


**IRISH SECURITY POLICY: NEUTRALITY, NON-ALIGNED
OR 'SUI GENERIS'?**

Trevor Charles Salmon

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



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IRISH SECURITY POLICY : NEUTRALITY, NON-ALIGNED OR SUI GENERIS?

Trevor C. Salmon

I TREVOR CHARLES SALMON hereby certify that this thesis which is approximately 110,000 words in length has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

date *18 September 1986*..... signature of candidate 

I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No.12 in December 1979 and as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy on 8 October 1980; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 1979 and 1986.

date *18 September 1986*..... signature of candidate 



Abstract

In this century the Irish have claimed, at critical moments, that they were neutral and that they have established a policy of traditional neutrality. In the last generation they have also claimed, on occasion, to be nonaligned. These claims are tested by identifying the true nature of neutrality and variables by which a state's claim to be neutral can be assessed, and by identifying the essence of nonalignment. That essence is inapplicable to developed European states. Given that neutrality per se can only apply in time of war, the variables are adjusted to reflect a peacetime policy 'for neutrality' in the event of war. For this purpose the model presented by three European neutral countries is examined and used to generate variables against which to test the Irish claims.

The identified variables are: (i) due diligence with respect to neutral rights and duties; (ii) the extent to which Irish claims have been recognised by others; (iii) the disavowal of help by them and; (iv) the extent of their freedom of decision and action. In addition, and partly reflecting the claim to non-alignment, two other variables are used: (v) lack of isolationism, willingness to ameliorate world problems, and impartiality and; (vi) the attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-determination.

Ireland has consistently failed to meet the criteria associated with either 'of' or 'for' neutrality, whilst its record on variable (v) is mixed. Its concern with variable (vi) has been pervasive, but ineffectual.

Nonetheless, Ireland has not been committed to co-belligerency, although neither non-aligned, neutral nor an alliance member. It is in a sui generis position, particularly, but not only, within the European Community.

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Chapter One : Introduction

Some states have a great deal written about them, others little or nothing, except insofar as their own nationals delve into their history. These states remain largely forgotten by the world at large, or merely footnoted. Whilst Ireland does not fall quite into this category, crucial aspects of Irish history and policy have been glossed over or simply ignored by Irish, British and other authorities.¹ Indeed, Ireland is, in some respects, a forgotten state, if not a forgotten nation.

Geography and history go far in explaining this circumstance. Ireland, geographically, is on the periphery of a continent, a position compounded by being sheltered and obscured as "une île derrière une île".² Its large neighbour not only influences the Irish, "it also insulates them" or at least, has done so in the past.³ Moreover, given the relative position and weight of the two islands, "Political independence did not automatically bring economic independence or cultural autonomy".⁴ Indeed an Irish ability to pursue any independent policy had been thwarted for centuries by the political subsumption of the small island by the larger. Nevertheless, the Irish have played a rather more significant role as a people and nation in international relations than is sometimes credited. The isolationist-insulated dimension can be exaggerated.⁵

The extant political literature on Ireland deals predominantly with Irish history, the 700 years of British domination and the Irish freedom struggle. Traditionally the works on its external relations have been similarly orientated, focusing on (i) the independence question, (ii) Anglo-Irish relations and, (iii) empire's evolution into Commonwealth, and the Irish role in that process. Once these matters appeared to have been resolved, firstly by political

independence for 26 counties in 1922; secondly, by the loosening of Commonwealth ties in the 1920s and 1930s; thirdly, by the affirmation of independence by the apparent neutrality of 1939-1945; and finally, the declaration of the Republic in 1949, interest declined in Ireland, until "the troubles" in Ulster demanded attention, albeit even then, attention has not really focused on Dublin.

Thus there has been no major work which has focused primarily upon the self-proclaimed basis of Irish foreign, security and defence policies for nearly fifty years, namely an Irish attempt to pursue a variant of neutrality, in addition to a periodic aspiration and commitment to a policy of nonalignment.⁶ Thus a major raison d'être for this work is the attempt to fill this vacuum. This is particularly important because it will be argued that the lack of serious analysis of the basis of Irish foreign policy has led to a situation of great confusion in Ireland itself, and amongst other states in the international system, about the nature and foundations of Irish policy, especially the relevancy of certain concepts and policies, as well as their possible implications. In other words, a central and recurring theme of this work is that the imprecise use of concepts and language has obscured significant aspects of Irish foreign policy. That that policy has been different from that often portrayed in official statements, doctrine and rhetoric. What follows, therefore, endeavours to analyse the degree of Irish conformity in practice to the conceptual essence of the terms 'neutrality' and 'nonalignment'.

No previous major study has explicitly attempted to apply these concepts to Irish foreign and security policy except in particular cases, nor to seriously analyse the Irish interpretation and understanding of these concepts, nor indeed to question whether Irish

policy in this regard is sui generis or not, despite the attempts to delineate 'neutrality' and/or 'nonalignment' with respect to a few other select countries.⁷ This is despite the fact that for nearly half a century the Irish themselves have seen their policy as predicated upon neutrality, and that in the postwar period they have at times seen themselves as exponents of nonalignment.

Moreover, Ireland is worthy of special attention with respect to these concepts for a variety of reasons. For example, the Irish have been aware of the potential relevance of their position as an example to others, so that "The student may, therefore, be tempted with some justice to treat Ireland as an ex-colonial, recently independent state".⁸ Ireland also claims to be neutral and/or nonaligned whilst at the same time being a full member of the European Community, participating in all its activities without any 'neutrality clause' or 'reservation'. Ireland believes, and proudly proclaims, that there is no inherent incompatibility between neutrality and membership. This, of course, puts it into a very different position from the other self-confessed neutral and nonaligned in Europe, who as will be seen, explicitly rejected that the two conditions were and are compatible.⁹ The Irish, on the contrary, have advanced the view that their own position and experience can serve as a model for these doubters, showing that there is a distinction between NATO and the Community, and that membership of the Community need not involve a military commitment. Thus the Irish see their experience as an encouragement to Sweden, Switzerland and Austria to join.¹⁰ It is thus of interest to examine whether Irish experience does offer encouragement to other European neutrals and whether it is an appropriate model for them.

Ireland is particularly interesting because Irish policy since the 1930s has not been constrained by international treaty or by a constitutional commitment to neutrality, but rather has been the result of a 'free', albeit constrained choice. There is always the question of how 'free' any decision by a small, weak country really is in an interdependent world, and particularly for a country like Ireland with a very heavy trading dependency upon the United Kingdom. But it was 'free' in the sense that unlike Switzerland, which is constrained by the 1815 Treaty of Paris, whereby Swiss 'perpetual' neutrality was both recognised and guaranteed; or Austria which is constrained by the Constitution of 1955 which by Austria's own volition decreed its perpetual neutrality;¹¹ or Finland, which has been self-constrained by the ambivalent and ambiguous nature of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, Ireland has faced no legal constraint vis-à-vis its neutrality for many years. In this sense, the Irish position has been much more analogous to that of Sweden, similarly unconstrained by constitution or treaty. Of critical interest is that looking at the same European treaties, commitments and obligations in the 1960s and 1970s, the Swedish and Irish governments came to diametrically opposed conclusions concerning Community membership and neutrality.

It may be that their relative economic strength and inter-dependence vis-a-vis other nations critically affected their evaluations. Ireland's constrained choice with regard to the Community is typical of the dilemmas faced by it since 1921-22. Whilst Ireland has retained an element of choice, one must question the extent to which economic factors, especially dependency, have impinged upon Irish policy, and particularly the extent to which they

have or have not in the Irish case impinged upon neutrality. In particular, "is it possible to meet both the imperatives of political nationalism (for an independent economy) and the demands of the populace for the modern high-consumption life? Eamon de Valera in the 1930's said 'no' - and that it was better to be independent than well-off. Since then, southern Irish politicians have been tacitly admitting that the two goals were indeed incompatible, but that it is better to be comfortable than independent." In fact, this latter view has a longer pedigree than Akenson suggests.¹²

Whilst Ireland is not unique in this regard, these considerations do lead to a central hypothesis of this work, namely that socio-economic and political environment of Ireland, both domestically and internationally, has perforce led in the practice of Irish foreign policy to the aspirational pursuit of neutrality being overshadowed by more pressing and immediate concerns of an economic and social welfare nature. That Ireland could not claim like Sweden that her "neutrality is determined by fundamental evaluations relating to security policy, not by economic interests".¹³

This possibility also raises other possible doubts as to the permanency of Irish neutrality which need to be analysed. Is Irish neutrality absolute or is it conditional? Conditional, moreover not only upon the economic variable, but also conditional upon the Partition and Ulster situation, particularly given the regularly recurring suggestion of some sort of deal of 'united Ireland for defence commitment' to the United Kingdom and/or the West in general, or even as an enticement to Ulster Unionists. Furthermore, the Irish have clearly demonstrated the difficulties of trying to separate the interplaying strands of economic policy, foreign policy, politics, security and defence; and these difficulties have become

particularly apparent both with respect to the European Community and the national question.

Fundamentally, Ireland is of interest because as a self-professed neutral, and at various times, nonaligned state, it provides an opportunity to examine the essential components of those concepts against the actual policies of a state claiming to apply them, that is Ireland provides a possible test for the applicability of key criteria in those concepts. Ireland may be used as a test case for the various types of 'neutrality' and 'nonalignment' which are thought to exist, variations of which proliferate in the literature. Ireland might also be regarded as a legitimate test of whether classical neutrality, which reached its zenith in the Second Hague Conference of 1907, still retains any vitality, or whether Roderick Ogley was correct, when writing in 1970, to predict that "The neutrality that we are likely to see will, then, be a somewhat messy neutrality".¹⁴ Is the same true of nonalignment? Does Ireland substantiate or undermine Ogley's contention? In essence, what follows is concerned with the question of whether Ireland can legitimately be termed neutral or nonaligned. This is now a live issue in Irish politics, even though much of the debate is highly uninformed.

In examining these questions, this work will, after a review of the literature on Irish foreign, defence and security policies in Chapter 2, examine in Chapter 3 the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment, attempting to move beyond their 'messiness' to isolate the key criteria at their essence. There are significant problems in this given that the concepts can be equated with their professed application in foreign policies, and that, as noted previously, the concepts have not remained static in meaning. But given the proliferation of terms, it is crucially necessary to define

and delineate usage and meaning. The proliferation is illustrated by the continuum in Table 1. Although there are problems in categorization, Table 1 is heuristic, and does illustrate that no agreed name for 'neutrality' in peacetime exists in international relations. Moreover, further complications arise with the famous Swedish formulation of "non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war"¹⁵, and the possibility of 'for neutrality' rather than 'of neutrality'. In addition, to these variations one must also consider whether 'nonalignment' umbrella can be legitimately extended to incorporate both the Afro-Asian experience and the European experience? Whilst both will be looked at, particular emphasis will be placed in Chapter 4 upon the European models and variants of nonalignment and neutrality. Furthermore, Ireland will be particularly compared to Sweden, partly for the reasons already given, but also because on occasion, Irish officials and politicians have wanted to model Irish policy upon the Swedish example, even to test the Irish position against the Swedish touchstone.¹⁶

Always, it is necessary to be aware that these terms are often deliberately misused for political purposes, both as a means of accusation and of defence. In addition, one must distinguish between what the terms have historically meant, and what they are now understood to mean. Are they passé, anachronistic or outdated? If so, what are the implications for the Irish position?

Part One of this work thus delineates the essence of these concepts, models and variants, and identifies key variables which may be used to determine whether a state may legitimately be termed neutral or nonaligned in either a general sense or in the senses understood by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.

Part Two commences with an analysis of Irish policy prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. Whilst the variables identified in Part One cannot legitimately be applied earlier than 1939 because of the complications engendered by the Irish constitutional position vis-a-vis Britain and 'the ports' issue, and their partially proleptic nature, the prewar period remains important. It provides an understanding of a basic feature of Irish discussion and practice regarding security policy, namely the existence of at least two alternative traditions, the one stressing, albeit not exclusively, the pursuit of an aspiration for neutrality, and the other stressing an acceptance of practical and current realities. The prewar background also helps to explain why the notions of neutrality and non-alignment have appealed so strongly to the Irish and what the Irish have actually tried to do.

The Second World War obviously provides a good test of Irish 'neutrality', and the relevant variables identified in Part One will be applied to Irish policy in that period. Subsequently the variables will be applied to determine the extent to which Irish security policy in the postwar period has conformed to the general understandings of neutrality and nonalignment or even to the models provided by apparently similar European states. Has Irish policy been based upon consistent, identifiable principles or expediency? 1982 was a particularly significant year marking, as it did, the sixtieth anniversary of independence, the tenth anniversary of European Community membership, and providing the test to Irish policy of the Falklands campaign. It thus provides a suitable point of conclusion, although many of the issues continued to have relevance beyond that time.

Table 1 : Typology of different terms for 'nonalignment' and 'neutrality'

<u>Nonalignment</u>		<u>Neutrality</u>			<u>Alliance</u>	
nonaligned	middle power	permanent	free rider	semi-alliance	bilateral	satellite
unaligned	non-belligerent	perpetual	conditional	protective umbrella	collective	
not aligned	neo-neutrality	perfect	benevolent		universal	
positive nonalignment	non-alliance	absolute	qualified			
negative nonalignment		total	partial			
noninvolvement		traditional	imperfect			
independent foreign policy		general	unneutral service			
non-bloc		voluntary				
non-identity		treaty based				
neutralism(ist)		guaranteed				
militant neutralism		positive				
uncommitted		integral				
have nots (etc.)		expedient				
non-associated		economic				
third force		ideological				
Bandung		armed				
Panchsheel		spiritual				
		neutralized				

Chapter One : Footnotes

1. See below, Chapter Two, for an analysis of the extant literature on Irish security, defence, foreign policy, neutrality and non-alignment, by Irish, British and other authorities.
2. Jean Blanchard, Le droit ecclésiastique contemporain d'Irlande, (Paris 1958) p.11. Quoted in Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland, (London, Oxford University Press, 1974) p.46.
3. idem.
4. idem.
5. See Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations : Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) for a detailed analysis of Irish involvement in "international relations as a people", p.17.
6. See Chapter Two pp.11-25 below.
7. See Chapter Four pp.95-138 below.
8. David Thornley, 'Historical Introduction' in Chubb op.cit. p.2, but note that Thornley also highlights reasons why the analogy is flawed, since "Unlike so many of the emergent African states, Ireland is not a legal entity superimposed arbitrarily upon ethnic and economic diversity by a conqueror", although, of course, Partition was so imposed! Thornley also argues Ireland has not been so examined.
9. See Chapter Four pp.110-136 below.
10. See, for example, the speeches of Mr. Richie Ryan as reported, for example, in The Irish Times of 24 October 1978 and 24 October 1981. Mr. Ryan's approach is particularly interesting because it illustrates that these arguments are not confined to "the left" in Ireland, and Mr. Ryan has been a Member of the European Parliament, Fine Gael spokesman on foreign affairs, and also Minister of Finance 1973-77.
11. Albeit that, in practice, this was implicit in the negotiations over the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, although not explicitly stated in the treaty.
12. Donald Harman Akenson, The United States and Ireland, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973, p.129, and pp.149 ff below.
13. Broadcast by Swedish Foreign Minister 1 November 1971 reproduced in Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1971 (Stockholm : Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New Series 1 : C21, 1971) p.81.
14. Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) p.205.
15. Fact Sheets on Sweden : The Swedish Defence System (Stockholm: Swedish Institute July 1982).
16. One prominent example, one-time official and politician, is Conor Cruise O'Brien. See, for example, To Katanga and Back, (London, Four Square Books, 1965) p.25. Other Labour politicians, for example, ex-leader Michael O'Leary, have had similar hopes.

Chapter Two : A Negligent Literature

Outwith the three areas previously identified - independence, Anglo-Irish relations, and Commonwealth relationship¹ - for years very little of substance was published on Irish foreign, security and defence policies. At first sight this view is apparently contradicted by the authoritative bibliographical guide, A Bibliography of Published Works on Irish Foreign Relations 1921-1978, which lists 1314 "books, articles, pamphlets and official publications as well as a number of unpublished dissertations", on the broad area.²

This appears impressive, but in reality is much less so if one searches for major works dealing with the issues of Irish putative neutrality and nonalignment. Under the heading "General foreign policy"³ there are only two major works on Irish foreign policy, both by the same Irish author, whilst the rest are minor articles, with the exception of three articles by Keatinge, Lemass and Conor Cruise O'Brien.⁴

Of the two major works, the first, published a decade ago, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, focuses upon "the way in which foreign policy issues are treated in the Irish political system, as well as the principal attitudes of Irish political figures towards their country's external relations" (p xi), but the book deals predominantly with 'The Policy-Making Machinery' (pp 39-160) and 'The Domestic Environment' (pp 161-294). On several occasions, neutrality and security are mentioned, but these references are scattered and are only raised as illustrations of some other point, for example, in the context of parliamentary questions, cabinet solidarity, or in prewar and World War II context.⁵ The work

contains only a very brief discussion of neutrality policy per se, whilst the final section "Ireland's New Diplomacy" looks at the policy-making implications of recent changes in the Irish external environment, particularly European Community membership, rather than at policy itself.⁶ Nonetheless, Keatinge's work is seminal, as the first, and until his second book, the only major, authoritative work on the general nature of Irish foreign policy and how it is made.

That second work, published in 1978, is more promising and substantial, examining as it does 'Issues of Irish foreign policy'.⁷ It focuses upon six issue-areas - "independence, security, unity, prosperity, global order and global justice".⁸ However, 'security' is dealt with in only 19 pages, of which only 7 are postwar, and that section, of course, includes much on Northern Ireland. 'Neutrality', 'defence and 'security' are also touched on under other issues, such as their relationship with the Irish quest for identity and independence, as well as Anglo-Irish relations, relations with the United States and in the context of Partition. But, Irish neutrality/defence/security are only briefly discussed, there being no thorough-going analysis of the issues.⁹ It is not a central theme or concern.

Also in the period covered by the bibliography Professor Keatinge addressed some of these issues more specifically in 'Odd Man Out? Irish Neutrality and European Security' published in 1972.¹⁰ This article has a brief explanation of the basis of Irish neutrality, before moving on to consider the Community membership debate and neutrality, and possible developments in the Community potentially affecting the Irish position. It does include a brief discussion of "factors which tend to involve Ireland in a European alliance system" (p 445) and "Does the western alliance need Ireland?" (pp 447-9).

With respect to general discussions of Irish foreign policy, Patrick Keatinge has written on the policy of the new 1973 coalition,¹¹ whilst more substantially there is the brilliant, if tendentious, article 'Ireland in International Affairs' by Conor Cruise O'Brien.¹² A typically incisive analysis, this is again predominantly concerned with prewar Irish policy and World War II. Whilst it does contain a brief, perceptive, discussion of the 1949 debate over the attitude to NATO, it contains no real discussion of the Community dimension, except to note the alleged absurdity of the argument that "'independent foreign policy', it is hinted, was a very nice thing in its way, but Ireland's economic interests require that it is dropped so as to get into the Market".¹³ Nonetheless, this remains the best short account of Irish foreign policy, and it also raises interesting questions as to the basis of Irish policy at the United Nations.

Sean Lemass also principally concerned with Ireland at the U.N., sought to counter the 'liberal' (and O'Brien) argument that the Irish position changed, by asserting "it was not we who changed our position; rather it was the United Nations that changed. This change was brought about by another major shift in the balance in the Assembly when in the early sixties a large number of Afro-Asian countries gained independence and seats in the Assembly".¹⁴ With respect to Europe, however, he simply declares Irish enthusiasm for regional organisations and full commitment to the ideals of the Treaty of Rome and the aims of the Community, without discussing the implications, except insofar as to assert that small states have a clear stake in international organisations.

With respect to specific areas of policy - Anglo-Irish relations, the Commonwealth etc, there are several references to Irish

foreign policy, defence and security, but, it must be said, only very much as a by-product of another predominant focus. This is the case, for example, in the excellent studies by Mansergh and Harkness, both historically orientated, which deal with the Commonwealth question in depth.¹⁵ Something of a similar pattern emerges with reference to the literature on Ireland and the European Community, where, of course, there have been a number of articles and pamphlets on the "implications of membership".¹⁶ These, however, also contain either only passing reference to the neutrality issue, or alternatively comprise only a handful of pages.

There are, of course, several general texts dealing with 20th Century and postwar Ireland, which contain a chapter relating to Irish foreign policy, security or defence. These are, however, for the main part by leading historians and only succinct overviews. They are based largely on secondary sources and do not discuss the concepts at stake.¹⁷ An exception is the O'Brien article cited above. A similar problem is inherent in most of the texts dealing with World War II, with only a few exceptions, including Carroll's Ireland in the War Years.¹⁸

The Maguire bibliography lists only six items under "General Defence Policy", plus two official publications, only one of which is significant.¹⁹ There is, however, here a rather surprising omission, namely, the 1968 Irish Army Hand-book, which contains a very useful descriptive summary of the history, role, organisation and structure of the Permanent Defence Force (P.D.F.), and of its U.N. service.²⁰ Of the six, three were published in the Commonwealth orientated Round Table, one dating from 1939, and the others dealing with the original N.A.T. decision.²¹ Two further articles are from the 1960-62 period when Ireland was first seriously considering EEC membership, one

interestingly is a Soviet view.²² More substantial than any of these is the Shebab history of Irish defence, but it has a limited time-span and a limited focus.²³ There are, of course, other works cited elsewhere,²⁴ but, in sum, there is nothing of substance dealing with the post-1950 period, and little even on the earlier postwar period.

The specific topic of "Neutrality" is somewhat better treated, but of 39 cited works, 30 are wholly or predominantly concerned with pre-1939 developments or the position relating to "The Emergency". Even the interesting work by T. Ryle Dwyer on the relationship with the U.S. during this period on the issue of neutrality is focused upon the short 1939-47 period.²⁵ Of the other eight, one contains a succinct account of "America's Neutral Ally",²⁶ whilst there was a general brief discussion in Contemporary Review in 1959.²⁷ An Italian published a more substantial work in 1950 dealing with the link between independence and neutrality.²⁸ Five focused upon the link with the Community, including the Keatinge work cited above.²⁹ The other four contain either very succinct descriptions or are concerned with the general issues of the political and legal relationship of European neutrals with the European Community.³⁰ The only official publication listed is the legislation enacted in 1941 relating to war damage.³¹ It is worth noting that there is, and has been, no systematic nor coherent set of neutrality laws, as is frequently found elsewhere.³² The only conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing is that in the period 1921-1978 very little of substance was published on the issues which provide the central focus of this study. Although more has been published since 1978 on aspects of Irish foreign policy, that lacuna still exists.

1984 saw a contribution to the filling of the lacuna with the publication of a third significant work by Patrick Keatinge,

A Singular Stance : Irish Neutrality in the 1980s.³³ However, as the title suggests this is primarily an analysis of the contemporary Irish position. It embraces a comparative review of Austrian, Swedish, Swiss and Finnish positions, as well as an analysis of the diplomatic and military challenges to the Irish position and the domestic Irish debate. The concept of neutrality per se and 'The Historical Record' are, however, only dealt with briefly. There is no rigorous definition of neutrality, which is rather inadequately described as "not being involved in wars between other states".³⁴ A further contribution is the unpublished D.Phil. thesis by Norman MacQueen, Irish Neutrality : the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Experience 1945-1969.³⁵ This thesis examines Irish U.N. policy with reference to the apparent policy of neutrality, to the concept of 'middle power', and addresses the question of whether the Irish position changed during the period under examination. Peace-keeping is used as a test case. The discussion involves an historical examination of Irish neutrality, looking at its prewar evolution, the Second World War experience and the legacy. It focuses upon entry into the U.N., the famous Cosgrave 'principles' and most particularly upon the role of Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister of External Affairs between 1957-1969 (as well as 1951-54). It examines whether Irish policy at the U.N. was affected by the original EEC application of 1961 and in Chapter 6 has a very useful analysis of U.N. voting, which purports to show that Irish policy did not 'change' in 1961, that although there was a somewhat greater propensity to vote with the West, this can be dated from 1959 (the 14th session).³⁶ It goes on to examine the concept of 'middle power', and the Irish contribution to U.N. peace-keeping. In many ways, it is an excellent work, its statistical analysis being particularly interesting, but, and this unfortunately is important,

there is no attempt at a rigorous definition of 'neutrality' and very few references to the literature on neutrality.³⁷

The other major works published in recent years have tended to focus upon particular historical periods or issues. Two deal with the wartime situation, namely In Time of War : Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality 1939-1945 by Robert Fisk³⁸ and Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich by John P. Duggan.³⁹ Works by Bowman, Canning, Downey, Dwyer and McMahon touch upon aspects relevant to this study, but have their primary focus elsewhere, either upon the national question or upon Anglo-Irish relations.⁴⁰ A major contribution to understanding, albeit a different type of work to those cited, was the publication in 1980 of Speeches and Statements by Eamon De Valera 1917-73.⁴¹

Contributions to the 1980s debate have also been made by William Fitzgerald, Patrick Comerford, Bill McSweeney and Anthony Coughlan. Fitzgerald argued for Irish membership of NATO as a quid pro quo for British agreement to reunification of Ireland.⁴² Comerford, writing from a CND standpoint, argued for positive steps to ensure a permanent guarantee of Irish neutrality.⁴³ In a somewhat similar vein is the edited work by Bill McSweeney. McSweeney's own contributions cover the arguments for and against Irish neutrality, changing perceptions of Irish neutrality and the case for active Irish neutrality. Two contributions focus upon the impact of Community membership and involvement in European Political Cooperation.⁴⁴ The Community provides the focus for The EEC : Ireland and the making of a Super Power by Anthony Coughlan, a polemic against the Community.⁴⁵

Reflections on the impact of Community membership are also to be found in edited works by David Coombes,⁴⁶ and P.J. Drury and Dermot McAleese.⁴⁷ Both works have chapters on the impact of membership

upon Irish foreign policy, as well as other pertinent comments.⁴⁸

Putting membership into historical perspective, but with very little upon the focus of this current study is The Road to Europe : Irish Attitudes 1948-61.⁴⁹ In addition, there are several articles and contributions on the impact of Community membership by Cooney, Keatinge, Kennedy, MacKernan and Salmon.⁵⁰

On the specific questions of defence and neutrality there have also been a number of articles, some on the organisation and structure of the Irish Permanent Defence Force;⁵¹ some on neutrality, specifically raising questions about Irish neutrality and the pressures upon it⁵² and; some looking at specific issues, such as the decision to abstain from membership of the Atlantic Alliance.⁵³

Whilst this explosion of work is to be welcomed, it has not filled the lacuna since the major works, as has been seen, either focus on a particular aspect or period of the issues treated in this current study, whilst the articles, notes and chapters are either brief, or treat these issues as a by-product of some other predominant concern.

A striking factor emerges when the broader literature on neutrality and nonalignment is examined, namely, that whilst Ireland proudly proclaims its neutrality and/or nonalignment, Ireland is hardly ever mentioned in the literature on these subjects, except perhaps in passing or as a footnote. Thus, although much of the general literature might be thought either applicable or relevant to Ireland, authors have tended to ignore Ireland both as an example and as a possible case-study. Of considerable significance to this current study is that Ireland is rarely, if ever, mentioned even in discussions of the 'European neutrals'. Perhaps the most striking example is the publication Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe.⁵⁴

This work focuses exclusively on Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia as these are "often mentioned in the same breath as the major European countries that do not belong to either of the two military alliances", in addition to their involvement in the 'neutral and nonaligned' group at the C.S.C.E.⁵⁵ No mention is made of Ireland at all, nor is it even thought necessary to explain why Ireland is excluded. All this in a collection organised by two leading European academics, one of whom is an expert on neutrality (Neuhold). Similarly, in the companion work on arms control, Neuhold writing on The European Neutrals and Arms Control again makes no reference to Ireland, nor to Frank Aiken's efforts in this regard.⁵⁶ Instead, the reader is informed that "The main members of the heterogeneous group of European neutrals are Austria and Switzerland ... Sweden ... Finland ... and nonaligned Yugoslavia." Again, interestingly, it is not even thought necessary to explain the exclusion of Ireland, despite saying that neutrality is seen as not belonging to military alliances, and relying primarily upon "their own efforts in providing for their defences".⁵⁷

With one notable exception, other writers and collections have taken a similar line. Even Harto Hakovirta, the exception, has not, however, always been consistent. In 1980 he identified Ireland as a European neutral,⁵⁸ as he did in 1981, although in 1981 he acknowledged "Ireland is seldom grouped together with Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland" albeit that "since she does not belong to the Western alliance and adheres to typical neutrality declarations, it is meaningful to include her in the present sample as a case possibly revealing some extremes or limits of neutrality".⁵⁹ In 1983 he both included and excluded Ireland. In the first case it was with the caveat that on at least one issue Ireland could be

disregarded "as a special case",⁶⁰ whilst in the second, the exclusion of Ireland (and Malta and Cyprus) was supported on the grounds that their inclusion "would make the discussion too unfocused".⁶¹

More typical of the literature are 'The European Neutrals and the Atlantic Community',⁶² which contains no reference to Ireland, and 'The European Community and the neutrals' which rules out Ireland from consideration without mentioning it by the simple assertion that "neutrality, whatever it is based on, precludes membership",⁶³ again focusing solely upon Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, with some reference to Finland. In another symposium, this time on Small states in International Relations three contributions in the published work list the European neutrals in one way or another without including Ireland, despite the presence of Lemass, who does not seem to have commented upon this omission.⁶⁴ Again, in 1973 the University Association for Contemporary European Studies managed to hold a conference on the European neutrals and the Community without a paper on Ireland.⁶⁵ Miriam Camps too has had problems in this regard, when writing of the period of Britain's first negotiation, since she refers to "the three neutrals" (Austria, Sweden and Switzerland) noting that "association with the neutrals raised problems of a different order".⁶⁶ Even the Commission fell into this trap at that time, reporting to the European Parliament in 1963 that whilst with "Norway and Ireland ... contacts had been made and the importance of certain special problems had been assessed. As regards the three neutral countries, the negotiations had not advanced beyond an initial statement".⁶⁷

Works on neutrality in general tend to illustrate these same features either ignoring Ireland or mentioning it only in passing.

One notable exception is Peter Lyon who describes Ireland as an "erstwhile isolationist" between 1935-6 and entry into the U.N. in 1955, and then cites Ireland as a "dramatic example of how membership of the U.N. can lead to a radical alteration in the policies of an erstwhile isolationist", whilst the E.E.C. application of August 1961 is seen as having "implied a willingness to abandon her nonalignment".⁶⁸ Other works, however, do live up to the tendency previously cited. Leo Mates, in his otherwise excellent study of nonalignment from a European, and particularly Yugoslav, perspective only refers to Ireland in the course of remarks about Churchill and India, but otherwise fails to mention it despite several references to Sweden and Switzerland as examples of one or another aspect of Western non-aligned attitudes.⁶⁹ Adam Roberts refers only to "continental European neutrals", despite the fact that Ireland has a longer history of a variant of "territorial defence" than those countries he does examine, i.e. particularly Sweden and Yugoslavia, and that Ireland is hardly less "European" than either.⁷⁰ Roderick Ogley's study of The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century includes only passing reference to Ireland with no postwar reference at all.⁷¹ This contrasts markedly with chapters devoted to Belgium, the United States, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria, in addition to the Belgrade Conference documents etc. Only Finland is similarly treated to Ireland. The classical studies by Burton, Martin and London all suffer from similar problems.⁷² In addition the classic treatise on international law, admittedly somewhat dated on this topic, contains only two very slight references to Ireland.⁷³

In another, but relevant context, namely the literature on the 'external relations' and 'foreign policy' of the European Community,

it is again both remarkable and significant, how many of the classical works do not make any acknowledgement of the position of Ireland and the problems that does or may pose for the Community in the evolution of its policies and identity towards the rest of the world. For example, European Political Co-operation makes no reference to Irish neutrality and/or nonalignment in the main text, although in noting one reason for the allegedly pro-Arab stance of Ireland, reference is made to the historical liberation parallel.⁷⁴ In a postscript David Allen notes that "EPC has quietly considered security matters without any noticeable embarrassment of the Irish", yet no reason is given as to why it might cause them embarrassment.⁷⁵ In this major work on political co-operation, the special position of Ireland is not adequately taken cognizance of. The same is true of 'Political Co-operation : Procedure as Substitute for Policy' in the first edition of Policy-Making in the European Communities published in 1977.⁷⁶ In the second edition published in 1983, the parallel chapter 'Political Co-operation : Integration Through Intergovernmentalism', demonstrates slightly more awareness particularly in the discussion of the Genschere-Colombo suggestion that the Ten should discuss the military aspects of security. Nonetheless, no real analysis of the Irish position is made.⁷⁷ The Keatinge contributions to the volumes edited by Hill, and Allen and Pijpers have somewhat remedied the situation, but generally acknowledgement and analysis of the Irish position has remained sparse.⁷⁸

This has long been the case. For example, writing in 1967 Werner Feld focused upon economic issues in discussing Ireland but not upon defence and security, even when discussing Community relations with Communist countries.⁷⁹ Similarly in his 1976 work no specific mention is made of any special Irish problem arising from neutrality,

even when 'strategic problems' are considered.⁸⁰ Contributions by Holston on security and Garnett on defence in EEC Policy towards Eastern Europe also contain no acknowledgement of the Irish position,⁸¹ and neither does The Defence of Western Europe by Garnett.⁸² Well might Bailey note over a decade ago, that "very little has been heard ... of how the addition of Britain, Ireland and Denmark ... affected the Community". Bailey, himself, however, does not discuss the most important potential effect of Irish entry.⁸³ Neither does the Geusau volume.⁸⁴ Morgan does acknowledge Irish nonalignment and non-participation in NATO, but focuses upon the problems generated by the French position, and the distinctive legacies of the major powers, rather than upon the country with perhaps the most distinctive legacy of all.⁸⁵ In other words, there is token factual recognition of Irish non-membership of NATO but this is not allowed to intrude upon other arguments, for example, in the discussion of whether the Community might be a 'superpower' or a 'civilian power'.

Galtung, in addressing that question, makes a factual reference to the Irish position but at the same time asserts that the Community could not "be said to be politically neutral". Indeed, inter-member association might so develop "that any political virginity becomes purely technical".⁸⁶ Given that "in and by herself" Eire is not "sufficient to upset the relationship", Ireland's position is not allowed to interfere with his central theme.⁸⁷ Galtung's protagonist in the debate over the future of the Community, Francois Duchene noted Scandinavian objections to colonialism, but not the Irish.⁸⁸ Even more strikingly, in discussing proposals for a 'Neutral Community' there is no reference to Ireland even when discussing to whom the idea might appeal! Moreover, "with the sole exception of France under de Gaulle" apparently all of the nations of Western Europe have

been pursuing "collective action".⁸⁹ Furthermore, it is very striking that despite his idea of 'civilian power', an idea many in Ireland believe Irish neutrality helps to bring nearer reality, Duchene makes no reference to Ireland as a possible model, guide or initiator of such a policy.

The same story is repeated in the Twitchett volume (1976) in the contributions of Twitchett, Morgan and Pinder. Despite a token reference to Irish non-participation in NATO, focus is again placed predominantly on difficulties caused by France, and the Irish case is not allowed to interfere with the general argument. Morgan, for example, focuses upon London, Paris and Bonn when looking at defence frictions.⁹⁰ Pinder in examining why the Community has avoided the defence issue, refers to the EDC debacle and French opposition, and later on, to Danish opposition to "any Community intervention in political affairs", but not to the neutral and/or nonaligned member which joined with Denmark.⁹¹ Similarly, Edwards and Wallace fail to comment upon Ireland as a model for the future of the Community, even in the Swedish connection.⁹²

Only a few are properly aware of the Irish dimension. Burrows and Irwin, for example, probably have the emphasis exactly right in suggesting that it is "probably permissible to think of Ireland taking part in the rather generalised consultations on defence policy which we have envisaged as the initial extension of the Davignon type of structure into this field. It is much more difficult to envisage Irish participation on concrete and practical measures of defence co-operation between countries who, except for Ireland, are members of the Atlantic Alliance".⁹³ Similarly, Burrows in The Defence of Western Europe demonstrates an awareness of the potential difficulties and of the Irish dimension, although he envisages

developments which would not be entirely congenial to that country.⁹⁴ The same is true of European Defence Co-operation by Trevor Taylor. Taylor acknowledges the Irish position, noting that "a real obstacle to the EPC's moving into defence questions is the attitude of Ireland, which presents itself, not entirely convincingly, as a neutral state" but he is also aware that the major powers might press ahead, rather than let 3.5 million people determine their future.⁹⁵ Paul Taylor also demonstrates some awareness of the situation, quoting a member of the Irish Permanent Representation in Brussels who drew the usual Irish distinction between defence and security. Taylor goes on to say "The distinction may appear to be one of semantics, but it is, for the Irish, an important one", and notes that in the Community there are "different national perceptions as to the question of collective security (for example, Ireland advocates neutrality)".⁹⁶

Conclusion

Ireland has been poorly served in the general literature on neutrality, nonalignment and the European 'neutrals'. It has been equally poorly served by Irish authors on the question of defence, security and neutrality. These deficiencies go some way to explaining the paucity of public debate in Ireland on these issues, and the rather loose usage of these terms by the Irish themselves. The next chapter, therefore, will attempt to clarify the meaning of these concepts, identifying their essence.

Chapter Two : Footnotes

1. See page 1.
2. Maria Maguire, A Bibliography of Published Works on Irish Foreign Relations 1921-1978, (Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 1981) p.vii.
3. ibid pp.2-3.
4. Patrick Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1973).
A Place Among Nations, op.cit.
Patrick Keatinge, 'The Foreign Policy of the Irish Coalition Government', World Today Vol.29 No. 8 (August 1973).
Sean Lemass, 'Small States in International Organisations', in Schou and Brundtland (eds.) Small States in International Relations, (Uppsala, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971).
C.C. O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs', in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), Conor Cruise O'Brien Introduces Ireland, (London, Deutsch, 1969).
5. Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, op.cit. pp.24-6, 58 and 229.
6. ibid pp.34-5, 45, 67 and 295 ff.
7. The Sub-title of A Place Among Nations, op.cit.
8. ibid p.4.
9. ibid pp.94-7, 168-9.
10. Patrick Keatinge, 'Odd Man Out? Irish Neutrality and European Security', International Affairs Vol.48 No.3 (July 1972).
11. World Today, op.cit.
12. In Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), op.cit. pp. 106-134.
13. ibid p.133.
14. In Schou and Brundtland, op.cit. p.118.
15. See, for example, N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of External Policy 1931-9 (London, Oxford University Press, 1952).
N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Post-war Change 1939-1952 (London, Oxford University Press, 1958).
D.W. Harkness, The Restless Dominion, The Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-31 (London, Macmillan, 1969).
16. See, for example, G. Fitzgerald, 'The Political Implications of the European Community' Studies, Vol.51 (1962).
The Irish Council of the European Movement, Understanding the EEC: 8: Defence and Neutrality, (Dublin 1971).
Two Swiss contributions, in German, one of which deals explicitly with Ireland (in 4 pages) and the other with the neutrals in general:
H. Mayrzedt, 'Ist Irlandes Beitritt zur EWG ein Vorbild fuer die anderen europaischen Neutralen?' (Is Ireland's entry into the EEC an example for other European neutrals?). Aussenwirtschaft (St. Gallen) 27 (March 1972) pp.66-70.
and H. Mayrzedt and H.C. Binswanger, Die Neutralen in der europaischen Integration: Kontroversen - Konfrontationen - Alternativen (The neutrals in European integration; controversies - confrontations - alternatives) (Wien, Stuttgart : W. Braumuller, (1970)).

- /16. Daltun O'Ceallaigh, Political and Military Implications of Ireland's EEC Membership, (Dublin 1975) written from the viewpoint of the Irish Sovereignty Movement, and only 8 pp.
and Mary Robinson's unpublished LL.D. Dissertation, Constitutional, Legal and Administrative Adaptations in Ireland to Membership of the EEC, (Dublin, Trinity College, 1976).
17. See, for example, T.D. Williams, 'Ireland in the War'.
G.A. Hayes-McCoy, 'Irish Defence Policy, 1938-51'.
N. Mansergh, 'Irish Foreign Policy, 1938-51' in K.B. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams, Ireland in the War Years and After, 1939-51, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1969).
J.A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1975).
N. Mansergh, 'Ireland: External Relations 1926-1939', in MacManus, The Years of the Great Test 1926-1932, (Cork, Mercier Press, 1967).
T.D. Williams, 'Irish Foreign Policy 1949-69' in J.J. Lee, Ireland 1945-70 (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1979).
and, of course, the superb, F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, (London, Fontana, 1973).
18. Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years, (Newton Abbot, David and Charles, 1975). See also:
Bernard Share, The Emergency, Neutral Ireland 1939-45, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1978).
Mairin Mitchell, The Atlantic Battle and the Future of Ireland, (London, Muller, 1941).
An interesting wartime exposition of the Irish position and the reasons for it, is to be found in Henry Harrison, The Neutrality of Ireland : Why it was Inevitable (London, Hale, 1942).
19. Liam Cosgrave, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Helsinki, 30 July-1 August 1975. Address by An Taoiseach, Mr. Liam Cosgrave, TD, and Final Act (Dublin, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1975) and the famous, Ireland, Department of External Affairs, Texts Concerning Ireland's Position in Relation to the North Atlantic Treaty (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1950, P.No. 9934 presented to both Houses of the Oireachtas by the Minister for External Affairs on 26 April 1950).
20. Lt. Col. P.D. Kavanagh, The Irish Army Handbook (Dublin, Department of Defence, 1968).
The Irish Army Handbook 1973 (Department of Defence) updated it.
A similar handbook was also published in 1941.
21. 'Ireland's Vital Problems (Defence)', Round Table, 115 (June 1939).
'Ireland and the Atlantic Pact: International Isolation of the New Republic', Round Table, 155 (June 1949).
'Ireland: the Republic and Western Defence', Round Table, 161 (December 1950). N.A.T. (North Atlantic Treaty).
22. Brian Inglis, 'Should Ireland Join NATO', NATO Letter, 8:10 (1960).
L. Sedin, 'Irlaniya i NATO: Igra na Krayu Propasti' (Ireland and NATO: a game on the edge of a precipice), Novoe Vremya (Moscow, 1962) 14.
23. H.M. Shebab, Irish Defence Policy, 1922-1950, (Unpublished M.Litt. Dissertation, Trinity College, Dublin, 1976).
24. Such as those cited in footnote 17 above.
25. T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the U.S.A. 1939-47, (Dublin, Macmillan, 1977).

26. Carolle J. Carter, 'Ireland: America's Neutral Ally', Eire: Ireland, 12.2 (1977).
27. E. Cammaerts, 'Neutrality and its Critics', Contemporary Review, 157 (March 1940).
28. V. Beradis, Neutralita e Indipendenza dell Eire (Neutrality and Independence of Ireland) (Rome: Istituto Grafico Tiberino, 1950).
29. See footnote 10.
30. H. Mayrzedt, op.cit., H. Mayrzedt and H.C. Binswanger, op.cit., U. Gasierok, Europejskie Panstwa Neutralne a EWG (Analysis of legal and political aspects of association or other special relations of European neutral countries with the EEC) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Szkola Glowna Planowania: Statystyki, Warsaw c. 1971).
Irish Council of the European Movement, op.cit.
31. Ireland, Oireachtas Eireann, Neutrality (War Damage to Property) Act 1941, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1941).
32. See, for example, the mammoth work by F. Deak and P. Jessup, A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties of Various Countries, (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1939). The only post-1922 Irish Free State legislation mentioned in this work are:
League of Nations (Obligations of Membership) Act 1935 and
League of Nations (Obligations of Membership) Order 1935
both passed with reference to sanctions against Italy.
Only two other references:
Treaty Regarding Principles and Policies to be followed in matters concerning China - Washington February 1922 (pre-independence), and
Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, London, April 1930.
There was also, of course, the impact of, and legacy of, pre-independence legislation and treaties on these matters.
33. Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance : Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984).
34. ibid p.3. The reasons for this adequacy are explained in the chapter following.
35. Norman MacQueen, Irish Neutrality: the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Experience, 1945-1969, (Unpublished D.Phil. Dissertation, New University of Ulster, 1981).
36. ibid, Chapter 6, passim.
37. Only the works of Peter Lyon, Neutrality, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963).
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G. Stourzh, 'Some Reflections on Permanent Neutrality' in Schou and Brundtland, op.cit., are cited in this regard.
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39. John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1985).
40. John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question, 1917-1973, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982).
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Deirdre McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists : Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s, (New Haven, Ct., Yale University Press, 1984).
41. Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and Statements by Eamon De Valera 1917-73, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980).
42. William Fitzgerald, Irish Unification and NATO, (Dublin, Dublin University Press, 1982).
43. Patrick Comerford, Do You Want to Die for NATO?, (Cork, Mercier Press, 1984).
44. Bill McSweeney (ed.), Ireland and the Threat of Nuclear War, (Dublin, Dominican Publications, 1985). McSweeney acknowledges his peace-studies orientation, and acknowledges that his work "starts from certain moral assumptions which function to direct the progress of work and the selection of relevant evidence" (p.3). This orientation pervades his specifically Irish contributions - Chapter One (pp.3-20), Chapter Eight (pp.118-140) and Chapter Eleven (pp.179-203).
On the Community and EPC are Chapter Nine (pp.141-162) by Desmond Dinan and Chapter Ten (pp.163-178) by Patrick Keatinge.
45. Anthony Coughlan, The EEC : Ireland and the Making of a Super Power, (Dublin, Irish Sovereignty Movement, 1979).
46. David Coombes (ed.), Ireland and the European Communities : Ten Years of Membership, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1983).
47. P.J. Drury and Dermot McAleese, Irish Studies 3 : Ireland and the European Community, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983).
48. See David Coombes 'Ireland's Membership of the European Community, Strange Paradox or Mere Expediency?' and Brigid Laffan 'The Consequences for Irish Foreign Policy' in Coombes op.cit. pp.16-21 and 89-109 and;
Patrick Keatinge, 'The Europeanisation of Irish Foreign Policy' in Drury and McAleese op.cit. pp.33-56.
49. Miriam Hederman, The Road to Europe : Irish Attitudes 1948-61, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1983).
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Chapter Three : Neutrality and Nonalignment

Although most writers are agreed that "1648 marks the beginning of neutrality as a formally recognized principle",¹ there had always been states which sought to take no part in the quarrels of others, with relations between belligerents and non-belligerents being "governed by variable customs and rudimentary rules".² It was, however, after 1648 with the embryonic emergence and recognition of both sovereign states and international law, "that neutrality as a legal concept was born".³ At that time the concept appeared to mean merely not participating fully in wars. As sovereignty became more firmly entrenched, and with it the apparent absolute and unconditional right of war, the no less logical consequence of "the equally absolute and unconditional right of neutrality" also became established. As Politis points out "sovereignty, wars and neutrality have been closely allied ideas".⁴ The emphasis upon sovereignty coupled with the development of international economic relations, however, had to contend with on the one hand the belligerents' desire to cut off all trade with their opponent, and on the other the neutrals desire to maintain their own trade with belligerents. As a consequence it was "natural for governments to seek precision in written undertakings, and it was in this way that the law of neutrality was formed and became explicit".⁵

Despite this evolution, there remained no general international agreement codifying neutral rights and duties, and as war became more absolute with the Napoleonic struggles, with war including increasingly economic warfare and blockade, so neutrality came under strain. Yet ironically, it was at this same time that the real foundations were laid for "that strange and important political creation of the nineteenth century, impartial and passive neutrality or

neutrality built on law".⁶

All writers stress the seminal importance of the United States attitude during the period 1793-1818.⁷ Of particular significance was the 'Proclamation of Neutrality' in April 1793 which stressed for the first time impartiality as one of the principal duties of a neutral power.⁸ Another key principle was that belligerents were not to be allowed to engage in hostilities within neutral territory and Ørvik correctly asserts that "Respect for neutral territory has ever since been the corner-stone of all neutral policy, since it involves the related question of sovereignty".⁹ The Americans also emphasised abstention.

Before long many European countries, especially the weak who desired to stay out of war, followed the United States model, and an increasingly strict view was taken of the requirements of neutrality. "Wanting to be left alone, they adopted the principles of impartiality and non-participation, ... From that time on, Europe spoke of traditional neutrals."¹⁰ This process was aided by the return to limited wars and a readiness on the part of the major powers to see war regulated, codified and thereby to some extent limited. Peter Lyon has described the nineteenth century as "like a golden age for the theory and practice of neutrality" and has argued that this reflected "the coincidence of a multiple balance of power, a general respect for international law and the absence of any widespread and prolonged international conflict. This period found its apogee in the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907."¹¹

As Ørvik argues "For the first time, the whole system of neutral rights and duties, on sea and on land, was defined and officially incorporated in international law to its fullest extent. What had for centuries been the always shifting usages and interpretations of

the 'law of nations' were now put into an international code which had the official approval of all nations."¹² The codification, however, was not complete, and it largely involved codifying existing customary law.¹³ Moreover, given insufficient international ratification, the Convention did not become an international obligation in a strictly legal sense. Nonetheless, the system was approved, if not ratified, by all. Refinements were added subsequently by the Declaration of London in 1909, which again although not ratified, served as a model for neutral conduct.¹⁴ But it was the Fifth and Thirteenth Conventions of 1907 which were of most significance, although some of the other Conventions were indirectly of great importance.¹⁵ The Fifth Convention concerned "Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land" and the Thirteenth "the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War".¹⁶ Of general significance in the Conventions were the following:

- (a) that the signatories wished to lay "down more clearly the rights and duties of neutral Powers in case of war on land" and were "desirous of defining the meaning of the term 'neutral'";¹⁷
- (b) "The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable";¹⁸
- (c) "The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality can not be regarded as a hostile act";¹⁹
and
- (d) "Seeing that it is, for neutral Powers, an admitted duty to apply these rules impartially to the several belligerents."²⁰

What has emerged as the essence of neutrality was abstention, the inviolability of neutral territory, and impartiality. Each of these aspects had associated with it a number of rights and duties.²¹ Since 1907 there has been virtual unanimity among writers on international law as to the essence of neutrality in this classical sense.

Neutrality : its core, characteristics, requirements and definition

Several definitions of neutrality equate it simply with non-participation in or abstention from war(s). For example, Ogley suggests "The idea of neutrality is simple enough. It means, obviously, not taking part in others' quarrels: that is, for states, keeping out of other states' wars".²² Peter Lyon comes to a similar conclusion, in that after arguing that today "the law on the rights and duties of neutrals is neither undisputed nor unchanging" he goes on to suggest that "given a hot war, every state which stays out of it is 'eo ipso' neutral".²³ Other authorities have sought to impart more content to the concept of neutrality by making inherent within it, not just non-participation, but also the concept of rights and duties, especially the obligation of impartiality, and that neutrality is a legal status. Jessup in his authoritative definition, for example sees neutrality as "a legal status arising from the abstention of a state from all participation in a war between other states, and the recognition by the latter of its abstention and impartiality".²⁴ Ørvik argues that a "status of neutrality is dependent upon strict impartiality and absolute non-participation and passivity".²⁵ Perhaps the most authoritative definition, found in Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, takes a similar view, seeing neutrality "as the attitude of impartiality adopted by third states towards belligerents and recognized by belligerents, such attitude creating rights and duties between the impartial States and the belligerents Since neutrality is an attitude during a state of war only, it calls into existence special rights and duties which do not generally obtain.... they expire ipso facto with the termination of the war, or with the outbreak of war between neutrals and a belligerent".²⁶

Rather than these elements being integral to neutrality, Tucker-

Kelsen prefers to draw a distinction between neutrality "as the status of non-participation in war" and "the specific consequences that are attached to the status of non-participation according to the traditional law". It is accepted that the legal significance of non-participation is the bringing "into operation rules for the regulation of neutral-belligerent relations", that these rules impose duties and confer rights upon both belligerents and neutrals and indeed that "the law of neutrality comprises the totality of the duties imposed and the rights conferred upon participants and non-participants." Nonetheless, Tucker-Kelsen is emphatic that whilst "Not infrequently these rules - the consequence of non-participation - have been identified with neutrality and particularly with the neutral's duty of impartiality. This identification of neutrality with the duties imposed by international law upon non-participants is nevertheless incorrect. Instead, neutrality should be considered simply as the status of states which refrain from participation in hostilities; the only essential condition for neutral states being that of non-participation in hostilities".²⁷

The distinction between non-participation and the consequential rights and duties, especially impartiality, does pose fundamental problems, not least because of the emergence of the notion of "non-belligerency". It can be argued that the term neutrality "should be abandoned, where the object is not impartiality, but keeping the country out of war". According to Wright the mere object or indeed fact, of staying out of war at any price is not sufficient to enable a state to use the term neutrality.²⁸ Supporting this argument Nils Ørvik draws particular attention to the neutrality of the late 1930s which he argues "boiled down to one single object, namely, to stay out of the war that was to come. Not conditionally, by insistence on

rights and duties, but almost at any cost and by all means.... Unbound by rules and obligations, they prepared to steer their course, through discrimination and compromise, in order to stay out of war. It was no longer neutrality, it was non-belligerency".²⁹ Tucker-Kelsen itself notes that "the pursuit of discriminatory policies" coupled with "the abandonment of the impartiality required by the traditional law" led to the emergence of so-called 'non-belligerency'. Non-belligerency being regarded as indicating "the position of states that refrained from active participation in hostilities while at the same time abandoning the duties imposed upon non-participants it involved the abandonment by non-participants of the impartiality required by customary law".³⁰ In fact, all these non-belligerent states were seeking to assert and establish that "there could be an intermediate position between impartial neutrality and belligerency."³¹ In practice the relationship between belligerents and non-belligerents was governed by political and military factors so that the degree of partiality shown varied considerably, and was not governed by legal formulas.

Given these problems a more satisfactory approach is that of Lauterpacht-Oppenheim with its equation of neutrality with "an attitude of impartiality". Indeed so strong is that identification that it is argued that "the rights and duties arising from neutrality come into existence, and remain in existence, through the mere fact of a state taking up an attitude of impartiality, and not being drawn into the war by the belligerents".³² Neutrality has to be seen as involving both non-participation in military conflict and the rules regulating this non-participation.³³ The two must be taken together. Building upon Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, "neutrality - supposes a state of war in the formal or factual sense of the word. It describes the

situation of a state which remains outside armed conflicts involving other states. When a state decides to adopt this attitude, its decision takes the form of a conditional act which involves the application, for a time, of rules pre-determined and pre-arranged in international law. These rules involve a balance of rights and obligations and make up what is called the law of neutrality".³⁴ This attitude must also be recognized and accepted by the belligerents.

A further difficulty with the simple non-participation criterion is what might be termed the 'far-off-country' phenomenon. Can a state thousands of miles away aptly be termed neutral in a local or regional conflict simply upon the basis of its non-participation? Involving rights and duties in neutrality does at least imply a consciousness on the part of the state concerned, rather than neutrality by nothingness.³⁵ This way of looking at neutrality leads to an appreciation that a state is neutral towards specific wars involving specific belligerents and that, therefore, a distinction is to be made since that state could be neutral towards one war and one set of belligerents, but not necessarily so regarding another war with a different set of belligerents.

Given common misconceptions, certain aspects of neutrality need brief attention. For example, neutrality is not a unilateral action. It requires to be recognized by the belligerents. As Lauterpacht-Oppenheim suggests "A belligerent who, at the outbreak of war, refuses to recognize a third state as a neutral, does not indeed violate neutrality, because neutrality does not come into existence in fact and in law until both belligerents have, expressly or by implication, acquiesced in the attitude of impartiality taken up by third States".³⁶

Secondly, the "Rights and duties derived from neutrality do not exist before the outbreak of war, however imminent it may be".³⁷ Thus

legally there cannot be any such thing as 'peacetime neutrality'. It is a contradiction in terms.

Thirdly, given impartiality, there is no duty to break off all intercourse or economic exchange with the belligerents.³⁸ Indeed it can be argued that the very raison d'être of the "rules of neutrality is to ensure the maintenance of the normal economic relations of neutral States".³⁹ Impartiality necessitates that trade cannot be totally free, but rather that exchange takes place as before.

Fourthly, "International law does not recognize ideological, political or economic neutrality".⁴⁰ In international law there is no question of 'military neutrality' which in some way might be regarded as distinct from other forms of neutrality. Whilst in the past 'qualified neutrality' was occasionally allowable, the majority of modern writers have maintained "that a State was either neutral or not, and that it violated its neutrality if it rendered any assistance whatever to a belligerent from any motive whatever".⁴¹

Fifthly, legally speaking "A special assertion of intention to remain neutral is not ... legally necessary on the part of neutral states, although they often expressly and formally proclaim their neutrality".⁴² It is clearly in the self-interest of the states concerned that a special declaration of neutrality be issued, given the need for that neutrality to be recognized by others.⁴³

Sixthly, as has been argued above, certain correlative rights and duties are inherent in the concept of neutrality, and non-participation is not enough. Neutrality can only be carried out if both neutrals and belligerents follow a certain agreed code of conduct in their relations with one another.⁴⁴

In essence both the rights and duties of neutrals can be simply expressed in two sets of ideas. As to rights, these are the

inviolability of their territory and freedom in the commercial relations between them and with each of the belligerents,⁴⁵ whereas the "duties incumbent upon neutral states in time of war can be expressed with the two words: abstention and impartiality".⁴⁶ Certainly, the duty of impartiality is universally regarded as essential. In addition to that duty, Tucker-Kelsen identify others: "the duty to abstain from furnishing belligerents any material assistance, whether goods or services, for the prosecution of war; the duty to prevent the commission of hostile acts within neutral jurisdiction as well as to prevent the use of neutral jurisdiction as a base for belligerent operations; and ... the duty to acquiesce in certain repressive measures taken by belligerents against private neutral commerce on the high seas". Under these four general duties, which also establish correlative rights for belligerents, "may be grouped almost all the specific obligations regulating the conduct of neutral states".⁴⁷

Finally, and also incidentally another reason why neutrality cannot be simply equated with non-participation, neutrality requires "active measures from neutral States". Neutrals must prevent, even by means of physical resistance and fighting, belligerents from making use of their territory or their resources for military purposes during the war. Similarly, they must seek to prevent any interference by one belligerent with their legitimate intercourse with the other belligerent in commerce etc.⁴⁸ Whilst not obliged to prevent such acts under all circumstances and conditions, to escape neglect of duty if they are nevertheless performed, "due diligence" must have been exercised "for the purpose of preventing such acts".⁴⁹ What is clear is that a simple pious declaration of neutrality is not enough. The neutral state must exhibit a willingness to uphold that condition. For example, neutral states have not only the right to prevent misuse

of their waters "but also a duty to take adequate measures of prevention". A neutral may, therefore, need to convince belligerents that it will seek to stop encroachments, and has some reasonable prospect of so doing. Even if militarily weak, some effort is necessary, as the neutral is "obliged to use the means at its disposal."⁵⁰

This then is the classical, legal understanding of neutrality. But neutrality, of course, has a "general diplomatic or political connotation" as well, which has caused tremendous confusion as to the real meaning of the term.⁵¹ It must be emphasised, however, that the real essence of neutrality remains that as outlined above.

Neutrality : 20th Century Challenges

(a) Legal Problems

The legalistic view of war and thus of neutrality has always faced challenges. Historically one significant query has been the 'just war' doctrine, with the concomitant implication that abstention in such a war was either illegal or immoral, or both. A modern-day variant of it has arisen from changes in the legal position of war. Of particular significance have been the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) and the Charter of the United Nations, which have led to a questioning as to "whether it is correct to assume the continued validity of the law that has traditionally served to regulate the conduct of war".⁵²

The Covenant did not at first sight give a clear-cut answer, there being particular debate about articles 10, 15 and 16. In practice neutrality had not been abolished, and the League Covenant did not abolish war under all circumstances.⁵³ The collective security system established was almost completely decentralised since "The decisive question whether a member had resorted to war in disregard of

the Covenant was to be answered by each of the members for itself".⁵⁴ Moreover, the League was not universal. In addition Switzerland was accepted for membership whilst at the same time insisting upon maintaining its position of permanent neutrality,⁵⁵ and finally, there was the constant stream of statements from governments qualifying their commitment, their understanding of their obligations and the Covenant itself.⁵⁶

Whilst clearly not abolishing neutrality, the Covenant and the League did modify some of its classic tenets, particularly impartiality. Measures such as economic sanctions "would normally constitute an abandonment of absolute impartiality", and thereby represent a violation of neutrality. Yet, ingeniously, the concept was arguably saved since "the Covenant-breaking belligerent was deemed, by signing the Covenant, to have consented in advance to measures of discrimination being applied against him by those Members of the League who did not elect to declare war upon him."⁵⁷

Under the Kellogg-Briand Pact it remained lawful to be neutral since a degree of discrimination against an aggressor appears to have been acceptable, without violation of the duties imposed upon neutrals by the traditional law of neutrality. Certainly, the Pact was not as radical an attack upon neutrality as is sometimes suggested.⁵⁸ Apparently much more genuinely radical were the innovations introduced by the UN Charter.

At the San Francisco Conference which drew up the Charter it was clearly thought that a status of permanent neutrality was incompatible with membership in the new organization. The issue was raised directly by the French who wished this to be stated explicitly in the Charter.⁵⁹ This was not done and the terminology "peace-loving" was retained, but it was agreed that any applicant for membership would have to be ready

and able to accept and fulfill the obligations of the Charter. For the Swiss these provisions were enough to deter it from applying, especially since there was to be no special treatment for them as had happened vis-à-vis the League. Other 'neutrals' also had doubts with prominent Swedes, for example, believing that membership involved writing off the traditional policy of neutrality. Although prepared to do this in support of "international solidarity", they also anticipated that the likely absence of great power unanimity meant that certain obligations were not likely to be imposed upon them. Sweden joined the United Nations in 1946.⁶⁰

Austria was admitted to membership in 1955. This was despite its announced intention to pursue permanent neutrality and its request to all states to recognise its position and status. Most did, including it should be noted the permanent members of the Security Council. Austria was apparently to be allowed to refrain from involvement in war, and to uphold the traditional law requirements.⁶¹ This did not lead to a change in the Swiss position.

Perhaps the main innovation of the Charter was the greatly enhanced centralization with respect to the legitimate use of force and the bringing into operation of the new international security system. Under the Charter the Security Council has the authority to determine, with an affect binding upon all the member-states, whether there has been aggression, who is responsible, and what action shall be taken to remedy the situation. It can make obligatory even the collective use of force.⁶²

Articles 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47 which relate to the obligation "to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for

the purpose of maintaining international peace and security" and the establishment of a Military Staff Committee also theoretically pose problems for neutrals.⁶³ Some have argued that there is no obligation to conclude any such agreement and that the absence of an agreement negates any Security Council competence to obligate member states to undertake military action.⁶⁴ This interpretation, however, so undermines the letter and spirit of Chapter VII as to appear perverse.

The notion of neutrality can, however, to some extent be saved within the Charter. For example, the Charter "contains no direct obligation to outlaw 'aggressors' or to take sanctions against them",⁶⁵ nor does it lay down "that the determination of a State as an aggressor shall automatically be followed by a general war against it".⁶⁶ Moreover, one must not lose sight of the fact that action requires unanimity on the part of the permanent members of the Security Council, and that has been lacking. It should perhaps also be noted that if in the event of Security Council inaction, the General Assembly decides to seek to take action, it can only make a recommendation, not a mandatory decision.⁶⁷

In summary, the position is confused. Under certain circumstances neutrality has been abolished by the Security Council's powers to call upon members to declare war or take warlike actions. But there are other cases where the situation is not so clear-cut and the survival of neutrality may depend upon whether a member-state's general obligation under article 2 (5) undermines impartiality.⁶⁸ Certainly, neutrality as classically understood, has been circumscribed by the Charter, although the actual practice and experience of the UN has meant those constraints have not been as wounding as was perhaps imagined in 1945.

In addition to these specific legal problems for neutrality,

there is a more general and profound challenge to the continuing vitality of the concept. So far the discussion has presumed the existence of an international community "where all the members could agree to abide by certain rules of conduct recognized by them as binding in peace and in war", whereas what has occurred has been the break-up of the international law community and a growing reluctance to accept predominantly Western legal concepts and philosophy.⁶⁹ A significant example is that Communists have a view of neutrality, which is not in accordance with traditional Western thinking.⁷⁰ This is of great relevance to states contemplating neutrality in any future war involving Western and Communist states. What one demands of a 'neutral' may well not be regarded as neutrality by the other side. The Struye Report puts this issue very pertinently in relation to the issue of whether neutrality is compatible with participation in the EEC - "the communist theory must reply 'No', as such participation does not serve the Communist cause!"⁷¹ Yet these states need to acquiesce in the neutrality of small Western or Northern European states in a European war or a global war involving European states, since neutrality does not come into existence until recognized by both belligerents.

(b) Political Difficulties

A number of conditions underlay the classical period of neutrality, including the nature of war and the international system. Wars were limited in scope, method and objective, and whilst war remained an instrument of policy, it was becoming regulated and codified. Furthermore, there was a growing acceptance of international law, and the need to regulate trade, even during periods of conflict. Despite the challenges produced by trade and technological innovation, faith in sovereignty remained.

A number of developments since 1907 undermined several of these conditions. In particular, the industrial revolution with the concomitant mass-production of weapons of ever greater destructive power, coupled with growing economic interdependence, the evolution of democracy and the growing assertiveness of nationalism, led to changes in the attitude to and the nature of war, making total victory more appealing and restraint more difficult.⁷² These developments, moreover, placed strain upon a vital ingredient which allowed states to be neutral, namely that a state should be "absolutely sovereign and absolutely independent of other states in all matters",⁷³ since the status of neutrality is "inseparably connected with and dependent upon the amount of sovereignty which a country enjoys".⁷⁴ To be neutral a state requires a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency, and at least sufficient military strength to deter violations of its territory and rights. Ørvik has argued, however, that "In the realistic, interrelated world of today, a true, impartial and legal neutrality is impossible", since neutral rights, duties and sovereignty are threatened.⁷⁵

Politis felt 1914-18 "dealt the death-blow to neutrality" because of the way great powers transgressed established rules relating to neutral rights, and their determination to involve "the entire forces of the belligerents", so that "the economic situation of each of them plays a decisive part in so far as the outcome of the conflict is concerned".⁷⁶ In other words, the "process of economic and political interdependence had gone too far",⁷⁷ so that the conditions prevailing in the two World Wars could hardly be reconciled "with the conditions that are plainly assumed by the traditional law".⁷⁸ In addition, since those wars the further geographical expansion of the international system, as has been seen, has contributed to the general undermining of the sense of comity of nations.

These trends clearly have had a profound effect upon the possibility of genuine neutrality, and in particular the interdependence literature of recent years has tended to give the impression that no country has total independence, and even that "dependence in one area tends to correlate highly with dependence in other areas... If a country is highly dependent economically upon another country, the likelihood is that it will also have a high perceptual, communication, military and political dependence as well".⁷⁹ Nonetheless, this trend towards determinism may be misleading, since states can break the links of interdependence, albeit at cost to themselves. States do not always choose to do that which is of economic advantage to their citizenry, and there may be other values which, on occasion, are placed higher in value than the economic.⁸⁰

The trend towards absolutism in war can also be overstated since it is self-evident that not all wars since 1945 have exhibited that character. Scores of conflicts have remained limited. Moreover, the economic weapons of sanctions, blockades and boycotts have not enjoyed total success.⁸¹

Whilst they have been challenged by a number of developments this century, it cannot be stated definitively that the necessary conditions for the existence of neutrality have been destroyed, although there should be no illusion as to the difficulties involved. Neutrality has, however, always been problematical in that it depended more upon power than upon law, and upon "the good pleasure of the belligerent(s)", who were always liable to disregard it whenever they perceived it to be in their interest to do so.⁸²

Neutrality relates as much, if not more, to factors such as location, strength and the balance of power as to aspiration and law. With Bjøl the crucial importance of "security geography" must be

recognized,⁸³ that for example, the "situation of each country on the operational map makes its neutrality improbable or probable in advance".⁸⁴ Neutrals may be attacked not because of their own intrinsic value, but rather because of their strategic position.

The relative strength of a neutral is also crucial. This is somewhat paradoxical in that many neutrals, particularly in Europe, have tended to possess only a limited capacity for military action. Nonetheless, as will be seen, some of the leading 'neutrals' in contemporary Europe do take their own defence seriously, in addition to relying upon the dictum "Marginal Resource Attack, Marginal Cost Deterrence".⁸⁵ In the battle between David and Goliath, Goliath may only have one arm free and will probably be looking elsewhere also. Neutrals do, however, need the ability to deter by making the cost of attack too high, relatively for the belligerent.

A further complication is what has been termed 'defence against help' or 'the protective umbrella'.⁸⁶ A neutral may need defence against potential allies as much as against potential adversaries. Neutrals need to be able to resist the idea of 'friendly' intervention, that one belligerent will protect them against another by direct action, and being placed by a major power under its protection whether the neutral requests it or not. A major power may let it be known that "it would consider penetration by another power as a hostile act and would respond militarily" to it.⁸⁷

In meeting these difficulties a neutral may be helped by the existence of a balance of power system. Indeed, Hagglof and Hopper both argue that a basic condition of neutrality is the existence of a balance of power.⁸⁸ Today, it has been argued that this condition is met since the independence of small European states "is protected not by their policy of neutrality but by the existence, thanks to

the defensive measures adopted by the Western committed nations, of a balance of power which compels the Soviet Union to respect the neutrals".⁸⁹ Clearly, however, this position may degenerate precisely into a protective umbrella.

These issues are relevant to the critical issue of credibility since "A neutral must ... convince each belligerent that, if left alone, it will not go over to the enemy, nor help the enemy in any unneutral way ... that it can and will stop encroachments and attack from the other".⁹⁰ Also relevant in this context are the predisposition and behaviour of the neutral state prior to the commencement of hostilities, and whether it has given any putative belligerent cause to believe that it will not remain neutral. Such cause may emanate from its ideological stance, its socio-economic and political system, or from the pattern of its trade which may appear to make abstention or impartiality difficult. The difficulties are compounded in that neutrality lies in the eye of the beholder.⁹¹

A neutral needs "to make clear the unequivocal and determined character of its foreign policy; and in Europe those states which have turned the legal status of neutrality into a great national dogma have in fact generally been the more successful neutrals - simply because their neutrality is widely understood and accepted".⁹² In some cases the "tendency to transform neutrality into an ideology" may be so pronounced as to raise it beyond the everyday level of political debate, and to lead to it being accepted internally as axiomatic.⁹³ Similarly, it may be transformed into an unquestioned tradition, whereby rather than there being any contemporary compelling rationale for the position, it is rather the case that "'We are neutral because we have always been neutral'".⁹⁴ Neutrality may "surreptitiously", or deliberately, be allowed to creep "to a much higher station in the

hierarchy of policy aims "than its logical status entitles it to. It is a means not an end."⁹⁵

A neutral may also seek to establish its position by a formal declaration of intent, and whilst not legally required, such a declaration is normal practice. Another method is by way of international treaty or guarantee, or by joint affirmation of neutrality by a group of countries, such as the agreement among Scandinavian countries in 1938.⁹⁶ States may also seek to have their status recognised by means of having it written into communiques after bilateral meetings with putative belligerents.⁹⁷

The problem remains, however, of credibility since "Formal arrangements did not solve the core problem of credibility. A declaration of traditional, legal neutrality would hardly be credible when a state's economic and perhaps also military capabilities depended upon continued massive exchange and cooperation with the states that would be involved in a major conflict ... the ties of organised interaction could not be undone overnight".⁹⁸

This, and other of the difficulties mentioned, have not been ameliorated by the high degree of flexibility shown by so-called neutral states in the twentieth century. Writing in the winter of 1944-45, Joesten asked "Which of the few surviving neutral countries can claim to have maintained the same status throughout the war? ... All of them have passed through various stages of affiliation with one or the other of the belligerents, ranging from unavowed collaboration to non-belligerent alliance, or even 'moral belligerency'".⁹⁹

A related issue is whether abstention and impartiality are to be regarded as "equivalent to complete disinterestedness", whatever the cause or character of the war?¹⁰⁰ Given a concern with self-

preservation, can any state be disinterested in the course and outcome of a war between third parties? The classical view has been that the ambience, and indeed definition, of neutrality "cannot be given without invoking the concept of the negative",¹⁰¹ and that "political passivity was the main characteristic" of neutrality.¹⁰² Indeed, Frei has argued that "it is legitimate in the Swiss case to interpret neutrality in terms of isolationism",¹⁰³ whilst Andren has noted the "traditional idea of Sweden's attitude to international events - long prevailing not least in Sweden itself - as one of not having any foreign policy at all".¹⁰⁴

Most neutrals, however, no longer wish to identify with passivity and disinterestedness, such an attitude being "definitely and absolutely obsolete".¹⁰⁵ Petitpierre has challenged the isolationist view of Swiss neutrality,¹⁰⁶ whilst Vukadinovic, amongst others, has done the same for Finland and Sweden arguing that on European soil "the conception of neutrality has essentially changed", since only an "active international policy can satisfy the interests of small countries".¹⁰⁷ One consequence has been their activity in mediation and UN peace-keeping. UN membership in itself, with the concomitant need to take a view and vote, has been a factor in this transformation, although it is salutary to recall the Soviet argument that "there are no neutral men".¹⁰⁸

Given the foregoing difficulties, Roberts argues that neutrality "should not ... be regarded as a totally fixed quantity" but rather as "a rudimentary framework" of foreign policy, within which changes of style and substance may occur.¹⁰⁹ Somewhat similarly, Ogley whilst suggesting neutrality is "far from being an anachronism" since it is "a condition that states are likely to find themselves in ...

with increasing frequency", goes on to argue that this "will not ... be a status governed very meticulously by the international law of neutrality", since the rules will be "improvised" and may be disregarded by the powerful. Nonetheless, he argues, there will persist "a reluctance of third parties to involve themselves in others' conflicts ...".¹¹⁰ This, however, is no longer neutrality, although it may be non-belligerency, there being "a clear distinction" between the two.¹¹¹ For neutrality per se, as demonstrated earlier, certain conditions must be met and utilising them content can be given to the concept. The fact that the concept is often wrongly applied, or that the conditions may be difficult to attain in the contemporary world, is no grounds for abandoning it, especially since the term is still widely used, not least by states themselves, and does provide a useful yardstick against which to analyse the policies of such states. The essence of neutrality is a deliberate, conscious policy of impartial abstention during a war or armed conflict with concomitant rights and duties, together with an intention to resist violations of those rights and duties by armed resistance if necessary. Given this a number of 'types of neutrality' are, in reality, nothing of the kind whether they be 'integral', 'qualified', 'benevolent', 'spiritual', 'idological', 'neo', 'peacetime' or indeed 'non-belligerency'.¹¹²

Within 'genuine neutrality', however, it is worth noting an important distinction, namely that in some cases neutrality may be imposed by international treaty, whilst in others it is voluntarily adopted by the state concerned. This distinction being important because it vitally affects the freedom of action of the states concerned. In the first case, the state is governed by the specific requirements of the treaty by which it is bound, whilst in the latter, it has no obligation save to itself and the policy is a matter

of choice, to be continued or abandoned as it sees fit. Occasionally a certain confusion arises because some authorities wish to term the former 'perpetual' or 'permanent' and the latter 'occasional' or 'temporary' neutrality.¹¹³ It can be argued, however, that perpetual neutrality need not be neutralisation, whilst in practice 'occasional' or 'temporary' neutrality may well be exceedingly long-lasting, elevated indeed into a 'traditional' neutrality!

Voluntary neutrality may indeed be sub-divided between (a) traditional, by which is usually meant 'general' and (b) 'ad hoc', by which is usually meant particular. With respect to the former the state concerned has the objective of keeping out of all and any war, whilst with respect to the latter, the state merely wishes to be neutral in a particular conflict at a particular time. A succession of such 'ad hoc' decisions may transform the state into a traditional neutral, as has occurred in the Swedish case. The credibility of a general and traditional neutral is likely to be higher than that of an 'ad hoc' neutral, since in the latter case no state can be sure in advance what the putative neutral will actually do.

The issue of types of, or variants of, neutrality is of particular relevance to the European context given the conventional wisdom (often supported by internal rhetoric from the states concerned) regarding Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the focus of this study, Ireland. If not pursuing a policy of neutrality, are they pursuing what Roberts terms a policy "for neutrality"?¹¹⁴ They, themselves, have wished to see their policies in this light, and may therefore be used as a model to identify the key requirements of such a position inasfar as it differs from neutrality per se.

Before turning to examine their position in the following chapter, however, the key characteristics of nonalignment will be identified.

Nonalignment

There is some dispute about dating the origins of nonalignment, depending upon whether nonalignment is regarded principally as a movement, with its origins at Belgrade in 1961, or as a rather more amorphous development of ideas and tendencies. In the former school belongs Willets who maintains that "nonalignment was not born until 1961 as a coherent group of ideas propounded by a group of relatively like-minded states".¹¹⁵ He is also adamant that to go back earlier is "One of the more frequent ways in which nonalignment is given false roots".¹¹⁶ Leo Mates, on the other hand, sees the Bandung Conference as at least a precursor of nonaligned meetings, whilst accepting that in 1955 "nonalignment was still not a finished political concept".¹¹⁷ The conference laid "down the foundations of a movement which subsequently expanded the original program considerably, ... leaders of the nonaligned countries ... have always stressed their attachment to Bandung, and the movement of the nonaligned was regarded as the political continuation of the 1955 anti-colonial conference. This connection is significant because it stresses the importance of anti-colonialism in the years of the early movements to define non-alignment". Moreover, "the movement of nonaligned is not a formal organization with a definite membership, holding regular meetings".¹¹⁸ Those attached to this view also cite earlier Indian thinking, meetings in New Delhi in 1947 and 1949, Colombo and Bogor in 1954, and put particular emphasis upon the Panch Sheel declaration of 1954.¹¹⁹ Whilst these earlier meetings and pronouncements cannot be equated with nonalignment, they were important influences upon it.

The Bandung conference of 1955 was officially "The Asian-African Conference", with 29 states attending, with a clear preponderance of

Asians. Given its regional composition, that about half of its attenders were aligned, and the very active role of China, Bandung cannot be equated with nonalignment, but many of its concerns have lived on to be equally the concern of the nonaligned.

The communique touched upon many themes concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security and the condemnation of colonialism, as well as emphasising equality, sovereignty, independence and freedom. It contained no blanket condemnation of alliances, but did condemn those which served "the particular interests of any of the big powers". It also emphasised the "urgency of promoting economic development", although this was not a central issue.¹²⁰ The conference was an assertion of independence and of distinctive concerns, and it was this together with "increasing contacts and seeing the advantages of an international platform", which was perhaps of most significance, rather than the actual formulations of words agreed upon.¹²¹

In Europe, President Tito of Yugoslavia became increasingly interested in such matters visiting Asia and Africa, and meeting Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah and Sukarno.¹²² Partly to forestall a second Bandung, Tito and Nasser sent an initial joint letter inviting twenty-one nonaligned countries to a preparatory conference at Cairo in 1961. This invitation list set both the initial tone and membership of the movement, since Tito and Nasser "strongly influenced the issue by sending preliminary invitations to 21 countries of their choice", and there was a high correlation between these states and those who finally attended.¹²³ When asked the basis of the invitation "the principles they had applied were never revealed to questioners".¹²⁴ The Cairo meeting of Foreign Ministers, drew up a five-point definition of nonalignment which "framed the first ... official definition of nonalignment".¹²⁵ The principles were:-

- (i) to follow an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence, or to show trends towards such a policy;
- (ii) always to support popular liberation movements;
- (iii) not to become a party to any collective military pact or bilateral treaties that would involve implication in East-West wrangles;
- (iv) not to have on its territory any foreign military bases set up with their own consent.

This is hardly a definitive classification, with Anabtawi arguing it was a "meaningless yardstick for assessing whether or not a state is neutralist".¹²⁶ Flexibility was needed because of the multiplicity of policies being practised and the diverse nature of the interests of those involved. Whilst it might be said that all those invited were, broadly, neutralist, not all neutralists were invited,¹²⁷ and in deciding additional invitees a number of local, and idiosyncratic factors were taken into account, not all of which touched upon non-alignment. India and Ceylon, amongst others, fought for a wider range of countries being represented, perhaps as many as 19 more (including Sweden, Finland and Ireland), but at the end of the day only four countries were added. "This involved no mere dispute over diplomatic protocol, for the invitation list would in turn largely determine the agenda, tone and results of the conference."¹²⁸ There is some confusion as to who actually was invited, and this revolves around the fact that some countries were sounded-out but let it be known the answer would be no. Thus "the choice of Belgrade as the venue ... discouraged the European nonaligned countries ... Sweden, Finland and Ireland would have had invitations but they ... cried off in advance because attendance at a political conference in Marshall Tito's domain might compromise their neutrality".¹²⁹

It is also true that it would rather have changed the nature of the conference.

In September 1961 the Heads of Government or State of 25 'nonaligned countries', as it was put in Final Declaration, met in Belgrade. Three countries sent observers. It was the first large meeting of self-proclaimed nonaligned countries. Whilst previously nonaligned policies had tended to be referred to in terms of independence, autonomy or peaceful coexistence, increasingly the term 'nonalignment' was now used,¹³⁰ despite the fact that several governments represented were aligned on one issue or another.¹³¹

It was initially uncertain whether the conference would concentrate on problems of world peace, or would develop along strict anti-colonialist lines. More generally, Belgrade was concerned with peace and security, self-determination, imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, racial discrimination, especially apartheid, disarmament, a test ban, the problem of foreign bases, peaceful coexistence, and the structure of the UN. The great divide between rich and poor countries was also a theme running throughout the conference, with attention being focused on economic development. Several times during the conference reference was made to the nonaligned as being the 'conscience of mankind', whilst most speakers stressed non-alignment "was not a passive doctrine despite the negative prefix to the word".¹³²

The final document reflected the aspirations, concerns and fears of those represented. It was agreed that for conflict to be eradicated it was necessary "to eradicate colonialism in all its manifestations and to accept and practise a policy of peaceful coexistence in the world". It attempted to give some content to 'peaceful coexistence' by stressing that it involved "the right of

peoples to self-determination", and "to an active effort towards the elimination of historical injustices and the liquidation of national oppression, guaranteeing at the same time, to every people their independent development".

The declaration also affirmed, amongst other things, that the nonaligned "do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a bloc". Foreign military bases were denounced as violations of sovereignty, their abolition being a contribution to world peace. Disarmament was regarded as imperative, as was the ending of all nuclear tests. The declaration called for the "abolition of colonialism", since all nations had the right to "unity, self-determination, and independence". All nations should be able to "freely dispose of their natural wealth". The "economic imbalance" was to be removed, and "just terms of trade" secured. Moreover, "excessive fluctuations in primary commodity trade and therestrictive measures and practices "which adversely affected developing countries were to be eliminated. Of most significance in the economic area was the call for all such countries to convene a conference "to discuss their common problems" and how they might "ensure the realization of their economic and social development".¹³³

Whilst in subsequent years the nonaligned have tended to vary in their enthusiasm for specific aspects of this declaration, it does represent many of the concerns of the nonaligned, at least, as represented by international declarations. Thus whilst it can be claimed that Belgrade was "singularly unproductive of concrete results", it did have a longer-term significance.¹³⁴ It revealed that whilst the nonaligned movement was not monolithic, containing a number of fissiparous tendencies, it could reach a measure of agreement on fundamentals. At the same time, its fissiparous

nature meant there was no question of seeking to bind the conference attenders to specific policies agreed by the group as a whole.

After 1961 the economic factor became even more of an issue and this was reflected in "A conference on the Problems of Economic Development" in Cairo in 1962, at which a majority of attenders had been at Belgrade. The Cairo meeting was a boost to the development of interest in this area, and proved to be almost a preparatory conference for Geneva and UNCTAD. It fuelled demands for a conference on trade and development, and this led to demands for a permanent organization, and the development of "The Group of 77".¹³⁵ These developments represented "the most significant achievement of the nonaligned countries in their efforts to improve the economic situation".¹³⁶ These developments are also significant in that they reflected a crucial distinction between the Bandung/Belgrade group and the European 'neutrals' (with the exception of Yugoslavia), namely the growing divergence between white 'haves' and coloured 'have-nots'.

These developments demonstrate why the concept of nonalignment is difficult to pin down since the movement had begun to introduce concerns which were different from the original motivation. Yet, the economic dimension cannot be discounted as irrelevant to non-alignment given its importance to the countries concerned, whilst it, plus anti-colonialism, do help explain why some countries were involved in the movement and others not. The increased weight attached to anti-colonialism was revealed at the second nonaligned summit in Cairo in 1964.

By 1964, the number of attenders had grown to 47 and there were 10 observers (including Finland). In issuing invitations there was no attempt "to define the precise principles or limits of nonalignment,

still less to apply them to individual invitees".¹³⁷ At the Cairo conference, questions of world peace seemed much less urgent than in 1961, and in the final document the initial focus was upon the elimination of colonialism, the right to self-determination and, the need to end racial discrimination, especially apartheid. Only then, did it turn to nine "fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence". The document also referred to sovereignty, territorial integrity, pacific settlement of disputes, disarmament, non-proliferation, nuclear free zones and the abolition of nuclear weapons and foreign bases, amongst other issues. A separate section (Section X) dealt with "Economic Development and Cooperation".¹³⁸

The next major conference at Lusaka in 1970 confirmed the tendencies apparent at Cairo. So much so, particularly on the economic front, that Rothstein amongst others, has argued that "Nonalignment as either a tactic of manoeuvre between the cold war blocs or as a means of establishing a zone of peace, began to decline in the mid-1960s" largely because of the declining salience of the old core issues such as cold war tensions and colonialism, and the ever-increasing salience of internal problems relating to internal development.¹³⁹ "The Third World was no longer merely new and Afro-Asian states, for the common denominator was now poverty and a shared resentment of unfair treatment", with the consequence that "a foreign policy of nonalignment simply seemed increasingly irrelevant". Rothstein goes on to argue that the nonaligned movement has been "transferred into something quite different : a joint alignment against all the industrial countries", thus his aphorism "from nonalignment to class war". Despite this, he also points out "that foreign policy in ... its more traditional meanings has (not) completely disappeared ... Nevertheless, the axis of real concern has shifted".¹⁴⁰

The tension between the old and the new, as it were, can be seen in any examination of the speeches and declarations of Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1976), Havana (1979) and Delhi (1983).¹⁴¹ Despite the language of Castro in his opening remarks in Havana in the Havana Conference Political Declaration most of the concerns remained those of previous conference communiqués. The language used, however, was more strident, for example, in the references to the need for a new international economic order (NIEO). The establishment of such an order was in 1979 regarded as "an integral part of the people's struggle for political, economic, cultural and social liberation", and it was argued that the world economic crisis was aggravated by the "structural and management deficiencies of developed market economies".¹⁴²

Havana embodied a number of conflicting ideas, not all of which were capable of resolution. There was also 'the Cuban problem', given Havana's role in drafting documents. Cuba's initial draft conference documents, for example, implied that the nonaligned were the reserve and natural allies of the Soviet bloc.¹⁴³ Indeed in September 1979 the Burmese Foreign Minister announced Burma's withdrawal from the movement on the grounds that the principles espoused were no longer recognizable as nonalignment. Such problems were exacerbated by further increases in attendance, with 92 full participants at Havana (plus a further 3 which were considered to be so), and nearly 40 official observers and guests. In fact, the final texts were not as pro-Soviet as the drafts, and the diversity of view represented led to an emphasis upon the nonaligned remaining nonaligned.¹⁴⁴

After Havana, the Indians hosted the seventh summit in Delhi in 1983. Here there was a clear attempt to steer the movement away

from divisive political issues and towards a concentration on the creation of NIEO and the North-South dialogue. Nonetheless, the Delhi meeting still condemned much of Western policy, although it also deplored foreign intervention in Afghanistan, albeit without naming the Soviet Union. Delhi had a simple unifying message as "the voice of the poor, pleading, or demanding, more from the rich. Money ... became the main theme". Indeed, by 1983 the countries concerned felt that the gap between rich and poor countries was "the most serious problem threatening world peace".¹⁴⁵

Problems of Definition

In the literature on nonalignment, there is almost unanimous agreement that the term has been used "so often by so many people in such different circumstances and with such different intentions, that its meaning seems to change, chameleon like, depending on the context in which it appears".¹⁴⁶ This has been increasingly so, moreover, given the exponential rise in the number of adherents, each influenced by their own interests, values and backgrounds. The amorphous character of nonalignment also reflects the fact that it did not come into being as a fully-fledged idea but evolved in a series of ad hoc reactions to contemporary stimuli. Only later were there attempts to construct a legitimising conceptual framework.¹⁴⁷ Lyon and Jansen both emphasize that nonalignment was "pragmatic", was "a policy, not a creed; a tactic, even a weapon, but not a gospel; for whatever else gospels may do, they do not establish or preserve the national self-interest of newly and fiercely independent states".¹⁴⁸ For these reasons nonalignment is eclectic, lacking both "canonical works" and a "corpus of knowledge, ... (an) integrated body of theory", and is "rather a constellation of concepts ... shrouded in a confusing medley of supporting arguments".¹⁴⁹ To add to the problem, the

'constellation of concepts' is not static, so that "nonaligned states, except in the most general terms, do not agree among themselves" about the nature of nonalignment. As a result generalizations are "dangerous and largely erroneous".¹⁵⁰

As a consequence both Crabb and Lyon argue that the term means "little in abstract",¹⁵¹ needing to be applied to policies and viewpoints of particular countries in particular cases, with the first question being "whose neutralism is referred to and what forms does it take, how general or particular are these forms?".¹⁵² Indeed Lyon believes it is "a mistake and a distraction of political enquiry from its proper concerns to seek for a quintessential neutralism".¹⁵³ It is, nonetheless, worthwhile to pursue the search for the essence of nonalignment, since if a concept is to be used, it should have a clearly understood content.

