Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism:
Through the Doors of Perception

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Abstract

This study examines the new terrorism debate and is intended to rethink the root causes of terrorism by examining alternative approaches, in part provided by conflict theory, to the predominant understanding of terrorism provided by what it identifies as orthodox terrorism theory. It presents a critical and discourse analysis approach to explaining and understanding the roots of terrorism and focuses initially on a description and explanation of the existence of orthodox terrorism discourse, clarifying how and why it is constructed, what it is used for and the associated implications it has for understanding terrorism. The study also aims to explore the range of alternative perceptions of terrorism created in terrorism and conflict studies by using international relations theory as frameworks through which to examine different levels of analysis pertaining to terrorism and conflict. The purpose is to develop a multi-level and multi-dimensional framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism based upon the most sophisticated theoretical approaches provided by terrorism and conflict studies. This framework, which also provides a reflexive critique of orthodox terrorism theory, is not intended as a new theory of terrorism but represents an attempt to provide a broader, more comprehensive and holistic approach to the problem of terrorism.

In order to test this comprehensive framework for the analysis of terrorism, this study examines the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and discusses how orthodox terrorism theory is employed by Israel. It also demonstrates how Palestinian terrorism can be re-examined through the application of the alternative framework to reveal a considerably more comprehensive, multi-dimensional and multi-level understanding of the root causes of terrorism. The conclusion of this study suggests that rethinking terrorism will provide an increasingly sophisticated understanding of political violence and equip the study of terrorism with more robust analytical tools with which to create a number of potential channels to facilitate resolution of the deep underlying problems that cause terrorism.
Declarations

I, Jason Franks, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 100,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

date 24.09.04...signature of candidate...

I was admitted as a research student in September 2001 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in September 2001; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2001 and 2004.

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This study was prompted by an initial interest in the study of terrorism and then inspired by deeper questions relating to how it is understood and ultimately why it occurs. The navigation points for these questions were provided by the study of the roots of conflict. So this thesis is a product or hybrid of conflict and terrorism studies. The thinking that inspired the questions tacked in this project originated from the courses run at St Andrews University and extends to researchers and writers the majority of whom are mentioned in the bibliography. I would like to thank all at St Andrews University who helped me with this project, and in particular Oliver Richmond for his guidance, diligence and interest in my work. I would also like to thank the Carnegie Trust and St Andrews University who generously provided the funding for my fieldwork. My gratitude also goes out to all those in the Palestinian Territories and Israel who took the time to speak to me during my research, some of whom have already become victims of the brutal conflict. In particular my thanks go to Gershon Baskin at IPCRI, Fathi Tobail and Sami Abu Salem at the Palestinian State Information Service, and Tahir and Najwa al Assar for their hospitality in Gaza. I am also grateful to Agnes Spink for meticulously proof reading this work. Finally thanks to my family and friends for their support during this period. All errors are of course my own responsibility.
## Terms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Arab Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCE</td>
<td>Before Common Era</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>Common Era</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>Fateh</td>
<td>Palestinian National Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>Fedayeen</td>
<td>Irregular Arab Fighter</td>
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<td>Hamas</td>
<td>The Islamic Resistance Movement</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Force</td>
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<td>IJ</td>
<td>Islamic Jihad</td>
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<td>NIS</td>
<td>New Israeli Shekel</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>PDFLP</td>
<td>Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFLP-GC</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Palestinian National Council</td>
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<td>PLA</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Army</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNLU</td>
<td>Unified National Leadership of the Uprising</td>
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<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Palestinian Refugees</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
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Introduction

‘Terrorism’ has become the plague of the twenty first century: it is a concept that has seemingly penetrated all quarters of international society, especially in the wake of the September 11th attacks in New York and the subsequent “war on terrorism.” Few places on the globe are now unaffected by the hysteria caused by ‘terrorism.’ It has given new meaning to ongoing ‘domestic conflicts’ and redefined wars in all continents of the planet. Previously considered indigenous ‘terrorist’ groups involved in local conflicts are now often perceived to be linked to the worldwide nebulous bin Laden organisation that has truly globalised ‘terrorism.’ From Europe and Russia, through the Middle East to the Philippines, Indonesia, Nepal, South America and Africa multifarious new ‘terrorist’ situations are continuously being identified.1 However, despite having its international profile raised immeasurably, ‘terrorism’ is far from a new phenomenon, as the consensus of academic opinion dates it to the French revolution and the Nihilists of 19th century Russia,2 suggesting that it has been a continuous part of modern world history.

Nevertheless, despite the historic existence and the apparent global omnipresence of ‘terrorism’ in wars, politics, the media and society in general, there is no commonly accepted understanding of what actually constitutes ‘terrorism,’ as no

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clear and universally acknowledged definition actually exists.\textsuperscript{3} ‘Terrorism’ is essentially a contested concept.\textsuperscript{4} This assumption, which is also disputed,\textsuperscript{5} forms the basis for this study, which is designed to rethink and re-examine how terrorism is explained and understood relative to different perspectives. For example, terrorism can be presented as a concept that is defined and understood relative to the legitimacy of state governance,\textsuperscript{6} or as specific methods of political violence\textsuperscript{7} or as acts of violence against a specific target group.\textsuperscript{8} As a result of the apparent confusion surrounding the understanding and definition of terrorism, terrorism studies has become preoccupied with the constant debate which revolves around explaining what actually constitutes terrorism and how to counter it: instead of perhaps concentrating on why it actually occurs. This is directly attributable to the lack of any collectively recognised and accepted understanding of what the problem actually is. As a result it is naturally proving difficult to establish a firm basis upon which to investigate why it occurs. This has become increasingly more difficult in the contemporary world especially as the definition and understanding of conflict is also changing due to the uncertainty caused by the end of the Cold War and the growing influence of globalisation. This apparent transformation in the understanding of war, conflict and terrorism has been examined in the ‘new war’ ‘new terrorism’ debates.\textsuperscript{9}

The new war / new terrorism debates challenge the traditional understanding of conflict as interstate war or symmetric conflict. The crux of the debates suggest that new conflict is no longer conducted in a highly organised and ritualised manner


\textsuperscript{4} I have employed inverted commas to emphasis this point and although I will not continue using them, terrorism is to be taken as a contested concept unless otherwise stated or defined in the text.

\textsuperscript{5} Although the definition of terrorism is exhaustively debated proponents of Orthodox terrorism theory argue that the understanding it is not contested. See chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{6} Terrorism is predominantly defined by states as illegitimate and illegal. For example, the United States Department of Defence defines terrorism as: “Unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, religious or ideological objectives.” Hoffman, \textit{Inside Terrorism}. p.30.

\textsuperscript{7} For example, the United Nations (UN) defines terrorism in relation to international conventions, which attempt to deal with terrorism by prohibiting the method of violence used, such as Hijack and Bombing. See Friedlander R A, (ed), \textit{Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control}, 4 Vols Dobbs Ferry: New York, Oceana, 1979-84, vol.1, pp.253-8. Quoted in Wilkinson, \textit{Terrorism Versus Democracy}. pp.190-191.

\textsuperscript{8} Terrorism has also been defined as simply violence against civilians. See, Wilkinson, \textit{Terrorism Versus Democracy}.

between designated armies with established codes of conduct and comprising of particular and stylised violence. All of which is intended for the specific purpose of achieving perceived gains such as political advantage or territory.\textsuperscript{10} The debates argue that this old type of warfare existed and was propagated by the perceived existence of the realist state-centric Westphalian international state system. A system that is based on the governmental and territorial legitimacy of the state, one in which the sovereign state is the principal actor and the standing state army its policy tool. This was particularly prevalent during the Cold War when conflict was related to the state-centric and ideologically polarised bi-polar world. However, in the confusion of the post-Cold War world, the propensity for inter-state conflict has been replaced by intra-state conflict. Kaldor identifies these as "new wars"\textsuperscript{11} taking the form of asymmetric warfare between groups, movements and organisations often against the state but predominantly within it. These new conflicts are often described as ethnic identity conflicts, characterised by irredentist and secessionist movements and multi-party civil war. They are often underwritten by religious or ethno-nationalist ideas and characterised by hatred, fear and genocide and, as Holsti suggests, have no declarations of war, few battles and are typified by attrition, terror and violence against civilians.\textsuperscript{12}

The new war debates suggest that recognition of these new forms of conflict have occurred in the disorder and uncertainty caused by the end of the cold war and the realignment of the international system following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it could also be due to the failure of the state as an institution and the unsuitability of the Westphalian system as an international order. For example, Kaldor suggests that new wars are a product of the erosion and disintegration of the state.\textsuperscript{13} But it is a tangible argument to suggest that this degradation of an established structure of governance by ethnicity and identity could have been occurring chronically in recent history, only it may have been obscured by the ideological monochromatic veil of the Cold War. The fracturing of the institution of the state and the growing doubt as to its compatibility with the trends of the contemporary world is

\textsuperscript{10} Holsti, \textit{The State}, p.1.
\textsuperscript{11} Kaldor, \textit{New and Old Wars}.
\textsuperscript{12} Holsti, \textit{The State}, p.20.
\textsuperscript{13} Kaldor, \textit{New and Old Wars}, p.4.
also personified by the globalisation debate\textsuperscript{14} in which the established borders, populations and governance of the state are increasingly undermined by social interconnectedness and trans-state and suprastate forms of global governance. This coincides with the rise of identity and importance of the individual in terms of ethnicity and security and is typified by the growing value attached to individual human rights. This argument suggests that in order to recognise these contemporary trends and understand this new type of conflict, which relates to nations, communities, groups and individuals often within states or irrespective of established state boundaries, it is necessary to move beyond the state into the late or post-Westphalian system.\textsuperscript{15} So by departing from the rigid state-centric Westphalian system it will be possible to recognise the roots of contemporary conflict as existing in areas such as identity, representation and participation.\textsuperscript{16} Arguably, conflict studies is making this transition into recognising and dealing with conflict outside of the traditional state-based understanding and is moving into employing more sophisticated, and comprehensive approaches for resolving it. This is apparent in third and fourth generation multi-dimensional approaches to conflict, found in conflict resolution and transformation and peace building techniques, such as those explored by Boulding, Vayrynen and Lederach.\textsuperscript{17}

Terrorism theory is at a similar point of crisis, as it is affected by the same post-Cold War and globalisation trends and is also in the international spotlight following September 11\textsuperscript{th} and the war on terrorism. However, the study of terrorism has not yet embraced the change and made the transition to a more holistic understanding of the roots of political violence. This is largely because attempts at understanding “new terrorism” are still located in the Cold War, state-centric realist and positivist understanding, principally because the predominant understanding of terrorism is as a state discourse. Terrorism is defined primarily in terms of state legitimacy and is largely understood to represent a challenge and threat to state authority. The conventional orthodox understanding of terrorism does not engage in a

roots debate with the causes of terrorism. This is a problem not just for approaching and dealing with terrorism by the symptomatic management of the violence, but also for enacting long-term solutions that attempt to solve the root causes, in the style of conflict resolution, such as those established by John Burton.\textsuperscript{18} It is also becoming a problem for understanding “new terrorism”\textsuperscript{19} which like new war does not necessarily fit the state-centric parameters employed in the past. ‘New Terrorism’ according to Walter Laqueur is deadly violence perpetrated by unidentified amorphous non-state groups, who often bear no relation to their country of origin and who claim no responsibility for their actions. They intend to kill as many people as possible, predominantly non-combatants and their blind lethal violence is typified by hate, aggression and anger.\textsuperscript{20}

![Diagram of Conflict, Terrorism, Peace, and Root Causes]

\textit{Figure 1.1} The ‘new war’ / ‘new terrorism’ nexus


\textsuperscript{20} Laquer. \textit{New Terrorism}. 
The new war / new terrorism debates suggest that those involved in these types of violence are becoming increasingly hard to separate, especially as those involved in terrorism often perceive themselves to be in conflict. This conceivably accounts for the high lethality against non-combatants and the similarities in the type of violence used in both new war and new terrorism. This implies that if the symptoms of these types of violence are becoming increasingly similar then perhaps the root causes might also share a common ground, see figure 1.1. The problem is that whilst the study of conflict has moved on and engaged with alternative methods of understanding war and conflict, the orthodox terrorism understanding is still constrained by the relative moral legitimacy debate.\textsuperscript{21} It is presently unable to break out of this understanding and therefore significantly hinders any engagement in a roots debate using alternative multi-dimensional analytical tools.

The purpose of the following study is to approach this problem and argue that just as a rethinking has been successfully applied to conflict. What needs to happen now is a rethinking of terrorism if any useful progress is to be made in approaching and understanding the root causes with the aim of resolving the problems and ending the atrocious forms of violence currently being experienced. To facilitate this change I intend to shift the definition and understanding of terrorism out of the unhelpfully restrictive relative moral legitimacy debate and into a realm more closely associated with contemporary conflict. This will allow the study of terrorism access to the comprehensive and multi-dimensional range of analytical tools used by conflict studies to improve the understanding of terrorism and hopefully make significant progress toward eradicating the reasons for the manifestation of this type of lethal political violence.

\textsuperscript{21} This debate relates to the relative understanding of terrorism employed by each side, for example, states believe they have legitimacy and brand any challenge to their authority as illegitimate. Terrorist groups, who by definition challenge the political authority of the state, deem themselves and their cause legitimate and conversely view the state as illegitimate. The relative moral legitimacy debate is summed up in the expression, ‘one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist.’ See Chapter 1.
Defining the Study

This study is an attempt to re-think the roots of terrorism by relocating the study of terrorism into a conceptual space in which it can gain access to the tools provided by conflict studies. As a result this work addresses a gap in the field of terrorism studies. I aim to argue that terrorism studies has not progressed beyond the realist positivist state-centric approach because it is a discourse created and employed with the express purpose of providing the state with an understanding of terrorism that is based upon a relative legitimacy. This allows the state to deal with terrorism without engaging in a roots debate, as it perceives terrorism as a threat to its security. It can therefore employ whatever means it chooses against whomever it wishes. This is the ‘orthodox terrorism discourse’ and is supported by an extensive body of literature that relates to how terrorism is understood relative to the authority and legitimacy of the state in relation to unlawful, coercive and terrorising violence against the state for political ends. It also forms the basis of counter terrorism and anti-terrorism policy construction.

This study focuses on:

1. An explanation and clarification of the existence of orthodox terrorism discourse. How and why it is constructed, what it is used for, and the associated problems.
2. The creation of an alternative theoretical framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism based upon the best theoretical approaches provided by terrorism and conflict studies.
3. A demonstration of how different approaches to terrorism can reveal different root causes when applied to the case study of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
4. A working example of how the application of the alternative framework can provide a comprehensive multi-dimensional understanding of the roots of terrorism.

This study employs a critical approach to orthodox terrorism discourse and the normative use of the conventional understanding of terrorism. It seeks to open the debate on the causes of terrorism by aligning it with the causes of conflict and
employing the methods and approaches provided by conflict studies to rethink the roots of terrorist violence. The aim of this study is not to establish a new theory of terrorism but to attempt to provide a broader and more comprehensive and holistic framework with which to approach the problem of terrorism. This will provide an increasingly sophisticated understanding of terrorism and equip the study of terrorism with more robust analytical tools with which to create a number of potential channels to facilitate resolution of the violence. This study highlights and fills the gaps that exist in the existing literature on the roots of terrorism, particularly in the realm of political, socio-economic and psychological causes. To achieve this it draws heavily on the debates provided by conflict studies. These debates clearly demonstrate the inadequacy of the orthodox approach to terrorism, as it cannot entertain a roots debate due to the constraints imposed by the moral legitimacy of the definition.

Chapter 1 is a comprehensive literature review of terrorism studies. It will explain the current state of research on terrorism including the definitional debate and seek to encompass the principal methods, lens, frameworks and ideas through which terrorism can be defined and understood. It is an interdisciplinary and multilevel investigation incorporating the main theoretical schools of IR theory as levels of analysis. It will reveal the existence of orthodox terrorism discourse and clearly explain how and why it is employed.

Chapter 2 is an extensive literature review of conflict studies encompassing the main theories, paradigms, frameworks and ideas through which conflict can be defined and understood. This also provides an interdisciplinary and multilevel investigation incorporating the main theoretical schools of IR theory as levels of analysis, as well as political theory, social conflict theory, philosophy, anthropology, sociology and psychology.

Chapter 3 is a comparative chapter and contains the construction of an alternative comprehensive framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism. It provides a comparative analysis of both terrorism and conflict literature in order to critically compare and contrast what tools the two approaches can offer as a way of comprehensively understanding terrorism and its root causes. It identifies the apparent gaps in the terrorism theories used to explain the root causes of terrorism and shows how conflict studies can provide approaches to violence with which to successfully

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22 These debates and frameworks will be discussed at length in chapter 2.
fill these spaces. It consists of the composition of a theoretical multi-level and multidimensional framework that essentially combines the various perspectives of terrorism into a single framework. This can be employed in order provide a holistic understanding of the root causes of terrorism. It also discusses what issues arise from this comparison and what implications they have for understanding terrorism.

Chapter 4 deals with the historical roots and the evolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and is the chosen case study for this project. It contains an historical evaluation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to date via a comprehensive review of the literature to establish how the events and facts of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are understood in reference to the two central conflict discourses, “Palestinianism” and “Zionism.” It also shows how the roots of the conflict and of terrorism are understood relative to these discourses and how they help to sustain the conflict via the construction of historical narratives.

Chapter 5 is a defence of the central claim of this study that it is possible to rethink the root causes of terrorism by employing an alternative and comprehensive framework. The theoretical framework constructed in chapter 3 is applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in this chapter. The application of fieldwork data to this framework demonstrates the two central claims of this study. First, the existence of the orthodox terrorism discourse its uses and its limitations. Second, it shows how an alternative understanding that combines the various perspectives of the roots of terrorism can be revealed and how useful this is for viewing the existence of multifarious political, social, economic and psychological causes of violence.

Finally, the conclusion deals with the implications for the use or employment of the alternative terrorism discourse and what future applications it may or may not have. It suggests the disadvantages and the central problems of employing this approach in a project to investigate the roots of terrorism and it discusses how this discourse might be employed alongside more normative counter and anti-terrorism policies that are employed by states dealing with terrorism. The conclusion will primarily suggest recommendations and possible useful applications for the alternative approach to terrorism while taking into account its own inherent problems.
Methodology

The Critical Approach

This study into rethinking the roots of terrorism is based on two methodological approaches, critical theory and discourse analysis. Critical theory is a method of examination suggested by Robert Cox, which is used to question all theories and assumptions, where no theory is the right one and the facts are not independent and objective but the product of specific theoretical frameworks. This method of examination is adopted throughout this study in order to rethink terrorism and principally question how, why and for what purpose terrorism is understood, ultimately questioning if it can be understood in an alternative way. As Cox suggested critical theory attempts to find the source of understanding by stepping outside the confines of existing relationships. He suggests that it “asks how the order came about and calls into question the nature of the existing structures.” Centrally, the critical method seeks to ask, why is the theory employed? What tasks is it designed to perform? And, what is the purpose of the particular interpretation of the facts? As Roland Bleiker suggests “Critical theories problematise existing power relations and try to understand how they have emerged.” These ideas were also developed by Andrew Linklater who used critical theory to examine boundaries. These boundaries, particularly within the political community, are questioned in relation to the reason for their existence and nature of their role.

Discourse analysis complements this and questions the “category of reality.” Discourse, according to Jim George, is a “matrix of social practice that gives meaning

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25 Cox, Approaches to World Order, p.10.
26 Cox, Approaches to World Order, p.88.
27 Cox, Approaches, p.87.
30 George, Discourses, p.28.
to the way people understand themselves and their behaviour." By engaging in discourse analysis, George built upon the Foucaultian power-knowledge relationship by arguing that, contrary to the positivist debate, knowledge is linked to power and thus only through power (within a particular discourse) can ‘truth’ be established. Although this is a subjective ‘truth’ or ‘regime of truth’ the critical process can help to identify the root of power, which it can be argued, is the key to understanding issues, institutions, structures and relationships. Bleiker endorses the use of discourses, which he sees as "a most viable conceptual tool...it facilitates an exploration of the close linkages that exist between theory and practice." It is also important to stress the link between theory and practice, this is an argument endorsed by Jenny Edkins in an examination of Foucault. She suggests, “The two do not exist in some separate way but are mutually constituted.” This implies that discourse and practice cannot be separated; it is an argument that I apply throughout this study. As Foucault suggests, “Theory does not express, translate or serve to apply practice: it is practice.” This argument is complemented by Walker who supports recognition of the link between discourse and practice. He argues that empirical theory or policy analysis should not be isolated arbitrarily from meta-theoretical and philosophical assumptions that are often drowned out by appeals to objectivity or reality.

Through this critical and discourse approach, which is applied to the root causes of terrorism, no single theory can be accepted as the truth. Critical theory attempts to question the nature of the theory used to interpret ‘facts’ which are seen, not as independent and objective occurrences, but as a product of the specific social and historical frameworks. This approach is in direct contrast to the ideas of an established and scientific order to the international world as provided by positivism. These methods of analysis are particularly useful for rethinking the roots of terrorism

31 George, Discourses p.29.
33 The positivist debate relates to the debate on the construction of knowledge. Positivism is based on assumptions relating to: the unity of science, the neutrality of facts, the regularity of the ‘natural world’ and the determination of the ‘truth’ by using these neutral facts in an empiricist epistemology. See Baylis and Smith, Globalisation, p.168.
34 George, Discourses, p.221.
35 Bleiker, Popular Dissent, p.17.
and provide perfect analytical tools for examining how terrorism is understood relative to the perspectives created by international relations theory. This approach is also useful for examining the positivist orthodox terrorism discourse provided by realism. Critical methods are applied to the different perspectives of terrorism in order to break down and deconstruct established views and question concepts by critically re-examining the theories used to interpret the ‘facts’ relating to the understanding of terrorism. They also generate an examination of alternative theories and understandings, as critical theory can never produce a universal or single accepted truth. All truth is subjective depending on the theory employed to understand it.

The implications for reassessing the roots of terrorism using these methods is particularly useful in respect to the well established and institutionalised normative understanding of terrorism provided by orthodox terrorism theory. As a result this theory can be viewed as a specific discourse or ‘just a theory’ instead of the accepted ‘truth’ to explain the manifestation of lethal political violence. This approach also helps expose the study of terrorism to a progressively wider dimension and in particular open it up to a much needed roots debate. It is important to stress that by employing this approach any proposed theory for understanding terrorism is subject to the same critical analysis, so no single theory for the roots of terrorism is possible as each is subject to a relative understanding.

The principal aim of this study is to critically examine the different discourses that relate to how terrorism is understood, by investigating the different approaches to the roots of terrorism provided by the different international relations theories. From this it is possible to construct a comprehensive theoretical framework that bridges ontological boundaries and which can incorporate different perspectives of the roots of terrorism into a holistic multi-level and multi-dimensional framework. In the first two chapters of this study, I critically examine how the discourses of realism, pluralism, structuralism and liberalism provide different perspectives of terrorism and conflict. These approaches produce different understandings and explanations of terrorism,\(^{40}\) which claim under their relative perspectives to be true, but can be

\(^{40}\) Hollis and Smith argue that depending upon which traditions are chosen; scientific or hermeneutic to approach problems in international relations, depends whether the problem will be explained or understood. Suggesting that the natural sciences seek to explain from ‘outside’ and the interpretive approach seeks to understand from ‘inside.’ This study is a departure from this approach and represents a holistic method that seeks to show how different perceptions provide different explanations and understandings of terrorism. See, Hollis M, Smith S. Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992 3rd ed. Also see, Walker. Inside / Outside.
displayed in the comprehensive framework as one of a number of alternatives from which a holistic and multi-level understanding of the roots of terrorism can be constructed. The mainstream international relations theories or lenses create different perceptions, and provide alternative approaches to explaining and understanding international relations.\textsuperscript{41} They are employed in this study with the sole purpose of establishing levels of analysis from which a multi-level framework can be constructed that can be employed to holistically rethink the root causes of terrorism. The theories of realism, pluralism, structuralism and liberalism are employed to establish a multi-level approach by corresponding primarily to the state actor, the non-state actor, the structure and the individual respectively. The outcome of which can be used as the foundation for a multi-level theoretical framework for rethinking terrorism, which is based on the multi-dimensional approaches provided by third and fourth generation conflict resolution.\textsuperscript{42}

The outcome of this project is to provide a wide-ranging and broad theoretical framework containing different perspectives of terrorism in one study. This will provide a more advanced and holistic understanding, and ultimately a more useful approach to the roots of terrorism. It is important to stress that this is a theoretical study that intends to combine different perspectives of terrorism, which by definition\textsuperscript{43} are mutually exclusive. The reasons for the employment of different discourses for understanding terrorism, and the inherent problems with combining these approaches will be discussed throughout the study. As will the major political obstacles that exist against constructing a holistic approach to terrorism especially in regard to the formation and implementation of state terrorism policies.

\textsuperscript{41} See Hollis and Smith, \textit{Explaining and Understanding}.
\textsuperscript{42} See, Richmond, \textit{Maintaining Order}, chapters 5 and 6.
Research Method

The basis of the research strategy for this study is theory-then-research; the intention is to construct a multi-level and multi-dimensional theoretical framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism from a hybrid of created theories drawn from the literature in terrorism and conflict studies, and then test it by data collection from qualitative research (fieldwork) in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The primary intention with this study is to deconstruct the accepted orthodox theory of terrorism and challenge its understanding of the roots of terrorism with an alternative framework, this theoretical framework is not intended as a replacement for orthodox theory but a holistic approach that encompasses a wide range of theoretical approaches. Although the methodological criticism with this ‘theory-first’ approach is that the results might be selected to fit the theory, it is a design favoured by Karl Popper who believed in establishing theories and then challenging them. He suggested, “If we try we can breakout of our frameworks, admittedly we shall find ourselves again in a framework but it will be better and roomier and we can break out again.”

This research strategy has been selected because the theoretical approaches created for this study from the literature on terrorism and conflict need to be tested. This strategy provides a method of incorporating them into a comprehensive theoretical framework and is also an approach that is complementary to the techniques of critical theory. The theories for this study have been created and established into a conceptual framework, which is classified as “categories in a structure of assumed propositions,” where the propositions are statements that explain empirical observations. These are the multi-level roots of terrorism theories and are to be accepted or rejected. Although the component ‘terrorism’ theories or propositions of each level in the conceptual framework are to be tested, it is the comprehensive framework itself as an approach to rethinking the roots of terrorism that comprises the central theory under test (see annex 1).

45 Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, Research Methods, p.41.
Research Design

The research design selected for the collection of data in this project is a case study of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is a study of the contemporary events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict up to and including the first two years of the second Intifada and will involve the period January – April 2003 for fieldwork. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict was chosen as a case study because it provides an interesting and suitable example of a contemporary conflict in which the orthodox understanding of terrorism is a central feature and a roots debate is contested. It also has the potential as a useful test-site for the roots of terrorism theories constructed in the conceptual framework because it has all the components of a protracted social conflict. Furthermore, from the researcher perspective it provides an examination of a conflict from a standpoint of cultural neutrality, by which I mean the researcher is not related to either the Muslim or Jewish cultures. It was also suitable from a language perspective as English is widely spoken in Israel and the researcher has a basic written and spoken knowledge of Arabic.

The fundamental problem with a case study research design according to Denscombe is the “credibility of generalisation made from the findings.” Whilst it is accepted that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is unique, it does demonstrate extensive similarities with other types of contemporary ethno-nationalist and identity conflicts. This suggests that this selected case study can produce credible generalisations to support this study of terrorism. A further problem with this approach is the “perceived production of soft data” which relates to the data gathering techniques employed in this strategy, particularly qualitative data and interpretive methods. Whilst this research strategy will largely employ these methods, every effort will be made to ensure it is complemented with quantitative data such as secondary data analysis and statistical studies. A further criticism of case studies is boundaries, relating to which sources of data to include. This case study will focus on gathering data from the set boundaries established by the multi-level framework. Data gathering will therefore be

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46 See chapter 3.
concentrated and bounded by the levels of analysis, which in this study are: state, non-state, structural and individual (see annex I). The chosen research strategy will also attempt to overcome the other two problems associated with case studies, “negotiating access” and the “observer effect” by engaging in qualitative research as a non-participant observer in a broadly ethnographic approach to fieldwork, albeit within a limited time frame.

The main advantage of the case study design is that it provides holistic analysis by allowing for the employment of a variety of research methods that will provide multiple sources of data. These will help to facilitate validation through techniques such as triangulation. It is also suitable for the observation of the phenomenon of conflict and terrorism, as it requires no input from the researcher. Furthermore, due to the relative time constraints of the fieldwork useful research can be conducted in a limited number of sites. The case study is also a suitable design for theory testing research.

Data Collection

Data collection in this case study concentrates on qualitative research or fieldwork in Israel and the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. According to Frankfort-Nachmias et al, qualitative research takes the form of “a study of people acting in the natural course of their daily lives.” The ‘people’ in this fieldwork are those directly involved with the conflict in the period from January – April 2003. For Israelis, this focuses on representatives of the Israeli State, such as the government, military, police and intelligence services. For the Palestinians, it is the principal political groups, namely Fateh, PFLP, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, and their respective armed wings: Tansim, Abu Ali Mustapha Brigade, al Quds Brigade and al-Qassim as well as the increasingly independent al-Aqsa martyrs brigade. Also interviewed are the individuals in the conflict both Palestinian and Israeli. these

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51 Triangulation is the validation of theory by combining different forms of data collection. See, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, Research Methods, p.203.
52 For the advantages of the case study approach see, Denscombe, Good Research Guide, p.20.
53 Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, Research Methods, p.281.
include. Israeli Soldiers, settlers, and civilians as well as Palestinian fighters, refugees and civilians. Also included is a broad representation of Palestinian and Israeli academics and non-governmental organisations. Attention is focused primarily on those directly in the conflict such as Israeli soldiers and Palestinian fighters and the leaders and politicians on both sides. However, ‘ordinary’ Israeli and Palestinian people are also observed and questioned in the belief that even though they are not perhaps directly involved with violence, they are, as Israeli or Palestinian people, automatically part of conflict at some level. For this reason I included all the findings from questions and observations during the fieldwork into the data collection on the conflict.

For the observation of ‘daily lives,’ qualitative research was conducted in the main cities of Israel, particularly, ‘new’ Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa, as well as numerous smaller towns and villages. The Palestinian research was conducted in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, specifically in Gaza city and the refugee camps of Nuseirat, Khan Younis and Jabalia and in East Jerusalem. Also the Old City of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jericho and Nablus.

The techniques employed were non-participant observation and survey research in the form of interviews. Observation has the advantage of directness, the natural setting, validation of verbal reports and the experience of the contextual background.\textsuperscript{54} It focuses on the levels of analysis provided by the conceptual framework constructed in chapter 3 and seeks to collect data by observation of behaviour and situations and involves a certain level of inference.\textsuperscript{55} The survey research involves personal interviews in the form of formal schedule-structured questions for representatives of the Israeli state and the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{56} and also ad hoc informal non-constructed talks with Palestinian and Israeli individuals.\textsuperscript{57} Also included are a broad representation of Palestinian and Israeli academics and non-governmental organisations. Throughout the fieldwork, ethical consideration is given in this potentially dangerous environment, to privacy, sensitivity of information, settings under observation, dissemination of information, anonymity, confidentiality

\textsuperscript{54} For the advantages of observation see, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, \textit{Research Methods}, p.206.
\textsuperscript{55} Observations from the fieldwork were recorded into Fieldnotes at the time or as soon as possible after events.
\textsuperscript{56} The format of the formal interview questions for the representatives of the Israeli state and the Palestinians were read directly from an established list, which was employed on every occasion. The formal interviews were tape recorded and transcribed into interview transcripts.
\textsuperscript{57} These informal interviews were noted at the time or written after the event into Fieldnotes.
and the code of ethics, relative to sensitive research areas. The researcher also gained informed consent and comprehension from those interviewed, and where possible observed.

Data collection is also complemented by secondary data analysis from documents and sources from Israeli, Palestinian and independent non-governmental organisations. The purpose of this research is to provide data collection from a multi-level examination of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This will be used to test the comprehensive framework constructed in chapter 3, thereby providing a grounded theory for re-thinking the roots of terrorism outside the established orthodox approach to terrorism. In reference to Annex II, the application of the data to the comprehensive framework was achieved by testing the implications at each level. This was accomplished by questioning the particular approach that corresponds to the implication. The format of the formal schedule-structured interviews reflected the approach to be questioned. For example, (with reference to Annex II) at the state level, the existence of inherent terrorism is to be tested; so formal questions, observations and secondary data analysis are directed at representatives of the Israeli state in reference to the state approach to terrorists. From the answers, conclusions were drawn as to the existence of inherent terrorism, and so on, through the levels. In chapter 5 all the case-study data collated from the fieldwork is applied to the theoretical framework in this manner. The intention is to demonstrate how the application of the data collected from the field research relates to the comprehensive framework in order to support the claim of this study that the roots of terrorism can be re-examined in a wider and more holistic approach outside of the orthodox terrorism discourse understanding.

**Fieldwork in Practice**

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict was chosen as the fieldwork case study for this project because of the central role terrorism has in the understanding of this conflict. The different perspectives and relative understandings of this conflict vis-à-vis terrorism suggested that it can provide a rich and comprehensive source of data with

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58 For comprehensive arguments on the ethics of fieldwork see, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, Research Methods, pp.76-98.
which to test the theoretical framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism constructed in chapter 3. For example, the Israeli State defines the conflict in a manner familiar with the orthodox understanding of terrorism, 59 where as the Palestinians see it as a freedom struggle and legitimate conflict. 60 Other, more moderate discourses view the existence of some socio-economic and political root causes as generating the violence. 61

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict also provides an advantageous fieldwork choice because of the relative proximity of the actors and the events. The conflict exists in a relatively small area and for this reason provides easy access for observation and interviews. This was particularly relevant in the Gaza strip where the majority of the Palestinian interviews were conducted and where direct exposure to the events of the conflict was possible. During the period of the fieldwork, the population of the Gaza Strip was not able to travel out of the province; in fact their movement around the Strip itself was also considerably limited due to continued incursions by the Israeli army. The strategic locations of the Israeli settlements enable the IDF at any time to divide the Gaza strip into three separate areas. This successfully isolates each area from physical contact with the others and effectively renders movement in the Gaza Strip impossible. These incursions represented the violent interface between the IDF and the Palestinians. The Palestinian fighters comprise generally of local people, particularly from the refugee camps but also from the surrounding towns. Once inside the refugee camps and with the help of interested parties 62 it was possible to gain comprehensive access to these fighters. Also, due to the restrictions on travel it was possible to conduct extensive interviews with representatives of the leadership of the main Palestinian political and armed groups. Travel between regions, relatively simple for a British national, especially between Gaza and the West Bank was also useful for observing the conflict environment.

59 The conflict was described by an Israeli MK as “using moral or unjust means of coercion…forcing political decisions not according to power but emotional stress and fear. Yulie Tamir, MK Labour-Menad, Knesset: Jerusalem, 01.04.2003, Interview transcripts, p.31.
60 A legitimate conflict to “defend and oblige the enemy (Israel) to leave our land and end the occupation.” Kalyid Aghol, PFLP Leader, Gaza City: Gaza, 22.03.2003. Interview transcripts, p.9.
61 More balanced and moderate understandings of the roots causes of the conflict and terrorism emanate from the many Ngo’s that operate in the region. An example of which is the Israel / Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI) run by Dr Gershon Baskin. See Fieldnotes pp.8-10.
62 I was aided continually in my data collection by Palestinians who introduced me to useful sources of information. Particularly helpful was Fathi Tobail and Sami Abu Salem at the Palestinian State Information Service in Gaza City and Tahir el Assar in Nuseirat refugee camp.
particularly the isolation of the Palestinian towns, the development and construction of Israeli settlements and the security role of the IDF.

Within the Israeli cities it was also possible, despite the extensive security precautions, to travel freely to conduct interviews and observe. Once again the relative proximity was an advantage, particularly due to the closeness of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The majority of Israeli State activity is centred on the Knesset in Jerusalem, which once penetrated proved a useful source of interviewees. The main Israeli cities also host universities and various useful non-governmental organisations that focus specifically on the conflict. Finally, the immediacy and proximity of the conflict in the region meant that almost everyone was affected by it in some way. This provided an endless source of information and data.

The fieldwork disadvantages related primarily to gaining access to State officials, particularly Israeli military and police who were very reluctant to be interviewed. Furthermore, some Palestinian leaders were in hiding and were almost impossible to locate due to the Israeli pre-emptive assassination policy. Also related to this is the difficulty of follow-up interviews after the fieldwork period. For example, due to the assassination policy it will not be possible to obtain further data from some sources.63

Other potential difficulties related to translations and questions. Whilst some interviews were conducted in English and others with ‘independent’64 translators, some organisations provided their own. This often proved problematic, as translators were often prone to pre-empt the interviewee or construct a reply relative to their own understanding. This was also true of the questions in formal structured interviews, which although designed to produce a particular response often inspired a reply relative to the subjective understanding of the interviewee. The fieldwork however, did produce comprehensive data on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and provides useful material to test and develop a viable framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism; this is presented in chapter 5.

63 My primary Hamas interview was with Ismail Abu Shanab, a moderate voice within the Hamas organisation. He was targeted by Israeli Helicopters and killed in Gaza City in August 2003.
64 Although independent is a misnomer. I refer to translators provided by the Palestinian Information Service and not the political organisation itself.
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The Root Causes of Terrorism: Orthodox Terrorism Theory

Introduction

Terrorism has been the subject of a vast amount of research especially during the last thirty years.\footnote{See, Schmid A, Jongman A, Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Oxford: North Holland, 1988.} The production of which has notably increased since the end of the Cold War and more recently in the shadow of the events of September 11th 2001, the so-called ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA), and the ‘War on Terrorism.’ The reason for this growth is two fold; first is the apparent omnipresence of terrorism, especially in the ambiguous post-cold war world or Grey Area Phenomenon.\footnote{Grey Area Phenomenon has been used to denote and describe the fluid and unstable post Cold War World that is beset with new conflicts, acts of terrorism, insurgency, drug-trafficking, warlordism, militant fundamentalism, ethnic cleansing and civil war. All of which form transnational threats and instability. See Manwaring M G, Grey Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.} Second, is the actual study of terrorism, which is locked in an endless definitional debate based around the question of legitimacy.\footnote{This legitimacy definitional debate is aptly illustrated by the clichéd expression: ‘one mans’ terrorist is another mans’ freedom fighter.’} Consequentially, as no clear and universally acknowledged definition exists, terrorism studies have become the source of a constant debate as to what actually constitutes terrorism. As a result of the lack of any universally recognised and accepted understanding of what the problem actually is, it is naturally proving difficult to establish a firm basis on which to investigate why it actually occurs. The preoccupation within terrorism studies of trying to define and establish what actually constitutes Terrorism detracts considerably from research into why it occurs. As Walter Laqueur suggests ”Disputes about a detailed, comprehensive
definition of terrorism will continue for a long time and will make no noticeable contribution towards the understanding of terrorism.\(^4\)

The lack of investigation into the reasons for terrorism is further compounded by the obsessive interest generated within terrorism studies for the methodology of violence. Although the orthodox study of terrorism has engaged in a limited roots debate concerning why terrorism occurs,\(^5\) the majority of research has been largely preoccupied with how it occurs. Orthodox approaches to understanding terrorism tend to focus on the type of violence employed. This approach is clearly illustrated by the United Nations (UN) Conventions on terrorism. These conventions focus not on why the violence might be occurring but instead seek to establish what type of violence is it and how can it be countered.\(^6\) This has located the study of terrorism into the study of methods of violence. As a result, terrorism has become an academic analysis of the mechanics of the actual violence, dealing with research ranging from the formation, construction and operation of terrorist groups, to the type of weapons, tactics and operational methods employed.\(^7\) The reason for this is perhaps the central basis for the existence of terrorism studies, which is how to respond and deal with terrorism. This represents the core of terrorism literature\(^8\) and relates directly to the formation of governmental policy and feeds the construction and implementation of anti-terrorist and counter-terrorism policies.

The effects of this intuitive development of the study of terrorism have been to further proliferate the ongoing comparative definitional debate. This is due to the political pressure to establish an accepted single definition of terrorism that can be used to institute a general scientific theory of terrorism, enshrined in law. The purpose of this is to institute a common governmental and international basis with which to


approach terrorism. The institutional study of Terrorism has also firmly established within its remit the production of in-depth methodological studies of the techniques and tactics of varying types of terrorist groups. Although these are useful for understanding and countering terrorist groups in relation to methods of response and policy formation, they are often of little help in understanding why the groups are engaging in violence.

It is my intention in this chapter to move away from the current trend of terrorism studies. Instead I will seek to rethink the root causes of terrorism by investigating alternative perspectives and their respective understanding of the problem. This will involve a critical theory\(^9\) based inter-disciplinary and multi-level approach to the manifestation of terrorism, and the definitions and understandings afforded to it. Critical theory will be used to examine how the root causes of terrorism, according to terrorism literature, are perceived and understood through the various lenses provided by mainstream international relations theory, which will form the levels of analysis. Thus, realism, pluralism, structuralism and liberalism are employed in this chapter to differentiate levels of analysis with which to examine the different perspectives of terrorism that they create. They are intended to establish a multi-level approach by corresponding to the state actor, the non-state actor, the structure and the individual respectively.

Prior to this analysis of terrorism literature through international relations theory. I will begin this survey by establishing a broad categorisation or point of departure for the understanding of terrorism. In this section I intend to investigate the construction of the orthodox definitions of terrorism and use this to explore the conventional understanding of terrorism, which is enshrined in orthodox terrorism theory. This chapter will be divided into two parts: Part 1 will be an examination of the orthodox terrorism discourse; part 2 will be a theoretical examination of the current terrorism literature that exists through IR theory, all of which will demonstrate how terrorism studies provide an understanding of the roots of terrorism.

\(^9\) A critical theory approach seeks to question all theories and assumptions. It focuses on why a particular theory is employed? What tasks is it designed to perform? And, what is the purpose of the
**Part 1: Understanding Orthodox Terrorism Theory**

**Legitimacy: The problem with the orthodox definition of Terrorism**

As I have alluded to above and, as Andrew Silke points out in a recent review of current research, the development of the study of terrorism is constrained by the supposed emotive nature of the subject and the confusion surrounding the conception and definition of the phenomenon.\(^{10}\) It is not my intention here to add to the definitional debate but it is an important step in analysing orthodox terrorism theory to consider why the definitional debate exists. The debate exists because the orthodox definition of terrorism is based on legitimacy, which can be defined as the acceptance and recognition of the authority of the established government by the population. Terrorism can be viewed as violence generated by the conflict over the contention for political legitimacy. For example, states believe they have legitimacy and brand any challenge to their authority as illegitimate. Whereas Terrorist groups, by the orthodox definition, challenge the political authority of the state. They deem themselves and their cause legitimate and view the state as illegitimate.

Due perhaps to the dominance of the power of the state, the ‘relative legitimacy’ explanation has become the widely accepted understanding of terrorism. As a result of this, terrorism has become a pejorative term adopted by actors to make a moral justification of their claim to legitimacy and moral condemnation of their opponents. States call groups terrorist, not necessarily because they use lethal violence to attempt to attain political goals but because they view their challenge as illegitimate. Equally groups label states terrorist not because they use lethal state violence to maintain their political position, but because they see it as illegitimate. Hence, the constant referral in the definition of terrorism debate to the hackneyed term, ‘one mans freedom fighter is another mans terrorist.’ Aptly, Brian Jenkins

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points out that, "What Terrorism is, depends upon one’s point of view." Consider therefore the United States Department of Defence definition of terrorism; "Unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, religious or ideological objectives" and Sheikh Fadlallah, spiritual leader of Hizballah who suggests terrorism is "fighting with special means against aggressor nations in religious and lawful warfare against world imperial powers." The roots of this legal and moral legitimacy debate can be seen to originate in the western understanding of liberal democracy. For example, Conor Cruise O'Brien suggests that the terrorist label has been used to describe and politically condemn groups who use terrorist methods in a liberal democracy, where the opportunity exists to articulate grievances through the non-violent political and legal process. Wilkinson adds, "In Liberal Democracy aggrieved man enjoys full protection and rights of participation...violence for political ends cannot be morally justified." However, for a group to resort to violence they must have already rejected the legitimacy of the ruling regime, and so have created their own relative understanding. The existence of democracy whilst it promotes the state’s claim to the moral argument does not necessarily change the relative understanding of legitimacy held by the actors. This argument implies that the orthodox definition of terrorism is based on the assumption that the employer of the definition is liberal and democratic and therefore has legitimate grounds to judge and morally condemn the user of political violence. However since many instances of terrorism exist outside the liberal democratic framework and perhaps are even reasons for it, a universal moral definition is perhaps unhelpful. Furthermore, as Cruise O'Brien points out, a minority within a liberal democratic framework, whose representation is so small that it is denied all participation except voting, and is consequently outvoted, will lose the ability for peaceful representation and participation.

Legitimacy is enshrined in the orthodox definition of terrorism, producing in effect a relative understanding of terrorism that is locked into an endlessly cyclical

11 Jenkins, quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.30.
13 Quoted by Kramer, 'Moral Logic of Hizballah,' in Reich, Origins, p.148.
14 Cruise O'Brien C., 'Terrorism under Democratic conditions the case of the IRA,' in Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power, p93.
15 Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.38.
16 Cruise O'Brien, in Crenshaw Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power, p.93.
moral debate between relative perceptions of right and wrong. If progress is to be made in understanding and dealing with the root causes of terrorism, perhaps orthodox terrorism needs to be critically reassessed as existing merely as a definition of a discourse on terrorism and not a universal truth of terrorism. This would allow the freedom to critically examine the purpose of orthodox terrorism discourse and demonstrate that it can be employed as a means by which actors reinforce their own claim to legitimacy. For example, under an orthodox definition of terrorism, such as “Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation for political ends and is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the victims to publicise a cause and to coerce a target to acceding to the terrorists’ aims.” States can employ orthodox terrorist theory and suggest a terrorist attack is a provocative, symbolic act to intimidate and terrorise, intended to undermine the established and legitimate political rule. Using this, the state is able to legitimately respond with the forces of state control, namely the legal and military machinery. Similarly, groups can use terrorism theory to suggest the state is attempting to intimidate them by using state violence against their symbolic targets, such as group leaders and training camps. This allows them to respond with whatever means of violence is available to them causing a cycle of violence that can be characterised by a protracted and intractable conflict over legitimacy, which is a common characteristic in so-called terrorist conflicts. This is clearly illustrated in the Palestinian-Israeli case study. The Israelis view Palestinian attacks as terrorism and respond with military violence. The Palestinians view this as terrorism and respond with violence. Both claim legitimacy of action both view the other as terrorists.

An example of how the legitimacy debate generates and views violence is illustrated by the relative understandings of force and violence, which are provided by the presence of legitimacy in the definition of terrorism. For example, Wilkinson establishes a difference between force and violence. Violence he suggests is the opposite of legitimate force and defines it as the illegitimate use or threatened use of coercion resulting in death, injury, restraint, and intimidation of persons or destruction of property. This argument suggests that illegitimate violence is used in terrorism and legitimate violence is force, which is used against it. It also serves to obscure the understanding of the causes of terrorism because it further perpetuates the relative

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understanding of terrorism in which both sides claim moral legitimacy. It also increasingly polarises the actors within their own comprehensions and further exacerbates and in some cases can justify the underlying problems that initially generated the political violence.

In order to further highlight the ambiguity of the concept of legitimacy and demonstrate how the orthodox definition of terrorism can be manipulated to serve political ends, it can be argued that a ‘process of legitimisation’ exists. For example, a number of groups and individuals have been labelled, relative to state legitimacy, as terrorist. As a result they were tackled with state measures, such as the rule of law and military force. However, in reaction to changing political situations, some individuals and groups have subsequently become legitimised. Group members have been released from prison or returned from exile into accepted society, and in some cases have become recognised politicians.¹⁹ This is reflective of the historical events of the French Revolution and the historic precedent of reversing accepted legitimacy by violence. This makes a mockery not only of the moral legitimacy inherent in the definition and understanding of terrorism but more importantly in the rule of law and the principle of justice.

The problems and inherent relative contradictions of the concept of legitimate violence that are built into the orthodox definition and understanding of terrorism, can also be found in two important concepts that are associated with the causes of terrorism. These are Tyrannicide and Just War Theory and clearly illustrate the confusion and disarray that accompanies the legitimacy debate. Tyrannicide is often cited as justification for terrorist violence, especially against a ‘tyrannical’ regime. However, there are immediate problems with this justification. Although the concept of legitimacy provides the state with the legitimate use of lethal violence, there are extensive contradictions inherent in the relative understandings of this concept. These are illustrated in the relative understandings of terrorism in which all violent actors believe they are acting legitimately. This suggests that the legitimacy of violence can also exist in groups outside the established ruling authority if they believe the state is ruling unfairly. this is the principle that supports the concept of tyrannicide. Using this concept Laqueur is forced to question if terrorism is always morally wrong. He

¹⁹ Wilkinson, Liberal State, p.23.
suggests tyrannicide is legitimate if it is the only feasible means of overthrowing a cruel dictatorship, "the last resort of free men and women facing intolerable persecution." The obvious difficulty here is this is a morally relative argument and by the subjective definition of a cruel dictatorship any group could therefore morally justify terrorism or lethal violence against the incumbent regime.

Just War Theory, associated with the work of Aquinas and Grotius offers actors a similar justification for terrorist violence and is also open to relative interpretations. According to Aquinas in Summa Theologica, just war requires jus ad bellum (justice of war), which is war for a just cause with no other alternative, which incorporates the correct authority and right intentions. Kennedy suggests that modern just war theory also incorporates jus in bello (justice in war), which is proportionality and discrimination. The problem, which is inherent in the definition of terrorism, is that the claim to a just cause can be made as a legitimate claim relative from almost any perspective and authorised by any source of perceived political grievance. In addition, the just war theory implies that only one of the belligerents is waging a just war, which immediately invites subjective interpretations.

The concept of just war theory can also be undermined and manipulated by relative interpretations of the justice of war and also the concept of justice in war. Both have little normative orientation as different actors view proportionality and discrimination differently. Whilst the method of terrorism can be considered by some as not satisfying justice in war and so violating the modern embodiment of just war theory which is the Geneva Convention 1929 / 1949. Terrorist actors can cite the 'end justifies the means' debate; which suggests that whatever means employed is acceptable in war to achieve their just cause.

Terrorism is often associated with violence against non-combatants as a violation of the most basic human right, the right to life. However the comparison is

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19 Examples of this range from Palestine where 'terrorists' such as Menachem Begin of the Irgun became a respected Israeli leader to Gerry Adams and Martin McGinnis, who as active members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army are now in government in Northern Ireland.


22 Proportionality suggests the costs of the conflict must not exceed the potential benefits and discrimination requires that non-combatants be immune from direct intentional attack in ibid p6.

23 Wilkinson Terrorism versus Democracy, p.101. Furthermore, the difference between attacking civilians (non-combatants) and soldiers (combatants) is often seen as the distinction in definition.
often made between the considered illegality of groups detonating improvised explosive devices against innocent civilians and the perceived legality of military bombardment of non-combatants by the armies of the state. Omar Malik deals with this issue by pointing out the relative nature of the concept of innocent. He suggests “At any time the boundary between guilty and innocent is set primarily by the killers’ current view on their own necessity, capability, and the victims accessibility, they kill whom they can kill.”24 Furthermore, it is also possible to suggest that in conflict and war there are no innocents. This line of argument questions the nature of war in relation to terrorism and political violence. For example, uniformed soldiers, armies and war relate solely to states for whom the declaration and conduct of war is considered their preserve. The reason for medieval just war theories and latter day ‘rules of war’ conventions is therefore an attempt by states to control and restrict warfare. Non-state actors without the military strength of the state, use whatever means of violence they have available in order to conduct what they perceive as a war or conflict. However, by virtue of the terrorist method of violence they employ, which maybe the only one available, they are outlawed and deemed illegal not only by the legitimacy of the state definition of terrorism but also under international law. This is illustrated by the international conventions on terrorism and the law of armed conflict. Once again this implies that the term terrorist exists, as a label for ‘illegal’ war or conflict from the relative perspective of the state.

In order to avoid the problems in understanding terrorism that are created by this relative definitional debate, the understanding of terrorism should perhaps be moved beyond this legally restrictive and morally relative judgemental definition and relocated to exist as an act of lethal violence for a political purpose. A politically neutral approach which is similar to the understanding of lethal violence between opponents in a conflict. Stohl argues that force is warfare, he suggests that war is the power to inflict hurt and damage which enhances the techniques of influence by coercion and intimidation and not necessarily by destruction.25 This argument can be seen as a contemporary synthesis of the ‘new wars’ debates26 and the ‘new terrorism’

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24 Malik O, Enough of the Definition of Terrorism, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p.36.
25 Stohl M, 'States, Terrorism and State Terrorism,' in Slater and Stohl, Current Perspectives, p.171.
debates. The suggestion is, that to avoid the problem of legitimacy, terrorism needs to be deconstructed and decoupled from the imposed relative moral harness and seen as neither legitimate force nor illegal violence, just simply as conflict. The central advantage of which could perhaps prove useful for understanding the roots of terrorism in conflicts.

It is clear that a number of contradictions are apparent in the moral paradox that exists when employing a definition of terrorism that incorporates a moral judgement based on legitimacy. In order to establish a point of departure for this survey and to progress with the study of terrorism I intend to sidestep for now the legitimacy debate and the moral, ethical and subjective arguments surrounding the definition and adopt an understanding of terrorism based on rudimentary and accepted components of terrorism as an act of a particular type of political violence. Regardless of the political pejorative overtones or judgements on the practice of this type of violence, current literature does suggest conformity on a number of established components that constitute terrorism. Many researchers agree that terrorism can be seen as the expression of a particular type of violence and can be defined methodologically as a “special method” of armed struggle or as a “weapon-system.” That incorporates recognised techniques such as assassinations and bombing, and is characteristically directed against people or property, with the express intention of causing terror. These are differentiated from similar forms of violence by the existence of a political motive, which Hoffman argues is the key characteristic of terrorism. He suggests that, “in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term (of terrorism) it is fundamentally and inherently political.”

A political motive implies an agenda that involves some violent interaction by, with or against the established power centres in order to affect the nature of the power centre. So in its most basic manifestation terrorism can be seen as lethal violence for a political agenda. I would argue that this basic definition of terrorism provides a useful point of departure from which to begin an examination of the roots of terrorism as it is

29 Although the majority of terrorism researchers include the actual acts of violence in their definitions, a few argue that terrorism should be defined solely on the nature of the act. See Jenkins B M. The Study of terrorism: Definitional problems, Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 1980, p.6563, quoted in Hoffman B. Inside Terrorism. London: Indigo Press, 1999, p.33.
a value neutral expression and focuses on an approach to terrorism based on the simplicity of the act of violence for a political purpose. This provides a level of clarity in which it is possible to investigate the reason or root cause for this particular type of violence and is a useful alternative to the orthodox definition of terrorism which is shrouded and obscured by the moral legitimacy debate and the confusion caused by the degeneration of the study into an intractable debate between subjective and relative right and wrong. Orthodox terrorism definitions should be viewed as part of a particular discourse and need to be recognised as such if progression is to be made beyond the stale, morally relative definitional debate and into understanding and dealing with terrorism.

Orthodox Terrorism Theory: A Discourse for Understanding Terrorism

Normative definitions of terrorism are employed to support the prominent positivist paradigm of orthodox terrorism theory, which it can be argued, is the predominant discourse, or paradigm that is used to explain, understand and deal with terrorism. Ted Gurr suggests “Terrorism is a doctrine about the efficacy of unexpected and life-threatening violence for political change and a strategy of political action which embodies that doctrine.”\textsuperscript{31} Orthodox terrorism theory is built upon the act of terrorism in order to understand its logic, which Jenkins points out by suggesting, “The theory of terrorism is underwritten by the belief that terrorism is a means to an end.”\textsuperscript{32} Although this is intended to explain the act from the perspective of both the instigator and recipient, be it a terrorist group against a state or indeed vice versa. Orthodox terrorism theory concentrates mainly on acts of terrorism as violence against the established authority or state, not necessarily by it. Whilst it does expound state terrorism, orthodox terrorism theory is essentially a western model of understanding rooted, as O’Sullivan and Herman point out, in western freedoms.


rule of law and the liberal democratic state.\textsuperscript{33} This is due to the necessity for a requirement to deal with acts of terrorism, which, according to orthodox terrorism theory, are seen as threats to the established power centre, in this instance, the state.

Orthodox terrorism theory is based on a number of common themes that reoccur throughout terrorism literature. Bowyer Bell suggests three types of terrorism, functional, symbolic\textsuperscript{34} and tactical.\textsuperscript{35} By using each of these types as a guide it is possible to expound the orthodox theory of terrorism. Functional terrorism, according to Bowyer Bell, is intended to "prove a response to further the cause by strategic manipulation."\textsuperscript{36} This is a central concept and suggests that the aim of the act of terrorism is to force a reaction, hopefully an over-reaction by the established power centre, governing authority or state against the instigators, their supporters and even the population in general. Rubenstein calls this "Heroic Terrorism" and suggests that the aim is to "prove intense indiscriminate state repression, in order to deprive the government of legitimacy and radicalise the masses."\textsuperscript{37} Walter Laqueur calls this "the terrorist theory of provocation" and suggests that it is intended to produce (state) repression, draconian measures and thus ultimately undermine the 'liberal' façade.\textsuperscript{38} Alongside this attempt to demonstrate the unsuitability of the incumbent authority to govern and by exposing its 'true' nature, orthodox terrorism theory suggests that the terrorists endeavour to wrest legitimacy from the state and bestow it upon their own cause. The intention of terrorists is to undermine the security of the population by demonstrating that the state is unable to provide adequate protection and therefore force them to turn to alternative sources such as the instigators of the terrorist violence to negotiate a settlement or provide alternative governance.\textsuperscript{39} Within this realm Rubenstein argues that the terrorist aim is the polarisation of society where "violence and counter violence will break the psychological fetters bonding the lower classes to their social superiors."\textsuperscript{40} Interestingly it is possible to reverse this argument and

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item Also see, Richmond O, Realising Hegemony? Symbolic Terrorism and the Roots of Conflict, Conflict and Terrorism.
  \item Bowyer Bell, Time of Terror, p.51.
  \item This is particularly noticeable with unrepresented or marginalised ethnic minorities who seek to polarise society to their cause.
  \item Rubenstein, Alchemists, p.99.
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suggest that the state can generate its own terrorism to create political instability and challenge a particular legitimacy. This can occur as a method of foreign policy by sponsoring terrorist groups in other states or regions, or internally by acts of terrorism designed to undermine and discredit alternative or rival power sources.

A second theme is symbolic terrorism. This is arguably the basis of orthodox terrorism theory, which according to Hoffman has it origins in the earliest forms of nineteenth century terrorism and is encapsulated in Carlo Piscane’s “Theory of Propaganda by Deed.”

Orthodox terrorism theory uses this concept of symbolic terrorism to explain an act of terrorist violence as being highly symbolic and an attempt to terrorise, intimidate and strike fear into the those against whom the violence is directed, (even if they are not the actual physical recipients of the violence). The actual targets of the act, and the wider audience who witness it directly are obviously affected by it. The functional argument suggests symbolic terrorism seeks to use, “coercive intimidation” which Wilkinson regards as “pure terrorism” and defines as “the systematic use of murder and destruction or the threat of, to terrorise individuals, groups, communities and governments into conceding to terrorists demands.”

The philosophy of terrorism as a symbolic act is intended to affect more than just the target of the violence. In the writing of Sun Tzu, orthodox terrorism theory suggests the aim of terrorist violence is to “kill one and frighten ten thousand.”

Whilst much of the literature on orthodox terrorist theory supports these psychological implications it also emphasises the communications value aspect of this symbolic violence. Orthodox terrorism theory suggests that acts of terrorism are committed in order to publicise and internationalise the political aim, thereby demonstrating the high propaganda and publicity value that can be gained from acts of terrorist violence. Jenkins cleverly encapsulates this concept by describing “terrorism as theatre.”

This understanding of terrorism applies equally to the state, which is known to generate the symbolic terrorism of fear and intimidation against its own domestic population in order to ensure political loyalty and compliance to

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41 Piscane suggested that ideas result form deeds and that violence was necessary not only to draw attention to, or generate publicity for a cause but also ultimately to inform, educate and rally the masses. From Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.17.
42 Wilkinson, the Liberal State, p.46
44 Jenkins B M, quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.132.
authority. Moreover, some terrorism theorists argue that the symbolic nature of terrorism theory allows an act of terrorism to be categorised into domestic or international depending where it occurred. Both the psychology of fear and the role of publicity contained in the symbolic nature of orthodox terrorism theory demonstrate quite graphically the significance of the role of media in propagating the psychological implications of the terrorist message to an even wider audience.

The third aspect of orthodox terrorism theory that helps to explain acts of terrorism is tactical terrorism. This can be understood in two ways, first as a limited means to achieve short-term gain, such as the exchange of hijack hostages for prisoners or a bank robbery to fund arms procurement. The second is as a tactical part of a wider strategic initiative; this has its roots in the theories of revolution and guerrilla warfare by proponents such as Mao Tse-Tung and Carlos Marighela, who suggested that acts of terrorism should be part of the wider struggle for revolution or an initial stage preceding popular revolt. Schmid and Jongman define this phenomenon as “the insurgency context of terrorism.”

Orthodox terrorism theory is employed to understand acts of terrorist violence and is based upon the assumptions I have discussed above. It is interesting to note however that by adopting this terrorism theory, assumptions are made about the nature of the terrorist actor, Crenshaw investigates this and develops “Strategic choice theory” which she argues is a representation of the perpetrator of the act of violence

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45 Much of the Literature on Orthodox Terrorism Theory suggest that the historical roots of terrorism exist in the French Revolution of 1789 when the ideology of the French Revolution and the power of the new government was enforced and consolidated by the so-called “reign of terror,” which was enacted on the population. See, Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.15.

46 Wilkinson suggests domestic or Internal terrorism is confined within a single state or region while International terrorism is an attack carried out across international frontiers. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, p.15, also see Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, chapter 6, p.67.


49 “Mao developed a strategy of protracted war in three stages: the enemy’s strategic offensive and the revolutionaries’ strategic defensive; the enemies strategic consolidation and the revolutionaries’ preparation for counter offensive: and the revolutionaries’ strategic retreat”. From Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.11.

50 Marighela’s strategy was to convert a political crisis into an armed struggle by violent acts that force the government to transform the political situation into a military one. From Chaliand, Terrorism Popular struggle, p.87. For further information see, Marighela C, For the Liberation of Brazil, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971.

51 Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, p.7. Insurgency can be defined as, ’a rebellion or rising against the government in power or civil authorities.” See, Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus democracy, p.2.
as a rational actor, who has calculated the implications and made a rational choice among alternatives as part of strategic reasoning.\textsuperscript{52} This suggests that acts of terrorist violence whilst appearing to be indiscriminate and random, and the behaviour of mad and crazed individuals, are in fact tactical parts of a carefully planned and calculated strategy to influence decision-making and effect political change.

Whilst orthodox terrorism theory is based on normative definitions it also helps to provide them, especially for governments and agencies involved in dealing with terrorism. The US Department of Defence defines terrorism as, “the unlawful use of – or threatened use of – force or violence against individuals or property in order to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”\textsuperscript{53} Schmid and Jongman suggest terrorism is “a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as instrumental targets of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics, which form the basis for the victimisation. Other members of that group or class are put in a chronic state of fear (terror)…. the purpose of which is to change attitudes or behaviour favouring the interests of the user of method of combat.”\textsuperscript{54} This particular definition of terrorism was produced after an exhaustive survey of academics and practitioners in the field, and has consequently had a profound influence on the general understanding of terrorism. The mainstream definitions and understanding of terrorism are crafted from orthodox terrorism theory and are based on the principle assumptions I discussed above, which give an accepted understanding of why terrorism occurs. According to orthodox terrorism theory, acts of violence occur to achieve a political purpose for functional, symbolic and tactical reasons.

Orthodox terrorism theory however is a discourse; it does not necessarily represent the ‘truth’ about terrorism but exists to provide an explanation of the political violence. Unsurprisingly not all actors accept the orthodox understanding of terrorism: this is due primarily to the moral problems inherent in the relative legitimacy definition and the lack of a roots debate. As I have argued, the orthodox


\textsuperscript{54} Schmid and Jongman, Political Terrorism, p.2.
understanding of terrorism is enshrined in a moral legitimacy debate, which is focused on the legitimate and legal use of lethal violence. This allows terrorism discourse to be employed (for a purpose for which it is perhaps designed) to legitimise the violence used by the incumbent power centre to enforce its political will whilst simultaneously delegitimising the use of political violence by opposition movements. Orthodox terrorism theory also eschews a roots debate relating to why the terrorism is occurring as this could potentially bestow legitimacy on the terrorist actor.

The definitions and the theory of orthodox terrorism discourse whilst comprehensively explaining how terrorism works and what it is intended to achieve, does little to explain why it occurs. Once again, this is perhaps the designed purpose of terrorism discourse, to provide an explanation of political violence that can be dealt with without any recourse to a roots debate. Any form of roots debate might affect the political legitimacy of the dominant power centre, because investigation into why terrorism occurs could potentially result in the legitimisation of the terrorist group and the delegitimisation of the state. The purpose of this study is to attempt to provide an alternative means of understanding the root causes of terrorism and political violence by moving away from the confines of the legitimacy debate. Thus by examining different perspectives of terrorism it could be possible to apply alternative terrorism theories. With these it may be possible to rethink the reasons for the violence and expose alternative root causes of terrorism.

Before moving on to discuss other theories to explain terrorist violence, it is perhaps important to briefly consider the current condition of orthodox terrorism theory which appears to be in a state of crisis. Whilst the theory I have expounded above is still very relevant and instrumental in the understanding of terrorism, a number of new trends identified by terrorism theorists are becoming increasingly apparent and bring into question its very foundations. For example, Hoffman identifies what he terms as "new terrorism" which he suggests is characterised by less comprehensible motives and an unwillingness to claim or credit responsibility, he also highlights the increased lethality of acts of terrorism. Wilkinson calls this trend "mass terror" and links it to the large number of people killed in ethnic conflict. This obviously problematises the understanding of terrorism as symbolic, which suggests the intention is low lethality and high publicity.

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55 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.211.
Walter Lacquer in his recent publication *The New Terrorism* reiterates these themes and adds that new terrorism is motivated by hate, blind violence and aggression and therefore questions the role of ideology in terrorism.\(^{57}\) This argument causes difficulty in supporting the functional understanding of terrorism, which is further compounded by the actions of millennial groups, or extremist sects whose sole purpose is to kill and therefore lack any obvious political objective.\(^{58}\) This brings into question whether they actually constitute a terrorist organisation. These themes are increasingly apparent in the contemporary literature on terrorism theory, especially in the aftermath of the destruction of the World Trade Centre and the implications of this high death toll in the debate over the terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).\(^ {59} \) The understanding of ‘new terrorism’ may therefore require new theories as it certainly brings into question the psychological foundations of traditional terrorism theory, as Jenkins makes clear when he stated that “killing a lot of people has seldom been the terrorist objective.”\(^{60} \)

Orthodox terrorism theory is the predominant discourse that is used to explain, understand and deal with terrorism. It is preceded by a state centric definition and establishes an understanding of terrorism as illegitimate and unlawful violence. It is also based on the assumption that the terrorist is a rational actor, as it suggests that terrorism is a carefully planned and calculated strategy directed against the state in order to influence decision-making and effect political change by the use of functional, symbolic and tactical violence. Orthodox terrorism theory is based on the legitimacy of the state. Although this is a relative legitimacy, this understanding of terrorism has become widely accepted as the normative definition of terrorism and consequentially exists as a pejorative term adopted by actors, predominantly state actors, to create a moral justification for their claim to legitimacy. This is because orthodox terrorism theory is a terrorism discourse designed specifically to aid the incumbent power centre or state. It legitimises the use of force by the state against its

\(^{56}\) Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy*, p.49.

\(^{57}\) Laquer, *New Terrorism*, p.274.

\(^{58}\) An example of this is the Japanese religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo who released Sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway system, killing a dozen people and injuring 5,000. See Wilkinson, *Terrorism Versus Democracy*, pp.50-1.

\(^{59}\) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) are Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons. This debate suggests that if terrorists are in fact prepared to kill as many as possible then they will not be afraid of using WMDs contradicting the arguments of orthodox terrorism theory discussed above.

‘terrorist’ enemies; it explains how the use of terrorism is an unlawful and immoral form of violence and suggests how terrorism can be dealt with. Needless to say the primary function of orthodox terrorism discourse is to support policy construction and implementation, particularly counter terrorism and anti-terrorism strategies.

The majority of literature within terrorism studies is linked in some way to this orthodox understanding of terrorism. I intend in Part 2 of this chapter to examine through levels of analysis provided by international relations theory, how terrorism literature can be re-examined in relation to explaining how the roots of terrorism can be better understood.

**Part 2: The Roots of Terrorism and International Relations Theory**

**Realism and the State**

Realism is the prominent paradigm of international relations and represents the state centric approach; it focuses on political elites, established authority and the dominant power centres. These are all encapsulated in the high-level political approach to understanding acts of terrorism, which are located in the institution of the state,\(^1\) an institution represented by the international relations theory of realism. It is my intention to argue in this section that the existence of the state viewed through the paradigm of realism can be seen as a root cause of terrorism. By applying a critical approach to examining the relationship between the state and terrorism, it is possible to investigate where the roots of terrorism can be located in relation to the realist understanding of the state.

\(^1\) Realism in this study is used as the state centric paradigm in order to view to state based, high level political understanding of terrorism. I refer to it generically as the state based approach to international relations theory and include in this concept the neo-realist arguments. For a comprehensive explanation of Realism and Neo-realism see, Baylis J, Smith S, *The Globalisation of World Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 (3rd Ed), pp.109-124.
The state is defined in international law as a permanent population within a distinct territory under the authority of an established government.\textsuperscript{62} This implies the existence of legitimacy\textsuperscript{63} and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{64} These two concepts are instrumental in the realist state-based understanding of the root causes of terrorism because they imply that the state is the embodiment of centralised power over a population and that a relationship exists between other states. The realist ‘state system’ is maintained by the existence of a political relationship between the governing machinery and the governed population of the state, and the recognition and acceptance of these concepts in other sovereign states. These are mutual relationships and realist terrorism can be located in the conflict generated between the actors in these political interactions. These can be found internally between the state (governing authority) and governed population as conflict over legitimacy, and externally between states as conflict over sovereignty.

Terrorism through the framework of realism is primarily a state centric understanding of the political relationship that exists between the state and its population and other states, as it is one that guarantees the existence of the state and the maintenance of power by the political system of the incumbent ruling elites. Paradoxically, both the consequences of the enforcement of these relationships and the signs inherent in its possible breakdown can produce acts of terrorism. Sanguinetti suggests, “all states are terrorists, most violently at birth and imminence of death.”\textsuperscript{65} Not only can terrorism exist internally between the ruling and the ruled but also externally between states. This is suggested by the classic realist understanding of interaction between states as unitary, rational actors in the shadow of the security dilemma.\textsuperscript{66} It can be argued however, that there is a necessity for realism to generate some form of threat to the state in order to justify a policy of security. For example, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the concept of ‘Grey Area Phenomena’ was developed. Manwaring suggests this is a “new paradigm to fight new conflict, like

\textsuperscript{63} Legitimacy can be defined as the acceptance and recognition of the authority of the established government by the population.
\textsuperscript{64} Sovereignty can be defined as the existence of the sole authority of the state over its own population.
\textsuperscript{66} The Security Dilemma is the name given to the spiral of insecurity caused by the security provisions made by a state which under Realism are interpreted as aggressive by other states causing them to adopt increased security measures of their own which become self-fulfilling and thus only add to the perception of the necessity for increased security. See Baylis J and Smith S Globalisation, p.117.
terrorism, insurgency, militant fundamentalism...and transnational threats and instability.\textsuperscript{67} all of which are perceived as a threat to the stability of nation-states. Terrorism can be employed by the state in the pursuit of both domestic and international interests. I intend in this section to explore the nature of realist state terrorism by considering first, internal and then external state terrorism.

\textbf{Internal State Terrorism}

Internal state terrorism can be seen as acts of terrorism by the state within its own borders. This is a common theme in terrorism literature\textsuperscript{68} and is often associated with the reign of terror, perpetrated by the Jacobins during the French revolution. Calvert in his \textit{Theory of Revolution} suggests that terror is “the consolidation of revolution” and argues that the reign of terror of the Jacobins was directed as much at the established aristocracy as it was against other revolutionaries, as it was used to maintain, consolidate and stabilise revolution. He also cites War Communism in Russia in 1917 as a further example of this theory.\textsuperscript{69} Eugene Walter, in an important study called \textit{Terror and Resistance} understands all acts of terrorism to signify violence designed for political control, he calls this ‘Regime Terror theory,’ which he argues, is state rule by violence and fear.\textsuperscript{70} Hannah Arendt points to the Russian Revolution and suggests that this heralded the use of “Terror as an institutional device.”\textsuperscript{71} Terrorism can be clearly employed as a potent instrument by the state or established authority to subjugate a population and enforce political compliance; as Leon Trotsky suggested, “The State is much richer in the means of physical destruction and mechanical repression than terrorist groups are.”\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{72} Quoted in Rubenstein, \textit{Alchemists}, p.236.
It seems to be part of the natural condition of the state to generate and employ terrorism in order to create and maintain political power. This is illustrated by the existence of the social contract, which Rousseau identified as the implied relationship between the government and the citizen. He suggested this contract allows for the monopoly on the use of violence by the state, in return for the protection of the rights of the individual citizen. Alexis de Tocqueville identified this concept and termed it ‘containment’ and concluding that terror is a consequence of maintaining social peace and personal safety. Bowyer Bell argues that states have a category of assets, which include armies, money and police in which to protect power, repress rebellion, impose order and reinforce legitimacy. Hoffman points to extreme examples of this theory, such as Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, which he calls the “abuse of power by Governments.” However with legitimacy bestowed on established states this could equally be called the legitimate exercise of political power.

Herman and O’Sullivan develop the concept of the ‘discipline of terrorology’ or ‘the science of terrorism.’ This theory they suggest, is the ability of the state to use terrorism; not only directly against its own population to keep them in-line, but also indirectly, as a means to develop by propaganda, a fear of terrorism as a threat to the state within the population. The maintenance of a type of public paranoia effectively sanctions the legitimate use of state terrorism against a perceived threat. This is demonstrated in Israel, where despite the human losses and questions about its effectiveness, the majority of the Israeli public maintain support for the use of state violence against the Palestinians.

Scepticism however, is voiced by Miller, who suggests “The agencies of government to which we entrust our security and who devote themselves to the eradication of terrorism, maybe more a part of the problem itself than we wish to acknowledge.” Moreover, Chomsky suggests the existence of ‘image’ and ‘reality’ concepts of terrorism. ‘Reality’ he argues, is ‘literal terrorism,’ which is an

76 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.23.
77 Herman and O’Sullivan, ‘Terrorism as Ideology,’ in George, Western State Terrorism, p.77.
78 An opinion poll in Haaretz found that 70% approved the attempted assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Yassin and 60% urged the Army to try again. The Economist. September 13th 2003, p.62.
identifiable and real threat to the state. ‘Image’ however, is ‘propagandist terrorism,’ which he sees as the “construction of the concept as a weapon to be exploited in the service of systems of power.”80 These ideas relating to internal state terrorism can also be seen from the realist standpoint as counter or anti-terrorism, which as O’Sullivan points out, have both advantages and disadvantages. He suggests “the domestic or internal threat of terrorism can strengthen the modern state to the detriment however of the rule of law and security of civil liberties.”81

Internally, terrorism it seems is endemic to the existence of the modern state as whenever political power is in contention it is a method that can be used to establish and then maintain political power or purely to strengthen an existing position. This implies that the relationship between political power and governance makes terrorism practically synonymous with the institution of the state.

