


**RADICALS AND REACTIONARIES: THE POLARISATION OF
COMMUNITY AND GOVERNMENT IN THE NAME OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY**

Douglas M. Weeks

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



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
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Radicals and Reactionaries: The Polarisation of Community and Government in the Name of Public Safety and Security

Douglas M. Weeks



This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

15 November 2012

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Abstract

The contemporary threat of terrorism has changed the ways in which government and the public view the world. Unlike the existential threat from nation states in previous centuries, today, government and the public spend much of their effort looking for the inward threat. Brought about by high profile events such as 9/11, 7/7, and 3/11, and exacerbated by globalisation, hyper-connected social spheres, and the media, the threats from within are reinforced daily. In the UK, government has taken bold steps to foment public safety and public security but has also been criticised by some who argue that government actions have labelled Muslims as the ‘suspect other’. This thesis explores the counterterrorism environment in London at the community/government interface, how the Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade deliver counter-terrorism policy, and how individuals and groups are reacting. It specifically explores the realities of the lived experience of those who make up London’s ‘suspect community’ and whether or not counterterrorism policy can be linked to further marginalisation, radicalism, and extremism. By engaging with those that range from London’s Metropolitan Police Service’s Counterterrorism Command (SO15) to those that make up the radical fringe, an ethnographic portrait is developed. Through that ethnographic portrait the ‘ground truth’ and complexities of the lived experience are made clear and add significant contrast to the aseptic policy environment.

Acknowledgements

There are numerous people who made this thesis possible and without their help, support, and guidance, none of this would have been possible. I would first like to thank my supervisors Roger Mac Ginty and Robert Lambert who provided uncompromising guidance and support throughout the entire process. Your patience and unremitting commitment made this project a reality.

I would also like to expend my thanks to the men and women of the Metropolitan Police Service, London Fire Brigade, ACPO, and Home Office who set aside their busy schedules and took the time to speak with me. Your perspective and insight was a critical asset to my understanding and appreciation of the public safety environment in London.

Finally, I want to thank all of the men and women from the community who I interviewed and spoke with. Your willingness to engage and share your views provided a personalised and critical understanding of the lived experience you face each day. I hope I have told your story accurately and that future opportunities will present themselves to continue our engagement.

Last, for those that eyed me with suspicion, for the record, I'm not associated with the CIA, FBI, or any other intelligence or law enforcement agency in any country, really!

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List of Abbreviations

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AM	Al Muhajiroun
AQ	Al Qaeda
ATCSA 2001	Anti Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001
CASE	Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion
CCA	Civil Contingencies Act
CONTEST	Counter-terrorism Strategy
COTISSCM	COT Institute for Safety, Security, and Crisis Management
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CSC	Centre for Social Cohesion
CT	Counter-terrorism
CTA 2008	Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008
CTSA's	Counter Terrorism Security Advisors
DCLG	Department of Communities and Local Government
EC	European Commission
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EDL	English Defence League
ELM	East London Mosque
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(GIA)	Armed Islamic Group of Algeria
HT	Hizb ut Tahrir
IFE	Islamic Forum Europe
ILO	Interagency Liaison Officer
IRA	Irish Republican Army
LFB	London Fire Brigade
LIFE	Local Intervention Fire Education
MAC	Muslims Against Crusades
MCB	Muslim Council of Britain
MI5	British Domestic Security service
MI6	British Secret Intelligence Service
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NaCTSO	National Counter Terrorism Security Office
NCTT	National Communities Tension Team
NDC	New Deal for Communities
NI35	National Indicator 35
NIRT	Northern Ireland Terrorism
NIS	National Identity Scheme
NRA	National Risk Assessment
NRR	National Risk Register
NSS	National Security Strategy
OBM	Omar Bakri Mohammad
OED	Oxford English Dictionary
OSCT	Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
PBUH	Peace be upon him
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army

PSA 26	Public Service Agreement 26
PTA 1974	Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974
PTA 2005	Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
RD	Relative deprivation
SAW	<i>Sallal-lahu 'alayhi wa-alihi wa-sallam</i>
SC	Social Constructionism
SIT	Social Identity Theory
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SNA	Social Network Analysis
SNT	Social Network Theory
SO15	Metropolitan Police Service Counterterrorism Command
SPJ	Structured Professional Judgment
TA 2000	Terrorism Act of 2000
TA 2006	Terrorism Act 2006
TACT	Terrorism Act of 2000
TPIM's	Temporary Prevention and Investigation Methods
UK	United Kingdom
UKBA	United Kingdom Border Agency
US	United States of America
UTREC	University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee
VERA	Violent Extremism Risk Assessment
WRAP	Workshop to Raise Awareness about Prevent

Glossary of Islamic/Arabic Terms

Ahl Al Bid'ah wal Firqah

Those people who use innovation are the deviant sects

Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah

The people of the Sunnah and the group; those that follow the ways of the Prophet

Allahu Akbar

Allah is the greatest or God is great

Aqeedah

Belief; collectively it infers the six articles of Sunni belief: the oneness of God, belief in the angels, belief in the books sent by God, belief in the messengers, belief in the day of judgment, and the belief that God has carefully planned what has happened, what is happening now, and what will happen in the future (predestination).

Ash-Sham region

Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria

Bid'a

Innovation; contextually, any deviation from the ways of the prophet, the understandings of his companions, or literal interpretations of the Qur'an

Batil

False or falsehood

Dar al harb

Literally 'house of war'; generally conceived as those areas not under Muslim rule; often used to describe the West

Dar al Islam

Literally 'house of Islam'; generally conceived as those areas under Muslim rule

Dawah

Calling people to Islam; proselytising

Deen

Way of life; contextually, living as a pious Muslim following the ways of the prophet and his companions

Ebad ul Rahman

Islamic Scouts in Lebanon

Fard

Obligation; a religious duty

Fard 'ayn

An individual religious obligation

Fard Kifayah

A collective community or societal obligation for all Muslims

Fatwa

Non-binding religious ruling or opinion of Islamic law; typically issued by an Islamic scholar; similar to a legal opinion

Fiqh

Islamic jurisprudence; defines what is obligatory, recommended, permissible, not recommended, and forbidden; normally derived from Qur'an, Sunnah, and hadith; unique to the four schools of Sunni Islamic thought: Hanafi, Malaki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali

Fiqh al Tadafu

Provoking the enemy to respond so the Muslims will wake up

Hadith

The recorded sayings, actions, and approvals of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH); scientifically collected and catalogued tracing the chain of transmitters

Hajj

The fifth pillar of Islam; pilgrimage to the city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia

Halaka meetings

Study circles; group meeting to learn and study Islam

Haqq

Truth; infers the correct belief

Haram

Prohibitive or forbidden

Hijra

Migrate; historical reference to the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and his followers leaving Mecca and establishing the first Muslim community in Medina

Ikhwan

Literally brotherhood; usually refers to the Muslim Brotherhood

Ijma

Consensus of Islamic scholars; serves as one of four methods in the determination of Islamic *fiqh*