In establishing that content there are difficulties, although Willets suggests "there is an easy way out" since the summit communiques should "be relied upon as the most authoritative statements of the principles of nonalignment".¹⁵⁴ Whilst Willets is clearly right to emphasize such communiques, and the Cairo 1961 principles, as vital sources in the endeavour to understand non-alignment, there are certain traps in relying too heavily upon such declarations. Why should communiques be taken at face-value as definitions, especially given Willets' earlier observation that it is "too facile to accept the judgement of the Non-Aligned politicians"?¹⁵⁵ Moreover, it leads to an equating of nonalignment with membership of the Non-Aligned Movement. Was Burma necessarily less non-aligned because it left the movement? These difficulties are compounded by the way in which the initial invitations were issued, and the "all and sundry" aspects of later meetings.¹⁵⁶ In addition, some of

those subscribing to the communiques have not conformed themselves to a strict application of the injunctions contained therein. Communiques are the result of horse-trading and bargaining rather than any conception of an ideal type, being at best compendiums and at worst collections of internally inconsistent assertions. A further difficulty is the tendency of the nonaligned "to act as if verbal pronouncements, without any subsequent substantive policy ... are sufficient to 'decide' complex issues".¹⁵⁷ This is important given the significance Frankel, Holsti, Wolfers and others attach to distinctions between aspirational and operational foreign policy goals.¹⁵⁸

There are other traps in attempting to define nonalignment, for example, forgetting that policies involve means to ends and that nonalignment is both a means to ends and "only one aspect of the foreign policies pursued by its adherents", since each nonaligned state has "other distinct foreign policy objectives".¹⁵⁹ Thus many of them have maintained relationships with their former metropole, which it would be costly to break, and have distinguished these "from the wider systemic relationships" towards which they remain nonaligned.¹⁶⁰ Indeed, many such states may "be more fettered than some aligned states".¹⁶¹ Marshall Singer demonstrates this vividly, showing that formal treaties or alliances are not necessary to create "Ties that Bind".¹⁶² Thus the behaviour of a nonaligned state may not accord with the pronouncements of the movement. This is evident in the way such states tend to ignore such pronouncements on peaceful co-existence, military pacts and the use of force in international relations when it comes to localized, regional disputes.¹⁶³

The answer to the issues raised in the foregoing discussion is that nonalignment is not a foreign policy. Rather it is "an

approach to policy-making ... (defined) not in terms of what ... government's policy will be on the problems ... but in the spirit in which the government would approach the decision ... That non-alignment is an approach is a point seldom grasped".¹⁶⁴ Thus non-aligned countries are to be "identified more according to their position in the international community than according to their concrete and specific foreign policies".¹⁶⁵ Indeed, nonalignment is to be seen as "a 'frame of mind' that sharpened and emphasised the distinction between 'we' and 'they'".¹⁶⁶ After all "The new countries became nonaligned first in the consciousness of their political leaders and statesmen".¹⁶⁷

The "Key" to Nonalignment

Whilst one cannot discount the idiosyncratic and national variations shaping the consciousness and position of each society and leader, "most of the leading neutralist 'ideologues' share a wide range of strikingly similar national and personal problems" which tends to give them "something of a common character".¹⁶⁸

At the very least there is something of "a racial and cultural aspect of nonalignment". Nonaligned countries are those "which have been made to feel that they live in a world apart from Europe ... which have been exploited economically and dominated politically by others". It is not just a question of colour, the "fact that non-aligned nations are predominantly non-white is, however, incidental. There are other peoples who have equally been exploited and dominated". The key is the "natural reactions against being made use of by major Powers ... The common 'cultural' tie in nonalignment is probably far more related to traditional relations with major Powers than it is to race".¹⁶⁹

More fundamentally, a number of factors have contributed to the

perception of a 'common identity' whereby individuals perceive "some aspect of the external world more or less similarly, communicate their similarity of perception among themselves, thus forming an identity group". Singer argues that for this to happen there needs to be both channels of communication and most importantly "the members of the group must understand the common language or 'code'".¹⁷⁰ Even though individuals or states may use the same phraseology, pursue similar policies, this is not the same as belonging.

Moreover, "the very ties binding individuals from one state to individuals and groups in another are often the barriers separating them from other states", so that membership "in one group implies membership or non-membership in certain others". In a useful analogy, Singer argues that whilst a man may act and think "as do women", this does "not make him a member of the perceptual/identity group called 'women'".¹⁷¹ This argument is of seminal importance in understanding why Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and Ireland are not nonaligned. The inner consciousness, the id, of these societies is different and cannot be transmogrified into something which it is not. Nonalignment is not a rigid formula, but rather a feeling of belonging "to a world which is different from the developed part of the world whether East or West", so that the North-South divide is not merely economic but "embraces all aspects of life as well as the form, substance and structure of society".¹⁷² In creating this common identity three pillars are crucial.

(a) The Political Pillar

The overwhelming majority of the nonaligned have experienced colonial rule. That experience, together with the struggle against such rule, was enough to engender a sympathy towards nonalignment.¹⁷³ As products of this struggle, most of the countries concerned

accorded it priority in their newly independent foreign policies. Nonalignment served a dual function in this regard. On the one hand it was "both a visible symbol of a nation's dedication to anti-colonialism and a method of inhibiting new colonialist tendencies"¹⁷⁴ whilst on the other, it seemed to epitomize all that the struggles had been about, nonalignment being an "assertion of state sovereignty".¹⁷⁵ It implied an "ideological and philosophical emancipation", promoting the "quest for ideological and spiritual 'identity'".¹⁷⁶

Willets argues indeed that whilst the East-West issue did not provide a "common identity" for the nonaligned, "anti-colonialism did provide a bond between them", and he sees this as an important distinguishing characteristic between the European 'neutrals' and the nonaligned. His statistical analysis of voting behaviour purports to support this view, enabling him to claim that "The pro-colonial record of the European neutrals makes it completely explicable that these states remained so distant from nonalignment".¹⁷⁷ If, says Willets, "anti-colonialism is a stronger identifying characteristic of the Non-Aligned than is abstention from East-West alignment, then it is not surprising that the European neutrals have not joined the Non-Aligned".¹⁷⁸

The Europeans concerned, in fact, are not pro-colonial. They have, however, flinched at some of the vigorous means encompassed in U.N. resolutions concerned with eliminating colonialism. Their experience of foreign rule was not generally by different ethnic groups, nor by geographically remote and alien socio-political systems and cultures.¹⁷⁹ There was not the same degree of alienness, and perhaps as a consequence these states have been more refrained in their attitude to the means to be employed in ending

colonialism than nonaligned states, although they do share the same objective. Experiencing foreign rule in itself is not a sufficient condition to form that common identity underlying nonalignment.

The colonialism experience left a number of other legacies relevant to an understanding of nonalignment. One was the need for nation-building, a concern for national unity, given that the new states often were not coterminous with pre-existing nations or tribal grouping, but rather were superimposed upon ethnic and economic diversity by the colonial power. As a result, the search for a cohesive force, for national unity was usually an "overriding and unavoidable concern" for the new leaders of these states.¹⁸⁰

Nonalignment proved to be a mechanism helpful in achieving political stability and unity, since it served as a "broad national front behind which extremely divergent sections of the population are able to come together",¹⁸¹ it helped to secure support, moreover, "by reinforcing the goal of independence in foreign policy".¹⁸²

Inextricably related was the pursuit of independence in foreign policy. According to Mates "nonalignment can be defined as a policy strictly based on independence".¹⁸³ Nonalignment was regarded as an ideal vehicle for demonstrating the new states' independence since it implied "diplomatic freedom of action and choice".¹⁸⁴ It conformed to the need "to discover, to articulate, and to safeguard and strengthen one's own national interest in the world",¹⁸⁵ whilst also serving to emphasize that the new states were concerned with their own interpretation of their national interest rather than either somebody else's interpretations, or somebody else's interests.

This insistence upon independence in foreign policy relates to attitudes to alliances. Equally significant, however, is the relationship to the nonaligned "penchant" for deciding each issue

on its merits".¹⁸⁶ Whether this penchant is operationalized is the subject of some controversy, but at least theoretically, the non-aligned "proclaimed the right to think for ourselves and to speak for ourselves. Our voice is not an echo".¹⁸⁷ This attitude forms the heart of Jansen's definition of nonalignment, although perhaps it should be regarded as a necessary but not sufficient criterion. Jansen suggests that nonalignment is simply "the desire and ability of an independent country, ... to follow an independent policy in foreign affairs; it is the desire and ability to make up its own mind, to take its own decisions or not to take them, after judging each issue separately and honestly on its merits".¹⁸⁸ The combination of national interest and judgement helps to explain why divergences exist among the nonaligned, and why whilst exercising independent judgement, the nonaligned are not impartial. It is independent yet partial judgement. A further complication is that informed judgement requires both information and expertise, which many of these states may lack the resources to attain.

The foregoing helps to explain the nonaligned's attitude to alliances and foreign military bases. The nonaligned believe that "membership in an alliance would involve at least some compromise in the interests of coalition diplomacy, and may even involve subordination to the stronger power".¹⁸⁹ They fear the possible inferior position within such an arrangement, and the likelihood that bloc leaders would seek to control "the foreign policy of alliances members" and even "the internal development of weaker nations".¹⁹⁰ There is a certain air of disapproval of alliances, but this tends to be the alliance of others rather than oneself. There is also a residual belief of a relationship between alliances and colonialism, and a vague concern that perhaps alliances

(particularly involving great powers) are a cause of tension and war, and certainly not in conformity with the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Despite this scepticism, the nonaligned are clearly not anti all alliances, most of them being heavily involved in alliances of one sort or another themselves.¹⁹¹ The key distinction to be drawn was identified in the Havana principles as opposition to participation in military pacts and alliances arising from great-Power or bloc rivalries and influences.¹⁹² It is the link with out-of-area great powers which leads to opposition, not the mere fact of existence of alliances.¹⁹³ Non-alignment was never simply a question of opposition to alliances and alignment. This partly explains why nonalignment has outlived many of the alliances current at the time of its gestation. It has had much more to do with the pursuit of an independent foreign policy.

The attitude to alliances has not been related to pacifism, but rather to a feeling of outrage at being dragged into the quarrels of others.¹⁹⁴ Gupta, indeed, argues that the desire for "non-involvement in irrelevant political contexts paved the way for subsequent emergence of the doctrine of nonalignment".¹⁹⁵ The Cold War was regarded as a conflict between countries in a different part of the world, a part of the world whose philosophy, culture, interests and levels of economic development were very different.

Distaste, however, was not to be equated with isolationism since distance and water were not enough to ensure safety. Whilst, therefore, seeking to avoid involvement in the Cold War, the non-aligned were determined to do their "utmost to prevent the next war which we believe will only result in the extinction of human civilization".¹⁹⁶ Indeed, one of the key aspects of nonalignment,

its lack of passivity, partly stems from "an underlying conviction ... that nonaligned countries are in a peculiarly advantageous position to ameliorate cold war conflicts and to make 'peaceful coexistence' a reality".¹⁹⁷

(b) The Economic Pillar

In contemplating common experiences which have touched the non-aligned it is necessary to heed the warning of Geldart and Lyon with respect to a closely related issue-area. They point to the fact that by the early 1980s it had increasingly been "recognised that it is grossly misleading to equate North and South with rich and poor, industrialised and non-industrialised, developed and underdeveloped countries, because each grouping brings together states of considerable diversities by any economic measures".¹⁹⁸ Similarly one must be wary of any simple developed/aligned - underdeveloped/nonaligned division.

Notwithstanding this important truth, however, it is also true that many of the nonaligned have experienced certain similarities of economic circumstance.¹⁹⁹ A number of related economic experiences in the economic sphere, which have directly or indirectly influenced the nonaligned, can be identified, including: poverty; dependency; underdevelopment and lack of industrialisation; unfavourable terms of trade on the world market; a desire to attain economic independence in order to make a reality of political freedom and; a low economic status.

Of the poverty and relative lack of development, even now, of most of the nonaligned there can be little doubt. If a number of indices of development and industrialisation are examined, an interesting pattern emerges. In the following table (Table 3.1) a clear relationship between lower income per capita as a basic (if simple) measure of a lower stage of economic development and involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement emerges.

Table 3.1:

Countries classified principally according to GNP per capita

	<u>Low-income</u>	<u>Middle-income</u>	<u>Industrial Market Economies</u>	<u>Capital-Surplus Oil Exporters</u>	<u>Nonmarket Industrial Economies</u>
<u>Number of Countries</u>	36	60	18	4	6
<u>Full members</u>	34 (94½%)	34 (56½%)	0	4 (100%) ^d	0
Relationship to Non-Aligned Movement and Percentage of states in category	<u>Observers</u> ^e	9 (15%)	0	0	0
	<u>Guests</u> ^e	3 (5%) ^b	4 (22%) ^c	0	0
	<u>Not-involved</u>	2 (5½%) ^a	14 (78%)	0	6 (100%)

a. China and Haiti

b. Romania

c. Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland but not Ireland. N.B. Willets following the official documentation of Lusaka conference suggests Finland and Austria participated in 1970 as observers, whereas in fact, they were guests.

d. Saudi Arabia boycotted the Havana meeting.

e. Observers have a higher status than guests, and is now almost a kind of waiting for full membership.

Sources : Derived from:

Peter Willets, The Non-Aligned in Havana, (London, Frances Pinter, 1981) p.77

World Bank, World Development Report, 1981, (Oxford, Oxford University Press for World Bank, 1981) categories and figures for 'World Development Indicators' pp.133 ff. Not all attenders at Havana have figures in the World Bank tables; these are generally 'micro states'.

N.B. Willets pp.248-254 uses different categorizations based upon UNCTAD groups, but the broad pattern is similar.

In the low-income group 94½% were 'nonaligned' having 'full membership'; in the middle-income group this figure falls to 56½%, but rises to 76½% if guests and observers are included. Of 18 'industrial market economies' it is striking that none attended as full members, nor in the next most significant category of 'observers'. Similarly, none of the 'nonmarket industrial economies' were involved. In summary, of 96 low/middle-income countries, 71% were full members and 12½% attended in some other capacity. This compares with a 16½% minimal involvement by industrial economies.

Although figures for many countries are not available, an examination of "gross manufacturing output per capita"²⁰⁰ as a measure of industrialization tends to confirm the pattern of per capita income, as do measures of 'adult literacy rate'²⁰¹ and energy consumption per capita (although in this latter case Trinidad and Tobago, and Romania break the pattern).²⁰² Although a number of caveats should be entered before accepting this evidence as definitive, there is an element of commonality in the circumstances of the countries under review.

One of the most striking things to emerge is that Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland are in a completely different economic league from virtually all of the 'nonaligned', for example, in GNP per capita they rank 14th, 16th, 3rd, 2nd and 24th respectively, and even the Irish figure is at least double that of any of the poorest 85 states.²⁰³ There is an economic aspect to the 'identity' dimension of the nonaligned, even if diverse interests do lead them to pursue widely differing economic policies.

Whilst not definitive, figures on trade dependency are similarly suggestive. Singer examined 116 states and found that over 40 had more than one-third of their trade with just one state.

Singer draws two conclusions from his material. Firstly, that the "weaker could legitimately be considered economically dependent upon the stronger" and secondly, that it is "a generalization that seems to hold with remarkable consistency that the more economically developed the country, the less likely it is to be dependent upon one major trading partner".²⁰⁴ The less developed tend to be most dependent.

Dependence and lack of development have led these states to seek greater economic independence and to escape their predicaments by seeking aid, preferably without strings and from multilateral sources, and by developing and diversifying trade.²⁰⁵ However, it does not appear that the old cliché about nonalignment as a tactic to maximize aid (by either obtaining help from both sides, or by attempting to play each side off against the other) is true.

All of these problems were compounded for these states by their being confronted with "an unfavourable situation in the world market" which has been "dominated by countries that had gone far ahead in labor productivity and generally in technical progress".²⁰⁶ It is thus not surprising that increasingly they have turned their attention to the structural weaknesses of the international economic system, and demanded a New International Economic Order, in order to ameliorate and overcome the inequalities which exist. The "compartmentalization of foreign policy and domestic development ... could not survive", and "the economies of development and the diplomacy of development have become increasingly difficult to separate".²⁰⁷ It is also true the "economic factor constituted one of the main motive forces and later became the strongest motive which impelled the nonaligned countries to cooperation and joint-action", although it may be going too far to suggest that "actions

in the economic domain brought most of the countries together under the banner of nonalignment".²⁰⁸

Certainly the nonaligned themselves now appear to be fully aware that political and economic questions are inextricably linked. Thus whilst the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement "maintained their separate identities until the mid-1970s despite some degree of overlapping membership"²⁰⁹ increasingly they have been complementary to each other, with a certain division of labour, but with "each taking up, developing and using the proposals and decisions of the other".²¹⁰

Given this strong concern with the economic pillar, there is truth in the argument that nonalignment was "not simply a by-product of the conflict between the two protagonists in the cold war" but that it was rather "inspired by and desires stemming from their low level of development, their internal problems and from the awareness of the gap separating them from the developed countries and from the fear which is generated by all these disadvantages". There is perhaps even some truth in the view that they would have found themselves essentially "in a similar position even if there had been no cold war", and would in any case have constituted themselves as a "separate part of the international community".²¹¹

(c) The Social Pillar

As Burton points out "types of domestic institutions are not considered by the nonaligned nations to be a test for nonalignment".²¹² Nonetheless, there is a degree of congruity among the nonaligned in their domestic circumstances in the social sphere. The social pillar, like the other pillars, reflects the colonial experience and legacy, particularly the consequent need for social integration and national political unity. Integration has been a major post-colonial problem, as the political institutions left by colonial

regimes have proved to be largely unable to cope with the lack of socio-political homogeneity. The new states often lacked the bonds usually associated with nationalism. These societies, then, were often fragmented, lacking socio-economic development, and not yet transformed nor integrated by the impact of industrialization. Whilst they have experienced a social transformation during the last generation, this has often exacerbated rather than ameliorated the problems.

One important consequence of these factors is the differentiation they reflect between the European and non-European societies, such that whereas "the internal problems of the industrially advanced world were due to different social and political systems based on modern economies and social structures, the underdeveloped countries faced completely different problems which resulted from their backwardness", and clearly their social structures and problems were different also.²¹³ The social origins, experience and orientations of their societies resulted in many of the nonaligned lacking "any identification with, or attachment to, the traditions of the Western state system ... They tend, that is, to think differently than their Western counterparts ... most significantly, perhaps, they do not have the same sense of what being a Small Power implies in terms of a range of acceptable behaviour".²¹⁴

The urgency accorded to development appears to have influenced the type of regime these countries have adopted, or submitted to. It also clearly distinguishes the European from non-European states.

Table 3.2:

	<u>Involvement in nonalignment system, GNP per capita as evidenced by attendance</u>		<u>nature of political system, GNP per capita and nonalignment</u>	<u>Per capita GNP</u>	<u>No. in group</u>	<u>% of states in category at nonaligned summits</u>
	<u>Attenders</u>	<u>Guests/Observers</u>	<u>Competitive</u>			
	3		"	0-199	3	100% Full
	6	1	"	200-599	15	(40% Full (6½% Guests
	1		"	600-999	5	20% Full
	0	3	"	1000+	20	(0 Full (15% Guests
Total	10	4			43	23% Full 9% Guests
			<u>Mobilizing</u>			
	8		"	0-199	13	61½% Full
	6	1	"	200-599	8	(75% Full (12½% Guests
	0		"	600-900	6	0
	0		"	1000%	1	0
Total	14	1			28	50% Full 3½% Guests
			<u>Authoritarian</u>			
	28		"	0-199	36	77½% Full
	7		"	200-599	18	39% "
	2		"	600-999	5	40% "
	1		"	1000+	1	100% "
Total	38				60	63% Full

Sources: Derived from:

R.W. Cox and H.K. Jacobsen, The Anatomy of Influence, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974) Table C.3 'The Distribution of Units by Political and Economic Characteristics : 1967', pp.463, and for explanation of categories pp.457-464.

Peter Willetts, The Nonaligned Movement, (London, Frances Pinter, 1978) Table A4.1, 'Full Participants at the Non-Aligned Summits' pp.254-256.

Thus Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland all come within the 'competitive 1000+ GNP per capita grouping' in which are found no full members of the non-aligned movement, but rather the countries of the so-called 'western' world. Ireland falls into the 'competitive 600-999 GNP per capita' range. Interestingly only one attendee at non-aligned summits also falls into the same category, namely Trinidad and Tobago, which as already demonstrated, is sui generis according to a number of other indices. Whilst undue precision should not be claimed for the figures or categories, the table remains suggestive.

Conclusion

(a) The Europeans Are Not Nonaligned

In general, the European countries under discussion are different in the following ways from the nonaligned:

- (i) most importantly, vis-a-vis 'identity', 'consciousness' and empathy of perception;
- (ii) they have different experiences of alien rule and consequently subsequent differing legacies;
- (iii) the European states are in a different league with respect to socio-economic levels of income, development and modernization;
- (iv) the European states are part of a system of society, economies, philosophy and politics which is alien to most of the non-aligned;
- (v) a factor compounded by geographic/strategic location and;
- (vi) the Europeans have a concern with issues which differ from the inescapable concerns of the nonaligned.

(b) Neutrality and Nonalignment

Neutrality and nonalignment are often used as generic terms for each other, as if they were synonymous or one was a derivation from the other.²¹⁵ However, from the foregoing discussion it is evident that there is no inherent relationship between nonalignment and neutrality. It can on the contrary be argued that the specific demands of neutrality run counter to the grain of the ethos of nonalignment. Moreover nonalignment is "not a policy of seeking for a neutral position in the case of war".²¹⁶ Indeed, "In the event of open warfare between the main power those, nonaligned countries could be obliged, as all countries are, to declare themselves either as neutral or at war",²¹⁷ since nonalignment does not involve any declaration or decision in advance "of a fixed position to be taken in case of war".²¹⁸ Moreover, the nonaligned "admit no binding obligations to remain indifferent and impartial".²¹⁹ Indeed, the very motivation of nonalignment is not to be an idle by-stander, but to be an active participant in the unfolding of events. As early as 1961 this positivism was integral to non-alignment, given the profound belief that it was "essential that the non-aligned countries should participate in solving outstanding international issues concerning peace and security in the world as none of them can remain unaffected by or indifferent to these issues".²²⁰

Nevertheless a degree of confusion persists and the concepts are often loosely applied simultaneously to the same countries. Partly this is simply a problem of the distinction being slurred in popular usage, and that slur being "deeply entrenched".²²¹ Politicians, too, often deliberately or unconsciously, slur the distinction. The problem is compounded in that superficially the

two have certain characteristics in common, especially when they are operationalized in the foreign policies of states, for example, the stress on independence in foreign policy, sovereignty and freedom of decision, freedom from entanglements, and non-membership in superpower confrontational alliance systems. Confusion is further caused by 'neutrality' not being an appropriate description for a peacetime policy, and yet widely used as if it were. Problems in this regard are extenuated when seeking to clarify states whose official policy is 'non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war'.

The confusion over these terms is most rife with respect to Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland, who often claim to be neutral or nonaligned or both. Before examining in depth the Irish case, attention will now be turned to 'the European neutrals'.

Chapter Three : Footnotes

1. Nils Ørvik, The Decline of Neutrality, (London, Cass, 2nd ed., 1971) p.11.
2. Nicolas Politis, Neutrality and Peace, (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pamphlet No.55, 1935) p.11.
3. Peter Lyon, 'Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism', Review of Politics, Vol.22, No.2, April 1960, pp.256-7 and passim.
4. Politis, op.cit., p.6.
5. Lyon, Review of Politics, op.cit., p.257.
6. Ørvik, op.cit., p.17.
7. For example, Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, International Law, Vol.II (London, Longman, 7th ed., 1952) and Ørvik, op.cit., pp.17-25, Lyon, op.cit., pp.259-260, and Politis, op.cit., pp.15 ff.
8. Ørvik, op.cit., p.18, quotes from the Proclamation "The duty and interest of the United States require that they should, with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers".
9. Ibid, p.20.
10. Ibid, p.28.
11. Lyon, Review of Politics, op.cit., p.260.
12. Ørvik, op.cit., pp.33-34.
13. Politis, op.cit., p.27
14. See Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.633. The Declaration dealt with the law of blockade, contraband, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer to neutral flag, enemy character, convoy, resistance of search and compensation. See also L. Oppenheim, International Law : a Treatise, 3rd edition, edited by R.F. Roxburgh (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1921) pp.396-399.
15. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.633.
16. Details concerning these Conventions may be found in James Brown Scott (ed.), The Hague Conventions and the Declarations of 1899 and 1907, (New York, Oxford University Press for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2nd Edition, 1915), pp.133-139 and 209-219. See also his The Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, (New York, Oxford University Press for Carnegie Endowment for Internatinal Peace, 1917).
17. Preamble to Convention (V).
18. Article I of Convention (V).
19. Article 10 of Convention (V).
20. Preamble to Convention (XIII).
21. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., contains a detailed, and generally accepted, analysis of these rights and duties - pp. 652 ff, 673 ff and 684 ff, and passim. In addition to the

texts on neutrality cited there is, of course, the standard work by Jessup and Deak, Neutrality, its History, Economics and Law, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1935). See, for example, Vol.1, The Origins.

22. Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) p.1.
23. Peter Lyon, Neutralism, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963), p.18.
24. P. Jessup, 'Neutrality', Encyclopedia Britannica, XI, p.363.
25. Ørvik, op.cit., p.37.
26. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, 7th edition, op.cit., pp.653-5.
27. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law - revised and edited by Robert W. Tucker, (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 2nd ed., 1967), pp.154-5 and p.170.
28. Quoted by Ørvik, op.cit., p.155.
29. Ibid, pp.189-190.
30. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.166.
31. Lyon, Review of Politics, op.cit., pp.264-5.
32. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, 7th ed., op.cit., pp.653-4, emphasis added.
33. Gerald Stourzh, 'Some Reflections on Permanent Neutrality', in Schou and Brundtland, op.cit., p.93. See also George Schwarzenberger, 'The Scope for Neutralism', The Year Book of World Affairs, 1961, Vol.15 (London, Stevens and Sons, 1961), p.234.
34. Memorandum on the legal aspects of neutrality, presented by Mr. Struye, Chairman of the Political Committee, of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; 9 May 1962, Doc.1420, p.37 (Hereafter cited as the Struye Report 1962). Emphasis added.
35. See Frances Low-Ber, 'The Concept of Neutralism', American Political Science Review, Vol.58, No.2, June 1964, p.384.
36. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.660-661. Tucker-Kelsen disagree with this view, partly because of the key distinction relating to consequences discussed earlier. They argue that "the decision whether or not to recognise the existence of a state of war, and thereby to bring into force the law of neutrality, must rest principally with third states. The attitude of the parties engaged in armed conflict need not prove decisive". Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.155.

Another difficult question is what is a 'war'? See Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., pp.23-4, 28, 91 and 155 ff; Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.293 ff, Quincy Wright, 'The Status of Neutrality', op.cit., pp.392-3, 403. Peter Lyon has summed up the problem by reference to "the present fuzzy status mixtus of war and peace", Review of Politics, op.cit., p.257. See also his Neutralism, op.cit., pp.18-19.
37. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.655-6, emphasis added.

38. Ibid, p.659.
39. Struye Report 1962, op.cit., p.40.
40. Idem. This point is particularly significant given the looseness with which the term 'neutrality' is often used and the German concept of 'integral neutrality' i.e. the neutrality of both state and population. See Joachim Joesten, 'Phases in Swedish Neutrality', Foreign Affairs, Vol.23, No.2, January 1945, especially pp.327-8.
41. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.663-4, emphasis added, and p.655.
42. Ibid, p.654. Thus at the beginning of the Second World War a number of League of Nations' members informed the Secretary-General of their intention to remain neutral.
43. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.155.
44. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.673.
45. Idem, and Struye Report 1962, op.cit., pp.37-8.
46. Struye Report 1962, op.cit., p.38.
47. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.156.
48. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.654.
49. Ibid, pp.757-8, due diligence being understood as "such diligence as can reasonably be expected when all the circumstances and conditions of the case are taken into consideration".
50. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.160.
51. Lyon, Neutralism, op.cit., p.17.
52. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., pp.87-9.
53. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., pp.34-5, Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.645 ff, and Politis, op.cit., pp.44 ff, all agree on this point.

For the Covenant, see Ruth B. Henig (ed.), The League of Nations (Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1973) pp.179-189.
54. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.36 emphasis added. See also Ørvik, op.cit., pp.119 ff, especially p.125 where the report of the International Blockade Committee of August 1921 is quoted, particularly its opinion that "it appears difficult indeed, to make it obligatory for a free and independent nation to accept the opinion either of the Council or the majority of the members of the League, when the issue is the adaptation of measures of such importance as those prescribed in case of violation of the Covenant".
55. Not only did the Swiss worry about the contradiction of neutrality and membership, the League Council recognised their unique position whilst at the same time emphasising that "neutrality in everything, economic or military, is clearly inconsistent with the position of a member of the League" - Ørvik, op.cit., p.122. The League Council exempted Switzerland from the military obligations contained in the Covenant in their resolution of 13 February 1920 - Lyons, Neutralism, op.cit., p.153.

56. A typical, but by no means only, example, was a joint declaration in July 1936 by seven small 'neutral' states complaining about the changed conditions since they signed the Covenant and the inconsistent application of Covenant articles and undertakings. Given this they would reserve their position regarding the application of Article 16 - League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement, No.154, 1936, p.19. Whilst in 1938, most members of the League denounced their obligation to participate in economic sanctions. Official Journal, 1938, p.385.
57. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.646.
58. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., pp.168-9.
59. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.647. For details see Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, (London, Stevens, 2nd edition, 1949), ppp.132 ff; and Ørvik, op.cit., pp.247-9.
60. See Nils Andren on the Swedish Government's Message to Parliament on 22 October 1945, in Nils Andren, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment: A Perspective on Swedish Foreign Policy, (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1967) pp.41-46. As well as commentary this volume contains extracts from a number of central documents on postwar Swedish foreign policy.
61. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.171.
62. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.647. This volume and Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., have excellent discussions of the impact of the Charter upon neutrality.

The Charter of the United Nations (1945) Chapter VII 'Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression', especially Articles 39, 41 and 42. Also relevant are Article 2, paragraph 5 in which members undertake to assist the UN in action taken in accordance with the Charter, and Article 25 whereby they agree to accept and comply with Security Council decisions.
63. The UN Charter, especially Article 43, paragraph 1 and Articles 46 and 47.
64. Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., pp.46-7, footnote 36 and p.170.
65. Ogley, op.cit., p.21.
66. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., p.650, see also pp.648-9 and Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.172, for a discussion of the significance of this.
67. Of particular relevance here is the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 3 November 1950, General Assembly Resolution 377A(V). Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares, (London, University of London Press, 3rd ed., 1965) pp.245-7 discusses this, and is emphatic that the operative organ for Uniting for Peace "has only recommendatory authority" - p.246.
68. Lauterpacht-Oppenheim, op.cit., pp.222-3, and Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., pp.170-1.
69. Struye Report 1962, op.cit., p.34. Struye focuses only upon the Communist-Western divide and "two entirely different and perhaps irreconcilable concepts of neutrality: the Communist

concept and what can perhaps be called the Western concept". There is also the example of the question of diplomatic immunity etc. during the Iranian hostage crisis when some sought to justify the action by reference to the inadequacy or inapplicability of Western concepts.

70. See P.H. Vigor, The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) and Harto Hakovirta, 'The Soviet Union and the Varieties of Neutrality in Western Europe', World Politics, Vol.XXXV, No.4 (July 1983).
71. Struye Report 1962, op.cit., pp.36-7.
72. See R. Osgood and R.W. Tucker, Force, Order and Justice, (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1967) passim for a general review of these issues.
73. Ørvik, op.cit., p.268.
74. Ibid, p.73.
75. Ibid, p.277.
76. Politis, op.cit., p.39.
77. Ørvik, op.cit., p.117.
78. Lauterpacht-Oppenheimer, op.cit., p.796 and Tucker-Kelsen, op.cit., p.158.
79. See the superb analysis of Marshall R. Singer in Weak States in a World of Powers : the dynamics of international relationships, (New York, the Free Press, 1972), pp.48-50 and passim. On interdependence see, for example, Robert D. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition, (Boston, Little, Brown, 1977); Richard N. Cooper, 'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies', World Politics, Vol.24, No.2, January 1972, pp.161-181; Edward C. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations, (New York, Free Press, 1976) and for an excellent analysis of the concept and much of the associated literature see David A. Baldwin, 'Interdependence and Power: a conceptual analysis', International Organization, Vol.34, No.4, Autumn 1980, pp.471-506.
80. As events in Iran in the last decade perhaps illustrate.
81. There is an extensive literature on these issues, including Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, (New York, Wiley, 1963), Robert R. Osgood, Limited War Revisited, (Boulder, Westview Press, 1979), Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1981) and Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott with Kimberley A. Elliott, Economic sanctions reconsidered : history and current policy, (Washington D.C., Institute for International Economics, 1984).
82. Politis, op.cit., p.31, and Samir N. Anabtawi, 'Neutralists and Neutralism', Journal of Politics, Vol.27, No.2 (1965), p.355.
83. Erling Bjøl, 'The Power of the Weak', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.4, No.3 (1968), p.158. He makes a similar point in 'The Small State in International Politics', in Schou and Brundtland, op.cit., p.32.

84. Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War quoted by Lyon, Neutralism, op.cit., p.89. See also Roberts op.cit., p.41 and Ogley op.cit., p.8.
85. Roberts, op.cit., pp.90 ff.
86. See Nils Ørvik, 'Defence Against Help - A strategy for Small States', Survival, (Sept.-Oct. 1973), pp.228-231 and Singer op.cit., p.285.
87. Singer idem.
88. See H. Gunnar Haggloff, 'A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War' in Ogley, op.cit., pp.153-172, and Bruce Hopper, 'Sweden: A Case Study in Neutrality', Foreign Affairs, Vol.23, No.3, April 1945, pp.435-448.
89. Jacques Freymond, 'The European Neutrals and the Atlantic Community' in C.O. Wilcox and H.F. Haviland Jr (eds.), The Atlantic Community : Progress and Prospects, (New York, Praeger, 1963), pp.74-90.
90. Ogley, op.cit., pp.14-15.
91. Manfred Scheich, 'The European Neutrals after Enlargement of the Communities - the Austrian Perspective', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.12, No.3 (1973-4), pp.336-7 argues "it lies primarily with the neutral to create this credibility" but also notes "There has to be international confidence" in the position.
92. Roberts, op.cit., p.44.
93. D. Frei, 'Switzerland and the EEC : Facts and Trends', Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.12, No.3 (1973-4) p.260.
94. Ibid, p.259.
95. In an excellent article which focuses upon the contextual aspect, Francis Low-Beer, 'The Concept of Neutrality', American Political Science Review, Vol.58, No.2, June 1964 p.390. See also Scheich op.cit., p.236 and Gerald Stourzh, 'Permanent Neutrality' in Schou and Brundtland, op.cit., pp.96-7.
96. See Declaration Between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden for the Purpose of Establishing Similar Rules of Neutrality, Signed at Stockholm, May 27th, 1938 (No. 4365 League of Nations Treaty Series Vol. CLXXXVIII) pp.294-331, Ørvik, Decline of Neutrality, op.cit., p.217, wrongly refers to Ireland instead of Iceland as participating.
97. The Swedes have been particularly assiduous in this regard - see Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, (Stockholm : Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New Series) for a number of such communiques.
98. Ørvik, Decline of Neutrality, op.cit., p.282.
99. Joesten, op.cit., p.324. See also Bruce Hopper, 'Sweden : a case study in neutrality', Foreign Affairs, Vol.23, No.3 (April 1945).
100. Politis, op.cit., p.28.
101. Francis Low-Beer, op.cit., pp.384-5.
102. Max Petitpierre, 'Is Swiss Neutrality Still Justified' from Switzerland, Present and Future, (New Helvetic Society, 1963) cited in Ogley, op.cit., p.176.

103. Frei, op.cit., p.259.
104. Nils Andren, Power Balance and Non-Alignment, op.cit., p.9.
105. Ibid, p.9.
106. Petitpierre, op.cit.
107. R. Vukadinovic, 'Small States and the Policy of Non-Alignment' in Schou and Brundtland, op.cit., p.106.
108. In a famous Khrushchev interview with Walter Lippman, New York Herald Tribune, 17 April 1961, although he prefaced this by acknowledging "there are neutral countries".
109. Roberts op.cit., p.79.
110. Ogley, op.cit., pp.204-5. In a somewhat similar vein is Harto Hakovirta, 'Effects of non-alignment on neutrality in Europe : an analysis and appraisal', Cooperation and Conflict, XVIII (1983). He looks at neutrality in terms of the "positions and policies" of five European states (p.57), claiming that neutrality has been "largely disconnected" from its legal basis" (p.60). Neutrality is, however, perhaps inappropriate terminology in such circumstance.
111. Ørvik, The Decline of Neutrality, op.cit., p.278. Ørvik, p.183, also comments upon how the two concepts became somewhat intertwined. See also Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968) p.31.
112. See Stourzh in Schou and Brundtland op.cit., pp.93-4.
113. Thus Lauterpacht-Oppenheim op.cit., p.661 suggest "Perpetual or permanent neutrality is the neutrality of States which are neutralised by special treaties", and the Struye Report 1962 op.cit., p.37 "Occasional or temporary neutrality - often called simply neutrality ..."
114. Roberts op.cit., p.69 writing of Sweden suggests "The foreign policy, in other words, is one for neutrality rather than one of neutrality" - emphasis in original.
115. Peter Willetts, The Nonaligned Movement : The Origins of a Third World Alliance, (London, Frances Pinter, 1978) p.14.
116. Ibid, p.3.
117. Leo Mates, Nonalignment : Theory and Current Policy, (Belgrade and New York, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade and Oceana Publications, 1972).
118. Ibid, pp.227-8.
119. G.H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Nonalignment, (London, Faber and Faber, 1966) passim and Mates op.cit., pp.44-53 and 58-74.
120. The full communique is reproduced in Noble Frankland with Patricia Woodcock (eds.), Documents on International Affairs, 1955, (London, Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1958) pp.429-436. See also Jansen op.cit., pp.182-226.
121. Peter Lyon, Neutralism, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963) p.48.
122. Mates op.cit., pp.175-218. Mates' work was originally published in Serbo-Croat in 1971.

123. Lyon op.cit., p.180, emphasis in original.
124. Jansen op.cit., p.282
125. Ibid, p.278.
126. S.N. Anabtawi, 'Neutralists and Neutralism', Journal of Politics, Vol.27, No.2 (May 1965) pp.352-3.
127. Jansen op.cit., p.283. Neutralist here being equated with nonaligned.
128. Cecil V. Crabb Jnr., The Elephants and the Grass, (New York, Praeger, 1965) pp.23-4.
129. Jansen op.cit., p.289 and Lyon op.cit., pp.56-57 and 179-185.
130. Mates op.cit., p.76. Mates suggests the term was used as early as early 1950s, whilst it was used in the communique of Tito/Nasser meeting in Brioni in 1956 - Mates pp.379-381.
131. Lyon op.cit., p.194.
132. Jansen op.cit., p.298, see also Richard Gott, 'The Decline of Neutralism, the Belgrade Conference and After' in D.C. Watt, Survey of International Affairs 1961, (London, Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965) p.378 and Lyon op.cit., pp.188-9.
133. Reproduced in D.C. Watt et al (ed.), Documents on International Affairs 1961, (London, Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965) pp.621-630, and see also 'The Belgrade Summit' in Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvart, The Third World without Superpowers : The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Volume I (Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications, 1978) pp.1-42.
134. Jansen op.cit., p.305 and see Lyon op.cit., p.57, Mates op.cit., p.247 and J.W. Burton (ed.), Nonalignment, (London, Deutsch, 1966) p.20.
135. Mates op.cit., pp.264 ff. See Carol Geldart and Peter Lyon, "The Group of 77 : A Perspective View", International Affairs, Vol. 57, No.1 (Winter 1980-81) pp.79-101, for a review of these developments and the cautionary note that as early as Bandung attention was paid to these issues.
136. Mates op.cit., p.279.
137. Jansen, op.cit., pp.376-7.
138. For documents relating to Cairo summit see Jankowitsch and Sauvart (Volume I) op.cit., pp.43-78.
139. Robert L. Rothstein, 'Foreign Policy and Development Policy : From Nonalignment to International Class War', International Affairs, Vol. 52, No.4 (Autumn 1976) p.613.
140. Ibid, pp.614-616.
141. See Jankowitsch and Sauvart, volumes I, II, III and IV, op.cit., passim; Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana : Documents of the Sixth Summit Conference and an Analysis of their Significance for the Global Political System, (London, Frances Pinter, 1981) and; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXIX (1983) (London, Longman, 1983) pp.32349-55.
142. See Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana op.cit., pp.216-227 for Castro's address and pp.77-136 for the 'Political Declaration' and pp.140-168 for the 'Economic Declaration' agreed at the summit.

143. Willetts argues that "The phrase 'natural allies' has been used frequently to describe the Cuban position, but it never appeared in these words in the Cuban draft declaration for the summit" - Ibid footnote 24, p.51. He also acknowledges, however, "the 'natural allies' thesis appeared 16 times in the Cuban draft in various wordings" - p.13.
144. The Burmese decision was announced at the UN 3 weeks after the Havana summit. Willetts suggests as the Burmese withdrew in 1970 only to return in 1971, "not too much significance should be placed on their withdrawal" - Ibid footnote 54, p.53.
For other details of Havana see Willetts passim.
145. The Economist 286:7281, 19 March 1983, p.55. For further details of the Delhi meeting see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, op.cit., pp.32349-55.
146. Lyon, op.cit., p.15. See also Crabb op.cit., p.16 quoting an Indian Express editorial of 7 March 1963.
147. See Mates op.cit., pp.75 and III, and N. Choucri, 'The Non-alignment of Afro-Asian states : policy, perception and behaviour', Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. II, No.1 (March 1969) p.15; and C. Crabb, 'The United States and the Neutralists', in C. Crabb (ed.) Nonalignment in Foreign Affairs, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.362 (November 1965) p.93.
148. Lyon, op.cit., p.87 and Jansen op.cit., p.402.
149. Lyon, op.cit., pp.59-62.
150. Theodore L. Shay, 'Nonalignment Si, Neutralism No', The Review of Politics, XXX, No.2 (April 1968) p.230. See also Mates op.cit., p.78 and Crabb, 'Introduction' in Annals op.cit., p.8.
151. Crabb, The Elephant and the Grass, op.cit., p.212.
152. Lyon, op.cit., p.196.
153. Idem.
154. Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement, op.cit., pp.18-19.
155. Ibid, p.2.
156. Jansen op.cit., p.376 describing the problems preceding the 1964 Cairo conference.
157. Lyon, op.cit., p.69.
158. See Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London, Macmillan, 1970) pp.31-33; K.J. Holsti, International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1983, 4th edition) p.128 and; Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1975) pp.67-80.
159. S.K. Gupta, 'Asian Nonalingment' in Crabb (ed.) Annals op.cit., pp.46-48 and Francis Low-Beer op.cit., p.390.
160. Rothstein op.cit., p.611.
161. Lyon op.cit., p.89. See also the discusson in Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York, Columbia University Press, 1968) pp.52, 247 and passim; Francis Low-Beer op.cit., pp.389-90; Crabb, Elephants and the Grass op.cit., pp.72-76 and; Willetts, The Nonaligned Movement, op.cit. pp.223-234.

162. Singer op.cit., pp.87 ff.
163. A point made by Anabtawi op.cit., p.354 and many others.
164. This view of Keita of Mali is reported by M. Legum, 'Africa and Nonalignment' in J.W. Burton, Nonalignment, op.cit., p.56. See also Crabb, 'Introduction' in Annals op.cit., p.4.
165. Mates op.cit., p.362.
166. Quoted by Rothstein, 'Foreign Policy and Development Policy : From Nonalignment to International Class War' op.cit., p.607 from Fayez A. Sayegh (ed.), The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World : A Symposium, (San Francisco, Chandler, 1964) p.93.
167. Mates op.cit., p.75, emphasis added.
168. Lyon, op.cit., p.60.
169. J.W. Burton, International Relations : A General Theory, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1965) p.194. Compare Singer op.cit., p.129.
170. Singer op.cit., p.71.
171. Ibid, p.89.
172. Mates op.cit., pp.229-231.
173. Edward W. Blyden III, 'The Idea of African "Neutralism" and "Nonalignment" : An Exploratory Survey' in K. London (ed.), New Nations in a Divided World, (New York, Praeger, 1963) p.147.
174. Crabb, Elephants and the Grass, op.cit., pp.41-2.
175. Willetts, The Nonaligned Movement, op.cit., p.29.
176. Crabb, Elephants and the Grass, op.cit., p.50.
177. Willetts, The Nonaligned Movement, op.cit., pp.191-2.
178. Ibid, p.167 and pp.89-113 on 'Voting in the General Assembly'.
179. See David Thornley argument cited above p.10 and Harto Hakovirta, 'Effects of Non-Alignment on Neutrality in Europe : An Analysis and Appraisal' op.cit., pp.57-75.
180. Lyon op.cit., 108.
181. N.P. Nayar, 'Nonalignment in World Affairs', India Quarterly 1962, p.51 quoted by Crabb, Elephants and the Grass, op.cit., p.58.
182. Fred L. Hadsel, 'Africa and the World : Nonalignment Reconsidered' in J.C. Charlesworth (ed.) Realignment in the Communist and Western Worlds, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.372 (July 1967) p.96.
183. Mates op.cit., p.108. See also Crabb, The Elephants and the Grass, op.cit., p.12 and Lyon op.cit., p.72.
184. Crabb, The Elephants and the Grass, op.cit., p.11.
185. Lyon, op.cit., p.73.
186. Ibid, p.68 emphasis in original.
187. Indian Prime Minister Shastri in 1964, cited in Crabb, 'Introduction', Annals (1965) op.cit., p.17.
188. Jansen, op.cit., pp.115-7 and 404.

189. Lyon, op.cit., p.108.
190. M. Nikezic, 'Why Uncommitted Countries hold that they are not "Neutral"', in J.C. Charlesworth (ed.) 'Is International Communism Winning?', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.336 (July 1961) p.78.
191. See Willetts, The Nonaligned Movement, op.cit., pp.127 ff.
192. This appears several times in the Political Declaration agreed at Havana - See Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana, op.cit., pp.77-137.
193. Nehru, for example, is quoted on this in Jansen op.cit., p.138.
194. See Nehru on this as quoted by Mates op.cit., p.240.
195. Gupta op.cit., p.45 emphasis added. See also Mates op.cit., pp.120.121.
196. Indonesian views cited by Crabb, Elephants and the Grass, op.cit., p.8.
197. Idem.
198. Geldart and Lyon, op.cit., p.101.
199. Lyon op.cit., p.82.
200. World Bank, World Development Report 1981, (Oxford, Oxford University Press for World Bank, 1981) pp.144-5, Table 6 'Industrialization' - figures are only given for 65 out of 124 states for 'Gross manufacturing output'.
201. Ibid, pp.134-5, Table 1 'Basic Indicators'. Here Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, and Romania come close to industrial economies' scores.
202. Ibid, pp.146-7, Table 7 'Commercial Energy' especially 'Energy consumption per capita', which is an indicator of industrialization.
203. Ibid, pp.134-5, Table 1 'Basic Industries'. Excluding capital-surplus oil exporters, no full member of the Non-Aligned Movement came higher than Ireland in the rankings, and of members/guests/observers at Havana, only Spain, a guest (23rd in ranking) marginally does. A similar pattern emerges from energy consumption figures, where only Trinidad and Tobago, and Singapore of the full members rank higher than³Ireland, and only Romania of the guests, Ireland being the lowest of relevant Europeans.
204. Singer op.cit., pp.238-9, but see also Table 6.1 'Trade with Major Powers as a Percent of Total Foreign Trade, 1938 and 1967' and Table 6.2 'Trade with Major Powers as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product, 1967' and the associated commentary, pp.227-246.
205. Hedsel op.cit., pp.97-100.
206. Mates op.cit., pp.150-154.
207. Rothstein, 'Foreign Policy and Development Policy', op.cit., pp.615-6.
208. Mates op.cit., pp.112-116.
209. Geldart and Lyon op.cit., p.80.

210. Ibid, p.95.
211. Mates, op.cit., pp.173-4.
212. Burton, Nonalignment, op.cit., p.198.
213. Mates, op.cit., p.42.
214. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, op.cit., pp.243-4
emphasis in original.
215. Thus Hamilton Fish Armstrong, 'Neutrality : Varying Tunes',
Foreign Affairs, Vol.35, No.1 (October 1956) discusses both,
whilst Ogle, op.cit., pp.4 and 33 sees nonalignment as a
category of neutrality. See also Crabb, Elephants and the
Grass, op.cit., p.7.
216. Choucri, op.cit., p.6.
217. Burton, International Relations, op.cit., p.220.
218. Armstrong op.cit., p.61.
219. Burton, Nonalignment, op.cit., p.22.
220. See Watt, Documents on International Affairs 1961, op.cit.,
pp.621-630 and Jankowitsch and Sauvart Vol. I, op.cit., pp.1-42.
221. Lyon op.cit., p.20.

Chapter Four : A European Dimension

The relationship of members of the Neutral and Nonaligned (NNA) caucus (with a population over one million) at recent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review conferences to the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) has been:¹

Table 4.1 Types of Participation in Nonaligned summits by members of Neutral and Nonaligned Caucus

<u>Summit</u>	<u>State</u>				<u>Yugoslavia</u>	
	<u>Austria</u>	<u>Finland</u>	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Switzerland</u>		
Belgrade 1961	-	-	-	-	Full Member	
Cairo 1962	I	I	I	I	"	"
Cairo 1964	I	O	I	-	"	"
Lusaka 1970	G	G	-	-	"	"
Algiers 1973	G	G	G	-	"	"
Colombo 1976	G	G	G	G	"	"
Havana 1979	G	G	G	G	"	"
Delhi 1983	G	G	G	G	"	"

I Invited but did not attend

O Observer

G Guest

Sources: Harto Hakovirta, 'Effects of Non-Alignment on Neutrality in Europe : An Analysis and Appraisal', Conflict and Cooperation, XVIII (1983) p.62 Table 1 : 'Participation by European Neutral States in the non-aligned summit meetings' Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned in Havana, (London, Frances Pinter, 1981) p.67. Keesing's Contemporary Archives Vol. XXXIX (1983) (London, Longman, 1983) pp.32349-55.

Yugoslavia has attended all the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) summits as a full member, whilst the other significant members of the NNA caucus have attended as Guests, with the single exception of Finland's Observer status in 1964.² Ireland has been involved neither in the

NNA caucus, nor in the NAM summits, not even apparently receiving an invitation to the latter. Despite its position in NAM, Yugoslavia will not be used for comparative purposes with Ireland, given its radically different political and socio-economic systems and its lack of involvement in mainstream West European developments. Finland will also be excluded given its similar lack of full participation in these developments, and more particularly because of the ambivalent nature of its position stemming from the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. Particularly problematical are those provisions relating to an agreement for "assistance, in case of need" from the Soviet Union.³ Moreover, whatever the arguments concerning that treaty, the Soviet Union has always regarded the essence of Finnish policy as being "benevolent relations" with the USSR.⁴

Austria, Switzerland and Sweden will be used as the basis of comparison, particularly Sweden since it is unfettered by constitution or international treaty obligations with respect to its position. Using these countries an attempt will be made to extrapolate a composite view of the essence of their position, although it needs to be remembered that each of these states "arrived at their neutrality under rather different conditions", this being "reflected in the diversity of their ideas and policies".⁵

'As regards the three neutral countries'⁶

Despite the diversity, similarities in their position have been perceived both by third parties and by the countries themselves. They engaged, for example, in a "joint exercise" in negotiating with the European Community⁷ and joint activity has also been evident in their membership of NNA caucus at the CSCE conferences. They have all had the status of Guests at NAM summits, and have shared a common

perception of how they differ from NAM members, recognizing the latter as "the political expression" of the poor, whilst they, themselves, are rich. Indeed they do not wish "to be politically identified with such states".⁸ As the Swedes have acknowledged, "many of the decisions made by this group diverge from Swedish views",⁹ as do the "origin" and "form" of nonaligned policies, even if the "foreign policy objectives are similar".¹⁰ The Europeans do wish, however, to be "fully acquainted with the views of the nonaligned group".¹¹

The 'three neutral countries' also took a common position on the International Energy Programme and the International Energy Agency. They joined, given the insertion in their agreements of a special clause guaranteeing their neutral status, despite the provisions for weighted majority voting and the possibility of automatic activation of oil-sharing.¹² Ireland, incidentally, did not insist on a similar clause.

More generally, the three states have adopted broadly similar positions regarding West European institutions. Before turning specifically to those positions, however, the attitudes of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland towards alliances, trade, Western values and independence will be examined, as will their rejection of passive isolationism as a basis for foreign policy.

The three states are not signatories of any military treaties with other powers,¹³ nor indeed are they members of any military alliances. Austria and Switzerland have both consistently upheld that "A neutral country cannot join a military alliance in time of peace because in so doing it would destroy its ability to remain neutral in time of war".¹⁴ The Swedes have also predominantly taken this attitude, arguing that they "do not wish, by advance commitments, to deprive ourselves of the right and opportunity to remain outside a

new war"¹⁵ and that "neutrality is not only a legal concept but indeed also a matter of policy. It implies a conduct, even in peacetime, which maintains confidence in the determination as well as the ability to remain neutral in war or crisis".¹⁶ Treaties, alliances and organizations which prejudice that ability are to be avoided.

The Swedes have wavered when the issue of a Nordic or Scandinavian defence pact has arisen. Andren has characterized Swedish initiative on this issue as "remarkable" given that their "traditional policy of neutrality had meant not only freedom from engagements with the great powers but on the whole a stubborn refusal to undertake any military commitments in relation to any other state". The Swedish initiative, in fact, represented "an attempt to increase the possibilities to attain the first goal by giving up the second".¹⁷

In 1948 the Swedes spoke out clearly against joining "any block of the Great Powers" on their own part.¹⁸ But a year later, it was emphasised that this did not exclude the possibility of "blocs of equal, smaller countries", and clearly a "Scandinavian defence alliance is not a great power bloc".¹⁹ Clearly the Swedes were not against participation in alliance per se, but they would not participate in any alliance "if the aim would be that this alliance should form part of a major security system with the character of a great power alliance." Hence a Scandinavian defence alliance was only acceptable if "free of outside alliances".

Moreover it was to be "directed towards neutrality in case of a conflict", and if not directly involved in the war the signatories were to consult on both the rules of their neutrality and maintaining their neutrality. In fact, whilst directed to "strengthening of the power of resistance of the participating countries in the event of an attack against any one of them" this was linked to strengthening their neutrality, and to helping them "keep ... outside a general

conflict, and in time of peace to stay outside other groups of powers". Whilst acknowledging that the plans represented "a departure and an important one from our policy of neutrality" the Swedes felt that given the conditions they had laid down, "this Scandinavian alliance would, looked at as a whole, mean an extension to all those countries of a zone not bound by any alliances to any third power. And so the main idea of Sweden's foreign policy would still be maintained."

If agreed the Scandinavian arrangement would have been a thorough-going alliance, since the Scandinavian countries "would consider themselves, from the point of view of defence, as one unit". There were to be plans for a joint defence council and joint defence, in addition to close collaboration in foreign policy. Crucially and fundamentally, an attack on any one of the three signatories (Sweden, Denmark and Norway) was to be considered an attack on all, and the others "would be obliged immediately to render military aid". Also considered for a time was "a partial defensive cooperation in peacetime without an alliance", although this seems to have been discarded since "the cooperation could not be pursued as far as possible within a defensive alliance, neither could it in war be set in motion as quickly and become effective".

Moreover, as Robertshas noted, "Sweden does not base her arguments for neutrality on any sweeping condemnations of alliances as such; indeed, there is a tendency to go to the opposite extreme and argue that neutrality is a function of the balance of power and can only exist in circumstances of such a balance".²⁰ Although by the late 1960s and 1970s many felt this basic condition of Swedish neutrality was "in a process of dissolution", an alliance balance has been crucial to Swedish policy.²¹ It has been given a particular twist and importance by the concept of the 'Nordic balance' and the position of Finland.²²

All three states have also given a number of general reasons for hostility to alliances. A basic factor has been "a stubborn, almost instinctive distrust of being entangled in great Power alliances and military blocs",²³ a feeling "that the rest of the world is something dismal and threatening: hence, the best policy is to keep away from foreign entanglements".²⁴ More specifically, there is a fear of being drawn into a war by an allied great power, and that membership "increases the risk that local conflicts of various kinds will be magnified into becoming major political issues".²⁵ The real objection to alliances is the link between neutrality and independence of mind and action. There is a profound belief that neutrality is "the condition precedent for a free and independent attitude. Our deeply rooted resolve to define our own policy makes it impossible for us to consider joining alliances where decisions must nevertheless make allowances for the interests of all members".²⁶ The governments have regarded it as inherently inimical to their basic policy that on various international questions, their attitudes should be determined beforehand by any group, so that a fundamental line of their foreign policy "of neutrality is that we shall be free to take our own stand and to rely on our own independent judgement".²⁷ To pursue "a credible policy of neutrality, the neutral country has as a matter of principle to maintain its freedom of decision and action in all spheres of national policy".²⁸ The policy they have pursued is, of course, regarded as being "firmly anchored in our own interests",²⁹ and is of their "own choosing".³⁰ The problem of choosing, however, is exacerbated by the trade patterns and linkages of the economies concerned. The foreign trade distribution of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland over a twenty year period (Table 4.2) reveals the following pattern:

Table 4.2 : Foreign trade by area *

	<u>1961</u>		<u>1971</u>		<u>1981</u>	
	<u>% imports</u>	<u>% exports</u>	<u>% imports</u>	<u>% exports</u>	<u>% imports</u>	<u>% exports</u>
<u>Sweden</u>						
OECD	79.6	78.3	84.2	85.2	79.5	78
OECD Europe	68.2	73.8	73	87.8	66.6	68.4
Comecon	4.4	4.2	4.8	4.3	4.5	3.9
<u>Austria</u>						
OECD	78.7	69.7	81.7	74.8	74.7	70.4
OECD Europe	72.8	65.8	75.5	66.8	66.5	64.9
Comecon	3.1	14.6	9.1	12.2	11.9	11.4
<u>Switzerland</u>						
OECD	85.5	68.5	90.2	77.4	86	72.9
OECD Europe	75.2	59.2	78.2	59.9	72.68	57.6
Comecon	2.3	3.2	2.2	4.0	4.0	3.28

* It should be noted that over the years the figures for various countries and groups are not always strictly identical, but the margin of error is small.

Sources

OECD Economic Surveys (Paris, Organisation for European Cooperation and Development):

Sweden (July 1982) p.64, (March 1967) pp.36-7

Austria (February 1983) p.72, (July 1976) p.54,
(March 1967) p.33

Switzerland (May 1983) p.54, (March 1976) p.56,
(February 1972) p.76

and OECD Statistic Bulletin : Series A (monthly) (Paris, Organisation for European Cooperation and Development)

The foreign trade of 'the three neutrals' has been decisively with the West, particularly with West European markets. Austria, Sweden and Switzerland have, themselves, been extremely conscious of this

economic dependence and have not hidden their concern about it.³¹ The figures also help to explain why the neutrality-economic priority debate has been significant in these countries, given the question: "should the country be allowed to stagnate by not participating in an essential political-economic alliance? - or, equally difficult, should the reasoned principle of neutrality be abandoned in order to continue the economic well-being of the nation?"³² Even if it was possible to avoid this dilemma, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland have had "to come to terms with a politically loaded economic situation which threatens the very premise of neutrality, i.e. independence of action".³³ Nonetheless, there has not been any significant trade diversification, at least, between economic blocs. On the other hand, they have preferred a free trade policy as a way of enhancing independence. Clearly, however, whilst officially the Swedes have maintained that "neutrality is determined by fundamental evaluations relating to security policy, not by economic interests", it has not always been quite so clear cut.³⁴

These problems are exacerbated by their close identification with West European developments and civilization. Even the careful Swiss have acknowledged that "We are not placed ... between the Communist world and the Western world; we are part of the latter. Its civilization is ours",³⁵ the bonds, indeed, creating "a moral solidarity".³⁶ The Austrian representative spoke in a similar vein,³⁷ whilst the Swedes have regarded themselves as linked to Western Europe "by many links deriving from a common civilization and a common history no less than from geographical affinity".³⁸ In fact, the three states are faced with a problem since whilst on the one hand "a strong emphasis on the fact that ... foreign policy is conducted without ideological ties would undermine the feeling of solidarity with the democracies",³⁹ on the other hand, too great an emphasis upon that solidarity, leading perhaps to "neutrality with a Western flavour",⁴⁰ is subversive of the

necessary credibility of independence which is essential for neutrality.

One way in which these states have attempted to overcome this problem has been in the pursuit of active and independent foreign policies, with the concomitant affirmation of the belief that the "policy of neutrality is not an isolationist policy".⁴¹ This has been most marked in the Swedish case and the current Swedish position is centred around a belief that they have a positive contribution to make and that neutrality does not require silence. Indeed this is regarded as strengthening their own position, as "long as these standpoints are independent standpoints on matters of principle, there is no reason to suppose that they detract from the credibility of our policy of neutrality. On the contrary, ... our independent opinions ... can if anything help to make our neutrality more convincing".⁴² Somewhat hesitantly, even the Swiss have now acknowledged that isolationism "is not only a crime but a political blunder".⁴³ The Austrians under Chancellor Kreisky have also moved to a more active role.

The essence of 'the three neutrals' policies, however, has been the need to be seen to be independent, since neutrality is to some extent in the eye of the beholder, and the concomitant need to retain as much sovereignty and freedom of action as is possible.

(a) the need to be seen to be independent

For the Swedes "an essential condition determining whether a policy of neutrality can be maintained when put to the test is of course that the rest of the world must have confidence in the will of the neutral state to uphold without faltering its chosen line of foreign policy ... We must make it clear by words and deeds that it is our intention in the event of war to use the freedom of action we have possessed in peacetime to assert our neutrality. We must not give the Great Powers any grounds for suspecting that Swedish territory may be placed at the

disposal of another Power and form a base from which an attack could be launched. Our foreign policy must not be drawn up so as to give rise to suspicions in the country of one Great Power or expectations in the country of another".⁴⁴

Indeed, the Swedes have tried to emphasize that even "If a war between the Great Powers breaks out, we cannot choose, even in a critical situation and under heavy external pressure, to enter the war on the side of one of the belligerents".⁴⁵ The problem is, of course, that all states retain the ultimate right to choose.⁴⁶ To try and demonstrate otherwise, to attain a high degree of credibility, the policy must be pursued with consistency and steadfastness, "it must not be made dependent on transitory factors but must be an expression of a lasting programme. The world must be able to rely on our assurances".⁴⁷ Periodically the government has argued that a high degree of domestic unity on the issue is the strongest guarantee for the policy's success and credibility.⁴⁸ The neutral must be particularly aware that in "an acute and tense situation it is particularly important ... not to give the rest of the world the impression that ... actions are dependent upon consultations with a certain group of states".⁴⁹ Even more fundamentally, it must recognize that to renounce its right to defend itself, would also be renouncing its chances of upholding neutrality in a future war. A neutral must recognize that "defence effort is an instrument of ... foreign policy. It makes ... foreign policy more credible". Yet if not taken seriously "it immediately affects the question of confidence in ... tenacity to uphold ... chosen line of policy", giving rise perhaps to expectations and distrust. At worst it might be contended "that we were trying to ensure that we should be able to coordinate our policy with that of a Great Power in the event of armed conflict".⁵⁰ In fact, the credibility and

viability of neutrality presupposes a strong, independent defence.⁵¹
It too is an essential precondition of the policy for neutrality.

(b) the need to retain as much sovereignty and freedom
of decision and action as possible

This dimension may be divided into political, economic and military elements, which inter-relate and over-lap. The political element is apparent from the repeated stress upon the link between independence, national interest and neutrality, and also in their attitude to alliances. It will be examined in more detail in the discussion of attitudes to European cooperation.⁵²

Many of the same concerns are apparent in the economic element, since the need to "maintain ... freedom of decision and action ... includes economic and trade policy",⁵³ and "undoubted viability in economic life" is a crucial condition of neutrality.⁵⁴ Strictly speaking, such economic viability and independence requires self-sufficiency and reliance upon one's own resources. Any diminution in this area involves the potential loss of economic sovereignty, which in turn has repercussions for political sovereignty by undermining independence of action.⁵⁵ The three neutrals are aware of these requirements, but they are also aware that in a world of growing inter-dependence they "must frame their policies in such a way that it is possible for them to reap the benefits of cooperation without giving up their independence and national identity. On occasion this can be a difficult tight-rope act".⁵⁶

One solution has been the stress upon 'total defence', whereby an economic defence programme becomes an indispensable component of defence, since if "economic defence or ... civil defence arrangements are not sufficiently strong, there is less likelihood that other nations will have confidence in our ability to defend our neutrality

... We must be able to hold out in the case of a blockade".⁵⁷ Special efforts, therefore, have been made in regard to economic preparedness, seeking "to ensure necessary supplies in the event of war and in situations where war or conflicts outside Sweden threaten our independence and disrupt international trade".⁵⁸ Such action was also to apply to peacetime crises.

The problem is that the countries are part of the international division of labour as Roberts points out, and given their trading patterns are so committed in a particular way, it is difficult to see how "suddenly in a crisis" they would be able "to reverse the dependence on international trade".⁵⁹ All the states concerned are so committed to international trade, they would find it difficult to meet the requirements of self-sufficiency, despite efforts at strategic stock-piling.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the crucial question in a crisis would not necessarily be maintaining the current (or recent) standard of living, but avoiding involvement in a war, whatever the economic consequences may be. It is clearly a matter of judgement what minimum requirements are necessary "to safeguard the survival of the people and the maintenance of the most essential functions of society ...".⁶¹ It is worth noting that states do not necessarily put a certain level of economic development as their foremost value, and all three states have, to some extent, in their peacetime policy been prepared to make economic sacrifices for neutrality.⁶²

Whilst economic independence and the political freedom of action are indispensable props to neutrality, even more crucial, although not entirely separate is the question of defence.⁶³ It is crucial for credibility and independence that a state has the physical ability to defend its territory (including, if appropriate, its territorial waters), its interests, and its neutral rights.

Few in the countries concerned have any illusions that neutrality offers complete security, but there is a sense, in those neutrals with long experience of neutrality, Sweden and Switzerland, that, on the whole, armed neutrality has served them well in the past. It is, however, also appreciated that "no solution exists which in the present situation is completely satisfactory" regarding defence and security.⁶⁴ The fundamental solution has been neutrality with the concomitant attitude to alliances. It leads to a disavowal of help, an emphasis upon own resources, and to a belief in a significant defence effort with a willingness to pay the price.

The explicit disavowal of help is crucial, and applies to both formal and informal arrangements, since "only by making it clear that it will not be forced into an alliance, nor tolerate a 'friendly' intervention, can a neutral convince its adversary that it really is neutral, and not a wavering and potentially hostile power".⁶⁵ There must be a lack of preparation for or expectation of, receipt of military assistance from other states. The neutral must act independently, relying upon its own resources and stressing self-help, and "cannot let others assume responsibility for ... (its) security". Moreover, they regard neutrality as "a policy that would have little substance if it were not secured by a well-equipped defence".⁶⁶ Furthermore given the feeling that avoidance of dependency upon imported arms and supplies is crucial, it is also necessary, as far as practicable to supply one's own weapons and equipment.⁶⁷

If defence and self-sufficiency is taken seriously then there must also be a willingness to accept the consequences in terms of expenditure. This appears to have been the case in Sweden, with an acceptance that they could not "create the society we want, nor carry out the foreign policy we want, unless we are prepared to pay the

price".⁶⁸ Thus by the 1970s the Swedes could boast that their defence expenditure per capita "is by far the highest in Europe", although clearly, this was not the case for either Austria or Switzerland, and by the end of the decade Sweden had fallen behind others.⁶⁹ Indeed the much vaunted Swedish defence effort came under strain in the late 1970's, experiencing "a period of retrenchment and contraction", caused by "new and more pessimistic evaluations than before of Sweden's economic and technological potential". Inside Sweden this development has been "accompanied by gloomy predictions ... on the future capability of the defence organization".⁷⁰ Nevertheless, in comparison with other European states, Sweden still ranked sixth in 1982 in terms of kronor per capita defence expenditure, and tenth in terms of percentage of GNP spent on defence with 3.6%.⁷¹ In comparison with other European non-members of alliances in 1982, Sweden also emerges relatively highly, see Table 4.3.

Table 4.3 : Comparative Defence Effort of European Non-alliance states - 1982

	<u>\$ per head</u>	<u>% of GNP</u>	<u>Numbers in armed forces</u>
Austria	112	1.3	49,400
Eire	101	2.0	16,400
Finland	179	1.8	36,900
Sweden	379	3.6	64,500
Switzerland	314	2.1	20,000
Yugoslavia	132	5.2*	252,500

* Derived from Gross Material Product.

Source:

The Military Balance 1982-3, (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982) p.124, Table 5
Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and

Military Manpower.

The Military Balance 1984-5, (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984) p.140, Table 4 Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower.

Sweden takes defence seriously, although the same is perhaps less true of Austria and Switzerland. This may reflect the differing foundations of their position.

Statistics alone, of course, cannot answer, indeed it is almost impossible to answer, whether these efforts are 'enough?'.⁷² The Swedes have admitted that "no defence of our making would have sufficient scope to meet every eventuality. The degree of security our defence arrangements can give us must always be limited".⁷³ Nonetheless, they do believe "our defence efforts do show that we take out neutrality seriously ...",⁷⁴ that it "prevents the emergence of a military vacuum in northern Europe. It should also enable Sweden to repulse even far-reaching attempts to violate Swedish neutrality during hostilities".⁷⁵

Also significant is the Swedish conception of the circumstances of the likely attack. The Swedes believe Sweden would not be an objective "to be attacked except in conjunction with a major conflict. There is no reason for an isolated attack on Sweden and we do not therefore take such an attack much into account. In a major conflict ... even the Great Powers must plan the use of their resources ... and they cannot therefore afford to throw in overwhelming troop concentrations against a minor secondary objective. Accordingly we are building up a defence which has naturally not much of a chance of surviving against a concentrated attack by a Great Power but which, nevertheless, may be rather troublesome to overcome if Sweden is a

secondary objective ...".⁷⁶ It is a strategy of deterrence, which as in the case of Switzerland aims to "deter attack by raising the price of entry".⁷⁷ As Roberts notes, it is not so much that any attack could not succeed but rather that it "would be unpleasant and costly for the attacker".⁷⁸ The Swedish position is reinforced by a belief that there are "no areas of primary strategic interest to the great power blocs within our borders".⁷⁹ Sweden would therefore hope "to refuse to be at the beck and call of any Great Power" and "to defend ourselves against violations of our integrity and threats of attack".⁸⁰ It is noticeable, however, that to some extent the defensive ambitions of the countries concerned are inherently limited. There is much stress on the defensive aspects of their policies. What appears not to be worthy of mention, or only marginally, is a more positive defence in the sense of defence of neutral's rights, such as trade.

Although periodically the appropriate strategy has been called into question,⁸¹ the countries concerned have been consistent in the basic principles they have espoused, namely:- non-participation in great power alliances with a concomitant insistence upon their own resources and a disavowal of outside help, coupled with an attempt to have a deterrent strategy based upon a reasonably strong defensive effort.

Attitude to European institutions

In the postwar period the foregoing factors have been perhaps the major variables in the attitude of the 'three neutral countries' to European institutions, particularly the European Community. A combination of these variables and attitudes provides further evidence to aid the elaboration of their position, and serves also as a further basis of comparison with the Irish Republic.

Austria, Sweden and Switzerland have all become full members of the Council of Europe, despite Soviet hostility to the Council.⁸²

Importantly, the Council of Europe can only make recommendations, whilst article 1(d) of the Statute states "Matters relating to national defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe".⁸³ This question, of vital importance to the neutrals, was the subject of early constitutional difficulties within the Council, given the call, in 1950, in the Assembly for a European Army. After dispute between the Assembly, which wished to delete 1(d) and the Committee of Ministers, the latter finally accepted that the Assembly might discuss "the political aspects of European peace and security", though it could not address recommendations to the Committee on this issue.⁸⁴ In fact, the Assembly has taken as a guide the suggestion that "it can properly discuss questions which, in a national parliament would be dealt with by the minister for foreign affairs, but not those that would be handled by the minister of defence".⁸⁵ It has avoided military questions in the technical sense, but proposals for the European Defence Community and the Western European Union have been discussed by the Assembly. The real problem initially, however, for Sweden was the federalist desire to use the Assembly as at best a constituent assembly for a new Europe, or at least, to delete 1(d) and allow discussion of 'political' questions. A further difficulty emerged with the Eden Plan of 1952, which envisaged remodelling the Council of Europe so that it could also serve as the institutional framework of the European Coal and Steel Community, the proposed European Defence Community, and other subsequent developments.⁸⁶ The Swedish reaction was vehement, with Foreign Minister Unden pointing out that "Sweden would not be able to engage herself in any way in an international organisation for joint defence, seeing that we have chosen our line of no alliances". Joining the EDC would be the same as joining NATO, but even "a looser form of adhesion as would result from the EDC forming, so to say, an element of

the Council of Europe would naturally have as a consequence that we were forced to reconsider our entire position within the Council". He was emphatic that an essential condition of Swedish entry to the Council had been the existence of 1(d), and that whilst Sweden could not veto revision of the Statute, he felt Sweden would leave rather than stop what other members desired. Interestingly, as of May 1952, he felt that "probably all members of the Council of Europe except Sweden are in favour of the British proposal ... and it is to be expected that it will be proceeded with in a positive direction".⁸⁷ In fact this was not the outcome and the issue died after a few other proposals.⁸⁸

It was the lack of centralized decision-making power which allowed these states to become founding members of OEEC/OECD and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Most importantly, there was a lack of supranational decision-making, and any common external tariff in EFTA. It was felt that whilst the obligations of a customs union would pose difficulties for neutrality, a free trade agreement did not, especially given certain escape clauses in the Stockholm Convention.⁸⁹ Its membership was different i.e. less close to NATO, and it did not have similar political objections as the EEC.

Austria, Sweden and Switzerland and the European Community

In attempting to determine their appropriate relationship with the European Community, the three neutrals have been faced with a fundamental conundrum: the nature of the Community. No-one has been entirely sure what was involved in membership in or association with the Community, given that "no one today can know what sort of EEC there will be ... Will it be an EEC without supranational elements and without a political content other than of economic affairs and trade cooperation, or will it be an EEC according to the terms of the Treaty of Rome?"⁹⁰

Given this conundrum and changes in the policies and attitudes not only of the members but also important non-members, like the UK, the neutrals have had to live with unpredictable factors which they could not "directly influence but that pose(d) considerable problems of policy adjustment".⁹¹ It is thus perhaps not surprising that their own policies and attitudes have not been entirely consistent over the past twenty-five years. Moreover, since states are not monolithic actors, the neutrals have also been affected by internal political debate.⁹² Yet notwithstanding these difficulties, it is possible to identify a relatively consistent strand of principles and issues which have concerned the neutrals in their relationship with the Community and which may serve as a benchmark for comparative purposes, although some of these points have rather waxed and waned over the years.

A real difficulty was an awareness that the decisive question of "whether membership in the EEC is compatible with or conflicts with a consistent policy of neutrality ...cannot be answered by a formal study of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome".⁹³ That one must study not only its concrete provisions, but "the history of the founding and development and the economic and political aims of the signatory powers".⁹⁴ The general and political aims were regarded as integral to the Treaty of Rome "whether they have been directly expressed in the Treaty or not, there can be no misunderstanding on that point. The signatory Powers ... declare, ...that its political content is one of the main points of the Treaty",⁹⁵ and "the Swedish Government have taken the distinctly political purposes of the members of the Community quite seriously and not merely as empty words", assuming "the Community will energetically strive not only for economic integration but for political unification".⁹⁶ The Swiss also believed signature "of the Treaty of Rome involves acceptance of the spirit in which it was devised".⁹⁷

Whilst Stalvant argues that by the spring of 1970 Prime Minister Palme believed that "at least some of the discussion about political goals within the EEC appeared to be empty rhetoric",⁹⁸ nonetheless, the definition of the situation by the neutrals did involve a belief about the goal of political integration being inherent. Their view, regarding the European community, moreover, was reinforced at a critical moment by the Hague communique of December 1969 which "agreed to instruct the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement".⁹⁹ Those Ministers, in their own reports issued in the summer of 1970, emphasised "the correlation between membership of the European Communities and participation in activities making for progress towards political unification". They also laid down that applicant states "will have to adhere" to the "objectives and machinery described in the present report ... when they join the Communities", and accept that "in line with the spirit of the Preambles to the Treaties of Paris and Rome, tangible form should be given to the will for a political union".¹⁰⁰ It is thus perhaps not surprising that the Swedish government concluded that it is "obvious that the Davignon cooperation is regarded as an important stage in the realisation of the political aims of the Treaty of Rome the acceptance of these aims being laid down as a pre-requisite for membership".¹⁰¹ Indeed the Hague communique itself had stressed that applicants must "accept the treaties and their political finality".¹⁰² The neutrals sincerely believed that there was a basic incompatibility between the goal of a federal united Europe, or indeed even of some confederal arrangement, and the desire to be neutral. Inherent in conceptions of federalism and political unification was the notion that the Community should progressively act "as a single entity" so that a "genuinely European foreign policy" and a

'European identity' could evolve.¹⁰³ Discussions had repeatedly taken place on these questions, some dating from proposals for a European Defence Community and an associated European Political Community.¹⁰⁴ A decade later there were the Fouchet negotiations following the Bonn summit of 1961.¹⁰⁵ Added significance, however, was given to these matters at the very moment when enlargement of the Community became a real possibility since as well as envisaging enlargement, the Hague summit also saw agreement to re-affirm the intention to pave "the way for a united Europe capable of ... making a contribution" to the world.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, when the Foreign Ministers reported later on how to achieve political union, as instructed by the summit, they argued that "foreign policy concertation should be the object of the first practical endeavours" in this area. Solidarity was to be enhanced "by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action where it appears feasible and desirable".¹⁰⁷ This prospect worried the neutrals, who were adamant that they could not involve themselves with "cooperation in matters of foreign policy which is binding and which aims at the working out of common policies".¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, they understood that East-West relations, and possibly defence, would be discussed in this framework, and that such discussions would not be confined to routine matters only, since the "nature and intensity" of cooperation was to be "directly dependent upon whether there was an increase in tension and unrest in the world".¹⁰⁹ The proposals, for example, did include provision for meetings of Heads of State or Government, in "the event of a serious crisis".¹¹⁰ The neutrals felt it was precisely at such times that they should not appear to be bound by consultations with others.¹¹¹ It may be that the neutrals took the proposals too much at face-value, but clearly it was legitimate to believe the Foreign Ministers meant what they said.

A further difficulty was the often assumed trinity of union, foreign policy and defence, given the belief that it was difficult to conceive of a union which would not be responsible for the defence of its citizens, or a common foreign policy that did not on the one hand guide that defence and on the other require a military instrument to sustain it. This perception was exacerbated by the fact that the union was clearly not going to be neutral, nonaligned or even alliance-free. This had been made clear at Bonn with its declaration, that "only a united Europe, allied to the United States of America and other free peoples, is in a position to face the dangers which menace the existence of Europe and of the whole free world". Coordinated action, indeed, was partly for the purpose of "strengthening the Atlantic alliance".¹¹²

This declaration was a determining factor in the preparation of the seminal speech by the Swedish Prime Minister Erlander to the Swedish Steel and Metalworkers' Union on 22 August 1961. He noted that "the political aim of strengthening the Atlantic Alliance is no inducement for us to participate in European cooperation. On the contrary, in view of the fundamental line of our foreign policy, a political aim of this kind gives us very definite cause for restraint". He went on to stress all the reasons why this was so, particularly the need to "avoid commitments restricting our chances of enlisting confidence in our policy of neutrality and of carrying it out". An application for membership of the Community might do that since it "might be interpreted as a political move signifying that we were prepared to depart from our policy of neutrality and to seek membership of the Atlantic Pact".¹¹³

This was, of course, possible given the initial over-lapping membership of the Community and NATO, which generated fears that it

would not be possible "to distinguish clearly political solidarity within a group of states from military solidarity".¹¹⁴ It was not just, however, a question of virtual identity of membership, but also the fact that many outside observers saw the Treaty of Rome as "supplementary to the Atlantic Pact" as well as "strengthening it".¹¹⁵ Paul-Henri Spaak saw "economic cooperation within the Community" as a "complement to the military cooperation of NATO", so that in his view they "belonged together".¹¹⁶ Moreover, apart from the Bonn Declaration, there was also the evidence of the Monnet Action Committee for the United States of Europe call for a "partnership between a united Europe and the United States".¹¹⁷ In other words, whilst the neutrals could see that initially military cooperation was likely to continue "in bodies other than the EEC ... the intention to achieve political, economic and defence integration, has been voiced so often and so explicitly" that they felt they had "no choice but to pay regard to their declarations".¹¹⁸ The neutrals could point to numerous statements by Community political leaders, and indeed by politicians from the applicant Britain, on the possibilities of the question of military cooperation being taken up within the framework of the EEC.¹¹⁹ It seemed "unavoidable that progress towards a common foreign policy will be followed by a greater degree of cooperation in respect of defence".¹²⁰ The real problem was, however, not the particular proposals but the general orientation that they revealed, so that whilst the neutrals did "not know how soon a common foreign policy will be worked out, neither do we know how soon such a common foreign policy will be linked with a common defence policy",¹²¹ they had legitimate grounds for believing that the member states of the Community were committed to such possibilities, and that Europe might well evolve in such a manner.

The neutrals did not regard it as realistic to suppose that they

"could systematically coordinate ... course in foreign affairs with that of the Western Powers while at the same time maintaining international confidence in ... policy of neutrality".¹²² Sweden, for example, felt that its policy could not "be combined with declared or implied pledges that we will enter into systematic cooperation in foreign policy or consultations with a certain Power bloc ...".¹²³ The precise legal text and obligation, the distinction between voluntary and obligatory cooperation, was not regarded as important as the impression created in the minds of others. Moreover the neutrals felt morally that they could not reserve their position on matters of foreign policy etc. which they knew prior to entry the Community members felt were important.¹²⁴

There were other political problems too, some of which related directly to the treaties, such as the question of handing over the right of making decisions to the institutions of the common market.¹²⁵ Indeed, Scheich writing from an Austrian perspective felt that "We have arrived at the point where the two spheres - neutrality and European integration - meet, or rather where they do not meet. Integration in the real sense of the word and with its institutional requirements is not compatible with the status of permanent neutrality. The neutral country is condemned to independence, condemned to staying alone".¹²⁶ Even if by the 1970s there was a realization that over time the "efforts to institute supranational ties to determine the actions of the EEC states have become less intense",¹²⁷ there was still a lack of preparedness "to give up our national sovereignty by transferring our right of decision-making on important economic and political questions to supranational organs".¹²⁸

It should be remembered that despite the 1965-6 crisis and the Luxembourg agreement of 1966, the EEC treaty did still contain provision for the eventual usage of majority voting on a wide range of

issues after the end of the transitional period. The de jure position remained that established by the treaty. Thus, for the neutrals the fundamental problem remained unaltered. Indeed, if anything they became more concerned about this when the proposals for economic and monetary union were published, fearing the possibility of centralized decision-making over crucial economic matters.¹²⁹ Moreover, the neutrals did not take a sanguine view regarding the possibilities of using the veto, since "for a small, neutral country ... It must be assumed that in practice the chances of using the right of veto will be very limited in cases where the neutral country stands alone".¹³⁰ In addition, it was felt they "should accede to international cooperation only when we are convinced that we shall ourselves be able to make a constructive contribution ... not ... on the understanding that we must limit our participation by having recourse, if necessary, to the right of veto".¹³¹

The insistence upon sovereignty related intimately to the desire to pursue a policy for neutrality, but there was a somewhat wider concern on the issue of sovereignty, with at least some voices in Sweden, for example, seeing close ties with the EEC as reducing Sweden's capacity to decide its own policies, it being an error "to purchase free trade with an ... expanded Community at the cost of limited sovereignty",¹³² especially with the risk of a threat to egalitarian policies within Sweden.¹³³ Such arguments and pressures were "apparently a major secondary consideration (after neutrality) in the government's final decision against full membership".¹³⁴

The sovereignty issue is crucial vis-à-vis the Community since the eminent J.D.B. Mitchell has clearly argued that "already by 1973, the Treaty of Rome had become a constitution having its effects within the internal law of the whole Community and having consequentially

effects, even then sufficiently clear, on the constitutional situation and internal law of each of the original Member States". In addition, he argues, the EEC Treaty itself claims that certain decisions may be "directly applicable", for example, in article 189. Mitchell argues, therefore, that Community law does enjoy primacy, citing in addition the Van Gend en Loos and Simmenthal cases. The original treaties had become by 1973 "a constitution" according to Mitchell, which overrode national constitutions.¹³⁵

Crucial is the question of whether a state can devolve its own sovereignty to an international organization for a period of time, or devolve a portion of its sovereignty? Whether, since it has only 'devolved' that sovereignty it still actually retains ultimate sovereignty, because it can either reclaim the sovereignty which it has devolved or simply withdraw? Implicit in some of the arguments concerning accession in the new member states in 1973 was an assumption that despite a lack of a definitive clause within the treaties themselves concerning withdrawal, or the mechanism of withdrawal, any state could, of course, at any time use its power - physical and democratic - to re-assert its sovereignty, that withdrawal was always possible from treaties, and that in reality the Community lacked any effective instruments for prohibiting or physically stopping secession. Whilst this debate perhaps lacks clear resolution, the neutrals were insistent upon the formal and explicit right of denunciation being in any agreement with the Community, rather than relying upon unilateral denunciation, which might have left their status somewhat unclear in law.

The foregoing does at least demonstrate that the arguments of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were not specious nor mendacious, particularly if one attached importance to credibility and expectation.

To some extent the letter of the treaties, and prosaic legal argument, were secondary considerations. It was the perceptions of the neutrals and others which mattered. In addition, these arguments took place in the context of discussion on union, steps towards political cooperation and, latterly, economic and monetary union, as well as in the context of the specific treaty articles and policies on such questions as the Common Commercial Policy.

However, the Swedes were clear that "even if" the process of political integration "was left out of account, it being maintained that the Treaty of Rome in actual fact only had a bearing on economic matters, we would nevertheless be compelled to point out that there are provisions in the Treaty which cannot be reconciled with our policy of neutrality in that certain cardinal points, few in number though they may be, affect our ability to implement it in practice".¹³⁶

Articles 223-225 of the EEC Treaty were and are a case in point, with the Swedes believing that on some interpretations, "in wartime all the institutions of the Common Market would continue to function more or less in the same way as in peacetime. If this interpretation is correct a neutral state would not be entitled in wartime to renounce its obligations", and as such there was a legal impediment between membership and continuing neutrality.¹³⁷ More generally, even as late as 1984 a Chatham House study argued "Article 224, which recognised that the operation of the common market depended on security factors, could be generously interpreted to permit Community concern with defence in cases in which the market's operations might be under threat as a result of civil and international disorder", and further suggested that defence was not formally excluded "from the Community agenda in the Treaty of Rome. Instead it was largely ignored ... Unless the narrow view is taken that anything not specifically allowed

is illegal, it would seem that the EC could expand into defence without actually violating the Treaty of Rome if its members so chose.

Evidence favouring a wide interpretation of the Treaty can be found in the Preamble, which notes members' determination to 'strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty', and in Article 235 ...".¹³⁸ Clearly, the 'three neutral countries' took a similar view in the earlier period.

Other problems arose with the EEC Treaty in respect of its internal provisions per se, its internal provisions with external effects and its specifically external provisions. Whilst it may be true that in the external area as a whole the legal and treaty competence of the Community is relatively limited in scope, in that the "Rome Treaty ... did not dwell at length or in detail on the external relations of the Community, apart from the provisions for association and trade agreements and a common commercial policy",¹³⁹ in these areas Community organs can play a significant role in shaping the economic and trade relations between the Community, its member states and third parties.¹⁴⁰

Most important in this respect is article 113 establishing a Common Commercial Policy based upon "uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff roles, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievements of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade ...". The article also gives the Commission a specific negotiating role, albeit "within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it".¹⁴¹ In 1970 a common foreign trade policy came into being, and since 1 January 1973 the member states of the Community have not been free to conclude independent bilateral trade agreements. They were to be replaced by multilateral agreements negotiated by the

Commission under the terms of article 113, the European Community henceforth acting as a collective entity in such matters. Indeed in 1974 "the Commission began to insist that all negotiations for trade agreements with East European countries be conducted exclusively by the Community".¹⁴² This made the policy of interest to neutrals who will also have been aware that all the countries of the Community, bar Ireland, were members of NATO, and that NATO had sought to operate an embargo of strategic goods towards Eastern Europe.

The customs union and Common External Tariff (CET) were also, in fact, important foundations of the external policy of the Community, the CET being the basic instrument of the Community's trade policy. It has meant, for example, that the Community states have negotiated collectively in both GATT and other international forums. Moreover, the Community has begun, on occasion, to be represented by the Council Presidency, or the Commission, or some combination thereof, on trade and commercial matters.¹⁴³ The neutrals were also aware that third countries, especially on economic matters, were more conscious of the unity and strength of the Community than they were of the centrifugal pressures and divisions within it.

