movement continued until 1914 (Grobelny, 1992: 72).
program and some inklings to this end included in Stalmach’s memorial obviously could not be actualized without decisions taken by the state (Gawrecka, 1993: 67). After 1848 the Polish national movement managed to retain continuity unlike its Czech counterpart since Stalmach and the circle of Polish activists centered around him successfully transformed the politically tarnished Tygodnik Cieszyński (1848-1851) into apolitical Gwiazdka Cieszyńska (1851-1920) which was somewhat ultramontane in agreement with the official Großdeutschland line of the Habsburgs. The Polish-language weekly besides serving the gradually formalized Polish national movement in East Silesia, also catered for the Polish activists in Prussian Silesia where no Polish periodical worth mentioning appeared in the period 1853-1869, and later was also directed at Polish readership in all the lands of partitioned Poland (Zahradnik, 1989: 85-87). No similar continuity of cultural life was developed by Czech activists in Austrian Silesia. The goals of the Czech national movement meandering among Panslavism, Austroslavism and unity of the historic lands of the Czech Crown were unfocused and often mutually exclusive which in the prenational so-called complicated ethnic situation of Austrian Silesia where the Czech-speaking population constituted just one quarter of the population led to preservation of the land identity and symbiosis with the Polish national movement. Obviously, some Czech periodicals from Moravia and Bohemia reached Austrian Silesia but only in the 1860s when Young Czechs partly renounced Austroslavism and Panslavism as championed by Old Czechs centered around Palacký, and chose to emphasize significance of unity of the Czech lands the clearly delineated goal of the Czech national movement gained some popularity among the Czech-speaking Austrian Silesians (Bělina, 1993: 99; Gawrecki, 1993: 55; Jakubíková, 1994: 143).

The 1848 revolution started some low key linguistics traditions that survived the period of reactionary absolutism and formed the springboard for later dynamic development of Polish and Czech national movements in Austrian Silesia. In 1848 Polish was introduced as the medium of instruction to primary schools in the Polish-speaking areas of East Silesia (Michalkiewicz, 1970: 545) which fortified the position of Czech and Polish vis-a-vis German. On the basis of Article 21 of the imposed 1849 constitution, which established the principle of equality of all the people of the Habsburg empire (Prinz, 1995: 327) Polish and Czech were accepted as office and land languages in Austrian Silesia. This equality toward German was somewhat illusory as German still remained the sole medium of instruction at secondary schools and the official status of Czech and Polish was scrapped in 1851 leaving German the only official language of Austrian Silesia (Gawrecka, 1993: 68; Michalkiewicz, 1970: 545). It was one of the first steps institutionalizing reactionary absolutism in Austrian Silesia after the successful suppression of the revolution which had sent Kundlich and Kolatschek abroad and brought persecutions on the person of Pawel Oszelda358 (Gawrecki, 1992: 60). Similar fate was shared by the Czytelnia Polska (Polish Reading Circle) and the Biblioteka Polska dla ludu Kraju Cieszyńskiego (Polish Library for the People of the Cieszyn Country)359 established in 1848 and 1850, respectively. In 1854 the authorities as an example of dangerous institutionalization of Panslavism dissolved these organizations360, which also put an end to the Polish-language amateur theater which produced c. 10 plays in 1852-1854 (Fazan, 1991: 47, 54, 63, 65). Stalmach tried to offset this blow to the Polish movement by accepting the rules of the political game. Having managed to preserve Gwiazdka Cieszyńska, in 1856 he founded the apolitical cultural organization of Kasyno (Casino) at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) which local Polish-speaking and German-speaking inhabitants frequented. In 1859 together with Kludsky he also established the Kasa Oszczędności (Saving Society) (Myška, 358 They mobilized national guards in Austrian Silesia to go to Vienna in order to come to the aid of the revolution endangered by the reactionary forces. Oszelda was especially guilty of this event by having delivered a speech to this end at a revolutionary rally (Gawrecki, 1992: 60; Lis, 1993: 84).
359 Not surprisingly, the board of this institution was constituted by members of Polish, Czech and German provenances (Fazan, 1991: 54). However, ethnic difference did not pose an insurmountable cleavage at that time, and, similarly, the fact that some of them were Protestants and others Catholics did not pit them one against another. They were united by the land identity and their liberal opposition against absolutism.
360 The holdings of the Polish library were incorporated into the Sherschnik library which was not public (Fazan, 1991: 65).
1993: 101). This channelling of radical revolutionary and national movements into the fold of cultural and economic activity went in line with the situation in education. To German, Czech and German-Czech primary schools German-Polish schools were added in 1848. Polish textbooks were imported from Galicia in the case of Catholic schools and Jan Śliwka published his Polish primary (1852), geography textbook (1863) and collection of Polish reading texts for higher grades (1870) for Protestant schools (Fazan, 1991: 29/30; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 357). Also Czech continued to be a medium of instruction at primary schools, and in the 1850s and 1860s it was also taught as an elective subject in Austrian Silesian secondary schools (Jakubíková, 1994: 143). Besides Czech and Polish (often significantly influenced by local dialects) were used in church and everyday contacts between pastors, priests and their faithful (Grobelny, 1992: 60). A comparable situation developed across the border in the region of Hultschin (Hlúčín) where thanks to Lelek’s efforts and the reforms introduced by Bogedein the Czech\textsuperscript{361} language and primary survived at the local primary schools from 1844/1849 to 1863 and 1873 when their use was seriously limited in favor of German (Plaček, 1996: 7). Prior to the 1860s Czech-(dialect)-speaking in Austrian Silesia life also concentrated around parish churches and in voluntary fire-fighting organizations (Jakubíková, 1994: 143). Another impulse to changes in the sphere of language use was given by rapid industrialization in the Ostrava-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin. In 1822 its mining industry produced just 6,700 tons of coal, in 1842 62,000, in 1852 168,000 (i.e. one quarter of coal output of the whole Habsburg empire at that time), 1,100,000 tons in the 1870s and 2,600,000 in 1882. After 1848 this progress of mining was accompanied by rapid development of the metallurgical, coaling and textile industries in the north-western and north-eastern parts of East Silesia as well as the dense railway network. From the mid-19th century the industry of Austrian Silesia (mainly concentrated in East Silesia and the adjacent wedge of northern Moravia around Ostrau (Ostrava) started attracting labor from outside. Engineers and managers were recruited from the Czech-speaking and German-speaking areas of Bohemia and Moravia whereas workers usually stemmed from the Polish-speaking and later even from the Ruthenian-speaking areas of Galicia. Hence industrialization and modernization caused steady growth of the Austrian Silesian population from 154,782 in 1754 to 237,340 in 1790, 337,224 in 1815, 466,002 in 1846 and 511,581 in 1873 with the single drop after 1848 to 438,586 in 1851. Because the educated strata employed in the industry were predominantly German and Czech-speaking and at least 80% of the Polish-speaking graduates of Austrian Silesian secondary schools preferred to identify themselves as German the industrial regions of East Silesia acquired the same linguistic characteristic. The Polish-speaking uneducated work migrants from Galicia, more often than not, got Germanized or Czechized through school, church and cultural organizations especially in this early period when no nationalist propaganda could stop this process of peaceful assimilation (Gawrecki, 1992: 56, 61; Grobelny, 1992: 64/65; Lis, 1993: 86; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 357; Myška, 1992: 99; Zahradnik, 1992a: 41).

The end of absolutism came with the collapse of the Habsburg hegemony over Italy in 1859. Constitutional reforms giving more rights to the citizen and various peoples (nations-in-becoming) of the empire, were inevitable though the government set out on the policy of procrastination until 1866 when the Danubian monarchy definitively lost hegemony over Germany to Prussia and its Kleindeutschland concept (Kinder, 1978: II 61). In 1861 Czechs won vast majority of 75:15 in the Prague self-government (Kořalka, 1995: 17), and in the same year the first issue of the Czech national movement’s mouthpiece Národní listy (National Paper) appeared. The Sokol (Falcon) gymnastic association established in 1863, proved a useful instrument of turning the Czech national movement from intellectual-cum-political to a massive one which would, importantly, appeal to the youth. The Sokol members gathered in great numbers at large meetings called tabors which later evolved into

\textsuperscript{361} The official Prussian statistics dubbed the medium of instruction in the Hultschin (Hlúčín) schools as Moravian (Kokot, 1973: 74). The inhabitants of this area spoke Silesian dialects of northern Moravian Czech, transitory dialects between Silesian Polish and Silesian Czech as well as Slavic-German creoles. This linguistic situation did influence language use at school despite Bogedein’s stance that standard Polish and Czech should be used for the needs of education instead of dialects/creoles.
political rallies the basic form of Czech national struggle (Prinz, 1995: 339). Further concessions to Czech national activists included promotion of the Czech language and culture by dividing Bohemian secondary schools into Czech, German and bilingual ones in 1864 and Bohemian technical schools into Czech and German ones in 1869 (Belina, 1993: 98). The process was carried out to its logical end in 1882 when the Prague University was divided into the two separate Czech and German universities (Hemmerle, 1992: 197). The hopes of uniting the historical Czech lands within the framework of the Habsburg Empire were dashed after the Ausgleich of 1867 that transformed the Danubian Monarchy into dual Austro-Hungary. Old Czechs continued to petition Franz Josef I to apply the same formula to their lands but he declined repeated invitation to come to Prague to be crowned with the ancient crown of St. Vaclav. Moreover, the Hungarians opposed such a move and they were seconded by the German-speakers living in the Czech lands. In 1871 the German Empire was established and the Habsburgs could not disregard the wishes of German nationalists any more at the peril of their becoming disloyal and turning for support to Emperor Wilhelm I. Afterwards Czech nationalists were faced with the dilemma whether to boycott the parliament and land diets or to join the government majority for further concessions in education and economic life. It drove the wedge deeper between conservative Old Czechs and Young Czechs leading to the definitive split in 1874 (Carter, 1992: 923). These changes had their repercussions in Austrian Silesia where the Czech national movement centered around the concept of unity of the Czech lands arrived only at the beginning of the 1860s. The key figure of the movement was the Troppau (Opava) gymnasium teacher Antonín Vašek (1829-1880) who in the year of establishing Národní listy (1861) he started publishing the first Czech paper in Austrian Silesia Opavský besedník (Opava Entertaining Paper) (1861-1865). After it went defunct, Vašek together with Father Antonín Gruda (1844-1903) and the historian Jan Zápal (1844-1888) founded Opavský Týdenník (Opava Weekly) (1870-1913). In this early period the periodicals gathered the first group of Czech intellectuals who forged the Czech National movement in Austrian Silesia, among others: Jan Lepař (1827-1902), Vincenc Prasek (1843-1912) and Josef Zukal (1841-1929). In 1864 the Spolek čtenářů a zpěváků (Society of Readers and Singers) was established in the framework of the Katharinein (Kateřinky) parish. In 1870 Father Gruda transformed it into the Katolicko-politicka beseda (Catholic-Political Club) and similar clubs had been earlier established at Stiebrowitz (Stěbořice), Jaktař (Jaktar) and Tiefengrund (Hlubočec). Similar clubs opened at other localities. In 1865 when Vašek had to close down Opavský besedník due to financial problems, he tried to establish a reading society at the Austrian Silesian capital of Troppau (Opava) and the authorities allowed to commence its activities in February next year but German activists and citizenry of the town opposed it so the project had to be given up. It was a signum temporis. At the beginning of the 1860s the Austrian Silesian diet and the German paper Silesia propagated equality of all the peoples of the Habsburg Empire, and the official organ of the crownland Troppauer Zeitung (Troppau Paper) warmly welcomed the appearance of the first Czech paper of Austrian Silesia Opavský besedník. The situation changed dramatically in the second half of the 1860s when, for instance, in 1868 Silesia wrote that due to too great accommodation of the rights of other Austrian peoples the German nation was loosing ground everyday. Under the influence of German nationalism and Panslavism non-German peoples (i.e. ethnic groups) wanted to become recognized nations not unlike the Germans who had already attained the status. In case of the Czech national movement the culmination came with the mass tabors (political rallies) in support of unity of the Czech lands which took place in 1868-1871. The most known of them is the one which was organized in 1868 at Ostrá Huť near Chabitschau (Chabičov) according to the Czech figures (probably overestimated), in the period 1868-1871 25,000 people participated in the tabors in Austrian Silesia, whereas 1.5 mln in Bohemia and 450,000 in Moravia (Waldenberg, 1992: 41).
anti-rabor staged at Schelenburg (Šelenburk) near Jägerndorf (Krnov). The Czech-speaking Austrian Silesians opposed moving of the Lemberg (Lviv) University to Troppau (Opava) afraid that it would fortify Austrian Silesian Germandom. In 1871 the crownland authorities were handed the petition in which 1,500 people who signed it asked for establishment of a Czech gymnasium and Czech teacher seminary at Troppau (Opava). The effort amounted to nothing as the petition was declined. The Czech and German national movements began to delineate themselves in a conflict against one another which since that time onward was continuous. The land identity which encompassed all the Austrian Silesians had become a matter of the past, and the nascent German-Czech national conflict spilled across the border to the region of Hultschin (Hlučín) where besides Národní listy Lelek propagated reading of Opavský besedník and Opavský tydenník being a regular contributor of both the periodicals (Gawrecka, 1993: 68, 70; Gawrecki, 1992: 63; Jakubíková, 1994: 143/144; Lubos, 1974: 608/609; Myška, 1994: 75).

Similar developments could be observed in the development of the Polish national movement which unlike its Czech counterpart had managed to maintain continuity in the difficult 1850s through Gwiazdka Cieszyńska and the Kasyno. After the end of absolutism Stalmach organized the Czytelnia Ludowa (People Reading Society) which was founded and frequented by Polish-, Czechand German-speaking members of the East Silesian elite. Although it was to spread knowledge of the Polish language and culture among the Polish-speaking East Silesians it was not a strictly national organization trying, in a very ultramontane manner, to attract members across the ethnic line not unlike Gwiazdka Cieszyńska. In 1863 Stalmach established the Teatr Polski Amatorski (Polish Amateur Theater) in the framework of the Czytelnia Ludowa. By 1881 it presented 118 productions (Fazan, 1991: 67/68, 77). In the same year Stalmach led to consolidation of the economic life of the Polish-speaking East Silesians in the Towarzystwo Rolnicze (Agricultural Society). He also supported founding of Polish reading societies throughout East Slesia. The ones which came into being in this early period were at Jablunkau (Jablunkov), Skotschau (Skoczów), Obersuchau (Horní Suchá) and Zabrzeg (Zabrzeg) (Grobelny, 1992: 72; Zahradnik, 1992a: 40). Polish-speaking East Silesian rich peasants from at least sixty localities sent, in 1861, 1866 and 1870, three petitions to Franz Josef I requesting more or even official recognition for Polish but to no avail even though in 1870 their and East Silesian Polish national activists delegation were received by the President of Imperial and Royal Ministers Count Adam Potocki (1822-1872), a Polish politician and aristocrat from Galicia the first political successes came in 1867 when the first Polish-speaker, Józef Dostal, was elected to the Austrian Silesian Diet. Four Polish-speaking representatives entered the body in 1871, and in 1873 the rich Polish-speaking peasant Jerzy Cienciala from Mistrzowitz (Mistrovice) was elected to the Reichstag (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 359). The Polish national movement thanks to the continued existence of the Polish-language press since 1848 influenced the development of the Polish national movement in Prussian Upper Silesia and established numerous ties with Polish national centers in Congress Poland and Galicia. Especially the contacts with Cracow were fruitful due to no international border which would obstruct them. In turn Cracow became quite receptive of the needs of the Polish national movement in East Silesia especially after 1869 when Galicia obtained cultural autonomy. Thanks to it Polish was introduced in the province as the official language, administration and education together with universities and the Higher education institutions at Cracow and Lemberg (Lviv) were Polonized. In 1871 the Polish scientific society Akademia Umiejętności (Academy of Knowledge) came into being at Cracow (Buszko, 1989: 6). Hence, East Silesia obtained an easy access to the mainstream of Polish national and cultural life at Cracow and East Silesian delegates did

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365 The Germans of Galicia and Austrian Silesia appealed for such a move not to allow this university to become a Polish institution due to Polonization of Galicia after introduction of the cultural autonomy for the province in 1869 (Buszko, 1989: 6).

366 It is often forgotten that to avoid fortifying Polishdom in Galicia too much Ukrainian/Ruthenian also received the status of a land language and primary education in this language developed quite dynamically in eastern Galicia (Buszko, 1989: 33).
not forget to attend the Polish national events which were staged at Cracow and Lemberg (Lviv) in 1870 and 1871 (Grobelny, 1992: 72). Even earlier such links with Polishdom had been forged by the sojourn of January Uprising refugees from Congress Poland in East Silesia in 1863 (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 358) and the Polish national festivals at Schwibitz (Sibice) and Roppitz (Ropice) in 1869 and 1871 which were attended by Polish delegates from all the lands of partitioned Poland and Upper Silesia. The festivals copied the example of Czech tabors and were a visible example of cooperation between Polish and Czech national movements as Polish activists attended Czech events and vice versa. Polish activists also participated in the symbolic events of significance for the whole of Czech national movement, i.e. in the celebrations of moving the Czech coronation jewels from Vienna to Prague in 1867, and the body of the Czech poet Boleslav Jablonsky from Cracow to the Bohemian capital. Due to the shape of the Habsburg railway network both of the train processions had to cross East Silesia. In these formative years of the Polish and Czech national movements their activists chose to cooperate with one another defining them against their already firmly established German counterpart. German national activists also encouraged cooperation between the Polish and Czech national movements lumping them together as an instance of dangerous anti-state Panslavism. However, first conflicts between the two Slavic national movements cropped at the close of the 1850s and in the 1860s, especially at the level of communes. They were connected to the attempts at delineating, on the basis of language, a clear border between the western part of East Silesia which was considered to be Czech and its eastern part claimed to be Polish. Certainly, in the view of the fact that the Slavic population spoke the whole spectrum of transitory Silesian dialects/Creoles between Czech and Polish additionally interlaced with German elements rendered the task impossible. Polish demands to introduce the Polish language at primary schools, for instance, in the parishes of Tierlitzko (Terličko) and Deutschleuten (Nemecká Lutyně) and Czech counterarguments slowly commenced the national conflict between the Polish and Czech national movement in East Silesia. (Grobelny, 1992: 71). It was common knowledge among national activists, though not openly articulated, that the Slavic East Sileans with their prenational complementary identities were game to be hunted by national movements. Simply, depending on the fact if it was decided to grant a parish/commune with a German/Polish/Czech primary school, after a generation up to 80% of the young people were transformed into Germans/Poles/Czechs having become fully versed in the standardized form and culture of one of the languages. They gradually superseded their parents who usually stuck to their prenational identities but had to pass away with time leaving their children in an already national reality.

Specifically, this competition of the German, Czech and Polish national movements for souls of the Slavic-speaking East Sileans caused many to recoil from the unfolding world of nationalisms, especially in the rural Catholic parishes entrenched in ultramontane tradition undisturbed by industrialization. The Catholic Church strove to encourage this attitude in the time of Völkerfrühling publishing the weekly Nowiny dla Ludu Wiejskiego (1848/1849). In the 1860s and 1870s this initial impetus gave the basis for growing difference of this still pre-national Slavic-speaking East Silesian population vis-a-vis the swelling ranks of Germans, Poles and Czechs. The Protestant Church also started supporting this trend and in 1877 established the aforementioned periodical’s successor political weekly Nowy Czas (New Time) (1877-1920). With the German aid both the Churches canvassed for the establishment of the Silesian nationality beginning with the 1870s hoping to curb influence of Polish and Czech nationalism in East Silesia, and initially to preserve unity of their faithful referring to the Austrian Silesian land identity. The East Silesian Slavic-speakers at whom this propaganda was directed, were quite receptive as it was easier for them to accept the promise of preserving their prenational world in the tolerant fold of politically and economically successful German nationalism (as it easily could be seen across the border in Prussian Silesia, i.e. in the German Empire) than to identify themselves with Czech or Polish nationalisms which championed the cause of non-existent states. Moreover, the seminal stereotypes of Galician poverty and polnische Wirtschaft also deterred them from becoming Poles (or by default akin Slavic Czechs) as in the case of Polish/Slavic-speaking Upper Sileans who remained deaf to the calls of Polish/Czech nationalism in Prussian Silesia (Gawrecka, 1993: 71; Nowak, 1995: 27; Zahradnik, 1989: 122).
Thus, from the spatial point of view the German national movement of Austrian Silesia was concentrated in the west, center and south-east of West Silesia and around Bielitz (Bielsko) and other industrial centers of East Silesia as the Austrian Silesian German-speakers were concentrated in these areas where they enjoyed Hochdeutsch schools and church services. The Czech-speaking population dominated in the north-east of West Silesia and across the border in the Hultschin (Hlučín) region as well as in the Moravian wedge between East and West Silesia, and in eastern part of East Silesia. Across the blurry ethnic line the east of East Silesia was populated by Polish-speakers. The Polish and Czech national activists predominantly operated in their own ethnic areas whereas in cities and industrial regions the situation got more entangled as well as in the transitory region which in future was to become the electorate of the Silesian (national?) movement (cf. Nabert, 1994: map at back). It was the basis for opening the radical ethnic cleavages in Austrian Silesia which were to come into being in the fateful year 1880 when the national question was included for the first time in the Austro-Hungarian census. It made people of prenational complimentary identities, feeling at ease in several languages/dialects/creoles and cultures, choose one and only one national identity thus creating statistically clearly delineated nations in Austrian Silesia, and splitting the whole population of Austro-Hungary into separate nations which would prove unmaking of the Dual Monarchy. As mentioned above such a decisive census was conducted in Prussian Silesia already in 1861.

In conclusion to this chapter which, on the example of Silesia, has traced elevation of the earlier unimportant ethnic difference to the very basis of the ideology of nationalism, it is justified to state that German, Polish and Czech nationalisms arrived to Silesia from outside with the partial exception of Lower Silesia. This region of Prussian Silesia had an easy access to western German universities where Herderian philosophy bloomed and Lower Silesian intellectualists actively participated in the subsequent discussion on the German nation and state from an early date. Moreover, Lower Silesia was the stage of the first most formative event of German nationalism, i.e. the War of Liberation (1813-1815), but later the point of gravity of German nationalism moved to Frankfurt as the seat of the German National Assembly in 1848/1849 and to Berlin which was elevated to the status of the German imperial capital in 1871.

In order to clothe the spread of various nationalisms in Silesia in an analytic garment it is useful to accept the model which was worked out by the Czech scholar Miroslav Hroch on the basis of his meticulous research into development of nationalisms in Central Europe. He distinguishes the following phases in the growth of national movements:

Phase A: where a small group of intellectuals devoted themselves to scholarly enquiry into the language, history, traditional culture and so on, of the [...] ethnic group;

Phase B: where a new range of activists emerged, who now began to agitate for their compatriots to join the project of creating a fully-fledged nation;

Phase C: where a majority of the population responded to the patriotic call and formed a mass movement; during this Phase C, the full social structure of the nation would come into being, and political differentiation begin to emerge.

(Hroch, 1994: 5)

Another eminent scholar of nationalism, E. J. Hobsbawm commenting on the last phase adds that the transition from the phase B to C occurs more often after the creation of a nation-state than before (Hobsbawm, 1990: 12).

In case of the German national movement in Prussian Silesia, it was mainly concentrated in Lower Silesia and its development cannot be separated from the emergence of German nationalism in

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National movements which wrench establishment of nation-states proclaim them to be pure states of one nation (and in Central Europe the notion of national language is emphasized) already from the very start, but it should be borne in mind that in reality it is an ideological postulate which has to be met in subsequent decades through the policies of consolidating the nation and assimilating the minorities.
Prussia and other German states. Hence, the phase A of cultural, literary and folkloric pursues started somewhen in the second half of the 18th century. The ideas of Herder and of the French revolution provided an ideological basis for the transition to the Phase B. This transitional period, in the case of Silesia as a Prussian province, lasted from the defeat of 1806 to the War of Liberation. During the 1848 revolution the transformation of German nationalism into a mass movement started. In 1861 the national question asked in the Prussian census formalized the basis of the German-speaking Prussian nation which was forged into a Kleindeutsch nation by the successful wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870/1871. The transition to the phase C was over with the creation of the German nation-state in the form of the German Empire in 1871. However, specific problems arose: the German nation-state excluded Germans of Austro-Hungary and contained large Slavic-speaking minorities. Silesia shared the same patterns of ideological problems with largely Slavic-speaking Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia with its German-speaking population left beyond the borders of Prussia and the German Empire.

The Polish national movement concentrated mainly in eastern Upper Silesia, entered the phase A shortly before 1848 (with Lompa’s books) but, in earnest, only after this date. The ultramontane politics of the Catholic Church (and less so of the Protestant Church which was bound faster with the state) aimed at keeping the Slavic-speaking Silesians faithful to the universalistic ideas of Christianity unharnessed by state borders, and loyal to Prussia. The state facilitated the Church’s task allowing the Church-controlled educational system to cater for the faithful’s children in Polish or Czech. The state also urged the Protestant Church to adopt a similar position. Both the Churches and the Prussian government hoped that in this manner they would win the Polish/Slavic-speaking Silesians for the sake of Germandom or manage to retain them in the phase A indefinitely. These goals were largely achieved in the case of the Protestant Polish-speaking Silesians of north-eastern Lower Silesia many of whom got assimilated with their German-speaking neighbors later on. Unexpectedly, the Polish national movement of the province of Posen (Poznań), which had entered the phase B after the failed uprising of 1848, started (especially after the failed January Uprising (1863/1864)) canvassing among Polish Upper Silesian activists of the phase A for more support to the very cause of all the Polish national movement which was the reestablishment of the Polish state. This message was fortified by the continued influence of East Silesia’s Polish national movement which had already entered the transitional period between the phases A and B steadily propped by the phase B Polish national movement in Galicia, which suddenly jumped into the transitional period between the phases B and C, when Galicia was granted cultural autonomy in 1869. However, Upper Silesia’s Polish national movement shifted into the transitional period between the phases A and B only after 1871 due to the impact of Kulturkampf.

In Austrian Silesia echoed the developments achieved across the border by Prussian Silesia’s German national movement. The phase A of the German national movement in the German-speaking Habsburg lands largely coincided with the pattern of the phase A elsewhere in the Holy Roman Empire with the exception of language. Latin was retained as the official language of the Habsburg lands up to the 1790s when it was superseded with German. In East Silesia German replaced also Czech which had been the language of the Upper Silesian administration and, by default, of East Silesia’s after the Prussian conquest of 1742. The wars of the Habsburgs with the Napoleonic France and their participation in the War of Liberation did not sway the German national movement into the phase B but only into the protracted transitional period between the phases A and B. After the Congress of Vienna (1815) when the German Confederation was established, the Habsburgs were not ready to encourage emergence of the German national movements too well aware of the fact that, inevitably, it would trigger off various non-German national movements endangering existence of the Habsburg Empire. Moreover, Vienna could not espouse the idea of a German nation-state always hoping to incorporate non-German lands of the Danubian Monarchy in the German Confederation. The transition to the phase B was quickened by the sudden appearance of Slavic national movements in 1848 but the suppressive policies of the 1850s allowed the transition to be completed only in the 1860s when the constitutional reforms were introduced, Austro-Hungarian statisticians accepted the principle of nationality (procrastinating its introduction until 1880), and due to the decisive shock of
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the German-German war of 1866 which terminated the existence of the German Confederation. The hopes for actualization of the Großeutsche solution were shattered and the Austro-Hungarian German-speakers were excluded from the safe national haven of the postulated German nation-state when it came into being in 1871. Hence the date may be taken as the beginning of the Phase B for the German-speakers of Austrian Silesia who had started renouncing their land identity only after 1848.

The Polish movement of East Silesia entered the phase A very shortly before 1848 but in earnest only after 1848. Its continuity was retained during the very anti-national 1850s, and the movement bloomed in the liberal 1860s gradually shifting toward the phase B influenced by Galicia whose Polish national movement was put on the road to the phase C with the granting of cultural autonomy in 1869.

Bohemia’s Czech national movement entered the phase A at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries before moving to the phase B in 1848 which lasted until 1867 when Czech activists not contented with cultural and linguistic concessions comparable to those granted to Hungary in 1867, repeatedly demanded partner treatment on the part of Vienna because such a status was given to the Hungarians in the Ausgleich. Afterwards Young Czechs putting forward more radical demands and wrenching more concessions steer Bohemia’s national movement into the phase A in the 1890s when Old Czechs loose elections and influence (Carter, 1992: 923). However, development of the Czech national movement in Moravia and especially in Austrian Silesia was much slower. The phase A of Austrian Silesia’s Czech national movement lasted from 1848 (or started shortly before the date) to 1861 when Opavský besedník was founded and started promoting the idea of unity of the Czech lands. Thus initiated transition to the phase B was largely completed at the turn of the 1860s and 1870s 368 with the firmly established ties between the Austrian Silesian Czech national movement and its counterparts in Bohemia and Moravia.

Considering East Silesia’s Silesian national movement, it entered the phase A in 1848, and once again in the 1860s after the discontinuity of the 1850s. Silesian national proponents mainly priests and pastors of German provenances strove to beef up this phase of the Silesian national movement drawing on folkloric, cultural and linguistic material worked out in the specific A-phases of Austrian Silesia’s German, Polish and Czech national movements. The Silesian national movement’s transition toward the phase B started with the founding of its organ Nowy Czas in 1877.

368 The Czech national movement of the Hultschin (Hluc’ in) region in Prussian Upper Silesia under the policies of Kulturkampf and due to the lack of direct organizational links with the centers of the Czech national movement in Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia, remained in the phase A until 1893 when the weekly Katolické Nowiny, pro lid moravský v Pruském Slezsku (Catholic News for the Moravian People in Prussian Silesia) (1893-1920) started to be published. This periodical commenced the transitional period to the phase B, but not unlike in the case of the Silesian national movement in East Silesia, the Hlutschin (Hulčin) region’s Czech national movement was transformed into a pro-German Moravian national movement pegged on the local Silesian transitory dialects between Polish and Czech (Gröschel, 1993: 240).
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A parallel Upper Silesian national movement could have evolved around Father Bogedain’s Gazeta Wiejska dla Górnego Śląska but it was a short-lived periodical and, what is more, it rather promoted standard Polish than the local Slavic dialect. After the revolutionary events of 1848, the relative absence of publishing in standard Polish or the local Slavic dialect, combined with no great interest on the part of the mainstream Polish national movement in Upper Silesia, translated into the weakness of the fledgling local Polish national movement in this region. Thus, it did not have to be countered, whilst German nationalism was not actively supported by Berlin until the 1860s due to Vienna’s adverse view of any nationalisms, which had to be taken into consideration because of the Habsburgs dominant position in the German Confederation. Consequently, the use of standard Polish limited to church life and primary schools, and the use of German to offices, education and the army, there was no immediate ennationalizing impingement (cf.: Reiter, 1989: 122) on the Upper Silesian multiple identity pegged on the local Slavic dialect and, in cities, gradually more increasingly (with the development and spread of industrialization), on the Slavic-Germanic creole. This situation was to change only with the establishment of the Kleindeutsche nation-state and the commencement of the Kulturkampf. In effect, the Polish national movement received a boost through these anti-Polish-language and anti-Catholic policies which brought about the German-Polish national conflict as well as ennationalizing stress on the Upper Silesians of non-national multiple identity. Supported by the Catholic Church they opposed this pressure, and the Upper Silesian national movement entered the phase B with the publication of the bilingual weekly Schlesier-Szlązak (1872-79). After the wrapping up of the Kulturkampf, Berlin rightly hoped that this movement with the support of the Catholic Church would limit the Polish national movement in Upper Silesia.

Having glanced at the development of the national movements in Prussian and Austrian Silesia prior to 1871, it is necessary to see how they related to the national and ethnic groups inhabiting these two lands.

As mentioned earlier, multiple identity was the norm before the ideology of nationalism introduced its monistic counterpart, usually based just on a single constituent of the former. Before the age of nationalism, there was only the German natio, or more correctly, the Bildungsbürgertum of the standard German language in Prussian and Austrian Silesia. Members of the Czech-speaking natio of the Czech Crown disappeared after the battle of the White Mountain (1620), and the extent of the Polish natio was limited only to Wielkopolska and Galicia in Prussia and the Habsburg empire, respectively, after the partitions of Poland-Lithuania, because Silesia had become part of the Kingdom of Bohemia and the Holy Roman Empire as early as the 14th century. It entailed the transition of the members of the Silesian gens into the German/Bohemian nationes, and after the battle of the White Mountain, exclusively into the German natio. Obviously, it did not preclude immigration of members of some other nationes/gentes to Silesia. They were not pressed to enter the fold of the locally extant German/Bohemian nationes because the fixation of homogeneity was then limited to faith only. However, with time, descendants of these immigrants did become members of the local nationes not being able to maintain any practical link with the nationes of their forefathers.

369. Usually, in Polish sources, Józef Lompa (1797-1863) and Karol Miarka (1825-1882) are enumerated as the fathers of the Polish national movement in Upper Silesia. Although, to a degree, it is substantiated by the deeds and statements of both of them, especially during the revolutionary period of 1848 in the case of the former, and after 1871 in the case of the latter; it is too easily overlooked that Lompa referred to himself as a (Polish-speaking) Silesian and wrote for the (Polish-speaking) Silesians (Lompa, 1996: 1) whereas Miarka even felt himself to be a German before he declared himself to be a (Polish-speaking) Upper Silesian and started to publish in Polish for the sake of the (Polish-speaking) Upper Silesian people/nation (Miarka, 1984: 25, 55).

370. In the 13th century the Silesian principalities were largely independent, and the Kingdom of Poland did not exist for all the practical purposes. Hence, even if one is eager to risk a statement that a Polish natio did exist, it was of lesser significance than the local gentes of Mazovia, Malopolska, Silesia etc.
With the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the increasingly German *natio* of Silesia (Reiter, 1989: 119) was purged of non-Catholic elements though some limited privileges were granted to Protestant burghers and noblemen especially in western Lower Silesia which did remain predominantly Protestant. After the division of Silesia between Prussia and the Habsburgs in 1742, Protestants gained equal rights in Prussian Silesia which did not entail depriving the local Catholics of them though since that time they had not enjoyed a privileged status as they had under the Habsburgs. Moreover, the Hohenzollerns welcomed to Silesia loyal to them Protestant nobility, and promoted local loyal Protestant burghers and civil servants through ennoblement. In result the German *natio* in Prussian Silesia received the dual Protestant-Catholic character. The authorities based their rule on the Protestant segment of this *natio* while its Catholic members were torn between loyalty to the Habsburgs and to the new rulers. This vacillation in the loyalty of the latter continued in a decreasing degree until the establishment of the *Kleindeutscher* nation-state.

The Catholic character of the German *natio* was retained in Austrian Silesia though increasingly more rights were granted to Protestant burghers in East Silesia. Consequently, when in the course of modernization the *Bildungsbürgertum* emerged, it was of mixed Catholic-Protestant character in East Silesia.

The split of Silesia into two, also translated into the gradual overhauling of the constituents in the multiple identity of the members of the German *natio/Bildungsbürgertum* in Prussian and Austrian Silesia. Namely, regional loyalties to both the Silesians and their respective monarchs developed, and this process deepened after the demise of the Holy Roman Empire (1806), when members of the *Bildungsbürgertum* could no longer refer to the ultimate suzerain the emperor (a Habsburg) who had also been the direct ruler of Austrian Silesia. Thus, the tentative link between both the Silesias, in the form of the Holy Roman Emperor of the German *Natio* was gone too.

From the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries to the mid-19th century, urbanization, industrialization, growth of the transportation and communication networks were accompanied by the gradual phasing out of serfdom. It had a tremendous effect on the peasantry which prior to that time had been immobile and, consequently, existed in laterally insulated communities. Their identities were largely pegged on the localities of their abode and on religion (cf.: Gellner, 1983: 9). It was the *natio/Bildungsbürgertum* who mediated between them and the wider world. What is more, the persons of the monarch and the emperor served as the instrument of cohesion between the peasantry and the *natio/Bildungsbürgertum*, besides constituting the locus of common loyalty.

The end of serfdom granted the peasantry with mobility, and the processes of modernization began to draw them into the German nation which was emerging from the *Bildungsbürgertum*. The instruments used to this end were popular education, compulsory military service and the gradual doing away with the estate structure through democratization of the political life: first, suffrage was extended to all the males, and, next, weight of their votes was equalized. Hence, male inhabitants were gradually transformed from subjects into citizens.

Democratization proceeded at a quicker pace in Prussia/Germany than in Austria/Austria-Hungary (Davies, 1996: 1295), and modernization was of various intensity and geographical extent in various areas of Prussian and Austrian Silesia. Consequently, the variegated pace and the degree of completeness of the transition of peasants into the fold of *Bildungsbürgertum/German nation*, and of the members of the *Bildungsbürgertum* into the German nation brought about different results.

First of all, after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, all the inhabitants of Prussian Silesia developed attachment to their region as well as to Prussia (cf.: Fiedler, 1987: 148). A similar development took place in the respect of the inhabitants of Austrian Silesia though it was delayed a bit by the administrative merger of this crownland with Moravia. What is more, the usually less mobile peasants tended to identify either with West or East Silesia, Austrian Silesia being territorially discontinuous. On the other hand, the Austrian Empire was not such a unitarian state as Prussia (especially after the establishment of Austria-Hungary), so, at the level of the state, inhabitants of
Austrian Silesia, first, tended to express they loyalty to the emperor, before they developed a tentative identification with the Cisleithania as Austrians.

Now bearing in mind what has been said on the development of the national movements in Prussian and Austrian Silesia prior to 1871, it seems that the overwhelming number of the inhabitants of Lower Silesia became Germans\(^{371}\). It was more problematic in the case of Catholic Lower Silesians, but with the end of the alienating policies of the *Kulturkampf* nothing hindered them from becoming Germans any more. In the case of Upper Silesia, only those who were Protestants, spoke German and did not speak the local Slavic dialect/Slavic-Germanic creole, became Germans.

German-speakers of Austrian Silesia could not too easily identify themselves as Germans because the only effective strain of German nationalism (i.e. *Kleindeutsche* nationalism) which resulted in the establishment of the Little German nation-state, was pegged on Protestantism. Only after the end of the *Kulturkampf* in Germany, and with the rise of various non-German nationalisms in the Danubian Monarchy, Vienna and Berlin inched toward cooperation not unlike the respective groups of German nationalists, who, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries were to find a unifying ideological plane in the form of anti-Semitism and racial superiority vis-a-vis the Slavs. Consequently, prior to 1871 majority of the German-speakers in Austrian Silesia, retained their multiple identity, but some broadened it with the constituent of German nationality.

The nascent Polish and Czech national movements did not produce more than several hundreds people who began to feel themselves to be Poles and Czechs but still without renouncing their multiple identities which also allowed them to identify themselves as Silesians, Prussians and Catholics\(^{372}\) in Upper Silesia or Austrian/West/East Silesians, Austrians, Catholics/Protestants\(^{373}\) in Austrian Silesia.

What is more, the rise of German, Polish and Czech nationalisms gradually squeezed those of non-national multiple identities into a tight place. However, in future, the ennationalizing efforts of these adverse ideologies were somewhat to cancel out one another, and the Catholic Church opposed the advance of nationalism as contrary to its universal message. This danger of having to resign from the old way of life, accompanied by the modicum of protection from ennationalization, were enough to create niches in which specific ethnic groups developed. This development was also facilitated by the fact that Upper and Austrian Silesia were located in the peripheral areas of Prussia/Germany and the Austrian Empire/Austria-Hungary, as well as in a multicultural and multilingual borderland. Consequently, ennationalizing policies, even if supported by the state, could not be so effective as in the centers of the states.

Ethnic groups drew on the local non-national multiple identities but the increasingly greater ennationalizing pressure made the rather straightforward dynamics of these identities more complex. They began to function as a buffer protecting the established manner of pre-national life of an ethnic group from the outer world of the ongoing homogenization in the name of nation. Thus, for instance, the resulting multiple ethnic identity allowed the Slavic-speaking Upper Silesian to be perceived,

\(^{371}\) At that time, the Sorbian-speakers of Lusatia partitioned among Saxony, and Brandenburg and Silesia in Prussia, also started developing their national movement turning rather into Sorbs than Germans. However, this problematic falls out of the scope of this study as would demand tackling developments also in Saxony and Brandenburg.

\(^{372}\) The Slavic-speaking Protestants of north-eastern Lower Silesia and of the county of Pleß (Pszczyna) in Upper Silesia were equally repelled from Polish nationalism as attracted to Prussia/Germany because of the former being pegged on Catholicism, and of the latter’s espousal of Protestantism as the religion of the state. As mentioned above the group of the Slavic-speaking Protestants became Germans by the end of the 19th century. It was not the case with the other group who lived in a very backward and rural corner of Upper Silesia so the influence of the German ennationalizing efforts was not felt so deeply here as in Lower Silesia or in the industrialized areas of Upper Silesia.

\(^{373}\) Those of the Czech predilection, were overwhelmingly Catholic, while those of the Polish one - Catholic and Protestant.
ideally, as Szlonzok\textsuperscript{374} among other Szlonzoks, a Pole among Poles, a German among Germans, and a Czech among Czechs. However, from the national point of view, such a Szlonzok seemed to have a monistic national identity while only other Szlonzoks understood it as just one of the constituents of the Szlonzokian multiple ethnic identity. So such an identity protected the Szlonzok from encroachments on the part of national administrations and, ideally, reinforced the cohesion of the Szlonzokian ethnic group.

In German sources the Szlonzoks\textsuperscript{375} were referred to as Wasserpole, and their vernacular as Wasserpolnisch, Oder-Wendisch or Böhmisch-Polnisch. Before the first efforts were undertaken to ennationalize the Szlonzoks to the German nation (in the mid-19th century), and, later, to the Polish one, they had inhabited most of Upper Silesia contained within the borders of the Breslau (Wrocław) diocese. They spoke a West Slavic dialect which, due to the development of primary education, first, was subjected to the influence of standard German, and in the years 1848-73, also to the influence of standard Polish. Moreover, in the second half of the 19th century, in the industrial towns of eastern Upper Silesia, a West Slavic-West Germanic creole emerged, and became one of the markers of the Szlonzokian identity (Kamusella, 1998). From the confessional viewpoint, the Szlonzoks were Catholics with the exception of the several-thousand-strong group of Protestants in the border county of Pleß (Pszczyna) (Triest, 1984: 564, 569) (who were rather more akin to Slunzaks of East Silesia than to the Szlonzoks). Their way of life, initially, was limited to agriculture, before in the process of industrialization they became workers in mines and metallurgical works which sprang up in eastern Upper Silesia. But besides being industrial workers, they often toiled on their own small plots of land or in gardens at their houses (Pallas, 1970: 9-35).

Slunzaks refer to themselves as ślunzoki or Ślunzoki in Polish spelling as well as Schlonsaken and Slunzoky in German and Czech spelling (Bahlcke, 1996: 114; Pallas, 1970: 44). They lived in East Silesia which was included within the borders of the Breslau (Wrocław) diocese. But about 50 thousand of them were Protestants (besides 8 thousand German-speakers of the same confession) in 1851, which amounted to over 40% of the inhabitants of this part of Austrian Silesia. The rest of the populace (including most Slunzaks) were Catholics (Grobelny, 1992: 68/9; Seidl, 1996: 146). This Catholic-Protestant character of the Slunzaks constituted their very specificity (Nowak, 1995: 27) which, to a degree, was shared by the Slavic-speaking Protestants from the county of Pleß (Pszczyna) across the border in Prussian Silesia. The Slunzaks spoke a West Slavic dialect referred to as Wasserpolnisch in German sources (Wurbs, 1982: 33). It differed, however, from Upper Silesia’s West Slavic dialect because the former was less influenced by German/Germanic dialects (in 1880 only 14% of East Silesia’s population were German-speakers (Anon., 1992c: 61)) and had stronger links to West Slavic dialects of northern Moravia, north-western Upper Hungary (Slovakia) and

\textsuperscript{374} Szlonzok, Schlonsok (i.e. Silesian) is the very ethnonym with which the Slavic-speaking Upper Silesians chose to refer to themselves. In order to distinguish between (Upper, Lower, Austrian, East, West) Silesians who identified only with their respective regions without forming a distinctive ethnic group, and the members of the Slavic/Slavic-Germanic creole-speaking Upper Silesian ethnic group, the latter are referred to as the Szlonzoks.

The Slavic-speaking population of the eastern half of East Silesia, who also turned into an ethnic group, decided to refer to themselves as Sileans (Ślunzoks, Szlonzoks) too. To avoid confusion the ethnonym Slunzaks is accepted in this study to refer to them.

\textsuperscript{375} Obviously, emergence of ethnic groups is a gradual process, so the Szlonzoks did not spring up when effects of modernization had already been well entrenched in the societal reality. Usually larger ethnic groups are welded from smaller ones usually pegged on several localities (cf.: the well documented cases of how the Xhosas and the Zulus came into being (Krige, 1975: 598; Hammond-Tooke, 1975: 550/1)). Hence, the Szlonzoks not unlike other ethnic groups extant in Prussian and Austrian Silesia, were preceded by such small ethnic-cum-local groups. Information on existence and ethnonyms of such groups may be obtained from 19th-century linguistic works. For instance, two of the small groups which became the basis for the emergence of the Szlonzoks, were known as the Kobylorze and the Golocy (Bańk In: Cząstka-Szymon, 1996: I, map bet. pp. 10 and 11). But the modernizing changes in Upper Silesia were so swift that, perhaps, not all of these small pre-Szlonzokian groups even managed to get unambiguously delineated or to acquire specific ethnonyms of their own.
western Galicia. What is more, standard Polish and standard Czech influenced the Slunzakian dialect earlier and for a longer time (though less intensively than Polish the Szlonzakian dialect during the years 1849-72 in Prussian Silesia when the standard language functioned in primary education) through publications from Cracow and Moravia (Knop, 1967: maps bet. pp. 48/9; Wronicz, 1995). Due to the small number of the German-speaking population concentrated around Bielitz (Bielsko) and in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin, and also to the prevalence of agriculture in most of East Silesia, unlike in Upper Silesia, no West Slavic-West Germanic creole developed in East Silesia but only ephemeral pidgins used in retail commerce and in works with linguistically variegated labor.

Another ethnic group of interest to this work is the Mährer or Morawzen as they were referred to in German. In Czech one spoke of the Moravec, whilst themselves they wrote down their ethnonym as the Morawce 376 (Pallas, 1970: 36-8). The ethnonym’s meaning is the Moravians which often led to the confusion of the Morawecs with the Moravians (Mährer in German, Moravané in Czech). The Moravians, unlike the Morawecs, were the inhabitants of Moravia who identified with their region, or Moravia’s Slavic-speakers (cf.: Žáček, 1995). The Morawecs lived mainly in the south of Upper Silesia, the north-east of West Silesia, the Moravian salient between West and East Silesia as well as in the western slither of East Silesia. They constituted a territorially compact group though separated by the Prussian/German-Austrian and crownland borders. But even the international border was generously porous until 1918. In the north the Morawecs bordered on the Słonzoks, in the northwest and in the west on the German-speaking Austrian Silesians, and in the east on the Slunzaks. The south was open to direct influences from the akin Slavic-speaking Moravians though initially the pastoral Vlachs 377 inhabited these areas (Nabert, 1994: map). The societal cohesion of the Morawecs was ensured by Catholicism, their agricultural way of life, inclusion of the areas of their settlement in the Olmutz (Olomouc) archdiocese (with the exception of the western slither of East Silesia), and also by the consistent use of the Moravian language 378 (mährische Schriftsprache, based on the Morawec Silesian-northern Moravian West Slavic dialect (Knop, 1967: map 1)) in primary education, publications 379, and church and public life. The development of the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin located on the border of East Silesia and Moravia, brought about, especially beginning with the second half of the 19th century, an increase in the contacts of the Morawecs from the Moravian salient between West and East Silesia, with the Moravians from Moravia proper. In result, the former began to identify with Moravia and the Moravians which facilitated infiltration of this salient by the Czech national movement (especially since the 1870s when the movement’s activists successfully started propagating the slogan that the Slavic-speakers of Bohemia and Moravia are one nation of the Czechs (Pallas, 1970: 36/7)) that, in the last two decades of the 19th century, also penetrated West and East Silesia. On the other hand, the Morawec, who lived in Prussian Silesia did not get influenced by Czech nationalism until 1919 when part of their area of settlement concentrated around Hultschin (Hlučín) was transferred to newly-established Czechoslovakia. Prior to this event, they had been shielded from Czech nationalism by the policies of the Catholic Church and the Prussian/German administration which promoted the Morawec identity. Moreover, other possible identification changes were prevented by their traditionally agricultural way of life as well as by the

376. For the sake of clarity, their own ethnonym is used in this study. The singular of the Morawce is Morawec so the spelling of the anglicized plural, employed here, is the Morawecs.
377. The Vlachs (Walachen in German, Valašvi in Czech, Walachowie in Polish, not to be confused with the Vlachs of the Balkans) were an ethnic group whose identity was pegged on montane pastoralist economy. They inhabited the westernmost ranges of the Carpathians crisscrossing the Moravian-Upper Hungarian and Moravian-East Silesian borders. By the close of the 19th century they had got assimilated with the locally extant neighbor nations and ethnic groups (Nabert, 1994: map; Svatava, 1994: 60).
378. This language of the Morawecs was akin to the Moravian/Slavic-Moravian/Slavic language used in Moravia proper, but the latter was based on different dialects.
379. Unlike in Bohemia and Moravia, the Gothic type was used to print publications for the Morawecs.
fact that no significant labor was derived from among the Morawecs for the needs of the Upper Silesian or Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basins till 1919.

Having described the contents of the identification loci of the three aforementioned ethnic groups, one wonders what constituted the ethnic border which separated them from one another and also from the neighbor national groups.

The Szlonzoks were separated from the Moravecs by the inclusion of the former in the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese, and the latter in the Olmütz (Olomouc) archdiocese (Pallas, 1970: 38); and from the Slunzaks by Catholicism which was not undermined by any strong Protestant influences like in East Silesia. As in the case of the Szlonzoks, homogenous Catholicism separated the Moravecs from the Slunzaks, as well as the fact that the Slunzaks belonged to the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese.

From the linguistic viewpoint, Upper Silesia’s Slavic-Germanic creole (especially in the Upper Silesian industrial basin) was a strong marker of the Szlonzoks vis-a-vis the Moravecs and the Slunzaks. Also bilingualism began to serve this role after it had spread in the urbanized and industrialized areas of Upper Silesia. The Moravecs differed from the Szlonzoks in this respect that, to a large degree, they based their church, educational and public life on the Moravian language. In these social contexts, since 1848, the Szlonzoks had used standard Polish and the Slunzaks their own dialect which gradually inched toward standard Polish under the influence of neighbor Galicia where Polish gained the status of an official crownland language in 1869. What is more, the three ethnic groups were separated from one another by their own West Slavic dialects, which, nevertheless, were quite similar. Although members of these groups referred to their language as speaking po naszymu (in our way), with time, the dialect of the Moravecs (especially of those who lived outside Upper Silesia) acquired increasingly more linguistic loans from standard Czech, the dialect of the Slunzaks from standard Polish, and that of the Szlonzoks, at most, from standard German and the Upper Silesian creole, but also from standard Polish.

Taking under consideration the way of life, the distinctive feature of the Szlonzoks was their growing employment in industry, which was true only in regard to a smaller group of the Slunzaks and very few Moravecs who obtained jobs at the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin. Moreover, the Moravecs in Upper Silesia and without it, usually were peasants while the Slunzaks had better opportunities of finding employment in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin, as well as in one of the largest Austro-Hungarian centers of textile industry at Bielitz (Bielsko) (Kuhn, 1977: 29), where only few Moravecs arrived. The relatively lesser mobility of the Moravecs was brought about by the slower and later development of the railway network in the areas of their abode than in the much more economically attractive areas of Upper and East Silesia, where, since the mid-19th century, the phenomenon of mass commuting began to emerge.

Another factor deepening differentiation among the three ethnic groups, was international and administrative divisions which had emerged since the split of Silesia in 1740-42. The Szlonzoks identified themselves with Upper Silesia and Prussia. They were also loyal to their Prussian king. Due to the territorial discontinuity of Austrian Silesia, the Slunzaks usually identified themselves with East Silesia (Koz don in Kacir, 1997: 54) as well as with the whole Danubian Monarchy via their loyalty to the ruler. On the other hand, the cohesion of the Moravecs was quite impeded by the divisions. Living in Prussia/Germany and the Austrian Empire/Austria-Hungary, as well as in West and East Silesia, and in Moravia, the Moravecs developed variegated loyalties to different states, rulers and administratively delineated regions.

During less or more intensive social interactions among members of these three ethnic groups certain stereotypes of one another emerged the more reaffirming the ethnic borders separating the groups from one another. The most distinct of these stereotypes was used by the Moravecs and the Slunzaks in their interaction because the administrative, ecclesiastical or linguistic divisions between the two ethnic groups did not delineate them too clearly vis-a-vis each other. The Moravecs dubbed the Slunzaks with the pejorative of Lach, Lachman (in Austrian Silesian-northern Moravian dialects, it denotes a rogue, tatterdemalion, disorderly person), and the latter reciprocated by calling the former
with the pejorative of Walach\(^\text{380}\) (i.e. uncultured, uncivilized highlander’) (Pallas, 1970: 75/6). What is more, the Slunzaks (especially from the non-industrialized areas) in encounters with Szlonzoks (especially from the Upper Silesian industrial basin) perceived the behavior of the latter as swaggering, while, on the other hand, the Slunzaks appeared to the Szlonzoks as backward pampunie (villagers, peasants). The infiltration of Austrian and Upper Silesia through nationalisms, superimposed on the aforementioned interethnic prejudices a new paradigm of national ones. Because Polish nationalism penetrated East Silesia more quickly than Upper Silesia, the Morawecs and, to a lesser degree, also the Szlonzoks began to identify the Slunzaks not so much with the Poles as with the stereotypes of the Polish uncivilizedness, such as: Galician poverty or polnische Wirtschaft\(^\text{381}\). Similarly, with the later advances of this nationalism in Upper Silesia, the Morawecs from the south of this region (not unlike Germans), at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, began to feel repugnance toward the Szlonzoks who increasingly succumbed to Polish tendencies, be they only linguistic or also national. On the same ground, this Upper Silesian section of the Morawecs did not feel well disposed to Morawecs from Austria-Hungary as many of them espoused the standard Czech language or Czech nationalism. Thus, in the eyes of Upper Silesia’s Morawecs, the consequence was that the Szlonzoks and the Austrian-Hungarian Morawecs shifted further away from them and got closer to the civilizationally inferior Poles and Czechs. It caused the Upper Silesian Morawecs to gradually identify more with the Germans.

The above-described contents and borders of the three ethnic groups created mutually exclusive communication fields which translated the so-achieved societal cohesion into a considerable degree of endogamy, and, by the same token, into a certain biological self-enclosure of these groups\(^\text{382}\).

The maintenance of separateness of these ethnic groups from the growing national groups was effected with the means of ethnic borders. The Szlonzoks and the Slunzaks perceived Poles as very alien as expressed with their use of the ethnonyms Polok (Pole) and Galicjok (Galician, inhabitant of Galicia) in the function of strong pejoratives (Kaciř, 1997: 54). Moreover, Poles from Congress Poland, the Province of Posen (Poznań) and Galicia did not consider the dialects of the Szlonzoks and the Slunzaks to be Polish (Pallas, 1970: 50), and they themselves referred to their language as speaking po naszymu (in our way). Poles from the Province of Posen (Poznań) also referred to the Szlonzoks with the pejorative of Odraks (i.e. poor, uncultured folk with their backward economy centered on the River Oder (Odra)). Besides, the influence of the Polish language and culture on the Szlonzoks, which emanated from Galicia and Congress Poland, was limited by international borders, whereas the interest of the Wielkopolska Polish national movement in the Szlonzoks emerged only at the close of the 19th century when, on the ethnic ground, the notion of the Prussian partition (of Poland-Lithuania) was extended to contain Upper Silesia. The overwhelming majority of the Szlonzoks disagreed with this approach and continued to perceive their region as an integral part of Prussia/Germany\(^\text{383}\).

\(^{380}\) Of course, this pejorative is derived from the East Silesian version of the ethnonym of the Vlachs, many of whom merged with the Morawecs. Ironically, some of them, especially in south-eastern East Silesia, also got assimilated with the Slunzaks.

\(^{381}\) Literally, the term means Polish economy, but it denotes disorder, filth, dilapidation and backwardness (Orlowski, 1998).


\(^{383}\) This perception of Upper Silesia as an entity separate from Poland, has survived among the Szlonzoks to this day, especially in the expression jada do Polski (I’m going to Poland). It denotes a trip to the cities of Sosnowiec or Chrzanów across the small rivers of Brynica (Brinitza) or Przemsza (Przemsa) which used to constitute the border between Prussia/Germany, and Russia (i.e. Congress Poland) and Austria-Hungary.
It was relatively easy for the Polish language and nationalism to infiltrate East Silesia from its firm base in Galicia even though the administrative border did amount to a barrier. However, the factor which limited ennationalization of the Slunzaks to the Polish nation was the coupling of Polish nationalism with Catholicism which repelled from this ideology numerous Protestant Slunzaks and their Catholic counterparts who had been raised in the tradition of religious tolerance and mutually fruitful coexistence. Moreover, the relatively higher level of development of Upper and East Silesia vis-à-vis the adjacent areas of Congress Poland and Galicia, did fortify the stereotype of the civilizations inferiority of the Poles. Due to this stigma associated with Polishness, Galician migrant workers in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin predominantly got ennationalized into the German or Czech nations which were perceived as civilizationally superior (Grobelny, 1992: 69).

The centers of Czech national movement were relatively remote from the areas inhabited by the Morawecs, which delayed the spread of Czech nationalism among them. What is more, its very center in Bohemia was associated with anti-Catholic Hussitism/Protestantism and as such incompatible with the ultramontane Catholic character of the Morawecs. Another barrier was constituted by the Moravian language which the Morawecs perceived as different from standard Czech (pegged on Bohemia and its central dialects, i.e. of the Prague region’s). Additionally, in print and writing it appeared in the Gothic type not unlike the German language prior to 1918. One cannot overestimate barriers in the form of administrative and international borders. Hence, the Czech national movement most easily penetrated the Moravian salient (between West and East Silesia) because the ethnic border between the Morawecs and the Slavic-speaking Moravians was rather blurry there; and the Slavic-speaking areas around the Troppau (Opava) which somehow belonged to Moravia due to the inclusion of all of Moravia as well as of the two-thirds of West Silesia in the Olmütz (Olomouc) archdiocese. It was more difficult for the Czech national movement to enter the west of East Silesia. East Silesia was included in the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese which contributed to making the border between the Morawecs and the Slunzaks less distinct and brought about counteraction of the Polish national movement because it considered the western part of East Silesia as well as all the region to be its and unambiguously Polish. Last but not least, the international Prussian/German-Austrian/Austro-Hungarian border, despite the ecclesiastical inclusion of the south of Upper Silesia in the Olmütz (Olomouc) archdiocese, did not allow Czech nationalism to penetrate this area until 1918. Regarding the mechanism used by the Morawecs to differentiate themselves from the Poles in East Silesia (and also from the Slunzoks whom the Morawecs sometimes identified with the Poles), it was the rife stereotype associating Polishness with a low level of civilization.

The Szlonzaks separated themselves from the Germans with language, but until the Kulturkampf it did not amount to too much, so the Szlonzaks could easily identify themselves not only with their region but also with Prussia (the same was true in the case of the Morawecs from the south of Upper Silesia) (Pallas, 1970: 39). The subsequent homogenizing line of the Kleindeutsche nation-state directed against Catholicism and languages other than German, caused the emergence of the stereotype that the German is a Protestant and the Szlonzok a Catholic who used standard Polish in church and at school, which obviously did not mean that he felt himself to be a Pole³⁸⁴ (Reiter, 1960: 7). Moreover, Germans tended to use the terms Wasserpolen and Wasserpolnisch as pejorative labels for the Szlonzoks and their language (Pallas, 1970: 39), which fortified the ethnic border between the two groups, as well as between the Poles and the Szlonzoks when the former used the term Wasserpole in the meaning of renegade (Kaciř, 1997: 54), i.e. a Szlonzok who did not want to become a Pole or who apart from the Polish constituent of his multiple identity, dared to reveal some other ones.

³⁸⁴ However, it would later facilitate the task of the Wielkopolska Polish national movement which drawing on the confessional divisions decided to promote the slogan A Pole is a Catholic, a German - a Protestant in its effort to forge a clearly delineated Polish national group in Prussia/Germany.
The Moravecs (not unlike the Szlonzoks) were repelled from the Kleindeutsche nation-state by its ideological Protestantism and the attempts aimed at limiting the use of the Moravian language in social life. On the other hand, the paramount ethnic marker of the Moravecs in Austria-Hungary was their language. It was seconded by the spread of Kleindeutsche nationalism, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, which separated them from the neighbor German-speakers increasingly ennationalized into Germans. Another factor was the Moravian Ausgleich (compromise) of 1905. It regulated the relations (i.e. separateness as well as coexistence) between Slavic and German-speaking Moravians at the constitutional level. In result the infiltration of this region either by Czech or German nationalism was limited allowing the Morawecs of the Moravian salient to preserve their ethnic identity.

The Slunzaks were separated from the neighbor German-speakers through their language as well as by homogenous Catholicism of almost all the German-speaking populace of Austrian Silesia. Distance constituted another barrier as extensive compact areas of settlement of German-speakers were located only beyond the Moravian salient, in West Silesia.

Having described the development of the national movements in Silesia prior to 1871 as well as the ethnic groups (which were co-shaped by the rise of nationalism), and the relations among the ethnic and national groups; it is necessary to scrutinize the approximate numerical size and political influence of the national and ethnic groups.

As said before, the persisting loci of identification were: the region, the monarch, the pre-national state, the estate, the confession and the traditional way of life, besides the nation. The nation was of ever growing significance in the wake of the establishment of the Kleindeutsche nation-state until it would overshadow any other element of identification after the international espousal of the national principle as the very instrument of political organization at the close of the Great War (1918). Bearing in mind this gradual transition from the non-national multiple identity constructed from numerous malleable constituents, to the monistic one based on one constituent of a given nationality only, it comes as no surprise that national groups in Silesia grew with the unfolding of the corresponding national movements which, on the other hand, incited the coming into being of ethnic groups as opposed to these ennationalizing developments which endangered the traditional ways of life on which these ethnic groups were pegged. But in a way, it was broadly understood modernization that prepared the ground for the growth of national and ethnic groups through increased mobility and democratization. They brought about the gradual phasing out of the insulation of self-contained localities as well as of estate divisions.

By 1871 this process has been largely completed in Lower Silesia where the overwhelming majority of the populace felt themselves to be Germans but without forgetting their keen attachment to their region of Silesia and their state of Prussia headed by the Prussian monarch who had just become the Kaiser of the German Empire, not of the German nation-state or the Germans386 (Görtemaker, 1996: 253). The same was true of the predominantly monolingual German-speaking Protestants of Upper Silesia. On the other hand, the Slavic/Polish-speaking Protestants of northeastern Lower Silesia gradually gravitated toward Germandom, and this process (facilitated by the grounding of Polish nationalism in Catholicism) was completed at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Slavic/Polish-speaking (and frequently bilingual to a varying degree of linguistic competence in standard German/Upper Silesian German dialect) population of Upper Silesia was alienated from the Kleindeutsche nation-state by Little German nationalism pegged on Protestantism and the German language. But it was only true of the period of the Kulturkampf and afterward, however, it did not push them to espouse Polish nationalism, but rather increased their attachment to

385. I.e. not only industrialization.

386. The changing relation of the Hohenzollern monarchs to the Prussian state ruled by them can be clearly seen in the case of Prussia. The royal title assumed by Friedrich I at his coronation in 1701 was King in Prussia. Friedrich II became King of Prussia in 1772 (i.e. the year of the first partition of Poland-Lithuania) (Morby, 1994: 137). Thus, the Hohenzollerns had been Prussian kings only since 1772.
(Upper) Silesia and Prussia besides contributing to their coalescence as the Szlonzokian ethnic group. Prior to 1871, the interest of the all-Polish national movement in Upper Silesia was minuscule, and the region was not considered part of the partition areas to be redeemed as a would-be Polish (national-)state. Only with the forging of the ethnic definition of the Polish nation, in the 1890s, Upper Silesia and the Szlonzoks entered the plans of the Polish nationalists in earnest. So at the end of the period surveyed by the Part I of this study, only very few educated locals (anything from several tens to, perhaps, a hundred) felt themselves to be Poles but without detaching themselves from their region and Prussia. Although some Szlonzoks could pass themselves as Poles during their trips to the adjacent areas of Congress Poland and Galicia, they rather did not cherish Polishness as even a meager constituent of their multiple identity due to the rife and stereotypically lowly perception of the Poles and the Galicians.

The Slavic/Polish-speaking population of the county of Pleß (Pszczyna) could have been quite a catchment area for the Polish national movement provided they had not been Protestants. Only across the border in East Silesia it was the only place where Protestantism did not bar one from becoming a Pole. It was the pragmatic approach of the local Polish nationalists who having espoused the ideology of Polish nationalism from one of its center at Cracow, transplanted it to East Silesia less its confessional element, in recognition of the religiously mixed character of their region. Even some of the activists were Protestants, but they did not embark on the Polish national course to change their faith which would actually lessen their ethnic distinctiveness vis-a-vis the overwhelmingly Catholic German-speakers of Austrian Silesia and the Cisleithania. Actually, the beginning of the Polish national group in East Silesia is connected to the Slavic/Polish-speaking activists from the local Protestant secondary school (one of very few in the Austrian Empire). They were only later joined by Catholics, who had to carry out the work further on when the ranks of Protestants were depleted by the Silesian national movement at the turn of the 1860s and 1870s, headed by East Silesia’s German-speaking pastors. Although the universalism of the Catholic Church (propagated in Austrian Silesia by the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop) toned down Polish nationalism in East Silesia, it did not prevent the crystallization of the educated elite of several tens of Polish national activists with active support from the Polish national movement in Galicia. These activists did form a considerable larger percentage of population in East Silesia than their counterparts in Upper Silesia. What is more, the East Silesian activists developed a more monistic identity in which the confessional, dialectal and regional constituents were clearly subordinated to the Polish national constituent. In this manner, the other constituents evolved into the basis of the specific kind of East Silesian Polishness.

It was possible because only few thousands of Germans lived in East Silesia and upward social mobility in the Austrian Empire/Austria-Hungary was not limited exclusively to the German language and culture as in Prussia/Germany. It became even less so with the introduction of Polish as the official language in the neighbor Galicia in 1869. Hence, advancement through the Polish language and culture gradually became an even more inciting option unlike in Upper Silesia where, additionally, the peer pressure of the German-speaking environment caused the vast majority of the few Slavic/-Polish-speakers who gained secondary/university education, to become Germans as the only way to reaffirming their higher social status pegged on their learned professions. It was not so much true of priests who had to cater for all the linguistically variegated population of Upper Silesia. But the universalism of Catholicism largely discouraged them from espousing particularism of any nationalism, so the message of Polish nationalism was spread in Upper Silesia only in a cloaked version by not too well educated local lay teachers and other individuals turned journalists and pro-Polish-language rather than straightforward Polish nationalist activists.

The spread of Bohemia’s Czech nationalism forged only in the mid-19th century and somehow pegged on the Husitic/Protestant tradition of the Bohemian natio, was not too easy in homogeneously Catholic Moravia and West Silesia. However, several tens of Czech nationalist activists emerged at the turn of the 1860s and 1870s especially in the vicinity of Troppau (Opava) before making some incursions into the Moravian wedge and the west of East Silesia encouraged by the gradually decreasing cooperation with Polish nationalist activists in East Silesia on the ground of the concept of
Slavic reciprocity and countering the spread of German nationalism. However, the then codified standard Czech language and culture gained fuller recognition only in Bohemia and only in the 1870s-1880s, whereas the Moravian/Moravian-Slavic/Slavic language written and printed in the Gothic type was the standard for the Slavic-speakers in Moravia and West Silesia. Consequently, social advancement was rather more possible through the German language and culture rather than the Czech counterparts unless one moved to Bohemia. What is more, as mentioned above, Czech nationalism kept at bay by the international border and the policies of the Catholic Church and the Prussian/German administration, did not penetrate the south of Upper Silesia until 1918.

Most German-speakers of Austrian Silesia though aware of the goals of German nationalism which resulted in the establishment of the successful Kleindeutsche nation-state, were somehow repelled from this state by its ideological Protestantism, and from the ideology because it had brought about the defeat of the Austrian Empire at the hands of Prussia in 1866 and endangered the existence of the Austrian Empire/Austria-Hungary and Austrian Silesia with splitting them along the frayedly unclear ethnic lines. It was all they had, so only with the advance of the Czech national movement in Bohemia in the 1870s-1880s, some of the German-speaking intellectuals and journalists began to espouse the ideals of vaguely Großdeutschely nationalism. It was given a boost due to the rapprochement and subsequent cooperation of Vienna and Berlin which took off in the 1880s and 1890s and was sealed by the spread of German nationalism in the Cisleithania which found the common ground with its Kleindeutsche counterpart in anti-Semitism, imperialism, Pangermanism and the struggle against the rapid proliferation of various non-German nationalisms in Austria-Hungary. However, prior to 1871, the majority of Austrian Silesia’s German-speakers identified themselves as Austrian/West/East Silesians, Silesian Austrians or, simply, Austrians.

In East Silesia the situation was a bit different in the case of the German-speaking area around Bielitz (Bielsko), and of much smaller islets concentrated around the other towns. Most of those German-speakers were Protestants so some of them were quite quick to espouse Kleindeutsche nationalism especially if they lived in the localities close to the border with Prussia/Germany. On the other hand, with the development of the Upper Silesian and Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basins, where the management and highly qualified workers were almost exclusively German-speaking in the former case, and German and Czech-speaking in the latter one, the environment fostered bilingualism as the linguistic adaptation technique among the Slavic-speakers who most often were unqualified and lowly qualified workers. In a longer perspective, a Slavic-Germanic creole developed in the Upper Silesian basin, and akin pidgins in the other one, as go-between language forms. However, those who hoped for social advancement through work or education, had to acquire standard German in the former industrial basin or standard German/standard Czech in the latter, which, later, encouraged such enterprising individuals to get ennationalized into the German/Czech nation.

To reiterate, most of the Slavic-speakers of Upper and Austrian Silesia belonged to one of the following three ethnic groups: the Szlonzoks, the Slunzaks, and the Morawecs. When the German, Polish and Czech national movements began to endeavor to ennationalize members of these ethnic groups into the corresponding nations of the movements, their frequently clashing efforts canceled out one another while the Silesian national movements in Upper and Eastern Silesia boosted the Szlonzoks and the Slunzaks, respectively, and the propagation of the Moravian regional ethnic identity in Upper Silesia and Moravia did serve the same end in the case of the Morawecs. On the other hand, the Catholic Church fostered these ethnic identities hoping to oppose the spread of particularism of nationalisms, especially when the Church’s autonomous existence was endangered by the Kulturkampf. Afterward, the Church, having recognized the economic, social and political achievements of the Kleindeutsche nation-state, was rather bent on protecting it and the traditional

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387 Bilingualism and multilingualism also spread among traders and foremen (in spite of their mother tongue) because the former wanted to sell their wares to every client regardless of his language of preferences, whilst the latter had to be unambiguously understood by everybody in their working gangs (Reiter, 1989: 123/4).
way of life of its faithful with non-national ethnic multiple identities before the potentially destructive incursions of Polish and Czech nationalisms. In this task it was joined by the Protestant Church.

On the other hand, in Austrian Silesia, the Catholic and Protestant Churches, without the interlude of the highly divisive Kulturkampf, jointly worked to preserve the existing social, economic, administrative and ethnic relations against the disruptive influence of nationalisms. However, with the spread of non-German nationalisms, the German nationalisms began to function as the bulwarks protecting Germany and Austria-Hungary. Then, inevitably, the aforementioned efforts to preserve the three ethnic groups, contributed to strengthening these German nationalisms as well as to making the ethnic groups more sympathetic toward Germandom than to Czechdom or Polishdom. Anyway Berlin and Vienna had provided them with quite a prosperity vis-a-vis the bleak situation in the adjacent areas of Galicia and Congress Poland without pressing them too hard to renounce their non-national identities and traditional ways of life, whereas no one could be sure what better the Polish and Czech national movements could offer the ethnic groups instead, not having their own nation-states and pressing interested members of these ethnic groups into becoming Poles or Czechs without any regard for their ethnic identities, needs and beliefs.

Finally, before 1871, even the Germans of Lower and Upper Silesia did not develop clearly monistic national identities and continued to invest their regions and Prussia (submerged in Germany) with a role in their self-identification. Across the border, the region did remain the locus of identification for Austrian Silesia’s German-speakers besides the Cisleithania and the emperor. It was even more true in the case of the members of the ethnic groups and of the few individuals who became the founders and activists of the local Polish and Czech national movements. The region and the monarch, thus, did remain the instruments of ensuring social cohesion in Prussian and Austrian Silesia until 1871. The national and ethnic differences had to be further elaborated and supported/counteracted from outside until they gained momentum enough to unravel the old social bonds at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries before contributing to shaping of the new political map of Europe based on the national principle after the Great War.

The emergence of the nationalist movements in Silesia and the conflicts which mounted among them and led to the head on confrontation at the close of the great war (1871-1918)

The stir of the German national movement which was the first one to enter the fray in Silesia, began in the first half of the 19th century. Its ideologues successfully set out to implement its postulates of homogenization when the Kleindeutsch model of the German nation-state under the Prussian leadership was accepted by the majority of the German rulers in 1866/1867 through the establishment of the North German Confederation, and the real breakthrough was achieved with the creation of the German Empire in 1871. Prussia triumphed: France was defeated and isolated, and the non-nationalist, universal (i.e. ultramontane) idea of the Großdeutsch state was largely discarded after the setback the Habsburgs suffered at the hands of Wilhelm I in the Six Weeks War of 1866.

The ideology of nationalism got firmly entrenched in Central and East-Central Europe despite the procrastinating policies of Austria-Hungary which wanted to maintain a prenational status quo among its numerous ethnic groups. They suddenly began to transform into nations impressed by the Prusso-German example, and the relative supremacy of the German-speaking Austrians and the Hungarians within the monarchy. The process did not leave Silesia untouched. The homogenizing policies of the nation-state building applied in Germany fortified by rapid industrialization threw out the populace of the multi-ethnic parts of Silesia from the cozy niche of their immediate social and geographical environs confronting them with the other. Many left the countryside for cities and western Germany to find a better living for their families. The labor-hungry Upper Silesian and Austrian Silesian industrial centers attracted engineers, managers and investors from the intellectual and financial centers of Germany and Austria-Hungary whereas many workers came to Prussian Silesia across the border from Russia (mainly Congress Poland) and Austria-Hungary (mainly Galicia), and to Austrian Silesia predominantly from Galicia. The managerial strata usually
constituted from German-speakers, and in the case of Austrian Silesia also of Czech-speakers and few Polish-speakers. Workers recruited by the Upper Silesian industry were predominantly Polish and German-speakers though after 1905 a sizeable group of Ruthenian-speakers from eastern Galicia arrived. The manpower of the Austrian Silesian industry tended to speak German, Czech and Polish. The picture would not be complete without mentioning that Catholics were most numerous among the managerial and work force strata in the industry of Austrian Silesia whereas the managerial layer of the Upper Silesian industry was composed, more often than not, from Protestant Germans. In both of the Silesias also some assimilated Jews did participate but excepting their origin and sometimes their faith and proficiency in Yiddish, they were hardly recognizable as different from Germans and German-speaking Austrians. However, some traditional Jewish traders and artisans of Hasidic custom did arrive in East Silesia from Galicia and the same process could be observed in the eastern part of Prussian Upper Silesia with the creation of the Jewish pale of settlement in Russia (1882, limited to the lands of partitioned Poland-Lithuania) which drastically restricted the geographical sphere of their economic activity pushing them abroad (Pogonowski, 1993: 25).

Conscious self-realization of ethnic difference vis-à-vis co-workers, employers, shop assistants and neighbors, was forced on the swelling urban population by the necessity of one’s continual interaction with people of different language, religion, custom and origin. The process was fortified by censuses which made one first, verbally and then effectively renounce one’s prenational complementary identity and to declare allegiance to some nation-in-making. Such a choice often coincided with one’s desire of social and economic progress which was possible only through the language and culture of the Germans who constituted the demographic basis of the German-nation state, and who clearly dominated until the turn of the centuries in the Austrian part of Austria-Hungary. The state-controlled popular education, conscript army and administration contributed to this phenomenon pushing away the linguistically, culturally (and sometimes confessionally) incompatible groups to social and economic margins either accelerating their assimilation or breeding discontent. Generally speaking, the source of this discontent was the repeated rejection on the part of the mainstream of society barring one from the benefits of assimilation or ideological disagreement to the prospect of assimilation. The latter attitude came about during the time when the state got increasingly involved in devising and implementing the homogenizing policies in an effort of nation and nation-state building. Such policies more decisively pursued in the 1870s toward the Polish-speaking population in Congress Poland and the Province of Posen (Poznań) by Russia (Pogonowski, 1993: 25) and Germany (Prussia), respectively, contributed to the formation of the Polish national movement which drawing on the exemplar of German and Western European nationalisms worked out its own version of nationalist ideology. Such a speedy reply was largely possible thanks to the fact that in 1869 Austria-Hungary granted cultural and linguistic autonomy to Galicia which became the unhampered center of Polish culture and learning as well as semi-safe

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388 The autonomous Congress Kingdom of Poland established in 1815 by Tsar Alexander I (ruled 1801-1825, 1815 crowned as King of Poland) in the wake of the Congress of Vienna, was suspended after the November Uprising, in the period 1832-1861. It was renewed in 1861 to placate the January Uprising but finally Alexander II (ruled 1885-1881), who was the last tsar to use the title of the King of Poland, abolished it in 1874 and subsequently transformed into a regular province under the name of the Land of the Vistula. The name of Poland was entially scrapped from the political and administrative map of Europe, and a stream of homogenizing legislation based on the German (Prussian) example followed. For instance, in 1869 the University of Warsaw became a Russian-language university, all the secondary schools were Russified in the period 1869-1874, and all other public schools after 1885 (interestingly, by 1905 there were relatively fewer schools and students in the Land of the Vistula than there had been in 1815), in 1875 the reminder of the Uniate Church preserved within the boundaries of Congress Poland was abolished and converted to Eastern Orthodox, in 1876 the Polish language in courts of law was replaced by Russian, and in 1879 Russia’s military courts acquired jurisdiction over the civilian population of the province. This homogenizing, Russifying trend became even less unwavering after the killing of Alexander II (1881) in a suicidal bombing by the Polish engineering student Ignacy Hryniewiecki (1855-1881), which also sparked off a wave of anti-Semitism complete with pogroms (Davies, 1991: II xxv; Davies, 1996: 1264; Pogonowski, 1993: 24/25; Smogorzewski, 1992: 950).
haven for Polish nationalist activists from the Russian and Prussian partitions of Poland. The more accommodating attitude of the Habsburgs toward non-dominant ethnic groups employed after the failure of 1866 and the Ausgleich of 1867, contributed to the development of the Czech national movement (the third largest one after the dominant Germans and Hungarians) and other ones throughout the monarchy. In the 1880s and 1890s this situation caused the German national and Pangerman movements to appear since the German-speakers noticed that their privileged was at stake should other national movements receive more equal treatment and representation in the institutions of the monarchy. Subsequently, German nationalists from Austria-Hungary established closer links with their counterparts in Germany which was sealed by the alliance of the two states and allowed Pangermanism to become a significant ideological force at the beginning of the 20th century inciting a short revival of Panslavism.

During the Great War, majority of European politicians supported by the US President Woodrow Wilson accepted the national principle as the basis of economic and social organization despite the protests of advocates of federalism and multiculturalism who failed to save Austria-Hungary by having attempted to overhaul it into a federal state, at the last minute, in 1918 (Ehrich, 1992: 533). Thus the processes of nation and nation-state building and emergence of various national movements though usually did not take their beginning in Silesia did strongly influence this borderland, rapidly industrialized region a veritable epitome Central Europe, squeezed in the confluence of the frontiers of the three empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia.

In Prussian Silesia the homogenizing policies of the state and the offer of full social and economic privilege to those who were German-speaking and Protestant, caused the majority of the Polish-speaking Protestants of north-eastern Lower Silesia to assimilate with Germandom at the turn of the centuries. This centering of the German national unity on language and religion triggered off some discontent among the Upper Silesian populace who were multilingual and predominantly Catholic, and as such better fitted Austria’s ultramontane concept of Großdeutschland than the actualized Kleindeutschland of Prussia. The unifying effort of the state, they perceived as an attack on their religion and customs of their ancestors as preserved in language which was inextricably connected to the Catholic Church which promoted it as the preferred medium of communication with the faithful, and of religious instruction. The Slavic-speakers of Upper Silesia objected and their discontent was channelled into the political arena where on the basis of the popular male suffrage a party system had recently emerged. The goals of the Catholic Zentrum party which undertook to represent their interests were embraced by the Upper Silesian Catholic clergy. In their stance they were followed by their parishioners who readily identified with prenational universality of the Catholic Church much to the dismay of German nation-state builders, and of Polish nationalist activists especially from the Province of Posen (Poznań) who wanted to win the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians for the sake of Polishdom and of reestablishing the Polish state. The ensuing ideological struggle for the allegiance of the non-German-speaking/bilingual population of Upper Silesia fought out among the Catholic Church, Polish and German nationalisms led to politicization and preliminary protonational polarization, especially among the activists and their immediate followers at the beginning of the 20th century. However, majority of the population decided to remain in their prenational Catholic world of complementary identities entrenched in closely-knit communities until, in line with the national principle, they were forced, against their will and better judgement, to opt for German or Polish nationality after 1918. The new situation bred another wave of discontent which was channeled into the Upper Silesian ethnic movement. However, it could not effectively contend with Polish and German nationalisms and was largely phased out by the latter following the plebiscite (1921) and the division of Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland (1922).

Later, in appreciation of the role Galicia played in the creation of the Polish nation and Nation-state, some Polish historians tended to dub it Polish Piedmont (cf.: Buszko, 1989: cover).
Even more confused situation developed after 1871 in Austrian Silesia. The nation building policies gradually became popular among the German-speakers, the non-dominant majority of the population, due to the visible successes of Germany (Prussia) in the field of nation and nation-state building (which one could observe across the border), and to the steady spread of Czech nationalism as well as of its Polish counterpart seeping from Galicia. Development of German nationalism in this region was hardly facilitated by the state which preferred to maintain an equilibrium among various ethnic groups/emergent nations in Austria-Hungary than to risk dissolution of the monarchy through embarking on the task of constructing a nation-state and subsequently privileging the largest but non-dominant ethnic group of Germans at the cost of the others. So as Slavic nationalists became more culturally and economically visible in the 1880s German nationalist and Pangerman groups began to form in response seeking contacts with similar organizations throughout Austria-Hungary and in Germany. The German national movement was confronted by Czech nationalism in West Silesia and in the industrial basin of Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) where both the nationalism were locked in a struggle with its Polish counterpart, especially over Polish-speaking Galician immigrant workers. More often than not they assimilated with Germans or Czechs in order to improve their social and economic status because being a Pole was stereotypically connected to poverty and low prestige in the context of Galicia (Nowak, 1995: 32). The Polish nationalists even with some aid from Cracow could not offset this process. What is more, the Polish national movement of East Silesia got considerably weakened in the closing decades of the 19th century. Because Polish nationalism got increasingly intertwined with the Polish Catholic Church, often resulting in the simplistic stereotypes of Pole-Catholic and German-Protestant, this ideological development alienated the sizeable section of Polish-speakers who were Protestants, and contributed to splitting the Polish national movement into the Protestant and Catholic branches. The latter managed to establish firm links with Galician co-religionists whereas denouncing the Polish-speaking Protestants as pro-German due to the fact that they shared religion with many German-speakers of East Silesia. The Protestant Polish-speakers countered by developing the stereotype of Pole-Protestant but it remained current only in East Silesia (Nowak, 1995: 5). The conflict allowed Czech national activists to canvass for their goals in traditionally Polish-speaking areas of East Silesia and at the beginning of the 20th century Polish nationalists successfully retaliated. The curious situation which developed in the span of 40 years before the outbreak of the Great War seemed quite unnatural to many inhabitants with prenational complementary identities who in their differences felt to be united by attachment to their crownland and by the figure of the monarch. They called themselves Austrian Silesians or simply Austrians, and in the situation of escalating national conflict at the beginning of the 20th century they felt to be beleaguered by baffling nationalisms. They opposed the coming change through reinforcing the Silesian ethnic movement inside which they hoped to be able to conduct their prenational way of life as well as to be able to access Germandom in search of economic and social success. The movement attracted many Polish-speakers along with German-speakers and bilingual persons. Polish nationalists perceived it as pro-German and a danger of deeper splintering of the Polish national movement so they decried the adherents of the Silesian movement to be worse than Czechs or Germans (Nowak, 1995: 32). Similar conditions contributed to the revival of the Moravian ethnic movement among the Czech-speaking population in the north-east of West Silesia and across the border in the south of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county. The division of West Silesia between Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as handing over the region of Hultschin (Hlučín) to the latter state, did not solve the interlocked Polish-German-Czech national conflict but contributed to liquidating the two ethnic movements. Majority of the sympathizers of the Silesian one found themselves in Poland where they became Polonized/Germanized and the Moravians hailed as staunchly Czech surprised everybody by gradually turning to Germandom.

The above synopsis of the subject matter of this chapter traces the pattern of the spread of the ideology of nationalism in Silesia and its effect on the region and its inhabitants. The issue is looked into in more detail further on because it is impossible to understand why nationalism became a social, political and economic force in Silesia after 1918 without having observed unfolding of national academic
movements in Silesia in the period 1871-1918 as contextualized against the growing significance of nationalism in Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The year 1871 marked the success of the Kleindeutsch strain of German nationalism. The German Empire modelled on the North German Confederation took a similar form of a confederation of states which included 25 federal states, 4 kingdoms and 6 grand duchies. However, the Kingdom of Prussia dominated this structure through its sheer share in the area and population of the empire which amounted to 65% and 62%, respectively. The Prussian hegemony was sealed in the person of Wilhelm I who simultaneously acted as the German Emperor, King of Prussia and Supreme Commander, and the fact was symbolically reflected in the German imperial black, white and red tricolor which simply took over the colors of the Prussian flag (black and white/silver) and the Prussian royal standard (black, silver and red); the only difference showed in the imperial standard for which the additional golden color was used (Anon., 1889:334/335). The German Empire though similar in structure differed from the Northern German Confederation in this fact that Wilhelm I exercised a tight control over the new state. He was solely responsible for convoking the Federal Council (upper chamber) and the Reichstag (lower chamber). The latter he could dissolve. Besides he had the exclusive right to nominate the chancellor and to command the armed forces. With such wide-ranging prerogatives and the unwavering support of Chancellor Bismarck bent on transforming the collection of German states and statelets into the German nation-state, the emperor could wholeheartedly embrace this process judging from the national euphoria that majority of his subjects did perceive the goals of German nationalism as their own (Kinder, 1978: II 76/77).

The construction of the German nation-state entailed through and through homogenization of all the aspects of state and national life. Standardization of variegated legal and economic systems posed the most daunting challenge. Various legal and economic practices prevailed in the constituent entities of the empire, and stark differences in privilege existed even within the territories of the entities. Without successful homogenization in these spheres Germany could not even dream of competing with the leading powers of those times. The task was largely completed in 1871-1900 (Kinder, 1978: II 77). The ready-made framework of the nation-state was filled in by dynamic investment and trade which accelerated industrialization which was not deterred by the world-wide economic crisis of 1873 but, paradoxically, fostered. Urbanization and improvement of health-care and sanitary standards accompanying technological development resulted in significant population surplus when ex-peasants brought their traditional procreation patterns to cities where it was not curbed by high children mortality rate as it had happened in the countryside. In the 1870s 600,000 German citizens emigrated overseas and 1.2 mln in the 1880s. A quantum leap occurred in the 1890s when the German industry became fully capable of absorbing the excess population so they rather left for the Ruhr than the Americas, and there was still much place left for immigrant workers in the soaring, labor-hungry economy (Turner, 1992: 113/114). In terms of production Germany ranked third behind the US and the UK in 1871 but in 1913 it followed the US as second, also in terms of GNP (Czapiński, 1990: 541; Kennedy, 1989: 243). Germany’s population soared from 41 mln in 1871 to 67 mln in 1914 (Turner, 1992: 111/112) and in Europe was second only to Russia’s. The numerical difference was easily offset by far higher levels of education, social provision and per capita income. It is suitably illustrated by statistics on literacy: in 1913 330 out of 1,000 recruits entering Italy’s army were illiterate, the corresponding ratios were 220/1,000 in Austria-Hungary, 68/1,000 in France, and an astonishing 1/1,000 in Germany. The beneficiaries were not only the Prussian army, but also the economy requiring skilled workforce. The German educational system

390 One can describe the imperial chancellor as the veritable right hand of the emperor, as he usually was the Prussian prime minister, chairman of the Federal Council, and superior of the secretaries of state and the imperial bureaucracy (Kinder, 1978: II 77).
391 In 1913 Germany’s share of world manufacturing topped 14.8%. Britain lagged behind with 13.6% whereas France became negligible with its two and a half smaller production (6.1%) (Kennedy, 1989: 211).
392 However, Britain with the per capita income of $244 surpassed Germany with its $153, and the GNPs of both the states were comparable with Germany’s of $12 bln and Britain’s of $11 bln (Kennedy, 1989: 243).
produced them in abundance. The ever increasing level of education among the populace allowed application of the fruits of the knowledge to agriculture and industry. Use of chemical fertilizers and large-scale modernization increased crop yield which was much higher than in any of the other European and world powers. Germany’s coal output grew from 89 mln tons in 1890 to 277 mln tons in 1914, just behind Britain’s 292 mln and far ahead of Austria-Hungary’s 47 mln, France’s 40 mln or Russia’s 36 mln. In steel, the increase had been even more spectacular, and the 1914 German production of 17.6 mln tons was larger than that of Britain, France and Russia combined. Germany also excelled in the newer, 20th-century industries of electrics, optics and chemicals, and with its foreign-trade figures tripling between 1890-1913, brought Germany close to Britain as the leading world exporter (Kennedy, 1989: 210/211).

Unlike Austria-Hungary or Russia, imperial Germany did not contain numerous ethnic/national minorities, which amounted only to 3.7 mln (7% of the total population) in 1900, out of which 3 mln were constituted by Pole/Polish-speakers (Czapliński, 1990: 570). A more significant cleavage was posed by religion: in 1914 Germany’s population was composed from Protestants (63%), Catholics (36%) and Jews (1%) (Turner, 1992: 111/112). Bismarck wanted to diminish or do away with it because this discrepancy rendered it difficult to build a unified German nation. Moreover, universalism of ultramontane Catholicism still played in the hands of the Habsburgs sustaining their weakening influence in southern Germany and Upper Silesia inhabited by Catholics. On the other hand, some intellectuals and politicians were still ready to cooperate with the Catholic Church hoping for extending Kleindeutschland into Großdeutschland. The Protestant Church, on the contrary, had traditionally perceived Prussia and the Hohenzollerns as its protectors in the German states, and, consequently, without much demure it accepted its role within the framework of Kleindeutsch nationalism. Protestantism nicely fit and simultaneously reinforced the ideological pattern of homogenization unlike Catholicism. The latter presented a danger to unified Germany and the German nation-in-construction, because the Protestant and especially Catholic Churches organized popular education at the primary and secondary levels as well as controlled curricula. Ideological tenets furthered by Protestant schools usually went in line with the general goals of German nationalism but universalism (ultramontanism) propagated by Catholic schools the authorities perceived as possibly subversive of the ideal of the German nation-state. With its ecclesiastical administrative divisions which not always coincided with the existing state borders and were centered on the Vatican, the Catholic Church also competed with the nation-state in the field of administration, where it was responsible for controlling the institution of marriage and for registering births and deaths in Catholic areas. Because the educational system and administration are the cornerstone institutions (besides the conscript army and mass media) through which national ideals are instilled in society and homogenization is carried out, the leverage of the Catholic Church over some aspects of them had to be eliminated in order to consolidate the newly established German nation-state (Kinder, 1978: II 77; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 305).

Recognizing the Catholic Church as the very obstacle to nation and nation-state building, in 1871 Bismarck embarked on the policy of the Kulturkampf\(^\text{393}\) in Prussia. It was also pursed elsewhere in Germany and in somewhat more tame forms in other European states. The protracted struggle to limit the social and political influence of the Catholic Church continued in Germany well into the mid-1880s when it was terminated in an uneasy consensus facilitated by the conciliatory attitude of the Pope Leon XIII (1878-1903). In the course of the strife the state wrenched control over the educational system away from the Catholic Church, imposed German as the sole medium of instruction at schools, introduced the institution of the civil marriage and strove to subordinate clergy

\(^{393}\) The origin of the term Kulturkampf (war of cultures) is probably linked to the 1873 ordinance which obligated all Catholic seminary graduates to pass the Kulturexamen (examination in the German language, culture and history) before they would be allowed to serve as priests on the territory of Germany (Czapliński, 1990: 549). The spark which triggered off the Kulturkampf was the dogma of papal infallibility which was declared by the Vatican Council in 1870 (Kinder, 1978: II 77).
and the Church hierarchy to the state administration. But instead of full success, the restrictive measures brought about the creation of the Catholic Zentrum party (1871) which transposed the confessional cleavage from society at large into the political life. The party reigned supreme in Catholic areas and engaged itself in protection of the use of minority languages in church and religious instruction in line with Catholic universalism (Bokenkotter, 1977: 308; Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 299/300; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 329; Pater, 1993: 8/9). Not being able to make the Catholic Church docile, Bismarck had to accept impossibility of swift liquidation of the confessional cleavage and to strike a compromise so that the stalemate would not hinder development of the nation-state. This process was facilitated by the increasing division between the state and the Catholic Church in Austria-Hungary, which the termination of the concordat in 1868 had started (Kinder, 1978: II 79). Consequently, in the 1880s ultramontanism was just a shadow of its old self whereas the old rival of Prussia the Habsburg empire, having overcome the short-lasting anti-Prussian sentiment of 1866, had ever grown closer and more subordinate to Germany since the establishment of the League of the Three Emperors (of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia) in 1872 (Kinder, 1978: II 83).

Thus politically it was safe for Bismarck to cooperate with the Church especially in the face of a danger posed to the conservative order by the socialist movement which had emerged with industrialization in the 1860s/1870s. The unfavorable attitude of the Catholic Church and Bismarck to this ideology facilitated passing the antisocialist act which barred socialist deputies from the Reichstag and land diets in 1878-1890 (Czapliński, 1990: 568). Georg Kopp (1837-1914) was for Bismarck a suitable partner on the part of Catholic Church to cooperate on a consensus between the Church and the state. In 1881 he was the first bishop appointed since 1872. In this manner he symbolically commenced gradual termination of the Kulturkampf in which he was assisted by the fact that he controlled the heart of German Catholicism the Fulda diocese 394, and that Wilhelm II (reigned 1888-1918) perceived him as one of the few German bishops comprehending Germany’s raison d’etat. Bismarck immediately noticed that directly via Kopp he could achieve a compromise with the Vatican without having to enter an agreement with the Zentrum. So in 1884 Kopp became a member of the Preußischen Staatsrat (Prussian Council of State) and of the Preußischen Herrenhaus (higher chamber of the Prussian diet) in 1886. Next year he was appointed the bishop of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese. As the largest in Europe and second largest in the world the significance of the diocese was heightened by the fact that the imperialPrussian capital of Berlin was located on its territory. Being the bishop of the two most important German dioceses, the chairman of the Fulda Conference (since 1887) and an active pro-state politician, he easily moved in the interface between the state and the Catholic Church and strongly contributed to passing the 1886-1887 acts which abolished the Kulturkampf. His stance contributed to lessening the political clout of the Zentrum so that the party’s leader Ludwig Windthorst (1812-1891) reviled him as Staatsbischof (state bishop) and earned him a warning from the Vatican that this Catholic party should not be weakened. In recognition of his merits, the pope nominated him as cardinal in 1893 (Galos, 1992: 55; Neubach, 1995: 185; Pater, 1996: 188/189, Scheuermann, 1994: 832/833).

Because the policy of the Kulturkampf and the antisocialist legislation alienated Germany’s Catholics and industrial workers 395 Bismarck won their loyalty, in the 1880s, with phasing out of the Kulturkampf and passing the most progressive social security legislation of the world, which

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394 At Fulda the so-called Fulda Conference of the German bishops assemble. Following the creation of the German Empire in 1871, it was established as a permanent organ the very next year. The chairman of the conference (usually the oldest one of the German bishops) presides over the German Catholic Church not unlike the primate in the Polish Catholic Church (Anon., 1989a: 779/780; Pater, 1996: 189).

395 Often Catholics were also workers as in the case of the industrial region of eastern Upper Silesia. But socialist believers did not take any strong root in the populace prior to 1900 due to the joint counteraction of the state, the Catholic Church and the Zentrum (Schofer, 1974: 156; Wanatowicz, 1992: 65).
gradually covered agricultural laborers and artisans \(^{396}\) (Czapliński, 1990: 569; Kinder, 1978: II 77). Prior to 1914 the social conditions of German workers \textit{vis-a-vis} their European counterparts were succinctly summarized by the French statesman Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929): \textit{Ce sont des bourgeois} (In Conrads, 1995: 8). So Bismarck and his successors managed to attract many proletariat supporters away from socialism providing them with these solutions to social ailments caused by industrialization which had been promised to them by the socialist movement. The potential electorate of socialist and social-democratic parties was diminished and the antisocialist legislation could be revoked in 1890. In 1891 Leon XIII issued the bull \textit{Rerum novarum} in which he stated that clergy should mediate between workers and employers (Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 85). This newly-formulated opinion allowed the Church to start Catholic worker organizations and facilitated activities of Kopp in this field, who since the latter half of the 1880s had engaged in establishing such societies (Pater, 1996: 190). In this way, the Church strove to curb the influence of socialist and social democratic ideas (which the Catholic hierarchy and thinkers perceived as godless) among the proletariat. Subsequently, the sphere of similar interests and cooperation between the state, the Church and the \textit{Zentrum} grew contributing to consolidation of the nation-state.

The social reforms and steady absolute growth of income per capita placated majority of the German population and accelerated nation building, but the language policy aiming at fortifying the official status of German (\textit{the} pivotal element of Germandom) at the cost of limiting the use of other languages dramatically misfired especially in the province of Posen (Poznań) where Polish nationalism enjoyed a growing organizational network and perfected ideological framework in conjunction with akin movements in Galicia and Congress Poland. Polish nationalism reformulated along ethnic lines started looking at Upper Silesia as a possible part of the would-be Polish state (Mroczko, 1994: 82). In turn, the Catholic Polish/Slavic-speakers of Upper Silesia who during the \textit{Kulturkampf} painfully experienced their otherness \textit{vis-a-vis} the German nation-state centered on the German language and culture, and on Protestantism started perceiving the state with a degree of distrust and got even more tightly linked with the Catholic Church as the guarantor of their prenational identity and traditional way of life. Their assessment of the situation was summed up in the fresh stereotype: the German is rich and Protestant, and the Pole poor and Catholic (Neubach, 1995: 200). It was a ready-made pattern waiting to be filled in with nationalist sentiment. In popular thinking the average German started perceiving the Polish/Slavic-speaking Upper Silesians simply as Poles, maybe a little different from those in Posen (Poznań), but decisively distinct from himself. The feeling of otherness also spread among the Upper Silesians concerned, but still did not translate into their identification with Polishdom. The improved standard of living made them into loyal German citizens, and being usually simple people it was unthinkable for them to engage for the cause of a non-existent state. However, Polish activists tried to channel their discontent into gradual acceptance of the ideology of Polish nationalism and accordingly started transferring some basic of Polish organizational life from Posen (Poznań) to Upper Silesia. In the 1880s and 1890s this phenomenon was coupled with the strengthening of the political position of non-German ethnic groups/nations within the political, economic and social framework of Cisleithania\(^{397}\) (Ehrich, 1992: 529) and with \textit{Landflucht} and \textit{Ostflucht} demographic tendencies caused by industrialization. The former term denotes the flight from land which is the usual phenomenon when developing industries lure excess rural population to cities with the offer of improved standard of living and employment. In turn a reinforcing feedback comes into being because, next, increasingly less people can earn a living in the countryside where agricultural revolution (another effect of industrialization) makes farming less labor-intensive and causes the prices of agricultural product to drop or stagnate. In order to profit under such conditions, the farmer has to have large capital at his disposal to pay for fertilizers and

\(^{396}\) Of the most significant breakthroughs in social legislation, one should enumerate: sickness insurance (1883), accident insurance (1884), health and pension scheme for all state employees (1888), and old age and disablement insurance (1889) (Czapliński, 1990: 569; Davies, 1996: 630; Kinder, 1978: II 77).

\(^{397}\) The Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy. The Hungarian section was known as Transleithania. Both the names are derived from the name of the border Leitha river which still separates Lower Austria from Hungary.
harvesters as well as considerable amount of land to provide him with suitable revenue. Consequently eastern Germany (i.e. larger part of Prussia) which was the most agricultural, was relatively denuded of rustic population who usually went to industrialized western Germany. This westward demographic shift was made known under the name of Ostflucht (flight from the East). It is estimated that negative balance of emigrants east of the Oder-Neisse line amounted to 1.82 mln 4 mln in 1840-1910 (Brozek, 1966: 28) and to 610,121 in 1885-1890 only (Jonca, 1958: 139). Actually in 1871-1918 the industrial counties of Upper Silesia were the only region east of Berlin with surplus of immigrants over emigrants (Schofer, 1974: 20).

The emergence and strengthening of non-German ethnic/national movements in Germany and Austria-Hungary disagreed with the basic goals of Kleindeutsch and Großdeutsch nationalism. Landflucht added to this ideological frustration because it dealt a blow to the national mythology which linked the German nation and state with their roots which were imagined to be placed in the custom and tradition of the simple and hard-working rural Volk. Ostflucht immediately illustrated the Polish/Slavic danger with the instrument of statistics: in some east German rural areas percentage of Pole/Polish-speakers went a little up in relation to the corresponding percentage of Germans. But all in all the percentage of Germans in cities and towns grew steadily and their growth rate slower in comparison to western and central Germany was duly reflected by a similar tendency among the Polish/Polish-speaking population who also participated in Ostflucht (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 39, 52; Weber, 1913: 28). None the less the above-sketched phenomena contributed to spawning German and Pangerman nationalist organizations which deemed the process of nation-state building and the position of Germandom in Central Europe imperiled.

Pangermanism (Pangermanismus, Alldeutschtum) had its roots in the desire of German unification stimulated by the War of Liberation (1813-1815). Its early proponents such as Friedrich Ludwig Jahn and Ernst Moritz Arndt championed the Großdeutsch solution. Others also wished to include the Scandinavians. Lastly, writers such as Friedrich List, Paul Anton Lagarde, and Konstantin Franz argued for German hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe to ensure European peace. At the ideological plane they were assisted by the notion of the superiority of the Aryan race proposed by Joseph-Arthur, comte de Gobineau in his Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (Essay on the Inequality of Human Races) (1853-1855). The Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain espoused the tenets of scientific racism and propagated the racial struggle in his writings which the stronger influenced Pangermanism because he married Richard Wagner’s daughter and wrote in German. On this basis, in 1891, the loosely organized Allgemeiner Deutscher Verband (General German League) came into being. In 1894 Ernst Haase, a Leipzig professor and, significantly, a member of the Reichstag turned it into a the influential Alldeutscher Verband (Pangerman League). Its purpose was to heighten German national consciousness, especially among German-speakers outside Germany. In his three-volume work Deutsche Politik (German Politics) (1905-1907) Haase called for German expansion in Europe. His ideas prepared the ground for the

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398 This assumed natural link of nation with its land got firmly anchored in Central European nationalist mythologies as it is attested by the German example of Blut und Boden (blood and soil). The notion symbolized the inalienable unity of the German nation (and, later, race) with the German state and gave an ideological ground for the German act on hereditary mansions passed on September 29, 1933, shortly after Hitler’s rise to power (Kopaliński, 1991: 539).

399 The forerunners of his thought on races and their inequalities were the Göttingen professor Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840), the French baron G.L. Cuvier (1769-1852) and the French scholar Victor Courtet (1813-1867) who developed the notion of the Caucasian race (Davies, 1996: 734).

400 His ideas on race were influenced by the concept of the Aryan race first uttered in 1848 by a German professor in Oxford, Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900) (Davies, 1996: 817; Thorne, 1975: 921).

401 Popularly, his music and operas are perceived as essence of Germanness.

402 Rabidly anti-English he was naturalized as a German citizen in 1916 (Thorne, 1975: 251).
notorious concept of *Lebensraum*\(^{403}\) (space required by a nation for life and growth) which would become the core of Hitler’s national socialist ideology (Anon., 1992: 103; Kinder, 1978: II 65; Thorne, 1975: 251). In Austria-Hungary Georg von Schönerer (1842-1921) and Karl Hermann Wolf unleashed the away-from-Rome movement in 1897\(^{404}\). They attacked Jews and Slavs, and appealed for closer links of the Germans of Austria with Germany which contributed to gradual forging of the concept of Sudetenland\(^{405}\) which was to become prominent in 1918 and during World War II (Anon., 1992: 103; Kinder, 1978: II 79; Prinz, 1995: 354, 358).

The rise of Pangerman organizations was seconded by establishment of German nationalist organizations in Germany. They purported to support endangered Germans especially in the Polish-speaking areas of the Province of Posen (Poznań) and West Prussia because the state could not too easily act in this capacity without breaching the rule of law. The first inklings of this process were visible in the formation of the *Gesellschaft für Verbreitung von Volksbildung und Volksspielgruppen* (Society for Spreading Folk Education and Supporting Folk Amateur Theater Groups) (1871) which mainly supported development of small folk libraries; and of the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein* (General German School Association) (1881) which aimed at bolstering the network of German schools. The activities of the former organization, for instance, led to establishing the *Verband oberb CURSISCHER Volksbüchereien* (Union of Upper Silesian Libraries)\(^{406}\) (1903) to counteract the influence of the Posen (Poznań) *Towarzystwo Czytelni Ludowych* (Society of Popular Reading Rooms) which had been active in Upper Silesia since the 1880s (Mroczko, 1994: 27); whereas the latter one was transformed, in 1908, into the *Verein für des Deutschtum in Ausland* (Association for Germandom Abroad) in order to strengthen the position of German-speakers outside Germany, especially in Austria-Hungary and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus it evolved from a German into Pangerman organization which survives to this day (Czubiński, 1991: 106; Lüer, 1995: 82). Apart from societies of gymasts, singers, riflemen, voluntary firemen and students (whose development is described in the previous chapter), mass mobilization for goals of German nationalism was achieved mainly by societies of war veterans. The first German organization of this kind sprang up in Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency (1839)\(^{407}\). Renewed interests in such organizations was awakened by the Prussian wars of 1864 and 1866, and the decisive boost to the mass movement of veteran organizations was given by the Prusso-French War of 1870/1871. The *Deutsche Kriegerbund* (German Union of War Veterans) was established in 1872. On the eve of transformation into the more comprehensive and tightly organized *Deutsche Reichs-Kriegerverband* (Imperial German Union of War Veterans) in 1884, there were 157,721 members of the *Deutscher Kriegerbund*, and 75,431

\(^{403}\) The idea and its ramifications were presented in the interwar period by Hans Grimm in his *Volk ohne Raum* (The Nation without Space) (1926) and Ewald Banse in *Raum und Volk im Weltkriege* (Space and Nation in the World War) (1932).

\(^{404}\) Among others, its antecedent may be found in the activities of the *Evangelische Bund* (evangelic (Protestant) Union) which came into being in Silesia (1886) in reply to the end of the *Kulturkampf*, which the organization interpreted as a dangerous increase of Rome’s (i.e. ultramontane) influence in Silesia and Germany (Neubach, 1995: 185).

\(^{405}\) The term Sudetenland (*Czech* Sudety) was used for the outlying usually mountainous regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia which were inhabited predominantly by German-speakers. First, it gained political currency when in the wake of the break-up of Austria-Hungary (1918) the German-speakers strove to establish their own state which would not be included in the forming Czechoslovakia (Prinz, 1995: 381). Thus the four provinces of Sudetenland (West Silesia), Deutsch-Böhmen (north and west Bohemia), Böhmerwaldgau (south Bohemia) and Deutsch-südmähren (south Moravia) came into being, and subsequently were suppressed by the Czechoslovak troops by 1919 (Honzák, 1995: 477). Sudetenland was reestablished during World War II. The first two aforementioned provinces were transformed into Sudetenland-Gau, whereas the third one was divided between Bayerische Ostmark and Oberdonau (previously Upper Austria), and the fourth one was incorporated into Niederdonau (previously Lower Austria) (Hemmerle, 1992: 433; Jähnig, 1991: 151; Wagner, 1991: 257).

\(^{406}\) The union comprised c. 70 German libraries (Lüer, 1995: 82).

\(^{407}\) Anyway it was predated by a similar organization in the Habsburg Monarchy which came into being in Bohemia in 1821 (Anon., 1888) 210).
members of Prussia’s other war veteran organizations. It is estimated that together with other war veteran organizations (especially from Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg) which stayed away from the Deutsche Reichs-Kriegerverband, the count of German veterans active in their various organizations, was close to 500,000 (Anon., 1888: 209/210). The war veteran organizations were the natural recruitment pool for German nationalist organizations and activities. Moreover, in 1897 the Deutsche Reichs-Kriegerverband adopted a clearly nationalist slogan: Ein Reich, ein Volk, ein Gott (One empire, one people, one God) and soon Emperor Wilhelm II (1888-1918) extended his patronage to the union lending it his imperial prestige. The Deutsche Reichs-Kriegerverband’s membership could not be rivaled by any other organization’s, and, in 1903, amounted to 55,784 members in 466 branches in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency alone well surpassing membership of all the Polish/Polish-language societies in Upper Silesia.\footnote{It is estimated that in 1989 64 Polish organizations of Upper Silesia comprised 13,622 members and in 1914 the number of the societies rose to 464, and their members to 46,000 (Figowa, 1966: 15).}

Although the German state could not do much against its Polish-speaking citizens without violating its own legislation too blatantly, it was in the position to discriminate against foreigners who had not acquired German citizenship and did not possess residence permits. Such an approach allowed to make a more homogenous nation-state out of Germany (Schofer, 1974: 23). In result, the 1885/1886 expulsion of alien Poles/Polish-speakers and Jews from Congress Poland and Galicia contributed to sealing off the German-Austrian-Hungarian border which had not been patrolled still in the 1870s, and to regulating immigration and customs procedure into the form which is currently accepted in Europe. The action, which caused the removal of only 26,000 illegal immigrants\footnote{During the years 1885-1887 5,239 Poles/Polish-speakers and Jews were expelled from Upper Silesia (Lis, 1993: 93).}, also expressed the will of the German authorities to bolster the position of Germandom east of Berlin and, thus, indicated that the government accepted the nationalist view that the phenomena of Landflucht and Ostflucht may be somehow dangerous to the German nation (Mroczko, 1994: 30; Rogall, 1993: 70). The Catholic Church did not condemn this event which was essentially against the principle of universalism, because it did not want to imperil its shaky modus vivendi with the state which was then finalized with the passing of acts were to terminate the Kulturkampf. However, it infuriated Polish nationalists who made the expulsions into one of the very symbols of their national struggle against the Germans under the name of rugii. This singular event did not repeat later on, and besides involving Poles/Polish-speakers it also forced Jews to leave Germany, which was overlooked by Polish nationalists in order to strengthen efficiency of this symbol for the Polish national movement. In a way, their attitude may be justified by what followed. In 1887 a total ban on teaching Polish was imposed (Wiskemann, 1956: 11) and a year earlier the Königlich Preußische Ansiedlungskommission (Royal Prussian Settlement Commission) with the seat at Posen (Poznań) had been established on the basis of the act on promoting German settlement in the provinces of West Prussia and Posen (Poznań). In the period 1886-1914 the commission spent 480 mln marks\footnote{The sum translates into c. DM 5 bln of 1990 (Rogall, 1993: 74).} on purchasing 461,000 ha of land. Albeit it was to buy Polish farms in order to bolster the German element, ironically it obtained 334,000 ha from German hands, and only 127,000 ha from Polish ones. This land was used for establishing 300 villages (i.e. 10% of the initially foreseen number) and settling 154,000 persons. But this effort did not manage to alter the declining percentage of Germans in the Posen (Poznań) population as 115,000 of the settlers came from the very province and 23,000 (15%) were constituted by Polish settlers\footnote{Other settlers arrived from Westphalia, Saxony and Pomerania. Since 1904 also ethnic Germans who had to leave Galicia, Congress Poland and Volhynia on national or economic grounds, started arriving (Rogall, 1993: 76).} (Rogall, 1993: 75/76; Zakrzewski, 1988: 45).
Chapter five

From the 1880s the national conflict between Posen (Poznań) and West Prussian Poles/Polish-speakers and German, started by the Kulturkampf and restrictive language laws, magnified by the 1885/1886 expulsions, and the land and settling policy, was also transferred into the broader sphere of economy. Since the 1880s numerous saving banks, cooperatives, shops and the like were divided along the national line drawing capital and customers usually from their own national groups. The cleavage was sharpened by artisan, agricultural, shop owner associations which also chose to cater for memberships differentiated on the national basis (Rogall, 1993: 74). The situation was dubbed as Wirtschaftskampf (economic war) and must have fanned insecurity among the Germans, especially those living in the province of Posen (Poznań). Therefore it is not surprising that the Verein für Förderung des Deutschtums in den Ostmarken (Society for Advancement of German in the Eastern Marches) came into being at Posen (Poznań) in 1894 (Tims, 1966: 29). It was a grass roots answer to the falling percentage of German inhabitants in the province of Posen (Poznań) and to Chancellor Leo von Caprivi’s (1890-1894) relaxed policies toward Poles and the issue of teaching Polish (Rogall, 1993: 71; Wiskemann, 1956: 11). Its name was shortened to the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein (Society of German Marches) in 1899, and it was popularly known to Poles as Hakatá due to its distinctive logo combining H, K and T (which appeared on its press organ Die Ostmark) the initials of its founders: Heinrich Tiedemann, Ferdinand Hansemann and Hermann Kennemann (Rogall, 1993: 72/73). The society aimed at providing economic aid to Germans living in east Germany and fortifying German national consciousness (Snoch, 1991: 45). In 1912, in the province of Posen (Poznań) it grouped 12,000 civil servants, teachers, doctors, jurists and middle class artisans i.e. intelligents who were responsible for spreading the nationalist ideology in Central Europe in the second half of the 19th century (Rogall, 1993: 72). The first branches of the Deutsche Ostmarkenverein sprang up in Silesia on the initiative of some local industrialists in 1895/1896. The Schlesischer Landesauschuss des Deutscher Ostmarkenverein (Silesian Regional Committee of the society) was established in 1903 with the seat at Breslau (Wroclaw). Albeit its membership rose steadily from 7,500 in 1905 to 11,850 in 1913, the organization devoted only a very small part of its activities to Upper Silesia despite the fact that the Oppeln (Opole) Regency contained a third of all the Polish-speaking population in Prussia, or more than a million out of three and a half million, making it the most densely inhabited Polish-speaking center of the German Empire. Moreover, the provincial authorities remained aloof to the Deutsche Ostmarkenverein since any overt support would be acknowledgement of the existence of some Polish problem in Silesia, and it was to be avoided because as it had been exemplified by the 1880 Austrian-Hungarian census any official recognition of ethnic/national difference instead of containing it, led to creation of ethnic/national movements disruptive towards the state and the privileged position of the dominant ethnic/national group (Snoch, 1991: 45; Tims, 1966: 287/288). The society inspired the expropriation act of 1908 which was applied just in 4 cases involving 1,655 ha of land belonging to Polish owners, to popular outcry which brought about official condemnation and suspension of the practice in 1913. The Zentrum which organized its branch at Posen (Poznań) in 1908 did not manage to curb the swelling national conflict on the basis Catholicism and universalism unlike in Upper Silesia. Perceived by Poles as an instrument of Germanization, and by German nationalists as a clandestine supporter of Polishdom it did not have even support enough to launch its provincial press organ. However, due to the outbreak of the Great War the national conflict abated. The German government wanted to secure loyalty of Poles for its struggle against Russia whereas the latter hoped Germany would allow for a Polish state after the tsar had been defeated (Rogall, 1993: 71; Snoch, 1991: 45; Wiskemann, 1956: 14).

The head-on collision between German and Polish nationalisms in east Germany allowed both the movements to forge improved and indispensably opposed versions of their ideologies pegged on the cleavage which quite violently had swung open between the nationalisms in the 1880s. Besides, the young nation-state and its equally new nation craved for symbols which would make their ancient

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412 The province’s population comprised 40% Germans in 1871 but 38% in 1910. Their share in its urban population remained at 50% though started diminishing especially in smaller towns at the beginning of the 20th century (Rogall, 1993: 71).
glory known to foreigners and themselves. In 1875 the Arminius monument (*Hermannsdenkmal*), commemorating the battle of the Teutoburg Forest between Teutons and Romans, was erected. The *Niederwald* monument at Rüdesheim on the banks of the Rhine was consecrated in the presence of all the German princes in 1883, and the *Kyllhäuser* monument in Thuringia finished in 1897. Not unusually did war veteran associations bear a major part of the cost of the latter edifice, as they had done previously for the *Niederwald* monument with its colossal statue of Germania. Money for the monument to the Battle of the Nations at Leipzig in 1813 which sealed Napoleon’s fate, erected between 1898 and 1913, was raised by a specially created League of German patriots, whose membership soared to thousands (Alter, 1994: 46). The Centenary of the War of Liberation when the ideology of German nationalism was clearly formulated for the first time, was most lavishly celebrated at Breslau (Wroclaw) where Friedrich Wilhelm III had commenced the warfare with his appeal *Aufruf an Mein Volk* (To My People). The imperial court was transferred from Berlin to the Silesian capital on this occasion, and numerous exhibitions as well as thousands of visitors and revellers were conveniently accommodated by the massive modernist *Jahrhunderthalle* (Centennial Hall) with its dome which was the largest in the world at that time (Klemmer, 1993; Scheuermann, 1994: 666/667). Not only were historical events inlaid in the national German past-in-construction but also the figure of the hailed creator of the German empire, Bismarck lent itself to nationalist mythologization. Larger than life the chancellor was the very icon of the success of Germany’s nation and nation-state building. With the Germans reintegrated after the termination of the *Kulturkampf* by gradual introduction of progressive social legislation and the soaring economic strength of their state, his 70th birthday was celebrated as a great national event in 1885. Unfortunately, it coincided with the 1885/1886 expulsion of alien Polish-speakers and Jews which must have made the difference between Polish and German nationalisms even more pronounced in the two completely different perceptions of the year. After the short reign of Friedrich III (reigned 1888) dubbed as the hope of liberals, his young son Wilhelm II (reigned 1888-1918) ascended the imperial throne. The emperor resented Bismarck’s independent and masterful ways, and the chancellor felt driven to resign in 1890 when Wilhelm II decide to introduce personal régime. Despite a formal reconciliation in 1894 Bismarck became a continued critic of the emperor and the successive chancellors. It could not prevent another national celebration of his birthday in 1895 though somehow marred by the *Reichstag* which refused to present an address of congratulation (Anon., 1908: 188; Kinder, 1978: II 77). The death of Bismarck in 1898 sparked yet another wave of national feeling which culminated in the construction of Bismarck towers through grass roots initiative of national, cultural and economic organizations as well as with support of communal administration. An exemplar of such a tower still survives in Scheersberg near Quern, Schleswig-Holstein, and importantly, another one was constructed in Upper Silesia in 1907 (or in 1903?) in Slupna (Slupna, today a district of Myslowice (Mysłowitz)), close to the symbolic *Dreikaiserreichsecke* (corner of the three empires of Russia, German and Austria-Hungary, where their borders converged from 1846 to 1918). It is said that on Sundays the over 20-meter high tower was frequented by German families to show their children *polnische Wirtschaft* visible across the border in Galicia and Congress Poland, in order to make the youngsters realize how happy they were

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413 A colonnaded pedestal supporting a gigantic statue in beaten copper nearly 30 m in height took nearly 40 years to build. It represents the Germanic chieftain Hermann (Arminius) who annihilated the invading Roman legions in AD 9 (Davies, 1996: 827).

414 It was unveiled in 1883 and commemorates the national war of 1870/1871 (Anon: 1889d: 163).

415 The equestrian statue of Emperor Wilhelm I (Davies, 1996: 827).

416 The hall survived both the world wars and, today, exorcised from its previously deeply-felt German provenance by the name of *Hala Ludowa* (People’s Hall - the Polish name is obviously a survivor of the times of the People’s Polish Republic, 1947-1989), it serves similar needs of the Polish inhabitants of Wroclaw (Breslau).
to have been born in united Germany a deft method of instilling national consciousness and prejudice in new generations. (Dziadul, 1996: 4; Pierzchala, 1997: 49; Reichling, 1977: 325).

To wrap up the ponderings on development of German nationalism in the process of the post-1871 nation-state building, the effects of the ideology on European and international relations must be outlined. In 1872, shortly after the establishment of the German Empire, Bismarck constructed the League of the Three Emperors of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia to prevent France’s wish for revenge. This alliance was strained by the Russo-Austrian rivalry in the Balkans during which Germany stood fast by Austria-Hungary which resulted in the ever closer links between the two states. It was formally sealed in the Dual Alliance of 1879. After conciliatory moves Russia joined in the renewed League of the Three Emperors in 1881. Next year the Dual Alliance was extended with Italy into the Triple Alliance though tensions between the newcomer and Austria-Hungary remained. In the 1880s the Austria-Russian struggle for influence in the Balkans flared up again and did not abate until 1887 when Germany concluded the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. The alliance system which allowed Bismarck to keep France isolated was shattered after the dismissal of the chancellor in 1890. The pattern of the old balance of power was decisively overhauled in 1894 when Russia concluded the Dual Alliance with France after Germany had not renewed the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 decided to broaden its and Austria-Hungary’s sphere of influence in the Balkans at the cost of the Tsar (Kinder, 1978: II 83; Turner, 1992: 114/115). The ground for this change had been prepared by the unwavering policy of bolstering the armed forces and successes of industrialization. Despite Bismarck’s insistence that Germany was a saturated power the grass roots pressure mounted to emulate imperial expansion of other powers. In 1882 Germany’s Colonial League came into being and the inventor of German imperialism Carl Peters (1856-1918) established the Society for German Colonization in 1884. Bismarck reluctantly had to recognize this trend. The imperial capital housed the Berlin conference (1884/1885) at which the powers carved up Africa, and Germany joined in the race to build overseas empires. During the very same years Germany established its colonies in South-West Africa, Cameroon, Togo, East Africa and in the South Pacific. The effort, however, was disproportionately bigger than gains especially due to the fact that the total area of the possessions was six times bigger than that of Germany while their population was six times smaller than of their mother country (Kennedy, 1989: 211; Kinder, 1978: II 77, 108/109; Sabin, 1990: 212).

Germany extended its colonial possessions in the South Pacific and its sphere of influence in China throughout the 1890s, and on the basis of the regulatory framework set up by the Berlin Conference (1884/1885), it concluded a series of treaties with Britain (1890), the United States (1898) and Spain (1899) legalizing its overseas empire-in-construction (Muirhead, 1908: 176; Sabin, 1990: 212). The policy of overseas expansion was also urged by the Allddeutscher Verband and other Pangerman and German nationalist organizations who also formed the membership of colonial organizations. After 1895 the German ruling elite seemed convinced of the need for large-scale territorial expansion which admiral Alfred von Tripitz (1849-1930) deemed as irresistible as a natural law. His idea of constructing a huge naval fleet found eager support on the part of the emperor and the Flottenverein (Naval League) and commenced in 1898. By the eve of the Great War Germany’s fleet was second only to Britain’s. Thus with this potential behind him, in 1899, the soon-to-be Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow (1900-1909) called for a redivision of the globe which would take into consideration Germany’s interests. Queen Victoria (ruled 1837-1901) being mother-in-law of Wilhelm I’s son Friedrich III, and grandmother to Wilhelm II was not opposed to fulfilling the colonial dreams of the German branch of her family, and neither was the influential Secretary of

417 Polish nationalists could not overhaul its German provenance so that it would play in their hands, even after they renamed it after the Polish national hero as the Kos’ciuszko tower. Gradually devastated after Poland’s takeover of eastern Upper Silesia in 1922, it was finally pulled down by veterans of the anti-German Upper Silesian Uprisings (of 1919, 1920 and 1921) sometime in the mid-1930s (Dziadul, 1996: 4; Pierchala, 1997: 49).

418 With the exception of Britain, Germany bore the cost of the armed forces more easily than any other European state spending just 4.6% of its GNP on defense in 1914 whereas Russia’s expenditure in this field consumed 6.3% of its GNP causing stupendous on its economy and populace (Kennedy, 1989: 212).
Colonial Affairs Joseph Chamberlain (1895-1903) who held Pangerman opinions. So English foreign policy was directed toward the Triple Alliance (1885-1892, 1895-1902) until the demise of Victoria and the growing appetite of Germany trying to compete with Britain and other imperial powers in the Middle East. The balance of power changed quite decisively when Britain and France having overcome their enmity concluded the Entente Cordiale in 1904. In 1907 Russia joined the alliance reformulated as the Triple Entente, and in 1909 concluded the secret Treaty of Racconigi with Italy to keep the status quo in the Balkans. Germany was left isolated standing fast by its Nibelungen alliance with Austria-Hungary via which it exerted its power in this region and in Turkey against the wishes of Italy, Russia, France and England which became clearly visible in the ensuing rivalry during the Balkan crisis of 1912/1913 which prepared the scene for the imminent outbreak of the Great War (Anon., 1990: 350/351; Davies, 1996: 1300/1301; Kennedy, 1989: 211-213; Kinder, 1978: II 83, 103, 109, 121).

The processes of nation, nation-state and empire building in Germany together with its European and world repercussions created the context against which development of Polish nationalism in the province of Posen (Poznań) and Upper Silesia must be interpreted. After the repeated failures of Polish risings of 1830/1831, 1846 and 1863/1864 which were mainly directed against Russia as the partition power which had seized the majority of Poland-Lithuania’s territory and population, Polish activists dreaming about reestablishment of the Polish state decided to channel their efforts into organic work not being able to achieve the paramount goal through a military insurrection. The concept of organic work meant fortifying the Polish influence through accumulating Polish capital as the basis for development of Polish factories and modernization of agriculture in Polish hands. And most importantly its practitioners concentrated on spreading Polish-language and Polish national education as the basic tool of forging a Polish nation because Bismarck (conscious that unification of Germany just commenced German nation and nation-state building) rightly remarked in 1873 that Polish leaders were just a handful of truculent aristocrats and priests with no nation behind them (Wiskemann, 1956: 10). It was especially significant in the face of the Germanizing and Russifying endeavors which aimed at incorporating the Polish speaking population either in the German nation or in the mainstream of Russian society. In result of subscribing to organic work Congress Poland was turned into the engine of the Russian economy before industrialization was transplanted eastward into the heartland of the empire in the 1890s (Smogorzewski, 1992: 951), and the province of Posen (Poznań) into the stage for the nationalist Wirtschaftskampf in which the local Poles were not unsuccessful. Galicia with its cultural and language autonomy, on the other hand, afforded a safe haven for development of the Polish national movement and instilling national feeling in the Polish-speaking populace through the Polish-language bureaucracy and educational system though the spread of Polish nationalism was checked in the 1880s/1890s by emergence of its Ukrainian counterpart (especially in eastern part of this crownland)\(^419\).

The period of organic work came to a close with the coming of age of the new generation of Polish nationalist activists who did not experience the defeat of the January Uprising and its dire consequences themselves. The coming change gained momentum from numerous clandestine Polish-language circles which sprang up at secondary and tertiary schools especially of Congress Poland in the 1880s. They were the springboard for the socialistic, nationalist and peasant trends in the overall Polish movement. The nationalist trend which is of the prevalent concern to the work, was given its first ideological framework in the e’émigre and ex-insurrectionist Zygmunt Młkowski’s (1824-1915)\(^420\) Rzecz o obronie czynnej i skarbie narodowym (On Active Defence and the National Treasury) (1886) in which appealed for gathering funds indispensable for the struggle which would bring about reestablishment of the Polish state. In the same year another Polish activist Zygmunt Balicki (1858-

\(^{419}\) Recognition of Ukrainian language rights was spearheaded by the Galician governor (1886-1895) and Polish Count Kazimierz Badeni who even rose to the position of the Austrian-Hungarian prime minister (1895-1897). It indicates that he and Galicia’s other Polish-speaking nobles were still not nationalist, entrenched in their loyalty to the monarchy and their own estate.

\(^{420}\) He is more widely known as Tomasz Teodor Jez which was his pseudonym (Anon., 1985: 112).
1916) established the secret Związek Młodzieży Polskiej (Association of Polish Youth) known as the Zet\textsuperscript{421}. It became the organizational basis for the all-partition Liga Polska (Polish League) established in Switzerland in 1886/1887 on Milkowski’s initiative. The league’s aim was to reestablish Poland within its prepartition boundaries. Such young nationalist activists as Balicki and Roman Dmowski (1864-1939) were not satisfied with the traditional legalistic approach stemming from the days of uprisings, and, in 1893, they established the overtly nationalist Liga Narodowa (National League) with its seat in Congress Poland. Its narrow elite membership strove to gain control over the grass roots wszeczpolski (all-Polish) movement which spawned numerous cultural, social and economic societies in all the partitions. Dmowski turned into the main ideologue of Polish nationalism. In his 1893 brochure Nasz patriotyzm (Our Patriotism) he propounded that the interest of Polish nation should take precedence over any other concerns of every Pole, and, in 1903, Dmowski’s book Myśli nowoczesnego Polaka (The Thoughts of the Modern Pole) called for conscious nation building which would obliterate the prenational differences dividing the Polish-speaking population. Using this theoretical framework the Liga Narodowa postulated assuring the best conditions possible for development of the Polish nation-in-construction, which meant reestablishment of the Polish state within the combination of the pre-partition and ethnic borders within which Upper Silesia could be contained too. In the 1890s this approach led to a new understanding of the term the Prussian partition among Polish activists and intellectualists, which was no more limited to Poland-Lithuania’s provinces of West Prussia and Poznań (Posen) which had been annexed by Prussia, but also included Upper Silesia as inhabited by sizeable Polish-speaking population though the territory had lost its last politically significant ties with the Polish state in the 13th/14th centuries (Anon., 1983: 212; Anon., 1983a: 615; Anon., 1987: 879; Ślusarczyk, 1996: 1-5; Smogorzewski, 1992: 951).

The Liga Narodowa became the nucleus of the Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne (SN-D, National Democratic Movement) which was established in Congress Poland in 1897 and turned into a legal party in 1903-1905. Many of the party’s members were elected to the first Russian Duma (parliament) in 1905, where under Dmowski’s leadership they formed the Polish Circle (1905-1917) which demanded Polish autonomy hoping for gradual reestablishment of the Polish state which would be supported by Russia. The SN-D’s line was represented in Galicia by the Stronnictwo Demokratyczno-Narodowe (Democratic National Movement), established in 1905, and in the Prussian partition by the Polskie Towarzystwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne (Polish National Democratic Society), established in 1909. More radical stance against Russia was taken by the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS, Polish Socialist Party), established in 1892/1893. It was the strongest socialist party in the Russian Empire, and under the leadership of Józef Piłsudski (1867-1935) it took part in the abortive 1905 revolution clearly struggling for the Polish cause as it was against the internationalist cooperation between Polish and Russian socialists unlike Rosa Luxembourg and Julian Marchlewski’s rather insignificant Social-demokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy (Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, est. in 1898). The Galician counterpart of Piłsudki’s PPS the Polska Partia Socjal-demokratyczna Galicji i Śląska (Polish Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and Silesia\textsuperscript{422}, est. in 1892) had to share its influence with the conciliatory Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL, Polish People’s [Peasant] Movement, est. in 1895), after the introduction of universal suffrage in Austria-Hungary in 1907 (Anon., 1987a: 314; Davies, 1991: II xx/xxi; Jakóbczyk, 1989: 72; Ślusarek, 1996: 3; Smogorzewski, 1992: 951).

In 1905 the SN-D gained more ground in Congress Poland after the PPS was compromised for the fact that its members took part in the revolution, and Dmowski even more pronouncedly hoped for a Polish autonomy within the Russian Empire emphasizing that Germany was Polish nationalism’s main opponent (Smogorzewski, 1992: 951). This judgment was based on the Germanizing endeavors which were carried out more decisively and methodically in the Prussian partition than in still backward Russia where the tsar had to allow some democratic concessions after the 1905 revolution

\textsuperscript{421} The Zet is derived the Polish name for the letter z (zed) which constituted the first letter of the full name of the youth organization.

\textsuperscript{422} Besides Galicia it also wanted to exert its influence in East Silesia.
starting systemic reforms. These changes conceived as half-measures to keep a semblance of the *ancien régime* afloat weakened the state and its economy. Subsequently, Russia became more absorbed with sustaining the shaky system of governance and production than containing Polish nationalism unlike the economically and systemically robust German nation-state.

However, Polish activists living in Germany perceived their situation in a different light. Sharing in the economic and political success of Germany, they were far better suited to conciliation than revolution. The network of various Polish societies catered for by the burgeoning Polish-language press and publishing industry, which came into being especially during the 1840s-1860s did not disappear with the establishment of the German nation-state and the introduction of Germanizing measures. First of all, until German officialdom chose to harass the Polish-speakers, Germanization was widely thought to be the natural destiny of all the Hohenzollerns non-German-speaking subjects. After all, enlightened Englishmen and Americans of the same era largely assumed that all non-English-speaking inhabitants of their countries would eventually be Anglicized. Homogeneity was accepted as a legitimate necessity without which the modern state could not effectively compete at the international arena, as long as its obvious link with nation and nation-state building was not grasped by minority activists who decided to use it to their own, often irredentist, ends. Their rhetoric was fortified by every too strong a German statement on the need of assimilation of Polish-speaking Prussians (Zakrzewski, 1988: 46/47) but only thanks to the *Kulturkampf* Polish activists were able to forge a very effective national ideology by intertwining it with Catholicism. During its course the Primate of Prussian Poland, Archbishop Mieczyslaw Ledóchowski (1822-1902) after two years of jail, was exiled in Rome. Ninety Polish priests shared his fate, and many more were harassed, disrupting pastoral life of numerous parishes and simultaneously convincing lay Polish-speakers that they and the Catholic Church were on the same side of the barricade in the Protestant-oriented state (Davies, 1991: II 122, 127, 130/131).

The Germanizing measures concentrated on language and economy. The answer to the stereotype of *polnische Wirtschaft* and the activities of the *Ansiedlungskommission* was to outdo the Germans at the use of the new weapons of work, order and thrift. Many Polish entrepreneurs and companies won in the ensuing Wirtschaftskampf which was especially visible in the meager performance of the *Ansiedlungskommission* despite the fact that the state and the *Deutscher Ostmarkenverein* came lavishly to its succor (Davies, 1991: II 122). In 1871-1878 Polish was removed from secondary education, courts of law and administration. In 1885/1886 the Polish public opinion was outraged at the expulsion of alien Polish-speakers and Jews, and since 1887 only religion had been taught in Polish at primary schools. In 1900 religious instruction in Polish was limited only to the two lowest grades, and the more liberal 1908 act on associations included a clause providing that German should be used at all public gatherings in the areas where Polish-speakers did not constitute more than 60% of the population (Trzeciakowski, 1976: 553). The anti-Polish language policy made it clear to Polish activists that as the German language constitutes the core of *Deutschtum*, they should develop Polish nationalism around the issue of the Polish language in order to be taken seriously by the German authorities. Polish activists concentrated around Polish-language newspapers and aided by the largely Polish-speaking Catholic clergy and Church administration developed dense networks of: singing, peasant, economic and Catholic worker societies, as well as numerous branches of the influential *Towarzystwo OŚwiaty Ludowej* (Society for Popular Education), the *Towarzystwo Czytelni Ludowych* (Society for Popular Reading Rooms) and the Sokól (Falcon) gymnastic society.423 The organizations did not limit themselves to the territory of the Prussian

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423 The Sokól gymnastic society is a spectacular example of how closely Central European Slavic nationalisms emulated its German counterpart. Especially in the period 1811-1871 the German gymnastic societies mobilized male youth preparing them to become fighters/soldiers ready to die for their nation in the period. The Czech nationalists established similar societies under the name of Sokol (Falcon) already in 1862 (Políšenský, 1991: 98), and Polish activists followed closely. The first Sokól was established at Lemberg (Lviv) in 1867 giving the beginning to the Galician network. In 1885 it appeared in the Prussian partition, and, in 1905, made an illegal entree in Congress Poland. By 1914 it got dominated by the SN-D and by 1919 it was turned into a paramilitary
partition but, beginning with the 1880s, spread their activities to Silesia and the Polish-speaking diaspora in Berlin, Westphalia and Rheinland (Davies, 1991: II 124; Trzeciakowski, 1976: 555).

It was possible despite the unfavorable attitude of the German administration since unlike Russia and the Habsburg Empire prior to the 1860s liberalizing reforms, Prussia (and later Germany) was a Rechtstaat a political community which operated within the framework of law. Although many political institutions retained a visible degree of authoritarianism, the political system operated through regular procedures, and by legal means. Under these conditions Polish nationalists could also develop their activities within the confines of law and without the fear of being unjustly incarcerated or deported to such inhospitable places as Siberia unlike his compatriots in Congress Poland. Actually through the deputies to the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag, who formed the Polish circle at Berlin, they influenced German and Prussian politics. In the 1890s the anti-Polish rhetoric spearheaded by the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein was clearly expressed in 1895 by Max Weber who joined the Altleutischen Verbund: Only we Germans could have made human beings out of these Poles. It was followed by intensified petty anti-Polish measures: street names, and even official signs, even in cemeteries or public lavatories, were Germanized whereas the same fate met Polish names of hundreds of towns and villages even before 1878. Poles replied in kind but careful not to breach law. In 1906/1907 almost half the schools of the province of Posen (Poznań) were engulfed by school strikes against the imposition of German into religious classes. During the climax, 70,000 children protested in 950 schools in the province and 19,300 children in 536 West Prussian schools. Against the wishes of Polish nationalists the strike did not really spread into Upper Silesia, where it affected only 431 children. Another weapon of opposing Germanization and, simultaneously, an instrument of nation building were celebrations of various Polish anniversaries. In 1909 it was the centenary of the birth of the renowned Polish romantic poet Juliusz Słowacki (1809-1849), in 1910 the 500th anniversary of the battle of Grunwald (1410) during which the Teutonic Knights (symbolic forefathers of Prussia) were defeated by the joint Polish-Lithuanian forces; and the centenary of the birth of the most renowned Polish composer Fryderyk Chopin (1810-1849), in 1812 the centenary of the birth of another renowned Polish romantic poet Zygmunt Krasiński (1812-1859), and of the birth of the prolific historical writer Józef Ignacy Kraszewski (1812-1887)\textsuperscript{424}, in 1913 the centenary of the death of Prince Józef Poniatowski (1763-1813), Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and Marshal of France, and the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of the January Uprising (Davies, 1991: II 116, 134; Jakóbczyk, 1989: 25, 67/68).

For the anniversary of the battle of Grunwald, a public subscription was launched to raise a monument in commemoration of the Polish victory over the Germans. The acrimonious character of the celebrations aiming at deepening the cleavage between Polish and German nationalisms made the provincial administration stage such official hostility that the organizers of the scheme were obliged to erect their monument in Cracow, Galicia. It was unveiled by the world-known pianist and composer as well as nationalist activist Ignacy Paderewski (1860-1941) to the strains the very anti-German Rota (Military Oath)\textsuperscript{425} composed by the poet Maria Konopnicka (1842-1910):

\begin{quote}
We shall not yield our forbearers land,
Nor see our language muted.
Our nation is Polish, and Polish our folk,
\end{quote}

organization whose members participated in Poland’s numerous border wars after 1918, not unlike their German forerunners in the German wars of 181-1815, 1864, 1866 and 1870/1871 (Anon., 1987b: 233).

\textsuperscript{424} In 1864 he settled in Germany (Hargreaves-Mawdsley, 1968: 305) and continued to be involved in the Polish nationalist movement which he strongly supported with his historical novels, thus, creating a glorious past for the emerging nationalism.

\textsuperscript{425} The virtual creed of Polish nationalism defining Polishdom through enmity to everything German was commonly sung at Polish schools during the communist period (1947-1989) in order to divert attention from the equally traditional Polish-Russian enmity. Unfortunately, some nationalistically-minded Polish teachers of history and literature still utilize this song in the course of their classes.
By Piasts constituted.
By cruel oppression we’ll not be swayed!
May God so lend us aid.
We’ll not be spat on by Teutons
Nor abandon our youth to the German!
We’ll follow the call of the Golden Horn,
Under the Holy Spirit, our Hetman.
Our armed battalions shall lead the crusade.
May God so lend us aid.
By the very last drop of blood in our veins
Our souls will be secured,
Until in dust and ashes falls
The stormwind sown by the Prussian lord.
Our every home will form a stockade.
May God so lend us aid.

Despite such displays of animosity, the Poles in Germany continued to be modest in their political aspirations to the very end. Because recognition of the solid material benefits of German rule was widespread, and hatred of Russia universal, loyalty to Prussia remained strong. The Polish deputies to the Reichstag often voted in line with the government’s wishes especially during the chancellorship of Caprivi (1890-1894) who granted the Polish-speaking population with the most nominal concessions such as giving private lessons of Polish. Polish-speaking Upper Silesians together with Poles and Polish-speakers from the Pomeranian, West Prussian and Posnanian regiments marched through the Great War to the strains of Preussens Gloria with never a thought but to keep in step. They served on all fronts with distinction and there was never a hint of mutiny until the very end of the war. Only because of the vacuum left by the revolution in Berlin and the abdication of the Kaiser, the Poles of the province of Posen (Poznań) were stirred into rebellion at the turn of 1918 and 1919 who on his way from Stettin (Szczecin) to Warsaw delivered a pro-independence speech in Posen (Poznań), on December 26th, 1918 (Davies, 1991: II 136/137; Ślusarczyk, 1996: 4).

The situation in Upper Silesia was markedly different, the influence of German and Polish nationalisms was not strong prior to 1871, and even after this date the concept of nation remained largely alien to the German and Slavic-speaking local population who pegged their identity rather on the Catholic Church. Even the Slavic-speaking Protestant minority in Upper Silesia and the 120,000 strong group in north-eastern Lower Silesia followed the pattern before they gradually got aligned with the German nation having been repelled from emergent Polishdom by its strict association with Catholicism. The accession of the Protestant Slavic-speakers into the German nation was facilitated by the fusion of Kleindeutsch nationalism with Protestantism whereas the Catholic Slavic-speakers were barred from it by the double barrier of faith and language. On the top of it attachment to the locale and Prussian identity symbolized by the Hohenzollern dynast remained strong slowing down their inclusion into Germandom and leaving them immune to the few pro-Polish influences entering

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426 The local Protestant population of Upper Silesia amounted to 4% in 1800. With industrialization and the influx of German-speaking engineers, teachers and clerks it grew to 9% in 1871 and remained unchanged until 1914. According to the 1910 census there were 187,751 Protestants in Upper Silesia out of the total population of 2,207,981. Probably half of them were Slavic-speakers (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 58; Szczepankiewicz-Battek, 1996: 10)
Upper Silesia mainly from Wielkopolska, and to a lesser degree from Galicia and East Austrian Silesia.

A change in the attitudes of the Upper Silesian Catholics steeped in the universal ideals of ultramontanism (more congruent with Austria-Hungary’s Großdeutsch concept than with Prussia/Germany’s notion of the German nation), came with the formation of the German nation-state in 1871. Bismarck was faced with the daunting task of homogenizing Germany in accordance with the espoused tenets of Kleindeutsch nationalism. The center of the newly-founded state was conveniently Protestant but West Prussia, western East Prussia, the province of Posen and Silesia as well as south-western and western Germany remained strongly Catholic. In 1871 the German population consisted from 62.3% Protestants, 36.2% Catholics and 1.3% Jews (Anon., 1889b: 816/817). In this initial phase of the German Empire, the Catholic Church with its pro-Austrian, ultramontane leanings presented itself as the primary enemy of Kleindeutsch nationalism. The process of vigorous nation-state building quite understandably turned against this obstacle with the sweeping anti-Catholic Church policies of the Kulturkampf. As remarked above they proved to be almost futile in the end leading to cooperation between the German Catholic Church and the state rather than to a change in the confessional pattern which in 1880 looked almost the same with 62.6% Protestants, 35.9% Catholics and 1.2% Jews (Anon., 1889b: 817).

The consolidating endeavors of the Kulturkampf were deeply felt in Silesia where, in 1885, Catholics numbering 2,156,578 (52.4%) prevailed as opposed to Protestants 1,897,002 (46.1%) (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 60). Silesian Catholics concentrated mainly in Upper Silesia and the Glatz (Klodzko) Margravate which contained less than 10% Protestants. Due to the higher growth rate in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency than in the rest of Silesia, actually the percentage of Catholics grew to 56.7% (2,962,783) and Protestants fell to 42.1% (2,199,114) in 1910. In the break-down of the statistics, the Oppeln (Opole) Regency supported 2,000,066 (90.6%) Catholics, 187,751 (8.5%) Protestants, the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency 751,562 (40.8%) Catholics and 1,055,570 (57.3%) Protestants, and the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency 211,155 (18%) Catholics and 955,793 (81.2%) Protestants (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 58/59). Therefore, the heaviest brunt of the Kulturkampf measures was exerted on the Oppeln (Opole) Regency which besides being staunchly Catholic contained the majority of Slavic-speakers inhabiting Silesia. In 1861 in the regency German-speakers amounted to 36.4% of its population whereas Polish and Czech-speakers to 59.1% and 4.5%, respectively (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 48). In 1890 the numbers were: 36.3% (572,281), 59.2% (934,601) and 3.8% (59,243), and in 1910: 39.2% (865,780), 53% (1,169,340) and 2.6% (57,347) together with 88,802 (4%) bilingual Polish/German-speakers and 571 bilingual Czech/German-speakers. On the other hand, in the Breslau (Wroclaw) and Liegnitz (Legnica) Regencies German-speakers clearly prevailed amounting, in 1890, to 94.6% (1,512,397) and 96.2% (1,007,184), respectively; and, in 1910, to 94.5% (1,739,299) and 95.6% (1,124,284). In 1890 the Slavic populace of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency included 54,038 (3.4%) Polish-speakers and 9,704 (0.6%) Czech-speakers, and in 1910 51,931 (2.8%) together with 11,564 (0.6%) bilingual Polish/German-speakers. In 1890 in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency there were 27,255 (2.6%) Sorbian-speakers, and in 1910 26,576 (2.3%) Sorbian-speakers together with 1,178 bilingual Sorbian/German-speakers and 1,739 (0.1%) bilingual Polish/German-speakers. In 1890, in the context of the whole province, the Polish-speakers added up to 994,961 (23.6%), Czech-speakers to 70,333 (1.7%), Sorbian-speakers to 27,320 (0.6%), and bilingual Polish/German-speakers to 3,091,862 (73.2%). In 1910 the number of Polish-speakers grew to 1,236,328 (23.7%), Czech-speakers relatively

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427 The rest of the total population of 4,112,219 was composed from 51,481 Jews (1.3%), 7,048 other Christians (1.3%) and 110 included in the others rubric (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 60).

428 Out of the 44,985 Jews constituting 0.8% of the Silesian population, 18,268 lived in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, 23,161 in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency and 3,556 in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency amounting to 0.8%, 1.3% and 0.3% of the regencies populations, respectively. Those included in the others rubric amounted to 19,080 for the whole of the province, and were the lest numerous in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 58).
decreased to 71,436 (1.4%), Sorbian-speakers relatively went down to 26,650 (0.5%), and of bilingual Polish/German-speakers increased to 102,194 (2%). In 1905 the categories of bilingual Sorbian/German and Czech/German-speakers were introduced and in 1910 they amounted to 2,117 and 1,162, respectively. Lastly, the German-speaking population, though relatively, still decreased most decisively by 1.8 points to 3,729,363 (71.4%). Considering the Jewish population it is important to remember that through the concurrent processes of emancipation and the Haskalah, they got largely assimilated into the mainstream of the German life with the exception of their religious practices which still allowed to differentiate them as Jews. In 1890 they numbered 48,003 (1.1%) in Silesia, and in 1910 44,985 (0.9%), in the context of regencies they concentrated in and around Breslau (Wroclaw) and in Upper Silesia, i.e. in 1890 there were 22,232 (1.4%) of them in the Breslau Regency, 21,147 (1.3%) in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and only 4,624 (0.4%) in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency. In 1910 the numbers were: 23,161 (1.3%), 18,268 (0.9%) and 3,556 (0.3%), respectively (Kokot, 1973: 77; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 52).

The Kulturkampf commenced immediately in the year of the unification of Germany with the liquidation of the Catholic Department in the Prussian Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kultusministerium) and with Bismarck’s ordinance condemning any clergyman using his church function to comment matters of the state, to incarceration up to two years. Since 1872 it was spearheaded by the Protestant Silesian Adalbert Falk (1827-1900) who was nominated as the Prussian Minister of Religious Affairs. In the very year the Jesuits and similar orders were banished from Germany considerably weakening the Church’s hold on the educational system. In 1873 the bubble of the speculative boom of the Gründerzeit (founders years) burst. The crash stimulated a revival of anti-Semitism and deepened suspicion toward the Catholic Church considered as the supporter of Polish nationalism. This thought soon spawned the concept of an enemy within who was supposed to aid external enemies. This tension facilitated passing of the comprehensive portfolio of May Acts in 1873 which amounted to a declaration of war with the Church. On their basis the state gained the right to control all Church nominations and Catholic seminaries, whereas the educational system (as an significant instrument of nation building) was also wrenched away from the Church. In 1875 the Reichstag passed an act on compulsory civil marriages gradually shifting the task of registering marriages, births and deaths to the hands of the state429 (Bahlcke, 1996: 103; Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 299/300; Fulbrook, 1990: 131-133; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 302; Scheuermann, 1994: 292).

The Kulturkampf led to serious disorganization of the Catholic Church. In 1878 one third of German dioeceses had to function without bishops who either were not nominated to the positions or were forced to leave their sees (Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 300). In 1875, the harassed Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop Heinrich Förster (1799-1881) had to flee to the Austrian Silesian part of his dioecese where he stayed until his demise almost completely deprived of influence on his dioecese within the German borders. In 1876 the authorities closed the Breslau (Wroclaw) seminary430 and its students had to continue their theological education in Austria-Hungary, especially at Prague without a possibility to return to their dioecese where so many priests were persecuted and dismissed from their parishes by the authorities (Pater, 1996a: 103/104; Hepa, 1994: 6/7). In result more than one quarter of the Silesian parishes were deprived of their priests and pastoral services (Neubach, 1995: 184).

This situation could not dispose the Silesian Catholics well especially in Upper Silesia where the concurrent language homogenizing policies were superimposed on the pattern of the anti-Church moves. With the 1872 ordinances of the governments of the Oppeln (Opole) and Breslau (Wroclaw) Regencies all other languages than German (i.e. Polish and Czech in the south of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county) were removed from schools except religious classes in the lowest grades where they were used as auxiliary languages up to 1875 when new ordinances imposed German as the sole

429 Without having taken over this function, the state would not have been able to build an effective homogenous bureaucratic apparatus for the control of the population. On the other hand, statistics as the basis of language planning and nation building, must have found this apparatus to be an indispensable source of data.

430 It was opened again only in 1886 (Pater, 1996a: 104).
medium of instruction in all the schools of the two regencies (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 304; Plaček, 1996: 8). Förster and the Catholic hierarchy vehemently opposed the ordinances of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and supported the development of the extraschool system of teaching religion in Slavic languages also appealing to parents to teach their children how to write and read in their respective languages. The Church opined that spread of German would facilitate expansion of Protestantism in this traditionally Catholic land. In this manner the clash between Catholic ultramontanism and German nationalism unwittingly got pegged on the thus created language cleavage spawning the self-reinforcing stereotype of the Catholic Pole and Protestant German (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 305, 478; Pater, 1993: 21; Pater, 1996a: 104).

The policies did not inspire any active political opposition on the part of the Slavic-speaking Upper Silesian Catholics (often disparagingly denounced as the tool of the clergy and agents of Rome (Schofer, 1974: 154)) affected by the language and other policies of the Kulturkampf (Wanatowicz, 1992: 42) but created the ready electorate of the Zentrum party which strove to protect the Church and its universalist principles against the consolidating onslaught of German nationalism. The Silesian branch of this party was organized by one of the biggest Upper Silesian land owners as well as of captains of industry, and aristocrat Count Franz von Ballestrem (1834-1910). Thanks to his efforts and the support of the Upper Silesian Catholics mobilized by the Church and the Zentrum’s position favoring the use of Polish and Czech in religious instructions, in 1881 all the twelve constituencies of the Upper Silesia were represented by the party’s deputies in the Reichstag. In this year the party also gained four mandates out of twelve in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency, and in result held the relative majority in Silesia with the total of fifteen deputies surpassing the Fortschrittspartei (Progressive Party) with thirteen mandates, the conservative parties with 3 mandates and the Reichspartei (Imperial Party) with three mandates. The pattern of the relative dominance in Silesia the Zentrum had maintained since 1878. The situation looked different in the case of the Prussian Landtag where conservative deputies dominated with 30 mandates over 20 Zentrum mandates in 1888. But the latter clearly held sway in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency with 20 mandates out of 21. In sum the Zentrum was a party to be reckoned with as since 1878 it had had the relative majority in the 397-seat Reichstag which, in 1888, amounted to 101 deputies well ahead of the conservatives with 77 seats but in a close race with the National Liberals whose number of deputies fluctuated from 150 in 1874 to 45 in 1881 and 100 in 1888. The Zentrum remained alternately the first or second largest Reichstag party until the last elections of 1912 (Anon., 1889c: 688; Bahlcke, 1996: 103; Czapliński, 1990: 536; Fuchs, 1994: 598; Gross, 1995: 58; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 316/317).

Although the social and cultural interests of the Upper Silesian population were well served by the Zentrum which was instrumental in bringing about a decisive retreat from the policies of the Kulturkampf in 1879 (Wanatowicz, 1992: 43), in the context of the domination of the German political life by the Junkers (landed gentry) (Fulbrook, 1990: 144) later polarization was inescapable in the Oppeln Regency. It is not surprising in the view of the fact that Upper Silesia seems to have been this part of Germany where the feudal and industrial relations got more tightly intertwined opening an extremely deep social cleavage. For instance 51% (5,255 sq km) of the arable land in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency was owned by a handful of agricultural-cum-industrial magnates (Neubach, 1995: 185), and alone seven of them shared as much as 26.4% (2,720 sq km) of this land among themselves (Weber, 1913: 21). In the meantime, the Catholic Slavic-speakers of Upper Silesia stuck fast to the party and the Church as the sole guarantors of their traditional way of life. It is easy to understand in the light of the incomprehensible (to the Upper Silesians) change in the policies of the state toward their region which partly deprived them of pastoral service and did away with the bilingual approach in education and social life. The elimination of Polish/Czech from schools was accompanied by a string of similar decisions. In 1871 the Higher Mining Office forbade the hiring of supervisors who spoke Polish only (Schofer, 1974: 153). In 1876 German became the only language

431 The majority of Polish- and Czech-speakers of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency were Protestants, and as such of not much interest to the Catholic Church.

432 The extraschool system unfolded in full only in the 1880s (Pater, 1993: 21).
of government and administrative offices, and in 1886 it was forbidden to employ clerks who spoke Polish/Czech only whereas those who had joined the civil service earlier and had not acquired a good command of German, were dismissed (Klein, 1972: 11/12).

In order to offset the adverse effects of the Kulturkampf in Upper Silesia, the Church together with the Zentrum entered a symbiosis with the Polish-language Catholic press whose most important title was Miarka’s Katolik, and this triple alliance actively supported development of Catholic organizations. These organizations and the press were responsible for spreading literacy in Polish (and Czech) assisting in the educational endeavors the Church and parents (who, prior to 1872, had acquired literacy in Polish/Czech at bilingual elementary schools) of non-German-speaking children (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 306-308). Already in 1872 there were 26 various Catholic organizations in Upper Silesia, and two years later 94 with 11,065 regular and 942 honorary members according to hasty estimations of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency authorities who seem not to have included all of them. It is impossible to assess how many of the members were Polish-speakers and how many German-speakers or bilingual. Thinking along nationalethnic lines was still unusual then in this region at that time. It was a conflict between ultramontanism and Kleindeutsch nationalism which produced the broad Catholic social movement not any national conflict (Pater, 1993: 77-79). Obviously, Polish/Czech having been eliminated from the education and administration, the sphere of its use was transferred to many of the organizations which were co-established by the Church and the Zentrum for this purpose. Thus, the party wishing to be heard by its Polish-speaking electorate supported among its ten Reichstag and seventeen Landtag deputies from the Oppeln (Opole) Regency in 1879 at least eight who had a reasonable command of Polish433 (Hytrek, 1996 [1879]: 64; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 316/317). The mobilizing model of rallies popular in Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia, was transplanted to Upper Silesia in order to spread education in Polish. They involved several thousands of peasants and attracted participants from Galicia and Wielkopolska (Hytrek, 1996 [1879]: 38/39). Also Upper Silesians continued in smaller numbers to go on pilgrimages to Częstochowa and especially Cracow, e.g., in 1879 200 of them visited the tomb of St. Stanislaw (Pater, 1993: 107). The stirring up of the Polish-language social life brought about by the Kulturkampf was served by Polish periodicals from Wielkopolska, and Polish and Czech ones from Austrian Silesia (Hytrek, 1996 [1879]: 36). Soon Katolik took over the role. The number of its copies per issue grew steadily from 4,000 in 1874 to 24,000 in 1911 (Gröschel, 1993: 144) rivaling the largest Silesian newspaper in German Schlesische Zeitung (Silesian Newspaper) whose number of copies grew less dynamically from 12,742 in 1872 to 18,089 in 1906 (Fuchs, 1994: 594). Katolik also got involved in the action of spreading education in Polish by publishing in the years 1876-1880 the educational weekly Monika (Monica) to which close to 2,000 readers subscribed (Gröschel, 1993: 226/227).

In effect the Kulturkampf caused the emergence of a symbiosis between political ultramontanism and the largely educational-cum-devotional Polish-language movement in Upper Silesia, which endangered the process of German nation-state building with the prospect of politicizing the movement which, next, could turn into a full-fledged Polish national movement as it had already happened in the province of Posen (Poznań). To forestall this possibility, the authorities tried to discourage Miarka by having harassed him with no less than sixteen trials in 1869-1882 (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 309), which made him resign the editorial board of Katolik and move to Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) where he died in 1882 (Brozek, 1995: 61). Similar trials were staged against Miarka’s collaborators and priests who got engaged too much in this Polish-language movement violating the Kulturkampf’s laws (Pater, 1996b: 333). The authorities also supported publication of the bilingual weeklies Prawda (Truth) (1871-1877, an organ of Polish-speaking Old Catholics in Upper Silesia), and Szlązak (Silesian) (1872-1880). These periodicals advocated the official line of the government and, hence, were distrusted by the Upper Silesian populace which

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433 One of them was the Prelate and Polish prince Edmund Wiktor Radziwill from Posen (Poznań). Although he did not belong to the Polish Circle (composed from Polish deputies from the province of Posen (Poznań)) at the Reichstag, he stressed the common origins of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians and the Polish-speakers of Wielkopolska (Wanatowicz, 1992: 40)
brought about their downfall (Glensk, 1992: 18; Gröschel, 1993: 115, 225/226; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 309/310). Interestingly, some clergymen having noticed that Polish agitators from Posen (Poznań) had to switch to German in order to communicate with Upper Silesians speaking in their Slavic-based creole (Osborne, 1921: 47), they embarked on the task of standardizing an Upper Silesian language on the basis of this creole. Such a language could allow the Church to check the swelling flow of publications in standard Polish from Posen (Poznań). However, the project was never completed (Wanatowicz, 1992: 51).

A similar fate of the aforementioned bilingual periodicals met the biweekly *Gazeta Górnoszląska* (Upper Silesian Newspaper) (1874-1886) established with the financial support from the Cracow bishop Albin Dunajewski by Father Franciszek Przyniczynski (1844-1896) from the province of Posen and run together with his brother. They wanted to weaken the position of the ultramontane Katolik in order to transplant the ideas of the Posen Polish movement to Upper Silesia. They even started the abortive monthly *Nowy Katolik* (New Catholic) (1883). In the papers they agitated for the Polish national movement stating that the Polish-speakers of Upper Silesia were part of the Polish nation, and wanted to merge the Upper Silesian Polish-language movement with the straightforward Posen (Poznań) Polish national movement. The Polish national rhetoric was alien to Upper Silesian readers, as well as anti-Zentrum overtones. Despite Przyniczynski’s attempts his weekly did not receive Church approval from bishop Förster unlike Katolik, and his 1881 campaign for putting forward Polish-language candidates to the Reichstag, who would not be members of the Zentrum failed completely (Glensk, 1992: 19; Gröschel, 1993: 38/39; Pater, 1996b: 333). The Przyniczynski brothers were forgetful of several facts. They directed their nationalist message to the Upper Silesian Polish-language middle class but at that there was none as upgrading of one’s social status was possibly only through the German language and assimilation with the German nation-in-making Reiner, 1966: 71). Majority of Upper Silesian priests, who held the greatest influence over the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians, got involved neither in Polish nor German national movements discouraging such sentiments among their faithful. The priests rather espoused ultramontanism against any forms of nationalism which could split their flocks along the ethnic lines and drew them away from the Church (Pater, 1993: 121). On the other hand, with advance of the press and education the Polish-speakers of Upper Silesia and the province of Posen (Poznań) became consciously aware of one another, they chose not to identify as belonging to the same ethnic group. It is clearly visible in the use of the term Pole which was considered pejorative by the Upper Silesian if applied to him (Wanatowicz, 1992: 76). The Polish-speakers of Posen retorted speaking contemptuously of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians as Odraks434 (Osborne, 1921: 50/51).

The tenuous links between Upper Silesia and Galicia, the province of Posen (Poznań) and even Congress Poland, established through pilgrimages, few personal contacts of nationalist activists and the intra-Catholic Church administration dealings, were to be developed quite extensively with the active involvement of the Polish national movement from Wielkopolska. The Przyniczynski brothers sent the first feelers with their newspaper. During the great famine of 1879 Miarka organized the *Komitet Glodowy* (Hunger Committee) which appealed for and channeled aid from the province of Posen (Poznań), Galicia, Congress Poland and Polish organizations in the US to the needy in Upper Silesia. Miarka illegally used the remaining resources for financing the distribution of the Polish-language press (Brozek, 1995: 61/62; Snoch, 1991: 89). Some Polish national groups who agreed with the Przyniczynskis statement that the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians are part of the postulated Polish nation, and noticed after the 1881 failure of the Polish candidates in the Reichstag elections that there was no clear-cut Polish national movement in Upper Silesia, decided that the situation may be changed only with immigration of Polish national activists, intelligentsia and middle class from Wielkopolska (Wanatowicz, 1992: 48). Many of them arrived in Silesia in the 1880s and 1890s (Glensk, 1995: 90), usually due to economic reasons. In 1907 they constituted the largest group of immigrants in Silesia, who amounted to 58,795. In the period of the intensified Ostflucht Germans were not attracted to the alien bilingual region of Upper Silesia where the standard of living and

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434 I.e. inhabitant of the Oder (Odra) lands.
wages were lower than in central and western Germany. However, what was linguistically and culturally alien to them, was closer to the Polish-speaking inhabitants of the province of Posen (Poznań) who found it easier to adapt to the living conditions in Upper Silesia than in the through and through German-speaking areas of Germany. Out of the Wielkopolska immigrants, 7,048 worked in civil service or practised their professions (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 43) but as few as 200, who moved to Upper Silesia in 1885-1914, could be classified as intelligentsia (i.e. doctors, lawyers, journalists, university graduates) (Wanatowicz, 1992: 74). Members of this Posen (Poznań) middle class and intelligentsia who settled in Upper Silesia, facilitated spread of the so-called großpolnisch\textsuperscript{435} agitation.

The most visible Polish influence arrived from Posen (Poznań) in the form of small libraries established by the Towarzystwo Czytelni Ludowych (TCL, Society for Popular Reading-rooms) which had come into being in 1880. (Davies, 1991: II xxii). In 1887 there were thirty such libraries in Upper Silesia and two in Lower Silesia (Jakóbczyk, 1989: 30). In sum with local initiatives there were 175 Polish-language libraries in 166 Upper Silesian localities in the years 1879-1893, with average holdings of 300-400 volumes. In the same period 214 more clearly Polish-oriented but also Polish-ultramontane economic, social and cultural organizations came into being in about 100 localities. They formed a tentative Polish-language environment which produced audiences for c. 932 Polish-language amateur theatrical productions in 1870-1900, and customers for Polish cooperative shops which numbered 97 in 1885-1902 (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 345, 347/348; Mykita-Glensk, 1988: 18). Now the question arises how large this potential Polish national movement was in numerical terms. According to Polish estimates 13,622 members belonged to 64 clearly pro-Polish organizations in 1898 (Figowa, 1966: 15). However, one should bear it in mind that in the 1880s and even in the 1890s it was still rather difficult to decide which organization was pro-Polish and which pro-German. The ultramontane attitude not differentiating along ethnic lines prevailed. This orientation began to disappear only when the German Catholic Church led by bishop Kopp managed to patch up its relations with the state (which could not disregard the relative majority of the Zentrum) at the beginnings of the 1880s leading to the scrapping of the Kulturkampf laws in 1885-1887 and the return of priest teachers to schools in 1876-1890 (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 89, 480/481). The Church and the Zentrum stopped supporting the cause of Polish-language education so vociferously (obviously not resigning from Polish during religious instructions) pointing out to the advantages of bilingualism and emphasizing the fact that one could succeed in one’s life only through the German language (Wanatowicz, 1992: 44). Even Father Norbert Bonczyk (Bonek, Bontzek) (1837-1893) who strove to write Upper Silesia into the imagined past of the Polish nation\textsuperscript{436} with his epic poem Góra Chelmska\textsuperscript{437} (Chelm Mountain, 1886), stated, at the Catholic rally in Beuthen (Bytom) in 1888 that on two tongues man stands more firmly (Pater, 1993: 121, 166).

However, the inroads made by the Polish national movement in Upper Silesia were accompanied by tentative ideas of including Upper Silesia, on the ground of ethnic unity of the Polish-speaking Upper Sileans with the rest of the Polish-speakers, in a would-be Polish state. First they appeared in Posen (Poznań) and were made known in Upper Silesia by Father Przyniczyński. In

\textsuperscript{435} The German adjective großpolnisch is ambiguous. Its basic meaning is: of the region of Wielkopolská (Großpolen in German, Great Poland in English), whereas the later one is Panpolish. The latter alludes to the Wszechpolski (Pan polish) movement which emerged in the 1890s and was just one of the numerous forms of early Polish nationalism. It gained its peculiar name due to its association with the Galician periodical Przegl_d Wszechpolski (1895-1905) which was established by Dmowski in order to popularize Polish nationalism among the young members and sympathizers of the largely elite Liga Narodowa. In the popular use it designated the Polish national movement from Posen (Poznań) (Osborne, 1921: 49; Tobiasz, 1947: 25; Wanatowicz, 1992: 137).

\textsuperscript{436} It seems that modern interpreting of his works from the national point of view is not fully justified as his \textit{oeuvre} also includes two collections of poems and a non-fiction book in German. Thus Bonczyk was a bilingual writer of ultramontane persuasion not unlike the majority of his Upper Silesian colleagues (Mandziuk, 1996: 44).

\textsuperscript{437} Chelm is the old name of St Anne Mountain which houses the most important Upper Silesian shrine.
1886 the same idea appeared in the Galician press (Kulak, 1990: 123) and a year later in Congress Poland (Suleja, 1992: 44; Wanatowicz, 1992: 59). By the end of the 19th century Polish nationalists started thinking about Upper Silesia as an integral part of the Prussian partition\(^{438}\) hoping to fortify the economic potential of a would-be Polish state and to provide a strategic bridge which would conveniently connect Wielkopolska with Galicia (Wanatowicz, 1992: 62, 64). Polish nationalists were given an additional tool for including Upper Silesia in the mental picture of Poland in the form of the first Polish history of Silesia *Dzieje Ślązka* (A History of Silesia) (1897) written by the scholar Feliks Koneczny (1862-1949) from the Jagiellonian University (Dyba, 1993: 33/34; Lubos, 1974: 524). The changing role of Upper Silesia and its inhabitants in the plans of Polish nationalists coupled with the spread of Polish-language organizations and the press in this region as well as with the statistically visualized and created Ostflucht amounted to a danger in the eyes of German politicians. The authorities decided to counteract this trend to ensure further building of the German nation-state.

School absenteeism among Slavic-speaking schoolchildren in Upper Silesia which had increased after the commencement of the *Kulturkampf* (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 475), was to be curbed by the 1886 ordinance (Lis, 1993: 94). Another decision of the same year liquidated all the Polish/Polish-language student organizations at Breslau (Wroclaw) including: the *Towarzystwo Literacko-Słowiańskie* (1836-1886) and the *Towarzystwo Górnosłazaków* (1880-1886)\(^{439}\) (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 349-353; Swierc, 1963: 123). In the mid-1880s Kopp appealed for more German in church, and limited the use of Polish/Czech in religious instructions (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 329, 480/481) and since 1894 canvassed against Polish nationalism (but advocated teaching of Polish among Upper Silesians and German-speaking clergymen, doctors and lawyers who, due to their vocations, dealt with Polish-speakers) (Galos, 1992: 57). In 1891, with the decision of the Breslau (Wroclaw) consistory the weekly *Nowiny Śląskie*\(^{440}\) (Silesian News) (1884-1891) the only periodical for the Polish-speaking Protestants was closed down sealing their speedy assimilation into Germandom to which they felt more affinity because of their confession than to Polishdom pegged on Catholicism (Gröschel, 1993: 322; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 321; Szczepankiewicz-Battek, 1996: 10). In 1898 the circular letter was issued which obliged clerks to support Germandom (Klein, 1972: 12). To the measures some historians also add Germanization of Slavic names and surnames in Upper Silesia, which started in the 1860s and got intensified after 1871. It is an ahistoric interpretation of the past, as the process was not an orchestrated action, and came about with the influx of German-speaking civil servants who started arriving to Upper Silesia in large numbers in order to build the bureaucratic apparatus of the nation-state and serve the growing industrial basin. They usually did not know Polish/Czech so while beginning to institute the bureaucratic procedures which affected everybody, they had to write down names of Upper Silesians. They did so using German spelling, and also resorted to translation\(^{441}\).

\(^{438}\) From the historical point of view Silesia not having been part of Poland-Lithuania, it was not partitioned along with the hapless constitutional monarchy. Hence Upper Silesia was not a fragment of the Prussian partition.

\(^{439}\) The *Towarzystwo Polskich Górnoślązaków* (Society of Polish Upper Silesians) (1863-1876) directed mainly at Upper Silesian students of Catholic theology, it was dissolved due to the strictures introduced by the policies of the *Kulturkampf* (Tobiasz, 1947: 22).

\(^{440}\) This weekly like majority of other Protestant publications for Polish-speaking Silesians was published in Gothic fonts which were unambiguously associated with Germandom. After World War II Polish settlers and expellees who found such prints at their new homes disposed of them deeming them German (Gröschel, 1993: 322; Szczepankiewicz-Battek, 1996: 10).

\(^{441}\) The alterations can be classified as:

a. phonetic, brought about by the use of German spelling (*Koloczek > Kolotzek*);

b. caused by translation (*Kowol > Schmidt* [Smith]);

c. demanded by the German usage. German and English employ one form of surname for man and woman unlike Slavic languages which require different masculine and feminine forms of the same surname (*m Markowski, f Markowska*). In agreement with the German ortographic tradition, usually the masculine form (*Markowski*) was accepted both for man and woman in Upper Silesia (Jarczak, 1996: 12).
concerned Upper Silesians hardly ever being fully literate in standard Polish and usually knowing better how to write and read in German, more often than not readily espoused the formalized written forms of their names⁴⁴² (Jarczak, 1996: 12). Provision of more financial resources for Protestant than Catholic schools in Upper Silesia seems to have constituted another harassing step which rather emanated from the atmosphere of the *Kulturkampf* than from a conscious effort to curb the Polish-language movement (Schofer, 1974: 153). However, the most decried (by Polish nationalists) German move was the 1885-1887 expulsions of alien Polish-speakers and Jews from Congress Poland and Galicia. It was made by Polish nationalist historians into the very symbol of the struggle between Germandom and Polishdom under the emotional name of *rugió⁴⁴³*. Leaving aside the rhetoric, it seems that the causes were fear of socialist/revolutionary influences⁴⁴⁴ from Russia and the need to straighten up these cases which were not congruent with the German law which simultaneously was homogenized, and produced a unified legal framework of the nation-state which gradually more clearly drew a line between citizens and unaccepted aliens. At present the very same concept together with the right to expel unwanted aliens is employed by majority of the states. In sum, 25,914 aliens were expelled from the eastern provinces of Germany but 10,162 were allowed to stay. 6,624 were expelled from the whole of Silesia and 5,758 from the Oppeln (Opole) Regency whereas 2,389 were allowed to stay in the province including 1,975 in Upper Silesia (Brozek, 1863: 28, 37; Lis, 1993: 93; Rogall, 1993: 70).

All these decisions could not curb development of the Polish national movement (largely transplanted to Upper Silesia from outside). Nobody wanted to exercise more effective measures because they would have had to be unconstitutional and as such undoubtedly would have shattered the underlying framework of the *Rechtstaat* which was the basis for the German nation-state. So the limits imposed on Polish-Language social life together with Bismarck’s addresses emphasizing the need for homogeneity of Germany and its citizenry, rather solidified the opposition of the few Polish nationalist activists who steeled themselves for instilling Polish national identification among Upper Silesians (Machray, 1945: 26). In 1889 Adam Napieralski (1861-1928) from the province of Posen (Poznań), arrived at Beuthen (Bytom) to become the editor of *Katolik*. Although he continued the ultramontane line of this weekly being rightly convinced that the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians did not consider themselves Poles (as some Polish activists hoped, e.g. Przyniczyński), he gradually broadened the organizational framework of the Polish-language movement, which later was to be utilized by more radical Polish nationalists. He established the first two Polish credit banks in Upper Silesia in 1895 and 1900 (Snoch, 1991: 95) introducing the basic tenets of *Wirtschaftskampf* developed by Polish activists in the province of Posen (Poznań). The clearly Polish nationalist trend came into being in Upper Silesia through the actions undertaken by another two Wilkopolska journalists Jan Karol Mac’kowski (1865-1915) and Bronislaw Koraszewski (1864-1924). In 1890 the latter founded *Gazeta Opolska* (Opole Newspaper) (1890-1923) with financial resources received from the *Liga Polska*, and, in 1891, the former probably received a subsidy from the Upper Silesian medical doctor and Polish activist Józef Rostek⁴⁴⁵ (1859-1929), to purchase *Nowiny Raciborskie* (Racibórz News) (1889-1921) (Gröschel, 1993: 197/198, 238; Snoch, 1991: 67, 87, 122).

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⁴⁴² One may surmise that a many Upper Silesian speaking the Upper Silesian creole as his mother tongue, but writing rather in German than in Polish, would have found the Polish spelling of his surname awkward.

⁴⁴³ This antiquated term belongs to the Polish nationalist terminology as currently expulsion is translated into Polish as *wysiedlenie* or *ekspulsjá*.

⁴⁴⁴ The anti-socialist laws instituted by Bismarck in 1878 to eliminate from politics the *Reichsfeinde* (enemies of the empire), i.e. the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD, German Social Democratic Party), whose social influence had dramatically increased since its inception three years earlier, were annulled only after his resignation in 1890. The laws constituted an additional platform of rapprochement between the state and the Catholic Church, as the latter did not sympathize with any organized worker movements until the publication of the encyclical *Rerum novarum* in 1891 (Fulbrook, 1990: 133/134).

⁴⁴⁵ He was one of the very few Polish-speaking Upper Silesians who attended a university and graduated from other than the theological department without having acquired German national identity. On the contrary, he
The relaxed attitude toward the Polish movement in Germany during the chancellorship of Leo von Caprivi (1890-1894) allowed establishment of new organizations. The Towarzystwo Naukowe Akademików Górnosłazaków (Scientific Society of Upper Silesian Academics) (1892-1899) and the Kółko Polskie (Polish Circle) (1895-1906) of theological students sprang up at Breslau (Wrocław) (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 358/359). More radical views were brought to the academic center in 1894 with founding of the local Sokół organization drawing on similar organizations already existing in the province of Posen (Poznań). A year later another Sokół organization was established by a Posen (Poznań) worker at Beuthen (Bytom). New branches proliferated, and in 1901 they got united as the VIth (Silesian) Group of the Związek Sokolów Polskich w Państwie Niemieckim (Union of Polish Sokół Organizations in Germany). In 1894-1914 there existed about 30 Silesian Sokół branches (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 346-348; Ponczek, 1987: 3-5). The organization opened the way for various radical nationalist groups inspired by the Liga Narodowa and Zet (with its Breslau (Wrocław) branch commenced in 1895) which came into being especially in Breslau (Wrocław) at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 358; Swierc, 1964: 123; Tobiasz, 1947: 23). Their members usually students, were responsible for spreading Polish nationalism in Upper Silesia (Lis, 1993: 96). The picture would not be full without mentioning that Polish associations of singers had existed in Upper Silesia since 1883 and with time got radicalized and became a pool of recruits for more actively nationalist organizations after having been united in the umbrella organization of the Związek Śląskich Kół śpiewaczych in 1910 (Union of the Silesian Circles of Singers) (Hanke, 1997: 66; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 342/343). This variegated collection of associations Polish women organizations joined beginning with 1900, and already in 1907 not less than 2,000 Upper Silesian women participated in the congress of the women periodical Przodownica (Female Leader) in Cracow (Michalkiewicz, 348-350). In the 1890s hundreds and even thousands of Upper Sileans went on pilgrimages to Cracow, and thanks to this Upper Silesian-Galician ties 74 Upper Silesian priests received their education at the city in 1892-1913 (Kwiatek, 1992: 80-82, 90). More nationally-minded Upper Silesian activists also participated in some Polish national anniversaries celebrated at Cracow, for instance, in the moving of the greatest national Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz’s (1798-1855) remains to the Wawel Royal Castle (1890), in the centenary of the Kościuszko Insurrection (1894) and in 500th anniversary of founding the Jagiellonian University (1900) (Wanatowicz, 1992: 56). The ties developed both ways. For instance, some participants of the November Uprising fled from Russia to Romania where they established their cultural center in Iasi in 1866. It gathered quite a capital and a library of 4,000 Polish volumes. In 1892, due to the rapid shrinking of the Polish community, this collection and the financial resources were transferred to Beuthen (Bytom) the center of the Polish movement in Upper Silesia, and gave rise to the Górnośląskie Towarzystwo Literackie446 (Upper Silesian Society of Literature) (Anon., 1997: 4).

This situation encouraged establishing more formal ties between Polish nationalist organizations and their fledgling counterparts in Upper Silesia. For instance, after the annulment of the anti-socialist laws in 1890 the SPD and the affiliated Towarzystwo Socjalistów Polskich (TSP, Society of Polish Socialists) got interested in Upper Silesia where a considerable strike had been staged a year earlier. Soon the TSP separated from the SPD and having accepted the program of the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna PPS, Polish Socialist Party) (established at Paris in 1892), co-founded the PPSzp (PPS of the Prussian Partition) in 1893. The PPSzp was active in the province of Posen (Poznań) and Upper Silesia accepting the ethnic idea of Poland which included Upper Silesia. Moreover, the strength of worker movement was so conspicuous in the Upper Silesian industrial basin, that in 1901 the PPSzp’s main press organ Gazeta Robotnicza (Worker’s Newspaper) (1891-1939) was moved from Berlin to Kattowitz (Katowice) (Davies, 1991: xx; Gröschel, 1993: 334; Lis, became a Polish national activist, and in 1880 established the Towarzystwo Polskich Górnosłazaków at Breslau (Wrocław) (Tobiasz, 1947: 22).

446 This Polish library from Iasi grew and after the division of Upper Silesia became the basis of the library of the Silesian Sejm in 1922. In 1936 it was transformed into the Silesian Public Library, and in 1952 into the Silesian Library, which with its 1996 new imposing seat in Katowice (Kattowitz), remains one of the main symbols of Polishdom in Upper Silesia (Anon., 1997: 4; Snoch, 1991: 11).
1993: 94/95; Wanatowicz, 1992: 56, 65). Other Polish political groupings did not share the PPSzp’s rather unrestrained espousal of Upper Silesia as part a future Poland. The Polish national conservatives standing on the ground of legalist loyalty to the partition powers, opposed including Upper Silesia in the schemes of Polish nationalism, demanding reestablishment of the Polish state in its prepartition shape. In 1872 the Posen (Poznań) conservatives stated that Silesia should exist for itself and not for the Polish nationalist cause (Wanatowicz, 1992: 71/72). They were afraid that Polish national agitation would contribute to establishing strong socialist movement in Upper Silesia, which did happen at the turn of the centuries. So in 1901 the Polish Circle at the Reichstag vehemently condemned Polish national agitation in Upper Silesia following the exemplar of the rector of the Jagiellonian University count Stanisław Tarnowski who at the 500th anniversary of the establishment of the university (1900) had refused to accept the coal bust of the Polish King Władysław Jagiełło (the founder of the university) from the hands of the Upper Silesian delegation (Wanatowicz, 1992: 69/70).

The lukewarm welcome to the idea of Upper Silesia as part of a future Poland was caused by the fact that from the historical point of view this region was never included in Poland-Lithuania which Prussia, Russia and the Habsburg Empire partitioned in the second half of the 18th century and which the Polish national movement sought to restitute; whereas, on the other hand, Polish nationalists were not sure if the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians should be included in the postulated Polish nation on the ethnic grounds. The Upper Silesian clergy quite accurately opined that they were the Polish-speaking population of no national attachment. The Zentrum modified this statement a little saying that they were Polish-speaking Prussians, which still seems acceptable (Wanatowicz, 1992: 110/111). The opinions repeated the words of Bismarck who said, in 1886, that the Wasserpolnische Volk were nationally indifferent. Later he commented that because of the local Polish language movement and the influence of the Polish national movements, the Wasserpolacken were Polonized (Nicolai, 1930: 58/59). The effects of this process of Polonization of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians was quite optimistically assessed by Polish sources which claimed that 20% of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians considered themselves to be Poles at the turn of the centuries. More up to the point was a conservative Polish statement of 1908 which propounded that only a handful of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians identified themselves as Poles (Wanatowicz, 1992: 90, 123).

The Zentrum and the Church still espousing ultramontane views could not remain neutral to the efforts to establish a Polish nationalist center in Upper Silesia on the basis of the Polish-language movement they had helped bring about themselves. Moreover, Kopp having entered the Prussian governmental structures in the mid-1880s (Scheuermann, 1994: 832) he opened the way for Zentrum politicians to significant positions in the state. Von Ballestrem, the leader of the Silesian Zentrum, became the first Vice-President of the Reichstag in 1890 (Gross, 1995: 58), and, in 1894, the first Catholic Prince Hermann von Hatzfeldt 448 (1848-1933) was nominated to the position of the Oberpräsident of the province of Silesia (Kaczmarek, 1993: 19; Scheuermann, 1994: 521). In this situation the Silesian Catholic Church and the Zentrum could not compromise their position supporting the Polish language movement too vociferously or, least of all, the budding Polish national movement as it would go against the universalist tenets of ultramontanism and the process of German nation-state building. In 1893 he appealed to the Kaiser for some concessions for teaching in Polish (for what he was strongly criticized by German nationalists) but to no avail. In 1902 he opposed any transgressions of the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein against Church and spiritual life of the faithful as well as, in 1908, castigated the overtly anti-Polish laws which were issued after 1900. On the other hand, in 1890 Kopp recommended the Silesian clergy to use German in church life more often, as

447 This term can be rendered in the modern terminology as the Upper Silesian Polish-speaking ethnic group.

448 He belonged to the Reichspartei (Scheuermann, 1994: 520).
a member of the Austrian Silesian Landtag he opposed giving the official status to Czech and Polish in this crownland, in 1894 he said that he aimed at severing any organizational ties between Upper Silesia and the Polish partition lands but had nothing against the Polish language in church life, in 1897 he dissolved the pro-Polish Catholic Towarzystwo Św. Alojzego (St. Aloysius Society) and advised priests to resign leadership in pro-Polish associations (Galos, 1992: 57; Galos, 1996: 190/191; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 481; Reiner, 1966: 113). Subsequently, the clergy remained staunchly ultramontane, and at the end of the 19th century only about 25 out of the 500 Upper Silesian priests were active in the pro-Polish and Polish nationalist movements (Tobiasz, 1947: 38).