Imam

Prayer leader and typically an Islamic scholar; spiritual leader of the mosque

Iman

Personal faith

Intifada

Literally to be shaken, woken up; contextually refers to the Palestinian uprising(s) against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza

Islamist

A complex term but simplistically the belief that Islamic principles are all encompassing and distinctions between personal, social, and political divisions are inappropriate; roughly the opposite of secularism; often used pejoratively by those in the West to describe 'political Islam'; contextually neutral unless indicated otherwise

Jahiliyya

Ignorance; contextually the period before the revelation of the Qur'an

Jannah

Paradise or heaven

Jihad

Literally to struggle; numerous meanings apply personally and/or collectively; simplistically, greater *jihad* is to strive to be a better Muslim whereas the lesser *jihad* refers to fighting or struggling to support the Islamic community or *ummah*; contextually both the greater and lesser *jihad* are referenced

Jihadist

Complex term with many meanings; typically a pejorative reference given to Muslims inferring violent action; contextually represents both violent action, and individual and group struggle against injustice

Khilafa

Caliphate; often regarded by Muslims as man's trusteeship on earth; contextually, the abolishment of man-made law and democratic principles so that they can be replaced with divine law (*shar'iah*)

Kufr

Someone who is ungrateful to God, a disbeliever; contextually, a pejorative term used by Muslims to describe non-Muslims or un-Islamic practices

La Illah Ila Allah, Muhammed Rasoul Allah

There is no God but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God; the first pillar of Islam; also referred to as the *shahadah* or declaration of faith

Madrassa

Islamic religious school

Minbar Ansar ul Deen

Literally the pulpit of helpers for the Muslim way of life

Muatamin

Leader

Mubah

Permissible; neither recommended nor discouraged; neutral in *fiqh*

Mujahidin

Muslim fighter who fights in God's cause

Mukruh

Something that is discouraged in *fiqh*

Mustahabb

Something that is recommended in *fiqh*

Qiyas

Analogy; a conclusion that is based on reason; contextually, in strict *Salafi* doctrine, reason is often rejected in place of literalism

Qur'an

Islamic religious text; considered the literal word of God by Muslims; immutable; the last in a series of God's revelation to man; delivered through the angel Gabriel to the prophet Muhammad between 610 and 632

Sahaba

The companions of the prophet Muhammad

Salaf

The righteous Muslim predecessors; normally refers to the first three generations of Muslims; those considered the most authentic and pure in their belief

Salafi

Someone who practices the Islamic faith as it was practiced during the first three generations of Muslims

Salafism

Religious orthodoxy based on early Islamic belief and practices; follows the examples of the prophet Muhammad and the *sahaba*

Sallal-lahu 'alayhi wa-alihi wa-sallam

Blessings and peace of God be with him and his household. It is a prayer which is said after the name of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

Salafi Jihadists

Those who have adopted *Salafi* ideological belief and engage in a personal and collective struggle; typically associated with violence/fighting and therefore normally pejorative; contextually neutral when describing those who are engaged in non-violent action

Shar'iah

Literally 'the path to the watering hole'; Islamic law based on *fiqh*

Shirk

Polytheism; associating partners with God; considered the one unforgivable sin by Muslims

Sunnah

The examples of exemplary life by the prophet Muhammad; his actions, his sayings, and his approvals

Tabi'een

The first generation of Muslims following the *sahaba*

Tabi' Tabi'een

The second generation of Muslims following the *sahaba*

Tafsir

Exegesis of the Qur'an

Takbir

An invocation; God is greatest; contextually used as a prompt with the response of *La Illah Ila Allah, Muhammed Rasoul Allah*

Takfir

The excommunication of one Muslim by another; historically developed by the Kharijite's circumventing the religious injunction that Muslims should not fight other Muslims

Tawahush

Anarchy

Tawhid

The oneness of God; contained in the first part of the *shahada*, *Illah Ila Allah...*

Ulema

Scholars of Islam

Ummah

The global community of Muslims

Zakat

Obligatory tax for all Muslims; normally 2.5 per cent of earnings after expenses; also the fourth pillar of Islam; supports the poor and needy

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Douglas M. Weeks

University of St Andrews

15 November 2012

First Supervisor: Dr. Roger Mac Ginty

Second Supervisor: Dr. Robert Lambert

Chapter I: Introduction

“One belief more than any other (to quote a phrase from Isaiah Berlin) is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the altar of great historical ideas. It is the belief that those who do not share my faith— or my race, or my ideology— do not share my humanity. At best they are second-class citizens. At worst they forfeit the sanctity of life itself. They are the unsaved, the unbelievers, the infidel, the unredeemed; they stand outside the circle of salvation. If faith is what makes us human, then those who do not share my faith are less than fully human... For every we there is a them.”¹

The threat of terrorism and the government responses in the Western world have profoundly shaped the worldview of policy makers, communities, and individuals alike. The rise of al Qaeda following the Afghanistan/Soviet war and its successful exportation of radical Islamic doctrine has arguably resulted in the default position that terrorism and Islam are interconnected protagonists. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan which have dominated the media for the past eleven years serve as a daily reminder of the threats that face the contemporary world. Moreover, the evolution and proliferation of social media, sometimes in parallel to, and sometimes in opposition of, mainstream media has resulted in the world being an extraordinarily interconnected place; events are documented, ideas are exchanged, and opinions are formed. Thus the worldview, including the threats that all societies face has become decidedly globalised.

In the United Kingdom (UK), terrorism has not been as distant a threat as for most other Western countries. The recurrent rise of Irish Republicanism, especially during ‘The Troubles’ that dominated Northern Ireland during the late 1960s until the mid- 1990s gave the UK an upfront and personal view of modern terrorism. The bombings that became the trademark of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and its successor groups introduced an entire generation to what it meant to be a radical. Whether Loyalist or

¹ Jonathan Sax, *The Dignity of Difference* (London: Continuum, 2002) 45.

Republican fighters, the caricature of the hooded Irish ‘provisional’ or Loyalist ‘paramilitary’, arguably became the stereotypical terrorist during that time.² In response to the violence in Northern Ireland, the government utilised a wide range of military and legislative actions before negotiating the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998 which calmed the hostilities.³

As the conflict in Northern Ireland was exiting the world stage in the mid- 1990s, it was however immediately replaced with another threat, al Qaeda, and what has been loosely termed Islamically (sic) inspired terrorism.⁴ Despite the UK’s experience with terrorism in Northern Ireland, the rise of religiously based terrorism changed the playing field and it and most other countries were ill-equipped to understand the challenges of radical Islam.⁵

The UK has legislated ‘special powers’ to deal with terrorism as far back as 1922 because of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland.⁶ However, to deal with the threat of ‘Islamically (sic) inspired’ or more aptly put, religiously inspired terrorism, in 2000 it began enacting several pieces of counter-terrorism legislation, most with strong historical legacies to Northern Ireland.⁷ The events of 11 September 2001 and the London bombings of 7 July 2005 provided the momentum to continuously expand the legislative environment in the UK resulting in five major pieces of counter-terrorism legislation being passed between 2000 and

² Kathryn Gregory, “Provisional Irish Republican Army”, Council on Foreign Relations, Available from <http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations/provisional-irish-republican-army-ira-aka-pira-provos-glaigh-na-hireann-uk-separatists/p9240> [Accessed 29 August 2012].