Whilst the apparently severe restrictions upon members in concluding trade agreements did not come to pass, the neutrals made their judgement upon the basis of the relevant Treaty articles, as well as their understanding of the motivations and principles behind the CCP and Community trade policy, in addition to the declaratory policy of the member-states and therefore, had reason to suspect the possibility of supranational intervention, or worse, in their commercial policies. Indeed, they considered "The rules on trade with outside countries are ... most characteristic of the political restrictions imposed upon its members by the Treaty of Rome".¹⁴⁴

In fact, the formal transfer of external economic relations competences has been heavily constrained by the increasing use which has been made of so-called economic cooperation agreements between individual member-states and non-members, which have been developed as a means of by-passing Treaty requirements and obligations under CCP.¹⁴⁵ The significant point, however, remains the genuineness of the neutrals' belief prior to 1973 and the general cause for that belief which existed. Moreover, since that time it has been clear that foreign economic policy cannot always be separated neatly from foreign policy or even security, and that the economic external relations of the Community have, on occasion, been given a 'political' flavour.¹⁴⁶

Another area of the Rome Treaty having an external dimension is, of course, Part IV 'Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories' (articles 131-136), whereby the dependent territories of the member states were to be linked with the EEC. This further contributed to a certain image of the Community as capitalist or imperialist.¹⁴⁷ Whatever one's view on this, the capability of Community institutions to negotiate association agreements with these, and other countries, is a significant aspect of the international trade relations of the Community, particularly given the ever-spiralling numbers involved. Another form or category of association is provided for by article 238 which allows for "agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures". It is necessary under article 238 for the Council to act with unanimity.¹⁴⁸ Countries treated in this manner have included Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, and prior to membership, Greece.

As noted earlier, however, the role of the Community in the world is not to be seen as simply the outcome of specific articles on

external trade policy. One of the most important internal policies, the CAP, has, in fact, been another important element of the Community's external relations and persona. The establishment of CAP also imposed specific restraints on certain areas of member-states' trading policy.¹⁴⁹ For a while, given the commitment to economic and monetary union, it appeared that the Community would also have this as a basis for common external activity. This development, however, has been hampered by fundamental policy differences.¹⁵⁰ A somewhat similar disjointed picture emerges in another area where there is an overlap between the treaties and non-treaty areas, namely energy.¹⁵¹ Whilst the EEC Treaty does not specify the development of an energy policy, given the very remit of Euratom and ECSC, energy has been central to the Communities development. It is also true that the treaties have direct interaction with the international environment. The EEC also could not avoid involvement either, particularly given the events of 1973. Although most would judge that the EEC failed to rise to the challenge, this is an area where united common action could have important international consequences. It may also illustrate that as well as specific articles of the treaties potentially causing problems, it may well be that the very base for their survival, whether outlined in the treaties or not, also could cause difficulties for members, especially if neutral.

There are several areas where the linkage between the political objectives, the economic means as embodied in the treaties and that undefined grey area of spill-over between treaty and non-treaty concerns and activities can be demonstrated. One such is the attempt to evolve a global Mediterranean policy,¹⁵² another is the signing of the Lome Agreements by both Community and national authorities i.e. under the system of 'mixtes accords',¹⁵³ and a third in an allegedly 'low' political area, namely access to Icelandic waters. Rosemarie Allen

has suggested that the "small lever in the Community's hands to prise open access to these rich fishing grounds was the wish on the part of the Icelandic Government to increase its tiny share of industrial exports to the EEC. This lever was not, however, used because strategic considerations about Iceland's position in NATO restrained the Nine from exerting such pressure".¹⁵⁴

Most discussion of these problems has centred upon the EEC Treaty, but it should be noted that problems exist under the Euratom Treaty also. In the 'external' area, for example, articles 103 and 106 curtail the freedom of member states to conclude agreements with third parties. Article Two also has implications for sovereignty and also for the external relations of the member-states, and does represent some curtailment of a member-state's independence.¹⁵⁵ For Sweden with its own uranium, the possibility of part or all of the responsibility for its use being transferred to Euratom, and possibly onwards to the programmes of other states, was particularly worrying, if not publicly referred to by the Government. This latter observation is also true of the ECSC Treaty, which gave the High Authority (now the merged Commission) direct control over certain aspects of the activities of firms within states, and a role with relation to prohibiting 'unfair competitive practices' or 'discriminatory practices' by states.¹⁵⁶

All of the foregoing touched upon the issue of political freedom of action and specifically in connection with neutrality, these concerns led directly to the so-called "neutrality reservation" entered by all of the neutrals in their approaches to the Community as early as 1961. In essentials, the reservation was the same for each country, although in each case each year saw slightly different formulations. As outlined by the Swedish Minister of Commerce

before the EEC Council of Ministers on 28 July 1962, there was essentially three neutrality requirements.¹⁵⁷

"The first of the neutrality points relates to trade policy towards third countries ... As a neutral Country, we would have to keep a certain liberty of action and to reserve the competence to negotiate and sign agreements with third countries in our own name. On the other hand we are prepared, within institutional arrangements for consultation, to coordinate our tariff and trade policy closely with that of the Community."

"The second neutrality point relates to the safeguarding of certain supplies vital in wartime." The neutrals wanted the clear right to be able to take certain measures to safeguard supplies and resources.

"The third point has to do with a neutral country's need to be able to take or abstain from measures according to the requirements of neutrality. It may, for instance in cases of war and grave international crisis, have to introduce controls on trade or to refrain from taking part in sequestration of property directed against a belligerent. The derogation from any common action in an integrated market, which this need might imply, would be of varying importance according to the circumstance. But it is not excluded that it might go as far as the suspension of parts of, or the whole of, the agreement ... or withdrawal from the agreement," and the Minister referred to the provisions of article 224, which allowed the possibility of certain derogations to member states in some circumstances. The neutrals were adamant that if the international situation warranted it, they must be free to "take, or omit to take certain steps, even if necessary" terminating the agreement.¹⁵⁸

Whilst these were the central reservations, on occasions other elements were added, or the above were embellished. One such

additional requirement was the insistence upon the unanimity principle in any joint institutions involving the neutrals and the Community.¹⁵⁹ In summing up the reservations expressed in 1961-62, and indeed subsequently, the Swedish Minister of Commerce was anxious to emphasize that "the three neutrality requirements ... have the common feature of implying a certain liberty of action or right of derogation for the neutral country ... A basic feature of the liberty of action to be reserved is to make it possible for the neutral country not to take part in measures which, although of an economic nature, are actuated by political considerations alone and directed against third countries".¹⁶⁰ This, of course, is of relevance not only regarding 'liberty of action' but is also a revealing insight, again, into how the neutrals viewed the Community as rather more than a narrow economic arrangement.

What the neutrals really wanted was "to retain the right to determine their policies unilaterally and independently", and to arrive at the same result as the Community but in their own way.¹⁶¹ Any convergence of policy was to be by their own decision and not imposed by a third party, and certainly not to flow automatically from majority decision in a supranational body.

The decision about the relationship between Austria, Sweden and Switzerland and the Community was not solely in their hands, since it also crucially depended upon the attitude of the Community. Whilst there was no consistent exposition by the members of their attitude to neutrality, it is clear, however, that the most ardent Europeans were hostile to the very notion of neutrality. Indeed, in November 1961 President Hallstein of the EEC Commission attacked neutrality arguing that European neutrality had its origins in European conflicts, but that the aim of European unification was to

make war in Schuman's phrase "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible".¹⁶² It aimed to abolish the very state of affairs which created neutrality and occasioned its existence, and all effort, therefore, should go in the attempt to make war impossible.

Another prominent European, Paul-Henri Spaak had said at the beginning of 1963 that he did not believe that the Community should open its doors to countries which did not share its political ideal and philosophy, especially the philosophy underlying the Treaty of Rome.¹⁶³ Moreover, many felt that there was not necessarily any inherent incompatibility between membership and neutrality, and that, as a result, the neutrals were trying to gain advantages without the reciprocal obligations. The problem of attitude to the neutrals was further complicated by the fact that within each member-state various pressure groups held their own views.¹⁶⁴ The predominant view of the pro-Europeans was that there was a need to preserve their aspirations and the integrity of the Community. If non-members were prepared to accept these, then the Community would (France permitting) welcome them. If not, then perhaps no arrangement would be possible. The Community was anxious that no special arrangement should weaken its own cohesion, or lead to an impression that some form of loose arrangement without acceptance of far-reaching objectives was possible. In this latter respect, there was a fear of creating precedents.

One of the most considered responses to the neutrals' arguments came in the First Struye Report of 1962, and it must be recognized that it came to diametrically opposed conclusions to the neutrals concerning both the sovereignty and majority voting decisions arguments.¹⁶⁵ Struye argued that one could no longer regard sovereignty as one and indivisible, that states could voluntarily, and often did, limit their

own powers or delegate them to others. If sovereignty simply meant "the powers belonging to the State" permanent neutrality only affected them "in a field which is strictly limited by rules of law" and that that area apart (in any case very narrow in peacetime) "the powers of the State and consequently its sovereignty are not subjected to any restrictions". The state could therefore exercise these powers "in complete freedom", even delegating them to "supranational authorities" except where "such limitations or delegations are concerned with fields which are affected by neutrality". The conclusion was that such limitations or delegations would be incompatible with neutrality as a goal "if they prevent the State from deciding freely whether to take part or not in a war, or threaten the very existence of the State concerned. This is not so of the limitations of sovereignty contained in the Treaty of Rome".

Perpetually neutral states "can, at least in time of peace, submit to the majority decisions of the Treaty of Rome, as these do not concern fields affected by the law of neutrality". Similarly, in time of peace, "participation in a joint commercial policy as laid down in the Treaty of Rome raises no legal objection" for the neutral. Very significantly, however, it was admitted, somewhat grudgingly, that "such participation by neutrals in a joint commercial policy might be considered as incompatible with the duties of neutral States in time of war if one follows the extensive interpretation of the duty of impartiality" with the result that the neutral might have "to leave" the Community, in order to avoid participation in potentially discriminatory commercial decisions. But this conclusion was somewhat weakened by a reference to neutrals being allowed to maintain "normal intercourse" and trade. Notwithstanding the problems caused by the CCP, Struye concluded "in our opinion neither the independence

nor the neutrality of the States we have been dealing with would be threatened by their participation in the European Economic Community". The problem is, however, that it is difficult to be quite so sanguine about the impact of membership of the Community and its implications for independence and neutrality, as is Struye.

Before examining the final outcome in 1972 it is necessary to briefly discuss the attitude of the Soviet Union to the European Community. Although this does not appear to have been a decisive factor in either Swedish or Swiss discussions (the case of Austria was different because of the events, undertakings and treaty of 1955) it remains important in the sense that if these states were concerned about the damage membership might do to their image and credibility, then the attitude of the Soviets, would have been an important guide for them. The opinion of the other super power regarding the Community was clear and indeed US support for the European idea had on a number of occasions been crucial and an important stimulus to European action.

In the Soviet mind there seems to have been a clear linkage between the economic, political and military moves towards integration. They were regarded as tools of US capitalism, cold war instruments and an economic underpinning of NATO. In 1957 the Soviet Union gave its considered view on the Common Market in the form of 17 theses, which argued that "under cover of the 'unification' of Europe, the imperialist promoters of integration have divided Europe into economic, political and military groups opposed to one another; they have created an aggressive military bloc of Western European powers aimed against the Soviet Union and the popular democracies".¹⁶⁶ In 1962 32 theses echoed very much the 17 theses. One significant difference by 1962, however, was the recognition that the Common Market was an

economic and political reality, which had to be countered, contained and its expansion prevented. This attitude was combined with a refusal to extend diplomatic recognition to the Community or to treat it as an entity in diplomatic relations.¹⁶⁷

This basic hostility has remained the fundamental Soviet position, although they have had to come to terms with the Community's continuing existence and enlargement, and the change of atmosphere in the 1970s given detente and Ostpolitik. Moreover, in the early 1970s the movement towards the CCP, especially as it affected state-trading countries, was also significant. Given these developments there was a certain moderation of rhetoric and by 1972 Brezhnev was contemplating the possibility of business relations between Comecon and the Community.¹⁶⁸ What is clear is that in the critical years 1961-1972, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland could have been in no doubt concerning the Soviet attitude.

Certainly the Austrians could have been in even less doubt about the Soviet attitude, given, for example, the Khrushchev warning in 1960 that the Soviet Union would not tolerate violation of Austrian neutrality, nor of the provision of the 1955 State Treaty prohibiting "all agreements having the effect, either directly or indirectly, of promoting political and economic union with Germany", with the Soviets inclining to interpreting a relationship with the Community in that vein.¹⁶⁹ The Soviets reiterated their concern in 1972. In fact, the Soviets did not make a major issue of this, and the Austrians have not yielded to the Soviet warnings, although these may well have reinforced Austrian conclusions or stiffened their attitude.¹⁷⁰

The actual arrangements involving Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were virtually identical with one another, and were preferential trade agreements establishing a free trade area in industrial products but

excluding agriculture. Significantly the agreements were concluded under article 113 (ie. CCP arrangements) and not article 238 (association agreements).¹⁷¹ The neutrals themselves made much of article 21 (in all three agreements) which allowed them to take "any measures" they considered essential to their "own security in time of war or serious international tension", and article 34 (in all three agreements) which gave each side the right to denounce the agreement, albeit that it would remain formally in force for a further 12 month period. The institutional arrangements were minimal (articles 27-31), with the creation of a Joint Committee comprised of representatives from both the Community and the state concerned. There was a requirement for unanimity and an avoidance of supranationalism. The Joint Committee was to supervise the proper functioning of the agreement and to act as a clearing-house for information. More importantly, it was also the custodian of the so-called evolutionary (or amplification) clause, namely article 32 (in all three agreements) which allowed for potential entry, by mutual agreement, into fields not covered by the original agreements.

This clause, which appears to have been a particular Swedish initiative, was a way for the neutrals to reconcile their original aspirations with the restricted agreement finally reached. It has also proved to be one of the most contentious articles of the agreements. The official view was that the partnership between Community and neutrals would be dynamic, that it would naturally spill-over into other fields, such as general economic and monetary policies.¹⁷² It was precisely this that critics feared. In response the Swedish government asserted "this clause is not something forced on us by the EEC", but was rather a Swedish idea. Moreover, at any time, it was dependent upon mutual agreement whether anything

happened, there being no "automatic implications".¹⁷³

Another area of relevance to the neutrality argument was agriculture. On the one hand, the Swiss, in particular, were reluctant to have it included for reasons of neutrality, since "According to official Swiss views, maintaining a certain level of Swiss agricultural production is necessary for economic self-reliance (or at least partial self-reliance) in case of war".¹⁷⁴ On the other, as well as French worries over particular items, the Community, especially the Commission, were reluctant to see any tampering with the institutional system behind the CAP, and it was difficult, given the emphasis upon Community autonomy, to see how non-members might contribute.

The governments concerned, particularly the Swedish who perhaps had had the highest expectations, were ready to admit that "No settlement comes entirely up to expectations",¹⁷⁵ but argued that the disadvantages were the price of neutrality, since the "limited nature of the agreement is an outcome of the fact that ... refrained from seeking membership".¹⁷⁶ The governments were emphatic that the agreements signed contained "no undertakings, either formal ones or in practice, which might restrict our freedom to pursue an independent foreign policy and to preserve our neutrality".¹⁷⁷ Given the governments self-proclaimed concern over this issue, this perhaps remains the real test.

The neutrality issue is not closed, since the real problem is not the formal agreements but whether with economies increasingly tied to those of the Community, the governments of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland would be prepared to sever economic links with their major trading partners. It is this interdependence which undermines neutrality.

Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, is the argument from the Swiss perspective by Frei, for example, who concluded that "there will most definitely be no whirling process of rapid spill-over" since the items on the agenda "are quite remote from the sensitive political areas ... when it comes to ... central questions, there are myriad difficulties and a host of diverging interests". But, on the other hand, he was also aware that what happens "will take the form of action by the EEC and of reflex action by Switzerland", since "Swiss integration policy is, in most fields, a function of EEC policy".¹⁷⁸

The kernel of the matter, then remains the pace and depth of development within the European Community, with the additional dimension of increasing economic interdependence eventually subverting the de facto possibility of neutrality, by tying the neutrals irrevocably to the Community, perhaps ultimately causing them to join. If the Community had developed as expected post-1972, the problems for the neutrals would have multiplied, given their exclusion from Community decision-making and the Community movement towards EMU etc. As it happens, that has not occurred. Moreover, there is perhaps one great advantage in the 1972 agreements compared especially with membership, and perhaps with association, in that the world does tend to perceive the Community externally as a single unit in many areas of activity. Given the somewhat amorphous relationship in the public eye that Austria, Sweden and Switzerland have with the Community, it might be argued that the visibility of the relationship is much more clouded than would have been the case given membership. They are not identified with the 12 to the same extent as Ireland as a member is, and their distinctive persona is evident, for example, in many international fora. Give the significance attached to the need to

be seen to be independent, to credibility and expectations this may be very important.

The critical point, however, is that if such agreements under article 113 can lead to continuing doubts over the status of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, how much more serious must the doubts be about a putative neutral which actually chose to become a full member of the Community, and tried for over a decade to join.

Summary

Whilst an almost infinite number of independent variables can be associated with neutrality, nonalignment and with the European model of 'Neutral and/or Nonaligned', from the foregoing discussion the most significant variables can be identified, albeit in a somewhat compendious and integrated form. With regard to neutrality, the key variables are:-

- (i) the rights and duties of neutrality - including impartiality; abstention; inviolability of territory and sovereignty; active measures and due diligence with regard to upholding rights and fulfilling duties and; normal trade;
- (ii) recognition of position by belligerents and others - since neutrality is not a unilateral art but rather requires credibility, the confidence of others and gives no ground of suspicion or hope to others;
- (iii) disavowal of help - including the lack of preparation for or expectation of help, as well as 'defence against help' and action against having a 'protective umbrella' and;
- (iv) freedom of decision and action - in the political, economic and military spheres, with the avoidance of entangling commitments and alliances or dependence, and the pursuit of independence.

These variables will be applied specifically to Ireland in the years of the great test, namely the period of the Second World War.

With regard to nonalignment and the European model the number of putative variables is huge. However, with regard to nonalignment per se, it has already been established that much of its quintessence, particularly as it relates to the crucial variables of experience and attitude, is quite distinct from the European situation and, therefore, for the reasons already established, not particularly helpful or relevant to the European or Irish cases. Nonetheless, certain elements of that quintessence and of the European model can usefully be related to the already established variables, especially since they, in any case, need to be modified to take account of the postwar move to peace, and thus to the requirements 'for neutrality' rather than 'of neutrality'. For example, the quest for independence and the question of attitudes to alliance can be meaningfully discussed under a modified 'freedom of decision and action'. It is, however, necessary to add two new variables for use in the analysis of the postwar situation to adequately reflect the nonalignment dimension, and to also distinguish it from neutrality per se. The modified and extended variables for the period 1945-1982 are, therefore:-

- (i) due diligence - with respect to maintaining inviolability of territory and sovereignty, and the related question of active measures. The strict requirements of neutral rights and duties will not be applied, given the absence of war, although the crucial issue of impartiality will be discussed under (ii) and (v);
- (ii) recognition of position by others - with regard to the credibility of the Irish position, the confidence of others in it and the lack of grounds for suspicion or hope by others;

- (iii) disavowal of help - including the lack of preparation for or expectation of help, as well as 'defence against help' and action against having a 'protective umbrella';
- (iv) freedom of decision and action - in the political, economic and military spheres, with the avoidance of entangling commitments and alliances, dependence, or 'ties that bind', and the pursuit of independence;
- (v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to help ameliorate world problems and impartiality and;
- (vi) attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-determination.

Before either set of variables can be applied, however, it is necessary to examine the prewar foundations of Irish policy. In the prewar period, the complications engendered by the Irish constitutional position, its Commonwealth membership, and 'the ports' issue, are so severe as to make the strict application of the variables identified inappropriate, although as will be seen in the following chapter the themes represented by the variables inform the nature of the discussion.

Chapter Four : Footnotes

1. Those under one million are Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta and San Marino.
2. The category of 'Guest' was introduced at Lusaka primarily for liberation movements, but on Austrian initiative was extended to European states not aspiring to full membership. 'Observers' do so aspire - see Harto Hakovirta, 'Effects of Non-Alignment on Neutrality in Europe : An Analysis and Appraisal; Cooperation and Conflict, XVIII (1983) pp.61-63.
3. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Republic, Moscow, 6 April 1948 in J.A.S. Grenville, The Major International Treaties 1914-1973. A History and a guide with texts, (London, Methuen, 1974) pp.369-370.
4. Brian Faloon, 'Aspects of Finnish neutrality', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 1, No.3 (1982) p.10. For aspects of the debate on the Finnish position see: G. Maude, The Finnish Dilemma, (London, Oxford University Press, 1976); M. Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality (London, Evelyn, 1968); Bengt Sundelius (ed.), Foreign Policies of Northern Europe, (Boulder, Westview, 1982); Raimo Vayrynen, 'The Evolution of Finland's Foreign Policy since the end of the Second World War', and Aimo Pajunen, 'Some Aspects of Finnish Security Policy' in Karl E. Birnbaum and Hanspeter Neuhold, Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, (Wien, Braumiller, Laxenburg Papers, 1981) pp.132-165; Karen E. Orvik, 'The Limits of Security : Defence and Foreign Trade in Finland', Survey Vol.24, No.2 (Spring 1979) and; R. Allison, Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-1984 (Oxford, St. Anthony's College, 1985).
5. Jacques Freymond, 'The European Neutrals and the Atlantic Community' in F.O. Wilcox and H.F. Haviland Jr. (eds.), The Atlantic Community : Progress and Prospects, (New York, Praeger, 1963) p.86.
6. European Economic Community: Commission, Report to the European Parliament on the state of the negotiations with the United Kingdom, (Brussels, European Economic Community, 1963) p.97.
7. Manfred Scheich, 'The European Neutrals after Enlargement of the Communities - The Austrian Perspective', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.12, No.3 (1973-4) p.240. See also Struye, 'Memorandum on the political aspects of neutrality' (Document 1581) to Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 29 April 1963, (Hereafter Second Struye Report 1963).
8. Swedish Foreign Minister, Wickman, in 'Afrique-Asie' September 1973, re-produced in Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1973, (Stockholm, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, New Series 1:C:23, 1976) p.65 (Hereafter D.S.F.P.). See also Hakovirta op.cit., p.61.
9. Government Declaration to Riksdag, 31 March 1976 - D.S.F.P. 1976, p.23.
10. Swedish Prime Minister, Erlander, speech to Swedish Steel and Metal-workers' Union, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.119
11. Wickman, in 'Afrique-Asie' September 1973, D.S.F.P. 1973, p.65.
12. See Agreement on an International Energy Program, 18 November 1974, (London, H.M.S.O. Cmnd. 5826, 1975). See also Maude op.cit.,

- p.128, and for Swedish view and position see 'Press release' 18 November 1974, D.S.F.P. 1974, pp.251-2 and Parliamentary reply by Foreign Minister Andersson, 16 January 1975, D.S.F.P. 1975, pp.251-2.
13. This does not apply to their commercial military activities i.e. the buying and selling of equipment. See, for example, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.93; D.S.F.P. 1971, p.244 and; D.S.F.P. 1975, p.10. See also Nils Andren, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment : A Perspective on Swedish Foreign Policy, (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1967), p.174 and Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms : The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence, (London, Chatto and Windus, 1976), pp.57-58, and 109.
 14. Bruno Kreisky, 'Austria Draws the Balance', Foreign Affairs, Vol.37, No.2 (January 1959) pp.269-281.
 15. Government message to Parliament, 4 February 1948 in Andren op.cit. p.51.
 16. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 28 July 1962, D.S.F.P. 1962, p.148, and Swedish Foreign Minister, November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.77.
 17. Andren op.cit. p.60. He has an interesting commentary on these developments pp.53 ff.
 18. Government message to Parliament, 4 February 1948 Ibid pp.48-52.
 19. Minister of Foreign Affairs to Riksdag, 9 February 1949 Ibid pp.62-72. The quotations in the next three paragraphs are from the same speech.
 20. Roberts op.cit. p.80.
 21. Andren op.cit. p.192.
 22. See Nils Andren (ed.), The Future of the Nordic Balance, (Stockholm, Ministry of Defence, 1977); J.J. Holst (ed.), Five Roads to Nordic Security, (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1973); Nils Andren, 'Prospects for the Nordic Security Pattern', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. XIII, No.4 (1978); and A.O. Brundtland, 'The Nordic Balance' and Erik Moberg, 'The "Nordic Balance" Concept. A Critical Commentary', in Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.II (1966).
 23. Swedish Foreign Minister, 13 March 1964, D.S.F.P. 1964, p.9.
 24. D. Frei, 'Switzerland and the EEC : Facts and Trends', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.12, No.3 (1973-74), p.260.
 25. Prime Minister, Erlander, 24 January 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.12.
 26. Swedish Foreign Minister, 13 March 1964, D.S.F.P. 1964, p.11.
 27. Government statement, 31 March 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.31.
 28. Scheich op.cit. p.237, referring to the Austrian position.
 29. Government statement, 19 April 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.15.
 30. Swedish Foreign Minister, 11 March 1965, D.S.F.P. 1965, p.17.
 31. Although in August 1961, Prime Minister Erlander attempted to argue Swedish trade was neither predominantly in one commodity, nor with one product, which allowed "a certain amount of freedom of action", 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, pp.116-117.
 32. James L. Waite, 'The Swedish Paradox : EEC and Neutrality', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.12, No.3 (1973-74), p.335.
 33. Ibid p.319.

34. Swedish Foreign Minister, 1 November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.81.
35. Max Petitpierre, 'Is Swiss Neutrality Still Justified?' in Switzerland, Present and Future, (New Helvetic Society, 1963) extract in Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970) p.176, emphasis added.
36. Quoted by Freymond from Swiss presentation to Council of Ministers, 1962 - See Wilcox and Haviland op.cit. pp.76-77.
37. Idem.
38. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 28 July 1962, D.S.F.P. 1962, p.146.
39. Andren, Power-Balance and Non-Alignment, op.cit. p.54.
40. Howard Turner, Sweden and European Integration : the significance of the neutrality component in Swedish foreign policy, (Unpublished M.A. dissertation, Leicester University, June 1975), p.iv.
41. Swedish Foreign Minister, 6 October 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, p.71.
42. Swedish Foreign Minister, 5 November 1975, D.S.F.P. 1975, pp.80-85 and Government declaration, 31 March 1976, D.S.F.P. 1976, p.19 and Andren op.cit. p.9.
43. Jacques Freymond, 'How the Small Countries Can Contribute to Peace', in A. Schou and A.O. Brundtland (eds.), Small States in International Relations, (Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971) pp.177-186.
44. Swedish Foreign Minister, 11 March 1965, D.S.F.P. 1965, p.17. See also Government declaration, 23 March 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, p.22.
45. Swedish Prime Minister, 2 February 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, pp.14-15 emphasis added.
46. It is worth reiterating that the Swedish position is not immutable given its lack of legal foundation, especially given that in 1956 the Swedish parliament "rejected the idea that Sweden should bind its foreign policy ... in an unforeseeable future under the guarantee of foreign powers" - Andren op.cit. p.191.
47. Government statement, 21 March 1968, D.S.F.P. 1968, p.13.
48. Swedish Prime Minister, 9 November 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, pp.80-81, and Foreign Minister, 6 October 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, pp.72-3.
49. Swedish Government Statement, 31 March 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.31.
50. Swedish Prime Minister, 2 February 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.16.
51. See below pp.107-110 and 137.
52. See below pp.110-136.
53. Scheich, op.cit. p.237.
54. Peter Lyon, Neutralism, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963), p.175.
55. Waite, op.cit. pp.319-336.
56. Swedish Foreign Minister, 1 November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.81, and Roberts, op.cit. p.74.
57. Swedish Prime Minister, 2 February 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.16. See also Sweden's Total Defence 1982-1987, (DsFo 1981:5, Ministry of Defence, Sweden, 1981).

58. Sweden's Total Defence 1982-1987, op.cit. p.15.
59. Roberts, op.cit. p.103, and p.73.
60. Sweden's Total Defence 1982-1987, op.cit. p.16 and Sweden in Brief, (Stockholm, The Swedish Institute, 1982) pp.32-34.
61. Sweden's Total Defence 1982-1987, op.cit. p.15.
62. See Swedish Prime Minister, 5 August 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.46, and Foreign Minister, 1 May 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, pp.32-36.
63. For basic facts about the respective forces and equipment of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland see The Military Balance 1985-1986, (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985) pp.62-3, 65-7, and 170.
64. Compare Swedish Minister of Defence, 21 May 1963, D.S.F.P. 1963, p.151, and Foreign Minister 9 February 1949 quoted in Andren op.cit. pp.62-72.
65. Roberts op.cit. p.42.
66. Swedish Foreign Minister, 25 February 1964, D.S.F.P. 1964, p.10.
67. The Times, 10 May 1983, reported that "70% of the armed forces' equipment is made in Sweden" albeit at "a very much higher cost than the equivalent bought elsewhere". See also Roberts op.cit. pp.57-58 and 108-109; Andren op.cit. p.174 and; D.S.F.P. 1961, p.93, D.S.F.P. 1969, pp.9-11, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.244 and D.S.F.P. 1975, p.10.
68. Foreign Minister 25 February 1964, D.S.F.P. 1964, p.10, and Foreign Minister 9 February 1949 quoted in Andren op.cit., pp.62-72.
69. Swedish Foreign Minister 1 November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.81, and The Military Balance 1985-1986, op.cit. p.170.
70. Andren, 'Prospects for the Nordic Security Pattern', op.cit. pp.189-190. See also Swedish Foreign Minister, 21 January 1967, D.S.F.P. 1967, p.10.
71. The Military Balance 1984-1985 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984) p.140. The Times 7 April 1981 reported that "Sweden ... possesses as many inceptor fighters - 432 Viggen and Saab aircraft - as Nato has in the whole of northern Europe".
72. Defence comparisons involve a number of difficulties, for example, whether there is conscription and reservist numbers and training.
73. Swedish Foreign Minister, 25 February 1964, D.S.F.P. 1964, p.10.
74. Idem.
75. Swedish Foreign Minister, 1 November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, pp.80-81.
76. Swedish Prime Minister, 7 June 1962, D.S.F.P. 1962, p.30. See also Minister of Defence, 21 May 1963, D.S.F.P. 1963, pp.150-151.
77. Quoted by Roberts, op.cit. p.54 as a Swiss official description of their aim. See also M.R.D. Foot, Men in Uniform : Military Manpower in Modern Industrial Societies, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961) p.63.
78. Roberts, op.cit. p.94.
79. Sweden's Security Policy and Total Defence : A Summary of the first report by the 1978 Parliamentary Committee on Defence, June 1979, (Ds Fo 1979:3, Stockholm, Ministry of Defence, 1979), pp.12-15.

80. Swedish Prime Minister, 22 June 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.104.
81. See Minister of Defence, 21 May 1963, D.S.F.P. 1963, p.149, and Prime Minister, 2 February 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.18.
82. Sweden as a founding member, Austria almost immediately upon re-gaining its independence and Switzerland in 1963. Both Austrian and Swiss observers had previously contributed to debates.
83. Article 20(a) of The Statute of Council of Europe, 5 May 1949, and Article 1 (d). See A.H. Robertson, The Council of Europe, (London, Stevens and Sons, 2nd ed., 1961) pp.257-269 for The Statute.
84. Ibid, pp.46-47. Robertson cites Resolution (51)31 of the Committee of Ministers.
85. Idem. This formula originated with Harold Macmillan.
86. Full text in Documents of the Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, 1952 Doc. 11. For a discussion of the proposals and reaction see Robertson op.cit. pp.94-99.
87. 27 May 1952, extracts re-produced in Andren op.cit. pp.122-124. It is worth noting that this view, if valid, says much concerning Ireland's position.
88. Robertson, op.cit. pp.102-108. Neither the Swiss nor Austrians were members at this time.
89. European Free Trade Association Secretariat, Convention of Stockholm establishing The European Free Trade Association, 4 January 1960, (Geneva 1967).
90. Minister of Commerce, 23 March 1966, D.S.F.P. 1966, p.122; 23 and 30 November 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, pp.153-4; Government message 25 October 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.133 and; Foreign Minister, 23 October 1967, D.S.F.P. 1967, p.54.
91. Carl-Einar Stalvant, 'Neutrality and European Integration : a comparison of Finland's and Sweden's EEC policies', Scandinavian Studies, Vol.46, No.4 (Fall 1974) p.406. See also Swedish Prime Minister, 6 August 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.48.
92. See, for example, Bengt A.W. Johanson, 'Sweden and the EEC : An Approach to the Study of the Political Process', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol 1, No.4 (1970), pp.286-292, which is a review of Mats Bergquist, Sverige och EEC, (Lund Political Studies II, Norstedts, Stockholm 1970).
93. Swedish Prime Minister, 6 August 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.48.
94. Government Message to Riksdag, 25 October 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.132.
95. Idem. See also Swedish Prime Minister, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.120.
96. Minister of Commerce, 15 May 1962, D.S.F.P. 1962, pp.133-4 and Foreign Minister, 25 August 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.45.
97. Freymond in Brundtland and Schou op.cit. p.184.
98. Stalvant op.cit. p.415.
99. 'Communique of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the European Community's Member States of 2 December 1969, in The Hague', Bulletin of the European Communities (January 1970) Vol.3, No.1, Bull. 1-1970, pp.11-18.

100. 'Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification', Bulletin of the European Communities, November 1970, Vol.3, No.11, pp.9-14.
101. Government statement, 31 March 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.30 and see also p.228.
102. The Swedish Prime Minister visited Bonn, Paris and London in the spring of 1970 in an endeavour to discover what 'les traites et leurs finalites politiques' meant.
103. Following the Paris summit of 1972, the Nine states agreed in July 1973 to define the European identity in a Declaration. The text was approved by the Foreign Ministers in November 1973, and was published during the December 1973 Copenhagen summit. The text is Bulletin of the European Communities, December 1973, Vol.6, No.12, pp.118-122.
104. See Edward Fursdon, The European Defence Community : A History, (London, Macmillan, 1980).
105. See A. Silj, Europe's Political Puzzle : A Study of the Fouchet Negotiations and the 1963 Veto, (Occasional papers in International Affairs No. 17, Harvard, Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1967).
106. 'Communique of the Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the European Community's Member States of 2 December 1969, in The Hague', Bulletin of the European Communities 1-1970, pp.11-18.
107. 'Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification', Bulletin of the European Communities, November 1970, Vol.3, No.11, pp.9-14.
108. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 10 November 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.60, emphasis added.
109. Swedish Government Statement, 31 March 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.31.
110. 'Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problem of Political Unification', Bulletin of the European Communities, November 1970, Vol.3, No.11, pp.9-14.
111. Swedish Government Statement, 31 March 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, pp.30-31.
112. See Silj op.cit. pp.133-5 for text.
113. Swedish Prime Minister, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, pp.111-125.
114. Swedish Foreign Minister, November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.78.
115. Swedish Prime Minister, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, pp.120-121.
116. Swedish Prime Minister, 5 August 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.48.
117. Quoted in M. Palmer and J. Lambert et al. for P.E.P., European Unity (London, Allen and Unwin, 1968) pp.142-143. This was precursor to the famous President Kennedy Philadelphia speech on 4 July 1962.
118. Swedish Foreign Minister, November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.78.
119. Swedish Prime Minister, 5 August 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.49, and see, for example, Edward Heath, Old World, New Horizons : Britain, The Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance, (The Godkin Lectures at Harvard University, 1967 published London, Oxford University Press, 1970), pp.59-84, especially pp.72-4.

120. Swedish Prime Minister, 2 February 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.228.
121. Swedish Foreign Minister, 1 January 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, p.33.
122. Swedish Government Declaration, 23 March 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, p.26.
123. Idem, emphasis added.
124. Swedish Prime Minister, 5 August 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.49, and Swedish Foreign Minister, November 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.78.
125. Government message to Riksdag, 25 October 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.134, and Minister of Commerce, 10 November 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.60.
126. Scheich op.cit. p.237, emphasis in original.
127. Swedish Foreign Minister, 23 October 1967, D.S.F.P. 1967, p.54 but it was a concern, see Swedish Prime Minister, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.122.
128. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 23-30 November 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.150.
129. The 'Werner Report' - 'Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of 'Economic and Monetary Union' in the Community', Supplement to the Bulletin of the European Communities, 1-1970.
130. Swedish Government Statement, 31 March 1971, D.S.F.P. 1971, p.29. In May 1982, of course, even a British veto was over-ridden.
131. Idem.
132. Tord Ekstrom, Gunnar Myrdal and Roland Palsson, Vi och Vasteuropa : Andra rouden, (Stockholm, Raben and Sjogren, 1971) p.106 cited by M. Donald Hancock, 'Sweden, Scandinavia and the EEC', International Affairs Vol.48, No.3 (July 1972) p.434.
133. Tord Ekstrom, 'Sverige, EEC och jamlikhetspolitiken', Tiden Vol.63 (1971), No.7, p.409 cited in Hancock idem. See also Swedish Prime Minister, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, pp.122-124.
134. Hancock op.cit. p.435.
135. J.D.B. Mitchell, 'The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community Law : the Stumbling-Block that isn't there', International Affairs, Vol.55, No.1 (January 1979) pp.33-46. This produced a rejoinder by Stephen A. George, 'Letter to the Editor : The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community Law', International Affairs, Vol.56, No.1 (January 1980) pp.94-97, which concluded there was no definitive proof Mitchell was correct. On the sovereignty question see Charles Burton Marshall, The Exercise of Sovereignty, (Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1965); M. Wight, Systems of States, ed. H. Bull (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977); J.E.S. Fawcett, Law and Power in International Relations, (London, Faber, 1982); H. Bull, The Anarchical Society, (London, Macmillan, 1977) and; two interesting articles: P.A. Reynolds, 'International Studies : Retrospect and Prospect', British Journal of International Studies, Vol.1, No.1 (April 1975) and Alan James, 'Sovereignty: ground rule or gibberish?', Review of International Studies, Vol.10, No.1 (January 1984) pp.1-18.
136. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 26 November 1962, D.S.F.P. 1962, p.161.

137. Swedish Prime Minister, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, p.120, and Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957 - hereafter, EEC Treaty in Treaties Establishing the European Communities, (Brussels, Office for Official Publications, 1978).
138. Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation, (Chatham House Papers 24, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1984) pp.17-18.
139. Geoffrey Goodwin, 'The external relations of the European Community - shadow and substance', British Journal of International Studies, Vol.3, No.1 (April 1973) p.39.
140. Werner J. Feld, The European Community in World Affairs : Economic Power and Influence, (Sherman Oaks, Alfred Publishing, 1976) p.11.
141. EEC Treaty op.cit. Article 113.
142. Feld op.cit. p.219.
143. Based on the provisions of EEC Treaty op.cit. Articles 116, 229, 230 and 231.
144. Swedish Prime Minister, 22 August 1961, D.S.F.P. 1961, pp.119-120.
145. Feld op.cit. p.219 cites, for example, the ten-year accord between the Federal Republic of Germany and Romania of 29 June 1973.
146. See, for example, Jean Siotis, 'The European Economic Community and its emerging Mediterranean Policy' in Frans A.M. Alting Von Gesau, The external relations of the European Community, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1974) pp.69-70.
147. See, for example, the work of Johan Galtung, The European Community : A Superpower in the Making, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1973).
148. EEC Treaty op.cit. Article 238.
149. For a review of the CAP see John S. Marsh and Pamela J. Swanney, 'The Common Agricultural Policy', in Juliet Lodge (ed.), Institutions and Policies of the European Community, (London, Frances Pinter, 1983) pp.54-84.
150. See Dennis Swann, The Economics of the Common Market, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 5th edition, 1984) especially pp.175-205.
151. See Robert A. Black Jnr., 'Plus ca Change, Plus C'Est la Meme Chose : Nine Governments in Search of a Common Energy Policy', in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Communities, (London, John Wiley, 1977) pp.165-196.
152. See Roy Howard Ginsberg, 'The European Community and the Mediterranean' in Lodge op.cit. pp.154-167.
153. See, for example, Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, A Framework for Development : The EEC and ACP, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1981) and Carol Cosgrove Twitchett, Europe and Africa : From Association to Partnership, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1978).
154. Rosemarie Allen, 'Fishing for a Common Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies XIX No.2 (December 1980) pp.123-139, especially p.129.

155. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Rome 25 March 1957, articles 2, 103 and 106 in Treaties Establishing the European Communities, op.cit.
156. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 18 April 1951, articles 47 and 60, in Treaties Establishing the European Communities, op.cit.
157. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 28 July 1962, D.S.F.P. 1962, pp.146-154.
158. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 23-30 November 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.150.
159. Partly as a safeguard against new obligations being created - Scheich op.cit. p.240.
160. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 28 July 1962, D.S.F.P. 1962, p.153.
161. Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, (London, Oxford University Press, 1965) pp.497-8.
162. For Schuman's speech see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 13-20, 1950 (Keynsham : Keesing's Publications, 1950) p.10701, whilst Hallstein's arguments are re-produced in 'The Macmillan Report' of May 1962 to Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, as Doc. 1420, Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 9 May 1962, p.21. 'The Macmillan Report' gives a revealing insight into a number of attitudes.
163. 'The Macmillan Report' op.cit. p.23.
164. See Camps op.cit. p.498.
165. M. Struye, 'Memorandum on the legal aspects of neutrality' (Doc.1420) to Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, 9 May 1962, (hereafter First Struye Report, 1962).
166. An English version of 'The Seventeen Theses on the Common Market', issued by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Moscow 1957 is to be found in Richard Vaughan, Post-War Integration in Europe, (London, Edward Arnold, 1976) pp.156-8.
167. See David F.P. Forte, 'The Response of Soviet Foreign Policy to the Common Market, 1957-63', Soviet Studies XIX No.3 (1967-68) pp.373-386; John Pinder, 'The Community and the State-Trading Countries' in K. Twitchett, Europe and The World, (London, Europa Publications, 1976) pp.57-76; I. John (ed.), EEC policy towards Eastern Europe, (Farnborough, Saxon House, 1975); A. Shlaim and G. Yannopoulos, The EEC and Eastern Europe, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978) and; C. Ransom, The European Community and Eastern Europe, (London, Butterworth, 1973).
168. I. John, 'The Soviet Response to Western European Integration', in John (ed.) op.cit. p.47.
169. Article 4 Austrian State Treaty. See Michael Cullis, 'The Austrian Treaty settlement', Review of International Studies, Vol.7, No.3 (July 1981) pp.159-164 for background on the 1955 negotiations.
170. See Scheich op.cit. p.245.

171. Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Austria Regulation (EEC) No.2836/72 of the Council of 19 December 1972. OJ No. L300.
Official Journal of the European Communities, Special Edition 1972, (31 December) pp.4-97.
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Sweden Regulation (EEC) No.2838/72 of the Council of 19 December 1972. OJ No.L300.
Ibid pp.98-189.
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation.
Regulation (EEC) No. 2840/72 of the Council of 19 December 1972. OJ No.L300.
Ibid pp.190-287.
172. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 18 October 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, p.275. The Commission of the European Community had a rather more cautious view - see Bulletin of the European Communities 9-1972, p.19.
173. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 5 October 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, pp.66-67. This speech touched on a number of relevant questions.
174. Frei op.cit. p.253, although according to Scheich op.cit. p.243 the Austrians would have been prepared to include it. The Swedish position varied - see Swedish Minister of Commerce, 10 November 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, pp.57-62, and 23 and 30 November 1970, D.S.F.P. 1970, p.151.
175. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 5 October 1972, D.S.F.P. 1972, pp.63-4.
176. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 15 June 1972, Ibid p.262.
177. Swedish Minister of Commerce, 5 October 1972, Ibid p.63.
178. Frei op.cit. pp.256-258 ff emphasis in original. See also Scheich op.cit. p.244 and Waites op.cit. pp.331-335 for views on the Austrian and Swedish cases.

Chapter Five : A Neutral Tradition or a 'Certain Consideration'?

The Pre-Independence Period

The postwar confusions that have arisen over the nature and status of Irish neutrality, in particular, whether it is the national tradition or not, owe something of their origin to a confusion over the historic role of Ireland, or more accurately, the Irish, in the international political system, not only since independence in 1922, but even before that time. Ronan Fanning, for example, observes that "The Irish predisposition towards non-involvement in international relations has earlier origins in the nineteenth century and beyond", and suggests that by the turn of this century, the nationalist movement had become "increasingly introverted and isolationist as the very name 'Sinn Féin' with its emphasis on self-reliance testifies".¹ A case can be made for the view that for most of its history Ireland experienced an insularity from the mainstream of world events, with Britain acting as an effective screen between Ireland and the world. Ireland was an integral part of the British political and economic system. For many countries Ireland was "almost out of the world".²

Nonetheless, this view of Irish experience before independence can be over-drawn. Ireland, at least in the form of its people, made a significant contribution to the international community, even before 1922. Particularly significant was the Irish diaspora, the contribution the émigré Irish made to their new homelands, and the influence of the Irish religious, who spread not only Christianity but something of Ireland.³

Clearly sections of the population were pre-occupied with the freedom struggle against the British, but this led to an awareness of the potential help that the Irish abroad, or sympathetic nations, might give to their cause.⁴ Moreover, de Valera was adamant that

'Sinn Féin' did not mean, as was usually suggested 'Ourselves alone', but rather 'We ourselves', a motto of self-reliance, not selfish isolation. Ireland, indeed, wanted independence so that "she might freely give of her gifts to, and receive in return of their gifts from, her sister nations of the world over".⁵ Yet, before 1922 (and indeed even after 1922) the central problem was lack of independence and freedom, as Michael Collins put it "The Irish struggle has always been for freedom - freedom from English occupation, from English domination".⁶ This obsession was not only manifested in the physical struggle against the British, but also by the opposition to involuntary (or indeed, even voluntary) Irish participation in British wars, and by a willingness to engage in alliances with Britain's enemies.

The former trait was perhaps most sharply revealed by the widespread opposition to the very idea of the imposition of conscription in Ireland during the First World War, although opposition to recruitment into the British army to fight British wars had been manifest earlier, for example, during the Boer War. Patrick Keatinge observes indeed that the "objection to participation in what were seen as Britain's rather than Ireland's wars was widespread, a forerunner of an instinctive Irish predilection for neutrality",⁷ and furthermore, that the trauma produced by the British decision in 1918 to impose conscription in Ireland, although never implemented, "was to establish significant restrictions on future Irish political leaders faced with the issue of some form of military participation in international politics; the popular basis of Irish neutrality was enshrined in 1918".⁸

This profound antipathy to participation in British wars found expression in the anti-conscription campaign. It was in 1918 that the issue of conscription really came alive, with the cause becoming "almost overnight, the most massive demonstration of nationalist solidarity that

had been seen since the beginning of the war".⁹ It is important to appreciate that at this time, the support for the campaign came from disparate parliamentarians and parties, trade unions and the Roman Catholic Church. The impact of the campaign was to help Sinn Féin in their triumph at the polls in December 1918.

The sentiment against both conscription and British wars was reflected in the formation of the Irish Neutrality League. It appears to have evolved out of a series of meetings of progressive nationalists in September 1914, which discussed the question of a rising. The circulars announcing an inaugural public meeting were issued on 5 October 1914, with the first, and some suggest only, public meeting taking place seven days later, although Greaves is adamant that "there were several others", and that "The main decision of the meeting was to start a campaign against recruiting".¹⁰ Apart from its title, there is no evidence that the League as such had any particular conception of neutrality, beyond the basic opposition to participation in British wars, or indeed, any very clear idea of what neutrality involved.

At least in the initial period of the war Irish opinion was more genuinely reflected by the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, John Redmond, given that "in the autumn of 1914 there had been quite considerable enthusiasm for the war".¹¹ It is interesting that Redmond increasingly took a strong line, moving from a pledge to defend Ireland and to allow the British to remove troops,¹² to the claim that "Ireland would be false to her history, and to every consideration of honour, good faith, and self-interest, did she not willingly bear her share in its burdens and its sacrifices".¹³ The culmination of this gradual evolution towards full commitment reached its climax in his famous Woodenbridge speech of Sunday, 20 September 1914. Having noted that the duty of Ireland was "to defend the shores of Ireland against

foreign invasion", that the "interests of Ireland ... are at stake in this war", he urged his audience to "account yourselves as men, not only in Ireland itself, but wherever the firing-line extends, in defence of right, of freedom, and of religion in this war".¹⁴

It was this speech which split the Volunteers, although of about 180,000 Volunteers, nearly 170,000 supported Redmond.¹⁵ "The vast majority of Irish nationalist opinion - those whose nationalism found expression in the idea of Home Rule - remained as nationalist and active as before, behind Redmond's policy of support for the Imperial war effort".¹⁶ In late 1914-early 1915 Redmond was in the ascendancy, and antipathy to Britain and British wars was not nearly as widespread, at least at that time, as is often subsequently suggested by reference to the anti-conscription campaign and the Irish Neutrality League. Even after the Rising of 1916, the emotional backlash it produced, the disillusionment with the offer of Home Rule, and the rise of Sinn Féin, "the British Army, without any particular campaign at all, had managed to secure 14,013 voluntary recruits from Ireland".¹⁷ At the very least it may be queried whether this justifies Keatinge's description of "an instinctive Irish predilection for neutrality".¹⁸

Nonetheless, aspects of the minority point of view did prevail, becoming transformed into a majority between 1916 and 1918, and gaining a degree of post facto legitimacy in the election of 1918. Nonetheless, it is as well to remember that "Before World War I, Irish nationalism pursued almost as many foreign policies ... as it contained different groups, objectives and strategies",¹⁹ and that all "of this did not add up to a very consistent foreign policy image, ...When asked what Sinn Féin's foreign policy was, Griffith is alleged to have said: "In any issue I find out where England stands. Ireland will be found on the other side".²⁰

When contemplating Irish attitudes to Britain and alliances advocates of the 'tradition' of Irish neutrality often point to the writings of Sir Roger Casement. Casement was keen to show that a defeat for Great Britain might, in fact, be to Ireland's advantage. He suggested that a German victory and subsequent German dominance in Europe would lead to a situation in which "An Ireland, already covered by a sea held by German warships, and temporarily occupied by a German Army, might well be permanently and irrevocably severed from Great Britain, and with common assent erected into a neutralised independent European State under international guarantees".²¹

That some arrangement with Germany might last even after war and independence was also hinted at during the crucial time of the Rising, when apparently both Pearse and Plunkett in conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, talked of, given a German victory, the possibility of a German prince, ruling an independent Ireland.²² In the Proclamation of Easter Monday 1916, the IRA, Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizens' Army, made reference not only to Ireland's own strength, to the support of "her exiled children in America" but also to the support "by gallant allies in Europe".²³ As Lyons notes, this last claim "was more fantasy than fact, though it was fantasy based on fact".²⁴ Despite problems at a very late stage, there had been expectations of German support in the form of ammunition etc.

Casement by the end of 1914 had entered into a formal agreement with the Germans on the question of support for Ireland, an agreement incidentally which Casement regarded as a Treaty. It is necessary to stress that this alliance did leave crucial decisions to the Irish, but whilst there is an implication that the fighting would be performed by the Irish, it is not clear from the agreement itself that the Germans were to be prohibited from direct participation on Irish soil.²⁵

Fanning claims that the German link and episode "in itself was hardly the stuff of a diplomatic tradition, especially as the attractions of a German alliance vanished overnight and the United States entered the war in 1917" and he also makes a general point that independence would transform the environment, making it inappropriate for alliances with British enemies.²⁶ Whilst the point is generally true it does, perhaps, tend to gloss over an important feature of this period, namely the clear demonstration of a strand of pragmatism. The real concern was, and has remained, independence, not the questions of alliance or neutrality and this was epitomized by the pronouncements of the Dáil at its first meeting on 21 January 1919 - the Declaration of Independence, the Message to the Free Nations of the World, and the Democratic Programme of Dáil Éireann.²⁷ In all three there was a "preoccupation with sovereignty", yet no mention of neutrality.

As well as being willing to ally with Britain's enemies during the war, after it Irish leaders seemed to be ready to envisage some arrangement with, or guarantee to, Britain regarding British security post Irish independence. de Valera in February 1920, put it this way: "Mutual self-interest would make the peoples of these two islands, if both independent, the closest possible allies in a moment of real national danger to either".²⁸ Other possibilities for British security were also touched upon. The most famous was the reference to the Monroe Doctrine and the Cuban analogy, with de Valera suggesting that Ireland's relationship with Britain should be analogous to Cuba's with the USA. Another suggestion, the third, is occasionally identified as the proposal, namely: "An international instrument could easily be framed, as in the case of Belgium". The fourth envisaged Irish participation in a League of Nations, in which all would agree to respect and defend each other's integrity and independence.

The most important point, however, is that de Valera identified four possible ways of preserving British security, establishing a working Anglo-Irish relationship, and securing Irish independence, and there was no question of neutrality being the only option, or necessarily, the preferred option. The Irish were prepared to take cognizance of British needs, and indeed even saw, to paraphrase de Valera, that they should 'see fear in the downfall of Britain and fear, not hope, in every attack upon Britain'. This gave rise to the idea of Irish guarantees not to let Irish territory be used as base for foreign invasion or attacks upon Britain.

The Irish were not, even on the eve of independence, isolationist. In April 1919, for example, the Dáil debated the motion that "We are eager and ready to enter a World League of Nations based on equality of right ... We are willing to accept all the duties, responsibilities and burdens which inclusion in such a League implies".²⁹ Unfortunately, the League that was created appeared simply, to the Irish, to perpetuate the power of those who had it. They were also unhappy about Article X of the Covenant, which with its emphasis upon 'territorial integrity' appeared to cement the status quo.³⁰ These events left a mark on subsequent Irish thinking.³¹

On all of these questions the central pre-occupation, the litmus paper reflecting attitudes, was the struggle for freedom and independence. After a 'war of independence' and a protracted correspondence by de Valera and Lloyd George, it was finally agreed at the end of September 1921 that talks should take place in October 1921 "with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations".³²

In analyzing the Irish proposals and the negotiations, it is

important to bear in mind the distinctions between aspirations and policy, and that negotiation involves not only compromise but also an element of asking for more than one expects. This is all the more significant if one remembers that it was neither defence nor neutrality that caused problems in either London, or for that matter, Dublin, but rather the vexed questions of Oath and Empire, and certainly during the negotiations, if not the subsequent Dáil debates, Partition. Fanning, Murphy and particularly Longford (amongst others) are all agreed that defence and neutrality were "not central to the treaty split and to the tragic events leading to civil war".³³ As Longford puts it "In their hearts the Irish had always recognized that Defence touched Ireland's honour least and British security in British eyes most".³⁴ Nonetheless, significant weight was attached to neutrality at the beginning of the negotiations. This is evidenced both by the draft Irish proposals the Irish left Dublin with - Draft Treaty A³⁵ - and by discussions at the second plenary session on the first afternoon (the 11th October 1921) of the Conference.³⁶

Draft Treaty A was only "Outlines for ideas and principles only. Wording tentative and rough" since the wording would be refined once agreement upon principles reached. In terms of neutrality, most attention is usually focused, correctly, upon article V: "Ireland accepts and the British Commonwealth guarantees the perpetual neutrality of Ireland and the integrity and inviolability of Irish territory; and both in its own interest and in friendly regard to the strategic interests of the British Commonwealth binds itself to enter into no compact, and to take no action, nor permit any action to be taken, inconsistent with the obligation of preserving its own neutrality and inviolability and to repel with force any attempt to violate its territory or to use its territorial waters for warlike

purposes". Article XI also made reference to neutrality given that the British were to seek recognition of Ireland's neutrality by others. Fully one-third of the draft dealt with these issues.

Whilst proponents of Irish 'traditional neutrality' naturally focus upon these articles, less attention is usually paid to Article II which, it might be argued, compromises that neutrality, given that Ireland would agree "to become an external associate of the states of the British Commonwealth. As an associate Ireland's status shall be that of equality with the sovereign partner states of the Commonwealth ...". This is particularly significant given British views on the rights of Commonwealth states.³⁷ It is also significant that the first Irish proposals submitted to the British on the 24th October were also significantly different from the original Draft Treaty A, which was never presented. The memorandum of 24 October proposed, in a critical section, that "Ireland shall be recognised as a free State, that the British Commonwealth shall guarantee Ireland's freedom and integrity".³⁸ Longford suggests it was Collins who "had the word 'neutral' altered to 'free'; and says Longford "without apparently much change in the meaning". Longford suggests this view by arguing that 'freedom' would make "clear once and for all that England had no right of occupation in time of war" whilst "some scope would apparently be left Ireland to join in a war; she would not therefore, from a military point of view, be completely sterilised as she would be under neutrality".³⁹ Clearly the change of wording is significant. It emphasises the significance of the perception that "The Irish struggle has always been for freedom - freedom from English occupation, from English domination - not for freedom with any particular label attached to it".⁴⁰

Nonetheless, there were a number of verbal exchanges on the issues of defence and neutrality, even on the first afternoon of

negotiations, with Griffith raising the question of permanent Irish neutrality guaranteed by England. However, it is significant that the general tenor of the verbal exchanges was rather different from the various Irish memoranda. Moreover, the British were adamant that neutrality meant secession, and as such, and for other reasons, was not acceptable.

Indeed, the question was complicated by the discussions over the form of relationship between Ireland, Britain and the Commonwealth. For example, at one stage in these discussions, Griffith told Lloyd George that in terms of association with the Crown, Britain and Dominions, Ireland would be "Something more than allies - not temporary but permanent allies", and that regarding matters of 'common concern', Ireland understood "war and peace, trade, all the large issues. It is a matter of drafting". Indeed, Griffith said "I would regard defence of our country and your country" as a matter of common concern. Griffith also told Lloyd George, after having been told that no country would recognize Irish neutrality if Britain had the harbours, that in principle the Irish had "no objection to taking those safeguards which are necessary to your security", although "working out of details might be very difficult".⁴¹ As Longford comments "Not much more was likely to be heard of the Irish claims to neutrality; Britain had won on Defence".⁴²

In the final agreement,⁴³ the relevant clauses on defence and facilities are contained in articles 6, 7 and 8, and the Annex, whilst articles 1 to 3 attempted to define the position of Ireland, its Commonwealth responsibilities, and its relationship to the Imperial Parliament. On these questions, Ireland was to be, largely, similar to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, except that vis-à-vis the Imperial Parliament the Canadian model was, largely, to apply.

Article 6 in large measure gave Britain responsibility for "the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland", until Irish Free State "undertakes her own coastal defence", by agreement with the British. These arrangements were to be reviewed after five years "with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence". There was no guarantee, however, that Britain would accept alternative arrangements after five years, or agree to an Irish contribution.

Article 7 was in clear contradiction to any Irish aspiration to neutrality, since in peacetime Britain was to be given certain port facilities, whilst "In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power", the Irish accepted that the British should have "such harbour and other facilities" as they "may require for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid". In article 8 "if" the Irish established a military force it would "not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain".

These provisions ruled out Irish abstention in a British war, impartiality, the ability to fulfill neutral rights and duties, and, in addition, not only would Ireland lack the right to be neutral, given article 8 (and the lack of its own navy) it would also lack the power to be so. Any notion of 'defence against help' was now a bitter irony. The British might forego an active Irish contribution to their war effort in terms of men etc., but remained emphatic throughout that membership in the Empire involved automatic Irish involvement in British conflicts. No dominion could be neutral, for Ireland, especially, there could be no neutrality.⁴⁴

The treaty split the Irish Cabinet and parliament but it was accepted by a majority. Much of this debate and controversy avoided defence and neutrality altogether, perhaps another sign of its relative importance. Only Childers dwelt upon the issues, relating them to the

question of independence. Ireland would not be like Canada, given the cession of the ports and British defence of Irish coasts. Indeed what was the "use of talking of responsibility for making treaties and alliances with foreign nations which may involve a country in war?", when Ireland remained "under British authority and under the British Crown". Ireland, it appeared to Childers would almost inevitably be both legally and militarily pulled into British wars.⁴⁵

Although de Valera complained that the Treaty signed differed from the draft treaty the delegates took with them, it is clear that his own 'Document No. 2' in December 1921 was also significantly different, in that, it omitted the very specific reference to neutrality.⁴⁶ It is interesting, incidentally, that this was the second occasion at least during the crucial six months of negotiations and debate that whilst privately proposing to include neutrality in the formal document which ensued, the word was omitted. It was not the only objective, and it could be traded-off against other objectives.

Even de Valera's own idea, what came to be known as 'external association' was problematical for neutrality. This was so because it was intertwined with defence, war and treaties being matters of 'common concern'; with the Irish guarantee not to allow itself to be used in ways inimical to British security and; its amorphous nature at a time when Commonwealth involvement was understood to imply commitments to Britain. It should be noted that these problems arose irrespective of the ports or other issues.

Prior to independence in 1922, Irish attitudes on neutrality and defence were clearly complex, there was no one consistent tradition.

Evolving policy: the political dimension

For the first ten years of the new state's life, policy-making was in the hands of supporters of, and sympathisers with, the Treaty.

A consequence of exclusion from power, was that on coming into government in 1932 de Valera's party, Fianna Fáil, had other, more pressing pre-occupations initially than foreign policy, with the crucial exception of the bilateral relations with Britain. Indeed, Fanning argues "Nor ... was neutrality high on the agenda of de Valera's First Fianna Fáil government when it came to power in 1932. Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty... escaped unscathed in the early thirties when de Valera was busily engaged in rewriting much of the rest of the Treaty as he thought it should have been written in the first place".⁴⁷ The overriding initial pre-occupation was freedom and independence, to put flesh upon Michael Collins' famous aphorism that the Treaty gave "not the ultimate freedom that all nations aspire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it".⁴⁸

The initial constraints on the new Irish regime were both internal and external. On the one hand, there was an attempt to placate anti-Treaty elements, but on the other the British had also to be placated. This later was important because the constitution of the new Ireland had to be acceptable to the British and indeed, eventually, was embodied in British law.⁴⁹ The finally approved Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) certainly constrained the Irish, since the accompanying Constituent Act made it clear if any article, or amendment, as law made thereunder "is in any respect repugnant to any of the provisions of the Scheduled Treaty (ie Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland), it shall, to the extent only of such repugnancy, be absolutely void and inoperative ...". At first sight, Article 49, "Save in the case of actual invasion, the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann) shall not be committed to active participation in any war without the assent of the Oireachtas", would appear to allow for neutrality. However, this must be read in conjunction with the Constituent Act. Moreover,

the constitution, as adopted, interestingly specifies "active participation". The use of the adjective is presumably deliberate, and it leads to the implicit implication that passive participation does not require such consent. Moreover, on Article 49, the British Lord Chancellor was reassuring (in British eyes), and clearly stated "There is no question here of neutrality; it may be said that, by their giving facilities, neutrality goes".⁵⁰

Nonetheless, no final settlement had been attained and those who had supported the Treaty were clearly committed to stretching the terms of the Treaty as far as possible in order to expand the scope of Irish freedom and independence. In this the Irish benefitted not only from their own efforts, for example, in registering the Treaty of 1921 with the League of Nations in 1924 over British objections, but also from the aspirations, drive and actions of the older Dominions. The following years saw a successive widening of Dominion freedom and power.⁵¹

It was perhaps the Statute of Westminster which put the stamp on the developments of the preceding years - the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930, the Irish accepting invitations to conferences and signing treaties on their own initiative (1928-9) and the Report on the Operation of Dominion Legislation in 1929, amongst other things. The Statute of Westminster defined the Commonwealth as a "free association" of members, implying that a state could leave. Furthermore, in future no British laws were to extend to the Dominions, unless the Dominion consented.⁵² In effect, Ireland was now only to be bound by moral obligations and the normal conventions relating to international treaties.⁵³

The unilateral steps of de Valera were more dramatic than the painstaking diplomacy in Commonwealth meetings, but they did not

significantly alter the degree of independence in foreign policy. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, the clarity of that independence in external eyes remained rather clouded given the terms of the Executive Authority (External Relations) Act of 1936, whereby the King was to continue to have a strictly formal role in diplomatic accreditation and the signing of international treaties, albeit "as and when advised" by the Irish Executive Council.⁵⁴

The 1937 Constitution affirmed Irish independence, and contained marked differences from the 1922 Constitution. For example, Article 28.3.1 stated that "War shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war save with the assent of Dáil Éireann".⁵⁵ In the changed environment no subtle distinction between active and passive participation was necessary, but further ambiguity remained after 1937 with respect to the position of Ireland in the Commonwealth. The Irish regarded themselves as outside it and only externally associated with it, whilst only after much agonizing, Britain and the Dominions decided they were "prepared to treat the new Constitution as not affecting a fundamental alteration in the position of the Irish Free State".⁵⁶ This issue was of more than semantic or symbolic importance, since arguments were still occurring within the Commonwealth as to whether the Dominions had the right to decide the issue of peace or war themselves, notwithstanding the evolution of doctrine culminating in the Statute of Westminster.

This despite the fact that the 1937 Imperial Conference had "recognized that it is the sole responsibility of the several Parliaments of the British Commonwealth to decide the nature and scope of their own defence policy",⁵⁷ and that Mansergh has argued "In the supreme issue of war and peace the Commonwealth had henceforward to rely not, as in 1914, upon a unity constitutionally imposed from above,

but upon a unity of wills".⁵⁸ For Ireland the question was difficult given, for example, its geographical propinquity to Britain, but even then, as Lyon puts it "neutrality, after all, was not just the instinctive reaction of a small power to keep clear of the quarrels of big powers, it was the outward and visible sign of absolute sovereignty. To be free to choose between peace and war was the mask of independence, to be free to choose between peace and a British war demonstrated to all the world just how complete that independence rally was".⁵⁹ This was very important to an Ireland so proximate to Britain, with internal and external confusion over its precise constitutional position and degree of freedom, and to an Ireland which in 1939 still had only diplomatic relations with nine states;⁶⁰ its letters of accreditation were still signed by the King. But most of all it was important to an Ireland which had divided over the treaty, over whether it gave the 'freedom to achieve freedom', over the oath and empire, and which wished to assert the sovereignty and independence proclaimed in the 1937 Constitution.

The problem for the Irish was that a "politically independent Irish state ... posed a strategic problem for successive British governments, concerned to protect their Atlantic flank",⁶¹ despite de Valera's oft-repeated pledge that "our territory will never be permitted to be used as a base for attack upon Britain".⁶² This pledge is not a commitment to participate in a British war, nor is it a commitment to alliance. In one sense, it is fully compatible with an aspiration to neutrality, since the central Irish concern was simply defending its independence and sovereignty (and potential neutrality), but with the by-product of offering additional security to Britain.⁶³ However, on the other hand, a potential belligerent might well construe this guarantee differently, since in that same

speech of April 1938, de Valera commented that "an independent Ireland would have interests, very many interests, in common with Great Britain. In providing for our defence of our own interests, we would also of necessity be providing to a certain extent for British defence of British interests".⁶⁴

Over a decade earlier the Cumann na nGaedheal of William Cosgrave had considered those common interests. Examining the possibility of "some foreign Power" using "our geographical position either as a base for an offensive against Great Britain or against sea-borne traffic between ports in Saorstát Eireann and other countries" (the only contingencies specifically referred to), the document the Cabinet considered argued that central Irish defence policy precept must be that the army be "so organised, trained and equipped as to render it capable, should the necessity arise, of full and complete coordination with the forces of the British Government in the defence of Saorstát territory whether against actual hostilities or against violation of neutrality on the part of a common enemy".⁶⁵ This oblique reference to neutrality, clearly illustrates a desire to keep that option open, but the tenor of the document as a whole places greater emphasis upon "full and complete coordination" with British forces. In the February 1927 debate Desmond FitzGerald had, following it would seem the 1925 document, declared "We need not blink the fact that it is quite possible, that in the event of a general attack on these islands - it is perfectly obvious - our army must cooperate with the British Army". When asked what if the United Kingdom alone were attacked, could Ireland be neutral, or would Ireland be "bound up in" an attack by conceiving of itself "as part of the defence forces of the British islands", FitzGerald did not directly reply, simply stating that he had been speaking of a

general attack, and anyway, it would be for the Dáil to decide.⁶⁶ It is interesting that whilst not always explicit, that expectation was to some extent enduring.

The possibility of a formal defence arrangement or alliance was certainly not as 'beyond the pale' as a fixation upon neutrality would suggest, if indeed there were such a fixation. Indeed, in May 1935, in a rather enigmatic phrase, de Valera himself had said "We can make trade treaties ... I can even conceive conditions in which we could make defence treaties".⁶⁷ One problem, of course, and it permeates this whole issue, is whether such rhetorical statements were reflections of a genuine policy position or whether they were trial balloons for potential negotiations, and indeed what was the envisaged content of any such agreement? These questions are particularly significant in the 1938 period in the context of discussions to end the Anglo-Irish 'economic war' and to arrange for a settlement on the ports issue. It is the conventional wisdom that by 1938 de Valera was committed to neutrality as the appropriate policy for Ireland in any forthcoming war, and sought the return of the ports to make such a policy viable (or at least, more viable). Indeed, in later years, de Valera himself regarded the return of the ports as "his greatest political achievement ... because of its importance in the context of neutrality".⁶⁸ On the other hand, in January 1938, de Valera "indicated that he would then be willing to conclude a naval agreement to Britain's satisfaction" if Britain would settle the Partition issue;⁶⁹ and in February 1938 he acknowledged that if Partition were subsequently satisfactorily settled "he would be able to go a long way' towards the defence agreement then being contemplated". Indeed, at the same meeting, he told the British that some in Ireland "would urge that 'defence should be made a lever'

in order to bring effective pressure on Britain over Partition".⁷⁰

It may be that de Valera was at least persuaded of tactical advantages in such a ploy, since "It was at this same time ... that the policy of neutrality began to be linked with the question of partition".⁷¹

Malcolm MacDonald, who became Dominions Secretary in 1935 (and was also influential in Anglo-Irish relations during the war) believed that "For de Valera, Irish control of the ports was not only a symbol of independence but an establishment of independence".⁷² Neutrality was an objective at the talks, but the achievement of sovereignty was a higher priority. There was, it should be noted, no guarantee of cooperation, even if Partition were ended. There was no unconditional assertion of neutrality in the negotiations of 1938 either.

In the negotiations in 1936-8, de Valera clearly envisaged some defence relationship, if only the "possibility of making a request for British defence experts, a common defence plan and interchangeable equipment 'because our forces would cooperate together'. There was even talk of the construction of a munitions factory in the Free State. But de Valera said that the Irish people "were 'nervous of being dragged into some Imperialist war' which Britain might wage".⁷³ It was the Irish who formally proposed discussion "in regard to economic and other measures to be adopted in time of war".⁷⁴ No such deal was struck, largely because de Valera was able to get the ports and the ending of the tariff war without one, whilst there was no movement on Partition. Nonetheless, talk of a defence arrangement was not abandoned until a late stage in the 1938 negotiations and at one stage a draft agreement on defence was placed before delegates.⁷⁵

When de Valera spoke in the Dáil introducing the motion in favour of the return of the ports and an end to the Anglo-Irish economic war, he made no specific mention of neutrality. Rather on the 27 April

1938 he emphasized independence and sovereignty. de Valera also sought to make the point that "we have got these defences unconditionally ... There has been no bargain ... there is no secret understanding. But there is a belief, I am certain ... that it is far better for Britain, far more advantageous for Britain, to have a free Ireland by its side than an Ireland that would be unfriendly because of liberties which Britain denied".⁷⁶ Perhaps the omission of a reference to neutrality was a gesture towards British sensibilities until after the British had ratified the agreement, since after that de Valera was more direct in his references to neutrality. Nonetheless in an important speech of 13 July 1938 to the Dáil,⁷⁷ although he was explicit in the "desire not to get into a war if they can keep out of it", de Valera's actual assertion of neutrality as an objective, was highly equivocal, namely: "Assuming other things were equal, if there were any chance of our neutrality in general being possible, we would probably say that we want to remain neutral. I do not know that you can follow that up by saying in any war but, in general, our desire would be for neutrality as far as possible". This is a remarkable section of a speech normally identified with a statement of neutrality.

de Valera asserted "we have no commitments, we can keep out of war, we can be neutral if we want ... There are no advance commitments on us to take any side". But he went on, to consider the situation "in which our rights, or liberties, or interests generally were being attacked by some State other than Britain". In response de Valera was convinced, that Britain would have to act to help Ireland in Britain's own interest "because of her geographic position". Britain would act "not in our interests ... (but for) immediate selfish interest". As a result Ireland "may be able to ... count on assistance".

Now here is the rub - de Valera asked, would we want such assistance? He doubted whether Ireland could effectively resist "a frontal and straightforward attack from any foreign State" unaided. Given, therefore, that it would be in Britain's interest to help and Ireland would require such help "commonsense dictates that we should try to provide in advance so that that assistance would be of the greatest possible benefit to us". This being so, consultation with Britain might be "necessary and advisable ...".

Whilst de Valera had played 'hard to get' earlier in the year, by the summer of 1938 it was clearly the Irish who were placing the emphasis upon some arrangement, be it tacit or formal. In August 1938 Dulanty, the Irish High Commissioner to Britain, asked "if he could attend the meetings of the Cabinet's Committee for Imperial Defence",⁷⁸ and in September Dulanty began to attend "the daily briefings for the High Commissioners given by Malcolm MacDonald in the Dominions Office".⁷⁹ That same summer, the Irish also requested copies of the British Government's War Book measures.⁸⁰ This activity by officials would be exceedingly curious without the imprimatur of de Valera, given that he was not only Taoiseach at the time, but also Minister for External Affairs. de Valera, himself, met with the British Minister for Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, on 8 September 1938, and made it clear he was anxious to attain "help in deciding what were the matters that needed attention and on the type of defences required".⁸¹

Despite hesitations, in October two senior Irish army officers were sent to London for secret talks. Again, the primary objective was information, for example, how the ports might best be defended. Apparently, the British felt these discussions were 'very satisfactory'.⁸² Nonetheless, there were to be no more such military talks in the prewar period, although the Irish did suggest that the British recommend a

French officer who could become the principal military adviser to the Irish army. As explained to the British, "political expediency made the appointment of a British officer impossible" and therefore the Irish wanted "the next best thing in securing a high military officer of our ally. The appointment of such an officer would be a clear indication to Germany and the world that Eire was on the side of the Western democracies".⁸³

Nonetheless, despite these talks and exchanges, de Valera was making it clear that partition remained the problem, that in "the event of war the attitude of Ireland would be very different if partition still existed from what it would be were Ireland one, and many of the steps which he would like to take in the event of our being at war would be impossible for him so long as partition lasted".⁸⁴ In the talks that took place in the late 1930s, it is clear that the Irish position was not unambiguously one of neutrality. The 'traditional neutral' image is, therefore, open to question. This is true also, if one examines the attitude of the Irish to the League of Nations, collective security and neutrality in that context, especially given the Irish commitment to collective security.

The Irish saw League membership as an assertion of statehood and independence, and sought to make this manifest by their activities at the League, for example, the insistence in 1924 on registering the 1921 Treaty. A sign that independence was regarded as the key was the insistence by Kevin O'Higgins, as early as 1923, that despite support for the League, participation in any war, including a League war, would require, under the new Constitution, the Dáil's consent.⁸⁵ Unlike Switzerland, however, Ireland never appears to have sought nor attained a neutrality reservation, although the Swiss had established the precedent in 1920.⁸⁶ Up until 1935-36, the Irish were committed, and moreover, knew full well the nature of the commitments and

obligations involved. This route to security took precedence over the neutrality route, which only significantly re-emerged in 1935-36.

de Valera had demonstrated his commitment when he addressed the League Assembly as Acting President in September 1932 and spoke of the need to "show unmistakably that the Covenant of the League is a solemn pact, the obligations of which no State, great or small, will find it possible to ignore".⁸⁷ de Valera, in fact, laid great stress upon upholding the Covenant and united collective action.

Three years later, de Valera was arguing that the "theory of the absolute sovereignty of States, interpreted to mean that a State is above all law, must be abandoned ... peace and order (are) impossible if States may hold that self-interest is for them the supreme law, and that they are subject to no other control ... The rule of unanimity for decision and legislation must go ... There must ... be some tribunal by which the law shall be interpreted and applied, and, finally, there must be some means by which its judgments can be enforced against a State". It must be acknowledged that de Valera described this as "the idea" and acknowledged the League was "very far from coming up to the ideal". Nonetheless, it hardly epitomizes a recalcitrant member. In closing de Valera spoke of the need to maintain the League, and to do that "we must live up to its obligations".⁸⁸

Four days later de Valera emphasized that the Irish by their "own choice and without compulsion ... entered into the obligations of the Covenant. We shall fulfill these obligations in the letter and in the spirit. We have given our word and we shall keep it".⁸⁹ Ireland was ready to pay the price for peace. As a submission to the Irish Cabinet in September 1935 makes clear, whilst aware that military action under the Covenant was unlikely to occur, de Valera did acknowledge that "it would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant for the member

concerned to refuse to take part ..(in).. collective military action to be taken by the League".⁹⁰ Indeed, de Valera's biographers even suggest "Had World War II come from a joint decision of the League of Nations his attitude would, no doubt, have been modified".⁹¹

This attitude prevailed until the League failed to apply the military sanctions he had supported earlier. In September 1935, de Valera was clear that the Abyssinian crisis meant the "final test of the League ... has come".⁹² As a result of the test, Irish attitudes changed, with there henceforth being a search for alternative means of safeguarding security. Indeed, in a debate on the Estimate for External Affairs in June 1936, de Valera went so far as to ask the Chair "if it would be appropriate at this stage to discuss the question as to whether or not we should withdraw from the League".⁹³

After 1935, de Valera spoke of "bitter humiliation" regarding the League, and began to make it clear that there could no longer be "an obligation to go to war to maintain the principles of the League". Ireland, along with other small states, could only resolve "not to become the tools of any great Power", and to "resist with whatever strength they may possess every attempt to force them into a war against their will".⁹⁴ This was not equivalent to saying that Ireland would necessarily avoid involvement, if it was by their own decision.

Nonetheless, after 1935 the Irish attitude to security clearly changed and only now, after four years and after de Valera had been "busily engaged in rewriting much of the rest of the Treaty", was attention turned to 'the ports' issue.⁹⁵ Only then did it come to be argued that British occupation of the ports provided others with a reason to ignore Irish neutrality, that it was not Irish "will that would be effective in keeping a position of neutrality but the will of

other people",⁹⁶ and that Ireland "could be treated as an automatic belligerent".⁹⁷ Only then did the cry "We want to be neutral"⁹⁸ become clearer, although even then there was the complication of the relationship and the negotiations with Britain in the 1936-1939 period.

A further complication is that neutrality is inseparably dependent upon sovereignty. Although the Irish had made great strides in the politico-legal area, there still remained the problems of economic sovereignty and military self-sufficiency.

Self-sufficiency : the economic dimension

Whatever the etymology of Sinn Féin, it is usually associated with the concept of "self-reliance",⁹⁹ and this attitude remained a Fianna Fáil ideal, namely "an Ireland self-contained and self-supporting economically".¹⁰⁰ de Valera's biographers have argued that his views on this matter were related to his view that Ireland should be neutral, that his "economic policy was calculated to make that possible. It was part of a pattern of self-sufficiency".¹⁰¹ The problem, however, is that there was a severe disjunction between rhetoric and policy, and that even in rhetoric the stress upon self-sufficiency was almost always upon the grounds of economic and political independence, given the Fianna Fáil pledge "not merely to try to secure independence politically in this country, but to try and secure its economic independence also".¹⁰² That was the real rationale of self-sufficiency, and other rationales were not persistently advanced and remained peripheral.

By any measure the degree of economic dependence upon the UK was severe, as was the degree of general Irish dependence on trade with others. This is illustrated by the following:

Table 5.1 Percentage of Irish Imports and Exports to and from
Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1924-1939

	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>1927</u>	<u>1928</u>	<u>1929</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1931</u>
Imports	81.1	81.1	75.6	77.4	77.9	78.1	80.1	80.8
Exports and Re-exports	98.1	97.2	96.7	95.8	96.2	92.3	91.4	96.3
	<u>1932</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1939</u>
Imports	76.6	69.9	66.7	72.4	51.9	48.7	50.5	55.7
Exports and Re-exports	96.2	93.9	93.3	91.7	91.5	90.8	92.6	93.6

Sources Statistical Abstract of Ireland : 1931, 1935, 1938 and 1945:

- 1931 Table 82: 'Value of Consignments from and to each country expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports and Exports in each year, 1924 to 1930', p.63.
- 1935 Table 97: 'Value of Consignments from and to each of the principal countries expressed as percentage of total value of Imports and Exports in each year, 1928 to 1934 (excluding Bullion and Coin)', p.75.
- 1938 Table 98: 'Value of Trade with each of the principal countries expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports and Exports in each year, 1931 to 1937 (excluding Bullion and Coin)', p.87.
- 1945 Table 93: 'Value of Trade with each of the principal countries expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports and Exports (including Re-Exports) in each year, 1938 to 1944 (excluding Bullion and Coin)', p.100.

Table 5.2 Ireland : Foreign Trade Dependence, 1926-1938

	Merchandise Exports	Merchandise Imports	Exports of Goods and Services	Imports of Goods and Services
(As a percentage of GNP at current factor cost)				
1926	26.8	39.8	n.a.	n.a.
1929	29.3	38.0	n.a.	n.a.
1931	24.7	34.4	38.7	37.7
1938	15.1	25.8	27.4	26.2

Sources: T.K. Whitaker, 'Monetary Integration : Reflections on Irish Experience', Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland (Winter 1973) p.69. He cites Kieran A. Kennedy, Productivity and Industrial Growth. The Irish Experience (London, Oxford University Press 1971) as his source.

Although in Table 5.1 the import pattern does reveal a significant decline over the years in reliance upon British goods, down from 81.1% in 1924 and 50.5% in 1938, the last full year before the war, there is only a marginal decline with regard to exports 98.1% in 1924 and 92.6% in 1938. The earlier figures 81.1% and 98.1% reveal in effect total dependence for export markets on Britain, whilst even by 1938 the level remains high enough to be virtually total dependence. Whilst Table 5.2 appears more reassuring, given the declining percentages, it is as well to recall Hancock's comment concerning the 1932-1938 dispute "Great Britain and the Irish Free State deliberately inflicted economic damage upon each other. That damage, undoubtedly, was not light. Yet it had not been able to do more than scratch the grapplings binding the two economies together ...".¹⁰³

de Valera clearly saw the dangers inherent in such dependency,

and both at the beginning and end of the 'Economic War' sought to argue that Britain was using its economic predominance for political purposes. To illustrate the Irish concern regarding being squeezed by Britain, de Valera used the analogy of a wall, arguing that "a good way would be to approach it as if this country were surrounded by a wall ... what I mean is how we could maintain our population if by any chance we were cut off ... we have the food that is necessary here ..." ¹⁰⁴.

It must be acknowledged that the Anglo-Irish dispute highlights that the high degree of economic dependence of Ireland upon the United Kingdom did not lead to, or cause, political servility on the part of the Irish towards the United Kingdom. The Irish were aided in their counterdependency strategy by the constraints exercised upon the United Kingdom by other factors, whilst the generally interdependent nature of the relationship also imposed costs upon the United Kingdom if any significant rupture occurred. ¹⁰⁵

According to Longford and O'Neill, Irish neutrality in the Second World War "would scarcely have been possible if it had not been for the extent to which self-sufficiency had been achieved", ¹⁰⁶ that the policy of "self-sufficiency ... was to be a crucial factor in the years of World War II". ¹⁰⁷ More objective authorities, however, are rather more equivocal in their judgment, whilst even de Valera himself was less sanguine than Longford and O'Neill. In direct reference to these questions in 1941, de Valera was anxious to emphasize the progress that had been made in the 1930s, but he acknowledged that "the war came and found us still far from our goal of self-sufficiency. We were still importing considerable quantities of wheat, fertilisers and many such fundamental raw materials as pig-iron, steel, timber, paper, vegetable oils, as well as coal and liquid fuels for our factories, for our field tractors and for transport. Tea has come to be regarded almost as the national beverage, and it all reaches us, of course, from abroad ..." ¹⁰⁸

Whilst it may be true that in reviewing "the progress made towards self-sufficiency in the cramped circumstances of those pre-war years, one cannot record spectacular success but nevertheless there was progress ...",¹⁰⁹ there remained significant, important gaps and Ireland was not self-sufficient. An internal memorandum of 16 April 1939 reveals the extent of the dependency. Quite apart from virtually all of Irish foreign investment being in British securities, the trade dependency, it was also true that although the import figure was lower, much of the import were "essential supplies ... which we cannot provide ourselves". As the report noted, the country depended "entirely on other countries for the shipping space necessary to carry our entire imports of wheat, maize, petroleum, timber, and any other 'bulk' cargoes from abroad". Clearly, "if war should break out we are very largely at the mercy of other countries, and particularly of the United Kingdom, in respect of our external trade, and that the economic activities of this country could in such circumstances be completely paralysed".¹¹⁰ The document shows that Irish dependency upon the UK in specific areas was:

Table 5.3 Irish raw materials dependency upon Britain 1939

<u>Product</u>	<u>% provided by UK</u>
Coal	100
Iron piping	94
Pig iron	84
Aluminium	78
Copper plates and sheets	74
Cattle feed stuffs	51

Source: SPO S11394 Department of Industry and Commerce 18.4.39.

No wonder that in February 1939 de Valera had had to express his fear to

the Dáil that "It is possible that, despite any declarations on our part of our desire to keep out of these conflicts, if we desired and tried to carry on the trade which is essential to our economic life here, we would be regarded as a combatant, and our neutrality would not be respected".¹¹¹

Moreover, although some "effort had been made to set up a proper Irish merchant marine before the war", it had been thwarted.¹¹² Not surprisingly Keatinge is somewhat sardonic in his comment on "the lack of a viable national shipping line - for a supposedly self-sufficient state mostly surrounded by sea!"¹¹³ Similarly thwarted were continuing efforts in the 1930s to provide an independent source of petrol supply, until ironically "with war imminent, the oil refinery project had to be shelved ...".¹¹⁴ Again this may be indicative that few really saw the link between self-sufficiency and the potential position of Ireland in a possible war, despite the occasional rhetorical linkage.

According to Farrell the "administrative process of preparing the Irish economy for war conditions began in 1938", although apparently the Irish "administrative machine had begun making preparations to organise for a major international emergency since the mid-thirties".¹¹⁵ A review of the principal Irish industries took place and sought to encourage them "to prepare for an emergency". Not unnaturally the "main emphasis was on securing and building up supplies. The response was generally positive, but somewhat mixed, since, for example, "the oil distributors ... did little to develop extra reserves ...".¹¹⁶ In 1939 the "case for a major reorganisation of governmental functions and priorities became more urgent. It was also increasingly evident ... that it was time to regularise arrangements for securing supplies; informal assurances by British civil servants should be replaced by 'an agreement between the two governments'". Nonetheless it appears that

de Valera was slow to move, since "it was only with the actual outbreak of war that de Valera bowed to the inevitable, regrouped his cabinet and created a new Department of Supplies" with Lemass as its Minister.¹¹⁷

Despite the clear aspirations expressed between 1927-1932 (and both before and after) the actual record of achievement was mixed.

Self-sufficiency : the defence dimension

Contrary to the argument of Fisk, that "an authentic policy of neutrality, the desire to maintain the country's commercial life and safeguard its political integrity from external pressures, while taking only minimum defence precautions on the grounds that neutrality - if strictly adhered to - would obviate the need for enormous military expenditure",¹¹⁸ concern and regard with 'due diligence' are a fundamental requirement of a 'for neutrality' policy, and in that sense, ought to have been a significant factor in the defence policy framework of Ireland. Intellectually Irish leaders appear to have recognized these needs. In March 1939, for example, Frank Aiken said that Ireland could not have neutrality merely by wishing for it; that there was "no use in trying to substitute a wishbone for a backbone".¹¹⁹

Perhaps one of the most surprising things concerning Irish defence is that whilst much attention has been paid to the island as single entity, very little, if any, attention has apparently been paid to the island qua island. This is particularly significant for an island deficient in resources, lacking self-sufficiency, and dependent upon foreign trade. Particularly revealing concerning Irish attitudes to the sea is the reported statement of the Irish representative "at the Naval Conference of 1936, that the Irish Free State had no concern with the treaty as she possessed no navy and had no intention of possessing one".¹²⁰ Initially, of course, the Irish were constrained by the 1921 Treaty but no serious effort was made to develop a navy, even in

the period 1935-1939 when Ireland was legally free to do so, nor did the Irish pursue this matter with the British in the way that a range of other issues were pursued. It appears that the main reason for this persistent Irish attitude was a belief that they were defended anyway by the British navy.¹²¹

Secondly, there was hesitation because of the degree of expenditure involved. An awareness of financial constraints was made apparent in the related matter of 'the ports'. Speaking in the debate on the 1938 agreement and the return of the ports, the President of the Executive Council between 1922 and 1932, William Cosgrave, sought to argue that his government "could have taken over these ports six or seven years ago". Cosgrave explained, however, that he "hesitated to do it. For what reason? At that time the cost would have involved the people of this country in an expenditure of between £350,000 and £500,000".¹²² Depending upon which year is used, this would have been equivalent to between 17.8-28.4% of Irish defence expenditure at the time.¹²³ Even the de Valera government was not to prove enthusiastic about such defence expenditure, with de Valera telling MacDonald that whilst he, and "strong nationalists" would be glad to gain control of the ports, "he feared such a proposal would not be accepted if the Irish had to pay maintenance costs!"¹²⁴

More generally in the 1930s, old arguments were revived concerning the most appropriate basis of Irish defence. In brief the argument revolved around whether it was more sensible to rely upon naval and air defences, or whether, as Fianna Fáil proposed, land forces. Fine Gael argued that whilst it was true that Ireland had one land frontier across which it could be attacked, there was also the possibility of attack by air and/or sea. Therefore, "the defence of the country had to be oriented towards having a strong navy and air

force capable of preventing an invasion from sea, or at least capable of causing heavy losses, with an adequate air support".¹²⁵

Initially, at least, the Fianna Fáil government was committed primarily to land forces, although as the thirties came to an end there was some effort to improve the air force, or Air Corps. Nonetheless, it remained small. Even by 1939, Ireland had "very little air cover".¹²⁶

According to Fisk, "by the autumn of 1939, the Irish Air Corps comprised four Gloster Gladiators, fifteen Miles Magisters, three Walrus amphibious aircraft, six Lysanders and an assortment of Vickers Vespas, Avro 636s, de Havilland Dragons and Avro Ansons. Only the Gladiators could be regarded as fighter aircraft of any consequence".¹²⁷

Although as the thirties progressed planes were purchased and the number of Flying Officers increased, doubling from 17 in 1936 to 34 in 1939,¹²⁸ Ireland remained exceedingly vulnerable. This vulnerability provided an important incentive for non-involvement in war, particularly since some of the Irish were alive to the horrendous prospect of massive aerial bombardment of their "meaga-cephalic capital city, with all the consequences that that entails",¹²⁹ although it was only in July 1939 that ARP for house-holders was considered by the Cabinet.¹³⁰

This lack of defence pertained not only in the air, since "Ireland's territorial waters were virtually undefended" also.¹³¹ There were, even after the return of 'the ports' only two vessels, which were "operated by the Department of Agriculture on fishery protection duties".¹³²

It appears that de Valera may have been more interested in passive measures such as coast watching and a coastal patrol service rather than a genuine navy, but even these activities came under pressure from the Department of Finance. Whilst there had been some plans for a new coastal patrol service, by February 1939 the Department of the Taoiseach was suggesting that its proposed size could be halved.¹³³

Ireland was clearly in 1939 not in a position to exercise, by any

reasonable interpretation, 'due diligence' in the protection and maintenance of neutral 'rights', nor indeed was it capable of adequately fulfilling neutral 'duties'.¹³⁴ It was relying upon the sufferance and forbearance of others.