**External state terrorism**

External state terrorism is also a common theme in terrorism literature and can be defined as an act of terrorism sanctioned by states outside of its own borders. It is also referred to as state-sponsored, surrogate, state directed, or proxy terrorism. Herman and O’Sullivan argue that the state has been a primary source of terrorism since the Second World War. They suggest terrorism has been employed by the state as an instrument of propaganda and control in order to preserve the international status quo by maintaining the respective position of power of the state by the domination of others.82 Rubenstein maintains this argument and suggests that state terrorism is immeasurably more destructive and indiscriminate than small-group violence.83 The state therefore can be regarded as a cause of terrorism; this can be due

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82 Herman and O’Sullivan, *Terrorism as Ideology,* in George, *Western State Terrorism,* p.41.
to the perceived utility of terrorism when employed as a tool of foreign policy, through the maintenance of state security or the projection of power and influence abroad. Stohl argues that the concept of state-sponsored terrorism permeates virtually every aspect of the study of terrorism. He divides state terrorist behaviour into three types; coercive diplomacy, covert behaviour and surrogate terrorism.84 This typology can be enhanced by adding direct military action. States can therefore perpetrate acts of terrorism outside of their borders to enact what can be termed low-cost, low-risk, high yield foreign policy. This can take the form of acts of overt violence by one state carried out in another state, or as covert violence by agents of the perpetrator state (or ‘third party’ ‘proxy’ state) in the form of direct military action or secret financial, technical or logistical and support.

Under the neutral definition of terrorism as lethal political violence. I suggest that the most contentious acts of terrorism are overt acts by states. According to the realist paradigm these can be regarded as military acts, such as retaliatory and preemptive strikes.85 Covert state terrorism however is also often practiced because it avoids direct military confrontation between states and considerably reduces the danger of interstate war, especially if the states concerned have nuclear weapons. This type of confrontation was prevalent during the Cold War, as indigenous terrorist groups would often be supported by the superpowers in ‘proxy conflicts,’ depending upon their ideological perspective. During this period, Clare Sterling produced a thesis entitled ‘the network theory,’ in which she argued that the cause of world terrorism was state-sponsorship of terrorism by the Soviet Union.86 Whilst this serves to highlight the importance of state sponsored terrorism, it overlooks the role of other states, especially western. in state terrorism and can also obscure other reasons for the manifestation of terrorism. This ‘network’ thesis whilst largely discredited now appears to be re-emerging as an Islamisist terrorist network theory.87

State sponsored terrorism is not just the preserve of the powerful states, as the framework of realism inspires all states to fear for their security and employ a proactive foreign policy to attain their goals. Laqueur suggests a number of other factors that might cause state sponsored terrorism. These include, the weakness of some

85 See George, Western State Terrorism, for arguments concerning military action as terrorism.
states to field comparative military strength, religious or ideological causes and endemic socio-economic problems. Alexander and Cline suggests state terrorism is a tool for nations to project military and political power, which can be brought into action whenever a state wishes to project its power without accepting responsibility. However, it is also important to stress that direct military action by states can also be regarded as terrorism. The manifestation of Terrorism therefore can be attributed directly to the existence of the state, as Wilkinson succinctly suggests, “as an instrument of internal repression and control and a weapon of external aggression and subjugation.”

As I have argued, realism sees the sovereign state as the established centre of legitimate power and authority within its own territory, and therefore exists as a unitary actor in the resulting international system of anarchy. Clearly the state has a vested interest in maintaining its own security and hence political power; consequently terrorism can be employed by the state internally to subjugate the population and externally in defence of state security. These I suggest are the root causes of terrorism in the realist perspective.

Realism provides a high level political approach to understanding terrorism. By using this lens to examine terrorism literature it is possible to see the roots of terrorism as existing within the state and the state system. The perception produced by realism is also linked closely to orthodox terrorism theory and employs a positivist approach to understanding acts of terrorism as illegal and illegitimate violence against the state. From this respect it is an invaluable level of analysis for the examination of the roots of terrorism, as I argue that terrorism by definition is lethal political violence, and a political agenda invariably involves the state in some capacity. However because of the state centric orientation of realism a serious flaw exists within this framework for understanding terrorism. This relates to the fact that realism sees the manifestation of terrorism as originating only from established states as it does not recognise the importance of the non-state actor. So acts of terrorism against states are perceived as instigated only from other states. The problem with the realist approach is that the focus for understanding terrorism will only be on relations with

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87 For example, there is a profusion of recent work on al-Qaeda and its believed involvement in every conflict as a Islamist network that sponsors world terrorism. See Gunaratna R, Inside al-Qaeda.
other states and not on groups or non-state political or socio-economic causes. For example, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has often been understood through the realist lens as a conflict between the established Arab states in the region. The Palestinians as a non-state group are viewed by realism as either the proxy agents of the Arab states or as an Israeli internal security issue. They are certainly not seen as politically and socio-economically marginalised or oppressed actors in their own right. ⁹¹

Pluralism, the Non-State Actor and the Roots of Terrorism

Pluralism is arguably the principle alternative discourse in international relations theory to realism and is a theory that helps explore the nature of the interaction between state and non-state entities. ⁹² Whilst it is also primarily focused on the importance of the state in international relations, it is not solely orientated to it, as it recognises the importance of other actors. Pluralism in particular understands transnational, intranational and supranational actors as well as the concept of world society. ⁹³ In this study pluralism is a theory that represents the next analytical level down from the purely state based political approach of realism. It will be used to investigate the roots of terrorism by considering the influence of non-state actors as a cause of lethal political violence. I aim to do this by examining the nature of the terrorist challenge to the state and why it occurs. Opposition to the state as the accepted source of political power, can be recognised in two principle forms; the first is that which seeks to change and reform the existing system, this can be termed ‘reactionary terrorism.’ Bowyer Bell suggests this concept is apparent in actors seeking political change; those who have a ‘dream,’ which encompasses a political challenge to the state for reform. The opposition and resistance the institution of the established state produces to this challenge represents a considerable obstacle to

⁹¹ See Chapter 4.
⁹² My use of pluralism in this study is intended as a generic concept to represent a non-state centric perception of the root causes of terrorism. It represents the second analytical level of the holistic approach to rethinking terrorism. For an explanation of pluralism see. Baylis and Smith, *Globalisation*, pp.147-189.
fulfilment of this ‘dream.’ The position the state adopts vis-à-vis the demands of the group represents a major determinant of the nature of armed struggle and terrorism.\textsuperscript{94}

The second are those challenges from groups that exist in a revolutionary form and seek the complete destruction of the state in its existing format; they no longer recognise or accept the established authority. In this situation, the institution of the state becomes a contested entity and violence against the state can occur. Charles Townshend identifies this in his study on Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{95} This can be known as ‘revolutionary terrorism’ and is often associated with civil war. Owing to the importance of these two pluralist approaches to terrorism against the state, this section will consist of an investigation of terrorism literature to examine revolutionary and reactionary terrorism. However, prior to this I will endeavour to explore the role of the state itself as an institution in order to theorise about why sub-groups react against it with lethal violence.

**Terrorism against the State**

Terrorism against the state is arguably the most commonly accepted and widely understood cause of terrorism within terrorism literature. However, in comparison to realism, which views terrorism against the state as originating from other states, pluralism is able to consider the input of non-state groups. Nevertheless, the central feature in both frameworks is the state, which is considered by both theories to be the accepted and established source of political power, in the form of a national and internationally recognised ruling authority. This suggests that the institution of the state, by virtue of its existence as the ruling political institution, will be a natural target for those seeking political influence. The state and its legal and military defence machinery is therefore orientated to oppose any form of political change, especially violent, that attempts to affect the state monopoly of political and socio-economic control. The roots of terrorism as lethal violence for a political

\textsuperscript{94} Bowyer Bell, *Dynamics*. p.14.
objective exist in the nature of the violent challenge by power seekers against the natural opposition provided by the state monopoly of political power. This is clearly illustrated by movements for national liberation or socio-economic reform that harbour a political claim to some or all of the power of the state.

To explain the roots of terrorism, it is crucial to investigate the root causes of terrorist challenges by various groups against the established authority of the state. This is particularly important when some states employ a form of parliamentary democracy or at least provide the facility to potentially obtain political power through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{96} A theory, which relates to the ideas of pluralism, suggests that the roots of pluralist terrorism exist within the institution of the liberal state. This is explored by O’Sullivan, who develops an argument in this area based on the ideological creation of the state. He suggests that from the inception of the modern state in the French Revolution, a new style of violent politics evolved which is rooted in western political thought. His claim implies that terrorism is much more closely related to the liberal values of pluralism than is commonly recognised.\textsuperscript{97} Paradoxically, whilst the French Revolution is held in the highest traditions of western thought as \textit{the} example of gaining freedom and liberty, it was actually achieved and consolidated by the use of terrorism, which is revolution or political change by violence. As O’Sullivan reiterates, terrorism is located in modern western political thought through the French Revolution as it, “led men to believe that it was within their power to remake society from top to bottom.”\textsuperscript{98}

It is possible to suggest that a revolution of thought occurred, triggered by the example of the French Revolution. This showed that it was no longer necessary for people to accept without question the ruling elite or established political and indeed socio-economic situation as demonstratively, political change could be facilitated by violence. Chaliand adopts a similar line of argument. He suggests that the ideas of the enlightenment helped generate the concepts behind rights and freedoms and supports his argument with quotes from the work of Rousseau and Burke. Individuals and nations, he continues, developed an understanding and belief in ‘natural rights’ especially for the creation of a representative state. These beliefs, he suggests,

\textsuperscript{95} Townshend C, ‘The Culture of Paramilitarism in Ireland,’ in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, p.349.

\textsuperscript{96} This is central to Wilkinson’s understanding of terrorism, which he sees as political violence against the liberal democratic state. See, Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy.

enshrined in the concept of the state, have been instrumental in the cause of terrorism since the French Revolution as they occur. For example, in the concepts of European nationalism, self-determination, de-colonisation and ethno-nationalism. These types of asymmetric power challenges from non-state actors are widely regarded as some of the main causes of terrorism, especially in orthodox terrorism theory. The irony is however, that these expressions of violence are enshrined in the western value systems of freedom and liberty that helped establish the state in the first instance.

A second area that can be seen as a general cause of terrorism between non-state actors and the state is its arbitrary nature of the state itself. States, especially liberal democratic ones, are arguably created as representative, yet it is very unlikely that they will represent the entire population, so political grievances are likely to materialise. Laqueur argues that because of this, terrorism is endemic to the state and he is doubtful if a peaceful settlement to all the demands of all terrorists could ever be met. States are also territorially arbitrary, as their borders do not necessarily reflect social, ethnic or religious divisions. Chaliand also identifies this and argues that states are a ‘model’ and often reflect the will of the majority therefore marginalising minorities into terrorism. States can be seen principally as artificially created political ‘products.’ Characterised by a population who may be socially, economically, ethnically and religiously diverse but who are forced together into a bounded territory and governed by an established authority under an enforced political system. Whilst this may be acceptable to some, especially the ethnic majority, the nature of the relationship of violence between the governing and the governed and the diversity of people in a state might suggest otherwise. An interesting argument to complement this is by Cassese. He suggests that terrorism exists in the fragmentation of state, not its forcible creation. Terrorism, he argues, should be seen as occurring in the “framework of the progressive decline of the nation-state and the disintegration of communities into smaller groups, sub-groups and minorities.”

A further cause of terrorism by non-state groups is the reaction and response of the state itself. As discussed above, the ability of the state to employ violence to maintain its security is well documented. The roots of terrorism can therefore be

98 O’Sullivan, Terrorism, p.6.
99 Chaliand, Terrorism, p.32.
100 Laqueur, New Terrorism, p.34.
101 Chaliand, Terrorism, p.35.
attributed to the repressive nature of the state. In detailed studies of ideological terrorist groups Donatella della Porta argues that the strategy chosen by the state is often instrumental in the development of anti-state terrorism. She suggests the occurrence of “radicalisation of protest,” this happens to political demonstrations that start peacefully and culminate in violence, as potential terrorist groups are driven underground by harsh state opposition.\textsuperscript{103} Rubenstein suggests that it is the violence perpetrated by the state that causes acts of terrorism, he argues that terrorists gain respect for violence from the state.\textsuperscript{104} Moreover, Carlos Marighela in his ‘\textit{mini-manual of terrorism}’ stated that, “the tactic of revolutionary terrorism must be used to combat the terrorism used by the dictatorship against the people of Brazil.”\textsuperscript{105} An example of the socialisation of violence or the inheritance of violence from the state by non-state groups is provided by Sayyid Fedlallah, the spiritual leader of Hizbollah, who was quoted as saying, “the extraordinary and unconventional methods of waging war are necessary to redress the imbalance of power and as an obligation for self-defence.”\textsuperscript{106}

The state can exist for many as a passive faceless and oppressive monolith that obstructs and frustrates the political and social goals of weaker opponents against which they vent their frustration and anger with the expression of violence. It can also be seen as an insensitive and hostile leviathan that dispenses its own brand of arbitrary violence. It is interesting to note however, that groups often perpetrate terrorism against the state with the intention of forming their own version of a state, in which they hope to realise their own political power and accomplish their own particular goals. This Orwellian scenario under the present line of argument would continually propagate terrorism, as the ‘new incumbent state’ would dispense its own violence whilst being the recipient of violence from new opposition groups. Prior to the formation of the State of Israel in 1948 Menachem Begin, representing the Irgun, (a terrorist group opposing British rule in Palestine) proclaimed that “a fighting underground is a veritable state in miniature: a state at war.”\textsuperscript{107} This statement could

\textsuperscript{103} Della Porta D, ‘\textit{Left-Wing Terrorism In Italy},’ in Crenshaw, \textit{Terrorism in Context}, p.117.
\textsuperscript{104} Rubenstein, \textit{Alchemists}, p.12.
\textsuperscript{106} Kramer M, ‘\textit{The Moral logic of Hizbollah},’ in Reich, \textit{Origins}, p.145.
\textsuperscript{107} Begin M, \textit{The Revolt: The Story of Irgun}, quoted in Rubenstein, \textit{Alchemists}, p.127.
now equally apply to the Palestinians. Although this argument suggests that terrorism is synonymous with the state, as I have suggested above, the state is an institution built on violence and also the majority of states were formed through violence.

I have suggested in this section that the roots of the pluralist theory of terrorism see it emanating from and between the state and non-state group. This is also where Schmid and Jongman suggest it is possible to locate terrorism. “in the state and non-state contest between the forces of order and change, power holders and challengers and forces of social control and dissent.”108 Although it is possible to establish that terrorism occurs in this relationship, what needs to be discussed is why it occurs. Regardless of the claim that there is no “adequate general scientific theory for the necessary and suitable conditions for political violence,”109 it is possible nonetheless to glean from the various studies of terrorism that a number of underlying causes do exist. Even so, due to the unpredictable nature of the occurrence of terrorism most causes are applied in very general terms and therefore lack rigorous scientific application. It is my intention in the next section to divide the examination of these suggested causes into two general sections based on the assumed intended outcome of the terrorism, these will be ‘revolutionary’ terrorism and ‘reactionary’ terrorism.

**Revolutionary Terrorism**

Revolutionary terrorism, I suggest, is terrorism conducted by a sub-state group in order to overthrow the state and completely destroy the existing political system and replace it with a new political framework. I am employing this classification in order to argue that a primary cause of terrorism in the pluralist perspective is the desire for state formation, the implications of which suggest that the roots of terrorism exist within the established state system of governance. Moreover, it can be argued that paradoxically the roots of this cause of terrorism can be found in liberal ideas, which support the rights of individuals and the attainment of freedoms. Thus terrorism employed by groups engaged in anti-colonial conflict is caused by the perceived need

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to achieve some form of legitimacy and sovereignty through self-government and political autonomy. These concepts are enshrined in the political institution of the state and form the basis upon which individuals, communities and nations gain and exercise their individual rights and freedoms. It can be argued that these liberal principles, especially the concept of the right to self-determination and independent state rule, are instrumental in causing terrorism. This suggests that through the prism of pluralism it is possible to see the institutionalisation of the roots of terrorism in the existence of the liberal state and the international state system. For example, UN Resolution 1514 states, “All peoples have the right to self-determination.” It is controversial argument to suggest that a UN resolution approves the use of terrorism to achieve statehood, but it certainly exists as a justification for seeking an independent state through violence. Yasser Arafat in his address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 argued, “A revolutionary, is one who stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land.”

The existence of the institution of the state, the power it holds and the access it permits to the international society is an incentive for groups to seek their own state. As Chaliand suggests, “the state is the tool-box containing the instruments for access to the West’s power and superiority” and that access to this is a “natural right.” Groups and communities that exist as minorities in states due to race, ethnicity, religion or culture actively seek this goal and often resort to terrorism to achieve it. This is supported by the typologies of terrorism widely adopted in the terrorism literature; such as anti-colonial, irredentist, separatist, nationalist, ethno-nationalist, insurgent and revolutionary. Bowyer Bell calls this phenomenon the “submerged nation” and suggests it is a very serious problem for modern societies.

Finally, it is possible to argue that the orthodox theory of terrorism; a theory which demonstrates that it is possible to achieve revolutionary change and the formation of an independent state through the use of terrorism, is actually instrumental in recreating and propagating terrorism as a technique for revolution. This argument is especially relevant in the light of the ‘success’ of the terrorist campaigns mounted in the ‘anti-colonial conflicts,’ such as Algeria, Palestine, Cyprus

109 Wilkinson, the Liberal State, p.37.
110 Balys and Smith, Globalisation, p.43.
112 Chaliand, Terrorism. p.20.
and Aden. All of which culminated in political autonomy and state formation, thus graphically illustrating the apparent benefits of terrorism. Although this argument suggests that terrorism causes terrorism, it does appear nevertheless to be a successful way or method of achieving statehood to all potential terrorist groups who desire political change and state formation. Whilst the central purpose of orthodox terrorism literature is to condemn terrorism, it is forced to concede that anti-colonial terrorism was ‘successful’ albeit due to a number of ‘special conditions’¹¹⁴ and as Wilkinson tellingly suggests, the apparent success of terrorist tactics employed during the anti-colonial period were very influential in facilitating the emergence of modern terrorism.¹¹⁵

**Reactionary Terrorism**

Reactionary terrorism is terrorism by non-state groups employed to reform the political system within the existing state structure. This classification of terrorism is intended to identify the pluralist causes of terrorism. These are perpetrated with the assumed intention of effecting change within the established political processes of the state. The objective of this terrorism being not to overthrow the state, but to reform it, in order to redress perceived political grievances or socio-economic inequality. It is important to stress that this classification is adopted for ease of examination and does not necessarily suggest a formal demarcation between groups who seek state formation and those who do not. Reactionary terrorism may not lead inadvertently to revolution and conversely revolutionary groups may only succeed in reactionary reform. Whilst I have argued that the desire for state formation is the cause of revolutionary terrorism, it is possible to suggest that some of the causes of reactionary terrorism may also be secondary underlying causes of revolutionary terrorism. Kegley for example, suggests a number of hypothesised causes of terrorism: government repression, economic deprivation, political opposition, ethnic

¹¹⁴ Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy*, p.21
persecution and class cleavage. These causes can be applied equally to both reactionary and revolutionary terrorism. Furthermore, I would suggest that in the pluralist world view non-state groups do not necessarily follow state borders and therefore can and do exist inside, outside and across the borders of established states.

Reform of the existing political system by terrorism is a pluralist theme explored by terrorism literature, as Kegley has highlighted. He suggests that the causes of terrorism can be seen as political or socio-economic grievances expressed by groups or communities. In 1972 the United Nations Secretariat produced a document on the causes of international terrorism, it suggested that the roots of terrorism were in “genuine frustration and despair with national and international policy in the political, economic and social situations.” The concept of grievance is a reoccurring theme in the suggested causes of terrorism. Bowyer Bell, for example, cites the influence of “real grievance, such as hunger, misery, disease and humiliation,” whilst Rubenstein suggests ethereal concepts such as “hope and desperation; hope for profound political change and desperation in political defeat and economic decline.” O’Sullivan calls this type of terrorism “anomic violence,” which he suggests is an expression of social and cultural dislocation. Friedland also draws attention to social conflict and suggests that terrorism is located in a decaying and unstable social system that triggers the disadvantaged in what he terms “blocked societies” to seek to reassert their rights.

Terrorism caused by the need for reform was also an argument articulated by the former US president, Bill Clinton, who suggested “Terrorism is the last desperate pitch of the humiliated and hungry and is a raw message of those neither heard nor understood.” Crenshaw argues that causes of terrorism can be divided into “preconditions and precipitants.” Preconditions are factors that set the stage such as modernisation, urbanisation and the development of social habits and historical traditions. Precipitants are specific events that trigger a violent reaction.

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117 Kegley, International Terrorism, p.102.
118 Bowyer Bell, Dynamics, p.2.
119 Rubenstein, Alchemists, p.72.
120 O’Sullivan, Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution, p.xiii. (intro).
della Porta explains this build-up to violence as “a protest cycle” in which claims or demands gather momentum within specific social groups and can radicalise into violence unless addressed by the government.\textsuperscript{124} Ehud Sprinzak calls this “a crisis of confidence” and suggests that protest movements begin, not necessarily because of fundamental faults in the system but because of rulers misleading behaviour and misguided policies.\textsuperscript{125}

The outcome of these frequently occurring causational arguments in terrorism literature is to conclude that the roots of terrorism are in social conflict. Groups and communities engaged in terrorism often refer to concepts such as order and justice. They demand the redress of the perceived social imbalance due to social inequality, injustice, discrimination, marginalisation and the lack of political representation. Two important theories of terrorism emerge from this line of argument; the first is relative deprivation. This theory, expounded by Ted Gurr in Why Men Rebel, suggests that the perceived discrepancy between what the group expect to have and what they actually have is a source of violence.\textsuperscript{126} The second is functionalism or utility theory; this has its roots in the work of Coser on social conflict theory,\textsuperscript{127} but is developed and applied to explaining terrorism by Crenshaw. She suggests that terrorism has a positive social function to ease social tension by creating and maintaining necessary social change.\textsuperscript{128} Further to this is change theory, which sees terrorism as a purposeful safety valve for dangerous social pressures and serves to raise awareness and help governments make timely reforms in order to avoid a potentially violent situation from worsening. This ultimately implies that terrorism has a purpose, and the means of violence, no matter how abhorrent, leads to an important end, which therefore justifies it. Bowyer Bell remarks that terrorism accompanies an ideal or a dream and suggests, “armed struggle is a means to change history and not an end in itself.”\textsuperscript{129} This theme is also explored by Albert Camus in The Rebel; he suggests that revolt is a spontaneous response to injustice and a chance to achieve change without giving up personal and collective freedom. Rebellion, he argues, “is the basis for human progression and freedom.”\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{124} Della Porta D, ’Left-Wing Terrorism,’ in Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, p.112.
\textsuperscript{125} Sprinzak E, ’The process of Delegitimation: Towards linkage theory of Political Terrorism,’ Terrorism and Political Violence, p.54.
\textsuperscript{129} Bowyer Bell, Dynamics, p.43.
The existence in society of ideas of grievances, demands and problems that can act as potential and indeed actual causes of terrorism, are identified by Wilkinson. He suggests the existence of “corrigible terrorism.” This is terrorism in which the causes, such as desires and grievances can be addressed.\(^{131}\) Reform of grievances is not however a panacea for terrorism despite Lacquer’s optimism that, “rarely do happy and contented people throw bombs”\(^{132}\) as not only does it occur for many other reasons outside of a pluralist understanding but also grievances and especially the concept of relative deprivation can by definition prove to be both endemic and unsolvable.

The lens of pluralism provides a useful tool with which to examine terrorism as it brings into focus the importance of the non-state group and highlights the relationship between the institution of the state and the goals of the group. It suggests that the terrorism can arise due to the incompatibility between the operation and functioning of the state and the demands of the non-state group. These can range from basic reform of the state to complete removal of the existing system of governance. Pluralism also demonstrates that terrorism can have a necessary and in some cases vital role as an instigator of essential and judicious political reforms and that it can be a channel through which political and social economic grievances can be communicated. Pluralism also provides an understanding of the role of basic rights and freedoms of non-state actors in the generation of violence. It is also able to explain why non-state groups might resort to violence using a nationalistic revolutionary discourse through the promotion of the right to self-determination.

Pluralism is a theory that can provide a vital explanation of the root causes of terrorism as it highlights the political position of the non-state actor vis-à-vis the state. It explains terrorism as the violence of non-state actor against the repressive state through the manifestation of reactionary or revolutionary violence. Its weakness however relates to its reliance on the centrality of state as it provides an understanding of terrorism that is related to state construction and performance. It looks to understanding terrorism via the institution of state either through reform or revolution, which it can be argued, merely serves to propagate terrorism because in the pluralist perspective terrorism is synonymous with the state.

\(^{131}\) Wilkinson P. ‘*Future of Terrorism,*’ Valedictory Lecture, University of St Andrews, 29 April 2002.
Structuralism and the Root Causes of Terrorism

Structuralism is a theory that can be employed to examine the existence and influence of structure in international relations. It is essentially an investigation into the actions of actors in relation to each other and the perceived structure that causes this or is created by it. Structuralism deals with the situational, the contextual and the systemic. In this section structuralism will be employed as a lens through which to examine the structural causes of terrorism provided by terrorism literature. Crenshaw believes that “terrorism cannot be adequately explained without situating it in its particular social, political and economic situation.” Structural causes of terrorism can manifest themselves in many forms. Examples are global economic disparity, territorial disputes, absence of supernational institutions and colonialism. They can also be ethereal concepts such as subjugation and oppression. Concepts the spiritual leader of Hezbollah identifies when he stated “Oppression makes the oppressed discover new weapons and strength every day.” The investigation of structure as structural constraints or influences can be very revealing in understanding the reasons why individuals, groups, communities and states behave in a certain way, especially relating to violence. Rubenstein suggests “Terrorists are normal people driven to extremes by situations.” In this next section I intend to study the potential structural causes of terrorism by examining three areas, these are ideology, culture and socialisation.

132 Laqueur, New Terrorism, p.36.
133 Although structuralism is often referred to as world systems theory and relates directly to a particular framework (see Baylis and Smith, pp.125-145) it is used in this study to examine structure and relates more to the ideas of social constructivism, see Baylis and Smith, pp.183-187. It is also intended to include an examination of political, social and economic structures through theories such as Marxism.
136 Quoted in Kramer M. ‘Moral Logic of Hezbollah,’ in Reich, Origins, p.145.
137 Rubenstein, Alchemists, p.228.
Ideology

An ideology is a set of ideas or beliefs that form the basis of a theory, which can then be used to justify actions. In the first section I discussed some examples of ideology relating to terrorism, many of these ideas by writers such as Mao, Guevara, and Marighella were directed primarily at conducting revolutionary and guerrilla warfare. As a result terrorist groups often adopted them. Structural terrorism theorists and indeed practitioners based their understanding of the perceived structural influences of terrorism on their own subjective situation which relates to a form of political, social and or economic oppression. The existence of oppressive structure is perhaps the most prominent and reoccurring theme in terrorism literature by those attempting to understand the manifestation of terrorism and by those actually practicing it. It is appropriate therefore that the most influential ideology for terrorism has been Marxism, this is primarily due to its suitability as an ideology for overcoming oppression.

Although advocating a class struggle, Marxism pledges that socio-political and economic change could be achieved if the oppressed unite in revolutionary opposition to overthrow their oppressors and remove the structural constraints on their freedom. The Manifesto of the Communist Party states, “Their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions...the proletariat have nothing to lose but their chains. They have the world to win.”


supreme act of resistance."¹⁴⁰ Resistance, struggle, oppression and freedom. common words in Marxism, are equally expressed in the lexicon employed by terrorist groups.

The ideas of violence and resistance as a response to structural oppression were also powerfully developed by Franz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre who. it can be argued, made significant and influential contributions to the development of terrorist thought.¹⁴¹ Although Fanon and Sartre constructed their ideas in response to anti-colonial conflicts, which can be seen as structural causes of terrorism, they developed their theories further to suggest the existence of structural violence, which in itself had become a cause of terrorism. Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth saw violence as an omnipresent structural force. He advocated an even greater violent response to the violence of colonial oppression, and implied that only though violence could true individual and group expression be found. Violence he believed was a unifying force and a way to gain self-respect and vent frustration. He argued, “Violence alone, violence committed by people, organised and educated by its leaders makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them.”¹⁴² Sartre developed a similar understanding of violence in Critique de la raison dialectique. Like Fanon he sees violence as the cohesion to all social and political relationships and advocated violence as self-expression and ultimately an end in itself. He wrote, “Violence, like Achilles’ lance, can heal the wounds that it has inflicted.”¹⁴³

The ideology that supports structural causes of terrorism can be divided into structural theory, such as Marxism, which advocates the use of violence to achieve a political aim and structural violence, which thinkers like Fanon and Sartre suggested is the use of violence as a political aim in itself. Both of these types exist as powerful causes of terrorism. The examination of ideology, whilst providing a useful understanding of how terrorist groups perceive their structural position also serves as a justification for violence by the groups themselves. Although this is perhaps the intended purpose of ideology, it serves as ‘a means justifies the end’ approach to violence.

¹⁴² Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p.118.
¹⁴³ Sartre J-P in Preface to Fanon, Wretched of the Earth.
Culture

Culture in this context, can be defined as a structural influence on the actions of society developed through history, behavioural habits and institutions. For this reason, culture is a very useful area to examine in the search for the causes of terrorism. Bowyer Bell suggests the existence of a cultural context, as an “arena or ecosystem” in which the armed struggle is generated. He suggests this is comprised of a combination of “history, culture, vulnerability and possibility.” Okamoto develops an interesting theory in this realm by suggesting the existence of a “phenotype” which is a product of culture and environment. This implies that terrorism can be perpetuated by the structural characteristics inherent in culture and is illustrated by the international terrorist Carlos the Jackal, who is quoted as saying, “Violence is the only language the Western democracies can understand.”

By employing the lens of structuralism it is possible to view the expression of violence enshrined in the history and culture of society. This implies the existence of a culture of violence, generated within society and propagating terrorism. This can be understood by considering the level of occurrence or propensity for violence in a society, community or region in both historical and contemporary events. Shabad and Ramo suggest that a culture of violence can be propagated and prolonged by the continuity provided by historical and cultural memory. Societies can be sensitised to accept different levels of violence depending on their history and experience. Some environments are therefore more conducive than others in generating terrorism. Laqueur suggests, “in the Basque region as in Northern Ireland a culture of violence has developed that tends to perpetuate itself.” However, he then points out that although terrorism has been infrequent in societies in which violence has not been a part of tradition and political culture, there have been few parts of the world that have been free of it.

144 Bowyer Bell, Dynamics, p.28.
146 Quoted in Bowyer Bell, Time of Terror, p.104.
148 Laqueur, New Terrorism, p.35.
Della Porta argues that the expression of terrorism is not necessarily representative of society as a whole and suggests the existence of a “sub-culture of violence,” which is terrorism instigated by different social groups who by definition and action consider themselves outside accepted society. \(^\text{149}\) Bowyer Bell calls this “the underground” and suggests that it exists as a subjective reality created by history. habits, customs, institutions and assumptions and is therefore not understood by those outside it. \(^\text{150}\) This theory of a culture of violence is useful because it encourages an examination of the components of culture, such as the history and cultural institutions of a society, as a cause of terrorism. The main problem with this approach is that it is based on the assumption that the acts of terrorism are perpetrated within a single society, suggesting that the entire society is representative of the violence.

**Socialisation**

Socialisation is an attempt to investigate the structural causes of terrorism from a socio-economic perspective. It is an approach that is intended to understand the structural nature of the relationship between the individual, group and socio-economic environment. A relationship that is responsible for causing people to behave in a certain way. Reoccurring socialisation themes in the causes of terrorism are poverty, low standards of living and limited socio-economic opportunity. According to Rubenstein “Terrorism is a product of social dislocation and a symptom of political instability,” he clarifies this statement by proposing that class struggle and economic disparity is responsible for the development of left-wing terrorist groups. \(^\text{151}\) Laqueur suggests that social and political trends coupled with youth unemployment and widespread immigration caused the increase of right-wing terrorist groups. He also argues that religious fanaticism does not necessarily explain the root causes of violence and cites a tradition and culture of violence coupled with poverty.


\(^\text{150}\) Bowyer Bell, *Dynamics*, p.27.

unemployment and unfulfilled political promises.\textsuperscript{152} However, it is important to point out that the socio-economic structure is not always seen as a cause of terrorism: a recent study entitled ‘Does poverty cause terrorism?’ concluded that any direct connection between poverty and terrorism is probably weak and a more accurate cause is in response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration.\textsuperscript{153}

Socialisation issues however, do have much in common with the grievances discussed under pluralism. They exist as a structure that is not initially apparent and are significantly more deep-rooted and underlying in society. As a result the problems produced by it are not necessarily solvable by quick-fix solutions that deal only with the symptoms. Crenshaw cites issues such as divided societies, long-standing protracted conflict and instutionalised discrimination and inequality as the structural context. She links these to specific events that provoke despair, rage and vengeance.\textsuperscript{154} This implies that terrorism can be generated by a self-perpetuating dynamic created by the socialisation between the long-term structural issues, such as economic inequality, political marginalisation and social discrimination and immediate trigger events such as election results, price rises or racial violence. Schmid and Jongman suggest these structural problems can be identified in the relationship between environment and sub-culture and suggest regional and global factors such as the international system, colonialism and revolution, coupled with urbanisation and modernisation as structural causes of terrorism within socialisation.\textsuperscript{155}

A further socialisation theory that examines psychological issues in the causes of terrorism is provided by Della Porta, who identifies the “social construction of reality.” This she suggests is the idea that terrorism cannot be understood unless the interaction is between the structural conditions and the objective or subjective reality is acknowledged.\textsuperscript{156} This implies terrorism can be caused by the construction of a subjective reality, which is unintelligible to those outside of the subjective reality employed by the group. Wardlaw maintains this theme and suggests that the causes are situationally dependant upon the social construction of reality. He emphasises the

\textsuperscript{152} Laqueur, \textit{New Terrorism}, p.105.
\textsuperscript{154} Crenshaw, \textit{Context}, p.19.
\textsuperscript{155} Schmid and Jongman, \textit{Political Terrorism}, p.111.
uniquely human involvement in the construction of social order. Bowyer Bell calls this subjective reality “the rebel dream” and suggest that the structure or “arena is in the mind of those involved.” This implies that only by examining the psychological structure inherent in the mind of the terrorist will it be possible to understand the subjective reality of the terrorist and therefore realise the context in which the reasons for the violence exist.

Socialisation provides an insight into the construction of the political and socio-economic environment, as the interaction of this environment with the actors can generate acts of terrorism. It also stimulates a useful recognition of the subjective realities that exist within the mind of the terrorist actor and which comprise the mental structure through which they operate. However, it should be pointed out that this is a theoretical approach to understanding terrorism. Difficult socio-economic environments are not automatically synonymous with the generation of terrorism, nor is it possible to predict the construction of an actor’s subjective reality. It is perhaps enough to appreciate that they exist as components in a potential structure that can cause terrorism.

Structuralism is a framework that can be employed to investigate the inherent structure of terrorism. By examining the nature of the relationships between: the actors and the structure, and also between the actors themselves - which might also form a structure. In relation to the causes of terrorism, structuralism shows that within terrorism literature there is an approach to the structural causes of the violence. This is demonstrated by an examination of ideology, which although predominantly Marxist, illustrates that a political structure is perceived by terrorist actors as a cause of oppression. This exists as a structure against which they need to employ violence in order to free themselves. Marxism can also exist as a cause of terrorism in itself because it can supply a counter narrative to the state and provide the ideological justification for the construction of the reality under which the terrorist actors believe they should carry out acts of violence. The central problem with structuralism however is that it is based on the assumed interaction between actors and or a perceived structure. The assumed nature of the relationship produces its own theoretical structure, which is seen as a cause of terrorism. Nevertheless structuralism

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156 Della Porta D, *Social Movement*, p.4.
157 Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism*, p.5.
158 Bowyer Bell, *Dynamics*, p.27.
provides a very useful theoretical tool with which it is possible to explain the root causes of terrorism by examining the effect and influence of political and socio-economic structures on actors.

Liberalism, the Individual and the Roots of Terrorism

Liberalism is a theory of international relations theory that can be defined as "an ideology whose central concern is the liberty of the individual."\(^{159}\) I have chosen liberalism in this section because its central focus is on the individual. Liberalism stems from the ideas of the enlightenment and the importance of individual human rights and humanitarian law. Coupled with this is contingency theory or the belief that mankind is not inherently aggressive and malevolent, but a victim of the surroundings and circumstances. Rousseau argued that the corrupt nature of humanity is due to social forces acting upon it. He suggested "Man is naturally peaceful and timid...honour, interest, prejudice and vengeance are remote from him in the state of nature, it is only when he has entered into society with other men that he decides to attack another."\(^{160}\) This was also suggested by John Locke who believed that man has no innate principles or ideas at birth; all knowledge he argued was derived from external experience and environment.\(^{161}\) According to liberalism, the causes of violence focus on the role of the individual in society. They can be seen as originating from the influence of the immediate environment on the individual, such as society, state or the state system, and not from the nature of man. In the enlightening work *Terror and Liberalism*, Paul Berman argues that liberalism gives the individual the freedom to act, as it provides a way of thinking about life and reality. "It is an

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\(^{159}\) Baylis and Smith, *Globalisation*, p.161.


insistence on freedom of thought and freedom of action...a relative freedom that recognises the existence of other freedoms."\textsuperscript{162}

Liberalism is employed in this study as a lens through which to examine the existing literature on terrorism in an effort to investigate the role of the individual in the root causes of terrorism. This also corresponds to the last and lowest level of analysis in this multi-level study, the examination of the individual level, which represents the grass roots approach to understanding the roots of terrorism. In this section I intend to consider a number of areas that relate directly to role of the individual in orthodox terrorism theory. these will be ideology, religion, psychology and single issues.

**Ideology**

Ideology is examined in this section because of the importance of the ideas and belief systems that are employed by the individual in the generation of terrorism. Ideology provides the individual terrorist with the cognitive reasoning with which to justify the use of violence. By adopting a definition of terrorism, as I have in this study of terrorism, as lethal political violence, a political cause or ideology is a prerequisite for acts of terrorism. This suggests that ideology can be regarded as fulfilling an instrumental role in generating, executing and sustaining acts of terrorism. Any political ideology held by an individual can lead potentially to violence as a trigger for acts of terrorism. Understanding the ideological motivation of terrorism is a constant theme in *The Dynamics of Armed Struggle* by Bowyer Bell who explains the ideology of the individual terrorist using the helpful metaphor of a "dream." He suggests that the rebel 'dream' is both the source and determinant of the armed struggle and is pursued by the faithful who believe that the only way of transforming it into reality is through the use of violence.\textsuperscript{163} The 'dream' is the ideology that provides the subjective reality to the terrorist; as Bowyer Bell suggests "the rebel is driven by a


vision only the faithful can see and this determines his world."¹⁶⁴ This subjective vision is the source of the perceived legitimacy of the political claim of the individual and provides the justification for the use of violence in order to achieve it.

This argument implies that the roots of terrorism, within the individual, exist in the beliefs; a concept Dostoevsky explored in his novel Demons. In this novel he suggested that terrorists are individuals who had become possessed by ideas."¹⁶⁵ Rubenstein also investigates this theme, and suggests in Alchemists of Revolution that terrorism is produced by a "social and moral crisis in the intelligentsia." He argues that individuals, not the masses generate terrorism; and quotes Lenin who said, "Terrorism is the violence of the intelligentsia not the proletariat."¹⁶⁶ Rubenstein’s central thesis is that acts of terrorism are generated by the intelligentsia within a society, who subject to the forces of political, socio-economic and structural change, are forced to resort to violence to create the impression of a mass movement in order to cope with this fundamental transformation.¹⁶⁷ This theme is also identified by Hoffman who argues, "The terrorist is fundamentally a violent intellectual prepared to use force in the attainment of goals."¹⁶⁸ This is also an idea examined by Berman who argues that the ideology and beliefs provided by liberalism, especially the notion of freedom, are a cause of terrorism. He suggests liberalism provides the ideology for violent action through rebellion to attain freedom. Interestingly, he also explains terrorism as the violent reaction against the ideas of liberalism.¹⁶⁹

It is also apparent in the literature on terrorism that ideology, when regarded as a specific political system, is seen as the cause of a certain type of terrorism. In a basic typology of terrorism, Wilkinson suggests the existence of "ideological terrorists...who seek to change the entire political and social system either to an extreme left or extreme right model."¹⁷⁰ I would argue that terrorists, by definition require some form of ideology, hence the typology of ideological terrorism is useful because it illuminates causes of terrorism that are left or right of the existing regime. Porta argues that the foundation of the term ‘terrorism’ originates from the nature of

¹⁶⁴ Bowyer Bell, Dynamics, p.9.
¹⁶⁵ Dostoevsky suggested that individuals can become possessed by 'Demons,' a metaphorical concept he adopts for revolutionary and terrorist ideas. See Dostoevsky F, Demons, London: Vintage, 1994.
¹⁶⁷ Rubenstein, Alchemists.
¹⁶⁸ Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.43.
¹⁶⁹ Berman, Terror and Liberalism, p.42.
¹⁷⁰ Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.20.
the challenge to the existing regime; she identifies the appearance of both right and left wing groups, who use terrorism in opposition or support of the existing regime depending on their respective ideological perspectives.\textsuperscript{171}

Examination of the ideology of the terrorist is a useful route into attempting to understand the reasons for violence that exist within the individual, as the existence of a political ideology is axiomatic to terrorism. However, the various ideologies employed by individuals engaged in violence can be highly subjective and very difficult to penetrate. This is especially true if their vision of reality is far from societal norms, which is often the case in individuals who are prepared to kill for their cause. Political ideology can also be used to obscure and potentially screen other more basic and fundamental reasons for the expression of violence. This is often the situation with orthodox terrorism literature, which places a great deal of emphasis on the political and ideological roots of terrorism. So whilst ideology is an important factor for consideration of the roots of violence it should not be treated as the sole cause and should be viewed in context with all the other possible causational factors considered in this study.

Religion

Religion is arguably the most widely assumed cause of terrorism within orthodox literature. Hoffinan suggests that it is the major driving force behind international terrorism, and states that religious motivation accounted for half of all active international terrorist organisations in 1995 and also in generating the most serious terrorist attacks of the decade.\textsuperscript{172} Although the apparent influence of religion in terrorism is a well-established assumption, what really requires investigation is the actual role of religion as a cause of terrorism. Religion, using a critical approach can be seen as purely an ideology that provides the reality, legitimacy and justification for terrorist acts. This is the basis of the argument of Juergensmeyer, who suggests that violence by religious groups is an expression of political power mandated by god. an

\textsuperscript{171} Della Porta, 'Left-Wing Terrorism,' in Crenshaw, Context, p.106.
attempt to express the legitimacy of religious rule against the state. He suggests religious violence occurs because of the nature of religion, the nature of secular politics and the nature of violence itself.\textsuperscript{173} Religion, using this argument can be regarded as a just another political ideology, which is vying with other secular ideologies for political power.

Conversely, religion can be seen as more than just a political ideology. Arguably it is inextricably linked to the identity and culture of a socio-economic community and therefore exists in the very roots of the terrorism. Wilkinson argues that religious terrorism has arisen out of the disillusionment with secular ideology and also points to the fact that some religious groups have moved beyond the political by establishing socio-economic community structures.\textsuperscript{174} Berman argues that religious terrorism has developed within the understanding of liberalism, as a response to the freedom of action and thought provided by liberalism in society.\textsuperscript{175}

Religious terrorism can also arise as a direct political challenge to the established political authority, in a similar way to secular terrorism. It can be a socio-economic and cultural counter reaction to perceived threats to the religious cultural fabric or it can exist simply as an expression of religious principles. The different meanings associated with the concept of ‘Jihad’ illustrate this diversity. ‘Jihad’ can represent the effort to lead a good religious life or to attempt to purify society. It can also mean the desire to spread Islam through preaching, teaching and or armed struggle.\textsuperscript{176} Rapoport suggests that the roots of religious terrorism are cultural, and points out that compared to secular terrorism it has established precedents and determinants, enshrined in sacred texts, which are unalterable. Religious terrorists, he argues, take their example from history and culture.\textsuperscript{177} Kramer calls this “the incalculable sense of sacred mission” and suggests that far from restricting the actions of terrorists it allows them the justification to deviate from the fundamental teaching of their religion. This argument refers to acts of violence that take the lives of others as well as their own and applies particularly to suicide bombing.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{172} Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.92.
\textsuperscript{173} Juergensmeyer M., 'Terror Mandated by God,' in Terrorism and Political violence, Vol.9, No.2 (Summer 1997) p16-23.
\textsuperscript{174} Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.35.
\textsuperscript{175} See, Berman, Terror and Liberalism.
\textsuperscript{177} Rapoport D., 'Sacred Terror: The Contemporary Example from Islam,' in Reich, Origins, p.107.
\textsuperscript{178} Kramer, Hizballah, in Reich, Origins, p.133.
The ambiguity of the role of religion as a cause of terrorism centres on whether religion is a motivation for it own sake, as a purely theological inspiration, or if it is actually overtly a political discourse. This can be illustrated by examining the development of Islamic extremism, which is widely recognised as a cause of terrorism. According to Esposito, the architect of radical Islam was Sayyid Qutb who through his writing, the most notable of which was the book *Signposts*, established the radicalisation of Islam. Qutb was a dedicated Muslim but the orientation of his understanding of religion was in relation to the politics of state. In *Signposts*, Qutb identified and literalised the basics of Islam from the Koran and ancient texts in relation to the secular (Egyptian) state. Although religious in principle these text gained fundamental political implications. The most important of which are, the division of the world into those for Islam and those against it. The theological clarification that state and society is controlled by god and not man, which implies that authority and sovereignty over man must come directly from God. This puts the secular state in direct conflict with extremist Islam. Lastly, the reinterpretation and development of the understanding of jihad, which according to Qutb became the coordinated, legitimised and authorised use of violence in order to overthrow the secular state and oppose any non-Islamic entity, including uncommitted Muslims. This implies that religion whilst it has theological overtones can exist as a political ideology and belief system and therefore act as a discourse for justifying terrorism.

This does not just apply to established world religions, as the seemingly theological texts of some more marginal religions, which includes all manner of religious cults, sects and millenarian organisations, can suggest a moral and ethical justification for violence. These are unrestrained by the moral or political considerations often applicable to secular groups. Hoffman points out “Terrorist groups motivated by religion contemplate massive acts of death as a reflection of belief, as a sacramental act of divine duty.” Laqueur continues this theme in his understanding of New Terrorism, which he suggests is rooted not in individuals, demands or concessions but by the destruction of society and elimination of large

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179 Islamic Extremism can be defined as a movement dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state, an Islamic state being one that exists under the implementation and sole authority of the Shari’a.
182 Hoffman B. 'Low-Intensity Conflict: Terrorism and Guerrilla War,' In Howard, *Terrorism*, p.144.
sections of the population. This returns the roots debate back to the nature of the religion itself and turns on its head the argument that religion may obscure the real socio-economic and political reasons for acts of terrorism. This is aptly summed up by a Hamas commander, who stated, “We are not fighting so the enemy recognises us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.”

Identifying the roots of religious terrorism is very complicated and can at best be misleading. Principle arguments suggest a quick-fix solution, which is that terrorism is synonymous with religion and is used to attempt to enforce the propagation of the religion. The justification of which can be found in increasingly militant and extreme interpretations of religious texts that are used to relate directly to ideology or a political belief system. However, others argue that it occurs for various other deeper underlying socio-economic, nationalistic or ethnic reasons, which are often obscured by the influence of religion and politics in a similar way to the effect of the Cold War on the understanding of the cause of regional conflict. Rubenstein argues that religious terrorists are fundamentally nationalist, he suggests, “Religious fundamentalism expresses widely felt longings for national redemption, national power, self-purification and revenge.” However, in millennial cults and extremist groups religious terrorism can also occur as violence for an end in itself, violence for no other purpose than to kill. This obviously makes a roots debate highly problematic and thus locates the causes of this form of terrorism deep in the psychology of violence.

Psychology

An Examination of the psychological causes of terrorism is an investigation into the nature of the individual and involves exploring the behaviour and attitudes of individuals and groups and an examination of group dynamics. Arguably, the most

185 Rubenstein, Alchemists, p.132.
important causes of terrorism are in the mind of the individual and the creation and existence of a subjective reality. Although acts of terrorism can be committed for a number of different reasons, as I have explored above, it is within the particular mindset and subjective reality of the individual that acts of terrorism occur. The cause of this thought matrix and subsequent reasoning to resort to violence can be seen as the psychological root cause of terrorism. Bowyer Bell suggests that the rebel establishes and exists in a perceived reality, this is a vision created and reinforced by faith in the 'dream' or terrorist goal. This he argues is a shared reality as all rebels assume their truth is universal. This produces an arrogant intractable belief in the group and results in "killing for a world others cannot see." Sprinzak calls this phenomena "Transformational delegitimation" he suggests it is the complete separation of a group from reality and is preceded by increasing radicalisation as the collective group identity takes over. Although the influences for the generation of this reality can be attributed to any number of the causes of terrorism examined so far. It is also important to include the effects of irrational psychological emotions on the individual, such as of fear, hatred, rage and vengeance.

Arguably the most important development for understanding the causes of terrorism are within group dynamics, in this area terrorism is generated by like-minded individuals who join together to create a subjective world, made by their own rules to support their own subjective feelings and reinforce their own collective understanding. This ultimately serves to justify their actions. This underground or alternative society can become even more insular and self-perpetuating as the terrorist actions can increasingly cut the group off from exposure to alternative 'realities.' Whittaker believes that the mindset of terrorists in the underground is such that they see themselves as reluctant warriors driven by desperation and lack of alternatives. He suggests self-denial and an altruistic desire to serve a good cause are primary psychological characteristics of terrorists. The separation of the group from wider society is also an important development. This 'splitting' produces polarisation and a Manichean black and white, them and us attitude which not only accounts for acts of terrorism but also triggers further psychological consequences such as stereotyping and dehumanisation. An example of this is Ulrike Meinhof who is reputed to have

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186 Bowyer Bell, Dynamics, p.33.
said in response to a challenge about killing policemen; “the person wearing a uniform is a pig and not a human being.”

Internal group dynamics can also produce an increasingly intractable situation where the only action is violence. Groups can become exclusively orientated towards violence, as it becomes their sole mode of communication. Crenshaw suggests that indoctrination of group members is such that they are forced to commit acts of violence. This is a prerequisite for acceptance into the group and also ensures group cohesion, as members can no longer return to wider orthodox society. Moreover it serves to accustom them to violence as a form of social conditioning. In a further study she suggests that small group dynamics produced by conditions of isolation lead to galvanised feelings of self-righteousness, trust, identity and loyalty. This can also be accompanied by ‘organisational violence’ within the group to ensure discipline and loyalty. Recognising this, Lustick suggests the existence of “Solipsistic violence.” This, he argues, is the expression of symbolic violence. Although this violence is directed at the ‘enemy,’ it is intended for the group, as a means to develop group psychology in order to strengthen group needs of identity and purpose.

Other psychological causes of terrorism within group dynamics can be attributed to leadership. Strong dominant leaders or persuasive entrepreneurial types can generate group directed violence, such as the influence of Ulrike Meinhof in the Red Army Faction or Dighenis Grivas of EOKA in Cyprus. This was identified by Max Weber, who suggested three types of leadership authority that provided motivation for obedience. These are rational; based on legal standing. Traditional, relating to established authority and charismatic, indicative of the personal qualities of the leadership. Group members can also commit violence for group leaders and therefore absolve themselves from the blame by transferring responsibility for it to the leaders. Stern calls this “displacement of responsibility.” Bandura also identifies “diffusion of responsibility” in which acts of terrorism are committed by group decision, thus when everyone is responsible no one is responsible. Miller suggests

190 Crenshaw M, ‘How Terrorists Think: What Psychology can Contribute to Understanding Terrorism,’ in Howard, Terrorism, p.72.
191 Crenshaw M, ‘The Causes of Terrorism,’ in Kegley, International Terrorism, p.120.
that individuals and groups commit acts of violence against symbolic targets, such as political or religious leaders or emblematic buildings as a substitute for the more complicated actual cause of the social, political or economic distress.\textsuperscript{196} This cathartic cause of terrorism can also be termed “displacement violence.”

Group dynamics can also be maintained and given purpose by violence; this can cause a cult of violence, which can rule the group and establish their existence solely for the sake of violence. This justifies their existence and makes the recourse to acts of terrorism the natural choice. The Israeli terrorist group leader Menachem Begin famously stated “we fight therefore we are!”\textsuperscript{197} Post calls this phenomenon “group think” and suggests it provides an illusion of invulnerability, builds confidence and risk taking. It also presumes group morality polarises the opposition and produces intolerance to challenges by group members to key beliefs.\textsuperscript{198} An indicator of group dynamics as a cause of terrorism is the question: why do groups continue violence even after a form of political settlement has been reached or the position is no longer tenable? This is due; it can be argued, to the strength of the terrorist group dynamics and the belief that if members of the group died for the cause then it must be continued at all costs. This can also be seen as a form of survivor guilt.

The arguments discussed above have been correlated in a recent paper on psychology and terrorism by Jacob Rabbie who suggests a behavioural interaction model that can provide a social-psychological framework for examining terrorist behaviour. He bases his model on the assumption that behaviour is a function of the interaction of the actor with the environment. For environment, he includes a social environment, which he sees as the behaviour of people within and outside the boundaries of the group. He combines this with psychological orientations distinguished as cognitive, emotional, motivational and normative. Rabbie suggests that the interaction of these psychological orientations with the environment provided by group dynamics can cause terrorist behaviour.\textsuperscript{199}

An examination of the role of psychology in the generation of terrorism is particularly valuable, especially as it prompts investigation into the mindset of the

\textsuperscript{196} Miller, 'Intellectual origins,' in Crenshaw, Context, p.59.
\textsuperscript{198} Post J M, 'Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a product of Psychological forces,' in Reich, Origins, p.36.
individual and the nature of the psychological composition of group dynamics. This has a significant effect on the generation, but in particular, the maintenance of violence. However, the employment of a psychological discourse with which to view the causes of terrorism can serve to detract from considering the reasons why the individual or group is actually in a violently psychological condition in the first instance. It can serve to overemphasise the importance of the composition and activity of the group, focusing on how, instead of why, they perpetrate acts of terrorism. Orthodox Terrorism theory assumes that the group formed in reaction to a particular situation or reason. Against this situation the group have adopted the use violence in order to change it to their desired political outcome. The weakness of group psychology approach suggests that the group uses violence because they are a group and as a result perhaps overlooks the initial reasons why the group formed. Nevertheless psychology has an important role to play in understanding the longevity and continuance of terrorism within both individuals and groups.

Single-Issue

Thus far I have considered causes of terrorism that are accountable to wider issues and have implications beyond the immediate terrorist group, suggesting that the causes of the violence are open to a roots debate. However, it can be argued that terrorism can be generated by causes that are not subject to a roots debate. This is primarily because they are related directly to single issues, which are specific and localised, individual or small group problems and are the direct cause of the violence. Single-issue terrorism can be defined as violence committed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within a target society. These might include employment or financial disputes, racial or homosexual hatred, socio-religious extremism or in fact any act of lethal violence with a very localised political agenda. It also includes extremist factions of peaceful protest groups such as animal rights and

200 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.20.
ecological movements. Whilst it is possible to identify the cause of this type of terrorism, it is perhaps not so easy to solve it. Often their demands are so intractable, extreme and fanatical that it is totally unrealistic and virtually impossible to offer a workable solution. Wilkinson calls this type of terrorism “incorrigible.”

A further cause of single-issue terrorism identified within terrorism literature is initiated by organised crime and the drugs trade. This is a contentious area in the roots debate, as it can be argued that organised crime and the drugs trade is often inextricably linked to terrorist groups, not only as justification for violence but also to mask criminal activity and narcotics trafficking. An important study by Miller and Damask however. decrives the myth of narco-terrorism and argues that the term was established during the Cold War by the United States to suggest a Soviet sponsored conspiracy to undermine the west and therefore justify American foreign policy, especially in Latin America. In addition, pioneering work by Wardlaw suggested that so-called ‘narco-terrorism’ served only to group together disparate terrorist and guerrilla groups with different motives, divergent agendas and diverse links into an association with the drugs trade. This had the effect of implying that the relationship between terrorism and the drugs trade is very simple, as the term narco-terrorism suggests.

The link between political violence and crime and the drugs trade as a cause of terrorism, according to Miller and Damsak, is more to do with greed than political agendas. However they do suggest linkages between groups over a common opposition to the government. Despite this relationship they point out that the agendas of insurgents and narcotics traffickers are virtually incompatible as they are diametrically opposed over the nature of the governing power structure. For example, insurgents operate outside the political structure in an attempt to overthrow it, whilst the drugs trade profits from it and thus seek to maintain it. Despite the controversy, crime and drug trafficking remain a serious cause of terrorism. Clutterbuck suggests that the cultivation, processing and distribution of narcotics are probably the greatest single generator of political violence and crime.

203 Miller and Damask, Dual Myths, p.119.
204 Miller and Damask, Dual Myths, p.124.
Examination of single issues as causes of terrorism within the individual can provide a useful understanding into why a particular expression of violence is occurring. Despite the belief that it negates a roots debate due to the understanding that single-issue terrorism assumes that if the issue is solved then terrorism will stop. Conversely if the issue is so radical it cannot be solved then the terrorism will continue indefinitely. This discourse causes problems for attempts at solving so-called issue terrorism, as actors cannot be placated except with recourse to remedying the particular issue, which might be a political impossibility. However, it can be argued that orthodox terrorism in fact views terrorism as single-issue and consequently refuses to engage in a roots debate. The approach of this study is intended to penetrate into the roots of terrorism from a multi-level perspective. It argues that suggesting a single issue causes terrorism is unhelpful in revealing the deeper root causes.

Liberalism is a theory that can be employed to examine the role of the individual in the root causes of terrorism. This reveals a very important level of analysis, as the individual is ultimately responsible for carrying out acts of terrorism and is often overlooked by the propensity of terrorism studies to focus on the ‘high level’ state causes and the political impact of terrorism. This section provides an investigation into the construction of the ideology and belief systems of the terrorist, and explains why the particular individual uses it. This helps to question the nature of relationship between religion and ideology and suggests how religion can trigger violence within the individual terrorist, for its own sake and as a purposefully constructed ideology for political violence. It also allows individual psychological causes of terrorism to be scrutinised, which helps construct a picture of individual mindsets and the nature of group dynamics, both of which have a great deal to offer the study of terrorism. It also highlights single-issue causes of terrorism and suggests that they can exist within the individual terrorist as a sole cause of violence.

Liberalism is however a framework that focuses on the individual and assumes that the individual terrorist is a rational actor and therefore acts in accordance with an ideologically created psychological mindset that is constructed from a reasoned and cognitive understanding of the political situation. However, as Joseph Conrad suggests in *The Secret Agent*, individuals who commit acts of terrorism can equally be
the unwitting violent end-product of a chain of events caused by complicated political relationships and socio-economic situations of which they are completely unaware.\textsuperscript{206}

\section*{International Relations Theory and the Roots of Terrorism}

In this survey of terrorism literature I have employed levels of analysis with which to view the root causes of terrorism, these were provided by the principle theories of international relations. These theories were chosen to represent the different perspectives of the root causes of terrorism. They also broadly correspond to the levels of analysis of state, non-state, structure and individual. In this section, I intend to briefly debate the relative strengths and weaknesses of each theory at each level of analysis by employing the approaches of critical theory and discourse analysis.

Realism is linked closely to orthodox terrorism theory and employs a positivist approach to understanding acts of terrorism as illegal and illegitimate violence against the state. It is a very useful discourse for state governance to employ in order to view terrorism, as it perhaps provides the most widely accepted understanding of the cause of terrorism, that of an unlawful political threat to the state. This is because realism and its modern theoretical derivative, neo-realism,\textsuperscript{207} is based on the traditional assumption of a unitary rational state existing in international anarchy. It is focused solely on state politics and domestic and foreign security and provides no form of roots debate with which to understand terrorism, because realism assumes that terrorism emanates from other states.

However, this is useful for the state as it can legitimately employ its legal and military security machinery to ‘deal’ with terrorism, which is perhaps the central reason for the construction and employment by state governance of the orthodox terrorism discourse. The realist model establishes terrorism as practically synonymous

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{206} Conrad J, \textit{The Secret Agent}. London: Penguin, 5\textsuperscript{th} ed, 2000. \hfill \textsuperscript{207} Neo-realism is based on similar assumptions to realism and has a closer application to security related problems; see Baylis and Smith, \textit{Globalisation}, p.196.}
with the existence of the state, as it is a theoretical tool that can be used to both establish and maintain the political power of the state. This is because a terrorist threat to the state, far from weakening it, will help to reinforce its legitimacy and in some cases increase its political power, often to the detriment of civil rights and freedoms. Terrorism through the discourse of realism allows the state to maintain its own legitimacy, internally by the subjugation of its population and externally in defence of state security. This is the purpose of viewing terrorism through realism and the construction of orthodox terrorism discourse, both of which provide the theoretical basis for the construction of government anti-terrorism and counter terrorism policies.

The central weakness of realism in understanding the roots of terrorism is due to its state centric orientation, which means it is unable to understand the non-state causes of terrorism. Nevertheless, terrorism by definition is primarily a violent challenge against the established political power. So realism, which is a political level approach to understanding the roots of terrorism, is vital if any comprehensive understanding of the phenomena of terrorism is to be constructed.

Pluralism is a discourse that provides a clearer insight into the possible social causes of terrorism by engaging in a limited roots debate that incorporates non-state actors. Although the discourse of pluralism rests on the assumptions that are inherent in the dominance of the state, it does expose the nature of some of the power relationships between the state and non-state actors. It also highlights a number of possible social causes such as injustice, socio-economic deprivation, discrimination and marginalisation. However, it falls short of examining deeper causes outside of the state and rests on the ability of the state to satisfy grievances as a ‘safety valve’ for reform. The theory of pluralism also incorporates concepts such as universal rights, interdependence and self-determination. These concepts, although intended perhaps ironically, as determinates of peace are seen through the lens of pluralism as a root causes of terrorism, existing within the non-state group. Pluralism is a useful discourse for highlighting why non-state groups resort to political violence because it shows the cause of the violence by non-state groups against the state.

Although pluralism does explain the significance of the non-state actor in the causes of terrorism its main weakness is its reliance on the dominance of the state and the international state system and therefore will always see terrorism as inherent. It does not engage effectively with any structural approaches nor does it explain the role of the individual in terrorism. It is not a useful discourse for state and government
because it can bestow legitimacy on groups engaged in terrorism as it explains and helps to justify their motivations. The primary strength of the theory of pluralism is to provide an alternative to the state-centric discourse of realism. It reveals an important player in the manifestation of terrorism, the non-state actor, and clearly helps to explain why it might be engaged in terrorism. Thus it is a perception that is becoming increasingly important in understanding the contemporary world and the existence of transnational and across border groups who have little or no state affiliations.

Structuralism is a theory of international relations that creates a perception of terrorism outside of the familiar state centric understanding. It facilitates an investigation into the situational, contextual and systemic causes of terrorism. It also highlights important literature and thinkers, such as Marx, who have been instrumental in the construction and understanding of the roots of terrorism. Through this discourse it is possible to investigate the structural influences on the causes of terrorism that exist within terrorism literature, such as ideology, culture and socialisation. This theory provides a useful route into understanding the causes of terrorism as an alternative to the state and non-state levels, as it provides access into theoretical causational areas that are not understood using state centric approaches. However, the central criticism of structuralism is that it is deterministic; it suggests that the actors are produced by the system and their behaviour is part of it, consequently they have little ability to act freely.\textsuperscript{208} If employed as a single discourse this can create broad generalisations and produce an understanding of the causes of terrorism based on perceived and theoretical political and socio-economic structures.

Liberalism is a theory employed in this study because it views the root causes of terrorism through the perspective of the individual. It is a discourse that is based on individual rights and freedoms, and defends the importance of concepts such as individual liberty and self-determination.\textsuperscript{209} This theory represents the lowest level and grass roots approach to the roots of terrorism. It is a very helpful theory for explaining the role of the individual in the manifestation of terrorism because this area is not considered in any of the other approaches. It creates access into the terrorist mindset and psychological construction and reveals important psychological causational factors. It also questions the role of religion and the existence of single-

\textsuperscript{208} See the criticism on World Systems Theory by Holden and Wyn Jones in Baylis and Smith, \textit{Globalisation}, p.135.
\textsuperscript{209} Baylis and Smith, \textit{Globalisation}, pp.147-63.
issue causes of violence. However, the weakness of liberalism is the attractive nature of the arguments. Although its purpose as a discourse is to focus on the individual this can lead to a disproportionate understanding. This theory can overemphasise the role of the individual, the psychology of group dynamics and the psychological construction of individual realities in relation to acts of terrorism. These can easily detract attention from investigating why the acts of terrorism are actually occurring.

Each international relations theoretical approach has its own strengths and weaknesses but it is important to note that the causes of terrorism are often viewed using only one of these perspectives; this is especially relevant to realism. This survey of terrorism literature implies that if a comprehensive and holistic understanding of terrorism is to be achieved then it is vital to apply a multi-level analytical approach to the causes of terrorism, incorporating all these perspectives. This will allow an explanation of the roots of terrorism at all the levels. This will be far more useful in attempting to understand the causes of terrorism and conceivably resolve them, than confining a study to one particular approach, which will automatically exclude a vast number of other factors.

Consider that an act of terrorism occurs; realism sees this as an illegitimate and unlawful attack against the legitimacy of the state, which represents a direct illegal challenge to the established authority, and therefore warrants a legal and military response. Pluralism, however, sees a non-state actor requiring the formation of a state in order to satisfy the need for self-determination or the requirement for socio-political change. Yet, structuralism sees the violence as a product of a culture of violence caused by the systemic socio-economic and political oppression. But, liberalism explains the violence as individual grievances enshrined in ideology or religion through the creation of a subjective reality. I am not suggesting that one or any of these approaches is the right one. Instead I am merely illustrating that by recognition of the existence of different ontological comprehensions, discourses, theories or perspectives, all of which relate to different levels of approach. It is possible, if all these perspectives are recognised, to combine them into one single holistic approach, which would potentially provide a much a more extensive and sophisticated understanding of the root causes of terrorism.
Orthodox Terrorism theory and the Roots of Terrorism

Orthodox terrorism theory, it can be argued, is the predominant terrorism discourse that is used to explain, understand and deal with terrorism. It is recognised by an orthodox definition, which is identified by its state centric and positivist understanding of terrorism as illegitimate and unlawful violence. It is also based on the assumption that the terrorist is a rational actor, as it suggests that terrorism is a carefully planned and calculated strategy directed against the state in order to influence decision-making and effect political change by the use of functional, symbolic and tactical violence. Orthodox terrorism theory is based on the legitimacy of the state. Although this is a relative legitimacy, this understanding of terrorism has become widely accepted as the normative definition of terrorism and consequently exists as a pejorative term adopted by actors, predominantly state actors, to create a moral justification for their claim to legitimacy.

Orthodox terrorism theory is designed and employed to legitimise the violence used by the incumbent power centre to enforce its political will whilst simultaneously delegitimising the use of political violence by opposition movements or organisations against the existing power centre or state. It is established and employed in order to deal with terrorism from the perspective of state security, without any form of roots debate in order to legitimise governmental anti-terrorism and counter terrorism policies and actions. Orthodox terrorism theory is just a discourse; it does not necessarily represent the ‘truth’ about terrorism. It is created and employed as a state discourse for the purpose of providing a theoretical interpretation of facts and events and provides an accepted explanation of the political violence, which allows the legitimisation of state violence through moral and legal justifications.

In this study I have attempted to examine the roots of terrorism represented in terrorism literature by viewing it through the different perspectives created by international relations theory. This has produced a multi-level and in some cases inter-disciplinary survey of terrorism literature, which I would argue, demonstrates that the manifestation of terrorism can be caused by a multitude of different factors depending which model or perspective is employed. The outcome of this survey of literature in terrorism studies suggests that the roots of terrorism can be explained in different ways by different perspectives. Two main implications have arisen from this survey of terrorism studies for understanding the roots of terrorism. First. if a comprehensive
and holistic understanding of the roots of terrorism is required than a combination of these different perspectives is required. Second, the survey of terrorism literature suggests a general differentiation between approaches to explaining the roots of terrorism. These are,

1. Orthodox terrorism theory, this is the predominant explanation and understanding of terrorism. It is based on the dualism between the illegitimate and legitimate use of violence that mirrors the realist state-centric understanding and is the basis for governmental anti-terror and counter terrorism policies. It is supported by a well-known school of terrorism academics particularly Wilkinson, Hoffman, Alexander, Schmid and Jongman.

2. Radical terrorism theory, this is occasionally apparent in the literature and explains and understands terrorism largely from the perspective of the terrorist. It is a justification for violence and a defence of the root causes that exist predominantly in the structure. It is expressed by writers such as Fanon, Sartre, Camus, Qutb and Marx.

3. Moderate terrorism theory. this is a limited approach in terrorism studies that deals with a roots debate. It is a trend that attempts to explain and understand the roots of terrorism in relation to socio-economic and structural as well as political causes. Examples of this are Gurr, Bowyer Bell, Crenshaw, Della Porta and Berman.

Although these different approaches suggest a wide understanding of the roots of terrorism, alternatives to orthodox terrorism theory are marginal. The discipline is dominated by orthodox terrorism discourse. In order to develop a considerably more sophisticated and advanced understanding of the root causes of terrorism, one that can be usefully employed in attempting to solve terrorism, I have three recommendations. The first is to adopt a definition of terrorism that is outside of the moral legitimacy debate. One that will free the understanding of terrorism from pejorative, moral and legal judgements that continually obscure the reasons for the violence and are unhelpful in understanding the root causes. The simple definition I suggest is, terrorism as ‘lethal political violence.’ Although this definition is an attempt at
neutrality it loses the understanding of terror. Which it can be argued, is integral to the understanding of terrorism. However, terror is linked with orthodox theory, which suggests that the perpetrators of the violence are attempting to illegally and illegitimately coerce and terrorise a political group into complying with their demands. Acts of violence, in both conventional war and unconventional conflict all serve to terrorise, which I would argue is the nature of political violence. A neutral definition of terrorism helps to move the understanding of terrorism closer to the realm of conflict.

The second recommendation is reliant on the adoption of this neutral definition. I suggest that in order to construct a more comprehensive conflict resolution style roots debate it is necessary to draw upon thinkers outside of the terrorism studies. These I suggest could be found in the work of conflict theorists. This will be examined in chapter 2, the root causes of conflict. The third recommendation also needs the neutral definition, this is the suggestion that in order to ensure all the possible causes of the violence are examined a multi-level theoretical and holistic framework to the manifestation of terrorism should be constructed from a combination of terrorism and conflict studies. This is the subject of chapter 3.

Terrorism studies is a largely dormant academic discipline, it focuses on examining and justifying an already established discourse which only serves to promote the positivist understanding of terrorism that the discourse is designed to do, thereby reinforcing its own reality. The study of terrorism needs to break out of the mono-dimensional and pejorative moral legitimacy definition and move beyond the state centric understanding of terrorism provided by the orthodox discourse and into a wider and more holistic approach to political violence that will provide access into the deep roots of the violence and facilitate movement towards a resolution of terrorism. This recommendation will be examined in the next chapters, which deal with the useful approaches of conflict studies and the construction of a comprehensive framework for rethinking terrorism. A framework that when applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a case study in chapter 5 will demonstrate how the roots of terrorism can be comprehensively understood.

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210 Robert Cox calls this "problem solving theory," see Cox. Approaches, p.88.
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Approaches to Conflict: The Root Causes

Introduction

Conflict is an issue that is said to have occupied the thinking of humankind more than any other, save only god and love.¹ This is probably because conflict and violence have not only been an omni-present phenomenon in the progress of human history but have often been the reason for the creation of history itself. The events of the Trojan Wars, catalogued in the Iliad of Homer, exist as an example of the first written primary source record of the history of mankind and was inspired by conflict. This is also true of primary source histories of medieval warfare, especially the crusades, and of course modern accounts of the first and second world wars and also contemporary wars, such as the Gulf War of 1992 and Iraq in 2003. Some would argue that this is to be expected, as in a Hobbesian world, war and conflict is a state of nature. Although this is debateable, few philosophers neglect the study of conflict when examining the composition of human kind. The study of conflict represents not only an effort to comprehend the nature of human kind, without which it would not exist, but also shows an attempt to understand why it occurs, and then produces measures to try and prevent it. This is no more apparent than in the periods immediately after the first and second world wars, when the shock of over 20 and 50 million deaths respectively² prompted the international community to actively seek the avoidance of conflict by creating institutions such as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Nevertheless, the prevention of conflict has always been a process

fraught with difficulty. Despite the fact that the UN was created to end war (it claims in the preamble to the UN charter that it intends “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”3), it actually fails to support an absolute ban and in fact, somewhat paradoxically, explicitly sanctions the use of force in defence of the Charter.4

Attempts at creating systems to prevent war are not new. It can be argued that the perceived existence of the realist state-centric international system based on the governmental and territorial legitimacy of the state was created in the peace of Westphalia in 1648, in order to promote international stability and peace. Although this so-called Westphalian system was created to establish order, its foundations are paradoxically in conflict, because the Westphalian system creates a structure in which the use or threat of violence, as war, represents the accepted method by which sovereign states maintain their international and territorial integrity. This is the reason for the continual recourse to security and the reoccurring problems of the security dilemma. Moreover, it also represents the attainment of the international status of a state with all the associated benefits, by the use or threat of violence. This is clearly illustrated by the number of states in the international system that are created through violence, and implies that the Westphalian system exists as the instigator and propagator of institutional violence. As a result of this assumption there are a number of important implications for understanding conflict by employing the Westphalian system and the associated state-centric perception. The first is the reliance on the inter-state and highly stylised warfare of the state that relates to established armies and symmetric conflict. The second is the employment of an international system that is not only founded on conflict, but which also creates an inherent conflict based structure that recreates and propagates interstate violence. Possibly the most important implication is the inability of this system to perceive intra-state conflict. This is identified by Richmond who suggests the central problem is “the psychosis of Westphalian imagery and its inability to understand or address issues outside the rigid state centric organisation.”5 These implications for conflict of the Westphalian system will be examined in greater detail below, in the section on realism.