³ Ian Cuthbertson, “Whittling Liberties: Britain’s Not-so-Temporary Antiterrorism Laws”, *World Policy Journal* 18, no.4 (Winter 2001/2002), 29.

⁴ University of Exeter, “Research uncovers why conventional wisdom on radicalism fails”, University News, July 2010, Available at http://www.exeter.ac.uk/news/archive/2010/july/title_87919_en.html [Accessed 29 August 2012]

⁵ University of Exeter, “Research uncovers why conventional wisdom on radicalism fails.”

⁶ Ibid, 11.

⁷ Ibid.

2008.⁸ The stereotypical terrorist caricature of the hooded Irish ‘provisional’ or Loyalist ‘paramilitary’ was indelibly replaced by the Arab male wearing a tunic and skull cap.⁹

In support of its legislative actions, the UK developed its first counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) in 2003.¹⁰ CONTEST was further updated in 2006, 2009, and 2011. Additionally, a first ever National Security Strategy was developed in 2008 which identifies several ‘threats and risks’ both foreign and domestic.¹¹ Domestic threats from the National Security Strategy are further articulated in the National Risk Register.¹² Together, the National Security Strategy, the National Risk Register, and more narrowly CONTEST and the five legislative actions all combine to create an integrated counter-terrorism framework for the UK.

However, the application of strategy through counter-terrorism legislation originally conceived and applied to combat a nationalist/separatist struggle like Northern Ireland to one that is religiously based, and where religious radicalism is viewed as the root cause of the problem raises several questions about efficacy and equity. In the UK, Muslims have critically characterised the government’s response as an over-reaction by an authoritarian regime that is Islamophobic, has constructed Muslims as a ‘suspect community’, has violated human rights through disproportionate arrest and pre-charge detention, illegal stop and search, unremitting surveillance, and abused freedoms through the restriction of movement, employment, and accommodation.¹³ These allegations raise significant questions about the affect this will have on social agency over time and given the potential loss of social capital,

⁸ Home Office, *Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (CONTEST 2009) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2009) 68.

⁹ Fauzia Ahmad, British Muslim Perceptions and Opinions in News Coverage of September 11, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32, no.6, (2006).

¹⁰ Home Office, *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy* (CONTEST 2006) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2006) 1.

¹¹ Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2008) 32.

¹² Cabinet Office, *National Risk Register* (London: The Cabinet Office, 2008) 5.

¹³ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How not to prevent violent extremism* (London: The Institute for Race Relations, 2009) 8.

whether the strategies and legislation intended to manage the threat of terrorism could actually drive some to radicalisation. If that is true, then an argument can be made that the strategic and legislative environment is undermining the very safety and security they are attempting to create. This thesis is dedicated to exploring that environment.

A. Problem Statement

The UK security environment is driven by the UK National Security Strategy, the National Risk Register, and within the narrowed focus of counter-terrorism, the CONTEST strategy. Beginning with the adoption of Terrorism Act 2000 on 24 July, 2000, and perpetuated by the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, the UK's legal and counter-terrorism strategic environment expanded significantly in the spirit of providing additional public safety and security. However, despite "...general acceptance and support of CT measures" by the general population, within the broader Muslim community, the policies are often perceived as "violating civil liberties and human rights."¹⁴ In particular, actions that have been undertaken by public safety agencies to maximise public safety and security, such as 'stop and search' and '14 day detention' by the police are often perceived as "unfair, unjust, and discriminatory."¹⁵ Despite good intentions, fundamental questions remain regarding the application and efficacy of counter-terrorism strategy implementation at the local level. More specifically, police and fire agencies may be at risk of losing critical ties to the communities they serve, and the policy environment delivered through strategies like CONTEST that are designed to make communities safer from extremist violence may be driving some individuals to adopt more radicalised and potentially violent ideology. Put more plainly, if

¹⁴ Home Office, *What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of counter-terrorism legislation implemented since 2000?* Occasional paper 88 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office) 42 and 3.

¹⁵ Ibid, 2.

UK counter-terrorism policy is responsible for alienating and marginalising certain sections of the population then it is at risk for inflaming the very problem it attempts to address.

The problem statement above began after conducting an initial literature review of key concepts that underpin this research such as ‘community’ and ‘public safety’ (see Chapters II and III for more), and exploring the fundamental concepts of *Salafi* ideology (see Chapter IV). However, the problem statement is actually a hybrid, generated and solidified by a combination of literature review and discussions with some of London’s public safety practitioners (see Chapter VI for more). The combination of both highlighted several gaps but two stood out. First, there is a continued lack of understanding of the radicalisation process. Second, the development of primary research data based on personalised interaction with those at risk to better understand how communities and individuals are reacting to the policy/strategic environment is limited.

The initial literature review, exploration of *Salafi* ideology, and the discussions with London’s public safety practitioners also led to the development of five initial hypotheses. They are introduced here but explained in detail in Chapter VI.

1. Some individuals will radicalise to the extreme irrespective of preventative actions taken by public safety agencies.
2. The effects of hard power used by public safety personnel do exacerbate marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism by some within the Muslim community.
3. The short term benefit of maximising public security will be overshadowed by a marked decline in public safety/community relations especially by those at the margins.
4. The loss of social agency will cause greater numbers to move to the extreme and risk will increase over time.

5. The true benefits of the Prevent workstream may be that there is a positive influence on community relations in areas not associated with terrorism.

Last, the literature review, formation of the five hypotheses, and development of the problem statement led to the construction of the following research question.

B. Research Question

Do current UK counter-terrorism strategies intended to increase public safety and public security, exacerbate marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism within the Muslim community?

In order to answer the research question above, this research uses a two tiered approach. At the first level, it explores the relationship that exists between public safety agencies (Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade) and their constituent communities within the narrowed scope of counter-terrorism. Specifically, it explores the reality of how counter-terrorism policy is delivered by those public safety agencies, and how it is consumed and reacted to by communities and individuals in London. Exploring this interaction was chosen because it represents the interface where policy is actualised. Furthermore, because this thesis is designed with an ascriptive methodology and bottom-up orientation, the realities of the community/government interface had to be established. As will be demonstrated in the chapters that follow, the view from the bottom is significantly different then the view from the top.

The second tier drives deeper into the core focus of the thesis, the nature of ‘Islamic’ radicalisation and whether or not the policy/strategic environment can be linked to that

process. In doing so it explores first-hand the realities and lived experiences of the radical fringe; those that are pejoratively labelled radicals, extremists, and terrorists.