In fact, Irish defence policy in the 1930s rested upon deterrence through making the cost of occupation too high, rather than through denial or retaliation against the aggressor's homeland. The idea was to make it too hot for the invader, and clearly the memories of the War of Independence (1919-21) and before, when the British found the resistance of the people, flying columns and guerrillas too difficult to overcome at reasonable cost were in the minds of Fianna Fáil leaders. In 1934 Fianna Fáil, thinking along these lines, established a new 'Volunteer Force', which greatly increased the number of part-time reserves.¹³⁵

The army Fianna Fáil inherited was certainly small, numbering only 5,793 in 1932 and 5,763 in 1934,¹³⁶ and Aiken proposed to build upon its smallness by the establishment of the Volunteer force which could be grafted on to the small force in being. Such a force had a reasonable basis if the objective was not so much to stop the invader at the sea-shore but to either deter through cost, or eject through cost. Mr. Aiken hoped that "such a type of organization is sufficient to make even strong neighbours respect a country, and we hope to make ours respected".¹³⁷ By 1935 Ireland had a 'Reserve' of 6,483 men and 11,531 in the new Volunteers, although by March 1939 these figures had drifted down to 5,100 and 9,952 respectively, which compared to 7,263 'Regulars'.¹³⁸ "At the outbreak of the Second World War on 2nd September 1939 the strength of the Defence Forces was:

Regulars	:	630 officers
		1,412 NCOs
	and	5,452 privates
A and B Reservists	:	194 officers
		544 NCOs
	and	4,328 privates
Volunteers	:	327 officers
		557 NCOs
	and	6,429 privates" ¹³⁹

This added up to 19,973 all ranks, regulars, reserves and Volunteers.

Could Ireland reasonably hope to be able to ensure that no portion of its territory could be occupied and used as a base by third parties? The answer was surely no, given the limited nature of Irish defence capabilities - no navy, a small air force, and a total of less than 20,000 in the armed forces.

A further issue was Ireland's financial commitment to defence. Between 1922-23 and 1939-40 Irish expenditure on defence was:¹⁴⁰

Table 5.4 : Irish Defence Expenditure 1922/23 - 1939/40 in millions
of £, and as a percentage of Government Expenditure

<u>Year</u>	<u>Expenditure (£)*</u>	<u>% of Government Expenditure**</u>
1922-3	7.502	27.8
1923-4	10.581	29.9
1924-5	2.994	12.2
1925-6	2.596	11.1
1926-7	2.352	9.8
1927-8	2.018	9.1
1928-9	1.737	8.1
1929-30	1.334	6.3
1930-31	1.133	5.5
1931-32	1.161	5.4
1932-33	1.179	4.9
1933-34	1.209	4.6
1934-35	1.324	5.0
1935-36	1.352	5.2
1936-37	1.376	5.2
1937-38	1.469	5.3
1938-39	1.766	6.2
1939-40	2.973	10.1

* According to Tables these figures are "Actual Amounts issued in each year"

** At least, "Total Supply Services"

Sources : Statistical Abstract of Ireland : 1931,1935,1937 and 1945:

1931 Table 155 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services
in each year ended 31st March, 1923 to 1931 ...'
pp.128-131.

1935 Table 173 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services
in each year ended 31st March, 1927 to 1934 ...'
pp.130-133.

1937/

1937 Table 179 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st March, 1929 to 1937 ...'
pp.134-137.

1945 Table 171 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st March, 1937 to 1945 ...'
pp.180-183.

After the civil war there was clearly a progressive decline for several years. Even when the decline was arrested, the increases were only marginal until 1939-40. The statistical evidence is hardly consistent with the June 1936 commitment to undertake all necessary expense or indeed to mobilize the "full strength of this nation".¹⁴¹

Indeed after the agreement re the ports in April 1938 but the failure to come to defence agreement with Britain, "there is evidence that de Valera ... was ready to pare down even the limited defence scheme which he, Aiken and other ministers had prepared in case of war".¹⁴² Indeed a number of plans made in 1938 suffered reductions over the winter of 1938-9, with reductions in arms for rifle battalions, the proposed coastal patrol service, the arming of the new field brigades, and the number of Swedish armoured cars to be purchased.¹⁴³

Nonetheless, in the spring of 1939 the government did announce plans to improve the defence situation, largely by allocating £5½m. for expenditure on the acquisition of capital equipment and stores. This planned expenditure included £1m. on aircraft, and a further £1m. on anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. It also involved plans for aerodromes and a munitions factory, an increase in army size and the new coastal patrol service and mine-sweeping.¹⁴⁴ The problem was, however, that since Europe stood on the eve of war, it made it

virtually impossible for Ireland to acquire the proposed equipment and stores.¹⁴⁵ According to the figures on actual defence expenditure, by 1939-40, defence expenditure was only up £1½m. from 1937-38.¹⁴⁶

Despite the talk of self-sufficiency, the Irish were not in a position to arm or supply themselves with home-produced equipment. When war broke out, Ireland had no source of war supplies within its shores,¹⁴⁷ even though Desmond FitzGerald, Minister of Defence, had argued in 1931 that "no country which lacks any part of the raw materials necessary for the manufacture of warlike stores is capable of being free".¹⁴⁸ But between 1931 and 1939 little or nothing was done to remedy the situation.

Some in the Fine Gael Opposition, acknowledging this dependence, particularly upon Britain, appeared to argue for Commonwealth solidarity, arguing that Ireland would be virtually powerless, unless she had "a guarantee of assistance from Great Britain", and they asked about the possibility of a unified Anglo-Irish command to meet an attack and the possibility of a new arrangement with the British regarding the defence of the ports.¹⁴⁹ Thus by the late 1930s, the Fine Gael opposition was still sceptical about Ireland's ability to go it alone, with Dr. O'Higgins saying that whilst prepared to try neutrality, he "was never a firm believer in the feasibility or benefits of neutrality".¹⁵⁰

The dilemma between the demands of neutrality and geographical proximity remained acute for the Fianna Fáil government, as it had for its predecessors. Indeed, on 13 July 1938 de Valera made a speech to the Dáil on the problems of Irish neutrality,¹⁵¹ much of which echoed the FitzGerald speech of 1927. de Valera wondered "Would Britain just stand aside and allow us to be attacked by an outside State?". The answer was clearly in the negative, especially if an

enemy "was likely to get possession of our territory from which they would be in a position to menace British interests or rights". In such a case "there is no doubt that Britain would have an interest and an immediate interest because of her geographic position", a factor reinforced by the "certain association" existing between the two countries, although that was secondary. But crucially, Britain would act "not in our interest ... (but) for some immediate selfish interest". Therefore, if attacked "it is not unreasonable that we should - if we wanted it, count on assistance". de Valera then touched upon the question of whether Ireland would ask. This depended "on the circumstances ... whether we thought it advisable to act alone or not. If we considered that we had an advantage in acting alone we would act alone in all probability". But, in an admission of dependency and lack of self-sufficiency in the military sphere, de Valera believed in meeting the problem of attack, in terms of planning Irish defence based upon "not alone, but with assistance". In a remarkable admission de Valera acknowledged, "if we had a great Continental power attacking us we would recognize that we would need such assistance, because of ourselves we probably would not be able, in fact I think it is almost certain, to meet a frontal and straightforward attack from any foreign State", although Ireland would resist. As a consequence of such thoughts, de Valera felt it acceptable to talk with Britain to discover "their plans in such a case" and to "prepare our plans accordingly". Before concluding he referred to a strong Britain being a shelter for Ireland, and that as a consequence Ireland had "an interest in seeing that sheltering position was maintained". Clearly "a direct attack upon Great Britain, even though it was not a direct attack upon us, but which might remove from us the shelter or protection that we had up to then, would be a matter of

serious importance to our people".

No wonder some argued that "the real defences of Ireland were not those which might be put up by her people - the defences, that is, on which the government declared itself to rely - but rather the British navy, and the fact that Ireland is geographically remote from central Europe. It would be quite wrong ... to minimize the effect which another people's battleships and aeroplanes and the all-important matter of distance had on the situation".¹⁵²

'The expectations of others' or 'the recognition of Irish neutrality'

In July 1938 de Valera had clearly acknowledged the central importance of others recognizing, tolerating and accepting the neutrality of a country if it were to be viable and sustainable. He was aware that herein lay "the trouble".¹⁵³ The Irish position in the late thirties with respect to expectations was difficult. One problem was that they themselves were not sure if they could sustain neutrality, partly for economic reasons but also for political reasons. For example, John Dulanty, the Irish High Commissioner in London, told Sir Thomas Inskip (Secretary of State for the Dominions) that he thought that "in a week Eire would come in on our side as a result of attacks on shipping".¹⁵⁴ Central was their dependency upon Britain. However, if the Irish were not confident, then how could other states be confident that the Irish would be either desirous or capable of upholding strict neutrality? Prior to 1938 this problem was clearly aggravated by the ports issue. Even given the return of the ports, however, some clearly felt there must be a catch.¹⁵⁵

To some extent the factors that caused the Irish to doubt the position were also prevalent in British minds, for example, Inskip did not think that Irish neutrality could survive, given that Ireland

was dependent upon trade, especially agricultural trade, with Britain.¹⁵⁶ At the very least there would be attacks on lines of communication and Anglo-Irish transport.

Complicating the issue was the question of Irish membership of the Commonwealth. Whilst Mansergh has convincingly argued that by 1939 the Dominions were free to make their own decisions regarding peace and war,¹⁵⁷ to some extent the changes had been so recent that there appears to have been something of a time-lag in terms of the perceptions of the states themselves and others as to what the situation actually was. The problems are well illustrated by a memorandum written by Anthony Eden, British Dominion Secretary, shortly after the outbreak of war. Britain did not want to recognize Ireland as neutral, whilst Britain regarded her as a Commonwealth member, but equally did not wish to assert that Ireland was no longer such a member.¹⁵⁸ Given these ambiguities and perplexities, the question of 'expectations of others' was hardly clear-cut.¹⁵⁹ This was even more so given the vexed question of 'the ports'. Not only the Irish wondered if it were 'too good to be true'. Thus whilst Longford and O'Neill are emphatic that "No hint was ever dropped by de Valera to encourage the idea that Ireland would participate in the war", they are prepared to admit that Chamberlain may perhaps have misunderstood de Valera.¹⁶⁰

If the British attitude to Irish neutrality on the eve of war lacked a certain clarity, the same is not quite the case regarding the Germans. On 26 August the civil service head of the Irish Department of External Affairs met the German Minister in Eire Dr. Hempel for lunch and made clear that "Ireland would remain neutral except in the case of a definite attack, for example dropping bombs on Irish towns".¹⁶¹ Walshe expressed concern re trade with Britain,

especially given its "vital importance to Ireland for obtaining supplies of essential consumer goods", and asked that if Ireland were involved indirectly, because of "German acts of war against Britain" that "any suffering incurred should be kept to a minimum".

The German 'expectations' regarding Ireland were made quite clear in the reply that Hempel received from Ribbentrop.¹⁶² Ribbentrop explicitly asked Hempel to see de Valera with the following statement, in which the Germans asserted they were "determined to refrain from any hostile action against Irish territory and to respect her integrity, provided that Ireland, for her part, maintains unimpeachable neutrality towards us in any conflict. Only if this condition should no longer obtain as a result of a decision of the Irish Government themselves, or by pressure exerted on Ireland from other quarters, should we be compelled as a matter of course, as far as Ireland was concerned too, to safeguard our interests in the sphere of warfare in such a way as the situation then arising might demand of us". Germany was "of course, aware of the difficulties involved in the geographical position of Ireland".

This statement was, naturally, highly conditional. Moreover, the Germans were seeking "unimpeachable neutrality", which it might reasonably be argued meant something specific to the Germans, since elsewhere German theorists had developed the concept of 'integral neutrality', that is, that neutrality of the state was insufficient of itself and had to be complemented by neutrality of the people.¹⁶³

Hempel duly delivered the statement in a meeting with de Valera on 31 August 1939.¹⁶⁴ de Valera repeated his statement of 16 February to the Dáil that Ireland wished 'to remain neutral'.¹⁶⁵ Interestingly de Valera made something of the phrase 'unimpeachable neutrality',

apparently fearing that "translated as 'non-objectionable'" it might easily give Germany "cause for objections". According to Hempel, de Valera then "said that in spite of the Irish Government's sincere desire to observe neutrality equally towards both belligerents, Ireland's dependence on Britain for trade vital to Ireland on the one hand, and on the other the possibility of intervention by Britain if the independence of Ireland involved an immediate danger for Great Britain, rendered it inevitable for the Irish Government to show a certain consideration for Britain". He then warned Hempel of dangers regarding violation of Irish territorial waters or exploitation of radical nationalist sentiment. A further warning, incompatible with neutrality, was given regarding "any hostile action against the population on the other side of the Northern Ireland frontier who wanted to return to the Irish State". It is extremely difficult to see how this could be reconciled with a neutral stance since it implied that the Irish might react to an attack upon territory the Germans might legitimately regard as British.

Hempel clearly was impressed in the sense that his "general impression was one of a sincere effort to keep Ireland out of the conflict" although he also perceived "great fear". Before the meeting closed de Valera proposed identical and simultaneous announcements regarding "friendly German-Irish relations" and that the Germans "had promised respect for Irish neutrality".¹⁶⁶ The Germans were prepared to accept this, as long as it was clear that after their "promise is referred to, the words 'conditional on a corresponding attitude by Ireland' must be added".¹⁶⁷ The Germans were prepared to accept the Irish position regarding 'neutrality', but their reiterated insistence upon the conditional nature of their recognition of Irish 'neutrality' leaves the impression that they did

not really expect it to survive.

The Irish and neutrality : attitudes and policy prior to 3 September 1939

It is of major significance that contrary to the cited literature and much Irish opinion, there is, in fact, a clear distinction to be drawn between the Irish position(s), albeit variously expressed and not always consistent, and the requirements of both the classical theory of neutrality as understood by international law and convention and of what subsequently came to be understood as the principal and necessary components of a policy 'for neutrality'.

The object was simply to stay out of the war, not necessarily following an impartial policy, nor a policy conditional upon insistence on and respect for neutral rights and duties, nor a policy limited by well-known rules and obligations. Rather it was a policy based upon bending with the wind, through discrimination and compromise. Ireland wished to avoid involvement at almost any cost and by all means. All of this was starkly revealed when de Valera spoke to the Dáil in the first weeks of the war, when he said "Our attitude we hope to keep not by adherence to some theoretical, abstract idea of neutrality or anything like that, but by addressing ourselves to the practical question that we do not want to get involved in this war, and we merely want to keep our people safe from such consequences as we would be involved by being in the war".¹⁶⁸ This is non-belligerency not neutrality.

The notion of 'a traditional policy of the Irish state since independence' must, therefore, be questioned. At best the evidence for it is equivocal, and at worst, it is equally possible to posit an alternative tradition, quite apart from the question of non-belligerency. Indeed, it can reasonably be argued that those with government

responsibility in Ireland have always taken a more pragmatic view, and that such pragmatism has even been displayed by de Valera.¹⁶⁹ Finally, of course, there was the clear admission by de Valera to Hempel of the discriminatory and partial nature of Irish policy in the forthcoming war. As Kevin O'Higgins had put it on 17 February 1927, neutrality might be "a consummation devoutly to be wished for, but ... we are unable to alter the geographical relations between this State and Great Britain and we are unable to alter the strategical aspects of the matter ...".¹⁷⁰

Chapter Five : Footnotes

1. Ronan Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality - An Historical Review', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1, No.3, (1982) pp.27-28. See also Donald H. Akenson, The United States and Ireland, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973) p.192.
2. Patrick Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1973) p.2 and pp.2-4.
3. Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations : Issues of Irish Foreign Policy, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) p.10.
4. Perhaps one of the most famous examples was the protracted visit to the United States by de Valera between 1917 and 1920.
5. Quoted in Lord Longford and Thomas P. O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, (London, Hutchinson, 1970) p.90, from The Daily Herald, 2 April 1919.
6. Michael Collins, The Path to Freedom, (Cork, Mercier Press, 1968 edition) p.32.
7. Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.38.
8. Ibid p.47.
9. F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, (London, Fontana, 2nd edition, 1973) p.393, but see also pp.360-361. For a nationalist view see Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic, (London, Corgi Books, 1968) pp.109 ff. and p.242, and for details of Mansion House pledge and declaration of 10 April 1918 see Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera 1917-1973, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980) pp.12-18.
10. C. Desmond Greaves, The Life and Times of James Connolly, (London Lawrence and Wishart, 1961) p.293. For other accounts of the League see Lyons op.cit. p.339, Fanning op.cit. p.28, Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.45 and, Samuel Levenson, James Connolly : A Biography, (London, Martin Brian and O'Keefe, 1973) pp.263-264.
11. Lyons, op.cit. p.360.
12. See Redmond's speech to the House of Commons on the outbreak of war - Parliamentary Debates (Official Report), Fifth Series - Vol. LXV, 8th Volume of Session 1914, columns 1828-9.
13. Redmond's official declaration to the people of Ireland, reproduced in Denis Gwynn, The Life of John Redmond, (London, Harrap, 1932) pp.384-6.
14. Reproduced ibid pp.391-2.
15. See Macardle op.cit. pp.112-5, Lyons op.cit. p.330 and Robert Kee, The Green Flag : A History of Irish Nationalism, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972) p.520.
16. Kee, ibid pp.521-3
17. Ibid, p.623 and p.525. By October 1915 there were 132,454 Irishmen in the British Army, over 80,000 having volunteered since the outbreak of war.

18. Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.38.
19. Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, Ibid p.24.
20. Ibid, p.38.
21. Writing under pseudonym Shan van Vocht, 'Ireland, Germany and the Next War' in Irish Review, Vol.III (July 1913), pp.217-227, especially pp.224-5, emphasis added, reproduced in Denis Gwynn, The Life and Work of Roger Casement, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1930), pp.195-204. See also an article under the pseudonym Bathr MacCrainn in Irish Review, (September 1912). (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), p.227.
22. Desmond FitzGerald, Memoirs of Desmond FitzGerald, 1913-1916, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp.140-1.
23. "'Poblacht na h.Éireann' The Provisional Government of the Irish Republic to the people of Ireland" - facsimile in Macardle op.cit. p.157.
24. Lyons, op.cit. p.371.
25. It was signed by Casement as the 'Irish Envoy' and Von Zimmermann, 'Staat-sekretar, Deutsche Regierung' and is reproduced in Gwynn, The Life and Work of Roger Casement, op.cit. pp.329-331.
26. Fanning, op.cit. pp.27-29.
27. All reproduced in Macardle, op.cit. pp.252-3, 850-1 and 254-5.
28. de Valera handed the draft of a speech to a journalist from The Westminster Gazette who selected passages and edited it as an 'interview'. It is reproduced in Moynihan, op.cit. pp.32-34.
29. Report of the First Dáil, 11 April 1919, as reported by The Irish Independent 12 April 1919.
30. de Valera, 11 April 1919, reproduced in Moynihan, op.cit. pp.26-28.
31. For example, in attitudes to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 - see below pp. 276-287.
32. Much of the correspondence, and Lloyd George's letter of 29 September 1921 using this phrase, is reproduced in Macardle, op.cit. pp.431-479, especially pp.478-9.
33. Fanning, op.cit. p.29. See also John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1975) p.33, and Lord Longford, Peace by Ordeal, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972 edition), pp.90-91 and p.145.
34. Longford, ibid, p.148.
35. 'Draft Treaty A' is re-produced in Macardle op.cit. pp.863-865, Appendix 16.
36. See Longford, Peace by Ordeal, op.cit. p.124, and Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary : Volume II - Ireland 1918-1925, Edited by Keith Middlemas, (London, Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.121-2.
37. See below pp. 163-4 and 189.
38. Jones op.cit. p.141 wrongly refers to this as 'Draft Treaty A'. For the memorandum see Macardle op.cit. pp.866-868.
39. Longford, op.cit. p.144.

40. Collins, op.cit. p.32
41. For details of these exchanges see Jones op.cit. pp.142-144 and Longford, op.cit. pp.146-8.
42. Longford, ibid, p.148, but for further exchanges see Longford, pp.90-1, 213-217; Macardle op.cit. pp.519, 530-531 and 578-579 and Jones op.cit. pp.142-144 ff.
43. For the Treaty see Macardle, ibid, Appendix 21, pp.880-5.
44. Longford held this view even nearly twenty years after the Treaty and much constitutional evolution within both Ireland and Commonwealth - Longford op.cit. pp.302-3. It is interesting that what came to be the 'Simonstown solution' in South Africa was not considered - see Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of External Policy 1931-1939, (London, Oxford University Press, 1952) p.257.
45. Dáil Éireann, Official Report : Debate on the Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland signed in London on 6 December 1921, (Dublin, 1922) pp.37-38 and passim.
46. Much controversy surrounds this document. The Treaty was 'Document No. 1'. For details of the document and de Valera's expositions upon it see Macardle op.cit. pp.886-891 (Appendix 22) and Moynihan, op.cit. pp.80-87.
47. Fanning, op.cit. p.29.
48. Dáil Éireann, Official Report : Debate on the Treaty, op.cit. pp.29-35.
49. See for the relevant documentation and the Constitution:
Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922 (31st March 1922)
An Act to provide for the Constitution of the Irish Free State
(5 December 1922)
An Act to make such provisions as are consequential on or incidental to the establishment of the Irish Free State
(5 December 1922)
in The Public General Acts passed in the 12th and 13th years of the Reign of his Majesty King George the Fifth, During the 5th Session of the 31st Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
50. Quoted in Macardle, op.cit. p.747.
51. For an impressive literature on Anglo-Irish and Commonwealth relations, on the role of the Irish in the evolution of the Commonwealth, and for differing views on these questions see:
W.K. Hancock, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of Nationality 1918-1936, (London, Oxford University Press, 1937); N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of External Policy 1931-9, (London, Oxford University Press, 1952); N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Postwar Change, 1939-1952, (London, Oxford University Press, 1958); D.W. Harkness, The Restless Dominion, The Irish Free State and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1921-31, (London, Macmillan, 1969); Deirdre McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists : Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s, (New Haven, Ct., Yale University Press, 1984) and; Paul Canning, British Policy Towards Ireland 1921-1941, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985).

52. For Statute of Westminster, see Nicholas Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952, Vol.1, (London, Oxford University Press, 1953) pp.1-4.
53. This was confirmed by Moore v. Attorney-General for the Irish Free State 1935, see Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of External Policy, op.cit. pp.28, and pp.292-3.
54. Executive Authority (External Relations) Act 1936.
55. Bunreacht Na hEireann, 29 December 1937. See also Article 29 on 'International Relations'.
56. Statement published in The Times 30 December 1937, and reproduced in Mansergh, op.cit. pp.305-306. de Valera did not protest but disagreed, continuing to regard Ireland as externally associated.
57. Summary of Proceedings : Imperial conference 1937 (London, HMSO, 1937, Cmd. 5482) Sections IX and X in Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs Vol.1, op.cit. pp.163-9.
58. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of External Policy 1931-9, op.cit. p.87.
59. Lyons, op.cit. p.554, emphasis in original.
60. Britain, United States of America, Holy See, France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy and Canada - in order of date of establishment.
61. Patrick Keatinge, the Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, op.cit. p.5.
62. Dail Eireann Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Vol.56, columns 2086-2116, (29 May 1935), (Hereafter Dail Debates). See the February 1920 'interview' in Moynihan op.cit. pp.32-34; 'Document No. 2' in Macardle op.cit. pp.886-891 and; Dail Debates 71 : 32-48 (April 1938).
63. de Valera, Dail Debates op.cit. 71 : 32-48 (April 1938).
64. Idem.
65. At a Cabinet meeting on 13 November 1925. A schedule entitled 'Defence Policy' is attached to Cabinet minutes 2/225.
66. Dail Debates op.cit. 18 : 384 ff (February 1927).
67. Ibid 56 : 2082-2116 (May 1935).
68. J. Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982) p.181.
69. T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939-47, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1977) pp.11-12, although no precise evidence is cited. Compare Longford and O'Neill op.cit. pp.313-314; Bowman op.cit. p.175 and Moynihan, op.cit. pp.358-362.
70. Bowman, ibid p.174.
71. C.C. O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs', in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), Conor Cruise O'Brien Introduces Ireland, (London, Deutsch, 1969) p.120.
72. Interview with Fisk, 18 April 1978 - Robert Fisk, In Time of War : Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality 1939-1945, (London, Deutsch, 1983) p.34 - emphasis in original.
73. Ibid, p.32, citing PRO CAB 24/271 MacDonald to Cabinet 12.10.37.

74. Ibid, p.34 citing SPO CAB 1/8 Cabinet minutes 23.11.37, and the Irish Cabinet's attitude.
75. Fisk, op.cit. pp.34-35.
76. Dail Debates op.cit. 71 : 32-48 (April 1938). Chamberlain seemed to concur in the House of Commons on 5 May 1938, although Churchill did not - House of Commons Debates op.cit. 335 : 1072-8 and 1094-1105.
77. Dail Debates op.cit. 72 : 696-703 - emphasis added (July 1938).
78. Deirdre McMahon, 'Ireland, the Dominions and the Munich Crisis', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1, No.1 (1979) p.35.
79. Ibid p.30.
80. Ibid p.35.
81. Idem, and see Fisk op.cit. pp.59-61. For the general relationship in the 1930s, see Deirdre McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists, op.cit., passim.
82. See McMahon, 'Ireland, the Dominions and the Munich Crisis' op.cit. p.35 and Fisk, ibid, pp.61-62. The Irish Deputy Prime Minister (An Tanaiste), Sean T. O'Kelly was one of those with doubts.
83. Fisk, ibid p.68. The British felt unable to agree.
84. Ibid pp.63 ff, for this and what de Valera told Chamberlain in the spring of 1939.
85. Dail Debates op.cit. 5 : 423(1923). For most of the period the League did not generate much Irish interest - see Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. pp.152-157 and Stephen Barcroft, The International Civil Servant : The League of Nations Career of Sean Lester 1929-1947, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Trinity College, Dublin 1972). See also Barcroft's 'Irish Foreign Policy at the League of Nations 1929-1936', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1, No.1, pp.19-29.
86. See Nils Ørvik, The Decline of Neutrality, (London, Cass, 1971, 2nd ed.) p.122, and Peter Lyon, Neutrality, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963) p.152.
87. 'Address opening the 13th League Assembly', 26 September 1932, reproduced in Peace and War : Speeches by Mr. De Valera on International Affairs (1932-1938), (Dublin, N.H. Gill and Son, 1944) p.11. For whole speech see pp.5-14.
88. 'The League and Peace : Broadcast to the United States', 12 September 1935, ibid pp.39-43.
89. 'The Abyssinian Crisis', Speech to the League Assembly, 16 September 1935, ibid, pp.44-48. On 4 October, de Valera reiterated that on coming into office Fianna Fail could have renounced the obligations, but they "decided otherwise" - 'Abyssinian War - Broadcast from Radio Eireann', 4 October 1935, ibid, pp.49-53.
90. 24 September 1935 - Cabinet File S8083 (State Paper Office of Ireland).
91. Longford and O'Neill op.cit. p.347. See also O'Brien op.cit. p.115 and compare with Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.156.

92. To League Assembly, 16 September 1935, Peace and War op.cit. pp.45-46.
93. Dail Debates op.cit. 62 : 2650 ff. (June 1936).
94. 'Withdrawal of Sanctions', 2 July 1936, in Peace and War op.cit. pp.54-59.
95. Fanning, op.cit. p.29.
96. de Valera, Dail Debates op.cit. 67 : 721-2 (May 1937).
97. Longford, op.cit. p.303.
98. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 62 : 2650 ff. (June 1936). For the 1932-1938 period on the neutrality issue see Paul Francis O'Malley, The Origins of Irish Neutrality in World War II, 1932-1938, (Ph.D. thesis, University of Boston, 1980).
99. Lyons, op.cit. p.256, and Longford and O'Neill op.cit. p.90.
100. As it was put in de Valera's motion to the Sinn Féin Ard-Fheis, 10 March 1926. It is at this meeting that de Valera resigned as President of Sinn Féin - Moynihan op.cit. pp.127-128.
101. Longford and O'Neill, op.cit. p.267.
102. de Valera speech to Fianna Fáil Ard-Fheis, 8 November 1932, Moynihan op.cit. pp.223-9, especially p.227.
103. Hancock op.cit. pp.367-8, and note Whitaker's observation that in the 1930s, foreign trade was reduced both absolutely and as a percentage of GNP - T.K. Whitaker, 'Monetary Integration : Reflections on Irish Experience', Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland, (1973 Winter) p.68.
104. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 25 : 474 ff. (July 1928). See also his speeches to Fianna Fáil Ard-Fheis, 8 November 1933 in Moynihan op.cit. pp.245-258, especially p.248, and to the Dail, Dail Debates, 41 : 906-19 (April 1932).
105. On 'counterdependence' see Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers ; the dynamics of international relationships, (New York, Free Press, 1972), pp.42-3, and on interdependence generally, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, (Boston, Little, Brown, 1977) pp.8-11 and passim.
106. Longford and O'Neill op.cit. p.331.
107. Ibid, p.334. See also p.349.
108. de Valera, 'Radio broadcast to United States, St. Patrick's Day 1941', in Moynihan op.cit. pp.452-5.
109. T.K. Whitaker, 'From Protection to Free Trade - the Irish Experience', Administration, Vol.21, No.4 (Winter 1973) p.412. More generally see Raymond James Raymond, The Economics of Neutrality. The United States, Great Britain and Ireland's War Economy : 1937-1945 Volumes I and II, (Ph.D., University of Kansas, 1980).
110. SPO S11394 Department of Industry and Commerce 18 April 1939, memorandum to Taoiseach and ministers.
111. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 74 : 719 (February 1939).
112. Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years, (Newton Abbot, David and Charles, 1975) p.89.

113. Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit., p.137.
114. Brian Farrell, Sean Lemass, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1983) pp.49-50. This was ironic given that Carroll, op.cit. p.90, notes that because of the proposed oil refinery "Ireland had probably the most modern oil-tanker fleet in the world when war broke out", but they were transferred to the British register!
115. Farrell, op.cit. pp.47 and 51, Farrell does not explain or elaborate upon the discrepancy.
116. Ibid, p.51.
117. Ibid, p.53.
118. Fisk, op.cit. p.84.
119. Dail Debates, op.cit. 74:2318 (March 1939). Aiken was Minister of Defence (1932-1939), Minister for Coordination of Defensive Measures (1939-1945), Minister of Finance (1945-1948) and Minister of External Affairs (1951-1954, 1957-1969).
120. Cited in Hancock, op.cit. p.289 footnote 2.
121. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 50:1148 (February 1934).
122. Wm. Cosgrave, ibid, 71:49-50 (April 1938).
123. See H.M. Shehab, 'Irish Defence Policy 1922-1950', (Unpublished M.Litt. thesis, Trinity College, Dublin, 1975) p.297 for Irish defence expenditure in 1927/8 and 1928/9.
124. 4 October 1937 conversation with MacDonald, see Fisk, op.cit. p.32.
125. Dr. Thomas O'Higgins, Dail Debates, op.cit. 50:1140-1150 (February 1934).
126. Lt.-Col. P.D. Kavanagh (ed.), The Irish Army Handbook 1973, (Dublin, Department of Defence, 1973) p.12.
127. Fisk, op.cit. p.66, citing a letter from the Department of Defence, Dublin 4 April 1979.
128. Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1939 (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1939) Table 176a 'Numbers of each rank in the Air Corps on 31st March in each year, 1934 to 1939', p.149.
129. Col. J.J. O'Connell had warned of this danger in "The Vulnerability of Ireland in War", Studies (March 1938) - see Fisk, op.cit. p.136.
130. Fisk, ibid, pp.138-9.
131. Capt. J. Sheehan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d) p.63.
132. Kavanagh, op.cit. p.48. See also Francis E. McMurtrie, (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships 1939, (London, Sampson, Low Martin, 1939) p.115.
133. Fisk, op.cit. p.85.
134. See 'Overseas Reactions to the Crisis : III Ireland', The Round Table Vol.29, No.113 (December 1938) pp.35-36.
135. Sheehan, op.cit. pp.8-11.

136. Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1935, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1935) Table 169 'Numbers of each rank in the Army on 31st March in each year, 1932 to 1935..' p.125.
137. Aiken, Dail Debates, op.cit. 50:1130-35 (February 1934) for his arguments on introducing the new force. For a brief account of the force, see Sheehan op.cit. pp.8-10.
138. Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1935, op.cit. p.125, and Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1939 (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1939), Table 176 'Numbers of each rank on 31st March in each year, 1936 to 1939 ..' p.149.
139. Kavanagh, op.cit. p.12.
140. These figures differ marginally from Shehab, op.cit. p.297 Appendix II, 'Statement showing the Net Audited Expenditure on Public Services for each year from 1922/23 - 1950/51', which is based on Published Estimates for Public Services, (Dublin, Stationery Office).
141. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 62:2654-60 (June 1936), and 71:32-48 (April 1938).
142. Fisk, op.cit. pp.84-5.
143. See SPO S10868A Department of Finance and SPO S10823 Department of Taoiseach.
144. 'Ireland's Vital Problems', Round Table Vol.29, No.115 (June 1939) p.586.
145. See Dr. T. O'Higgins, Dail Debates, op.cit. 74:182 ff. (February 1939).
146. See Shehab, op.cit. p.297 and Table 5.4 above, p.184.
147. See G.A. Hayes-McCoy, 'Irish Defence Policy, 1938-51', in K.B. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams, Ireland in the War Years and After 1939-51, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1969) p.40.
148. Dail Debates, op.cit. 37:1126 (March 1931).
149. James Dillon, ibid 62:2673 (June 1936), although later events showed Dillon was atypical, but see also General Mulcahy 62:2688-2695 and McGilligan 74:182 ff. (February 1939). In reply, de Valera 74:716 (February 1939) admitted that if attacked by a third party, Irish and British forces would combine.
150. Ibid, 77-463 (September 1939), and 77:1197 (November 1939).
151. Ibid, 72:696 ff. (July 1938).
152. G.A. Hayes-McCoy, op.cit. p.39, and 'Mr. De Valera's Victory' Round Table Vol.28 (1937-38) p.751.
153. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 72:696 ff. (July 1938).
154. Carroll, op.cit. p.12.
155. de Valera went to great lengths to emphasize there were no secret understandings or conditions - Dail Debates op.cit. 71:32-48 (April 1938). Why he was concerned is explained in Fisk op.cit. p.62.
156. PRO FO 800/30 Inskip/de Valera 8 September 1938.

157. Mansergh, Survey of British commonwealth Affairs : Problems of External Policy, op.cit. p.87.
158. PRO CAB 66/1 WP (39) 34 Eden memorandum 16 September 1939. See also PRO FO 800/300, for paper by Malkin, the Foreign Office Legal Adviser, which supported Irish rights in this regard, and PRO FO 800/310 for Churchill's riposte. For further argument see PRO FO 800/310 passim, PRO CAB 65/1 and, PRO CAB 67/2.
159. A further problem, for example was the complex issue of British, Irish and Commonwealth citizenship and subject-ness - see Nicholas Mansergh, 'Ireland : the Republic outside the Commonwealth', International Affairs, XXVIII, No.3 (July 1952) pp.277-291.
160. Longford and O'Neill, op.cit. p.343, but see also p.353 and Maffey report (PRO CAB 66/2) of 21 October 1939 when Maffey implied Britain had certain expectations.
161. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 : Series D (1937-1945) Volume VII : The Last Days of Peace August 9 - September 3, 1939, (London, H.M.S.O., 1956) p.311 (Hereafter, D.G.F.P.) Document No. 303 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry' - Telegram
162. D.G.F.P. ibid, pp.422-3 Doc. No. 428 'The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire' - Telegram, 29 August 1939.
163. Joechim Joesten, 'Phases in Swedish Neutrality', Foreign Affairs Vol.23, No.2 (January 1945) pp.327-8.
164. D.G.F.P. op.cit. pp.471-2, Doc. No. 484 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry' - Telegram 31 August 1939. The paragraph is based on this report, emphasis added.
165. Hempel had reported this in 'A143 of February 23, 1939' to Berlin but the report is not published in D.G.F.P., although referred to in a footnote D.G.F.P. ibid, p.471 footnote 3.
166. See footnote 165.
167. Ibid, p.504, Doc. No.527 'The State Secretary to the Legation in Eire' - Telegram 1 September 1939. See also p.482, Doc. No. 499 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry' - Telegram 1 September 1939.
168. Dail Debates, op.cit. 77:592 (September 1939). See also 72: 696 (July 1938) and Carroll op.cit. p.12 who quotes from de Valera's broadcast on the outbreak of war : "the aim of our policy .. to keep our people out of a war".
169. Even Longford and O'Neill op.cit. p.348, describe his speech to the Dail on 2 September 1939 as "a pragmatic approach based on Ireland's interests and on the circumstances of Irish public opinion".
170. Kevin O'Higgins, Dail Debates, op.cit. 18:654-6 but he reiterated the point several times 654-658.

Chapter Six : 'Unneutral Neutral Eire'¹ or Non-belligerent Ireland?

There are now several chronological accounts of Irish policy, and the policy of others towards Ireland, between September 1939 and May 1945.² With the exception of Smyllie, however, they generally take as axiomatic that Ireland was 'One of the Neutrals'.³ It is, however, possible to challenge this consensus if one moves from the simply chronological to a more analytical perspective. Then Smyllie's assertion that "Eire was nonbelligerent ... but she was never neutral in the generally accepted sense of the term ..." becomes very significant.⁴

It is possible to draw up an almost infinite list of factors influencing the Irish position. The principal influences have been evident in much of the foregoing, including: the desire of a newly independent state to assert its sovereignty; partition; lack of defence; hostility to participation in British wars; and a general disposition to fear the lack of influence of small states and the general immorality of great powers. This historical background was of vital importance, as were the associated internal dynamics of the Irish situation.

After all, the IRA had engaged upon a bombing campaign in the UK in January 1939, and at least "one faction in Fianna Fáil approved of the hallowed republican maxim that 'England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity'. The first wartime Ard Fheis heard delegates advocate the use of force against Northern Ireland".⁵ On the other hand, de Valera had to contend with many others whose sympathies were clearly pro-Commonwealth and involvement.⁶ Given this divide and the recent civil war, internal unity was a factor not to be under-estimated, and there was widespread acceptance that neutrality was the course of

action most likely to unite the people of Eire.

It can be argued that such was the support for the proposed course that "there was no discussion in the Dáil of the issues involved, or of the factors which should determine Irish policy".⁷ Even after the entry into the war of the United States, de Valera still felt that "Our circumstances of history, ... partition ... made any other policy impracticable. Any other policy would have divided our people, and for a divided people to fling itself into this war would be to commit suicide".⁸ Unanimity was only achieved, however, by a stress upon the disjunction between Irish sympathies and interests.⁹

The historical background and internal dimension were also crucial in the Irish case because of the significance of symbols in Irish political history and life. Arguably, the divide over the Treaty and the Civil War has been about the symbols of 'Republic' and 'oath'. Concepts and symbols in Ireland were always prone to having a particular interpretation and significance attached to them. Even towards the end of the war the British Representative, Maffey, would complain that de Valera was concerned with "the symbols of neutrality and independence. It was obvious that he attached immense importance to this symbolic factor".¹⁰ It is also clear that the commitment to independence was more than merely 'symbolic'.

The outbreak of the Second World War was to prove the "acid test"¹¹ of many of the questions facing Ireland about its position and was, in fact, to resolve many of the ambiguities, although in some cases only with hindsight. It must be remembered that as of September 1939 "Irish neutrality ... was by no means clearly established - in the sense, for example, that Swiss neutrality was

universally recognized"¹² and as noted earlier many internal and external observers doubted whether it could or would ever be implemented. Moreover, neutrality was not enshrined in the new 1937 Constitution, or in the amendment to the Constitution rushed through on the outbreak of war, although occasionally in the literature there are loose references to "legislation affirming Ireland's neutrality for the duration of the conflict".¹³ The First Amendment to the Constitution Bill sought to clarify the original phrase "in time of war" (article 28.3.3) to make it clear that it included situations "when there is taking place an armed conflict in which the State is not a participant but in respect of which each of the Houses of the Oireachtas shall have resolved that, arising out of such armed conflict, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State ...".¹⁴

de Valera himself in introducing the amendment spoke of it as "indirectly" indicating the policy of the Government, that is, "to keep this country, if at all possible, out of" war.¹⁵ Clearly, however, as either the original version or revised version stands, there is no necessary implication of neutrality and the word is not used. Its inclusion would certainly have strengthened the Irish position, and its omission tends to lend support to the view of neutrality as a means rather than as an end. Clearly far from putting itself in a position where it could not choose to go to war, Ireland had in effect closed no doors nor options. It could be neutral, non-belligerent or belligerent within the terms of the framework of the decisions of the summer of 1939.

Attention will now turn to the period of the Second World War, and the variables identified at the end of Chapter Four will now be applied, namely: the rights and duties of neutrality; the

recognition of Ireland's position by belligerents and others; the disavowal of help and; the freedom of decision and action.

(i) rights and duties

As neutrality evolved rights, duties, and crucially, impartiality were emphasised. In Ireland there was some grasp of these matters. Aiken, for example, although referring to the "old Hague Convention", clearly grasped the key to neutrality was the need to avoid breaching "the impartial conduct which neutrality imposes".¹⁶ de Valera also saw the need "to avoid giving to any of the belligerents any cause, any proper cause, of complaint".¹⁷

The Irish were aware that a simple declaration of neutrality was not enough, that it was necessary to make clear a determination "to stand by their own rights, conscious of the fact that they did not wish to injure anybody, or throw their weight, from the belligerent point of view, on the one side or the other".¹⁸ They also knew that with regard to neutrality, "you have to defend it and uphold it. The upholding of neutrality, if you are sincere about it, means that you will have to fight for your life against one side or the other - whichever attacks you".¹⁹

An initial manifestation of the Irish approach was an aide-mémoire handed to the British on 12 September 1939 on the subject of neutrality.²⁰ The memorandum made explicit reference to the Hague Convention of 1907 on the rights of neutral powers, and in formal terms announced prohibitions against vessels of war and submarines of the belligerents in Irish waters and it forbade the use of Irish airspace to their military aircraft. It applied equally to all of the belligerent powers, and was based upon international law. Indeed Eden had to advise the British Cabinet that "it would hardly be possible to

offer any serious criticism of the proposals set out in the memorandum",²¹ although Maffey, the British Representative in Dublin, made clear to de Valera that "this rigid aide-mémoire, dotting the 'i's' and crossing the 't's' in the way of stringent rules affecting British ships and aircraft had been read with profound feelings of disappointment".²²

The problem was that the formal position was undermined simultaneously by the Irish themselves in both words and actions. Ireland would and did "show a certain consideration for Britain".²³ Whilst Hempel may have felt at the beginning of October 1939 that there had been "careful, consistent adherence to" the declaration of Irish neutrality,²⁴ the strict letter of neutrality law and certainly its spirit was already being eroded by the Irish. Already a British plane which came down at Skerry had been allowed to depart "without interference", whilst a British plane at Ventry Bay had managed, or been allowed, to get away.²⁵

Whilst some may regard Irish behaviour as scrupulous with regard to the 'forms of neutrality',²⁶ there is a much greater consensus that Irish behaviour was friendly or benevolent. de Valera, himself, stated that whilst "we proclaimed our neutrality ... it has all the time been a friendly neutrality",²⁷ and immediately after the entry of America into the war, in a famous speech in Cork on 14 December 1941, whilst emphasising the reasons for Irish neutrality and that the "policy of the State remains unchanged", he did continue "We can only be a friendly neutral".²⁸ Again, subsequent to 'the American Note' in 1944, de Valera complained that the American government did not seem to realize "the uniformly friendly character of Irish neutrality in relation to the United States and of the measures which had been taken by the Irish Government, within the limits of their

power, to safeguard American interests". Although in conclusion he did make the point that the Irish government "must, in all circumstances, protect the neutrality of the Irish State".²⁹ Only Smyllie appears to raise the question of the consistency between such expressions and behaviour, and neutrality.³⁰

Despite these statements and Irish behaviour, de Valera sought to emphasize to Hempel "Eire's continued adherence to strict neutrality" and that this was being "so far" respected by the English. He made clear that Ireland would fight against either England or Germany if they invaded and in an effort to appear impartial, assured Hempel that "Except for the minimum of loose connection with the British Empire provided for constitutionally, which was exclusively intended to facilitate the future return of Northern Ireland to the Irish State, and except for the strong economic dependence of Ireland on England, Ireland stands in exactly the same position toward us as toward England".³¹ In fact, the Irish were not impartial. The Germans were prepared to accept this, because what they regarded as Ireland's "understanding neutral attitude" was to their advantage.³²

With respect to the foregoing, it could be argued that "sympathy was one thing and positive action was another",³³ but in fact, the Irish expressions of sympathy were not confined to words but reflected the way in which Ireland was actually partial given its geographical and economic position. Words and actions, moreover, cannot be completely divorced since words can create expectations or suspicions on the part of others. Indeed in a memorandum to colleagues in January 1940 Aiken had argued that partiality in propaganda could "be regarded as an act of war". Indeed a belligerent might "regard it as a departure from the impartial conduct

which neutrality imposes".³⁴ This was Aiken's justification for tough domestic censorship. Interestingly, according to Hempel "Germany's view was that taking sides was not permissible in neutral countries and that they should remain silent ... And it was not in accordance with strict neutrality that Mr. de Valera should have protested" about the invasion of Holland and Belgium.³⁵

Before turning to specific Irish overt action and behaviour, full weight must be accorded to two factors which offer some support for the 'neutral' argument. Firstly, Ireland did abstain from belligerency during the Second World War, although like many other non-belligerents it suffered the occasional damage of war.³⁶ Secondly, the Irish consistently resisted threats and blandishments to involve them as belligerents. It might then be argued that the Irish retained a sufficient degree of independence, sovereignty and freedom of decision and action, to say 'no'. This, however, can be exaggerated, since Irish non-belligerency was only really possible because of "strategic factors outside the Irish government's control ... Ireland was never of critical strategic value to any of the belligerents".³⁷ As de Valera himself was to admit in 1946, outside circumstances and personalities were decisive, indeed, Irish neutrality "depended ultimately upon the will of, perhaps, two men".³⁸

The real pressure came from the Allies over, initially the question of the access to the ports and then over the 'American Note' affair in spring 1944 when the Allies called for Axis representatives to be removed and complained about espionage.³⁹ The blandishments were usually in the form of some arrangement for a united Ireland. A particular example was the British plan of 26 June 1940.⁴⁰ The Irish, however, would not accept these offers, because as de Valera put it in a letter to Chamberlain, "The plan would commit us definitely to an

immediate abandonment of our neutrality. On the other hand, it gives no guarantee that in the end we would have a united Ireland ...".⁴¹

Churchill raised the ports' issue publicly in the autumn of 1940, referring to the inability to "use the south and west coasts of Ireland to refuel" as "a most heavy and grievous burden", made worse by the irony that it made more difficult the protection of the "trade by which Ireland as well as Great Britain lives".⁴² Although not in itself a direct or immediate threat, coming after private pressure, it troubled the Irish. Therefore, de Valera responded by emphasising there could "be no question of the handing over of these ports as long as this State remains neutral. There can be no question of leasing these ports. They are ours. They are within our sovereignty ...".⁴³

On certain major issues, touching upon the core of sovereignty, the Irish dug in their heels. On issues not so central to sovereignty, the Irish were prepared to act and behave in 'unneutral' ways or as a 'non-belligerent' rather than as a neutral. If abstention is to be understood as offering no partial assistance to either belligerent, the Irish did not conform to this criterion, since their sympathies did spillover into acts.

The charge of partiality it may be argued is mitigated by German acquiescence, and by the fact that despite favours for Britain, the very fact that the British were denied the ports balanced out the effects of Irish behaviour, so that over all, it was balanced and even-handed. This argument falls foul of the fact that the Germans were watchful against blatant partiality and in some other cases, of course, were not always aware (at least fully) of the partiality. Moreover, partiality to one side or the other is not to be added up and simply judged acceptable if the score comes out alright at the

bottom in overall evenhandedness. There can be little doubt that the Irish engaged in unneutral acts and in partial behaviour.

Meeting on 20 September 1939 with Maffey, de Valera exhibited a clear, but subtle distinction between form and substance.⁴⁴ He agreed that the Irish coast-watching service would wireless en clair information on the presence and location of German U-boats. Superficially this was in conformity with impartiality, since any belligerent could theoretically receive and act upon the information. But given the geography of the war and Ireland's location, it was exceedingly partial in substance. Indeed within a short time Hempel was advising that "Submarines should avoid Irish territorial waters".⁴⁵ Later a similar arrangement was apparently made about movements of German aircraft, although in this case at "British request the radio messages were made in code".⁴⁶ This would appear to breach both the form and substance of neutrality.

Something similar occurred with regard to censorship, although this time operating in favour of Germany. Whilst not even factual and documented accounts of German atrocities were allowed to be published, there was no similar restriction with regard to the enduring problem of Partition, partly because it was regarded as unconnected with the war and an internal issue.⁴⁷ As one of the constant victims of the censorship wrote after the war, "In theory the censorship was entirely neutral; in practice it worked almost exclusively against the Allies".⁴⁸

Given the inadequate nature and level of their defences, the Irish were unable to effectively prohibit violations of their air-space and territorial waters, despite the contents of the 1939 aide-mémoire. The Irish record was not totally consistent throughout the war as on occasions British aircraft were fired upon by Irish anti-aircraft

gunners, whilst the more general pattern was that, rather than being defended, Irish airspace was porous, there being, at least, 160 recognized violations.⁴⁹

Initially, British aircrews who crashed in the 26 counties were interned and then released. Subsequently, British and American crews were returned to Northern Ireland without being interned. The Irish distinguished 'operational' as against 'training' flights, and the Americans were always regarded as being on the latter, despite the frequency of their infringements of Irish airspace. The Irish distinction as between types of flight was partial,⁵⁰ and no Germans were released for the duration. In addition to these cases, de Valera also allowed RAF flying-boats a corridor beside Lough Erne for over-flights over Irish territory.

The Irish also had difficulties with their territorial waters, despite the injunction in the 1939 aide-mémoire that no "vessels of war, whether surface or submarine craft" should enter Irish territorial waters, unless in distress,⁵¹ and the publication in September 1940 of prohibitions upon belligerent ships in Irish waters.⁵² de Valera agreed that British warships (surface craft) should be allowed to pursue and attack hostile submarines infringing Irish territorial waters and neutrality "whatever the regulations may be".⁵³ Certainly the British did, at times, take the precaution of covertly patrolling the Irish coast. It is also clear that German U-boats operated close to Irish shores on occasion.

In some other areas, the Irish were more scrupulous, most notoriously, when on 2 May 1945 de Valera and Walshe called upon Hempel to express condolence at the death of Hitler.⁵⁴ The Irish also, ultimately, rejected a trade agreement with Britain in the summer and autumn of 1940, despite the fact that the talks had opened on the

initiative of the Irish at the end of April. The reason for the breakdown was that the Irish felt the proposed terms on offer were incompatible with their neutrality.⁵⁵ A trade agreement per se need not have violated neutrality, given the traditional Anglo-Irish relationship, but the Irish were concerned at the British request for transshipment and storage rights, whilst even more significantly, Churchill became British Prime Minister and the Germans advanced to the Channel ports. Pragmatism clearly played a role.

Shipping was something of a sore point for the Irish. At the beginning of the war the Irish had voluntarily transferred to Britain seven modern oil tankers, and subsequently had agreed, in order to avoid competition and at Britain's request, to charter ships through the British Ministry of Shipping's Charter Office. Although the real hardships came after 1940, the Irish already felt they were receiving something of a raw deal. Even more problematical was that for some time Irish ships, and neutral ships engaged in Irish trade, took part in British convoys. Furthermore, the Irish do not appear to always have been vigorous in protesting about their shipping losses, at least this was a stated reason at the end of 1943 for the American rejection of an Irish request for "permission to purchase another ship as a replacement for the two ships chartered in 1941, which had been lost while carrying wheat to Ireland".⁵⁶ On the other hand, there clearly were cases when the Irish government did protest.

The complexities in the Irish position is further evidenced on the issue of intelligence cooperation with the Allies.⁵⁷ Whilst there is some conflict of evidence, it does appear that close contact was maintained, with senior Irish officials meeting their British and American counterparts. Information from captured German agents was

also handed over. Dwyer has even claimed that Walshe "even offered to allow the United States to station agents in Ireland".⁵⁸ Although no definitive judgement can be made on the extent of the cooperation, co-operation and thus partiality there certainly was.

A similar de facto partiality was evident in the contribution allowed by the Irish to the British war-effort in terms of manpower for the British armed forces and industrial and agricultural production. As R.M. Smyllie put it "Mr. de Valera easily might have followed the example of other neutral countries by passing a Foreign Enlistment Act, making it an offense, punishable by loss of all civil rights, to join the fighting services of any of the belligerent Powers. He did nothing of the kind. All through the war, Irishmen were completely free to join the British Forces; and ... they did so in comparatively large numbers ...".⁵⁹ It is impossible to be precise about the numbers involved, but the consensus appears to be that around 40,000 people from the twenty-six counties served in the British forces. Some 10% of these volunteers deserted the Irish Army to join the British Army, taking with them their training.⁶⁰ Mansergh suggests that "If their enlistment did not infringe the letter of Irish neutrality, it materially strengthened the forces at the disposal of the British Commonwealth".⁶¹ In fact, it did infringe neutrality by its partiality.

A related question was the manpower contribution by the Irish to British production. Again, estimates vary, but it was probably of the order of 150-180,000.⁶² Originally whilst not officially encouraging the traffic, the Irish government did nothing to stop it. Although certain advertisements were prohibited from Irish newspapers, the government ordered "that the British Ministry of Labour's National Clearing House Gazette should be displayed at employment exchanges

throughout Ireland".⁶³ As the war progressed certain restrictions were placed on emigration, although not for reasons of neutrality but rather for reasons concerning the state of the domestic economy.⁶⁴ If impartiality involves lack of material assistance, then Ireland would appear to have been partial. Although a distinction might be drawn between state and citizens the degree of complicity of the Irish state in this material assistance cannot be ignored. This partiality far outweighs the impartiality represented by banning of collections for Spitfires.

Northern Ireland provided other sensitive and difficult issues for the Irish, given Article Two of their Constitution and de Valera's public claim in May 1941 that "The Six Counties are a part of Ireland ... Their inhabitants are Irishmen, and no Act of Parliament can alter this fact ...".⁶⁵ Article Three of the Constitution, limiting Dublin's jurisdiction to the 26 counties "Pending the re-integration of the national territory",⁶⁶ might have provided a basis for ignoring belligerent actions in the six counties, but such action was not ignored. Dublin complained about the possibility of conscription being introduced and the American presence. This latter leading David Gray, the American representative in Dublin, to ask why de Valera "protested American troops coming as friends for the protection of Ireland, and did not protest German bombers coming to Belfast and killing Irish nationals".⁶⁷ de Valera saw the presence of American troops in terms of Irish sovereignty,⁶⁸ but the problem was made worse by the fear that his protests could have stirred up trouble for the GIs from the nationalist minority in Ulster, which would have been difficult to reconcile with either abstention or impartiality.

A complication was the thought that occurred to Irish and other minds, of what to do if the Germans should invade Northern Ireland and

proclaim themselves as liberators. de Valera told Gray that if this happened "what I could do I do not know". The Irish Labour Party would not countenance aiding the British in such a situation, whilst Fine Gael would have. Fianna Fáil had no ready answer.⁶⁹ This issue is of interest since a factor in neutrality is the expectations of belligerents as to what a neutral might do in certain situations, but it did not arise because the Allies were strong enough to prevent it.

Most of the 'active' measures undertaken by Ireland were of a negative nature, namely the refusal to yield to pressure. Whilst these refusals were frequent, the Irish position was somewhat underminded by the fact that de Valera himself realized that "We are a small nation, we are quite aware that in modern wars the equipment and armaments required are far beyond the possibilities of a small nation",⁷⁰ although again it was made clear that "Any attempt to bring pressure to bear on us by any side ... could only lead to bloodshed" since Ireland would defend its rights "in regard to these ports against whoever shall attack them, as we shall defend our rights in regard to every other part of our territory", and "if we have to die for it, we shall be dying in that cause".⁷¹ Indeed, in a private interview with the Canadian High Commissioner, de Valera emphasized that the Irish would resist the Allied threat to "the sovereignty of Eire". If that sovereignty were interfered with "the army and the country would fight, and were even now preparing for eventualities. He intended to summon the Dail and receive their endorsement of this renewal of the old struggle, this time against England, against America, against anybody ...".⁷² On occasion the words were matched by action, for example, the army was put on alert on the night of the American Note.

When publicly speaking to the nature of Irish preparations, naturally some emphasis was usually put upon Irish strength. Thus in

November 1940 de Valera was keen to make clear that Ireland had "at present in men and material a stronger defensive force than ever existed in this island before, and we are constantly strengthening it". However, in the same passage de Valera had also had to admit that Irish equipment was not complete, although he argued that was "not our fault".⁷³

Clearly the Irish defence effort was substantially increased over the period 1938-9 to 1945-6. The increase is marked in both amount and as a proportion of 'Total Supply Services' as the following table indicates:

Table 6.1 Irish Defence Expenditure 1938/39-1945/46 in millions of £, and as a percentage of Government Expenditure

<u>Year</u>	<u>Expenditure (£m)*</u>	<u>% of Government Expenditure**</u>
1938-39	1.766	6.2
1939-40	2.973	10.1
1940-41	6.682	20.35
1941-42	8.155	22.9
1942-43	8.394	22
1943-44	8.189	20.5
1944-45	8.147	18.7
1945-46	8.768	18.4

* Actual Amounts issued in each year

** Or at least, percentage of "Total Supply Services"

Source: Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1946, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1947 - P.No. 7745), Table 174 'Amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st March 1938 to 1946', pp.152-155.

The figures show sharp increases between 1939-40 and 1941-42 after which expenditure levelled off, although peaking in gross terms in 1942-43. The effect is somewhat modified, however, by the substantial rise in the cost of living index over the period.⁷⁴ The figures tend to support the argument that it was only "with the overthrow of France" that "for the first time, de Valera and the Opposition parties set about attempting to introduce some kind of effective defence force ...",⁷⁵ that the "emergency became a reality".⁷⁶ It was only in May 1940 that certain infantry battalions were placed on a war footing, as were an anti-aircraft brigade and two companies of engineers.⁷⁷ It was during this period that de Valera sought American help; established the inter-party Defence Conference; intensified action against the IRA; and suggested Anglo-Irish military talks. It was on 28 May that a new security force was created, the Local Security Force (LSF), and between 31 May, when recruiting for LSF began and 16 June 1940, 44,870 men were enrolled. It was only in June that general recruiting began in earnest. At the beginning of June, the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) (No.2) Bill was passed through all its stages in two days. It provided for enlistment for the duration of the emergency, billeting, the placing of troops on active service and certain other contingencies.⁷⁸ Whilst, despite the activities of 2 September 1939, it was only on 7 June 1940 that the Irish Government declared a state of emergency existed! Nonetheless, even in 1940, it was not until November that a supplementary army estimate for £3 million was adopted.

Until the crisis in 1940 numbers in the army were comparatively small. In September 1939 the Reserve had been called out on permanent service, as were the Volunteers. The Reserves numbered nominally 5,066 officers and men, the Volunteers 7,223, and in addition

to which there were 7,494 Regulars.⁷⁹ Of the Reserves and Volunteers, however, 2,053 exemptions were granted by Christmas 1939, and by the end of 1939, the Cabinet was committed, for financial reasons, to reduce the numbers permanently on service to "the smallest number of troops necessary to garrison fixed positions", and that meant below 15,350.⁸⁰ By April 1940, "one way and another, there were 1,256 officers and 15,900 other ranks on permanent service", a total of 17,156, although even then apparently "the authorities began to wonder, in the slang of the time, if their journey was really necessary".⁸¹ In a revealing comment the editor of the Defence Forces Handbook, Capt. J. Sheehan, states that "By the end of 1940 the army had more or less completed its expansion to a war-time footing".⁸² The 'end of 1940' seems rather late to be ready for war, especially given the excitements of the summer, the fear of invasion, and the vexed issue of the ports.

The LSF trained regularly and by 1942 the LSF had 98,429 men; 103,530 in 1943 and; 96,152 in 1944, it being estimated that the strengths were 90% effective.⁸³ Whilst these figures appear impressive, it remains true that in 1942 the number of Irishmen on permanent service was 38,787 all ranks, and in the summer of 1944, 36,211 all ranks.⁸⁴ In other words, the effective Irish figure was about half de Valera's aspiration to a quarter of a million men. One possibly significant factor was, as Gray reported being told by de Valera himself, de Valera "dares not arm volunteer force", because of fears about IRA infiltration.⁸⁵

Even if given the benefit of the doubt, the effective size of the Irish defence forces remained small, a problem compounded by the fact even when "The recruits ... were forthcoming; ... the arms were not".⁸⁶ Even in 1940 de Valera was very conscious of Ireland's "nakedness of defence", and felt that in such circumstances the government "could

not have it on their consciences" that they had taken Ireland to war.⁸⁷ A somewhat jaundiced opposition member of the Defence Conference, Dr. T. O'Higgins had privately observed in March 1941, "We have 100,000 LSF men with empty hands - as helpless as any civilians", whilst 20,000 of the LSF had "rifles of a bore that limits the supply of ammunition to less than 100 rounds or about a couple of hours service". Ireland has "no aerial fighters worth mentioning and no anti-aircraft ground defences".⁸⁸

Irish weakness was most dramatic with respect to the navy, or the Marine Defence Service. At the outbreak of war, there was no navy nor Marine Defence Service. Fort Rannoch and Muirchu, the fishery protection vessels became Public Armed Vessels in January 1940, with the first Motor Torpedo Boat arriving a week earlier. This, and subsequent MTBs were built by Thorneycrofts in Britain. Within two years the number of MTBs had increased to six, but they were very small and were unsuited to rough seas.⁸⁹ There was also the schooner Issault which was purchased as a training ship, and the barge, SS Shark, which was designated as a 'mine planter'.⁹⁰ With respect to the sea, Ireland defaulted with regard to 'active' measures.

With respect to the skies, Ireland did a little better, but still fell short of sufficiently vigorous 'active' measures. Ireland did have a number of planes of various types by the autumn of 1939, but most were of little or no use in the war of 1939-45, given the technological developments that had taken place, and perhaps only the Gloucester Gladiators were of practical significance.⁹¹ During the war itself, no significant fighter aircraft were acquired, but only six Hector Hinds in 1940 and a further ten Hector trainers in the summer of 1941. Again the British were the suppliers. The only other acquisitions were those repaired and pressed into service by the

Air Corps from the 163 belligerent aircraft which crashed in Eire. This produced a Fairey Battle and a Lockheed Hudson, as well as a couple of Hurricanes.⁹² Aerial defence also involved anti-aircraft guns, of course, but the Irish remained short of them, although in November 1941 the British let Ireland have twelve 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns. Nonetheless, they were too few, and failed to stop the high-level of incursions or indeed the bombing of Eire.

As for the Irish Army, it was "Lightly armed, with very little aircover and no armour, it was not a formidable force".⁹³ Once the war was underway, supplies became a critical problem. The Americans tended to argue that they only had enough for their own rearmament, and those fighting aggression.⁹⁴ The British that no arms could be given unless "assured that it was Southern Ireland's intention to enter the war".⁹⁵ The Germans were also a possible source, but in that case there were substantial problems of transport, and Irish fears about British sensitivities and reactions.⁹⁶ Everyone was only willing to give arms it seemed in return for quid pro quos that violated Irish neutrality. Despite the occasional bile in British and American responses, Britain was Ireland's chief source of supply, and later on the Americans supplied rifles. But Ireland still only had a couple of tanks, less than 30 armoured cars, and in addition, some armoured vehicles adapted by the Irish from Ford and Dodge chassis. Its armour was inadequate. The Irish were deficient in tanks and anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, rifles and ammunition, and they were further handicapped by the antiquity of some of their equipment.⁹⁷

The recurring question of 'how much is enough?' is incapable of being empirically answered, but at sea, and in the air, the Irish clearly did not have 'enough' since they were incapable of preventing

invasions into territorial waters and air-space, or violations of their neutrality. Their relative defencelessness meant that on occasion they did bend. On land the situation was somewhat different given that throughout the duration the land area of the twenty-six counties remained inviolate. There was perhaps an element of deterrence. Nonetheless, the crucial factors appear to have been the geo-political.⁹⁸ Certainly, the Irish could have made whole-scale occupation unprofitable, and even partial occupation of, say, the ports would have been relatively expensive in men, time and resources, a factor the British Chiefs of Staff had taken into account in 1936.⁹⁹

Irish active measures were not wholeheartedly or vigorously pursued. With respect to 'due diligence' the Irish clearly defaulted, particularly in the air and at sea. The Irish objective was to, simply, avoid participation in the war. That is not neutrality.

(ii) recognition of position by belligerents and others

In his speech to the specially convened Dáil on 2 September 1939, de Valera attempted to make clear that Ireland would seek to pursue a policy of neutrality.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, many internal and external observers doubted whether such an Irish policy could ever be implemented. It lacked antiquity, whilst Ireland appeared to be in an ambiguous juridical position. Moreover, there were questions concerning the political, military and economic viability of such a policy.

For the most part the Germans accepted Irish neutrality, although there were some violations. Irish rights were breached by U-boats, by occasional bombing, and by such incidents as aerial reconnaissance, which, incidentally led the Irish to fire on German planes.¹⁰¹ The Germans also found it difficult to abjure some involvement with the

more militant of Irish republicans and there was also some espionage activity.¹⁰² In 1940 and 1941, there was some discussion and planning of an attack upon Eire, but this was largely envisaged as 'diversionary', and of a lower priority than the main target of Operation Sealion, Britain.¹⁰³

On 17 June 1940 Hempel was asked by Walshe "to declare that we would not make a landing in Ireland". Hempel said such a request "could only meet with a negative reaction on my part and I added that such a declaration was impossible in the present military situation".¹⁰⁴ Within a month, however, the Germans were more reassuring saying that "As long as Ireland conducts herself in a neutral fashion it can be counted on with absolute certainty that Germany will respect her neutrality unconditionally".¹⁰⁵ In 1941 Hitler himself apparently argued "Eire's neutrality must be respected. A neutral Irish Free State is of greater value to us than a hostile Ireland", although he recognized that certain marginal encroachments could not be avoided.¹⁰⁶ The Irish were fortunate that although Hempel was aware "Irish neutrality was weighted on the Allied side ... he did not believe such breaches of impartiality warranted German retaliation",¹⁰⁷ and that geography and the Allied forces remained strong enough to prevent the Germans from doing much otherwise.

The initial British discomfiture was clearly revealed in the Eden memorandum of 16 September 1939 on the legal and constitutional position.¹⁰⁸ The British never simply accepted the 1939 Irish aide-mémoire and throughout the war Britain formally refused to recognize the Irish position. Moreover, not only was a guarantee of respect for Irish neutrality missing, but so too, and quite deliberately, was a guarantee not to invade Irish territory. Early in 1941, the Irish were told the question was "academic" but nonetheless, "in a war like

this it is impossible to foresee what might develop. A situation of life and death might arise in which it might be essential, in our view, to the survival of the liberties of Britain and Southern Ireland too that we should have the use of the ports".¹⁰⁹

On occasion there was a certain apparent de facto recognition of the Irish position, and a certain ambiguity of language, for example, when on 17 June 1940 MacDonald spoke to de Valera of Ireland's "immediate abandonment of neutrality" in return for cooperation in advance against a possible German invasion.¹¹⁰ Moreover, one of the British proposals put forward by MacDonald during negotiations contained the idea that "Eire to remain neutral, at any rate for the time being".¹¹¹ More indicative of British attitudes was the continuing belief that it might be possible to do a deal over unity, 'the ports', or the supply of equipment. Whilst rebuffed, it is of significance that such deals were at least subject to negotiation, giving some sustenance to British hopes.

The Americans also refused to guarantee the Irish position, and even prior to entry into the war, were not sympathetic to the Irish position. As it came to be put the American government "did not question the determination or the right of the Irish people to maintain their neutrality, but between a policy of this character and one which potentially at least gave real encouragement to Germany there was a clear distinction".¹¹² The United States remained antipathetic and came back to charges concerning the nature of Irish neutrality, although Roosevelt in February 1942 did send reassurances to de Valera there was not, and "is not now, the slightest thought or intention of invading Irish territory or threatening Irish security".¹¹³ This was repeated in the wake of Irish fears over the 'American Note' in 1944.¹¹⁴ The Note specifically charged "that despite the declared

desire of the Irish Government that its neutrality should not operate in favour of either of the belligerents, it has in fact operated and continues to operate in favour of the Axis Powers and against the United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your national economy depend".¹¹⁵ The British concurred with the Americans.

In 1940, Hempel was confident that "the Army, together with the nationalist population, would be prepared to carry on strong resistance in the form of guerilla warfare against an English attack",¹¹⁶ although in November 1939 he had explicitly warned that if the British took action against the harbours, the Irish government "might put up armed resistance or it might not, in view of the small size of the armed forces".¹¹⁷ Ribbentrop, moreover, was annoyed at an Irish rejection of German arms, believing this reluctance to accept arms in advance implied that Irish resistance to a British attack was hardly likely to be all it was made out to be.¹¹⁸

Hempel was aware that the position of the United States was crucial, warning in October 1939 that "a possible abandoning of American neutrality would constitute a threat to Irish neutrality",¹¹⁹ and a month later, commenting that whilst US entry into the war was "not expected for the time being", such "a step would exert a decisive influence on the situation here".¹²⁰ The American representative in Dublin, David Gray initially felt the same, since de Valera had told him, US entry into the war "would alter our situation over-night".¹²¹

The Allies also occasionally had hopes with respect to Irish opinion, possible internal divisions within the Fianna Fáil government, the possibilities of an alternative, more congenial government, and the cultivation of Mr. James Dillon TD. Whilst some of these thoughts were chimerical, there was also some foundation for certain hopes along

these lines. Maffey and Hempel were both originally agreed, in October 1939 that neutrality enjoyed public support, but the degree of unanimity can be exaggerated.¹²² For example, whilst a senior Fine Gael politician felt in 1940 that entry into the war would be opposed by "perhaps more than half of" Fianna Fáil, "one third of Fine Gael and perhaps the whole of Labour", this suggests the abandonment of neutrality did have some support.¹²³ This despite the fact that neutrality was fortified by censorship.

For some, private doubts revolved around the moral issue of abstention from a war against Nazism. For others the doubts involved the practical grounds of viability and expediency of the policy. There was no organized group of 'doubters' and those holding such views did not always do so consistently, or with the same strength. For example, doubts concerning viability and expediency rose significantly with the fall of France. The most consistent opponent of the government's policy was James Dillon TD, deputy Leader of Fine Gael until he was forced to resign on the issue in February 1942, when he suggested that "Whatever the sacrifice, whatever America may want from us to protect her from her enemies, she will get for the asking".¹²⁴

Whilst they refused to support Dillon's motion in March 1941 that the shadow cabinet seek a declaration of war, the shadow cabinet were interested in a bargain over Ulster. The great constraint was the perception of public opinion. There was, in fact, more concern over neutrality among the shadow cabinet than their public utterances suggested.¹²⁵ Cosgrave had publicly repudiated Dillon, but in private was somewhat more flexible. He had, after all, written to de Valera in July 1940 (for the first time in eighteen years), pointing out that "If the Government in changing circumstances feel it necessary

to depart from the policy of neutrality in which they have had our support up to the present, my colleagues and I would be prepared to give them our fullest support in such a change of policy". de Valera did not act upon this hint, and Cosgrave's reply emphasized his original "letter had been written, not to suggest a change of policy but to indicate what would be his party's view if the Government felt obliged to abandon neutrality".¹²⁶

In private with Maffey in October 1942, Cosgrave observed that no Irish government could abandon neutrality because support for the policy was increasing, rather than diminishing. Maffey had to report in fact that "the conversation revealed the present firm and unyielding adherence of all parties to the policy of neutrality", although it is interesting that in repudiating Dillon, Cosgrave used the expression 'at the moment', and Maffey reported 'the present' adherence.¹²⁷ Even in Fianna Fáil some were ready, perhaps including Lemass, to at least discuss some of the British offers.¹²⁸

During the 1943 election campaign Fine Gael was, nonetheless, careful to insist that it supported neutrality, although there were hints of the need for closer cooperation with Britain after the war. Fianna Fáil sought to use neutrality for their own purposes, suggesting "If you vote Fianna Fáil, the bombs won't fall" and arguing neutrality would be endangered if they were not returned. de Valera told audiences: "Remember that this nation is being watched, and if you turn down the Government, foreign people will represent it as a turning down of the policies for which the Government has generally stood".¹²⁹ Despite this, the Fianna Fáil vote fell significantly in 1943 compared to 1938.¹³⁰ Although this primarily reflected domestic factors, it was hardly a ringing endorsement of de Valera.

As for the 1944 election, the Round Table correspondent reported in July that "The election campaign was remarkable, ... for the discreet silence which was observed on topics which to an outsider might well have seemed all-important for the future of Eire ... Neutrality was not an issue".¹³¹ Little was said about the future, although in the spring of 1944 General Mulcahy had argued Eire should become a full member of the Commonwealth again when the war was over, a departure from his party's policy. In 1944 Mulcahy also advocated an Anglo-Irish military alliance as a future plank in the party's platform.¹³² In 1944 Fianna Fáil recovered support, although not back to the 1938 level. Most of the votes appear to have come from Labour,¹³³ and as such were not necessarily related to neutrality, although 'the Note' crisis does appear to have enhanced de Valera's position. With regard to attitudes to neutrality, however, it must be remembered that thousands of Irishmen voted with their feet by going to Britain.

(iii) the disavowal of help

For the Irish there was uncertainty as to who the enemy might be. This uncertainty, indeed, "contributed to a rather schizophrenic feeling in the army with the men in the 1st Division in the south mentally anticipating a German landing, and those in the 2nd Division in the northern part of the country facing towards the border with the possibility to having to oppose a British invasion".¹³⁴ If there was uncertainty about the source of possible invasion what was the attitude to receiving and accepting help from others?

At the height of the German successes in 1940, de Valera asked to see Hempel, and warned him that fears about German intentions

concerning Ireland had increased, that Ireland stood by its pledge not to become a base against Britain. He then went on: "If it came to an invasion then Ireland would inevitably become a battlefield for the belligerents. In an English invasion we would fight with Irishmen against the English, in a German invasion the English would fight along with the Irish".¹³⁵ Indeed, whenever this subject came up, the Irish catechismal response was to focus, as de Valera did in his talk with Hempel, upon 'invasion'. There was to be no physical presence by German or British armies until the other side had invaded.

The Germans periodically enquired of the Irish attitude towards help either to forestall or in response to a British invasion, with the assurance that the "Reich Government would be in a position to give Ireland vigorous support and would be inclined to do so".¹³⁶ On 3 December 1940 Hitler himself decided Hempel should find out "whether de Valera desires support" and this was coupled with the offer of the British arms left in France.¹³⁷ In response to such offers the Irish were very circumspect, at least at official level, fearing British discovery and response. For those reasons they declined "until a British attack, which was unlikely for the time being, had become a fact".¹³⁸ de Valera thought "I don't think we have to make provision now. Should it really happen, I think Germany is so efficient that they could find ways and means".¹³⁹ Hempel occasionally worried, however, that even in the event of a British attack, de Valera might not call upon the Germans.¹⁴⁰ One senior Irish army officer, the GOC of the 2nd Division, Major-General Hugo McNeill, the officer commanding the Irish troops on the Northern Ireland border, met with the German Counsellor in Dublin to solicit German arms and assistance but again, this appears to have been in the event of a British invasion.¹⁴¹

With regard to the British, the Irish shied away from formal arrangements, partly because de Valera felt that an agreement "no matter how independent it left both parties, would inevitably be interpreted by outsiders as making them allies".¹⁴² Indeed, in 1940 de Valera refused an invitation to go to London for much the same reason.¹⁴³ Nonetheless, German success aroused Irish fears, and talks about defence cooperation did take place. On 23 May 1940 the Irish suggested "immediate secret contacts should be established between the Irish military authorities and the service chiefs in this country (Britain) with a view to concerting the military action which would be taken when the occasion arises".¹⁴⁴ It was Walshe and Col Archer who attended the meeting that day in London with Machtig (Permanent Under-Secretary of the Dominions Office) and British air-force, naval and army officers to explore possible avenues of German attack,¹⁴⁵ and who showed Lt-Col Dudley Clarke around Dublin. Clarke, incidentally, subsequently reported on the satisfactory nature of the arrangements for coordination, and that his visit had been encouraging. It was also agreed that the British should appoint a military attache to their Dublin mission, albeit in a civilian guise.¹⁴⁶ The British Chiefs of Staff told their own Cabinet at the end of the month, that the Irish had been told "they may expect to receive direct support as far as land forces are concerned from General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland district. Staff officers from headquarters, Northern Ireland, have attended the conversations in Dublin and detailed planning is now proceeding. There have also been talks on how the RAF can help from United Kingdom bases". The British Cabinet sanctioned the Chiefs of Staff action on 1 June 1940.¹⁴⁷ After this excitement the impetus was lost.¹⁴⁸

Throughout this period there was a repeated caveat. This was with

regard to the stimulus for British help. The original Irish suggestion of 23 May made clear that the political situation in Eire was such that there was no question of inviting in United Kingdom troops before fighting between Ireland and Germany had actually begun. On 17 June 1940 MacDonald referred to the Irish reservation, making it clear that this might mean help arriving too late, and proposing an immediate pre-invasion invitation.¹⁴⁹ The Irish were unyielding, and according to Bowman "there were strong arguments against acceptance. Any abandonment of neutrality in advance of a German invasion, would create a rift in the Fianna Fáil party and cabinet; ... it seemed likely to the cabinet that some British troops would be attacked by republican extremists; in the event of a German invasion, a government which had invited prior British aid, would be open to the charge that it was the British presence which had precipitated the attack; further, there was a suspicion in de Valera's mind, at least, that if the British ever returned to the Treaty ports - even by invitation - they might never leave; moreover, Germany at this hour in the war, seemed invincible; and, lastly, there was Ulster ... Was de Valera not being cast in the role of Redmond?"¹⁵⁰

The real question is whether the caveat was sufficient to 'save' neutrality. Preparations for and expectations of help certainly ran counter to the more contemporary policy of 'for neutrality' as followed by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, and although lacking a formal treaty it might be regarded as nearer to the Finnish position, given the 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union. A further problem for the Irish was the asymmetrical nature of their preparations and expectations, which showed a clear partiality, given the number of talks with the British. In October 1940 discussions began again, whilst in March 1941 plans for combined resistance were revitalized.¹⁵¹

In addition, some specialist Irish personnel were sent for training in Britain, whilst the British sent experts to Ireland to give advice.¹⁵²

This period of liaison continued until the threat of the German invasion was deemed to have passed, and bitterness entered Anglo-American relations with Ireland in the winter of 1943-1944. However, between March 1941 and that time the "improved liaison between the army staffs north and south eventually eased the Irish army's shortage of modern equipment and there were frequent secret rendezvous on the border when Irish army lorries which had gone north with hams, eggs and butter returned south with badly needed military supplies".¹⁵³ There was no Irish disavowal of help, no lack of preparation or expectation, no real 'defence v. help' and every instance of a 'protective umbrella'.

(iv) freedom of decision and action

Much of the foregoing has dealt with the constraints upon Irish policy-makers because of their economic and military dependency upon others. Crucially, the "availability of supplies of anything depended on many matters which were outside the control of 'the Irish'. They depended increasingly, as the war wore on, on the degree of cordiality between Ireland and the major allies".¹⁵⁴ The dependency resulted from the simple facts, as de Valera told the nation in January 1941 that "Ours is an island country. Everything which we use and do not produce ourselves comes to us in ships across the seas. We have few ships of our own and little hope of purchasing any". de Valera went on, "we must now create for ourselves a war economy capable of withstanding the economic stresses that we shall henceforth feel acutely".¹⁵⁵ Perceptive listeners might have wondered in the lapse of time since September 1939, or even before

that when war seemed likely. Indeed, de Valera had not even taken action on a memorandum drawn up by his own department in 1935 which noted that in a war any significant interruption of supplies "of petrol and other fuels and lubricating oils would practically bring road transport in this country to a standstill in a short time". All supplies of raw materials would be "critical".¹⁵⁶ There was also a warning from Department of Industry and Commerce in April 1939 on Irish dependence on other countries shipping for imports of "wheat, maize, petroleum ... and any other 'bulk' cargoes from abroad". It had concluded "if war should break out we are very largely at the mercy of other countries, and particularly of the United Kingdom, in respect of our external trade, and that the economic activities of this country could in such circumstances be completely paralysed".¹⁵⁷ Despite all the rhetoric about self-sufficiency, Ireland had no 'strategic reserve'. Consequently, third parties saw room for influence and manoeuvre, and doubted not only the credibility of Irish neutrality, but the real extent of the Irish freedom of action and decision.

However, the formal position on key issues was clear. Ireland was not constrained or obligated by any military alliance or commitment, by any formal agreement re the ports, nor by any formal treaty in the political area, although in some minds questions did remain about the nature of the relationship with the Commonwealth.¹⁵⁸ The Irish retained that essential ingredient of political sovereignty, namely the right and ability to say 'yes' or 'no'.¹⁵⁹

Although there are well-known pitfalls in a legalistic approach to sovereignty, it remains true that after the constitutional upheavals of the 1930s the Irish themselves were in no doubt about their exclusive right to declare war. The 1937 Constitution stated "War

shall not be declared and the State shall not participate in any war save with the assent of Dáil Éireann" (28.3.1°). The provisions of article 28 are, in fact, crucial for they meant that Irish participation could not be delivered solely by the government, or even head of government, except in case of actual invasion. This was of critical importance with respect to both credibility and the perceived freedom of action and decision. Equally importantly, the constitution was also clear that "Every international agreement to which the State becomes a party shall be laid before Dáil Éireann" (29.5.1°), which made any agreement on the ports more difficult.¹⁶⁰

The Irish clearly did face a number of difficulties, but in addition to those discussed as de Valera put it in his broadcast of 29 January 1941 "another danger has presented itself ... the economic one". He went on to make his famous comment that "The belligerents in blockading each other are blockading us". What clearly worried de Valera at that time was whether suffering might compel the nation to give way to pressure. He felt "it need never compel the nation at any time to give way", but this was predicated upon making "whatever adjustments in our economic life the new situation may demand".¹⁶¹

It was because of this Irish vulnerability and indeed dependence that Gray thought Irish neutrality was ridiculous.¹⁶² de Valera himself recognized the problem of getting supplies and of meeting the high cost of them, urging his people "to try to get our own home substitutes for the things we imported".¹⁶³ He also explicitly recognized that the British controlled shipping space which they could "deny to us if they choose leaving us in a dependent position".¹⁶⁴

It might well be argued that too much is made of Irish dependency since it clearly never reached a level, nor did their lack of resources

or supplies, as to force them 'to give way to pressure'. This is not a conclusive answer, however, for it begs the question of whether it was Irish action and resources that were decisive, or whether the Irish were able to resist pressure because the pips were never squeezed so tight as to make them squeak. At the height of their success, for example, in June 1940 the Germans were cautious about blockading Ireland, partly because they believed "she can subsist in a pinch".¹⁶⁵ This clearly suggests Irish resources, especially food would be sufficient, that a blockade would not lead to a change in Irish political policy. If the Germans were somewhat constrained, so too were the British, even if they did embark, early in 1941 upon a policy of deliberate sanctions.¹⁶⁶ Further measures were taken later in the war, for example, petroleum in 1943 and a range of action in the prologue to the launching of the second front in 1944. But the British War Cabinet's Committee on Economic Policy towards Eire, formed in 1942, apparently had as its general policy "keeping Eire's economy going on a minimum basis".¹⁶⁷ Carroll rightly concludes that "It was never, therefore, starvation but a question of constantly reminding the Irish that they owed their survival to Britain but had refused to pull their weight and so must expect to pay some price in personal comfort".¹⁶⁸

The potential power of Britain was daunting. In July 1940 the Irish Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Measures worried that more than a quarter of a million Irish people could be made idle if the country was cut off for a significant period,¹⁶⁹ while a year later Gray was writing to Roosevelt that "If Britain completely shuts off coal and gasoline this place would be disorganised and howling wilderness in three months".¹⁷⁰ The pattern of Irish trade was one problem. During the period 1939-45 the value of Irish trade with

Britain expressed as a percentage of total value of external trade was:

Table 6.2 Percentage of Irish Exports and Imports to and from
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and its Allies 1939-45

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
<u>Imports</u>							
Britain	55.7	53.1	71.5	57.3	50.6	47.0	47.5
British "allies"*	15.3	20.2	15.5	25.3	25.9	30.8	25.9
<u>Total</u>	71	73.3	87	82.6	76.5	77.8	73.4
<u>Exports</u>							
Britain	93.6	96	97.1	98.8	98.8	98.8	97.9
British "allies"*	1.4	2	2.6	1.1	1	1	1
<u>Total</u>	95.0	98	99.7	99.9	99.8	99.8	98.9

* Including for this purpose even prior to 1942, the United States.

Source: From: Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1946, (Dublin Stationery Office, 1947, P.No. 7745) Table 94 'Value of Trade with each of the principal countries expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports and Exports (including Re-Exports)' p.84.

These figures are crippling, being especially dramatic on the export side. But even on the import side, the impact of the war was dramatic, as is demonstrated in Table 6.3:

Table 6.3 Quantity of Imports in Key Economic Sectors 1939 to 1945

Article	Unit of Quantity	Year						
		1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
<u>Cereals & Feeding-stuffs</u>								
Wheat	cwt	7,257,581	6,637,177	1,000,014	3,897,906	1,942,202	4,462,682	4,567,718
Barley	"	338,713	275,277	-	19,684	4,552	736,970	764,190
Oats	"	285	121,269	110	-	95,621	2	355,677
Maize	"	8,160,980	5,782,519	789,004	-	-	-	n/d
Wheaten Flour	"	96,322	79,611	30,769	10,353	577	668	n/d
<u>Other Food</u>								
Sugar	"	899,553	1,803,114	5	25,062	351,091	18	8,818
Tea	lb	21,858,693	23,605,229	11,203,771	11,610,025	6,144,209	6,216,032	7,824,137
<u>Non-metalliferous mine products</u>								
Coal	ton	2,875,773	2,757,318	1,487,920	1,048,636	1,015,371	734,654	920,573
<u>Iron and steel</u>								
Pig iron	"	7,566	4,012	939	2,994	2,749	2,301	1,597
Steel bar rods	"	13,609	10,904	2,161	1,130	1,045	1,527	8,692
<u>Non-ferrous metals</u>								
Aluminium	cwt	6,025	6,340	450	53	59	52	5,977
Lead		63,053	30,766	7,173	3,634	5,064	6,699	11,500
<u>Machinery & Vehicles</u>								
Agricultural machinery	No.	8,984	8,744	1,637	1,470	441	1,317	4,661
Tractors	"	572	769	31	65	138	387	1,066
Ships, boats & Parts	"	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aeroplanes	"	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>Oils/</u>								

Table 6.3 (cont'd)

Article	Unit of Quantity	Year						
		1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945
<u>Oils</u>								
Gas & fuel oil	gall.	11,623,035	11,473,077	8,652,951	6,132,927	6,103,093	6,470,282	6,284,045
Oils - motor spirit	"	39,021,517	32,343,909	17,814,232	14,090,493	10,831,209	12,916,818	14,925,890
<u>Fertilizer</u>								
Rock phosphate	ton	88,986	73,624	6,776	-	18,370	27,525	18,240
<u>Seeds for Sowing</u>								
Wheat	cwt	614,973	205,172	176,509	44,252	250	-	n/d

n/d = data not available, or not available in comparable form.

Sources:- Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1945, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1945, P.No. 7099) Table 97

'Quantity and Value of Imports in each year 1939 to 1944', pp.104-119.

Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1946, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1947, P.No. 7745) Table 98

'Quantity and Value of Imports', pp.88-95.