The ultramontane and pro-state attitude of the Church and the Zentrum displeased the radicalized Polish activists so the 1891 bilingual Zentrum/Catholic rally at Beuthen (Bytom) was the last one where a common position was adopted. In the 1893 elections to the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag the rift appeared clearly when the Polish-speaking Zentrum members put forward their own candidates against the wishes of the party’s leadership. It was not a manifestation of support for Polish nationalism but discontent with aristocratic candidates who did not fully represent the interests of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesian peasants and workers. One candidate of the Polish-speaking Zentrum fraction was elected to the Landtag, and next two ones, in the 1894 and 1895 be-elections to the Reichstag. Noviny Raciborskie, Gazeta Opolska and even Katolik contributed to their success because they resolutely canvassed for the candidates. The falling out between the Zentrum and the Polish fraction made the party understand that it would lose its position in Upper Silesia without the full support of the Polish-speaking Catholics grouped around Katolik, and a compromise was worked out by 1897 which, never the less, could not prevent bickering between the two groups at the close of the 19th century. However, Napieralski the Katolik faction leader noticed that in many constituencies Polish-speaking Upper Silesians chose to vote for traditional German-speaking aristocratic candidates which cemented the increasingly uneasy alliance, in the age of the intensifying nationalist Polish-German conflict, into the next century (Brozek, 1995: 62; Lis, 1993: 95/96; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 365-375; Wanatowicz, 1992: 70).

The coming to terms between the Zentrum and the Katolik faction did not please young radicals who appeared among Upper Silesian students and get under influence of Polish nationalist propaganda channelled from Posen (Poznań) and Galicia. Upper Silesians participated in Polish student meetings at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (1899, 1909, 1910, 1912, 1913) and Cracow (1908), and their staged a similar meeting at Beuthen (Bytom) in 1911. The Liga Narodowa got quite an influence among Polish/Polish-speaking students at Breslau after 1900 establishing numerous organizations usually affiliated with the Zet. In 1901 the Zet established the Polska Grupa Narodowa (Polish National Group) which, in 1908, grouped 156 members: 87 from the province of Posen (Poznań), 37 from Silesia, 30 from Galicia and Congress Poland, and 2 from other states. The Polish nationalists organized summer camps for their supporters in Wielkopolska and after 1910 in Lemberg (Lviv) and infiltrated secondary schools in Silesia (Kwiatek, 1991a: 11; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 357-364). The students brought Polish national ideas to Upper Silesia, and, consequently, the more radical faction of the local Polish-language movement encouraged by election successes of Polish-speaking candidates not accepted by the Zentrum, distanced itself from the moderate stance of Katolik and strove to establish links with the Polish national movement. In 1894 they took part in the Polish national rally at Lemberg (Lviv) (Neubach, 1995: 200/201) and already in 1901 the leadership of pro-Polish and Polish language organizations from Upper Silesia met at Beuthen (Bytom) (Kwiatek, 1991: 12). Having observed this undoubtful increase of interest in matters Polish Napieralski launches the first

449 Because the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese included the whole of Austrian East Silesia and one third of Austrian West Silesia, the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop had a guaranteed seat in the Austrian Silesian Landtag (Dąbrowski, 1922: 176; Galos, 1996: 191).

450 The society named after St Aloysius (1568-1591), a Jesuit student (Attwater, 1983: 37/38), was established by Father Bonczyk (Boncek, Bontzek) in 1871. In Upper Silesia it was the first Polish-speaking youth organization and conducted cultural and educational activities in Polish, in defiance of the Kulturkampf (Snoch, 1991: 150).
Polish-language daily *Dziennik Śląski* (Polish Daily) (1898-1931) and the number of its sold copies rapidly rises to 6,000 in 1910 and 10,000 in 1913. Five years later it is joined by another daily the overtly pro-Polish *Glos Śląski* (Silesian Voice) (1903-1921) whose initial high number of copies 4,000 rose only to 4,700 in 1914. The short-lived *Gazeta Polska* (Polish newspaper) (1902) and *Iskra* (Spark) (1903) were connected to the *Eleusis* which stemmed from Cracow and propagated the messianic strain of Polish nationalism derived from the writings of Polish romantic poets. The organization got promptly suppressed in 1904/1905 and its members continued their activities underground in connection with the Zet (Glensk, 1992: 20/21; Gröschel, 1993: 41, 83/84, 108/109; Kwiatek, 1991; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 354/355; Snoch, 1991: 30/31). Since the turn of the centuries Polish periodicals, publications, bookshops, cooperatives, credit and saving banks/societies, trade unions, cultural and other organizations proliferated. As usual the question arises what the extent of their influence was. In 1914 the 494 various Polish organizations boasted 45,760 members and 85,129 readers belonged to Polish-language libraries in 1911/1912 (Michalkiewicz, 331-340). However, it would be an overstatement to claim that they were Poles. In the light of the Upper Silesians unwavering loyalty to Prussiandom and their local Upper Silesian identity (which often was flabbergasting to the outside observer when an Upper Silesian claimed to be a Pole and German simultaneously\(^{451}\) when pressed for revealing his national identity (Pater, 1993: 214)), it is sobering to remark that according to the contemporary police sources there were only 120 Polish national activists in 1910 in Upper Silesia. Many of them having come from Posen (Poznań) and Galicia, the indigenous contingent was even smaller\(^{452}\) (Molik, 1993: 77).

The Polish national movement started in earnest by *Gazeta Opolska* and *Nowiny Raciborskie* in the 1890s, could not effectively compete with the traditional and popular ultramontane leanings among the Upper Silesians until the appearance of the legendary figure of Wojciech (A(da)lbert) Korfanty (1873-1939). Many a German Silesian and historian consider(ed) him *Deutschenhasser* (embodiment of venomous hatred against the Germans) (Scheuermann, 1994: 834) and dub(ed) Polish nationalism in Upper Silesia as the *böse Geist Korfantys* (bad spirit of Korfanty) (Bahlcke, 1996: 110), while he is a paragon of Polishness to Polish nationalists (Wawryszyn, 1992) and an ambiguous figure to the Upper Silesians of no national leanings. To the last he usually seemed to be a tragic politician who tried to secure some socialpolitical space for the Upper Silesians of no national convictions, where they could continue living sticking to their own prenational complementary identity in the rapidly advancing world of clashing nation-states. In sum, trying to satisfy the hopes of the Upper Silesians, the needs of the Polish state which emerged after 1918, the expectations of the German minority who, understandably, appeared in Poland’s Silesian Voivodship after the division of Upper Silesia in 1921, as well as his own political ambitions, he was doomed to have to make controversial decisions which more frequently than not were perceived as anti-German by the Germans, pro-German or even anti-Polish by the Poles, and simultaneously pro-German and pro-Polish, and, in result, anti-Upper Silesian by the Upper Silesians (cf. Gross, 1995: 85/84; Snoch, 1991: 67).

He was born to a miner family in the small worker settlement Sadzawka (Sadzawki) located (quite symbolically) very close to the border of Congress Poland. Presumably he was a brilliant and diligent student and continued his education at the Kattowitz (Katowice) gymnasium which was extremely rare in the case of Upper Silesian children unless they wanted to become priests. Initially he had a better command of German than Polish but his mother taught him to read in Polish with the use of religious books. Next he developed a rebellious taste for matters and publications Polish which led to his expulsion from the gymnasium with no right to continue his education at any secondary school in Germany. Thanks to aid from Posen (Poznań) Polish activists and especially from the Prussian

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451 An unambiguous example of the prenational complementary identity interacting with the promoted national identities.

452 However, as the later years were to show, this relatively small number was able to bring about quite radical changes. On the other hand, the same sources indicated that the Posen (Poznań) Polish activists numbered 380 in 1905/1906 (Molik, 1993: 77) which is not many more.
**Landtag** deputy Józef Kościelski (1845-1911) he was able to pass his matriculation examination in 1895 without having attended a gymnasium, and to study at Berlin (1895-1898). Before leaving the imperial capital for Breslau (Wroclaw) he associated himself with Polish students, Polish socialists and Polish national activists. Probably while already in Berlin he became a member of the Zet and he continued his contacts with this organization at Breslau (Wroclaw) (Scheuermann, 1994: 835/836; Kaczmarek, 1993: 20/21; Tobiasz, 1947: 18-23; Zieliński, 1983: 3).

At the turn centuries the Polish national newspapers Galician Przegląd Wszechpolski (Panpolish Review) from Lemberg (Lviv), and Gazeta Gruziądzka (Gruziądz Newspaper) and Praca453 (Labor) from the province of Posen (Poznań) started reaching Upper Silesia. Especially the last one with 2,000 subscribers in Upper Silesia and the Dziennik Berliński (Berlin Daily) were responsible for propagating Polish nationalism in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency. Collaborating with the two periodicals, Korfanty declared in Praca (1901): we hate you Germans in 1901, and in the same year on Korfanty’s initiative Dziennik Berliński published two brochures: Bacznośc’! Chleb drożeje! (Attention! Bread Prices Rise!) and Precz z Centrum! (Away with the Zentrum!) which were distributed in Upper Silesian industrial cities and towns. It was a deft stratagem calculated at drawing the Polish-speaking and Catholic Upper Silesian workers away from the Zentrum and winning them for Polish nationalism with social concern. In this manner, seizing the opportunity of the deepening economic slump which followed the brief recovery of 1897 (Fulbrook, 1990: 143) Polish nationalists and Korfanty abducted the socialist program commencing an open conflict with them and the non-nationalist idea of internationalism of the socialist movement. Dziennik Berliński and Praca fortified the influence of Polish nationalism among the Upper Sileans with further brochures which popularized the idea of the Polish nation and equalized it with the Polish language (not unlike Arndt did in the case of the German nation, in 1813 (Fishman, 1996: 166)). In 1901 the elite Liga Narodowa accepted Korfanty as a member, and he forcefully entered the fray the same year with his article where he stated that the Upper Silesians are Poles. This article appeared in the clearly Polish nationalist daily GórnoŚlązak454 (Upper Silesian) (1901-1933) which with the number of its published copies soaring to 6,000 in 1902 and 9,400 in 1914 rivalled Napieralski’s Dziennik Śląski. In 1902-1905 Korfanty worked as an editor in the GórnoŚlązak. In 1902 the top ideologues of Polish nationalism: Dmowski, Balicki and Poplawski and other Liga Narodowa members (including Korfanty) met at Cracow and decided to create a fully-fledged Polish national movement in Silesia (Glensk, 1992: 21; Gröschel, 1993: 119/120; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 366-368; Snoch, 1991: 42; Wanatowicz, 1992: 96; Zieliński, 1983: 4). To this end they established the Polskie Towarzystwo Wyborcze (PTW, Polish Electionary Society) in November 1902 with the seat in Gleiwitz (Gliwice) and published their program where they emphasized that they were Poles and would join the Polish Circle of Posen (Poznań) deputies if elected, adding the slogan that Polish-speaking Upper Sileans should elect pro-Polish Polish-speaking deputies. In the 1903 Reichstag elections the PTW fielded seven candidates. Korfanty obtained a mandate as the only one in a run-up voting and by a very narrow margin of 1.4%, in which he was helped by intensive campaigning and the recession which hit Germany that year causing bitter discontent in his highly industrialized constituency of Kattowitz (Katowice-Zabrze). As a 30-year-old he was the youngest Reichstag deputy along with Matthias Erzberger. Korfanty unlike the Katolik faction and Zentrum Polish-speaking deputies, joined the Polish Circle tangibly showing the German public opinion that he was serious about the idea of making Upper Silesians into Poles and incorporating the region in a future Poland. His stance was made even clearer when in 1904 he was elected to the Prussian Landtag from a Wielkopolska not Upper Silesian constituency. These initial successes prompted Poplawski to state that Upper Silesia shifted from the category of uncertain semi-Polish borderlands (Kresy, which included: Lithuania, Ruthenia, Szepez (Spìš), and, perhaps, Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Silesia) into the center of the Polish

453 The Upper Silesian Marcin (Martin) Biedermann founded it in 1896 (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 376).
454 Marcin Biedermann establish this periodical at Posen (Poznań). It was transferred to Kattowitz (Katowice) in 1902 (Snoch, 1991: 42).

In the year of the 1905 revolution in Russia, which had direct influence on Upper Silesia across the border from Congress Poland, Korfanty’s mandate was annulled. Using the unrest and the lingering economic recession which had set in in 1903 the PPSzp with the SPD’s support put forward its own candidate in the ensuing by-elections hoping to add a new deputy to the four SPD ones who had gained their mandates in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency two years earlier. Korfanty won with a wide margin adopting anti-socialist rhetoric of the Zentrum and the Church which deeply Catholic Upper Silesians easily espoused unlike the prospect of the revolutionary order which seemed to them ungodly and dangerous. Subsequently, the PPSzp again started functioning within the organizational framework of the SPD, and Napieralski, having observed that the strain of unmitigated Polish nationalism attracts followers, took part in the 1906 by-elections and was elected to the Reichstag (Lis, 1993: 110/111; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 270, 404). In 1905 Korfanty established the newspaper Polak (Pole) (1905-1926) and adopted a less nationalist tone not wishing to alienate the powerful Katolik faction. His attitude contributed to consolidating the Polish camp around Christian democratic values espoused by the middle class, and to limiting the socialist influence. In 1907 before the new elections to the Reichstag, Korfanty established the daily Kurjer Śląski (Silesian Courier) (1907-1922). He, Napieralski and three other Polish candidates (of the Katolik faction) won mandates in the twelve constituencies of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency (Bahlcke, 1996: 110; Glensk, 1992: 21/22; Gröschel, 1993: 123/124). Polish nationalists rejoiced, and in his 1908 book Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia Polska (Germany, Russia and the Polish Question), Dmowski demanded for a future Polish state, among others: Upper Silesia, the Lower Silesian counties of: Gross Wartenberg (Syców) and Namslau (Namysłów), and the whole of Austrian Silesia (Mroczko, 1994: 97/98). The offensive stance of Polish nationalism and the election results put the Zentrum with only five mandates (one mandate went to a conservative candidate) on defence. The Polish movement restricted with anti-Polish legislation also felt uneasy. Thus, in 1908, the Katolik faction and the Zentrum with nine mandates among them (Korfanty did not join the alliance) decided to form a coalition to ward off socialists and anti-Polish measures (Lis, 1993: 114; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 270; Wanatowicz, 1992: 120). Korfanty also moved in the same direction having renounced his ties with the Liga Narodowa and his staunchly anti-German program in the same year. The pragmatic line of Napieralski bore more fruit and Korfanty was rapidly losing support among the electorate. Not to be obliterated from the political scene Korfanty reached an agreement with Napieralski in 1910. Next year they established the Stronnictwo Polskie na Śląsku (Polish Party in Silesia) breaking the ties between Katolik and the Zentrum, and the Katolik press concern had continued monopolizing the Polish-language press in Upper Silesia through buying out independent Polish-language periodicals (including Korfanty’s Polak) (Figowa, 1966: 16). Actually the Zentrum had distanced itself from Katolik in 1909 hoping that the split among the PPS, nationalist and ultramontane strains in the Polish movement would reduce its appeal. Moreover, the Silesian Zentrum leader von Ballestrem and his colleagues actively canvassed for structural and economic improvements in Upper Silesia which disposed the electorate more favorably to the party. Subsequently, in the last Reichstag elections (1912) the Polish movement obtained only three mandates. It was a significant loss: the rapid growth of votes supporting Polish candidates in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, which grew from 17.7% in 1903 to the staggering 39.5% in 1907, dropped to 30.8% in 1912 (Dlugoborski, 1995: 15). Korfanty did not dare to participate in the elections having been accused by the PPSzp and the Liga Narodowa that he was a traitor of the Polish national cause. Next year in the Prussian Landtag elections no Polish candidate obtained a mandate

455 Although the Polish movement and the Zentrum obtained five mandates each, the former received 39.5% votes and the latter only 31.7% (Lis, 1993: 112).

456 In the light of the loss it is good to mention that the plebeian strain, which had been started in the Zentrum by the emergence of the Polish movement, led to the situation that not even a single nobleman was a candidate in the 1912 elections in Upper Silesia (Bahlcke, 1996: 110).
In 1912 the *Zentrum* organ *Der oberschlesische Kurier* (Upper Silesian Courier) (1906-1945) commented that Polish nationalism in Upper Silesia was dealt a death blow and predicted its speedy demise due to educational and economic improvements gradually introduced by the German governance in the wake of the economic recovery (Bahlcke, 1996: 110; Gröschel, 1993: 150). This opinion drew on the same tenet as Polish national voices who had maintained, in 1907, that the presence of Polish nationalism in Upper Silesia had not been brought about by any local Polish revival but by cultural and educational influence from outside. It had been also understood that the movement would vanish without continuous development of Polish cultural and social organizations (Wanatowicz, 1992: 118). Both the assessments were right. The anti-Polish measures coupled with the end of recession and improved social conditions did weaken the Polish movement which was decisively muted by the outbreak of the Great War. New laws limiting activities of Polish organizations and weakening of their membership through draft rendered the Polish movement extremely inactive but the war proved to be a new variable in the Polish-German national conflict which was to flare up only after the close of World War I (Lis, 1993: 116; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 421).

German nationalists felt endangered by the emergence of the Polish-language movement in the 1890s, and, subsequently, the German governance due to the appearance of the Polish national movement after 1903. In their eyes the Polish successes imperiled the processes of German nation and nation-state building which were predominantly perceived as the highest good by the German public opinion and politicians. Accordingly, since the 1890s, German civil servants and professionals were appealed to and economically incited to settle in the not-German-speaking areas (including Upper Silesia) of the Reich to strengthen Germandom and offset the influence of other national movements (Migdal, 1965: 73). Accordingly, the number of civil servants grew by 50% in 1895-1906 thanks to various financial perks. In 1894 Emperor Wilhelm II delivered an overtly anti-Polish speech at Thorn (Toruń) and in the same year the conciliatory Chancellor von Caprivi was removed. In 1895-1897 a new wave of expulsions of Polish-speaking and Jewish aliens was conducted (it involved considerably less persons than its predecessor of 1885-1887). The capital of the Colonization Committee was enlarged in 1998, and in the same year the ministerial circular letter recommended civil servants living in the Polish-speaking regions, to enroll in various German organizations as well as to actively participate in German cultural life. In 1900 von Büllow became Chancellor and started a more comprehensively anti-Polish line clearly conscious that Polish nationalists aimed at attracting the Upper Silesians into the fold of Polishdom in order to turn Upper Silesia into a territorial bridge between Posen (Poznań) and Cracow. The Wirtschaftskampf started in Upper Silesia in earnest in 1898, when the Prussian minister of state pointed out that the emerging Polish economic movement should be curbed. In 1901 the Präsident of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency Ernst Holtz appealed for development of German cooperatives and savings banks which he offered to support with special subsidies. Next year he issued a circular letter in which he forbade civil servants and their families to maintain any contacts with Polish banks and coop shops, and in 1902 and 1903 lists of such enterprises were compiled. Moreover, Polish credit and saving banks from Upper Silesia were forbidden to join the cartel union of similar banks in the province of Posen (Poznań) (Molik, 1993: 63). Special commissions aimed at furthering German colonization commenced their activities in Upper Silesia in 1903 and in 1905 the Prussian government issued the order which stated that the emperor supported the idea of enlarging Fideikommissen\(^\text{457}\) to strengthen Germandom. The 1904 amendment to the 1886 Colonization Act allowed the authorities not to permit construction of houses in Polish-speaking areas, and in 1908 the Expropriation Act was passed. The 1904 and 1908 laws giving preferential treatment German colonists in the purchase of land, were more in use in the

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\(^{457}\) *Fideikommiß* in German, *fideikomis* in Polish is derived from the latin term *fidei commissum*. It denoted a hereditary land which could be sold only as a whole. *Fideikommisses* were the stronghold of Junkers and accounted for almost half the arable land in Upper Silesia (Snoch, 1991: 32; Tokarski, 1971: 216; Ullmann, 1985: 86)
province of Posen (Poznań) than in Upper Silesia where there was little arable land and the majority of workforce were employed in industry (Łukasiewicz, 1988: 82). Actually the latter act was used only once in 1912 and applied just to four farms in the province of Posen (Poznań). Much more restrictive for Polish-language and Polish national life in Upper Silesia was another act of 1908. It forbade political organizations recruit members younger than 18 and established German as the language of meetings of all organizations in the counties where non-German-speakers did not constitute more than 60% of the populace. The other than German languages were allowed to be in use at such meetings only until 1928. All the restrictions were enforced by obligatory presence of a policeman during meetings (Klein, 1972: 12-14; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 280-284). This situation led to numerous trials of Polish journalists, activists and organizations which transgressed against the laws (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 285-287, 295) but local opposition was not too strong. For instance, the 1906 school strike against religious instructions in German was joined by at least 70,000 schoolchildren in 50% of the schools in the province of Posen (Poznań) whereas in Upper Silesia only 431 children of several schools participated in this strike due to the unfavorable position of the Zentrum as well as Napieralski and Korfanzy (Jakőbczyk, 1989: 67; Reiter, 1966: 44/45). In 1912 the struggle for land as conducted by the Ansiedlungskommission and Polish landowners in the province of Posen (Poznań) was also extended to Silesia through the Besitzfestigungsgesetz Act on strengthening possession of land which covered these Prussian territories where the Ansiedlungskommission did not have the statutory right to operate. The royal ordinance of 1913 determined the areas of Silesia where these new act was to be applied. They contained all of the Oppeln (Opole) regency with the exception of the counties of Leobschütz ( Głubczyce), Neisse (Nysa) and Grottkau (Grońków). In case of the Breslau (Wroclaw) and Liegnitz (Legnica) regencies all the counties near the province of Posen (Poznań) were included (Brożek, 1966: 15-17). Thus through the move the authorities eventually accepted the German nationalist stance that also Silesia is endangered by Polish nationalism. But the land struggle never started in Silesia in earnest because the Reichstag condemned Prussia’s expropriation policy in 1913, and after the outbreak of the Great War neither the Prussian government nor German nationalists were interested in continuing the nationalist conflict faced with external enemies and the fortified socialist movement (Wiskemann, 1956: 14).

The official moves to limit the development and influence of the Polish national movement were accompanied by grass roots German activities. Already when Nowiny Raciborskie started promoting Polish nationalism, the Zentrum launched the short-lived biweekly Gazeta GórnoŚląska Ludowa (Popular Upper Silesian Newspaper) (1892-1893). Due to the initiative of the Industriellenbund (Union of Industrialists) the thrice-weekly Der Oberschlesische Arbeiterfreund (Upper Silesian Worker Friend) (1900-1919) was established to offset the Polish influence among industrial workers. Its run soon reached over 20,000 copies (many of which were distributed free of charge) and the periodical was supplemented by the annual calendar Arbeiterfreund-Kalendar. Generally, these German-language periodicals which wanted to achieve a financial success in Upper Silesia strove to be neutral not to repel Polish-speaking Upper Silesians. Thanks to this tactics, the bilingual weekly Der Oberschlesische Bergund Hüttenmann (Upper Silesian Miner and Metallurgical Worker) (1880-1899) reached 3,000 copies in sales, and the daily Der Oberschlesische Wanderer (Upper Silesian Wanderer) (1828-1945) grew to the second largest newspaper in Silesia at the beginning of the 20th century with the ruin of 20,000 copies in 1906 and 40,000 in 1914 (Glensk, 1992: 20, 24/25; Gröschel, 1993: 79/80, 119, 239; Schofer, 1974: 95). The influence of the periodicals was significant in drawing the Upper Silesians from socialism and Polish nationalism. Since 1896 their efforts as well as the official measures were supported by Rudolf Küster, the director of the Department of religious and Educational Affairs in the government of the Opole (Oppeln) regency. The first popular German library was established at Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry in 1897, and in 1910 there were 146 stationary popular libraries and 939 travelling libraries with 120,825 members.

This act like the Colonization Acts gave German farmers the right to purchase available land before Slavic-speakers, and access to preferential loans (Brożek, 1966a: 17).
In 1903 they got united in the framework of the *Verband oberschlesischer Volksbüchereien* (Union of Popular Libraries of Upper Silesia), and in 1906 it started publishing its own bimonthly *Die Volksbücherei in Oberschlesien* (Popular Library in Upper Silesia) (1906-1922). The 1568 Upper Silesian elementary schools boasted their 1538 libraries which were supplied with 64,000 copies of *Kindergärtchen* (Kindergarten Children) (1893-1919) and *Der Junge Oberschlesier* (Young Upper Silesian) (1894-1920) in 1910/1911 (Gröschel, 1993: 241, 326). Schools also organized numerous extracurricular activities. For instance, in 1912 they staged skating and skiing events in 361 localities, which were participated by 19,778 children. In 1912 there were 614 further education schools which aimed at improving German literacy among 35,061 youth working in shops, on farms and in crafts. In 1912 there were also 20 factory schools with 2,202 students. The ideals of German nationalism were spread among school youth through the *Jung-Deutschland-Bund* (Union of Young Germany) and the Maidchenheime (Girl club rooms). The *Deutsche Turnerschaft* (Union of German Gymnastics) and the *Oberschlesische Spiel und Eislaufsverein* (Upper Silesian Union of Sports Games and Skating) supported 516 organizations with 37,312 members in 1912 in Upper Silesia, and were served by their own monthly *Oberschlesische Turn-Zeitung* (Upper Silesian Gymnastics Newspaper) (1907-1921) (Gröschel, 1993: 241). The *Oberschlesische Sängerbund* (Upper Silesian Union of Singers), *Schlesischer Sängerbund* (Silesian Union of Singers), Männersingervereine (Societies of Male Singers) and the *Oberschlesische Arbeiter Sängerbund* (Upper Silesian Workers Union of Singers) grouped almost 12,000 members in 1912. The Polish-language amateur theater was countered with state-subsidized productions in the theaters of Oppeln (Opole), Beuthen (Bytom), Gleiwitz (Gliwice), Kattowitz (Katowice) and Ratibor (Racibórz) and the activities of the *Oberschlesisches Volkstheater* (Travelling Popular Upper Silesian Theater) with the seat in Königshütte (Chorzów). Moreover, the *Kriegsvereine* (veteran associations) and the *Flottverein* (Fleet Association) had 82,388 and 7,559 members in 1912, respectively. The par excellence German nationalist society of the *Deutscher Ostmarkenverein* was of little importance in Silesia, unlike in the province of Posen (Poznań), since the Silesian authorities held that there was no problem of Polish nationalism in their province so that official support for this association would amount to antagonizing the populace. But thanks to the patronage of Upper Silesian entrepreneurs first branches of the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein came into being in Silesia in 1895/1896. The situation changed after Korfanty’s success in 1903 when the *Schlesischer Landesausschuss* (Silesian Committee) of the *Deutschen Ostmarkenverein* with the seat at Breslau (Wroclaw) came into being. The association’s membership rose from 7,500 in 1905 to 10,422 in 1909 and 11,850 in 1913. In 1909 6,150 persons belonged to it in Upper Silesia. The association actively supported all the anti-Polish measures introduced by the government and appealed against any participation of German-speakers in Polish-language life (e.g. German enterprises publishing their advertisements in the Polish-language press). This association’s Silesian branch’s largest success was the all German rally which took place in Upper Silesia in 1909. The *Deutschen Ostmarkenvereins* and German nationalists activities almost ceased like of their Polish counterparts with the outbreak of the Great War (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 296-309).

The German initiatives started strongly attracting the Upper Sileans toward Germandom despite the stunning successes of the Polish movement in the 1900s. It also showed in the Catholic Church statistics. In 1867-1918 the percentage of only German-speaking priests grew from 9.2% to 19.8% in Upper Silesia (Surman, 1992: 70). Despite Kopp’s disapproval of the anti-Polish laws and the activities of the *Deutscher Ostmarkenverein* (Galos, 1992: 57), the Silesian Church continued to go along the official line which aimed at civilizing Upper Sileans through the medium of the German language and culture (Lüer, 1995: 82/83). Not surprisingly, were German sermons delivered in 120 Upper Silesian parishes in 1900 and already in 231 in 1910, whereas the pre-First-Communion teaching was which was conducted in German only in 26 parishes in 1900, spread to 46 in 1910 (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 303).

The national conflict which unfolded at the turn of the centuries in Upper Sileisia, and the Ostflucht had peculiar influence on the labor relations in the Upper Silesian industrial basin which demands a separate treatment. The rapid development of the Upper Silesian industry in the first half of the 19th century brought about staggering urbanization. Beuthen’s (Bytom) population grew from
1,558 in 1795 to 15,711 in 1871 (Krause, 1995: 8; Weczerka, 1977: 23). Another city indexical of this process is Kattowitz (Katowice). It became a town in 1865, and the number of its inhabitants soared from 675 in 1825 to 4,815 in 1865 and 35,722 in 1905. In 1875 in this town’s vicinity there were six iron and eleven zinc metallurgical works, and 14 coal mines (Reichling, 1977: 223). The ongoing industrialization brought about the 1873 division of the old county of Beuthen (Bytom) into the new counties of Beuthen (Bytom), Kattowitz (Katowice), Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry) and Zabrze (Hindenburg). In 1890 the county of Beuthen (Bytom) was split into the urban and land counties of Beuthen Bytom, the same process was repeated with the county of Kattowitz (Katowice) in 1899 but already in 1898 the county of Königshütte (Chorzów) had been carved from it (Stüttgen, 1976: 190, 197, 214, 217). All the counties together with the counties of Tost-Gleiwitz (Toszek-Gliwice), Rybnik (Rybnik) and Pless (Pszczyna) formed the Upper Silesian industrial basin (Schofer, 1974: 6). Despite all the developments the Ruhr became more productive and modern than Upper Silesia during the 1860s and 1870s. The Upper Silesian mining and metallurgical industries employed 18,717 workers in 1852, 36,306 in 1865, 77,464 in 1885, 122,540 in 1900 and 193,560 in 1913; whereas the Ruhr mines alone gave work to 14,299 persons in 1851, 51,391 in 1870, 101,929 in 1885, 226,902 in 1900 and 382,951 in 1913 (Schofer, 1974: 14/15). In the united German state, Upper Silesia became more peripheral than it had been in Prussia. The cost of transport was reflected in wages which were smaller than those of workers in the Lower Silesian mines of Waldenburg (Walbrzych) and even the latter were surpassed by what the Dortmund employers offered (Fuchs, 1994: 561). The Silesian workers and miners had also to work longer shift hours than their Ruhr counterparts. Hence many Upper and Lower Sileans migrated westward in search of improved living and working conditions. This phenomenon intensified especially in the time of economic crisis (1873, 1882, 1893, 1903) when laid off workers rarely decided to return to farms of their parents. In 1871-1910 about 600,000 people left Silesia (Schofer, 1974: 20, 44, 115), or, in other words, 250,000 from Upper Silesia, 220,000 from the Breslau (Wrocław) regency, and 166,000 from the Liegnitz (Legnica) regency in the years 1867-1910. The only counties with more migrants coming than leaving in the period 1871-1905 were those of Beuthen (Bytom), Kattowitz (Katowice) and Zabrze (Hindenburg) (Wrzesiński, 1995: 182). In 1907 there were 730,388 Silesians residing in Germany outside their province: 297,350 in Berlin and Brandenburg, 162,312 in Saxony, 93,641 in Westphalia and Rheinland, and 43,605 in the province of Posen (Poznań) (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 41). Considering intraprovincial migrations, in 1900, there were 104,266 Upper Sileans in Lower Silesia while only 58,000 Lower Sileans in Upper Silesia. On the other hand, in 1907, 200,000 non-Sileans resided in the province though only 75,000 in the industrial region of Upper Silesia. Out of the 60,000 non-Sileans residing in the Oppeln (Opole) regency in 1900 none of the German provinces contributed more than 2,400 except Posen (Poznań) (8,400). Thus in every census from 1871 to 1900 95% of the population of the Upper Silesian industrial basin was being listed as born in Silesia, and no major alterations took place in this respect by 1914 when the war cut short any major shifts in population trends (Schofer, 1974: 22, 34/35).

The Ostflucht which was seen as one of the greatest dangers to Germandom was deepened by the influx of foreign workers in Upper Silesian industry who mainly came from the outlying counties of Galicia and Congress Poland. In 1885 there 3,178 of such workers in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency who together with their family members added up to 7,761. 60.7% of them were Russian citizens, and 39.3% Austrian-Hungarian ones (Brozek, 1958: 5). Because only 2,851 of these foreign workers were employed in the Upper Silesian industrial area, at most they constituted just 3.7% of the workforce in Upper Silesian mines and metallurgical works a rather insignificant percentage (Brozek, 1958: 5; Schofer, 1974: 14). The 1885-1887 expulsions of foreign workers did not meaningfully lowered the overall number of Polish-speakers in Upper Silesia, and did not affect daily cross-border commuters. The traffic involved 8,000 people before 1885 and continued to involve thousands of daily migrants down to 1914 (Schofer, 1974: 23). The resultant labor shortage due to increasing production (also due to the failure of the Ansiedlungskommission which had not managed to attract the predicted number of settlers (Davies, 1991: II 129)) deepened in the second half of the 1880s. Thus, despite the proposals to bring in Swedes, Lithuanians, Estonians, Finns, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Germans from
Hungary, Italians and even Chinese the fact was recognized that Galicia and Congress Poland were
the natural hinterland of Upper Silesia. So when the border was opened to foreign workers in 1890,
under the pressure exerted by employers, almost all the foreign contract workers were Polish-speakers
from these regions. But no Jews were allowed in, and in order to prevent naturalization Karenzzeit
(waiting period) was applied to them because of which they had to leave Germany for several winter
months every year (Brozék, 1958: 17; Schofer, 1974: 24/25). In 1894 the institution of Karenzzeit
was applied also to Czechs and in 1902 to Lithuanians (Jonca, 1958: 150/151). After the initial
upsurge of 5,267 foreign contract workers, the annual figure hovered between 200 and 1,000 in 1892-
1895, and 1,000 and 3,000 in 1896-1900 (Brozék, 1966a: 56). From 1900 to 1906, the total labor
force grew swiftly, and the numbers of foreign workers increased to an average of 3,000 annually
(Schofer, 1974: 25/26). Because the constant annual outflow of 5,000-6,000 Upper Silesian migrants
to the Ruhr in 1898-1905 drained the local workforce pool a more decisive measure had to be
introduced to satisfy the labor shortage (Schofer, 1974: 75). Opportunely, in 1905 a Greek Catholic
priest Hanyckyj, from the vicinity of Lemberg (Lviv), organized recruitment of
Ruthenian/Ukrainian workers to Upper Silesia. The annual waiting period did not apply to them so
they proved to be popular among employers (Jonca, 1958: 152; Schofer, 1974: 72). Thanks to their
influx, the number of foreign reached the significant number of 9,466 (including 3,122
Ruthenians/Ukrainians), i.e. 10% of the total workforce in 1907. In due time Hanyckyj moved to their
faithful in Upper Silesia and the number of foreign contract workers topped the unprecedented 19,366
in 1913. Since 1908 there had been a more or less equal number of Polish-speakers and
Ruthenians/Ukrainians employed in the Upper Silesian industry since in this year the authorities had
introduced a many anti-Polish measure and the Upper Silesian industrialists had been also
recommended against employing Polish workers from the province of Posen (Poznań). In 1913 the
situation decisively changed in favor of Ruthenian/Ukrainian workers who numbered 10,627 whereas
Polish foreign workers only 7,648. With the inflow of the foreign workers the number Polish cross-
border commuters did not drop significantly and was maintained at the level of 6,419 in 1910
(Brozek, 1966a: 57, 65; Schofer, 1974: 26, 38, 72). Most probably than not there was no much social
interaction between local and foreign workers due to lower civilizational and cultural standards of the
immigrants (Wanatowicz, 1992: 74/75). Thus the main cleavage was among the predominantly
Polish-speaking local workers and the predominantly German-speaking ones. But this divide was
closed after 1910 due to the split in the Polish movement in Upper Silesia and the negative stance of
Polish activists and the Zentrum against socialism which was perceived by workers as lack of interest
in their social problems. Hence, socialists eventually gained the upper hand in 1913. The Polish and
German trade unions circumvented the simmering ethnic conflict constantly flared up by Polish and
German nationalists, by creating all-German and all-Polish groups. Thus they were able to stage the
first coordinated strike in Upper Silesia, which involved some 55% of all crews at one point in May

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459 In 1910 out of 30,000 Czechs working in Germany (predominantly in the Ruhr where the waiting period did not apply), only 7,000 were employed in Silesia. Almost none of them came from the Ratibor (Racibórz) county (Schofer, 1974: 71).

460 I resorted to double labeling due to terminological problems. The Austrian and German sources described these workers (who predominantly came from eastern Galicia) as Ruthenes, but modern Polish ones as Ukrainians. In Polish usage the term Ruthene is reserved for the Lemkos, Boykos and Huculs of the Carpathians. At present, some of the Lemkos wish to create their Ruthenian/Carpato-Ruthenian nation which would be separate from the Ukrainian nation. Historically speaking the Ukrainian label emerged in reaction to the misleading and insulting designation of Little Russians which tsarist officialdom had invented for Ruthenes living in Russia. Hence a Ukrainian simply meant a politically (nationally) conscious Ruthene. In Galicia, where Ruthenes enjoyed greater cultural and political freedom, they were slow to adopt the Ukrainian label (Berdychowska, 1995: 28/29; Davies, 1996: 831; Hann, 1995: 107-116).

461 Almost no Polish workers from Congress Poland were employed until 1908. Afterwards the number of Polish workers from Congress Poland and Galicia was more balanced, and in 1913 there were 3,735 of the former and 3,913 of the latter (Brožek, 1966: 57).

462 3,358 from Congress Poland and 3,061 from Galicia (Brožek, 1966: 65).
although only about 15%-20% of all Upper Silesian miners were unionized. Thus socialism seemed to be the winner of the ideological conflict in Upper Silesia prior to the outbreak of the Great War (Schofer, 1974: 156).

Before switching to the problematic of Austrian Silesia, it is worthwhile to observe the Silesian contribution to the development of Jewish nationalism, i.e. Zionism. The term denotes the movement to unite the Jewish people of the diaspora and settle them in Palestine. The Austrian Jewish philosopher Nathan Brinbaum (1864-1937) was the first one to apply the term to this movement. Zionism is derived from the Hebrew word Zion which denotes one of the hills of Jerusalem, on which the city of David was built, and which became the center of Jewish life and worship. Later it acquired the symbolical meaning of the house of God, Israel and Judaism (Cohen, 1992: 161; Onions, 1983: 2595). The achievement of political equality by European Jewry began in revolutionary France in 1791 and by 1871 spread over most of Europe with the notable exception of Russia. Emancipation coupled with the Haskalah brought about assimilation in Germany and Austria-Hungary in the second half of the 19th century (Cohen, 1992: 161/162; Kinder, 1978: II 62). However, this trend was shaken by the enduring existence of the pale of Jewish settlement in Russia, which had been instituted in 1835, and by the repeated waves of pogroms of the Russian Jewry (1881-1884, 1903-1906, 1917-1921) (Carr, 1996: 42; Davies, 1996: 844, 1311). Moreover, anti-Semitism emanating from Russia was taken up, in the 1880s/1890s, by the Austrian-Hungarian Pangerman movement under the leadership of Georg von Schönerer, and it started to spread all over the Dual Monarchy and Germany (Anon., 1992: 103). Consequently, Jewish activists put forward ideas that the Jews should establish their own homeland, preferably in Eretz Israel (the Land of Israel) (Cohen, 1992: 161). Although there were only 46,617 Jews in Silesia in 1871, and 45,692 in 1905-1910 (Kokot, 1973: 76/77), Upper Silesia proved to be a convenient venue for the Kattowitz Conference which took place in the city in 1884, since it was attended by 22 delegates from nearby Russia apart from six from Germany, two from England, one from France and one from Romania. The conference’s date was set on the 100th birthday of Sir Moses Haim Montefiore (1784-1885). The delegates were representatives of Hibbat Zion societies which had come into being since the early 1880s when the movement to settle Eretz Israel had been activated. The conference established an institution named Agudat Montefiore to promote farming among the Jews and support Jewish settlement in Eretz Israel. In sum the Kattowitz Conference laid the foundations for the organization of the Hibbat Zion societies, especially in Russia (Anon., 1972: 619-621). The movement obtained its ideological foundation in 1896 when the Budapest-born Viennese Jewish journalist Theodore Herzl (1860-1904) published his work Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) having observed the limits of assimilation set by the trial of Dreyfus in 1895. Next year he organized the first Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland. In turn the congress founded a permanent World Zionist Organization. Before 1905 it was not clear that the Jewish state would be the Holy Land so Herzl got involved in canvassing for establishing a Jewish homeland in Uganda, Kenya or somewhere else in East Africa. The 7th Zionist Congress (1905) rejected this proposal. In the meantime the number of Jews in Palestine increased from 12,000 in 1845 to 85,000 in 1914. During World War I, the British wooed the Zionists in order to secure strategic control over Palestine and to gain the support of world Jewry for the Allied cause. The British government therefore issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, officially supporting the idea of establishing 463 I.e. 22,764 in the Oppeln (Opole) regency, 19,189 in the Breslau (Wroclaw) regency) and 4,664 in the Liegnitz (Legnica) regency (Kokot, 1973: 76).
464 I.e. 18,268 in the Oppeln (Opole) regency, 23,564 in the Breslau (Wroclaw) regency and 3,860 in the Liegnitz (Legnica) regency (Kokot, 1973: 77).
465 An Anglo-Jewish philanthropist who through his personal advancement in English society and his continuous endeavors brought about emancipation of the British Jews in 1858. Between 1827 and 1875 he made seven journeys in the interest of Jewry in Congress Poland, Russia, Romania and Damascus (Kinder, 1978: II 62; Thorne, 1975: 904).
466 As early as the 1860s the first attempts to send Jewish settlers to Palestine were undertaken (Davies, 1996: 846).
a Jewish state in Palestine. In 1922, the League of Nations approved the terms of the declaration in the mandate for Palestine. During the British mandate in Palestine the Yishuv (Jewish community) grew from 50,000 to 600,000 people, and in 1948 the establishment of Israel was achieved (Davies, 1996: 846; Carr, 1996: 42; Cohen, 1992: 162/163; Peretz, 1992: 306/307).

Conducting the narrative toward the subject of Austrian Silesia it is necessary to have a look at the general external and internal situation of Austria-Hungary in the years 1871-1914. The 1867 Ausgleich which had turned the Habsburg Empire into the Dual Monarchy, also opened the way for Hungarian politicians into imperial politics. Count Gyula Andrássy who was nominated the minister of foreign affairs in 1871, discarded the anti-Bismarck bias of his predecessor and sought the friendship of the German Empire. The memories of the German-German War of 1866 were gradually forgotten. Andrea’ssy promised that the Danubian Monarchy would not interfere with German internal affairs. In return, Germany backed Austro-Hungarian attempts to limit Russian influence in southeastern Europe. Accordingly, in 1872, Franz Josef I joined the League of the Three Emperors to contain France. The gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire brought about the outbreak of numerous revolts and upheavals in the Balkans. Andrássy failed to induce the Turkish government to adopt a reform program. By next year Russian intervention seemed to be imminent. In order to placate Austria-Hungary, Russia offered to join in with it in partitioning the region between them. Andrássy declined believing that the Dual Monarchy would not be able to absorb much new territory without upsetting the delicate internal balance between various nationalities and ethnic groups. Russia gave up its plans and, in 1877, secured Austria-Hungary’s neutrality during the former’s war against Turkey. In 1878, with the war won, the Russians wanted to help themselves to more than had been predicted.

The situation in the Balkans was reorganized in a more balanced manner at the Congress of Berlin in the same year. Austria-Hungary was allowed to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina, which took quite a lot of war effort and proved the point that Vienna would not be able to absorb any more land and population effectively. But most importantly Andrássy’s endeavors were rewarded with the signing of the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1879. Both the sovereigns promised each other mutual support in the case of Russian aggression. Although Austria-Hungary’s hold on the Balkans solidified after Serbia had become its client in 1881, in 1887 Bismarck made the Dual Monarchy adopt its foreign policy to the German and Italian demand for the isolation of France. The latter country had joined the Dual Alliance in 1882 and entered the Balkans as another player having been given some concessions by Vienna. The First and Second Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 joined Great Britain to the powers (Austria-Hungary and Italy) interested in blocking Russia from the Straits. The Three Emperors Alliance was allowed to expire after Bismarck’s dismissal, but in 1897 Franz Josef I and his foreign minister Goluchowski travelled to St Petersburg, where they and the tsar signed agreements aiming at excluding Italy from Balkan affairs, and sought to entrust preservation of the Balkan order to the bilateral cooperation between two eastern monarchies rather than to a multilateral alliance system. In 1903 a major revolt occurred in Macedonia, and in Serbia the Obernovic dynasty was replaced by the Karageorgevic following the assassination of King Alexander I (ruled 1889-1903). Serbia’s relations with Austria-Hungary deteriorated, the economic pressure applied by Vienna did not crush the country but rather pushed it into the Russian camp. After 1906 the new foreign minister Aehrenthal made an effort to free Austria-Hungary from its submission to German interests and strove to pursue a more dynamic Balkan policy. It was frustrated by the combined Russian and Serbian opposition. In 1908, following a revolution in Turkey, the Young Turk movement announced the reform of the Turkish constitution. Because Bosnia-Herzegovina nominally remained under Ottoman suzerainty, Austria-Hungary was afraid that this constitutional change could undermine its position in the provinces. Thus Vienna annexed the provinces in the same year. Serbia was deprived of its hopes of extending its territory with Bosnia-Herzegovina in an effort to construct a fully fledged nation-state. Moreover, in 1909 a German ultimatum forced the Russians to withdraw their support from Serbia. Serbia remained in the state of simmering conflict with Austria-Hungary which, in turn, had become dependant on Germany’s support again. In 1912 when the Italian-Turkish conflict over Tripoli provoked anti-Turkish sentiment in the Balkans, the international situation became extremely tense. The ensuing Balkan Wars (1912/1913) made Turkey renounce the majority of its remaining
European possessions. The rapid territorial growth of Serbia was especially unwelcome to Austria-Hungary. Twice Vienna threatened the country with an ultimatum to retract from its newly-gained possessions. However, no military action was undertaken as neither Germany nor Italy was willing to guarantee support. By supporting Bulgaria against Serbia, Austria-Hungary alienated Romania, which country had shown resentment against the Habsburg monarchy because of the treatment of the Romanian minority in Transleithania. Romania thus joined Italy and Serbia in support of irredentist movements inside the Dual Monarchy. By 1914, leading Austro-Hungarian government circles were convinced that offensive action against the foreign protagonists of irredentist claims was essential to the integrity of the empire. Disregarding warnings, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir of Franz Josef I, participated in the army maneuvers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When he and his wife were assassinated by a Serbian nationalist at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, Serbia’s attempts at conciliation were to no avail. The Austro-Hungarian foreign office decided to use the opportunity for a final reckoning with the Serbian danger which threatened to disrupt the empire from outside and from inside. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28. A localized conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia with a quick victory for the former was desirable but impossible because of Russian support for Serbia. The German government pessimistic about the long-term strength of the Central Powers vis-à-vis the Triple Entente changed the Balkan conflict into a continental war by placing its strategic plans over Austro-Hungarian interests. In answer to Russian mobilization, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1. Because France declared it would act in accordance with its own interests, Germany preemptively declared war on the state two days later. On August 2-3 German troops invaded Belgium challenging the Allies guarantee of the country’s neutrality. Therefore, on August 4, Britain presented Germany with an ultimatum which amounted to declaration of war. Other declarations of war followed in a quick succession: by Serbia on Germany (August 6), Austria-Hungary on Russia (August 6), France on Austria-Hungary (August 11) and Britain on Austria-Hungary (August 12). The stage for transition of Europe and the world into the violent 20th century, had been set (Ehrich, 1992: 527/528, 530/531; Kinder, 1978: II 83, 121/122).

The external politics of Austria-Hungary was a reflection of its internal ethnic/national composition as the domestic tensions produced by the onset of the ideology of nationalism made the displeased groups, which could not realize their nationalistic dreams within the monarchy, look for outside allies along ethnic lines. The Austro-Hungarian Germans developed a special affinity for Germany, the Czechs for Russia, the Southern Slavs for Serbia and the Romanians for Romania (Walker, 1908: 605). The Poles and Hungarians who were the most satisfied and loyal subjects of Franz Josef I were also ready to carve out independent states of their own should an occasion arise as it was proved at the close of the Great War. Happy days of Austria when the slogan Bella gerant alii; tu felix Austria, nube held truth, were long over. In the second half of the 20th century nationalism ruled supreme. In this respect, the general development of German and Czech nationalist movements must be scrutinized as the background against which one has to observe Austrian Silesia’s local developments pertaining to nationalist conflict. Not much attention is devoted to Polish nationalism because, as it was remarked in the previous chapter, it received the best conditions possible for growth with the Galician autonomy of 1869. Nowhere in Russia or Germany the situation was so convenient for Polish nationalists as in Austria-Hungary. It is not surprising thus that the Galician Poles did not seek any drastic alteration of their status quo unlike the Czech and the Austrian Germans.

After the victory of Prussia over France and the establishment of the German Empire, the finality of the Sadowa (Sadova) defeat of 1866 had to be accepted. The internal weakness of the Habsburg Monarchy revealed by the Austro-Prussian conflict made Franz Josef I grant the Hungarians with the Ausgleich in 1867. It remodelled the Austrian Empire into bipartite Austria-Hungary and triggered off resentment of the Poles and Czechs who demanded similar compromises next year (Carter, 1992: 923). It became an urgent issue how to reorganize Cisleithania to make it governable as its German and Czech inhabitants accounted for 60% of its population (Waldenberg, 1992: 37). In 1869 the Poles received full cultural autonomy within Galicia and in 1871 a ministry for Galician affairs was set up turning them into the staunchest supporters of the monarchy and government well into the Great War. Franz Josef I also wished to solve the Czech problem along the
same line. Meanwhile the Franco-German War of 1870/1871 temporarily diverted public attention from the Czech demands, but it also indicated how deep ethnic cleavages had become under influence of the ideology of nationalism. Austro-Germans celebrated the Prussian victories whereas the Czechs and other Slavs were decisively pro-French. In 1870, Palacky’s son-in-law and the leader of the Národní Strana (National Party) of the Old Czechs, František Rieger (1818-1903) protested in the name of the Czechs against the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine (Elsass-Lotharingen). In 1871 secret talks with Palacky and Rieger led to the issuance of an imperial rescript by Franz Josef, promising the Czechs recognition of their traditional rights and showing his willingness to take the coronation oath. Czech leaders answered with a constitutional program (Fundamental Articles) according to which, Bohemian affairs should be regulated along the principles of the Hungarian compromise, raising Bohemia to a status equal to Hungary. The Germans afraid of losing their privileged position in Bohemia and the Hungarians fearing that this program could incite minority groups in Transleithania, they rejected the program. Since that moment Cisleithania was governable only thanks to the Polish support as the Czechs resorted to obstructionism: they withdrew from the Bohemian Landtag and again abstained from attendance at the Reichsrat. (Ehrich, 1992: 527; Polišenský, 1991: 91).

The more radical Young Czech wing which had gradually emerged in the Národní strana since 1863 and especially after 1867, led to the open break upon the failure of the Old Czech line, by the establishment of the Národní strana svobodomyslná (Liberal National Party) in 1874. In the ensuing period of political passivity and indecision Rieger devoted his time to editing the first Czech-language encyclopedia (1859-1874) whereas the Young Czechs came to dominate the most influential press organ of Czech nationalism Narodní listy (Carter, 1992: 923; Pokorný, 1993: 113). The precarious position of the Germans was fortified by the conclusion of the Dual Alliance with Germany in 1879 and temporarily placated the German liberals. They had opposed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina a year earlier and the subsequent redirecting of the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy toward the Balkans since it had brought about an increase in the number of Slavic inhabitants. But already in 1879 Austrian German politicians were put on defensive by a cabinet above parties, formed by a coalition of clericals, German aristocrats and Slavs. Prime Minister Eduard Taffe persuaded the Czechs to give up their boycott, and in return the Stremayr Language Act was passed. It made Czech and German equal languages in the outer [public] services in Bohemia and Moravia (i.e. with the exclusion of Austrian Silesia). Since then the citizen could deal with any state office in the two crownlands in either German or Czech. But German still remained the medium of communication inside civil service. In 1882 the Prague University was divided giving to the Czechs a national university, and in the same year Taffe introduced an electoral reform, thus enfranchising the more prosperous Czech peasants and weakening the hold of the German middle class. Consequently, after 1882 Germans lost dominance in the Bohemian Landtag and in the Prague city council where no German aldermen were present in the years 1882-1918. In 1886 Czech was introduced in the supreme courts of Bohemia and Moravia at Prague and at Brünn (Brno). Nationalistically-minded Austrian German politicians accused Taffe of Slavicizing Austrian (Ehrich, 1992: 528; Koťátko, 1995: 18/19; Prinz, 1995: 348-350; Schenk, 1993: 72). Thus the cabinet did not satisfy either the Czechs or the Germans. The Young Czechs started to gain increased support from the electorate and the German liberals were confronted by the German nationalists who put forward the Linz program in 1882. They proposed the restoration of German dominance in Cisleithania by detaching Galicia, Bukovina and Dalmatia from the monarchy, reducing relations with Hungary to a purely personal union, and establishing a customs union and other close links with the German Empire (Kinder, 1978: II 79). Because German-speakers tended to turn away from Vienna looking for deliverance from Berlin (Pokorný, 1993: 132), an encouraging environment for emergence of Pangermanism developed. Its program found its chief protagonist in Georg von Schönerer, a deputy to the Reichsrat, who also introduced, for the first time, a note of anti-Semitism into German nationalism. As mentioned above, the first official Pangerman organizations came into being in the early 1890s (Anon., 1992: 103).
In the second half of the 19th century the Czech national movement spawned numerous school, parish and county Czech-language libraries. It was also supported by a dense network of various organizations. From the most significant ones one should enumerate the *Matice Česká* (Czech Language Society), the *Matice Školská* (School Society), the *Živnostenská banka* (Commercial Bank) and the *Sokol* (Falcon Gymnastic Association). In 1880 the *Ústřední matice školská* (Society for Secondary Schools) was established and the Czech national theater followed next year. The Germans answered with their own national organizations which were to safeguard their national interests in Austria-Hungary. They had their own *Hypothekenbank* (Mortgage Bank) which had been established at Prague in 1864, and their gymnastic associations were organized as the XVth branch of the *Deutsche Turnerschaft*. In 1880 the *Deutsche Schulverein* (German School Society) was founded, and it was followed by the nationalist *Schutzvereine* (protection societies): the *Deutsche Böhmerwaldbund* (German Böhmerwald Union) (1884) in Budweis (České Budějovice), the *Bund der Deutschen Nordmährens* (Union of German Northern Moravia) (1886) in Olmütz (Olomouc), the *Bund der Deutschen in Böhmen* (Union of the Germans in Bohemia) (1894) in Prague, the *Bund der Deutschen Ostböhmens* (Union of the Germans in East Bohemia) (1894) in Troppau (Opava), the *Bund der Deutschen in Südmährren* (Union of the Germans in South Moravia) (1899) in Brünn (Brno), and the *Bund der Deutschen der Iglauer Sprachinsel* (Union of the Germans in the German-speaking Island of Iglau (Jihlava)) (Pokorný, 1993: 129, 134/135; Prinz, 1995: 355; Schenk, 1993: 77).

In the 1880s the Czech and German nationalisms were countered by the emergent socialist movement but the ethnic cleavage prevailed. In 1890 Prime Minister Taaffe strove to negotiate an agreement between the Old Czechs and German liberals whereby Bohemia would have been divided for administrative and judicial purposes along national lines. This proposal was a direct threat to the weakening German situation in Bohemia and could not satisfy the Young Czechs hoping for officially accepted dominance of the Czech language and culture within the administratively united lands of the Czech Crown. In 1893 Taaffe’s endeavours brought about riots in Prague. He had to resign and the compromise project was shelved. Interestingly, the Young Czechs who had been gradually superseding the Old Czechs since the 1880s, did not manage to retain their position after the Old Czechs had suffered a total defeat in the *Reichsrat* elections of 1891. Dissatisfied Czech peasants and workers turned away from the bourgeoisie-centered Young Czechs toward their class movements. A similar phenomenon also took place among German-speaking peasants and workers of Bohemia and Moravia. This precarious calmness of nationalists continued even when a Polish aristocrat, Kazimierz Badeni became the Prime Minister in 1895. Little noticed at that time, the appointment of Badeni symbolized the breakdown of German control over the Habsburg Monarchy. For the first time in Habsburg history, the Germans controlled none of the key positions in the government. Not only the Prime Minister but also the Finance Minister (von Biliński), and the Foreign Minister (Goluchowski). Relying on support from the Slav and conservative parties in the Reichsrat, Badeni dared to take up the Bohemian language question again. In 1897 in order to achieve a consensus with the Young Czechs, he issued an ordinance that introduced Czech as a language equal to German even in the inner [public] service, i.e. inside all state offices in Bohemia and Moravia. It provided that every civil servant would have to master both the languages by 1900. This decision put Germans, who refused to learn Czech, at disadvantage, and provoked widespread protests. They climaxd in November 1897, when demonstrators took to the streets not only in Vienna but in Graz and some German cities of Bohemia. Franz Josef I had to dismiss Badeni and his language ordinance was revoked in 1899 (Carter, 1992: 923; Ehrich, 1992: 528/529; Schenk, 1993: 75; Waldenberg, 1992: 45).

This solution did not satisfy German nationalists and turned Bohemia the largest and richest crownland into a trouble spot second, after 1908, only to the southern Slavic provinces (Carter, 1992: 923; Prinz, 1995: 358). In 1910 the Czech lands: Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia were responsible for 40% of the industrial production, and 45% revenue income of all Austria-Hungary, and almost 50% of the Cisleithanian railway lines were placed there. The number of Czech-language periodicals (indexical of the development of the mass Czech national movement) soared from 30 titles in 1861 to over 750 in 1905. Due to rapid industrialization the percentage of Czechs began to
unproportionally increase in the predominantly German-speaking areas of the Czech lands, because majority of factories and mines happened to be constructed in German areas. Moreover, in 1900 there were 4.26% illiterate Czechs and 6.83% illiterate Germans in Cisleithania. More Czechs were employed in industry (26.2%) than Germans (25%). In 1913 the 13 Czech banks had at their disposal 25% more capital than their German counterparts in the Czech lands. Practically the social, cultural, political and economic situation of the Czechs and the Germans in the Czech lands was equal prior to 1914. Since the beginning of the 20th century an opinion had held that Germans are even discriminated against. For instance, in 1903 out of 24,700 imperial civil servants in the Czech lands, only 5,400 were Germans, and Czech schools were opened in areas where Czechs were in minority. But on the other hand, Germans who constituted 37% of the Bohemian population paid 53% of the taxes, which indicates that they had to control a larger chunk of industry and commerce (Waldenberg, 1992: 41-47).

The nationalist conflicts became so pervasive at the turn of the centuries and inability of the authorities to alleviate them so frustrating that the Social Democratic Party came with the Brünn (Brno) Program during congress at the city in 1899. This program presented a national reform based on democratic federalism. It assumed granting the right of national decision to territorial units formed on a basis of nationality. Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, who later became leaders of German-Austrian socialism, drafted various programs for the solution of the nationality problem in books published between 1900 and 1910. The second model embodied by the Moravian Ausgleich of 1905 was actually implemented. The Germans who had an absolute majority in the Moravian Landtag though constituted only 27% of Moravia’s populace, in 1896, decided to work out a practical consensus with the local Czechs to avoid nationalist conflicts ravaging the political and economic life of Bohemia. In 1897 the Moravian Landeskulturrat (Council of Culture), responsible mainly for education, was divided into the German and Czech sections. After nine years of work the Ausgleich was ready in 1905, and it was accepted by the Landtag and the monarch. The Czechs gained equal access to politics, clear majority in the Landtag, and both the languages were introduced to education and civil service on the same basis. The Brünn (Brno) University was divided into the German and Czech sections giving the Czechs their second national university. Proposals of introducing similar compromises in Bohemia and Austrian Silesia were not espoused (Ehrich, 1992: 531; Kořalka, 1995: 20; Kotzian, 1991: 9/10). Instead under the impression of the 1905 revolution in Russia, Franz Josef I sanctioned the popular equal male suffrage in 1907. It made the Germans a minority in the 516-seat Reichsrat, but certainly the strongest national group with 233 deputies. Universal suffrage brought the expected decline of the nationalist parties, whereas the Christian Socialists and Social Democrats returned as the two strongest parties out of 30 represented. It bode well for transforming Austria-Hungary into a federal state but after 1908 the Balkan crises took precedence over internal reforms. Actually the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, contributed to convening the Panslav congress to Prague, among others, in support of Serbia. During the diplomatic crisis the Czechs took the side of the Serbs and on Franz Josef I’s 60th anniversary of accession to the throne, martial law had to be declared in Prague. A small Czech party of intellectualists even demanded independence. They were in minority, however, as majority of Czech politicians opted for a wide autonomy within the monarchy. In case of independence there was a danger that their state would be dominated by Germany or Russia. The situation became more difficult after the Reichsrat elections of 1911, when the social democrats lost half of their mandates. In result influence of nationalist parties increased. Thus Bohemian Germans noticed that it would be hardly possible to retain their dominance. They were ready to accept the idea of administrative division of the Czech lands, but the Czech nationalists stood fast by their program of unification of all the Czech lands. The political and social tension which emerged in result of this German-Czech nationalist altercation was not resolved by the failed attempt at reaching a Bohemian Ausgleich in 1912, and had to be cooled with the suspension of the Bohemian constitution and land autonomy in 1913. This unresolved situation was to become even more exacerbated especially at the close of World War I which heralded the break-up of Austria-Hungary (Ehrich, 1992: 529/530; Kolejka, 1956; Kořalka, 1995: 19; Prinz, 1995: 361; Waldenberg, 1992: 37, 42, 47-49).
Although Austrian Silesia was detached as a separate administrative and political entity from Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia, development of Czech, Polish and German national movements started influencing the smallest Austro-Hungarian crownland already in the 1860s. Moreover, the establishment of the German Empire, in triumph of Kleindeutsch nationalism, just across the border was not without relevance for the attitudes of especially the German-speaking Austrian Silesians. Taking into consideration the general statistics and development trends in Austrian Silesia as well as the emerging pattern of nationalist strife in Bohemia, it was quite sure that there was ample potential for emerging of nationalist, social and confessional conflicts in this crownland too. Its population rose from 511,581 in 1869 to 756,948 in 1910. In 1869 54.5% (279,024) inhabitants lived in West Silesia whereas 45.5% (232,557) in East Silesia. Due to rapid industrialization which attracted many workers to the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin, the percentages were completely reverted. In 1910 West Silesia housed only 42.6% (322,128) of Austrian Silesians while East Silesia 57.4% (434,821). According to the 1857 estimate 51.1% of the Austrian Silesians were German-speakers and 48.9% Slavic-speakers (Jews usually spoke German), other researchers speak about 51% Slavic-speakers, 48% German-speakers and 1% of Jews. Thus it may be safely assumed that the number of Germanand Slavic-speakers were almost equal at that time. According to the 1910 census there were 326,000 (43.9%) German-speakers, 235,000 (31.7%) Polish-speakers and 180,000 (24.3%) Czech-speakers in Austrian Silesia. Considering both the parts of this crownland, West Silesia contained 18.9% Czech-speakers in 1880 and 20.1% in 1910 with the rest of its population composed from German-speakers. The situation was much more complicated in East Silesia where, in 1880, there were 58.6% Polish-speakers, 27.4% Czech-speakers and 14.1% German-speakers, and, in 1910, the figures were 54.6%, 27.1% and 18%, respectively (Gerber, 1994: 30/31; Myška, 1992: 61). Sudden changes in the mere span of three decades (especially in East Silesia) can be explained by influx of immigrants to the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin, outflow of population to Vienna and other urban centers of the Dual Monarchy, as well as by the relative novelty of the concept of nationality which had been introduced in the official Austro-Hungarian census only in 1880. The measuring of nationality was based variously on standard languages as used within one’s family or with the census clerk. However, quite a sizeable chunk of the East Silesian population used rather spectra of transitory dialects and creoles extending among the standard cores of German, Polish and Czech, and were not fluent in none of the standard languages. Because dialects/creoles were not taken into consideration (Nowak, 1990: 3), sways in opinions of census clerks and of those concerned which language they spoke could be considerable on instigation of nationalist activists and in the cases of bior multilinguality. To wrap up this introductory paragraph, let us mention, to illustrate the processes of migration, that in 1910 76,000 Austrian Silesians lived in Vienna and 58,545 Galicia-born Polish-speakers permanently resided in the industrial basin (Gerber, 1994: 30). Moreover, the above-described emerging national cleavages were even more complicated by the old divisions running along the confessional lines. In 1910 there were 84.4% Catholics, 13.6% Protestants and 1.8% Jews in Austrian Silesia. Once again the differences between both the parts of this crownland were considerable: West Silesia’s population was quite homogenous with 96.3% Catholics, unlike East Silesia with 76% Catholics, 21.5% Protestants and 2.5% Jews. What is more, East Silesia’s Protestants were predominantly Germanand Polish-speakers whereas its Jews included a sizeable community of Yiddish-speaking Hasids from Galicia, who greatly differed from the enlightened German-speaking Jews of West Silesia (Myška, 1992: 61). From the General point of view, the Czech-German national cleavage in West Silesia was alleviated by unity of faith. Catholicism also united the majority of Czech-speakers in both the parts of this crownland. Protestantism also held together the German-speakers of East Silesia who concentrated in and around Bielitz (Bielsko) (Würbs, 1982: 84), but split the Polish-speakers.

From the national point of view the statistics augured not too well for Austrian Silesia’s German-speakers as their percentage diminished from 51.1% (or 48%) in 1857 to 48.9% in 1880, and to 43.9% in 1910 (Gerber, 1994: 30/31; Kofalka, 1995: 18; Myška, 1992: 61). But the changes were not too clearly realized and officially espoused until the concept of nationality gained currency since 1880 onward. On the other hand, the crownland seemed to be a sure foothold for Gerandom,
as its percentage of German-speakers was the largest of all the lands of the Czech Crown. The number of German-speakers in Bohemia sank from 31.17% in 1880 to 36.76% in 1910, and the corresponding figures for Austrian Silesia’s neighboring Moravia were even lower: 29.38% and 27.62%. Moreover, the demographic dominance of Czech-speakers in Bohemia and Moravia was not moderated by the strong presence of Polish-speakers like in Austrian Silesia (Kofalka, 1995: 18). The relative German dominance in Austrian Silesia ensured stability of the crownland’s politics and consequently delayed emergence of national movements which largely had to be ignited from outside. It is surprising then that, in 1873, the crownland issued the ordinance instituting bilingual education with German as the leading medium of instruction, in place of Polishand Czech-language elementary schools (Anon., 1939: 1338; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 661). Perhaps it was a reaction to the intensifying altercation with the Czechs after the failure of the proposed Bohemian Ausgleich, and to the successful creation of the Kleindeutsch nation-state across the border and barring of all languages other than German from elementary education in Prussian Silesia and elsewhere in the German Empire (1872). It does not seem though that this ordinance was efficiently enforced (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 661). Austrian Silesia was perceived as impregnable to the Czech-German national conflict which made it difficult to govern Bohemia and, less so, Moravia. So the Stremsy Language Act of 1880 was never extended to cover this crownland (Pokorny, 1993: 116). However, similar provisions were granted to the Austrian Silesians in 1882 when Moravia’s supreme court at Brünn (Brno) issued a decision obliging all Austrian Silesian courts to accept Czech and Polish as official languages in contacts with customers. The letter of this decision was frequently avoided because documents in Czech and Polish were indeed accepted but answers were invariably issued in German. (Knop, 1992: 113). The language situation continued unchanged until the end of the century since Badeni’s dramatic equalization of German and Czech in inner public service did not apply to Austrian Silesia (Prinz, 1995: 356). However, recognizing the need for wider use of Czech and Polish, in 1899, these languages were accepted in the crownland’s financial and internal revenue offices (Knop, 1992: 113).

Because the 1880s and 1890s saw development of Polish and Czech national movements in Austrian Silesia and the influx of Polish-speaking immigrants from Galicia (Nowak, 1995: 29), these decisions were criticized but not so vehemently as Bohemia and Moravia’s language acts of 1880 and 1897. One of the main critics was Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop Kopp whose diocese contained the whole of East Silesia and one third of West Silesia. In 1888 he appealed the pope not to support the idea of language rights for Slavic-speakers in Austrian Silesia. As a member of the Austrian Silesian Landtag, he voted against the 1899 decision extending the official use of Polish and Czech. He recommended that priests used German in religious instructions and ordered them to leave boards of all Slavic societies as well as the editorial board of Gwiazdka Cieszyńska. Kopp also opposed Polonization spread by the influx of Galician immigrants and the subsequent increase of Cracow bishop’s influence in East Silesia. He strongly contributed to opening of the Catholic seminary at Troppau (Opava) in 1899, whose graduates curbed the inflow of Czech-speaking priests from Moravia (Galos, 1996: 191; Golec, 1993: 178). German language and nationalist organizations also started emerging in the two last decades of the 19th century following the examples of Polish and Czech nationalisms as well as influences from Vienna and Berlin. However, it is good to remember that since the first half of the 19th century Großdeutsch associations of singers and riflemen had existed, and similar associations of gymnasts and voluntary firemen dated back to the mid-19th century. They constituted the natural springboard for the new organizations which were to oppose the rise of Slavic nationalisms. In 1880 the Deutscher Schulverein (German School Organization) was established in Austrian Silesia and its branches sprang up in the towns (Wurbs, 1982: 32; Zahradnik, 1992: 32). German political activists who had traditionally supported Germany since the 1870/1871 war with France, were grouped around the liberal periodical Slesia. In the 1880s their leftist wing established the nationalist daily Freie Schlesische Presse (Free Silesian Press). At the beginning of the 1890s the Pangerman, nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas propagated by Georg von Schönerer were

467 Actually the oldest Cisleithanian German association of singers was established in Bielitz (Bielsko) in 1834 (Wurbs, 1982: 34).
taken up by some Austrian Silesian liberals who, in 1892, established their nationalist weekly *Deutsche Wehr* (German Defence). This tale-telling title spelled out insecurity of the crownland’s German-speakers vis-a-vis Slavic national movements and the increasing percentage of Slavic inhabitants associated with these movements (Gawrecki, 1992: 62). This attitude caused German nationalists (e.g.: W. Kudlich, E. Rochowanski) to establish the *Bund der Deutschen Ostböhmens* with its seat at Troppau (Opava) in 1894. Although it followed the suit of similar organizations which had come into being in Bohemia in the 1880s (Prinz, 1995: 355), the year of its birth was quite ominous as it coincided with the establishment of the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein at Posen (Poznań) and (Snoch, 1991: 45) the *Alldeutscher Verband* (Anon., 1992: 103). The Austrian Silesian organization was dubbed as a *Schutzverein* (protective association) and its name was simplified to the *Nordmark* (Northern March). This German nationalist organization operated in Austrian Silesia and in the Moravian salient between the two parts of this crownland (Gawrecka, 1993: 69). In 1914 it comprised about 25,000 members (Bein, 1995: 144) whereas the *Deutscher Ostmarkenverein* had just 11,850 members (1913) in the whole of Prussian Silesia (Snoch, 1991: 45). In 1897 the Nordmark openly adopted Großdeutsch nationalism as its ideological stance by appealing: Let us become Germans in toto but let us also remain true German Silesians (Gawrecki, 1993: 57). German national socialists of Austrian Silesia joined the field of the nationalist strife in 1907 when they launched their newspaper *Neue Zeit* (New Time) (Gawrecki, 1992: 62).

In 1905 the feeling of being beleaguered by Slavic nationalisms caused German Landtag deputies to turn down the Czech deputies proposal to work out an Ausgleich for Austrian Silesia modelled on the successful example of the Moravian Ausgleich (Kořalka, 1995: 20). This decision was quite understandable because in the same year the Galician Landtag appealed the emperor to join predominantly Slavic-speaking East Silesia with Galicia. The Austrian Silesian Landtag replied with the proposal of attaching of the predominantly German-speaking border areas of Galicia to Austrian Silesia, and, consequently, the status quo was retained as Franz Josef I took no decision. However, due to the overall language and national situation in Bohemia and Moravia, the Landtag could not abstain from granting Slavic-speaking Austrian Silesians with more language rights. In 1907 it decided that autonomous administrative bodies would choose suitable languages of inner and outer administration (i.e. German, Czech or Polish)\(^{468}\) (Knop, 1992: 113; Wurbs, 1982: 48/49). In 1910 the *Landeskulturerrat* (Land Council of Culture) was divided into the three (German, Polish and Czech) sections (Kořalka, 1995: 20), which officially allowed to reintroduce Czech and Polish textbooks to Austrian Silesian schools (Fazan, 1991: 206). To sum up the language situation: in 1910 there were six dailies in Austrian Silesia, including a Czech and a Polish one (Gawrecki, 1992: 64). In 1880 West Silesia boasted eight, exclusively German-language, secondary schools, and by 1914 four new ones were added two Czech-language and two German-language ones. In 1880 there were seven secondary schools (all with German as the medium of instruction) in East Silesia. By 1914 14 new ones were established: six with German, five with Czech and three with Polish as media of instruction (Gerber, 1994: 33). In 1917, the 306 elementary schools of East Silesia included: 156 Polish ones, 76 Czech ones, 49 German ones, 21 Polish-German ones and 4 Czech-German ones. However, to finish the elementary school one had to attend the 6th and 7th forms in German or bilingual schools as these forms were not available at Czech or Polish schools (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 662). Thus the German language dominated in Austrian Silesia until 1918 (Kořalka, 1995: 20) unlike in Bohemia, Moravia or Galicia, but, on the other hand, Czech and Polish were allowed some official status which was unthinkable just across the border in Prussian Silesia. Very sad accords in these gradually more equal language and national relations, were struck by Polish and Czech nationalists from outside. In 1908 Dmowski demanded, among others, the whole of Austrian Silesia for a future Poland (Mroczko, 1994: 97/98). Prior to the outbreak of the Great War, in May 1914, a Young Czech activist, and Masaryk’s friend, Karel Kramař (1860-1937) propounded the idea of a Slavic federal state (ruled by the tsar) which would consist from Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Montenegro, the South Slavic lands of Austria-

\(^{468}\) Polish and Czech were allowed to be used for administrative purposes in Gemeinden - counties, already in 1901 (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 714).
Hungary, as well as from the lands of the Czech Crown. In this respect, he demanded the Glatz (Klodzko) Margravate from Prussian Silesia for Bohemia, and decided that the western half of East Silesia would belong to Poland. Finally, on June 28, 1914 the day when Archduke Francis Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo a nationalist showdown was staged on the Austrian Silesian-Galician border. Austrian Silesia’s city of Bielitz (Bielsko) was separated from the Galician town of Biala (Biala) by the Biala (Biala) River although they formed one urban complex. In support of the Polish demands to merge East Silesia with Galicia, Polish activists of the Sokół and voluntary fire brigades demonstratively marched onto the bridge spanning the two towns but were prevented from crossing it by German gymnasts and athletes. It was a bad omen for the coming years (Wurbs, 1982: 49/50).

Considering the Polish national movement, it was concentrated in the center and the east of East Silesia. Having come to the fore in 1848 it managed to maintain its continuity throughout the reactionary 1850s and became quite active at the end of the 1860s. In 1867 the first Polish-speaking deputy was elected to the Austrian Silesian Landtag, and four further ones in 1871. What is more, in the years 1873-1879, the Mistrzowitz (Mistrovice) rich peasant and Polish activist Jerzy Cienciala was Austrian Silesia’s first Polish-speaking member of the Reichsrat where he joined the Polish Circle of the Polish deputies from Galicia (Golec, 1993: 71; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 359). For similar developments Austrian Silesia’s Czech-speakers had to wait until the 1890s and the turn of the centuries (Anon., 1939: 1338). Moreover, the development of the Polish movement in Austrian Silesia was facilitated by proximity of the Polish cultural center of Cracow, and by the fact that in 1869 Galicia obtained a wide-ranging cultural and political autonomy unlike Bohemia and Moravia. It is not surprising then, that beginning with the 1870s Polish activists from Galicia were bringing Polish national ideas to East Silesia (Wanatowicz, 1992: 75). Polish activists also participated in Polish national meetings organized at Cracow and Lemberg (Lviv) in 1870 and 1871 Grobelny, 1992: 72). A boost to development of Polish nationalism among Polish-speaking Protestants was given by Reverend Leopold Otto (1819-1882). Being of German-speaking stock, anyway introduced Polish-language Protestant celebrations in Warsaw (1849). After the fall of the January Uprising (1864) he moved to Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn), where he contributed to establishing numerous Polish organizations, and published the only Polish-language Protestant periodical Żwiastun Ewangeliczny (evangelic Announcer) (1865-1875). He returned to Warsaw in 1875 but left initial inklings of Polish nationalism, which, with time, were to develop into the atypical association of Polishdom with Protestantism which did not strike root anywhere else among Polish-speakers (Golec, 1993: 213/214; Zahradnik, 1989: 224). Actually the fact that the Polish-speakers of north-eastern Lower Silesia were Protestants, caused them to become Germans, but it was not the case in East Silesia.

Considering the development of Polish organizations, the already existing reading rooms and small libraries as well as the Towarzystwo Rolnicze (Agricultural Society) (1868) were appended by numerous new ones. In 1872 Pawel Stalmach, still the publisher of Gwiazdka Cieszyńska and one of the leading Polish activists of East Silesia, founded the Towarzystwo Naukowej Pomocy (Aid Society for Students) to support poor Polish-speaking students from East Silesia (Myśka, 1993: 101; Snoch, 1991: 133), and, next year contributed to the establishment of the Towarzystwo Oszczędności i Zaliczek (Society for Savings and Loans) (Zahradnik, 1992: 40). Father Ignacy Świeży (1839-1902) who, together with his East Silesian friends, had established the Towarzystwo Narodowe (National Society) at the Catholic Seminary, Olmütz (Olomouc) in 1861 inspired them to found the Polish-language Catholic publishing house Dziedzictwo bl. Jana Sarkandra (Blessed Jan Sarkander) Heritage based on a similar Czech-language publisher active in Bohemia and Moravia since 1835, and named after the Czech patron saint Jan Nepomucen. By 1897 the publishing house brought out exclusively religious 33 books in 1,000 copies each, and 20 calendars in 5,000 copies each (Pater, 1951 both the towns were officially merged into Bielisko-Biala (Bielitz-Biala) (Anon., 1983b: 293). 470 Father Jan Sarkander (1576-1620) born in Skotschau (Skoczów), East Silesia, strove to regain the faithful for Catholicism in several largely Protestant parishes in Moravia where he worked. He was tortured to death in North Moravian Holleschau (HolSvov). In 1855 he was announced to be blessed, and in 1995 Pope John Paul II canonized him (Golec, 1993: 236).
1996b: 436/437). Due to the Catholic-Protestant rivalry the Polish movement was split along the confessional line in the second half of the 1870s (Kaciř, 1996: 4; Lis, 1993: 99/100) and no Polish-speaking candidate entered the Reichsrat in the 1879 elections (Golec, 1993: 71). In order to get a better control of education the Polish-speaking Protestants established their Towarzystwo OŚwiaty Ludowej (Society for Popular Education) in 1881. The confessional split deepened in 1883 when the Związek Śląskich Katolików (ZŚK, Union of Silesian Catholics) came into being. Already next year it boasted the membership of 2,000, and dynamically entered social and political life of East Silesia organizing rallies and meetings, and publishing brochures. The alienated Polish-speaking Protestants replied, in 1884, with founding of the Polityczne Towarzystwo Ludowe (PTL, Popular Political Society). The looming conflict was gradually terminated by reconciliation in the face of the Landtag elections in 1884 and the Reichsrat elections next year. In result Father Swieży and P. Kania entered the Landtag and the former also the Reichsrat (Pater, 1996b: 434). Under the influence of the success of the Matica opavská (1877) which founded the Czech gymnasium im Troppau (Opava) (1883) (Gawrecki, 1992: 63), and of the establishment of the Deutscher Schulverein (1881), Polish activists led by Pawel Stalmach and Father Swieży managed to establish the similar Macierz Szkolna (School Organization) in 1885 (1886). In 1895 it eventually brought about opening of the Polish gymnasium in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (Lis, 1993: 100; Michalkiewicz, 1976: 357; Myška, 1993: 101).

On August 2, 1888 a terrible storm ravaged East Silesia. Because state aid did not amount to much, next year Father Swieży appealed for help from Polish organizations in Galicia and Congress Poland (not unlike Miarka in a similar case in 1879) which led to more contacts with Polish activists from these areas. Thanks to Father Swieży’s alleviation of this dramatic situation and his activities aimed at doing away with the Protestant-Catholic tension, full reconciliation was reached in 1890. The SKL and the PTL agreed that they would field Father Swieży as their common candidate to the 1891 Reichsrat elections. Thanks to this political-cum-confessional consolidation he received more votes than the German candidate and obtained the mandate, and consequently, temporarily, prevented the rise of fully-fledged Polish nationalism by directing the Polish-language movement toward ultramontanism similarly as Katolik did in Upper Silesia (Michalkiewicz, 1976: 360). The previous year the SKL and the PTL had also reached an compromise with Czech-speakers thanks to which the latter’s candidates had entered the Landtag for the first time. Thus the three Polish-speaking deputies and the three Czech-speaking ones had formed an alliance which had to be reckoned with by the German-speaking majority (Anon., 1939: 1338; Pater, 1996b: 435). Although cooperation with Czech-speakers continued, especially in face of emerging German nationalism471, it was marred by the development of the Czech national movement in Austrian Silesia since Polish activists perceived it as Czechization in the case of East Silesia. Since the 1880s Czech nationalists had been active in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn). In 1893 the Czech organization Snaha (Endeavor) was founded in this town, and next year was followed by the Czech weekly Noviny Těšínske (Těšín News) (Grobelny, 1992: 73). Also in 1894 Bohemia’s leading nationalist newspaper Narodni listy appealed for making the whole of East Silesia a truly Czech-speaking land (Zahradnik, 1992: 44) much to the horror of Polish nationalists who, in the 1890s, answered with their own program proposing making East Silesia Polish-speaking up to the Ostrawica (Ostravice) River, i.e. the western border of East Silesia.

471 Polish activists gave access to the premises of the Dom Polski (Polish House) in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) to the Czech cultural and educational organization Snaha (Endeavor) in the 1880s (Zahradnik, 1992: 44). On August 1, 1897 15,800 people attended the Polish rally near Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) and German-speakers organized a counter-rally at this town on September 12, 1897 with the attendance of 800. Polish and Czech activists replied with a joint Czech-Polish rally in which all Polish and Czech Landtag and Reichsrat deputies participated. (Pater, 1996b: 436). In 1900 the Czech-speaker P. Cingr was elected to the Reichsrat with the voices of Czech- and Polish-speaking social democrats (Kaciř, 1996: 5). Due to numerous instances of the escalating Polish-Czech national tension, in 1902, Czech and Polish scholars and journalists published appeals for Polish-Czech cooperation in the periodicals Czech-language Slovanský přehled (Slavonic Review) and Polish-language Świat Slowiański (Slavonic World). With an increase of the activities of German nationalists prior to the outbreak of the Great War Czech and Polish nationalists organized many joint protest rallies in East Silesia, with the largest one of them at Michalkowitz (Michálkovice) (Grobelny, 1992: 75/76).
Czech nationalists continued to establish schools and organizations in east and central East Silesia (much to the discontent of Polish activists in case of the central part) using the fact that Czech national life quickly developed in and around rapidly industrialized Ostrau (Ostrava) which, due to its location on the East Silesian-Moravian border, acted as the center of Czech cultural and national life in the Moravian salient dividing Austrian Silesia in two, and in western East Silesia. The radiating influence of the city increased, especially after the Moravian Ausgleich of 1905, when Czech-speakers obtained more civil and language rights than Czech and Polish-speakers enjoyed in Austrian Silesia (Grobelny, 1992: 73; Kaciř, 1996: 4).

In 1897 Czech activists managed to open the Slezská matice osvěty lidové (SMOL, Silesian Organization for Popular Education) in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn), but due to the growing strength of Polish nationalism it had to be moved to Ostrau (Ostrava) in 1908. The same fate met the Noviny Těšínske which had been transferred to Friedek (Frýdek) (on the border with Moravia) a year earlier. In 1901 Ferdinand Pelc, a leading activist of the SMOL stated that the Polish danger was equal to the German one. His opinion was supported by the emotive poetry of Petr Bezruč, who commented with one of his poems that one hundred thousand of us [Czech-speaking Austrian Silesians] were Germanized, and one hundred thousand Polonized. This line of reasoning were derived from Ignác Hořica’s 1895 thesis that East Silesia’s Polish-speakers are Polonized Moravians who should be regained for Czechdom (Zahradník, 1992: 44). These opinions were disheartening for Polish nationalists because they partially reflected the feelings of the Slavic-speaking East Silesians who (like the Slavic-speaking Upper Silesians) considered the labels Pole and Galician as offensive (especially due to the clearly lower standard of living and education of the Polish-speakers in Galicia). Moreover, due to the low status ascribed to these labels, Galician immigrants in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin did not want to be identified as Poles, and promptly got Germanized or Czechized to the helpless dismay of Polish organizations (Kaciř, 1996: 3, 5).

Polish nationalists answered with help of Galician activists. The Sokół opened its first East Silesian branch at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) in 1891. The Towarzystwo Szkól Ludowych (Society for popular Schools) which commenced its activities at Cracow in the same year, opened its Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) affiliate in 1992, which, in turn, helped the Macierz Szkolna to open the first Polish-language gymnasium of Austrian Silesia at this town in 1895 (Fazan, 1991: 105, 122; Lis, 1993: 100). In reaction to the increasingly ultramontane character of the Polish movement commenced by cooperation of Catholic and Protestant Polish activists, Polish nationalists established the non-confessional nationalist society Jedność (Unity) in 1897. Its membership soared from 300 to 3,000 in 1907 (Fazan, 1991: 107/108). After doing away with legal restrictions, the social democratic movement dynamically developed in Austrian Silesia (not unlike in Upper Silesia), because this crownland was the most industrialized region of Austria-Hungary which was responsible for 46.2% coal output of the state and 97% of its coke production (Lis, 1993: 120/121), and where 39.4% of the workforce were employed in industry in 1910 (Bahlcke, 1996: 114). Seizing this opportunity Polish social-democrats from Galicia established the newspaper Równość’ (Equality) (1897-1901) at

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472 Petr Bezruč’ (without hands’) is a penname of Vladimír Vašek (1867-1958), a son to the Czech activist Antonín Vašek (he founded the first Austrian Silesian Czech-language periodical Opavský besedník in 1861). He established his position with the one collection of artistically original and highly political poems, entitled Slezské písně (Silesian Songs, 1909). Half of these poems had been published in an earlier collection in 1903. He sympathized with the Austrian Silesian Czech-speaking poor, and was vociferously anti-Bohemian, anti-German and anti-Polish (Myška, 1994: 75; Pynsent, 1993: 44; Urbanec, 1965: 5/6).

473 The Czech-speakers of Austrian Silesia and the Upper Silesian county of Ratibor (Racibórz) tended to identify themselves as Moravians (Moravce) like the Czech-speakers of Moravia (Kaciř, 1996: 3; Záček, 1995: 152/153).

474 In the second-most industrialized crownland, Bohemia, this percentage was markedly lower - 36.6% (Bahlcke, 1996: 114).
Chapter five

Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (Lis, 1993: 100; Zahradník, 1989: 180), whereas Polish nationalists commenced the weekly Glos Ludu Śląskiego (Voice of the Silesian People) (1897-1920) at Freistadt (Fryštát) to prevent Czechization/Germanization of Galician immigrants. The Polish national center which developed in this town survived until 1912 when the newspaper moved to Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (Grobelny, 1992: 74; Zahradník, 1989: 74-76). The radical Polish nationalist group of Freistadt (Fryštát), in cooperation with Polish activists from Galicia (including Dmowski), popularized Polish nationalism in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin which resulted in an intensified Polish-Czech national conflict in this area at the turn of the centuries. Less radical Polish activists with their Czech counterparts strove to abate this tension by insisting on Slavic cooperation against German nationalism, and by concentrating Polish national and cultural life at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (Grobelny, 1992: 74-76; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 714). The period of resulting uneasy status quo was shaken by the 1905 revolution in Russia. Subsequently, many Polish-speaking refugees from Congress Poland sought safe haven in Galicia and East Silesia, where they fortified the social democratic movement. Strikes engulfed East Silesia, and in the wake of this general social commotion and the introduction of popular male suffrage Polish activists from Galicia and East Silesia decided to establish overtly pro-Polish organizations in the latter region. In 1906 the Polskie Strownictwo Narodowe (PSN, Polish National Party) came into being as offshoots of Galicia’s PSL and SD-N. In this year the social democratic movement of Austrian Silesia was divided along ethnic lines which led to the emergence of the Polska Partia Socjal-Demokratyczna (PPSD, Polish Social Democratic Party) of East Silesia which formed one party with its mother Galician organization of the same name (Lis, 1993: 117/118; Myśliński, 1986: 9). Also in 1906, the PSN launched the first Polish-language daily in Austrian Silesia, Dziennik Cieszyński (Cieszyn Daily) (1906-1920) (Zahradník, 1989: 53). Next year a Galicia-born Polish activist, Franciszek Popiolek (1868-1960) launched the influential literary quarterly Zaranie Śląskie (Silesian Dawn) (1907-1938, 1957-1992) and, in 1913, wrote the first Polish history of Austrian Silesia Dzieje Śląska Austryackiego (Lubos, 1974: 523; Zahradník, 1998: 218). The influence of Galicia’s Polish nationalism was so strong and accepted after 1905 that the authorities did not do anything against coupling of Galicia and East Silesia on one map in Polish-language textbooks which amounted to a tacit espousal of the Polish claim to this part of Austrian Silesia (cf. Haardt, 1907?: 57).

In 1907, the first elections to the Reichsrat after the introduction of suffrage, were taken by social democrats who won 51% of votes in the Dual monarchy. It was a blow to Polish radicals and ultramontane Polish activists in ultramontane Austrian Silesia (Gawrecki, 1992: 62/63; Lis, 1993: 118). In order to offset the social democratic influence, the latter decided to enliven Protestant-Catholic cooperation between the ZŚK and the PZN (Zahradník, 1992: 47), and also started collaborating with Polish nationalists which resulted in the 1907 merger of the Macierz Szkolna with the Jedno’ć (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 714). In 1911 the PSL merged with the PSN to form the Polskie Zjednoczenie Narodowe (Organization of Polish national Unity). It closely cooperated with the ZŚK and the PZN, and together they managed to weaken the social-democrats and, unsuccessfully, strove to limit the influence of Josef Kozdon’s ethnic Silesian Śląska Partia Ludowa (Popular Silesian Party, established in 1909) in the 1911 elections. However, this unprecedented consolidation of the Polish movement in East Silesia (which excluded only the Polish social-democrats) intensified the tension with Czech nationalists prior to the outbreak of the Great War. In 1909 it was tangibly exemplified by the opening of the two gymnasia: Polish and Czech in the same locality of Orlau (Orlová) (Gawrecki, 1992: 63/64; Lis, 1993: 119; Nowak, 1995: 31; Zahradník, 1992: 47). Closing the scrutiny of the development of the Polish national movement in Austrian Silesia, it is relevant to ask how influential it was prior to the Great War. The Sokół, which usually attracted nationalist-minded youth and students and would provide closely-tight cadres of pro-Polish fighters and organizers in Upper and Austrian Silesia after 1918, had 649 members in 1909. The size of the less nationalist and more ultramontane-oriented

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475 None of its main Polish proponents: Tadeusz Reger (1872-1938), Ryszard Kunicki (1873-1960), and Ignacy Daszyński (1866-1936) (who was destined to become one of the most influential politicians of interwar Poland) stemmed from Austrian Silesia (Golec, 1993: 172; Lis, 1993: 118).
Polish language movement may be assessed on the membership of the *Macierz Szkolna*, which amounted to 5,144 in 1914 (Fazan, 1991: 122, 127). In 1910 the Polish-speakers of East Silesia were served by 28 periodicals, including: one daily, one twice-weekly, eight weeklies, six bi-weeklies, six monthlies, one quarterly, and five irregular publications (Zahradnik, 1989: 248). In sum, it is possible to state that the Polish national movement was considerably weaker than Austrian Silesia’s German movement represented by the *Nordmark’s* 25,000 members. But since the Polish-speakers were concentrated in the central and eastern part of East Silesia, and constituted the majority of its inhabitants they had a clear numerical advantage in this area of Austrian Silesia (Zahradnik, 1992: 45). For the sake of better comprehension of the national conflicts which were to tear East Silesia apart after 1918, it is good to remember that the west of East Silesia was dominated by Czech-speakers as the area around Bielitz (Bielsko) by German-speakers. Germanand Czech-speakers were also prevalent in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin though Polish-speakers contested their dominance in Freistadt (Fryštát), Orlau (Orlová) and Karwin (Karviná). What is more, more often than not instances of Polish-Czech national conflicts were more excruciating than their German-Polish or Czech-German counterparts (Gawrecka, 1993: 71). The explanation for this phenomenon may lie in the fact that ethnically and linguistically all the Slavic-speakers of East Silesia were quite homogenous, so Polish and Czech nationalists must have invested much effort to forge the ethnic border, in this task, they were unexpectedly assisted by the first Austro-Hungarian censuses which introduced the national question in 1880. The maintenance and shifts of this imagined (but gradually actualized) border, visualized by statistics, constituted the basis for nationalist acrimonies between Czech and Polish nationalists.

The Czech national movement of Austrian Silesia was more effectively suppressed during the reactionary 1850s than its Polish counterpart which had been more pronounced since its strong emergence in 1848. Polish activists managed to found a Polish-language weekly in 1848, and to maintain its publication in a less radical form up to 1920. In this respect the Czech national movement can be considered discontinuous. Although it spawned some local activists and institutions such as reading circles, in and shortly after 1848 it did not produce an instrument for further forging and uniting the fragmented movement in the whole crownland. Necessarily it fed on Czech-language publications from near-by Moravia and Bohemia. Popularity of Panslavism among the Old Czechs caused many Czech activists of Austrian Silesia to cooperate with Polish-language groups and *Gwiazdka Cieszyńska*. This peaceful Slavic cooperation was fortified by the ultramontane attitude of the Catholic Church, as majority of Austrian Silesian Czech-speakers were Catholics. This situation continued until the beginning of the 1860s when the political relaxation brought about by an attempt at constitutional reforms in the Habsburg Empire, allowed the Troppau (Opava) gymnasium teacher Antonín Vašek to establish Austrian Silesia’s first Czech-language periodical the weekly *Opavský besedník* in 1861. It went defunct in 1865 disrupting continuity of the Czech national movement. The emergence of the Young Czechs in the latter half of the 1860s and the efforts to negotiate a Bohemian *Ausgleich* created appropriate ambience for embarking on new initiatives. Vincenc Prasek (1843-1912), a graduate of the Troppau (Opava) gymnasium where he was influenced by Vašek, worked in Slavic gymnasium at Olmütz (Olomouc). He met there a Moravian-born Czech activist, Jan Zacepl whom inspired to establish the Czech-language weekly *Opavský týdeník* (1870-1913) at Troppau (Opava). The Catholic Church also strove to accommodate to the political changes and the Katharein (Kateřinky) parish reading and singing circle was transformed into the *Katolicko-politicka beseda* (Catholic-Political Club) in 1870. Anyway the weekly which became the first permanent institution of the Czech national movement in Austrian Silesia gave a new impetus to the Troppau (Opava) Czech-

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476 In 1910 there were 233,850 (54.8%) Polish-speakers in East Silesia as compared to 115,604 (27.1%) Czech-speakers and 76,916 (18.1%) German-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 45).

477 The language forms used by the inhabitants of Moravia were officially named as Slavic or Moravian Slavic (though they did not differ much from standard Czech of Prague) in order to strengthen the regional Moravian identity, and, consequently, prevent spreading of the Czech national movement from Bohemia (Začek, 1995: 152/153).
speaking intelligentsia. In 1875 they brought about the introduction of Czech sermons at St. George church in the Austrian Silesian capital and founded the Matice opavská (Opava Cultural Organization) in 1877. The Matice opavská was destined to become the most influential organization of Austrian Silesia’s Czech national movement, which survives to this day as the Matice Slezská (Silesian Cultural Organization) (Gawrecki, 1992: 63; Jakubikova, 1994: 144/145; Myška, 1994: 94).

Up to 1918 the Matice opavská was the main organizer the Czech national life in Austrian Silesia, i.e. Czech-language schools, libraries, kindergartens, museum rooms, reading and singing societies. In 1878 it opened its own Czech-language library, and started publishing Austrian Silesia’s first Czech-language scholarly journal Věstník Matice opavské (Bulletin of the Matice opavská). It was established as a stable periodical only in 1892 and survives to this day (with its name changed after 1945) as the quarterly Slezský sborník (Silesian Contributions). With a modest financial support from Prague, but mainly thanks to its own resources, the Matice opavská founded Austrian Silesia’s first Czech-language gymnasium in 1883. Prasek was its first principal. Next year the Muzeum Matice opavské (Museum of the Matice opavská) was opened commencing the action of collecting various items which would assist in proving that the crownland was a Czech land from an ethnic and historical point of view. Initially the influence of the Matice opavská was limited to Troppau (Opava) and the Czech-speaking areas of West Silesia, but with time it contributed to the forming of the Czech national movement in north-eastern Moravia and in the Moravian wedge between West and East Silesia (Anon., 1939: 1342; Bein, 1995: 144; Gawrecki, 1992: 63; Jakubikova, 1994: 143, 149, 151). In the 1880s numerous Czech organizations came into being including the overtly nationalist Sokol.

Czech activists established themselves in the western East Silesian border towns of Friedek (Frýdek) and Ostrau (Ostrava)\(^ {478} \), and already in 1883 the Snaha was established in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn). When German aldermen got to dominate the Friedek (Frýdek) townhall in 1884 Czech activists started operating more decisively in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) (Gawrecki, 1992: 63; Zahradník, 1992: 44). Thanks to the Polish-Czech pre-electoral campaign three Czech-speaking and three Polish-speaking deputies entered the Landtag (Anon., 1939: 1338). This exemplary (Pan)Slavic-cum-ultramontane cooperation faltered in the 1890s due to the increased influence of Czech nationalists from Prague and their Polish counterparts from Cracow, who put forward mutually excluding demands for East Silesia as part of prospective Czech and Polish states, respectively. The ultramontane Catholic political organization Jednota (Unity), which became active in the 1880s, could not effectively lower this tension working with its Polish counterpart the ZŠK. In 1894 the Noviny Těšínske was launched at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) much to criticism of the Gwiazdka Cieszyńska as this town was considered by Polish activists to be the center of the Polish nationalist movement. Thus the Slezská matice osvěty lidové, which came into being at this town in 1898, was also met with enmity of Polish activists. Due to this situation and development of polish nationalism the Czech newspaper had to move to Friedek (Frýdek) in 1907, and the Czech school organization to Ostrau (Ostrava in 1908 (Grobelny, 1992: 73; Zahradník, 1992: 44). Vincenc Prasek in cooperation with the Matice opavská strove to describe various aspects of the whole of Austrian Silesia to claim it for Czechdom through scholarship conducted in this language. He planned ten volumes of the Slezské vlastivědy (Silesian Regional Studies), but only four were published on: the folklore of the Austrian Silesian Czech-speakers (1888), historical topography of West Silesia (1889), history of West Silesia up to 1813 (1891), and history of East Silesia up to 1433 (1894) (Myška, 1994: 95). On the other hand, František Slama (1850-1917) and Adolf Emil

\(^{478}\) The name of the city constitutes a fine example of nationalist manipulation. There were two towns of the same name. The bigger one Mährisch Ostrau (Moravská Ostrava) was located in the Moravian salient, and the smaller one - Polnisch Ostrau (Polská Ostrava) across the border river of Ostrawitza (Ostravice) in East Silesia. Due to rapid industrialization they had started functioning as one urban organism since the second half of the 19th century and were officially merged into one city in 1945. In 1920 the Czech authorities altered the name Polská Ostrava (Polnisch Ostrau), i.e. Polish Ostrava, to more neutral Slezská Ostrava, Silesian Ostrava, not to give the Polish authorities an additional argument for claiming this part of East Silesia as Polish. All the adjectival labels disappeared in 1945 (Batowski, 1964: 44).
Vašek (1881-1948) who wrote fiction inspired by Austrian Silesian themes, and Jan Loriš (1860-1920) adn Čeněk Ostravický (1869-1912) who wrote poetry, strove to write Austrian Silesia into Czechdom through the means of literature, before it was finally achieved by Petr Bezruč (Lubos, 1994: 610-621). Bezruč’s poetry merged Silesian topics with industrial imagery which proved to be quite effective in the period of rapid industrialization and emergence of the social democratic movement. The worker movement of the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin was organized by Bohemia-born Petr Cingr (1850-1920) in 1893. In the same year he also started publishing the periodical Odborné listy (Trade Union Newspaper). The miners strikes of 1894 and 1896, as well as the general strike in 1900 indicated that the social democratic movement was temporarily stronger than the nationalist movements. The cooperation of social democratic activists of Czech, German and Polish tongues ceased after the successful 1907 Reichsrat elections when they seized four of Austrian Silesia’s seven mandates. The social democratic organizations split along ethnic lines and fully espoused nationalist ideology after 1910 (Gawrecki, 1992: 63/64; Lis, 1993: 118; Myška, 1993: 24/25). The nationalist tension was visible in the activities of Polish, German and Czech organizations whose national interests clashed violently in the industrial basin. Before the Polish-Czech national conflict was symbolized in 1909 by the establishment of one Polish and one Czech gymnasium in Orlau (Orlova), a year earlier Czech activists had launched there a weekly under the tale-telling title Obrana Slezska (Defence of Silesia) (Grobelny, 1992: 24). Although Austrian Silesian nationalist and ultramontane activists of various tongues, among them Petr Bezruč, claimed that they wanted better social, cultural and educational standards for their fellowmen, the pipelines through which ideological, financial and cadre aid flew from Prague, Cracow, Vienna and Berlin, inextricably linked Austrian Silesia with the mainstreams of Polish, Czech and German nationalisms, setting the scene for the partition of this crownland after 1918 (Pynsent, 1993: 44).

Concluding the outline of the development of the Czech national movement in Austrian Silesia, it is appropriate to ask how strong it was vis-a-vis its Polish and German counterparts. From the above-quoted statistics it is clear that 20% of West Silesia’s population were Czech-speakers in 1910 whereas 27% in East Silesia. From the point of view of the whole crownland they were the smallest ethnic group ranked behind the dominant German-speakers and Polish-speakers. Due to the geographic distribution German-speakers clearly dominated in the whole of West Silesia with the exception of its eastern corner around Troppau (Opava), whereas Polish-speakers in East Silesia with the exception of its western part. But the Austrian Silesian Czech-speakers located in the facing parts of West and East Silesia were linked by the Moravian wedge populated by Czech-speakers too. This salient gave them direct access to the Czech-speakers of north-eastern Moravia. Thus it is difficult to assess development of Austrian Silesia’s Czech national movement without taking into consideration this Moravian environment where the conditions for the Czech national movement were quite affable after the Ausgleich of 1905. But bearing in mind that Troppau (Opava) and Ostrau (Ostrava) continued to be the Czech cultural centers for northern Moravia well into the 20th century, and that the Ausgleich rather fortified the regional Moravian identity instead of inspiring Czech nationalism, it is justified to say that Czech nationalism of Austrian Silesia was weaker than its German and Polish counterparts (Gawrecki, 1992: 61; Zahradník, 1992: 45; Wiskemann, 1938: map at end). Due to the author’s lack of information on membership of the Czech national organizations of Austrian Silesia let suffice it to say that in 1919 there were 25 German savings banks with the deposits of 162 m crowns, and three Czech ones with the deposits of 5 m crowns (Anon., 1919: 19), which shows that Austrian Silesia’s Czech-speaker lost the Wirtschaftskampf to the crownland’s German-speakers unlike the Czech-speakers of Bohemia and, less so, of Moravia (Waldenberg, 1992: 43).

Analyzing the development of the Czech national movement in Austrian Silesia, one has to pay some attention to the Czech-speakers who lived in a compact area across the border in southern Upper Silesia. As said in the previous chapters they spoke northern Moravian dialects of Czech as well as the transitory dialects between these northern Moravian dialects and the Silesian dialects of Polish. Like majority of the dialectal Czech-speakers of Austrian Silesia and Moravia they considered themselves to be Moravians (Moravci), and labeled their language forms as the Moravian language (Kaciř, 1996: 3; Žáček, 1995: 152). The Prussian authorities (as their Habsburg counterparts in regard to Moravia)
sought to fortify their regional identity by referring to them in official documents and statistics as Moravians or Moravian-speakers (Gawrecki, 1992: 59). However, it was their locally-born priest Father Cyprian Lelek (1812-1883) (the only Czech-speaking deputy of the German national Assembly at Frankfurt, and the Prussian National Assembly at Berlin) who was most responsible for the development of the Czech national movement in this region and across the border in Austrian Silesia and the Moravian salient. He published one (and only) issue of the first Austrian and Prussian Silesian newspaper in Czech in 1846 and, in the same year, wrote the first Czech-language history of Silesia. Even before Czech and Polish-language textbooks were introduced to Austrian Silesian elementary schools at the beginning of the 1850s he wrote the Czech-language primer which enjoyed six editions in the period 1846-1871. His interests were mainly folkloristic and attitudes ultramontane so, not unlike Upper Silesia’s Polish-speaking clergymen, he shied away from the Czech national movement which emerged across the border in Austrian Silesia in the 1860s and 1870s sticking rather to confessional loyalties which still overrode ethnic lines in Silesia at that time. His ultramontane stance was made easier by the fact that his Moravian faithful were Catholics (Myška, 1994: 74/75). But it was not enough for the authorities of the newly formed German Empire during the *Kulturkampf* since ultramontanism was perceived as constituent part of *Großdeutsche* nationalism which was made especially subversive by its association with the Slavic languages of Upper Silesia. These languages clashed with the homogenous monolingual ideal of *Kleindeutsche* nationalism. Because no Czech-language periodical emerged in Prussian Silesia after 1848, Father Lelek, who collaborated with several Austrian Silesian and Bohemian Czech-language newspapers, encouraged their faithful to subscribe to them, as well as to purchase religious books in Czech (Hytrek, 1996: 36; Myska, 1994: 74/75). Because some publications contained the Czech national message propagated by the Old Czechs, already in the 1860s, the Prussian authorities (rightly) blamed Czech nationalists for striving to introduce the ethnic cleavage which would destroy the peaceful German-Moravian coexistence which had continued for several centuries then (Wanatowicz, 1992: 135).

The Moravians who amounted to c. 42,000 in 1840 (Kokot, 1993: 74) formed 25% of the population of the county of Ratibor (Racibórz), and 11% of the population of the county of Leobschütz (Glubczyce) in 1875 (Reiner, 1971: 397). By 1905 their number rose to 57,000 in the former county and to 5,000 in the latter (Gawrecki, 1992: 61). Their percentage share in the populace of both the counties remained unchanged though in the case of the county of Ratibor (Racibórz) they amounted to 42.2% of the rural population and 4.4% of the urban population. They concentrated west of the line running from Oderberg (Bohumín) to Bauerwitz (Baborów) in the southern section of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county. A smaller region of the concentration of Moravians lay in the south of the Leobschütz (Glubczyce) county around the villages of Branitz (Branice), Nassiedel (Nasiedle) and Jakubowitz (Jakubowice) (Gregor, 1904). The policies of the *Kulturkampf* which removed Polish from elementary education after 1872, and from school religious instruction after 1875 in Silesia, were also applied to them. The only preserve of their language and customs remained the local Catholic churches (Plaček, 1996: 7/8). Due to the anti-Church and anti-Slavic character of the *Kulturkampf*, the Moravians as the Polish-speaking Upper Silearians turned into the loyal supporters of the Zentrum. However, the Moravians pro-German attitude remained quite strong (unlike in some cases of Polish-speaking Upper Silearians and Slavic-speaking Austrian Silearians) because their religious books were published in their dialect which differed in spelling and usage from standard Czech, and were predominantly printed in the Gothic type unambiguously associated with Germandom (Triest, 1984: 657). Their distinctiveness vis-a-vis other inhabitants of Upper Silesia and the emerging national movements of Austrian Silesia was deepened by the fact that the territories they populated, mainly belonged to the Olmütz (Olomouc) diocese like the Moravian wedge between East and West Silesia. In order to separate them from the developing Slavic national movements in Upper

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479 The Bohemian newspapers included the *Hlasy* (Voices), the *Národní listy*, and the Austrian Silesian ones: the *Opavský besedník*, and the *Opavský týdeník* (Myška, 1994: 75).

480 Polish-speakers constituted 47.9% of the county’s rural population whereas German-speakers 9.4%, and 30.7% of the urban population while German-speakers 64.9% (Gregor, 1904).
and Austrian Silesia, and to retain their unwavering loyalty to the Catholic Church and the Zentrum, the local clergy launched a weekly, in their dialect the Katolické Nowiny (Catholic News) (1893-1920) which was printed in the Gothic type. Its runs soared from 420 copies in 1893 to 3,000 in 1911-1917. The editors of this newspaper: Arnošt Jureczka and Josef Hlubek were the main leaders of the Moravian ethnic movement. On the basis of the Treaty of Versailles, the larger part of the territory the Moravians inhabited was transferred to Czechoslovakia. Because of the area’s main town Hultschin (Hlučín) it got to be known as the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko). It measured 315.8 sq km and supported the population of 48,446 according to the 1910 census, the majority of whom were Moravians. The Czechs considered them to be antiquated Czechs who had to be brought up to the date. In 1920 the year when the Katolické Nowiny were closed down standard Czech and the Latin type were employed in this periodical so that its title read Katolické Noviny (Gröschel, 1993: 240; Weczerka, 1977: 199). The sudden imposition of the Czech national identity on the Moravians quenched the Moravian ethnic movement and brough an equally rapid reaction to Czechization, as they started to identify themselves as Germans. According to the 1910 census there were 19% Germans in the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) whereas the Czechoslovak sources estimated it at 20%\(^\text{481}\) (Weczerka, 1977: 200). Czechization continued against the wishes of the Huktschiners, caused 80% of them to vote for the Sudetendeutsche Partei (Sudetic German Party) so prior to World War II the majority of them identified themselves as Germans. In this process the Moravian ethnic identity vanished, and as an ironic observer remarked: Bismarck could not make the Hultschiner into Germans, but where he failed the Czechs have succeeded (Wiskemann, 1938: 232-234).

Before moving to the problematic of the Silesian ethnic movement, it is worthwhile to note that in 1840 8,500 Czech-speakers lived in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency, in: the Glatz (Klodzko) Margravate and in the counties of Strehlen (Strzelin) and Gross Wartenberg (Śyców), as well as 1,000 in Hirschberg (Jelenia Góra), Jauer (Jawor) and Görlitz (Zgorzelec, Görlitz) of the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency. By 1905 their number rose to 1,800 in the latter regency and to 10,000 in the former regency, where they presence became visible in the workforce of the Waldenburg-Neurode (Walbrzych-Nowa Ruda) coal mining area Kokot, 1973: 74). In their majority they were descendants of the 18th century Protestant refugees from Bohemia and Moravia. Becuase they lived in predominantly German-speaking areas they were more often bilingual than not. Moreover, being Protestants and knowing German they could very easily be assimilated into Germandom which was pegged on the two features. It was more practical to be a German than a Czech at that time in Prussian Silesia and in Germany. So the Czech national movement did not influence them, and as the Polish-speaking Protestants of north-eastern Lower Silesia, by 1945, almost all of these Lower Silesian Czech-speakers became Germans only with vague memories of their Czech ethnic origins\(^\text{482}\). Even those who 2-3,000 who declared themselves to be Czechs in the second half of the 1940s decided to leave for Germany rather than for Czechoslovakia after the communist take-over was effected in this country in 1948 (Palys, 1995: 39, 49).

A phenomenon similar to the Moravian ethnic movement was the Silesian ethnic movement which slowly developed after 1848 in East Silesia as a reaction to the emergence of the Czech and Polish national movements which aimed at homogenizing the population with their specific dialect and customs into the worlds of standard Polish and Czech langauges and cultures, respectively. The beginning of this movement can be traced back to the decision of the local Catholic clergy to neutralize the Tygodnik Cieszyński and the clearly Polish national activists who had launched it, with

\(^{481}\) It seems that official Czechoslovak statistics on nationality of the inhabitants of the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) were frequently massaged. The photocopies of documents in possession of Mr Andreas Götzé (Freie Universität Berlin), unambiguously indicate that Czech census officers often altered the Hultschiners increasingly more numerous declarations for Germandom by striking the latter’s statements and entering, in official hand, answers which made concerned Hultschiners, against their will, into Czechs.

\(^{482}\) When the Glatz (Margravate) was occupied by the Soviet troops and taken over by the Polish administration who jointly carried out the expulsion of the margravate’s German population in 1945-1946, there was no need for the use of the Czech language (cf. Großpietsch, 1994).
the Polish-language ultramontane and pro-German weekly *Nowiny dla Ludu Wiejskiego* (1848/1849). This initiative was abandoned in the reactionary 1850s but the development of the Czech and Polish national movements led to the establishment of the pro-German political weekly *Nowiny Śląskie* (Silesian News) (1868/1869) which propagated the regional Austrian Silesian identity and loyalty to the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy. Both the periodicals were published at Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) and were mainly directed at the readership in the vicinity of this town. At that time Lemberg (Lviv)-born Rev Theodor Haase (1834-1909), who had become the pastor of the bilingual Protestant Bielitz (Bielsko) parish in 1859, had followed in the footsteps of Rev Leopold Otto as the Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) pastor in 1876, when the latter had left for Warsaw in 1875. With one difference, however, Rev Otto propagated the national idea and, unusually, managed to associate it with Protestantism in East Silesia though, elsewhere, Polish nationalism and Protestantism (because of its association with Germandom) were mutually exclusive. Rev Haase was elected to the *Landtag* in 1876, and three years later entered the *Reichsrat* from the urban curia constituency of Bielitz (Bielsko), Skotschau (Skoczów), Schwarzwasser (Strumień) and Jablunkau (Jablonków). In 1882 he was also nominated to the position of the Moravian-Austrian Silesian superintendent of the evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession (Gawrecki, 1992: 62; Golec, 1993: 119; Weczerka, 1977a: LXXXV; Zahradnik, 1989: 122, 125). He was against nationalisms which introduced the ethnic cleavage cutting across the Protestant faithful, and generally through the Austrian Silesian population.

In his activities against this phenomenon he was aided by the split in the Polish movement along the confessional line which led to the emergence of the Catholic ŚKL and Protestant PTL in the first half of the 1880s. Haase commenced the publication of the pro-Austrian Silesian, Protestant and pro-German political weekly *Nowy Czas* (New Time) (1877-1920). Later it was appended by the more practical-oriented biweekly *Przegląd Rolniczy* (Agricultural Review) (1887-1909). The run of the former periodical reached 1,500 in 1900. He also established the Protestant reading Room at Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) to limit the influence of similar Polish institutions in this region. In 1885 already 14 East Silesian pastors cooperated with Haase as opposed to the three who either stayed neutral or leaned toward the pro-Polish PTL. The long career of Haase crowned, in 1905, with his life nomination to the *Reichsrat*’s higher chamber, *Herrenhaus* (House of Lords) lent such a degree of respectibility to the emerging Silesian movement which was not readily available to the Polish or Czech camp (Nowak, 1995: 27/28; Zahradnik, 1989: 125/126, 153/154). However, the emergence and intensification of the national conflict in East Silesia produced in the 1880s-1910s by industrialization and the influence of Polish, German and Czech nationalisms radiating from Cracow, Prague and Vienna, respectively, could not be countered by Haase’s traditional methods any more at the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, the political situation was even more complicated by the growing strength of the social democratic movement at the turn of the centuries.

A solution to this debacle was offered by locally-born Josef Koźdoń (1873-1949). He attended a Polish-language elementary school and, later, graduated from the Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) teacher seminary (where the medium of instruction was German as in all the other Austrian Silesian teacher seminaries at that time). In 1898 he started working at the elementary school at Skotschau (Skoczów) so by birth, education and job he was attached to this area of East Silesia at which Rev

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483 In the Danubian Monarchy deputies were elected to the *Landtags* and the *Reichsrat* according to various rules and the constituencies of different kinds of mandates were organized in *curiae*. Usually more votes were needed to elect a deputy from the countryside or urban *curia* that from the Church or great landowner/aristocratic *curia*. Moreover, the two former *curiae* had less deputies to themselves than the two latter ones. Consequently, the more privileged were represented by a larger number of deputies than those with less entitlements.

484 Czech researchers spell his surname in accordance with Czech orthography Koždoň while Polish scholars employ the Polish-language version of his name Józef. It is difficult to pin point the correct form of his name and surname without referring to his deed of birth which is not available to the author, but after analysis of various German, Polish and Czech sources it seems that the person concerned used the form Josef Koźdoń when signing official documents.
Chapter five

Haase had directed his efforts. Kozdon subscribed to Rev Haase’s views and spoke against nationalisms. He especially opposed the Galician Polish-speakers (who, according to him, culturally, had nothing in common with the East Silesian Polish-speakers) and the inflow of the Czech intelligentsia attracted by industrialization. Thanks to the German support he was elected to the Landtag in 1907 (Golec, 1993: 161; Nowak, 1995: 29). Next he started building his electorate, especially in the region around Skoczów (Skotschow), Schwarzwasser (Strumień) and Bielitz (Bielisko) (Nowak, 1995: 31) around his political creed: We, East Silesians, regardless of the language [we speak], call ourselves Austrians and repudiate any nationalistic chauvinism, be it Polish or German; and are bound with Vienná (Kacir, 1996: 3). This political program which aspired to preserve the ethnic distinctiveness of the East Silesians firmly anchoring it in regionalism and loyalty to the Habsburg monarch proved to be attractive to the population whose identity (against their wishes) was contended for by Polish, Czech and German nationalists as well as by the Catholic and Protestant Churches. In the process of industrialization the East Silesians entered into contacts with arriving Czech-speaking intelligentsia and Galician Polish-speaking workers. Confronted with the Other they expressly rejected the attempts to include them into Polishdom considering the labels Pole and Galician as pejorative. The Czech nationalist influence having weakened in east and central East Silesia at the turn of the centuries, Czechdom was no option. On the other hand, centuries-long attraction of the Austrian culture based on the German language did continue. Thus, Kozdon and his East Silesian followers not wishing to transform their ethnic group into a full-fledged nation decided that, from the cultural stance, they are more affined to Großdeutsch Germandom than forming Polishdom (Kacir, 1996: 3; Nowak, 1995: 30). Consequently the solely ethnic appeal of the East Silesian movement was confined to the rural areas where the demographic patterns had not been transformed by industrialization. The East Silesian ethnic identity was no option to Galician immigrants in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) basin who usually chose between assimilation with Germandom or Czechdom (Nowak, 1995: 32).

In 1909 Kozdon with aid of the Protestant Church and local German activists established the Śląska Partia Ludowa/Schlesische Volkspartei (ŚPLŚP, Silesian People’s Party) at Skoczów (Skotschow), and was elected to the Landtag for another term (Gawrecki, 1992: 62; Kuhn, 1977: 508). In the very same year the new party attracted 2,000 members and in 1910 the electoral base of this movement was considerably broadened by the founding of the apolitical Związek Ślązaków/Bund der Schlesier (ZŚ/BdS, Union of the Silesians) (Nowak, 1995: 31). The movement was served by the ŚPLŚP’s weekly Ślązak (Silesian) (1909-1923) whose run soon topped 3,400 copies (Zahradnik, 1989: 191); and, in 1911, achieved a considerable success in the local elections when members of the ŚPLŚP or ZŚ/BdS were elected to head 36 Gemeinden (local communities). The pronounced disinterest of the East Silesian movement was clearly displayed in the 1910 census when Kozdon suggested that his supporters should indicate German or Polish as their Umgangssprache (language used in everyday situations) (Nowak, 1995: 30). The anationalist but pro-German stance of the East Silesian movement inescapably bred conflict with the Polish national movement which considered the north-eastern corner of East Silesia dominated by proponents of Kozdon as its own. Polish activists abused their East Silesian counterparts with such labels as: renegades, kozdoniowiec or ślonzakowiec (Kacir, 1996: 3) and appealed for an unrelenting struggle against them as worse than

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485 Austrian Silesia was divided into counties which constituted from Gemeinden (local/village communities). East Silesia housed the four counties of Bielitz (Bielisko), Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn), Friedek (Fry'dek) and Freistadt (FrySVtat) which shared among them 213 Gemeinden (Nowak, 1995: 26). In the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) county where the Polish movement was the strongest, in 1907, administration was conducted in Polish in 25 Gemeinden, in Polish and German in 8 Gemeinden, and in German in 36 Gemeinden (Grobelny, 1992: 75).

486 A man of Kozdon.

487 This phonetically altered label derives from Ślązak (Silesian) which Polish activists reserved to themselves and denied to the members of the East Silesian ethnic movement. East Silesians aspiring to preserve their identity described themselves in their own Slavic dialect as Szlonzaki, SVlunzoky, Schlonsaken which is
Czechor German-speakers inhabiting East Silesia (Nowak, 1995: 32). Consequently, not only straightforward Polish nationalists attacked the ŚPLŚP but also nationally-minded members of the PTL and ZŚK (Zahradnik, 1992: 47). Kozdon answered in kind attacking the increasingly monolingual Polish-language libraries which could not appropriately serve the multilingual population of East Silesia, and popularized Polish nationalism (Fazan, 1991: 103, 174).

Social and national conflicts in Austrian and Prussian Silesia were forgotten due to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 (Grobelny, 1992: 77; Lis, 1993: 116). Political and economic life of Austria-Hungary and Germany were subordinated to the war effort. Radical socialist and nationalist publications were suppressed by preventive censorship. Activities of nationalist and socialist organizations were limited almost to a standoff by mobilization and wartime strictures. Soldiers of various tongues and ethnic backgrounds fought loyally at various fronts remaining true to true to the tsar or the German and Austro-Hungarian Kaisers. For the time being, general attachment to the dynasts ruled supreme successfully overriding ethnic cleavages up to 1917/1918. The Polish or Czech question was more frequently toyed with by Moscow, Vienna and Berlin for the sake of winning the war than by those concerned who hoped to survive the nightmare and return to their families let alone continue the fighting to facilitate emergence of nation-states which some nationalist ideologues had devised and awaited opportunities to force onto the political map of Europe. But the gradual collapse of the prewar status quo in 1917/1918 with the concomitant espousal of the national principle in the form of Wilson’s rule of self-determination as the cornerstone of the political reorganization of the continent, made many an unwilling troop to continue soldiering for numerous new lords who followed in quick succession after the break-up of Austro-Hungary, and the collapse of traditional power systems in Germany and Russia. This delayed end of the 19th century spawned a dramatically altered Europe and brought about a new division of Silesia with consolidation of nation-states whose emergence respective nationalist ideologues demanded and justified. Regional identities and loyalty to multiethnic and multiconfessional political entities became passe. Ethnic, linguistic and, to a lesser degree, confessional homogeneity became the word of the day, which, unavoidably, marked the dawn the traditional way of life in Silesia as in many other distinctive multicultural regions of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus it is necessary to conclude this chapter with the general overview of the activities of the Polish and Czech nationalist movements eventually leading to the creation of Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1918, and their impact on Silesia before commencing the chapter on the interwar period with an analysis of the division of Austrian Silesia in 1919 and Upper Silesia in 1919 and 1921.

The Western Front soon extending 800 km from Switzerland to the North Sea and immobilized by the war of attrition was of no immediate consequence for Silesia. This region because of its eastern location was more readily linked to the vicissitudes of the more dynamic Eastern Front. Possessing a larger standing army to offset their slower mobilization procedures, the Russians assumed the offensive at the very beginning of the war. Already in August Russian armies advanced into East Prussia and Galicia and were precariously held back from entering East Prussia, the province of Posen (Poznań) and Silesia, and from seizing Cracow. The chief aim of the 3 mln Russian troops was to seize Upper Silesia the second largest industrial basin of Germany, and Silesia’s capital Breslau (Wrocław). The possibility of losing Silesia to the Russians was so imminent that evacuation of civil population started and destruction of industrial equipment was prepared. German desperation was indicated by putting up barbed wire fences east of Breslau (Wrocław) in hope of restraining the advancing Russian forces. Gen Remus von Woyrsch (1847-1920) in charge of his native province deftly withstood the Russian onslaught, which was decisively stopped by gen Paul von Hindenburg’s victory at Tannenberg (Grunwald) in East Prussia (August 26-30, 1914) and his two

phonetically the same word Silesian rendered in the ortographic systems of standard Polish, standard Czech and standard German (Kacir’, 1996: 3).

488 To commemorate his victories which contributed to saving Upper Silesia from falling prey to the Russians, the Upper Silesian town of Zabrze was named after Hindenburg in 1915 (Batowski, 1964: 69).
further victories in the two battles of the Masurian Lakes (September 7-14, 1914; February 7-21, 1915). In April 1915 the German forces advanced into Lithuania and Courland, and next month Galicia and Bukovina were regained. The Austro-German offensive launched on July 1 along the line from the Baltic to the San River achieved a crossing of the Vistula at Ivanogrod (Dęblin) on July 29/30 and led to the seizure of Warsaw (August 8), Kovno (Kaunas) (August 18) and Brest-Litovsk (Brest) (August 25), before its impetus was checked by the Russians in eastern Galicia. The four Russian offensives staged in the second half of 1916 pushed back the Austro-German armies only a bit. From July 1917 the Germans and the Austrians recaptured almost all of Galicia and Bukovina. In September the Germans took Riga and next month occupied the greater part of Latvia. In further advances they were helped by the increasing disorganization of the Russian state brought about by the outbreak of the October Revolution in November 1917. On February 9, 1918, the Central powers recognized the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian autonomy in eastern Galicia in exchange for the delivery of grain supplies. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Brest) (March 3), Soviet Russia embroiled in numerous internal and border conflicts, left the stage of the Great War having surrendered Livonia, Courland, Lithuania, Estonia and Congress Poland, and having recognized Finland and Ukraine as independent states. The Central Powers eager to check the westward spread of bolshevism, controlled the vast eastern territories (with the exception of Finland) by Autumn 1918 when many Central and Eastern European states declared independence and revolution was transplanted to Germany and Austria-Hungary. On October 16, 1918 Emperor Karl (reigned 1916-1918) issued a manifesto announcing the transformation of Austria-Hungary into a federal union but the long overdue move could not forestall the break-up of the Habsburg realm. The Ottoman Empire also crumbled and the Allies made inroads into the Western Front so Germany had to conclude an armistice with the Allies on November 11. The Great War was over. On January 18, 1919 the peace conference convened at Paris to work out a new shape for Europe, which instead doing away with the hostilities only swept them under the carpet of rhetoric dictating unduly harsh terms of peace to Germany (Czapliński, 1993: 43; Ehrich, 1992: 533; Fuchs, 1994: 608/609; Kinder, 1978: II 125, 130/131; Neubach, 1992: 12; Scheuermann, 1994: 1980).

During the war the Polish question became a trump card to be used in times of need by Russia and the Central Powers. On August 16, 1914 the Austrian government allowed formation of the Naczelný Komitet Narodowy (NKN, Supreme National Committee) in Cracow, and of a Polish legion whose membership was recruited from Piłsudski’s society of Polish riflemen and his other followers. On August 14 Russia recognized the basic rights of the Poles to autonomy and allowed the founding of the Komitet Narodowy Polski (KNP, Polish National Committee) under Dmowski’s leadership in November. Also on Piłsudski’s initiative the clandestine Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW, Polish Military Organization) came into being at Warsaw in October. The NKN hoped to reestablish the Polish state with the support of the Central Powers and the KNP strove for the same expecting support from Russia. However, with the quick succession of the Central Powers victories in the Eastern Front the Poles seemed to be no needed any more. Congress Poland was divided into two military occupation zones, with a German governor in Warsaw and an Austrian-Hungarian one in Lublin. Dmowski’s plans having been frustrated, he left for the West and Congress Poland’s activists established the Centralny Komitet Narodowy (CKN, Central National Committee) in December 1915. It accepted the KKN’s program. However, the Central Powers were reluctant to contribute to the restitution of an independent Poland in any substantial manner hoping to win the war soon and reestablish the prewar status quo possibly improved in their favor. Only when the war of attrition continued with no end in sight overburdening the unprepared economies of the Central powers to the point of collapse, the Poles were to be won for the war effort again on the German instigation. The German and Austrian-Hungarian emperors proclaimed a new Kingdom of Poland on November 5.

German nationalists treated this battle as a symbolical revenge for the 1410 battle of Grunwald (Tannenberg) during which the Teutonic Order’s forces were defeated by the more numerous Polish-Lithuanian and Bohemian troops (Czapliński, 1990: 600).
The proclamation did not fulfill the hopes of Polish nationalists as it was limited to Congress Poland only, without any possibility of attaching to it the rest of the Russian partition, Galicia or let alone the province of Posen (Poznań). However, the decision did encourage the nationalists and caused the CKN (which controlled the then semi-legal POW) to undertake anti-Russian activities. In the meantime, thanks to the personal contacts of the renowned Polish pianist Ignacy Paderewski (1860-1841) with Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924), the US president stated, on January 22, 1917, that the Allies and the Central Powers accepted a united, independent and autonomous Poland was to be reestablished. On March 29 the Russian Provisional Government proclaimed that a Polish state in alliance with Russia will be reestablished. Subsequently, Polish armies were founded in France and Russia. On August 15, 1917 Dmowski reestablished the KNP in Switzerland before it was moved to Paris. In Congress Poland Pilsudski’s 20,000-strong Polish legion did not want to swear allegiance to the Central Powers which led to the his imprisonment on July 22. A Regency Council was installed on October 15, but it came too late to overcome the distrust that now divided the Poles and the Central Powers. The principle of the right for self-determination of all nations as stated by both Wilson and Lenin became the accepted guideline to reorganize the political map of Europe. On January 8, 1918 Wilson demanded an independent Polish state in his 14-points speech. The military collapse of Austria-Hungary in October led to the formation of the Polska Komisja Likwidacyjna (Polish Liquidation Commission) at Cracow on October 28. It was the first independent Polish administrative body. On November 7, a Provisional Government of the Polish Republic was established in Lublin. Pilsudski was freed when Germany collapsed in November. Upon his return to Warsaw the aforementioned administrations put themselves under his control and he became the unrivaled ruler of the forming Poland on November 11. This date is generally recognized as the day of the founding of the Second Polish Republic and celebrated as the Day of Independence (Czubiński, 1976: 613/614; Schramm, 1989: 80/81; Smogorzewski, 1992: 951/952).

The bitter Czech-national conflict which unfolded in Bohemia prior to the Great War and the suspension of the crownland’s constitution in 1913 could not make the war popular among the populace. The Czech intellectuals of Panslav leanings openly proclaimed that the war was not fought for the Czech national cause and that they should rather ally with Russia. This disloyal stance brought about incarceration of many pro-Russian Young Czechs including Karel Kramař and made whole Czech units to go over to the Russian side in 1915. In December 1914, the Young Czech leader Toma’s Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937) warned that he would be arrested, fled abroad protected by a Serbian passport. He settled at London and started appealing English intellectuals (including R.W.

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490 Wilhelm II considered offering the Polish crown to the Pless (Pszzcyna) prince Hans Heinrich XV of the Hochbergs (1861-1938) or to his eldest son. This prince was a renowned industrialist, large landowner, member of the higher chamber of the Reichstag, the deputy Oberpräsident of Silesia, president of the elite Union-Klub in Berlin, diplomat and friend of the emperor. He belonged to the group of the ten richest persons of the German Empire. He, as many other aristocratic families in Silesia, accepted the tradition of the Silesian Piasts as his own which has been visible in the symbolic use of the Polish name Bolko in his family. Due to some distant genealogical connections with the Silesian Piasts he promoted his Piast origin and his claim was accepted by a many Polish scholar. After the division of Upper Silesia the majority of his estates were included within the Polish borders. Not to lose his control over them he accepted the Polish citizenship and ranked as the fifth richest person in Poland (in the estimate of his fortune his Lower Silesian mansions were not taken into account) (Polak, 1995: 200/201).

491 He taught philosophy at Vienna, was a professor at the Czech Prague University since its inception in 1882, and served several terms as a deputy to the Reichsrat where he opposed Pangerman policies subjugating Austria-Hungary to Germany as well as the aggressive Austro-Hungarian course in the Balkans. He also contributed to the standardization of the Czech language and culture having been an editor of the monumental Ottu v slovni’k naučny (1888-1942) (this 30-volume encyclopedic work remains unsurpassed to this day. After 1989 it is reprinted and updated with new volumes. It was even published on a CD-ROM.) Later Masaryk acted as the first president of the Czechoslovak Republic in the years 1918-1935, and due to this fact he became a veritable epitome of the Czechoslovak statehood and Czech nationalism.
Seton-Watson\textsuperscript{492}) for the Czech national cause. In 1915 he was joined by his student Edvard Beneš (1884-1848) who had established the secret organization Mafia (Mafia) which was to oppose the official Austro-Hungarian line and serve as a liaison between domestic and emigre Czech nationalist organizations. Masaryk at first was vague about what course to take. After the young Slovak astronomer Milan Rastislav Štefánik offered his support, he settled on the idea of a Czechoslovak state, as composed from the historical Czech lands (of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia) and Slovakia. The official commencement of the Czechoslovak independence movement is associated with the celebration of the anniversary of Jan Hus’s\textsuperscript{493} death in Geneva on July 6, 1915. The subsequent association of Czech nationalism with this strain of Protestantism which had been forged by Bohemian dissenters including other significant figures: Jan Žižka\textsuperscript{494} (1370-1424) and Jan Amos Komenský\textsuperscript{495} (1592-1670), allowed the Czech nationalists differentiate their nation-in-making from ultramontane Austria-Hungary and Polish nationalism pegged on Catholicism though majority of the Czecho-Slovak-speakers were Catholics after the centuries of the successful Counter-Reformation (Davies, 1996: 609). In November the Československý výbor (ČV, Czechoslovak Committee) was founded, proclaiming as its goal the achievement of independence for a Czechoslovak state within the framework of the Habsburg monarchy\textsuperscript{496} (Waldenberg, 1992: 48). In February 1916 the ČV was transformed into the Československa národní rada (ČNR, Czechoslovak National Council) which began to cooperate with Polish and Romanian organizations abroad, as well as with the Yugoslav Committee. The victories of the Central Powers on the Eastern Front, convinced the Young Czechs that loyal support for the Dual Monarchy’s war effort would be a better service to their cause. in 1916, together with other Bohemian political groups, they established the Český Svaz (ČS, Czech Union), which grouped the Czech Reichsrat deputies, and the Národní výbor (NV, National Committee) which was to serve as the highest Czech national body in Bohemia. The Czechs relations with Vienna relaxed after the demise of Franz Josef I in November. The new Emperor Karl I granted amnesty to political prisoners and attempted to reform the Dual Monarchy along the federal line. In reply to these initiatives, on January 24, 1917, the ČS declared that its goal was to liberate the Czechs from the foreign state [of Austria-Hungary] but added that wanted to achieve this aim under Habsburg rule. The February Revolution which swept Russia in March and the US declaration of war on Germany (April 6) coupled with the worsening economic situation did not allow Karl I to go on with his plans of domestic reforms. More Czech activists as other politicians throughout Austria-Hungary started reaching the conclusion that it would be impossible to prevent the break-up of the Dual Monarchy along ethnic lines. In May 1917\textsuperscript{497} Masaryk left London for Russia to speed up organization of a Czechoslovak army from freed Czech and Slovak POWs. A Czechoslovak brigade participated in the last Russian offensive against the Central Powers in Summer 1917. After the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in November Masaryk left for the United States to canvas for the Czechoslovak cause whereas the Czech troops struggled against the Bolsheviks and seized the control of the Siberian railroad. On January 8, 1918, Wilson promulgated his Fourteen Points, the 10th of which called for the freest opportunity of the autonomous development for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. Two days earlier a demand for a sovereign state within the historic frontiers of the Czech lands and of

\textsuperscript{492} He was a major Western European historian of the Slavic peoples of Central and Eastern Europe as well as a commentator on their national movements. His son Hugh Seton-Watson developed his father’s studies giving the basis for the study of ethnicity and nationalism in this part of the old continent.

\textsuperscript{493} The reformer’s significance for Czech nationalism is symbolized by the grand monument placed in the premiere Old Town Square of Prague.

\textsuperscript{494} The colossal equestrian statue of this victorious one-eyed Bohemian Hussite military leader overlooks the whole of Prague, placed on the top of the hill located in the district named after him - Zvězda.

\textsuperscript{495} Masaryk saw him as the key figure in the history of Czech democracy and humanism. He even entitled the first part of his memoirs The Testament of Komenský (Davies, 1996: 609).

\textsuperscript{496} However, already in 1916 Beneš presented quite an uncompromising stance in his book De’truissez l’Autriche-Hongrie (Destroy Austria-Hungary) (Polišenský, 1991: 107).

\textsuperscript{497} At the same time the last Reichsrat convened (Polišenský, 1991: 107).
Slovakia) had been made in Prague at the Epiphany Convention which had been followed by anti-Austrian demonstrations. Czech delegates participated in the Congress of oppressed Nationalities at Rome (April 1918) where the anti-Austrian resolution was adopted. On April 30 the ČS demanded transformation of Austria-Hungary into a federal state and in May a Slav national celebration in Prague demonstrated the strength of the Czechoslovak and other Slav independence movements. In the same month the Allies began to support the possibility of emergence of nation-states at the cost of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. On May 31 the Pittsburgh Convention, favoring political union of the Czechs and Slovaks, was adopted. On July 13 the ČSR was reorganized in line with the results of the last (1911) Bohemian Landtag elections, and was to transform Bohemia into the third constituent part of the Dual Monarchy. But at the same time France recognized the ČNR as the supreme body controlling Czechoslovak national interests, and other Allies followed the suit. On September 28 Benes signed a treaty whereby France agreed to support the Czechoslovak program in the postwar peace conference. The ČNR constituted itself as a provisional government on October 14, and, undeterred by Karl I’s manifesto promising overhauling Austria-Hungary into a federal state (October 16), on October 18 Masaryk and benes issued a declaration of independence simultaneously in Washington and Paris. The NV proclaimed a Czechoslovak Republic on October 28 at Prague, and, two days later, the Slovak Národní rada (National Council) acceded to the proclamation. On October 27 the last Austro-Hungarian foreign minister Gyula Andrássy accepted the existence of an independent Czechoslovak state. After the signing of the armistice between the Allies and Austria-Hungary on November 3, Karl I relinquished his administrative powers on November 11 (the day when an armistice was concluded between the Allies and Germany) marking the final dismantling of Austria-Hungary (Carter, 1992: 923/924; Ehrich, 1992: 533/534; Pokorný, 1993: 141/142; Polišenský, 1991: 106-110).

The coming into being of the new states of Czechoslovakia and Poland meant that they would compete for the industrial and mineral wealth of Silesia among each other in the case of East Silesia and with Germany in the case of Upper Silesia encouraged by the rapid break-up of Austria-Hungary, as well as by the sharp decline in the military and political power of Germany and Russia embroiled in revolution. However, before this process is analyzed in relation to its effects on Silesia in further chapters of this work, it is necessary to sketch the general situation in Prussian and Austrian Silesia during the war with special attention paid to the activities of the Slavic national movements.

Prior to the outbreak of the Great War Polish activists strove to consolidate the Polish national movement in Germany, and to merge it at the leadership level with the counterpart movements in Congress Poland and Galicia. In April 1913 the Rada Narodowa (RN, National Council) was established at Posen (Poznań) with four delegates from Upper Silesia (including Korfanty). Apart from the aforementioned goals, the RN also aimed at propping Polishdom in at the western and northern edges of the province of Posen (Poznań) as well as in western East Prussia and in Upper Silesia. Polish activists perceived these territories as Polish so the considerable percentage of German-speaking inhabitants over there, as well as nonexistence of Polish national identity among the Polish-speaking inhabitants, they perceived as a danger to the striven-for process of Polish nation and nation-state building (Jakóbczyk, 1989: 72; Michalkiewicz, 1985: 422; Wanatowicz, 1992: 129). The leadership of the Liga Narodowa staged a meeting at Berlin in 1914 to convince Polish LN activists in Germany that they should accept Dmowski’s concept of restituting Poland with the aid of Russia after it had defeated the Central Powers (Mroczko, 1994: 102). These moves, clearly disloyal to Germany in the case of the LN decision, were restrained by the tense political situation in 1913/1914, and cut short by the outbreak of the Great War (Michalkiewicz, 1985: 421). In August 1914 about 60 socialist and Polish activists were interned in Silesia. The martial law (introduced to ensure the Burgfrieden (civil peace) announced by the Kaiser) and conscription put an end to socialist and Polish national activities. The press was censored. Majority of socialist organs were temporarily closed down including the increasingly pro-Polish Gazeta Robotnicza, and the Katolik was the only Polish-language newspaper which was published in Upper Silesia at the beginning of the war (Fulbrook, 1990: 152; Glensk, 1992: 23; Kwiatek, 1991: 15/16). Initially the inhabitants of Silesia, not unlike those of the whole of eastern Germany, were united in the face of the Russian onslaught. The
newspapers brought out by Napieralski’s Katolik press concern loyally supported the German war effort and Korfanty also shared this opinion (Figowa, 1966: 25, 29). After the Russians were repelled the imperial war Head Quarters were located in the Pless (Pszczyna) palace in the immediate vicinity of the prewar German-Russian border, in Spring 1915, and remained there until Spring 1917. It stayed in close liaison with its Austro-Hungarian counterpart which, for this purpose, had been moved to Teschen (Tęśín, Cieszyn) due to the military subordination of the Dual Monarchy to Germany (Ehrich, 1992: 532; Fuchs, 1994: 609).

The ensuing German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of Congress Poland brought almost all of the Polish-speaking population within the confines of the Central Powers disassociating them from Russia. Germany and Austria-Hungary could not ignore this human potential, and put forward all kinds of incentives before having proclaimed a Polish Kingdom (1916) in order to win them for the struggle against Russia in this dangerously prolonging warfare (Wiskemann, 1956: 14). Napieralski organized pro-German Polish-language press in the occupied territories of Congress Poland propagating the view that with German help Poland could be reestablished within the boundaries of Congress Poland (Snoch, 1991: 95). Further links between the occupied territories and Upper Silesia were forged by the merger of the sized Dombrowa (Dąbrowa)498 industrial basin with the former’s industry when the pre-1914 German-Russian border had been annulled (Fuchs, 1994: 610). Congress Poland and Galicia through which the front-line swept on a scale which was unimaginable on the Western Front, suffered serious damage. Upper Silesian Polish activists, who remembered the aid which had flown from Congress Poland and Galicia to Upper Silesia during the famine of 1879, decided to reciprocate in 1914-1916. Napieralski’s predominant pro-German ultramontane Katolik camp (who predicted an independent Poland but without Upper Silesia) worked hand in hand with the pro-LN nationalist faction (who hoped for including Upper Silesia in a would-be Poland) centered around Bronislaw Koraszewski’s Gazeta Opolska and Zygmunt Seyda’s499 Gazeta Ludowa. In this manner Napieralski hoped to fulfill the Christian obligation whereas the radicals strove to sustain contacts with other Polish-language territories in order to use them, under more favorable conditions, as a springboard for establishing a Polish state which would include Upper Silesia (Kwiatek, 1991: 19/20, 27; Mendel, 1987: 33/34, 37).

Although in 1914/1915 Korfanty distanced himself from the loyally pro-German stance represented by Napieralski (Figowa, 1966: 29) did not favor Polish voluntary forces which Pilsudski formed in Galicia. He rightly noticed that they would be utilized for the anti-Russian struggle and not for substituting the Polish state, but did not predict that those involved would choose to disregard the Austro-Hungarian command at some point. The dominant attitude among the Polish nationalist radicals was that one would gain more if one calmly waited for the right moment. Posen (Poznań) and Upper Silesian Polish nationalists were disillusioned by the NKN’s favoring creation of a Poland within the framework of the Dual Monarchy through a merger of Galicia with occupied Congress Poland in 1915/1916 but the Katolik faction espoused this stance. (Kwiatek, 1991: 21/22, 25).

Because of the war of attrition, the economic situation of the Central Powers declined resulting in shortages of goods and high inflation which made citizens hoard gold coins. The authorities answered by introducing token paper money and an increasing number of hundreds of ersatz products (Mendel, 1987: 14, 16). This system functioned quite effectively until the 1916/1917 winter when food shortages became acute all over Germany and Austria-Hungary (Fuchs, 1994: 612). Generally speaking, food rations and living conditions were worse in Upper than Lower Silesia (Gelles, 1978:

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498 The Upper Silesian coal field extends outside the land’s boundaries into Galicia and Congress Poland which belonged to Austria-Hungary and Russia, respectively. Russia’s part of the coal field was centered on the town of Dombrowa (in Russian). In 1915-1917 and 1939-1945 the Germans named this town Dąbrowa, and in 1918-1939, 1945- it has been known under its Polish name as Dąbrowa Górnicza. Consequently, this industrial basin, named after this town, is known as the Dąbrowa/Dombrowa/Dombrova industrial basin to the Poles, the Germans and the Russians, respectively (Batowski, 1964: 13)

499 Zygmunt Seyda (1876-1925), an LN activist from the province of Posen (Poznań) who organized and led the pro-LN Polish nationalist movement in Upper Silesia (Anon., 1987c: 161).
Due to conscription many factories (especially producing consumer goods) had to limit or even cease production. The dearth of workforce was alleviated with POWs who, predominantly, were employed in mines. Also women started entering the job market. However, the plight of the populace did not improve which triggered off hunger marches in 1916/1917 and brought about more acceptance for socialist ideals as elsewhere in Germany at this last stage of the war (Migdal, 1967: 12, 16, 18, 24/25). These general difficulties provided Polish LN nationalistic camp from Posen (Poznań) to form the clandestine Międzypartyjny Komitet Obywatelski (MKO, Multiparty Civil Committee) in January 1916. A few Upper Silesians belonged to it. The MKO gradually transplanted to Wielkopolaska Dmowski’s idea that Poland should be reestablished with the help of the Allies. In 1916 the Polish national movement did definitely reemerge in the province of Posen (Poznań), but this phenomenon was not paralleled in Upper Silesia where the LN camp was actually weakened when Seyda left this region. However, connections between Polish nationalists in Posen (Poznań) and Upper Silesia were steadily fortified. This process was exemplified in 1916 by the celebrations of the 61st anniversary of Mickiewicz’s death at Posen (Poznań) and Beuthen (Bytom) with mixed participation of Posnанians and Upper Silesians. Similar events which served to establish links between Polishdom and Upper Silesia’s Polish nationalists were, in 1916, the 70th birthday of the immensely popular Polish nationalist writer and Nobel prize winner Henryk Sienkiewicz (1846-1916); and, in 1917, the centenary of the Polish national hero Tadeusz Kościuszko’s death. In that time one of the top Posen (Poznań) nationalist leaders Father Stanislaw Adamski (1875-1967) started his numerous contacts with Polish activists in Upper Silesia which were to result in his moving to this region after the war (Kwiatek, 1991: 28-30; Mendel, 1987: 35/36).

Upper Silesia’s Polish national movement suddenly reemerged in 1917 after Korfanty’s speech in the Prussian Landtag (January 19, 1917). He criticized the anti-Polish measures and presented the Prussian government with a catalog of demands. Because he had entered the Landtag on a mandate from the province of Posen (Poznań) Napieralski maintained that Korfanty’s opinion related only to this province. Gazeta Ludowa disagreed. The general scandal caused by the speech propelled Korfanty onto the political stage once again (Kwiatek, 1991: 31). Although probably unbeknownst to general public, on January 11, Paderewski handed President Wilson with a memorial in which he indicated Prussian Silesia and East Silesia as Polish (Mroczko, 1994: 110). At the end of March Dmowski handed the British Foreign Minister Sir Arthur James Balfour (1848-1930) with a proposal that, among others, a future Poland should include Upper Silesia and East Silesia. (Kulak, 1990: 211). Moreover, in June 1917 the ND activist Boleslaw Jakimiak wrote Zachodnia granica Polski (Poland’s Western Boundary) which was published at Moscow in 1918. He proposed the Oder-Neisse line (without Stettin (Szczecin)) as the appropriate Polish-German border giving an early start to the idea which was embodied after 1945 (Kulak, 1990: 221-224). At the later stage the proposals were to make the Allies more prone to accept limited transfers of lands with Polish-speaking inhabitants which had not been included within Poland-Lithuania, to the Polish state. In the meantime, on April 19, the Prussian government annulled the language clause of the Act on Associations of 1908. Once again Polish could be used as the medium of communication at the meetings of Polish-language societies. But this freedom was considerably curtailed in Upper Silesia where the authorities noticed that Polish

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501 5,623 women were employed in Upper Silesian mining in 1914, and 14,037 in 1918. They amounted to 4.6% and 9.4% of all the mining workers in these years, respectively (Migdal, 1967: 16).
502 He wrote historical novels in which Polish heroes successfully fought against German, Swedish and Russian enemies. Sienkiewicz sought to utilize history for building Polish nationalism. He obtained the Nobel award in 1905 in recognition of the achievement of his Roman-time novel Quo Vadis? on Nero’s persecutions of early Christians. It was filmed several times and constitutes the author’s international recognition (Hargreaves-Mawdsley, 1968: 494).
503 He was born in the north-west Lower Silesian town of Grünberg (Zielona Góra) but through his education and ecclesiastical career got bound with the province of Posen (Poznań) (Myszor, 1996: 6).
activists used standard Polish instead of the Upper Silesian creole (Wasserpolnisch). Only the latter was considered as indigenous and appropriate (Klein, 1972: 22; Kwiatek, 1991: 33). Napieralski and Father Jan Kapica (Kapitza) (1866-1930) strove to reestablish the alliance between the Upper Silesian Polish-speakers and the Zentrum in May and June but the radicalized clergy and population did not fulfill their hopes turning to socialists and Polish nationalists. The situation was worsened by the April 23 ordinance allowing teaching of religion in Polish in the province of Posen (Poznań) without a parallel relaxation in Upper Silesia (Kwiatek, 1991: 33-35). It brought about demands for a modicum of recognition for Polish in Upper Silesia and led to the establishment of the ecclesiastical Towarzystwo Oswiaty im. Sw. Jacka (TOSJ, St Jacek Educational Society) in Oppeln (Opole) in October and November 1917 (Mendel, 1987: 38). In the latter half of 1917 the idea of self-determination became popular among Polish nationalists in Germany, and the general political thaw in the face of economic and military failures, allowed the Sokół and other Polish nationalists to operate in Upper Silesia quite freely (Kwiatek, 1991: 37/38).

In January 1918, the political bases of European order were shaken by Wilson’s Fourteen Points, in which he accepted the national principle hidden behind the buzz word of self-determination. In this atmosphere charged by the Bolshevik Revolution during which Lenin paid lip-service to the aforementioned principle, Korfanty demanded protection of minorities in the Prussian Landtag on January 11, 1918. In March, the Tosj handed the Prussian Ministry of Education with the memorial including the demand for reintroducing Polish as a medium of instruction for religious classes. In the increasingly difficult economic and military situation the Central Powers concluded the peace treaties with Ukraine in February, and with Soviet Russia in March dashing Polish nationalists hopes for including some of the eastern territories of Poland-Lithuania in a future Poland (Kwiatek, 1991: 39; Schramm, 1989: 81). Moreover, the German government striving to win the war and preserve the territorial integrity of Germany was not prepared to embark on some experiments which could appease Polish activists in Upper Silesia. Anyway, this region was perceived as an integral part of Germany, and any Polish nationalist demands were considered to be an indication of a groundless aggression (Lüer, 1995: 84). A change to this stalemate was brought in June by the Reichstag by-election in the traditionally pro-Polish Upper Silesian constituency of Gleiwitz-Lublinitz (Gliwice-Lubliniec). Polish nationalists with the active involvement of activists from Posen (Poznań) fielded Korfanty who stood against the Zentrum candidate. Korfanty won with 62.5% votes (Kwiatek, 1991: 39-41; Zieleński, 1983: 5). Also the Upper Silesia-born socialist Józef Rymer (1882-1922) participated in this election. He was a leader of the Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie (ZZP, Polish Workers Union) whose headquarters was moved to Kattowitz (Katowice) in 1911. The ZZP nationalist members formed the Narodowe Stronnictwo Robotników (NSR, Workers National Party) in March at Posen (Poznań), and Rymer actively supported connections between the ZZP and the NSR (Dubiel, 1993: 2; Kwiatek, 1991: 42).

The Sokół organized Polish nationalist activities in Summer 1918 which made the authorities not to authorize its rallies. On October 5, the Landtag’s Polish Circle (including Korfanty and Seyda) demanded ethnically Polish territories of Prussia for a future Poland in agreement with Wilson’s Thirteenth Point. Moreover, almost all of the Polish nationalist movement in Prussia (including Upper Silesia) got consolidated in the hands of the Posen (Poznań) Rada Narodowa (RN, National Council). (Kwiatek, 1991: 43/44). On October 8, Dmowski handed Wilson with a memorial in which, among others, demanded Upper Silesia and three counties of the Breslau (Wrocław) Regency for a Poland. In the Reichstag, on October 25, Korfanty demanded all the Prussian territories inhabited by Polish-speakers (Kulak, 1990: 229/230). Next day, the Sokół-based Straz Obywatelska dla Górnego Śląska (SOdGŚ, Civil Guard of Upper Silesia) came into being in anticipation of the possibility of insurrectionist seizure of this land. Revolutionary chaos downed on Germany beginning with November 3 when sailors rioted at Kiel (Kwiatek, 1991: 46-47). The situation got complicated for Germany with the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the emergence of Czechoslovakia on October 28. The new state was seen as a greater danger to Silesia than Polish nationalism, because Prague demanded the border areas of Schreiberhau (Szklarska Poręba), Glatz (Klodzko) Margravate,
Landeshut (Kamienna Góra), the Waldenburg-Neurode (Walbrzych-Nowa Ruda) industrial basin, and of south-eastern Upper Silesia (Wanatowicz, 1994: 23).

Workers and soldiers councils were established in November 5-8 in northern Germany, on November 9 in central and southern Germany, and next day in eastern Germany including Silesia (Kinder, 1978: II 130). Numerous Bauernräte (Peasants councils), Volksräte (People’s councils), Arbeiterräte (Workers councils), Soldatenräte (Soldiers councils) supplanted the official authorities in Silesia as elsewhere in Germany. In Silesia the councils were subjected to the Volksrat zu Breslau. Zentralrat für die Provinz Schlesien (VzB, People’s Council at Breslau (Wrocław). Central Council for the Province of Silesia) which was established on November 10. The VzB functioned until December 31, 1919, and during this time coordinated actions against Polish nationalists hoping to retain the whole of Silesia for Germany (Lesiuk, 1982: 467/468). In November the official authorities did not have at their disposal any troops to safeguard the Silesian borders against possible Polish or Czech incursions (Hauser, 1991: 18/19). This dire situation was solved by the inflow of Freikorps counterrevolutionary voluntary corps (Bialy, 1982: 129-131) which were subordinated to the Grenzschutz-Division (Border Protection Division) with the seat at Gleiwitz (Gliwice) (Hawranek, 1982: 158). The general feeling of Silesia being surrounded by Czechoslovakia in the south and Poland in the east did not allow any greater concessions than reintroduction of Polish for religious instructions in the first three forms (December 20), and only on the Breslau (Wrocław) bishop Adolf Bertram’s insistence (Klein, 1972: 37).

Because the aforementioned various councils did not wish to espouse the Polish national cause in Upper Silesia or elsewhere on the German territory, Polish activists started organizing Polskie Rady Ludowe (PRLs, Polish People’s Councils) in Upper Silesia beginning with November 1918. They existed until February 1920, and according to the Polish sources there were c. 500 different PRLs during this period (Wygłenda, 1982: 423/424). The PRLs constituted the grass roots basis for the Polish national movement which got rapidly organized in Germany due to the Posen (Poznań) unifying effort in the form of the Sejm Dzielnicowy (Regional Sejm) which convened at the city on December 3-5. Out of the total number of 1,399 representatives 431 came from Upper Silesia. This Sejm established the 80-person-strong Naczelna Rada Ludowa (NRL, Supreme People’s Council) which comprised 29 Upper Silesian representatives. The NRL was headed by the 6-person Commissariat including two Upper Silesians: Korfanty and Rymer (Wanatowicz, 1994: 23). The clandestine 8-person Naczelna Władza dla Górnego Śląska (Supreme Authority in Upper Silesia) which had come into being at Beuthen (Bytom) on November 19 and had been renamed as the Naczelna Rada Ludowa (Supreme People’s Council) in December, accepted the authority of the Posen (Poznań) NRL (Wygłenda, 1982a: 321) and was transformed into the Upper Silesian...
Subcommissariat of the NRL on January 3, 1919. Because of the hurdles put in its way by the German authorities the Subcommissariat opened its branch across the border in Polish Sosnowiec. After the Subcommissariat was delegalized on May 14, 1919, it was moved to the city (Wyglenda, 1982b: 407/408).

The forging of political structures merging the Polish national movement and popular support for it in the province of Posen (Poznań) and Upper Silesia, was supplemented with the emergence of paramilitary structures in anticipation of armed struggle which would detach Upper Silesia from Germany in favor of Poland. The Związki Wojackie (ZWs, Veteran Associations) came into being in December 1918 emulating the model set by the German Kriegervereine after the illegal Sodgs was discovered by the German authorities making its members liquidate it on December 12, and concentrate on organizing legal Zws (Wyglenda, 1982c: 670). Faced with the task of liquidating the German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of Congress Poland, taking over western Galicia from the Austro-Hungarian administration, engaged in the conflict over eastern Galicia with the West Ukrainian Republic, and contesting for East Silesia, Arva (Orawa, Orava) and Szepes (Zips, Spisz, Spiš) with Czechoslovakia (Davies, 1991: 395), the Polish government did not want to venture into any conflict with Germany over the province of Posen (Poznań) or any other Polish-speaking regions. The NRL was displeased by this stance (Kwiatek, 1991: 54) but, on the other hand, did not want to take any decisive actions on its own. The nationalist tension which had mounted since the beginning of November 1918 became uncontrollable in Wielkopolska after Paderewski’s visit in Posen (Poznań) (December 26/27). The Wielkopolska Uprising broke out on December 27. On January 8, 1919 the NRL superseded the German authorities. The uprising did not spread to any other provinces, and finished on February 16 when the prolongation of the armistice between the Allies and the Central Powers was signed at Trier. The NRL government became independent of Berlin, and the temporary border placed majority of the Posen (Poznań) province’s territory under its authority (Broz, 1982: 438).

On November 28, 1918 Pilsudski in his capacity of the Naczelnik Państwa (State Leader) issued the Constituent Sejm Electoral Act which covered (in a symbolic rather than practical manner) the province of Posen (Poznań), the Oppeln (Opole Regency), some areas of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency as well as some areas of East Prussia. This move was protested by the German authorities as all these territories still remained under German control until the time when the Peace Conference would decide otherwise. The elections to the Legislative Sejm were to take place on January 26, 1919. As a preemptive measure the German authorities issued regulations on whose basis any attempt to stage these elections within the German borders would be treated as high treason. The regulations also offset possible hinderances which could have been effected by Polish activists appealing for boycotting the German National Assembly (January 19) and Landtag (January 26) elections (Hauser, 1991: 42; Wyglenda, 1982d: 15). Pilsudski encouraged by the successes of the Wielkopolska Uprising decided to fulfill the largely symbolic letter of the Electoral Act in the context of the claimed German territories by inviting pro-Polish Landtag and Reichstag deputies to the Legislative Sejm. Five of them came from Upper Silesia (including Korfanty) and soon they were joined by Rymer. The presence of the Upper Silesian deputies indicated that Poland was willing to treat the question of Germany’s Polish-speaking territories as its domestic affair (Kwiatek, 1991: 68). This encouragement was an incentive enough to use the members of the Sokół and the Zws to establish a secret military organization based on the model of Pilsudzki’s POW (Davies, 1991: II 381). Thus in January 1919 the POW for Upper Silesia was organized with its headquarters at Beuthen (Bytom). It was controlled by the NRL headed by Korfanty. The POW’s ranks swelled with young Polish-speaking Upper Silesians radicalized by the postwar commotion, revolution, disruption of the traditional power and social structures as well as by their unpleasant experiences in the German army where one often derisively called them Wasserpolacken. They strove for a change. So the POW’s membership soon rose to 5,000 in March 1919 and 14,000 in May (Kwiatek, 1991: 74).
The military, political and personal contacts (facilitated by the traditional links of the Upper Silesian Polish movement with its Posen (Poznań) counterpart) were forged between the Polish nationalists in Upper Silesia and the Polish government. The German government busy with quenching the revolution and stabilizing the difficult economic and social situation in order to offset the possibility of the dismantling of the state (as it had happened in the case of its ally Austria-Hungary), could not effectively curb development of the Polish irredenta in Upper Silesia neither with administrative nor economic measures. Moreover, the overall situation in Silesia was worsened by the unprecedented wave of strikes at the turn of 1918 and 1919 as well as by the effective seizure of the province of Posen (Poznań) by the Poles. Out of sudden Silesia was surrounded by Czechoslovakia in the south and by Poland in the east and north. (Hauser, 1991: 47). Thus it was necessary, to introduce the martial law on January 3, 1919 in the most troubled spots of the Upper Silesian industrial basin (Wanatowicz, 1994: 26) as even the Grenzschutz-Division with 2,000 people at the end of January was too small to deal effectively with the looming disaster. Moreover, the Breslau (Wroclaw) VzB (which unrealistically aspired to control the whole province of Posen (Poznań)) was entrusted with the governance of the Posen counties of Lissa (Leszno), Frauenfeld (Wschowa), Rawitsch (Rawicz) which were not engulfed by the Wielkopolska Uprising (Hauser, 1991: 51). The danger of further Polish offensives against Germany, and especially Upper Silesia was prevented by the Polish-Soviet War (February 1919-October 12, 1920) which broke out when German troops had withdrawn from the intervening zone of occupation, the Ober-Ost (Davies, 1991: II 396). Using the opportunity that Polish troops were engaged in the struggle with Soviet Russia and the Western Ukrainian Republic, the Czechoslovak army attacked the Polish section of East Silesia on January 23 pushing the partition line eastward (Wanatowicz, 1994: 16). Hence it was unlikely that being involved in East Silesia, Czechoslovakia would launch any offensive in order to seize the Silesian territories it had claimed. In this period of respite, the German authorities attracted as many volunteers as possible to protect Silesia. They numbered c. 40,000 already at the beginning of February (Hauser, 1991: 52).

The German control of the province was ensured against any military incursions. Its fate was to be decided by the Peace Conference (January 18, 1919-January 21, 1920) and although the analysis of the subsequent events belongs to further chapters of this work, it is necessary to remark that because Germany had already lost to the Allies control of all its industrial basins with the exception of Upper Silesia, it was obvious that it would do whatever it could to protect the latter from passing into Polish or Czechoslovak possession. Giving up Upper Silesia would have meant an immediate economic collapse of Germany still blockaded by the Allies at the turn of 1918 and 1919. On the other hand, the growing strength of the Polish national movement in Upper Silesia could not be denied. But though numerous Upper Silesians started thinking about themselves as Poles, the vast majority of the Upper Silesian Polish-speakers stuck to their prenational complementary ethnic identity and did not wish to be forced to choose between Germandom or Polishdom. They strove to reestablish their own way of life as it had been prior to 1914. This situation gave rise to the Upper Silesian ethnic movement not unlike, much earlier, the Czech-German-Polish national conflict to the Silesian ethnic movement in East Silesia. The slogan Upper Silesia for the Upper Silesians became rife at the end of 1918 (Hauser, 1991: 40).

The origins of the Upper Silesian ethnic movement must be sought in the rapid success of the Kleindeutsch nationalism which led to the founding of the German Empire in 1871. This newly-created Germany aspired to become a nation-state with its nationalist symbolism pegged on Protestantism. These officially espoused goals necessarily gradually alienated the non-German-speaking Upper Silesians on the linguistic basis as well as many an Upper Silesian and Silesian Catholic (regardless of language) on the religious basis. The ensuing anti-Catholic Kulturkampf fortified the hold of the ultramontane Zentrum on Upper Silesia, and to a lesser degree on the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency, as well as facilitated the rise of Polish nationalism in Upper Silesia which was strongly financed and supported from Posen (Poznań). At that time, the pro-German weeklies Prawda/Wahrheit (1871-1877) and Szlązak (1872-1880) were launched to win Polish-speaking Upper Silesians for pro-state Old Catholicism, in the first case, and for the ultramontane Zentrum and the mainstream Catholicism in the latter (Gröschel, 1993: 115, 225/226). But, above all, the newspapers
fortified the local ethnic identity of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians making them well disposed toward Germandom against Polish nationalism which the organs presented as an alien influence. The end of the Kulturkampf commenced the age of peaceful cohabitation of the state and the Catholic Church in Germany and in Upper Silesia. The Zentrum which emerged from opposition to become one of the most significant ruling parties increasingly engaged in the process of German nation-state building and could not represent the particularist interests of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians very successfully any more. The Church strove to accommodate their needs, but various acts curbing the use of Polish and the Upper Silesian creole were issued, in an especially quick succession at the beginning of the 20th century. The most radical of these measures were criticized by the Church and the Zentrum, but the damage had been made opening the way for Polish nationalism.

Germany’s relative military success during the Great War stemmed the tide until 1917/1918 when economic difficulties mounted coupled with the threatening break-up of Austria-Hungary which led to the unexpected establishment of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The new states advocated for the sake of Slavic nationalisms better than any amount of prior nationalist rhetoric. Furthermore, the commotion of the end of the Great War was worsened by the influenza pandemic and disruption of the old order. The revolutionary impetus emanating from Soviet Russia led to the collapse of traditional structures leading to the creation of various soldiers and workers councils which seized control over the army and various areas of the country. The deafest, which was sealed by the armistice of November 11, had toppled the monarchy and empire on November 9 when the republic was proclaimed more to a blunder of a political speech than a real intent (Turner, 1992: 116). These events deprived Silesia of any effective military shield against the anticipated Czechoslovak attack whereas, on the other hand radicalized the populace. In Upper Silesia waxing Polish and waning German nationalisms clashed endangering the traditional influence of the Church and the Zentrum, and spelling out the possibility of the Polish annexation of this region which became ominously imminent at the turn of 1918 and 1919 due to the outbreak of the Wielkopolska Uprising.

An additional dimension to this dire social and political situation was given by the November 15 decision of the Prussian government separating the state and the school from the Church. The Silesian Catholic Church and the Zentrum protested against this move not unlike the overwhelmingly Catholic Upper Silesian population who demanded religious instruction (in appropriate mother tongue) at school (Hauser, 1991: 25). Once again the Zentrum and the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians were united by the same political goal weakening the influence of Polish and German nationalism in Upper Silesia. To strengthen the position of Catholicism and ultramontanism in Silesia Zentrum activists proposed excluding Silesia from Prussia and turning it into a separate German state. This position was also espoused by the VzB who, at the end of November, proposed making the province temporarily independent of Berlin in order to prevent the socialist revolutionary ideas propagated by the Spartakusbund (Spartacus Union) from infiltrating Silesia. The idea of a momentary independence of Silesia was not supported by the army who decided that such an entity would not be militarily viable especially in the event of Polish or Czech attack. Thus in December, the VzB abandoned this plan simultaneously demanding a degree of autonomy in the spheres of language and religion in Upper Silesia. The idea of Oberschlesien als selbständiger Freistaat (Upper Silesia as an independent free state) found its advocates among the Upper Silesian industrialists who were afraid that Friedrich Ebert’s (1871-1925) social democratic government was not strong enough to tame revolution and keep Upper Silesia within Germany. Moreover, they believed that as an independent state, Upper Silesia would not have to share the burden of war reparations with Germany. The industrialists started cooperating with the proindependence activists already at the end of November. The most known of these activists were Ewald Latacz, chairman of the Loslau (Wodzislaw) soldiers council, Jan Reginek, chairman of the Ratibor (Racibórz) workers and soldiers council, and Jan’s brother Father Thomas (Tomasz) Reginek (1887-1974). They wanted to base an Upper Silesian state on the Swiss political system, and started actively canvassing for support in Prague hoping that the Czechoslovak government would facilitate their contacts with the Allies, but this scheme did not work out. On December 20 Der Oberschlesischer Kurier (Upper Silesian Courier) (1908-1945) published an emotional appeal to the Upper Silesians. It stated that they had been treated as second-class citizens
in Germany but reminded that their language had been laughed at by Poles. It advised the Upper Silesians not to trust the Poles or the Germans who wanted to obtain Upper Silesia solely for its mineral wealth and industry, but rather to stand for an independent Upper Silesian State. On December 28, the VzB decided to avert the possible separation of Upper Silesia by promising to proclaim a Silesian Republic on December 30, with an SPD government which would ensure retaining a partisan connection with the Berlin SPD government (Hauser, 1991: 28-31).

The Breslau (Wroclaw) conference of December 30 which concentrated on the possibility of separation of Upper Silesia, did not generate enough official support for such a plan, especially in the context of the December 28 decision which withheld the introduce the of separation of the Church from the state. The main bone of contention was phased out whereas external dangers contributed to maintenance of the province’s unity within the framework of the German Republic. However, to ensure loyalty of the independence-minded Upper Silesians, the conference adopted the so-called Breslauer Beschlüsse (Breslau Resolutions) giving cultural autonomy to Upper Silesia. They provided, among others, that Catholics with knowledge of Polish would be nominated to high administrative positions in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, religious instructions would be conducted at schools in children’s mother tongues, a separate Church delegation would be established for Upper Silesia, and the position of Upper Silesian Commissar would be created in the provincial government. The resolutions were displayed in the form of posters all over the Oppeln (Opole) Regency. On January 4, 1919, the Prussian government accepted all of them but dropped the demand requiring high officials to know Polish, and the decision to form a separate Upper Silesian Church delegation. (Hauser, 1991: 39-42). In the meantime the internal situation deteriorated. In addition to the Polish nationalist separation trend, the radical non-ethnic-oriented Kommunistische Partei Oberschlesiens/Komunistyczna Partia Górnego Śląska (Communist Party of Upper Silesia, i.e. a branch of the Spartakusbund) had come into being on December 20, 1918 at Beuthen (Bytom). Its membership soared to 16,000 at the beginning of 1919 and to 25,000 in the middle of this year (Hawranek, 1982a: 232). In order to prevent an outbreak of a socialist revolution the martial law had been introduced in some areas of the Upper Silesian industrial basin, and it was gradually extended to other areas of Upper Silesia in the context of the Spartacist revolt which broke out at Berlin on January 6 (Turner, 1992: 117; Wanatowicz, 1994: 26).

The internal instability, external dangers and coming to terms with some of the demands of the Upper Silesian ethnic movement convinced the Upper Silesian clergy and the Katholische Volkspartei (Catholic People’s Party) to support rather than boycott the January elections to the National Assembly and the Landtag. Hence, despite Polish nationalists appeals not to vote a lot of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians did take part in these elections as 59% of the voters cast their ballots. In January 1919, the Polish danger was averted by the engagement of the Polish troops in western Ukraine and in Wielkopolska. The Czechs were unlikely to attack either, struggling with the Poles over East Silesia. The Spartacist revolt was quenched after a week and a modicum of internal stability was reintroduced. The growing ranks of the various Freikorps and the Grenzschutz-Division provided the Silesian populace with more security. However, the improved situation and the Oppeln (Opole) Regency President Walther von Miquel’s December 31, 1918 ban on propaganda of Upper Silesian autonomy did not stop the rapid growth of the Upper Silesian ethnic movement which had been widely advertised among the populace at the close of 1918. Its one leg headed by the Rybnik (Rybnik) Landrat Hans Lukaschek (1882-1960) demanded autonomy for Upper Silesia within Germany. It soon merged with the mainstream of the postwar German politics. The other trend strove for a Freistaat Oberschlesien (Cimala, 1982: 23). At the beginning of January 1919 the Bund der Oberschlesiener/Związek Górnosłazaków (Union of Upper Silesians) came into being and soon its membership topped 150,000. The Bund, in the name of its main slogan Upper Silesia for the Upper Silesians, demanded nullifying all the anti-Polish-language acts, equality of Polish and German, civil

506 The Zentrum adopted this new name in Upper Silesia on December 16, 1918 (Hauser, 1991: 42).
507 The regency’s authorities considered it high treason (Cimala, 1982: 23).
servants who would know both the languages, public service nominations which would reflect the confessional structure of Upper Silesia, a separate Catholic delegation for this region with a bilingual bishop; and, last but not least, should Upper Silesia gain autonomy or independence it would not be divided. Initially, the Bund popularized its goals in the Zentrum’s premier organ Schlesische Volkszeitung before establishing its own bilingual weekly Der Bund/Związek (Union) (1920-1922) whose run soared from 20,000 in 1920 to 40,000 prior to the plebiscite in 1921 (Gröschel, 1993: 50/51; Hauser, 1991: 43; Wanatowicz, 1994: 25). The Bund’s first Secretary General Thomas Reginek had to flee Upper Silesia at the beginning of 1919 because he faced the danger of being arrested by the Grenzschutz-Division due to his firm stance for Polish language rights. In Berlin he probably met Korfanty, and in Paris talked to Dmowski on a social-economic autonomy for Upper Silesia (Cimala, 1982a: 474; Wycisło, 1996: 346).

Having presented the multifaceted struggle for control of Prussian Silesia, and especially of Upper Silesia, one has to turn one’s attention to Austrian Silesia where the war and the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary sparked off similar antagonisms played out by nationalist movements. Although the actors were different than in the case of Prussian Silesia, the main bone of contention was constituted by coal seams and industry which concentrated in the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karvina) basin.

Prior to the outbreak of the Great War the Czech national movement got consolidated in umbrella organization of the Narodni rada (National Council) (1907), and its Polish counterpart the Silesian section of the NKN was formed at the end of August 1914. Ostrau (Ostrava) the main urban center of the industrial basin became the main stage of the national conflict. This development could threaten production so vital for the Austro-Hungarian war effort hence the gradual cessation of the activities of nationalist organizations caused by draft, was sealed by militarization especially of steel and mining industry beginning with Autumn 1914. The volatility of the Eastern Front and the necessity of close cooperation with Germany in warding off the Russian attacks, made it indispensable to move the imperial-royal military headquarters to Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn). Fighting in alliance with Germany was especially attractive for the Austrian Silesian German-speakers who anticipated a speedy victory and strengthening of their position vis-a-vis the strengthening Slavic national movements in the crownland. Some Austrian Silesian Polish-speakers and nationalists welcomed the idea of forming a Polish state from Galicia and Congress Poland. A state which would obviously be incorporated in Austria-Hungary. To support this end young adherents of this trend volunteered to Pilsudski’s Polish legion. The Austrian Silesian Czech-speakers and nationalists considered the war as not for their cause. Moreover, in the light of Czech nationalism’s traditional affinity to Panslavism, it is not surprising that many a young Russophile of this crownland volunteered to the Czech legions organized in Russia. As in the case of Germany, the war of attrition led to the difficult economic situation in Austria-Hungary and Austrian Silesia. In result numerous strikes flared up in 1916 and 1917 especially in the industrial centers. In Spring 1917 the government had to allow reemergence of the political life in its prewar shape in order to maintain the status quo. Nationalist tensions were soon to reappear. In January 1918 municipalities of the majority of the Austrian Silesian towns, and the Landtag issued a memorandum calling for fortifying the German character of the crownland, and protesting against the idea of merging East Silesia with Galicia as part of a proclaimed Polish state. Polish and Czech activists had striven to undertake a joint action against this growing German influence already in 1917, but, in 1918, the viable prospect of establishing an independent Poland and Czech(oslovak) state pitted the two nationalist groups against each other over the future of East Silesia claimed by both the camps (Gawrecki, 1992: 64/65; Grobelny, 1992: 77).

After the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, the social situation radicalized in the crownland in 1918. The socialist movement grew rapidly in industrial centers where trade unions staged numerous strikes against continuing the war. But soon socialist slogans of these
demonstrations were imbued with Czech and Polish pro-independence elements. The quicker stabilization and recognition of the prospective Czechoslovak authorities, than its later-to-emerge Polish counterparts, led to the formation of the crownland ČNR branches. Czech nationalists were given an advantage of time which they deftly used organizing, on September 22, 1918, the nationalist rally at Ostra huťka near Troppau (Opava) where they proclaimed the right of self-determination for the Czechoslovak nation. Soon on October 28 Czechoslovakia came into being whereas the Polish state was to reemerge only on November 11 (Gawrecki, 1992: 65; Grobelny, 1992: 78).

The Czech move was countered by the crownland’s German-speakers apprehensive of the possibility of being included in a Czech(oslovak) state as a minority subjected to the Czech authorities. On October 15 they organized the Volkstag (People’s Rally) at Troppau (Opava) in order to show their willingness to stand for Germandom (Gawrecki, 1992: 65). Later their moves were orchestrated with the events which took place at Vienna after the de facto break-up of the Dual Monarchy. Considering the fate of Cisleithania: prior to Austria-Hungary’s signing the armistice with the Allies on November 3, the 210 German members of the Reichsrat formed themselves into a National Assembly for Deutschösterreich or German-Austria. On October 30, they proclaimed it an independent state, and in the wake of the revolutionary events at Vienna and in Germany the National Assembly resolved that German-Austria is a democratic republic on November 13, i.e. a day after Emperor Karl I’s abdication (Ehrich, 1992: 534). In the meantime: on October 29 (i.e. a day after the proclamation of Czechoslovakia), the German members of the Reichsrat from Bohemia proclaimed Deutschböhmen or German-Bohemia (with its capital in Reichenberg (Liberec)) in the predominantly German-speaking western and northern areas of this crownland. Next day the province of Sudetenland was proclaimed at Troppau (Opava). It contained West Silesia and the predominantly German-speaking areas of northern Moravia. Sudetenland’s area was 6,534 sq km, and its population included 643,804 German and 25,028 Czech-speakers. The Landtag member Robert Freißler (1877-1950) was nominated to the position of the provisional Landeshauptmann, and together with his deputy Hans Jokl, he started organizing the new province. It was difficult to turn Sudetenland into a viable province due to transportation, food supply and economic problems, and, above all, lack of other than verbal support from Vienna. Despite all the odds, the province’s Volkswehr (People’s Guard) rapidly grew to 6,700 troops (Bahlcke, 1996: 146; Gawrecki, 1992: 65; Prinz, 1995: 381; Rothschild, 1992: 78/79). On November 22, the National Assembly claimed for German-Austria all the Habsburg lands in which a majority of the population was German. It also claimed German-Bohemia, Sudetenland, and the later established Böhmerwaldgau (Bohemian Forest District) and German Southern Moravia which were intended for annexation to adjacent Lower and Upper Austria (Breugel, 1973: 22/23; Ehrich, 1992: 534).

These four short-lived German-speaking provinces were dubbed as Sudetenland509 in the wake of the tradition (which developed at the very beginning of the 20th century) to call Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia the Sudetenländer (Sudetic Lands) probably in defiance of the Czech tradition of lumping these areas together as the lands of the Czech Crown (Breugel, 1973: 22/23; cf.: Haardt, 1907: 53). Considering the province of Sudetenland, its authorities planned to take into consideration possible demands from the Czech-speakers, Polish-speakers, (East) Silesians and Jews living in this territory, thus, clearly realizing that Sudetenland was not ethnically homogenous and could not exist without active participation and consent of the inhabitants of non-German-speaking stocks (Breugel, 1973: 23). However, from the beginning, in order to avoid the possibility of wide-spread ethnic/nationalist tensions, the Czech-speaking areas of West Silesia and predominantly Slavic East Silesia (with the whole of the industrial basin) were excluded from Sudetenland (Prinz, 1995: 381; Würbs, 1982: 52). Although German-Bohemia and Sudetenland adjoined Germany rather than German-Austria, from which they were separated by the broad Czech heartland, it appears that the long-run assumption was German-Austria’s own early incorporation into Greater Germany. This hope remained unrealized, as the Allies effectively prevented the coming into being of Greater Germany. What is more, the Allies did not answer repeated requests for endorsement of the German Sudetic

509 Sudetenland of 1918 is by no means identical with the bigger Sudetenland of the 1938 Munich Agreement.
Chapter five

provinces in agreement with the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, and the fate of the Sudetic Germans, who had not belonged to the German Empire, had at this moment of defeat and revolution a relatively low priority for Berlin. Hence, neither the Allies nor Germany gave them serious support when Czech legionaries, newly returned home from France and Italy, proceeded to occupy the self-proclaimed German provinces and thus reasserted the territorial integrity of the historic lands of the Czech Crown the very basis of Czech nationalism. Reichenberg (Liberec) fell to the Czechs on December 16, and Troppau (Opava) two days later. By the end of December the west of West Silesia was taken, and the Sudetenland government assembled for the last time on February 18, 1919. The absence at this time of military resistance by the local German-speakers to this Czech occupation was a function not only of weakness but also of confidence that the Allies at the peace conference would order plebiscites whose results would prove decisive. Three months later, when it was clear that such expectations were erroneous, the Sudetic Germans belatedly staged massive protest demonstrations, with scattered marches on gendarmerie barracks, on March 4, 1919, the day of the opening of the new German-Austrian National Assembly in whose election they had not been allowed to participate by the Czech authorities engaged in careful strengthening the territorial base of their nation-state. In the course of dispersing the demonstrations, 52 Germans were killed and 84 wounded. Of all non-German states, Czechoslovakia with 3,232,000 Germans (3,051,000 in the Czech lands + 148,000 in Slovakia) contained the largest such ethnic German community which amounted to 22.3% of its total population in 1930 (Lemberg, 1995: 34). Due to its sheer size, this minority inevitably had to have a destabilizing effect on the newly-founded state in the interwar period when the principle of nationality was the supreme guiding rule of European, and especially Central European politics (Bahlcke, 1996: 146; Rothschild, 1992: 79).

A still more complicated situation unfolded in East Silesia, especially in the context of the mutually excluding Polish and Czech claims to the whole of East Silesia. Already before the capitulation of Austria-Hungary, majority of local Polish and Czech parties supported the respective demands suddenly reintroducing the nationalist tension which had been dulled by the war. On October 10, 1918, Polish members of the Reichsrat convened at Cracow and decided to take some steps to secure East Silesia for the emerging Polish state. On the basis of Karl I’s October 16 proclamation promising to turn Austria-Hungary into a federal state, the Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego (RNKC, National Council of the Cieszyn Principality) came into being, as the body representing the Poles of East Silesia. On October 30, it published its manifesto announcing that East Silesia would belong to Poland though the eventual border would be negotiated with the Czechs. The board of the NRKC comprised Father Londzin, Jan Michejda and Tadeusz Reger. At the night of October 31/November 1, Polish officers of the Austro-Hungarian army conducted a coup at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) which allowed the NRKC to seize the majority of the territory and start preparing its own military branch in the form of civil militia which soon numbered 2,000-2,500 people (Wurbs, 1982: 52). The Polish national authorities at Warsaw and Cracow accepted the NRKC as the legitimate representative of Polish governance (Gawrecki, 1992a: 80; Wanatowicz, 1994: 14/15).