One area of discussion that needs to be clarified before going any further is that this thesis is not constructed as a policy options analysis or even a critique of policy. Although the policy environment serves as a backdrop, it is accepted as given. More appropriately, this thesis represents a bottom up view of radicalisation by taking into account the relationships that public safety agencies in London have with the community within a counter-terrorism context, and whether or not there is a link between the actualisation of counter-terrorism policy and radicalisation with either mainstream Muslims or the radical fringe. Additionally, to engage in a study that encompasses all Muslims is not feasible for a single researcher. Priority was given to those areas and groups where the relationship with government is already strained. See Chapter VI for more discussion on what groups and areas were chosen for study.

Another area that warrants clarification is that despite occasional references in the chapters that follow to ‘the Muslim community’, there is acknowledgement that there is no single Muslim community, and that Muslims and Muslim communities are extremely heterogeneous. When ‘the Muslim community’ is referenced, it is done to differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims, in some cases to designate a particular geographic area, or to group Muslims as collective recipients of the counter-terrorism policy/strategic environment.

There is also some intermingling of the terms policy and strategy at times which is largely influenced on where the source of information originated. In the context of this thesis, it is acknowledged that policies articulate a vision or principle and generally remain the remit

of elected officials whereas strategies provide direction and are often developed by government agencies, departments, or groups.¹⁶

Finally, this thesis discusses issues that often invoke a significant visceral reaction and are often highly politicised. To use somewhat dated terminology, those that discuss terrorism and/or Muslims in the contemporary context are often labelled as either ‘neocons’ (sic) or ‘apologists’ and are immediately cast into the ultra-conservative or ultra-liberal camp. Although there is always some degree of reflexivity to any research project and some will undoubtedly take issue with some of the arguments presented, this research has attempted to remain as neutral as possible by approaching the subject from a rather simplistic security point of view rather than a political, religious, foreign policy, or even human rights perspective. Namely, does the counter-terrorism policy/strategic environment add to or undermine the overall safety and security of the UK? Through ethnography, this research sought out the nuanced patterns of radicalisation leading to extremism. Furthermore, the choice was made to use qualitative rather than quantitative methods so that the earliest signs of radicalism and the cognitive shift that is a part of that process could be discovered.

C. Thesis Structure

In total, there are 10 chapters to this thesis.

- I. Introduction
- II. Literature Review of Key Concepts
- III. Literature Review of Key Terms
- IV. Generalising the Current Threat
- V. CONTEST

¹⁶ Home Office, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (London: The Stationery Office, 2011) 111.

- VI. Methodology
- VII. Case Studies from Fieldwork
- VIII. Al Muhajiroun and other Radicals
- IX. Analysis
- X. Conclusion

In Chapter II, a literature review establishes some of the key concepts that are used in the thesis such as public, community, public security, public safety, and process, power, and exclusion are introduced. Beginning with the often used but rarely considered term public, a discussion develops around its legal, political, and social meanings. The evolution and meaning of community is also explored from its warm agrarian roots, its evolution as a stigmatised identity during the Thatcher years, and finally its resurgence as a power demanding recognition. Similarly, the constructs of safety and security are also discussed including the sacrifices that accompany the notion of security, and the inter-subjective socially constructed notion of what safety actually means. Last, the notions of process, power, and exclusion are discussed including how power is simultaneously held within and outside of state control, and how identity politics manifest as spheres, competing for influence as part of the democratic political process.

In Chapter III, the literature review continues and two key terms are discussed and ultimately defined: radicalisation and marginalisation. Both terms are included in the research question and critically form the underpinnings for the analytical framework. The chapter begins with a brief exploration of radicalisation from a British historical perspective but quickly moves on to more contemporary politicised definitions. The discussion includes when radicalisation is acceptable and when it is not, and how its meaning changes depending on the audience or individuals involved. There is a similar discussion on marginalisation exploring how it is used and defined in the contemporary environment. Because both terms

relate directly to the research question and analytical framework, they are discussed in detail. There is also limited discussion on some of the more common psychosocial explanations found in terrorism literature such as Social Identity Theory, Social Network Theory, and Relative Deprivation.

In Chapter IV, an overview of radicalised Islam and the current threat in the UK are discussed. The discussion is relatively brief and generalised but is nonetheless important, serving as a bridge between the theoretical concepts in Chapters II and III, and the real world contemporary development of the UK counter-terrorism policy/strategy environment in Chapter V. The threat is placed in context, citing both UK and European Union sources. The discussion moves on providing an overview of *Salafism* which influences both normal contemporary piety and more radicalised Islamic orthodoxy. The chapter concludes by profiling some of the issues that have damaged government/Muslim relations in the UK like the Bosnian War and the Salman Rushdie affair.

In Chapter V, the counter-terrorism policy and strategic environment is explored. The discussion begins by exploring CONTEST, the common name given to the UK's counter-terrorism strategy. Because CONTEST serves as the conceptual roadmap for how domestic security is envisioned, significant discussion is provided, especially surrounding the 2009 version which is the most detailed of three publicly available documents. The discussion further explains the nature of the threat and the four workstreams that make up the strategy: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. Each of the five major pieces of counter-terrorism legislation is also explained in more detail including how they link to previous the 'temporary' or 'emergency' measures of Northern Ireland. Because so much of the counter-terrorism policy and strategy was developed by New Labour, the chapter concludes with a discussion on the perception of risk and the political positioning of New Labour's Third Way, Communitarian agenda.

In Chapter VI, the methodology for this thesis is established. The discussion traces the conceptual development of the thesis by including why the research is needed, some of the preliminary assumptions and hypotheses that influenced its design, and justifies the use of a qualitative approach. There is also explanation about the development of the four macro case studies used in this thesis, why they were chosen, and how they fit into the overall research plan. However, the main portion of the discussion is dedicated to outlining the methodological (ethnography) and analytical tools (social constructionism and social movement theory) used to complete this research and why they were chosen. Before concluding, some of the functional elements of the fieldwork are discussed such as how data was collected, timelines, modifications to the plan, ethics, privacy, and the issues, obstacles, and opportunities encountered including the elements of who, what, where, when, and why the data was collected in the manner it was. The discussion also explains the role of the gatekeepers, how ‘snowballing’ was maximised, and how the limitations and roadblocks encountered were successfully overcome.

Chapter VII is the first of two chapters that reports the data obtained during the fieldwork. The chapter begins by recalling some of the key concepts and key terms established in Chapters II and III so that they can be considered against the data presented. The main body of the discussion that follows reports the data from the first three macro case studies that were included in the fieldwork: public safety agencies, other government, and communities and individuals. Each is profiled in detail to explain organisational, community, and individual sentiment about the current counter-terrorism environment. More importantly, the impacts of that environment are made clear. The data contained in this chapter is *all* (emphasis added) primary and functionally builds an effective ethnographic snapshot of those organisations, communities, and individuals studied.