5 This is contained in chapter 7, in relation to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. See, The UN Charter, Chapter 7, at www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
The Westphalian system, nonetheless, has been accepted as a way to understand conflict, especially during the cold war, when conflict was related to the state-centric and ideologically polarised bi-polar world. However, in the uncertainty of the post-Cold War world, the propensity for inter-state conflict has been replaced by intra-state conflict, in the form of ethnic identity conflict, characterised by irredentist and secessionist movements and civil war. This argument suggests that in order to understand this type of conflict, which relates to nations, communities, groups and individuals often within states or irrespective of established state boundaries, it is necessary to move beyond the Westphalian system and employ a discourse that deals with issues such as non-state identity, representation and participation. These frameworks will be examined later in the chapter, but the point to make here is that conflict in the post-Cold War period, referred to from this point on as contemporary conflict, is a complex and inconsistent phenomena. As a result, the state-centric Westphalian system of understanding can be seen to be in crisis. To explain and understand this 'new' phenomena alternative approaches need to be applied, if paths into dealing with the roots of contemporary conflict are to be established.

By employing different theories and discourses, understanding conflict becomes an ontological and epistemological problem. It then requires a critical approach to the theoretical framework or discourse employed in order to understand it, as each theory produces a different interpretation or relative truth. In this chapter I intend to consider the potential root causes of conflict by investigating and examining the main theoretical approaches provided by the conflict literature. To achieve this I intend, as I did in chapter 1 on terrorism, to examine the roots of conflict through the different perspectives created by international relations theory. The lenses through which I will view the root causes of conflict will be realism, pluralism, structuralism and liberalism. I will also seek to examine each approach using critical theory and discourse analysis. As with chapter 1, these theories have been chosen to broadly represent the levels of analysis of state, non-state, structure and individual, an approach that is often found in techniques employed by third generation conflict resolution. The reason for this is to examine the different perspectives of the roots of

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violence provided by terrorism and conflict studies and then combine them in a multi-level framework. This will be the subject of chapter 3. The framework will then be applied in chapter 5. to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a case study to illustrate the argument that it is possible to rethink the roots of terrorism. It is important to stress that the theoretical levels of analysis constructed in this chapter are an aid to examination and are not mutually exclusive. Prior to the theoretical survey of conflict literature I will discuss an overview of how conflict can be defined and understood with particular reference to typologies of conflict. This will comprise part 1 of this chapter. Part 2 will then deal with a survey of conflict literature, comprising of an investigation of the roots of conflict viewed through international relations theory critiqued by critical theory and discourse analysis.

**Part 1: Conflict Theories**

**Approaching and understanding conflict**

Attempting to deal with conflict, which is the assumed aim of conflict studies, requires an understanding of conflict. This is in itself problematic, as no normative definition exists because definitions are enshrined in the theoretical framework used to understand it. Nevertheless, a broad working definition would be useful at this juncture in order to facilitate a point of departure for this study. An initial definition of conflict is “a serious disagreement or argument; an incompatibility between opinions.” This definition is useful in highlighting the incompatibility of goals, a central concept in the understanding of conflict. However it is very broad and fails to distinguish between violent and non-violent conflict. A lack of violence does not necessarily mean an absence of conflict; this concept is explored in the literature on

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peace research, which problematise the accepted understanding of peace and conflict by examining the concepts of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ peace. Boulding suggests, “Negative peace is to pacify, manage and appease the existence of conflict.” Galtung calls this “the absence of direct violence,” implying that conflict exists in peace. Boulding also argues in his pioneering study “Positive peace is resolution and is the absence of conflict.” Galtung, who developed research on structural causes of conflict, complements this by suggesting positive peace, is the removal of the root causes of structural and cultural violence. This argument suggests peace without conflict. Boulding succinctly illustrates the ambiguity of this argument by suggesting, “all non-conflict is peace but conflict is war and peace.”

Conflict as an incompatibility of goals that is represented by both sides using force is often termed armed conflict. Wallensteen and Sollenburg define ‘armed conflict’ as a “contested incompatibility which concerns governments or territory where the use of armed force between two parties (of which at least one is a government state) results in at least twenty-five battle related deaths.” Although this definition helps to orientate an understanding centred on the manifestation of violent conflict, it incorporates problematic terminology such as ‘battle related’ and ‘government state,’ both of which suggest a specific type of conflict, which in the context of this study might prove too constraining. I intend to adopt a classification of conflict for the purpose of this study from the approach of Miall et al. to “actual or potential violent conflicts,” which they suggest range from “domestic conflict situations that threaten to become militarised beyond the capacity of domestic civil police to control, through to full-scale interstate war.” Although this provides the most useful focus for the study of conflict it does introduce the concept of war, which has traditionally been understood to signify symmetrical interstate conflict, whereas conflict is an attempt to delineate non-state or intra-state violence. Nevertheless, current conflict researchers are widening the traditional criteria even further in line with the current trends in contemporary conflict. For example, Jabri defines war as “a

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9 Boulding K, Stable Peace, Austin Texas: University of Texas Press, 1910, p.135
12 Galtung, Peace, p.22.
13 Boulding, Stable Peace, p.15.
15 Miall et al, Conflict Resolution, p.23.
contest or conflict over valued resources and belief systems carried out through the use of violence by one group against another.”

The reason for the adoption of this broad definition of conflict and indeed war, is to incorporate the present thinking currently surrounding the understanding of contemporary conflict. This is because historically, conflict and war have had a narrow definition and specific application, due primarily to the understanding of war in the ‘the modern period,’ (from 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia) as the preserve of sovereign states. This is illustrated by the highly stylised conduct of war and is represented in the writing of Machiavelli and latterly Von Clausewitz, who classically believed in war as the continuation of state politics by other means. Ho suggests that warfare during this period was a highly organised and ritual affair between designated armies with established codes of conduct and comprised of particular violence between armies in order to achieve perceived gains, such as political advantage or territory. The sovereign state was the principal actor in these situations and an established army was its policy tool involved in predominantly interstate conflict.

According to Kaldor this type of conflict reached an apex in the first part of the twentieth century, culminating in 1945. During the subsequent Cold War, but more apparent after 1989, was the appearance of what has been termed a ‘new type of conflict.’ This is typically intrastate and classically involves asymmetric conflict between groups, movements and organisations against the state for succession, irredentism or self-determination. It can also exist between groups in multi-party civil wars, all of which are often underwritten by religious or ethno-nationalist ideas and characterised by hatred, fear and potential genocide. Ho labels these conflicts “wars of the third kind” and suggests, in direct contrast to traditional conflict, that they are typified by “no declaration of war, few battles, attrition, terror, psychology and violence against civilians.” This contemporary trend is empirically illustrated by Wallensteen and Sollenberg who show by statistics that 94 out of 110 armed conflicts between 1989-1999 were intrastate.

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20 Holst, The State, p.20.
The traits in this trend of contemporary conflict have been attributed to the role of the state, which, it can be argued, has been shifted from its central role in driving interstate conflict and can now be seen as a cause of conflict. Kaldor argues that "new wars" as she calls them, are attributed to the erosion and in some cases disintegration of the state.22 Within this argument are questions relating to the state system and the suggestion that in order to understand and deal with contemporary conflict, such as those illustrated in new wars, it is necessary to move beyond the Westphalian system. Richmond calls this post- or late-Westphalia and suggests that traditional concepts such as sovereignty are losing primacy and that only by moving away from the rigid state-centric Westphalian system will it be possible to recognise the roots of contemporary conflict or new wars. He suggests, the states-system is inadequate in dealing with certain forms of conflict, no longer easily distinguishable by the traditional concepts of war, such as insurgency, belligerency, secessionism, irredentism, revolt and other forms of political violence.23 This argument is also identified by Jabri who suggests that "our understanding of war cannot be limited to inter-state conflict or to the definition of world politics as external relations of states as behavioural entities."24

The appearance of this contemporary type of conflict is the reason for the current difficulty experienced in explaining the roots of conflict. It is now necessary to attempt to discern differences between conflicts in order to establish routes into attempting to understand them. This is because the pre- and Cold war causes of war and conflict were easily understood in the mechanics of state. But now, it can be argued, the realist tradition has problems explaining intractable conflicts over identity and representation as they are beyond the Westphalian system.25 This crisis in trying to understand and locate contemporary conflict in conflict studies has produced extensive typologies of conflict that attempt to catalogue various forms and types of conflict. For example, the interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM) have established five stages of conflict:

1. Peaceful stable situations.
2. Political tension situations.

22 Kaldor, New Wars, p.4.
23 Richmond, Maintaining Order, p.17.
24 Jabri, Discourses, p.1.
(3) Violent Political Conflict, (not more that 100 killed in a year).
(4) Low Intensity Conflict, open hostility and armed conflict,
    (100-999 people killed per year).
(5) High Intensity Conflict, open warfare, civilian displacement,
    (1,000 or more killed each year).²⁶

This new approach is also illustrated by Miall et al, who present a very useful working conflict typology formed by a synthesis of the typologies of conflict provided by Holsti and Singer. They suggest conflict can be divided into 4 types:

1. Interstate conflict.
2. Non-interstate: revolutionary / ideological (which is defined as conflict attempting to changing the nature of government).
3. Non-interstate: identity / secession, (which is conflict generated by the relative status of communities within states).
4. Non-interstate: factional, (which is conflict arising from attempts to control the state).²⁷

These examples of typologies of conflict are by no means exhaustive and merely represent an example of how contemporary conflict can be approached: they are also useful primarily for highlighting different forms or types of conflict. However this can be problematic as non-interstate conflicts are particularly difficult to understand especially from a causational perspective and could conceivably exist as all the above types. Azar points this out in reference to protracted social conflict, he suggests, “conflict is an inseparable part of social interactions and relates to multifarious mutually incompatible goals among parties.”²⁸ This implies that typologies are useful in demonstrating that in order to comprehensively examine the root causes of conflict it is necessary to investigate the manifestation of all types of conflict in a multi-dimensional and multi-level examination. This is the purpose of part 2 of this study, which investigates the roots of conflict by embarking on a survey

²⁵ Richmond, Maintaining Order. p.2.
of conflict literature viewed through international relations theory and critiqued by critical theory and discourse analysis.

Part 2: The Roots of Conflict and International Relations Theory

Realism and Conflict

Conflict studies and indeed international relations theory have been dominated by the theory of realism for most of the latter part of the Twentieth Century. In fact some realist scholars point to as far back as the writing of Thucydides in the fifth century BC to argue that realism is the way to understand international relations and conflict. Realism represents the state centric political approach to conflict and focuses on political elites within the state, as well as the established state authority that exists within an international state system. This approach is based on a number of concepts or assumptions that are common themes in conflict studies and are fundamental to the theories of realism and the understanding of the causes of conflict. By critically examining these assumptions it should be possible to establish routes into explaining and understanding the reasons for conflict. In this section on realism, I aim to examine how the realist concepts of inherency, sovereignty, power, and security can be seen as the root causes of conflict according to literature contained in conflict studies. Prior to this I will briefly examine the philosophical tradition of positivism that underwrites the theory of realism in order to illustrate how this method of empirical data collection, employed by realism, can itself exist as a root cause of conflict.

Positivism

Positivism is a philosophical tradition closely associated with realism, as it provides realism with an understanding of empirical data or facts. Positivism in conjunction with realism can be seen as a cause of conflict because it propagates a self-fulfilling prophecy. When the realist framework is used to disseminate facts or events relating to conflict, its empirical nature provides no critical process for their application but merely uses them to reinforce the already ‘understood’ worldview. Ashley argues that positivism “treats the given order as the natural order” which limits political discourse.\(^{31}\) It is the philosophical approach of positivism, which explains facts as it sees them, within the realist theoretical framework that leads to the propagation of conflict. The reason for this is summed up in a critique of positivism by Steve Smith, who argues that as a science-based methodology, positivism uses only observable causes to establish natural laws, hence it has no objective observation as perceptions are affected by prior theoretical and conceptual commitments, thus it considers something true by empirical verification.\(^{32}\) Simply, if realism, which is a state centric conflict based paradigm, is employed to understand conflict, then when state conflict is empirically observed it naturally assumes that states are the cause of conflict. This reinforces the realist understanding and thereby negates the necessity for the examination of deeper root causes.

The implications of this for understanding conflict from the realist perspective, is that conflict will always be an expected part of the theory, so it will not be out of context or questioned when it is observed, but merely accepted as a positivist confirmation of the realist theory. A critical debate is useful when examining the roots of conflict because it calls into question ontology and epistemology, which are the philosophical methods used to formulate views of the world and how information or facts are chosen to be gathered. This leads to question how and why particular frameworks are used, in short, it is the basis for the generation of the claim to knowledge. This epistemological debate has two central implications for understanding conflict, the first is to refute the existence of universal truth; in this

\(^{30}\) See, Baylis and Smith, Globalisation, pp.109-124.

argument all truth is dependant on the theoretical framework used to construct it and the application of the theory to interpret the facts. Truth is therefore relative, and exists, according to Foucault as "regimes of truth." Secondly, if realism perceives its understanding to be unquestionably true, then conflict will be seen as inherent and impossible to solve without a complete deconstruction of the realist understanding of the world. Until realism is critically reassessed and the very nature of positivism questioned, conflict will remain an endemic part of the realist international world order.

**Inherency**

The principal assumption that endorses the theory of realism is inherency theory. This is an ontological claim that attempts to explain the very nature of mankind and the existence of a common set of primordial and intrinsic characteristics. Not only is it the starting point for the majority of academic debate concerned with the epistemological nature of human existence but it is also identified by Thucydides in one of the earliest text on war, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, as a root cause of conflict. Thucydides central claim is that the endless struggle for power is firmly rooted in human nature. Inherency theory is centred on the assumptions of human aggression especially selfishness, greed, malevolence, and immorality. Doyle calls this “fundamentalism” and suggests, “All social interaction (in realism) is rooted in mankind’s psychological and material need for power.”

The most important implication of the human inherency debate for understanding conflict in relation to realism is its transposition onto the state. Thus, the state is assumed to be a selfish, aggressive and a unitary rational actor that interacts cynically with other states based on the assumption that they are also power hungry, self-centred and self-interested actors. This is the basis of the Hobbesian world represented in *Leviathan*, and the understanding of international anarchy in

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which all actors relate to each other in a natural condition based on a constant state of war. Hobbes stated. “Out of civil states, there is always war of every one against everyone.” In testament to the strength of the inherency debate as a cause of conflict, three hundred years after Hobbes, it was reiterated by Kenneth Waltz in *Man the State and War*, who stated, “Wars would not exist were human nature not what it is.” This is the very essence of realism. As Doyle points out by suggesting, “The core of the realist world view is the state of war.”

The inherent nature in the way states relate to each other as a root cause of conflict is also identified in the realist tradition by Rousseau in *The State of War*, although he did not necessarily believe aggression was in human nature. He saw instead the inherency of war in a number of areas relating to the state. The first was the construction of the state. He argued, “It is only when man enters society that he decides to attack another man.” He also identified the effect of the state on the individual by suggesting, “man becomes a soldier after he becomes a citizen.” He also saw war as a result of state interaction within an artificially constructed state system, thus he considered war, “of an accidental and exceptional nature which can arise between two or more individuals.” The approach of inherency theory to conflict firmly locates the root causes within the institution of the state, as it suggests that the creation of the state and its subsequent interaction with other states is an inherent root cause of conflict.

Inherency is a useful tool for examining the causes of realist conflict as it provides a helpful way to understand how the individual and the state perceive the roots of conflict. Critically, it also exists as a functional discourse that can be employed by the individual and the state in order to legitimise, justify and in some cases, propagate conflict. By its very nature it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as those who choose to view conflict through the realism/positivist prism see only the

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inherency of conflict in the individual and the state, which serves to reinforce the theory. This is the basis of the security dilemma.

The most significant outcome of inherency is that it makes conflict not only endemic but also an established norm in human activity. Although this is a useful starting point for understanding the causes of conflict, the disadvantage with the inherency debate is that it makes realist conflict very difficult to explore with an aim to resolving it as its cause will always be seen as existing in ‘human nature.’ Conflict, when viewed through a realist lens, will always be seen as an inherent part of human action and an accepted, and even expected part of human activity. Any approach to conflict which is based upon this theory will fail to epistemologically question the human element in conflict, and instead will merely accept and even dismiss the existence of conflict as ‘human nature.’ Reasons for conflict explained through inherency theory are liable to criticism, as Waltz points out by suggesting, “they blame a small number of behaviour traits for conflict, ignoring more benign aspects of human nature that point in the other direction.”\(^{42}\) This is the central criticism that is levelled at inherency as a cause of conflict. It is a very bleak and pessimistic portrayal of human nature and ultimately the state, which by accepting its very nature, identified through realism, is impossible to change. This is pointed out by Keohane, who suggests that realism cannot account for change especially within the domestic structure of states, as it merely provides an established and accepted set of answers.\(^ {43}\) This is particularly apparent in regard to the ubiquity of the inherency argument.

**Sovereignty**

A state, under the normative understanding provided by international law, is defined in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Article 1, 1933, in relation to four criteria. These are, a defined territory, a permanent population, independent government and the capacity to engage in international

\(^{42}\) Waltz, *Man, the State*, p.39.

\(^{43}\) Keohane, *Neorealism*, p.158.
relations (with other states). The institution of the state is constructed on two conceptual pillars. The first is sovereignty, this enshrines the existence of the state as a unitary, rational actor, and by definition, implies that the state has sole authority over its internal population and is free from outside interference. The other is legitimacy. it is achieved through sovereignty, and implies that the government has accepted and recognised political authority over the population. This effectively means that in realist thought the state has the legitimate use of violence both inside and outside of its borders in order to protect the rights of its population and the institution of the state against perceived threats.

This is the basis of the social contract, identified by Rousseau, which can be regarded as a cause of conflict, as it legitimises violence by the state in the name of self-interest. If the state perceives an internal challenge to its authority from within the state territory, which is perceived as a direct challenge to state legitimacy, it can validate the use of violence. Similarly, if the state perceives a challenge to the core values of territory, population or government from outside the state, this is seen as a direct threat to its sovereignty. In a response similar to a challenge to legitimacy, the state will embark on conflict or war with other states. Which according to the cynicism inbuilt in realist theory is a very real possibility. Suganami suggests that sovereignty provides state leaders with a discourse with which to use war as a tool. He points to “key decision-makers” within states as “instigators of war.” Buzan however, recognises the underlying potency of conflict in the composition of the state and argues that the concepts of war and state are synonymous. He suggests, “states make war and wars make states.” This argument is illustrated empirically by Wallensteen and Sollenberg, who show that out of 110-armed conflicts between 1989-1999 all involved the institution of the sovereign state in some capacity.

Sovereignty is also a central concept in the existence of the realist Westphalian international system. This can also be seen as a cause of conflict because acceptance of the idea of sovereignty also implies a lack of recognition of any form of global governance or ‘higher than state authority.’ This causes, as Suganami points out, the

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48 Wallensteen and Sollenberg, Armed Conflict, p.638.
rationale that makes states constantly prepared for war and indeed embark upon it at any time. Richmond argues, that it is the artificial territorial and identity based construction of the individual states, coupled with the Westphalian framework in which they operate, that exist as continually replicating causes of conflict. He lists a number of reasons in his critique of the Westphalian system that relate directly to sovereignty as a cause of conflict. These are,

(1) Failure of the state to provide constitutional arrangements in representation and territory for diverse identities.
(2) Coercive and oppressive majority regime as a false representation of unity of state.
(3) Desire for impermeable borders representing an artificially constructed territory.

This suggests that the discourse of sovereignty, which forms the basis of the construction of the state and also underwrites the realist international system, is itself a cause of conflict. Sovereignty is a useful discourse to deconstruct in relation to the causes of conflict as it allows the construction of the state to be questioned, especially in regard to identity, participation and territory. It also highlights the central role of the state within the realist framework in the generation and maintenance of conflict. A role that due to its very nature and construction it is destined to recreate indefinitely, suggesting conflict is synonymous with the realist state.

Power

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49 Suganami, *Causes of War*, p.32.
50 Richmond, *Maintaining Order*, p.5.
51 However, it is important to point out that other strains of realism do not necessarily see the state and it’s interrelating system as a direct cause of conflict. For example, Liberal Realism under the so-called English school were proponents of what they called the world society or international society; this implied a linkage between sovereign states through international agreements and was intended to avoid conflict. See, Bull H, *The Anarchical Society*, London: Macmillan, 1977, and Wight M, *Systems of States*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977.
Power is a commonly reoccurring concept in realism and in the causes of conflict. Keohane suggests that power can be defined in two ways, “power as a resource, and power as the ability to influence others’ behaviour.”\footnote{Keohane, Neorealism, p.11.} Morgenthau in the realist text, \textit{Politics Among Nations}, suggested that power is instrumental in deciding international relations. He argues, “Statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.”\footnote{Morgenthau H, Politics Among Nations, New York: Knopf, 1948, p.11.} Power is considered by realism to be an inherent human aspiration and is focused within the state and the state centric world. Morgenthau argues that the intrinsic struggle for power between nations shows the limitless character of the lust for power revealing the quality of the human mind.\footnote{Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.10.} He also suggests that this insatiable human desire for power is not just a way to influence other states but is an end in itself because it is located in human nature. This he suggests is the reason for international conflict.\footnote{This is quoted in a critique of Morgenthau by Waltz; see Waltz, \textit{Man, the State}, p.39.}

In a realist world power is traditionally understood as substantiated by military strength, and provides credibility for both aggressive and defensive state policy. Individual states can be seen through the realist lens as vying for power, relative to each other. Morgenthau convincingly argued that power underwrites the whole international process or interaction between states and that the incessant struggle for power was not only the force behind the actions of states but that it also provided a means of stabilising the international system by a balancing of relative power.\footnote{Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.11.} Dunne suggests that other sources of realist power can be found through non-violent authority or international status and economic or ideological influence.\footnote{Dunne, Realism, p.64.} However, it is more than apparent that the competitive and conflictual nature of the assumed power relationship between states, which is underwritten by the existence of standing armies and the availability of weapons of both low and high technology, support realist assumptions that conflict is inevitable and can be seen not only as a way to understand conflict but also as a root cause of it.

This functional instrumentalist approach to understanding conflict, which has echoes of Von Clausewitz, is supported by Quincy Wright. He suggests that power, generated by conflict and war, is used to effect policy change, redress power

\footnote{Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.11.}
imbalance and maintain the status of nations and the established international order.\textsuperscript{58} Vasquez returns to the power argument and proposes that the main cause of war is the foreign policy practice of power politics. He believes that war is state organised violence.\textsuperscript{59} This is also the basis for the understanding of the hegemonic power concept, which suggests that the most powerful state builds an international system to reflect and protect its own interests. It is apparent that power in the realist world is concentrated in the hands of the state and as I have argued above, can be seen as a root cause of conflict. Paradoxically, this is primarily because the approach of realism sees conflict or war as rational behaviour, especially in regard to the distribution of power and the importance of state self-interest.\textsuperscript{60} This assumption of rationality in realist conflict provides the basis for game theory, which is a highly abstract and systematic approach to the understanding the roots of conflict.\textsuperscript{61}

The pursuit and use of power in human and international relations can be regarded as a root cause of conflict, especially within the realist paradigm. Power features as an indispensable part of the theory, not only as a way to influence relations by a balance of power, but also in the tangible terms of state military power. This is an additional powerful catalyst of the realist security dilemma and common cause of conflict and war. Deconstructing power and its sources in the state and between states is a useful method of understanding the root causes of conflict.

\textbf{Security}

\textsuperscript{58} Wright Q. \textit{A Study of War}, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1947, p.254.
\textsuperscript{60} Paradoxically, because if realism is interested in state survival and self-interest it seems unusual that it would risk its own position in conflict.
\textsuperscript{61} Although game theory can be useful in providing an insight to conflict and proves that war is a rational state action, it relies on a scientific approach to predicting human behaviour. I intend to avoid using this approach on the grounds that its formal and mathematical nature fails to take account of human elements, which I consider instrumental in the manifestation of conflict. See Rapoport A \textit{Fights, Games and Debates}, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1967, and Nicholson M B, \textit{Rationality and Analysis of International Conflict}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
The final element of realism I intend to examine in relation to the roots of conflict is security. This concept can be defined as protection of, or freedom from threats to core values and within the realist paradigm implies state security. State security is essentially protection of sovereignty, which as I discussed above, relates to the norms of international law. A realist system by virtue of its inherent distrust of other states will be based on its own security and the protection of the state from the impending or actual conflict, which realists believe is inevitable. This system, according to Susan Strange, is based on the domination of prime political authority by state governance, which has a monopoly on violence within a recognised territory and is based upon non-intervention and mutual recognition of sovereignty. The obsession with state security causes the realist preoccupation with the pursuit of power, both resources related such as military capability and hardware, and influence related via political and economic strength. Security is therefore directly related to power, which is clearly a problem for weak states. Realists suggest that as all states are preoccupied with state security which self-generate an international state security system. This system, paradoxically known by the misnomer ‘security,’ is really an ‘insecurity system’ based on paranoia and fear that as a result exists as a prime cause of conflict. Perhaps the best example of this is the tenuous and precarious relationship between India and Pakistan, whose deep mistrust of each other is institutionalised in the realist world of security.

The international security system is based on the concepts of Hobbesian anarchy and relates to the unitary state, but this is in direct relation to all the other states that also all fear for their own security. This suggests an obvious inequality in power between individual states and is believed to cause constant movement and realignment in order to establish a balance of power and an international status quo that provides security for all states. The problem is that whilst this system is intended to provide state security, it does not necessarily mean ‘positive peace.’ The realist ‘security’ system exists in a constant state of conflict or ‘negative peace.’ This implies that the realist international system is not only underwritten by conflict but also generates it, as any large or even small power change, especially in relation to arms procurement, particularly regarding nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. could

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62 Baylis J *‘International security in the Post-Cold War era*’ in Baylis and Smith, *Globalisation*, p.194.
result in conflict to redress the balance. This is the logic of the security dilemma and the rationale behind preventative and pre-emptive war.

The realist security system benefits from a hegemon or a number of powerful states that can actively enforce international law or at least the version of it that benefits their own international (state) security. This argument is aptly illustrated by Thucydides who wrote in the 5th century BC and pointed out via the Melian dialogue, that “the strong do what they want and the weak do what they can.”65 The realist international security system can be seen, paradoxically, as a cause of conflict. Waltz identified this by pointing out that in international anarchy there is nothing to prevent war. He termed this structural realism.66 Suganami continues this structural argument and calls the international system a “causal mechanism” and suggests that states do not choose to enter into conflict but have it imposed upon them by the system.67 This line of argument has its roots in the work of Rousseau who believed in the structural causes of conflict. He argued that the individual was not inherently conflictual but was made that way by the nature of the system.68 The realist concept of security is therefore somewhat of a misnomer. Security paradoxically, is provided by conflict, which is in itself a threat to security. This serves to clearly illustrate how the structural influences of the realist international system can be the root cause of conflict.

Robert Keohane in his critique of realism, Neorealism and its Critics, suggested, “realism helps us determined the strength of the trap but does not give us much assistance in seeking to escape.”69 The realist framework provides a useful explanation of how the root causes of conflict can be explained in relation to the state and associated state system. It can be argued, that conflict is an inherent part of the state, represented by irreversible human nature, which transposed to the state as an artificial political and social creation, causing permanent, self-perpetuating and inevitable conflict, both inside and outside the institution. Realism also suggests that the state is created by conflict and for conflict, as the concepts of sovereignty and legitimacy illustrate. States recognise no higher authority and guard their self-

64 Balance of Power is defined as a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it can dominate others. See, Bull, Anarchical Society.
66 This is termed structural realism see, Waltz K., The Theory of International Politics, Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
67 Suganami, Causes of War, p.209.
68 See Rousseau, State of War, in Brown et al, Political Thought, p.416.
69 Keohane, NeoRealism, p.199.
governance, territory and population with conflict based self-interest, creating either actual conflict or an uneasy ‘negative peace.’ Moreover, the creation of a realist Westphalian state system only exacerbates the causes of conflict by creating a structure based on the inequality of states in the unending pursuit of power, both resource and influential, creating a precarious and paradoxically insecure system, in which all actors pursue their own self-interest in a chronic state of fear.

Realism is useful in demonstrating that the causes of conflict can be located firmly with the institution of the state and the associated state system. It does not however recognise conflict outside of the state matrix and due to its understanding of conflict as inherent to human nature and the state, makes no attempt to understand its roots from any other source, making it difficult to solve outside of conflict management approaches.\(^70\)

### Pluralism and the roots of conflict

Pluralism is a much wider theoretical approach to international relations in comparison to realism, as its purpose is to incorporate all actors and not just states into the international and indeed intranational political process. This approach is becoming increasingly important in the light of the growing influence of both subnational non-state actors such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Corporations (ICs) and Regional Corporations (RCs) such as the EEC, NATO and Multi-National Companies (MNC) as well as the value and rising importance of the individual. It is also important in relation to understanding contemporary conflict, which, as I argued above, is becoming increasingly difficult for the state-centric realist framework to explain. Despite the fact that pluralism is more of a multi-level approach, its emphasis is still largely political and its orientation is also focused on the centrality of the state in international relations. Nevertheless its strength is its consideration of alternative, non-state actors and influences, which help to expose other potential sources of conflict, both internal and external to the state.

I aim to discuss in this section a number of theoretical approaches that are intended to help to explain the roots of conflict relative to the non-state actor. These pluralist approaches to understanding conflict are idealism, functionalism and human needs theory. It is important to stress that these theoretical sections are purely for ease of access for examination and should not be considered definitive, as the categorisation is an attempt to reflect the multi-level approach to conflict provided by pluralism.

**Idealism**

Pluralism is a theoretical framework of international relations that is underwritten by some of the ideas provided by idealism. Idealism is motivated by the desire to prevent war and focuses on the concepts of interdependence, collective security and the establishment of international institutions. Idealism as a normative approach to international relations also advocates the principles of self-determination and Human Rights.\(^{71}\) These principles were perhaps first identified by Kant who argued that by creating a secure environment of international cooperation and interdependence among states, conflict could be eradicated. This was his theory of “perpetual peace” and was based on the principle that liberal democracies do not fight each other.\(^{72}\) This theme is continued by David Held, who identifies the cause of conflict as the lack of democratisation and individual autonomy and argues for the creation of a secure world order based upon cosmopolitan liberal democracy.\(^{73}\) However, it can be argued, that these approaches to ending conflict are in themselves a cause of conflict. Aiming to politically impose or instigate a world order of what ‘ought to be’ is highly problematic, as it suggests the existence of a universal political norm that will be accepted by all cultures, if not voluntarily, then forcibly. Not only is this a direct cause of conflict and highly questionable in the context of the concept of

\(^{71}\) See, Baylis and Smith, *Globalisation*, pp.151-3.

\(^{72}\) For Kant’s theory of ‘perpetual peace’ see Kant I, Perpetual Peace in Brown, Nardin and Rengger, *International Relations in Political Thought*, pp.428-455.

sovereignty but potentially a future source of violence as suggested by the arguments of the ‘new colonialism’ debate. It can be argued, that attempting to end violence through the imposition of an order actually causes more conflict by waging war to end war. Many of these problems and difficulties have been illustrated by the war with Iraq in 2003 and the arguments used to criticise it, in particular the neo-colonialist debate and the paradox of using violence to make peace. In a departure from this argument Carr suggested in The Twenty Year Crisis, a critique of idealism, that the conciliatory idealist thinking of the inter-war years caused the Second World War, because it not only obscured the growing threat of war but also failed to deal with it until it was too late.

Idealism can be seen as a root cause of conflict at the state and non-state level. This is primarily due to the ideological tools that idealism gives the non-state actor. For example, a common cause of conflict through the pluralist framework is nationalism and the desire for state formation. This is brought about by the need for representation, participation and in many cases protection, of a nation, ethnic group or identity. As Ignatieff suggests, “No human difference matters until it becomes a privilege.” It is also a product of the international state system and the international guarantees and benefits that becoming a member of the exclusive state ‘club’ provides, notably, sovereignty, legitimacy and international recognition. This is especially evident in the post-colonial era in Algeria, Palestine and Cyprus and in the post-Cold War period especially in Central Asia and the Balkans. It is also applicable to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where pluralism can explain the desire by the Palestinian non-state actor to achieve a recognised state (a principle of self-determination enshrined by the UN) by generating a severe and intractable conflict with Israel.

From this perspective it can be argued that idealism is an institutionalised cause of conflict. The post-World War One ideas of Woodrow Wilson especially the

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75 The ‘new colonialism’ debate argues that imposing an alien political system on another state in the name of security or humanitarian principles is a new form of colonialism.
78 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, 14th December 1960. Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. For the complete document see www.un.org/docs/resolution
concept of national self-determination can be seen as a cause of conflict, as it inspires groups and communities to seek self-rule by state formation, primarily through violence. Wilson believed that the way to peace was by state formation and the creation of a state system. His fourteenth point stated the need for "a general association of nations to be formed to afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to all states."\(^7^9\) This encourages communities to exercise their rights and establish states if not politically then by recourse to legitimate violence. So whilst the state and the state system became an institution created for peace it inadvertently became enshrined as an idealist cause of conflict.

Although the League of Nations was unsuccessful in preventing further conflict, it was the first attempt at creating an international body and it did provide a blueprint for the United Nations (UN). However, the UN has problems, it is a state centric body, so it serves to reinforce the importance of the state in international relations, which is a cause of conflict. Also, as I have argued, contemporary conflict is increasingly intrastate and frequently exists inside states or between communities along ethnic geographical boundaries that do not reflect the often arbitrarily created state borders. So, whilst the UN represents a global organisation for world peace and purports an aim to end the "scourge of war," it is actually recreating conflict by institutionalising the importance of the state, which is a proven cause of conflict and also fails to officially recognise the importance of non-state conflict. Furthermore, the right to self-determination is enshrined in United Nations resolution 1514, which states, "all peoples have the right to self-determination and membership of international society...and colonialism is a crime which constitutes a violation of the charter of the United Nations."\(^8^0\) This implies that all non-state actors who claim to represent a 'peoples' have the legitimate right, sanctioned by the UN, to self-determination and state formation. This is an understanding that maintains conflicts in areas such as Palestine, Kosovo and Chechnya. Thus, a state is able to engage in conflict in order to protect their right to self-determination and their sovereignty and territorial integrity or that of others. This is the basis of chapters 6 and 7 of the UN charter.\(^8^1\) This brings into question the relationship between established states and the rights of nations within them for autonomy. It also illustrates a difficult contradiction

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79 Baylis and Smith, *Globalisation*, p.54.
80 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514, 14th December 1960. Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. www.un.org/docs/resolution
in the guarantee of the rights of peoples by the UN, between the protection of peoples and their individual human rights and the maintenance of the political and geographical integrity of the established state under international law.

The principal contradiction with this situation is between the rights of the state enshrined in self-determination, legitimacy and sovereignty and the rights of the individual non-state groups who do not have the universal rights listed above. Whilst this is probably the subject of another study, there is clearly a cause of conflict between rights of states in respect to sovereignty and the rights of the non-state group to self-determination. This is often seen in the debate over the legitimacy of conflicts in which nations struggle for independence, self-rule and the rights enjoyed by sovereign states against established states. This is clearly demonstrated by the conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and is particularly problematic when institutions such as the United Nations favour established states even though they state in their charter that nations should have independence as a right.\(^{82}\) Who therefore decides who can have self-rule and independence? Irrespective of the answer to this question, it is apparent that within the pluralist framework, the concept of idealism produces conflict, as it exists in the nexus between the rights of the state and the rights of the non-state group, both of which are paradoxically and perhaps incompatibly enshrined in the UN charter.

**Functionalism**

By employing the lens of pluralism to view the causes of conflict it is possible to identify the central role of the non-state actor in its root causes. Jabri suggests that conflict is a social condition and is located in the relationship between self and society as an inevitable form of human conduct.\(^{83}\) By examining the location of the actor within the framework of society it is possible to view the causes of conflict within a social context. Conflict studies provide a useful and enlightening approach to

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\(^{81}\) See, www.un.org/charter
\(^{82}\) www.un.org/charter
\(^{83}\) Jabri. *Discourses*. p.3.
explaining this form of conflict through social conflict theory and the theory of functionalism. Functionalism is a utilitarian approach to conflict and suggests that it is a purposeful and necessary procedure to enact or stimulate social change. George Simmel, who provided some pioneering research in this field, argues that conflict is functional. He believes in an a priori fighting instinct of man towards man\textsuperscript{84} and suggests that conflict has a positive social purpose in resolving tension and disputes. He suggests, “Conflict resolves the tension between contrasts, and contains something positive.”\textsuperscript{85} In a continuation of this argument Coser in *The Functions of Social Conflict*, explores the basic communicative purpose of conflict and suggests that it is “ranked among the few basic forms of human action” and provides an invaluable role as a form of social ‘safety value’ that provides a political, social and economic tension release for actors within society.\textsuperscript{86} Coser divides conflict into two social types. The first is realistic; this is conflict directed at the source of the frustration and is stable. Second is non-realistic; this is tension release and is unstable.\textsuperscript{87} This implies that conflict has a vital social function and is instrumental in establishing boundaries relative to identity in groups and communities. It also formulates and conserves social divisions and provides a communications channel for necessary and positive social change. This theory is also known as ‘instrumentalism’ and is the function of violence and conflict as societal change. Vayrynen argues that whilst violence produces human suffering it is useful for providing a channel through which to express grievances. He sees violence as an inherent part of the dynamism of society and suggests that by examining the function of the violence the cause may be found.\textsuperscript{88}

This approach can also be termed ‘constructivist’ and is expounded by Angell who suggests that conflict is a catalyst for the necessary progression of society, as it generates institutional political and socio-economic change and technological development. He illustrates this argument with reference to Marx’s *The Communist Manifesto*, which he suggests is “the most influential theory of social conflict” because it demonstrates the necessary social upheaval caused by the overthrow of the

\textsuperscript{84} Simmel call this “homo homini lupus” (“man is wolf to man”) Simmel G, *Conflict*, New York: First Free Press, 1964, p.28.
\textsuperscript{87} Coser, *Social Conflict*, p.42.
capitalist class. He also applies the theory of Social Darwinism to the function of conflict and suggests that societies and groups are engaged in conflict as a struggle for the survival of the fittest.

There are however a number of problems with functional theories of conflict, perhaps the most important is suggested by Burton, who argues that these theories assume that the developing society is homogeneous and coherent. He quotes Hobbes' 'Coercion Theory' and Weber's 'Value Theory' to illustrate the assumption of an integrated social system upon which the justification for functional, instrumentalist and constructive conflict is based. Interestingly, Burton differentiates between conflict within an established value system (rebellion) and conflict against it (revolution). Both of these generate social conflict, but have different orientations to the existing social system. This implies that whilst conflict can have a function for society as a whole, it might have conflicting agendas within it. For example, some actors might foresee the violence as useful to enable social change within the established framework of society, whereas others may want to destroy the existing social framework. This differentiation between reactionary and revolutionary violence was explored in chapter 1. A further criticism is that functional theories of conflict assume that violent conflict is an inherent function of society. Deutsch, identifies this and suggests that conflict has a perceived utility and that the root of conflict depends on the type of social relationship, either constructive (non-violent) or destructive (violent) and the issue is not to prevent conflict but to understand what conditions cause it to become violent.

Social conflict theory is also a very useful approach for attempting to understand the actual manifestation of conflict. In a groundbreaking study on violence, Dollard developed a useful theory in which he considered violence to be the end result of a biological human tendency that links frustration to aggression. He argues that an individual or group has a goal or objective, but if attainment of this

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91 Hobbes argued that society is a form of social order that is imposed on others by threat and coercion in Burton J, Deviance Terrorism and War, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979, p.47.
92 Weber suggested that society is maintained by the existence of a set of shared values that are powerful enough to influence acceptance of inequality and social injustice. Burton, Deviance, p.47.
93 Deutsch, p.48.
94 Deutsch M, 'Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution,' in Vayryen, New Directions, p.27.
goal suffers interference then frustration occurs. This leads to aggression, which is
direct physical violence against the source or believed source of the interference.\textsuperscript{96} In
a critique of this hypothesis, Yates points out that this theory assumes aggression is
always a consequence of frustration and the occurrence of aggression always
presupposes frustration.\textsuperscript{97} Nevertheless, frustration-aggression does serve as a
constructive tool for exposing the potential roots of violent conflict and provides a
useful basis on which to construct further theories of conflict. For example, Ted Gurr
based his ‘Integrated Theory of Political Violence’ on the manifestation of human
aggression.\textsuperscript{98} He suggests that political discontent develops, becomes politicised and
eventually turns violent due to the perceived discrepancy between what the individual
or group expect to have (perceived value) and what they actually have (value
capability). Gurr terms this “Relative Deprivation.”\textsuperscript{99} Although the theory of relative
deprivation is an excellent tool for examining the generation of conflict, it is not an
exact science and cannot predict instances of violence in comparison to suggested
high levels of deprivation. It could also be argued that relative depravation can be an
infinite cause of conflict. For example, an individual or group, regardless of their
political, economic or social condition, may never be totally satisfied and will always
perceive some form of depravation, which will cause frustration and potentially,
aggression. Relative depravity is a relative perception and can serve as a discourse to
justify violence, so the employment of a deprivation discourse by the actor could itself
create a sense of deprivation resulting in violence.

The perceived function and utility of violence is an important area of
examination using the pluralist framework in relation to the influences on the non-
state actor and the root causes of conflict. It acts as a useful tool with which to
examine the root causes of violence by moving away from standard dysfunctional
arguments of conflict and instead re-evaluating its root causes within a perceived
functional capacity located in society and social conflict theory. The implications of
functionalism and social conflict theory root the causes of conflict firmly in the
actions and goals of the non-state actor.

\textsuperscript{96} Dollard, \textit{Frustration and Aggression}, p.15.
Human Needs Theory

Human needs theory is further example of a pluralist approach for explaining conflict, which locates the non-state actor firmly in the roots of conflict. The foundations of this approach are in the work of Maslow who suggested the existence of a universal set of socio-biological basic human needs that required satisfaction on a hierarchical basis. Maslow argued that all human action and motivation was based upon the fulfilment of these (unconscious) needs of which he considered members of society to be in a constant state of partial satisfaction.\textsuperscript{100} John Burton adopted this human needs theory and applied it to explaining conflict. He suggested the existence of a knowable set of human needs that although individual, were enshrined in the context of society.\textsuperscript{101} Burton argued that the roots of conflict existed as unsatisfied human needs, which were often supplanted by the power requirements of the state and society. He suggested individuals in society would pursue their needs within the confines and norms of society. If however, these needs become frustrated they will resort to methods outside of these norms.\textsuperscript{102} This theory suggests that in order to avoid conflict, society must make provision for the satisfaction of individual human needs.

There are problems with this approach. Although it demonstrates that society has to take individual needs into account in order to avoid violence, it also reveals the potential conflictual disparities between the individuals and society. For example, the thesis of human needs and violence suggests that if individual values are subordinate to societal values and do not reflect them, then violence can occur. This implies that it is not possible to enforce values on society that do not represent individual needs. However, individual needs (as the name suggests) relate directly to the individual and

\textsuperscript{99}Gurr, \textit{Why Men Rebel}, p13
\textsuperscript{102} Burton, \textit{Deviance}, p.78.
are not necessarily reflective of society as a whole. Is it possible therefore for society as an expression of the collective to provide satisfaction of the needs of every individual? No society it would seem can satisfy every individual’s needs. Human needs theory presupposes the existence and significance of an arbitrary list of needs, which implies a universal human application, but which takes no account of the influence of culture or history and more importantly gives no indication which needs are more influential than others. It also does not suggest how often these needs change in accordance with changing human values and requirements. In a critique of Burton’s work, Hoffman questions if the human needs approach is applicable at the international level of states and if they are indeed common needs. Hoffman suggests: “that whilst commonality might exist at the cultural level, it is at the level of values and interests that differences occur.”

He also adds that if they are actually universal needs in regards to culture, then this raises questions relating to human needs imbued with western-centric values, which problematises the actual notion of needs themselves.

Human needs theory does however provide the point of departure for a very revealing approach to understanding conflict, and as Richmond points out “helps to uncover the many levels of conflict through a human-needs spectrum and provides alternative tools to understand the basis for social conflict.” Testament to this fact is the number of human needs related theories that have subsequently developed. In conjunction with Burton, Azar developed the theory of protracted social conflict (PSC) in which he attempted to explain the manifestation of violent conflict, especially prolonged intrastate war. Azar built on Burton’s work and identified that the cause of conflict was often located not necessarily in the needs of individuals but in the relationship between individuals in identity groups and the state. Azar called this “disarticulation between the state and society.” Crucially, Azar identified that individual needs and values where represented by social groups and it is the needs of these groups in society that have to be fulfilled. He suggested, “Protracted social

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105 Richmond, *Genealogy of Peacekeeping*, p.325.


conflict arose due to communities deprived of satisfaction of basic needs on the basis of communal identity.

108 To tackle this he developed a framework that comprised of four areas of investigation designed to expose all the possible causes of the conflict. The first area, "communal," is an analysis of the identity groups involved in the conflict to establish racial, religious, ethnic and cultural influences and relationships. The second is based on the deprivation of human needs, the most important of which Azar considerers to be the 'safety needs.' These include security, identity, representation and equality. The third area scrutinises the role of the state and governance in order to examine how human needs are satisfied by the state. Finally, Azar included international linkages; an area intended to ascertain the nature of the socio-economic relationship with other states, particularly stronger ones.109 This approach to understanding the causes of armed conflict by identifying the relationship between the needs of identity groups and (state) governance is increasingly becoming accepted into mainstream approaches to conflict. It is illustrated by the construction of a comprehensive and multi-level model for identifying the sources of contemporary conflict, recognised as "international social conflicts" by Miall et al, which seeks to demonstrate the complexity of contemporary conflict.110

Human needs theory is a key element in helping to understand the manifestation of contemporary conflict especially in relation to the non-state actor and prevalence of intrastate conflict. This pluralistic approach however, does assume that society is able to satisfy the individual needs of all different groups and individuals, whilst concurrently maintaining a cohesive common culture. It also fails to examine the implications of satisfying the group needs against those of other groups or those of wider society in general. Richard Little argues that Burton’s perception of a tolerant world society is an illusion and the apparent diversity of society is social engineering, because individual values and needs must be subordinate to those of society in order to preserve the institutions and structure.111 By highlighting the apparent differences and inequalities between individuals and groups within a society, a form of social conflict can develop. Human needs also attract criticism from the perspective of a

108 Azar, Protracted Social Conflict, p.11.
109 Azar, Protracted Social Conflict, pp.7-11.
110 See, Miall et al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, pp.77-91.
universal application of needs. But “there is still strong support for the universality of the concept of human needs because humans are all the same organism.”  

The Pluralist approach to the root causes of conflict is very useful in exposing the importance and centrality of the non-state actor in the generation of conflict, especially in the contemporary conflict of the post-Westphalian world order. where the role of the super and intra state actor is becoming increasingly important. Idealism, as a framework for motivation, adopted by the non-state actor is firmly rooted in conflict. It provides the ideological incentive for national self-determination for non-state groups. Pluralism also demonstrates how conflict can be created from the inherent contradiction caused by the parallel processes of national non-state group rights and state rights, suggesting that perhaps the two processes are incompatible. Pluralism also helps explain the perceived use and purpose of conflict to stimulate political, social and economic change. More importantly this framework locates conflict in society as the actions of individual within society. This provides explanations of conflict through approaches in social conflict theory such as relative deprivation. These allow the examination of the effect of societal political and socio-economic forces on the individual in conflict. Pluralism also exposes human needs theory, which provides an invaluable tool in examining why individuals and groups become violent in respect to their position in society, reiterating the link between the individual, society and conflict.

**Structuralist approaches to Conflict**

In International Relations theory structuralism is a discourse that can be employed in order to examine the existence and influence of structure on the activities of international actors. In the context of conflict it is an investigation into whether structure is the reason why and how actors (depending on their agency) behave in conflict, particularly in relation to each other and or the perceived system.

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113 This relates to the agency debate, the concept of human agency relates to how people may or may not be able to influence their social environment. See, Bleiker R, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp.23-50.
Structuralism allows the causes of conflict to be examined from different perspectives, such as actor behaviour, which is generating the conflict and behaviour produced by the conflict, which suggests the existence of systems of conflict. A useful starting point for structural theory is through the work of Marx, who argued that the worker must break the structural system of capitalist exploitation causing oppression and servitude by instigating violent revolution. This theory provides a clear understanding of the influence of structure as well as the blueprint and justification for conflict by individuals and groups that perceive themselves as oppressed and subjugated because it legitimises their violent behaviour against a dominating structure. Wallerstein developed this argument into a theory of international relations by applying structural theory to the international system. He argued that a system of global capitalism exists in which the strong core states economically exploit a weak semi-periphery and even weaker periphery of states. He suggested, “the world system is a social system, its boundaries are strong member groups, rules of legitimisation and coercion and its life is conflicting forces which create the tensions that hold it together.” Structuralists argue that violence is generated by the structural constraints imposed by a perceived system. This is developed by Wendt, whose constructivist arguments suggested that individuals, in this case, states, act in their own interests and develop a structure that protects their own identity and interests in direct relation to other states. Individual states exist in their own intersubjective and history based structures. It can be argued that the roots of conflict are in the construction of these systems and conflict is caused by the interaction between systems and actors and between actors themselves over the existence of incompatible goals. In this section I aim to investigate how the root causes of conflict can be understood using structural theories by examining the structural concepts of system, situation and culture.

System

117 See, Baylis and Smith, *Globalisation*, pp.183-188.
Key structural approaches for understanding conflict have been developed by peace researchers and applied to theories of social conflict. The principal contributor in this field is Johan Galtung who has examined conflict from a human social perspective and created the conflict triangle.\(^{119}\) This is an attempt to delineate conflict, both symmetric and asymmetric, into direct, cultural and structural violence. One component or side of Galtung’s conflict triangle is “conflict behaviour”\(^{120}\) and relates to how the actors behave in relation to the perceived system and to each other. In respect to this Mitchell suggests conflict behaviour can be characterised as “overt actions in conflict situations intended to force the opposition to abandon or modify their goals.”\(^{121}\) This suggests that the behaviour of actors in relation to each other, and or the perceived conflict structure, can create a conflict system. Mitchell illustrates his argument by proposing different strategies of conflict behaviour; these are “coercion, reward and settlement.”\(^{122}\) All of which can produce different conflict systems.

Systems of conflict also exist due to the friction between actor and structure. Mitchell develops this structural argument and suggests that the source of incompatibility is a mismatch between social values and social structure, where the pursuit of goals as values or resources is rendered incompatible with the existing value system or structure.\(^{123}\) This also suggests a correlation between how actors behave and the creation of a conflict system. Giddens identifies this and formulated “structuration theory” in which he suggests that violent conflict is due to structural reasons inherent in every social system and although the system may change the structural causes remain.\(^{124}\) This implies that conflict is inherent in social systems as the natural interaction of human action with social structure. Giddens calls this “the institutionalisation of war as human practice.”\(^{125}\) Jabri develops this theme and argues that violent conflict is a human activity, which is caused by the interaction of human


\(^{120}\) Galtung, Peaceful Means, p.71


\(^{122}\) Mitchell sees coercion as threats and acts of violence, reward as imposed offers / benefits and settlement as concessions or compromise, in Mitchell, Structure, p.121.

\(^{123}\) Mitchell, Structure, p.18.

\(^{124}\) Giddens A, Central Problems in Social Theory, London: Macmillan, 1979, quoted in Jabri, Discourses, p.3.

\(^{125}\) Giddens, Central Problems, in Jabri, Discourses, p.3.
action (agency) and the incumbent social system (structure). This is the primary claim of her book *Discourses on Violence*, in which she locates violence in the relationship between self and society. She suggests that “War or violent conflict are social phenomenon emerging through social practices, rendering war an inevitable and acceptable form of human conduct.”

This implies that in order to understand the roots of conflict it is necessary to examine the structural relationship created by the behaviour of actors in their natural interaction with society. Banks suggests that human behaviour can be explained by two factors: actor and environment. He argues that “mental selves are constructed largely by what we have experienced and learned in our human-made environments” This argument is also apparent in the influential work of Fanon who identified the existence of colonialism as a structural cause of conflict, which generated the behaviour of actors. He argued that although decolonisation was a change of system, the structural violence would remain. In an Orwellian twist, Fanon stated, “the native is an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor.” This suggests that the roots of conflict are a reaction or inter-reaction of the behaviour of the actor with the structure and with one another, which can recreate the conflict structure in the form of systemic violence.

**Situation**

It is apparent from these arguments that the structural roots of conflict are in the interaction between actors, typified by conflict behaviour, in the form of the pursuit of incompatible goals within the incumbent social structure or system created by human activity. However, is it also possible to suggest that the roots of conflict also exist in the relationship between actor and perceived goal. At the apex of Galtung’s conflict triangle is ‘contradiction’ (conflict situation), which is the actual or perceived incompatibility of actors and is defined by Galtung as “incompatible goal-

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126 Jabri, *Discourses*, p.4.
127 Jabri, *Discourses*, p.3.
128 Banks, *Conflict*, p.41.
states in a goal seeking system."\textsuperscript{130} This Galtung argues is the structural cause of the conflict. He suggests, “deep inside every conflict lies a contradiction – a problem that requires a solution.”\textsuperscript{131} Bercovitch combines these ideas in “situationalist theory” and although he recognises the importance of human involvement he stresses that it is the situation that generates incompatible goals or values among different parties.\textsuperscript{132} In a similar theory, Boulding argues for a more general understanding. He suggests that conflict arises as a result of the stress and strain of social relationships. He lists structural variables that together with dynamic variables comprise the “strain (war) functions,” which in times of conflict outweigh the “strength (peace) functions.”\textsuperscript{133} Structural causes of conflict can be seen to exist within all conflict, from a wider systemic Marxian sense through the existence of a social value system to an objective issue that becomes structural.

The structural roots of conflict also exist within the conflict situation provided by the mutually incompatible goals of the parties. Mitchell develops a theory on conflict situation and suggests it is created by “the pursuit of goals and from goal incompatibilities.”\textsuperscript{134} He suggests that the source of the goal incompatibility is located in the social structure and value system and the goals exist as “positive” and “negative” types.\textsuperscript{135} By identifying the type of goals he argues that the source of the conflict will become apparent.\textsuperscript{136} Conflict situations or the roots of conflict can exist in a structural form created from the aims and goals of the conflicting parties in relation to the structure of the society in which they are located. Although this argument suggests, perhaps too simply, that if the goals of the conflicting parties are achieved then the conflict will be solved. It does however provide a useful lens with which to scrutinise the subjective aims of the conflict actors and the nature of the social system against which they believe they are incompatible.

\textsuperscript{130} Galtung, \textit{Peaceful Means}, p.71.
\textsuperscript{131} Galtung, \textit{Peaceful Means}, p.19.
\textsuperscript{133} Boulding lists the structural causes of conflict as Historical, Military, Political and Ideological. See Boulding K, \textit{Stable Peace}, Austin Texas: University of Texas Press, 1910.
\textsuperscript{134} Mitchell, \textit{Structure}, p.18.
\textsuperscript{135} Positive goals are the tangible, such as state formation or resources. Negative goals are avoidance of a situation. See, Mitchell, \textit{Structure}, p.20.
\textsuperscript{136} Mitchell, \textit{Structure}, p.22.
Culture

This structural framework suggests that in order to understand the roots of conflict it is necessary to examine the cultural reasons behind the conflict actions. This represents the nature of the socio-cultural environment and the individual, and is an attempt to locate the role of violence and conflict in the relationship between the individual and the history and culture of society. The philosophical tradition of this approach to conflict revisits the debate that deals with whether the individual is a product of society or society a product of the individual. If a society is considered anarchic, it is possible to argue that the ‘normal’ and accepted situation for individuals is a constant state of conflict as it is apparent that all individuals in a society are subject to some form of moral and ethical authority. As Plato argued, “even among a band of robbers there must be a principle for justice to permit them to share the spoils.”137 It can be argued that society creates its own structural behavioural system based on the socio-political environment and shared history and culture. Rousseau argued that society influences the behaviour of individuals138 and Marx suggested that environment determines consciousness.139

However, is it possible to discern the actions of individuals from an evaluation of a society as a whole? It is perhaps idealistic and unrealistic to assume that all individuals within a society share all the same norms in values, beliefs and behaviour. I suggest that in order to gain access to the behaviour of individuals the focus is not on the actual group or society but on the influences that generate its existence, the element for consideration is culture. By this I mean the particular influences, reasons and environment that create the behaviour of individuals, which in turn have an effect on both individual and group characteristics. Cultural influences on behaviour can be from the immediate family, to tribal, group, community, nation, state, continent and even global. This incorporates the arguments of social anthropology and the need for “cultural analysis”140 in order to attempt to establish and then differentiate between cultural frameworks in societies. Mead and Metraux believe the existence and interactions of cultural society contain the roots of human conflict and suggest a six-

point framework for cultural analysis, which is intended to identify cultural structures.\textsuperscript{141} They argue that culture equals the social environment and this is shared by all members of a given culture and regulates their relationships with one another.\textsuperscript{142} Nordstrom and Robben argue that an examination of the anthropology and ethnography of violence is an attempt to locate conflict firmly in the realm of human society. They suggest “violence is culturally constructed, like all cultural products it is only a potential - one that gives shape and content to specific people within the context of particular histories.”\textsuperscript{143} Conflict can therefore be a cultural construct, which is the point Margaret Mead suggests by stating, “warfare is only an invention.”\textsuperscript{144}

Cultural analysis can help to identify the causes of conflict within a particular society. Fanon examined the culture of colonialism and concluded that within this cultural framework violence was a natural state. He suggested that the constant atmosphere of violence inspired only greater violence, which then became a cultural norm.\textsuperscript{145} This can also be seen when investigating the culture of a society that appears to exist only by violence, whether instigated by state ideology, ethnic groups, religion, crime or the drugs trade. Conflict and violence exist and propagate wherever it is considered culturally acceptable. This can be considered a culture of violence, so ingrained that it becomes accepted. Bourdieu calls this phenomenon “habitus”\textsuperscript{146} and argues that fear, insecurity, and violence of death, torture, disappearances and rape become ‘normal’ and ‘natural.’\textsuperscript{147} This implies desensitization and the socialisation of violence within conflict cultures, which culturally normalises violent behaviour.

Cultural analysis relies upon a number of assumptions and generalisations from which it can provide a broad insight into society. It is based on a principal assumption that the behaviour of an individual in society is a product of cultural influences. This serves to provide access to the culture and the location of

\textsuperscript{142} Mead and Metraux, ‘Anthropology,’ in McNeil, Nature of Human Conflict, p.121.
\textsuperscript{143} Nordstrom C, Robben A, (ed) Fieldwork under Fire, Berkeley California: University of California, 1995, p.3.
\textsuperscript{145} Fanon, The Wretched, p.48.
conflict within it, by reference to the behaviour of the individual. This is helpful in providing a useful culturally sensitive approach to conflict through which the causes of violence can be addressed. Cultural analysis may explain the permanent presence of violence in society, as a culture of violence that can be explained in relation to a particular society and exists as a structural cause of conflict. But it is not a uniform method as it fails to explain the presence of violence in peaceful societies without a history of violence and conversely cannot account for the lack of violence in cultures with a long history of violence. It also suggests that societies are insular and impervious to influences from other regions or cultures that might trigger violence.

Nevertheless, it is equally as important to avoid the trap of cultural relativism, by which I mean the explanation and acceptance of human behaviour placed in the socio-cultural institutions of a society. The manifestation of conflict should still be viewed relative to a normative understanding. Even in so-called civilised cosmopolitan cultures where extreme levels of open violence are culturally unacceptable, the recourse to state sponsored violence can easily regenerate conflict as socially acceptable. This is demonstrated by public support for war, illustrated by the support for the ‘war on Terrorism’ instigated in 2001 which effectively sanctioned conflict against ‘terrorism’ throughout the globe, and led directly to wars in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003. Fanon demonstrates this societal paradox by pointing out that double standards exist between societies that extol the virtues of peace yet still engage in conflict outside of their own society. He states in response to his understanding of colonialism; “this Europe where they are never done talking of man, yet murder men everywhere they find them.”

The problem is that cultural norms are difficult to identify, as cultural analysis gives only a general understanding on a broad scale. The application to multi-ethnic or multi-religious societies needs to be questioned, as it is misleading to impose a generic culture on a region that contains a myriad of small groups and communities. Cultural analysis is also problematic when considering the single individual because it can be argued, that it is ultimately the individual cultural construction and subjective

147 Bourdieu, Theory of Practice, in Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, Peacekeeping, p.195.
149 I suggest the normative understanding of conflict relates to the definition I have adopted for this study, which is actual or potential violent conflicts which range from domestic conflict situations that threaten to become militarised beyond the capacity of domestic civil police to control, through to full-scale interstate war. Miall et al, Conflict Resolution, p.23.
150 Fanon, The Wretched, p.250.
opinion of the human being who commits violence that will determine the appearance of conflict in a society, regardless of apparent norms and values. This suggests that the roots of conflict might exist in the behaviour of an individual who commits violence for no other reason than just for enjoyment. Nevertheless cultural analysis is very useful tool for examining the location of violence in the relationship between the individual and society and in helping to provide an understanding of the manifestation of conflict. As Jabri suggests, understanding will come from “situating war and violent conflict in the constitution of the human self and human society.”

Structural approaches to the roots of conflict provide a useful route into understanding how conflict is generated in and between societies. It presents an insight into the relationship between actors and their social environment and focuses on why this causes conflict. It also concentrates on understanding how the behaviour of actors with each other and the perceived system can generate violence and even institutionalise its use. Structural arguments also help to examine how the history and culture of a society produces violence, perhaps in direct relation to communities within it.

Liberalism and the Roots of Conflict

Jabri suggests that, “War is a consequence of human actions and human decisions.” The central theme of the approach of liberalism for explaining conflict follows this argument as it is designed to locate the individual human element firmly into the roots of conflict. Liberalism as I defined in chapter 1, is “an ideology whose central concern is the liberty of the individual.” The theoretical framework of liberalism is chosen in this section because its focus is on the individual and it helps understand the role of the individual in the roots of conflict. For example, the liberal belief in the existence and protection of individual human rights can be seen as a

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151 Jabri, Discourses, p.22.
152 Jabri, Discourses, p.22.
153 Baylis and Smith, Globalisation, p.161.
cause of conflict, not only from inside as individuals struggle to establish their rights, but also from outside in the form of humanitarian intervention and the use of violence to enforce or protect individual human rights. The universal declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948 is a “Declaration that recognizes fundamental rights towards which every human being aspires, namely the right to life, liberty and security of person; the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution; the right to own property; the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the right to education, freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and the right to freedom from torture and degrading treatment, among others.”154 These established human rights present a considerable justification for conflict by individual actors who do not have them or by third party actors who seek to protect them. They clearly form the basis for conflict, paradoxically legitimised by the UN, as is claimed by many non-state actors.

This next section will concentrate on examining the nature and role of the human individual in the root causes of conflict and represents the lowest level of analysis of conflict. It is essentially a survey of grass roots approaches to understanding the location of the individual in conflict according to conflict studies. This is in line with the new thinking on contemporary conflict and so-called ‘new wars,’ whose common feature is protracted social conflict, centred on the individual,155 and relates to a whole range of contemporary issues, encompassing questions concerning ethnic identity, individual autonomy, sovereignty and human rights. This approach also parallels attempts to understand and resolve contemporary conflict in peace research, as Lederach argues by suggesting that the key to this new type of conflict is in its uniquely human dimensions.156 In this next section I aim to employ the theoretical framework of liberalism with which to investigate the location of the individual in the roots of conflict, according to conflict studies. I will achieve this by the use of a critical and discourse analysis approach to examining the concepts of identity and ethnicity, ideology; with a particular focus on nationalism and religion, human issues and agendas, and finally social-psychological influences as causes of conflict.

154 For the complete document see, www.un.org/udhr
155 See, Kaldor, New and Old Wars, Intro, and Holsti, The State.
Identity and Ethnicity

Viewed through the lens of liberalism, conflict is observed from a human perspective. In the following section I aim to argue that human identity is the principal cause of contemporary conflict, especially since the end of the Cold War. Regional conflicts can no longer be regarded as the by-product of the east-west ideological struggle or viewed through the state centric positivist Westphalian prism. This argument is consistent with the apparent brutal nature of contemporary conflict typified by ethnic identity violence directed against communities and groups, some of which has developed into genocide. This trend has led contemporary conflict researchers to investigate the role of individual and group identity and the ensuing rivalry as a root cause of conflict. Kaldor illustrates this gap in the understanding of contemporary conflict by pointing out that before closer scrutiny, it was assumed that violence against civilians, in particular ethnic cleansing, was a side effect of conflict and not the actual goal.157

Individual identity can be defined as a secure sense of self, developed from childhood, that incorporates Maslow’s needs158 into a deep rooted psychological ‘identity card’ consisting of values, motives, emotions and attitudes. Identity theory on individual identity can be combined with theories relating to the construction of social identity via group membership and social interaction and is known as social identity theory.159 This represents an important link as it identifies social or group interaction as an area prone to conflict. Anthony Smith develops ‘group identity theory’ and suggests the existence of the “ethnic group” or “ethnic”160 as a type of community with a shared sense of origin, values, individuality and history, all of which equate to culture. This is frequently supported by a sense of a shared homeland;

157 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p.58.
158 Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p.15.
a common language and often religion and can also include the physiological concept of race and the socio-economic definition of class.\textsuperscript{161} Eriksen believes that the categorisation of people into ethnic groups is a classification that comes not only from inside the group or community but also from outside.\textsuperscript{162} This is an important point as it suggests that ethnicity is not just a product of how people view themselves but how they view each other. This supports the classic identity mantra, ‘we know who we are by who we are not.’

The existence of the ethnic group can be regarded as a cause of conflict because it is based on identity, which is a concept established by group interaction or conflict. This is the argument of the Copenhagen school,\textsuperscript{163} which suggest that identity is socially constructed and is susceptible to social change. However, it can be argued, that the need for identity presupposes the existence of the ethnic group, yet without the existence of the ethnic group there would be no identity. A very effective way to establish identity is through conflict, but this is only possible if a group identity exists. If a community is engaged in conflict either aggressively or defensively, the effect will be to galvanise group identity. If the community has an element of cultural cohesion this ethnic bonding can develop into the formation of an ethnic group. The relationship between identity and ethnic group is therefore symbiotic, as neither can exist without the other and the catalyst for this relationship, it can be argued, is conflict.

The importance of this concept is also apparent at an individual identity level. Enloe suggests “the basic function of ethnicity is to bind individuals to a group, it informs a person where he belongs and whom he can trust.”\textsuperscript{164} This understanding is exacerbated if the individual feels threatened, suffers relative deprivation or the suppression of individual needs. The existence of the ethnic group for protection of identity and satisfaction of needs is particularly observable in failed states as Ignatieff argues by suggesting “it is the disintegration of states and the Hobbesian fear that results, that produces ethnic fragmentation and war.”\textsuperscript{165} This identity phenomenon is also recognised by Eriksen who calls this “the reflex of self-identification.”\textsuperscript{166}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Smith} Smith, 	extit{Ethnic Revival}, p.67.
\bibitem{Jeong} Ho-Won Jeong, 	extit{The New Agenda For Peace Research}, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers,1999, p.56.
\bibitem{Ignatieff} Ignatieff, 	extit{Warriors’ Honour}, p.7
\bibitem{Eriksen} Eriksen, 	extit{Ethnicity}, p.90.
\end{thebibliography}
ethnic group exists as a cause of conflict because its existence is centred on identity, which can be both a by-product of, and catalyst for conflict.

The existence of the ethnic group, established to represent individual and community identity is a cause of conflict in itself, because it takes on the persona of an individual and reminiscent of human needs theory will be as a cohesive community, sensitive and demanding to its own particular needs as an ethnic group. These needs could span the whole spectrum, from identity related political representation and participation, through demands for territory and economic equality, to social and cultural recognition and acceptance. Any one of these could result in conflict. As Fanon argued, the only recourse of a subjugated community was to violence, "The last shall be first only after a murderous and decisive struggle."\(^{167}\)

Whilst it is perhaps inaccurate to suggest that the existence of an ethnic group presupposes conflict, it is possible to suggest that it represents a useful indicator of the potential.

This argument however fails to take into account the role of the sovereign state. As the realist argument above suggests, the individual, group and community that exists within the state has a social contract of legitimacy, in which the needs of the people are meet by the state in return for allegiance and protection. It is the nature of this relationship that can be a cause of conflict, especially if the state fails to provide for the individual, group or community. Smith suggests that the ethnic community has a number of strategies available to it in its relationship with the state, although these include the non-violent accommodation, communalism and autonomism;\(^{168}\) he names perhaps the two most important violent triggers to conflict, separatism and irredentism.\(^{169}\) This stimulation of ethnic groups into political violence against the state can also be termed "mobilisation theory."\(^{170}\)

Richmond, in a study of ethnic conflict, identifies a "metaphorical and physical no man’s land" in which the ethnic group is trapped between the realist security fears of the state and the ethno-nationalist demands of the ethnic leadership.\(^{171}\) The nature of the precarious and

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\(^{167}\) Fanon, *The Wretched*, p.29.

\(^{168}\) Smith, *Ethnic Revival*, p.15.

\(^{169}\) Separatism, the desire to establish self-rule as an ethnic community and Irredentism, the desire for a community divided among different states to seek reunification Smith, *Ethnic Revival*, p.15.


symbiotic relationship that exists between the identity driven ethnic group and the sovereign nation-state is therefore a potent cause of conflict.

The ethnic group also grows in importance when the state (central government) is perceived to be, or actually is, no longer in a position to impose sovereignty and guarantee the security of the identity of the individual or community. At this point society can fracture as its members default from the state and transfer allegiance to the security of ethnic groups. This reversion to tribalism can also be termed ‘Balkanisation.’ Barry Posen argues that as ethnic groups polarise along ethnic, religious and cultural lines and central state authority gives way to anarchy, the outbreak of conflict can be explained by the manifestation of the intrastate security dilemma.\(^{172}\) This can be seen as a form of civil war and can explain conflict between ethnic identity groups, within an existing state, in a failed state or across established state borders. Richmond points out that state sovereignty is not only becoming increasingly challenged by ethnic security demands but also more importantly by individual human sovereignty and the concept of human security, which he suggests, is beyond the remit of the traditional state-centric perspective.\(^ {173}\)

This introduces arguments that relate not only to the needs of the ethnic group as a cause of conflict but also to the needs and autonomy of the individual in a contemporary liberal democratic world where human rights, freedoms and security for the individual is gaining in importance.

Individual and group identity is buried deep in the roots of ethnic conflict, as individual identity either under threat from the state or unprotected by it, gravitates towards the ethnic group for protection and security. The ethnic group then becomes the representative of the needs and security of the individual and the group as a whole. The satisfaction of these needs and the ensuing dynamics between other ethnic groups and the state or surrounding states will dictate the appearance of conflict. This implies that until an international body exists that can guarantee the basic rights of individuals beyond both the state and the ethnic group, ethnic conflict will remain ubiquitous.

**Ideology**

Ideology is perhaps the most easily understandable cause of conflict within the individual as it provides the political agenda and the motivation for conflict. The two most important examples of ideology as proven causes of conflict are nationalism and religion. Nationalism has similarities to the concept of ethnicity, as the basis for individual and group identity. However, instead of ethnic identity, nationalism is based on national identity and is centred on an affinity to the concept of the nation, which is underwritten by the existence of the sovereign state. The conflict caused by identity politics, which I examined above in relation to the ethnic group, is just as relevant to nationalism, although Connor argues that it can be even more conflictual. He suggests that whilst an ethnic group may be other-defined, the nation must be self-defined.\textsuperscript{174} This often presupposes the manifestation of identity conflict and is reinforced by the argument that most states were created out of conflict.

Nationalism can be seen as an overtly political concept that seeks to unite all individuals, factions, ethnic groups and cultural communities inside an established territory into one single recognisable entity. Smith points out that to achieve this the identity of the individual is recast into that of the citizen.\textsuperscript{175} He also suggests that nationalism exploits the existence of ethnic conflict, “It endows ethnicity with a new self-consciousness and legitimacy as well as a fighting spirit and political direction.”\textsuperscript{176} Nationalism is the removal of power\textsuperscript{177} from the ethnic group into the hands of the state for both the creation and preservation of the elites and the political. Just as so-called ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ exploit and direct the power provided by ethnicity to serve their own agendas, so the state harnesses the grassroots human power generated by ethnic groups to serve the political needs of the nation. Giddens calls the nation “a bordered power container.”\textsuperscript{178} Viewing the state as an expression of political power can therefore be regarded as a potent cause of conflict as the nation exhibits similar characteristics to the ethnic group when under threat. Conflict can be generated not

\textsuperscript{173} Richmond, Ethnic Security, p.30.
\textsuperscript{174} Connor W., ‘A Nation is a Nation is a State is an Ethnic group is a...’ in Hutchinson J, Smith AD, Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.45.
\textsuperscript{175} Smith, Ethnic Revival, p.18.
\textsuperscript{176} Smith, Ethnic Revival, p.19.
\textsuperscript{177} Power can be defined as the ability to influence others’ behaviour. Keohane, Neorealism. p.11.
\textsuperscript{178} Giddens A. The Nation as a Power-Container, ’ in Hutchinson and Smith. Nationalism, p.34.
only to create a state but also to prevent its disintegration by forging internal coherence and staving off decent into ethnic fractionalisation.

Nationalism, alongside the Westphalian system can be seen as a mythical construct, a discourse or regime of truth that is essentially, artificially created to provide political power and legitimacy over a population within a defined territory. This is supported by the paraphernalia of nations, such as flags, anthems, and heroes that serve to inspire the cohesion of the people to the nation. This is especially evident during conflict and can be regarded as patriotism. Withey and Katz argue that nationalism succeeds, as does ethnicity, because it exploits an inherent identity need in the individual. They suggest nationalism is “a compensatory feeling of security, superiority and power for psychologically weak people.” This is supported by Max Weber who suggests that nationalism is the establishment of a “prestige community.” However, by inverting this argument it is possible to recognise a major cause of conflict, as nationalism aims to pull together all manner of ethnic groups into a single cohesive multiethnic state. Tanja Ellingsen argues that multiethnicity increases the propensity of domestic violence and links it to the condition of the state’s political regime and socio-economic situation. Conflict is an ever-present threat in an unstable or even stable state, as it could erupt internally due to ethnonationalism or externally as a way to provide internal cohesion and stability.

A similar argument can be applied to the second provider of conflict ideology, religion. This is a similar discourse to nationalism as it creates an ideology that can harness power for the pursuit of political agendas. Juergensmeyer sees religion as a form of political loyalty, which he terms “ideologies of order.” Samuel Huntington attributes the cause of ethnic conflict and “identity wars” to the religious divisions or “fault lines” that occur between different civilisations. Although this is an attractive argument, it over simplifies religion and assumes a level of homogeneity within a civilisation, which is often not even present in a community. It is perhaps misleading and inadvisable to view conflict as solely caused by religion as this can serve to hide other political and socio-economic triggers. Esposito cites the threat to identity and

182 Ellingsen, ‘Colourful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? P.228.
socio-cultural values from economic change and the subsequent social dislocation as the reason for the emergence of religious fervour and conflict.\textsuperscript{185}

Nevertheless, religion can certainly play a major role in the generation of conflict. It can, if exploited correctly by the political elites, legitimise conflict, by establishing a ‘just cause’ in the form of a holy war.\textsuperscript{186} It provides both the theological motivation for individuals to enter into conflict and is a concept that can easily generate mass support. Religion, like nationalism is also linked to identity. Jeffrey Seul suggests religion is at the core of individual and group identity. His argument centres on “identity competition” as a cause of intergroup conflict, which he suggests, is a product of the high level of commitment required by religious groups coupled with the ease by which group boundaries can be established through religious self-identification.\textsuperscript{187} Religion is a key issue in conflict as it can be seen as the fuel, catalyst and spark to protracted violence.