Understandably, the NRKC was not supported by the local Czech-speakers subscribing to the Czech national program, or by the members of Kozdon’s SPLSP who stood for indivisibility of East Silesia. On October 28 (the day when Czechoslovakia officially came into being), the Zemský národní výbor pro Slezsko (ZNV, Land National Committee for Silesia) was established at Troppau (Opava) and started fortifying its power and infrastructure basis hoping to obtain the whole of West and East Silesia from Sudetenland and the NRKC, respectively. To this end, on November 1 at Ostrau (Ostrava), the ZNV proclaimed that it was entitled to exercise its authority in the whole crownland. In reality, before Sudetenland was seized by the Czech troops in December, the ZNV’s influence was limited to the counties of Friedek (Frýdek) and Freistadt (Frýštát), and the last region was strongly contested by the Poles. The ensuing escalation in the nationalist tension was abated by the provisional division agreement signed by the ZNV and the NRKC on November 5. The majority of the industrial basin was included in the Czech part but the strategic Kassa (Kaschau, Košice)-Oderberg (Bohumín) railway the only reliable transportation route between the Czech lands and Slovakia, and majority of
East Silesia’s territory remained in the Polish hands. This largely ethnically correct division line was not viable economically and strategically for Czechoslovakia. Voices for a division more favorable for Czechoslovak interests were heard at Prague (Gawrecki, 1992: 66; Wanatowicz, 1994: 14/15). In this case as in the disputes over Zips (Spiš, Spisz) and Arva (Orava, Orawa), each state wished to see the other confined to ethnic frontiers, lest this neighbor become a source of irredentist instability in postwar Europe, while reserving for itself the right to claim historic or strategic or economically rational frontiers (Rothschild, 1992: 85). This different standards for oneself and one’s neighbor led to the typical coolness in the bilateral relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia in the interwar period despite the small scale of their territorial conflicts.

The letter of the provisional agreement of November 5 was violated by the Polish government’s November 28 decision to conduct the January 26, 1919 elections to the Constituent Sejm also on the territory of whole East Silesia, Csaca (Čadca, Czadca), Zips (Spiš, Spisz) and Arva (Orava, Orawa). The Czechoslovak government rightly interpreted this move as Poland’s usurpation of the territories whose fate should be decided at the Peace Conference. Both the sides began to fortify their military forces in East Silesia in anticipation of an armed solution. In December the ZNV’s position was bolstered when its power was extended over the whole of East Silesia due to the Czechoslovak annexation of Sudetenland, so the ZNV could afford to question legitimacy of the RNKC. Warsaw’s attention was at that time diverted from East Silesia by the conflict with Western Ukraine. Anyway, East Silesia was one of Poland’s numerous unresolved border questions, and a rather insignificant one whereas its perception was completely opposite at Prague. East Silesia was the only coal and steel industrial basin of Czechoslovakia without which the state would have not economically thrived in the interwar period. The French who supported Poland in its conflict with Germany over Upper Silesia to weaken the latter, assisted Czechoslovakia against Poland in the case of East Silesia, with the same goal in eye without the East Silesian industry Czechoslovakia would not have been able to effectively deter Germany. On January 23, 1919 the Czechoslovak army supported by French and Italian troops launched an attack which was not swift and did not lead to the complete removal of the Polish troops from East Silesia as hoped, due to the staunch opposition of Polish soldiers helped by local civil militia and Polish-speaking miners in the industrial basin. After the battle of Skoczau (Skocznów) (January 28) the front stabilized at the Vistula, and the armistice was signed on January 30. After this conflict, the question of East Silesia entered the agenda of the Peace Conference which had convened at Paris on January 18. On February 3 the new, more favorable for Czechoslovakia division line was established. The Czechs moved to this new provisional border on February 25, but remarked, adding a new argument to the ongoing discussion on quality of Poland’s and Czechoslovakia’s rights to this territory, that ethnic border does not always make sense as some of those who spoke local Slavic dialects/creoles did not feel themselves to be Polish but local or East Silesian (Gawrecki, 1992a: 81/82; Roucek, 1945: 148; Wanatowicz, 1994: 15/16).

Thus it is necessary to observe what actions the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict elicited among the Germans and the East Sileans of east Silesia. When in October 1918 the idea appeared to seek separation of the German-speaking territories of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia from a would-be Czech state, on October 19, at the meeting in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) Kozdon’s ŠPLSP supported the German program of including East Silesia in a German-Austria. Adam Sikora’s splinter group favored transferring East Silesia to Poland hoping to receive a wide autonomy for their homeland from Warsaw. When Czechoslovakia began to take measures against Sudetenland and other German provinces, it became obvious that East Silesia which had not even been included in Sudetenland, would not have a chance of becoming part of German-Austria. The local Germans and the ŠPLSP proposed establishing a neutral republic from Austrian Silesia and the Moravian wedge separating West from East Silesia. Some also spoke in favor of a joint Austrian-Polish-Czechoslovak condominium. On November 30, 1918 Kozdon was arrested on the charge of pitting the populace against the RNKC. His movement fell into

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510 Czechoslovakia received 519 sq km and Poland 1,762 sq km of East Silesia (Wurbs, 1982: 53).
511 The Czechoslovak-Polish War resulted in 150 casualties and 1,000 wounded (Wanatowicz, 1994: 17).
disarray. In the meantime, the German-speakers of north-eastern East Silesia, who had not been able to achieve attaching East Silesia to Sudetenland or turning it into a separate political entity, decided to swear an oath of loyalty to the Polish authorities at the beginning of December 1918, and did not let their people’s guards to be involved in the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict. Because of the preliminary division of East Silesia, the East Silesian German-speakers concentrated around Ostrau (Ostrava) decided to pledge loyalty to the Czechoslovak authorities. On the intercession of Father Londzin and Michejda Kozdon was released and moved to Ostrau (Ostrava) where he assumed publishing his weekly Ślązak. Now he canvassed for creating a neutral East Silesian republic or for transferring the whole of East Silesia to Czechoslovakia rather than Poland. His top priority was not to allow division of his Silesiá. The Polish-Czechoslovak conflict played into his and the local German-speakers hands. The problem of East Silesia was made international. The Interallied Commission arrived there to make detailed inquiries. For the first time after the end of the Great war Kozdon and the German-speakers could present their own point of view at an international forum. They proposed turning East Silesia into a joint US-British mandate, and on February 7, 1919, Kozdon handed the Commission with a memorial stating that East Silesia should be turned into a neutral state, and if it were impossible, it ought to be given to Czechoslovakia. (Nowak, 1995: 33; Wotawa, 1919; Wurbs, 1982: 53/54).

At the onset of the Peace Conference, a complicated pattern of claims and counterclaims to Upper and East Silesia developed. Poland and Germany were the main forces contesting Upper Silesia with a minor Czech involvement which virtually disappeared in favor of making a stronger bid for East Silesia. East Silesia was struggled for by the Czechs and the Poles whereas the Germans took the back seat after Sudetenland had been successfully annexed by Czechoslovakia. The Trojan horse in the conflict for control of both the industrial basins, appeared in the form of the Silesian ethnic movements, which, generally, were unfavorable to Poland. The leaders and members of these movements perceived the new Polish state through the pejorative stereotypes of Pole, Galician, Galician poverty, polnische Wirtschaft with lower culture as opposed to the higher culture of Germany or Czechoslovakia. The Silesian movement of East Silesia as of longer standing proved to be more consistent than its recently-founded Upper Silesian counterpart, which, at times, was perceived to be a menace by the Poles and the Germans equally. Ethnic and nationalist cleavages deepened in Upper and East Silesia especially in the postwar revolutionary atmosphere under the influence of rife propaganda and nationalist actions taken by various social and paramilitary organizations directed and financed from Posen (Poznań), Berlin and Breslau (Wrocław) in the case of Upper Silesia, and from Vienna, Prague and Cracow in the case of East Silesia. The stage was set for internecine fighting which almost erupted in the process of Czechoslovak seizure of Sudetenland, and broke loose in the Polish-Czechoslovak contest over East Silesia. The premonition of similar fate awaiting Upper Silesia was seen in the Wielkopolska Uprising which could have easily spilled over to Silesia. The realization was slowly deeming on decision-makers that the idealist quest for peace and justice through standing fast for self-determination would probably not produce a better world. This forethought was soon to be exemplified by the policies of planned and thorough ethnic cleansing employed in the province of Poznań (Posen) in the wake of the Wielkopolska Uprising. First camps were organized for interning most significant German civil servants, intellectual and political leaders. In the two largest camps located at Szczypiorno and Strzalkowo (Stralkowo) about 16,000 Germans were detained until July 1919. On June 2, 1919 all the communal German civil servants were dismissed from public offices (c. 100,000 with families). All the Germans who had moved to the province of Posen (Poznań) prior to January 1, 1908 were treated as foreigners. Those who had established their place of abode there earlier could opt for German citizenship. 150-175,000 people used this possibility and became foreigners in the light of the Polish law. every one of these foreigners eventually had to leave Poland adding to the number who had left after the outbreak of the Wielkopolska Uprising or displeased by the introduction of Polonizing measures 512. The official Polish

512 In 1919 Wielkopolska’s Polish-language mass media and, at a later stage, Polish historians strove to justify the harsh treatment of the province’s Germans by producing evidence of crimes committed by German troops and volunteers on Polish population during the Wielkopolska Uprising (Tomkowiak, 1994). However, it seems
calls for loyalty to the new state and peaceful work together with Poles for common good, could not be too appealing in the face of the above-described methods of discrimination which amounted to the virtual war against Germandom. In order not to enumerate other instances of intolerance, it is suffice to give the tale-telling name of one Polish NGO which was founded at that time at Poznań (Posen): the *Centralna Organizacja dla Oczyszczania Poznania od Żydów i Niemców* (Central Organization for Cleansing Poznan of Jews and Germans) (Rogall, 1993: 125, 130/131). Consequently, the number of the Posen Germans which steadily grew from 218,393 (27.7%) in 1816 to 806,504 (38.4%) in 1910 (Kozłowski, 1994: 18), sharply fell after the war to 327,846 in 1921 (Hauser, 1994: 44) and 224,254 in 1926. Their percentage in the population of the Poznań (Posen) voivodship sank to 11%. The change was even more dramatic in cities. The percentage of Germans living in Poznań (Posen) dropped from 42% in 1910 to 2% in 1931, and from 77.5% in 1910 to 8.5% in 1931 at Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) (Rogall, 1993: 130). The homogenizing workings of the nation-state failed to bring a modicum of the prewar long-lasting peace and prosperity. The *belle époque* was definitively over, and the poverty of small [nation-]states engulfed Central Europe giving the foretaste of the 20th-century crimes: genocide, ethnic cleansing, expulsions. In this context it is worth remembering that usually various nationalisms seeped into Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia predominantly from outside. They mobilized small groups of locals who due to their activities often were somehow estranged from the majority who safely remained entrenched in their prenational complementary identities normally pegged on the regions (Wanatowicz, 1994: 12). The situation was gradually altered by the plebiscite and the divisions of Upper and Austrian Silesia as well as by the homogenizing policies of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This process speeded up with the aid of the totalitarian methods inherited from the Stalinist SU but to this date survive large groups (counted in tens of thousands in Czech Silesia, and in hundreds of thousands in Upper Silesia) of people identifying themselves also or exclusively as [East or Upper] Silesians.

To wrap up this chapter one should scrutinize the development of various Austrian and Prussian Silesian national and ethnic movements in the period 1871-1918 following Hroch’s theoretical model which was introduced at the end of the previous chapter.

Silesia’s and Upper Silesia’s ethnic relations were dramatically altered with the formation of the *Kleindeutsch* nation-state in 1871. It was the last impulse which made the majority of the Silesian German-speakers into Germans who entered the mainstream German national movement in its phase C. The situation of the province was complicated by the ethnic diversity of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency additionally differentiated from the rest of Silesia by its predominant subscription to Catholicism the very adversary of Germandom pegged on Protestantism. The decisive impulse was provided by the *Kulturkampf* whose homogenizing policies discriminating Catholics and non-German-speakers antagonized the Polish-speakers of the province of Posen (Poznań) and of Upper Silesia. Because the anti-Polish measures were retained after scrapping of the *Kulturkampf* in 1885/1886, and they steadily became harsher in the period 1890-1914, it is not surprising that the Posen (Poznań) Polish nationalist movement vehemently moved to the transitional period between the phases B and C. Its desire to achieve the phase C was restrained by the German authorities and the division of all the Polish-speakers among the partition powers which one could not hope to make grant the Polish-speakers their own state without a dramatic change in the international relations. Such an opportunity arose in the course of the Great War and was deftly utilized to establish the Polish state in 1918. Under the influence of this impressive achievement, the Posen (Poznań) Polish nationalist movement forcefully moved to the phase C through the 1918/1919 Wielkopolska Uprising, and subsequently effected a swift incorporation into the Polish state.

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513 The phrase was coined by the seminal Hungarian thinker István Bibó (Bibó, 1995).
The Posen (Poznań) Polish activists strove to spread the Polish national idea to other Polish-speaking areas in Prussia, and also to Upper Silesia. The East Silesian influence on the Polish nationalist movement in Upper Silesia ceased due to the 1870s/1880s split among Polish activists of Catholic and Protestant confession at Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn). On the other hand, Cracow Polish nationalists concentrated on East Silesia discouraged by the international border hindering their access to Upper Silesia. The radical Posen (Poznań) influence on the Polish movement in Upper Silesia did not bear any immediate fruit despite the fact that the Upper Silesian Polish-speakers were much displeased by the Kulturkampf and laws banning Polish from all aspects of official life with the exception of sermons during masses. Moreover, in an ultramontane vein, the Silesian Church sought to retain unity of its Upper Silesian faithful by moderating the impact of state-supported Kleindeutsch nationalism and of Polish nationalists from Posen (Poznań). In result the Polish movement remained in the transitional period between the phases A and B up to the 1890s. Then the radical nationalist trend started gaining a tentative foothold especially among the usually more receptive and radicalized population of the industrial basin. It achieved the initial breakthrough with the 1903 election of Korfanty to the Reichstag. However, it did not mean the straightforward shift of the Polish movement into the phase B but its split. Napieralski’s Zentrum/Katolik faction, holding loyalty of the majority of the Upper Silesian Polish-speakers, remained between the phases A and B well into the Great War, whereas Korfanty’s pro-LN camp moved into the phase B but lost many supporters prior to 1914. However, the destabilizing effect of the Great War and the emergence of the Polish state led to an increase in the ranks of Korfanty’s backers. The position of his group grew stronger with the ideological and material aid flowing from Posen (Poznań) quickly pushing it to the transitional period between the phases B and C. Many Polish-oriented members of Napieralski’s camp also moved into this direction. Thus the final fate of the nationalist movement as well as of Upper Silesia was to be established at the Peace Conference.

The Germans anxious of the possibility of losing Silesia/Upper Silesia put forward the plans of autonomy/statehood for the province/regency, together with some ultramontane pro-Polish activists. The prospect of retaining their prenational way of life (preferred to the painful process of assimilation into Germandom/Polishdom) made many Upper Silesians to form the powerful ethnic Upper Silesian movement which had earlier appeared in the 1870s and gone into oblivion after the Szlązak had ceased to be published in 1879. German and Polish attempts to sway this young movement into one of these national directions stalled its meteoric development, but its importance continued until the plebiscite and remained a distinct though highly variegated influence on the political life of divided Upper Silesia in the years 1921-1939. Thus the Upper Silesian ethnic movement which dashed from the phase A to B in 1918/1919 and attempted crossing the threshold of the phase C in 1919, lapsed to the grey zone between A and B after 1921.

In Austrian Silesia the Polish and Czech nationalist movements which had developed in the liberal 1860s, were dealt a blow when bilingual (German-Slavic) education was introduced in the 1870s. On the other hand, the Ausgleich of 1867 for the first time did seriously limit the influence of the German ethnic group in the Danubian Monarchy reflecting the multi-ethnic/national character of this political entity. After the military failures of the mid-19th century, the governing circles became convinced that it would be impossible to govern the empire on the basis of loyalty of the German-speakers only who though a dominant group did not constitute the majority of the inhabitants. They even attempted to secure loyalty of the Czechs of Bohemia (one of the richest crownlands) with a similar Ausgleich to make Cisleithania governable along more democratic lines at the beginning of the 1870s but to no avail due to the staunch opposition of the Hungarians and the German-speakers afraid of losing their dominant position. eventually the stability of the political system was based on Polish-dominated Galicia pleased with its wide autonomy. It strongly backed the throne because the emperor granted Galicia’s Polish nationalist movement with the best conditions of all the three partitions. What is more Polish nationalists of Galicia did not canvass for establishing a Polish state not having any immediate possibilities of getting consolidated with the other Polish-speaking areas outside Austria-Hungary. Bohemia’s Czech activists obstructed the monarchy’s political life displeased by the tactical exclusion of them from political considerations in favor of the Poles and the
Hungarians, and even more relentlessly continued propagating unity of the Czech lands which contributed to the fortifying of the akin Czech nationalist movements in Moravia and Austrian Silesia, as well as of the links of the latter with the Bohemian ideological base. The situation led to the loss of power by the Old Czechs to the more radical Young Czechs in the 1870s-1890s. The Young Czechs pushed Bohemia’s Czech nationalist movement into the phase C by the 1890s gradually winning more linguistic and cultural concessions which always fell short of authorizing the sought-for unity of the lands of the Czech Crown. Since the 1890s Bohemia’s Czech nationalists were seriously weakened by the rise of social democarts and Pangermanism. Moreover, a retreat towards the prenational realm of regional identities took place in Moravia due to the celebrated 1905 Ausgleich. Consequently, Bohemia’s Czech national movement retreated to the transitory area between the phases B and C whereas Moravia’s Czech nationalist movement remained in the phase B and partly got denationalized by the successful cohabitation with the local German-speakers. This increasing attraction of regionalism ideologically dissociated Moravia’s Czech nationalist movement from its Bohemian counterpart.

These discrepancies of Czech nationalism had a strong influence on the development of Austrian Silesia’s Czech nationalist movement which reached the phase B in the 1870s especially due to the founding of the Matice opavská in 1877. Rapid industrialization provided Czech nationalists with the means of developing and spreading their activities, especially to adjacent northern Moravia. However, the relative isolation from Prague and disinterest of Moravia kept the movement in the phase B. Its growth was stunted by the aforementioned general decline of the Czech nationalist movement at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and the rise of the local German nationalist movement apprehensive of the growing political and cultural strength of the Czech-speakers of Bohemia and Moravia. The stance of the German activists was bolstered by the successes of Kleindeutsch nationalism clearly visible across the border. The rise of the Slavic and Hungarian national movements in the Dual Monarchy and the government’s decisions taken to accommodate their needs and aspiration within the existing political framework put the German-speakers at a relative disadvantage which they interpreted as discrimination and answered by turning to the nationalism of their own in the 1870s-1890s. Weary to lose their still dominant position in Austria-Hungary they reached the phase B in the 1890s, also in Austrian Silesia. Prior to 1914 they moved to the transitory area between the phases B and C striving to emphasize and maintain the German character of the crownland where they constituted the largest though non-dominant part of the population. Moreover, their privileged position was facilitated by the intensifying conflict of Polish and Czech nationalisms over East Silesia.

The overwhelming political, economic and numerical strength of Austrian Silesia’s German-speakers made some Czech activists to seek cooperation with their Polish counterparts, often in the name of Panslavism. This trend largely disappeared in the 1870s/1890s when the Czech and Polish nationalist movements started developing similar cultural, political and educational institutions and forms of organization which opened a cleavage between them in East Silesia. Polish activists had the advantage of proximity of Galicia and Cracow where the Polish nationalist movement remained safe and content in the transitory area between the phases B and C. However, the potential strength of East Silesia’s Polish movement was weakened by the 1880s split into the Catholic and Protestant camps. It eventually confined this movement to the phase B. Furthermore the extent of the failure of East Silesia’s Polish activists was illustrated by their inability to prevent assimilation of Polish-speaking immigrants from Galicia into Germandom/Czechedom at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. The negative stereotypes associated with the Galicians also kept many East Silesian Polish-speakers from identifying with them and with Polish nationalism. In 1905-1910, it was the springboard for the successful rise of the East Silesian ethnic movement which ephemerally had appeared in the 1840s/1850s and the 1870s. The mass appeal of this movement became obvious in north-eastern East Silesia in the period 1910-1914 vis-a-vis the relatively weakened Polish and Czech nationalist movements. The East Silesian movement rapidly reached the phase B and stopped short of demanding an autonomy/state for itself choosing cultural and state alliance with Germandom.
The Great War which submerged various nationalisms with the superficial loyalty and unity conditioned by the military rule, actually exacerbated national and ethnic cleavages especially in the face of the German. Austro-Hungarian alliance which gave German nationalists a hope of building a truly German nation-state of Greater Germany through a successful merger of *Großdeutsch* and *Kleindeutsch* nationalism. Such a prospect was appalling to majority of the non-German ethnic/nationalist movements and their discontent erupted in the last years of the prolonged warfare marked by internal and external social, economic and political commotion. The acceptance of the principle of nationality in the guise of the Wilsonian notion of self-determination led to the fall of the Dual Monarchy imperiling Germanism in favor of satisfying the non-German movements whose success was sealed with the internationally recognized coming into being of their postulated nation-states. Thus the Polish and Czech(oslovak) nationalist movements reached the phase B and engaged in the venture of seizing Austrian Silesia for themselves despite the opposition of the local German-speakers. German nationalists answered this situation with a tacit proposal of creating a *Großdeutsch* nation-state through a union of Germany with the predominantly German-speaking areas of Austria-Hungary. Following this line of defence Austrian Silesia’s German nationalist movement reached the phase C and participated in the establishment of Sudetenland. Czech nationalists displeased with this development because of their own phase C-aspirations propped by their full organizational and ideological merger with mainstream Czech nationalism, saw to the dismantling of the province and engaged in a bitter conflict with their Polish counterparts over East Silesia. Through a full merger with the Galician and mainstream Polish nationalist movement Polish activists of East Silesia also reached the phase C. Only the East Silesian ethnic movement reluctant to be overhauled in a nationalist movement or to embark on the process of nation-state building hovered between the phases B and C in its plans for saving the traditional political and ethnic structure of East Silesia through making it into a neutral state or attaching it to a Greater Germany or Czechoslovakia as an indivisible autonomous region.

The pattern of nationalist conflicts which developed at the end of the Great War through the crossing of the threshold of the phase C by the Polish and Czech nationalist movements as well as by the German nationalist movement of Austria-Hungary, had a direct bearing on Upper and Austrian Silesia where the local nationalist movements got quickly subjugated to the akin mainstream nationalist movements and transplanted the general nationalist conflicts to these regions simultaneously making more acute the residual local conflicts. The short-lived local opposition in the form of the ethnic Silesian movements was quenched or subjugated by the nationalist movements due to the former’s dearth of means and outside aid. Moreover, importance of the local nationalist movements subsided due to the fact that their voices were just advisory at the Peace Conference where the mainstream nationalist movements negotiated the interwar shape of Upper and Austrian Silesia. Thus the local nationalist movements largely disappeared after 1919 in the case of Austrian Silesia, and after 1921 in the case of Upper Silesia, becoming branches of the respective mainstream state nationalist movements. Even the minority nationalist movements: German in the Silesian Voivodship (the eastern part of Upper Silesia granted to Poland), Polish in the Upper Silesian Province or the truncated Oppeln (Opole) Regency, and Polish in Czech Silesia started taking irredentist orders from Berlin and Warsaw respectively. The demographically dominant German minority of Czech Silesia was a somewhat exceptional because first it became part of the Sudetic German nationalist movement in Czechoslovakia. Only when it became apparent after the war that German-Austria would not be allowed to merge with the German Republic, Sudetic activists gradually directed their movement toward politically stronger and geographically adjacent Germany. The ethnic Silesian movements took the back seat in the hostile atmosphere of homogenizing efforts fostered by the respective nation-states in making. However, they survived propped by the weaker and stronger autonomous measures employed in Czech Silesia, the Upper Silesian Province and the Silesian Voivodship. From time to time, they also grew stronger at the grass roots level when some supporters of the nationalist movements joined the ethnic movements having noticed that the nation-states enforced thorough homogenization often without any concern for local particularisms which constituted the traditional fabric of life and regional identities of the majority of the inhabitants of
Upper and Austrian Silesia irrespectively of their less or more conscious political-nationalist choices. Losing one’s traditional way of life and pre-national complementary identity is always a painful process even if one has decided one is eager to do it for the sake of some nationaldom. In the moment of the introduction of the striven-for change afterthoughts confront one with the question if one is ready to forsake his childhood, kin, friends, multiethnic homeland, dialect/creole, in short safety ensured by the closely-knit generation-old immediate social environment in favor of the abstract and distant though highly attractive ideas of nation (i.e. imagined community) and nation-state which will not reciprocate one with longed-for Gemütlichkeit (once easily found in the arms of one’s dialect-speaking grandma) but will provide with a completely different world of nation, where one would have to learn how to live and find his sense of life anew.

This phenomenon of sudden realization of the end of one’s ethnic world is clearly visible in the case of the Moravian ethnic movement of southern Upper Silesia. It emerged thanks to Father Lelek’s efforts in the 1840s and was allowed its low-key existence in the form of Moravian-language education at the elementary level, and the use of this dialect at church. This tentative continuity was severed by the Kulturkampf, and the movements only haven became the Catholic Church until the establishing of the only Moravian-language periodical Katolické Noviny (1893-1920) which heralded the movement’s shift from the phase A to B. The movement remained at this level untroubled by the geographically relatively distant processes of industrialization in Upper and Austrian Silesia, entrenched in rurality and Catholicism. The dramatic changes at the end of the Great War and Czech nationalists claims to this area and its inhabitants, were largely unintelligible to the Moravians. They had hard time to identify with any nationalism and especially with the ethnically close Czech nationalism as it was pegged to Protestantism contrary to the Moravians attachment to Catholicism. The seizure and subsequent closing of their only paper by Czech activists as well as the transfer of the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) to Czechoslovakia, alienated many of the Moravians. They closed themselves in their ethnic parochiality and frustrated the nation-state’s attempts to Czechize them by turning to Germandom exemplified by the culturally and confessionally close Sudetic Germans. To a larger extent the Moravian ethnic movement disappeared after the war but contrary to the expectations the Moravians predominantly became Germans than Czechs though their largely retained facility of complementary identity allowed them to function as Czechs among Czechs, Germans among Germans and locals in their home environment.

The end of this chapter also demands reiteration of the policies of ethnic cleansing employed by Germany and Austria-Hungary in Prussian and Austrian Silesia, respectively, prior to 1918. However, it ought to be borne in mind that the methods and techniques were quite subtle and rarely amounted to such typically 20th-century harsh measures as expulsion, genocide, totalitarian liquidation of cultures and languages.

The nation-building policy of the Kulturkampf which was to weaken Catholicism in favor of Protestantism (compatible with German nationalism) largely failed leading to a fruitful modus vivendi between the Church and the German nation-state. However, the policy had ethnic besides confessional overtones in Upper Silesia and the Slavic-speaking areas of the Breslau (Wrocław) Regency. All other languages than German were gradually banned from state offices, schools and religious instructions in the 1870s. On a limited scale the Church became haven for these languages (dialects, creoles) but only until the 1890s when even the ultramontane Church started promoting Germandom and the German language but without suppressing services in Polish and Moravian. The language policies were assisted by the process of rapid industrialization which necessitated immigration of numerous German, usually Protestant civil servants, engineers and other professionals together with their families. Through industrialization the emerging German nation-state gained necessary means to further pursue the processes of nation and nation-state building without alienating the non-German-speakers who could enjoy much higher standard of living than Polish-speakers in Congress Poland and Galicia, or even Czech-speakers in the rural areas of Bohemia and Moravia. The German-language school, mass media and civil service gradually nudged the multiethnic and multilingual
environment of Upper Silesia toward Germandom. Clerks often unwittingly altered Slavic personal and place names writing them down in line with German phonetics, spelling and usage.

A backlash came with attempted limitations of the use of non-German languages at church in the 1890s, as well as with the rise of more radical German nationalism which got engaged with Polish nationalism into the Wirtschaftskampf which was largely conducted in the province of Posen (Poznań). The effect was the rise of the non-ultramontane Polish nationalist movement in Upper Silesia which culminated in the 1903 election of Korfanty to the Reichstag. The growing irredentism of the Posen (Poznań) Polish nationalism and the political emergence of the Polish nationalist movement in Upper Silesia led to the emergence of state-supported German cultural organizations and libraries and made the authorities issue new laws limiting the use of Polish at meetings of Polish-language organizations as well as the sphere of economic freedom for non-German-speakers in 1900-1910. The last trend culminated in the Expropriation Act which, however, was never applied in Upper Silesia, and became a dead letter due to vehement criticism voiced by the Church and liberal political groups.

The outbreak of the Great War did not alter the official language policies in Upper Silesia albeit censorship ensured loyalty of the Polish-language press, and preventive interning of socialist and Polish nationalist leaders their inactivity. Compulsory military service which had better assimilated young Upper Silesian males into Germandom than any other measures, allowed depriving the nationalist movements of the most dynamic members through thorough mobilization during the wartime. The unchanged situation lasted until the last years of the war during which soldiers and the population got radicalized. To offset the danger of growing anti-German feeling among the non-German-speaking Upper Silesians, in 1917 it was allowed to use Polish/Moravian at the meetings of Polish/Moravian-language organizations, and employment of civil servants with a better command of a non-German language (usually their mother tongue) than of German. At the end of 1918 Polish and Moravian were reintroduced as the medium of instruction for religious instructions in the first three forms, and finally, Article 113 of the constitution of the Weimar Republic guaranteed language and minority rights for non-German ethnic/national groups living in Germany (Klein, 1972: 37-50). However, any consistent minority policies in Upper Silesia started emerging only after the division of this region between Poland and Germany in 1921.

Considering Austrian Silesia, Czech and Polish which shortly enjoyed the status of official languages of the crownland in 1849-1851, continued to be used at school until the 1870s when the Slavic elementary education was replaced with its bilingual counterpart. Eventually this change was not thoroughly successful as it was boycotted by many teachers and schools who soon were succored by the Matice opavská (1877) and the Macierz Szkolna (1885) and opening of the Czech and Polish-language secondary schools in 1883-1914. Actually there were hardly any policies of ethnic cleansing pursued by the central or the crownland authorities after the 1870s, who rather gradually granted the non-German-speakers with more cultural and language rights up to the break-up of the Dual Monarchy in 1918. However, the Austrian Silesian non-German-speakers (or at least their nationalist-minded elites) felt to be discriminated against by comparing their situation to the non-German-speakers from Bohemia, Moravia and Galicia. The authorities could not allow similar developments in Austrian Silesia because they would alienate the German-speakers who constituted almost half of the crownland’s population (Korvalka, 1995: 18), and precipitate nationalist/ethnic conflicts which were to be contained and not encouraged. What is more, understandably, the crownland’s Czech and Polish nationalist activists did not have enough economic and political power to coax the Landtag or the Reichsrat to grant the non-German-speakers with more rights without the aid from German deputies and the central government. To conclude, some say that during the period 1867-1918 the emperor was seeing to the peaceful dismantling of Austria-Hungary the process started with the Hungarian Ausgleich. In this vein one may infer that all the various ethnic/national groups of the empire opted for independence when the government had nothing more to concede to them. Although, on the other hand, in accordance with the principle of perceiving a half-empty bottle as half-full, one may say that Austria-Hungary was a botched attempt at creating a federal state. Leaving the
interpretations aside, it is sure that as multiethnic and multilingual as the Danubian Monarchy was, and as weak and backward it was in comparison to Germany, Austria-Hungary had no conditions whatsoever to embark on the then modernizing task of nation or nation-state building without risking the instantaneous dismantling the Dual Monarchy in a sea of chaos.
Chapter six

The notion of Silesia

(Part II: 1918-today)

This chapter is a follow-up of the earlier one which traces emergence and development of Silesia as a region, and political and ecclesiastical entity in relation to the identity of its inhabitants and widespread myths and beliefs about this land. It covered the period since the 10th century up to the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna (1815), which constructed a new order in Europe which (excluding minor disturbances) ensured peace and prosperity on the continent up to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. The belle epoque commenced by the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars also reintroduced stability in Prussia and Silesia which had been harshly visited in 1806 when Napoleon seized them and effectively controlled until 1813.

In the case of Silesia, its new governmental and administrative structure was built in the decade of 1815-1825. In 1815 the Province of Silesia was constituted and divided into four regencies. The territory of the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency was extended with part of the Upper Lusatia which Prussia had gained from Saxony. In 1816 the Silesian enclave of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin) and some fragments of the Sagan (Zagań) county were transferred to the Province of Brandenburg. In 1820, due to financial constraints the Reichenbach (Dzierżoniów) Regency was dismantled and its territory allocated to the adjacent Regencies of Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wrocław). In 1825 the Upper Lusatian county of Hoyerswerda (Wojercy) came from Brandenburg to the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency so that the regency comprised roughly two thirds of Upper Lusatia (Lesiuk, 1995: 24/25; Stüttgen, 1976: 8). This situation lasted largely unchanged until the changes brought about by the end of World War I. The only relatively major alterations could be seen in the growing number of counties and of urban counties. This trend reflected the increase of population, urbanization and industrialization. Because Lower Silesia had been traditionally better developed and more integrated in the Prussian and Western European economy, the changes in the Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wrocław) Regencies were not so dramatic as in backward and predominantly rural Upper Silesia which started emerging as the major European industrial center only in the second half of the 19th century. Thus the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency had nineteen counties in 1825, and no urban one. Its number grew to twenty-one in 1918, and the cities of Görlitz (Zgorzelec) and Liegnitz (Legnica) were constituted as urban counties. In 1820 there were twenty-three counties in the Breslau (Wrocław) Regency, and the Silesian capital enjoyed the status of the urban county as the only entity in Silesia at that time. In 1918 the regency contained twenty-six counties; the status of urban counties was enjoyed by the cities of Brzeg (Brieg) and Schweidnitz (Świdnica). In 1817 the Oppeln (Opole) Regency had fifteen counties whose number grew almost two-fold to twenty-six by 1918, including the unparalleled number of seven urban counties which concentrated in the industrial basin with the exception of the urban counties of Oppeln (Opole) and Neisse (Nysa) (Stüttgen, 1976: 39, 41, 119, 121, 190, 193).

One usually referred to the whole province as Prussian Silesia to distinguish it from Austrian Silesia which had remained in the Habsburg Empire after Friedrich II’s annexation of 1740. Due to the tripartite administrative division of the province scholars tended to dub the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency as Lower Silesia, the Breslau (Wrocław) Regency as Middle (Central) Silesia and the Oppeln (Opole) Regency as Upper Silesia. However, the term Lower Silesia was often employed to denote both the Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wrocław) Regencies, and was more appropriate from the viewpoint of Silesian historiography. Therefore, Middle (Central) Silesia gradually lost currency as redundant and disappeared after 1919 when the administrative structure of Silesia was overhauled resulting in the division of this land into the two Provinces of Lower and Upper Silesia. Moreover, when the ideology of nationalism started spreading in Central Europe in the first half of the 19th century, scholars developed the term Polish Silesia to denote these areas of the Breslau (Wrocław) and Oppeln (Opole) Regencies.

514 Mittelschlesien in German, Śląsk Środkowy or Śląsk Średni in Polish.
predominantly inhabited by the Polish-speaking population. This term fell into disuse after 1918 but some Polish scholars persisted in employing it to speak about the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and East Silesia together, and, after the division of Upper Silesia (1921), to denote the truncated Oppeln (Opole) Regency. On the other hand, few German academics and journalists used this name to describe the Silesian Voivodship, i.e. these parts of East Silesia and Upper Silesia which were granted to Poland in 1920 and 1921, respectively (Snoch, 1991: 140/141).

The Great War and the acceptance of the national principle as the yardstick for organization of political and international relations in Europe wreaked havoc in Silesia and sowed discontent which formed the basis for the outbreak of World War II. In November 1918 Austria-Hungary and Germany capitulated, and in the meantime the political situation in Central Europe was changed by the break-up of the Danubian Empire and emergence of independent Czechoslovakia and Poland. Both the states strove to extend their respective territories to include all the language-speakers of the proposed Polish and Czechoslovak nations as well as historical lands of Poland-Lithuania and the Czech Crown together with additional adjacent areas significant because of their industry or infrastructure. The ethnic argument found its proponent in the persons of Wilson and Lenin whereas other arguments, as long as they would lead to weakening of Germany, France readily espoused. The defeat of France in 1870/1871 and creation of the Kleindeutsch nation-state had brought about the first proposals of truncating or partitioning Germany in order to reestablish the European balance of power which had been disturbed by the territorial, economic and military growth of the German Empire. Such plans became especially numerous in 1910-1920. Most frequently they were put forward by French sources as the state was interested in redressing the injustice of the humiliating defeat of 1870/1871. Short of describing the cartographic games in detail, it is suffice to observe their treatment of Silesia. The French project of 1913 foresaw transferring all of East and Central Germany (together with Silesia and Berlin) to Russia. The rest would be divided among the neighboring states so that Germany would be limited just to a statelet of Thuringia. The two other but less draconian French projects of 1915 wanted to leave Silesia with truncated Germany or within a separate Prussian state. The next one of 1915/1916 wished to transfer Silesia to Austria. Czech nationalists enjoying support of France espoused the French views and proposed, in 1917, truncation of Germany with the simultaneous establishment of a Czech state which would include the historical lands of the Czech Crown : Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian and Prussian Silesia (up to the River Oder (Odra)), Lusatia, together (on the basis of the ethnic principle) Upper Hungary (Slovakia). Here, it is interesting to take a note of the 1915 American project of doing away with Germany and Austria by creation of independent Poland and Hungary as well as vast territorial extension of Serbia, France, Luxembourg, Belgium and Russia Silesia would be included in such an enlarged Belgium (Hellriegel-Netzbändt, 1996: 170-173; Krebs, 1992: 21).

In 1918 the projects included the new players of Czechoslovakia and Poland who started voicing their own opinions at international fora after the capitulation of Austria-Hungary and Germany. In regard to Prussian Silesia, Czechoslovakia claimed the southern strip of Upper and Lower Silesia (together with the whole of the Glatz (Klodzko) region, whereas demanding independence for Lusatia which, as another Slavic state, would limit the German influence giving the upper hand to Poland and Czechoslovakia in this region. Poland demanded Polish Silesia, i.e. the whole of Upper Silesia and the Polish-speaking areas of Lower Silesia but some projects strove for inclusion even of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency. The Allies also pushed for internationalization of the Oder (Odra) (Pudelko, 1993: 221). More substance to this initially wishful thinking was given by the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the success of the Wielkopolska Uprising which sent the message that also the lands of east Germany were to be grabbed. Before the uprising was terminated by the armistice of Trier (February 16, 1919) which granted the majority of Wielkopolska to Poland, two days earlier the Polish party had demanded most of Upper Silesia where no hostilities had taken place (Polak, 1993: 147). Moreover, Paris pressed for the transfer of Elsass-Lotharingen (Alsace-Lorraine) and the Saar to France and east German territories to Czechoslovakia and Poland in order to weaken and make it impossible for Germany to wage another war against France.
The prevailing anti-German attitude and the wholesale espousal of the nationalethnic principle were moderated by the British stance but, nevertheless, led to the imposition of the peace treaty on Germany without any possibility to negotiate its terms (Johnson, 1996: 190/191; Kinder, 1978: II 133). The more the Germans generally despised the harsh terms of this dictated peace because they inclusion the humiliating clauses stating Germany was wholly responsible for the outbreak of the Great War though it was patently incorrect (cf. Eitzen, 1923: V). The Treaty of Versailles was signed by Germany on June 28, 1919, and its provisions went into force on January 10, 1920 Germany lost about 70,000 sq km together with 7.3 mln inhabitants (Bahlcke, 1996: 126). In regard to Silesia the treaty authorized:

a) the transfer of the predominantly Moravian-speaking area of the Ratibor (Racibórz) county, the so-called Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko)515 to Czechoslovakia. On February 4, 1920 the Czechoslovak troops took over this area of 315.8 sq km with 48,446 inhabitants according to the 1910 census. It formed a bridge which connected, previously separated by the Moravian salient, West and East Silesia (Weczerka, 1977: 198/199).

b) the transfer of the predominantly Polish-speaking northern Lower Silesian areas to Poland. They were included in the Poznań (Posen) Voivodship and included small fragments of the Breslau (Wrocław) Regency’s counties of Guhrau (Góra), Militsch (Milicz), Groß Wartenberg (Syców) and Namslau (Namysłów) (Stüttgen, 1976: 41). The largest territorial losses were suffered by the counties of Groß Wartenberg (Syców) (382.59 sq km (Weczerka, 1977a: 161)), Namslau (Namysłów) (84 sq km (Weczerka, 1977b: 328)). The losses of the counties of Guhrau (Góra) and Militsch (Milicz) amounted to 44.96 sq km, so, in total, Poland gained 511.55 sq km of the Silesian territory at that time. All the Silesian territories lost to Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1920 added up to 827.35 sq km (Pudelko, 1993: 224). Moreover, some fragments of the erstwhile Province of Posen (Poznañ) which were not included in Wielkopolska, which was taken by Poland, found their way to the diminished Lower Silesian counties. The remaining part of:

the Krotoschin (Krotoszyn) county was transferred to the Militsch (Milicz) county,

the Lissa (Leszno) county to the Guhrau (Góra) county,

the Rawitsch (Rawicz) county was divided among the counties of Guhrau (Góra) and Militsch (Milicz) (Stüttgen, 1976: 41).

In the May 7, 1919 project of the peace treaty, Art 87 and 88 predicted the transfer of the whole of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency to Poland but due to the staunch German opposition to this provision, the Treaty of Versailles came up with the experimental idea of plebiscite. Its Art 87 stipulated that the area of plebiscite would be divided between Germany and Poland on the basis of the results of the plebiscite as well as on geographical and economic basis (Kinder, 1978: II 133; Wyglenda, 1982: 21). The plebiscite area included the whole of Upper Silesia with the exception of the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) (to be transferred to Czechoslovakia), and the clearly German-speaking counties of Grottkau (Grodków), Falkenberg (Niemodlin), Neiße (Nysa) and the westernmost part of the county of Neustadt (Prudnik). Moreover, the easternmost part of the Lower Silesian county of Namslau (Namysłów) was added to this area, and it was decided that the southern half of the Leobschütz (Głubczyce) county was to be ceded to Czechoslovakia should the inhabitants of this area vote in favor of Poland (Firich, 1921: table 1). The size of the plebiscite area was 11,008 sq km (Lis, 1982: 153) so it amounted to the majority of the territory of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency (13, 238.86 sq km (Stüttgen, 1976: 325)). According to the Polish estimates based on the 1910 census, it was inhabited by about 2 mln persons, including 1.3 mln Polish-speakers, 670,000 German-speakers and 30,000 Moravian/Czech-speakers (Lis, 1982: 153).

The popular assumption that the plebiscite would be an instrument of peaceful settlement of border and nationalist conflicts was soon to be proved wrong. After the announcement of the Versailles decisions in regard to Upper Silesia, the region was engulfed in communal violence instigated by Polish

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515 In Polish it is referred to as Hulczyńskie (Hulczyn Land) or, rather rarely, as Śląsk Hulczyński (Hulczyn Silesia) (Snoch, 1991: 50).
and German nationalists urged by orders from Warsaw and Berlin respectively. The conflicts culminated in the three Silesian Uprisings (which the Germans considered rebellions) of 1919, 1920 and 1921, and widespread pre-plebiscite political violence which frequently got transformed into communal violence especially in urban and industrial neighborhoods. The violence was not even effectively contained after the Treaty of Versailles went into force (January 10, 1920), and on its basis the German troops and administration left the plebiscite area (January 27-February 11) to be taken over by the Interallied Commission for the Government and Plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Finally the plebiscite took place on March 20, 1921. 1,220,514 persons were eligible to vote (including 191,154 (16%) emigrants who had been born in the plebiscite area but lived outside it, and 41,000 (3.5%) qualified by domicile only). 1,190,846 (97.5%) cast ballots, out of which 3,882 (0.3%) were found void. 707,605 (59.6%) voted for Germany and 479,359 (40.3%) for Poland. However, in conformity with the treaty, the official result of the voting was given by communes (Gemeinde and Gutsbezirke), no figures being given for the total vote of the area or of the separate counties. Hence, 844 (54%) communes voted for Germany, and 678 (42.5%) for Poland. The votes of 73 communes were doubtful due to various irregularities. The Polish and German propagandists tended to disregard the intricacies and irregularities of the voting and reinterpreted the results in the most favorable possible manners for themselves. Thus the Germans claimed that 59.7% of the eligible voted for Germany and only 40.3% for Poland. The Poles emphasized the official result according to communes and maintained that 44.7% communes voted for Poland and 55.3% for Germany (Bahlcke, 1996: 132; Lis, 1982a: 397-400; Wambaugh, 1933: I 249/250). However, none of the results and interpretations could be easily translated into some obvious borderline on the map. Predominantly German and Polish-speaking communes, counties, towns did not want to coalesce into two separate ethnic areas emphasizing the polyglot and multiethnic character of this region (Wambaugh, 1933: I 266). The Poles disregarding the urban areas demanded central and eastern parts of the plebiscite area. The Germans who hailed victory stressed that it was impossible to sensibly divide Upper Silesia from the economic and infrastructural vantage point, and canvassed for granting the whole of the plebiscite area to Germany. For propagandistic reasons both the parties were forgetful of the fact that the treaty stipulated the plebiscite would be just an opinion for the Allies who would make the final decision (Lis, 1982a: 398). The United Kingdom and Italy did not want to weaken Germany too much as it would give disproportionate power to France while the latter strove make Germany unable to attack France any time in future (Orzechowski, 1972: 15).

The resultant compromise did not please anybody showing that the instrument of plebiscite rather contributed to perpetuating than solving conflicts. The League of Nations reached the preliminary consensus on division of the plebiscite area on October 12, 1921. The Council of Ambassadors accepted it on October 19 and was followed by the Polish and German governments (October 26 and 27) though the latter lodged a protest against this decision. The provisional delimitation of the Polish-German border dividing the plebiscite area was carried out on October 28-December 18, 1921. The negotiations between Germany and Poland over the detailed issues entailed by the division continued from November 23, 1921 to May 15, 1922 when the convention, a monumental work of 606 articles, was signed at Geneva. On May 24 the Geneva Convention was ratified by the Sejm, and on May 30 the Reichstag, in special session, the hall draped in mourning. On June 15, the Conference of Ambassadors informed the German and Polish governments that they were at liberty to take over their respective areas. Poland and Germany took over their respective parts on June 17-July 4 whereas the process of supplanting the interallied administration (in accordance to the convention) was completed on July 10. However the process of demarcation of the new border lasted until June 6, 1923. Germany obtained 7,794 sq km (71%) of the plebiscite area and Poland 3,214 sq km (29%). From the total number of inhabitants (2,112,700) 1,116,500 (54%) remained in Germany while 996,500 (46%) found themselves in Poland. In the Polish

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516 It is a misleading name - all the uprisings took place in the east of Upper Silesia but they were dubbed Silesian by the Poles as the distinction between Upper and Lower Silesia was of no value for them since they were to obtain only part of Upper Silesia. For the same reason, the part of Upper Silesia Poland received in 1922 was named the Silesian Voivodship not an East Upper Silesian Voivodship which would have more faithfully reflected the relation of this area to Silesia as a whole.
section 43% of ballots were cast in the plebiscite, i.e. 60% of all the votes for Poland, and 32% of all the votes for Germany. In the German section 57% of ballots were cast in the plebiscite, i.e. 68% of all the votes for Germany, and 40% of all the votes for Poland. Although territorially Poland did not gain much, it was the great winner in the sphere of economy. Poland obtained 53 out of the 67 coal mines, all the 9 iron ore mines, 10 out of the 15 zinc and lead mines, 11 out of the 18 coking plants, 3 out of the 4 briquetting plants, 22 out of the 37 blast furnaces, 1,875 out of the 3,030 coke ovens, 7 out of the 10 steel plants, 13 out of the 25 steel and iron foundries, all the 18 zinc, lead and silver plants, 9 out of the 12 rolling mills, and 50% of all other factories active in other fields than the coal and metallurgical industries (Lesiuk, 1982: 92; Pudelko, 1993: 224; Wambaugh, 1933: 259/260; Wyglenda, 1982a: 409/410; Wyglenda, 1982b: 453). Moreover, the application of internationally supervised self-determination in the plebiscite area in the name of the principle of nationality, did not lead to homogenization of the German and Polish sectors so that they would be congruent with the German and Polish nation-states-in-construction. The division of the plebiscite area just created new majorities and minorities. Thus, according to the 1925 census 155,069 Polish-speakers and 387,439 bilingual Polish and German-speakers lived in the truncated Oppeln (Opole) Regency of 9,714 sq km. Without any other but ideological justification, the Polish authorities used the numbers to claim that the Polish minority amounted to 530,000 (40%) out of the regency’s total population of 1.3 mln. On the other hand, the Polish sources estimated the number of Germans living in the Silesian Voivodship at 230-260,000 as opposed to the German estimates of 300-336,800, i.e. 28% of the voivodship’s population. The potential for future nationalist conflict instigated by Warsaw and Berlin nationalists was clear (Kessler, 1989: 167; Wambaugh, 1933: 269; Wyglenda, 1982a: 409). Besides, creating the new pattern of nationalist/ethnic conflict, the division of the plebiscite area severely impeded functioning of the Upper Silesian economy and administration; the new border cut across: 15 railway lines, 9 narrow gauge railway lines, 7 tramway lines, 45 various roads, 12 high voltage power lines, 8 water lines and numerous gas lines, 11 counties, numerous farms, and separated factories of 11 large mining-metallurgical holding companies (Pudelko, 1993: 226/227; Wyglenda, 1982a: 410). All the minority and economic problems arising in the plebiscite area before the expiration of the Geneva Convention in 1937, were to be solved by the Mixed Commission installed at Katowice (Kattowitz) and the Arbitral Tribunal at Beuthen (Bytom). At the request of both parties the League of Nations appointed as President of the Commission Félix Calonder, formerly President of the Swiss Confederation, and as Chief Justice of the Tribunal, Georges van Kaeckenbeeck, a Belgian lawyer and member of the Secretariat of the League of Nations. Before any minority rights disputes were passed to the Mixed Commission they had to be dealt with by the Polish and German Minorities Offices situated at Katowice (Kattowitz) and Oppeln (Opole), respectively. Should there be no possibility to reach consensus on some disputes at the level of the Mixed Commission and the Arbitral Tribunal, Art 147 of the convention allowed recourse to the League of Nations (Bahlcke, 1996: 133; Stone, 1933: 10-15; 83; Wambaugh, 1933: 260).

The establishment of the new states of Czechoslovakia and Poland which aspired to acquire the whole or parts of Silesia concurrent with the rise of the movement for autonomy/independence of Upper Silesia/all Silesia, made the German government counter these tendencies in order to retain integrity of the state whose territory was severely truncated by the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. After the Weimar Republic was proclaimed, the separatist tendencies got limited to the most heterogenous of the Silesian regencies the Oppeln (Opole) Regency. The local Polish nationalists assisted by their counterparts from Wielkopolaska and top ideologues from Warsaw, utilized postwar Germany’s dire political and economic problems to spread Polish nationalism aimed at popularizing the idea of transfer of Upper Silesia from Germany to Poland as the miraculous panacea to all the ills as well as to the German

517 The international authorities and scholars were well aware that a sizeable number of Upper Silesian Polish- and bilingual-speakers were ethnic Upper Silesians not Germans or Poles. However, for practical and political reasons recognizing the national principle as supreme, the Geneva Convention made them choose only between these two national identities when a situation required administrative or juridical solution (Stone, 1933: 36-44).

518 22 such companies existed at that time (Wyglenda, 1982a: 410).

519 The first head of the Polish Minority Office was Hinze, and of the German Gospos (Stone, 1933: 83).
nationalist policies which hoping to build a thoroughly homogenous nation-state had disregarded the polyglot and multicultural character of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency. In order to contain irredentist radicalism and sway the vote in the coming plebiscite in favor of Germany, the idea of granting autonomy to Upper Silesia was propounded in July and August 1919 (Rechowicz, 1971: 52). On October 14, the Prussian Landtag decided to espouse some of the postulates of the movement for autonomy of Upper Silesia by turning the Oppeln (Opole) Regency into the Upper Silesian Province separate from the Lower Silesian Province. The former consisted from the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and the latter from the two remaining Silesian Regencies of Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wroclaw). Oppeln (Opole) was the capital of the Upper Silesian Province and Breslau (Wroclaw) of the Lower Silesian Province (Stüttgen, 1976: 8, 272). The importance of the political and propagandistic effect of this decision was not lost on the Polish Sejm which, on July 15, 1920 passed the Organic Statute of the Silesian Voivodship which granted the still non-existent voivodship whose prospective territory was situated outside the Polish borders, with a wide-ranging autonomy complete with its own budget, legislature the Silesian Sejm, and executive the Voivodship Council which was elected by the Silesian Sejm, but headed by the Voivode nominated by the Polish government (Ciągwa, 1988: 4/5; Dąbrowski, 1922: 35-51). On November 27, 1920, the Reichstag not to lose the pre-plebiscite propaganda war with Poland, passed an act on organizing the referendum if the Upper Silesian Province should remain within Prussia or become a separate German land (Land Oberschlesien). The referendum was to take place within two months after Germany would take over the plebiscite area. The act was so significant that it required adding two more paragraphs to Art 167 of the Weimar Constitution of August 11, 1919 (Ciągwa, 1988: 7). The referendum was held on September 3, 1922. The Katholische Volkspartei (previously the Zentrum), the strongest political force in German Upper Silesia, was satisfied with new autonomous prerogatives granted to the Upper Silesian Province, and stood on the ground that the province should remain in Prussia. The party’s position was supported by the voting: 74% of the eligible cast their ballots, out of which 513,126 (91.1%) were for the aforementioned solution, and 50,400 (8.9%) for establishing the Land Oberschlesien (Bahlcke, 1996: 134/135). Subsequently, the movement for autonomy in the Upper Silesian Province and in the Silesian Voivodship became negligible especially after the dissolution of the ZG/BdS in 1923 (Cimala, 1982: 23).

The decisions of the Treaty of Versailles and the plebiscite followed by the Geneva Convention did seriously alter Silesia administratively and territorially for the first time after the Congress of Vienna. First of all the overall territory of Silesia diminished from 40,343.60 sq km in 1910 to 37,020.31 in 1925, as the reflection of the changes in the Breslau (Wroclaw) and Oppeln (Opole) Regencies whose areas decreased from 13,489.75 sq km and 13,238.86 sq km in 1910 to 12,998.9 sq km and 10,404.48 sq km in 1925. Only the territory of the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency (13,614.99 in 1910 and 13,616.93 in 1925) remained the same, the small fluctuations caused by county border adjustments. The number of inhabitants of Silesia also dropped from 5,225,962 in 1910 to 4,531,486 in 1925 and remained low (4,868,764 in 1939), but in the terms of regencies this decrease was owsed only in German Upper Silesia whose population of 2,207,981 in 1910 plummeted to 1,372,407 in 1925 and grew to mere 1,582,225 in 1939. Thus the previously most populous the Oppeln (Opole) Regency was surpassed by the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency with 1,906,590 inhabitants in 1925. The Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency remained the least populous with its populace of 1,252,489 in 1925 (Stüttgen, 1976: 324/325). Due to the division of Upper Silesia Poland received:

- the urban counties of Kattowitz (Katowice) and Königshütte (Królewska Huta) and the counties of Kattowitz (Katowice) and Pless (Pszczyna) in entirety;
- the larger parts of the counties of Lublinitz (Lubliniec), Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Góry), Beuthen (Bytom), Hindenburg (Zabrze) and Rybnik (Rybnik);

520 In other words, the constitution of the Silesian Voivodship.

521 With the exception of this part of East Austrian Silesia which was controlled by Poland and later granted to it, on July 28, 1920, by the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors which divided this land between Czechoslovakia and Poland (Wambaugh, 1933: 160).
the smaller parts of the counties of Tost-Gleiwick (Toszek-Gliwice) and Ratibor (Racibórz), and of the urban counties of Beuthen (Bytom) and Ratibor (Racibórz).

The truncation of the Upper Silesian Province resulted in lowering the original number of 26 counties in 1918 to 22 in 1922. However, the final overhaul of the county borders and organization was implemented only in 1926 indicating that the German authorities resigned themselves to the effects of the plebiscite. Thus the Oppeln (Opole) Regency’s counties numbered 20 up to 1939 (Stüttgen, 1976: 193-195). Moreover, German sovereignty and the prerogatives of the authorities of the Upper Silesian Province and the Oppeln (Opole) Regency were limited in 1922-1937 by the Geneva Convention. Besides, in conformity with the Treaty of Versailles, almost the whole Upper Silesian Province as well as the southern and northern parts of the Lower Silesian Province were included in the demilitarized zone (Hellriegel-Netzebandt, 1996: 134).

To round up the chapter’s section on the administrative changes in postwar Prussian Silesia, it is necessary to add that the number of counties was also rationalized in the Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wroclaw) Regencies. Their numbers fell from 21 to 20, and from 26 to 22, respectively, in the years 1918-1933. The number of counties in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency remained unchanged until 1945. Considering the other regency, its territory was enlarged in 1938. The Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen (Poznań-West Prussia Border March) Province, which had been established from the remaining parts of the Provinces of Posen (Poznań) and West Prussia (they had passed almost in their entirety to Poland and the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk)), was an administrative curiosity constituted from three separate parts. It was dissolved in 1938 and its larger fragments were transferred to the Provinces of Pomera尼亚 and Brandenburg. The rest, i.e. the county of Fraustadt (Wschowa) and the 10 communes of the county of Bomst (Babi Most) were included in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency on October 1, 1938. The former constituted a separate county and the communes were included in the Grünberg (Zielona Góra) county. Henceforth, the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency’s number of 21 counties did not change until 1945 (Jähnig, 1991: 145; Stüttgen, 1976: 41-43, 119-124). The 1938 reorganization of the east German provinces which liquidated the Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen (Poznań-West Prussia Border March) Province, and aimed at improving efficiency of administration as well as centralizing the state structure, also was applied to Silesia. On April 1, 1938 the Upper and Lower Silesian Provinces were united into the Silesian Province constituted by the three regencies. It was an attempted return to the administrative situation before 1919 showing the German government’s will to revert the decisions of the Versailles Diktat, and certain disregard for distinctiveness of German Upper Silesia whose measure of autonomy could not be safeguarded by the Geneva Convention any more as it had expired in 1937 and had not been renewed (Stüttgen, 1976: 9).

Having observed the changes in the political, administrative, territorial and demographic shape of Prussian Silesia after 1918 as well as of its truncated form in Germany up to 1938, it is indispensable to focus on Austrian Silesia and its postwar fate before delving into the interwar status of these Silesian fragments which were included in the territories of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Austrian Silesia came into being as a crownland of the Habsburg Empire in 1742, as a result of Prussia’s seizure of 7/8 of Silesia which had measured 37,480 sq km before Friedrich II’s annexation and the subsequent partition. Austrian Silesia was the smallest crownland. The Moravian salient separated it into two parts West and East Silesia. Additionally, the territory of West Silesia was riddled with Moravian enclaves. Austrian Silesia’s area amounted to 5,153 sq km without the Moravian enclaves adding up to 316 sq km. East Silesia measured 2,282 sq km and West Silesia 2,871 sq km or 3,187 sq km.

522 For instance, prior to 1926, the rump county of Lubliniec (Lubliniec) continued to exist despite the fact that its capital Lubliniec (Lubliniec) was handed over to Poland. Provisionally, the administration of this county was conducted from Gutten tag (Dobrodzień). This situation was accepted as permanent when the truncated and dysfunctional Lubliniec (Lubliniec) county was turned into the Gutten tag (Dobrodzień) county (Stüttgen, 1976: 194/195).

523 The county’s area was 282 sq km (Weczerka, 1977c: 99).

524 They amounted to c. 100 sq km (Weczerka, 1977d: 1).
with the Moravian enclaves. In the run of Josephine reforms Austrian Silesia was merged with Moravia in 1782. In 1849 it was reconstituted as a crownland on its own, and the majority of the territory of the Moravian enclaves was included in West Silesia whose area increased to 3,181.8 sq km. Next year it was divided into 7 political counties (Bezirkskommunen) which were subdivided into 22 court districts. The administrative division was overhauled in 1855 when the 20 court districts were given under control of the Troppau (Opava) and Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) in West and East Silesia, respectively. This situation lasted up to 1868. In the meantime it was decided to limit the overgrown administration in the Danubian Monarchy. Hence Austrian Silesia was again merged with Moravia on November 15, 1860, but due to the staunch opposition to this decision, Franz Joseph II reestablished the crownland already on March 29, 1861. The new administrative reform of 1868 introduced 9 political counties and 25 court districts whose number slightly fluctuated but was again the same in 1918. The crownland’s capital Troppau (Opava) was the seat of the Landtag and the crownland government headed by the governor (Statthalter) (Anon., 1905: 368, 371; Anon., 1939: 1338; Dąbrowski, 1922: 176/177; d’Elvert, 1854: 278-283; Fazan, 1991: 5; Grim, 1992: 75-78).

After the break-up of Austria-Hungary and the emergence of Czechoslovakia, on October 30, 1918 the German-speaking members of the Reichsrat from Austrian Silesia and northern Moravia established the province of Sudetenland out of West Silesia and the predominantly German-speaking areas of northern Moravia. The province with its capital at Troppau (Opava) measured 6,534 sq km and was inhabited by 643,804 German-speakers and 25,082 Czech-speakers. Together with the three other German provinces which came into being in the predominantly German-speaking outlying regions of Bohemia and Moravia, Sudetenland aspired to become part of an enlarged German-Austria which remained from truncated Cisleithania. With no real support from Vienna beset by the problems arising from the dismembering of Austria-Hungary, the Czech troops seized Troppau (Opava) on December 18 and the whole of Sudetenland by the end of 1918. On February 18, 1919 the Sudetenland assembly (Landesversammlung) convened for the last time, and the German-speakers of Sudetenland were not allowed to participate in the elections to the German-Austrian National Assembly. It was the end of the dreams on an independent Sudetenland united with German-Austria as an example of equal application of the Wilsonian rule of self-determination. The German-speakers of Austria-Hungary and the German Empire were largely deprived of this right (Bahlcke, 1996: 146; Grim, 1992: 78; Rothschild, 1977: 79).

Even a more complicated conflict pattern emerged in East Silesia contested by Czechoslovakia and Poland on the strength of economic and ethnic arguments by the latter, and of economic and historical arguments by the former. On October 10, 1918 the Poles established the RNKC and on October 28 the Czechs the ZNV with the objective to seize control of the whole of East Silesia. They clashed already on November 1 when the RNKC and the ZNV attempted to take over the railway station at Oderberg (Bohumin). The ZNV controlled only two counties in East Silesia and none in West Silesia which was included in Sudetenland. In this difficult situation the Czechs decided to deal first with the German-speakers who attempted to seize much more land from the postulated territory of Czechoslovakia. Hence, on November 5, the ZNV and the RNKC signed an agreement on the provisional partition of East Silesia which gave the Poles 1,762 sq km and the Czechs only 519 sq km. Both sides used faits accomplis to boost their rights to West Silesia. Using the engagement of the Polish troops in Western Ukraine (east Galicia) the Czechs militarily adjusted this provisional division in the Czech-Polish War (January 23-30, 1919). At the Peace Conference in Paris the Supreme Council announced the provisional demarcation line on February 3. The Interallied Commission arrived to East Silesia and after some months proposed a detailed dividing line which was not accepted by Czechoslovakia. Thus on September 27 the Supreme Council decided to carry out a plebiscite in East Silesia. On January 30, 1920, the International Commission arrived in Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) and took over the administration of West Silesia by February 3. This move reintroduced a modicum of stability as well as gave some protection to Czech and German-speakers in the Polish section and to Polish-speakers in the Czech section. The plebiscite campaign turned into regular communal violence (unlike in Upper Silesia where the situation was much more peaceful despite the three Silesian Uprisings), and the meager military forces of the Interallied Commission did not allow maintaining order. Also occupied with the Russo-Polish War, on April 24, Warsaw officially rejected the plebiscite stating that it would be impossible to carry it out. Gradually, this
opinion was espoused by the Allies and Prague, which caused the German-speakers to call for establishing a neutral Arbeiterrepublik Ostschlesien (Workers Republic of East Silesia) drawing on earlier separatist plans which had appeared when Sudetenland had come into being. Without taking into consideration the opinion of the German-speakers, the Conference of Ambassadors divided East Silesia on July 28, 1920, and the Interallied Commission left on August 6 having transferred sovereignty over the two parts to Czechoslovakia and Poland, respectively. Poland received 1,009 sq km (the political county of Bielitz (Bielsko), and part of the political county of Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) with almost all of the town), and Czechoslovakia 1,273 sq km which included the whole of the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin and the strategic railway link connecting Slovakia with Moravia and Bohemia. According to the 1910 census the Polish section’s population of 139,600 was constituted by Polish-speakers (61.1%), German-speakers (31.3%) and Czech-speakers (1.4%), whereas the Czechoslovak section’s population of 295,200 was made up of Polish-speakers (48.6%), Czech-speakers (39.9%) and German-speakers (11.3%). None of the sides of the nationalist conflict were pleased with this division. Prague failed to achieve the union of all the historic lands of the Czech Crown and Poland had to leave quite a number of Polish-speakers in the Czech section. Moreover, it must be remembered that many of the Polish and bilingual-speakers identified themselves as East Silesians and sided with the German-speakers. The East Silesians and many German-speakers who found themselves in Poland were often anti-Polish and pro-Czechoslovak, on the other hand, in the Czechoslovak section numerous Polish-speakers were pro-Polish and anti-Czechoslovak, East Silesians sympathized with Prague but remained allied with the German-speakers who, with time, turned anti-Czechoslovak hoping for deliverance coming from Germany not unlike the other Sudetic Germans (Gawrecki, 1992: 80-85; Wambaugh, 1933: 146-161; Wanatowicz, 1994: 14-21; Wurbs, 1982: 53-57).

The granting of the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) to Czechoslovakia and the division of East Silesia did shape Czech(Slovak) Silesia making it quite different from Austrian Silesia. The Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) as the political county and court district of Hlučín (Hultschin) was almost wholly included in West Silesia. The political county of Bielitz (Bielsko) together with its three court districts as well as the Teschen (Cieszyn) part of the former Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) political county were transferred to Poland. In result, Czech Silesia consisted from 9 political counties and 23 court districts. The Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) connected previously separate West and East Silesia turning Czech Silesia into a territorially viable land (Grim, 1992: 78). Czech Silesia measured 4,458.7 sq km, hence West Silesia (Opavsko) 3,181.8 sq km, and Czechoslovak part of East Silesia (Těšínsko) 1,276.9 sq km. Czech Silesia formed the smallest land of the 5 administrative lands into which Czechoslovakia was divided (Anon., 1939: 1338). According to the Czechoslovak census of 1921, Czech Silesia was inhabited by Czech-speakers (47.28%), German-speakers (40.53%) and Polish-speakers (11.23%). The percentage of German-speakers in Czech Silesia was the highest of all the three Czech lands, what is more, German-speakers dominated in West Silesia (Kořalka, 1995: 18). The German-speakers formed the second largest national group in Czechoslovakia in 1930, i.e. 22.3% preceded by the Czech-speakers (51.1%) and followed by the Slovak-speakers (15.8%) (Lemberg, 1995: 34). The Czechoslovak Republic failed to emulate the Swiss model as promised by Masaryk, and various nationalist conflicts tended to take place in opposition to the centralizing and Czechizing policies of the state. The most significant rift opened between the Czechs and the Germans. In order to improve and make more efficient administration of the state the Czechoslovak government decided to merge Czech Silesia with Moravia on the basis of the act of July 14, 1927. This act went into force on November 30, 1928 and on this day administrative and self-governmental distinctiveness of this land was phased out (Anon., 1939: 1338; Grim, 1992: 78). From the German point of view this move was to submerge German-speakers in statistics which should allow defter Czechization (Breugel, 1973: 78). And indeed in the joint Moravian-Silesian land their percentage was only 22.85% in 1930, i.e. lower than in Bohemia 32.38%. The percentage of Polish-speakers also conveniently plummeted to the negligible 2.27% (Roucek, 1945: 174). The administrative division of Czech Silesia into political counties and court districts was retained in Moravia-Silesia and the situation lasted until 1938 (Grim, 1992: 78).
Considering, the Polish section of West Silesia or, in other words, Cieszyn (Teschen) Silesia, on August 4, 1920, the RNKC decided to get dissolved. When on August 10 the Interallied Commission ceded sovereignty of the Polish section of West Silesia the Tymczasowa Komisja Rządowa Śląska Cieszyńskiego (TKRŚC, Provisional Governmental Commission of Cieszyn Silesia) together with the governmental commissar took over, on the basis of Art 40 of the Organic Statute of the Silesian Voivodship. This provisional situation was maintained until the division of Upper Silesia. On June 15, 1922 the provisions of the Organic Statute and the Polish Constitution entered in force on the territory of the Polish section of Upper Silesia. The Tymczasowa Śląska Rada Wojewódzka (TSRW, Provisional Council of the Silesian Voivodship) had come into being on June 12, and was constituted from 15 persons from Upper Silesia and by 5 from Cieszyn (Teschen) Silesia. The Naczelna Rada Narodowa na Górnym Śląsku (Supreme People’s Council in Upper Silesia) which had been established on July 30, 1921 and provisionally represented the Polish government and administration, was turned into the Administrative Office of the Silesian Voivodship in July 1922. The TSRW was active until October 10 when the first Silesian Sejm assembled and the Śląska Rada Wojewódzka (SRW, Council of the Silesian Voivodship) was constituted. The Silesian Voivode headed the SRW and the Administrative Office. Out of the 48 mandates of the first Silesian Sejm (1922-1930), the German parties won 14 (29.2%), and out of the 20 members of the TSRW 5 (25%) were Germans (Dąbrowski, 1922: 49/50, 181; Rechowicz, 1971: 83; Wanatowicz, 1994: 22, 47; Wyglenda, 1982c: 321).

In 1922 the Silesian Voivodship came into being as the result of the merger of the Polish sections of Cieszyn (Teschen) Silesia and of the Upper Silesian plebiscite area. Its territory measured 4,216 sq km up to 1938. It was the smallest Polish voivodship (1.1% of Poland’s territory) and the only autonomous one. It was also most densely populated (300 persons per sq km). In 1922 the voivodship was divided into 9 counties and 3 urban counties. In 1924 one county was liquidated so the total number of counties was 11 in 1938. Katowice (Kattowitz) was the voivodship’s capital. The voivodship’s population amounted to 1,129,024 in 1931 (4.4% of Poland’s populace). The number of Germans/German-speakers residing in this area plummeted from 336,800 (28.3%) in 1921 to 91,207 (7-10%) in 1931 due to their dramatic outflow caused by anti-German/Polonizing policies and widespread massaging of statistics. Moreover, it was difficult to clearly pinpoint national identity of the voivodship’s population as many of them were bilingual and felt to be Upper Silians rather than Poles or Germans. The declining number of Germans and the even more pronounced drop in their political influence was indicated by the number of German members of the Silesian Sejm. In the second Silesian Sejm (1930)16 (33.3%) Germans won mandates but already in the third one (1930-1935) their number plunged to 9 (18.75%) and no German representatives were to be found in the last and rump Silesian Sejm (1935-1939/1945) consisting from 24 deputies and dominated by Polish nationalists (Bahlcke, 1996: 149/150; Kessler, 1989: 167; Rechowicz, 1971: 313-326; Tomaszewski, 1985: 31-51, 121; Wanatowicz, 1994: 41). Some of the Silesian German deputies were also elected to the Polish Sejm and Senate (e.g. Thomas Szczeponiak, Eduard Pant, Bernard Jankowski) but also due to Polish nationalist policies, the overall number of German MPs and Senators plunged from 21 and 5, respectively in 1928, to 5 and 3 in 1930, and 0 and 2 in 1935 and 1938 (Rogall, 1993: 133/134).

Polish sovereignty and the Organic Statute were limited in the Polish section of the plebiscite territory by the Geneva Convention up to 1937. This territory was known as the so-called Upper Silesian area of the Silesian Voivodeship. These limitations did not apply to the part of East Silesia incorporated into this voivodeship. The provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Organic Statute protected the German minority and allowed Upper Silians to remain Upper Silians without having to become Germans or Poles (Chalasiński in Rechowicz, 1971: 56). In a longer run it clashed with the nation-state

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525 According to the Catholic Church statistics there were 149,153 German Catholics in the Silesian Voivodeship in 1933. The Church was not so much involved in the process of the nation-state building so the figure is much more trustworthy though it is may still be a little too low. Thus together with 20,000 German Protestants the number of the Silesian Voivodeship’s was about 170,000 in 1933 (Rechowicz, 1971: 69).

526 The Voivodeship was liquidated by Germany in the period 1939-1945 when it was included in German Silesia again, but the postwar Polish authorities abolished it only on May 6, 1945 (Anon. 1995: III 55/56).
building policies of Poland which expressed themselves in centralization and homogenization pegged on the complex of the Polish language and culture and Catholicism. Autonomy of the Silesian Voivodeship was gradually weakened by the inflow of outsiders with whom the top administrative positions were manned at the disadvantage of the ambitious locals. This trend became clearly visible after the so-called May coup of 1926 which commenced dismantling of Poland’s fledgling democracy, and led to nomination of the ambitious Galician Michal Grzastyński (1890-1965) as the Silesian voivode. He duly executed centralizing policies of the Polish government of colonels in the Silesian Voivodeship and minimized the influence of the pro-autonomy camp of Korfanty. The crowning achievement of his rule came in the form of the April Constitution of 1935 which, with Art 81 par. 3, illegally phased out the Organic Statute’s Art 44 which stated that autonomy of the Silesian Voivodeship could be broadened without any prior consent of the Silesian Sejm unlike limitation of the voivodeship’s special status (Rechowicz, 1971: 67). It was the beginning of the end of the Silesian autonomy, and the process sped up after the expiration of the Geneva Convention in 1937. However, it ought to be borne in mind that this Central European tendency to centralization was reflection of the on-going processes of nation-state building which got completely unbridled in the second half of the 1930s with the overcoming of various limitations previously imposed on them by the Treaty of Versailles and its follow-up agreements. This phenomenon is clearly visible in the case of Silesia. In 1928 the administrative distinctiveness of Czech(oslovak) Silesia was done away with, in 1935 the autonomy of the Silesian Voivodeship was permanently undermined, and in 1938 the Upper Silesian Province was phased out.

Having observed the political, territorial, border, demographic and administrative changes in the case of Prussian and Austrian Silesia after 1918, it is indispensable to scrutinize the rapid alterations in the Silesian terminology caused by the upheavals because the new or overhauled notions became the very tool of nationalist struggle in the period 1918/1922-1945 before the situation was once again dramatically transformed after the end of World War II.

The terms Prussian Silesia and Austrian Silesia stopped being used after 1918. The divided Austrian Silesia was simply referred to as Silesia in Czechoslovakia or Czech/Czechoslovak Silesia. However, Polish sources often employed the term Czech Silesia to denote the Czechoslovak part of East Silesia (Snoch, 1991: 140). Polish and Czech scholars had traditionally not used the terms West and East Silesia associated with the pro-German stance and the Austro-Hungarian times. The Poles referred to them as Opawa and Cieszyn Silesia whereas the Czechs preferred not to mention Silesia at all and spoke on the Opava region (Opavsko) and the Těšín region (Těšinsko). Moreover, the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) was included in the notion of the Opavsko whereas the Těšinsko got limited to the Czechoslovak part of East Silesia. The Polish section of East Silesia was known as Cieszyn Silesia in Poland. The Poles who continued to set up claims to the Polish-speaking areas of Těšínsko came up with the geographically incorrect name the Zaolzie (the lands behind the River Olza/Olše) which the locals had previously used for a different fragment of East Silesia which actually had been included in the Polish section of East Silesia. Less frequently the Polish propaganda used the derivative form Zaolziański Silesia instead of the Zaolzie (Komar, 1939: 7/8; Snoch, 1991: 162).

Similar propagandistic changes in terminology took place in the case of divided Upper Silesia. The Germans usually referred to the truncated Oppeln (Opole) Regency as West Upper Silesia (West-Oberschlesien) and to the Silesian Voivodeship as East Upper Silesia (Ost-Oberschlesien) (Mende, 1991: 20). There were attempts to use the old term Polish Silesia for the Silesian Voivodeship but it was equally unsuitable for Polish and German propaganda as did not allow the former to express its claims to the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and the latter to the Silesian Voivodeship. Thus Polish scholars came up with the term Opole (Oppeln) Silesia to denote. Sometimes it was changed just into the Opolszczyzna (Opole (Oppeln)) land (Snoch, 1991: 140/141). Moreover, as in Czechoslovakia in case of Czech(oslovak) Silesia, the Silesian Voivodeship was popularly referred to as simply Silesia in Poland. This phenomenon was reinforced by the fact that the distinction between Upper and lower Silesia had no practical significance in Poland which possessed only a fragment of Upper Silesia. However, foreigners, not involved in the political and nationalist conflict over Upper Silesia, tended to speak of German and Polish Upper Silesia in regard to the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and the Silesian Voivodeship.
The disruption of Silesia as a region caused by the conflicting nationalisms was reflected in the above-outlined terminological confusion spawned by various propagandists. The resultant bewilderment weakened the basis of ethnic identities pegged on the region and played into hands of nationalisms prodding growing numbers of Silesians and Upper Silesians into Germandom, Polishdom or Czechdom. Ethnic and regional movements strove to oppose this process of homogenization concomitant with nation-state building. The clearly-stated idea of the reunion of the Prussian, Polish and Czechoslovak parts of Silesia was urged by a certain Dr Patscheider, a German schoolmaster from Opava (Troppau). His stance must have been influenced by the fact that he was a Tyrolese by birth and could easily empathize with the predicament of unrealized Silesian unity having experienced the division of his own homeland in 1919. On the Pangerman note, he stated that such a united Silesia would be Germany’s gate to Moravia and her bridge to the valley of the Danube, i.e. a necessary territorial link for establishing a Großdeutsch nation-state. This idea was taken up by the Kameradschatsbund (KB, Friendship Union) (1926) in Czechoslovakia and similar Pangerman organizations. They were associated with the Arbeitskreis für gesamtschlesische Stammeskultur (AKfgSK, Work Circle for All Silesian Culture) in Breslau (Wroclaw), and the AKfgSK’s activities as well as help for the KB was transferred through the Verein für das Deutschum im Ausland (Society for Germandom Abroad) and the Bündische Front Nord-Ost (Federal North-East Front) among others (Wiskemann, 1938: 136-138). The idea of the grossschlesischer Raum (Greater Silesian Region) was popularized by the Berlin writer Hans Schwarz, and became part of the concept of deutsche Grossraum (Greater Germany) developed by the Munich professor Karl Haushofer. His thinking had a direct bearing on the Breslau (Wroclaw) jurisprudent Gustav Walz who propounded that protection of minorities should be fulfilled by granting them autonomy through the means of which they would be able to enjoy national unity (Gemeinschatsidee) with their parent nation-state despite residing outside it, in a host state. On the basis of his theories he concluded that the Sudetic lands should be incorporated in Germany. His research was supported by the Breslau (Wroclaw) Ost-Europa-Institut (Institute of Eastern Europe) (1918-1945), which started focusing on Silesia, and German-Polish and German-Czechoslovak relations beginning with 1934. In the field of racial anthropology Ilse Schweidetzky published a work (1935) in which she proved the dominance of the Nordic element in Silesia. These legal and racial argument were utilized by an AKfgSK member, Dr Ernst Birke, who, in 1938, had his Der gesamtschlesische Raum (The All Silesian Region) published with the assistance of the Bund Deutscher Osten (BDO, Union of the German East). His main theses were:

- the all Silesian region comprises all the areas inhabited by the Silesian population (schlesischer Stamm) regardless of any international borders;
- the Silesian people are the constituent part of the German nation;
- territorially, the Silesian fatherland (schlesisches Stammland) comprises German Silesia, Czech Silesia, the Silesian Voivodeship, the south-western corner of the Poznań (Posen) Voivodeship, and the Sudetic areas adjacent to the southern border of Silesia.

The pre-war culmination came with the All Silesian Week of Culture (February 12-19, 1939) which was celebrated in the Province of Silesia and the adjacent regions of the Sudetic lands which were incorporated in Germany at the end of 1938. Since this event the all Silesian rhetoric frequently cropped up in speeches of top NSDAP officers (Jonca, 1970: 107, 121-125, 179).

Consequently, the idea of reuniting Silesia was incorporated as part of Hitler’s general policy of reverting the Versailles Diktat. Without any decisive opposition on the part of the international community Hitler was allowed to breach provisions of the Treaty of Versailles one after another. In March 1935 the general conscription was reintroduced, and Germany remilitarized the Rheinland on March 7, 1936. The important new military development of 1938 was the turning of Czechoslovakia’s Austrian flank with the Anschluß of March 1938. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia’s disgruntled German...
minority lent almost unanimous support to Konrad Henlein’s Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP, Sudetic German Party) in 1935 so that he could escalate his demands from mere administrative decentralization within the republic (1934) through federalization by ethnic units (1936), to complete political autonomy and the application of National Socialist ideology for the Sudetic Germans (April 24, 1938) (Habel, 1992: 41; Kinder, 1978: II 197; Rothschild, 1977: 130/131). The European powers strove to avoid any military conflict with Hitler and sought to ensure peace, hence the abolishing of the SdP (September 19, 1938) and the mobilization of the Czechoslovak army (September 23) came too late. On September 29, Germany, Italy, France and Great Britain signed the Munich agreement obliging Czechoslovakia to give up the Sudetic lands to Germany. Next day the Czechoslovak government accepted the provisions of this agreement, and in October 1-10 the lands were taken by the German army (Hemmerle, 1992: 24). In October Slovakia and Ruthenia were granted extensive autonomy, and an extraterritorial road connecting Silesia and Austria was put on Germany’s disposal (Rothschild, 1977: 133), whereas the Sudetic lands were officially incorporated in Germany on November 21 (Hemmerle, 1992: 24). On March 14, 1939 Slovakia became independent and Hungary helped itself to Ruthenia (Brandes, 1995: 55), and next day the unopposed German troops took ramp Czechoslovakia sealing the end of the so-called Second Czech-Slovak Republic which was turned into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. On April 15 the Hultscher Ländchen (Hlučínsko) was returned to the Upper Silesian county of Ratibor (Racibórz) (Stüttgen, 1976: 195), the southern and south-western Sudetic lands were transferred to Bavaria, Oberdoanu and Niederdonau, whereas the rest was turned into the Province of Sudetenland with its capital at Reichenberg (Liberec). The province consisted from two parts separated by the westernmost tip of Silesia’s Glatz (Klodzko) Margravate. The western part, coinciding with the 1918 German-Bohemia, was divided into two regencies with their capitals at Eger (Cheb) and Aussig (U’stí nad Labem), while the eastern part, corresponding to the 1918 Sudetenland, constituted one regency with its capital at Troppau (Opava) (Bahlke, 1996: 147; Hemmerle, 1992: 24; Prinz, 1995: 381; Wagner, 1991: 257). According to the census of May 17, 1939 Czech-speakers constituted 2% of the population of the Eger (Cheb) Regency, 8.5% of the Aussig (U’stí nad Labem) Regency, and 20% of the Troppau (Opava) Regency (Schenk, 1993: 103).

The situation of Czech Silesia was further complicated by the stance of Polish government which, in the wake of the Munich Agreement, handed Prague with the ultimatum demanding cession of the Zaolzie (September 29, 1938). On October 1 the Czechoslovak government accepted the terms, and the Polish troops took the area of 861.8 sq km in October 2-9. This incorporation was hampered by the reluctant attitude of the Czech-speakers, and protested to the German government by the local Silesian and German activists who had hoped their land to be annexed by Germany. After some border adjustments (November 15) the incorporated territory’s area finally stabilized at 805,01 sq km. In sum, Poland possessed now 1,871 sq km of East Silesia whereas the rest of 436 sq km, inhabited overwhelmingly by Czech-speakers, remained in Czech-Slovakia, and, later, was included in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Furthermore, on the basis of the Polish-Czecho-Slovak agreement of November 27 signed at Zakopane, Poland annexed a thin slice of the Slovak territory (44 sq km) the Czadecki (Čadca) region to round up its gains in the Zaolzie (Gawrecki, 1992: 72; Gawrecki, 1992a: 100; Gotkiewicz, 1939: 23; Olszar, 1995: 125; Sobczyński, 1986: 13; Wanatowicz, 1994: 172/173). The Zaolzie and the Czadecki (Čadca) region were incorporated into the Silesian Voivodeship. Part of this annexed territory was included in the Cieszyn (Teschen) county and the rest was organized in the new county of Fryštat (Fryštat) (Grim, 1992: 78; Wanatowicz, 1994: 41). According to the 1930 census, the area of the Zaolzie was populated by 227,399 inhabitants out of whom 56% were Czech-speakers, 35% Polish-speakers, and 8% German-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 8). According to the not wholly reliable

529 Even before obtaining official agreement from the Czecho-Slovak President Emil Hácha, the German troops seized the economically significant Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) industrial basin on March 14, 1939 (Habel, 1992: 78).

530 Oberdonau and Niederdonau (Upper and Lower Danube Provinces) were established in 1938 out of the Austrian länder of Upper and Lower Austria (Hemmerle, 1992: 24).

531 It was organized in the county of Fry’dek (Friedek) (Grim, 1992: 78).
Polish official sources the number of the Czech-speakers in this region plummeted to mere 10,000, and the German-speakers to 8,000 in 1939, whereas the number of Polish-speakers sky-rocketed to 212,500, i.e. 93% of the total population of the Zaolzie (Komar, 1939: 14, 16-19). The same rather unreliable sources claimed that the Czadecki (Čadca) populace of 4,500 was, in 95%, composed by Polish-speakers (Gotkiewicz, 1939: 23). Obviously the statistics conveniently did not mention the ethnic Silesians of the Zaolzie and the ethnic Górals (Highlanders) of the Czadecki (Čadca) region.

The Polish gains were short-lived. On September 1, Germany attacked Poland and the East Silesian section of the Silesian Voivodeship was seized on the very day (Borák, 1992: 107) whereas the Polish troops left the voivodeship’s Upper Silesian part by September 4. The Silesian Voivodeship in its territorial shape of September 1, together with the cities of Beuthen (Bytom), Gleiwitz (Gliwice), Hindenburg (Zabrze) and Ratibor (Racibórz) as well as with the county of Tost-Gleiwitz (Toszek-Gliwice) and the parts of the counties of Ratibor (Racibórz) and Cosel (Koźle) was organized as the so-called Abschnitt Oberschlesien (Sector Upper Silesia) under military rule. With the decree of October 8 annexation of western Polish territories was announced but without clear delimitation of the borders. The remaining Polish areas seized by Germany, were to be turned into the General Gouvernment. The decree also established the fourth Silesian Regency of Kattowitz (Katowice) with the capital at the city. The decree went into force on October 26. Subsequently, the military administration was supplanted with its civilian counterpart. The annexed Polish territories were organized into the provinces of Danzig (Gdańsk)-West Prussia and Wartheland whereas the region of Ciechanów (Zechenau) was incorporated in the Province of East Prussia. Considering Upper Silesia, at the turn of September and October it was decided that besides the Silesian Voivodeship this region should be enlarged with the border counties of the Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships in order to include the whole of the continuous industrial basin and coal field within the German borders. All the territories were finally included in the Province of Silesia by November 19 with the exception of the county of Blachownia which was incorporated in the province only in December. The non-Silesian Polish areas merged with Silesia included the counties of Biała, Zywiec, Będzin, Zawiercie and Blachownia, as well as parts of the counties of Chrzanów, Wadowice, Olkus and Częstochowa (Dlugoborski, 1983: IX; Stüttgen, 1976: 287; Wagner, 1991: 257; Wanatowicz, 1994: 177/178). The new eastern border of Upper Silesia ran at the outskirts of Częstochowa the most significant Polish Catholic shrine, and just 30 km away from, Cracow the second largest center of Polish culture. In May 1939 4,868,764 people lived in the Province of Silesia whose territory together with the fragments of the Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen (Poznań-West Prussia Border March) Province and the reincorporated Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) amounted to 37,095 sq km. The annexed area included the enlarged Silesian Voivodeship (4,216 sq km + 805 sq km + 44 sq km = 5,021 sq km) and the non-Silesian counties (5,565 sq km). Hence according to the 1941 statistical calculations the area of the 1939 Province of Silesia was enlarged with the total of 10,586 sq km and its population with 2,674,663 new inhabitants (Weczerka, 1977d: LXXXIX).

The newly-acquired territories as well as the area of the old Oppeln (Opole) Regency which together amounted to 20,635 sq km were distributed among the overhauled Oppeln (Opole) Regency and the newly-established Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency. The former’s territory only slightly increased from 10,720.73 sq km in September 1939 to 11,711 sq km at the end of this year. However, its number of counties decreased from 20 to 18, and to 17 in 1941 this administrative division remained valid until 1945. From the non-Silesian counties the wartime Oppeln (Opole) Regency included the counties of Blachownia and Zawiercie, and, besides, the Silesian Voivodeship’s county of Lubliniec (Lubliniec). The Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency’s area amounted to 8,924 sq km, and its original number of counties 18 was lowered to 17 in 1941. The regency included the non-Silesian counties of Będzin (Będzin), Chrzanow (Chrzanów), Olkus (Olkus), Saybusch (Zywiec) and Sosnowitz (Sosnowiec), 9 counties organized on the territory of the former Silesian Voivodeship, as well as 4 counties of the interwar Oppeln (Opole) Regency. In 1939, the population of the Oppeln (Opole) and Kattowitz (Katowice)  

532 The Czedecki (Čadca) region was returned to Slovakia after the demise of Poland in 1939 (Sobczyński, 1986: 15).
Regencies was 1,529,000 and 2,967,329, respectively (Pudelko, 1993: 224; Stüttgen, 1976: 195/196, 284/285, 325).

Thus by the end of 1939 almost all the territory of historical Silesia was enclosed within the boundaries of one administrative unit with the exception of West Silesia attached to Sudetenland and the westernmost county of East Silesia which remained in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. However, due to the extensive annexations the Province of Silesia became the most populous and the largest of all German provinces with its territory of 47,597 sq km and its number of inhabitants of 7,462,061 (Wagner, 1991: 257). In order to make its administration more effective, on December 20, 1941 the act dividing it into the Lower and Upper Silesian Provinces was issued. The division went into force on April 1, 1941 (Stüttgen, 1976: 10). The Lower Silesian Province (26,980 sq km, pop. 3,287,500)\textsuperscript{533} with its capital at Breslau (Wroclaw) constituted from the Breslau (Wroclaw) and Liegnitz (Legnica) Regencies whereas the Upper Silesian Province (20,617 sq km, pop. 4,174,617) with its capital at Kattowitz from the Oppeln (Opole) and Breslau (Wroclaw) Regencies (Bahlcke, 1996: 158; Długoborski, 1983: X). On May 21, 1941 the too Polish-sounding names of Upper Silesian counties were altered. In the Oppeln (Opole) Regency: Blachownia into Blachstädt, Zawiercie into Warthenau, and Lublinitz (Lubliniec) into Loben. In the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency: Bendzin/Bandyn (Będzin) into Bendsburg, Chrzanow (Chrzanów) into Krenau and Olkusch (Olkuszy) into Ilkenau (Stüttgen, 1976: 196, 287). The policies of ethnic and administrative homogenization applied by the German administration in Upper Silesia, clearly indicated that they were acutely aware of the heterogenous character of this region. The customs and police border remained in Upper Silesia at the pre-1939 German-Polish border until mid-September, 1939, before on September 14 it was shifted to the pre-1918 German-Russian border, and on November 20, finally, to the border of the General Gouvernement (Długoborski, 1983: X). However, until 1945 the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency was separated by a police barrier from the rest of Germany. German citizens could cross it freely unlike Poles who had to obtain permits to do so (Szefer, 1984: 32). The authorities were cautious not to allow the non-German element to infiltrate Germany proper.

The next task was to homogenize the population with the means of the statistics. From December 1939 to February 1940 the police census was carried out in the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency. It measured language and nationality of the following categories: German, Polish, Silesian, Jewish, Czech, Other. According to nationality, the regency was inhabited by 1,089,600 (47.02%) Germans, 931,121 (40.18%) Poles, 157,057 (6.78%) Silesians, 88,746 (3.83%) Jews, 46,877 (2.02%) Czechs, and 3,939 (0.17%) Others (including 1,025 Ukrainians). According to language there lived in the regency: 897,812 (38.74%) German-speakers, 1,007,014 (43.45%) Polish-speakers, 288,445 (12.45%) Silesian-speakers, 83,624 (3.61%) Jewish-speakers, 30,312 (1.57%) Czech-speakers, and 4,128 (0.18%) Other-speakers (including 948 Ukrainian-speakers). The Germans/German-speakers dominated in the Upper Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship. The Poles/Polish-speakers accounted for 42% of the inhabitants of the East Silesian part of the former Silesian Voivodeship, and for 89% of the population of the non-Silesian territories. The Silesian-speakers constituted 10.5% of the population of the Upper Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship, and the Silesians/Silesian-speakers accounted for 30% of the inhabitants of the East Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship. The Czechs/Czech-speakers concentrated in the East Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship (9% and 7% of the area’s population) whereas the Jews/Jewish-speakers in the non-Silesian territories (10% of the area’s inhabitants). The census prepared the ground for planned social engineering (and also for extermination of the Jews) by having officially disentangled language from nationality which allowed as many as 191,788 non-German-speakers and bilingual-speakers to opt for the German nationality. Moreover, the category of the Silesians/Silesian-speakers\textsuperscript{534} (which aptly described the surviving Upper Silesian ethnic

\textsuperscript{533} In December 1939 the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency’s territory was 12,957 sq km and population 1,970,856, and the numbers for the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency were 14,023 sq km and 1,316,588, respectively (Bahlcke, 1996: 158).

\textsuperscript{534} Interestingly, in the Upper Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship only the category of the Silesian-speakers was allowed unlike in the East Silesian section of this former voivodeship where one could also claim
identity) allowed to carve up a group which would be most easily Germanized possessing no national attachment (Bahlcke, 1996: 159; Szefer, 1984: 34; Zahradník, 1992: 9).

The results of the above-presented census allowed to further homogenization=Germanization in the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency with more effective administrative measures. The instrument of this process was the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL, List of ethnic Germans) which was implemented mainly in 1941-1943. Its four groups included:

1. Active members of the German minority in Poland;
2. Passive members of the German minority in Poland;
3. People of German descent (majority of ethnic Upper Silesians were included in this group);
4. Upper Silesian renegades who previously chose Polishdom but were allowed to return to the fold of Germandom.

Furthermore, in the statistics one was considered to be a German if one was a Reichsdeutsche (German with the prewar German citizenship), Umsiedler (resettler), or belonged to the DVL group 1. Those who belonged to the DVL groups 2 and 3 were considered the Zwischengruppe (intermediate group), and those of the DVL group 4 as well as those outside the DVL system as Poles. The DVL and the category of the Zwischengruppe, besides aptly reflecting the continuous, analog character of ethnicity, also offered the administratively accepted transition way from non-national ethnicity and Polishdom/Czechdom to Germandom. In October 1943 in the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency without its western part which had belonged to the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency, there were 226,517 (9.79%) Germans (i.e. 100,482 Reichsdeutsche, 33,086 resettlers, and 92,949 persons belonging to the DVL group 1), 1,160,214 (50.17%) persons belonging to the intermediate group (209,037 to the DVL group 2, and 951,177 to the DVL group 3), 876,898 (37.82%) Poles (i.e. 50,827 belonging to the DVL group 4, and 826,071 outside the DVL system), 6,067 (0.26%) persons whose DVL applications had not been processed yet, and 43,038 people of other nationality (including 37-38,000 Czechs from the former county of Freistadt (Fryštat)\(^5\)). Understandably, those belonging to the DVL concentrated mainly in the former Silesian Voivodship whereas Poles in the annexed areas of the former Voivodeships of Kielce and Cracow. Those classified as Germans as well as the DVL members who were to become Germans and enjoyed German citizenship (with the exception of those belonging to the DVL group 4) constituted majority of the population 1,386,731 (59.96%), but the single largest demographic segment was composed from Upper and East Sileans roughly covered by the DVL groups 2-4 1,211,041 (52.36%) (Bahlcke, 1996: 160/161; Szefer, 1984: 56/57; Wanatowicz, 1994: 180).

Having described the territorial, political, administrative and demographic changes in Silesia in the period 1918-1945 the continuity of the developments is apparent. However, the atrocities of World War II, which manifested themselves in Silesia with the most notorious Auschwitz (Oświęcim) concentration camp and Germany’s largest POW camp at Lamsdorf (Lambinowice), were to break this continuity almost completely. Before moving to describing the post-1945 decomposition of the notion of Silesia, it is indispensable to scrutinize the fate of the Silesian ecclesiastical organizations in the period 1918-1945.

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\(^5\) In 1940 the county was incorporated in the county of Teschen (Cieszyn). With its area of 1,570 sq km it was the second largest county of Germany, and housed 284,951 inhabitants (Bahlcke, 1996: 161; Borák, 1992: 107; Zahradník, 1992: 9).

\(^5\) It was constructed in the town of Auschwitz (Oświęcim) which was located in the western Polish territories incorporated in Silesia in 1939. However, the Auschwitz (Oświęcim) principality belonged to Silesia up to the mid-16th century (Snoch, 1991: 73).

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Silesian nationality. This discrepancy must have been caused by the continuity of the ethnic Silesian movement in East Slesia, whereas it had disappeared in Upper Silesia shortly after the plebiscite. This difference shows up in the statistics - only 105,655 persons registered as Silesian-speakers in the Upper Silesian section as opposed to 157,044 Sileans/182,788 Silesian-speakers in the East Silesian section (Bahlcke, 1996: 159).
Originally the diocese of Breslau (Wroclaw) belonged to the Polish ecclesiastical province of Gniezno (Gnesen) but due to the interstate border separating the Gniezno (Gnesen) archbishop from the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop, the latter gradually became independent of the former. This state of affairs was officially acknowledged by the pope in 1732 when he placed the diocese under the direct jurisdiction of the Holy See. In 1811 (when Poland-Lithuania had not existed for 16 years yet) under the Prussian pressure, the Cracow bishop agreed to transfer the deaneries of Beuthen (Bytom) and Pless (Pszczyna) to the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese. This transfer as well as separation from Gniezno (Gnesen) and the direct subordination of the diocese to the Holy See were officially instituted by the bull De salute animarum of 1821. What is more, the bull extended the traditional western border of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese (which largely coincided with the pre-1815 border of Silesia) to include the Upper Lusatian territories incorporated to Prussia at the Congress of Vienna (1815), and also the county of Schwiebus (Swiebodzin). However, the bull did not make the diocese’s all borders coincide with state borders as was the general practice there were still some territories in Prussian Silesia which did not belong to the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese whereas, on the other hand, some of the diocese’s areas found themselves outside Prussia. In result the diocesan borders still crisscrossed international borders which was rather exceptional in Central Europe in the 19th century. The Prussian Silesian territories which did not belong to the Breslau diocese included:

the Commissariat of Katscher (Kietrz). As a Moravian exclave it was under the jurisdiction of the Olmütz (Olomouc) archbishop but after Friedrich II’s annexation of almost all Silesia, this exclave was incorporated in Prussian Silesia and separated by the international border from Olmütz (Olomouc). Thus in 1742 the Olmütz (Olomouc) archbishop organized this territory as an ecclesiastical commissariat which comprised the three deaneries of Katscher (Kietrz), Hulitschin (Hlučín) and Troplowitz (Opawica) (Menzel, 1977:220);

the Vicariate of Glatz (Klodzko). It was an exclave of the Prague archdiocese separated from it by the Königgrätz (Hradec Králové) diocese though this diocese as all other Bohemian ones were subordinated to the Prague see in the Bohemian ecclesiastical province. The Glatz (Klodzko) vicariate (congruent with the Glatz (Klodzko) Margravate) came into being in 1631 when the Prague archdiocese was divided into vicariates. After 1742 Friedrich II appointed the Glatz (Klodzko) vicar himself without asking Prague, and since then he was known as the royal dean. In 1810 his title was changed to that of the great dean, and in 1821 he received the hereditary membership of the Breslau (Wroclaw) chapter and the right to participate in the election of the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop. In 1920 the vicariate was elevated to the rank of the vicariate general (Weczerka, 1977e: 122).

The Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese’s territories which were located outside the boundaries of Prussian Silesia included:

the whole of East Silesia and one third of West Silesia which were organized into the vicariate general of Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) which was established in 1770 (Anon., 1995a: 6). Considering the remaining two thirds of West Silesia, it formed homogenous part of the Olmütz (Olomouc) archdiocese. Its eight deaneries were organized in the Troppau (Opava) archpresbytery (Anon., 1905: 371; Galos, 1996: 189; Olszar, 1995: 119).


537 In order to make the diocesan borders coincide with the political ones, the Ostrzeszów (Schildberg) land (which had been lost by Silesia to Wielkopolska at the close of the Middle Ages) was transferred from the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese to the Gnesen (Gniezno) diocese in 1821 (Anon., 1995a: 7; Orzechowski, 1971: 55).
538 With the exception of the Crossen (Krosno) county which though comprised by the Silesian ecclesiastical boundaries, administratively belonged to Brandenburg and stayed there until 1945 (Anon., 1995a: 7).
539 Administratively, the Lusatian territories were divided among the Provinces of Silesia and Brandenburg).
540 This traditional Silesian enclave was transferred to Brandenburg in 1815 (Orzechowski, 1972: 8).
The resultant territorial organization of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese remained unchanged from 1821 to 1920. The diocese comprised:

almost the whole of Prussian Silesia (with the exception of the Glatz (Kłodzko) vicariate and the Katscher (Kietrz) commissariat belonging to the Prague and the Olmütz (Olomouc) archdioceses, respectively);

Brandenburg’s Upper Lusatian territories and counties of Crossen (Krosno) and Schwiebus (Swiebodzin);

almost the whole of Austrian Silesia (organized in the framework of the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) vicariate divided into Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) commissariat in East Silesia and the Neisse (Nysa) one in West Silesia) with the exception of two thirds of West Silesia which belonged to the Olmütz (Olomouc) archdiocese.

In 1910 the area of the Prussian part of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese was 45,383.73 sq km, and of its Austrian Silesian part 3,091.4 sq km. Moreover, because many archdioceses and dioceses ceased to exist in northern Germany after the Reformation, the vast territories where the Catholic Church had relatively few adherents were divided among the surviving adjacent archdioceses and dioceses. Hence, in 1821 the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese was entrusted with the administration of the apostolic delegation of Brandenburg (Berlin). The delegation comprised Brandenburg and Pomerania, i.e. the territories of the defunct dioceses of Lebus, Brandenburg, Cammin (Kamień) and Kolberg (Kolobrzeg). The area of the delegation was 60,258.38 sq km. Thus the total area of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese amounted to 108,733.5 sq km, which made it the largest in Germany (as well as the politically most important for the Prussian and German capital of Berlin was located on its territory), and the second largest Catholic diocese in the world (Galos, 1996: 189). Obviously, Catholics (3,675,300 in 1913 (Kaps, 1990: 11)) were a minority on the whole territory of the diocese together with its delegation. But if one excludes the delegation from the considerations, Catholics must have accounted for half the inhabitants of the diocese because they formed 54.52% (2,366,754) of the whole Christian population of the Province of Silesia in 1895. Regarding the Silesian regencies in the year 1895, Catholics clearly dominated in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency 90.85% (1,534,329), formed a sizeable section of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency’s population 41.1% (656,075), and were in minority in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency 16.7% (176,350). What is more, Catholics accounted for 84.73% (576,408) of Austrian Silesia’s population in 1900 (Anon., 1905: 371; Anon., 1995a: 7; Magocsi, 1995: 111-113; Olszar, 1995: 119; Pater, 1996: 25; Stüttgen, 1976: 324/325).

Despite the Breslau (Wroclaw) Bishop Adolf Bertram’s 1918 pledge to retain the ecclesiastical status quo in spite of possible border changes caused by the emergence of Poland and Czechoslovakia, alteration in the ecclesiastical organization were indispensable especially under the pressure of the Polish episcopate. In 1920, on the basis of the Treaty of Versailles, the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) was transferred to Czechoslovakia and some northern Lower Silesian territories to Poland. The former, which belonged to the Katscher (Kietrz) commissariat was excluded from it and merged with the rest of the Olomouc (Olmütz) archdiocese in 1923, whereas the truncated commissariat was elevated to the level of the vicariate general next year. Due to the change in the seat of the vicar general its name was also changed from the Katscher (Kietrz) to Branitz (Branice) vicariate general (Menzel, 1977: 220; Menzel, 1977a: 37). The northern Lower Silesian territories lost to Poland were incorporated into the Gniezno-Poznań (Gnesen-Posen) archdiocese in 1920. The small remnants of the Posen (Poznań) Province bordering on the Lower Silesian Province were incorporated into the latter and also into the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese. From the three remaining and separate fragments of the Provinces of Posen (Poznań) and West Prussia the Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen (Poznań-West Prussia Border March) Province was formed in 1920, but the bordering on the Baltic northern-western corner of former West Prussia was merged with the Province of Pomerania. However, all these fragments, including this one merged with Pomerania, were used to establish the Free Prelatehood of Schneidemühl (Pila) (Freie Prälatur Schneidemühl). Even though the Grenzmark Posen-Westpreußen (Poznań-West Prussia Border March) Province was liquidated in 1938 (and some of its fragments incorporated into the Silesian Province), the
prelatehood remained intact until 1945 because the Vatican was not eager to execute any changes in the ecclesiastical borders due to the tense relations with the German government after 1933 (Jähnig, 1991: 129, 145; König, 1995: 98). Moreover, also due to the Holy See’s strained relations with Czechoslovakia which chose to base its nation-state ideology on the Hussitic tradition (Davies, 1996: 609/610) in conscious opposition to the Austro-Hungarian Catholic, ultramontane state ethos, it was impossible to adjust the borders of the ecclesiastical provinces of Bohemia and Moravia with the international borders. The vicariates general of Glatz (Klodzko) and Branitz (Branice) located on the German territory, remained within the boundaries of the archdioceses of Prague and Olomouc (Olomütz), respectively. On the other hand, the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese’s vicariate general of Těšín (Teschen) located on the Czechoslovak territory, was not incorporated into the Olomouc (Olomütz) archdiocese (Hemmerle, 1992: 236; Olszar, 1995: 119-124).

The minor changes in the territorial organization of the Catholic Church in Austrian/Czech Silesia only reflected the territorial gains of very pro-Catholic Poland whose nation-state ideology was inextricably combined with Catholicism. In 1920 East Silesia was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the same year Bertram established the commissariat for the Polish section whose area was 1,009 sq km, with its administrative headquarters at Cieszyn (Teschen). The diminished Těšín (Teschen) vicariate general (2,082.4 sq km) remained responsible for these fragments of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese which remained in Czech Silesia though its headquarters was moved to Karviná (Karwin) (Anon., 1993: 3). Another organizational change was brought about by the division of the Upper Silesian plebiscite area. This decision was taken by the Council of Ambassadors on October 20, 1921 and already next day Bertram instituted the delegation for the Polish section, with its headquarters at Tychy (Tichau). The Cieszyn (Teschen) commissariat and the delegation still remained parts of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese and were subordinated to the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop. However, the Polish government did not recognize the Upper Silesian delegation so that with the decree of November 7, 1922, Pius XI turned the delegation into the apostolic administration within its seat at Kattowitz (Katowice). He excluded it from the jurisdiction of the Breslau (Wroclaw) bishop and nominated an Upper Silesian priest of Polish convictions, Father August Hlond (1881-1848) to the position of the apostolic administrator. On December 17 Hlond accepted subordination of the apostolic administration to the Polish primate partially reversing the provisions of the 1821 bull which had separated the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese from the Gnesen (Gniezno) archdiocese. An even more significant change came on February 10, 1925 when the concordat was concluded between the Holy See and the Polish government. This treaty gave rise to the [Polish] Silesian diocese which became officially known as the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese. Formally, the new diocese was established with the bull *Vixdum Poloniae unitas* of October 28. It also included the Cieszyn (Teschen) commissariat which was dismantled and came under the jurisdiction of the first Kattowitz bishop Hlond, on November 17. The new diocese coincided with the Silesian Voivodeship with the exception of the border Galician village of Chelmek which had been transferred to the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese from the Cracow archdiocese (Olszar, 1995: 119-123). The Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese described as *una omnium, liceat bilingium* had the area of 4,216.02 sq km (1.08% of the Polish territory), and as such was the smallest of all the Polish dioceses and archdioceses not unlike the Silesian Voivodeship in comparison to the other voivodeships. It was included in the Cracow ecclesiastical province which, besides the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese, comprised the Cracow archdiocese, and the dioceses of Częstochowa, Kielce and Tarnów. The Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese constituted just 10.57% of the ecclesiastical province’s territory of 39,874 sq km. The dioceses faithful numbered 1,293,000 in 1938, which was 92.23% of the population living on the diocese’s territory. In 1931 there were 149,000 (12.5%) German-speaking Catholics for the sake of whom German masses were conducted in 36 parishes. The diocese’s extent and place in the Polish ecclesiastical structure remained unchanged until 1938 (Kopiec, 1991: 88-91; Kopiec, 1996: 116-120; Olszar, 1995: 120-128).

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541 One for all although bilingual (Olszar, 1995: 123).

542 In 1932 67,050 Protestants lived in the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese (Kaps, 1990: 150).
The loss of its most Catholic areas to the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese was very painful for the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese. On the basis of the Prussian concordat of 1929, it was compensated on August 13, 1930 with the bull *Pastoralis officii nostrii* which elevated the diocese to the rank of the archdiocese. Moreover, its territory was considerably enlarged with the south-eastern corner of Brandenburg centered around the cities of Landsberg (Gorzów Wielkopolski) and Küstrin (Kostrzyń). In 1929 with its 2,241,485 (40%) Catholics (or 1,949,926 (37.4%) Catholics in the Prussian part of the diocese and 291,559 (75.7%) in the Czechoslovak one), the Breslau (Wroclaw) archdiocese was the second largest in Germany, and the largest according to its territory. Breslau (Wroclaw) also became the capital of the newly-established East German ecclesiastical province, which contained the Berlin diocese (established on the basis of the diminished apostolic delegation of Berlin (Brandenburg) in 1929), the Free Prelatehood of Schneidemühl (Pila) and the diocese of Ermland (Warmia)\(^\text{543}\) with its capital at Frauenburg (Frombork). (König, 1995: 98; Kaps, 1990: 11/12; Scheuermann, 1994: 103).

After 1930 there were no significant changes executed in the archdioceses of Breslau (Wroclaw), Olomouc (Olmitz) and Prague, as well as in the diocese of Katowice (Kattowitz). But already the 1938 annexation of Sudetenland and the *Zaolzie* forced the ecclesiastical hierarchy to reflect these new developments in the territorial organization of the Church in these areas. In the same year the Branitz (Branice) vicariate general regained its pre-1920 territorial shape with the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) reincorporated into the county of Ratibor (Racibórz), and, subsequently, was vastly extended to embrace the whole territory of the Olomouc (Olmitz) archdiocese which had happened to be included in the Troppau (Opava) Regency of Sudetenland. It suddenly grew from two deaneries to three and then to 26 (Menzel, 1977: 220/221). In regard to Poland’s annexations, the nuncio residing in Warsaw, excluded the *Zaolzie* from the jurisdiction of Bertram and incorporated into the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese on November 5, 1938. On January 13, 1939, the nuncio residing in Prague, entrusted also the Čadca (Czadecki) region of the Nitra (Neutra, Nyitra) diocese to the Katowice (Kattowitz) bishop. Consequently, the Polish ecclesiastical structure was established in these territories and the Těšín (Teschen) vicar general had to leave his headquarters at Karviná (Karwin) for the West Silesian part of his vicariate. But after Germany’s seizure of western Poland, the *Zaolzie* was returned to the Teschen (Těšín) vicariate general on January 15, 1940, and also the Czadecki (Čadca) region to the Nitra (Neutra, Nyitra) bishop. In 1940 the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese housed 2,324,058 (39.5%) Catholics, the Glatz (Klodzko) vicariate general 165,059 (89.6%), and the Branitz (Branice) vicariate general (without its newly-added Sudetenland part) 81,776 (91.8%). The plans to reincorporate the Kattowitz (Katowice) diocese to the Breslau (Wroclaw) archdiocese were not actualized. Also neither the Breslau (Wroclaw) archdiocese nor the Kattowitz (Katowice) diocese attempted to incorporate the non-Silesian territories included in the Upper Silesian Province in 1939. So these territories remained parts of the dioceses of Tschenstochau (Częstochowa) and Kielce, and of the Cracow archdiocese. The German authorities could strongly influence the ecclesiastical relations in the incorporated territories of western Poland, because these areas were not covered by the German concordat, and Berlin obviously did not observe the provisions of the Polish concordat. The German administration divided the local structures of the Catholic Church in these territories along the ethnic lines but this policy was not effected in the Upper Silesian Province due to the opposition of the German clergy and the authorities apprehension that the disgruntled population would have hindered productivity of the enlarged Upper Silesian industrial basin which was so significant for the war effort (Anon., 1993: 3/4; Kaps, 1990: 150; Olszar, 1995: 124/125; Wanatowicz, 1994: 179).

Before moving to the radical change of the Silesian reality brought about by the defeat of Germany in 1945, it is still necessary to scrutinize the structure of the Protestant Churches in Silesia. In Prussia where Protestantism was closely linked to the state, in 1815, the territorial organization of the evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession (i.e. the Lutheran Church) was overhauled to correspond to the division of Prussia into provinces and regencies. Hence, provinces of the Lutheran Church coincided with administrative provinces. The seat of the Silesian consistory was located at Breslau (Wroclaw). The church provinces were divided into counties which frequently coincided with administrative counties in

\(^{543}\) It comprised the whole Province of East Prussia (König, 1995: 98).
the Regencies of Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wroclaw) where Protestants were in majority. On the other hand, the Oppeln (Opole) Regency was divided just into 5 church counties in 1864. In 1817, on the 300th anniversary of the beginning of the Reformation, Friedrich Wilhelm III instituted the so-called Old Prussian Union of the Lutheran Church and the Reformed (Calvinist) Church. The union was met with opposition in the regions where Lutherans or Calvinists dominated, however, it was welcomed in areas with similar numbers of adherents of both the denominations. In 1834 it was decided that the union meant common ecclesiastical organization, and it resulted in the emergence of the evangelical Union Church. The Lutheran opposition to the union and structural merger grew and was especially strong in Silesia where the Old Lutheran Church came into being with its Prussian headquarters at Breslau (Wroclaw). The organization and status of the Union and Old Lutheran Churches remained largely unchanged until 1918. The only significant alteration was brought about by industrialization of Upper Silesia which attracted many migrants from other regions of Prussia and Germany. These migrants were usually Protestants. Hence the percentage of Protestants in Upper Silesia grew from 4% in 1800 to 10% in 1871 and remained the same up to 1918 (Orzechowski, 1972: 12/13; Szczepankiewicz-Battek, 1996: 9/10).

According to regencies, in 1895, proportionally, most Protestants lived in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency 879,841 (83.3%), they dominated in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency 940,184 (58.9%), and were in minority in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency 154,604 (9.15%) (Stüttgen, 1976: 324/325). In Austrian Silesia almost all of its Protestant inhabitants concentrated in East Silesia where they numbered 91,264 (13.48% of Austrian Silesia’s populace) in 1900. All of them belonged to the evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession. The Reformed Church was represented only by 477 faithful in Jägerndorf (Krnov). Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) which had been the very source of the Protestant ecclesiastical structure and theology in Cisleithania, also was the seat of the Austrian Silesian seigniory of the Lutheran Church subjected to the Moravian-Silesian superintendency (Anon., 1905: 371; Kuhn, 1977: 532/533).

After 1918 the structure of the Union evangelical Church and the Old Lutheran Church remained largely unchanged in Prussian Silesia as of the Lutheran Church in Czech Silesia with the exception of these Prussian Silesian and Austrian Silesian territories which were attached to Poland. The Lutheran Church of Congress Poland which developed on the basis of the German-speaking population at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, got considerably Polonized in the second half of the 19th century not least thanks to the efforts of Rev Leopold Otto (1819-1882) who, having recognized this change, appealed for introduction of Polish to the Church’s pastoral services. In 1914 the Church numbered 400,000 faithful in Congress Poland. At the end of the Great War the Church started actively canvassing for extending the borders of Poland hoping to establish the great Church of all Polish-speaking Lutherans. The superintendent general Rev Juliusz Bursche (1862-1942) presented the Allies with the memorial of February 14, 1919 appealing for handing East Silesia, Prussian Silesia and the south of East Prussia over to Poland. He supported his demands claiming that 80,000 Polish-speaking Protestants lived in East Silesia and 10,000 in the east of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency. Already in 1918 the Polish-speaking Lutherans of East Silesia got engaged in the work to establish the Lutheran Church of Poland. After the division of East Silesia, about 40,000 of them were included in this Church. Furthermore, the division of Upper Silesia brought about 55-60,000 members of the evangelical Union Church to the Silesian Voivodeship. In its Upper Silesian section they constituted 6% of the population. The faithful residing in the industrial basin usually were German migrants or their descendants whereas in the Pszczyna (Pless) county Polish-speaking Upper Silesians. The evangelical Union Church of Polish Upper Silesia was established at Katowice (Kattowitz) on June 8, 1923. Administratively it was independent from its parent Silesian consistory at Breslau (Wroclaw), however, the latter assisted the former with finances and clergy. Thanks to the Geneva Convention, the Church enjoyed wide autonomy and used German as its official language. The nationalist conflict mounted with the outflow of the Church’s faithful to Germany and the inflow of the Polish Lutherans from the East Silesian section of the Silesian Voivodeship. The latter vis a vis the evangelical Union Church, emphasized their Polish and purely Lutheran character. In 1924, they established the Towarzystwo Polaków Ewangelików (TPE, Society of evangelical Poles), and having resigned from the idea of creating separate Polish Lutheran parishes in Upper Silesia which would have been subordinated to the Warsaw Lutheran consistory, they decided to win power within the structures of the evangelical Union Church of Polish Upper Silesia. In 1930, on the initiative of the TPE,
Voivodeship Office started nominating Polish teachers of Protestant religious instructions delegated by the Polish Lutheran Church without having reached any agreement on this matter with the Evangelical Union Church. The tension became unbearable after the expiration of the Geneva Convention when the Silesian Voivode Michal Grazynski coerced the Silesian Sejm to pass an act, on July 16, 1937, which subjected the Church to the close control of the voivode and banned its authorities supplanting them with the Provisional Church Council dominated by PTE members. The PTE started nominating Polish pastors to the parishes and on July 19, 1939, the Silesian Sejm granted the voivode with even more powers to encroach on the life of the Evangelical Union Church. Consequently, the overall position of the Polish Lutheran Church increased as the number of its members which topped half a million whereas the number of the faithful of the Evangelical Union Church of Polish Upper Silesia plummeted to 30,000 in 1939544. The forcefully Polonizing course was averted by the outbreak of World War II. On October 14, 1939, the Upper Silesian parishes of the Evangelical Union Church of Polish Upper Silesia were reincorporated in the Province of Lower and Upper Silesia of the Evangelical Church of the Old Prussian Union. This dramatic change spelt persecutions for the Polish Protestant activists (Karski, 1994: 115-119; Szczepankiewicz-Battek, 196: 10/11).

The Jews constituted a tiny minority of the Silesian Population. In 1910 there were 23,564 of them in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency, 18,268 in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and just 3,860 in the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency. So they constituted the following percentages of the population of the regencies, namely: 1.28%, 0.83% and 0.33%. Their total number of 45,692 added up to mere 0.87% of the Silesian populace in 1910 (Kokot, 1973: 77; Stüttgen, 1976: 324/325). In Austrian Silesia they numbered 11,988 (1.76%) in 1900 (Anon., 1905: 371). Their status was regulated by the gradually more tolerant legislation of the 18th and 19th century which had been issued in the Danubian Monarchy and in Prussia/Germany. In the second half of the 19th century they were emancipated in both the countries (1866, 1871), and, consequently, predominantly got merged with the mainstreams of both the societies adopting the dominant languages of the two states, i.e. German and Hungarian. In this process they became relaxed in the matters of religion not unlike the Christian fellow citizens who had limited their religious life to the confines of Sunday church attendance. The so-called liberal Jews separated synagogue from their everyday life, and emulated Christian society in tongue and garb becoming undistinguishable from it (Kinder, 1978: II 62/63). This change did not omit Prussian and Austrian Silesia, however, the Hasidic, orthodox, Yiddish element seeping from Congress Poland to the industrial basin of Upper Silesia, and even more so (unrestricted by any international border) from Galicia to East Silesia were somewhat noticeable. But Jewry of Prussian and Austrian Silesia, for all the practical reasons, was overwhelmingly assimilated with Germandom prior to 1918.

With the advance of emancipation, already since the last quarter of the 19th century Jews had started moving from backward Prussian and Austrian Silesian towns to more prosperous cities westward, and especially to the capitals Berlin and Vienna in search of better opportunities afforded by assimilation. The outflow of these liberal Jews was not filled up by the small inflow of orthodox Jews discouraged by borders and the markedly different cultural and linguistic environs. So the westward migrations of the Jews fell in the pattern of the Ostflucht. The process was reinforced by the dangerous closeness of the Eastern Front at the beginning of the Great War and by the emergence of new nation-states at the end of this war which led to the division of East and Upper Silesia. Majority of the Jews as assimilated Germans in Prussian Silesia or German-speaking Austrians in Austrian Silesia loyally stood on the position of retaining territorial integrity of Germany and Austria-Hungary. When it proved impossible they did share the fate of their German(-speaking) fellow citizens and, consequently, voted for Germany in the Upper Silesian plebiscite (Weiser, 1992: 45-47). After the division of East and Upper Silesia, many of the liberal assimilated and German-speaking Jews found themselves in the environs which rapidly grew foreign to them. This situation coupled with recurrent conflicts with the orthodox Jews especially those coming to Upper Silesia, attracted by better business opportunities. Thus by 1926 the membership of the Upper Silesian Jewish communities in the Silesian Voivodeship had fallen by half (but was increased by the inflow of Polish, orthodox Jews). Majority of the German-speaking migrants moved to western and

544 The Old Lutherans numbered just 3,000 in the whole of western Poland (Karski, 1994: 119).
central Germany and only few to the truncated Oppeln (Opole) Regency (Weiser, 1992: 48). In 1931 there were 19,000 Jews in the Silesian Voivodeship (including the Upper and East Silesian sections). The Jewry concentrated in the Upper Silesian cities: Katowice (Kattowitz) (5,716), Königshütte (Królewská Huta) (2,811) and Myslowice (Myslowitz) (463) as well as in the East Silesian city of BIELITZ (4,420). In the Oppeln (Opole) Regency there were 10,068 Jews in 1925, and 29,953 in Lower Silesia, i.e. 40,021 in the whole of German Silesia (Jonca, 1995: 56; Kokot, 1973: 77). In Czech Silesia the number of Jews was 3,681 (0.59%) in 1921. The sudden drop in comparison to the prewar number was caused by the fact that majority of the Austrian Silesian Jews concentrated in East Silesia, so after 1921 many of them found themselves in Poland whereas many left for Vienna or bigger cities in Bohemia and Moravia (Roucek, 1945: 174). In German and Czech Silesia prewar German and Austrian legislation was retained as the basis for the autonomous character of Jewish communities whereas in the Silesian Voivodeship both the legislation coexisted in its Upper and East Silesian sections, respectively. However, the autonomy given to the Jewish communities by both the legislation was narrower than what was offered by the Polish legislation outside the Silesian Voivodeship (Wanatowicz, 1994: 46).

The worsening of the situation of the Jews in Germany and Poland coincided with the Great Depression of the beginning of the 1930s which facilitated strengthening of the nationalist groups which effected the introduction of dictatorships in 1933 in Germany and in 1935 in Poland. Rampant nationalisms besides putting Poland and Germany at odds with the neighbor nation-states, also contributed to the rise of the anti-Semitic sentiment and general xenophobia. In January 1933, before Hitler’s became Chancellor on January 30, 34,423 Jews had lived in Silesia: 25,195 in Lower Silesia and 9,228 in Upper Silesia. The anti-Semitic measures culminated in the so-called Nuremberg Laws (1935) which created the second-class citizenship for German Jews (Fullbrook, 1991: 87). However, their situation was markedly different in the Upper Silesian plebiscite area included in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency. Since it was covered by the Geneva Convention which guaranteed all minorities equal civil and political rights. Franz Bernheim, a warehouse employee was dismissed from work as a result of the ensuing discrimination. On the initiative of Jewish organizations he submitted a petition against anti-Jewish legislation to the League of Nations on May 17, 1933. After two devastating public sessions, on September 30 the German government submitted a letter in which it claimed to have fulfilled its obligations, and that the rights of the Jews of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency had been restored. Until the expiration of the Geneva Convention on July 15, 1937, the Jews continued to enjoy equality of rights (Anon., 1972: 681/682). The discrimination and segregation of the German and Upper Silesian Jews reached new heights prior to the outbreak of World War II and culminated in the Reichskristallnacht (Night of Broken Windows) of November 9, 1938 (Fullbrook, 1991: 88/89). Understandably Jews started leaving Germany en masse, and by May 17, 1939 their number had sunk to 17,257 in Silesia (i.e. 12,880 in Lower Silesia and 4,377 in Upper Silesia) (Jonca, 1995: 56). The discrimination and segregation of the German and Upper Silesian Jews reached new heights prior to the outbreak of World War II and culminated in the Reichskristallnacht (Night of Broken Windows) of November 9, 1938 (Fullbrook, 1991: 88/89). Understandably Jews started leaving Germany en masse, and by May 17, 1939 their number had sunk to 17,257 in Silesia (i.e. 12,880 in Lower Silesia and 4,377 in Upper Silesia) (Jonca, 1995: 56). The anti-Jewish legislation was extended to Austrian Silesia in 1938 when West Silesia was included in the Troppau (Opuva) Regency and in 1939 to the Czechoslovak part of East Silesia when the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was established. The same fate met the Jewry from the Polish sections of Upper and East Silesia when the Silesian Voivodeship was seized at the beginning of September 1939. The Silesian Jews deprived of their civic rights, as well as of their property, and excluded from all the spheres of social life, were effectively cast away from the framework of the German state, and Silesia as a region. On May 16, 1940 there were still 9,323 Jews in Silesia, 4,486 of them in the former Silesian Voivodeship. The Endlösung (Final Solution) of the Silesian Jewry commenced on September 1, 1941, and was finished in 1944. Only very few singular Silesian Jews survived this process545 to tell the horror story after the war (Jonca, 1991: 231-235; Weiser, 1992: 60-63).

The tragic fate of the Silesian Jewry affords a parable of end appropriate for describing what happened to Silesia as a region after World War II. Continued existence of Silesia as a region and a homeland for its inhabitants was seriously endangered in 1740 and after 1918, but the subsequent changes introduced by the division of this land into Prussian and Austrian Silesia after Friedrich II’s

545 For instance, one Gleiwitz (Gliwice) Jew survived the Auschwitz (Oswiecim) concentration camp, and two Oppeln Jewesses the Auschwitz (Oswiecim) and Theresienstadt (Terezín) (Jonca, 1995: 64).
conquest, and the division of East Silesia and Upper Silesia in the wake of the Great War did not shatter this continuity. It was maintained by terminology, administration, ecclesiastical organization, and most importantly by the Silesians themselves who straggled arising borders maintaining their family links and pursuing economic ends. However, the first glimpses of what could happen to Silesia (as well as to the rest of Central and Eastern Europe) in the 20th century were provided by the events of the 1930s. With 1933 state-supported discrimination of the Jews commenced in Germany and in German Silesia as well, with the exception of the Upper Silesian plebiscite area in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, where the discriminatory acts were introduced only after the expiration of the Geneva Convention in 1937. Moreover, the Polish-speaking population of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency were made to emphasize their attachment to Germandom, and those who consciously opted for Polishdom were ostracized (Jonca, 1970). After the coup of 1926 the autonomy of the Silesian Voivodeship was gradually limited until it became negligible after 1935 with the docile rump Silesian Sejm. The indigenous Upper Silesians inhabiting the Silesian Voivodeship could not hope for any brilliant career in the state or voivodeship administration being German or having little formal Polish education. The highest and decision-making positions were taken by non-Silesian Poles breeding discontent among the local population which became especially alienated from the Polish authorities and state after 1935 (Gerlich, 1994; Wanatowicz, 1994: 47-49). Moreover, members of the voivodeship’s German minority were treated quite harshly after the expiration of the Geneva Convention, so it is estimated that 80% of their working-age male populace were unemployed in 1937 (Bahlcke, 1996: 150). The administrative distinctiveness of Czechoslovak Silesia was phased out already in 1928, and various discriminatory measures were introduced to Czechize or limit the political influence of the Poles in Czechoslovak East Silesia and of the Germans in West Silesia. On top of that, the division of Upper Silesia and East Silesia, and nationalist discriminatory policies triggered off waves of migrants. In the interwar period almost 200,000 Germans left the Silesian Voivodeship (Bahlcke, 1996: 149), more than 100,000 Poles the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, around 20,000 Poles Czechoslovak East Silesia (Wanatowicz, 1994: 161), and a certain number (perhaps few hundreds) of pro-Czechoslovak East Silesians (including Kozdon) Polish East Silesia. The Polish annexation of Czechoslovak East Silesia in 1938 caused 30,000 Czechs and several hundreds/5,000 Germans to leave this area (Borak, 1992: 102; Zahradnik, 1992: 8). Germany’s annexation of West Silesia in 1938, and of the enlarged Polish East Silesia in 1939 sent another wave of migrants (Habel, 1996: 292/293) from these regions, as well as the seizure of the Silesian Voivodeship in September 1939. In the interwar period the economic and living space abandoned by non-nationally congruent migrants was filled in with nationally congruent migrants from the other side of the border and by the administration and education corps from the national heartlands of the nation-states which happened to obtain pieces of Silesia. During the wartime 364 Polish families were expelled from the Teschen (Těšín, Cieszyn) county (i.e. East Silesia) and, and 2,808 Poles and 298 Czechs from this region were sent to the German interior as forced laborers (Zahradnik, 1992: 10/11). Germandom in the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency enlarged with non-Silesian Polish territories, was had to be strengthened. By December 1942 22,148 Poles had been expelled to the General Gouvernement, 45,075 moved within the boundaries of the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency, 5,100 sent to the German interior as forced laborers, and 9,016 placed in the 21 Polenlagers (Polish camps). Their place was taken by 36,270 ethnic German settlers who, on the basis of the German-Soviet agreement, had left the areas occupied by the Soviet Union (or belonging to Germany’s allies). It was planned to expel 220,000 Poles from the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency to make room for 150,000 German settlers but shortage of workforce in the Upper Silesian and Ostrau-

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546 This phenomenon was fortified by the economic revival which was clearly visible across the border in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency after 1933, and was not matched by the more sluggish recovery from the Great Depression in Poland.

547 An estimation of Ms Danuta Berlińska, the Opole Voivode’s Plenipontentary on Minorities in the years 1993-1995.

548 This measure was not applied to Czech families (Zahradnik, 1992: 11).

549 30,445 Ethnic Germans came to Upper Silesia from Bukovina, 5,091 from the Polish eastern territories seized by the Soviet Union, and 734 from Estonia, Latvia, Bessarabia, Dobrudja, Romania and Bosnia (Anon., 1995: 6).
Karwin (Ostrava, Karviná) industrial basins, as well as the defeat of Germany in 1945 did not allow to actualize it

(Anon., 1995: 6; Dlugoborski, 1983: XLVI-XLVIII; Szefer, 1984: 139). However, when considering migrations and forced movements of population, one should be cautioned that the statistics of that time were weapons of nationalist struggle, and that the clear-cut nationality labels did conceal the whole spectrum of prenational Silesian ethnic identities which were to be homogenized so as to be congruent with one nationhood or another.

The first omens pointing to the fact that Central Europe might be drastically overhauled politically and ethnically came to the light prior to the outbreak of World War II with the Anschluß of Austria and the Munich conference. Already in 1937 nationalistically-minded Czech intellectuals propounded that the Sudetic German question could be solved by expulsion of certain segments of the Sudetic Germans (Wiskemann, 1956: 62). In 1939, in answer to the German propaganda depicting all of Central Europe as historically Germanic area, Polish newspapers and posters began to show central and eastern Germany as historically Slavic regions, at least half of which together with Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, should belong to Poland as the border of the 11th century Polanian state had embraced them (Hansel, 1989: 447; Hellriegel-Netzbandt, 1996: 174/175; Rösner-Kraus, 1989: 211). The Polish declaration of August 29, 1939 for the official Italian fascist press agency Stefani, proposed a peaceful and gradual exchange of ethnically German population from Poland for ethnically Polish population from Germany emulating the Turko-Greek agreement of 1923\(^\text{550}\). The outbreak of the war did not allow even to consider this idea, but with all these above-described solutions the way was set for overhauling Central Europe through vast border changes and population transfers.

The World War I plans to carve up or divide Germany were taken up again. The Franco-English solution of May 1940 predicted cession of eastern Germany (together with Upper Silesia and the east of Lower Silesia) to Poland, western Germany to France, and dividing the enlarged wartime Germany to the northern state of Prussia, the central one of Bavaria, and the southern one of the Habsburg Monarchy. The US-journalist Theodore N. Kaufman’s 1941 book *Germany Must Perish* wanted the wartime Germany’s territory to be divided among Switzerland, France, Holland, Denmark, Poland and Czechia. According to him Poland would obtain eastern Germany together with Berlin, and Czechia Saxony and almost whole of Austria. Silesia would be divided along the Oder (Odra) River line between Poland\(^\text{551}\) and Czechia (Hellriegel-Netzbandt, 1996: 176). Considering Czechoslovakia, two concepts were developed. Firstly, that in the light of international law the state’s diplomatic representations were legitimate continuation of independent Czechoslovakia after the loss of Sudetenland. Secondly, that Germany’s 1939 occupation of Czecho-Slovakia made the Munich Agreement null and void so that in the light of international law independent Czechoslovakia continued to exist in its pre-Munich boundaries (Hrbek, 1993: 211). The latter view was espoused by Beneš, and due to his active canvassing, on August 5, 1942 the British Parliament at last annulled the Munich Agreement (Wiskemann, 1956: 66). What is more, the Czechoslovak emigre government in London had already got involved with its Polish counterpart in negotiations on the creation of the postwar Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation/Federation which would successfully safeguard West Slavdom against any future German incursions (Fertacz, 1991: 25, 51). Silesia as a protruding German wedge would shatter territorial unity of such a federation so it was proposed in 1942 that at least the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency should be ceded to a would-be Polish-Czechoslovak federation (Seyda, 1942: 21). Considering Sudetenland and other German territories which would be ceded after the war, Beneš and other Czechoslovak emigre politicians had openly championed

\(^{550}\) It is a popular misconception that on the basis of this agreement ethnic Greeks and Turks were exchanged. Actually, Orthodox inhabitants of Turkey who usually spoke Turkish (but wrote it down in Greek characters) were exchanged for Muslim inhabitants of Greece who usually spoke Greek (but wrote it down in Arabic characters). In the years 1923-1925 0.5 mln such Turks were moved from Greece to Turkey, and 1.6 mln Greeks from Turkey to Greece (Satava, 1994: 270).

\(^{551}\) Interestingly, Poland’s eastern territories occupied by the Soviet Union were depicted as permanently lost to the latter (Hellriegel-Netzbandt, 1996: 176).
population transfers/exchanges since 1941 (Staněk, 1991: 32). Already in January 1942 this uncompromising stance Beneš communicated to Wenzel Jaksch, the leader of Sudetic German social democrats who hoped to solve the nationalist conflicts by creating a Central European federation after the war (Beneš, 1996: 23-25). Also in August 1942 the British government accepted the principle of transfer of the Sudetic Germans from Czechoslovakia (Wiskemann, 1956: 67). The Polish emigre circle supported this measure in September 1942, and appealed for its application to the postwar Poland (Seyda, 1942: 21).

In the context of the plans for establishing a Polish-Czechoslovak federation, the Pan-Slavic thought was revived. The rather insignificant Polish-Czechoslovak emigre organization the West Slavic Movement, based in Edinburgh, appealed for the creation of a West Slavic Empire (i.e. a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation) as well as its South Slavic counterpart. Together with non-German and simultaneously non-Slavic nations the two empires would be able to contain Germany and Russia and secure independence for the Central European peoples. This clandestinely anti-Soviet program was partially taken over by communist emigres of various Slavic nationalities at Moscow. The Communist International with the support of the leading Soviet intellectuals organized the rally of the Slavic nations which took place on August 10 and 11, 1941, which brought about establishment of the All-Slavic Committee on the first day of the rally. The committee’s members opposed any possible Polish-Czechoslovak confederation on the ground that it would be bourgeois, and hoped for building a Slavic confederation which would extend from Prague to Vladivostok. Hence, they repeated the Russoslovak idea of constructing a Slavic confederation dominated by Moscow. Consequently, the committee’s activities were subjected to the needs of the Soviet imperial politics, and when it was dissolved in 1947 (i.e. after the Soviet Union had achieved dominance over almost all Slavs), its national branches were turned into various Polish-, Czech-, etc.-Soviet friendship organizations (Fertacz, 1991: 22/23, 25, 38-40, 96-111; Terry, 1983: 67-79). Before relating the anti-German character of the committee to the similar attitudes of Central European emigre politicians in London, it is interesting to note that the communist poet Ondra Lysohoský (pseudonym of Ervín Goj) who wrote in his native dialect of the East Silesian town of Frýdek (Friedek), and since the 1930s propagated the idea of the Lachian worker-peasant nation pegged on this dialect (or the Lachian language, i.e. the dialect after its standardization), left for Moscow in 1939, and obtained Stalin’s support to work towards creation of the Lachian state which would contain the whole of East Silesia. Later he developed this concept hoping that a multinational state could be established from northern Moravia, Czechoslovak, Polish and German Silesia, and Lusatia. However, with the espousal of the interests of nation-states and the Soviet empire at the cost of ethnic groups and Slavic nations, his thought was ignored by decision-makers after 1941. In the All-Slavic Committee he was not allowed to become a representative of the postulated Lachian nation but only of East and West Silesia together with the northern Moravian wedge of Ostrau (Ostrava) (Fertacz, 1991: 38, 41; Lubos, 1974: 622-624).

Although politically at odds, Czechoslovak and Polish emigre representatives at London and Moscow did agree that Germany’s territory must be curtailed and its German inhabitants together with ethnic Germans from elsewhere in Europe transferred to such a diminished postwar Germany. The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union gradually embraced this stance in 1942 and 1943, but the question how the changes were to be executed remained not decided (De Zayas, 1988: 45/46). In the Spring of 1943, the British Foreign Ministry proposed to split Germany into 3-5 states and to hand over the German land east of the Oder (Odra) (i.e. also whole of northern Silesia) to Poland with the exception of East Prussia whose fate was to be decided at a later date. At the Teheran conference (November 28-December 1, 1943), Roosevelt put forward his own plan of dismembering Germany into five states and the three internationalized areas of Kiel, the Ruhr and the Saar. In this case only East Prussia would be lost to Germany and the whole of German Silesia included in the successor state of Prussia. It was quite a change from his position which he had presented at the Cairo conference (November 22-26, 1943) foreseeing dividing Germany into the northern and southern state, and handing over western Germany to France, whereas eastern Germany together with Silesia, Saxony and half of Berlin to Poland and the Soviet Union (Hellriegel-Netsbandt, 1996: 177/178; Wagner, 1991: 270). At last the preliminary shape of the postwar borders emerged. At the Teheran conference, Churchill and Stalin agreed that Poland should
receive all the German territories up to the line of the Oder (Odra) together with Oppeln (Opole) whereas the Soviet annexation of the Polish eastern territories was to be legitimized under the name of the Curzon line. The matter of the expulsion of the Germans from the new Poland got no further than disentanglement of population at some points (Wiskemann, 1956: 75/76). Roosevelt disagreed with too extensive annexations at the cost of Germany, and at the end of 1943, suggested Poland could receive East Prussia but in exchange for the western slices of the Baltic corridor and Wielkopolska which had belonged to Poland in the interwar period. His stance was influenced by Sumner Welles who presented this plan (which also predicted dividing Germany into three states, and appropriate population transfers) in his 1944 book *The Time for Decision* (Terry, 1983: 306-309). In December 1943 the British Foreign Office established the Interdepartmental Committee on the Transfer of German Population. *The Times* of February 16, 1944 opposed the principle of population transfer, but during his speech in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944 Churchill stated that the provisions of the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941 would not be applied to Germany. This decision opened the way for the postwar population transfers and annexation of German territories. However, the debate between supporters and opponents of transfers of German population continued well into the autumn 1944 (Staněk, 1991: 37-42). In the meantime, on April 10, 1944 Newsweek published a map indicating that northern Germany would be occupied by the United Kingdom, Berlin by the British and Americans, southern Germany, and Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia by the United States, Poland, Slovakia and all the German territories by the Oder (Odra) River (i.e including northern Silesia) by the Soviets, whereas Austria by the three powers. At the Quebec conference (September 5/6, 1944), the US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (1891-1967) put forward his controversial recommendations for the disposition of Germany after the war by reducing it to an agricultural economy and dividing to the North and South German states, while the northern part of East Prussia would go to the Soviet Union, the southern one plus the Oppeln (Opole) Regency to Poland, and western Germany would pass under international control. This plan was tentatively accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill (Hellriegel-Netzbandt, 1996: 178/179).

At the end of 1944 and at the beginning of 1945 the Czechoslovak emigre government in London pressed the Allies to espouse the principle of the transfer of German population (Staněk, 1991: 41-47). Beneš also coaxed the Polish emigre government to accept the Curzon line as the postwar Polish-Soviet border and eastern German territories for the eastern Polish territories lost to the Soviet Union, but to no avail (De Zayas, 1988: 45/46). Only on October 10, 1944 the emigre Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikołajczyk (1901-1966) faced with the unwavering stance of the Allies in this respect, agreed to convince his government to embrace this solution. This decision cost him his position (Harper, 1990: 18-20). He was supplanted by Tomasz Arciszewski (1877-1955), who, on December 17, in the interview for *The Sunday Times* protested against the possible loss of the Polish eastern territories, and accepted the postwar incorporation of a part of East Prussia, the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, the north of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency and a part of Pomerania, but without the cities of Breslau (Wroclaw) and Stettin (Szczecin) so that the new Poland would not have face the daunting task of absorbing too many Germans. Hence, he still did not espouse the principle of population transfer (Wiskemann, 1956: 73/74). However, already at the turn of June and July, 1944 the Soviet armies reached the line of the Vistula. In July the first Allied air raids terminated safety of the Silesian air shelter (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 29). On October 20/21 the Soviet troops breached the prewar German border for the first time (in East Prussia) (De Zayas, 1988: 61). Having the strategic advantage over the US and British troops which in the Autumn only reached northern Italy, and landed in Normandy and southern France only on June 6 and August 15 (Kinder, 1978: II 210, 212/213), Moscow could disregard the Polish emigre government in London knowing that it would not be supported by the Allies in the light of the Soviet swift advance toward Berlin. Hence, the puppet *Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego* (PKWN, Polish Committee of National Liberation) was formed at Moscow and flown to Chelm Lubelski (the first considerable Polish

552 It was quite cryptic phrasing not specifying if the city of Oppeln (Opole) or the Oppeln (Opole) Regency was meant - both stretched to the west of the Oder (Odra) (Wiskemann, 1956: 75/76).

553 The British Foreign Secretary George Curzon proposed this line as the Polish eastern border in 1919, but later it was considerably pushed eastward due to Poland’s success in the Polish-Soviet War (Thorne, 1975: 342).
town seized by the Red Army west of the Curzon line) on July 21. The PKWN agreed to the Curzon line as the eastern border of the postwar Poland, and Moscow, on the basis of Art. 4 of the agreement concluded by the Soviet government and the PKWN, obliged itself to support the postulate of moving the Polish western border to the line of the Oder (Odra) and the western Neisse (Nysa) (Lis, 1993: 18). The PKWN was recognized only by the Soviet Union, but this backing was enough to allow Stefan Jędrychowski (1910-), the head of the PKWN Department of Propaganda, to counter Arciszewski’s view on the shape of the new Poland, by stating, on December 18, in the Soviet Pravda that the Polish western border should be demarcated from Stettin (Szczecin) along the Oder (Odra) and the western Neisse (Nysa) to the Czechoslovak border (De Zayas, 1988: 53).

On January 12, 1945 the Red Army launched the sweeping offensive from the Vistula bridgeheads at Baranów Sandomierski and Magnuszewo. On January 19, the Soviet troops crossed the Silesian border in the vicinity of Kreuzburg (Kluczborz) and Guttenrug (Dobrodzień) (Bahlcke, 1996: 164). By the end of January almost the whole Upper Silesian industrial basin was seized by the Red Army, and all Upper Silesia together with northern Lower Silesia by the end of March (Czapliński, 1993: 52; Kowalski, 1988: 19). At that time the Red Army was only 90 km away from Berlin while the Allies had just entered western Germany (Kinder, 1978: II 214). On December 31, 1944 the PKWN was transformed into the Polish Provisional Government which was entrusted with organizing the Polish pro-Soviet administration in the Polish territories west of the Curzon line, which were seized by the Red Army (De Zayas, 1988: 53). The Polish emigre government in London became gradually isolated and ceased to have any real influence on the political developments in Poland. On January 19, 1945 the US Foreign Ministry recognizing the Soviet-backed demand to shift Poland’s postwar western border to the Oder (Odra) and the Western Neisse (Nysa), prepared an appropriate map indicating the areas to be annexed and the German population to be expelled (Hellriegel-Netzbandt, 1996: 180). At the Yalta conference (February 4-11), in the view of the military and political faits accomplis, and Stalin’s support of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line as Poland’s postwar western border, the Allies even had to agree to the cession of the southern Lower Silesian territory extending between the Western and Eastern Neisse (Nysa) Rivers, when he lied that the majority of the German inhabitants of this area had fled. But Churchill and Roosevelt maintained that all the border changes would have to be confirmed by a postwar peace conference 554 (De Zayas, 1988: 53). Moreover, on February 5 the Provisional Government announced it would administer all the German territories up to the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line (Marzian, 1953: 282/29). Since the end of January, the Polish communists had started expropriating and depriving Germans of any civic and political rights as well as interning them and using as forced laborers. The Red Army also hauled many of them to forced labor camps in the Soviet Union (Anon., 1995: 34-39; Anon., 1995a: 2/3; Misztal, 1990: 58; Urban, 1994: 54; Wiskemann, 1956: 96/97).

On March 14, the Polish communist authorities established the Upper Silesian Voivodeship which comprised the prewar Silesian Voivodeship and the non-Silesian Dombrowa industrial basin 555 which had been incorporated in the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency at the end of 1939 (Lis, 1993: 18). The rest of the Silesian territories where fighting continued, were subjected to the Soviet military administration. It allowed the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government to prepare there the foundations of the would-be Polish administration. On March 14 the two administrative districts were formed. The District I contained the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency. The District II embraced Lower Silesia located east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line and appropriate fragments of Saxon and Brandenburg territory (Bahlcke, 1996: 186). On March 18, without any prior agreement on the part of the other Allies, the Soviet Union unilaterally transferred the Oppeln (Opole) Regency east of the Oder (Odra) (i.e. de jure a German territory) to the Polish authorities who incorporated it in the Upper Silesian Voivodeship. In the appropriate act the voivodeship was renamed as Silesian though it became popularly though incorrectly

554 Due to the sudden outbreak of the Cold War, it actually never took place. In 1990 it was held in the delayed ersatz form as the 2 + 4 negotiations between the two German states and the wartime Allies.

555 i.e. the counties of Bendsburg (Będzin) and Warthenau (Zawiercie). The other non-Silesian counties incorporated in the Oppeln (Opole) and Kattowitz (Katowice) Regencies, were transferred to the Voivodeships of Kielce and Cracow (Orzechowski, 1972: 19).
known as Silesian-Dombrowá (Cimala, 1995: 14; Lis, 1993: 18). On May 6, the Organic Statute of the prewar Silesian Voivodeship was abolished (Anon., 1995: 55/56) allowing the communist authorities to execute any organizational changes to their liking. However, though after the end of World War II, the Soviet military authorities started transferring the territories east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line under Polish jurisdiction but many Soviet governmental and military offices were active in these areas by the beginning of the 1950s (Cimala, 1995). Moreover, the headquarters of the Soviet troops stationed in Poland was located behind the impenetrable wall in Legnica (Liegnitz) by 1993.

Considering the Polish administration of the German territories of the Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wrocław) Regencies, on July 7, 1945 the Lower Silesian counties of Fraustadt (Wschowa) and Grünberg (Zielona Góra) were transferred to the Poznań (Posen) Voivodeship. The rest of the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line granted to Poland (with the exception of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency included in the Silesian Voivodeship), i.e. the Administrative District II was administered by the Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych (MZO, Ministry for the Recovered Territories) on the basis of the act of November 13. Only when majority of the Germans were expelled, the suitable number of Polish settlers, and expellees from the Polish eastern territories lost to the Soviet Union, arrived, and the MZO established the framework of Polish administration, it was possible to divide the former German territories into regular voivodeships, and subject them to the homogenous Polish administration. This event took place on May 29, 1946. Lower Silesia, i.e. the then defunct Liegnitz (Legnica) and Breslau (Wrocław) Regencies were turned into the Wrocław (Breslau) Voivodeship. The new voivodeship embraced 38 counties. Their number included the erstwhile Brandenburg county of Sorau (Zary). The Zgorzelec (Görlitz) county whose western part east of the Western Neisse (Nysa) remained in Germany, was enlarged with the eastern part of the Saxon county of Zittau situated east of the Western Neisse (Nysa). The part of the Rothenburg county remaining east of the Western Neisse (Nysa) was divided between the counties of Zgorzelec (Görlitz) and Zary (Sorau). What is more, it was reaffirmed that the Lower Silesian counties of Zielona Góra (Grünberg) and Wschowa (Fraustadt) remained in the Poznań (Posen) Voivodeship, as well as the counties of the erstwhile Oppeln (Opole) Regency in the Silesian Voivodeship which, altogether, contained 35 counties. Generally, the Wrocław (Breslau) and the Silesian Voivodeships corresponded to the wartime Provinces of Upper and Lower Silesia, and their border coincided with the border between the former (Wrocław) and Oppeln (Opole) (Anon., 1995: 90, 95, 225/226; Orzechowski, 1972: 19/20).

Considering the fate of the Silesian population in relation to administrative changes and decisions on prospective expulsion of Silesian Germans, it is good to remember that the task was quite daunting. On May 17, 1939 the Silesian Province was inhabited by 4,576,000 persons (Reichling, 1986: 63). After the incorporation of the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) and the Silesian Voivodeship together with the adjacent non-Silesian Polish counties in 1938 and 1939, respectively, the enlarged province’s population was enlarged by 50,000 Hultschiners (Reichling, 1986: 63), and, on the basis of the data of October 1943, by 37,000 German and ethnic German settlers (Dlugoborski, 1983: XLVII), 1,303,990 DVL-holders, 826,071 Poles and 49,151 persons of unclear status (Bahlcke, 1996: 160/161). Hence, prior to the Soviet onslaught in 1945 the war-time Silesia was populated by 5,921,990 Germans and persons of German/Upper Silesian provenance and 875,222 Poles and persons of other status. By 1945 100,000 German civil servants and workers had arrived to Upper Silesia, and 450,000 persons from other regions

556 Although the question requires referring to historians of constitutional law for further examination, it seems that the communists who shunned the April constitution (which had introduced the possibility of changing the status of the Silesian Voivodeship by the Polish government without any prior agreement on the part of the Silesian Sejm), and operated within the framework of the democratic March constitution, abolished the autonomous status of the Silesian Voivodeship illegally. Hence, it may be surmised that de jure the Silesian Voivodeship still exists.

557 This county was attached to the Liegnitz (Legnica) Regency only in 1938.

558 This westernmost tip of Lower Silesia which remained in Germany west of the Western Neisse (Nysa), i.e. 2,188 sq km with roughly 250,000 inhabitants (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 115), embraced the whole Hoyerswerda county, the larger part of the Rothenburg county, and the smaller part of the Görlitz (Zgorzelec) county together with the more important part of the town of Görlitz (Zgorzelec).
of Germany were evacuated to the relative safety of Silesia which was not pestered by air raids until Autumn 1944. The figures cannot be simply added up to come up with a clear number as simultaneously many Silesians were drafted, Poles expelled, and Jews and Gypsies exterminated. According to the German sources the German population residing in Silesia at the beginning of 1945 is estimated at 4,700,000. The looming Soviet attack caused many Silesians to flee westward and to Sudetenland at the turn of 1944 and 1945. During the fighting production continued in the Upper Silesian industrial basin, and only a small number of women with small children were evacuated from this area. Upper Silesia was quickly engulfed by the Soviet troops so that 700,000 persons who were later evacuated, came from Upper and Lower Silesian regions west of the Oder (Odra). Next 700,000 civilians were evacuated from Breslau (Wroclaw) turned into a fortress. The Silesian capital capitulated on May 6, and from the city’s population of 200-300,000 who stayed during the siege only 40,000 soldiers and civilians survived. At the end of the war, on May 8, there were 1.2-1.5 mln Silesian Germans in the land whereas 1.6 mln in Sudetenland and 1.6 mln west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line. Moreover, 62,000 Upper Silesians (including women and children) were hauled to the Soviet Union as forced laborers. In the subsequent months, 800,000 returned to Silesia from Sudetenland and 200,000 from the regions west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line. (Bahlcke, 1996: 163-166).

The decision about the method and manner of the transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia, Poland, the territories east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line, and from elsewhere in East-Central and Eastern Europe was to be taken by the Allies at Potsdam. But already in June and July the Polish authorities having obtained a tacit agreement on the part of the Soviet Union (De Zayas, 1988: 104/105), expelled all Silesian Germans (200,000) from the belt adjacent to the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line (Bahlcke, 1996: 166) and 86,000 from the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency (Lempiński, 1979: 162, 216, 221, 225). The matter of border changes and resultant expulsions was taken further at the Potsdam conference (July 17-August 2). On the basis of the Art VI and IX of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (commonly referred to as the Potsdam Protocol), the German territories were de facto transferred to Poland and the Soviet Union, but not de jure as the stipulated border changes had to be reaffirmed and legalized by the future peace conference which actually never took place. Anyway, Art XIII in recognition of the de facto border changes allowed for the transfer of German population from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in an orderly and humane manner (Blumenwitz, 1989: 40; De Zayas, 1988: 87/88; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 110, 113-115). The transfer559, in the light of the prevailing and often aggressively expressed anti-German sentiment, as well as of acute food shortages and unimaginable war destruction, was anything but orderly and humane (Calka, 1993). In violation of the Potsdam agreement, Germans were still expelled from Silesia to the Soviet Occupation Zone by December 23 when the Soviet authorities sealed the border at the Oder (Odra) and the Neisse (Nysa). Legal expulsions commenced in February 1946 and intermittently lasted until the end of 1947, German Silesians were transported mainly to the British and Soviet Occupation Zones. The expulsions were resumed for a short time in Summer 1948 and rounded up with the family link action (Aktion Link) in 1950/1951 (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 129, 144, 146; Wiskemann, 1956: 118, 120). In sum, there were 958,000 Germans from the prewar Polish territory expelled, 400,000 from the former Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk) and 10,087,000 from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line granted to Poland, totalling 11,445,000 persons (Wiskemann, 1956: 121). The largest single group of expellees came from Silesia: 2,698,903 of them resided west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line on October 29, 1946, and 3,197,200 in 1950. Out of the latter figure, 2,053,400 lived in West Germany, 1,200 in the Saar, 36,600 in West Berlin, 1,080,000 in the Soviet Occupation Zone, 10,000 in East Berlin, 6,000 in Austria, 3,000 in West Europe and 7,000 outside Europe. What is more, 361,000 Silesians lost their lives during the war, and 386,000 in the course of flight, evacuation and expulsion (Bahlcke, 1996: 168-170).

559 It is more appropriate to refer to it as expulsion because it was a forced movement of population. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the measure was applied to Germans only (the label though excluded Germans of other citizenships than German), the transfer may also be correctly dubbed as ethnic cleansing.
According to the MZO sources, the number of Lower Silesians (i.e. Lower Silesian Germans) rapidly decreased from 1,234,125 in 1946 to 65,989 in 1948 and 51,578 in 1950 (Ociepka, 1994: 25). On December 3, 1950 they constituted only 3% of the sized-down Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship’s population of 1,678,300. The rest was composed from 33,222 Lower Silesians who were found to be Poles, 915,800 (54.6%) Polish settlers, and 677,700\(^{560}\) Polish expellees from the Polish eastern territories lost to the Soviet Union. A more complicated situation developed in these areas of the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship which belonged to Germany before 1939. The Polish authorities clung fast to the Polish claim that in 1939 750,000 Poles (i.e. Polish-speaking Upper Silesians) lived in the Opeln (Opole) Regency and 60,000 in the Breslau (Wroclaw) Regency (Bahlcke, 196: 201), because they probably realized that they would not be able to properly populate the territories gained from Germany only with Polish expellees and settlers, or to effectively run the Upper Silesian industrial basin whose production was of vital significance for the postwar Poland. Poland was short of qualified industrial workers and specialists due to wartime losses, but above all to the fact that prior to 1939 it was largely an agricultural country. In order to tackle this obvious predicament, it was proposed not to subject Autochthons (i.e. local Polish-speakers) to expulsion. It could be done only through dividing the population of the Deutsche Ostgebiete\(^{561}\) (German eastern territories situated east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line) within the Polish borders, according to the nationality principle. Emulating the exemplar of the DVL, it was decided to classify the populace according to the following labels: I. Persons of full Polish consciousness, II. Persons who speak Polish but do not feel any clear affinity with the Polish nation, III. Persons who do not know Polish but have Polish surnames or are of Polish origin. The fourth, not indicated category embraced indubitable Germans who were to be expelled. The action of national verification was commenced on March 22, 1945 by the Silesian Voivode gen Aleksander Zawadzki, reaffirmed on April 7 by his deputy gen Jerzy Ziętek, and sanctioned by the MZO only on November 13 (Lis, 1991: 25-29). The regulatory delay allowed many irregularities, e.g. in some forced labor and internment camps for Germans Upper Silesians of the aforementioned categories I-III, constituted 70% of inmates, verification was used as a cover-up to expel all population from the area close to the troubled Upper Silesian section of the border with Czechoslovakia (Kalicki, 1991: 12; Rauziński, 1995: 14). On April 28, 1946 the act granting Autochthons with Polish citizenship was passed (Anon, 1995: 197; Strauchold, 1995: 75). When the verification process was completed in mid-1949, 851,454 had been verified as Poles and 15,687 Lower Silesians. In other parts of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete only 152,083 persons had been verified by December 31, 1948 (Misztal, 1990: 306-308). On December 3, 1950 the Autochthons constituted 54.3% (436,900) of the newly-established Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship’s population of 804,000, and 15.3% (414,500) of the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship’s population of 2,705,200. Excluding the Autochthons, the latter voivodeship’s 1,917,800 (70.9%) inhabitants had lived in the Silesian Voivodeship on August 31, 1939 (Bahlcke, 1996: 188/189).

In 1950 the reconstruction six-year plan had been completed, Germans expelled, the former Deutsche Ostgebiete populated with Poles, Autochthons verified, and communist administration well entrenched. Moreover, the extremely influential MZO was abolished on January 11, 1949 (Moldawa, 1991: 99). In this situation, in order to reinforce these gains, to further homogenize the administrative structure of the state, and to introduce strict central planning and control in accordance with the Stalinist model of governance, it was necessary to truncate the existing voivodeships and to introduce new ones in order to fortify the center’s over them. The administrative reform was executed with the act of June 28, 1950. In case of Silesia, the new Zielona Góra (Grünberg) Voivodeship was established from 11 former Brandenburg counties (including the counties of Krosno (Crossen), Swiebodzin (Schwiebus) which had belonged to Silesia before the 19th century). Moreover, the truncated Poznań (Posen) Voivodeship provided it with the Lower Silesian counties of Zielona Góra (Grünberg) and Wschowa (Fraustadt),

\(^{560}\) The figure also includes negligible numbers of Polish reemigrants from France, Germany and other states (Bahlcke, 1996: 189).

\(^{561}\) Polish propaganda referred to the Deutsche Ostgebiete within the Polish borders as the recovered territories, Piast lands, or less emotionally as western and northern lands. The Deutsche Ostgebiete less the Polish part of East Prussia, is also called the Nadodrze (Odra land) (cf.: Rauziński, 1995)
whereas the truncated Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship with the Lower Silesian counties of Glogów (Glogau), Kozuchów (Freystadt), Zagań (Sagan), and the former Brandenburg county of Szprotawa (Sprottau). So in sum it consisted from 17 counties, including 5 Lower Silesian ones. The diminished Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship embraced 26 exclusively Lower Silesian counties. The Silesian (-Dombrowa) Voivodeship was split into the Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeships. The former one included 11 Upper Silesian counties and the two Lower Silesian counties of Brzeg (Brieg) and Namysłów (Namslau), which had been transferred from the Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship. The Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship embraced 24 counties but due to frequent changes of their borders and names, and their mergers and splits, as well as because of enlarging the voivodeship with the further three non-Silesian counties of Myszków, Klobuck and Częstochowa, their number of the voivodeship’s counties stabilized, in 1963, at 14 counties and 17 urban counties. Out of them 7 counties and 11 urban counties were Upper Silesian, 2 counties and 2 urban counties East Silesian, and 5 counties and 4 urban counties non-Silesian. To a lesser degree the same measures were applied to the other voivodeships including the Silesian territory. In consequence, the Zielona Góra (Grünberg) voivodeship retained the same number of counties 17 (only changes of names occurred there), the Wroclaw (Breslau) voivodeship embraced 27 counties and 5 urban counties, and the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship 14 counties. This administrative division (which remained largely unchanged until the new administrative reform of 1975) consciously strove to erase the traces of the administrative divisions which had developed in Silesia in the 18th and 19th centuries. Despite of this endeavor, the county network was retained largely unaltered in the Voivodeships of Zielona Góra (Grünberg), Wroclaw (Breslau) and Opole (Oppeln) unlike in the Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodeship whose administrative reality had been overhauled most. Out of these voivodeships the Wroclaw (Breslau) one was the largest and almost thoroughly Lower Silesian in character (with the exception of a small piece of the Saxon territory in the Zgorzelec (Görlitz) county). Roughly a quarter of the Zielona Góra (Grünberg) Voivodeship’s territory was Lower Silesian as its capital. The Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship was the smallest of the four ones but its territory most homogenous Upper Silesian (with the exception of the two Lower Silesian counties of Brzeg (Brieg) and Namysłów (Namslau)) and roughly corresponding to the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency. Its homogeneity was further reinforced by the fact that slightly more than 50% of its population was composed from the prewar inhabitants (Bahlcke, 1996: 188). The Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship was strategically the most significant for communist Poland because of its industry and coal seams. To entrench it in the postwar Poland most firmly, it was also made most heterogenous. Its territory was derived from Upper and East Silesia (or from the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency and the Silesian Voivodeship, and the wartime Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency) as well as from the prewar Voivodeships of Kielce and Cracow (which had been parts of Congress Poland and Galicia). Thus the voivodeship straddled the confluence of pre-1918 Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary, symbolically tying Poland (whose territory consists from the adjacent fragments of the three bygone empires) into a singular territorial and political entity. Moreover, although 86.2% of the voivodeship’s population as of 1950 had lived in this area on August 31, 1939 (Bahlcke, 1996: 188), only a minority of them were Upper Sileans (Anon., 1995: 225/226; Orzechowski, 1972: 20/21).

To conclude the description of Silesia within the Polish borders after the end of World War II, it is worthwhile to sketch the complicated ethnic situation which developed in this area in the years 1945-1950. As mentioned above, due to the expulsion of Germans their number plummeted to 51,578 in Lower Silesia, where they concentrated in Wroclaw (Breslau) and, predominantly, in the industrial basin of Walbrzych (Waldenburg) (Ociepka, 1994: 25). On the other hand in Upper Silesia, ethnic Upper Silesians, Germans, and ethnic Poles who had lived in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency before 1945, were submerged in the ideologically expedient category of Autochthons. Regarding settlers (Poles and Jews) who came to Silesia from these parts of the prewar Poland which were included in its postwar borders, the Zielona Góra (Grünberg) Voivodeship received 138,000 of them from the region of Poznań (Posen) and Bydgoszcz (Bromberg), 57,000 from the region of Warsaw and Łódz and 69,000 from the region of

562 Some counties, as for instance half of the county of Bielsko-Biala (Bieltitz-Biala), also embraced non-Silesian territory (Orzechowski, 1972: 20/21).
Kielce, Lublin, Rzeszów and Cracow. The figures for the Breslau (Wroclaw) Voivodeship were: 169,000, 217,000 and 459,000; and for the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship: 9,000, 24,000 and 128,000. Considering, the Polish citizens (i.e. Poles, Jews, Ukrainians etc.) who had been expelled from the former Polish eastern territories, in the years 1945-1950, 231,000 of them arrived to the Zielona Góra (Grünberg) Voivodeship, 539,000 to the Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship, 193,000 to the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship and 75,000 to the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship. Most of them stemmed from the east Galician (western Ukrainian) voivodeships of the prewar Poland. Considering ethnic Poles, in the years 1945-1950, the Zielona Góra (Grünberg) Voivodeship absorbed 3,000 of them from France, 6,000 from Germany, and 2,000 from other states. The figures for the Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship were 15,000, 32,000 and 38,000, respectively; for the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship: 2,000, 4,000 and 2,000; and for the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship: 11,000, 3,000 and 2,000 (Bahlcke, 1996: 188/189; Palota’s, 1996: 137). Moreover, in the years 1947-1950, the Ukrainian and Lemko population of south-eastern Poland (around 150,000) was forcefully dispersed in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete (Pudlo, 1993: 156/157). As of 1961, 9,000 of them lived in the Zielona Góra (Grünberg) Voivodeship, 16,000 in the Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship, and 1,500 in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship (Iwanicki, 1994: 79). Following the defeat of the communist forces in the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), in the years 1948-1951 14,525 communist refugees (Greeks, Macedonians and few Kutzo-Vlachs) arrived to Poland and were settled mainly in the Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodeship, where they concentrated in Zgorzelec (Görlitz) and Wroclaw (Breslau) (Pudlo, 1995: 138-140). There were virtually no Jews in Silesia in 1945, but due to the arrival of Jews from the former Polish eastern territories, elsewhere from the Soviet Union, and from other parts of the postwar Poland where they were pestered by the anti-Semitic sentiment and pogroms, they numbered to about 100,000 in 1946 and stabilized at the level of 80-85,000 in 1946. Most of them concentrated in the counties of Dzierzoniów (Reichenbach) (16,000), Wroclaw (Breslau) (15,000), Walbrzych (Waldenburg) (10,200) and Legnica (Liegnitz) (3,200). Due to emigration encouraged by the Polish state and Jewish organizations their number decreased to 50,000 at the beginning of 1948, and to 30-32,000 at the end of the year. At that time they constituted 50% of all the Jews living in Poland. Their number further decreased to 7-8,000 in 1960/1961, and after the anti-Semitic events of March 1968 almost all of them emigrated. In 1992 there were 400-500 Jews in Silesia as compared to Poland’s total Jewish population of 5-8,000. The Silesian centers of Jewish life include: Wroclaw (Breslau), Dzierzoniów (Reichenbach), Legnica (Liegnitz) and Bielisko-Biala (Bielitz-Biala) (Berdychowska, 1995: 26; Bronsztajn, 1993: 12/13, 20, 23; Massil, 1991: 180).

To recapitulate, in 1945-1950 Silesia as a region was effectively submerged in the new administrative divisions which somehow dissolved it in the structures of the postwar Polish state. The process was facilitated by expulsion of the largely German population and replacing it with highly variegated groups of Polish and Jewish settlers, immigrants, reemigrants and expellees as well as refugees of other provenances. Only the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship largely retained its prewar population and administrative structure. The same is true of the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship but to a lesser degree due to the adding of non-Silesian territories to it. Moreover, already the population of the prewar Silesian Voivodeship had been altered through the emigration of Germans and influx of Polish citizens from other regions of Poland (Wanatowicz, 1982).

Considering, Czechoslovak Silesia, majority of East Silesia embraced by the enlarged Silesian Voivodeship on August 31, 1939, was included in the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency while the rest had earlier passed to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. On the other hand, West Silesia had been added to the Province of Sudetenland as part of the Troppau (Opava) Regency. Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudetic Germans appealed Hitler to transfer whole of East Silesia to Sudetenland and was opposed by the authorities of the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency who, still in 1940, demanded incorporation of the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin which had been left in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (Borák, 1992: 107/108). The quarrel in the ranks of the national socialist administration was soothed by the retaining of the 1939 administrative division. The county of Teschen (Tešín, Cieszyn) was ethnically most diverse in Silesia. According to the December 1939 census, it was inhabited by 126,593 Silesians (44.5%), 66,788 (23.4%) Poles, 46,567 (16%) Czechs and 41,522 (14.6%) Germans. By October 1943 180,000 (70%) had been inscribed on the DVL (Borák, 1992:
Moreover, if one takes into consideration the whole East Silesian part of the former Silesian Voivodeship in its 1939 borders, in 1940 it was inhabited, according to nationality, by 215,061 (41.64%) Poles, 157,044 (30.41%) Silesians, 85,842 (16.62%) Germans, 46,661 (9.03%) Czechs, 9,782 (1.89%) Jews and 2,094 (0.41%) others, or, according to language, by 213,014 (42.24%) Poles, 182,788 (35.39%) Silesians, 75,691 (14.66%) Germans, 36,214 (7.01%) Czechs, 7,580 (1.47%) Jews and 1,197 (0.23%) others. After the introduction of the DVL, in October 1943, this area supported: 29,804 (4.92%) Reichsdeutsche, 14,827 (2.45%) ethnic German resettlers, 279,560 (46.13%) members of the DVL, 236,425 (39.01%) Poles\textsuperscript{563}, 38,000 (6.27%) Czechs and 2,456 (0.4%) others. Moreover, the 1940 statistics clearly showed that the smaller East Silesian part of the former Silesian Voivodeship embraced 215,061 Poles according to nationality and 213,014 poles according to language as opposed to the larger Upper Silesian section of this voivodeship with only 50,005 Poles according to nationality and 125,133 Poles according to language (Bahlcke, 1996: 159-161). The steadfast attachment of a large group of East Silesians to Polishdom, who were not eager to swap it for the relative security of Silesiandom resulted in their methodical persecution by the national socialist authorities bent on creating homogenous German Silesia. This process was accompanied by the extermination of the Jews who had been largely wiped out by October 1943. The demographic loss was deepened by the death toll of East Silesian soldiers who were drafted to the German army from the groups of the population who were labelled as German and Silesian. Therefore, after the war it was established that the highest death toll in the whole of Czechoslovakia had been sustained by East Silesia within the Czechoslovak borders. The situation was different in these parts of prewar Czechoslovak Silesia in Sudetenland and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia populated more uniformly by Germans and Czechs (Moravians). Many of the former lost their lives in the ranks of the German army, but the latter, unlike other Slavs, were earmarked for Germanization. As such they enjoyed similar privileges as their German neighbors, but they were not drafted. This rule also applied to Czechs living in the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency (Borák, 1992: 109/110; Zahradník, 1992: 9/10).

The Polish-Czechoslovak contention over East Silesia led to the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict in 1919 and the Polish annexation of almost all Czech East Silesia in 1938. Consequently, the question of East Silesia became a thorn in the relations between the Czechoslovak and Polish emigre governments in London, who in the years 1939-1942 actively negotiated the possibility of the Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation which could be acceded by Lithuania and other Central European states, and would be able to contain Germany and the Soviet Union with the aid of the planned Balkan Union of Yugoslavia and Greece. Due to the 1943 fall out between the Soviet Union and the Polish emigre government on the ground of the discovery, in Katyń, of the mass graves of Polish officers murdered by the NKVD, the Czechoslovak government broke off negotiations on the confederation on May 17. Beneš having received Molotov’s assurance, on June 4, 1942, that the Soviet government recognized the continued statehood of Czechoslovakia in its pre-Munich frontiers, he was not eager to sacrifice the support of the powerful ally for the doubtful prospect of a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation (Kisielewski, 1992: 273-289). This stance did have its rewards. The British government, after the British parliament annulled the Munich Agreement on August 5, 1942, had stated that would not oppose the transfer of minority population from Czechoslovakia in an endeavor to make it into a homogenous nation-state. In June 1943 they were followed by Moscow who raised no objection to the planned postwar Odsun (expulsion), and Roosevelt who unanimously agreed with Churchill and Stalin on this matter (Wiskemann, 1956: 67/68). In this manner, by mid-1943, Beneš as the emigre Czechoslovak president recognized by all the Allies, secured their annulment of the Munich Agreement and acceptance of the Odsun which meant recognition of the continued existence of Czechoslovak statehood in the pre-1938 borders and espousal of the ethnic cleansing which was to make the postwar Czechoslovakia closer to the ideal of the homogenous nation-state. Hence, two years before the end of the war, the Czechoslovak emigre government reached its two main strategic aims unlike its Polish counterpart whom, after breaking off with Moscow in 1943, the Allies started perceiving as a troublemaker and a dangerous threat to their unity in the crucial moment of

\textsuperscript{563} Quite a lot of them was added by the incorporation of some territory of the former Cracow Voivodeship) to the Bielitz (Bielsko) county (Bahlcke, 1996: 161).
the war when it still was not sure who would win. The Polish emigre government became gradually isolated, and its pleas to reestablish the Polish state in its pre-1939 borders, and not to extend it farther westward than to the line of the Oder (Odra) so as not to overburden a postwar Poland with the daunting task of assimilating too many Germans, fell on deaf ears. The uncompromising stance of the Polish emigre government led to the establishment of the Soviet-ordained PKWN in July 1944, and the latter’s transformation into the Polish Provisional Government at the beginning of 1945. Holding factual control over Poland with the support of Moscow it was gradually recognized by the other Allies at the cost of the emigre government which was left in a political limbo after the end of World War II. The emigre government did not manage to secure its objectives whereas its Soviet-controlled counterpart went hand in hand with its communist protector. In effect continued political and territorial existence of Polish statehood was severed unlike in the case of Czechoslovakia[^564].

On December 12, 1943 Beneš concluded a treaty on friendship, mutual assistance and postwar cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union (Kisielewski, 1992: 288), and on May 8, 1944, Benes signed an agreement with the Soviet leaders stipulating that Czechoslovak territory liberated by Soviet armies would be placed under Czechoslovak civilian control (Gawdiak, 1989: 52). After the negotiations with Czechoslovak communists at Moscow, the joint Czechoslovak government was set up at Košice (Kassa, Kaschau) in Slovakia on April 3, 1945. The Soviet and US troops penetrated the outlying regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Czech Silesia only at the beginning of May, but even on May 9 most of Bohemia, southern Lower Silesia and the west of West Silesia were still controlled by German forces (Carter, 1992: 926; Magocsi, 1993: 157). At the end of the war, the population of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia swelled with hundreds of thousands of evacuees and refugees who sought relative security of the Luftschutzkeller des Reiches (air raid shelter of the Reich), as well as with German soldiers. Among them there were especially numerous Silesians living west of the Oder (Odra) who, in March and April, had had time enough to flee southward. The Silesians and the lower number of evacuees from northern Germany constituted as many as 2 mln. The soldiers added up to 800,000. So together with the Sudetic Germans and other categories of refugees, the German population of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia on May 9 was estimated at 6 mln (Franzel, 1979: 18/19; Habel, 1992: 94). At the end of the war, Silesian and north German refugees started returning home or trekking to the occupation zones of the Western Allies. In Moravia the situation was complicated by the German commander-in-chief, Marshall Schörner who refused to accept the German capitulation and continued the command not to recognize the czechoslovak army as legally belligerent. In accordance with the orders of admiral Karl Dönitz who succeeded Hitler as Führer, Schörner attempted to save as many as possible German soldiers and civilians by taking them to the American Zone, but to no avail as the passage was blocked by the Red Army. Therefore he flew off to surrender to the Americans personally, leaving a leaderless army which ran amok for some days. The misdeeds of the soldiers and the popular anti-German sentiment erupted in many instances of brutal and frequently lethal revenge taken on Germans by Czechs who employed the principle of collective responsibility (Staněk, 1996: 67; Wiskemann, 1956: 99/100). The wide-spread persecutions coupled with the illegal wave of expulsions of Germans in May-July caused the number of Germans residing in Czechoslovakia in August to plummet, according to the official figure, to 2,359,906, i.e. 1 mln less than the number of Sudetic Germans living in Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Munich Agreement (Chiodo, 1993: 249-271; Staněk, 1996: Wiskemann, 1956: 98-106).

However, the situation was a bit different in Czech Silesia restored to Czechoslovakia in its pre-1938 shape against the wishes of the Poles who had hoped to retain this part of Czech East Silesia annexed in 1938. So the immediate period after the end of the war was marred by the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict in East Silesia rather than expulsion of local Germans who had been few and, still,
many of them had fled before the advancing Soviet troops (Krol, 1991: 61/62). On the other hand, West Silesia and especially the western part of this region was dominated by German population who could effectively oppose the illegal Czechoslovak attempts at expulsion with the sheer weight of their number. What is more, in the commotion of the first postwar months, it was logistically almost impossible to transport West Silesian Germans to the distant Austrian or postwar German borders. However, the Soviets striving to exploit the Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) industrial basin, not unlike its Upper Silesian counterpart, seized machinery, goods as well as miners. As in Upper Silesia, they were hauled to mines, plants and forced labor camps in the Soviet Union (Borák, 1992a: 109).

In the first weeks after the war the Czechoslovak government effectively took power over the whole of former Sudetenland, and did not have to issue a torrent of various acts which, in the case of Poland, regulated and affirmed the *de facto* Polish annexation of the *Deutsche Ostgebiete*. The aims of the new Czechoslovak governance were spelled out in the Košice Program. The program’s point XIII stipulated that Sudetic Germans would be expelled with the exception of the loyal Czechoslovak citizens. So in theory the subsequent expulsion was not to be thorough or indiscriminate (Hrabovec, 1996: 55). The legal instruments indispensable to carry out expulsion of the Sudetic Germans were provided by Beneš’s presidential decrees. The decrees of June 19 and October 27 provided for the punishment of Nazi criminals, traitors and their helpers, and of certain offenses against national honor. The decree of August 2, in its stipulations deprived persons of German nationality of their Czechoslovak citizenship. Lastly, 9 decrees issued from May 19 to October 24, provided the legal basis for nationalization and confiscation of property of persons of German nationality (Winkler, 1992: 17-21). The Potsdam decisions authorizing expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line stopped the wild summer expulsions and widespread retributions against Germans. The economic situation was so critical that in September compulsory labor service for Germans was introduced throughout the republic. Beneš appealed for humane and orderly organization and carrying out of the expulsion of the Sudetic Germans in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. Moreover, the western embassies could without difficulty inspect the *Odsun* process and journalists had easy access unlike in Poland. So though the Czechs had treated their German perhaps about as badly as the Poles in 1945, the transfer of the Sudetic Germans to Germany was better managed than that of the Germans from Poland in 1946 (Wiskemann, 1956: 122-124).

In the second half of 1945 a considerable number of Germans were interned and obliged to work as camp prisoners. The camps were regarded as *Sammelstellen* (collection centers) for those under sentence of expulsion (Wiskemann, 1956: 122). Six such centers were organized in Czech Silesia (Staněk, 1991: map on cover). According to the plan from the end of 1945 2,142,476 Germans were to be expelled from Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia. In case of Czech Silesia the number amounted to 176,282 (Hrabovec, 1996: 230). The first legal trainload with Sudetic Germans left Mariánské Lázně (Marienbad) for the American Zone on January 25, 1946 (Wiskemann, 1956: 125). The expulsion was carried mainly in 1946/1947 and rounded up by 1950. On November 1, 1946 there were still 239,911 Germans in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia, out of whom 38,982 in Moravia-Silesia and 17,674 in Czech Silesia (Hrabovec, 1996: 324). On January 27 their number decreased to 216,545, i.e. 13,712 in Moravia-Silesia, and 8,635 in Czech Silesia (Wiskemann, 1956: 127/128). In 1950 There were 1,850,00 Sudet Germans in West Germany and West Berlin, 880,000 in East Germany and East Berlin, 137,000 in Austria and 23,000 in other European and non-European states (Staněk, 1991: 366). After the termination of the expulsions (1947, the number of those who remained in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia either under the status of anti-fascists, indispensable specialists, clergymen or as members of mixed families and affirmed Czechs, was estimated at 148,076, i.e. 126,142 in Bohemia, 21,934 in Moravia Silesia, and 9,562 in Czech Silesia (Hrabovec, 1996: 324). According to the March 1, 1950 census there were 165,117 Sudetic and Carpathian Germans in Czechoslovakia (Habel, 1992: 124). They concentrated especially in the north-western border counties, and in the case of Czech Silesia constituted 5-10% of the population of the Bruntal (Freudenthal) county (Gawdiak, 1989: 96). Considering, Germans who were officially considered to be Czechs, in Czech Silesia they were mainly confined to the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) and

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565 The *Karpathendeutsche* (Carpathian Germans) have lived in the Carpathian regions of northern Slovakia.
Chapter six

not unlike the Upper Silesians they were considered Czechs by the Czechoslovak authorities and as
Germans by the German authorities with complete disregard for their prenational Moravian ethnic
identity. Therefore, many emigrants (Aussiedlers) from this region to Germany partly accounted for the
discrepancy in German and Czechoslovak assessments of the number of Germans living in
Czechoslovakia. According to the 1991 census, 53,418 Germans resided in Czechoslovakia (Zahradnik, 1992a: 252), and in relation to Czech Silesia, there were 1,000-1,999 Germans in the counties of Šumperk (Mährisch Schönberg) and Opava (Troppau), and 500-999 in the counties of Bruntal (Freudenthal), Havírov and Ostrava (Ostrau).

Another conflict which was to leave its imprint on the everyday reality of Czech Silesia and of the
postwar Polish Silesia, was the thorny issue of East Silesia as well as the Czechoslovak claims to some
parts of the Deutsche Ostgebiete detached from Germany and largely handed over to Poland. After
having had any prospects of creating a Polish-Czechoslovak confederacy in 1943, due to the
staunchly anti-Soviet attitude of the Polish emigre government over the matter of the Katyn massacre,
Czechoslovak politicians going on strongly on their more cordial relations with Moscow, returned to the
World-War-I idea of uniting all the historical lands of the Czech Crown and creating a Greater
Czechoslovakia. In April 1945 they demanded the southern section of the Oppeln (Opole) Regency west
of the Oder (Odra), the Glatz (Klodzko) Margravate, the border strip of southern Lower Silesia, as well as
the whole of Lusatia, i.e. a German territory west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line. Moreover, they
asked for a corridor to Yugoslavia consisting from fragments of the Austrian Länder of Burgenland,
Styria and Carinthia (Kowalski, 1988: 30; Palota’s, 1996: 136; Staněk, 1991: 134). The cessions of the
territories lying outside the Deutsche Ostgebiete east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line, were not
considered by the Allies, whereas Stalin wishing to placate the Poles for the loss of the Polish eastern
territories, and to make them thoroughly dependant on the Soviet Union in the face of German-Polish
enmity induced by handing over large strips of the German territory to the postwar Poland, decided not to
grant Czechoslovakia any section of the Deutsche Ostgebiete trusting that the traditionally good relations
between Prague and Moscow would be made indispensable by the expulsion of the Sudetic Germans
which would exclude any possibility of real friendship and cooperation between Czechoslovakia and
Germany. On the other hand, the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict which flared up already in May 1945 over
the unequal division of the Deutsche Ostgebiete allowed Stalin to seize firmer control over these two
states having ensured such a situation in which no efficient cooperation would be possible between
Poland and Czechoslovakia, let alone formation of a Polish-Czechoslovak confederacy which could have
limited the Soviet influence in Central Europe.