Chapter VIII continues reporting the data obtained during the fieldwork but is focused exclusively on those that fit the pejorative label of radical, extremist, and terrorist. The chapter begins by profiling six protests that were attended, what the issues were, and the interaction between the Muslim protestors, the police, and the English Defence League. To help make sense of the protests and as a precursor to the individual interviews that follow, the discussion moves to outline the ideology of al Muhajiroun. As one of the largest and most public Islamist groups in London, significant discussion is dedicated to Al Muhajiroun. The discussion is supported by numerous interviews that range from the group's founder Omar Bakri Mohammed to its newest 'students'. Interviews with members of Hizb ut Tahrir, Muslims Against Crusades, and other like-minded individuals are included which provide a first-hand accounting of radical Islamic ideology, why they do what they do, and how the counter-terrorism environment affects them. Before concluding, additional interviews are included with former Guantanamo Bay detainees, those who have been convicted on terrorism charges in the UK, and those on control orders which adds additional perspective to the discussion.

In Chapter IX, analysis of the data obtained during the fieldwork is completed. The chapter begins by revisiting some of the basic terms such as radicalisation and marginalisation so that their meanings are refreshed and understood contextually. The discussion continues by explaining the analytical framework which is derived from Pressman's work profiled in Chapter III. The main body of discussion however is focused on importing the data from the reporting chapters where it is measured against six clearly defined attributes that make up the analytical framework. The chapter ends by answering the research question.

In Chapter X the concluding remarks are presented. The discussion revisits some of the key points that were discussed in the previous chapters including the hypotheses that were

postulated in Chapter VI and how they interrelate to the data obtained. There is also some discussion on the contribution this thesis makes to the literature and what remains under-explored or under-studied. The chapter concludes by revisiting the key concepts that were developed in Chapter II, thus bringing the discussion full circle.

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Chapter II

Literature Review of Key Concepts- Public; Community; Public Security; Public Safety; Process, Power, and Exclusion

“24/7 news, the internet, and palm sized technology pulled back the curtains of the world. The problem is, when you open up the curtains you not only see out, you can see in.”¹

Words and phrases, although frequently used, are often ambiguous, meaning different things to different individuals. In order to establish a common understanding of the key terms and concepts that will be used throughout this thesis, this chapter utilises a literature review to explore some of the vocabulary and its meaning. Central to this thesis are the terms public, community, public safety, and public security. Not only do they play a role in contextualising some of the discussion, they are some of the most basic terms used to describe and explain how societies function. Moreover, these terms and concepts play a central role in how counter-terrorism policy is conceived and justified, and are often used by individuals when describing their place in society. Although often taken for granted, their importance should not be forgotten.

Also included will be a discussion on the theoretical mechanisms of how ‘public safety’ and ‘public security’ are negotiated between the government and its constituent ‘communities’. This is a recurrent theme throughout this thesis and of particular importance to the discussion on how the government has adopted its counter-terrorism legislation and negotiated its relationship with the ‘public’. As such, it is important to consider how process, power, and ultimately exclusion are influenced and how they affect the negotiation process. Although there will surely be differences of opinion, for the context and purposes of this

¹ Student Paper, California State University Long Beach, Summer 2012.

thesis, this chapter will establish an applied understanding of those key terms and mechanisms.

Most of all, establishing the normative conceptual meanings in this chapter will make for a richer understanding, appreciation, and at times contrasting view of the realities the data reveals in the reporting and analysis chapters later in this thesis.

A. Public

It seems appropriate to begin with the word ‘public’ as its root meaning is conceptually contained within and applicable to the other terms. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), the word “public” can be used as an adjective, noun, and verb, and generally means the opposite of private². The OED goes on to say that the word ‘public’, when used as an adjective, is often defined not by its own meaning but by the meaning of the noun that it describes³. This creates tremendous ambiguity; if the meaning of the word ‘public’ changes each time it is used, how can it be defined, much less understood? Purdy touches on this concept stating “Nearly everyone has repeated a common word dozens of times until it becomes unfamiliar...but the easier way to lose a word is to stop thinking about it”⁴ Purdy alleges that one of the leading phantom phrases today is the word ‘public’ and its nebulous nature comes from being overused and under thought.⁵ However, despite the current ambiguity of the word, Purdy and others agree that its origins come from the Latin word *publius* and can be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome.⁶

² Oxford University Press (2009), “Public,” [http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50191807?query_type=word&queryword=public\\$first=1&max_to_sort=alpha&search_id=1r7m-xfmpTQ-8633&result_plXW=1](http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50191807?query_type=word&queryword=public$first=1&max_to_sort=alpha&search_id=1r7m-xfmpTQ-8633&result_plXW=1) [Accessed October 23, 2009].

³ *ibid*

⁴ Jedediah Purdy, *For Common Things* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knoph, 1999) 77.

⁵ *Ibid*, 78.

⁶ *Ibid*.

Beginning in the 6th Century BC, Greek society pushed back against wealthy property owners who formed clan oriented tyrannies and created oligarchies to manage the polis (city-states) of the time.⁷ This revolutionary ideology marked the evolutionary beginnings of democracy, suggesting that the power to rule should rest in the hands of the ‘public’ or people (demos), not with the elite property owners.⁸ As Greece and then Rome struggled with the fledgling concepts of democratic rule, several radical versions of representative governance were attempted before a final democracy, at least one that would be recognisable today, was established.⁹ Despite striving to develop a system where citizens had an equal opportunity to be heard, participate in political activity, hold office, and develop laws and policies, the process was not an all inclusive one; women, slaves, and non-citizens were excluded from participating and were not considered to be part of the ‘public’ during that time.¹⁰

In more recent times, Habermas attempted to expand the concept of public by focusing on its evolution his during the French, German, and British Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries.¹¹ However, as noted above, Purdy found that despite the concept of ‘public’ being established in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries BC of early Greece, its meaning had already changed several times before Habermas began his inquiry. The locus of Habermas’ work was on Britain which he found to be a more liberal society than that of France or Germany. Habermas developed the notion that there was no longer one public but rather a collection of ‘public spheres’ that compete with one another.¹² Habermasian theory suggests that the early 18th century public spheres evolved as Europe grew out of its feudal

⁷ James L. O’Neil, *The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy* (London, Roman and Littlefield, 1995) 39.

⁸ O’Neil, *The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy*, 37.

⁹ Ibid, 2.

¹⁰ Ibid 1.

¹¹ Craig Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1992) 14.

¹² Ibid.

past of representative publicity.¹³ As representative publicity declined, rise was given to the public's ability to influence societal issues by gaining widespread consensus through critical dialogue. Importantly, that dialogue was out of the reach of government control.