Whilst in some sectors, for example, sugar, the impact of trade dislocation was mitigated by increased domestic production, this was not possible in all areas, for example, tea, coal, iron and steel, oils, fertilizers and seed. Indeed, "by 1943 the community had 25 per cent of its nominal requirements of tea, 20 per cent of its requirements of petrol, less than 15 per cent of its paraffin, 16 per cent of its gas coal, no domestic coal whatever and 22 per cent of its textiles".¹⁷¹ Elements of the normal stable diet, bread, butter and tea, became scarce and expensive, whilst what was available, namely meat, was also expensive. Despite this, the worst never quite came to the worst, and "apart from tea and white bread the Irish were better fed than the British with meat, bacon, butter and eggs ... for those who could afford them".¹⁷²

It was Irish good fortune to live, as de Valera put it, on a "fertile island". As a result he felt "no one should starve. We can have abundance of the best food if we set out now to produce it ourselves". He also explicitly told farmers that "every extra acre they grow" was "giving the nation added strength to pursue unwaveringly its own policy, and to resist pressure, should pressure be attempted by any side".¹⁷³ Compulsory tillage was introduced, and 'crop and turf' output rose by over 30% during the war.¹⁷⁴

Meehan judged that "the economy just managed to keep going; and above all, the policy of neutrality was not prejudiced by economic weakness",¹⁷⁵ a judgement shared by Longford and O'Neill.¹⁷⁶ Carroll, on the other hand, believes that early in 1941 de Valera made "a definite pro-British shift in policy", the British economic campaign having brought home "the country's dependence on British goodwill for essential supplies", and he cites the renewed interest in military cooperation as evidence.¹⁷⁷ Whilst there is supporting evidence for

Carroll's view,¹⁷⁸ the Irish did not yield on their fundamental line of policy. On the other hand, allied forbearance meant that the Irish were never put to the full test, and de Valera had subsequently to admit that Irish neutrality hung upon the "slender thread" of the will of Roosevelt and Churchill.¹⁷⁹

Conclusion

Ireland did not fulfill all the criteria 'of' or 'for' neutrality, even during this war period, despite Keatinge's claim that this period saw "the most clear-cut manifestation of neutrality in Irish history".¹⁸⁰ More important than neutrality per se was the imperative of proving to the world and themselves, their independence. Even in 1944 when Ireland could have joined the allies with little risk to itself, de Valera felt "Irish independence of action had to be preserved".¹⁸¹ On 7 February 1939 in a crucial speech to the Irish Senate on Irish unity, de Valera had stressed the need for independence of action and Article One of the Constitution, with its basic affirmation of sovereignty. He "would not sacrifice that right, because without that right you have not freedom at all".¹⁸²

There was also an abhorrence of war and of participation in British wars, reflecting a "dumb but powerful urge among the people for peace at any price", an urge which provided much of the strength of neutrality.¹⁸³ Whilst thousands felt differently and contributed to the British war effort, this dumb urge heavily influenced de Valera. In May 1940, for example, he commented that having been scourged by whips, the Irish wanted "no scourging with scorpions instead". Given this, he had the "desire and intention to save our people from the horrors of this war".¹⁸⁴ Some time later, he re-

affirmed that it was his "duty to Ireland to try to keep out of this war".¹⁸⁵ Conscious of the effects of bombing, he noted that if defended "London is suffering ... what would happen to Dublin, Cork and other Irish cities relatively unprotected". No country should court such dangers, so that whilst the Irish would think of the world, "Our principal purpose now must be to save our own people".¹⁸⁶

Neutrality was merely an apparent vehicle to meet these fundamental urges, although in fact, meeting those urges was actually achieved by non-belligerency. The period 1939-1945 saw highly pragmatic policy-making. Despite this, the Irish experience in these years generated a powerful myth of Irish neutrality. Important in this regard was the actual success in keeping Ireland out of the war which had been achieved under the label of neutrality. Whilst Irish policy had been ad hoc and pragmatic, de Valera had "carried it through so successfully and brilliantly that for many people, including his political opponents, neutrality became a veritable creed".¹⁸⁷ For most Irishmen it was perceived as a specifically Irish success, the crowning glory of independence, and confirmation of distinctiveness from Britain. Consequently neutrality was elevated beyond the realms of normal political debate, and acquired an almost hallowed status, despite not being in the Constitution.

Influential in this process was the distorted Irish worldview as a result of isolation and censorship. The end of the war saw anti-American scenes in Dublin (which possibly had some relevance four years later), and the Irish "were less informed than almost any other people" in Western Europe.¹⁸⁸ There is general consensus on the deleterious effects of this ignorance, perhaps captured most graphically by F.S.L. Lyons' observation that "It was as if an entire people had been condemned to live in Plato's cave, with their backs to

the fire of life and deriving their only knowledge of what went on outside from the flickering shadows thrown on the wall. ... When ... they emerged, dazzled, from the cave into the light of day, it was to a new and vastly different world".¹⁸⁹ As Constance Howard observed, "the dream had become more real than the hard facts ...",¹⁹⁰ and as a consequence according to Dr. O'Higgins, the Irish brought "up a generation blissfully unconscious of facts ... We have magnified our immunity from war and our neutral position into a major ... achievement ...".¹⁹¹

These factors were reinforced by the linkage of neutrality with partition which reached its apogee in de Valera's famous reply to Churchill on 16 May 1945 when de Valera asked whether a partitioned England would have fought on behalf of the partitioner. To many, this speech was de Valera's finest hour and it was "the final, crucial episode in ... transformation of Irish perceptions of neutrality".¹⁹²

The myth, then, became an established part of Irish political culture, despite its flawed basis. The actual position of Ireland was sui generis, and even Keatinge accepts that "the use of the term neutrality is best qualified in the Irish context",¹⁹³ requiring to be seen "in its specifically Irish context".¹⁹⁴ Geographical propinquity, resource deficiencies and consequent dependence upon Britain meant 'a certain consideration' for Britain and non-belligerency rather than neutrality.

Footnotes : Chapter Six

1. R.M. Smyllie, 'Unneutral Neutral Eire', Foreign Affairs Vol.24 No.2 (January 1946) pp.317-326.
2. See, for example, Robert Fisk, In Time of War : Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality, 1939-45, (London, Deutsch, 1983); T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality and the USA 1939-47, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1977); Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years 1939-1945, (Newton Abbot, David and Charles, 1975); John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982); Bernard Share, The Emergency : Neutral Ireland 1939-1945, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1978); Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of Wartime Co-operation and Postwar Change 1939-1952, (London, Oxford University Press, 1958); V.P. Hogan, The Neutrality of Ireland in World War II, (University of Notre Dame, Thesis, 1953); Kevin B. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams (eds.), Ireland in the War Years and After 1939-1951, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1969) and; C. Howard, 'Eire' in A.J. Toynbee and V.M. Toynbee (eds.), Survey of International Affairs 1939-46, The War and the Neutrals, (London, Oxford University Press, 1956).
3. Lord Longford and T.P. O'Neill, Eamon de Valera, (London, Hutchinson, 1970), Chapter 28, pp.347-368.
4. Smyllie op.cit. p.324.
5. Bowman op.cit. p.208. Ard Fheis (Annual conference or meeting).
6. Most notably James Dillon T.D., but there were others, see below pp. 214-5, 225-8. Dillon was Deputy Leader of Fine Gael.
7. Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of External Policy 1931-1939, (London, Oxford University Press, 1952) p.403.
8. Speech in Cork on 14 December 1941, in E. de Valera, Ireland's Stand : Being a Selection of the speeches of Eamon de Valera during the war (1939-1945), (Dublin, M.H. Gill and Son, 2nd ed., 1946) pp.56-7.
9. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 77:1-8 (2 September 1939).
10. PRO FO 371 42679, Maffey memorandum 22.2.44.
11. John A. Murphy, Ireland in the Twentieth Century, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1975) p.101.
12. T. Desmond Williams in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.15.
13. Murphy op.cit. p.100. See also T.Desmond Williams in Nowlan and Williams, idem.
14. Bunreacht na hEireann, Article 28.3.3°. The 1937 Constitution allowed amendment prior to June 1941 without a referendum.
15. Dail Debates, op.cit. 77:1-8 (2 September 1939).
16. In his memorandum to colleagues, 'Neutrality, Censorship and Democracy' 23 January 1940 - SPO S11586A.
17. Dail Debates op.cit. 77:1-8 (2 September 1939)
18. Idem.

19. Dail Debates, ibid, 91:2130-1 (16 November 1943).
20. PRO CAB 66/1 Appendix 1 12.9.39. At British request it was not published for over a year.
21. PRO CAB 66/1 Eden memorandum 16.9.39.
22. PRO CAB 66/1 Appendix II Maffey 14.9.39.
23. Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 : Series D (1937-1945) Volume VII, (London, H.M.S.O., 1956) (Hereafter DGFP), Doc.No.484 pp.471-2, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry' - Telegram 31 August 1939.
24. D.G.F.P. VIII op.cit. Doc.No.216, p.241 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry' 8 October 1939.
25. PRO CAB 66/1 Appendix II Maffey 14.9.39.
26. See Murphy op.cit. pp.101-106; Carroll op.cit. p.171; F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, (London, Collins/Fontana edition, 1973) p.557 and; G.A. Hayes McCoy, 'Irish Defence Policy, 1938-51', in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.49.
27. Dail Debates op.cit. 83:971-2 (26 May 1941).
28. Ireland's Stand, op.cit. pp.56-7.
29. Ibid, pp.105-109. Mr. de Valera's reply handed to the State Department 7 March 1944. See pp.209, 224-5 below.
30. See Smyllie op.cit. passim.
31. D.G.F.P. IX op.cit. Doc.No.310 pp.422-4 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry', 23 May 1940.
32. Ibid, Doc. No.506 pp.637-640 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry', 21 June 1940, and Carroll op.cit. p.37.
33. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of External Policy 1931-1939, op.cit. p.405.
34. SPO S11586A 23 January 1940.
35. See Hempel's recollections published in The Sunday Press 22.12.63 and cited in Fisk op.cit. p.149.
36. In the summer of 1940 three girls were killed when German bombs fell on a Wexford creamery; in January 1941 German bombs fell near Drogheda, in Dublin and in Counties Wexford, Carlow, Wicklow and Kildare. Further bombs fell on Dublin in May 1941.
37. Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) p.89.
38. Dail Debates op.cit. 102 : 1323-4, and 1463-78 (24-25 July 1946).
39. Ireland's Stand op.cit. pp.103-109 for the original American Note of 21 February 1944 and de Valera's reply 7 March 1944.
40. PRO CAB 66/9 WP(40)233 annex I, 'Proposals taken by MacDonald to Dublin', 26 June 1940, annex II MacDonald's report to Cabinet of meeting of 27.6.40 and, annex III, 'Text of communication handed to Mr. de Valera' 29 June 1940.
41. PRO CAB 66/9 WP(40)251 deValera to Chamberlain 4 July 1940. See also Bowman op.cit. pp.237 and 252, pp.218-239 and passim.
42. Winston Churchill, Parliamentary Debates : House of Commons : Official Report, Volume 356 column 1243 (5 November 1940).

43. de Valera, Dail Debates, op.cit. 81:582-6 (7 November 1940).
44. PRO DO 35/1107 Maffey 20.9.39.
45. D.G.F.P. VIII, op.cit. Doc.No.216 pp.241-2, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry', 8 October 1939.
46. Carroll op.cit. p.21.
47. Fisk, op.cit. pp.146-7.
48. Smyllie op.cit. p.322. Smyllie was editor of The Irish Times during the war.
49. See Fisk op.cit. p.152 and Carroll op.cit. pp.121-2. See also PRO CAB 66/2 Maffey to Eden 26.10.39.
50. Longford and O'Neill op.cit. p.401, note the repeated protests of Hempel over this, and say he presented a formal note of protest on 27 July 1943.
51. PRO CAB 66/1, Dulanty 12.9.39.
52. SPO S12026 A, Emergency Powers (51) Order, September 1940.
53. See Longford and O'Neill op.cit. p.354; Fisk op.cit. p.150 and Carroll op.cit. p.21, although it is not clear whether this was a tacit or explicit agreement.
54. For de Valera's reasoning see Longford and O'Neill op.cit. pp.411-2.
55. Carroll op.cit. pp.83-4 and Brian Farrell, Sean Lemass, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1983) p.60.
56. Dwyer op.cit. p.178.
57. See, for example, Nigel West, MI5 British Security Service Operations 1909-1945, (London, Bodley Head, 1981) pp.309 and 316 and, MI6 British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 1909-1945, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983) pp.206 and 228-9. See also T. Desmond Williams in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.21; Carroll op.cit. pp.35, 41-44 and 157 and; Longford and O'Neill op.cit. pp.398 and 405.
58. Dwyer op.cit. pp.197-8 and p.148.
59. Smyllie op.cit. p.320. For a discussion of the various estimates see Fisk op.cit. pp.451-2; Murphy, op.cit. p.103; Carroll op.cit. p.109 and; Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Postwar Change, op.cit. p.164.
60. See Smyllie op.cit. p.321 and Carroll op.cit. p.118.
61. Mansergh, op.cit. p.164.
62. Smyllie op.cit. p.321; Carroll op.cit. p.109 and; Dwyer op.cit. p.147.
63. Dwyer, ibid, p.19.
64. See James F. Meehan, 'The Irish Economy during the War' in Nowlan and Williams, op.cit. p.32 and Carroll, op.cit. p.109.
65. Dail Debates op.cit. 83:971-2 (26 May 1941).
66. Bunreacht Na hEireann, Article Three.
67. Quoted by Dwyer, op.cit. p.152, and see p.143.
68. See Press statement, 27 January 1942, re-produced in Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and Statements by Eamon De Valera 1917-73, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980) p.465.

69. Bowman, op.cit. pp.211-2.
70. Dail Debates, op.cit. 91.2130-1 (16 November 1943), emphasis added.
71. Ibid, 81:582-6 (7 November 1940), emphasis added.
72. See PRO FO 371 42679, Maffey 22.2.44 emphasis added.
73. 19 November 1940, United Press interview, in Ireland's Stand op.cit. pp.31-32.
74. Using 1914 = 100 as base, the cost of living index in May of each year, 1939-1945 was 1939 172; 1940 204; 1941 220; 1942 240; 1943 275; 1944 292; 1945 292. See Table 238 'Cost of Living Index Numbers in Certain Months', Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1946, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1947, P.No.7745) p.195.
75. T. Desmond Williams, 'Ireland and the War' in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.17.
76. G.A. Hayes-McCoy, 'Irish Defence Policy, 1938-51', ibid p.47.
77. SPO CAB 2/3, Cabinet minutes 17.5.40. It was only in July 1940 that it was agreed to manufacture mines for Irish ports - SPO S12014A, Cabinet minutes 2.7.40.
78. Dail Debates, op.cit. 80:1522 ff (5 June 1940) for the debate. Carroll argues that the call-up "found the army seriously unprepared", with "not enough blankets" - Carroll op.cit. p.32.
79. Lt.-Col. P.D. Kavanagh (ed.), The Irish Army Handbook 1973, (Dublin, Department of Defence, 1973) pp.12-3.
80. SPO CAB 2/3, Cabinet minutes 11.12.39.
81. Kavanagh, op.cit. p.13, emphasis in original.
82. Capt. J. Sheehan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d) p.11.
83. Ibid, pp.11-12. For Cabinet's views on L.S.F. role see SPO CAB 2/3, Cabinet minutes 28.5.40.
84. Ibid, p.11.
85. Quoted in Bowman, op.cit. p.225. Hempel also saw the IRA as a factor in this - D.G.F.P. IX op.cit. Doc.No.310, pp.422-4, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry' - Telegram 23 May 1940. For de Valera's aspiration "for a force of a quarter of a million men" see United Press Interview, 19 November 1940, Ireland's Stand op.cit. pp.31-32.
86. Fisk, op.cit. p.137.
87. In conversation with MacDonald - PRO PREM 3/131/1 MacDonald memorandum 21-22.6.40.
88. Quoted in Fisk op.cit. p.211 from UCD Archives Mulcahy papers P7/C/114, O'Higgins 3.3.41.
89. For details see Francis E. McMurtrie, (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships 1944/45, (London, Sampson Low Marston, 1944) p.128a, and Capt. T. McKenna, 'Thank God We're Surrounded by Water', An Cosantoir, (April 1973).
90. Sheehan, op.cit. p.63.
91. See above pp.181.

92. See Carroll op.cit. pp.119-20; Sheehan op.cit. pp.60-1 and; Lt.Col. M. Cassidy, 'A Short History of the Air Corps', An Cosantoir (May 1980).
93. Kavanagh, op.cit. pp.11-12.
94. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull Vol. II, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1948) pp.1353-4.
95. PRO PREM 3/131/3, Churchill to Cranborne 31.1.41.
96. D.G.F.P. XI op.cit., Doc. No. 523 pp.882-3, 'The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 17 December 1940.
97. For details of what the Irish received and what they possessed see:
PRO CAB 66/27, Chiefs of Staff to War Cabinet Annex I 6.8.42; G.A. Hayes-McCoy, 'Irish Defence Policy, 1938-51' in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.48; Carroll op.cit. p.81 and; Denis J. McCarthy, 'Armour in the War Years', An Cosantoir (March 1975).
98. In December 1940 German Naval Staff, 'The Question of Supporting Ireland Against Britain' had argued, for example, against an invasion of Ireland whilst Britain remained supreme at sea. See Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Postwar Change, op.cit. pp.70-72.
99. PRO CAB 53/6, Committee on Imperial Defence 6.7.36.
100. Dail Debates op.cit. 77:1-8 (2 September 1939), and see also his contribution to the Dail on 16 February 1939, Dail Debates 74:707-23.
101. D.G.F.P. VII op.cit. Doc.No.428 pp.422-3, 'The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire - Telegram', 29 August 1939, and Doc. No.527, p.504, 'The State Secretary to the Legation in Eire - Telegram', 1 September 1939, and Fisk op.cit. pp.199-200.
102. See Enno Stephan, Spies in Ireland, (London, Four Square, 1965) and Carole J. Carter, The Shamrock and the Swastika, (Palo Alto, Cal., Pacific Books, 1977).
103. See John W. Blake, Northern Ireland in the Second World War, (Belfast, H.M.S.O., 1956) pp.154-5; Dwyer op.cit. p.75 and; Fisk op.cit. pp.189-200 and 226-7.
104. D.G.F.P. IX op.cit. Doc.No.473 pp.601-3, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 17 June 1940.
105. D.G.F.P. X op.cit. Doc.No.149 pp.184-5, 'The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Eire', 11 July 1940.
106. Irish Independent, 26.4.49 General Kurt Student, 'Airfields around Belfast as Paratroop Objectives', quoted by Fisk op.cit. pp.226-7. Student had 'A German Airborne Attack on the North' published the previous day.
An order of 1 January 1942 told the navy to observe Irish neutrality, although the order was occasionally deliberately flouted - Fisk, p.277 citing Supplement 3 to German Standing War Orders Nos. 104 and 105.
107. Murphy op.cit. p.102.
108. PRO CAB 66/1 WP(39)34, Eden memorandum 16.9.39.

109. PRO PREM 3/131/3, Cranborne to Churchill 30.1.41, and for other examples of British views on this, PRO CAB 66/10 Caldercote to Cabinet 20.7.40; PRO PREM 3/131/5 report of Duff Cooper speech of 7.5.41; PRO PREM 3/131/7 Maffey memorandum 14.3.41 and; Winston Churchill, The Second World War : Vol.III, The Grand Alliance, (London, Cassell, 1950) p.641.
110. PRO PREM 3/131/1, MacDonald memorandum 17.6.40.
111. PRO PREM 3/131/1, MacDonald memorandum 21-22.6.40, emphasis added.
112. Hull, op.cit. pp.1353-4 for US attitudes, and Dwyer op.cit. p.100.
113. Carroll, op.cit. pp.116-7.
114. Longford and O'Neill op.cit. p.406. For accounts of 'The Note Affair' see Longford and O'Neill pp.403-8; Carroll op.cit. pp.139-159 and; Dwyer, op.cit. pp.179-200.
115. The Note and de Valera's reply are re-produced in Ireland's Stand op.cit. pp.103-9.
116. D.G.F.P. IX, op.cit. Doc.No.310 pp.422-4, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram' 23 May 1940.
117. D.G.F.P. VIII, op.cit. Doc.No.401 pp.466-7, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 30 November 1939, emphasis added.
118. Carroll, op.cit. p.75, and see D.G.F.P. XI op.cit., Doc.No.523 pp.882-3, 'The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 17 December 1940, and D.G.F.P. XII, op.cit., Doc.No. 79 pp.152-3', 'The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland - Telegram', 24 February 1941 and Doc.No.150 pp.270-1, 'The Minister in Ireland to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 11 March 1941.
119. D.G.F.P. VIII, op.cit., Doc.No.216, pp.241-2, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Radio Telegram', 8 October 1939.
120. Ibid, Doc.No.401, pp.466-7, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 30 November 1939.
121. Gray to Roosevelt, 19 June 1940, quoted in Bowman op.cit. p.234.
122. PRO CAB 66/2, Maffey to Eden 23.10.39 and, D.G.F.P. VIII, op.cit. Doc.No.216 pp.241-2, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Radio Telegram, 8 October 1939.
123. U.C.D. Archives, Mulcahy papers P7a/210 memorandum 4 and 5 July 1940, quoted by Bowman op.cit. p.237.
124. Carroll, op.cit. p.116, and PRO PREM 3/131/7, Extract of a Dillon speech, attached to Maffey letter 10.3.41.
125. See Dwyer, op.cit. p.131; Fisk, op.cit. pp.260 and 383 and Bowman, op.cit. pp.242-3.
126. See Longford and O'Neill, op.cit. pp.370-371 for Cosgrave's letter to de Valera on 9 July 1940 and a paraphrasing of de Valera's reply of 16 July 1940.
127. According to Dwyer, op.cit. p.161.
128. See, for example, PRO PREM 3/131/1, MacDonald memorandum of meeting with de Valera, Aiken and Lemass of 27.6.40.

129. See 'Ireland', in Round Table XXXIII, (July 1943) pp.373-6, especially p.374, and Murphy, op.cit. pp.109-110; Murphy in Nowlan and Williams, op.cit. pp.151-157 and; Carroll, op.cit. pp.122 and 129.
130. Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland, (London, Oxford University Press, 1974), Table B.5 'Electoral Strength of the Major Parties, 1922-65', p.334.
131. 'Ireland', Round Table XXXIV (July 1944) pp.363-365.
132. Murphy, op.cit. p.110.
133. Chubb, op.cit. p.334.
134. This is a succinct summation of a complex and varying situation - Carroll op.cit. p.119. de Valera had tried to make clear "If attacked, we are at war with whoever attacks us" - United Press Interview 19 November 1940 - Ireland's Stand, op.cit. p.32.
135. D.G.F.P. IX, op.cit. Doc.No.506, pp.637-640, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 21 June 1940, emphasis added.
136. D.G.F.P. XI, op.cit. Doc.No.407, pp.718-9, 'The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Ireland - Telegram', 26 November 1940.
137. Fisk op.cit. p.193.
138. D.G.F.P. XI, op.cit. Doc.No.523, pp.882-3, 'The Minister to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 17 December 1940.
139. Dr. E. Hempel (as told to John Murdoch), 'Ireland on the Brink', Sunday Press, 17 November 1963, quoted in Fisk op.cit. p.218.
140. D.G.F.P. IX, op.cit. Doc.No.310 pp.422-4, 'The Minister in Eire to the Foreign Ministry - Telegram', 23 May 1940.
141. Carolle J. Carter, op.cit. pp.162-6, and 173 and; Stephan, op.cit. pp.208-9.
142. Longford and O'Neill, op.cit. p.316.
143. Ibid, p.365.
144. See British Chiefs of Staff Committee on Eire, memorandum 30.5.40 - PRO CAB 66/8, Chiefs of Staff minutes 30.5.40.
145. PRO PREM 3/130, Minutes of Machtig - Walshe meetings 23.5.40 and 24.5.40. Each side conferred with their government between meetings.
146. Details of Clarke's trip are in Carroll, op.cit. pp.43-44. Carroll had access to the uncensored manuscript of Clark's memoirs, Seven Assignments, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1948).
147. PRO CAB 66/8, Chiefs of Staff minutes 30.5.40. For a wider discussion see Fisk, op.cit. pp.203-10, 213, 217, 228 and 234 and; Blake op.cit. pp.156-7.
148. Partly because cooperation became embroiled in unity-neutrality-defence exchanges of MacDonald and de Valera in June 1940.
149. For these negotiations see PRO PREM 3/130, Minutes of Machtig-Walshe meeting 24.5.40; PRO PREM 3/131/1 MacDonald memorandum 17.6.40 and; PRO PREM 3/131/1 MacDonald memorandum 21-22.6.40.
150. Bowman, op.cit. p.235.

151. Carroll, op.cit. p.96. Carroll is adamant that de Valera was always told about the meetings and had a report afterwards on them.
152. See, for example, SPO CAB 2/4, Cabinet minutes 8.10.41, and Fisk, op.cit. p.235.
153. Carroll, op.cit. p.312.
154. James F. Meehan, 'The Irish Economy During the War' in Nowlan and Williams, op.cit. pp.28-38.
For a fuller account of the economic dimension see Raymond James Raymond, The Economics of Neutrality : The United States, Great Britain and Ireland's War Economy : 1937-1945, Volumes I and II, (Ph.D., University of Kansas, 1980).
155. de Valera, Radio broadcast to the nation, 29 January 1941 in Ireland's Stand, op.cit. pp.40-45. See also Frank Forde, The Long Watch : The History of the Irish Mercantile Marine in World War Two, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1981).
156. SPO S28208, Department of the President memorandum 'War. Essential Materials' 4.12.35. The nomenclature 'President' refers to the situation before the 1937 Constitution.
157. SPO S11394, Department of Industry and Commerce 18.4.39.
158. For example, Mulcahy and Dillon.
159. Cf. James op.cit. p.12 - "Sovereign states are those territorially-based entities which are independent in terms of their constitutional arrangements".
160. See Bunreacht na hEireann Articles 28 and 29, and also Articles 1, 5 and 15.
161. de Valera, Radio broadcast to the nation, 29 January 1941 in Ireland's Stand, op.cit. pp.40-45.
162. Dwyer, op.cit. p.133.
163. de Valera, Speech at Galway, 12 May 1940, Ireland's Stand, op.cit. pp.19-20.
164. de Valera, Christmas Day broadcast to the U.S., 1940, ibid, pp. 36-7.
165. See D.G.F.P. IX, op.cit. Doc.No.367, pp.500-501, 'Memorandum by Ambassador Ritter, 1 June 1940, and Doc.No.396 pp.524-5, 'The High Command of the Navy to the Foreign Ministry', 6 June 1940. This latter document also contains Hitler's views on the subject.
166. For their origin and rationale see PRO CAB 66/14 Wood memorandum 6.12.40.
167. See Carroll, op.cit. pp.78-94 on these measures and British policy.
168. Ibid, p.92. For Irish reactions see PRO CAB 72/25, Dulanty to Attlee 23.2.43
169. SPO S11980, Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Emergency Measures 4.7.40.
170. Letter of 11 August 1941, quoted by Dwyer, op.cit. p.133.
171. Meehan in Nowlan and Williams, op.cit. p.36.

172. Carroll, op.cit. p.92.
173. de Valera, Radio broadcast to the nation, 29 January 1941, in Ireland's Stand op.cit. pp.41-2.
174. Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1946, op.cit. p.59, Table 50 'Index Numbers of Volume of Agricultural Output'.
175. Meehan in Nowlan and Williams, op.cit. p.38.
176. Longford and O'Neill, op.cit. p.378.
177. Carroll, op.cit. pp.95-6.
178. The supply position led to de Valera considering going to London for trade talks in March 1940 - SPO S11846A.
179. Dail Debates, op.cit. 102:1463-78 (25 July 1946). de Valera did not originally name the two, until Dillon intervened.
180. Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance : Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984), p.17.
181. Longford and O'Neill, op.cit. p.405. de Valera had told the Dail in November 1943 that "There is no question ... of trying to get up on the band-wagon ...", Dail Debates, op.cit. (16 November 1943).
182. de Valera, Seanad Eireann Parliamentary Debates Official Report, (hereafter, Seanad Debates) 22:1510:35.
183. Carroll, op.cit. p.178, see also Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs' in O. Dudley Edwards (ed.), Conor Cruise O'Brien Introduces Ireland, (London, Deutsch, 1969) p.122.
184. de Valera, Speech, Galway, 12 May 1940 in Ireland's Stand, op.cit. p.21.
185. de Valera, Radio broadcast to U.S., Christmas Day 1941, in Moynihan, op.cit. pp.463-4.
186. de Valera, Interview with United Press, 19 November 1940, in Ireland's Stand, op.cit. p.29.
187. Carroll, op.cit. p.178. See also Mansergh's comment, that what "had begun as a policy had ended by becoming a symbol", Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of Wartime Cooperation, op.cit. p.163, and O'Brien in O. Dudley Edwards, op.cit. p.123.
188. Douglas Gageby, 'The Media' in J.J. Lee (ed.), Ireland 1945-70, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1979) p.125.
189. F.S.L. Lyons, op.cit. pp.557-8.
190. Constance Howard, 'Eire', in A.J. Toynbee and V.M. Toynbee (eds.), op.cit. p.256. A prominent future Fine Gael politician, Alexis FitzGerald, was to describe neutrality as a "narcotic", quoted in Bowman, op.cit. p.255.
191. Dr. T.F. O'Higgins, Dail Debates, op.cit. 94:1448 (28 June 1944).
192. Ronan Fanning, 'Irish neutrality - an historical review', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.I No.3 (1982) p.32. For de Valera's speech see Moynihan, op.cit. pp.470-7.
193. Keatinge, op.cit. p.56.
194. Ibid, p.7.

Chapter Seven : 'Erstwhile Isolationist'?¹ 1945-1955

Most of the causes and rationales underlying Irish policy did not evaporate with the ending of the Second World War. Rather they came to be exacerbated by the fact that in Ireland the psychological effect of the war was "eventually to prove far more significant"² than the material effects, and by developments in the immediate post-war period. Some of these developments were within, and some out-with, Irish control. They served to further entrench the myth of a tradition of Irish neutrality, contributing to "the process whereby neutrality acquired the sanctity of a dogma that was not merely uncontested but uncontestable. Perhaps 'mystery of faith' would be more appropriate than 'dogma' since it had still failed to acquire ideological foundations ...".³ This process was aided by Ireland's limited international role given its exclusion from the embryonic United Nations, although the extent of Irish abstention from international affairs in the postwar decade can be exaggerated. Nonetheless, there was a degree of insularity and reality failed to penetrate the psyche of either Irish politicians or public. The legacy of the war and its apparent confirmation in the period 1945-1955 has been a crucial factor in Irish policy ever since.

The termination of hostilities in 1945 removed a necessary condition of neutrality as classically understood, although 'the emergency' in Ireland continued for another generation. Moreover, the legacy of the wartime years was so potent that the term neutrality continued to have a pervasive influence in Ireland as a description of Irish policy in the years of peace after 1945. Irish policy in that period will, therefore, now be analyzed using the criteria already applied to the war years in a modified form to reflect 'for'

neutrality rather than 'of' neutrality. In this period also, whilst it would be somewhat proleptic to analyse Irish policy in terms of nonalignment, two new variables derived from the 'political' pillar of nonalignment will be applied, especially since they are reflective of the fact that nonalignment is best seen as an attitude of mind or identity rather than as a particular policy.

(i) due diligence

The conclusion of the war did nothing to resolve what for many Irishmen was the fundamental problem regarding the inviolability, or otherwise, of Irish territory and sovereignty, namely the British presence in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the war years had exacerbated the problem. Partition remained for de Valera and others, "the burning question" which would "dominate every political issue" in the country, be it "in times of crisis or in times of no crisis".⁴

Whilst this issue was to have a dramatic impact upon Irish security policy, the initial concerns in 1944-5 were with the defence of the 26 Counties, and planning both for demobilisation and the future shape, size and role of the Irish defence forces. It was, in fact, an Irish General Staff submission to government in August 1944⁵ which examined these issues and which, together with the decisions taken on it, "formed the basis for ... postwar reorganisation and the size and shape of the army for more than a decade ...".⁶ The General Staff made a number of assumptions about the basis of future defence policy, which de Valera subsequently told them could be "taken as substantially representing the Government's defence policy" although modifications might prove "necessary at a later stage".⁷ There were essentially four major assumptions, namely:

- "(a) That the State will endeavour to remain neutral in future wars.

- (b) That the defence forces will be organised, trained, equipped and maintained on the basis of operating on and in defence of our own territory.
- (c) That in the event of Great Britain being involved in another major war, our defence forces would be sufficiently strong to enable the Government to assume complete responsibility for defence of this country so that Great Britain and her allies could not justify a claim that it was necessary to occupy our territory or part thereof to protect both this country and Great Britain from invasion by another Great Power.
- (d) That the defence forces to be raised, equipped and maintained should be sufficiently strong to ensure that on the one hand Great Britain's enemies would be deterred from attempting to invade this country for the purpose of defeating Great Britain, and on the other, that Great Britain and her allies would be deterred from attempting to invade this country for the purpose of securing bases from which to attack their opponents".

The memorandum then went on "to consider the most practicable method of implementing" the foregoing.⁸

The General Staff clearly appreciated the need to have sufficient strength such that a putative belligerent would not perceive any need to act against Ireland, and the responsibility of a neutral to be sufficiently strong and to take active measures to meet the requirements of neutrality. The political debate over the next decade

revolved around the extent to which this recognition of principles was to be translated into policy and capability.

Not all members of Dáil Éireann accepted as axiomatic that the Irish State needed an army in the traditional sense. Mr. Coogan, for example, thought the army should be organized "on a purely gendarmerie basis", as simply "a reserve for the civil authority".⁹ Dr. O'Higgins, Fine Gael's spokesman on defence and later a Minister of Defence, was himself sceptical of the need for a large army, although in his case he wished the resources to be allocated to air and naval protection instead.¹⁰ In addition, in opposition, he occasionally gave the impression that he saw the "main purpose" of the army as preserving internal peace, although he acknowledged a ceremonial function "and, if you want the third, a small nucleus which would be capable of expansion in times of greater emergency".¹¹

For Fianna Fáil this orientation was anathema since it meant "your defence will then have to be provided for outside". Moreover, garrisoning by foreign troops would be necessary "at the very commencement of ... operations and any chance you have of maintaining neutrality goes".¹² Fine Gael disputed this, believing on the one hand that Britain would never invade and on the other, that, therefore, the only danger to Ireland was from an enemy powerful enough to defeat Britain.¹³ In that eventuality they felt there was little Ireland could do. This line of reasoning was of dubious historical validity and was itself hardly compatible with neutrality. When in opposition Fianna Fáil claimed that the Inter-Party governments (1948-51 and 1954-7) had allowed doubts to arise as to whether Ireland was capable of protecting itself, and inter alia neutrality.¹⁴ As their spokesman put it in June 1955, "if we are really serious about preserving the neutrality of this State, then we ought at least provide the means

by which we can protect that neutrality. No nation will take our statements that we are a neutral nation seriously if we do not ourselves make an effort ... by keeping the Army at the highest possible strength ...".¹⁵ Fianna Fáil also claimed that wartime neutrality was respected "mainly by reason of ... the forces which were there".¹⁶

In government all parties paid lip-service to possessing "a defence force capable of operating in defence of the national territory", with sufficient strength, training and equipment to allow the Irish government "to assume complete responsibility for the defence of the country".¹⁷

They also had to contend, however, with the recognition that "for a country such as this", the objective of "providing a Defence Force to resist and repel any aggressor" was beyond them. Despite this, Major de Valera, Fianna Fáil's most articulate spokesman on defence, was adamant that the alternative was not to do nothing since defence was one of the privileges of independence. Whilst absolute defence might be out, "a more modest view of the problem" was reasonable, involving the objective of minimising the danger of interference.¹⁸ Nonetheless, in actual policy and provision ambivalence persisted. When asked in 1951 whether Ireland could protect its neutrality, the Inter-Party Minister for Defence, General MacEoin replied "I think so", saying the country would put up "a very decent show" holding out longer than an opponent might expect.¹⁹ However, it was not a very positive statement.

The Irish did recognize that in the new international environment Ireland occupied a pivotal position, lying as it did "right across the communications of the North Atlantic", so that it "could not ignore the storm breaking".²⁰ Consequently Oscar Traynor, Fianna Fáil's shadow spokesman on defence in 1951 and subsequently Minister, argued

that if Ireland left a vacuum and failed to ensure its territory could not be used by others, "then it is almost certain that we would find this State of ours in the hands of one or other of the belligerents",²¹ not through malevolence on their part, but rather because there would be "no other military way out" for them, "as a protection for themselves" as Major de Valera put it.²²

The official answer to these problems was deterrence, since whilst Ireland could not necessarily stop an invader, it could it was argued "have such a force as would compel any belligerent ... to deploy relatively large forces ... (making) the cost both in men and materials relatively high for them". If Ireland could have sufficient forces to pose a putative belligerent problems, it could deter him.²³ Some deputies even quoted with approbation the Swedish example.²⁴ In the Irish case, the hope was to deter partly by making it clear that the costs of continued occupation would be high. Moreover, the Irish explicitly took comfort in the marginal attack scenario, denying that the full weight of an aggressor was likely to fall upon Ireland,²⁵ insisting such an attack was more likely to be "incidental".²⁶

How much was enough was further complicated by a division of opinion over the likelihood of war and where the threat to Ireland came from. On coming into office in 1948 the Inter-Party Government established a cabinet committee to examine the possibility of war,²⁷ and this concluded Ireland was "facing a period of peace and not a period of war".²⁸ This influenced policy towards army strength, resources and roles. Fianna Fáil were less sanguine, fearing especially that there would not again be the "favourable accident" of 1939-40 which allowed for build-up of forces, and that the world situation was inherently dangerous.²⁹ Fianna Fáil were also less sanguine about the likelihood of Britain and/or America not invading,

given their refusal to give guarantees on respecting Irish neutrality during the Second World War.³⁰ The Inter-Party Government was more relaxed about the situation, believing it to be "beyond question" that Britain would "never ... lay a finger on this country".³¹

Given this background of rhetoric, it is revealing to examine what actually happened with respect to defence expenditure, equipment procurement and defence force strength.

Table 7:1 Actual amounts issued in each year for Defence, 1946-1955, and as a percentage of amounts issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services

		<u>Government</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>£</u>	<u>%</u>
To	18.2.48	Fianna Fáil	1946	8,768,712	18.46
		" "	1947	4,983,022	9.43
To	14.6.51	Inter-Party	1948	3,671,891	6.27
		" "	1949	3,674,322	5.68
		" "	1950	3,679,172	5.02
		" "	1951	4,204,303	5.56
To	2.6.54	Fianna Fáil	1952	5,116,519	5.66
		" "	1953	7,037,767	7.54
		" "	1954	7,864,730	7.50
From	2.6.54	Inter-Party	1955	6,667,966	6.32

Sources: Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1950, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1950 - Pr.124), Table 182, 'Amounts Issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st March, 1942 to 1950', pp.144-7.

Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1955, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1956 - Pr.3018), Table 226, 'Amounts Issued from the Exchequer for Supply Services in each year ended 31st March, 1947 to 1955', pp.234-7.

N.B. There may be variations each year in terms of what services came under the Defence heading, but they are minor.

Allowing for 1946 and 1947 as periods of adjustment, on average between 1948 and 1955 defence accounted for 6.19% of government expenditure, with some tendency to slightly increase under Fianna Fáil and decrease under Inter-Party governments. By comparison, according to figures given in the Dáil in 1949 and 1950 the Swedes were spending between 19-25%, the Swiss 25-30%, the Spanish 30-34%, Belgium 11% and Holland 22% of total government expenditure on defence.³² The Irish figure was clearly of a different order of magnitude from both fellow 'neutrals' and small alliance members.

The Irish situation was made worse by their inadequacy with respect to 'warlike stores'. Whilst money was allocated for this purpose, in the period 1946-1950 between £397,545 and £117,888 annually, in 1947-8 budgetary year only £4,000 was actually spent, and in the following year only £73,000, since the equipment could not be attained.³³ To some extent the picture changed towards the end of the period with £4.5m being spent between March 1952 and June 1955,³⁴ but over the ten year period the amount was pitifully small, especially since it was admitted in 1946 that Ireland lacked sufficient armoured vehicles, guns and carriages, parts for rifles and machine guns, and other items, the army being "under-equipped".³⁵

The figures of the size of the Permanent Defence Force (PDF) were hardly better.

Table 7:2 Numbers in Permanent Defence Force 1946-1955

Date	1/4/46	1/3/47	30/4/48	1/3/49	31/3/50	31/3/51	31/3/52	31/3/53	31/3/54	31/3/55
<u>Total</u>	13,040*	8,750*	8,511*	8,006	8,113	7,880	10,004	10,562	10,412	9,692

* In these years there were additionally 1,286, 1,188 and 86 members respectively of the 'Construction Corps' but these were not regarded as soldiers per se.

Sources: Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1955, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1956 - Pr.3018), Table 211

'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31st March, in each year, 1951 to 1955, p.220.

Dáil Debates 104:1732, 111:1360, 114:2225 and, 120:522.

These figures hardly suggest a strong force, especially when the number of men actually capable of being put in the field is contemplated. On the other hand, official policy made much of the large number of trained men (as a result of the war) in reserve, who could be quickly called up.³⁶ This was, however, a diminishing asset so that by 1955 there were only 4,406 in the First Line Reserve, and 19,980 in the Second Line Reserve.³⁷ Moreover, after 1946 the peacetime establishment was officially fixed at 12,860 officers and men in the P.D.F., with some subsequent minor modifications, but there was continually a shortfall of at least about 20% in the actual numbers in service.³⁸ Altogether P.D.F. and Reserves were well short also of the figures contained in the General Staff plans of 1944 which envisaged total forces of between 60-120,000.³⁹ In addition, of the reserve that existed, especially the Second Line reserve, on occasions few went for training.⁴⁰ This was a failure to fulfill self-assigned objectives, a failure compounded by the General Staff's unease about relying upon a voluntary system of recruitment. In 1944-45 the General Staff had warned the government of the difficulties in rapidly expanding a small cadre.⁴¹ In fact, compulsory military training was more seriously considered than public statements imply,⁴² but it was rejected and although the problems of army size and the reserves were often debated, little of substance was achieved.⁴³

The situation was even worse with regard to Irish air and naval services, despite Ireland's island nature. There was some awareness by Traynor and others that if they were "serious in regard to the policy of neutrality ... the least that would be expected from a nation with a coastline such as we possess would be that we would be capable of patrolling that coastline and ensuring that it would not in any way be used to the detriment of other countries ...",⁴⁴ but little was actually done.

In October 1945 the General Staff had recommended the immediate "purchase of two corvettes, to be followed by the annual purchase of one corvette until six have been acquired" and detailed the tasks the new naval service should perform.⁴⁵ In discussions on the submission, ministers appear to have been concerned whether the service "would give value for the money expended on it" and only 3 corvettes were agreed, with doubts as to whether Cabinet would agree to more.⁴⁶ 3 Corvettes were purchased from Britain late in 1946, and by the early fifties they comprised the Irish Naval Service, remaining "the mainstay of the service right up to the nineteen seventies".⁴⁷ It was impossible for such a navy to fulfill the tasks originally assigned by both General Staff and successive governments.

In 1944 the General Staff had also planned for a "small air force"⁴⁸ of perhaps "10 fighter squadrons", with a first step being "5 fighter squadrons".⁴⁹ In discussions on the plan de Valera made clear that "ordinarily this country would not possess sufficient aircraft for war purposes".⁵⁰ In the following years purchases were made of Spitfires, Seafires, Ansons and re-conditioned Magisters, and by the summer of 1953 it was announced that all aircraft in use by the Air Corps had been purchased since 1946 and all had been new when purchased.⁵¹ The force was, however, dated whilst in addition it was only decided in 1953 to provide concrete runways at Baldonnel.⁵² In the summer of 1955 plans were put into operation to purchase 3 jet trainers and 4 piston-engined trainer aircraft.⁵³ In the early fifties the Air Corps had between 20 and 32 aircraft.

The Irish clearly failed to meet the requirements of 'due diligence', and indeed, in conversations with the American Secretary of State and President in March 1951, the Inter-Party Minister for External Affairs, Sean MacBride, admitted "Ireland was unable to defend itself",⁵⁴ it was "quite defenceless".⁵⁵

(ii) recognition of position by others

Ireland was not, however, isolated from the world. By 1952-3 it was making payments to 33 international organisations⁵⁶ and had some form of diplomatic representation in 18 states, although some of their representatives were accredited to more than one state.⁵⁷ A striking feature of Ireland's diplomatic profile, however, was the lack of representation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a factor which did affect Soviet perceptions of the Irish.⁵⁸ The perceptions of others may also have been influenced by the fact that with the ending of the war the practise resumed of using the King's signature on letters of credence, a practise which lasted until the Republic of Ireland Act came into operation on Easter Day 1949.⁵⁹

An early test of the Irish position after the war and of others' perceptions of it, came with the question of United Nations membership. In the summer of 1946 de Valera on a number of occasions specifically compared the Irish position with the "attitude taken by the other neutral States", initially in advocating lack of urgency in making an application,⁶⁰ but a month later in urging the need for decision.⁶¹ Whilst the Swiss position was described as unique, de Valera also told the Dáil that "Sweden is in a practically analogous position to ours ... Her parliament has agreed in principle".⁶²

de Valera told the Dáil that the Postdam declaration suggested Ireland would be accepted,⁶³ but his own department, Department of External Affairs, had already told the government that despite Postdam "candidatures are apt to be regarded not so much on their merits as from the point of view of their probable effect on the distribution of political forces and voting power within the organization".⁶⁴ This assessment proved correct and the Soviets vetoed the Irish application.

Interestingly by way of contrast the Swedish application proved acceptable.⁶⁵ The Irish were vetoed four times by the Soviets. The Soviet arguments were the absence of conventional bilateral relations,⁶⁶ Irish failure to aid the laying of the foundations of the organization and, Irish "open sympathy with the Axis and with Franco Spain". The Irish, therefore, lacked "the qualities which are required by the Charter".⁶⁷ In 1955 Ireland was finally admitted as a result of a 'package deal', a deal which was "So intricate ... that Ireland's membership was in doubt up to the last moment", with the Soviets nearly vetoing again "all the Western nominees".⁶⁸ The Irish were clearly perceived by the Soviets as part of the hostile camp.

The leader of the other camp was influenced in its attitudes to Ireland by the experiences of 1941-45, and also by its perception that the United States was now in another "real war".⁶⁹ Despite the former, the United States had at its avowed objective, "to ensure the collaboration of Ireland as an ally with the Western Powers in any future conflict".⁷⁰ The U.S. Legation in Dublin did not believe this to be unachievable if "properly presented and the moment well chosen", believing important elements of Irish opinion were "not disposed to support a policy of neutrality in terms of present day threats to peace". The Irish would not accept the humiliation of capitulation to British terms, but "something could perhaps be achieved" by an American or Canadian approach.⁷¹ Indeed, even when it became clear that the government would not sign the North Atlantic Treaty, George Garrett the head of the U.S. Legation, was still sure that if he had been "permitted to go to higher places ... I could have cracked the situation and avoided the impasse as it has now materialized".⁷² He also reported that MacBride had told him he was committed to accepting the Atlantic Pact provisions "if Partition

issue removed ... there was no question whatsoever about this".⁷³

As of 1 April 1949 the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) believed Ireland to be "already ideologically aligned with the West, ... strongly Catholic and anti-Communist, and, in spite of military weakness and the Partition issue, would probably not remain neutral in an East-West war". It did acknowledge that the Irish attitude might not change in "anything short of war", and that Irish participation might provoke "civil disorder". Nonetheless, it argued that even de Valera was not likely to insist upon neutrality in a "Holy War", whilst MacBride did not believe "Ireland would remain neutral in the event of war".⁷⁴

The Irish rejection of the North Atlantic Treaty changed the American perception, as evidenced by a National Security Council Staff Study in October 1950. Considering whether the U.S. should offer inducements to Ireland to join NATO or some bilateral arrangement, the NSC decided against. This was partly so as not to encourage others to seek bilateral arrangements rather than NATO membership, but also because whilst Irish neutrality "undoubtedly would be more benevolent" than in 1939-45, there were "no indications that the Irish would abandon neutrality even if by so doing a strong contribution to the anti-communist forces would be made". In any case, the "denial of Ireland to enemy forces is already encompassed in existing NATO commitments".⁷⁵ This 1950 decision was still considered valid in November 1960.⁷⁶

Whilst such assessments were being made, the possibility of an arms for bilateral agreement deal was discussed, apparently on the initiative of Garrett. It was proposed that the British offer technical assistance and military aid. Most interestingly Garrett wrote to President Truman that in "the event this proposal was approved,

MacBride ... volunteered to make an all-out effort to secure bipartisan support for a bilateral treaty of defence". Garrett felt this "would ... bring Ireland into the defence picture" against the communists.⁷⁷ Subsequently in 1951 in meetings with the American Secretary of State and President, MacBride raised "the subject of the desirability of some military assistance being provided for Ireland", and advised the Americans on how best to carry on the struggle against communism. He reiterated that but for the political difficulties caused by Partition, Ireland would join NATO.⁷⁸

Any American doubts about Ireland were removed when the Fianna Fáil government rejected the amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 by the Mutual Security Act passed by Congress in 1951. The 1951 Act made future American assistance conditional upon the recipient's willingness to contribute to the "defensive strength of the free world".⁷⁹ Ireland told the Americans they could not accept this condition and "altering its established foreign policy ... by ... undertaking to render military assistance to other nations ...".⁸⁰ Ireland was now putting a price on its principles, albeit that the price was small given that the bulk of assistance had already been received.⁸¹

A factor in other states' perception of Ireland was Irish catholicism. This appears, for example, to have encouraged Spanish officials to see Ireland as a possible member of "a neutral bloc" for the "defence of the Catholic religion and resistance to Communism", given that "Ireland was an essentially Catholic" country.⁸² The Irish did not wish to become involved with Spain, Portugal and the Argentine, but the perception of Ireland as catholic was strong.⁸³ It was also valid given that in 1946 94.3% of the population were Roman Catholic, a figure which did not significantly alter for a generation, whilst there was also a practice rate of over 80%.⁸⁴ This affected others'

perceptions the more so, given the activities of "professional Catholics" who were always ready to raise the spectre of atheistic Communism, and that opinion was "anti-Soviet in a sense in which it was not anti-Nazi".⁸⁵ On the other hand, despite occasional hic-cups, there was a strong identity of values with the United States, with MacBride even claiming Ireland supported the "cardinal principles" of American policy,⁸⁶ although the C.I.A. regarded Aiken as "extremely anti-British and anti-American".⁸⁷ Most of the Irish political elite agreed with MacBride that Irish "sympathies ... lie clearly with the nations of Western Europe",⁸⁸ that Ireland was "an essentially democratic and freedom-loving country ... anxious to play her full part in protecting and preserving Christian civilization, and the democratic way of life", albeit thwarted by partition.⁸⁹ Ireland agreed "with the general aim of the ... Atlantic Pact",⁹⁰ and in 1955 Liam Cosgrave, Minister for External Affairs, reiterated Irish commitment to "a policy of cooperation with peoples who, like ourselves, have a Catholic and democratic way of life".⁹¹ His Taoiseach, John A. Costello had affirmed that Ireland was not ethically neutral, had a duty to help the West and that its influence would "always be directed against the threat of Communism".⁹²

Whilst hostile to some and supportive of others, however, there were limits to how far the Irish would go to offer support "against the threat of Communism".

(iii) disavowal of help

To some extent treatment of this variable has been implicit in the foregoing discussion particularly with regard to the clear evidence of Irish sympathies and the lack of 'due diligence'. This latter, it could be argued, was based upon implicit assumptions, particularly in Fine Gael, about British attitudes and behaviour and the degree to

which Ireland had been and was protected by "the second mightest navy in the world ... That is our naval defence".⁹³

Certainly there was no explicit disavowal of this 'protective umbrella' and it can be argued that the Irish did not foreclose the more general question of disavowal of help. Whilst the question of attitudes to alliances will be dealt with in the following section, it is relevant to note in the current context that in opposition two sometime Ministers for Defence, General MacEoin and Oscar Traynor, acknowledged Ireland would need and accept help if attacked. Oscar Traynor of Fianna Fáil, for example, whilst arguing that Ireland must have a strong army and a deterrent capability, acknowledged that "it would be a question, as it was in the past, of retaining our territory for the longest possible time until such time as we could receive help from one of the other interested parties in a world strife".⁹⁴ Furthermore, Major de Valera repeatedly attempted to show that "whether ... neutral ... or whether you envisage cooperation with the Western Powers",⁹⁵ the desiderata of Irish policy and "the general plan for its implementation can and should be so framed as to fit either situation".⁹⁶

Dr. O'Higgins (another sometime Minister for Defence) occasionally seemed willing to go further,⁹⁷ whilst General Mulcahy, the Fine Gael leader in 1947, argued Ireland was "unique in the world" if it thought it could defend itself with its own resources. Lack of consultation with friends meant money spent on defence "is being wasted". For Mulcahy, "if we do not realise the lines on which they are thinking we are simply going to act irresponsibly".⁹⁸ Others complained of a lack "even of a gentleman's agreement",⁹⁹ or proposed cooperation with the British and American navies,¹⁰⁰ or suggested a defence arrangement with Britain and common defence of the British Isles.¹⁰¹

Fianna Fáil complained that Fine Gael appeared to be flirting with such ideas, and asked "Is there any alliance?".¹⁰² In April 1950 as Minister for Defence, O'Higgins, poured scorn on such suggestions, denying "Emphatically" and "categorically" such arrangements had been made and reminding the House that any arrangement would in any case require Dáil approval.¹⁰³ O'Higgins, however, limited his reply to formal arrangements and it is interesting that in December 1948 the U.S. Legation in Dublin was noting the not "infrequent visits made to the Irish Chief of Staff by the G.O.C. Belfast and vice versa".¹⁰⁴ Nonetheless, the Taoiseach was adamant that no Irish representative "either directly or indirectly, by implication or otherwise, entered into any commitment on defence matters with any other country".¹⁰⁵ Despite this, it is clear that contact between the military of both states occurred, and the links were reinforced by numbers of Irish officers being sent on courses in both Britain and the United States.¹⁰⁶

In fact, the Irish were acting in a highly pragmatic way, there being no question of a principled foreclosure of assistance. Whilst formal plans do not appear to have been laid, the Irish clearly were keeping the door open, trying to maintain their freedom of decision and action. Unfortunately such a policy faced a number of constraints.

(iv) freedom of decision and action

One problem for Ireland was that whilst its "legal status" was "that of a neutral ... laws have never been able to contravene economic forces", and that the Americans, for example, regarded Britain and Ireland as economic "Siamese twins",¹⁰⁷ or in C.I.A. terms, Ireland as an "economic satellite" of Britain.¹⁰⁸ This situation was so despite all the previous talk of self-sufficiency. Indeed, this phrase disappeared from the Irish political lexicon.

The main problem was the financial and economic dependence upon Britain.

Table 7:3 Percentage of Irish Exports and Imports to and from Great Britain and Northern Ireland 1946-1955

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
<u>Imports</u>	52.2	41.5	53.9	57.3	52.9	46.8	50.9	50.7	55.7	52.7
<u>Exports</u>	92.3	88.6	87.3	89.9	86.7	84	86.1	90.5	88.6	87.2

Sources: Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1950, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1950 - Pr.124) Table 100, 'Value of Trade with each of the Principal Countries' expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports and Exports (including Re-Exports) p.82.

Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1956, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1957 - Pr.3542), Table 112, 'Value of Trade with each of the Principal Countries' expressed as a percentage of total value of Imports and Exports (including Re-Exports), p.130.

Over the 1946-55 period, on average 51½% of Irish imports were from Britain and 88% of exports to Britain. The dependence upon Britain was exacerbated by financial ties, so that when Britain devalued in 1949 so too did Ireland. A further complication was Ireland's "meager endowment of natural resources" and the need to import all of their petrol and 75% of their coal, for example. A saving grace, as in the war years, was over 90% self-sufficiency in food, although even in this sector "wheat for flour, animal feed-stuffs, and fertilizers" needed to be imported.¹⁰⁹ Whilst food caused "no apprehensions", there was concern at the lack of economic

base in other areas.¹¹⁰ Aiken, for example, noted that if Ireland lacked a properly equipped army, "if we have not got a reasonable amount of the essentials of life within our shores ... the decision will be made by somebody else and we will be kicked around". It was, therefore, necessary not only to organise "national military defences but our economic defences" so as to be capable of making "our own decision" and having "a reasonable chance" of sticking to it "during the war, in spite of what anybody else may say".¹¹¹

In fact, postwar planning appears to have taken little cognizance of economic defence,¹¹² and most indicative of this was the attitude to arms production. The General Staff in 1944 had mentioned the need for a munitions factory,¹¹³ but the Fianna Fáil government decided to defer the issue,¹¹⁴ despite the fact that Ireland was "not able to produce a .22 bullet or even a shot-gun cartridge", and that all equipment and ammunition "came from across the water".¹¹⁵ Even by 1950 the Irish did not produce a bullet or a rifle, and the wherewithal came from "outside the shores" of Ireland.¹¹⁶ The Fianna Fáil government re-opened the munitions factory issue in 1951 but nothing came of it,¹¹⁷ essentially because it was not regarded as viable, given the lack of raw materials and that "three day's working" would meet the army's annual requirements.¹¹⁸ Even de Valera on a visit to America in 1948 had to admit that as a small nation, Ireland was "unable to provide its own means of defence", and could only obtain supplies if it suited great power purposes.¹¹⁹ The problem for Ireland was that for most of the period it did not so suit great power purposes, and given their own pre-occupations they did not wish to meet Irish requirements, so that only "dribblets" of supplies were received.¹²⁰

As the Korean situation eased, so too did the Irish problem, and a

Supplementary Estimate was introduced in March 1953 for weapon procurement,¹²¹ it being confessed that summer that a "heavy leeway" had to be made up.¹²² Problems remained, however, with fears of obsolescence and escalation of cost of equipment,¹²³ so that within two years the new Inter-Party government was suggesting "a cautious attitude towards the purchase of conventional weapons of the heavier and less mobile types", and indeed even in 1954 both Fianna Fáil and Inter-Party governments cut back equipment purchase estimates.¹²⁴ As before, moreover, shipping remained a problem.¹²⁵ All in all it is difficult to see how the Irish could perform their avowed policy of relying on their "own strength to hold this island against anybody".¹²⁶

Economic autarky received further blows from the change in Europe away from protectionism towards liberalization and the impetus to international economic cooperation provided by the Marshall Plan announcement of June 1947.¹²⁷ Initially the Irish hesitated regarding these developments with, for example, Sean Lemass attacking the fallacious notion that economies are complementary rather than competitive.¹²⁸ Moreover, de Valera was wary of surrendering any independence, arguing that it would be "most unwise for our people to enter into a political federation which would mean that you had a European Parliament deciding the economic circumstances, for example, of our life here". Ireland "did not strive to get out of that domination of our affairs by outside force or we did not get out of that position to get into a worse one", although Ireland would cooperate to the extent commensurate "with our liberty to look after the fundamental things ...".¹²⁹

In fact, participation in the European Recovery Programme and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation were judged to be so commensurate but perhaps more important was the realization that Ireland

could not raise her living standards unless she looked beyond the confined home market. Albeit hesitantly and whilst trying to maintain protectionist tariffs, a "host of binational economic agreements" were signed with European states.¹³⁰ Interestingly, Partition was not allowed to obtrude into these economic developments.

The aspiration to independence remained powerful, however. As de Valera put it in July 1950 "What could be regarded as of greater value than the maintenance and integrity of this State ... of our independence ... our way of life ...?"¹³¹ In fact, some were already beginning to answer by pointing to economic prosperity,¹³² and it can be argued that the difficulties encountered in the economic realm only served to provide an added edge to the desire to assert unequivocally sovereignty in the political sphere. This pre-occupation was not the preserve of one party, and it was also inextricably intertwined with "the first object" of Fianna Fáil and Inter-Party governments' domestic and foreign policies, "the ending of partition".¹³³

This period, then saw a marked concentration upon and agitation regarding partition, this being epitomized by de Valera's anti-partition campaign after leaving office in 1948.¹³⁴ This agitation fundamentally shaped the political environment within which other questions were debated and decided. In fact, the period 1946-1955 saw a reinforcement of the symbiosis between this issue and the avowed aspiration "to keep out of any entanglements ... any wars ...".¹³⁵ This symbiosis, however, had to contend with a changing external environment where European interdependence was growing. Moreover, the Irish had a number of other objectives, such as a concern with the maintenance of international peace and security, prosperity and global order and justice.¹³⁶ The Irish found themselves, therefore, having to reconcile a number of objectives

rather than paying exclusive attention to one or two. The question of Irish attitudes to membership of the U.N. was an early manifestation of some of the difficulties in this resolution.

In July 1946, for example, de Valera presented the issue of U.N. membership as essentially involving one question, was membership the course "most likely to preserve the independence of this country?". Yet, in the next paragraph, the key question appeared to be: "are we more likely to keep out of war by joining an organisation of this sort" or by remaining outside?¹³⁷ de Valera appeared to equate the two questions, but there is no necessary equation, and the objectives could have proved contradictory.

A full study of the obligations of membership was undertaken, and the obligations were made clear to both government and Dáil. The discussion, moreover, was based on a rather literal reading of the Charter, which tended to emphasize the obligations, since no one was sure how the U.N. might evolve, especially with respect to Article 43 and the negotiation of military agreements between the Security Council and member states. According to the Department of External Affairs it was clear that "once the Security Council has decided that enforcement measures should be taken, the members are obliged to carry out the ... decision". The Military Staff Committee, incidentally, was one of a number of matters which were not regarded as giving rise "to any major question of principle".¹³⁸ The Attorney-General believed Ireland was obliged to negotiate a military agreement, and was, moreover, concerned that the Charter involved members agreeing, "inter alia, to engage in war on the call of the Security Council", a situation which clashed with the Dáil's constitutional rights in that regard.¹³⁹ Despite such briefings, the Fianna Fáil Cabinet favoured membership.¹⁴⁰

de Valera specifically brought to the attention of the Dáil Articles 25,33 to 37 and, 43 to 45, making clear the perceived obligation to make a military agreement, and that "If the Security Council decides that action should be taken against a particular State, and that action leads to war, we must participate in that action and enter the war". There was no question of accepting "the advantages of collective security and of avoiding obligations". As to the constitutional issue, the Dáil would have to deal with that when the issue arose, bearing in mind that international undertakings should be honoured.¹⁴¹ If anything, de Valera drew a 'worst case scenario' and the Dáil still agreed to membership.

The Dáil appreciated membership "may undoubtedly involve us in war in certain contingencies" but was generally supportive.¹⁴² Despite concern as to whether the calls upon Ireland would be disproportionate to its resources,¹⁴³ there was a general willingness to accord collective security a higher priority than neutrality. It was recognized that collective security demanded Ireland be "really loyal members", committed to taking "collective action with other people" and ready to engage, if necessary, in "a war of enforcement". The Irish accepted the principle of having "to face the waging of war in order to prevent war"¹⁴⁴ and that traditional sovereignty was "not consistent with the idea of collective security" since in a collective security system you surrendered "the right to do at any time just as you please", being "prepared to accept some deciding authority other than your own will".¹⁴⁵

Not all Dáil members supported membership. Those against were concerned that the Irish had "sold our right to declare our position as one of neutrality",¹⁴⁶ that Ireland would be involved in war¹⁴⁷ and that contrary to 1939-45, "the ports" and airfields would be used by a

belligerent.¹⁴⁸ Opponents lost the argument, however, essentially because of a pervasive belief that the U.N. and collective security afforded a better prospect of peace than did neutrality.

The initial failure to achieve entry led to the accrual of doubts about the U.N., as did the first decade of the U.N's operations.¹⁴⁹ de Valera, MacBride and Costello all considered the possibility of withdrawing the Irish application, and actual entry aroused little enthusiasm.¹⁵⁰ Costello announced entry on 15 December 1955 noting that since the 1946 debates the Korean War had made clear that Article 43 and the making available of armed forces were not mandatory.¹⁵¹ It should be noted that Irish disenchantment with the U.N. stemmed from concern at the U.N's weakness, not its strength.

The Irish were also confronted with conflicting pressures and the need for policy choices with respect to their attitude to help, as already disussed, and to bilateral and regional security arrangements. Some in Ireland appreciated the signifiante of the geographical propinquity to Britain and the pivotal position in the Atlantic.¹⁵² Many accepted that Irish security "would be bound up with Britain's security",¹⁵³ and that even if one had a "very deep quarrel" with neighbours, if a fire broke out all would cooperate to extinguish it.¹⁵⁴ Some backbenchers, moreover, drew attention to the facts that Ireland was a 32-county nation,¹⁵⁵ that defence would be stronger if the whole nation made common cause against communism, and that cooperative schemes on drainage and railways already existed.¹⁵⁶ Some in the North clearly felt the same and in January 1949 the Northern Ireland Premier proposed talks on a joint defence arrangement on the basis of the constitutional status quo.¹⁵⁷ Over two years earlier, in July 1946, there were brief Anglo-Irish exchanges on the "old question" of a deal involving defence

and unity, but they petered out following the lines of previous exchanges.¹⁵⁸ The British were fearful that "any suggestion that we are prepared to give the matter consideration, is, ... certain to lead to serious trouble".¹⁵⁹ For his part de Valera retained his scepticism regarding the British ability to deliver,¹⁶⁰ and warned the Dáil more generally about the dangers of "entering into arrangements which involve military alliances", given that Irish "history is there with a warning finger to us as to what is likely to happen if we do it ...".¹⁶¹ Moreover, independence was regarded as a right to be acquired, not to be bargained over.¹⁶²

A further bilateral possibility was an arrangement "with the most powerful of all the nations that stand for the protection of freedom", especially given the historical Irish-American ties.¹⁶³ If the United States called for talks should not the Irish "at least enter into discussions" to see what was involved and what the United States might offer in return?¹⁶⁴ As already made clear, in private MacBride did seek to explore certain possibilities, but just as the British were wary of trouble in such arrangements, so too the Americans feared that any such bilateral deal with the Irish would undermine American pressure for "collective defence" and might pose a counter-attraction to the new North Atlantic Treaty, as well as creating "friction and resentment" with N.A.T. signatories.¹⁶⁵ Whilst the Inter-Party government might have favoured some arrangement, principally perhaps to secure equipment,¹⁶⁶ Fianna Fáil tended to feel that if the West felt threatened they should support Ireland even without a formal treaty.¹⁶⁷ In addition, in 1953 de Valera claimed that a majority would be against a bilateral treaty with the Americans, especially if it involved American bases in Ireland.¹⁶⁸

Many in Ireland felt it impossible to "consider entering into any

... military commitment ...for joint defence so long as she is denied ... national unity and freedom".¹⁶⁹ Ireland could not "possibly ally itself with an army that occupies portion of its territory".¹⁷⁰ Partition was "the keystone" in the "arch of foreign policy" thrown across "the chasm that separated a small neutral from ... belligerent powers".¹⁷¹ This feeling was especially pertinent given de Valera's anti-Partition campaign and the atmosphere created by the Republic of Ireland Act and the British riposte, the Ireland Act, which confirmed the status quo regarding Partition.¹⁷² This atmosphere influenced a makeshift and ideologically diffuse coalition which occupied government between 1948 and 1951. A coalition, moreover, which lacked confidence¹⁷³ and also included the strongly republican Clann na Poblachta.

The factors mitigating against Irish support for bilateral arrangements also operated with respect to multilateral, regional arrangements. Again, given the blatant division of the world into two opposing camps, several leading Irish figures called for some Irish relationship with the western-minded states. Mulcahy, for example, talked of the need for "regional conceptions of defence policy",¹⁷⁴ whilst Dillon wanted Irish involvement in a United States - Commonwealth arrangement, such an arrangement possibly being open to certain European states. Such an arrangement would "build a citadel for independence ... and above all for the undying freedom of Bishops".¹⁷⁵ Mulcahy, Dillon and O'Higgins whose sympathy was strongly with the British, were all in the Inter-Party government.¹⁷⁶

Fianna Fáil opposed such ideas for the reasons already advanced regarding bilateral arrangements, and because of a general antipathy towards alliances. An alliance involved recompensing partners as well as receiving help¹⁷⁷ and ones' partners would primarily remain interested in themselves.¹⁷⁸ Particularly important was the view that

small nations should be cautious when entering alliances because such entry could bring them "willy-nilly, into ... wars". Ireland "would not be consulted in how a war would be started ... when it was ended ... (nor) the terms on which it should end".¹⁷⁹ Moreover, defeat for a small nation meant it would be "utterly destroyed - effaced from the earth ...".¹⁸⁰

In the planning for the Atlantic Pact in 1948, Ireland was usually mentioned in the lists of those to be invited to participate, albeit possibly as "limited members", with "graded membership".¹⁸¹ Ireland was also conceived as a possible full member and on 14 April the Canadian Under-Secretary of State asked the Irish High Commissioner in Ottawa how the Irish would respond "to a proposal on the lines ... of the basic commitment in the Rio Pact" for the "Atlantic Nations".¹⁸² The report of the conversation was circulated to all Cabinet members and what ensued moved the Irish from simply talking about their attitude to having to make a decision concerning regional security arrangements. Whilst there is a dearth of information about the Cabinet's discussions,¹⁸³ it is extremely revealing that at no stage did any Irish official statement simply declare membership in the proposed Atlantic Pact to be unacceptable given Irish neutrality. Indeed, other reasons were advanced and neutrality per se appears to have played little part in the decision.

Discussion of the issue did not occur at a propitious moment given the 1948-9 furore over Partition, although on the other hand, several members of the coalition government were sympathetic in principle to some kind of regional security arrangement, and it has been claimed that "a Fine Gael government, with a safe majority of its own, ... would eventually have committed itself to NATO".¹⁸⁴ Certainly the American Legation in Dublin felt Costello might be sympathetic¹⁸⁵ and also

reported on the privately expressed "dissatisfaction over the course of events" by ministers,¹⁸⁶ and the "disillusionment" of many Fine Gael supporters.¹⁸⁷ The decision was by no means straightforward, however, since other elements in the coalition, especially Clann na Poblachta, had fought the 1948 election primarily on the issues of the establishment of an Irish republic, ending Partition, as well as social radicalism.¹⁸⁸ The Irish Labour Party, moreover, had a traditional attachment to neutrality.¹⁸⁹ Thus, whilst the American Legation felt it could have mobilized support for some arrangement, there were difficulties, especially given the political environment relating to Partition. In addition, after sixteen years in opposition, coalition members appear to have put a premium on keeping de Valera out, especially since for some of them he was a greater enemy than either Britain or Stalin.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, de Valera's anti-partition campaign posed the danger of the coalition being outflanked on the national question, a risk they sought to avoid. Whilst it is too suggestive of prescience to argue de Valera may have engaged on such a campaign "to forestall attempts to involve Ireland in future military alliances", his emphasis made any movement to such involvement "far more difficult" and had the effect of contributing to Irish abstention.¹⁹¹

In this environment it was not clear what the Irish response to any invitation to adhere to the Atlantic Pact should be. Ultimately they declined, but the key question is whether this was because of expediency or principle, and if the latter was the principle that of Partition or neutrality?

On 7 January 1949 the Americans handed MacBride an aide-mémoire on the proposed Pact, which invited Ireland to help draft the treaty and to be one of the "original signatories". The aide-mémoire spelt

out the proposed obligations, specifically that "all parties would take such action as might be necessary to restore and assure the security of the area" by a "definite obligation" to contribute to collective defence both prior to and after any attack, although such a contribution would be commensurate with the "resources and geographic location" of the state. Crucially it was suggested the obligations "would not necessarily involve in every case declaration of war in the event of armed attack" since in democracies it was usually a "parliamentary prerogative" to declare war, and there might be advantages to the alliance if not all members were involved in a war.¹⁹²

On 8 February 1949 the Irish replied by re-affirming Irish commitment to democracy, freedom and Christianity, but also arguing that a corollary was concern for human rights and national self-determination. The Irish wished to play their "full part" in protecting such values and "with the general aim of the proposed Treaty" were "in agreement". However, Partition involved a denial of Irish territorial integrity, and the "elementary democratic right of national self-determination", as well as allowing "undemocratic practices" in Northern Ireland. British occupation of six of Ireland's "north-eastern counties" against the will of the Irish people, meant that "any military alliance with, or commitment involving military action jointly with, the State that is responsible for the unnatural division of Ireland, which occupies a portion of our country with its armed forces, and which supports undemocratic institutions in the north-eastern corner of Ireland, would be entirely repugnant and unacceptable to the Irish people. No Irish Government, whatever its political views, could participate with Britain in a military alliance while this situation continues, without running counter to the national sentiment of the

Irish people. If it did, it would run the risk of having to face, in the event of a crisis, the likelihood of civil conflict within its own jurisdiction".

In addition, it was argued that on a small island only an integrated defence under a single authority with popular support had a chance of success, whilst Partition denied to the Dublin government the productive capacity of "the industrial area of the country", thus weakening its capacity. Alliance with the occupying power would lack "the necessary sympathy and support" of the people. Nevertheless, there was no hostility to Britain, it being "inconceivable ... Ireland should ever be a source of danger ... to Britain in time of war". On the contrary, a united Ireland would be in the interests of Britain and the other participating states. Given this, the Irish sought American help to resolve Partition.¹⁹³ In sum, Partition was the central objection, partly in its undemocratic aspects, and partly because of its economic, political and military consequences. With some variation, these arguments were repeated over the following months and years.

The allies' reply was simply that the Pact was "not a suitable framework" to resolve bilateral Anglo-Irish difficulties and that Partition was "not considered ... connected in any way with membership" in the Pact.¹⁹⁴ MacBride took some umbrage at this and tried for over two years to persuade the United States to intervene and take up the Irish case.¹⁹⁵ He failed.

On 4 April 1949, in the presence of the Irish Minister in Washington, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.¹⁹⁶ Nearly two months later, the Irish Government made a full and considered reply to the American position. Before reiterating the previous arguments, it argued that the British 'Ireland Bill' appeared, amongst other things,

to be "specifically designed to bring the six north-eastern counties of Ireland within the scope of the mutual undertakings" regarding territorial integrity in the North Atlantic Treaty and thereby attempted to accord Partition "a new measure of international guarantee and recognition". The Irish rejected the alleged lack of connection between adherence and Partition. They insisted that Partition was "the sole obstacle to Ireland's participation in the Atlantic Pact".¹⁹⁷ Again there was no reference to neutrality and again Washington refused to rise to the bait regarding Partition.¹⁹⁸ Interestingly, the Irish sought agreement to make these exchanges public, thus making it a matter of international knowledge that there was a sole obstacle to Irish participation in the Atlantic Pact.¹⁹⁹

Partition was undoubtedly the key factor, although Raymond Raymond has tried to establish that it was used "as a reason ... merely in legitimization of a policy dictated by political expediency", as a "useful smokescreen" against the failure of the coalition's domestic programme.²⁰⁰ Clearly a number of factors were relevant but the role of Partition ought not to be underestimated given the political environment of 1948-9 and the background of Irish Republican Army involvement by MacBride. Moreover, even when first broached with the High Commissioner in Ottawa, the High Commissioner had indirectly alluded to Partition as a problem.²⁰¹ Both before and after the question became public, ministers told the Dáil "time and again", according to O'Higgins, that successive governments had argued "alliance is unthinkable and impossible for a divided partitioned country".²⁰² In July 1948, MacBride had spoken of Partition preventing Ireland from taking its "rightful place" in a number of developments,²⁰³ a view with which de Valera concurred since it was "ridiculous that we should be

asked to join in" to create a large bloc, "whilst Ireland was deliberately kept cut in two".²⁰⁴ The American Legation was also privately reporting that "the government ... opposed to signing while the question of partition remained unresolved",²⁰⁵ whilst the C.I.A. reported that feeling over Partition was "genuine, not artificial; constant, not occasional. If political parties keep the issue before the people, it is because they cannot do otherwise and continue to exist".²⁰⁶

MacBride told the Americans privately that if Partition were ended, "there was no rpt. (sic) no question whatsoever" but that Ireland would accept the Pact's provisions,²⁰⁷ and in April 1949 he was reported in the Irish Press as saying that Ireland "would join the Atlantic Pact as a full charter member immediately after British forces were withdrawn from the Six Counties" since then, it would be maintaining its own "territorial integrity and political independence".²⁰⁸ Moreover, he thought that in such a situation the Irish people would be 100% behind the treaty.²⁰⁹ O'Higgins described membership as "the natural thing" if circumstances were different,²¹⁰ whilst de Valera suggested that a proper basis of Anglo-Irish relations would lead to "the normal reaction here" on the Pact,²¹¹ and that given independence and unity Ireland would "probably have the same inducements to join as other nations",²¹² and that in such circumstances "he would advocate entrance into the Pact".²¹³ These utterances suggest a Dublin belief in the possibility of a deal involving unity and participation, and also omit significant references to neutrality as a reason for abstention.

With respect to a deal, "the Irish politician" failed "to appreciate or evaluate with proper emphasis the interest that is taken abroad in

matters affecting Ireland", this being a particular failing the Americans believed of MacBride.²¹⁴ In addition, the wartime pressure led them to exaggerate the allies' need of Ireland. In reality an American National Security Council (NSC) study in October 1950 concluded that whilst "Strategically located" and affording "valuable sites" for air and naval operations, those sites were "not considered essential at this time", certainly not so essential as to jeopardise the principle of collective defence. Irish participation would be welcome if "unqualified".²¹⁵ Few in Ireland appreciated this basic assessment.²¹⁶ If some were ready to bargain, only a few insisted that neutrality was a principle not to be bargained away. Despite the almost incidental role of neutrality in the debate, the shibboleth of 'no NATO' became subsequently synonymous with neutrality.

Even those like Raymond Raymond who attack the conventional wisdom regarding the role of Partition do not seek to substitute principled adherence to neutrality in its place. Rather, Raymond, for example, cites the fear of a "loss of independence in foreign policy".²¹⁷ It is possible to support this argument by reference to the attitude of An Tánaiste, William Norton, who wished Ireland "to detach" itself "from the groups and the blocs of power"²¹⁸ and de Valera, himself, who claimed Ireland gained respect in the 1930s because it was "taking an independent attitude".²¹⁹ On the other hand, there is little evidence in the 1945-55 period of any consistent attempt to evolve a distinctive Irish position. Although MacBride made clear his view that "Europe cannot continue for ever to live as an armed camp" and needed "an ideal round which they can rally" as an alternative to communism, he was unable to give the Americans any substance when asked to elaborate.²²⁰ MacBride acknowledged, moreover, that alliance was "wholly right" in certain circumstances.²²¹ In addition,

perhaps to compensate for non-participation in the Atlantic alliance, MacBride went out of his way to decry anti-Americanism,²²² to support American foreign policy in general and to regret, for example, that American efforts in Korea should be misinterpreted as military aggression.²²³ Nonetheless, for Irishmen of the 1948-51 political elite's generation, independence was the issue.

Raymond also draws attention to other issues such as economic fears and worries over the possibility of foreign bases on Irish soil. He suggests it was believed that "additional military expenditure of the order of Ir. £14-20 million" would be required given membership, at a time of defence spending constraints.²²⁴ If this were a factor, it is surprising that there is no evidence of the Irish seeking financial aid from the Americans to ameliorate it. Similarly, the argument regarding the installation of bases enhancing the prospect of Ireland becoming a target, tends to ignore the need to overcome British air defence first. Perhaps more significant was a calculation that Ireland could "secure all the advantages of being within the ambit of the Pact without any of the disadvantages of subscribing to its terms".²²⁵ Equally important is that Irish participation was never considered vital enough to generate sufficient allied pressure upon them.

None of the above arguments point to principled neutrality per se. For those who mentioned it an equal number complained that Eire was fiddling "not only while Rome but all Christianity trembled on the brink of a Red inferno".²²⁶ What really mattered was partition and independence, partly because many of the Irish political elite actually cared about it and partly because after years in the political wilderness the Coalition parties did not wish to be outflanked on the national

question by de Valera but wished rather to deprive the Opposition of issues.²²⁷ The principle of Partition was reinforced by expediency, but neutrality hardly came into play.

Parallel with these debates were the plethora of developments and initiatives concerning European integration. Whilst Ireland abstained from the Brussels Treaty of 1948²²⁸ and from the European Coal and Steel Community, it was a founder member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe, whilst unofficial Irish representatives were at the Congress of Europe at The Hague in May 1948.²²⁹ The Irish attitude appeared to revolve around a high-low politics distinction, with abstention not only from defence organizations, but also from those involving the integrity of the state and the sensitive sovereignty issue. The Council of Europe and OEEC were acceptable since they imposed "no obligations which are inconsistent with our national rights" whilst, as has been seen, it was felt NATO did given the 'territorial integrity' dimension.²³⁰ The Irish also favoured the OEEC and Council of Europe because of their basis of unanimity.²³¹ Whilst MacBride appeared to favour European integration in principle, he was also a nationalist, so that whilst accepting few could object to surrendering "a part of their national sovereignty" if by so doing "they could avoid utter destruction" and war, he could also see that sovereignty was "a matter for consideration" and that the rights of small nations needed to be safeguarded.²³²

As previously discussed, de Valera was anxious to distinguish military from non-military cooperation,²³³ although he was somewhat wary even of the latter, believing Ireland "would not be wise ... in entering into a full-blooded political federation". Nonetheless, he recognized that Ireland had "interests ... in common with other countries" and, therefore, should cooperate so long as it was "consistent

with our own reasonable well-being" and Ireland was not precluded from building up its own economy.²³⁴ Partly for this reason, the Irish tended to follow the British minimalist and ad hoc approach, steering clear of any transfer of sovereignty and lacking the continental sense of need and urgency regarding European unity.²³⁵ In addition, of course, "neither coal nor steel played any major role in the Irish economy (other than imports) ...", so that Ireland was not an obvious candidate for the European Coal and Steel Community.²³⁶

Partition was felt to be important, and the raising of it as a grievance in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe became routine.²³⁷ So routine, in fact that it not surprisingly dominated Irish contributions to the debate on a European army in August 1950, with severe denunciations of a European "freedom army"²³⁸ whilst Ireland was still "not free", even before Churchill was able to put his motion. de Valera joined with Norton in his tirade and all four Irish members voted against Churchill's motion.²³⁹ On the other hand, the Irish do not appear to have complained too much when the rule change allowed the Consultative Assembly to discuss certain "political problems connected with the security of Europe", and they did not vote against the motion.²⁴⁰

Next to nothing was said concerning the 'European army' or the European Defence Community (EDC) within Ireland itself,²⁴¹ although Miriam Hederman suggests the latter "was regarded with some favour in Irish circles which followed the debate 'on the mainland'", given that "the new idea of a genuinely multi-national defence had no particular prejudices to overcome". But fundamentally it was a question of being suitable for others, not Ireland given its position and the unacceptability of "the concept of Irish soldiers serving with, under

and over British soldiers", albeit that the force would be diluted by others.²⁴² In fact, the EDC was never an issue.

In December 1954 the Consultative Assembly discussed the Paris Agreements leading to the Western European Union (WEU). The Irish members generally supported it, although Boland said he intervened "diffidently" given Irish inability "to take part in the movement for European defence". Nonetheless, he had a "personal interest" in the question, "realising that a strong Western Europe is the best guarantee for the preservation of peace". He also described himself as "feeling that on this subject I was more an observer than a Representative".²⁴³ Another Irish member implied that he objected to the stretching of "the Statute ... by bringing in the question of defence", referring to defence as "the cancer in the heart of the Council of Europe" and a diversion from its "primary aims" of rebuilding ravaged Europe in the economic, cultural, social and ultimately political fields. Nonetheless, he still expressed support for "an integrated European defence system under a specialized authority".²⁴⁴

Fundamentally, however, these proposals generated none of the excitement of the 1948-1950 debates about the Atlantic Pact, and indeed those debates appear to have foreclosed a genuine debate about the European dimension, a situation which lasted for over a decade.

(v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to help ameliorate world problems and impartiality

Despite the foregoing focus upon the Irish position, Ireland was not at the centre of events in the postwar decade. Indeed, by 1948 Ireland was "almost wholly isolated from the mainstream of world events and without the means to influence them", the exclusion from

the United Nations, coming so soon after Ireland's wartime abstention, having "led to considerable diplomatic isolation".²⁴⁵ The Irish were involved in Europe, but their pursuit of the 'sore thumb' strategy of raising Partition at every opportunity, meant that they appeared introspective and somewhat detached. They appeared "content to let the world go by, heeding it only when necessity forced ... (them) to do so", and their outlook was "essentially isolationist".²⁴⁶ The pre-occupation with domestic issues, Partition and Anglo-Irish questions led to "little positive thinking" about foreign policy,²⁴⁷ a situation further exacerbated by resource constraints, geography and the ideological divide in the world.

On the other hand, the Irish themselves were aware of "the missionaries ... the Wild Geese, the diaspora" and the millions of Irish living abroad,²⁴⁸ so that they felt they had an influence "far in excess of what its mere physical size and the smallness of its population warrants", given their "spiritual dominion".²⁴⁹ de Valera, himself, thought Irish "spiritual" resources allowed a materially small Ireland to "play a very important part in international affairs".²⁵⁰ In addition, there was a feeling that the Irish freedom struggle was a model for others, especially since Ireland lacked "any imperialistic ambitions"²⁵¹ or involvement in "power politics".²⁵² There was also an awareness that "even, if it were desired to maintain a policy of complete isolation, this ... (was) no longer possible" in the shrinking postwar world.²⁵³

Yet, if the Irish had perceptions of influence, the lack of constructive thinking meant that there was little distinctive positive Irish contribution to the world. Instead it was a case of what the Irish were against, with only faint glimmerings of an aspiration not

to be as identified with one camp in the Cold War struggle as the overwhelming welter of their statements suggested. There was an even fainter glimmering of an aspiration to be part of a third force, with backbenchers occasionally floating the suggestion of Irish participation in a "barrier ... to prevent ... America and Russia - from involving the world in war", although the proposed composition of this barrier varied widely.²⁵⁴ Some hoped the British Commonwealth might organize a third force of neutral nations,²⁵⁵ whilst other suggestions involved a league of small nations²⁵⁶ or of small European countries specifically,²⁵⁷ or even a league of the disarming.²⁵⁸

During this period the Irish made no significant mediation efforts. The MacBride version of mediation saw Ireland as a "link" between Western Europe and the United States,²⁵⁹ whilst with respect to the Korean War, de Valera argued "we cannot stop the conflict" but only try to "survive as a nation through it".²⁶⁰ More generally, the Irish had "little sympathy for the neutralist attitudes ... being advocated, principally by India" at that time.²⁶¹ Most preferred, like MacBride, to think of Ireland, the United States and Western Europe as "we".²⁶² For many in Ireland the Cold War had the characteristics of a Jihad, being a struggle between the Cross and the anti-Christ.²⁶³ Whilst a few felt Ireland "should keep ... nose out of the business of other nations",²⁶⁴ in such a situation most Irishmen were neither indifferent nor impartial.

A glimmering of an aspiration for a distinctive Irish position and contribution was in MacBride's search for an "ideal which had stronger influence and attraction than Communistic ideology" but he was unable to put substance into the deal except to lament increasing materialism and the armed division of Europe.²⁶⁵ Despite the brow-beating, the Irish contribution to the solution of the world's problems

was negligible and by 1951 there was "very little evidence" that the Irish government cared.²⁶⁶ Ireland was no innovator, nor mould-breaker. It was no incipient leader of a third force. Whilst somewhat detached, it belonged to the 'old world' not the nonaligned world.

(vi) identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-determination

The concern with these variables has permeated much of the preceding discussion and the variables will thus only be dealt with briefly here. It is noteworthy, however, that the debate "about identity, legitimacy, symbolism, status" not only "underlay all Ireland's early efforts in the international field" as O'Brien suggests, but stretched into the postwar period as the pervasive basis of Irish policy.²⁶⁷ In 1945, for example, Dillon and de Valera were still involved in heated exchanges over the "dictionary Republic" and Ireland's status in the Commonwealth.²⁶⁸ Moreover, the goal of Sinn Féin of a free, independent and united Republic had still not been achieved, and neither had self-sufficiency and economic independence. Indeed, even in 1972 an Irish Foreign Minister still saw the basic issues of policy as "the assertion of ... identity" and "the recognition of that identity by others",²⁶⁹ and in the postwar period as a whole, the Irish worried about "Ireland's right to pursue her own foreign policy" and establish "her full sovereignty".²⁷⁰ These concerns permeated the entire period, but particularly in "the ultimate paroxysms of anti-partitionist fervour" produced by the Ireland Act of 1949 these issues mattered.²⁷¹

Conclusion

In the 1945-1955 there was a striking lack of assertions that the fundamental Irish policy was one of 'for neutrality'. Indeed, leaders such as de Valera and MacBride argued that Irish policy was as it was only "so long as" Partition existed.²⁷² Moreover, irrespective of party, no government was willing to provide the wherewithal 'for neutrality'. In addition, there was no single aspiration in the direction of such a policy since some were ready to countenance some form of security understanding with others. Just as non-participation in war is not equivalent to neutrality, neither is non-participation in alliances a sufficient condition. The post-war decade saw rather the foundation of a sui generis position.

Footnotes : Chapter Seven

1. Peter Lyon, Neutralism, (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1963), pp.99-104.
2. F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, (London, Fontana / Collins, 2nd ed., 1974), p.557.
3. Ronan Fanning, 'Irish neutrality - an historical review', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1 No.3 (1982), p.35.
4. de Valera, Dail Debates, 122:1540 (1950).
5. SPO S13620 Memorandum on the Defence Forces submitted by Lt.-Gen. D. MacCionnaith 23 August 1944.
6. Lt.-Col. P.D. Kavanagh (ed.), The Irish Army Handbook 1973, (Dublin, Department of Defence, 1973) p.15.
7. SPO S13620 B Notes of meeting held in the Taoiseach's Room, Government Buildings, 2 January 1946.
8. SPO S13620 op.cit. p.3.
9. Coogan, Dail Debates, 105:68-71 (1947).
10. O'Higgins, ibid, 97:1449-1451 (1945).
11. O'Higgins, ibid 105:50-51 and 62 (1947) and see also 104:447 ff (1947).
12. Major V. de Valera, ibid 105:106 (1947).
13. O'Higgins, ibid, 105:50-51 (1947).
14. Traynor, ibid 125:1754 (1951).
15. Traynor, ibid 151:1663 (1955).
16. Traynor, ibid 110:728 (1948).
17. Traynor, ibid 104:434 (1947). See also O'Higgins, 120:591 (1950) and Traynor, 100:583 (1946).
18. Major V. de Valera, ibid 132:674 (1952).
19. General MacEoin, ibid, 124:1948 (1951).
20. Major V. de Valera, ibid, 120:629 (1950).
21. Traynor, ibid, 125:1754-5 (1951).
22. Major V. de Valera, ibid 100:639 (1946). See also Colley 110:753 (1948) and 119:814 (1950).
23. Major V. de Valera, ibid 114:2015-6 (1949). See his contributions also at 120:631 (1950) and 132:673 ff.
24. Colley, ibid 110:753-4 (1948), for example.
25. E. de Valera, ibid 122:1831 ff (1950).
26. Major V. de Valera, ibid 132:817 (1952).
27. It comprised An Tánaiste and the Ministers of Finance, Defence, External Affairs, Agriculture and Industry and Commerce. It attempted to consolidate the experience of 1939-45 and to draft legislative bills in event of another war. See ibid 122.1851 (1950) and 122.2022 (1950).