In the case of Silesia the open Polish-Czechoslovak conflict first set in over ownership of the
Zaolzie (Czech East Silesia). After this territory was recaptured from the Germans at the beginning of
May 1945, the Poles claimed it as theirs hoping to reestablish their 1939 borders in this area, and were
countered by the Czechs according to whom their state had the right to exist in the pre-Munich borders as
early it had been agreed by the Allies. The Polish authorities also claimed their right to protect the Polish
population of Czech East Silesia, whose sections did support the Polish activities in this area. On May
3 armed Polish militiamen attempted to seize the railway station in Těšín (Teschen), since May 15 the
illegal Zaolzie Polish militia were active and the Katowice (Kattowitz) radio called for the
reincorporation of the Zaolzie (Krol, 1991: 61/62). The Czechoslovak authorities did strive to limit the

566 In 1938 the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) was reincorporated in the Ratibor (Racibórz) county, i.e. to
Germany in its 1937 borders. Almost all the inhabitants of this region (i.e. 51,712 out of the total 52,967)
automatically reobtained German citizenship. 51,455 of these citizens declared themselves as Germans. In August
1945, when the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlučínsko) had been already reincorporated in Czechoslovakia, the
population of this region was 40,825 including 11,759 (29%) Germans. However, already in mid-December 1946,
the Germans numbered only 748 (1.55%) of the area’s population of 48,182. In consequence, only 2,100 Germans
had left or been expelled from this region in the years 1945/1946 (Staněk, 1991: 138/139).

567 The name of the county is derived from its capital which was established only in 1947 as a large housing project.
Therefore it never had a German name (Hosnedl, 1989: 113).

568 Information based on research data of Mr Andreas Götz, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin.
Polish influence in this region and to Czechize it in accordance with the postulate of building a postwar Czechoslovak nation-state. For instance, already on May 12, the Okresní Národní Vybor (ONV, County National Committee) of Těšín (Teschen) commenced a census of the Poles who had arrived after the Polish annexation of this area in October 1938. They were dubbed Polish occupiers, and on the basis of the circular letter of May 26 sent to all the communes of the Zaolzie, they were to leave Czechoslovakia by June 3. The decision was not carried out as the expulsions of Germans took precedence. According to the February 1946 statistics in Těšín (Teschen) Silesia there were 6,182 Polish occupiers and 47,640 (63,913, according to other sources) Poles who had been inscribed on the DVL. By June several hundreds of Poles had been expelled, in October Poles started to be removed from their flats in Karviná (Karwin) and Bohumin (Oderberg), and in December it was declared that along Germans and Hungarians, Poles would also have to leave Czechoslovakia. On December 13, it was even officially demanded that odsun should be applied to 5,300 Polish occupiers and 6.178 other Poles to ensure 1,200 flats for Czechoslovak civil servants. Moreover, in the result of the rehabilitation action, one-third inhabitants of Těšín (Teschen) Silesia, mainly Poles, had not received certificates giving the receiver the right to be trusted by the state.\footnote{Polish sources estimate that almost 30,000 Poles who had been inscribed on the DVL, declared themselves to be Czechs in order to facilitate the rehabilitation procedure (Zahradník, 1992: 115).} In 1946 when the expulsion of the Sudetic Germans commenced, it was decided that the Polish population and even the Polish occupiers (except some)\footnote{It was established that majority of the Polish occupiers had been Polish-speaking inhabitants of Těšín (Teschen) Silesia who left their homes for Poland in 1919/1920 (Palys, 1994: 134).} would not be expelled not to exacerbate the tense Polish-Czechoslovak relations constantly aggravated by the parallel border conflicts in the area of Klodzko (Glatz) and in the south of the former Oppeln (Opole) Regency. What is more, presumably, expulsion of Poles would create dearth of workforce in the mines and heavy industries of the Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) industrial basin putting at peril reconstruction of the Czechoslovak economy (Palys, 1994: 129-136).

The conflict over Těšín (Teschen) Silesia continued at the political plane mitigated by Moscow eager to achieve a resemblance of official friendship among its Central European satellites, without which it would not have been able to counter, in propaganda, the economic successes of Western European reconstruction. So even in September 1946, the Polish Head of State Bolesław Bierut, in Opole (Oppeln), promised the Polish inhabitants of Těšín (Teschen) Silesia that the [Polish] nation and the PKWN would do anything necessary to ensure the return of the Zaolzie to Poland in near future (Palys, 1994: 135). The Polish-Czechoslovak conflict which began in Těšín (Teschen) Silesia in earnest already at the beginning of May 1945 with the Polish intervention, was paralleled by similar Czechoslovak demands and Polish answers in the regions of Klodzko (Glatz) and of Racibórz (Ratibor), Głubczyce (Leobschütz) and Koźle (Cosel). The Slezská národní rada (SNR, Silesian National Council), established during the German occupation, demanded, in April 1945, a self-governing Silesia for Czechoslovakia, foreseeing that it would also embrace the German Silesian lands west of the Oder (Odra). On May 17 the Czechoslovak government confirmed the transformation of the SNR into the Ostrava (Ostrau) Expozitura (Branch) of the Moravian-Silesian Zemský národní vybor (ZNV, Land National Committee) in Brno (Brünn). In the years 1945/1946 the Expozitura was responsible for preparing and mobilizing support for the Czechoslovak claims to southern Upper Silesia, and for organizing the Hornoslezský komitét (HK, Upper Silesian Committee) which grouped Czech refugees from southern Upper Silesia under Polish control (Palys, 1996: 76-78; Staněk, 1991: 135). By May 18, 1945 the Soviet military administered southern Upper Silesia. On May 12 they had received the order to transfer this area to the Polish authorities which was made difficult because since May 10 Czech civil servants had been waiting at the outskirts of Racibórz (Ratibor) to take over the administration of the county. On the Soviet order they returned behind the Czechoslovak border, but already in June 7-22, Czechoslovak troops seized control over several localities and even approached Racibórz (Ratibor) at the distance of 5 km. Hostilities did not break out as the Soviets managed not to let them occur. The Moravian population did not wish to be treated as Poles and did not want to undergo the process of verification. The Czechs also spread message among them that after the Potsdam conference this territory would be given to Czechoslovakia. Many Moravians
decided to illegally flee to Czechoslovakia, and, moreover, the opinion was rife that it is better to be expelled than to remain in an unstable state. Probably on November 30, 1945, the Polish authorities even started expelling some Moravians. However, in the overall commotion when the Czechoslovak authorities were transferring German Silesian refugees to the Polish border areas, the Poles were trying to sift Autochthons from Germans, and both the states strove to establish themselves as proper nation-states, the Polish authorities tended to disregard the ethnic distinctiveness of the Moravians and to treat them as Autochthons or Germans accordingly to local needs and interests (Palys; 1991: 19-21; Palys, 1993: 27; Palys, 1994a: 34-42). At the end of 1945 there were 5,000 such Moravian/Czech refugees from southern Upper Silesia in Czech Silesia, and, among others, their presence which allowed the establishment of the HK on February 1, 1946, led to the failure of the Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations in the same month. Some of them returned whereas the others settled down in Czechoslovakia. Those who returned together with their countrymen who decided to stay, created a welcome pool of workforce who, on the basis of Polish-Czechoslovak agreements, crossed the border to work in the Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) industrial basin. The number of such workers topped 6,000 in autumn 1950 (Janák, 1993: 66-77; Janák, 1995: 83-85).

Another flare point of the early postwar Polish-Czechoslovak relations was the region of Glatz (Klodzko) which had been attached to Silesia only after Friedrich II’s annexation in 1740-1742. It had retained its administrative distinctiveness until the Prussian administrative reform of 1813-1816. The Czech nationalist activists claimed that Czechoslovakia had the right to receive this area because of its historical links with the Czech Crown and due to the Český koutek (Czech corner) i.e. the several localities inhabited by ethnic Czechs. They number was estimated at 8-9,000 by the Czechs, and at most at 5,500 by the Poles. Already in April 1945 Czechoslovak authorities strove to take over administration of the Glatz (Klodzko) area, and on April 14 they published an appeal demanding incorporation of this region into Czechoslovakia. A semblance of peacefulness was kept by the Red Army which administered this area by May 30. On May 31, a note was handed to the US Charge d’Affairs at Prague expressing the decision of the Czechoslovak government to take over this area. During May Czech troops entered this region several times, and after June 10 they penetrated this area to the depth of 10-12 km and seized Lewin Klodzki (Lewin/Hummelstadt) and Międzylesie (Mittelwalde) apart from 12 other localities in the belt extending from Racibórz (Ratibor) to Klodzko (Kladsko). On the Soviet request Czechoslovak troops returned to the border line and hostilities were prevented. According to the August 22 census there were 538 Czechoslovak citizens and 2,512 ethnic Czechs in the Klodzko (Glatz) area. Observing the unstable situation, many of them crossed the border to Czechoslovakia and the rest had been verified by the end of May in 1947. 1,094 were found to be Czechs and 434 Germans. The latter were expelled to Germany. By 1950 90% of the verified Czechs had left for Czechoslovakia. At the beginning of the 1950s on the other side of the border in the county of Náchod (Nachod) there were 1,112 Klodzko (Glatz) Czechs. Later many of them left for Germany to join their families (Jira’sek, 1991: 57-59; Palys, 1995: 33-49). After 1950 those who remained in Lower Silesia often declared themselves as Germans and left for West and East Germany. At present there are still about 2,000 ethnic Czechs in Lower Silesia. Usually they are members of the Reformed evangelical Church out of whose 10 parishes 2 are located in Lower Silesia, in Strzelin (Strehlen) and Pstrązyna (Strausseney, Straussdörfel)\(^{571}\). These are the centers of Czech life in Silesia. Some Czech members of this Church attend celebrations at this Church’s unPolish communes at Jelena Góra (Hirschberg), Cieplice (Bad Warmbrunn)\(^ {572}\) and Wroclaw (Breslau). It is more difficult to estimate the number of Moravians/Czechs in Upper Silesia, as they were more often than not lumped with the Autochthons and officially deemed as Poles. However, in the light of economic contacts between the Upper Silesian and Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) industrial basins the Český ústřední výbor (Central Czech Council) was established at Katowice (Kattowitz) in 1953 (Pudlo, 1995: 87-90). The influx of Czechoslovak citizens was also facilitated by the administration of the Czechoslovak Odra (Oder) navy which had existed from the late 1940s up to 1956 (Pacult, 1997: 10).

\(^{571}\) Today, part of Kudowa-Zdrój (Bad Kudowa).
\(^{572}\) Today, part of Jelena Góra (Hirschberg).
In the 1940s the full scale Polish-Czechoslovak conflict was prevented by the position of the Soviet Union. On March 18, 1947, having observed that the parties do not wish to come to any clear agreement on their own, Moscow forced Prague to sign the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement on friendship and mutual aid. The question of the border was to be put in order during next two years. Although this matter had not been settled as required, both the parties resigned to the pre-Munich status quo in relation to the borders and this situation was reaffirmed by the Polish-Czechoslovak border treaty signed at Warsaw on June 13, 1958. Some subsequent minor frontier adjustments led to the exchange of 700.9 ha of the Polish territory for 309 ha of the Czechoslovak territory through purchase (Janák, 1993a: 246; Palys, 1995: 48).

The postwar population shifts were rounded up roughly by 1950. The place vacated by 3 mln expelled Sudetic and Carpathian Germans, 165,000 expelled Hungarians, 10,000 Ruthenians/Ukrainians who left for the Soviet Union, and several hundreds of Poles who left for Poland, was taken by 1.9 mln Czechs and Slovaks, and 35,000 Ruthenians/Ukrainians as well as 60,000 Czech and Slovak emigrants and 30,000 Ruthenian/Ukrainian emigrants (Magocsi, 1995: 48). In the case of Czech Silesia the most drastic exchange of population took place in West Silesia which had been predominantly German in character before 1945. Thus majority of the current inhabitants of this region settled there after 1945 unlike in the case of czech East Silesia. Its ethnic make up had been overwhelmingly Slavic before 1945, and, what is more, the planned thorough expulsion of ethnic Poles was not carried out, so its character remained largely the same less the several tens of thousands of Germans who were expelled. The region’s population started to swell since the beginning of the 1950s when heavy industry was being extended in the Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) basin in accordance with the communist model of development. In 1951-1965 its population grew by 119,798. Besides Czechs, the newcomers were numerous Slovaks, Romas, and even Bulgars, Macedonians and Greeks (Janák, 1992: 134-137). In 1950 Czech East Silesia’s populace of 219,811, and consisted from 155,146 (70.6%) Czechs, 59,005 (26.8%) Poles, 4,388 (2%) Slovaks, and 1,272 (0.6%) others. In 1961 the numbers were: 281,183, 205,785 (73.2%), 58,876 (20.9%), 13,223 (4.7%) and 3,299 (1.2%). In 1970: 350,825, 263,047 (75%), 56,075 (16%), 26,806 (7.6%) and 4,897 (1.4%), whereas in 1980: 366,559, 281,548 (76.8%), 51,586 (14.1%), 28,719 (7.8%) and 4,706 (1.3%) (Zahradník, 1992a: 250).

Considering, the administrative division of Czech Silesia, it returned to a similar form which had existed before 1938. First of all, Czech Silesia had not constituted a separate entity since 1928, and the Moravian wedge between West and East Silesia had been gradually merged with the Silesian territory. The distinctiveness of Czech Silesia was partly recognized when the on May 17, 1945 the SNR was transformed into the Silesian Expozitura of the Brno (Brünn) ZNV. Besides 8 Silesian counties it included two Moravian ones, as well as the two urban counties of Ostrava (Ostrau) and Opava (Troppau). In accordance with the act of December 12, 1948, on January 1, 1949 the new administrative division was implemented. Once again Silesia was submerged in Moravia. Its territory was divided into the Moravian-Silesian regions of Olomouc (Olmitz) and Ostrava (Ostrau). In the years 1949-1960, the former contained 3 counties from the area formerly controlled by the Expozitura, and the latter 11. The overall number of counties grew due to the influx of population in and development of the Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) industrial basin. On April 9, 1960, Czechoslovakia’s administrative structure was overhauled again and all of czech Silesia found itself in the North Moravian Region. The territory of Czech Silesia was divided into 7 counties (Grim, 1992: 79).

The administrative, legislative changes and the process of expulsion accompanied by the influx of Polish settlers in the case of the former German Silesia, and of Czech and Slovak settlers in the case of Czech Silesia, created faits accomplis, which, with the active support of the Soviet Union and the tacit acceptance of the Western Allies, allowed the postwar Poland to take over the larger part of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, and the Czechs to take over the German property. The process was accompanied by the efforts of the Polish Catholic Church to do the same for the former German territories which were included in the postwar Polish borders, in order not to allow the increasingly pro-Soviet government deprive the faithful of pastoral service in this area. What is more, before 1939, the Catholic Church had enjoyed the status of the primus inter pares in Poland, and had strongly contributed to the building of
Polish statehood as many of its members had been active Polish nationalists, Catholicism had formed the very core of Polish nationalism, and the powers of royal regent had been vested in the primate for the periods of interregnum. After the war the Polish Catholic Church did wish to regain its prewar position and perceived itself as the bulwark of the traditional Polish nationhood against godless pro-Soviet communism. In accordance with these aims, and sure of support of the majority of the overwhelmingly Catholic population, the Polish primate Hlond, whom American soldiers had freed from German captivity in the Wiedenbrück monastery near Paderborn on April 1, 1945, arrived at Rome on April 8. Since April 24 he had spoken many times with the pope Pius XII (1939-1958) striving to secure special prerogatives which would enable him to effectively administer the Polish Catholic Church even if the communists effectively sealed any channels of contacts between it and the Holy See as it had occurred in the Soviet Union after 1918 and led to the crumbling of the acephalous Catholic Church over there because no one had received any special papal powers which could have made it possible for one to revert the situation or limit the damage. The repeat of the sad scenario in the case of Poland one of the most Catholic states in the world was most unwelcome to the Vatican, but quite possible, since, during the war, Pius XII had made himself equally unpopular among the Polish communists and the Polish emigre government having entrusted the administration of the Polish diocese of Culm (Chelm) to a German bishop, established the position of the apostolic administrator for the German faithful in Wartheland (Wielkopolska), and nominated a German suffragan bishop to the Wilno/Wilna (Vilnius) diocese, among others (Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 194). Under these conditions aggravated by the Polish communist-dominated government who broke the concordat, on July 8, the pope granted Hlond with the extraordinary prerogatives (facultates specialisimae) which were almost equal to the papal power but limited the Polish territory (in tutto il territorio polacco) (Adamczuk, 1991: 114; Hupka, 1997: 5; Mandziuk, 1996: 137; Micewski, 1994: 8/9; Scholz, 1989: 221-228).

On July 20, Hlond returned to Poznań (Posen) and commenced making preparations for establishing the administration of the Polish Catholic Church in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete against the wishes of the pro-Soviet authorities who wished to weaken the position of the Church in the Polish society in accordance with the communist dogma. In case of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese the largest and the most Catholic of all the dioceses in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, as well as the center of the East German Ecclesiastical Province, the daunting task of taking over it was made easier by the death of the 86-year-old Breslau (Wrocław) archbishop Bertram who passed away on July 6 in his palace in Johannesberg (Jánský Vrch) in the Czech Silesian part of his diocese. He could have effectively opposed Hlond as the Chairman of the Fulda Committee of the German catholic Church. The members of the Breslau (Wrocław) Chapter elected the Upper Silesian Ferdinand Piontek (1878-1963) to the position of the chapter vicar in order not to leave the archdiocese acephalous in the times of the postwar commotion. The Katowice (Kattowitz) bishop Adamski, who actively supported the policies of Hlond, three times travelled to Wrocław (Breslau in May and July, 1945 to convince the Breslau (Wrocław) chapter that expulsion of the German population as well as German priests was unavoidable and that it was indispensable to establish an Opole (Oppeln) vicariate general. Finally, when the Potsdam Agreement of August 2 transferred the Deutsche Ostgebiete under the provisional administration of Poland and the Soviet Union, Hlond decided to meet Piontek. During the encounter on August 12, Hlond pressed Piontek to resign and the latter eventually succumbed. The so much needed precedence was established. On August 15 Hlond instituted Polish ecclesiastical administration in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, which was divided into five apostolic administrations to which five administrators were nominated. The changes went into force on the symbolic date of September 1 the sixth anniversary of the outbreak of the war. The territory of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese was divided into the apostolic administrations of Opole (Oppeln), Wrocław (Breslau) and Gorzów (Landsberg). The Opole (Oppeln) administration contained the Upper Silesian section of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese as well as the Branitz (Branice) vicariate general of the Olomouc (Olmutz) archdiocese. The Wrocław (Breslau) administration embraced the larger part of the Lower Silesian area of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese together with the Glatz (Klodzko) vicariate general of the Prague archdiocese, and a fragment of the Zittau county which belonged to the Meissen diocese. The Gorzów (Landsberg) administration comprised the Brandenburg area of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese, the Pomeranian and Brandenburg
sections of the Berlin diocese and the Free Prelatehood of Schneidemühl (Pila). Moreover, the West and East Silesian sections of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese within the Czechoslovak borders were left to be administered by the Olomouc (Olomütz) archdiocese. Considering the rest of the East German ecclesiastical province, the Polish part of the Ermland (Warmia) diocese was turned into the Warmia (Ermland) administration, whereas the Soviet section went defunct. The Lower Silesian/Lusatian and Brandenburg sections573 of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese (with 90,000 faithful) which remained in Germany positioned east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line were administered as the truncated Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese from Görlitz by Piontek who took over the Görlitz Archbishopric Office on March 17, 1947 with the full support of Pius XII. To the positions of the apostolic administrators of the Opole (Oppeln), Wrocław (Breslau) and Gorzów (Landsberg) apostolic administrations Hlond nominated the Upper Silesian Bolesław Kominek (1903-1974), the East Silesian Karol Milik (1892-1976) and Edmund Nowicki, respectively (Adamczuk, 1991: 114; Bahlcke, 1996: 216; Micewski, 1994: 7-9; Myszor, 1996: 11; Scheuermann, 1994: 103, 1238/1239; Scholz, 1989: 56-69, 222/223, 236-239).

The establishment of the Polish apostolic administrations in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete was not a smooth process as some German priests and hierarchs opposed it on the ground that they deemed it illegal. They opined that the phrase used by Pius in tutto il territorio polacco in the facultates specialissimae conferred on Hlond on July 8, 1945 referred only to Poland within its prewar borders and could not denote the section of the Deutsche Ostgebiete transferred under the provisional Polish administration only on August 2 at Potsdam (Hupka, 1997: 5). What is more, the Allies Protocol over the Zones of Occupation and Administration of Berlin, which was signed at London on September 12, 1944, and went into force on May 7 and 8, 1945, introduced the concept of Germany within its December 31, 1937 borders which was not erased by the Potsdam Agreement and was written into the Basic Law of the FRG. Thus Polish and Soviet de facto possession of the Deutsche Ostgebiete was not recognized de jure. Hence, from the viewpoint of international law, the section of the Deutsche Ostgebiete within the postwar Polish borders did not constitute part of the Polish territory (Blumenwitz, 1989: 24, 46/47). However, in the light of the permanent Soviet seizure of the Polish eastern territories, the Polish communist authorities supported by Moscow (bent on introducing irreconcilable hatred between Germany and Poland) stuck fast to their mythological-propagandistic interpretation which deemed the Deutsche Ostgebiete the ancient Polish recovered territories, and, as such, the constituent part of the Polish territory. So although the postwar Polish communist-dominated government was at odds with the Church on the ideological ground, the latter readily embraced the propaganda of recovered territories and contributed to annexing the former Deutsche Ostgebiete by establishing its own ecclesiastical administration in this territory, in an effort to retain its traditional influence among the Polish populace and to remain the basis of Polish nationalism. However, in the case of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese, except Piontek’s unwilling resignation, instilling of the Polish ecclesiastical administration was not so smooth as it may appear from the perusal of the Polish sources (cf.: Micewski, 1994: 10/11). In August 1945, Hlond informed the Glatz (Klodzko) vicar general Franz Monse and the Branitz (Branice) vicar general, the Upper Silesian Josef Martin Nathan (1867-1947) that they should transfer their vicariates (belonging to the Prague and Olomouc (Olomütz) archdioceses, respectively) which happened to fall within the postwar Polish borders, under the Polish ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They were reluctant to do so without any prior order from their respective archbishops and the pope, so in mid-September the Wrocław (Breslau) apostolic administrator Milik forcefully seized Monse’s Klodzko (Glatz) office with the aid of Polish soldiers, and at the same time Hlond met Nathan at Branitz (Branice) vicar general, the Upper Silesian Josef Martin Nathan (1867-1947) that they should transfer their vicariates (belonging to the Prague and Olomouc (Olomütz) archdioceses, respectively) which happened to fall within the postwar Polish borders, under the Polish ecclesiastical jurisdiction. They were reluctant to do so without any prior order from their respective archbishops and the pope, so in mid-September the Wrocław (Breslau) apostolic administrator Milik forcefully seized Monse’s Klodzko (Glatz) office with the aid of Polish soldiers, and at the same time Hlond met Nathan at Branitz (Branice) and coerced him to give his vicariate up to the Opole (Oppeln) apostolic administrator Kominek. Due to his illness Nathan arrived at Opole (Oppeln) and complied with Hlond’s wish only at the beginning of October (Kaps, 1990: 23/24). Moreover, Hlond did not manage to get in touch with the Berlin bishop Konrad von Preysing in relation of the official transfer of the Pomeranian and Brandenburg sections of his diocese to the Gorzów (Landsberg) administration, and neither did he so in the case of the four Saxon parishes belonging to the Meissen

573 The part of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese which remained in Germany, consisted from the Brandenburg and Lower Silesian/Lusatian sections forming one continuous territory, and from the separate tiny Brandenburg strip east of Berlin (Scholz, 1989: 236/237).
diocese. In the latter case, finally on January 24, 1948 Milik managed to obtain a letter from the Meissen bishop Petrus Legge, in which the latter transferred the four parishes to the Wroclaw (Breslau) administration with the knowledge of the Holy See but without his consent (Scholz, 1989: 64-68).

The tension between the Polish Church and the Polish communist government increased so after the demise of Hlond in 1948, Pius XII transferred the primate’s facultates specialissimae to his successor Stefan Wyzyński (Fischer-Wollpert, 1990: 194). On January 28, 1951, the government removed the apostolic administrators from his posts574 and supplanted them with hand-picked chapter vicars who were elected in accordance with the government’s wishes. In this manner Warsaw wanted to subjugate the ecclesiastical structure in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, and to do away with the provisional character of the Church administration in these territories. Wyzyński accepted the government’s actions and the vicars not to allow a schism to occur. But while in Rome, Wyzyński convinced Pius XII that for the sake of the continuity of the Catholic Church in Poland it was necessary to nominate residential bishops for the apostolic administrations in the Deutsche Ostgebiete. Following this line of reasoning, on April 28, 1951, the pope nominated the five bishops. Among others, Teodor Bensch was entrusted with the Gorzów (Landsberg) diocese, Kominek with the Wroclaw (Breslau) diocese, and Franciszek Jop (1897-1976) with the Opole (Oppeln) diocese. After cooling down of the relations between the Church and the government, they were able to take over their dioceses in December 1956. Thus, as in the case of the civilian administration of the Deutsche Ostgebiete by the Polish state, a modicum of stability of the ecclesiastical division of the territories was attained in the 1950s (Micewski, 1994: 26, 35, 41; Mikolajec, 1996: 155).

Having observed the postwar demographic, administrative and Catholic Church administration alterations in Silesia, it is indispensable to have a cursory look at the developments in the case of other denominations albeit one should bear in mind that due to the expulsion of Germans and the influx of Polish settlers and expellees, the whole of Silesia within the Polish borders became almost uniformly Catholic.

Considering the Union evangelical Church of German Silesia and the former Silesian Voivodeship, it gradually disappeared with the expulsion of its faithful, and it was finally dissolved with the decree of September 19th, 1946 and the act of July 4, 1947. Its property was taken over by the state or the Catholic Church. The Union Church’s Upper Silesian faithful who, predominantly, were Upper Silesians could be verified as Autochthons. However, the Catholic Church and the authorities used their denomination as the proof of their Germanness so that they counted only to 16,800 in 1950, i.e. 50% of their prewar number. Immediately after the war, the Polish evangelical Church of the Augsburg Creed started organizing its structures in the Deutsche Ostgebiete mainly with the help of Cieszyn (Teschen) activists whose parish with 8,000 members is the largest in Poland. Upper Silesia together with Polish East Silesia were contained in the Katowice (Kattowitz) (with the seat at Bytom (Beuthen)) and Cieszyn (Teschen) dioceses whereas Lower Silesia in the Wroclaw (Breslau) diocese575. However, the former diocese also contained Malopolska, while the latter also the Brandenburg and Pomeranian sections of the Deutsche Ostgebiete. In 1950 there were 35,000 faithful in the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese, and 7,000 in the Wroclaw (Breslau) diocese. The recognized indubitable Germans who were retained by the Polish government as valuable specialists especially in the region of the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) industrial basin predominantly were Protestants. In 1949 they numbered around 65,000. They were allowed to gather in their own unPolish religious communes where pastoral service was provided by the Polish evangelical Church. After majority of them left for East Germany in 1956-1960, the number of the members of these unPolish communes plummeted to 1,600 in 1959 and 940 in 1968. They were not

574 The situation became difficult in the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese too. Bishop Adamski mobilized his faithful for the sake of reinstating religious instructions at school, and the authorities removed him from his post on November 7, 1952. He was allowed to resume his duties on November 5, 1956 (Myszor, 1996: 11).

575 As of 1992, on the territory of Poland there were altogether six dioceses of the Polish evangelical Church. They are, apart from those enumerated above, the dioceses of Masuria, Warsaw and Pomerania-Wielkopolska (Karsi, 1994: 121).
included in the structures or the statistics of the Polish evangelical Church until 1993. Only then the remaining 8 unPolish communes with 300 faithful, were overhauled into the German parish of Wroclaw (Breslau), which the Polish evangelical Church included in its structures. Obviously, the faithful of Upper Silesia and Masuria, considered to be the Autochthons (i.e. Poles-in-making) were not allowed to establish their unPolish communes and were included in the Polish evangelical Church. Their massive emigration to West and East Germany after 1956, strongly contributed to the dramatic decrease of the Church’s membership from 256,000 in 1949 and 200,000 in 1950 to 100,000 in 1964 and 66,000 in 1992. Consequently, in 1993 in Silesia there were 13,662 faithful in the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese, 2,186 in the Wroclaw (Breslau) diocese, and 33,000 in the Cieszyn (Teschen) diocese. Thus the last diocese though territorially the smallest contains half of all the Church’s member today (Bahlcke, 1996: 192; Karski, 1994: 120-122; Pawlak, 1997: 6E; Szczepankiewicz-Battek, 1996: 12-14, 19-28).

The shift of the Polish expellees from the former Polish eastern territories as well as the forced disentanglement of the Lemko/Ruthenian/Ukrainian population of the south-eastern corner of the postwar Poland, and resettlement of both the groups to the former Deutsche Ostgebiete caused coming into being of the centers of eastern rites and the Polish Orthodox Church in these ex-German territories where they had not existed prior to 1945. Out of the three prewar Greek Catholic (Uniate) dioceses of Poland only the western part of the Przemyśl diocese remained in Poland after 1945 and the Lemko apostolic administration with its headquarters at Sanok. Due to the negative attitude of the Polish communist government to this Church it was impossible to elect its new bishop after 1946, so Pius XII entrusted the position of the ordinary of the Greek Catholic Church to the Polish primate in 1947. In 1987 the primate Józef Glemp established the north-western and south-eastern vicariates general of this Church. The latter consists of the two Przemyśl and Wroclaw (Breslau) deaneries. The Wroclaw (Breslau) deanery possesses 14 points of pastoral service in Lower Silesia and 4 in Upper Silesia. In 1989 John Paul II nominated the first postwar Greek Catholic bishop in Poland, and in 1991 he was raised to the rank of the ordinary. All of the three deaneries of the Armenian Catholic Church remained beyond the Polish borders in 1945, and the position of the ordinary of this church was vested in the Polish primate. The situation continues to this day. The faithful can obtain pastoral service at Cracow, Gdaśk (Danzig) and Gliwice (Gleiwitz). Only in the two latter localities there are the only two Armenian Catholic parishes in Poland, whereas only the Gliwice (Gleiwitz) parish has its own church (Adamczuk, 1991: 58-60, 68-70, 75-80). Considering, the Polish Orthodox Church with the second largest number of the faithful in Poland, its diocesan structure was considerably changed after the loss of the former Polish eastern territories where the members of the Church had concentrated before 1945. At present the majority of the faithful reside in the east of Poland and in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete. The Church is divided into 4 dioceses organized into the ecclesiastical province with the metropolitan seat at Warsaw. Lower Silesia along with the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship is contained in the Wroclaw-Szczecin (Breslau-Stettin) diocese with the seat in Wroclaw whereas the rest of Upper Silesia in the Lódź-Poznań (Lodz-Posen) diocese. In Silesia the Orthodox faithful concentrate mainly in northern Lower Silesia and are organized into 21 parishes (Pawlak, 1997: 6D).

In regard of Czech Silesia, West Silesia was traditionally strongly Catholic whereas Těšín (Teschen) Silesia quite Protestant. From the ethnic point of view, Germans and Czechs of West Silesia were religiously homogenous, unlike in Těšín (Teschen) Silesia where Czechs, Moravians were usually adherents of the Catholic Church whereas Germans, Poles and Silesians of the evangelical Church (Anon., 1905: 371). In Bohemia and Moravia the Czechs and the Germans were usually Catholics, but in 1880, there were 32,000 Czech Lutherans (members of the Austrian evangelical Church of the Augsburg Creed) and 109,000 Czech Calvinists out of Cisleithania’s 260,000 Lutherans and 120,000 Calvinists. So, at that time, the Czechs constituted 37.1% of Cisleithania’s all Protestants. However, in 1910, Catholics dominated accounting for 96% of the populace living on the territories of the would-be Czechoslovakia. Masaryk, having based Czech nationalism on Protestantism, instituted the radical division between the Church and the state on February 29, 1920, in accordance with the French model. He encouraged equally radical reforms in the Catholic Church of Czechoslovakia to break its power which still bound the new state to Austria, Germany and Rome. The reforms led to a schism, which, on January 8, 1920, brought about the emergence of the Czechoslovak Church independent of the Vatican. The number of its
members skyrocketed from 200,000 to 800,000 ensuring, along Protestants, growing support of Catholics for the new state and its policies because the Czechoslovak Church, not unlike the Protestant Churches, was subjugated to the state which was a drastic change from the Catholic model propagating autonomy of the Catholic Church and subjugation to the pope only. Building of the Czechoslovak state and nationalism at the cost of the Catholic Church sealed any effective relations with the Holy See, and alienated the Sudetic Germans. Beginning with 1918, they started establishing their own ecclesiastical and religious organizations which allowed the Sudetic German clergy and faithful establish their own structures and religious life within the remaining diocesan structures, which could not be adjusted to the new state borders and the new needs of the faithful due to the ideological enmity between Prague and the Vatican. In 1938 the Czechoslovak government strove to suppress the separate religious and political life of the Sudetic Germans as perilous to the unity of the state. In 1939 similar precautions were taken against the czech catholics of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The ideologically motivated subjugation of the Churches and religious life to the interests of the state, which had started in Czechoslovakia already in 1918, was joined by the strict communist clamp down after the World War II. In result, the Churches weakened by the prewar Czechoslovak policies could not oppose the atheistic trend unlike in Poland (Schenk, 1993: 128-131; Prinz, 1995: 421-423). The religious life in Czechoslovakia, was freed from the communist fetters only after the success of the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Little was known about the religious life of the Czechoslovak citizens before the census of 1991. According to it, in the Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) industrial basin and in West Silesia there were 39.2% Catholics, 36.2% atheists. In the southern part of Těšín Silesia and the adjacent Moravian wedge 47.1% of the populace were Catholics and 25.8% atheists. The remaining percentage is accounted for by the various Protestant Churches and people who did not declare themselves as atheists or adherents of any denomination. It is worth mentioning that in Těšín (Teschen) Silesia there are 43,141 members of the evangelical Church, predominantly Poles and Silesians (Janák, 1992: 139).

The notion of Silesia took a curious twist in Germany after the end of the World War II. The diminished postwar Germany became the new home to the refugees, expellees and resettlers (Aussiedlers) from the Deutsche Ostgebiete. Also the majority of the inhabitants of prewar Silesia were relocated there ensuring the continuance of various traditions peculiar to this region. The two strongest driving forces which kept them going and sticking to the memories of their largely idealized homeland, were the affinity to their Landesleute (fellow countrymen) in the alien environs outside the usual social networks and usually in the state of abject deprivation, and the hope that they would be able to return after the conclusion of the would-be peace conference. No such conference took place after the war due to the outbreak of the Cold War, which left the German question largely unresolved until the decisions of the Two plus Four conference in 1990 a delayed ersatz peace conference officially doing away with the effects of World War II which had not been solved after 1945. This postponement spawned certain peculiarities which had haunted the European relations up to 1990. The largest bone of contention was the Deutsche Ostgebiete. With the London Protocol of September 12, 1944 pertaining to the future zones of occupation in Germany, the Allies decided that Germany existed in its December 31, 1937 frontiers, i.e. within those which had been established after World War I before the territorial aggrandizements effected by Hitler. This decision was not altered by any allied agreements taken jointly after the war (Blumenwitz, 1989: 24-29, 73). In the Potsdam Protocol, which established the provisional postwar order in Europe, Art IXb described the new Polish western border and placed the former Deutsche Ostgebiete (except the northern part of East Prussia placed under the Soviet administration) under the Polish administration. However, it did not stipulate recognition of the frontier in the light of international law as the Soviet foreign minister V. M. Molotov opined interpreting Art IXb in conjunction with Art XIII on orderly transfers of German populations from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The notion of Poland used in Art XIII did mean the Polish territory and the Deutsche Ostgebiete placed under the Polish administration, but the Western Allies emphasized that the joint reading of the two articles is unintended, and that the recognition of the de facto Polish-German border must await the peace conference (Blumenwitz, 1989: 87/88; De Zayas, 1989: 166/167). This interpretation though argued against by Moscow, the Soviet Union did tacitly espouse as is clearly visible in the Soviet-Polish treaty of August 16, 1945, which describes the course of the Soviet-Polish border through East Prussia. This document
repeats the peace settlement reservations in reference to the Potsdam Agreement (Blumenwitz, 1989: 40). Hence, from the legal point of view Germany continued to exist within its December 31, 1937 borders, and as such included Silesia short of the former Silesian Voivodeship and Czech East Silesia. The only legally effective change enacted in relation to the former Deutsche Ostgebiete was the abolition of the State of Prussia on February 25, 1947 with the Allied Control Council’s Law No 46 (Blumenwitz, 1989: 89). Thus Silesia and other provinces of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete got deprived of their uniting mantle in the form of the Prussian Land, whereas the Prussian territories east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line were administratively reorganized usually as separate Länder (Jähnig, 1991: 162). This abolition of Prussia the cradle of German nationalism and statehood, coupled with the expulsion of the overwhelming majority of its populace, became more final than the 18th-century partitions of Poland-Lithuania, as the Polish and Lithuanian statehoods were recreated in 1918 but there is no such possibility for Prussia in the obvious dearth of Prussians.

In the light of the Soviet law the northern East Prussian part of the Deutsche Ostgebiete was incorporated into the Soviet territory on February 25, 1947 as the Kaliningrad (Königsburg), whereas the incorporation of the rest of the Deutsche Ostgebiete into Poland, had been, for all practical reasons, completed by January 11, 1949 when the MZZ (which had controlled the territories) was phased out (Moldawa, 1991: 99). Meanwhile, in 1946/1947 the Länder structure of Germany was overhauled ensuring, after the abolition of Prussia, that no Land could dominate the other (Jähnig, 1991: 161/162). By 1947 the Länder of the western zones of occupation had freely elected parliamentary assemblies unlike those of the Soviet zone, where sovietization of the political life was not congruent with the tenets of democracy. When it had become apparent by 1947 that the SU would not permit free multiparty elections throughout Germany, the Americans and the British amalgamated their zones of occupation into Bizonia. One month before the lifting of the Berlin blockade in May 1949, the French began to merge their zone into Bizonia, which became Trizonia. Finally the FRG came into being also in May after all the Länder except Bavaria had ratified the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). In reply the SU turned its zone into the GDR which came into being in October 1949 when its constitution had been ratified (Turner, 1992: 125-127). The formation of the two states was completed only when, on March 25, 1954, the SU declared the GDR a sovereign power, and the Western Allies, on May 5, 1955, recognized sovereignty of the FRG. Nonetheless, the SU and the Western Allies reserved a varying degree of control over the GDR and the FRG, respectively (Blumenwitz, 1989: 32), until, in result of the Two plus Four talks, united Germany regained full sovereignty on October 3, 1991. In regard to the Deutsche Ostgebiete, the GDR officially renounced any identification with the German Reich unlike the FRG, which, through the Basic Law, became the successor of the German Reich. As such, albeit the FRG’s sovereignty was limited to the area where the Basic Law was effective, West Germany became the guardian of the whole German territory defined as Germany within its December 31, 1937 borders as well as of the task of uniting Germany in future. Moreover, it was distinguished between the FRG’s territorial sovereignty over the eastern territory (the GDR) which was still possessed by Germany as a whole, and sovereign rights exercised by Poland and the SU in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete. Following this line of thought, it was argued that Germany (the FRG) was the rightful owner of the Deutsche Ostgebiete although Poland and the SU had become rightful possessors of the territories. Poland and the SU possessed the territories without owning them, so that they could not make final dispositions concerning their status pending the conclusion of a final peace treaty (Blumenwitz, 1989: 32/33, 38, 41).

Under the Soviet pressure and despite the opposition of the Western Allies and the FRG, on July 6, 1950 at Zgorzelec (Görlitz)577, the GDR concluded with Poland the border treaty, in which it quasi-recognized the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line as the Polish western border but only confirming it as an inviolable frontier of peace and friendship. In the treaty the word recognition was not used, so the purely declaratory recognition was not a final determination of a legal territorial border. Moreover, the GDR not

576 The special status of Berlin was established in 1948 (Blumenwitz, 1989: 38) and the Saar was reincorporated into the FRG as a separate Land only in 1957.

577 After 1945 Görlitz got dissected by the Western Neisse (Nysa) into the smaller Polish part renamed as Zgorzelec, and the German one which retained the name of Görlitz.
being the successor of the German Reich, could not legally dispose of the *Deutsche Ostgebiete* (Blumenwitz, 1989: 37/38, 96/97). On September 9, 1953 the day after the elections Konrad Adenauer attempted to solve this stalemate between the *de facto* and *de jure* situation of the former *Deutsche Ostgebiete*. He proposed that the territories could be administered as a German-Polish condominium \(^578\) or be placed under the United Nations. It was impossible to realize this idea at the time of the Cold War and neither was it popular in the FRG, so it was not repeated (Wiskemann, 1956: 206/207) until 1990 when the Brandenburg Premier Manfred Stolpe and the *Bund der Vertriebenen* (BdV, Union of Expellees) secretary general Hartmut Koschky proposed turning Poland’s former *Deutsche Ostgebiete* and the adjacent German Länder into a large Euroregion which would have easier access to the Common Market than the rest of Poland (Ociepka, 1997: 102; Urban, 1994: 125, 140). Afterwards, the deteriorating relations between the Soviet bloc and the West resulted in almost total isolation symbolized by the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. The official East-West enmity ran as a fault line through Germany rocking the FRG and the GDR at the times when the Cold War intensified edging to the breakout of a hot war. Diplomatic contacts and attempts at resolving the effects of World War II were resumed only at the beginning of the 1970s when the detente commenced. However, even earlier Catholic and evangelical Church circles strove to break the official vicious circle of hatred and recriminations.

In the second half of the 1940s, following the flight and expulsion of the Germans east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line, Protestant and Catholic Church organizations were the first ones to assist the refugees and expellees, especially in the western zones of occupation. They formed the springboard for later social, cultural and political organizations of the refugees and expellees in the FRG (Bahlcke, 1996: 171/172). Neither wishing to forfeit their right to the *Deutsche Ostgebiete* written by the Allies into the Basic Law, nor repeating the tragedy of inhuman war to execute their right, on August 5, 1950 the Charter of the German Expellees was proclaimed by the unknown expellee in Stuttgart at a large meeting in the presence of members of the federal government, the Churches and of the Länder’s assemblies. The charter was signed by 30 top representatives and politicians of the expellees, and endorsed at large meetings in all parts of the FRG. On the basis of the Christian values, the charter stated in Art 1: We, the expellees, renounce all thought of revenge and retaliation. Thus not resigning from their wish to return to their respective homelands, the expellees obliged themselves to strive to achieve this goal through peaceful means which hopefully would be provided by a foreseen process of European integration. Obviously, at the height of the Cold War the charter was not publicized in the Soviet bloc where the hysterical anti-German propaganda prevailed. Sadly enough it is still largely unknown to the Polish public even at present, with the exception of a handful of scholars (Ociepka, 1997: 84/85, 310). The almost hermetic isolation between the FRG and Poland was slightly dented, in 1956, by the retreat from stalinism in the Soviet bloc. For the first time a delegation of the Polish evangelical Church arrived in the FRG to attend a meeting at Frankfurt am Main, and in February 1957, Martin Niemöller (1892-1984), the superintendent of the German evangelical Church visited Poland on the invitation of the authorities of the Polish evangelical Church (Karski, 1994: 123). After having returned he scandalized the German public opinion by stating that that land [i.e. the Deutsche Ostgebiete] is not ours any more. His conciliatory attitude was espoused by the elite Protestant scholars. In 1961 they put together the Tübingen Memorandum, which after the thorough discussion with Bundestag deputies, was publicized in February 1962. They appealed for reconciliation between Germany and Poland in order to make it impossible for the SU to pit the states against each other. The negative outcry made the German evangelical Church not to accept it as its official stance. However, in October 1965 the Church espoused the Eastern Memorandum, which short of delivering political statements, called for East-West dialogue and pointed to acceptance of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line as the Polish-German border on the theological grounds (Heller, 1995: 5; Hild, 1994: 106/107). In the meantime the Catholic hierarchy more closely bound to interstate relations through concordats, territorial organization of the Catholic Church and its supranational, universal character, were slower to undertake conciliatory moves in the situation of the.

\(^{578}\) It seems that for the sake of ensuring future unity, which could not have been obtained without the unanimous consent of all the four wartime allies, it was assumed that the SU should keep its relatively small part of the former *Deutsche Ostgebiete*. 
provisional order postwar order not settled by a peace conference. Despite the atmosphere of enmity and suspicion, in the 1940s, the Opole (Oppeln) apostolic administrator Kominek strove to ensure pastoral service in German for the Germans rounded up for expulsion (Sitek, 1995: 12), and after being freed in 1956 when he took over the Wroclaw (Breslau) apostolic administration, Kominek said German masses and organized German pastoral service for the indubitable Germans of Lower Silesia before majority of them left at the turn of the 1950s and the 1960s. However, in agreement with the official line of the state he never used German in Upper Silesia, considered primordially Polish by the propaganda (Urban, 1994: 179/180). On the other hand, Berlin bishop Julius Döpfner was the first German Catholic hierarch to publicly call for acceptance of the fact that terrible wrongs were perpetrated by Germans against Poles in 1933-1945, and by the latter against the former after 1945, in order to commence a reconciliation process (Heller, 1995: 1; Stehle, 1994: 93). Kominek had maintained correspondence with some German hierarchs, especially of Upper Silesian extraction whom he had got to know before 1945. The opportunity for more intensive contacts between Polish and German bishop was provided by the the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). Hoping to invite German bishops to the celebrations of the millennium of Poland’s baptism (1966), the Polish bishops, without any prior consultations with the Polish authorities, compiled a letter in German and forwarded it to the German bishops in November 1965. Its most crucial sentence read: we forgive you and ask for forgiveness. This letter written by Kominek and authorized by Primate Wyszyński was an act of Christian feeling rather than political calculation, therefore, its conciliatory influence on the German-Polish relations has been visible to this day. However, the German bishops could not wholly endorse this letter and agree to the Polish ecclesiastical reorganization of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete as the Churches’s policy is to rather follow political changes than to be ahead of them. What is more, the overall world situation deteriorated in 1965 with the full scale US military involvement in the Vietnam War and the defeat of communism in Indonesia. Hence, the contacts between the West and the East came to a standstill, and the bishops letter was castigated by the Polish government which severely attacked the Polish Catholic Church branding it as unpatriotic and bending to West Germany. Large segments of the Polish population did support this stance unsure of their continued existence in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, and fearing that the territories would return to Germany in result of reconciliation leaving them homeless and unable to return to their homelands in the former Polish eastern territories annexed by the SU. Obviously, the Polish government did not allow German bishops to participate in the millennial celebrations in 1966 (Heller, 1995; Madajczyk, 1994; Stehle, 1994).

Although the conciliatory endeavors got frustrated by the intransigence of the Cold War, the need to maintain a modicum of contacts between the two blocs in order to prevent an accidental outbreak of another world war or to relieve an economic disaster was clearly demonstrated by the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the repeated Soviet crop failures in 1963 and 1965 which made the SU pay gold for wheat from Canada and Australia (Trager, 1992: 1002). The case of divided Germany illustrated this necessity even more clearly, and caused the West German government to make the first cautious dabs at Ostpolitik (eastern policy) in 1966-1968 when more openness between the FRG and the GDR was striven for (Bark, 1993: II 95-112). When the SPD won the elections in 1969 and Willy Brandt became the fourth chancellor of the FRG, he developed the timid Ostpolitik into the spearhead of the East-West detente which started at the beginning of the 1970s. Recognizing unity of Germany which could not allow recognition of the GDR as a separate state, Brandt proposed improved cooperation between the two German states and settling the matters which still awaited their solution at some illusory peace conference (Bark, 1993: II 168). He put an end to the Hallstein doctrine according to which the Bonn authorities had refused to maintain diplomatic relations with all those states (other than the SU) that recognized the GDR (Turner, 1992: 128). The Soviet bloc also welcomed the prospect of stabilizing the postwar status quo.

579 In 1965 he was elected to the position of the chairman of the Fulda Commission of the German Bishops.

580 For instance, since his theological studies he had been a friend of Gerhard Schaffran. In 1962 he was nominated to the position of suffragan of the truncated Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese limited to the area around Görlitz to assist aged Piontek, and Schaffran was elected to resume the former’s responsibilities when Piontek died in 1963 (Scheuermann, 1994: 1454; Stehle, 1994: 93).
and establishing diplomatic links with the West because the SU had not managed to spread communism all over the world restrained by the US policy of containment whereas, on the other hand, this ideology wreaked havoc with the communist states economies. Detente with the West meant descalation of armament race, technology transfers and trade so much needed for ensuring the continued existence of the Soviet bloc. For Poland, which had sought establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG already at the end of the 1950s (Linek, 1995: 111), it was a chance for normalizing the status of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete. In the wake of the intensive diplomatic meetings and negotiations Bonn opened the full-fledged East-West dialogue by its signature of the treaties:

- with the Soviet bloc countries at Moscow (1970), Warsaw (1970), Prague (1973);
- on the status of Berlin (1971/1972);
- and on the relations between the two Germanies (1972).

Brandt’s Ostpolitik also contributed to the signature of the SALT I, the first agreement ever on limiting strategic arms between the US and the SU (1972) (Bark, 1993: II 171).

The normalization of relations between the West and the East and, especially between the FRG and the Soviet bloc bore numerous fruits at the beginning of the 1970s before leading to the signature of the groundbreaking Helsinki Final Act in 1975. However, the process was also riddled with legal ambiguities especially in relation to the status of the Deutsche Ostgebiete, which considerably delayed ratification of the so-called Eastern treaties (i.e. the treaties concluded between the FRG and the Soviet bloc states). Most questions were raised by the Warsaw treaty (Treaty Concerning Basis for Normalizing Relations) (1970) which reaffirmed the Polish western border in the shape described by Art IX of the Potsdam Agreement. However, in this treaty similarly as in the other Eastern treaties where the subject of the postwar borders was dealt with, the word recognition was not used in relation to any of the frontiers. However, the clauses on inviolability of the existing borders, and renunciation of any territorial claims and the use of violence included in the Moscow and Warsaw treaties amounted to the de facto resigning from the Deutsche Ostgebiete. It caused CDU/CSU MPs accuse Brandt of violation of the Basic Law which defined the German territory as in the borders of December 31, 1937, and obliged the FRG to strive to seek unity of Germany within such frontiers. Espousing this view, Herbert Hupka, an SPD MP and a Silesian expellee activist defected his party on this issue in January 1972, and was followed by other expellee MPs (Bark, 1993: II 207/208) who perceived the CDU/CSU as the only guardian left, of their Recht auf die Heimat (right to return to their homeland) (Kimminich, 1989). The defections and the general uncertainty over some clauses of the Eastern treaties caused a considerable delay and the Bundestag ratified the most controversial Moscow and warsaw treaties only on May 17, 1972 but not before having stated its reservation in the resolution of May 10: The treaties do not anticipate a peace settlement for Germany by treaty and do not create any legal foundations for the frontiers existing today (Blumenwitz, 1989: 52/53, 112). On July 7, 1977 the Federal Constitutional Court upheld this interpretation stating that the Deutsche Ostgebiete had not been annexed after the war but only placed under Soviet and Polish administration in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement subject to the settlement of the territorial questions in a final peace treaty. Thus, the Eastern treaties did not remove from German sovereignty the territories east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa), nor did they permanently place this area under Soviet and Polish sovereignty (Blumenwitz, 1989: 65/66; Korbel, 1986: 15). But in spite of Bonn’s correct legal reservations, both friends and adversaries of the FRG regarded the treaties as tantamount to abandonment of all claims to the Deutsche Ostgebiete, a quarter of a century after the Potsdam Conference (Bark, 1993: II 188).

Also the Holy See promptly acted upon this decision. After 1945, the Vatican agreed to the semi-authorized establishment of the Polish ecclesiastical organization in the Deutsche Ostgebiete to save the most Catholic state of the forming Soviet bloc from atheization. On the other hand, the Polish diocesan structure of these territories was not officially recognized as it would have amounted to a breach of the Reich concordat of 1933, and certainly alienated the German Catholics, second only to the US Catholics in contributing to the Church after the success of the FRG’s Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). However, with the ratification of the Warsaw treaty, pope Paul VI appointed Polish bishops to Poland’s
recognized dioceses in the *Deutsche Ostgebiete* already in June 1972 (Bark, 1993: II 188/189). The third Eastern treaty concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1973 and ratified on July 10, 1974, least affected the status of Germany as a whole, as the nullification of the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938 presented no problems for the FRG since Bonn accepted that Germany only continued to exist after 1945 within its 1937 borders. The only thorny issue of the validity of German law in Sudetenland from 1938 to 1945 was resolved according to the Bonn’s wishes, since validity of the law in this period, was reaffirmed by the treaty (Bark, 1993: II 222/223; Blumenwitz, 1989: 50). Here the Vatican, had less ground to tread on in relation to these parts of the Prague and Olomouc (Olmutz) archdioceses which had passed to Poland as parts of the *Deutsche Ostgebiete*, and to these Czechoslovak fragments of the Breslau (Wroclaw) archdiocese which had been officially detached after the erection of the recognized Polish ecclesiastical organization in the *Deutsche Ostgebiete* in 1972. What is more, the continued suppression of the Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia visible in the vacant bishoprics and the rapid spread of atheism aggressively encouraged by the state, did not allow to settle the border discrepancies too soon. Most probably, under the coaxing of the Polish episcopate and in the atmosphere of detente sealed by the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, in December 1977 Paul VI issued a letter on the basis of which the Czechoslovak fragments of the Breslau (Wroclaw) diocese were incorporated in the Olomouc (Olmutz) diocese, and the incorporation of the Silesian fragments of the Prague archdiocese (i.e. the Glatz (Klodzko) vicariate general) and the Olomouc (Olmutz) diocese (i.e. the Branitz (Branice) vicariate general) in the Wroclaw (Breslau) archdiocese and the Opole (Oppeln) diocese, respectively, was reaffirmed (Korbelářova, 1995: 194).

The first stage of normalization of the relations between the West and the East was accomplished by the mid-1970s. In 1970 official diplomatic relations between the FRG and Poland were established, and in 1973 between Bonn and Prague, Budapest and Sofia (Bark, 1993: II 171). In the same year also both the German states exchanged diplomatic representatives and joined the UN (Blumenwitz, 1989: 48-50). In Europe the ongoing process of detente culminated in the signature of the Helsinki Final Act and the establishment of the CSCE in 1975. However, it is unadvisable to venture into the later period before scrutinizing the fate of the Silesian Germans and their institutions together with the Lusatian westernmost tip of Lower Silesia in the postwar Germanies. Because of their sheer number and the FRG’s constitutional reservations about recognizing the Polish and Soviet de facto annexation of the *Deutsche Ostgebiete*, they did influence German domestic and foreign politics.

Since the end of 1944 millions of German refugees flooded west and central Germany beyond the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line, and after the end of the war they were joined by millions of expellees whose influx culminated in 1946 and lasted until 1948 when it was succeeded by less centralized efforts focusing on linking families and facilitating the passage of various individuals and German POWs to Germany. The truncated postwar Germany ravaged by warfare and plagued by hunger and typhoid fever was ill-prepared to accommodate the newcomers. With the steady cooling off of the relations between the SU and the Western Allies, Moscow strove to transfer as quickly as possible majority of the expellees to the western zones of occupation hoping to destabilize them which could have thrown the whole of Western Europe into a commotion facilitating farther westward spread of communism. Although the Soviet calculations did not come true staved off by the massive US and British aid, the expelled Germans were not welcome. The sources of conflicts with the local population were confessional and regional differences, whereas the Sudetic Germans and other ethnic Germans were perceived as foreign because they had not been German citizens before 1939. Moreover, under the conditions of the postwar scarcity of food, goods and accommodation, it could not be to the liking of the local residents that the expellees added up to 70.7% of the population of Schleswig-Holstein, 48.6% of Lower Saxony, 29.9% of Bavaria and 21.5% of Hesse as of October 1948 (Wiskemann, 1956: 140-143). In 1945 and 1946 the occupying powers busied themselves with the organization of administration and provisional solution of day-to-day problems without paying too much attention to tribulations suffered by expelled individuals nor to their needs. The Protestant and Catholic Churches did their best to fill in this gap, and already in the 1945 spring first Church relief and mutual aid groups and organizations came into being in all the occupation zones (Ociepka, 1997: 63/64). Considering the Silesian expellees, the Protestant Church was the first to respond because not having been so much territorially oriented as the Catholic Church, it was easier for
the former to reestablish its structures and reconsolidate its faithful. Expelled pastors took care of the members of their parishes and communicated with them through the means of circular letters. In 1946, still in Wrocław (Breslau) the leadership of the evangelical Church of Silesia of the Old Prussian Union was reestablished under the Superintendent Bishop Ernst Horing (1894-1975), who after having been expelled transferred the seat of the Church to Görlitz at the end of this year (Scheuermann, 1994: 635). Bishop Otto Zänker (1876-1960) and the chairman of the Silesian consistory Walter Schwarz were active in central and western Germany encouraging and facilitating holding together of Protestant Silesians (Scheuermann, 1994: 1992). The 1948 Silesian Church congress at Wittenberg recognized the leadership of bishop Hornig with his headquarters at Görlitz, and the needs of the Protestant faithful in the western zones of occupation were taken care of by the Church’s representatives and by the relief committee which was established at Stuttgart on May 1, 1948. In 1949 it started publishing a newspaper for its faithful Wir haben keine hier bleibende Stadt (Here We Have No Town of Our Own) which, in 1950 was renamed as Schlesischer Gottesfreund (Silesian Church Newspaper) and is still published. Finally all the Silesian Protestants residing in the FRG, were united in the Gemeinschaft evangelischer Schlesier (Society of Protestant Silesians) established at Darmstadt in 1950. The Silesian Catholic Church centered on the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese was structurally shattered by expulsions and the seizure of the archdiocese by the Polish Catholic Church. The disorganization was sealed by the death of bishop Bertram on July 6, 1945. The two first relief organizations established at Munich and Augsburg in 1945 and 1946 focused rather on the needs of the expelled priests, monks and nuns rather than of the faithful. In 1946/1947 the first organization of the Silesian Catholics the Eichendorffgilde (Eichendorf Guild) was established at Munich, and in December 1947 it started publishing its periodical. Local branches of the Eichendorffgilde were set up in numerous towns and cities of the western zones of occupation, and their membership grew quickly. Moreover, in the British Zone, Silesian Catholics established the St Hedwigswerk (St Hedwig Organization) and the Deutsche Hedwigsstiftung (St Hedwig German Foundation) in the Osnabrück diocese. In 1951 the Eichendorffgilde was renamed as the Heimatwerk schlesischer Katholiken (Silesian Catholics Work for their Homeland) and started publishing Der schlesische Katholik (The Silesian Catholic, 1952-1973). Moreover, since 1946 regular meetings for expelled Silesian priests had been organized in Königstein, Hesse before they gave rise to the Schlesisches Priesterwerk (Organization of Silesian Priests) which, among others, has published its yearly Archiv für schlesische Kirchengeschichte (Periodical for Silesian Ecclesiastical History) (Bahlcke, 1996: 171/172). Considering, the fate of the Silesian Catholic Church in the Soviet Occupation Zone, it should be remembered that, territorially speaking, the part of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese remaining west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line was twice as big as the Lusatian westernmost tip of Lower Silesia which stayed with Germany (cf. Scholz, 1989: 236-239). Having received full powers and the official agreement from Pius XII, on March 17, 1947, Ferdinand Piontek took over this remaining part of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese with 90,000 faithful (including 40,000 Silesian expellees), and administered it from Görlitz until his death in 1963. He was succeeded by the Upper Silesian Gerhard Schaffran (1912-) who, in 1970, was elevated to the position of the bishop of the adjacent Meißen diocese when, at the same time, the previously independent remaining part of the Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese was subjected to the Meißen bishop (Bahlcke, 1996: 216; Scheuermann, 1994: 1239, 1454). It is interesting to add that Pius XII wishing to secure pastoral care for all the expelled Germans nominated the last German bishop of Ermland (Warmia), who was an Upper Silesian, Maximilian Kaller (1880-1947) to the position of the Special Apostolic Representative for the Expelled Germans (Kaps, 1990: 17).

Confessional organizations of expellees and refugees dominated immediately after 1945 because the occupying powers forbade the formation of other expellee organizations in spring 1946 albeit in November 1945 the British had decreed that advisory committees of refugees and expellees should be attached to the respective counties and communes of their residence. However, their swelling ranks could not be disregarded for too long. The census of October 29, 1946 indicated that there were 5,995,000 of

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581 In 1979 its seat was moved from Meißen to Dresden so nowadays it is known as the Meißen-Dresden diocese (Scheuermann, 1994: 1454).
them in the western zones, 120,000 in Berlin and 3,606,000 in the Soviet zone. The largest groups of expellees and refugees came from Silesia: 1,634,000 of them resided in the western zones (i.e. 27.26% of all the refugees and expellees in the western zones), 27,000 in Berlin and 1,049,000 in the Soviet zone. In 1950, refugees and expellees constituted 16.1% of the FRG’s population. The problem was, as gen George Marshall put it in 1948, how to minimize the inescapable irredentist pressure in Germany. The unanimous stance of the Allies bent on securing the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line as the western border of the postwar Poland, in accordance with the Soviet wishes, led to the suppression of the first expellee organization the Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Flüchtlinge (Society for German Refugees). Therefore, the expellees could only form groups in conjunction with other Germans with whom they joined in Interessengemeinschaften (groups of interests) of various kinds. In July 1948, when the breach with Moscow had come over Prague, Berlin and a thousand other matters, amounting to the outbreak of the Cold War, the Western Allies agreed to the formation of local expellee societies with cultural, economic and social aims (Ociepka, 1997: 47, 49; Wiskemann, 1956: 146, 179/180). This vacillation of the Allies attitude toward the expellees and refugees is well illustrated by the history of the Silesian expellees organizations. The first Landsmannschaft (homeland) organizations of the Silesian expellees the Vereinigung der Schlesier (Union of the Silesians), founded at Munich in 1946, and the Verein ehemaliger Schlesier und Oberschlesier (Association of the Former Silesians and Upper Silesians), established in Lower Saxony in the same year, were refused registration. The former one reappeared in the context of the deepening rift between the SU and its Western Allies, in 1948 as the Schlesierverband Bayern (Silesian Union of Bavaria) which served as the umbrella organization for the Silesian societies in Bavaria. Similar organizations of Silesian expellees sprang up in other Länder located in the western occupation zones. In Hannover the Eichendorff-Bund (Eichendorff Union) came into being already in 1947 as an organization of Silesian expellees and in mid-1949 it was followed by the Land branch of the Landsmannschaft Schlesien (LS, Homeland Organization of Silesia). In Hamburg there had already been present Silesian organization of long standing, such as: the Verein der Schlesier in Hamburg-Harburg (Union of Silesians in Hamburg-Harburg, 1903), the Schlesierverein Rübezahl Hamburg (Rübezahl\textsuperscript{582} Silesian Union of Hamburg, 1910) or the Schlesierverein Annaberg Hamburg (Annaberg Silesian Union of Hamburg, 1920). The free city’s LS branch came into being in 1950. In West Berlin the Kulturverband Schlesische Heimat (Cultural Union of the Silesian Homeland) founded in 1948, was changed into an LS branch at the beginning of 1949. Next LS branches were founded in 1950 in Bremen and North Rhine-Westphalia, before on March 28, 1950 at Bonn-Bad Godesberg the umbrella organization of all the Silesian societies the LM was formally established with its full name as the Landsmannschaft Schlesien, Nieder und Oberschlesien (Homeland Organization of Silesia, Lower and Upper Silesia). After this groundbreaking event LM branches sprang up in other western Länder. The LS aspired to represent German expellees from Lower and Upper Silesia in the provinces 1937 borders, i.e. Reichsdeutsche with the exclusion of the German expellees from the former Silesian Voivodeship and Czechoslovak Silesia. This tendency was opposed by the Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier (LO, Homeland Organization of the Upper Silesians) (1949) which accepted in its ranks German expellees from all the historically Upper Silesian territories including Czechoslovak Silesia. The LS and the LO proceeded by attracting and integrating members in numerous local branches and through the means of of regional meetings and federal meetings organized every two years. In 1950 the LO founded its official weekly Unser Oberschlesien (Our Upper Silesia), and in 1951 the LS took over the weekly Breslauer Nachrichten (Breslau News, 1949) and overhauled it into its organ under the title of Der Schlesier (The Silesian). A considerable degree of assistance was offered to all the expellee organizations and groups through the unique institution of Patenschaft (caring patronage, literally godparenthood). The source of Patenschaften were relief committees organized under the auspices of the Protestant Churches to help the expellees. These committees which constituted the Ostkirchenausschuss (Commission of the Eastern\textsuperscript{583} Churches), commenced regular cooperation between the local population and the expellees which, gradually, was formalized by establishing numerous Patenschaften between villages, towns, cities, communes and

\textsuperscript{582} Rübezahl, one who counts turnips, the legendary mountain spirit of the Sudets,

\textsuperscript{583} The adjective eastern denotes those from the Deutsche Ostgebiete.
organizations grouping expellees from corresponding localities in the *Deutsche Ostgebiete* which they had had to leave. Subsequently, western Länder undertook such Patenschaften over the various federal *Landsmannschaften*. In 1950 Lower Saxony established its patenschaft over the LS, and in 1964 North Rhein-Westphalia over the LO. In 1955 the largest *Landsmannschaft* was that of the Sudetic Germans with 340,000 members, closely followed by the LS (318,000), the LO (100,000), and the *Landsmannschaften* of the East Prussians (130,000) and the Pomeranians (85,000) (Bühlke, 1996: 173-177; Ociepka, 1997: 64/65, 68).

The dynamic development of influence, activities and membership of the LS and the LO was sustained by the growing number of the persons with the official status of expellee. When the Potsdam-ordained expulsions were largely over by the end of the 1940s, Aussiedlers (resettlers, i.e. Germans and ethnic Germans who stayed over beyond the postwar German borders) started trickling especially to the FRG in broader and narrower streams which indicated the state of relations between Bonn and the Soviet bloc states. Hence, the number of expellees from Lower Silesia increased from 1,212,000 on October 29, 1946, to 1,550,000 on September 13, 1950 and to 1,820 on May 27, 1970. The corresponding numbers for the Upper Silesian expellees were: 422,000, 540,000 and 942,000. The percentage of all the Silesian expellees as part of all the expellees grew, correspondingly, from 27.26% in 1951 to 28.78% in 1970 (Ociepka, 1997: 47). However, the influence of the LS and the LO on the social, economic and political life cannot be explained separately from the organizations which mobilized all the expellees irrespectively of their origin. After the lifting of the ban on expellee organizations, the *Hauptarbeitgemeinschaft der Organisationen der Heimatvertriebenen* (HOH, Main Union of the Expellee Organizations) came into being in 1949. It was not too effective because of the rivalry between organizations grouping expellees from specific regions, and organizations representing expellees from a given Land in the FRG of occupation. This debacle was partially solved by the founding of the Vereinigte Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften (VOL, United East German Landsmannschaften) on August 11, 1948, and the Zentralverband der Vertriebenen Deutschen (ZvD, Central Union of the Expelled Germans) on April 9, 1949. The former grouped separate Landsmannschaften and the latter expellees organized in Land branches (Landesverbände). The division of labor between the VOL and the ZvD was thereupon agreed at Göttingen on November 20, 1949. At the same time both the organizations decided to work out a Charter of the German Expellees which was announced on the Tag der Heimat, August, 5, 1950, at Cannstatt near Stuttgart. Later the VOL was renamed as the Verband der Landsmannschaften (VdL, Union of the Landsmannschaften), and the ZvD as the Bund vertriebener Deutschen (BvD, Union of the Expelled Germans). Finally, on October 27, 1957 the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV) was founded. It united the expellee movement but the momentum needed for unification was brought about by the declining significance of the BvD and the failure of the Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE, Bloc of the Expellees and the Disenfranchised) in the 1957 Bundestag elections when the party did not manage to cross the 5% threshold. The first Bundestag elections (1949) provided the direct incentive for establishing this party on January 8, 1950. It concentrated on Länder elections in 1951 and 1952, and in result gained 71 seats in 6 Länder assemblies, and 8 ministerial posts in 6 Länder governments. In preparations for the second Bundestag elections the BHE eager to broaden its electorate beyond the expellees changed its name to the Gesamtdeutscher Block/BHE (GB/BHE, Bloc of all the Germans/BHE) in September 1952, having received 5.9% votes it managed to enter the Bundestag with 27 mandates. The GB/BHE effectively represented interests of the VOL and the ZvD. Internal and personal conflicts culminated in 1954 when 9 leading MPs left the party to join the CDU. In such a situation the expellee movement had to unite in order to be able to influence the interests of the expellees through other parties. With time, and especially after the ratification of the Eastern treaties by the SPD government despite the expellees vociferous opposition, the CDU/CSU became the main political representative of the expelled Germans (Ociepka, 1997: 65-67, 69-73; Wiskemann, 1956: 180-183). The FRG government was also interested to quickly and peacefully integrate the expellees to stave off the danger of irredentist which would not go down well with its Allied patrons, so the Bundesvertriebenenministerium (Federal Ministry for the Expellees) already in 1949. It existed until 1969, when the SPD government entrusted the expellee matters to the Ministry of Interior where they have been dealt with to this day (Schlau, 1996: 280). Hans Lukaschek (1885-1960), the former Upper Silesian Oberpräsident (1929-1933), served as the first

The situation of the expellees was markedly different in the Soviet Zone and later in the GDR. On July 19, the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) issued the order on the basis of which expellees concentrated in the areas adjacent to the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line, were resettled to other regions. At the beginning the problems of expellees and refugees and their integration were dealt with by the Zentralverwaltung für Flüchtlingswesen und Heimkehrer (ZfFH, Central Office for the Matters of Refugees and those Returning to Their Homeland), But the word Flüchtling (refugees) as ideologically unsound was to be avoided so the name of the ZfFH was changed for the Zentralverwaltung für deutsche Umsiedler (ZfdU, Central Office for German Resettlers). The ZfdU conducted numerous campaigns aimed at convincing the expellees and refugees that the loss of the Deutsche Ostgebiete was final, and repeated this view in the periodical Die neue Heimat (New Homeland) (1946-1949). The ZfdU was dissolved in July 1948 to speed up integration, and after the establishment of the GDR the matters of expellees were in the competence of the Ministry of Interior. Gradually such words as expellee, refugee and resettler were banned from use and supplanted with the politically correct term former resettler. Moreover, it was prohibited to publicly remark on the expellees homelands which had become parts of the territory of the SU and Poland, and as such could not be German. Instances of this prohibited behavior were tracked down by the Soviet and East German security forces and the perpetrators punished and persecuted. The radio of the Soviet zone was also barred from broadcasting any songs from the regions from which Germans had been expelled. At the end of 1946 there were 1,048,700 expellees from Silesia in the Soviet zone. their number grew only a little to 1,090,000 in 1950. At the beginning of this year the GDR Ministry of Interior issued the directive which prohibited formation of any expellee organizations or arranging for homeland meetings of the former Silesians, East Prussians and Pomeranians (Bahlcke, 1996: 182; Ociepka, 1997: 60-62). Thus, unlike in the FRG, no expellee organizations could come into being in the GDR because they would endanger the security of the Soviet bloc based on the unconditional recognition of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line. What is more, the GDR to become a truly socialist state had to get detached from the pre-1945 German tradition and law which were easily dismissed branded as fascist. This attitude was easily observable in the field of territorial organization. Initially, the Soviet zone’s Länder structure was reorganized similarly as the western zones. The five Länder (and separate East Berlin) absorbed the remaining fragments of the provinces whose larger parts remained east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa). Hence, Mecklenburg was enlarged with western Pomerania and Saxony with the Lusatian tip of Lower Silesia, whereas truncated Brandenburg deprived of its western section was allowed to remain on its own. But already three years after the establishment of the GDR, in July 1952, the five Länder were de facto though not de jure dissolved and supplanted with 15 administrative regions largely disregarding the historical borders and attachments. Consequently, the westernmost part of Silesia remaining in Germany, was divided between the districts of Cottbus and Dresden reflecting the same communist policy of submerging historical lands and regions in new administrative divisions as applied in Poland and Czechoslovakia after 1945 (Jähnig, 1992: 159, 163). The erasing of the last traces of Silesianity in the GDR was completed in 1968, when under the state pressure the evangelical Church of Silesia remaining west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) in its Görlitz department, changed its name into the evangelical Church of the Görlitz Ecclesiastical Region (Bahlcke, 1996: 215).

The lack of any official contacts between the Soviet bloc states (with the exception of the SU) and the FRG maintained by the ideological enmity and reinforced by the militarily organized and virtually impenetrable Iron Curtain separating the East from the West in Europe, did not bar thousands of people from crossing it. Generally speaking, they were Polish and Czech emigrants, forced laborers and POWs who decided to return to their countries in the 1950s, German POWs and forced laborers in the SU who were allowed to return especially to the FRG until this process was largely over in the mid-1950s, the recognized indubitable Germans from Poland majority of whom left by 1960 (most for the GDR,
However, Germans allowed to join their families in the FRG, and Germans fleeing the GDR for the FRG and West Berlin.\(^{584}\) Anyway, the biggest group who crossed the East-West divide in a continuous stream (which has continued to flow into Germany to this day), were ethnic Germans and former German citizens together with their descendants classified in the FRG as Aussiedlers. The Basic Law which guaranteed territorial, legislative and historical continuity of German statehood, also provided similar instruments for consolidating its citizenry who had been scattered all over Europe after the war due to border changes and to displacement policies carried out in the interwar and postwar periods.\(^{585}\) In accordance with Arts 16 and 116 of the Basic Law based on the German citizenship laws of 1913 and with the derived legislation, all the persons who acquired German citizenship by December 31, 1937, who were deprived of their German citizenship between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945, and their descendants, as well as ethnic Germans have right to German citizenship (Blumenwitz, 1989: 67). This legislative solution made it easy to accept large numbers of Aussiedlers as German citizens unlike foreigners who have had tough time seeking to be granted with German citizenship through the process of naturalization because the \textit{jus sanguinis} attitude has dominated in German law. Aussiedlers automatically obtained the status of expellee and all the entailed privileges up to December 31, 1992 (Wolf, 1996: 23/24). Although as late as 1950 a US congressional committee, convinced that it would not be possible to integrate all the expellees in the newly-formed FRG, recommended that 1 mln of them should emigrate\(^{586}\) (De Zayas, 1994: 126), with the flowing Marshall plan aid Bonn proved otherwise. The 1950s became the beginning of the German \textit{Wirtschaftswunder} which created a serious dearth of workforce which since 1955 had to be satiated with workers from Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. In the situation when no such laborers could come from the adjacent Soviet bloc states, Aussiedlers were quite a blessing for the FRG’s rapidly expanding economy as well as for its society because they strengthened Germandom instead of swelling the ranks of foreign residents refused the possibility of becoming naturalized Germans by the German law. In 1950-1959 439,714 Aussiedlers arrived in Germany. The largest group of them 292,181 (66.4%) came from Poland. In 1960-1969 they numbered 221,516 and the Poland’s share was 110,618 (49.9%). In 1970-1979 the numbers were 355,381 and 202,711 (57%), respectively, and for the period 1980-1989 they topped the record 984,087 and 632,800 (64.3%) (Anon., 1994: 23; Bartz, 1995: 6/7). Understandably, because of the influx of the Aussiedlers, the number of the expellees grew from 7,977,000 in 1950 to 9,598,000 in 1970 and 10,750 in 1986. In 1950 they accounted for 16.1% of the FRG’s populace, in 1970 for 16.5%, and in 1986 and 1989 for 19% (Anon., 1994: 21, 23; Ociepka, 1997: 47). In regard to Silesia, the number of persons with the status of expellee (i.e. refugees, expellees and Aussiedlers) from Lower Silesia residing in the FRG grew from 1,212,000 in 1946 to 1,550,000 in 1950, 1,820,000 in 1970 and 1,940,000 in 1985. The corresponding numbers for Upper Silesian expellees were 422,000, 540,000, 942,000 and 1,199,000. Hence between 1946 and 1985 the number of Lower Silesian expellees grew by 25.2%, whereas of Upper Silesians by 184.1% (Reichling, 1989: 30/31). Looking at the phenomenon from a different angle: 54,783 Aussiedlers from Lower Silesia arrived in the FRG in 1946-1959, 4,266 in 1960-1969, 4,005 in 1970-1976, 4,859 in 1977-1981 and 21,433 in 1982-1989. The figures for Upper Silesia were following: 113,312, 68,277, 49,536, 107,261, and 219,591 (Bahlcke, 1996: 188). From the cited numbers it is obvious that almost all the German population of Lower Silesia had left by 1950 and the remnants by 1970 (up to 1960 many of them for the GDR). On the other hand, 851,454 Upper Silesians who had been verified as Autochthons by July 1, 1949 and were not expelled (Misztal, 1990: 306), constituted 50% to

\(^{584}\) Those who arrived in Germany were classified as Aussiedlers and obtained the status of expellee.

\(^{585}\) The treaties concluded between the GDR and the FRG did not regulate the question of citizenship, thus, any GDR citizen who entered the territory of the FRG automatically became a German citizen if he consented (Blumenwitz, 1989: 67).

\(^{586}\) Alluding to the interwar period, especially the displacement of the SU’s Volga Germans is meant. They had never been German citizens, but as ethnic Germans acquired the right for German (FRG) citizenship in the light of the solutions instituted by the Basic Law.

\(^{587}\) Many did leave, especially for the US and Canada, but most expellees did not want to emigrate (De Zayas, 1994: 126).
Chapter six

70% of the total emigration from Poland to the FRG in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1986-1988 the number of the Silesian expellees in the FRG was boosted by 101,000 emigrants, mainly from Upper Silesia. Moreover, in the record year when more than 250,000 Aussiedlers from Poland arrived in the FRG, majority of them were constituted from Upper Sileans too (Anon. 1996: 11/12; Lis, 1993: 44-48).

Having observed the development of the situation of the expellees in the FRG and the GDR up to 1970 as well as the constant outflow of Lower and, especially, Upper Silesians mainly to the FRG in the period 1950-1989, it is necessary to observe how the normalization process commenced in 1970 influenced Silesia itself.

The first visible alteration came with Paul VI’s bull Episcoporum Poloniae. After the ratification of the Warsaw Treaty, the Vatican officially recognized the Polish ecclesiastical administration of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete. What is more, the territorial organization of the Polish Catholic Church was overhauled. The Gorzów (Landsberg) administration was divided into the dioceses of Gorzów (Landsberg), Szczecin-Kamień (Stettin-Cammin) and Koszalin-Kolobrzeg (Köslin-Kolberg). The two latter ones were subjected to Gniezno (Gnesen) archdiocese while the first one became part of the Wroclaw (Breslau) ecclesiastical province. Besides the Gorzów (Landsberg) diocese, the province consisted from the Wroclaw (Breslau) archdiocese and the Opole (Oppeln) diocese. In this shape the province largely coincided with these lands of the former Breslau (Wroclau) archdiocese which happened to remain east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa). The provinces territory amounted to 45,915 sq km, and 5,759,514 Catholics lived on its territory in 1986. The corresponding figures for the Wroclaw (Breslau) archdiocese were 20,360 sq km and 2,878,294, for the Opole (Oppeln) diocese 9,713 sq km and 1,127,000. The Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese remained in the Cracow ecclesiastical province in an unchanged shape. Although its territory of 4,216 sq km was much smaller than territories of the other dioceses in this province, in 1986 the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese supported the largest number of faithful of all these dioceses, i.e. 2,357,177. Considering the Wroclaw (Breslau) province, Boleslaw Kominek was nominated to the position of the first Wroclaw (Breslau) archbishop. After his death in 1974 he was succeeded by Henryk Gulbinowicz (1928-) in 1976. Franciszek Jop (1897-1976) became the first bishop of the Opole (Oppeln) diocese. Alfons Nossol (1932-) succeeded Jop after his death. In the case of the Gorzów (Landsberg) diocese Wilhelm Pluta was elevated to the position of the first bishop. After his death in 1986 he was succeeded by Józef Michalik (1941-). Considering the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese, Herbert Bednorz (1908-1989) succeeded Adamski in 1967, and Damian Zimon (1934-) succeeded Bednorz in 1985 (Adamczuk, 1991: 87, 92, 100, 114-116, 120/121; Malarski, 1992: 128/129; Scholz, 1989: 336-339).

The official recognition of the Polish ecclesiastical organization in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete simultaneously demanded appropriate alterations in the German diocesan structure. In 1972 the separate Brandenburg strip of the Breslau (Wroclau) archdiocese east of Berlin was incorporated in the Berlin diocese, and the rest of the Breslau (Wroclau) archdiocese west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) was turned into the Görlitz apostolic administration (Jecht, 1995: 124; Scholz, 1989: 236-239). On the other hand, on the behalf of the Breslau (Wroclau) archdiocese’s priests and faithful residing in the FRG, who had been represented by the spokesman for the expelled priests of the Breslau (Wroclau) archdiocese in the dioceses of the FRG (the conference of German bishops founded this position in 1964) (Bahlcke, 1996: 172), on June 23, 1972, the conference of German bishops asked the pope to appropriately upgrade the position of the spokesman to lessen the pain of the final loss of the Breslau (Wroclau) archdiocese. In accordance with the bishops wish, Paul VI established the apostolic visitorship for the priests and the faithful of the Breslau (Wroclau) archdiocese. On October 23, 1972 the last spokesman Thielen was elevated to the new position of the visitor. In 1982 the prelate Winfried König succeeded him and the visitorship’s seat was established at Münster (Scheuermann, 1994: 103, 1748/1749). In 1997 the

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588 The first spokesman was the Upper Silesian prelate Oskar Golombek. After his death in 1972 the position was taken over by the Lower Silesian prelate Hubert Thielen (1904-1987). The latter also established the Heimatbriefes der Katholiken des Erzbistums Breslau (Homeland newspaper for the catholics of the Breslau archdiocese) (Bahlcke, 1996: 172; Scheuermann, 1994: 1748)
visitorship secured pastoral service for 2,000 faithful and it has striven to attract young people through its activities in the field of German-Polish reconciliation (Miś, 1997: 16). Also after the formal liquidation of the vicariates general of Glatz (Klodzko) and Branitz (Branice) which were officially incorporated in the Wroclaw (Breslau) archdiocese and the Opole (Oppeln) diocese, respectively, in 1977, interests of the priests and the faithful of the former vicariates, residing in the FRG have been represented by the apostolic protonotary Joseph Buchmann, Hamm, in the case of the Glatz (Klodzko) vicariate, and by the canon visitor for the Branitz (Branice) vicariate Wolfgang Grocholl, Stuttgart (Scholz, 1989: 64, 189).

The process of Polish-German normalization, commenced in 1970, was used by the Polish government to allow emigration of the rest of the indubitable Germans from Lower Silesia. The expellee organizations estimated the size of the German minority in accordance with Art 116 at 1.1 mln. Warsaw did expressly not agree with this view reaffirming its stance that Upper Sileilians (Autochthons) are Poles. Thus the possibility of emigration only for several tens of thousands was predicted. However, out of the total emigration of 62,484 from Poland to the FRG, 28,056 (45%) emigrants came from Upper Silesia. It was not a clear defiance of the official Polish stance as Warsaw also agreed to linking families, i.e. to emigration of persons from mixed families. Another breakthrough came after the signature of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, when the new SPD chancellor Hans Schmidt struck a deal with the Polish first secretary Edward Gierek. The former wished to draw the expellee electorate displeased by the Eastern treaties away from the CDU/CSU and ensure newly arriving Aussiedlers votes for the SPD whereas the latter wanted to boost the Polish economy with loans made from the surplus of the Western capital which could be easily tapped thanks to the detente. Subsequently, on October 9, 1975 the Polish government agreed to emigration of 120-125,000 persons in the next four years on the conditions of the 1970 agreement. Bonn reciprocated with DM2.3 bln. In the years 1976-1979, 134,603 persons left for Germany including 87,306 (64.9%) from Upper Silesia indicating sustaining the faltering economy became more important than sticking to the myth of Polish Autochthons (Bielski, 1986: 222-225; Lis, 1993: 46; Urban, 1994: 90-93). However, where it could, the Polish government strove to centralize the state at the expense of self-government and regions which had been gradually submerged in the consecutive layers of new administrative divisions. In 1975 the number of the voivodeships was considerably enlarged from 17 to 49, and the counties were abolished. In this manner more prestigious voivodeship positions were opened for loyal and deserving comrades, voivodeships were weakened, power of the counties phased out, and the pretense of self-government vested in the mass of tiny communes. The territory of Silesia was even more carved up and banned from the administrative reality. The fragments of Lower Silesia were included in the voivodeships of Zielona Góra (Grünberg), Leszno (Lissa) and Kalisz. The rest of Lower Silesia was divided between the voivodeships of Jelenia Góra (Hirschberg), Legnica (Liegnitz), Walbrzych (Waldenburg) and Wroclaw (Breslau). In this new division the border between the erstwhile Wroclaw (Breslau) and Opole (Oppeln) voivodeships was retained. Hence, the traditional border between Lower and Upper Silesia remained intact with the persisting irregularity of the Lower Silesian counties of Brzeg (Brieg) and Namysłów (Namslau) included within the Opole (Oppeln) voivodeship. On the other hand, the counties of Olesno (Rosenberg) and Racibórz (Ratibor) were transferred from this voivodeship to the Częstochowa and Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodeships, respectively. Thus, the wartime border between the Regencies of Oppeln (Opole) and Kattowitz (Katowice) was completely erased. The larger part of Polish Eastern Silesia was excluded from the Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodeship and incorporated in the Bielsko-Biała (Bielitz-Biala) voivodeship (Pawlak, 1997: 6).

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589 This term was used for families whose members were Poles and Germans. However, as a matter of fact, the families were usually through and through Upper Sileesian. Simply, Warsaw perceived their members already residing in Germany as Germans and those who remained in Upper Silesia as Autochthons, i.e. Poles.

590 DM1.3 bln was to be used for the pensions of the ex-German citizens whereas the remaining DM1 bln was treated as a loan which, later, Poland was not able to pay back. What is more, the eligible recipients of the DM1.3 bln hardly obtained a fraction of this sum which through the specific currency exchange rate was siphoned by the communist state for its own sake (Urban, 1994: 92).
The Soviet decision of December 12, 1979 to intervene in Afghanistan commenced the end of the détente. The Truman doctrine of containment obliged the US to bolster Pakistan so that it would be able to withstand the spread of communism. In Europe, the difficulties with repayment of outstanding debts by the inefficient communist economies plunged the Soviet bloc states into serious social problems. Consequently, in Poland a serious anti-communist outbreak took place commenced by labor unrest which erupted in summer 1980. On December 13, 1981, when Solidarity proposed a referendum on whether to retain the communist system, the party chief Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski introduced the martial law under Soviet pressure. In 1981 the republican candidate Ronald Reagan won the US presidential elections, and immediately started the unwavering economical offensive against the Soviet bloc through escalating armaments in order to shatter the overtrained and wasteful communist economies. The tactics paid handsomely. The Soviet bloc could not keep pace with the US in the race. For Poland ruled by a junta and isolated by the West it spelt a rapid economic collapse. The unstable economic and political situation caused 166,630 Polish citizens to leave for the FRG in 1980-1985. Upper Silesians accounted for 99,462 (59.7%) of them. Since 1982, when the CDU/CSU replaced the SPD, Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s subsequent cabinets supported the US aggressive anti-Soviet stance. Jaruzelski’s junta allowed emigration for the FRG hoping to lessen isolation of Poland as well as alleviate the economic plight of the populace, for instance, by being able to redistribute vacant flats among those waiting for them. On the other hand, recent emigrants and other relatives from the FRG, sent, on their own, at least 4 mln food and cloth parcels to Poland as well as in conjunction with Church and other organizations (Urban, 1994: 95). Going on strong against the Soviet bloc Kohl had to replace the swinging votes of pacifist-minded persons who gradually chose to support the SPD, with some other electorate. The expellees and Aussiedlers were a perfect group to bet on, as frequently having had the first-hand experience they would unwaveringly support any anti-communist policies. What is more, thanks to the CDU/CSU’s support for their cause the expellees and especially the Aussiedlers could reap a considerable number of financial and social advantages. In the second half of the 1980s when the demise of the communist system began to loom imminent and irreversible, and, having partly recognized the fact, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a relaxation in the East-West relations, 215,833 people emigrated from Poland to the FRG in 1986-1988 including 101,000 (46.8%) Upper Silesians. Upper Silesians also constituted at least 50% of the record high number of 250,000 emigrants who left Poland for the FRG in 1989 (Bartz, 1995: 67; Lis, 1993: 47). In sum, in 1982-1989 21,433 Lower Silesians left for the FRG and 219,591 Upper Silesians (Bahlcke, 1996: 183).

In the meantime, the expellee movement in the FRG developed in defiance of the Easter treaties which did not cede the Deutsche Ostgebiete to Poland and the SU, in the opinion of the Constitutional Court. Their ranks were boosted by numerous Aussiedlers, especially from Poland. The network of Patenschaften of inhabitants from former German communes and localities of Silesia was formalized in the Schlesischen Städte-, Kreisund Gemeindentag (Assembly of Silesian Cities, Counties and Communes). The LS started recruiting young Silesians to boost its aging membership through the affiliated organization of the Schlesische Jugend (SJ, Silesian Youth). The subject of the Deutsche Ostgebiete and German populace remaining there, once almost a taboo outside the expellee organizations in the FRG, entered the mainstream of the political discourse in the 1980s. The SJ even established the Arbeitgemeinschaft Menschenrechtsverletzung in Ostdeutschland (AGMO, Working Group for Recording the Instances of Human Rights Violations in east Germany). The AGMO, strove to make the fate of Poland’s not recognized German minority known in the FRG and in the world, as well as to facilitate establishment of some German organizations in Poland. The developments awakened hopes for revision of the Eastern treaties which was clearly expressed in 1985 at the 21st German Meeting of Silesians in Hannover. Its motto was: 40 Jahre Vertreibung Schlesien bleibt unser (40 years of expulsion Silesia remains ours). But due to the controversial participation of the chancellor at the

\[591\] It was lifted in 1983.

\[592\] Ostdeutschland (east Germany), a pre-1945 term for the Deutsche Ostgebiete. Subsequently, in this pre-1945 terminology, East Germany was known as central Germany (Mittledeutschland), and West Germany as west Germany (Westdeutschland).
meeting, the motto had to be toned down to: 40 Jahre Vertreibung Schlesien bleibt unsere Zukunft Im Europa freier Völker (40 Years of Expulsion Silesia remains our future in Europe of free peoples). The circle of the LS’s official organ Der Schlesier who contributed to the extremist stance on the Deutsche Ostgebiete, was a bit sidelined in 1986

when the role of the official press organ was entrusted to the new periodical Schlesischen Nachrichten (Silesian News), which, clandestinely, began to be distributed especially in Upper Silesia. The multifaceted development of numerous networks of expellee organizations and the growing governmental support for them in the 1980s led to the creation of virtual Silesiá in absence of the land itself. Only in this manner, children of Silesian parents could become Silesians and Silesian expellee organizations become attractive venues of social and political activity for them. Considering this phenomenon at its cultural plane: since 1977/1978 the LS and Lower Saxony have awarded the Silesian Cultural Prize, and since 1965 the LO and North Rhein-Westphalia the Upper Silesian Culture Prize. The former one was awarded for the first time at Wroclaw (Breslau) in 1994. Silesia and its culture became the center of activities of such organizations as: the Stiftung Schlesien (Foundation Silesia) in Hannover established in 1974, the Stiftung Haus Oberschlesien (Foundation of the Upper Silesian House) established in 1970 with its Upper Silesian House in Ratingen-Hösel which houses the Upper Silesian Land Museum, library and archives. The Stiftung Kulturwerk Schlesien (Foundation for Cultural Work for Silesia) established in 1980 at Würzburg continues the tradition of the renowned Silesian publishing house Korn which was active at Breslau (Wroclaw) from the 18th century to 1945. What is more, in 1951 the Upper Silesian editor of the influential interwar monthly Der Oberschlesier (The Upper Silesian), Karl Schodrok (1890-1971) founded the Kulturwerk Schlesien (Cultural Work for Silesia), Würzburg which has dealt with the whole of Silesia including Austrian Silesia. Since 1956 the Kulturwerk Schlesien has published the quarterly Schlesien-Kunst-WissenschaftVolkskunde (Silesia-Art-Science-Ethnography), and the Stiftung Kulturwerk Schlesien another quarterly Schlesische Kulturspiegel (Silesian Cultural Mirror) since 1966. The expelled Silesians wish for a place where they could hold formal and informal meetings was actualized in 1978 when the construction of the Haus Schlesien (Silesian House), Königswinter was completed. In the field literature, the following Silesian establishments are noteworthy: the Eichendorff-Gesellschaft (Eichendorff Society), Ratingen-Hössel, the Eichendorff-Institut (Eichendorff Institute), Universität Düsseldorf, the Gerhart-Hauptmann-Gesellschaft (Gerhart Hauptmann Society), Berlin, the Gustav-Freytag-Gesellschaft (Gustav Freytag Society), Ratingen, the Walter Meckauer-Kreis (Walter Meckauer circle), Cologne, the Deutsche Eichendorff-Museum (German Eichendorff Museum), Wagen, the Gustav-Freytag Archiv und Museum (Gustav Freytag Archives and Museum), Wagen. The Stiftung Kulturwerk Schlesien and the town of wagen jointly award the Eichendorff-Literaturpreis (Eichendorff Literature Prize). In the sphere of music there are following Silesian organizations: the Verein zur Erforschung und Erhaltung schlesischer Orgeln (Society for Reasearch into and Preservation of Silesian Organs) and the Freundeskreis Oberschlesischer Orchester (Circle of Friends of Upper Silesian Orchestras). What is more, the Schlesischen Musikfeste (Silesian Music Festival) has been organized in Görlitz since 1972. At the scientific plane, the Historische Kommission für Schlesien (Historical Commission for Silesia) established before World War II is still active organizing numerous conferences as well as supervising publishing of many series of works concentrating on history of Silesia, as well as, the Jahrbuch der Schlesischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau (Yearly of the Friedrich Wilhelm Silesian University of Breslau (Wroclaw)). The noteworthy establishments are: the Verein für die Geschichte Schlesiens (Society for Silesian History), Marburg, Verein für schlesische Kirchengeschichte (Society for Silesian Ecclesiastical History), Regensburg, the Gerhard-Möbus-Institut für Schlesienforschung (Gergard Möbus Institute for Researches into Silesia), Universität Würzburg, the Ludwig Petry-Institut, Universität Mainz, and the Projektbereich Schlesische Geschichte (Project of Research into Silesia), Universität Stuttgart (Bahlcke, 1996: 173-181).

The fortification of Silesian expellee organizations and their activities in the FRG, and the contacts which had been established between them and German minority members in Silesia itself in the context of the humanitarian aid actions in the 1980s, were to become extremely useful in 1989 the year of the fall

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593 Now the tradition emerged that, intermittently, the prize is awarded in Silesia one year and next in the FRG.
of communism and dramatic political change in Central and Eastern Europe. Since 1985 Gorbachev had tried his best to ease the East-West tension in an effort to salvage socialism in the reformed form proposed by his ideology of glasnost and perestroika. On January 10, 1989 Cuban troops pulled out from Angola and in February Soviet troops completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan. In Poland the round table talks resulted in the partially free elections in June. After 40 years of strict communist rule a new cabinet formed on August 18, was headed by the non-communist Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Since May the wave of 170,000 East Germans escaped their country via Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland until November 9 when the GDR authorities opened the border and the Berlin Wall fell down. Hungary proclaimed itself a democratic republic on October 23, on December 10 the velvet revolution succeeds in Czechoslovakia and violent anti-communist demonstrations shook Romania in the same month heralding the end of Ceausescu’s regime. Similar processes of democratization engulfed the whole of the Soviet bloc at the turn of 1989 and 1990. On July 1, 1990 the Warsaw Pact was dismantled and the already non-functioning CMEA was dissolved on June 28, 1991. In 1990 and 1991 all the constituent republics of the SU declared their independence, and Gorbachev’s power quickly declined after the failed coup against his government in August 1991 while his state the SU was fading into oblivion. The end of the SU was sealed on December 8 when it was replaced by the CIS and succeeded by Russia with Boris Yeltsin at its helm (Kukulka, 1994: 501-508). In this context of the sudden overhaul of the postwar order, the question of German became most pressing as the fulcrum of this order was placed in Berlin. The unexpected opening of the FRG-GDR border to East German travellers coaxed the wartime allies to meet at Ottawa on February 11-13 and discuss the possibility of German reunification. The ground for this event was prepared by the Two plus Four talks held at Berlin (June 22), Paris (July 17) and Moscow (September 12). In the meantime the union between the GDR and the FRG was established by the treaty concluded at Bonn (May 18), and on August 31, at Berlin, both the governments signed the treaty instituting unification through the GDR’s joining of the FRG. On October 1 the allies returned full sovereignty to the FRG and it act into force on October 3 together with the FRG-GDR union treaty, and the Moscow treaty which had concluded the Two plus Four talks obliging Bonn to maintaining good relations with its neighbors and conducting peaceful foreign politics (Kukulka, 1994: 435-437). In case of Poland its western border based on the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line was seemingly imperiled by these events as the Görlitz and Warsaw treaties of 1950 and 1970, which guaranteed the frontier, technically became null and void because of the act of unification. What is more, Kohl was rather vague on the subject of the border not to lose the support and votes of the expellees and Aussiedlers. In this situation, the chancellor’s repeated reassurances as well as the Bundestag’s resolution of November 8, 1989 stating that Poland’s border was final were not enough. Even despite the joint resolution of the Bundestag and the GDR’s Volkskammer (June 21, 1990) promising reaffirming the border in a separate treaty, Warsaw, thanks to its diplomatic efforts, participated in the Paris leg of the Two plus Four talks to ensure no second Yalta could take place (Koc’win, 1993: 107-109, 141/142). This period of uncertainty finished on November 14, 1990 when Poland and the FRG signed the border treaty at Warsaw. Subsequently, it was swiftly ratified, and the Deutsche Ostgebiete became de jure former even in the light of the German law.

The treaty was a blow to various hopes maintained by expellee activists in relation to the Deutsche Ostgebiete. Since the memorable LS meeting at Hannover in 1985, the question of the possibility of revision of the postwar Polish-German border was resumed in earnest by the expellee movement. At that time Kohl’s attitude toward the border was not unambiguous either. Drawing on this line, the BdV was reconsolidated in 1987, and its Upper Silesian activist Herbert Hupka proposed it should be renamed as the Bund für Deutschland (Union for Germany) or the Patriotischer Bund (Patriotic Union) to be able to attract all to whom appealed the idea of border revision. However, when in 1988 Der Schlesier published an article radically dissociating the FRG from Germany of the National Socialist period and appealing for more aggressive reaffirming of the German rights at the international arena, Hupka severed all the links

594 The Yalta conference, where the postwar division of Europe along the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) line was finally decided, in the Polish political vocabulary is the symbol of the western Allies treason of democratic Poland which they gave away to Moscow at this conference.
of the LS with this weekly. The events of 1989 commenced the discussion on the Polish-German border in earnest. On July 2, 1989 at the LS meeting in Hannover, the CSU chairman Theo Waigel repeated the constitutional principle in accordance with which the question of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) frontier was still open as the German territory was defined as of the German boundaries of 1937. On November 8 the Bundestag’s resolution accepting the existing German-Polish border was accepted, but in October Kohl said that no peace treaty had been concluded with Germany so far, which the BdV activists interpreted as reaffirmation of openness of the border question. When the conclusion of the Polish-German border treaty became imminent in mid-1990 the BdV secretary general Hartmut Koschyk put forward the plan of Frieden durch freie Abstimmung (Freedom through free voting) with the three possibilities:

the Deutsche Ostgebiete could remain with (i.e. de facto be transferred to) Germany;

be transferred to (i.e. de facto remain with) Poland;

or to become Europeanized, in this respect, the Deutsche Ostgebiete (and later also Sudetenland) would become a German/EC-Polish condominium.

Finally, only the meager 209,889 signatures in favor of such voting were collected by August 30, 1991 when in the meantime the Polish-German treaty on good neighborliness and friendly cooperation was signed on June 17, 1991 at Bonn (Ociepka, 1997: 168-198).

The initial opposition of the BdV against both the treaties had to subside in the face of the faits accomplis. What is more, the prize of the unified and sovereign of Germany was bigger than the promise of the illusory return of the Deutsche Ostgebiete. The treaty of 1991, also amounted to the recognition of Poland’s German minority and granting them with minority rights, which the BdV and the LO welcomed most as, in result, the biggest compact German group outside Germany emerged in Upper Silesia (Ociepka, 1997: 200-223). A long road had lead to this achievement. With the aid of the AGMO attempts at organizing official German organizations in Poland were undertaken in 1983 in Roszków (Roschkau) near Racibórz (Ratibor), in 1984 at Warsaw and Katowice (Kattowitz). All of these organizations were refused registration and the initiators were allowed to leave for the FRG which, under the then prevailing political conditions which limited emigration on ideological and economic basis, was their main goal. In December 1985 Blasius Hanczuch established the first clandestine Deutscher Freundeskreis (DFK, German Circle of Friendship). Later it became the standard name for local branches of the German minority movement in Upper Silesia. At the end of 1987 membership of the DFKs topped 5,000 and grew despite harassment by the security forces. DFK representatives were not prevented from meeting the German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the German embassy in Warsaw in January 1988. In 1989 the leadership of the German movement in Upper Silesia was assumed by 71-year-old Johann Kroll595 from Gogolin (Gogolin) who wishing the Polish authorities to recognize the German minority in Upper Silesia organized the action of collecting declarations of persons that they were Germans. Altogether 250-300,000 signatures were collected. The next step in the development of the political action was offered by the senate by-elections following the demise of the Opole (Oppeln) senator Edmund Osmańczyk596 (1913-1989). In the second round on February 4, 1990 there was a close race between Kroll’s son Heinrich Kroll597 and the pro-Polish Upper Silesian and Opole (Oppeln) scholar Dorota Simonides. Heinrich Kroll lost but in the wake of the campaign the Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Ludności Pochodzenia Niemieckiego Województwa Katowickiego/Sozialkulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen Volksgruppe in der Woiwodschaft Kattowitz (Sociocultural Society of the German Ethnic Group in the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship) was registered on January 16, 1990, the

595 The Polish postwar authorities automatically changed his name (as well as other Upper Silesians names which sounded too German) into Jan Król. Johann Kroll was allowed to return to his original name after having applied for it at the beginning of the 1990s when the Polish law was brought to the line with the provisions of the Polish-German treaty of 1991.

596 An Upper Silesian who was an activist of the interwar Polish minority movement in the Oppeln (Opole) regency.

597 At that time his name was still Henryk Król.
Chapter six

Towarzystwo Spoleczno-Kulturalne Ludności Pochodzenia Niemieckiego Województwa Częstochowskiego/Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen Volksgruppe in der Woiwodschaft Tschenstochau (Socio-Cultural Society of the German Ethnic Group in the Częstochowa voivodeship) on February 8, and Kroll’s Towarzystwo Spoleczno-Kulturalne Mniejszości Niemieckiej na Śląsku Oposkim/Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen in Oppeln (Socio-Cultural Society of the German Minority in Opole (Oppeln) Silesia) on February 16. More than 150 similar organizations sprang up especially in the period 1990/1991. The majority of them are located in Upper Silesia (Berdychowska, 1995: 123, 126/127; Urban, 1994: 101-109). However, the three enumerated organizations are the biggest ones with their respective memberships of 80,000, 19,000 and 180,000 in 1994 (Bahlcke, 1996: 203). Almost all the German organizations in Poland are members of the umbrella organization Związek Niemieckich Stowarzyszen Spoleczno-Kulturalnych w Polsce/Verband der Deutschen Sozialkulturellen Gesellschaften in der Republik Polen (Union of the German Sociocultural Societies in the Republic of Poland) established on August 27, 1991 at Opole (Oppeln). The membership of all the organizations participating in the Union is about 420,000 (Kamusella, 1996: 16), which is a good guideline for the Polish estimation of the number of Germans living at present in Silesia 300-400,000, and the German one of 400-800,000 (Bahlcke, 1996: 203). Necessarily, all the figures are a kind of guess because the rubric nationality has not been included in any postwar Polish census. The discrepancy can be explained by the Polish attitude which considers the Upper Silesians (Autochthons) as predominantly Poles, and the German constitutional one which includes all the persons eligible for (re-)obtaining German citizenship under Art 116 of the Basic Law.

Describing the 1989/1990 reluctant recognition of the German minority in Upper Silesia and in Poland in reciprocation for the Polish-German border treaty and to forestall the dramatic outflow of Aussiedlers depopulating certain rural regions Upper Silesia, it is good to remember that one German society has survived since the 1950s to this day. The rights of the indubitable Germans retained by the Polish authorities in Lower Silesia were, at least recognized, in 1950 when the first 28 German schools were opened there. The number of the schools rose to 55 in 1955/1956 and declined to 2 in 1962/1963 when the remaining German schools were liquidated in the wake of the emigration of these Germans, predominantly, to the GDR. From 1951 to 1958 they had their own newspapers, and on April 5, 1957 their first organization the Niemieckie Towarzystwo Spoleczno-Kulturalne/Deutsche Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft (German Socio-Cultural Society) with the seat at Walbrzych (Waldenburg) was registered. It is still active today, and in 1995 its membership was 307 (Bahlcke, 1996: 199; Berdychowska, 1995: 114/115). They have been always able to use the German language unlike in Upper Silesia where teaching and the use of this language was had been forbidden since 1945. The Opole (Oppeln) bishop, Upper Silesian Nossol broke this taboo in 1977 when he introduced the language to the seminary at Nysa (Neisse), and, finally, on June 4, 1989, when he used German in the course of the mass celebrated at Góra Sw. Anny (St Annaberg). The first political success of the Upper Silesian German minority came in the May 1990 local elections when its members won 388 (26.4%) mandates in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship. The minority’s most important newspaper Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomości GórnoŚląskie (Upper Silesian News) had started appearing prior to these elections, in April, and, today, under the title of Schlesisches Wochenblatt (Silesian Weekly) is the official organ of the minority. Since its inception in 1990 the newspaper has been bilingual in recognition of the loss of knowledge of German especially among those who could not attend a German school prior to 1945. Another success came in 1991 when Warsaw obliged itself to observe the rights of the minority in the Polish-German treaty of 1991, and when 7 German MPs and one senator entered the Polish parliament. In the next parliamentary elections 4 German MPs and one senator obtained mandates. In the first half of the 1990s German was introduced to several hundreds of elementary schools, and around 10 secondary schools established bilingual Polish-German departments in Upper Silesia. The first bilingual elementary school was opened in 1996 but, so far, no single monolingual German school has been established (Bahlcke, 1996: 205-210). Although these improvements are still not satisfactory the number of Aussiedlers coming to Germany from Poland (i.e. mainly from Upper Silesia) plummeted from 250,000 in 1989, to 133,000 in 1990, 40,129 in 1991, 17,742 in 1992, 5,341 in 1993, 2,440 in 1994, 1,677 in 1995, 1,175 in 1996 (Anon., 1996: 11/12; Anon., 1997: 5). This dramatic change was brought about by democratization and transition
from the centrally-planned to market-oriented economy in Poland as well as by Germany, where under the SPD’s pressure the Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (War Consequences Consolidation Act) was passed in 1992. In accordance with this act, descendants of ethnic Germans resident outside Germany born after January 1, 1993, cannot acquire German citizenship. This decision amounts to the effective scrapping of Art 116 of the Basic Law. What is more, the act makes it almost impossible for ethnic Germans from the former Deutsche Ostgebiete and Sudetenland to obtain the status of Aussiedler (Cordell, 1995: 20; Wolf, 1996). But German consulates started issuing ethnic Germans with German passports, which are actually German and EU passports. In 1994 there were more than 170,000 holders of them in Poland (Kamusella, 1996: 17). This document enables one to legally work in Germany and the EU, so that the incentive to leave one’s homeland is not conspicuous anymore. Hence at present most Aussiedlers arrive to Germany from the former SU (in 1996 172,181) (Anon., 1997: 5).

The German minority is the strongest in the Opole (Oppeln) voivodeship. The situation developed a bit differently in the adjacent Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodeship the most populous one in Poland where the German minority is just a minuscule fraction of the total populace. The memory of the autonomy of the prewar Silesian Voivodeship is still alive over there, and the movement for a reintroduction of a degree of similar autonomy for Upper Silesia and official recognition of distinctiveness of (Upper) Silesianity was represented, at the beginning of the 1990s, by the Związek Górnośląski (Upper Silesian Union) in Katowice (Kattowitz), the Związek Górnosłaskaków in Opole (Oppeln) and the Ruch Autonomii Śląska (Movement for Autonomy of Silesia) in Rybnik (Rybnik) (Bahlcke, 1996: 212). All of them were rather pro-Polish but they faded into oblivion when prior to the 1993 parliamentary elections the 5% threshold was introduced. The German minority still prospered because national minorities were excepted from this demand. The further disregard of Warsaw for regional distinctiveness of the Katowice (Kattowitz) part of Upper Silesia (which as the industrial center of postwar Poland had disproportionally contributed to the Polish economy without reaping any fruits of its efforts) as well as for its dire economic and environmental problems made some activists of the afore-mentioned organizations and of others to register the Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej (ZLNŚ, Association of the Silesian National Group) in Katowice (Kattowitz) on June 26, 1997 in anticipation of the September parliamentary elections. The ZLNŚ, as a minority organization will also be exempted from the 5% threshold as the German minority, and may become a third alternative for those Upper Silesians who do not want to become Poles or Germans but to remain Upper Silesians. On the other hand, the association may also lead to the overhaul of the Upper Silesian ethnic movement into a national one. This possibility irks Polish nationalists who opine that it may be the beginning of Balkanization of Poland but, as a matter of fact, the author believes that such an Upper Silesian national movement will just provide the Upper Silesians with more self-esteem and ensure more self-governing powers for Upper Silesia in accordance with the EU principle of subsidiarity (Filar, 1997: 1; Smolorz, 1997: 1, 5). For sure, after the initial uproar, it will prove so benevolent and harmless as its Frisian or Sorbian counterpart.

The 1989 change also allowed the German minority in Czechoslovakia, therefore, also in Czech Silesia, to assume a bolder organizational shape but their number is rather small in comparison to the Polish minority concentrated in Czech East Silesia. Contextualizing the position of the Germans in Czechoslovakia against the historical background, it is good to notice that after the expulsion, the remaining Germans obtained Czechoslovak citizenship only in 1968, on the basis of the Czechoslovak Citizenship Act passed in the same year. Next year after the Polish (1947), Hungarian (1949) and Ukrainian (1954) minorities, Czechoslovakia’s Germans obtained their own minority organization the Kulturní sdružení občanů německé národnosti/Kulturverband der Bürger deutscher Nationalität der ČSSR (KSONN, Cultural Union of the Czechoslovak Citizens of the German Nationality) which was closely controlled by the state authorities as all the other minority organizations. In 1984 the KSONN’s membership was 7,732, i.e. 13.3% of all the Germans resident in Czechoslovakia at that time 58,135. However, in the period 1950-1980 63.6% of the Czechoslovak Germans left for the FRG or the GDR (Malá, 1993: 190/191, 197). According to the West German official sources, in 1950-1979, 88,372 Aussiedlers arrived in the FRG from Czechoslovakia, and in 1980-1989 12,727 (Anon., 1994: 23). Many of these Aussiedlers were also residents of the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen), who not unlike the Upper Silesians (Autochthons) were considered Czechs by Prague and Germans by Bonn in the view of
Art 116 of the Basic Law. After the velvet revolution of 1989 numerous new German organizations came into being in defiance of the officially-ordained KSONN. Majority of them were united in the independent umbrella organization of the Landesversammlung der Deutschen in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien (Land Assembly of the Germans in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia). In case of West Silesia, in 1991, the Schlesisch-Deutscher Verband (Union of Silesian Germans) came into being at Opava (Troppau) with 370 members in 1995, including 27 at Ostrava (Ostrau) (Götze, 1995: 2). In the wake of founding new independent organizations the Verband der Deutschen Nordmähren-Adlergebirge (Union of the Germans of Northern Moravia-Orlické (Adler) Mountains) came into being in 1993. Out of its total membership of 570, 120 live in the westernmost West Silesian county of Jeseník (Freiwaldau) (Götze, 1995a: 2). The Czech East Silesian Germans are organized in the Regionalverband des Teschner Schlesien (Regional Branch of Těšín (Teschen) Silesia)) of the KSONN (Anon., 1995d: 2). According to the 1991 census, there were 48,556 Germans in the Czech Republic, majority of them concentrated in the western Bohemian border counties. In Moravia and Silesia the highest concentration of Germans was observed in the Opava (Troppau) county where they constituted 0.9% of the population (Frištenská, 1994: 13/14). On the other hand, in Czech East Silesia they added up to 706, 0.15% of the population (Zahradník, 1992: 251). Probably, the number of the Czech Silesian Germans will slowly decline due to exogamic marriages and impossibility of organizing an educational system for such dispersed populace, but not because of emigration. The outflow of Aussiedlers from Czechoslovakia was always low, and their number definitely went down after 1989: 1,708 in 1990, 927 in 1991, 460 in 1992, 134 in 1993 and 14 in 1996 (Anon., 1994: 23; Anon., 1997: 5). Recognizing this fact the Czech Silesian Germans are eager to cooperate with their Czech neighbors to preserve their identity and spread knowledge of German. This function is fulfilled by the Begegnungszentrums (meeting centers) located in Opava (Troppau) and Haviřov.

Considering the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia, after the two years of acute Polish-Czechoslovak border conflict in southern Silesia, and disregarding of the rights of Czechs and Moravians in Silesia by the Polish authorities, and of Poles in Czech East Silesia, Prague reluctantly granted the latter, in 1947, with the permit to establish the Polski Związek Kulturalno-OSwiatowy (PZKO, Polish Cultural-Educational Association). The PZKO did not manage to regain quite extensive property of the prewar Polish organizations but maintained a modicum of Polish cultural life and organized the Polish educational system. The Polish organizational life intensified during the period of the Prague Spring (1968). After the Warsaw Treaty Pact’s clamp down on Czechoslovakia, the PZKO condemned the invasion. Consequently, during the period of normalization after this invasion, many of Polish activists were persecuted and harassed. Only in 1976, it was allowed to use bilingual signs and the Polish language in offices in the East Silesian communes with considerable percentages of Polish inhabitants. Due to the high influx of migrants to the Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwina) industrial basin, the percentage of Poles in the East Silesian population decreased as well as their overall number (Zahradník, 1992a: 112, 152-167). In 1945 there were 82,000 Poles in Czechoslovakia, in 1949 73,000, in 1961 68,000, in 1970 65,000, in 1980 68,000 and in 1991, 62,000 (Šatava, 1994: 56). In the case of Czech East Silesia, their number decreased from 59,005 (26.8%) in 1950, to 58,876 (20.9%) in 1961, to 56,075 (16%) in 1970, 51,586 (14.1%) in 1980 and to 43,479 (11.8%) in 1991 (Zahradník, 1992: 250/251). Consequently, the number of Polish schools and students plummeted too to the outcry of the activists. However, in 1993/1994 in Czech East Silesia there were still 29 Polish elementary schools, 10 Polish elementary schools with an incomplete number of forms and one secondary school (Frištenská, 1994: 15-17). After 1989 the Polish state also started supporting the Polish minority, and 50 places for Polish students from the Czech Republic are put aside at Polish universities every year. The Poles in Czech East Silesia not unlike across the border in Polish East Silesia, are consolidated in the evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession. About two-thirds of the Polish minority constitute 50,000 members of the Church.

Information obtained from Mr LeoS Pejsar, a Czech German.

Information gained from Polish students from the Czech Republic whom the author taught at Opole (Oppeln) University in 1995/1996.
The remaining 18,000 faithful are Czechs. In Czech east Silesia, the Church is divided into the two senior councils of Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) and Těšín (Teschen) (Bahlcke, 1996: 216).

Considering other ethnic and national groups residing in Czech East Silesia, the Góralsi (Highlanders) living in the south-eastern corner of this region are considered to be an ethnic group of the Polish nation (Satava, 1994: 57) although the matter is not so clear cut as it is explained in the previous chapters. With intensification of the heavy industrial production Slovak workers appeared. In 1950 there were 4,388 (2%) of them, in 1961 13,223 (4.7%), in 1970 26,806 (7.6%), in 1980 28,719 (7.8%), and 26,629 (7.2) in 1991 (Zahradnik, 1992: 250/251). In 1956 the only Slovak elementary school in the Czech lands was opened for them at Karviná (Karwin) (Frištenská, 1994: 17). Greeks and Macedonians who fled from Greece after the failure of the communist uprising at the end of the 1940s, settled in and around Krnov (Jägerndorf) but majority of them have returned to their country now (Bechný, 1992: 24). The sudden drop in the number of Poles in 1991 is partially explained by reappearance of Germans, Moravians and Silesians who had not been included in the postwar statistics. In 1991 in Czech East Silesia there were 16,992 (4.6%) Moravians and 10,858 (2.9%) Silesians (Zahradnik, 1992: 251). In the whole of Czech Silesia and northern Moravia, the membership of the Silesian group topped 44,446. On the other hand the Moravian national group concentrated in Moravia and Silesia became the second largest national group in the Czech Republic with 1,362,313 members followed by 314,877 Slovaks. The reemergence of the Moravians and Silesians as national groups is the continuation of the prewar tradition of the Silesian and Moravian ethnic movements which attracted those who did not want to give up their respective ethnic identities by choosing to become Czechs, Germans or Poles. Today, they do not want so much minority rights for themselves as respect for their distinctive identities. Their program is of decentralization and dividing the state into the three historically-based administrative regions of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (Frištenská, 1994: 13-15). They constitute membership of three parties which struggle for their sake against the centralism of Prague and Bohemíá, namely: the Bohemian-Moravian Center Party (CMSS), the Movement for Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia, and the Moravian national Party. Only the first one has its own deputies in the parliament whereas the other two seem to fade away from the political scene as it happened with Upper Silesian pro-autonomy organizations. It is due to the fact that the 5% election threshold is applied to all the parties and groups unlike in Poland where minority organizations are exempted from complying with this demand (which in 1987 may open the way to the parliament for the ZLNS).

The changes which took place in Polish and Czech Silesia after 1989 are going to have a lasting influence on the notion of Silesia, especially in the light of the ongoing debate on decentralization and regionalization of the Polish and Czech states to make them more compatible with the EU-promoted model state based on self-governing regions in line with the principle of subsidiarity. At present Poland still consists from 49 minuscule governmental voivodeships divided into self-governing communes. Controlled by the government the voivodeships hardly can press Warsaw to decentralize the state whereas the voice of communes is rather not heard in the capital. There are plans to reduce the number of the voivodeships to 17 as it had been prior to 1975 or to 12 or twenty-something, in order to overhaul them into viable regions. The question remains if they should be self-governing or governmental. No solution has been reached in any of these respects because self-government means less power for the center and less voivodeships fewer high positions for party officials. Similar problems trouble Prague where the regions were scrapped in 1989 in favor of governmental counties. Now there are plans to create from 3 to 12 regions. The idea of 3 regions is supported by the Moravian and Silesian movements because then the three historical provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesian would be reestablished. They also appeal for limiting centralism which could be effected by making such regions self-governing (Bubin, 1995: 5). Simply, the French model of a highly centralized state on which Poland and Czechoslovakia had been based in 1918, is still perceived by many Polish and Czech politicians as the guarantor of state and national unity, and they have difficulties with grasping the fact that the state constituting from self-governing regions (as Germany, Switzerland or the US) is much more efficient and

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600 The June 28, 1995 letter to the author from Mr Roman Krasnický, the Secretary of the Embassy of the Czech Republic, Warsaw, Poland.
stable in the ever quicker changing modern world. Thus even if regionalization of Poland and the Czech Republic is to proceed soon the reform will take place after both the states commence their membership negotiations with the EU at the beginning of 1998. Considering, recent changes in the administrative divisions in relation to Silesia, in 1993 the quite large Šumperk (Mährisch Schönberg) county was split into the smaller northern Moravian Šumperk (Mährisch Schönberg) county and the West Silesian Jeseník (Freiwaldau) county.

The significance of the fall of communism and ongoing democratization was better realized by the Catholic Church which has already instituted ecclesiastical division changes which are to make it better adjusted to the new situation and also to the needs of its faithful. The fall of communism and the break-up of the SU allowed the return of the Catholic Church to the successor states of the SU. In this situation, on March 22, 1992, pope John Paul II issued the bull Totus tuus Poloniae populus on the basis of which the ecclesiastical division of the Polish Catholic Church was consolidated. First of all, the truncated ecclesiastical provinces of Lwów (Lviv) and Wilno (Vilinus) which had continued to exist after the war (as the truncated Breslau (Wrocław) archdiocese in the GDR in the period 1945-1972) were overhauled into the ecclesiastical provinces of Przemyśl and Białystok. In case of Silesia, the territory of the Gorzów (Landsberg) diocese was limited in the north in favor of the Koszalin-Kolobrzeg (Köslin-Kolberg) diocese. Moreover, the Gorzów (Landsberg) diocese’s name was changed into the Zielona Góra-Landsberg (Grünberg-Landsberg) diocese, and it was transferred from the Wroclaw (Breslau) ecclesiastical province into the newly-formed Szczecin-Kamień (Stettin-Cammin) one. The Opole (Oppeln) diocese was detached from the Wroclaw (Breslau) ecclesiastical province which now consists from the Wroclaw (Breslau) archdiocese and the Legnica (Liegnitz) diocese carved up from the archdiocese. Regarding the Opole (Oppeln) diocese, its northernmost deanery of Wolczyn (Konstadt) was transferred to the newly-founded Kalisz diocese belonging to the Poznań (Posen) ecclesiastical province, whereas its protruding eastern part gave beginning to the new Gliwice (Gleiwitz) diocese. In case of the Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese, its East Silesian part was detached and united with the western part of the Cracow archdiocese into the Bielsko-Zywiec (Bielitz-Saybusch) diocese which remains in the Cracow ecclesiastical province. The Katowice (Kattowitz) diocese which was elevated to the rank of the archdiocese, was excluded from this province and became the Katowice (Kattowitz) ecclesiastical province on its own. This Upper Silesian province comprises the Katowice (Kattowitz) archdiocese and the Opole (Oppeln) and Gliwice (Gleiwitz) dioceses. The Wroclaw (Breslau) and Katowice (Kattowitz) ecclesiastical provinces include majority of Lower and Upper Silesia, respectively. North-western Lower Silesia is included in the Zielona Góra-Gorzów (Grünberg-Landsberg) diocese, a fragment of Upper Silesia in the Kalisz diocese, and Polish East Silesia in the Bielsko-Zywiec (Bielitz-Saybusch) diocese. The Wroclaw (Breslau) archbishop is Henryk Gulbinowicz and the Legnica (Liegnitz) bishop is Tadeusz Rakoczy, the Katowice (Kattowitz) bishop is Damian Zimoń, the Opole (Oppeln) bishop is Alfons Nossol and the Gliwice (Gleiwitz) bishop is Jan Wieczorek, the Zielona Góra-Gorzów (Grünberg-Landsberg) bishop is Adam Dyczkowski, the Bielsko-Zywiec (Bielitz-Saybusch) bishop is Tadeusz Rybak, the Katowice (Kattowitz) bishop is Damian Zimoń, the Opole (Oppeln) bishop is Alfons Nossol and the Gliwice (Gleiwitz) bishop is Jan Wieczorek, the Zielona Góra-Gorzów (Grünberg-Landsberg) bishop is Adam Dyczkowski, the Bielsko-Zywiec (Bielitz-Saybusch) bishop is Tadeusz Rakoczy and the Kalisz bishop is Stanislaw Napierala (Adamczuk, 1991: 116; Hanich, 1997: 12; Henzler, 1994: 14/15). The postcommunist normalization of the relations between the state and the Catholic Church was also visible in the Czech Republic, where the Czech Silesians dream, about their own diocese was finally actualized in 1996 when the Ostrava-Opava (Ostrau-Troppau) diocese was founded on the territorial basis of Czech Silesia and the northern Moravian salient between West and East Silesia. The new diocese is comprised in the Olomouc (Olmutz) ecclesiastical province (Anon., 1996a: 8/9).

The sudden political changes which also brought unification of Germany, could not remain without any influence on the Lusatian part of Lower Silesia west of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa). The Görlitz archdiocesan office which was changed into the Görlitz apostolic administration in 1972 had to get prepared for another transformation. Obviously the new alteration was orchestrated with the 1992 ecclesiastical changes in Poland. In 1992 the Conference of German Bishops requested the pope to elevate the apostolic administration to the position of a diocese. John Paul II complied with thins entreaty, and in 1994 the Görlitz diocese came into being. The Görlitz suffragan Bernhard Huhn, who, as the apostolic administrator, was subjected to the Dresden-Meissen bishop, today, as the Görlitz bishop
answers to the Berlin archbishop (Bahlcke, 1996: 216). Recently Rudolf Müller succeeded Huhn, and, on February 17, 1997, consolidated the pastoral service for all the Silesians resident in Germany by nominating Winfried König, the visitor of the priests and the faithful of the Breslau (Wroclaw) archdiocese, to the position of a member of the Görlitz chapter (Anon, 1997a: 11). Thanks to the changes the evangelical Church of Silesia which had to change its name into the evangelical Church of the Görlitz Ecclesiastical Region in 1968, could overhaul its name into the more appropriate one of the evangelical Church of Silesian Upper Lusatia in 1993. In the five ecclesiastical counties of this Church there were 250,000 of its faithful in 1955, at present they number around 100,000. Currently bishop Klaus Wollenweber heads this Church (Anon., 1997b: 5; Bahlcke, 1996: 214/215).

The unification of Germany also brought the former GDR citizens into touch with the expellee movement. Then it was soon to be seen that the unity of the GDR society which the SU and the GDR communist authorities decreed at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s was illusory. The expellees living in the GDR suffered even more under the communist regime than the locals, because they lost their property and homelands east of the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) and could not even cultivate their memories of those lands prior to 1945 not unlike the expellees from the former Polish eastern territories. This suppressed need caused Paul Latussek to establish the Verband der Umsiedler (VdU, Union of the Resettlers) in March 1990. He decided not to use the term Vertriebene (expellees) in the name of this organization in order not to antagonize the populace of the former GDR, which having been conditioned by the communist propaganda, perceived the BdV and other West German expellee organizations as revisionists (not unlike the public opinion of other postcommunist states until their own expellees emerged as, for instance, in Poland). On the other hand, the BdV in its bid for securing a return of the Deutsche Ostgebiete to Germany/EU, sought to boost its electorate and membership. Not surprisingly, besides other actions, it strove to establish its structures in the new five Länder (plus united Berlin) which reemerged after the demise of the GDR. In July 1990, the BdV founding commissions came into being in Saxony-Silesian Lusatia and Thuringia. On November 10 the BdV Land branch was registered in Thuringia, and the VdU not to disunite the expellee movement, dissolved itself whereas its members entered the BdV, and Latussek was accepted into the ranks of the BdV federal authorities. When the state-financing of the expellee movement was extended to the new Länder, the BdV Land branches complete with their own equipped seats came to being in all of them before the end of 1990. The expellee movement in the new Länder obtained its joint representation in the form of the Rat der Vertriebenen in Mittledeutschland (Council of the Expellees in Central Germany). The BdV membership in the new Länder rose from 70,000 at the end of 1991 to 150,000 in 1992 and to 250,000 in 1993. At present the main efforts of the BdV in this area concentrate on equalizing the status of the expellees from the former GDR with those from West Germany (Ociepka, 1997: 76-79). In regard of Silesia, the LS established its new branches in Thuringia and Saxony-Silesian Lusatia. Interestingly, in the latter land there are two LS branches: one of Saxony-Silesian Lusatia and the other of Lower Silesia with their seats at Weißwasser and Görlitz, i.e. in the remaining part of Silesia. Besides branches of the BdV and the LS as well as of the LS’s Schlesische Jugend, many other Silesian organizations and institutions sprang up there after 1989, e.g.: the Schlesisches Vereinszentrum (Center of the Silesian Associations), the Festkomitee Schlesische Musikfeste (Festival Committee of the Silesian Music Festival), the Landesmuseum Schlesien (Land Museum of Silesia), the Freier Wählerbund Niederschlesien (Lower Silesian Union for Free Elections), the Unabhängige Initiativegruppe Niederschlesien (Independent Initiative Group of Lower Silesia), the Niederschlesisches Kammerorchester (Lower Silesian Chamber Orchestra), the Niederschlesischer Sprottsverein Gelb-Weiβ (Yellow-White Lower Silesian Sports Club), the Gehörslosenverein Niederschlesien (Lower Silesian Association for the Deaf), the Niederschlesisches Umweltzentrum (Lower Silesian Environment Center), the Niederschlesische Sparkasse (Lower Silesian Savings Bank), the Schlesisch-Oberlausitzer Dorfmuseum Markersdorf (Silesian-Upper Lusatian Village Museum in Markersdorf), the Schlesische Heimatbund (Silesian Homeland Union), the Singund Musizierschule Schlesische Lausitz (Singing and Music School of Silesian Lusatia), the Verband schlesischer Kulturfreunde (Union of Friends of Silesian Culture) and the Niederschlesische Kultur-, Kongrefßund Messezentrum Stadthalle Görlitz (Lower Silesian Culture, Congress and Cafeteria Center in Görlitz). The Kuratorium Schlesische Lausitz (Board of Trustees of Silesian Lusatia) acts as an umbrella organizations
for all those groups and associations which endeavor to preserve Silesian tradition. Moreover, there are numerous other institutions, offices and business establishments with the adjective Niederschlesisch (Lower Silesian) in their names. This trend is encouraged by the 1992 Land constitution of the Free State of Saxony. It recognizes that this Land also consists from the Lower Silesian territories, and allows the official use of Lower Silesian colors and coats-of-arms in these territories. The same right is granted to the regions inhabited by Sorbs. Because the Lower Silesian areas predominantly overlap with Lusatia, dual use of the specific Lower Silesian and Sorbian colors and coats-of-arms do occur. What is more, though it is not official usage it became popular to refer to Saxony as Saxony-Silesian Lusatia (Anon., 1997b: 5-11; Bahlcke, 1996: 214). The authorities and inhabitants of Görlitz bent on putting their backwater border city back on the map, decided to bet on its Silesian past. They promote it as the biggest and most known (Lower) Silesian city in Germany and do support the construction of the Landesmuseum Schlesien (Lechner, 1997: 12).

Having presented the changes in the notion of Silesia caused after 1918 by border, political, demographic and ecclesiastical changes, now one ought to scrutinize how the developments influenced the geographical/regional terminology used in regard of Silesia, as well as metamorphoses of Silesianity at the hands of the nation-states of Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic), and changes in identity of the Silesians. Without such a rounding-up analysis this chapter would not give a full picture of the notion of Silesia as promised in the title.

The basic geographical division of Prussian Silesia into Lower and Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia into West and East Silesia was shattered by the annexations of some fragments of the former for the sake of the newly established states of Poland and Czechoslovakia, as well as by division of Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany, and East Silesia between Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Lower Silesian territories included in Poland did not merit any special name due to their low population and lack of any high economic significance. The situation was different in the case of the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) transferred from Upper Silesia to Czechoslovakia in the context of the looming division of Upper Silesia which housed the second most important German industrial basin after the Ruhr. It happens, but rarely, that the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) is referred to as Hlučín (Hultschin) Silesia. After the division of Upper Silesia it was popular to speak about this part which remained in Germany as German (Upper) Silesia and that given to Poland as Polish (Upper) Silesia. The alternative names were West and East (Upper) Silesia but they were a bit confusing as the two parts of Austrian Silesia were called West and East Silesia. Anyway both the sets of names for divided Upper Silesia were quite popular in Germany but not in Poland. Warsaw to emphasize its claim to this part of Upper Silesia which remained in Germany, referred to it as Opole (Oppeln) Silesia whereas Silesia (Śląsk) to the Silesian Voivodeship. The Voivodeship also included this part of East Silesia which was allotted to Poland. It was referred to as Cieszyn (Teschen) Silesia while that part which stayed in Czechoslovakia as Těšín (Teschen) Silesia or Těšínsko. At the end of the interwar period the Poles spoke about the latter as the Zaolzie (Transolza) or, mistakenly, as Czech Silesia because in the Czech usage Czech Silesia meant West (or Opava (Troppau) Silesia, Těšín (Teschen) Silesia and the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen). Hence, Czech Silesia or, simply, Silesia (Slezsko) was quite different from Austrian Silesia, deprived of Cieszyn (Teschen) Silesia and with the addition of the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen). After 1928 when (Czech) Silesia was merged with Moravia, the term (Czech) Silesia gradually disappeared from popular usage, except from the political lexicon of the Sudetic Germans who were vitally interested in maintaining separateness of this most German administrative region of interwar Czechoslovakia. Generally, one used the term Moravia and meant Silesia too. Those more given to the perception of detail, also tended to speak about Moravia-Silesia. The meaning of Moravia-Silesia and Czech Silesia was changed again after the Munich Agreement when the Hlučínsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) was reincorporated in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, and the Zaolzie (Transolza), hailed as the recovered territories by the Polish propaganda, in the Silesian Voivodeship. On the other hand, West Silesia became part of Sudetenland leaving Czechoslovakia with a thin strip of East Silesia which was included in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. After the outbreak of World War II, Upper Silesia was reunited in its pre-1918 shape with the addition of the majority of East Silesia which had been previously included in the Silesian Voivodeship. What is more, at the end of 1939, it was decided to include the whole of the
Chapter six

Upper Silesian coal basin in Upper Silesia which meant the incorporation of the adjacent Polish counties from the voivodeships of Kielce and Cracow. This highly artificial enlargement of Upper Silesia caused locals to refer to the new additions as the incorporated territories. However, should Germany have won the war they would, with time, have become truly Upper Silesian. Almost all of historical Silesia was included in the wartime German Province of Silesia which was divided into the provinces of Lower and Upper Silesia in 1941. The year 1945 brought the end of German Silesia. First of all, the pre-1938 frontiers were reestablished in Silesia and all of German Silesia up to the Oder-Neisse (Odra-Nysa) was given to Poland as part of the Deutsche Ostgebiete, or, from the Polish viewpoint, as part of the recovered territories, western and northern territories or Piast lands. Obviously, the Polish terms were aimed at proving Polishness and unGermanness of these territories along with the official ideological line. For the Germans the Deutsche Ostgebiete were east German (Ostdeutschland), the Soviet Occupation Zone (later the GDR) central Germany (Mitteldeutschland), and the western occupation zones (later the FRG) west Germany (Westdeutschland). The usage was gradually superseded by the terms East and West Germany for denoting the GDR and the FRG, but the expellee movement sticks fast to the traditional coinages. In case of Silesia, the term West Silesia was used for short time in technical and economic documents to denote all of German Silesia which was transferred to Poland after 1945. When the postwar changes stabilized the terms Silesia and Upper Silesia became quite synonymous in the Polish popular usage. They are quite misleading because they denote just the Upper Silesian industrial heartland. For some the Opole (Oppeln) voivodeship is synonymous with Opole (Oppeln) Silesia but few are able to correctly distinguish between Lower, Upper and Polish East Silesia. For the majority Lower Silesia is just part of the eastern and northern territories gained after the war. However, young people who were born in Silesia and have nowhere else to refer to (unlike their parents and grandparents from Poland’s former eastern territories) start digging into the past of their homeland learning more and bringing the temporarily lost traditions to the surface of reality again. But the difference which was maintained by the communist ideologues between the Autochthons and Polish settlers and expelles who settled down in Silesia, does not allow the children of the latter to say I am a Silesian since it would be the same as stating: I am an Autochthon. So to solve this dilemma they tend to say: I am from Silesia (Unilowski, 1997: 25). From the tourist point of view, one speaks about north-eastern Upper Silesia as White Silesia (due to abundance of limestone), the inustrial basin in east-central Upper Silesia as Black Silesia, and south-eastern Upper Silesia as Green Silesia (because of forests and greenery which spread into the Beskids of Polish East Silesia). In case of Czech Silesia there was a tendency to use this term immediately after the war, but with the communist takeover Czechoslovakia was divided into non-historically based regions, and only after 1989 the term regained currency as there are efforts to reestablish the division of the Czech Republic into the historical provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. The first (more symbolical than practical) step was taken in 1993 after the division of Czechoslovakia, when the state adopted a new coat-of-arms. It consists from four quarters two are adorned by the Bohemian lion, one by the Moravian eagle and one by the (Austrian) Silesian eagle (Blasiak, 1994: 16/17; Snoch, 1991: 140-142).

[institutes and universities, changes in identity]

[virtual Silesia, changes in identity]


[Czech Rep Polish minority in Teschen Silesia, German minority only after 1989]

[on geographical terminology]

[Church administration, administrative divisions in Pl, CS, DDR, virtual Silesianity in the FRG till today, Church administration once more]
Chapter seven

Intensification of the policies of ethnic cleansing in the interwar period and during the second world war

At the end of the First World War Germany asked the US President Woodrow Wilson to arrange peace. The three empires of Germany, Russia and Austro-Hungary, which had controlled Central Europe, collapsed and a plethora of new countries came into being. Especially the states of Czechoslovakia and Poland are important for our argument. Since respective national politicians had attempted to create the states in 1916, one of the main problems had been posed by the question of future territories the countries should possess in accordance with the Wilsonian idea of national self-determination based on linguistic boundaries.

The easiest adjustment was the transfer of the small territory of Hultschin (Hlucin, Hulczyn), north-east from Troppau (Opava, Opawa) with about 50,000 inhabitants which was taken from Germany and given to Czechoslovakia in 1919. About 80% of the Hlucin people spoke Moravian Czech and they used to give the Prussian authorities a good deal of trouble. The Hlucin country was mainly agricultural and of no particular value and its transfer was based on the straightforward application of linguistic Wilsonianism because the principle did not conflict with other considerations, but also satisfied the Czechs who were only too eager to win more covering territory in order a little to protect the vulnerable industrial district around Ostrau (Ostrava) so near the point Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland were to meet. In their Second Memoire to the Peace Conference they suggested that their country should stretch as far as to Ratibor (Racibórz) but to no avail (Wiskemann, 1938: 116/117).

The question of the division of Austrian Silesia was a thorny issue in the Polish-Czechoslovak relations. According to the 1910 census the Polish-speaking inhabitants accounted for 54.8% of the population, Czech-speaking for 27.1% and German-speaking for 18.1% (Zahradnik, 1992: 45) on the basis of language of intercourse (Roucek, 1945: 174). The local agreement between the Rada Narodowa Ksistwa Cieszyskiego (the National Council of the Cieszyn/Teschen/Tesen Principality) and the Zemsky Narodni Wybor pro Slezsko (the Land National Committee for Silesia) provisionally granted Poland with the regions of Bielitz (Bielsko), Teschen (Cieszyn, Tesen) and Freistadt (Frystat, Frysztat) (except eight administrative subdivisions) because they were predominantly inhabited by Polish-speakers. The ethnic basis of this agreement was questioned by the Czechoslovak authorities who claimed that historical and economic reasons entailed adding all of Austrian Silesia to Czechoslovakia, and establishing the would-be Polish-Czechoslovak border on the River Biaa or the Vistula, or in the worst case on the Olza. While the main Polish army was stationed in Galicia facing the Ukrainians, on January 23, 1911 the Czechs invaded the Principality, and though opposed by the Polish-speaking miners (Roucek, 1945a: 148), they reached the Vistula. The Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations in Cracow (July 22-29, 1919) failed and at the Paris Peace conference it was decided on September 27, 1919 that a plebiscite should be conducted in Austrian Silesia (Dugajczyk, 1989: 2).

602. Ostrava lies on a thin strip of land belonging to Moravia, which was curiously squeezed in-between the two parts of Austrian Silesia almost cutting the latter in half.
The Austrian Silesian German-speaking population which was much irredentist not agreeing to the position of a minority in Czechoslovakia was restrained by their industrialists who wanted to avoid the competition of Reich German heavy industry. The capitalists much preferred a Czech, i.e. more Western, to a Polish prospect, and extended their influence towards pushing the Czechoslovak-Polish border as far to the east as possible (Wiskemann, 1938: 115). Because of the pro-Czechoslovak attitude of the Germans and the local population of the Silesian identity (irrespectively of their mother tongues), Czechoslovakia could count on gaining more than 50% of votes in the plebiscite, Czechoslovak historians claimed that even more than 60% (Gruchaa, 1990: 4). Thus Poland opposed organization of the plebiscite using political and even terrorist measures. Due to the tense situation the plebiscite was revoked and on June 28, 1920 the Council of Ambassadors in Spa divided Austrian Silesia (Kerner, 1945: 66). Poland received the region of Bielsko (Bielitz) and a part of the Cieszyn (Teschen, Tesen) region which were unquestionably ethnically Polish with an admixture of a small German minority. The Czechoslovak part of Austrian Silesia contained 140,000 Polish speakers, 114,000 Moravian/Czech speakers and 30,000 German speakers. The Polish-Czechoslovak agreement on minority rights signed in November 1920 was never ratified leaving room for aggravation of differences (Gruchaa, 1990: 4).

A similar situation complete with nationalistic conflicts and territorial claims could be observed in Upper Silesia. Germany and Austro-Hungary strove to curb radicalization of Polish irredentism by proclaiming creation of the Polish Kingdom in 1916 and issuing, in 1917, a bill which allowed to teach religion in Polish in the first grades of the elementary school. They were half-measures as Polish was not re-introduced to Upper Silesian schools as the Prussian government argued that the local population used Wasserpolnisch (Silesian Polish) not literary Polish. Moreover, it was prohibited to disseminate information on Polish Legions which were formed in Austro-Hungary. The half-hearted pseudo-solutions intensified the feeling of irredentism. The Church hierarchy in the person of the Breslau bishop Adolf Bertram demanded education in Polish because the majority of Upper Silesians used Polish, in order to soothe antagonisms (Mendel, 1988: 4). At the Paris Peace Conference on September 8, 1918 Roman Dmowski claimed the whole of the Oppeln Regency for Poland with the exception of predominantly German areas of Grottkau (Grodków), Neisse (Nysa), Falkenberg (Niemodlin) and Neustadt (Prudnik). In reciprocation he demanded the areas of Namslau (Namysłów), Gross Wartenberg (Syców) and Militsch (Milicz) from the Breslau Regency. He was supported by Korfanty in the Reichstag who in his speeches presented a similar position. The claimed territory of about 12,000 sq km was inhabited by 2.1 mln out of which 67% were Polish speakers (Przewocki, 1988: 1).

The growing Polish nationalism, which caused a many pro-German-oriented Silesian to flee west, was answered on December 3, 1918 by the Oppeln Regency President Bitta who declared state of emergency (Przewocki, 1988a: 2) which was extended to whole Silesia by the Government Commissary Otto Hörsing on January 13, 1919. He introduced martial courts and abolished Polish organizations. Resemblance of order was maintained by the Grenschutz, 117th Infantry Division under the command of gen. Karl Hoefer, which had arrived to Silesia in November 1918 requested by Hörsing (Lis, 1988: 3). It was followed by the remnants of the German Army which responded by forming their celebrated

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On October 21, 1918 the independent German-Austrian state was proclaimed, with jurisdiction over the whole German ethnic area, particularly the Sudeten territories (the Germans in Old Austria used to call Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia die Sudetenländer, i.e. the Sudeten territories). On the basis of the proclamation the Province of German-Bohemia was established and on October 30, 1918 it was followed by founding of another province constituted from the German districts of Northern Bohemia and Silesia, with Troppau (Opaava, Opawa) as capital. Moreover, also two other German provinces of the Böhmerwaldgau Bohemian Forest District) and German Southern Moravia were created (the short-lived country was called Sudetenland which by no means is identical with the bigger Sudetenland of the 1938 Munich Agreement).

Governor and Depuy-Governor of the Province of Northern Moravia and Silesia (which falls into the scope of the thesis) were Robert Freissler and Hans Jokl respectively. They planned to take into consideration possible demands from the Czechs, Poles, Silesians and Jews living in the territory, thus, clearly realizing their province was not mono-ethnic and could not exist without active participation and consent of the inhabitants of non-Germanic ethnic stocks (Breugel, 1973: 22/23).
Freikorps to defend the German cause, and brought about victimization of private people of both nationalities\(^{604}\) (Wiskemann, 1956: 27).

The decisions of the German government caused escalation of Polish irredentism and the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW, the Polish Military Organization) came into being and staged a short-lived rebellion (which is referred to as the First Silesian Uprising in Polish historiography) in August 1919 which was bloodily suppressed and sent a wave of refugees who were involved in it to Poland (Dugajczyk, 1989a: 2) because the Berlin government intensified its efforts to uproot Polish irredentism. On the other hand, the government decided to address the aspirations of locally-oriented Upper Silesians who wished their region to become autonomous. For a long time they had felt neglected by the authorities in Berlin and Breslau so they could side with the Polish irredentist. In order to prevent the possibility and to contain Polish nationalism, in October 1919 the German government divided Silesia into two provinces: Lower Silesia with the capital in Breslau, and Upper Silesia with its capital in Oppeln. Many Protestant administrative officers from outside of Upper Silesia were replaced with locally-born Catholics (Kopiec, 1991: 88).

Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles was the basis of organizing a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Since January 31, 1920 French and later Italian troops started entering Upper Silesia and on February 11 the British, French and Italian representatives of the Allied Governing and Plebiscite Commission arrived to Oppeln. The occupation forces were to confiscate weapons and to liquidate military and paramilitary organizations. However, many weapons remained in hands of the local population (Dugajczyk, 1990: 1/2) and were used in nationalistic skirmishes which left many dead and wounded on both the sides. The Polish-German tension culminated in the Second Silesian Rebellion (Uprising) which lasted from August 18 to August 25, 1920 (Raciski, 1990: 3) and resulted in replacement of the German Police with the German-Polish Plebiscite Police (Anon., 1968: 303).

Nationalistic struggle in the period preceding the plebiscite was accompanied by intensive Polish and German propaganda which was directed mainly at this segment of the population which identified itself rather with Upper Silesia than Poland or Germany. Thus, the Polish side started to publish Der Weisse Adler and Grenzzeitung\(^{605}\) striving to influence the group while Germany (and Czechoslovakia) promoted development of the very Silesian identity and used the stereotype of Polnische Wirtschaft which claimed that to give Upper Silesia to Poland would be like presenting a watch to an ape (Kaganiec, 1990: 2).

At last Upper Silesia voted on March 20, 1921. There were 707,393 votes for Germany and 476,365 votes for Poland, which meant that c. 300,000 Silesians who spoke the Polish dialect had voted for Germany. The champions of Poland pointed out that it was due to intimidation and participation of emigrants, people born in Silesia\(^{606}\). There was also some, but perhaps less, truth in the claim that Korfanty’s men had intimidated others. The Germans were convinced that Upper Silesia would stay with Germany, while the Poles did not espouse the result as unduly favorable to Germany (Wiskemann, 1956: 28) and rose in the third and biggest rebellion (Uprising) in May 1921 in an effort to seize the territories they demended. Gen. Karl Hoefer’s Selbstschutz (Self-Defence) defeated the Polish troops in the decisive battle of St. Annaberg (Góra w. Anny) on May 21, 1921 and suppressed the rebellion pushing away the Poles south-eastward.

Under the influence of the rebellion, on October 20, 1921 the League of Nations decided to do unthinkable to divide Upper Silesia across its industrial heart. Poland was granted two fifths of the area (3,213 sq km), four fifths of the industry and 893,000 inhabitants. The progress of gradual division of the

\(^{604}\) Notably on June 24, 1922 a gang of former Freikorps executed a prominent German Jew, Walter Rathenau, the foreign minister of Weimar Germany (Raymond, 1992: 269).

\(^{605}\) Because the newspapers were published in German it is obvious they were to appeal to local-oriented Upper Silesians who did not know Polish. Not accidentally the title of the former newspaper means the white eagle which is the coat-of-arms of Poland.

\(^{606}\) 180,000 of them voted for Germany, and only 10,000 for Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 28).
German and Polish parts of the industrial complex from one another and minority rights were to be guarded by the Geneva Convention which was signed on May 15, 1922 and was valid for fifteen years, i.e. through 1937. It did not prevent migrations of the threatened pro-Polish activists from the German part of Upper Silesia to the Polish part (Szaraniec, 1992: 1), and of the pro-German Silesians, who did not want to be Polonized, to the Reich (Neubach, 1992: 13). The cross-border population movement included approximately 100,000 people (Bartodziej, 1993: 25).

The parts of Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia gained by Poland were joined into the small and territorially disjointed Silesian Voivodship which was the smallest one of the interwar Polish voivodships though economically most important and most densely populated. Preservation of cultural, historical and ethnic distinctiveness of this land was guaranteed by the regional autonomy which was granted to it by the respective act of the Polish Sejm (Parliament) of July 15, 1920. This unusual event in the history of Polish statehood, which in the modern times was modeled on the example of the French unitary state where minorities, dialects and local differences were thoroughly suppressed and obliterated; was prompted by the rise of the idea of separate Silesian state, Freistaat Schlesien. It was promoted by Germany and the Silesians who identified themselves with their own land and not with Poland nor Germany. Moreover, this approach was gradually accepted by Korfanty disillusioned by the Polish authorities who did not comprehend Silesian problems. Silesian autonomy, at the institutional level, was reflected by the Organic Status (the constitution) which gave the legal basis for establishing the Silesian Sejm (parliament) which was inaugurated on October 10, 1922. Article 22 of the Status did not allow limiting of the powers of the Silesian Sejm without its prior consent. The competencies of the Silesian Sejm were strongly checked by the powerful Voivoda (governor) who was appointed by the Warsaw government (Goclon, 1993: 1). The legal make-up of the territory was marred by an important anomaly the Geneva Convention did not apply to the Polish part of Austrian Silesia which was an integral part of the Voivodship (Goclon, 1993: 2).

The settlement of the German, Czechoslovak and Polish interests in Silesia prepared a ground for interwar co-existence which was marked with successes and failures.

Most curiously the division of Silesia between Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia was not followed by immediate changes in the ecclesiastical division of the Catholic Church. Only in the much-publicized case of the Silesian Voivodship already one day after the official division of Upper Silesia by the Council of Ambassadors, Cardinal Bertram established a sub-bishopric for the Voivodship on October 21, 1921. On November 7, 1922 the Holy See established the Apostolic Administration for Katowice Silesia directly subordinated to Vatican. The Silesian (Katowice) Diocese was established and attached to the Cracow Metropolis by the Pope Pius XI on October 28, 1925. The diocese consisted of the Apostolic Administration and the parishes of Polish Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia. Since the middle 1920s, the Katowice Church published its newspaper in Polish and German versions (Go Niedzielny and Sonntagsboter) and continued the tradition of celebrating masses in languages spoken in a given parish in order to lessen and distance itself from nationalist tensions (Myszor, 1992: 3). In the case of German and Czechoslovak Silesia, the District of Glatz (Kladzko, Kodzko) stayed within the diocese of Prague while much of Czechoslovak Silesia remained subject to the archbishop of Breslau; a few parishes in German Silesia, too, remained in the diocese of Olomouc (Olmütz, Oomuniec). The Church was not eager to conduct any alterations impoverished and weakened by Czechoslovakia’s Land Reform and in conflict with the government over the person of John Hus. This antagonism was alleviated later on but the

607. On September 3, 1922 the inhabitants of the part of the Oppeln Regency which remained within Germany after the division of Upper Silesia, voted on the issue of becoming a Land, an autonomous region in Germany. The outcome of the plebiscite was negative but did not prevent development of the Upper Silesian identity also on the German side of the border (Neubach, 1992: 16; Wiskemann, 1956: 31/32).

608. Besides the Silesian Sejm, Katowice Silesia was also represented in the Polish Sejm, and there was no restriction on being an MP simultaneously in both the legislatures which though practically rarely happened (Goclon, 1993: 11).
Chapter seven

ecclesiastical division of the Church not compatible with the new borders stayed as it had been (Wiskemann, 1938: 229/30).

Albeit nationalistic fervor subsided after the settlement of the postwar borders and the signature of minority treaties worked-out by the League of Nations, differences still prevailed. The treaties were to prevent state-forced assimilation of minorities allowing them to choose between adhering to their own language and culture or accepting the tradition of a majority. Thus assimilation should have been natural. Unfortunately, the treaties provided for no obligation on the part of minorities themselves (Roucek, 1945: 173). This flaw posed a danger to respective countries which were apprehensive of disloyalty of their minorities. In order to prevent the risk, the states more or less forcefully tried to assimilate their minorities which naturally delayed the process of natural assimilation and increased the number of cases of disloyalty of minorities to the host country.

The mechanism played a significant role in the Hlucin (Hultschin) territory where the Czechoslovak government adopted the racialist attitude towards the population, i.e. that these people, who were clearly Slavic by decent and by language, must be rescued from the semi-Germanization which had overtaken them until then. The census indicated that the German-speaking minority was smaller than 20% of the population so the German schools were closed, and their children either went to school in Opava (Troppau) or learnt privately at home. Strangely enough non-German-speaking parents showed great eagerness for their children to join the German classes which sprang up. Germanophilia of the population might be caused by the Czechization measures, and it considerably increased after the introduction of the Lex Uhlir Act which compelled all the Hlucin children to attend Czech schools irrespectively of their ethnic background. In May 1935 an 80% of the population voted for the Sudetendeutsche Partei. The Czechoslovak government wanted to contain increasing irredentism by incarcerating pro-German activists and teachers inciting people for action against the state. The measures justified from the Czechoslovak point of view appeared grossly oppressive to the Hlucin populace. The outcome of the situation can be summed up in the saying one often hear in Opava (Troppau): "Bismarck could not make the Hlutschiner into Germans, but where he failed the Czechs have succeeded" (Wiskemann, 1938: 232-234). This common truth, unfortunately, aptly describes the outcome of minority policies in other parts of Silesia which did not belong to Germany in the interwar period.

The situation in the post-First-World-War Czechoslovakia was complicated by mutual adversity of the Polish and Czech authorities which failed to reach even a semblance of peaceful settlement. Czechoslovakia was displeased that it obtained only a part not the whole of Austrian Silesia while the Poles declared that they would have never complied with the decision of the Council of Ambassadors had they not been engaged in the war with Soviet Russia (Kerner, 1945: 68). On the other hand, the Germans who suddenly were reduced to the position of a minority and a non-dominant ethnic group in Czechoslovakia after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and who had not managed to maintain their Sudetenland, had been strongly irredentist in Czechoslovak Silesia ever since then. Their stance was fortified by the change in the ethnic composition of the province after the separation of the Polish part of Austrian Silesia. They formed 40.5% of the population (the Czechs 47.5%, the Poles 11.2%) (Roucek, 1945: 174), which was a bigger proportion than the corresponding number of the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia, although it totalled only 252,635 (Wiskemann, 1938: 116).

The population statistics became another weapon in the nationalistic strife in Czechoslovak Silesia. In Austro-Hungary the basis for national description in censuses was the language of intercourse. It was changed to the declaration of a mother tongue in Czechoslovakia (Roucek, 1945: 174). Moreover, the question of the Silesian identity arose in that time. The Poles considered it a ploy to diminish the percentage of Polish-speakers in the official statistics (Zahradnik, 1992: 77). The Czechs argued on the basis of election statistics that the Silesians were an objectively existing ethnic group which even formed its own political parties (Gawrecki, 1991: 25). It was established that in 1930 there were 24,697 Silesians; 10,672 of them were pro-Polish, 13,834 pro-Czechoslovak, 191 pro-German and 4,036 pro-Silesian. It was also claimed that 14,500 Germans were Silesians who had accepted the German identity in the postwar years (Gawrecki, 1991: 26). For this reason, Polish, German and Czechoslovak reckonings on the ethnic make-up of this region vary widely serving the needs of the respective nationalist propagandas.
First of all, the role of the German language was limited with the advent of the Czechoslovak statehood which introduced Czech as the official language in Czechoslovak Silesia, which entailed Czechization of place-names as the matter of course. Generally speaking, the situation of the Czechoslovak Silesian Germans was a reflection of the position of the Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic. During the first days of the Republic, the Czechs set out to humiliate them in a thousand little ways, e.g., on the new Czechoslovak paper money the four languages of the Republic correctly appeared, but German came third on the list, following the Cyrillic script of some hundred thousands Ruthenians (Wiskemann, 1938: 118). This unfriendly attitude of the Czechs, coupled with the loss of Sudetenland as an independent state, caused the Germans to protest against the Czechoslovak Constitution in April 1920 as forced on them, and to refuse to take part in the presidential elections (Wiskemann, 1938: 122). The Czechoslovak-German relationship deteriorated even more due to the 1921 census irregularities it was proved that the actual number of the Germans in Czechoslovakia was higher by 1% than shown in the official statistics (Wiskemann, 1938: 123, 125). In 1925 the deadlock was broken when the two German parties the Agrarians and Christian Socialists joined the government majority (Carter, 1991: 924).

This period of moderate relaxation in the nationalist struggle was cut short in Czechoslovak Silesia in 1927 when the province was merged with Moravia on the grounds that it was too small to be independently viable. It was the most regrettable step from the German point of view because it was the only province in Czechoslovakia where the German minority reached 40%. On this occasion, some German nationalists began to accuse the Activists (the Germans cooperating with the Czechoslovak government) of betrayal of German interests which also facilitated Czechization of the German minority, thus, deepening a rift in the German political life (Breugel, 1973: 78).

Subsequently, influences of Pan-Germanism emanating from the Weimar Republic, grew stronger in Czechoslovakia especially supported by the inflow of financial resources from different Auslandsdeutsche organizations in Germany. This facilitated the creation of Kameradschaftsbund (KB) in 1926, which grouped the mystically inclined who enthusiastically embraced the teaching of the Vienna University professor Othmar Spann. He believed in organic bündisch or ständisch. social grouping, a vaguely back-to-the-guild medievalism, which rejected the concept of western democracy. What was perhaps even more to the point was that he believed in a resurrection of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, a tidying-up of the whole of Central and Eastern Europe by the Germans the cream of Humanity and the only possible saviors of civilization, as Fichte claimed in 1809. In Czechoslovak Silesia the ideology was widespread among the professional classes and simple-life youth of Opava (Troppau) and Tesin (Cieszyn, Teschin). Some of them believed that the Historic Provinces (i.e. Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) should form the heart of the new German empire to come. A certain Dr. Patscheider, Tyrolese by birth, but now a schoolmaster in Opava, urged the reunion of the Prussian, Polish and Czechoslovak parts of Silesia, so that united Silesia should be Germany’s gate to Moravia and her bridge to the valley of the Danube. The KB and similar organizations were associated with the Arbeitskreis für gesamtschlesische Stammeskultur in Breslau (Vratislavia, Wroclaw), the Verein für das Deutschtum im Auslande (VPA) and the Bünische Front Nord-Ost (Wiskemann, 1938: 136-138).

This trend revived the old prewar Pan-Slavic, Neo-Slavic and Pan-German arguments. Moreover, from 1930 Czech mistakes, economic decline609 and the rising tide of Hitlerist propaganda increased Pan-German thinking among the Sudeten Germans. Activities of the German organizations which claimed to be solely culture-oriented brought about an increase of the Czech apprehension of German disloyalty. This charged atmosphere culminated in the famous Volkssport trial in 1932. Seven young members of the Volkssport were accused of having prepared an armed rebellion in connection with a foreign power.

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609 The Great Depression hit the highly industrialized German-speaking districts more severely than the predominantly agricultural Lowlands (Carter, 1991: 925).
610 Members of the sports organization belonged to the Czech DNSAP which, at Salzburg in 1920, had regarded itself as the very same thing as Hitler’s NSDAP. Moreover, it is worth remembering that in 1931 Nazi and Volkssport uniforms were forbidden in Czechoslovakia (Wiskemann, 1938: 138).
Later this charge was dropped but they were sentenced for conspiring against the Republic and its democratic constitution (Wiskemann, 1938: 138).

The trial, the Great Depression, German grievances caused by the Land Reform\(^{611}\) (Wiskemann, 1938: 147-160), and financial aid for the Sudeten Germans from Germany prepared the ground for the rise of the Sudeten German Party (the Sudetendeutsche Partei) in October 1933. It was established by Konrad Heinlein, a supporter of Hitler and head of the political active Sudeten Turnverband gymnastics society. In the parliamentary elections of May 1935, the party captured nearly two thirds of the Sudeten German vote and became a political force second only to the Czech Agrarians. The German irredentism amplified in all ex-Sudetenland provinces (including Czechoslovak Silesia) and triggered off the bitter political struggle between this separatist trend and the Czechoslovak state which wished to preserve its democratic existence. In 1938 Czechoslovakia was defeated when the leaders of Western Europe wishing to appease Hitler decided at the Munich Conference that by October 10 Czechoslovakia was to transfer all the territories of Bohemia and Moravia with 50% or more Germans to the Reich (Carter, 1991: 925). Some pieces of the Czechoslovak land were also annexed by Hungary and, most importantly for our argument, by Poland in the case of a part of Czechoslovak Silesia (i.e. Transolza) which was seized by the country.

The division of Austrian Silesia clearly subordinated the ethnic to the economic principles (Buell in Roucek, 1945: 188) thus leaving beyond Poland’s boundaries a Polish-speaking minority of 69,967 (11.24%) in Czechoslovak Silesia according to the Czechoslovak census of 1921 (Roucek, 1945: 174). The data was not accepted by the Polish sources stating that 129,000 Polish-speakers lived in Czechoslovak Silesia in 1921, and that they formed a majority of 54.6% in the counties of Czech Tesen (Teschen, Cieszyn) and Frystat (Freistadt, Frysztat) (Zahradnik, 1992: 72).

In the first period after the division the Czech authorities had a negative attitude towards the Polish-speakers who fended off Czechization by founding and re-activating numerous political, cultural and social organizations, and, most importantly, Polish cooperatives. However, nationalist tendencies subsided later on and the Association of Silesian Catholics (the Zwizek Iskich Katolików) started to support the Czech Agrarians.\(^{612}\) The Polish-Czechoslovak relations worsened in 1927 when Czechoslovak Silesia was merged with Moravia arguably for economic and administrative reasons, and the Silesian Parliament in Opava (Troppau) liquidated. The policies of assimilation and Czechization practised by the Czechoslovak authorities as justified means of strengthening the new state, were directed at all Czechoslovak minorities but were especially successful in the case of the Polish-speakers whose national feelings were heterogeneous. The process of assimilation was accelerated by the ongoing industrialization of this region which constantly attracted newcomers from all over Czechoslovakia, but especially from Moravia and Bohemia; thus, decreasing the number of the Polish-speakers in the ethnic composition of the populace. Moreover, certain sources maintain that above 15,000 Polish-speakers left Czechoslovak Silesia looking for work farther afield or displeased with the ethnic policies (Zahradnik, 1992: 70/71-75).

Czechization, as in the case of the Sudeten Germans, was also conducted at the plane of education. There were less or more covert efforts to close down Polish schools whereas Czech schools were located in ethnically Polish regions. Not surprisingly did the number of schoolchildren in Polish schools decreased from 22,104 in 1920 to 9,504 in 1938, and rise in Czech schools from 7,582 to 24,167 in the respective years. Such a dramatic fall was also facilitated by a low economic position of the Polish-speakers who were predominantly peasants and workers, and could not count on financial support from Poland unlike the German minority which was incited into disloyalty also by economic incentives from

\(^{611}\) It liquidated great disproportions in land ownership which had led to such a situation that 2% of the population had owned one quarter of the land (Wiskemann, 1938: 147). No democratic state can afford to maintain such a state of affairs without endangering the existence of democracy itself.

\(^{612}\) The role of the Silesian movement and its Silesian Peasant Party (the Slezska lidova strana, Schlesische Volkspartei, _l_ska Partia Ludowa) in the context of the Polish nationalist movement in Czechoslovak Silesia, has not been adequately researched so far, and could alter the interpretation of the ethnic situation presented in this thesis.
the Reich. Actually, the Czechs emulated the German example in the years of the Great Depression, when the Polish-speakers could immediately receive a job should they decide to send their children to a Czech school. Moreover, Polish educational organizations obtained only one licence to open a cinema (which was an influential mass medium then) as opposed to sixteen such licences for Czech organizations (Zahradnik, 1992: 75/76, 79).

It is also important to notice that the Polish-speakers (maybe also due to substandard education) were underrepresented among in the local bureaucracy. In 1930 there was one officer among every 5,445 Polish-speakers, one among 662 Czechs, and one among 245 Germans. During the time the state employed 268 officers in Czechoslovak Silesia, i.e. 182 Czechs, 70 Germans and 14 Polish-speakers. No single Polish-speaker was employed in jurisdiction or in the authorities of state-owned enterprises in this region. In the local government of Frystat (Frysztat, Freistadt) only one Polish-speaker was employed instead of four, and two instead of six in Tesen (Cieszyn, Teschen). According to the Polish-speakers they were also underrepresented in the Czechoslovak Parliament while the Jews were clearly discriminated which shows up even in the official Czechoslovak statistics (Roucek, 1945: 175). Because the Sudeten Germans were anti-Semitic having had been influenced by the ideology of Nazism, the German-speaking Jews of Czechoslovak Silesia took part in parliamentary elections in a bloc together with political groups of the Polish-speakers (Gawrecki, 1991: 24). (Zahradnik, 1992: 76, 79)

Immediate worsening of the Polish-Czechoslovak relations was brought about in 1934 when Poland signed the Pact of Non-aggression with Germany, which Czechoslovakia felt as appeasement of Germany at its cost. Intensification of discrimination was countered by the Polish-speakers. In 1935 the Polish Workers Socialist Party (the Polska Socjalistyczna Partia Robotnicza) presented, before the Parliament of the Czechoslovak Republic, a document entitled Cieszyn Silesia, Its Postulates, and Grievances. In 1936 the action was undertaken once again by the Association of the Polish Catholics (the Zwizek Katolików Polskich) in the form of The Postulates of the Polish Population in Czechoslovakia. The documents emphasized loyalty of the Polish-speakers towards the Czechoslovak state and demanded discontinuation of discrimination and compensation for the consequences of the anti-Polish policies. In 1937 the Polish Workers Socialist Party, the Polish Peasant Party (the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) and the Association of the Polish Catholics formed a common committee which appealed the Czechoslovak government to positively address the national demands of the Polish-speakers. The appeal coincided with the Czechoslovak government’s declaration of February 20, 1937 which spelt out a more accommodating official line towards the minorities in Czechoslovakia including the Polish-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 77, 79).

One cannot say if it was a sincere effort on the part of the Czechoslovak government to alleviate grievances of the minorities in Czechoslovakia or just a tactical ploy undertaken in order to facilitate preservation of unity of the Republic, and of democracy in the context of appeasement of Germany by the West at the cost of Czechoslovakia. Anyway, the international political situation was ripe for peaceful acceptance of the Reich’s seizure of Czechoslovakia after the Anschluss of Austria.

To conclude this part devoted to ethnic relations and policies in Czechoslovak Silesia, one should not forget that the Protestant Church in the province was almost purely of the Polish character because parsons and the administration was composed from Polish-speakers. However, one third of the Czechoslovak Silesian Protestants were Czechs and they chose to demand equal rights for themselves (Zahradnik, 1992: 78).

After the division of Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland, the uneasy situation was regulated and controlled by the Geneva Convention which had duly established its institutions: the Mixed Commission and the Arbitration Tribunal in Katowice (Kattowitz), Poland, and in Beuthen (Bytom), Germany, respectively. The institutions were to oversee correct implementation of the Geneva

613 Also the Land Reform of the 1920s and 1930s was conducted in such a way that instead of making up for inequalities in land ownership, it promoted the Czechs to higher social positions in the Czechoslovak Silesian countryside at the cost of the Polish-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 76).
Convention which from the legal point of view guaranteed equal treatment for the minorities in Oppeln (Opole) and Katowice (Kattowitz) Silesia, individual rights, the rights to freedom and life, the right to language, minority schools and publishing houses, and freedom of religion among others. Moreover, some other original solutions in the field of international law were taken to guard the rights every citizen living on the territory protected by the Convention could sue the states of Poland or Germany after having filed a complaint in the Minority Offices in Oppeln or Katowice. The ensuing trial was conducted before non-state, international institutions whose final decisions were obligatory and had to be observed by the sued state and the minority member who had initiated the litigation. During the fifteen years from 1922 to 1937 when the Convention was in force, 2,283 complaints were filed (Poomski, 1989: 33-38).

However, revisionism and non-acceptance of the existing border between Poland and Germany was widespread in Upper Silesia, which was treated as a ground of contest between German and Polish nationalisms which must have limited effectiveness of the Convention and radicalized the populace along the ethnic lines.

After having gained the eastern part of Upper Silesia, the Warsaw government set out to Polonize it, or unGermanize it as the comprehensive action was presented by the official propaganda. The most visible effect of Polonization was changes in place-names, street names and information inscriptions which became exclusively Polish (Jarczak, 1993: 15; Goclon, 1993: 2). In 1923 the proposal of some German parliamentaries in the Silesian Sejm to introduce bilingual street signs in localities with a German majority was staunchly rejected as well as the possibility to use the German language in offices where there were not enough officers able to speak Polish. Actually, Polonization had been already affirmed by Korfanty in 1922 when he ruled out any chance of bilinguality in the Silesian Sejm with his statement that only Polish can be the official language in Poland. The only retractions from this hard-line position which could conflict with the Geneva Convention, allowed the Silesian Sejm deputies to deliver speeches in German till the expiration of the Convention on July 15, 1937, the populace to submit documents to Silesian institutions in German, and German officers to use German inside their offices until July 15, 1937 (Goclon, 1993: 2). Education was directly linked to the question of language. It also became the field where the fierce nationalist struggle was waged. The Polish state procrastinated opening of new German schools with German as the medium of instruction (Goclon, 1993: 3), and did not allow all willing children to attend the schools arguing that some of them were sent to German schools by Polish-speaking parents who were either intimidated by their German employers or allured into the fold of Germanism by the financial support they could thus receive from German organizations subsidized from Germany, which was quite an opportunity in the years of the Great Depression (Komjathy, 1980: 68). In reciprocation, the German Sejm Club strove to hinder opening of the Polish vocational school of metallurgy and mechanics in Królewska Huta (Königshütte) in effort not to allow Polonization of the ranks of industrial technicians and engineers who were predominantly of German stock (Goclon, 1993: 3). This hostile reaction was also caused by the influx of Polish engineers, teachers and settlers during the post-plebiscite period when many German teachers and German-speaking inhabitants decided to leave Upper Silesia (Falcki, 1989: 166) for Germany where they could enjoy a better economic situation and be free from harassment of the Polish nationalists, which also included such minor but painful instances as prohibition of certain literature for use in the schools: Goethe’s Childhood from Dichtung und Wahrheit, the Nibelungenlied and Edda (Komjathy, 1980: 88). The measures were extended to the Catholic Church as well. They culminated in cases of dismissal and expulsion of clergy of German ethnic origin in 1937. Therefore, it is not surprising that German and Silesian-oriented organizations answered with the slogan: Upper Silesia for Upper Sileans (Kulak, 1989: 86).

Some concrete actions followed: German industrialists, first of all, employed Silesians and Germans and in the periods of economic difficulties dismissed Polish workers as first. Even some Church

614 1,613 complaints were filed by the German minority in the Silesian Voivodaship, and in the Oppeln Regency 522 by the Polish-speaking minority and 148 by the Jews (Po_omski, 1989: 37/38).

615 They hardly ever understood ethnic and cultural specificity of Silesia nor its problems and thus did not mix well with the local population bringing about mutual mistrust and discontent.
officials entered the conflict preaching expulsion of non-Silesian Poles to Poland (Manatowicz, 1989: 151). However, one must be careful not to overestimate effectiveness of this pro-Silesian propaganda like the Polish nationalist historiography, because similar measures were directed at Germans and pro-German Silesians by the hostile pro-Polish administration of the Silesian Voivodship. For instance, in 1925 it proposed merging of the Voivodship with the Cracow Voivodship (Manatowicz, 1989: 150) which would automatically liquidate Silesian autonomy and submerge the ethnically diversified populace in the Polish element. Moreover, not only the economic depression but also the restrictive nationalist policies of the Polish authorities must be taken into consideration to account for the very high ratio of unemployment among the members of the Volksbund (43%) and the Trade Union of German Workers (62%) (Komjathy, 1980: 75, 87/88).

Such an antagonistic attitude of the Polish authorities towards the German minority in the Silesian Voivodship was not caused only by the desire on their part to assimilate this region in order to construct an ethnically homogenous Poland. They strove to reciprocate for the biased treatment of the Polish-speakers who were left, after the plebiscite, in the western part of the Oppeln Regency which remained with Germany. First of all, Lower Silesia which ethnically was almost purely German, did not like strengthening of the postwar ethnic diversification of Upper Silesia which was going against the Pan-German idea of ethnically unitarian German state. Thus, the fact that the inhabitants of the Oppeln Regency rejected the offer of autonomy (comparable to that which was instituted in the Katowice Voivodship), served as the springboard for renewed Germanizing efforts in the territory, which were a response to the action of Polonization (or re-Polonization as the contemporary Polish propaganda dubbed the process) in the Katowice Voivodship. Already in 1926 a general plan (the so-called Ausrottungsprogram) to eradicate Polishdom from the German Ostgebiete existed, which, at first, manifested itself in changes in place-names all Slavic names and Germanized forms of Slavic names were replaced with German ones (Jarczak, 1993: 15). Polish-speakers who were elected to become members of court juries, mayors, or heads of local governments in the countryside were not accepted for the positions by the Regency administration in the persons of President Alfons Proske and his successor Hans Lukaschek. Their decisions breached many guarantees given by the Geneva Convention and Article 113 of the Weimar Constitution. They were partially reverted by the efforts of the Association of Poles in Germany (the Zwizek Polaków w Niemczech) and under the pressure of the Polish administration in the Silesian Voivodship which reciprocated with not accepting Germans who had been elected to local governments. Moreover, Polish-speaking parents who decided to send their children to German schools, and the families of the insurrectionists who fought on the Polish side in the three Silesian rebellions (Uprisings) but now joined some German nationalist organizations, could count on good jobs and generous financial support which attracted many Polish-speakers during the difficult years of the Great Depression. Some more harsh means of nationalist struggle with Polishdom included closing of schools, harassment of Polish organizations, physical and verbal assaults, and generalized violence. Moreover, in 1937 a law was passed which let expel Polish leaders residing in border areas in order to protect the borders of the Reich. It was part of the systematic ten-year plan of eradication of Polishdom which was accepted by Hitler in 1934 (Anon., 1968: 304). So till the outbreak of the Second World War only very few Polish schools had survived and the Polish cultural and national life had been largely suppressed. The oppression was eased for a short time in 1934 when Poland signed the Non-aggression Pact with Germany, but did increase after the expiration of the Geneva Convention in 1937. Despite the vociferous criticism by the Poles and the Germans as well, it did maintain an uneasy status quo in Upper Silesia considerably weakening if not making forced assimilation impossible. Significantly, it delayed introduction of Nazi anti-Semitic legislation in the Oppeln Regency till 1937. However, on the whole, the Convention was more advantageous to the German minority actively supported by the industrial might

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616 The efforts aimed at weakening of the German element in Upper Silesia were clearly exposed by the manipulated official statistics which lowered the number of the Upper Silesian Germans by half in the 1931 census (Wanatowicz, 1989: 141).

617 Only 3.4% Polish-speakers, 2.6% Sorbian-speakers and 0.6% Czech-speakers lived in Lower Silesia before the Second World War (Kulak, 1989: 85).
and prosperity of the *Reich* than to the Polish minority which could not expect much assistance from the newly-restituted and mainly agricultural Polish state\(^{618}\) (Poomski, 1989: 31-44).

In the Silesian Voivodship, the nationalistic struggle between the German minority and the Polish state was less successful for the latter than in the case of the German state in the Oppeln Regency. A significant role in preservation of the German and Silesian identity and culture was played by Silesian autonomy. The German minority was represented in the Silesian *Sejm* by four influential parties nationalistic: the *Deutsche Partei* and the *Volksbund*, the *Deutsche Katholische Volkspartei*, and the social-democratic *Deutsche Socialistische Arbeiterpartei* (Goclon, 1993: 2). All of the parties and German cultural organizations (but especially the *Volksbund* which espoused the Pan-German ideology) received large amounts of money from organizations in Germany, which supported preservation of Germandom among the *Auslandsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche* (Komjathy, 1980: 1-16). The parties got radicalized when despite many endeavors from 1924 to 1926 Korfanty did not succeed in securing loyalty of the German industrialists in the Silesian Voivodship, for the Polish state let alone their cooperation (Falcki, 1989: 171) which could stop nationalistic tensions in the region. The industrialists were not interested in such proposals because the majority of their economic interests was connected to Germany, and they trusted in future re-unification of Upper Silesia, especially after 1925 when Germany failed to guarantee the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia at Locarno, implicitly leaving them to a possibility of revision. This caused deterioration of the Polish-German relations which had negative repercussions for the position of the German minority especially after the May *coup d'état* in 1926 when dictatorship was installed in Poland, and the new Warsaw government nominated Dr. Micha Grayski to the position of Silesian Voivoda.

He decided to use the very extensive prerogatives of the Silesian Voivoda in a dictatorial way, like Marshal Pisudski in Poland, in order to stall the activities of the Silesian *Sejm*, gradually dismantle Silesian autonomy and thoroughly Polonize the Voivodship. Korfanty reacted emphatically against this hard-line course in Silesia, which did not take into account specificity of the region and its inhabitants. Since then on he began to vocatively defend Silesia autonomy disillusioned by the Polish politics in the Voivodship and the role of Grayski who had been one of the commanders in the Silesian rebellions (Uprisings). He sided with the Silesian deputies who supported the condemnation of the 1926 *coup d'état* in the Silesian *Sejm*. His politics was summarized by his *Two Theses* which were espoused by the majority of the Silesian parliamentarians:

1. Security of the Poles and the Germans in Silesia should be defended to the equal degree;
2. The Silesian insurrectionists are the sole representatives of the Silesian people.

The postulates were an effort to put the powers of decision-making about the region back into the hands of the original inhabitants of the Voivodship which was not accepted by the Polish dictatorial government. It led to a prolonged struggle between the government represented by Grayski and Korfanty supported by the pro-Silesian forces. The bitter strife, at least at the political level, was won by the Polish *junta* and on the basis of minor charges Korfanty was incarcerated in 1930 (like another opponent of Marshal Pisudzki the Peasant Party ex-Prime Minister Wincenty Witos) (Wiskemann, 1956: 32), and later received political asylum in Czechoslovakia which was the only Central European country to retain the democratic system of government till 1939. Korfanty returned to Poland after the *Anschluss* of

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\(^{618}\) One could not forget that in the sea of anti-Polish measures the Catholic Church played a very positive role in the Oppeln Regency. Each priest sent to Upper Silesia had to know Polish which was a compulsory subject at the Breslau (Wrocław) Seminary. Moreover, the Church fostered establishment of different organizations for the laymen, and was involved in educational, social and even political life though distanced itself from official ideologies which besides being anti-Polish, were anti-Catholic too. The Polish-speaking population responded by connecting its Polishdom stronger with the Church which was clearly demonstrated in the 1930 elections when the Polish-Catholic Peasant Party (the *Polsko-Katolicka Partia Ludowa*) demanded establishment of a separate Oppeln diocese and a Polish bishop in Oppeln. Unfortunately, the wishes of the Polish-speakers of the Oppeln Regency could not be actualized due to the rise of the anti-Polish and anti-Catholic movement of Nazism in the whole of German Silesia (Kopiec, 1991: 90-94).
Czechoslovakia in 1939 and died as a broken man before the outbreak of the Second World war (Goclon, 1994: 5).

The installation of the *junta* replacing the legal Polish government in 1926 was of decisive influence on the Silesians in whose eyes the significance and status of the voivodship authorities, considered to be a direct extension of the Warsaw dictatorial government, plunged considerably, which coupled with the growth of factionalism among the Polish parties and the unstable economic situation of the region 619 caused the victory of the pro-German candidates in the regional elections on November 19, 1926 620 (Goclon, 1994: 5). For the first time intimidation was practised during the regional elections, and this illegal instrument of election campaigning, unfortunately, got solidly rooted in the political life of Upper Silesia which was indicated by similar excesses during the Polish parliamentary elections of 1930 (Wiskemann, 1956: 32).

For Grayski Silesian autonomy smacked of separatism (Wiskemann, 1956: 32) and he did not spare any effort to weaken it (Goclon, 1993: 1) which alienated the German minority and many a Silesian, who even happened to have been pro-Polish earlier, because they perceived it as endangering of their ethnic and cultural existence. Consequently, numerous Silesians disappointed with the policy and worsening economic climate, whose rapid deterioration had been started by the Polish-German tariff wars and the Great Depression, opted for the pro-German orientation also enticed by financial assistance offered by German organizations (Goclon, 1993: 4). Germany invested GM 37,000,000 in Upper Silesia trying to win the population for the sake of Germandom but with little success, however, because of which the *Volksbund* leaders were scolded by Berlin. The Polish authorities especially after Locarno and having observed violent irredentism of the Sudeten Germans, considered the contacts of the Upper Silesian German minority with Germany as a direct danger to the Polish interests. Ensuingly, the Polish authorities started to use preventive incarceration of Silesians suspected of disloyalty or anti-Polish activities, and strove to limit the privileges of the Germans (Goclon, 1993: 4). The Upper Silesian German minority perceived it as obvious hostility of the host country which wanted to assimilate them forcefully, and thus the propaganda war in the Polish and German Silesian mass media escalated (Kulak, 1989). There were efforts, especially on the part of Dr Eduard Pant, the leader of the *Deutsche Christliche Volkspartei* to promote acceptance of the *status quo* and a moderate attitude towards Poland. He loyally upheld his stance till the very end of the Second Polish Republic in 1939, and strongly opposed Nazism in Upper Silesia (Komjathy, 1980: 67; Falcki, 1989: 170). He was a sober politician and after the victory of Hitler’s NSDAP in Germany in 1933, he emphatically criticized the Polish ethnic policies in Upper Silesia which resulted in emotional outbreaks of Polish nationalists preventing any possibility of a calm discussion on the issue in the Silesian *Sejm* (Goclon, 1994: 6).

The rise of Nazism in Upper Silesia, however, was difficult to be curbed due to the afore-presented economic and political situation, and the disastrous ethnic policies of the Polish government. The nationalist *Volksbund*, which had become influential in 1926 when its complaints against the Polish school policy had been heard in the league of Nations (Komjathy, 1980: 68), had to give way to the more radical *Jungdeutsche Partei* (JDP, the Party of Young Germans), which was formed by the disillusioned younger and idealistic generation, who were influenced by the success of National Socialism in Germany. They followed the Nazi ideas but still professed loyalty to the Polish state and denied any connection with the *Reich* (Komjathy, 1980: 72/73). Having noticed the success of the JDP, Otto Ulitz, the leader of the *Volksbund*, expressed his and his party’s unconditional support for Hitler’s regime on May 28, 1933 (Goclon, 1994: 6). Anyway, the *Volksbund* was discredited among the young Upper Silesian Germans so

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619 Poland, unlike Germany in the Oppeln Regency, could not afford to cushion the economic effects of the division of Upper Silesia, and rather treated the Silesian Voivodship as the source of financing for modernization of the Polish state; which inescapably must have lowered the standard of life in this region in comparison to the Oppeln Regency.

620 Participation in the elections reached the very high figure of 94.6%. The most spectacular victory of the German parties was observed in Katowice (Kattowitz) - 57%, Królewská Huta (Königshütte) - 70% and _wi_toch_owice (Schwientochlowitz) - 54%, where the industry was concentrated. Of course, there was a handful of non-industrial counties where the Germans lost, e.g.: Pszczyna (Pless) - 9% or Rybnik - 17% (Goclon, 1994: 5).
the JDP’s popularity steeply increased and after the local elections in December 1934, it became the strongest German party in Upper Silesia (Komjathy, 1980: 73). Its advances were facilitated by the growing hostility of the Polish factions in the Silesian Sejm to the pro-German groups often dubbed as Nazist (Goclon, 1994: 6), and by the Polish-German Non-aggression Pact (signed on January 26, 1934) which was interpreted by the Polish authorities as Hitler’s consent to deal with Poland’s German minorities as they wished (Komjathy, 1980: 20) which allowed Polish nationalism to become Nazist-like (Goclon, 1994: 6). Besides accounting for the success of the JDP, accelerated re-Polonization of the Germanized Silesians, and official and unofficial harassment of ethnic German organizations and individuals triggered a reaction, especially on the part of the younger German generation, which began to organize against the advice and will of the elders active defenses (Komjathy, 1980: 70).