Ideology is a central factor in the generation of armed conflict within the individual not only because it supplies a political agenda for the motivation and justification for violence but more simply because it provides something to recognise, identify with, believe in, and ultimately to fight for. The problems with nationalism and religion are their overtly political connotations, which might serve to obscure other more influential socio-economic causes of conflict. It is very easy and attractive to suggest that the cause of a conflict is nationalism or religion, but whilst this may be an important contributory factor or provide the rallying cry for the fighters, it may not necessarily be the actual root cause of the conflict. Ideology needs to be examined in context with all the other possible root causes of conflict in order to put its contribution to the generation of violence into perspective.

\textbf{Issues and Agendas}

\textsuperscript{186} Holy war, defined in the realm of the believer, is war sanctioned by their respective god.
The examination of issues and agendas is an attempt to highlight the existence of the causes of conflict that relate directly to the individual. Although many of these have already been examined especially in the section on structuralism, it is important to stress the emphasis conflict studies places on the issues that cause conflict, especially ethnic conflict. The central reason for this approach is because conflict studies seek to examine the root causes of conflict and demonstrate that when conflict occurs, it is due to multifarious issues and subjective agendas, which are often underwritten by deeper root causes. Mitchell suggests that conflict issues originate as "Positive goals," such as establishing a state or economic gain and "Negative goals" which implies the avoidance of a situation.\(^{188}\) Similarly, Jabri suggests a typology of conflict issues. She divides them into: "consensual," which are values actively sought such as territory and resources, and "disensual" which are belief systems such as religion and ideology.\(^{189}\)

This approach to conflict at the individual level provides the study of conflict with a natural scepticism of broad quick fix solutions and causational assumptions, and promotes a multi-level and multi-dimensional approach to the root causes that adequately reflect the multi-level complexity of contemporary conflict. Carment and Jones point out that the term ethnic conflict reveals little about the underlying intercommunal tensions and issues that may become ethnic because that is the basis for exclusion and repression.\(^{190}\) This problem has been tackled by conflict studies, which has provided a number of multi-dimensional approaches to ethnic conflict. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham suggest ethnic conflict is caused by six factors these are "historical, religious, demographic, political, economic and psychological."\(^{191}\) Gurr and Harff suggest a framework theory for explaining conflict, which has a number of variables; these are "discrimination, group identity, leadership, political environment, state violence, external support, economic status and international factors."\(^{192}\)

The employment of a comprehensive examination of all the possible issue and agenda contributory factors for conflict relate directly to the grass-roots generation of conflict, in an attempt to interpret and understand the aims and goals of individuals.

\(^{188}\) Mitchell, Conflict, p.18.
\(^{189}\) Jabri, Discourses, p.16.
So whilst religion or territory might provide the issue for conflict it is the existence of other possible issue root causes, such as unemployment or loss of property that might actually generate the conflict in the individual. Although, in the structural section I argued that conflict was caused by the structure created by the interaction of the incompatibility of these goals, this section suggests that by examining the issues it is possible to investigate why they have become agendas for conflict. Conflict issues and agendas I suggest, are related to the concept of power,\textsuperscript{193} not state power that was discussed above but the notion of human power, by which I mean the motivational force behind human action. Coser from the functionalist school argues that conflict is essentially a positive test of power and relative strength between antagonistic parties.\textsuperscript{194} Foucault suggests that the mechanism of power combined with perceived knowledge is instrumental in establishing ‘regimes of truth.’\textsuperscript{195} This concept suggests that individual or group behaviour is affected by power, which consequently influences how truth is perceived. Thus by becoming aware of the source and generation of power, issues that lead to conflict can be identified. This is supported by Fetherston who suggests that the key to understanding social issues, institutions, structures and relationships is provided by understanding power relations.\textsuperscript{196} Investigation of the issues in a conflict suggests the existence of multi-dimensional issues as root causes in conflict, which need to be addressed from multi-dimensional perspectives if the conflict is to be understood.

**Social-Psychological causes**

Social-psychological conflict is an examination of the psychological root causes of violence, which is a valuable area of focus within conflict studies. A central element in social psychology is attitude. Conflict attitude is a component of Galtung’s conflict triangle,\textsuperscript{197} and relates to the construction of the mental condition of those in conflict. It relates particularly to how they view the conflict, themselves and

\textsuperscript{193} I define power as the ability to influence others’ behaviour, see, Keohane, *Neorealism*, p.11.

\textsuperscript{194} Coser defines power as the ability to influence the behaviour of others Coser, *Functions*, p.137.

\textsuperscript{195} Foucault, *Power and Knowledge*, p.122.

ultimately the opposition. Miall et al divides attitude into a number of components; these are emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (will).\textsuperscript{198} Similarly, Mitchell defines conflict attitudes as “a set of psychological processes and conditions that accompany involvement in conflict.”\textsuperscript{199} He separates attitude into “Affective” (emotional, judgemental) and “Perceptual” (cognitive).\textsuperscript{200} This implies that the roots of conflict can be exposed via an investigation of the highly subjective and relative psychological construction of the individual in conflict. Whilst this is useful in helping to theorise as to the mindset of the individual in conflict, it is difficult to actually fully understand the psychological construction of such subjective concepts. Furthermore, this theory presupposes a link between the occurrence of violence and the psychological attitude of the combatant.

In a continuation of the frustration-aggression and inherency arguments, many psychologists have argued that the roots of aggression and violence are an innate emotion. Lorenz suggested, “Aggression is psychic energy, a drive that is the basis for all human violence,”\textsuperscript{201} and argued that it is located in a territorial and hunter based killer instinct.\textsuperscript{202} Simmel suggested the existence, deep in the human psyche of an \textit{a priori} fighting instinct that causes a need for hostility. He points to the ease with which it is possible to inspire distrust, suspicion, over confidence and sympathy and believes that it is this “hostility drive” of feelings, emotions and impulses that sustains a conflict around objective causes.\textsuperscript{203} Freud argued for the existence of “thanatos” or the “death instinct,” which he believed, became destructive when directed outwards as aggression.\textsuperscript{204} These arguments imply that conflict attitude, whilst it remains a potent cause of conflict, is actually an inherent human characteristic that just requires the right conditions to turn it to violence. Tidwell suggests that inherent conflict attitudes are beneficial to the individual as a self-preservation or survival instinct.\textsuperscript{205} Conflict attitudes, it can be argued, emanate from a belief in the emotional make-up of the individual and can be an effective cause of conflict under the right conditions. As

\textsuperscript{197} Galtung, \textit{Peaceful Means}, p.71.
\textsuperscript{199} Mitchell, \textit{Structure}, p.28.
\textsuperscript{200} Mitchell, \textit{Structure}, p.28.
\textsuperscript{203} Simmel, \textit{Conflict}, p.28.

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Mitchell suggest “conflict attitudes are common patterns of expectation, emotional orientation and perception which accompany involvement in conflict situations.”

The existence and construction of subjective beliefs can be seen as not only a major cause of conflict but also a factor that can sustain protracted conflict by often prolonging the violence after the original objective reasons for it have long since disappeared. A very helpful study into the underlying process and psychological construction of conflict attitudes is Christopher Mitchell’s *Structure of International Conflict*. Mitchell’s central argument is that conflict attitudes arise from the common human tendency to develop ways of dealing with stress. He calls this the “protective psychological process” and suggests a “cognitive consistency” is achieved by “selective perception, selective recall and group identification.” Although Mitchell suggests that cognitive consistency is in response to conflict, it can also be seen as both an initial cause and reason for the continuation of conflict. Mitchell also argues selective perception and selective recall are the rejection and suppression of all information that does not conform to the most basic and simple understanding adopted by the individual. For example, the categorisation of information into black and white thinking assists the individual by simplifying a complex or stressful environment. Examples of this include stereotyping of individuals and groups, tunnel vision and dehumanisation. This psychological process also serves to exacerbate the conflict, by employing, for example, uncomplimentary (mirror) images, issue polarisation and the freedom of action differential. Banks suggests that this is an identifiable cause of conflict as each party becomes “cognitively blind” to the other, by employing different theories based on different beliefs and values which ultimately influence perceptions.

The other important part of Mitchell’s cognitive consistency thesis is “group identification.” This argument builds upon the ideas discussed above on the role of individual and group identity in the generation of conflict. Mitchell however concentrates on the psychological elements that exist in the differentiation between

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205 Tidwell, Conflict Resolved? p.43.
209 Mitchell believes this is the psychological tendency to over-rationalise and perceive that events, circumstances and consequences are all the result of the planned action of the other party. Mitchell, *Structure*. p.101.
the “in-group and out-group.” He suggests that the ‘in-group’ rationalise their actions with their own reasoned, logical and moral understanding of the situation. Consequently, from their subjective moral stance they perceive their actions in conflict as a reaction to aggression and thus fail to see how any blame for the conflict can be apportioned to them. They consider themselves defensive and seek to galvanise the in-group by projecting the stress of hostility onto outsiders, denying responsibility and avoiding any internal ambiguity of identity. Hence the maxim ‘those who are not for us are against us.’ Fanon argues that group identity thrives on the actual existence of violence and that this is a further cause of conflict. He suggests that the practice of violence is a source of dignity and empowers the repressed individual and draws members of the group into a cohesive element. Individuals, through acts of violence, can establish their own identity, that of the group and of the enemy, all of which is assumed to be cohesive and homogeneous. This is especially important for the enemy, which is then seen as an uncomplicated focus of hostility. Mitchell suggests that in order to deal with the psychological difficulty of alienating a complete ‘people’, the “black top” image is often employed to demonise the leadership and separate it from the repressed or indoctrinated masses.

Further social-psychological causes of conflict are suggested by Vayrynen, who highlights the psychological perceptions and resultant misjudgements inherent in the causation of conflict such as, the perceived incompatibility of goals and the expected gain or perceived utility of conflict. Lederach suggests that it is the social-psychological perceptions, emotions and subjective experiences that trigger the cycle of violence that leads to deep-rooted self-perpetuating conflict. Dollard, in a development of the frustration-agression theory suggests the existence of “displaced aggression,” as a cause of conflict, which he argues is a cathartic expression of violence against a target other than the actual source of the frustration. Mitchell calls this “transfer” and “displacement” and suggests that the generation of aggression

211 Mitchell, Structure, p.103.
212 Fanon, The Wretched, p.67.
213 Mitchell, Structure, p.106.
214 Vayrynen, New Directions, p.29.
215 Lederach attributes the ‘perceptions’ to the political manipulation of leaders coupled with the need for the security of identity of the individual and sees fear and hatred among the ‘emotions.’ Lederach, Building Peace, p.29.
216 Dollard, Frustration and aggression, p.36.
might be redirected against something completely unconnected to the original source of aggression;\textsuperscript{217} this is the basis for the concept of the scapegoat.

Social-psychological factors or conflict attitudes serve to illustrate important sources of conflict that are encompassed in the entrenched nature of the subjective understanding of conflict by the actors. These factors can serve to not only generate the conflict, but can also cause an increase in the intensity and duration of violence, especially as cognitive opinions over time can become even more polarised and self-fulfilling. This implies that in order to fully understand the roots of conflict it is necessary to penetrate the minds of the actors in conflict.

The approach of liberalism for understanding the root causes of conflict is designed to firmly locate the individual in the creation of conflict. The framework places emphasis on the importance and role of the generation and employment of individual and group identity as an instigator of social interaction and conflict. It provides an important examination of the role of identity in generating ethnic conflict through protection, representation and ethnic security issues and also serves to highlight the precarious and potentially conflictual relationship that exists between the constructs of ethnic identity and the sovereign state. Individual identity and the group are therefore inextricably linked and can be considered a root cause of conflict as it is the pursuit of needs of the group, and the ensuing interaction with other agencies, such as the state, that generates the dynamics of conflict.

This theoretical approach also demonstrates the effect of belief systems such as nationalism and religion as root causes of conflict, which provide the justification and motivation for the individual in conflict. Through examination of the role of the individual it is important to recognise the existence of multi-dimensional causes of conflict that necessitate the requirement for multi-dimensional approaches for dealing with the conflict agendas of individuals, many of which are located in the struggle for the generation and control of human power. It is also possible to locate the roots of conflict in the psychological make-up of the individual and the group, especially in the form of attitude. This is particularly relevant for appreciating how parties in conflict form an understanding of the other combatants and the ensuing nature of the violence, which can provide an explanation for the existence and often longevity of a conflict. Although the approach provided by liberalism is far from all encompassing it

\textsuperscript{217} Mitchell, \textit{Structure}, p.92.
does provide a very helpful understanding of the root cause of conflict at the level of the human individual.

**International Relations Theory and the Roots of Conflict**

This chapter has focused on attempting to explain the root causes of conflict by investigating the approaches to it supplied by conflict studies, when viewed through the different perspectives created by international relations theory. This survey of literature has not produced any definitive reasons or conclusive scientific explanations for the manifestation of conflict nor has it suggested ways of solving it. It has however demonstrated how conflict can be explained and understood from a number of different perspectives. These perspectives or discourses, when taken together, provide a very useful multi-level and interdisciplinary approach to understanding conflict. However, it is important to stress that this is a theoretical exercise and these theoretical frameworks are not necessarily complimentary. Each approach has a particular use and function. This is argued by Robert Cox, who suggests, "theory is always for someone and for some purpose." Realism is a state-centric and principally political, conflict based framework that not only generates conflict but also reproduces it via a positivist ‘reality.’ Realism is designed to ‘explain’ and ‘understand’ interstate conflict and support the existence and centrality of the state and the importance of the Westphalian system. From this perspective it is useful, because as the dominant framework in international relations it exposes the role of the state and indeed the Westphalian international system in the generation and maintenance of conflict. This was particularly apparent by examining the concepts of inherency, sovereignty, power and security.

Realism however, is notably flawed in its understanding of conflict because it cannot recognise non-state or intra-state conflict, which as I argued above, is becoming an increasingly important factor in the nature of the contemporary conflict.

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218 Cox, *Approaches*, p.87.
This gap in the understanding of conflict can be filled by pluralism, which can provide conflict theories that explain the manifestation of non-state violence. Pluralism, as a broad based non-state actor approach to conflict, is designed to demonstrate the role and importance of other actors in conflict as it highlights the nature of the conflictual relationship between the individual and society. This is particularly evident in the examination of functionalism and human needs theory. However, the purpose of pluralism is also to maintain the dominance of the state and reinforce the state-centric approach, as it is not completely free from the influence of the state in the understanding of conflict. This is especially apparent in relation to idealism, a discourse that although purporting to extol the rights and values of the individual group, nation or state, actually enshrines them and makes them beholden on the existence of the institution of the state. For example, the implications of the concept of self-determination for non-state actors is to cause the actor to seek the creation of a state and acceptance into the Westphalian ‘club,’ which is a common cause of conflict.\textsuperscript{219} Pluralism therefore does not truly break from the state-centric approach to conflict and provide a completely alternative understanding of the causes of conflict.

Structuralism does however provide an alternative approach to conflict. This discourse is designed to highlight the nature and purpose of the systems in which the actors’ perceive they exist; this is demonstrated by considering the structural arguments provided by Marxism. Structuralism is also particularly useful in exposing the systemic and situational causes of conflict, especially actor behaviour, and is exceptionally valuable in examining the effect of an historical and cultural structure of violence. Nevertheless, structuralism is a very general approach and suffers criticism for generating a generic understanding of a conflict situation that assumes all the individuals are affected similarly by the structure.

This is where the approach provided by liberalism is beneficial, as it is designed to focus particularly on the role of the individual and the group in conflict. It allows an examination of the construction of the identity of the individual, especially ethnic, and an investigation into the effects of ideology and the potent conflict generators of religion and nationalism. It also provides a constructive study into the

\textsuperscript{219} How far the actor uses and changes discourses is perhaps the subject of another study. But it is interesting to theorise that as a non-state group, the actor might employ pluralism and then once a state is established it might switch to employing realism, the discourse of the state.
psychological construction of the conflict mindset. But liberalism does not take any account of the role of the state in the generation of conflict, which as I argued above is instrumental in causing conflict and vital to understanding the roots of violence. This returns the discourse debate back to the start and is a point that perhaps illustrates the purpose of this study to demonstrate that whichever perspective or theory of conflict is employed to explain the root causes, regardless of how helpful or illuminating they are in understanding particular causes of conflict, they are all based on particular assumptions and therefore suffer from limitations and restrictions in their approach to conflict.

The conclusion of this roots survey suggests some important findings. First, the causes of conflict, especially contemporary conflict, can be better understood from a comprehensive, multi-level and multi-dimensional perspective. This implies that although different perspectives are employed to understand the roots of conflict, by combining these approaches into a single multi-level framework it might be possible to establish an all-inclusive and wide-ranging explanation of the root causes of conflict. From the perspective of solving conflict this would be invaluable, as it will allow the deep-rooted reasons for conflict to be engaged, addressed and potentially answered. Second, like the survey of terrorism literature in Chapter 1, the survey of conflict studies suggests a general differentiation between approaches for explaining conflict. These can be classed as follows,

1. Orthodox conflict theory is a realist state centric approach and relates to the traditional understanding of conflict as inter-state war. It is found in historical texts such as Machiavelli and Von Clausewitz and conventional work by Waltz. It is also the basis for conflict management approaches.

2. Moderate conflict theory can be seen as the conflict resolution approach to conflict. It is a multi-level approach and incorporates theories such as human needs. Its main proponents are researchers such as Boulding, Azar, Burton and Galtung.

3. Critical conflict theory is a radical, holistic and multi-dimensional approach to explaining conflict and is found in the work of Linklater. Lederach, Jabri and Richmond.
Thirdly, conflict studies do not really deal extensively with the subject of terrorism, even though it has made considerable advances into explaining non-state conflict it still focuses primarily on war. Conflict studies would definitely benefit from incorporating some of the approaches to explaining terrorism, which were discussed in Chapter 1. This is dealt with in the construction of a comprehensive theoretical framework, (together with the approaches provided by terrorism studies from Chapter 1) which is the subject of the next chapter. Once constructed this wide-ranging approach incorporating both terrorism and conflict studies will be ‘tested’ on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (in Chapter 5) to demonstrate how a comprehensive, multi-level and multi-dimensional framework, comprising of different perspectives can render a rethink of the root causes of terrorism.
Conflict and Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis

Introduction

The studies of terrorism and conflict both have potential benefits for explaining each others root causes if their respective approaches are applied. This is particularly significant for the study of terrorism. In this chapter I intend to demonstrate how the root causes of terrorism can be much more clearly explained and understood by combining the different approaches employed in terrorism and conflict studies. In Chapter 1, I examined how the root causes of terrorism can be explained by employing different theoretical approaches to terrorism demonstrating the need for a more sophisticated approach to understanding terrorism. This was in response and comparison to the orthodox explanation of terrorism provided by terrorism discourse, which has particularly limiting shortcomings in relation to understanding terrorism. As I explained in Chapter 1, the understanding of terrorism provided by orthodox terrorism discourse is based on the legitimacy of the state. Although this is a relative legitimacy, it has propagated an understanding of terrorism based on a moral legitimacy definition that favours the realist state centric approach to explaining terrorism as illegal and illegitimate. This has become widely accepted as the normative definition of terrorism and consequentially exists as a pejorative term adopted by actors, predominantly state actors, to create a moral justification for their claim to legitimacy. The implications of this approach are serious for understanding the root causes of terrorism. The intractable subjective moral difficulties of the relative political legitimacy debate that accompany orthodox terrorism discourse mean that it eschews a roots debate, as this might bestow legitimacy on the terrorist
actor. The effect of this is to limit the explanation and understanding of terrorism to a mono-dimensional state-centric understanding.

The purpose of this study is to rethink this understanding of the root causes of terrorism by suggesting a broader, multi-dimensional approach that will provide a better explanation and ultimately more useful understanding of the manifestation of terrorism. I suggest that in order to widen the understanding of terrorism, it might be beneficial for terrorism studies to draw from the approaches provided by conflict studies. This would supply the study of terrorism with greater access to a wider range of analytical tools with which to respond to the problem of political violence with the intention of resolving it. In Chapter 2, I conducted a survey of the roots of conflict in order to illustrate the number of different theoretical approaches available to the understanding of the root causes of conflict and demonstrate that from these multi-dimensional approaches it was possible to develop a comprehensive and advanced understanding of conflict. This provides a number of viable routes to facilitate resolution of conflict; the implications of this for rethinking terrorism are obvious.

In this chapter I intend to conduct a comparative analysis of both terrorism and conflict literature in order to compare and contrast how the two approaches to violence can provide a more substantial and sophisticated way of understanding the root causes of terrorism. I aim in Part 1 to combine the strengths of both approaches to violence by examining terrorism studies and developing the most useful applications in the field whilst highlighting the gaps that exist. I will then compare this to conflict studies and discuss how the gaps in terrorism studies can be filled by the approaches and theories provided by conflict studies. This should provide a more comprehensive, interdisciplinary, multi-level and multi-dimensional study of the roots of terrorism, from which it should be possible to construct (in Part 2) a theoretical framework that can be applied to terrorist conflicts in order to gain a much more advanced understanding of the root causes of political violence. This comprehensive theoretical framework will then be ‘applied’ in Chapter 5 to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to illustrate how rethinking terrorism can provide a substantially more sophisticated and wide-ranging explanation and understanding of the roots of the problem. It is important to point out that my aim is not to establish a new theory of terrorism but to attempt to provide a broader, more holistic framework and comprehensive method of approach to terrorism, from which a more advanced and refined understanding can be gained. This is to equip the study of terrorism with more
robust tools with which to appreciate the roots of terrorism and hence provide a number of channels to help potentially facilitate preventing its occurrence.

Prior to this comparative analysis I will re-establish definitions for terrorism and conflict and briefly discuss if they can be accommodated by each other. I will also debate the strengths and weaknesses of the respective theoretical approaches to understanding terrorism and conflict used in Chapters 1 and 2, with the intention of establishing theoretical levels of analysis for constructing the theoretical framework for approaching terrorist conflicts.

**Terrorism and Conflict defined**

To facilitate a definitional point of departure for this comparative study, it is necessary to compare the definitions of both terrorism and conflict to ascertain if terrorism can be suitably located in conflict, and also if the dominant understanding of conflict encompasses terrorism. In Chapter 1, I defined terrorism as a particular form of violence motivated by a political agenda or more simply as ‘lethal political violence’.¹ This suggests an act of lethal violence that is perpetrated in order to further a political cause or achieve a stated political² objective. This definition as I argued is useful as it separates the act of violence from the political legitimacy debate, whilst still differentiating it from non-political lethal violence, such as that based on greed or personal gain. It is a definition of a particular type or method of violence³ and can appear quite narrow in its application. However its usefulness is in explaining the act of violence itself and the relative political consequences. It does not necessarily seek to explain the wider implications, such the context in which the violence occurs, the actors involved or indeed the roots of the violence, as its focus is predominantly political. Notably, the definition I employ does not refer to terror, which is seen by

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¹ See, Chapter 1, *Terrorism*.
² The term political, in this instance implies involvement in politics, which can be defined as “activities associated with the governance of a country or area.” Concise Oxford Dictionary Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.1107.
³ Orthodox terrorism studies suggest that terrorism is an expression of a particular type or method of violence or even a form of weapon system see Wilkinson P, *Terrorism Versus Democracy*. London: Frank Cass 2001, p.1.
orthodox theory as the basis of the understanding of terrorism. Terror is not used in
my adopted definition because it is so closely associated with orthodox terrorism
theory and the problems inherent in the subjective moral legitimacy debate, which is
synonymous with orthodox terrorism discourse.\footnote{Orthodox terrorism theory holds that terrorism seeks to terrorise a people for political gain, which is morally and legally wrong whatever the circumstances. In my understanding war, conflict and political violence all produce terror.}

In comparison, the classification of conflict I employ for this study seeks to
incorporate “actual or potential violent conflicts which range from domestic conflict
situations that threaten to become militarised beyond the capacity of domestic civil
police to control, through to full-scale inter-state war.”\footnote{Miall H, Ramsbotham O, Woodhouse T, \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p.23.} It is immediately apparent
that the application of conflict suggests a much more wide-ranging and broader
approach to the manifestation of violence, than terrorism, this is primarily because
more advanced approaches to conflict, such as conflict resolution and peace building,
seek to incorporate all types of violence, including terrorism, into an extensive
definition that can aid multi-level investigation into the causes of the conflict.

Terrorism by the adopted definition of lethal violence in conflict can be
relocated into conflict studies. The principal advantage of this would be to open up
terrorist conflicts to the multi-level and interdisciplinary approaches to understanding
violence that I discussed in Chapter 2. This relocation would also bring with it the
tools of conflict resolution, such peacemaking and peacebuilding\footnote{Miall H, Ramsbotham O, Woodhouse T, \textit{Contemporary Conflict Resolution}. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p.23.} with which
progression could be made into understanding the manifestation of terrorism beyond
the constraining influence of politics. There are however, tremendous difficulties with
this manoeuvre; accepting terrorist violence as conflict could mean in effect
bestowing some form of legitimacy on the perpetrators of the violence. Using the
above definition of conflict, a state dealing with a group that employs terrorist
violence would be forced to concede that the group might have a legitimate reason for
the anti-state violence. It could then be classed as a form of asymmetric conflict and
could imply recognition of the cause of the group, legitimacy of their actions and
combatant status to group members as legitimate soldiers. This would give them the
protection afforded to lawful combatants provided by the Geneva Convention.
Arguably, it is this desire for legitimacy that is the principal aim of the majority of
terrorist groups. The implications of this are highly problematic, as it would have an
immense and probably unacceptable political impact on the formation of state policy, especially anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist strategies, as these policies are based on the monopoly of legitimacy.\textsuperscript{7} It is also possible to argue that whilst states might be aware of the roots debate when dealing with terrorist groups, it is in fact incompatible with orthodox terrorism theory, which is employed by states to maintain and defend the political and socio-economic status quo.\textsuperscript{8}

Conflict studies are also subject to a legitimacy debate where typically both sides refuse to accept the legitimacy of the other or recognise their claims and are locked into seeking a zero sum solution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{9} Terrorist conflicts, without even attempting to relocate the violence, can be seen as conflict involving the use of terrorism between groups contesting the rights to legitimacy, hence a situation not unlike one found in most conflicts. Despite this conclusion, the question that needs to be asked is can orthodox conflict studies actually accommodate terrorism? Terrorism by definition is violence with a political objective, and conflict or war, as Von Clausewitz famously stated, is the continuation of politics by other means and is intrinsically “an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to comply with our will.”\textsuperscript{10} Although this initial comparison suggests an easy symbiosis, the problem arises in the method of violence. It can be argued in the subjective moral debate that conflict and war is legitimised ‘legal’ violence whereas terrorist violence is ‘illegitimate’ and ‘unlawful.’ This line of argument suggests that terrorism can only exist outside conflict, where the legitimacy of conflict is recognised by both sides. Terrorism cannot by the normative definition of unlawful violence, occur in a declared war that is accepted by both parties. This suggests that in the normative understanding of terrorism both sides might be employing terrorist violence against one another in the form of terrorism and counter/anti-terrorism and because it is not a recognised legitimate conflict both sides claim the other is acting illegitimately and unlawfully and therefore feel able to justify their own actions. Conversely in war,

\textsuperscript{6} Miall et al, \textit{Conflict Resolution}, p.16.
\textsuperscript{7} Orthodox terrorism theory is a discourse designed to support anti-terrorism and counter terrorism policies by states. It is suggested that in the interests of parsimony the orthodox definition and understanding of terrorism is useful to allow government responses.
\textsuperscript{8} Arguably, a roots debate can only begin at the point at which terrorism theory ends, as the processes are mutually incompatible.
\textsuperscript{9} The general usage of zero-sum conflict is intended to represent self’s gain is other’s loss and non-zero-sum in which both may lose or win, it is traditionally accepted that the task of conflict resolution is to help conflict parties transfer their perceptions from zero-sum to non-zero-sum. Miall et al, \textit{Conflict Resolution}, p. 6.
both side might be employing terrorist tactics but this is seen as legitimate violence within in the realm of conflict.

However, not all conflict is recognised as legitimate by all those involved. Although the main arguments inherent in this subjective debate of terrorism were discussed in Chapter 1, it is important to reiterate here that terrorism is often characterised by the relative difference in how it is defined and understood. Typically each side defines and understands terrorism relative to the others actions and not their own, hence they can both define terrorism as illegitimate and unlawful but as both claim legitimacy through their relative understandings, they see the others’ action as terrorist and not their own. Furthermore, terrorism and conflict are subject to an inside / outside debate.\textsuperscript{11} Those on the ‘outside’ viewing the violence deem it as terrorist in nature while those who employ it on the ‘inside’ see it as conflict. It would seem that orthodox conflict cannot accommodate orthodox terrorism unless it sheds its relative and subjective understanding, but then, it can be argued, it will cease to be orthodox terrorism. This debate then poses the question, if terrorism studies cannot be accommodated by conflict studies should it be left in its subjective and relative moral understanding and not relocated? Although this approach aids the forces of state and underwrites the policies of counter and anti-terrorism, it will leave the phenomenon of terrorism where it has been since the study began: without a roots debate, in an intractable, unapproachable and largely unsolvable position.

Perhaps orthodox conflict can in fact accommodate terrorism under the alternative definition of terrorism as ‘lethal political violence’ by considering the targets of violence. Lethal violence directed against ‘civilians’ (those who are neither uniformed combatants, militias or members of the establishment and who for the purpose of this argument, can be regarded as ‘innocent civilians,’) can be deemed violence or even crime against humanity.\textsuperscript{12} This is a characteristic often solely attributed to terrorism and is where the link between terrorism and conflict exists, at the root of an ambiguous relationship located in the legitimacy debate.\textsuperscript{13} Lethal

\textsuperscript{11} The inside / outside debate suggests a rethinking of the accepted theoretical assumptions that reinforce how aspects of international relations are understood. Walker RBJ, Inside / Outside, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1993.
\textsuperscript{12} Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.4.
\textsuperscript{13} Jabri suggests the existence of a discourse of legitimacy, which establishes a differentiation between criminal and judicial violence, thus suggesting that those who act within law have rights and those who act outside do not, and are therefore regarded as unlawful combatants. Jabri V, ‘The war / ethics nexus: Globalised Warfare in late modernity.’ Lecture. University of St Andrews, 7 October 2002.
violence against individuals outside the matrix of legitimised conflict can be seen as terrorism, however lethal violence against individuals or in this case civilians or non-combatants within conflict is not necessarily viewed as terrorism. O’Sullivan points out that “World War Two did much to eliminate distinction between combatant and non-combatant by legitimising the deliberate massacre of civilians.”\textsuperscript{14} Although a form of legality does exist in conflict, as war crime under the Geneva Conventions and Human Rights Acts, without doubt the greatest casualties of war and conflict are civilians. In a study of armed conflict since 1945 it was estimated that eighty-four percent of those killed since 1945 were civilians.\textsuperscript{15} It would seem that deliberately targeting civilians in ‘legitimate’ conflict, subjective or otherwise is acceptable but outside of this it is not. Wilkinson argues that terrorist campaigns inherently involve deliberate attacks on civilian targets and are analogous to war crimes,\textsuperscript{16} this suggests that if some form of legality is invoked, either the violence is occurring outside the framework of legitimate conflict or inside a subjectively legitimised conflict. Within this argument the deliberate targeting of civilians within a legitimate conflict or war can be seen as ‘legitimate’ terrorism, which is in fact conflict. This is supported by the claim that deliberate attacks on civilians in all forms of conflict are fast becoming an accepted norm of contemporary conflict. Mary Kaldor points out that in the past civilian casualties in war have often been assumed to be a consequence or side-effect of the conflict between combatants. However the prevalence of genocide and ethnic cleansing in contemporary conflict suggests that attacking, terrorising and destroying the civilian population might in fact be the aim of the conflict.\textsuperscript{17}

This comparative definitional debate can be brought up-to-date by considering the ‘new’ war ‘new’ terrorism debate. As I have already alluded to, the ‘new’ war debate\textsuperscript{18} suggests the existence of contemporary conflict that is characterised by no formal declaration of war, no established battle lines, little distinction between combatant and non-combatant, no rules of war or formality and typified by hate, attrition and terror. In recent contemporary conflicts, legitimised by one side at least, such as Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, combatants in uniform were denied the

rights of prisoners of war, and were viewed instead as terrorists suggesting that even with the involvement of structured state armies it is no longer viewed as formal conflict.  

This coincides with the ‘new’ terrorism debate. This debate suggests that terrorism is perpetrated by unidentified amorphous groups, who claim no responsibility for their actions, who intend to kill as many people as possible, predominantly non-combatants and whose blind violence is typified by hate, aggression and anger. High lethality suggests that the intention of new terrorism is synonymous with the intention of conflict, to maximise the number of people killed. Although it is consistent with the orthodox understanding of terrorism that non-combatant individuals are often the targets of terrorist violence, it is perhaps important to question who actually sees them as innocent civilians or non-combatants. The perpetrators of the violence may not consider the targets innocent civilians, as is often the case in conflict. This is certainly characteristic of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and as Rubenstein points out, “attacking unarmed civilians makes perfect sense to nationalists at war.” It is the recipients of the violence whose relative claim to legitimacy and non-recognition of the conflict lead them to employ the traditional terrorism discourse, and try to de-legitimise the violence away from conflict and towards the orthodox understanding of terrorism. This is particularly a state employed discourse, but is also employed by non-state groups.

The question remains how the actors themselves see their acts of violence; as symbolic acts, intended to engender fear, intimidation and terror in a population, as orthodox terrorism theory suggests or simply as acts of violence in a perceived conflict, the asymmetric nature of which forces them to resort to a particular method of violence. Conclusions to this are often contradictory. For example, Some

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19 Many of those captured in Afghanistan and Iraq were designated terrorists and denied prisoner of war rights. However, on transfer to a United States prison camp in Guantanamo Bay Cuba, the ‘prisoners’ were also denied the right to legal representation, which calls into question their position as terrorist ‘criminals.’ The lack of any approach to explain the status of the prisoners, neither as enemy soldiers or terrorist criminals perhaps illustrates the current difficulties in explaining contemporary conflict and terrorism.


21 This ‘innocent’ civilian debate is often linked to the legitimacy debate and a relative inside / outside understanding.

Palestinian actors state that the aim of violence is to “establish a balance of fear.” which is concurrent with orthodox terrorism theory. Others state that it is simply to “fight and defend the homeland,” which is perhaps orthodox conflict theory. This question is also relevant to the relative understanding of the killing of civilians. Buzan argues that the “exclusion of civilians from the definition of the enemy contrasts markedly with the West’s behaviour until recently.” He illustrates this argument with reference to Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Vietnam. In addition, in a translated video interview following the destruction of the world trade centre, Bin Laden states; “We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy who would be killed.” This implies that the study of acts of terrorism and a great deal of terrorism literature is more applicable to the study of conflict. Terrorism, it can be argued, has become a substitute for war as it allows an asymmetric conflict to exist by providing low cost, high yield violence via modern technology and communications that can almost achieve parity with conventional forces. Bowyer Bell argues, “To divide up the war, the campaigns, as military or conspiratorial, protracted popular war or urban terror is to mingle intensity and means, time and opportunity.” Interestingly, all but one of thirty-one major armed conflicts in 1993-95 listed by Schmid and Jongman featured the killing of non-combatant civilians.

Conflict and terrorism studies are both in crisis. This is revealed in the uncertainty of the post-Cold War and September 11th world, and is exacerbated by the globalisation debate and the decay of the dominance of the state as an institution and the rise of the identity and importance of the individual. This is ushering in the possibility of a post and late-Westphalian world order where only by moving away from the rigid state-centric Westphalian system will it be possible to recognise the roots of contemporary conflict, new wars and new terrorism.

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23 Israel regularly condemns Palestinian attacks as terrorism; Hamas also say that Israel uses “terrorist actions against civilians.” Ismail Abu Shanab, Hamas Political Leader, Gaza, 24.03.2003, Interview Transcripts, p.29.
25 Kalyid Aghol, PFLP Leader, Gaza City, 22.03.2004, Interview Transcripts, p.9.
27 Quoted in, Whittaker, *Terrorism*, p.66.
28 Bowyer Bell, *Dynamics*, p.207.
would argue, especially moderate and critical approaches,\textsuperscript{31} have begun to identify change and have initiated the transition to recognising and dealing with conflict outside of the traditional state-centric and realist understanding. The study has moved into employing more sophisticated and comprehensive approaches to deal with this so-called new type of conflict, such as third and fourth generation multi-dimensional approaches, found in conflict resolution and peace-building.\textsuperscript{32} Although these approaches are not yet mainstream they exist in the literature as a critical approach\textsuperscript{33} and focus on the roots of conflict found in human security and the needs of individuals and non-state actors.\textsuperscript{34} Terrorism however, is still locked in the restraints of the moral legitimacy debate and the Cold-War state centric orthodox and positivist understanding.

The aim of this study is to relocate terrorism out of the relative moral quagmire of ‘subjective’ politics and into the realm of conflict where it can be seen simply as an act of violence within a wider context. This will allow the understanding of terrorism to develop alongside changes in contemporary conflict and will provide it with access to a roots debate and the whole spectrum of multi-dimensional techniques available for conflict resolution provided by conflict studies. In the next section I will briefly debate the strengths and weaknesses of the respective theoretical approaches to understanding terrorism and conflict used in Chapters 1 and 2, with the intention of establishing theoretical levels of analysis with which to rethink the roots of terrorism in Part 1 of this Chapter.

\textsuperscript{31} See, Chapter 2, conclusion.
\textsuperscript{32} See, Richmond, \textit{Maintaining Order}, p.12.
\textsuperscript{33} See, Chapter 2.
Terrorism and Conflict: levels of analysis

In the previous chapters on terrorism and conflict I examined how the prominent theories in international relations can be employed to define and understand terrorism and conflict. During the course of this examination I subjected these theoretical frameworks to an epistemological and ontological analytical debate relating to their relative strengths and weaknesses in relation to how and why the particular theoretical approach might be employed. It is my intention in this next section to briefly compare the approaches of each framework and their relative understanding of terrorism and conflict in order to establish levels of analysis with which I can approach and reassess the roots of terrorism.

The first and primary theoretical approach to violence is realism; this is a state-centric based understanding of terrorism and conflict and relates to violence as a threat to the security, legitimacy, authority and monopoly of power of the sovereign state. Together with positivism, realism underwrites orthodox terrorism discourse and understands terrorist violence as a direct challenge to the state from both inside and outside. The natural response and recourse of the state to terrorism is to employ the criminal-legal machinery to deal with what it sees as illegitimate and unlawful violence.\(^{35}\) Realism is a framework that is closely associated with conflict. However, it only recognises terrorism and conflict as emanating from states and does not necessarily understand or recognise non-state conflict or terrorism that is generated by groups or individuals. This is particularly relevant to organisations that are not associated with a particular state, or who exist within or across state boundaries, such as irredentist or separatist movements.\(^{36}\) This view is highly problematic for understanding the manifestation of ‘new terrorism’ and ‘new wars’\(^{37}\) as new terrorism is characterised by nebulous networks of individuals or groups that have little or no


\(^{35}\) See, Chapter 1, *Realism*.

\(^{36}\) Whilst accepting that terrorism and the violent challenge to state authority is from within the state it will not necessarily be seen by the state as anything other than illegitimate and illegal violence. The realist state does not embark on a roots debate with the violence, as this might bestow legitimacy on the terrorists and undermine the state monopoly of power. States also see challenges from within the state as state sponsored terrorism by other rival states; such is the realism of the security dilemma.

\(^{37}\) See Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, and Holsti, *The State*.
direct involvement with states, and new wars do not obey state boundaries or provide formal state armies to engage.

Nevertheless, realism is a political and state based discourse that is widely employed to view the manifestation of terrorism and conflict as emanating from sovereignty, power and security and is invaluable in explaining the influential and pivotal role of the state in the understanding of terrorism.\textsuperscript{38} Examination of the state perspective is vital for explaining and understanding terrorism. To this end I intend to examine the roots of terrorism by employing as my first level of analysis, the level of the state. This will focus on the state centric perspective and provide a thorough investigation of the instrumental role of the state in the generation, maintenance and management of terrorism and conflict.

The next theoretical approach to understanding and defining terrorism and conflict is provided by pluralism. Although this is an approach for understanding violence that is still primarily based on the sovereign state, its focus is on recognition of the importance of non-state actors, world society and human needs. It is also associated with the theory of idealism,\textsuperscript{39} which can help to explain terrorism. This argument suggests that terrorism and conflict is rooted within the institution of the liberal state as a means of achieving freedom and liberty from the margins, especially in relation to self-determination. It can also be recognised and supported as a means of achieving and enforcing rule in a non-liberal state, an argument that is supported by the events of the French Revolution. The existence of the state, formed on the basis of natural rights, actually exists as a cause of terrorism because it represents an expression of the beliefs and value systems that instigators of terrorist violence are attempting to achieve, such as self-determination, nationalism, ethno-nationalism, and de-colonisation.

By employing the pluralist lens it is possible to view the state as an arbitrary monolith whose borders and territory take little or no account of a population whose identity may be socially, economically, ethnically and religiously diverse. A greater understanding can be gained of the violence inherent within a state by considering the role of the non-state actor, not only between different groups and the state, which exists as concerted opposition to their demands, but also between distinctly individual and divergent cultural groups themselves. Pluralism when applied to terrorism and

\textsuperscript{38} See Chapter 1 'Terrorism and the Realist State'.

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conflict studies recognises the needs of non-state actors and locates terrorism in the conflict between the state and non-state actors and also between non-state actors themselves who attempt to revolutionise or reform the state via the functional use of terrorism. It also highlights the individual human needs and deprivation that can trigger violence in the relationship between the state and non-state group. In the light of these useful theoretical approaches, I intend to employ the level of the non-state actor as my next level of analysis for reassessing the roots of terrorism.

A further theoretical approach adopted for the examination of the causes of terrorism and conflict was structuralism. This framework is based on the structural theories used to explain terrorism, such as the influence of political belief systems and ideology, the role and influence of history and culture, and the socio-economic situation. It also includes the processes employed for approaching the causes of conflict incorporating useful structural methods pioneered by peace research techniques, as well as examining the nature of the relationship between the human actor and society. It focuses particularly on conflict behaviour and goal incompatibility and the construction of systemic, situational and cultural conflict structures.

The discourse or lens of structuralism for viewing the causes of terrorism and conflict exposes the structure of the relationship between states, non-state actors and individuals, and within the structure itself. It provides a valuable exploration of the link between society, actor and structure and the occurrence of violence. A reassessment of the roots of terrorism will therefore include an examination of the root causes at the structural level.

The final theoretical approach employed to examine how terrorism and conflict are defined and understood is liberalism. This perspective focuses on the individual and helps explain the role of the individual in the roots of conflict. This is illustrated by the liberal belief in the existence and protection of individual human rights that can be seen as a cause of conflict, not only from inside as individuals struggle to establish their rights, but also from outside in the form of humanitarian intervention. This framework provides an examination of the individual from the perspective of terrorism and opens up areas for investigation, such as the composition

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39 See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 'Pluralism'.
40 See Chapter 1 'Structuralism'.
41 See Chapter 2 'Structuralism'.
of the terrorist mindset and the role of ideology and religion. It also aids investigation of the psychological construction of the individual terrorist and reveals important psychological causational factors. In the study of conflict, liberalism exposes the nature of individual identity by exploring elements such as ethnicity, religion and nationalism. It also considers the importance of particular conflict issues or agenda as well as developing social-psychological routes into the individual and group dynamics. Understanding of the role of the individual is the grass roots approach to explaining terrorism and is a critical area of examination when reassessing the roots of terrorism. This will comprise the final level of my multi-level investigation into the roots of terrorism.

The section above represents a brief overview of the theoretical foundations of the approaches to terrorism and conflict examined in the first two chapters of this study of root causes. It has served to briefly illustrate how the use of particular discourses or theoretical lens can create different perspectives that help to unlock and expose theoretical spaces for investigating the roots of violence. These theoretical perspectives that are created are also linked to different levels for approaching terrorism and conflict. My stated intention has been to investigate the roots of terrorism and conflict through these perspectives in order to demonstrate how useful each approach is in explaining and providing an understanding of the root causes.

However, these perspectives or views of terrorism and conflict are intellectually separate theoretical approaches to international relations and thus are considered mutually exclusive. The above overview therefore clearly illustrates the necessity to break away from the epistemological and ontological restrictions imposed by these theoretical frameworks and instead, step through the different perceptions and combine the benefits of all the theoretical approaches into a single theoretical hybrid and conceptual holistic framework. This should provide a much more comprehensive, multi-level and multi-dimensional explanation and understanding of the roots causes of terrorism.

This step can be achieved because these perspectives naturally correspond to, and form the theoretical foundations for, the basis for the construction of levels of analysis. It is these levels of analysis that I intend to employ in Part 1 to compare and contrast the approaches to explaining the roots of terrorism and conflict, the purpose of which is to establish a theoretical comprehensive multi-level framework for reassessing the root causes of terrorism. The levels of analysis I intend to employ in
Part 1 of this chapter in order to compare the approaches to understanding the root causes of terrorism and conflict, with the intention of constructing a comprehensive approach to terrorism are; State, Non-State Actor, Structural and Individual.

**Part 1**

**Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: a comprehensive approach**

**The State Level**

"States are the creation not of nature but of men."

*Said Bonaparte* 42

The first level of analysis I intend to employ in order to compare terrorism and conflict is the state. This represents the high level, top down, political approach to understanding the phenomenon of terrorism. It is also the most revealing area for investigation into terrorism, as terrorism studies is inextricably linked to the concept of the state. This is clearly shown in orthodox terrorism theory which views terrorism as primarily a threat to the existence of the state. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as, “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government or the civilian population…in the furtherance of political or social objectives.” 43 This is principally due to the fact that the concept of the state is based upon centralised power, 44 which is enshrined in the ideas of sovereignty, 45 and legitimacy, 46 concepts over which the state has a monopoly. From the state perspective the roots of terrorism and the subsequent manifestation of violence lie in the protection and preservation of these

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43 Quoted in Hoffman *Inside Terrorism*, p38.
45 Sovereignty can be defined as the existence of the sole authority of the state over its own population.
46 Legitimacy can be defined as the acceptance and recognition of the authority of the established government by the population.
concepts. By employing this orthodox terrorism discourse, states view terrorism as an illegitimate challenge to their legitimate authority, which can occur from both inside and outside the boundaries of the state.

Terrorism can be ‘internal’ or from within a state (governed population) and directed against the state (governing authority), and ‘external,’ as a threat to the security or political integrity of a state from another state. It can also exist as a state response to perceived internal threats, as it is possible to argue that the state by virtue of its position claims a monopoly on violence. This is enshrined in the social contract and is enforced by what Eugene Walter calls “Regime terror theory.” he sees this as state rule underwritten by violence and fear. This is the principal approach of terrorism studies to the manifestation of terrorist violence and is employed in order to facilitate concerted and established state opposition to challenges to its authority, from both inside and outside state boundaries. Orthodox terrorism studies provide the state with a discourse with which it can approach threats of violence by legitimising its actions against perceived challenges and potential threats to state power. Terrorism discourse justifies the legal and military state policies of counter and anti-terrorism, which are very useful tools for maintaining state control; the state therefore has a vested interest in employing and propagating terrorism discourse.

Orthodox terrorism theory is useful in illuminating how states perceive terrorism and effectively attempt to deal with it. Within orthodox terrorism discourse terrorism is solely viewed as an illegitimate threat to legitimate state power and is the reason for the constant recourse to the legitimacy debate by states. This implies that violence against the state is seen as terrorism where as violence by the state is not. Legitimacy is therefore the central element in the state explanation and understanding of the manifestation of terrorism, both by the state and against it.

The difficulty with employing orthodox terrorism theory in order to understand the manifestation of terrorist violence is that it is not open to a roots

49 Schmid and Jongman recognise this factor and suggest; “those seeking and those holding state power are both involved in a struggle for legitimacy.” Schmid AP Jongman AJ. Political Terrorism. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1998, (2 Ed), p.44.
debate. The established terrorism discourse employed at state political level is a mono-dimensional approach to the understanding of terrorism that sees terrorism as a threat to the state and seeks to deal directly with the symptoms or manifestation of violence by employing the legal and military machinery. This, it can be argued, often increases the level of reactionary violence and exacerbates the original problem that was causing the violence. Terrorism discourse does not suggest the existence of underlying causes or roots of the violence but instead concentrates primarily on legal and military efforts to directly engage and attempt to deal with the appearance of the violence.

The principal reason for the lack of a roots debate in the state level approach to terrorism is due to legitimacy. Arguably the state is incapable of engaging in a roots debate with terrorist actors because if the state admits or accepts that a terrorist challenge has grounds for violent political dissention it is in effect bestowing some form of legitimacy on the terrorist cause. A manoeuvre that is very unlikely given that state action in the form of counter-terrorism is based on the monopoly of legitimacy. It might also inspire other groups to employ terrorism in order to gain legitimacy for their actions. It is more useful for the integrity of the state to ignore any possible roots causes and concentrate instead on condemning violence as an illegal and illegitimate threat to the state and its population, and by employing the forces of state to counteract it. It is unsurprising therefore that terrorism is often defined by the state as “the systematic use of murder and destruction to terrorise individuals, groups, communities and governments into conceding to terrorists’ demands.” This type of judgemental language facilitates a forceful state response and makes no reference to the roots of the violence or any possible justification that the actors might claim to legitimise their actions. Orthodox terrorism discourse seeks to engage but at the same time monopolise the legitimacy debate for its own purpose, which is to maintain the political and socio-economic status quo.

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50 Jenkins argues that “terrorism is seen as a means to an end,” which is violence for gaining state power. opposition to this is state violence, the deeper causes or roots are not examined. Jenkins BM. in Kegley JR. International Terrorism, London: Macmillan, 1990, p.102.
52 It can be argued that terrorism discourse is employed to understand terrorist violence as an illegal and unlawful challenge when directly related to the Liberal Democratic state, which in theory gives everyone the opportunity to for political expression without the recourse to violence see Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.38. However, Cruise O’Brien argues that even in a democracy a small group will be outvoted and therefore have no participation or representation and thus lose the option of peaceful channels. Cruise O’Brien C. Terrorism under Democratic conditions: the case of
Orthodox terrorism studies at state level is trapped by the constraining nature of the legitimacy debate, which is characterised by law enforcement and military methods of approach that fail to investigate the deeper root causes of violence. This is an identifiable gap within terrorism studies, but one that can be complemented by the approach of conflict studies, which if employed will allow terrorism studies to move away from the stale legitimacy debate and into a more useful and sophisticated understanding of terrorism. Conflict studies are a useful complement to the state level of analysis because some of its approaches question the nature and role of the state in the generation of violence, a debate which terrorism theory fails to engage.  

In comparison to the one-sided nature of the approach of terrorism studies to the manifestation of violence, conflict theory if applied to terrorism will look at the state as a cause of violence. Many conflict theories when applied at state level consider violence to be synonymous with the state and inherent in its existence, as it is an expected condition with other states and within the state itself, this is illustrated by the security dilemma. This approach however, is not without difficulties as it suggests that terrorism and violence are so ingrained in the state that the only way to approach and deal with terrorism and conflict on a long-term solution basis is to reevaluate the role of the state and even suggest a completely alternative form of state and international system. This is a controversial argument, given the primacy and dominance of the state and some aspects of the modern form of governance. The principal advantage with applying conflict approaches to the manifestation of terrorism is that the state is examined as a root cause of violence. This is a principal gap that exists in orthodox terrorism studies at the state level, so by critically

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the IRA, in Crenshaw, Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power, p.93. Furthermore Terrorism in nondemocratic states can seem be a justified struggle for liberal democratic rights and freedoms see Chapter 1, Terrorism, Or as Tyrannicide, see, Laqueur, New Terrorism, p.9. 

55 Orthodox terrorism theory does explain state-sponsored terrorism as international terrorism sponsored by donor states. However only a few countries are actually listed and others are briefly mentioned for ‘supporting’ terrorist activity. Therefore the actual role of the state in the generation of terrorism is not directly questioned as a root cause. See, Wilkinson P. Terrorism Versus Democracy. London: Frank Cass, 2000, p.62. 

54 See, Chapter 1, Realist Conflict. 

53 It is worthy of note however that not all conflicts result from the security dilemma as Timothy Dunne points out that historically more conflicts have been caused by predator states. See Dunne T, ‘Realism,’ in Baylis and Smith, Globalisation, p.124. 

50 Richmond argues for reform of the international system as it is failing to provide the tools to resolve conflict because it is constructed by state-centric actors in a predominantly state-centric environment. Richmond OP, ‘Ethnic Security in the International System,’ Journal of International Relations and Development. March, 2000, p.41.
examining the role of the state in the generation of terrorism. It is possible to open a
roots of terrorism debate within the state.

The main implication of employing this hybrid approach of terrorism and conflict studies for reassessing the roots of terrorism is that a number of new approaches to understanding terrorism can be made in the space created. The first is based upon an examination of responses the state employs to deal with terrorism. By utilising the approach of conflict studies, it is possible to suggest that the state has a primary role in the generation of terrorism due to the response it adopts. Terrorism is part of the natural condition of the state as it is generated, paradoxically, as state terrorism in response to the threat of terrorism. It is used essentially to create order and maintain political power. For example, if states counter the threat of terrorism with the military and legal apparatus of counter terrorism, it can be seen as not only a means of dealing with terrorism but also a method that helps to strengthen and consolidate the power of the state, (although this approach can also generate terrorism in response).\(^{57}\) The implication of adopting this argument for the roots of terrorism suggests the existence of *Inherent Terrorism* within the state, implying that terrorism it is not only endemic but also vital for the existence of the state and is an engineered commodity that is propagated by orthodox terrorism discourse.

This has a useful application for reassessing the roots of terrorism because it locates the cause of terrorism firmly within the state. Through this perspective, the roots of terrorism can exist in the conflict against the state (both inside and outside state boundaries) and also by the state, not only as state terrorism or anti-terrorism in response to actual threats but also as pre-emptive measures. In addition, it can also be generated by the state to counter perceived external threats (counter-terrorism) or project foreign policy objectives (state sponsored terrorism). Incidentally, all these types of terrorism generated by the state help to reinforce state power.

Orthodox terrorism and conflict studies have definite parallels at the state level. Conflict can be used by the state to bolster its political position and employ legitimate military means against opponents, which is similar to the argument that terrorism is employed by the state as a means not only to maintain control within

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\(^{57}\) Orthodox terrorism theory suggests that the intention of the terrorists is to incite or provoke a violent or repressive state response intended to deprive the government of legitimacy and radicalise the masses. See Rubenstein, *Alchemists of Revolution* p.161. Wilkinson argues that State responses to terrorism should be kept within the criminal justice model to maintain the rule of law. Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy*. p.125.
its own borders but also to affect some form of foreign policy under legitimate counter-terrorism. Conflict and terrorism are state orientated tools and focus on the political implications of violence by concentrating on state power and the challenges to it from within the state and by other states. Paradoxically, it is also the main response of the state to the threat of conflict and terrorism. The state can be regarded as a cause of terrorism, not only because it employs terrorism to counter terrorism but also as a method to maintain state power, both inside and outside state boundaries. The identification of this type of state generated terrorism can be established by investigating state responses to internal and external terrorism demonstrating that the state can be centrally located in the roots of terrorism debate.

By examining the state approach to terrorists it is possible to argue that orthodox terrorism discourse can be employed by the state in order to pursue a hidden agenda or policy of secondary gain or devious terrorism against opponents of the state. By employing orthodox terrorism theory and suggesting that political opponents have illegitimate designs on state power the forces of state are able to employ a ‘free hand’ and legitimately pursue an agenda to eradicate state opposition, regardless of whether they are actually the cause of the terrorism. This is possible because terrorism discourse allows the state the domination of legitimacy and under the social contract, the monopoly of violence. Thus, states are able to pursue policies of terrorism (counter-terrorism) against their opponents both inside and outside state boundaries because of the legitimacy bestowed on them by terror. Therefore by examining how a state approaches actual terrorists it is possible to demonstrate how instrumental the state is in propagating the manifestation of devious terrorism. For example, it is unusual for a state to suggest a roots debate when dealing with a terrorist as this might erode their legitimacy. Instead the state can tackle the terrorists using the legal and military framework provided by terrorism discourse. This implies that the state can in fact pursue a policy of secondary gain to eradicate and neutralise any threat to the state with whatever means are available.\textsuperscript{58}

This employment of a recognised understanding of terrorism by states in order to tackle political dissention within its borders is becoming increasingly apparent in many countries after the declared ‘war on terrorism,’ which effectively legitimised

\textsuperscript{58} Wilkinson argues that policies of counter and anti-terrorism should obey Liberal Democratic rights and freedoms otherwise they are self-defeating and undermine the system they are being employed to protect. Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.117.
state violence against ‘terrorists.’ Devious terrorism, is perhaps most apparent in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, where legitimised state violence is extensively employed inside and outside established state borders. Also, the current ‘war on terrorism’ is legitimised by orthodox terrorism discourse and facilitates violent action against opponents of the state in Indonesia (against Jemaah Islamiyah), in the Philippines (against the Abu Sayyaf), and in Russia (against the Chechens). It is also possible to suggest that many states are free riding the terrorist discourse of al Qaeda in order to allow states to employ devious terrorism against their own indigenous terrorist groups. This is again illustrated by Israel’s use of pre-emptive assassinations against Hamas, which they justify as the ‘war on terror.’

It is also apparent that in state polices of counter terrorism, human and individual rights and freedoms are often sacrificed in the fight against terrorism. This suggests that if a state employs an approach to terrorists that is terrorist in its nature, the state can be firmly located in the root causes of terrorism.

The third and final area of examination that becomes apparent when conflict theories are applied to the state in an attempt to re-asses the roots of terrorism is located in how the state approaches terrorism. This is linked to the last two areas discussed above, those of the state response to terrorism and the state approach to terrorists. The existence of a terrorist threat is useful for the state as it helps bolster its political standing and bestows on it extra political powers over and above those existing in the social contract. For example, terrorist situations often see the introduction of emergency powers that give the state authority to pursue the threat using methods that might ordinarily undermine the basic individual human rights and freedoms. The threat of terrorism in a state has a similar effect to a state in conflict; it makes it more cohesive and powerful, implying that states can employ terrorism discourse in order to pursue a policy of terrorism management. This is a controversial argument and suggests that the state does not employ a roots debate with the intention of facilitating terrorism resolution, as this would loosen the state grip on political power. Instead the state aims to propagate terrorism and manage it in order to maintain tight political control of the population. By examining how the state actually

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59 The Economist, August 23rd 2003.
60 The Economist September 13th and December 6th 2003. Wilkinson argues that the introduction of emergency powers should be accompanied by a number of safeguards to ensure the maintenance of civil liberties. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, p.117.
approaches terrorism and what methods it adopts to deal with it, it is possible to ascertain the role of the state in the root causes of terrorism.

It is evident that the current approach to understanding terrorism adopted by the state and enshrined in orthodox terrorism discourse is beneficial to the state as it fails to question the role of the state in the generation of terrorism. It also bestows absolute legitimacy on the state to justify its actions against a terrorist threat regardless of the reasons or root causes. The application of conflict theories questions the role of the state and in particular the response and approach of the state to terrorism and terrorists. Conflict studies identifies and locates the roots of terrorism in the institutions of state, particularly in the relationship between the state (governing authority) and the governed population, and the state and other states. This produces a number of important implications for the understanding of the roots of terrorism, and suggests the existence within the state of inherent, devious and management terrorism.

The Non-State Actor level

"The condemned social order has not been built up on paper and ink and a combination of paper and ink will never put an end to it."

Joseph Conrad The Secret Agent 61

The next level of analysis for approaching the roots of terrorism is the non-state actor level. This is an approach that moves the focus of the roots debate away from the centrality of the state, although not completely, and onto the role of the non-state actor. As I discussed above, orthodox terrorism discourse locates the cause of terrorism in the violent challenge or threat to the state, which it sees as originating from within the state itself or from another state. The non-state actor level however is an approach that allows recognition of the non-state actor as a terrorist player

independent of the state.\textsuperscript{62} This level of analysis has become increasingly important in the contemporary world, particularly since the end of the Cold War, where the perceived role of the non-state actor in the generation of political violence has greatly increased. Hoffman proposes theories associated with the Grey Area Phenomenon\textsuperscript{63} to suggest that terrorism can be located in “threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organisations.”\textsuperscript{64} Orthodox terrorism theory positions the roots of terrorism in the interaction or relationship between the state and the non-state group (although the non-state group is not seen as a separate from state entity). Without question, the state represents an obstacle to the ambitions of the non-state group and is a major determinant of armed struggle.\textsuperscript{65} This is supported by Wilkinson, who differentiates between state and factional terror, but focuses on the challenge of non-state groups employing terrorism against the liberal democratic state.\textsuperscript{66}

The emphasis of the orthodox terrorism discourse is solely based upon the threat of a non-state group to the state. This is illustrated by the majority of orthodox definitions of terrorism, which seek to reinforce this positivist understanding and are comprised of similar elements that suggest the purpose of terrorism is to influence a political situation by threats, intimidation and coercion. The United States Department of Defence definition is “the unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”\textsuperscript{67} This suggests that the power seekers target the power holders, who are predominantly represented by the state. Although more moderate approaches in terrorism studies point to the attempt of terrorism to influence political communities or behaviour, such as Crenshaw, who suggests “terrorism is the deliberate and systematic use or threat of violence to coerce changes in political behaviour,”\textsuperscript{68} the ramifications of this reflect again on the holders of political power.

Whilst it is valuable to consider the political causes of terrorism, the understanding of the roots of terrorism needs to move beyond the constraints of a

\textsuperscript{62} States using orthodox terrorism theory and the positivist approach see terrorism as always originating from another state and consequentially fail to understand terrorism from non-state actors.


\textsuperscript{64} Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.28.


\textsuperscript{66} Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.13.

\textsuperscript{67} Quoted in Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.38.

purely political approach in order to facilitate a wider and more advanced understanding. The problem with the orthodox understanding of terrorism, as I argued above, is its political orientation: it is excessively represented as a contentious struggle for political power, to the detriment of considering any other causes. Despite the ability of orthodox terrorism studies to locate terrorism in the conflict generated by the dynamics of intrastate interaction and the relationships between non-state groups, it takes little or no account of any other reasons why the violence might occur other than the pursuit of political power. This detracts not only from identifying the individual motivations of groups and from consideration of the political and socio-economic situation which might be something other than a direct challenge to political authority, but also from the advantages of a wider roots debate, which might help to understand the deeper underlying causes of the violence.

This gap in the understanding of terrorism can be filled by applying social conflict theories contained in conflict studies. Jabri argues that although conflict manifests itself in the political, it has its roots in the relationship between self and society; it is therefore a social condition and needs to be located in the realm of social conflict.\textsuperscript{69} The application of social conflict theory\textsuperscript{70} is a very useful tool in understanding why terrorist violence and conflict occurs. For example, if applied to terrorism studies, it can be employed to suggest that terrorism has a constructive purpose and a political and social utility. This is supported by the conflict theories contained in functionalism,\textsuperscript{71} instrumentalism\textsuperscript{72} and constructivism.\textsuperscript{73} All of which argue that violence can have a purpose, such as acting as a catalyst for necessary and positive social change, or forming a channel through which to express and alleviate political, social and economic inequality. The implications of this approach for the roots of terrorism suggest that the causes of the violence can be located in political, social and economic grievances. Therefore by questioning the nature of the social order and the broad economic, social and political perspectives and by analysing the

\textsuperscript{69} Jabri V, \textit{Discourses on Violence}, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996, p.3, also see chapter 2, pluralism for a critique of conflict theory.


\textsuperscript{71} Coser sees conflict as one of the few basic forms of human interaction and suggests it can act as a safety value within society Coser L A, \textit{The Functions of Social Conflict}, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1968. See chapter 2, pluralism, for a critique of functional theories.

function of the violence it may prove possible, as Vayryen argues, to provide the key to understanding the cause of the violence.\textsuperscript{74}

The above argument suggests that conflict is a function inherent in society and can be located in all social relationships. The key to understanding terrorism according to social conflict theory is to investigate the function of terrorism within the established social order. This might help to explain the character and intentions of the actors and the nature of goals they seek. Terrorism, viewed through the prism of functionalism is the demand for social change located in the interaction between actors in society. As Jabri suggests "violent conflict comes from agency and structure. human action as a product of human decisions within the context of social relations."\textsuperscript{75} The approaches of social conflict theory effectively provide space in which it is possible to re-examine terrorism and project the potential cause of the violence outside the political realm and into a social spectrum.

There are a number of assumptions associated with applying the conflict theory discourse to the roots of terrorism debate. For example, by investigating the function of the terrorism the assumption is made that the terrorism has a purpose; this presupposes the existence of a social grievance or perceived injustice within the non-state actor that perpetrates the violence. It also suggests that if terrorism exists in the relationship between actors seeking change in society then it is an inherent part of society. But according to Vayryen, "society is like conflict; dynamic and in constant change."\textsuperscript{76} Furthermore, by examining the function of the terrorism, it is possible to establish if the violence is intended to destroy the existing framework of society or merely reform it. As Burton suggests, the two possible intentions of functional violence are either rebellion or revolt within the values of a coordinated social system, where rebellion implies reform and revolution, the destruction of the existing socio-political fabric.\textsuperscript{77} By implication therefore it is possible to identify the existence in functional social conflict of either Revolutionary Terrorism or Reactionary Terrorism, which have an agenda for either destroying or reforming the existing social system.

\textsuperscript{74} Vayryen, New Directions, p.1.
\textsuperscript{75} Jabri, Discourses, p.4.
\textsuperscript{76} Vayryen, New Directions, p.4.
\textsuperscript{77} Burton J, Deviance Terrorism and War. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1979, p44.
A further conflict theory that can be used to bridge the gap between terrorism and conflict studies in the space created for reassessing the roots of terrorism in regard to the non-state actor is human needs theory. This theory is a further attempt to move away from the political and relocate the roots of terrorism in the socio-economic framework of society. Human needs theory suggests the existence of a set of socio-biological human needs that require satisfaction on a hierarchical basis, if these needs remain unfulfilled the actors will resort to violence. Burton suggests, “If attempts are made to subordinate individual values to social values because it is not possible to enforce social values that are inconsistent to human needs, the response will be damaging both to the individual and the social system.”

The advantage with human needs theory in its application to understanding the roots of terrorism is that it illuminates the relationship between the individual (or the particular non-state group) and society. Individual needs are pursued within the confines of a value system or society, if these needs become frustrated, methods such as violence are employed that are outside the established norms. It also concentrates attention on the needs and values of the individuals who make up different communities and organisations within society and questions their individual aspirations and their subsequent relationship with society. Human needs theory has featured in a number of useful approaches for understanding conflict by providing a focus on the nexus between the individual and society in the roots of conflict debate. For example Azar suggests, “grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively and thus failure to redress these grievances by the authorities cultivates a niche for protracted social conflict.”

The application of human needs discourse to the gap identified in roots of terrorism debate, provides a useful way to unlock the stale political contest and provide a route into the causes of terrorism that can be located in the non-state group. The implications for reassessing the roots of terrorism by applying this theory are

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78 Burton, Deviance, p.44. See chapter 2, pluralism, for a critique of human needs theory.
80 Burton, Deviance, p.83.
81 For example, Azar constructed a comprehensive multi-level framework for investigating the roots of what he termed Protracted Social Conflict (PSC); one of these levels contained an examination of human needs. Azar, Protracted Social Conflict.
82 Azar, Protracted Social Conflict, p.9. Also see chapter 2.
revealing. They suggest that the manifestation of terrorist violence implies that individual needs are in some way frustrated, thus society can no longer satisfy these needs and the established norms of society have been transcended. By employing the basic safety needs identified by Azar and applying them to a terrorist non-state actor it is possible to suggest a possible correlation between these needs and the manifestation of terrorism. This implies that if the suggested safety needs of individual non-state actors are unsatisfied they might generate grievance terrorism which requires inclusion and consideration in the roots of terrorism debate.

A further social conflict theory that can provide an alternative for reassessing the roots of terrorism is the theory of relative deprivation. This discourse complements human needs theory and suggests that violence develops in society between groups or individuals who perceive a relative imbalance; politically, economically (and) or socially between what they should have and what they actually have. This theory is useful because it focuses attention on the perceived differences in the status of non-state actors suggesting that if the actor feels deprivation in relation to society as a whole or another actor then this is a cause of conflict. Gurr suggests, “Conflict is a condition in which the source of the discrepancy between value expectation and capabilities is another group competing for the same values.” The theory of relative deprivation can also be applied to terrorism in an attempt to fill the gap produced by the lack of explanation of the socio-economic roots causes of the political violence. The implications for explaining terrorism by using the relative deprivation discourse are such that the manifestation of terrorism can be attributed to some form of disparity between actors in society, because where human needs are subjective to the individual deprivation is a perceived situation relative to others. This suggests that the cause of terrorism could be located in the relative perceptions of the belligerent actors to each other and society in general, thus existing as deprivation terrorism. This is illustrated by Gurr who suggests, “The potential for political violence is a function of the degree to which such discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents.”

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83 The basic safety needs used by Azar in identifying Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) are security, identity, representation and equality. Azar, Protracted Social Conflict, p.5.
85 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p.42.
86 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, p.8.
The roots of terrorism at the non-state actor level, according to orthodox terrorism studies, are located in the political, thus a gap in the understanding of the roots of terrorism exists within the socio-economic realm. This can be bridged by conflict studies; in particular by the application of social conflict theory, which includes functional, human needs and relative deprivation discourses. All of which provide a number of enlightening and useful approaches to reassessing the roots of terrorism by relocating them in the socio-economic sphere. It is perhaps important to point out here that this study is also a critique of orthodox terrorism theory and whilst some of these approaches, particularly relative deprivation, appear in terrorism studies, albeit as moderate terrorism theory they are not adopted by the mainstream orthodox approach. This is primarily because they are incompatible with the relative legitimacy debate upon which orthodox terrorism theory is based. Wilkinson dismisses them by arguing that theories of frustration and aggression and relative deprivation are too general and cannot explain why some groups in similar conditions become violent and others do not.

Although it is very important not to completely discount the influence of politics on the generation of terrorism, it is helpful, as I have illustrated above, to widen the debate and relocate conventional terrorism theory into the realm of social conflict. This will allow identification of possible causes of violence that exist in the relationship between actors in society. This is echoed by Jabri who concludes, "conflict is a social phenomenon involving governments, communities and individuals." The implications that exist for understanding terrorism by applying conflict theories highlight the roots of terrorism as existing in the nature of the socio-economic relationship between individuals, groups and communities within society and imply alternative root sources of terrorism, these are functional (revolutionary / reactionary), grievance and deprivation terrorism.

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87 See Chapter 1.
88 Wilkinson, Liberal State, p.96.
89 Jabri, Discourses, p.174.
The Structural level

"Colonialism is violence in its natural state... and will only yield when confronted with greater violence."
Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. 90

This section represents an examination of the roots of terrorism at the structural level of analysis in this multi-level study. The structural approach complements the last two levels and seeks to explore the nature of the relationship between the actor (state / non-state) and the structure, a link identified by Jabri as influential in the causes of conflict. 91 Orthodox terrorism discourse locates the structural roots of terrorism firmly in the political sphere, often in the guise of ideology, and associates the structural roots of terrorism as existing as a violent reaction to an oppressive political system or situation. Terrorist theorist-practitioners such as Mao 92, Guevara and Marighella 93 recommended employing terrorist violence to overthrow repressive regimes and gain independence or freedom. This ideology has its roots in the work of Marx 94 and the struggle between the oppressed and the oppressor. Unsurprisingly Marxism has featured heavily in the political ideology of many terrorist groups. 95 This theme of violence in response to political oppression was also continued by Sorel, 96 Fanon, 97 Sartre 98 and Camus, 99 all of whom provided an attractive justification for the use of terrorism to overthrow an oppressive political system and gain personal freedom. Fanon suggested, "the last shall be the first only after a murderous and decisive struggle." 100 These writers however are not entertained by orthodox terrorism theory and can be classed in terrorism studies as

90 Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p.48.
91 Jabri, Discourses, p.4.
95 Wilkinson points out that almost without exception leaders of insurgent groups have espoused ideologies of Marxist revolutionism, such as the IRA, ETA, PFLP, DFLP and FLNC. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, p.28.
96 Sorel argued that the function of violence was as a weapon of the proletariat and should be used as the supreme act of resistance. Sorel G, Reflections on Violence, New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1969.
97 Fanon argued using the example of Algeria that colonised 'man' is repressed by the coloniser and that only through violence could freedom from oppression be achieved, Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.52.
98 Sartre JP, Critique de la raison dialectique, and Introduction to Fanon, Wretched of the Earth.
100 Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p.27.
radical terrorism theory. For example, Wilkinson dismisses and heavily criticises Fanon, Sartre and other ‘situationalists’ for having a great significance in the development of terrorist thought and for glorifying violence and terror as an end in themselves. Sartre, he suggests, “created a positive ideology of terror.”

Although terrorism discourse is useful in explaining the influence of the political structural causes of terrorism, it does not often venture any further and fails to provide sufficient analysis of any other potential structural causes. Areas that lack consideration in orthodox theory are the possible structural influences inherent in society, history, culture and socio-economics. Although routes into these areas have begun under moderate terrorism discourse, they are far from extensive and still display a large void in comparison to the approaches provided by conflict studies.

This gap in the understanding of terrorism can therefore be bridged by conflict studies, which provides a number of useful approaches for investigating the structural causes of conflict. The first example of this is an examination of the historical and cultural context of conflict. This is provided by structural conflict theory, which identifies causes of conflict that are based on the culture and history of a region and the possibility of the existence of a culture of violence. Both Fanon and Sartre argue for the endemic existence of violence as an omnipotent structural force in society, one that is the cohesion to all social and political relationships and gives meaning and purpose to political action. Fanon uses the colonial relationship between native and settler to suggest that violence is an inherent part of the culture. This permanent structural undercurrent of violence represented by a spiral of violence and counter violence can also be exacerbated by the historical and cultural context. Bowyer Bell describes this as an “arena” or “ecosystem,” in which “violence is generated due to history, culture, vulnerability and possibility.” This implies that violence can be generated and prolonged by the continuity provided by historical and

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101 See, Chapter 1, conclusion.
102 See, Wilkinson, Liberal State.
103 Wilkinson, Liberal State, p.76.
104 Crenshaw argues that “Terrorism as a general phenomenon cannot be adequately explained without situating it in its particular social, political and economic context” Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, p.1.
105 See, chapter 2., structuralism.
106 Fanon, Wretched of the Earth.
107 See, the Introduction written by Sartre, to Fanon, Wretched of the Earth.
108 Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p.41.
cultural memory,\textsuperscript{110} which suggests that some regions are more historically and culturally conducive to the generation of terrorism and conflict than others. Conflict studies employs the techniques provided by cultural analysis\textsuperscript{111} to approach this question, which although established on a number of assumptions,\textsuperscript{112} suggests that an analysis of the cultural influences inherent in a particular society can reveal how much influence they have on the manifestation of violence. This implies that the particular history and culture of a region enshrined in a society might exist as the primary cause of conflict and terrorism. This is an area of particular relevance to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and will be discussed at length in Chapter 5.