28. O'Higgins, ibid 114:2037 (1949) and see also 114:712-6 (1949).
29. E. de Valera, ibid 119:815-6 (1950). His son, Major V. de Valera felt the same - 114:2017 ff (1949) and 112:978 (1948).
30. See Traynor ibid 110:727 (1948) and 132:982-4 (1952), and E. de Valera 119:818 (1950).
31. O'Higgins, ibid 105:49-50 (1947).
32. See Aiken, ibid 114:1969-70 (1949) and Major de Valera 120:693-4 (1950).
33. See O'Higgins, ibid 114:1954-5 (1949). See also 100:586, 105:42, 120:598, 126:1178 ff, 132:331 ff, 136:2060, 138:1310 and 151:1589.
In 1949 Major de Valera claimed (114:2025 ff) that in the fifteen years prior to the Second World War, the average short-fall between money allocated and money spent on defence equipment was 11%, so the postwar phenomenon was not new, only more marked.
34. General MacEoin, ibid, 151:1589 (1955).
35. Traynor, ibid, 99:2127 (1946).
36. O'Higgins, ibid 113:1460 (1948).
37. Ireland : Statistical Abstract 1955, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1956 - Pr.3018) Table 211 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31st March, in each year, 1951 to 1955', p.220.
38. Traynor, Dail Debates 104:429 (1947). The figure was reduced to 12,500 within a couple of years only to be increased to 12,743 by Fianna Fáil in 1951 - 126:1178 (1951).
39. SPO S13620 Memorandum on the Defence Forces op.cit. pp.5-6 and Appendix No.1 'Estimate of Approximate Strengths Under Proposed Scheme of Defence'.
40. O'Higgins, Dail Debates 119:885-7 (1950).
41. SPO S13620 Memorandum on the Defence Forces op.cit. pp.7-8 and 12-17.
42. See, for example, SPO S13620B Notes of Meeting Held in the Taoiseach's Room, 2 January 1946 and SPO S13620 Addendum No.1, and Dail Debates 110:822 ff and 919; 114:2025 and 2040; 119:884; 120-593 ff and 719; 126:1199; 132:537; 138:2379 and, 139:348.
43. For a flavour of the debate see Dail Debates 99:2130, 2142, 2163 and 2173; 104:429 and 707-9; 110:722, 822 and 910; 114:2017 ff; 120:593, 605; 132-685; 138:2416 and 151:1587, 1659 and 1667.
44. Traynor, ibid 151:1597 (1955) and see O'Higgins 100:607 (1946) and 105:50 (1947). At other times, both were Minister for Defence.
45. SPO S13620, Memorandum on the Defence Forces, op.cit. and Addendum No. 2, 'Naval Service' p.8 and passim.
46. SPO S13620 B, Notes of Meeting Held in the Taoiseach's Room, 2 January 1946 pp.5-7.
47. Capt. J. Sheehan, (ed.), Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d) p.63.
48. SPO S1362 Memorandum on the Defence Forces, op.cit. p.5

49. Ibid, Appendix No.1 Estimates of Approximate Strength under Proposed Scheme of Defence pp.34-36.
50. SPO S13620 B Notes of Meeting held in the Taoiseach's Room, 2 January 1946 p.2.
51. See Traynor in Dail Debates 100:581 (1946), 105:45 (1947) and 139:673 (1953) and General MacEoin 151:1590 (1955). See also Sheehan op.cit. p.61.
52. Ibid 141:178 (1953).
53. General MacEoin 151:1590 (1955).
54. Memorandum of Conversation : Call of Minister for External Affairs, Sean MacBride, 13 March 1951, Acheson papers Box 66, Truman Library.
55. Memorandum of Conversation, 23 March 1951, ibid. Some Dail Deputies felt the same - Dail Debates 139:437 (1953).
56. Dail Debates 143:2426 (1953).
57. Ibid, 143:1738 (1953) and 179:64 (1959).
58. See below pp.263-4.
59. See N. Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs : Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Postwar Change 1939-1952, (London, Oxford University Press, 1958) pp.268 ff and Dillon in Dail Debates 101:2181-2 (1946) and 106:2326 (1947).
60. E.de Valera, Dail Debates 101:2452 (1946). For a discussion of Irish entry see Norman MacQueen, 'Ireland's entry to the United Nations 1946-1956', in Tom Gallagher and James O'Connell, Contemporary Irish Studies, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1983) pp.65-80.
61. E. de Valera, Dail Debates 102:1469-70 (1946). On the change see Irish Times 22 July 1946 in SPO S13750 A.
62. E de Valera, Dail Debates 102:1325 (1946).
63. E. de Valera, ibid 102:1311 and he referred specifically to the Potsdam Agreement.
64. SPO S13750, Department of External Affairs Memorandum for the Government 'Membership of the United Nations Organisation' 11 July 1946.
65. On the general background see MacQueen op.cit. pp.68-9 and Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, (London, London University Press 1964 - 3rd revised ed.) pp.81-3. Claude suggests the Soviets vetoed what they regarded as "potential adherents to the Western grouping".
66. MacQueen op.cit. p.68 citing UN Document S/PV 57, 29 August 1946.
67. Irish Press, 31 July 1947 reporting on UN membership committee meeting at Lake Success on 30 July 1947, in SPO S13750 A.
68. MacQueen op.cit. p.71 and Claude op.cit. p.85.
69. For an elaboration of this view see NSC 68/2 'Report by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security', 30 September 1950, President's Secretary's Files, box 209, Truman Papers, Truman Library (TL).

70. State Department Policy Statement on Ireland 1948, RG84, Box 702 Washington National Records Center (WNRC).
71. State Department Policy Statement on Ireland : Memorandum from the Dublin Legation, 7 December 1948 RG84 Box 702 WNRC.
72. Garrett to Hickerson, Director, Office of European Affairs, State Department, 8 April 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
73. Garrett to Secretary of State, 18 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
74. Central Intelligence Agency: Ireland SR-48, President's Secretary's Files, Intelligence File, Truman Papers, TL.
75. National Security Council Staff Study 'The Position of the United States Regarding Irish membership in the NATO and Military Assistance to Ireland Under a Bilateral Arrangement' 17 October 1950, NSC 83/1 President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, TL. See also NSC 83 which is attached to it. This view was adopted by NSC.
76. Memorandum, James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC, to the NSC, 10 November 1960 - attached to copy of NSC 83/1 ibid.
77. Garrett to Truman, 10 July 1950, Official File 218, Truman Papers TL.
78. Memorandum of conversation between MacBride and Acheson, 13 March 1951; and Acheson memorandum of conversation of 23 March 1951, Acheson Papers Box 66 TL.
79. Mutual Security Act 1951.
80. Aide-mémoire of Matthews (Head of Dublin Legation) and Aiken conversation of 7 January 1951 in SPO S15231 A. This file contains other relevant material on this issue. For example, Aiken in letters told the Americans "Partition ... dominates ... approach to all questions of external policy".
81. Even with the suspension of aid, it was expected Ireland would receive "the benefit of the entire authorized commodity program", some \$146.2 million, although \$900,000 of technical assistance was to be lost, in addition to some currency complications. See Memorandum from Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Office of the Director for Mutual Security, to Charles Murphy, White House, 25 February 1952, Official File 218 Truman Papers TL.
82. John A. Belton, Irish Legation in Madrid, reporting conversation with Director of the Foreign Political Section of the Spanish Foreign Office. Senor Erice said it was a "purely personal" idea. Belton to The Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 8 April 1948 S14291 A/1.
83. American officials, for example, asked the Vatican if it would give "indirect advice" to Ireland on the Atlantic Pact. The Vatican did make known its views to the Irish. See correspondence between Gowen and Ranney, Ranney and Garrett, Ranney to Gowen, and Gowen to Ranney in RG84 Box 703 WNRC. Ranney was in State Department Division of British Commonwealth Affairs and Gowen was one of Truman's representatives to the Vatican.
84. See Basil Chubb, The Government and Politics of Ireland, (London, Oxford University Press, 1974), Table A.10, Membership of the Main Religious Denominations, 1861-1961, p.328 and J.H. Whyte, Church and State in Modern Ireland 1923-1979, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1980, 2nd ed.) pp.5-6 and 382.

85. Nicholas Mansergh, 'Ireland : The Republic Outside the Commonwealth', International Affairs, Vol.28 No.3 (July 1952) p.288.
See also Michael O'Corcora and Ronald J. Hill, 'The Soviet Union in Irish Foreign Policy', International Affairs, Vol.58 No.2 (Spring 1982), Marcus Wheeler, 'Soviet Interest in Ireland', Survey, Vol.21 No.3 (1975), Michael MacGreil, Prejudice and Tolerance in Ireland, (Dublin, College of Industrial Relations, 1977) and CIA SR-48 op.cit.
86. MacBride to U.S. National Press Club, in Eire-Ireland-Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs No.78, 2 April 1951.
87. CIA SR-48 op.cit.
88. MacBride, Dail Debates 112:903 (1948).
89. MacBride, ibid 114:223-6 (1949).
90. MacBride, idem.
91. Cosgrave, ibid 152:540 (1955).
92. Costello speech to Fine Gael Ard Fheis 1951, reported in Eire-Ireland - Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs No.72, 13 February 1951. See also a Costello speech in the Dail, Dail Debates 152:566 ff (1955).
93. O'Higgins, Dail Debates 105:52 (1947).
94. Traynor, ibid 151:1665 (1955), and for MacEoin's views 132:504 ff (1952).
95. Major V. de Valera, ibid 114:2014-6 (1949).
96. Major V. de Valera, ibid 120:627 (1950).
97. See O'Higgins, ibid 72:773 (1938), 105:52 (1947) and 104:407 (1947).
In 1938 he had said, for example, if "we are going to stand alone, and absolutely alone, the most reasonable defence policy for us is absolute disarmament ...".
98. General Mulcahy, ibid 105:97-103 (1947), and 104:729 (1947).
99. Coogan, ibid 105:65 (1947).
100. Coogan, ibid 104:561 (1947).
101. Capt. Giles, ibid 105:84 (1947).
102. Traynor, ibid 119:804 (1950) and Moran 104:720 (1947).
103. O'Higgins, ibid 120:587-8 (1950).
104. American Legation Memorandum by Chapin, 7 December 1948, RG 84 Box 702 WNRC.
105. Costello, Dail Debates, 113:1123 (1948). In 1946 Traynor denied similarly any arrangements or steps relating Irish defence to that of others with an interest in the Atlantic - 103:1101 (1946).
106. The Irish Government were anxious for their officers to receive training abroad. The language issue meant that it was overwhelming to Britain and U.S. that officers went, and a degree of familiarity was probably established. See ibid Traynor 100:657 (1946), Traynor 103:1101 ff (1946), Dillow 99:2180 (1946) and O'Higgins 132:558 ff (1952).

107. State Department Policy Statement on Ireland, 1948. Records of the United States Legation at Dublin, Irish Delegation Memorandum 7 December 1948, RG84 Box 702, WNRC.
108. CIA SR-48 op.cit. and see Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) p.139 and Donald Harman Akenson, The United States and Ireland, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973) pp.111-2.
109. CIA SR-48 op.cit.
110. Costello, Dail Debates, 122:2006-7 (1950), compared to MacBride, Irish Independent 9 April 1949, Major V. de Valera 132:817 ff (1952) and 120:670(1950) and Capt. Giles 132:371 (1952).
111. Aiken, ibid 119:827 (1950).
112. Although Major V. de Valera spoke on it regularly - ibid 119:827-8 (1950) and 120:668-70 (1950).
113. SPO S13620 Memorandum on the Defence Forces, op.cit. pp.27-8.
114. SPO S13620 B Notes of Meeting Held in the Taoiseach's Room, 2 January 1946, op.cit.
115. Capt. Giles, Dail Debates 99:2195 (1946).
116. O'Higgins, ibid 119:888 (1950).
117. Traynor, ibid 127:277 (1951).
118. O'Higgins, ibid 132:357 (1952).
119. E. de Valera, 3 April 1948 New York in Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and Statements by Eamon de Valera 1917-73, (Dublin, Gill and MacMillan, 1980) p.502.
120. O'Higgins, Dail Debates, 120:589 (1950) and see O'Higgins 114:2034 (1949), 132:350-1 (1952), and 139:431 (1953) and General Mulcahy 99:2158 (1946).
121. Traynor, ibid 136:2061 (1953).
122. Traynor, ibid 138:1309 ff (1953).
123. O'Higgins, ibid 113:1459-60 (1948).
124. General MacEoin, ibid 151:1589 (1955).
125. E. de Valera, ibid 122:1831-40 (1950) and 119:815 (1950).
126. O'Higgins, ibid 119:884 (1950).
127. Akenson, op.cit. p.109.
128. For the debate on the Convention of European Economic Cooperation and the contributions by Lemass and MacBride see Dail Debates 111:1979-2077 (1948).
129. E. de Valera, ibid 152:548-9 (1955).
130. Akenson, op.cit. pp.109-110, but Lyons argues Ireland did not abandon protectionism - Lyons, op.cit. p.625. See also Patrick Lynch, 'The Irish Economy since the War, 1946-51' in K.B. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams (ed.), Ireland in the War Years and After (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1969) p.190.
131. E. de Valera, Dail Debates 122:1831-40 (1950).
132. Akenson, op.cit. pp.107-129.

133. Nicholas Mansergh, 'Irish Foreign Policy 1945-51' in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.136.
134. Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations op.cit. pp.112-3 and Patrick Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1973) p.285.
135. O'Higgins, Dail Debates 105:49-50 (1947).
136. See Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. passim.
137. E. de Valera, Dail Debates, 102:1465 (1946). The previous day he argued membership would neither help nor hinder unity - 102:1324.
138. SPO S13750, Memorandum for the Government, Department of External Affairs, 'Membership of the United Nations Organisation' 11 July 1946.
139. SPO S13750, 'Membership of United Nations', Ard-Aighne (Attorney-General) 18 July 1946.
140. The Cabinet decided to apply on 30 July 1946, SPO S13750.
141. E. de Valera, Dail Debates 102:1315 ff (1946).
142. Coogan, ibid 102:1381 (1946).
143. See, for example, O'Higgins, ibid 102:1401-3 (1946) but General Mulcahy was more sanguine - 102:1330 (1946).
144. E. de Valera, ibid 102:1466 ff (1946), and see also 101:2450-1 (1946).
145. E. de Valera, ibid 102:1312-3 (1946).
146. Maguire, ibid 102:1414 (1946).
147. Cafferky, ibid 102:1368-9 (1946).
148. Oliver J. Flanagan, ibid 102:1395-8 (1946). He was against it for other reasons also.
149. There was distaste for a 'deal' and the insult to national dignity - Cogan ibid 104:4 (1947) and 117:999 (1949).
150. See E. de Valera, ibid 117:886 and 3 April 1948 in New York, see Moynihan, op.cit. p.504; MacBride 112:903-4 (1948) and for Costello, Eire-Ireland - Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs No.77, 19 March 1951. Finan, Dail Debates, 138-734 (1953) for a backbench view.
151. For the announcement and exchanges between Costello and de Valera on whether a debate was necessary see Dail Debates 153:1601-8 (1955).
152. For example, Major V. de Valera, ibid 114:2011-2 (1949).
153. MacBride interview to United Press 12 February 1949, SPO S14291 A/1.
154. Cogan, Dail Debates 120:700 ff (1950) but interjected Mr. Hickey "Surely you are helping John Bull when you do that?".
155. MacCarthy, ibid 152:118 (1955).
156. See Capt. Giles, for example, although he acknowledged some difficulties - ibid 132:368-371 (1952) and 139:387 (1953).

157. Irish Times, 19 February 1949, in SPO S14291.
158. Norman Archer, a Dublin British embassy official reported on this conversation. For fuller details see John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982) pp.262-4, who cites PRO DO 35/1228/W.X.101/154.
159. Bowman, ibid p.264 citing Addison, Cabinet memorandum 'Eire and Northern Ireland' 18 October 1946 PRO CAB 129/13, CP(46)391.
160. E. de Valera, Dail Debates 120:712 (1950).
161. E. de Valera, ibid 152:550-2 (1955).
162. E. de Valera, Irish Times 17 March 1951 in SPO S14291 A/2. de Valera said there could be no "bargaining of that sort".
163. Cogan, Dail Debates 120:700 (1950).
164. Cogan, ibid 117:998-9 (1949).
165. NSC 83/1 NSC Staff Study on 'The Position of the United States Regarding Irish Membership in NATO and Military Assistance to Ireland Under a Bilateral Arrangement' 17 October 1950.
166. See Dillon, Dail Debates 99:2179 (1946) albeit in Opposition at the time.
167. E. de Valera, ibid 120:723-6 (1950).
168. E. de Valera, Interview with United Press International, see Eire-Ireland - Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, No.208 9 November 1953.
169. Aiken in letter to Francis P. Matthews, US Legation in Dublin, 24 December 1951 SPO S15231 A.
170. O'Higgins, Dail Debates 119:884 (1950).
171. F.S.L. Lyons, op.cit. p.590.
172. For an excellent account of this episode see Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Problems of Wartime Cooperation and Postwar Change (London, Oxford University Press, 1958) pp.262-304.
173. The American Legation certainly felt this, see Chapin to Acheson 4 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC. See also F.S.L. Lyons op.cit. p.590.
174. General Mulcahy, Dail Debates 104:441-4 (1947).
175. Dillon, ibid 101:2186-2190 (1946). See also 104:471 (1947) and 106:2388 (1947). Coogan occasionally spoke in a similar vein 102:1341 and 1388-9 (1946) and 104:557-9 (1947). See also 'Ireland and the Atlantic Pact', Round Table Vol. XXXIX No.155 (June 1949) pp.214-220.
176. So too was Patrick McGilligan as Minister for Finance. On 1 November 1948 he circulated privately to Fine Gael colleagues in Cabinet a memorandum in which he recommended joining the Brussels treaty and entering negotiations with the Commonwealth on mutual defence. Patrick McGilligan Papers, University College Dublin Archives, P35/c/185. I am grateful to Professor Raymond Raymond for bringing this to my attention.
177. E. de Valera, Dail Debates, 110:911-2 (1948).

178. E. de Valera, ibid 122:1831-40 (1950).
179. E. de Valera, ibid 152:548 (1955).
180. E. De Valera, New York, 3 April 1948 in Moynihan op.cit. pp.501-2, and see Dail Debates 120:712 (1950).
181. See Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1983) pp.17, 48-50, 55, 61-2 and 77-8. Graded members would be able to remain neutral until their partners determined their belligerency would be more helpful.
182. Report of meeting between J.J. Hearne, Irish High Commissioner, and Pearson, Canadian Under-Secretary on 14 April 1948 - see SPO S14291 A/1.
183. The relevant State Paper Office files SPO S14291, S14291 A/1, and S14291 A/2 contain only apart from speeches and press cuttings the Hearne report of the Pearson warning.
184. Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs' in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), Conor Cruise O'Brien Introduces Ireland, (London, Deutsch, 1969) pp.124-5, emphasis in original. F.S.L. Lyons, op.cit. p.592 suggests they "might" have.
185. Garrett reporting to Hickerson at the State Department said that Archbishop MacQuaid thought it worth approaching Costello, 11 February 1949. Decimal File of the Department of State 840.20/2 - 1149, National Archives Building, Washington D.C.
186. Garrett to Acheson 12 April 1949 RG84 Box 703 WNRC. He also reported not all of Fianna Fail were happy with the Irish position.
187. Chapin to Acheson 4 March 1949 RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
188. The two Clann na Poblachta ministers were MacBride whom Akenson has described as 'an Anglophobe' - Akenson op.cit. p.122 - and Lyons as one of the "die-hard republicans", F.S.L. Lyons op.cit. p.560, and Dr. Noel Browne who in latter years vehemently opposed Irish entry to the European Community because it was, amongst other things, a threat to neutrality.
189. See 1927 debate contribution by Johnson, Labour Leader, Dail Debates 18:625-640 (1927).
190. Round Table, 'Ireland and the Atlantic Pact', op.cit. p.216.
191. O'Brien, op.cit. pp.123-7, and see also Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations op.cit. p.92.
192. For this aide-mémoire, and the further aide-mémoires of 8 February, 25 May and 3 June 1949, and a verbal reply to the Irish Minister in Washington on 31 March 1949 see: Texts Concerning Ireland's Position in relation to The North Atlantic Treaty : Presented to Both Houses of the Oireachtas by the Minister for External Affairs on 26 April 1950 (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1950 - P.No.9934). Hereafter Texts re N.A.T. The U.S. aide-mémoire is at pp.3-4.
193. The Irish aide-mémoire of 8 February 1949, ibid pp.4-7.
194. Verbal reply to Irish Minister in Washington, Nunan, on 31 March 1949, ibid p.7.

195. See, for example, Garrett to Acheson, 24 May 1949 RG84 Box 703 WNRC; Acheson memorandum of conversation with MacBride 11 April 1949 RG84 Box 703 WNRC and; memorandums of conversations of 13 March 1951 MacBride and Acheson, and 23 March 1951 MacBride, Acheson and Truman in Acheson Papers, Box 66 Truman Library.
For some of the background see Garrett to Acheson 2 February 1949 RG84 Box 702, Chapin to Acheson 4 March 1949, Garrett to Acheson 18 March 1949, Garrett to Acheson 21 March 1949, Hickerson to Garrett 14 April 1949 and Garrett to Acheson 8 April 1949 all in RG84 Box 703 WNRC, and Garrett to Hickerson 11 February 1949, Decimal File of the Department of State 840.20/2-449, National Archives Building, Washington D.C.
196. The Irish presence was noted by the Irish press, see Garrett to Acheson 5 April 1949 RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
197. Irish aide-memoire 25 May 1949, Texts re NAT op.cit. pp.8-10, emphasis added.
198. U.S. aide-memoire 3 June 1949, ibid pp.10-11.
199. The French were initially opposed, the Belgians reluctant and the U.S. 'neutral' about agreeing, see Ranney-Wapler, Counselor, French Embassy, memorandum of conversation 13 September 1949 RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
200. Raymond James Raymond, 'Irish neutrality : ideology or pragmatism', International Affairs Vol.60 No.1 (Winter 1983/4) pp.36-9.
201. J.J. Hearne, Irish High Commissioner in response to Pearson, 14 April 1948 SPO S14291 A/1.
202. O'Higgins, Dail Debates 113:1341 (1948).
203. MacBride, ibid 112:903 ff (1948).
204. E. de Valera, ibid 112:931 (1948).
205. Garrett to Acheson, 2 February 1949 RG84 Box 702 WNRC.
206. CIA SR-48 op.cit. p.15.
207. Garrett to Acheson, 18 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
208. Irish Press, 23 April 1949 SPO S14291.
209. Irish Independent, 9 April 1949, ibid.
210. O'Higgins, Dail Debates 120:590-1 (1950).
211. E. de Valera, Press conference 18 June 1951 SPO S14291 A/2.
212. E. de Valera, Statement, 16 March 1951, ibid.
213. Both Irish Times and Irish Independent on 22 March 1949 carried this report, ibid.
214. Chapin to Acheson on 4 and 21 March 1949; and Garrett to Acheson on 18 and 21 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
215. NSC Staff Study NSC 83/1 17 October 1950 op.cit.
216. See, for example, Brigadier O. Gowan addressing Literary and Philosophical Society, University College, Cork, reported in Irish Times 19 February 1951, SPO S14291; and see Round Table 'Ireland and the Atlantic Pact' op.cit.

217. Raymond Raymond op.cit. pp.39-40.
218. Norton, Dail Debates, 102:1350 (1946).
219. E. de Valera, ibid 101:2448 (1946).
220. MacBride to Garrett 19 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
221. Acheson memorandum of conversation with MacBride, 11 April 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
222. MacBride, Dail Debates 136:1170 (1953).
223. MacBride, ibid 122:1603-4 (1950).
224. Raymond Raymond, op.cit. pp.39-40.
225. Round Table, 'Ireland and the Atlantic Pact' op.cit. p.216.
226. Cogan, Dail Debates 117:999 (1949).
227. This view was put very strongly by Chapin to Acheson, 4 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
228. Despite Patrick McGilligan's memorandum of 1 November 1948 - see above footnote 175.
229. Senators Douglas and Butler, and Professor Tierney.
230. E. de Valera, Associated Press Interview, 2 April 1952, in response to a specific question as to why Ireland could participate in some but not other organizations - SPO S14291 A/2.
231. For MacBride's contributions and the debate generally on these issues see, Dail Debates 111:1979-2077 (1948) and 117:694-716 and 741-8 (1949).
232. MacBride in the Seanad debate on The Hague Congress, Seanad Debates 35:809 ff (1948). See also Dail Debates 111:1989 and 2067 (1948), 117:694 (1949) and 122:1590-1607 (1950).
233. See p.272 above.
234. E. de Valera, Dail Debates, 152:548-550 (1955), and see also 120:1608 (1950), and 117:707-711 (1949).
235. See, for example, Gerald Boland in Official Report of Debates : Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, Sixth Ordinary Session (Third Part) Vol.VI, 1954, p.933 (Hereafter Cons.Ass.Debates).
236. Miriam Hederman, The Road to Europe : Irish Attitudes 1948-61, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1983) p.36 and passim for a general review of Irish attitudes to Europe. Aiken, incidentally, welcomed the Schuman initiative, although he did not believe in the "sector approach". Cons.Ass.Debates Second Session 19th Sitting 1950, pp.1030-2.
237. It became known as the "sore thumb" policy, see F.S.L. Lyons op.cit. p.591, and Paul-Henri Spaak's distaste for it, Cons. Ass.Debates, Part One, 1st Sitting 1949, p.238.
238. Norton, ibid 1st Session 2nd Sitting.
239. E. De Valera, ibid 1st Session 2nd Sitting. Hederman, op.cit. p.37 argues MacBride would have voted differently, but offers no evidence.

240. Although Oliver J. Flanagan spoke against the idea in the Dail, arguing for neutrality, Dail Debates 138:813-7 (1953). See also A.H. Robertson, The Council of Europe, (London, Stevens and Sons, 1961, 2nd ed.) pp.46-7 and Report of the Committee of Ministers, 1951, Documents 1951, Doc.5, and Documents of the Assembly 1950 Part II Doc.4 and Part III Doc.8.
241. For an example of a rare mention see Dail Debates 128:549 (1951).
242. Hederman, op.cit. pp.38 and 47.
243. Boland, Cons.Ass.Debates, Sixth Ordinary Session (Third Part) Vol.VI December 1954, p.932.
244. Crosbie, ibid pp.958-9.
245. Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, op.cit. p.29.
246. Michael Macdonagh, 'Ireland's Attitude to External Affairs', Studies Vol.48 (1959) p.78.
247. Idem.
248. Douglas Gageby, 'The Media' in J.J. Lee, Ireland 1945-70, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1979) p.129.
249. Costello, Montreal speech, 1 September 1948 in J.A. Costello, Ireland in International Affairs, (Dublin, Monument Press, 1948) pp.28-9.
250. E. de Valera, Dail Debates 152:547 (1955).
251. MacBride, ibid 152:557 (1955).
252. O'Higgins, ibid 102:1405 (1946).
253. MacBride, ibid 152:554-5 (1955).
254. Capt. Cowan, ibid 136:2070 (1953) and 139:370 ff (1953).
255. Capt. Gowan, idem.
256. Blowick, ibid 138:749 (1953).
257. Desmond, ibid 152:563 (1955).
258. Kyne, ibid 139:437 (1953).
259. MacBride, Seanad Debates, 35:804 (1948) and Dail Debates 136:1170 (1953).
260. E. d Valera, Dail Debates, 122:1831-40 (1950).
261. Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984) p.22.
262. MacBride to Garrett 19 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC.
263. Capt. Giles, Dail Debates, 110:855 (1948) and 125:1811-2 (1951). See also O'Higgins 110:719 (1948), Collins 120:617 (1950), and Dillon 138:817 (1953).
264. McQuillan, ibid 152:575-6 (1955).
265. Garrett to Acheson, reporting conversation with MacBride on 18 March 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC, and Acheson memorandum of conversation with MacBride 11 April 1949, RG84 Box 703 WNRC. See also MacBride in the Dail, Dail Debates 152:557 (1955) and Costello in Costello, op.cit. pp.28-9.

266. T. Desmond Williams, 'Conclusion', in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.204.
267. O'Brien, op.cit. p.104.
268. See Dail Debates 97:2568-75 (1946).
269. Hillery, ibid 260:384 ff (1972).
270. T. Desmond Williams, 'Conclusion', in Nowlan and Williams op.cit. p.204.
271. Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.113.
272. E. de Valera used this expression at least twice, see Dail Debates 115:808-17 (1949) and Press conference 18 June 1951 in SPO S14291 A/2, whilst MacBride in an important Dail speech used the phrase "As long as" - 114:323-6 (1949).

Chapter Eight : 'Bloody Mavericks'¹ or Partners? 1956-1972

The quiescence of Irish policy in the mid-fifties was shattered by Irish entry into the United Nations in December 1955 and the concomitant need to work out "nothing less than the basic principle on which our policy towards the outside world is to be based".² Within a few years this task was exacerbated by additional questions arising from the need to take a view on the possible nature of different relationships with the European Economic Community (EEC) and upon the obligations which might follow any relationship. In addition, the embryonic concept of nonalignment was attractive to some Irish minds,³ and combined with the legacy of neutrality, required to be taken into account. Consequently, the period 1956-1972 saw a renewal of debate and of the need for decision regarding the foundations of Irish policy. Further questioning arose with the eruption of "the troubles" in Northern Ireland in 1968-9.

(i) due diligence

In the spring of 1964 the General Staff's postwar plan was described as "archaic" since in "no year since that plan was formulated have we had or were we ever in reach of having the number of men envisaged".⁴ Throughout the period the overall shortfall between number of men and the peacetime establishment of 12,915 averaged 33%, with an average of 13% for officers and 37% for other ranks.⁵ In the period 1956-1972 the figures were:

Table 8.1 Number of Officers and men in the Permanent Defence Force in each year 1956-1972 and the percentage shortfall in each year compared to peacetime establishment of 12,915

<u>Year</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>
Numbers	8735	8846	8130	9188	8965	8868	8451	8449	8221
% Shortfall	32	31	37	29	31	31	35	35	36
<u>Year</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	
Numbers	8199	8159	8331	8312	8232	8574	8663	9932	
% Shortfall	36.5	37	35	36	36	34	33	33	

Sources: Derived from:

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1958, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1958 - Pr.4564), Table 222, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1953-58' p.230.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1962, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1962 - Pr.6571), Table 247, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1957-62', p.259.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1967, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1967 - Pr.9587), Table 234, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1962-67', p.266.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1974 - Pr.1974), Table 227, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1966-71, p.275.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1974 and 1975, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1977 - Pr.6072), Table 220, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March, 1970-75', p.235.

By their own criterion the Irish failed to provide enough men for the P.D.F. Whilst ministers bemoaned the shortfall,⁶ to some extent it was a matter of policy since the general ethos was that defence was only

"one of many State services" and that "if more is given to one, the others must do with less - unless, of course, extra revenue can be procured".⁷ By 1971 every one thousand men cost a flm.,⁸ and certainly the Irish felt that "small countries such as ours are forced by circumstances to do with the military forces they can maintain".⁹

The smallness of the P.D.F. created a number of problems given that there were hardly enough to cope with day to day tasks, especially given periodic periods of internment duty and border patrols.¹⁰ Moreover, the number of men actually available for patrols at certain times was only a part of the overall total.¹¹ Furthermore, the numbers in Ireland were further depleted by Irish contributions to United Nations' peace-keeping operations, despite doubts as to whether the dwindling army could meet such commitments.¹² For certain periods between 1960 and 1965 the figures for personnel abroad and personnel in Ireland were:

Table 8.2 Numbers serving with United Nations at certain times 1960-1965, this as a percentage of P.D.F. total, and total in Ireland as of preceding 31 March

<u>Date</u>	<u>U.N. Commitment</u>	<u>Total of Irish Involved</u>	<u>% of total PDF</u>	<u>Number in Ireland</u>
August '60 - January '61	Organisation des Nations Unies du Congo (ONUC)	1395	15.5	7570
May '61	ONUC	988	11	7880
December '61 - May '62	ONUC	715	8	8153
May '62 - November '62	ONUC	723	8.5	7728
November '62 - April '63	ONUC	826	9.75	7625
August '64 - October '64	United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1005	12.2	7216
April '65 - July '65	UNFICYP	1044	12.7	7155

Source: Derived from:

Capt. J. Sheehan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d), Appendix B 'Record of Unit Service with United Nations' pp.79-80 and Table 8.1 above

Whilst the percentage might seem small, the more significant figure is the number left in Ireland which was generally lower than the insufficient strength of the period 1945-1955, and of those left in Ireland a similar number to those abroad were preparing to go abroad. In 1964 Tully asked whether the army left in the country was "in position to carry out duties for which intended or are we slowly proving that ... we do not need an Army?".¹³ The official reply was that U.N. service provided valuable experience for an army which had not seen action for over a generation.¹⁴ In all some 3934 Irishmen served in ONUC and somewhat more in UNFICYP.¹⁵

In addition, between 1956 and 1972 the First Line Reserve numbered only between 5128 in 1957 and 1333 in 1972, whilst the Second Line Reserve numbered between a high of 21,033 in 1960 and a low of 17,623 in 1972.¹⁶ With regard to the latter only half trained regularly,¹⁷ so consequently for most of the period the Irish had some 20-22,000 reasonably effective and trained troops. This was, again, well below their own planning assumptions. A comment on Irish defence force size was that with "the troubles" in Northern Ireland, elements of the First and Second Line Reserve had to be called-up for guard duty.¹⁸

Part of the explanation for the scale of the Irish defence effort was a general sense of inadequacy. Replying to criticisms of cutbacks in the 1956 Defence Vote for 1956-7, General MacEoin, the Minister, argued that "to defend this small island would require nearly as much if not more defensive equipment than Britain requires to defend itself".¹⁹

Given this attitude and the constant emphasis upon living "within our means",²⁰ not surprisingly little was done. The general pattern was one of declining resources in real terms being allocated to defence, and of even less of government spending going to defence than had been the case in 1948-55 period.

Table 8.3 Irish Defence Expenditure Totals, and as a percentage of total supply services and Gross National Product, 1956-1972

	<u>1956</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>
Defence Expenditure (£m.)	6.494	6.355	6.094	6.090	6.591	7.108
% of Total Supply Service	6.1	5.8	5.5	5.4	5.7	5.6
% GNP	1.16	1.10	1.01	0.96	0.98	0.98
	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Defence Expenditure (£m.)	7.459	8.235	8.505	11.396	11.910	10.418
% of Total Supply Service	5.2	5.2	4.9	5.5	5.2	4.2
% GNP	0.96	0.98	0.90	1.12	1.11	0.97
	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	
Defence Expenditure (£m.)	11.184	12.212	14.184	18.681	19.165	
% of Total Supply Service	4.0	3.7	3.7	4.1	3.9	
% GNP	0.84	0.82	0.85	0.98	0.84	

Sources: Derived from:

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1958, (Pr.4564) Table 239 Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services, 1952-58 ... in each year ended 31 March, p.245.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1962, (Pr.6571) Table 251 Gross National Product at Current and Constant Market Prices, 1953-61, p.266; Table 263 Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services, 1956-62 ... p.274.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1967, (Pr.9587) Table 238 Gross National Product ... 1958-66, p.273; Table 250 Issues from the Exchequer for

Supply Services, 1961-67, pp.280-1.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71, (Pr1.1974) Table 231 Gross National Product ..., 1965-70, p.281; Table 243 Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services, 1965-71, pp.288-9.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1974 and 1975, (Pr1.6072) Table 224 Gross National Product ..., 1968-1975 p.241; Table 236 Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services, 1968-1974 p.252.

This level of effort did attract internal criticism. Whilst official policy emphasised the continuing deterrent basis of Irish policy, that the more force an aggressor had to use or contemplate using, the "more likely we will retain our neutrality",²¹ that the "hostilities that might affect us would be only part of a much larger scheme", and that Ireland "can still even be neutral" given there was no reason why a great power should "suddenly single out this island for annihilation",²² senior backbenchers and future Ministers for Defence argued there was "no real defence",²³ and that to "talk about our having any defence at all is a joke. We have a small Army which probably is adequate to quell a civil commotion ... That is all we have ...".²⁴ In the mid-sixties some felt there was little need for a traditional army, wanting the P.D.F. to become a "sort of auxiliary to the Garda",²⁵ or the amalgamation of the Justice and Defence Departments.²⁶ Whilst this was a minority view, it reflected widespread doubts about the strength and role of the P.D.F.

Generally it was accepted "there must be an army",²⁷ and according to official policy its size and role was "not calculated" upon the premise of "participating in world war" but rather "merely to defend our territory against occupation as far as that is possible". In 1957 four roles were identified for the P.D.F., namely the maintenance of internal security; as far as possible to prevent occupation by others;

warning of attacks and; if possible, assistance in civil defence. The preservation and upholding of neutrality per se was not a specific role, although it was argued that the ability to perform the stated roles would help in the retention of neutrality.²⁸ For most of the period the stress was upon the P.D.F. as the "protector of sovereignty and independence",²⁹ and "territorial integrity".³⁰ These responsibilities were not to be left to others.³¹ Subsequently other roles were added, such as contributing to U.N. peace-keeping and fishery protection.³² As the emphasis changed somewhat, it did not result in according the requirements of neutrality higher priority but rather the needs of internal security priority, so that by 1972 it was argued that "the primary role of the Army is the defence of the State against external aggression and helping the Civil Power ...".³³ A difficulty for the Irish was that whilst they recognized that it "would be unreasonable to expect the Great Powers to allow a military vacuum to develop here",³⁴ this recognition was not translated into operational policy and resources.

Reflecting, for example, financial constraints was the problem of equipment, an area in which it was repeatedly stressed Irish efforts had to be "within our resources".³⁵ One argument was that in the nuclear age, Ireland could not compete, its equipment being as obsolete "as the bow and arrow",³⁶ and another was the cost of up-dating that equipment. In fact Irish shortcomings regarding equipment were revealed during U.N. service in the Congo, when Irish forces were able to compare their equipment with others.³⁷ This led to the purchase of small arms and F.N. submachine gun.³⁸ But problems persisted with the lack of modern equipment for training the reserves³⁹ and a lack of suitable transport and communication systems for the P.D.F.⁴⁰ In 1970 the youngest truck in the Curragh military base was 15 years old,⁴¹ and

many of the other vehicles were thin-skinned. The "troubles" in Northern Ireland led to Supplementary Estimates for additional equipment and transport. In 1971 it was £1.7m., namely 10% of the original Estimate,⁴² and in 1972 £1.985m., an additional 11½%.⁴³ This was hardly sufficient to offset "the extra costs of inflation".⁴⁴

These general problems had a specific impact upon the Air Corps and the Naval Service. The Air Corps was unable to stop incursions into Irish air-space, and most notably in 1971 failed to do anything when an R.A.F. Canberra flew in Irish air-space for an hour, approached within 20 miles of Dublin and flew over crucial communication lines around Mount Oriel.⁴⁵ Such was the Air Corps' condition that in 1971 Mark Clinton asked whether it was "to remain in existence?" although he felt it should.⁴⁶ It allegedly had four roles - military, Aer Lingus training, aerial surveys for Ordnance Survey and responsibility for helicopters⁴⁷ - but was too ill-equipped for any substantial role and there was little the 48 pilots could do to protect Ireland.⁴⁸

There was little similarly the Naval Service could do with its 3 Corvettes. In 1957 the Minister had to admit that whilst the defence plan provided for seaward defence, the naval service was not geared for that role and was merely protecting Irish fisheries.⁴⁹ Despite this, the 3 corvettes remained the Naval Service until 1968-1971 when they were withdrawn from service.⁵⁰ Clearly they could not perform their official roles of anti-submarine patrols, mine-sweeping, seaward defence of the ports, control of maritime activities within Irish territorial waters, fishery protection and the protection of ships,⁵¹ nor the official principal rationale, namely that if Ireland "had not a Naval Service some other country would claim to be protecting our waters" and thereby influence the traffic to Irish ports.⁵²

The Corvettes were increasingly aging, slow and unreliable.⁵³

Their retention was in marked contrast to the view of Traynor in 1956 that if Ireland wished to demonstrate its sincerity about neutrality it should purchase a new vessel every year for ten years.⁵⁴ The problem was that by 1965-8 it was estimated the cost would be between £1-1.4m. for each vessel, so that 10 would have cost more than one year's total budget for defence.⁵⁵

In 1969, given a combination of condition of vessels and inadequate numbers of personnel, at one stage not one Naval Service vessel was capable of being put to sea, and the Irish had to rely upon an unarmed fishery research vessel.⁵⁶ This situation was repeated in the spring of 1970.⁵⁷ Little wonder that a Minister, a few years earlier, had to admit he was not satisfied the Naval Service would be of any real use in an emergency.⁵⁸ In 1971 3 coastal minesweepers built in the mid-fifties were purchased from Britain,⁵⁹ and in May 1972 the Naval Service took delivery of a purpose built fishery protection vessel, the Deirdre.⁶⁰ Subsequently further efforts were made, but generally between 1956 and 1972 the Naval Service was a "joke".⁶¹

In this period the Irish again failed to meet either their own criteria of adequate defence and the requirements of 'due diligence'. Moreover, at the time of crisis in Northern Ireland in 1969-70, the P.D.F. was unprepared. For example, in the two years ended 31 March 1972 there were 88 known border incursions by the British Army into the Republic,⁶² and by February 1972 27 confirmed overflights.⁶³ Whilst the Dublin government protested, little positive was actually done despite a recognition that some incursions were "deliberate".⁶⁴ In addition, in the winter of 1970-71 the British boarded a number of Irish vessels in Carlingford Lough, looking for arms. Whilst some TDs called for "defensive measures to protect Irish vessels", and the

deployment of Irish naval vessels to the area,⁶⁵ a government minister dismissed such ideas as "empty gestures".⁶⁶ In an Adjournment Debate, Richie Ryan argued Irish vessels were "entitled to the full protection of the military forces" of the State, and called "if necessary" for "armed forces aboard Irish vessels", ready to arrest and intern "troops who forcibly enter Irish vessels or Irish soil".⁶⁷ The government preferred the "velvet glove approach" and did not use the recently acquired British minesweepers for action.⁶⁸ There was a clear failure to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of the state, and more generally, as will be discussed under variable (vi), a clear inability to intervene militarily in the North.

(ii) recognition of position by others

Apart from the establishment of a United Nations mission in January 1956, entry into the U.N. did not produce any expansion of Irish diplomatic representation. Subsequent modest expansion appears to have been predominantly influenced by trade considerations.⁶⁹ In the mid-60s the pattern of Irish representation was challenged, particularly by the Irish Labour Party, which drew attention to the vacuum regarding Eastern Europe.⁷⁰ Trade seems to have influenced them, although the official position was that the "volume of trade does not warrant cost of formal diplomatic representation".⁷¹ Some in Fine Gael not only derided the trade argument, but argued also that the Soviets represented the antithesis of everything the Irish believed, so that the Irish should not "suckle the Russian bear".⁷² Labour representatives did introduce the question: "How can we suggest that we are neutral? What is the meaning of neutrality if we have no diplomatic relations with the damned on the other side?",⁷³ but when the situation did change, with diplomatic relations being established in 1973, it appears to have been more to do with Irish entry into the European Community and trade,

rather than considerations of neutrality.

On the Soviet side, in 1959 they accused the Irish of not being independent agents, but of acting as tools and agents of another country.⁷⁴ The following year they opposed the election of F.H. Boland for the Presidency of the General Assembly, their candidate being from Poland, "the West's was from Ireland".⁷⁵ Later, it appears that the Soviets did not send the Irish a Note indicating that they regarded membership of the European Community as incompatible with neutrality, although Finland, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland did receive such Notes.⁷⁶

During this period the Irish did not participate in either the first nonaligned summit at Belgrade nor subsequent nonaligned meetings. In June 1961 the Dáil was twice told that no invitation to Belgrade had been received, but it is unclear whether President Sukarno of Indonesia had made informal soundings on a visit to Dublin earlier in the year.⁷⁷ The lack of Irish participation and invitation is revealing about the perception of the Irish position. In the following year, moreover, the Irish supported the American position during the Cuban missile crisis, and did not participate in meetings of what Aiken referred to as 45 "unaligned" and "Afro-Asian states".⁷⁸ Many in Ireland were suspicious of the nonaligned movement, seeing behind it "Communist sympathizers".⁷⁹

Evidence of a more positive perception of the Irish position is provided by the invitations to contribute to the peace-keeping forces established by the United Nations, suggesting a view of Ireland as having "no ties, commitments or obligations to any other nation or group of nations", as neutral and, therefore, acceptable.⁸⁰ Certainly Irish politicians perceived it in this light.⁸¹ Similarly Conor Cruise O'Brien has postulated that Dag Hammarskjöld chose him to be the

Representative of the United Nations in Katanga, because the choice narrowed "to a European neutral".⁸² Some in Ireland saw similar perceptions behind Boland's election to the General Assembly Presidency in 1960 and Ireland's election to the Security Council in 1962.⁸³

In fact, the claims associated with acceptability for peace-keeping are highly tendentious. MacQueen has argued that Ireland only superficially met the criteria regarding so-called "middle powers", and that the "middle power" argument is itself based on a "misinterpretation", since at crucial junctures the U.N. itself "was not politically neutral between East and West".⁸⁴ Moreover, an examination of major participants in U.N. peace-keeping and observer missions up to 1970 reveals that out of 12 operations, the contributors were: Sweden 10, Canada 9, Denmark 8, Ireland 7, Norway 7, and India, Italy, Netherlands and New Zealand 6 each. Six of the nine were alliance members. Out of the total list of participants, only Yugoslavia "could be said to be identifiably non-western", whilst nearly all NATO members, but no Warsaw Pact states took part.⁸⁵ MacQueen concludes that, contrary to Irish conventional wisdom, peace-keeping was "a western conception", a conception, moreover, viewed with suspicion by the communists.⁸⁶ Peace-keeping participation was not a world imprimatur of independent position, but only a few in Ireland recognized this.

Only a minority, for example, argued that participation in Organisation des Nations Unies du Congo (ONUC) could involve a sacrifice of Ireland's alleged "non-committed" standing, since it might be regarded as supporting colonialism.⁸⁷ Interestingly, MacQueen observes that the Congo experience demonstrated "the fundamental differences in perspective and interests between the Afro-Asian small powers and those of Western Europe".⁸⁸

Perceptions of Ireland may also have been influenced by Irish behaviour and pronouncements at the U.N. itself. O'Brien argues, for example, that while initially regarded as "Absolutely safe on straight East-West issues",⁸⁹ a change occurred in 1957 when Aiken became minister, firstly with his statement on disengagement in Europe and secondly, and more importantly, in the vote to allow a discussion of the question of Chinese representation.⁹⁰ This latter, according to O'Brien, was regarded as a reliable indicator of votes on a range of issues,⁹¹ and led to a perception of Ireland as one of "the bloody mavericks".⁹² O'Brien argues that this only lasted four years, given that in 1961 the Irish voted for a different American formula, so that observers could subsequently predict that Ireland "would now be aligned with ... the United States. In this expectation these observers were not disappointed".⁹³ There is other evidence (discussed under variable (iv) below) that the Irish position, or at least alignment, did change about this time.

Those attempting to discern the true nature of the Irish position had the additional problem of confronting divergent Irish statements regarding Irish views. For example, early in 1960 the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass drew "important distinctions" between the Afro-Asians who refused to take a position on East-West issues and stressed anti-colonialism, and the "'independent' countries such as Sweden and Ireland" who wished to judge according to the criteria of the Charter.⁹⁴ In October of the same year, however, Aiken as Minister for External Affairs spoke to the General Assembly of the role, "we smaller ... independent ... uncommitted countries, call us what you will ... We, the recently emerged ...", could play.⁹⁵ A year later, Aiken denied using the word 'uncommitted' claiming he had stressed Ireland was 'independent'.⁹⁶ This ambiguity of view was present in the Irish U.N.

delegation itself, so that although "all important matters" were decided by the Chairman of the delegation, there were variations in the Irish position according to committee, issue and representation.⁹⁷

Adding to the problems was the manner in which the Irish distanced themselves from the Afro-Asians on certain aspects of the colonial, South African and Rhodesian questions. Whilst given their history, the Irish knew "what imperialism is and what resistance to it involves",⁹⁸ they believed in gradualism and preparation for self-government,⁹⁹ so that peoples should not "immediately and without preparation of any kind" be "thrown on their own resources", since this might lead to "tyranny and exploitation",¹⁰⁰ although the principle of self-determination "ought to be the great master principle by which this Assembly should be guided ..".¹⁰¹

There was a depreciation of the Afro-Asians "proposing unrealistic resolutions".¹⁰² Given their memory of the Italian case, the Irish also had doubts as to the efficacy of sanctions. Although the Irish complied with the mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia and prohibited arms sales to South Africa, this was not done with any confidence.¹⁰³ Fundamentally, the Irish would have preferred "separate vote(s) on the contentious issues" but the denial of this led them not to support a number of resolutions.¹⁰⁴

Perceptual difficulties were exacerbated by the 1961 decision to apply for membership of the EEC, particularly given that on this issue "Ireland definitely parted company with the European neutrals".¹⁰⁵ This was clearly recognized in Europe. In February 1963 the EEC Commission referred to "the three neutral countries" as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland and dealt with Ireland in another context,¹⁰⁶ whilst in 1962-3 the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in examining the problem of the relationship between neutrals and the Community made

no mention of Ireland in its committee analyses and reports. Ireland was not cited as an example of a neutral which had been able to reconcile neutrality and membership.¹⁰⁷ In fact, few European politicians argued this.¹⁰⁸ One exception was Maurice Schumann, the French Foreign Minister, who argued it was "wrong to say that joining the Community involved a change in Ireland's neutral policy" on the grounds that the Community was purely economic.¹⁰⁹ More generally, there was hostility to neutral membership since it implied dilution of the political objectives of the Community.

The distinction between Ireland and 'the three neutral countries' was perceived by some in Ireland, who concluded Irish "so-called neutrality is a joke and a joke in poor taste".¹¹⁰ There were queries as to why the Irish government was not coordinating its approach with that of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland to "ensure that in common Ireland may ensure her neutrality in future".¹¹¹ The answer was that it was not deemed useful to coordinate policy with non-applicants,¹¹² and moreover, Ireland had "no traditional policy of neutrality ... like countries such as Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, who have declared themselves to have permanent policies of neutrality". Rather, in the Irish case, it was for the Dáil to decide "in the light of the circumstances prevailing" at the time.¹¹³

(iii) disavowal of help

The Irish position and debate on this variable remained little changed from the previous period. Other arguments arose in connection with the nature of Ireland's relationship to the European Community, and will be dealt with in the following section dealing with freedom of decision and action.¹¹⁴ Mostly they concerned the extent Ireland would have to help others, not the situation vice versa.

What did emerge with respect to 'disavowal of help', however, was an explicit admission by the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass, in 1962 that it would be highly undesirable to give the impression that the Irish regarded NATO membership as discreditable, since "the existence of NATO is necessary for the preservation of peace and for the defence of the countries of Western Europe, including this country". Although we are not members of NATO, we are in full agreement with its aims".¹¹⁵ Richard Burke in 1969 berated those who found it convenient to be derogatory about NATO, since the Irish at times, "were very glad of its umbrella of protection".¹¹⁶ Some backbenchers continued to assume, given the lack of Irish 'due diligence', that the Irish system must be based upon cooperation with both Britain and America in the event of an attack.¹¹⁷ It was argued the Irish would be unwise to cut themselves off completely from cooperative planning, since if hostilities commenced Ireland would undoubtedly be part of the general scheme of the defence of Western Europe.¹¹⁸ Official policy was to disavow such reasoning, and during this period there was no apparent question of an alliance or defence arrangement, nor of any deals on the basis of 'neutrality/unity'.¹¹⁹

What did arise was the vexed question of foreign military bases.¹²⁰ The government denied such possibilities and strongly denied in 1962 a specific rumour that they were considering a proposal to allow American bases in Ireland in exchange for the freedom of Northern Ireland.¹²¹ What did occur was the landing of a significant number of foreign military airplanes at Shannon, and between 1 January - 20 July 1967, there were 167 such landings with aircraft from the United States, Canada, France, West Germany, Belgium, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia.¹²² Whilst not definitive evidence, it is suggestive of an Irish informal orientation.

In general, however, the Irish remained against foreign military bases be it on Irish soil or on the soil of other nations. Frank Aiken spoke out repeatedly on this issue at the U.N., for example, in his disengagement proposal of 1957,¹²³ and in his so-called 'areas of law' proposals.¹²⁴ He was particularly critical of the Cubans in 1962, arguing that instead of introducing new foreign bases into the area, the Cubans should have followed the Irish example of "under no circumstances" allowing "our country to be used as a base for attack against our neighbour ...".¹²⁵

(iv) freedom of decision and action

Despite many years of official policy and rhetoric, Ireland had not attained economic self-sufficiency. It remained a very open economy, still "extremely dependent on foreign trade",¹²⁶ and this dependency increased in the period 1956-1972, as is shown in Table 8.4.

Table 8.4 Ireland : Foreign Trade Dependence 1955-1972, as a percentage of GNP at current factor cost

	<u>Merchandise Exports</u>	<u>Merchandise Imports</u>	<u>Exports of Goods and Services</u>	<u>Imports of Goods and Services</u>
1955	22.8	42.7	37.2	44.5
1960	25.9	38.4	39.8	39.9
1965	27.2	43.7	39.7	45
1970	32.4	47 ^a	46.2	50.7 ^a
1972	33.8	44.1	44	46.9

^a Distorted by exceptional imports of aircraft.

Source: From: T.K. Whitaker, 'Monetary Integration : Reflections on Irish Experience', Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland (Winter)1973 p.69.

Such dependence had a decisive effect upon Irish economic choice,¹²⁷ and was exacerbated by the continuing "monetary union in the form of a fixed link between the Irish pound and sterling", so that the Irish devalued at the same time and by the same amount as the British.¹²⁸ Although the significance to Ireland of the United Kingdom declined somewhat between 1956 and 1972, it remained extraordinarily high as can be seen in Table 8.5.

Table 8.5 Trade by areas in selected years as a percentage of total imports and total exports

	<u>1956*</u>	<u>1961</u> (1st application to EEC)	<u>1967</u> (2nd application to EEC)	<u>1969</u> (Revitalized application)	<u>1972</u> (Last Year before entry)
% Imports from:					
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	57.8	50.8	50.2	52.6	51.0
Rest of EFTA*	n/a	3.2	3.8	5.8	6.7
EEC members*	11	13.5	14.6	15.6	17.5
Dollar Countries	10.9	10.2	10.8	10.8	9.1
Eastern Europe	<1	1	1½	1	1
% Exports to:					
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	76.2	74.3	72.1	65.4	60.8
Rest of EFTA*	n/a	1	1.1	1.7	2.4
EEC members*	9	6.3	8.5	11.1	16.8
Dollar Countries	3.5	9.1	10.8	12.5	12.0
Eastern Europe	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1

* For 1956 the figures are for trade with the eventual member states of EFTA and EEC

n/a Figures not available in Statistical Abstract

Sources: Derived from:

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1958, (Pr.4564) Table 114 Value of

Imports from each of the Principal Countries and, Table 115 Value of Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.135; and Table 121 Trade by Monetary Areas p.139.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1962, (Pr.6571) Table 131 Value of Imports from each of the Principal Countries and Table 132 Value of Total Export consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.155; and Table 138 Trade by Areas p.159.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1969, (Pr.1101) Table 123 Value of Imports from each of the Principal Countries and, Table 124 Value of Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.149; and Table 130 Trade by Areas p.153.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71, (Pr1.1974) Table 118 Value of Imports from each of the Principal Countries and Table 119 Value of Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal countries, p.151; and Table 125 Trade by Areas, p.155.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1972-73, (Pr1.4053) Table 114 Value of Imports from each of the Principal Countries and Table 115 Value of Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.154; and Table 121 Trade by Areas p.161.

The dependence upon one state is the critical distinction between the Irish pattern of trade and that of 'the three neutral countries'.¹²⁹ At key moments of decision the Irish were importing about two-thirds of their requirements from Britain and the Six, and exporting over three-quarters of their exports to those same countries. Once Britain decided to apply for EEC membership, the Irish faced the daunting prospect of being at a tariff and competitive disadvantage in key and large markets, with little apparent alternative market available.¹³⁰ Equally significant, and again a key distinguishing feature from 'the three neutral countries', was the size of the agricultural sector in

Ireland. In 1961, 1967, 1969 and 1972, agricultural, forestry and fishing produce accounted for 51.8%, 53%, 46.5% and 41.8% respectively of Irish Domestic Exports,¹³¹ whilst the agricultural figures for 1969 of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were 4.1%, 2.4% and 2.9% of total exports respectively.¹³² Agriculture, including additionally processed products, approached 75% of the Irish export trade and nearly all of it was exported to Britain.¹³³ Garrett FitzGerald in 1961 commented that such dependence upon another state was a "serious undermining of the true independence of a country like ours ... we are not independent economically".¹³⁴ Lemass, too, felt that "the historic task" of their generation was to secure economic independence,¹³⁵ and that a failure to do so "would set the political gains to nought".¹³⁶

The extent of the influence of dependence upon Britain was further evidenced by the government White Paper of 30 June 1961 on the 'European Economic Community'. A "major factor" in determining Irish policy was the proportion of external trade with Britain, and any Irish-EEC relationship would have to take that into account. Irish national interest might be best served by joining if "the United Kingdom was a member" but "would not be served by joining ... if the United Kingdom remained outside". Ireland had to "avoid any action which might adversely effect ... (the) special trading relations" with Britain. Ireland might seek membership or association, but a decision could only be made when it was clear if Britain was joining and on what conditions.¹³⁷

Lemass told the Dáil that if Britain applied, "we also will apply, while at the same time informing them of our difficulty in accepting, in the present stage of our development, the full obligations of membership".¹³⁸ If Ireland's trading partners joined "together in an economic union, we cannot be outside it", since there would be "no economic future for

this country if we were to be cut off by a uniform tariff" applying to Irish exports from "all our European markets". It was not a "choice of joining ... or leaving things as they are" since the status quo was disappearing.¹³⁹ Generally the Dáil accepted there was little or no alternative to membership, with Browne arguing the Dáil no longer had real freedom of decision, being merely a "puppet".¹⁴⁰ Others too complained that whilst allegedly a sovereign state they had no real choice, and had less control over their destiny than in 1922.¹⁴¹ Ireland was dependent "on the decisions taken in Britain and elsewhere over which ... (it had) no control".¹⁴²

That lack of control was further emphasized by de Gaulle's veto on British entry in 1963, with Lemass having to admit that the Irish position was dependent upon how relations between Britain, the Community and others evolved.¹⁴³ Again, the Irish could not determine their position "until the position concerning the British application, and Britain's future commercial policy" were known.¹⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, in 1967 Lemass announced "our own application for membership should follow closely on that of Britain".¹⁴⁵ The primacy of economic considerations is further evidenced by the key role at this time of the Department of Finance, and Industry and Commerce, rather than External Affairs.¹⁴⁶

The Irish did "continue to plan and prepare ... entry".¹⁴⁷ They continued with the change of direction in economic policy initiated in 1955-56.¹⁴⁸ A reassessment at that time of Irish economic progress, culminated in the historic White Paper 'Economic Development' in 1958 which acknowledged that previous policies "have not resulted in a viable economy" and that a "sense of anxiety is, indeed, justified". Given this, and developments in Europe, the government concluded that "sooner or later, protection will have to go and the challenge of free

trade be accepted. There is really no other choice for a country working to keep peace materially with the rest of Europe".¹⁴⁹

Despite the problems with the EEC there could, therefore, be no turning back for the Irish especially since the Six began tariff reductions in January 1959 and the British pursued the idea of a free trade industrial area in Europe, culminating in the foundation of European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. The Irish sought informal partial interim agreements with the Six and the EFTA Seven, but to no avail and were also excluded from EFTA. Exclusion followed British insistence that EFTA was for developed economies only, (the Irish having explained in the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) Maudling negotiations their weaknesses and inability to fully participate in a free trade area) and that agriculture be excluded. Consequently Lemass took the view that "participation in EFTA cannot be expected to offer substantial advantages to us". The Irish would have no additional rights in the British markets, whilst the exclusion of agriculture outweighed any putative advantage of free trade with the other EFTA members.¹⁵⁰

Instead in 1965 the Irish accepted the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. This was generally in Britain's favour reflecting the asymmetrical bargaining positions of the two sides.¹⁵¹ It was indeed partly the need to change that situation, where Britain could act as "referee and umpire", that made the Community attractive, since if members, both would be "subject to the European institutions" and Ireland would be safer than in "the big jungle of the world".¹⁵² The Irish were still constrained, however, facing the problems that "in the world today there is no such thing as a really independent nation"¹⁵³ and that reduced dependence upon Britain was simply "at the cost of increasing their dependence on the markets of Western Europe and the

United States".¹⁵⁴ This was evidenced by the pattern of investment in Ireland after the replacement of the Control of Manufacturers Act by the Industrial Development (Encouragement of External Investment) Act. 46% of investment came from the United States and West Germany, with 29% from Britain. There was now an acceptance of foreign penetration of the Irish economy,¹⁵⁵ which incidentally, also raised the question of whether Irish subsidiaries of multinational firms would have to comply with NATO restrictions on trade in 'strategic goods' with Eastern Europe.¹⁵⁶

The Irish could see little alternative to the EEC, but they initially failed to gain entry for non-Irish reasons, although there were doubts about their preparedness.¹⁵⁷ In the 1961 White Paper both association and membership were considered as possibilities.¹⁵⁸ To some extent the matter was again outwith Irish control given Community ambivalence regarding association, but the Irish themselves also quickly decided that only membership would give them "a voice in the formulation of policies and ensure access on a footing of equality", as well as allowing "possible recourse to sources of assistance".¹⁵⁹ Crucially, participation in the Common Agricultural Policy offered assured and remunerative markets for Irish agricultural produce. On the other hand, it was recognized that membership "on the basis only of full obligations ... would create a critical situation".¹⁶⁰

No substantive decisions were required, however, until further changes in circumstances, again outwith Irish control, changed the situation with The Hague summit of December 1969 leading to substantive negotiations for the first time on an Irish application. That Irish dependence upon Britain remained was evident in the January 1972 White Paper 'The Accession of Ireland to the European Communities'.

If Britain joined and Ireland remained aloof "the results for industry would be very serious, to say the least and, for agriculture, disastrous". It was "not a realistic" alternative, bearing in mind "the limitations" imposed by "the key position of agriculture" and "the critical dependence on external trade". An examination of a range of alternatives concluded they involved "such major disadvantages as to cause serious damage to our economic growth, to employment and to our standard of living".¹⁶¹ Irish choice was, therefore, constrained as Aiken had admitted earlier, by forces "operating in Europe ... which are beyond our sole control, beyond direction by our single will".¹⁶² It was against this background that the debate about the implications of Community membership took place.

Another feature of that background was that speculation regarding what might happen if Ireland joined involved "an hypothesis about an hypothesis".¹⁶³ As a consequence of this and a changing external environment, the Irish attitude over the years 1961-1972 encompassed several changes of emphasis depending upon the Irish perception of what was required of them at certain times. When expedient to stress commitment to the European cause, including defence, this was done but at other times such commitment became sotto voce and conditional. Questions associated with defence were somewhat "peripheral" to the main debate,¹⁶⁴ although between 1961-1972 about one hundred parliamentary questions, in addition to points in debate, adjournment debates and motions, were asked in the Dáil relating to NATO membership, whether Community membership involved a defence commitment and a number of related questions, such as attitudes to the Western European Union (WEU).

On the one hand, it became clear that there was no enthusiasm for joining any existing alliance system. In 1961, for example, the

Dáil was assured that "Irrespective of Partition" there were reasons for non-membership of NATO.¹⁶⁵ Particularly significant, apart from freedom of action and not having to clear every word with states before speaking, was the ability "to make suggestions ... that a member of a bloc could not make"¹⁶⁶ so as to contribute to "reducing tensions" by, for example, nuclear non-proliferation proposals and contributions to U.N. peace-keeping.¹⁶⁷ Rather than help alliances destroy each other, the Irish should "try to win the peace".¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, within days of such statements the Irish applied to join what some regarded as "one of the most powerful groups and blocs" in the world, namely the European Community.¹⁶⁹ The government denied the Community was a bloc, querying "Is the U.S.A. a bloc?"¹⁷⁰ and arguing there was "no commitment to belong to any bloc or to take part in any conflict involved in negotiating membership of the Community".¹⁷¹ Ireland was still "neutral as between blocs, ... neutral in conflict", and no incompatibility existed between that and Community membership, or between that and the commitment to "take part in the defence of Europe just as now we defend our own territory" since it involved "absolutely no question at this time of participating on one side or another in a bloc or taking part in any conflict".¹⁷²

Yet tensions did emerge between what many saw as Ireland's traditional position and the apparent obligations of Community membership. These tensions were exacerbated initially by a number of statements by the Taoiseach, Sean Lemass. Given his conviction of the primordial importance of Irish economic interests, he attempted to de-sanctify neutrality announcing, for example, "there is no neutrality and we are not neutral".¹⁷³ If help from Ireland was crucial to a Western victory, "could we in the last resort refuse it", especially since everybody knew Ireland was on the democratic side?¹⁷⁴ Ireland could

help NATO even if not a member¹⁷⁵ and by 1962 Lemass was arguing it was "not in the national interest to represent that (article 4 of North Atlantic treaty) as implying an undertaking to preserve Partition situation", having regard to similar phrases in the U.N. Charter and League Covenant, although he still felt the 1950 White Paper arguments were relevant.¹⁷⁶ NATO membership was not discreditable, indeed NATO helped defend Ireland.¹⁷⁷ Whilst no Cabinet committee looked at NATO membership at that time,¹⁷⁸ Lemass did arrange for Michael Moran, Minister for Lands, to air the issue.¹⁷⁹ Moran noted that all current EEC members were NATO members also and that they had come together, at least partly, because of common policies on foreign and defence issues. Lemass, he said, had made it clear that there was no "laid down" policy with respect to neutrality between Communism and freedom, and that neutrality in that "context is not a policy to which we would ever wish to appear committed".¹⁸⁰ Lemass, himself, was emphasising that Ireland recognised "that a military commitment will be an inevitable consequence of our joining the Common Market and ultimately we would be prepared to yield even the technical label of neutrality. We are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without any reservation as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence".¹⁸¹ Neutrality was no longer an aspiration nor a fundamental principle.

In the autumn of 1962 Lemass made clear to the Dáil the willingness to cooperate "without qualification" in achieving the wider objectives of the Community¹⁸² having said this to the EEC Council of Ministers in January 1962. Ireland, he declared, accepted the general aims of NATO, the ideal of European unity and "the conceptions embodied in the Treaty of Rome and the Bonn Declaration ... of the duties, obligations and responsibilities which European unity would impose".¹⁸³ In subscribing to the Bonn Declaration, Lemass was accepting that "only a

united Europe, allied to the United States of America and to other free peoples, is in a position to face the dangers that menace the existence of Europe and of the whole free world". It involved accepting the need to create conditions allowing for a "common policy" with the aim of political union and strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁸⁴

The Irish application was made without any reservation regarding the supranational implications of membership¹⁸⁵ or request for any discussion of possible neutrality reservations. In the summer of 1969 the government was again emphatic that it had "no reservations whatever about our application ... We know there are political and economic obligations and that whenever the defence of Europe arises we will play our part".¹⁸⁶ Did 'no reservations' mean literally that? Lemass, on occasion also tried to argue that the Irish motives for their application were "primarily political", especially the desire to play a role in building Europe, and that this involved accepting the wide scope and depth of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome.¹⁸⁷

This approach may have been a corrective to an initial Irish memorandum submitted on 4 July 1961 which had raised doubts about Irish political commitment and ability to cope with full membership. Although another memorandum was substituted for it,¹⁸⁸ Lemass may have used hyperbole to advance the Irish cause. Nonetheless, as a matter of public and international record Ireland accepted the letter and spirit both of the Community treaties and the Bonn Declaration. It might argue "NATO is completely irrelevant to our EEC application"¹⁸⁹ and that no one had requested Irish membership,¹⁹⁰ but the tenor of Irish statements suggests that for Lemass the economic arguments were so strong that he was prepared to yield neutrality.

A difficulty was uncertainty as to whether the treaties and Community membership involved a defence commitment. If the Irish

joined, "Would we have to take part in a war?"¹⁹¹ The official reply argued the treaties contained no military provisions,¹⁹² no requirement to join alliances¹⁹³ and said nothing about neutrality.¹⁹⁴ Obligations contrary to neutrality were not "mentioned directly or indirectly" by the EEC.¹⁹⁵ No military or defence commitments "are involved in Ireland's acceptance of these Treaties".¹⁹⁶ The Irish argued that any attempt to impose non-economic matters would be ultra vires and that any defence treaty would require Irish consent and, indeed, a referendum if it involved raising an army or decisions about going to war.¹⁹⁷ Irish movement on these matters would be voluntary. It was also asserted that the Treaty of Accession contained no recognition or guarantee of territorial boundaries.¹⁹⁸

This legalistic approach can be challenged on both specific and general grounds as indeed it was by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. Moreover, a recent study concluded "there was no formal exclusion of defence from the Community agenda in the Treaty of Rome", and that the Community "could expand into defence without actually violating the Treaty of Rome if its members so chose", especially given article 235 which allowed, under certain circumstances, the Community to move into new areas.¹⁹⁹ Such moves would require Irish consent but it is not clear they would be ultra vires or require a referendum. In addition, many feared Ireland would be too constrained to have a free choice, since membership would be like "jumping on to a moving escalator from which one will never be allowed to get off ... In ten years time we shall be so totally economically committed to the infrastructure of the EEC and our trade will be so firmly based ... that if ... a decision is taken of a political or military kind", Ireland would have lost the real choice of digging its heels in.²⁰⁰ Economic association was bound to lead to some form of political and

military involvement and legalistic safeguards would be no genuine safeguard.

This was why Labour rejected the Fine Gael amendment to the Third Amendment of the Constitution Bill (1971). The original bill provided for Irish membership of the Communities and as originally drafted said no provision of the Constitution could invalidate "laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State consequent on membership of the Communities ...". The amendment substituted "necessitated by the obligations of" for "consequent on" and was successfully and specifically introduced to seek to ensure a narrow interpretation of the treaties and that any defence treaty arising out of Community membership would have to be put to the people. Labour continued to argue the de facto position would outweigh the de jure one.²⁰¹

Within Ireland scant attention was paid to the specific treaty articles which worried 'the three neutral countries', although attention was focused upon the Preamble and likely political and defence obligations. Whilst imprecision remained as to what those obligations would be, many realized "it would be less than frank if we imagined that defence was not at the forefront of the thinking behind the drafting of the Rome Treaty"²⁰² and that as responsible members the Irish had to shoulder "our share of responsibility for securing its well-being". Those "participating in the new Europe ... must be prepared to assist, if necessary, in its defence", although as a member Ireland would have a voice in shaping those developments.²⁰³

Clarity on this issue was not helped by successive government declarations which emphasised the legal position when stressing neutrality, but which emphasised Irish moral and political obligations when emphasising Community commitment. A distinction was also drawn between current and future commitments, and between the Community and

an alliance. Not a little ambiguity existed on these questions but underneath the statements lay a public recognition and acceptance that at some time in the future, and conditional upon certain developments, Ireland would join in the defence of the Community. The problem arose from a reluctance to accept the corollary, namely that such a position involved the abandonment of neutrality. Instead Taoiseach Lynch tried to argue that he did "not think ... the word 'neutrality' is relevant" in the context of Community membership, since neutrality "would not be relevant in the context of our being attacked by anybody: we would defend ourselves". In an admitted departure from previous policy, it was accepted that Ireland would "be interested in the defence of the territories embraced by the communities. There is no question of neutrality there ...".²⁰⁴ Ireland told its prospective partners it would be prepared to assist in Community defence, "if this became necessary, at any time".²⁰⁵

Lynch was also emphasising the conditional nature of Irish neutrality, that it was not traditional like the three neutral countries and that the Irish were free to "make up our minds as to our neutrality in certain circumstances". Lynch believed that in a "war between atheistic communism ... and the way of life we know" neither Dáil nor people would "permit us to be neutral".²⁰⁶ Scorn was now poured on the way in which ad hoc wartime neutrality had become "inculcated in some people" as "an idea that ... was a policy for all time in all circumstances".²⁰⁷ It was an "accident" for "reasons ... which are not relevant today". It was a "practical expedient".²⁰⁸ Past decisions would not "in any way impede ... Parliament from taking a decision that would make us non-neutral in other circumstances", specifically as EEC obligations developed.²⁰⁹ Ireland had "never adopted a permanent policy of neutrality in a doctrinaire or

ideological sense".²¹⁰ Although Hillery on one occasion spoke of neutrality as "Traditional since the last war", this was part of a rebuttal of the wider traditional argument,²¹¹ and more generally it came to be argued that Ireland had "never been neutral" since 1945 given its role in international organisations and making decisions and taking our own independent line".²¹² Entry into the U.N. was "not the action of a country with a tradition of neutrality"²¹³ since Ireland was "now on the side of all peace-loving countries".²¹⁴

Given such developments it was highly tendentious to argue they had "abandoned nothing",²¹⁵ that neutrality would be preserved, and that the commitment to "cooperate more and more closely together" did not "at any stage ... conflict with our neutrality", nor did "neutrality conflict with our participating in this aim to participate in the close union of the countries of Europe".²¹⁶ The reality was the recognition that a "political union without the capacity and the means to defend that union would be utterly meaningless", since such a union "necessarily" implied "the formulation of a common defence policy and the working out of common defence arrangements". After all, as Haughey asked "what is wrong with nations getting together and deciding they are going to have a common bond of defence between them?"²¹⁷

The enduring Irish position has seen the question of any commitment to European defence as being dependent upon considerable evolution within the Community and as highly conditional. It has depended upon whether political unity "develops far enough", or "if political development goes to its finality and an institution is created of which we are a part and defence is discussed in that Community". The Irish would "not renege on" their "duties" if "in the context of political evolution, the question of the defence of the Community arises ...".²¹⁸ An additional condition was that

commitment depended upon "enjoying all the benefits of being part of Europe".²¹⁹ It was also emphasised that as of 1971 there was no commitment to defend any Community country which was attacked, even after Ireland became a member. There was "no guaranteed continuation of the European concept",²²⁰ with the 1972 White Paper emphasising that "progress towards the achievement of an ever closer union ... must be pursued with due deliberation ... joint action in the political sphere must develop gradually but at the same time on a progressive basis".²²¹

Such statements led Keatinge to ask whether the Irish were paying little more "than the obligatory lip service which any applicant's negotiator must pay".²²² This misses the point that even in its conditional statements the government was abandoning the principle of and aspiration to neutrality. Friend and foe alike knew the Irish position, its distinctiveness from 'the three neutral countries' and the problems economic dependence generated for political independence. Whilst Lynch might argue it was "not a question of neutrality but of meeting obligations within a complex", he was nearer the mark in admitting that neutrality "in the context of the EEC would not be the old conception of neutrality at all".²²³

Pro-European figures, like FitzGerald, thought it "would be dishonest and dishonourable" to join if there were reservations about the "moral obligations" to "move towards a common foreign policy". He distinguished, however, foreign policy from defence arguing the latter was "nowhere in the offing at the present time" and would only arise "if this becomes a full political union".²²⁴

Opponents of entry argued the government was accepting "a military commitment"²²⁵ and was engaged in a "shocking" betrayal of traditional policy.²²⁶ Echoing Swedish arguments, they argued the Community was

"essentially a NATO European membership" or involved a "side-door" involvement with NATO.²²⁷ The Community was not "a philanthropic body" but a "ruthless capitalist superpower with an empire and a nuclear capability", comprised of notorious aggressors.²²⁸ Was "communism any less atheistic ... in 1949-50 ...?"²²⁹ Labour resurrected the de Valera rationales for neutrality and compared those with the government "sacrificing" Irish identity and sovereignty²³⁰ as well as appearing to be "willing to do anything ... to be allowed ... in".²³¹

There was some attempt to reconcile the perceived traditional position and Community membership in the vision of the Community as "a Third Force between the Soviet Union and the United States ... not a third power of the same kind ... but ... capable of looking after itself to a large degree and ... able to take an independent line",²³² being neither "pro-American ... or ... pro-anything but ... independent".²³³ The Irish claimed not to accept that the European ideal "is a confrontation against the powers of the Warsaw Pact" but rather that it "was to put an end to war in Europe". The idealism involved "in the idea of a united Europe is not represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. When we say that we are prepared to undertake the defence commitments of a European Community we are not pledging our loyalty to NATO. We are saying that the European Community which we wish to join is something worthwhile and therefore worth defending, but it is only worth defending for itself and not defending for any other ideology outside itself".²³⁴ However, as Tully pointed out such a Europe would need a "military force" and would not, therefore, preserve neutrality per se.²³⁵ One senior Fine Gael figure, Ryan, was willing to argue for the EEC as "a neutral zone" with Irish neutrality being an example and encouragement to others.

Ryan believed the Six wanted Ireland to assert neutrality "as a proper doctrine for any member nation of the EEC",²³⁶ partly in order to demonstrate it was "not a war-like instrument".²³⁷ The Six did not want a European army and, therefore, membership did not involve alliance.²³⁸

Ireland differed from the neutrals in finding no insurmountable obstacle to Community membership in neutrality. Unlike Austria, Sweden and Switzerland the Irish accepted:

- (a) the political obligations of membership and the political objectives of the Community, including political unification and a European identity in the world;
- (b) the Bonn Declaration and the need ultimately to partake in Community defence;
- (c) the supranational nature of the Community, the possibility of majority voting and the supranational direction of external trade, and the general constraints on sovereignty;
- (d) the constraints placed upon 'economic defence' in particular by treaty articles, and the general constraints upon the domestic economy, especially given the pre-entry prospect of Economic and Monetary Union and;
- (e) article 224 and the lack of either neutrality reservations or provisions for terminating the treaties.

The crucial distinction was the differing extents of economic dependency.

Some of the Irish pre-entry hypotheses were tested before entry in January 1973. On 18 May 1971 the Ten Foreign Ministers met and the "subject of European security was ... amongst those discussed".²³⁹ This attracted little attention but a meeting at The Hague on 20-21 November 1972 caused some consternation, given that the Conference on

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the recent German treaty and the Middle East were all discussed. The government also announced it would "take into account the views of its partners", especially West Germany, on the question of the timing of German entry into the U.N. and the recognition of East Germany. The opposition saw this as "the first major question" upon which "the principle of acting in concert with other members" appeared to have operated and worried it was an "anticipation of future changes in our foreign policy", clearly being surprised by it. The government answered in what became a familiar pattern, namely that it simply involved an attempt to find "where there is consensus" and that there was "no pressure on any country to change its individual stand". Ireland would continue to consult its partners.²⁴⁰ This was precisely what Aiken had derided in 1961 and it was part of a wider question relating to Irish sovereignty and the ability to pursue an independent foreign policy, particularly at the U.N.

Much of Irish policy had traditionally been concerned with sovereignty issues, and sovereignty was itself linked to neutrality. Just as neutrality was re-defined in 1961-72 period, so too was sovereignty. The 1972 White Paper, for example, argued "no form of cooperation between nations" involved no "limitations on their freedom of action" and states willing accepted such limitations if they were perceived to be in the national interest. The Community was to be seen in this light, but any "limitations on national freedom of action" would be "more than counter-balanced by the influence" Ireland would be able to bring to bear "on the formulation of Community policies affecting ... (Irish) interests". This was contrasted with the reality of being "independent but with little or no capacity to influence events abroad that significantly affect us", in other words

"the nominal right" to freedom. Real freedom was constrained in an interdependent world but Community membership meant the powers Ireland was to share "would in fact be enhanced rather than diminished by the cooperation involved".²⁴¹ The Community would place Ireland in a much better position than the prevailing pervasive bilateral relationship with the U.K.²⁴² Despite complaints from Labour, this view generally prevailed²⁴³ despite undermining further the aspiration to neutrality.

It also caused problems for the aspiration to have a genuinely independent foreign policy, although other problems also arose in that connection. These problems were epitomised by the famous Cosgrave statement in July 1956 outlining the basic principles of Irish policy with particular relevance to Irish policy at the U.N. The first principle was that Ireland would observe the Charter and insist that others also do so. - It was in the interests of the weak that the Charter be upheld, and upholding such principles would also increase Irish influence. Secondly, Ireland would "try to maintain a position of independence, judging the various questions ... strictly on their merits, in a just and disinterested way" and therefore "avoid becoming associated with particular blocs or groups so far as possible". Finally, there would be a wish to reflect national traditions, objectives and moral concepts, which meant an obligation to do "whatever we can as a member of the United Nations to preserve the Christian civilization of which we are a part and with that end in view to support wherever possible those powers principally responsible for the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of Communist power and influence". In terms of general policy, in the "great ideological conflict ... our attitude is clear, by geographical position, culture, tradition and national interest. We belong to the

great community of states, made up of the United States of America, Canada and Western Europe. Our national destinies are indissolubly bound up with theirs". Cosgrave did admit there would be difficulties in applying the principles, specifically given the issue of self-determination.²⁴⁴

Given the change of government in March 1957, it was Aiken who was responsible for Irish U.N. policy for the next twelve years. In 1956 he had supported Cosgrave's first two principles but noted that the third "departed to some extent from the first and second" and that Cosgrave was "rather tying himself up" in the third point, since there were "sins that are common" to communist and non-communist states alike. The crucial point was not to "become a part of any tied group bound by agreements to support one another, no matter what the subject matter up for discussion".²⁴⁵ Despite this Conor Cruise O'Brien has argued that whilst the second principle held "relative ascendancy" over the third initially, as "symbolized by 'the China vote'" in 1957, this position "became eroded and eventually collapsed".²⁴⁶ The change being dated from the 1961 vote on the substantive issue of Chinese representation.

This raises the issue as to whether such a change occurred and if so, to what extent it was motivated by the August 1961 application to join the Community, given the concern of some that Ireland's "economic interests" were not being enhanced by "fatuous observations which have no effect other than a disturbing one on our friends"?²⁴⁷ Certainly Costello thought it "quite obvious that the Government's foreign policy ... changed radically ... from the time they took their decision to join the EEC".²⁴⁸ Could Ireland be uncommitted at the U.N., whilst blathering its support for Europe?²⁴⁹

The most detailed analysis of the question of whether there was a

change is by Norman MacQueen in a statistical analysis of Irish voting behaviour in the U.N. General Assembly between 1956-70. Most interestingly this analysis does not support the charge by Costello and O'Brien, although except on colonial questions there was an increase in levels of cooperation with the United States and Britain. MacQueen argues that the degree of identity between Irish and Swedish voting, Sweden being regarded as "a traditional European neutral", remained "largely steady" whereas had a 1961 change "taken place as a result of domestic political circumstances, voting cooperation with Sweden might be expected to show a discernible decline". Given that there is "no evidence to support the suggestion that any change took place in Swedish foreign policy ... the changing emphasis throughout the 1960s must be seen to have taken place within the U.N. itself and not as a positive redirection of Irish policy as a result of extraneous influences ... the transformation was rather in the nature of the Assembly which underwent a general radicalisation during this period. Ireland and Sweden, progressive neutrals in the earlier period, now by standing still, objectively moved to the right". Sweden did not apply for Community membership, yet "a close affinity is detectable throughout the period" with Irish voting behaviour, and this affinity "appears to have been little affected by the supposed rightward shift in Irish policy after 1961". Indeed MacQueen argues that the "gradual move towards greater cooperation with the western powers ... cannot ... be dated as beginning in 1961 ... Rather, the process appears to begin in the plenary votes around 1959 ...".²⁵⁰

Outwith the U.N. there clearly was some change in policy after 1961 as is clear in the attitude to sovereignty and neutrality. There was a fragmentation in policy-making, whereby problems were "segmented into constituent elements".²⁵¹ This fragmentation had a certain

historical basis in that historically the Department of Industry and Commerce had acquired certain trade responsibilities and it was the economic departments who determined the need to move away from protectionism, having predominant roles in the early dealings with the EEC. Moreover, finance, trade and constitutional issues had also traditionally involved the Taoiseach's Office.²⁵² Lemass was, therefore, in a strong position to take charge of the Community issue. He was also the inspiration for the post-revolutionary elite which was "economically oriented with a view to the establishment of ... sound economic policy for steady economic growth".²⁵³

Given the economic and constitutional implications of the EEC, Aiken believed it "right and natural" for the Taoiseach to play a leading role on the issue,²⁵⁴ and consequently he hardly mentioned it in the Irish parliament, only uttering 58 words on Europe in 20,000 words espousing policy in the External Affairs debates in the Dáil 1963-1965.²⁵⁵ This division of labour allowed Ireland to pursue a number of policies which were "mutually conflicting, ... (and) contradictory ...".²⁵⁶ One foreign policy was operated by Lemass towards Europe and the creation of "a viable Irish society",²⁵⁷ whilst Aiken continued in the de Valera mould, prone to "the rhetoric of his ideals" in New York.²⁵⁸

(v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to ameliorate world problems and impartiality

In his July 1956 speech setting out the basis of Irish foreign policy, Cosgrave had welcomed the admission to the U.N. as a necessary consequence of Irish sovereignty, and argued that to turn their backs upon it would lead to isolation and insignificance in world affairs. That, it was argued would be contrary to the ideals of those who worked for freedom, the principles of Irish policy since 1922 and

against Irish national interest. Ireland would rather seek to contribute to the world for both moral and material reasons.²⁵⁹ Trade followed the flag and in the contemporary, competitive world Ireland could not, in any case, isolate itself.²⁶⁰

It was also in Ireland's self-interest to participate since "the weaker States" benefitted from "the protection and support afforded by the moral influence" of the U.N., which was "the protector of weak nations and friend of the poor, and our own best hope for the security and reunification of the Irish nation".²⁶¹ Support for the Charter had been Cosgrave's first principle in July 1956.²⁶² Aiken believed support for U.N. and the Charter were the best hope for small nations, for the evolution of world order based on justice and the rule of law, and this in turn was the only basis of permanent peace.²⁶³ Given this perspective, de Valera argued that as members of the U.N. it was their "duty" to make suggestions to resolve conflicts, and this was the "only point" of being involved.²⁶⁴ Not all agreed since Deputy Sherwin asked why Ireland should concern itself with the rows of others when it had a major unresolved row at home.²⁶⁵ More generally it was felt that Ireland could play a particularly valuable role and exert influence because it had not been a colonising power, it had had to struggle for its own freedom, it had ties of Catholicism with Europe and Latin America and influence in numerous countries through its emigrants.²⁶⁶ Irish "historical experiences" were thought to present "a unique opportunity to stand as an example" to the newly independent, whilst Ireland had "throughout the world an influence far beyond any material strength or wealth", given the role of Irish missionaries and their contribution to education in many parts of the world.²⁶⁷ Ireland had a "special role in certain spheres".²⁶⁸

To maximise this role many, including de Valera and Aiken, thought

the emphasis should be upon Cosgrave's second principle, since it was not in accord with Irish "interests ... or ... traditions ... to stand silent and not offer our opinion truthfully and honestly ...". On the contrary, it was "valuable to countries that bear the real burden to have an independent nation which is prepared to make proposals and suggestions in the present disastrous world situation".²⁶⁹ Some, like MacBride, felt Ireland could make little material contribution but could contribute to the battle for men's minds, and thus "carve out a niche" for itself.²⁷⁰ Others went further, wanting Ireland to "follow the Indian line",²⁷¹ although Fine Gael urged Aiken not to copy the Indian position or try to outdo it in neutralism, but rather to sympathise with it.²⁷² Conor Cruise O'Brien has described how for many younger officials in Iveagh House, "the ideal of what constituted good international behaviour was exemplified at this time by Sweden", whose actions were "independent, disinterested and honourable".²⁷³ A few favoured the Swiss model of making a contribution whilst maintaining neutrality.²⁷⁴

As already seen, there was some similarity between Irish and Swedish voting. In the first half of Aiken's tenure (1957-1969), the Irish also made a number of proposals in attempting to ameliorate the world situation, as well as contributing to U.N. peace-keeping. The attempt to mark out a distinctive position was most sharply epitomized by the China vote of 1957 when Aiken voted for a "full and open discussion of the question of the representation of China".²⁷⁵ According to O'Brien this issue was regarded as a key index of a state's alignment, the vote indicating how the state was likely to vote "on all other critical issues".²⁷⁶ The estrangement with the United States did not last, however. During this period Aiken also made a series of proposals to enhance international security. In

the 'disengagement' proposal of September 1957 Aiken suggested "a fair and reasonable drawing back of the non-national forces on both sides from the border of Russian-occupied Europe ... along latitudinal lines from either side of the border for an equal number of kilometres", this process to be supervised by a "United Nations inspection unit".²⁷⁷ This idea was developed into a series of proposals for "ever-widening areas in which the contest for the adherence of smaller States will be brought to an end".²⁷⁸ These would be "area(s) of law" by which was meant "a specific region ... in which the neighbouring States would agree to limit their arms below blitzkrieg level, to exclude foreign troops from their territories and to accept supervision by the United Nations of the fulfilment of these conditions".²⁷⁹ These neutrality regions would gradually be built up throughout the world, as areas committed to peaceful change and settlement.²⁸⁰ These proposals were linked by Aiken to other proposals on nuclear test limitations, proliferation issues and disarmament.²⁸¹ In 1958, for example, Ireland submitted a resolution calling for "an ad hoc Committee to study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and recommend ... appropriate measures for averting these dangers"²⁸² and in 1961 the General Assembly unanimously adopted an Irish resolution on the "Prevention of the Wider dissemination of nuclear weapons", it being possible to argue that Aiken made a significant contribution to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.²⁸³

During this time Aiken also spoke out "firmly in support of the office of the Secretary-General" since no "triumvirate or committee" could replace the Secretary-General as providing "the means of effective implementation of the Organisation's decisions".²⁸⁴ Aiken linked attacks on the Secretary-General with other attempts to destroy the organisation, like the "non-payment of subscriptions"²⁸⁵ and "the

failure" to meet "the cost of implementing the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly".²⁸⁶ In 1965 Ireland co-sponsored a number of draft resolutions on the financing of peace-keeping operations.²⁸⁷ In addition, it initially refused to be reimbursed for its peace-keeping endeavours from "voluntary funds" in case this undermined the principle of collective action or tainted the Irish contribution.²⁸⁸ By the spring of 1966 this policy changed to accepting money from any fund the Secretary-General might have, but Aiken continued to fret about the situation.²⁸⁹

In the period 1956-1972 the Irish made a significant contribution to U.N. peace-keeping, beginning initially with co-sponsorship of the idea of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for Suez and following this by contributing to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon in 1958 (UNOGIL) and the Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East from 1958. Other similar missions followed. More substantial were the contributions to ONUC and UNICYP, which at times represented one-eighth of the P.D.F.