Although the Non-aggression Pact enabled the Upper Silesian Germans to halt Polonization (Komjathy, 1980: 81), it was of no help in the struggle with anti-German policies. In September 1935 Poland renounced the minority treaties and established concentration camps for elements hostile to Poland. When in March 1936 Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, large anti-German demonstrations were organized by the West Marches Society (a Polish veterans organization) all over Poland (Komjathy, 1980: 76). On the other hand, the Polish press constantly emphasized the Germanization policies of the Reich towards the Polish minority in the Oppeln Regency and elsewhere in Germany which resulted in anti-German demonstrations in late 1935. In May 1936, a JDP meeting was disrupted in Upper Silesia leaving seventy persons injured, including women, and in July the police in Katowice dissolved the Upper Silesian Wanderbund which was loosely connected to the JDP. In June 1936 a sensational trial was held against the NSDAB which in the initiation demanded an oath of unconditional loyalty to Adolf Hitler. It was organized by one Manjura of Strzybnica (Friedenshütte) and predominantly grouped simple and unemployed Polish-speakers. Moreover, repressive measures against the German minority (especially Protestant) Churches escalated (Komjathy, 1980: 79-83).

The Geneva Convention regulating the situation of the Polish-speaking minority in the Oppeln Regency and the German minority in the Silesian Voivodship, expired on July 15, 1937 to the delight of the German and Polish governments which now could deal with their minorities without any international supervision (Falcki, 1989). However, Poland and Germany did not want to lose all instruments with which they could influence the fate of their respective minorities in order not to leave them at the mercy of the law of reciprocation. Thus, the German-Polish Minority Declaration was signed on November 5, 1937. By signing this Declaration, Poland had conceded that the minority question was intergovernmental rather than domestic. From that moment the Reich became the advocate of the German minorities. But since Germany was seeking rapprochement with Poland, the concession did not seem to be serious. Poland paid only lip service to the Declaration and continued its re-Polonization campaign and the land redistribution program at the expense of German landowners. German objections, if they were voiced at all, were mild considering the unchanged Polish attitude. In the meantime oppression escalated: German families were relocated or expelled from areas considered strategically important, and the Frontier Zone Decree of January 22, 1937 provided that within 30 km from the border Volksdeutsche could not make any land transactions (Komjathy, 1980: 85-87).

Germany escalated Germanization of the Polish-speaking minority in the Oppeln Regency as well, especially after the anti-Polish speech of Minister Hjalmar Schacht in Oppeln (Goclon, 1994: 6), which presented the official line of the NSDAP. However, the party was not so popular in German Silesia as in

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621 The name of the NSDAB differs from the name of Hitler’s NSDAP only by the last letter of the acronym. The B is for Bund.

622 The official state religion of Poland, after the May 1926 coup d'état, was Catholicism and other faiths such as Protestantism and Orthodox Christianity were barely tolerated because they were associated with the greatest adversaries of Poland: Germany and Russia respectively.

623 Gra_y_ski wanted it to be the basis of ethnic relations in Upper Silesia (Goclon, 1994: 5).

624 The land reform was not of such great significance in Upper Silesia as in, for instance, in Posnania because the former was heavily industrialized.
the rest of the Reich which is indicated by relative poor election results and the fact that German Silesia had not almost any indigenous Nazi leaders (Neubach, 1992: 17, 19). In the so-called Röhm’s putsch (1934) which was especially bloodily suppressed in Silesia, more than one quarter of the victims were Silesians, or persons politically or professionally linked with the province. The first concentration camp was organized in Dürrgoy (Tarnogaj) a district of Breslau (Neubach, 1989: 17), and discrimination of the Jews in German Silesia increased as elsewhere in the Reich (with the exception of the Oppeln Regency where they were protected by the Geneva Convention) and culminated in Kristallnacht of November 9, 1938 which opened the way to the Holocaust.

The Munich Conference which sanctioned annexation of Sudetenland by Germany was perceived as a direct danger to Poland territorially encircled by the Reich in the West, North and South (Mroczko, 1989: 120). Thus, at night, at the turn of September 30 and October 1, 1938, the Polish Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Kazimierz Papee, submitted the Polish ultimatum to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Kamil Kofta. Poland demanded the south-western strip of Czechoslovak Silesia, the so-called Transolza or the Czechoslovak part of Tesen (Cieszyn, Teschen) Silesia\(^625\). The Czechoslovak government striving to save its state and democracy consented to the ultimatum on October 1, 1938 and transferred to Poland the territory of 1,296 sq km (Goćlon, 1993: 1) with the population of 230,282 (Roucek, 1945: 188)\(^626\). Polish sources claim that this annexation was fully justified because in 1910 65% of the population were Polish-speakers (Zahradnik, 1992: 82). However, at the moment of annexation the population of Transolza was composed of 134,311 Czechs and Slovaks, 17,351 Germans and only of 76,303 Poles (Roucek, 1945: 188). The Czechs considered the ultimatum as a betrayal by a fellow Slavic country, whereas the Poles defended the act as an attempt to protect the Polish population which otherwise would have been immediately subjected to the authoritarian dictate of Hitler. Considering the ethnic relations, the Polish authorities immediately replaced Czechoization with Polonization and brought about 6,000 Polish settlers to this region (Zahradnik, 1992: 115) in order to fortify the Polish element\(^627\). Unfortunately, the eleven months of the Polish rule in Transolza rapidly worsened the Polish-Czech relations which was deftly used in this region by the Reich authorities during the Second World War (Zahradnik, 1992: 82-96).

In 1939 when the world was on the verge of another world war, chauvinistic feelings made any meaningful dialog impossible. Poland and Germany were fighting with each other at the international level, as well as in the Polish and Silesian Sejms. In March 1939 Germany annexed the whole of Czechoslovakia and in April Hitler renounced the Non-aggression Pact and the Minority Declaration after Poland had received security guarantees from Britain (Davies, 1981: II 431). Also in March, the National Party (the Stronnictwo Narodowe) published its declaration stating that Poland had the right to Danzig (Gdask), East Prussia, and to the western border based on the line of the Sudeten Mountains and the lower Oder. This stance was accepted by Foreign Minister Józef Beck who rejected all the German demands in his speech in the Sejm on May 5, 1939 (Mroczko, 1989: 121). Dr. Eduard Pant and his Deutsche Katholische Volkspartei sided with the Polish government because they were anti-Nazi. But the relationship between ethnic Germans and Poles at the local level worsened, under the influence of war

\(^625\) The rest of Czechoslovak Silesia was annexed by Germany. United German Silesia (Lower and Upper Silesia were merged into one province following the Nazi concept of strong and centralized state) governed by Josef Wagner, hoped that Czechoslovak Silesia would be re-attached to it but only the Hultschin (Hlucin, Hulczyn) Territory, which had been lost in 1919 due to the decision of the Versailles Treaty, was re-incorporated in Silesia. The rest of the part of Czechoslovak Silesia gained by Germany after 1938 remained in the Province of Sudetenland. However, in 1938 after the dissolution of Border March Posen-West Prussia, Silesia received the county of Fraustadt (Wschowa) and the southern part of the county of Bomst (Babimost). According to the census of May 1939, the population of enlarged German Silesia was 4.8 mln (Neubach, 1992: 17/18).

\(^626\) Transolza was incorporated in the Silesian Voivodship.

\(^627\) The annexation of Transolza triggered off emigration of Czechs. It is estimated that about 35,000 of them left the territory during the short Polish rule (Zahradnik, 1992: 100). Also the Slezsky odboj (the Silesian Resistance) was organized which fought with the Polish state in Transolza and after September 1, 1939 became part of the Czech Resistance in this region (Zahradnik, 1992: 105).
psychosis, so much that Polish-speakers and Germans of the minorities in the Oppeln Regency and the Silesian Voivodship respectively, were afraid to speak their mother tongues in public. German minority papers were censored, then confiscated, and finally closed down. The Polish authorities as well as the common people, boycotted German businesses. Because of heavy Polish pressure, the Silesian Germans who only two years earlier had displayed disinterest in nationalism and Nazi ideology, began to accept more directions from the Volksbund, which was designed to become the chief organization of the German minority group. As international events moved closer to the great crisis of August 1939, attacks against the Germans increased. The Polish authorities used discrimination and took to custody those Germans whose names appeared on the list of suspects drawn by the state in April and May 1939. They were marched under guards to the eastern parts of Poland. Unofficial German sources estimate their number between 50,000 and 58,000. Many died during the march or were murdered by hysterical mobs along the roads, despite best efforts of the guards. The German minority lived in fear and many of them left for the Reich while the rest were hoping for quick appearance of the liberating German armies (Komjathy, 1980: 93-95).

The Second World War was started on the Silesian soil by a provocation carried out by Sturmbaführer Alfred Helmut Naujocks of the Nazi Security Service (SD). At 8pm on August 31, 1939, he led an attack on the German radio station at Gleiwitz (Gliwice). His men were a dozen convicted criminals, who had been promised a reprieve in return for their cooperation. They burst into one of the studios, broadcast a patriotic announcement in Polish, sang a rousing chorus, fired a few pistol shots and left. Once outside they were mown down by the machine guns of the SS. Their bodies, carefully dressed in blood-soaked Polish uniforms, were abandoned where they fell, to be found in due course by the local police. Before the night was out, the world was awakening to the astonishing news that the Polish army had launched an unprovoked attack on the Third Reich (Davies, 1980: II 435). Having created the necessary casus beli, Germany attacked Poland on September 1, 1939.

In Upper Silesia the war activities lasted from September 1 to 4 (Szefer, 1989: 179). Due to the ensuing panic flared up by the Polish mass media, every German became a fifth columnist who should be dealt with as such and executed without trial. The new wave of violent attacks convinced the still loyal Germans to welcome with flowers the invading German armies and help their advance, sometimes actively participating in the military operations. The atrocities and hysterical mob actions disappointed many Polish patriots, who risked their lives to offer asylum to the hunted Volksdeutsche (Komjathy, 1980: 95). The Polish troops in Upper Silesia were assisted by Silesian insurrectionists but they were soon crashed by the overwhelming German forces. The defeat was followed by a wave of anti-Polish terror and repression which lasted till the beginning of October. Although it was not so intensive as in other parts of Poland, it claimed 2,500 casualties. Silesian insurrectionists, Polish organizations members and intelligentsia were executed without trial or arrested. The actions were chaotic and often undertaken on the basis of denouncements by local Germans. The arrested were transferred to the makeshift

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628 This volatile situation caused many nationally indifferent Silesians, who identified themselves with Silesia only, to choose suitable national identities to survive. The attitude is well summarized by the opinion Lord Bülow heard from a peasant during the German occupation of Poland: Your Lordship! We were Germans before and that passed away. Then we were Poles and that passed away too. Now we are Germans once again, and that too, will pass. This conviction prevented Silesians from participating in activities directed against Poland, and also from challenging the Polish authorities. When the time came they even obeyed the mobilization orders (Komjathy, 1980: 92/93). The same situation recreated itself during the occupation of Poland, when the Silesians who had served in the Polish army at the beginning of the Second World War, now had to join the Wehrmacht.

629 The war in Transolza was commenced even earlier, that is, on August 26, 1939 when a German officer with civil troops illegally crossed the border from Slovakia to Poland and for several hours managed to control the railway in Mosty (Zahradník, 1992: 97).

630 However, a majority of the Upper Silesian population, be they of German stock or not, did not participate in the war activities. On the other hand, much of the proof of fifth column subversion is based on hearsay individual depositions not affirmed by other witnesses (Komjathy, 1980: 191).
concentration camp in Nieborowice (Neubertsdorf) near Tychy (Tichau, Tüchau) where a majority of them perished (Szefer, 1989: 179).

On the basis of Reichsführer Heidrich Himmler’s order of September 4, 1939 organized military groups with the assistance of Freikorps members were to suppress any Silesian opposition to the new rule. Gen. Georg Barndt in command of the border troops issued a regulation obligating the populace to inform the authorities on the places of abode of Silesian insurrectionists and people suspected of possessing weapons or ammunition, and on secrete resistance organizations (Sroka, 1968; Sroka, 1969). Private and public book collections and monuments were destroyed which was especially painful in the case of the almost completed building of the Museum of Silesia in Katowice (Matuszczak, 1976). In the second half of September the first cells of the NSDAP and SA were established together with the youth organizations of the Hitler-Jugend and the Bund Deutscher Mädel (Szefer, 1989: 181). On October 2, 1939 all Polish organizations were officially dissolved and it was prohibited to use the Polish language in public. Later even a whole system of eavesdropping was organized by the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (the National Socialist Welfare Organization) and the Bund Deutscher Osten (the Association of the German East) to discourage the use of Polish at home (Szefer, 1989: 181). Should one anyway speak in this language one could be severely punished or be struck in the face in street. Also the removal of all public notices and inscriptions in Polish was ordered (Anon., 1943: 500). The Germanization policy pursued after September 1, 1939 was the logical continuation of the ten-year plan of eradication of Polishdom which had been started in German Silesia in 1934 (Anon., 1943: 500). Germanization of surnames and given names was started by the official acts of 1932 and 1938. Official Germanization of incorporated Czechoslovak and Polish Silesia was completed in 1944 (Jarczak, 1993: 16/17).

The ethnic Germans, after the unbelievable happiness of the first few days, went through a bitter period of awakening. Many of them were arrested and promptly executed without trial for their cooperation with the Poles, or simply on the basis of reports submitted by their personal enemies. Houses were plundered, and property was confiscated. The destruction of Catholic religious monuments which was carried out at night to provide the Nazi propaganda with good anti-Polish material alienated the Volksdeutsche. On the other hand, Silesian Germans who followed the Protestant evangelical faith were considered to be real Germans as opposed to Silesian German Catholics regarded as Poles, that is, enemies. The handling of the Jews also created animosity so eventually not a single Volksdeutsch of Upper Silesia was deemed trustworthy enough to be appointed to a higher position by the Reich authorities (Komjathy, 1980: 96).

On October 25, 1939 the military administration of Upper Silesia was replaced with civilian rule (Szefer, 1989: 182) and one day later the Silesian Voivodship together with Transolza were incorporated in the German Province of Silesia (Anon., 1943: 509). Subsequently, the new Kattowitz Regency was established which was added to the three other Silesian Regencies of Liegnitz (Legnica), Breslau and Oppeln. On November 19, 1939 the Kattowitz Regency was enlarged by the incorporation of the purely Polish counties of Bdzin and ywiec, and of the western part of the Cracow Voivodship rich in coal (Chrzanów-Jaworzno) (Szefer, 1989: 182). The eastern border of such enlarged Upper Silesia went on the edge of the most important for the Polish Catholics city of Czstochowa and only 25 km from Cracow (Neubach, 1992: 18). The administrative structure of the Province of Silesia was changed once again in April 1941 when it was divided into two separate Provinces of Upper and Lower Silesia to make it easier to administer the large territory (Neubach, 1992: 18).

The incorporation of the Polish territories and Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia to the Upper Silesian Province made sense from the economic point of view uniting the industrial complex whose development had been hindered by its division among Poland, Germany and Czechoslovakia. However, taking into consideration the ethnic aspect of the decision, it was most unfortunate since now one third of the population was constituted by Poles with a sizeable admixture of Czechs/Moravians (Neubach, 1992: 18). Thus, paradoxically, an inner policing border had to be established in the province (Szefer, 1989: 183).
The ethnic-racist policies of the Third Reich were the very backbone of its legislation and official ideology so already at the turn of 1939 and 1940 the national registration was conducted in Upper Silesia. In the eastern part of the incorporated territories which before the second World War had not belonged to the Silesian Voivodship, only 0.7% inhabitants declared to be German. In what used to be the Silesian Voivodship 95% inhabitants declared to be German which means that many Poles and almost all the locally-oriented Silesians changed their national orientation to make it compatible with the repressive policies of the Third Reich. Due to the complicated ethnic situation in Teschen Silesia, the Germans decided to sustain the Czechoslovak-introduced national category of Silesians. So 42% declared to be Polish, 30% Silesian, 23% Czech and only 5% German. The Silesians, however, were referred to as Deutsche-Schlesier and hence would-be Germans. It is also possible that some Polish-speakers and Silesians who did not want to be considered Germans, declared themselves as Czechs because this national group was treated well in Teschen Silesia as well as in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. They were to be Germanized not eradicated (Wiskemann, 1956: 68) unlike the Poles. Moreover, the Czechs were not expelled, their property was not confiscated, did not pay 15% of their wages as the war effort tax (which applied to the Poles), received German food rations, did not have to serve in the Wehrmacht unlike the people who had declared to be Germans (Szefer, 1989: 184-186), had longer annual leaves than the Poles, could marry Germans and enter the public places where it was prohibited for the Poles (Zahradnik, 1992: 99).

The territories incorporated into the Reich were to be thoroughly Germanized in order to make them homogenous with the purely German core of the state. Subsequently, all the population of Upper Silesia which could not be classified as non-Polish, and thus inclined to Germandom, was either to be expelled to the Generalgouvernement or sent inside the Reich as forced labor (Anon., 1943: 158), and the Polish property was confiscated (Anon., 1943: 171). The same methods were applied to the Silesian Jews (Szefer, 1989: 191) who first were relocated to the ghettos in Bdzin, Sosnowiec and Zawiercie (Szefer, 1989: 192) and then murdered in the concentration camp complex of Auschwitz-Birkenau (Owicim-Brzezinka) which had been established in 1940 on the territory of the Kattowitz Regency (Neubach, 1992: 19). In consequence, 81,000 Poles were expelled from Upper Silesia, who were replaced with 37,000 families of German settlers. It was planned to settle 300,000 German families after the war only in the Kattowitz Regency alone which would have forced many more Poles and Polish-oriented Silesians to leave the territory (Szefer, 1989: 191).

The Catholic Church in Silesia found itself in a situation similar to the period of Kulturkampf. The irreligious state tended to associate the Protestant Church with Germandom and regarded the Catholic Church as a haven of nationally uncertain and unGerman elements. Bearing it in mind Cardinal Adolf Bertram of the Breslau archbishopric reacted to the cases of incarceration and murders of priests, and to the extermination of the Jews and the mentally retarded, only with written complaints directed to the Reich government (Neubach, 1992: 19/20). The Katowice bishop Stanisaw Adamski, before he was deprived of his function and transferred to Cracow in February 1941, had suspended masses in Polish and any other use of the Polish language in churches which was intended to protect the population from persecutions; and had advised priests to apply for the Reich citizenship so that they could remain in Upper Silesia and serve the believers in their parishes (Adamski, 1946: 12/13).

631 The last Jews in Silesia were liquidated only in August 1943 because of the desperate shortage of labor in Upper Silesia (Hilborg, 1985: 524/525). Considering Silesia, it should be added that the Silesian Jewish philosopher Edith Stein also perished in Auschwitz (Neubach, 1992: 19).
632 The parochial priest of the cathedral in Ohlau (O _awa), Bernhard Lichtenberg, publicly prayed for the persecuted Jews and had to pay with his life for his courage (Neubach, 1992: 19).
633 Many religious Catholics, especially women, established informal groups where they prayed and sang religious songs in Polish. It should not be perceived as an element of nationalist struggle for preservation of Polishdom but as attachment to the local Upper Silesian tradition and culture where Polish was a traditional element of local Catholicism (Sobeczka in Anon., 1993: 6).
The hectic and to certain extent chaotic ethnic policies in Upper Silesia at the beginning of the Second World War were replaced with more thoughtful measures aiming at assuring loyalty of the population to the Third Reich. The March 4, 1941 act on German citizenship in the Incorporated Territories and on the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL) was the legal basis for the final national-cum-political classification of the populace, and the previous grantings of German citizenship were annulled. The mechanism of including people on the German national list and quotas for respective groups were established by Himmler’s order of September 1940. He decided that Wiedereinweise (re-acceptance into Germanism) is to be applied to 400,000-500,000 Wasserpolen (Upper Silesians) and 120,000 Slonsaken (Silesians of Teschen Silesia). However, Gauleiter of the Province of Upper Silesia, SS-Brigadenführer Fritz Bracht decided that all Wasserpolen and Slonsaken are of German origin so the third group of the DVL, where they were to be included, swelled to 1.2 mln much exceeding Himmler’s quota of 600,000. Thus, the third group contained many Silesians of the pro-Polish and pro-Czech orientation which made it difficult for the authorities to ensure complete loyalty of the group (c. 73% of the populace) which was vital for successful implementation of the war economic policy and Germanization of this region. Other groups of the DVL were much smaller; the first one comprised Reichsdeutsche, second the segment of the local population which had declared themselves German before the war, and fourth people who were more Slavic than German but not purely Slavic. The people of the fourth group were treated almost as badly as Poles: the could not possess any property, had to pay rent even if living in own houses, could not be promoted to higher positions and the education of their children was limited to elementary school. The only privilege created for them was the possibility for their children to join the Hitler-Jugend634 (Szefer, 1989: 187-189; Zahradnik, 1992: 101).

The most dramatic aspect of the application of the policies of Germanization, Polonization and Czechization to the Upper Silesians who largely identified themselves only with their own homeland, Heimat, was numerous splits in families which included some individuals who developed non-Silesian national consciousness oriented to Poland, Germany or Czechoslovakia. Such persons got actively involved in resistance groups or joined the NSDAP (Borak, 1991; Szefer, 1989: 192-197) while their brothers and fathers had to join the Wehrmacht and fight for Greater Germany (Anon., 1968: 304). Consequently, many of the latter Silesians found their death abroad whereas the Silesian resistance fighters were sentenced to death by the so-called special courts (c. 3,700 death penalty verdicts in the Kattowitz Regency) or sent to the KL-Auschwitz-Birkenau which at the beginning was intended as a concentration camp for Silesians who opposed Germanization (Szefer, 1989: 197). Considering Lower Silesia, German resistance played an important role there. In 1942 in the mansion of count Helmuth James von Moltke, 25 km from Groß Rosen (Rogonica) the Kreisauer Kreis group was established with the aim to liquidate the Nazi regime and rebuild democratic Germany. Von Moltke’s friend count Peter Yorck van Wartenburg closely cooperated with his cousin count Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg who tried to assassinate Hitler. Another assassination of Hitler which was not carried out due to a sudden alteration in the daily schedule of the Führer, was planned by baron Rudolph-Christoph von Gersdorff of Lüben (Lubin) (Neubach, 1992: 19).

The united industrial basin of Upper Silesia was of extreme importance for the Third Reich and as such was ruthlessly exploited especially at the end of the war when intensified production caused widespread decapitalization (Anon., 1943: 309-311). Due to numerous bombings of the Ruhr, the Silesian mines supplied 60% of Germany’s coal (Shirer, 1993: 1097) and Silesian industry accounted for a sizeable share in the Reich’s military production (Neubach, 1992: 20). There was virtually no bombing of Silesia till the end of 1944 with the exception of the American raids from Central Italy which hit military works in Upper Silesia in the Summer of 1944, and sporadic Soviet air raids of Breslau in October. Understandably, because of its relatively safe location Silesia together with East Prussia and Pommern became a haven for the civil population of Central and Western Germany. At the dawn of tragic 1945 the population of Silesia was swollen with hundreds of thousands of such refugees which

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634 The DVL was for the first time introduced in Upper Silesia at the end of 1939, however, the population were pressed to apply for it so eventually only 2% of them were not included in it making the list completely useless from the point of view of ethnic policy-makers (Szefer, 1989: 188).
makes it difficult if not sheerly impossible to objectively analyze movements of the population at the end of the war, and explains widely varying statistics which deal with this region during the time (Neubach, 1992: 20).

The Soviet offensive from the line of the Vistula River started on January 12, 1945, and by February 1 the Ukrainian Front stabilized at the line of the Oder. The majority of Silesia was overrun by the Soviet troops by April 14. Glogau (Gogów) and Breslau were announced to be fortresses and suffered terrible damage due to the long-lasting sieges. The latter surrendered only on May 6 (Davies, 1981: II 470; Neubach, 1992: 20). Already at the beginning of 1945 and even earlier many Silesians decided to flee westward not to be liberated by the Red Army which having captured for several days the first place on the German soil in East Prussia, did massacre every living creature in the village of Nemmersdorf on October 20-21, 1944 (De Zayas, 1988: 61). The trek intensified in January 1945 when a virtual flood of Silesians headed for Saxony, and some of them for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Many of the civilians died of cold and starvation, and many others perished attacked by Soviet planes or overrun by front lines. The most tragic event was the carpet bombing of the capital of Saxony, Dresden on February 13-14, 1945, which was known to be teeming with refugees, a majority of them from Silesia (600,000). It claimed the lives of 100,000 people (De Zayas, 1988: 77/78).

When the Red Army crossed the frontiers of the territories incorporated in the Reich, all caution was thrown to the winds. The Soviet soldiers incited by Ilya Ehrenburg’s notorious leaflet Kill
did not show any restraint committing acts of wanton vandalism, stealing and killing. German soldiers were hunted down like vermin. Members of the Volkssturm, young and old were denied combatant status, and were killed out of hand. Silesian graves, no less than Silesian womenfolk and farm animals, were indiscriminately assaulted. The significance of the invaders limited vocabulary, of Davay (give) and Frau, komm (woman, come), was known to everyone. Arson, battery, murder, group rapes, and family suicides marked the passage of the liberating armies on a scale unparalleled elsewhere in Europe. The well-documented devastation of Silesia, which was so much more severe than comparable events in the provinces of Central Germany, has led some historians to suspect a calculated policy of driving the German population from their homes in anticipation of the Potsdam Agreement (Grau, 1970).

The events conclude this part of the thesis and the influence of the postwar order on Silesia and its inhabitants is dealt with in the next chapter.

Upper Silesia in the Central Europe Reorganized on the Basis of the National Principle (1918-1945)

Because the ethnically heterogenous Oppeln (Opole) Regency bordered directly on Russia, due to security concerns in the second largest German industrial basin, at the beginning of the Great War about fifty local Polish nationalist and socialist activists were preventively interned there for a short time, and censorship of the press was intensified. Consequently, as elsewhere in Germany, activities of various social organizations (including nationalist ones) came to a standstill, and all the citizenry together with its ethnically non-German segments united for the war effort. No doubt was the unity ensured by conscription and, in Upper Silesia, by military supervision of the industry but also by the universally dreaded possibility of a Russian incursion into the German territory. This threat was felt especially in eastern Germany where at the close of 1914 Russian troops entered East Prussia and almost broke into the Oppeln Regency. evacuation of the Upper Silesian civilian population had already started and preparations were made to destroy factories and mines lest they fell into the hands of the enemy, when the situation was saved by Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg’s successful counteroffensive. In the wake of the popular relief, the biggest Upper Silesian industrial village

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635 The last paragraph reads in part: The Germans are not human beings...there is nothing more amusing for us than a heap of German corps (De Zayas, 1988: illustration 1, after p. 32).

636 One of many spectacular operations was to dismantle and to carry off to Russia the entire electrification system of the Silesian Railways (Davies, 1981: II 481).
Zabrze (it received city rights only in 1922) changed its name to Hindenburg in 1915 (Bahlcke, 1996: 121-2).

Afterwards the front line receded deep into Russia and although it remained there until 1918, the war was felt in Upper Silesia, because from 1915 to 1917 the imperial military headquarters was placed at Pleß (Pszczyna), and paralleled by the Austro-Hungarian counterpart just across the border at Teschen (Cieszyn/Tesin) in Austrian Silesia. The joint Austro-German administration of west Russia (Congress Poland) brought more contact between the Polish/Slavic-speaking population of Upper Silesia and Polish-speakers from across the prewar border. It was especially true of the joint military administration of the Upper Silesian industrial basin and the adjoining Russian Dombrowa (Dabrowa) which together with the largest Austro-Hungarian industrial basin of Ostrau-Karwin (Ostrava-Karviná) shared the same Upper Silesian coal field. Moreover, some relief aid was gathered in the Oppeln Regency for Polish co-nationals in Austro-German-held west Russia, and the pro-German Polish-language press in occupied western Russia was organized by the publishing concern of the Upper Silesian weekly *Katolik*, but the main Polish nationalist influence did still come to Upper Silesia from the Province of Posen (Poznan) (Wielkopolska).

When the hopes for a swift conclusion of the conflict got frustrated and the war of attrition set in, Berlin and Vienna strove to ensure loyalty of Polish-speaking subjects and soldiers by having proclaimed the Polish Kingdom on 5 November 1916 but without any clear specification of its borders. This kingdom was to be located on some of the territories seized from Russia but hardly were any preparations for introduction of its administration made which angered the Polish nationalists of Wielkopolska which continued to be perceived as an integral part of Germany. They became quite active beginning with 1916. This situation was slowly, but only to a limited extent, reflected in Upper Silesia where the Polish nationalist circles had crystallized around several low-circulation newspapers which tacitly championed goals of Polish nationalism through celebration of various Polish national anniversaries.

The deterioration of the economic situation was worsened by the severe 1916-17 winter which brought about hunger and even starvation. The highly volatile social situation resulted in the growing opposition to the continuation of the war and numerous strikes which required introduction of an electoral reform and liberalization of censorship and political control. Consequently, in Upper Silesia the prohibition of conducting religious instruction in Polish (1873) was lifted in 1917, and Polish MPs from Wielkopolska started to repeatedly voice at the Reichstag the novel idea of self-determination for Poland in the second half of 1917 (Kwiatek, 1991: 35-7).

The outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution preceded by the radicalization of the situation in Russia following the February Revolution and abdication of the tsar, contributed to the complication of the internal situation and encouraged social democrats and various worker movements in Germany. On 8 January 1918 US President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the Fourteen Points which set the general conditions of the would-be peace, accepted the national principle as the basis of the political organization in Europe and provided for re-establishment of the Polish state. Espousing the principle of self-determination (to which, in the meantime, also Lenin paid a lip service), on 11 January Korfánty demanded protection of national minorities at the Prussian Landtag, on 6 June was elected to the Reichstag from an Upper Silesian constituency, and at this forum, on 25 October, he remarked that ethnically Polish areas of Prussia should be included in the future Polish state (Kwiatek, 1982: 241).

Thus Korfánty clearly showed that he was a proponent of the so-called Piast concept which the prominent Polish nationalist Roman Dmowski popularized in the 1890s. It foresaw an inclusion of all the Polish-speaking areas in the postulated Polish nation-state and clashed with the older Jagiellonian concept which appealed for the re-establishment of a federal Poland in its pre-partition borders. Jozef Piłsudski espoused the other program, and wished to annex for would-be Poland neither Prussian Upper Silesia nor East Austrian Silesia unlike Dmowski.
Chapter seven

The short respite the Central powers gained after the signature of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March) was not enough to prevent the gradual collapse of Austria-Hungary, in the wake of which on 28 October independence of Czechoslovakia was proclaimed. The state took over the Czech national program which demanded the re-establishment of the union of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (or, more realistically, Austrian Silesia). Understandably, on 1 November the Zemsky narodni vybor (ZNV, Regional National Committee) proclaimed Austrian Silesia an integral part of Czechoslovakia. But earlier, on 30 October, the Rada Narodowa Księstwa Cieszyńskiego (RNKC, National Council of the Cieszyn Principality) had demanded the eastern part of Austrian Silesia for Poland which became independent on 11 November. On 2 November the ZNV and the RNKC signed the preliminary agreement on the division of East Silesia setting the stage for the future Polish-Czechoslovak conflict in this region, especially because the claims of the Germans of Sudetenland were limited only to West Silesia (Gawrecki, 1992: 80; Rothschild, 1977: 78-80).

On the proclamation of independence of Poland Wielkopolska was not included within the state’s borders which incited the Polish nationalist movement to start the Wielkopolska Uprising (27 December 1918-16 February 1919) which could not be effectively countered by the extremely weak German state which had been transformed into a republic on 9 November 1918. In result, the Naczelna Rada Ludowa (NRL, Supreme National Council) seized the control of almost the whole territory of Prussia’s Province of Posen.

Korfanty became a member of the leadership of the NRL on 14 November 1918 and actively participated in the Wielkopolska Uprising attracting a handful of volunteers from Upper Silesia and striving to establish similar structures which would make it possible to incite a pro-Polish uprising in Upper Silesia. On 3 January 1919 a branch of the NRL was opened at Beuthen (Bytom), and on 11 February the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa Gornego Śląska (POW, Polish Military Organization for Upper Silesia) on the basis of Polish gymnastic societies.

On 28 October 1918 the socialist revolution broke out in Wilhelmshaven. It engulfed the whole of Germany and reached Silesia and Wielkopolska by 10 November. Next day the armistice, signed on the basis of the Fourteen Points, took effect but the turmoil continued. The revolution culminated at Berlin and Bavaria during the first half of January 1919 before it was resoundingly suppressed by the German army with the help of the Freikorps (free corps)\textsuperscript{637}, opening the way for the stabilization of the Weimar Republic after the first elections of 19 January.

The speeches of the Polish MPs at the Reichstag and the collapse and division of Austria-Hungary were a shock for the German public opinion. The evacuation of occupied western Russia and transformation of it and Galicia into Poland was easily accepted in line with the armistice. The truncation of the Cisleithania\textsuperscript{638} and the Allies prevention of Germany-Austria (which was also made to change its name into Austria) from joining Germany, frustrated the hopes for creating the Großdeutschland\textsuperscript{639}, this is, the Little-German nation-state constituted from Prussia and other German states outside Austria-Hungary, was established in 1871. However, it was a faulty nation-state because a sizeable number of Germans/German-speakers was left outside it especially in Cisleithania. Großdeutschland (Great-German nation-state) was to embrace also Cisleithania, but was discouraged as it would mean the break up of the Dual Monarchy.

\textsuperscript{637} The nationalist tradition of the Freikorps dates back to the time of the Befreiungskriege (War of Liberation, 1813-15) against Napoleon, when students and other activists hoping for establishment of the German nation-state spontaneously formed the Freikorps Lützow of mounted riflemen who bore the red-black-gold colors which became the national flag of Germany beginning with the Weimar Republic.

\textsuperscript{638} Cisleithania - the Austrian section of Austria-Hungary. The Hungarian one was known as Transleithania.

\textsuperscript{639} Kleindeutschland, this is, the Little-German nation-state constituted from Prussia and other German states outside Austria-Hungary, was established in 1871. However, it was a faulty nation-state because a sizeable number of Germans/German-speakers was left outside it especially in Cisleithania. Großdeutschland (Great-German nation-state) was to embrace also Cisleithania, but was discouraged as it would mean the break up of the Dual Monarchy.
However, giving up the Province of Posen or Upper Silesia, integral parts of the German nation-state, seemed completely unacceptable and contradictory to the national principle propounded by Wilson. Silesia had belonged to the Holy Roman Empire/Prussia/Germany since the Polish king had given it up in the 14th c., and the Province of Posen had lain in the heart of Prussia since the close of the 18th c. The Polish victory in Wielkopolska sealed by the Treaty of Versailles was grudgingly accepted, and the province where, in 1910, 806 thousand (38.4 per cent) Germans had lived, became increasingly Polish with the number of Germans rapidly plunging to 328 thousand in 1921 and 193 thousand in 1931 (Hauser, 1994: 44; Kozlowski, 1994: 18).

The German public opinion and army was not prepared to accept a similar development in the case of Upper Silesia, which the average German and Upper Silesian could not reasonably perceive as Polish or Czech (as Prague also put forward demands to the southern part of Silesia). But in November 1918 there were not enough soldiers to guard the borders of Silesia and Saxony against the possible incursions on the part of the newly formed nation-states of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The situation was made even more acute by the revolution and the separation of the Church from the state which alienated Catholics in Upper Silesia and had to be suspended.

To prevent annexation of Silesia or its parts by Prague or Warsaw it was proposed to establish an independent state of Silesia or Upper Silesia which would not have to suffer the burden of reparations to be paid by Germany or to be subjected to the revolutionary government at Berlin. The establishment of the Zentralrat für die Provinz Schlesien (Central Council for the Province of Silesia) on 9 November 1918 reintroduced a modicum of order, and began to protect the borders with the help of citizen militias (Bahlcke, 1996: 123; Hauser, 1991: 28-9). In Upper Silesia the Zentrum, however, propagated autonomy for the region hoping to limit the influence of the social democrats and found eager support among Upper Silesian Catholics. On 9 December 1918 the party (renamed in Upper Silesia as the Katholische Volkspartei, KVP, Popular Catholic Party) called for independence of Upper Silesia with the support of local industrialists, but already on 31 December the president of the Oppeln Regency prohibited any propaganda in favor of independence or autonomy of the region considering it high treason. It did not stop the spread of the separatist movement but helped to split it into two branches. Hans Lukaschek with the further support of the KVP agitated for autonomy of Upper Silesia within Germany while the Związek Gornosłazaków/Bund der Oberschlesier (ZG/BdO, Association of the Upper Silesians) demanded an independent bilingual state, no separation of the Church from the state, more widely available popular education, more progressive welfare legislation, freedom of confession and guarantee for indivisibility of Upper Silesia (Cimala, 1982: 23; Cimala, 1982a: 661).

Soon 150 thousand members joined the ZG/BdO (Wanatowicz, 1994: 25). Most of them were Szlonzoks, and the staggering support they gave to the organization showed that demands of the ZG/BdO reflected the needs of the Szlonzoks in the postwar period most appropriately. However, there was no serious intention to grant them the right of self-determination, and Berlin and Warsaw strove only to use them as much as it would contribute to strengthening/building of the German/Polish nation-state. Outside this context the Szlonzoks were unnecessary, and from the official point of view only Germans and Poles lived in Upper Silesia. Not to complicate the matters any more, did the Allies with their new rule of the national principle accept this stance too.

After the fall of the revolution in January 1919, the remaining revolutionary elements were suppressed by the army and Freikorps. Since March 1919 various Freikorps and Selbstschutz (Self-defence militia) organizations took over the protection of the Silesian borders and together with regular troops formed the Grenzschtz (Border protection troops) (Bahlcke, 1996: 123).

In the meantime, the Polish troops were busy in the east fighting the Ukrainians and the Soviets in order to actualize the Jagiellonian concept canvassed for by Piłsudski - the Naczelnik Panstwa (Leader of the State). This situation allowed the Czechoslovak army to enlarge its share of East Silesia in a swift attack of 23-30 January 1919, and, above all, to ensure Prague’s control over the whole Ostrau-Karwin industrial basin - the only supply of coal and steel for the new nation-state.
This development did not prevent the Polish delegation at the Peace Conference to unrealistically further Polish territorial claims against Germany with an active support of France which sought to weaken Berlin as much as possible. On 7 May 1919 the proposal of the Peace Treaty was presented to the German delegation who were appalled at the predicted handing over of most of Upper Silesia to Poland, and its southern areas to Czechoslovakia. They opposed it stating that from the ethnic point of view the region was inhabited rather by Germans, Szlonzoks and Moravecs than Poles and Czechs; from the historical one it hardly ever had belonged to the Polish state; and from the economic one giving it to Poland would make it impossible for Germany to cope with the burden of reparations. The United Kingdom agreed with this line of argument afraid that the European balance of power would be too much disturbed with strong France and its Central European clients against weak Germany deprived of all its industrial basins. Also the possible falling of the Dombrowa, Upper Silesian and Ostrau-Karwin industrial basins into the Polish hands would unduly strengthen the state vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia and Germany. Thus in the case of West Silesia, in 1920, the Allies decided to grant the whole of the Ostrau-Karwin basin to Prague even though it left 70 thousand Poles/Polish-speakers in Czechoslovakia (Gawrecki, 1992: 85), and to conduct a plebiscite in Upper Silesia to facilitate decision what to do with this region.

On 28 June 1919 Berlin signed the Treaty of Versailles which was decried by the German public opinion as the Versailles dictate undeservedly punishing Germany for the war which was not only of its making and which Germany did not actually lose. When the treaty came into force on 10 January 1920, Germany lost about 70 thousand sq km of its territory and 7.3 million inhabitants. In Silesia the losses were relatively small limited to 512 sq km (given to Poland) in sparsely populated fragments of four Lower Silesian counties (Kreise)\(^\text{640}\), and to the southern part of the Upper Silesian Ratibor (Raciborz) county (316 sq km) which with most (this is about 40 thousand) of the Moravecs was transferred to Czechoslovakia under the name of the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlucinsko) (Bahlcke, 1996: 126; Weczerka, 1977: LXXXV). Not everything was lost though, because due to the British support the question of Upper Silesia was to be decided with the modern instrument of plebiscite which the international pundits of the League of Nations were so fond of applying when they encountered difficulties with implementation of the national principle in the interwar period.

On the basis of Art 88 of the Treaty of Versailles the plebiscite area included almost all of Upper Silesia without several of its western counties not claimed by Warsaw, but together with a fragment of a Lower Silesian county. The German and Prussian administration was duly evacuated from this area and the Inter-Allied Commission headed by the French gen. Henri Le Rond took over the control on 11 February 1920 with British, French and Italian troops. Even earlier heated pro-German and pro-Polish propagandas had emerged deeply polarizing the Upper Silesian public opinion on the issue of the future of their region. It had led to the clashes started by the POW displeased with the Versailles peace settlement, which are known in the Polish historiography as the First Upper Silesian Uprising (17-26 August 1919). The 70-80 thousand various German troops had swiftly contained the uprising especially because Warsaw had not supported this effort engaged in the Soviet-Polish War (1919-20).

In this context Berlin decided to espouse some of the popular demands of the Upper Silesian population vocatively expressed by the ZG/BdO, in order to curb the Polish irredenta, and on 14 October 1919 the Oppeln Regency was detached from the Province of Silesia (subsequently the Province of Lower Silesia) and overhauled into a new separate Province of Upper Silesian within the borders of the Land of Prussia. Warsaw answered in kind, and on 15 July 1920 the Polish Sejm passed the Organic Statute of the Silesian Voivodeship which granted wide-ranging autonomy to this part of Upper Silesia which would be granted to Poland, and as such de jure amounted to an incursion into the territory which from the legal point of view still belonged to Germany.

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\(^{640}\) The population of these areas was twenty-six thousand in 1910 (Weczerka, 1977: LXXXV).
Afterward, the Polish and German plebiscitary campaigns intensified. Besides hate journalism and posters, and also violence and terrorism\textsuperscript{641} became rife. On top of that the Polish side caused the outbreak of the Second Upper Silesian Uprising (17-25 August 1920). In spite of all the daunting difficulties (which, for instance, had dashed the possibility of carrying out a plebiscite in West Silesia), the Upper Silesian plebiscite took place on 13-20 March 1921. Berlin and Warsaw variously interpreted the results: 55.3 per cent communes (\textit{Gemeinde}) voted for Germany and 44.7 per cent for Poland, 59.4 per cent eligible voters opted for Germany and 40.3 per cent for Poland. Poland criticized the Allies for the inclusion of persons who had emigrated from Upper Silesia (95 per cent of them voted for Germany) though they had become eligible for the vote on the explicit insistence of the Polish delegation to the Peace Conference, and pointed to the fact that territorially speaking most of the countryside had voted for Poland, conveniently not noticing that the aggregatively larger urban population voted for Germany. Moreover, Warsaw claimed that widespread German intimidation tilted the balance in favor of Germany, but neither did Poland shy away from using force. On the other hand, Berlin took the results for the clear victory and appealed for leaving the whole of Upper Silesia within Germany, however, it overlooked the provision of Art 88 which deemed the plebiscite as an opinion which was advisory but not binding on the Allies in their decision on the future of Upper Silesia (Wambaugh, 1933: Vol I, ch VI).

Understandably, the Allies could not make any clear decision on the basis of the plebiscite, and soon international consideration took prevalence. France tended to side with the Polish stance, and the United Kingdom and Italy with the German one. Poland afraid that Upper Silesia may be left with Germany actively supported the Third Silesian Uprising (2 May-5 July 1921) headed by Korfanty. French troops (unlike the Italian ones) did not hinder the inflow of Polish insurrectionists so that Upper Silesian Germans under the leadership of gen. Karl Hoefer had to organize the \textit{Selbstschutz} for self-protection (Weczerka, 1977: LXXXVI).

The uprising amounted to a local civil war, but, nevertheless, only a small fraction of the population was engaged in it along Polish and German volunteers from without Upper Silesia\textsuperscript{642}. Except regular and secret military troops, those who participated in the uprising on the Polish and German sides usually were youngsters in search of adventure, demobilized and unemployed bachelors, and those bearing grudge and seeking revenge on perceived Poles/Germans as well as on some who decided to become Germans/Poles. The fighting was not especially intensive or bloody, but atrocities committed by one side were usually exaggerated by the other while denying one’s own (Pollok, 1998: 44-6). On both the sides fought Upper Silesians of the same custom and even language\textsuperscript{643} (Körner, 1981), who more often than not can be identified as \textit{Szlonzoks} in the process of being ennationalized into the German and Polish nations.

Consequently, the developing national division cut across towns, villages and families. The Conference of the Ambassadors reinforced this ideological division with the physical one when on 20 October 1921 it approved the dividing line worked out by the League of the Nations\textsuperscript{644}. Poland gained the peculiarly hourglass-shaped east of Upper Silesia (29 per cent of the plebiscite area) with 46 per cent (996 thousand) of the population, and most of the industrial basin with 75 per cent of the

\textsuperscript{641} In the pre-plebiscite period c. 3,000 people lost their lives in political violence (Pollok, 1998: 43).
\textsuperscript{642} At most the Polish insurrectionist army counted 50 thousand troops, but only 26 thousand were armed with firearms (Dobrzycki, 1971: 150). The number of the German \textit{Selbstschutzers} was comparable, so 100 thousand was just 0.045 per cent of the total Upper Silesian population of 2,208 thousand in 1910 (Stüttgen, 1976: 327).
\textsuperscript{643} Usually the average Upper Silesian had a better command of written German than Polish, and spoke both German and the local Slavic dialect/Slavic-Germanic creole. Some spoke better German than the dialect/creole which caused the Polish propaganda to publish for them appropriate materials in German, and the German propaganda similarly addressed those with poor command of German in Polish.
\textsuperscript{644} After prior delimitation, in June and July 1922, the Inter-Allied Commission handed the agreed parts of Upper Silesia to Poland and Germany.
industry, 79 per cent of the coal mines and 85 per cent of the coal field (Bahlcke, 1996: 133; Wyglenda, 1981: 409).

This division amounted to a tragedy at every level, because it split factories, infrastructure, localities, farms, and, most significantly, families. On the other hand, the Upper Silesian plebiscite was the largest and most complicated one of all those undertaken after the Great War, and was to be the exemplar of scientific approach to the issue how to solve the national question. To make it workable the League of the Nations had to coax Germany and Poland to sign the Geneva Convention (15 May 1922) consisting of 606 articles vis-à-vis the 440 articles of the Treaty of Versailles. The convention also provided for minority rights and delayed the head-on Polish-German conflict for fifteen years when it was in power (Wanatowicz, 1994: 39).

Although the majority of Upper Silesia’s populace were Polish-speakers according to the 1910 census, quite a lot of them voted for Germany because they did not feel themselves to be Poles but rather Szlonzoks who above all were attached to their region and Prussia/Germany. The latter attachment waned with the social and economic decline at the end of the war and during the subsequent years but rather for the sake of the region than the still hardly existing Polish state. Only the young and the poorest gambled at voting for Poland as they had little to lose, but the other Szlonzoks (best represented by the ZG/BdO) when they saw impossibility of establishing their own state and a general improvement in the living standard after founding of the Weimar Republic, decided to entrust their future to Germany. They reaffirmed their stance on 3 September 1922 when 89 per cent of the votes in the truncated Province of Upper Silesia with its capital at Oppeln, were cast in favor of this solution rather than separating it from Prussia as a Land on its own (Mende, 1991: 20).

Eventually, the inhabitants of the Hlucisko and the western part of East Silesia found themselves in the Czechoslovak Province of Silesia with the capital at Opava (Troppau), and the inhabitants of the Polish sections of Upper Silesia and East Silesia in the autonomous Silesian Voivodeship with its own Sejm and the organic statute (regional constitution), and capital at Katowice (Kattowitz).

The division of Upper Silesia triggered off considerable migratory movements. Until 1925 117-170 thousand Germans left the voivodeship for Germany (Bahlcke, 1996: 149; Weczerka, 1977: LXXXVII) and altogether 190 thousand by 1939 (Serafin 1996: 88). In the 1920s 90-100 thousand Poles arrived in Poland from the province and ten thousand from Czechoslovak Silesia (Serafin, 1996: 80). Later, the movements continued at a smaller scale. In 1925 the population of the truncated Province of Upper Silesia amounted to 1,372 thousand (Stüttgen, 1976: 325). Out of this number 151 thousand (11 per cent) were Polish-speakers, and 385 thousand (28 per cent) bilingual speakers of Polish and German (Masnyk, 1989: 15). The rest of 836 thousand (61 per cent) were German-speakers including ten thousand (0.73 per cent) Jews (Jonca, 1995: 56). On the other hand, the population of the Silesian Voivodeship amounted to 1,295 thousand in 1931 (Serafin, 1996: 81). Ninety-one thousand (7 per cent) were German-speakers; sixty-eight thousand of them lived in the Upper Silesian section of the voivodeship and twenty-three thousand in the East Silesian one. The number of twelve thousand usually German-speaking Jews in 1923 grew to twenty-seven thousand in 1939 especially due to the influx of Yiddish-speakers from other Polish territories. The rest were Polish-speakers - 1,190 thousand (92 per cent) (Greiner, 1996: 179-80).

Berlin after the losses authorized by the Versailles dictate wanted to consolidate the German nation-state as Warsaw and Prague wished to transform their states so that they would conform with the nation-state internationally accepted norm. Therefore, the discourse was limited to nations and

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645 The very concept of minority rights and their protection entered the discourse of international relations during the frenetic and often ill-advised peace efforts implemented in the first years after World War I (Girasoli, 1995: 12-24).
646 Only the Upper Silesian part of this voivodeship and the section of the plebiscite area remaining in the Province of Upper Silesia were covered by the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
national minorities only lest the process of ennationalization was complicated or hindered by acknowledgement of the existence of the ethnic groups of the Szlonzoks, Slonzaks and Moravecs.

It is understandable then that Berlin interpreted the statistics for the province in favor of Germandom. Namely, it calculated the total number of the Germans (1,221 thousand - 89 per cent) by adding the numbers of the German-speakers and the bilingual-speakers, and including the minute number of German-speaking Jews. Warsaw, on the basis of the same data, arrived at the total number of 633 thousand (46 per cent) Poles adding together the numbers of Polish- and bilingual-speakers (Masnyk, 1989: 15). In the case of the voivodeship, Polish historians calculated the number of Germans at 130-210 thousand (basing this estimate on the size of the electoral support for the German parties) while German ones at 230-350 thousand (out of this 180-310 thousand in the Upper Silesian section of the voivodeship) (Greiner, 1996: 179).

The differences of 385 thousand between the German and Polish estimates of the number of Poles in the province, and of

139-259 thousand between the Polish and German estimates of the number of Germans in the voivodeship can be easily explicated when one remembers that besides the growing number of Poles and Germans with singular national identity Upper Silesia was also populated with Szlonzoks and Moravecs, and the East Silesian section of the voivodeship with Slonzaks. Members of the three ethnic groups enjoyed multiple identities. Arise there a need (especially under ennationalizing pressure), the non-national multiple identity allowed them to emphasize these constituents of their identities which would make them in the eyes of the external national observer to be what was demanded of them (this is, Poles, Germans or Czechs), and, consequently, would protect their ethnic identities and ensure continued existence of their ethnic groups (Kamusella, 1997).

The ethnic groups, esp. the Szlonzoks (numerically largest) were deftly used by Berlin to strengthen Germandom through espousing their specific needs, whereas Warsaw strove to deny their existence carrying out the policy of straightforward ennationalization. The outflow of Polish activists and self-declared Poles from the province to Western Europe, the Ruhr and the voivodeship during the Great Depression, as well as the Germanizing efforts weakened the Polish minority movement in the province which is reflected by the steady decrease in the Polish votes cast in the Reichstag, Prussian Landtag and the Upper Silesian Provinzialausschuß (provincial assembly) elections, this is, from fifty thousand in 1922 to twelve thousand in 1933 when the national socialist government dissolved other parties than the NSDAP (Masnyk, 1989: 46-58). Moreover, already after the division of Upper Silesia the new category of the eigensprachiger Kulturdeutsche (non-German-speaking Kultur-German) began to be promoted. It assumed that the cultural element of nationhood is more significant than the linguistic one, and as such allowed to include along the Kashubs and the Mazurs as well as the Szlonzoks and the Moravecs into the fold of Germandom (Pallas, 1970: 31). Drawing on this concept, the category of Polish-speaker was not included in the 1933 census, and, according to it, in the province only ninety-nine thousand speakers of the Upper Silesian-Polish language and 266 bilingual speakers of that language and German lived besides the majority of 1,118 thousand German-speakers (Kokot, 1973: 71; Masnyk, 1989: 15). Thus, when the Act on Reich Citizenship of 15 September 1935 introduced the two kinds of German citizenship of the Reichsbürger (Reich citizen), and the substandard one of the Staatsangehörige (person belonging to the state) reserved for non-ethnic Germans (i.e. Jews and national minorities), the Mazurs, the Kashubs, the Szlonzoks and the Moravecs were automatically made into Reichsbürger unless they explicitly demanded to be treated as members of a national minority (Wanatowicz, 1994: 158-9).

The simplistic Polonizing policy of Warsaw played into the hands of the German minority movement which in elections, first, reasserted its real numerical influence underestimated in censuses, and took over the votes of the displeased Szlonzoks who, with time, came to the conclusion that Poland and the voivodeship did not fulfill their expectations. Germans were elected to Poland’s Sejm and Senate, the Silesian Sejm and to local self-governments. In 1922-29 there were fourteen (29.2 per cent) German deputies in the Silesian Sejm, in 1930 fifteen (31.25 per cent), and in 1930-35 nine
(18.75%). During the last term (1935-39), when the number of its deputies was halved from forty-eight to twenty-four, no German deputy sat in the Sejm prevented from doing so by the gradual collapse of the democratic system in Poland (Bahlcke, 1996: 149-50; Greiner, 1996: 185-6). In the local elections in the Upper Silesian section of the voivodeship the German minority gained the staggering 40.9% votes (besides 2.2% cast on the Polish-German lists) in 1926, and less in 1929\textsuperscript{647} - 19.9 per cent in the countryside and 39.6 per cent in the urban areas (Ujdak, 1996: 69-72).

The numbers become more comprehensible when one remembers the initial situation of the newly established Poland. In 1918-21 it fought several wars before its borders got stabilized in 1922. Subsequently, three different legal, economic and infrastructure systems\textsuperscript{648} inherited from Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary had to be unified and put under the speedily created Polish administration to make the state and its economy work. In the voivodeship carved out from the intricate economic and industrial whole, the problems were even more acute. Although Warsaw quite successfully started to carry out the necessary unification and managed to curb the postwar hyperinflation, its efforts were frustrated by frequent changes of government and the outcry of minorities which were quite forcefully Polonized in order to lower their 31-35 per cent share in Poland’s population (Tomaszewski, 1985: 50).

Pilsudski decided to remedy the problems with the coup d’etat which he staged in May 1926. It was most protested by the population of the Silesian Voivodeship well entrenched in the tradition of Prussian and German parliamentarism. Korfanty at the helm of the Chrzescijanska Demokracja (ChD, Christian Democratic Party) (quite strong though concentrated almost exclusively in the voivodeship), unsuccessfully organized opposition to the coup. But Pilsudski’s camp, dubbed the Sanacja (moral cleansing), won, and, subsequently tried Korfanty on trumpeted up charges before interning him at the camp for oppositionists at Brzesc in 1930 and making him leave for Czechoslovakia in 1935 with an attempt at opening a new trial against him.

The voivodeship’s local pro-Polish population disliked the treatment of their hero\textsuperscript{649} (whhad made it possible for part of Upper Silesia to be transferred to Poland) as well as marginalization of the veterans of the Upper Silesian Uprisings at the political level. They were also against the inflow of Poles from without the voivodeship who held top positions in the administration and industry, and disagreed with through and through Polonization of place-names, gradual introduction of Polish as the only official medium of communication, irregular attempts at Polonizing names and surnames, illegal\textsuperscript{650} limiting of the autonomy of the voivodeship with the April Constitution (1935), discrimination of the German minority and the blatant disregard for the Szlonzokian tradition (Greiner, 1994; Linek, 1997: 149-50).

On the other hand, Pilsudski perceived the appeals of the voivodeship’s German minority (supported by Germany) to the League of the Nations made in order to protect their rights guaranteed in the Geneva Convention, as one of the instruments to convince the world public opinion to the revision of the borders. The treaties of Rapallo and Locarno did nothing to guarantee Germany’s borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia, which only intensified his fears to the point that after the evacuation of all the occupied areas in western Germany, he proposed that France and Poland would conduct a preventive war against Germany, but to no avail.

\textsuperscript{647} No further local elections were organized in the voivodeship before the outbreak of the war, because the Sanacja was not approved by the Silesian Sejm as required by law.

\textsuperscript{648} The situation was even more mind-boggling in the voivodeship where no less than eleven legal systems functioned side by side (Wanatowicz, 1994: 45).

\textsuperscript{649} In the province and among the voivodeship’s Germans Korfanty was perceived very negatively as this one who had caused the split of their Upper Silesian Heimat. His stereotypical figure functioned even as a bogeyman with which mothers scared their children.

\textsuperscript{650} Because not approved by the Silesian Sejm as required by law.
To uproot opposition to the Sanacja and to better Polonize the voivodeship, Pilsudski nominated Michal Grazynski (from Galicia) to the position of the Silesian voivode (provincial governor of the voivodeship) in 1926. He limited enrollment in German-language schools with methods contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention, fought the influence of the German minority, Polonized the administrations of the Upper Silesian companies owned by Germans, and reciprocated every German move against the Polish minority in the province. The Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact (1934) gave both the states even more freedom in dealing with their minorities as they pleased for the sake of stabilizing the international situation which Germany and Poland needed having been devastated by the Great Depression (Urban, 1994: 40-42).

German workers were the first ones to be laid off and the last ones to be employed (Komjathy, 1980: 83) which forced many of them to search for work in the province, where economy (as elsewhere in Germany) picked up much quicker in 1937 the side effects of the depression were still visible in Poland while due to the national socialist policies of public works and armament there already showed dearth of labor in Germany. After the Geneva Convention expired in 1937 Berlin and Warsaw signed the Minority Declaration thus conceding to perceive each other as the guardians of their respective minorities on the territory of the other signatory. The modicum of minority protection not guaranteed by any international mechanism, anyway allowed Grazynski to go on with his anti-German initiatives such as expulsion of Reichsbürger651 subjection of the evangelical Church of the Old Prussian Union to the voivodeship’s administration with assistance of Polish Protestants from the East Silesian section of the voivodeship (Krzyzanowski, 1996: 124). The overall index of discrimination against the voivodeship’s Germans may serve the unemployment rate. In 1938 the rate vacillated between 60-80 per cent for members of various German trade unions while the overall unemployment rate in the voivodeship, at that time, was 16 per cent (Komjathy, 1980: 88).

In the province, the Polish minority was organized into the first department of the single organization of the Zwiazek Polakow w Niemczech (ZPwN, Union of the Poles in Germany), unlike the German minority in Poland and the voivodeship who boasted a plethora of various parties and organizations. From 1923 to 1939 the membership of the first department oscillated between five and seven thousand (Masnyk, 1994: 43). The nascent Polishdom was severely weakened by the steady outflow of self-declared Poles (mainly to Poland) while the vast majority of the Polish- and bilingual-speakers considered themselves rather to be Szlonzoks and Germans. The quick economic recovery of the Weimar Republic provided them with a better standard of living than Poland the inhabitants of the voivodeship. Moreover, Germany faster overcame the aftereffects of the Great Depression than Poland so that the gap between the standards of living in the province and the voivodeship did widen. The stance of the province’s Szlonzoks was reaffirmed with the inflow of workers from the voivodeship in search of employment especially in the second half of the 1930s.

Unlike Berlin, which even in the worst time could afford to lavishly support the German minority in Poland and the voivodeship up to the point of inciting Szlonzkian parents with a monthly allowance to send their children to the German minority school, Warsaw was hardly in a position to match this challenge. Therefore, the enrollment in the Polish-language schools of the province from 1,400 in 1923 sank to 1,270 in 1925 and mere 295 in 1931 (Popiolek, 1972: 419-20) while in the voivodeship the enrollment in the German-language schools declined much more gradually from a much higher level of twenty-three thousand in 1922 to eight thousand in 1938 (Iwanicki, 1994: 176). Subsequently, opting for Polishdom became no viable national alternative as it often meant losing one’s job or having to move to Poland. Moreover, those belonging to the Polish minority usually were of very modest social status unlike the German minority in the voivodeship, who

651 This is, Upper Silesian inhabitants of the voivodeship who under the provisions of the Geneva Convention decided to adopt German citizenship. They were obliged to leave for Germany within fifteen years since the moment of having obtained the citizenship. The same procedure applied to those from the province who opted for Polish citizenship, however, numerically speaking, they were fewer.
enjoyed membership ranging from peasants and workers, through professionals and civil servants to industrialists and aristocrats.

Furthermore, siding with Polishdom was increasingly no option after Hitler seized power in 1933 and embarked on the policy of constructing the Volksgemeinschaft (ethnically and genetically pure Germandom of all the Germans) which meant a protracted ethnic cleansing aimed at achieving the clean German nation-state broadened eastward with the Lebensraum (living space) so that to include in it all the ethnic Germans of Central and Eastern Europe. Up to 1937 the discrimination was curbed by the Geneva Convention which also restrained Hitler from immediate application of the Nürnberg Laws (1935) and any other anti-Jewish measures in the province. However, the Reichsburger citizenship was denied to members of the Polish minority and they could not enter the civil service. Beginning with 1931 too Slavic-sounding place-names were Germanized and a similar process in the respect of names and surnames commenced a year later. Both the processes intensified after 1933 and in 1937-39 were rounded up with removals of Polish shop signs and inscriptions (Linek, 1997: 148; Masnyk, 1989: 21-4).

Before the outbreak of World War II, it was clearly visible to the inhabitants of Upper Silesia that Poland was weaker economically, politically, and possibly militarily than Germany. Although the Polish propaganda emphasized the point that the voivodeship was the most developed and modern region of Poland (Wanatowicz, 1994: 41-2), this opinion had little relevance for the Szlonzoks and the voivodeship’s Germans who invariably compared their situation to that in the province. Polish observers hardly noticed nor comprehended this stance believing the Silesian Uprisings to be the clear reflection of the will of the Upper Silesian Polish-speakers to belong to Poland. However, most of those who decided to fight on the Polish side in these uprisings, predominantly longed for better life, this is, as it had been before 1914. The ZG/BdO explicitly expressed this attitude which was shared also by those who struggled against the insurrectionists trusting that their expectations would be better met in Germany.

As time showed, those who bet on Germany won. The loss of democracy in 1933 was no factor in this formula as equally little democracy was available in Poland after 1926. Although the Polish and German propaganda equally vilified each other’s states, the stereotypically negative picture of Poland summed up in the concept of polnische Wirtschaft, did prevail even in the voivodeship, especially since the mid-1930s, whereas the stereotypically positive picture of Germany began to be gradually more widely espoused by the average inhabitant of Upper Silesia on both sides of the border. What is more, the dissatisfaction of the average Szlonzok with Poland also appeared in his lack of identification with the state. For instance, in the common usage, when travelling from the Silesian Voivodeship to any other part of Poland he remarked that he was going to Poland, and coming back he was returning home from Poland. This phenomenon constituted another argument for the popular German opinion that Poland was just a Saisonstaat (state of one season).

This had to be of strong influence on ennationalization of the so-called Zwischensicht/warstwa posrednia (in-between people). Polish and German scholars applied this term to this segment of the Upper Silesian population which could not be realistically claimed as Polish or German, and as such was for grabs into the fold of one or the other nation. Because of the discontent with the Polish rule which did not fulfill the hopes of the voivodeship’s Szlonzoks and in their eyes turned them into the second-class citizens in their own Heimat, few of them became Poles though the younger generation educated in Polish schools was quite pro-Polish. Those of the latter’s parents who had to go/commute to the province in search of work or ask for financial aid from German organizations in the voivodeship, apparently sympathized with Germany if did not become Germans. On the average, the Szlonzok felt more affinity with the province (which Warsaw perceived as his disloyal leaning to Germany) than with Poland.

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652 The number of Jews in the province plummeted to 4,300 in 1939 (Jonca, 1995: 56).

653 Polnische Wirtschaft - Polish economy perceived as the symbol of the proverbial total, this is, Polish, disorder and laxness (Orlowski, 1992).
Hence, for Berlin it was easier to ennacionalize the province’s Szlonzoks to the German nation and to curb their anyway minimal ennacionalization to the Polish one. What is more, the comparatively worse economic and social situation of Szlonzoks in the voivodeship allowed to attract them into Germandom and simultaneously limit their ennacionalization to the Polish nation. The policy was equally successful in the case of Moravecs in the Hlucinsko. Although their kin from the territory of former Austrian Silesia and Moravia became Czechs or, more rarely, Moravians and Slonzaks, the Moravecs of the Hlucinsko became the distinctive group of the Hultschiners. Prague treated them as Czechs without much respect for their ethnic identity and needs not dissimilar from those of the Szlonzoks. The Moravecs changed into the Hultschiners because due to their bilingualism and unwillingness to become Czechs, they were turned into second-class citizens, denied any schooling in German and discriminated in the employment market like the rest of Czechoslovakia’s German minority. Consequently, they looked for work in Germany, and especially in the province, which brought them closer to Germandom rather than to Czechdom. Considering, the Slonzaks of former East Silesia, because of the continued existence of the Polish national movement since 1848, most of them became Poles in the East Silesian section of the voivodeship and the rest who remained in the Czechoslovak part of East Silesia, changed into the Polish minority. Warsaw quickly suppressed the remnants of the Slonzakian ethnic movement in the 1920s, whereas Prague encouraged it on its side of the border as an instrument of limiting the membership of the Polish minority (Kamusella, 1998).

Further curb on ennacionalization of the members of the ethnic groups, and especially of the Szlonzoks, was provided by the frequent border changes which exposed the inhabitants of Upper Silesia to conflicting influences of antagonistic nationalisms. The revision of the post-1918 order began in earnest when Hitler remilitarized the Rheinland in 1936, carried out the Anschluß of Austria (with virtually no opposition on the part of the state’s citizens who considered themselves Germans) in 1938, and, following the Munich Agreement (1938), annexed the Sudetenland (much to the applause of the area’s overwhelmingly German population). The process of constructing the Volksgemeinschaft which was to be contained within the borders of the Great German nation-state, had commenced.

With the Sudetenland Berlin also seized East Silesia and the Hlucinsko. After the Province of Silesia was reestablished and the Province of Upper Silesia scaled down back into the Oppeln Regency (1938) in agreement with the line of the Gleichschaltung (homogenizing) policy, the Hultschiner Ländchen was reincorporated into the Oppeln Regency in April 1939, and its inhabitants became Reichsbürger. Paralleling the German move, in September 1938 Warsaw decided to round up its nation-state by seizing most of Czechoslovakia’s part of East Silesia. Poland gained 825 sq km which left Czecho-Slovakia with 448 sq km of East Silesia. In November Poland also annexed 44 sq km of the adjacent territory from Slovakia claiming it to be ethnically Polish. The altogether 869 sq km was incorporated into the Silesian Voivodeship. Voivode Grazynski here, as earlier elsewhere in the voivodeship, introduced the stern policy of speedy Polonization. Polish became the only official language, no minority schools were allowed to be opened for the local Czechs and Germans, Czech and German officers were removed from the civil service and the administration of the industry. To strengthen Polishdom several thousands of the Polish emigrants who had left this area in 1920, were helped by the state to settle back. In result over thirty thousand Czechs and five thousand Germans left or were removed from this area leaving its population at the level of about 200 thousand, this is fifteen thousand Germans, eighty thousand Czechs and 110 Poles. To the displeasure of the local Germans this area had not been incorporated in Germany along with the Sudetenland and West Silesia, and the Polish annexation made them appeal Hitler, Göring and other high German officials, on behalf of fifty thousand Germans and one hundred thousand Slonzaks for rectification of the

654 This minute part of East Silesia which remained in Czecho-Slovakia, was included in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, when Germany annexed the western half of the state and gave independence to Slovakia.

655 The Polish, Czech and German estimates of the numbers of people belonging to the respective nations vary widely due to the ongoing struggle of the three nationalisms to reassert their dominance in this area, and due to the

Poland could not enjoy its half of the Ostrava-Karviná industrial basin it had gained from Czecho-Slovakia for a longer time. When Berlin liquidated the latter state in March 1939 the outbreak of the war became imminent. In the Oppeln Regency it was prohibited to use Polish in church, the Polish-language press was severely controlled and censored, activists of the Polish organizations were harassed, expelled and 200 of them were arrested on 31 August 1939. Warsaw meted out similar measures against the German minority in the voivodeship and elsewhere in Poland (Bahlcke, 1996: 150; Masnyk, 1989: 23; Urban, 1994: 46).

The war broke out on 1 September 1939 preceded, a day earlier, by the staged Polish provocation in the radio station at Gleiwitz (Gliwice) - a city located in the Oppeln Regency close to the Polish border. German troops overran the territorially diminutive voivodeship in no time. The Polish forces retreated toward Cracow by 2-3 September. In the heated political atmosphere of August 1939 and during the September campaign several thousand German civilians lost their lives in no combat situations in Poland including about 700 in Upper Silesia (Pospieszalski, 1981: 39; Urban, 1994: 42-3).

The German population of the ex-voivodeship (including numerous pro-German Szlonzoks) warmly welcomed the German troops hoping for better economic and social future under the rule of Hitler who, in the popular opinion, had put Germany and Germany’s part of Upper Silesia into order unlike Warsaw (Bahlcke, 1996: 158). The expectations were not to materialize, as Hitler was bent on replacing the policy of Polonization with even more thoroughgoing Germanization. In September all the Polish schools and organizations in the Oppeln Regency were dissolved, activists of the organizations along with many Polish veterans of the Silesian Uprisings were transported to the concentration camp at Buchenwald or executed (Masnyk, 1989: 24).

After having defeated Poland which, in agreement with the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, had been crashed from the east by the Soviet attack since September 17, the western and northern areas of the country were incorporated into Germany while the other areas controlled by Berlin were turned into the Generalgouvernement. The new Soviet-German border largely coincided with the eastern boundary of the post-1945 Polish state. To the Province of Silesia the area of the Silesian Voivodeship, was added together with the adjacent non-Upper Silesian counties (powiats) of the Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships. Most of the territory was organized as the new regency of Kattowitz (Katowice) with the exception of the county of Lubliniec (Lublinitz) from the Silesian Voivodeship and the counties of Blachownia (Blachstädt) and Zawiercie (Warthenau) from the Kielce Voivodeship which were incorporated into the Oppeln Regency. The Province of Silesia also regained the Lower Silesian areas which in 1920 had been lost to Poland (this is, to the Poznan Voivodeship) on the basis of the Versailles Treaty (Stüttgen, 1976).

In 1940 Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg were incorporated to Germany, and in 1941 the contiguous Yugoslav areas to the Provinces of Styria and Carinthia. Thus the building of the Great German nation-state was complete. What remained was homogenization of the nation-state and enlarging it into a European empire. In the case of Silesia, the policy was translated into an effort of gathering all the historically Silesian territories within the administrative borders of the Province of Silesia. The new Kattowitz Regency and the enlarged Oppeln Regency brought in even such areas which had ceased to be part of Silesia in the Fifteenth-Nineteenth centuries. On the other hand, the rest of East Silesia not included in the Silesian Voivodeship, in 1938, was left within the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Moreover, the administration of the Province of the Sudetenland claimed the whole of East Silesia whereas the administration of the Province of Silesia claimed West Silesia overlooking the existence of the Slonzaks whom every of the three nationalist propagandas did not fail to claim as belonging exclusively to one of the three nations.

656 The forty-four sq km of the Cadca area seized by Poland and incorporated in the voivodeship in 1938, Berlin returned to Slovakia.
which had been incorporated into the Sudetenland with the adjoining Bohemian and Moravian areas as the Troppau (Opava) Regency. Berlin decided to retain the 1939 status quo which left half of former Austrian Silesia outside the Province of Silesia (Dlugoborski, 1983: VIII-XI; Jähnig, 1991: 151).

The enlarged Province of Silesia with the whole Upper Silesian industrial basin as well as the Dombrowa one and half of the Ostrau-Karwin one proved to be too big a strain on the Breslau (Wroclaw) provincial administration. In 1941 the province was divided once again into the Provinces of Lower and Upper Silesia. The latter one consisted from the two regencies of Oppeln and Kattowitz (Stüttgen, 1976).

The administrative changes were followed by homogenizing measures in order to make Upper Silesia truly German. The suppression of the Polish minority in the Oppeln Regency in September and October 1939 was reflected in much more draconian measures in the newly incorporated areas, and especially in the former Silesian Voivodeship. 1 200 people lost their lives in the combat and combat-related situations, 1 500 in summary executions. Further 1 300 were incarcerated and few of them survived. The usual targets were activists of the organizations of the Silesian Uprisings veterans, civil servants, teachers and intelligentsia. The initial terror sent others from these groups fleeing for safety in the Generalgouvernement. Afterward, in the years 1939-42 eighty-one thousand Poles (mainly those who had arrived in the Silesian Voivodeship after 1922) were expelled from Upper Silesia, and thirty-seven thousand ethnic Germans from the territories seized by the Soviet Union, settled in the Kattowitz Regency. The authorities planned to settle ninety thousand Germans in the Province of Upper Silesia during the wartime, and, after the conclusion of the war, 300 thousand German families alone in the Kattowitz Regency. This would have necessitated expulsion of 220 thousand Poles immediately after the war (Dlugoborski, 1983: XLVII-XLVIII). Czechs from this part of East Silesia which was first annexed by Poland and than by Germany, often decided to move to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, where the Czech language remained the medium of communication at school and in administration and because Czechs were not drafted into the German army (cf. Borak, 1992: 108-10).

Also language measures appended the population policies. Even before the introduction of the official prohibition on the use of Polish in public, people were afraid to speak the language. After the stabilization of the situation, numerous persons began to speak in Polish again before decisive administrative measures were taken to suppress the phenomenon and strengthen the position of German as the only official medium of communication. Obviously, not only were standard Polish considered to be the Polish language but as well as the Upper Silesian Slavic dialect and Slavic-Germanic creole. It was a clear reversal from the eigenprachige Kulturdeutsche policy, for the sake of complete homogenization of the Great German nation also in the sphere of language.

Consequently, Polish inscriptions, shop signs and monuments were removed, and the action of Germanizing too Slavic-sounding names and surnames (which originated in the interwar Province of Upper Silesia) was extended to include the Kattowitz Regency. On the territory of the former Silesian voivodeship, first the pre-1918 forms of the place-names were restored, and later those of them which were deemed too Slavic-sounding, were changed into more German ones. During the latter period Germanization of place-names was also applied to significant localities and topographic objects in the incorporated areas from the former Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships.

As in most nation-states, responsibility for reaffirming the use of the official language in all the spheres of public and private life lay in the hands of the school, army, mass media, administration and police. Additional, the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei - State Security Police) strove to limit the use of unofficial languages in the private sphere of life (Serwanski, 1963: 86-150).

However, it would not be realistic to pursue the polices of dePolonization and Germanization too sternly as such an attitude would have demand further expulsions and suppression of such elements of life which the average German perceived as Polish but the Szlonzoks considered just Szlonzokian. Too drastic measures against the Slavic constituent of the Szlonzokian identity would
have distanced this population from Germany. It could not be allowed, because Berlin needed soldiers
and qualified work force without which production of the enlarged Upper Silesian industry would
have been hampered. The more the output of this industry was essential the more Germany extended
eastward giving the industrial basin the most central position in the wartime Germany. What is more,
properly Germanized Szlonzoks would have limited the need of bringing German settlers to Upper
Silesia after the war.

The most important part of the Szlonzakian life was religion which clashed with the progressive
ideals of national socialism, but had to be tolerated to a certain degree, for the sake of meeting the
aforementioned goals. The uneasy modus vivendi between the Catholic Church and Hitler had
developed in Upper Silesia since 1938 when the national monument in memory of the defendants who
had fallen in battle with Polish insurrectionists during the Silesian Uprisings, had been erected in 1938
at St. Annaberg (Gora Sw. Anny) the spiritual and geographical heart of Upper Silesia. The
monument with its amphitheater became the center of national socialist celebrations which were to
overshadow the innumerable pilgrims and pilgrimages coming to the shrine of St. Ann from all over
Silesia.

The goal was never fully achieved even during the wartime and the average Szlonzok remained
staunchly Catholic. However, the Catholic Church had to develop a kind of uneasy cohabitation with
the national socialist government in order to survive and to continue to take care of its faithful. In this
respect, the octogenarian Breslau archbishop cardinal Adolf Bertram must have borne an immense
burden as the president of the Fulda Conference of the German Bishops. He and the Breslau clergy
strove to continue providing pastoral service to the Slavic-speaking faithful in Upper Silesia as well as
to non-German-speaking POWs and forced laborers interned on the territory of the Breslau
archdiocese. For these efforts some clergymen lost their lives in concentration camps (Bahlcke, 1996:
143-4; Köhler, 1997: 41-2).

Similar attitude was adopted by suffragan Josef Martin Nathan, whose tiny Branitz vicariate
general of the Olomouc (Olmütz) diocese located in the south of Upper Silesia, grew immensely with
the incorporation of the Sudetenland in Germany, and, besides its traditional territory, was extended to
include the Troppau Regency (Kopiec, 1997). However, the clergy of the former Silesian
Voivodeship faced the biggest odds in carrying out their duties. With the 1925 bull the pope had taken
away the territory of the voivodeship from the jurisdiction of the Breslau bishop and transformed it
into the Katowice diocese. With the establishment of the Kattowitz Regency, neither the Prussian
(1929) nor German (1933) concordats were extended to cover the diocese, so Berlin could act here as
it pleased in matters religious. Consequently, Bishop Stanislaw Adamski was expelled from his
diocese, and the use of Polish in pastoral services was prohibited in June 1940. However, the
structures of the diocese were not liquidated and the national socialist authorities de facto allowed
Adamski to govern the diocese from without (Wanatowicz, 1994: 181).

Before a concrete ennationalizing policy could be devised and implemented in Upper Silesia,
the ethnic make-up of the population of the wartime Upper Silesia had to be surveyed. The police
carried out the task at the turn of 1939 and 1940 in the form of the Einwohnererfassung (registration
of residents). In the survey residents were required to declare their nationality and language used at
home (Haussprache). The ethnic groups of the Szlonzoks and the Slonzaks were explicitly
distinguished in this survey by allowing the category of Silesian language. However, while Slonzaks
were also permitted the category of Silesian nationality, Szlonzoks had to chose between German or
Polish nationalities.

From the administrative point of view, in the Upper Silesian section of the former voivodeship,
106 thousand (10 per cent) declared the Silesian language as their Haussprache. 818 thousand (77.8
per cent) German, 125 thousand (11.9 per cent) Polish. 2 500 inhabitants declared other languages,

657 The Breslau diocese was elevated to the rank of an archdiocese in 1929 on the basis of the Prussian concordat
concluded in that year.
mainly Ukrainian, Yiddish and Czech. However, 999 thousand (95 per cent) declared German nationality, as opposed to 50 thousand (4.2 per cent) who chose Polish one and 2 800 who chose other nationalities.

In the Austrian Silesian section of the former voivodeship, 183 thousand (35.4%) declared the Silesian language and 157 thousand (30.4%) Silesian nationality. The figures for the German language and nationality were seventy-six thousand (14.7 per cent) and eighty-six thousand (16.6 per cent), for the Polish language and nationality 213 thousand (41.2 per cent) and 215 thousand (41.6 per cent), for the Czech language and nationality thirty-six thousand (7 per cent) and 47 thousand (9 per cent). 8 700 persons (including 7 500 Jews) declared other languages, and 11 800 (including 9 700 Jews) other nationalities.

From the data it is clear that in the Upper Silesian section of the voivodeship bilingual speakers of German and Polish declared the German language only, and those Słonżoki with a poor command of German, declared either Silesian or Polish. However, most of the population (even those who did not speak German) declared German nationality in line with the concept of the eigensprachige Kulturdeutsche. Thus it remained to teach proper German to seventy-five thousand Polish-speaking and 106 thousand Silesian-speaking Germans. The only sizeable remaining non-German group of fifty thousand persons who declared Polish language and nationality would be either coerced into Germandom or expelled to the Generalgouvernement.

In the Austrian Silesian section of the voivodeship where Germandom was traditionally weak, population ethnically more diversified than in Upper Silesia, and the Austro-Hungarian and Czechoslovak administrations were less ennationalizing than their Polish and German counterparts, more options were left to the population. Hence, only ten thousand non-German-speakers declared German nationality. The fact that Czechs, earmarked for Germanization, enjoyed rather a bearable position in Germany in comparison to members of other Slavic nations, and did not have to join the German army (unlike the Słonżoki and the Słonżaki), convinced more than ten thousand non-Czech-speakers to declare Czech nationality. On the other hand, two thousand non-Polish-speakers declared Polish nationality which indicated the strength of Polishdom not oserved in the Upper Silesian section of the voivodeship. This situation demanded a more multifaceted approach than that in Upper Silesia. The Polish national group had to be reduced by expulsions as well as by coercing its members to join the Słonżakian ethnic group and Germandom. The Czech national group was to remain as it was as it would have been Germanized after the war.

The border counties of the former Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships housed (according to the declared nationality) 666 thousand (88.9 per cent) Poles and 77 thousand (10.2 per cent) Germans. Moreover, only one thousand non-German-speakers decided to declare German nationality, mainly in the Dombrowa industrial basin. The distinctly un-German (this is, Polish and Jewish) character of these area was only slightly altered with the subsequent expulsions of some Poles and extermination of Jews, and could have been Germanized only with a huge influx of German settlers after the war.

Obviously, the statistics in the context of the pro-Germanization coercion on the side of numerous police officers engaged in the Einwohnererfassung, does not very well reflect the actual national and linguistic self-identification of the inhabitants. Because it was not only a preliminary survey for the preparation of appropriate ennationalizing instruments, but also the first one of these instruments. However, as indicated above, the data can be a basis for estimating the numerical size of the Słonżokian and Słonżakian ethnic groups, for illustrating the multiple character of their ethnic identities, as well as for indicating the relative strength of Polishdom severely tested through the German domination and Germanization. It is clear, that Polishdom was extremely shallow in the

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658 Before 1914, several thousand Ukrainian/Ruthenian workers from the vicinity of Lwów (Lemberg, Lviv), were encouraged to arrive in the Upper Silesian industrial basin to limit the growing Polish influence with the influx of Polish-speaking workers from western Russia and Galicia. Around one thousand of them remained in Upper Silesia.
Upper Silesian section of the voivodeship (predominantly based on Poles who had migrated there after the division of Upper Silesia) unlike in its Austrian Silesian counterpart (Bahlcke, 1996: 159; Dlugoborski, 1983: LII).

Before going to the second stage of doing away with the Polish facade which covered the true and overwhelmingly German core of Upper Silesia, the extermination of the Upper Silesian Jews had commenced already in October 1939 when one thousand of them had been deported to forced labor camps. Most of the Jews living in the enlarged wartime Upper Silesia were exterminated by 1943. Actually the most notorious concentration camp of Auschwitz (Oswiecim) with tens of its subcamps, was placed within the borders of the Province of Upper Silesia, which accounts for the quick extermination of Upper Silesia’s Jewish population. Many Jews, especially from the Austrian Silesian section of the province, lost their lives also at Theresienstadt (Terezin) (Borak, 1992: 110; Maser, 1992: 60-2). What is more, numerous Soviet as well as fewer Polish and allied POWs lost their lives either at the forced labor camp located in the Upper Silesian village of Lamsdorf (Lambinowice)659 and its subcamps or at other forced labor camps within the province of Upper Silesia (cf. evans, 1995; Urban, 1994: 74).

The first hints at how to homogenize the heterogenous areas of the Great German-nation state developed already in autumn 1939 in the province of the Wartheland established on the basis of Wielkopolska, this is, the former Poznan Voivodeship and the western areas of the Warsaw and Kielce Voivodeships. The Wartheland national socialist leadership proposed to segregate the population according to the national principle. Germans, the eigensprachige-Kultdeutsche category of population, and other segments of populace suitable for Germanization or deemed Aryan from the racial point of view, were to remain in the Wartheland while the rest was to be gradually driven away.

This overall concept crystallized in the form of the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL, German national List). The DVL’s four groups included:

Group I: persons who actively reaffirmed their German national identity in the interwar period, mainly by belonging to German associations;

Group II: persons who did not actively demonstrate their German national identity but retained this identity in full;

Group III: persons of German origin, with German spouses, or of unclear national identity;

Group IV: persons of German origin, German national identity, unclear national identity who were pro-Polish or partially Polonized (in the bureaucratic jargon they were dubbed as renegades).

Persons belonging to Groups I and II were entitled to the Reichsbürgerschaft (Reich citizenship), whereas those belonging to Group III were to become only Staatsangehörige. Those of Group IV obtained Staatsangehörigkeit (the status of a Staatsangehörige) only through individual conferment which could be withdrawn within ten years.

The decree of 4 March 1941 (signed by Frick, Deputy Interior Minister, Hess, Hitler’s deputy and Commander-in-Chief of the SS (Schutzstaffeln Defence Formation), and Himmler, Reich Commissar on Strengthening Germandom) commenced the action of inscribing the eligible population onto the DVL. In Upper Silesia it took off in the middle of the year. The sheer impossibility of in-depth screening of various cases of persons to be included in the most controversial Group III caused the issuance of the decree of 31 January 1942 which simplified the procedure but made the conferment of Staatsangehörigkeit revokable within the period of ten years.

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659 This camp initially was constructed to house French POWs during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, and next was put into use during both World Wars and after 1945 as a transfer/concentration camps for local Germans/Szlonzoks.
This new approach was needed due to the planned attack on the Soviet Union which would necessitate drafting further recruits (Boda-Krezel, 1978: 13-20).

In Upper Silesia the membership of Group III was the biggest of all the Provinces established from the Polish areas which had been incorporated into Germany (Jastrzebski, 1995). It aimed at including the slonsakischer and oberschlesischer populations, this is, the Slonzaks and the Szlonzoks (Boda-Krezel, 1978: 14).

The DVL and various other groups were the basis for determining one’s national identity and the state’s attitude toward one. The following groups having or eligible to obtain the Reichsbürgerschaft were considered to be Germans, this is:

Reichsdeutsche (Reich Germans), German citizens who had obtained their citizenship before 1 September 1939;

Umsiedler (resettlers), this is, ethnic Germans evacuated from areas seized by the Soviet Union in agreement with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. They were eligible for obtaining the Reichsbürgerschaft;

Group I of the DVL, its members were eligible to obtain the Reichsbürgerschaft.

Persons of all the categories enjoyed basically the same rights as citizens of Germany.

Groups II and III of the DVL were dubbed as the Zwischengruppe (in-between groups) clearly indicating that the authorities considered their members as the Zwischensicht which were to be re-Germanized, because according to the official view they were of German descent. The cohesion of the Zwischengruppe could not develop as members of Group II enjoyed the Reichsbürgerschaft, whereas those of Group III only the revokable Staatsangehörigkeit.

In Upper Silesia, those of Group IV and remaining outside the DVL were considered to be Poles. But the Polish group as the Zwischengruppe was split with different statuses ascribed to its members. The members of Group IV enjoyed only the revokable Staatsangehörigkeit which made them more similar to the members of Group III than to the Poles outside the DVL, who did not enjoy any civil rights.

The similarity between the members of Group III and IV ended, for instance, in access to education. Only elementary and basic vocational education was available to the latter whereas secondary and tertiary education to the former provided they received an agreement to continue their education from the authorities. However, those of Group III could not become civil servants and had to obtain agreement for contracting a marriage, however, initially their rights were to be basically the same as of those from Groups I and II, though members of Group III were to be re-Germanized by having been relocated deep into Germany (Boda-Krezel, 1978: 24-5).

From the territorial point of view, the action of inscribing onto the DVL was carried out in these areas which did not belong to Germany before 1 September 1939, hence, from the administrative point of view, in the majority of the counties of the Kattowitz Regency and in three counties of the Oppeln Regency, everybody residing within the borders of the former Silesian Voivodeship had to fill in the DVL questionnaire660, but in the counties of the former Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships such questionnaires were issued only on demand.

Considering, the results of the Germanizing action alone in the Kattowitz Regency, the situation was following in October 1943:

In the Upper Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship, there were fifty-three thousand (4.8 per cent) Reichsdeutsche, 1 400 (0.1 per cent) Umsiedler, and eight thousand (7.2 per cent) members of Group I. Thus the number of Germans was 135 thousand (12 per cent). The

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660 At the end 1944, the refusal to fill in the questionnaire usually earned one a sentence of capital punishment (Boda-Krezel, 1978: 28).
Zwischengruppe of 882 thousand (78.9 per cent) consisted from 163 thousand (14.7 per cent) members of Group II, and 718 thousand (64.2 per cent) members of Group III. The Polish group comprised one hundred thousand (8.9 per cent), out of this forty-eight thousand (4.3 per cent) were members of Group IV and fifty-two thousand (4.7 per cent) Poles outside the DVL system.

In the East Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship, there were thirty thousand (4.9 per cent) Reichsdeutsche, fifteen thousand (2.4 per cent) Umsiedler and twelve thousand (2 per cent) members of Group I who together added up to fifty-seven thousand (9 per cent) Germans. The Zwischengruppe of 265 thousand (43.8 per cent) comprised forty-three thousand (7 per cent) members of Group II and 223 thousand (36.8 per cent) members of Group III. The Polish group of 238 thousand (39 per cent) consisted from 1 500 (0.2 per cent) members of Group IV and 236 thousand (39 per cent) Poles outside the DVL system. Moreover, the number of Czechs was anything between thirty-seven thirty-eight thousand.

In the counties of the former Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships, the number of Germans thirty-five thousand (5.9 per cent) was small, and the membership of the Zwischengruppe and Group IV at twelve thousand (2 per cent) and 1 700 (0.3 per cent), rather negligible. Poles remaining outside the DVL system - 539 thousand (91.6 per cent) constituted the overwhelming majority. Those who were inscribed onto the DVL, this is, fourteen thousand (2.4 per cent), mainly resided in the Dombrowa industrial basin bordering on the former Silesian Voivodeship (Bahlcke, 1996: 160-1; Dlugoborski, 1983: LIV-V).

Because the Zwischengruppe and Group IV of the DVL were earmarked for speedy Germanization, the biggest success was attained in the Upper Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship where merely fifty-four thousand out of the total population of 1 119 thousand were not considered to be Germans and were not to be Germanized. In the East Silesian section of the former voivodeship the success was dubious as 282 thousand belonged to the clearly unGerman category out of the population of 606 thousand. In the counties of the former Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships much would have had to be done to lower the ratio of 541 thousand unGerman persons to the population of 588 thousand.

On the other hand, the statistics can be a basis for estimating the number of the Szlonzoks and the Slonzaks. However, with the former it is more complicated as no comparable data on the Szlonzokian population on the territory of the interwar Oppeln Regency is available. However, it can be safely assumed that their number in the interwar Oppeln Regency corresponded to that in the Upper Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship. Most of the Szlonzoks were included in the DVL Group III, some who were clearly pro-German or had German spouses found themselves in the DVL Group II, and those who were pro-Polish in the DVL Group IV. Bearing these qualifications in mind, the number of the Szlonzoks may be gauged at the combined memberships of the DVL Groups III and IV together with half the membership of the DVL Group II, which equals 848 thousand. Thus another 800 thousand out of the total population of 1 582 thousand (1939) in the interwar Oppeln Regency (Stüttgen, 1976: 325) is not an improbable number. In result the total number of the Szlonzoks in the wartime Province of Upper Silesia can be assessed at about 1 650 thousand.

Considering the Slonzaks in the East Silesian section of the former Silesian Voivodeship, if one accepts the same method of calculation based on the DVL, the estimate results in the number of 244 thousand.

The numbers, to a large degree, are confirmed by the results of the Polish policies of homogenization and ethnic cleansing which were applied to the former Province of Upper Silesia after World War II, and closely emulated the German model of the DVL. The number of persons from the territory of the interwar Oppeln Regency, who had got verified as Poles stood at 852 thousand in 1949 (Miształ, 1984: 159-60). On the other hand, all of those inscribed into Group III and IV of the DVL, were rehabilitated as Poles together with more than 30 per cent of the members of the DVL Group II (Boda-Krezel, 1978: 131).
In order to peer beyond the numbers which were, simultaneously, the instrument and result of ennationalizing efforts of the German and Polish administrations, it is worthwhile remembering that the \textit{Szlonzoks} and the \textit{Slonzaks} had multiple ethnic identities, whose constituents allowed them, should there a need arise, to pass themselves as Poles/Germans/Silesians in the eyes of the Germans and the Poles. However, in the context of the acute Polish-German nationalist conflict exacerbated by the excesses of World War II, the German administration officially classified members of the two ethnic groups as Germans, and its postwar Polish counterpart as Poles, while the average German reserved for them such pejorative labels as \textit{Wasserpole}, \textit{Slonzak}, crypto-Pole, and the average Pole the following pejorative labels of \textit{Volksdeutsch}, Fritz, Kraut, Hitler manv, Göbbels.

Although, the narrative on the postwar ennationalizing policies of Warsaw and Prague (conducted in agreement with the Soviet directives) directed at the Upper Silesian population in the larger context of the reorganization of the political map of Europe and the world, belong to the next chapter, it is necessary to mention several phenomena which set the stage for the postwar events.

First, the initial hints of the war reached the inhabitants in the heartland of the wartime Germany quite late with the Allied bombardment of the only remaining German oil refinery at the Upper Silesian locality of Blechhammer (Blachownia) in June 1944, and the atrocities committed by the Red Army in the East Prussian village of Nemmersdorf (Mayakovskoye) in October that year. However, the war started for them only in January 1945 with the Soviet offensive which engulfed most of Upper Silesia east of the Oder by March. The front line brought limited damage as German and Soviet troops as well, were interested in maintaining the war effort production in the Upper Silesian industrial basin despite and for the sake of the hostilities. Hence a relatively small percentage of the population was evacuated, and in the hardly damaged factories and mines production was resumed only few days after the Soviet takeover by the very same workers who had toiled for Germany.

However, the population at large fared worse. The front line troops pillaged, raped and committed arson. The second line, this is, the NKVD troops took the control over government, industry, infrastructure, archives, and most importantly, over the repressive network of forced labor and concentration camps, which now were put into use against NSDAP members and the anti-communist element, as well as transfer points for workers despatched to the Soviet Union. They were accompanied by industrial and infrastructural equipment which was seized by special troops for the reconstruction of the Soviet Union.

The excesses perpetrated against the civilian population did get much worse after the line of the Oder was crossed in March 1945, and the Soviet troops reached the prewar border of Germany. By 7-8 May, almost all the Province of Upper Silesia was overrun by Soviet troops with the exception of its south-western corner and the East Silesian section west of Teschen (Fuchs, 1994: 684). On the other hand, the gradual handing over of the control of Upper Silesia to the Polish communist administration had commenced already in March 1945 and continued well into the late 1940s. This administration also took over the repressive system of the camps which was enlarged by the NKVD. The Poles used it in the same manner as the Germans. First, for ensuring production, second, for liquidating political opposition, third, for homogenizing the population (this is, for expelling Germans and Polonizing the remaining populace of \textit{Szlonzoks} and \textit{Slonzaks} verified/rehabilitated as Poles as well as for making space for Polish settlers from central Poland and Polish expellees from the eastern Polish territories annexed by Moscow) (Kamusella, 1998a).
Chapter eight

The origins and anatomy of the ethnic cleansing in upper Silesia a conducted at the close of and after the second world war

Methodological Notes

1. Due to the brevity of this paper the description of the postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia is necessarily limited to Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) and the Katowice part of Upper Silesia (Eastern Upper Silesia/Ostoberschlesien) with the exclusion of both the Polish and Czech parts of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia and the Czech Hlucin (Hluczyn) land (Hultschiner Ländchen).

2. In conformity with the international onomastic norms (cf. Davies, 1981; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994) the majority of place names are given in the forms which were officially recognized in given periods of time. In order to prevent confusion the reader will find appropriate Polish, German, Czech or Russian counterparts of the place names used in this paper in parentheses.

3. The paper concentrates solely on the mechanics of the postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia, thus, the author decided not to elaborate (unless it is necessitated in the course of the argument) on the question of ethnic, national, linguistic and religious identity of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia661, who, usually, are referred to as the Upper Silesians in the essay. The term has its counterparts in Polish, German and Czech, and does not evokes pejorative associations unlike the ideologically-tainted label Autochtons which has been restricted in its usage almost exclusively to the Polish postwar historiographic and political terminology.

An Explanatory Note on Political and Administrative Divisions of Upper Silesia

The note is not exhaustive as it is intended just to facilitate perusal of the paper.

The boundaries of Upper Silesia tended to fluctuate in the course of history following relatively frequent changes in the political allegiance of the province. Already in the Middle Ages the sizeable territories of Siewierz (Sewerien) and Oswiecim (Auschwitz) principalities were lost to Malopolska (Lesser or Little Poland, which in the concerned area of Cracow overlaps with Galicia), and subsequently formed the so-called Silesian-Malopolska borderland. In the same period of time Opava (Troppau, Opawa) Silesia was formed from a northern chunk of Moravia and added to Upper Silesia. From 1526 the whole of Upper Silesia belonged to Austria but after its defeat in the Silesian Wars in the 18th century only Opava Silesia and Tesen (Teschen, Cieszyn) Silesia stayed with Austria while the rest was ceded to Prussia. Subsequently, the former two were referred to as Austrian Silesia (it is superfluous to use the term Austrian Upper Silesia as all of Lower Silesia belonged to Prussia) and the latter as Prussian Upper Silesia. After the third partition of Poland in 1795 New Silesia (i.e. the sizeably enlarged territory of the Principality of Siewierz/Sewerien (which in its renewed form bordered on the outskirts of Czestochowa) was attached to Prussian Upper Silesia but the annexation was annulled by Napoleon in 1807. After the First World War Austrian Silesia was inherited by Czechoslovakia, however Czech(oslovak) Silesia is not identical with Austrian Silesia. In 1919 Tesen (Teschen, Cieszyn) Silesia was split between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the southernmost part of the Prussian Upper Silesian county of Raciborz (Ratibor), i.e. the Hulcin (Hlutschin, Hulczyn) land was added to Czech Silesia. Moreover, after the Plebiscite in 1921 Prussian/German Upper Silesia (less the Hulcin land) was divided between Poland and Germany. Its Polish part was granted autonomy and is referred to as Silesian Voivodship (Wojewodztwo Slaskie) in Polish sources and as Eastern Upper Silesia (Ostoberschlesien) by German scholars. Silesian Voivodship was enlarged with the Polish part of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia. The remaining part of Upper Silesia is

661 An introduction to the complex issue of identity in Upper Silesia is provided by the insightful article on this subject by Harry K. Rosenthal (Rosenthal, 1972).
referred to as German Upper Silesia or Oppeln (Opole) Regency whereas Polish historiography tends
to name the region as Opole (Oppeln) Silesia or Opolszczyzna (i.e. Opole Land). In the 1938 post-
Munich carving-up of Czechoslovakia Germany seized Opava (Troppau, Opawa) Silesia but it was
incorporated into Sudetenland not into German Upper Silesia, whereas the Czech part of Tesen
(Teschen, Cieszyn) Silesia, i.e. so-called Transolza (Zaolzie, Olsagebiete) (increased with the strip of
land adjacent to its southern border) was annexed by Poland and incorporated into Silesian
Voivodaship. After the outbreak of the Second World War so enlarged Silesian Voivodaship was
incorporated into Gau Oberschlesien to which the Silesian-Malopolska borderland was added together
with a strip of Polish land next to the eastern borders of the historical territories of the Principalities of
Siewierz (Sewerien) and Oswiecim (Auschwitz). After the end of the Second World War the prewar
status quo was re-introduced, however, Poland obtained whole German Upper Silesia and did not
revoke the German addition of the Dabrowski industrial basin (which forms part of the Silesian-
Malopolska borderland) to Upper Silesia. At present the lands of the Prussian part of Upper Silesia
enlarged with the Dabrowski industrial basin occupy the whole of Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice
(Kattowitz) Voivodaships while smaller chunks of the territory are included in Czestochowa and
Bielsko-Biala (Bielitz-Biala) Voivodaships.

The year 1995 occasions celebrations of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the end of the Second
World War in Europe, and in the case of Poland, as well, numerous events commemorating the fiftieth
anniversaries of the establishment of schools, factories, colleges, universities in the western territories
of today’s Poland, i.e. former Deutsche Ostgebiete (eastern territories of Germany).

Although it is widely known, anyway in the context of the article it should be clearly borne in
mind that half a century ago no peace was effected from the legal standpoint, but only the cessation of
hostilities. The planned Allied peace conference, which was to determine the postwar status quo
(hastily sketched during the largely inconclusive conferences at Yalta and Potsdam), never took place.
Thus, the Second World War almost imperceptibly evolved into the Cold War which was terminated
only recently with the positive conclusion of the Two Plus Four negotiations, and with the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The former event de facto amounted to an ersatz of a universal peace conference,
and de jure finished the Second World War. Moreover, considering the period immediately after
1945, it ought to be noted that fighting did not completely stop and continued as limited guerilla
warfare, into the 1950s in the Soviet Union and its stallites (cf. Estonia, Latvia, the Ukraine, Bulgaria,
Romania).

On the other hand, the war division of Europe brought about by the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov
Pact has never been openly questioned and has never been found invalid in its part concerning the
territorial gains of the Soviet Union. By reason of this tacit acceptance, Poland lost one-third of its
prewar territory, and subsequently the lands were incorpoarated into the Soviet Republics of
Lithuania, Byelorussia and The Ukraine. The Polish Government in Exile residing in London, did not
want to recognize the annexations but reluctantly had to concede to them due to the political pressure
exerted by the Allies, and especially faced with the policy of faits accomplis consequently carried out
by the Polish communists on behalf of and under the supervision of the Soviet Union. The Polish
communists accepted and supported the political line of the Soviet Union striving to incorporate the
majority of the Deutsche Ostgebiete into postwar Poland as an unusual compensation for the eastern
lands Poland had lost to the Soviet Union. It was clearly realized that existence of postwar Poland in
such a shape could be guaranteed solely by the Soviet Union because of the virtual impossibility of
any rapprochement of the Poles with the Germans. Understandably, the latter recognized the Oder-
Neisse line as the legally-binding German-Polish border only in 1990.

Moreover, the incorporation of Silesia, part of Brandenburg, the Free City of Danzig and part of
East Prussia into Poland provided the Polish communists with their ideological trump card which
allowed them to introduce their pro-Soviet rule by their having represented the Polish defeat in the

662 The parties to the negotiations, which preceded the unification of Germany, were both Germanies and the
four war-time Allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France.
Second World War as a victory, and thanks to the general improvement of the living standard accompanying the transformation of postwar Poland from an agricultural country into an agricultural-industrial one caused by the absorption of the relatively highly developed Deutsche Ostgebiete. The so called regained territories\(^{(663)}\) let the communists consolidate the Polish society around the unwanted aim which was to build socialism, and also to legitimize their undemocratic seizure of power.

The Polish incorporation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete was inseparably linked to the question of the German-speaking population which had lived there for about seven centuries. Some harbingers of would-be decisions in this respect had been already present prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. In answer to the prewar German territorial claims in the name of Lebensraum (living space), in 1939 the Polish propaganda demanded for Poland and Czechoslovakia erstwhile Slavonic lands which used to extend to the line formed by the cities: Bremen, Hannover, Göttingen, Fulda and Nuremberg (Hansel, 1989: 447). On 29th August 1939 the official Polish declaration for the facist Italian news agency Stefani stated that Poland hoped to solve the problem of the Polish minority in Germany and the German minority in Poland through a gradual exchange of the populaces (Wiskemann, 1956: 47) emulating the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1923\(^{(664)}\). The Polish declaration could also be an echo of the population shifts caused by the Munich Conference (1938) which approved the subsequent annexations of part of the Czechoslovak territory by Germany, Hungary and Poland, as well as of the opinions on the possibility of expulsion of part of the Sudeten German (Sudetendeutsche) population expressed by Czech intellectuals since 1937. The vague proposals were, for the first time, brought forward before European and world political fora in quite a definitive form by the open discussion on the subject between Eduard Benes (who resigned his function of the Czechoslovak President after the implementation of the Munich Agreement) and Hubert Ripka\(^{(665)}\), prominent Czechoslovak journalist and politician (Wiskemann, 1956: 62).

As President of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London, Benes vociferously propagated ethnic homogenization of Czechoslovakia through expulsions (Wiskemann, 1956: 66/67), completely disregarding the stance of Jaksch (a Sudetendeutsche social democrat and antinazist) who proposed to solve the question of Czechoslovak/Slavonic-German enmity by creating a multinational federation in Central Europe (Wiskemann, 1956: 63)\(^{(666)}\). Following Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union (22nd June 1941), the Polish Government in Exile (under British pressure) and the Soviet government concluded the Polish-Soviet mutual assistance pact on 30th June 1941, thus establishing relations and declaring the Nazi-Soviet treaties null and void. Most significantly the agreement did not guarantee Poland’s prewar borders (Harper, 1990: 5; Hubatsch, 1967: 299)\(^{(667)}\) opening the way for postwar

\(^{(663)}\) The term (in Polish Ziemie Odzyskane) as well as another term the Piast (first Polish dynasty) territories (in Polish Ziemie Piastowskie) were widely used by the Polish communist propaganda to prove primordial Polishness of the lands and to justify their postwar annexation by Poland.

\(^{(664)}\) The agreement approved the compulsory exchange of minority (i.e. Muslim and Orthodox) populations between Turkey and Greece in an effort to ethnically consolidate both the countries in accordance with the principle of ethnically homogenous states, which after the First World War had been introduced into European politics by President Wilson. The exchange followed the similar Greco-Bulgarian agreement of 1919 (which, however, was on voluntary basis), and was sanctioned and supervised by the League of Nations.

\(^{(665)}\) In the interwar period he worked as a journalist but during his emigration years in London he became a close associate of President Benes and served as a minister in the Czechoslovak Government in Exile. In the period 1945-1948 he actively opposed communism in Czechoslovakia being active in the Narodna Strana (National Party), and after the communist take-over of the country he again emigrated to Great Britain.

\(^{(666)}\) In his proposal Jaksch evoked the so called Swiss model which had been to be the basis of the Czechoslovak state as promised by Benes at the Paris Peace Conference after the end of the First World War. However, the agreed solution had never been fully and satisfactorily implemented in the interwar period especially in its part considering the Studentendeutsche (De Zayas, 1988: 22), after the Czechs the second largest ethnic group in Czechoslovakia of that time.

\(^{(667)}\) Poland’s prewar eastern borders were set by the Treaty of Riga in 1921 after the Polish victory in the Soviet-Polish War. The terms of the treaty and the military defeat were considered to be a humiliation to the Soviet
annexations and population shifts. Moreover, in the negotiations prior to the signature of the pact Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to Britain, had announced the Soviet intention to retain the territories acquired through the Nazi-Soviet agreement (Harper, 1990: 10). On 14th August 1941 the Atlantic Charter, setting the principles for the postwar world order, was promulgated and signed by the Soviet Union and Poland on 30th September 1941. On this occasion Polish Foreign Minister Edward Raczyński delivered a vague speech on the issue of Polish postwar borders which prompted Maisky to dispatch a note to the Polish government on 1st December 1941, in which the Soviet Union pressed for a settlement of the Polish eastern frontiers (Hubatsch, 1967: 299). Stalin set forth the same territorial demands during the Moscow visit of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in December 1941 (Hubatsch, 1967: 300). Due to the success of the German offensive in the Ukraine, Molotov and Stalin backed down and specific territorial agreements were excluded from the Treaty of Alliance concluded in May 1942 (Harper, 1990: 9). However, on 2nd December 1942 the Polish Parliament in London decided, in addition to the eastern frontiers of 1921, to demand straightening and shortening of the Polish-German border. The unclear declaration was made more specific by Polish Head of State Władysław Sikorski on 6th December 1942. In the course of his negotiations with President Roosevelt he designated the Oder-Neisse line (including Stettin/Szczecin) as Poland’s natural security line (Hubatsch, 1967: 300). Hence, in the light of the political developments Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union gradually began to espouse the tenet of postwar transfers of population in the years 1942 and 1943 (Wiskemann, 1956: 67; De Zayas, 1988: 34) as the planned expulsions were referred to euphemistically. The expulsion of the German-speaking population from the Deutsche Ostgebiete was mentioned for the first time at the Conference in Teheran (28th November-1st December 1943) when Stalin, supported by British Foreign Minister Eden, proposed the River Oder as the postwar western border of Poland (Hubatsch, 1967: 301; Wiskemann, 1956: 73/4).

The year 1943 was marred by the final severance of the tense relations between the Polish Government in Exile and Moscow. The termination of political links took place after 13th April 1943 when the Germans exposed the mass murder of thousands of Polish army officers perpetrated by the Soviet authorities. The former had found the group graves of the Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Minsk and at other sites (Harper, 1990: 5; Hubatsch, 1967: 300). The diplomatic situation became more acute despite Benes’s persuasive arguments presented to the Polish diplomats in London on 10th January 1944. Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk did not wish to accept the loss of the prewar Polish eastern territories in exchange for the Deutsche Ostgebiete. His stance became even more inflexible after the fall of the Warsaw Uprising which was not aided by the Red Army Union and thus required a redress in the form of obliterating Poland from the political map of Europe once again. The goal was achieved through signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (23rd August 1939) which authorized the war partition of Poland. Subsequently, the achievement of the Soviet foreign policy was reaffirmed with the German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty of 28th September 1939 (Harper, 1990: 4; Hubatsch, 1967: 298).

The inflexible Soviet attitude which constantly prevailed during any negotiations on postwar Polish borders becomes clear if one remembers the two guiding principles of the Soviet security policy of that time: First, an independent Poland would be allowed to reemerge but its territory would be shifted to the west and its government would be friendly to the Soviet Union. Second, no indigenous Polish activity would be allowed to interfere in any way with the progress of the Red Army or with the Soviet control of the rear (Harper, 1990: 10). Most significantly it was not to be applied to Germany which indicated a possibility of a postwar annexation of German territories and expulsion of their indigenous populations.

The political ties were entwined severance by the Soviets who accused the Poles of endorsing nazi propaganda (Harper, 1990: 5).

The losses more or less coincided with the so-called Curzon line which for the first time was proposed by the British Government after the First World War as a possible eastern border of the newly re-established Polish state.
positioned in the middle of the city at the line of the Vistula River (De Zayas, 1988: 45/6). On 10th October 1944 during the meeting at the British embassy in Moscow Churchill and Eden managed to make Mikolajczyk agree to the Curzon line, and Mikolajczyk promised that he would persuade his cabinet to endorse the decision, but he failed to do so and on 24th November 1944 quit the Polish government (Harper, 1990: 18-20).

This staunchly legalistic stance of the Polish London government, flatly refusing any concessions, allowed the Soviets to establish the PKWN (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego - Polish Committee of National Liberation) in Lublin in July 1944. It was recognized only by the Soviet Union and was to serve as a nucleus of the would-be postwar communist government in Poland and as such a puppet in the Soviet hands. In a 17th December 1944 interview for The Sunday Times, Tomasz Arciszewski, new Prime Minister of the Polish government in London, protested against the possible loss of the Polish eastern territories, but also agreed to the would be incorporation of part of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, part of Pomerania and part of Lower Silesia, with the exclusion of the cities of Breslau (Wroclaw) and Stettin (Szczecin), in order not to overburden a postwar Poland with a task of assimilating too large a number of Germans. He still was not prepared to take into consideration mass expulsions as a political instrument (Wiskemann, 1956: 81/2). An immediate response to this pronouncement of the official line of the Polish London government was formulated in a long article by Stefan Jedrychowski, head of the Propaganda Department of the PKWN, which was published in the main Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda on 18th December 1944. For the first time the Oder-Neisse line with the city of Stettin (Szczecin) was officially demanded as the postwar western frontier of Poland (De Zayas, 1988: 50). The territorial claims of the Polish communists together with the acceptance of the Curzon line by the PKWN augmented Soviet support for its underling and facilitated its smooth transformation into the Rzad Tymaczasowy (Provisional Government) on 31st December 1944. Hence, at the Yalta Conference (4th-11th February 1945) Stalin could fully support the demands of the Polish communists against the contrary opinions of Roosevelt and Churchill. The doubts of the two western leaders considering too big an increase of the number of Germans who would have to be expelled were dismissed by Stalin. He maintained that a majority of the German population of the Deutsche Ostgebiete had already fled before the rapidly advancing Red Army which had launched the successful offensive on 12th January 1945. The information was obviously not true because 30-60% of the Germans remained in the Deutsche Ostgebiete.

In spite of their mutual enmity the Russians and the Germans suspended their hostilities in this region in August 1944 in order to allow the latter to suppress the uprising, and thus to fulfill the expectations of the former who wished the Polish anticommunist forces to be conveniently obliterated before they would try to impose Soviet rule on postwar Poland.

Thus, the Allies made the question of Polish postwar borders even more daunting because Mikolajczyk was quite moderate on this issue in comparison to his colleagues who supplanted him in the Polish Government in Exile.

The first nucleus of the Polish pro-Soviet authorities was initiated by the Soviet Union in Chelm and originated from the Moscow-based, communist Związuk Patriotow Polskich (ZPP, Association of Polish Patriots). After having been based in Lublin for a while it was transferred (in a full-fledged form) to Warsaw when the Red Army seized the Polish capital from the nazi hands on 19th January 1945. The Soviets indicated here stringent consistency in their policies not allowing the communist Poles to set any modicum of a Polish government anywhere else but on the lands which they had decided were to be included into the territory of postwar Poland.

In Article 4 of the PKWN-Soviet Agreement of 27th July 1944 there was a clause which obliged the Soviet Union to internationally support the postulate of shifting the Polish western frontier 300 kms to the Oder-Neisse line (Lis, 1988: 22).

It was officially recognized by the Soviet Union on 5th January 1945 (Harper, 1990: 22).
Ostgebiete, and many returned (especially to Upper Silesia) after the end of the Second World War (De Zayas, 1988: 53).

To analyze the effects of the onslaught of the Red Army it is necessary to become acquainted with the ethnic make-up of Upper Silesia at the close of the Second World War. It must be remembered that Oberschlesische Gau contained whole Teschen (Cieszyn/Tesen) Silesia, German Upper Silesia (Oppeln/Opole Silesia) and Polish Silesia (Silesian Voivodship/Eastern Upper Silesia) together with the added territories of the Silesian-Malopolska borderland and the Dabrowski industrial basin which in the Middle Ages had belonged to the territory of historical Upper Silesia. The eastern boundary of this new Upper Silesia ran through the outskirts of Czestochowa and few kilometers away from Cracow (Anon. 1943: map between pp. 530/1), and thus embraced all the Upper Silesian coal field which earlier Germany had had to share with Austro-Hungary and Russia, and after the First World War with Poland and Czechoslovakia. So it can be easily inferred that the enlarged territory of Oberschlesische Gau was populated by Germans, Silesians, Poles, Czechs, Moravians and Jews. In the framework of the Endlösung policies of the Third Reich, the Upper Silesian Jews were channeled through the ghettos in Bedzin, Sosnowiec and Zawiercie to the Auschwitz (Oswiecim) Concentration Camp (Szefer, 1989: 191/2). All the population which could be classified as non-Polish or non-exclusively-Polish was to be retained and subsequently Germanized (Anon., 1943: 158), because it would not be advisable to hinder the rapid war economic development of the Upper Silesian industry by depleting the qualified work force (Wiskemann, 1956: 56). Therefore, only c. 81,000 Poles (Szefer, 1989: 191) were expelled to the General Gouvernment, and subsequently replaced with 30,445 ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) from Bukovina, 5,091 from the prewar eastern territories of Poland seized by the Soviet Union, and 734 from Estonia, Latvia, Besarabia, Dobrudja, Romania and Bosnia (Anon., 1995: 6). Silesia was rarely visited by US or RAF bombers lying far away from Allied air force bases. So almost 450,000 from the total number of 850,000 German citizens (Reichsdeutsche) from the cities of western and central Germany (regularly troubled by air raids) relocated at the end of the war for safety reasons, were moved to this relatively safe part of the Reich. Some refugees must have also reached Upper Silesia but it seems that the majority of them stayed in Lower Silesia (Engel, 1967: 194; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 23). These frequent and non-supervised population shifts do not allow for any exact or reliable estimates of the size and structure of the Upper Silesian population prior to the end of the Second World War.

The relative security of Silesia was over with the destruction of the Heersgruppe Mitte (Army Center) and after the Soviet armies reached the Vistula River at the turn of June and July in 1944. The first Allied bombing raid in Upper Silesia took place on 7th July 1944 and caused serious damage at the oil refinery in Blachenhammer (Blachownia), which supplied the Reich with 40% of its synthetic petrol (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 29). For the first time on 19th October 1944 the Red Army crossed the borders of the Reich and seized the counties of Goldap (Goldap) and Gumbinnen (Gusev) in East Prussia. The German troops recovered the territories on 5th November 1944, and it was discovered

677 In the final draft of the Yalta Declaration on Poland, the Allies called upon the now functioning (i.e. pro-Soviet Lublin) Polish government to reorganize itself on a broader democratic basis. The declaration indirectly legitimized the Provisional Government and effectively excluded the London Polish government from a role in Poland’s political future (Harper, 1990: 32).

678 In the city there is the most important Polish Catholic shrine Jasna Gora on which Polish nationalism has traditionally centered.

679 It preceded Warsaw as the capital of Poland, and since then has been the second largest center of Polish culture.

680 The cities are the main urban centers of the Dabrowski industrial basin.

681 Prior to and during the Second World War the Third Reich combined its policy of extending its Lebensraum with the policy of Germannom consolidation. In practice it meant that the new eastern territories incorporated into the Reich at the expense of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania were eathnically cleansed from their non-Germanic populaces and re-populated with the Volksdeutsche from the German islets spread all over Central and Eastern Europe. This policy could also contribute to the idea of the postwar expulsions of Germans.
that on 20th and 21st October 1944 the Red Army soldiers had killed all the population and livestock in the village of Nemmersdorf (Mayakowskoye), and committed other numerous atrocities in different localities, which also included the massacre of the c. 50 French POWs (De Zayas, 1988: 61/2). In the Autumn of 1944 and at the turn of 1944 and 1945 the fright evoked by the Red Army’s excesses aimed against the German civilian population, was increased by disinformation and the activities of the Reich authorities who strove to dissuade the Upper Silesian population from flight in order to continue the production in the Upper Silesian industrial basin which had to take over the destroyed Ruhrgebiete as the powerhouse of the Reich (Wiskemann, 1956: 90).

Therefore, only relatively small segments of the Upper Silesian population had a chance to flee before the rapidly advancing Red Army, i.e. 20-50% of the rural populace, and sporadically larger percentages of the urban populace from the cities east of the River Oder (Lis, 1993: 19). The escapees and evacuees sought shelter mainly in Sudetenland and in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, however, small groups of Upper Sileans reached Saxyony where some of them (e.g. Nikolaus Graf von Ballestrem) perished during the carpet bombardment of Dresden on 13/14th February 1945 (De Zayas, 1988: 77; Lazure, 1986: 216/7). On 12th February 1945 the Soviet armies launched the winter offensive from the bridgeheads in Magnuszewo and Baranow Sandomierski at the River Vistula. Silesia was attacked by the First Ukrainian Front under the command of General Konyev who was supported in the north by the First Byelorussian Front commanded by General Zhukov, and in the south by the Fourth Ukrainian Front under the command of General Petrov (Kinder, 1978: 214). On 19th January 1945 the Soviet soldiers entered Upper Silesia near the town of Herby (Anon., 1995a: 2) and in the vicinity of Kreuzburg (Kluczbork) after having crossed the Prosna River (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 58). On 23rd January 1945 the Red Army entered Ehrenforst (Slawiecice), on 24th January Oppeln (Opole) and Gleiwitz (Gliwice), on 25th January Hindenburg (Zabrze), on 28th January Kattowitz (Katowice), and on 31st January Heydebreck (Kedzierzyn) and Ratiborhammer (Kuznia Raciborska). At the close of January practically all the Upper Silesian industrial basin was in the hands of the Soviets. Subsequently, using the bridgeheads on the River Oder in Krappitz (Krapkowice) and near Cosel (Kozle, the town was defeated on 18th March), the Red Army started the attack which resulted in the seizure of Upper Silesia on 26th March 1945 except for Teschen (Cieszyn, Tesen) Silesia which was overrun by the Soviet soldiers at the turn of April and May 1945 (Czapliński, 1993: 52; Anon., 1995b: 7).

The offensive was preceded in November and December 1944 by a wide-scale indoctrination action which was aimed at the Red Army soldiers. Hatred of the Germans and everything German was induced by marching the troops through the Majdanek concentration camp and by Iliya Ehrenburg’s propaganda articles published in Pravda, Izviesta and the front newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda. In his writing he appealed for indiscriminate massacres and bloody revenge (De Zayas, 1988: 65; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 57). Moreover, it was announced that every soldier and platoon who would cross the River Oder as first would be recommended for distinctions, and the bravest of them would receive the title Hero of the Soviet Union (Tomczyk in: Walenski, 1990: 36). Thus, it is not surprising that after having crossed the Oder, the Soviet soldiers cruelly avenged the years of nazi terror in Byelorussia, The Ukraine and Russia (Grau, 1970). Rape, arson, pillage, murder and massacre tended to take place sporadically after the troops had crossed the war borders of the Reich, however the occurrence of all the phenomena increased when the Red Army reached Germany’s prewar border.

682 The information was received from Ferdinand Graf Kinsky whose wife is one of the children of Graf von Ballestrem.

683 On this day also the River Oder was crossed near Steinau (Sinawa) in Lower Silesia north-west of Breslau (Wroclaw) (Hubatsch, 1967: 302).

684 It was one of the main Jewish extermination centers.

685 The assaults against the civilian population were designed not only to unleash a vast refugee movement that would impede the military operations of the Wehrmacht, but rather as an introduction to and the first stage of the subsequent ethnic cleansing (Hubatsch, 1967: 313).
The wrongdoings were somehow curbed by the wide-spread though incorrect belief that as far westwards as the River Oder, Silesia is populated by Polish or Polish-speaking population, and as such basically Slavonic. The tragedy suffered at the hands of the Red Army by the Upper Silesian populace living west of the Oder, regardless of their linguistic, ethnic or national provenances is daunting and defies description (Anon., 1995b: 7; Czapliński, 1993: 52).

When the Soviet occupation of the industrial part of Upper Silesia stabilized in February 1945, probably the biggest forced population deportation of all in the Reich lands, was carried out by the Red Army in Upper Silesia. Wehrmacht soldiers and men, but also women and children, were transported in unheated freight trains or marched in sub-zero temperatures into the heartland of the Soviet Union (Cholewa, 1993: 1). It is estimated that only from the area of former Polish Upper Silesia (i.e. Silesian Voivodaship) 40,000 persons (Lis, 1991: 13)\(^{686}\) were deported to forced labor/concentration camps in Moscow, Kiev, Sverdlovsk, the Krivy Rog industrial basin, Kola Peninsula, Ivano-Frankovsk (Stanislawow), Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, the Zaporozhe region, Kazakhstan, Borzom (Georgia), Starosvinysk, Chelabinsk, Kopyieiska, Nidelov, Zhelapinsk, Stalino, Mikhailov, Tula, Kasirka, Kisimov in the Urals, and at the Usa River (Cholewa, 1993; Honka, 1993; Lis, 1993: 19/20; Kracher, 1995: 3). About 50-75% of the Upper Silesian prisoners perished from hunger and disease in these camps (Honka, 1993), and some of them were freed only in 1949 (Wiskemann, 1956: 94)\(^{687}\). Besides the Upper Silians deported to the Soviet Union, the Soviet occupation authorities imprisoned several tens of thousands of other Upper Silians in the so-called DP (Displaced Persons) camps which, as a matter of fact, were forced labor camps. Among others some of them were placed in the camps in Blachownia (Blachenhammer), Chorzow (Königshütte), Bakow, Gliwice (Gleiwitz), Jaworzno, Kedzierzyn (Heydebreck), Korfantow (Friedland), Labedy (Laband), Lagiewniki, Lambinowice (Lamsdorf), Myślówce Mysłowitz, Strzelce Opolskie (Groß Streblitz), Świetochłowice (Schwentochlowitz) and Zdzieszowice (Deschwowitz) (Lis, 1993: 20).

Serious war damage sustained in Upper Silesia was deepened by activities of the regional Soviet military commands which besides establishing the occupation administration were to gather as many war trophies (i.e. property left by the Germans) as possible and transport them to the Soviet Union. Thus, factory equipment was dismantled, and food and agricultural machinery were taken away from the land. It made the postwar famine more acute, and caused ruralization of previously industrial areas or at least halted industrial production for a decade or two after the end of the Second World War (Pacult, 1995: 2; Weczerka, 1977: 215). The most spectacular Soviet action was dismantling of the entire electrification system of the Upper Silesian Railways and sending it to the Soviet Union (Davies, 1981: II 481).

The deportations of productive workers and the dispatch of movable property to the Soviet Union clashed with the interests of the Polish communists, who (after their preliminary acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line at the Yalta Conference) during the talks between the delegation of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa (KRN, National Polish Council) and the Soviet government in Moscow (14th-21st February 1945) obtained the right\(^{688}\) to establish the Polish administration at the occupied territories of the Reich by the Oder and Neisse Rivers, on the basis of the Soviet-PKWN Agreement of 27th July 1944 (Kowalski, 1983: 37). The Polish communist authorities strove to prevent occurrences of deportations and Soviet-approved and -executed methodical pillage already in February 1945 (Lis,

\(^{686}\) The available estimates for the whole of Upper Silesia total 65,000 persons (Engel, 1967: 194; Magocsi, 1993: 48).

\(^{687}\) Beginning with 1947 the Polish authorities repeatedly requested release of the persons considering them to be autochtonous Poles but the Soviet Union disregarded the demands and did not answer them. The issue was taken up by international politics only in 1955 when German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer managed to convince the Soviet government to free the remaining Upper Silesian prisoners together with the Wehrmacht POWs (Wysocki in: Dobrosielski, 1995: 62).

\(^{688}\) From the Allied point of view it was not a valid but separatist agreement since specific border changes were to be decided upon only after the end of the Second World War at Potsdam.
1993: 25), but only at the end of April 1945 did the deportations stop, although the planned seizure of property continued until the liquidation of Soviet military commands in the period from July to October 1945 (Lis, 1993: 144). The destructive exploitation of the Upper Silesian economy (Pacult, 1995: 2), and frequent instances of rape, robbery, murder and theft committed by Soviet troops, continued in the postwar years. It is clearly shown by the fact that on 14th January 1946 Wladyslaw Gomolka, Minister of the Regained Territories wrote a secret letter in this respect to the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, as well as to Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsyky (Misztal, 1990: 107).

The Polish communists consistently used the tactics of faits accomplis and already on 5th February 1945 announced that the Polish State was entitled to administer the Deutsche Ostgebiete by the Oder-Neisse Line (Marzian, 1953: 28/9). Earlier on 28th January 1945 the Polish citizens of German descent from the territory of prewar Poland (i.e. also from Silesian Voivodaship/Eastern Upper Silesia) were deprived of their Polish citizenship with a decree issued by the Polish communist authorities, and were simultaneously expropriated and used as forced labor or interned in labor camps (Anon., 1995a: 2; Wiskemann, 1956: 96/7). On 29th January 1945 Silesian Voivoda (communist regional governor) General Aleksander Zawadzki approved seizure of all German farms and agricultural machinery for Poland’s sake (Misztal, 1990: 58). The decree of 3rd March 1945 stated that all Germans living in the regained territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete) would be expropriated from their movable property and real estate (Urban, 1994: 54). On the same day Edward Osobka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the Polish Provisional Government, announced that the regained territories would be populated with Polish settlers from the overpopulated areas around Warsaw (Central Congress Poland) and Cracow (Galicia/Little Poland). On 5th March 1945 the confiscation of the property of Upper Silesians, who had fled before the advancing Red Army, commenced (Anon., 1995a: 3). On 14th March 1945 Upper Silesian Voivodaship (Wojewodztwo Gornoslaskie) was formed and the Dabrowski industrial basin was included inside its boundaries (Anon., 1995a: 3; Lis, 1993: 18), thus recognizing the 1939 nazi annexation of this region. When on 18th March 1945 German Upper Silesia (i.e. Oppeln Regency), already controlled by the Polish administration, was added to the Voivodaship it was renamed as Silesian-Dabrowski Voivodaship (Wojewodztwo Slasko-Dabrowskie) (Lis, 1993: 18). The inclusion of the ethnically and historically different territory of the Dabrowski industrial basin inside the new Silesian Voivodaship was brought about by the consistent policy of the Polish communists who wished to homogenize Upper Silesia as quickly as possible and to integrate it within postwar Poland. It also increased the percentage of Poles in the statistics describing this region which was ethnically, nationally, linguistically and religiously diverse at that time.

The Polish communists were vitally interested in retaining as many local residents (i.e. Upper Silesians) in Upper Silesia, and especially in German Upper Silesia (Oppeln Regency), as possible in order to prove Polishness of the land and to show appropriateness of its incorporation into postwar Poland (Strauchold, 1995: 8). Moreover, the communists did not want to depopulate the region because that could frustrate Polish efforts to populate the Polish part of the Deutsche Ostgebiete with the Polish expellees from the Polish territories seized by the Soviet Union, since their number was considerably lower than the number of the Germans who were to be expelled from the regained

689 Until the 1950s the Soviet Union controled sailing at the River Oder, and operated many factories and land estates in Silesia exclusively for its own profit and in order to supply the Soviet troops who left Poland only in 1993 (Pacult, 1995: 2). It may be interesting to note that the Head Quarters of the Soviet forces in Poland were located in the Lower Silesian city of Legnica (Liegnitz).

690 On 8th April 1945 the US government protested to the Soviet government against the arbitrary actions of the Polish authorities in the Deutsche Ostgebiete which Poland was incorporating in all forms. The Soviet government replied, on 17th April 1945, that the setting up of a local Polish administration bore no relation to the question of frontiers. After a prolonged exchange of notes on this issue, during the Potsdam Conference it became clear that the creation of the Polish administration did influence the delimitation of postwar borders (Hubatsch, 1967: 303/4).
Otherwise the international pressure could have been used more decidedly against the Soviet Union’s decision to grant the territories to Poland. Thus, in Cracow on 22nd January 1945 General Zawadzki, the Polish Provisional Government’s Plenipotentiary for Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) saw to the establishment of the Komitet Obywatelski Polakow Slaska Opolskiego (KOPSO, Citizen Committee of the Opole Silesia Poles) which was to work out a program of the national verification postulated by the Polski Zwiazek Zachodni (PZZ, Polish Western Association) which had been reestablished on 3rd November 1944 in Lublin. The members of the KOPSO arrived to Katowice (Kattowitz) at the beginning of February 1945. They decided that in order to protect the Upper Silesians, who considered themselves or were considered to be Polish, from Soviet deportations, it was necessary to ethnically cleanse Upper Silesia and especially Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) from the German element, i.e. from the Upper Silesians who considered themselves or were considered to be German. In the memorandum of 12th February 1945 submitted to General Zawadzki by the KOPSO, its members proposed the division of the whole Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) population into three categories: I Persons with full Polish consciousness; II Persons who know Polish but do not feel any link with the Polish nation; III Persons who do not know Polish but have Polish surnames or are of Polish ancestry; and IV Undisputable Germans. This division exactly emulated the example of the Deutsche Volksliste which had been used by the nazis to ethnically cleanse the Upper Silesian population during the Second World War (Lis, 1993: 25-7; Pacult, 1994: 2).

The national verification was commenced on 22nd March 1945 with the decree of the Silesian Voivoda (signed only by Deputy Voivoda General Zietek) and was legalized by the Polish Ministry of Regained Territories (which had been established on 18th November 1945) quite late on 6th April 1946 (Lis, 1993: 28/9). There was no central supervision over the process of verification at the state level which resulted in appalling irregularities (Pacult, 1994: 2; Strauchold, 1995: 8) especially during the first year of the action.

After the front lines had moved westwards, the Soviet occupation administration was formed in Upper Silesia and was gradually being replaced by its Polish counterpart. This brought about a certain degree of stabilization to this region which attracted many Upper Silesian evacuees and escapees to return to their homeland. At that time they were not and could not be aware that at the international level it was being decided to incorporate the Deutsche Ostgebiete (including German Upper Silesia) into the territory of postwar Poland. On the other hand, the Red Army was closely followed by a massive wave of szabrowniks from Central Poland and Galicia, and already in April 1945 the first

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691 At the end and after the Second World War c. 8,315,000 fled or were removed from the Deutsche Ostgebiete annexed by Poland, whereas only c. 3,500,000 Poles from Central Poland and Galicia, and c. 1,500,000 Polish expellees from the eastern territories of Poland (i.e. 5,000,000 Polish settlers altogether) were available to repopulate the regained territories in the years 1945-1952 (Engel, 1967: 194/5).

692 The PZZ was a nationalist and government-controlled organization which appealed for transfer of Oppeln Regency and some other eastern territories of Germany to Poland before the Second World War.

693 The ethnic cleansing also caused expulsion of the Silesian-Moravian-Czech population who lived in the south-eastern corner of Oppeln Regency in the counties of Leobschütz (Glubczyce, Hlupcic) and of Ratibor (Raciborz) (Stanek, 1991: 135/6; Wiskemann, 1956: 132). Due to the brevity of the article, the author did not closely look into the subject.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that during the duration of the national verification its scope was consistently broadened because of a meager number of Upper Silesians openly identifying themselves with Polishdom. At last it was decided that all the Upper Silesians who hopefully may get assimilated or whose children may get assimilated during the planned Polonization action, must be positively verified as Poles (Izdebski, 1946; Strauchold, 1995: 8).

694 They were individuals who specialized in pillage of the property left by the Germans who had fled before the advancing Red Army. Some of them used the loot for their own needs but the majority were thriving black marketeers who regularly pleyed between Central Poland and Galicia, and the regained territories. Also Soviet soldiers, Polish and multinational criminal groups, as well as the Red Army and the Polish adminsitration took
transports with Polish expellees from prewar Poland’s eastern territories seized by the Soviet Union, began to arrive to Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) (Nowak, 1991: 48). Moreover, Polish males coming back from Germany, where they had been exploited as forced labor, tended to settle down in Lower and Upper Silesia and quite often were employed as officers in the forces of the Milicja Obywatelska (MO, Citizen Militia) (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 133). They frequently took vengeance on the local population for the injustices they had suffered at the hands of the nazi administration. The Upper Silesians were also discriminated against by Polish municipal organs, especially in Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) where the administration was staffed mainly with officers from the Dabrowski industrial basin, central Poland and Galicia. They treated the Upper Silesians as Germans because of their distinctive Polish dialect interlaced with a plethora of German loan words and expressions, their knowledge of the German language and their links with German culture (Nowak, 1991: 51; Strauchold, 1995: 8).

Intimidation of the local population by the Polish administration and Polish settlers, widespread lawlessness and looting for black market profit (i.e. szaber as practised by szabrowniks), the beginning of political strife between the anti-communist Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL, Polish Peasant Party) and the pro-Soviet and communist Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR, Polish Workers Party) (Lis, 1993: 34) and the national verification evoked the general feeling of insecurity and fear especially in Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency). The state of deep anarchy was worsened by successive decisions of the Polish authorities; most importantly, on 3rd May 1945 Osobka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government commenced the action of Polonization of the regained territories (erstwhile Deutsche Ostgebiete), which on 6th May 1945 was followed by the unilateral annulment of the Organic Status (i.e. constitution) and subsequently autonomy of prewar Silesian Voivodaship. On the same day the Act on Expulsion of Enemy Elements from Poland was issued (Urban, 1994: 55). The act provided the Polish authorities with the legal basis to conduct early or so-called unorganized (i.e. illegal in the light of international law) expulsions of Upper Silesians even before the decisions of the Potsdam Conference. Moreover, the act also legalized instances of expulsions prior to the date of its enactment.

part in the pillage. The administration specialized in transporting the property especially to Warsaw (Ordylowski, 1995: 18)

695 In the initial period the MO was one of the destabilizing factors because often its personnel in the regained territories changed completely almost from day to day (Ordylowski, 1995: 17).

696 The PSL was headed by Mikolajczyk who decided to return from emigration in Great Britain and join the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej) in order to oppose the Polish communist effectively. His party grouped mainly peasants who have proved to be the main anti-communist force in Poland till the collapse of the system in 1989. In the case of Upper Silesia, only Polish settlers and few locals joined the party.

697 The date of 3rd May is of special importance for the Poles as on 3rd May 1791, just before the final partitioning of Poland among Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1793 and 1795, the Polish parliament adopted the first Polish constitution, which was promulgated as second in the world after the American constitution. In the interwar period 3rd May was celebrated as the Polish National Holiday, as well as after the end of the Second World War till 1948/9 when it was superseded by the Worker’s Holiday of 1st May. After the fall of communism in 1989 both the holidays are celebrated in Poland.

698 In official documents it is referred to as the action of re-Polonization on the tenet that the Upper Silesian population used to be Polish, and only later on was Germanized. However, it is largely an ideological fallacy to talk about any national feelings and conscious policies of national assimilation before the 19th century in Silesia.

699 Silesian Voivodaship was formed from the eastern part of Upper Silesia (Ostoberschlesien) which had been granted to Poland on 20th October 1921 on the ground of the Plebiscite of 20th March 1921. In interwar Poland the voivodaship enjoyed formal political, economic, territorial and cultural autonomy which was quite incompatible with centralism of the Polish state striving to emulate the French model of governance.
In the framework of Polonization, first of all, teaching and use of the German language in public and private were forbidden (Wyderka, 1994: 71). Almost simultaneously with the creation of the Polish administration the Polish educational system was being organized; first Polish schools in Upper Silesia opened already in March and April 1945 (Pacult, 1995b). Afterwards, the Polish administration conducted and enforced Polonization of Upper Silesian geographical names, as well as first names and surnames of the Upper Silesians (Jarczak, 1993: 18/9) who were faced with the fait accompli usually without any prior knowledge of the administrative action nor possibility to seek redress of the decision (Strauchold, 1995: 8). With active participation by the Polish settlers, German libraries and monuments were destroyed, and German inscriptiones defaced or removed from signposts, buildings, graves, furniture, machinery and even from table cloths and walls in private houses and flats (Pacult, 1995b: 2; Siembieda, 1993: 16; Strauchold, 1995: 8). During the war hostilities c. 60,000 Upper Silesians lost their lives (Brehmer, 1994: 423), but those who survived and found themselves in Germany were not allowed by the Polish authorities (who considered them to be Germans) to return to Upper Silesia whereas their families (considered to be Polish Upper Silesians) to leave for Germany which led to break-ups of many marriages. These Upper Silesians who had been classified as belonging to the first and second groups of the Deutsche Volksliste during the Second World War were customarily discriminated against by the Polish authorities who made it impossible for them to find employment and barred them from any form of professional career until 1956. The few who obtained employment had to be pleased with manual labor jobs (also women and youngsters), and for two years had to give up one quarter of their earnings for the re-construction of the Polish capital Warsaw which had been razed by the German forces after the fall of the Warsaw Uprising in October 1944 (Brehmer, 1994: 422/3). The Germans used as forced labor, and holders of the first and second groups of the Deutsche Volksliste obtained the lowest, i.e. IIIrd Category of food rations (891 calories per day - the threshold of chronic malnutrition) and their family members or unemployed members of the three afore-mentioned groups even the lower IIIR Category entitling to the ration of only 604 calories per day (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 170). Thus, it may be inferred that biological eradication of the local population and the wish to make the Upper Silesians docile towards every decision of the totalitarian pro-Soviet rule were also significant, albeit covert, targets of the action of Polonization.

The only German secondary school (lycee) in Upper Silesia was established in Katowice (Kattowitz) and named after the German communist Wilhelm Pieck. It was accessible only to privileged students who did not come from German or Upper Silesian families (Brehmer, 1994: 422). The general level of education and ability to read and write (in German) among the Upper Silesians was quite high in comparison with Poland. The authorities strove to utilize the situation for Polonization by establishing numerous Polish libraries, rooms and houses of culture, and also by organizing trips to central Poland which were meant to pull the Upper Silesians away from German literature and culture (Strauchold, 1995: 9). Another instrument of Polonization was compulsory military service in the Polish Army (Karwat, 1995: 8), not unlike the compulsory conscription of Upper Silesians into the Wehrmacht during the Second World War, for the sake of Germanization. In the 1940s and 1950s it was one of the Polonization policies to draft young Upper Silesians (often only breadwinners in their families, some of whom, after the end of the Second World War had happened to survive the Polish and Soviet forced labor camps) into the Polish Army which immediately dispatched them to work in Upper Silesian coal mines for free or for a pittance of a wage (Karwat, 1995: 8).

Due to the continuous influx of Polish expellees from the former eastern territories of Poland and of Polish settlers from central Poland and Galicia coinciding with frequent instances of Upper Silesians returning to their homeland, conflicts considering ownership of farms, houses and flats did

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Many Upper Silesian escapees and evacuees after having crossed the Oder-Neisse line received official orders from German municipal authorities to return to Upper Silesia (De Zayas, 1988: 107).
arise. Often new co-owners were settled on Silesian farms, and in houses and flats which led to mutual acrimony and negative verification of many Upper Silesians also with Polish national linkings. In this manner they were deprived of their own property; and eventuay many of them were expelled or interned in DP, i.e. labor camps (Nowak, 1991: 48).

May and June 1945 marked the period of the so-called unorganized expulsions conducted by the Polish authorities on the basis of the unofficial Soviet permission (De Zayas, 1988: 104/5). The shift of the Silesian population to the south was terminated in the middle of May 1945 with the effective enforcement of its borders by the Czechoslovak state which had been reestablished in April 1945. The first officers of the Polish administration arrived at Zgorzelec (Görlitz), i.e. on the new German-Polish, border on 23rd May 1945 when the Soviet Union officially renounced its right to control the Deutsche Ostgebiete (with the exception of the northern part of East Prussia) in favor of Poland. Already on 1st June 1945 the Görlitz bridge over the Oder was closed in order to limit unorganized expulsions (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 121), and to prevent Silesians from leaving Silesia for Germany or to return to Silesia from Germany. In the middle of June 1945, Wroclaw (Breslau), Legnica (Liegnitz) and the whole of Upper Silesia were tightly closed, barring the returning Silesian evacuees and escapees from entering the areas and causing discontent of the Soviet authorities not able to feed the population in the Soviet zone of occupation (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 125).

In deeply believing Upper Silesia, the Catholic Church also became an element of the political game which was to intimidate the faithful. During the first weeks after the capitualtion of the Third Reich Katowice (Kattowitz) Bishop Adamski started to vest the deans of the Upper Silesian part of Breslau (Wroclaw) Diocese (i.e. of Oppeln Regency) with plenipotentiary powers (Kaps, 1980: 69). This displeased Cardinal Adolf Johannes Bertram who anxiously oserved activities of the foreign church official in his diocese. On 15th May 1945 Bishop Adamski arrived at Wroclaw (Breslau) and appealed to the local (i.e. German) clergy to leave the diocese (Wiskemann, 1956: 97). Mortaly ill and very old, Cardinal Bertram could not oppose the incursions on the part of Polish Church officials, and died soon afterward. On 8th July 1945 Polish Cardinal Augustyn Hlond managed to obtain special powers to protect Polish Catholicism from Pius XII. It appears that Cardinal Hlond interpreted the prerogatives too broadly as he extended his jurisdiction over the Deutsche Ostgebiete (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 205). On 12th August 1945 Cardinal Hlond coaxied the successor of Cardinal Bertram, Upper Silesian Ferdinand Piontek to resign from the office. Having divided Breslau (Wroclaw) Diocese into three parts, Cardinal Hlond nominated Boleslaw Kominek (also an Upper Silesian) as Apostolic Administrator for former German Upper Silesia. At the same time, without permission from the Pope or any Czechoslovak Church official, Cardinal Hlond unilateraly extended father Kominek’s jusrisdiction over the southern part of the region which previously had been part of Olomouc (Olmutz, Olomuniec) Diocese with its bishop’s seat in Czechoslovakia (Lesiuk, 1992: 79; 1997: 318).

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701 He died on 6th July 1945 in Schloß Johannesberg in Bohemia.
702 It is indirectly visible in the stance of the Holy See which consistently refused to set up new diocesan boundaries and to change the character of the temporary Polish administration of the Church offices in the Deutsche Ostgebiete (Hubatsch, 1967: 318) till 1972 well after the West German-Polish Treaty had been signed (1970).
703 It was a thought-out policy which allowed the settlers learn about the functioning of their new environment from the Upper Silesian owners, and coaxed the former, as would-be owners, to see to it that the latter would not destroy or take away their movable property.
704 After he was expelled from Wroclaw (Breslau) in July 1946, Piontek resided in the Görlitz part of Lower Silesia (i.e. Upper Lusatia) which remained with Germany after 1945 (Breyer, 1967: 404). Due to the hostile attitude of the Soviet occupation administration he had to leave for West Germany. In 1959 he was raised from the rank of vicar to that of Titular Bishop and served the Silesian diaspora in West Germany till the year of his death in 1963 (Weczerka, 1977: 606).
705 The apostolic administrators of the unrecognized Polish dioceses in the Deutsche Ostgebiete were unilateraly replaced with vicars general in the rank of titular bishops by the Primate of Poland Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski in 1951 (Hubatsch, 1967: 318).
Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 203). The decisions of the Polish Church officials emulated those of the Provisional Government in the secular domain. The prohibition of bilingual education at the Wroclaw (Breslau) Seminary and of using German during liturgy and the sacrament of confession, was followed by the official demand that Upper Silesian priests should sign humiliating declarations of loyalty to the Polish state (Kozak, 1995: 4), which made many of them leave for Germany or caused imprisonment of these ones who refused to comply with the requirement (Raina, 1994; Ratajczak, 1995). The dramatic situation in the Upper Silesian Church increased the feeling of alienation and insecurity among the Upper Silesian faithful deprived of their spiritual leaders. Upper Silesian priests were often replaced with priests from the interior of Poland, usually of little or no understanding and appreciation for the Upper Silesian distinctiveness (Anon., 1995c; Mis, 1995: 4; Strauchold, 1995). However, it must be noted that Father Kominek strove to oppose these trends, and even managed to establish the German church service for German POWs (Baldy, 1994: 147).

The pinnacle of the postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia was marked by the Potsdam Conference (17th July-2nd August 1945), where though not de jure anyway de facto the Deutsche Ostgebiete was transferred to Poland, and on the basis of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement (i.e. Article XII of the Protocol) the Polish government was allowed to expel the German population of the territories in an orderly and humane manner (De Zayas, 1988: 87/8; Hubatsch, 1967: 304/5; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 110).

The time-consuming process of the national verification delayed expulsions from Upper Silesia, which took place later than those from Lower Silesia populated by undisputable Germans whom the Polish communists understandably did not want to nationaly verify (Calka, 1993: 3). Some Upper Silesians succeeded in returning to their Heimat despite the fortified border control and the danger of becoming Soviet POWs during the trip. If their houses and farms had been already taken over by new Polish owners they were often sent to DP camps which earlier had been transferred to the Polish administration by its Soviet counterpart. It is estimated that there were 23 such camps in Upper Silesia. The most notorious were in Lambinowice (Lamsdorf), Swietochlowice (Schwientochlowitz), Blachownia (Blachenhammer) and Jaworzno (Anon., 1993: 8; Calka, 1993: 3). In reality they were labor camps (Nowak, 1991), or taking into consideration the casualties the author of the article is ready to risk labeling them as concentration camps since in the years 1945-1947 c. 40,000 persons perished in them including women and children (Anon., 1993: 2; De Zayas, 1988: 106; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 133). The authorities started to send to the camps negatively (i.e. as Germans).

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706 Under the pressure from the United Kingdom and the United States, the government was reconstructed to include some political figures from the Polish government in London, and on 28th June 1945 it was transformed into the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jednosci Narodowej). The United States and Great Britain recognized it on 5th July 1945, thus granting the pro-Soviet Polish communists with the long-sought air of legitimacy, and opening the way for the communist take-over of Poland in 1947 (Harper, 1990: 41).

707 The earliest mass expulsions were conducted in May/June 1945 when the German population was removed from the 50-100kms wide strip of land east of the Oder-Neisse line. The vacated land was quickly repopulated with Polish soldiers demobilized for this specific purpose. This fait accompli was badly needed by the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference to strengthen the clout of its arguments for legitimating the granting of Poland with the Deutsche Ostgebiete. This case of mass population transfer must have also indirectly contributed to emboldening the Polish authorities in their ethnic cleansing of Upper Silesia.

708 John Sack, a Jewish American historian and journalist described behavior of Jewish personnel in the Upper Silesian camps for Germans in Gliwice (Gleiwitz), Lambinowice (Lamsdorf) and Swietochlowice (Schwientochlowitz) where they avenged the Holocaust by tormenting and murdering the inmates. The rule of collective responsibility was most cruelly used by Solomon Morel, commandant of the camp in Swietochlowice-Zgoda. At present he resides in Israel (Sack, 1993).

709 In the recently found incomplete inmate register of the camp in Lambinowice (Lamsdorf) there are data considering 2,050 prisoners (i.e. only part of the total number which is still unknown). It includes names of 1,430 males and 620 females, of which there were 370 children of both sexes, younger than 14. 785 persons, i.e. 38.23% of the incomplete figure of 2,050 inmates, died during their imprisonment. Moreover, this percentage
verified or inconvenient Upper Silesians (Nowak, 1991: 79) who remained there awaiting revision of their negative verifications, or primary verification. The Polish authorities did not fully comply with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and continued to expel certain numbers of Upper Silesians to the Soviet occupation zone until 23rd December 1945 when the Soviet Union closed the border on the Oder-Neisse line (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 129). On 15th January 1946 the Krajowa Rada Narodowa (KRN, Polish National Council) issued the decree regulating the settler campaign in the western territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete) (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 139). The subsequent legal mass expulsions lasted intermittently from February 1946 to the end of 1947 (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 144; Wisckemann, 1956: 118). The persons who were to be expelled were customarily robbed and intimidated by expulsion officers, militiamen (i.e. MO officers), soldiers and railwaymen. They were not furnished with appropriate food rations guaranteed by the Potsdam agreements and were transported in freight trains largely unprepared for human beings which resulted in numerous deaths en route (Calka, 1993; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 147). The expulsions were re-started for a short time during the summer of 1948 (Calka, 1993: 5), and during the following years the process was continued under the label of individual departures for Germany, and of the Family Link Action in the years 1950 and 1951 (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 146; Wisckemann, 1956: 120). In the meantime, on 6th April 1946, Wladyslaw Gomolka, Minister of the Regained Territories, issued the decree on the procedure of affirming Polish nationality of persons residing in the Deutsche Ostgebiete (Strauchold, 1995: 9) which was reflected in the 28th April 1946 Act on Polish Citizenship for the Autochthonous Population (i.e. original inhabitants of the territories who could be potentially Polonized) (Dobrosielski, 1995: 61). The act approved the broad approach to the national verification and in many cases was used to stop the expulsions of Upper Silesians, and, subsequently, to make it almost impossible for Upper Silesians to leave for Germany.

After the completion of the national verification in Upper Silesia in 1950, 806,800 Upper Silesians remained and 591,300 Polish expellees and settlers moved into the region (Lis, 1993: 31) whereas in Germany there were c. 800,000 Upper Silesian expellees (Reichling, 1986: 61). The postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia continued in a low-scale manner until the fall of communism in 1989 when it gradually became possible for Upper Silesians to identify themselves without any impositions on the part of the Polish state. The new conditions facilitate a modest revival of Silesian culture which beginning with 1945 suffered irreparable losses in the form of:

- annihilation of the intellectual elite who were expelled or exterminated earlier than any other groups of the Upper Silesians (Calka, 1993: 4);
- destruction of material and cultural heritage which was created by many generations of the Upper Silesians;
- overwhelming limitation of the Upper Silesians knowledge of the German language, the Silesian dialect and history of the region;
- preventing the Upper Silesians living in Germany and those who remained in their homeland from establishing effective cultural relations;
- censorship which prevented publication of the writings of old and contemporary Silesian authors, and their Polish translations (Knapik, 1993: 6/7). \(^{711}\)

should be increased with c. 44-46 victims of the 4th October 1945 fire, whose deaths are not adequately noted in the register. Accepting 785+46=831, as the appropriate figure of casualties the camp’s death rate amounts to 40.54% (Nowak, 1995: 73/4).

\(^{710}\) In order to bolster populating of the Deutsche Ostgebiete, after 1951 no ethnic prerequisites were required for acquiring Polish citizenship, which, thus, was forced onto the Upper Silesians of German provenences, who remained in their homeland after the completion of the Family Link Action in 1951 (Hubatsch, 1967: 319).

\(^{711}\) The majority of formal Silesian literature was committed to paper in German (cf. Arno Lubos’ three-volume *Geschichte der Schlesische Literatur*), though there are some worthwhile instances of Silesian literature in Upper Silesian dialects of Polish (esp. recorded folk tales and songs), as well as in Czech (cf. poet Petr Bezruc,
Moreover, it is worthwhile to provide a synoptic overview of the ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia in order to better understand its underlying logic and mechanics since it could facilitate comprehension of other exemplars of ethnic cleansing and maybe would contribute to prevention of such atrocities from happening in future.

On the basis of the paper four chronological periods can be distinguished in relation to the case of the Upper Silesian ethnic cleansing:


In the pre- and post-Munich Czechoslovakia, and after the outbreak of the Second World War, European intellectuals and politicians were involved in a continuous discussion searching for a final solution to the German question in Central and Eastern Europe.

After the annulment of the Munich Agreement by the British Parliament, the decision of the Allies not to apply the Atlantic Charter to Germany, and the lukewarm acceptance of the Soviet annexations stipulated by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the tenets of the annexation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete, as well as of mass-population transfers of Germans living in the territories, were being cautiously embraced by the Allies.

II. 1943-1945. Working out of the exact implementation of the two afore-mentioned principles which were to constitute the very basis of the Allies postwar politics towards Germany.

The Soviet Union wrenched the unwilling espousal of the predicted postwar shift of Poland to the west from the Polish Government in Exile in London by ruling the liberated parts of the country with its docile proxy - the Polish communist government. At the Yalta Conference the United States and Great Britain were also coaxed to accede to the Soviet demand to subject more of the German territory to would-be annexations than it had been tentatively agreed at Teheran. Shortly prior to the conference the Soviet Union had launched its successful winter offensive in January 1945 and it was obviously only a matter of few months before the Red Army would seize the concerned territories.

Already in 1944 the Soviet Union had concluded the secret agreement with the Polish communists de facto giving them right and support to govern postwar Poland in return for their wholehearted agreement to the shifting of Poland westwards.

Since the end of 1944 the approaching frontline threw Upper Silesia and the other Deutsche Ostgebiete into a panicky commotion causing the beginning of the flight to safer areas of the Reich, which in the case of Upper Silesia was quite small and rather limited in scope to the rich and powerful.


Soviet soldiers, induced by the deftly applied propaganda of hatred against the Germans, raped, looted and indiscriminately slew the civilian population in Upper Silesia executing the objectives of Soviet politics which were to make more Upper Silesian escape westwards, and to thoroughly intimidate the remaining population into resigned docility.

The two specific aims were also meticulously carried out during the Soviet occupation when numerous Upper Silesians were rounded up into labor camps, forced to become free labor, or deported to the Soviet Union. The situation was worsened by the behavior of the Red Army, rampant destruction and the general atmosphere of lawlessness.

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his real name was Vladimir Vasek (Urbaneck, 1965: 4)), and in the Lachian (Laski) dialect (a transitory dialect placed between Polish and Czech) which produced quite a significant poet in the person of Ondra Lysohorsky (real name, Ervin Goj (Anon., 1986: 902)). His poetry has been widely translated into German, French, English (even by renowned W.H. Auden) and into as many as sixty other languages in the case of individual poems, but unfortunately since 1958 none of his writings has been published in original (Short, 1986: 249).
After the preliminary discussions in 1944 the Polish communists decided to conduct the ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia with the four instruments of:

(1) National Verification to appropriately classify the Upper Silesians as Polish or Germans;

(2) Mass-population Transfers (i.e. expulsions) to remove the Upper Silesians classified as Germans from Upper Silesia;

(3) Polonization (i.e. forced assimilation) to assimilate the Upper Silesians classified as Polish; and

(4) Settling Policy (in Marxist terminology - social engineering) seeking to hasten Polonization of Upper Silesia by infusing it with Polish settlers and expellees.

All the four instruments of the Upper Silesian ethnic cleansing were consistently employed following the bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the Polish communists, however, before their use was internationally sanctioned at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945.

The Poles gradually took over the administration of Upper Silesia from the Soviet hands since March 1945. Roughly speaking the process was completed in the 1950s. In the meantime, only on the basis of a decree which was issued by a regional governor, the national verification was commenced in March 1945 and was not authorized by Warsaw until 1946. It was preceded and followed by restrictive legislation stripping the Upper Silesians of German provenances from their property, and civil and human rights. This harsh process of the imposition of Polishness on Upper Silesia resulted in increased suffering and anarchy which were exacerbated by the settling action which started in April 1945. The rapid influx of the Polish population combined with food shortages and scarcity of accommodation triggered off unorganized mass-population transfers which began in May/June 1945. Polonization was tacitly introduced with opening of first Polish schools already in March/April 1945, and with abolishing of the autonomous status of the prewar Silesian Voivodship in May 1945.

The intensity of unorganized mass-population transfers decreased after the Potsdam Conference but they continued until December 1945. So even in the environment of relatively growing stability at the turn of 1945 and 1946 the Upper Silesians were effectively intimidated by the humiliating mechanics of the national verification and Polonization. Their acute feeling of insecurity was aggravated with the internationally-approved resumption of mass-population transfers and the ongoing Polish exploitation of the Upper Silesian economy and population who were treated as an actually free workforce pool.

The ethnic cleansing was officially over in 1948 with the end of mass-population transfers, and coupled with the de facto Polish annexation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete resulted in a firmer grip of the Soviet Union over Poland as the sole guarantor of Polish independent existence in the face of the comprehensible postwar German enmity which did not subside until the ratification of The German-Polish Treaty on the Polish-German Border in 1990, and of the subsequent Polish-German Treaty on Cooperation and Good Neighborliness in 1991.


The ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia was concluded with individual departures for Germany at the end of the 1940s and with the Family Link Action organized by the Red Cross in 1950-1951. Afterwards, the ethnic cleansing continued in the form of:

disadvantaged access of the Upper Silesians to education, management, politics and government;

gradual destruction of Upper Silesian culture and concomitant degradation of the region’s natural environment through indiscriminate economic exploitation; and

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712 Because Poland and West Germany did not maintain any official political relations till 1970.
more or less numerous (depending on political and socio-economic situation) individual departures for Germany caused by the afore-mentioned factors.

At the Polish national level, on the one hand, the ethnic cleansing conducted in Upper Silesia and in the rest of the Deutsche Ostgebiete helped the Polish communists unite the divided Polish nation around the issue of the regained territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete) - the very precondition of Polish territorial existence, and, thus, sanctioned their de facto governance of Poland. On the other hand, it indirectly contributed to the German Wirtschaftswunder and continually infused Germany’s growing economy of the 1950s-1970s with badly needed workforce as well as with electorate for anti-communist associations of the expellees\(^{713}\).

At the international arena, the ethnic cleansing was one of the tools which allowed the Soviet Union to effectively subjugate Poland and to expand the Soviet sphere of influence westwards. In the economic field it secured the whole of the Upper Silesian industrial basin (obviously, together with its Czechoslovak part)\(^{714}\) for the Soviet Union, which was of crucial significance for the postwar development of the military-industrial complex in the Soviet bloc, especially in conjunction with the close at hand and rich iron ore deposits in the Ukraine\(^{715}\).

Moreover, the consequences of the ethnic cleansing were a factor contributing to East-West animosity during the the Cold War years.

The Upper Silesian ethnic cleansing survived in its covert form, resembling emigration\(^{716}\), until the fall of communism in 1989 and the growing Polish-German rapprochement when the Cold War logic of the operation lost its validity.

**Ultimate ethnic cleansing: an exercise in social engineering or the post-potsdam population transfers and suppression of the existence of minorities in Silesia in communist Poland and Czechoslovakia**

The postwar order was commenced to be shaped already at the beginning of the Second World War. The method of faits accomplis was the instrument of ultimate ethnic cleansing in this part of Europe. Immediately after having invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, the Germans started expelling from the would-be incorporated territories people of non-Germanic origin who could not be possibly Germanized. The same tactics was utilized by the Soviet Union after September 17, 1939, which started transferring the Polish population to Siberia and Kazakhstan preparing the eastern territories of the prewar Poland for incorporation into the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine and Byelorussia; and propagating among the Polish Communists the Curzon line of the Bug River as the future Polish-Soviet border.

\(^{713}\) The Landsmannschaften balanced the rising leftist if not openly communist trend in the West German society and politics in the 1970s and 1980s, because many of their members had had first-hand experiences of the communist reality before leaving for Germany. Moreover, the expellees, unlike other Westerners, continued to conduct research on the areas which they had had to leave, and, thus, provided substantial intelligence basis for West Germany’s Ostpolitik.

\(^{714}\) The Soviet Union did not obliterate state borders of its East and Central European satellites in order to maintain the illusion of their independence, and to keep the countries from scheming together against their overlord, in accordance with the imperial principle to rule and govern. However, through the COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation) it could effectively exploit the whole Upper Silesian industrial basin not unlike the Third Reich during the Second World War.

\(^{715}\) The Third Reich also exploited the Upper Silesian industry using the Ukraine as the supply base of raw materials.

\(^{716}\) The continued stream of Upper Silesians leaving for Germany cannot be labeled as emigration because the freedom to leave one’s own country was prohibited to the citizens of socialist states. Some of them having evaded the ubiquitous socialist control system managed to escape to West Germany albeit the majority of them were allowed to leave thanks to more or less official Polish-German agreements.
The developments were seconded by the dynamic political dialog among the exiled governments of the occupied countries and the Allied Powers in the West. In 1940 the Sudeten German Socialists in Britain provisionally agreed to a federation with the Czechs provided they were a fully recognized nationality with a regional parliament and government of their own. However, after the experience of Munich, the Czechs were quite unwilling to accept the demands and decided to do away with the German encirclement of Bohemia and Moravia. Their leader Benes approved the principle of population transfers under decent human conditions, under international control and with international support, and hence the plan of the Odsun (expulsion) was born in the winter of 1941/1942 and was bolstered by the official annulment of the Munich Agreement by the British Parliament on August 5, 1942. The Soviets and Americans agreed to the concept of the transfer of minority populations in June 1943. The Polish government in exile did not consider this idea at all and favored a federation of Poland and Czechoslovakia which would be strong enough to oppose the German threat in Central Europe. The first declaration of this view was made on November 11, 1940 and was followed by Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations which were marred by the question of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia (Zacek, 1991). On the other hand, the Poles were not prepared to accept the line of the Bug as the eastern border of their country. Their stance was fortified by the discovery of the mass graves of the Polish officer corps at the Katy forest in April 1943. By that time the notion of the Czechoslovak-Polish federation had been largely forgotten in the context of the international decisions of more vital significance for the postwar existence of the two countries. Churchill considered it essential that Prussia would be dismembered (Wagner, 1991: 270) and he presented his point of view at the Teheran Conference (November 28 - December 1, 1943).

Stalin, in exchange for the warm-water port of Königsberg (Kaliningrad) was ready to accept the Curzon line and demanded the line of the Oder and the Neisse (Nysa) as the western frontier of Poland. Churchill consented but failed to know that there are two Neisse (Nysa) Rivers western (Görlitzer, Lausitzer, uycza) and eastern (Glätzer, Kodzka) which introduced much uncertainty to later negotiations. At Teheran the matter of the expulsions of the Germans from the would-be western territories or the Deutsche Ostgebiete which were to be handed over to Poland, and from Sudetenland got no further than disentanglement of population at some points. It even seems that after the conference in 1944 Mikojajczyk of the Polish London government was opposed to exaggerated expansion of Poland westward because seemingly he did not predict any transfers of Germans which had by now been mentioned so often by the Americans and British (Wiskemann, 1956: 62-78).

The Big Three conferred together for the last time in the persons of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. at Yalta in the Crimea from February 4 to 10, 1945. The western Allies were at a disadvantage exhausted by Hitler’s offensive in the Ardennes and eager to obtain Russian help against Japan, whereas the Soviet armies swept forward so that by February roughly all Central and Eastern Europe except for Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia was in their hands. By now Churchill had time to study the map and discover the difference between the two Neisse (Nysa) Rivers: he had informed himself that some three million Silesian Germans lived in the area between them and had become aware of feeling in Britain against the transference of vast numbers of people. On February 6 Stalin made it clear that he favored the western Neisse and to the objection of Churchill Stalin answered that there were no Germans in these areas, as they had all run away which was not true. At last Roosevelt and Churchill accepted Stalin’s demands but did not clearly say which of the Neisse Rivers should become the western border of Poland. They also agreed that the Germans were to be repatriated and the Poles from Germany the same, and on the Curzon line with minor rectifications in favor of Poland. On February 5, however, the Polish Communist authorities had announced that the administration of the country up to the Oder and western Neisse had been taken over by them. The London Poles protested against the Yalta decisions on February 13 describing them as Poland’s fifth partition, this time by her Allies. In the end even the latter assented to the proposal having had accepted the political reality, although in the process of having its borders shifted from the East to the West Poland regained roughly half of the territory it had lost to the Soviet Union (Bark, 1993: I 24/25). The land Poland obtained in the West was highly developed and heavily

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713 The lost territory amounted to 178,220 sq km, and the territory gained by Poland was 101,200 sq km (Davies, 1981: II 489).
industrialized in comparison to the lost eastern areas largely comprising poor agricultural land, forest and the Pripyet Marshes. Thus, curiously enough, the history of, and the basis for the rapid postwar development of Polish industry was created (Wiskemann, 1956: 83-86).

Since the beginning of 1945 refugees from Warthegau and Generalgouvernment had been streaming to Silesia and a large segment of the swollen population of the province were desperately trying to cross the Oder-Neisse line in order to escape the Soviet offensive preferring occupation at the hands of the western Allies. The trek was harassed by Soviet air raids and the quickly moving front line while the number of casualties was increased by the unusually cold winter and frequent blizzards. Those who did not flee faced a terrible ordeal mentioned at the end of the previous chapter. Except wanton destruction, violence and pillage, another constant element in the Soviet policy was the drive to acquire German slave labor to rebuild Russia. Already in March, and systematically until the end of April, the Soviet army commanders deported Germans to Russia. Possibly the biggest haul they made in Upper Silesia where many skilled workers had been kept at work until the very moment of the Soviet conquest (Wiskemann, 1956: 93/94). The Silesians were transported to the East in freight trains or had to walk in columns, often barefoot. Those who were sent off during the worst cold of the winter suffered proportionally and some of them died on the journey. Curiously, the inmates were not only Wehrmacht soldiers and men. in some of the camps two thirds of prisoners were women and children (Cholewa, 1993: 1). It is known that Silesians were imprisoned in numerous camps in the Soviet Union, but so far it has been confirmed that they were kept at the following localities: Moscow, Kiyev, Sverdlovsk, the Krivoy Rog industrial basin, Kola Peninsula, Ivano-Frankovsk (Stanisławów), Kazakhstan. Kasirka, Zhelapińsk, Stalinogorsk, Mikhailov, Tula, Kasimov, Skopin, Shirkolag in the Urals, and in the camps Polarniy at the Usa River and Kharabiey at the same river in the Arctic Urals (Cholewa, 1993; Honka, 1993). They were regular Soviet concentration camps where 50%-75% inmates usually died of malnutrition, slave work, inhuman treatment and complete lack of any medical care (Honka, 1993). Although these people began to be sent back in the Summer and Autumn of 1945 some of them did not return until 1949 (Wiskemann, 1956: 94) and the mid-1950s. A majority of the freed Silesian prisoners left for Germany through the refugee point in Berlin Kaulsdorf. Those who wished to return to Silesia had to go through the refugee point in Brest (Brze) and stay for a time in the Central Work Camp in Jaworzno. The Silesians who were sent to Berlin Kaulsdorf could not legally go back to Silesia and were turned back or employed in Soviet-controlled enterprises before they managed to reach their Heimat (Honka, 1993).

The deportations led to a clash of interests between the Russian authorities and their protege, the Polish provisional government; the latter, it had been announced at Yalta on February 5, 1945, would take over the administration of the liberated territories destined to become Polish. On March 3, the provisional Prime Minister, announced to the Polish National Council that these Recovered Territories

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718 There was only some industry concentrated around Lwów (Lemberg, Lviv, Lvov), Wilno (Vilnius) and Borysław (Borislav) an oil center; and an undeveloped coal field extending from Lwów eastward (Davies, 1981: II 520).

719 It is estimated that only from eastern Upper Silesia, 40,000 people were deported to Russia. Although some Silesians returned the fate of many thousands of them has remained unknown (Lis, 1991: 13).

720 This date is based on confirmed information considering two members of the author’s family.

721 Having reached Germany, they and other refugees could not be unconditionally sure that they would not be sent to Russia unless they found their way to the western occupation zones. Especially the fate of intelligentsia was uncertain which is best illustrated by the case of young Gleiwitz (Gliwice) writer Horst Bienek who despite the (dubious) protection of Bertolt Brecht in East Berlin, was sent to the Vorkhuta mines in 1951 and was allowed to return only in 1955 (Vetter, 1992: 93).

722 Most often they were Upper Sileseans who were considered to be Germanized Poles by the Polish authorities.

723 Using this specific name and the huge historical-cum-political propaganda action which lingers in the Polish mass media even nowadays, the Polish government wanted to erase from the Polish mind awareness of the 600 years during which the Germans lived in this land, and to prove its primordial Polishness. The action was
as the Poles henceforth called them, would be settled by Poles from the lost eastern territories, as well as, by Poles from formerly overcrowded Central or Congress Poland and Western Galicia now known as Southern Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 94). To Silesia, usually the Poles from the Ukraine were directed, and they were followed by their cultural institutions such as the University of Lvov and the Ossoliscy Library which were transplanted from Lvov to Wroclaw (Breslau). A sizeable amount of the deportees removed from Silesia and Poland by Germany and Russia as forced labor, settled in Silesia after the war (Davies, 1981: II 562). By May 1945 the transfer of the Polish peasants from the eastern territories lost to the Soviet Union, was in full swing as the Polish authorities had already been handed over administration of the land east of the Oder-Neisse line by the Russians (Wiskemann, 1956: 90). After the end of the war, in the Summer of 1945 many Silesians decided to return to their homes not believing in the finality of the severance of the Deutsche Ostgebiete or wishing to remain in their Heimat no matter what. A majority of them were turned back already at the Oder-Neisse line or at later stages of their travel. Those few who succeeded in reaching their destinations, found that their houses and apartments had been repossessed by Polish families from the East. By this time the property of the Silesians who fled, was exhausted and the authorities began to evict the Silesians who had not left on their own accord. On the other hand, the Poles like the Russians were determined to do unto the Germans as they had been done by. It meant that the very anti-German men, who had escaped from forced labor for the Germans, were enrolled in the new Polish militia, the Germans were branded by wearing armllets, their food rations were subnormal, and their movements restricted. Many Germans accused of Nazi affiliations were interned in camps (which were reminiscent of Dachau and Belsen) (Wiskemann, 1956: 94/95) and also a great deal of completely innocent Silesians including the elderly, women and children (Mi, 1993: 1, 3). In the years 1945-1946 there were at least twenty-three camps for the civilian Silesian populace of German extraction. Without any trial or court sentence, especially Silesians who signed the DVL, were held in the camps provisionally accused of treason of Polishdom. Over 40,000 of them perished during their internment. The most notorious camps were located in Jaworzno, ambinowice (Lamsdorf) and witochowice (Schwientochlowitz). The appalling treatment of the population of Silesia was demanded by the raison d’etre of the new postwar European order. The two champions of the rights of the Silesians: Cardinal Bertram in his residence at Javornik, Czechoslovak Silesia, and the literary Nobel Award winner Gerhart Hauptmann living in Agnetendorf (Jagnitków) were too ill and too old to undertake any protest which could be heard worldwide. They died shortly after the end of the war. Only the Socialist Paul Löbe decided to speak on behalf of the Silesians and went to Berlin but he was not allowed to see Marshal Zhukov (Neubach, 1992: 21).

The situation worsened in June 1945 when the confused German refugees started streaming to and from Silesia. An appalling crisis overtook the city of Görlitz (Zgorzelec) where the streams were crossing at the bridge on the western Neisse River. The catastrophe was intensified towards the end of the month by the sudden eviction by Polish troops of all Germans who lived within a strip of territory 100 to 200 km deep to the east of the Oder and western Neisse. The congestion was made still more alarming especially extremely successful and at present rarely any regular Pole knows that some of the territories used to belong to Poland only for short periods of time in the Middle Ages (cf. the chapter on history of Silesia at the beginning of the thesis) whereas the others (Sztettin/Szczecin or East Prussia) had never been parts of Poland before. From this pseudo-historical point of view based on anachronism Poland has even more rights to Kiyev or Smolensk but the propaganda following the Kremlin dictate was careful not to remind the Poles of the lost eastern territories.

724 Molotov, towards the end of the Yalta Conference, spoke of the return of these territories to Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 94).

725 The estimated number of the Silesian internees is c. 70,000 (Lis, 1991: 13).

726 The camp in _witochowice_ is meticulously portrayed in the diaries of Dutchman Eric van Calestern who survived it. Also John Sack wrote a work on this camp (Anon., 1993a: 8), and many German publications were devoted to the camp in _ambinowice_. The problem of the camps has not been properly researched in Poland and the few Polish publications dealing with this issue deny the high death rate among the inmates or state that in comparison with the KL-Auschwitz-Birkenau the camps were quite humane (Nowak, 1991).
during June, by the return of many Silesians from Bohemia where a new Czechoslovak state had been established since the middle of May (Wiskemann, 1956: 98).

Due to the annulment of the Munich Agreement Czechoslovakia was to be restituted after the war in its pre-1938 shape less the Subcarpathian Ruthenia ceded to the Soviet Republic of the Ukraine. On March 17, 1945 Benes formally announced what had been accepted by the Big Three in 1943 that Czechoslovakia would be a national state with no special rights for minorities. The program proclaimed at Kosice in Slovakia on April 5, a month before Prague was freed, announced that the former Czechoslovak citizens of German and Magyar nationalities would be expelled and their property confiscated unless their loyalty to Czechoslovakia was proved. Subsequently, the decree on confiscation of property was issued on June 21, and the decree of August 2 deprived the Sudeten Germans of their property. Like in Poland all the Germans were subjected to subnormal food rations, to a curfew and to wearing distinctive armbands (Wiskemann, 1956: 101-103).

The above-sketch background together with the widespread fear of the fifth column especially in the form of the Wehrwolf, was the basis for the negotiations on the future of the German population of the Deutsche Ostgebiete at the Potsdam Conference on July 17, 1945. By that time Churchill’s attitude changed, for he had been made aware that large transferences, are far from being more possible in modern conditions than they ever were before (Leahy, 1950: 462; De Zayas, 1988: 87), and he unequivocally opposed the Soviet-Polish plan of moving the German population westward. Yet in spite of objections, the western Allies did finally approve the transfer of the Germans in Article XIII of the Potsdam Protocol faced with the adamant stance of Stalin who realized that the Soviet control over the Deutsche Ostgebiete gave him an upper hand and the argument of fait accompli in the negotiations (De Zayas, 1988: 87). The only concession the West won was that any transfers of the remaining German population from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary should be effected in an orderly and humane manner (De Zayas, 1988: 88) which resulted in the brief suspension of these expulsions so that they could be more systematically organized. The decision practically created the Oder-Neisse line and sealed the fate of the German East which was formally obliterated by the Allied Control Council’s Law No. 46 of February 25, 1947 which abolished the state of Prussia (Blumenwitz, 1989: 89). Here it is adequate to mention the contrast between the attitude of the Czechoslovak and Polish governments towards the expulsions in Poland no voice was raised to preach restraint (Wiskemann, 1956: 111) which might be caused by the rapid shifting of the Polish borders 300 km westward. For the Poles that tragedy of this change and the heavy biological losses during the Second World War overshadowed the sufferings of the German nation and the Polish propaganda fortified the lack of empathy promoting the picture of the German as inhuman animal obsessed with the desire to kill Slavs and conquer their land.

The Potsdam decisions slowed down informal expulsions till 1946 but did not stop them altogether. The German element in Silesia was quickly overtaken by the Polish refugees from the East who often showed hostility to them especially in the cases when there was lack of property, which could be distributed among the newcomers. It prompted many Silesians to leave on their own accord. Moreover, the Germans were harassed verbally and sometimes physically assaulted, and their language was scorned upon; in big cities such as Wrocaw (Breslau) a Polish militiaman was likely to remonstrate should he hear German spoken (Wiskemann, 1956: 272). Inscriptions in German were removed from public places and German books wantonly destroyed by the new owners of Silesian houses and

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727 The group included the Silesians of Troppau (Opava) whose land was part of Sudetenland during the war, and the Silesians of Czechoslovak Silesia whose land had been merged with the Reich Province of Upper Silesia.

728 A secret organization of ex-German soldiers which was to destabilize the rule of the new owners of the Deutsche Ostgebiete. It rarely had time enough to get organized and undertake any acts of subversion anywhere (with the exception of Romania) before the transfer of the population deprived it of its social base (De Zayas, 1988: 98, 107, 202).

729 The finality of this abolishment is more tragic than the partitions of Poland, because on the territory of ex-Prussia there is no Prussian German population left (because of the expulsions) which could try to restitute the state.
apartments, or carelessly thrown into cellars or attics. Tombs in cemeteries were defaced by the means of a chisel or cement (with the exception of Polish-sounding names) and German monuments razed. The newcomers were sometimes so hostile to the local Silesian population and reality that when the authorities told the Polish settlers to remove German signs, they even removed the plaques off agricultural machinery, destroying many new tractors and cultivators (Siembieda, 1993: 16). Already in 1945 Polonization of place-names started in Silesia and by the end of 1947 all the localities which before the war had had more than 50 inhabitants, received brand-new Polish names. The alterations were regulated by the Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowych i Obiektów Fizjograficznych przy Urzędzie Rady Ministrów (the Council of Ministers Commission Responsible for Changing Place- and Geographical-Names) which was established in 1946 and was active till 1950 (Jarczak, 1993: 18). So the linguistic, cultural and ethnic structure of Silesia was rapidly getting Polonized (or Czechized in the case of Czechoslovak Silesia) alienating the original inhabitants of this land and facilitating the expulsions.

The expulsions as agreed upon at Potsdam started again at the beginning of 1946 in accordance with an agreement of February, 14, 1946 reached at Berlin between Polish and British representatives of the Combined Repatriation Executive. The trains from Silesia were to use the routes: Cf Orion Kalawsk (Kohlfurt, Wgliniec) to Mariental and Alversdorf via Helmstedt, by rail at rate of 3,000 per day (2 trains); and Da later stage 2,500 per day to Friedland (Davies, 1989: II 563). Operation Swallow was commenced on February 20, 1946 when the first Polish train left Wgliniec (Wiskemann, 1956: 116).

The Silesian Germans who were expelled at the first stage, comprised the elderly, crippled, ill, single mothers, children and the Reich refugees who had not managed to flee. The rest of the German population of Silesia, who were considered as productive, were divided into three categories: I unskilled workers; II qualified workers; and III highly qualified professionals. The workers of the groups I and II were employed as long as the could not be replaced with Polish counterparts and till that time they could stay in the Recovered Territories with their families. They could not take managerial positions and had to work 12 hours and 14 hours per day in industry and agriculture respectively. 25% of their wages was deducted as the tax for reconstruction of the country and welfare. The restrictions were not used in the case of the group III which included specialists who could not be easily replaced by Polish personnel; they enjoyed all the privileges accessible to the Poles (Caka, 1993: 4).

Moreover, intelligentsia and clergy were also included in the group which was to be expelled at the very beginning of Operation Swallow. Already in January 1946 the Polish authorities received information on secret German lessons, but only the anti-Polish sermon preached by one of Wroclaw priests in the presence of Soviet ambassador Viktor Lebyedyev brought about the decision of immediate expulsion of Silesian intelligentsia and clergy at the end of 1946 (Caka, 1993: 5).

Operation Swallow nevertheless came to a sad end. Not only were the Poles disorganized and starving in 1946, they were also without fuel or stoves; thus, the stoves which they originally fixed in the Swallow trains tended to disappear (especially in the Soviet zone) like beds and blankets which were often stolen by the Polish railway workers who also robbed the expellees of their belongings (Caka, 1993: 9). The idea of providing the expellees with food was abandoned in March 1946 and since the winter 1946/1947 was another abnormally severe it led to many cases of death and first degree frost-bite. The British protested and having learned about the terrorist measures used against the expellees by the Polish authorities (Caka, 1993), they called off the whole operation at the beginning of 1947. The Soviets also stopped population transfers demanding less unproductive persons and more qualified personnel which they badly needed in their occupation zone (Caka, 1993: 9). At last they decided to accept trains on April 20, 1947 (Wiskemann, 1956: 118) and the operation was eventually terminated in October 1948 (Caka, 1993: 6) (Wiskemann, 1956: 116-118). By that time a large proportion of the Germans claimed to have remained in Silesia were the bilingual Upper Sileans whom the Poles treated and regarded as Germanized Poles who should be re-Polonized and rescued from the clutches of Germandom. Moreover,

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Expelled Germans had very little time to collect their belongings before being barred from their places of abode (often in the thick of a night). Their possessions were confiscated and many families were split en route. The Germans caught while traveling west on their own, were interned in work camps (Ca_ka, 1993: 6).
the biggest compact mass of undoubted Germans who were left in Silesia and in the new Poland were the miners of Waldenburg (Wabrzych): this was an important coal field where mining was difficult and the miners required a particular technical skill. The skilled Polish miners brought back from France were settled here, but the experienced Germans were indispensable. Other German technicians were sent off to Polish towns or to help the new plans for development of the Upper Silesian industrial complex (Wiskemann, 1956: 118/119). The two groups of Silesian inhabitants (i.e. the Upper Silesians and the undoubted Germans) constituted the hotly denied German minority in Poland. Before one delves deeply into the problem, one should also survey the expulsions of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in the context of Silesia, and the problem of Silesia in the Czechoslovak-Polish relations.

Although the Czechs had treated their Germans perhaps as badly as the Poles in 1945, the transfer of the Sudeten Germans to Germany was better managed than that of the Germans from Poland (Wiskemann, 1956: 124). Actually, in the border area many Silesian Germans decide to flee to Czechoslovakia to be deported from there. It was decided on June 26, 1945 that all of them should return to Polish Silesia by August 30. The refugees who came back to Czechoslovakia once again, were promptly expelled to Germany (Stanek, 1991: 136). A vast majority of Czechoslovak Silesian Germans were expelled from Germany to 1945 to 1947 through the gathering points of which the most important were: Knov (Jügendorf), Bruntal (Freudenthal), Opava (Troppau) and Ostrava (Ostrau) (Stanek, 1991: map at beginning). Besides, the structure of industry in Czechoslovak Silesia changed dramatically already in the period prior to the introduction of Communism in 1948 because big Jewish industrialists (who had also controlled many mines and enterprises in Czechoslovak Silesia before the war) instead of being restored to their former positions in the economy, had their property confiscated, the reason given in 1945 being that they had facilitated Germanization of Bohemia and Moravia, which was true (Wiskemann, 1956: 123) but in an ironic way the Czechoslovak Jews could not help it because predominantly they were German-speaking.