In Habermas' view, the earlier days of the public sphere could be regarded as its golden age, when anyone with access to books, plays, journals, print media, or other cultural products could participate in the dialogue of the times and influence the public debate.¹⁴ At least in the 18th century, Habermas saw the public sphere as a decidedly inclusive process where the common man and the wealthy elite had an equal voice. However, as time passed the public sphere became dominated by the bourgeois elite who had more available time to debate societal issues than the common working man. This, in Habermas' view, began the decline of the public sphere as "...a certain educated elite came to think of themselves as constituting the public..."¹⁵ To Habermas, this was a direct contrast to the publicum of the early Greeks who despite having 'non-citizens', believed that the political system should function without giving special privileges to individuals of social prominence, and where power was held in check and given only to achieve "public good."¹⁶

Despite Habermas' infatuation with Britain and the ability of public spheres to engage in rigorous public debate, it did not guarantee that public policy would be influenced. Even though it can be argued that Britain has had a representative form of government since the establishment of the Parliament in the middle of the 13th century, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that the current form of the democratic state emerged. In earlier times the monarchy and its representatives more closely resembled ancient pre-democratic Greece than the common notion of Parliament today.¹⁷

¹³ Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, 7.

¹⁴ Ibid, 13.

¹⁵ Ibid, 9.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Strathearn Gordon, *Our Parliament* (The Hansard Society, London, 1945) 18.

As Habermas discovered, the concept of ‘public’ has been in transition ever since its inception. Today, arguably, there are three common domains where the concept of ‘public’ (noun) can be found: legal, political, and sociological, and each defines the term from a different perspective. In a legal context, Stroud’s *Judicial Dictionary* defines ‘public’ as meaning “...nothing wider than the British public...but it does not mean anything so narrow as the general interests of the particular localities which may be affected by the matters in question; it means those matters that concern the public at large.”¹⁸

In a political context, Black’s *Dictionary of Politics and Government* first clarifies the context as “the public, the general public, the people in general, public administration” then defines ‘public’ as “a means by which government policy is carried out” and “people responsible for carrying out government policy.”¹⁹ Lastly, from a sociological perspective, Reading offers the simplest definition stating that ‘public’ is “A mass with a common interest.”²⁰ Although broadly defined, Reading’s definition also raises several questions: Can such a mass exist in a deeply divided society? How does it cope with change? What processes allow it to be inclusive or exclusive amidst the greater mass?

It is clear by the examples above that the concept of ‘public’ has evolved significantly since its origins in ancient Greece and each domain, legal, political, and social bring their own dimension and nuance to its meaning. While each are broad in scope, the legal definition conceives ‘public’ in its widest form; “...nothing wider than the British public... but...not... so narrow as the... interests of... particular localities which may be affected by the matters in question; it means those matters that concern the public at large.”²¹ Stated differently, it is the whole of society, irrespective of the interests of a particular segment or locality.

¹⁸ John S. James, *Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases* (London: Sweet and Maxwell Ltd., 1974) 2174.

¹⁹ A.C. Black, “Dictionary of Politics and Government, 2004,” <http://www.credoreference.com/entry/acbgovpol/public> [Accessed January 22, 2010].

²⁰ Hugo F. Reading, *A Glossary of Sociological Terms* (Athens: Cantos Press, 1963) 16.

²¹ James, *Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases*, 2174.

Politically, the conception of ‘public’ changes considerably. What is striking in this definition is that it is much more narrowly focused and has a distinct directional tone. Black’s definition, “a means by which government policy is carried out” and “people responsible for carrying out government policy” has a decidedly top down theme.²² Unlike the legal term which references society, Black’s term only references government.

Finally, in the sociological context, Reading’s definition “A mass with a common interest” is the most ambiguous of the three.²³ Reading’s concept of ‘public’ could mean all of society or a small segment of society. He also does not differentiate whether the mass he refers to is made up of citizenry, government representatives, or a combination of both. Reading’s definition adds to the ambiguity of who might be considered part of the public, who is included, and who is not.

The definitions cited above are provided as samples and should not be construed as universalised across the entire legal, political, or social spectrums; there are undoubtedly numerous other definitions available and the focus here is not to engage in a rigorous and critical debate over semantics. Instead, the examples provided serve to highlight the reality that differences do exist and that each domain or focus approaches the concept of ‘public’ in a different manner.

Combining the macro perspectives of the legal, political, and social, the term ‘public’ is used extensively in all segments of society as both a noun and an adjective, and depending on how one orients him or herself in that perspective, its meaning is potentially conflicting. This can be demonstrated notionally using the theoretical example of policy ‘X’.

Policy ‘X’ is being contested by members of a community because they feel that it is detrimental to their well-being (sociological construct of public). Despite opposition by the community, government officials stand by their decision convinced that they took the

²² Black, “Dictionary of Politics and Government, 2004.”

²³ Reading, *A Glossary of Sociological Terms*, 16.

necessary amount of input before making the decision to implement policy 'X' (political construct of public). Frustrated, the community presses their case to the judiciary who rules in favour policy 'X' on the basis that it benefits the whole of society which supersedes the interests of a particular locality (legal construct of public). Even though this is an overly simplified model, it demonstrates how perspective and orientation can conflict even within the simplest of terms like 'public'.

B. Community

Although 'public' has taken on the unenviable traits of a word that people rarely think about, its antithetical cousin would have to be the term 'community', at least from the perspective of anthropological interest. Over the past thirty years, 'community' has become a prominent term that is used extensively by virtually all corners of society. It is not uncommon to hear political leaders speak of the partnerships that they have built with the 'community', individuals speak of 'community' spirit, and the nightly news to reference a 'community' in turmoil, in mourning, or in celebration.

In Britain, the term 'community' can be traced back to the time of the Magna Carta which establishes "...the unremitting claim of the community of the realm to be consulted on matters of high policy..."²⁴ Even though the term 'community' can be traced back to the dark ages and its meaning has not changed in the way that 'public' has, there remains no uniform definition despite its interest to sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists. Although, 'community' is broadly used in our current terminology and a lexicon for politicians who perpetually seek a closer relationship with their constituency, some anthropologists have argued that the notion of community is too "slippery," too vague, and too variable to define.²⁵

²⁴ R. Butt, *The Power of the Parliament* (London: Constable, 1969) 34. Cited in Judge, *The Parliamentary State* (Sage Publications, London, 1993) 7.

²⁵ Veried Amit and Nigel Rapport, *The Trouble with Community* (London, Pluto Press, 2002) 13.

The importance of this terminology is noted as far back as the 19th century when the idea of ‘community’ represented the positive values of pre-industrial society.²⁶ In the early 20th century, ‘community’ became a simple metaphor for what was good in society.²⁷ However, that does not suggest that those societies were somehow utopian, only that the terminology represented a certain sense of warmth. In fact, concerned about the loss of social connectedness and bonding that was occurring especially as cities grew, the “respectable classes” were often concerned about the “dangerous other.”²⁸ These concepts represent something more than a simple descriptive phrase. To social scientists, it represents a larger notion of how individuals view and relate to one another, and therefore justifies deeper inquiry.

Traditional studies of ‘community’ contrasted groups from one location to another and attempted to build comparative models and taxonomies that allowed the development and application of precise analytical definitions.²⁹ Classic examples of this are the seminal works of Tonnies, Durkheim, and the “Chicago School Urbanist’s” (Robert Park, Earnest Burgess, and Louis Wirth).