Establishing a culture of violence debate as a structural cause of terrorism and employing cultural analysis as a tool for examining societies in conflict, draws attention away from the political debate and into an investigation of cultural and historical influences, which can be very powerful in the generation of terrorism and the natural recourse to violence. The implications for using this approach to understand the roots of terrorism is to suggest that the manifestation of terrorism presupposes the existence of structural historical and cultural influences for the use of violence in the form of a cultural terrorism. Any investigation into the causes of terrorism in a particular region therefore requires the careful examination of the cultural and historical influences of violence in order to understand the roots of terrorism.

A further structural cause of conflict is systemic. This relates to the relationship and interaction of the actors with one another and is characterised by actor behaviour which creates the apparent system when viewed from the 'outside',\textsuperscript{113} such as the interaction of states with one another and the creation of a perceived international system.\textsuperscript{114} The perceived conflict system created by actor relationships is


\textsuperscript{111} Cultural analysis suggests that culture equates to the social environment and suggests a framework that assesses common behaviour, attitudes, relations and boundaries, relationships, decision-making groups and established time periods. It is however based on large generalisations and assumptions and could be accused of stereotyping. See, Mead M, Metraux R, 'Anthropology of Human Conflict,' in McNeil E B, The Nature of Human Conflict, Cliffs NJ: Prenticehall, 1965. Also see chapter 2, for a critique of cultural analysis.

\textsuperscript{112} See chapter 2 for a critique of cultural analysis.

\textsuperscript{113} The behaviour of actors is often assumed to correlate into the existence of a system when viewed from outside and in relation to a particular philosophical claim. See, Walker, Inside / Outside, p.17.

\textsuperscript{114} The international system however is open to debate as it depends on which paradigm is employed as to which international system is seen. For example realism equates to a international system of anarchy.
a structure that can exist as a potential root cause of conflict and terrorism. An examination of the actors in conflict from ‘outside’ is provided in conflict studies by the study of ‘conflict behaviour’, so by investigating how the actors relate to each other, the nature of the system and the structure of the causes of conflict can be investigated. The implications of this approach for the roots of terrorism debate suggest that by adopting an ‘objective’ examination of the behaviour of the actors involved it is possible to develop an understanding of the structural nature of the system in which terrorism is being generated. The difficulty with this approach however is that the interpretation of the behaviour of the actors depends upon which ontological framework or discourse is adopted to understand the actions, as by this rationale it is not possible to have an ‘objective’ view. As Walker points out “attempts to think otherwise about political possibilities are constrained by categories and assumptions that contemporary political analysis is encouraged to take for granted.”

This argument is illustrated by the problems inherent in the methodology of positivism and suggests that although the roots of terrorism can be attributed to the interpreted behaviour of actors and the assumed system in which they operate, it is perhaps important to be aware of the theoretical framework that is used to interpret the behaviour of terrorist actors. Nevertheless, this approach means that it is the observed behaviour of the actors that creates the system in which the roots of terrorism are located, and if this is the case, it suggests the existence of systemic terrorism.

A complementary approach to understanding the generation of the ‘outside’ causes of terrorism is an examination of the ‘inside’ structural causes and is facilitated by an examination of the situation or the subjective understanding of the causes of terrorism by investigating the terrorist view of the conflict. In this approach, provided by conflict studies, structural influences are examined from the point of view of the actor and how their perception of the system or structure of the conflict influences both their actions and ultimately the roots of terrorism. Mitchell argues that

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where as pluralism might suggest one based on international society; both might have different structural influences. See, Baylis and Smith, Globalisation.


116 This is identified by Galtung in his conflict triangle, see, Galtung J. Peace by Peaceful Means, Oslo: Sage Publications, 1996, p.72.

117 Walker, Inside / Outside, p.5.

118 Walker, Inside / Outside.
conflict situations develop due to “mutually incompatible goals that are mis-matched against social values and structures.”

This implies that actors perceive the existence of a conflict occurring between the attainment of their goals and the opposing incompatible nature of the system that cannot accommodate these aims. By applying a further part of Galtung’s conflict triangle, “contradiction,” which he sees as the “conflict situation,” and defines it as “the actual or perceived incompatibility between actors,” it is possible to investigate the conflict structure from the inside. This approach examines the relative and subjective understanding of the conflict as a perceived situation that is created by the interaction of the actors’ goals or aims and the perceived existing structure of the system. This it can be argued can create the structural reasons for conflict and terrorism that can exist as situational terrorism.

The problem with this approach is that the conflict can become a subjective reality for the actor, as both the goal incompatibility and the nature of the incumbent ‘system’ are perceived. The conflict may be unintelligible to those outside the society or to those employing a different theoretical perception; this is identified by della Porta who suggests the existence of a “social construction of reality.” She argues that terrorism cannot be understood unless the interaction is taken into account between the structural conditions and the subjective reality. This argument is also endorsed by Wardlaw and Bowyer Bell. However, it is a useful conflict approach to apply to terrorism studies as it advocates an examination of the terrorist’s view of the conflict and therefore intends to establish the cause of the violence directly from the actor. This will help to explain the perceived structural causes of terrorism, as it will cast light on both the nature of the perceived goal incompatibility and the structure of the perceived system. Examination of this area is vital if a route is to be established for understanding the root causes of terrorism.

The final area of investigation into structural issues is an examination of the socio-economic environment or socialisation. This is an attempt to investigate the structural causes of conflict from a socio-economic perspective and is an examination

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120 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, p.72.
122 Wardlaw suggests that social reality is situationally dependant and related to a subjective understanding. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p.5.
123 Bowyer Bell argues that the terrorists creates a subjective truth established around a faith in the attainment of the goal or dream, this faith is a reality for group members but is difficult for outsiders to understand. Bowyer Bell J, The Dynamics of Armed Struggle, London: Frank Cass, 1998.
of the relationship between the actor and the socio-economic environment. Terrorism studies, particularly the moderate approaches, have suggested socio-economic factors that can potentially contribute to the manifestation of violence, such as social dislocation, urbanisation, modernisation, immigration, unemployment and poverty.\textsuperscript{124} Although some of these factors also relate to the satisfaction of human needs discussed above, establishing human needs or relative deprivation as a cause of terrorism implies that the actors are perhaps aware of the socio-economic disparity and therefore identify it as unsatisfied needs or social inequality. By investigating socio-economics as a structural cause of terrorism, the assumption is made that the actors are affected by the system or structure but are perhaps unaware of the forces acting on them. An examination of the structural environment should help to identify deep-seated and underlying socialisation issues that generate long-standing conflicts and acts of terrorism, such as institutionalised socio-economic discrimination and inequality.

By applying some of the approaches provided by conflict studies it is possible to explore the structural influence of socio-economics on the causes of violence. As Azar suggests protracted social conflict is rooted in socio-economic depravity and underdevelopment.\textsuperscript{125} In addition Maill et al suggest that there is a direct correlation between absolute levels of underdevelopment and violent conflict.\textsuperscript{126} Also, economics in the form of a weak economy, poor resource base and relative deprivation can be cited as a direct cause of conflict.\textsuperscript{127} The implications of this for understanding the roots of terrorism suggest that by examining the nature of the socio-economic environment it is possible to claim the existence of socio-economic terrorism.

However, there are problems with this approach, as the link between terrorism and low socio-economics is not continually proven. Krueger and Maleckova suggest that any direct connection between poverty and terrorism is probably weak and they attribute the cause to political conditions.\textsuperscript{128} There are also a number of examples of

\textsuperscript{125} Azar, Protracted Social Conflict, p.16.
\textsuperscript{126} A survey found that major armed conflict was more likely in countries low down on the UN development programme and UNDP Human development Index Jongman A, Schmid A. Contemporary Armed Conflicts, quoted in Miall et al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, p.86.
\textsuperscript{127} Miall et al, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, p.77.
\textsuperscript{128} Krueger and Maleckova, 'Does poverty cause terrorism?' p.27.
manifestations of terrorism that have appeared in developed first world. But whilst this does not repudiate the theory it is possible to argue that socio-economic depravity can exist for a particular group regardless of the socio-economic condition of the host state. This debate will be examined further in Chapter 5, in relation to the case study example of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Orthodox terrorism discourse at the structural level is predominantly located in the political. This is complemented by the application of some chosen theories from conflict studies that lead the roots of terrorism debate into the realm of political and socio-economic structure. This helps to provide an explanation of the roots of terrorism in relation to the historical and cultural context, as cultural terrorism. Also the nature of the system, viewed from ‘outside’ and generated by the behaviour of the actors, is systemic terrorism. Complementing this is an examination of the conflict situation, which focuses on the terrorist view of the conflict and explores the perceived understanding held by the actors of each other and the incumbent system. This yields an ‘inside’ view of the roots of terrorism, which it can be argued, produces situational terrorism. Lastly, an investigation is provided into the environment in order to establish if socio-economic structural forces are generating terrorism, as socio-economic terrorism.

The Individual Level

"Warfare's finality lies in the work of the hands"

Homer, The Iliad

The individual level is the final level of analysis in this examination of the roots of terrorism. This approach seeks to investigate and ultimately locate the role of the human individual in the generation of terrorism because "War is a consequence of

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129 Examples of European terrorist groups such as the IRA, ETA, RAF, and RB are not considered by orthodox terrorism theory as the result of economic underdevelopment.

human actions and human decisions.\textsuperscript{131} Although moderate terrorism studies develops an investigation into the individual human causes of terrorism\textsuperscript{132} it is predominantly concerned with explaining the political role of the individual. Bowyer Bell suggests that the ideological motivation of the individual is a useful way to understand the cause of terrorism. He argues that all terrorists have an ideology of action that is encompassed in what he calls “the dream” which is the root of the ideological motivation and is the source of the perceived legitimacy of the political claim and justification for the use of violence.\textsuperscript{133} This is a useful approach as it allows for a direct examination of the ideological motivation or belief system and ideas of the individual terrorist.

Whilst this ideology or mindset might identifiably exist as the individual or group political motivation and can be seen as the cause of terrorism, it is possible to argue that investigation into the roots of terrorism requires an examination of further motivations in order to establish if there are other deeper socio-economic or structural forces that create the necessity for the generation of a political ideology of action. Orthodox terrorism studies focus on the political ideology of individual terrorists, such as religion,\textsuperscript{134} which is often portrayed as the sole cause and in some cases a substitute for political ideology.\textsuperscript{135} The problem with the approach of orthodox terrorism theory is that it concentrates on the political dimension of religion and fails to investigate other possible areas that might prove to be an underlying cause of terrorism.\textsuperscript{136} Although it is important to consider the importance of religion as a cause of terrorism it does provide an easy solution to explaining the manifestation of

\textsuperscript{131} Jabri, Discourses, p.22.
\textsuperscript{132} Crenshaw develops a very useful approach to the causes of terrorism by examining the role of the individual especially within the political and socio-economic context. See Crenshaw, Context.
\textsuperscript{133} Bowyer Bell, Dynamics, p.6.
\textsuperscript{134} It can be argued however that religion and politics are inseparable in some terrorist groups, especially Muslim. See Ranstorp M, ‘Terrorism in the name of Religion,’ Journal of International Affairs, summer 1996, v.50 n1 p.41. Also Hoffman argues that religion is the main motivational force in International terrorism and points out that in 1995 half of all terrorist groups were religiously motivated and the most serious terrorist incidents of the decade had a religious dimension. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p.92.
\textsuperscript{135} For example Juergensmeyer argues that the violence caused by religious groups is an expression of political power, which is mandated by god. Juergensmeyer M, ‘Terror mandated by God,’ in Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.9, no.2, (summer 1997), p.16-23.
\textsuperscript{136} Although Ranstorp does argue that religious terrorism is motivated largely by religion (which he sees as specifically the threat to religion and religious identity from secularism) and the practical political considerations of the context-specific environment, he does suggest the existence of social, political and economic factors that exacerbate the religious crisis from which religious terrorism emerges. Nevertheless the causes of religious terrorism are firmly rooted in religion and politics. Ranstorp, Terrorism in the name of Religion."
terrorism, without recourse to a roots debate. Although this might be the intention of the users of the orthodox terrorism discourse, who may seek to obscure the underlying socio-economic causes of the violence or who intend to discredit religion itself. The criticism remains that orthodox discourse does not adequately consider the deeper social or cultural roots of the individual in violence.

Applying conflict studies can fill this gap in the understanding of terrorism, as it provides a number of alternative approaches to understanding the roots of terrorism within the individual. These approaches have a far greater socio-economic and cultural emphasis than the political orientation of terrorism studies and seek to firmly locate the causes of violence on the individual in society. The most useful approach provided by conflict studies for examining the ideology and mindset of the terrorist individual is incorporated into identity theory. This is based on the existence of individual identity, forming the basis of social identity theory, which is a very useful tool for exposing alternative reasons for violence between groups of different identities. For example, social identity theory can be applied to religion, as the considered mainspring of terrorism, in order to uncover the roots of terrorism. Consequently, the causes of violence can be just as easily located in the identity of the individual and the group as with the immediate and often more obviously stated cause, such as religion. This suggests that it is possible to locate the causes of religious terrorism not just in the existence of religion itself but also in the identity needs of those individuals involved in religious violence. The problem with this approach is similar to the criticism levelled at human needs theory, that the identity needs represent a theoretical set of socio-biological needs that are difficult to

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137 Jabri highlights this theory by questioning the composition of the unique construction of the individual and suggesting that the nature of individual identity makes it exclusionist and thus conflict can ensue from the friction between inclusion and exclusion in wider social groups. Jabri, Discourses, p.121. See chapter 2.

138 Individual Identity is comprised of the psychological equivalent of an identity card, which defines ones identity at a given point in time. The contents consist of one’s values motives, emotions, feelings, attitudes, thoughts, goals, aspirations on one hand and group membership, social influence, social interaction patterns and roles on the other. Seul J R, ‘Ours is the Way of God: Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict,’ Journal of Peace Research, v.36 n.5 1999, p.554.

139 Social Identity Theory is the link between individual identity and group identity, which is based on achieving a secure and positively valued sense of self. Hence group formation, differentiation, self-categorisation, social judgements and perceptions can all emanate form social identity. Seul, ‘Ours is the Way of God.’

substantiate. However, merely by suggesting that the roots of terrorism might exist beyond the political, progress is made into examining the deeper root causes.

Identity theory is also useful for approaching the subject of ethnicity and ethnonationalism and is often cited as a further central cause of terrorism and violence in both terrorism and conflict studies.\textsuperscript{141} However, terrorism studies whilst recognising the influence of identity is preoccupied with the political motivation of ethnonationalism,\textsuperscript{142} which although important is not necessarily the sole cause of terrorism. Conflict studies highlights the existence of the ethnic group which exposes the existence of a collective culture, and can encapsulate shared origins, values, language, religion, homeland, and history.\textsuperscript{143} Importantly, this categorisation of people occurs from both inside and outside the group.\textsuperscript{144} By examining ethnic violence with identity theory it is possible to suggest the existence of political or socio-economic threats that galvanise group identity, as it can be argued that the existence of an ethnic group suggests a group with security fears, unfulfilled needs or a political or socio-economic agenda.\textsuperscript{145} The approach of conflict studies is important as it serves to highlight the existence of social forces in the generation of violence.

It is also important to consider the influence of political ideology, such as nationalism which is a powerful motivator of terrorism and can provide the socially deprived and threatened individual or group with a political ideology, sense of direction and justification for violence. Just as ethnicity is a grass roots phenomenon, so nationalism can be seen as a top down controlling and motivating political influence. The value of combining terrorism and conflict approaches is to ensure that a holistic approach is maintained in examining the roots of terrorism. For example, in the manifestation of ethnic terrorism consideration must be made of the political ideology employed to generate and justify the violence, such as religion or nationalism but at the same time an examination must be conducted of the social forces that are generating the grass roots movement of the individual that is

\textsuperscript{141}For example, statistics of armed conflict from 1985-94 suggest 44.1\% were ethnonationalist in nature. Scherrer C P, Ethnonationalismus in Weltysystem, Munster :Agenda Verlag,1997, quoted in Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.6.

\textsuperscript{142}Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, p.9.


\textsuperscript{145}Ignatieff argues that no human difference matters until it becomes a privilege, thus he suggests that individuals under threat look for protection and security in groups comprised of individuals with
committing the terrorism. This approach helps to identify how terrorism can be
generated by ethnic entrepreneurs who under the guise of nationalism or religion are
exploiting the unfulfilled needs of an ethnic group for their own political agendas.

The implications for explaining terrorism by adopting the approaches of
crime studies for the examination of the root causes at the individual level is to
suggest that terrorism can be generated by a political ideology that is employed with
the express intention of motivating and justifying the violence of the individual for the
pursuit of political power. Foucault calls these regimes of truth,\textsuperscript{146} so by examining
the existence of regimes of truth or ideological belief systems it is possible to
understand the manifestation of violence because by identifying the source and
generation of power the root causes of terrorism can be unearthed. This suggests the
existence of \textit{Ideological terrorism}. In addition, it is also possible to argue for the
existence of \textit{Identity terrorism}, which is violence, generated at the socio-economic
and cultural grass roots level that is based on unsatisfied identity needs and can
underwrite religious or ethno-nationalist violence.

A further cause of terrorism within the individual is the generation of a
mindset or individual ideology that relates directly to a particular issue, this generates
violence by a particular group for a specific cause. Individuals can feel so affected by
a single issue that they are provoked into acts of terrorism in order to remedy it. This
is often how orthodox terrorism theory views a terrorist, and argues controversially
that this type of political violence, as single-issue terrorism;\textsuperscript{147} is not open to a roots
debate.\textsuperscript{148} Whilst it is very important to examine the existence of an actual issue or
particular cause of the violence, it is debatable if the contribution of orthodox
terrorism theory in this area is useful, if it eschews a roots debate. Whilst
consideration of a single issue should not be overlooked, it can often obscure other
underlying reasons or causes of violence that might be located at the individual level,
such as socio-political issues. However, this might be the intention of the employment
of the orthodox discourse, to focus concentration on a particular issue in order to deal
with it and thus avoid the difficulties involved in opening up a wider roots debate.

\textsuperscript{147} Wilkinson defines single issue Terrorism as violence committed with the desire to change a specific
\textsuperscript{148} Wilkinson calls it ‘incorrigible’ terrorism, Wilkinson P, ‘Future of Terrorism,’ Valedictory lecture,
University of St Andrews, 29 April 2002.
The application of conflict studies is intended to move away from this monodimensional interpretation and look for roots in a multi-dimensional approach. The study of conflict can provide an approach into understanding this area by establishing "consensual" issues as conflict issues, which can be seen as the goals, aims, objectives or intentions of combatants and can range from specific localised issues that trigger violence to large scale disputes such as those over land or resources. Although this approach considers the conflict issues, the important difference is that this approach allows the roots of the terrorism to be investigated beyond any immediate and obvious cause of violence. A roots debate can also provide alternative methods for dealing with the violence; attempts at conflict resolution for example, look beyond the intractable issue that is believed to be causing the conflict. However, this is a contentious move as it has dramatic ramifications for the formation and execution of counter and anti-terrorism policies that are often based on the clarity provided by the existence of single issues.

There is a problem with this approach because altering the focus of the terrorism may only serve to detract from the real cause of the violence. Also single issues that generate terrorism may simply be a particular issue existing within the mind of the individual and are therefore unintelligible to anyone attempting to deal with the violence. It is perhaps also important to question and problematise the multi-dimensional approach, as it is essential to ensure that the vast array of other potential causes of terrorism considered in this study do not obscure that which could prove to be the main driving force behind the violence: the impenetrable reason of an individual. The middle ground between terrorism and conflict studies, which is the advantage of this holistic study, is to include in any examination of the causes of terrorism. Thus investigation is vital into the existence of issues and to include them into any analysis of the violence alongside the other potential factors that generate terrorism. A theoretical framework for approaching terrorism should include an examination of the actual or perceived conflict issues suggesting that issue terrorism might exist alongside other reasons that generate terrorism in the individual.

The last area for investigation of the roots of terrorism at the level of the individual is the social-psychological causes of terrorism. This is a continuation of the examination of the mindset of the individual and probes for psychological causes.

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149 Consensual issues are values sought such as territory and resources. Jabri, *Discourses*, p.16.
Moderate terrorism theory in this realm provides useful investigation into the psychological composition of the individual terrorist. It concentrates on the existence of the construction of a subjective or perceived reality\textsuperscript{150} within the individual, which serves to provide an understanding and justification for the actions of the terrorist in pursuit of the subjective and relative truth.\textsuperscript{151} This process of investigation of the roots of terrorism has also progressed into group dynamics and examines the dynamics of like-minded individuals existing in an enclosed and socially isolated subjective world which serves to strengthen and self-perpetuate the collective understanding and alternative reality.\textsuperscript{152} Terrorism studies also suggests violence is generated by individuals as, displacement and diffusion of responsibility,\textsuperscript{153} cathartic symbolism - as a substitute focus of aggression for more complicated political or socio-economic reasons\textsuperscript{154} and also as violence as an end in itself, to strengthen the political cause and cohesion of a group.\textsuperscript{155} In addition to these rational psychological explanations it is also important to incorporate irrational psychological emotions as a cause of terrorism such as fear, hatred, rage and vengeance.

These psychological approaches for understanding the roots of terrorism are very helpful, but as ‘moderate terrorism theory’ explanations for the root causes they remain on the periphery of terrorism studies. What is required is a complementary theoretical approach in order to apply these theories to the manifestation of terrorism. This approach can be provided by conflict studies, which draws considerably on these issues into a central roots debate and can noticeably enhance the understanding of terrorism by employing the theories on socio-psychology provided by conflict studies. Conflict studies bring the psychological roots of conflict debate into a mainstream understanding and seek to incorporate them into a holistic process for approaching

\textsuperscript{150} Bowyer Bell argues that rebels are motivated by a dream and faith in the dream which exists as their own reality or truth and is the way all their actions are defined, understood and ultimately justified. Bowyer Bell, \textit{Dynamics of Armed Struggle}.


\textsuperscript{153} Displacement is violence committed by group members for group leaders, members therefore absolved themselves from blame. Diffusion is acts of violence committed by all members by group decision and therefore everyone and no one is responsible. Bandura A, ‘The Mechanics of Moral Disengagement,’ in Reich W, \textit{Origins of Terrorism}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.181.


\textsuperscript{155} Post J M, ‘Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of Psychological forces,’ in Reich, \textit{Origins}, p.36.
conflict. Galtung integrates this area of examination into the conflict triangle and explores it under the title conflict attitude.\textsuperscript{156} This approach to conflict attitude is also considered by Mitchell.\textsuperscript{157} Attitude can be divided into two areas of analysis. ‘emotional,’ which are irrational judgemental feelings and ‘cognitive,’ which are perceptual beliefs and a cognitive process for construction of the violent attitude.\textsuperscript{158} The emotional approach is useful as it can be used to examine the existence of irrational emotions in the generation of terrorism such as hatred, fear and vengeance. Cognitive is useful because it analyses the development and construction of the subjective or perceptual terrorist understanding, which is a major cause and sustaining component of violence. The formation of terrorism attitude is responsible for the Manichean polarisation of issues and the production of a number of psychological consequences such as scapegoat, tunnel vision, stereotyping and dehumanisation.\textsuperscript{159} The implications for the study of terrorism from combining and applying conflict and terrorism psychology theory is to suggest that within the roots of terrorism, psychological attitude can exist as emotional terrorism and cognitive terrorism.

As a complement to investigating the psychological construction of the individual in violence, it is also possible to apply the approaches of conflict studies to the understanding of group dynamics in a psychological investigation into the roots of terrorism. In addition to the approach discussed above in terrorism studies, conflict studies suggest that group identification\textsuperscript{160} is a primary cause of conflict. An examination of the formation of the in-group and out-group and the subsequent group dynamics can provide a helpful insight into the causes of terrorism. Associated with this theory is the creation of a subjective reality or underground, that is shared by members of the group and which exists to reinforce their subjective understanding of the world. This serves to justify their actions, especially as the group becomes increasingly insular from society or begins to construct its own society.

\textsuperscript{156} Galtung divides conflict attitude into emotive (feeling) cognitive (belief) and conative (will) see Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, p.72.
\textsuperscript{158} Mitchell suggests a number of factors for consideration when examining the cognitive process; these are selective perception, selective recall and group identification. Mitchell, Structure of Conflict, p.77.
\textsuperscript{160} Mitchell argues that causes and effects of conflict are a search for group identification and a subsequent polarisation of the in-group and out-group. Mitchell, Structure of Conflict, p.85. Also see McNeil, Nature of Human Conflict, p.60.
The group can also become completely controlled by violence, not only in their actions against their opponents but also to ensure group loyalty and maintain their sense of identity.161 Individuals become so consumed by violence within the group that it soon develops a self-sustaining dynamic of violence and becomes the main driving force behind their actions and in some instances even eclipses the original reason for violence. Although this has problematic implication for the roots of terrorism debate, it serves to reinforce the belief of Fanon and Sartre, as it implies that individual actors commit acts of violence for the sake of violence.162 The implications for the study of terrorism by adopting this argument is to suggest that by examining the psychological roots of terrorism in the individual it is possible to discover the existence of group terrorism which exists within the realm of the dynamics of the subjective understanding and reality of the terrorist group.

The role of the individual is highly influential in the roots of terrorism debate. By combining the approaches of terrorism and conflict studies it is possible to construct routes into examining the manifestation of violence at the level of the individual. This holistic approach provides a close investigation into the ideology, mindset, and system of belief or regimes of truth that the terrorist uses in order to motivate acts of violence and which might generate ideological terrorism. This is complemented by an examination of the identity of the individual to test the existence of identity terrorism. Furthermore, it is also important to explore the existence of any specific issues at the centre of the violence in order to ascertain its relevance to the plausibility of issue terrorism. Terrorism and conflict studies both suggest a thorough examination of the psychological elements inherent in violence existing in the conflict attitude of the individual and forming emotional and cognitive terrorism. Investigation is also required into the group dynamics to establish if any potential deep underlying psychological forces are generating group terrorism. Examination and reassessment of the roots of terrorism is therefore invaluable at the level of the individual as it provides a wealth of possible causes of terrorism to consider.

It is apparent from Part 1 of this study that by combining the best approaches provided by terrorism and conflict studies it is possible to compile a comprehensive survey of methods for understanding the roots of terrorism that incorporates all the

161 Lustick I S. 'Terrorism in the Arab Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences,' in Crenshaw M, Terrorism in Context, p.552.
useful approaches at all the levels in the roots debate. Part 2 of this chapter will examine how these approaches can be formatted into a workable and practical comprehensive framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism, which can then be successfully applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in order to test if it is possible to rethink the roots of terrorism. This will be the subject of Chapter 5.

**Part 2**

**A Comprehensive Framework for Rethinking Terrorism**

**Construction**

The main reason for establishing this roots of terrorism debate and the comparison of terrorism and conflict studies is to challenge and ultimately deconstruct the mono-dimensional approach to terrorism provided by orthodox terrorism theory. This challenge to the orthodox explanation of terrorism can be achieved by incorporating the alternative approaches or perspectives of the root causes of terrorism, as discussed in Part 1, into a hybrid comprehensive framework. This ‘alternative theoretical’ approach is intended as a holistic framework that incorporates a wide-ranging, multi-level and multi-dimensional approach to explaining and understanding the root causes of terrorism. The framework can be constructed from the implications for understanding terrorism that were deduced in Part 1, and can be represented for ease of application as levels of analysis.

The first level of analysis is the state level; this concentrates on the political and focuses on the state approach by examining state responses to terrorism and terrorists. A number of implications for the roots of terrorism debate emerge from this perception. The most important is that terrorism can be seen to exist inherently within the institutions and policy construction of the state. This suggests terrorism can be considered synonymous with the institution of the state. The theoretical root causes of

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162 Sartre JP, *Critique de la raison dialectique*, and Introduction to Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, also see Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth*, p.27.
terrorism at the state are *inherent terrorism, devious terrorism and terrorism management*. The next level in the framework is the non-state actor level. This provides an understanding of terrorism based on social conflict theory and suggests terrorism is caused by the perceived function and utility of terrorism, unsatisfied human needs and relative deprivation. The implications of this perspective for understanding the roots of terrorism suggest the existence at the non-state level of *revolutionary* or *reactionary terrorism, grievance terrorism* and *deprivation terrorism*.

The structural level approach concentrates on the structure of society, and in particular the relationship between the actor, the structure and the socio-economic environment. The implications of this perception suggest that the roots of terrorism can be located in the historical and cultural background of a region and the behaviour and objectives of the actors. This implies the existence of *cultural terrorism, systemic terrorism, situational terrorism* and *socio-economic terrorism*. The final level of analysis is the level of the individual; this perspective of the root causes suggests that the individual has a central role in the generation of terrorism, implying that terrorism can be found in the ideology, identity and composition of individual and group psychology. This approach suggests the roots of terrorism at the level of the individual are in *ideological terrorism, identity terrorism, issue terrorism, emotional and cognitive terrorism and group terrorism*.

The objective of this synthesis of terrorism and conflict studies is to combine all these perspectives and levels of analysis in the construction of a single, holistic and more wide-ranging framework for approaching the roots of terrorism. The aim of this study is to suggest a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism than the orthodox approach; one that can be applied to conflicts in which terrorism exists for the purpose of generating a root causes debate and opening alternative pathways for resolving the violence. The synthesis of the material examined in Part I can be summarised by the theoretical construction of a multi-level and inter-disciplinary analytical framework. A graphic representation of this comprehensive framework is contained in Annex I.
Application:

Why a multi-level framework is required

The employment of a theoretical framework is intended to provide, as I suggested above, a wider understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism. It is my intention to apply this framework (see Annex I), to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Chapter 5, as a case study example. The aim of this is to compare the comprehensive approach with the conventional one provided by orthodox terrorism theory. It will also provide an opportunity to test the assumptions, claims and implications for rethinking terrorism that have been developed in the construction and application of this holistic comprehensive approach. My aim in the next section is to briefly explain how I intend to apply the multi-level framework developed above and graphically represented in Annex I.

First, a terrorist conflict is selected; this can be defined as one that contains terrorism in the form of ‘lethal political violence.’ This is the value neutral definition I constructed in Chapter 1 and have employed in this study in order to move away from the constrains of the political legitimacy debate contained in the definitions of orthodox terrorism theory. This definition is also selected because, as I argued at the beginning of this Chapter, it allows access to the analytical tools of conflict resolution approaches provided by conflict studies. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as the selected conflict in this case, is subject to an orthodox terrorist theory understanding that is typified by relative and subjective interpretations of what constitutes terrorism. These relative understandings are represented by a political conflict over legitimacy, coupled with an actual conflict that is characterised by both sides employing terrorist methods but each claiming they are acting legitimately in response to the use of illegitimate violence. As a consequence, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has become typical of an intractable, deeply entrenched and highly acrimonious political struggle, characterised by an increasing spiral of extreme violence. Importantly the orthodox theory of terrorism; the prominent discourse for explaining and understanding this conflict is so focused on the legitimacy question that it fails to engage in a roots
debate with alternative causes of the violence.\textsuperscript{163} This is the purpose of the comprehensive framework, to rethink the roots of terrorism and refocus attention on deeper multi-level and multi-dimensional causational factors in order to identify possible root causes and potential routes to prospective solutions.

In the next sections I intend to outline how I propose to apply the framework at each level to the case study. This technique involves an adopted approach or method of examination created from the synthesis of terrorism and conflict studies and will produce a number of implications relating to the root causes of terrorism. These implications or forms of root causes of terrorism will be tested in Chapter 5 to illustrate how it is possible to rethink the roots of terrorism. This format is clearly displayed in Annex I.

**Approaching the Roots of Terrorism at State level**

The first level of approach is state level; this approach is intended to examine how the state responds to terrorism, both internally within the state and externally with other states. This can be achieved by examining the *intrastate*, which is the relationship between the state (governing machinery) and its governed population; and also the *interstate*, or the relationship between different states. These approaches will help ascertain at the state level how terrorism is understood and where it is perceived to exist. Application of these approaches can be achieved by examining the state definition of terrorism and how it applies to members of the state and other states. This will also be apparent by observing and inquiring how the state understands what a terrorist is and will be found in legal and political documents, the news and media; and interviews with policy makers, politicians and the military. A state can perceive a terrorist threat to exist between itself and its own population as a very serious threat to the internal security of the state. It can also see it as an external security threat between itself and another state; official state policy and the observable actions of the state will reflect this. If this is the case it is possible to argue, by

\textsuperscript{163} It can be argued that the orthodox terrorism discourse is employed specifically because it does not
implication, that the roots of terrorism are in fact inherent within the state and therefore exist as inherent terrorism, in the social contract relationship between the governing and the governed,\textsuperscript{164} and also in the security based relationship with other states characterised by the security dilemma.\textsuperscript{165}

An examination also needs to be conducted into how the state approaches terrorists, in other words what methods do states employ to deal with terrorists. For example, do states employ a criminal legal method underwritten by orthodox terrorism theory or do they approach it from a conflict perspective and use military solutions. This can be achieved by observing state actors, inquiring by interviews, examining secondary sources and investigating how legal, political and military approaches to terrorism are conducted. For example, are they prosecuted and imprisoned under state law, assassinated without trial, held as prisoners of war or viewed as oppressed minorities with a legitimate cause. The implications of these will suggest how and also if, the state might employ terrorism discourse in order to pursue a policy of secondary gain. By maintaining a relative political and moral understanding of terrorism the state can utilise counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism techniques in order to legitimately eradicate terrorist opponents, which suggests that the roots of terrorism can be found as devious terrorism in state action. Conversely, if the state approach is purely military,\textsuperscript{166} or even civil then the roots of terrorism can be located away from the state.

It is also necessary to investigate how the state approaches terrorism. Does it employ a roots debate and attempt to find political or socio-economic solutions to the violence and foresee a long-term solution to the problem? Or does it use an approach based on terrorism theory, which sees the violence as a threat to the state and leads to the employment of the machinery of state to deal with the threat in the short-term? If the latter is the case it is possible to argue that the state sees terrorism as unsolvable and therefore endemic and inherent. If this is apparent, then by implication it is possible to suggest that the roots of terrorism can be located within the state, as the

\textsuperscript{164} This relationship is underwritten by the principles of Legitimacy and Sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{165} The Security Dilemma is the name given to the spiral of insecurity caused by the security provisions made by a state which are interpreted as aggressive by other states causing them to adopt increased security measures of their own which become self-fulfilling and thus only add to the perception of the necessity for increased security, this can be exacerbated by the threat of state terrorism. See Baylis and Smith, \textit{Globalisation}, p.117.

\textsuperscript{166} By military I mean an approach based on an understanding of war or conflict, such as an insurgency conflict and not military assistance to the civilian authorities for policing as found in Northern Ireland.
state is employing a method of *terrorism management*. This implies that terrorism will never be completely eradicated but instead maintained at a manageable level to suit state objectives. The outcome of this policy is that terrorism management can be observed by the use of terrorism legislation and military approaches to the problem, which can either help solve it or actually serve to aggravate it. This includes examining emergency legislation and special powers and the actions of the police and military in regards to political accountability, which might actually serve to bolster the political power of the state.

**An approach to Terrorism at Non-State Actor level**

Application of the comprehensive framework at the non-state actor level is focused on social conflict theory;\textsuperscript{167} this deals directly with the wants and needs of the non-state actor. The objective is to ascertain if the roots of terrorism are located at the non-state actor level in the conflict. The initial investigation is intended to examine the utility or function of the terrorism; this approach attempts to ascertain why terrorism is employed by the actor and for what reason. This information can be found by examining the aims and objectives of the non-state actors or groups and by interviews with their political leaders. The functional approach is focused principally on the political and often relates directly to the political nature of the state vis-à-vis the actor, thus the function of non-state actor terrorism is often a way to achieve political, or socio-economic change from below. The implications for this understanding of the roots of terrorism suggest that terrorism can be located in the relationship between the state and the non-state actor as methods to either completely transform the existing socio-political system (*revolutionary terrorism*) or reform it (*reactionary terrorism*).

Investigation at this level also needs to be focused on individual human needs;\textsuperscript{168} in particular, the individual safety needs of the actors. These needs, are security, identity, representation and equality,\textsuperscript{169} if left unfulfilled or unsatisfied can


\textsuperscript{169} *Azar, Protracted Social Conflict*, p.5.
be linked to the manifestation of political violence and terrorism. It is also important to look for the roots of terrorism in the relative deprivation of actors in the conflict. Thus if actors perceive a relative imbalance, politically, economically and or socially, between what they want (perceived value) and what they actually have, (value capacity) violence as terrorism can occur. This suggests that grievance and deprivation terrorism can be generated by the non-state actor. To demonstrate this non-state terrorist actors need to be observed in the conflict, questioned and interviewed about their demands and perceptions and studied in their socio-political environment in order to determine if their needs are frustrated and their subjective perceptions built on relative deprivations are causing violence.

A Structural approach to the Roots of Terrorism

Structural approaches to the roots of terrorism are mainly concerned with attempting to examine the nature of the society in conflict, which can be understood as the relationship between the actors and the structure. This approach can be employed to examine the context of the conflict; this implies an examination of the historical and cultural background of the region and can be achieved by an extensive survey of secondary sources relating to the history and culture of the conflict. From this it is possible to link the manifestation of terrorism with the cultural nature of the conflict, thus establishing a connection between culture and violence and implying that the root causes of terrorism can be located in cultural terrorism.

Analysis at the structural level can also reveal the systemic nature of the conflict; this is a structural investigation of the system created by the relationship between the actors and the system. This relationship, it can be argued, can be examined by observing the behaviour of the actors, which is obviously achieved by scrutinising activities of the actors in conflict, either directly or by contemporary records and secondary sources. Notably, this is an examination of the roots of the violence from an ‘outside’ perspective and represents an ‘objective’ view. If

170 Frustration-aggression theory. See, Chapter 2, pluralism.
171 See, relative deprivation theory, Chapter 2.
conclusions in the data gathering suggest that the nature of the system is affecting the behaviour of the actors or if the behaviour of the actors is generating the conflict system, then it is possible to argue that terrorism can be rooted in this realm, as 

systemic terrorism.

In addition to this approach, it is useful to consider the view of the terrorists, as their perspective from ‘inside’ the conflict can reveal the way the actors perceive the nature of the structure or system that they are in and why they resort to violence. This can be achieved by examining the conflict situation and more specifically the contradiction.\(^{173}\) This is a complex set of inter-relationships between, the actor and their desired goals, vis-à-vis their actual or perceived goal incompatibilities, and between the actors and the perceived existing structure. These relationships can be examined by questioning and interviewing the conflict actors in order to ascertain their actual understanding of the dynamics of the conflict situation. From this it is possible to attribute the cause of terrorism to the nature of the situation, such as the presence of other actors or the type of structure that obstructs an actor from achieving their goal and therefore generating violence. This can be a root cause of situational terrorism.

Finally, it is necessary to examine the socio-economic structure of the conflict, which is the nature of the relationship between the actor and the socio-economic environment. This involves an examination of secondary data, statistics and surveys as well as observations and interviews with actors in a socio-economic role in order to identify if a structure exists and that by virtue of its interaction with the actors in society is creating violence. If this is the case it can be argued that the socio-economic structure itself is generating socio-economic terrorism.

Approaching the Roots of Terrorism at the Individual level

Examination of the roots of terrorism at the individual level is primarily concerned with attempting to make an approach into the mindset of the individual and

\(^{172}\) Behaviour is one of the vertices of Galtung’s conflict triangle and relates to his work on structural violence. He understands violent behaviour to be threats, coercion and destructive acts. See, Chapter 2.

\(^{173}\) See, Galtung, Peace by Peaceful means, p.21, and chapter 2.
establish a linkage to the potential causes of terrorism. Although this study focuses initially on ideology its emphasis is directed primarily at socio-economics and culture rather than the political. Nevertheless, the initial point of entry is an examination of the ideology or belief system used by the terrorist individual. This can be achieved by observing, interviewing and examining the individuals in conflict from the ground operators to the field commanders and political leaders. The intention is to establish if their ideology or mindset creates a regime of truth in which violence has a purpose. If this is possible it implies the existence of ideological terrorism. However, ideologies like religion can often obscure other reasons for the causes of terrorism inherent in the nature of the individual. It is perhaps useful therefore to examine the identity of the individual. This, it can be argued, will be more useful in revealing the belief system employed and the nature of the regime of truth that the terrorist has adopted in order to generate motivation and justification for the acts of violence. In this process the nature of the identity of the individual terrorist actor needs to be examined. This can be found through observation, interviews and secondary source studies on how the actors perceive themselves and others, especially those with whom they are in conflict. If this proves to be an established connection it is possible to suggest that terrorism can be located within the individual as identity terrorism.

A further area of investigation within the individual is the existence of actual or perceived single issues or agendas surrounding the conflict that are considered a mainspring of violence. These need to be examined in order to assess just how much influence they have as a single cause in actually directly generating the violence. This will determine if the roots of terrorism can be solely associated with a single issue or agenda. This can be achieved by interviewing the conflict actors to ascertain if they have any particular issues or agenda that they feel are causing them to be violent, if so it is possible to suggest the existence of issue terrorism.

A particularly valuable area of study in this individual level approach relates to the socio-psychological construction of the individual and is found in an examination of conflict attitudes. This can be divided into an examination of the presence of irrational emotions such as fear, hate, anger and vengeance and rational emotions or cognitive processes. These relate to the construction of a subjective or

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174 See, Foucault, Power, p.176 and Chapter 1 and 2.
175 See, Identity Theory, Chapter 2.
176 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful means, p.21 and chapter 2.
perceived reality and cognitive perceptual belief and process for the justification of violence. They can be examined by questioning, interviewing and observing the conflict actors in order to establish how far their psychological conflict construction is comprised of emotional attitude, such as hate and fear, or more rational cognitive processes that construct the conflict reality. The existence of either of these forms of a subjective reality of violence implies the existence of emotional and cognitive terrorism.

It is also very important to consider the influence of group dynamics on the generation of violence because the processes of action within a group, such as acts of violence to initiate group members or enhance the group cohesion or even cathartic violence, can often exist as a self-sustaining dynamic for the generation terrorism. This can be achieved by interviews with group members as well as close examination and observation of the interaction and dynamics of the individuals in terrorist groups. If this link is identifiable it is possible to suggest the existence of group terrorism.

**Towards a Comprehensive Framework**

In the above section I attempted to explain how the multi-level framework (contained in Annex I) could be applied to a particular terrorist conflict. The technique is to apply each level to the mechanics of the conflict by employing the approaches and methods of examination suggested. This will test the theoretical implications, which are the claims to the existence of the roots of terrorism. By substantiating the implications it is possible to suggest the existence of a number of different root causes of terrorism. In the next two chapters I intend to examine the case study example of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This will represent a working example of a terrorist conflict. It is to this example that I will apply, in Chapter 5, the comprehensive theoretical framework I constructed above. The purpose of this is to challenge orthodox terrorism theory and demonstrate that it is possible to rethink the roots of terrorism and develop a more sophisticated and advanced understanding by adopting a holistic approach that combines some of the principal theoretical perspectives of terrorism. The intention is to broaden the understanding of terrorism
and develop a number of useful routes into it from multi-level and multi-dimensional perspectives in an attempt to establish workable and practical techniques for resolving violence.
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| LEVEL |

**COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR RE-THINKING THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM**
Discourses on Conflict and Terrorism: The Palestinian-Israeli Case

Introduction

The Palestinian-Israeli\(^1\) conflict is both a protracted social conflict and a complicated internationalised dispute that is characterised by terrorism. It also typifies the relative legitimacy debate on the use of terrorism that is so enshrined in the orthodox understanding. It is therefore an ideal case study for applying the comprehensive framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism that was constructed in Chapter 3. In Chapters 1 and 2, I conducted surveys of literature from terrorism and conflict studies to investigate how the roots of terrorism and conflict can be explained and understood according to the perspectives created by different theoretical approaches and discourses. In Chapter 3, I combined the best approaches from these surveys and constructed a holistic multi-level and multi-dimensional framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism. The survey of literature, the deconstruction of orthodox terrorism theory, the creation of levels of analysis (from a critique of the main theories of international relations theory) and the construction of the comprehensive framework were all conducted using the methodological approaches provided by critical theory\(^2\) and discourse analysis.\(^3\) This is the overall perspective

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\(^1\) For the purpose of this study I define the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a conflict between the peoples living in the geographical region of Palestine, namely the state of Israel and the people in the other Territories of Palestine. This conflict is often referred to as the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, I view this conflict as a wider conflict between Israel and the Arab nations, notwithstanding the fact that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the crux of this wider conflict.


employed throughout this study into rethinking the roots of terrorism because both methods question the nature of the theory or discourse used to interpret ‘facts’ which are seen, not as independent and objective occurrences, but as a product of the specific social and historical frameworks. In Chapter 5, the comprehensive framework will be applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to demonstrate how it is possible to rethink the roots of terrorism. The purpose of this chapter is to frame the Palestinian-Israeli conflict within a historical context, by evaluating the historical and subjective discourses used to understand the conflict and explain the roots of terrorism. The aim is to critically examine the discourses employed by the principal actors in the conflict, and evaluate how and why they are used to interpret and understand the historical events and suggested facts of the conflict, thus determining the effects and implications of these discourses on the understanding of the roots causes of terrorism.

The evaluation of historical events and the generation of facts is a precarious venture from the outset as E H Carr points out in What is History? He suggests that the facts can often exist as untenable theories of history. Foucault argues that historical facts are often seen as the truth, or regimes of truth, that can be easily established by a combination of power and perceived knowledge. This suggests that the perceived roots of conflict and terrorism are often enshrined in subjective historical realities, established through relative facts and the construction of regimes of truth. The events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are no exception, as they are also the subject of a fierce historiography debate, which will be examined in greater detail below. The intention in this chapter is not to discover the universal ‘truth’ of the conflict as this may well prove to be a quixotic quest; instead I aim to examine the

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5 He suggests history can exist as an objective compilation of the facts, as the unqualified primacy of fact over interpretation or as the subjective product of the mind of the historian who establishes them through the process of interpretation. He argues that facts can never exist in the pure form as they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder. Carr EH, What is History? London: Penguin Books, Second Ed. 1988, p.23.
7 The creation of subjective realities is often symptomatic of protracted social conflict because it permits each actor to construct, through selective perception, images of the other such as, demonisation, stereotyping and dehumanisation. These not only exacerbate the conflict but also help the actors engage in it. See Mitchell C R, The Structure of International Conflict, London: Macmillan Press, 1981, p.77.
8 Edward Said suggests that there can be no neutrality or objectivity on the subject of Palestine, as so ideologically saturated is the subject that even a superficial or cursory apprehension of it involves a position taken. See, Said E, “The Burdens of Interpretation and the Question of Palestine,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 16, Aug 1986, p.29.
history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by employing a critical theory and discourse analysis approach to the events. I intend to scrutinize the particular theories, frameworks and historical structures through which the facts are perceived and established, in order to examine for what tasks they are designed and ultimately for what purpose the interpretation of the facts and the creation of perceived truths are required. This study will focus primarily on illustrating how these different discourses relate to the understanding of the roots of the conflict and ultimately of terrorism.

Before moving to an examination of the creation of the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, I would briefly like to outline the current historiography debate that surrounds the conflict. As I have suggested above, the manipulation of history for the creation of facts that can be employed to vindicate a particular policy, or reinforce an ideology, are a common feature of conflicts where adversarial interpretations of historical events are employed. This suggests a battle of history can often ensue that aims to negate the opponents claim to legitimacy whilst asserting ones own, often characterised by a propaganda war. As Kimmerling explains, history is a powerful tool in both domestic and external conflict and is used to form meta-narratives that determine legal, political and territorial claims as well as being responsible for establishing individual and collective identities.9 Without doubt both the Palestinians and the Israelis employ their own collective and relative understanding of history upon which their claims to legitimacy and justice are based. This not only sustains the conflict, as each actor believes they have sole legitimacy of action and the exclusive right to justice, but it is also a barrier to peace, as recognition of the others claims casts into question the validity of their own history upon which the conflict and the inherent ideologies of action are based. This is the basis of the current historiography debate within Israeli society.10 It is an academic debate essentially re-thinking Israeli history focusing particularly on 1948 and how the ‘Arab’ is perceived in established Israeli history, with specific reference to the refugee situation.11 Ilan Pappe outlines this debate, which he suggests began in the 1980s with scholarly works by the ‘new historians’ or ‘revisionists’ that strongly challenged the

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10 Although it should be pointed out that a similar re-thinking of History has not occurred with the Palestinian camp.

Israeli public’s self-image, collective memory and established historical ‘truths.’\textsuperscript{12} For example, Flapan recommends the re-examination of certain myths surrounding the birth of Israel that have become accepted historical truth and which are central to the creation of structures of thinking and propaganda.\textsuperscript{13} Although this ‘new history’ began by focusing on the events of 1948, as Finkelstein points out, it has now spread to include a rethinking of all Israeli history.\textsuperscript{14} The implications of this revisionism, whilst useful for a critical examination of the history of the conflict and the creation of space in which to work towards reconciliation, can be considered highly problematic for Israel. For example, Hazony suggests that the Jewish society is in crisis as the state is under attack from its own cultural and intellectual establishment because the new historians are threatening the national narrative.\textsuperscript{15} Thus a re-examination of Israeli history and the sacred ‘myths’ that underwrite it suggest a deconstruction of Zionism,\textsuperscript{16} Pappe identifies this as the post-Zionism critique or debate.\textsuperscript{17} Although not widely accepted and often dismissed as a largely academic exercise,\textsuperscript{18} it is a potent challenge to the traditional Israeli historical version.\textsuperscript{19} The post-Zionist debate is a useful point of departure to begin a critical examination of Israeli history and one I will be employing during this chapter, whilst using a similar approach for the Palestinian version of history.

I intend to approach the historical evaluation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and an examination of the discourses that drive it, by dividing this study into two parts. Part 1, will be an examination of the construction of the two conflict discourses, especially in relation to ancient and modern history. Part 2 will be an examination of


\textsuperscript{13} Flapan, \textit{The Birth of Israel}, p.8.


\textsuperscript{16} Zionism is an ethnic Jewish identity based ideology that supports the secular movement for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

\textsuperscript{17} Pappe defines post-Zionism as a hybrid of anti-Zionist notions and a postmodernist perception of reality, that is the deconstruction of Zionist truths coupled with the postmodern discourse of the deconstruction of reality without a means of reconstructing it. See Pappe, ‘Academic Debate’ p.30.

\textsuperscript{18} He does however argue that the post-Zionist critique has begun to penetrate into the Israeli media and popular culture. See Pappe I, ‘Post-Zionist Critique on Israel and the Palestinians, Part 2: The Media and Part3: Popular Culture,’ Journal of Palestinian Studies, 26, no.3. spring 97, pp.37-43 and pp.82-9.

the application and development of the conflict discourses by investigating their role in the major conflicts between the Palestinians and Israelis from 1948 and will include the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, International conflict, the Lebanon War, and the first and second Intifadas.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Part 1}

\textbf{Construction of Conflict Discourses}

\textbf{From Time Immemorial: The Ancient History Debate}

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is often referred to as simply a conflict over land or territory; this is a primary root of the ancient history debate and one that is woven into the fabric of the conflict. Perhaps the central question in the conflict is whose claim to the land is the oldest. However, since both parties claim to have been there since time immemorial, there is no easy answer to this. The Israeli’s claim is located in Biblical narrative, which dates to the Old Testament period and the story of the twelve tribes, who it is believed were led by Moses out of Egypt to the promised land of Canaan, where they established the Israelite era in about 1300BCE. After this the region became known as Judea, Samaria and Galilee, and later included the kingdoms of David and Solomon. Despite the weakening and decline of the kingdom following successive assaults by regional powers,\textsuperscript{21} it was the Roman Empire that finally ended the Israelite kingdom in 63 BCE, and following two unsuccessful rebellions in 66 and 70 BCE, the Jews were driven into exile and dispersion.\textsuperscript{22} The main purpose of this narrative will become more apparent in the discussion below on Zionism. However, if the crux of the conflict is the land of Palestine, then the role of

\textsuperscript{20} Incidentally, the case study in this work is an analysis of the contemporary events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict up to and including the first two years of the second Intifada and includes the period January – April 2003 for fieldwork.

\textsuperscript{21} The Israelite empire was continually conquered through its ancient history. By the Assyrians in 772BCE, Babylonians in 586BCE, Persians in 538BCE, Greeks under Alexander in 332 BCE and Seleucid Dynasty in the second century BCE, all before the appearance of the Romans. Tessler M. \textit{A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, p.8.

\textsuperscript{22} Tessler. \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, p.8.
this historical discourse is to establish for the Jewish people claims and even rights to ownership of the land by enshrining the principles of legitimacy and justice. Legitimacy because it relates to the validity of the claim to the land, which for the Jews is reinforced by divine law because they believe God promised them the land. For them the claim to the territory is enshrined in religious belief and has an unquestionable authority and legality for the Jewish people. Secondly, justice, a powerful motivator for violence, is a theme in the historical narrative because the basis of the ancient Jewish historical claim is the divine right to land of which they were wrongfully dispossessed (by the Romans) and exiled from in the 1st Century BCE. The Jews believe the land of Israel, the ‘promised land,’ is rightfully theirs. This is the foundation for a claim based on the right to return of all Jewish people to a homeland they were driven from. This is an important area and will be discussed further in the next sections. In the context of the modern conflict, Israel is merely exercising its historical and divine right to reoccupy land that it originally inhabited and controlled.

By comparison the Palestinian ancient historical narrative stresses the continuity of the Palestinians as original inhabitants. It suggests that the Palestinians were descendants of two ancient peoples, the Canaanites and Philistines, which according to the Bible were the earliest known inhabitants of Palestine or the Land of Canaan from 3000 BCE. During the Israelite period they existed as a minority but were regenerated by the arrival of Islam in 610 CE, which according to Tessler “created currents of change and a fundamental transformation of existing political and cultural patterns.” Coupled with this is the inextricable link to Arabism, which is the central and unifying theme in identity and political outlook of peoples in the Arab world. Palestinian historical discourse is therefore intertwined with the history of the Arabs.

23 During the course of this chapter I will use the terms, Jewish and Jews interchangeably. I do not use these terms to refer to this specific group of people from a religious perspective per se, but use the words to describe an ethnically homogenous group of people, who identify themselves as Jewish but might not necessarily be religious. In my understanding Jewish whilst immediately associated with the Jewish religion is not necessarily synonymous with it. Furthermore I employ the term Israeli as a description of ethnically Jewish people from or within the Israeli State post 1948.
24 Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.69.
25 Tessler defines Arabism as cultural symbols and patterns of social behaviour and explains the History of the Arabs according to the earliest Islamic revelations from pre-Islam to the present day. see Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.72.
The Palestinian historical narrative is employed in a similar manner to that of the Jews. Palestinian legitimacy for action is based on their legal rights as not only the original but also the continuous occupants and inhabitants of the land. The Palestinian claim to justice stems from legitimacy and the right to maintain an unbroken inhabitancy of their homeland. This is a legal claim to permanent residency, which in the context of the modern conflict is injustice by the Israelis who have occupied and forced them out of their homeland. These issues are powerful motivators of violence and coupled with the complexity and traditions of the Islamic religion; certainly exist in the roots of conflict and terrorism.

From both ancient historical narratives, legitimacy and justice can be employed to endorse methods to re-claim the land, such as Just Cause and Just War theories, which are often engaged to justify violence, conflict, terrorism and holy war. Whilst the roots of conflict are often regarded as existing in the material dispute over land it is often the associated rationale supported by historical narrative and religion that can provide the ideological polarity of conflict understanding and the incentive for violent action. This is the basis for the construction of conflict discourses.

Historical narratives not only provide the validation and motivation for violence in defence of the historical claims, but also contain a counter narrative, which is intended to discredit the opponents’ narrative. This will become much more apparent as more recent historical events in the conflict are discussed. However, an example of an ancient narrative is in the ‘time immemorial’ debate. Thus, in order to counter the Israelis claim that they were established since time immemorial, the Palestinians, as Kimmerling points out, have invented their own time immemorial in reference to their Canaanite and Philistine roots, which according to the bible preceded the Jewish tribes. The intention as I suggested above, is not to debate the truth of these narratives but to investigate how they are employed. For example, both parties employ the Bible to substantiate their historical claims not only because they are applicable to their own religions, but also because they are comprehensible to each other and are accessible enough for the international community to recognise. Biblical terminology is freely interspersed with modern geographical regions and contemporary lexicon in order to create an established historical narrative. Thus as Masalha points out, terms such as ‘promised land’, ‘holy land’, ‘Palestine’ and

26 Kimmerling, *Decline of Israeliness*, p.16.
‘greater Israel’ (Eretz-Yisrael) all have important modern political implications. The knowledge of the geography of the ‘land of Israel’ is often a precondition for understanding its history.”

The ancient historical narratives, whilst useful for generating propaganda and to project claims and counter-claims, also help to sustain historical memory: an integral part of protracted social conflict. According to Flapan, “The Jews and Arabs possess a long historical memory and suffer trauma and tragic events unable to forgive or forget.” However, it is possible to argue that the use of historical narrative does in fact create memory and only by examining the narrative is it possible to ascertain and question the claims in historical memory. Tessler argues that it is only in the last century that Jews and Arabs have viewed each other as enemies. He suggests a necessity to “dispel the common misconception that the current struggle in Palestine is an extension of an ancient blood feud, fuelled by ethnic or religious antagonisms, dating back hundreds of years.” Historical narrative is clearly an influential factor in the formation of conflict memory and the continuation of violence as it forms the basis for the construction of conflict discourses.

**History and the Formation of Discourses**

Historical narratives have a very significant role in establishing, substantiating and maintaining discourses, which as I have argued above, are an integral element in the construction of conflict because they often contain the incompatibles that lead to violence and the institutionalisation of conflict. The question in this context is the location of history in the formation of a discourse or indeed the effect of a discourse on the creation of history, because it might be misleading to assume that history creates the discourse and instead it may be more useful to investigate if discourses in fact create history.

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The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterised by two opposing discourses. Zionism and Palestinian Nationalism or Palestinianism. These are fluid concepts and open to varying definitions, but at their most extreme interpretation they are mutually exclusive, hence the perceived zero sum nature of the conflict. Discourses are central to understanding not only the historical narratives of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute but also the actual dynamics of the conflict. Throughout the modern period both discourses develop in reaction to and from events, this will be examined in further sections. Unsurprisingly, the history of the discourses is also debated by the opposing discourse. For example, the central pillar of orthodox Zionism is to deny the existence of Palestinianism; orthodox Israeli history argues that Zionism created modern Palestinian Nationalism, whereas Palestinian history suggests it always existed and developed relative to the other Arab states. It is immediately apparent that there are a number of similarities in the claims and progress of both movements. Due to this many scholars suggest a mutual development and stress the impossibility of explaining one discourse without the other. However, whatever the nature of their progress, the existence of a discourse is central to the causes of the conflict, so what are the discourses and what historical claims do they make? In the next section I intend to explore the perceived historical development of both discourses prior to 1948.

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30 Extreme Zionism believes in the eradication of the Palestinians and the establishment of Greater Israel in the territory from the Nile to the Euphrates, whilst extreme Palestinian nationalism is committed to the destruction of the Jewish state and the formation of the Palestinian state in its place. These versions are employed not only by the instigators of it but also by the opposing side as propaganda.

31 Joan Peters argues that before Jewish immigration, Palestinian land was a barren and unoccupied land and it was only after the start of Jewish prosperity that Arab migration to Palestine began, thus Palestinian Nationalism developed as a result of Zionism. Peters J, *From Time Immemorial*, London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1985.


Zionism

Israeli historical narrative suggests that Zionism originated in Eastern Europe in the late 19th century and was given a political voice by Theodore Hertzl, with the publication of *The Jewish State* in 1896. Zionism is an ethnic Jewish identity based discourse that supports the secular movement for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. It is a type of Jewish nationalism and is built predominantly on ancient historical narrative. As Laqueur suggests, “it is a belief in the existence of a common past and common future for the Jewish people.” Zionism requires acceptance of the historical narrative and the belief that Jewish people all over the world have a right not only to belong to a nation but also to live in an established homeland. Also, as Zionism originated in Europe it is infused with the ideas of the European enlightenment and the French Revolution, and is rooted in European political and social culture, especially the existence of the nation-state and the protection that it can afford its ethnic citizens. This theme of protection is perhaps the central thread of Zionism and is as relevant now as it was then. Hertzl embraced and developed Zionism not only in response to increasing levels of anti-Semitism in Europe at the time, but also to counter chronic anti-Semitism throughout Jewish history. Laqueur makes an important distinction on this point; he differentiates between Zionism and Political Zionism: “Political Zionism, distinct from mystical longings would not have come into existence but for the precarious situation of European Jewry in the nineteenth century.” The implications of the existence of Zionism for the first wave of Jewish immigrants who arrived in Palestine in 1902, is

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34 This however is subject to debate especially within Palestinian propaganda, as it is argued that the founding father of Zionism considered other locations such as Argentina and Africa before settling on Palestine, this ‘fact’ the Palestinians argue negates the ancient Jewish historical claim to the land of Palestine...field notes.


36 In particular, Kimmerling quotes the Dreyfus Affair in 1894, in which a well-respected Jewish French Army officer was accused of spying; this he suggests is an example of the depth of anti-Semitism even in an enlightened, progressive and assimilated society such as France. Despite the fact that Dreyfus managed to clear his name it also illustrates the lack of protection available to the Jewish people. Kimmerling, *Decline of Israeliness*, p.21.

that these people accepted a discourse that promised them a return to the national Jewish homeland where they could exist in safety and security from threats to their ethnic well-being. This in hindsight was the motivation for the unique and unprecedented creation of the nation-state of Israel by importing an ethnically homogenous community from all over the world into a bounded, governed, and secure national territory.

Zionism is subject to various interpretations and exists in a number of categories, the most important for this study are, Classical, Labour and Revisionist. Classical Zionism is based upon the continued and unbreakable tie of the Jewish people to Palestine and the formation of Eretz Yisrael (Greater Israel). As Lewy suggests, “Despite the dispersion of the Jewish people, the true home of the Jews remained in the land of Israel, the idea of eventual return from the four corners of the earth was never abandoned.” This is the ideological extension of the ancient narrative, the implications of which suggest that those employing this discourse firmly believe in the unwavering right of the Jewish people to live in Palestine. Zionism also represents the belief in the creation of a new society. According to Shlaim, “Zionism is a secular movement orientated to Palestine not merely to create a new Jewish state but also a new society based upon universal values, freedom, democracy and social justice.” The second main interpretation is Labour Zionism. This is an understanding of Zionism according to Socialist working class principles and is based on equality and social justice. Labour Zionism focused on agricultural settlement of the land and emphasised self-reliance by encouraging immigrants to populate and cultivate a new state based on socialist principles. Tessler points out that this is consistent with the concept of the Kibbutz or collective farm, notable for its autonomy, social cohesion and ability to provide security. The labour Zionist movement provided a universal and appealing ideology for immigrants and a possible vision of the new Israel by Labour Zionists.

The main implication of Zionism is the acceptance of Palestine as the new state of Israel. This employs the assumption that Palestine was either unoccupied at

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38 Interestingly, Masalha’s central thesis is that ‘Greater Israel’ is both a territorial concept and an ideology for achieving maximum territorial expansion and imperial domination of the region. See, Masalha N, Imperial Israel and the Palestinians, London: Pluto Press, 2000.
41 Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.63.
the time of the arrival of Jewish immigrants, or that it was accepted that the indigenous population would be subsumed. As Finkelstein suggests, “the mainstream Zionist movement never doubted its historical right to impose the Jewish state through the ‘right to return’ on the indigenous Arab population of Palestine.” As suggested above, the debate over the rightful ownership of the land of Palestine is a very contentious issue. Zionism, coupled with the ancient historical narrative provides a discourse for the Jewish settlement of the land. So even if the early Zionist pioneers recognised the indigenous population the Zionist discourse provided the necessary justification for action. As Finkelstein explains, the Zionist ideology provided a pre-emptive right to Palestine that outweighed the Arabs residential claim. It is based on the unique Jewish bond with the land; their historical ‘right’ and the belief that the indigenous Arabs were not a separate nation and were therefore part of the wider Arab community, and as a consequence could settle anywhere.

It can be argued that the existence of an indigenous Arab population in Palestine is incompatible with the Zionist discourse, as Zionism requires an ethnic Jewish state that belongs solely to the Jews, implying that non-Jews were not intrinsically part of it. Zionist history suggests that there were no indigenous Palestinian Arab people. As a result Zionist discourse does not recognise their existence. For example, contemporary orthodox Israeli history maintains that when the first Jewish immigrants arrived from Europe in the nineteenth century to Palestine the country was deserted and had no native population. Netanyahu argues, “Up until the twentieth century the name Palestine referred exclusively to the ancient land of the Jews. It has never yet been argued that there existed a Palestinian people after the Jews.” Joan Peters produced an extensive work called From Time Immemorial in which she argues that before Jewish immigration, Palestinian land was a barren and unoccupied land and it is only after the start of Jewish prosperity when Arab migration to Palestine began. This historical argument produced the Zionist rallying

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43 Shlaim suggests that Herzl recognised that an Arab population already lived on the land that they intended to settle. Herzl’s envoys are believed to have said, “The bride is beautiful but she is married to another man.” Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, p.3.
cry “a land without a people for a people without a land.” An important implication for the Palestinian people from this Zionist belief of non-existence is that the Palestinians are not seen as people rooted to the land of Palestine but instead as rootless Arabs and part of the wider nomadic Arab continent. This is illustrated by Netanyahu who states, “It was not the Jews who usurped the land from the Arabs but the Arabs who usurped the land from the Jews.”

It also relates to the belief in Zionist discourse that Arabs are generic and can be re-located to anywhere in the region, hence the ‘transfer’ of Palestinians to other Arab states.

Despite these arguments Palestinians existed in the region and were unwilling to submit to Zionism and by the 1920s were becoming increasingly hostile to immigration. Zionism dealt with this problem by widening its discourse to incorporate Revisionist Zionism, which was formulated by Ze’ev Jabotinsky in 1925. Revisionist Zionist discourse provided the justification for the use of force to achieve Zionist objectives. It is a discourse established on the assumption that the Arabs would not peacefully accept the formation of the Jewish state of Eretz Yisrael in Palestine. Flapan, a ‘new historian’ suggests that Jabotinsky implanted in the Jewish psyche the image of the Arab as the mortal enemy and established the idea of inevitability of conflict and the impossibility of a solution except by sheer force. Shlaim also points out that Jabotinsky wrote an article entitled ‘The Iron wall’ in which he suggested revisionist theory understood that the Arabs would never voluntarily give up land they saw as their own. He therefore recommended settlement by the use of force to construct a metaphorical iron wall, which they would be powerless to break down.

The principal implications of employing the revisionist discourse is that it provides a framework for dealing with the Palestinian Arab problem by suggesting

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48 Interestingly Pappe suggests of this period that Zionist history is so adept that it creates the impression that the struggle of Zionism is only against the British Mandate. Pappe, ‘Academic Debate,’ p.32.
49 This right wing movement contrasted with the Zionism of Chaim Weizmann who advocated the Labourite approach of economic and social development by immigration and settlement. Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, p.10.
50 Ironically Shlaim suggests that it was in the struggle of the Irgun and Lehi groups and the drive of Ben Gurion against the British Mandate in the events leading up to 1948 that fully established the combative spirit of Zionism, he calls this ‘fighting Zionism.’ Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, p.25.
52 This is quoted from and is the title of Shlaim’s ‘new history’ of the Israeli-Arab conflict in which he argues that the iron wall approach has been a continuous Israeli policy since Jabotinsky, Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, p.12.
that the Palestinians do not want peace, will never accept the Israeli state and seek both its destruction and that of its people. This discourse allows Zionism to take by force what they perceive is rightfully theirs and subjugate the opposition. It can also serve to reinforce any number of Israeli policies especially involving domestic and foreign security decisions, as it can generate a climate of fear within the Jewish population by employing a positivist approach to Palestinian and Arab violence. It also allows the Israel space in which to pursue the objectives of Zionism, such as justifying violence in defence of their land and reoccupation and settlement of others. The Zionist discourse, as Finkelstein points, out requires the existence of a Jewish state which belongs to the Jews, non-Jewish inhabitants are not part of this and are therefore not only superfluous but antithetical and a threat to Zionism.53 This implies that the transfer or expulsion of indigenous non-Jewish people from the land of the Jews is a legitimate action under the revisionist discourse.54

This vision of Zionism is one that represents the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and when confronted with opposition to this objective, employs armed struggle to achieve it. The Zionist discourse also generates and employs its own historical narrative to justify these policies and actions as Jewish and Israeli action is enshrined in its own Zionist legitimacy, which justifies employing terrorism, violence and conflict to achieve the aims and objectives of Zionism. The construction and employment of the Zionist discourse is designed and intended to achieve its aims by whatever means are necessary and therefore exists at the very core of the conflict. As Aggestam suggests, “History lessons, experience, analogical reasoning, cognitive beliefs, and Zionism constitute a major part of the ideological belief from which conflict is evaluated and legitimised.”55

53 Finkelstein, Image and Reality, p.15.
54 This is another highly contentious issue, and is the basis for the refugee debate between traditional Zionists, Palestinians and New historians, which centres on cause of the Palestinian refugee problem, thus was it active Zionist policy or did the Palestinian and Arab leadership encourage the exodus? For an example of the debate see Morris, Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem.
Palestinianism

Palestinianism or Palestinian Nationalism is the other principal discourse in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and like Zionism can also be seen as an identity discourse. Edward Said argued that it is the key not only to understanding the existence of the Palestinian people but also the conflict with Israel. He suggests the principal tenets of Palestinian Identity are built upon the need for repossess of the land and realisation of Palestinian statehood.\textsuperscript{56} Acceptance of the discourse of Palestinianism is an acceptance of the assumptions upon which it is based. These include, territory, identity, history, culture and religion. Palestinianism is not only a reaction against Zionism and British imperialism but also against the wider Arab world; it is an expression of a collective and individual entity. Schultz points out that there is no single understanding of the phenomena and suggests that Palestinian Nationalism can be understood by employing a number of different discourses, from ethnographic, through religious to nationalistic.\textsuperscript{57} The intention in this section is to examine the construction of the discourse by investigating its historical and ideological roots. It is important to stress that Palestinian Nationalism is an evolving ideology. Many of the key developments occur during and after 1948 (these will be discussed in later sections).

The Palestinian historical narrative proposes that Palestinianism as a discourse originated during the end of the Ottoman Empire. Muslih suggests that after the final defeat of the Ottomans the old Arab order of political allegiance to the dynastic sovereign of the Islamic state was gradually replaced by one of allegiance to the country in which one lived.\textsuperscript{58} The beginning of this movement was the appearance of political Arabism in 1908-14 in response to growing Turkish nationalism; typified by

\textsuperscript{57} Schultz provides a useful list of the various studies into Palestinian Nationalism and the different academic perspectives employed. See, Schultz H.L., \textit{The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism}, Manchester: Manchester university Press, 1999, p.3.
\textsuperscript{58} Muslih M., ‘\textit{Arab Politics and the Rise of Palestinian Nationalism.}’ Journal of Palestinian Studies. Summer 87, 16, no.4, p.77-8.
the 1908 young Turks revolt.\textsuperscript{59} The young Turks revolt is significant for the development of Palestinianism because it freed press censorship for the Arab people and made them able to express and distribute their grievances in print. According to Muslih, "The press was the single most effective vehicle through which the Palestinians could make their views known...especially in opposition to Zionism."\textsuperscript{60} Morris called the revolt a watershed, and suggests that from this period onwards the Arab resistance to the Zionist project becomes nationalistic;\textsuperscript{61} this is the beginning of a recognised Palestinian identity.

Arabism was soon replaced by Arab Nationalism, which was drawn into the vacuum created by the crumbling Ottoman Empire after the defeat in the First World War. Arab Nationalism also gained in stature following the McMahon-Husain agreement\textsuperscript{62} and the decision by the Arabs under Faisal to begin a revolt against the Turks in 1916. Although these nationalist movements were based on western ideas and those enshrined in the individual state, such as self-determination and individual rights and freedoms, Muslih points out that Arab Nationalism envisioned the establishment of a pan-Arab system based on a united Greater Syria.\textsuperscript{63} However, at the end of the war the hopes of Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism were frustrated by the emergence of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement,\textsuperscript{64} which included the creation of the British mandate in Palestine in 1922.

This historical narrative suggests that Arab Nationalism not only emerged as an ideological discourse but also was actively fought for. Although it is argued that the Arab campaign did not play a large role in the overall military effort,\textsuperscript{65} the important implication for the Arab Nationalist discourse was that it was both

\textsuperscript{59} Arab nationalism was reform of Arab rights within the Ottoman Empire inspired by the Young Turks revolt in 1908, this event is often seen as the beginning of Arab Nationalism. Muslih, 'Arab Politics and Palestinian Nationalism,' p.78. Interestingly it is also seen as the beginning of open Jewish-Arab conflict. See Shafir G, Land, Labour and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.202. Quoted in Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.128.

\textsuperscript{60} Muslih M, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p3


\textsuperscript{62} For the complete document see, Laqueur W, Rubin B, (eds) The Israeli-Arab Reader, London: Penguin, fourth ed, 1984, p.15. In this agreement the British promised to support the emancipation of the Arabs if the Arabs joined the War against the Turks. See Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.146.

\textsuperscript{63} Muslih, 'Arab Politics and Palestinian Nationalism,' p.78.

\textsuperscript{64} For a copy of the original document see Laqueur and Rubin (eds), Israeli-Arab Reader, p.12. This was a secret agreement concluded between the British and the French to carve up the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire in-line with pre-war spheres of interest. See, Morris B, Righteous Victims. p.33.

\textsuperscript{65} See, Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict p.146.
recognised and employed by the Arabs and the British. This narrative also suggests
the existence of an independent Palestinian identity not only within the wider Arab
world but also within the Ottoman Empire. The implication is the existence,
recognition and use of Palestinian identity discourse, not only by the Palestinians and
the British but also by the wider Arab world. This historical narrative also implies the
employment of Palestinian Nationalist discourse, especially in opposition to Zionism,
and particularly in the light of the Feisal-Weizmann agreement. The establishment
of the British mandate effectively established the internal and external territorial
boundaries of Palestine, thus shaping in physical reality, a national identity
particularly at a time when Arab identity was in transition from Ottoman control. On
this point it could be argued that Arab Nationalism was created by the post-war
agreements. According to Morris “National movements and identities soon congealed
in each mandated territory, each pressing for statehood despite common bonds of
language, culture and history.” Arguably the most important political trigger for
Palestinian nationalism was the Balfour Declaration 1917, which effectively
sanctioned the establishment of a Jewish national State in Palestine. Palestinianism
can therefore be understood through three different and seemingly contradictory but
paradoxically complimentary processes; Identity, Nationalism and Pan-Arabism. By
examining each of these individually I intend to construct a picture of the discourse of
Palestinianism.