After the war there was a clash of interests between the Czechs and the Poles over the question of Silesia which especially in the region of the industrial complex of Upper Silesia had been an area of ethnic confusion for many centuries. Due to the annulment of the Munich Agreement Czechoslovakia regained its part of Austrian Silesia and the Hlucin land while the transfers of the German population were soon to liquidate the wedge of German-speaking Sudetenland and Silesia creating an unprecedentedly long border between Czechoslovakia and Poland. Czechoslovakia, emboldened by the postwar Polish gains in the West and the loss of Subcarpathian Ruthenia, demanded the whole of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia (on the other hand, the Poles called for the area’s annexation to Poland in order to recreate the post-Munich status quo), and the areas of the former German Silesia concentrated on the towns of Ratibor (Racibórz) and Leoobschütz (Hlubice, Gubczyce) in order to better cover its industrialized region of Ostrava (Ostrau, Ostrawa) (Kaplan, 1987: 19-23; Pays, 1991). Moreover, the Czechs also remembered that at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 there had been talk of the cession of Glatz (Kladzko, Kodzko) and even of Lusatia with its Slavic Sorbs to them (Wiskemann, 1956: 131). However, already in May 1945 all the territories (with the exception of Lusatia which was included in the Soviet occupation zone) were controlled by the Polish authorities. The tension grew when the Poles started expelling the ethnically Czech population of the territories in and June 1945 (Wiskemann, 1956: 132. Many Czechs also decided to leave the areas on their own accord determined not to face the hostile Polish administration and the Polish settlers (Stanek, 1991: 135/136). In June the Czech troops penetrated into the Ratibor county (Pays, 1991: 19) and the Warsaw government was considering a military intervention in Transolza which was controlled by the Czech administration in agreement with the international decisions. The situation was so serious that a battle between Polish and Czechoslovak units was imminent and only the Soviet troops prevented a military encounter (Kaplan, 1987: 20). Subsequently, Moscow pushed the Poles and the Czechs to the negotiation table but with no practical success. By the Autumn 12,000 Czech/Moravian refugees had arrived in Czechoslovakia. They invariably told stories of beatings for those who would not say they were Poles, and the seizure of land and other property from Czech peasants without compensation, in order to give them to the Polish

731 It used to be part of Silesia since 1825.
colonists. The obvious Polish policy of ethnic cleansing Czechoslovakia reciprocated with intensified Czechization of Transolza. the Czechs expelled to Germany a number of pro-Polish Silesians because the Nazis had inscribed them on the DVL (Wiskemann, 1956: 132). Because of no signs of improvement in the Polish-Czechoslovak relations Moscow decided to suppress the hostility between the two Slavic states in its sphere of influence, and made Prague and Warsaw draft a treaty on friendship and cooperation which was ready by December 1946. It was signed under the pressure of Kremlin at the beginning of 1947 (Kaplan, 1987: 23/24) and on June 13, 1958 was followed by the agreement on the definitive demarcation of the Czechoslovak-Polish border based on the pre-Munich status quo (Pays, 1991: 21).

This tacitly contained disagreement had to influence the attitude of the respective authorities towards the pro-Polish and pro-Czech minorities on their territories. In the postwar history it was consistently characterized by hostility and policies of forced assimilation. For instance, after 1947 1,500 Kodzko (Kladsko, Glatz) Czechs stayed in their Heimat which had become Polish (Stanek, 1991: 136) but nowadays one cannot hear about any Czechs in this region. On the other hand, the Czechs/Moravians and pro-Czech Silesians of Gubczyce (Hlubic, Leobschütz) and Racibórz (Ratibor) have been thoroughly Polonized and though may happen to speak Moravian Czech they consider themselves to be Polish, and if decide to change their national identity they opt for German rather than Czech citizenship. The same pattern could be observed in Transolza. In Czechoslovak Upper Silesia Polish schools and even kindergartens were closed down and rehabilitation of Silesians inscribed on the DVL was swifter and more certain if they decided to declare they were Czechs. Thus, the pro-Polish segment of the population was diminished by 30,000 persons. Although the Polish Communist Alfred Kaleta was elected from Transolza to the National Assembly on May 26, 1946 it could not improve the situation of the pro-Polish population in this region. Their reactivated system of education was being gradually Czechized and Polish organizations faced dire problems seeking legalization. The Polish-speakers were not promoted to higher positions and were treated as second class citizens unless they denounced their pro-Polish attitude. In 1968 the leaders of the Polish Cultural and Educational Association in Czechoslovakia (the Polski Zwizek Kulturalno-Owiatowy w Czechosowacji) condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Association of the Polish Youth and the Polish Scouting Movement which had been reactivated thanks to the democratization of Prague Spring, were promptly abolished in 1970. At the end of 1969 the district committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party purged the journalists of the Polish paper Gos Ludu (The People’s Voice) who had supported the democratic changes of 1968. Once again Czechization became the course of the day though the decision of June 8, 1976 by the Ostrava local government reaffirmed the right of the citizen to use his mother tongue while dealing with the state bureaucracy in Transolza, and that bilingual notices should be used in public places and state offices. Subsequently, the young generation having observed disadvantages of clinging to Polishness was thoroughly Czechized, also because of the growing number of mixed marriages and the desire of parents that their children should be able to enter the mainstream of Czechoslovak life without the apparent obstacle of Polish identity. The other trend has been to claim German citizenship on the basis of Reich citizenship which one obtained after having been inscribed on the DVL. This right to German citizenship is automatically extended to descendants of people with Reich citizenship, and as such is also widely used by the population of the Hlucin (Hultschin) land where after the war only 29% of the populace declared to be Germans while the rest chose Czechoslovak citizenship in order to be able to stay in their Heimat (Stanek, 1991: 138). (Zahradník, 1989: 112-117, 152-157)

Regarding the policies of ethnic cleansing directed against the Silesians in the postwar People’s Republic of Poland, one should scrutinize the administrative decisions which shaped the Silesian reality. On May 6, 1945 the Communist, pro-Soviet Polish provisional government, led by Bolesaw Bierut, issued the act which abolished the Organic status of the Silesian Voivodship and thus effectively liquidated Silesian autonomy, which had been considered as a dangerous centrifugal force by the government and as such incompatible with the communist idea of strong and highly centralized state which should strive for ethnic and national homogeneity (Goclon, 1994: 6). On May 15 Bishop Adamski of Katowice arrived in Wroclaw (Breslau) and conveyed to the German Catholic authorities there that it
would be best if the Germans left as Poland was shifting up to the Oder (Wiskemann, 1956: 97). On May 26 Silesia was divided between two voivodships. The Wrocław (Breslau) Voivodship contained Lower Silesia without Lusatia and the Silesian Voivodship comprised Upper Silesia together with the Dąbrowskie industrial basin concentrated on the cities of Zawiercie, Bdzin and Sosnowiec. The boundary between the two voivodships was exactly the same as the border between the oppeln and Breslau Regencies. The Lower Silesian counties of Zielona Góra (Grünberg) and Wschowa (Fraustadt) were added to the Pozna (Posen) Voivodship (Lestuk, 1992: 83). In 1950 the Opole Voivodship was formed on the basis of the Opolln Regency with the addition of the Wrocław Voivodship counties of Brzeg (Brieg) and Namysłów (Namslau) (Kopiec, 1991: 105). Moreover, the county of Częstochowa was added to the Katowice Voivodship and the Zielona Góra Voivodship was constituted on the basis of the Silesian counties of the Pozna Voivodship and the border counties of the Wrocław Voivodship and some ex-Brandenburg counties. In 1975 Poland was divided into the multitude of forty-nine voivodships and Silesia was promptly divided into eight voivodships which included many counties of Posen while non-Silesian voivodships included a certain number of Silesian counties. Thus, Silesia as an administrative, historical and cultural region was obliterated and its concept survives only in geographical terminology (Leszczycki, 1978: 3/4).

The changes were to facilitate the creation of new administrative-cum-regional environment with which the Polish settlers could easily identify, and to deny history of Silesia as an important province with a distinctive past loosely if at all connected to Polish history. The Upper Silesians who identified themselves with their Heimat rather than with Poland or Germany were considered to be Autochtons (indigenous people) of Polish origin who were Germanized and should be returned to the fold of Polishdom. Therefore, on March 22, 1945, the Silesian Voivoda issued a regulation which formed the legal basis for national verification of the Upper Silesians. It was finished at the end of 1949, and subsequently 848,131 inhabitants of Upper Silesia and 15,146 of Lower Silesia received Polish citizenship. The Silesians constituted 85% of the population who were positively verified in the western territories (Lis, 1991: 29). During the process of this verification, many irregularities and wrongdoings were committed which effectively alienated a large segment of the Silesians from the new state
administration. This alienation was deepened by the disregard for cultural, ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness of this region, and by hostility of the Polish settlers for whom hardly intelligible Silesian Polish interlaced with a plethora of German words seemed to be the German language itself. Moreover, many Upper Silesians could not speak Polish and often were branded as Nazis, Hitlersmen and Krauts. The authorities, which were usually completely ignorant and scornful of Silesian tradition, strove to forcefully Polonize them by the system of education with teachers from Central Poland, and by the ban on teaching and use of German. Immediately after the war, and later on the basis of the government’s regulation of April 7, 1952 names and surnames of the Silesians, were Polonized or changed more often than not without any prior agreement of the persons concerned (Jarczak, 1993: 19). Also the declaration of loyalty was demanded from the Silesians who received Polish citizenship. Ironically, the Protestant Church became an ersatz of normal life for them because over there they could speak in German with their friends and acquaintances. Paradoxically, Silesian Catholics accounted for one third of the people who attended Protestant celebrations (Kowalski, 1994).

In 1950 the Poles agreed to the Link Action which rescued isolated members of families which were already in Germany. It lasted from March 1950 to the end of 1951 and completed the process of expulsions. Nevertheless, the authorities often refused to let able-bodied and qualified workers go (Wiskemann, 1956: 120) but this action commenced Polish-German normalization under the auspices of Moscow. In spite of strongly adverse sentiment on the part of the East German population, their government accepted the Oder-Neisse frontier at Zgorzelec (Görlitz) on July 6, 1950 (Wiskemann, 1956: 273). On November 24, 1950 the Communist Party Committee of the Opole Voivodship demanded more Silesians to be promoted to middle-managerial positions, their larger share in membership of the Communist party in the Voivodship, and improved participation of the Silesians in the militia troops (MO), security forces (UB), Railways (PKP), and the Zwizek Modziey Polskiej (the Polish Youth Association). However, the percentage of Silesians in these work places, organizations, the Communist Party, and the local government has remained consistently low indicating the fact that the Silesians have been treated as the second class citizens (Lis, 1991: 38/39).

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It is worth mentioning that since the end of May 1946, the authorities began to receive many applications for emigration to Germany from Silesians who had been verified to be Poles, especially from mothers whose husbands had stayed in Germany after the war. The authorities did not allow them to leave and advised divorce. The prewar pensioners could not emigrate either and had to stay in Poland deprived of financial resources which otherwise would allow them to lead decent lives (Linek, 1993: 2).

They were ignorant of Silesia and its complexities and largely alienated the young generation of the Silesians, and almost managed to obliterate Silesian Polish.

In 1948 the official action of Polonization was terminated because it was announced that all ethnic groups of the Opole Voivodship had been successfully integrated in the fold of Polishdom. It meant lack of information on Silesia and its inhabitants till 1950, which allowed the Polish authorities, unhindered by the mass media coverage of the situation in this region, to speed up collectivization of farms, to destroy the economic and commercial infrastructure of Silesian cities and towns, and to intensify the struggle against the Catholic Church which as the only Polish institution had achieved at least some modest successes in the field of integrating the diverse local population (Linek, 1993: 2).

According to the Polish sources there were 53,472 Germans left in the Wroclaw Voivodship and 4,986 in the Silesian Voivodship. The West German sources estimate that there were 280,000 to 1,6 mln Germans in Silesia. The disparity is caused by the Autochtons or Upper Silesians who are considered Germans by Germany and Polish by the Poles (Lis, 1991: 35).

It was the only voivodship where the Autochtons constituted more than half of the population. However, the proportion changed after 1959 when the action of linking of families was officially finished. By that time 46,000 Silesians had left the Opole Voivodship (Linek, 1993: 2).

The local authorities strove to comply with the guideline promoting former members of the Communist Party of Germany to higher positions in the local governments and regional committees of the Communist Party (Linek, 1993: 2).
After the proclamation of March 1951 as the month of Polish-German friendship (Wiskemann, 1956: 273), in June 1951 the strictly confidential government decision of February 1945 about excluding the people of German origin from Polish society was rescinded (Schmidla, 1993: 3). On April 22 Polish President Bierut visited Berlin (Wiskemann, 1956: 273). This ongoing normalization and gradual acceptance of the German minority in Poland brought about the permission of the authorities for 2,757 persons, from 1952 to 1953, to leave for both Germanies to join their families there (Lis, 1991: 40/41). Confiscated German property was returned to owners (Kowalski, 1994), the ban upon the use of German in Poland was reversed (Wiskemann, 1956: 274) and the Ministry of Education began to organize primary schools and kindergartens with German as the medium of instruction. Textbooks and periodicals at first were imported from East Germany and later were published in Poland. The German education and press were run by German Communists, and were loaded with ideological messages not unlike the Polish press and education. The publications used only Polish place-names in the course of their German texts which could repulse many German readers (Wiskemann, 1956: 276). In 1952 first German artistic and folk groups were established (Kowalski, 1994). Relaxation of anti-German policies and allowing Germans to leave Poland (usually for East Germany) brought to the attention of the authorities the problem of the German minority in the Opole Voivodship. It had been claimed that the German minority was concentrated in Lower Silesia and that after the verification only the Autochtons had remained in Upper Silesia, however, the information gathered till June 1, 1952 indicated that over 47,000 persons felt to be German. The Voivodship statistics give even a bigger number of 69,645 persons. The findings triggered off a swift propaganda and harassment campaign which managed to make 30,102 persons to decide their nationality as Polish (Lis, 1991: 41/42). Moreover, young Germans made repeated efforts to escape from Poland since the did not want to serve in the army for two years and did not have a chance for legal emigration (Wiskemann, 1956: 277). This tense situation and an increase in applications for emigration to both Germanies were the basis for the negotiations between the Polish and West German Cross, and after the end of Stalinism in 1956 151,226 persons left Silesia for the FRG from 1956 to 1959 during the renewed action of family linking (Lis, 1991: 54). Also in October 1956 the party members from the Opole and Katowice Voivodships demanded from General Secretary Wiesaw Gomóka a change in the policies towards the Autochtons and an end to treating them as an uncertain element (Lis, 1991: 47). The official acknowledgment of the existence of German minority in Poland allowed them to establish the Niemieckie Towarzystwo Spoeczno-Kulturalne (the German social and Cultural Society) in April 1957, which was supported and

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743 This ban stayed in place in the Opole Voivodship in order to speed up Polonization of the Autochtons (Wiskemann, 1956: 274).

744 The German daily in Poland Arbeitstimme was opened in 1952. On May 5, 1958 it became a weekly entitled Die Woche in Polen and shortly afterwards the publication was defunct (Lis, 1991: 51).

745 The information was obtained in the course of issuing new internal passports (i.e. dowody osobiste). The Silesians declared their national feelings by filling in the blank for their nationality with the word German (Linek, 1993: 2).

746 The methods of the harassment most often included dismissal from work and refusal to allow the pro-German Silesians children to attend schools in Poland (Linek, 1993: 2).

747 Especially Eryk Wyra (a former member of the Communist Party of Germany), a member of the Opole Voivodship Communist Party Committee, was vocative on this point. He demanded: an investigation of confiscations of property belonging to Silesians, asking the government to allow each person wishing to leave for the GDR or FRG to emigrate, and introduction of German teaching to secondary schools, complete with providing the voivodship population with progressive (i.e. Communist) books and periodicals. Existence of any German minority in the Opole Voivodship was denied by the former activists of the Association of Poles in Germany which was explicitly expressed in the open letter of Wojciech Wawrzynek. In December 1956 the Voivodship Conference of the Communist Party decided to accept the hard-line of the latter, and subsequently Jan Marchon (a former member of the Communist Party in Germany), the president of the voivodship local government was made to resign together with Henryk Werbejczyk (the editor-in-chief of the voivodship Communist daily Trybuna Opolska, where the depicted conflict was played out in the form of letters and polemical articles) who soon after emigrated to Israel (Linek, 1993: 2).
controlled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (i.e. security forces) (Kowalski, 1994). The Silesians of the Opole Voivodaship were not allowed to join the Association in order not to allow them to be re-Germanized, because of the emigration the Association was dissolved and publication of *Die Woche* in Poland was discontinued, for the *Autochtons* who perused the weekly were supposed to read the Polish not German press (Lis, 1991: 51). In 1960 West Germany strove to renew the action of family linking which stopped in 1959, but the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued strict regulations which severely restrained emigration of Silesians till 1970. From 1963 to 1970 only 57,142 Silesians were allowed to leave Poland causing much discontent in West Germany (Lis, 1991: 55).

The 1960s were a decade of the intensified Cold War and the detente came only in October 1969 following the election of Willy Brandt to the Federal Chancellorship. His government embarked on a new conciliatory Ostpolitik. Article 3 of the Treaty of August 12, 1970 with the Soviet Union stated that the FRG regarded the present European borders (including the Oder-Neisse line) as inviolable. The Oder-Neisse line as the western frontier of Poland was reaffirmed by Article 1 of the Polish-German Treaty signed on November 20, 1970. the treaty went into force on June 3, 1972 after having had been ratified by the Bundestag on May 17, 1972 (Allcock, 1992: 89/90). The warming of the Polish-German relations toned down Polish anti-German propaganda and the support of the German government for revisionist groups which allowed a slight relaxation of Polish anti-emigration policies. Thus, in the period 1971-1975 28,056 persons emigrated from Upper Silesia (Lis, 1991: 55), which means that predominantly they were *Autochtons* who previously had been considered ethnically Polish by the Warsaw government. The dynamic development of diplomatic, cultural, tourist and scientific links between Poland and the FRG culminated in 1975 at the CSCE Helsinki Summit where General Secretary Edward Gierek and Chancellor Willy Brandt met (Lis, 1991: 56). Under the protocol agreed to the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975, between 120,000 and 125,000 ethnic Germans were allowed to leave Poland and settle in the FRG during the following four years, with further emigration applications being permitted after the expiry period (Allcock, 1992: 91). It meant a tacit reversal of the Polish policies on the Silesian *Autochtons* especially under the influence of the jumbo loan which the FRG gave to Poland which struggled with its outstanding debt incurred during the first half of the 1970s (Dobrosielski, 1992: 38). From 1976 to 1979 87,306 persons emigrated from Upper Silesia but the realization of the Helsinki protocol did not diminish the number of persons from the Katowice and Opole Voivodaships eager to leave for the FRG, so in the period 1980-1985 c. 100,000 left Upper Silesia daunted by the most severe economic crisis, which was worsened by the Communist clamp down on the Solidarity movement on December 13, 1981 (which brought about the Western economic embargo); and despite all the bureaucratic and legislative obstacles which they had to overcome with bribery and cunning (Siembieda, 1993a: 16). Gradual worsening of the economic situation and the efforts of the Polish Communist government to leave the post-1981 international isolation and to re-enter the world political arena as an equal partner, resulted in relaxation of passport issuing and border controls which allowed 101,000 persons to leave Upper Silesia from 1986 to 1988 (Lis, 1991: 57).

This emigration was actively stimulated by the ethnic policies of the FRG which never stopped considering the Upper Silesian *Autochtons* as people of German ancestry or German-oriented. It is explicitly demonstrated by Article 116 of the German Constitution which reaffirms the right of all the people born inside the 1937 borders of the Third Reich before May 9, 1945 and their descendants to German citizenship (Kowalski, 1994). More leverage to this preferential treatment of the Silesian emigrants in the FRG was added by the weighty presence of Silesians in Germany and its political life. According to the census of October 29, 1946: 1,623,000 Silesians lived in West Germany, 27,000 in Berlin and 1,049,000 in the Soviet zone (Wiskemann, 1956: 146). Already in 1946 the Silesians wanted

\[748\]-Ironically, in this wave of emigration from 1956 to 1959 many Communist Party members and prewar pro-Polish Silesian activists (e.g. E. Zmarzly) participated which led to the collapse of numerous Communist Party basic cells in the Opole Voivodaship (Linek, 1993: 2)

\[749\]-It was an established practice that the local security offices issued tourist passports to the *Autochtons* who went to Yugoslavia, Austria or East Berlin whence they could easily reach the FRG where they claimed German citizenship or political asylum.
to found their organization in Munich, Bavaria (Neubach, 1992: 21) where half a million of them had settled down; but to no avail since the Allied authorities did not tolerate any kind of organizations of the expellees, political or otherwise (Wiskemann, 1956: 149). Only at the end of 1948 the Association of the Silesians in Bavaria was established (Neubach, 1992: 21), and after the FRG was called into existence by the Allies in May 1945, the Landsmannschaft-Schlesien (LS) was established in Bad Godesberg in 1950, and in October official patronage over it was taken by Lower Saxony where several hundred thousands Silesians lived. Even earlier, in December 1949 a group of Upper Silesians founded the Landsmannschaft der Oberschlesier (LdO). In 1964 North Rheinland-Westfalen became its patron. Twenty-three Silesian politics were elected to the first Bundestag and then endeavored to facilitate the new beginning of their fellowmen in the FRG (Neubach, 1992: 21/22). On August 5, 1950 at Stuttgart the organizations of all the German expellees accepted The Charter of the German Expellees where, most importantly, they renounced all thought of revenge and retaliation and expressed their unwavering support for the establishment of a united Europe in which the nations may live in freedom from fear and coercion, but called for recognition of the right to [their] native homeland [as] one of the basic rights of man, granted to him by God (Anon., 1950).

The Polish authorities have considered the official renunciation of revisionism as a meaningless statement750, and the right to homeland and adjacent cultural activities as the practical actualization of revisionism and a threat to the existence of Poland (Cygaski, 1992: 12). Thus, the organizations of the Silesians in the FRG were even more misrepresented by the Polish propaganda than the Germans themselves. Calumnies and offensive invectives were directed at the organizations, the more intensively the greater economic and democratic progress was achieved in the FRG, and the more Silesians strove to leave Poland where they were harassed by the Communist regime and had to suffer constant acute economic crisis (Lis, 1991: 79). The Silesians were identified by the Polish population as Germans and as such even became an object of Polish nationalist hatred fuelled by the tendentiously negative picture of the German which was installed in the Polish mind by Polish and Soviet war films which were the dominating genre before the end of Communism.

The Silesian homeland organizations had approximately 418,000 members in the years 1955-1958 and became bigger than the homeland organizations of the Sudeten Germans. Understandably, the Silesians became one of important political forces in the FRG especially after 1960 when their organizations were united with the organizations of the Sudeten Germans under the aegis of the Verband der Landsmannschaften (VdL). Moreover, the VdL became also part of the Bund der Vertriebenen Vereinigte Landsmannschaften und Landsverbände (BdV) whose membership rose from 1.34 mln in 1959 to 2.2 mln in 1963, and most significantly Herbert Czaja, the President of the LdO, was elected the President of the BdV in 1970 (Cygaski, 1992: 10/11).

In the 1950s the organizations of the expellees were mainly interested in improving the lot of their members inside the FRG and facilitating the action of family linking. In the 1960s when the whole net of their cultural, social and political organizations worked out a stable position for their members inside the FRG, the influence of the expellees in politics culminated in Chancellor Erhard’s note of March 26, 1966 sent to all the governments with which the FRG had political ties. It questioned legality of the Oder-Neisse line on the basis of the fact that there had been no peace conference after the Second World War which would reaffirm the postwar status quo (Allcock, 1992: 89). But under the influence of approaching detente the stance was softened which was also reflected in the political statements of the organization of the expellees. The Federal Congress of the LdO in Würzburg, March 29-30, 1969 under the leadership of Czaja announced a new program which emphasized: a future united Europe as the goal, the right to homeland, collective minority rights and the realization of human rights on the other side of the Iron Curtain (Cygaski, 1992: 14; Czaja in Anon., 1950). This mitigated attitude facilitated the signature of the German-Polish Treaty in 1970 and fostered emigration of the Silesians from Poland after 1975. Czaja, however, remained adamant in the question of illegality of the Oder-Neisse line, and was largely assisted

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750 However, it largely prevented Palestinian-like terrorism and the expellees have never striven to regain their homeland by force or coercion.
by the Federal Constitutional Tribunal’s statements of July 31, 1973 and July 7, 1975 which expressed the opinion that the lands east of the Oder-Neisse line still belong to Germany from the legal point of view (Cygaski, 1992: 17).

In the second half of the 1970s the BdV concentrated on the question of human rights and collective minority rights in the Deutsche Ostgebiete, and on cooperation with the organizations of the expellees abroad. The Silesian groups managed to establish contacts with the Verein der Schlesier in the United States and the Verband Ehemaliger Oberschlesier in IsraelTM and thus international interest in the fate of the Silesians remaining in Polish Silesia was established. In 1977 at the CSCE Conference in Belgrade, the BdV postulated establishment of the Human Rights Protection International Tribunal and the signature of a convention against forced assimilation but to no avail, the West did not want to endanger the shaky detente. Czaja presented the situation of the Autochtons in Washington during his American visit, August 12-24, 1978. G. Prusko, spokesman of the LdB, sent a letter to the UN Secretary General during the Geneva Conference on Racism and Discrimination of Minorities. During the European Parliamentary elections in June 1979 Czaja appealed for implementation of collective minority rights in every European country. This line was continued in the 1980s and broadened by the grass roots humanitarian action of sending food/clothes parcels, medicines and medical equipment to Poland which suffered even more acute economic crisis after the trade embargo was imposed on the country in reply to the introduction of martial law on December 13, 1981 (Cygaski, 1992: 16-18).

After the return to power of the CDU/CSU coalition in the FRG, the Silesian homeland organizations received full government support. In January 1984 the CDU/CSU representatives introduced to the European Parliament’s agenda the issue of discriminated German minority in Upper Silesia, and on January 17, 1985 in the Bundestag, H. Hupka (the Vice-President of the BdV and President of the LS) spoke on the ban on the German language in Upper Silesia. Moreover, the rights of the expellees and German minorities were championed by F.J. Strauss, the leader of the Bavarian CSU, who demanded an end to the Polish propaganda which was obfuscating the fact that the western territories of Poland used to be centers of German culture, and denying the right of the German minorities in Silesia, Pommern, Danzig and East Prussia to preserve their identity (Cygaski, 1992: 18-30).

Accordingly, in 1983 and 1984 the West German government tried to influence the Polish authorities to give a consent to establishment of the Verband der Deutschen in Polen (VdDP) which would emulate the Association of the Poles in the FRG and the defunct German Social and Cultural Society in Wabrzycz (Waldenburg). None of the Polish courts registered the VdDP but its branches were illegally formed in the Katowice and Opole Voivodaships during 1985. From 1985 to 1988 the German minority movement was developed in numerous branches of the Deutsche Freundschaftskreis in Schlesien (DFK, the German Friendship Circles in Silesia), it was headed by Franz Poppe from Raszowice (Raschewitz) who worked in Kdzierzyzn-Kole (Kandrzin/Hydebreck-Cosel). On January 12, 1988 he met FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in the West German Embassy in Warsaw, and the latter promised support for the DFK’s continuous efforts to obtain legalization. However, the DFK chiefly advocated emigration to the FRG which coupled with the repressions by the Polish security forces considerably weakened the organization.

The year 1989 marks the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. The old ideology was proved to be economically unfeasible and socially unsound. The ethnic violence in Nagorno-Karabakh and the approaching ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia made Central and East European leaders aware that nationalism and ethnic feelings could not be contained any longer. Some decided to use them as an instrument to gain power (cf. ex-Yugoslavia, Slovakia) but others decided to recognize minorities in their countries and to grant them some obvious rights (which had been denied to

751 The majority of the Silesian Jews were exterminated and the survivors most often decided not to return to Silesia so the most important Jewish centers in Silesia: Wroc_{aw}, Zi_{bice} (Münsterberg), Katowice and Gliwice are mainly populated by the Jews from the Polish East. They numbered 10,000 but after 1967, when the anti-Semitic campaign was flared up by the Communist government, almost all of them left. Hence, with the exception of 1,500 Jews in Wroc_{aw} only small pockets of them remain in Silesia (Wigoder, 1992: 173, 864).
them during the Communist times) in order to ensure a peaceful social situation, only on the basis of which one can try to build a working capitalist economy and the liberal-democratic system of government.

The Dynamics of the Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia During the Years 1950-1989 (as Contextualized Against the Background of the Ennationalizing Policies of Poland and Germany in 1918-1949)

Although with the introduction of the Endlösung the national socialist authorities of Germany kept declaring various areas as Judenrein (clean of Jews), the term ethnic cleansing753 is rather a recent coinage. It has become widespread after the world public opinion learned about the atrocities of the Yugoslav conflict. For instance, the SilverPlatter 3.1 CD ROM Social Sciences Index (92/83 11/93), records the term for the first time in the two contributions to the August 1, 1992 issue of The Economist, entitled as follows: Out of Bosnia: Serbia engages in ethnic cleansing and Brutalized ethnic cleansing of Muslims754.

This novel term describes a phenomenon which has recurred for centuries755 but became notorious with the acceptance of the national principle after the close of the Great War in 1918. It was hoped that with this principle an orderly world of a neat mosaic of nation-states would be established. However, the elevation of nationalism to the rank of the ideology of the whole globe, time after time, was defied by the social reality. Simply, nations and ethnic groups did not fit nicely their nation-states and vice versa. Politicians often strove to rectify this anomalous756 situation with population exchange, expulsion, forced assimilation and the like. However, the most concentrated effort at fitting European nation-states to their nations and the nations to their nation-states occurred at the close of World War II with the unanimous agreement and cooperation of the Allies to this end.

The largest ever forced population shifts commenced by Hitler and Stalin during the war, the Allies completed in the period 1945-48757 before the outbreak of the Cold War which froze, for half a century, the postwar order established in this manner. The very locus of the dramatic changes was the Polish state. Its territories east of the River Bug (Kresy) were seized by the Soviet Union in compliance with the secret Ribbentrop Molotov pact. The Allies recognized this annexation and recompensed Poland with the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line (Dutesche Ostgebiete) with the exception of northern East Prussia incorporated into the Soviet Union.

The redrawing of the borders required expulsion of Poles from the newly acquired western areas of the Soviet Union as well as of Germans from the postwar Poland. In the political language of euphemisms and misnomers, the two parallel processes were dubbed, respectively, as repatriation and orderly and humane transfer758. The effect was similar ethnic cleansing. It concentrated the Polish nation in the container of the new Polish state and simultaneously cleansed it of an alien ethnic element. Thus

752. The new coinage ennationalization means efforts leading to make various group/persons become of a given nation. It is preferred to the traditional term nationalization which may be ambiguous as more current in the vocabulary of economics than of social sciences.

753. A Bell-Fialkoff A brief history of ethnic cleansing Foreign Affairs (Vol. 72, Summer 1993) 114.


755. Cf.: Bell-Fialkoff.

756. From a nationalist point of view, of course, as before the Twentieth century coexistence of members of various ethnic groups in one state was the norm in Europe, and still is outside this continent.


758. In the scope of the former the people were made to leave fatherland (understood as areas where they were born and resided) and not to return to it, while the latter process was neither orderly nor humane.
Poland whose population in, at least, 35 per cent had consisted from non-Polish groups in the interwar period, became almost ethnically homogenous after 1945 with the expulsion of Germans. This process was concluded in 1948 and rounded up with the Action Link in 1950 which allowed stranded spouses, children or parents to join their families in the GDR (German Democratic Republic) or the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany). Subsequently, it gave the Polish communist propaganda a ground to claim that Poland was inhabited by Poles only. Despite all the odds, this myth of ethnic cleanliness was officially maintained until the fall of communism in 1989.

This article concentrates on Silesia because it was the largest, most industrialized and populous region of the Deutsche Ostgebiete with 4.8 million inhabitants in 1939, and remains the most ethnically diversified area of Poland, especially in its easternmost section known as Upper Silesia. The choice of the period 1950-1989 when no official expulsions occurred, may seem questionable, but ethnic cleansing may be also carried out in less pronounced ways.

Let us define this phenomenon as [...] a planned, deliberate removal from a certain territory of an undesirable population distinguished by ethnicity [...], which can be executed by the following methods ranging from genocide, through deportation/expulsion, transfer under pressure and exchange under pressure, to emigration.

In the period 1945-48, the ethnic cleansing in Silesia proceeded mainly through the means of expulsion. Moreover, a sizeable percentage of the population had also fled or been evacuated before the approaching front line and, subsequently, Polish and Soviet troops barred those who wished to return home, from crossing the Oder-Neisse line. Besides, 65 thousand of Upper Silesian inhabitants were rounded up and despatched to the Soviet Union as forced labor, and some genocidal practices occurred in transfer/forced labor camps, especially in Upper Silesia. In result, in 1950, there were 2,410 thousand...
Lower Silesian and 800 thousand Upper Silesian expellees in the FRG/GDR\textsuperscript{767}. At the same time 66 thousand prewar inhabitants of Lower Silesia (this is, German citizens) still resided in the region, and 866 thousand of their counterparts in Upper Silesia\textsuperscript{768}.

In order to go on with this narration, it is necessary now to sketch its geographical and ethnic parameters. Without delving into administrative and political niceties, suffice it to say that in 1922 the German/Prussian Province of Upper Silesia was split between Germany and Poland. Warsaw molded its part into the autonomous Silesian Voivodeship while Berlin allowed the province to continue in its truncated form.

From the ethnic point of view, the Province of Lower Silesia was overwhelmingly German-speaking, with only some 66 thousand Slavic-speakers in 1910. Out of the number, 16 thousand Sorb-speakers dwelt predominantly west of the would-be Oder-Neisse line, 10 thousand Protestant Bohemians in a handful of scattered towns and villages, and 40 thousand Protestants who spoke a dialect akin to that of the Catholic Polish-speakers in the adjacent region of Wielkopolska (which would be included in Poland in 1918/19). By 1939 the number of the last group had dwindled to less than 20 thousand though boosted by several thousand Catholic Upper Silians who considered themselves Poles and settled at Breslau (Wroclaw)\textsuperscript{769}, and other important cities of Lower Silesia. The Bohemians ceased to speak their Slavic dialect and virtually became indistinguishable from their German neighbors. The Sorb-speakers do not fall into the geographical scope of the article as the Lower Silesian parts of their region of Lusatia remained in Germany\textsuperscript{770} after 1945, but their number plummeted to seven thousand in 1939\textsuperscript{771}.

Upper Silesia presented a much more diversified picture, in 1910, with 1,169 Polish-speakers, 884 thousand German-speakers, and 57 thousand Moravian-speakers\textsuperscript{772}. Out of them about 90 thousand were bilingual-speakers\textsuperscript{773}.

Obviously, the statistical categories were dictated by the efforts aiming at homogenizing the German nation-state as well as by the Polish and Czech national movements which began to gain strength in Silesia at the turn of the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. In consequence, the categories did not reflect the ethnic make-up of Upper Silesia too closely. The so-called Polish-speakers did not speak any standard Polish but a West Slavic dialect, and those who resided in industrial cities of eastern Upper Silesia - a West Slavic-West Germanic creole\textsuperscript{774}. Moreover, to a larger or smaller extent all of them could communicate in German. On the other hand, the German-speaking peasants and workers spoke an Upper Silesian dialect of this language while the command of its standard version was limited to the educated people.

\textsuperscript{769} I use the name of a locality, which was official at a given time in the past, and provide its current counterpart in parentheses, when mentioned for the first time. When giving a current name of a locality, similarly, I append it with the pre-1945 form of its name.
\textsuperscript{770} I use the name of Germany for all the four occupation zones, as the Allies intended to recreate a German state until the two Germanies came into being in 1949 as the result of the Cold War division of Europe.
\textsuperscript{771} On the ethnic composition of Lower Silesia see: J Kokot Problemy narodowosciowe na Slasku od X do XX wieku (Opole: Instytut Slaski 1973) 20, 745.
\textsuperscript{772} Stüttgen, op. cit., 327.
\textsuperscript{773} Kokot, op. cit., 23.
All the inhabitants of Upper Silesia felt themselves to be Prussians, and, simultaneously, were strongly attached to their homeland region. This identification with Upper Silesia was fortified by the fact that 90 per cent of Upper Silesians were Catholics unlike the overwhelmingly Protestant inhabitants in the rest of Germany (with the exception of Bavaria culturally as distinct as Upper Silesia). The homogenizing pressure exerted by the administration and the educational system of the German nation-state (established in 1871), did not allow most of the Upper Silesian Catholics and non-German-speakers to become Germans. Hence, the Szlonzok\textsuperscript{776} ethnic group evolved from the Polish- and bilingual-speakers. Predominantly Catholic German-speakers became Germans but without losing their distinct regional identity akin to that of the Bavarians, as they were somehow barred from becoming one with Germandom\textsuperscript{777} by its Protestant core. The Moravian-speakers coalesced into the Moravec ethnic group together with their kin across the border in Austria-Hungary, but they are not considered here too widely as most of them were transferred with the territory their inhabited to Czechoslovakia in 1919\textsuperscript{778}.

The division of Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland triggered off considerable migratory movements. Until 1925 117-170 thousand people (who felt themselves to be Germans) left the voivodeship for Germany, and altogether 190 thousand by 1939\textsuperscript{779}. On the other hand, in the 1920s 90-100 thousand people (who felt themselves to be Poles) arrived in Poland from the province\textsuperscript{780}. Although the League of Nations, with the instrument of the Geneva Convention (1922-37) restrained Warsaw and Berlin from thorough ennationalization of the ethnically variegated populations remaining in the voivodeship and the province, less and less could be done in this respect with the crumbling of the post-World-War-I order in the 1930s, and virtually nothing after the expiration of the convention\textsuperscript{781}.

The consequence was political and statistical games played out in the interest of Polishdom and Germandom. Thus, in the 1931 census, out of the voivodeship’s total population of 1,295 only 91 thousand (7 per cent) got registered as Germans which clashed with much higher levels of support for various German parties and groups in local elections\textsuperscript{782}. On the other hand, drawing on the novel concept of eigensprachiger Kulturdeutsche (non-German-speaking Kultur-German)\textsuperscript{783}, the category of Polish-

\textsuperscript{775} Stüttgen, op. cit., 325.
\textsuperscript{776} I decided to retain their self-ascriptive ethnonym pronounced in their dialect to avoid confusion. The English translation of the ethnonym is Silesian which rather denotes an inhabitant of Silesia than a member of Upper Silesia’s Szlonzokian ethnic group.
\textsuperscript{777} In my usage the terms such as Germandom or Polishdom roll into one: the appropriate nation, nation state and national feeling. When I speak of the Polish or German national feeling I use the following terms: Polishness and Germanness. In short, they cover all the traits which make one into a Pole/German or a state into the Polish/German nation-state. By extension, I also apply terms derived in this manner, to ethnic groups, for example: Szlonzokiandom and Szlonzokianness in the case of the Szlonzoks.
\textsuperscript{778} T Kamusella Chapter Four In: K Cordell (ed) The Politics of Ethnicity in Central Europe (London: Macmillan [Forthcoming]).
\textsuperscript{780} Serafin, op. cit., 80.
\textsuperscript{781} Interestingly, thanks to the Bernheim petition submitted to the League of Nations, in 1933, against the introduction of anti-Jewish legislation in the province as in breach of the Geneva Convention, application of this legislation did not commence in this part of Germany until the expiration of the convention (N F Bernheim petition In: Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem: Ketter Publishing House and New York: Macmillan 1972) Vol 4 p 681).
\textsuperscript{782} Serafin, op. cit., 81; M Ujdak Samorzad In: Serafin (ed, op. cit., 69-72
\textsuperscript{783} This concept emphasizes national culture as the nation-binding factor rather than language. Consequently, the Szlonzoks, Mazurs, Kashubs and Sorbs the Slavic-speaking ethnic groups within the borders of Germany, were considered to be Adoptivstämmen (adopted tribes) who had entered the German nation by having embraced
speaker was not even included in the 1933 German census. It recorded in the province 99 thousand
speakers of the Upper Silesian-Polish language784, 266 thousand bilingual speakers of this language and
German besides 1,118 German-speakers. Hence, no Polish-speakers let alone Poles.

The simplistic Polonizing policy of Warsaw attempting assimilation through methods ranging from
administrative measures to open harassment785, rather fortified Germandom in the voivodeship. The
voivodeship Germans were also encouraged to cultivate their national identity by economic aid flowing
from Germany and the country’s economic success after 1933 which stood out in the stark contrast to the
young Polish nation-state’s predicaments, in a way, substantiating Berlin’s claim that Poland was just a
Saison-Staat (one-season state). On the other hand, the German authorities, strove to secure various
non-German-speaking ethnic groups for Germandom through manipulation with the concepts of
nationality and citizenship786 which allowed temporary satisfaction of variegated interests of these groups.

No such niceties were taken into consideration after 1939 when following the swift defeat of
Poland, the national socialist authorities reincorporated the voivodeship787 into the Province of Upper
Silesia and added to it the adjacent counties of the Kielce and Cracow Voivodeships. Then in this
enlarged wartime province the construction of the Volksgemeinschaft (homogenous German nation)
 commenced with the use of the Gleichschaltung (homogenizing) policy. In 1939-42 81 thousand Poles
(mainly those who had arrived in the Silesian Voivodeship after 1922) were expelled, and 37 thousand
ethnic Germans from the territories seized by the Soviet Union, settled in the Kattowitz Regency788. While
the Szlonzoks of the interwar province were considered Germans on the peril of being sent to
a concentration camp, the Szlonzokian population of the former voivodeship was inscribed onto the four
groups of the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL, German National List). Those belonging to the groups I and II
(this is, 92 thousand and 207 thousand persons, respectively) were considered to be Germans. The group
III contained 940 thousand Szlonzoks of no national leanings (and as such suitable for Germanization),
while the group IV comprised 49 thousand renegades Szlonzoks/Germans of pro-Polish feelings789.

When after the war Moscow handed Silesia over to Poland, about 4,450 thousand out from the
well over five-million strong population of the enlarged wartime region, fled, were evacuated or
expelled790 in 1944-50791. The number of Germans in Lower Silesia estimated at 1,234 thousand in 1946,

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784. This language label lumped together the non-codified Western Slavic dialect of Upper Silesia as well as the
Upper Silesian West Slavic-West Germanic creole.

785. For instance, at the end of the 1930s the unemployment rate in the voivodeship was 16 per cent but 60-80
per cent among the local Germans (A Komjathy and R Stockwell German minorities and the Third Reich:
Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe between the wars (New York and London: Holmes & Meier) 88)

786. Often the notions of nationality and citizenship are used as synonyms, especially in the US context. Here
nationality means one’s membership in a nation whereas citizenship one’s membership in a state’s citizenry.

787. Also the southern part of the Ratibor (Raciborz) county, transferred to Czechoslovakia in 1919, was
reincorporated into the province in 1939, after having been detached from Czechoslovakia in 1938.

788. Due to the sheer size the wartime province was subdivided into the Oppeln (Opole) Regency largely
containing the territory of the interwar province, and into the Kattowitz (Katowice) Regency based on the
territories gained from Poland.

13-20.

790. In June 1945 December 1947 1,770 thousand persons were expelled from Lower Silesia, and in June 1945
January 1947 310 thousand from Upper Silesia (M Iwanicki Ukraincy, Bialorusini, Litwini i Niemcy w Polsce
w latach 1918-1990 (Siedlce: WSRP 1994) 184).

after the expulsions, stabilized at 51 thousand in 1950\footnote{Ociepka, op. cit., 25.}. Those retained ones (dubbed as indubitable Germans) were specialists (and their families) indispensable for running the Walbrzych-Nowa Ruda (Waldenburg-Neurode) industrial basin and other Lower Silesian industry before they could be replaced by Polish counterparts. Considering the ethnically non-German populace, close to 16 thousand persons were verified as Poles\footnote{J Misztal Weryfikacja narodowosciowa na Ziemiach Odzyskanych (Warsaw: PWN 1990) 307.}, and 6-7 thousand Bohemian-speakers who declared themselves to be Czechs could not be expelled and faced Warsaw with a geopolitical difficulty in the light of the 1945-47 border conflict with Prague over the southern strip of Lower and Upper Silesia\footnote{P Palys Klodzko, Raciborz i Głubczyce w stosunkach polsko-czechosłowackich w latach 1945-1947 (Opole: author’s publication 1997); K Pudlo Czesi na Dolnym Śląsku po roku 1945 Slezsky sbornik (No 1-2 1995) 87.}. In order to prove Polishness of Upper Silesia and to be able to run the Upper Silesian industrial basin (the second largest, after the Ruhr, on the continent) which immediately after the war turned out one-third and, later, a quarter of the Polish GDP\footnote{J Dziadul Ślaska niemoc Polityka (No 19, May 13 1995) 8.}, Warsaw decided to retain most of the Upper Silesian populace. Thus, in 1944-50 only about 500 thousand fled, were evacuated, expelled or deported to the Soviet Union\footnote{B Linek Chapter Six In: K. Cordell (ed) [forthcoming], op. cit.}. The rest, this is, 851 thousand former German citizens from the interwar province were verified as Poles\footnote{Bahlcke, op. cit., 160-1; Boda-Krezel, op. cit., 130-1.} while close to one million members of the DVL groups III and IV as well as 70 per cent (140 thousand) of the DVL group II were rehabilitated as Poles\footnote{D Janak Neklidna hranice II (Slezske pohranici v letech 1945-1957) Casopis Slezskeho Zemskeho Muzea (Series B, No 2, 1993) 162; Palys, op. cit., 14, 37, 68-9.}. What is more, Moravecs who declared themselves to be Czechs constituted a bone of contention between Warsaw and Prague. Five thousand of them fled to Czechoslovakia, and the remaining 5-9 thousand were verified as Poles or expelled to Germany\footnote{Albeit the terms: de-Germanization and re-Polonization reflect the nature of the actions undertaken by the Polish authorities in Silesia after 1945 quite well, the latter one is more ideologically-laden. Basically, in the line with Polish nationalism, its underlying assumption is that Silesia has always been ethnically and culturally Polish, and that the perceived Germanness of this region is just a late and thin Nineteenth-century veneer covering the robust Polish core. Linek, op. cit.}.

Integration of Lower and Upper Silesia was based on the myth that the Deutsche Ostgebiete were archaically Polish lands which got robbed by Germans, and after the war returned to Poland in an act of historical justice. What was left to be done was the task of ethnic homogenization of such a reshaped postwar Polish nation-state. As verification and especially rehabilitation were directly based on the German DVL policy, the Gleichschaltung of the Volksgemeinschaft was the model for the Polish policies of odenieczanie (de-Germanization) and repolonizacja (re-Polonization)\footnote{Albeit the terms: de-Germanization and re-Polonization reflect the nature of the actions undertaken by the Polish authorities in Silesia after 1945 quite well, the latter one is more ideologically-laden. Basically, in the line with Polish nationalism, its underlying assumption is that Silesia has always been ethnically and culturally Polish, and that the perceived Germanness of this region is just a late and thin Nineteenth-century veneer covering the robust Polish core. Linek, op. cit.}. De-Germanization aimed at removing the German population as well as the remnants of the German culture in their entirety, while re-Polonization at filling the Deutsche Ostgebiete with Polish population and at changing the identity of the verified (and also of the rehabilitated, but to a lesser degree as they were considered to have been appropriately re-Polonized in the interwar period) so that they would adopt the ideology of Polish nationalism as their own\footnote{Ociepka, op. cit., 25.}. Those verified were dubbed in the official language as Autochthons (this is, archaically Polish population) and sometimes this label was extended to cover the rehabilitated whom the average Pole tended to call with the pejoratively-tinted term of the Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans), which the national socialist authorities used in relation to the members of the DVL as well as to other ethnic Germans who did not possess German citizenship and resided outside the 1938 borders of the Third Reich (cf.: Eichenberger, op. cit., 34-9).
In the framework of re-Polonization repatriates from the Kresy, settlers from central Poland and repatriates from Western Europe and the Soviet Union constituted, in 1950, 94.9 per cent of the Wrocław Voivodeship’s (largely corresponding to Lower Silesia) population of 1,678 thousand. The same groups accounted only for one-third of the population of the postwar Silesian Voivodeship (corresponding to the wartime Province of Upper Silesia) of 2,800 thousand, while the rehabilitated and the verified added up to one-third of the populace each, this is, to about 1,100 thousand. Therefore, de-Germanization proved much more painful in Upper Silesia as it was not applied only to the landscape as in Lower Silesia, but also to the two-thirds of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia. Thus in the latter case, de-Germanization did not only mean Polonization of place names, removal of German inscriptions and destruction of publications and prints in German, and monuments as in Lower Silesia, but also the ban on the use of the German language, Polonization of names and surnames, and gradual onslaught on the Szlonzokian tradition paradoxically considered as pro-German though it had constituted the very basis for the ideological claim that the Szlonzoks and their region are part of Polishdom.

Szlonzoks guilty of the pro-German stance, this is, those reluctant to comply with the demands of de-Germanization, were brought into line with official warnings or fines. If they persisted, they could be moved to a worse flat or given a worse job, and even incarcerated or sent to a special forced labor camp at Gliwice (Gleiwitz). Moreover, the indubitably Polish one-third of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia, usually considered Szlonzoks to by crypto-Germans and their dialect/creole the German language. Szlonzoks were severely underrepresented in the administration and in the communist party ranks, and the Polish citizenship they gained in a very humiliating manner through verification/rehabilitation could be always revoked (especially prior to 1950) at a whim of a civil servant or a communist party functionary.

De-Germanization and re-Polonization were decreed to have achieved their goals in full after 1948 and no activities in their framework were undertaken after 1950 (though they remained the dogmas of Polish nationalism). But albeit the removal of the external remnants of Germanness was attained, the de facto condemning of Upper Silesia’s verified/rehabilitated to the role of the second-class citizens tolerated only for the sake of their qualifications indispensable for running the Upper Silesian industry, caused them to perceive the Germans as culturally and ethnically closer to them than the Poles. This pro-German feeling was fortified by the communist take-over in Poland, the re-establishment of severed links with relatives in Germany via correspondence, and the founding of the FRG which seemed to be a better option than any socialist and Soviet-dominated state (such as Poland or the GDR).

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802 They were repatriates only in the propaganda terminology, because actually they were expelled from the Kresy seized by the Soviet Union.
803 Bahlcke, op. cit., 189.
804 In popular Polish usage this postwar Silesian Voivodeship is referred to as the Silesian-Dabrowa Voivodeship though such name was not introduced by any official document.
805 Linek, op. cit.
806 Prior to the reception of the citizenship, they had to sign a letter of unwavering loyalty to the Polish nation, as well as to pay for the citizenship so they dubbed it the 25-zloty citizenship. On more instances of such humiliation see: Ch Th Stoll Die Rechtstellung der deutschen Staatsangehörigen in den polnisch verwalteten Gebieten. Zur Integration der sogenanneten Autochthonen in die polnische nation (Frankfurt/M and Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag 1968) passim.
808 Ibid. 131-41.
In result many of the Upper Silesian verified/rehabilitated wished to renounce their Polish citizenship and leave for Germany. The indubitable Germans from Lower Silesia also shared this attitude despite the fact that in 1951 they were offered Polish citizenship and together with it a modicum of minority rights (German schools, press, cultural institutions and associations). Obviously such concessions could not be offered to the Szlonzoks officially considered to be Poles. In this situation the Polish and German Red Cross organizations were able to secure the emigration of 40-56 thousand persons from Poland to the FRG/GDR during the Action Link (1950-51). This so-called akcja laczenia rodzin (ALR, action for the reunion of families) instead of rounding up the expulsions opened the emigratory trickle which has continued to this day. Although in 1952-55 only 1,800 persons left Poland for Germany the change was to come in 1956 when de-Stalinization made it to Poland.

The growing displeasure of the Upper Silesian verified/rehabilitated with the Polish state was not abated by the continued practice of limiting their allowed sphere of upward career mobility to manual jobs and low rank communist party positions while reserving white collar and management positions in the industry, the administration, the educational system and the party for indubitable Poles. What is more, the school closed, for Upper Silesia’s young verified/rehabilitated persons and their children, the way to higher/secondary education aiming rather at teaching them proper Polish than educating them. The stereotypical belief was rife that basic vocational education for the Szlonzok (this is, a verified/rehabilitated Upper Silesian) was more than enough because he would not strive for anything more. The authorities fortified this self-fulfilling prophecy, having had earlier expelled the Upper Silesia intelligentsia (teachers, intellectuals, clergy) in 1945-46, by directing Szlonzokian school-leavers to industrial jobs and making Szlonzokian males do their compulsory military service not in the army but in mines as free labor.

To a large extent the same predicament was suffered by the indubitable Germans of Lower Silesia excluded from majority of available career paths because of their nationality. Despite the toning down of the nationalist rhetoric with the introduction of the new citizenship act (1951) which did not equalize Polish nationality with Polish citizenship (so that indubitable Germans could obtain it), the close union of nationalism and socialism in the official line (authorized by the example of Stalin’s espousal of the ideology of Russian nationalism during the conflict with Hitler) continued, and, in Upper Silesia, with the predominance of the former. It became even more pronounced after the death of Stalin (1953) when any semblance of socialist internationalism was dropped and Polish nationalist activists were rehabilitated inasmuch as they were not anti-communist. This trend culminated in 1956 when Władysław Gomułka was permitted to seize the power in Poland as a Polish communist thus also gaining the support of Polish anti-communist emigre circles who recognized him as the author of the Polonization of the Deutsche Ostgebiete. Simultaneously, the Polish nation-state was homogenized administratively through

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Prior to 1951, they had been stateless and had not possessed any identification documents issued by the Polish state (cf.: Cz Osekowski Spoleczenstwo Polski zachodniej i polnocnej w latach 1945-1956 (Zielona Gora: WSP 1994) 127).

\[810\]
According to the official statistics, besides the verified/rehabilitated, only 681 indubitable Germans resided in Upper Silesia in 1952 (Ibid., 128)

\[811\]
These organizations were responsible for most human-level relations between Poland and the FRG because the states did not establish formal diplomatic links until Bonn decided to recognize Poland’s western border in 1970.

\[812\]
Osekowski op. cit., 133-4.

\[813\]
Reichling, op. cit., 41.

\[814\]

\[815\]
Ph Ther Dzieje poszukiwania identyfikacji narodowej i regionalnej w sowieckiej strefie okupacyjnej i NRD w latach 1945-1953 In: B Linek et al. (eds.) Fenomen nowoczesnego nacjonalizmu w Europie środkowej (Opole: Instytut Slaski 1997) 124; A Walicki Marksizm i skok do krolestwa wolnosci, Dzieje komunistycznej
centralization, which in the case of the Deutsche Ostgebiete meant breaking the territories down into smaller units which would contain areas of various traditional regional origin. Hence, in 1950, the north-western fragment of Lower Silesia was transferred from the Wroclaw Voivodeship to the newly-established Zielona Gora (Grünberg) Voivodeship, the Silesian Voivodeship was split into the Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeships (corresponding to the wartime Upper Silesia’s Regencies of Oppeln and Kattowitz though the industrial Gliwice (Gleiwitz)-Bytom (Beuthen) which had belonged to the former, was included in the Katowic Voivodeship), and two Lower Silesian counties were transferred from the Wroclaw Voivodeship to the Opole Voivodeship.

Nationalism, socialism and centralization so much clashing with the Upper Silesian tradition of multiculturalism, free entrepreneurship and self-government, alienated the Szlonzokian verified/rehabilitated the more inciting them to espouse Germanness. In 1952 the authorities requested the adult populace to fill in questionnaires as the first step to the introduction and issuance of internal passports (dowody osobiste). Although the category of nationality was dropped from the Polish censuses and statistics in 1946 with the assumption that the ideal of the clean Polish nation-state had been achieved, this category re-appeared in the questionnaires. Consequently, in the Opole Voivodeship 67 thousand persons declared German nationality and more than 12 thousand in the Katowice Voivodeship. Moreover, in the Opole Voivodeship 1.5 thousand persons declared German citizenship and 1.8 thousand refused to fill in this questionnaire whereas in the Katowice Voivodeship 900 persons declared German citizenship, 5.2 thousand temporary Polish citizenship, 3.7 thousand claimed to be stateless, and 8.2 thousand refused to fill in this questionnaire.

Reprisals followed in the manner known from the de-Germanization and re-Polonization actions of the latter half of the 1940s. Persons considered to be ring leaders were incarcerated, activists were laid off from their jobs, and the administration and the security forces pressed others to change their declarations into Polish nationality. There was even a plan designed that those who would not conform, would be resettled and dispersed in the Rzeszow and Lublin Voivodeships in eastern Poland. It was not carried

In 1975 the further centralization of the state with the aim of limiting the regional differences and doing away with the remaining self-government, deprived the Opole Voivodeship of the Olesno (Rosenberg) and Raciborz counties which were transferred to the newly-established Czestochowa (Tschenstochau) Voivodeship, respectively. On the other hand, some Upper Silesian areas from the even more diminished Katowice Voivodeship, were transferred to the newly-established Bielsko-Biała (Bielitz-Biala) Voivodeship. In regard to Lower Silesia, the vast areas detached from the Wroclaw Voivodeship, were the basis for establishing the new voivodeships of Jelenia Gora (Hirschberg), Legnica (Liegnitz) and Walbrzych (Waldenburg). Some Lower Silesian areas were also transferred to the new voivodeships of Kalisz (Kalisch) and Leszno (Lissa).

These areas were quite depopulated as in the framework of the Action Vistula (Akcja Wislaw, 1947) the remaining several hundred thousand of Ukrainians and Lemkos (who had not been expelled to the Soviet Union in 1944-46) were expelled from their homeland and dispersed all around Poland. Nowadays their number is estimated at 180-500 thousand. Most of them live in the north-eastern and south-eastern corners of Poland, but the third most significant place of their residence is Lower Silesia. Lower Silesia is also the center of the Lemko movement (their number is estimated at 50 thousand) striving for creation of the Lemko Carpatho-Rusyn nation together with the akin Ruthenians from Slovakia, Ukraine and Canada. In 1947 there were 5 thousand families, this is, 24 thousand persons labelled as Ukrainians in Lower Silesia. In 1961, the number of Ukrainians in Lower Silesia stabilized at 25 thousand. Out of this number 19 thousand can be considered to have been Lemkos (B Berdychowska et al. (eds) Mniejszosci narodowe w Polsce w 1993 roku (Warsaw: Biuro do Spraw Mniejszosi Narodowych przy Ministerstwie Kultury i Sztuki 1994) 10; B Berdychowska et al. (eds.) Mniejszosci narodowe w Polsce. Informator 1994 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 1995) 22-4; Iwanicki, op. cit., 75; K Pudlo polityka panstwa polskiego wobec ludnosci ukraińskiej (1944-1991) Sprawy Narodowościowe (No 1(2), 1993) 153-7; A Sakson Mniejszosc niemiecka na tle innych mniejszosci narodowych we wspolczesnej Polsce Przegląd Zachodni (No 2, 1991) 8; R Zerlik mniejszosc ukrainska w Polsce po II wojnie swiatowej In:
out because it could have impaired the functioning and output of the crucial Upper Silesian industrial basin".

This continued repressive attitude of the authorities toward the Upper Silesian verified/rehabilitated enforced the self-enclosing of the group apparent in endogamy and in cultivation of the everyday culture much different from the Polish norm, and with time based on the model of the consumerist society seeping into Upper Silesia from the FRG of the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) via correspondence, perusal of the West German press (customarily passed from one person to another), and especially through listening to the West Berlin RIAS radio station. In consequence, sociologists estimate that more than half of the 770 thousand verified residing in Upper Silesia in 1950 considered themselves to be Germans already in 1945, while the other half Szlonzoks. Paradoxically, due to forced Polonization without any regard for the Szlzonkian tradition, about 270 thousand Szlonzoks had become Germans by 1955, and only 115 thousand stack to Szlonzokianness or regarded themselves as Poles. Moreover, at least 130 thousand verified persons possessed various documents (issued by UK and US embassies as well as the FRG authorities) which reaffirmed their German citizenship. Also many of the one million rehabilitated shared the same pro-German attitude but the percentage of those of them who continued to feel themselves as Szlonzoks and Poles was rather larger.

In 1956 facing the impossibility of further carrying out of the policies of de-Germanization and re-Polonization, as well as the indubitable German presence, the communist party authorities of the Opole Voivodeship decided that the only thing to do was to recognize the de facto German minority. But it would go against the Polish raison d'état doing away with the very argument of the archaic Polishness of the verified population, which justified the incorporation of Upper Silesia into Poland. So no such recognition was granted, and establishment of a regional Szlonzokian organization at Opole, which would secure proportional representation of Szlonzoks in the state and communist party administration, and introduce a modicum of regional autonomy, was not allowed either. A regional Szlonzokian organization would have clashed with the logic of the model of the homogenous and centralized nation-state propagated by communists and nationalists.

In the wake of the 1956 liberalization, which commenced de-Stalinization in Poland, 103 thousand verified/rehabilitated persons from Upper Silesia were allowed to leave for the FRG in 1956-59 in the framework of the ALR. During the same period 48 thousand indubitable Germans from Lower Silesia left for the FRG and around 7 thousand for the GDR. Thus their number in the official statistics dropped to 900 in 1961 though in the light of the size of their later emigration the estimate of 3 thousand is more probable.


825. Lis, op. cit., 44; Ociepka, op. cit., 42, 47.
826. Lis, op. cit., 45; Ociepka, op. cit., 46; Sakson 1991, op. cit., 17.
When the emigration did not bring about the establishing of political links between Poland and the FRG, and negatively influenced the Upper Silesian industry, Warsaw closed the ALR unilaterally. Although no agreement regulated further emigration from Poland to the FRG in 1960-70, pressure exerted by West German diplomats and by persons striving to leave, was an argument enough for the Polish administration to allow them to especially if those persons presented the unwavering pro-German stance. In that period 72 thousand verified/rehabilitated persons from Upper Silesia, and 7-8 thousand indubitable Germans and verified persons from Lower Silesia left for the FRG. The number of indubitable Germans in Lower Silesia decreased to 2 thousand in 1970, and their socio-cultural organization with the membership of 500, since 1977, had to be administered by the state due to the lack of activists who would do the day-to-day organizational work. In 1971 the population of Upper Silesia’s verified and their descendants was estimated at 730 thousand in the Opole Voivodeship. Similarly, the number of the region’s rehabilitated and their descendants must have oscillated around 800-900 thousand then.

By 1970 also one elementary school and the few organizations of the Lower Silesian Bohemians (Czechs) had disappeared because most of them had left for the FRG/GDR besides Czechoslovakia, while the rest got assimilated or prefers not to emphasize their national identity outside their families. However, 2 thousand of them survive there to this day organized in the two parishes of the evangelical Reformed Church as almost all of them are Protestants.

Before delving into the 1970s, it is necessary to concentrate on the 1968 events. As an indirect result of power struggle within the communist party, they did not influence the situation of the verified/rehabilitated in Upper Silesia or indubitable Germans, but the anti-Jewish dimension of these events brought about the liquidation of the Jewish community which had found their seemingly safe haven in Lower Silesia. Many survivors of the Holocaust had moved into this region when their situation had become precarious after the pogroms perpetrated at Kielce and elsewhere in central and eastern Poland in 1945-46. In 1946 there were 100 thousand Jews in Lower Silesia but due to further emigration their number dropped to 30-32 thousand in 1948 before stabilizing at 7-8 thousand in 1961. In that period they constituted from one-third to a half of all the remaining Jewry in Poland. After 1968 most left Poland, and, in 1992, only 400-500 of them lived in the region, mostly in Wroclaw which still houses the only Jewish theater left in Poland (it stages plays in Yiddish).

In December 1970 Bonn recognized Poland’s western border and diplomatic ties were established between Poland and the FRG. Warsaw reciprocated by stating that in Poland [...] a certain group of people of German national identity and persons of predominantly this identity in [ethnically] mixed families remained, and by taking the decision to allow them to leave for one of the two

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827 Linek In: Cordell (ed) [Forthcoming], op. cit.
828 About 20 thousand verified persons lived in Lower Silesia in 1952 (Osekowski, op. cit., 120).
831 Pudlo 1995, op. cit., passim.
832 The prewar Jewish population of Lower and Upper Silesia perished in the Holocaust and the few surviving individuals left for Israel, Germany, the US and other states.
834 The GDR had recognized the border in 1950 but it did not amount to anything binding in the light of international law as the FRG was the only successor state of the Third Reich, and, moreover, the GDR had not been recognized as a state outside the Soviet bloc until the 1970s (cf.: D Blumenwitz What is Germany? Exploring Germany’s status after World War II (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen 1989)).
Germanies. Obviously almost nobody left for the GDR because (unlike in the early 1950s) the state was considered untrue Germany and an extension of the oppressive socialist Poland (less Polish nationalism) which would not allow the fulfillment of the consumerist ethos cultivated among the Upper Silesian verified/rehabilitated. In 1971-75 28 thousand verified/rehabilitated persons from Upper Silesia left for the FRG and 2-3 thousand indubitable Germans and verified persons from Lower Silesia.

In 1975, after the signature of the Helsinki Accord at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the Polish leader Edward Gierek agreed that 125 thousand persons more would be allowed to leave Poland through 1979 on the conditions agreed in 1970. At the same time Schmidt secured DM 1.3 billion to cover pensions of the former German citizens living in Poland and the loan to the tune of DM 1 billion needed for bolstering the inefficient Polish socialist economy. This indirect German reciprocation caused the West German media to accuse the federal government of trafficking in people.

In 1976-79 87 thousand persons left for the FRG from Upper Silesia and 1-2 thousand from Lower Silesia before the severe economic crisis pushed 10 million of Poles (organized in the Solidarity independent trades union) to threaten the communist party’s power monopoly with their demands of democracy and freedom in 1980-81. In that brief period of free opinion unencumbered by censorship, leading Solidarity activists appealed for recognizing the existence of national minorities in Poland and granting them with appropriate rights in an effort to return to the pre-Nineteenth tradition of Poland-Lithuania dubbed as the Republic of many nations. Jan Jozef Lipski expressed this view most distinctly at the first (and also last) country-wide congress of the Solidarity independent trades union in October 1981.

The introduction of the martial law in December 1981 abruptly ended the short period of freedom, but in anticipation of this move, in 1980-81, the legal and illegal emigration from Upper Silesia to the FRG had peaked 37 thousand. At the turn of the 1970s and the 1980s when the serious economic crisis started, and throughout the 1980s when it was worsened by the embargo and the political isolation of Poland in the context of the Soviet bloc crumbling under the economic burden exerted by the attempt to match the US futuristic armament initiatives known as the Star Wars; most humanitarian aid came from the FRG in the form of millions of food and clothes parcels donated by people (many of whom had just emigrated from Poland) and NGOs. Moreover, in the scope of its Ostpolitik, Bonn was the very first Western government seeking rapprochement with the Polish junta of gen Wojciech Jaruzelski. Warsaw could not afford to lose this possibility of being gradually accepted back into the international community, and paid only lip service to the official line reasserting time and again that no Germans had been left in Poland after the ALR and the authorized 1970s emigration. In consequence, in 1982-85, the legal and illegal emigration from Upper Silesia to the FRG soared to 62 thousand persons, and skyrocketed to close to 100 thousand in 1986-88, and to 35-50 thousand out of a quarter of a million people.

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836 Bahlcke, op. cit., 183; Korbel, op. cit., 34.
838 Bahlcke, op. cit., 183; Korbel, op. cit., 37.
839 Of course the term natio used in the Latin original of this phrase has a starkly different meaning from the modern nation, but there is no space to discuss this matter here.
840 Eichenberger, op. cit., 63-4.
841 Legal emigration was authorized by the authorities whereas illegal emigration happened equally often when a person on a holiday in a foreign country outside the Soviet bloc (usually in Yugoslavia, Austria or West Berlin) decided to defect.
842 Korbel, op. cit., 38.
who left Poland for the FRG in 1989 the year of the fall of communism. In 1982-89 also 20 thousand persons left Lower Silesia for the FRG.

Warsaw allowed this increasing emigration in order to satisfy Bonn’s desire to enable all the Germans of Poland to leave for the FRG but, also, because it made more food, consumer goods and flats/houses available for the impoverished Polish citizens who did not have the option to emigrate. What is more, with every person leaving for the FRG the Poland became a really homogenous nation-state. But with such a massive emigration from Poland to Germany and equally massive humanitarian aid flowing the other way round, the border became quite permeable since around the mid-1980s. So the self-help groups of Upper Silesia’s verified/rehabilitated, and Lower Silesia’s indubitable Germans and verified persons which, beginning with 1982, started to coalesce in Upper and Lower Silesia with the aim to press the authorities to let them leave for the FRG, gave way to attempts to establish an organization of Germans in Poland, not without some organizational aid from the Silesian Vertriebene organizations in the FRG. Norbert Gaida from Upper Silesia applied for registration of such an organization in 1983 and 1984. In 1984 also 17 persons from all over Poland submitted an application to this end. All the requests were turned down on the ground that the negligent number of Germans remaining in Poland did not justify establishment of such an organization. Subsequently, the security forces harassed the initiators into leaving for the FRG. In December 1985, in the Upper Silesian town of Racibor (Ratibor), Blasius Hanczuch organized the Deutscher Freundschaftskreis (DFK, German Circle of Friendship) without any attempt at registering it with the authorities. The number of the DFKs dynamically multiplied. Its membership rose to 5 thousand in 1987, and though the security forces closely observed and harassed the DFK activists, it was not a deterrent enough to prevent them from meeting German journalists and diplomats, eventually, in January 1988, the DFK representatives met the FRG’s Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the West German embassy in Warsaw. This event opened the way to the recognition of the German minority in Poland in early 1990 when the first regional organizations of the Upper Silesian Germans were registered. At the same time, the largely latent organization of Lower Silesia’s indubitable Germans at Walbrzych (Waldenburg) surviving since the 1950s, became active again, and its branches opened all over the region again.

This emigration which severely depleted the population of Upper Silesia making it into the largest area of emigration in the postwar Poland, beginning with the 1960s and 1970s, increasingly, also embraced the most surprising groups of the Upper Silesian verified/rehabilitated, namely: Polish movement activists from the interwar province, the pro-Polish insurrectionists from the Silesian Uprisings (1919, 1920, 1921) and their children, as well as Catholic clergy. The local clergy were not ideologically connected to Polishdom like the former two groups, and persisted in their decision to stay in order to serve the spiritual needs of their Upper Silesian faithful despite persecutions suffered at the hands of Polish superiors and, especially the security forces. But the participation of the Polish Roman

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843 Anon. In der Heimat bleiben/pozostac w ojczyznie Auslandskurier (No 17 June, 1996) 11-12; Bahlcke, op. cit., 183; Eichenberger, op. cit., 76; Lis, op. cit., 47.
844 The German term Vertriebene (expellees) covers those persons who fled, were evacuated or expelled from their homeland (for instance, Silesia), or left it as Aussiedler (resettlers) after the official end of the expulsions.
847 These uprisings which usually amounted only to some riots (with the exception of the third one), are dubbed Silesian though they took place exclusively in the east of Upper Silesia on the incitement of clandestine Polish military organizations, because Poland gained only a fragment of Upper Silesia in 1922 so that there was no incentive to introduce the distinction between Upper and Lower Silesia in the Polish mass media. On the other hand, the consistent use of the name of Silesia for Poland’s section of Upper Silesia played in the hands of the nationalists voicing the Polish claim to the whole of Silesia, especially at the close of World War II.
Catholic Church in the integration of the Deutsche Ostgebiete into the Polish state through building up its own ecclesiastical administration in the territories as well as maintaining the traditional conjunction of Polish Catholicism with Polish nationalism, made 188 Upper Silesian priests leave for the FRG in 1956-1976. 77 of them even did so without having secured appropriate permission from the Opole bishop which caused him to intervene on this matter in the Vatican.

In answer to these problems, in 1977, the pope elevated to the rank of the Opole bishop father Alfons Nossol of the local Szlonzokian/German Upper Silesian stock. Nossol decided to bring back the traditional bilingualism of the region liquidated by the German national socialist and Polish communist authorities, and introduced German as a compulsory subject to the curricula of the diocesan seminary already in 1977. In 1984 Polish primate cardinal Jozef Glemp officially denied the need of offering pastoral service in German as, according to him, no Germans remained in Poland. His stance changed with the pope’s pronouncements at the close of the 1980s, which reaffirmed that observance of minority rights was the condition of lasting peace, and when Glemp noticed that large Polish minority groups existed on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The first public Protestant celebration in German was held in German in Lower Silesia in April 1988, and its Catholic counterpart in Upper Silesia in October the same year. eventually in 1989 Nossol obtained from the pope the official permission to celebrate masses in German, and since June 1989 they have regularly taken place in Upper Silesian Catholic churches. The authority of the Church not only did facilitate registration of the organizations of the Upper Silesian Germans but also contributed to practical re-introduction of the German language and culture into this region.

In 1950-89 89 thousand indubitable Germans and verified persons left Lower Silesia, and 558 thousand verified/rehabilitated persons Upper Silesia for the FRG. Thus, in the re-united Germany 2,820 thousand Lower Sileanians and 1,649 thousand Upper Sileseans resided in 1989. At the same time the number of Germans in Lower Silesia amounted to about 1-2 thousand, the number of Germans/Szlonzoks (this is, verified persons and their children) amounted to about 350-500 thousand in Upper Silesia which also houses a similar number of the rehabilitated and their children. From the

849 The Holy See recognized it only in 1972 following Bonn’s recognition of Poland’s western border.
851 Interestingly, he is of German origin and some of his relatives live in Germany.
853 Bahlcke, op. cit., 183.
854 Bahlcke, op. cit., 183; G Dallinger and R Thomas (eds.) Datenreport 1994. Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 1994) 23; Lis, op. cit, 47; Reichling, op. cit, 64; G Reichling Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen (Part II: 40 Jahre Eingliederung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen 1989) 30.

This number also includes the several thousand Moravets/Czechs who did not flee to Czechoslovakia in 1945-50. After 1989 almost all of them became Germans (Palys, op. cit., 69).

857 The number of the verified and the rehabilitated persons with their children in Upper Silesia, adds up to 700-1,000 thousand which agrees with the German estimates of the number of Germans in this region. However, it should be borne in mind that the basis for this calculation is not perceived ethnicity or self-declaration but the legal effects of Art 116 of the FRG’s Grundgesetz (Basic Law), which allow the overwhelming majority of the verified and the rehabilitated (who prior to 1945 had been German citizens or gained this citizenship via the DVL) and their descendants to reclaim their German citizenship which has not been nullified by the post-1945 acquisition of the Polish citizenship because this acquisition has not been legally effective in the view of the German law.

As of 1 January 1993 the right to reclaim German citizenship by descendants of the verified/rehabilitated was limited to persons born before this date, with the introduction of the Kriegsgefolgenbereinigungsgesetz.
ethnic point of view most of the verified/rehabilitated and their descendants have multiple identity, this is, feel themselves to be Szlonzoks and Poles, Szlonzoks and Germans, Szlonzoks and Germans and Poles at the same time. Obviously, some feel to be only Szlonzoks, Poles or Germans, and in the case of others their identity oscillates among its national, regional and multiple variants. Most of the verified tend to lean toward Germandom and/or Szlonzokiandom whereas majority of the rehabilitated toward Szlonzokiandom and/or Polishdom.

Although in 1990-93 23 thousand verified/rehabilitated persons left for Germany from Upper Silesia and 3 thousand indisputable Germans and verified persons from Lower Silesia and this emigratory has continued at the level of about one thousand persons from Poland every year, the post-1989 emigration from Silesia is the matter of personal choice in the context of the Polish democracy where human and minority rights are observed and guaranteed by bilateral and multilateral treaties as well as the international jurisdiction of the Council of Europe. So in no way this emigration amounts to a form of ethnic cleansing as it used to before the fall of communism.

To reiterate, the basing of the postwar Polish nation-state and Polish nationalism on the anti-German paradigm contributed to the alienation of the verified/rehabilitated who were claimed to be archaic part of the Polish nation and as such constituted an ideological justification of the incorporation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete and the expulsion of the German populace. Neither did it allow indubitable Germans to identify with Poland as citizens because the granting of Polish citizenship in 1951 came too late after 6 years of maltreatment and humiliation. Humiliation was also measured out to the verified/rehabilitated in the form of the policies of de-Germanization/re-Polonization (1945-49) which prescribed for them the position of Poland’s second-class citizens (indispensable for the economy but distrusted) in 1950-89. The discrimination they suffered in the 1950s was the matter of course for other groups such as anti-communist opposition, prewar civil servants and Ukrainians/Lemkos. However, the first two groups were not singled out for their ideological stance not ethnicity, and the ethnicity of the third group was not denied.

Opportunistically, on the part of the Polish administration, the verified/rehabilitated were considered to be Poles at the ideological level, but were treated as Germans/non-Poles at the level of everyday practice. It pushed them toward Germandom, and in the view of no possibility to better their lot in Poland, to leaving for the FRG. This option was unavailable to the three aforementioned groups, and the verified/rehabilitated as well as indubitable Germans strove to make the full use of it.

In the communist times going abroad and especially to the West was a severely rationed good. Moreover, one was issued a passport only when one secured obtaining of a permit to go abroad. Upon return one was obliged to return one’s passport immediately. The same restrictions applied to the verified/rehabilitated and indubitable Germans. However, it was much more difficult to obtain a permit to leave Poland. Emigration was considered to be high treason so those of the verified/rehabilitated and indubitable Germans who wanted to leave (even if international agreements secured the right for them) were habitually stripped of civil rights, property, accommodation, job for unregulated periods of time before actually allowed to leave destitute and shaken by this experience. If one’s relatives were civil servants in the West German administration or served in the Bundeswehr, one could be permitted to leave only on the condition that one would become a Polish spy in the FRG. Another trick was to let one leave but for the GDR not the FRG. The custom was that one was allowed to take to the FRG little or

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Consequences Consolidation Act). However, should their parents reclaim this citizenship, it would be extended to them too (cf.: K Cordell Retreat from ethnicity? Upper Silesia and German-Polish relations (Plymouth: Plymouth International papers 1995) 20; A Wolf Der Status des Spätaussiedlers nach dem Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (Wiesbaden; Kommunal- und Schul-Verlag 1996)).

858 D Berlinska In: Lis, op. cit., 140; T Kamusella Niemcy i Polacy w oczach Gornoslazakow Kultura i Spoleczenstwo (No 1, 1997) 151.
859 Bahlcke, op. cit., 183.
861 Personal communication from a DFK member in Renska Wies (Reinschdorf).
nothing of one’s moveable possessions, and, prior to that, one’s real estate had had to be sold at
ridiculously low state prices or the state had simply seized it. In the socialist economy of scarcity
corruption was rife, so bribes ranging from exorbitantly large sums of money to real estate and sexual
services had to be given to civil servants/communist party functionaries responsible for issuing
emigration permits and passports. Should one try to leave Poland illegally (this is, without a permit), the
practice was to allow only one member of a family to go to the West at one time. Hence, such a decision
amounted to the separation with one’s dearest which could last even more than 5 years before one’s
family was allowed to join one in the FRG.

The difficulties one encountered on one’s way to the FRG the more reassured the
verified/rehabilitated and indubitable Germans that they were second-class citizens in Poland causing the
most dynamic of them to leave faster and those daunted by the problems entailed by such emigration the
more to hide their identity and displeasure with the socialist reality of the Polish nation-state. For
Warsaw, on one hand, it meant potential human capital in the relations with the FRG which could be
bartered for various political concessions or hard currency, and the docile highly qualified work force, on
the other. Moreover, the more left for the FRG and the more suppressed the remaining ones became, the
more truth was lent to the claim that Poland had been the model of an ethnically clean nation-state since
1950.

Although this assumption was somehow valid in the respect to indubitable Germans,
Bohemians/Czecks and Jews of Lower Silesia after whose departure the region was left as purely Polish
as never before, this approach made most of the verified and many of the rehabilitated into Germans,
while most of the rehabilitated into Szlonzoks, and made many pro-Polish Upper Silesian activists to
renounce their aspiration to become one with Polishdom in favor of securing decent life for their families
in the FRG. It is doubtful if such identity changes had not occurred if the above-analyzed repressive
enationalizing policies had not been implemented. The communist system was at loggerheads with the
Szlonzokian ethos based on Catholicism, private entrepreneurship and property, and participatory

862 During the communist period the only true market was the black market, and one reckoned prices in
accordance to the black market exchange rate of the US dollar or the Deutsche Mark when it came to selling or
purchasing something substantial.

863 Maciej Siembieda When all the rage was abroad The Warsaw Voice (November 7, 1993) 16.

864 The described mechanisms governing emigration to the FRG, I learned from personal communications of my
friends and relatives.

865 I do not consider here the fifteen thousand refugees (including 7 thousand Greeks, 7 thousand Macedonians, 1
thousand Kutzo-Vlachs) who arrived in Poland during the years 1952-55 following the defeat of the
communist forces in the Greek civil war. Most of them settled in Lower Silesia, and almost all left for the
Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia in Yougoslavia (1958-68) and for Greece (after 1975), but only when
they decided so, and not due to the administrative and social pressure as in the case of Upper Silesia’s
verified/rehabilitated or Lower Silesia’s indubitable Germans or verified (K Pudlo Grecy i Macedonczycy

Quite on the contrary, I would like to devote some space to the emigration of Rroms (Gypsies) from Silesia but
not research enough has been done in this field yet. One may only say that Silesia’s prewar Rroma population of
the Sinti group perished in the Holocaust. In the 1960s and 1970s when sedentization (as intended Polonization)
of Poland’s Rroms was carried out, many of them were forcefully settled in various Silesian cities and towns.
Most of them belong to the Polska Roma group. In the 1980s, due to prejudice and racism, some minor civil
servants/communist party functionaries decided to solve the Gypsy problem through harassing their local Rroma
populations to leave for the FRG. After 1989, quite a few Rroma refugees appeared in the UK and Germany
after the pogrom at Mlawa (1991) in northern Poland, and three more ones which have been perpetrated since
then (A Bartosz Nie boj sie Cygana (Sejny: Pogranicze 1994); D Kenrick and G Puxon Gypsies under the
swastika (Hatfield, Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press 1995); D Kenrick Foreign Gypsies and
British immigration law after 1945 In: Th Acton (ed) Gypsy politics and Traveller identity (Hatfield,
Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press 1997) 109; C Schmalz-Jacobsen and G Hansen (eds.) Kleines
Lexikon der ethnischen Minderheiten in Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 1997) 131).
democracy, so such a communist Poland less its nationalism, would not have attracted them to Polishdom either, and might have limited their shift to Germandom only a bit if at all.
Chapter nine

The German minority of Poland (which have predominantly concentrated in Silesia): its postwar origin and current situation

In the year 1995 encountering history is unavoidable because of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe. It is also impossible not to mention the obvious though commonly neglected fact that 1945 evokes various meanings and memories in people living in different countries of the old continent. It is simply VE for Western Europe, but on the other hand the beginning of the Soviet domination over Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover it should not be forgotten that the basic differentiation breaks down into smithereens when one tries to apply it to the defeated Third Reich. First of all, Germany and its capital Berlin were split among the Allies thus reflecting the emerging Cold War division of Europe. Furthermore, for the sake of the maintained war effort and for the promise of the USSR to participate in the final offensive against Japan, the Western Allies agreed that the secret Ribentropp-Molotov Pact should stay in force in its part which had authorized the wartime Soviet annexations. This political decision did inexorably combine the German and Polish questions together.

Seemingly Poland as well as the other Central European states left in the Soviet zone of influence could not be conveniently absorbed into the USSR as another set of Soviet republics. On the other hand, Poland could hardly exist as a state with one-third of its prewar territory truncated by the USSR, and with the Polish population widely dispersed outside the Polish boundaries. Stalin together with the other Allies "solved" this dilemma by having shifted Poland 300 km westwards to the Oder-Neisse line. So he effectively annexed the East German territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete), i.e.: Prussia, the larger chunk of Pomerania, the eastern part of Brandenburg, a sliver of Saxony and the majority of the area of Silesia. All the territories with the exception of the northern half of Prussia (which was directly incorporated into the USSR under the name of Kaliningrad Oblast), became the so-called Recovered Territories (in Polish Ziemie Odzyskane), and since then have constituted the western and northern regions of postwar Poland.

The post-1945 shift of the territory of Poland was followed by the expulsion of the Polish-speaking population from Poland's prewar eastern territories (so-called Kresy) lost to the USSR. The expellees together with Poles from relatively overcrowded and seriously damaged Central Poland and Galicia, were to settle the former German eastern territories.

This decision let Stalin make the Polish nation (which was traditionally strongly anti-Russian, as well as anti-Soviet and anti-communist) dependant on the USSR as the only guarantor of the very existence of the Polish state vis-a-vis not incomprehensible German enmity. Hence, using the imperial principle "to divide and rule" Stalin achieved several crucial goals of his European politics, namely: he weakened Western Europe by having detached the Central European states from it and so significantly furthered the Soviet sphere of influence westwards, he neutralized Germany having caused its permanent division, made Poland a docile puppet in his hand, and from the panslavic point of view he also broadened and reaffirmed Slavdom's territorial assets.

The losers of the game were Poles who were deprived of their homes in the East, and Germans who lost their Heimat because they had to accept the tenet of collective responsibility which was unilaterally imposed on them by the Allies decisions at Yalta and Potsdam. The victorious powers gave green light to the transfer of German populations in an orderly and humane manner. In the period 1945-1950 only in Central and Eastern Europe (without the USSR) c. 15 mln Germans were displaced, expelled or seized as forced labor by the Soviet Union, and c. 2 mln of them died in the process, according to other sources 13,4 mln were expelled and displaced, additional 4.5 mln perished during this period, and 2 mln remained in their homelands. Before World War II 1.2 mln ethnic Germans had lived in Poland (0.78 mln according to the 1931 Polish census) and 8.4 mln in the Deutsche Ostgebiete (excluding Stettin/Szczecin) and the Free City of Danzig/Gdansk which were
granted to Poland in 1945. It was the end of the 300-1000-year-old specific and highly diversified East German civilization, and of Prussia which had unified the German state in 1871.

The vast majority of the expellees from the would-be Polish territories east of the Oder-Neisse line were transported to the British and Soviet Occupation Zones with the exception of: a) qualified miners and specialists in the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) region and agricultural workers and experts in Western Pomerania since they could not be replaced by Polish counterparts; and b) the so-called Autochtons, i.e. the borderland populations of unclear national identity who were intended to be won for the sake of Polonization.

The plight of the two groups was equally harsh immediately after 1945 due to massive waves of rapes, looting, murders, and wanton destruction exacted in revenge for the years of brutal nazi occupation, first, by the Red Army in the first half of 1945, and later by the closely following ranks of the Polish troops, administration and settlers. From 1945 to 1948 the Germans who remained in the postwar Poland were deprived of any civil rights, expropriated and intimidated whereas their lands incorporated into the Polish administrative structure under the package of numerous acts and decrees issued by the Polish authorities.

However, one crucial difference could be observed in the Polish treatment of the two aforementioned groups of Germans. The specialists who had been retained to rebuild and develop agriculture and industry in Pomerania and Lower Silesia especially, were considered undoubted Germans by the Polish government who would allow them to leave for Germany as soon as they would not be needed by Poland’s economy. The Autochtons, on the contrary, were considered to be of Polish ethnic origin and as such were to be Polonized. In order to achieve the goal the Polish authorities embarked on the action of weryfikacja narodowosciowa (national verification), first they divided the population concerned into groups reflecting different degrees of Polishness (closely emulating the nazi system of the Deutsche Volksliste), and subsequently cleansed [it] from the German element. At the end of 1949 there were over 1,015 thousand positively verified Autochtons (i.e. 848,131 in Upper Silesia, 15,146 in Lower Silesia, 91,046 in Ermland (Warmia) and Masuren (Mazury), 37,152 in Gdansk/Danzig and former West Prussia (Powisle), 18,754 in Pomerania and 5,131 in Poznan (Posen) region). Several thousands of them never requested the authorities to nationally verify them, but, anyway, they were also granted Polish citizenship, while some were verified at a later date so the total figure of the Autochtons must have been bigger. In 1950 their number was estimated as 1.65 mln. At the end of this year there were also c. 300,000 undoubted Germans left in Poland though the Polish official statistics prefer to indicate only the retained German specialists who together with their families numbered 65,400 in 1947. The German sources give the figure of 1.7 mln as the number of Germans who remained in Poland during this time, so in their estimates they include the Autochthonous population.

Until 1950 the indubitable German children roamed aimlessly as no schooling was provided for them, and pensioners were not supported because they had earned their rights in Germany and now they lived in Poland. Other groups of the German population were also discriminated but their lot was more bearable as long as they were employed. In 1949 the former Deutsche Ostgebiete were taken away from under the special jurisdiction of the Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych (Ministry of the Regained Territories) and incorporated into the Polish state on the same legal footing as other regions. In 1950, after having been established in 1949, the German Democratic Republic made a treaty with Poland, accepting the Oder-Neisse line. This event lessened the postwar anti-German rhetoric (largely induced by the USSR and now channelled against the Federal Republic of Germany), and brought about two acts abolishing any sanctions against Germans living in Poland with the promise to remunerate for their lost property. Moreover in 1951 the liberal law was introduced allowing Germans to easily obtain Polish citizenship.

Consequently, the ban upon the use of German in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete was reversed with the exception of Upper Silesia and Mazury (Masuren) where the Autochthonous population was concentrated. In 1950 the Ministry of Education organized first kindergartens and schools with
German as the medium of instruction, and in 1951 the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) miners received their own paper Wir bauen auf, as well as agricultural cooperative workers in the Koszalin (Köslin) region their bimonthly insert in the local party paper Glos Koszalinski, entitled Der PGR Arbeiter. The Wroclaw (Breslau) daily Arbeiterstimme started to appear during the same year. It was to serve all the German minority in Poland with the exception of the Autochthons. Soon it reached the circulation of 80,000 copies. In the school year 1950/51 there were 68 schools with 5,455 students, in 1953/54 138 with 7,194 students. The periodicals and the schools were controlled by the Polish authorities and trusted German communists.

The first genuinely German initiative was the Freudschaft folk dance group established in 1952 in Walbrzych (Waldenburg). Almost 100 other choirs, dance and theater groups sprang up in the following years, and in 1956 550 performers attended the German amateur groups festival in Koszalin (Köslin).

The Polish authorities wanted the undoubted Germans to remain in Poland and to this end, in 1955 and 1957 the Central Committee of the PZPR (Polish United Workers Party) issued the instructions to improve living standards of the German population. However, when the undoubted Germans had wished to obtain Polish citizenship immediately after World War II, already in 1954 they had hesitated to participate in the communal elections unless it was guaranteed that they would not acquire Polish citizenship in this way. After the June 1956 disturbances in Poznan (Posen) the period of Stalinism in Poland was over and the so-called Odwilz (Thaw) started. Finally, after many years of renewed attempts the Niemieckie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne/Deutsche Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft (NTSK/DSKG, German Socio-Cultural Society) in Walbrzych (Waldenburg) was registered on April 5th, 1957. Its statutory area of activity was only Lower Silesia but it strove to represent all the indubitable Germans in Poland (the founding group of a similar society in Olsztyn (Allenstein) had left for West Germany before it even assembled). The NTSK/DSKG fostered social and cultural activities, and helped its members leave for West and East Germany though it was financed and controlled by the MSW (Ministry of Internal Security). However, after the period of 1952-1955 when only 1863/737 persons had been allowed to go to West Germany, the majority of the undoubted Germans decided to emigrate before the predicted end of the lenient policy, which did come at the beginning of the 1960s.

In 1960 there were only 5 German schools with 140 students and they closed down by 1963. Arbeiterstimme went defunct and its weekend inserts Wochenend-Magazin and Am Sontag were turned into the weekly Die Woche in Polen which was published in Wroclaw (Breslau) by 1960. The NTSK/DSKG became a dormant organization: its members numbered only 160 in the 1970s, and in 1988 the average age of the members was 63.

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Completely different treatment was meted out to the Autochthons. In the framework of Polonization, they were methodically deprived of their own institution, heritage, culture, and the right to speak in German and their specific Slavic dialects. Those who signed the Deutsche Volksliste No. 1 and No. 2 were expropriated, interned in forced labor/concentration camps or expelled to Germany. These measures were also haphazardly applied to other groups of the Autochthons. Especially cruelly the Mazurs were Polonized because they were Protestants but according to the common Polish saying The Pole is a Catholic. Their Church was subjugated to the Protestant bishopric in Warsaw, their churches were seized by the Polish Catholic Church, and there were cases when Mazurs and more frequently Mazurian orphans were made to convert to Roman Catholicism. The wide-spread harassment evoked the feeling of resistance especially in Upper Silesia where between 1945 and 1968 at least 18 underground groups existed. They were disconnected and before they could grow into an efficient network they were liquidated by the SB (Polish security forces) who together with the DDR-Staatssicherheit[ITALICS] also used some of the former to infiltrate the German/Upper Silesian society.
After 1948 Polonization was scaled down as counterproductive. Easing of the political line brought about more openness among the Autochtons. When in 1952 new internal passports were issued to the Polish citizens, more than 131,000 Autochtons declared themselves to be German and c. 16,000 refused to fill in the forms necessary to obtain such a passport. In 1953 grassroots demands for German periodicals appeared in schools based in Upper Silesia, but the communist authorities scared by the ideologically incorrect re-appearing of the German problem harassed and intimidated the persons concerned to change their declarations. Due to the decision to hush up the existence of the German minority among the Autochthonous population, the social status of the Upper Silesians and Mazurs, who were considered by Polish settlers as Germans, sank even lower. They became second class citizens (without their own intellectual elites which had been expelled or liquidated in 1945/46) who were severely underrepresented at managerial positions, in state administration and at secondary and tertiary schools.

After the Thaw has already started, in October 1956 Eryk Wyra, a member of the executive of the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Opole (Oppeln) (former member of the Komministische Partei Deutschland), stated that existence of the German minority in Upper Silesia must be acknowledged, German ought to be introduced to schools, and that everybody that wished so should be allowed to leave for West or East Germany. Already then, 60% of the copies of Arbeiterstimme destined for the indubitable Germans were bought out by the Autochtons although its distribution was restricted in Upper Silesia and Mazury (Masuren). In 1957 565 Germans from the Upper Silesian town of Strzelce Opolskie (Groß Strehlitz) sent their petition to the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Opole (Oppeln), demanding a school with German as the language of instruction. The authorities did not wish to accept existence of the German minority in the Autochthonous population because it clashed with the ideologically correct statistical data determining the number of Germans in Poland at 50,000. In such a situation, the people, as soon as it was only possible, emigrated from Poland. In the years 1956-59 275,000 (247,766) left Poland for Germany, i.e. five times more than the official number of the members of the German minority in Poland.

Thus, the Polish authorities could decide that the German problem had been solved for good. Anyway it must be remembered that in the official Polish-German relations from 1952 to 1982 the term German minority in Poland never cropped up, but only the question of family linking. Since then the official Polish propaganda claimed that there were no Germans left in the country, and that Poland had achieved the Stalinist ideal of the ethnically pure state. However, the Polish scholarly sources (in Poland’s postwar censuses there was no rubric nationality included) estimated the number of the German minority at 4,000 in 1961, 3,500 in 1971, and several thousands in 1978 and 1983. However the data clashed with the German sources and the emigration numbers from Poland to Germany. For instance from 1960 through 1970 116,242 Aussiedlers (ethnic German resettlers) came from Poland to West Germany, and 305,062 (305,064) in the years 1971-1982. And the German side claimed that there were still c. 1,1 mln ethnic Germans residing in Poland at the end of 1982. The bigger than assumed by the Polish authorities number of Germans in Poland is also reflected in German scholarly sources, e.g.: 765,000 in 1961, c. 700,000 German-speakers in 1971 and 900,000 in 1978.

The discrepancy was caused by the fact that Poland did not wish to recognize the existence of the German minority on its soil preferring to cling to the myth of the through and through Polish Autochtons. On the other hand, according to Art. 117 of the German Basic Law every citizen of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937, and his descendants have the right to return to Germany and to (re)obtain German citizenship. The right is also extended to former German descendants (and their descendants) who were deprived of their citizenship between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945. Hence, practically all the citizens of the war-time-size Third Reich, and their offspring can enjoy the right to return which by derivative legislation was extended to comprise also these ethnic Germans who have never lived within the German boundaries but are able to prove their German origin (cf. the Volga Germans in Russia). Consequently, almost all the Autochtons and indubitable Germans in Poland were (and still are) eligible for receiving German citizenship. Facing the prevalently disadvantageous legal, economic and social situation in the postwar Poland, the
German minority could express their existence only through emigration to Germany; understandably so, their activity was limited to individuals, who, on their own, repeatedly petitioned the authorities to allow them to leave.

After the Thaw (1956-1960) rather few applicants were allowed to emigrate to Germany till 1970 when the process of normalization started with the signature of the Polish-West German Treaty. The liberal emigration policy stopped already in 1973, but this time a continued dialog with the German side was possible thanks to the existence of full diplomatic links between Poland and the FRG since 1970. The Polish wish to improve the economic situation in the country through heavy borrowing abroad resulted in a semi-official meeting between the West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Polish counterpart Stefan Olszowski at the Helsinki Conference in 1975. In their signed record of 9 October 1975 Poland acknowledged the fact that the German minority existed on its territory, and estimated its number at 125,000. And most significantly the document did not impose any time limits on submitting of applications. On its side, the FRG granted Poland the jumbo loan of DM 2.3 bln (including DM 1.3 bln for covering the pensions of the former German citizens living within the Polish frontiers). The conclusion of the agreement fostered another wave of emigration to West Germany which was also encouraged by the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in Poland.

The massive emigration combined with the somewhat liberal Polish visa and passport policy let the expellees and Aussiedlers visit their families in Poland and vice versa. Not surprisingly, thus, could one observe some grassroots efforts to establish some German organizations at the local level. However, the endeavors were quickly suppressed by the Polish authorities who also began to harass the surviving NTSK/DSKG (with only 2,000 members left) in Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodship in 1977 and so making it impossible for the organization to function. The position of the Polish government clinging fast to its thesis on non-existence of the German minority in Poland was challenged in September 1981 by the Solidarity delegates who at their first congress voted to include the question of minority rights protection in their program. The political and social atmosphere had been earlier prepared for the motion by a rapid rise in emigration to West Germany (26,637 in 1980 and 50,983 in 1981), and growing private and church charity from Germany for the Polish populace suffering the tight austerity measures due to the severe economic crisis. However, despite the goodwill presented by Solidarity its overuse of national-religious symbols in its rhetoric and activities must have rendered the German minority mistrustful.

The growing number of family visits and transports with humanitarian aid facilitated development of the first contact networks which were used especially by the newly-established AGMO (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Menschenrechte in Ostdeutschland, Work Group for Human Rights in east Germany, i.e. the former Deutsche Ostgebiete) and the Schlesische Jugend (Silesian Youth organization), and also by BdV (Bund der Vertriebenen, Association of the Expellees) and VdL (Verband der Landsmannschaften, Union of Homeland Organizations) to assist organizing of ephemeral German groups in Olsztyn (Allenstein) Voivodship and foster coming into being of such organizations there where the German minority were concentrated.

The introduction of the martial law on December 13, 1981 imposed a clamp down on the activities as well as on emigration. Also the majority of the local initiators who were to create German minority organizations with the German support, left for West Germany. The contact channels, however, were not effectively sealed because transports with food parcels were let in. Until the end of the martial law on January 1, 1983 c. 4 mln of the parcels were donated to the Polish population which challenged the postwar propaganda- and media-induced picture of the German as a bloodthirsty and scheming nazi. Accordingly the aforementioned organizations did use the window of opportunity to help the proliferating grassroots initiatives get established as formal organizations.

In 1983 Poland was internationally isolated and suffered extreme difficulties under the economic embargo. At that time, after the long dominance of the SPD, the CDU/CSU formed a conservative government in Germany, which also relied on the electorate of the expellees, and,
therefore, it was eager to please these voters by taking up the issue of the German minority in Poland with the use of the leverage of unpaid debts which the country owned to Germany. On December 14, 1983 Secretary of State Alois Mertes stated in the German Foreign Ministry that over 1.1 mln Germans lived in Poland. The German government felt responsible for the protection of the minority and demanded a guarantee of minority rights for it. The Polish communist regime could not accept the demand nor acknowledge the existence of the German minority in the period of the transitory instability in the USSR between the death of Leonid Brezhnev and coming into the office of Mikhail Gorbachev. Therefore, in the Autumn of 1984 gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski declared that the German minority is an artificial problem used to divide the country along ethnic lines. While taking part in the Wroclaw (Breslau) celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the capitulation of the Third Reich he reaffirmed the statement claiming that there was no German minority in Poland left after the government-approved emigration in the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. The official standpoint was closely reflected by the Polish Catholic Church through the mouth of Primate Cardinal Jozef Glemp, who in his sermon on August 15, 1984 in Czestochowa remarked on the German minority east of the Oder-Neisse line: What Germans? What injustices?"

In the atmosphere of the tacit West German pressure exerted on the Polish government, and with the active German support (also discreetly given by the German embassy in Warsaw) there could be observed efforts to establish the Verband der Deutschen in Polen (the Union of the Germans in Poland) at the turn of 1983 and 1984. For the first time in November 1983 Norbert Gaida from Roszkow (Roschkau) near Raciborz (Ratibor) submitted an official request to register the Union. The authorities, of course, refused to accept the request let alone processing it. In accordance with the Polish political line the emigration policy became more restrictive, and as such activated the Germans in Poland who got deprived of the chance to leave when they wished. In 1984 the requests were repeated by persons from Warsaw, Gdansk (Danzig) and Upper Silesia, obviously to no avail, and the appeals became even more numerous in 1985, when forester Edward Vogelsang from Gryfino (Greihenfagen) in Pomerania attempted to start publication of a German periodical entitled Unsere Muttersprache (Our Mother Tongue). The endeavors were followed by infiltration and harassment by the SB (Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa, Security Forces) which frustrated the first congress of the German minority in Poland on May 10, 1986 in Raciborz where artisan Blasius Hanczuch had established the first Deutscher Freundschaftskreis (DFK, German minority circle) in December 1985. The SB also interrupted another congress next year in Polska Cerekiew (Polnisch Neukirch/Groß Neukirch) in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship. The disappointments brought about much mistrust among the DFK members, however, the movement was not suppressed and already in 1987 it boasted 5,000 members in Upper Silesia.

Certain improvement of West German-Polish relations was started on May 8, 1985 by the conciliatory speech of President Richard von Weizsäcker, which was followed by his address in Warsaw on the 15th anniversary of the Polish-German border treaty, when he said that not only Poland needed Europe but also Europe Poland. In the wake of the event Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher came to Poland to commence work of various bilateral groups who were to prepare the ground for the would-be visit of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The developments were reflected in Poland by the amnesty of 1986 when the last political prisoners interned during the martial law were freed. In 1987 the Polish political climate relaxed which caused a sudden hike in emigration to West Germany: in 1987 48,000 Aussiedlers came from Poland, in 1988 - 140,000 and in 1989 - 260,340.

The mass migration to certain extent paralyzed the DFK movement because many of its leaders left Poland. However, they managed to initiate the action to build new ones and re-erect monuments (which were hidden after 1945 to prevent their destruction) commemorating the local German soldiers who died during the two World Wars. And most importantly, on January 12, 1988 the SB did not bar the six DFK delegates from meeting Foreign Minister Genscher at the German Embassy in Warsaw where they handed him with the petition entitled Menschenrechte der Deutschen in der Volksrepublik Polen (The Human Rights of Germans in the Polish People’s Republic). They wrote that the Polish
authorities had eradicated German from their everyday life, intimidated the persons applying for emigration to West Germany, and mistreated the latter’s children at school and work. Genscher promised to help them with legalization of the DFK structures.

Following the meeting many of the DFK leaders were interrogated by the SB, and the applications for registration of the DFK were regularly rejected in 1987 and 1988. The change came with Mieczyslaw Rakowski, the last communist Polish PM who already in 1982 said that for sheer economic reasons Poland would rather grant minority rights to the Upper Silesian Germans than allow them to emigrate. Remembering the pragmatic tenet, the German minority question become an issue on the agenda of the Polish-German relations.

In November 1988, without permission from the authorities or Opole (Oppeln) bishop Alfons Nossol the first postwar mass in German was celebrated in the sanctuary at Gora sw. Anny (Sankt Annaberg) to commemorate recently deceased Bavarian PM Franz Josef Strauss who was highly respected by the DFK members. The Mountain of St. Anna is the holy mountain of the Upper Silesians, a very special place where before World War II pilgrimages were coming from near and afar, and masses were intermittently said in the two languages of the region, i.e. Polish and German. The tradition was hindered in 1938 by the nazi rulings and stopped in 1945 by Polonization. However, bishop Alfons Nossol, an Upper Silesian himself, had providently prepared the ground for the revival of the tradition because shortly after his nomination to the rank of Opole (Oppeln) bishop, he had introduced German as a compulsory subject to the curriculum of the Opole (Oppeln) seminary in 1977. At the turn of 1988 and 1989 he was showered with appeals to allow masses to be said in German. He did not approach the communist authorities nor Primate Glemp to approve such a decision but directly Pope John Paul II. In the papal message on the occasion of the World Day of Peace he had also mentioned minority rights: Respect for minorities - a condition of peace, which he had repeated on the 1989 New Year Day when in his sermon he spoke on the responsibility of every state to protect its minorities. Nossol did use the sermons as the argument to support his plea, and on June 4, 1989 the first legal mass in German was celebrated at Gora sw Anny (Sankt Annaberg). It coincided with the partially free parliamentary elections which broke the PZPR’s power monopoly.

The elections were preceded by the Round Table negotiations (February 6 - April 5) between the communist government and Solidarity opposition. Although the MSW did not wish to discuss the issue of the minorities in Poland with their delegates, in the document Stanowisko w sprawie reform politycznych (Considering Political Reforms) it was written that: We agree that all the minorities living in Poland are entitled to enjoy all their rights. Consequently, the old regulations on associations, which entailed the tight MSW control of the registration process, were replaced on April 7, 1989 with the more democratic Act on Associations. At the time of the rapid decline of the communist rule in Poland Jan Krol and his son Henryk started to create the Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Mniejszości Niemieckiej na Śląsku Opolskim/Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen Minderheit in Oppelner Schlesien (TSKMN/SKGD, Socio-Cultural Society of the German Minority in Opole/Oppeln Silesia) with the seat in Gogolin (Gogolin). The society was formed from the fusion of the Gogolin DFK and a similar organization based in Jemielnica (Himmelwitz) with the support of the DFK members from the nearby towns and villages. Moreover, in order to demonstrate the existence of the German minority in Silesia they started the semi-legal action of gathering declarations from the persons who felt themselves to be German. Before the action was terminated in the second half of the year, they had managed to gather 200-250,000 signatures which they deposited with the German embassy in Warsaw afraid that they may have been seized by the SB, but this time they were not harassed. On July 24, 1989 they used the declarations as a supplementary document to their request to the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship Court to register their organization, saying that their goal was to organize the German minority on permanent basis and thus to stop the drastic emigration to Germany. The application was rejected evoking negative reactions in Germany. CSU Chairman and Federal Finance Minister Theo Weigel declared that the FRG would provide Poland with financial support only when the legal situation of the German minority in Poland would be ameliorated. Similar
reservations were also voiced by Chancellor Kohl faced with the massive influx to the FRG from Central and Eastern Europe as well as from the GDR.

The failure in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship mobilized the German minority in Katowice (Kattowitz) and Czestochowa Voivodships (in 1975 Upper Silesia had been split between the three voivodships and mixed with ethnically and historically different lands in order to smother its strong regionalism), and also in Gdansk (Danzig) and Olsztyn (Allenstein) Voivodship where the corresponding societies were formed in 1989. They continuously strove to register their organizations but despite the new liberal Act on Associations Polish courts regularly turned down their requests on different grounds. The refusals, however, were not followed by any direct and thought-out harassment. Hence the AGMO could almost openly facilitate activities of the still illegal organizations (especially in Upper Silesia) with financial resources, photocopiers, satellite TV equipment, PCs, etc. It is worthwhile mentioning that in 1989 three tons of books were dispatched only to Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship and the till today functioning distribution network of periodicals from Germany was organized.

The sudden re-emergence of the German minority in Poland was a shock to the Polish society who for decades had been convinced by the official propaganda that there were no Germans left in Poland. The first tangible proof of their existence was provided by the article entitled There are Germans in... Poland! which was published on June 24, 1989 in the widely-read weekly Politika. It started an avalanche of articles in the local Upper Silesian and national press. Majority of the journalists presented the minority as not real Germans, they were even dubbed as Volkswagen-Deutsche, i.e. opportunists seeking financial gain only, while others wished to see in the minority a growing German menace if not a fifth column in the political context of the discussion on the undecided issue of the German-Polish border.

On September 12, 1989 the first postwar Polish non-communist government was formed with Tadeusz Mazowiecki at its helm. Besides Solidarity he was closely connected to various Christian groups which since the 1960s strove to start the process of Polish-German reconciliation. One of the most active Polish intellectualists in this field was Mieczyslaw Pszon (1915-1995), the deputy editor of the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny, the only legal semi-anti-communist periodical which was published during the communist times. He became Mazowiecki’s plenipotentiary in the contacts with the German Chancellery preparing Chancellor Kohl’s visit in Poland. Moreover, Mazowiecki nominated Prof. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, a lawyer and expert in matters German as his foreign minister. The will to improve Polish-German relations was also indicated in the new Polish PM’s expose in which he acknowledged existence of minorities in Poland and added that they should have the right to cultivate their languages and cultures.

In return, one day before his Polish visit Kohl signed the Bundestag resolution stating that Germany would never question the existence of Poland within its postwar border against the wishes of some BdV politicians. Kohl arrived to Warsaw on November 9, 1989, but out of sudden the GDR border troops opened the border in Berlin. The Chancellor interrupted his visit for two days. However, he returned after two days. In Krzyzowa (Kreisau), Lower Silesia, where the anti-nazi Kreisauer Kreis (Kreisauer Circle) had met in Count Helmuth James von Moltke’s mansion during World War II, the mass was celebrated by bishop Nossol. During the mass Mazowiecki and Kohl embraced to symbolize the Polish-German reconciliation and the German minority demonstrated its presence unfurling banners with the following inscription: Helmut, du bist auch unser Kanzler (Helmut, you are also our chancellor). The event provoked more anti-German voices in the Polish press. As the conclusion to the visit, on November 14, 1989 they signed the declaration where on the basis of reciprocity they agreed not to limit circulation of publications between Poland and Germany, and to let minority organize their associations, as well as, to facilitate their access to mass media and contacts with their nation-states.
On October 10, 1989 Opole (Oppeln) Senator Edmund Jan Osmanczyk died which entailed the necessity of organizing the by-election in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. he was an Upper Silesian but a strong proponent of Polish presence in this region, so it was paradoxical that thanks to his death the German minority got consolidated and gained new supporters during the heated election campaign. The German candidate was Henryk Krol one of the TSKMN/SGKDM two top leaders, while the Polish side was represented by pro-Polish Upper Silesian prof. Dorota Simonides. The Polish press got hysterical already at the turn of 1989 and 1990 comparing the election to the 1921 plebiscite when Upper Silesia was divided between Germany and Poland. The election turned ugly when in many DFK houses windows were broken, and the Polish nationalists started spraying swastikas and graffiti slogans: Kroll do vaterlandu (Kroll, go back to your fatherland), Kroll do Bundestag (Kroll to Bundestag). Nie glosuj na szkopá (Don’t vote for the Kraut), Szwaby raus (Krauts go away). They were answered by their German counterparts: Polacken raus (Poles go away), Polenpack, ab hinter den Bug (Polacks, go beyond the Bug), Nur für Deutsche (Only for Germans). Krol tried to avoid any anti-Polish undertones because his wife is a daughter of the Polish expellees from the vicinity of Lviv (Lwow, Lemberg). Simonides also abstained from mentioning national issues. However, other candidates used nationalist slogans, and even proposed to retain Soviet troops to protect Poland before the fifth column, i.e. the German minority. The pinnacle was reached when the paramilitary members of the Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (Polish National Revival) came to Opole (Oppeln) from Katowice (Kattowitz) and publicly burnt the West German flag.

The tension was maintained by Trybuna Opolaska, former local daily of the PZPR. In his Lent pastoral letter Bishop Nossol appealed for forgiveness, reconciliation, tolerance and peace but the situation was only partially mollified because the relative victory of Krol (39.44%) over Simonides (35.7%) in the first inconclusive round of the election (February 4, 1990) shocked the Polish electorate which got mobilized and on February 18 provided Simonides with 67.1% of votes against Krol’s 32.3%. Strangely enough, during the time of the campaign the first German societies were registered, on: January 16 in Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship, February 8 in Czestochowa Voivodship, and February 16 in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship.

Between the end of World War II and the normalization in 1990 the German minority in Poland suffered terrible losses. Their presence in former East Prussia became vestigial (1947 - 121,500; 1991 - c. 18,000), as well as in former West Prussia (1994 - 15-18,000) and in Lower Silesia (1994 - several thousands). Even smaller islets of just few hundreds of Germans survived in Pomerania, former East Brandenburg, Poznan (Posen) Voivodship, and also in central Poland in Radom and Lodz Voivodships. However, in Upper Silesia there are still c. 500,000 -800,000 Germans left. Moreover, the huge emigration to Germany lessened in the coming years due to the gradual improvement of the situation of the German minority in Poland, successful development of the Polish economy, and the post-unification depression in Germany. In 1990 133,872 Aussiedlers came to Germany from Poland, 40,129 in 1991, 17,742 in 1992, 5,431 in 1993, 2,440 in 1994 and 811 in the first four months of 1995. The most serious problem the German minority in Poland must face is the identity question: nowadays, after 45 years of Polonization, forceful assimilation and ban on the use of German, almost exclusively people who were born before World War II have good command of their language. In conjunction with this, another dilemma which must be addressed by the German minority in Poland is almost total lack of its own intellectual elites. After World War II they were expelled or liquidated, and while the communist system brought about high social mobility in the postwar Poland (connected to the steep increase in the general education of the society, and fast industrialization) the Autochtons were marginalized. According to the official propaganda of that time, they were Poles who survived centuries of Germanization, but in real life they were not to be trusted, and thus they could not be employed at managerial positions or in the state administration. The positions in the areas where they formed majorities were staffed with Polish settlers. At schools, Autochthonous children were stigmatized because of their distinctive dialects and different traditions which effectively barred them from education - 85% of them finish their education only at the vocational school level, three times
more seldom than the Polish settlers, the Autochtons gain secondary and university education. The only way left to them to upgrade their social status was to get assimilated or to leave for Germany.

After the registration of the biggest German minority organizations at the beginning of 1990, the situation did not calm down because the mass media claimed that the issue of the Polish-German border would be open to negotiations after the finalization of the process of the German unification which had started at the turn of 1989 and 1990. On the other, hand, confusion and the feeling of vulnerability were widely spread in the Polish society after the system and economic reforms started in earnest on January 1, 1990. The three-digit inflation in the first months, and appearing of unemployment disillusioned the Poles and channelled their angst into enmity for the others (especially Germans) and support for chauvinist political groups. These groups deftly exploited the feelings to broaden their memberships and influence, and in April polls indicated that 69% Poles thought that united Germany would be a direct danger to Poland.

The Polish government could not disregard the social feelings not to endanger the process of transition to democracy and market-oriented economy, so on April 27, 1990 it presented the German authorities with a project of a comprehensive bilateral treaty which, among others, would reaffirm the German-Polish border. Kohl could not promptly answer this initiative with the German situation in constant flux. He had to deal with the intricacies of the German-German relations, appease the BdV conservative electorate in the FRG, address the social and economic anxieties of the East Germans, and above all, negotiate with the Allies on the form of the German unification. Anyway, under the influence of the information on uneasy feelings in Poland and under the pressure of Poland's hectic diplomatic activities, one day before the second round of the 2+4 negotiations in Berlin, on June 21 the Chancellor said in the Bundestag that he supported the idea of a comprehensive Polish-German treaty which would reaffirm friendly relations with Poland, as well as, guarantee minority rights for the German ethnic group in Poland. On the same day the Bundestag accepted the resolution (which one day earlier had been espoused by the GDR’s Volkskammer), where it expressed the will of Germany to conclude a formal border treaty with Poland. Although the treaty was superfluous from the point of view of international law, because the border was recognized by the Polish-German Treaty of 1970, and the Moscow Treaty of September 12, 1990, united Germany did sign the Border Treaty with Poland on November 14, 1990 to allay the fears of its eastern neighbor.

In this unfavorable situation the Polish government did not obstruct the distribution of Landsmannschaft Schlesien’s (LS, Silesian Homeland Organization) outspoken periodical Schlesische Nachrichten (whose publication had been started in 1990 for the German readersip in Upper Silesia), and BdV’s weekly Deutscher Ostdienst. The two periodicals vociferously opposed the reaffirmation of the German-Polish border at the Oder-Neisse line. Moreover it supported the establishment of the first legal periodical of the German minority in Poland - the first (No. 0) four-page issue of the bilingual biweekly Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomosci Gornoslaskie (addressed mainly to the largest group of the German minority in Poland which is located in Upper Silesia) was brought out in Opole (Oppeln) on April 20, 1990. In the issue the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship TSKMN/SGKDM leadership was presented together with the organization’s general program, and local elections declaration. It was rounded up with the long editorial entitled Wir wollen Frieden und Toleranz (We want peace and tolerance).

The program’s main points were: furthering knowledge of the German language and culture, participation in local governments, participation in the political life of the voivodship and the country, codecision on issues vital for the region, access to mass media, and cooperation with the German state to improve the standard of life; whereas the local elections declaration aimed at mobilizing the German electorate to fulfill the program goal of the German minority’s participation in local governments. The short campaign was continued in another issue of the paper as well as actively in the localities with sizeable percentage of German population in Opole (Oppeln), Katowice (Kattowitz) and Czestochowa voivodships. Shortly before the elections, on May 24, 1990, at Gora Sw Anny (Sankt Annaberg) an agreement was concluded in which the Ost- und Mitteldeutschen Vereinigung (OMV, Organization for East and Central Germany) from Düsseldorf obliged itself to
support the Upper Silesian DFK structures. At the meetings with DFK leaders the OMV delegates kept convincing the former that there was possibility of recreating Germany within its 1937 borders.

The Upper Silesian Germans expectations and pre-electional activities must have heightened the feeling of insecurity among the Poles. It was visible in another outbreak of graffiti war, devastation of two cemeteries in the strongly German, Upper Silesian village of Szczedrzyk (Szczedrzik, Hitlersee). The results of the local government elections of May 27, 1990 were as much shocking to the Polish public opinion as the outcome of the February Senate by-elections, so similarly no Polish paper published the comprehensive report on the new local governments, and, as in February, also this time it had to be done by LS’s Schlesische Nachrichten. The German candidates won mandates in 27 out of Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship’s 63 communes, and they gained majority in 20 communes. For the first time since 1945, the German minority in Upper Silesia had its representatives in their local governments.

The success was followed by the ten-day-long official visit of BdV’s Secretary General Hartmut Koschyk, who after stopping in Warsaw participated in meeting with DFK leaders in Silesia consistently proposing Europeanization of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete into an autonomous political organism closely resembling the idea of Polish-German condominium over the territories which was proposed by Konrad Adenauer in 1953. He repeated the basic theses of his lecture which he had delivered at the 7th Congress of the BdV’s Young Generation (May 5-6, 1990). For the first time German delegates from Poland, Hungary and the GDR came to a BdV event, and overall the Congress expressed the BdV’s strong opposition to possible treaty reaffirmation of the Polish-German border at the Oder-Neisse line. Koschyk also took part in a later Poland’s German minority meeting in Lubowice (Lubowitz) (the birthplace of Joseph von Eichendorff, one of the greatest German romantic poets) near Raciborz (Ratibor), which was also attended by LS Chairman Herbert Hupka and Otto von Habsburg, a son of the last Austrian emperor, and Chairman of the Pan-European Union. The meeting attracted 10,000 people. It is remarkable that Hupka and Koschyk who (together with Herbert Czaja, BdV Chairman) were considered to be revanchists by the Polish authorities and mass media, and even could not dream about entering Poland legally during the communist times, since 1990 were allowed in without much ado.

In 1990 quick proliferation of German organizations could weaken the minority, so at the beginning of September, German leaders met in Wroclaw (Breslau) and established an umbrella organization under the name Zentralrat der Deutschen Gesellschaften/Centralna Rada Stowarzyszen Niemieckich (ZDG/CRSN, Central Council of the German Societies) with the seat in Katowice (Kattowitz) and later in Strzelce Opolskie (Groß Strehlitz), and till to day in Opole (Oppeln). On October 11 the Council presented its Memorandum, in which they asked for: restructuralization of the Upper Silesian industry, opening a German bank’s branch in Upper Silesia, for a quota of 10,000 work places in Germany for the minority members, improvement of the social care system, establishment of: bilingual kindergartens, and elementary and secondary schools, German departments at Silesian universities, for bilingual mass media, parliamentary representation, bilingual geographic names, and the right to return to the original spelling of names and surnames which were forcibly Polonized after 1945.

At the end of October representatives of the Council went to Bonn where together with Czaja and Koschyk they worked out the Katalog von 16 Forderung (Catalog of 16 Demands) with which they handed Genscher, and later Mazowiecki on November 17. For the first time, the demands were presented at the press conference in Bonn on October 24, 1990, where the Council officially recognized the BdV as the sole advocate of the interests of Poland’s German minority in Germany. In the Catalog the Council demanded a recognized and guaranteed status for the minority, the rights to: self-government, establishing own parties, parliamentary representation, and individual national/ethnic self-identification, prohibition of assimilation by the state, participation in Polish-German cooperation, and no hindering of the contacts between German organizations in Poland and in Germany, which seem to be sensible in respect to protection of a minority group’s status quo. However, Bonn and Warsaw became alarmed with the demands of: distinctive rights for
the German minority in Poland, guarantees for the right to homeland (Heimatrecht) not only for the individual but also for the whole national group, actualization of the right for these Germans who had been expelled from the Deutsche Ostgebiete after 1945, participation in German-Polish negotiations which may consider the status of the minority, no limiting of the right to return enshrined by Art. 116 of the German Basic Law, Germany’s protection, and guarantee of Deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit (i.e. German citizenship) for the minority members.

Fulfillment of the latter demands was not possible because it would question the existing Polish-German border, excessively privilege the German minority vis a vis other minorities in Poland and the Poles themselves, and would entitle Germans in Poland to dual citizenship which is illegal in the light of Polish and German law. However, from all these unacceptable demands, dual citizenship is tolerated by Poland and Germany as the guarantee for the minority, and the method to prevent them from leaving Poland. Even before 1990 Germans from Poland could go to Germany and obtain PO Nummer (German citizenship number). It allowed them to cross the border without visa, and to work and settle in Germany whenever they chose. Beginning with 1991 the process was even more facilitated: Germans can apply for German citizenship directly in German consulates, which when the outcome is positive, furnish the applicants with German/EU passport which is almost an economic asset in Poland. In the years 1991-1994 170,238 persons received German passports in Poland (only 135 were refused German citizenship), and on February 28, 1995 63,392 applications were awaiting processing.

The Catalog of 16 Demands, Polish uncertainty about the recognition of the German-Polish border, and approaching presidential elections did result in an outcry of fear in the Polish press. It was not uncommon to hear that we are going to have Anschluss in Upper Silesia, the Germans are buying Silesia out or that [Nagorno-]Karabakh is going to be re-enacted in Silesia. The fright was also deepened by the proposal to solve the ethnic, economic and environmental problems of Upper Silesia by re-granting it with an autonomous status, especially because this initiative was taken up also by local and pro-Polish Upper Silesian organizations.

The Polish and German governments wished to placate the tense situation for the sake of improved relations between the two states in the post-Cold-War Europe. On November 6, 1990 MP Jerzy Wuttke, Chairman of the National and Ethnic Minorities Commission of the Sejm (lower chamber of the Polish Parliament) talked to the Opole (Oppeln) TSKMN/SGDM leadership and Voivode Ryszard Zembaczynski in Opole (Oppeln), and next day he continued the talks Gogolin with the former, German Consul Bruno Weber from Wroclaw (Breslau and Father Andrzej Hanich, representative of Bishop Nossol. They appealed for improved coexistence and cooperation of all ethnic groups in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. It was also pointed out that after the signature of the Polish-German border treaty in Slubice/Frankfurt an der Oder, Kohl said that Germany wanted the rights of the German minority in Poland to be guaranteed at the European level. On November 18-20, invited by Voivode Zembaczynski German Ambassador Günther Knackstedt visited Opole (Oppeln) and Gogolin, where he refused to try to formalize dual citizenship for Germans in Poland but promised to provide the minority with German language textbooks, German teachers, and prayer books in German. Consequently at the turn of 1990 and 1991 the ethnic relations in the voivodship relaxed, and the German and Polish organizations even cooperated against the plan of liquidating the voivodship.

During the development of the conflict in the second half of 1990 the Catholic Church played a very positive role. On September 9, 1990 Bishop Nossol established the formal structure of pastoral services in German in his diocese (which at that time comprised Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship and the western part of the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship which is densely populated by the German minority) and it was rapidly developed which was of great importance for the Upper Silesian Germans who are strongly-believing Catholics not unlike their Polish neighbors. The Catholic press in Upper Silesia (strongest in Poland) strove to foster mutual understanding and reconciliation. On October 3, 1990, the day of the unification of Germany, the East German consulates in Wroclaw (Breslau), Szczecin (Stettin) and Gdansk (Danzig) became West German Consulates, and the first of them
gained the status of unofficial intermediary between the German minority in Silesia and Germany especially because it has a consul fostering the relations. And most importantly, following the phasing out of Russian as a compulsory subject, 14 foreign language teacher training colleges commenced their first academic year. Until today they have been educating majority of German teachers so much needed for the minority education system. Though in the school year 1990/1991 German started to be taught as a foreign language in 184 elementary schools out of the total of 543 in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship, the majority of the teachers have been unqualified, the overall amount of teaching hours is small and the support from Germany (e.g. 10 teachers in 1990/91) has been rather miniscule in the context of the overwhelming needs involved in building a bilingual/German educational system in Upper Silesia.

At the end of 1990 the Upper Silesian German minority was split on the issue of close cooperation with the BdV. Dietmar Brehmer, a sociologist who at the end of 1980s entered the Polish anticommunist opposition in Warsaw was against being dependent on the BdV and disillusioned by the Catalog of 16 Demands as rather worsening the situation in the Polish-German relations in Poland. He was accused of being too pro-Polish and on November 3, 1990 he was stripped of his post of Secretary and excluded from the ZDG/CRSN. Coming from Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship, with a slim number of Germans in comparison to the Polish majority, he had a different vision of the role of the German minority in this region and Poland. Already in 1989 he established the first non-Church charitable organization in the countries of the ex-Soviet bloc, namely the Gornoslaskie Towarzystwo Charytatywne (Upper Silesian Charitable Society) to address the problems of extreme poverty, alcoholism and environment degradation in Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship which till 1989 Warsaw had treated as an internal colony of Poland. He wanted Germans and Poles to reconcile and to cooperate to revive this region together. To achieve his aim, on March 28, 1991 he registered the Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versöhnung und Zukunft/Niemiecka Wspolnota Robocza Pojednanie i Przyszlosc (DAVZ/NWRPP, Reconciliation and Future German Working Group). He also started publishing his own periodical Auf Schlesischer Erde/Na Slaskiej Ziemi to counter Schlesischer Kurier from Germany, which was distributed in the voivodship, and on May 5, 1991 he started broadcasting his weekly program (in Polish) to which c. 800,000 listeners tune in. Thus he became quite popular among all the inhabitants of the voivodship, and in effect prompted the TSKMN/SKGDM to start a similar radio program in Opole (Oppeln).

At that time the TSKMN/SKGDM was given control over Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomosci Gornoslaskie which started to be subsidized by the Polish Ministry of Culture and Art which brought about the change of its title into Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Gornoslaska. The Ministry also started supporting Masurische Storchenpost published in Olsztyn (Allenstein).

At the end of 1990 the ZDG/CRSN, after abstaining in the first round of the presidential elections, supported Lech Walesa against Stanislaw Tyminski, and already on February 14, 1991 Foreign Minister Skubiszewski officially addressed the Catalog of 16 Demands saying that the German minority may not be given any special status, but he emphasized that the Polish and German governments efforts aim at enabling the German minority to become a bridge between Poland and Germany, and that the expellees in Germany could contribute to the construction of the bridge. At the beginning of March 1991, after talks in Warsaw, Bundestag Chairman Rita Süssmuth visited Upper Silesia (no German official of such high rank had come before). And a month later, on April 24, 1990 new PM Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, who already in January, during his visit in Bonn, said that the Polish way to Europe goes through Bonn, met the TSKMN/SKGDM leadership in Gogolin. He was handed with the Memorandum der Deutschen Volksgruppe (Memorandum of the German Minority) which was which was a repetition of the Catalog without the controversial demands. The significant additions were support for: recognition of the Polish-German border and integration of Poland with the EC, border cooperation with Germany and Czecho-Slovakia, revival of traditional links between all ethnic groups in Upper Silesia, and full realization of the decisions of the European Convention on
Human Rights, and of the CSCE. Bielecki espoused the program but rejected the repeated demand for acknowledgment of dual citizenship.

Another breakthrough after the mass meeting in Lubowice (Lubowitz) the previous year was the Schlesien Treffen (Meeting of Silesian Germans) at Gora Sw. Anny (Sankt Annaberg) on May 18/19, 1991 which was attended by numerous guests from Germany and BdV and TSKMN/SGKD leaders. The locality is a highly symoblic place for the Poles and Germans so the organizers strove to eliminate political undertones, and in effect the event was financed by the Ministry of Culture and Art and the Office of the Council of Ministers.

After the prolonged and difficult negotiations the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed on June 17, 1991. In Articles 20-23 Poland and Germany officially recognized the existence of the German and Polish minorities, respectively, on their territories and granted them with the right to sustain and develop their identity individually and together with other members of their respective minorities. Moreover the minorities were given the right to: free use of their national languages, to assemble, to practise their religions, to maintain links with their national states, use of their names in national language spelling, and to participate in the works of international NGOs. The parties to the Treaty also obliged themselves to protect the respective identities of the minorities, and to enable them to exercise their rights guaranteed by the Treaty. Thus, assimilation was abolished as an instrument of politics, and it was demanded that citizens be loyal to their states as well as integrity of the borders be observed. In Poland the Treaty also gave impetus to the activities of the Government Commission on Minorities (established on September 7, 1990), and caused the coming into being of voivodes plenipotentiaries on minorities who were nominated to the position in voivodaships with minority populations. Moreover, the Polish Government declared that it did not see any possibility of introduction of German geographical names on the territory of Poland then but was ready to discuss the matter on an unspecified appropriate date. The parties did not try to regulate the contentious matter of citizenship either. Despite its drawbacks the Treaty set the model for bilateral minority agreements which followed its example in Central and Eastern Europe contributing to the stabilization of the highly volatile situation in this region after the fall of communism.

The Bundestag ratified the aforementioned Treaty and the Polish-German Border Treaty on October 17, 1991 and the Polish Sejm a day later. Both the Treaties became valid on January 16, 1992 after the exchange of the ratification documents. Even before the event, on September 7, 1991 the Polish Sejm passed an Act on the Educational System. Its Article 13 guarantees minority education in their languages but without much detail needed in a modern state. More substance was added to it on March 24, 1992 by the Polish Minister of National Education in his Decree on Organization of Education which Would Allow Sustaining of National, Ethnic and Language Identity of Students Belonging to National Minorities, but the standards in this field lag far behind the minority education legislation in Romania or Hungary. Without much supportive legislation the former Treaty allowed the Germans living in Poland to shed the Polonized versions of their names, and, for instance, Opole Voivodaship German leaders Janusz Krol and Henryk Krol, now, are known as Johannes Kroll and Heinrich Kroll. However, the process is obstructed and stalled by some Polish registry clerks of Polish nationalist feeling. Moreover, the decisions of the Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation have been quite slowly internalized in the Polish domestic law, leaving to many decisions to the discretion of public servants, and so far the Polish and German Governments have not tried to approach the questions of dual citizenship and bilingual geographical names.

The positive conclusion of the Treaty did not calm the anti-German feeling in Poland which became tangible because of instances of harassment targeted against Polish travellers in Germany, and before the first free parliamentary elections due on October 27, 1991. The campaign of German organizations triggered off a whole mass of anti-German graffiti. Even more negative emotions (on the Polish part, especially Polish war veterans) were evoked by Dietmar Brehmer and his DAVZ/NWRPP who, in 1991, decided to ameliorate the often abject situation of former Wehrmacht soldiers whose active service years and imprisonment were not counted into their work years (unlike
in the case of their Polish army counterparts) which are the basis for determining monthly amounts one receives from the Polish pension program after retirement. However, the campaign was not as hysterical as the one which had preceded the senatorial by-elections in Opole Voivodeship in 1990.

The split in the German minority movement was deepened during the parliamentary elections because the TSKMN/SGDM and Brehmer’s DAVZ/NWRPP formed separate election committees. In the Nowy Sacz and Krosno Voivodeships the TSKMN/SGDM attracted non-German minority candidates, while the DAVZ/NWRPP counted on sizeable Polish electorate favoring its charitable activities. However the only candidate of the DAVZ/NWRPP - Brehmer (who wished to become a senator), despite the extraordinarily high amount of votes he received - 138,167 (73.7% of the votes gathered by all the minority committees in Poland), failed by a narrow margin in the most populous Polish Region - Katowice Voivodeship. In effect the TSKMN/SGDM, who had trusted its solid population base won six mandates in the Sejm and one in the Senate [The Territorial distribution of the votes clearly indicates where the German minority is concentrated in Poland - mapka Sprawy narodowosciowe Zeszyt 1 (4), p. 137] - for the first time since 1945 the Germans gained their parliamentary representation in Poland. The MPs and the senator grouped themselves into the German Parliamentary Circle under the leadership of Heinrich Kroll.

The surge of anti-German sentiments subsided at the turn of 1991 and 1992. The German MPs and Senator started building their networks in the Polish Parliament. On January 29, 1992 Kroll appealed for an act which would guarantee minority rights in Poland. On February 4, 1992, during his Warsaw visit German Foreign Minister Genscher had a meeting with the German parliamentarians. On February 22 and 23, 1992 German parliamentarians participated in the meeting of all the minorities in Poland with the Helsinki Committee in Poland. On the special invitation from President Walesa Kroll accompanied the Polish President on his visit to Bonn (March 29-April 2, 1992). German Senator Prof Gerhard Bartodziej became a Polish parliamentarian of the Consultative Assembly in the Council of Europe. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel met German MPs during his Warsaw visit on July 29, 1992.

On the other hand, the German government probed into the situation of the Germans living in Poland having sent its Plenipotentiary on Aussiedlers Horst Waffenschmidt to Upper Silesia. He was accompanied by Hartmut Koschyk from the BdV. Waffenschmidt concluded his visit by saying that with no political nor economic stabilization nor working system of minority rights protection in Poland, the Germans from this country would not resign from their right to dual citizenship as their life insurance. On September 24, 1992 the Bundestag resolved to contribute to gradual improvement of the living standard of the German minority in Poland in order to coax them not to leave for Germany. Subsequently, representatives of the German minority as well as the BdV leadership were invited by the German Ministry of Domestic Affairs to discuss most effective ways to aid the minority. The issue was also taken up in the talks of Polish PM Hanna Suchocka and Chancellor Kohl in Bonn on November 5, 1992.

The developments indicated the growing acceptance of the representatives of the German minority in Poland and abroad, and were coupled at the local level by: the long-awaited opening of the German Vice-Consulate in Opole (Oppeln) on May 9, 1992, just a stone’s throw from Gogolin - the center of the German minority in Poland; the registration of the Fundacja Rozwoju Slaska (Foundation for the Advancement of Silesia) on July 3, 1992; the signature of the agreement on German education with the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship School Authority on July 9, 1992. Opole (Oppeln) Bishop Nossol also contributed to the process actively functioning as a link between the Catholic Church in Germany and his diocese. He concentrated on the sad plight of the old Upper Silesian Germans who could hardly fend for themselves and could not receive any help on everyday basis for their children who had settled down in Germany. The German Caritas with the seat in Freiburg/Breisgau and the Deanery in Düren (Rheinland) already in 1990 had started channelling financial resources from the German Ministry of Domestic Affairs to the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese where it had been used to improve the equipment of dilapidated hospitals and outpatient clinics, and also to promote the German language and culture. On October 10, 1992 the efforts resulted in opening
of the German Caritas social care station in Dobrzyn (Groß-Döbren). It has been followed by 46 similar station so far. Moreover, in 1992, first reunions of expellees took place in the towns which they had had to leave after the war, e.g. in villages near Prudnik (Neustadt), in Jemielnica (Himmelwitz) near Opole (Oppeln), in Zlotnik (Reinswalde) near Zielona Gora (Grünberg) in Lower Silesia, and in the former East Prussian counties of Goldap (Goldap), Gżycko (Lötschen) and Sorkwity (Sorquitten).

Thanks to this positive environment the DFK movement in Upper Silesia and in some other regions of Poland got more consolidated within its umbrella organization ZDG/CRSN which was renamed as the Verband der deutschen soziokulturellen Gesellschaften in der Republik Polen/Zwiazek Niemieckich Stowarzyszen Spoleczno-Kulturalnych w Polsce (VdG/ZNSSK, Union of German Socio-Cultural Societies in Poland), and fostered coming into being of the Bund der Jugend der deutschen Minderheit der Republik Polen/Zwiazek Mlodziezy Niemieckiej w RP (BDJM/ZMMN, Association of the German Youth in Poland).

The tension, however, was maintained with the unresolved issue of bilingual village signs and street names which beginning with June 1991 were erected by the local Upper Silesian self-governments and sometimes dismantled by the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship authorities; and started growing with the publication of the monthly Schlesien Report which had commenced to appear in November 1991, and was perceived by the Polish press as revisionist. There was an attempted arson in the headquarters of the Bund der Bevölkerung deutscher Abstammung/Zwiazek Ludnosci Pochodzenia Niemieckiego (Association of the People of German Origin) in Gdansk (Danzig) on February 16, 1992. At night on March 18/19 the window panes were broken at the flat of German MP Bruno Kozak in Kędzierzyn-Koźle (Kandrzin, Heydebreck, Cosel), but the perpetrators were acquitted because the court found out that they thought they had acted as Polish patriots. In December 1991 the TSKMN/SKGDM had resolved to change its name from the Socio-Cultural Society of the German Minority to the Socio-Cultural Society of Germans but in 1992 the request was persistently rejected by the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship Court. On April 25, 1992 the Pope split the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese (which had contained on its traditional territory the majority of the Silesian Germans) into a diminished counterpart and the new Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Diocese. It was rumored that the decision was brought about by Bishop Nossol’s engagement for the revival of Germandom in Upper Silesia. During the course of the whole year 1992 Opole (Oppeln) Voivode Zembaczynski started to speak against the erected and re-erected monuments devoted to the local German casualties of the First and Second World Wars, because some considered the monuments as devoted to the nazi past. On September 20, 1992 supporters of Polish nationalist leader Boleslaw Tejkowski, interrupted the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship Harvest Home Celebrations at Gora Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg). Polish skinheads burnt the German flag in front of: the newly-opened German Vice-Consulate in Opole (Oppeln) and the German Consulate in Wroclaw (Breslau). In October 1992 the plaque of the VdG/ZNSSK Opole (Oppeln) seat was many times defaced, and the sad culmination came in Luban (Lauban) near Poznan (Posen) at night of November 16/17 in the form of bomb explosion near the house of Mr Włodzimierz Siebert, Chairman of the TSKMN/SKGDM in Poznan (Posen) Voivodaship.

The Polish press erupted in a multitude of negative articles on the German minority concentrating on the issue of monuments commemorating German soldiers, and of the three members of the extremist German organization Nationale Offensive who rented a house in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship in the small village of Dziewkowice (Schewkowitz, Frauenfeld). They became known to the public opinion after their presentation by the German SatTV Channel Sat3 in July 1992. Despite their presumably revisionists opinions they were not told to leave Poland before December 14, 1992. The monthly Schlesien Report which was considered to be their press organ was closed only at the beginning of 1993 after having published the anthem of the Third Reich. The anti-German sentiment culminated on December 4, 1992 when in the main evening News President Walesa remarked in the context of the German minority that if one wants to have a war one will get it.
The leaders of the German minority, and especially Senator Bartodziej strove to explain the contentious issues of German monuments and the Nationale Offensive in order to defuse the intense conflict. At the end of 1992 the German minority and the German Parliamentary Circle decisively distanced themselves from the activities of the Nationale Offensive and the like in Poland, as well as, condemned chauvinist excesses directed against foreigners in Germany. The Komisja d/s Pomnikow (Committee on [German] Monuments) started its work in December 1992. At the press conference on December 19, 1992, Heinrich Kroll expressed his satisfaction at the news on the expulsion of the Nationale Offensive members from Poland and said that the German minority was ready cooperate on acceptable solutions to all contentious issues. Moreover, he remarked that the words of Walesa on a war with the minority he understood as a call to respect the Polish law. Moreover the participants of the TSKMN/SGGD general meeting held in Krapkowice (Krappitz) on December 19, 1992 appealed for peaceful coexistence. Within the framework of the conciliatory moves, members of the local branches of the TSKMN/SGGD, which are called DFKs, were disillusioned by the open admittance of the police that it is not able to effectively protect German monuments.

On January 11, 1993 Minister on Integration with EC, former PM Jan Krzysztof Bielecki came to Opole (Oppeln) to meet the German minority representatives and foster rapprochement. Significantly he repeated his thesis that the Polish way to the EC was through Germany, and added that the minority had the opportunity to contribute to the process. Another step was taken be Walesa himself who shortly talked with the German MPs in the Parliament on January 21, 1993, and already on February 5, 1993 his example was followed by PM Hanna Suchocka. Also in February the German MPs picked up the subject of German as the medium of education during their meeting with the Minister of National Education. In the same month Opole (Oppeln) Voivode Ryszard Zembaczynski nominated Danuta Berlinska to the position of his Plenipotentiary on Minority Affairs in accordance with the German-Polish Treaty. However, none of the minority leaders had been consulted beforehand, and they learned about the fact only at the meeting of the Parliamentary Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities which took place in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship on February 24 and 25, 1993. Later on Berlinska proved to be a deft plenipotentiary able not to allow serious conflicts to arise. The quick succession of positive developments resulted in PM Suchocka's historical visit to Opole (Oppeln) in April. In her speech, for the first time, the Polish PM fully espoused the need for minority rights, and reaffirmed the important role of the German minority in the voivodship and Poland, simultaneously acknowledging that Germans living in Poland had been subjected to harsh and unjust treatment after World War II, and also appealing for loyalty to the Polish State.

Some anti-German elements visible during the celebrations of the Polish national holiday of May 3 Constitution at Gora sw. Anny (St Annaberg) in 1993, as well as burning of the German flag by 60 skinheads in Opole (Oppeln) during the same day did not have much bearing on the relations between the minority and the Polish government because: on May 5, 1993, after one and a half years of attempts the TSKMN/SGGD was officially re-registered as the Towarzystwo Spoleczno-Kulturalne Niemcow/Soziallkulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen (TSKN/SGGD, Socio-Cultural Society of Germans) (however, Voivode Zembaczynski appealed this registration as unlawful); agreement on the regulations regarding German monuments was reached on May 24, 1993, and in the meantime the dissolution of the Polish Parliament by Walesa superseded other considerations.

The actions of the President who wished to introduce more order and consistency into the Polish political life, were supported by the German MPs. Perhaps also thanks to this stance, the new Electoral Act which introduced the 5% threshold for parties wishing to enter the Parliament, exempted minorities from the requirement.

In its election program the Wahlkomitee den Deutschen in der Republik Polen - Deutsche Minderheit/Komitet Wyborczy Niemcow w RP - Mniejszosc Niemiecka (The Election Committee of the Germans in the Republic of Poland - German Minority) staunchly supported democracy, market-oriented economy, Polish endeavors to access the EC and devolution. They wanted: full observance of minority rights guaranteed by the Polish-German Treaty, Poland’s espousal of the
standard of minority rights protection developed by the Council of Europe, equality in access to state administration posts, and an educational system with German as the medium of instruction. They did not agree to the treatment of Germans as second-class citizens, using the German minority as a scapegoat or a pawn in political games, nor to ideologization of Silesian history for the sake of Polishdom. At the later stage of the campaign Heinrich Kroll also demanded quick solutions to the thorny issues of German place names, and of Wehrmacht soldiers who were (and still are) deprived of the pension rights which apply to other veterans living in Poland.

In effect of the parliamentary elections which took place on September 19, 1993 Prof Bartodziej was re-elected as a senator and four German MPs won mandates. Thus, the German minority lost three seats in the Sejm as the result of 27.1% drop in the number of votes in comparison to the 1991 elections. However, the very entrance of German deputies to the Parliament must be deemed as a success especially in the context of the 5% threshold which could have barred all German candidates from winning mandates. Another indirect accomplishment was connected to the minority’s most important periodical Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Gornoslaska which immediately after the elections was turned into a weekly published on high-quality newsprint. It should also be noted that the elections did not incite nationalist passions as only 1588 votes were cast in favor of nationalist groups in the whole of Upper Silesia.

Throughout the year one could observe a growing though unwilling acceptance for the role of the BdV which was expressed by numerous press interviews with Herbert Hupka, LS Chairman which broke away with the stereotypical picture of revisionist eater of Poles. In November 1993 the Johanniters (i.e. Knights of St. John, the Protestant branch of the Knights of Malta) returned to former East Prussia - the territory of their traditional activity where they opened two social care stations in Mragowo (Sensburg) and Pisz (Johannisburg) emulating the similar initiative of the Caritas in Upper Silesia. However, in December the end of the year was marred by the comment of Walesa’s interview for Die Welt, where he said that if one [i.e. Germans] does not like it here [i.e. in Poland] one may leave. Senator Bartodziej summed up the year 1993 saying that forced tolerance for the existence of the German minority and its rights was wrenched from the civil servants in Upper Silesia and Warsaw. As major obstacles he enumerated destruction of the natural environment in Upper Silesia and concomitant plunge in health and health-care standards, politically-motivated barring of foreign investment from the regions populated by Germans (e.g. in 1993 5% of the total foreign capital was invested in Upper Silesia where more than 10% of the Polish population live), simplistically legal but not intended realization of the Polish-German Treaty, weakness of Polish democratic structures, and chauvinist feelings and excesses directed against the minority.

The new year 1994 was not commenced too positively for the minority because on January 1 the Bonn Administration, with its Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (Act on the Settlement of the Consequences Caused by World War II), limited and made more difficult, though not liquidated, the possibility for ethnic Germans living outside Germany to settle in Germany. The move, however, considerably disturbed the Germans living in Poland especially in the context of the parliamentary and numerous land elections in Germany in 1994, because popularity of Kohl and his CSU/CDU-FDP ruling coalition began plunging under the burden of economic and social cost of the unification, while seemingly giving the chance to win to the SPD which advocated scrapping Art. 116 of the German Basic Law, and, thus, to do away with the right of ethnic Germans to settle in Germany altogether.

Reconciliation and mutual acceptance of their entangled past and cultures between the Poles and the Germans living in Poland, reached a new quality when the plaque in memory of German/Aussiedler writer Horst Bienek on his family house was unveiled in Gliwice
(Gleiwitz) on January 21, 1994. Besides the understanding that the identity of the Germans living in Poland may be lost without active participation in German culture led to registration of the Stowarzyszenie Autorow i Tworcow Mniejszosci Niemieckiej/Gesellschaft deutscher Autoren in Polen (Association of Authors and Artists of the German Minority) at the beginning of 1994.

The date of February 7, 1994 marked another breakthrough in the relations between Poland and its German minority, because on this day the Polish TV broadcast the so-called Polish-German Table talk-show which was attended by the representatives of the minority, the Poles living in Germany, Polish and German parliaments, the BdV and the Polish press. In this context an unexpected overture could be observed at the end of February 1994; Austria had opened the Austrian Library in Opole (Oppeln) in May 1993 one year after the inauguration of the German Vice-Consulate; and the former was visited by Austrian Consul General Dr. Emil Brix (based in Cracow). During his visit in Opole (Oppeln) he committed a diplomatic and political faux pas saying that Germany should abolish Art 116 of its Basic Law and that the links between the country and the German minority in Silesia are too strong and should be partially replaced with ties with the Czech Republic and Austria because Silesia shares much of its past with the two states. Moreover, he paraphrased Bielecki’s words maintaining that the Poland’s way to the EU leads through Silesia. Brix’s speech was interpreted as an attempt to push away the German influences from Silesia in favor of Austria which, as a would-be new EU member, would like to play a more prominent role in Osterweiterung (eastwards widening) of the EU. The Austrian move was quickly countered by German Consul General Bruno Weber from Wroclaw (Breslau) and German Vice-Consul Manfred Gerwinat from Opole (Oppeln), who, on March 3, 1994, met Opole (Oppeln) Voivode Zembaczynski to discuss the organizational details of the Rhineland-Palatinate Economic Days in Opole (Oppeln) which took place from March 24 to 25 boosting business cooperation between this German land and Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship. Another positive accent in the Polish-German relations in Upper Silesia was the inaugural transmission of the monthly 30-minute-long TV program of the German minority entitled Oberschlesisches Journal (Upper Silesian Journal).

In preparation for the local elections, in March 1994, the German MPs handed the Polish and German governments with the Memorandum and the Catalog of Problems of the German minority in Poland. In the Memorandum they admitted that since the signature of the German-Polish Treaty there had been constant improvement in the situation of the German minority, but also appealed for regular consultations with the German minority in further actualization of the decisions of the Treaty, and for a comprehensive Act on Minorities, and implementation of the Vienna Declaration on Minorities and of The Council’s of Europe Recommendation 1201. Besides, they supported the endeavors of the Poles in Lithuania to obtain more rights, apparently hoping that Poland would reciprocate with the same rights in the case of the German minority as in the sphere of education Lithuania’s Polish minority enjoys better solutions than its German counterpart in Poland. In the Catalog majority of the problems enumerated in the 1993 parliamentary election program, were included. It was, however, broadened: with the official call for the solution to the Wehrmacht soldiers pension issue, and appeal for: organizing a German educational system, easier access to mass media, protection of monuments of German culture in Poland, improved economic development of the regions populated by Germans, co-decision on the use of financial resources received from Bonn and Warsaw, non-limiting of the minority’s right to dual citizenship and to settlement in Germany (which was somewhat restricted by Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz),
equality in access to the process of reprivatization in Poland, as well as, for acceptance of the BdV, the expellees and their other organizations as a major contributor to the process of Polish-German reconciliation.

Everybody hoped the pre-election period to be calm; in mid-May ubiquitous Hupka was even allowed to lecture in Szczecin (Stettin), Gdansk (Danzig) and Nysa (Neiße) though he already encountered some problems in the last town. Moreover, despite Nossol’s another Lent pastoral letter in which he appealed the faithful to refrain from chauvinism and ethnically-induced hatred, at the night of March 11/12, 1994 two German monuments were burnt in Pruszkow (Proskau) and Wiekszyce (Wiegschütz, Neumannshöh), and anti-German slogans and slogans attacking Bishop Nossol began to appear in scores. Moreover, discrimination of some German minority members at work made its way to the German press. On April 14 and 15, 1994 the Polish postcommunist coalition Government PM Waldemar Pawlak met the Polish minority representatives at the Polish Embassy in Cologne. Father Jerzy Jozef Sobkowiak, President of the Kongres Polakow w Niemczech (Congress of the Poles in Germany), estimated the number of Poles living in Germany at 2 mln, but he also admitted that 1.7 mln from the total are persons with dual citizenship (or stateless persons) who according to the German law are Aussiedlers and as such Germans. The nationalist events culminated on the Polish national holiday of May 3. At the official voivodaship celebrations at Gora sw Anny (St. Annaberg), the three leaders of Polish nationalist movements, namely Boleslaw Tejkowski of the Polska Wspolnota Narodowa (Polish National Community), Boguslaw Rybicki of the Stronniectwo Narodowe Ojczyzná (Fatherland National Party), and Roman Giertych of the Mlodziez Wszechpolska (Polish Youth of the World) were allowed to speak, and, despite their prior promises to the contrary, they did incite ethnic hatred: two coaches of the parties members went to Dziewkowice (Schewkowitz, Frauenfeld), where they broke shop windows, beat an old man and demolished the German monument and its vicinity. Ten of the perpetrators were detained by the police in Strzelce Op. (Groß Strehlitz) but after 48 hours they were released as no evidence of crime had been found. In the wake of the incident, on May 5, 1994, several skinheads disturbed Nossol’s sermon in Kedzierzyn (Kandrzin, Heydebreck) shouting Nossol Raus (Nossol go away). Moreover, reports on the events in the Polish press were placed next to articles usually entitled Poles attacked in Germany.

The Polish government, in the person of Deputy PM and Minister of Justice Cimoszewicz, condemned the chauvinist excesses, and obliged itself to prevent any occurrence of such events in future. The positive development was nullified by Opole (Oppeln) Voivode Zembczynski who attempted to force local governments to accept his decisions on alterations which were to be conducted on German monuments without any prior consultations with the TSKN/SKGD. On May 21, 1994 Michal Strak, Head of the Council of Ministers held a meeting with Voivode Zembczynski, MP Kroll, Senator Bartodziej, and two ruling coalition MPs from Opole (Oppeln) in Czestochowa, outside Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship to abate the conflict before approaching local elections.

In the local elections of June 19, 1994, the German minority won majority in 36 communes in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship, five in Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodaship and four in Czestochowa Voivodaship, and 35% of all the mandates in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship. The elections more or less repeated the pattern of the 1990 local elections, however, they were marred by meager 36% participation rate. In result the most numerous group in the Opole (Oppeln) Sejmik (voivodaship self-government) was formed by the German minority.
Immediately after the elections steps were taken to finally solve the conflict on the issue of inscriptions and symbols which may be shown on German monuments. Moreover, the Rhineland-Palatinate Economic Days in Opole (Oppeln) were emulated in Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodaship, which in the period June 28-30, 1994, was visited by the economic delegation from the most populous and developed land of Germany, Baden-Württemberg. And in July something unthinkable happened in the process of German-Polish reconciliation. President Walesa invited newly-elected President Roman Herzog to participate in the official celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising, which had been the last effort of the Polish pro-democratic forces to save Poland from coming Soviet domination. It was quenched by the Germans whereas the Soviet armies willingly contributed passively waiting for the expected end almost in the middle of the capital at the line of the Vistula River. Walesa added that the feelings of enmity [between Poland and Germany] belong now to the past, and significantly he did not invite Russian President Yeltsin to the celebrations. On August 1, 1994 Herzog delivered probably the most memorable for the 20th-century Polish-German relations speech, in which he condemned the evil which was done to the Poles by Germany during the war and asked the Polish nation for forgiveness. At the local level the exercise in reconciliation was repeated on August 21, 1994 when President Walesa and German parliamentarians met at the mass celebrated by Bishop Nossol at Gora Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg) to commemorate the First Silesian Uprising which had lasted from August 16 to 26, 1919 and aimed at separating Upper Silesia from Germany in order to attach it to the forming Polish state. This controversial event was not attended by the local Germans though.

After so much had been achieved at the political level, the minority strove to improve its situation in the field of education at the very beginning of the new school year, on September 3, 1994 the Founding Committee of the Niemieckie Towarzystwo Oswiatowe/Deutschen Schulgesellschaften (NTO/DG, German Educational Society) assembled. On the same day majority of the splinter groups of the German minority in former East Prussia united in the Verband der Vereinigung deutsche Bevölkerung in ehemaligen Ostpreußen/Zwiazek Stowarzyszen Ludnosci Niemieckiej w Bylych Prusach Wschodnich (Union of the Societies of the German Population in former East Prussia). The next day it was marked by the inauguration of the first academic year at Opole (Oppeln) University which had been formed as the effect of the merger of the Teachers Training College and the Theological Academy (a branch of the Catholic University of Lublin) in Opole (Oppeln), so after decades of marginalization and forced Polonization the local German population obtained a university which is placed in the middle of their Heimat. Also on September 4, 1994, the re-erected monument of Joseph von Eichendorff (one of the most renowned German romantic poets) which had been razed by the Polish authorities in 1945, was unveiled in Raciborz (Ratibor) (despite the cleaning problem as the monument had been splashed with paint in mid-July 1994) several kilometers from the poet’s birthplace, during the ceremony which was attended by 5000 participants, and among them: Hupka, Ratibor Prince Franz Albrecht von Metternich-Sandom and the Mayor. It is noteworthy that German Foreign Minister Kinkel had sent a short address to be read at the function. At the beginning of October 1993 Kroll, Head of the German Parliamentarian Circle, presented a proposal of the would-be new Polish constitution’s article on minorities in the Sejm: The Republic of Poland guarantees for the Polish citizens belonging to national minorities, the right to preserve and develop their own culture, language, customs and tradition. It also secures the right to establish their own educational, religious and cultural institutions, and the right to
participate in the matters considering acknowledgement and protection of their cultural identity, in accordance with the international acts ratified by the Republic of Poland.

On the other hand, September and October were the period when thousands of Germans living in Poland decided to submit their applications for German citizenship frightened that in the case of the SPD’s victory Art. 116 of the German Basic Law may be scrapped or altered. Only the governing CDU/CSU stated in their common election program that they supported the right of minorities to preserve ethnic and national identities, and in the framework of Germany’s reconciliation with the Central and Eastern European countries they promised to help ethnic Germans in this region of Europe obtain adequate minority rights. So some Silesian Germans even went to the westernmost tip of Silesia, which is incorporated in Saxony, to manifest their support for Kohl during his election meeting in the city of Görlitz at the border with Poland. The wave of acute anxiety deepened by the fact that German passport holders in Poland were not allowed to vote in the German parliamentary elections of October 16, 1994 (unlike the Polish passport owners who live in Germany in Polish elections) abated when it became known that the CDU/CSU-FDP ruling coalition won by a narrow margin with the SPD.

After the emotions subsided, at the end of October 1994, Kroll and other German parliamentarians met Zbigniew Siemionowicz, head of the Polish MPs circle in the Lithuanian Parliament, and they decided to cooperate on implementation of minority rights in their countries on regular basis. From November 2 to 4, 1994 Brehmer, chairman of the DAVZ/NWRPP participated in Bonn in the Polish-German ministerial negotiations which aimed at solving the pension problem of the Wehrmacht veterans who live in Poland. An initial agreement was signed in Hamburg on December 5, 1994 during the first visit of the German representatives from Poland on the German President’s invitation. They were hosted by Herzog at Bonn. At this meeting the leaders of the TSKN/SKGD furnished Herzog with the Catalog of Problems of the Germans living in Poland which they had made public before the June local elections in Poland. Herzog said that the German minority in Poland should try to become a bridge between this country and Germany. Kroll replied that it would demand Poland’s acceptance of the role of the expellees and their organizations in the process of reconciliation. Herzog concluded that, thus, he wished to be kept informed on the situation of the German minority in Poland.

Other 1994 events significant for the German minority are, above all, Heinrich Kroll’s membership in the Administrative Council of the based in Germany Verein für Deutschum im Ausland (VDA, Association for Germandom Abroad), and the VDA’s prize for his father Johann Kroll which was given to him, on November 6, 1994, by VDA Chairman Hartmut Koschyk in recognition of J. Kroll’s efforts which led to the Polish acknowledgement of the existence of the German minority in 1989. In this year the annual Schlesische Kulturpreis (Silesian Culture Prize) of the Land of Lower Saxony was, for the first time, handed in Wroclaw (Breslau) - the capital of Silesia. At the end of 1994, the renowned Bishop of the Breslau (Wroclaw) Diocese Adolf Bertram, who had died shortly after the end of World War II in his summer residence near Jauering (Javorník, Czechoslovakia) was re-buried in the Wroclaw (Breslau) Cathedral next to his predecessor Georg Kopp. Thus, the continuity of tradition in Silesian Catholicism, which had been severed in 1945, was re-established. And last but not least, Reinhard Selten, as the fourth Breslauer (Vratislavian) and as the tenth Silesian received the Nobel Prize (in Economics).
The improved situation of the German minority after the successful local elections and Herzog’s famous speech was marred at the end of the year by several irresponsible incidents. Gen. prof. Stanisław Kozieja wrote that though Poland had no external enemies after 1989, it was possible that an armed ethnic conflict could flare up on its territory, thus, indirectly pointing at the German and Ukrainian minorities as the source of such a danger. The principal of the elementary school in Proschkow (Proskau) near Opole (Oppeln) continued obstructing organization of German classes in his school, and in November the old German/Slovakian Protestant cemetery in Smoldzin (Schmolsin) near Slupsk (Stolp) in Pomerania, was robbed of c. 100 cast-iron crosses. Moreover, the rift between the TSKN/SKGD and DAVZ/NWRPP continued as the Katowice (Kattowitz) DFK established Zwiazek Charytatywny (Charitable Association) in June 1994 in an effort to break into the field which had been completely dominated by Brehmer by that time.

The year 1995 was uneasily expected in Poland as it was the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. During the previous 49 years the event had been celebrated as liberation and the beginning of peace, however, after 1989 the date had become more controversial and ambiguous. Freed from the straitjacket of ideology the Germans living in Poland could point out that the end of the World War was the beginning of a war against them, and a Soviet/Polish occupation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete. Their families were split by expulsions, and hauls of the population to put them to work in Polish camps or their Soviet counterparts sprawled all over the Soviet Union. The real end of World War II and a possibility of equality were brought for the minority only after the fall of communism in 1989. Thus, especially with the hindsight of nationalist excesses which had been repeated at Gora Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg), the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship authorities decided that there would be no centrally-organized celebrations in order to prevent such acts, and to allow communes to celebrate the date as they see it fitting.

In mid-February 1995 Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Gornoslaska was upgraded with four more pages under the new monolingual title Schlesisches Wochenblatt as the newspaper of all the Germans in the Republic of Poland. It could be seen as acknowledgement of the real political force of the TSKN/SKGD and further marginalization of the DAVZ/NWRPP whose paper Hoffnung, at the same time, was deprived of its state subsidy.

Striving to attain the European standards in the field of minority rights because it could improve Poland’s chances for accession into the EU, as well as its relations with Germany, the state signed the Framework Convention on the Protection of Minorities on February 1, 1995 which had been put forward by the Council of Europe. Schlesisches Wochenblatt already in March 1995 started publishing a thorough serialized translation of the Convention in an anticipation of its final ratification which would give the minority a legal instrument to obtain the right to use bilingual place names among others.

Not surprisingly, in the wake of the signature, did Deputy PM and Minister of Finance Grzegorz Kolodko meet Voivode Zembaczynski and the German parliamentarians on February 23, 1995 in Opole (Oppeln). Senator Bartodziej handed Kolodko with the Memorandum and the Catalog of Problems of the German minority which had been compiled before the local elections in June 1994. In the conversation the German parliamentarians indicated that the main problems of the minority were: irregular manner of the transfer of German aid for the minority, insufficient financing of German education by the Polish state, high custom duties imposed on publications and equipment presented for German classes and kindergartens, and insecurity of the German population cause by nationalist provocations whose perpetrators customarily remained undiscovered. Following the meeting the TSKN/SKGD repeated its appeal for a comprehensive Act on Minorities in Poland. On March 25-26 Hartmut Koschyk, Voivode Zembaczynski, Polish Deputy PM Michal Jagiello and
Jacek Kuron, Chairman of Sejm Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities, attended the Second General Election Meeting of the TSKN/ SKGD in Dobrzyn Wielki (Groß Döbren). In his speech H. Kroll said that nowadays the TSKN/ SKGD concentrated on parliamentarian, socio-cultural and communal activities leaving other fields, especially economy, to other institutions which had been founded thanks to the TSKN/ SKGD’s initiatives, e.g. the Fundacja Rozwoju Slaska (Foundation for the Advancement of Silesia), Schlesisches Wochenblatt, Miedzywojewodzka Izba Gospodarcza i Rzemioslniczca (Interviovodaship Commerce Chamber) etc. He also emphasized the organization must involve the German youth in its activities to prevent them from leaving for Germany, which should be complemented by a revival of the German language, education and culture to allow them feel at home again. Kroll also touched upon the thorny pension question of Wehrmacht veterans, of whom more than 22% had already died since 1991. Jacek Kuron acknowledged the need for minority rights, as well as, importance of Heimaten for united Europe. However, the meeting turned sour when Zembaczynski stated that it would be even possible to cooperate with the expellees and their organizations provided Germany would scrap Art. 116 of its Basic Law, which was a minor civil servant’s unacceptable meddling into the domestic matters of a foreign state.

On March 29, 1995 Kroll met PM Jozef Oleksy in Warsaw. Aside the usually enumerated problems encountered by the German minority, Kroll concentrated on the administrative difficulties looming over Silesian Germans who had left Poland several years ago, and, now, would like to return, and on general insecurity felt by the Germans living in Poland especially in the context of the acts of burning of German monuments in Pietnia (Pietna, Teichgrund, February 12, 1995), Kamien Slaski (Groß Stein, February, 13, 1995). Although these incidents were immediately condemned by Voivode Zembaczynski and the TSKMN/ SKGD, another German monument was burnt in the night of March 19/20, 1995 in Kujawy (Kujau). In the night of March 17/18 the DFK office in Raciborz (Ratibor) was burglarized. It had also happened earlier but strangely enough nothing was stolen. In Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodaship many other DFK offices facades were splashed with paint or somehow disfigured. Nobody was found guilty of the acts. Moreover, at the beginning of March 1995 the Polski Zwiazek Zachodni (PZZ, Polish Western Union) staged a provocation in Gliwice (Gleiwitz) claiming that soon another plebiscite was going to take place on the basis of the fact that schoolchildren’s parents were asked to furnish schools with declarations if they want their children to learn German. The action was conducted in order to determine the extent of German education system which would be needed in Upper Silesia. The anti-German events were summed up by Kroll: This is the way Polish nationalists want to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the end of World War II. It was even said that the nationalists wanted to burn 50 German monuments for the 50th Anniversary.

The events could not be easily balanced by such positive developments as: opening of the museum of Brothers Hauptmanns (renowned German writers) in Szklarska Poreba (Schreiberhau), Lower Silesia at the end of February 1995, unveiling the bilingual plaque in the memory of German resistance members in Wroclaw (Breslau) at the beginning of March 1995, unveiling of the plaque (April 17, 1995) in memory of the inhabitants of Brynica (Brinitze, Kiefernhein), Grabczak (Grabczok, Buchendorf) and Surowina (Surowine, Roden) who lost their lives during World War II and at the hands of the Red Army in 1945/46, the visit of Klaus Hänsch, President of the European Parliament on April 20, 1995 when he came to his birthplace - Szprotawa (Sprottau), Lower Silesia, nor the unveiling of the small monument in memory of those who perished (mainly Germans) in 1945 in Świetochłowice-Zgoda (Schwientochlowitz-Zgoda) camp which was as notorious as its Lambinowice (Lamsdorf) counterpart.

Moreover, the situation in the Polish-German relations became quite tense as Chancellor Kohl decided to invite only representatives of the war-time Allies to the official celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of the end of the war in Berlin. President Walesa who could have delivered there a conciliatory speech as President Herzog had done the previous year felt to be slighted. Poland was partially placated with the invitation to new Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who had been an organizer of the resistance in the Auschwitz concentration camp and a founder of the Zegota organization which strove to rescue Jews, to speak at the common session of the Bundestag and
Bundesrat on April 28, 1995. He deplored the postwar expulsions of Germans and suffering of the individuals but he did not ask for forgiveness on Poland’s behalf as some wished he would have emulating President Herzog’s 1994 speech. Bartoszewski, however, finally shattered the taboo allowing Poles to freely exchange views on the expulsions; and added that, at last, this was the right time to talk on Polish-German relations without emotions in order to reach this level of cooperation and reconciliation which had been achieved by Germany in its links with France.

Despite the fact that some Upper Silesian towns and cities commemorated the 50th Anniversary as liberation, quite Insensitively in areas populated by Germans, the conciliatory mood was continued at the local level. On May 4, 1995, at Wroclaw (Breslau) University Rita Süßmuth and Polish PM Jozef Oleksy attended the ceremony of the conferment of the PhD Degree of Honoris Causa on the SPD member Helmut Becker who had strongly contributed to the normalization of the Polish-German relations. Moreover, at his follow-up press conference in Warsaw, Oleksy admitted that the post-1945 expulsion of the Germans from Poland and the Deutsche Ostgebiete had been a taboo until 1989. Thus, in a way, he officially opened, on the 50th anniversary of this tragic event, a wide discussion on this subject in the Polish mass media and academic circles, which had been very tentatively started after the fall of communism. On May 9, 1995 Senator Bartodziej, Voivode Zembaczynski and a representative of the German Embassy laid flowers at the cross in memory of the victims of the Laminowice (Lamsdorf) camp. And on the same day the re-erected statue of Friedrich Schiller was unveiled in Wroclaw (Breslau). Another gesture of Polish-German reconciliation and acknowledgement of his work for the educational and material well being of all the inhabitants of the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese, was Opole (Oppeln) University’s first PhD Degree of Honoris Causa which was conferred on Bishop Nossol at the end of May. Moreover, in preparation of the imminent visits of Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Minister Kinkel, Horst Waffenschmidt (who had been regularly visiting Silesia in his official capacity since 1992), parliamentarian Plenipotentiary of the German Government on the Expellees, conducted a fact-finding trip in Poland from May 22 to 26. At Warsaw he talked to Deputy Sejm Chairman Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Deputy PM Aleksander Luczak (who was responsible for minority affairs) and Foreign Minister Bartoszewski, among others. At all the meetings he was accompanied by Heinrich Kroll. In Upper Silesia, together with Voivode Zembaczynski, he laid flowers at the site of the former Laminowice (Lamsdorf) camp, participated in a mass at Gora Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg), and met Bishop Nossol, the Raciborz (Ratibor) mayor and the founder of the TSKN/SKGD, Johann Kroll in Gogolin. He noticed a certain improvement in the Polish-German political relations and acknowledged the notion that the German minority in Poland should function as a bridge between the country and German, however, he added that this role can be assumed by the minority only with Poland’s friendly acceptance. Thus he pointed at the Polish unwillingness to cooperate with the minority for the sake of Polish-German reconciliation.

In Spring 1995 it became known that Chancellor Kohl would visit Poland in summer that year, so the German minority in Upper Silesia did hope that he would visit their Heimat as he would have done in 1989 if he had not been prevented by the fall of the Berlin Wall then. These high hopes were dashed perhaps due to the growing political tension in Poland before the presidential elections. Moreover, the political climate around the process of German-Polish reconciliation process was not very welcoming then. The Polish TV started to broadcast very popular war series Czterej pancernych i pies (The Four Tankers and the Dog) and Stawka wieksza niz zycie (A Stake Bigger Than Life), which had been produced in the 1960s and 1970s with the ideological goal to denigrate the picture of the Germans in the Polish society for the sake of improved Polish-Soviet friendship which was the regular political fare of the communist times. Moreover, Justice Minster Jaskiernia of the postcommunist-dominated Polish government started the court proceedings aimed at the TSKN/SKGD in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship deeming the biggest German minority society’s charter to include irregularities which must be corrected despite the prolonged procedural struggle which had preceded the registration of the society under its current name. On May 28, 1995 the wooden cross commemorating martyrdom of local Germans who died in the Laminowice (Lamsdorf) camp in 1945/46, was burnt. Also a trilingual inscription in Polish, German and Russian was left by the perpetrators: No forgiveness for the Germans as they committed the genocide, Reconciliation is
German hypocrisy, lie and trick, Never ever mercy for the Germans. On June 3, 1995 the Polish-German relations in Upper Silesia became even more strained due to the incident at the main Opole (Oppeln) railway station when the exchange group of 20 German elementary schoolchildren were not allowed to get on the train which was to take them home, by some aggressive passengers who cried out that they would not travel together with Krauts. A planned provocation was also carried out on June 20, 1995 in Wroclaw (Breslau) during the visit of an official from Land Brandenburg at the Wroclaw (Breslau) University where unknown perpetrators left leaflets with the picture of German troops marching, with swastikas on their helmets, and the following text: Ein Volk, Ein Europa! Poles! When you are finally in the EU and NATO, together with your friends you will be able to feel safe, and you will be victorious. Gott mit uns!. The leaflets were marked with the impressions of the stamp of the BJDM/ZMMN (German minority youth organization). Strangely enough, the Wroclaw (Breslau) Public Prosecutor’s Office decided that the leaflet had not been intend to incite a nationalist tension and as such was not criminal.

Thus, as a matter of compromise it was decided that only Deputy Chancellor and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel would come to Upper Silesia as he had promised the previous year. His visit took place on June 14, 1995 and he had been the German highest government official to encounter the German minority in their Heimat since the stay of Bundestag Chairwoman Rita Süssmuth four years earlier. The minority introduced him to the thorniest problems of their existence and showed him the tangible effects of the German financial support for the minority. In conclusion of his talks with the minority’s representatives Kinkel said that Germans who live in Poland should remain here instead of leaving for Germany. Prior to the meeting he had also talked to high Polish officials in Warsaw. Unfortunately, though, the German minority’s positive remembrance of the groundbreaking visit was marred almost immediately after Kinkel’s departure, when the monument of Eichendorff in Raciborz (Ratibor) was, once again, splashed with paint, and the DFK office in Bytom (Beuthen) was burglarized twice in a row. Moreover, on June 18, 1995 at the mass in Szczecin (Stettin) Cathedral, which commemorated the 50th anniversary of the annexation of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, Szczecin (Stettin) Archbishop Przykucki quite nationalistically concluded his sermon: The shifting of the Polish border westwards to the Oder-Neisse line is a fulfillment of historical justice. The return of Poland to the territory is also the return of the [Polish Catholic] Church to its sources. Significantly, the mass was attended by the Polish bishops and President Walesa.

Kohl’s three-day-long sojourn in Poland (July 6-8, 1995), was closely observed in Europe. The Chancellor opened his visit by having laid wreaths in the former concentration camps of Auschwitz (Oswiecim) and Birkenau (Brzezinka), and at the recently-constructed grave of the Unknown German Soldier in Warsaw. In his speech at the joined session of the Sejm and the Senate, he stated that Germany would do whatever is possible to allow Poland to enter the EU before 2000. At Warsaw he also met German parliamentarians and representatives of most important German organizations (TSKN/SKGD, VDG/ZNSSK, DAVZ/NWRPP, and the Bund der Jugend der deutsche Minderheit/Zwiazek Mlodziezy Mniejszosci Niemieckiej (BJDM/ZMMN, Association of the German Youth). In their discussion most time and attention were devoted to the questions of German minority education and pensions for Wehrmacht veterans. In the latter case the Chancellor said that this matter should be solved in September 1995. Regarding the legal problems connected to dual citizenship Kohl remarked that all the difficulties in this area would disappear when Poland became a EU member. The representatives replied that young Aussiedlers who wanted to return from Germany to their Heimat had problems with the Polish authorities who were not eager to accept the Aussiedlers fulfillment of the military service duty in the Bundeswehr. Kohl answered that it should become a non-issue when Poland accessed NATO. Moreover, Heinrich Kroll remarked on the continuing Polish negative attitude towards the expellee organizations whose members were friends and kin of the Germans who lived in Poland. Kohl (and earlier Oleksy) was also given the document entitled The Remarks on the Situation of the German Minority in the Republic of Poland. It emphasized that the decisions of the Polish-German Treaty had been superficially actualized as four years after the signature of the Treaty there was still no real German minority education system. Other significant problems included: systematic discrimination of German minority members in access to state service and government
positions, too low financial support by the Polish state, no effective protection of the minority by the police and justice system, systematic legal pressure on the TSKN/SKGD, constant pressure on German organizations not to maintain any links with expellee organizations based in Germany, lack of mediatory institutions. In The Remarks, the minority also noted that there was need to regulate certain matters which had not been included in the Polish-German Treaty, namely: pensions and social support for Wehrmacht veterans, dual citizenship, imposition of customs duties on aid from Germany, bilingual place names, no Polish act on minorities, weak knowledge of the decisions of the Treaty among Polish civil servants, and precarious legal situation of persons with dual citizenship regarding their military service duty. In the conclusion to The Remarks, especially in the context of Poland’s recent signature of the Framework Convention on the Protection of Minorities, it was added that the German minority it was high time Poland and Germany should negotiate a comprehensive solution of the problems on the basis of the standards which had been worked out by the Council of Europe.

Kohl’s visit was immediately followed by the numerous group of the leading CSU federal ministers and MPs (July 9-13). On July 11, 1995 they came to Upper Silesia where they encountered Germans living in Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodships, Bishop Nossol and Voivode Zembaczynski. The last repeated his March political faux pas, but now before the international audience, asking the delegation members to strive to remove Art 116 from the German Basic Law, because it unjustly favored minority members permitting him to work in Germany legally. Eduard Lintner, Minister of State in the German Ministry of Domestic Affairs parried the comment saying that dual citizenship constituted a psychological guarantee of the German minority’s rights in the new democracy, as it was not 100% sure that old practices would not return. The delegation was also handed The Remarks on the Situation of the German Minority in the Republic of Poland. The series of visits was summed up, on July 22, 1995, with the meeting of the VDG/ZNSSK in Bierawa (Birawa, Reigersfeld), Upper Silesia, and with the visit of Polish Ombudsman Prof Tadeusz Zielinski on July 27, 1995 in Opole (Oppeln) where he also visited the head quarters of the VDG/ZNSSK. On both the occasions discussions were devoted to the aforementioned problems of the minority. On the side of the Polish government, at the beginning of August 1995, PM Oleksy answered The Remarks in his letter to the TSKN/SKGD claiming that there was no systematic discrimination against the German minority, however, he thanked the minority leaders for having pointed out the shortcomings on the part of state administration in meeting the needs of the minority.

The feeling of unspecified danger anyway continued to persist among the German minority in Poland being a reflection of the postwar horrors and the thorough communist suppression of this ethnic group, as well as, a reaction to repeated acts of vandalism directed against traces of the German culture in today’s Poland: in the night of July 13/14, 1995 two youngsters ruined c. 50 graves at an old cemetery in Opole (Oppeln), on August 16, 1995 the 17th century wooden church in Gronowice (Grunowitz, Teichfelde) burnt down and most probably it was an arson, and at the end of August, 1995 a scandal broke out in the Ministry of Culture and Art (which is responsible for supporting and contacting national minorities in Poland) when it was discovered that one of the highest officials in the ministry had allowed a transport of over 2,000 architectonic details taken away from Lower Silesian mansions and palaces to cross the Polish border; and at the end of October 1995 the plaque at the Raciborz (Ratibor) monument of Eichendorff was vandalized.

The picture of the negative side of the German minority’s situation at that time would not be full without mentioning: the internal split in the German Parliamentarian circle and the TSKN/SKGD leadership which appeared after Kohl’s visit, and also establishment of a small splinter group from a small number of TSKN/SKGD members in Glogowek (Oberglogau). It may be inferred that the contentious issue which brought about the two fall outs, was the division of financial resources received from Germany.

Another outbreak of coolness in Polish-German relations in Upper Silesia came with the commencement of the new school year. Since the end of 1994 Polish courts repeatedly rejected requests for registration of the Niemieckie Towarzystwo Osviatowe/Deutsche Schulgesellschaft
(NTO/DSG, German Educational Association) and it also happened on September 8, 1995. It was accompanied by the dispute over the would-be medium of instruction at the newly-constructed elementary school in Olesno (Rosenberg). This part of Czestochowa Voivodship is densely populated by Germans and their organization contributed to the building of the school channelling much financial support from Germany. Therefore, from the onset it had been agreed that it was going to be a bilingual school. However, when it was opened on September 5, 1995, the voivodship authorities unilaterally decided that it would be a Polish-language school. Strangely enough, at the same time, a strike erupted in Poland’s only Kashubian school in Glodnica (Glodnitz) near Gdansk (Danzig), showing that the Polish educational authorities have a rather restrictive attitude towards the needs of Poland’s minorities. Thus, the TSKN/SKGD leadership opined that it was rather impossible to provide the minority with adequate German education within the framework of the Polish centralistic educational system, and proposed to establish a subsystem of minority education which would also serve other minorities living in Poland.

In the usually sleepy summer period several important domestic and international developments were recorded in relation to the German minority in Poland. On August 18, 1995, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in accordance with the Vienna Declaration (A/Conf. 157/23); its 1994/24 Resolution of August 24, 1994 on freedom of movement; the UN Human Rights Commission’s March 8, 1995 Resolution entitled Human Rights and Mass Expulsions; the UN Human Rights Commission’s 1995/24 Resolution of March 3, 1995 entitled The Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; and also having observed a dramatic increase in instances of ethnic cleansing and of the number of refugees in recent years, unanimously passed the Resolution, which, among others, states that ethnic cleansing is injurious to international law, and recognizes the right of expellees, refugees and displaced persons to return to their homelands. Thus, BdV’s long-sought goal of international recognition for the right to return, the right to one’s own homeland was achieved at last, but obviously without direct effect for the German expellees who would like to return to their homes in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, however, it was a moral victory. Moreover, in September 1995, 45 years after its signature the Polish translation of The Charter of the German Expellees was, for the first time, published in Poland. Probably, many Poles who had a chance to read the document were struck by the discrepancy between the wholly negative picture of the BdV which had been promoted by the communist ideology, and relevance of the Charter for today’s Europe, because in the document the German expellees had renounced all thought of revenge and retaliation whereas dedicating themselves to the establishment of a peaceful united Europe.

On August 27, 1995, the German faithful of Wroclaw (Breslau) rejoiced at the visit of Cologne Archbishop Cardinal Joachim Meissner. At the end of August Lothar Wittman, Head of the Department of Culture in the German Foreign Ministry visited Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. He talked to Bishop Nossol and with the Schlesische Wochenblatt staff, and also came to Opole (Oppeln) University. In September 17-20, 1995 Rhineland-Palatinate PM Kurt Beck came to Opole (Oppeln) and met the TSKN/SKGD in Gogolin in order to fortify cooperation between his land and Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship which had been officially commenced the previous year. At the beginning of October 1995, the process of German-Polish reconciliation was furthered thanks to the unveiling of the monument in the shape of a stone cross, which is devoted to the Polish and German victims of the Labminowice (Lamsdorf) camp. This solemn function was attended by the TSKN/SKGD leadership, Opole (Oppeln) Voivode, Protestant and Catholic clergymen, German diplomats, former Lamsdorf (Lambinowice) inhabitants and BdV Deputy Chairman. Symbolic significance of the event is indicated by the fact that President Herzog and Bundestag Chairwoman Süssmuth had sent their letters to be read at the occasion. Soon afterwards, on October 11, 1995, the Polish Supreme Court decided that there were no irregularities in the TSKN/SKGD’s charter, and that the society could use in its name the word Germans instead of the euphemistic expression German minority. Another groundbreaking event took place on 1995 All Saints Day, when the mass celebrated by Nossol in German, Polish and Latin at Gora Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg) was directly transmitted to the vicinity of the shrine and to Germany via radio.
At that time the presidential election campaign was already quite intense. The TSKN/SKGD did not officially support any candidate but appealed the German population to participate in the election. In the first round on November 5, 1995, the minority mainly voted for current President Walesa and Jacek Kuron. They perhaps voted for the latter because he proved to be able to respect the rights of Poland’s minorities as the Head of the Sejm Commission on Minorities. On the other hand, though Walesa’s polices towards the German minority had vacillated during his term from acceptance to enmity, the German minority decided to support his candidature rather than his main adversary the postcommunist Aleksander Kwasniewski. It depicted a high degree of political maturity of the minority since they decided to vote for the person who gave them a chance of recognized existence after 1989, rather than for Kwasniewski who directly or indirectly represents continuation of this political forces which had systematically oppressed the minority from 1945 to 1989. Understandably, because the votes had been so evenly distributed between Walesa and Kwasniewski, the TSKN/SKGD resolved to explicitly canvass for Walesa. The decision had been preceded by a phone call, full of promises, from Kwasniewski’s election committee, and, on November 9, 1995, by the meeting of Walesa with H. Kroll in Warsaw, when the former had said that his bitter words and allusions directed at the German minority in the past, had just been accidents in his presidential work and that he would try to avoid them in future. On November 19, 1995 the minority voted in favor of Walesa who gained even more than 80% of all the votes in some of the communes populated by Germans (as opposed to serious losses in areas with the Polish majority), and thus triumphed over his adversary in the whole of Upper Silesia; but Kwasniewski won the election in Poland, and Senator Bartodziej together with H. Kroll congratulated the latter on his victory and declared: We trust that you [Kwasniewski] will be the president not only of all the Poles, but also of the minorities who live in Poland.
Conclusion

Throughout its history Poland had been a multiethnic, multicultural, multireligious and multilingual country till 1945-49 when the most successful ethnic cleansing in Europe, was conducted with the instruments of forced population movements and the westward shift of the state’s boundaries. Prior to World War II c. 35% of the Polish population consisted from minorities, but as the result of the real-life social engineering in the best nationalist/Soviet/nazi style Poland became almost ethnically or nationally pure for the first time in its existence. The change was so dramatic that it was even decided to drop the rubric devoted to nationality of citizens from Polish censuses. On the other hand, it was also a device of Polish communist propaganda which sought to deny the very existence of the remnants of Poland’s previously numerous multiethnic community in order to forcefully assimilate them, and to further the myth of complete congruence of the Polish nation with its state and language. It was the ultimate achievement of the nationalist dream brought about by the thorough implementation of Stalin’s policies which were to solve the national question once for ever. Hence, according to a considerably massaged estimate, in 1954 only 2.5% (650,000) of the Polish citizens were not ethnic Poles, whereas after the fall of communism in 1989 estimates began to oscillate around 4% (1.5 mln).