In the late 19th century, Tonnies contrasted the solidarities of life in rural agrarian societies with the new associations of life in the urban industrial cities of his time.³⁰ The focus of Tonnes’ study was to enhance life in the urban setting by re-emphasising rural values.³¹ In many ways Tonnies began a trend of making comparisons of an idealised rural life to one in the city for several sociologists to follow.

One of those to follow was Durkheim. Influenced by Tonnies’ earlier work, Durkheim sought to contrast the notion that traditional societies were considered to be ‘mechanical

²⁶ Christopher Clay, *Towards Understanding Community*, eds. Christopher Clay, Mary Madden, and Laura Potts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 19.

²⁷ Ibid, 19.

²⁸ Charlie Cooper, *Community Conflict and the State* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 84.

²⁹ Anthony Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (London: Routledge Press, 1993) 38.

³⁰ Cooper, *Community Conflict and the State*, 92.

³¹ Ibid.

solidarities'; societies based on similarity and unable to accept large degrees of personal difference.³² Instead, Durkheim developed the notion that societies were based on 'organic solidarity'; a society that prospered because of integration and diversity, and although complex, was harmonious.³³

The last example, the Chicago School Urbanist's studied social cohesion and identity between urban and rural populations, and developed conclusions on what they perceived as the differences between simple and complex environments.³⁴ Although their conclusions were later regarded as inaccurate, notably that simple and complex environments could be found in either setting, their work is widely documented in the literature and demonstrates the degree of interest and sociological study dedicated to the early concepts of 'community'.³⁵

As cities expanded in the early half of the 20th century, the idea of 'community' within urban environments followed. However, social scientists who were studying populations within cities soon found that there were other problems there as well. The increasing urbanisation and growth that occurred within cities meant that the diverse and transient populations could no longer be studied as one single entity.³⁶ Critics argued that the assumption that one group of people or one culture could be descriptively and interpretively reduced and appropriately applied to another was inherently flawed.³⁷ This fundamental attribution error meant that anthropological studies were becoming suspect causing some within the social sciences to distance themselves from 'community' studies.³⁸

In the 1960s more problems arose. There was a wave of sentiment that mass media, urbanisation, and the growth of state power ended the traditional sense of 'community'.³⁹

³² Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, 22.

³³ Ibid, 22.

³⁴ Amit and Rapport, *The Trouble with Community*, 42.

³⁵ Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, 29.

³⁶ Amit and Rapport, *The Trouble with Community*. 42.

³⁷ Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, 39.

³⁸ Clay, *Towards Understanding Community*, 13.

³⁹ Ibid, 76.

Also during this time, race relations and issues of equality were cast into the public discourse. Especially in the United States, the civil rights movement and women's demands for equality became increasingly vocal if not outright militant.⁴⁰ The idea that the 'community' no longer existed coupled with the complexities of race and gender caused anthropologists to reorient themselves and in response, developed the notion of 'personalised social networks' as an alternative way to study the multifaceted nature of society.⁴¹

As the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s unfolded, a tremendous migration of immigrant populations found their way into urban cities. In Britain, immigrants came from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and other 'old commonwealth' countries⁴². These transnational populations, who commonly sought asylum, education, and the economic advantages of more prosperous societies, typically settled in lower socioeconomic neighbourhoods where race and ethnicity were long time factors. The stigma of race, ethnicity, and economic worth was not lost on society and the traditional reference to the 'dangerous other' now found its way into the vernacular of 'community', becoming synonymous with the poor and disenfranchised.⁴³

The loss of 'community' in its most pristine sense and the view that society had evolved to one large melting pot was not being ignored by politicians either. An interview with Margaret Thatcher in 1987 revealed her frustration-

I think that we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand 'I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!...and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no

⁴⁰ Clay, *Towards Understanding Community*, 60.

⁴¹ Amit and Rapport, *The Trouble with Community*, 15.

⁴² Timothy J. Hatton, "Explaining Trends in UK Immigration" *Journal of Population Economics* 18, no. 4 (2005) 723.

⁴³ Clay, *Towards Understanding Community*, 16.

government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. There is no such thing as society.⁴⁴

Thatcher's frustrations are clearly evident. Her denial of society and call for individual responsibility reflected both a political and social cavern of emptiness; if there was no society and there was no community, what was there? Although it would not be fair to attribute the reengagement of social scientists to Ms Thatcher's statement, the migration away from the study of 'community' reversed and social scientists renewed their interest.⁴⁵

Similar to the domains of 'public' discussed previously, it seems appropriate to frame the contemporary notions of 'community' in a social and political context. However, given that the literature on this subject is extensive, and that definitions vary widely across the spectrum of political and sociological consciousness, the theoretical frameworks proposed below will be limited to a more generalised conceptual basis rather than an all inclusive critical assessment of the academic discourse that has taken place over the past three decades.

In a social context, there are both objective and subjective elements that make up a 'community'. Objectively, communities are still defined by the physical boundaries that they encompass whether that boundary is a street, a block, a defined area within a town or city, a city, a state, or a country.⁴⁶ Although using boundaries is the simplest way to label a 'community', its objective measurement is limited to quantifiable dimensions like area, population, education, and income.

Objective measurement can be also found in the structural association of social groups.⁴⁷ Individuals who are members of churches, social clubs, and business alliances,

⁴⁴ Margaret Thatcher, Interview for *Woman's Own* (23 September 1987), cited by Simon Parker, *Towards Understanding Community*, eds. Christopher Clay, Mary Madden, and Laura Potts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 22.

⁴⁵ Clay, *Towards Understanding Community*, 18.

⁴⁶ Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, 13.

⁴⁷ John Moritsugu, Frank Wong, and Karen Grover Duffy, *Community Psychology*, 4th ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2010) 23.

recreational teams all share some form of association to a common entity. However, even though there is association to a common entity and its members can be measured in terms of numbers, it would be in error to say that all members share the exact same association. Several examples support this argument: although members of a church identify with the same religious institution, their faith and practice varies greatly; even though members of a business alliance all belong to the same group, their concept of how that alliance should support their own particular business interests covers a spectrum of thought; although there are multiple individuals on a sports team, their athletic ability is uniquely their own. In this sense, communities can be objectively measured in terms of the numbers associated with the collective but retain the uniquely subjective sense of self which is neither measurable nor comparable. It is in this notion that people can be members of multiple communities simultaneously.

The subjective sense of community immediately casts off the quantifiable simplicities that exist in its objective sense. As Cohen states “Community is largely in the mind.”⁴⁸ Another simplistic explanation is that individuals feel a sense of community because they are “...a part of a larger dependable and stable structure.”⁴⁹ The complexity and inability of quantifiable measurement here is obvious and perhaps it is that very complexity that has helped lure social scientists back to the anthropological study of ‘community’.

One of the most prominent social scientists to have added greatly to the understanding of community is Putnam. In his book *Bowling Alone*, Putnam writes extensively about the historical decline of social networks and the disenfranchisement of individuals in the democratic process. Putnam’s work exemplifies the efforts of social scientists to rebuild the

⁴⁸ Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, 114.