Identity, according to Schultz, is associated with ethnic and cultural identity in
social organisation and relates to the relative understanding of the self and the other. Sayigh suggests that at the beginning of the mandate period, Palestinian social
structure comprised of a fragmented mass base of agricultural peasants under the
control of two potentially ruling groups competing for British patronage, the
indigenous Palestinian elites and the Zionist leadership. Despite the homogenous
and compact nature of Palestinian society, according to Muslih the political identity of
the peasant majority still functioned according to the Ottoman patronage through

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66 For a copy of the original document see, Laqueur and Rubin (eds), *Israeli-Arab Reader*, p.18. This
agreement between Faisal and Weizmann was viewed by the Palestinian Arabs as a betrayal and trade
of a Palestinian state to the Zionists in return for financial resources and political influence. See,
Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* p.150, for a more detailed explanation.
67 Morris B, *Righteous Victims*, p.34.
68 For a copy of the original document see, Laqueur and Rubin (eds), *The Israeli-Arab Reader*, p.17.
family, tribal and regional loyalties and had little grasp of Palestinian national identity. The political elites were influenced by national consciousness. These elites, he suggests, could be divided into two groups, the Old Ottoman leaders and urban elites who wanted Palestinian independence and the Young leaders not of the Ottoman period who sought Arab unity in greater Syria. Effectively Palestinian identity stood at a threshold, the majority of peasants were still in the old system whilst the elites were looking progressively forward.

The catalyst for change it seems was Zionism, which initiated a major economic and social transformation. According to Kimmerling and Migdal. Jewish land purchase and investment strengthened the economy and led to extensive redevelopment of commerce, industry and infrastructure. The implication of this was the dislocation of Palestinian peasants from the land, increasing urbanisation, unemployment and radicalisation. This led to a growing discontent and realisation of the threat posed by Zionism to Palestinian identity and society. Consequently, “the notion of a cohesive society with a unique history, its members facing common threats and a shared future gained increasing acceptance among Palestinian Arabs in the interwar years.” This narrative suggests that the Palestinian identity discourse was increasingly accepted within Palestinian society as a reaction to a perceived threat, and can be directly associated with incidents of Palestinian violence becoming more widespread. This is typified by the growth of Islamic resistance groups, populated from the urban slums, the most important of which was led by Sheikh al-Qassam. The consequence of this was the establishment of Palestinian identity in the form of violent resistance groups such as the Black Hand, political nationalist groups such as Istiqlal and the institutionalisation of heroes and martyrs for the cause, such as al-Qassam. As Khalidi suggests, “The resistance of Palestinian

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71 Muslih, Origins, p.175.
72 Muslih, Origins, p.155.
74 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.27.
75 Sheikh al-Qassam was a militant nationalist who organised direct action against the Zionists, he preached Jihad and is believed to have established militant groups such as the Black Hand, he was killed by British Police in 1935 and is a major icon of the Palestinian struggle. See Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.146.
76 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.27.
77 Istdlqal or the independence party was formed in 1932 with an agenda for independence and Pan-Arabism. See Morris B, Righteous Victims, p.125.
78 al-Qassam was killed by British Police in 1935. Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.146.
peasants to Jewish settlers underlines the role of the peasants in making Zionism central to Arab political discourse."^{79} The second discourse of Palestinianism or Palestinian Nationalism is the generation of the understanding of the existence of Palestine as an independent state which in effect builds on identity discourse. Muslih suggests that the generation of the discourse for an independent state in Palestine has its roots in western ideas, "patriotism, nationhood, sovereignty, self-determination and loyalty to a specific territory greatly affected Palestinian development."^{80} Palestinian nationalist discourse was employed to counter the imperialism of the British Mandate,^{81} and the nationalist threat posed by Zionism, which from the outset intended to establish a state in the European form. This outcome was supported by the British^{82} as nationalism is an internationally recognised discourse for the protection of identity because "it provides collective security and is emancipatory, inclusive and exclusive."^{83} The implications for employing this nationalist discourse are central to the roots of Palestinian-Israeli conflict as it can be viewed as a clash of nationalism, two seemingly incompatible identities in one territory.

The last part of Palestinianism under examination is Arabism. In this discourse Palestinian identity gravitates to pan-Arabism and the establishment of a single Arab state, similar in respects to the Ottoman Empire. Arabism is based upon similarities in culture, language, religion, history and ultimately identity. Although most scholars agree that Palestinians largely abandoned this discourse in the late 1930s because of the intensity of the localised struggle between the Palestinians, Zionists and the British,^{84} it is nevertheless an important discourse and a part of Palestinianism that reoccurs throughout its contemporary history. The implication of using this discourse for Palestinianism is to focus on the Arab world to establish and protect Palestinian identity, which potentially brings the Arab states into conflict with both Zionism and the British.

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80 Muslih, Origins, p.224.
81 It is also possible to argue that Palestinian Nationalism developed after the collapse of Faisal’s kingdom and the anti-imperialist revolts in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. See, Flapan Zionism and the Palestinians, p.55.
82 Morris suggests that Lloyd George saw the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine very useful in strategic terms. See Morris B, Righteous Victims, p.72.
83 Schultz argues that Nationalism is inclusive because it embraces the in-group and exclusive because it excludes the out-group. Schultz, Reconstruction, p.6.
84 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.94.
Palestinianism was an evolving discourse comprising of three main processes. Identity, Nationalism and Arabism, which developed from the late nineteenth century among the Palestinians due to various internal and external influences. It became the main element in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Muslih suggests that this is due to an ideological and institutional shift of political loyalty from tribal to national. It can be argued however that one event above all others at this time served to bring together all the elements of Palestinianism together and acted as the mainspring for Palestinianism. This was the Arab Revolt of 1936. It began as a series of spontaneous outbreaks of communal violence and waves of strikes and civil unrest, directed by the Palestinians at the Zionists and the British. Although it is suggested that these actions were spontaneous grassroots behaviour, the activities were eventually coordinated by the hastily convened Higher Arab Committee, which demanded that, “The British Government introduce basic changes to stop Jewish immigration.” The spontaneous strikes became a general strike and widespread popular demonstrations and riots became increasingly violent coupled with concerted guerrilla activity, all of which typified a period of sustained civil disorder until it was resolutely and progressively put down by the British by 1939.

Employing the discourse of Palestinianism it is possible to understand the cause of ‘the Great Arab revolt’ as the first organized expression of Palestinian identity. For Palestinian Nationalism it was, “the most sustained phase of militant anti-imperialism in the Arab world to date.” Kimmerling and Migdal suggest it is “the first sustained uprising of the Palestinian national movement and no event is more momentous in Palestinian History.” The implications from this for the development of the Palestinian national movement are quite extensive. There is little doubt that the revolt politicised all levels of the already uneasy Arab community, and

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85 Muslih, Origins, p.211.
86 Higher Arab Committee was a committee of representatives from the six main Palestinian political parties; it was headed by al-Aij Amin the Mufti of Jerusalem. Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.231.
88 Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.231-2.
89 Although the Palestinians call it ‘the Great Arab revolt’ it is also referred to as the ‘Peasant Rebellion’ in reflection of the predominant involvement of uprooted peasants and the poor urban classes, symptomatic of the previously discussed social and economic upheaval in Palestine during the mandate period. See, Schultz, Reconstruction, p.6.
90 Sayigh, Palestinians, p.43.
91 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.96.
was channelled into support of Palestinianism. The general unrest caused by the British Occupation, Zionist expansionism and chronic socio-economic difficulties mobilised the masses to the cause of Palestinian Nationalism. Schultz suggests the revolt crystallised Palestinian political identity and created a nation.92

Following the defeat and harsh British repression of the revolt, Palestinian forces were considerably weakened, especially the leadership elements, which lost its central command and authority.93 The implications of this are obvious to the fighting Palestinian elements, but equally as significant, the isolated Palestinian communities and villages lost their local leadership and organisation and became dislocated, isolated and vulnerable.94 This development represented the loss of security of identity that Palestinianism was supposed to provide. Hence, the overwhelming power of the British and growing strength of the Zionists caused the Palestinians to look to other Arab nations for assistance and protection, thus suggesting a re-emergence of Arabism. The Arab Revolt also had implications for the Zionists. Most importantly, it radicalised the Zionist opposition and developed into almost open warfare. Smith suggests that as a result the Zionists adopted terrorist tactics equal to the Arabs and begun to prepare for concerted resistance against the Arabs and the British.95 It illustrated to the Zionist leadership the nature of the conflict they could expect with the Arabs, and justified the development of revisionist Zionism as a reaction to Palestinian intransigence and resistance to their aims. This recognition of the core of the conflict was summed up by Ben Gurion, who is quoted as saying "There is a fundamental conflict, they and we both want the same thing – Palestine."96

The outcome of the Arab Revolt for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was to create the conflict structure. The violence that was generated established the framework in which the modern conflict exists as both the Palestinian Arabs and the Jews established their diverging positions and entrenched adversarial stances. The Arab Revolt was the beginning of the modern Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It became clear to both communities that each other’s intentions were incompatible. By 1939

92 Schultz, Reconstruction, p.29.
93 Morris suggests between 3-6,000 Palestinians were killed and up to 6,000 detained by the British. Furthermore the Mufti of Jerusalem al-Aij Amin, who was also head of the Higher Arab Committee, fled to Lebanon. See, Morris, Righteous Victims, p156.
94 Kinnerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.115.
96 Quoted in, Shlaim, Iron Wall, p.18.
both nationalist ideologies had taken form and moved to adversarial positions. They employed incompatible and conflicting nationalist discourses that were given corroboration by the generation of the cycle of violence by both sides during the Arab Revolt. Both discourses are therefore crucial to understanding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The events discussed above constitute the historical background to understanding the causes of the violence and whilst they are central to the roots of conflict they continue to develop and crystallize further causes of violence after 1948. I now intend to examine in Part 2 the principal contemporary historical events of the conflict and their implications for understanding the roots of the conflict and terrorism. These events are the major conflicts between the Palestinians and Israelis since 1948 and include, the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, International conflict, the Lebanon War. and the first and second Intifadas.

Part 2

Application of Conflict Discourses

1948 – The First Arab-Israeli War

On the May 14 1948 Ben Gurion the Jewish Prime Minister declared the existence of the State of Israel. This was the culmination of a bitter civil war with the British and the Palestinians, which was characterised by guerrilla warfare and an increasingly severe cycle of violence. Smith calls it a period of terror and atrocity by both sides in a cycle of attack and retaliation in which there was little regard for non-combatants or women and children. The declaration of a state by Israel was also the precursor to a conventional war with the regional Arab states of Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq from May 1948 to May 1949, in which Jewish forces repulsed the invasion and prevailed militarily to achieve their aim of an independent Jewish national state. The roots of the war, it can be argued, were in the Arab revolt of 1936 and the realisation by the Palestinians and the Israelis that they faced conflict over

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97 Smith *Palestine*, p.141.
their incompatible claims to the land of Palestine, which at the time was under British control. However, in the aftermath of World War two, an exhausted Britain could no longer sustain conflict with the Jews and Palestinians nor devise an acceptable solution and so handed the problem over to the UN, before withdrawing completely.99 The UN then devised a partition plan, but drawn into the vacuum of the departing British occupation were two increasingly militarised communities.

The effect of the British withdrawal from Palestine was to remove the last structural constraint to civil war; the communities were now able to wage unrestrained open conflict. However, the UN General Assembly, by proposing a partition plan, brought into being a two state discourse and the possibility of two independent nations in a divided Palestine.100 Two other Second World War factors were also important in shaping the war. First was the role of the United States; as Smith suggests without American help the UN would not have accepted the Israeli state.101 Second is the effect of the Holocaust, which was extremely influential in strengthening the Zionist case for the formation of independent Jewish state, not only in Palestine but also throughout the modern world. The Holocaust internationalised the plight of the Jews. It also had the physical effect of motivating mass immigration to Palestine from central and Eastern Europe. With these new conflict dynamics the historical events of the First Arab-Israeli war unfolded and ended with the existence of an independent Jewish National state and a defeated and fractured Palestinian community surrounded by defeated and scornful Arab countries.

The war of 1948 is known to the Israelis as the war of Independence or liberation, and occupies a fundamental position in the historical roots of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Despite the fact that the majority of the fighting was against the Arabs, the Israeli historical narrative records it as a “war of liberation,” against the British. As Pappe points out “Israeli terminology of the war is constructed carefully so as to confer upon Zionism the equivalent status of a third world liberation

99 Morris includes a quote by Ernst Bevin the British Prime minister who said, “We are unable to accept the scheme put forward by either the Arabs or the Jews or to impose ourselves, a solution of our own.” Morris, Righteous Victims, p.186.
100 Prior to the UN plan, an Anglo-American Inquiry in 1946 had decided that Palestine should remain a single country and recommended a bi-national solution with equal rights for Arabs and Jews. This however was incompatible with the aims of both parties and also the British, as it recommended a continuation of the mandate. For a copy of the original document see, Laqueur and Rubin (eds), The Israeli-Arab Reader, pp.84 -94.
101 On 29 November 1948 the UN voted 33/3 with 10 abstentions for the partition of Palestine and the recognition of the Jewish Independent State, Smith suggests that victory at the UN was won in the US by the so-called Jewish bloc vote. See Smith, Palestine, p.135.
movement.” This serves to justify and legitimise the conflict for Zionism and is the basis for the modern historical narrative of the Zionist discourse, which is intended to incorporate legitimacy and justice. It is especially relevant to the terrorist tactics employed by the Jewish underground organisations such as the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organisation) and Lehi or Stern group (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) who incorporated national liberation into the Zionist discourse in order to legitimise and justify terrorist attacks. Ian Lustick argues that the Jewish terrorist groups employed solipsistic violence, which was intended to inspire and motivate the Jewish people.

Violence is an integral factor in the application of the discourse of Zionism: it is the practice of the discourse and is linked inextricably to the foundation of the Israeli national psyche characterised by an oppressed and subjugated Jewish people struggling against adversity to regain what is rightfully theirs. The application of the Zionist discourse in 1948 and the subsequent enshrinement of these events into the Israeli historical memory configure the Israeli self-image, and as Pappe argues, still shape national myths as it is seen as “the culmination of the teleological process of redemption and renaissance of the Jewish people.” The national psyche of the Jewish people went through a transformation in 1948 and engaged the Zionist discourse that is now enshrined in the national psyche. This was a culmination and realisation of the ancient historical roots of the Zionist discourse that promised the Jews Palestine ever since the Romans drove them out into a life of exile as the Diaspora. Since then, until the moment of statehood, they have continually been persecuted and humiliated, have been unable to defend themselves and have become a weak and subservient people. This is personified by the Holocaust. The Zionist discourse portrays the events of 1948 as the resurrection and re-establishment of the

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102 Pappe, ‘Academic Debate,’ p.32
103 For example, the Irgun bombed the King David hotel in Jerusalem in 1946, which was being used as a British military headquarters ninety-one people were killed. At the end of this year Irgun and the Stern claimed to have killed 373 (300 of whom were civilians). See Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.231-2.
strength of the Jewish people and is demonstrated by the portrayal in Israeli historical narrative of a tiny Israeli David that overcame against all probability, the attack of the mighty Arab Goliath.\(^{107}\)

The war of 1948 in the discourse of Zionism was for the newborn Israel, a fight to defend the state and its people, a fight to live or die. The Israeli national psyche was transformed from a self-image of non-violent, persecuted and meek people into assertive, aggressive and a violently defensive nation, who realised that after generations of suffering they no longer had to be subservient and could defend themselves and their people. This discourse was substantiated by the war of independence against the British and Arabs. It also provided positivist evidence of the Zionist discourse by clearly demonstrating the aggression of the Arab nations and their intention to destroy the Israeli state and the Jewish People. The implications of this can be seen in the Israeli preoccupation with state security, defence and self-protection, such as the formation of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). This fear of domination and fight for self defence can also be seen as a continuation of the ancient historical narrative of Massada,\(^{108}\) and the modern history of the Holocaust: never again will the Jewish people suffer at the hands of another, all of which positively endorse Zionism.

The discourse of Zionism following its application in 1948 began incorporating defensive connotations. Zionism, whilst an aggressive discourse, was now manipulated to provide justification for actions to defend and consolidate the Israeli state. Aggressive actions by the IDF within the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are classed by Israel as defensive or pre-emptive actions. This aggressive attitude, Finkelstein argues, is also apparent in the settler mentality, as Zionism reasons conquest of the land as forcefully reclaiming and violently defending rightful

\(^{107}\) Herzog suggests the Israeli war of Independence was a Jewish population of 650,000 ranged against a Palestinian Arab population of 1.1 million surrounded by 7 million in the Arab armies. Herzog C, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1982, p.11. However, these events do form the basis of the historiography debate, as Flapan argues that the Israeli forces were better trained and more experienced and thus far superior in weapons on land sea and air that the Arab forces. Flapan, *Birth of Israel*, p.18. Furthermore, Shlaim suggests that the Arabs fielded 25,000 troops compared to the 35,000, which increased to 65,000 Jewish troops, Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, p.33, also see. Morris, *Righteous Victims*, p.192.

\(^{108}\) According to Israeli ancient narrative after the second Jewish rebellion in 73 BCE. a band of zealous Jews held out at the desert fortress of Masada. However, preferring death to submission they took their own lives, this is seen as a symbol of the Jewish desire for independence and their willingness to stand up against the outside world. From, Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, p.13.
This policy of aggressive defence was also identified by Morris who suggests that it is illustrated by the implementation by Israel of Plan D during the war of independence to aggressively "secure all areas allocated under the UN settlement including Arab villages." Coupled with this doctrinal development in Israel was the professionalisation of the Israeli military. According to Morris, the Haganah transformed from a semi-underground militia into a fully-fledged national army. A national belief emerged in the power of the Israeli state through the strength of the military, giving the Israeli state a military dominance of the region and enabling it to pursue its Zionist agenda. As the Palestinian scholar Sayigh argues, "Israeli military and political power became a dominant factor and aided the Zionist states land clearance and displacements, as the surrounding Arab governments were powerless to stop it." Zionism and the Israeli state was established, enforced and protected by military power. As a result the Israeli state is built on military power and is a completely militarised society. This is the basis upon which it exercises its political will, which can also be justified as a positivist vindication of Zionist discourse, especially in relation to the "Iron wall" and "revisionism." The events of 1948 established the Israeli state and Zionism and out of this violence created a cohesive and homogeneous society that realised they were able to defend themselves and achieve their political objectives through the use of violence. Morris calls this the "national collective."

The war of 1948 exists in the Palestinian historical narrative as al-Nakba or the catastrophe. Despite organised Palestinian resistance, the invasion of the Arab states and the UN partition plan for two separate states, the Palestinians did not gain independence; instead their society was shattered. First by the civil war with the Jewish community, and then by the effects of the entry of Arab states into the war, particularly Jordan and Egypt, who invaded and occupied the West Bank including

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109 Finkelstein calls the 'defensive ethos' the sustaining myth of Zionism and thus argues it is a mask for a mission of conquest, Finkelstein, Image and Reality, p.99.
110 Morris, Righteous Victims, p.31.
111 During the period of the British Mandate, Zionist forces consisted of the terrorist groups Irgun and Lehi or Stern group as well as the Haganah (defence in Hebrew) who were the pre-state army. Herzog Arab-Israeli Wars, p.11.
112 Morris, Righteous Victims, p.236.
113 Sayigh, Palestinians, p.98.
115 Morris, Righteous Victims, p.192.
East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip respectively.\textsuperscript{116} All of this, according to Kimmerling and Migdal, led to the virtual disappearance of Palestinian society.\textsuperscript{117} as those who remained were subsumed by the new Jewish state or the Arab neighbours and those who fled were dislocated in a mass exodus to the Arab states \textsuperscript{118} and beyond. They become known as the Palestinian refugee problem.\textsuperscript{119}

The disaster of 1948, compounded with the defeated revolt of 1936, is at the core of the Palestinian historical narrative as a principal cause of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and was a huge setback for the discourse of Palestinianism. For the Palestinians, 1948 was a humiliating military defeat, it led to the enormous loss of Palestinian land (including west Jerusalem) to the Israeli state, and also led to the creation of a refugee problem in which the once complete Palestinian nation was fragmentated to exist as Diasporas in various refugee camps with no right of return. The Palestinian national psyche was deeply affected by the war; this had a similar degrading effect on Palestinianism. Kimmerling and Migdal suggest, “in place of society and self-worth, the Palestinians believe they are victims of an immense conspiracy and monumental injustice.”\textsuperscript{120} They felt great anger at the Zionists for forcibly taking their homeland and scattering their community, and also bitterness at the Arab states for failing to defend them whilst also occupying their land. Rosemary Sayigh suggests that these losses penetrated deep into Palestinian psychology. She points out that a sense of isolation developed that was compounded by family disruption and separation, and coupled with the sense of shame and loss of respect and status that accompanied land ownership, had a deep cultural impact on the Palestinian communities.\textsuperscript{121} Yezid Sayigh highlights the fact that the loss of land and other means of production undermined the sense of identity in a predominantly

\textsuperscript{116} This continued until 1967.
\textsuperscript{117} Kimmerling and Migdal suggest that 350 Palestinian villages vanished, urban life evaporated for example, the population of Jaffa decreased from 70-80,000 to 3-4,000 and 500,000-1 million became refugees. Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.128.
\textsuperscript{118} Palestinian refugees established camps in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq. Smith Palestine, p.146.
\textsuperscript{119} The cause of Palestinian Refugee problem is one of the principal subjects of the historiography debate. The Palestinian narrative suggests it was a Zionist policy to actively relocate the Population and point to massacres such as Dair Yasin as proof, whereas the Israelis suggest Arab leaders called upon Palestinians to leave. Morris in his extensive study suggests there were between 6-700,000 refugees between December 1947 and September 1949 and concludes diplomatically that the problem was “born of war, not by design.” See Morris, Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1988.
\textsuperscript{120} Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.129.
\textsuperscript{121} Sayigh, Palestinians, p.124.
agrarian society and removed sources of autonomous wealth and economic reproduction.\textsuperscript{122}

This created a Palestinian national self-image of humiliated and unjustly disposed victims. Benny Morris calls this a “psychosis of flight.”\textsuperscript{123} The events of 1948 according to Sayigh were both “centrifugal and centripetal” in that it scattered the Palestinian national population whilst simultaneously forming small exiled communities who had no identity, security, rights or recognition.\textsuperscript{124} Kimmerling and Migdal suggest that the events of al-Nakba for the Palestinian nation meant they became characterised as a camp society alongside city populations in the West bank and Gaza, and a scattering of satellite communities in other countries.\textsuperscript{125} The implications of this were to create concentrations of Palestinian people with extreme grievances, who could arguably be motivated and radicalised into conflict. The war of 1948 crystallized Palestinian national identity and created a distinct identity based upon the common experience of loss. This focused on the right to return and the demand for a state.\textsuperscript{126} According to Edward Said, “Behind every Palestinian there is a general fact: that he once lived in a land of his own called Palestine.”\textsuperscript{127}

Despite the common cause, after 1948 the Palestinian community was leaderless. scattered and broken and without doubt effectively marginalised from any position of influence or authority in the region until at least 1967. The implications of this for Palestinianism was its increasing marginalisation to the growing predominance of the Arab states in representing the Palestinians community, especially as the Palestinians in their weakened state looked to the Arab states for leadership and resolution of their problems. Sayigh points to the growth of the appeal of Pan-Arabism among Palestinians after 1948.\textsuperscript{128} However, the centrality of solving the Palestinian issue in the agendas of the Arab states needs to be questioned, as it can be argued that the discourse of Palestinianism was dangerous to the other Arab

\textsuperscript{123} Morris, Righteous Victims, p.255.
\textsuperscript{124} Sayigh Y, ‘Armed Struggle and State Formation,’ p.18. This was true both inside and outside the Israeli state, as Palestinians became pariahs of the Arab world. See Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.156.
\textsuperscript{125} Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.156.
\textsuperscript{127} Said, Question of Palestine, p.115. Furthermore, many second generation refugees when asked where they come from, name the region in Israel where there parents / grandparents once lived, some also still carry the key to their houses round their necks…Field Notes.
\textsuperscript{128} Sayigh Y, ‘Armed Struggle and State Formation,’ p.18.
States.\textsuperscript{129} However, issues within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict such as the refugee situation, Arab public opinion vis-à-vis the Israeli state and the status of Jerusalem, greatly concerned the Arab states.\textsuperscript{130} The post-1948 Palestinian-Israeli conflict became a state conflict between Israel and the Arab states over security, and the Palestinians, practically a political nonentity after 1948, were marginalised even further.

The central implications of the events of 1948 are the creation and recreation of modern self-images and national psyches in both communities, which have the effect of crystallizing conflict attitudes. The Jewish people performed a transformation and an effective reversal of their historical national psyche. They enacted the Zionist discourse and rediscovered their strength through the aggressive projection of military power, and realised that by the use of violence they could not only realise their political objectives but also successfully defend them. This identity-based unity of purpose was coupled with the image of a united leadership and cohesion in society that bonded the community into an organized and structured state, based on the dominance of force. In comparison the Palestinians self-image and national psyche was transformed into humiliated and unjustly disposed victims as their deep sense of loss, humiliation, and defeat, became established into the Palestinian historical memory. The Palestinian people although unified in their common sense of loss were transferred into a scattered and broken refugee community and became a nonentity in their ‘own’ land and that of others.

\textbf{1956 – The Second Arab-Israeli War}

The period from 1949 to 1956 in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be seen as a war of attrition, characterised by cross-border violence and low-intensity conflict between the Arab nations and the newly formed state of Israel. Smith calls this, "not

\textsuperscript{129} Although this is probably the subject of separate study, within the context of the events of 1948 it is possible to suggest collusion between the Arabs and Israelis. For example Shlaim suggests "King Abdullah (of Jordan) and the Zionists saw in each other a means to an end." Implying that Jordan would trade the occupation of the West Bank for the Israeli state. Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.29.

\textsuperscript{130} Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.50.
war, yet not peace situation,” a “state of belligerency.”131 This period however culminated in the Suez War, when Egypt under Nasser moved to nationalise the Suez Canal. Israel responded by invading the Sinai, causing Britain and France to then intervened against Egypt to secure the canal. The result of the war was a further humiliating defeat for Egypt and the Arab world and a complete military success for Israel, which gained Gaza temporarily and the Sinai permanently.

This war has a number of implications for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; perhaps the most important is the virtual disappearance of the Palestinians from the historical narrative. Despite the ongoing Palestinian refugee situation, which often triggered ‘border’ violence. The Palestinians were marginalised as a non-state group and as such were only recognised as Arabs from their particular host state, such as Jordan or Egypt. The Suez war further demonstrated the predominance of the Westphalian system in the Middle East, as the situation was now largely viewed as a state based Arab-Israeli conflict. Suez also illustrated the declining authority of Britain and France and the growing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union, as the Middle East states began to polarise.132 The Palestinian-Israeli conflict although central to the violence in the region became subsumed and subordinate to the wider state concerns of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which in turn became an arena for conducting the Cold War. Nevertheless, there are important implications from the 1956 war for the Palestinian and Israeli conflict discourses.

The perception of the Suez campaign according to the Zionist discourse is one of a defensive and just war that achieved all its operational objectives, including the defeat of Egypt, the reopening of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and to end guerrilla attacks on the southern border.133 This suggests an Israeli security policy that focused on the high intensity threat of war posed by the neighbouring Arab states and the low intensity threat of border incursions. Accordingly, Schultz suggests that Israeli security was the priority and became progressively pro-active and pre-emptive.134 This period shows a continuation of the preoccupation of the Zionist discourse with creating and maintaining the security of the Israeli state by violence.

For example, Shlaim expounding his ‘Iron Wall’ thesis of Israeli defence policy

131 Smith, Palestine, p.151.
132 In the run up to Suez, Israel and Egypt became locked in an arms race in which Israel was supported by the West, in particular America, whilst Egypt after the failure of the Aswan Dam project looked to the Soviet Union and thus secured a large arms deal with Czechoslovakia.
134 Schulze, Arab-Israeli Conflict, p28.
suggests that Israeli policy makers believed Israeli security was not served by peace or settlement because the Arabs had no interest in it. He argues that Israeli leaders called for a policy of counterforce, which involved the immediate recourse to violence and direct military action as the central doctrine of Arab relations.\textsuperscript{135}

This policy was not just due to the Suez war but also to the period preceding it, which was characterised by border conflicts of increasing intensity. In response, Israel employed a ‘direct action’ security discourse to embark on ‘defensive’ actions, such as the raids on Qibya\textsuperscript{136} Egypt\textsuperscript{137} and Gaza.\textsuperscript{138} The purpose was to secure its borders with the use of force against aggression by Palestinian Arab armed groups and displaced refugees attempting to return home. This had the effect of further militarising and desensitising Israeli society (especially the military). This is illustrated by Shlaim who suggests that during this period the IDF adopted a “free-fire policy” which he suggested displayed “a growing disregard for human lives and barbaric acts that can only be described as war crimes.”\textsuperscript{139}

The employment of the Zionist discourse by Israel, which was intended to provide security and justify the actions taken to secure and defend its borders, had a second function of maintaining the conflict. Although this might seem paradoxical, it can be argued that the ongoing conflict benefited Israeli Zionist objectives, which included securing the existing borders for an ethnically homogenous state and achieving territorial expansion. For a state in perpetual conflict, force can be justified against perceived aggression and land can be occupied for defensive settlements and strategic depth. Also, a peace settlement with the Arabs would imply the surrender of land and the return of refugees, both of which are antithetical to Zionism. Morris

\textsuperscript{135} Shlaim quotes in particular the defence minister Pinhas Lavon and the IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan as proponents of direct action. Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.98.
\textsuperscript{136} In response to an Arab raid, unit 101 commanded by Ariel Sharon attacked the Jordanian village of Qibya in October 1953, most of the village was destroyed and many inhabitants killed. See Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.90.
\textsuperscript{137} In particular Tessler highlights the ‘Lavon Affair’ and the ‘Bat Galim Affair’ as examples of Israeli policy to conduct covert raids in Egypt. See Tessler, \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, pp.342-345.
\textsuperscript{138} In February 1955 Israel conducted an extensive operation in Gaza destroying a number of military targets. This raid is considered the final casus belli of the Suez War for the Egyptians. See Tessler, \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, p.345.
\textsuperscript{139} Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.82. Benny Morris suggests that between 2,700-5,000 infiltrators were killed on the Israeli border between 1949-56. See Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.274.
supports this argument and suggests that Israel sought to provoke the 1956 war with Egypt.\textsuperscript{140}

Although the war was a further humiliating defeat for Egypt, the Palestinians and the other Arab nations, paradoxically it improved the political standing of Egypt and the personal prestige of Nasser within the Arab world as it demonstrated a nation with a leader that could oppose Israel and the West. The second Arab-Israeli war fuelled Nasserism and the desire for pan-Arabism that he championed. From the Palestinian perspective the defeat increased the sense of isolation, frustration and disappointment with the Arab nations to whom the Palestinians continually looked to rectify the situation. Arguably though, whilst the Arab states employed the Palestinian discourse they were driven primarily by their own interests; hence, the assumption that the Arab states intended to fight for the creation of a Palestinian state, needs to be questioned as it might have been contrary to their own security. This is particularly relevant to Jordan at this time. Schulze supports this argument and points out that the Arabs used the Palestinian issue to strengthen their own domestic and regional positions.\textsuperscript{141}

The most important development in this period for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the emergence of the Fedayeen\textsuperscript{142} or irregular Arab fighter. These fighters emerged predominantly from the refugee camps, initially in Gaza and were trained by Egypt. They embarked on continuous cross border guerrilla operations against Israeli military, settler and civilian targets. The implications of this development for the Palestinian conflict are important, as it represents the beginning of coordinated and organised Palestinian military action against Israel and more importantly demonstrates the practice of the discourse of Palestinianism. However, it is not necessarily seen as this by the Westphalian state narrative employed by Israel, which viewed the attacks of the Fedayeen as directly attributable to the state from where they originated, in this case Egypt.\textsuperscript{143} As I argued above, the Zionist state-centric security discourse benefits Israeli security policy because Fedayeen attacks

\textsuperscript{140} Morris also argues that the pre-Suez war collusion between Israel, Britain and France demonstrated the willingness of Israel to establish and cooperate with western allies to generate conflict. Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.281.

\textsuperscript{141} Schulze, \textit{Arab-Israeli Conflict}, p.21.

\textsuperscript{142} Fedayeen means self-sacrificer in Arabic and is often used in the literature as a variation of guerrilla, commando or irregular Arab fighter.

\textsuperscript{143} However, it was not long before Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq soon began to produce their own Fedayeen.
provided Israel with the justification for action against the perceived supplier state. Although this assumption is not without some element of accuracy, as Shlaim points out, Nasser intended to recruit, arm and train the Fedayeen in Gaza in order to conduct a guerrilla war against Israel.\footnote{Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.128.} Tessler suggests that the Fedayeen originated as a response to the continued extremism and provocation of Israel against Palestinians.\footnote{Tessler, \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict} p.346.} The appearance nevertheless, of the Palestinian Fedayeen conducting a low cost proxy war for Egypt can be seen as the beginning of Palestinian armed resistance.

The Sinai-Suez War once again demonstrated the superior military strength of Israel and illustrated the uncoordinated and chronic weakness of the Arab states. It was a Pyrrhic victory for Pan-Arabism and heralded the beginning of Palestinian armed resistance as the Fedayeen. The events also reaffirmed the conflict discourses employed by both sides. To the Israelis the war demonstrated the continued hostility of the Arabs, the necessity for a strong IDF, and vindicated their policies of pre-emption and counter-force security. From the Arab perspective it demonstrated the continued expansion and aggression of the Israelis and reinforced the necessity for armed resistance. The end result of this second round of war was to further radicalise the conflict and establish beyond doubt the irreconcilable conflict discourses employed by both sides.

1967 – Third Arab-Israeli War

On 2 June 1967 Israel launched a devastating attack on Egypt, Jordan and Syria in response to provocative troop movements and border skirmishes.\footnote{Aside from the continual deadly border skirmishes with Egypt, Jordanian and Syrian forces, the main trigger for the war was between Israel and Egypt. Prior to the conflict Egypt requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from Sinai and replaced it with Egyptian troops, and also closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. See Tessler, \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, pp.387-397.} This was the beginning of the third Arab-Israeli war, which ended on 10 June with a ceasefire between a victorious Israel and the defeated Arab states. Although the human losses
on both sides were high, it was the territorial changes that were to have the most far-reaching implications for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. During the course of defeating the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, Israel captured all of the Sinai and the Gaza strip from Egypt, the West Bank and the Old City of Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. Morris put these gains into perspective; "The IDF conquered an area three and a half times larger than Israel with one million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza."

The 1967 war had far reaching implications not just for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict but also for the wider Arab-Israeli conflict and the international situation. The Arab world in defeat was once again imbued with a deep sense of shame and humiliation, the effect of which was a festering anger and intense desire for revenge. But the defeat, far from breaking the resolve of the Arab world made it even more irreconcilable and hostile. A resolution passed at the Arab summit meeting in Khartoum in August 1967 became famous for "the three noes": no peace, no recognition and no negotiation with Israel. The events of the war naturally furthered the state of belligerency that existed between the Arabs and Israel. The 1967 war also had international ramifications for the Cold War as the Soviet Union saw its two principal Middle East client states, Egypt and Syria, defeated by an American ally. Consequently, the Soviet Union sought to rebuild the shattered armed forces of both states. The events of 1967 also prompted the Arab-Israeli conflict to be transferred to the regular session of the UN General Assembly, the outcome of which was one of the most important UN resolutions on the conflict, UN Security Council Resolution 242. This resolution called for the withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied during the recent conflict and the respect and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area. Security Council Resolution 242 effectively enshrined the principle of land for peace or withdrawal of Israel from occupied areas in return for state recognition.

147 Tessler quotes 20,000 Arabs killed of which 11,500 were Egyptian, compared with 766 Israeli dead. Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.397.
148 Morris, Righteous Victims, p.329.
150 It can however be argued that the suggested hostility and irreconcilable intransigence of the Arabs was part of the historical discourse employed by the Israel to show an aggressive Arab world. Tessler argues that Khartoum represented an Arab movement towards diplomacy and political compromise. Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.410.
According to Tessler it “established a coherent framework within which peace could be sought.” \textsuperscript{152} As a result of this the Arab-Israeli conflict became internationalised. Hourani suggests, “The war (1967) left its mark on everyone in the world who identified with Jews or Arabs and what was a local conflict became a world wide one.” \textsuperscript{153}

From the Israeli perspective the Six-Day War, according to Shlaim, was the “most spectacular military victory in Israeli history.” \textsuperscript{154} The war reaffirmed the Israeli Zionist discourse and the conventional understanding of the hostility of the Arab nations towards Israel, as it is perceived by the discourse as a representation of the ‘live or die’ situation in which Israel exists. Morris calls this fight for survival by Israel, “the mortal fear for the existence of the national collective.” \textsuperscript{155} According to Finkelstein the central Israeli rationale for the pre-emptive strike (which he considers a myth) was that Israel faced imminent destruction. \textsuperscript{156} However, the subsequent victory was a vindication of the security provided by Zionist discourse because the Six-Day War is seen as ‘defensive,’ and although it was initiated by Israel it is understood as an example of the importance of the pre-emptive and pro-active security policy and the necessity for a powerful defence force. The implications of this suggest that if the six-day war is perceived in Israeli historical memory as a fight for survival then it is very unlikely they will surrender the occupied land and return to a pre-1967 situation, as this would be a return to the precariousness of the past.

The orthodox Israeli understanding of 1967 further militarised society, facilitated the predominance of the Army in politics, and established the security situation as the primary policy motivation. Golda Meir who famously denied the existence of the Palestinian people\textsuperscript{157} stated, “supreme morality is the right to exist of the Jewish people, without that there is no morality in the world.”\textsuperscript{158} Finkelstein, a critic of Israeli orthodox history, argues that Israel deliberately contrived the preventative war to realise territorial gains.\textsuperscript{159} There is little doubt that Israel made

\textsuperscript{152} Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.421.
\textsuperscript{154} Shlaim, Iron Wall, p.241.
\textsuperscript{155} Morris, Righteous Victims, p.311.
\textsuperscript{156} Finkelstein argues that Israel did not face a significant threat and instead started the war with American acquiescence, with the intention of reducing the pan-Arab power of Nasser and realising territorial desires. See Finkelstein, Image and Reality, pp.141-3.
\textsuperscript{157} Shlaim A, Iron Wall, p310.
\textsuperscript{158} Quoted in Morris, Righteous Victims, p.343.
\textsuperscript{159} Shlaim, Iron Wall, p.241.
enormous gains from the Six-Day War but there should be little surprise that Israel exploited the 1967 war to further annex Palestinian land, as this is fully conversant with the nature of the Zionist discourse. Although this discourse is employed by Israel to maintain Zionist objectives, particularly the security of the state, it could equally imply territorial expansion to increase the strength of the state or land annexation for buffer zones. The question of Israeli territorial expansion is the subject of fierce debate, the Israeli defence minister at the time, Moshe Dayan, stated that there was no objective of conquest.\footnote{Dayan stated that the objective was to frustrate the Arab intention to conquer Israel. Quoted in Morris, Righteous Victims, p.313.} However, revisionist historian Benny Morris suggests that some Army commanders acting without cabinet authorisation tried to drive Palestinians into exile.\footnote{Morris suggests 200-300,000 fled the West Bank and Gaza, whilst 80-90,000 left Golan. see Morris, Righteous Victims, p.327.} Certainly, the aftermath of 1967 saw a second Palestinian refugee crisis\footnote{Although this is also the subject of debate, Tessler suggests that about one quarter of the West Bank’s population fled across the Jordan River. Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.403.} and after the conquest of the Old City of Jerusalem it was stated that the “Israeli people had returned home and would never move out.”\footnote{Morris, Righteous Victims, p.332.}

The new territorial situation is perhaps the most important repercussion of the six-Day War for the Israelis in the context of conflict with the Palestinians. As I have discussed above, Israel’s territorial gains surmounted to fundamental change in Israel in both actual territory and political position. Masalha calls the effect of 1967 a “territorial earthquake” and suggests it transformed Israel from an ethnic Jewish state into a mini empire.\footnote{Masalha, Imperial Israel, p.15.} This is the most important debate and is central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as Israel, by occupying the conquered lands created a buffer zone of strategic depth,\footnote{See Herzog, Arab-Israeli Wars, p.189.} which is fully conversant with the security discourse. However, by occupying this land, Israel had become an imperialist power because within this land are almost one million Palestinians. As a result of this territorial change, a political shift occurred in post-1967 Israel politics, relating to the resurgence of the fundamentalist and predominantly religious right. By employing the revisionist Zionist discourse, the Israeli right are able to claim these new lands to be rightfully annexed as the regions of biblical or greater Israel, namely, Judea, Samaria and Jericho. Masalha suggests that the post-victory triumph of Zionism established a confident, dynamic, semi-military and expansionist settler society, which laid claim to
the occupied territories as part of maximalist territorial expansionism. Although these arguments are employed from a Palestinian perspective, Morris highlights the massive settler movement of soldiers and farmers driven by religious and ideological motives and economic incentives, who moved into the conquered lands to establish Israeli settlements and eventual annexation.

The implications of occupation and annexation of these territories for Israel under the discourse of revisionist Zionism is acceptable policy for the Israeli right. However, for a Jewish state that evolved under the persecution and oppression from others, it can now be seen ironically as one that has become a society that oppresses and persecutes another people. This is a difficult and uncomfortable accusation for the Israeli left. The Palestinian writer Edward Said pointed to this shift when he suggested Israel had changed after 1967 from an “underdog to an overlord.”

This debate represents the dilemma in Israeli politics, and is characterised by the left and right dispute of Labour and Likud over ‘land for peace’ or ‘no surrender.’ Shlaim calls these two intellectual movements the peace movement and the greater Israel movement. The occupation also caused a further problem for Israel, and one which is antithetical to the principles of the Zionist discourse: Israel is intended to be an ethnic Jewish state, yet the existence of one million Palestinian Arabs combined with the existing Arab-Israeli population, create a very serious demographic threat to the ethnic integrity of Israel. This debate accounts for the accusations and occurrences of ‘population transfer,’ which could represent an attempt by the Israeli right to deal with the demographic problem. Masalha suggests population transfer has a deep basis in mainstream Zionist thinking and remerged after 1967.

The effects of 1967 on Israel were very significant but the effect on the Palestinians was even more dramatic. To the Palestinians it is known as the June War and the period leading up to it and the war itself are fundamentally influential in the development of the Palestinianism. This is principally due to the emergence or re-emergence of the Palestinian Issue. As Morris suggests “the events of 1967 demolished the status quo and reawakened Palestinian identity and nationalist

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166 Masalha, Imperial Israel, p.16.
167 Morris, Righteous Victims, p.333.
170 Masalha, Imperial Israel, p.23.
aspirations.” ¹⁷¹ This occurred primarily for two reasons; the first was the defeat of the Arab states and the apparent realisation by the Palestinians that the Arab states were either incapable or unwilling to help them achieve their ultimate aim of a secure homeland, which led them to take up their own armed struggle. Secondly, the effect of the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank was to unite the Palestinian people into the same territory for the first time since 1948. ¹⁷² Initially Palestinian resistance was a tool of foreign policy for the Arab nations, Nasser formed the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 with the principal objective to “right wrongs to their people and dismantle the Zionist entity.” ¹⁷³ Although it was actually created by Egypt as an umbrella organisation for Palestinian resistance groups in order to enable coordination and control of the Fedayeen, it was actually through the existence of this infrastructure that the movement for Palestinian independence was able to develop and further its objective of autonomy, both from the occupation of Israel and from the control of the Arab states. Sela argues that the impetus was not just from the Palestinians, because following the defeat; the Arab states gave priority to the recovery of the occupied territories and sought to promote and institutionalise the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The independence movement was driven from inside, primarily by Fateh. ¹⁷⁴ This was the strongest of the Palestinian resistance groups and sought to exploit the post-1967 situation, by seeking to quickly fill the leadership vacuum left by the defeated Arab states, and assume management of the Palestinians and later the PLO. As a direct consequence of the June War, Yasser Arafat and Fateh, who had adopted the strategy of armed resistance based on the anti-colonial example of the FLN in Algeria, presided over a renaissance of the Palestinian psyche. As a result of the June War a transformation occurred in the Palestinian people, similar in effect to the change in the Jewish people in 1948, as through armed struggle the Palestinians found an identity, and were able to throw off their humiliated and defeated national psyche. Kimmerling and Migdal suggest that the adoption of armed action inspired and motivated the Palestinians and “renewed a sense of pride and autonomy which helped

¹⁷² Kimmerling and Migdal suggest that following the events of 1967 over 600,000 Palestinians could now regain direct contact with 300,000 in Gaza. Kimmerling and Migdal, *Palestinians*, p.209.
¹⁷⁴ Fateh or the Palestinian National Liberation Movement was formed in 1959 and led by Yasser Arafat.
rekindle Palestinian National consciousness. This phenomenon is clearly illustrated by the events of the battle of Karameh in 1968, in which Palestinian forces, predominantly from Fateh, fought a pitched battle with the Israelis. Although the Palestinians suffered a defeat this battle exists in the Palestinian national consciousness as a triumph for the discourse of Palestinianism. Lustick argues that this expression of Palestinian violence was directed as much for the motivation of the Palestinians as it was against the Israelis. This psychological shift “from downcast refugees into aroused fighters” was described by Arafat as “one of the greatest achievements of our revolution.” The effect of Karameh was not just psychological; as a result of the battle, the ranks of Fateh and other Palestinian armed resistance groups swelled with thousands of new volunteers. Violent resistance became an established part of the new Palestinian identity.

The resurgence of Palestinianism inspired by violence was enshrined in the Palestinian National Charter of 1968, which effectively established the parameters for a Palestinian state, in territory, people and governance whilst stating that the way to achieve it was via armed struggle. The war of 1967 represented a re-emergence of Palestinianism because a shift in emphasis occurred from Pan-Arabist to Palestinian nationalist in the Palestinian nationalist movements, typified by Fateh and the PLO. In support of this Schultz suggests, “Struggle and resistance, suffering and sacrifice began to embody the Palestinian narrative of selfhood and history.” Struggle became central to the existence of Palestinianism. Sayigh suggests armed struggle confirmed Palestinian national identity and “provided freedom from Arab control allowing for nation building through a common political arena and state construction through the establishment of quasi-governmental services.” The employment of a liberation and independence emphasis in the Palestinian discourse firstly allowed Palestinians the justification to use violence and also allowed them the ability to

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177 Lustick, `Changing Rationales,` p.73.
178 Lustick, `Changing Rationales,` p.74.
180 The charter laid claim to the whole of Palestine as representing the Palestinian homeland, one that was to be reclaimed by armed struggle and which implied the destruction of the state of Israel. See Laqueur and Rubin, *Israeli-Arab Reader*, p.366.
181 Schultz *Reconstruction*, p.38.
182 Sayigh *Armed Struggle*, p.20-21.
develop the ideas of state, such as governance and sovereignty. This process was illustrated by the emergence of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), which attempted to be a state within a state, and sought to establish the political, social and economic infrastructure of a state. Employment of the revolutionary struggle and liberation discourse also propagated the appearance of other revolutionary Palestinian armed groups, such as the PFLP and DFLP\textsuperscript{183} many of whom employed Marxist or structural anti-colonial discourses to understand the conflict situation.

The events of 1967 can be described as a watershed for both conflict actors as it established the parameters for the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israel maintained the Zionist discourse to provide security by creating strategic depth whilst simultaneously taking control of its biblical lands. But in doing so it enveloped a massive Palestinian population that threatens the very nature of Zionism and the existence of the ethnic Jewish state. It also established the settler movement and provided the resurgence of right-wing religious extremism. In the view of many Israelis it shed its persecuted and oppressed national image and became occupiers and oppressors. For the Palestinians, the 1967 war showed the weakness and decline of Pan-Arabism, heralded the rebirth of Palestinianism, and triggered a similar shift in the national self-image from a persecuted, oppressed and defeated people who looked to the help of others, to the resurgence of a proud and defiant national identity. Who through armed struggle, resistance and sacrifice personified their existence and provided the route to realising the discourse of Palestinianism, which in practice implied the desire for a national state. In a notable comparison with the Zionist discourse, Palestinianism now officially adopted violent armed struggle as the way to achieve its national objectives. The conflict discourses of Zionism and Palestinianism were now mirror images of each other and were destined to be in violent conflict, as both had identical goals - a state in Palestine.

\textsuperscript{183} PFLP – Palestinian Force for the Liberation of Palestine. DFLP- Democratic Force for the Liberation of Palestine.

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1973 - The Fourth Arab-Israeli War

On 6 October 1973, the combined Arab forces of Egypt and Syria conducted a surprise attack on Israel. Although the causes of the war are rooted in the defeat and humiliation of 1967, it is widely accepted that the Arab-Israeli conflict had reached a political logjam due to intransigence on both sides. Shlaim suggests that the Arab aim of 1973 was to break this impasse and provoke an international crisis in which the superpowers would intervene to enforce a settlement representative of the pre-1967 situation, particularly regarding the Sinai and the Golan Heights.\textsuperscript{184} The war resulted in a defeat for Syria and a partial territorial victory for Egypt. Paradoxically this amounted to a considerable moral and political success for the Arab forces, not only in regard to the legitimacy of the individual regimes in Damascus and Cairo but also for the prestige, honour and dignity of the Arab World.\textsuperscript{185} The war illustrated the ability of the Arab nations to not only seek the initiative and attack Israel but also to inflict considerable damage, thus undermining the myth of Israeli invincibility. Herzog points out that initiating the attack represented for the Arabs a major move forward and an important political change,\textsuperscript{186} the consequences of which led to peace between Egypt and Israel. The War also led to United Nations Security Council Resolution 338,\textsuperscript{187} which called for a cease-fire and an observation of the earlier UNSC Resolution 242. Although the events of 1973 were primarily a further war in the state based Arab-Israeli conflict it had important implications for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

For Israel the Yom Kippur war of 1973 was a continued endorsement of the Zionist discourse as it clearly demonstrated the threat to Israel from the Arab states and showed the necessity for an aggressive security policy. Orthodox Israeli history records the events as a belief that Israel sought peace and the Arabs, who only understood force, did not, so after an incredible military victory by Israel, Sadat was

\textsuperscript{184} Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.315.
\textsuperscript{185} See O’Neill, \textit{Armed Struggle}, p.58.
\textsuperscript{186} Herzog, \textit{Arab-Israeli}, p.314.
\textsuperscript{187} For the complete document see, www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1973
forced to realise that the only recourse was to diplomacy and peace with Israel.\textsuperscript{188} Finkelstein, a critic of orthodox Israeli history, argues that it was in fact Israel that bowed to the language of force, as following the war, Egypt was able to regain its territory in the Sinai.\textsuperscript{189} This demonstrated to the Arab world that occupied territory could be regained from Israel by violence. The main political implication for Israel of 1973 was a right-wing backlash; blame was sought for Israel’s lack of preparedness and the government changed to the ideologically motivated Likud party and Menachem Begin became Prime Minister. Shlaim calls this “not just a ballot box revolution but a watershed in Israeli relations with the Arab world.”\textsuperscript{190} The effect of this for the Palestinian conflict was quite considerable as the ideological roots of Likud are in the ideas of ‘greater Israel’ and are close to revisionist Zionism. Begin believed that the “Jewish people have an unchallengeable, eternal and historical right to the land of Israel.”\textsuperscript{191} As Morris explains Begin viewed the occupation and settlement of the West Bank and Gaza as a ‘divine mission’ of liberation not conquest.\textsuperscript{192} Consequently during this period settlements increased in the occupied territories and right-wing extremist groups such as Gush Emunim\textsuperscript{193} appeared.

Perhaps the most important development from the 1973 war was the revolutionary peace deal between Israel and Egypt that was concluded at Camp David in 1977. Although the main developments of this treaty related to the situation between Israel and Egypt, it has important ramifications for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For example, the Palestinian issue was sidelined and the Palestinians themselves were completely excluded from the peace negotiations. This fuelled the Palestinian (and Arab World) accusations that the Egyptians betrayed them in making peace with Israel. However, Israel absolutely refused to accept the concept of linkage\textsuperscript{194} between the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Palestinian situations. This is perhaps because by concluding peace with Egypt, Israel was able to successfully

\textsuperscript{188} Finkelstein, \textit{Image and Reality}, p.150.
\textsuperscript{189} Finkelstein, \textit{Image and Reality}, p.150
\textsuperscript{190} Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.353.
\textsuperscript{191} Quoted in Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.353.
\textsuperscript{192} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.456.
\textsuperscript{193} Gush Emunim or Bloc of the faithful was formed in 1974 by fundamentalist Jews in order to prevent the partition of Greater (Eretz) Israel. See Flaimhaft Z, \textit{Israel on the Road to Peace}, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, p.135.
\textsuperscript{194} Netanyahu calls this the ‘Theory of Palestinian centrality’, which is the attempt by Arabs to link all the problems of the Middle East to the Palestinian situation. He also suggests the existence of the ‘Reversal of Causality,’ which is a campaign to explain the Palestinian Problem not as a by-product of the wars in which the Arabs attacked Israel but as the cause of those attacks in the first place. See Netanyahu \textit{Place among Nations}, p.130.
exclude them from the Palestinian equation and thereby further isolate the Palestinians.

The 1973 war is known as the October War by the Palestinians, and was an opportunity for them to express themselves as their own national entity alongside other national armies. The Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) mobilized units and deployed them to Cairo to fight together with the Egyptian forces. This was a successful endeavour for the Palestinian leadership and the PLO as it demonstrated the existence of an independent Palestinian Army and according to Cobban won support from the wider Palestinian communities whilst gaining much needed inter-Arab legitimacy and self-confidence.195 This period is characterised by the emergence of the Palestinians as self-representatives of an independent national entity. Alongside the 1973 war, the other influential event in the Palestinian historical narrative at this time was the war in Jordan in 1970. This is referred to by the Palestinians as Black September and was seen by many as a civil war.196 During September 1970 the Jordanian leadership embarked on a military operation to expunge the PLO and Palestinian forces from Jordanian soil and notably Amman,197 where they had become ensconced, establishing a virtual state within a state, primarily as an operating base for activities against Israel.198 Although Syria entered the fray in defence of the PLO the Palestinian forces were beaten to the point of surrender. Despite this defeat for the PLO and the loss of Jordan as a sanctuary and area for freedom of movement, the war had important consequences for the development of Palestinian Nationalism. Jordan essentially opposed the leftist Palestinian groups such as the PFLP and DFLP, who supported Palestinian socialist revolution in Jordan, and the Palestinian guerrilla groups who were sponsored by Syria (Sa’qa) and Iraq (Arab Liberation Front - ALF). Although these groups were targeted and considerably weakened by Black September, harming the Palestinian forces as a whole, it did in fact benefit the purely

197 The Jordanian leadership attacked the Fedayeen primarily because of the human and economic cost of Israeli reprisals, the subversion of the Jordanian Monarchy by Palestinian groups and because of the loss of the West Bank. See O’Neill, *Armed Struggle*, p.164.
198 Since the occupation of the West Bank by Jordan 1948-67 the Arab world, the Israelis and to a certain extent the Palestinians, saw the Jordanian monarchy as the natural leaders and representatives of the Palestinians. Arguably Jordan always had designs on occupying and eventually annexing the West Bank. Jordan also had a vested interest in the Palestinian issue as so many of its population were native Palestinians who had been granted citizenship rights and Jordan was also host to Palestinian refugee camps. Israel often negotiated directly with the Jordanians not only as an attempt to sideline the Palestinians but also perhaps to alleviate the Palestinian issue through population and territory transfer.
nationalist movements, notably, Fateh. According to Sayigh the primary consequences of the war in Jordan was to establish Fateh as the undisputed leader of the Palestinian national movement. A further effect of the Palestinian defeat in Jordan was the relocation of Palestinian guerrilla forces to Lebanon.

The combination of the Black September, which effectively divorced the Palestinians from Jordanian control, and the October War (and subsequent peace deal), which in effect separated the Palestinians from Egyptian influence, had the overall effect of establishing the PLO as the principal representative of the Palestinian people. This was illustrated by two further events in 1974; the Arab summit in Rabat in October in which the PLO were recognised and endorsed as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; and the address to the UN General Assembly by Arafat in November in which the PLO were awarded official observer status. These events also caused a streamlining of the Palestinian Nationalist movement, and produced a shift in the Palestinian discourse. Sayigh suggests that at this point the sole use of armed struggle to achieve liberation was modified to the use of military action to achieve national authority. The PLO with its new status of recognition now assumed a quasi-state role where armed struggle instead of the primary focus became a function of the Palestinian ‘state’ to protect its ‘citizens’ as part of the mechanics of the wider strategy of state. This ideological shift to the acceptance of National Authority and the desire for a Palestinian state instead of destruction of Israel and liberation of the whole territory is perhaps recognition by the Palestinians of the strength and permanence of the Israeli state, as well as the limits of their own military capability. This change is apparent in the political programme of the Palestinian National council (PNC) of June 1974, which endorsed the need for a state and national authority.

There are however a number of implications from this change in the Palestinian discourse vis-à-vis Israel; not all Palestinian armed groups accepted this change, primarily because it was a shift from the necessity for the destruction of Israel and reclaiming the whole of Palestine. This had serious implications for the refugees and effectively implied the surrender of Palestinian land to the Israeli state.

200 For a copy of the original document see, Laqueur and Rubin (eds), Israeli-Arab Reader, p.518.
201 Rubin, Revolution until Victory, p.47.
203 For a copy of the document, See, Lukacs (ed), Israeli- Palestinian Conflict documents, p.308.
fundamental pillar of the conflict. It also suggests a tactical employment of the diplomatic and national authority discourse by the PLO in order to legitimise their existence in the international community by softening their stance on Israel and facilitating the opening of diplomatic channels. However, it could equally have represented a realisation by the PLO that following four Arab-Israeli wars; Israel had become a permanent feature of the region. Arafat in his speech to the UN General Assembly stated, “today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”

This statement is perhaps indicative of the PLO stance, a desire for peace yet with a threat of violence.

The 1973 war represented a shift within the conflict discourses of the Palestinians and Israelis. Following the Arab surprise attack, the political right was swept into power to dominate Israeli politics and with this followed right-wing groups and extremist settler groups who moved in to colonise the West Bank. Although the events surmounted to a further endorsement of the security discourse, the ideology of the right characterised by revisionist Zionism implied not only ‘no surrender’ of occupied land but also further colonisation. Paradoxically this period also saw the unprecedented Egyptian peace deal, although this is part of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict the implications for the Palestinians was further isolation.

The Palestinians modified their discourse to incorporate and engage in the desire to build a National Authority, establish sovereignty and create a state, instead of liberation, re-conquest and the destruction of Israel. How far this was a product of their isolation caused by the cooling of relations with Egypt and Jordan and or a realisation of the permanency of Israel, depends largely on the argument employed. Shlaim points to the willingness of the PLO to accept a state next to Israel as interpreted by the Israelis as part of the PLO theory to establish a base for continuation of the armed struggle against Israel, with the ultimate objective of destroying it.

Nevertheless, the period was characterised for the Palestinians by the ascendancy of Palestinianism under the guidance of Yasser Arafat and Fateh.

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204 For a copy of the document, See, Lukacs (ed), Israeli-Palestinian Conflict documents, p.332.
205 Finkelstein suggests that Israel viewed Egypt as central to regional hegemony and therefore represented the key to the future of Israel, Egypt was therefore neutralised by the peace deal. Finkelstein, Image and Reality: p.169.
International Conflict

Since 1948 the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been fought on a number of occasions outside the immediate vicinity of the Middle East and has taken on an international dimension. Perhaps the most notable of these periods was after 1967 when Palestinian groups embarked on airplane hijacks, hostage taking, raids, sabotage and assassinations against predominantly Israeli targets around the world.\textsuperscript{207} Although the airline hijacks were a new development, the tactics employed showed little difference to the character of the conflict that had occurred since 1948 within the regional boundaries of Israel and Palestine. Similarly these attacks brought Israeli reprisals in the form of military attacks, assassinations and raids, just as they did in the domestic conflict. The effect of this worldwide extension of the war however was to fully internationalise the conflict.

These occurrences of international violence are understood by the Israeli discourse as international terrorism. Netanyahu states, “The PLO is not just another territorial movement or national liberation movement but a quintessential terrorist organisation.”\textsuperscript{208} The Israelis employ the terrorism discourse to understand this violence against them as illegitimate, unlawful and morally wrong.\textsuperscript{209} As Palestinian scholar Edward Said argues, the Palestinians are immediately associated with terrorism, so “stripped of context an act of Palestinian desperation can look like murder.”\textsuperscript{210} The Zionist discourse was further supported by these attacks as they proved empirical evidence of the positivist understanding that the Palestinians were intending to destroy Israeli people wherever they found them. As Kimmerling and Migdal point out this allowed Israel to delegitimise Palestinian national claims.\textsuperscript{211} The consequence of this was the development of the ‘War on Terrorism’ discourse that was part of the wider Zionist understanding and incorporated all the elements of the pre-emptive and aggressive security policies employed thus far by Israel. It allowed

\textsuperscript{207} Morris suggests that international attacks peaked between 1971-74 but also suggests 29 hijacks were carried out by Palestinian organisations between 1968-77. Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.376.
\textsuperscript{208} Netanyahu \textit{Place among Nations} p.204.
\textsuperscript{210} Said, \textit{Question of Palestine}, p.171.
\textsuperscript{211} Kimmerling and Migdal, \textit{Palestinians}, p.225.
them to ‘legally’ respond to acts or potential acts of violence, which they perceived as terrorism, with military force. As a result Israel employed offensive operations, reprisal raids, pre-emptive strikes and assassinations on a global capacity against suspected Palestinian targets.\textsuperscript{212} As Herzog points out, the Israeli policy rejected any form of compromise and sought to stamp out Palestinian violence wherever it occurred.\textsuperscript{213} The war on terrorism discourse is a natural extension of the security discourse that allows Israel the legitimacy to act in any way it deems necessary to ensure the maintenance of its security, either domestically or internationally. Thus by employing this discourse Israel is able to pursue and destroy its political and military opponents with international impunity.

For the Palestinian discourse this was a period of international armed struggle. Initially the Palestinian groups who embarked on international attacks were proud to be referred to as terrorists, as it bestowed on them a certain honour. However, in response to the employment of the terrorist discourse by Israel, Palestinian fighters distanced themselves from the definition and adopted the freedom fighter discourse, which aptly demonstrates the relative understandings of terrorism based on claims to legitimacy. Arafat in his UN speech in 1974 stated “the difference between revolutionary and terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for freedom and liberation of his land cannot be called a terrorist.”\textsuperscript{214}

There are a number of different reasons within the Palestinian historical discourse for the appearance of the international attacks. They can be seen as an attempt to recover from the Black September defeat in Jordan, and to project Palestinian military power by selecting ‘soft’ targets outside Israel, or as an attempt to internationalise the Palestinian position. The leader of Black September\textsuperscript{215} Abu Iyad stated that the purpose of the attacks was to “make the world feel that the Palestinian people exist.”\textsuperscript{216} However, this discourse could easily exist as a way to allow the Palestinian groups freedom to conduct acts of violence against their own chosen

\textsuperscript{212} Following the Munich Olympics attack in 1972, Israeli Prime minister Golda Meir authorised the Israeli secret service to hunt down and kill the Palestinians responsible. Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.377.

\textsuperscript{213} Herzog, \textit{Arab-Israel Wars}, p.327.

\textsuperscript{214} For a copy of the original document, See, Lukacs (ed), \textit{Israeli-Palestinian documents}, p.326.

\textsuperscript{215} One of the most prolific and deadly of the Palestinian groups that embarked on international violence during this period was called Black September and was associated with Fateh. Sayigh Y. ‘\textit{Armed Struggle}’ p.27.

\textsuperscript{216} Quoted in Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.377.
targets to satisfy their own ideological agendas. Although, it is also argued that the attacks were an attempt to disrupt the Israeli economy and undermine morale, O’Neill suggests that they were at best used to indirectly gain support, both domestic and international. 217 Although it is probably a combination of these factors, one area is particularly important and influential in the development of Palestinianism, the continual propagation and splintering of Palestinian groups into multifarious ideological factions. 218 The PLO umbrella allowed for the operation of a number of different Palestinian groups, although this provided extensive and varied operations, all of which were directed for the Palestinian cause. Due to the ideological differences it made coordination of a single Palestinian policy almost impossible, as some groups were nationalist others Marxist and others anti-imperialist. Rubin suggests, all the PLO member groups’ retained operational and ideological autonomy. 219 Some Palestinian groups even acted against each other, 220 and others forged links and operated in conjunction with European and Asian groups. 221 The net result was to considerably weaken the united Palestinian opposition in the conflict against Israel as it continually undermined a united PLO operational leadership.

The effects of the international campaign were principally to gain prestige for the PLO within the Arab world and demonstrate that the Palestinians were capable of conducting operations against Israel independently of the other Arab nations. This was especially relevant post-1967, when a realisation emerged within the Palestinian camp that the other Arab nations were not capable or wholly interested in helping them. After the 1973 war the Palestinians also sought to disrupt the growing peace process between Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel in order to prevent an unacceptable resolution to the Palestinian problem. Although they did succeed in internationalising their situation and conveying it to the world’s attention, the seemingly random acts of violence did not engender the support for the Palestinian cause that they had hoped for. As a result the PLO leadership, notably Fateh, attempted to move away from conducting incidents of international terrorism, but due to the diverse and fractured nature of the organisation it was very difficult to halt the violence completely.

219 Rubin, Revolution until Victory. p.32.
220 Although it appeared later in the period the Iraqi sponsored Abu Nidal group acted extensively against Fateh.
221 Such as the Japanese Red Army (JRA) and the Red Army Faction (RAF).
Inevitably the Palestinians suffered international condemnation especially as the west understood the orthodox terrorism theory approach employed by Israel to explain terrorism and vindicate their security policy.

1982 – The Lebanon War

In the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 by Israel was a result of the development and implementation of the Israeli pre-emptive and pro-active security and anti-terrorist policy. This was combined with a right-wing government facing the growth of the PLO in both physical military proportions and psychological operating ability. The Lebanon War was also a culmination of the interaction of the incompatible interests of the regional actors who became embroiled into a protracted, complicated and bloody civil war between the rival religious factions in Lebanon. By the time the Israeli forces withdrew in 1983, Israel had achieved a costly though decisive victory over the PLO in Lebanon. The PLO however were not completely destroyed and relocated into exile, the defeat also did little to reduce the Palestinian opposition to Israel and support for the PLO which existed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israeli withdrawal also allowed Syria to fill the political vacuum in Lebanon and as a result of the war: Israel confronted deadly new enemies on its northern borders in the form of the Shia, Iranian-sponsored Hizballah.

For Israel, the Lebanon war or Operation Peace for Galilee and Operation Big Pines began as a limited invasion of South Lebanon in 1982 to secure Israeli settlements in Galilee from PLO attacks. However, what actually occurred was an all out military assault on Lebanon that ended in the siege and fall of Beirut. In the Israeli discourse the invasion had two aims, first to forge an alliance with the Lebanese

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222 The Civil war in Lebanon began in 1975; the factions consisted principally of the Druze, Christian Maronite, Muslim Shia and Muslim Sunni communities. This conflict embroiled these factions and the regional actors. Syria was interested in creating a ‘greater Syria’ to include Lebanon and supported the Muslim factions whereas Israel was pursuing a ‘greater Israel,’ and supported the Maronite Christians. The PLO who were attempting to establish a secure base from which to fight for Palestinian independence were drawn in.
Christians and effectively counter the growing Muslim influence, and second to deal with the PLO in Lebanon, which had established a virtual state within a state.\textsuperscript{223} Shlaim suggests that there was a “big plan” driven by Ariel Sharon, which was intended to destroy the PLO completely, and break Palestinian Nationalism, allowing the annexation of the West Bank into ‘Greater Israel’ and the relocation of Palestinian refugees into Jordan.\textsuperscript{224} This argument demonstrates the depth of the Israeli discourse and the apparent paradox in the Israeli orthodox historical narrative, generating the reoccurring question of which discourse is driving Israeli policy. Is it the revisionist Zionist discourse of ‘Greater Israel,’ which implies annexation of all of Palestine and relocation of Palestinians or the Security discourse, which seeks to defend and secure the borders of the existing Israeli state? Invading a sovereign state is perhaps a precarious security or defence policy but as Begin argued, the security of Israel depended on it. He emphasised this by evoking the emotive memory of the holocaust; “the alternative to attacking the PLO in Lebanon is Treblinka.”\textsuperscript{225} Sharon also sought to link the invasion of Lebanon with the territories by stating “we are seeking a solution for peaceful coexistence with residents of the territories, who would no longer be subject to PLO terrorism.”\textsuperscript{226} This suggests that the Zionist discourse is a combination of achieving the aims of Zionism whilst maintaining security for the state, which as I have discussed above can be one and the same. Annexing territory means both reclaiming Palestine for the Jews and providing a security zone; the Israeli discourse does just what it purports - it justifies and legitimises Israeli actions.

The Israeli discourse is driven by revisionist Zionism but is camouflaged in part by the more politically and internationally acceptable security and orthodox terrorist discourse. Palestinian scholar Yezid Sayigh suggests that the diplomatic position of the PLO was becoming so strong that they were nearing a breakthrough in establishing direct negotiations with the US for statehood. He argues that in order to pre-empt the possibility of Palestinian statehood Israel invaded Lebanon.\textsuperscript{227} There is little doubt that Begin was either obsessed with security or obsessed with employing the security discourse to justify politically unacceptable actions. For example. Begin justified the Israeli Air Force attack against the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak in June

\textsuperscript{224} Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.396.
\textsuperscript{225} Quoted in Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.518.
\textsuperscript{226} Quoted in Tessler, \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, p.581.
\textsuperscript{227} Sayigh, ‘\textit{Armed Struggle}, ’ p.28.
1982, by invoking the his own ‘Begin doctrine’, which stated, “On no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the people of Israel.” 228 Although internationally condemned as a flagrant violation of international law this attack was largely accepted and understood by the international community as a necessary action under the security and terrorism discourse.

The implications of the Lebanon war demonstrated the ability of Israel to employ the security discourse in order to successfully pursue policy objectives, security orientated or otherwise. Israel could act under this discourse not just to secure its own borders but to the extent that it could invade another country, relatively unmolested by the international community. 229 The Lebanon war also had important consequences for the Israeli population as the apparent dual policy paradox created a public debate over security or expansionism. Tessler suggests that the government’s case for an expansion of the war created a fully-fledged political debate that deeply divided Israeli political opinion. 230 The Israeli international and domestic image was also tarnished by the events in Lebanon, the results of which led to an increasingly vocal peace movement, which reverberated through the Israeli population, the Knesset and front line soldiers. 231 Israel also suffered large causality figures, suggesting that Israel withdrew from Lebanon the emasculated victor. As Bundy argued, “An Israel deeply disillusioned by the outcome of 1982, the casualties from it and under heavy economic strain was a lot less powerful or at least less willing to use its power after 1982.” 232 Arguably, the outcome of the Lebanon War led to the election of a government of National Unity in 1984 under Shamir and Peres.

For the PLO and the Palestinians the effect of the Lebanon War was severe. According to Sayigh, “the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut effectively ended the Palestinian armed struggle and the process of state building.” 233 This had a number of obvious implications for Palestinianism; the most important was the shift of focus of the Palestinian struggle to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The implication of this was to increase the support for an independent

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229 Begin was diplomatically pressured by the United States Regan administration to withdraw from Lebanon.
230 Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.582.
231 See Tessler, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.582-587.
Palestinian state both within Palestine and internationally. The Palestinian ‘national army’ was also defeated and split as a body by dispersal to various locations in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{234} Not only was the PLO now unable to conduct coordinated military operations against Israel but also was incapable of protecting the Palestinian communities, especially the refugee camps in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{235} The PLO leadership, considerably weakened, was forced into exile and the sub-state infrastructure they had carefully constructed was dispersed and fractured. Sayigh suggests that the result of this was a fragmented organisational structure inhibited by bureaucracy, patronage and corruption; a structure that he argues was engineered by and to suit the highly stylised and patronial leadership of Arafat.\textsuperscript{236} Nevertheless, the PLO were still well supported; their position of leadership of the Palestinian people could not have been maintained by the exiled PLO and Arafat without, as Rubin points out, “the support of the majority of the Palestinians.”\textsuperscript{237}

With their effective ability to wage armed conflict severely reduced, the isolated, exiled and emasculated PLO were forced to shift their strategy to include greater diplomacy, which inspired a campaign by Arafat to solicit regional allies. The defeat of the Palestinians and the subsequent massacres in the refugee camps\textsuperscript{238} had the combined effect of eliciting international recognition and sympathy for the PLO and Palestinian cause. As Morris points out, instead of destroying the Palestinian leadership and allowing the annexation of the territories, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon inadvertently “groomed the PLO for the forthcoming peace process.”\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{234} Following the US brokered ceasefire PLO fighters left Beirut by ship for Cyprus where they were dispersed among Arab nations, including Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen. Tessler, \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, p.589.

\textsuperscript{235} A further outcome of this were the massacres at Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in September 1982 by the Christian Phalangist militia arguably with the acquiescence of the Israeli forces in Lebanon and Israeli government. notably Ariel Sharon. For a comprehensive account of the events See Lamb F., (ed), \textit{Reasons not the need: Eyewitness chronicles of Israel’s war in Lebanon}. Nottingham: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1984. Also see Schiff, Z Ya’ari E, \textit{Israel’s Lebanon War}, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

\textsuperscript{236} Sayigh, ‘\textit{Armed Struggle},’ p.29.

\textsuperscript{237} Rubin, \textit{Revolution until Victory}, p.59.

\textsuperscript{238} See Tessler, \textit{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}, pp.582-587.

\textsuperscript{239} Morris, \textit{Righteous Victims}, p.553.
This war began in Gaza but quickly spread to the West Bank; it is unique in the recent history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because it was a completely spontaneous Palestinian popular uprising. A mass mobilisation of all levels and classes of Palestinian society against the Israeli occupation and military rule, a popular movement in the mould of the first Arab revolt of 1936. It was also a return to direct conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in Palestine and has been called the "re-Palestinisation of the Arab-Israeli conflict." This war was fought predominantly without firearms and was characterised by civil disobedience, strikes, protests, street demonstrations and riots between predominantly unarmed Palestinian civilians and Israeli soldiers. Although the cause of the war was the occupation it was the effects of the occupation that triggered the violence. Gail Pressberg lists the root causes as land confiscation, the asymmetric legal system, the absence of political freedom, heavy taxation, collective punishments, and travel restrictions. Socio-economic grievances and lack of opportunity coupled with the concentration of large population densities produced the humiliation, anger and hatred all of which culminated in the mass expression of rage. By 1992 the war was over and the Palestinians and Israeli’s had embarked on an unprecedented peace process. This period has far reaching implications for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The Israeli discourse perceives this ‘war’ as a revolt against Israeli rule in the Gaza and West Bank. The situation was seen as an internal security problem and a threat to the existence of the state. The Israeli government employed the security and terrorist discourse and treated it as such. The Israeli defence minister Rabin is quoted as saying “mighty force and beatings will be used to break their bones.” The Israeli army responded in a very heavy handed manner with an ‘iron fist’ policy and

240 Morris, Righteous Victims, p.603.
242 Although as Shaim suggests the uprising did produce debate within Israeli politics; the Left under Peres favoured negotiation and compromise. The more powerful Israeli right under Shamir and Rabin favoured force and the military option. Shlaim, Iron Wall, p.451.
243 Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.266.
instigated harsh counter measures such as the deportation of activists, physical punishments, political assassinations, mass arrests and curfews. There were also government-led punitive economic and social sanctions that included the closing of Palestinian schools and universities.\textsuperscript{244} Shlaim points out that this was “the kind of arrogant and aggressive attitude that had provoked the uprisings in the first place.”\textsuperscript{245} The effect of the uprising on Israel was to demonise their international position and damage their perceived national narrative as a meek nation of the persecuted. The intense media coverage of the conflict often represented in reports as being characterised by a Palestinian boy armed with rocks against an Israeli tank, had the effect of portraying the Palestinians as the weak David against the powerful and mighty Israeli Goliath. This was a complete reversal of the Israeli self-perception following the events of 1948. It not only damaged the Israeli national psyche but Israel was also the recipient of strong international criticism and almost continuous UN Security Council resolutions calling for the protection of Palestinian Human Rights.\textsuperscript{246} The effect of this was to widen the left – right divide in Israeli politics and deepen the crisis in Israeli society. The uprising was particularly damaging to the Israel economy because the Palestinian territories were a source of cheap labour and export products. It also had a dramatic impact on foreign and domestic tourism in Israel. Although the uprising was not a defeat for Israel and ended in a hurting stalemate for both parties, Israel did effectively lose control of the Palestinian territories and suffer an economic and psychological sense of isolation. By 1989 following international recognition of the PLO and the withdrawal of Jordan from the negotiation process, Israel took the unprecedented step of beginning direct communication with the PLO. This began the ‘peace process’ and led to the Madrid conference in 1991 and Oslo in 1993.