The postwar ethnic cleansing in Poland, though it was applied to almost all the minorities in a harsher or more lenient manner, its main thrust was directed against the German population. It was understandable in the light of the strong anti-German feeling among the Polish who had suffered terrible losses during the war; and especially due to the political solutions which granted Poland with the Deutsche Ostgebiete. They were predominantly inhabited by Germans who had to be pushed away to make Lebensraum for Polish expellees and settlers. The postwar nation state of Poland was artificially constructed by the Soviet Union in the interest of the latter which was the only guarantor of the existence of the former which had to face comprehensible German enmity. Hence, the Polish population at large, though rather anticommunist, did support the Soviet proxies ruling Poland when it came to new borders, fearful of a new war and forced population movements.

For all the practical reasons the issue of Germans living in Poland ceased to exist in the period 1950-1989. Albeit, from time to time thousands and even hundreds of thousands of Germans were allowed to leave, the matter was not publicized, and the public awareness of it was limited by ubiquitous censorship. Anyway, national identity of many of the Germans living in the postwar Poland was not clear. Until 1945 they had been German citizens but ethnically speaking they were a highly heterogeneous group of populations speaking various Kashub, Polish and other Slavic dialects who identified themselves rather with their small homelands (Heimat) than with Germany, Poland or other nation states. Some of them were bilingual and even multilingual, some got assimilated into the mainstream of the German society while the others developed Polish national identification, therefore, one has to speak about the whole spectrum of identities in relation to the population who was dubbed as Autochthonous by the Polish authorities who strove to Polonize them in order to strengthen Polishdom which had suffered excessive losses during World War II.

These discriminatory endeavors without much respect and regard for cultural and ethnic distinctiveness of the Upper Silesians, Mazurs, and Kashubs, who were considered to be Poles unaware of their Polishness at the ideological level, but Germans by the average Pole and local administration, did push the people towards Germandom whose attraction systematically increased with the Wirtschaftswunder in West Germany as opposed to the dreariness of Polish socialist economy. In effect, majority of the Mazurs left for West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, and the remaining 6,000 feel themselves to be German; many Upper Silesians (whose homeland was treated by Poland as an internal colony) decided to leave for West Germany and almost 80% of the remaining ones disassociated themselves from Polishdom, the Slovincians (a branch of the Kashubs) disappeared with their emigration to West Germany and the rest of the 200-300,000-strong Kashubian minority set out on the way to create their own national identity, though several thousands identify with Germandom.
These people constitute the population basis of the German minority in present-day Poland, as well as, German clerks and workers (together with their progeny) who had come to Upper Silesia, Mazury (Masurien) and the Gdansk (Danzig) region before and during World War and stayed afterwards evading expulsions. One should not also forget the ethnic German settlers who, in the course of World War II, were moved to Silesia and the Polish areas annexed by the Third Reich from their traditional settlements in the Soviet sphere of influence. The remaining German clerks, workers and settlers, a number of German miners in the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) region and some German agricultural workers in Pomerania, who were retained by the Polish state short of qualified labor, constituted the several thousands of the so-called genuine Germans who sometimes cropped up in socialist Poland’s semi-official statistics.

Geographically speaking, almost 90% of Poland’s current German minority are concentrated in Upper Silesia, i.e. in the eastern half of Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship, on the western border of Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship and in Czestochowa Voivodship’s south-western corner which was detached from Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship in 1975. In this territorially continuous area Germans constitute the majority of the population which in certain communes (gminas) is almost 100%. Therefore, the region is the very center of the German minority politics in Poland, and the election basis of the minority’s politicians. Also the most important German foundations and organizations, including the VDG are based here. Several thousand Germans are sprawled in Walbrzych (Waldenburg) and Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodships in Lower Silesia. Another important concentration is represented by former East Prussia, i.e. today’s Elblag (Elbing), Olsztyn (Allenstein) and Suwałki (Sudauen) Voivodships where 25-30,000 Germans live, however, considering Olsztyn (Allenstein) Voivodship alone, the largest minority living there are Ukrainians whose population is c. 60-70,000. Considering former West Prussia, i.e. today’s Gdansk (Danzig), Torun (Thorn) and Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) Voivodships, c. 15-18,000 Germans still live there. And several thousands of Pomeranian Germans are concentrated in Szczecin (Stettin) and Slupsk (Stolp) Voivodship. Moreover, minute pockets of Germans are sprawled all over the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, and in the traditional areas of settlement in historical Poland, i.e. in Lodz and Radom Voivodships. From the religious point of view one may say that while the Germans living in Upper Silesia, are predominantly Catholics, the Germans in other areas are, more often than not, Lutherans.

The Germans living in Poland are organized in c. 150 organizations. Majority of the organizations are territorially based societies of German inhabitants, but there are also foundations, cultural organizations, charitable societies, associations of farmers, women, youth, Wehrmacht veterans etc. Almost all the societies are members of the umbrella organization VDG with its head quarters in Opole (Oppeln). About 420,000 Germans belong to the organizations grouped in the VDG. The biggest German organizations are the TSKN/SGKD in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship with c. 200,000 or 180,000 members, the TSKN/SGGD in Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship - c. 70,000 or 73,500 members, and the TSKN/SGGD in Czestochowa Voivodship - c. 50,000 or 15,100 members. In Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship the TSKN/SGGD is rivaled by Brehmer’s DAVZ/NWRPP with 46,000 or 9,000 members. The membership of the three TSKN/SGGD organizations tends to fluctuate as sometimes the members who do not pay their fees (usually poor old pensioners) are included and sometimes not. Although the three TSKN/SGGD organizations are registered separately in three different voivodships they function almost as an integral whole with the administrative center in Gogolin, Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. Their town and village branches are known as DFKs, as the grass roots movement of the DFK groups gave the rise to the eventual registration of the three TSKN/SGGD in 1990. Other important German organizations are based in Olsztyn (Allenstein) - c. 20,000 members, Gdansk (Danzig) - c. 4,200, Szczecin (Stettin) - c. 2,400 members, Slupsk (Stolp) - c. 1,200, Torun (Thorn) - c. 1,000, Wroclaw (Breslau) - c. 800, Poznan (Posen) - c. 700, Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) - c. 700, Bielsko-Biala (Bielitz, Biala) - c. 600, Gorzow (Landsberg, Warthe) - c. 600, Jelenia Gora (Hirschberg) - c. 600, Walbrzych (Waldenburg) - c. 310, Legnica (Liegnitz) - c. 200, Pila (Schneidemühl) - c. 200, Lodz - c. 50 members, Zielona Gora (Grünberg) - c. 50, Radom - c. 30.
Conclusion

All the German parliamentarians are members of the three TSKN/SKGD organizations in Upper Silesia, so this region has been leading in the political struggle, first, for the official recognition of the German minority in Poland (1985-1990), and, second, for minority rights for the Germans who live in Poland. They succeeded in so far, as the Germans are represented the Polish Parliament, and in the local governments in all the Upper Silesian communes with German population. The German members of the governments even established an active club affiliated with the Opole (Oppeln) TSKN/SKGD. In order to promote the economic development of the region and the minority, the TSKN/SKGD co-established the Zwischenwoiwodsc haftliche Wirtschaftskammer Ślask”/Miedzywojewodzka Izba Gospodarcza Ślask (Slask Interviovodaship Chamber of Commerce) with its seat in Strzelce Op. (Groß Strehlitz). Another achievement was mobilization of the German youth who are organized in the BJDM/ZMMN with the seat in Wroclaw (Breslau), which boasts 8,000-strong membership.

The Polish attitude towards the German minority changed from total surprise and even outrage at the political re-emergence of the minority in 1989 to cool acceptance (in November 1994 28% Poles liked the Polish citizens of German origin, 30% did not, and 36% claimed to be indifferent to them, significantly, at that time, the Polish citizens of Russian, Jewish, Ukrainian and Gypsy descent were more disliked than those of German nationality) which had been forced by the sheer pressure of the will of the minority to be recognized, and also due to Germany’s support and Poland’s eagerness to meet some European standards in human and minority rights protection as a member of the Council of Europe, which aspires to access the EU in near future. However, all the rights the minority enjoys at present are the result of their painstaking grass roots, legal and political efforts. As it was shown above, nothing, even implementation of the decisions of the Polish-German Treaty have not come into being without prodding from the minority itself. On the other hand, recurring political campaigns against the minority, and waves of anti-German excesses do not allow the minority to feel safe at home, and indicate that the Polish acceptance of the minority is not wholehearted despite the flowery statements delivered at the meetings of Polish and German politicians. One can only hope, that with time when the average Pole attain more or less the same standard of living as his German counterpart, and become more mobile in Europe, the postwar Polish nationalist intolerance will be less pronounced.

At present, apart from politics, the activities of the three TSKN/SKGD organizations in conjunction with the VdG concentrate on stopping minority members from leaving for Germany (which has been quite successful) through improvement of their economic and social chances at home. Here the organizations are much helped by the German government who since 1990 has provided the minority with financial support which in 1990 amounted to almost Dm7 mln, grew to DM20.4 mln in 1995 (in the period 1990-1995, Germany transferred well over DM100 mln for the sake of the minority), and is going to increase to DM26.6 mln in 1996, as opposed to mere DM282,000 given by the Polish state in 1994. Moreover, many Germans decided to stay in Poland because with their dual citizenship they can legally work in Germany and return to spend their income in Poland, where it has much superior purchasing value. This venue is often used by farmers with very small plots of land and by artisans. Thus, dual citizenship which used to be a taboo became a praised useful and economic asset, though it is also a source of envy for Polish neighbors and instrument used in anti-German campaigns when the minority is accused of disloyalty as some of its men dodge military service or fulfill the duty in the ranks of Bundeswehr. The problem, however, should disappear with Poland’s accession to the EU as it was emphasized by Kohl in June 1995 and by Polish politicians.

Moreover, German organizations in Poland maintain strong links with the organizations of the expellees in Germany with mutual benefit, as the former continue to receive considerable private aid from the latter, whereas the latter have more chances to return to their Heimaten. The phenomena bring more young activists into the aging ranks of the BdV in Germany and contribute to economic development in the regions populated by Germans in Poland. The links are fortified by Poland’s 26 voivodships and 258 villages, towns and communes ties with their German partners, and regular
cooperation of German organizations from Poland and the expellee organizations from Germany, which recently were joined by some German organizations from Czech Hlucinsko (Hultscher Ländchen) which until 1918 and during World War II used to be part of the Upper Silesian county of Ratibor (Raciborz).

In their social activities the German organizations in Poland are seconded by the Catholic and Protestant (Lutheran i.e. Augsburg) Churches which is of great significance for many old German minority members whose children live in Germany and cannot or do not want to take proper care of their parents. Since 1991 the German government and the German Red Cross and Caritas have supported the development of Caritas social care stations in Opole (Oppeln) and Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Dioceses. During the period 1993-1995 the German government subsidized the activities with DM 18.5 mln, and at present there are 51 such stations. The stations also give free meals to the poor and unemployed, train nurses and take care of retarded children. There are plans to establish even more such stations. Moreover, the Caritas uses mobile Polish/German bus libraries to provide its charges with books, and in 1995 the organization decided to open, at least, 54 rehabilitation cabinets for the ill and disabled in near future. The activities are emulated by the Protestant Church in Pomerania and former West and East Prussia, where the Johanniters have already opened five social care stations. These activities coupled with the efforts of German minority organizations to improve service and equipment standards in local hospitals (which often balance on the verge of insolvency) serve not only the German population but their Polish and other nationality neighbors. This fact is recognized by local governments which try not to hinder the developments though difficulties are met at border crossings where the aid coming from Germany is frequently stopped with exorbitantly high custom duties. This help provided by the Churches is also useful in the case of Wehrmacht veterans whose pension problem, despite numerous promises emanating from the Polish and German governments, has not been solved yet, mainly because of the negative stance of the former. These 51,000 registered old men often live in poverty and more than 20% of them have died since 1991.

The Catholic and Protestant Churches also foster the spiritual life of the German minority members. Already in 1989 Bishop Nossol got the right to use German in liturgy in the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese, and after the split of the diocese in 1992 the process also continued in the newly-established Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Diocese. The German faithful were provided with copies of the bilingual traditional Upper Silesian prayer book Droga do Nieba/Weg zum Himmel which in Germany is used by Aussiedlers from Silesia, the department of minority pastoral service was founded in the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese, and at present German masses are celebrated in c. 250 churches of the diocese. The Opole (Oppeln) Diocese and its bishop cooperate with the Breslau (Wroclaw) Apostolic Visitature in Germany, which is the continuation of the Breslau (Wrocław) Diocese and represents over one million expellees and Aussiedlers from the former German diocese. On May 26, 1995 Bishop Nossol even celebrated the mass at St. Anna church near Haltern in Westphalia, which for 50 years, in lieu of Upper Silesian St. Annaberg (Gora Sw. Anny), have continued to be the traditional place of pilgrimages of the Silesian expellees and Aussiedlers who live in Germany. The German Protestants could not be so active as the Catholics because they are less numerous. Anyway, they established their own German parishes in Slupsk (Stolp), Pomerania and in Wroclaw (Breslau), and are quite active in their endeavors to receive the right to German celebrations in the parishes with majority of the Polish faithful. The German Protestants animate the life of German organizations in Pomerania, former Prussia and Lower Silesia, and cooperate with the Johanniters.

Considering the use of German in liturgy on should not forget that from 1945 to 1989 it was virtually prohibited to use the language in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, and especially in the areas inhabited by the Autochthonous population. Moreover, the Decree of November 30, 1945 on the State Language and the Office Language in Government and Self-Governments is still in force. In its Art 2 it says: The state language of the Republic of Poland is the Polish language. The state language shall be used by all the government and selfgovernment authorities and administrative offices. Thus, there is still no legal basis to use any other than Polish language in the official context in Poland. It is one of the most restrictive regulations with which Poland’s minorities are faced. A certain relaxation of the
decree was exercised in the sphere of the minority mass media, education and religious life, but still there is no possibility to display bilingual town/village signs or to use a minority language in an office placed in an area mainly inhabited by a minority population.

The unresolved issue is the most important in the German minority’s continuing discussion on preserving their identity in the situation when the only Germans who speak their language well are people aged 60 or more. The minority members who were born after World War II were not allowed to speak German and actually had to conceal their identity for the sake of survival in communist Poland. This situation also bears negatively on German minority education. There is almost no local intelligentsia among the minority as educated people were exterminated or expelled to Germany as the very first ones. The universities and other higher schools placed in or near the areas populated by the Autochthons did not educate German teachers or very few. Anyway during the communist times, the top priority was to turn out as many Russian teachers as possible, so teachers of modern Western European languages are still scarce in the whole of Poland. Hence the re-establishment of a German education system in Upper Silesia and elsewhere in Poland demands outside help.

This fact was readily recognized by the German government who started sending German teachers to Poland already in 1990. Their number steadily grew from 17 in the school year 1990/91 to 120 in 1994/95. However, for the sake of fairness to all the Polish citizens they are quite equally sprawled all over the country, only with 45% of them centered in the areas inhabited by Germans. After the fall of communism foreign languages teacher training colleges and special languages teacher departments at higher education institutions were inaugurated in many places in Poland to produce enough teachers of Western European languages to replace Russian in school curricula. In the case of Upper Silesia one can enumerate the Department of German, Opole University and the Foreign Languages Teacher Training College in Opole (Oppeln), similar colleges in Raciborz (Ratibor) and Cieszyń (Teschen, Tesin) and German three teacher educational centers in Niwki (Niewke, Groß Neuland), Opole (Oppeln) and Olesno (Rosenberg).

In 1990/91 German was taught in 184 elementary schools to 5450 schoolchildren in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. In 1994/95 the numbers were 265 and 25,000 respectively whereas the total number of elementary school in the voivodship is 600 with c. 127,000 schoolchildren. Usually, the schoolchildren attending German lessons are taught the language for two school hours (one school hour = 45 min) a week. It is obviously too little for German children to master their language in the light of the fact that their parents have a very limited command of the language. So in 1992 German was introduced as a mother tongue to 14 elementary school in Opole Voivodship, which means just three school hours of German lessons a week. In 1995/96 there are 131 schools of this kind in the voivodship, and real bilingual German-Polish classes in two secondary schools in Opole (Oppeln) and in another two secondary schools in Kędzierzyn-Koźle (Kandrzin, Heydebreck; Cosel) and Dobrzyn Wielki (Groß Döbern). A similar bilingual class in a secondary school also exists in Bytom (Beuthen).

Thus, the situation, despite the apparent achievements, is bad as there are no straightforward minority schools with German as the medium of instruction unlike in the case of other Polish minorities, though the German minority is, numerically speaking, the biggest minority in Poland. Moreover, the bilingual German classes in the aforementioned secondary schools are mainly attended by Poles as the majority of the German youth learn in vocational schools where there are almost no German teachers. Incidentally, if the present rate of increase in employment of German teachers in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship schools is maintained one can predict that a modicum of a German minority education system will be achieved only in 17 years. It could leave another generation of Germans living in Poland with no knowledge of their mother tongue. Understandably, this is an abominable perspective for the minority leadership who continue to strive to register the NTO/DSG in order to revive Germandom in Upper Silesia. Their efforts are often dashed by the uncongenial attitude of the voivodship school authorities and nationalist principals of schools concerned. Moreover, since 1989 the minority organizations and the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese have been actively
initiating gratis German courses for minority members. They provided the learners with free textbooks obtained as aid from Germany.

Integration but not assimilation of the German minority in Poland is strongly dependant on establishing a dynamic German school system which would allow a recreation of a cultural niche for the minority. Such a system will be possible only when the restrictive decree on the state language in Poland is scrapped, and Poland ratifies The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and signs The European Charter for regional or Minority Languages which set out the European standards of treatment of minorities. Moreover, it is almost shameful that so far Poland has not written protection of minorities into its constitution, has not passed an comprehensive act regulating the relations between the state and the minorities, and has not developed an act on minority education. In this respect, Poland which used to be in the forefront of the 1989 changes, lags behind Hungary, Slovakia and even Romania though unjustifiably the last country is perceived by the Poles as a symbol of backwardness.

The indispensable cultural activity of the minority itself, without which preservation of their identity would not be possible, is quite visible. For instance, in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship alone the TSKN/SKGD fosters 15 traditional brass orchestras, 12 music groups, 30 choirs, 28 singing groups, 24 dancing groups and 7 other artistic groups. The small Gliwice (Gleiwitz) publishing house Wokol nas was established in 1989 and has brought out albums on Upper Silesia, booklets devoted to minority rights and the EU, books on Polish-German relations, as well as, bilingual editions of works by Horst Bienek, one of the most renowned Upper Silesian writers; and the Stowarzyszenie Autorow i Tworcow Mniejszosci Niemieckiej/Gesellschaft Deutscher Autoren (The Association of German Minority Authors) published the first anthology with the works by their members in 1995. Moreover, there have been also some grassroots and official initiatives which produce books which strive to do away with the simplistic and nationalisticallytainted stereotypes of the Pole and the German, and in 1995 the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny decided to further the process of German-Polish reconciliation by publishing insightful articles which aim at unideologizing the perception of Polish-German history.

Nowadays, it is almost sure that at least the young generation of the German minority in Poland (especially in Upper Silesia) will be almost fully versed in the German language and culture, which is the very prerequisite to be perceived as a German by the Germans in Germany and other ethnic Germans who live elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, and did not have to suffer a total ban on the use of their mother tongue in the past. The most contentious issues between the minority and the Polish majority, such as: dual citizenship, military service, the right to return to their homelands for the expellees and Aussiedlers, and the right for foreign nationals to purchase Polish land without much ado, will gradually fade away with the accession of Poland to the EU and full approximation of Polish law to acquis communautaire. However, if this positive scenario is not followed one may expect some nationalist tensions to flare up in some regions of Poland.
This phrase was widely used by the Polish postwar propaganda which strove to justify the Sovietordained annexation of the German territories by claiming that all the territories had been included in the 10th c. Polish state. However one of the earliest usages can be traced to the context of the post-Munich, Polish annexation of the Czechoslovak Transsilvanian part (Zaolzie/Olsa Gebiet) of Tesin Silesia (Tesinsko/Slask Cieszynski/Teschen Schlesien) in 1938 (cf. Komar, Stanislaw. 1939. Czesti i Niemcy na Ziemiac Odzyskanych Slaska Cieszyńskiego [Czechs and Germans in the Recovered Territories of Tesin Silesia]. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Slaskiego).

The communist propaganda labelled them as repatriates which was a misnomer since the people were not returned to the land of their birth as the word suggests but quite on the contrary.

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Poland’s German minority: its origin and current situation

ABSTRACT

This article is devoted to the origins of the postwar German minority in Poland and its post-1989 current situation as contextualized against Polish postwar politics towards it. Also the role of the minority for the future of Central European politics in general is noted.

Postwar Origins of the Minority

Social clubs, dance groups, orchestras, and literary societies have sprung up recently in Poland, organized by a minority that was unrecognized until a few years ago. Virtually invisible in Poland since the end of World War II, former German citizens and their descendants have begun a renaissance of German cultural life. Because they were essentially Polonized for the past 40 years, most younger than 60 do not speak or read German or do so only poorly.

With the weakening of communist rule in the second half of the 1980s, the Germans living in Poland were able to organize clandestine societies that were not effectively suppressed by the security forces. The strongest of these was the Socio-Cultural Society of the German Minority (designated in Polish as TSKMN, while the German acronym is SKGDM), in Upper Silesia, which in 1989 mobilized 250,000 to 300,000 Germans.

The reemergence of the German minority came as a shock to Poles, who for decades had been convinced by official communist propaganda that there were no Germans left in their country. The Polish press hosted a nationalist backlash that reached its climax at the turn of 1989 and 1990 prior to the hotly contested Senate by-election in the voivodship of Opole (Oppeln) (February 1990) due to the participation of SKGDM leader Heinrich Kroll. He lost the election, but in the window of opportunity opened by the strong grassroots support for his candidacy, the SKGDM organizations of the Opole (Oppeln), Katowice (Kattowitz), and Czestochowa were registered before the election in January and February 1990. The government had officially acknowledged the existence of the German minority if unwillingly.

After 1945, in accordance with Allied plans, Poland was moved 300 kilometers to the west and was recompensed with the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line (Deutsche Ostgebiete) for the Polish eastern lands (Kresy) lost to the Soviet Union. The territories were largely cleared of their German population to accommodate the Polish expellees from the eastern lands as well as other Polish settlers. The majority of the Germans were transported to the British and Soviet occupation zones. But two categories remained: indubitable Germans and Autochthons. The first category consisted of ethnic German miners and industrial specialists in the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) region of Lower Silesia and agricultural workers and experts in western Pomerania all essential workers who could not be replaced by Poles. Autochthons were the borderland populations of various local/multiple ethnic identities whom the Polish government intended to win for Polishdom through forced Polonization. Their main groups are the Upper Silerians, Kashubs and Mazurs. They have mainly resided in Upper Silesia (i.e Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodships), in the vicinity of Gdansk (Danzig) and in Olsztyn (Allenstein) voivodship, respectively.

By the beginning of the 1960s, almost all the indubitable Germans had left Poland, and those of the Autochthons who remained continued to be forcefully Polonized. The Polish authorities assumed that they had solved the German problem for good and that a ethnically pure state had been achieved.

866 Also a minuscule number of prewar Polish citizens of German nationality.
867 His name and surname were Polonized after 1945 as it was the case with other Autochthons, so he was Henryk Król until 1992 when he was allowed to return to the original spelling.
868 The German territories given to Poland comprised: the southern part of East Prussia, Free City of Danzig (Gdansk) and Pomerania in the north, and eastern Brandenburg, Silesia and a sliver of Saxony in the west. Polish propaganda dubbed the area as recovered territories or (north-)western lands.
Accordingly, in Polish postwar censuses, there has been no category for ethnicity, and in official Polish-German relations from 1952 to 1982 the phrase German minority in Poland never cropped up. Germans, however, were mentioned by some obscure Polish scholarly sources, which estimated their number in Poland as 3,500 in 1971 and as several thousands in 1978 and 1983. Those numbers clashed with German statistics, which claimed that more than one million descendants of former German citizens were residing in Poland at the end of 1982. The discrepancy was caused by Poland’s refusal to recognize the existence of the German minority on Polish soil, clinging to the myth that the Autochthonous population was thoroughly Polish.

Autochthons were actually highly heterogenous populations speaking various Kashub, Polish, and other Slavic dialects (heavily interlaced with German loanwords and syntactical borrowings) who identified more with their small homelands than with Germany, Poland, or other nation-states. Some of them had assimilated into mainstream German society, some developed a Polish national identification, and others remained attached to the ethnic identity of their ancestors.

But the Polish communist government discriminated against them through forced Polonization. In the immediate postwar period political pressure to eradicate traces of the former German presence in the so-called recovered territories was intense. German libraries were burned down. German inscriptions on tombs and public buildings were cemented over or chiseled out. The Autochthons were treated at the official level as Poles unaware of their Polishness, but by average Poles and by local administrations they were treated as Germans without much respect for the cultural, religious, or ethnic distinctiveness of the Upper Silesians, Mazurs, and Kashubs.

Discrimination pushed these ethnically mixed German-Slavic peoples toward Germany. And Germany’s attraction systematically increased as the Wirtschaftswunder in West Germany stood out in brilliant relief against the dreariness of the Polish socialist economy. Consequently, many left for West Germany, and those who remained identify themselves as Germans. These ethnic groups (with the exception of the Kashubs, majority of whom embarked on the efforts to construct their own nation) form the basis of the German minority in modern-day Poland.

**How Many Germans Are There in Poland?**

Almost 90 percent of Poland’s current German minority is concentrated in Upper Silesia in the eastern half of the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship, on the western border of the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship, and in the Czestochowa Voivodship’s southwestern corner. In this territorially contiguous area, Germans constitute the majority of the population in certain communes (gminas) nearly 100 percent.

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671 See Gerhard Reichling, *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen* (Teil 1) [German Expellees in Numbers (Part 1)] (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 19860, p. 46.

672 See *Odra*, no. 5 (May 1991), p. 36.

673 These peoples are described as mixed only from the national point of view. More objectively speaking, they did not develop any national attachment and are still endowed with pre-national complementary identities incorporating elements of Polish and German cultures as well as religion and pivotal bond with their respective localities.

The Germans living in Poland now belong to about 150 organizations that mainly sprang up after 1989. Most of the organizations are territorially based societies of Germans inhabitants, but there are also foundations, cultural organizations, charitable and educational societies, and associations of medical doctors, farmers, women, youth, German armed forces veterans and other groups. Almost all the societies are members of the umbrella organization Association of German Socio-Cultural Societies (VdG), which has its headquarters in Opole (Oppeln) and boasts 420,000 members. Given that number, and in the absence of any official census data (current scholarly and news estimates vary widely from 300,000 to 1.1 million), the figure of 600,000-800,000 Germans in Poland is probable, but many of them still retain pre-national multiple identities and/or have become assimilated to Polish society at the level of language and culture.

It must be remembered though that the tentative estimate might be considerably corrected should any unpredicted political change take place in Poland causing more or less former German citizens and their descendants to claim German citizenship on the basis of Art 116 of the German Basic Law. The article provides that every citizen of the German Reich within the frontiers of December 31, 1937, and their descendants have the right to return to Germany and to (re)obtain German citizenship. The right is also extended to former German citizens (and their descendants) who were deprived of their citizenship between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945. Hence, practically all the citizens of the war-time-size Third Reich, and their offspring can enjoy the right to return which by derivative legislation was extended to comprise also these ethnic Germans who have never lived within the German boundaries but are able to prove their German origin (cf. the Volga Germans in the ex-Soviet Union). In 1992 the right to German citizenship for the descendants of former German citizens who have lived beyond the Oder-Neisse line was limited with the Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (War Consequences Consolidation Act) which was passed by the Bundestag following the ratification of the Two Four, and two German-Polish treaties) only to these ethnic Germans who were born prior to January 1, 1993. Interestingly, the limitation as well as the scrapping of the status of Aussiedler (i.e. ethnic German resettler, with all the concomitant state support) does not apply to the ethnic Germans from the ex-Soviet Union who continue to arrive at Germany within the annual quota of 200,000.

**The German Minority Enters the Postcommunist Poland’s Political Life**

Since the official acknowledgement of the existence of the German minority in 1989-1990, the struggle for minority rights has been spearheaded by Kroll’s SKGDM. The Polish authorities were initially reluctant to register the group for elections but did so just in time for the 1990 local elections. Those elections were the first since the end of World War II in which Germans living in Poland were allowed to elect their representatives as Germans. German candidates won mandates in 35 of the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship’s 63 communes, and they gained a majority in 26. They increased their political presence in 1994 during the next local elections, and in the first fully free Polish parliamentary elections in 1991, eight Germans (all SKGDM members) entered parliament. In the 1993 parliamentary elections, the German minority lost three seats but election was still a success, since the German deputies had helped win an exemption for minority candidates from the 5 percent threshold introduced by the new Electoral Act.

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876. See Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 43 (October 27, 1995).
878. Few indubitable Germans were elected to local governments in the 1950s; See Elizabeth Wiskemann, Germany’s Eastern Neighbours (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 277/278.
879. See Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 16 (August 16-31, 1993).
A certain relaxation in the tense relations between the Polish state and the German minority came about with the signing of the German-Polish Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 1991. The treaty introduced a modicum of minority rights for the Germans living in Poland, including the right to minority education, to freedom of assembly, and to use the German spellings of their names. Forced assimilation was abolished as a valid political instrument, but the parties did not try to solve such contentious issues as dual citizenship or the question of bilingual place-names and signs. Moreover, problems with adopting treaty provisions into Polish law prompted Kroll to appeal for a comprehensive Act on Minorities, which has yet to be produced.

For a year and a half, the Polish courts did not allow the SKGDM to replace the euphemistic phrase German Minority with the word Germans in their organization’s name, but at last in 1993 the organization obtained permission to call itself the Socio-Cultural Society of Germans (SKGD in German and TSKN in Polish). However, in 1995, before German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s second visit to Poland, the Polish justice minister filed a lawsuit against the SKGD, claiming that its charter included irregularities and that it had no right to use the revised name. The Polish government lost the case. During the German minority’s five years of acknowledged political existence in Poland, there have been many such antagonistic moves by the Polish authorities at the central and voivodship levels. Initially, the government made the establishment of minority schools and bilingual classes almost impossible. And voivodship authorities have hindered the (re-)erection of monuments to Germans who died in both the World Wars.

Anti-German excesses have periodically recurred in postcommunist Poland. Polish nationalists have defaced or destroyed several German cemeteries and monuments as well as DFK (Deutscher Freundschaftskreis, German Friendship Circle, name of the SKGD’s local branches) information billboards. A few DFK headquarters have been burgled and anti-German graffiti became a common sight in Upper Silesia. In 1992, a bomb exploded at the headquarters of the German organization in the Poznan (Posen) Voivodship. Another bomb attack was attempted on the Opole (Oppeln) Cathedral in 1994.

Still, the postcommunist Poland, with its dynamically growing economy and increasingly democratic institutions, has proven to be an attractive alternative to Germany. The SKGD continues to wrench more rights for ethnic Germans, who were virtually second-class citizens in Poland before 1989. They had no chance of advancing to any high-level post in state service or any managerial position in the industrial sector. The success of the SKGD’s efforts can be measured in the substantial drop in the number of ethnic German Aussiedler (resettlers) arriving in Germany from Poland: from c. 200,000-250,000 in 1989 and 133,872 in 1990 down to 1,677 in 1995.

There were, of course, other factors curbing emigration, such as a less inviting atmosphere for immigrants in post-unification Germany, scrapping of support and financial aid for Aussiedler beginning with January 1, 1993, Polish-level pensions of c. 100-300 German marks awaiting the retired Aussiedler in Germany, and the considerable financial aid for the minority in Poland that has been flowing from Germany since 1990. It amounted to almost 7 million German marks in 1990 and

881 See Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 11 (June 1-15, 1993).
882 See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 42 (October 20-26, 1995); Dziennik Zachodni (Opole version), no. 168 (October 12, 1995).
883 See Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 20 (May 27-June 2, 1994).
884 Opole (Oppeln) Bishop Alfons Nossol is an ethnic Upper Silesian who has openly supported the German revival.
885 See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 28 (June 16-22, 1995); Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 3 (January 20, 1995); Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 1 (January 5, 1996).
886 The limitations are not applied to ethnic German Aussiedlers from the former Soviet Union: 209,409 of them arrived to German in 1995: See Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 1 (January 5, 1996).
grew to 26.6 million marks in 1996\(^{887}\), compared with a mere 282,000 marks from the Polish state in 1994\(^{888}\).

In addition, many Germans decided to stay in Poland because, since 1991, the German consulates in Poland have been issuing them German/EU passports despite the fact that neither Polish or German law accepts dual citizenship. In the years 1991 through 1994, more than 170,000 Polish citizens received German passports\(^{889}\). The passport is a tangible economic asset that allows its holder to be legally employed in Germany and throughout the European Union. The passport issuance policy thus prevents high rates of unemployment and poverty among Poland’s predominantly rural German population while allowing many German minority members to achieve significant economic success in Poland with money earned in Germany\(^{890}\). On the other hand, the dual citizenship is a source of envy for the Germans Polish neighbors. Germans who dodge Polish military service or perform the duty in the German Bundeswehr are sometimes accused of disloyalty\(^{891}\).

Also a specific phenomenon is connected to the holders of German passports with permanent residence in Poland. They cannot vote in German elections casting absentee ballots. The German concession to the Polish side produces a curious paradox a sizeable group of Aussiedler retained their Polish citizenship and have not renounced their Polish citizenship. Hence, in view of the Polish Citizenship Act of 1920 they are still Polish citizens as according to Polish law one cannot effectively acquire a foreign citizenship without having abjured the Polish one. Thus, the group of Aussiedler can and do vote in Polish elections. After 1989 also former citizens of the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939) with residence elsewhere than in the previously communist states (where they were deprived of their citizenship on the basis of bilateral treaties with Poland) are granted Polish passports and obviously the right to vote in Polish elections.

**Cultural Revival**

Efforts to recreate a separate German cultural identity have had a visible effect. For instance, in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship alone, the SKGD boasts 15 traditional brass orchestras, 12 music groups, 30 choirs, 28 singing groups, 24 dance troupes, and seven other artistic groups\(^{892}\). The small Gliwice (Gleiwitz) publishing house Wokól nas, established in 1989, has brought out books on Upper Silesia and Polish-German relations, booklets devoted to minority rights and the EU, and bilingual editions of works by Horst Bienek, a renowned Upper Silesian writer\(^{893}\).

\(^{887}\) See Auslands Kurier, no. 2 (June 1992); Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 35 (September 1-7, 1995).
\(^{888}\) See Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Górnośląska, no. 7 (February 18-24, 1994).

It must be added though that in comparison with the 20,000 German minority in Denmark Poland’s Germans receive next to nothing. In 1996 Germany supports Poland’s German minority with 45-50 marks per capita, whereas with 927 marks per capita Denmark’s German minority. The latter minority also receives 640 marks per capita from Denmark but the former only 0.50 mark per capita from the Polish state; See Bericht zur Arbeit der dänischen Minderheit, der deutschen Minderheit in Nordschleswig, der friesischen Volksgruppe und der deutschen Sinti und Roma für die 13. Legislaturperiode 1992-1996 [Report on Danish Minority, German Minority in North Schleswig, Frisian Ethnic Group, and Sinti and Roma] (Kiel: Schleswig-Holsteinisch Landtag, 1996), p. 81.

\(^{890}\) See Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 19 (May 12, 1995); Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 20 (May 19, 1995). The most recent sources state that as of November 30, 1995 the correct number is only 120,000, and that applications of 66,625 persons still await processing which usually takes one year or two. In 1995 a slight decrease in the number of applicants was observed to c. 35,000; See Schlesische Nachrichten, no. 5 (March 1, 1996).

\(^{891}\) See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 17 (April 28-May 4).

\(^{892}\) TSKN/SKGD information leaflet (1995).

\(^{893}\) Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 46 (October 6-12, 1995).
Germans in Poland maintain strong links with the organizations of the expellees in Germany (Landsmannschaften) and are members of the Catholic Church in Upper Silesia and the evangelical Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession in Pomerania and former East and West Prussia. With the help of the German government, both the Churches have established social welfare and medical stations. By 1989, Bishop Alfons Nossol had obtained the right to use German in liturgy in the Opole (Oppeln) diocese, and, at present, German-language Masses are celebrated in about 250 churches. The bishop actively cooperates with the German Catholic Church and with Church representative bodies of the Catholic expellees. The Protestants are not nearly as numerous as the Catholics but have nevertheless managed to establish their own German parishes in Slupsk (Stolp) in Pomerania, and in Wroclaw (Breslau) unlike the Catholics who can enjoy only German or bilingual Masses within Polish-language parishes.

The use of German in liturgy is quite an achievement, considering that from 1945 to 1989 the language was virtually prohibited in the former German territories (with the notable exception made for the indubitable Germans) and especially in the areas inhabited by the Autochthons. Moreover, the Decree on State Language of November 30, 1945 is still in force so there is no legal basis to use any language other than Polish in an official context. There is some leeway in the spheres of the minority mass media, education and religious life, but it is still illegal to display bilingual place-name signs or to use a minority language in a state office or court, even in an area predominantly inhabited by a minority population.

Since the only Germans who speak their language well are 60 or older, the unresolved language issue is the most important in the German minority’s continuing discussion on preservation of the ethnic group’s identity. Those born after World War II were not allowed to speak German and actually had to conceal their identity to survive in communist Poland.

**German Minority Education**

After 1989, the Polish authorities inaugurated many language teacher training colleges and language departments at universities all over the country, in order to produce enough teachers of Western European languages to replace Russian in school curricula. The German government started sending teachers to Poland in 1990. However, German teachers are not concentrated in the ethnic-German areas of Poland but are spread over the country.

In 1995 in the Opole Voivodship, only about 20 percent of all schoolchildren were offered German instruction. When it is available, German language classes generally take up just two school hours a week obviously too little for German children to master the language, given that their parents have a very limited command of it. In 1992, German was introduced as a mother tongue to 14 elementary schools of this kind in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship, which meant only one extra hour of German lessons a week. There are now more that 130 schools of this kind in the voivodship and c. 30 in the Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodship. Genuine bilingual classes are also provided by 5 secondary schools in Upper Silesia and 2 in Lower Silesia.

Still, there are no straightforward minority schools with German as the medium of instruction, although there are for other Poland’s minorities and although the German minority is numerically the largest. Moreover, the bilingual classes in secondary schools mainly benefit Polish students, as most German youths attend vocational schools that have almost no German teachers. There are some positive developments such as: planned opening of Poland’s first German bilingual elementary school in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship in September 1996 and few more in 1997 as well as agreements between the voivodship educational authorities and the German Länder of Rhineland-Palatinate and
Baden-Württemberg to secure c. 20 retired German teachers for the voivodship’s schools every year. Moreover, in spring 1996, the government having tentatively recognized the financial problems of the German minority education granted the Opole (Oppeln) voivodship’s communes which develop minority schools, with a school subsidy which is 20% larger than that one received by other communes; and at last the Deutsche Bildungsgesellschaft (BDG, German Education Association) was registered and could commence its activities in June 1996. But if the present rate of increase in employment of German teachers in the Opole (Oppeln) schools is maintained, a German minority education system will only be achieved in 17-20 years, and another generation of Germans living in Poland will have minimal knowledge of their national language. Besides Polish nationalist propaganda hinders creation of such a system tacitly intimidating German parents who hesitate to submit declarations that they children should attend German minority schools.

Integration (as opposed to assimilation) of the German minority in Poland depends on establishing a dynamic German school system that could re-create a cultural niche for the minority. Such a system will be possible only when the restrictive decree on the state language in Poland is scrapped and Poland ratifies the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (signed on February 1, 1995) and signs the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, which set out the European standards for treatment of minorities. So far, Poland has not written protection of minorities into its constitution, has not passed a comprehensive act regulating relations between the state and minorities, and has not developed an act on minority education.

**The Future**

Nevertheless, the Polish attitude toward the German minority has changed from the total surprise and even outrage apparent in 1989 to cool acceptance by 1995. Nowadays, it seems possible that at least the younger generation of the German minority (especially in Upper Silesia) will be somewhat versed in the German language and culture, which is a prerequisite for being perceived as German by the Germans in Germany. This, however, will only come about with extensive financial aid from Germany. The most contentious issues between the minority and the Polish majority such as dual citizenship, military service, the right for expellees and Aussiedler to return to their homelands, and the right for foreign nationals to purchase Polish land will gradually fade away with the accession of Poland to the EU, which is unwaveringly championed by Germany. However, if this positive scenario does not come about, nationalist tensions may flare up. Thus, it is worthwhile to observe the behavior of the ex-communists who now govern Poland. They have proven to be less that accommodating toward Poland’s minorities during their parliamentary and government dominance since 1994 although it seems that Poland’s slightly increasing aid for Polish minorities in the ex-Soviet Union and acceptance of ethnic Polish resettlers in the country may alter their stance on Poland’s minorities. However, minority issues being quite sensitive in Polish politics, no radical improvements can be expected in this area before the parliamentary elections due to be held in 1997.

**International Repercussions**

The situation of the German minority in Poland is the touchstone of Polish-German relations. In the years which have elapsed since the fall of communism in 1989, the gradual improvement of the minority’s status has been preceded by developments in the German-Polish reconciliation process marked by spectacular visits and speeches and, most significantly, by the 1990 Polish-German border treaty which definitively re-affirmed the German-Polish border along the Oder-Neisse line, which had been much disputed in the postwar period.

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897 See Opolski Goniec Sejmowy, no. 3 (April, 1996) & Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 26 (June 28-July 4, 1996).

898 See Wprost (July 2, 1995).
In case of education and cultural life the German minority still seems to suffer a disadvantage in comparison to the treatment given to Poland’s Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities. It may be the result of the immediate interest of the Polish state which is keen on supporting development of these latter national movements to counteract possible absorption of Belarus by Russia and the growing Russian influence especially in eastern Ukraine. The security reason must be perceived as valid by Germany itself as it does not emphasize the issue of equal treatment of minorities and at the turn of 1995 and 1996 decided to be more accommodating to the needs and expectations of diverse groups of the Polish-speaking population living in Germany although according to German law they cannot be recognized as a straightforward minority as they are not indigenous to any region in Germany. At the end of 1995 Poland reciprocated with its signature of the Polish-German agreement on the basis of which the time German veterans (at present living in Poland) spent in the German armed forces during World War II, is reflected by a modest raise in their pensions despite the vociferous opposition of Polish veteran organizations.

German-Polish relations are not so marred as German-Czech relations by the question of the right to return to their homelands for the German expellees. The surprising difference is caused by the fact that the Sudetendeutsche (Sudetic Germans) who were expelled from Czechoslovakia had been prewar Czechoslovak citizens unlike the expellees from the former German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line of whom only a small fraction had been holders of prewar Polish citizenship. Although the two groups of German expellees are comparable, the Sudetic Germans who were united by their common fate as second class Czechoslovak citizens, and during the war within the administrative borders of the province of Sudetenland are a more homogenous group than diverse populations of various German provinces east of the Oder and the Neisse. Besides, today the latter are spread all over Germany while the Sudetic Germans are concentrated in Bavaria where they and their descendants constitute c. one quarter of the land’s population. Understandably, the Bavarian government became the champion of the Sudetic Germans cause and must be respected by federal politicians as Bavaria, the second-largest land of Germany, is uniquely independent and thus exercises considerable leverage on German politics.

Although Hungary granted its expelled citizens of German descent the right to return to their homeland (only a little more than 100 have used this opportunity so far), Poland and the Czech Republic are unlikely to follow in the country’s footsteps whatever legal and political inconsistencies, because overwhelmingly larger amounts of real estate and land, and numbers of people involved could upset the postwar order even if, for instance, only 5-10% of the c. 3 million Sudetic Germans or c. 9 million inhabitants of Poland’s former German territories decided to return. Most probably, the Czech government will be periodically lambasted by Germany over the issue as a concession to the politically powerful electorate of the Sudetic Germans (so much needed by the CDU/CSU in its election struggles with the SPD), but the politicians seem to be playing a waiting game which should be concluded with the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary into the EU and NATO.

This would partially solve the problem of the right to return, as the countries having become part of the EU the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services would also apply to their territories. Consequently, any interested expellee/Aussiedler or his/her descendants would be able to move to their homelands and purchase their families real estate on the free market. It is however doubtful that many would use the opportunity as the countries have much lower living standards than present-day Germany. However, the possibility is used by the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) and Polish nationalist groups to propagate anti-German scare claiming that the Germans will soon buy out Poland and start dominating the country economically. In May 1996 the Polish Parliament’s decision to simplify the rules for foreigners who wish to purchase land in Poland was introduced. This act is

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899 See Dialog, no. 1 [special issue devoted to the Polish-speakers living in Germany] (April 1996).
900 See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 49 (December 8-14, 1995).
901 See Author’s interview with Dr Karl Cordell, Dept of Politics, Univ of Plymouth, UK (May 29, 1996).
strongly opposed by the PSL although it is one of a plethora of changes Poland obliged itself to enact in line with its Association Treaty (Europe Agreement) with the EU to approximate the Polish law to *acquis communautaire*.

On the whole these expellees (or other foreigners) who do wish to acquire land or real estate in Poland buy it through some Poles who offer their names as a cover-up (although the practice should stop with implementation of the aforementioned change in the property ownership laws) whereas many *Aussiedler* and Poland’s ethnic Germans who have at their disposal both the Polish and German passports, are not restricted by such limitations and contribute to the rapid development of economic and cultural links between Poland and Germany.

Last but not least, the German-Polish treaty of 1991 with the minority rights clauses was the first bilateral treaty guaranteeing minority rights in the postwar world. It was followed by many similar treaties which were contracted among Germany and Central and East European countries in an effort to regulate the minority question and to prevent ethnic strife which has ruined the countries which emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia. On this concluding note, it is clear that reemergence of the German minority in Poland not only has brought about fears and opportunities (which I have presented above) but also left its lasting imprint in the field of minority rights in post-Cold-War Europe.

*The end of the policies of ethnic cleansing in Silesia after 1989, and what next?*

The strong wave of strikes in the Spring and Summer of 1988 coaxed gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski to consent to the idea of the Round Table which was held from February to April 1989 and in June led to the partially free elections to the *Sejm* and the newly re-established Senate *de facto* marking the end of Communism. In Czechoslovakia it was matched by the Velvet Revolution in November 1989 which allowed broader recognition for the national minorities in Transolza and put an end to the action of forced assimilation which was conducted by the Czechoslovak Communist Party from 1947 to 1989. According to the March 1991 census there are c. 44,000 Poles, c. 45,000 Silesians and c. 40,000 Moravians in Transolza. The vast majority of the Transolza inhabitants is now constituted by the Czechs due to intensive industrialization and forced assimilation in the previous decades (Zahradnik, 1992: 167). However, nowadays, the minorities regained their rights to their languages/dialects, culture and identity. They are and should continue to be an integral element of the process of democratization and the economic reform which are currently implemented in the country. In this respect the words of the Polish President Lech Wasa uttered in the Federal Assembly during his first visit to Czecho-Slovakia (September 16-18, 1991) are encouraging. He said that the Transolza Polish minority should not be the source of Polish-Czecho-Slovak conflicts but a bridge which should facilitate fostering of closer relations between the two countries (Zahradnik, 1992: 166-174). Besides the Poles, the Silesians also wanted to voice their concerns about their and their land’s role in the postcommunist Czecho-Slovakia. In order to make their voice heard, together with the Moravians they founded the *Hnuti za samospravnou demokracii-Spolecnost pro Moravu a Slezsko* (the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy Association for Moravia and Silesia) on January 23, 1990. With 7.9% of the votes to the House of the People and 9.11% to the House of Nations, the Movement seated 16 deputies in the Federal Assembly. They are most vocative on the rights of the Moravians and the Silesians to autonomy, own identities, and after January 1, 1993 when Slovakia became independent, to their own republic which would be part of a future Czech-Moravian-Silesian

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902 In the most Polish Frydek-Mistek and Karviná counties the Poles account for 9.06% and 8.2% of the population respectively, the Moravians for 7.9% and 5.29%, and the Silesians for 2.16% and 2.84% (Zahradnik, 1992: 167).
903 After 1927 Czechoslovak Silesia continued to be submerged in bigger administrative districts and still nowadays is just an unrecognized part of the North Moravian District with the capital in Ostrava.
904 During the Communist times interests of the Czechoslovak Silesians were represented (to the degree tolerated by the aggressively atheist state) by the Silesian evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession whose 46,725 members predominantly speak the Silesian dialect which is their mother tongue (Ramet, 1989: 276).
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Republic (Wolchik, 1991: 94, 185; Zielonka, 1992: 3). However, it seems that from the demographic point of view the Polish and Silesian ethnic groups in Transolza have only small chance to survive in future due to the growing number of mixed marriages and to the fact that parents want their children rather to enter the fold of Czech/Moravian identity so that in future they could be successful citizens of the Czech Republic.

In the wake of the dismantling of Communism in Poland the Silesian/German minority posed a greater problem to the government (as the Sudeten Germans in the case of Czecho-Slovakia). First of all, the Silesian homeland organizations still have at their disposal the formidable social base of 1.94 mln Lower Silesians and 1.33 mln Upper Silesians in the former FRG, 0.87 mln Lower Silesians and 0.3 mln Upper Silesians in the former GDR and 10,000 Upper Silesians in Austria (Reichling, 1986: 64). Secondly, German sources maintain that there are 0.5-1 mln Germans/Silesians in Upper Silesia nowadays (Schmidla, 1993: 4) or 30,000 Lower Silesians and 750,000 Upper Silesians (Reichling, 1986: 64). The estimates of the number of the Germans/Silesians in Poland given by Anglophone sources vary from 600,000 to 900,000 (Zielonka, 1992: 25; Anon., 1993b: 48). The Polish authorities are interested in reducing this number as far as possible therefore it seems that only the estimate of the German minority Senator, Gerhard Bartodziej is most objective. Having excluded the pro-Polish Silesians from this number he considers the German/Silesian minority to be 300,000 persons strong in the historic area of Upper Silesia (Bartodziej, 1993: 26).

Therefore, the German minority in Upper Silesia had to be recognized in postcommunist Poland, especially in the view of the fact that Poland demanded a similar recognition of Polish minorities in Lithuania, Latvia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Moreover, the Poles could not continue the campaign of indiscriminate condemnation and accusations of German homeland organizations because similar homeland organizations of the Poles expelled from the former eastern territories of Poland began to mushroom all over the country, often generously supported by the local and state authorities (Schmidla, 1993: 4; Anon., 1993c).

In March 1989 the Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen Minderheit in Oppelner Schlesien (SKGDMS, the Social and Cultural Association of the German Minority in Opole Silesia) came into being as the effect of the merger of the DFK in Gogolin and the Society of Friends of German Culture in Jemielnica (Himmelwitz). The Association was officially registered and followed by a plethora of smaller and more specialized organizations of the German minority in the western territories of Poland, but especially in Upper Silesia. On November 15, 1990 in Wroclaw, an umbrella association for all the groups was formed, namely: the Zentralrat der Deutschen Gesellschaften in der Republik Polen (the Central Council of the German Minority Associations in the Republic of Poland). Also two important pro-Polish Silesian organizations came into being during the time: the conservative Zwizek Górnołski (the Upper Silesian Association) in Katowice, Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) and Opole on June 30, 1989, and later the traditional-liberal Zwizek Górnołzaków (the Association of the Upper Silesians).

The pro-Polish organizations, however, cannot match the German/Silesian organizations in membership and intensity of activities. Of all the latter, the SKGDMS is by far the most significant one. In November 1989 it gathered over 250,000 signatures of people declaring their German origin and at the end of 1990 the organization had c. 130,000 card holders (Cygaski, 1992: 45/46). The administration of the SKGDMS was elected at the meeting of April 19, 1990 in Gogolin, and immediately issued its program which aimed at liquidating disparities in treatment of the

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905 The Soviet-imposed silence on the question of the expellees in the GDR was broken in 1985 by the Silesian author Ursula Höntsch who published a biographic book on the times of the transfer of the German population from Silesia and the aftermath, entitled Wir Flüchtlingskinder (We, Children of the Expellees). The Polish translation of the novel was brought up in 1993 (Höntsch, 1993).

906 It is mainly concentrated in the eastern part of the Opole Voivodaship (which used to border with Polish Upper Silesia before the Second World War), in the Olesno (Rosenberg) County, now incorporated in the Cz_stochowa Voivodaship, and in a plethora of small pockets in the Katowice Voivodaship.
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Silesians/Germans in comparison to other Polish citizens, spreading of German teaching and knowledge of German culture, promoting environmental protection in Upper Silesia, gaining the right to co-decision about the country and the region, and access to mass-media among others (Anon., 1990).

Thus, linguistic, social, educational and cultural discrimination of the Germans/Silesians in Upper Silesia gradually came to an end. On April 20, 1990 the bilingual biweekly of the SKGDMS Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomoci Górno_l_skie was launched and it replaced the ultra-nationalist Schlesische Nachrichten which was closed down after it had published the forbidden national anthem of the Third Reich in full in 1992. Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomoci Górno_l_skie at the moment of its inception started local elections campaign thanks to which the German/Silesian electorate was mobilized and in May 1990 gained representation in 40 counties (to 64 counties in the whole Opole Voivodship) and in 26 counties they constituted a majority (Bartodziej, 1993: 26).

Meanwhile, the positive domestic achievements were constantly facilitated by the course of international efforts. In November 1989 Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Poland and met with thousands of Germans/Silesians at Krzyowa (Lichtenwaldau) in southern Lower Silesia. On November 14 a joint declaration signed by Kohl and the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, committed the FRG to accept the fact of the post-1945 frontiers of Poland and gave a reciprocal pledge of respect for minority German/Polish rights. On June 21, 1990 the FRG Budestag and the GDR Volkskammer adopted identically-worded resolutions calling for the existing borders to be definitely confirmed by a treaty under international law and reaffirming the inviolability of the frontier existing between Germany and Poland now and in the future. Finally after the completion of the Two-Plus-Four negotiations on September 12, 1990 and the unification of Germany on October 3, 1990, Genscher and his Polish counterpart signed The Treaty Between the Republic of Poland and the FRG Reaffirming the Borders Existing Between Them on November 14, 1990. The real breakthrough came with The Treaty Between the FRG and the Republic of Poland on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation of June 17, 1991 (Allcock, 1992: 95-98). For the first time in the history of the post-Second-World-War world the notion of national minority was explicitly used in a ratified and binding international treaty. The Treaty which is valid for the period of ten years, regulates the status, rights and obligations of the Polish minority in the FRG and the German minority in the Republic of Poland in Articles 20, 21 and 22:

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907 After the Second World War, this highly developed and industrialized region was treated as an internal colony which was to provide sources for development of the rest of Poland. Due to this inconsiderate economic policies, Upper Silesia is the most ecologically devastated region in Poland and its industry is largely decapitalized which coupled with general unfeasibility of heavy industry causes soaring rates of unemployment in Upper Silesia (Anon., 1990: 2; Dworaczyk, 1993; Rother, 1990: 5).

908 Later, its name was changed was changed to Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Górno_l_ska; and at the close of 1993 it became a weekly. The periodical is bilingual so that it could also cater for the Silesians/Germans who lost or did not acquire knowledge of the German language due to the official ban on it in Upper Silesia during the Communist time; and for the Poles interested in the region where they live.

909 It was financed from the FRG and at the beginning was even printed over there.

910 When the news of the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9 arrived, he returned for two days to the FRG, and so could not participate in the Catholic mass with the Silesians/Germans at the Holy Mountain of Upper Silesia - Góra _w. Anny (St. Annaberg).

911 Earlier, the concept of national minority was merely mentioned in Article 14 of The European Convention on Human Rights.
Article 20

(1) The members of the German minority in the Republic of Poland, i.e. the persons with Polish citizenship, but of German origin or espousing the German language, culture or tradition, and also the persons in the Federal Republic of Germany with Polish citizenship, but of Polish origin or espousing the Polish language, culture or tradition; have the right to individual or collective (with other members of their ethnic group) free expression, preservation and development of their own ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity without any attempt at assimilation against their will. They have the right to full and effective use of human rights and basic freedoms without any discrimination and fully equality before the law.


(3) The Parties to the Treaty declare that the persons mentioned in Item (1) have individual and collective (together with other members of their ethnic group) rights to:

- free use of their mother tongue in private and public life, access to information in this language, and to exchange and dissemination of it,

- establishing and maintaining own institutions, organizations, and educational, cultural and religious associations, which are allowed to try to obtain financial and other support from private persons as well as from public sources in accordance with the domestic law, and which have, and should have equal access to the mass media in their respective regions,

- confessing and practising their religion, including purchasing, possessing and use of religious materials, and to conducting educational religious activities in their mother tongue,

- establishing and maintaining unhindered contacts among themselves inside the borders of the host country, and also cross-border contacts with citizens of other countries with whom they are connected by the same ethnic or national origin, cultural tradition or religious feelings,

- use of their names and surnames in the way demanded by the rules of their mother tongue,

- establishing and maintaining organizations or associations inside the host country, and to membership in international non-governmental organizations,

- use of effective legal means (on par with other citizens) for realization of their rights in accordance with domestic law.

(4) The Parties to the Treaty reaffirm that belonging to the groups mentioned in Item (1) is the matter of individual choice, and that no negative consequences may result from the choice.
Article 21

(1) The Parties to the Treaty shall protect, on their respective territories, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1), and shall create conditions needed to support these identities. The role of intensified constructive cooperation in this field is highly appreciated. This cooperation should strengthen peaceful coexistence and good neighborliness of the German and Polish Nations, and contribute to better understanding and reconciliation between them.

(2) The Parties to the Treaty especially:

shall mutually make possible and facilitate activities aimed at supporting the members of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) or their organizations in the framework of valid legal acts,

despite the necessity of learning the official language of the respective country, shall endeavor in accordance with the appropriate regulations of domestic law to ensure for the members of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) appropriate opportunities for teaching of, or in their mother tongue, in the public educational system, and of using the language before the public authorities wherever it is possible and necessary,

shall include history and culture of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) in the history and culture syllabi in the educational system,

shall honor the right of the members of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1) to effective participation in public matters including protection of and support for their identity,

thus, shall undertake necessary steps to comply with the afore-stated commitment after appropriate consultations, in accordance with the procedure of undertaking such decisions in a given state, and in conjunction with the organizations or associations of the groups enumerated in Article 20 Item (1).

(3) The Parties to the Treaty shall comply with the decisions of Article 3 regarding the matters dealt with in this Article and in Articles 20 and 22.

Article 22

(1) None of the obligations enumerated by Articles 20 and 21 can be interpreted as giving the right to engage in any activities or to conducting any activities breaching the aims and rules of The UN Charter, or other obligations required by international law, and the Final Act of the CSCE, which also includes respecting territorial integrity of states.

(2) every person in the Republic of Poland or in the Federal Republic of Germany belonging to the groups mentioned in Article 20 Item (1) is accordingly obligated, in accordance with the afore-mentioned decisions, to be loyal to the respective State adhering to the obligations enacted by the legislation of the State.\(^{912}\) (Anon., 1991: 45-53)

The Treaty constitutes the model for reciprocal minority treaties which are signed in the postcommunist Europe. From the practical point of view it allowed the German/Silesian minority to take part in the first free Polish parliamentary elections in October 1991.\(^{913}\) Subsequently, the minority managed to elect seven of its candidates to the Sejm and one to the Senate. The deputies always consistently voted for all the initiatives needed to reform the state and its economy, and for bills

\(^{912}\) The author’s own translation on the basis of the Polish text of the Treaty.

\(^{913}\) The tension between the Poles and the German/Silesian minority in the Opole Voivodship reached the climax in the Winter of 1990 during the by-election campaign to the Senate. The candidacy of an assertive German Silesian Henryk Krol (one of the SKGEMS leaders) was met with hostile, if not hysterical reaction by the local Polish populace. Finally the Polish candidate, Professor Dorota Simonides (a pro-Polish Silesian and a lecturer in Silesian ethnography at the Higher Pedagogical School in Opole) won in the second round (Zielonka, 1992: 27).
which aimed at improvement of the social, economic and ecological situation in Upper Silesia, and at cooperation with the FRG in the framework of European integration (Bartodziej, 1993: 27).

In the following years, the German/Silesian minority had the German language and culture introduced to numerous schools in the Opole Voivodaship. Also German kindergartens were opened, and the Department of German at the Higher Pedagogical School in Opole 914 was instituted to provide the local educational system with qualified German teachers who are badly needed in this region because only in 1990 the ban on teaching German in Opole Voivodaship schools was repealed (Urban, 1993: 1). The issue of education of German/Silesia children and youth was officially regulated by the Agreement between the Opole Voivodaship School Inspectorate and the SKGDMS (Anon., 1992: 1). With the support of the FRG and the BdV a net of libraries and cheap/free German language courses was created. In 1993 the German Vice-Consulate was opened in Opole and the Silesians/Germans were allowed to submit documents necessary to obtain German citizenship (in accordance with Article 116 of the German Constitution) while residing in Poland. Exchanges of schoolchildren with Germany have been organized and German university scholarships have been offered to the Silesian/German students. Translations and originals of works by such renowned Silesian authors as Eichendorff, Bieneck, Piontek or Angelus Silesius commenced to be published as well as new periodicals, among which especially the color bilingual biweekly Hoffnung of the Towarzystwo Spoeczno-Kulturalne Ludnoci Pochodzenia Niemieckiego Województwa Katowickiego (the Social and Cultural Association of the Population of German Origin in the Katowice Voivodaship), launched at the end of 1993, is worth mentioning. 915

All the efforts coupled with intensification of economic contacts with the FRG at the level of private enterprises slowed down emigration the modern Ostflucht of the Silesians/Germans to the FRG which is one of the most important program aims of the SKGDMS (Cygaski, 1992: 50). Another factor responsible for diminishing of their emigration is a poor economic shape of the FRG in comparison to the period of the economic miracle in the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, the German authorities do not provide such emigrants, Aussiedlers with a job, partially free accommodation and gratis language courses as they used to in the past. But the economic situation and the standard of life in Poland is much lower which still causes some dynamic persons to leave Silesia; rather few since the possibility of possessing two passports enables them to emigrate immediately should they decide so. Double citizenship, from the legal point of view, is not allowed neither in the FRG nor in Poland. 916 It is sometimes frowned upon by the Polish authorities but luckily, at present, no measures are taken to curb the practice (Urban, 1993: 1) because it could trigger off an exodus of young Silesians (Anon., 1992a: 3; Ludwig, 1993: 2).

Another unresolved problem which hovers over Upper Silesia is the ban on the use of German place-names in documents, notices and mass media. Albeit the ban is often breached in the Silesian minority press, it is still unacceptable to put up signs with bilingual names of localities or streets. 917 In The Letters to the German-Polish Treaty of June 17, 1991, the Polish side strongly repudiated such a possibility though may choose to look into it at a later date (Anon., 1991: 73, 75). The question if

914 Soon it is going to be upgraded to the status of a university and its name will be most probably the Piast University. The Piasts were the first rulers of Poland and formed long-lasting dynastic lines in the Silesian principalities when their main line became extinct and the Jagiellonians began to sit in the Polish throne. The House of Piast is the symbol of Polishdom for Polish patriots who rarely realize that the Piast rulers were responsible for Germanization of Silesia.

915 The Catholic Church also did contribute to the normalization in Silesia by re-introducing bilingual religious services which had had long tradition in this region before they had been abolished after the outbreak of the Second World War.

916 During his sojourn in South Africa, the author noticed that Polish passports are readily issued to Polish nationals with South African citizenship which clearly constitutes a breach of the Polish law.

917 Poland demanded abolishing of a similar ban directed at the Polish minority in Lithuania, and the authorities of the latter did abrogate it (Anon., 1993c).
the German/Silesian minority has the right to renovate and build new monuments commemorating their husbands and sons who died during the two World Wars caused almost a hysterical nationalistic outcry in the Polish press. Most objections were directed against inscriptions in German (sic !) and Maltese crosses which the Poles interpret as Iron Crosses of the Reich. The right of the Silesians/Germans to honor their beloved ones who died in action, was reaffirmed and regulated by the Mixed Monument Commission with its final document of May 24, 1993 (Anon., 1993d; Hupka, 1993). The most serious and difficult social problem of the Silesian/German minority is the Wehrmacht veterans. The Wehrmacht was not a criminal organization, as the SS Waffen, but a regular conscript army. Its veterans in Silesia, of whom 48,500 still survive, are denied any veteran status, and are considered to be on par with the SSmen by the Polish veteran organizations, and, most importantly, the time they spent in the army and in Soviet concentration camps is not added to the years during which they worked which is a usual practice in the case of war veterans. In 1975 Bonn transferred to Warsaw DM1.2 bln which were to be distributed among them but the money never reached its destination. Till 1989 their case was a taboo and nowadays neither the Polish nor German governments show any eagerness to help these old and more often than not destitute people (Bubin, 1993). Yet the last complaint of the German/Silesian minority is about the excesses of Polish extremists in the form of breaking windows in the houses of German/Silesian MPs, acts of vandalism at headquarters of German/Silesian organizations, and offensive graffiti which recently concentrated on the person of Opole bishop Alfons Nossol918. Sometimes such actions may be caused by the activities of German extremists in Upper Silesia (Urban, 1993: 2), hence both the tendencies should be contained by the police which unfortunately seems to sympathize with the Polish nationalists.

However, Poland is a very young democracy which only starts to learn the truth that the attitude towards minorities is a measure of the level of civilization a country has achieved, so the Polish accomplishments in this field should not be overshadowed by failures. Thus, it must be rightly recognized, that, although only after one year and a half of efforts, the SKGDMS was registered by the Opole Voivodship Court as the Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutsche (the Social and Cultural Association of the Germans)919 on May 5, 1993 (Mi, 1993a: 1,3). In March 1993 the Polish Prime Minister, Hanna Suchocka visited Opole and delivered a groundbreaking speech in which she officially recognized that Silesia is inhabited by ethnically very diversified populace, including its original inhabitants the Silesians, and that well-being and security of the land and even whole Poland depends on peaceful cooperation here which is and shall be fostered and facilitated by the Polish state (Suchocka, 1993: 1, 3). Moreover, when the new parliamentary elections ordinance introduced the 5% vote threshold for parties and 7% for coalitions to limit the number of splinter groups, the minority parties and organizations were exempted from it which allowed the German/Silesian minority to elect one senator and five members of the Sejm in the last parliamentary elections of September 1993. After the wave of strikes of the Upper Silesian miners920 at the end of April 1994, President Lech Walesa officially came to Katowice (Kattowitz) on the Sunday of May 8, 1992 to placate angry social feelings. His visit was widely televised, and, among other activities, he watched the premiere showing

918 He is the first ethnic Silesian to head the Opole diocese, which is an important sign of the reversal of the Polish Church policy which earlier promoted Polishdom at the cost of suppression of the Silesian identity (Schmidla, 1993: 4).

919 The battle had been fought over changing the term German minority to the Germans, which had seemed to be quite unacceptable to the Polish authorities (Mi_, 1993a: 1,3).

920 The prices of the Polish coal are not competitive at the world market any more so many miners are unemployed nowadays and the government plans to close down majority of the mines in near future. The economic situation is desperate here as it was before the war. It is clearly demonstrated by the fact that many unemployed miners started to illegally mine low-calorific coal from shallow seams as their fathers and grandfathers used to in the 1930s (Wieczorek, 1994: 40/41).
of Smierc jak kromka chleba (Death As a Slice of Bread) the latest film\(^{921}\) by the foremost Silesian director Kutz. Most significantly, the director admitted that history of Silesia is highly idiosyncratic, and hardly constitutes a part of the Polish past for the first time in the postwar history of Poland, such a statement was so widely publicized. Let us hope it will be a harbinger of a better future for Silesia.

From this chapter of the thesis it is visible that after 1989 the Polish state has striven to acknowledge the previously hotly denied existence of the German/Silesian minority by the ongoing and dynamic process of legal regulations which, if consistently and justly implemented and observed, in future may result in a system of minority protection comparable to these ones worked-out in South Tyrol, Schleswig-Holstein or Catalonia. These developments are facilitated by the fact that 82% of the Polish populace accepts the fact that the German/Silesian minority is represented in the Polish parliament (Kowalski, 1994). On the international arena, Poland having become a member of the Council of Europe, ratified The European Convention on Human Rights. On the other hand, in the light of Poland’s endeavors to be allowed to ascend into the European Union, one may trust that it shall observe the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (Anon., 1993b: 4). Besides, the Polish-German Treaty of June 17, 1991, the Convention and the Declaration should constitute a basis on which the standards of German/Silesian minority protection in Poland ought to be developed, so that the standards would be compatible with the European norms, and hence Poland could easily enter a future united Europe of regions. This dream has been shared by so many Poles, and Silesians both at home and especially in Germany, that one must hope for its actualization which ideally would replace nationalistic tensions and conflicts with cooperation and respect for different identities they add flavor and a spectrum of interesting and seminal diversities to the largely homogenous Euro-American sphere of culture.

**Conclusion**

To reiterate, Silesia was and still is a multicultural and at least bi- if not trilingual borderland which lies in the transitory area between Western and Central Europe. In the past its diverse population lived peacefully gradually developing this rich region of outstanding soils and mineral riches, but exactly because of the fact that Silesia was usually placed at the peripheries of a country to which it happened to belong to, and was a wealthy country; it was often changing hands as a prize trophy in Polish-Czech, Czech-Hungarian, Czech-Austrian and Austrian-Prussian wars. Reformation and Counter-Reformation also imprinted their bloody sign on Silesia which then experienced first forced movements of its population.

It was only a portent of what was to come later with the spread of the concept of nation state which served as the model for the absolutist countries of Western Europe which usually were fairly homogenous from the ethnic point of view. On the other hand, the states in Central and eastern Europe were too small (as the three hundred odd German states, or a plethora of Italian statelets) or too big (Prussia, the Austrian or the Russian empires) to serve as the basis for construction of nation states. The small state organisms were underinclusive whereas the big overinclusive. This tension intensified by modernization, industrialization and establishment of nationalist movements had to be somehow bridged or liquidated in the process of nation building. The main methods of dealing with this predicament were federalism (e.g. the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the FRG) or centralism (e.g. Russia, Poland, Prussia). The former solution entailed tolerance towards national minorities and the latter forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing. Unfortunately, the majority of the Central and Eastern European states based on the federal model proved to be centralist though in disguise, therefore, the federations were unstable and had to crumble down.

\(^{921}\) The film is about the strike of miners of the Wujek Coal Mine, who commenced it after the introduction of the martial law on December 13, 1981. The strike was forcefully quelled by the security police (ZOMO) and seven miners were shot to death in the process.
Silesia has been a traditional bone of contention among Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia modern states which were created only in 1871 and 1918 respectively. Upon their foundation, the states aggressively embarked on the process of nation building to match the achievements of Western Europe in this sphere. Forced assimilation and policies of ethnic cleansing were sanctified by the ideal of nation state with a complete disregard for the rights of minorities. Accordingly, in Silesian history one can distinguish several periods which well illustrate the dynamics of policies of ethnic cleansing which were presented in the thesis, namely:

1) The Austrian rule till 1742 when Prussia seized most of Silesia, was marked by more or less intensified discrimination of Protestants.

2) 1742-1848: discrimination of Catholics and the rise of the Silesian national awareness.

3) 1848-1871: an increase in discrimination of Catholics and the beginning of national polarization.

4) 1871-1921: this period is opened by Bismarck’s Kulturkampf (in the year of German unification) which was an undeclared war with Catholicism. The majority of Catholics were Polish-speaking Upper Silesians so the policy and Polish nationalist influences from Posnania and Galicia radicalized them. Czech nationalism was also widespread in Austrian Silesia. There were also German and Austrian attempts to quench these growing irredentisms.

5) 1921-1938/1939: after the division of Upper Silesia between Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia the countries used all methods allowed by law and international agreements to assimilate their minorities. After the post-plebiscite division of Upper Silesia between Poland and Germany the movements of Silesians from the German side to the Polish one and vice versa involved approximately 100,000 people (Bartodziej, 1993: 25) the first clear exemplar of ethnic cleansing.

6) 1939-1945: the Third Reich Germanizes Upper Silesia with all available means including genocide in the case of the Silesian Jews and homicide in the cases of Polish-oriented Silesians.

7) 1945-1949: Silesia is a part of the postwar social engineering operation approved by the Allies, which resulted in the expulsion of 16,910,000 ethnic Germans from the Deutsche Ostgebiet and other Central and Eastern European countries (Reichling, 1986: 26). It has been an instance of biggest ethnic cleansing in the human history so far.

8) 1950-1988: the German/Silesian minority in Upper Silesia and the Polish-speaking minority in Czechoslovak Silesia are suppressed by the Communist authorities. Their existence is questioned and they are subjected to forced assimilation. The Prague Spring of 1968 terminated Czechization of Czechoslovak Silesia for several months.

9) 1989-: after the fall of Communism existence of minorities is acknowledged and the state relations of with them are based on the system of laws and agreements which are currently being worked-out, and on international conventions which are gradually adopted in the process of democratization by the countries possessing parts of Silesia.

Let us here express the hope that after the two centuries of policies of ethnic cleansing in Silesia, which have driven away most of its population, and almost obliterated its specific culture and tradition; we will observe peaceful cooperation among ethnically diversified groups which inhabit the land nowadays, with due respect for one another. It seems that the best framework for this difficult but worthwhile task is offered by a united Europe of regions which apparently is the goal of contemporary European politics. However, the right to attest if the statement is true or not belongs to future generations our own should strive to actualize this ideal.

In the Silesian context it means that the chauvinistic bias of Polish, German and Czech national historiographies (which only endeavor to prove that Silesia rightly belongs only to one of the three nations) ought to be dropped for the sake of objectivity which is the very first step in re-building amicable and fruitful relations between different ethnic groups. Thus, ideally, academicians of the three countries should compile a synthetic history of Silesia which could become a basic common
background for discussions on this region. The histories of Silesia which are obtainable at present are multi-voluminous works of minute detail, or short sketches, whereas scholarly articles dealing with the Silesian past never dare offer any broad synthesis (which could clash with the official line of a national historiography) and contain themselves to minor aspects and narrow issues.

It is a pity that so far no history of Silesia has been written by an English-speaker, who, by the virtue of the very fact that he would have no ethnic or emotional ties with the region, could produce an objective work. But obstacles awaiting such a person are really daunting. The source materials to Silesian history are written in Latin, German, Polish, Czech, English and French (the two latter languages were used in the cases of such international agreements as: The Versailles Treaty, The Geneva Convention, and Plebiscite Commission documents). Moreover, to obtain some reliable information from scholarly works in Polish, German or Czech, one should read several articles or books in all the three languages on every single event (which usually is differently interpreted by each national historiography), and acquire the difficult art of reading in-between lines because often the most crucial for Silesian history incidents and facts are those which are not explicitly stated, or are obviously omitted in academic accounts.

The author of this thesis does fully realize these difficulties and does not claim that has mastered all the skills necessary to attain objectivity while tackling the complicated past of Silesia. However, he made an effort, which is duly reflected in the bibliography, to use German, Polish, Czech and English works while having researched for this work. Thus, though it is certainly not free from errors and omissions (for which only the author is to be blamed), the thesis is an attempt at a synthetic overview of the problem of ethnic cleansing in Silesia. To the knowledge of the author, only parts of this significant issue were separately researched so one could not obtain its whole mental picture unless had diligently read scattered articles devoted to Silesian history. Therefore, the author believes, that the work can be a substantial contribution to the new synthetic and objective approach to Silesian history which he has postulated above.

The Revival of Silesian Regionalism in Poland

After World War II Poland was recompensed with the Deutsche Ostgebiete (German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line) for its Kresy (eastern territories) which the Soviet Union had seized in agreement with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and retained due to the Allies tacit agreement. Hence, the Polish communist government at Warsaw found itself with a state consisting in one-third from German territories on top of the almost complete lack of support in the staunchly Catholic, and anti-Soviet and anti-communist population. However, having to comply with the faits accomplis which could not be overturned as guaranteed by the Allies and Moscow (rather interested in stabilizing the postwar status quo in Europe than in starting a new war), the Polish communist deftly used the situation and the general anti-German feeling to win seemingly impossible support from the Polish nation.

The Poles from the Kresy were transferred to the Deutsche Ostgebiete with no viable hope of return, and were joined by settlers from the overpopulated and devastated by the war regions of central Poland in search of better life. Obviously, they agreed with the official line that the remaining German population should be transferred to Germany as quickly as possible. But, on the other hand, after the completion of the expulsion, the new inhabitants of the Deutsche Ostgebiete were afraid that the Germans would return one day and take everything away from the former leaving them destitute in the face of sheer impossibility of returning to the Kresy or to central Poland’s farms already taken over by their siblings. The anti-German psychosis was fortified by the propaganda and by the fact that no final binding agreement on the Polish western border was concluded with the GDR (German Democratic Republic) or the FRG (Federal Republic of Germany) before the fall of communism in 1989.

922 The omissions and errors are mainly caused by the fact that all the sources the author had to consult are fragmentary and narrowly specialist.
In this situation Moscow remained the only guarantor of Poland’s territorial integrity which boosted popularity of the Polish communists and allowed them to translate the traditional anti-Sovietism into the fortification of the anti-German feeling. What is more, the citizenry also quickly espoused the propaganda legitimization of the Polish incorporation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete, which, first, falsified history, and, second, changed the concept of the state from the Jagellonian one (this is, territorial) to the Piast one (this is, ethnic). In a nutshell, the view claimed that the Deutsche Ostgebiete were primordially Polish and Slavic, and that only recently and unlawfully had been seized by warmongering Germans on peaceful Poles (cf. Linek, 1998: 82-9).

This myth was supported by referring to the Deutsche Ostgebiete as the Recovered or Piast\(^\text{924}\) Lands, the official label of repatriates for the Krezy expellees, and the claim that the Deutsche Ostgebiete ethnic groups of the Kashubs, Mazurs, Warmiaks (Ermlanders), Szlonzoks and Slonzaks were primordial Poles\(^\text{935}\) who may have lost awareness of their Polishness (but not Polishness itself) only due to centuries-long Germanization. Their primordiality was emphasized by the official label of Autochthons\(^\text{925}\), though strangely enough they had to be de-Germanized and re-Polonized\(^\text{927}\) to become real Poles (cf. Linek, 1997).

In order to survive and to serve its faithful the Polish Catholic Church also accepted the official reading of history, and the communist authorities quite readily supported its efforts to establish Polish dioceses\(^\text{928}\) in the Deutsche Ostgebiete, because it strengthened the unwilling acceptance of the communist rule among the populace and fortified the nascent Polish administration in the incorporated territories. Despite the ideological differences the Church and the state cooperated in inventing and constructing the Polish past and present of the Deutsche Ostgebiete until 1965 when the Polish episcopate sent the letter to the German bishops in which they forgave the German wrongdoings and asked for forgiveness of the Polish wrongdoings\(^\text{929}\) (Madajczyk, 1994).

In spite of the rhetoric of internationalism, the Polish communists set out on the route of completing the building of the Polish nation and nation-state which had commenced in 1918 and been temporarily reversed in 1939-45. The model was still the ethnically homogenous and centralized French nation-state.

Homogenization meant expelling or assimilating non-Polish populations, and doing away with administrative divisions and statuses which did not fit the overall pattern. Hence, Germans were expelled from the Provinces of Lower and Upper Silesia, and the remaining Szlonzoks and Slonzaks were subjected to forced Polonization. From the administrative point of view, the two provinces were divided into Polish voivodeships, and the authorities rather illegally scrapped the autonomous status of the prewar Silesian Voivodeship lest it would mar homogeneity of the administrative structure of the state.

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\(^{923}\) The Polish (or more correctly Polanian) state comprised most of the future Deutsche Ostgebiete only very shortly at the beginning of the 11th century, but never ever included southern East Prussia before 1945 (cf. Magocsi, 1995: 14).

\(^{924}\) The House of Piast was the first Polish dynasty.

\(^{925}\) Actually no people in Europe can claim to be primordial with the exception of the Basques, and especially not those who inhabit the North European Plain which was crossed by numerous ethnic groups in the past.

\(^{926}\) Upper Sileans despise this label (usually written with the little instead of capital letter) considering it a pejorative rather than an ethnonym with which they would be ready to describe themselves.

\(^{927}\) The concept of re-Polonization ideologically stressed the myth that members of the aforementioned ethnic groups were Poles unaware of their Polishness, or of Polish origin.

\(^{928}\) They were known as apostolic administrations until 1972 when the Vatican officially recognized the Polish Church administration in the Deutsche Ostgebiete.

\(^{929}\) Not surprisingly was this letter authored in German by archbishop Boleslaw Kominek, an Upper Silesian who received elementary and secondary education at German school before the division of Upper Silesia (Pater, 1996: 180-3).
Subsequently, in accordance with the Polish interwar usage propagated already by the Sanacja, the name of Silesia (Slask) was employed only in the context of the Upper Silesian industrial basin (Wanatowicz, 1994: 126) whereas the area of the interwar Oppeln Regency was dubbed the Opolszczyzna (Opole land) or Opole Silesia\(^{930}\). What is more, the communists largely retained the administrative borders of the wartime Province of Upper Silesia with the incorporated non-Silesian territories, in the form of the new Silesian Voivodeship. Its first voivode, gen. Aleksander Zawadzki who came from the non-Silesian Dabrowa (Dombrowa) industrial basin (enclosed within the voivodeship’s borders), illegally changed the name of the voivodeship into the Silesian-Dabrowa Voivodeship under which it is known in historiography (Kamusella, 1996: 120-1).

De-Silesianization of Upper Silesia continued at the administrative level in 1950 when the Silesian-Dabrowa Voivodeship was split into the Opole and Katowice Voivodeships roughly corresponding to the wartime Oppeln and Kattowitz Regencies. Thus, the Katowice Voivodeship with its territory in one quarter non-Silesian, became even less Silesian in 1960 when the large area centered around the Polish national shrine of Czestochowa was transferred to it from the Lodz Voivodeship. Although the administrative reform of 1975 limited the extent of non-Silesian areas in the Katowice Voivodeship, it also transferred the north-eastern corner of the Opole Voivodeship, and the East Silesian section of the Katowice Voivodeship to the newly established Czestochowa and Bielsko-Biala Voivodeships, respectively (Pawlak, 1997: 6). Only the Church stuck to the interwar status quo retaining the Katowice diocese territorially corresponding to the interwar Silesian Voivodeship, and the Breslau archdiocese overhauled as the Wroclaw Ecclesiastical Province (consisting from the Wroclaw archdiocese and Opole diocese) corresponding to the interwar Province of Lower Silesia and the Oppeln Regency. So the Katowice and Opole dioceses comprised the whole of Upper Silesia in addition to Poland’s part of East Silesia (Adamczuk, 1991: 116).

From the ethnic perspective, the highest positions in the Silesian-Dabrowa Voivodeship were given mainly to officials from the Dabrowa industrial basin and from elsewhere in Poland. However, to the top positions in municipalities and counties numerous Upper Sileans\(^{931}\) were nominated to facilitate legitimization of the new communist order and authorities in the eyes of the Upper Silesian population which was not only Catholic and anti-communist, but also christian-democratic unlike the rest of Poland’s population. This situation lasted from 1945 to 1948 the year by which the communists had definitively suppressed any political opposition in Poland (Bahlcke, 1996: 202).

Afterwards, the Upper Silesian civil and self-government servants were gradually forced to leave because they were activists of the ZPwN (no memories of Polish minority in Germany were needed especially after the establishment of the brotherly GDR), associated with the Polish emigre government in London, members of the Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL, Polish Peasant Movement, which was the main opponent of the communists), associated with the interwar ChD or the movement of the veterans of the Silesian Uprisings. These traditions did not match with the communist line and threatened the legitimization of the communist rule as more truly Polish than the Soviet-ordained Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (PZPR, Polish United Workers Party). Moreover, they emphasized the ethnic, historical, economic and legal distinctiveness of Upper Silesia which clashed with the ongoing centralization and homogenization of the state administration.

This clamp-down on Upper Silesian officials meant that mentioning Korfanty became as politically incorrect as pointing at the German past of Upper Silesia, though he was against Pilsudski and the Sanacja the main interwar culprits in the communist propaganda. But, besides, Korfanty had been a ChD leader and striven for maintaining the autonomy of the Silesian Voivodeship and retention of power over this region in the hands of pro-Polish Upper Sileans. Obviously, it did not

\(^{930}\) These terms were also invented by the Polish interwar propaganda and popularized by the Kresy writer Stanislaw Wasyлевski in his book 1937 book Slask Opolski (Opole Silesia), so as to emphasize Poland’s standing claim to the whole of Upper Silesia, and to avoid using the term of German Upper Silesiá for this part of the region which stayed in Germany after the 1921 division.

\(^{931}\) I use the term Upper Silesian to denote the inhabitant of Upper Silesia in general.
agree with the communist line of homogenization (not very much different from the national socialist Gleichschaltung).

So if one was an Upper Silesian one had slim chances of being nominated to any high positions in civil service or management of the industry unless one proved oneself to be through and through Polish and communist, and, at best, undertook his career outside Upper Silesia. Thus it is not surprising that only gen. Jerzy Zietek and Edmund Osmanczyk enjoyed any political careers connected to Upper Silesia, which are worth mentioning. The former had been a petty civilian servant in the Silesian Voivodeship before the war but had gained appropriate credentials having resided during the war in the Soviet Union. The latter as an interwar activists of the Polish minority in the Province of Upper Silesia and Germany, had remained in the Generalgouvernement during the war so only after several decades of loyal service to the communist authorities as a journalist, he was allowed some political career in the 1980s (Moldawa, 1991: 408, 447-8). The other two Upper Silesians of some renown were the journalist Wilhelm Szewczyk and the writer Gustaw Morcinek, who unwaveringly served the cause of communism and Polnichdom with pen.

In order to hamper any possibility of the reconstruction of the Upper Silesian regional community, the communists used the old tactics of divide et impera, which had commenced with the national polarization of the region during the plebiscite and the division of Upper Silesia, and had been accelerated during the war by the introduction of the DVL. First of all, the mass of Polish population which arrived in Upper Silesia after the war, did not consider the remaining Upper Silesians, lumped together as Autochthons, to be Polish. In their eyes the Upper Silesians were Germans or crypto-Germans (Jonderko, 1998: 165-9). Second, the approach of the authorities recognizing Upper Silesians as Poles but blocking any meaningful career and thus turning them only into a pool of highly qualified workers indispensable for running the Upper Silesian industry, effectively made them into second-class citizens. Third, the actions of de-Germanization and re-Polonization suppressed and alienated the Upper Silesians from the Polish mainstream keeping them quiet and docile. And fourth, rehabilitation directed at the DVL holders and verification aimed at Upper Silesians who had resided without the Polish borders before the war, reinforced the cleavage which had split the Upper Silesians since the division of their region in 1921. Moreover, the divisions were complicated by Upper Silesians returning from Germany, the Polish armed forces in the West and in the East, and from Soviet forced labor camps. The authorities treated them quite differently persecuting, to a lesser or larger degree the two first groups together with those Upper Silesians who had fought in non-communist resistance groups, and not allowing any open voicing of the grievances of the two latter groups.

This staunchly Polonizing course and relegating the Upper Silesian to the position of the conscientious and docile though indispensable worker only, without any respect for the individual need of advancement, could not be accepted too readily. The inevitable backlash occurred in 1952, when the authorities started to issue new internal passports. In the pre-issuance questionnaire rubric nationality, seventy thousand wrote German in the Opole Voivodeship, and thirteen thousand in the Katowice Voivodeship (Bahlcke, 1996: 202). Although afterward most were pressed to change the declaration into Polish, the attraction of becoming German remained in the context of the repressions suffered in Poland contrasted with the more fond memories of good old days in Germany. Moreover, by 1950 280 thousand former inhabitants of Upper Silesia resided in the GDR and Berlin, and 520 thousand in the FRG (Reichling, 1986: 61) which exerted an immense emigratory pull on close family members staying in Upper Silesia. The Polish authorities fortified this pull making it almost impossible for the Upper Silesians in both the German states to return to their region, and soon such a return was no option any more when democratization and the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) took off in the FRG.

932 It is quite enlightening to remark that eight-nine thousand (40.7 per cent) of the troops of the Polish armed forces in the West were deserters from the German army (Hajduk, 1982: 351). Szlonzoks and Slonzaks predominated among the deserters.
Thus, Upper Silesians who were treated as second-class citizens and could not openly express their German or Upper Silesian (this is, Szlonzokian, Slonzakian) identity in Poland, expressed their displeasure and desire for social and economic advance with legs leaving for the true Germany, this is, the FRG\(^{933}\). About 581 thousand left in 1950-93 (Bahlcke, 1996: 183). Consequently, the Opole Voivodeship which in 1950 contained 437 thousand Upper Silesians (and, thus, was the only voivodeship with an Autochthonous majority of 54.3 per cent) (Bahlcke, 1996: 188), today houses less than 300 thousand (30 per cent) besides the estimated twenty thousand in the area which went to the Czestochowa Voivodeship in 1975. The corresponding statistics is more difficult to be worked out in the case of the Katowice and Bielsko-Biala Voivodeships because not only German, Szlonzoks and Slonzaks emigrated but many anti-communist local Poles\(^{934}\). But it seems probable that some 4300 thousand Szlonzoks still live there besides fifty eighty thousand local Poles which is a tiny percentage of the voivodeship’s population close to 4 million. In the case of the East Silesian section of the Bielsko-Biala Voivodeship, one may surmise that about forty thousand Slonzaks and sixty thousand local Poles still remain there\(^{935}\).

The exodus stopped only after 1989-90 (cf. Anon., 1996: 11-12), the years marked with the fall of communism, as well as with democratization and the transition from the centrally-planned to market-oriented economy in Poland. In the wake of the astounding changes in Europe and in the world, the united Germany and Poland finally signed the binding border treaty in 1990. Moreover, having recognized that many of the Autochthons have been or become Germans Warsaw concluded with Berlin another treaty (1991), which guarantees the rights of the German minority in Poland.

The seemingly sudden appearance of Germans in Poland which previously had been claimed completely ethnically homogenous, came during the 1990 by-elections in the wake of the demise of Senator Osmanczyk, an Upper Silesian. The subsequent contest put at the loggerheads Henryk Krol (now Heinrich Kroll), an Upper Silesian German, and Dorota Simonides, an Upper Silesian Pole. The latter won, but the elections launched the German minority into the political and social life of Poland after many abortive attempts at establishing German organizations since 1984, which by 1989 the Polish security forces had firmly quenched.

The membership of the German organizations stabilized at 180 thousand in the Opole Voivodeship, 80 thousand in the Katowice Voivodeship, 19 thousand in the Czestochowa Voivodeship, and 600 in the Bielsko-Biala Voivodeship (Bahlcke, 1996: 203). The subsequent local and parliamentary elections showed that they are concentrated in the rural areas in the eastern half of the Opole Voivodeship, in the westernmost communes (gminy) of the Katowice Voivodeship and in the south-eastern corner of the Czestochowa Voivodeship, as well as in the run down old worker residential areas in the Upper Silesian industrial basin. The inferior spatial locations (most often than not shared by Szlonzoks, Slonzaks and local Upper Silesian Poles) indicate the disadvantaged social status suffered by the population before 1989.

In the 1991 elections the Germans of Upper Silesia won seven mandates in the Sejm and one in the Senate. In the next elections of 1993 the number of German representatives dwindled to four in the Sejm, and to mere two in the 1997 elections when no German entered the Senate either (Bahlcke, 1996: 206). The results indicate that the initially broad electorate was reduced to those who feel themselves to be German and can reaffirm this fact by being able to speak German and/or having obtained the German passport. So far about 190 thousand persons (overwhelmingly in Upper Silesia) obtained the German passport (cf. Anon. 1996a).

\(^{933}\) The authorities put tremendous obstacles in the way of those Upper Silesians who decided to leave. Often they were as much discriminated as in the 1940s. However, the free way to the West could be bought with bribes, costly presents, real estate or even ... orgies (Siembieda, 1993: 16).

\(^{934}\) For instance, nowadays, almost all the family of Korfanty live in the US and his grand- and great grandchildren hardly speak any Polish.

\(^{935}\) These numbers are gauged to those of: the population of the interwar Silesian Voivodeship, the DVL holders and the post-1945 expellees and emigrants.
As of 1 January 1993 the Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (War Consequences Consolidation Act), limited the possibility of claiming German citizenship on the basis of Art 116 of Germany’s Basic Law (Grundgesetz), and phased out any assistance available to Germans from Poland should they decide to move to Germany (Cordell, 1995: 20; Wolf, 1996). Moreover, the bureaucratic procedure for receiving German citizenship demands from one submitting more and more documents which are hardly available after half a century of forced Polonization when they could be seen as an incriminating evidence of one’s high treason against the Polish nation. On the other hand, on the basis of the pre-1989 regulations still in force, Polish archives and courts do not issue copies of the DVL, rehabilitation or verification documents to the interested parties.

This entails that out of the estimated 300-400 thousand living in Upper Silesia only half two-thirds received German passports. The rest of them as well as most Szlonzoks and Slonzaks in the Katowice and Bielsko-Biała Voivodeships who acquired the right to German citizenship thanks to the DVL, have very slim chances of obtaining German passports. Thus although 300 thousand inhabitants of the Opole Voivodeship consider themselves to be Germans the availability of the German passport will probably stabilize their number at 200 thousand. In the Katowice and Czestochowa Voivodeships corresponding numbers of Germans perhaps will oscillate at fifty and twenty thousand, respectively.

The remaining difference are bound to get Polonized or retreat into their ethnic Szlonzakian identity. The latter choice would strengthen the various regionalist movements which commenced in answer to the rise of the German minority and the postwar exploitation of Upper Silesia by Warsaw which had turned this region into an ecological and social disaster on the continental scale.

In 1990 the following regionalist organizations came into being: the Zwiazek Gornoslazakow (ZG, Union of the Upper Silesians) in Opole, the Zwiazek Gornoslaszi (ZGr, Upper Silesian Union) in Katowice, and the Ruch Autonomii Slaska (RAS, Movement for the Silesian Autonomy) in Rybnik. In 1996 they were joined by the Stowarzyszenie Patriotyczne Slaski (SPS, Patriotic Association Silesia) in Kedzierzyn-Kozle. The ZG grouped several tens of members and proposed to recognize the Szlonzoks of Opole Silesia (this is, the Opole Voivodeship) as an ethnic group on its own, neither Polish nor German. However, the organization could be joined by anybody who wanted to work for the sake of Opole Silesia. Nowadays the ZG has gone practically defunct as not attractive enough an option to the German associations. The ZGr with several thousand members in the Katowice Voivodeship and its own Fundacja Gornoslańska (Upper Silesian Foundation) has remained quite influential in the Katowice Voivodeship. Its program is to construct and sustain the regional identity of all the inhabitants of Upper Silesia regardless of their ethnic background (though the Szlonzakian identity remains the basis for the project), as an integral part of the Polish national identity. The RAS with the membership of ten thousand, also operates in the Katowice Voivodeship and has a similar program to the ZGr’s, but emphasizing the intrinsic link with the Polish nation-state. The RAS wants the re-establishment of the Silesian autonomy in the scope which the Silesian Voivodeship had enjoyed before 1939. Its espousal of the christian-democrat ideals stands the RAS close to Korfanty’s thinking on Upper Silesia. The SPS has not more than twenty members, and rather than regionalist it is a radical nationalist grouping which operates in the Opole Voivodeship wishing to reaffirm Polishness of this region vis-a-vis the perceived encroachments of Gerandom in the form of German associations (cf. Lis, 1993: 99-103).

The ZG and the SPS are bound to disappear as they will not be able to attract any members in the Opole Voivodeship, where those looking for institutional expression of attachment to their region are still so well served by a network of the well organized and financed (with the assistance of the German government) German associations. On the other hand, the ZGr and the RAS are an option for those in the Katowice Voivodeship who cannot obtain German citizenship and who identify with the region. What is more, the needs of these two groups are also served by the Niemiecka Wspolnota Robocza Pojednanie i Przyszlosc/Deutsche Gemeinschaft Versöhnung und Zukunft (NWR/DG, German Work Group for Reconciliation and Future). It came into being in 1991, and, with ten thousand members, aims to serve as the interface between the German and Polish population of the
Katowice Silesia, as well as to save the region from civilization, cultural and social collapse (Berdychowska, 1994: 31).

Although the regionalist organizations try to appeal to the inhabitants of all Upper Silesia, their voice is heard only in the Katowice Voivodeship while the Upper Silesian German associations predominate in the Opole Voivodeship. The RAS and the ZGr managed to have two deputies elected to the Sejm in 1991, but when the 5 per cent threshold was introduced they could not win any more mandates in the subsequent elections. The parties represented in the Polish parliament hardly ever serve the needs of this Szlonzakan segment of population who: do not want to become Poles or are not accepted as Poles by Poles, want to become Germans but cannot obtain German citizenship, or want to be just Szlonzokian (this is, neither German nor Polish) Szlonzoks. The RAS and the ZGr which would readily espouse the electorate have no chance of entering the parliament.

However, national minorities are exempted from the election threshold. So, in 1997, Jerzy Gorzelik, a leader of the Slaski Zwiazek Akademicki (Silesian Academic Union), supported by the RAS and the ZGr, filed a request for the registration of the Zwiazek Ludnosci Narodowosci Slaskiej (ZLNS, Association of the Population of Silesian Nationality). The ZLNS became quite popular even to the point of attracting members from the Opole Voivodeship. Although the Katowice voivodeship court registered the ZLNS in June 1997, the Polish supreme court overturned the ruling in March 1998. Recently the ZLNS leadership appealed the decision in the Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg (RIM, 1998: 5).

In its program the ZLNS assumes the existence of the Silesian, this is, Szlonzokian nation, and wishes to develop national consciousness of the Szlonzoks as well as to take care of the Szlonzokian culture and language which would become the medium of education at Szlonzokian minority schools. The Szlonzokian nation is not to embrace only ethnic Szlonzoks but also those ethnically un-Szlonzokian inhabitants of Upper Silesia who got Szlonzokized. When the existence of the Szlonzokian nation is denied, the ZLNS points to the fact that in the 1991 Czechoslovak census besides 1 400 thousand persons who declared themselves to be Moravians, also recorded forty-four thousand persons who declared themselves as Silesians (Dziadul, 1997: 20-1; Jakimczyk, 1998: 1, 3; Satava, 1994: 50). The ZLNS could not participate in the 1997 parliamentary elections but should its leadership persevere, it is almost sure that this organization will have to be recognized by the Polish state. Then Warsaw would have the choice of extending the privileges connected to the status of the national minority also to Poland’s ethnic minorities (for instance, the Kashubs, the Lemkos, the Roma) or to face the attempts of the ethnic minorities to improve their situation by turning themselves into nations.

To wrap up the overview of Upper Silesia’s traditional ethnic identities, remnants of the Slonzaks are still noticeable in the Czech section of East Silesia but in its Polish counterpart included in the Bielsko-Biala Voivodeship, they are rather non-existent having become Poles. They have proved to be so Polish that it was possible to choose Poland’s first non-Catholic Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek from among them. But even as Poles, they often do emphasize the regional dimension of their identity based on Protestantism and their dialect. The handful who did not want to be ennationalized into the Polish nation became Germans. The same happened with the few thousand Moravecs south of Racibor (Ratibor), as well as with most of the 40 thousand of their kin in the Hlucinsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) across the border in the Czech Republic, who already in the interwar period preferred to refer to themselves as Hultschiners than Czechs.

The Moravians identity is more regional than ethnic though some organizations strive to turn it into a springboard for a Moravian nation. On the other hand, those who declared themselves Silesians, are ethnic Slonzaks as well as German- and Czech-speaking persons identifying themselves with the region of Austrian/Czech Silesia and hoping for its re-establishment when the Czech Republic is entually decentralized and regionalized.

German associations from the Katowice Voivodeship closely cooperate with their counterparts in the Hlucinsko, emphasizing the still quite recent historical and cultural links of this region to Upper Silesia. The
The Kresy expellees, settlers from central Poland, and Polish repatriates from the West and elsewhere who settled down in the Deutsche Ostgebiete as well as in houses and farms left by the expelled Germans elsewhere in Poland, most strongly identified themselves with Poland. The settlers maintained family links with their family villages in central Poland while the expellees continued to hope to return to the Kresy. They could not identify with the regions of their current residence as too clearly and threateningly German. Moreover, they perceived the Szlonzoks as Germans, so regionalism was no option as it would rather fortify the German character of the Deutsche Ostgebiete instead making the areas Polish and proving their primordial Polishness.

The emotions faded out in the new generations who were born in Silesia and came of age in the 1980s and 1990s. They do not feel any emotional attachment to the central Polish and Kresy regions where their grandparents were born. They often never visited or could not visit the regions, and hardly have such a need as the only regions with which they can realistically identify with, are those localities where they were born and raised. After the German threat (which had been cultivated in the communist times) disappeared with the German-Polish border treaty, many young people expressed their identification with their regions of birth establishing various regional associations and delving into their regions and towns histories. Thus they accepted the multicultural past of the regions recorded in documents written in Latin, German, Polish, Czech and various dialects.

In case of Silesia, it led to the development of identification with Lower Silesia and its towns. The process is more complicated in the case of Upper Silesia where the local Germans and the Szlonzoks refer to themselves as (Upper) Silesians. This practice somehow deprives the ethnic Poles who arrived in this region after 1945, of the right to use this ethnonym as a regional label. What is more, numerous Upper Silesian German and Szlonzoks are holders of German passports and as such can work in Germany, which creates an economic cleavage between them and the ethnic Poles who do not enjoy such a possibility and, on the average, are poorer. Consequently, the rate of unemployment is also higher among the latter. Thus even the younger generations still have problems with identifying with their region of birth and choose Poland as the main locus of their identity.

However, since the 1980s many ethnic Poles born in Upper Silesia have contracted marriages with Germans and Szlonzoks, and those who reside in rural areas or at old worker residence sites, often got Szlonzokized. On the other hand, German organizations with assistance from Germany, secure better hospital equipment, improved infrastructure and the like, not only for themselves but for whole village/town communities irrespective of ethnic origin.

This pro-integration approach develops on the basis of growing acceptance for non-Polish identities and for the multiple identity which allows one to identify with more elements than one, which is contrary to the tenets of the ideology of nationalism, because it demands total loyalty to the nation only. Hence, in Upper Silesia, at the ethnic level one can be a Pole, German, Szlonzok, Roma, Moravec, or Lemko (often one can feel themselves to be simultaneously a German, a Szlonzok and a Pole). At the spatial level one necessarily is a citizen of the Polish state, and can be an (Upper) Silesian (this is, an inhabitant of Upper Silesia), and/or even a European.

However, due to the ethnic, economic, historical, spatial and demographic differences it does not seem probable that the whole of Upper Silesia will become a locus of future regional identity. The cleavage which arose in the nineteenth century with development of industry in eastern Upper Silesia, was deepened by the division of this region between Poland and Germany, which during World War II was reaffirmed by the establishment of the two separate Upper Silesian regencies of Oppeln and Kattowitz, and since 1950 by the two voivodeships of Opole and Katowice.

Hlucinsko was severed from the Oppeln Regency first in 1919 and next (after having been reincorporated in the regency in 1939) in 1945

938 At present, young Poles born in Upper Silesia who want to express their regional identity say I am (a Pole) from Silesiá (cf. Berlinska, 1998: 71), as the label (Upper) Silesian still seems to be restricted for Upper Silesian Germans and Szlonzoks only.
This cleavage shows up in the increasingly coherent use of the names Opole Silesia and the Opolszczyzna for denoting the Opole Voivodeship, and the name Silesia for the Katowice Voivodeship. Hence, in the near future, after the completion of the process of regionalization of Poland in anticipation of the state’s accession into the European Union, Opole Silesia may become the locus of the Opole Silesian identity. It would be reinforced by Catholicism of almost all the region’s members and the fact that Opole Silesia largely coincides with the Opole diocese.

The prospect of developing a corresponding regional identity is not so obvious in the case of the Katowice Voivodeship. The main split in the voivodeship runs between the area of the interwar Silesian Voivodeship and the non-Silesian Dabrowa industrial basin. The ethnic-regional identity of the Szlonzoks in the voivodeship is often pitted against the ethnic-regional identity of the Zaglebiaks (this is, inhabitants of the Dabrowa industrial basin) and vice versa. Moreover, the Dabrowa basin is not part of Silesia and in the past was separated from Silesia by the Prussian/German Russian border. The old border has been reflected at the ecclesiastical level to this day the Dabrowa basin with the western areas of the Kielce Voivodeship constitutes the Sosnowiec diocese which is part of the Czestochowa ecclesiastical province. And when after the regionalization the Katowice Voivodeship will be enlarged with the Bielsko-Biala Voivodeship, the ecclesiastical organization of the region will become even more distorted, as the latter voivodeship coincides with the Bielsko-Zywiec diocese belonging to the Cracow ecclesiastical province, and the Katowice Voivodeship, apart from the Dabrowa basin, is split into the Katowice archdiocese and the Gliwice diocese (subjected to the Katowice archbishop).

Thus many obstacles would have to be removed to make it possible for the Silesian regional identity emerge in the Katowice Voivodeship. The coming into being of such an identity would additionally be hindered by the low percentage of the Szlonzokian and Upper Silesian German population in comparison to the current total population of the voivodeship close to 4 million, which with the enlargement of the voivodeship could rise to 5-6 million. Besides, the voivodeship is extremely differentiated at the spatial and social level: with the center highly industrialized, the agricultural north and the agricultural-tourist south. Resultantly, perhaps, first, some subregional identities may stabilize or emerge before coalescing into the Silesian regional identity when conditions permit.

Silesia as the Locus of Regional and Ethnic Identification in Future

Not only did the sweeping changes of 1989 mark the end of communism but also put a curb on nationalism in the perspective of globalization and the ongoing process of European integration which has already been tapped on quite deeply by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. For Silesia the close encounter with Germany’s national socialism in 1933-45, had just been replaced, in 1945-89, by its mirror reflection in the form of Polish national communism/communist nationalism. Hopefully, the horrors of 1933-89: forced ennationalization, expulsions, extermination, forced emigration, immense material destruction, and, last but not least, the Holocaust, will not be repeated.

Such an assumption goes against the common knowledge the average Silesian, or, for that matter, a Central European accumulated during the twentieth century having witnessed and survived numerous atrocities. But it is possible that the vicious circle of conflicts started in the name of nation (which superseded earlier ones perpetrated in the name of God) may be broken by the new political approach to the frequently antagonistic needs of the inhabitants of Europe. On the philosophical basis of personalism (which wishes to escape the extremes of individualism and collectivism) supported by the principle of subsidiarity (developed in the two-millennia-long administrative practice of the Christian/Catholic Church), the process of European integration was directed by the Maastricht Treaty toward a goal which is a Europe of three levels.

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On this fearful symmetry see Siebel-Achenbach’s *Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 1942-49* (1994).

I employ the term Silesian in the meaning of an inhabitant of Silesia.
The three levels are of: Europe (this is, the European Union), the (nation-)state, and the region. As such, this approach recognizes and encourages multiple identity whose constituents does not have to be contradictory but rather are mutually complementary and fortifying. According to this view, multiple loyalties are preferable to monistic national ones, as the former except contributing to building a Europe of three levels, also are conducive to strengthening the civil (open) society at the micro and macro levels. The multiple interlocking loyalties made tangible by increasing mobility (guaranteed by the principle of free movement of people in the common market) hold together the three levels of the EU as well as the constituents of the levels unlike the national loyalties which absolutize the nation-state as the ultimate entity of governance and locus of identity striving for clear-cut separation of nation-states and their populations formalized as separate nations.

What is more, the reversal from the paradigm of nationalist conflict in European relations was made possible by the Franco-German reconciliation which produced the very political core of unifying Europe as well as firmly contained Germany within the framework of the European structures transforming it from a strategic risk into the foundation of lasting European peace. The process of reconciliation and containing in the European structures, has now been extended to East Central Europe, and most significantly to Poland the largest country in the region whose postwar nationalism was based on virulent anti-Germanism (Anon. 1991; Kinsky, 1995; Kinsky, 1997: 115-24).

This means a different future for Silesia and its inhabitants who, living in a borderland, since 1918 have learned to expect periodic reversals in ennationalizing campaigns. Should Poland along with Silesia become part of the EU, the one-dimensional Polish-German relations (this is, between the two nation-states) would become a thing of the past. As one-dimensionality of German nationalism was downsized by regionalization of the FRG, Polish nationalism would follow the same route; and, on the other hand, together with growing loyalty to the EU as a whole a cleavage between the two nation-states would slowly be blurred into oblivion.

If this optimistic scenario prevails the Szlonzoks and the Upper Silesians would be more ready to leave the protective cocoon of their ethnicity as well as the Poles of Silesia their one of Polish nationalism and attachment to the Polish state with hardly any regard for their region. Hence, the expression of the traditional regionalism of the Szlonzoks and the Upper Silesians would not be only tolerated but also encouraged by the Polish majority who would increasingly join the trend contributing to the revival of regionalism in Silesia.

Regionalism tends to be parochial but Poland’s membership in the EU, would add to it a dimension of continental consciousness. From the practical point of view it would contribute to liquidating the difference in status between Upper Silesia’s Szlonzoks and Germans who have German (and be the same token EU) passports, and their Polish neighbors who are not entitled to them, and so cannot improve their lagging economic opportunities by working in Germany or elsewhere in the EU.

Equalization of status with the concomitant acceptance of ethnic difference would facilitate construction of new regionalisms in Silesia, obviously, not without rooting them in the unfalsified (though, of course mythologized, as it goes with construction of every mythomoteur941) past of the region. However, it seems improbable that the process could lead to (re-)emergence of an all-Silesian identity if it has ever existed. It rather did not, because even in the nineteenth century the term Schlesier (Silesian) usually denoted an inhabitant of Lower Silesia, and the term Oberschlesier (Upper Silesian) an inhabitant of a much more ethnically and economically diversified Upper Silesia. Moreover, it is good to remember that when one said a Schlesier in Austria-Hungary, one meant an inhabitant of Austrian Silesia.

941 On this novel concept developed by French scholars see Smith (1997: 716-7)
The differences in regional identification hark back to the division of Silesia between Prussia and the Habsburg empire in 1740 on which the ever more complicated pattern of national and ethnic cleavages was superimposed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. No nation-state vying for possession of Silesia has managed to homogenize the resultant territorial-ethnic mosaic because its antagonists always prevented it from seizing the whole of Silesia and left it time not enough for carrying out through and through ennationalization before another reversal in ownership of the region. Germany was close to the ideal in 1939-45 when almost all of Silesia was included in the Province of Silesia, but the large province was unmanageable and had to be split into the Provinces of Lower and Upper Silesia. Berlin could not Germanize the latter in the span of six years. Poland having gained most of Prussian Silesia after 1945, strove to Polonize it through erasing all the German traces which included doing away with this region altogether by dissecting and re-dissecting it among ever smaller voivodeships which also mixed Silesian and non-Silesian areas inside them.

At the ethnic level the result is exclusively Polish Lower Silesia, the ethnically heterogenous east and center of Upper Silesia, and the almost exclusively Polish west of Upper Silesia. The territorial reform currently under way in Poland, which replaced the mere administrative divisions in the form of forty-nine voivodeships by bringing forth regions (comparable to those of Spain) in 1999, allocated the historical territory of Silesia between three regions. They center on the cities of Wroclaw (Breslau), Opole and Katowice. The shift from centralism to decentralization is emphasized by superseding the term voivodeship with region, and replacing the tradition of deriving the name of the voivodeship from its capital city for the sake of a separate name for the region. The proposed names for the three Silesian regions are following: Lower Silesia, Opole Silesia and Silesia.

The apparent terminological confusion caused by frequent ideological and administrative changes in the twentieth century, is explained in the previous chapters so there is no need to reiterate its reasons here.

The construction of those three Silesias as regions started a bit reluctantly after 1945 when hardly anything was certain and final until Warsaw contracted border treaties with the FRG in 1970 and re-united Germany in 1990. It went quite swiftly for overwhelmingly Polish Lower Silesia.

Immediately after the war Lower Silesia as the other Deutsche Ostgebiete incorporated into Poland, used to be an extremely multicultural place. Alongside the Poles the so-called indubitable Germans lived there, as numerous German specialists were retained for running Lower Silesian factories as well as the Walbrzych-Nowa Ruda (Waldenburg-Neurode) industrial basin. The most multicultural was the town of Walbrzych (Waldenburg) which supported numerous German and Jewish populations, and also Polish miners from France and Belgium (who initially spoke more French than Polish). The indubitable Germans were recognized as Germans so after 1956 they had their own papers, organizations, schools which remained a forbidden fruit to the Autochthons. In 1946 the German population of Lower Silesia amounted to 1,234 thousand, but after the expulsions only to fifty-two thousand in 1950. Most of those who stayed or were retained left for the GDR after 1956 so only one thousand remained in 1961 (Ociepka, 1994: 25, 46). Due to the subsequent emigration to the FRG only few hundreds remain nowadays.

After the Holocaust, and the pogroms perpetrated at Kielce and elsewhere in central and eastern Poland after 1945, Lower Silesia seemed to be a kind of promised land to the survivors. In 1946 there were one hundred thousand Jews in Lower Silesia. Due to further emigration only thirty-thirty-two thousand (this is, half of Poland’s Jewish population) lived there in 1948. Finally, their number stabilized at seven eight thousand in 1961 but due to the anti-Semitic events incited by the Polish government in 1968, most left Poland so only four five hundred lived in Lower Silesia in 1992, mostly in Wroclaw which still supports the only Jewish theater left in Poland (it stages plays in Yiddish) (Bronsztejn, 1993: 12-13, 20, 23).

In 1947-51, the remaining several hundred thousands of Ukrainians and Lemkos (who had not been expelled to the Soviet Union in 1944-46) were forcefully dispersed all around Poland. Nowadays their number is assessed at 180-500 thousand. Most of them live in the north-eastern and south-eastern corners of Poland, but the third most significant place of their concentration is Lower Silesia. At Legnica (Liegnitz) there is one of the four Ukrainian secondary schools. Lower Silesia is also the center of the Lemko movement striving for the creation of the Lemko-Carpatho-Rusyn nation together with the akin Ruthenians from Slovakia and Ukraine (Berdychowska, 1994: 10; Berdychowska, 1995: 22-5, 28-9; Pudlo, 1993: 153-7). In 1947 there were five thousand families, this
where the German university was replaced with its Lwow (Lviv) counterpart at Wroclaw. The city as the cultural and academic center of Polish Lower Silesia contributed to melting various ethnic and regional traditions brought from the *Kresy* and elsewhere with what was left from German Lower Silesia. Hence, it became the locus of the emergent Lower Silesian regional identity.

Not a comparable process developed before 1989 in Upper Silesia which despite the postwar ethnic cleansing, large-scale emigration of *Szlonzoks*, and the Polonizing/de-Germanizing efforts, remained a heterogenous region a veritable thorn to the rhetoric of the completely homogenous Polish nation-state. The *Słaski Instytut Naukowy* (SIN, Silesian Scholarly Institute) established at Katowice in 1958, and the *Instytut Słaski* (IS, Silesian Institute) re-established at Opole in 1957 on the basis of its prewar counterpart founded at Katowice in 1934, were to further Polonization of Upper Silesia rather than to encourage any interest in matters regional or German. In 1967 the government decided to establish the model socialist university, this is, the University of Silesia. However, it was not entirely of Silesia with its departments sprawled in: the Upper Silesian cities of Katowice and Gliwice (Gleiwitz), the East Silesian town of Cieszyn (Teschen, Tesin), and in the non-Silesian Dabrowa city of Sosnowiec. The sprawl of the university did not allow development of a student community which could engage in any coherent anti-communist actions, and the PZPR’s generosity turned it into the forgery of party ideologues who underwrote further centralization of the state at the cost of regionalism as well as exploitation of industry and natural resources of Upper Silesia at the expense of civilizational collapse and natural disaster in the Katowice Voivodeship (Kamusella, 1998: 118).

Only after 1989 the university could become an intellectual center of Upper Silesian regionalism, which produced and supports the leadership of the ZGr and the ZLNS. Actually the first postcommunist Katowice voivode Wojciech Czech was a sympathizer of the ZGr, who unlike the organizations leaders, dreamt about recreating historical Upper Silesia as an administrative region. To that end he did away with the SIN which had worked for Polonization and centralization, and started propagating the vision of an Upper Silesian region as consisting from all the Upper and East Silesian territories within Poland’s borders as well as from the Dabrowa industrial basin, and perhaps from Czech Silesia too.

After the 1993 parliamentary elections he was replaced by a succession of nondescript individuals who did not muddle with regionalism steadily though unimanigavately following the governing parties line. A change came with the 1999 territorial administrative division reform which limited the number of voivodeships turning them into real-life regions with a considerable degree of self-government in agreement with the vision of a more efficient state based on decentralized structures and more active engagement of the citizenry in decision-making. At first the government proposed establishing a large Upper Silesia from a merger of the Katowice, Opole, Bielsko-Biala and Czestochowa Voivodeships. It would have resulted in a region consisting in one-third from non-

is, twenty-four thousand persons described as Ukrainian in Lower Silesia (Iwanicki, 1994: 75; Zerelik, 1997: 44). In 1961 the number of Ukrainians stabilized at twenty-five thousand (Iwanicki, 1994: 79). Out of this nineteen thousand can be considered Lemkos (Zurko, 1997: 52)

After the civil war in Greece, fifteen thousand communist refugees arrived in Poland during the years 1952-55. Among them there were seven thousand Greeks, seven thousand Macedonians and one thousand Kutzo-Vlachs. Most of them settled in Lower Silesia. Their cultural center became, first, Zgorzelec (Görlitz), and next Wroclaw. In 1958-68 most Macedonians left for the Socialist Federal Republic of Macedonia within Yugoslavia. Most members of the two other groups have left for Greece especially after 1975 when democracy was re-introduced in the country, and after 1985 when Athens and Warsaw concluded the agreement on recognizing the pension rights acquired in Poland (Pudlo, 1995: 136-8, 150).

Last but not least, the Rroms of the Sinti group who lived in Silesia were largely exterminated in the wartime Holocaust (Kenrick, 1995). In the 1960s and 1970s when sedantization of Poland’s Rroms was put into practice, many of them were forcefully settled in various Upper and Lower Silesian cities and towns. Most of them belong to the Polska Roma group. However, due to lack of research it is difficult to assess Silesia’s prewar and postwar Rroma population (Bartosz, 1994).
Silesian territories with a staggering population of six seven million (close to one-fifth of Poland’s total population of 40 million).

The plan incited vociferous opposition in the Opole Voivodeship which united its heterogenous Polish-German-

Szlonszkian population. This unprecedented phenomenon which allowed the leadership of the German organizations demonstrate together with the representatives of the Polish majority ensured a speedy coalescing of the population of Opole Silesia for the sake of retainment of their region on the map. The numerous events which followed together with the visual expression of the regional feeling in the ubiquitous use of the traditional Upper Silesian golden-blue colors (also on faces of young and older inhabitants of the region), did contribute to the tangible emergence of the Opole Silesian regional identity, the forging of which had commenced with various grass-roots initiatives in the first half of the 1990s under the longest-serving voivode Zembaczynski and the Opole bishop Nossol, and had initially culminated in the establishment of the Opole University in 1994.

The leadership of the Katowice Voivodeship disliked the movement for retaining Opole Silesia as a separate region because the idea of a large Upper Silesia (so reminiscent of the Freiestaat Ober-schlesien (Upper Silesian Free State) proposed in 1918 so as to prevent the region from becoming part of Poland and from burdening it with the war reparations demanded by the Allies from defeated Germany) as proposed by voivode Czech and espoused by the ZGr and the RAS, did take hold again. The resultant bitter political struggle was played out at every governmental and self-governmental level possible but without any massive support on the part of the Katowice Voivodeship’s population unlike in the Opole Voivodeship. However, the former had a structural advantage in the ecclesiastical sphere which could not be taken too lightly in such an overwhelmingly Catholic milieu. Namely, in 1992 the diocesan structure of the Polish church was overhauled. The Katowice diocese was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Cracow archbishop, and elevated to the rank of an archdiocese. From the Opole diocese, the Gliwice diocese (this is, this part of the former included within the Katowice Voivodeship) was cut out and both were incorporated in the Katowice ecclesiastical province together with the Bielsko-Zywiec diocese newly established from the East Silesian and Malopolska areas of the Bielsko-Biala Voivodeship. This ecclesiastical province would have overlapped with three quarters of a proposed enlarged Katowice Voivodeship.

Now when the matter is decided one can wonder if it was the opposition of the Opole Silesian population which tinted the balance or some other considerations. I believe that one should not underestimate the latter. Had an enlarged Katowice Voivodeship been introduced it would have proved to be unmanageable due to immense internal structural differences and would have fallen apart as it happened before with the Province of Upper Silesia which was divided into the two regencies, and the postwar Silesian Voivodeship which had to be split into the Opole and Katowice Voivodeships. Moreover, at the ethnic level, the German and Szlonszkian population’s displeasure with the decision could have backfired in the broadening the support base for the ZLNS leading even to development of a postulated Silesian nation, and further disintegration of the populace along ethnic lines.

Leaving aside the ifs, stabilization of the Opole Silesian regional identity seems to be a foregone conclusion. As such it should ensure effective functioning of the region for the sake of its inhabitants as well as containment of the German element (still perceived by many Polish political circles and numerous Poles, as an internal danger) within the non-ethnically based integrative loyalty to the region. The question remains if the enlarged Katowice Voivodeship less Opole Silesia, will be able to transform itself into a true region now being faced with ethnic, subregional and structural

943 Bishop Nossol strove to unite ethnically different groups of the Opole Silesian population since he had been nominated to his office in 1977. After 1989 he organized German/bilingual pastoral service constantly emphasizing multicultural character of the region so as not to alienate the Polish majority. Following this line, since 1996, representatives of Opole Silesia’s minorities of Germans, Lemkos/Ukrainians, Rromas and Moravecs/Czechs have met every year in May to pray together at the most significant Upper Silesian shrine of Gora sw. Anny.
differences, as well as with the widespread degradation of the natural environment and the social costs of having to shut down numerous mines and metallurgical works which entails laying off 200 thousand workers most of whom are sole breadwinners of their families in the traditional Upper Silesian manner.

On the other hand, with the introduction of the new Czech coat-of-arms as composed from the two Bohemian lions, the Moravian eagle, and the Silesian one in 1993; the establishment of the Silesian University at Czech Silesia’s traditional capital Opava (Troppau) in 1995, and the Ostrava-Opava diocese (containing Czech Silesia together with the adjacent northern Moravian territories), Czech Silesia may also become a locus of a viable regional identity unless it is submerged in the coming Czech territorial administrative reform. A similar process seems to have already taken hold in the westernmost part of Lower Silesia east of the Oder-Neisse line, which remained with Germany after 1945. Although in 1950 the GDR authorities prohibited to use such terms as Silesian, East Prussian, the Deutsche Ostgebiete or expellee, ordered to employ only Polish names for the localities in the Deutsche Ostgebiete, relocated the expellee population evenly all around the country, discouraged any discussion on the expulsion, split the westernmost tip of Silesia between the districts (Bezirke) of Dresden and Cottbus in 1952, and purged the noun Silesia from the name of the evangelical Church of Silesia (evangelische Kirche von Schlesien) in 1968, the memory of Silesia lingered on. First, in the form of the truncated Breslau archdiocese with the seat at Görlitz. In 1972 it was transformed into the Görlitz apostolic administration, and simultaneously the pope allowed the Breslau archdiocese clergy and faithful to establish the Breslau apostolic visitature in the FRG. The visitature cooperated with the FRG’s various organizations of the Silesian expellees in developing and sustaining the feeling of virtual (because without any direct contact with Silesia itself) Silesianity based on organizational life with some federal and Land legal and financial support.

However, western Lower Silesia being overwhelmingly Protestant, the apostolic administration was not of too much an influence in, anyway, the increasingly atheistic East German state. Only with the unification the necessary synergy came into being and allowed for the explicit reconstruction of Silesianity in Germany’s remaining part of Silesia. First of all, the whole of it was included in the re-established Land of Saxony and the Silesian expellees organizations of the FRG extended their activities to this region. In 1993 the former evangelical Church of Silesia was renamed as the evangelical Church of Silesian Upper Lusatia (evangelische Kirche der schlesischen Oberlausitz), and next year the apostolic administration was transformed into the Görlitz diocese. On its part the Land of Saxony guaranteed in its 1992 constitution the right to promote and express ethnic Sorbian and regional Lower Silesian identity as well as the use of Sorbian and Lower Silesian Symbols, and the Sorbian language and culture.

Consequently, the adjectives Silesian and Lower Silesian, as well as the nouns Silesíá and Lower Sílesiá are employed in official names of numerous organizations and enterprises in the region around Görlitz. Actually, Görlitz advertises itself as the largest Lower Silesian city of Germany. So the Sorbian ethnic and Lower Silesian regional elements remain part of the Saxon regional identity with the latter actively encouraging the former (Bahlcke, 1996: 213-16).

The question remains what is going to happen with the virtual regional Silesian identity among the expellees and Aussiedlers living outside Slesia. Their children and even grandchildren may retain some attachment to the region where they do not live and hardly ever sojourn but the sentiment is doomed to wane for the sake of stronger attachment to the regions where one was actually born and raised, and, now, lives. This process is visible in the aging membership of the expellee Silesian organizations and the heated discussion on the liquidation of the Breslau apostolic visitature as needed no more. Obviously, for some time a lease of life will be still given to these organizations by

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944 The Sorbs are a West Slavic nation/ethnic group of sixty-eighty thousand, based in the region of Lusatia which was split among Brandenburg, Silesia and Saxony up to 1945, and today is split among Saxony, Brandenburg and Poland. All of the remaining Sorbs reside in Germany. They use two closely related standard languages Upper and Lower Lusatian Sorbian.
cooperation between them and various cultural and regional organizations in Silesia itself, but
eventually only a handful of Germans residing outside Silesia will continue identifying with this
region. It may take a bit longer with the Upper Silesian branch of the expellee organizations, as in the
1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s their ranks were boosted with hundreds of thousands of
Aussiedlers from Upper Silesia, who can and still are eager to maintain strong links with their families
who remain in this region.

It seems plausible that in a future united Europe of three levels destructive antagonisms bred by
petty ethnic/national differences will abate, and acceptance will increase for various religious,
regional, ethnic/national identities which will be perceived as interlocking and complementary rather
than mutually exclusive. Hence Silesia would survive in the form of the possible five regions of
Poland’s Lower Silesia, Opole Silesia and (Upper) Silesia, and Saxony’s Lusatian Lower Silesia, and
Czech Silesia. They would constitute parts of their respective nation-states and the EU reflecting the
needs and expectations of their inhabitants rather than being a house divided against itself as Silesia
used to be from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the close of the latter.

It is a very optimistic scenario. However, it is not unrealistic. Of course, I could finish on
a somber note, and bring the exemplars of Bosnia and Kosovo as models after which Silesia may take
in order to make the train of my thoughts more vivid and shocking in line with the Hollywoodian
motto the more destruction the better pecuniary return. But in the terms of foreseeable near future it
would be less probable.

Anyway, I realize that what the future has for us in its store, is still more surprising than any
scenario one may come up with. However, as a European who was born and lives in Silesia, whose
family did suffer various follies and atrocities perpetrated by totalitarian and nationalist regimes,
I only hope history will not repeat itself. So that Silesia would not share the sad fate of Alexandria, on
the disappearance of colorful multiculturality of which, the city’s biggest seer Cavafy sang in The
City’:

There is no ship for you, there is no road.
As you have destroyed your life here
in this little corner, you have ruined it in the entire world.
(Cavafy, 1976: 27)
Poland’s National minorities\textsuperscript{45} and the process of European integration as exemplified by the case of the German minority

Introduction

The eastward enlargement of the European Union does not extend, in this geographical direction, only the rules of the common market and of the Economic and Monetary Union (which is currently being implemented), but also these standards of the protection of human and minority rights which are accepted by most of the EU members and safeguarded by the Council of Europe. The trick is that though the aforementioned standards do not form part of the \textit{acquis communautaire}, the EU espouses them and reinforces this decision by cooperating with the Council of Europe.

Hence, any state wishing to become a member of the EU, not only does have to comply with the economical and political requirements of accession but also with the dimension of human and minority rights protection. The European Commission clearly reiterated this position in \textit{Agenda 2000}.

Poland and the Emerging European Regime of Minority Rights Protection

Following Hungary (1990), Poland was accepted into the fold of the Council of Europe in 1991. Initially, the state was in the forefront of the changes which brought the issue of minority rights protection back into the field of the international political discourse after it had been shunned from the view in 1945 with the establishment of the bipolar Cold War world. The postwar order had more or less kept the balance between the Soviet bloc and the Free World than dealing with the rights of minorities, anyway, blamed for the outbreak of World War II.

This stance prevailed until the fall of communism (1989) when it was understood that no common house Europe would be possible without Polish-German reconciliation (not unlike the Franco-German rapprochement which had been the precondition of the integration of Western Europe). Consequently, the German-Polish Border Treaty (1990) was appended, in 1991, by the Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighborliness. It was the first post-World-War-Two bilateral treaty to include minority rights provisions. Subsequently, numerous similar treaties were contracted especially between the postcommunist and post-Soviet states of Central and Eastern Europe.

The next move was to establish a European regime of minority rights protection which would be extension of the European human rights protection regime instituted by the Council of Europe. On February 1, 1995 the first group of states (including Poland) signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. After having been ratified by 12 signatories the Convention entered into force in 1997 (Poland has not ratified it yet).

Provisions of this Convention are quite faulty as they do not cover ethnic minorities. Besides, deemed as a soft instrument of international law, it does not amount to a regime in the meaning of the European regime of human rights protection complete with its own Court of Human Rights. But the Convention is the first step toward creating such a regime. The need for it is apparent in the light of massive ethnic cleansings conducted in ex-Yugoslavia or post-Soviet Central Asia.

\textsuperscript{45} For the clarity of the argument, and due to the lack of space, I decided not to discuss Poland’s ethnic minorities.
**Protection of Minority Rights in Poland**

**The Situation Prior to 1989**

After 1945 Poland was reconstructed as a homogeneous nation-state. The thrust of the ideology of Polish nationalism was redirected away from Moscow toward Germany with the enmity between this state and the postwar Poland engendered by the Oder-Neisse line as the Polish western boundary which entailed incorporation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete (German eastern territories) into Poland.

The myth of national homogeneity was softened a bit after the death of Stalin (1953) and especially after the political Thaw of 1956 when national minorities were recognized and allowed a modicum of cultural rights including education and the press in their languages. Obviously, the security forces closely monitored all the organized activities of the minorities until 1989 when the task of maintaining relations with the minorities was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior (MSW) to the Ministry of Culture and Art (MKiS).

However, there was a tendency to lower memberships of various national minorities in statistical estimates, and even to deny the existence of the German minority. In agreement with this line no Polish census has included a question on the respondent’s nationality since 1946. Moreover, the ethnic cleansings of 1944-50, were rounded up by the 1968 purge of Poland’s Jews who had survived the Holocaust, and by the massive emigration to West Germany (more rarely to East Germany). Bonn accepted these emigrants as Germans but Warsaw only tacitly did so sticking to the ideological statement which claimed that there were no Germans left in Poland.

On the other hand, the ethnic groups of the Kashubs, Mazurs, Upper Silesians and Lemkos were considered to be ethnographic groups of the Polish nation, and, as such, unambiguously Polish. This attitude amounted to their Polonization which made some of them become Germans (cf. Mazurs, Kashubs, Upper Silesians) and other try to establish their own nations (cf. Lemkos and Upper Silesians) after 1989. The latter direction was also espoused by the Rroma (Gypsies) who were forcefully sedentized and ghettoized in the 1960s and 70s, as an asocial group (NB, not an ethnic/national one), which, in the view of the communist propaganda had to be made productive.

This ethnically homogeneous model of Poland known as the Piast concept was worked out by Polish nationalists at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, and counterpoised by Roman Dmowski against Jozef Pilsudski’s Jagiellonian concept of Poland as a multinational federal state with the Polish nation as the primus inter pares. Pilsudski’s vision was, to a certain extent, realized in the form of the interwar Poland whereas Dmowski’s model of the Polish nation-state was seized by the Polish communists who strove (quite successfully) to implement it in 1945-89.

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946. In the sphere of Polish law, equalization of Polish citizenship with Polish nationality was tacitly retracted in the Citizenship Act of 1952 which allowed granting Polish citizenship to non-Polish nationals permanently residing in Poland.

947. And even in 1946 the question was limited only to Germans, of whom the postwar Poland was to be cleansed in entirety.

948. During that period Ukrainians were expelled to the Soviet Union (or dispersed within Poland), Poles from the Kresy (Polish eastern territories seized by Moscow) to the new Poland, and Germans east of the Oder-Neisse line to the postwar Germany.

949. The House of Piast was the first Polish dynasty, whose kingdom Polish nationalism wrongly claims to have been ethnically homogeneous and territorially coinciding with the postwar Poland.

950. The House of Jagiello - the ethnically Lithuanian dynasty who followed the Piasts and ruled over the ethnically diversified and very extensive state of Poland-Lithuania.
The Situation After 1989

The call of retreat from the myth of ethnically homogeneous Polish nation-state in favor of acceptance for the multiethnic reality, for the first time, was issued by the Solidarity intellectuals in 1981, and, among them, by Jan Jozef Lipński who strongly contributed to Polish-German reconciliation before his death in 1991. He drew on the Jagiellonian concept less the dominant position of the Polish nation.

The breakthrough came with the fall of communism. The security forces surveillance of the minority organizations was lifted and Warsaw recognized existence of the German minority. Moreover, it was Poland’s first minority whose rights were reaffirmed by a bilateral treaty. Other minorities also profited from such treaties which Poland contracted with all its neighbors.

In the first half of the 1990s there were problems with the internalization of the minority rights provisions of these bilateral treaties into Polish domestic law, and none of the numerous projects of Acts on Minority Rights Protection has been passed onto the Polish Parliament yet. This stalemate worsened when ratification has not followed Warsaw’s signature of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

In 1994, Poland, in the wake of Hungary’s decision, submitted the application for EU membership. Many other Central European states also did shortly afterwards. The European Council at the summits in Copenhagen (1993) and Essen (1994) worked out the criteria the candidate states would have to meet before accession negotiations could be commenced with them. Basically, they sizzle down to stable democracy (including protection of human and minority rights), functioning market economy, and full acceptance and adoption of the acquis.

In answer to these demands, Poland adopted its first postcommunist Constitution in 1997. Besides providing for direct applicability of international treaties which allows for swift acceptance of the acquis and Community law (Art 87-91), the Constitution also addressed the plight of the minorities. First of all, in the Preamble, the Polish nation is re-defined as a civic nation, i.e., constituted from all the Polish citizens and not all the Polish nationals only951. Art 35 provides for the protection of Poland’s minorities, and not only national ones but the ethnic ones too952.

So now besides enjoying the burgeoning economy secured by the market reforms of 1990, Poland received the very base for developing stable democratic institutions, in the form of this long overdue Constitution. But in the context of the protection of minority rights, it is still necessary for the state to translate the provisions into actions as well as to ratify the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities at last.

The Protection of Poland’s National Minorities and the Eastward Enlargement of the European Union

All Poland’s national minorities are quite pleased with the level of economic development of their host country which usually allows them to enjoy a better standard of living in comparison to that available in their respective nation-states. The same applies to political freedoms.

The relatively largest national minorities in Poland are: Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians and Slovaks. Indisputably economy is in a worse shape in Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania than in Poland. On the other hand, one cannot sincerely say that Belarus, Ukraine and Slovakia are fully democratic states. Moreover, Warsaw is vitally interested in treating Poland’s Belarusian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian minorities well hoping that their nation-states will reciprocate in kind toward considerable Polish national minorities in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

951. The sentence to this end reads: [...] we, the Polish Nation - all the citizens of the Republic of Poland [...].
952. Other articles of this Constitution which make this protection more concrete are the following Art 13, Art 23, Art 25, Art 32, Art 51, Art 52, Art 55, Art 56, and Art 58.
On top of that, none of the nation-states of the four minorities was accepted for the first round of EU enlargement, and only two had submitted membership applications (i.e., Slovakia and Lithuania). In result, members of the four minorities, for the time being, can count on better life in Poland as well as on becoming EU citizens earlier than if they resided in their own nation-states. Therefore, despite various problems encountered in the context of preserving their national identity in Poland, attractiveness of their host country has been boosted by the fact that Warsaw commenced accession negotiations with the EU in March 1998.

The Special Case of Poland’s German Minority

These advantages are not so evident in the case of the German minority whose nation-state\(^5\) has been a member of the European Communities/EU since their inception, and of Nato since 1955.

Who are Poland’s Germans

As mentioned above, the existence of the German minority was denied as matter of course prior to 1989. It was claimed that all the Germans were expelled from the postwar Poland in 1945-50 while the remnants left in 1950-60. Massive emigration to West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s did deny this statement but Warsaw preferred not to call them Germans, and was bent on proving that actually they were Poles using cases of those persons who could not adapt to the West German society and decided to return (Cf.: Bielski, 1986: 229-35).

To add to this confusion, Polish scholarly sources estimated that none or just few thousand Germans remained in Poland, while the West German estimates came up with numbers much larger than one million. This wide divergence is easily explicated when one remembers that:

in 1939-45, Germany incorporated all the territories which had belonged to Germany prior to 1921 and, subsequently, had been transferred to Poland. The interwar Poland’s German minority received German citizenship in the wartime years whereas the border ethnic groups of the Upper Silesians, the Kashubs, the Mazurs and the Warmiaks (Ermlanders) who usually were bilingual and possessed multiple identities\(^6\), were adopted as tentative German citizens through the inscription onto the Deutsche Volksliste (DVL, German National List).

In 1945 Moscow transferred to Poland the Deutsche Ostgebiete less northern East Prussia (today, Russia’s Kaliningradskaya Oblast’), and Warsaw, following the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, cleansed the areas of their German population retaining only several tens of thousands of

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\(^5\) Under the label of the German nation-state I understand West Germany, because from the viewpoint of international law it was the only successor state of the Third Reich, and according to the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany encompassed all the areas which had been included within the German borders on December 31, 1937. Hence, unification of Germany (1990) was not a merger of two German states but rather the extension of Bonn’s administration to cover this part of the German territory, which had remained under communist control until 1990. By the same virtue, only with the German-Polish border treaty of 1990, Bonn resigned from treating the Deutsche Ostgebiete as part of the German territory under the temporary Polish administration (cf.: Blumenwitz, 1989).

\(^6\) When one is a member of a nation one is required to possess only one monistic identity, i.e. of the given nation. In prenational times people tended to develop and maintain several equally significant constituents of their identity. For instance, one could be a Prussian, Lower Silesian and Catholic in one person. This straightforward dynamics of the multiple identity became more complex with the advance of nationalism. Inhabitants of the peripheries of nations-in-making tended to secure their usual way of living through becoming members of ethnic groups emerging in response to nation-building. For example the multiple identity allowed the Upper Silesian to be perceived, ideally, as an Upper Silesian among Upper Sileans, a Pole among Poles, a German among Germans, and a Czech among Czechs. However, from the national point of view such an Upper Silesian seemed to have a monistic national identity whereas only other Upper Sileans understood it as the working of the Upper Silesian multiple identity and the very essence of being an Upper Silesian. So such an identity protected the Upper Silesian from possible encroachments on the part of national administrations and, ideally, reinforced the cohesion of the Upper Silesian ethnic group (Kamusella, 1997).
indispensable industrial and agricultural specialists (together with their families) in Lower Silesia and Pomerania. They were dubbed indubitable Germans and their number decreased to several thousand after 1960.

In order to facilitate peopling of the Deutsche Ostgebiete and to make it possible to run the Upper Silesian industrial basin (second largest on the continent after the Ruhr) which provided one-third to one quarter of the Polish GDP until the 1980s, Warsaw decided to retain the aforementioned ethnic groups claiming them to be archaically Polish though often uncocious of their intrinsic Polishness.

Those who lived in Germany prior to 1939 were dubbed Autochthons and were granted with Polish tentative citizenship through the process of national verification. Their counterparts who prior to 1939 lived in Poland and acquired German citizenship through the DVL, were re-granted with Polish citizenship through the process of rehabilitation.

From the stance of Polish law only indubitable Germans were considered to be Germans, and they did number only several thousand after 1960. On the other hand, Art 116 of the Grundgesetz and the derivative legislation consider all the persons who prior to May 8, 1945 had German citizenship or acquired it (for instance, via the DVL) as well as their descendants, to be Germans. The fact that they gained Polish citizenship through verification or rehabilitation, is not valid in the light of the German law. Hence, the number of the verified and the rehabilitated together with their descendants being well over one million -- it was the correct number of Germans remaining in Poland from the German point of view.

In 1945-89, the rehabilitated and the verified treated as second-class citizens, many hundreds of thousands of them left for West Germany where, as Aussiedlers (resettlers), they quite quickly became Germans enjoying fruits of the West German democracy and Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). Those who remained in Poland moved away from Polishdom in favor of Germandom or got entrenched in their ethnic identities.

Following the fall of communism, the stream of Aussiedlers flowing from Poland to Germany dried out to the level of one thousand a year due to the provisions of the Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (KfbG, War Consequences Consolidation Act). As of January 1, 1993 it did away with the status of Aussiedler and privileges it entailed in relation to the eligible persons from the postcommunist states. Moreover, any descendant of an eligible person, born on this date or after cannot apply for German citizenship which he can acquire only through his parents (Wolf, 1996).

After 1989, the ascription of Germanness by Polish or German law gave way to self-identification of those concerned. The membership of the German organizations vacillates at the level of about 300 thousand (Kurcz, 1995: 43) which together with passive sympathizers and children may add up to 400 thousand. 250-350 thousand of Poland’s Germans are concentrated in Upper Silesia which allowed them to establish permanent parliamentarian representation since 1990. However, the initial number of German MPs dropped from 6 to current 2, and the only senator who had served since 1990 was outvoted in 1997. It is important to mention that minority organizations are exempted from meeting the 4% threshold in parliamentary elections.

955. This process mirrored the wartime inscription onto the DVL.
956. This process mirrored wartime granting of German citizenship to Poland’s interwar German minority.
957. The status of Aussiedler is still granted to applicants coming from the successor states of the Soviet Union (more than 100 thousand of them emigrate to Germany every year), and it is still made easy for eligible persons (so-called Sp.,tausiedlers - late resettlers) from the poorer postcommunist states (especially from Romania) to move to Germany.
958. It was quite a blow because the German MPs lost their own parliamentarian club because to form one a party/political grouping has to have at least 4 MPs.
From the administrative point of view, Upper Silesian Germans (around 300 thousand) constitute about one-third of the population of the Region of Opole Silesia\(^{959}\), where they form majority of the population in the western half of this region. In recognition of this fact, the German Vice-Consulate was opened in Opole (the region’s capital) at the beginning of the 1990s. It, as well as the German Consulate General at Wroclaw, issue German citizenship documents and passports to those eligible in the light of Art 116 of the _Grundgesetz_ who wish to reaffirm their Germanness in the formal manner and do not wish to leave their _Heimat_ (homeland) (Kamusella, 1996; Kamusella, 1999).

Out of about 200 thousand holders of German passports the overwhelming majority reside in Opole Silesia (Deutscher, 1995; Deutscher, 1995a; Schlesische, 1996). Probably they and their children will form the core of Poland’s German minority in future as due to the policy of forced Polonization rarely any Polish German below 60 can speak passable German. So those who do not secure this document for themselves, may have hard time to reassert their Germanness not even being able to communicate with a German from Germany albeit bilingual Aussiedlers and _Sp.,taussiedlers_ may allow one to avoid having to meet this requirement for a generation or so.

In relation to the aforementioned ethnic/legal categories, the most verified and a sizeable number of the rehabilitated of Upper Silesia either left for Germany or became Germans. The rest of the rehabilitated maintain their multiple identity as members of the Upper Silesian ethnic group\(^{960}\) while some of them became Poles too. Out of the 100 thousand verified Mazurs, the overwhelming majority left for Germany whereas the remaining few thousand rather consider themselves to be more German than Mazur. It is different in the case of the verified/rehabilitated Kashubs. Although many left for Germany most remained - to the tune of 300 thousand. Only several thousand consider themselves to be Germans while the rest form the Kashubian ethnic group (Sakson, 1991: 14-23).

**Poland’s Germans and European Integration**

Due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Poland’s Germans live in Upper Silesia I will draw on the Upper Silesian Germans experience of European integration.

First of all, it is all too easily forgotten that some 200 thousand Upper Silesian Germans are not only holders of dual Polish-German citizenship, but also of the EU citizenship by the virtue of possessing German passports. Hence, they form the largest compact group of EU residents living outside the territory of the current EU. Although in the light of Polish and German law it is illegal for German and Polish citizens to possess two citizenships\(^{961}\), this situation is tolerated by Warsaw and Bonn as it is believed that Poland soon will become a member of the EU. Then EU citizenship would patch the existing gap in economic privileges yawning between the entitlements provided by Polish and German citizenships.

At present, a holder of German citizenship is discouraged from moving to Germany by the KfbG because he would not obtain any aid from the German state in the form of an apartment and a free language course which were the regular fare for the _Aussiedler_, and his pension would be calculated on the basis of its Polish equivalent resulting in the impossible to live on DM200-300. These difficulties coupled with the improving economic, political and social situation in Poland,

\(^{959}\). I.e. the western half of Upper Silesia largely coinciding with Germany’s interwar section of this region after its division in 1921.

\(^{960}\). Young Upper Silesian intellectuals disliking the inferior social status of their ethnic group as well as noticing that most of its members do not have a chance to leave for Germany or to pass as true Poles in the eyes of Poles, decided, in 1997, to reshape the Upper Silesians into a nation which would make Warsaw pay more heed to their needs and aspirations.

\(^{961}\). From the legal point of view, a Polish citizen’s German citizenship is not valid without prior renouncement of his Polish citizenship, and therefore it is non-existent within the Polish borders in the light of Polish law. The very same approach is espoused by German law to Polish citizenship held by German citizens when they happen to be on the territory of Germany.
rather convince most of the Upper Silesian Germans to remain in their Heimat while coaxing younger ones to go to Germany where they work seasonally or permanently, going back home once a week or month.

The difference between the absolute average salaries in Poland and in Germany and their relative purchasing power, allow those enterprising Upper Silesian Germans to live much a better life than they would working in Poland. On the other hand, the Region of Opole Silesia is much better off with their money spent at home and work in Germany. Without the inflow of the money fortified by DM twenty-several million coming from Bonn for the needs of the minority (Auslands, 1992; Schlesisches, 1995), the ongoing development of rural infrastructure and small business would not be possible. What is more, the fact that at any given time usually around 100 thousand Upper Silesian Germans work in Germany, makes it possible for the Opole Silesian unemployment rate to remain at 9%, well below the Polish average of 13-14%.

Actually, without so many inhabitants of Opole Silesia going to work in Germany, the unemployment rate could have been larger there than the Polish average, because the Germans traditionally worked small farms of 0.5-3 ha which was a supplement to their salaries derived from their work in the Upper Silesian industrial basin located east of their Heimat. Now when increasingly more coal pits and metallurgical plants have to close down in order to make these sectors of Polish economy compatible with the EU requirements, tens of thousands of Opole Silesian workers would find themselves unemployed and unable to support themselves and their families on their small plots of lands in the light of the falling prices of agricultural products (in relation to other goods) in answer to the EU’s demands appealing for down-scaling and modernization of the Polish agriculture.

Moreover, some enterprising Aussiedlers who left in the 1980s, decide to return and/or invest their money in various enterprises in their Heimat. The possible extent of this phenomenon is reduced by the immense difficulties a foreigner encounters when he wants to purchase Polish land. So only Aussiedlers with dual citizenship are able to buy land, and one cannot reasonably expect other Upper Silesian Aussiedlers to invest money into properties without the possibility of purchasing land on which they happen to be located.

The question of land is highly mythologized in Poland as in any nation-state with 30% of its population deriving livelihood from agriculture. The Polish peasant parties use the scare of massive buy-out by foreigners to boost their electorates and are seconded by their nationalist counterparts who claim that properties of those living in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete may have to be returned to previous German owners or their descendants when Poland accesses the EU. In the course of the 1997 German elections campaign such fears were fuelled by statements of some German politicians and Erika Steinbach, President of the Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV, Union of the Expellees) who appeal that Poland, and the Czech Republic should guarantee the return of property to their erstwhile German owners or their descendants as the precondition of being accepted into the fold of the EU. But, recently, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel officially distanced the German government from such opinions.

Such claims would destroy the basis of the postwar European peace, because Polish expellees, in turn, would demand their properties in the present-day Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. However, trusting that the contentious issue of land purchase by foreigners will gradually be solved in compliance with the acquis, a practically even more divisive problem looms on the horizon in the form of derogation periods in application of the Common Market provision of the full freedom of movement of people to the new member states.

If such derogation periods are indeed applied, then it will become apparent that the EU passports of Upper Silesian Germans will be of better value than those of Upper Silesian Poles. Not surprisingly, would Upper Silesian Poles feel to be second-class EU citizens in comparison to their German neighbors, it would be asking for social conflict and turning Upper Silesian Poles against the idea of European integration. Besides, further verified/rehabilitated would be coaxed by such a schizophrenic situation to apply for German citizenship. Should they be unsuccessful in their
endeavors, impotence of the Polish state in the task of securing EU citizenship of equal value for all its citizens, might as well as turn them into supporters and activists of the Upper Silesian national movement.

Last but not least, Germany is not hindered in issuing German/EU passports to Germans residing in Poland, but on the tacit condition that they are not allowed to take part in German elections\textsuperscript{962}. By extension, Upper Silesian Germans do not take part in the European parliamentarian elections either. On the whole, the average Upper Silesian German who goes to Germany to do some manual work there, does not realize that his passport is also a EU passport. However, as he learned about the advantages of possessing German citizenship, with time, he will learn about advantages brought about by EU citizenship. Then more of Upper Silesian Germans will crop up in Austria, Luxembourg and in the German-speaking areas of France (Alsace-Lorraine), Italy (South Tyrol) and Belgium before venturing into other EU states too. And, consequently, they may start demanding their rights entailed by the German/EU passport unless they are fulfilled beforehand.

A compact and self-aware settlement area of 200 thousand German/EU citizens would be a force to reckon with. It will depend on Polish, German and EU politicians if this considerable enclave of German/EU citizens and their Polish neighbors will be used for furthering the ideals of European integration (as expressed by the recent decision to enlarge the EU eastward) or to its detriment.

Postscript

What about a negative scenario? Let us assume that an accession referendum is lost in Poland or that the EU does not accept Poland as a member. In consequence, Poland becomes an economically isolated and insecure state between the two juggernauts of the EU and the CIS (Community of Independent States). Staying away from these two economic-cum-political-cum-security blocs Poland makes itself militarily vulnerable, and limited to a small economic sphere of its own, its economy rather stagnates or even deflates leaving the Polish citizenry ever poorer. Then, as during the communist times, Upper Silesian Germans would use their German/EU passport as the security insurance which would allow them to leave the state in no time and with little regret.

They would opt for a normal life in Germany/the EU and soon would be joined by numerous rehabilitated Upper Silesian and their descendants who would move earth and heaven in order to find appropriate papers which would ensure their obtaining the German/EU passport. For the Region of Opole Silesia it would mean serious depopulation as well as further disorganization of economic and social life. One would not be surprised if even a considerable number of Kashubs would follow this path bent on not having to endure sufferings which once were visited on them by communism and its dismal economics.

Should the situation turn so bad, nationalism could prove appropriate opium for masses, and Poland’s minorities once again would be turned into the scapegoat leaving them exposed to the vicious circle of Polonization and persecution in the search of the holy grail of the ethnically clean Polish nation-state

\textsuperscript{962}. It is quite a hypocrisy on the part of the Polish administration, as, since 1989, Polish passports have been steadily issued to Poles living outside the Soviet bloc who, in the past, were stripped of their Polish citizenship by the communist authorities, and acquired citizenships of the countries of their residence. Not only are they allowed to participate in Polish elections, they are encouraged to do so by the absentee ballot.
Poland’s German minority: its origin and current situation

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OCTOBER 20TH, 1998
Poland’s National minorities and the process of European integration as exemplified by the case of the German minority

I would like to draw the attention to the pages 21-23 of this article. In the context of the accession negotiations between Poland and the EU, it can be heard that there are plans to introduce a long derogation period in the full implementation of the Common Market freedom of movement of persons vis-a-vis Polish citizens after the Republic of Poland becomes a EU member.

The introduction of such a derogation period could have a harmful influence on the societal cohesion in Upper Silesia (Oberschlesien), and especially in Opole Silesia (Oppelner Schlesien, i.e. the western half of Upper Silesia).

The overwhelming majority of Poland’s Germans live in the compact settlement area in the eastern half of Opole Silesia, numbering 300-350 thousand persons, i.e. one-third of the region’s population. This compact area of their settlement spills over into the adjacent communes/counties (Gemeinde/Kreise) of the Katowice Voivodeship (Silesian Region) with c. 50 thousand Germans.

About 200 thousand of the aforementioned Germans, possess German citizenship which was reaffirmed by the fact that, after 1989, Germany issued them with the citizenship (einfügung) documents as well as with German passports. Because the German passport is also a EU passport which reaffirms that its holder possesses EU citizenship too, it seems that the east of Opole Silesia is, perhaps, the largest compact area of settlement of EU citizens without the Union.

Although dual citizenship is illegal in the light of Polish and German law, Warsaw and Bonn tolerate it in relation to Poland’s Germans tacitly assuming that this issue will be solved after Poland’s accession into the EU, through the extension of the EU citizenship to cover all the Polish citizens.

However, should this aforementioned derogation period be introduced, it would mean that the EU citizenship acquired by Opole Silesia’s Germans via the German citizenship, would be of better value than the EU citizenship of their Polish neighbors acquired via the Polish citizenship.

Such a situation would be a kind of return to the years 1945-89, when the Polish citizenship conferred on the so-called former citizens of the Reich 963 (i.e. today’s Germans and Upper Silesians 964) was of lesser value than the citizenship and its entitlements which were enjoyed by other Polish citizens who were indubitable ethnic Poles.

Since 1989 there have been attempts, on the part of the Polish administration, at equalizing the level of opportunities available to all the inhabitants of Opole Silesia regardless of their ethnic origins, and of their variegated identities. In the second half of the 1990s, this goal has been largely achieved as it was seen, during the first half of 1998, in the united stance of the vast majority of the inhabitants of Opole Silesia (regardless of their ethnic/national identities) for the common sake of preserving their region on the new administrative map of the Republic of Poland.

Nowadays, the Polish neighbors of Germans in Opole Silesia accept the fact that the latter have better employment perspectives thanks to the German passport which allows them to get a legal job in Germany and elsewhere in the EU. This acceptance is based on the recognition: how difficult it was for the local Germans to live normal lives in the period 1945-89.

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963. They were former citizens of the Reich only in the light of Polish law. German law has continued to recognize them and their descendants as (at least, potential) German citizens, who, on the basis of Art 116 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law of Germany) could reclaim their German citizenship.

964. The Upper Silesians (Slazacy in Polish, Schlonsaken in German, Slunzoky in Czech) an ethnic group whose members still preserve their non-national multiple identity. In the times of danger and need, this identity allows them to function as Poles, Germans, or, sometimes, as Czechs too. However, the ethnic border between them, and the Germans, the Poles and the Czechs is maintained by the fact that without their homeland (Heimat) of Upper Silesia, Upper Silesians are considered to be Poles (Wasserpolacken) by Germans, Germans (Hanysy) by Poles, and Germans by Czechs.
and that the German passport is a passport of a foreign state.

However, when after the accession of Poland into the EU, the citizenship of the umbrella polity (i.e. the EU) will provide Poles with less rights than their German neighbors, it may lead to reemergence of social tension in Opole Silesia.

Such a tension could:

- do away with the only recently achieved societal cohesion leading to the reopening the nationalist cleavage between the local Poles and Germans in Opole Silesia and elsewhere in Poland;
- trigger off a new wave of applications for the German citizenship submitted by eligible Opole Silesia’s Germans as well as Upper Silesians, which could spread to the Kashubs too;
- lead to emergence of enmity toward the EU and the process of European integration among the Polish inhabitants of Opole Silesia;
- and this enmity could translate into a boost in the electorate of Poland’s radical and nationalist parties and groupings,
- which could result in a renewed emigration of, thus, endangered Opole Silesia’s Germans and Upper Silesians to Germany, however, already in the framework of the common EU, which in the initial assumptions was to prevent such phenomena rather than to cause them.

Therefore, before making the eventual decision to introduce the aforementioned derogation period, the above-described possible effects should be taken into consideration because they would not have just local, inner-Polish but rather international repercussions. On the whole, their social, political and economic cost could be much higher for the EU, Germany and Poland, than resignation from the introduction of this derogation period.

I hope that this Note together with the enclosed article will contribute, first, to an in-depth scrutiny of the possible effects (especially adverse ones) of the introduction of derogation periods and other transitional instruments vis-à-vis Poland’s would-be EU membership, as well as, to reaching, during the accession negotiations, such a compromise regarding the aforementioned derogation period, which would prevent the occurrence of the above-described negative phenomena in Opole Silesia.

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965 The Kashubs (Kaschubs), an ethnic group inhabiting the region around Gdansk.
Appendix I

Place names in Silesia

Silesia not unlike Central and Eastern Europe has been a theater of onomastic wars for centuries. When this land changed its owner its place-names were often changed accordingly in order to suit the rules of pronunciation and spelling of the official language. However, before the Nineteenth century when nationalism began to spread in Silesia, this process was rather evolutionary and based on the usage of the local population inhabiting given localities. Thus, Czech Vratislav was transformed into Breslau only when the inhabitants of the city became predominantly German-speaking. On the other hand, Zabrze remained Zabrze till 1933 because it contained a large Polish-speaking populace. Only after coming to power, the Nazis started consistently Germanizing Silesian place-names in an artificial manner, so Zabrze was Hindenburg till 1945. After the war when Silesia was attached to Poland, the Polish authorities Polonized all the German-sounding Silesian place-names in the very same artificial fashion though they claimed that it was just a return to old Slavic names, but it was not and Vratislav/Breslau, out of sudden, was christened Wrocaw (Davies, 1981: II 510-517, 526/527).

Having been faced with this difficult methodological problem, the author could not determine that a certain name is solely correct for a certain locality because, bearing in mind what has been said above, it would have constituted a breach of the academic rule of objectivity. Subsequently, the author decided to use names appropriate for specific time periods with which the work deals with. For the sake of clarity other forms, i.e. Polish, German or Czech are given in parenthesis where necessary. Sometimes, two German names are given. one traditional and the other used after 1933. The Czech place-names, as well as publication titles and surnames are written without the use of appropriate diacritics because of technical problems, for which the author apologizes hoping that this drawback will not impede intelligibility of this work.

While writing the thesis, the author extensively used the dictionary of Polish and German forms of Silesian place-names compiled by Marek J. Battek and Joanna Szczepankiewicz (see the bibliography for details), however, he thought that it could be useful, for the sake of the prospective Reader, to include three lists of the most important forms of Silesian place-names, which constitute this appendix.

966 Partially it was an answer to systematic Polonization of place-names which was undertaken in the Silesian Voivodaship after the plebiscite.
Appendix II

Maps

The graphic material in the form of maps may greatly facilitate clear comprehension of complex territorial and administrative issues. Thus, in the light of the fact that no historical atlas of Silesia exists, the author included in the appendix photocopies of interesting maps having to do with Silesia, which he had come across in the course of his research for this work.
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Articles

The origins and anatomy of the ethnic cleansing in upper silesia 1944-1950

[Motto] There is no peace without remembrance’
Pope John Paul II
at the mass commemorating the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the end of the Second
World War
[Author] T. D. I. Kamusella

Methodological Notes

1. Due to the brevity of this paper the description of the postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia is necessarily limited to Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) and the Katowice part of Upper Silesia (Eastern Upper Silesia/Ostoberschlesien) with the exclusion of both the Polish and Czech parts of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia and the Czech Hlucin (Hluczyn) land (Hultschiner Ländchen).

2. In conformity with the international onomastic norms (cf. Davies, 1981; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994) the majority of place names are given in the forms which were officially recognized in given periods of time. In order to prevent confusion the reader will find appropriate Polish, German, Czech or Russian counterparts of the place names used in this paper in parentheses.

3. The paper concentrates solely on the mechanics of the postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia, thus, the author decided not to elaborate (unless it is necessitated in the course of the argument) on the question of ethnic, national, linguistic and religious identity of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia, who, usually, are referred to as the Upper Silesians in the essay. The term has its counterparts in Polish, German and Czech, and does not evokes pejorative associations unlike the ideologically-tainted label Autochtons which has been restricted in its usage almost exclusively to the Polish postwar historiographic and political terminology.

An Explanatory Note on Political and Administrative Divisions of Upper Silesia

The note is not exhaustive as it is intended just to facilitate perusal of the paper.

The boundaries of Upper Silesia tended to fluctuate in the course of history following relatively frequent changes in the political allegiance of the province. Already in the Middle Ages the sizeable territories of Siewierz (Sewerien) and Oswiecim (Auschwitz) principalities were lost to Malopolska (Lesser or Little Poland, which in the concerned area of Cracow overlaps with Galicia), and subsequently formed the so-called Silesian-Malopolska borderland. In the same period of time Opava (Troppau, Opawa) Silesia was formed from a northern chunk of Moravia and added to Upper Silesia. From 1526 the whole of Upper Silesia belonged to Austria but after its defeat in the Silesian Wars in the 18th century only Opava Silesia and Tesen (Teschen, Cieszyn) Silesia stayed with Austria while the rest was ceded to Prussia. Subsequently, the former two were referred to as Austrian Silesia (it is superfluous to use the term Austrian Upper Silesia as all of Lower Silesia belonged to Prussia) and the latter as Prussian Upper Silesia. After the third partition of Poland in 1795 New Silesia (i.e. the sizeably enlarged territory of the Principality of Siewierz/Sewerien (which in its renewed form bordered on the outskirts of Czestochowa) was attached to Prussian Upper Silesia but the annexation was annulled by Napoleon in 1807. After the First World War Austrian Silesia was inherited by Czechoslovakia, however Czech(oslovak) Silesia is not identical with Austrian Silesia. In 1919 Tesen (Teschen, Cieszyn) Silesia was split between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the southernmost part of the Prussian Upper Silesian county of Raciborz (Ratibor), i.e. the Hulcin (Hultschin, Hulczyn) land was added to Czech Silesia. Moreover, after the Plebiscite in 1921 Prussian/German Upper Silesia

An introduction to the complex issue of identity in Upper Silesia is provided by the insightful article on this subject by Harry K. Rosenthal (Rosenthal, 1972).

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(less the Hulcin land) was divided between Poland and Germany. Its Polish part was granted autonomy and is referred to as Silesian Voivodship (Województwo Śląskie) in Polish sources and as Eastern Upper Silesia (Ostoberschlesien) by German scholars. Silesian Voivodship was enlarged with the Polish part of Cieszyn (Tesen, Teschen) Silesia. The remaining part of Upper Silesia is referred to as German Upper Silesia or Oppeln (Opole) Regency whereas Polish historiography tends to name the region as Opole (Oppeln) Silesia or Opolszczyzna (i.e. Opole Land). In the 1938 post-Munich carving-up of Czechoslovakia Germany seized Opava (Troppau, Opawa) Silesia but it was incorporated into Sudetenland not into German Upper Silesia, whereas the Czech part of Tesen (Teschen, Cieszyn) Silesia, i.e. so-called Transolza (Zaolzie, Olsagebiete) (increased with the strip of land adjacent to its southern border) was annexed by Poland and incorporated into Silesian Voivodship. After the outbreak of the Second World War so enlarged Silesian Voivodship was incorporated into Gau Oberschlesien to which the Silesian-Malopolska borderland was added together with a strip of Polish land next to the eastern borders of the historical territories of the Principalities of Siewierz (Sewerien) and Oswiecim (Auschwitz). After the end of the Second World War the prewar status quo was re-introduced, however, Poland obtained whole German Upper Silesia and did not revoke the German addition of the Dabrowski industrial basin (which forms part of the Silesian-Malopolska borderland) to Upper Silesia. At present the lands of the Prussian part of Upper Silesia enlarged with the Dabrowski industrial basin occupy the whole of Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship while smaller chunks of the territory are included in Czestochowa and Bielsko-Biała (Bielitz-Biala) Voivodships.

The year 1995 occasions celebrations of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe, and in the case of Poland, as well, numerous events commemorating the fiftieth anniversaries of the establishment of schools, factories, colleges, universities in the western territories of today’s Poland, i.e. former Deutsche Ostgebiete (eastern territories of Germany).

Although it is widely known, anyway in the context of the article it should be clearly borne in mind that half a century ago no peace was effected from the legal standpoint, but only the cessation of hostilities. The planned Allied peace conference, which was to determine the postwar status quo (hastily sketched during the largely inconclusive conferences at Yalta and Potsdam), never took place. Thus, the Second World War almost imperceptibly evolved into the Cold War which was terminated only recently with the positive conclusion of the Two Plus Four negotiations, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The former event de facto amounted to an ersatz of a universal peace conference, and de jure finished the Second World War. Moreover, considering the period immediately after 1945, it ought to be noted that fighting did not completely stop and continued as limited guerilla warfare, into the 1950s in the Soviet Union and its stallites (cf. Estonia, Latvia, the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania).

On the other hand, the war division of Europe brought about by the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact has never been openly questioned and has never been found invalid in its part concerning the territorial gains of the Soviet Union. By reason of this tacit acceptance, Poland lost one-third of its prewar territory, and subsequently the lands were incorporated into the Soviet Republics of Lithuania, Byelorussia and The Ukraine. The Polish Government in Exile residing in London, did not want to recognize the annexations but reluctantly had to concede to them due to the political pressure exerted by the Allies, and especially faced with the policy of faits accomplis consequently carried out by the Polish communists on behalf of and under the supervision of the Soviet Union. The Polish communists accepted and supported the political line of the Soviet Union striving to incorporate the majority of the Deutsche Ostgebiete into postwar Poland as an unusual compensation for the eastern lands Poland had lost to the Soviet Union. It was clearly realized that existence of postwar Poland in such a shape could be guaranteed solely by the Soviet Union because of the virtual impossibility of

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968 The parties to the negotiations, which preceded the unification of Germany, were both Germanies and the four war-time Allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and France.
any rapprochement of the Poles with the Germans. Understandably, the latter recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the legally-binding German-Polish border only in 1990.

Moreover, the incorporation of Silesia, part of Brandenburg, the Free City of Danzig and part of East Prussia into Poland provided the Polish communists with their ideological trump card which allowed them to introduce their pro-Soviet rule by having represented the Polish defeat in the Second World War as a victory, and thanks to the general improvement of the living standard accompanying the transformation of postwar Poland from an agricultural country into an agricultural-industrial one caused by the absorption of the relatively highly developed Deutsche Ostgebiete. The so called regained territories let the communists consolidate the Polish society around the unwanted aim which was to build socialism, and also to legitimize their undemocratic seizure of power.

The Polish incorporation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete was inseparably linked to the question of the German-speaking population which had lived there for about seven centuries. Some harbingers of would-be decisions in this respect had been already present prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. In answer to the prewar German territorial claims in the name of Lebensraum (living space), in 1939 the Polish propaganda demanded for Poland and Czechoslovakia erstwhile Slavonic lands which used to extend to the line formed by the cities: Bremen, Hannover, Göttingen, Fulda and Nuremberg (Hansel, 1989: 447). On 29th August 1939 the official Polish declaration for the fascist Italian news agency Stefani stated that Poland hoped to solve the problem of the Polish minority in Germany and the German minority in Poland through a gradual exchange of the populaces (Wiskemann, 1956: 47) emulating the Greco-Turkish Agreement of 1923. The Polish declaration could also be an echo of the population shifts caused by the Munich Conference (1938) which approved the subsequent annexations of part of the Czechoslovak territory by Germany, Hungary and Poland, as well as of the opinions on the possibility of expulsion of part of the Sudeten German (Sudetendeutsche) population expressed by Czech intellectuals since 1937. The vague proposals were, for the first time, brought forward before European and world political fora in quite a definitive form by the open discussion on the subject between Eduard Benes (who resigned his function of the Czechoslovak President after the implementation of the Munich Agreement) and Hubert Ripka, prominent Czechoslovak journalist and politician (Wiskemann, 1956: 62).

As President of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London, Benes vociferously propagated ethnic homogenization of Czechoslovakia through expulsions (Wiskemann, 1956: 66/67), completely disregarding the stance of Jaksch (a Sudetendeutsche social democrat and antinazist) who proposed to solve the question of Czechoslovak/Slavonic-German enmity by creating a multinational federation in Central Europe (Wiskemann, 1956: 63). Following Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union (22nd June 1941), the Polish Government in Exile (under British pressure) and the Soviet government

969 The term (in Polish Ziemie Odzyskane) as well as another term the Piast (first Polish dynasty) territories (in Polish Ziemie Piastowskie) were widely used by the Polish communist propaganda to prove primordial Polishness of the lands and to justify their postwar annexation by Poland.

970 The agreement approved the compulsory exchange of minority (i.e. Muslim and Orthodox) populations between Turkey and Greece in an effort to ethnically consolidate both the countries in accordance with the principle of ethnically homogenous states, which after the First World War had been introduced into European politics by President Wilson. The exchange followed the similar Greco-Bulgarian agreement of 1919 (which, however, was on voluntary basis), and was sanctioned and supervised by the League of Nations.

971 In the interwar period he worked as a journalist but during his emigration years in London he became a close associate of President Benes and served as a minister in the Czechoslovak Government in Exile. In the period 1945-1948 he actively opposed communism in Czechoslovakia being active in the Narodna Strana (National Party), and after the communist take-over of the country he again emigrated to Great Britain.

972 In his proposal Jaksch evoked the so called Swiss model which had been to be the basis of the Czechoslovak state as promised by Benes at the Paris Peace Conference after the end of the First World War. However, the agreed solution had never been fully and satisfactorily implemented in the interwar period especially in its part considering the Sudetendeutsche (De Zayas, 1988: 22), after the Czechs the second largest ethnic group in Czechoslovakia of that time.
concluded the Polish-Soviet mutual assistance pact on 30th June 1941, thus establishing relations and declaring the Nazi-Soviet treaties null and void. Most significantly the agreement did not guarantee Poland’s prewar borders (Harper, 1990: 5; Hubatsch, 1967: 299)\(^{973}\) opening the way for postwar annexations and population shifts. Moreover, in the negotiations prior to the signature of the pact Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to Britain, had announced the Soviet intention to retain the territories acquired through the Nazi-Soviet agreement (Harper, 1990: 10)\(^{974}\). On 14th August 1941 the Atlantic Charter, setting the principles for the postwar world order, was promulgated\(^{975}\) and signed by the Soviet Union and Poland on 30th September 1941. On this occasion Polish Foreign Minister Edward Raczynski delivered a vague speech on the issue of Polish postwar borders which prompted Maisky to dispatch a note to the Polish government on 1st December 1941, in which the Soviet Union pressed for a settlement of the Polish eastern frontiers (Hubatsch, 1967: 299). Stalin set forth the same territorial demands during the Moscow visit of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in December 1941 (Hubatsch, 1967: 300). Due to the success of the German offensive in the Ukraine, Molotov and Stalin backed down and specific territorial agreements were excluded from the Treaty of Alliance concluded in May 1942 (Harper, 1990: 9). However, on 2nd December 1942 the Polish Parliament in London decided, in addition to the eastern frontiers of 1921, to demand straightening and shortening of the Polish-German border. The unclear declaration was made more specific by Polish Head of State Wladyslaw Sikorski on 6th December 1942. In the course of his negotiations with President Roosevelt he designated the Oder-Neisse line (including Stettin/Szczecin) as Poland’s natural security line (Hubatsch, 1967: 300). Hence, in the light of the political developments Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union gradually began to espouse the tenet of postwar transfers of population in the years 1942 and 1943 (Wiskemann, 1956: 67; De Zayas, 1988: 34) as the planned expulsions were referred to euphemistically. The expulsion of the German-speaking population from the Deutsche Ostgebiete was mentioned for the first time at the Conference in Teheran (28th November-1st December 1943) when Stalin, supported by British Foreign Minister Eden, proposed the River Oder as the postwar western border of Poland (Hubatsch, 1967: 301; Wiskemann, 1956: 73/4).

The year 1943 was marred by the final severance of the tense relations between the Polish Government in Exile and Moscow. The termination of political links took place after 13th April 1943 when the Germans exposed the mass murder of thousands of Polish army officers perpetrated by the Soviet authorities. The former had found the group graves of the Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Minsk and at other sites (Harper, 1990: 5; Hubatsch, 1967: 300)\(^{976}\). The diplomatic situation became more acute despite Benes’s persuasive arguments presented to the Polish diplomats in London on 10th January 1944. Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk did not wish to accept the loss of

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\(^{973}\) Poland’s prewar eastern borders were set by the Treaty of Riga in 1921 after the Polish victory in the Soviet-Polish War. The terms of the treaty and the military defeat were considered to be a humiliation to the Soviet Union and thus required a redress in the form of obliterating Poland from the political map of Europe once again. The goal was achieved through signing the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (23rd August 1939) which authorized the war partition of Poland. Subsequently, the achievement of the Soviet foreign policy was reaffirmed with the German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty of 28th September 1939 (Harper, 1990: 4; Hubatsch, 1967: 298).

\(^{974}\) The inflexible Soviet attitude which constantly prevailed during any negotiations on postwar Polish borders becomes clear if one remembers the two guiding principles of the Soviet security policy of that time: First, an independent Poland would be allowed to reemerge but its territory would be shifted to the west and its government would be friendly to the Soviet Union. Second, no indigenous Polish activity would be allowed to interfere in any way with the progress of the Red Army or with the Soviet control of the rear (Harper, 1990: 10).

\(^{975}\) Most significantly it was not to be applied to Germany which indicated a possibility of a postwar annexation of German territories and expulsion of their indigenous populations.

\(^{976}\) The political ties were eventually severed by the Soviets who accused the Poles of endorsing nazi propaganda (Harper, 1990: 5).
the prewar Polish eastern territories in exchange for the Deutsche Ostgebiete. His stance became even more inflexible after the fall of the Warsaw Uprising which was not aided by the Red Army positioned in the middle of the city at the line of the Vistula River (De Zayas, 1988: 45/6). On 10th October 1944 during the meeting at the British embassy in Moscow Churchill and Eden managed to make Mikolajczyk agree to the Curzon line, and Mikolajczyk promised that he would persuade his cabinet to endorse the decision, but he failed to do so and on 24th November 1944 quit the Polish government (Harper, 1990: 18-20).

This staunchly legalistic stance of the Polish London government, flatly refusing any concessions, allowed the Soviets to establish the PKWN (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego - Polish Committee of National Liberation) in Lublin in July 1944. It was recognized only by the Soviet Union and was to serve as a nucleus of the would-be postwar communist government in Poland and as such a puppet in the Soviet hands. In a 17th December 1944 interview for The Sunday Times, Tomasz Arciszewski, new Prime Minister of the Polish government in London, protested against the possible loss of the Polish eastern territories, but also agreed to the would be incorporation of part of East Prussia, Upper Silesia, and part of Lower Silesia, with the exclusion of the cities of Breslau (Wroclaw) and Stettin (Szczecin), in order not to overburden a postwar Poland with a task of assimilating too large a number of Germans. He still was not prepared to take into consideration mass expulsions as a political instrument (Wiskemann, 1956: 81/2). An immediate response to this pronouncement of the official line of the Polish London government was formulated in a long article by Stefan Jedrychowski, head of the Propaganda Department of the PKWN, which was published in the main Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda on 18th December 1944. For the first time the Oder-Neisse line with the city of Stettin (Szczecin) was officially demanded as the postwar western frontier of Poland (De Zayas, 1988: 50). The territorial claims of the Polish communists together with the acceptance of the Curzon line by the PKWN augmented Soviet support for its underling and facilitated its smooth transformation into the Rzad Tymaczasowy (Provisional Government) on 31st December 1944. Hence, at the Yalta Conference (4th-11th February 1945) Stalin could fully support the demands of the Polish communists against the contrary opinions of Roosevelt and Churchill. The doubts of the two western leaders considering too big an increase of the number of Germans who would have to be expelled were dismissed by Stalin. He maintained that a majority of the German population of the Deutsche Ostgebiete had already fled before the rapidly

977 The losses more or less coincided with the so-called Curzon line which for the first time was proposed by the British Government after the First World War as a possible eastern border of the newly re-established Polish state.

978 In spite of their mutual enmity the Russians and the Germans suspended their hostilities in this region in August 1944 in order to allow the latter to suppress the uprising, and thus to fulfill the expectations of the former who wished the Polish anticommunist forces to be conveniently obliterated before they would try to impose Soviet rule on postwar Poland.

979 Thus, the Allies made the question of Polish postwar borders even more daunting because Mikolajczyk was quite moderate on this issue in comparison to his colleagues who supplanted him in the Polish Government in Exile.

980 The first nucleus of the Polish pro-Soviet authorities was initiated by the Soviet Union in Chelm and originated from the Moscow-based, communist Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich (ZPP, Association of Polish Patriots). After having been based in Lublin for a while it was transferred (in a full-fledged form) to Warsaw when the Red Army seized the Polish capital from the nazi hands on 19th January 1945. The Soviets indicated here stringent consistency in their policies not allowing the communist Poles to set any modicum of a Polish government anywhere else but on the lands which they had decided were to be included into the territory of postwar Poland.

981 In Article 4 of the PKWN-Soviet Agreement of 27th July 1944 there was a clause which obliged the Soviet Union to internationally support the postulate of shifting the Polish western frontier 300 kms to the Oder-Neisse line (Lis, 1988: 22).

982 It was officialy recognized by the Soviet Union on 5th January 1945 (Harper, 1990: 22).
advancing Red Army which had launched the successful offensive on 12th January 1945. The information was obviously not true because 30-60% of the Germans remained in the Deutsche Ostgebiete, and many returned (especially to Upper Silesia) after the end of the Second World War (De Zayas, 1988: 53).

To analyze the effects of the onslaught of the Red Army it is necessary to become acquainted with the ethnic make-up of Upper Silesia at the close of the Second World War. It must be remembered that Oberschlesische Gau contained whole Teschen (Cieszyn/Tesen) Silesia, German Upper Silesia (Oppeln/Opole Silesia) and Polish Silesia (Silesian Voivodship/Eastern Upper Silesia) together with the added territories of the Silesian-Malopolska borderland and the Dabrowski industrial basin which in the Middle Ages had belonged to the territory of historical Upper Silesia. The eastern boundary of this new Upper Silesia ran through the outskirts of Czestochowa and few kilometers away from Cracow (Anon. 1943: map between pp. 530/1), and thus embraced all the Upper Silesian coal field which earlier Germany had had to share with Austro-Hungary and Russia, and after the First World War with Poland and Czechoslovakia. So it can be easily inferred that the enlarged territory of Oberschlesische Gau was populated by Germans, Silesians, Poles, Czechs, Moravians and Jews. In the framework of the Endlösung policies of the Third Reich, the Upper Silesian Jews were channeled through the ghettos in Bedzin, Sosnowiec and Zawiercie to the Auschwitz (Oswiecim) Concentration Camp (Szefer, 1989: 191/2). All the population which could be classified as non-Polish or non-exclusively-Polish was to be retained and subsequently Germanized (Anon., 1943: 158), because it would not be advisable to hinder the rapid war economic development of the Upper Silesian industry by depleting the qualified work force (Wiskemann, 1956: 56). Therefore, only c. 81,000 Poles (Szefer, 1989: 191) were expelled to the General Gouvernment, and subsequently replaced with 30,445 ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) from Bukovina, 5,091 from the prewar eastern territories of Poland seized by the Soviet Union, and 734 from Estonia, Latvia, Dobrudja, Romania and Bosnia (Anon., 1995: 6). Silesia was rarely visited by US or RAF bombers lying far away from Allied air force bases. So almost 450,000 from the total number of 850,000 German citizens (Reichsdeutsche) from the cities of western and central Germany (regularly troubled by air raids) relocated at the end of the war for safety reasons, were moved to this relatively safe part of the Reich. Some refugees must have also reached Upper Silesia but it seems that the majority of them stayed in Lower Silesia (Engel, 1967: 194; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 23). These frequent and non-supervised population shifts do not allow for any exact or reliable estimates of the size and structure of the Upper Silesian population prior to the end of the Second World War.

The relative security of Silesia was over with the destruction of the Heersgruppe Mitte (Army Center) and after the Soviet armies reached the Vistula River at the turn of June and July in 1944. The first Allied bombing raid in Upper Silesia took place on 7th July 1944 and caused serious damage at the oil refinery in Blachownian (Blachownia), which supplied the Reich with 40% of its synthetic petrol (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 29). For the first time on 19th October 1944 the Red Army crossed
the borders of the Reich and seized the counties of Goldap (Goldap) and Gumbinnen (Gusev) in East Prussia. The German troops recovered the territories on 5th November 1944, and it was discovered that on 20th and 21st October 1944 the Red Army soldiers had killed all the population and livestock in the village of Nemmersdorf (Mayakowskoye), and committed other numerous atrocities in different localities, which also included the massacre of the c. 50 French POWs (De Zayas, 1988: 61/2). In the Autumn of 1944 and at the turn of 1944 and 1945 the fright evoked by the Red Army’s excesses aimed against the German civilian population, was increased by disinformation and the activities of the Reich authorities who strove to dissuade the Upper Silesian population from flight in order to continue the production in the Upper Silesian industrial basin which had to take over the destroyed Ruhrgebiete as the powerhouse of the Reich (Wiskemann, 1956: 90).

Therefore, only relatively small segments of the Upper Silesian population had a chance to flee before the rapidly advancing Red Army, i.e. 20-50% of the rural populace, and sporadicaly larger percentages of the urban populace from the cities east of the River Oder (Lis, 1993: 19). The escapees and evacuees sought shelter mainly in Sudetenland and in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, however, small groups of Upper Sileans reached Saxony where some of them (e.g. Nikolaus Graf von Ballestrem) perished during the carpet bombardment of Dresden on 13/14th February 1945 (De Zayas, 1988: 77; Laqueur, 1986: 216/7). On 12th February 1945 the Soviet armies launched the winter offensive from the bridgeheads in Magnuszewo and Baranow Sandomierski at the River Vistula. Silesia was attacked by the First Ukrainian Front under the command of General Konyev who was supported in the north by the First Byelorussian Front commanded by General Zhukov, and in the south by the Fourth Ukrainian Front under the command of General Petrov (Kinder, 1978: 214). On 19th January 1945 the Soviet soldiers entered Upper Silesia near the town of Herby (Anon., 1995a: 2) and in the vicinity of Kreuzburg (Kluczbow) after having crossed the Prosna River (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 58). On 23rd January 1945 the Red Army entered Ehrenforst (Slawieicze), on 24th January Oppeln (Opole) and Gleiwitz (Gliwice), on 25th January Hindenburg (Zabrze), on 28th January Kattowitz (Katowice), and on 31st January Heydebreck (Kedzierzyn) and Ratiborhammer (Kuznia Raciborska). At the close of January practically all the Upper Silesian industrial basin was in the hands of the Soviets. Subsequently, using the bridgeheads on the River Oder in Krappitz (Krapkowice) and near Cosel (Kozle, the town was defeated on 18th March), the Red Army started the attack which resulted in the seizure of Upper Silesia on 26th March 1945 except for Teschen (Cieszyzn, Tesen) Silesia which was overrun by the Soviet soldiers at the turn of April and May 1945 (Czapiański, 1993: 52; Anon., 1995b: 7).