RECORD OF UNIT SERVICE WITH UNITED NATIONS

Table 8.6

Unit	No. of Officers	Non-Commissioned Officers	Privates	Period of Service		Place of Service
				From	To	
32 Battalion	45	184	460	July 1960	January 1961	Congo
33 Battalion	47	191	468	August 1960	January 1961	Congo
34 Battalion	58	192	398	January 1961	June 1961	Congo
1 Infantry Group	27	93	220	May 1961	November 1961	Congo
35 Battalion	58	200	396	June 1961	December 1961	Congo
36 Battalion	62	220	433	December 1961	May 1962	Congo
37 Battalion	59	208	456	May 1962	November 1962	Congo
2 Armoured Unit	9	21	66	October 1962	April 1963	Congo
38 Battalion	56	222	452	November 1962	May 1963	Congo
3 Armoured Unit	9	29	51	April 1963	October 1963	Congo
39 Battalion	38	165	261	April 1963	October 1963	Congo
2 Infantry Group	32	116	189	November 1963	May 1964	Congo
40 Battalion	45	202	359	April 1964	October 1964	Cyprus
3 Infantry Group	34	146	219	August 1964	January 1965	Cyprus
41 Battalion	46	207	358	October 1964	April 1965	Cyprus
4 Infantry Group	36	148	242	January 1965	July 1965	Cyprus
42 Battalion	47	209	362	April 1965	October 1965	Cyprus
5 Infantry Group	42	178	283	October 1965	April 1966	Cyprus
6 Infantry Group	42	177	284	April 1966	October 1966	Cyprus
7 Infantry Group	43	177	284	October 1966	April 1967	Cyprus
8 Infantry Group	43	180	284	April 1967	September 1967	Cyprus
9 Infantry Group	46	197	284	September 1967	March 1968	Cyprus
10 Infantry Group	46	192	289	March 1968	September 1968	Cyprus
11 Infantry Group	37	140	230	August 1968	March 1969	Cyprus
12 Infantry Group	36	144	225	March 1969	September 1969	Cyprus
13 Infantry Group	36	136	233	September 1969	April 1970	Cyprus
18 Infantry Group	36	132	241	March 1970	October 1970	Cyprus
19 Infantry Group	37	137	240	September 1970	April 1971	Cyprus
20 Infantry Group	37	137	240	April 1971	October 1971	Cyprus
21 Infantry Group	31	121	225	October 1971	April 1972	Cyprus
22 Infantry Group	11	44	74	April 1972	October 1972	Cyprus
23 Infantry Group	12	49	76	October 1972	April 1973	Cyprus

Source: Capt. J. Sheehan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d), Appendix B, pp.79-80.

The Irish contributed partly because of general considerations concerning their view of the international milieu, particularly support for the U.N. and its principles. It was also felt it was in Irish interests to maintain the rule of law, with the U.N. being the only channel for that in international affairs. Ireland could also, perhaps, contribute to an avoidance of world war, although it could not, of itself, stop such wars. It could, however, contribute to the prevention of local wars and their escalation. Some saw more local reasons for contributing, such as giving the P.D.F. experience and making it more attractive.²⁹⁰ The Irish did balk at the notion of establishing a special, permanent U.N. unit on the grounds of expense, especially when uncertain as to demand, and also because they did not wish to appear readily available for each and every emergency.²⁹¹ Nonetheless, the Irish contribution to peace-keeping has been substantial and reflects a lack of isolationism and a desire to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

On the other hand the Irish have never been active mediators, a fact which drew particular domestic criticism in the 1960s, particularly during the Nigeria-Biafra, Vietnam and India-Pakistan conflicts. In each case, in marked contrast to earlier behaviour and pronouncements, there was considerable official Irish silence and an emphasis upon the limited influence of small states. Indeed, Aiken's successor talked of the advantages of "quiet diplomacy" since one could not "approach problems with an open mouth all the time" without causing "harm and ... damage".²⁹² A future minister ridiculed suggestions of giving Ireland's "American friends" advice on Vietnam, since no one welcomed public advice. O'Kennedy went on to bemoan the "type of thinking that can prevail too widely here - that all we have to do is to express our view as a nation ... we are limited in scope from the financial

point of view and also, ... from the point of view of international reality".²⁹³

These limitations were revealed clearly on the Biafran issue, when despite Opposition clamour, a review by the new Minister in July 1969 concluded there was no initiative Ireland could take "which could have any real influence in helping to solve the major issues". Instead the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was regarded as "ideally suited" to mediate.²⁹⁴ Similarly with respect to India-Pakistan conflict, there was a reluctance to become actively involved in mediation, because Irish "usefulness could be diminished considerably if (mediation) offer is ill-timed" or if the proposed solution was "not acceptable" to one side.²⁹⁵ On Vietnam, there was again "no initiative" the government "could usefully take".²⁹⁶ All a small country could do was "to hope that good sense will prevail".²⁹⁷

A further difficulty was that of partiality, and the continuing tension between Cosgrave's second and third principles. Corish suggested a possible way out in that Ireland should generally ally with the West but "not be led by the nose", making specific reference to Suez.²⁹⁸ Furthermore as O'Brien has pointed out, there was "a considerable area of common ground" between these principles, "since Ireland is a Western country" and "its genuinely independent assessments will often also be 'Western' assessments".²⁹⁹ Indeed, Aiken's original stance at the U.N. drew charges in the censure debate on the government's foreign policy at the U.N., that the government was not supporting the West enough, and an affirmation that Ireland was "not uncommitted" in the great struggle of the times.³⁰⁰ Indeed in the Dáil there was general agreement that Ireland could "no longer sit on the fence in ... ideological clash".³⁰¹ Even Fianna

Fáil members argued Ireland should not upset the United States on the China issue.³⁰² Greater emphasis came to be focused on the formulation advanced by Costello in 1957, namely that whilst pursuing "military neutrality", Ireland was "not uncommitted in the war of ideas",³⁰³ and this was contrasted with the Tánaiste's (Sean MacEntee) pronouncement that Aiken was a "non-committed statesman".³⁰⁴ Deputies like Dillon hoped Irish policy was not to treat the super-powers exactly the same.³⁰⁵ A further illustration of the ambiguity in Ireland's position was the desire of some that Ireland should use its "independent and detached" position to lead the "emergent countries along the paths we believe can strengthen the defence of the free world", given that Ireland's own future was "indissolubly bound up with the West".³⁰⁶

One indicator of Irish partiality or impartiality is U.N. voting behaviour. MacQueen examined Irish voting behaviour at the U.N. between 1956 and 1970 by analysing plenary session votes in the General Assembly, votes in the First and Special Political Committees (on international security, arms control, disarmament and political conflicts) and in the Fourth Committee (trusteeship, non-self governing territories and colonialism). MacQueen used as a basis of comparison the Soviet Union, United States, the U.K. (as a leader of the western alliance and having special relationship with Ireland), Sweden (as a traditional European neutral), Burma (as an Afro-Asian non-aligned state), and Yugoslavia (as an eastern neutral, but also in the NAM). He also used a weighted system regarding similarities and dissimilarities in voting behaviour.³⁰⁷ No votes took place in the 19th session because of disputes over funding, but the results for fourteen plenary sessions between 1956 and 1970, were as shown in Table 8.7.

Table 8.7 Calculated percentages of voting cooperation between
Ireland and six selected countries 1956-1970 in
plenary sessions

<u>Year</u>	<u>Session</u>	<u>No. of Votes</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>U.K.</u>	<u>Yugoslavia</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Burma</u>
1956	11	45	92.2	83.3	48.9	40.0	83.3	67.8
1957	12	35	68.6	64.3	77.1	68.6	84.3	75.7
1958	13	33	71.2	51.5	75.8	60.6	90.9	89.4
1959	14	54	55.6	46.2	73.1	72.2	74.1	78.7
1960	15	102	76.0	70.1	56.9	51.5	90.7	71.6
1961	16	76	97.4	86.4	42.1	30.3	84.2	52.0
1962	17	45	90.0	85.6	40.0	33.3	88.9	64.4
1963	18	28	80.4	76.8	67.9	41.1	92.9	67.9
1965	20	41	82.9	81.7	57.3	52.2	90.2	72.0
1966	21	52	86.5	80.8	51.0	48.1	85.6	58.7
1967	22	39	76.9	71.7	48.7	57.7	73.1	55.1
1968	23	51	84.3	80.4	52.0	39.2	79.4	60.8
1969	24	44	73.9	73.9	60.2	62.5	80.7	70.5
1970	25	66	75.8	73.5	62.8	50.0	89.4	78.8

Source: Norman J.D. MacQueen, 'Irish Neutrality: the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Experience 1945-1969', D.Phil thesis, New University of Ulster, 1981, p.189.

In only one year (1959), largely because of the China question, was there greater accord with the Soviets than the Americans, and in only three years was Soviet-Irish accord higher than Irish-British accord. The correlation with Sweden was "consistently high", with the figures for Burma and Yugoslavia being rather more mixed.³⁰⁸

Analysis of the First and Special Political Committees shows broadly the same pattern, namely an increase in support for 'the west', although in the Fourth Committee this pattern is reversed.³⁰⁹

MacQueen's general conclusion is that "Irish neutrality at the United

Nations did not involve equidistant levels of support for each power bloc ... Irish voting behaviour was more closely aligned to that of the western powers", although it also demonstrated the "consistently high degree of similarity with that of Sweden".³¹⁰

(vi) attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-determination

In 1966 Garrett FitzGerald complained that a European minister had recently asked him how he liked his new Opposition leader, Mr. Heath; the minister "was not aware that we had a separate Government. It had slipped his mind. So unconscious are people of the realities of our position".³¹¹ Identity and independence issues were still, therefore, a major concern. As late as 1969 FitzGerald was still drawing attention to the need "to give effect to our belief in the value of maintaining the national identity of this country - our belief ... that Irish interests are best served by a separate, individual, Irish presence in the world" given the distinctiveness of Irish culture, way of life and values. The Irish wanted "to preserve that difference" because it was thought to be of value to them and to the world.³¹² Identity was particularly important given the approach to the European Community, and was given added significance by the 1966 celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the 1916 Rising. The eruption of violence in Northern Ireland in 1968-9 also had a crucial importance.

For most of the period Northern Ireland and unity were not major issues. The question was periodically raised at the U.N., "particularly whenever the Irish experience of the evils of partition seemed relevant to the specific international problem then under discussion",³¹³ but there was no return to 'sore thumb' approach. In the island itself,

the period 1956-1962 saw an IRA border campaign. More significantly Lemass became Taoiseach, and commenced his intervention on the question. Essentially he took a functionalist approach believing that economic cooperation could create a climate conducive to reunification. He also made a number of political gestures, such as visiting O'Neill, the Northern Ireland Prime Minister on 14 January 1965.³¹⁴ A few months earlier Lemass had acknowledged that the government and parliament of Northern Ireland "exist with the support of the majority" in the area, "artificial though that area is".³¹⁵ The Dáil established a Committee on the Constitution in 1966 which reported in December 1967. It recommended that Article 3 be replaced "by an expression of the aspiration that the island be 're-united in harmony and brotherly affection between all Irishmen', and that the state's jurisdiction was limited to the twenty-six counties 'until the achievement of the nation's unity shall otherwise require'".³¹⁶ Nothing came of this because of opposition within Fianna Fáil, and after O'Neill returned Lemass' visit, followed by O'Neill-Lynch visits, this approach was overtaken by events.

This is not the place to detail the events relating to Northern Ireland during and after 1968-9, but some issues are particularly relevant.³¹⁷ One such was the question of whether the Irish Government would intervene to 'save' the minority population or take the opportunity to use force to secure reunification. In September 1969 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Patrick Hillery, told the U.N. General Assembly the Irish did not have, "nor do we now have, any wish to achieve it (reunification) by force".³¹⁸ The Taoiseach in the late summer affirmed the government has "no intention of mounting an armed invasion of the Six Counties ... use of force would not advance our long-term aim of a united Ireland. Nor will the Government

connive at unofficial armed activity ...".³¹⁹ In the spring of 1971 the Dáil formally approved an Opposition motion "That Dáil Éireann formally rejects the use of force as an instrument to secure the unity of Ireland ..".³²⁰

However, at critical moments in August 1969 this message was not so clear, and Opposition deputies had some grounds for arguing the "Government hinted at armed intervention".³²¹ In addition, some backbenchers argued that if the Bogside had been attacked further there "would have been an invasion across the Donegal border to protect people".³²² The situation was exacerbated by the Taoiseach's television statement that the Irish government would not stand (idly) by, and by the decisions to establish field hospitals and refugee centres on the border.³²³ The Evening Press on 14 August carried the headline "Irish Troops Are on the Border", reporting "Very large forces and convoys are moving near the Border areas". It went on to say that the people of the Bogside had their "eyes ... turned chiefly to the Border only five miles away where they have heard Irish troops are building up", asking "But why don't they come?".³²⁴

Five field hospitals and two refugee centres were immediately established, but the P.D.F. did not cross the Border.³²⁵ What the troops were to do aroused some confusion since two explanations were given of the P.D.F.'s role. Initially reference was made to the field hospitals and refugee centres and the need to defend them, but then it was argued that troops had been moved in anticipation of an Anglo-Irish peace-keeping mission, the British having rejected a U.N. force.³²⁶ The tension was heightened by the mobilization of about 2,000 First and Second Line Reserves,³²⁷ and by dissension in the Cabinet over what to do, although there is evidence that "the Government adopted a Contingency Plan for the defence of the threatened

population ... and that this consisted of the disposition of small arms where they could most readily be made available to recognised representatives of those under attack".³²⁸ This plan was adopted because of Army advice that there was no other effective help they could provide. Part of the dilemma was what to do in the so-called 'doomsday situation' of a possible pogrom. A further complication is whether certain ministers attempted to smuggle arms and money unofficially to the besieged population, or whether they acted legally and within the terms of the Contingency Plan.

As the immediate crisis passed, this became a major issue bringing the dismissal, resignation and trial of some ministers.³²⁹ Clear answers are not possible given contradictory evidence, but it seems as if whilst no invasion per se was planned, a contingency plan for helping Northern nationalists did exist and that may have involved some incursions if ultimately deemed necessary. The intervention would be to 'save' the nationalist population, not to bring about unity which the Irish lacked the power to do. Unity remained a long-term aspiration.³³⁰ These questions nearly brought down the Fianna Fáil government and they continue to divide the party. It is significant, however, that the Army's own assessment stressed their weakness, although some politicians wished to go, in effect, to war, although a neutral state can hardly engage in war.

The Northern issue has remained on the agenda. After 1968-9 there has been a reaffirmation of the goal of unity, and initially a re-emphasis upon functional cooperation with suggestions, for example, of a joint economic council.³³¹ Internment in 1971 and Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972 when Catholics were killed in Derry by the British Army, temporarily halted that process. After Bloody Sunday the Irish ambassador to London was withdrawn and the British

embassy in Dublin burnt. Some had fears that the Irish might "be in a war situation",³³² or have "to face the reality of the issue of peace or war".³³³ Certainly certain speeches by Neil Blaney, one of the ministers dismissed in 1970, in 1972 suggested the calling up of the "entire reserves" and for the Army to be "on the Border" although the crucial ambiguity as to what the army would do remained.³³⁴ A Blaney supporter, Brennan, did suggest that if there were any more Derrys the army should be sent "across the border".³³⁵ This did not happen.

Conclusion

In this period there was again no unambiguous, clarion assertion of neutrality and despite the rhetoric, Ireland maintained a distinct position vis-à-vis the nonaligned. Confusion persisted as to Ireland's position as is illustrated by an exchange between Corish and Lemass in 1963. Corish was criticizing the government for preparing "to abandon our traditional policy of neutrality". Lemass interjected "will the Deputy define neutrality for me?". The exchange continued:

Corish "Non-participation"

Lemass "In what?"

Corish "In military encounters - non-participation ... we would not side with anybody ... Is that not what we mean by neutrality? ..."

Lemass then asked whether this included struggle of free world against Communism.

Corish replied "Even the Hottentots know we are anti-Communist", to which Lemass rejoined "In that case we are on one side and not neutral".³³⁶

Increasingly it was argued that it was "owing to an accident of history" that Ireland was "independent, untied and neutral, in the accepted sense of the term, in the military sense of the term".³³⁷ This de-sanctification and re-definition reflected the exigencies of the economic

situation and the consequent perceived need to join the European Community. Adherence to neutrality had become conditional and transient, depending upon how the Community developed. Any lingering long-term aspiration to it yielded in the commitment to the future development of the Community. More important than neutrality had become the maximisation of material well-being which the Community appeared to promise, whilst membership also appeared to offer the chance to change the claustrophobic bilateral relationship with Britain. In joining the Community, the Irish finally decided to put aside the austere ideals and aspirations of de Valera, and to seek comfort, at the expense of independence and neutrality. Moreover, they still remained unprepared to provide the necessary wherewithal, or to pay the necessary opportunity costs, for a genuinely independent and neutral stance. Neither neutral nor members of an alliance. Ireland's policy was again sui generis.

Footnotes : Chapter Eight

1. Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, (London, Four Square Books, 1965) p.36.
2. Liam Cosgrave, Minister for External Affairs, Dail Debates 159.136 ff (1956).
3. The Belgrade conference took place in the same year as the decision to apply to the EEC.
4. McQuillan, Dail Debates 208.656 (1964) and 214.1409 ff (1965) and Cosgrave 244.1699 (1970).
5. Ibid 156.268 (1956), 166.865 (1958), 181.781 (1960) and 195.1086 (1962).
6. See Hilliard, Minister for Defence, ibid 222.941 (1966).
7. Cronin, Minister for Defence, ibid 257.2155 (1971), and see also Peter Jay 'Public Expenditure and Administration', The Political Quarterly, 41, (June 1970) p.196.
8. Cronin, Dail Debates 251.681 (1971).
9. Hilliard, ibid 222.941 (1966).
10. See, ibid 161.870 (1957). In 1958, Boland as Minister for Defence, asserted 7,500 was the viable minimum size of PDF - 166.865 ff. In 1962, another Defence Minister, Bartley suggested a non-commissioned strength of 8,000 was desirable - 195.1086 ff.
11. Given administration and routine back-up duties.
12. Traynor, ibid 156.273 ff (1956) and Bartley, Minister for Defence, 208.588 ff (1964).
13. Tully, ibid 208.2111-2113 (1964) and 214.1296 (1965).
14. Boland, Minister for Defence, ibid 187.1187 ff (1961).
15. 15 Irish soldiers died in peace-keeping action between 1960 and 1972, and a further 20 were killed whilst overseas with peace-keeping forces. See Capt. J. Sheehan (ed.), The Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d) pp.81-2, and Dail Debates 200.985 (1963) and 234.1423 (1968).
16. Figures for each year can be found in:
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1958 (Pr.4564), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1958), Table 222 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1953-58' p.230.
Statistical Abstract of Ireland, 1962 (Pr.6571), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1962), Table 247 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1957-62', p.259.
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1967 (Pr.9587), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1967), Table 234 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1962-67', p.266.
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71 (Pr.1974), (Dublin Stationery Office, 1974), Table 227 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1966-71', p.275.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1974 and 1975 (Prl.6072), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1977), Table 220, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1970-75', p.235.

17. Hilliard in 1966 admitted only about 10,000 out of 18,000 went for training - Dail Debates 222.941 (1966).
18. See Tully, ibid 244.1690 ff (1970) and Gibbons, Minister for Defence 244.2093 ff (1970).
19. Gen. MacEoin, Minister for Defence, ibid 156.378 (1956).
20. Gen. MacEoin, idem, and Cosgrave 222.882 (1966).
21. Boland, Minister for Defence, ibid 164.1470 ff (1957), and Cronin, Minister for Defence, 257.2155 ff (1971).
22. Major de Valera, ibid 156.305-312 (1956).
23. Oliver J. Flanagan, ibid 175.70 (1959).
24. Donegan, ibid 247.1733 (1970).
25. Sherwin, ibid 208.637 ff (1964).
26. P. O'Donnell, ibid 227.588 (1967). See also Sherwin's observation about the Swiss having "no standing army but only a part-time army" - 201.670 ff (1963).
27. Corish, ibid, 201.635 (1963).
28. Boland, Minister for Defence, ibid, 164.1470 ff (1957).
29. Gen. MacEoin, Minister for Defence, ibid, 156.374 (1956).
30. Boland, Minister for Defence, ibid, 188.144 ff (1961).
31. Major de Valera, ibid 156.305-312 (1956), and Boland, Minister for Defence, 188.151-2 (1961).
32. See Fitzgerald, ibid 245.867 (1970) and Hilliard, Minister for Defence, 234.1474 ff (1968).
33. Cronin, Minister for Defence, ibid, 258.703 ff (1972). See also 245.710 (1970) and 257.2155 ff (1971).
34. Boland, Minister for Defence, ibid 188.151-2 (1961).
35. Bartley, Minister for Defence, ibid 195.1289 (1962) and MacEoin, Minister for Defence, 156.37-8 (1956).
36. Coogan, ibid 156.344 (1956), and Sherwin and Booth 194.526 (1962) and 156.908 (1958).
37. Sherwin, ibid 195.1146 (1962).
38. Bartley, Minister for Defence, ibid 194.521 and 536 (1962). According to Davern 245.831 (1970), it was only Congo-exposure that made Department of Defence realize that 303 rifle was twenty years out of date.
39. Davern, ibid 258.658 (1972).
40. Part of a general indictment, Cooney ibid 251.230-1 (1971) and Dr. Byrne 257.2225 ff (1971).
41. Clinton, ibid 257.2167 ff (1971).
42. Cronin, Minister for Defence, ibid 258.703 ff (1972), and see Clinton 257-2167 ff (1971).
43. Cronin, ibid 259.2069 ff (1972).

44. Dr. Byrne, ibid 257.2225 ff (1971).
45. Dr. Byrne, idem. For details re Air Corps see 156.316 ff and 344, 161.870-80, 164.1457 ff, 166.902 ff, 181.781, 187.1216 ff, 192.504, 203.687, 231.1336, 243.1185, 257.2155 and 2225 ff, and 260.317 and 2191 and, Lt.Col. P.D. Kavanagh, The Irish Army Handbook 1973, (Dublin, Department of Defence 1973) pp.47-8 and Capt. J. Sheehan op.cit. p.61.
46. Clinton, Dail Debates, 257.2167-8 ff (1971).
47. Bartley, Minister for Defence, ibid, 201.613 ff (1963) and 188.153 (1961).
48. As of December 1969, ibid, 243.1185 (1969).
49. Boland, Minister for Defence, ibid, 161.870 (1957) 166.961 (1958) and 188.152 (1961). See also Dr. Byrne 245.815 ff (1970), Tully 195.1131-42 (1962), Esmonde 245.855 ff (1970) and Hilliard, Minister for Defence, 234.1476 ff (1968).
50. Sheehan, op.cit. p.63.
51. Bartley, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 214.1583 ff (1965) and Boland, Minister for Defence, 166.961 (1958) and Esmonde 175.21 (1959).
52. Kavanagh, ibid, 258.682 (1972).
53. For description of vessels and complaints see ibid, 192.1187 (1961), 196.959 (1962), 201.719, 828 (1963), 207.325 (1964), 208.642 (1964), 212.469 (1964), 214.1271 (1965), 217.708, 1283, 1840, 1914, 1922 and 1930 (1965), 234.1423 (1968) and 236.2362 (1968).
54. Traynor, ibid 156.273 ff (1956).
55. Hilliard, Minister for Defence, ibid 234.1476 (1968) and Bartley, Minister for Defence, 214.1583 ff (1965).
56. Gibbons, Minister for Defence, ibid 243.1187 and 1944 (1969).
57. Gibbons, ibid 244.2033 (1970).
58. Hilliard, Minister for Defence, ibid 227.1396 (1967). By 1969 no other European naval service was still using Flower class Corvettes, Gibbons, Minister for Defence, 242.1537-9 (1969).
59. Gibbons, ibid 249.875 (1970). These ships had been held in reserve by the British for some years and required attention to a number of defects.
60. Cronin, Minister for Defence, ibid, 256.310 (1971), Gibbons, 242.491 (1969) and Sheehan op.cit. pp.63-4.
61. Booth, Dail Debates, 214.1352 ff (1965) and Dowling 227.1359 (1967). For a history of Naval Service see An Cosantoir (April 1973) which was given over to the Naval Service. It is worth noting that in 1964 Irish territorial waters were expanded to 15,136 square miles - Dail Debates, 213.921 (1964).
62. Cronin, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates, 260.1792 (1972).
63. Cronin, Minister for Defence, ibid, 258.1202 (1972).
64. Cronin, ibid, 256.283 (1971) and compare 251.1487 (1971).
65. R. Ryan, ibid, 252.1769 ff (1971).

66. Lenihan, ibid, 252.2057.
67. R. Ryan, ibid, 252.2112 ff (1971).
68. Lenihan, ibid, 252.2118 (1971).
69. For details of expansion see ibid 179.64 (1959) and 232.862-4 (1968) and for Irish policy on recognition and representation 222.1 (1966) and 194.1442 (1962). See also Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) Appendix 2, pp.270-1.
70. O'Leary, Dail Debates, 226.883 ff (1967).
71. Aiken, ibid, 232.1716 (1968).
72. Ryan, ibid, 260.406 ff (1972) and Coogan 260.504).
73. O'Leary, ibid, 260.473 ff (1972).
74. For Aiken's reply see Ireland at the United Nations 1959 : Speeches by Mr. Frank Aiken, (Dublin, Brun agus O Nuallain Tea, n/d), (Hereafter Ireland - U.N.), Speech delivered by Aiken to General Assembly 20 October 1959 pp.36-7, and Speech by Aiken to General Committee, 9 October 1959.
75. Strobe Talbott (ed.), Khrushchev Remembers : The Last Testament, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1974), p.470. O'Brien op.cit. p.46 refers to Boland as "the successful Western-sponsored candidate" in an "Eastern European year".
76. This speculation is raised by Adam Roberts 'Can Neutrality Be Defended?' in Bill McSweeney (ed.), Ireland and the Threat of Nuclear War, (Dublin, Dominican Press, 1985) p.25.
77. See Dail Debates, 190.5 (1961), 190.1097 (1961) and 209.868 (1964).
78. Ibid, 197.409 (1962).
79. Costello, ibid 191.551 ff (1961).
80. McQuillan, ibid, 208.1103 ff (1964), and Cosgrave 194.1355 ff (1962). See also Brian Farrell, Sean Lemass, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1983) p.118.
81. Corish, Dail Debates, 208.1075 ff (1964) and Lemass, Taoiseach, 183.1875 ff (1960).
82. O'Brien, op.cit. pp.52-3.
83. Compare Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg, (London, Methuen, 1971) pp.108-112.
84. Norman MacQueen, 'Irish Neutrality : the United Nations and the Peacekeeping Experience 1945-1969' (D.Phil. thesis, New University of Ulster, 1981) pp.223-4, see also pp.207-217, and Larry L. Fabian, Soldiers Without Enemies - Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping, (Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1971) p.88 and passim and J. van Doorn and J.H. Mans, 'United Nations Forces : on Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Military Operations', in J. van Doorn (ed.), Armed Forces and Society, (The Hague, Mouton, 1968) p.353 and passim.
85. MacQueen, op.cit. p.215 and Fabian op.cit. p.226.
86. MacQueen, ibid pp.217-8.
87. Browne, Dail Debates, 186.853 ff (1961).

88. MacQueen, op.cit. p.336.
89. O'Brien describing part of a 'Manipulator's Manual', O'Brien op.cit. pp.29-30.
90. Ibid, p.30 and O'Brien, 'Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa', Public Lecture, 20 July 1967 (Dublin, Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1967) p.3.
91. O'Brien, 'Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa' idem.
92. O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, op.cit. pp.35-6.
93. O'Brien, 'Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa', op.cit. p.5 and MacQueen op.cit. p.156.
94. Lemass, Address to Cambridge University Liberal Club, 31 January 1960, text in Eire-Ireland : Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, No.468, 1 February 1960. Ten years later, Lemass still felt the distinction was valid, see Sean Lemass, 'Small States in International Organisations', in Schou and Brundtland (eds.), Small States in International Relations, (Uppsala, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971) p.117.
95. Ireland-U.N. 1960, speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 6 October 1960, op.cit. pp.11-12.
96. Aiken, Dail Debates, 191.672-9 (1961).
97. O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, op.cit. pp.37-40 and 46-47.
98. Ireland-U.N. 1960, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 6 October 1960 op.cit. p.13.
99. MacQueen, op.cit. pp.119-120.
100. Aiken, Dail Debates, 171.1263 (1958).
101. Ireland-U.N. 1957, Statement by Aiken to General Assembly, 20 September 1957, op.cit. p.24.
102. Keatinge, op.cit. p.175.
103. See Dail Debates 188.175, 191.479, 196.1459, 197.1463, 203.981, 211.20, 214.754, 226.972, 232.1768, and 241.2278.
104. Aiken, ibid 203.981 (1963). More generally see Peter Willetts, The Nonaligned Movement, (London, Frances Pinter, 1978) passim.
105. Hanspeter Neuhold, 'Permanent Neutrality in Contemporary International Relations : A Comparative Perspective', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1, No.3 p.14.
106. European Economic Community - Commission : Report to the European Parliament on the State of Negotiations with the United Kingdom - (Brussels, 26 February 1963) p.97.
107. See, for example, 'Report on the general policy of the Council of Europe' (Rapporteur : Mr. Maurice Macmillan), with a memorandum on the legal aspects of neutrality by Mr. Struye - Document 1420, 9 May 1962, Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and 'Report on the general policy of the Council of Europe' (Rapporteur : Mr. Pflimlin) with a memorandum on the political aspects of neutrality by Mr. Struye - Document 1581, 29 April 1963, Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.
108. See Macmillan Report (as in footnote 107) pp.21-26; Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, (London, Oxford

- University Press, 1965) pp.422 and 498; Spaak in Council of Europe Consultative Assembly 15th Ordinary Session (1st Part) Official Report of Debates Vol.1 Sittings 1 to 8, pp.33-36 and, Dail Debates 230.1097 (1967), 196.3435 (1962), and 255.2121 and 2465 (1971).
109. Quoted in Irish Independent 21 October 1971 and Schumann quoted by Hillery, Dail Debates, 259.2444 (1972). For others see Ryan 257.1286 ff (1971).
110. O'Leary, Dail Debates 226.883 ff (1967).
111. Ibid 235.1214 (1968).
112. Idem.
113. Lynch, Taoiseach, ibid 241.631 (1969). He had earlier acknowledged that "our neutrality is not of the same nature as theirs" - 241.157.
114. See pp.321-3 above and pp.398ff below.
115. Lemass, Taoiseach, ibid 193.4 ff (1962), emphasis added.
116. Richard Burke, future Cabinet and Commission member, ibid, 241.1972 ff (1969).
117. McQuillan, ibid 188.108 ff (1961).
118. Russell, ibid 187.1246-1251 (1961). See also William Fitzgerald, Irish Unification and NATO, (Dublin, Dublin University Press, 1982) pp.41, 49, 64 and passim.
119. Irish personnel, however, continued to attend courses abroad, predominantly in Britain and the United States.
120. Browne, ibid 247.1715 ff (1970) and Tully, 248.68 (1970).
121. Lemass, Taoiseach, ibid 195.1 ff (1962). Bases had a symbolic importance given 'the ports' issue, see Tully 248.68 ff (1970).
122. This is the only period for which figures available. It includes the period of the 'Six Day War' between Israel and its neighbours. Ibid 230.429 (1967).
123. Ireland-U.N. 1957, Aiken speech to General Assembly, 10 September 1957, op.cit. pp.8-10.
124. See Ireland-U.N. 1958, Aiken speech to General Assembly, 14 August 1958, op.cit. pp.7-9, 14; Ireland-U.N. 1957, Aiken speech to General Assembly, 20 September 1957, op.cit. p.15 and; Ireland-U.N. 1960, Aiken speech to First Committee, 28 October 1960, op.cit. p.32.
125. Ireland-U.N. 1962, Aiken speech to Security Council, 24 October 1962, op.cit. pp.23-30.
126. Dr. T.K. Whitaker, 'Monetary Integration : Reflections on Irish Experience', Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Ireland, 1973 (Winter) pp.68-9, and see also Dermot McAleese, 'The Foreign Sector' in Norman J. Gibson and John E. Spence (eds.), Economic Activity in Ireland, A Study of Two Open Economies, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1976).
127. McAleese, ibid, p.116.

128. Whitaker op.cit. p.68.
129. See pp.100-102 above.
130. Not all accepted the lack of alternatives. See, for example, Appendix A 'Alternatives to Membership' in Raymond Crotty, Ireland and the Common Market : An Economic Analysis of the Effects of Membership, (Dublin, Common Market Study Group, 1971) pp.43-53.
131. Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1962 op.cit., Table 137, 'Distribution of Domestic Exports between Agricultural Produce and Other Exports', p.153.
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1969 (Prl. 1101), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1971), Table 129 'Distribution of Domestic Exports between Agricultural Produce and Other Exports' p.153.
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1970-71 op.cit., Table 124 'Distribution of Domestic Exports between Agricultural Produce and Other Exports' p.155.
Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1974 and 1975 op.cit., Table 119 'Distribution of Exports between Agricultural Produce and Other Exports' p.151.
132. According to Senator O'Higgins, Seanad Eireann Debates 72.800 (1972).
133. Economic Development (Pr.4803), (Dublin, Stationery Office 1958) p.15.
134. FitzGerald, Dail Debates, 241.1984 ff (1969), and see McAleese op.cit. p.146.
135. Lemass, Dail Debates, 175.938 (1959).
136. T.K. Whitaker, 'From Protection to Free Trade', Administration 1973 Vol.21 No.4 (Winter) p.421.
137. European Economic Community, laid by the Government before each house of the Oireachtas, 30 June 1961 (Pr.6106), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1961) pp.7-8.
138. Lemass, Dail Debates, 191.205 (1961). Corish described it as "Hobson's choice" - 191.232 (1961).
139. Lemass, ibid 191.264 (1961).
140. Browne, ibid 191.291 (1961).
141. McQuilligan, ibid 191.641 ff (1961).
142. Costello, ibid 199.972 ff (1963). This was especially significant since as Foreign Minister, Hillery referred to EEC decision as possibly the most significant decision of a generation, perhaps even since 1922 - 260.384 ff (1972).
143. Lemass, ibid 199.617 ff (1963).
144. Lemass, ibid 199.920 ff (1963).
145. Lemass, ibid 228.548 ff (1967) and 228.790 (1967). See also Cosgrave 228.799 ff (1967).
146. See Brigid Burns and Trevor C. Salmon, 'Policy-Making Coordination in Ireland on European Community Issues', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.XV No.4 (June 1977) pp.277-278 and Patrick Keatinge,

- The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1973) pp.129-131.
147. Lemass, Dail Debates, 199.617 ff (1963).
 148. On 11 October 1955 Lemass made a seminal speech to Comh-Chomhairle Atha Cliath in Clery's Ballroom - see Farrell op.cit. pp.92-93, and Whitaker, 'From Protection to Free Trade' op.cit. pp.415-416.
 149. Economic Development, op.cit. pp.2-5.
 150. For Ireland and EFTA see Garret FitzGerald, Seanad Eireann Debates, 61.1833 ff (1966), Lemass, Dail Debates, 189.295 ff (1961) and Farrell op.cit. p.110. See also Miriam Hederman, The Road to Europe : Irish Attitudes 1948-61, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1983) passim.
 151. See Garret FitzGerald, 'Ireland and the EEC', Collected Conference Papers, Ireland, Britain and Europe, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, May 1971 pp.30-31.
 152. Senator Dooge, Seanad Eireann Debates 69.1347 (1971).
 153. FitzGerald, Dail Debates 241.2137 ff (1969).
 154. McAleese, op.cit. p.146.
 155. See Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. pp.140-142.
 156. This possibility is raised by Michael O'Corcora and Ronald J. Hill, 'The Soviet Union in Irish Foreign Policy', International Affairs, Vol.58 No.2 (Spring 1982) pp.268-9.
 157. For a review of the response of the Six, the initial Irish memorandum and a critique of the Irish Government's approach see Garret FitzGerald, Seanad Eireann Debates 61.1833 ff (1966). For general background see Hederman op.cit. passim and Trevor C. Salmon, 'Ireland' in Carol and Kenneth Twitchett, Building Europe : Britain's Partners in the EEC, (London, Europa, 1981) pp.191-216.
 158. European Economic Community 1961 (Pr. 6106) op.cit. pp.7-8.
 159. Ibid pp.34-5.
 160. Lemass, Dail Debates 191.264 (1961).
 161. The Accession of Ireland to the European Communities, laid by the Government before each House of the Oireachtas, January 1972 (Pr1.2064), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1972) pp.61-68.
 162. Aiken, Dail Debates, 191.662 ff (1961).
 163. Gibbons, Minister for Defence, ibid 245.896 ff (1970).
 164. Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations op.cit. p.95. For a review of the issues see Hederman op.cit. passim and Salmon, 'Ireland' op.cit. passim.
 165. Aiken, Dail Debates, 189.461 (1961).
 166. Aiken, ibid 194.1412 ff (1962) and 191.672 ff (1961).
 167. Aiken, ibid 189.461 (1961).
 168. Aiken, ibid 230.887 ff (1967).
 169. Costello, ibid 194.1324 ff (1962).

170. Aiken, ibid 194.1412 ff (1962).
171. Hillery, ibid 255.2121 ff (1971).
172. Hillery, idem.
173. Irish Times 20 August 1960.
174. Lemass, Address to the Solicitors' Apprentices Debating Society on the motion 'The morality of neutrality' text in Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, No.506, 5 December 1960.
175. Lemass, Interview with The Scotsman reprinted in Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs, No.516, 20 February 1961.
176. Lemass, Dail Debates 193.4 ff and 1321-24 (1962). In the latter Lemass admitted he had only recently read the North Atlantic Treaty, although 1315 ff, McQuillan quoted a Lemass statement reported by the Irish Press 26 September 1953 citing territorial integrity argument as a reason for not joining NATO.
177. Lemass, ibid 193.4 ff (1962).
178. Dail Debates, 194.989 (1962).
179. Farrell, op.cit. p.106.
180. Lemass' version of speech is in Dail Debates 193.4 ff and Moran's 193.966 (1962).
181. As cited in Dail by Browne, ibid 199.1149 (1963) and FitzGerald 327.1423 (1981) emphasis added.
182. Lemass, ibid 197.14 (1962).
183. Statement by Lemass to Council of Ministers, Brussels, 18 January 1962, reproduced in European Economic Community : Developments Subsequent to White Paper of 30 June 1961, (Pr.6613), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1962) pp.63-4.
184. Lemass read the Bonn Declaration in full to the Dail and reiterated the government's acceptance of it - Dail Debates, 193.15-18 (1962).
185. Lemass, ibid 220.1613 (1966).
186. Lynch, Taoiseach, ibid 241.882-3 (1969) and see Browne, 199.1149 ff (1963).
187. Lemass, ibid 197.19 ff (1962), he was being specifically questioned on this.
188. See FitzGerald, Seanad Eireann Debates 61.1833 ff (1966).
189. Lemass, Dail Debates 193.4 ff (1962).
190. Lemass, ibid 197.14 (1962), and see 195.457 (1962), 197.14 (1962) and 259.2444 ff (1972).
191. Blowick, ibid 191.2619 (1961).
192. Lemass, ibid 195.890 (1962).
193. Lynch, Taoiseach, ibid 227.4 ff (1967) and Lemass, 192.140 (1961).
194. Lynch, ibid 249.263 (1970).
195. Idem. In the summer of 1961 it had been acknowledged that some EFTA members felt "unable to subscribe to the Rome Treaty because of its possible political implications" but whilst this

- was a factor to be considered, it was reiterated the treaty said nothing directly about defence - Lemass, 189.958 (1961).
196. The Accession of Ireland to the European Communities, 1972, op.cit. p.57.
 197. Idem, and compare Lemass, Dail Debates 193.1483 (1962) and debate on Third Amendment to the Constitution Bill, 258.393 ff (1972).
 198. Hillery, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 260.1248 (1972).
 199. Trevor Taylor, European Defence Cooperation : Chatham House Papers - 24, (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs/ Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) pp.17-18 and Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, (Brussels, Office for Official Publications, 1978) articles 224-226, and 235.
 200. Thornley, Dail Debates 258.448 ff (1972).
 201. For the debate see ibid 257.1095-1142, 1286-1555, 1720-32 (1971) and 258.393-484 and 519-621 (1972) emphasis added. It is worth noting that in 1962 the Dail had been told there would be no referendum on any change in Ireland's militarily neutral position, since Ireland was a parliamentary democracy - Lemass, ibid 193.19 (1962).
 202. Cosgrave, ibid 228.799 ff (1967). Cosgrave was leader of the Opposition and in 1973 became Taoiseach.
 203. Cosgrave, ibid 247.1668 ff (1970) and 199.1188 ff (1963).
 204. Lynch, ibid 241.1155 ff (1969).
 205. Although 'at any time' was qualified to a highly conditional situation when the Community had developed and there was a common defence force - Hillery, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 246.1372 (1970). He also acknowledged this was a departure from previous policy.
 206. Lynch, ibid 241.631 ff (1969).
 207. Cosgrave, ibid 230.826 ff (1967).
 208. FitzGerald, ibid 241.1984 ff (1969).
 209. Lynch, ibid 241.969 (1969).
 210. Hillery, Interview with Irish Press, 2 December 1970.
 211. Hillery, Dail Debates 255.2121 ff (1971).
 212. Lynch, ibid 249.263 (1970).
 213. Booth, ibid 201.990 ff (1963).
 214. O.J. Flanagan, ibid 252.666 ff (1971).
 215. Hillery, ibid 249.1913 ff (1970).
 216. Hillery, ibid 255.2121 ff (1971).
 217. Haughey, ibid 230.1098 ff (1967).
 218. Hillery, ibid 247.2011 ff (1970) and 2068 ff.
 219. Hillery, ibid 249.1917 (1970).
 220. Hillery, ibid 255.2121 ff (1971).

221. The Accession of Ireland to the European Communities, 1972, op.cit. pp.57-58.
222. P. Keatinge, 'Odd Man Out? Irish Neutrality and European Security', International Affairs Vol.48 No.3 (July 1972) p.440.
223. Kavanagh quoting a statement by Lynch on television, Dail Debates 252.734 ff (1971).
224. FitzGerald, ibid 247.1933 ff (1970).
225. J.Keating, ibid 248.575 ff (1970) in reference to 1970 White Paper, Membership of the European Communities : Implications for Ireland (Pr1.1110), (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1970). See also C.C. O'Brien 247.1875 ff (1970).
226. Noel Browne, ibid 199.673 ff (1963).
227. O'Brien, ibid 247.1875 ff (1970).
228. Keating, ibid 248.687 and 575 ff (1970), Kavanagh 252.734 ff (1971), and Browne 191.303-4 (1961).
229. O'Brien, ibid 247.1875 ff (1970). Browne also made a similar point - 199.673 ff (1963).
230. O'Brien, ibid 247.1875 ff (1970).
231. O'Brien, idem.
232. FitzGerald, ibid 241.1984 ff (1969).
233. FitzGerald, ibid 247.1933 ff (1970) and see O'Kennedy, later Foreign Minister, 252.770 ff (1971) and O'Leary 242.78 ff (1969).
234. Senator Dooge, later Foreign Minister, Seanad Eireann, 69.1345-6.
235. Tully, Dail Debates 248.68 ff (1970). This was part of a wider debate epitomised by the contrast between Johan Galtung, The European Community : A Superpower in the Making, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1973) and Francois Duchene, 'The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence' in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager, A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community, (London, Macmillan, 1973) and Duchene 'A New European Defence Community', Foreign Affairs (October 1971) pp.69-82.
236. Ryan, Dail Debates 260.429 ff (1972) and 255.679 ff (1971).
237. Ryan, ibid 257.1286 ff (1971). He went on to say Irish membership would be welcomed by the Six "to show just how a neutral country can be a member of the EEC without having its right to remain neutral qualified in any way".
238. Ryan, ibid 255.679 ff (1971).
239. Dail Debates 254.2268 (1971). Ireland only joined the Political Committee per se of the Community in April 1972.
240. Hillery, ibid 264.21 (1972).
241. The Accession of Ireland to the European communities, 1972, op.cit. pp.58-60.
242. FitzGerald, 'Ireland and the EEC' in Ireland, Britain and Europe, op.cit. p.37-8 indicated seven possible ways the relationship with Britain might change.

243. See Lemass, Dail Debates 191.2571-80 (1961) and 230.742 ff (1967); Aiken 194.1412 ff (1962), 201.1073 ff (1963) and 230.887 ff (1967); Corish 230.782 ff (1967) and O'Leary 260.473 ff (1972).
244. Cosgrave, ibid, 159.127-146 (1956).
245. Cosgrave, ibid, 159.147-8 (1956). Compare de Valera 159.432-440 who saw no fundamental disagreement on policy.
246. C.C. O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs', in Owen Dudley Edwards (ed.), Conor Cruise O'Brien Introduces Ireland, (London, Deutsch, 1969) pp.130-131.
247. Costello, Dail Debates, 164.1231 ff (1957).
248. Costello, ibid 201.951-2 (1963).
249. McQuillan, ibid, 191.641-52 and 551 ff (1961). See also FitzGerald, 241.1984 ff (1969).
250. MacQueen, op.cit. pp.177-200, emphasis in original.
251. Henry Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy' in James N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, (New York, Free Press, 1969) p.268.
252. See MacQueen, op.cit. p.113, and Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, op.cit. p.66.
253. A.S. Cohan, The Irish Political Elite, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1972) p.71.
254. Aiken, Dail Debates, 201.1073 ff (1963), and Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.209 and Farrell op.cit. p.109.
255. FitzGerald, Seanad Eireann Debates 61.1833 ff (1966). See also Costello, Dail Debates 176.685 ff (1959) and Aiken 191.662 ff (1961) and 194.1412 ff (1962).
256. FitzGerald, Dail Debates, 241.1984 ff (1969); Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, op.cit. pp.87 and 93-4 and T. Desmond Williams, 'Irish Foreign Policy, 1949-1969' in J.J. Lee (ed.), Ireland 1945-1970, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1979) pp.144-5.
257. J.J. Lee, 'Sean Lemass', in Lee, ibid pp.22-3.
258. Ibid, pp.170-171. Lee was actually comparing Lemass and de Valera but it also applies to Lemass-Aiken comparison.
259. Cosgrave, Dail Debates, 159.139 ff (1956).
260. John A. Costello, Taoiseach, ibid 159.610 (1956).
261. Ireland-U.N. 1964, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 8 December 1964, op.cit. p.9.
262. Cosgrave, Dail Debates, 159.139 ff (1956).
263. Aiken, ibid 194.1304 ff (1962).
264. de Valera, ibid 164.1290 (1957).
265. Sherwin, ibid 176.566 (1959).
266. Costello, ibid 163.578 ff (1957).
267. Cosgrave, ibid 191.620 ff (1961).

268. Cosgrave, ibid 194.1355 (1962).
269. Aiken, ibid 164.25 ff (1957).
270. MacBride, ibid 159.591 ff (1956).
271. McQuillan, ibid 159.218 ff (1956).
272. Costello, ibid 163.1177 ff (1957).
273. O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, op.cit. p.24.
274. Booth, Dail Debates, 167.268 ff (1958).
275. Ireland-U.N. 1957, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 23 September 1957, op.cit. p.28.
276. O'Brien, 'Ireland, the United Nations and Southern Africa', op.cit. p.3.
277. Ireland-U.N. 1957, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 10 September 1957, op.cit. p.3.
278. Ireland-U.N. 1958, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 19 September 1958, op.cit. p.19.
279. Ireland-U.N. 1960, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 6 October 1960, op.cit. p.10 and Ireland-U.N. 1959, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 23 September 1959, op.cit. pp.9-19.
280. Ireland-U.N. 1958, Speeches by Aiken to General Assembly, 7 August and 19 September 1958, op.cit. pp.8 and 19, and speech to General Assembly 23 September 1959, Ireland-U.N. 1959, op.cit. pp.9-19.
281. See just some of his contributions on these matters:
Ireland-U.N. 1957, op.cit. pp.13-17; Ireland-U.N. 1958, pp.17-25, 29-38, 39-53; Ireland-U.N. 1959, pp.12-15 and 55-77;
Ireland-U.N. 1960, pp.27-34, 40-46 and 58-60; Ireland-U.N. 1961 pp.13-21; Ireland-U.N. 1962 pp.35-39; and Ireland-U.N. 1963 pp.17-18.
282. Ireland-U.N. 1958, Text of draft resolution submitted by Ireland, 17 October 1958, op.cit. p.39.
283. Ireland-U.N. 1961, Text of resolution submitted by Ireland and adopted, 4 December 1961, op.cit. pp.37-8 and Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.163.
284. Ireland-U.N. 1960, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 6 October 1960, op.cit. p.21.
285. Ireland-U.N. 1961, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 28 March 1961, op.cit. p.11.
286. Ireland-U.N. 1962, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 4 October 1962, op.cit. pp.6 ff.
287. Ireland-U.N. 1965, Speeches by Aiken, op.cit. pp.17-71.
288. Aiken, Dail Debates 214.194 ff (1965).
289. Aiken, ibid 221.2069 (1966).
290. See the debates in 1960 on Defence (Amendment) Bill - ibid 183.1875-1904, and Defence (Amendment) (No.2) Bill, 185.774 ff. This legislation allowed troops to be sent abroad. On peace-

- keeping see also 186.905 ff (1961), 159.209 ff (1956) and 208.1085 ff (1964); and Con Cremin, 'United Nations Peace-keeping Operations : An Irish Initiative 1961-1968', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1 No.4 (1984) pp.79-84. Cremin was Irish Ambassador to the United Nations 1964-1974.
291. Ireland-U.N. 1963, Speech by Aiken to General Assembly, 3 October 1963, op.cit. pp.26-7 and Dail Debates 188.144-6 (1961), 208.114,1382 (1964) and 214.1583 (1965).
 292. Hillery, Dail Debates 245.279 (1970).
 293. O'Kennedy, ibid 242.68 ff (1969).
 294. Hillery, ibid 241.1874 (1969) and for Aiken's views 235.1638 (1968), 236.502 and 1101 (1968), 237.1302 (1968) and 238.37 (1969).
 295. Hillery, ibid 255.1474 ff (1971).
 296. Hillery, ibid 242.1491 (1969).
 297. Aiken, ibid 239.403 (1969).
 298. Corish, ibid 164.1243 (1957).
 299. O'Brien, 'Ireland in International Affairs' in Edwards op.cit. p.130.
 300. For censure debate see Dail Debates 164.1169-1304 (1957). The censure was defeated 78:38.
 301. Lindsay, ibid 176.570 ff (1959).
 302. Boland, ibid 176.601-5 (1959).
 303. Costello, ibid 163.597 (1957).
 304. Quoted by Costello, ibid 182.768ff(1960).
 305. Dillon, ibid 167.287 (1958) and 176.543 (1959).
 306. Cosgrave, ibid 191.620 ff (1961) and 176.500 (1959).
 307. MacQueen op.cit. pp.177-200.
 308. Ibid pp.183-5.
 309. Ibid pp.185-192.
 310. Ibid p.198.
 311. FitzGerald, Seanad Eireann Debates, 61.1871 ff (1966).
 312. FitzGerald, Dail Debates, 241.1984 ff (1969).
 313. Introductory Commentary - Ireland-U.N. 1969 op.cit. p.5.
 314. See Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. pp.113-9 and 195-6 and Farrell op.cit. pp.114-117
 315. Quoted in Donald Harman Akenson, The United States and Ireland, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973) p.262.
 316. P. Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.114.
 317. For such details see the works of and references in John Darby, Conflict in Northern Ireland, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1976) especially 'Bibliography' pp.198-242, and Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, (London, Faber and Faber, 1971).

318. Ireland-U.N. 1969, Speech by Dr. Hillery to General Assembly, 26 September 1969, op.cit. p.40 and pp.5-46. For Ireland's arguments and a detailed account see Con Cremin, 'Northern Ireland at the United Nations, August/September 1969', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1 No.2 (1980) pp.67-73. Cremin was Ireland's Ambassador to the United Nations.
319. Lynch, Dail Debates 241.1401 ff (1969).
320. Introduced by Cosgrave, ibid 252.234 ff (1971).
321. Corish, ibid 241.1425 (1969).
322. Harte, ibid 241.1441 (1969).
323. The broadcast is reproduced in Keesings Contemporary Archives 1969-70, Vol.XVII (London, Keesing's Publications, 1969-70) p.23583A without the 'idly'. On field hospitals and refugee centres see Lynch, Dail Debates, 241.1401 ff (1969).
324. Read out by O'Donnell in Dail Debates 241.1466 ff (1969).
325. Gibbons, ibid 244.1682 (1970). A month later a further refugee centre opened. Peak occupancy occurred on 23 August 1969 and was 720.
326. FitzGerald, ibid 241.1505 ff (1969), and Lynch 241.1401 ff (1969).
327. Lynch, ibid 241.1401 ff (1969) and Tully 246.1690 (1970).
328. Kevin Boland, Up Dev!, (Dublin, Boland, n/d) p.44 and passim.
329. Ibid passim for a personal view of these events. See also motion on 'Nomination of Members of the Government', Dail Debates 246.641-1350 (1970).
330. Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, op.cit. p.115.
331. Ibid pp.117-8.
332. Corish, Dail Debates 258.1164 (1972).
333. Cosgrave, ibid 258.827 ff (1972).
334. Blaney, ibid 258.950 ff (1972).
335. Brennan, ibid 258.1120-1130 (1972).
336. Lemass/Corish, ibid 199.1035-6 (1963).
337. Aiken, ibid 191.672 ff (1961): emphasis added.

Chapter Nine : Independence or Solidarity? 1973-1982

The beginning of 1973 saw both entry into the European Community¹ and, a few weeks later, the formation of a new Coalition government after sixteen years of Fianna Fáil government.² In April 1973 the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Garret FitzGerald, held a 'Conference of Heads of Mission and other senior officials', telling the Dáil in his first major policy speech on 9 May that it had been "essential ... to re-examine at this time existing general guidelines and formulate new ones for future foreign policy". This re-examination being necessitated by the movement "towards greater interdependence" in the world economy; "the evolving situation in Northern Ireland" and; "the accession to membership of the European Communities ...".³ That accession had also as "a consequence and corollary" involved Ireland, for a year already, in European Political Cooperation (EPC).⁴ A quantitative and qualitative change in the scope of Irish foreign policy had again occurred, and in November 1974 FitzGerald observed that it was "still perhaps not fully recognised in Ireland ... the extent to which our membership of the EEC has brought us into a new and direct relationship with countries throughout the world between whom and ourselves until last year there was virtually no political or economic contact".⁵

The decade after January 1973, the first ten years of Community membership, saw successive Irish governments trying to steer a path for Ireland in the changed and changing environment. It culminated in severe challenges to Irish policy-makers arising out of Anglo-Irish relations and attempts to ameliorate the Northern Ireland crisis; the plans for the development of the European Community and EPC and; the Falklands conflict of 1982.⁶ All raised the question of whether after

sixty years of independence and ten years of Community membership, the basic principles of Irish security policy had been defined, established and agreed.

(i) due diligence

Throughout the postwar period the Irish had failed to meet the requirements of due diligence, and in the early 1970s some senior Irish army officers regarded the Irish defence effort as "criminally inadequate".⁷ A notable feature of the 1973-82 period, however, was the significant increase in the scale of that effort, as, for example, numbers in the P.D.F. became the highest in over twenty years.

Table 9.1 Numbers of Officers and men in the Permanent Defence Force in each year 1973-1982

Year	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Numbers	10,618	11,312	12,059	13,996	14,666	14,464	13,425
Year	1980	1981	1982				
Numbers	13,383	14,282	14,983				

Sources:

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1978, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981 - Prl.9034), Table 234 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March, 1973-78', p.251.

Dáil Debates 334:780 (1982).

Nonetheless there continued to be a shortfall compared to the Establishment figure of between ten and twenty percent during this period, although the relative shortfall was smaller than previously and was based on higher figures.⁸ The reason for the increased effort

was clearly "the very important task" of "supporting the State and State institutions and in particular supporting the largely unarmed ... Garda Siochana in their Border duties".⁹ During the Coalition period in office, 1973-1977, it was accepted that the "main pre-occupation" was internal security, and when Donegan, Minister for Defence, spoke of the government's determination to provide adequate resources for defence, he specifically linked this to ensuring "not only that our democratic institutions are safeguarded but also that the conditions of security and internal stability ... are maintained".¹⁰ They had to deal with "subversion", with "a group of people who are saying that the State must be pulled down". The army had a role in this struggle.¹¹ Only the army and the police stood "between anarchy and democracy".¹² In 1976 the Oireachtas, in fact, declared "that, arising out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State".¹³

The burdens this, and aiding the civil power, imposed upon the P.D.F. were significant.¹⁴ In the 1970s between two and three thousand members of the P.D.F. were "engaged in security duties in the Border area",¹⁵ and by 1982 the P.D.F. was providing 21,032 military parties for checkpoint duties and 11,244 parties for joint patrols with the Garda.¹⁶ They also had other "non-soldiering duties" in terms of assisting in the protection of explosives, vital installations and V.I.Ps, as well as participating in searches and prison guard duties, and bomb disposal.¹⁷ In addition to aiding the civil power in this area, the P.D.F. was also concerned to 'show the flag' and demonstrate the authority of the government. Evidence of it being stretched is provided by the fact that for most of the period some members of the First Line Reserve and of Second Line Reserve (An Forsa Cosanta Aitiuil - F.C.A.) were on full-time duty.¹⁸

Such was the strain that the government only acceded after very serious consideration to a request to contribute to United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Middle East in the autumn of 1973. Donegan, the Minister for Defence, admitted that "security duties are heavy", that the army was "under-established" and that the "removal ... of 300 officers and men has a much greater effect on us than the proportion of 300 to 11,000 would seem to represent". At the time, moreover, some members of the P.D.F. were serving 100 hours per week (35 hours of which was in barracks waiting on a call out).¹⁹ The government only agreed, given their own difficulties, because they felt so few other countries were acceptable, so that there was "little alternative but to do what we could even if ... puts our own domestic security under strain".²⁰

The strain apparently became too much with the Dublin and Monaghan bombings on 17 May 1974, which caused the government to seek "the temporary release of the Irish contingent" with UNEF II.²¹ It was the "exceptional strain imposed on the forces at home at present on security duties (that) made this step necessary",²² and which continued to limit the Irish contribution for a further three years.²³ It was only in the spring of 1977 that it was decided "in principle" that a major contingent could again be made available,²⁴ and in the summer of that year, a new Minister for Foreign Affairs, O'Kennedy, sought permission to allow 300 personnel to be made available to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNICYP), telling the Dáil that the government was "satisfied that a contingent can be made available ... given the increase in ... strength in recent years" of the P.D.F., which had increased by over three thousand between 1974 and 1977.²⁵

The increase in strength ameliorated some of the difficulties of the P.D.F., but the strains upon it were so severe that in the aftermath

of the May 1974 bombings, the Taoiseach, Liam Cosgrave, floated the idea of "voluntary local security service units" based on Garda stations to patrol local areas, although prevarication later hit the scheme, so that whilst plans were drawn up for it, they were not implemented.²⁶ The P.D.F., as noted, was helped by the Reserves, but the numbers in the First Line Reserve never topped a thousand, averaging nearer 600 during this period,²⁷ whilst the F.C.A. although nominally of the order of sixteen to twenty thousand, only had half of that number who did as much as 8-14 days annual training in addition to their weekly sessions.²⁸ Indeed, in 1975 the Minister for Defence, Donegan, said he was "thoroughly dissatisfied with the present situation regarding the F.C.A.", given their fall-out rates and cost, as well as the difficulties in giving them adequate training.²⁹ This dissatisfaction, together with the problems of the enlarged P.D.F. resulting from an expansion of nearly forty percent between 1973 and 1977, led to a re-think as to the organisation and structure of the Irish forces, which produced in September 1979, the first major re-organisation since 1959. The P.D.F. and F.C.A. were now to be separated into "combat and local defence forces respectively", which was, in effect, a return to the pre-1959 system.³⁰ Incidentally, despite the strain on the defence forces, the idea of some form of compulsory military service continued to be ruled out as antipathic to the Irish tradition.³¹

As Table 9.2 shows the period 1973-1982 also saw an increase in the financial resources allocated to defence, although interestingly its share of total supply services was below that of earlier years.³²

Table 9.2 Irish Defence Expenditure Totals, and as percentage of total supply services and Gross National Product (GNP), 1973-1982

	Year ended 31 March		April-December*		
	1973	1974	1974		
Defence Expenditure (£m)	29.735	32.873	30.006		
% of Total Supply Services	4.76	4.37	4.37		
% of GNP	1.1	1.1			
	Years ended 31 December				
	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Defence Expenditure (£m)	59.154	71.92	84.229	99.033	110.602
% of Total Supply Services	4.71	4.77	4.75	4.49	4.17
% of GNP	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5
	1980	1981	1982		
Defence Expenditure (£m)	140.676	169.276	208.3		
% of Total Supply Services	4.15	3.90	3.8		
% of GNP	1.6	1.6	1.7		

*In 1974 the financial year was changed to end on 31 December.

Sources:

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1978, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981, Pr1.9034), Table 250 'Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services', pp.266-7, and Table 238, 'Gross National Product at Current and Constant Market Prices, 1972-1978', p.257.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1980, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1983, Pl.1618), Table 258 'Issues from the Exchequer for Supply Services' pp.286-7, and Table 246 'Gross National Product at Current and Constant Market Prices, 1974-1980' p.278.

The Military Balance 1982-1983, (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982) p.47.

The Military Balance 1983-1984, (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983) pp.45 and 126.

These increases were significant, however, and outstripped inflation, so that they were increases in real terms. Between 1975 and 1980, for example, whilst the Consumer Price Index rose from 100 (Base : Mid-November, 1975 = 100) to 197.7 (mid-November 1980), defence expenditure rose from £59.154m to £140.676m, an increase of 138%.³³ A problem was, however, that this extra effort was again related to internal security and Northern Ireland requirements. In 1980, the Minister of Finance calculated that in 1975 the costs incurred in extra security arising out of the Northern Ireland situation was £20m for the P.D.F., in 1979 £40m and in 1980 about £57m, namely between approximately 33 and 40% of total expenditure on the P.D.F.³⁴ A report to the New Ireland Forum in 1983, put the total extra costs on security arising from Northern Ireland in the years 1973-1982 as between 19.7 and 25.6% of total expenditure on security, including P.D.F., prisons and police.³⁵ If this extra effort is discounted, the remaining effort, as a percentage of GNP, is of the traditional order of magnitude.³⁶

The level of commitment continued to attract criticism, most significantly perhaps from Lieut.-General Carl O'Sullivan in September 1982. O'Sullivan, who had been Chief of Staff of the P.D.F. between July 1976 and June 1981, was scathing about the inadequacies of the 1969 period, when the P.D.F. had even lacked combat uniforms, and claimed that whilst now strong enough to cope with internal security, the country's defence forces were still in no position to maintain the country's neutrality in the face of external aggression. They could not, for example, counter a Soviet attack from the North Atlantic. In 1979 the P.D.F. had compiled a review on what would be required to meet external aggression and maintain neutrality, a review which was influenced by O'Sullivan's trips to Sweden. The review concluded

that if Ireland wished to adopt a minimum deterrent posture to preserve its neutrality "around £500 million even at that time" would be needed to be spent immediately, "and even that would not have been enough to fight ... protracted war ...". The £500 million would only have provided the basics, such as radar and planes, and perhaps six or seven days ammunition. In 1979 the defence expenditure was only 22% of the £500 million, which was regarded only as a first step.

O'Sullivan personally favoured neutrality, "but ... if I was in the same position as Sweden".³⁷ Throughout the 1973-1982 period Ireland was not in such a position, and some officers believed there was "no will to militarily defend the Irish stance".³⁸ The enhanced resources had been used to confront internal security problems, and much of the effort could not be easily switched to meet external aggression.

The Irish performance led some senior Irish politicians to acknowledge that it was "scarcely possible to argue" that the purpose of the P.D.F. was "to provide 100 percent security against aggression". John Kelly, when Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, had gone on to argue that even states with greater resources than Ireland could not "guarantee to repel invaders ... without the help of an alliance", an option the Irish had chosen not to adopt.³⁹ In opposition he went somewhat further, arguing that if the rest of the western world felt the need of, and was "already taking part in a defensive alliance, then self-respect, if nothing else, should require us to review our supposed policy of neutrality".⁴⁰ This latter drew an immediate riposte from a Fine Gael colleague, Richie Ryan, who argued that the best contribution the Irish could make to their own defence and to the defence of Europe was to defend the island against a conventional attack, and that "Nobody could do it better",⁴¹ but Ryan attempted no detailed analysis of the relative strength of Ireland's

efforts as against putative belligerents, or as against the European neutrals, and it is difficult to ignore the professional O'Sullivan's judgement on Irish inadequacy.

This judgement is all the more relevant, since "defending the State against external aggression" was still regarded as the "primary role" of the P.D.F., although the Minister for Defence who made that statement, Barrett in 1981, admitted that the "primary role often tends to be glossed over".⁴² In the key March 1981 debate on defence and neutrality, Barrett went on to list the other roles as aiding the civil power; participating in U.N. peace-keeping missions; fishery protection; aiding civil defence and; general search, rescue and emergency service duties,⁴³ although it was officially acknowledged that whilst "a secondary defence objective, Aid to the Civil Power has become a major part of the Defence Forces operational employment throughout the 1970s and the 1980s".⁴⁴ It is noteworthy that whilst Barrett listed these roles, and spoke of the army as "the outward and practical manifestation of a nation's sovereignty and of its determination to maintain and protect that sovereignty", he made no explicit reference to the defence and upholding of neutrality. Indeed, in the key debate on neutrality, he preferred the formulation, of being determined "to resist attempts by any party to a conflict to usurp the State's non-belligerency status in time of war. It behoves a State such as Ireland, which is not committed to co-belligerency, to take in peacetime such defensive measures as will safeguard its security in time of war".⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the Irish did not take such measures to sufficient degree, as is exemplified by the equipment issue.

Keegan and English have noted, for example, that whilst a few armoured vehicles had been developed and produced abroad, and a few

Naval Service vessels built, "Ireland cannot be said to have a defence industry in the accepted sense of the word and almost all items of equipment, including even small arms ammunition, must be imported", the principal suppliers being Britain, Sweden, France, Belgium and West Germany.⁴⁶ As a senior Irish officer put it bluntly, "we do not even make one bullet".⁴⁷ It has been the policy to shop around for arms, looking for a combination of quality, price and service, without any 'political acceptability' tests,⁴⁸ but there have been problems in acquiring the weapons desired at the time desired.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, increased resources did lead to improvements in mobility and communication, with, for example, the purchase of armoured personnel carriers,⁵⁰ but the purchase of four tanks could still cause excitement, whilst only in 1979 did the Artillery Corps move into the missile age.⁵¹ Only in mid-1980 was a 105mm light gun introduced, an event described in the Defence Forces Handbook as a "milestone".⁵² Despite these improvements, significant equipment problems remained, for example, by the early 1980s the F.C.A's equipment was "largely out of date",⁵³ and O'Sullivan clearly had reservations.

One arm of the P.D.F. to be transformed was the Naval Service. Crucial in the transformation, however, was outside help in the form of a European Community grant to aid the Irish in building up their Naval Service to police the EEC 200 mile fisheries limit and the exclusive economic zone introduced in 1977, by which the Naval Service had 136,000 square nautical miles to patrol instead of 15,000 square nautical miles as previously. This aid was crucial since even prior to that expansion the Coalition government was clear that the "provision of a naval force on a scale sufficient to patrol our length of coastline is beyond the financial capabilities of this country".⁵⁴ However, the Community eventually agreed to contribute to Irish capital costs in

providing for patrolling the extended waters, and in July 1978 agreed to provide 46 million European units of account, or IR £31,173.00 for the period 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1982.⁵⁵ The Irish subsequently, in December 1978, submitted a programme totalling IR £60.5 million, the programme describing the need for six vessels (4 Deirdre class and 2 helicopter-bearing vessels) and five maritime aircraft.⁵⁶ If completed, the programme would have added to the three minesweepers used for inshore patrols and the training ship Setanta, whereas in March 1977 the then Minister for Defence, Flanagan, had argued Ireland needed at least eighteen extra ships.⁵⁷ In fact, whilst four Deirdre class vessels were acquired (Deirdre 1972, Emer 1977, Aoife 1979 and Aisling 1979), the helicopter-vessels were delayed, the second being ultimately shelved, since they had, in effect, to be paid for by the Irish themselves. The armaments on the vessels, each of the Deirdre class having a Bofors 40mm gun on a powered mount, and two single Oerlikon guns, was of Irish choice and at their expense.⁵⁸

Despite the Community help, Faulkner, Minister for Defence, was quite clear in June 1980 that whilst the expansion had taken place for fishery protection purposes, the vessels were "available to participate as required in other Naval Service functions".⁵⁹ The provision of Community money led inevitably to questions as to whether "this agreement might get us involved in a military alliance?", to which the reply was "There is not the slightest danger of that", since the vessels would be under the Irish flag.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, in 1978 Flanagan, in opposition, asked about proposals for an "EEC navy", only to be told that no such proposals had been put to Ireland, although the Agriculture Committee of the European Parliament had made some recommendations along those lines.⁶¹

In spite of the increase, the Naval Service remained small for an island state, and it still faced problems of manpower, in 1982, for example, being 17% short of Establishment,⁶² although two years earlier, Faulkner, Minister for Defence, when asked directly whether there were enough men to man all the vessels in an emergency, had replied "Yes, just about enough".⁶³ It also had problems in detecting and prohibiting violations of Irish territorial waters, since as Taoiseach, Mr. Haughey was amazed to discover that Ireland could not flush out a Soviet submarine,⁶⁴ whilst in 1982 the Minister for Defence, could not say whether any had been detected.⁶⁵

The Air Corps also benefited from the increased concern with fisheries protection,⁶⁶ but other improvements were also made. The Vampires were replaced by Fouga Magister CM 170s in 1976, and in 1977 10 Siai Marchetti SF260W Warriors replaced the Chipmunks and Provosts. The Air Corps also possessed 9 helicopters, including a small provision for troop-carrying. Nonetheless, its capability was small with a 'fighter squadron' of 6 Fouga Magister CM170s, and perhaps a dozen or so combat aircraft.⁶⁷

The Irish, despite the increases, still failed to meet the criteria of due diligence. Indeed, speaking on behalf of Ireland to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly in 1982, Noel Dorr admitted "we are small, militarily insignificant ... and have acknowledged our own vulnerability. Our armed forces are about the same size, and serve the same peacekeeping and other purposes, as those which every country would be allowed to maintain even in a disarmed world".⁶⁸ Such a state is, in the words of Clarke, "incapable of carrying out its obligations".⁶⁹

(ii) recognition of position by others

In the full glare of publicity in March 1981 the Dáil rejected the suggestion that it reaffirm "the principle of the neutrality of Ireland in international affairs and declares that our foreign and defence policies will continue to be based on this principle". It also rejected the view that "in accordance with our traditional policy of neutrality", it needed "to establish without doubt the reality of ... neutrality and ... resolve to seek membership of the Non-Aligned Nations of the world", in order to strengthen the forces of peace.⁷⁰ The government majority rejected these notions on the argument that "Political neutrality or non-alignment is incompatible with ... membership of the European Community, and with our interests and our ideas ...",⁷¹ although in winding-up the debate, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian Lenihan, declared "We are neutral in a military sense, but we are not neutral in a political sense. That is the net position".⁷² The Dáil also rejected an amendment confirming "that a defence pact with the United Kingdom has not been mentioned in the current discussions with the U.K. Government and that it is not part of the joint studies now under way".⁷³

It was doubts on this question that led to the debate, the doubts arising from the 8 December 1980 Haughey-Thatcher meeting which agreed to give "special consideration" to "the totality of relationships within these islands. For this purpose they have commissioned joint studies covering a range of issues ... including ... security matters ...".⁷⁴ Press speculation in both Britain and Ireland suggested that defence had been raised by Haughey himself, although in the Dáil he initially refused to answer whether joint defence arrangements were under discussion on the grounds of confidentiality.⁷⁵ On the other hand, Humphrey Atkins, the British Secretary of State for Northern

Ireland, in February 1981 had said defence was "something, no doubt, that can be talked about".⁷⁶ It was only in the March debate that Haughey stated "unequivocally that the Government are not discussing or negotiating any kind of secret agreement on defence with Britain or with any other country or group of countries",⁷⁷ although the Opposition wondered as to "the significance of the word 'secret' ...".⁷⁸

The furore was significant, since some perceived that Irish neutrality was "now at an end", that "there was not a willingness on the part of Ireland to maintain her neutral position in future".⁷⁹ Moreover, a full diplomatic gallery heard the explicit rejection of an affirmation of either neutrality or non-alignment, and instead acceptance of an anodyne motion that "Dáil Éireann confirms the principles which have guided the defence policy of the Government and their predecessors".⁸⁰ This despite the fact that as previous chapters have shown, and FitzGerald as Opposition Leader pointed out, "there is no set of common principles that have guided ... defence policy ...".⁸¹ In the early 1980s the Dáil also failed to act on the 1980 Labour Party Conference decision that "neutrality ... be affirmed permanently by amendment of the national Constitution", although Labour was in Coalition government for much of the time.⁸²

At this time, further doubts were raised about the Irish position and perceptions of it arising out of the Irish response to the Genscher/Colombo proposals for formalising and expanding E.P.C.⁸³ Whilst this will be dealt with more fully below, under variable (iv),⁸⁴ it is noteworthy that the Irish stance in mid-1981 caused at least one leading European figure, Piet Dankert, to query whether Irish policy on neutrality remained the same.⁸⁵ Confusion persisted over the summer as to what Ireland had agreed or would accept, and the position was only partially restored by the London Report of October 1981,⁸⁶ and

Lord Carrington's explanation, as President-in-Office of the Community, that it was of particular interest to Ireland, "because they are not members of NATO, they are neutral" and that what had been agreed was "certainly not going to impinge on defence or embarrass the Irish".⁸⁷

The Irish position was also weakened by the continuing failure to be directly involved in the Non-Aligned Movement, although private consideration was given to attending the New Delhi summit as a 'Guest',⁸⁸ and the public repudiation of membership in March 1981. When asked whether the lack of any invitation to attend the Movement's conference meant that most of the non-aligned felt "we are not non-aligned ...", the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lenihan, did not answer directly, but argued there was "a difference between non-alignment and neutrality", and Ireland happened to be one of the countries "genuinely totally committed to neutrality".⁸⁹

The Irish regarded the Non-Aligned Movement as "diffuse",⁹⁰ and felt "many countries within the non-aligned movement ... perhaps are less nonaligned ... than we are ... membership or otherwise of this movement is not in any way a comment on the consistency of the foreign policy being pursued".⁹¹ Many members of the movement were in any case "very heavy users of ... military hardware".⁹² The Irish preferred to be "objective", to avoid "group membership", so as to avoid "constraining" themselves,⁹³ although, at times, they tried to establish close contacts with states such as Yugoslavia.⁹⁴

Ireland also remained outside the Neutral and Non-aligned group (N.N.A.) at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) meetings. Indeed, prior to the Madrid review conference it was made clear that a "major part of our preparatory work is being carried out jointly with our partners in the European Community", since it was felt "a joint approach " was "likely to carry more weight than proposals with

a single sponsor".⁹⁵ Whilst Ireland had "working contacts with ... other groups" it did "not participate in their meetings".⁹⁶ Nonetheless, at times the close Community/NATO relationship created an impression in some third party minds that Ireland was involved in the NATO caucus.⁹⁷ The Irish, on the contrary, have argued that their "special position" was recognised, for example, by Genscher, the German Foreign Minister, asking them to "make the necessary contacts with other countries outside NATO ... in an attempt to get talks going".⁹⁸

Nonetheless, in general, the Irish fell foul of the fact that ties binding a state to others are often barriers separating them from others, that membership in one group implies non-membership in others.⁹⁹ Interestingly, a survey on neutrality and nonalignment taken among Arab League and Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) members, for example, found that "not a single state which responded regarded Ireland as either 'neutral' or 'nonaligned'".¹⁰⁰

At the U.N. Ireland continued to distance itself from the non-aligned in a number of votes. It refused "to support guerilla activities"¹⁰¹ and "unsubstantiated allegations" against friendly countries, as well as opposing the increasing tendency to introduce into resolutions on principles, matters which they found offensive, for example, references to Zionism in resolutions on racism.¹⁰² On the other hand, at the same time, Ireland was voting with an alternative group, and member states of the Community were "increasingly viewed by third countries as a coherent force in international relations", Ireland increasingly being "regarded as a Community state" and "identified with the Community caucus in international conferences".¹⁰³ Keatinge agrees that Community states "clearly form an important diplomatic 'bloc'",¹⁰⁴ whilst the biannual Developments in the European Communities reports of the Irish government are replete with references to the Community states

adopting "common positions",¹⁰⁵ achieving "coordination of their position" or having found it "possible to harmonise successfully the various attitudes", leading to pursuing "on agreed policy",¹⁰⁶ or, on occasion "a common foreign policy".¹⁰⁷

Ireland has self-confessedly, as O'Kennedy told the General Assembly, been "one of the 'Nine'",¹⁰⁸ this being perhaps most pronounced when the Irish have held the Presidency of the Community. In 1979, for example, O'Kennedy spoke to the U.N. General Assembly, "On behalf of the European Community and its nine member States and as Foreign Minister of Ireland" and his speech was full of references to "we", and "the Nine", and only towards the end did O'Kennedy say, "I should now like as Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland to touch on a number of issues of particular concern to us in Ireland".¹⁰⁹ As President, the Irish were responsible for almost daily coordination of the Community states' position, for "negotiating on behalf of the Community with other regional groups ... speaking on behalf of the Community ... and ... delivering explanations of vote ...".¹¹⁰

Ireland clearly "does not today act in isolation. We face the world in partnership within the European Community", seeking "together" to resolve common problems.¹¹¹ This reached a certain apogee perhaps in the "concerted action" taken with regard to sanctions against Iran in 1980, and the similar action over Poland, Afghanistan and the Middle East.¹¹² On Iran it was made quite clear that it was the Foreign Ministers of the Community who "decided to take certain measures", that Ireland "acted in conjunction with our Community partners", and that "as one of the nine partners", it "could not stand apart", although as will be seen it did just that in 1982.¹¹³ Irish governments themselves have admitted the Community "is increasingly regarded by the external world as a coherent entity in world affairs".¹¹⁴

On the other hand, the record of Community states on E.P.C. is at best "mixed" and there is no really common foreign policy.¹¹⁵ Whilst "a pattern of solidarity has been reached, it is by no means complete or wholly predictable", and there is evidence that the Irish have "consistently maintained their freedom of manoeuvre".¹¹⁶ Certainly, on occasion the Irish have deviated from the Community 'norm', and in 1975-1977 period they were amongst the "minority voting group" of Community states most often.¹¹⁷ Foot writing in 1979 claimed her analysis tended "to reduce the credibility of the claim that the Community has become recognised as a united political force at the U.N.", and that the issues they disagreed upon were "the major ones",¹¹⁸ although increasingly rarely was "the Community split for or against a resolution".¹¹⁹ The Irish divergences occurred mostly on issues regarded as important before "involvement in E.P.C., namely, support for the process of decolonisation and self-determination and advocacy of effective measures of arms control and disarmament",¹²⁰ as well as Southern Africa and Third World issues generally.¹²¹

Irish officials, therefore, argue that whilst "aligned" they have not lost "independence on voting or action" and that third parties, especially the Third World, look at Irish U.N. behaviour and perceive that it is different from other Community states on these issues.¹²² Irish ministers have asserted their continuing ability "to act in isolation if we so wish"¹²³ and to speak "in a reasonably independent and disinterested manner".¹²⁴ Moreover, officials observe that whilst the Community Presidency may "heighten the profile of the country ... 'deviant' voting behaviour ... also serves to heighten Ireland's profile and increase the impact of its vote ...".¹²⁵ They also point to the election to the Security Council in 1980 as recognition of Ireland's position,¹²⁶ and to the continuing acceptability

of Ireland for U.N. peace-keeping missions. The request for Irish participation in U.N.E.F. II in 1973, for example, was regarded as "a recognition of our impartiality and independent and constructive attitude",¹²⁷ and more generally that the "fact that we are not members of any military alliance certainly enables us to play a role" in peace-keeping,¹²⁸ although as demonstrated in the previous chapter it did not necessarily represent an imprimatur of the Irish position.¹²⁹

Perhaps the most distinctive Irish action in heightening its profile was its refusal to continue to participate in Community sanctions against Argentina after the sinking of the General Belgrano. On 2 May 1982 the Irish government announced their anxiety to "re-affirm Ireland's traditional role of neutrality in relation to armed conflicts",¹³⁰ with as Keatinge has noted the resort to neutrality making "Irish neutrality a diplomatic issue, not for some ill-defined future but for the present ... it exposed the Irish position on avoidance of collective defence to a much greater extent than hitherto ...".¹³¹ Ireland also heightened its profile by seeking an "immediate" meeting of the Security Council on 4 May, and in attempting to use its Security Council membership to ameliorate the situation, but in a way which, like sanctions, distanced it from Britain.¹³²

These actions in 1982 followed earlier attempts to self-consciously distinguish the Irish position from that of Britain. This was partly done by emphasising Ireland's initial communautaire approach to the Community, and also by the distinctive policy in 1974-5 of trying to remain a member, whatever Britain did. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was clear that this led others "to see Irish membership in a different light to hitherto", breaking the perceived link in British and Irish membership.¹³³ This severed link was

reinforced by Irish participation in the European Monetary System (E.M.S.) in 1979, whilst Britain stayed aloof, and the consequential breaking of the link with sterling.

The distinctiveness of the Irish position in the Community and E.P.C. was given added emphasis by the Irish insistence upon the distinction between defence and security in the discussions following the Genscher/Colombo proposals, with ultimately both the London Report of 1981 and Lord Carrington recognizing Ireland's special position, specifically by the reference in the London Report to "the different situations of the member states" and the agreement "to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach" to E.P.C., which had allowed discussion of "the political aspects of security".¹³⁴ FitzGerald as Taoiseach saw this as explicit recognition of the Irish position in its reference to differing situations among the member states; in maintaining and not expanding E.P.C. and; in limiting discussions to the political aspects of security.¹³⁵ It continued to be argued that there was "no necessity" to make clear the Irish intention to stay outside military pacts to Community partners since it was not an issue and had never been raised.¹³⁶ This, in itself, is perhaps a comment on the perception by others of Ireland.

Indirect evidence that the Soviets were aware of the Irish position, at least theoretically, may be found in the Pravda attacks upon those whom it regarded as trying to undermine Irish neutrality.¹³⁷ Soviet-Irish relations were transformed in 1973 by the signing of a joint communiqué in New York on 29 September announcing the decision to exchange diplomatic missions at embassy level. It is noteworthy, however, that the communiqué made no reference to Irish neutrality,¹³⁸ although Marcus Wheeler has argued that one of the Soviet motivations

was "the wish to be seen to enjoy normal relations with a small, but increasingly internationally respected neutral state", but no evidence is produced to support this.¹³⁹ Following this a trade agreement was signed and FitzGerald visited the Soviet Union in 1976.¹⁴⁰ More generally too, in this period the Soviet view of the European Community became a little more relaxed, and whilst it continued to refuse to establish diplomatic relations with the Community, it did enter negotiations with it over fisheries, whilst between 1977 and 1980 negotiations also took place between the Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, although no agreement was reached.¹⁴¹

The development of relations with the Soviet Union was only part of a rapid expansion of Irish diplomatic relations in 1973-1977. In that period Ireland virtually doubled its diplomatic relations, although in marked contrast to the pre-1973 period, many were now 'Non-resident' missions.¹⁴² Whilst trade was important, and the growing participation in the world, it was the "European Community which provided the impetus", especially the prospect of holding the Presidency.¹⁴³ FitzGerald, however, had recognised in May 1973 that Irish policy could "be limited by the range of our existing diplomatic representation" which was predominantly orientated towards Western Europe and North America. He recognised that an active Irish role required "a greater range of contacts".¹⁴⁴ Nonetheless, ten years later, Keatinge still felt Irish diplomatic relations looked "thinly spread", and that Ireland trailed behind its Community partners (except Luxembourg).¹⁴⁵ Interestingly, where no Irish mission existed, Irish citizens in trouble were still advised to contact the British embassy.

In the 1973-1982 period third parties must have found it difficult to determine the real nature of Irish policy given the convolutions, particularly of the 1980-1982 period.

(iii) disavowal of help

The inadequacies of Irish 'due diligence', moreover, had led to a "conventional external view" that "implicitly Ireland relies upon the armed forces of the West for its security, and thus maintains armed forces totally inadequate for effective self-defence",¹⁴⁶ that "Irish neutrality is ... an illusion and something of a pious fraud indulged in under the implicit security of the NATO umbrella".¹⁴⁷ Whilst some in Ireland have recognised that "neutrality was incompatible with the incidental protection of a NATO umbrella",¹⁴⁸ a recent Minister for Defence, Patrick Cooney, argued in 1983 that the Irish could "confidently rely on (the Western bloc) to protect our territory should any state or combination of states hostile to the Western world threaten it".¹⁴⁹ More generally, the official position was that Ireland would "protect and defend" itself,¹⁵⁰ albeit within the limits of its resources,¹⁵¹ although even some who took this view actually had to countenance that in certain circumstances "the best we could hope for would be to defend and hold an area which would allow us to hold out for third party assistance ...".¹⁵²

Despite this, at least until 1980, no formal arrangements for joint defence were considered or made, and no proposal was made or received concerning membership of NATO, or any military alliance.¹⁵³ In 1980-81 this was called into question by both the Anglo-Irish talks and the Genscher/Colombo discussions, but these will be dealt with under the next variable (iv),¹⁵⁴ and no concrete arrangements for help in any case emerged. Whatever of formal alliance, the Irish continued to maintain close ties with several states on defence matters and in the years 1974-76, for example, 170 personnel went on 86 courses abroad in Britain, United States, France, Luxembourg, Holland, Italy and Sweden,¹⁵⁵ whilst some senior officers were frequent

visitors to Aldershott and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as, in 1978-1979, to Sweden to examine Swedish defence.¹⁵⁶ A key factor promoting the British link was language.

Other forms of cooperation also took place, most notably in the four-way relationship between the Irish Army, Garda Siochana, Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army. Whilst the P.D.F., "restricted as it is to aiding the civil power, was not able to talk directly with the R.U.C. or the British Army", a "four-way link-up across the border" developed as communications improved, and cross-border cooperation was generally close.¹⁵⁷ This, however, was not formalised in the 1973-1982 period and did not amount to an alliance,¹⁵⁸ and neither did the Community contribution to building-up the Irish Naval Service.¹⁵⁹ Clearly, however, certain aspects of the relationship with Britain remained close.

(iv) freedom of decision and action

The Irish have appreciated that the prospect of autonomy of action stems partly from having one's eggs in different baskets and in avoiding over-dependency,¹⁶⁰ and in the post-1973 period a striking feature of the Irish economy has been the "very marked pattern of export diversification" as the "trend towards a diminished concentration on the U.K. market, which had been evident in the decade preceding membership, continued".¹⁶¹ The U.K.'s share of the Irish export market dropped from 54.7% in 1973 to 38.8% in 1982, as can be seen from Table 9.3, although the import dependence upon the U.K. appeared relatively static.

Table 9.3 Trade by areas as a percentage of total imports and exports, 1973, 1977 and 1982

% Imports from	1973	1977	1982
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	50.7	48.2	48.0
Rest of EEC	21	19.9	21.8
EFTA	5.9	4.3	4.5
Dollar Countries*	8	10	14.1
Eastern Europe*	<1	2	1.3
% Exports to			
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	54.7	47	38.8
Rest of EEC	21.3	29.2	31.8
EFTA	2.7	3.1	4.2
Dollar Countries*	11	7.5	8.4
Eastern Europe*	<1	0.7	0.8

* Figures for these areas reflect orders of magnitude only.

Sources: Derived from

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1972-73, (Pr1.4053) (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1976), Table 121(a), 'Trade by Areas' p.161, Table 114, 'Value of Imports from each of the Principal Countries' p.154 and Table 115, 'Value of Total Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries, p.154.

Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1978, (Pr1.9034) (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981), Table 129, 'Trade by Areas' p.170, Table 131, 'Value of Imports from each of the Principal Countries' p.188 and Table 132, 'Value of Exports consigned to each of the Principal Countries', p.188.