For the Palestinians the uprising became known as the Intifada, which literally translated from Arabic means, ‘the shaking off.’ This is highly illustrative of the aims of this spontaneous, grassroots mass movement, as it represented an attempt by the whole Palestinian population to free themselves from Israeli influence and control. Although this is how it is understood in the Palestinian discourse another

\textsuperscript{244} See Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.450-52.
\textsuperscript{245} Shlaim, \textit{Iron Wall}, p.452.
interpretation is of ideologically multifarious Palestinian groups vying for leadership and control. Intifada mythology suggests that the Palestinians were united and rose as one, however, Robert Hunter argues that it began as the ‘youth’ rebelling against the ‘elders’ and then became a bloody internal struggle between factions.\textsuperscript{247} It is claimed that nearly half as many Palestinians in the occupied territories were killed as collaborators by other Palestinians as by Israelis.\textsuperscript{248} Despite this argument, for Palestinianism and the conflict with Israel, the Intifada had extensive consequences. Politically, the Intifada established a new breed of grassroots Palestinian leadership within the Gaza and West Bank, which had originated through the creation of a network of political and social organisations. Pressberg suggests these organisations were decentralised and involved people from towns, villages and refugee camps and whose leadership was predominantly young and professional.\textsuperscript{249} Although this represented the appearance of a new political consciousness of the Palestinians under occupation, it created an inside / outside leadership situation because the indigenous Palestinian leadership of the Intifada represented those inside the occupied territories whilst the PLO exiled in Tunisia represented the diaspora outside. From the outset leadership of the Intifada was provided by the Unified National Command of the Uprising (UNC) or the National Uprising Committee who were firmly established inside the territories and who coordinated strikes and disruption plans.

Although the PLO sought to represent all Palestinians, the reasons for the Intifada also arose out of growing frustration with the inability of the PLO to alleviate the situation in the occupied territories. For the PLO the Intifada represented an opportunity to reinvigorate their waning fortunes but also a challenge to their leadership position. Acting quickly to harness this spontaneous movement and secure its leadership position, the PLO sought to establish a leadership bond with the UNC, which Pressberg suggests “involved a relationship whereby Palestinians under occupation decided local tactics and initiate strategic plans in coordination with the PLO.” She also points out that this symbiotic leadership relationship was illustrated by the issuing of the Intifada demands or ‘fourteen points’, which revealed that only the PLO could represent the Palestinians in formal negotiations.\textsuperscript{250} However, the most

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\item \textsuperscript{247} Robert Hunter F, \textit{The Palestinian Uprising, a war by other means}, Berkeley California: University of California Press, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed, 1993, p92.
\item \textsuperscript{248} Kimmerling and Migdal, \textit{Palestinians}, p.268.
\item \textsuperscript{249} Pressberg, \textit{The Uprising}, p.42.
\item \textsuperscript{250} Pressberg, \textit{The Uprising}, p.46.
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significant political development that was triggered by the Intifada and the PLO’s newfound political legitimacy was the Palestinian declaration of independence in November 1988. The implications of this, aside from actually declaring independence, were the references to accepting a two-state solution in Palestine along the 1967 borders in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This meant that the PLO had seemingly engaged in a new discourse, which effectively recognised the existence of the state of Israel, despite the fact Israeli security discourse sees this as a hidden agenda to establish a state alongside Israel from which to conduct offensive operations, it is without doubt a departure from the 1968 Palestinian charter, which called for the destruction of Israel and the reclamation of all of Palestine.

The Intifada acted as the political catalyst for the rebirth of the PLO. Through the Intifada the Palestinian issue was re-elevated to the world stage because the PLO, via an historic renunciation of violence and terrorism and acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, were able to establish themselves as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in the international arena. Smith calls this the “legitimisation of Arafat” and suggests that due to the tactics employed by Israel, the PLO were able to solicit support and recognition from the United States. This effectively paved the way for PLO representation and direct negotiation with Israel at the Madrid and Oslo peace conferences. However, the implications of this policy change for the PLO were serious, and arguably the problem that Arafat created is still a current cause of political problems. Rubin sums up this difficult position by suggesting the PLO adopted a precarious and seemingly paradoxical twin track policy. Arafat and the PLO had to convince their own hardliners that they were not retreating, whilst simultaneously persuading the United States and Israel that they had renounced violence.

Alongside the 'shaking off' of Israeli political control, the Intifada also inspired the Palestinians to take control of their own social and economic situation.

251 For a copy of the original document, See, Lukacs, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict documents*, p.411.
253 Although this was not actually stated.
255 The day after a speech to the UN General Assembly in Geneva in December 1988 Arafat gave a press conference in which he made these historic pledges. For a copy of the transcript of the speech See, Lukacs, *Israeli-Palestinian documents*, p.434.
256 Smith, *Palestine*, p.301.
Punitive measures enacted by Israel forced the closure of social institutions. However, this suited the Palestinians as they took the opportunity to establish their own replacements. As Schultz explains the Palestinians used the Intifada to establish grass roots civil society by institution building, in areas such as heath, agriculture, education and Human Rights.\(^{258}\) The Palestinians reclaimed and re-Palestinianised their local communities into a national mould. The results of the Intifada inspired and recharged the common Palestinian people. Previously the PLO had proclaimed armed struggle and this was taken up by Palestinian fighters predominantly outside the territories, the Intifada was within and involved the entire community. The national psyche of the Palestinian people evolved into direct defiance of Israeli authority, rebellion and disobedience became synonymous with Palestinianism. This proved a re-birth of Palestinian self-esteem and dignity after the years of humiliation and oppression. Robert Hunter calls this sense of pride the “end of fear in the Palestinian psyche.”\(^{259}\) The implications of this fearless rejection of Israeli control were an increasing number of civilian Palestinian deaths especially among dedicated martyrs.\(^{260}\) Schultz suggests that during this period martyrdom became part of the national discourse. To die for the nation was a personal sacrifice for the land and the people of Palestine, it was a return to the memory of Sheik al-Qassam the ‘revolutionary father’ of the 1936 revolt.\(^{261}\) Martyrdom for the cause became a great honour, families were rewarded and the martyrs became heroes and legends in the community. Although dying and being killed for the cause was common during this period, the growing martyr culture coupled with increasing Islamic radicalism is perhaps the root of the suicide trend that developed at this time.

A further important development of the Intifada, which incorporates many of the themes discussed above, was the appearance of two Islamic Palestinian resistance groups; Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Although initially part of the peaceful Muslim Brotherhood that had developed through Islamic Universities they separated from it and radicalised towards violence. Nevertheless they continued to develop deep socio-political roots in Palestine, especially through social and religious welfare organisations and institutions. Although they initially existed outside the central

\(^{258}\) Schultz, Reconstruction, p.62.
\(^{259}\) Robert Hunter, Palestinian Uprising, p61.
\(^{260}\) All those killed in the process of the Intifada and Palestinian struggle become instant martyrs to the cause, however during this period there was a growing number who purposely sacrificed their lives in suicide attacks, these I would term as dedicated martyrs.
\(^{261}\) Schultz, Reconstruction, p.67.
command structure of the PLO, and were critical of the nationalist groups, they effectively sought the same goal of Palestinian independence albeit with an Islamic state.\(^{262}\) The implications of this development was for the expansion of further rival Palestinian factions against the nationalist groups who had fundamental and radical Islamic agendas and a growing support base in the Palestinian territories.

It is apparent that the effect of the Intifada on both the Palestinians and Israelis was to moderate their extreme and aggressive discourses. The PLO took the unprecedented step of accepting in principle a two-state solution, which required the recognition of the state of Israel. They also accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism. However, it is obviously difficult to ascertain if a new discourse existed or if it was just a refinement of Palestinianism (one which was just not overtly employing the rhetoric of the revolutionary discourse that sought the destruction of Israel and the reclamation of all of Palestine). Similarly, Israel seemed to have eased the security discourse and moved to recognise the PLO and agree to negotiate, but again, how far this was a departure from the Zionist discourse is difficult to determine? Arguably, both parties arrived at a hurting stalemate during the Intifada and perhaps mutual realisation that Israel could not be defeated and the Palestinian violence could not be stopped. It is however difficult to ascertain how sincere these shifts were and whether or not the disputants were in fact exploiting the process of international mediation in order to proceed with their own devious objectives,\(^{263}\) as is often the case in conflicts such as this.

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**Palestinian War of Independence - Second Intifada 2001-**

In the period between the end of the first Intifada in 1992 and the resumption of mass protest and armed violence by the Palestinians in 2001, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was engaged in the Oslo peace process. This involved complicated negotiations on the establishment of a limited National Authority for Palestinian self-
rule in the Gaza and West Bank. Despite the historic and groundbreaking negotiations and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, the violence continued on both sides and eventually erupted into a second Intifada. This time an armed uprising that effectively signalled the end of the Oslo peace accords and the dissolution of the Palestinian National Authority. Despite the movements towards peace by 2001 the Palestinians and Israelis found themselves back in the same debilitating cycle of violence that had characterised the conflict since 1936.

In spite of the apparent successes of the Oslo peace process Israel responded to the armed uprising with the familiar security and terrorist discourse and re-imposed military rule on the Palestinian territories. This was not perhaps a departure from the policy employed before the peace process as arguably Israel had in-fact been using this discourse continually. Allied to the security discourse is the ‘war on terrorism’ discourse, which was maintained throughout the Oslo peace process. Effectively Israel was able to pursue a twin track policy of political peace with the Palestinians whilst maintaining war on their potential enemies, such as political assassinations and anti-terrorist operations. It can be argued that Israel has never deviated from maintaining the revisionist Zionist discourse under the umbrella of the security discourse. Israel and in particular the Sharon government are not prepared, it seems, to allow the existence of a Palestinian state. By maintaining the conflict with the Palestinians, Israel is able justify the use of its superior military strength to prevent any form of it appearing, together with an unremitting policy of settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza. In response to suicide attacks Israel was able to destroy almost the entire infrastructure of the fledgling Palestinian National Authority by levelling Arafat’s compound in Ramallah in September 2002. This effectively stripped Arafat of political operating ability. In accordance with Avi Shlaim’s theory that Israel has consistently maintained throughout the history of the conflict with the Palestinians, the ‘Iron Wall’ Zionist revisionist doctrine of Jabotinsky, it is now possible to argue that this exists not just metaphorically because under the security discourse, Israel has begun construction of a security fence

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265 One of the most famous during this period was the assassination of the Hamas bomb maker Yahya Ayyash or ‘the engineer’ in January 1996. Israel also embarked on operation Grapes of Wraith against the Hizballah. See Shlaim, Iron Wall, p.556.
267 Shlaim, Iron Wall, p.12. Also see earlier section on Zionism.
that when completed will be an actual iron wall between the two communities. This suggests that far from abandoning the security discourse during the Oslo process, Israel always maintained this understanding, which is perhaps antithetical to a conflict solution. The question raised by this wall construction is familiar with the security discourse versus revisionist Zionist debate; under the policy of security is the construction of the wall in fact a disguised attempt to annex land, which will not only benefit the greater Israel movement but effectively emasculate the Palestinian territory to such an extent that they are unable to create a functioning state?

The second Intifada or Al-Aqsa Intifada (as it is known to the Palestinians) can be seen as an expression of frustration by the Palestinian population about the failure of Oslo, the inability of the PLO to alleviate the socio-economic conditions of the territories, and the United States continual support of Israel to the detriment of a Palestinian state. More importantly it represents the return to armed struggle by the Palestinian people, either to attack Israeli targets or to defend themselves against Israeli army incursions. It also demonstrates the increasing strength and support for the Islamic groups, especially Hamas whose policy of suicide attacks against targets within Israel has raised its profile and swelled the ranks of its supporters. Palestinian armed groups are also more likely to operate without central command and in some cases carry out attacks without authority from the PLO. For example, the second Intifada spawned an armed group called the Al Aqsa Martyrs brigade, who are an example of Palestinians who have formed small cells and act independently of the umbrella organisations. The implications for the Palestinians from the second Intifada, is a return to, or perhaps a continuation of the discourse of armed struggle against Israel. This discourse in the al-Aqsa Intifada could exist in two forms, a nationalist understanding to form a state in the mould of a secular Palestinian Authority or the Islamic discourse of establishing an Islamic state not just in the accepted Palestinian pre-state area but also in the whole region. This is a return to the aims of 1936 and the Palestinian charter of 1968, which called for the destruction of Israel. This demonstrates the continued in-fighting and fragmenting of the Palestinian community, but also shows the continuity of the conflict discourse of Palestinianism. Despite the fact that they are ideologically different groups they all seek the same end

269 Although Al Aqsa martyrs brigade is linked to Fateh they claim to act on their own and not receive orders from officials. Goldenberg S. Killers revel in kudos of a US terrorism designation' The Guardian 22 March 2002.
result: Palestinian identity and a Palestinian state, and they employ violence to achieve it.

**Conflict Discourses: Impasse**

The current situation at the time of writing\textsuperscript{270} clearly illustrates the common thread of opposing discourses accompanying national narratives that have sustained this conflict from the very beginning. Israel has maintained a security policy based on the protection of the ethnic Jewish state of Israel in Palestine: the Zionist discourse. It has occupied, annexed and settled further areas in Palestine and has sought to remove Palestinian people. It has also refused to engage with the issues central to the Palestinian understanding of the conflict, which are Palestinian lands, the return of refugees and the status of the Old City of Jerusalem. These demonstrate adherence to the Zionist, albeit revisionist, discourse. Israel can employ this discourse because it can argue that the Arabs (Palestinians) intend to destroy them, this has been clearly demonstrated since 1936. They can also maintain a security policy to justify their defensive violence against the Palestinians, which involves preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state by occupation, settlement and containment. Israel also has a vested interest in maintaining the conflict as this allows it to sustain their security discourse and keep alive their ancient historical claim to the whole region.

Similarly, the Palestinians employment of the discourse of Palestinianism, comprising of Identity, Nationalism and Pan-Arabism, requires the formation and acceptance of a Palestinian state. The Palestinians have employed a number of different tactics to achieve this but have ultimately returned to armed action and terrorism, perhaps because this is the discourse of a national liberation movement, which they consider themselves to be. The Palestinians fight for independence from Israel, who they claim intend to destroy them, and have empirical evidence of this from 1936. Hence they employ a national revolutionary discourse (both secular and religious) to justify and legitimise their use of violence.

\textsuperscript{270} This is a study of the contemporary events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict up to and including the first two years of the second Intifada (2001-2003) and includes the period January – April 2003 for fieldwork.
The nature of the impasse between the Palestinians and Israelis is the nature of the incompatibilities of the conflict discourses, which is conflict – incompatible goals. Unless both the Palestinians and Israelis actually change their established conflict discourses it is not possible to entertain a resolution to the conflict. How far it is actually possible to change a discourse on which conflict understanding, including the loss of life, is based is perhaps the subject of another study. This survey of the historical literature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has shown that despite the wars, conflict and terrorism, interspersed with negotiations and peace agreements, the conflict discourses have remained largely unchanged. Simply, Israel is a state in Palestine and wants to remain one, Palestine is not and wants to be one; the discourses supporting these aims are apparently mutually exclusive.

The nature of the discourses employed by the Palestinians and Israelis suggest that the actors have no desire to end the conflict. Zionism is centred on maintaining an ethnically homogeneous Jewish state; to abandon the security discourse underwritten by revisionist Zionism could effectively mean the end of the Jewish state as a racially pure entity. A unified one-state solution within the whole of Palestine encompassing both Jews and Arabs cannot be entertained without the complete rejection of the Zionist discourse. Whilst the Israeli left and the peace movement have criticised the extreme policies and actions of the predominantly ruling Israeli right, their recommendations stop well short of suggesting the disestablishment of the state of Israel. The Jews fear that the Palestinians are still committed to a Palestinian state in the whole region and foresee in their own destruction the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Palestinians also have a reason to maintain the conflict, as a settlement other than that which provided them with a Palestinian state incorporating the homelands and the settlement of refugees would be a betrayal of the Palestinian people. The approaches of conflict management in attempting to problem solve within established conflict discourses is perhaps represented by this study as it demonstrates the existence of high level political understandings of conflict that obscure the deeper root causes that are tackled by conflict resolution approaches.

Whilst these discourse questions are perhaps the subject of further study, what is important for this investigation into the roots of terrorism is that the Zionist discourse employed by Israel is based on security and incorporates orthodox terrorism

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272 Richmond, *Maintaining Order*.
discourse, which is applied by the Israelis within the relative legitimacy debate on the use of terrorism, in order to establish Palestinian terrorism as illegitimate, illegal and unlawful violence. However, this is perhaps no different from all other states that seek the notion of security enshrined in the realist positivist order of the Westphalian world. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be seen as asymmetric; an established state against a non-state actor that is seeking to become a state through violence. The discourses employed by the two actors although culturally significant are common political discourses for conflict, that of the state security / terrorism discourse versus the non-state national liberation discourse both of which are mutually incompatible, hence the nature of the conflict. They also aptly demonstrate the relative legitimacy debate in the understanding of terrorism, which is provided by the orthodox definition that simply highlights the terrorist versus freedom fighter debate.

The primary purpose of this chapter was to review the historical literature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and develop an understanding of its dynamics. By employing a critical theory and discourse analysis approach it is possible to demonstrate the development and employment of different conflict discourses and show how they are subjectively employed to define, understand and justify conflict and terrorism. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is also a useful example of how orthodox terrorism discourse is employed by the state within the conflict in order to avoid dealing with the root causes of terrorism. This is perhaps the central problem with the historical approach as it fails to engage in a roots debate and seeks instead to explain the violence and conflict relative to the discourse employed, which provide justification and legitimacy to the actions in conflict. In the next chapter, I intend to apply the comprehensive framework constructed in Chapter 3 to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in order to move beyond the constraining conflict discourses and penetrate into root causes of terrorism to demonstrate that beyond the perceptions of the mono-dimensional and political discourse understanding of terrorism exist multi-level and multi-dimensional root causes.

273 Although critical theory and discourse analysis approaches show this to be the actual the purpose of a discourse.
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Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism

“If the doors of perception were cleansed
everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.”

William Blake

Introduction

‘Terrorism’ needs to be re-examined: in Chapter 1 I argued that the conventional understanding of terrorism is currently shackled to a state-centric positivist understanding underwritten by a mono-dimensional and pejorative moral legitimacy framework that provides little space to engage in a roots debate, this is orthodox terrorism theory. Whilst this discourse allows the symptoms of terrorism to be tackled by the anti-terror and counter-terror policies of the state, it provides insufficient access for approaching the root causes of the violence. In Chapter 2 I discussed approaches provided by conflict studies that could potentially alleviate this difficulty by providing alternative perspectives based on an examination of the political and socio-economic root causes of conflict. Chapter 3 consisted of a comparative analysis of both terrorism and conflict literature in order to create a hybrid approach and provide a more substantial and sophisticated way of understanding the root causes of terrorism through the construction of a multi-level and multi-dimensional comprehensive framework. In Chapter 4 I examined the Palestinian-Israeli conflict within a historical context by evaluating the historical and subjective discourses used to understand the conflict and explain the roots of

terrorism. It is apparent from this chapter that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict\(^2\) is an example of the conventional understanding of terrorism that employs a state-centric positivist discourse on a mono-dimensional and pejorative moral legitimacy framework. This is because the conflict is largely understood through the predominant Israeli\(^3\) approach generated by employing orthodox terrorism theory,\(^4\) which as I suggested in the last chapter, is synonymous with Israeli security policies. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is therefore an ideal and constructive case study for rethinking the roots of terrorism by applying the comprehensive and holistic framework constructed in Chapter 3. This is the purpose of the following chapter in which I aim to explain how Israel understands the roots of terrorism through the state-centric perspective created by orthodox terrorism theory and then challenge this by rethinking the root causes by applying the comprehensive framework. The reason for this is suggested in the last chapter relating to the understanding of the conflict according to orthodox historical narratives and conventional terrorism theory that fail to understand root causes outside of the political discourses.

Israel however is not alone in the conventional terrorism approach because the most widely accepted understanding of terrorism is based on the definitions generated by orthodox terrorism discourse. Both the UN and EU, and perhaps more importantly the US, employ a definition that is based on relative legitimacy and subjective morality (although it is a claimed objectivity). The US state department suggests, “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence to...intimidate governments...”\(^5\) This approach to political violence suggests a predominantly state based understanding and consequently the most easily recognised cause of terrorism is anti-state sentiment. This is primarily due to the existence of the sovereign state and its monopoly of legitimate power and authority within its borders to maintain its own

\(^2\) It is perhaps important to stress that this is a study of the Palestinian-Israel conflict and focuses on the conflict and the manifestation of violence. Many Palestinian and Israeli people have a deep aversion to violence and are characterised by passivity and humanity with feelings of sorrow, regret and remorse for those engaged and caught up in the violence, which is even more humbling considering the circumstances in which they live. This study is intended to examine those who are engaged in violence and is focused on the causes of terrorism. Were this study to examine the root causes of peace a different impression of the two societies would no doubt be given.

\(^3\) Throughout this study I use the term ‘Israel’ and ‘Israeli’ interchangeably as a generic representation of the government of the Israeli state.

\(^4\) See, Chapter 1.

security, both internal and external. Opposition to the state especially in the form of political violence is a clear threat to its existence and is opposed and subjugated by state machinery. As I discussed in Chapter 1 orthodox terrorism theory provides the discourse through which states can legitimately act against their political opposition. This is part of the attraction of employing terrorism theory. It does not engage in a roots debate and views terrorism as categorically, morally and legally wrong.

The implications of this approach are that the Palestinians as terrorist actors are delegitimised by Israel, which maintains a legitimacy of action against them. As an Israeli Knesset politician suggested terrorism was "an immoral and unjust means of coercion." Orthodox terrorism theory suggests that conventional force is legitimate violence used by the state, whereas terrorism is illegitimate violence used by non-state actors. ‘Legitimate’ Israeli force is used to combat ‘illegitimate’ Palestinian terrorism without needing to engage in a roots debate or seek deeper reasons or causes for the violence. Although the question of whether the terrorist actors actually employ terrorism theory and see themselves as illegitimate and unlawful actors is the subject of another study, the central arguments against this, and one that is relevant to this study that seeks to explore the middle ground between terrorism and conflict studies, is the belief of many terrorists that they are actually in a conflict or war. They see their actions of killing and sabotage against both civilian and military targets as legitimate acts in conflict. For example, Palestinian groups widely regard suicide attacks as a way to counteract Israeli conventional superiority.

The intention of this chapter is to demonstrate theoretically how different perspectives of terrorism can reveal different root causes when applied to the

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6 Wilkinson suggests that the liberal state is founded on the supremacy of the rule of law; the state has a monopoly on legitimate force to preserve internal peace and order, by enforcing law and as protection from state enemies. Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.16.


8 Throughout this study I will use the term ‘Palestinian’ or ‘Palestinians’ as a generic reference to the Palestinian leadership contained broadly within the PLO, although the Palestinian leadership is divided between factions especially Islamic groups, the expression Palestinian (s) is employed to represent the Palestinians as a whole, where it differs significantly I will endeavour to make this clear.


10 Wilkinson P, Terrorism and the Liberal State, London: Macmillan, 1977, p23. It is important to note that Wilkinson bestows the legitimacy of force on the ‘Liberal State’ which satisfies a number of his criteria, however the orthodox understanding of terrorism is so widely understood that rarely is the Liberal nature of the state questioned, it seems therefore that by virtue of being a state a legitimacy of force can be exercised.

Palestinian-Israeli conflict. My aim is twofold; in Part 1 of this chapter I intend to demonstrate how orthodox terrorism theory explains and understands the roots of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by examining how and why the Israeli state applies it, and with what implications. In Part 2 I intend to show how the application of the comprehensive framework I constructed in Chapter 3 provides an alternative multi-level and multi-dimensional understanding of the roots of terrorism. This will contain a re-examination of the roots of terrorism at the level of the state, non-state, structural and individual. The chapter will be concluded with an investigation of how and why this alternative approach might be employed and an examination of the implications it has for the understanding of terrorism.

Part 1

Orthodox Terrorism Discourse

Israel

Orthodox terrorism theory is based on two principal assumptions: first, the primacy of state legitimacy. This suggests that the state is unequivocally both morally and legally right, compared to the terrorist actor who is unequivocally wrong. Secondly, the terrorist is considered a rational actor. According to orthodox terrorism discourse the terrorist is acting outside the law and is punishable without

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12 This is a study of the contemporary events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict up to and including the first two years of the second Intifada (2001-2003) and includes the period January – April 2003 for fieldwork.

13 Schmid and Jongman suggest terrorism is a struggle for legitimacy between those holding state power and those seeking it. Schmid A Jongman, A Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature, Oxford: North Holland, 1988 p.44. Also see Chapter 1.

14 Crenshaw develops “strategic choice theory” which she suggests represents the terrorist as a rational actor who has calculated the choices and implications of the act of violence as part of strategic reasoning. Crenshaw M “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a product of Strategic Choice,” in Reich W, Origins of Terrorism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p8. and
recourse to reasons, circumstances or root causes. The terrorist is also acting to accomplish a particular aim or tactical goal that is part of wider strategic plan into which the use of terrorism fits in order to achieve a desired political agenda.\textsuperscript{15} Ultimately by employing this discourse, the state is actually incapable of engaging in a roots debate and examining, publicly at least, why the violence might be occurring, as this would bestow some form of legitimacy on the terrorist and their cause, thus legitimating their violence and potentially that of any other group who decided to oppose the state. Instances of terrorist violence are understood by the conventional terrorism discourse as part of a wider strategic plan to destabilise and undermine the political position of the state.\textsuperscript{16}

Israel employs terrorism discourse to understand the conflict with the Palestinians because it allows them to locate the violence into an internal state security problem and external border dispute, instead of civil war, ethnic, separatist or independence conflict. For example, it was pointed out on a number of occasions by Israelis that the ‘problem’ with the Palestinians was an internal security matter.\textsuperscript{17} Also a member of the Knesset defence committee viewed the conflict within Israel, as ‘internal,’ meaning between the individual Palestinian groups and ‘external’ between Palestinians and the wider Arab world.\textsuperscript{18} So whilst the roots of terrorism are not explored, they are also often separated from any understanding of potential causes of the conflict with the Palestinians. Terrorism is seen as the act of extremists and is consequently divorced from the wider understanding of the conflict. As a Knesset politician suggested, “Terrorism was unacceptable and not part of the conflict.”\textsuperscript{19} This it can be argued is due to the way Israel sees terrorist attacks against “innocents” as impossible to understand and therefore condemned unequivocally as wrong without looking for the potential reasons why it is occurring.\textsuperscript{20} This allows Israel to employ the full power of state machinery in the form of legal and military means to deal with

\textsuperscript{15} Crenshaw M, 'How Terrorists think: What psychology can contribute to understanding Terrorism,' in Howard L., Terrorism; Roots, Impact and Responses, New York: Praeger 1992 p71. Also see chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{16} This can occur as part of a pure terrorist campaign or as part of an established conflict.
\textsuperscript{17} This is in comparison to acts of violence which take place within war or conflict; it is thus considered part of war to kill the enemy and not part of any particular coercion strategy.
\textsuperscript{18} Many Israelis refused to accept that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was a ‘conflict’ at all; instead they viewed it as an internal security problem. This is perhaps because the perceived threat from the surrounding Arab states overshadowed it. See field notes, p.7 and p.11.
\textsuperscript{19} Ilan Libovitch, MK Shinui, Knesset: Jerusalem, 01.04.2003, Interview transcripts. p.42.
\textsuperscript{20} Ilan Libovitch, p.45.

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the illegal security problem; this is the mainstay of Israeli counter-terrorist and anti-terrorism policies and actions.

Political violence in Israel is understood through the perspective created by conventional terrorism theory because it is a highly state-centric understanding of the cause of the violence and benefits the power and authority of the state. As I suggested in chapter 4, the principal discourse that underwrites the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for the Israelis is Zionism, which is focused on maintaining an ethnically homogenous Jewish state. Whilst it is true to say that states in general employ terrorism theory to maintain the security of the state, due to the precarious ethnographic nature of the Israeli situation, it is even more useful for Israel as it can employ orthodox terrorism theory to discredit, delegitimise and consequently ignore any claims the Palestinians have against the Israeli state. Orthodox terrorism theory has clear and useful applications for the Israelis when dealing with the Palestinian situation. I will now discuss how the Israelis apply orthodox terrorism discourse by examining the components of terrorism theory.

As I argued in Chapter 1, orthodox terrorism theory can be explained using a basic typology involving three concepts of terrorism: functional, symbolic and tactical. Functional terrorism is the basis for the theory that terrorist groups employ acts of terrorism in order to provoke a response from the state, such as inciting ruthless reprisals. These responses are intended to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the state and generate popular support or a rebellion against it. Laqueur calls this generalisation the “mainspring of terrorism” and suggests, “Seldom have terrorists assumed they could seize power but instead rely on a strategy of provocation…which is intended to trigger intended events.” This theory is inverted and used by Israel to explain and justify its actions against Palestinian terrorism. For example, following a series of bombings in mid-June 2002, Israel announced it would change the way it responded to “murderous acts of terror.” Within the week, eight major Palestinian towns were under direct military occupation and 700,000 Palestinian people were under curfew. Also, in September 2002 Israeli forces demolished Arafat’s Palestinian Authority compound in Ramallah. This was claimed to be in response to

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terrorist attacks in Tel Aviv a few days before.\footnote{The Economist, September 28, 2002, p65.} If according to orthodox theory the Palestinians strategic intention is to elicit a harsh response from Israel then their tactics worked. Conversely, if Israel is manipulating terrorist theory to suggest that their actions are what the Palestinians intend but instead are forced to respond to ‘fight terrorism,’ then either the Israelis are ignoring the lessons of orthodox terrorism theory, which advocate a measured response to terrorism\footnote{See Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, ‘pp.128-9 and Silke A, ‘Retaliating against Terrorism,’ in Silke A, (Ed), Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on terrorism and its Consequences, London: John Wiley & Sons, 2003, pp.215-231.} or they are free-riding on the orthodox terrorism discourse in order to destroy their political opponents.\footnote{It is argued that the destruction of the Palestinian Authority compound was a deliberate attempt to destroy the operating ability of the Palestinian Authority, which it effectively did. ‘Yasser Arafat amid the ruins,’ p.65.} This ambiguity was illustrated in a recent and unprecedentedly critical statement by the IDF from Lieutenant-General Ya’alon, who stated, “In our tactical decisions we are operating contrary to our strategic interest, as it (our hard-line tactics) increases hatred for Israel and strengthens the terror organisations.”\footnote{The Guardian Weekly, November 6-12, 2003, p.3.}

The second pillar of terrorism theory is symbolic terrorism. This suggests that terrorism is employed as a method or psychological weapon to coerce, intimidate, threaten, kill, and ultimately terrorise a particular target group.\footnote{Wilkinson defines pure terrorism as “the systematic use of murder and destruction or threat of, to terrorise individuals, groups, communities and governments to concede to terrorists demands.” See, Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p.46.} By this rationale the suicide bombings undertaken by Palestinian groups especially inside Israel are calculated to terrorise society. This is how terrorism is understood by Israel. For example, Hoffman suggests that “the (Palestinian) suicide terrorists intend to make (Israeli) people paranoid and xenophobic and fearful of venturing outside their homes…in order to compel the enemy’s societies acquiescence to their demands.”\footnote{Hoffman B, ‘The Logic of Suicide Bombers,’ The Atlantic Monthly, June 2003, v.291 i5, p.44.} The implications of this application of terrorism discourse is to delegitimise the actions of the Palestinians, as it allows Israeli society and government to openly condemn the Palestinians and suggest that they will not give in to the illegal and illegitimate demands of ‘killers’ and ‘murderers.’ An Israeli politician suggested that the Palestinian use of terrorism “broke the rules of the game.”\footnote{The Economist, September 28, 2002, p65.} Israel is then able to exploit this understanding by publicly suggesting that the aim of the terrorist is to illegally attempt to threaten, coerce and terrorise. This enables the state to justify the
adoption of tough counter-terrorism measures that pointedly refuse to acquiesce to terrorism in any way. This argument is found in orthodox terrorism theory and is expounded by Wilkinson as the “hardline approach” and relates to a set of key elements that refuse negotiations, concessions, special status or deals. The orthodox discourse is not only a way for Israel to approach the problem of terrorism and deal with the violence generated by the Palestinians but it is also a useful method to publicly delegitimise and demonise them, whilst simultaneously explaining to the public, who ultimately bear the brunt of terrorism, that the state counter and anti-terrorism policies are both legitimate and correct as a course of action. The landslide re-election of Likud and the Sharon government in February 2003 in the wake of the second Intifada is perhaps testament to the belief in or exploitation of terrorism theory and the understanding that the only way to deal with terrorism is by recognising it as an illegal strategy for political gain and opposing it with the mechanics of state, notably the police and the IDF. The Sharon government also continually demonise Yasser Arafat in both the national and international media and even suggested in September 2003 following a resurgence of terrorism that it would be in Israeli state interests to “remove” him. Although the suggestion received international condemnation the government’s approval ratings are indicative of the extent to which terrorism discourse is understood and accepted in Israeli society.

The last concept that helps explain terrorism theory is tactical terrorism. This suggests terrorism is employed to achieve short-term tactical gains or specific objectives within the wider strategic campaign, such as prisoner releases, the generation of funds or engaging the world media. Israel understands the proliferation of international terrorism in the form of hijacks, hostage taking and sabotage (from 1967) by Palestinian groups as largely intended to generate international public opinion for the Palestinian political cause against Israel, as well as raise funds and secure prisoner releases. Orthodox terrorism theory also explains the actual method of terrorism as tactical - a tactical weapons system employed by groups with limited

31 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy, pp.94-95.
32 The Economist, February 1, 2003, p.51.
33 The Economist, September 20, 2003, p.69.
34 An Opinion poll in Haaretz on September 10 showed; 18% said he should be assassinated. 28% said deportation and 27% said intensified isolation, the same poll suggested 70% in favour of assassinating the spiritual leader of Hamas Sheikh Yassin. The Economist, September 13, 2003. p.56.
means and resources. Terrorist bombings have also been described as the ‘poor man’s air force,’ and Hoffman, in reference to Palestinian suicide bombers suggested they were the “ultimate smart bomb.”36 Israel however does not see the attacks by the Palestinians as acts of retaliation for its own anti-terrorist actions nor does it understand them in terms of asymmetric conflict. They are viewed through orthodox terrorism theory as unlawful acts designed specifically to achieve a particular tactical goal with the effect of illegally influencing the political situation. This suggests that by employing the orthodox terrorism discourse Israel can argue that Palestinian violence is not a form of conflict or an asymmetric attempt to fight back against Israel or the manifestation of vented frustrations, anger or revenge. Instead these acts of violence are tactical components of a wider, calculated and rational plan to illegally influence Israeli state policies. For example, according to an Israeli politician, terrorism is “unacceptable.”37 It is apparent from the examination above how orthodox terrorism theory is applied by Israel to the Palestinian situation. It is also clear that this discourse provides a general understanding of terrorism. This is summed up by a member of the Israeli government who describes terrorism as “Using immoral or unjust means of coercion, forcing decisions not according to power but according to emotional stress and fear.”38 The concepts contained in the understanding of orthodox terrorism theory discussed above are clearly apparent in this definition.

As I have alluded to there are a number of possible reasons for this practice of orthodox terrorism discourse.39 Perhaps the primary reason is state security, this is a familiar application of the orthodox approach. In fact it can be seen as the raison d’etre for terrorism studies, especially in the construction of state policy. As I argued in Chapter 4, Israel is founded upon the discourse of Zionism, which implies that the State of Israel must remain an ethnically homogenous and racially dominant Jewish state. The political, social and cultural dominance of Jewish identity is a vital core value for the existence of the Israeli state and as Marc Ellis argues, a civil war currently exists in which Jews fight to maintain their separation from the ‘other’ as

36 Hoffman ‘The Logic of Suicide Bombers,’ p.40.
37 Ilan Libovitch, p.45.
only then can the essence of their Jewish identity be maintained.\footnote{Ellis M H, *The Future of Israeli/Palestine: Embracing the Broken Middle*, Journal of Palestinian Studies, 26, no.3, Spring 1997, p.58.} It is vital when considering the existence of Israel not to overlook the immense importance of a pure Jewish state, as anything less than a majority in Jewish homogeneity is not only antithetical to Zionism and the formation of Israeli but might also destroy the state itself. Ethnic Jewish security is integral to Zionism as it is ostensibly an identity based nationalist discourse and is deeply founded and enshrined in the Jewish national psyche. As Netanyahu argues “a distinguishing feature of Jews raised in Israel is the absence of the sense of personal insecurity and whilst Israel itself may come under personal attack the sense of being a Jew does not.”\footnote{Netanyahu B, *A Place Among The Nations, Israel and the World*, New York, Bantam Books, 1993, p.370.} Although the threat to the security of the state is the main pillar of terrorism discourse and is an understanding employed by almost all states,\footnote{See, Chapter 1.} in the case of Israel, the security of the state is particularly focused on maintaining Jewish ethnic security. This personifies the perceived terrorist threat from the Palestinians as political but also social, cultural and ethnic, thus threatening the whole fabric of the society and the existence of its ethnic homogeneity. As Gershon Baskin suggested the implications of annexation would amount to “Jewish national suicide” as the eventual assimilation of a population bigger than Israeli Jews would mean the loss of Jewish national Identity.\footnote{Israel faces a very serious demographic problem with the Palestinian and Arab populations as their growth relative to the Jewish population threatens to undermine the Jewish ethnic homogeneity. This is even more serious if Israel intends to permanently annex the West Bank and Gaza strip. See. Field notes, p.8. Interview with Dr Gershon Baskin from IPCRI (Israel/Palestine Centre for Research and Information).}

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is viewed primarily as an identity conflict and principally by the Zionist discourse as a fight for the survival of the Jewish people. This is enshrined in their historical narrative\footnote{See, Chapter 4.} and perhaps is personified by the legend of Massada.\footnote{According to Israeli ancient narrative after the second Jewish rebellion in 73 BCE, a band of zealous Jews held out at the desert fortress of Massada. However, preferring death to submission to the Romans they took their own lives, this is seen as a symbol of the Jewish desire for independence and the need to protect the Jewish identity from oppression and subjugation. As a result the Jewish rallying cry is Massada will never fall again. See, Tessler M, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, p.13.} This argument coincides with the lack of a roots debate within the Israeli approach to the conflict. The understanding of the causes of the conflict and of terrorism from the Israeli perspective is not related to the claims of the
Palestinians but the needs of Israel and the Jewish people, which is to maintain their own ethnic Jewish security enshrined in the existence of the state of Israel. A member of the Israeli Knesset illustrated this argument by suggesting, “the conflict is the interface between competing identities, which is not only an identity struggle but also a personal struggle.”

From the arguments above the reasons for the Israeli employment of orthodox terrorism theory become apparent, but it is also important to stress that there are a number of implications for the understanding of the roots of terrorism that are inherent with the application of this discourse. These implications will be discussed below in Part 2, which endeavours to rethink the roots of terrorism using an alternative discourse and which involves a critical theory approach to orthodox terrorism theory. Prior to this I aim to briefly introduce the alternative framework approach, which is also a discourse and is based on assumptions that can be subjected to a critical approach.

The Alternative Terrorism Discourse

The comprehensive approach to terrorism, as I suggested in Chapter 3, is based on a comparative analysis of terrorism and conflict literature. Although it is not my intention to provide an alternative theory of terrorism, it is an attempt to offer an alternative discourse or approach to the phenomenon by means of a multi-level framework which examines all the areas of a terrorist conflict in order to expose alternative root causes. An examination of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a case study for employing this alternative discourse requires a perspective change as fundamentally, I intend to examine the conflict outside of the orthodox framework. To achieve this I will define terrorism simply as ‘lethal political violence.’ This essentially relocates the act of terrorism out of the orthodox moral legitimacy debate and into a wider conflict context from where it can be examined in a root cause debate. The space provided by this shift should allow for the development of a more

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46 Yulie Tamir, MK Labour-Menad, Knesset: Jerusalem, 01.04.2003, Interview transcripts, p.32.
sophisticated understanding of the root causes of the political violence and provide possible routes to dealing with it. Notably, the definition I employ does not refer to terror, which is seen by orthodox theory as the basis of the understanding of terrorism. Terror is not used in my adopted definition because it is so closely associated with orthodox terrorism theory and the problems inherent in the subjective moral legitimacy debate. Orthodox terrorism theory holds that terrorism seeks to terrorise a people for political gain, which is morally and legally wrong whatever the circumstances. In my understanding war, conflict and political violence are all employed for political gain and all produce terror.

The alternative terrorism discourse is based on a number of assumptions, the first is that the act of violence is an act of conflict and is not morally or legally accountable from the relative moral perspective of the state. This is employed primarily as I suggested above, as an attempt to relocate the understanding of terrorism from the confines of the moral legitimacy debate, which is unhelpful in attempting to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the problem of political violence, into a broader conflict framework. From this perception the violence can be examined for what it is – lethal violence within the context of an established conflict.48 From a relativist perspective much of the violence that occurs within terrorism is actually occurring within a wider conflict and is often regarded by the perpetrators as acts of war or conflict.49 There is an argument to suggest that the roots of the terrorism are synonymous with the roots of the conflict. This is the second assumption of the alternative discourse that the acts of violence are within the context of asymmetric conflict. The alternative terrorism discourse can be applied to acts of political violence in order to attempt to penetrate into the root causes of the violence by examining the motivations and causes of violence at all levels, from the state to non-state, structural and individual. The rest of this chapter will examine the implications of applying the alternative terrorism discourse at these levels in order to rethink the roots terrorism.

47 See, Annex I, for tabular representation of the framework.
48 This effectively becomes a ‘roots of conflict’ debate, as the causes of terrorism can be seen as the same as the roots of the conflict. This is a departure from orthodox terrorism theory which not only considers that conflict has different roots, but ostensibly refuses to fully engage in the roots of terrorism apart from the political perspective.
49 This is not only applicable to the terrorists but also to the state, which paradoxically can declare ‘war on terrorism,’ the implications of which under terrorism theory could legitimise terrorist acts by placing them into a conflict framework.
Part 2

Application of the Alternative Terrorism Discourse

The Israeli State

“Freeing the great human conflicts from the naive interpretation of a battle between good and evil, and understanding them in the light of tragedy is an enormous feat of mind; it brings forward the unavoidable relativism of human truths.”

Milan Kundera\textsuperscript{50}

In this next section I intend to examine how the application of the comprehensive framework I constructed in Chapter 3, can be applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the state level. In order to achieve this I intend to investigate three areas: Israeli state responses to terrorism, Israeli approaches to terrorists, and Israeli approaches to terrorism. I will precede this with a brief explanation of the application of the alternative terrorism discourse at state level.

The alternative terrorism framework applied to the first level, the state level, employs a critical approach to the role of the state in the generation of terrorism and implies that the state is a root cause.\textsuperscript{51} This is essentially related to the internal dynamics of the state, arguably because the basis of state control is through violence and fear, hence the state population is ordered and controlled by fear generated by the

\textsuperscript{50} The Guardian, 17 May 2003, p.35.

\textsuperscript{51} Terrorism studies does deal with the state as a cause of terrorism but it is defined as acts of terrorism sanctioned by states outside its own borders, it is also referred to as state directed, state-sponsored, surrogate or proxy terrorism. It is notably a difficult subject for orthodox terrorism theory to deal with as it is never applied to the actions of liberal democratic or western states outside their borders and it usually preserved to refer to opposition or ‘unfriendly’ states. Interestingly states that are referred to as terrorist such as Iran, Syria and North Korea use the same understanding to refer to the west and especially the United Sates.
threat of force that exists within the state.\textsuperscript{52} This terrorising of the population into political and social compliance has its roots in the French Revolution, and is identifiable in Rousseau’s work on the social contract\textsuperscript{53} and Alexis de Tocqueville’s work on social containment.\textsuperscript{54} Terrorism, as lethal political violence can then be viewed as intrinsic to the existence of the state as it is a fundamental tool for the contention of political power. The use of terrorism to challenge the state will be discussed in a later section but at this level it is possible to see the employment of terrorism by the state to establish internal social cohesion and maintain political power.

It is feasible to argue that by examining how the Israeli state responds to terrorism it is possible to identify a root cause of terrorism. It is important to stress at this juncture that the intention of this theoretical study is not to judge, apportion blame or condemn or in fact suggest that Israel itself is a root cause of terrorism. The purpose of this work is to examine and theorise how the institution of the state and the dynamics of its politics and power relations leads to the manifestation of terrorism and political violence, these findings could equally relate to any state. Israel employs the powerful legal and military apparatus of the state not only as a means of dealing with challenges to the state but also a self-perpetuating dynamic for strengthening and protecting the state. The Israeli response to terrorism is terrorism, which far from dealing with the problem becomes a self-sustaining dynamic responsible for propagating the increasingly destructive cycle of violence within Israel and the Palestinian territories.\textsuperscript{55} Abu Shanab from Hamas argues, “Israel is killing and calling Palestinians terrorists. It is Israel who are the terrorists because they occupy the land and kill Palestinians.”\textsuperscript{56} Yet, Yulie Tamir from the Israeli Labour party suggests, “the power of terrorism is to disrupt liberal democracy, we fight terrorism without surrendering democracy; that is what we do.”\textsuperscript{57}

Israel benefits from the threat of terrorism as it helps to reinforce and consolidate the power of the state. Kimmerling suggests, “The (Israeli) state institutionalises conflict not because it cannot solve it but because it is conveniently

\textsuperscript{53} See, Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{54} See, Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{55} The Economist, October 11, 2003, p.14.
\textsuperscript{56} Ismail Abu Shanab, Hamas Political Leader, Gaza, 24.03.2003, Interview transcripts p.29.
\textsuperscript{57} Yulie Tamir, MK Labour-Menad, Knesset: Jerusalem, 01.04.2003. Interview transcripts, p.40.
suited to its own purposes... and can augment its power and neutralise competing social political agencies.”58 This suggests that rooted in the reality of the state and demonstrated by the response of Israel to terrorism is the existence of inherent terrorism. This implies that the roots of terrorism can exist in the power relationships of the state. These are against the state, from both inside and outside state boundaries and by the state, as state terrorism or anti-terrorism in reaction to actual threats, and as violent pre-emptive measures. It can also be a potent method of maintaining state power and a way to marginalize potential internal political threats and neutralise or suppress possible opposition by employing the legitimacy of force. As a result or perhaps as an intention, the government recourse to anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism policies and accompanying legislation often infringes basic human rights.59

The response of Israel to terrorism and its subsequent ability to respond and deal with the threat of terrorism provides it with a legitimate mandate to enforce a political agenda. Not only does it enforce political conformity within Israel and provide a suitable method of dealing with political dissent, it also allows for the implementation of particular political agendas, in particular the maintenance of the discourse of Zionism. The existence of a terrorist threat and the Israeli state response to it, provide definite political advantages that have been exploited by the Israeli right and can be directly attributable to their accession and dominance of Israeli national politics. By employing an alternative understanding of terrorism it is possible to see that the Israeli right has a vested interest in maintaining the employment of terrorism discourse and the existence of a terrorist threat, on which the future of the ethnic Jewish state of Israel is perceived to rest. The political power afforded to the state by the use of terrorism and political violence has been employed by Israel to maintain its political goals, from the pre-state terrorist campaigns of the Lehi and Irgun60 to the ideas and policies of Jabotinsky and Ben Gurion, through Golda Meir and successively to Sharon. Furthermore, successive Likud leaderships have consecutively employed a policy of violence in order to achieve the aims of Zionism.61 This was

59 The current Terrorism Act 2000 in the United Kingdom, which allows for secret jury-less trials, indefinite detention, discrimination against foreigners and the ability to revoke citizenship, as an example of the political strength the state can gain from its response to terrorism. See, The Economist, September 13, 2003, p.26.
60 See, Chapter 4.
61 See, Chapter 4.
starkly illustrated by the Chief of Staff in 1956 Moshe Dayan who summed up the Israeli settler mentality and the preoccupation of Israel with security, by stating: “We are a generation of settlers, yet without a gun barrel we cannot plant a tree...this is the fate of our generation. The only choice we have is to be armed. strong and resolute or else the sword will fall from our hands and the thread of our lives will be severed.”

The second theme I intend to examine in order to explain the application of the alternative terrorism discourse is the Israeli approach to terrorists. The principal consequence of the normative understanding of terrorism as illegal, unjust and morally wrong, is that it allows the Israeli state to invoke not just the criminal legal process but also extensive military operations against terrorists, and indeed any potential political opponent. Israel is able to pursue legitimate, legal and justified anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist policies against the Palestinians. These policies and actions are fully explained, justified and defended by orthodox terrorism discourse and are often security based in relation to pre-emptive self-defence against suspected terrorists or retaliatory actions against specific targets. These can be as varied an action as full-scale military operations, strikes by the Israeli Air Force or pre-emptive assassinations. The implications of employing an alternative terrorism discourse which views the policies and actions of Israel outside of the normative terrorism framework is to suggest the generation of secondary gain or devious terrorism by the state. Within the state understanding of terrorism it is possible for Israel to exploit and free ride on the terrorism discourse and legitimately, justly and legally pursue, and effectively eradicate, its political enemies and opponents with impunity, regardless of whether they are in fact a cause of terrorism. Judicial procedures and internationally recognised rights can be circumvented and ignored under the understanding that terrorism can be dealt with without any recourse to root

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63 These involve ‘incursions’ by the IDF using tanks, armoured vehicles and helicopters into Palestinian areas; an example of this was the virtual destruction of the refugee camp in Jenin in April 2002. See, The Economist, April 20, 2002, p.11. Furthermore, Gambill suggest that the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996 was a clear act of terrorism. See, Gambill G C. ‘The Balance of Terror: War by other means in the contemporary Middle East,’ Journal of Palestinian Studies, 28, no.1, Autumn 1998, p.62.
64 For example an Israeli Airforce attack on terrorist ‘training camps’ inside Syria, the first attack in 30 years against Syria, see, The Economist, October 11, 2003, p.14.
65 The assassination policy is known through the Israeli self-defence language as “targeted killings.” At the time of writing some of the most recent examples included the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab in Gaza City. The Economist, August 23 2003, p.45.
causes via orthodox terrorism discourse.\textsuperscript{66} The most recent example of this has been the killing in separate incidents of Sheikh Yassin and Dr Abdel Aziz Rantisi who were the respective spiritual and political leaders of Hamas.\textsuperscript{67}

The final theme, which helps to explain the application of the alternative terrorism discourse, is the Israeli approach to terrorism. This has a similar argument to the last two areas as it continues to suggest that the state as an institution is a cause of terrorism. A further consequence of the employment of orthodox terrorism theory, in order to understand and respond to acts of terrorism, is the creation of a climate of fear. Terrorism discourse suggests that acts of violence are perpetrated with the express intention of terrorising a particular target group. The psychological nature of this normative understanding of terrorism produces fear within Israeli society. This can be exploited by the Israeli state in two key ways, first to generate public support for conceivably unpopular or contentious anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist measures, such as full-scale military incursions into the Palestinian areas or assassination attacks by aircraft, which result in extensive collateral damage and civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{68}

Secondly, this climate of fear can also be used to reinforce and support the Israeli state by the control and manipulation it naturally provides for political society. Although these two implications have been discussed above, it is the fear generated by terrorism that is the most useful to Israel and gives them a vested interest not only in employing orthodox terrorism discourse but also in the continuation of Palestinian terrorism. Although this is a controversial argument, it is possible to argue that Israel greatly benefits from the existence of terrorism and the potential threat it provides the Israeli state.

The fear generated by the threat of Palestinian and Arab terrorism in Israeli society is very useful for Israel as it maintains the political unity of the Jewish state especially between the right and the left. In addition it also provides the cohesion for national unity between the otherwise fractious components of the composite nature of Israeli society. Israeli society is divided into seven separate collective identities:

\textsuperscript{66} It is possible to argue that the current ‘War on Terrorism’ by the United States, in particular against al Qaeda is being exploited by states in the same way. For example, The Philippines are able to pursue their own indigenous terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf group and use full military measures to suppress them with international impunity by suggesting they are part of al Qaeda and thus the ‘War on Terrorism.’

\textsuperscript{67} The Economist, April 24, 2004, pp.25-27.

\textsuperscript{68} For example, a one-tonne bomb was dropped by an Israeli F-16 on the home of the Hamas leader Salah Shehade, killing him and fourteen of his own family, mostly children. The Guardian Weekly, December 11-17, 2003, p.3.
Ashkenazi, National Religious, Mizrahim (Sepharadi). Orthodox Religious. Arabs. Russian Immigrants and Ethiopians, all of whom are in constant cultural conflict with each other. 69 It was pointed out on a number of occasions that the existence of a threat softens the divisions between these groups and promotes a sense of national unity. 70 Also in a recent article it was suggested that the continuing divisions in Israeli society over immigration and status were given an appearance of unity by the conflict with the Palestinians. 71 The existence of a threat greatly benefits the Israeli right, which is consistent with the principles of revisionist Zionism. The terrorist threat also undermines the strength of the Israeli Labour party and neutralises political challenges from the Israeli peace movement and stalls any possible progress of a ‘peace process.’ The implications of which, it was argued by a number of interviewees, prevents the succession of land or autonomy to the Palestinians, the return of Palestinian refugees or a compromise on the sovereignty of the old city of Jerusalem. 72 It is possible to suggest therefore that terrorism is generated from the state in the form of terrorism management.

Arguably, the continuance of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the subsequent acts of terrorism are sustained, managed and employed by Israel in order to maintain the specific Zionist goals. This argument is supported by Martin Woollacott who suggests that the “ultimate effect of the suicide bomber is to keep Sharon in power and to provide him with a constant supply of reasons for his persistent and dedicated refusal to negotiate seriously about the future of the Palestinians.” 73 Sharon’s hard-line actions and policies such as assassinations and incursions can be seen as an attempt to generate and manage terrorism and maintain his position in power whilst fulfilling the principles of Zionism. This argument is given further credence by Sharon’s visit to the al Aqsa mosque in 2000 which triggered the second Intifada and led to the end of the Oslo peace process but which also aided his subsequent landslide re-election in 2003. Also the recent end of the

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69 Kimmerling, Invention and Decline, p.2.
70 The Ashkenazi are the upper and middle class occidental Jews of European decent who consider themselves the traditional ruling class. The Mizrahim or Sephardi are the orthodox Jews from other Arabian and African countries who are considered the working class but are affiliated to the Shas party. See, field notes p.43.
72 Field notes p. 2.
ceasefire in August 2003 was due to an unrelenting Israeli policy of targeted killings.\footnote{In August 2003 Israel assassinated the Islamic Jihad commander Muhammad Sidr, this led directly to a bus bombing in Jerusalem by Hamas killing twenty people. A reprisal Israeli assassination of the Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab led to the universal rejection of the ceasefire and the return to violence by all the Palestinian groups. See, The Economist, August 23, 2003, p.45.}

By employing the alternative terrorism discourse it is possible to critique orthodox terrorism discourse and question the role of the state in the generation, employment and maintenance of terrorism. The alternative terrorism discourse suggests that terrorism is synonymous with the existence, function and security of the state as “Conflict is an inherent characteristic of Israeli culture and society.”\footnote{Kimmerling, \textit{Invention and Decline}, p.11.} Paradoxically the state needs terrorism in order to operate efficiently against its opponents and support the security discourse, which so effectively maintains the political power of the state. By employing the lens of an alternative terrorism discourse it is possible to argue that the roots of terrorism at the state level exist in a utilitarian self-sustaining dynamic that provides the lubrication for the efficient functioning of the machinery of state and the cement for the socio-political cohesion of national unity.

\begin{quote}
\textit{Rebellion is the common ground on which every man bases his values. I rebel – therefore we exist.}”
\end{quote}
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Orthodox terrorism theory firmly locates the roots of terrorism in unlawful, illegitimate and violently coercive political challenges against the state to enact political agendas. Consequently the Israeli state employment of orthodox terrorism discourse explains the roots of terrorism as emanating from the Palestinians and their
illegitimate claims against Israel. By employing this discourse Israel is able to rely on
the legitimacy of action it provides and is absolved from any responsibility for
causing Palestinian terrorism aside from existing as the institution of the state. Whilst
this is a useful approach to the problem of terrorism and political violence as the
relationship between state and non-state group is considered a major determinant of
armed struggle, it is not the only root cause. In fact the principal difficulty with the
orthodox terrorism theory approach is that is places too much emphasis on the nature
of the political relationship between state and non-state group, particularly in this
framework because the state is considered the legitimate actor. As I discussed in
Chapter 3, by moving away from the orthodox understanding and embracing the
approaches provided by social conflict theory it is possible to investigate functional
and utilitarian conceptions of the causes of terrorism as well as examine wider roots in
social and economic factors. In the next section I intend to examine how the
application of the alternative terrorism discourse at the non-state level can expose a
deeper understanding of the root causes of terrorism within the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. I intend to conduct this by theorising in three potential causational areas at
the non-state level. These are the perceived function of terrorism, the individual safety
needs of agencies and the relative deprivation of actors.

The principal advantage of employing the alternative approach to terrorism is
that is provides the space in which to consider and examine the reasons for terrorism
that originate from the perpetrators of the actual violence. Orthodox terrorism
discourse is unable to entertain this approach due to the confines of the moral
legitimacy debate in which it is enshrined. By applying the comprehensive framework
it is possible to expose deeper root causes. The first of these is the function of
terrorism. This relates to the argument that terrorism and political violence have a
necessary political and socio-economic purpose within society, one through which it
is possible to generate positive social change and provide a channel to express and
alleviate political, social and economic disparity. This implies that in order to make

78 See, Chapter 3.
79 See, Chapter 2 and 3 for the functional arguments. Also as this study is intended to be an objective
and non-judgemental examination of the phenomena of terrorism, the moral debate on the justification
for this type of violence and the relative reasons for and against it, is perhaps the subject of another
study. Suffice to say that this argument it is often captured in the bind of the terrorism definitional
debate and is encapsulated by the expression, ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.’
which as I argued in chapter 3 is of little use in penetrating the roots of terrorism.
change it is necessary to use violence against violence. This was identified by Fanon who suggested, “Colonialism is violence in its natural state...and will only yield when confronted with greater violence.”

The Palestinians consider themselves in a colonial conflict against an occupier and oppressor. It was pointed out to me on a number of occasions that many Palestinians view Zionism like colonialism, a culture of oppression in Palestine, which like colonialism will eventually pass to the next form. The natural recourse to this oppression is towards deadly conflict and political violence. This is shown by the development of Palestinianism that is illustrated in the historical narrative contained in Chapter 4. The adoption of armed conflict was an instantaneous response by the Palestinians to the early Zionist settlers and was typified by the Arab Revolts of 1936 and 1948. Similarly significant was the formal adoption of ‘armed struggle’ against ‘the occupation’ to establish a Palestinian state after 1967 by Arafat and the PLO, which was enshrined in the Palestinian charter of 1968, and stated, “Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine ... it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase.”

Despite the existence of cease-fires and the ongoing peace process in the conflict, the majority of political groups involved in the conflict support deadly violence in armed struggle as the preferred approach to achieving their political goals. This is justified as a reaction to Israeli violence and the perception by the Palestinians that Israel has consistently employed violence to achieve its political objectives. Dr Haider Abdul Shafi suggests, “Armed struggle is a useful tool to counter Israeli aggression.” However, it is also understood as a way to achieve political objectives. For example, a PFLP representative suggested that armed struggle is employed “in order to oblige Israel to withdraw and oblige Israel to pay the cost of occupying Palestinian land.” Furthermore, Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab argued that the

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81 Some interviewed Palestinians suggested that they had seen “many who come and go” and this current period was in the “hands of god.” Fieldnotes p.4.
82 See, Chapter 4.
83 See, Chapter 4.
85 Dr Haider Abdul Shafi, Gaza City: Gaza, 24.03.2003, Interview transcripts, p.21. Dr Haider Abdul Shafi was a former member of the Palestinian legislative, who was the independent Palestinian negotiator at the Madrid summit in 1992.
86 Kalyid Aghol, PFLP Leader, Gaza City: Gaza, 22.03.2003, Interview transcripts, p.9.
purpose of armed struggle was, “to get rid of the Israeli occupiers, free the Palestinian people, establish a Palestinian state and maintain the right to return.”

The implication of using the alternative framework applied at the non-state political level is to suggest that the Palestinians generate functional conflict in the form of revolutionary or reactionary terrorism. For example, the Palestinians actively employ violence to achieve political agendas, either with revolutionary or reactionary intentions. Revolutionary is the desire for destruction of the Israeli state and its replacement with a Palestinian or Islamic one, as demanded by Islamic Jihad (IJ) whose long-term aim after the Islamification of the whole of Palestine, is the formation of “a union of Islamic States.” Reactionary is the violent demand for the reformation of the existing system, such as a two state solution as Fateh demand; they want a “state of Palestine beside Israel not on account of it.”

A second area that can be considered a root cause of terrorism at the non-state level by using the alternative terrorism framework are the individual safety needs of actors. As I argued in Chapter 3, by applying human needs theory from conflict studies to the question of terrorism, it is possible to suggest the existence of a set of socio-biological human needs that require satisfaction on a hierarchical basis in order to avoid the manifestation of violence. The implications of employing this alternative discourse through which to examine terrorism is to suggest that if the basic needs of the non-state actor are unsatisfied they will trigger grievance terrorism. The basic safety needs as identified by Azar, are security, identity, representation and equality, and they feature highly in the needs expressed by Palestinians involved in the conflict with Israel. Examined individually, security is perhaps the most important need for the Palestinians and one that can be seen as a root cause of terrorism and powerful motivator of deadly violence against the Israelis. Broadly defined as freedom from threats to core values, the need for security by the Palestinians can seen be in three

87 Ismail Abu Shanab, Hamas Political Leader, Gaza, 24.03.2003, Interview transcripts p.29.
89 Diab Nemer Allouh, Fateh Leader, Gaza City: Gaza, 24.03.2003, Interview transcripts, p.27.
90 See, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3. Also, Burton J, Deviance, Terrorism and War, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979, p.44.
92 The demands or needs of the Palestinians expressed to me during interviews and observations suggested a similarity and correlation with the ‘safety needs’ expressed by humans needs theory. See, Fieldnotes.
main forms, individual, group or national. Individual security relates directly to human security.\textsuperscript{94} It is the need for individual freedom from harm or protection from violence and is closely linked to the existence and maintenance of individual human rights. The Palestinians feel a deep lack of personal security. This is particularly evident during the second Intifada and the subsequent Israeli occupation and is clearly apparent in interviews and from observations. A survey by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics found that the sense of satisfaction with personal security in Palestinian households fell by sixty percent during the period October 2000-May 2001.\textsuperscript{95}

The need for security can also exist at the group level, as ethnic security,\textsuperscript{96} which is the protection of group identity and cultural values. Coupled with this is national security; although this is usually associated with a state, it can imply the need for protection of "national values."\textsuperscript{97} National values however, can only be secure under the protection afforded by the formation of a state. In the current normative "international state system," only the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state can provide acceptable security under the regimes of international law and the auspices of the United Nations. This accounts for the Palestinian demands for an independent state, as a Fateh representative pointed out, by suggesting that although the main aim of the conflict was to "free the Palestinian lands" the social, political and economic benefits that accompany this could only be achieved through the security provided by an independent state.\textsuperscript{98} This need is clearly reflected in the 1968 Palestinian Charter, which stated, "The liberation of Palestine is a defensive action…in order to restore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to Palestine, to re-establish peace and security and enable national sovereignty and freedom."\textsuperscript{99}


\textsuperscript{95} The report found that before the crisis (second Intifada) 76.32\% of household were very satisfied with personal security but during the crisis this fell to 9.32\%. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics \textit{"Impact of Israeli Measures on the Well-being of the Palestinian household, 2001"}, Ramallah: Central Bureau of Statistics, November 2001, p.78.


\textsuperscript{97} Defined as political and territorial integrity, physical well-being and survival of the population, promotion of economic welfare and preservation of social harmony. In Sayigh Y, \textit{"Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security of the Palestinian State"}, Journal of Palestinian Studies 26, no.4, Summer 1995, p.6.

\textsuperscript{98} Fateh, Interview Transcripts, p.25.

\textsuperscript{99} For a full transcript of the document see, Laqueur and Rubin, \textit{Reader}, p.369.
The second safety need is identity; this is closely associated with security and can be defined as "a subjective but vital aspect of individual and group perceptions, relating to cultural, historical, linguistic and religious awareness and perceptions."\(^{100}\) The need for identity can be viewed as a potent cause of terrorism and is cited by Palestinians as a principal grievance against Israel, as many Palestinians expressed the feeling that their group identity, in the form of culture, language and beliefs is not adequately protected nor represented by Israel.\(^{101}\) Consequently, the formation of Palestinian national identity has been an ongoing and violent historical process and has evolved throughout recent history into a powerful motivator of violence. As the events from 1936 to the present day have demonstrated, identity issues have propelled thousands of Palestinians into violence.\(^{102}\) This trend in the growth of the popular need for Palestinian identity reached a new height in the 1990s and was personified by the spontaneous outbreak of the first Intifada which can be seen as the Palestinians attempt to express their own cultural identity by 'shaking off' the Israeli state and creating a unified Palestinian national consciousness.\(^{103}\) It also appears that the concept of Palestinian identity is inextricably linked to freedom, which is a very enduring theme and perhaps the most cited conception Palestinians give as their reason for engaging in violence.\(^{104}\)

A further safety need that can be considered a cause of *grievance terrorism* is representation. This refers to Palestinian participation and representation in the political process and the personification of Palestinians in society. Without doubt the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the subsequent imposition of Israeli military rule have created fertile ground for political violence due to the perceived marginalisation of the Palestinians. This became even more pronounced following the outbreak of the second Intifada and the virtual destruction by Israel of the embryonic Palestinian National Authority, which represented the beginning of Palestinian self-rule and the possible satisfaction of the need for representation. Principally, it is felt

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\(^{101}\) Jerusalem interviews; Field notes, p.3.


\(^{103}\) See, Chapter 4.

\(^{104}\) Fieldnotes, p.2, and pp.20-41. Interestingly many Palestinians referred to the Mel Gibson film *Braveheart,* which is about the struggle for independence of Scotland in the Twelfth Century, to illustrate and explain their own use of violence against Israel. This was memorably stressed by a fighter from the Al-Aqsa martyrs' brigade. Fighter, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Gaza, 20.03.03, Interview Transcripts, p.1.
by the Palestinians that Israel does not represent the Palestinian Arabs and therefore has little interest in protecting their well-being and security. The Palestinians continually stressed in interviews and conversations that what they want is participation and representation.\textsuperscript{105} It is clearly apparent that the Palestinians have an overriding need for the protection of their identity, culture, language and beliefs, as they do not know to whom to turn to for security.\textsuperscript{106} This is principally due to the Zionist discourse of the Israeli state that seeks to maintain its homogeneity as an ethnic Jewish state through religious affiliation. The nationality of an Israeli is Jewish and for a Palestinian it is Arab. Israel maintains the exclusivist nature of the Israeli state by qualifying its citizenship by religion and ethnicity\textsuperscript{107} and not nationality: the ethnic Jewish categorisation automatically marginalises non-Jewish nationals. It was explained to me on a number of occasions that the Israelis see themselves and their state as ethnically Jewish not necessarily religiously Jewish, it is predominantly seen therefore as an ethnic state not a religious one. This clearly illustrates the consequences of national exclusivity that exist within Israel and which automatically marginalise Palestinian Arabs.\textsuperscript{108} The need for representation is characterised by the Palestinians demand for self-determination, which is the principle-defining theme that Palestinians use to explain and justify violence.\textsuperscript{109} Abu Shanab from Hamas argued, “Resistance is to gain rights and is a message that Palestinians do not accept occupation, that we do not want to be slaves and want to live with dignity and freedom on our land.”\textsuperscript{110}

The final safety need and a possible cause of grievance terrorism is inequality. In the examination of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict this refers to how the Palestinian people are treated by the Israelis. They are essentially de facto second-class citizens within Israel and in the occupied territories are treated with derision. They routinely suffer molestation in the form of physical and psychological harm by the Israeli army because they are not in a position to guarantee and protect their own basic rights. Many Palestinians I spoke to in the Gaza Strip had spent some time in prison or under interrogation and all seemed to have had a member of their family or close friend

\textsuperscript{105} Jerusalem interviews and conversations, see, Fieldnotes, p.3.
\textsuperscript{106} West Jerusalem interviews and conversations, see, Fieldnotes, p.4.
\textsuperscript{107} Conversations with Israelis, Jerusalem, see, Fieldnotes, p.5.
\textsuperscript{108} Conversations with Israelis, Jerusalem, see, Fieldnotes, p.1.
\textsuperscript{109} This was a reoccurring theme throughout the field research and was referred to in almost every conversation. See, Fieldnotes.
\textsuperscript{110} Hamas, Interview Transcripts, p.32.
killed by the IDF. Robert Hunter suggests, “25% of the Palestinian population have passed through the Israeli military court system.”\textsuperscript{111} It is immediately apparent that the Palestinians feel a deep sense of inequality, which is caused by their inability to be able to travel freely, especially to visit friends and relations. In some regions they are virtual prisoners behind fences, barriers and armed guards, often forcibly turned away and prevented from access; even those who have the correct papers are often delayed for long periods. This was observed particularly for movement between the Palestinian regions in the West Bank such as Jericho and Ramallah and especially between Palestinian and Israeli areas in Gaza, where some check points remain permanently closed. Notably, in some areas the extreme restrictions of movement, association and expression are accompanied by harsh social and economic constraints, such as taxes and the trade tariffs.\textsuperscript{112}

The inequalities that the Palestinian people feel in relation to Israelis is without doubt a powerful motivation for terrorism because the daily existence of the Palestinian under Israeli occupation is dependent on the will of the Israeli army. Workers are frequently unable to travel to work, the sick or injured cannot reach hospitals and families live in terror of Israeli Army incursions into their towns, villages, refugee camps and homes. The principal grievance and feeling of inequality that materialises from this is the deep affront that the proud and self-respecting Palestinian Arabs feel to their dignity, self-worth and humanity. As a one Palestinian resident of Nuseirat refugee camp explained, “sometimes it is better to die than to live without dignity.”\textsuperscript{113}

The final area of examination that can be considered a root cause of terrorism at the non-state level by using the alternative terrorism framework is relative deprivation.\textsuperscript{114} This theory relates to the perceived and relative imbalance between what the Palestinians believe they should have politically, economically and socially in relation to the Israelis and what they actually have. This perceived disparity, it can be argued, is grounds for the emergence of deprivation terrorism. The Palestinians


\textsuperscript{112} The Palestinians in the west Bank and Gaza are subject to heavy taxation by Israel they also buy Palestinian produce at very low forced rates only to repackage and export the produce abroad.

\textsuperscript{113} He explained that the reason Palestinians are prepared to fight and die is that maybe dignity will be found in the next life, thus if you make life unliveable you force people (who believe) to seek another life. Fieldnotes; p.29.

can see that the Israelis have their own state, a permanent position in the United Nations, international recognition and the sovereignty, autonomy, legitimacy, security, and protection of their population that is afforded by the international institution of the state. Whereas the Palestinians perceive themselves as a people politically oppressed and under military occupation by a foreign power, who have a decimated and emasculated National Authority that cannot provide the benefits of a state. The Palestinians are also aware of the economic strength and standard of living experienced by Israelis that provides a relatively comfortable life with good prospects for work and financial security. It is also immediately apparent to the Palestinians from the proximity of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank how the Israelis live. from the new condition of their houses with running water and electricity to the expensive cars they drive on the deep banked highways that carve up the Palestinian lands to connect the settlements to the principal Israeli towns and cities. The Palestinians do not necessarily want to live like the Israelis but their grievances exist in relative deprivation and the fact that Israelis can live with freedom in relative comfort and security whilst the Palestinians suffer the ignominy of occupation, relative poverty and deep insecurity. Unsurprisingly therefore, in a recent study collated between October 2000 and May 2001, 25% of 18 to 45 year olds answered that they had a tendency to violence. Incidentally human needs and relative deprivation theories, employed to explain the manifestation of grievance and deprivation terrorism, are both based on the research in conflict studies of the assumed correlation between the appearance of frustration and the manifestation of aggression. Predictably a further survey by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics found that 70% of a mixed sex group aged between 18 and 45 suffered from feelings of hopelessness and frustration.

There is a convincing argument that by employing the alternative terrorism framework and applying it to the non-state level it can reveal a number of possible root causes of terrorism that are not considered under the orthodox approach, these have been illustrated by examples in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. By investigating the perceived utility of terrorism to enact political, social and economic change or


reform, it is possible to theorise about the existence of reactionary and revolutionary terrorism. Furthermore, by investigating the political and socio-economic circumstances in which the non-state group exists, it is possible to suggest that unsatisfied human needs and instances of relative deprivation support the manifestation of grievance and deprivation terrorism. By applying an alternative framework to the examination of the roots of terrorism it is possible to demonstrate the existence of deep socio-economic and political causes of violence at non-state level, thus facilitating a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of the root causes of terrorism.

Structure

"Environment Determines Consciousness."

Karl Marx\textsuperscript{118}

In this next section I intend to examine how the alternative theoretical framework for rethinking terrorism can be applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the structural level and to consider how the implications of this approach affect the understanding of the roots of terrorism. As I have argued above, the alternative terrorism discourse approach provides the space in which an investigation of the structural causes of terrorism can be considered. I aim to conduct this study by examining individually four structural areas of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: contextual (historical and cultural), systemic, situational, and environmental. The contextual approach relates directly to the relationship between the belligerents and the history and culture of violence\textsuperscript{119} within the region. By examining this relationship it is possible to theorise about the existence of cultural terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 4, violence and conflict have existed in this region since the biblical period. It is possible to argue therefore that a culture of violence exists and the present conflict


\textsuperscript{119} See, Chapter 2 and 3.
is merely an extension of the historical legacy of conflict in the region. For example, the Jews believe that the Romans wrongfully deposed them of their land and thus have a legitimate two thousand year old reason for violence to defend and reclaim what is rightfully theirs. Equally, the Palestinians claim to be the original inhabitants of the region pre-dating the Romans and maintain an even older legitimate justification for violence. Also, the current modern conflict has been ongoing since 1936 and has included five regional wars. Conceivably the current manifestation of terrorism is due to the existing cultural and structural context of violence that both sides cannot break out of. Fanon identified this structure in Algeria and pointed to the colonial relationship between native and settler to argue that violence will always exist in this type of cyclical relationship, he suggested, “The native is an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor.” Similarly many Palestinians rationalise the conflict with Israel as part of an ongoing history of violence. “We have a historical and cultural legacy of violence and have seen many who come and go.” The existence of historical memory in which violence is enshrined should not be underestimated in the dynamics of this conflict and as a catalyst for the generation and maintenance of terrorism. It exists as the justification for the natural recourse to violence which living generations and long dead ancestors engaged in to settle their differences. Interestingly, in response to a question on the culture of violence, an Israeli Knesset member pointed out that it was a culture imported from Europe. She suggested, “Nationalism, ethno-nationalist conflict and the creation of the nation-state model through force is part of the culture of Europe not of the region (of Palestine-Israel).”