The offensive was preceded in November and December 1944 by a wide-scale indoctrination action which was aimed at the Red Army soldiers. Hatred of the Germans and everything German was induced by marching the troops through the Majdanek concentration camp and by Iliya Ehrenburg’s propaganda articles published in Pravda, Izviestya and the front newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda. In his writing he appealed for indiscriminate massacers and bloody revenge (De Zayas, 1988: 65; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 57). Moreover, it was announced that every soldier and platoon who would cross the River Oder as first would be recommended for distinctions, and the bravest of them would receive the title Hero of the Soviet Union (Tomczyk in: Walenski, 1990: 36). Thus, it is not surprising that after having crossed the Oder, the Soviet soldiers cruelly avenged the years of nazi terror in Byelorussia, The Ukraine and Russia (Grau, 1970). Rape, arson, pillage, murder and massacre tended to take place sporadicaly after the troops had crossed the war borders of the Reich, however the

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988 The information was received from Ferdinand Graf Kinsky whose wife is one of the children of Graf von Ballestrem.

989 On this day also the River Oder was crossed near Steinau (Sinawa) in Lower Silesia north-west of Breslau (Wroclaw) (Hubatsch, 1967: 302).

990 It was one of the main Jewish extermination centers.
The occurrence of all the phenomena increased when the Red Army reached Germany’s prewar border. The wrongdoing were somehow curbed by the wide-spread though incorrect belief that as far westwards as the River Oder, Silesia is populated by Polish or Polish-speaking population, and as such basically Slavonic. The tragedy suffered at the hands of the Red Army by the Upper Silesian populace living west of the Oder, regardless of their linguistic, ethnic or national provenances is daunting and defies description (Anon., 1995b: 7; Czapliński, 1993: 52).

When the Soviet occupation of the industrial part of Upper Silesia stabilized in February 1945, probably the biggest forced population deportation of all in the Reich lands, was carried out by the Red Army in Upper Silesia. Wehrmacht soldiers and men, but also women and children, were transported in unheated freight trains or marched in sub-zero temperatures into the heartland of the Soviet Union (Cholewa, 1993: 1). It is estimated that only from the area of former Polish Upper Silesia (i.e. Silesian Voivodship) 40,000 persons (Lis, 1991: 13) were deported to forced labor/concentration camps in Moscow, Kiev, Sverdlovsk, the Krivy Rog industrial basin, Kola Peninsula, Ivano-Frankovsk (Stanislavow), Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, the Zaporozhe region, Kazakhstan, Borzomi (Georgia), Starosvinovsk, Chelabinsk, Kopyieisk, Nelidov, Zhelapinsk, Stalingorsky, Mikhailov, Tula, Kasirka, Ksimov in the Urals, and at the Usa River (Cholewa, 1993; Honka, 1993; Lis, 1993: 19/20; Kracher, 1995: 3). About 50-75% of the Upper Silesian prisoners perished from hunger and disease in these camps (Honka, 1993), and some of them were freed only in 1949 (Wiskemann, 1956: 94). Besides the Upper Silesians deported to the Soviet Union, the Soviet occupation authorities imprisoned several tens of thousands of other Upper Silesians in the so-called DP (Displaced Persons) camps which, as a matter of fact, were forced labor camps. Among others some of them were placed in the camps in Blachownia (Blachenhammer), Chorzow (Königshütte), Bakow, Gliwice (Gleiwitz), Jaworzno, Kedzierzyn (Heydebreck), Korfantow (Friedland), Labedy (Laband), Lagiewniki, Lambinowice (Lamsdorf), Myslowice Myslowitz), Strzelce Opolksie (Groß Strehlitz), Swietochlowice (Schwentochlowitz) and Zdzieszowice (Deschowitz) (Lis, 1993: 20).

Serious war damage sustained in Upper Silesia was deepened by activities of the regional Soviet military commands which besides establishing the occupation administration were to gather as many war trophies (i.e. property left by the Germans) as possible and transport them to the Soviet Union. Thus, factory equipment was dismantled, and food and agricultural machinery were taken away from the land. It made the postwar famine more acute, and caused ruralization of previously industrial areas or at least halted industrial production for a decade or two after the end of the Second World War (Pacult, 1995: 2; Weczerka, 1977: 215). The most spectacular Soviet action was dismantling of the entire electrification system of the Upper Silesian Railways and sending it to the Soviet Union (Davies, 1981: II 481).

The deportations of productive workers and the dispatch of movable property to the Soviet Union clashed with the interests of the Polish communists, who (after their preliminary acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line at the Yalta Conference) during the talks between the delegation of the Krajowa Rada Narodowa (KRN, National Polish Council) and the Soviet government in Moscow (14th-21st

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991 The assaults against the civilian population were designed not only to unleash a vast refugee movement that would impede the military operations of the Wehrmacht, but rather as an introduction to and the first stage of the subsequent ethnic cleansing (Hubatsch, 1967: 313).

992 The available estimates for the whole of Upper Silesia total 65,000 persons (Engel, 1967: 194; Magocsi, 1993: 48).

993 Beginning with 1947 the Polish authorities repeatedly requested release of the persons considering them to be autochtonous Poles but the Soviet Union disregarded the demands and did not answer them. The issue was taken up by international politics only in 1955 when German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer managed to convince the Soviet government to free the remaining Upper Silesian prisoners together with the Wehrmacht POWs (Wysocki in: Dobrosielski, 1995: 62).
February 1945) obtained the right to establish the Polish administration at the occupied territories of the Reich by the Oder and Neisse Rivers, on the basis of the Soviet-PKWN Agreement of 27th July 1944 (Kowalski, 1983: 37). The Polish communist authorities strove to prevent occurrences of deportations and Soviet-approved and -executed methodical pillage already in February 1945 (Lis, 1993: 25), but only at the end of April 1945 did the deportations stop, although the planned seizure of property continued until the liquidation of Soviet military commands in the period from July to October 1945 (Lis, 1993: 144). The destructive exploitation of the Upper Silesian economy (Pacult, 1995: 2), and frequent instances of rape, robbery, murder and theft committed by Soviet troops, continued in the postwar years. It is clearly shown by the fact that on 14th January 1946 Wladyslaw Gomolka, Minister of the Regained Territories wrote a secret letter in this respect to the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, as well as to Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsky (Misztal, 1990: 107).

The Polish communists consistently used the tactics of faits accomplis and already on 5th February 1945 announced that the Polish State was entitled to administer the Deutsche Ostgebiete by the Oder-Neisse Line (Marzian, 1953: 28/9). Earlier on 28th January 1945 the Polish citizens of German descent from the territory of prewar Poland (i.e. also from Silesian Voivodship/Eastern Upper Silesia) were deprived of their Polish citizenship with a decree issued by the Polish communist authorities, and were simultaneously expropriated and used as forced labor or interned in labor camps (Anon., 1995a: 2; Wiskemann, 1956: 96/7). On 29th January 1945 Silesian Voivoda (communist regional governor) General Aleksander Zawadzki approved seizure of all German farms and agricultural machinery for Poland’s sake (Misztal, 1990: 58). The decree of 3rd March 1945 stated that all Germans living in the regained territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete) would be expropriated from their movable property and real estate (Urban, 1994: 54). On the same day Edward Osobka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the Polish Provisional Government, announced that the regained territories would be populated with Polish settlers from the overpopulated areas around Warsaw (Central/Congress Poland) and Cracow (Galicia/Little Poland). On 5th March 1945 the confiscation of the property of Upper Silesians, who had fled before the advancing Red Army, commenced (Anon., 1995a: 3). On 14th March 1945 Upper Silesian Voivodship (Wojewodztwo Gornoslaskie) was formed and the Dabrowski industrial basin was included inside its boundaries (Anon., 1995a: 3; Lis, 1993: 18), thus recognizing the 1939 nazi annexation of this region. When on 18th March 1945 German Upper Slesia (i.e. Oppeln Regency), already controlled by the Polish administration, was added to the Voivodship it was renamed as Silesian-Dabrowski Voivodship (Wojewodztwo Slasko-Dabrowskie) (Lis, 1993: 18). The inclusion of the ethnically and historically different territory of the Dabrowski industrial basin inside the new Silesian Voivodship was brought about by the consistent policy of the Polish communists who wished to homogenize Upper Slesia as quickly as possible and to integrate it within postwar Poland. It also increased the percentage of Poles in the statistics describing this region which was ethnically, nationally, linguistically and religiously diverse at that time.

994 From the Allied point of view it was not a valid but separatist agreement since specific border changes were to be decided upon only after the end of the Second World War at Potsdam.

995 Until the 1950s the Soviet Union controled sailing at the River Oder, and operated many factories and land estates in Silesia exclusively for its own profit and in order to supply the Soviet troops who left Poland only in 1993 (Pacult, 1995: 2). It may be interesting to note that the Head Quarters of the Soviet forces in Poland were located in the Lower Silesian city of Legnica (Liegnitz).

996 On 8th April 1945 the US government protested to the Soviet government against the arbitrary actions of the Polish authorities in the Deutsche Ostgebiete which Poland was incorporating in all forms. The Soviet government replied, on 17th April 1945, that the setting up of a local Polish administration bore no relation to the question of frontiers. After a prolonged exchange of notes on this issue, during the Potsdam Conference it became clear that the creation of the Polish administration did influence the delimitation of postwar borders (Hubatsch, 1967: 303/4).
The Polish communists were vitally interested in retaining as many local residents (i.e. Upper Silesians) in Upper Silesia, and especially in German Upper Silesia (Oppeln Regency), as possible in order to prove Polishness of the land and to show appropriateness of its incorporation into postwar Poland (Strauchold, 1995: 8). Moreover, the communists did not want to depopulate the region because that could frustrate Polish efforts to populate the Polish part of the Deutsche Ostgebiete with the Polish expellees from the Polish territories seized by the Soviet Union, since their number was considerably lower than the number of the Germans who were to be expelled from the regained territories. Otherwise the international pressure could have been used more decidedly against the Soviet Union’s decision to grant the territories to Poland. Thus, in Cracow on 22nd January 1945 General Zawadzki, the Polish Provisional Government’s Plenipotentiary for Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) saw to the establishment of the Komitet Obywatelski Polakow Slaska Opolskiego (KOPSO, Citizen Committee of the Opole Silesia Poles) which was to work out a program of the national verification postulated by the Polski Zwiazek Zachodni (PZZ, Polish Western Association) which had been reestablished on 3rd November 1944 in Lublin. The members of the KOPSO arrived to Katowice (Kattowitz) at the beginning of February 1945. They decided that in order to protect the Upper Silesians, who considered themselves or were considered to be Polish, from Soviet deportations, it was necessary to ethnically cleanse Upper Silesia and especially Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) from the German element, i.e. from the Upper Silesians who considered themselves or were considered to be German. In the memorandum of 12th February 1945 submitted to General Zawadzki by the KOPSO, its members proposed the division of the whole Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) population into three categories: I Persons with full Polish consciousness; II Persons who know Polish but do not feel any link with the Polish nation; III Persons who do not know Polish but have Polish surnames or are of Polish ancestry; and IV Undisputable Germans. This division exactly emulated the example of the Deutsche Volksliste which had been used by the nazis to ethnically cleanse the Upper Silesian population during the Second World War (Lis, 1993: 25-7; Pacult, 1994: 2).

The national verification was commenced on 22nd March 1945 with the decree of the Silesian Voivoda (signed only by Deputy Voivoda General Zietek) and was legalized by the Polish Ministry of Regained Territories (which had been established on 18th November 1945) quite late on 6th April 1946 (Lis, 1993: 28/9). There was no central supervision over the process of verification at the state level which resulted in appalling irregularities (Pacult, 1994: 2; Strauchold, 1995: 8) especially during the first year of the action.

After the front lines had moved westwards, the Soviet occupation administration was formed in Upper Silesia and was gradually being replaced by its Polish counterpart. This brought about a certain degree of stabilization to this region which attracted many Upper Silesian evacuees and escapees to return to their homeland. At that time they were not and could not be aware that at the international

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997 At the end and after the Second World War c. 8,315,000 fled or were removed from the Deutsche Ostgebiete annexed by Poland, whereas only c. 3,500,000 Poles from Central Poland and Galicia, and c. 1,500,000 Polish expellees from the eastern territories of Poland (i.e. 5,000,000 Polish settlers altogether) were available to repopulate the regained territories in the years 1945-1952 (Engel, 1967: 194/5).

998 The PZZ was a nationalist and government-controlled organization which appealed for transfer of Oppeln Regency and some other eastern territories of Germany to Poland before the Second World War.

999 The ethnic cleansing also caused expulsion of the Silesian-Moravian-Czech population who lived in the south-eastern corner of Oppeln Regency in the counties of Leobschütz (Głubczyce, Hlupcic) and of Ratibor (Raciborz) (Stanek, 1991: 135/6; Wiskemann, 1956: 132). Due to the brevity of the article, the author did not closely look into the subject.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning that during the duration of the national verification its scope was consistently broadened because of a meager number of Upper Silesians openly identifying themselves with Polishdom. At last it was decided that all the Upper Silesians who hopefully may get assimilated or whose children may get assimilated during the planned Polonization action, must be positively verified as Poles (Izdebski, 1946; Strauchold, 1995: 8).
level it was being decided to incorporate the Deutsche Ostgebiete (including German Upper Silesia) into the territory of postwar Poland. On the other hand, the Red Army was closely followed by a massive wave of szabrowniks

1000 from Central Poland and Galicia, and already in April 1945 the first transports with Polish expellees from prewar Poland’s eastern territories seized by the Soviet Union, began to arrive to Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) (Nowak, 1991: 48). Moreover, Polish males coming back from Germany, where they had been exploited as forced labor, tended to settle down in Lower and Upper Silesia and quite often were employed as officers in the forces of the Milicja Obywatelska (MO, Citizen Militia) (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 133)

1001. They frequently took vengeance on the local population for the injustices they had suffered at the hands of the nazi administration. The Upper Silesians were also discriminated against by Polish municipal organs, especially in Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency) where the administration was staffed mainly with officers from the Dabrowski industrial basin, central Poland and Galicia. They treated the Upper Silesians as Germans because of their distinctive Polish dialect interlaced with a plethora of German loan words and expressions, their knowledge of the German language and their links with German culture (Nowak, 1991: 51; Strauchold, 1995: 8).

Intimidation of the local population by the Polish administration and Polish settlers, widespread lawlessness and looting for black market profit (i.e. szaber as practised by szabrowniks), the beginning of political strife between the anti-communist Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL, Polish Peasant Party) and the pro-Soviet and communist Polska Partia Robotnicza (PPR, Polish Workers Party)

1002 (Lis, 1993: 34) and the national verification evoked the general feeling of insecurity and fear especially in Opole Silesia (Oppeln Regency). The state of deep anarchy was worsened by successive decisions of the Polish authorities; most importantly, on 3rd May 1945

1003 Osobka-Morawski, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government commenced the action of Polonization

1004 of the regained territories (erstwhile Deutsche Ostgebiete), which on 6th May 1945 was followed by the unilateral annulment of the Organic Status (i.e. constitution) and subsequently autonomy of prewar Silesian Voivodaship

1005. On the same day the Act on Expulsion of Enemy Elements from Poland was issued

1009 They were individuals who specialized in pillage of the property left by the Germans who had fled before the advancing Red Army. Some of them used the loot for their own needs but the majority were thriving black marketeers who regularly plied between Central Poland and Galicia, and the regained territories. Also Soviet soldiers, Polish and multinational criminal groups, as well as the Red Army and the Polish administration took part in the pillage. The administration specialized in transporting the property especially to Warsaw (Ordylowski, 1995: 18)

1001 In the initial period the MO was one of the destabilizing factors because often its personnel in the regained territories changed completely almost from day to day (Ordylowski, 1995: 17).

1002 The PSL was headed by Mikolajczyk who decided to return from emigration in Great Britain and join the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rzad Jednosci Narodowej) in order to oppose the Polish communist effectively. His party grouped mainly peasants who have proved to be the main anti-communist force in Poland till the collapse of the system in 1989. In the case of Upper Silesia, only Polish settlers and few locals joined the party.

1003 The date of 3rd May is of special importance for the Poles as on 3rd May 1791, just before the final partitioning of Poland among Russia, Austria and Prussia in 1793 and 1795, the Polish parliament adopted the first Polish constitution, which was promulgated as second in the world after the American constitution. In the interwar period 3rd May was celebrated as the Polish National Holiday, as well as after the end of the Second World War till 1948/9 when it was superseded by the Worker’s Holiday of 1st May. After the fall of communism in 1989 both the holidays are celebrated in Poland.

1004 In official documents it is referred to as the action of re-Polonization on the tenet that the Upper Silesian population used to be Polish, and only later on was Germanized. However, it is largely an ideological fallacy to talk about any national feelings and conscious policies of national assimilation before the 19th century in Silesia.

1005 Silesian Voivodaship was formed from the eastern part of Upper Silesia (Ostoberschlesien) which had been granted to Poland on 20th October 1921 on the ground of the Plebiscite of 20th March 1921. In interwar Poland
the voivodship enjoyed formal political, economic, territorial and cultural autonomy which was quite incompatible with centralism of the Polish state striving to emulate the French model of governance.
Due to the continuous influx of Polish expellees from the former eastern territories of Poland and of Polish settlers from central Poland and Galicia coinciding with frequent instances of Upper Silesians returning to their homeland, conflicts considering ownership of farms, houses and flats did arise. Often new co-owners were settled on Silesian farms, and in houses and flats which led to mutual acrimony and negative verification of many Upper Silesians also with Polish national linkings. In this manner they were deprived of their own property; and eventually many of them were expelled or interned in DP, i.e. labor camps (Nowak, 1991: 48).

May and June 1945 marked the period of the so-called unorganized expulsions conducted by the Polish authorities on the basis of the unofficial Soviet permission (De Zayas, 1988: 104/5). The shift of the Silesian population to the south was terminated in the middle of May 1945 with the effective enforcement of its borders by the Czechoslovak state which had been reestablished in April 1945. The first officers of the Polish administration arrived at Zgorzelec (Görlitz), i.e. on the new German-Polish border on 23rd May 1945 when the Soviet Union officially renounced its right to control the Deutsche Ostgebiete (with the exception of the northern part of East Prussia) in favor of Poland. Already on 1st June 1945 the Görlitz bridge over the Oder was closed in order to limit unorganized expulsions (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 121), and to prevent Silesians from leaving Silesia for Germany or to return to Silesia from Germany. In the middle of June 1945, Wroclaw (Breslau), Legnica (Liegnitz) and the whole of Upper Silesia were tightly closed, barring the returning Silesian evacuees and evacuees from entering the areas and causing discontent of the Soviet authorities not able to feed the population in the Soviet zone of occupation (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 125).

In deeply believing Upper Silesia, the Catholic Church also became an element of the political game which was to intimidate the faithful. During the first weeks after the capitulation of the Third Reich Katowice (Kattowitz) Bishop Adamski started to vest the deans of the Upper Silesian part of Breslav (Wroclaw) Diocese (i.e. of Oppeln Regency) with plenipotentiary powers (Kaps, 1980: 69). This displeased Cardinal Adolf Johannes Bertram who anxiously observed activities of the foreign church official in his diocese. On 15th May 1945 Bishop Adamski arrived at Wroclaw (Breslau) and appealed to the local (i.e. German) clergy to leave the diocese (Wiskemann, 1956: 97). Mortally ill and very old, Cardinal Bertram could not oppose the incursions on the part of Polish Church officials, and died soon afterward. On 8th July 1945 Polish Cardinal Augustyn Hlond managed to obtain special powers to protect Polish Catholicism from Pius XII. It appears that Cardinal Hlond interpreted the prerogatives too broadly as he extended his jurisdiction over the Deutsche Ostgebiete (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 205). On 12th August 1945 Cardinal Hlond coaxed the successor of Cardinal Bertram, Upper Silesian Ferdinand Piontek, to resign from the office. Having divided Breslav (Wroclaw) Diocese into three parts, Cardinal Hlond nominated Boleslaw Kominek (also an Upper

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1006 Many Upper Silesian escapees and evacuees after having crossed the Oder-Neisse line received official orders from German municipal authorities to return to Upper Silesia (De Zayas, 1988: 107).

1007 It was a thought-out policy which allowed the settlers learn about the functioning of their new environment from the Upper Silesian owners, and coaxed the former, as would-be owners, to see to it that the latter would not destroy or take away their movable property.

1008 He died on 6th July 1945 in Schloß Johannesberg in Bohemia.

1009 It is indirectly visible in the stance of the Holy See which consistently refused to set up new diocesan boundaries and to change the character of the temporary Polish administration of the Church offices in the Deutsche Ostgebiete (Hubatsch, 1967: 318) till 1972 well after the West German-Polish Treaty had been signed (1970).

1010 After he was expelled from Wroclaw (Breslau) in July 1946, Piontek resided in the Görlitz part of Lower Silesia (i.e. Upper Lusatia) which remained with Germany after 1945 (Breyer, 1967: 404). Due to the hostile attitude of the Soviet occupation administration he had to leave for West Germany. In 1959 he was raised from the rank of vicar to that of Titular Bishop and served the Silesian diaspora in West Germany till the year of his death in 1963 (Weczerka, 1977: 606).
Silesian) as Apostolic Administrator for former German Upper Silesia. At the same time, without permission from the Pope or any Czechoslovak Church official, Cardinal Hlond unilaterally extended father Kominek’s jurisdiction over the southern part of the region which previously had been part of Olomouc (Olmutz, Olomuniec) Diocese with its bishop’s seat in Czechoslovakia (Lesiuk, 1992: 79; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 203). The decisions of the Polish Church officials emulated those of the Provisional Government in the secular domain. The prohibition of bilingual education at the Wroclaw (Breslau) Seminary and of using German during liturgy and the sacrament of confession, was followed by the official demand that Upper Silesian priests should sign humiliating declarations of loyalty to the Polish state (Kozak, 1995: 4), which made many of them leave for Germany or caused imprisonment of these ones who refused to comply with the requirement (Raina, 1994; Ratajczak, 1995). The dramatic situation in the Upper Silesian Church increased the feeling of alienation and insecurity among the Upper Silesian faithful deprived of their spiritual leaders. Upper Silesian priests were often replaced with priests from the interior of Poland, usually of little or no understanding and appreciation for the Upper Silesian distinctiveness (Anon., 1995c; Mis, 1995: 4; Strauchold, 1995). However, it must be noted that Father Kominek strove to oppose these trends, and even managed to establish the German church service for German POWs (Baldy, 1994: 147).

The pinnacle of the postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia was marked by the Potsdam Conference (17th July-2nd August 1945), where though not de jure anyway de facto the Deutsche Ostgebiete was transferred to Poland, and on the basis of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement (i.e. Article XII of the Protocol) the Polish government was allowed to expel the German population of the territories in an orderly and humane manner (De Zayas, 1988: 87/8; Hubatsch, 1967: 304/5; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 110). The time-consuming process of the national verification delayed expulsions from Upper Silesia, which took place later than those from Lower Silesia populated by undisputable Germans whom the Polish communists understandably did not want to nationaly verify (Calka, 1993: 3). Some Upper Silians succeeded in returning to their Heimat despite the fortified border control and the danger of becoming Soviet POWs during the trip. If their houses and farms had been already taken over by new Polish owners they were often sent to DP camps which earlier had been transferred to the Polish administration by its Soviet counterpart. It is estimated that there were 23 such camps in Upper Silesia. The most notorious were in Lambinowice (Lamsdorf), Swietochlowice (Schwientochlowitz), Blachownia (Blachenhammer) and Jaworzno (Anon., 1993: 8; Calka, 1993: 3). In reality they were

1011 The apostolic administrators of the unrecognized Polish dioceses in the Deutsche Ostgebiete were unilaterally replaced with vicars general in the rank of titular bishops by the Primate of Poland Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski in 1951 (Hubatsch, 1967: 318).

1012 Under the pressure from the United Kingdom and the United States, the government was reconstructed to include some political figures from the Polish government in London, and on 28th June 1945 it was transformed into the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jednosci Narodowej). The United States and Great Britain recognized it on 5th July 1945, thus granting the pro-Soviet Polish communists with the long-sought air of legitimacy, and opening the way for the communist take-over of Poland in 1947 (Harper, 1990: 41).

1013 The earliest mass expulsions were conducted in May/June 1945 when the German population was removed from the 50-100kms wide strip of land east of the Oder-Neisse line. The vacated land was quickly repopulated with Polish soldiers demobilized for this specific purpose. This fait accompli was badly needed by the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference to strengthen the clout of its arguments for legitimizing the granting of Poland with the Deutsche Ostgebiete. This case of mass population transfer must have also indirectly contributed to enboldening the Polish authorities in their ethnic cleansing of Upper Silesia.

1014 John Sack, a Jewish American historian and journalist described behavior of Jewish personnel in the Upper Silesian camps for Germans in Gliwice (Gleiwitz), Lambinowice (Lamsdorf) and Swietochlowice (Schwientochlowitz) where they avenged the Holocaust by tormenting and murdering the inmates. The rule of collective responsibility was most cruelly used by Solomon Morel, commandant of the camp in Swietochlowice-Zgoda. At present he resides in Israel (Sack, 1993).
labor camps (Nowak, 1991), or taking into consideration the casualties the author of the article is ready to risk labeling them as concentration camps since in the years 1945-1947 c. 40,000 persons perished in them including women and children (Anon., 1993: 2; De Zayas, 1988: 106; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 133). The authorities started to send to the camps negatively (i.e. as Germans) verified or inconvenient Upper Silesians (Nowak, 1991: 79) who remained there awaiting revision of their negative verifications, or primary verification. The Polish authorities did not fully comply with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and continued to expel certain numbers of Upper Silesians to the Soviet occupation zone until 23rd December 1945 when the Soviet Union closed the border on the Oder-Neisse line (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 129). On 15th January 1946 the Krajowa Rada Narodowa (KRN, Polish National Council) issued the decree regulating the settler campaign in the western territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete) (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 139). The subsequent legal mass expulsions lasted intermittently from February 1946 to the end of 1947 (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 144; Wiskemann, 1956: 118). The persons who were to be expelled were customarily robbed and intimidated by expulsion officers, militiamen (i.e. MO officers), soldiers and railwaymen. They were not furnished with appropriate food rations guaranteed by the Potsdam agreements and were transported in freight trains largely unprepared for human beings which resulted in numerous deaths en route (Calka, 1993; Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 147). The expulsions were re-started for a short time during the summer of 1948 (Calka, 1993: 5), and during the following years the process was continued under the label of individual departures for Germany, and of the Family Link Action in the years 1950 and 1951 (Siebel-Achenbach, 1994: 146; Wiskemann, 1956: 120). In the meantime, on 6th April 1946, Wladyslaw Gomolka, Minister of the Regained Territories, issued the decree on the procedure of affirming Polish nationality of persons residing in the Deutsche Ostgebiete (Stauchold, 1995: 9) which was reflected in the 28th April 1946 Act on Polish Citizenship for the Autochtonous Population (i.e. original inhabitants of the territories who could be potentially Polonized) (Dobrosielski, 1995: 61). The act approved the broad approach to the national verification and in many cases was used to stop the expulsions of Upper Silesians, and, subsequently, to make it almost impossible for Upper Silesians to leave for Germany.

After the completion of the national verification in Upper Silesia in 1950, 806,800 Upper Silesians remained and 591,300 Polish expellees and settlers moved into the region (Lis, 1993: 31) whereas in Germany there were c. 800,000 Upper Silesian expellees (Reichling, 1986: 61). The postwar ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia continued in a low-scale manner until the fall of communism in 1989 when it gradually became possible for Upper Silesians to identify themselves without any impositions on the part of the Polish state. The new conditions facilitate a modest revival of Silesian culture which beginning with 1945 suffered irreparable losses in the form of:

- annihilation of the intellectual elite who were expelled or exterminated earlier than any other groups of the Upper Silesians (Calka, 1993: 4);
- destruction of material and cultural heritage which was created by many generations of the Upper Silesians;
- overwhelming limitation of the Upper Silesians knowledge of the German language, the Silesian dialect and history of the region;

In the recently found incomplete inmate register of the camp in Lambinowice (Lamsdorf) there are data considering 2,050 prisoners (i.e. only part of the total number which is still unknown). It includes names of 1,430 males and 620 females, of which there were 370 children of both sexes, younger than 14. 785 persons, i.e. 38.23% of the incomplete figure of 2,050 inmates, died during their imprisonment. Moreover, this percentage should be increased with c. 44-46 victims of the 4th October 1945 fire, whose deaths are not adequately noted in the register. Accepting 785+46=831, as the appropriate figure of casualties the camp’s death rate amounts to 40.54% (Nowak, 1995: 73/4).

In order to bolster populating of the Deutsche Ostgebiete, after 1951 no ethnic prerequisites were required for acquiring Polish citizenship, which, thus, was forced onto the Upper Silesians of German provenences, who remained in their homeland after the completion of the Family Link Action in 1951 (Hubatsch, 1967: 319).
preventing the Upper Silesians living in Germany and those who remained in their homeland from establishing effective cultural relations;

censorship which prevented publication of the writings of old and contemporary Silesian authors, and their Polish translations (Knapik, 1993: 6/7).

Moreover, it is worthwhile to provide a synoptic overview of the ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia in order to better understand its underlying logic and mechanics since it could facilitate comprehension of other exemplars of ethnic cleansing and maybe would contribute to prevention of such atrocities from happening in future.

On the basis of the paper four chronological periods can be distinguished in relation to the case of the Upper Silesian ethnic cleansing:


In the pre- and post-Munich Czechoslovakia, and after the outbreak of the Second World War, European intellectuals and politicians were involved in a continuous discussion searching for a final solution to the German question in Central and Eastern Europe.

After the annulment of the Munich Agreement by the British Parliament, the decision of the Allies not to apply the Atlantic Charter to Germany, and the lukewarm acceptance of the Soviet annexations stipulated by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the tenets of the annexation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete, as well as of mass-population transfers of Germans living in the territories, were being cautiously embraced by the Allies.

II. 1943-1945. Working out of the exact implementation of the two afore-mentioned principles which were to constitute the very basis of the Allies postwar politics towards Germany.

The Soviet Union wrenched the unwilling espousal of the predicted postwar shift of Poland to the west from the Polish Government in Exile in London by ruling the liberated parts of the country with its docile proxy - the Polish communist government. At the Yalta Conference the United States and Great Britain were also coaxed to accede to the Soviet demand to subject more of the German territory to would-be annexations than it had been tentatively agreed at Teheran. Shortly prior to the conference the Soviet Union had launched its successful winter offensive in January 1945 and it was obviously only a matter of few months before the Red Army would seize the concerned territories.

Already in 1944 the Soviet Union had concluded the secret agreement with the Polish communists de facto giving them right and support to govern postwar Poland in return for their wholehearted agreement to the shifting of Poland westwards.

Since the end of 1944 the approaching frontline threw Upper Silesia and the other Deutsche Ostgebiete into a panicky commotion causing the beginning of the flight to safer areas of the Reich, which in the case of Upper Silesia was quite small and rather limited in scope to the rich and powerful.

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1017 The majority of formal Silesian literature was committed to paper in German (cf. Arno Lubos’s three-volume Geschichte der Schlesische Literatur), though there are some worthwhile instances of Silesian literature in Upper Silesian dialects of Polish (esp. recorded folk tales and songs), as well as in Czech (cf. poet Petr Bezruc, his real name was Vladimir Vasek (Urbanece, 1965: 4)), and in the Lachian (Laski) dialect (a transitory dialect placed between Polish and Czech) which produced quite a significant poet in the person of Ondra Lysohorsky (real name, Ervin Goj (Anon., 1986: 902)). His poetry has been widely translated into German, French, English (even by renowned W.H. Auden) and into as many as sixty other languages in the case of individual poems, but unfortunately since 1958 none of his writings has been published in original (Short, 1986: 249).

Soviet soldiers, induced by the deftly applied propaganda of hatred against the Germans, raped, looted and indiscriminately slew the civilian population in Upper Silesia executing the objectives of Soviet politics which were to make more Upper Silesian escape westwards, and to thoroughly intimidate the remaining population into resigned docility.

The two specific aims were also meticulously carried out during the Soviet occupation when numerous Upper Silesians were rounded up into labor camps, forced to become free labor, or deported to the Soviet Union. The situation was worsened by the behavior of the Red Army, rampant destruction and the general atmosphere of lawlessness.

After the preliminary discussions in 1944 the Polish communists decided to conduct the ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia with the four instruments of:

1. National Verification to appropriately classify the Upper Silesians as Polish or Germans;
2. Mass-population Transfers (i.e. expulsions) to remove the Upper Silesians classified as Germans from Upper Silesia;
3. Polonization (i.e. forced assimilation) to assimilate the Upper Silesians classified as Polish; and
4. Settling Policy (in Marxist terminology - social engineering) seeking to hasten Polonization of Upper Silesia by infusing it with Polish settlers and expellees.

All the four instruments of the Upper Silesian ethnic cleansing were consistently employed following the bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the Polish communists, however, before their use was internationally sanctioned at the Potsdam Conference in August 1945.

The Poles gradually took over the administration of Upper Silesia from the Soviet hands since March 1945. Roughly speaking the process was completed in the 1950s. In the meantime, only on the basis of a decree which was issued by a regional governor, the national verification was commenced in March 1945 and was not authorized by Warsaw until 1946. It was preceded and followed by restrictive legislation stripping the Upper Silesians of German provenances from their property, and civil and human rights. This harsh process of the imposition of Polishness on Upper Silesia resulted in increased suffering and anarchy which were exacerbated by the settling action which started in April 1945. The rapid influx of the Polish population combined with food shortages and scarcity of accomodation triggered off unorganized mass-population transfers which began in May/June 1945. Polonization was tacitly introduced with opening of first Polish schools already in March/April 1945, and with abolishing of the autonomus status of the prewar Silesian Voivodaship in May 1945.

The intensity of unorganized mass-population transfers decreased after the Potsdam Conference but they continued until December 1945. So even in the environment of relatively growing stability at the turn of 1945 and 1946 the Upper Silesians were effectively intimidated by the humiliating mechanics of the national verification and Polonization. Their acute feeling of insecurity was aggravated with the internationally-approved resumption of mass-population transfers and the ongoing Polish exploitation of the Upper Silesian economy and population who were treated as an actually free workforce pool.

The ethnic cleansing was officially over in 1948 with the end of mass-population transfers, and coupled with the de facto Polish annexation of the Deutsche Ostgebiete resulted in a firmer grip of the Soviet Union over Poland as the sole guarantor of Polish independent existence in the face of the comprehensible postwar German enmity which did not subside until the ratification of The German-Polish Treaty on the Polish-German Border in 1990, and of the subsequent Polish-German Treaty on Cooperation and Good Neighborliness in 1991.

The ethnic cleansing in Upper Silesia was concluded with individual departures for Germany at the end of the 1940s and with the Family Link Action organized by the Red Cross in 1950-1951. Afterwards, the ethnic cleansing continued in the form of:

- disadvantaged access of the Upper Silesians to education, management, politics and government;
- gradual destruction of Upper Silesian culture and concomitant degradation of the region’s natural environment through indiscriminate economic exploitation; and
- more or less numerous (depending on political and socio-economic situation) individual departures for Germany caused by the afore-mentioned factors.

At the Polish national level, on the one hand, the ethnic cleansing conducted in Upper Silesia and in the rest of the Deutsche Ostgebiete helped the Polish communists unite the divided Polish nation around the issue of the regained territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete) - the very precondition of Polish territorial existence, and, thus, sanctioned their de facto governance of Poland. On the other hand, it indirectly contributed to the German Wirtschaftswunder and continually infused Germany’s growing economy of the 1950s-1970s with badly needed workforce as well as with electorate for anti-communist associations of the expellees.

At the international arena, the ethnic cleansing was one of the tools which allowed the Soviet Union to effectively subjugate Poland and to expand the Soviet sphere of influence westwards. In the economic field it secured the whole of the Upper Silesian industrial basin (obviously, together with its Czechoslovak part) for the Soviet Union, which was of crucial significance for the postwar development of the military-industrial complex in the Soviet bloc, especially in conjunction with the close at hand and rich iron ore deposits in the Ukraine.

Moreover, the consequences of the ethnic cleansing were a factor contributing to East-West animosity during the Cold War years.

The Upper Silesian ethnic cleansing survived in its covert form, resembling emigration, until the fall of communism in 1989 and the growing Polish-German rapprochement when the Cold War logic of the operation lost its validity.

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1018 Because Poland and West Germany did not maintain any official political relations till 1970.
1019 The Landsmannschaften balanced the rising leftist if not openly communist trend in the West German society and politics in the 1970s and 1980s, because many of their members had had first-hand experiences of the communist reality before leaving for Germany. Moreover, the expellees, unlike other Westerners, continued to conduct research on the areas which they had had to leave, and, thus, provided substantial intelligence basis for West Germany’s Ostpolitik.
1020 The Soviet Union did not obliterate state borders of its East and Central European satellites in order to maintain the illusion of their independence, and to keep the countries from scheming together against their overlord, in accordance with the imperial principle to rule and govern. However, through the COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation) it could effectively exploit the whole Upper Silesian industrial basin not unlike the Third Reich during the Second World War.
1021 The Third Reich also exploited the Upper Silesian industry using the Ukraine as the supply base of raw materials.
1022 The continued stream of Upper Silesians leaving for Germany cannot be labeled as emigration because the freedom to leave one’s own country was prohibited to the citizens of socialist states. Some of them having evaded the ubiquitous socialist control system managed to escape to West Germany albeit the majority of them were allowed to leave thanks to more or less official Polish-German agreements.
**Reference list**


(A History of Ethnicity in the Upper Silesian Region)

A book project proposal & prospective contributors

I. Introduction
1. Foreward [KC] - 5 pp
2. Introduction. Theory of nationalism, European nationalism (1789, 1848); making Central Europe nationalist (Germany, Italy, the Habsburg Empire, Silesia in the context of European nationalisms) [KC, PK] - 15 pp.

II. A history of nationalisms in Silesia (A political - perspective)
2. Development of nationalisms in Austrian Silesia [PK] - 20 pp
4. Assimilating Silesia
   a. Silesia between Poland and Germany 1922-1950 [BL, JL] - 20/30 pp
   b. Teschen (Tesin/Cieszyn) Silesia and Troppau (Opava) Silesia among Czecho(slovakia), Germany and Poland, 1920-195? [DK, PK, AG] - 20 pp
5. Silesia in the nation-states
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III. Chosen (Problematic) issues
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5. Language [TK] - 20 pp
6. Migrations [PT] - 20 pp
7. Culture: national vs regional [?] - 20 pp
8. Virtual Silesia: on the institutions emulating the pre-1945 Silesian reality in Germany [PT, TK] - 20/30 pp

IV. The present and the future
1. The attitudes of the Czech Rep, Germany and Poland toward Silesia [KC] - 20 pp
2. The region and European integration [TK, KC] - 30 pp
   a. minorities and minority rights
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   c. crossborder/transborder cooperation
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3. The old and new inhabitants of Silesia [PT, TK, ?] - 20 pp
4. Postmodernist Silesianity [TK] - 20 pp

V. Appendixes
1. Index
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3. Chronology
4. Essay on the most significant Silesians
5. Maps
6. Photos
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KC - 70 pp > Karl Cordell
AG - ?? pp > Andreas Götze
PK - 95 pp > Petr Kacir
JL - 100 pp > Jörg Lér
BL - 60 pp > Bernard Linek
DK - 40 pp > Daria
TK - 120 pp > Tomasz Kamusella
PT - 60 pp > Philipp Ther

THE VERY SIGNIFICANT POINTS WHICH NEED BEING DEALT WITH:
1. WORKING OUT CLEAR-CUT CHAPTERS
2. ALLOCATION OF THE CHAPTERS TO CONTRIBUTORS
3. ARE WE GOING TO USE THE HARVARD OR EUROPEAN REFERENCING SYSTEMS, IN THE CASE OF THE LATTER ARE WE GOING TO USE THE FOOTNOTES OR ENDNOTES FOR REFERENCES (ARE WE GOING TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN REFERENCES AND NOTES), THE GENERAL STYLE FORMAT TO BE FOLLOWED BY CONTRIBUTORS;
4. COSTS OF TRANSLATION, AND STYLISTIC ADJUSTMENT OF THESE TRANSLATIONS
A History of Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Region

General remarks

Due to its borderland location, Silesia, for centuries, has been a multiethnic region of Central Europe, and its culture has been influenced by various ethnic and national groups. Despite the homogenizing attempts undertaken by the states to which Silesia has belonged, prenationalist cultural and identity variety still prevails in this region (especially in Upper Silesia and in the eastern part of Czech Silesia). For many inhabitants of Silesia, identifying only with one nation/language (as it is demanded by the ideology of nationalism in this area of Europe) is most unusual, because it would deny their own selves which are constructed around variegated complimentary identities. It is displayed in that that numerous Upper Silesians can simultaneously identify themselves as Germans, Poles and Upper Silesians (or Czechs, Germans, Silesians, Moravians), and also as Catholics (less often as Protestants) and inhabitants of their own localities, depending on the changing socio-cultural context.

In the age of European integration, nation-states give up many of their prerogatives to the EU and regions, in this manner accepting the fact that devolution and subsidiarity are the only way to reaffirming peace, prosperity and protection of human rights in Europe. So it seems that in the postnational age complementary identity (i.e. possibility to feel, in the same time, that one is a Pole, German, Upper Silesian and European) will become the norm as it used to be before the rise of the nation-states.

Silesianist historiography developed only during the period of nation-states therefore the region’s past was described and analyzed from the nationalist perspective, which, nowadays, seems to be rather a collection of mental constructs which were created for supporting the goals of the Polish, German and Czech nationalisms. Because of such an approach (which less or more consciously was employed in service of the paramount goal of building the nation-state), scholars of the states involved in the strife over Silesia, strove to prove eternal and exclusive right of ownership of this region to one of the nation-states. Their writings were turned in hands of politicians into a useful instrument of convincing the international public opinion and great powers of the need of this or that division of Silesia (as it happened after World War I).

On the other hand, nationalist historians also were obliged to write Silesian history into the official histories of their own nation-states. In result, the states historiographies produced different interpretations of Silesia’s past, which an outside observer found highly contradictory.

This nationalist conflict played out in the field of historiography was duly reflected in thecontending states mass media, social organizations and parties, as well as in their educational systems in order to influence the individual in such a way that he would be supportive of the goals of his nation-state’s nationalism. The nation-states participating in the conflict over Silesia were not interested in this region and its inhabitants but in bolstering their respective nations and their territorial footholds. Moreover, scholars dealing with Silesia wrote their works in their own national languages which hampered the exchange of ideas with scholars from the other nation-states because they hardly ever knew all the languages used in Silesia. Moreover, if they decided to comment on works on Silesia written in other national languages than their own, they often limited such a discussion to pejorative phrases only. After World War II, the lack of contact among the scholars was deepened by the iron curtain which dramatically limited possibilities of establishing personal ties across it.
This situation did not facilitate production of synthetical works on Silesia’s past, and the few which came into being, had to espouse the respective national point of view and omit these facts which did not agree with the tenets of a given nationalist ideology. What is more, Polish and Czechoslovak historians had to implement the marxian method in their researches. On the other hands, independent historians who did not want to work in the framework of the nationalist paradigm, had to devote their efforts to narrow specialist issues lest face the danger of persecution. Many of their works are extremely well referenced and insightful but they are not accessible to the public as they have not been utilised in synthetical studies of a broader scope.

In Germany the middle-aged and young generations hardly know anything about Silesia. A similar situation developed in Poland, where the regional distinctiveness of Silesia was diluted by the subsequent administrative divisions of the state (which did not take into consideration historical divisions). The same method was employed in Czechoslovakia. Although in the past Silesia was a politically, economically and strategically significant region of the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, Bohemia, The Czech Crown, Poland, Prussia and Germany, nowadays, it is almost unknown at the international level. There is on single English-language or French history of Silesia available. The few specialist works on Silesia which were published in these languages (especially after World War I in order to prove which nation-state has more right to it) just reflect the nationalist tendency through siding with one of the national historiographies involved in the ideological struggle over the region or bury the reader in a mass of incomprehensible details.

The political change effected by the emergence of Central Europe from the Soviet sphere of influence and the concurrent fall of totalitarian regimes (which were interested in maintaining the nation-states), makes it possible to have a new look at Silesia’s past thanks to the current, though gradual, detaching scholarship from the nationalist paradigms which used to prevail in this area of Europe prior to 1989.

The aims

Writing a new, non-nationalist synthesis of Silesian history seems to be possible only if such a task is undertaken by young scholars of interdisciplinary background, from the Czech republic, Germany and Poland, as well as from other countries. Participation of scholars from outside the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland, i.e. ones who do not have any emotional attachment to Silesia, is top priority, because scrutinizing Silesia from outside they would moderate intellectual tensions which could arise among other research team members. Also the young age of researchers is significant because it would facilitate cooperation in research groups and would also guarantee new interpretations of various aspects of Silesia’s past.

Moreover, because the nationalist struggle over Silesia did not utilize only facts and their interpretations but also language, it seems to be not advisable to publish the new synthetical work on Silesia’s past in any of the national languages involved in the conflict. Striving for objectivity it should be remembered that one can free oneself from certain prejudices and stereotypes encoded in the very semantic structure of one’s national language, and be able to scrutinize the subjectmatter of the research from outside only through the use of a language which has not been involved in the ideological conflict over Silesia. English fulfills all the criteria. Besides, it is also a lingua franca of world science, commerce and politics which would make it possible to produce a book which would make Silesian problems known to scholars in Europe and the world. What is more, majority of young scholars in Poland, the Czech Republic and Germany (unlike their older colleagues) have a command of this language and, thus, can attempt leaving the confines of their national languages for the sake of objectivity.

Therefore, an interdisciplinary synthesis of Silesia’s history and today written in English by a team of young international researchers, and contextualized against the background of Central Europe, and (when needed) of the whole continent and the world, would constitute:
a. an interdisciplinary study on the crux of history, ethnicity, languages and nationalisms in the multicultural and multiethnic region of Central Europe;

b. having been published in English it would be accessible for the international reader;

c. hence it would also function as indispensable comparative material for the developing theoretical researches in the spheres of nationalism, ethnicity, and human and minority rights;

d. in future, in an integrated Europe, it could become a significant source of expertise on Silesia, for politicians and various interested groups.

The main goals of the research

In order to be able to produce an objective study it is necessary:

a. to use literature written in German, Polish, Czech, English etc.;

b. to work out one’s own, non-nationalist interpretations;

c. consult one’s research results with other team members in order to avoid the danger of unconscious nationalist interpretations;

d. to include in the footnotes to one’s contributions other members separate opinions on which no consensus could be reached;

e. to get to know the latest world literature on nationalism/ethnicity, as the best aid in conscious and correct reading of nationalist interpretations present in numerous sources and books on Silesia; and a guarantee that the current project researchers would not fall into the pit of subjective interpretations;

Recommended theoretical literature on nationalism/ethnicity:

Anderson, Benedict. The Imagined Community. London: Verso (on cultural/anthropological construction of nation and the process of its having become in the feelings and minds of people as well as in social reality);

Cavallis-Sforza, L.L. & Feldman, M.W. Cultural Transmission and evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton: PUP (on connections between human evolution, and the coming into being and spread of cultural and linguistic differences; very useful in a critical approach to racism and biologically-motivated nationalism);

Eriksen, Thomas Hyland. Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London: Pluto (it provides a clear-cut analytical apparatus for describing and defining various phenomena connected to nationalism and ethnicity);

Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell (on constructing nations and coming into being of nationalisms as a function of industrialization and the concurrent phenomena);

Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: CUP (on such instruments as language, history, symbols, statistics, censuses etc., which have been utilized by governments and national movements in order to build nations and nation-states)

Hobsbawm, Eric & Ranger, Terence, ed. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Canto (on nationalism methods to create histories which would facilitate proving primordial existence of nations and nation-states);

Hroch, Miroslav. The Social Preconditions of Nationalism. Cambridge: CUP (exhaustive, quantitative and qualitative socio-historical study on the development of the nationalisms which led to the rise of the small Central European nation-states after 1918);

Hroch, Miroslav. The Social Interpretation of Linguistic DEMANDS in European National Movements (on convolutions between language and nationalism in Central Europe. The EUI Working
Hutchinson, John & Smith, Anthony D., eds. Oxford Readers: Ethnicity. Oxford: OUP (collection of basic texts on ethnicity);

Hutchinson, John & Smith, Anthony D., eds. Oxford Readers: Nationalism. Oxford: OUP (collection of basic texts on nationalism);


f. It is useful to get to know the further works:

Cesarani, David & Fulbrook, Mary, eds. Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe. London: Routledge (an analysis of the changing relationships between nationality and citizenship in the integrating Europe)

Eriksen, Thomas Hyland. Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology. London: Pluto Press (a simple introduction to anthropology which can be easily utilized for the needs of research into nationalism and ethnicity);

Periwal, Sukmar, ed. Notions of Nationalism. Budapest: CEU Press (distributed by Oxford Univ. Press) (latest insights into nationalism);

Quine, Maria Sophia. Population Politics in 20th Century Europe. London: Routledge (on the influence of nationalist policies on procreation of nations and ethnic groups);

Schlesinger, Arthur M., jr. The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society. New York: Norton (a reflection on the crux of ethnicity and citizenship in the American society);

Woolf, Stuart, ed. Nationalism in Europe: 1815 to the Present. London: Routledge (collection of texts on nationalism from the period 1861-1975);

g. It is useful to get to know the basic studies on Central and East-Central Europe as the historical and geographical context against which matters Silesian must be interpreted:


Halecki, Oskar. The Limits and Divisions of European History. London: Sheed & Ward;


Sugar, P.F. & Treadgold, D.W., eds. 1974-. A history of East Central Europe. Seattle: University of Washington Press (multivolumin work which approaches completion, and includes a historical atlas of East-Central Europe by Magocsi);

Wandycz, Piotr S. The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present. London: Routledge;
Remarks on the format of the book which should be the final result of the research, together with technical notes

The book being a collective work constituted from separate chapters (essays) written by different contributors, must assume certain editorial framework which should be accepted by all the project collaborators.

a. taking into consideration the fact that the book will include c. 20 chapters plus the additional materials, authors should limit their contributions to c. 40 double-spaced typed pages (i.e. 20-25 book pages), so as the main body of the planned book’s text would not exceed 400-450 book pages, and together with the additional materials 600-700 book pages;

b. references and notes should be consecutively numbered in every chapter’s text, and their texts should be organized as a separate file which it would be possible to edit separately;

c. for the sake of consistency and due to the necessity of using Polish, German and Czech fonts it is advisable for all the contributors to use the Word for Windows wordprocessor;

d. bearing in mind that the book will be published in English, it is advisable to write contributions in this language;

e. in the cases when submitted texts are written in national languages, editors must assure their translation into the target language;

f. the book’s whole text must be adjusted several times by a professional English-speaking editor and proofreader;

g. US spelling should be accepted for the book;

h. in order to achieve a higher degree of objectivity well-known place- and geographical names should be used in English renderings (if such exist), e.g. Cracow not Krakow, Prague not Praha, Munich not M nchen, the Vistula not Wisla, the Sudetic Mts not Sudeten or Sudety, the Oder-Neisse line not Odra-Nysa or Oder-Neiáe. Considering other place names, they should be given in such forms which were officially accepted in a given historical period plus their contemporary forms in parentheses, e.g. Kandrzin (Kedzierzyn) up to 1934, then Heydebreck (Kedzierzyn) and after 1945 till today Kedzierzyn (Kandrzin). When one speaks about kędzierzyn after 1945 it is useful to give the German counterpart (which was used for the longest period) in parentheses, i.e. Kedzierzyn (Kandrzin). The issue of placenames gets complicated in the Middle Ages and in early modernity (up to 1740 in Silesia) when many forms of a given placenames were in use. For the sake of simplicity and objectivity, it is proposed to use accepted Czech counterparts before Silesia went under the Polanian rule (e.g. Vratislavia (Wroclaw)), then Polish ones before Silesia went under the Luxembourgs control (e.g. Wroclaw (Breslau)), then German ones but still Czech ones in the case of Opava (Troppau) and Cieszyn/Tesin (Teschen) Silesia up to 1620 (the Battle of the White Mountain). In more complicated cases authors should develop their own approach which would appropriately reflected ethnic complexity of Silesia;

i. in the index of place, geographical and ethnic names page references should be used with every form of a given name. The entry for the contemporary form of a given name should be accompanied (in parentheses) by all its other forms employed in the work and the index;

j. in order to find out appropriate forms of placenames one is advised to use the following references:

Battek, Marek J. & Szczepankiewicz, Joanna. Słownik nazewnictwa krajoznawczego Śląska i Ziemi lubuskiej. Wrocław: Silesia (polish-german, German-Polish dict. of placenames and geographical names in Silesia and East Brandenburg as included in today Poland’s borders);
Choros, Monika; Jarczak, Lucja & Sochacka, Stanisława. Słownik nazw miejscowych Gornego Śląska. Opole: Instytut Śląski (pol-gm, gm-pol dictionary of Upper Silesian placenames including the Polish part of Cieszyn (Teschen) Śląska);

Choros, Monika & Jarczak, Lucja. Słownik nazw miejscowych Dolnego Śląska. Opole: Instytut Śląski (bilingual dictionary of Lower Silesian placenames without the Lusatian part of Lower Śląsia which remains with Germany; but includes Sorbian versions of Lusatian Ślesia’s placenames which occur within Poland’s boundaries);

Kaemmerer, M. Ortsnamenverzeichnis der Ortschaften jenseits von Oder und Neisse. Leer: Rauntenberg;

Pfohl, Ernst. Ortslexikon Sudetenland. Nürnberg: Helmut Preuáler Verlag (includes the whole territory of prewar Czechoslovakia, and considering Ślesia: Opava (Troppau) Ślesia, Hulcinsko (Hultschiner Ländchen), Cadca and the Czechoslovak part of Tesin (Teschen) Ślesia; it also gives Polish, German, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and Ruthenian versions of various placenames);

Considering names and surnames, it is advised to use this form which was preferred by the person concerned and/or which can be affirmed through the person’s deed of birth or the like. In cases which cannot be easily determined the surest form should be used and others should be added in parentheses. Considering names of rulers they should not be translated into English as it is often done: so Friedrich Wilhelm IV is correct but Frederick William IV not.

Preliminary list of chapters

(N.B.

Underlined fragments denote the titles of the sections of the book;

Brackets indicate alternative wordings in the places where the authors of the project have not arrived at a consensus yet;

The parts in bold are names of chapters, and other fragments suggest what should be included in the chapters)

O. Acknowledgements.

0. Introduction.

I. Theoretical Section:

1. The Notion of Ślesia.

1.1. The Notion of Ślesia.

1.2. National/Ethnic Groups and language (i.e. office, official, state and church languages, and dialects, creoles and pidgins) in Ślesia from the Beginnings of Recorded History Up to this Day;

1.2.2. Ethnicity and national identity in Ślesia;

1.2.2. The influence of politics on place, geographical and personal names in Ślesia.

1.3. Identity and Its Transformations in Ślesia;

1.3.1. The family, village, town and the Respública Christiana;

1.3.2. Religion and group identity;

1.3.3. Economic transformation and group identity;

1.3.4. Ethnicity and regional identity;

1.3.5. Ethnicity and national identity.

1.4. A Critique of the Silesianist Terminologies Developed by the National Historiographies of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Germany (they rather preoccupied themselves with The Invention of
Tradition (cf. Hobsbawm, 1993) - constructing the past of Silesia in accordance with the axioms of the respective nationalisms; rather than with description and analysis of the region’s history).

2. Prenationalist Silesia [Silesia Before the Ideology of Nationalism]:

   2.1. The Tenuous Relations Between Ethnic Groups and Archeological Cultures on the Territory of Silesia;

   2.1.1. Emphasis on the often nationally abused issue of settlement of Teutonic ethnic groups vis-a-vis the name of Silesia (cf. Sil(l)ingi).

   2.2. From Ślezsko to Śląsk (7th c. - 1138);

   2.2.1. The territory of would-be Silesia in the Realm of Samo and in the Great Moravian State;

   2.2.2. The territory of Silesia under Bohemian rule and the emergence of Silesia as a region;

   2.2.3. The Polanian annexation of Silesia and its further evolution as a region;

   2.2.4. Silesia in the Polanian state up to the time of feudal fragmentation commence in 1138.

   2.3. The Period of the Independent Silesian Principalities (1138-1327/1368);

   2.3.1. The gradual disappearance of the Silesian principalities ties with the Polish state and other Polish principalities;

   2.3.2. The transformation of the region of Silesia into a collection of independent Silesian principalities;

   2.3.3. The arrival of West European settlers (Walloon, Flemings, Thuringians, Saxons etc. - it is anachronistic to speak about Germans in relation to that period) to Silesia;

   2.3.4. The process of the take-over of the Silesian principalities effected by the Luxembourgs.

   2.4. Silesia - one of the lands of the Czech Crown (1327/1368-1526);

   2.5. Silesia in the Habsburg Empire (1526-1740/1742).

   2.6. Prussian Silesia (1740/1742-1806);

   2.6.1. The beginnings of industrialization.

   2.7. Austrian Silesia (1740/1742-1848).

3. Nationalism in Central Europe and the Ideology’s Influence on History of Silesia (main part of the planned work):

   3.1. The Ideology of Nationalism in Prussian Silesia (1806-1918);

   3.1.1. Nationalist ideas are gradually introduced to administration, education and church, thus the ethnic and linguistic situation in Prussian Silesia are gradually altered;

   3.1.2. The altered situation coupled with intensified industrialization contribute to the emergence of local Polish nationalism (the process was also initiated under the influence of the Polish national movement from Wielkopolska and, to a lesser degree, from Galicia and the Teschen part of Austrian Silesia);

   3.1.3. The intensifying conflict between Polish and German nationalisms (1871-1918) causes the emergence of the Moravian and Silesian ethnic movements as well as universalist (ultramontane) Catholic movements;

   3.1.4. Notes on the situation of the Jewish and Roma/Sinti populations in Prussian Silesia, and of the Sorbs in the Lusatian territories attached to Prussian Silesia in 1815 and 1821.
3.2. The Ideology of Nationalism in Austrian Silesia (1848-1918);

3.2.1. Nationalist ideas are gradually introduced to administration, education and church, thus the ethnic and linguistic situation in Austrian Silesia are gradually altered;

3.1.2. The altered situation coupled with intensified industrialization contribute to the emergence of local German, Polish and Czech nationalisms, respectively under influence of the Kleindeutsche nationalism after 1871, and unfolding of nationalisms at Prague and Cracow;

3.1.3. The intensifying conflicts between Polish and Czech, and Czech and German nationalisms (1880-1918) causes the emergence of the Moravian and Silesian ethnic movements as well as universalist (ultramontane) Catholic movements;


3.3. Silesia and the Process of Building Nations and Nation-States (1914/1918-1922);

3.3.1. Some fragments of the Lower Silesian territory are transferred to Poland, and the Upper Silesian area of the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlucinsko) to Czechoslovakia. Armed conflicts (uprisings/rebellions), the plebiscite, the division of Upper Silesia under the supervision of the League of Nations;

3.3.2. Austrian Silesia: the unmaking of the short-lived Sudetenland; Troppau (Opava) Silesia is given to Czechoslovakia; the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict over the division of Teschen (Cieszyn/Tesin) Silesia;  

3.3.3. The concepts of the Freiestaat Oberschlesien and the Ostmarkische-schlesische Industriegebiet (M. Ostrau-Teschen-Bielitz); Eine selbständige, neutrale Republik;  

3.3.3.4. Migrations triggered off by the new political divisions. The divisions were sanctioned by the acceptance of the nationalist ideology as the basis for shaping geopolitical relations in Europe.

3.4. Silesia in Nation-States (1922-1938/1939) (longish chapter which possibly should be split between three authors who would concentrate on Silesia in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, respectively);

3.4.1. In Germany (Lower Silesia and the diminished Oppeln (Opole) Regency);

3.4.1.1. Nationalist policies toward the bilingual (Slavic/German-), Polish-, German- and Czech-speaking Upper Silesian population, as well as toward the organized Polish minority;  

3.4.1.2. Nationalist policies toward the Jewish and Roma/Sinti population in Lower and Upper Silesia, and toward the Sorbian population in the Lusatian part of Silesia;  

3.4.1.3. Policies toward the German minorities in the Silesian Voivodship and in Czech Silesia;  

3.4.2. In Poland (the Silesian Voivodship);

3.4.2.1. Nationalist policies toward Polish-, German-, Czech-speaking and bilingual Upper Silesian population, as well as toward the organized Czech and German minorities, and Silesian and Moravian ethnic movements;  

3.4.2.2. Nationalist policies toward the Jewish and Roma/Sinti population, as well as to the Vlachs (Vlasi) and Grals (Goralen);  

3.4.2.3. Policies toward the Polish minorities in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and in Czech Silesia;  

3.4.3. In Czechoslovakia (Czech Silesia, dismantled as a separate administrative entity in 1927);  

3.4.3.1. Causes and aftereffects of the dismantling of Czech Silesia;
3.4.3.2. Nationalist policies toward Polish-, German- and Czech-speaking and bilingual Upper Silesian population, as well as to the organized Polish and German minorities, and to the Silesian and Moravian ethnic movements;

3.4.3.3. Nationalist policies toward the Jewish and Roma/Sinti population as well as to the Vlachs (Vlasi) and Gorals (Goralen)

3.4.3.4. Policies toward the Czech (Moravian) minorities in the Oppeln (Opole) Regency and in the Silesian Voivodship;

3.4.4. The Munich Agreement and its repercussions in Czech Silesia;

3.4.4.1. The incorporation of Opava (Troppau) Silesia into the Province of Sudetenland, and of Hlucinsko (Hlutschiner L„ndchen) into the Oppeln (Opole) Regency;

3.4.4.2. The incorporation of the central strip of Tesin (Cieszyn) Silesia (known in Poland as Zaolzie), and of Cadca to the Silesian Voivodship.

3.5. German Politics in Silesia During World War II;

3.5.1. United Silesia: the annexation of the Silesian Voivodship (Cadca is returned to Slovakia) and the adjacent Polish territories which is reincorporated into the Oppeln (Opole) Regency;

3.5.2. Nationalist policies in Lower Silesia;

3.5.2.1. The situation of the Sorbs;

3.5.3. Nationalist policies in Upper Silesia;

3.5.3.1. On the territory of the adjacent territories;

3.5.3.2. On the territory of the former Silesian Voivodship;

3.5.3.3. On the territory of the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency;

3.5.3.4. On the territory of Teschen (Cieszyn/Tesin) Silesia (including the issue of Goralenvolk);

3.5.3.5. On the territory of the Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlucinsko)

3.5.4. Nationalist policies in this part of Sudetenland which had been known as Opava (TRopppau) Silesia;

3.5.5. Ethnic German settlers arriving from the territories handed over to the USSR.

3.6. Expulsio: Vertreibung, Wypędzenie, Odsun (1944/1945-1948/1950);

3.6.1. The Flight/evacuation, the Red Army, returns of evacuees/fleers, transition of power from the USSR to Poland and Czechoslovakia;

3.6.2. Prewar German Silesia (except the Lusatian part) granted to Poland;

3.6.2.1. Hauls of Upper Silesian miners and general population to the USSR;

3.6.2.2. The process of expulsion of the German/German-speaking population from Silesia which had been granted to Poland;

3.6.2.3. The process of expulsion of the Czech/Czech-speaking population from southern Upper Silesia and the Glatz Grafschaft (Kladsko/Klodzko), and the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict over the counties of Leobsch tz (Głubczyce/Hlupcic), Ratibor (Raciborz/Ratibor) and Glatz (Kladsko/Klodzko);

3.6.2.4. Repopulating Silesia granted to Poland with Polish expellees, as well as with Polish/Jewish settlers from central Poland and from abroad;

3.6.3. Czech Silesia regains its pre-Munich status quo;
3.6.3.1. Hauls of Silesian miners and general population to the USSR
3.6.3.2. The process of expulsion of the German/German-speaking population;
3.6.3.3. The process of expulsion of the Polish/Polish-speaking population from Tesin (Cieszyn/Teschen) Silesia, and the Polish-Czechoslovak conflict over the counties of Leobschutz (Glubczyce/Hlupcic), Ratibor (Raciborz/Ratibor) and Glatz (Kladsko/Klodzko);
3.6.3.4. Repopulating Czech Silesia with Czech citizens (i.e. Czechs, Slovaks, Romas)
3.6.3.5. Ondra Lysohorsky and his efforts (a little favored by Stalin himself) to establish a Lachian state;
3.6.5. Silesia and Silesians in Germany;
3.6.5.1. The situation in the Lusatian part of Lower Silesia which remained with Germany;
3.6.5.2. The Silesian expellees as contextualized against the background of all the expellees who arrived to Germany after the war.
3.7. The Nationalist Politics of the People’s Polish Republic in Silesia;
3.7.1. The Liquidation of Silesia as a separate administrative division;
3.7.2. The accepted German minority in Lower Silesia (1950-1960/1975-1989);
3.7.3. The Upper Silesian population;
3.7.4. The Moravian/Czech/Czech-speaking population in southern Upper Silesia;
3.8. The Nationalist Politics of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in Czech Silesia;
3.8.1. The accepted German minority;
3.8.2. The accepted Polish minority;
3.8.3. The officially unnoticed Silesian ethnic minority;
3.8.3.4. The inflow of multiethnic population to Opava (Troppau) Silesia and to the Ostrava-Karviná (Ostrau-Karwin) industrial basin.
3.9. Silesians Outside Silesia (1945-1989);
3.9.1. The situation in the Lusatian part of Silesia and in the GDR;
3.9.2. The situation in the FRG;
3.9.3. The Situation in Austria;
3.9.4. Silesian emigrants/expellees in other European states and outside Europe.
3.10.1. Poland;
3.10.1.1. The different situation in Upper and Lower Silesia;
3.10.2. The Czech Republic;
3.10.2.1. Germans, Poles, Silesians and Moravians after the 1991 census;
3.10.2.2. The gradual return to the concept of the lands of the Czech Crown: Is Czech Silesia going to be an administrative entity again?;
3.10.3. The diaspora;
3.10.3.1. The Silesians of the former GDR can again express their identity (Heimatvereinen, rediscovery of Silesianity in the Lusatian part of Lower Silesia);

3.10.3.2. An increase in personal, cultural and economic contacts especially between Upper Silesians from former West Germany and from Upper Silesia;

3.10.3.3. Austria’s interest in Czech and Polish Silesia.

4. Conclusions: European Integration - an Introduction to the Postnationalist Epoch? What meaning can it have for:

4.1. The inhabitants of Silesia?
4.2. Silesia as a region?
4.3. National/ethnic minorities?
4.4. National majorities?
4.5. Upper Silesians?
4.6. Is a come-back of the concept of the nation-state possible? How could it influence Silesia and its inhabitants?


6. Chronological Presentation of Silesian History Contextualized Against the Background of the Significant events in the Neighbor Lands, Europe and the world.

7. Cartographic Materials (amounting to a small historical/ethnic/demographic atlas of Silesia);

7.1. Silesia in cartography, and the influence of cartographic representations for the changing popular and political thinking on Silesia as a region (cf. sections on maps and nationalism in: Anderson, 1993);

7.2. Reproductions of several significant historical maps of Silesia beginning with the very first maps made by Sebastian Münster and Martin Helwig;

7.3. A small historical-cum-geographical atlas of Silesia.

8. Various Tables and Statistics (which cannot be conveniently incorporated in the body of the text);

9. Illustrations (which cannot be conveniently incorporated in the main body of the text);

9.1. There should be a section on coat-of-arms, symbols, allegories connected to Silesia;

9.2. There should also be a section presenting development of nationalisms in form of nationalist posters, cartoons, monuments etc.

10. Lists;

10.1. Rulers of Silesia as a whole;

10.2. Rulers of Silesian principalities;

10.3. Bishops and administrators from the Silesian territory (Breslau/Wrocław diocese, Olomouc diocese, Prague diocese, Cracow diocese, Opole diocese, Gliwice diocese, Opava-Ostrava diocese;

10.4. Oberpräsidenten of the Province of Silesia (Upper/Lower Silesia) together with Regierungspresidenten;

10.5. Administrators of Austrian/Czech Silesia and of the Moravian-Silesian Gubernium;

10.6. Voivodes of the Polish voivodships created on the territory of Silesia;
10.7. Genealogical tables of Silesian princes.

11. Brief Bibliographical Dictionary of the Most Renowned Silesians or Figures Connected with the Region (40-50 short entries only)
   11.1. List of Silesian Noble award winners;
   11.2. list of Schlesische Kulturpreis winners and the like.


13. List of Abbreviations and Acronyms Used in the Work.

14. List of Authors with Short Bio- and Bibliographical Notes.

15. Endnotes.

16. Indexes;
   16.1. General;
   16.2. Of persons (apart from giving page references, every name should be accompanied by birth/death dates and info on their functions (ie. king, writer, doctor etc.));
   16.3. Of geographical and ethnic names as well as of placenames.

17. Concordance of Latin/Greek, Polish, German, Czech, Sorbian versions of Silesian placenames.

18. Abstracts (in French, Czech, Polish and German)

**Preliminary list of research team members**

(NB: after affirming the list, potential contributors should send to the editors/head their respective Čs with info on education, employment, research activities, publications, lectures etc., because without such documents it is impossible to get a grant for a team project or get a subsidy for publishing a team work at a renowned publishing house);

Cordell, Karl; Great Britain;
Kacir, Petr; Czech Rep.;
Kamusella, Tomasz; Poland;
Linek, Bernard; Poland;
Ler, Jörg; Germany;
Ther, Philipp; Germany.

**The market at which the book (which should result from the research project) ought to be directed at.**

First of all - the book should aim at international readership.

It is predicted that it could be used for comparative research and as assigned reading for students of Political Science, Political Geography, European Studies, Area Studies, Postcommunist Studies, German Studies, Slavonic Studies, Sociology and History. It would certainly become one of indispensable texts for courses in Politics of Ethnicity, Race Relations, and Politics of Nationalism.

Moreover, utilizing a novel approach and techniques to the description of ethnicity and nationalism in the context of central Europe, it is predicted that this work would constitute a model for similar studies on other regions as well as a significant example for comparative research in ethnicity, nationalism and regionalism. Because the book will be written in a manner allowing the non-specialist (i.e. non-Silesianist) reader to grasp the subject matter easily, many scholars and general readers interested in national and ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe would eagerly get acquainted with this work. On the other hand, because it would be a first synthetical study on Silesia carried out by an international team of researchers, surely it would be purchased by majority of university and
scholarly libraries in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria, and also in the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Thus it is justified to surmise that the international academic book market would relatively quickly absorb the hardcover edition of this book, and it is possible that later a steady demand would require reissuing this book in a quality paperback edition. And last but not least - the book could become a standard synthetical work on Silesia, and as such, it would undoubtedly be translated into German, Polish and Czech.

A critical overview of similar publications

a. (Geschichte Schlesiens herausgaben von der Historischen Kommission für Schlesien).

The origins of the work date back to the 1920s and 30s. The first volume (Von der Urzeit bis zum Jahre 1526) has been published in four altered editions so far, but at present it is out of print. More than ten years ago the second volume (Die Habsburgerzeit 1526-1740) was published but it is also out of print. The planned third volume (Die preuβische Zeit 1740-1945) has not been published so far. The thoroughly researched work seems to be outdated in this respect that it does not take into account a vast number of recent findings on various matters Silesian, and still there is no consensus among its contributors how to deal with the issues of ethnicity and nationalism, which is indicated by the delay in publishing the final volume of this synthesis. Moreover, the study is not prepared to cover the significant period of 1945-to this day. Another usual weakness of all histories of Silesia, and also of this one, is the nationally pure team of contributors. Besides, due to its vast size and its detailedness, the work is more of a reference than a synthesis with which the reader could easily get acquainted during some weeks or a month at most.


It was written from the Polish point of view avoiding description of the development of Polish and German national movements as well as Silesian and Moravian ethnic movements. The 19th and 20th-century Lower Silesia is poorly presented unless some events have to do with the Polish national movement. Moreover, beginning with the 18th century Austrian Silesia is not dealt with as a whole. The work concentrates solely on Teschen Silesia avoiding the subject of Troppau Silesia. Moreover, on the Polish national considerations the framework of the obligatory marxian-leninian theoretical framework is imposed; and the work do not even attempt to cover Silesian history after 1918. Another usual weakness of all histories of Silesia, and also of this one, is the nationally pure team of contributors. Besides, due to its vast size and its detailedness, the work is more of a reference than a synthesis with which the reader could easily get acquainted during some weeks or a month at most. This history of Silesia is out of print and because it was published during 25 years in a small number of copies, it is even difficult to obtain it from specialist libraries and second-hand bookshops.


A popular one volume outline of Silesian history but written very tendentiously from the Polish point of view which is clearly visible in the chapter titles (e.g. On the guard of independence and unity of the Piast state, The beginning of foreign rule, A not complete victory etc.). A similar trend in regard to the obligatory use of the marxian-leninian theoretical framework is indicated by other chapter titles (When feudalism waned, A new social force on the arena of history). The 19th and 20th-century Lower Silesia is poorly presented unless some events have to do with the Polish national movement. Moreover, beginning with the 18th century Austrian Silesia is not dealt with as a whole. The work concentrates solely on Teschen Silesia avoiding the subject of Troppau Silesia. Besides, the author decided not to tackle the crucial period after 1945.

Largely written from the Czech point of view, but includes sections on Polish and German national movements as well as on Silesian and Moravian ethnic movements. Due to the brevity of this work, beginning with the 19th century, the contributors tend to concentrate on mainly on the territory of Austrian/Czech Silesia. Moreover, many recent issues are just mentioned, and only one page and a half is devoted to 1938-1970. Other drawbacks are absence of references, and indexes which limit usefulness of this work for further research. Another usual weakness of all histories of Silesia, and also of this one, is the nationally pure team of contributors.


The comprehensive (800-page) work is written in an interesting and easily comprehensible manner. It attained a large degree of objectivity by having renounced the use of nationalist paradigm of thought. However, this effect is achieved through the tactics of avoidance, i.e. the contributors decided not to deal with: Silesian history prior to this region’s incorporation in the Polanian state, as well as with Austrian/Czech Silesia, and the Silesian Voivodship. The same method is visible in the fact that no maps are provided with the exception of the reproduction of the first map of Silesia ever published. So as not to have to deal with the issue of nationalism and nationalist conflicts, the contributors avoided describing development of Czech and Polish national movements as well as Silesian and Moravian ethnic movements. Due to this act of avoidance, it could be said that the work propounds the German point of view because it was published in the 10-volume series entitled Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas. Another usual weakness of all histories of Silesia, and also of this one, is the nationally pure team of contributors. To sum up, it is a sound synthesis of Silesian history up to 1945 with the period 1945-1993 just touched upon in a short afterword.

f. Irgang, Winfried; Bein, Werner & Neubach, Helmut. 1995. Schlesien

The almost 300-page-long synthesis attained a large degree of objectivity by having renounced the use of nationalist paradigm of thought. However, this effect is achieved through the tactics of avoidance, i.e. the contributors decided not to deal with: development of Czech and Polish national movements as well as Silesian and Moravian ethnic movements. Due to this act of avoidance, it could be said that the work propounds the German point of view because it was published in the series entitled: Historische Landeskunde: Deutsche Geschichte im Osten. Moreover, only three pages are devoted to the postwar period. Another usual weakness of all histories of Silesia, and also of this one, is the nationally pure team of contributors. Besides, it also lacks references which diminishes the study’s scholarly value.

IN CONCLUSION: The planned work should avoid the drawbacks of the aforementioned books because:

it will be written by an international team of researchers;

it will be written on the basis of literature published in German, Polish, Czech, English etc.;

it will be published in English, and as such it will be available to the international readership;

it will present the first full outline of Silesian history including contemporary times, and without omitting Austrian/Czech Silesia and the Lusatian part of Lower Silesia which remains within the German borders;

It will focus mainly on the issues of ethnicity and nationalism in the 19th and 20th cc. because it is the most ideologized area in presentations and interpretations offered by national historiographies of the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland;

the contributors will try to attain a high degree of objectivity describing the controversial period of the 19th and 20th cc. with the use of the best analytical instruments worked out in the course of the latest interdisciplinary research on nationalism and ethnicity;
besides objectivity of the whole book should be increased by the novel (i.e. non-nationalist) approach to personal, geographical and placenames.

**Duration and schedule of research**

a. research and the process of writing separate chapters as well as the compilation of the additional materials should take 2-2.5 years;

b. editing, spelling correction, translation, adjustment of translations and the compilation of indexes should take 1-1.5 years;

c. in sum it is 3-4 years before the book would be ready for the press;

d. it would be advisable for all the contributors to meet at least at two conferences during which they could exchange their opinions and comments on the whole work as well as on the chapters written by their colleagues. The conferences should improve objectivity of the whole work and should be organized at the commencement of the project and at the completion of the process of writing all the chapters.

**Scope of costs**

a. technical: correspondence, postage, diskettes, photocopying, print-outs, travel costs;

b. research costs: purchase of indispensable publications for contributors, research trips for contributors, pocket money for contributors;

c. organizational-cum-research costs: two conferences;

d. editorial: scanning of maps and illustrations, editing, spelling correction, translations, adjustment of translations, compilation of indexes.

**Financing**

a. a grant can be obtained for collective research from the Research Support Scheme, Prague, Czech Rep. (copyright remains with the authors);

b. similar grants can possibly be obtained from Great Britain, Germany, and the European Union;

c. one can apply for financial support to the Batory Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebnert-Stiftung, the Polish-German (Jumbo) Foundation, and some Czech, Czech-German foundations;

d. one can also appeal for some financial support from well-to-do companies active on the territory of Silesia in Poland, the Czech Rep. and Germany;

e. one can also appeal for financial support from organizations/institutions interested in Polish-German and Czech-German reconciliation in the broader framework of European integration (one should be careful not to give them any leverage on the contributors);

f. one should get in touch with renowned publishers which could finance/cofinance publication of the work. There are publishing support programs at the Central European University, CEU Press, Institut für die Wissenschaft vom Menschen, Vienna; the Batory Foundation etc. Publishers which specialize in bringing out novel and interdisciplinary works in English: Routledge, Pluto, Blackwell, Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, majority of US University presses, and some English-language scientific publishers in the Benelux states and Germany.
The Upper Silesian’s Stereotypical Perception of the Poles and the Germans

Biographical details

The author earned his MA degrees in English Philology, South African Literature and European Studies at the University of Silesia, Katowice, Poland; the Potschefstroom University, Potschefstroom, South Africa; and the Central European University, Prague, Czech Republic. Thanks to the grant from the Research Support Scheme, Prague, Czech Republic, in the years 1995-97 he conducted an extensive research on the dynamics of the policies of ethnic cleansing in Silesia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He works at the Opole University, Opole, Poland in the Unit for the Study of Central and Eastern Europe. His articles on the ethnic/national dimension of Silesia, Poland’s Germans and European integration have been published in Polish periodicals and in the international monthly Transition. In 1998 his contribution The Origins and Anatomy of the Ethnic Cleansing in Upper Silesia 1944-51 is due to be published in K. Cordell, ed., Ethnicity and Democracy in the New Europe (London: Routledge). At present he is working toward his PhD degree in Political Science and is busy writing his dissertation The Emergence of the National and Ethnic Groups in Silesia 1848-1918.

Summary

On the basis of a brief introduction acquainting the reader with the ethnic and political history of Silesia, and, especially, of Upper Silesia, the origins and characteristic of the Upper Silesian ethnic group are presented vis-a-vis their neighbors: the Poles, the Germans, the Czechs and the Moravians. Subsequently, the Upper Silesians stereotypical perception of the Germans and the Poles is analyzed in the contexts of the dramatically changing social, political and ethnic situation of Upper Silesia after 1945. In the conclusion it is observed that with the opening of the borders after 1989 and the ongoing Polish-German reconciliation in the framework of the process of European integration, the Upper Silesians perception of the Poles and the Germans tends to become the more objectified the more the Upper Silesians and their multiple identity are accepted in present-day Poland.

The Upper Silesians, a specific ethnic/regional group of the German-Czech-Polish borderland, are relatively unknown to scholars because in the age of nation-building, heralded by the unification of Germany in 1871 and the establishment of Czechoslovakia and modern Poland in 1918, they were effectively submerged by the contending nationalisms of the three aspirant nation-states which strove to turn their Upper Silesians into real Germans, Czechs or Poles. Therefore to shed some light on their origin I have to sketch a brief political and ethnic history of Silesia.

When Silesia emerged as a region in the tenth/eleventh century, having been incorporated into the Polanian state (forerunner of the Polish kingdom), its population was overwhelmingly West Slavic from the ethnic and linguistic point of view. In 1138 the Polish kingdom was split into separate principalities and Silesia became one of them. It shortly bifurcated into Lower and Upper Silesia, the former located north of the Sudetic Mountains and along the middle River Oder (Odra), and the latter around the Upper Oder (Odra). Beginning with the twelfth century settlers from the Holy Roman Empire were invited to Silesia. They predominantly spoke various Germanic dialects and established their towns and villages mainly in Lower Silesia Upper Silesia having poorer land and being less hospitable due to its extensive forests and marshes. In the meantime the two virtually sovereign Silesian principalities proliferated through constant subdividing, but at the end of thirteenth century the Breslau (Wroclaw) princes of the Polish royal house of Piast, united many of them under their rule and set out to reestablish the Polish kingdom. The Polish kingdom did reemerge in the first half of the fourteenth century, however, at the same time the profusion of the Silesian principalities came under the hegemony of the Bohemian kingdom and, thus, they became constituent parts of the Holy Roman Empire. In 1348, the emperor and Bohemian king Charles IV turned all the Bohemian possessions (including the now crownland of Silesia) into the lands of the Czech Crown. In the last quarter of the
fifteenth century the majority of the lands of the Czech Crown (including Silesia) were ruled by the Hungarian king, and all of them became the Habsburg patrimony beginning with 1526.

During the Bohemian dominance Czech was elevated to the position of an office language of Upper Silesia and increasingly encroached on the domain previously reserved for Latin, while German served the same function in Lower Silesia. The Hussite Wars (1420-33) and the religious wars of the sixteenth century rounded up with the Thirty Years War (1618-48) ravaged and intermittently depopulated Silesia so that Upper Silesia became predominantly West Slavic again as well as some areas of Lower Silesia. What is more, the West Slavic areas of Silesia became staunchly Catholic whereas the other Protestant, which is the basis of the popular nationalist stereotype that the Protestant Silesian is a German and the Catholic one a Pole/Czech. The Czech influence in Upper Silesia ebbed after the Czech nobility was obliterated in the aftermath of the defeat in the battle of the White Mountain (1620).

Silesia - a Catholic-Protestant crownland did not easily fit in the Catholic empire of the Habsburgs, and was one of the pretexts which allowed the Prussian king Frederick the Great to annex seven-eighths of it in the First Silesian War (1740-42). The remaining one-eighth (the southernmost slice of Upper Silesia) stayed with Vienna as the crownland of Austrian Silesia. Frederick’s part became known as Prussian Silesia. Due to the eighteenth-century reforms German superseded Latin as the language of offices in both the Silesias although elementary schooling be it bilingual or in Polish, Czech and West Slavic dialects, remained available in certain areas. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars Prussian Silesians had become loyal subjects of Berlin which is clearly exemplified by the fact that the War of Liberation (1813-15) was launched at Prussian Silesia’s capital of Breslau (Wrocław). When nationalism entered Central Europe with the revolutionary events of 1848, elementary education in standard Polish was demanded and offered in Prussian Upper Silesia (also few schools with Moravian Czech opened in the south of this region), and in standard/Moravian Czech and standard/Silesian Polish in Austrian Silesia.

In unified Germany these provisions were abolished in 1873 unlike in Austrian Silesia where Polish nationalists from Galicia and Czech ones from Bohemia were rather free to operate. However, until 1918 Czech and Polish were not accepted in Austrian Silesia as official languages along German unlike in Bohemia (1877) and Moravia (1905), and Galicia (1869), respectively.

At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Polish and Czech nationalisms started to infiltrate Upper and Austrian Silesia. Czech and Polish nationalist groups in Austrian Silesia (directed from Prague and Brno (Brno), and Cracow, respectively) were well entrenched before 1900, whereas the Polish nationalist circle in Upper Silesia (supported from Posen (Poznan)) only in the 1900s. It is rarely mentioned, but Silesians who did not appreciate the rise of feuding nationalisms which threatened unity of their Heimats (homelands), found support in the Catholic Church and established the Moravian and Silesian ethnic movements in Austrian Silesia and their counterparts in Upper Silesia.

After the Great War the national principle propounded by President Wilson became the basis for the reorganization of the political map of Europe. When Poland and Czechoslovakia demanded larger or smaller sections of Prussian and Austrian Silesia putting forward a complex of ethnolinguistic, historic and strategic arguments, Berlin and Vienna sided with the movements hoping to turn Upper Silesia and eastern Austrian Silesia into internationalized territories and, thus, to prevent the second largest German industrial basin, and the largest Austro-Hungarian one from being annexed by Warsaw and Prague. This policy was abandoned when eastern Austrian Silesia was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1920, and Upper Silesia, following the three pro-Polish uprisings, between Germany and Poland in 1922.

\[1023\] Earlier, in 1919, on the basis of the Versailles treaty, Poland had received minute fragments of north-eastern Lower Silesia along the border, and the southern section of Upper Silesia populated by Moravians (Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlucinsko)) was transferred to Czechoslovakia.
Subsequently all the three nation-states strove to nationally homogenize their fragments of Upper Silesia: Germany its truncated Oppeln (Opole) Regency (which, since 1919, constituted the newly-established Upper Silesian Province), Poland the Silesian Voivodeship (made up from the Polish sections of Upper Silesia and eastern Austrian Silesia), and Czechoslovakia Czech Silesia (this is, the rest of Austrian Silesia together with Upper Silesia’s Hultschiner Ländchen (Hlucinsko)). In 1939-45, when all of Upper Silesia and eastern Austrian Silesia were reunited and considerably enlarged as the wartime Upper Silesian Province, the ennationalizing line was pursued even more strenuously by the Third Reich. In 1945 the German defeat resulted in the reestablishment of the prerwar border in the case of Czech Silesia, and Moscow (in addition to the prerwar Silesian Voivodeship) granted Poland with almost whole German Silesia up to the Oder-Neisse line. The subsequent years also brought the final solution to the Upper Silesian question when indubitable Germans were expelled and ethnic Upper Silesians of somewhat unGerman identity (the so-called Autochthons) retained or harassed into staying as Polonizeable or Czechizeable. This approach in a less or more veiled manner was used toward the remaining Upper Silesians until the fall of communism in 1989 and the signature of the Polish-German border treaty (1990) officially recognizing the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish border. The treaty closed for the Upper Silesians able to prove their German origin/citizenship the easy way into Germany as Aussiedlers (resettlers).

Ironically, despite all these ennationalizing endeavors, the average German sees Upper Silesian Aussiedlers (not unlike Aussiedlers from other regions of Central Europe) as unGerman Germans because they do not speak standard German or does not speak German at all. The same is true of the average Pole who perceives Upper Silesians as untrue Poles for they speak German, a very distinctive West Slavic dialect or even a West Slavic-Germanic creole. These rife opinions only emphasize the fact that the Upper Silesians are best described as a variegated ethnic/regional group.

These introductory remarks allow the reader to see the Upper Silesians more clearly against the background dominated by the presumably monolithically homogeneous nations tightly fitting in their nation-states whose governments have striven to cover up and extinguish any ethnic/regional difference almost to this day. Now, in agreement with the title of this article it is necessary to change the perspective and to see how the Germans and the Poles look like seen through the spectacles of the Upper Silesian beliefs and prejudices.

It is difficult to analyze the Upper Silesian perception of the Germans and the Poles without succumbing to the stereotypes which, in 1945-89, were instilled by the biased presentation of the Polish-German relations in the mass media of the PRL (Polish People’s Republic). The German always appeared as: the essence of arrogance, evil and revisionism, the tyrant, imperialist, wrong-doer, perpetrator of wars, and was eagerly depicted as: the SSman, hitlerman, gestapoman, wehrmachtman or nazi. On the other hand, the Pole was always the good and just one, or in other words, the wronged one, martyr of the national cause, who was portrayed as the victim of concentration camps and the onslaught of the Third Reich. In public contexts, the Upper Silesians also had to use the ideologized Cold War icons because as Autochthons they belonged or were to belong to the Polish nation only as much as much they could document, this is, demonstrate their Polishness. Hence they had to be more Polish than Poles not to be classified as crypto-Germans or an element hostile to the Polish nation which would close for them the gate to a bearable if not wholly normal life in the communist state.

1024 In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia their political systems, as instituted after 1956, are more aptly described by the label national-socialist.

Also numerous Polish as well as German scholars striving to describe the ethnic reality of Upper Silesia objectively, labelled the Upper Silesians as mixed populace, of mixed, uncrystallized national identity or nationally indifferent, labile. These ascertainments (being the result of the researcher’s less or more conscious acceptance the ideology of nationalism as part of her scholarly Weltanschauung) implicitly assumed that univocal and clear declaration of one’s nationality was the essential condition for security of the nation-state and for happiness of the individual in the modern world. Simultaneously, they also did not allow any non-national identification as obsolete, undeveloped or historically backward.

Having mentioned the basic problems connected to the objective description of the Upper Silesian perception of the Germans and the Poles, I should scrutinize the identity of the Upper Silesians as the category which conditions this perception, otherwise my contribution would become a stereotypical presentation of the issue.

The space for this contribution being limited I focus on these parts of Upper Silesia with which I am best acquainted, this is, Opole (Oppeln) Silesia and the Katowice (Kattowitz) region. I do not deal with Poland’s section of eastern Austrian Silesia and Czech Silesia (though they were parts of historical Upper Silesia) or with the Upper Silesian diaspora in Germany.

The end of the Great War distorted continuity of the political development of East Central Europe. The local nationalisms had not had the support in the form of continually existing and ethnically corresponding states, natios (political nations) or dynasties unlike in Western Europe. So they tried to utilize language and ethnicity in the process of building and maintaining their postulated nation-states which came into being after 1918. In this manner the status quo of the old borders was questioned and the borders among the emerging nation-states (for instance, Czechoslovakia, Poland), and the ones which had to reconsolidate their territories (for example, Germany), became fluid. The qualitatively new situation enforced legitimization of governance almost exclusively on the national basis. Accordingly, the national governments had to maintain or broaden the territories of their nation-states and to homogenize their populaces by imposing a given national identity on minorities or groups which did not identify themselves with any nation (cf. the Upper Silesians) through the educational system, administration, military service, factories or other activities undertaken in order to ethnically cleanse nationally liable areas.

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1026. Upper Silesians are often referred to as Silesians in Polish (Slazacy) though not in German where the label Silesians (Schlesier) is applied to the inhabitants of the whole (pre-1945) region of Silesia.

1027. I could observe practical application of this belief by Norwegian social workers. They presumed that they had to help children of Pakistani immigrants because, they argued, the children underwent identity crisis not knowing if they were Pakistanis, Norwegians or some unhappy Pakistani-Norwegian half-breeds. De facto, if the crisis did occur, it was caused by this very approach of the social workers and by the impact of the strong ideology of Norwegian nationalism, which despite the official promotion of multiculturalism in Norway, still hardly accepts existence of non-national or multiple/segmentary identities.

1028. After 1945 the Polish communist authorities strove to obliterate the past submerging the historical territorial divisions with the new ones hardly entrenched in tradition. Therefore Upper Silesia disappeared as a region from the map. Opole (Oppeln) Silesia (corresponding to the prerwar Oppeln (Opole) Regency) coincides with the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodeship, as well as with the counties of Olesno (Rosenberg) in the Czestochowa Voivodeship and of Raciborz (Ratibor) in the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship. The Katowice (Kattowitz) region (corresponding to the interwar Silesian Voivodeship) coincides with the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodeship less the county of Raciborz (Ratibor) and the Dabrowa industrial basin with the adjacent areas which prior to 1918 lay within the borders of Russia and Austria-Hungary.

This process left a deep imprint on the group fate of the Upper Sileans who were unlucky enough to live on the German territory claimed by Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the wake of the 1921 plebiscite Upper Silesia was divided between Poland and Germany. It led to accelerated Polonization and Germanization of the region’s respective parts in the interwar period despite some obstacles instituted by the Upper Silesian Geneva convention (1922-37) under the aegis of the League of Nations which tried to protect the new national minorities created by the establishment of the nation-states after 1918. Germanization of the whole of Upper Silesia tremendously intensified during World War II when the authorities endeavored to eliminate any Czech, Polish or too Slavic Upper Silesian influences. This process was closely emulated by Polonization after 1945 when almost all of Upper Silesia (less the prewar Czech part duly returned to Czechoslovakia) found itself under the Polish rule. This ennationalizing approach remained largely unchanged until 1989 when the Upper Silesians were allowed (to a certain extent) to express their identity(ies) without the fear of immediate reaction on the part of the authorities and security forces if they decided not to identify themselves with Polishdom.

Now one may ask who the Upper Silesians really are. Willfully, the question may be answered that the Upper Silesians are simply Upper Silesians. However, from the analytical point of view it appears that largely they are persons of still non-national multiple, segmentary identity. It means that their identity is multifaceted, made from heterogeneous constituents which are appropriately communicated/negotiated in accordance with a given situation. In order to achieve emotional closeness with his interlocutor, the Upper Silesian would speak in German and emphasize his links with Germandom when he talks to a German; for the same purpose he would emphasize his Catholicism and regional identity while talking to a Bavarian; with a Pole he would speak in Polish; and with a Czech from northern Moravia in the West Slavic Silesian dialect enriched with Bohemisms. Obviously, the Upper Silesian may also use his identity constituents to demarcate a clear ethnic border between himself and his interlocutor.

There is a tendency to brand the Upper Silesians for this non-national manner of functioning of their identity, as turncoats, untrue Poles and false Germans (Wasserpolacken). But one reaches such conclusions only when one accepts the values of a national ideology as superior to everything else. To a large extent, multiple identity functions as language registers: one differently speaks to one’s wife, son, superior, subordinate, beer friend, a shop assistant or a scholar, but one still speaks the same language. On the basis of this analogy it may be remarked that the nationalist pressure exerted on the Upper Silesian so that he would eventually decide if he is a German or a Pole, seems to him as absurd as to us the wish that we should speak to all the persons (without any regard for their relations with us) exclusively in the language of official documents.

Due to varying historical and ethnic conditions, frequency of using and expressing various constituents of the Upper Silesian multiple identity may differ in certain areas of Upper Silesia. Simplifying this issue, it may be said that, at present, Upper Silesians of Opole (Oppeln) Silesia emphasize their links with Germandom and Upper Silesiandom whereas their fellowmen of the Katowice (Kattowitz) region stress their attachment rather to Polishdom and Upper Silesiandom.

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2. These analytically isolated constituents cannot be treated as separate identities because it would lead one to the false conclusion that a man with a multiple identity suffers from the syndrome of multiple split personality. It may look like this from the national point of view, and such a split may be even effected by the continual pressure of the institutions of the nation-state on the man with a multiple identity so that she transforms her traditional identity into the required monistic national one. However, in the atmosphere of acceptance, the self of the man with a multiple identity seems to be better integrated than the self of the man with a national identity, because the former is better equipped to enter effective and non-conflictual interactions in the highly heterogeneous world which still prevails in spite of the homogenizing efforts of national ideologies.
There is also a group expressing their loyalty only to Upper Silesiandom which is often strongly pegged on the tradition of a locality where one lives. Because of various pressures exerted by Polish and German nationalisms, almost no Upper Silesian has full command of all the constituents of the Upper Silesian multiple identity. It is especially visible in the sphere of language. The Upper Silesians over 60 speak standard Polish poorly preferring to use the Upper Silesian dialect/creole or German. The younger generations whose language the Polish educational system cleansed from vernacular and foreign elements, rather use standard Polish than the dialect, and often do not know German or the Upper Silesian creole. On the other hand those Upper Silesians of this group who remained uneducated, speak in the Upper Silesian dialect/creole not knowing standard Polish or German. However, it will be remembered that in the prenational times (to which the Upper Silesian identity dates back) a full command of this or that language was not so much necessary for successful communication as one never lost the sight of the interlocutor. In such a face-to-face situation the overall context and body language facilitated verbal communication (other forms of communication were rarely used) so that it did not require thorough knowledge of a standard language, today, entailed by a profusion of non-personal (context-free) messages transmitted via writing, the telephone, fax or e-mail.

Now one is inclined to ask what it is that binds the Upper Silesians into an ethnic group, and allowed them not to become Germans, Poles or Czechs? These key elements which have integrated the ethnic group as well as its identity are: the strong emotional connection to the region, Catholicism and the Upper Silesian dialect/creole. Moreover, in the twentieth century the Polish and German administrations treated the Upper Silesians as second-class citizens and a nationally suspect element. This discriminatory approach fortified and maintained the ethnic boundary which one can rarely cross through full assimilation (be it voluntary or forced) in the first generation. This barrier delimiting the otherness of the Upper Silesians vis-a-vis Polishdom and Germandom strengthened the feeling of community among the Upper Silesians sharing the same sad fate.

Having scrutinized the Upper Silesian identity (which seems to be overcomplicated and nebulous only from the one-dimensional standpoint of nationalism), it is necessary to address the main issue of this article, namely: how the Upper Silesians perceive the Poles and the Germans.

It is impossible to find a clear-cut answer to this question but only a whole continuum of generalizations which does not have to prove correct in every specific case. One should also realize that the fact that the Upper Silesian knows that he is asked the question by a Pole or a German, shall influence the answer as well as the language in which such a question is uttered. Answers with the smallest number of conscious interferences and modifications distorting the opinion upheld by an Upper Silesian, may be elicited by a researcher whom the interlocutor perceives as ours (this is, truly Upper Silesian), or without the usual cultural-linguistic context, for example, in Cyprus where the question would be asked in English or Greek.

1033. I.e. ability to speak, comprehend, read and write.
1035. The link between the Upper Silesians and their region is largely the function of their long lasting attachment to small plots of land which used to be tilled by their forefathers and still are by some of their relatives. Industrialization did not obliterate their ties to the peasant way of life because Upper Silesian workers more often than not are small holders or possess garden plots which support breeding of poultry, pigeons, rabbits and few goats or pigs. Moreover, their link with the region was fortified by endogamy and closely-knit rural communities whose traditions, in the cities, was transferred onto factories and architectonically self-contained worker residential areas. Due to the construction of huge housing sites consisting of impersonal blocks of flats and to intentional populating them with ethnically variegated families, this traditional Upper Silesian communal feeling tends not to be reestablished.
Older generations of the Upper Silesians who remember or were told, in their childhood, about the uprisings and the division of Upper Silesia, still bear a grudge against the Poles whom they blame for the destruction of their ol merry Upper Silesiá (so much idealized in their fond memories), and for the fact that they were made into second-class citizens in their own region by the influx of civil servants, and managerial and engineering cadres from the rest of interwar Poland. What is more, they accuse the Poles of not keeping the promise of enhancing the standard of living in the Silesian Voivodeship, which plummeted in comparison to the Oppeln (Opole) Regency especially in the wake of the Great Depression. These older Upper Silesians as well as Upper Silesian Germans blame on the Poles the division of their Heimat, because of which families, villages and cities were split by the new border. On the other hand, they express positive attitude toward the Germans who having pumped a lot of capital into the Oppeln (Opole) Regency, raised it from the economic shambles and allowed Upper Silesians residing in the Polish part of Upper Silesia, to return/resettle to the regency, provided they declared themselves as Germans.

The Upper Silesians remember the time of World War II, when they were prohibited to speak the Upper Silesian West Slavic dialect or creole (and let alone standard Polish), as the German onslaught on a part of their identity. However, the situation was not felt as too tragic because the wartime reunification of Upper Silesia appeared to be the eventual actualization of the dream of unflinching well-being in the undivided Heimat. Only the telegrams bearing the news on Upper Silesian fathers, husbands and sons killed in action, and incarceration of indocile neighbors in concentration camps made the Upper Silesians anxious. Consequently, they distanced themselves from the war even more because it was another conflict of the Poles with the Germans in which they rather would not be involved. However, it must be mentioned that numerous Upper Silesians approved of the extermination of the Jews remarking that if only a lesser Hitler had taken care of them without spreading the war all over Europe, maybe Upper Silesia, still incorporated in Germany, would have thrive as the Ruhr in today’s Germany.

For the Upper Silesians (especially those residing on the territory of the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency) the war started when the Red Army crossed the Upper Silesian (this is, German) border in January 1945. The excesses of the Soviet soldiery (which intensified after the crossing of the Oder (Odra) in March), rapes, robberies, arson, murders, concentration camps for Upper Silesians (commonly perceived as Germans) and hauls of Upper Silesians together with the machinery of the factories where they worked, into the Soviet interior, reaffirmed and fixed in the group consciousness of the Upper Silesians the propaganda image of the Soviets, who were portrayed in the Third Reich as animal-like Asiatic brutes. This stereotype tended to be transferred onto Poles who arrived later on or immediately followed the Red Army.

The Polish administration (composed of Poles from the Dabrowa industrial basin and without Upper Silesia) having taken over and extended the Soviet camp system, began to expel, nationally verify and put Upper Silesians to forced work. But even those Upper Silesians who were nationally verified as Autochthons (i.e. ethnic Poles) could be expelled if they proved to be somehow inconvenient, and others were deprived of their houses and farms given to Polish settlers and expellees. These Polish expellees from the Polish eastern territories (Kresy) seized by the Soviet Union, perceived the Upper Silesians (because of their tradition and creole) as Germans and treated them accordingly, which made most Upper Silesians to feel closer ethnic and emotional affinity with the Germans than with those Ruskies, Asiatics whose eastern Polish dialect interlaced with East Slavic loans seemed to the Upper Silesians identical with the Russian language.

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1037. Usually, some strongly pro-Polish Upper Silesians were also accepted provided they closely adhered to the communist orthodoxy. But as a suspect element they could not be nominated to the top positions in the state.
Repugnance and necessarily concealed enmity toward the Poles were fortified by the actions of unGermanization and Polonization\(^{1039}\). The state intruded in the privacy of personal lives deeper than ever before. The force of unilateral administrative decisions was felt at cemeteries, churches, homes, and even in the sphere of such personal goods as names and surnames. The Upper Silesian to survive and not to be expelled, had to become Polonized, and to resign from or conceal the other (i.e. not-Polish) constituents of his identity. The school strove to eradicate the Upper Silesian dialect and creole and, in this task, was assisted by the Upper Silesian Catholic hierarchy (previously the Catholic Church as a universal institution, had tended to sympathize with non-national Upper Silesiandom) to a large extent almost immediately staffed with priests from Poland, who did not comprehend the complex ethnic-national background of this region\(^{1040}\).

This discrimination and not taking into consideration the feelings of the Upper Silesians lasted more or less visibly until 1989. During this period the only way of protest not closed to the Upper Silesians, was emigration to West Germany dubbed Reich in Upper Silesia. When one said, in the Upper Silesian dialect, that one was going to Reich it sounded as if to the paradise in the ears of those who had to stay, because, in pronunciation, Reich is close to the word raj (paradise) in the dialect and also in Polish. Letters, parcels, and since the mid-1970s more frequent visits of their relatives living in West Germany, made the Upper Silesians aware of the showcase success of West German capitalism and democracy so starkly different from poverty and discrimination they suffered in the PRL. The obstacles created by the Polish authorities in the form of lengthy and humiliating procedures which one had to undergo before cleared for emigration to West Germany, only strengthened the overall determination of the Upper Silesians to leave.

In those years, West Germany and its inhabitants (as opposed to East Germany perceived as false Germany, dangerously similar to Poland) became the model of well-being and normal life to which the Upper Silesians aspired. They began to see the Poles, through the spectacles of the difficult political and economic situation of Poland under the Soviet dominance, as idlers, ne’er-do-wells, the disorderly ones, and ones imprecise in their work closely repeating popular German ascertainment of the Poles concentrated around such seminal stereotypes as the *polnische Wirtschaft*\(^{1041}\) and Polish disorder. An emotional expression of this negative attitude of the Upper Silesians toward the Poles one can come across in Jan Kidawa-Blonski’s film *Pamietnik znalezione w garbie* (A Memoir Found in the Hump)\(^{1042}\). In the scene when the main character and his wife endeavor to drive out an Upper Silesian city to leave Poland before the imposition of the martial law on 13 December 1981, they come across an anti-government demonstration, which his spouse sums up: *Te polskie ciule* (These Polish pricks)\(^{1043}\).

\(^{1039}\). In the language of the Polish postwar national propaganda, it was inaccurately labeled re-Polonization.

\(^{1040}\). At the end of 1946 there were 332 Upper Silesians among 576 priests working on the territory of the prewar Oppeln (Opole) Regency, cf.: W. Musialik, Powojenne duszpasterstwo polskie w Niemczech i niemieckie w Polsce, M. Lis, ed., *Polacy i Niemcy: placzyzny i drogi normalizacji. Duszpasterstwo i szkolnictwo* (Opole: IS, 1993), pp. 130-40.

\(^{1041}\). The long history of this stereotype is well described in: H. Orłowski, ”Polnische Wirtschaft”, E. Kobylinska et al., eds., *Deutsche und Polen: 100 Schlusselbegriffe* (Munich: Piper, 1992), pp. 515-21.

\(^{1042}\). It is interesting to know that this film, aspiring to show the whole process of the destruction of Upper Silesian multiculturalism and multilingualism in the years 1939-90, was negatively evaluated by numerous Polish critics who counterpoised it with the pro-Polish productions on Upper Silesia directed by Kazimierz Kutz. Quite symptomatically, Kidawa-Blonski’s film is a Polish-Canadian coproduction but the Canadian partners were Frabchopone Quebecois.

\(^{1043}\). I would like to thank Mr Bernard Linek, Instytut Slaski, Opole, Poland for having drawn my attention to this scene of the film.
The normalization of the late 1980s immediately preceding the fall of communism, brought about mass emigration of Upper Silesians to Germany (610 thousand in 1987-1991 alone\(^{1044}\)) and altered the situation of those Upper Silesians who remained in their Heimat. In the 1990s the attractiveness of Poland went up in comparison to reunited Germany, where, on 1 January 1993, the status of Aussiedler was phased out. Previously it had been granted to the Upper Silesian emigrants entitling them to a free flat, free language course, financial and other perks besides the constitutional right to the German/EU passport\(^{1045}\). Nowadays no more than a thousand Upper Silesians emigrate to Germany every year\(^{1046}\), and many do return wishing to start their own businesses in Poland where competition is less intense than in Germany and where their capital is of greater purchasing power. Moreover, frequent visits of Upper Silesians in Germany and their relatives in the Heimat rebuild family links which is most favorable for the Upper Silesian economy.

In these context, after the reunification of Germany, the Upper Silesians tend to see Germans as arrogant if they come from ex-East Germany or too little interested in the problems of the former Deutsche Ostgebiete which almost ceased to function as an integral part of Deutschland\(^{1047}\) in the consciousness of young Germans from ex-West Germany. These opinions are often verified during numerous interactions of Upper Silesians with Germans, be it in Poland or in Germany, simultaneously contributing to their objectification through individualization of experience, and to the disappearance of one-dimensional stereotypes especially among the youth.

The picture of the Pole in the present-day consciousness of the Upper Silesians is conditioned by, beginning with 1990, the establishment of legal organizations of Upper Silesian Germans (members of these organizations are many if not the majority of the Upper Silesians who have not managed to emigrate from Poland after 1945 and do not have fond memories of the PRL. Nowadays they identify themselves as Germans) and the hurdles the Polish authorities created to prevent registration of the organization and their activities. The rather pro-Polish regional Upper Silesian organizations\(^{1048}\), which came into being in the Katowice (Kattowitz) region, also met similar difficulties. Moreover, anti-German events such as burning of monuments commemorating German soldiers (this is, Upper Silesians in the German army) who died in both the world wars, and not taking into consideration the needs of the devastated industrial areas of Upper Silesia (which, after 1945, was a specific internal colony treated as a milch cow by Poland) caused the Upper Silesians to opine that Poland did not care about their Heimat. This belief, however, did not significantly alter the Upper Silesian’s perception of the Poles, which became objectified in the first half of the 1990s when the Poles lost their privileged position in the state, which, at least theoretically, gives the Upper Silesians equal access to all the high posts\(^{1049}\). But Upper Silesians who wish to return to the correct, unPolonized spellings/forms of their names and surnames or apply for minuscule rises in their pensions for the years they served in the German army before 1945 and in Polish/Soviet forced labor

\(^{1044}\) Ibid. E. Cziomer, p. 101.
\(^{1046}\) Cf. In der Heimat bleiben/Pozostac w Ojczyznie, Auslandskurier, No. 17 (1996), pp. 11/12.
\(^{1047}\) Ibid. D. Forsythe, p. 140.
\(^{1048}\) Before the 1997 parliamentary elections some of them set out on the way to build an [Upper] Silesian nation or national movement by attempting to register the Związek Mniejszości Narodowości Śląskiej (Association of the Minority of Silesian Nationality), so far, unsuccessfully.
\(^{1049}\) So far Upper Silesians and Upper Silesian Germans are well represented only in self-governments of their communes. None of them have been nominated a voivode or made it into the central government. The situation may change in the wake of the September 1997 elections. The new, non-communist government promised to devolve Poland soon, and is headed by Prime Minister Jozef Buzek, a Protestant (Upper) Silesian from the Polish-Czech borderland of eastern Austrian Silesia. His wife is a Catholic Upper Silesian. All in all quite an unusual concoction for Poland whose top echelon civil servants have been invariably Catholic and indubitably Polish.
camps after that year, still are met with contempt and enmity of Polish civil servants and clerks, which reminds them about the years before 1989. The aforementioned phenomena coupled with the activities of various Polish nationalist groupings aimed at coaxing Upper Silesian parents not to ask the school authorities for securing bilingual or German-language education for their children, to a certain degree, make Upper Silesians to apply for the German passport\textsuperscript{1050} (on the basis of Art 116 of Germany’s Basic Law) as the guarantee of personal and economic security.

In the 1980s and 1990s it became obvious that the epoch of postindustrialism will avoid neither Poland nor Upper Silesia. Since then there has been observed gradual merging of the Upper Silesian values and tradition with the European and world-wide (or rather Euro-American) counterparts. These changes, however, do not lead to the disappearance of the Upper Silesian identity, since among almost completely assimilated young Upper Silesians one can observe the so-called phenomenon of the third generation\textsuperscript{1051}.

The amicable atmosphere for this simultaneous neoregionalization and Europeanization or globalization came into being in Upper Silesia also as the direct result of the effective soothing of the postwar Polish-German conflicts, thanks to which the Poles more often perceive Germany as the open gate to the European Union and not the eternal enemy. Under these favorable conditions, young Upper Silesians (often discovering their own identity as adolescents and adults, because earlier family did not discuss their past and tradition not to make life difficult for children) seem to perceive and treat Poles and Germans as partners, together with whom they would have to work for the appropriate position of their Heimat in a united Europe.

To conclude on an optimistic note, it is worth noting that nowadays when nationalisms have been toned down in favor of the emergent European ecumene and regions functioning in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, Upper Silesians easily get used to particularism (or rather specific homeliness, Gemütlichkeit) of regionalism and universalism of Europeanity, and their open attitude often shows the way to young Poles who no more want to live their lives according to the rather intolerant and not very pragmatic tenets of the Polish nationalist-cum-messianic thought.

\textsuperscript{1050} So far more than 170 thousand Upper Silesians residing in their Heimat, have obtained these passports which makes them into the largest compact group of German/EU citizens permanently living outside Germany and the EU. Cf.: Schlesische Nachrichten, No. 5 (1996), p. 6.

\textsuperscript{1051} The notion of the phenomenon of the third generation was developed by American anthropologists investigating the social results of immigration. It turned out that the first generation of immigrants not capable of complete assimilation, live suspended between their old world and the American reality. Their children do get assimilated and wish to sever, forget their links with the non-American culture, and language of their parents in order to help their own children (i.e. the third immigrant generation) achieve success in life. On the other hand, many grandchildren of the original immigrants discover their roots, which were concealed before them by their parents. Subsequently, they become hyphenated Americans. It does not mean though that they begin to live as their grandparents. They only learn elements of their ancestral language and incorporate some elements of the non-American tradition of their grandparents into their through and through American way of life.
Poland's German minority: its origin and current situation

ABSTRACT

This article is devoted to the origins of the postwar German minority in Poland and its post-1989 current situation as contextualized against Polish postwar politics towards it. Also the role of the minority for the future of Central European politics in general is noted.

Postwar Origins of the Minority

Social clubs, dance groups, orchestras, and literary societies have sprung up recently in Poland, organized by a minority that was unrecognized until a few years ago. Virtually invisible in Poland since the end of World War II, former German citizens and their descendants have begun a renaissance of German cultural life. Because they were essentially Polonized for the past 40 years, most younger than 60 do not speak or read German or do so only poorly.

With the weakening of communist rule in the second half of the 1980s, the Germans living in Poland were able to organize clandestine societies that were not effectively suppressed by the security forces. The strongest of these was the Socio-Cultural Society of the German Minority (designated in Polish as TSKMN, while the German acronym is SKGDM), in Upper Silesia, which in 1989 mobilized 250,000 to 300,000 Germans.

The reemergence of the German minority came as a shock to Poles, who for decades had been convinced by official communist propaganda that there were no Germans left in their country. The Polish press hosted a nationalist backlash that reached its climax at the turn of 1989 and 1990 prior to the hotly contested Senate by-election in the voivodship of Opole (Oppeln) (February 1990) due to the participation of SKGDM leader Heinrich Kroll. He lost the election, but in the window of opportunity opened by the strong grassroots support for his candidacy, the SKGDM organizations of the Opole (Oppeln), Katowice (Kattowitz), and Czestochowa were registered before the election in January and February 1990. The government had officially acknowledged the existence of the German minority - if unwillingly.

After 1945, in accordance with Allied plans, Poland was moved 300 kilometers to the west and was recompensed with the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line (Deutsche Ostgebiete) for the Polish eastern lands (Kresy) lost to the Soviet Union. The territories were largely cleared of their German population to accommodate the Polish expellees from the eastern lands as well as other Polish settlers. The majority of the Germans were transported to the British and Soviet occupation zones. But two categories remained: indubitable Germans and Autochthons. The first category consisted of ethnic German miners and industrial specialists in the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) region of Lower Silesia and agricultural workers and experts in western Pomerania - all essential workers who could not be replaced by Poles. Autochthons were the borderland populations of various local/multiple ethnic identities whom the Polish government intended to win for Polishdom through forced Polonization. Their main groups are the Upper Silesians, Kashubs and Mazurs. They have mainly resided in Upper Silesia (i.e Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodships), in the vicinity of Gdansk (Danzig) and in Olsztyn (Allenstein) voivodship, respectively.

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1052 Also a minuscule number of prewar Polish citizens of German nationality.
1053 His name and surname were Polonized after 1945 as it was the case with other Autochthons, so he was Henryk Król until 1992 when he was allowed to return to the original spelling.
1054 The German territories given to Poland comprised: the southern part of East Prussia, Free City of Danzig (Gdansk) and Pomerania in the north, and eastern Brandenburg, Silesia and a sliver of Saxony in the west. Polish propaganda dubbed the area as recovered territories or (north-)western lands.
By the beginning of the 1960s, almost all the indubitable Germans had left Poland, and those of the Autochthons who remained continued to be forcefully Polonized. The Polish authorities assumed that they had solved the German problem for good and that a ethnically pure state had been achieved. Accordingly, in Polish postwar censuses, there has been no category for ethnicity, and in official Polish-German relations from 1952 to 1982 the phrase German minority in Poland never cropped up\textsuperscript{1055}. Germans, however, were mentioned by some obscure Polish scholarly sources, which estimated their number in Poland as 3,500 in 1971 and as several thousands in 1978 and 1983\textsuperscript{1056}. Those numbers clashed with German statistics, which claimed that more than one million descendants of former German citizens were residing in Poland at the end of 1982\textsuperscript{1057}. The discrepancy was caused by Poland’s refusal to recognize the existence of the German minority on Polish soil, clinging to the myth that the Autochthonous population was thoroughly Polish.

Autochthons were actually highly heterogenous populations speaking various Kashub, Polish, and other Slavic dialects (heavily interlaced with German loanwords and syntactical borrowings) who identified more with their small homelands than with Germany, Poland, or other nation-states. Some of them had assimilated into mainstream German society, some developed a Polish national identification, and others remained attached to the ethnic identity of their ancestors.

But the Polish communist government discriminated against them through forced Polonization. In the immediate postwar period political pressure to eradicate traces of the former German presence in the so-called recovered territories was intense. German libraries were burned down. German inscriptions on tombs and public buildings were cemented over or chiseled out. The Autochthons were treated at the official level as Poles unaware of their Polishness, but by average Poles and by local administrations they were treated as Germans - without much respect for the cultural, religious, or ethnic distinctiveness of the Upper Silesians, Mazurs, and Kashubs\textsuperscript{1058}.

Discrimination pushed these ethnically mixed German-Slavic peoples\textsuperscript{1059} toward Germany. And Germany’s attraction systematically increased as the \textit{Wirtschaftswunder} in West Germany stood out in brilliant relief against the dreariness of the Polish socialist economy. Consequently, many left for West Germany, and those who remained identify themselves as Germans. These ethnic groups (with the exception of the Kashubs, majority of whom embarked on the efforts to construct their own nation) form the basis of the German minority in modern-day Poland\textsuperscript{1060}.


\textsuperscript{1057} See Gerhard Reichling, \textit{Die deutschen Vertriebenen in Zahlen} (Teil 1) [German Expellees in Numbers (Part 1)] (Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, 19860, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{1058} See \textit{Odra}, no. 5 (May 1991), p. 36.

\textsuperscript{1059} These peoples are described as mixed only from the national point of view. More objectively speaking, they did not develop any national attachment and are still endowed with pre-national complementary identities incorporating elements of Polish and German cultures as well as religion and pivotal bond with their respective localities.

How Many Germans Are There in Poland?

Almost 90 percent of Poland’s current German minority is concentrated in Upper Silesia in the eastern half of the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship, on the western border of the Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship, and in the Czestochowa Voivodship’s southwestern corner. In this territorially contiguous area, Germans constitute the majority of the population - in certain communes (gminas) nearly 100 percent.

The Germans living in Poland now belong to about 150 organizations that mainly sprang up after 1989. Most of the organizations are territorially based societies of Germans inhabitants, but there are also foundations, cultural organizations, charitable and educational societies, and associations of medical doctors, farmers, women, youth, German armed forces veterans and other groups. Almost all the societies are members of the umbrella organization Association of German Socio-Cultural Societies (VdG), which has its headquarters in Opole (Oppeln) and boasts 420,000 members. Given that number, and in the absence of any official census data (current scholarly and news estimates vary widely from 300,000 to 1.1 million), the figure of 600,000-800,000 Germans in Poland is probable, but many of them still retain pre-national multiple identities and/or have become assimilated to Polish society at the level of language and culture.

It must be remembered though that the tentative estimate might be considerably corrected should any unpredicted political change take place in Poland causing more or less former German citizens and their descendants to claim German citizenship on the basis of Art 116 of the German Basic Law. The article provides that every citizen of the German Reich within the frontiers of December 31, 1937, and their descendants have the right to return to Germany and to (re)obtain German citizenship. The right is also extended to former German citizens (and their descendants) who were deprived of their citizenship between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945. Hence, practically all the citizens of the war-time-size Third Reich, and their offspring can enjoy the right to return which by derivative legislation was extended to comprise also these ethnic Germans who have never lived within the German boundaries but are able to prove their German origin (cf. the Volga Germans in the ex-Soviet Union). In 1992 the right to German citizenship for the descendants of former German citizens who have lived beyond the Oder-Neisse line was limited with the Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz (War Consequences Consolidation Act) which was passed by the Bundestag following the ratification of the Two + Four, and two German-Polish treaties) only to these ethnic Germans who were born prior to January 1, 1993. Interestingly, the limitation as well as the scrapping of the status of Aussiedler (i.e. ethnic German resettler, with all the concomitant state support) does not apply to the ethnic Germans from the ex-Soviet Union who continue to arrive at Germany within the annual quota of 200,000.

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1062 See Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 43 (October 27, 1995).
The German Minority Enters the Postcommunist Poland's Political Life

Since the official acknowledgement of the existence of the German minority in 1989-1990, the struggle for minority rights has been spearheaded by Kroll's SKGDM. The Polish authorities were initially reluctant to register the group for elections but did so just in time for the 1990 local elections. Those elections were the first since the end of World War II in which Germans living in Poland were allowed to elect their representatives as Germans. German candidates won mandates in 35 of the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship's 63 communes, and they gained a majority in 26. They increased their political presence in 1994 during the next local elections, and in the first fully free Polish parliamentary elections in 1991, eight Germans (all SKGDM members) entered parliament. In the 1993 parliamentary elections, the German minority lost three seats - but election was still a success, since the German deputies had helped win an exemption for minority candidates from the 5 percent threshold introduced by the new Electoral Act.

A certain relaxation in the tense relations between the Polish state and the German minority came about with the signing of the German-Polish Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 1991. The treaty introduced a modicum of minority rights for the Germans living in Poland, including the right to minority education, to freedom of assembly, and to use the German spellings of their names. Forced assimilation was abolished as a valid political instrument, but the parties did not try to solve such contentious issues as dual citizenship or the question of bilingual place-names and signs. Moreover, problems with adopting treaty provisions into Polish law prompted Kroll to appeal for a comprehensive Act on Minorities, which has yet to be produced.

For a year and a half, the Polish courts did not allow the SKGDM to replace the euphemistic phrase German Minority with the word Germans in their organization’s name, but at last in 1993 the organization obtained permission to call itself the Socio-Cultural Society of Germans (SKGD in German and TSKN in Polish). However, in 1995, before German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s second visit to Poland, the Polish justice minister filed a lawsuit against the SKGD, claiming that its charter included irregularities and that it had no right to use the revised name. The Polish government lost the case. During the German minority’s five years of acknowledged political existence in Poland, there have been many such antagonistic moves by the Polish authorities at the central and voivodship levels. Initially the government made the establishment of minority schools and bilingual classes almost impossible. And voivodship authorities have hindered the (re-)erection of monuments to Germans who died in both the World Wars.

Anti-German excesses have periodically recurred in postcommunist Poland. Polish nationalists have defaced or destroyed several German cemeteries and monuments as well as DFK (Deutscher Freundschaftskreis, German Friendship Circle, name of the SKGD’s local branches) information billboards. A few DFK headquarters have been burgled and anti-German graffiti became a common sight in Upper Silesia. In 1992, a bomb exploded at the headquarters of the German organization in the Poznan (Posen) Voivodship. Another bomb attack was attempted on the Opole (Oppeln) Cathedral in 1994.

1064 Few indubitable Germans were elected to local governments in the 1950s; See Elizabeth Wiskemann, Germany’s Eastern Neighbours (London: Oxford University Press), pp. 277/278.
1065 See Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 16 (August 16-31, 1993).
1067 See Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 11 (June 1-15, 1993).
1068 See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 42 (October 20-26, 1995); Dziennik Zachodni (Opole version), no. 168 (October 12, 1995).
1069 See Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 20 (May 27-June 2, 1994).
1070 Opole (Oppeln) Bishop Alfons Nossol is an ethnic Upper Silesian who has openly supported the German revival.
Still, the postcommunist Poland, with its dynamically growing economy and increasingly democratic institutions, has proven to be an attractive alternative to Germany. The SKGD continues to wrench more rights for ethnic Germans, who were virtually second-class citizens in Poland before 1989. They had no chance of advancing to any high-level post in state service or any managerial position in the industrial sector. The success of the SKGD’s efforts can be measured in the substantial drop in the number of ethnic German Aussiedler (resettlers) arriving in Germany from Poland: from c. 200,000-250,000 in 1989 and 133,872 in 1990 down to 1,677 in 1995.\textsuperscript{1071}

There were, of course, other factors curbing emigration, such as a less inviting atmosphere for immigrants in post-unification Germany, scrapping of support and financial aid for Aussiedler beginning with January 1, 1993, Polish-level pensions of c. 100-300 German marks awaiting the retired Aussiedler in Germany\textsuperscript{1072}, and the considerable financial aid for the minority in Poland that has been flowing from Germany since 1990. It amounted to almost 7 million German marks in 1990 and grew to 26.6 million marks in 1996\textsuperscript{1073}, compared with a mere 282,000 marks from the Polish state in 1994\textsuperscript{1074}.

In addition, many Germans decided to stay in Poland because, since 1991, the German consulates in Poland have been issuing them German/EU passports - despite the fact that neither Polish or German law accepts dual citizenship. In the years 1991 through 1994, more that 170,000 Polish citizens received German passports\textsuperscript{1075}. The passport is a tangible economic asset that allows its holder to be legally employed in Germany and throughout the European Union. The passport issuance policy thus prevents high rates of unemployment and poverty among Poland’s predominantly rural German population while allowing many German minority members to achieve significant economic success in Poland with money earned in Germany\textsuperscript{1076}. On the other hand, the dual citizenship is a source of envy for the Germans Polish neighbors. Germans who dodge Polish military service or perform the duty in the German Bundeswehr are sometimes accused of disloyalty\textsuperscript{1077}.

Also a specific phenomenon is connected to the holders of German passports with permanent residence in Poland - they cannot vote in German elections casting absentee ballots. The German concession to the Polish side produces a curious paradox - a sizeable group of Aussiedler retained their Polish passports and have not renounced their Polish citizenship. Hence, in view of the Polish Citizenship Act of 1920 they are still Polish citizens as according to Polish law one cannot effectively

\textsuperscript{1071} See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 28 (June 16-22, 1995); Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 3 (January 20, 1995); Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 1 (January 5, 1996).

\textsuperscript{1072} The limitations are not applied to ethnic German Aussiedlers from the former Soviet Union: 209,409 of them arrived to Germany in 1995: See Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 1 (January 5, 1996).

\textsuperscript{1073} See Auslands Kurier, no. 2 (June 1992); Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 35 (September 1-7, 1995).

\textsuperscript{1074} See Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Gornoslaska, no. 7 (February 18-24, 1994).

It must be added though that in comparison with the 20,000 German minority in Denmark Poland’s Germans receive next to nothing. In 1996 Germany supports Poland’s German minority with 45-50 marks per capita, whereas with 927 marks per capita Denmark’s German minority. The latter minority also receives 640 marks per capita from Denmark but the former only 0.50 mark per capita from the Polish state; See Bericht zur Arbeit der dänischen Minderheit, der deutschen Minderheit in Nordschleswig, der friesischen Volksgruppe und der deutschen Sinti und Roma für die 13. Legislaturperiode 1992-1996 [Report on Danish Minority, German Minority in North Schleswig, Frisian Ethnic Group, and Sinti and Roma] (Kiel: Schleswig-Holsteinisch Landtag, 1996), p. 81.

\textsuperscript{1075} See Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 19 (May 12, 1995); Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 20 (May 19, 1995). The most recent sources state that as of November 30, 1995 the correct number is only 120,000, and that applications of 66,625 persons still await processing which usually takes one year or two. In 1995 a slight decrease in the number of applicants was observed to c. 35,000; See Schlesische Nachrichten, no. 5 (March 1, 1996).

\textsuperscript{1076} See Schlesisches Wochenblatt: no. 20 (May 19-25, 1995); no. 35 (September 8-14, 1995); no. 43 (October 27-November 2, 1995).

\textsuperscript{1077} See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 17 (April 28-May 4).
acquire a foreign citizenship without having abjured the Polish one. Thus, the group of Aussiedler can and do vote in Polish elections. After 1989 also former citizens of the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939) with residence elsewhere than in the previously communist states (where they were deprived of their citizenship on the basis of bilateral treaties with Poland) are granted Polish passports and obviously the right to vote in Polish elections.

Cultural Revival

Efforts to recreate a separate German cultural identity have had a visible effect. For instance, in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship alone, the SKGD boasts 15 traditional brass orchestras, 12 music groups, 30 choirs, 28 singing groups, 24 dance troupes, and seven other artistic groups. The small Gliwice (Gleiwitz) publishing house Wokól nas, established in 1989, has brought out books on Upper Silesia and Polish-German relations, booklets devoted to minority rights and the EU, and bilingual editions of works by Horst Bienek, a renowned Upper Silesian writer.

Germans in Poland maintain strong links with the organizations of the expellees in Germany (Landsmannschaften) and are members of the Catholic Church in Upper Silesia and the evangelical Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession in Pomerania and former East and West Prussia. With the help of the German government, both the Churches have established social welfare and medical stations. By 1989, Bishop Alfons Nossol had obtained the right to use German in liturgy in the Opole (Oppeln) diocese, and, at present, German-language Masses are celebrated in about 250 churches. The bishop actively cooperates with the German Catholic Church and with Church representative bodies of the Catholic expellees. The Protestants are not nearly as numerous as the Catholics but have nevertheless managed to establish their two own German parishes in Slupsk (Stolp) in Pomerania, and in Wroclaw (Breslau) unlike the Catholics who can enjoy only German or bilingual Masses within Polish-language parishes.

The use of German in liturgy is quite an achievement, considering that from 1945 to 1989 the language was virtually prohibited in the former German territories (with the notable exception made for the indubitable Germans) and especially in the areas inhabited by the Autochthons. Moreover, the Decree on State Language of November 30, 1945 is still in force so there is no legal basis to use any language other than Polish in an official context. There is some leeway in the spheres of the minority mass media, education and religious life, but it is still illegal to display bilingual place-name signs or to use a minority language in a state office or court, even in an area predominantly inhabited by a minority population.

Since the only Germans who speak their language well are 60 or older, the unresolved language issue is the most important in the German minority’s continuing discussion on preservation of the ethnic group’s identity. Those born after World War II were not allowed to speak German and actually had to conceal their identity to survive in communist Poland.
**German Minority Education**

After 1989, the Polish authorities inaugurated many language teacher training colleges and language departments at universities all over the country, in order to produce enough teachers of Western European languages to replace Russian in school curricula. The German government started sending teachers to Poland in 1990. However, German teachers are not concentrated in the ethnic-German areas of Poland but are spread over the country.

In 1995 in the Opole Voivodship, only about 20 percent of all schoolchildren were offered German instruction. When it is available, German language classes generally take up just two school hours a week – obviously too little for German children to master the language, given that their parents have a very limited command of it. In 1992, German was introduced as a mother tongue to 14 elementary schools of this kind in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship, which meant only one extra hour of German lessons a week. There are now more than 130 schools of this kind in the voivodship and c. 30 in the Katowice (Kattowitz) voivodship. Genuine bilingual classes are also provided by 5 secondary schools in Upper Silesia and 2 in Lower Silesia.

Still, there are no straightforward minority schools with German as the medium of instruction, although there are for other Poland’s minorities and although the German minority is numerically the largest. Moreover, the bilingual classes in secondary schools mainly benefit Polish students, as most German youths attend vocational schools that have almost no German teachers. There are some positive developments such as: planned opening of Poland’s first German bilingual elementary school in the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship in September 1996 and few more in 1997 as well as agreements between the voivodship educational authorities and the German Länder of Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg to secure c. 20 retired German teachers for the voivodship’s schools every year. Moreover, in spring 1996, the government having tentatively recognized the financial problems of the German minority education granted the Opole (Oppeln) voivodship’s communes which develop minority schools, with a school subsidy which is 20% larger than that one received by other communes; and at last the Deutsche Bildungsgesellschaft (BDG, German Education Association) was registered and could commence its activities in June. But if the present rate of increase in employment of German teachers in the Opole (Oppeln) schools is maintained, a German minority education system will only be achieved in 17-20 years, and another generation of Germans living in Poland will have minimal knowledge of their national language. Besides Polish nationalist propaganda hinders creation of such a system tacitly intimidating German parents who hesitate to submit declarations that they children should attend German minority schools.

Integration (as opposed to assimilation) of the German minority in Poland depends on establishing a dynamic German school system that could re-create a cultural niche for the minority. Such a system will be possible only when the restrictive decree on the state language in Poland is scrapped and Poland ratifies the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (signed on February 1, 1995) and signs the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, which set out the European standards for treatment of minorities. So far, Poland has not written protection of minorities into its constitution, has not passed a comprehensive act regulating relations between the state and minorities, and has not developed an act on minority education.

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1083 See Opolski Goniec Sejmowy, no. 3 (April, 1996) & Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 26 (June 28-July 4, 1996).
The Future

Nevertheless, the Polish attitude toward the German minority has changed from the total surprise - and even outrage - apparent in 1989 to cool acceptance by 1995. Nowadays, it seems possible that at least the younger generation of the German minority (especially in Upper Silesia) will be somewhat versed in the German language and culture, which is a prerequisite for being perceived as German by the Germans in Germany. This, however, will only come about with extensive financial aid from Germany. The most contentious issues between the minority and the Polish majority - such as dual citizenship, military service, the right for expellees and Aussiedler to return to their homelands, and the right for foreign nationals to purchase Polish land - will gradually fade away with the accession of Poland to the EU, which is unwaveringly championed by Germany. However, if this positive scenario does not come about, nationalist tensions may flare up. Thus, it is worthwhile to observe the behavior of the ex-communists who now govern Poland. They have proven to be less that accommodating toward Poland’s minorities during their parliamentary and government dominance since 1994 although it seems that Poland’s slightly increasing aid for Polish minorities in the ex-Soviet Union and acceptance of ethnic Polish resettlers in the country may alter their stance on Poland’s minorities. However, minority issues being quite sensitive in Polish politics, no radical improvements can be expected in this area before the parliamentary elections due to be held in 1997.

International Repercussions

The situation of the German minority in Poland is the touchstone of Polish-German relations. In the years which have elapsed since the fall of communism in 1989, the gradual improvement of the minority’s status has been preceded by developments in the German-Polish reconciliation process marked by spectacular visits and speeches and, most significantly, by the 1990 Polish-German border treaty which definitively re-affirmed the German-Polish border along the Oder-Neisse line, which had been much disputed in the postwar period.

In case of education and cultural life the German minority still seems to suffer a disadvantage in comparison to the treatment given to Poland’s Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities. It may be the result of the immediate interest of the Polish state which is keen on supporting development of these latter national movements to counteract possible absorption of Belarus by Russia and the growing Russian influence especially in eastern Ukraine. The security reason must be perceived as valid by Germany itself as it does not emphasize the issue of equal treatment of minorities and at the turn of 1995 and 1996 decided to be more accommodating to the needs and expectations of diverse groups of the Polish-speaking population living in Germany although according to German law they cannot be recognized as a straightforward minority as they are not indigenous to any region in Germany. At the end of 1995 Poland reciprocated with its signature of the Polish-German agreement on the basis of which the time German veterans (at present living in Poland) spent in the German armed forces during World War II, is reflected by a modest raise in their pensions despite the vociferous opposition of Polish veteran organizations.

German-Polish relations are not so marred as German-Czech relations by the question of the right to return to their homelands for the German expellees. The surprising difference is caused by the fact that the Sudetendeutsche (Sudetic Germans) who were expelled from Czechoslovakia had been prewar Czechoslovak citizens unlike the expellees from the former German territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line of whom only a small fraction had been holders of prewar Polish citizenship. Although the two groups of German expellees are comparable, the Sudetic Germans who were united by their common fate as second class Czechoslovak citizens, and during the war within the administrative borders of the province of Sudetenland are a more homogenous group than diverse

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1084 See Wprost (July 2, 1995).
1085 See Dialog, no. 1 [special issue devoted to the Polish-speakers living in Germany] (April 1996).
1086 See Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 49 (December 8-14, 1995).
populations of various German provinces east of the Oder and the Neisse. Besides, today the latter are spread all over Germany while the Sudetic Germans are concentrated in Bavaria where they and their descendants constitute c. one quarter of the land’s population. Understandably, the Bavarian government became the champion of the Sudetic Germans cause and must be respected by federal politicians as Bavaria, the second-largest land of Germany, is uniquely independent and thus exercises considerable leverage on German politics.

Although Hungary granted its expelled citizens of German descent the right to return to their homeland (only a little more than 100 have used this opportunity so far)\textsuperscript{1087}, Poland and the Czech Republic are unlikely to follow in the country’s footsteps whatever legal and political inconsistences, because overwhelmingly larger amounts of real estate and land, and numbers of people involved could upset the postwar order even if, for instance, only 5-10\% of the c. 3 million Sudetic Germans or c. 9 million inhabitants of Poland’s former German territories decided to return. Most probably, the Czech government will be periodically lambasted by Germany over the issue as a concession to the politically powerful electorate of the Sudetic Germans (so much needed by the CDU/CSU in its election struggles with the SPD), but the politicians seem to be playing a waiting game which should be concluded with the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary into the EU and NATO.

This would partially solve the problem of the right to return, as the countries having become part of the EU the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services would also apply to their territories. Consequently, any interested expellee/Aussiedler or his/her descendants would be able to move to their homelands and purchase their families real estate on the free market. It is however doubtful that many would use the opportunity as the countries have much lower living standards than present-day Germany. However, the possibility is used by the PSL (Polish Peasant Party) and Polish nationalist groups to propagate anti-German scare claiming that the Germans will soon buy out Poland and start dominating the country economically. In May 1996 the Polish Parliament’s decision to simplify the rules for foreigners who wish to purchase land in Poland was introduced. This act is strongly opposed by the PSL although it is one of a plethora of changes Poland obliged itself to enact in line with its Association Treaty (Europe Agreement) with the EU to approximate the Polish law to 
\textit{acquis communautaire}.

On the whole these expellees (or other foreigners) who do wish to acquire land or real estate in Poland buy it through some Poles who offer their names as a cover-up (although the practice should stop with implementation of the aforementioned change in the property ownership laws) whereas many Aussiedler and Poland’s ethnic Germans who have at their disposal both the Polish and German passports, are not restricted by such limitations and contribute to the rapid development of economic and cultural links between Poland and Germany.

Last but not least, the German-Polish treaty of 1991 with the minority rights clauses was the first bilateral treaty guaranteeing minority rights in the postwar world. It was followed by many similar treaties which were contracted among Germany and Central and East European countries in an effort to regulate the minority question and to prevent ethnic strife which has ruined the countries which emerged from the break-up of Yugoslavia. On this concluding note, it is clear that reemergence of the German minority in Poland not only has brought about fears and opportunities (which I have presented above) but also left its lasting imprint in the field of minority rights in post-Cold-War Europe.

\textsuperscript{1087} See Author’s interview with Dr Karl Cordell, Dept of Politics, Univ of Plymouth, UK (May 29, 1996).
Poland's German minority: its origin and current situation

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SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

The article is devoted to the origins of the postwar German minority in Poland and its post-1989, current situation as contextualized against the Polish postwar politics towards it. Also the role of the minority in German-Polish relations is noted.

Encountering history is unavoidable in the year of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, especially in the context of the German minority in Poland, on which the war legacy left an indelible imprint. Western Europeans associate 1945 simply with V-E, but the Central and Eastern European countries consider it to mark their liberation from the nazi occupation or dominance, though did the year really mean freedom for the Slovak state which had been independent during the war for the first time in its history?, or any liberty at all for the region which fell under the Soviet overlordship? The import of the date is even more ambivalent for the Germans whose state was then truncated and eventually split into the east and west parts along with its prewar capital Berlin, thus, symbolically reflecting the Cold War division of Europe and the world into two antagonistic blocs. And, paradoxically, only in 1945 World War II started in earnest for the Germans living east of the Oder-Neisse line, and lasted until the official end of expulsions in 1947/48, if not in the Cold War form of protracted exodus by the fall of communism in 1989.

At Yalta and Potsdam the western Allies accepted the new Soviet western boundaries which had been guaranteed by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in 1939, as well as ceded Central and Eastern Europe to the USSR’s sphere of influence, and espoused the tenet of mass population transfers in order to solve the question of German, Polish and Hungarian minorities in this part of Europe. In the wake of these decisions Poland lost its prewar eastern territories (Kresy) to the USSR, and was shifted 300 km westwards where it was recompensed with the German east territories (Deutsche Ostgebiete): west Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia (without its westernmost Upper Lusatian tip), a sliver of Saxony, east Brandenburg, the majority of Pomerania, West Prussia, and the southern half of East Prussia. All the territories became the so-called Recovered Territories (in Polish Ziemie Odzyskane). They were to be populated with the Polish expellees from the Kresy together with Poles from relatively overcrowded and seriously damaged Central Poland and Galicia which had constituted General Gouvernment during the war.

This decision let Stalin make the Polish nation (which was traditionally strongly anti-Russian, as well as anti-Soviet and anti-communist) dependant on the USSR as the only guarantor of the very existence of the Polish state vis-a-vis not incomprehensible German enmity. The losers of the game were Poles who were deprived of their homes in the East, and Germans who lost their Heimat (homelands) because they had to accept the principle of collective responsibility which was unilaterally imposed on them by the Allies. The victorious powers gave green light to the transfer of German populations in an orderly and humane manner. In the period 1945-1950 only in Central and Eastern Europe (without the USSR) c. 15 mln Germans were displaced, expelled or seized as forced labor by the Soviet Union, and c. 2 mln of them died in the process, according to other sources 13,4 mln were expelled and displaced, 4,5 mln perished during this period, and 2 mln remained in their homelands. Before World War II 1.2 mln ethnic Germans had lived in Poland (0.78 mln according to the official, and most probably lowered 1931 Polish census) and 8.4 mln in the Deutsche Ostgebiete (excluding Stettin (Szczecin)) and in the Free City of Danzig (Gdansk) which were granted to Poland.
in 1945. It was the end of the 300 to 1000-year-old specific and highly diversified east German civilization, and of Prussia which had unified the German state in 1871.

The vast majority of the expellees from the would-be Polish territories east of the Oder-Neisse line were transported to the British and Soviet Occupation Zones with the exception of:

a) qualified miners and industrial specialists in the Walbrzych (Waldenburg) region, Lower Silesia, and agricultural workers and experts in Western Pomerania since they could not be replaced by Polish counterparts; and

b) the so-called Autochthons, i.e. the borderland populations of unclear national (or rather specific local/ethnic) identity whom the Polish government intended to win for Polishdom.

The plight of the two groups was equally harsh immediately after 1945 due to massive waves of rapes, looting, murders, and wanton destruction exacted in revenge for the years of brutal nazi occupation, first, by the Red Army in the first half of 1945, and later by the closely following Polish troops, administration and settlers. From 1945 to 1948 the Germans who remained in the postwar Poland were deprived of any civil rights, expropriated and intimidated, whereas their lands were incorporated into the Polish administrative structure under the package of numerous acts and decrees issued by the Polish authorities.

However, one crucial difference could be observed in the Polish treatment of the two aforementioned groups of Germans. The specialists who had been retained to rebuild and develop agriculture and industry in Pomerania and Lower Silesia respectively, were considered to be indubitable Germans by the Polish government, who would allow them to leave for Germany as soon as they would not be needed by Poland’s economy. The Autochthons, on the contrary, were considered to be of Polish ethnic origin and as such were to be Polonized. In order to achieve the goal the Polish authorities embarked on the action of national verification (weryfikacja narodowosciowa); first, they divided the population concerned into groups reflecting different degrees of Polishness (closely emulating the nazi system of the Deutsche Volksliste), and subsequently cleansed [it] from the German element. At the end of 1949 there were over 1,015,000 positively verified Autochthons (848,131 in Upper Silesia, 15,146 in Lower Silesia, 91,046 in Warmia (Ermland) and Mazury (Masuren) - i.e. former Southern East Prussia, 37,152 in Gdansk (Danzig) and former West Prussia (Powisle), 18,754 in Pomerania, and 5,131 in the Poznan (Posen) region. Several thousands of them never requested the authorities to nationally verify them, but, anyway, they were also granted Polish citizenship, while some were verified at a later date so the total figure of the Autochthons must have been bigger. In 1950 their number was estimated at 1.65 mln though the Polish official statistics prefer to indicate only the retained German specialists who together with their families numbered 65,400 in 1947. The German sources give the figure of 1.7 mln as the number of Germans who remained in Poland during this time, so in their estimates they include the Autochthonous population.

Until 1950 there was no schooling nor pensions provided for the indubitable Germans. The situation changed when the GDR accepted the Polish-German border in the Gürlitz/Zgorzelec treaty: the ban on the use of German in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete was lifted with the exception of Upper Silesia and Mazury (Masuren) where the Autochthonous population was concentrated, and the German educational system, press and cultural life began to develop quickly in Lower Silesia and Pomerania. The process accelerated after Khrushchov’s break with Stalinism which commenced the political Thaw (Odwilz) in Poland, and indirectly allowed the indubitable Germans to register their official organization.

The positive changes in the official attitude to the indubitable Germans and harshness of continuing Polonization in other cases caused many Autochthons to declare themselves as Germans. The Polish authorities did not wish to accept existence of the German minority within the Autochthonous population because it clashed with the ideologically correct statistics which determined the number of Germans living in Poland at 50,000. In such a situation, many
Autochthons, and the majority of the indubitable Germans (who did not wish to become Polish citizens)\textsuperscript{25} emigrated from Poland as soon as it was only possible. In the years 1956-59 247,766\textsuperscript{26} left Poland for Germany, i.e. five times more than the official number of the German minority members in Poland.

Thus, the Polish authorities could decide that the German problem had been solved for good. Anyway it must be remembered that in the official Polish-German relations from 1952 to 1982 the term German minority in Poland never cropped up, but only the question of family linking\textsuperscript{27}. Since the beginning of the 1960s the official Polish propaganda claimed that there were no Germans left in the country, and that Poland had achieved the Stalinist ideal of ethnically pure one-language-one-nation state. However, the Polish scholarly works (in Poland’s postwar censuses there was no rubric nationality included) estimated the number of the German minority at 4,000 in 1961\textsuperscript{28}, 3,500 in 1971\textsuperscript{29}, and several thousands in 1978 and 1983\textsuperscript{30}. The data clashed with the German sources and the number of emigrants from Poland to Germany. For instance, from 1960 through 1970 116,242 Aussiedlers (ethnic German resettlers) came from Poland to West Germany\textsuperscript{31}, and 305,062\textsuperscript{32} (305,064\textsuperscript{33}) in the years 1971-1982. Moreover, the German side claimed that there were still c. 1.1 mln ethnic Germans residing in Poland at the end of 1982\textsuperscript{34}. The bigger than assumed by the Polish authorities number of Germans living in Poland is also reflected in German academic publications, e.g.: 765,000 in 1961\textsuperscript{35}, c. 700,000 German-speakers in 1971\textsuperscript{36}, and 900,000 in 1978\textsuperscript{37}.

The discrepancy was caused by the fact that Poland did not wish to recognize the existence of the German minority on the Polish soil preferring to cling to the myth of the through and through Polish Autochthons. On the other hand, according to Art. 116 of the German Basic Law every citizen of the German Reich within the frontiers of 31 December 1937, and his descendants have the right to return to Germany and to (re)obtain German citizenship. The right is also extended to former German citizens (and their descendants) who were deprived of their citizenship between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945\textsuperscript{38}. Hence, practically all the citizens of the war-time-size Third Reich, and their offspring can enjoy the right to return which by derivative legislation was extended to comprise also these ethnic Germans who have never lived within the German boundaries but are able to prove their German origin (cf. the Volga Germans in Russia). Consequently, almost all the Autochthons and indubitable Germans in Poland were (and still are) eligible to receive German citizenship. Facing the prevalently disadvantageous legal, economic and social situation in the postwar communist Poland, the German minority could express their existence only through emigration to Germany; understandably so, their activity was limited to individuals, who, on their own, repeatedly petitioned and bribed appropriate authorities to allow them to leave\textsuperscript{39}.

In effect, during the communist years, the German minority became the hostage of the German-Polish and East-West relations: after the end of the Polish Thaw at the beginning of the 1960s rather few applicants were allowed to emigrate to the FRG or GDR until 1970 when the East-West detente and the Polish-German normalization started after the FRG had concluded nonaggression treaties with the USSR and Poland. The liberal emigration policy stopped already in 1973, but was resumed after the signature of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 upon the substantial prodding on the part of the FRG which contributed to the revival of Poland’s ailing communist economy with the jumbo loan of DM 2.3 bln (including DM 1.3 bln for covering the pension benefits due to the former German citizens living within the Polish borders\textsuperscript{40})\textsuperscript{41}. Another limiting of the emigration took place after the introduction of the martial law on December 13, 1981, from 1982 through 1985 only c. 67,700 Aussiedlers arrived in Germany from Poland\textsuperscript{42}. In 1985 Gorbachev took reins of power in the USSR, and the isolated Polish junta led by gen. Jaruzelski readily seized the opportunities offered by the policies of perestroika and glasnost. Already in the same year the Polish-West German rapprochement picked up its lost momentum\textsuperscript{43}, thus in 1987 48,000 Aussiedlers were allowed to leave Poland, in 1988 - already 140,000, and in the memorable year 1989 - 260,340\textsuperscript{44}. Only after the fall of communism the Polish authorities began to acknowledge the existence of the German minority in Poland, though implicit acceptance of such a possibility in the government circles can be traced, at least, back to 1982\textsuperscript{45}. 
The docile resignation of the German minority members to their non-existent status in Poland changed in the second half of the 1970s when they were allowed to visit their kin in the FRG, and German expellees and Aussiedlers started coming to Poland in order to visit their lost Heimat. Family ties were reestablished and subsequently facilitated organization of transports with private and church humanitarian aid to Poland which found itself in an increasingly severe economic crisis. In effect ephemeral and illegal German groups came into being in Lower Silesia and Olsztyn (Allenstein) Voivodship with some help offered by the BdV (Bund der Vertriebenen, Association of the Expellees) and other expellees organizations from Germany. The martial law hindered the activities but the contact channels were not effectively sealed as transports with food parcels and clothes were let in. In 1983 the CDU/CSU government with Chancellor Kohl at its helm replaced its SPD predecessor, and started pressing gen. Jaruzelski’s junta to accept the existence of the German minority in Poland. The newly-established German government favorably viewed the endeavors of the German expellees organizations, with whose help, since 1983, groups of Poland’s Germans began to demand official registration of their organizations. The Polish authorities flatly refused them the right, usually permitting members of such incipient groupings to leave for the FRG which was congruent with the very objective of these Germans who banded together in effort to appeal for liberalization of the Polish emigration policy.

A qualitative and quantitative change in the German movement came about in 1985/86 when first DFK (Deutscher Freundschaftskreis, German Friendship Circle) circles started cropping up in Upper Silesia. They were harassed but not suppressed by the SB (Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa, Security Forces) and already in 1987 boasted 5,000 membership. With the imminent fall of communism the movement rather strove to curb the swelling emigration of Germans from Poland, and to win Poland’s official recognition for its German minority. One of the conclusions of the Round Table talks between Solidarity and the communist government (February-April 1989) was that all the minorities living in Poland are entitled to enjoy all their rights, and on April 7, 1989 the democratic Act on Associations was passed by the Polish Sejm. The opportunity was seized by Jan Krol and his son Henryk from the small Upper Silesian town of Gogolin in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. On the basis of the DFK movement in the voivodship, they established the TSKMN/SKGDM (Towarzystwo Spoleczno-Kulturalne Mniejszosci Niemieckiej/Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen Minderheit, Socio-Cultural Society of the German Minority) and commenced the semi-legal action of gathering declarations from persons living in Upper Silesia, who felt themselves to be Germans. It resulted in 200-250 thousands signatures. They used the declarations as a supportive document to their application for official registration of the TSKMN/SKGDM in 1989. The voivodship court in Opole (Oppeln) refused their request which triggered off negative responses from Germany, and mobilized German minority members in Katowice (Kattowitz) and Czestochowa Voivodships (which contain chunks of historic Upper Silesia), as well as in Gdansk (Danzig) and Olsztyn (Allenstein) Voivodships. They also started establishing their own organizations with the dynamic support flowing from the German expellees organizations.

The sudden re-emergence of the German minority in Poland came as a shock to the Polish society who for decades had been convinced by the official propaganda that there were no Germans left in Poland, and sparked a nationalistic backlash in the Polish press which advocated the view that the German minority in Poland did not consist from real Germans. The anti-German feeling soared when during Chancellor Kohl’s visit to Poland in November 1989, the Polish TV News broadcast a report from his stop in Lower Silesia where a group of Upper Silesian Germans unfurled banners with the inscription: Helmut, du bist auch unser Kanzler (Helmut, you are also our chancellor). It reached its climax at the turn of 1989 and 1990 when Henryk Krol decided to participate in the Senate by-elections in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. The campaign turned dirty with a plethora of chauvinist slurs dealt by the Polish and German election camps and voters against each other. In the first round H. Krol took the biggest amount of votes but he lost in the second one to the Polish candidate, which calmed down the nationalist tension. However, in the window of opportunity opened by the strong grass roots support for H. Krol’s candidacy the three TSKMN/SKGDM organizations of Opole...
(Oppeln), Katowice (Kattowitz) and Czestochowa Voivodaships were registered in January and February 1990.

Thus, the unwilling official acknowledgement of the existence of the German minority in Poland was effected. Now it is a valid question to ask who the present-day members of Poland’s German minority are from the ethnic and historic point of view. Very small pockets of Germans still live in such prewar Polish cities as Radom, Lodz and Poznan (Posen) being the continuation of Poland’s prewar German minority, others are concentrated in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete and in Upper Silesia. The remnants of the indubitable Germans from Lower Silesia and Pomerania are erstwhile German citizens and their offspring. The situation is similar in the case of the indubitable Germans from Gdansk (Danzig) though they were rather citizens of the Free City of Danzig. Moreover, the city and its vicinity is populated by the Kashubs. They together with the Mazurs in former East Prussia and the Upper Silesians in Upper Silesia, constituted the group of former German citizens who were dubbed by the Polish communist authorities as the Autochthons.

Ethnically speaking, they constituted highly heterogeneous populations speaking various Kashub, Polish and other Slavic dialects who identified themselves rather with their small homelands (Heimat) than with Germany, Poland or other nation states. Some of them were bilingual and even multilingual, some got assimilated into the mainstream of the German society while the others developed Polish national identification, therefore, one has to speak about the whole spectrum of identities in relation to the population who was classified as Autochthonous by the Polish authorities who strove to Polonize them.

These discriminatory endeavors without much respect and regard for cultural, religious or ethnic distinctiveness of the Upper Silesians, Mazurs, and Kashubs, who were considered to be Poles unaware of their Polishness at the ideological level, but Germans by the average Pole and local administration, did push the people towards Germandom whose attraction systematically increased with the Wirtschaftswunder in West Germany as opposed to the dreariness of Polish socialist economy. In effect, majority of the Mazurs left for West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, and the remaining 6,000 feel to be German; many Upper Silesians (whose homeland was treated by Poland as an internal colony) decided to leave for West Germany and almost 80% of the remaining ones disassociated themselves from Polishdom, the Slovincians (a branch of the Kashubs) disappeared with their emigration to West Germany, and the rest of the 200-300,000-strong Kashubian minority set out on the way to create their own national identity though several thousands of them identify with Germanism.

These aforementioned ethnic groups form the population basis of the German minority in today’s Poland, as well as, German clerks and workers (together with their progeny) who had come to Upper Silesia, Mazury (Masuren) and the Gdansk (Danzig) region before and during World War II and stayed afterwards evading expulsions. One should not also forget the ethnic German settlers who, in the course of the war, were moved to Silesia and the Polish areas annexed by the Third Reich from their traditional settlements in the Soviet sphere of influence.

Geographically speaking, almost 90% of Poland’s current German minority are concentrated in Upper Silesia, i.e. in the eastern half of Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship, on the western border of Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodaship and in Czestochowa Voivodaship’s south-western corner which was detached from Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship in 1975. In this territorially continuous area Germans constitute the majority of the population which in certain communes (gminas) is almost as high as 100%. Therefore, the region is the very center of the German minority politics in Poland, and the election basis of the minority’s politicians. Also the most important German foundations and organizations have their headquarters there. Several thousands Germans are sprawled in Walbrzych (Waldenburg) and Wroclaw (Breslau) Voivodaships in Lower Silesia. Another important concentration is represented by former East Prussia, i.e. today’s Elblag (Elbing), Olsztyn (Allenstein) and Suwalki (Sudauen) Voivodaships where 25-30,000 Germans live, however, regarding Olsztyn (Allenstein) Voivodaship alone, the largest minority living there are Ukrainians whose population is c.
60-70,000⁶⁴. Considering former West Prussia, i.e. today’s Gdansk (Danzig), Torun (Thorn) and Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) Voivodships, c. 15-18,000 Germans still live there⁶⁵. And some thousands of Pomeranian Germans are concentrated in Szczecin (Stettin) and Slupsk (Stolp) Voivodships. Moreover, minute pockets of Germans are scattered all over the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, i.e. in Lodz and Radom Voivodships⁶⁶. From the religious point of view one may say that while the Germans living in Upper Silesia, are predominantly Catholics, the Germans in other areas are, more often than not, adherents of the evangelical Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession.

The Germans living in Poland are organized in c. 150 organizations⁶⁷. Majority of the organizations are territorially based societies of German inhabitants, but there are also foundations, cultural organizations, charitable societies, associations of farmers, women, youth, Wehrmacht veterans etc.⁶⁸ Almost all the societies are members of the umbrella organization VdG (Verband der deutschen sozialkulturellen Gesellschaften in der Republik Polen/Związek Niemieckich Stowarzyszeń Społeczno-Kulturalnych w Polsce, Association of German Socio-Cultural Societies in the Republic of Poland) with its headquarters in Opole (Oppeln). About 420,000 Germans belong to the organizations grouped in the VdG⁶⁹. The biggest German organizations are the TSKN/ SKGD in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship with c. 200,000 or 180,000 members, the TSKN/ SKGD in Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship - c. 70,000 or 73,500 members, and the TSKN/ SKGD in Czestochowa Voivodship - c. 50,000 or 15,100 members. In Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship the TSKN/ SKGD is rivaled by Dietmar Brehmer’s DAVZ/NWRPP (Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versöhnung und Zukunft/ Niemiecka Wspólnota Robocza Pojednanie i Przyszłość, German Work Group Reconciliation and Future’) with 46,000 or rather 9,000 members. The membership of the three TSKN/ SKGD organizations tends to fluctuate as sometimes the members who do not pay their fees (usually poor old pensioners) are included in the count and sometimes not. Although the three TSKN/ SKGD organizations are registered separately in three different voivodships they function almost as an integral whole with the administrative center in Gogolin, Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. Their town and village branches are known as DFKs, as the grass roots movement of the DFK groups gave rise to the formation of the three TSKN/ SKGDs, and contributed to their eventual registration in 1990. Other important German organizations are based in Olsztyn (Allenstein) - c. 20,000 members, Gdansk (Danzig) - c. 4,200, Szczecin (Stettin) - c. 2,400 members, Slupsk (Stolp) - c. 1,200, Torun (Thorn) - c. 1,000, Wroclaw (Breslau) - c. 800, Poznan (Posen) - c. 700, Bydgoszcz (Bromberg) - c. 700, Bielsko-Biała (Bielitz, Biala) - c. 600, Gorzow (Landsberg, Warthe) - c. 600, Jelenia Gora (Hirschberg) - c. 600, Walbrzych (Waldenburg) - c. 310, Legnica (Lieggnitz) - c. 200, Pilä (Schneidemühl) - c. 200, Lodz - c. 50 members, Zielona Gora (Grünberg) - c. 50, Radom - c. 30⁷⁰. This handful of scattered statistics must suffice for satisfying the question about the number of Germans living in Poland in the absence of any official census data, and when the scholarly and journalistic estimates vary widely from 300,000 to 1.1 mln. It seems that the figure of 600-800,000⁷¹ sounds probable, but one must remember that it may as well rapidly increase should Polish economic or political stability be shaken, because in the times of need many descendants of former German citizens may remember about their right to German citizenship (guaranteed by the German Basic Law) especially if such a choice does not cause discrimination as it used to during the communist times, and still entails automatic reception of EU citizenship as it does nowadays.

From the official acknowledgement of the existence of the German minority in 1989/90, the struggle for rights for the minority has been spearheaded by H. Kroll’s SKGDM/TSKMN. In the 1990 local elections German (i.e. SKGDM/TSKMN) candidates won mandates in 35 out of Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship’s 63 communes (gminas), and they gained majority in 26⁷². For the first time after the end of World War II Germans living in Poland were allowed to elect their representatives. This success was repeated in 1994 during next local elections: Germans elected their representatives to 39 Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship’s communes, and they achieved majority in 26 of them, as well as in five communes in Katowice (Kattowitz) Voivodship and in four in Czestochowa Voivodship⁷³. In the first fully free Polish parliamentary elections in 1991 seven Germans (and simultaneously SKGDM/TSKMN members) entered the Polish Parliaments, six the Sejm and one the Senate⁷⁴. In the
1993 parliamentary elections the German minority lost three seats in the Sejm, but anyway the result can be viewed as a success since prior to the elections the German deputies had contributed to the Sejm’s passing of the exemption for minority candidates from the 5% threshold introduced by the new Electoral Act.

A certain relaxation in the tense relations between the Polish state and the German minority came about with the signature of the Polish-German Border Treaty in 1990 and the German-Polish Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 1991. The latter introduced a modicum of minority rights for the Germans living in Poland, among others the right to minority education, to assemble, to speak in their mother tongue, and to use their names and surnames in German spelling.

Thus, forced assimilation was abolished as a valid political instrument but the parties did not try to solve such contentious issues as dual citizenship nor the question of bilingual place name signs. Moreover, the problems with internalization of the decisions of the treaty into the Polish law indicated the Treaty’s limitations and prompted the SKGDM/TSKMN leader and MP Heinrich Kroll to appeal for a comprehensive Act on Minorities which has not been produced by the Polish Parliament so far.

On the other hand, for a year and a half the Polish courts did not allow the SKGDM/TSKMN to replace the euphemistic phrase German Minority with the word Germans in their name, but at last in 1993 the organization obtained the permit to use their new name SKGD/TSKM (Socio-Cultural Society of Germans). However, already in 1995, before Kohl’s second visit to Poland, the Polish Justice Minister started a lawsuit against the SKGDM/TSKN claiming that their charter included irregularities and they had no right to use their current name but after several months the Polish government lost the case. During the five years of acknowledged political existence of the German minority in Poland one could observe many antagonistic moves dealt against it by the Polish authorities at the central and voivodship level, but the minority never retaliated and always supported market-oriented and democratic initiatives in the Parliament as well as Walesa in the 1995 presidential election against the postcommunist candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Despite anti-German excesses (complete with bomb attacks on German minority headquarters, provocations, and a Polish nationalists raid on a minority village) which periodically recur, the postcommunist Poland with its dynamically growing economy and increasingly democratic institutions proved to be an attractive option to emigration to Germany, especially in the context of the political achievements of the SKGD/TSKN which continues to wrench more rights for the minority who used to be second-class citizens in Poland before 1989. The success can be measured in the substantial drop in the number of Aussiedlers arriving in Germany from Poland (especially from Upper Silesia): 133,872 in 1990, 40,129 in 1991, 17,742 in 1992, 5,431 in 1993, 2,440 in 1994, and 811 in the first four months of 1995, though from other factors curbing this emigration one should enumerate: a less inviting atmosphere for immigrants in the postunification Germany, and considerable financial aid for the minority, which has been flowing from Germany since 1990. In 1990 it amounted to almost DM 7 mln, grew to DM 20.4 mln in 1995 (in the period 1990-1995, Germany transferred well over DM 100 mln for the sake of the minority), and is going to increase to DM 26.6 mln in 1996, as opposed to mere DM 282,000 given by the Polish state in 1994. Moreover, many Germans decided to stay in Poland because since 1991 the German consulates in Poland, on the basis of Art. 116 of the German Basic Law, have been issuing them with German passports despite the fact that neither Polish nor German law accepts dual citizenship. In the years 1991-1994 170,238 persons received German passports in Poland (only 135 applicants were refused German citizenship), and on February 28, 1995 63,392 applications were still awaiting processing. The passport, after 45 years of discrimination and forced assimilation during the communist years, is the guarantee for the Germans living in Poland, because if Polish political or economic reforms go astray, they will have the opportunity to leave for Germany without much ado, as foreign nationals. Besides, the passport is a tangible economic asset which allows its holder to be legally employed in Germany and in the EU, and as such prevents high rates of unemployment among predominantly rural German population with small plots of land in Upper Silesia, while allowing many German minority members to achieve significant economic success in Poland with the money they earned in Germany.
On the other hand, the dual citizenship is a source of envy for Polish neighbors and an instrument used in anti-German campaigns when the minority is accused of disloyalty as some of its members dodge Polish military service or fulfill the duty in the ranks of Bundeswehr. The problem, however, should disappear with Poland’s accession to the EU as it was emphasized by Kohl during his visit in Poland in June 1995 and by Polish politicians.

Albeit Germans living in Poland customarily are not employed as state servants at the voivodship or central level (which does not allow them to participate in the Polish society on equal terms) they are represented in the Polish Parliament and in local governments of numerous Upper Silesian communes which is beneficial for fostering development of business and private initiative among the minority members in Upper Silesia. In order to promote the economic development of the region and the minority, the German members of the local governments established an active club affiliated with the Opole (Oppeln) TSKN/SKGD, the TSKN/SKGD co-established the Zwischenwoivodschafliche Wirtschaftskammer Slask/Miedzywojewodzka Izba Gospodarcza Slask (Slask Intervojvodship Chamber of Commerce) with its seat in Strzelce Opolskie (Groß Strehlitz) . Another achievement was mobilization of the German youth who are organized in the BJDZMMN (Bund der Jugend der deutschen Minderheit in der Republik Polen/Zwiazek Mlodziezy Niemieckiej w RP, Association of the German Youth in the Republic of Poland) with the seat in Wroclaw (Breslau), which boasts 8,000-strong membership.

The Polish attitude towards the German minority changed from the total surprise and even outrage at the political re-emergence of the minority in 1989 to cool acceptance (in November 1994 28% Poles liked the Polish citizens of German origin, 30% did not, and 36% claimed to be indifferent to them, significantly, at that time, the Polish citizens of Russian, Jewish, Ukrainian and Gypsy descent were more disliked than those of German nationality) which had been forced by the sheer pressure of the will of the minority to be recognized, and also due to Germany’s support and Poland’s eagerness to meet some European standards in human and minority rights protection as a member of the Council of Europe, which aspires to access the EU in near future. However, all the rights the minority enjoys at present are the result of their painstaking grass roots, legal and political efforts. As it was shown above, nothing, even implementation of the decisions of the Polish-German Treaty have not come into being without prodding from the minority itself. On the other hand, recurring political campaigns against the minority, and waves of anti-German excesses do not allow the minority to feel safe at home, and indicate that the Polish acceptance of the minority as a bridge between the Polish and German nations is not wholehearted despite flowery statements delivered at the meetings of Polish and German politicians, and the fact that Polish politicians customarily invite German parliamentarians to accompany them during their official visits in Germany, and also despite that that German political figures on their trips to Poland come to Upper Silesia or, at least, hold meetings with the German minority’s representatives at Warsaw. One can only hope, that with time when the average Pole attains more or less the same standard of living as his German counterpart, and become more mobile in Europe, the postwar Polish nationalist intolerance will be less pronounced.

At present, apart from politics, the three TSKN/SKGD organizations in conjunction with the VdG maintain strong links with the organizations of the expellees in Germany with mutual benefit, as the former continue to receive considerable private aid from the latter, whereas members of the latter have more chances to visit their Heimaten. The phenomena attract more young activists into the aging ranks of the BdV in Germany and contribute to economic development in the regions populated by Germans in Poland. The links are fortified by partnerships of Poland’s 26 voivodships and 258 villages, towns and communes with their German counterparts, and regular cooperation between German organizations from Poland and the expellees organizations from Germany, which recently were joined by some German organizations from Czech Hlucinsko (Hultschiner Ländchen) which until 1918 and during World War II had been part of the Upper Silesian county of Ratibor (Raciborz).
In their social activities the German organizations in Poland are seconded by the Catholic Church and the evangelical Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession, which is of great significance for many old German minority members whose children live in Germany and cannot or do not want to take proper care of their parents. Since 1991 the German government and the German Red Cross and Caritas have supported the development of Caritas social care stations in Opole (Oppeln) and Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Dioceses. During the period 1993-1995 the German government subsidized the activities with DM 18.5 mln, and at present there are 51 such stations. The stations also give free meals to the poor and unemployed, train nurses and take care of retarded children. There are plans to establish even more such stations. Moreover, the Caritas uses mobile Polish/German bus libraries to provide its charges with books, and in 1995 the organization decided to open at least 54 rehabilitation cabinets for the ill and disabled in near future. The activities are emulated by the evangelic Church in Pomerania and former West and East Prussia, where the Johanniters (the protestant branch of the Knights of Malta) have already opened six social care stations. These developments coupled with the efforts of German minority organizations to improve service and equipment standards in local hospitals (which often balance on the verge of insolvency) serve not only the German population but their Polish and other nationality neighbors. This fact is recognized by local governments which try not to hinder the initiatives though difficulties crop up at border crossings where the aid coming from Germany is frequently stopped with exorbitantly high customs duties. This help provided by the Churches is also useful in the case of Wehrmacht veterans whose pension problem, despite numerous promises emanating from the Polish and German governments, has not been solved yet, mainly because of the negative stance of the former. These 51,000 registered old men often live in squalid poverty and more than 20% of them have died since 1991. They are still denied veteran status in Poland because they were... German soldiers.

The Catholic and Protestant Churches also foster the spiritual life of the German minority members. Already in 1989 Bishop Nossol got the right to use German in liturgy in the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese, and after the split of the diocese in 1992 the process has also continued in the newly-established Gliwice (Gleiwitz) Diocese. The German faithful were provided with copies of the bilingual, traditional Upper Silesian prayer book Droga do Nieba/Weg zum Himmel which in Germany is used by Aussiedlers from Silesia, the department of pastoral services for the German minority was established in the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese, and at present German masses are celebrated in c. 250 churches of the diocese. The Opole (Oppeln) Diocese and its bishop cooperate with the Breslau (Wrocław) Apostolic Visitature in Germany, which is the continuation of the Breslau (Wrocław) Diocese and represents over one million expellees and Aussiedlers from the former German diocese. On May 26, 1995 Bishop Nossol even celebrated the mass at St. Anna church near Haltern in Westphalia, which for 50 years, in lieu of the most important Upper Silesian pilgrimage shrine in Gora Sw. Anny (St. Annaberg), have continued to be the traditional place of pilgrimages for the Silesian expellees and Aussiedlers who live in Germany. The German Protestants could not be so active as the Catholics because they are less numerous in today’s Poland. Anyway, they managed to establish their own German parishes in Slupsk (Stolp), Pomerania and in Wroclaw (Breslau), and are quite active in their endeavors to receive the right to German celebrations in the parishes with considerable numbers of German parishioners. The German Protestants animate the life of German organizations in Pomerania, former Prussia and Lower Silesia, and cooperate with the Johanniters.

Considering the use of German in liturgy one should not forget that from 1945 to 1989 it was virtually prohibited to use the language in the former Deutsche Ostgebiete, and especially in the areas inhabited by the Autochthonous population. Moreover, the Decree of November 30, 1945 on the State Language and the Office Language in Government and Self-Governments is still in force. In its Art 2 it says: The state language of the Republic of Poland is the Polish language. The state language shall be used by all the government and self-government authorities and administrative offices. Thus, there is still no legal basis to use any other than the Polish language in the official context in Poland. It is one of the most restrictive regulations with which Poland’s minorities are faced. A certain relaxation of the decree was exercised in the sphere of the minority mass media, education and religious life,
but still there is no possibility to display bilingual town/village signs or to use a minority language in an office placed in an area predominantly inhabited by a minority population.

The unresolved language issue is the most important in the German minority’s continuing discussion on preservation of their identity in the situation when the only Germans who speak their language well are people aged 60 or more. The minority members who were born after World War II were not allowed to speak German and actually had to conceal their identity for the sake of survival in communist Poland. This situation also bears negatively on German minority education. There is almost no local intelligentsia among the minority as educated people were exterminated or expelled to Germany as the very first ones. The universities and other higher education schools located in or near the areas populated by the Autochthons did not educate German teachers or very few. Anyway during the communist times, the top priority was to turn out as many Russian teachers as possible, so teachers of modern Western European languages are still scarce in the whole of Poland. Hence, the re-establishment of a German education system in Upper Silesia and elsewhere in Poland demands outside help.

This fact was readily recognized by the German government who started sending German teachers to Poland already in 1990. Their number steadily grew from 17 in the school year 1990/91 to 120 in 1994/95. However, for the sake of fairness to all the Polish citizens the teachers are quite equally sprawled all over the country, only with 45% of them centered in the areas inhabited by Germans. After the fall of communism foreign languages teachers training colleges and special languages teachers departments at higher education institutions were inaugurated in many places in Poland to produce enough teachers of Western European languages to replace Russian in school curricula. In the case of Upper Silesia one can enumerate the Department of German, Opole University and the Foreign Languages Teachers Training College in Opole (Oppeln), similar colleges in Raciborz (Ratibor) and Cieszyn (Teschen, Tesin) and three German teachers educational centers in Niwki (Niewke, Groß Neuland), Opole (Oppeln) and Olesno (Rosenberg).

In 1990/91 German was taught in 184 elementary schools to 5,450 schoolchildren in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship. In 1994/95 the numbers were 265 and 25,000 respectively, whereas the total number of elementary school in the voivodship is 600 with c. 127,000 schoolchildren. Usually, the schoolchildren attending German lessons are taught the language for two school hours (one school hour = 45 min) a week. It is obviously too little for German children to master their language in the light of the fact that their parents have a very limited command of German. So in 1992 German was introduced as a mother tongue to 14 elementary school in Opole Voivodship, which usually means just three school hours of German lessons a week. In 1995/96 there are 131 schools of this kind in the voivodship, 30 in Katowice (Kattowitz Voivodship, and real bilingual German-Polish classes in two secondary schools in Opole (Oppeln) and in another two secondary schools in Kedzierzyn-Kozle (Kandrzin, Heydebreck; Cosel) and Dobrzyn Wielki (Groß Döbern). A similar bilingual class also exists in a secondary school in Bytom (Beuthen).

Thus, the situation, despite these apparent achievements, is bad as there are no straightforward minority schools with German as the medium of instruction unlike in the case of other Polish minorities, though the German minority is, numerically speaking, the biggest minority in Poland. Moreover, the bilingual German classes in the aforementioned secondary schools are mainly attended by Poles as the majority of the German youth learn in vocational schools where there are almost no German teachers. Incidentally, if the present rate of increase in employment of German teachers in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship schools is maintained one can predict that a modicum of a German minority education system will be achieved only in 17 years. It could leave another generation of Germans living in Poland with no knowledge of their mother tongue. Understandably, this is an abominable perspective for the minority leadership who continue to strive to register the DSG/NTO (Deutsch Schulgesellschaft/Niemieckie Towarzystwo Oswiatowe, German Educational Society) in order to revive Germandom in Upper Silesia. Their efforts are often dashed by the uncongenial attitude of the voivodship school authorities and nationalist principals of schools concerned. Moreover, since 1989 the minority organizations and the Opole (Oppeln) Diocese have been actively
initiating gratis German courses for minority members. They have also provided learners with free textbooks obtained as aid from Germany.

Integration (as opposed to assimilation) of the German minority in Poland is strongly dependant on establishing a dynamic German school system which would allow a re-creation of a cultural niche for the minority. Such a system will be possible only when the restrictive decree on the state language in Poland is scrapped, and Poland ratifies The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (signed on February 1, 1995) and signs The European Charter for regional or Minority Languages which set out the European standards for treatment of minorities. Moreover, it is almost shameful that so far Poland has not written protection of minorities into its constitution, has not passed an comprehensive act regulating relations between the state and the minorities, and has not developed an act on minority education. In this respect, Poland which used to be in the forefront of the 1989 changes, lags behind Hungary, Slovakia and even Romania, though the last country is unjustifiably perceived by the Poles as an epitome of backwardness.

The indispensable cultural activity of the minority itself, without which preservation of their identity would not be possible, is quite visible. For instance, in Opole (Oppeln) Voivodaship alone the TSKN/SKGD boasts 15 traditional brass orchestras, 12 music groups, 30 choirs, 28 singing groups, 24 dancing groups and 7 other artistic groups. The small Gliwice (Gleiwitz) publishing house Wokol nas, which was established in 1989, has brought out albums on Upper Silesia, booklets devoted to minority rights and the EU, books on Polish-German relations, as well as, bilingual editions of works by Horst Bienek, one of the most renowned Upper Silesian writers; and the Stowarzyszenie Autorow i Tworcow Mniejszosci Niemieckiej/Gesellschaft Deutscher Autoren (Association of German Minority Authors) published the first anthology with the works by their members in 1995. Moreover, there have been also some grassroots and official initiatives which produce books which strive to do away with the simplistic and nationalistically-tainted stereotypes of the Pole and the German, and in 1995 the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny decided to further the process of German-Polish reconciliation by publishing insightful articles which aim at unideologizing the perception of Polish-German history and relations.

Nowadays, it is almost sure that at least the young generation of the German minority in Poland (especially in Upper Silesia) will be almost fully versed in the German language and culture, which is the very prerequisite to be perceived as a German by the Germans in Germany and by other ethnic Germans who live elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, and did not have to suffer a total ban on the use of their mother tongue in the past. The most contentious issues between the minority and the Polish majority, such as: dual citizenship, military service, the right to return to their homelands for the expellees and Aussiedlers, and the right for foreign nationals to purchase Polish land without much ado, will gradually fade away with the accession of Poland to the EU and full approximation of Polish law to acquis communautaire. However, if this positive scenario is not followed one may expect some nationalist tensions to flare up in some regions of Poland. Thus, it may be worthwhile to observe the behavior of the postcommunist forces which will rule Poland virtually unchecked after the end of President Walesa’s incumbency on December 22, 1995. In the present Polish Parliament the German deputies side with the anti(post)communist opposition and claim that positive changes in the situation of the minority have been hindered if not completely stopped by the postcommunist majority. It is clearly epitomized by the personnel changes in: the Office on Minorities (a body incorporated in the Polish Ministry of Culture and Art) responsible for channeling financial support to the minorities and maintaining contacts between them and the government, the Polish-German Jumbo Foundation fostering German-Polish reconciliation, and at the position of Opole (Oppeln) Voivode’s plenipotentiary on Minorities (which was established by the 1991 Polish-German Treaty). At the turn of 1994 and 1995, when the strength of the postcommunist coalition grew considerably, the management of the two first institutions were replaced with rather nationalist postcommunists, whereas the position of the plenipotentiary has remained vacant until today, which considerably worsens the state of relations between the Opole (Oppeln) Voivodship authorities and the German minority. Moreover, Kwasniewski, the postcommunist successor to Walesa in the office of the
Polish President, is rather quite vague on his and the postcommunist coalition’s would-be approach to Poland’s minorities.123

Notes
1 This coinage was widely used by the Polish postwar propaganda which strove to justify the Soviet-ordained annexation of the German territories claiming that they are ancient Polish lands since they belonged to the Polish state in the 10th c. However, one of the earliest usages can be traced to the post-Munich Polish seizure of the Czechoslovak Transolza part (Zaolzie/Olsa Gebiet) of Tesin Silesia (Tesinsko/Slask Cieszyński/Teschen Schlesien) in 1938 (cf. Komar, Stanislaw. 1939. Czesi i Niemcy na Ziemiach Odzyskanych Slaska Cieszynskiego. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Instytutu Slaskiego).

2 The communist propaganda labelled them and also the German expellees as repatriates which was a misnomer since the people were not returned to the land of their birth as the word suggests but quite on the contrary.

3 Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1, 1945, Art. XII.


7 Reichling, Ibid., p. 17.


10 Repolonized according to the Polish propaganda (See: Hoffnung, no. 18/19, 3 April 1995, pp. 8/9)


16 Gazeta Wyborcza. No. 221, 21 September 1991, p. 11.

17 Reichling, Ibid., p. 48.

18 Gazeta Wyborcza. No. 221, 21 September 1991, p. 11.

19 Ibid.; & Die Vertriebung..., ibid., pp. 494,495 & 497.


22 Hoffnung, no. 18/19, 3 April 1995, pp. 8/9
25 Reichling, ibid., p. 41.
26 Dobrosielski, ibid., p. 33.
30 Reichling, ibid., p. 41.
31 Ibid.
32 Lis, ibid., p. 46/7.
33 Reichling, ibid., p. 46.
39 The sum has never been used for the purpose which is the source of current problems with pensions for Wehrmacht veterans who live in Poland.
42 Dobrosielski, ibid., pp. 40/1.
44 Urban, ibid., p. 100.
45 Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 49, 16-22 December 1994, p. 1; Lis, ibid., p. 64.
46 Urban, ibid., p. 95.
50 Dziennik Ustaw, no. 20, item 104, 1989.
51 Later, when it was allowed by the Polish law they returned to their original unPolonized names and surname, i.e. Johann and Heinrich Kroll.
52 Cyganski, ibid., pp. 41, 45/46; Urban, ibid., pp. 104/5; Lis, ibid., p. 66; Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 221, 21 September 1991, p. 12; & Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 45, 1989.
55 Auslands Kurier, no. 1, November 1991, p. 12
56 Urban, ibid., pp. 110-112; Gazeta Wyborcza. No. 221, 21 September 1991, p. 13; Lis, ibid., pp. 70-72; & Berdychowska, ibid., pp 39, 41 & 42.
57 Odra. no. 5, May 1991, p. 36.
60 Lis, Ibid., p. 140.
63 Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 41, 13-19 October 1995, pp. 1 & 3.
64 Deutscher Ostdienst (Sonderdruck), 16 December 1994, p. 5.
67 Berdychowska, Ibid., pp. 29-45, 48.
71 Berlinska in: Korbel, ibid., p. 53.
72 Nova Trybuna Opolska, 29 June 1994; Deutscher Ostdienst, no. 26, 1 July 1994, p. 4.
74 Lis, ibid., pp. 133/4; & Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 16, 16-31 August 1993.
75 Polish-German Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, Art 20.
79 Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung, no. 11, 1-15 June 1993, pp. 1 & 3.


Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 17, 28 April-4 May 1995, pp. 1 & 3.


It is an obvious continuation of the principle of limited trust which was used in the everyday relations with the Autochthons by the Polish state in the period 1945-1989 (See: Wodz, Kazimiera. 1993. Rewitalizacja slaskiej tozsamosci - sznse i zagrozenia (pp. 7-40). In: Wodz, Kazimiera, ed. Swoi i obcy na Gornym Slasku. Z problematyki stosunkow etnicznych. Katowice: Slask, p. 30).

Berdychowska, Ibid., p. 30.

Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 41, 13-19 October 1995, p. 4.

Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 31, 4-10 August 1995, p. 2.

Wprost. 2 July 1995, p. 20.


Schlesische Nachrichten, no. 1, 1 January 1995, p. 15.

Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 31, 4-10 August 1995, p. 5; Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 41, 13-19 October 1995, p. 3; Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 45, 10-16 November 1995, p. 8.


Oberschlesische Zeitung/Gazeta Gornoslaska, no. 21, 3-9 June 1994, p. 3.


Schlesische Nachrichten, no. 1, 1 January 1995, p. 12.


Dziennik Ustaw, no. 57, Item 324, 1945.

At present the minority publishes a plethora of small ephemeral periodicals as well as its official paper Schlesisches Wochenblatt. Now it is a weekly and has been published since 1991 under two other titles: Oberschlesische Nachrichten/Wiadomosci Gornoslaskie and Gazeta Gornoslaska/Oberschlesische Zeitung.
There are also weekly German programs broadcast by the local radio stations in Opole (Oppeln) and Katowice (Kattowitz), and a TV program Oberschlesische Journal which is transmitted every week from the latter city.

112 Deutscher Ostdiens (Sonderdruck), 16 December 1994, pp. 4/5.
113 Berdychowska, ibid., pp. 78-88.
116 Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 40, 6-12 October 1995, p. 5.
120 Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 44, 3-9 November 1995, pp. 1 & 3.
121 Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 48, 1-7 December 1995, pp. 1 & 3.
122 Wiadomosci Kulturalne, no. 1, 1 January 1995, p. 7, & confidential info from a scholar at the Instytut Slaski in Opole (Oppeln).
123 Schlesisches Wochenblatt, no. 49, 8-14 December, 1995, p. 2.