Trade Statistics of Ireland, December 1982, (Dublin, Central Statistics Office, 1983) Table 7B 'Percentage Trade by Area', p.11.

The import figures conceal a shift from U.K. manufactured goods to increased proportion of energy requirements,¹⁶² and ten years after entering the Community, the Irish economy remained "heavily trade-dependent ... essential supplies of materials and fuels" needing to be imported, and with exports and imports constituting "over 120 percent of Irish Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a figure twice the EEC average" in this period.¹⁶³ Moreover, the Community states, including Britain, retained a preponderant position in Irish trade, with indeed Irish external trade being conducted within the framework of the Common External Tariff (CET) and the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) of the Community.¹⁶⁴ Despite the diversification, a significant dependence upon the U.K. remained. Nevertheless, in December 1974 FitzGerald felt able to speak of the "new relationship" with Britain in the new "multilateral context" and of the "considerable effect" of this and of the reduced economic dependence upon Britain, "not just economically but politically and psychologically".¹⁶⁵

Evidence of this was demonstrated in the broad consensus in 1974-1975 that Ireland should seek to stay in the Community, even if Britain withdrew, a stark contrast to the pre-entry attitudes.¹⁶⁶ It was acknowledged British withdrawal "would pose some problems",¹⁶⁷ but the Irish felt they should stay "as a matter of principle and economic advantage" as well as because of "political obligation".¹⁶⁸ Similarly, in 1978-1979 the Irish, albeit somewhat hesitantly, agreed to participate

in the European Monetary System (EMS), although Britain did not. The problems involved the link with sterling, the trade relationship with Britain, the common currency on the island, and the general levels of Irish economic development. However, "the Irish were offered substantial inducements, in the form of so-called 'resource transfers', to join the EMS", and those eased the decision, although it was still difficult.¹⁶⁹ Ireland joined the EMS at its commencement, and "on 30 March 1979, ... adherence to the EMS intervention limits forced the Central Bank of Ireland to fix the value of the Irish pound below that of sterling", breaking the link of 150 years.¹⁷⁰ The Irish, fundamentally, preferring multilateral to bilateral constraint.

In 1978 O'Kennedy acknowledged a series of constraints faced Irish policy-makers, recognising that they produced a "framework" which created "the limits within which we must determine our policies and our attitudes", although he remained adamant that neither the "present situation nor ... past choices can wholly determine what our future will be", and that there were still choices to be made.¹⁷¹ One such was the question of alliance membership.

In May 1973 FitzGerald made clear that the Irish attitude remained "one of not wishing to become involved in any pre-existing defence organisation such as NATO or WEU", and that they desired "to make more explicit distinction ... between a possible independent European defence body in the more distant future" and existing-alliances. Ireland did not wish the Community to become "a power bloc", nor to "evolve as an element of NATO". Instead it should evolve independently.¹⁷² When specifically asked what the difference was between NATO and a future European arrangement, FitzGerald resorted to a reference to the origins of NATO and its "balancing function" in a

divided Europe, and then claimed that "European defence is quite ... different", since it would arise out of a European federation, which naturally would wish to defend itself. He clearly saw, however, that this was not likely in the foreseeable future.¹⁷³ Irish governments continued to give undertakings not to consider joining NATO, and in February 1981 resurrected the argument "that we were not able, and are still not able" to join NATO, "because of its implications for the Six County area situation".¹⁷⁴

It also became routine to assert that joining "the EEC did not entail any military or defence obligations for Ireland. The Community have not got a common defence policy".¹⁷⁵ This was made somewhat problematical, however, by Fianna Fáil governments continuing to accept that "in the event of political developments occurring in Europe and in the event of a situation arising ... (where) the Community of which we were a member were under attack, then obviously we would face our obligations".¹⁷⁶ However, even Fianna Fáil were conditional in their commitment, predicating it upon "full political union",¹⁷⁷ and arguing that "defence arrangements within the Community would have to be consequent upon and following upon the achievement of an acceptable political union",¹⁷⁸ although they occasionally caused trouble for themselves by reiterating Lynch's statement of July 1969 that they were interested in the defence of Community territories, with the doubt as to whether this implied at the moment or in the future.¹⁷⁹ Dooge, as Coalition Foreign Minister, in December 1981 when asked specifically whether Ireland was under any current obligation to defend a Community partner was clear that "Ireland is under no such obligation", and did "not feel committed to act" in such a way.¹⁸⁰ All were happier talking of the future, with Haughey in 1981 suggesting

that the question of Ireland and Community defence could be opened, "when full economic and monetary union has been achieved, and when Ireland's per capita income is at least 80 percent of the Community average and rising, instead of 61 percent as it is today ...".¹⁸¹

Not surprisingly the Irish were somewhat disconcerted in November 1981 to see the proposed British, French, Italian and Dutch contribution of a peace-keeping force in Sinai described "as a European, or EEC contingent", and represented as "The EEC's first-ever military decision".¹⁸² The Irish were insistent it was no such thing, but only "a decision of those four countries" and all that the EPC members had done was to confirm that such a force "was entirely compatible with the Community policy which had been declared at Venice".¹⁸³ However, the period 1980-1982 saw more substantial challenges to Irish attitudes.

In May 1980 it was reported by the Sunday Times that Mr. Haughey was to present Mrs. Thatcher with a "package of proposals aimed at transforming the Northern Ireland problem" and that the package included "Anglo-Irish cooperation on defence ... to ease British qualms about Ireland's traditional neutrality".¹⁸⁴ No such suggestion appeared in the communiqué,¹⁸⁵ but Haughey subsequently refused in the Dáil to explicitly reject the possibility of a deal over defence, although he flatly rejected the suggestion of a return to the Commonwealth.¹⁸⁶ At the end of the year doubts re-surfaced given the 8 December agreement to examine "the totality of relationships", including "security matters",¹⁸⁷ and with Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, saying that "everything was on the table".¹⁸⁸ Early in 1981, the Daily Telegraph claimed that the Irish were reviewing neutrality and considering offering a bilateral defence agreement in return for

concessions over Northern Ireland, although apparently NATO membership was still ruled out. It claimed "Mr. Haughey is known to have discussed" these questions, and was influenced by the realization "that sooner or later they will have to abandon the stance of neutrality" given European developments.¹⁸⁹ Even Sile de Valera (Eamon de Valera's grand-daughter) appeared ready to countenance such a deal.¹⁹⁰

In March 1981, however, Mrs. Thatcher ruled out a bilateral defence treaty,¹⁹¹ and on 11 March 1981 Haughey denied "unequivocally" that any secret arrangement was being discussed with anyone, although he did say that when "a satisfactory political solution is arrived at, we would of course have to review what would be the most appropriate defence arrangements for the island as a whole".¹⁹² The Irish Times noted that the eventual possibility of a pact had not been ruled out, and that there was little doubt the matter had been raised, but that clearly Haughey had had second thoughts.¹⁹³ It is difficult to be definite about what occurred, but it is clear that at least some in Dublin recognised that a deal with Britain over Northern Ireland could not avoid defence.¹⁹⁴

If the old issue of a deal with Britain could cause difficulty, so too periodically did the new relationship with the Community, although despite some initial fears that EPC might be "the thin end of the wedge", Ireland settled into it "fairly comfortably", finding it "very tolerant" and allowing "genuine diversity". Officials claim that Ireland's "special position" was accepted, and that there was no case of "8 NATO v. Ireland", the division being more likely to be "big v. small".¹⁹⁵ Ireland appreciated the "non-institutionalised, intergovernmental" nature of EPC and that it operated "pragmatically

and by consensus".¹⁹⁶ It denied that EPC could be equated with a common foreign policy, on the grounds that it lacked instruments and an internal union, as well as being limited by the need for consensus and the historical divergencies.¹⁹⁷

Nonetheless, it was the framework within which Irish policy-makers worked and it has occasionally been regarded as exhibiting a tendency towards "groupthink"¹⁹⁸ as the participants develop a "European reflex" from the habit of consultation, allowing them to see the "collective dimension" of issues, and making it "normal" to search "for consensus".¹⁹⁹ It may also be argued that "the various collective actions of the Ten ... gradually constitute a policy line from which it is difficult to depart",²⁰⁰ and that as the London Report of 1981 put it, political cooperation became "a central element in the foreign policies of all member states".²⁰¹

The Irish, then, found a certain "in-built pressure towards consensus"²⁰² and the need for "give and take".²⁰³ It was accepted that the question of balancing an independent role and the EPC role was "difficult", and that there was a "certain dilution of capacity to act completely independently",²⁰⁴ it being necessary to "accept a compromise on some issues about which we feel concern". The Irish accepted "a serious commitment to try and reach a common position" but also argued that the obligation, "though binding in the sense that we have committed ourselves to co-ordinate our policies, is not absolute since we are not obliged to reach agreement".²⁰⁵ EPC, however, was regarded as "not so much a constraint ... as an opportunity",²⁰⁶ since a small country could not decisively influence events "by its own actions",²⁰⁷ whereas the Community states acting together "carry much greater weight than anything which a small nation like ours could achieve in isolation".²⁰⁸ Some officials believed, indeed, that

Ireland now had a greater importance than when it was "free-floating".²⁰⁹

Nonetheless, when "fundamental interests" were at stake, Ireland managed to pursue an "independent role",²¹⁰ still being "free to act in isolation if ... wish(ed)",²¹¹ and still being able to speak and act "in a reasonably independent and disinterested manner".²¹² As has been seen, Ireland was prepared to take a minority view, and even stand alone apart from its EPC partners on a number of issues,²¹³ although it can be argued that "its stand on particular issues has altered. Rather than adopting a 'yes' or 'no' vote, Ireland may now opt to abstain".²¹⁴

More generally, Ireland adhered "quite closely"²¹⁵ to the predominant EPC view on a range of issues such as CSCE, Poland, Afghanistan, the southern enlargement, the Euro-Arab dialogue, and generally on the Middle East, despite reservations about putative parallels between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the IRA. Generally, Ireland acted as a part of the Community.

In acting in the world, many of Ireland's policies were touched upon and constrained by the Community treaties. Given the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), for example, Ireland was no longer free to conclude bilateral trade agreements with non-member countries, although like other Community states it had retained "some independence of action" outside CCP by the conclusion of cooperation agreements.²¹⁶ Lome I and II straddled treaty and non-treaty areas and also constrained Irish policy. Both agreements were concluded under the Irish Presidency, and the Irish claimed a role in their successful conclusion. In addition, both the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy, amongst other policies, had external impacts, and contributed to Ireland's interactions with the world being heavily

influenced by the Community, and reinforced the notion of Ireland as part of the Community.

Ireland, certainly until 1982, also showed it was one of the Community by taking part in sanctions with its partners. Whilst the sanctions agreed were largely "minimal and ... informal",²¹⁷ they were evidence of commonality and solidarity. They were imposed against Iran, albeit on "an almost inter-governmental pattern", although there was some Commission involvement.²¹⁸ Moreover, Lenihan in introducing the measures was clear that they followed a decision of the Nine, and that Ireland was acting "in conjunction with ... (its) Community partners", that as "one of the nine partners", it "could not stand apart".²¹⁹ In addition, collective action was taken against the Soviet Union over Afghanistan and Poland, in the first case utilising CAP regulations and in the second invoking CCP. Interestingly, whilst the Greeks, for political reasons, made an economic case to opt out of the latter sanctions,²²⁰ the Irish did not argue any special case with respect to 'neutrality'. The question of sanctions and Community solidarity took a different turn in 1982.

The Irish condemned at the outset the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands and supported the British inspired Resolution 502 in the Security Council. The Irish felt the Argentinians had flouted U.N. authority by ignoring the 1 April Security Council call for non-use of force, and they also opposed the use of force and the general challenge to the rule of law.²²¹ Subsequently, however, a certain tension arose between a concern for freedom of action, neutrality and the desire to utilise their Security Council position, and the British effort to secure Community support and solidarity.²²²

After initial hesitations concerning the efficacy of sanctions,²²³

on 10 April the Irish announced they would support them "in the interests of EEC solidarity",²²⁴ subsequently explaining that it had been hoped sanctions would complement other measures, rendering "unnecessary further military action".²²⁵ In mid-April, the Department of Foreign Affairs was adamant that the acceptance of sanctions had "no implications whatsoever for Ireland's neutrality",²²⁶ and on 16 April Ireland supported Council Regulation (EEC) No.877/82 "suspending imports of all products originating in Argentina" until 17 May 1982.²²⁷

The Preamble to the Regulation referred to discussions "in the context of European political cooperation", to consultations under Article 224, a proposal from the Commission, and "in particular Article 113" of the EEC Treaty. Interestingly, both EPC and Article 224 involve consultations between member states and the Irish could not have been compelled to take action, in the form of sanctions, under either. However, Article 113 allows for qualified majority voting, and regulations are, as Regulation 877/82 specifically stated "binding in ... entirety and directly applicable in all Member States".²²⁸

On 20 April the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Collins, warned that neutrality was "sacred to us" and would be maintained in the event of a formal declaration of war,²²⁹ this on the eve of the British attack on South Georgia. Indeed, as violence increased, the Irish Government was increasingly anxious about the compatibility of sanctions and neutrality. On 2 May a statement was issued confirming the "wish to re-affirm Ireland's traditional role of neutrality in relation to armed conflicts", and given the sinking of the General Belgrano, on 4 May a further statement expressed dismay at what amounted to "open war". It said the government would seek an "immediate meeting of the Security Council" at which Ireland would

call for an "immediate" ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. In a further assertion of an independent stance, the statement concluded that the government "regard the application of economic sanctions as no longer applicable and will therefore be seeking the withdrawal of these sanctions by the Community", although it did not give neutrality as a reason.²³⁰

It came to be argued that "as a neutral nation" Ireland had always "refrained from military alliance of any kind", and thus had to take "a very clear view of any action, economic or otherwise, that would appear supportive of military action". Therefore, "sanctions complementing military action" were unacceptable" and Ireland had to assert its "neutral status".²³¹ Nonetheless, it was also made clear that Ireland would, in the meantime, "act in concert with our EEC partners" and "would not unilaterally lift the embargo".²³² In fact, Ireland was constrained until the 17 May by Regulation 877/82, especially since at a meeting on 8-9 May they failed to convince others that sanctions should be discontinued.²³³

The Irish do not appear to have led the anti-renewal campaign as 17 May approached, the Italians being in the forefront, and some observers failed to detect signs "of a nation resolutely defending its 'traditional neutrality' against the depredations of a belligerent neighbour".²³⁴ Nonetheless, on 18 and 24 May Ireland and Italy opted out of the continuance of further measures, although both Council Regulation (EEC) 1176/82 and 1254/82 specifically stated they were binding in their "entirety and directly applicable in all Member States".²³⁵ It is not clear, therefore, that Irish and Italian action can be reconciled with those Regulations and Community law, although the matter was not tested in the courts. The argument turns

on the relationship between Article 113 and Article 224, and the status of the original Preamble, but doubts exist as to the legality of the Irish position, and whether if hostilities had been more protracted, they could have been made to comply.²³⁶

Haughey was clear, whilst not addressing this problem directly, that nothing in Irish EEC obligations required Ireland "to back military action",²³⁷ and that Ireland's position had changed when it found itself "moving into a situation which would seriously endanger ... traditional policy of neutrality". Ireland was "being seen ... as being associated with a serious escalation of military activity", with sanctions operating in a situation of open war.²³⁸ Given this, Ireland was "not afraid to stand alone on the issue of peace", or in reasserting its "neutrality". It had faced pressure before, and would withstand it again, especially since the people were so "deeply attached to neutrality". The government had, claimed Haughey, made it clear "in principle and in practice" that Irish neutrality would not be eroded. If Community solidarity was threatened, it was only threatened by those seeking to use it for purposes for which it was not designed.²³⁹

The Community dimension became less significant and the Irish pursued their independent line at the Security Council which reconvened on 21 May. Having made clear they would support a ceasefire, on 24 May the Irish circulated a draft resolution calling for a 72 hour ceasefire and negotiations, although the agreed resolution dropped the reference to a ceasefire. The Irish draft made no explicit reference to Argentinian withdrawal.²⁴⁰

A key feature in this episode appears to have been a concern "to uphold Ireland's independence of action",²⁴¹ although at times it

degenerated into anti-Britishness, as when the Minister of Defence referred, after the sinking of the General Belgrano, to the British as "very much the aggressors now",²⁴² a view disowned by Haughey.²⁴³ Many in Ireland, however, wondered at the sudden resurrection of the traditional policy of neutrality, given the debates of 1980-1981, and it has been argued that the government's stance was influenced by concerns of domestic popularity,²⁴⁴ leadership battles within Fianna Fáil, and frustration at the failure of the hoped for "historic breakthrough" over Northern Ireland.²⁴⁵ Moreover, in May 1982 the British had also made life difficult for the Irish by trying to block Community farm price rises.²⁴⁶ Certainly, Ireland has previously accepted participation in sanctions after military action, and in this case that action started on 2 April, after which the Irish again accepted sanctions.²⁴⁷ More problematical is that 1982 left somewhat unresolved the compatibility of Ireland's position and Community law, although in the short-term it demonstrated that Ireland retained sufficient freedom of action to adopt a neutral stance. Interestingly, in addressing the U.N. General Assembly on 30 September 1982, Collins made no reference to neutrality.²⁴⁸

The question of the relationship between defence, security, neutrality and Community membership also caused the Irish some anguish in 1981 in the context of the Genscher/Colombo proposals for a "Treaty of European Union" consolidating "the bases of concerted action in foreign affairs" and extending "coordination in the field of security policy".²⁴⁹ For years, at least since Irish entry, EPC had touched on matters such as disarmament and CSCE,²⁵⁰ and European Councils had also touched on NATO issues, these also being discussed 'en marge' at least at Foreign Ministers' meetings.²⁵¹ Now the issue

was being raised formally, with security as a "code word" meaning "as little or as much as its listeners like(d) to understand by it",²⁵² it in any case being accepted that there was a "grey area where defence merges into security policy in a general sense".²⁵³ Lenihan, nonetheless, publicly argued in November 1980 that there was a "clear distinction" between EPC, involving foreign policy consultation, "and defence" which was not discussed. He went on, "the question of harmonising the national defence policies of the member states simply does not arise".²⁵⁴

In 1981 it did arise, and the issue became whether "defence is indivisible from security"²⁵⁵ or whether as Lenihan argued in March 1981, there was "a very big difference between security, as such, and defence", security being "a much wider concept bringing in our whole relations within the United Nations, international relations generally, political relations and all that area other than defence". There was a difference between "security on an international level and military neutrality".²⁵⁶

In May 1981 at Venlo, whilst agreeing that there was no question of the Community becoming involved in "defence questions proper", some Community ministers did wish for regular exchanges on "security policy in the broad sense of stabilisation and confidence-building".²⁵⁷ Four options with regard to EPC were discussed: (i) to maintain the present system as it was; (ii) to make minor administrative procedural modifications to the present system, while retaining its present aims and basic features; (iii) to draw up a new report which would change the nature and expand the scope of political cooperation and; (iv) to draw up a formal treaty of political cooperation.²⁵⁸ What the Irish representatives agreed to at this and subsequent meetings became a heavily contested issue.

Lenihan, the Irish Minister at Venlo, subsequently claimed that he had favoured options (i) and (ii), but not the drawing up of a new report.²⁵⁹ The official record, however, showed agreement that "the political directors ... should examine options two and three" and this, according to FitzGerald, put Ireland "on a slippery slope of a highly dangerous kind". FitzGerald claimed it was only the subsequent activity by the new Minister, Dooge, and his officials which managed "for the moment" to push shut the door Lenihan had opened.²⁶⁰ Dooge had apparently been firm that discussion of political-military issues by foreign ministers was out, as was the notion that defence or other officials should coordinate policy on these issues.²⁶¹ FitzGerald claimed that Lenihan had left the impression that Ireland "would be willing" to move, which had encouraged these ideas.²⁶²

For his part, Lenihan, by October 1981 in opposition, claimed the London Report had "profound implications" for Irish neutrality, and for all practical purposes made Ireland a political member of the Western alliance, there being, according to Lenihan, "no limit" on the political subjects which could be discussed. Now, in October 1981, Lenihan spoke of "the artificial distinction between security and defence, which are really synonymous" and argued the distinction and Irish independence of action were being eroded.²⁶³ What worried Lenihan was the Report's reference to the agreement "to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which had made it possible to discuss in political cooperation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security". Lenihan now wondered, "What does 'the political aspect of security' mean?". He claimed it was a new phrase, and that now instead of an "excellent" ad hoc arrangement within a "loose framework", there was for the first time a "formalising of the situation and the first step towards having a

treaty on this basis", involving Ireland "still closer in military matters". He now felt the "political aspects of security" covered "the whole area of weaponry and military and defence aspects in relation to political security", although the "ugly word 'defence'" as such did not appear. Dooge had bargained away or put Ireland "on the slippery slope to bargaining" away, "the cornerstone of Irish diplomatic policy", neutrality.²⁶⁴

FitzGerald claimed the "slippery slope" had started with the agreement to study option (iii) and that the Coalition had secured the insertion subsequently of the key clause only partially referred to by Lenihan. FitzGerald referred to the additional initial clause "and having regard to the different situations of the member states" and argued that this was "a reference to our position", whilst the London Report agreed to "maintaining and not expanding" the EPC system, and constrained it to the "political aspects of security".²⁶⁵ Moreover, the Coalition believed that a paper on the scope and nature of EPC actually strengthened the Irish position by serving as a bench-mark for what was or was not acceptable.²⁶⁶

The London Report was, in fact, a compromise between options (ii) and (iii) since whilst it maintained the existing basic features of the system, it also contained some new features. EPC was to be extended, in that instead of reacting to events consideration was now to be given to taking "a longer-term approach to certain problems" and instituting "studies to that end". In addition, the presidency was in future to be aided by a small team from preceding and succeeding presidencies in order to strengthen it organisationally and enhance continuity, whilst it was also made clear that there could be both formal and informal meetings under the aegis of EPC, the

latter being confidential. Confidentiality was regarded as a key to success,²⁶⁷ although it also had the benefit of erecting a smokescreen as to the nature of what was to be discussed.²⁶⁸

In general, on this issue of EPC reform the Irish avoided some of their worst fears since military matters per se were to be left to NATO, and it was not only the Irish who were worried by the possible expansion of EPC. On the other hand, no definitive definition of 'the political aspects of security' had been agreed and Irish equivocation did not provide a firm basis upon which to avoid further slipping down "the slippery slope". Indeed, by November 1981 Genscher was circulating the text of a draft treaty or solemn undertaking on European Union, a draft which called for regular exchanges of view on security questions, leading to harmonisation of viewpoints, and to the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance. It was suggested that to allow for such discussion the Council of Ministers should be able to vary its composition, which was regarded by some "as diplomatic code for saying that Defence Ministers or experts should attend European Council meetings with the aim of strengthening NATO",²⁶⁹ something which Dooge made clear in December 1981 was beyond the pail.²⁷⁰ FitzGerald had warned of further pressure in October 1981, and had even suggested it "could lead to our isolation and to a two-tier political cooperation which would be greatly to our political disadvantage".²⁷¹

With regard to the general development of the Community the Irish "produced a certain amount of integrationist rhetoric, paying lip-service to the idea of European 'togetherness'"²⁷² and European Union, but the latter was clearly seen as something for "the distant future".²⁷³ As well as expressing their continuing acceptance of the political objectives of the Community,²⁷⁴ the Irish

stressed the importance of redistribution,²⁷⁵ and of inter-governmental progress not out-stripping treaty-based progress, having, in fact, a strong preference for building "on the Treaty foundations".²⁷⁶ Specific proposals to make progress in the direction of European Union often caused embarrassment, as with the Genscher/Colombo initiative and subsequent developments. Irish caution was also exhibited in the reaction to the reports on European Union in 1975-76. Tindemans, for example, caused alarm by raising the possibility of two-tier development in the Community, and in his calls for exchanges of view on defence leading to "a common analysis of defence problems" and for cooperation in armaments manufacture.²⁷⁷ The Irish were wary of such proposals. They also, on occasion, obstructed smaller steps, such as allowing the incoming Commission President to pick his own team, although on the other hand, FitzGerald expressed general support for a more democratic, supranational Community, with a stronger voice for the European Parliament.²⁷⁸

In terms of the development of the Community, the Irish faced problems in the way in which action taken under the Treaty, for example, the achievement of a customs union, presaged other activity, namely in this case, pressure for an industrial policy in order to make the single market a reality.²⁷⁹ This, in turn, led to defence-related questions being raised, since it was argued that the Community could not "draw an artificial dividing line between the civilian and defence industry sectors",²⁸⁰ that "without the development of a single organised market for the armaments sector", moreover, "it is hardly possible to imagine how a common industrial policy could be brought into play", especially in ship-building,

electronics and aircraft industries. The Klepsch-Normanton Report of June 1978 which argued in this way went on to propose that there should be Community representation, either through the Commission or the President-in-Office, in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), a collaborative forum for armaments cooperation.²⁸¹ The Irish did not object "in principle to there being a Community policy for the manufacture or export of arms" but clearly were wary of any blurring of competences or linkage between the Community and defence organisations.²⁸² Irish difficulties on such issues as raised by Klepsch-Normanton were illustrated by the three-way division among Irish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) when Klepsch-Normanton was voted on in the European Parliament. Fianna Fáil MEPs abstained on the grounds that it was irrelevant to Ireland, Fine Gael supported it on the grounds of employment, whilst Kavanagh of Labour voted against on the basis of it possibly drawing Ireland into NATO involvement.²⁸³ Fortunately for Ireland subsequent reports have tended to be more modest,²⁸⁴ although in October 1981 the Commission did send the Council of Ministers a document on industrial innovation which drew attention to the problems caused by nationalistic approaches to defence procurement and urged closer cooperation of military equipment purchases as an important element in development of a Community policy on industrial innovation.²⁸⁵

One possible aspect of the development of the Community took place on 18 May 1982, when at the very moment the Irish were asserting their own freedom of action, in regard to the Falkland's conflict, they consented to the over-riding of a British veto, and thus placed in potential future jeopardy both Irish independence of action and a basis of neutrality. Most interestingly, whilst Ireland

joined with the majority to vote through farm price rises, both Greece and Denmark refused to vote on the grounds of setting a precedent which could be used against them, although the increases would have been to their benefit. Ireland not only voted, but it also failed to have recorded at the end of the meeting its belief in the continuing validity of the veto principle, the course adopted by France and Italy. The Irish accepted there was a distinction between using a veto when it was a question of implementing agreed policy and law, as against vetoing new developments. Nonetheless, as an Irish diplomat admitted they had put themselves in a position where other people could "now tell us what our national interest is".²⁸⁶

The Irish then have faced pressures upon their independence of action and their claim to neutrality emanating from (a) the natural evolution of policies within the Treaty framework, for example, the Common Commercial Policy, fisheries policy and industrial policy; (b) the evolution of EPC, as the difficulties of separating defence and security grew and; (c) the spill-over between (a) and (b). Moreover, in the tenth year of membership FitzGerald felt obliged to point out that had Ireland not joined the Community, the "level of public and social services would by now have been at a ... totally unacceptable" level, a point he argued that those "who urge that we would be better to be outside the Community ... alleging a threat to our neutrality ... ought to reflect on ...".²⁸⁷

(v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to ameliorate world problems and impartiality

In 1980 Ireland was elected to the U.N. Security Council for 1981-1982. In December 1980 the Dáil was reminded of the functions

of the Security Council and assured that Ireland would play its "part in efforts to resolve whatever international disputes are considered by the Council", joining in efforts to promote implementation of solutions and working within the general aims of Irish foreign policy" for a more peaceful, stable and just international order".²⁸⁸ The most conspicuous Irish activity on the Council was their calls for ceasefires during the Falklands' conflict. Whilst, arguably, contributing to both the fulfilment of Irish policy and Council responsibilities, some of the Irish activity at this time was ill-thought out, in that, for example, their call for an "immediate" Security Council meeting had to be dropped, whilst their proposals made no explicit reference to Argentinian withdrawal.²⁸⁹ On the other hand, the government and Foreign Affairs officials have argued that Irish activity reflected the seriousness with which they took their membership responsibilities, their view of the need to bolster the U.N. role, and their belief that the conflict was precisely the sort of conflict that the U.N. should have been able to handle.²⁹⁰

Of greater long-term significance, perhaps, was the continued Irish contribution to U.N. peace-keeping, particularly in the Middle East between 1973 and 1982, save for the interruption between July 1974 and May 1978 because of the domestic security situation. The Irish record with the U.N. was:

Table 9.4 Record of Unit Service with United Nations

Unit	No. of Officers	Non-Commissioned Officers	Privates	Period of Service		Place of Service
				From	To	
23 Infantry Group	12	49	76	October 1972	April 1973	Cyprus
24 Infantry Group	12	46	72	April 1973	October 1973	Cyprus
25 Infantry Group	12	37	81	October 1973	April 1974	Cyprus & Middle East
25 Infantry Group Increment	10	46	76	December 1973	April 1974	Middle East
26 Infantry Group	23	104	180	April 1974	May & July 1974	Middle East
43 Infantry Batt.	655	104	759	May 1978	November 1978	Lebanon
44 Infantry Batt.	634	107	741	November 1978	April 1979	Lebanon
45 Infantry Batt.	625	104	729	April 1979	October 1979	Lebanon
46 Infantry Batt.	625	48	673	October 1979	April 1980	Lebanon
47 Infantry Batt.	598	75	673	April 1980	October 1980	Lebanon
48 Infantry Batt.	565	91	656	October 1980	April 1981	Lebanon
49 Infantry Batt.	571	85	656	April 1981	October 1981	Lebanon
50 Infantry Batt.	572	80	652	October 1981	April 1982	Lebanon
51 Infantry Batt.	642	80	722	April 1982	October 1982	Lebanon
52 Infantry Batt.	642	83	725	October 1982	April 1983	Lebanon

* The period of service relates to the Infantry Battalion. In many cases the service of the UNIFIL HQ Group would overlap with that of the Battalions

Source: Capt. J. Shehhan, Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d), Appendix B, pp.79-80.

Even during 1974-1978 small numbers served at times with UNICYP and UNTSO (of whom some served with United Nations Disengagement Observer Force).²⁹¹ The Irish were flattered by the requests for their contribution, and saw it as a role they could play precisely because they were "not members of any military alliance".²⁹² Their peace-keeping contribution was regarded as "out of all proportion" to their size, and it was felt it "might well be compromised if we were to

become members of any particular military alliance".²⁹³ That non-membership, together with Ireland's history, was regarded as enhancing Irish "acceptability among the Third World countries", and in addition, placed Ireland in a good position to play a "prominent role in the various disarmament debates",²⁹⁴ perhaps even being able to lead "a movement for peace in the U.N.". This latter because Ireland was "one of the nonaligned nations who can speak with independence and confidence about ... world peace and security".²⁹⁵

It also allowed, according to Lenihan, as has been seen, Ireland to play a crucial role regarding the Madrid CSCE review conference.²⁹⁶ More generally, it was felt that Ireland could help push the EPC process into a "progressive" direction,²⁹⁷ and FitzGerald in 1981 argued that Ireland, in conjunction with other countries, had influenced British policy on issues like Zimbabwe, and had made a "constructive" contribution on Namibia and the Middle East.²⁹⁸ This 1981 view echoing his argument in 1975 of the influence of the Irish Presidency in the Euro-Arab dialogue and in the Lome process.²⁹⁹

Some, particularly the Labour Party, felt Ireland should be more active and fretted at the constraints of EPC. In Cork in the autumn of 1980, as well as calling for neutrality to be enshrined in the Constitution and for cooperation with the nonaligned, the party called on the government to pursue "active neutrality", involving a "total commitment to peace, detente and disarmament, together with a programme of involvement in world affairs" as part of "the evolution and implementation of a positive policy of neutrality".³⁰⁰ Cluskey, the Labour leader, explained that neutrality could no longer simply be "an assertion that one wishes to avoid being draw into war" (sic),

but rather that its value was in "preventing war not escaping from it", and that this required "positive proposals" rather than withdrawal into a "neutralist cocoon".³⁰¹ Ryan of Fine Gael continued to see a version of active neutrality as appropriate for the European Community.³⁰²

The official view was rather more low key, acknowledging the limitations imposed by the range of Irish diplomatic representation and the "lack of resources",³⁰³ the result of which meant that Ireland could not contribute financially and economically.³⁰⁴ Indeed, its aid record was poor,³⁰⁵ and whilst the Irish continued to seek an input into the disarmament process, and support, for example, nuclear free zones, their input was limited by a lack of technological expertise.³⁰⁶ Apart from nudging the policy of others, the government saw Ireland's role as that of being "imaginative and constructive", which it was felt was all the more valuable given the alleged recognition of Ireland's "disinterestedness".³⁰⁷

Principally, after 1973, the Irish sought to exert influence within and via EPC, as has been seen. From 1973 it came to be argued that Ireland no longer acted "in isolation" but rather now faced "the world in partnership within the European Community",³⁰⁸ thus carrying "much greater weight" in the world.³⁰⁹ Clearly, moreover, membership of the Community and involvement in EPC were incompatible with isolationism.

Notwithstanding occasional 'deviant' Irish behaviour within EPC and the stance during the Falklands' conflict, there was also the question of whether Community and EPC involvement were incompatible with impartiality, especially given the number of other occasions on which the Irish did join their Community partners in sanctions

against third parties. As has been seen, Haughey as Taoiseach acknowledged that "Political neutrality or non-alignment" was "incompatible" with Community membership. More generally, a further difficulty was the continuing and related belief that Ireland's place was "with the Western democracies", since it shared with them, "common concepts of human rights, freedom under the law, individual liberty and freedom of conscience". According to Haughey, Irish economic interests also were "tied in with the Western industrialised world".³¹⁰ Indeed, FitzGerald was quoted in 1980 as going further: "There really isn't such a thing as neutrality today: we are part of Western Europe and our interests coincide with theirs".³¹¹

Ireland was not indifferent to what happened between East and West, nor to the issues which divided them. On "crucial issues", its sympathies were "clearly ... with the West", according to FitzGerald, and when asked whether Ireland was neutral between ideologies, he replied "Who is?".³¹² Given such clear commitment to the West and the Community, some doubted whether the classical formulation by Lenihan, namely "we are neutral in the military sense, we are neither ideologically neutral nor politically indifferent" was sufficient to gainsay the position,³¹³ especially taking into account the Irish performance as examined against other variables. The Labour Party, in particular, raised the issue of impartiality, claiming that the close association with the West meant that it had been lost. To them, Ireland appeared to favour U.S. policy in El Salvador, as it had in Vietnam, British connivance in Rhodesia and the West's support for apartheid. Querying Irish acquiescence in the Council of Ministers decision not to release humanitarian aid to the refugees in El Salvador, Quinn of Labour asserted "That is some

neutrality. That is some independence",³¹⁴ whilst the March 1981 debate led to the Irish Times to ask: "whose side are you neutral on?".³¹⁵

(vi) attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-determination

Membership of the European Community, at least within the immediate regional external environment of Europe, served to enhance Ireland's distinctive identity, and especially its distinctiveness from Britain, albeit that in the world more generally, as has been seen, Ireland was increasingly identified as a Community state. Enhancing the separateness of Ireland from Britain appears to have been a deliberate policy of FitzGerald as Foreign Minister in the first years of Community membership,³¹⁶ and in 1974 he argued that the Irish communautaire attitude had "certainly marked us out in contrast" to the U.K.³¹⁷ He claimed that nobody was "in any doubt as to whether Ireland is some kind of British satellite", given that on many issues Irish "views and those of Britain diverge markedly".³¹⁸ The Irish Presidency of the Council of the Community in 1975 and the determination to remain as members, even if Britain did not, broke any lingering linkage people may have perceived. Four years later, the divergent British and Irish paths over EMS confirmed the distinction and arguably, subject only to the uncompleted business of unity, marked the drawing to a close of the Irish independence struggle vis à vis Britain.³¹⁹

The unity issue and the related question of stability on the island remained high on the Irish agenda throughout the 1973-1982 period. The concern for stability was reflected in the increased defence effort and in 1976 by the Oireachtas determining "that, arising

out of the armed conflict now taking place in Northern Ireland, a national emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State". The Taoiseach, in introducing the measures, spoke of the challenge to the "public safety" and "the preservation of the State", by "an illegal organisation dedicated to the overthrow of the institutions of this State".³²⁰

In the period after 1969 more than 45 civilians and 9 members of the security forces were killed by terrorist explosions and activity in the Republic. In addition, the Republic suffered a severe economic cost, estimated at IR £1,050m in 1982 prices (£850m) between 1969 and 1982, whilst within the Republic there were periodic disturbances and riots, such as, for example, over the hunger strikes in 1981, when some 13-15,000 people marched on the British embassy. In addition, there was a significant rise in armed robberies, kidnapping and extortion.³²¹

At the beginning of the period, just as the forces of law and order in the Republic were ill-equipped to deal with the situation in the Republic, so too the PDF remained ill-equipped to intervene in the North. In the summer of 1974 two Coalition ministers publicly warned as to the limited ability of Dublin to help. O'Brien argued it would be wrong to suppose there was a "reassuring contingency plan", since if certain things happened "neither we nor anyone else can divert dire consequences for many people".³²² In September 1974 O'Brien caused an outcry when he warned that the Irish army did not possess the capacity to control events in the North and that it could only hope to hold one border town, such as Newry, in the event of civil war.³²³ FitzGerald, meanwhile, suggested people were asking the wrong question, when they asked whether the government had "the

will to protect the minority in Northern Ireland", since "nobody raised ... the question of the extent to which we have the power to protect the minority ...".³²⁴

With regard to general policy on Northern Ireland, for some of the period Irish governments were largely reactive to British initiatives, but at both the beginning and the end of the period they engaged in major joint initiatives with Britain. In December 1973 British, Irish and Northern Ireland representatives met together for the first time and agreed to the formation of a Northern Ireland power-sharing Executive, involving representatives from both communities in Northern Ireland. An 'Irish dimension' was also to be catered for, by a Council of Ireland, comprised of a Council of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly with Belfast and Dublin representation. In the Sunningdale agreement of December 1973 the Irish recognised that unity required the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland.³²⁵ The power-sharing Executive and the Sunningdale agreement collapsed in May 1974, given opposition within Northern Ireland, and for nearly five years, periodic British initiatives elicited periodic Irish attempts to influence them and to become accepted as a party with a legitimate interest in Northern Ireland.

One feature of this period was the 1975 Fianna Fáil call for the British government to declare its "commitment to implement an ordered withdrawal from ... involvement in the six counties", although it transpired they did not wish a date to be set, being fearful of the consequences, and that the declaration of withdrawal really meant a declaration of intent regarding a united Ireland.³²⁶ In 1979-1980 the Republic began to take the initiative rather more and began to seek a solution in the wider context of relationships

between Ireland and Britain, although the process was disrupted by elections and consequent changes of government in June 1981 and February and November 1982. 8 December 1980 saw the Haughey-Thatcher agreement on studying the "totality of relationships in these islands"³²⁷ and prompted Haughey's claim that the governments were "in the middle of an historic breakthrough".³²⁸ Subsequently, FitzGerald and Thatcher agreed in November 1981 to set up an Inter-governmental Council, which was to give institutional expression to the "unique character of the relationship between the two countries". The November 1981 agreement again saw an Irish acknowledgement "that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would require the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland",³²⁹ which led to a Fine Gael/Fianna Fáil row as to whether this involved abandonment of the legitimacy of the Irish claim to unity, especially since FitzGerald had made clear he favoured deletion of Articles Two and Three of the Irish Constitution. In practice, however, it was a question of tactics and strategy rather than objective, and in any case no substantial progress was made by the end of 1982, indeed in 1982 relations were temporarily strained over the Falklands and other issues.³³⁰

Conclusion

The first ten years of Community membership did not see the dramatic foreclosure of Irish freedom of decision that some had envisaged prior to 1973. Whilst somewhat constrained by Community membership and EPC, the Irish clearly retained a degree of freedom, although they did encounter some difficulties in balancing that freedom with their commitment to the Community. They managed to

walk that tight-rope because the nature of the Community between 1973 and 1982 meant that there was little general inclination among the member-States to engage in vertical integration measures which would really have challenged the Irish. FitzGerald, nonetheless, hinted at how dependent upon the Community Ireland was becoming,³³¹ and this suggests there was some validity in the escalator analogy used before entry, even if the escalator moved rather more slowly between 1973 and 1982 than anticipated.³³²

On the other hand, despite the increased effort, there was still a lack of genuine due diligence in terms of the scale, scope and orientation of the defence effort, and despite the assertion of neutrality in 1982, in general the period saw equivocation and confusion as to what Ireland really stood for, especially given the convolutions over EPC and the possibility of a defence deal with Britain. No clear, consistent set of principles were enunciated or upheld, except the continued narrow technical view of neutrality, as being equal to non-alliance membership. The key continued to be an assertion that they were not committed to co-belligerency, which they regarded as the essence of alliance.³³³ This, however, also continued to be a partial and inadequate view of neutrality, reflecting more a concern with "non-belligerency status in time of war" than neutrality per se.³³⁴ In essence, then, Irish policy whilst refraining from alliance, was neither one of 'for neutrality' nor nonalignment, but rather sui generis.

Footnotes : Chapter Nine

1. Ireland signed the Treaty of Accession on 22 January 1972. On 10 May 1972 the decision was overwhelmingly endorsed in a referendum when 1,041,880 (83% of those voting) people voted Yes, in a turnout of 71%.

For the background see: Trevor C. Salmon, 'Ireland', in Carol and Kenneth J. Twitchett (eds.), Building Europe : Britain's Partners in the EEC, (London, Europa Publications, 1981), especially pp.197-202; E. Wistrich, 'Referenda : The Lessons for Britain', New Europe, Vol.3 No.1 (Winter 1974/5) pp.7-14; Patrick Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1973) pp.167-8 and 257-60; Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations : Issues in Irish Foreign Policy, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) pp.140-144 and; Tom Garvin and Anthony Parker, 'Party Loyalty and Irish Voters : The EEC Referendum as a Case-Study', Economic and Social review, Vol.4 No.1 (October 1972) pp.35-9.
2. Fianna Fáil had been in government from 20 March 1957 to 14 March 1973. Their defeat in 1973 was unrelated to entry into the European Community.
3. FitzGerald had been at one time Chairman of the Irish Council of the European Movement. For his speech see Dail Debates 265:740-769, especially 741 (1973).
4. Padraic MacKernan, 'Ireland and European Political Cooperation', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1 No.4 (1984) p.16. MacKernan was in 1984 Political Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and also believed that entry into EPC had "entailed the development of a basic political approach - the definition of principles and objectives" for Irish foreign policy (p.17).
5. FitzGerald, Dail Debates 275:908 (1974).
6. See below pp.402ff for a discussion of this challenge.
7. Interview with senior Irish army officer, Dublin, November 1983.
8. See Dail Debates 277:1072 (1975), 289:197 (1976), 303:310 (1978), 304:648 (1978) and 313:2134 (1979). The Establishment figure varied, and was not publicly announced every year. See also Capt. J. Sheehan (ed.), Defence Forces Handbook, (Dublin, Department of Defence, n/d) p.18. For previous periods see pp.179-188, 217-222, 253-262 and 307-316 above.
9. John Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, Dail Debates 272:1667-8 (1974).
10. Donegan, Minister for Defence, ibid 272:649-656 (1974).
11. Donegan, Minister for Defence, ibid 285:1005-6 (1975).
12. Donegan, Minister for Defence, ibid 273:1751 (1974).
13. For the resolution, debate and vote see ibid 292:3 ff (1976).

14. For a general discussion of this issue see, Trevor C. Salmon, 'The Civil Power and Aiding the Civil Power : the case of Ireland', in John Roach and Jurgen Thomanek, Police and Public Order in Europe, (Beckenham, Croom Helm, 1985) pp.73-106.
15. Liam Cosgrave, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 273:1571 ff (1974).
16. This compared with 5,500 and 14,000 respectively in the mid-1970s, see Salmon, 'The Civil Power and Aiding the Civil Power : the case of Ireland', op.cit. p.83.
17. Donegan, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 275:329 (1974).
18. Barrett, Minister for Defence, ibid 326:1002 (1981).
19. Donegan, Minister for Defence, ibid 268:816 ff (1973).
20. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 268:824 ff (1973).
21. Donegan, Minister for Defence, ibid 273:692 (1974).
22. Donegan, Minister for Defence, ibid 273:1715 (1974).
23. See ibid 275:1322 (1974) and 288:1345 (1976).
24. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 298:942 (1977).
25. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 300:126 ff (1977).
26. Cosgrave, Taoiseach, ibid 273:1571 ff (1974) for original idea, and 274:165 (1974), 277:1041 (1975) and 295:482 (1976) for what happened subsequently.
27. Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1978, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981, Prl.9034), Table 234, 'Numbers in each rank of the Defence Forces at 31 March 1973-78', p.251.
28. Idem, and Dail Debates 326:1002 (1981).
29. Donegan, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 282:1426-1430 (1975).
30. Faulkner, Minister for Defence, ibid 318:659-660 (1980) and 320:71 (1980). On the new structure see also 322:1639-40 (1980), Sheehan op.cit. pp.18-38, C.P.D. Dorman-O'Gowan, 'The Irish Defence Forces - their Role and the Problems', Royal United Services Institute Vol.126 No.3 (September 1981) pp.54-56, and John Keegan and Adrian English, 'Irish Republic', in John Keegan (ed.), World Armies, (London, Macmillan, 1983, 2nd ed.), pp.297-300.
31. A Labour T.D., Coughlan, floated the idea but both Fine Gael and Fianna Fail opposed it, as did a majority of Labour, see Dail Debates 265:300 and 387 (1973), 271:1208 (1974), 272:1742 (1974) and 274:750 (1974).
32. See pp.184, 217, 258 and 311 above.
33. See Table 9.2 p.381, and Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1980, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1983, Pl.1618), Table 330 'Consumer Price Index' p.338.
34. O'Kennedy, Minister for Finance, Dail Debates 322:2318-9 (1980).
35. The Cost of Violence arising from the Northern Ireland Crisis since 1969 : New Ireland Forum, Table 6 'Security Costs in the South', Ireland Today supplement No.1003 November/December 1983, Bulletin of the Department of Foreign Affairs, p.5.

36. See pp.184, 217, 258 and 311 above.
37. Report of O'Sullivan speech to Association of European Journalists in Irish Times 25 September 1982, and other details from interviews in Dublin in November 1983.
38. Interview with senior Irish army officer, Dublin, November 1983. For a slightly different informed view but one which also talks of Soviet threat, see Comdt. P.O'Sullivan, 'Irish Neutrality and Defence', An Cosantoir XLI No.3 (March 1981) pp.58-61.
39. Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary to the Taoiseach, Dail Debates 272:1667 ff (1974).
40. Kelly, Irish Times 20 October 1978.
41. Ryan, who had been Minister for Finance between 1973-1977, reported in Irish Times 24 October 1978.
42. Barrett, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 327:1432-4 (1981).
43. Barrett, idem, and see Sheehan op.cit. p.17.
44. Sheehan, idem.
45. Barrett, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 327:1433 (1981), emphasis added.
46. Keegan and English op.cit. p.299. See also Dorman-O'Gowan op.cit. p.54.
47. Interview with senior Irish army officer, Dublin, November 1983.
48. Interview with senior Irish army officer, Dublin, November 1983.
49. Donegan, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 272:672 (1974).
50. Molloy, Minister for Defence, ibid 304:427 (1978).
51. A down-payment for the tanks was made in 1978, ibid 304:432 (1978), whilst the Milan Surface to Surface Missile was acquired in 1979, and a surface to air guided missile capability in 1980 - see Sheehan op.cit. p.28.
52. Sheehan, idem.
53. Dorman-O'Gowan, op.cit. p.53.
54. Donegan, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 265:240 ff (1973) and 265:387 ff (1973).
55. Faulkner, Minister for Defence, ibid 319:707-8 (1980).
56. Faulkner, Minister for Defence, ibid 320:63-4 (1980).
57. Flanagan, Minister for Defence, Irish Times, 29 March 1977.
58. Dorman-O'Gowan, op.cit. p.54 and interviews in Dublin, November 1983 with senior Irish army officer, and with Commission officials in Brussels in May 1980. The PDF had wanted all the armament they could possibly have on the vessels.
59. Faulkner, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 322:1226-7 (1980).
60. Gallagher-Kelly exchange, ibid 296:415 (1977).
61. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 307:931 (1978).
62. Power, Minister for Defence, ibid 334:780 (1982) and Sheehan op.cit. p.18.

63. Faulkner, Minister for Defence, ibid 320:1864 (1980).
64. Interview with senior Irish army officer, Dublin, November 1983.
65. Power, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates, 334:1306-8 (1982).
66. For example, in 1977 two Beechcraft SKA 200 Super King Airs were leased, and then purchased.
67. See Sheehan, op.cit. pp.60-63, Keegan and English, op.cit. pp.296-7, Dorman-O'Gowan, op.cit. p.54 and Dail Debates 265:240 (1973), 272:649 (1974), 291:15 (1976), 297:1277 (1977), 302:412 (1977) and 319:1105-1112 (1980).

Although it was claimed there was no shortage of personnel (297:1277) in 1982 it was 30% below Establishment (334:779-780).

68. Noel Dorr quoted in Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984) p.73.
69. John L. Clarke, 'NATO, Neutrals and National Defence', Survival XXIV No.6 (November-December 1982) p.261.
70. For the debate, motion and amendments see Dail Debates 327:1392-1490 and 1562-1569 (1981).
71. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 327:1399 (1981).
72. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 327:1466 (1981).
73. Proposed by Fine Gael, ibid 327:1566 (1981). The other amendments were proposed by Labour and by Noel Browne.
74. The official communique, Ireland Today, No. 972 (December 1980/January 1981).
75. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 326:1511-2(1981).
76. Atkins, The Times 27 February 1981.
77. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 327:1392 (1981).
78. Cluskey, the Labour leader, ibid 327:1408 (1981), at which Fine Gael leader, FitzGerald, interjected 'Hear, hear'.
79. Ryan, ibid 327:1454-5 (1981).
80. Ibid 327:1562-68 (1981).
81. FitzGerald, ibid 327:1424 (1981).

On 2 December 1981 Seanad Eireann agreed without division to call "on the Government to declare unequivocally that Ireland will not join a military pact" - see Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1103 ff (1981).

82. Quinn, Dail Debates 327:1440-1 (1981).
83. See Genscher, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, speech of 17 November 1980, and Colombo, Italian Foreign Minister, speech of 3 February 1981, cited in William Wallace, 'Political Cooperation: Integration Through Intergovernmentalism' in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Community (Chichester, John Wiley, 1983 2nd ed.) pp.397 and 402.
84. See pp.411-5 below.

85. Dankert was a Dutch Socialist, Irish Press 4 June 1981.
86. Report on European Political Cooperation, London, 13 October 1981, published in Europe Documents No.1174, 17 October 1981.
87. Verbatim report of Lord Carrington's press conference, 13 October 1981, see Keatinge op.cit. p.89, and Irish Times 14 October 1981.
88. Interview with senior Department of Foreign Affairs official, Dublin, November 1983. The idea was partly thwarted ironically by the change to a Coalition government. At least one other Community member also considered going to New Delhi.
89. The question was asked by Quinn, see Dail Debates 319:467-8 (1980).
90. Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Dublin, March 1981 and November 1983, and with senior Irish politician, March 1981.
91. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates, 307:1116-8 (1978).
92. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 327:1465 (1981).
93. Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Dublin, March 1981 and November 1983, and with senior Irish politician, March 1981.
94. For example, in 1978-9 there was an exchange of visits between the Foreign Ministers, during which time, O'Kennedy, the Irish Minister, stressed Ireland's "natural sympathy" for other countries not in alliance and spoke of future cooperation between Ireland and the Neutral and Nonaligned at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. See text of addresses delivered by O'Kennedy, in Belgrade 12 April 1978, and in Dublin 9 April 1979.
95. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 322:725 (1980) and also 319:2106-7 (1980).
96. J. Kirwan, Private Secretary, Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Irish Times 12 October 1982.
97. Trevor C. Salmon, however, was wrong to say that Ireland attended a formal NATO caucus, although he was so informed by a NNA delegation member, see 'Ireland : A Neutral in the Community?', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.XX No.3 (March 1982) p.223. On the NATO/Community relationships see Karl E. Birnbaum, 'Alignments in Europe : the CSCE experience', World Today, Vol.37 No.6 (June 1981) pp.219-223.
98. Lenihan, in opposition, Dail Debates 330:131 (1981).
99. See Marshall Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers, (New York, Free Press, 1972) p.71 and p.68 above.
100. Dennis Driscoll, 'Is Ireland really 'neutral'?', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1 No.3 (1982) p.57, although he gives no details as to nature of the survey.
101. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 279:354 (1975).
102. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 294:633 (1976), and 286:498 (1975).

103. Brigid Laffan, 'The Consequences for Irish Foreign Policy' in David Coombes (ed.), Ireland and the European Communities : Ten Years of Membership, (Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1983) pp.96 and 104.
104. Patrick Keatinge, 'The Europeanisation of Irish foreign policy' in P.J. Drudy and Dermot McAleese, Ireland and the European Community : Irish Studies 3, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983) p.45.
105. See, Developments in the European Communities : Second Report (Prl.3478) November 1973, (Dublin, Stationery Office, 1973) pp.7-8, (Hereafter Devs. in EC), and Devs.in EC : Third Report (Prl.3908), June 1974, p.12.
106. Devs. in EC : Fourth Report, (Prl.4319), December 1974, p.13.
107. Devs. in EC : Fifth Report, (Prl.4663), August 1975, p.17.
108. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 32nd Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 5 October 1977.
109. Speech by Michael O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs and President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities, to the United Nations General Assembly, Statements and Speeches 7/79 Ireland Today No.958 October 1979.
110. Padraic MacKernan, 'Ireland and European Political Cooperation', Irish Studies in International Affairs Vol.1 No.4 (1984) p.19. MacKernan was the Irish Political Director.
111. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 322:1339 (1980).
112. William Wallace, 'European Political Cooperation : A New Form of Diplomacy', Irish Studies in International Affairs Vol.1 No.4 (1984) p.3, although the actual measures against Iran were passed through national parliaments, see Dail Debates 322:1811 ff (1980).
113. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 322:1817 and 1829-30 (1980) and see below pp.407-411.
114. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 323:1181 (1980).
115. Laffan, op.cit. p.96.
116. Patrick Keatinge, 'The Europeanisation of Irish Foreign Policy' op.cit. p.47.
117. Namely, 15 occasions in 1975, 17 in 1976 and 11 in 1977 - see Rosemary Foot, 'The European Community's Voting Behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.XVII No.4 (June 1979) pp.353-6.
118. Ibid pp.359-360. This tends to confirm Beate Lindemann, 'Europe and the Third World : the Nine at the United Nations', World Today Vol.32 No.7 (July 1976) pp.260 ff, and her 'European Political Cooperation at the U.N. : a challenge for the Nine', in D. Allen, R. Rummel and W. Wessel, European Political Cooperation, (London, Butterworth Scientific, 1982) pp.110-133; see also Leon Hurwitz, 'The EEC and Decolonization : The Voting Behaviour of the Nine at the U.N.General Assembly', Political Studies Vol. XXIV No.4 (December 1976) pp.435-447.
119. Foot op.cit. p.360.

120. MacKernan, op.cit. pp.20-21.
121. See Foot op.cit., Lindemann op.cit., and Hurwitz op.cit. passim.
122. Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Dublin, March 1981 and November 1983.
123. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 306:367 (1978).
124. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 323:1169 (1980).
125. MacKernan, op.cit. p.19.
126. Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs official, London, April 1985.
127. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 268:797 (1973).
128. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 327:534 (1980), and see O'Kennedy, 268:801 (1973).
129. See above pp.317-8.
130. Statement by Government, 2 May 1982, Ireland Today No. 988, May 1982.
131. Patrick Keatinge, 'The Europeanisation of Irish Foreign Policy' op.cit. p.54.
132. Statement issued by Government, 4 May 1982, Ireland Today No.988 May 1982.
The Falklands will be further discussed below, see pp.407-411
133. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a major speech to Royal Irish Academy, 10 November 1975.
134. Report on European Political Cooperation, London, 13 October 1981, op.cit., and see above p.389-390.
135. FitzGerald, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 330:314-5 (1981).
136. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 306:423 (1978), and Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 319:466 (1980).
137. At least one Department of Foreign Affairs offered this view in an interview in Dublin in November 1983.
138. Text published in Irish Times 1 October 1973.
139. Marcus Wheeler, 'Soviet Interest in Ireland', Survey Vol.21 No.3 (1975) p.91. See also Marcus Wheeler, 'The Dublin-Moscow Accord', World Today Vol.29 No.11 (November 1973) pp.458-460.
140. John Kelly, Parliamentary Secretary to Department of Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 295:464 (1976).
141. Individual East European states have negotiated specific trade agreements with the Community. For the general position see John Pinder, 'Integration in Western and Eastern Europe : Relations between the EC and CMEA', Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.XVIII No.2 (1979); European Parliament Working Documents, 'Report on the state of relations between the EEC and East European state-trading countries and Comecon', 89/78 (11 May 1978) and 'Report on relations between the European Community and the East European state-trading countries and

- the CMEA (Comecon)', 1-424/81 (28 August 1981).
See also Michael O'Corcora and Ronald J. Hill, 'The Soviet Union in Irish Foreign Policy', International Affairs Vol.58 No.2 (Spring 1982).
142. See Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among the Nations, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1978) 'Appendix 2 : Countries with which Ireland maintains diplomatic relations (December 1977)' pp.270-1.
 143. Irish Times 28 January 1975. See also Patrick Keatinge, 'Ireland' in Christopher Hill (ed.), National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1983) p.147.
 144. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 265:745 (1973).
 145. Patrick Keatinge, 'Ireland', op.cit. p.147.
 146. Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance, op.cit. p.74 quoting T.N. Dupuy et al., The Almanac of World Military Power, (Novato, CA., Presidio Press, 1980, 4th ed.) p.186.
 147. John Keegan and Adrian English op.cit. p.300. See also Ciaran Farrelly, 'Irish Defence Policy Options', European Opinion (January 1977) p.2, who describes the present situation as amounting "to depending on NATO for protection".
 148. Keatinge, A Singular Stance op.cit. p.74 summarising Haughey's position in Dail, Dail Debates 343:2709-10 (1983).
 149. Cooney, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 343:2015 (1983). See also William FitzGerald, Irish Unification and NATO, (Dublin, Dublin University Press, 1982) pp.41, and 49 and passim. For an alternative view see Patrick Comerford, Do You Want to Die for NATO? (Dublin, Mercier Press, 1984) and Bill McSweeney (ed.), Ireland and the Threat of Nuclear War, (Dublin, Dominican Press, 1985). There is also the Kelly-Ryan debate, see above pp.383-4.
 150. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 327:1396 (1981).
 151. Liam Cosgrave, ex-Taoiseach (1973-1977) in interview, Dublin, March 1981.
 152. Comdt. P. O'Sullivan, op.cit. p.60.
 153. See Dail Debates 265:1560 (1973), 301:3 (1977), 306:423 (1978), 322:960 (1980), 325:820 ff (1980) and 327:1392 ff (1981).
 154. See below pp.403-4, and 412-415.
 155. Ibid 296:671 (1977) and 304:427 (1978).
 156. Interview with senior Irish army officer, Dublin, November 1983.
 157. Trevor C. Salmon, 'The Civil Power and Aiding the Civil Power', op.cit. pp.84-86.
 158. Neither did the joint patrols of disputed fishery and territorial waters, such joint patrols being "in accordance with international practice" - FitzGerald, Dail Debates, 298:937 (1977).
 159. See above pp.385-7.

160. Interview with senior Irish Department of Foreign Affairs official, Dublin, November 1983.
161. Dermot McAleese, 'Ireland and the European Community : the changing pattern of trade', in P.J. Drudy and Dermot McAleese, op.cit. p.154.
162. Ibid pp.160-161.
163. Ibid p.145. See also John Blackwell and Eoin O'Malley, 'The impact of EEC membership on Irish industry' in P.J. Drudy and Dermot McAleese, ibid pp.107-144.
164. Laffan, op.cit. pp.94-95, also mentions the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy as factors.
165. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates, 276:770-2 (1974).
166. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, claimed his was one of the few voices that would have been prepared for entry, even without Britain. Speech to Royal Irish Academy, 10 November 1975.
167. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 275:919-920 (1974).
168. O'Kennedy, Opposition spokesman, ibid 275:993 (1974).
169. Colm McCarthy, 'EMS and the End of Ireland's Sterling Link', Lloyds Bank Review No.136 (April 1980) p.35; see also pp.30-42 for background and effect of decision. In fact, not all of the inducement turned out to 'resource transfers' per se since the bulk of the aid was in the form of loans, namely IR £1,125m over five years from the Community and IR £250m over two years bilaterally, whilst the grants were to be IR £225m over five years from the Community, and IR £50m over two years bilaterally.
170. Ibid p.31. On the EMS decision see also Brendan M. Walsh, 'Ireland's membership of the European Monetary System : expectations, out-turn and prospects', in P.J. Drudy and Dermot McAleese op.cit. pp.173-190, and C.H. Murray, 'The European Monetary System : Implications for Ireland', Central Bank of Ireland Annual Review, 1979, pp.96-108.
171. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 306:342 ff, and 366-7 (1978).
172. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 265:744 (1973).
173. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, interview on 'This Week' RTE radio 4 July 1975.
174. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 326:1513-4 (1981), although in his RTE interview in July 1975 FitzGerald had been uncharacteristically vague on this - RTE radio 4 July 1975.
175. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 327:1466 (1981).
176. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 309:1799 (1978). See also 306:424 (1978).
177. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 327:1395-6 (1981).
178. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 327:1464 (1981).

179. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 327:1396 (1981) quoting Lynch 241:1157 (1969).
180. Dooge, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1140 (1981).
181. Haughey, Dail Debates 331:922 (1981). FitzGerald in 1975 in Royal Irish Academy speech, 10 November 1975, also linked the question to redistribution.
182. Irish Times 13 December 1981. William Wallace, 'European Political Cooperation : a new form of diplomacy', Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol.1 No.4 (1984) also refers to it as EPC's "first military decision", p.12.
183. Dooge, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1144 (1981).
184. Sunday Times, 18 May 1980.
185. See Ireland Today No.967 (June 1980).
186. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 321:1079-80 (1980).
187. See Ireland Today No.972 (December 1980/January 1981).
188. Irish Times, 13 December 1980.
189. Daily Telegraph, 28 January 1981. See also Irish Times, 17 December 1980 and Sunday Press 21 December 1980.
190. She stated that "a united and independent Ireland could well make possible a fresh approach to the consideration of her place within the scheme of western defence". Like her grandfather it was not a clear commitment. Irish Times 28 February 1982.
191. Stating, on a visit to Northern Ireland, that if Ireland wished to discuss defence, it would presumably do so "with a much wider group of nations". Times 7 March 1981.
192. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 327:1392-1400 (1981).
193. Irish Times, 12 March 1981. On 13 March Irish Times attributed the second-thoughts to the furore the issue had raised.
194. Interview with senior Irish army officer, Dublin, November 1983.
195. Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Dublin, March 1981 and November 1983.
196. Lenihan gave a description of its operation in 1980, Dail Debates 322:969 (1980).
197. Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Dublin, March 1981 and November 1983, and FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'European-Arab Cooperation', Cairo, 7 June 1976.
198. Christopher Hill, 'National interests - the insuperable obstacles?' in Christopher Hill (ed.), National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1983) p.189 using the term popularized by Irving Janis on the notion that groups tend to close in on themselves, Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink, (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

199. MacKernan, op.cit. p.21 cites approvingly Phillippe de Schoutheete, La Co-operation Politique Europeenne, (Paris, Fernand Nathan, 1980) p.118, MacKernan's translation. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 322:970-1 (1980) also used the word "reflex".
200. MacKernan quoting Schoutheete, MacKernan op.cit. p.21.
201. Report on European Political Cooperation, London, 13 October 1981, op.cit.
202. Laffan, op.cit. p.100.
203. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 275:912 (1974).
204. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 323:1169 (1980).
205. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 306:365-7 (1978).
206. O'Kennedy, idem.
207. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 322:1339 (1980).
208. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 306:366 (1978).
209. Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs official, London, April 1985.
210. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 323:1169 (1980).
211. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 306:367 (1978).
212. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 323:1169 (1980).
213. See pp.393 above, and Foot op.cit. pp.353-6.
214. Laffan, op.cit. pp.98-100; and Patrick Keatinge, 'Ireland' in Hill op.cit. p.144.
215. Patrick Keatinge, 'Ireland', in Hill, ibid p.142.
216. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Royal Irish Academy, 10 November 1975.
217. Christopher Hill, 'National interests ; the insuperable obstacle?', in Hill op.cit. p.191.
218. Pieter Jan Kuyper, 'Community Sanctions against Argentina : Lawfulness under Community and International Law', in D. O'Keefe and H.G. Schermers, (Eds.), Essays in European Law and Integration, 1983, (Deventer, Kluwer, 1982) p.145.
219. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 322:1811 ff and 1829-30 (1980).
220. Kuyper, op.cit. pp.144-147.
221. Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs official, London, April 185. See also Norman MacQueen, 'The Expedience of Tradition : Ireland, International Organization and the Falklands Crisis', Political Studies, Vol.XXXIII No.1 (March 1985) pp.38-55 and Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 334:798 ff (1982).
222. MacQueen, ibid p.43.
223. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 334:798 ff and 1424 ff (1982).

224. Irish Times, 12 April 1982.
225. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 334:800 (1982).
226. Irish Times, 13 April 1982, echoing a previous statement that "Ireland's neutrality was in no way watered down by this decision", Irish Times 12 April 1982.
227. Official Journal of the European Communities L102, (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1982), Council Regulation (EEC) No.877/82 of 16 April 1982. (Hereafter, OJ).
228. Idem.
229. Collins, Minister for Foreign Affairs, RTE interview, 20 April 1982.
230. For these statements see Ireland Today No.988 (May 1982).
231. Haughey, Taoiseach, Irish Times, 7 May 1982.
232. Haughey, Irish Times, 5 May 1982.
233. Haughey, Dail Debates 334:802-4 (1982).
234. MacQueen, op.cit. pp.49-50.
235. OJ op.cit. L136 Council Regulation (EEC) No.1176/82 of 18 May 1982 and L146 Council Regulation (EEC) 1254/82 of 24 May 1982.
236. For a discussion of the legal question see Kuyper op.cit. pp.147-151. The change of policy over sanctions was against the advice of senior Irish officials. Interview with senior Department of Foreign Affairs official, Dublin, November 1983. On the pre-16 April operation of sanctions see also Seeler Report European Parliament Working Documents - Doc.1-83/82.
237. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 334:802 (1982).
238. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 334:1425 (1982).
239. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 334:804 (1982).
240. MacQueen, op.cit. pp.50-53. Neither did the 4 May statement.
241. Senator John A. Murphy, Sunday Press 23 May 1982.
242. Power, Minister for Defence, Irish Times 4 May 1982.
243. Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 334:35-38 (1982).
244. FitzGerald, Opposition leader, ibid 334:1429 (1982).
245. For a discussion of these aspects see MacQueen op.cit. pp.53-55.
246. Haughey, Taoiseach, on RTE 12 May said all issues "impinged" on each other - Irish Times, 14 May 1982.
247. FitzGerald, Opposition leader, made these points, Dail Debates 334:1427-1430 (1982).
248. Collins, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Address to 37th General Assembly of the United Nations, 30 September 1982, Ireland Today No.993 (November/December 1982), and Gerard M.M. MacSweeney, 'Irish Neutrality and International Law', Irish Law Times, (August 1984) p.149.

249. See William Wallace, 'Political Cooperation : Integration Through Intergovernmentalism', in Wallace, Wallace and Webb op.cit. pp.397 and 402, and see above pp.389-390 above.
250. Dooge, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1138-9 (1981).
251. Interview with senior Irish politician with experience of these matters, Dublin, November 1983. As it was put in the interview: "If a Foreign Minister has just returned from spending hours with Gromyko, he naturally wants to report to colleagues. If he strays into certain areas, I would not hold up my hand and say you can't, but rather say nothing, sip my drink deeply and keep my ears open".
252. William Wallace, 'European Political Cooperation : a new form of diplomacy', op.cit. p.12.
253. President-in-Office at time of Venlo meeting, Dutch Foreign Minister Dr. van der Klaauw, The Times, 11 May 1981.
254. In a speech at a Conference on Neutrality organised by the Royal Irish Academy International Affairs Committee, 21 November 1980, four days after the Genscher speech. See Dail Debates 325:820 (1980).
255. The view of Lieut.- Général Carl O'Sullivan, Irish Times, 2 February 1982, and 25 September 1982.
256. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 327:1466 (1981).
257. For example, Genscher, The Times, 11 May 1981.
258. Lenihan, who was at Venlo, speaking in opposition, and FitzGerald as Taoiseach in October 1981, see Dail Debates 330 :125-6 and 310-11 (1981).
259. Lenihan, in opposition, ibid 330:124-134 (1981).
260. FitzGerald, Taoiseach, ibid 330:305-318 (1981).
261. Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs official, and with senior politician, Dublin, November 1983, and Dooge, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1142 (1981).
262. FitzGerald, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 330:313 (1981).
263. Lenihan, Irish Times, 15 October 1981.
264. Lenihan, Dail Debates 330:124-134 (1981).
265. FitzGerald, Taoiseach, ibid 330:306-318 (1981).
266. Interview with senior Irish politician, Dublin, November 1983.
267. Report on European Political Cooperation, London, 13 October 1981, op.cit. and Irish Times, 28 October 1981.
268. See Desmond Dinan, 'Irish Involvement in European Political Cooperation', in McSweeney, op.cit. p.144.
269. Irish Times, 5 November 1981.
270. Dooge, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1142 (1981).
271. FitzGerald, Dail Debates 330:315-6 (1981).

272. Patrick Keatinge, 'The Europeanisation of Irish Foreign Policy', op.cit. p.42.
273. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, interview on 'This Week' RTE radio, 4 July 1975. See also O'Kennedy as Foreign Minister, Dail Debates 306:421-2 (1978) and Dooge, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1143 (1981).
274. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 265:756 (1973).
275. Haughey in opposition, ibid 331:922 (1981) and FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Royal Irish Academy, 10 November 1975.
276. Dooge, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1141 (1981), a point reiterated in interviews with senior Irish politicians and Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Dublin, November 1983.
277. Report on European Union by Mr. Leo Tindemans, December 1975, Bulletin of the European Communities, (Brussels, Commission of the European Communities, 1976) Supplement 1/76 pp.18-20.
278. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 265:756 ff (1973) and Salmon, 'Ireland' in C. & K.J. Twitchett (eds.), Building Europe : Britain's Partners in the EEC, (London, Europa, 1981) pp.203-213 for a general review of Irish attitudes on these questions.
279. See Michael Hodges, 'Industrial Policy : Hard Times or Great Expectations?' in Wallace, Wallace and Webb, op.cit. pp.265-6.
280. Christopher Tugendhat, Vice-President of the Commission, First Annual Shell Lecture, University of St. Andrews, 14 May 1981.
281. Klepsch Report, European Parliament Working Documents 1978-79, Doc. 83/78.
282. Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance, op.cit. p.91.
283. Irish Times, 15 June and 14 June 1978.
284. See, for example, D. Greenwood, A Policy for Promoting Defence and Technological Cooperation among West European Countries for the Commission of the European Communities (1980), and Haagerup Report, European Parliament Working Documents 1982-1983 Doc. 1-946/82.
285. Irish Times, 16 October 1981. The paper also reported that O'Kennedy, the Irish Commissioner, had "fought ... a spoiling action ... to prevent any detailed suggestions emerging".
286. Irish Times, 19 May 1982. Lenihan did attempt to stress outside the meeting that he did not regard it as the end of the Luxembourg compromise.
287. FitzGerald, Leader of the Opposition, Irish Times, 12 May 1982.
288. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 325:594-6 (1980), see also 322:741-2 (1980).
289. See Government statement, 4 May 1982, Ireland Today No.988 (May 1982); FitzGerald, Leader of the Opposition, Dail Debates 334:809 (1982).

290. See Haughey, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 334:798-806 (1982) and; Noel Dorr's speech to the Security Council, 25 May, in Irish Times 26 May 1982. Also interview with senior Foreign Affairs official, London, April 1985.
291. Usually 6 with UNICYP and 21 with UNTSO, of whom 6 or 7 served with UNDOF, see Dail Debates 275:1322 (1974), 279:356 (1975) and 287:1168 (1976).
292. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 327:534 (1981).
293. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 327:1397 (1981).
294. Dooge, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Seanad Eireann Debates 96:1136-8 (1981).
295. O'Kennedy in opposition, Dail Debates 268:801 ff (1973).
296. See p.391 above.
297. In the 10 November 1975 speech to Royal Irish Academy, FitzGerald as Minister for Foreign Affairs argued that the EPC process inevitably involved "pressure on the more 'conservative' countries to adopt a more progressive stance" and vice versa, although generally the movement was in a "progressive direction".
298. FitzGerald, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 330:307-8 (1981).
299. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 10 November 1975, Royal Irish Academy.
300. Quinn, Dail Debates 327:1440-1 (1981).
301. Cluskey, Labour leader, ibid 327:1405-6 (1981).
302. Ryan, ibid 306:411 (1978) and Irish Times, 24 October 1978.
303. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 265:745 (1973).
304. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 276:781 (1974).
305. See Helen O'Neill, 'Irish Aid : Performance and Policies', Development and Peace, Vol.4 (Spring 1983) pp.130-147.
306. Interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, Dublin, March 1981; and see Dail Debates 276:1180 and Lenihan, Irish Times 28 October 1981.
307. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 265:741-2 (1973).
308. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 322:1339 (1980).
309. O'Kennedy, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 306:366 (1978).
310. Haughey, Taoiseach, ibid 327:1392-1400 (1981).
311. FitzGerald, Leader of the Opposition, Irish Times, 8 February 1980.
312. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, interview on 'This Week' RTE radio, 4 July 1975.
313. Lenihan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 327:1465 (1981).
314. Quinn, ibid 327:1440-8 (1981).

315. Irish Times, 9 March 1981.
316. In the summer of 1974 whilst on holiday he prepared a memorandum on planning the Presidency - private information.
317. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 276:798-9 (1974).
318. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, ibid 270:1861 ff (1974).
319. See pp.394-5 above.
320. Cosgrave, Taoiseach, Dail Debates 292:3 ff (1976) for the motion, Cosgrave's speech and the debate.
321. See Salmon, 'The Civil Power and Aiding the Civil Power : the case of Ireland', op.cit. pp.81-83, and The Cost of Violence Arising from the Northern Ireland Crisis since 1969 : New Ireland Forum, op.cit. passim.
322. O'Brien, Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Dail Debates 273: 1632 ff (1974).
323. O'Brien reported in Irish Times, 25 September 1974.
324. FitzGerald, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dail Debates 273: 1699 ff (1974).
325. For the agreement see Richard Deutsch and Vivien Magowan, Northern Ireland : a Chronology of Events, 1968-74 Vol.2 (1972-73), (Belfast, Blackstaff, 1974) Appendix 7.
326. See Padraig O'Malley, The Uncivil Wars : Ireland Today (Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1983) p.95.
327. See the official communique, Ireland Today No.972 (December 1980/January 1981).
328. Haughey, Taoiseach, Irish Times 9 December 1980.
329. See the official communique, Ireland Today No.983 (December 1981).
330. For Irish policy on Northern Ireland, events in Northern Ireland and the Anglo-Irish process see, O'Malley op.cit. passim, and James Downey, Them and Us : Britain, Ireland and Northern Ireland 1969-1982, (Dublin, Ward River Press, 1983) passim.
331. FitzGerald, Irish Times 12 May 1982 and p.418 above.
332. See p.334 above.
333. A point strongly emphasised by senior Department of Foreign Affairs official, interview, Dublin, November 1983.
334. Barrett, Minister for Defence, Dail Debates 327:1433 (1981).

Chapter Ten: Conclusion: Sui Generis Ireland

Neutrality per se involves the fulfilment of specific duties and the upholding of specific rights. Moreover, it only truly exists in times of war or armed conflict. However, given the absence of war in Europe since 1945, several states have attempted to pursue a policy "aiming at neutrality in the event of war" (p.7),¹ and although properly speaking no agreed name for neutrality in peacetime exists, the policies of these states may be described as ones 'for neutrality' if not 'of neutrality'. Even such policies, however, require the fulfilment of certain criteria.

Nonalignment is not a particular policy as such, but rather a spirit within which policies are approached, and it is best understood as a "frame of mind" (pp.66-7). This frame of mind having been shaped by socio-economic and political experiences, which the European states under review, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and particularly Ireland, did not experience in the same form or in the same degree. Thus, whilst these states, may, on occasion, seek to act as do the nonaligned, that should not be equated with nonalignment per se.

The Irish have claimed at times to be either neutral or nonaligned, or both. The analysis of neutrality, nonalignment and of the model provided by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, allowed the identification of a number of variables against which the Irish claims could be tested (pp.136-8). However, prior to the formal application of such tests, it was necessary to examine the basis of Irish policy in the period prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, to establish the nature of their experience and to establish what traditions, if any, had been established. Subsequently, four variables were applied as

tests of Irish neutrality during the Second World War itself, namely the extent to which: (i) the Irish fulfilled the duties and upheld the rights of a neutral; (ii) their position was recognised by belligerents; (iii) they disavowed help and; (iv) they retained freedom of decision and action.

Subsequently, to take account of the period of peace, the variables were adjusted so as to be appropriate to examine a policy 'for neutrality'. The variables were also adjusted to take cognizance of some aspects of nonalignment, and two other variables were added for this purpose, although the following analysis concentrated more upon the 'for neutrality' dimension, since it had already been established that European states, including Ireland, were different in kind and not just degree from the nonaligned. The variables applied in the 1945-1982 period were: (i) due diligence; (ii) recognition of position by others; (iii) disavowal of help; (iv) freedom of decision and action; (v) lack of isolationism, a willingness to ameliorate world problems and impartiality and; (vi) attitude to identity, nation-building, unity, stability and self-determination.

In the pre-Second World War period, the pre-eminent Irish pre-occupation was with the establishment of Irish sovereignty, particularly vis-a-vis Britain, although at times there was also some manifestation of an incipient aspiration 'for neutrality'. That aspiration, however, was undermined by the lack of defence and economic self-sufficiency, and was not in any case unambiguous or shared by all. Indeed, whilst later proponents of 'traditional neutrality' point to the anti-conscription campaign during 1914-1918, the Irish Neutrality League, the Casement call for a 'neutralised'

Ireland and antipathy initially to the League of Nations and the 1921 Treaty, as well as to the 1927 defence debate and the late 1930s desire to avoid participation in war, there was an alternative tradition, which was at least as strong, if not more so. This was the tradition of enlistment in the British Army, of support for Redmond, of the willingness to forego neutrality in the 1921 negotiations with Britain, of commitment to collective security, and of the willingness to accept the British 'protective umbrella' as well as to discuss possible defence arrangements and agreements with them. In addition, there was a discrepancy between Irish rhetoric and their commitment in terms of resources. As war approached, the Irish simply sought to avoid participation in it, not conditionally by insistence on neutral rights and duties, but at any price. It was not a policy 'for neutrality' but rather 'for non-belligerency'.

World War Two provided the only true test of Irish neutrality per se, and despite the conventional wisdom, the Irish failed the test. There was no strict adherence, for example, to neutral rights and duties, but rather a self-confessed "certain consideration for Britain" (p.191) and "friendly neutrality" towards the Allies (p.207). In addition, there was the inadequacy of Irish defence efforts, particularly with regard to equipment and air and naval defence. Whilst the Germans were willing to recognise Irish neutrality, they violated Irish neutral rights on occasion, whilst the British never formally recognised Irish neutrality throughout the war. The lack of tradition re neutrality in Ireland, the omission of neutrality from the Constitution, and the nature of domestic opinion, gave belligerents some grounds for questioning Irish commitment to neutrality, especially given the Irish lack of resources and due diligence. In addition, there was no unequivocal disavowal of help, especially given the talks

with the British. On the other hand, whilst they bent with the wind, the Irish retained enough freedom of decision and action to say 'no' regarding the ports and in rejecting, for example, both threats (like the American Note) and promises (on unity). Ireland did not become a belligerent, but the evidence suggests that the screw was never really turned on Ireland, as evidenced, for example, by the 1942 British decision to keep Ireland going on a "minimum basis" (p.235). Nonetheless, freedom of decision and action was relative, and conditional upon others, and the lack of self-sufficiency posed difficulties for Ireland in fulfilling the requirements of neutrality. The main pre-occupations were non-belligerency and the pursuit of sovereignty, pre-occupations which came together in abstention from a British war. Despite this, the apparent success of Irish neutrality, led to some elevating it to a "mystery of faith" (p.252).

After the war, the Irish failed to meet the criteria 'for neutrality'. In the initial postwar period, for example, there was a clear failure to meet their own self-assigned standards regarding due diligence, and there appeared again, at least on the part of some, to be dependence upon the British 'protective umbrella'. The Irish position was certainly not initially accepted by the Soviet Union, whilst Britain and the United States, at times, both saw Irish neutrality as negotiable. Even more problematical was the Irish failure to advance neutrality as a reason for non-participation in the Atlantic Pact, with Partition being referred to as the "sole obstacle" to participation (p.283). During this period it again appears as if, whilst concerned with the Irish position, the British and Americans were not so concerned as to really take advantage of Irish economic dependence, and so, the Irish again retained a degree

of freedom of decision and action, albeit also being subject to constraints. The 1946-1955 period saw opposition to a specific alliance, but also a willingness to accept United Nations collective security, and equivocation regarding possible bilateral defence arrangements. It was a time of relative Irish isolation from the mainstream of events, with the Irish making little contribution to the world. Despite the non-adhesion to the Atlantic Pact, the Irish were not impartial in the emerging Cold War, but remained hampered by their concern with the achievement of unity. Fundamentally important was the lack of an unequivocal assertion of 'policy 'for neutrality' and the failure to provide the necessary wherewithal to underpin such a policy. Non-participation in alliance cannot be equated with neutrality, and Irish policy was rather sui generis.

During the years 1956-1972 there was again a clear failure with regard to due diligence, with all aspects of Irish defence being inadequate. The Irish faced problems in having their position recognised by others since they were not participants in the Non-Aligned Movement and since their application to join the European Community in 1961 meant that they "definitely parted company with the European neutrals" (p.320). Furthermore, there was a clearer acceptance of a British and NATO protective umbrella, and a willingness to forego even the aspiration 'for neutrality' in the context of Community membership and development. It was in connection with the Community that the limitations upon Irish freedom of decision and action really became apparent, with the Hobson's choice they faced given the British application. At this time the Irish left behind their relative isolation by contributing extensively to the United Nations, and in their approach to Europe. Nonetheless, the equivocation in their policy was evidenced by the appearance of what

might be termed two foreign policies, the one reflective of a 'for neutrality' and 'nonalignment' aspiration, the other pragmatic and reflective of an aspiration for material prosperity. Whilst for much of the period issues connected with unity were not high on the agenda, the eruption of Northern Ireland in 1968-1969 made unity a major issue in Irish politics and revealed the constraints faced by the Irish.

Crucial in this period, however, was the clear abandonment, albeit subject to Community development, of any aspiration 'for neutrality', or adoption of the European model of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, or to be nonaligned, at least as far as Irish governments were concerned. The decisive pre-occupations were welfare maximisation, economic growth and, through Community membership also, the reduction of dependence upon Britain.

In the final period under review, 1973-1982, there continued to be a lack of sufficient commitment to the requirements of due diligence. Whilst improvements in Irish defence effort took place, they were either orientated towards the Northern Ireland situation or towards fishery protection, the latter being to some extent dependent upon Community funding. Ireland's own experts judged the Irish defence effort inadequate when measured against the requirements of a truly neutral stance. Sixty years after independence, Ireland still lacked its own munitions factory and was dependent upon others for supplies of weapons. Irish forces were those appropriate for a state "in a disarmed world" (p.387).

The equivocations of 1980-1982 relating to neutrality caused confusion in third party minds as to where the Irish really stood, and the nature of the stand in 1982 regarding the Falklands did not altogether destroy the impression of equivocation. Moreover, Ireland

still remained separated from both the Non-Aligned Movement and the Neutral and Nonaligned caucus of CSCE review conferences, and was instead increasingly perceived as a Community state. There was, again, no unequivocal disavowal of help, but rather an apparent Irish readiness to take the initiative in raising the question of defence cooperation with the British. Some in government, moreover, still clearly believed in the British and NATO umbrella, although as previously there was no formal agreement with either.

During the 1973-1982 period a notable development was the marked decline in the economic and political dependence upon Britain as a result of both Irish trade diversification and the multilateralisation of the previously bilateral relationship with Britain. These developments enhanced Irish freedom of decision, as evidenced by the 1975 Irish policy regarding their position in the event of British withdrawal from the Community, and the 1979 decision to enter the EMS. Whilst Community membership imposed new constraints upon Ireland, it appears that by 1982 these constraints had not become more severe than the old constraints imposed by the relationship with Britain, and the Irish thus enjoyed somewhat greater freedom of decision than anticipated prior to entry into the Community. In this period, moreover, the Irish became gradually increasingly more ambivalent in their attitude to the Community and in their commitment to its defence.

By 1982 the Irish appeared to retain sufficient sovereignty to say 'no' on certain questions, both, for example, regarding the expansion of EPC and with respect to the Falklands' conflict. Nonetheless, Community membership did impose constraints, and the Irish lacked the freedom of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. Moreover, FitzGerald in 1982 spoke in terms which implied that pre-entry fears of an

escalator effect of membership had some foundation, and there were signs both in regard to Community and EPC development that the Irish were on a "slippery slope" (p.414), although it was not clear how slippery the slope was, nor what lay at the bottom of it.

In the 1973-1982 period Ireland became even more committed to involvement in the world, but this increasingly took the form of involvement in and through the Community, rather than an identifiable and distinctive Irish involvement. On questions relating to identity, therefore, the record was mixed since the Irish achieved greater distinctiveness from Britain, but at the cost of identification with the Community. Whilst unity remained high on the political agenda little progress was made. Perhaps the most interesting feature of this period is that contrary to pre-Community expectations, the Irish still retained a reasonable degree of choice as to their policies and actions, albeit that in some cases the opportunity costs of alternative choices were potentially severe.

The examination of Irish security, foreign and defence policies demonstrates conclusively that there have been "no set of common principles" (p. 389) underlying them. Moreover, despite the claims of the Irish themselves, in which they have repeatedly regarded themselves as neutral and/or nonaligned, it is clear that Ireland has never been truly neutral, and cannot be regarded as nonaligned. In addition, Irish policy has not met the requirements inherent in the Swedish formulation of "non-participation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war" (p.7), given its failure to meet the criteria of 'for neutrality', most strikingly

in its lack of due diligence and in its equivocation as the foundations of Irish policy. Irish assertions of their being "neutral in a military sense" (p.388) do not save neutrality, since neutrality is not to be equated with mere non-belligerency, nor non-alliance membership. Despite the periodic apparent stance of neutrality there has been a demonstrable failure to evolve a single, unequivocal tradition on neutrality, and in many cases the Irish commitment to neutrality has clearly been conditional, for example, upon the ending of Partition or the development of the European Community.

Whilst a tradition regarding neutrality can be identified, it is not a consistent tradition, and an alternative tradition has been more powerful, reflecting the primordial concern with sovereignty, unity and independence, and establishing a distinctive position vis-a-vis Britain. The alternative tradition has also seen a high degree of pragmatism and expediency, awareness of geographical realities as well as of the constraints imposed by economic dependence, and the concern with prosperity and welfare maximisation. This alternative tradition has for the most part been adopted as Ireland's operative policy framework, and concerns for unity, sovereignty, independence, prosperity and limited resources, have predominantly been accorded greater weight than neutrality, nonalignment or the European model represented by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. The alternative tradition has increasingly been preferred to the austere, autarkic and Arcadian vision of de Valera.

Given that there have been these two traditions, there has been confusion in Irish rhetoric, and in the minds of third parties, as to the true nature of Irish policy and aspirations, and this has contributed to the appearance of "a somewhat messy neutrality" (p.6) in the Irish case. But contrary to appearance, it is not simply a

question of messiness, but rather that Ireland has consistently, over several decades, failed to meet the criteria of either 'of' or 'for' neutrality. This despite Keatinge's claim that "Ireland fulfills two basic conditions to be categorised as neutral: it does not belong to any military alliance, and it continues to make declarations asserting its neutrality".² In the case of the latter it has been shown that the declarations have not been consistent and, in addition, they have been more than matched by declarations yielding any real claim to neutrality. Similarly, non-alliance membership and the lack of a formal commitment to co-belligerency in the event of war on behalf of any other state or group of states, have been shown to be insufficient conditions of neutrality. It is not sufficient in these circumstances to argue merely "that the use of the term neutrality is best qualified in the Irish context", or to refer to "the limited nature of Irish neutrality".³ The concept is inappropriate to Ireland.

Similarly, recent suggestions regarding the pursuit of 'active neutrality'⁴ involve a contradiction in terms, and a dismissal of the established meaning of the concept of neutrality. Indeed, the difference is so great that it is perhaps an abuse of language to apply the same term to neutrality per se and the policies advocated by McSweeney and the Irish Labour Party, namely being actively involved in the creation of peace. Nonalignment, as properly understood, is also, as demonstrated, inappropriate terminology, whilst Ireland does not fit the model of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.

Given that there is no currently accepted concept which fits the Irish case, that Ireland differs from "the three neutral countries" (p.96) and that Ireland is unique within the European Community and has had its aspirations, such as they were, to neutrality, compromised by Community membership, Ireland is best regarded as a special case or sui generis.

Chapter Ten : Footnotes

1. Page numbers in this chapter refer to the text above.
2. Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, (Dublin, Institute of Public Administration, 1984) p.55.
3. Ibid p.56.
4. See, in particular, Bill McSweeney, 'Postscript: The Case for Active Irish Neutrality' in Bill McSweeney (ed.), Ireland and the threat of Nuclear War, (Dublin, Dominican Publications, 1985).

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