Both societies are also socialised to violence; Israel is a highly militarised society. As Kimmerling points out “the long-term Arab-Jewish conflict combined with traumatic Jewish experiences such as exile, persecution and the Holocaust have created in the Jewish Israeli collective identity a cultural code of civilian militarism.” Also, the Palestinians, due to their to constant exposure to violence have become so highly socialised to violence that it has become normalised and is a

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120 See, Chapter, 4.
121 Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, p.29. Similarly an Israeli MK suggested that the Jewish is historically connected to the region, he suggested the Jews used it in their struggle against the British and now it is the turn of the Palestinians. Shinui, Interview Transcripts, p.43.
122 Fieldnotes; Jerusalem p.4.
124 Kimmerling, Invention and Decline, p.208.

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routine part of their daily life. This desensitivity to violence has become institutionalised and passed on to the next generation in the creation and maintenance of memory.\footnote{125} It is apparent that Palestinian children from a very early age are engaged in violence and are active members of the Palestinian political groups. in particular they are encouraged to carry the flags at marches and rallies to prevent the identification of adult members by the Israeli security forces.

The desensitivity to violence is also illustrated by the ‘martyr to the cause’ mindset and the psychological bind that makes it very difficult for groups to give up a violent cause that members have died for. For example, it was suggested that the Palestinians cannot return to the pre-Oslo situation: as a Palestinian fighter remarked “too much blood has been spilt, it would be a betrayal of our martyrs who have laid down their lives so we can live with dignity.”\footnote{126} Coupled with this social structure of violence to which the Palestinians are exposed is the existence of the Arab revenge culture and retributionary sense of justice, which often serves to rationalise and sustain Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israel.\footnote{127} An examination of the cultural and historical structure of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict suggests that violence permeates all levels of society. The Palestinians position was aptly summed up by a PFLP representative who said, “The occupation affects all areas of Palestinian life, way of thinking and actions.”\footnote{128} The culture of violence also exists within the highly militarised Israeli society, represented by thousands of uniformed Israeli soldiers and civilians openly carrying weapons, from hidden pistols to automatic rifles slung over the shoulder. Living with the conflict has become a ‘normal’ perception of reality for both sides. This implies the normalisation of terror, as Nordstrom suggests, “Routinisation allows people to live in a chronic state of fear with a façade of normality at the same time that terror permeates and shreds the social fabric.”\footnote{129} Firmly rooted in the structural level approach to the root causes of terrorism is the existence of cultural terrorism.

\footnote{125} This was particularly noticeable in Gaza especially during marches and demonstrations. Fieldnotes p.23.
\footnote{126} Fieldnotes, Nuseirat refugee camp, p.32.
\footnote{127} On the subject of Suicide bombers in Israel the maxim “an eye for an eye” was often quoted by the Palestinians, Fieldnotes, p.26.
\footnote{128} PFLP, Interview Transcripts, p.10.
A further structural area for examination is systemic. This relates to the nature of the conflict system that is created by the conflict behaviour of the actors.\textsuperscript{130} and is linked directly to the generation of \textit{systemic terrorism} due to the relationship between the actor and the created structure.\textsuperscript{131} The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is characterised by recriminatory violence, where actor behaviour is typified by violence for violence with each side claiming the justification of legitimate retaliation. Both sides also employ the orthodox judgemental and moral understanding of terrorism, as each calls the other terrorists for their violent actions.\textsuperscript{132} For example, in August 2003 the Hamas leader Ismail Abu Shanab was killed by an Israeli helicopter attack in Gaza. This was, the Israelis claim, in response to a Hamas bombing of a bus in Jerusalem two days earlier that killed twenty passengers. The bus bombing, Hamas and Islamic Jihad claim, was in response to the Israeli killing of Muhammad Sidr an Islamic Jihad commander the week before.\textsuperscript{133} Such is the behavioural system of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that produces \textit{systemic terrorism}.

The behaviour of the belligerents, by which I mean the type of violence employed, is equally systemic in reproducing the same type of violence. Israeli Army incursions into the West Bank and Gaza often result in deaths of armed group members but also of civilians and children. In August 2002, an Israeli aircraft bombed the house of Hamas leader Salah Shehade killing him and fourteen others, including three women and nine children.\textsuperscript{134} In response to such attacks Hamas claim the justification of retaliation to bomb domestic bus services, in cities such as Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. The behavioural rationale from Abu Shanab of Hamas is “We fight Israel as they fight us, they attack us in our homes we attack them in their homes.”\textsuperscript{135} This supports the \textit{systemic terrorism} argument and suggests that by examining how the combatants behave it is possible to identify a root cause of terrorism.

When questioned the Palestinians see themselves as a pacific agricultural race of people forced into violence by Israel. Common statements are “they started the violence and we are responding” and “Violence is the only language Israel

\textsuperscript{132} Interview, Hamas, p.31.
\textsuperscript{133} The Economist, 23 August 2003, p.45.
\textsuperscript{134} The Guardian Weekly, December 11, 2003.
\textsuperscript{135} Hamas, Interview Transcripts p.32.
understands.”^{136} These statements are often repeated by Israeli soldiers and politicians in relation to the Palestinians.^{137} The Palestinians and indeed the Israelis justify their use of violence as a reaction to the violence of the other which merely reinforces the argument for the existence of a system of violence that has become a self-sustaining conflict dynamic and an ever increasing spiral into which both sides are inextricably bound. Conflict actor behaviour creates a perceived system in which the actors are forced to behave and is responsible for the generation of systemic terrorism. This is clearly illustrated by the actors who claim to have been unwittingly forced into violence by the behaviour of the other and substantiates the influence of the perceived system.

The next structural area for examination relates to the structure formed by the conflict situation and the contradiction^{138} caused by the incompatibility between actors and their desired objective. This is essentially an examination of the actors’ goals and how they threaten both the goals of other actors and the perceived structure in which they all exist, which then can theoretically be seen as a roots cause of political violence and terrorism. An example of this argument on situational structure is provided by David Ben Gurion who said, “There is a fundamental conflict, they and we both want the same thing – Palestine.”^{139} In order to expose the existence of situational terrorism it is necessary to examine the actors’ view of the conflict. This involves a vast investigation of all the possible goals of the Palestinians in the conflict, including all those examined in this multi-level framework. As the intention of this study is to theoretically demonstrate the existence of alternative root causes of terrorism to those delineated by orthodox terrorism theory, I will defend the existence of situational terrorism by considering selected objectives from the Palestinian groups. These will be in relation to the conflict situation created by the discourse of Zionism,^{140} which for the purposes of this example is the Israeli goal.

First is the stated aim of Fateh which is to “free the Palestinian land from under the control of other nations.”^{141} The situational structure that produces the conflict here is the difficulty in defining what is understood as Palestinian land. a

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^{136} al-Aqsa fighter, Interview transcripts p.1.
^{137} These were common remarks expressed throughout the period in most Israeli regions. Fieldnotes.
^{138} See the conflict triangle in Galtung, Peaceful Means, p.72.
^{140} See Chapter 5, for an explanation of Zionism but for the purpose of this example it can be considered simply as the desire for an ethnic Jewish national home in the form of a state in Palestine.
^{141} Fateh, Interview Transcripts p.25.
structural difficulty that will always exist. Furthermore, this Palestinian demand is incompatible with the objective of Zionism, which exists as the antithesis to this aim: unsurprisingly Fateh will also be drawn into conflict with other actors, especially rival Palestinian factions in attempting to achieve this goal. Similarly, the PFLP want “to liberate the land and form an independent state,”¹⁴² which again clashes with the situational structure and also creates further goal incompatibilities with the aims of the other Palestinian groups. For example, the long-term aim of Islamic Jihad is “to form a unity of Islamic states.”¹⁴³ This implies not only the creation of a Palestinian state in the contested land but also Islamification and then the Islamification of the whole region in a “European Union of Islamic states.”¹⁴⁴ The conflict situation caused by the incompatibilities between these aims is very extensive, arguably involving not only surrounding states but also the whole region with the further potential for global incompatibilities. By careful examination of the aims of those involved in conflict it is possible to identify the goal incompatibility and the associated situational structure of the conflict and the hence reveal the roots of situational terrorism.

The final structural area for investigation as a root cause of terrorism is environmental. This relates to socialisation, which is the interaction of the actor with the perceived socio-economic reality or environment¹⁴⁵ and can be seen as grounds for the generation of socio-economic terrorism. Within this argument it is possible to suggest that poverty and social deprivation are a cause of social conflict and terrorism;¹⁴⁶ although this is disputed in some studies¹⁴⁷ there are grounds to suggest that in the Palestinian territories where the poverty rate is 70%,¹⁴⁸ the social and particularly economic environment is a positive motivation for violence. For example, a suggested cause of the first Intifada was the maintenance of a constant state of underdevelopment of the Palestinian economy by Israel in order to exploit it.¹⁴⁹ Consequently, the Palestinian economy is heavily dependant on Israel as it provides

¹⁴² PFLP, Interview Transcripts p.9.
¹⁴⁵ See, Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.
¹⁴⁶ See, Chapter 3, and Azar Protracted Social Conflict, p.16.
¹⁴⁸ This figure is based on the World Bank criteria of $2 per person per day. Labour force survey report, July-Sep 2002, World Bank, West Bank and Gaza update, August 2002, http://www.passia.org
90% of West Bank imports and 55% of exports. This economic dependence has had dramatic implications for the Palestinian economy during both Intifadas, as the sealed borders prevent the flow of produce and workers to the relative prosperity of Israel. A report by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian refugees (UNRWA) stated, "this has caused a near-collapse of the Palestinian economy, causing unemployment to increase to over 50% and so increasing poverty, deprivations and affronts to human dignity." The unemployment situation is illustrated in a study by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in November 2001, which found that 24% of men in the Palestinian territories aged 15-55 were outside the labour force, significantly 42% of these men were aged 15-24.

Although unemployment figures do no necessarily suggest a direct relationship to instances of violence, it is possible to theorise a correlation between the volume of young men engaged in activity with armed groups and the very high percentage of young men out of work. Although this debate is probably the subject of another study, it is very apparent in the Palestinian territories that the structure of the socio-economic environment, in particular the perceived hopelessness due to the lack of prospects for the vast majority of men and women to find suitable work in which to earn money, is a powerful motivation for involvement in the activities of armed groups. An inverted argument to this approach, which helps vindicate the theory of socio-economic terrorism, is that in response to a question about an improvement in the socio-economic conditions an al-Aqsa fighter suggested, "when the socio-economic situation was good, yes we forgot the struggle for a while to make money."

However, Abu Shanab from Hamas points out that whilst the socio-economic conditions exacerbate the problem that causes the violence, it is still caused by the occupation. He suggests, "the misery of the Palestinian conditions helps as a motivation because it is caused by the occupation. But if all Palestine was rich we would still struggle."

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151 UNRWA Emergency Appeal 2003 pamphlet, UNRWA HQ, Gaza, June 2003 p.3.
153 This depravity, hopelessness and frustration, breeding ground for violence was apparent in the all the Palestinian areas I visited. Fieldnotes.
154 al-Aqsa fighter, Interview Transcripts Gaza, p.4.
155 Hamas, Interview Transcripts p.35.
Conversely, it can also be argued that those who take up armed action, especially against Israeli army incursions, are not necessarily unemployed. For example, fighters are often people with an education, jobs and prospects, who have something to lose and therefore fight to defend and protect their families, social position and values. The majority of unemployed, it is argued, have lost the impetus to act.\textsuperscript{156} As Diab Allouh of Fateh suggested, "The ones who fight are not just the ones who do not work."\textsuperscript{157} Nevertheless there is a great deal of visual evidence in Gaza and the West Bank to suggest that unemployment and lack of opportunity and hope is a motivator for involvement in political violence. This is especially true of Hamas who gain vast grass roots support for their terrorist activity against Israeli as a perceived solution to the socio-economic situation.\textsuperscript{158} The first female Hamas suicide bomber, Reem Raiyshi, was a married mother of two children who together with her husband had been unemployed for two years prior to her attack.\textsuperscript{159} The lack of opportunity also provides Hamas with a wide recruiting base through religion, thus it was suggested on a number of occasions, "when you have nothing and there is nothing to do, you go to the mosque."\textsuperscript{160} As a result Hamas has developed control of a network of mosques as well as sponsored social relief programmes in nursery schools, social and sports clubs, schools, hospitals and the Islamic university.\textsuperscript{161} Hamas has penetrated deep into the socio-economic fabric of Palestinian life; this is especially evident in Gaza.\textsuperscript{162}

A further socio-economic environment that can conceivably exist as a structural cause of violence is the chronic refugee situation and culture of camp society. This is a constant, reminder of the perceived socio-economic dislocation that many Palestinians feel. Many Palestinians still carry the keys to their former houses around their necks and when asked where they are from, they name the village or town where their family originally came from which is typically in the modern state

\textsuperscript{156} Fieldnotes, Gaza, pp.30-1. Although this debate is probably the subject of another study, many ‘middle class’ fighters that I met corroborated this argument, however I was also introduced to many who were not in employment.
\textsuperscript{157} Fateh, Interview Transcripts p.28.
\textsuperscript{158} Fieldnotes, Gaza, p.30.
\textsuperscript{159} Incidentally the Israel Army had killed her brother the year before, Guardian Weekly, January 22-28 2004, p.32.
\textsuperscript{160} Fieldnotes, Jerusalem p.3, and Gaza p.16
of Israel, even if they were born in the refugee camp. According to UNRWA there are 1.5 million registered refugees in the West Bank and Gaza, 600,000 of who live in the 27 official refugee camps. As a result, Gaza is one of the most densely populated regions in the world and is characterised by grim poverty and social misery. An important socio-economic implication of the refugee situation is the loss of social status. Many Palestinian families perceive themselves as reduced from the social position of landowners to a humiliated and discriminated against minority. The continuation of the oppression and stigma of refugee status without any hope for a solution to their transient existence is a constant reminder of their socio-economic situation and a continual source of bitterness for the Palestinian people. It is apparent that the Palestinians are exposed to a very harsh socio-economic environment that imposes structural conditions, which, it can be argued, are suitable for the generation of violence in the form of socio-economic terrorism.

By applying the comprehensive framework for rethinking the roots of terrorism at the structural level it is possible to identify a number of feasible root causes of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which would not have been ordinarily apparent under the orthodox approach. Examination of the historical and cultural context of the conflict can produce structural causes of violence, which can be seen as cultural terrorism. Investigation of actor behaviour due to the existing or perceived conflict system can produce systemic terrorism and in a similar way, actor conflict behaviour is relative to the perceived incompatibility of each other’s aims and can create situational terrorism. Finally, careful investigation of the relationship between the conflict actor and the socio-economic structure can produce socio-economic terrorism. It is clearly evident that in order to rethink the root causes of terrorism a theoretical approach at the structural level needs to be conducted if a more advanced understanding of the root causes of terrorism is to be achieved.

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162 Hamas as a political party, whilst not supported by all Palestinians, provides as a social movement much needed socio-economic relief and therefore gains respect from all quarters of Palestinian society. This is especially apparent in Gaza which is a Hamas support base. Fieldnotes.
163 A situation found in most Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza. Fieldnotes.
165 This was apparent from observations in Gaza, in particular the refugee camps. Fieldnotes. This point is also made by Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.199.
"Men at some time are masters of their fates...so every bondman
in his own hand bears the power to cancel his captivity."

William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar. 166

This section examines a rethinking of the roots of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the level of the individual and aims to consider a number of areas which relate directly to the motivations and involvement of individuals in political violence, terrorism and conflict. These are: ideology, identity, single issues, attitude and group dynamics. Ideology relates to an examination of the socio-political belief systems or regimes of truth167 that the individual terrorist has adopted in order to motivate and justify political violence. This argument supports the claim that the existence of an ideology of violence causes ideological terrorism. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has two principal ideological motivations for terrorism: nationalism and religion, in the guise of Palestinianism and Zionism, and Islam and Judaism. Probably the most important and most often quoted is Palestinian nationalism.168 This ideologically motivated demand for a state is the primary reason given by Palestinians for their involvement in political violence and armed conflict, of all the Palestinians formally interviewed and informally questioned, the majority purported to understand the need for a Palestinian state and quoted this as their primary motivation for armed struggle.169 This is applicable to both combatants and non-combatants, who easily identify with the political ‘cause’ of Palestinian nationalism as it provides a natural, accessible and seemingly readily understood political concept.170 It is the stated aim

168 See, chapter 4.
169 See, Interview transcripts and Fieldnotes.
170 Fieldnotes; p.37. However it is important to point out that the conflict is so politicised that many fighters when asked why they are fighting quote abstract political concepts such as state, identity and participation but often have little understanding of what this actually means. This suggests that either they are engaged by ethnic / nationalist entrepreneurs or they have other motivations that they cannot or will not verbalise.
of the Palestinian nationalist parties of Fateh and PFLP and also of the Islamic parties, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.\textsuperscript{171}

Ostensibly Palestinianism is a discourse that provides a unifying ideology or belief system among all Palestinians. However, as Dr Abdul Shafi points out, the Palestinians have never been as organised, single-minded and thus successful in the way that the Israelis were in their progression to statehood.\textsuperscript{172} This is primarily due to the fact that each Palestinian group and indeed faction envisages a different type of state creation. For example, the PFLP want a Marxist state\textsuperscript{173} and Hamas an Islamic one.\textsuperscript{174} Although nationalism exists as an ideological cause of terrorism it is important to stress that the nature of the ideology whilst purporting to represent a similar outcome might in fact exist as a number of alternative outcomes, pursued by different ideological groups. These exist singularly, as a cause of \textit{ideological terrorism} but are perhaps not resolvable with a single solution.\textsuperscript{175} For example, will Palestinian terrorism be halted at the creation of a Palestinian state, considering that the groups involved in the violence are so ideologically opposed over the form they want the state to take? Although this moves into the realm of another study, the argument remains that ideological justification and belief systems exist which demand self-determination by violence and therefore help explain the manifestation of \textit{ideological terrorism}.

The second principal belief system that is a potent generator of terrorism is religion. As I argued in Chapter 1, religion like nationalism is often employed by orthodox terrorism discourse as the sole root cause of terrorism, to the detriment and neglect of other socio-economic and political causes. However, as this study is multi-level and the ‘other’ possible root causes \textit{are} being examined, religion as a vital ingredient in understanding the construction of terrorism will be investigated in this section, in order to substantiate the claim that it provides motivation for the individual for political violence and thus is a cause of \textit{ideological terrorism}.

Within the Palestinian Islamic groups it is possible to argue that religion is the primary motivation for violence. This exists at the elite level as much as it does at the

\textsuperscript{171} See, Interview transcripts, p.9, 15,25, and 29.
\textsuperscript{172} Abdul Shafi, Interview Transcripts Gaza, p.21.
\textsuperscript{173} PFLP, Interview Transcripts, p.12.
\textsuperscript{174} Hamas, Interview Transcripts p.29.
\textsuperscript{175} Abdul Shafi suggested that if the issue of the Palestinian State were resolved all other issues would be too, this however runs contrary to the argument that different Palestinian groups have different understandings of what they envisage as a state. Abdul Shafi, Transcripts transcripts, p.23.
grassroots. For example, the aim of the Hamas leadership is to drive out the Israeli occupiers and establish a Palestinian way of life based on Islamic principals. Islam theologically defends this aim; as the instructions, actions and rewards for entering into violence can all be divinely justified.\textsuperscript{176} For those engaged in violence this religious understanding is equally important. For example, in a video taped recording of a Hamas (female) suicide bomber, released after her attack, she said, “I have two children and love them very much. But my love to see God is stronger than my love for my children, and I am sure that God will take care of them if I become a martyr.”\textsuperscript{177} Furthermore, the religious benefits of a martyr are a strong motivation for terrorism and indeed suicide attacks. As the Koran suggests martyrdom or death in jihad earns eternal bliss and rewards in paradise.\textsuperscript{178}

Although it is important to examine religion as a sole ideological root cause of terrorism, it is important to view it within the context of its association with political and socio-economic causes of violence, as religion often coincides with the socio-economic structure, implying that the only way to escape a life of socio-economic misery and hopelessness is to go to heaven. Thus, if all dignity and humanity is taken away and life is made unliveable, those who believe are prepared to “die with honour in order to go to a next life with dignity.”\textsuperscript{179} This suggests that religion provides an attractive alternative for those suffering a difficult life, the link between the perceived cause of the misery, in this case Israel and the occupation, and the act of violence against it is not difficult to understand. The appeal of religion also goes beyond just the Palestinian Islamic groups, even in nationalist groups such as al-Aqsa and the PFLP, the importance of religion should not be underestimated in facilitating violence. It was pointed out by an al-Aqsa fighter that although the al-Aqsa martyrs brigade does not have a religious political agenda, its members use religion as a belief system in order to motivate them into action, a fighter knows that

\textsuperscript{176} There is a fierce theological debate in Islam over the term Jihad, however it is often employed to justify violence against the non-believer. See, Esposito J L, The Islamic Threat, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 3rd ed, pp.30-31.

\textsuperscript{177} The Guardian Weekly, January 22-28 2004. p.32.

\textsuperscript{178} Martyrs are promised to meet the Prophet and see the face of Allah. Furthermore their sins will be forgiven and they can intercede with relatives on the day of resurrection and will live amid rivers of wine and honey and be married to 72 black eyed virgins. The Economist, January 19 2004, p.18. Furthermore, the families of martyrs also receive financial benefits and prestige in their community.

\textsuperscript{179} This is known as the ‘great cause’ or the existence of heaven. See, Fieldnotes, Gaza. p.29.
if he dies in action he will go to heaven a martyr.\textsuperscript{180} Thus in the words of Johann Goethe “death has no sting.”\textsuperscript{181}

Whilst religion in some instances can be the direct political or ideological cause of violence, it can also provide the motivation for others, especially suicide attacks. When a situation of perceived hopeless exists it can also give inspiration when there is nothing else left to remedy the circumstances. Instances of religious violence might belie a particular political or socio-economic cause, which is also true of nationalism. Ideology is a particularly important root cause of ideological terrorism either on its own merit or due to a particular political agenda or as a result of deeper socio-economic causes.

The second area that requires examination at the individual level for its role in causing terrorism is identity. Although this was discussed in the non-state section on the generation of grievance terrorism as part of human needs, this component is concerned particularly with the role of identity at the individual and group level, and how it becomes a cause of identity terrorism. Identity as a cause of terrorism has its roots in identity theory,\textsuperscript{182} which make it a cause of conflict, because by definition identity is exclusionist.\textsuperscript{183} Individual identity can be given form and an impetus for violence by group identity. However, the classification of identity comes from both inside and outside the group or ethnic community.\textsuperscript{184} Palestinian identity terrorism is rooted in the nature of the ‘self’ and the ‘other.’ The self relates to the development and maintenance of individual and group identity in relation to itself. For example, violence is a way in which the Palestinians can communicate their sense of self. This is argued by Franz Fanon who sees violence as an expression of individual freedom and power: “Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated by its leaders makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths.”\textsuperscript{185} Through violence the Palestinians can fight for and defend their identity, characterised by the intangible such as dignity, honour and self-respect,\textsuperscript{186} and the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} al-Aqsa, Interview Transcripts, p.4.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Goethe J, \textit{Faust part one}, London: Penguin, 1949, p.56.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Jabri, \textit{Discourses}, p.121.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Fanon, \textit{The Wretched}, p.118.
\item \textsuperscript{186} These were reoccurring themes in the Fieldnotes and Interviews.
\end{itemize}
tangible, represented by state formation, land and religion.¹⁸⁷ All of which are encompassed in their sense of identity relative to who they perceive themselves to be and are forms of identity violence for self-expression. Hence the pithy statement from one Palestinian fighter who said, I fight as a Palestinian for Palestinian identity therefore I am a Palestinian.¹⁸⁸

This relates to how the Palestinian identity is a trigger for violence in relation to the ‘other,’ as in how violence against Israel is caused by identity. Shultz suggests that the nature of the struggle against the Israeli and the occupation gives the Palestinians their identity. She argues, “the Palestinian Identity constitutes a denied and excluded entity but also a collectivity which is the struggle for statehood, independence and international legitimacy.”¹⁸⁹ The Palestinian conflict with the Israelis is the essence of Palestinianism. As a Palestinian resident explained all Palestinians are involved in the struggle and all are affiliated to political groups.¹⁹⁰ Lustick argues that identity violence is generated for solipsistic purposes; terrorism is employed not for what it can do to the Israelis but what it can do for the Palestinians.¹⁹¹ The adoption of violence and the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation transformed the Palestinians from peasants in 1948 into militants and revolutionaries by 1967.¹⁹² The constant support and unity of belief in the use of violence against Israel for state creation by all the Palestinian political groups¹⁹³ can be seen as a way to homogenise the nature of Palestinian identity. Identity is a root cause of terrorism, and helps corroborate the theoretical existence of identity terrorism.

A further area that requires examination at the individual level for its role in causing terrorism are single or specific conflict issues. This area requires consideration because by employing the multi-level framework, focus is directed on political and socio-economic causes of terrorism. Whilst it is vital to examine these areas it is also important not to overlook the possibility of simple single-issue causes of violence. These can exist theoretically as a straightforward cause of issue

¹⁸⁷ These were reoccurring themes in the Fieldnotes and Interviews.
¹⁸⁸ This came from a meeting with local fighters in the Nuseirat refugee camp. Fieldnotes p.17.
¹⁹⁰ Fieldnotes, Gaza, p.17.
¹⁹² See. Chapter 4, and Kimmerling and Migdal, Palestinians, p.192.
¹⁹³ Interview transcripts and Fieldnotes.
terrorism. This section is a departure from the complicated causational web of factors discussed so far and is an attempt to penetrate directly into the perceived causes of violence in order to investigate the existence of a single-issue or sole cause of political violence. Although protracted social conflicts such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are by their very nature highly complicated and a single-issue approach may not be applicable, it is nevertheless important to employ this lens to examine the roots of terrorism, as it may be useful in revealing sources of motivation. For example, Palestinian individuals may engage in acts of terrorism purely for the purposes of dealing with a particular issue. An example of this is land loss, which it can be argued is perhaps the single most important issue in this conflict. According to a report by B’Tselem, a Palestinian human rights organisation, since 1967, Israel has expropriated 79% of the land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories, also in the West Bank alone, 50% of the land is effectively under the control of settlements.\textsuperscript{194}

Aside from the goal of reclaiming the ‘homeland’ as an ethereal concept associated with national self-determination and identity, which is pursued at the political level, what the Palestinian actually wants and why he might engage in violence, is over the far more practical issue of his family home and his ancestral farming land. This is therefore a powerful motivator for violence and exists as an example of issue terrorism.

The land situation is currently becoming even more of an issue for violence following the construction by Israel of a security fence through the Palestinian territories. A UN report suggests that 2% of the West Bank total land area is on the Israeli side of the barrier. This has consequently created divisions in many Palestinian villages, causing the loss of agricultural lands, access to schools, hospitals, government services and universities.\textsuperscript{195}

An additional example of issue terrorism could be due to water. Since 1967 Israel has controlled the water resources of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which includes the only surface water supply, the river Jordan, of which 75% is diverted to Israel.\textsuperscript{196} Israel therefore controls the water provided to the Palestinian territories. According to the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), the Palestinians asked for 450 million mcm per year, they were given only

\textsuperscript{195} The Economist, October 11, 2003, p.27.
246m mcm. this is compared to Israel which uses 1,959m mcm annually, 25% of which comes from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which accounts for 80% of ground water resources in the Palestinian territories. The Israeli control of water and the subsequent scarcity and relative deprivation of water resources for agricultural and domestic use could easily exist as an issue that generates issue terrorism. Although land and water are just two examples of conflict issues that alone could motivate terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is useful to investigate all possible issues that could generate violence.

A further area for examination at the individual level is attitude. This is predominantly a psychological approach to rethinking the roots of terrorism and has its theoretical foundations in the work of Galtung and Mitchell. The examination of attitude can be divided into two areas in which the roots of terrorism exist. The first is emotional terrorism, which relates to terrorism generated by irrational feelings, emotional judgements and subjective truths. The other is cognitive terrorism, which is terrorism caused by a rational thought process based on a perceived reality and subjective beliefs. The irrational psychological emotions of the individual, upon which the understanding of emotional terrorism is based, are feelings such as fear, hatred, rage and vengeance. These are all common expressions that were employed by the Palestinians throughout the interviews and as Abdul Shafi explained, are central to the conflict as “it is very emotional, it is about issues of the family and the home.”

It can be argued that Palestinian terrorism is located in the emotional fear of Israelis. For example, the Palestinian subjective understanding of the conflict is based on their knowledge of Zionism, which is the creation of a Jewish state in the whole of Palestine. The Palestinians point to the Israeli flag and the 10nis coin as proof that Israeli intends to colonise the whole region and push the Palestinians out. According to the Palestinians the two blue lines on the Israeli flag represent the Tigris and the

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200 Interviews and Fieldnotes.
201 Dr Haider Abdul Shafi, Gaza City: Gaza, 24.03.2003, Interview transcripts, p.22.
Nile and the Jewish star represents the Jewish state in between, this is pictorially represented on the 10 NIS coin. \(^{202}\) Primarily the Palestinians perceive that they are in a struggle for their existence against Israel. \(^{203}\) This perception of fear is provided with empirical evidence from the construction of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and by the number of Palestinians killed. Estimates suggest there are 145 Jewish settlements, which in the West Bank comprise 42% of the post-1967 land. \(^{204}\) Conservative estimates of deaths suggest 3,650 Palestinians have been killed from 9 December 1987- May 2003. \(^{205}\) The reaction by Palestinians is therefore clear, according to Khalid al-Batsh of Islamic Jihad “the purpose of Sarayra al-Quds (the armed wing of IJ) is to establish a balance of fear: "the Palestinians are afraid therefore we must make Israelis afraid." \(^{206}\)

Hatred of the Israelis is a natural emotion that exists within the Palestinians. “The hate in my heart now is too big to describe to you. I never thought I was capable of hating so much but, day after day the anger increases.” \(^{207}\) Although it is important to point out that many Palestinians make a point of explaining that is not a religious hatred or a hatred of Israeli people per se, but a hatred of the occupiers. \(^{208}\) The Palestinians perceive that all their problems - political, social and economic, emanate from the Israeli occupation. The Israeli occupiers are therefore the hated enemy, against whom the Palestinian fighters express their hatred for what they perceive they do to them. \(^{209}\) As Mohammed Atitti, the leader of al-Aqsa martyrs brigade, stated, “So long as Israel comes into our homes in the refugee camps, we are going to come into theirs and take action.” \(^{210}\) It is possible to argue that this cycle of hatred (it is just as powerful on the Israeli side) has become for some a self-sustaining dynamic of the violence, as combatants seek to fight each other based purely on their inherent hatred of the other.

\(^{202}\) Fieldnotes Jerusalem, p.2.
\(^{203}\) Hamas, Interview Transcripts Gaza, p.31.
\(^{204}\) PASSIA, *Land and Settlements*, http://www.passia.org
\(^{205}\) This is the total number of Palestinians killed in the Occupied territories and in Israel. 1142 Israelis were killed during the same period. http://www.btselem.org/
\(^{206}\) Islamic Jihad, Interview Transcripts p.15.
\(^{208}\) This was a surprising find in response to questions relating to, who is and do you hate your enemy? The Palestinians struggled to explain just who the enemy was. This was also found in interviews with Israeli people. See Footnotes and interview transcripts.
\(^{209}\) I was however greatly surprised by the compassion and general calmness that many ordinary Palestinians displayed when I spoke of the Israelis, considering the suffering many had been through they did not show great emotion. One Palestinian woman explained this, as “people who know great suffering know great compassion.” Fieldnotes, p.40.
Anger against the Israelis also exists within the Palestinians as an emotional trigger for violence. Theoretically this manifestation of anger could arise due to any or indeed all of the political and socio-economic causes of violence discussed so far in this multi-level study. But as a sole cause of emotional terrorism, anger exists as a very natural human expression, when the daily problems and difficulties that confront the Palestinian people - which are caused by the Israeli occupation - are observed and examined. This unified expression of anger by the Palestinian people at their conditions has been clearly demonstrated by the spontaneous and unified eruption of violence and protest that has characterised the two Intifadas of 1987-92 and 2001-ongoing. This is especially evident during organised ‘days of rage,’ in which all Palestinians are encouraged to take to the streets in violent protest at the occupation. Although the first Intifada was intended as an unarmed uprising compared to the al-Aqsa Intifada in which firearms are being used, the proportion of deadly violence has notably increased. For example, in the first Intifada December 1987-1999, 1,338 Palestinians and 493 Israelis were killed in the Occupied territories and in Israel. The figure for the al-Aqsa Intifada so far, (September 2000-January 2004(ongoing)) is 2,305 Palestinians and 703 Israelis killed, which can only serve to increase the deep feelings of anger in both sides. Anger is therefore a potent emotional component in the generation of violence and emotional terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The last important element that can be viewed as a generator of emotional terrorism is vengeance. Revenge and retribution have a deep tradition in Arab culture, and it is evident that the continued levels of violence and killing experienced by the Palestinians among their friends and families from the Israelis can only serve to maintain the conflict and even drive acts of terrorism as a reason in itself for violence. Dr Haider Shafi suggested that even after the main issues have been resolved personal or family issues such as personal grudges might still exist as a cause of violence. The expression, “an eye for an eye,” is a commonly reoccurring theme used by Palestinians to justify suicide attacks within Israel. It is the basis for the justification for acts of terrorism inside Israel by Hamas and is revenge for attacks on Palestinians. The Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantissi recently stated, attacks inside Israel were

\[211\] See, Chapter 4.
\[212\] http://www.btselem.org/
\[213\] http://www.btselem.org/
\[214\] Dr Haider Shafi Interview Transcripts, p.23.
intended as a “balance of suffering...if they stop killing our people we will stop killing them.”²¹⁶ It can be argued that these irrational conflict emotions form the basis for the spiral of violence of increasing intensity that characterises the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and account for the manifestation of emotional terrorism.

This understanding of conflict attitude as a root cause of terrorism is further complemented by cognitive terrorism, which is terrorism caused by a rational thought process based on a perceived reality and subjective beliefs. Cognitive terrorism is a theoretical assumption based on the psychology of how the terrorists perceive the nature of their situation, which is the form of framework they employ to understand their world and deal with the events in it. These conflict frameworks are constructed from the relative conflict discourses and historical narratives discussed in Chapter 4. In addition, this approach is based on Mitchell’s cognitive consistency²¹⁷ arguments which he suggests are achieved through selective perception; information that does not conform to the actors monochromatic understanding of the conflict is rejected in the same way that information that does conform, is accepted. Importantly the Palestinians and indeed the Israelis perceive themselves in a righteous and justified struggle against the violence and injustice of the other. Both believe they are victimised, dehumanised and persecuted. The Palestinians and Israelis view each others actions as aimed at their own destruction, they perceive themselves to be in a ‘fight or die’ struggle; by employing this approach each side is cognitively blind to understanding the approach of the other.

This psychological profile provides a coping strategy for those engaged in violence and terrorism, suggesting that it is possible to understand how the rational action of Palestinians produces cognitive terrorism. For example, a Fateh spokesman stated that “it (the conflict) is an issue of justice and therefore belief will achieve victory.”²¹⁸ Mirror image perceptions also sustain the conflict, as an al-Aqsa fighter suggested, by stating, “I hate Israelis because they hate me, I destroy them because they want to destroy me.”²¹⁹ Continuous employment of a lexicon such as ‘occupation,’ ‘oppression,’ ‘suffering,’ ‘resistance’ and ‘freedom’ together with

²¹⁷ See, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3, also, Mitchell, International Conflict, p.77.
²¹⁹ al-Aqsa, Interview Transcripts, p.5.
religious legitimacy, build a ‘struggle discourse’\textsuperscript{220} which the Palestinians can employ to justify any actions they deem necessary to achieve their aim in the struggle. For example, Islamic Jihad stated, “Jihad is to bring liberty and dignity to the (Palestinian) people from the occupiers.”\textsuperscript{221} The roots of cognitive terrorism are therefore apparent in this examination of how terrorists construct their cognitive psychological understanding of the conflict situation.

The last area I intend to examine at the individual level as a cause of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israel conflict is group dynamics. This is a further psychological approach and also relates to the creation and maintenance of subjective realities within the group but also investigates how the group operates. In this area it is important to examine the external dynamics of the group, such as how it relates to both the ‘outside’ and other groups, as well as the internal dynamics, for instance how the group is constructed, motivated and led. All of these factors it can be argued contribute to the identification of the roots of terrorism within group terrorism. Although armed Palestinian groups are largely accepted within Palestinian society, they exist ‘outside’ or ‘underground’ in relation to the Israelis and to a certain extent the western world.\textsuperscript{222} Due to this ‘outside’ understanding they can be identified as a one cohesive group, such as a Palestinian resistance movement, or PLO, which is intended as an umbrella organisation for all Palestinian groups. Through this they gain their ‘cause’ cohesion, unity of action, and group justification and reasoning for the use of violence. All the Palestinian groups are pledged to fight the occupiers and justify their violence in the name of ‘freedom’ for the Palestinians.\textsuperscript{223} Furthermore there are many instances of the Palestinian movements working together; as a recent suicide attack at the Gaza crossing point demonstrated; it was claimed by Hamas and al-Aqsa martyrs brigade as a joint operation.\textsuperscript{224}

Nevertheless, the Palestinian movement is divided into different factions, which have their own agendas, group dynamics and justification for violence through the creation of subjective realities. These realities are relative to the other Palestinian

\textsuperscript{220} Struggle Discourse could be considered the opposite of Terrorism Discourse, and is employed by actors to justify their actions against states. See, Chapter 3, pp.7-11, and Chapter 5, Part 1.

\textsuperscript{221} Islamic Jihad, Interview Transcripts, p.19.

\textsuperscript{222} Although Palestinian armed groups gained extensive foreign media coverage for the Palestinian ‘Cause’ during the terrorist campaigns from 1968 (see Chapter 4, p.26.), they also marginalised themselves from world opinion due to their use of terrorist violence.

\textsuperscript{223} Interviews; p.9, 15,25, and 29.

groups, in the same way that the whole Palestinian movement has a subjective reality in relation to the conflict with Israel. The Palestinian groups are also in socio-political competition with each other. This difference or existence of the ‘other’ can also exist as a cause of violence as the groups vie for political control and social dominance of the Palestinian people. Hamas, it appears, is gaining in popularity among the Palestinians to the detriment of the traditional domination of Fateh because of its policy of attacks inside the Israeli state. This can also account for the rise of al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade and their employment of methods usually associated with the Islamic groups, as a reaction to the perceived inactivity of Fateh.

A further motivational aspect of group terrorism is related to the internal dynamics of the group. A highly motivated armed Palestinian group can be constructed in such a way that their existence is only justified through violence. Violence must therefore be sustained in order to validate their survival. For example, in their perception, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade gained a level of prestige and dignity by joining the US State departments’ list of terrorist organisations. As its joint-founder Nassar Badawi stated, “our reaction will be more action – the work of al-Aqsa Brigades will be accelerated.” Some Palestinian fighters can only exist within the structure of a group, who train, arm and lead them, without this infrastructure they would just be Palestinian civilians. One Palestinian fighter implied that he gained social kudos from membership of an armed group and from carrying a weapon, and explained that it was good to have a cause for which to fight.

Although all fighters refer to the Palestinian ‘cause’ and belong to the whole Palestinian struggle they are recognised and identified by their particular group affiliation and allegiance, and are identified as such. Consequently, it was suggested that all Palestinians are either active members or supporters of one of the groups. This suggests that some form of group dynamic structure exists which correlates group membership with identity leading to support of violence and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{225}} \text{Fieldnotes, Nuseirat Camp, p.32.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{226}} \text{The Guardian, 22 March 2002, p.14.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{227}} \text{The Guardian, 22 March 2002, p.14} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{228}} \text{This is not however always the situation as some operators act independently and others in reaction to Israeli incursions and if killed are ‘claimed’ be one of the Palestinian groups. Fieldnotes.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{229}} \text{The majority of armed fighters I questioned voluntarily showed me their firearms at some point during the meeting.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{230}} \text{Fieldnotes, Nuseirat Camp, p.39.} \]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{231}} \text{For example, a common method of introduction or referral to a Palestinian was “this is…who is…..” Fieldnotes.} \]
participation in it. Coupled with this is the nature of group leadership. It can be argued that group members carry out the acts of violence but only under a rigid group structure. It is perhaps the leadership therefore that generates the acts of violence. Abu Shanab from Hamas suggested that Hamas provides Palestinians with a way of showing their support. A particular group can therefore provide Palestinians with a conflict infrastructure and facilitate routes for direct participation in the conflict. This argument is not to necessarily suggest that the onus for violence is completely with the group leadership but is a composite factor in how leadership and membership coupled with causational factors create group dynamics, which it can be argued causes group terrorism.

Theoretical examinations of a number of areas at the individual level, which relate directly to the motivations and involvement of individuals in political violence, provide a useful approach for rethinking the root causes of terrorism. Ideology and belief systems; in particular nationalism and religion have a central role in the motivation and generation of terrorism as ideological terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Identity as an understanding of individual and group self-perception in direct relation to the existence of the ‘other’ with whom they are in conflict is a strong argument for the generation of violence as identity violence. It is also important, whilst examining multifarious reasons for violence is to examine the possible existence of a single issue, which is acting as a trigger for violence as issue terrorism. An examination of the individual psychological attitude that exists within a perceived conflict is useful in exposing the irrational feelings and reasoned beliefs that are constructed within the subjective realities of terrorists and which can generate emotional and cognitive terrorism. Finally an investigation into group dynamics reveals the possible motivations for the generation of violence as group terrorism.

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232 Fieldnotes, p.19.
233 Hamas, Interview Transcripts, p.35.
Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate with the aid of a case study that it is possible to rethink the understanding of terrorism by moving away from the mono-dimensional orthodox terrorism theory approach and engaging instead in a roots debate with political violence by employing an alternative comprehensive framework that reveals the root causes of terrorism in a multi-dimensional format. I have argued that by applying the alternative terrorism framework it is possible to rethink the root causes of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that are provided by orthodox terrorism theory. This study has illustrated that by employing the accepted normative understanding of what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist, the Israeli state is able to construct a perception of the Palestinians as unlawful users of deadly violence who are attempting to influence the democratic politics of the liberal state of Israel by illegal, unjust and morally unacceptable means for their own illegitimate ends. However, by applying the comprehensive approach it is possible to re-examine the causes of terrorism and recognise that the roots of political violence can exist at multi-levels within a conflict. An examination at the state level reveals just how instrumental the role of the Israeli state is in the generation and maintenance of terrorism and investigation at the non-state level illustrates how the Palestinians can employ terrorism in order to enact political, social and economic change and how it is an expression of their human needs and relative deprivation. Investigation into the roots of terrorism at the structural level show the structural pressures that cause violence in the Palestinian and Israeli societies created by the interaction between the actors and the perceived structures. Also, exploration of the individual level exposes the political, socio-economic and psychological reasons for political violence that exist within Palestinian individuals. The implication of this ‘alternative’ approach is a direct counter to the orthodox understanding of the terrorist as a mindless murderer. The alternative framework implies that terrorism arises from deep-rooted political and socio-economic problems that exist within all levels of society.
This study reveals a number of significant reasons, causes and motivations for terrorism within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and produces a far more satisfactory, comprehensive and indeed useful understanding of the causes of political violence and terrorism than the limited mono-dimensional political and moral orthodox approach. The primary advantage of employing this alternative discourse; examined in this chapter, is to expose the root causes of terrorism at all levels. This approach however is not without problems. The main difficulty with this approach relates to how the Palestinians or the perpetrators of terrorism can employ this alternative framework in order to justify their use of lethal violence as the alternative terrorism discourse can be used as a justification for the use of terrorism. Whilst the alternative terrorism discourse might prove a useful tool with which to understand the causes of violence and perhaps attempt to deal with them, it also can provide a useful excuse for the perpetrators of terrorism. Any of the above multi-level causational or motivational factors can be employed by the Palestinians to explain their use of violence. This is perhaps a reason why the orthodox terrorism discourse, which eschews a root debate, is so widely employed. Also, the alternative framework is not a panacea for all the ills of political violence, especially nihilistic or millenarian terrorism that is directed for universal destruction and the removal of all political structures.

Nevertheless, the primary use of the alternative terrorism framework within this case study is to provide an extensive and sophisticated understanding of the roots of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and prove that if the root causes are to be successfully engaged, then it is necessary to move away from the orthodox understanding and employ an alternative approach. This is a comprehensive perception that deals with the problems on a number of different levels, thereby facilitating a holistic study that is vital to the understanding of terrorism if solutions to the violence are to be found. The theoretical comprehensive framework employed in this study provides a number of keys that can be used to unlock complicated and protracted social conflicts - such as the Palestinian-Israeli example - that are characterised by terrorism. The primary purpose of this is to approach the root causes of terrorism within the conflict with the intention of solving or alleviating the deep-rooted problems and thus preventing the expression of political violence and the manifestation of terrorism.
Summary of Conclusions: Rethinking Terrorism

"The mind is its own place, and in itself can make a heaven of hell or a hell of heaven."

John Milton, Paradise Lost

Through the Doors of Perception

This study demonstrates that orthodox terrorism theory is the predominant terrorism discourse that is used to explain, understand and deal with terrorism. It can be recognised by an orthodox definition that is characterised by a state centric and positivist understanding of terrorism as illegitimate and unlawful violence. It is also based on the assumption that the terrorist is a rational actor and suggests that terrorism is a carefully planned and calculated strategy directed against the state in order to influence decision-making and effect political change by the use of functional, symbolic and tactical violence. Orthodox terrorism theory is primarily based on the legitimacy of the state, although this is a relative legitimacy, it is an understanding of terrorism that has become widely accepted as the normative definition of terrorism. It exists therefore as a pejorative term adopted by actors, predominantly state actors, to create a moral justification for their claim to legitimacy.

Orthodox terrorism theory as a discourse is designed and employed to legitimise the violence used by the incumbent power centre to enforce its political will whilst simultaneously delegitimising the use of political violence by opposition movements or organisations against the state. It is established and employed in order

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to deal with terrorism from the perspective of state security, without any form of roots debate, in order to legitimise governmental anti-terrorism and counter terrorism policies and actions. It is principally a state discourse created and employed for the purpose of supplying a theoretical interpretation of facts and events in order to provide an accepted explanation of political violence that allows the legitimisation of state violence through moral and legal justifications.

The use of orthodox terrorism theory is clearly illustrated by the Israeli state, which employs the discourse to understand the conflict with the Palestinians, as my case study demonstrates. The discourse explains Palestinian terrorism as an internal state security problem and external border dispute, instead of civil war, ethnic, separatist or independence conflict. Terrorism is seen through orthodox terrorism theory as the act of extremists and is consequently divorced from the wider understanding of the conflict, especially in relation to the wider Arab world. The Israeli state sees terrorist attacks against “innocents” as impossible to understand and condemns them as unequivocally wrong without looking for the potential reasons why they might be occurring. This allows the employment of the full power of the Israeli State machinery in the form of legal and military means to deal with the ‘illegal’ security problem and represents the mainstay of Israeli counter-terrorist and anti-terrorist policies and actions.

Political violence in Israel is understood through the perspective created by orthodox terrorism theory because it provides a highly state centric understanding of the cause of the violence and benefits the power and authority of the state. The reason for this is closely linked to Zionism, which is the principal discourse that underwrites the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for the Israelis and is focused on maintaining an ethnically homogenous Jewish state. Although the use of orthodox terrorism theory is principally intended to maintain the security of the state, it is even more useful for Israel due to the precarious ethnographic nature of the Israeli situation. Israel can employ orthodox terrorism theory to discredit, delegitimize and consequently ignore any claims the Palestinians have against the Israeli state. Orthodox terrorism theory has clear and useful applications for the Israelis when dealing with the Palestinian situation.

Although the emphasis of this study is on identifying and explaining orthodox terrorism discourse, it is not the sole understanding of terrorism contained in terrorism studies. By viewing terrorism through the different perspectives produced by
international relations theory, those of realism, pluralism, structuralism and liberalism. It has been possible to construct a multi-level survey of terrorism literature, demonstrating that the manifestation of terrorism can be caused by a multitude of different factors depending which discourse or perspective is employed. The outcome of this survey of literature in terrorism studies suggests that the roots of terrorism can be explained in different ways by different perspectives. This has exposed a general differentiation between approaches to explaining the roots of terrorism.

These are,

1. Orthodox terrorism theory: this is the predominant explanation and understanding of terrorism.
2. Radical terrorism theory: this is occasionally apparent in the literature and explains and understands terrorism largely from the perspective of the terrorist.
3. Moderate terrorism theory: this is a limited approach in terrorism studies that deals with a roots debate.

Although these different approaches suggest a wide understanding of the roots of terrorism, as alternatives to orthodox terrorism theory they are marginal. The discipline is heavily dominated by orthodox terrorism discourse.

The main finding of the study of terrorism literature suggests that if a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the roots of terrorism is required then a combination of different perspectives is essential. This is because terrorism studies is a largely dormant academic discipline dominated by a single approach that focuses on examining and justifying an already established discourse. It is a framework that serves only to promote the positivist understanding of terrorism, something that a discourse is designed to do, thereby reinforcing its own reality. The study of terrorism needs to break out of this mono-dimensional and pejorative moral legitimacy framework. It needs to move beyond the state centric understanding of terrorism provided by the orthodox discourse and into a wider and more holistic approach to political violence that will provide access into the deep socio-political roots of the violence and facilitate movement towards a resolution of terrorism.

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A more comprehensive and holistic approach to understanding the roots of political violence can be provided by the approaches employed in conflict studies. when viewed through the different perspectives produced by international relations theory. These perspectives or discourses, when taken together, provide a very useful multi-level and interdisciplinary approach to understanding conflict. However, as with the study of terrorism each conflict theory has a particular use and function. Realism is a state-centric and principally political, conflict based framework that not only generates conflict but also reproduces it via a positivist ‘reality.’ Realism is designed to ‘explain’ and ‘understand’ interstate conflict and support the existence and centrality of the state and the importance of the Westphalian system. From this perspective it is useful, because as the dominant perspective in international relations it exposes the role of the state and indeed the Westphalian international system in the generation and maintenance of conflict.

Realism fails to recognise non-state or intra-state conflict, which is becoming an increasingly important factor in the nature of the contemporary conflict. This gap in the understanding can be filled by pluralism, which is a discourse designed to understand the role of the non-state actor. Pluralism is intended to demonstrate the role and importance of other actors in conflict as it attempts to show the nature of the conflictual relationship between the individual and society. This is particularly evident in the examination of functionalism and human needs theory. However, the purpose of pluralism is also to maintain the dominance of the state and reinforce the state-centric approach, as a result it is not completely free from the influence of the state in the understanding of conflict. This is particularly apparent in relation to idealism, a discourse that although purporting to extol the rights and values of the individual group, nation or state, actually enshrines them and makes them beholden on the existence of the institution of the state. For example, the implications of the concept of self-determination for non-state actors is to cause the actor to seek the creation of a state and acceptance into the Westphalian “club.” This is a common cause of conflict and is certainly apparent in the Palestinian example. Pluralism does not truly break from the state-centric approach to conflict but does provide an alternative understanding to the causes of conflict.

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3 See, Cox R, Approaches, p.87.
Structuralism also provides an alternative approach to conflict. This discourse is designed to highlight the nature and purpose of the systems in which the actors' perceive they exist. This is demonstrated by considering the structural arguments, such as those provided by Marxism. Structuralism is also particularly useful in exposing the systemic and situational causes of conflict, especially actor behaviour, and is particularly valuable in examining the effect of the historical and cultural structure of violence. Nevertheless, structuralism is a general approach and suffers criticism for generating a generic understanding of a conflict situation that assumes all the individuals are affected similarly by the structure.

This is where the perspective produced by liberalism is beneficial because it is designed to focus particularly on the role of the individual and the group in conflict. It allows an examination of the construction of the identity of the individual, especially ethnic, and an investigation into the effects of ideology and the potent conflict generators of religion and nationalism. It also provides a constructive study into the psychological construction of the conflict mindset. But liberalism does not take any account of the role of the state in the generation of conflict, which, as I argued above, is instrumental in causing conflict and vital to understanding the roots of violence. This returns the discourse debate back to the start and is a point that perhaps illustrates the purpose of this study: to demonstrate that whichever discourse or theory is employed to explain the root causes, regardless of how helpful or illuminating they are in understanding particular causes, all are based on particular assumptions and therefore suffer from limitations and restrictions in their approach to explaining and understanding conflict.

The conclusion of this roots survey suggests some important findings. First, the causes of conflict, especially contemporary conflict, can be better understood from a comprehensive, multi-level and multi-dimensional perspective. This implies that although different discourses are employed to understand the roots of conflict, by combining these approaches into a single multi-level framework it might be possible to establish an all-inclusive and wide-ranging explanation of the root causes of conflict. Also the survey of conflict studies suggests a general differentiation between approaches for explaining conflict. These can be classed as follows,

1. Orthodox conflict theory: this is a realist state centric approach and relates to the traditional understanding of conflict as inter-state war.
2. Moderate conflict theory: this can be seen as the conflict resolution approach to conflict.

3. Critical conflict theory: this is a radical, holistic and multi-dimensional approach to explaining conflict.

It is apparent that by combining the best approaches provided by terrorism and conflict studies together with the perspectives produced by international relations theory. It is possible to compile a comprehensive survey of methods for understanding the roots of terrorism that incorporate many of the useful approaches at different levels in the roots debate. The main reason for establishing this roots of terrorism debate and the comparison of terrorism and conflict studies is to challenge and ultimately deconstruct the mono-dimensional approach to terrorism provided by orthodox terrorism theory. This challenge to the orthodox explanation of terrorism can be achieved by incorporating the alternative approaches or perspectives of the root causes of terrorism into a hybrid comprehensive framework. This ‘alternative theoretical’ approach is intended as a holistic framework that incorporates a wide-ranging, multi-level and multi-dimensional approach to explaining and understanding the root causes of terrorism.

This comprehensive and multi-level approach provides a rethinking of the roots of terrorism and offers a number of theoretical root causes of terrorism. Although these are listed as forms of terrorism within each category or level of analysis they are not a typology of terrorism but potential root causes (see Annex I). The first level of analysis in the alternative framework is the state level. This concentrates on the political and focuses on the state approach by examining state responses to terrorism and terrorists. A number of implications for the roots of terrorism debate emerge from this perception. The most important is that terrorism can be seen to exist inherently within the institutions and policy construction of the state. This suggests terrorism can be considered synonymous with the institution of the state. Hence, the theoretical root causes of terrorism at the state level are inherent terrorism, devious terrorism and terrorism management.

The next level in the framework is the non-state actor level. This provides an understanding of terrorism based on social conflict theory and suggests terrorism is caused by the perceived function and utility of terrorism, unsatisfied human needs and relative deprivation. The implications of this perspective for understanding the roots
of terrorism suggest the existence at the non-state level of revolutionary or reactionary terrorism, grievance terrorism and deprivation terrorism. The structural level approach concentrates on the structure of society, and in particular the relationship between the actor and the structure and the socio-economic environment. The implications of this perspective suggest that the roots of terrorism can be located in the historical and cultural background of a region, and the behaviour and objectives of the actors. This implies the existence of cultural terrorism, systemic terrorism, situational terrorism and socio-economic terrorism. The final level of analysis is the level of the individual. This perception of the root causes suggests that the individual has a central role in the generation of terrorism. Implies that terrorism can be found in the ideology, identity and composition of individual and group psychology. This approach suggests that the roots of terrorism exist at the level of the individual in ideological terrorism, identity terrorism, issue terrorism, emotional and cognitive terrorism and group terrorism.

The objective of this synthesis of terrorism and conflict studies is to combine different perspectives and levels of analysis into the construction of a single, holistic and more wide-ranging framework for approaching the roots of terrorism. Thus the aim of this study is to suggest a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism than the orthodox approach. One that can be applied to conflicts in which terrorism exists for the purpose of generating a root causes debate and opening alternative pathways for resolving the violence. The benefit of employing these alternative perspectives for understanding the roots of terrorism with the intention of dealing with them are clearly apparent from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The entrenched discourses employed in this conflict, (especially orthodox terrorism theory) make little reference to the potential underlying root causes of terrorism. In fact, it can be argued, that the approach adopted by the Israeli State is actually exacerbating the political and socio-economic motivations for terrorism that have been revealed by the alternative framework. For example, Israel has maintained a security policy based on the protection of the ethnic Jewish state of Israel in Palestine, which is the Zionist discourse. It has occupied, annexed and settled further areas in Palestine and has sought to remove Palestinian people. It has also refused to engage with the issues central to the Palestinian understanding of the conflict, which are Palestinian lands, the return of refugees and the status of the Old City of Jerusalem. These demonstrate adherence to the Zionist, albeit revisionist, discourse. Israel can employ this discourse
because it can argue that the Arabs (Palestinians) intend to destroy them, this has been clearly demonstrated to them since 1936. They can also maintain a security policy to justify their defensive violence against the Palestinians, which involves preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state by occupation, settlement and containment. Israel also has a vested interest in maintaining the conflict as this allows it to sustain their security discourse and keep alive their ancient historical claim to the whole region.

Similarly, the Palestinian employment of the discourse of Palestinianism, comprising of Identity, Nationalism and Pan-Arabism, requires the formation and acceptance of a Palestinian state. The Palestinians have employed a number of different tactics to achieve this but have ultimately returned to armed action and terrorism, perhaps because this is *the* discourse of the national liberation movement, which they consider themselves to be. The Palestinians fight for independence from Israel, who they claim intend to destroy them, and have empirical evidence of this from 1936. They employ a national revolutionary discourse (both secular and religious) to justify and legitimise their use of violence.

The nature of the discourses employed by the Palestinians and Israelis suggest that the actors have no desire to end the conflict. Zionism is centred on maintaining an ethnically homogeneous Jewish state. To abandon the security discourse underwritten by revisionist Zionism could effectively mean the end of the Jewish state as a racially pure entity. A unified one-state solution within the whole of Palestine encompassing both Jews and Arabs cannot be entertained without the complete rejection of the Zionist discourse. Whilst the Israeli left and the peace movement have criticised the extreme policies and actions of the predominantly ruling Israeli right, their recommendations stop well short of suggesting the disestablishment of the state of Israel. The Jews fear that the Palestinians are still committed to a Palestinian state in the whole region and foresee in their own destruction the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Palestinians also have a reason to maintain the conflict, as a settlement other than that which provides them with a Palestinian state incorporating the homelands and the settlement of refugees would be a betrayal of the Palestinian people. The approaches of conflict management⁴ in attempting to problem solve within established conflict discourses is perhaps represented by the historical survey of the conflict because it demonstrates the existence of high level political

understandings of conflict that obscure the deeper root causes that are tackled by conflict resolution approaches.\textsuperscript{5}

The Zionist discourse employed by Israel is based on security and incorporates orthodox terrorism discourse, which is applied by the Israelis within the relative legitimacy debate on the use of terrorism, in order to establish Palestinian terrorism as illegitimate, illegal and unlawful violence. However, this is perhaps no different from all other states that seek security, which is enshrined in the realist positivist order of the Westphalian world. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be seen as asymmetric: an established state against a non-state actor that is seeking to become a state through violence. The discourses employed by the two actors although culturally significant are common political discourses for conflict, that of the state security / terrorism discourse versus the non-state national liberation discourse both of which are mutually incompatible, hence the nature of the conflict. They also aptly demonstrate the relative legitimacy debate in the understanding of terrorism, which is provided by the orthodox definition that simply highlights the ‘terrorist’ versus ‘freedom fighter’ debate.

By employing an alternative comprehensive framework that reveals the root causes of terrorism in a multi-dimensional format it is possible to rethink the root causes of terrorism in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that are provided by orthodox terrorism theory. For example, by the accepted normative understanding of what constitutes terrorism and who is a terrorist, the Israeli state is able to construct a perception of the Palestinians as unlawful users of deadly violence who are attempting to influence the democratic politics of the liberal state of Israel by illegal, unjust and morally unacceptable means for their own illegitimate ends. However, by applying the comprehensive approach it is possible to re-examine the causes of terrorism and recognise that multi-dimensional roots of political violence can exist at multi-levels within a conflict. This is demonstrated by employing the alternative framework and testing for the existence of the categories of root causes of terrorism at all levels in the conflict. For example, an examination at the state level reveals just how instrumental the role of the Israeli state is in the generation and maintenance of terrorism and validates the existence of inherent, devious and management terrorism. Also an investigation at the non-state level illustrates how the Palestinians can employ

\textsuperscript{5} Richmond, \textit{Maintaining Order}, pp.75-105.
terrorism in order to enact political, social and economic change and how it is an expression of their human needs and relative deprivation. This provides evidence to support the existence of reactionary, revolutionary, grievance and deprivation terrorism. Examination of the roots of terrorism at the structural level show the structural pressures that cause violence in the Palestinian and Israeli societies created by the interaction between the actors and the perceived structure. This is demonstrated by the history and culture of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the behaviour of the actors towards one another and the nature of the relative socio-economic conditions that the Palestinians and Israelis experience. All of this supports the claim for the roots of terrorism as cultural, systemic, situational and socio-economic terrorism. Exploration of the root causes of terrorism at the individual level in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict expose the political, socio-economic and psychological reasons for political violence that exist within Palestinian individuals, which relate particularly to the nature of the conflict belief systems, identity and the psychological construction of the mindset of groups and individuals. This endorses the existence of root causes at the individual level; these are ideological, identity, issue, emotional, cognitive and group terrorism.

The implication of this ‘alternative’ approach is a direct counter to the orthodox understanding of the terrorist as a ruthless murderer. The alternative framework implies that terrorism arises from deep-rooted political and socio-economic problems that exist within all levels of society. This multi-perception approach to the roots of terrorism reveals a number of significant reasons, causes and motivations for terrorism within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This produces a far more satisfactory, comprehensive and indeed useful understanding of the causes of political violence and terrorism than the limited mono-dimensional political and moral orthodox approach, (although, as I have argued, the orthodox terrorism discourse is designed and employed precisely for this reason, to block any form of roots debate).

The primary advantage of employing this alternative discourse is to provide an extensive and sophisticated understanding of the roots of terrorism by exposing the root causes of terrorism at all levels. Thus facilitating a holistic study that is vital to the understanding of terrorism if permanent solutions to the violence are to be found. The theoretical comprehensive framework employed in this study provides a number of keys that can be used to unlock complicated and protracted social conflicts - such as the Palestinian-Israeli example - that are characterised by terrorism. The primary
purpose of this is to approach the root causes of terrorism within the conflict with the intention of solving or alleviating the deep-rooted problems and thus preventing the expression of political violence and the manifestation of terrorism.

Legitimacy

Attempts at dealing with terrorism using the orthodox theory are focused primarily on confronting symptomatic violence with either more violence, as state force, or by criminal and legal methods. This is management of terrorism and arguably is the only avenue available because the predominance of state legitimacy eschews a roots debate. If the state intends to actually resolve the violence, it needs to move outside the orthodox terrorism discourse and bestow some form of legitimacy on the claims of the actor producing the terrorism. It then needs to engage in a roots debate to solve the deep political and socio-economic reasons that are generating the cause of the violence. This I suggest is a ‘peace process’ and is conflict transformation in an established procedure that is more than just a respite from violence; it is a discourse shift, potentially from the orthodox understanding of terrorism to engaging with them as legitimate actors.\textsuperscript{6} During this process there is a change in the lexicon; terrorist actors are no longer referred to as terrorists, instead they are militants or fighters in value neutral conflict language, and are engaged in negotiations as legitimate actors and in some instances pardoned for ‘terrorist crimes’ that they were once tried and imprisoned for.\textsuperscript{7} There is also progress in dealing with the political and socio-economic and structural problems, that under an alternative terrorism approach would have been seen as the causes of the terrorism, but were ignored by orthodox terrorism discourse. So what changed? Although the questions that arise from this legitimacy argument are probably the subject of another study they are pertinent to understanding the role of legitimacy within the state in relation to orthodox terrorism theory and alternative root cause discourse debate, so:

\textsuperscript{6} Examples of Peace processes have occurred in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and Peru.
\textsuperscript{7} This occurred extensively in Northern Ireland peace process as terrorists who were tried and convicted for crimes of terrorism were released from jails, especially the notorious ‘H’ block.
1. When does the transition occur? At what point does the terrorist actor become legitimate? After a particular time period? At a certain level of violence? After a specified number of deaths?

2. Why does it happen? During a hurting stalemate? In untenable political situation? After recognition of the underlying causes of the violence? At the end of violence?

3. What is the form of the decision process that decides a group employing violence should gain legitimacy to their demands?

4. How can this occur considering orthodox terrorism theory gives no quarter to actors using violence? Is a peace process therefore a sign of victory for terrorists against the orthodox understanding? Does this show orthodox terrorism theory to be a flawed approach?

The point to stress is that a discourse transformation can occur, which suggests that at some point, a roots of terrorism discourse, incorporating the comprehensive causes of terrorism discussed in this study, can be applied by the state. It also demonstrates that orthodox terrorism theory is indeed a discourse that is employed to deal with the violent demands of illegitimate threats to the state, before they become legitimate, if they ever do. Orthodox terrorism theory is a crisis management coping mechanism employed by the state in response to anti-state violence, employed perhaps, whilst the state decides on the pertinence of the claim of the terrorists to legitimacy. However, given that orthodox terrorism theory legitimises state violence (as terrorism) in the form of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism, which actually causes further terrorism, and also cannot recognise any form of legitimacy other that the state. Is orthodox terrorism theory, on close examination, actually incapable of dealing with terrorism? And therefore whilst it is employed, can terrorism as illegitimate violence ever be eradicated? The critique of orthodox terrorism theory contained in this study suggests this might indeed be the case.
Complexity

Orthodox terrorism theory provides a simple method of understanding the manifestation of political violence against the state. It supplies a discourse, which can be understood by the government and the governed, and it defends the core security of the state - the legitimacy to govern - and is the basis for dealing with terrorism by providing the foundation for anti-terrorism and counter terrorism methods, which to a society affected by terrorism is a vital response. In the interests of parsimony therefore the definition and understanding of the complex and dangerous phenomenon of terrorism is well served by orthodox terrorism theory. By engaging in the complicated roots of terrorism debate, the state is not necessarily dealing directly with the violence, and to deal with so many possible root causes is a long-term investment with no guarantee of the expected return of peace in the short-term. Also, orthodox terrorism theory would argue that by employing a roots debate to counter the terrorism, the perpetrators have circumvented the political process, which in a democracy is a serious problem with dangerous, precedent setting implications.

The definitions of terrorism supplied by orthodox terrorism theory also provide a relative simplicity. The implications of adopting a definition of terrorism as broad as ‘lethal political violence’ and redefining the phenomenon as ‘conflict’ will cause a complexity of understanding and immense difficulties in dealing with the violence. It also implies terrorism with out terror, which is the foundation of the accepted understanding of terrorism. Using an alternative understanding of terrorism also undermines the purpose and foundations of the state, the implications of which for the state are potentially very serious. This discourse debate can be condensed dramatically and perhaps summed up as orthodox terrorism theory and state survival versus the roots discourse and state collapse.

The difficulties of the comprehensive framework relate to its complex approach to terrorism and the multifarious nature of the root causes. These might potentially relate to a vast number of grievances, which cannot be satisfied by the state without completely undermining its position and making governance untenable. Furthermore, how is a terrorist actor, which intends to destroy the entire existing framework of society, (such as the millennial cults or fanatic religious extremists
whose aim is world destruction) to be approached even within the comprehensive discourse? Surely, these types of terrorist threats suggested here require the monodimensional, state-centric, non-negotiable force of counter-terrorism? Although the comprehensive framework is not designed as an alternative terrorism theory: it is constructed to demonstrate the existence of alternative ways to understand terrorism and approach the root causes beyond the constraints of the political legitimacy debate. The application of the comprehensive framework could raise questions relating to whether the millennial group were actually as cohesive as orthodox terrorism theory would suggest. The violence could be investigated to ascertain the levels on which it is generated and how the causes can be approached and resolved. For example, what is the role of the state in creating the millennial violence? Do members of the group have unfulfilled needs or deprivation issues that are leading them into the cult? What structural issues are generating the violence? and what is the role of the individual? Although this is the comprehensive approach only in outline, it demonstrates how this approach can ask questions about the roots of their actions in order to penetrate beyond the immediate mono-dimensional understanding.

The difficulty with this approach, however, is that this may only placate a certain number of those involved in the violence, especially if it related to extreme cults such as Aum Shrinkyo or particular issues that cannot be resolved by the state without its own destruction. The state is truly then in conflict with the terrorist actor, as the incompatibility of goals suggests. However, if the comprehensive approach has been employed to deal with the root causes then only a marginalised and irreconcilable minority will remain, to be dealt with by the state. Although orthodox terrorism theory already considers terrorists as marginal actors, the point to make here is that the comprehensive approach can potentially help reduce the core of violent actors by dealing with some of the causes of the violence. Although this is probably the realm of further study, the point is that orthodox terrorism theory always views terrorists as irreconcilable when they take up violence, but by employing a roots

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9 In an interview with Boaz Ganor, director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya in Israel, he suggested that a twin track approach to terrorism needs to be adopted, one that employs a method of dealing and countering terrorism whilst concurrently attempting to resolve the deep rooted problems. Boaz Ganor, Director International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, 07.04.2003.
approach, despite the complexity, progress could be made into helping to marginalise those involved in terrorist violence into a manageable few.

This suggests that far from being a disadvantage, the complexity of the comprehensive approach is actually very useful. As Miall et al, point out in reference to contemporary conflict, “given the complexity of much of contemporary conflict, attempts at conflict resolution have to be equally comprehensive.”\textsuperscript{10} Thus, orthodox terrorism theory is too narrow because it focuses on the symptoms of violence and what it perceives to be the actual cause, although its purpose is a defence of the state and an end to violence: it is a short-term solution. As Miall et al, pointedly suggest, “although peacemakers strive to bring the violent phase of conflict to an end, long-term peace-builders who aspire to prevent violent conflict or ensure that settlements are transformed into lasting peace have to address the deeper sources of conflict.”\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Application}

Orthodox terrorism theory has a specific role. It was created to understand a particular type of violence and as a purely academic study it provides a useful way of seeing the manifestation of political violence. However, terrorism theory has become an unchallenged discourse, its application has been hijacked, manipulated and exploited to create a “regime of truth.”\textsuperscript{12} Research in this field focuses on propagating this understanding with positivist empirical evidence, which serves to “reinforce its own reality,”\textsuperscript{13} not necessarily challenge it. The alternative comprehensive approach I suggest in this study is not intended as an alternative or replacement for this approach, as this would lead to similar problems. Instead the alternative framework is designed to incorporate the orthodox understanding of terrorism and critique its position as an understanding of terrorism by providing a reflexive critique of orthodox terrorism theory.

\textsuperscript{11} Miall et al, \textit{Conflict Resolution}, p.94.
\textsuperscript{13} Robert Cox calls this “problem solving theory,” see Cox R. \textit{Approaches to World Order}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.88.
Since orthodox terrorism theory is applied predominantly by the state it provides a useful understanding of terrorism in relation to the state and helps explain how terrorism is perceived and demonstrates how it is dealt with. The application of comprehensive understanding merely relocates orthodox terrorism theory into a wider holistic understanding or framework of the violence, and is then able, by stepping out of the orthodox box, to suggest that state application of this approach to terrorism is actually itself a cause of terrorism, whilst also implying that this might in fact be a useful side effect, or even the reason it is employed.

Despite the problems with orthodox terrorism theory, the application of the comprehensive framework as a way to deal with terrorism, instead of its intended use as a way to understand root causes, could be quite problematic. For example, an approach employed by the comprehensive framework is to focus on liberal values, rights, needs, freedoms and requirements. However the acceptance of these concepts as a true justification for violence could paradoxically trigger greater violence. This is because elements of the comprehensive approach can exist as justification for violence, and could easily become a regime of truth or ‘discourse of struggle,’ employed to rationalise violence. This is an inherent problem in critical theory as “the main dilemma of such approaches, which in calling for universal inclusion also need to set normative standards for candidates to qualify for inclusion.”\textsuperscript{14} The comprehensive approach is not intended to condone or validate the use of the type of abhorrent violence associated with terrorism, but is an attempt to offer an holistic understanding of the root causes, the intention of which is to provide a clearer understanding of terrorism than the one provided by orthodox terrorism theory. This can then be used to identify and highlight a number of pathways to finding possible solutions to the violence.

Beyond Terrorism

The purpose of this study has been to suggest that there needs to be a rethinking of orthodox terrorism theory. This is due to the manifestation of 'new terrorism' and 'new war' or contemporary conflict. New terrorism is characterised by violence perpetrated by unidentified amorphous non-state groups, which often are not linked to their country of origin and who claim no responsibility for their actions, and who are prepared to die for their cause. Their aim is high lethality among non-combatants and their lethal violence is typified by hate and anger.\(^{15}\) New war or contemporary conflict is often asymmetric warfare between organisations, often against the state, but predominantly within it. They are primarily ethnic identity conflicts, characterised by irredentist and secessionist movements and multi-party civil war and are often underwritten by religious or ethno-nationalist ideas. They are characterised by hatred, fear and genocide and have no declarations of war, few battles, and are typified by attrition, terror and violence against civilians.\(^{16}\) These forms of warfare have been identified in chaos of the post-Cold War world and are problematic because they do not conform to the state centric realist understanding and they are also remarkably similar.

Conflict studies has embraced change and developed new approaches to understanding contemporary conflict with more critical analysis such as third and even fourth generation conflict resolution approaches.\(^{17}\) The study of terrorism however also needs to make the transition to multi-dimensional approaches to understanding the roots of political violence, but this will mean moving beyond orthodox terrorism theory. This requires a critical approach to rethinking terrorism, recognition of terrorism theory as a discourse, and a positive engagement with multi-level and multi-dimensional root causes. This is vital for the survival of terrorism studies in the post-Westphalian and globalised world, where the emphasis is shifting from state-centric to homocentric, characterised by individual human rights, human security, and easy access to borderless travel, hyper communications, high technology

and membership of global society. All of which can potentially create far more root causes of terrorism than the state and orthodox terrorism theory can hope to understand and ultimately deal with as the Palestinian-Israeli case clearly illustrated.
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Personal Interviews

Informal:

This comprised of casual conversations and unofficial dialogue with representatives of the Israeli State, including the government, military, and police and intelligence services as well as Israeli soldiers, settlers, and civilians. The Palestinians included members and representatives of principle political groups, namely Fateh, PFLP, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, and members of their respective armed wings: Tansim, Abu Ali Mustapha Brigade, al Quds Brigade, al-Qassim and the al-Aqsa martyrs brigade as well as Palestinian fighters, refugees and civilians.

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