⁴⁹ S. B. Sarason, *The Psychological Sense of Community* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974) cited in Moritsugu, Wong, and Duffy, *Community Psychology*, 24.

social fabric of society and regain social agency (social belonging) through the concept of ‘community’ which Putnam popularised by coining the term ‘social capital’.⁵⁰

While the subjective notion of ‘community’ appears to be boundless, there are common traits that come out repeatedly in the literature: a sense of membership, influence, integration, and emotional connection.⁵¹ Another collection of descriptions that describe ‘community’ is “...the convergence of place, people, identity, and culture.”⁵² Perhaps stated in its broadest form, ‘community’ occupies the place that is greater than kinship but less than the abstract notion of society.⁵³ These descriptors are both ephemeral and amorphous, yet give ‘community’ a sense of personal identity with purpose and structure.

As if the idea of ‘community’ was not amorphous enough, Anderson developed the concept of an ‘imagined community’ in the early 1980’s as a way to bring order to the rise of transnational associations claiming that physical contact was not a requirement of community.⁵⁴ Given the continued development of transnational association between Muslims, who have no other association other than religion, Anderson’s ‘imagined community’ appears to have particular contemporary relevance.

The subjective nature of community makes it a boundless construct, limited only in the degree of symbolic identification that any particular person has to an area, group, religion, or even an ideology. Similarly, whether through objective or subjective association, or a combination of both, individuals can belong to or can be members of multiple communities simultaneously. An example of this would be a person could live within a defined community, feel a sense of community pride because of affluence or communal values, be a member of his or her church, belong to a sports team, and ascribe to a religious or lifestyle

⁵⁰ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2000) 31.

⁵¹ Moritsugu, Wong, and Duffy, *Community Psychology*, 24.

⁵² Amit and Rapport, *The Trouble with Community*, 15.

⁵³ Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, 15.

⁵⁴ Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991) 7.

ideology. All of these, some which are measurable and some which are not, are examples of ‘community’.

In some cases a ‘community’ evolves on its own, without purpose, and without knowing the other members. Other times, communities are formed explicitly by design to bring ‘like-minded-people’ together. Such would be the case of a group gathered together for social protest. In this sense, when a community goes out of its way to say that it is different, it serves two purposes. The first is that it forms the conventions of the community identity. The second is that it establishes its boundaries to the outside world.⁵⁵

Lastly, as Cohen suggests, community is a state of mind and unlike the membership in a church or residents of a geographical location which is quantifiable, the borders of symbolic communities are porous and ever changing, relational rather than absolute. More importantly, they frame the community in relation to other communities.⁵⁶

Fortunately, the notion of ‘community’ in a political sense is much more fundamental and simpler to grasp. Similar to Habermas’ notion of completing public spheres bound together to influence public debate and sway political outcomes, ‘community’ has become the contemporary replacement for that process. In its simplest form, ‘community’ leads to a sense of collectiveness, and sometimes that collectiveness manifests as a political voice. More directly, when groups of people want their voice to be heard they sometimes mobilise as political movements. Identity or coalition politics refers to a community that speaks collectively.⁵⁷

The idea that groups of people influence the political discourse is nothing new. Whether in ancient Greece, post-enlightenment Europe, or today, it is a reality of the community/government relationship. The voice of ‘community’, even if described as the

⁵⁵ Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, 63.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 58.

⁵⁷ David Bennett, *Multicultural States*, ed. David Bennet (London: Routledge, 1998) 5.

‘dangerous other’, whether loud or muted, has a historical legacy.⁵⁸ As such, despite Mrs Thatcher’s denial of society, she was arguably wrong to suggest that the only thing that remained was the individual. Perhaps more appropriately, she vocalised the Conservative Party belief of the time, that Britain was experiencing a moral collapse.⁵⁹ Either way, her comments demonstrated a failure to embrace or even recognise the ‘community’s’ voice of that time.

From a very primal perspective, ‘community’ and the state are inextricably intertwined in that state power is only realised when the ‘community’ extends it.⁶⁰ In this sense communities and states have a quid pro quo relationship; the community extends power to the state that in turn is entrusted to manage the affairs of the community. Through this collective relationship, ‘community’ becomes the fundamental source of social cohesion and power. Given that community exists mostly as a state of mind, individually and collectively, it should be understood that the basic source of state power lies outside of what can be controlled by government.

Perhaps the uncontrollability and inherent insecurity in that notion is what motivates politicians to continually measure their relationship with ‘community’. It also explains the rise of Communitarianism which is neither politically conservative nor liberal, but instead focuses on the “values, beliefs, and goals” of individuals and communities as a political safe haven following the contentious Conservative Thatcher years.⁶¹ At its core Communitarian ideology asserts that the intangible ideals of value, justice, and belonging all derive from

⁵⁸ Cooper, *Community Conflict and the State*, 84.

⁵⁹ Simon Parker, *Towards Understanding Community*, eds. Christopher Clay, Mary Madden, and Laura Potts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 26.

⁶⁰ David Studdert, *Conceptualizing Community: Beyond the State and Individual* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 184.

⁶¹ Elizabeth Frasier, *The Problems with Communitarian Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 41.

‘community’.⁶² Additionally, Communitarian theory emphasises “the importance of both groups and communities in binding individuals together to produce coherent state policies.”⁶³

When Tony Blair came to power in 1997, New Labour wove Communitarian ideology into their political discourse by seeking to re-infuse ‘community’ with a stronger sense of social capital and placing a strong emphasis on partnership through “...bonds of trust, reflexivity, and normative consensus building.”⁶⁴ Promoted as an ideology that invokes both rights and responsibilities, it sought to imbue the notion that government is once again ‘here to help’. As Etzioni clarifies, “The good society is an ideal. While we may never quite reach it, it guides our endeavours and we measure our progress by it.”⁶⁵

In political discourse, ‘community’ has been “...something of a football- kicked around by different ideological positions...”⁶⁶ In the late 20th century, the Conservative government chose to use terms like “individuals and families” over ‘community’ as their fundamental nomenclature.⁶⁷ Conversely, New Labour used ‘community’ extensively and intricately wove it into their dialogue.⁶⁸ In the hybrid of New Labour politics, “Terms such as ‘stakeholding’ and ‘partnership’ ... became permanent features of New Labour’s discourse...”⁶⁹ These terms serve as a way to help ‘depoliticise’ the jargon of political rhetoric while simultaneously making a statement that political leaders and the community share a common bond.⁷⁰ Whatever the rationale, the idea of community is both recognised and reverberated throughout the political discourse as a source of power that must be acknowledged and managed effectively.

⁶² Aveneri and de-Shalit, *Communitarianism and Individualism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 4.

⁶³ Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd, and Paul Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 11.

⁶⁴ Studdert, *Conceptualizing Community*, 48.

⁶⁵ Etzioni, *The Third Way to a Good Society*, 13.

⁶⁶ Clay, *Towards Understanding Community*, 13.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 18.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 20.

⁶⁹ Parker, *Towards Understanding Community*, 30.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 27.

C. Public Security

Within this mix of partnerships the words ‘public safety’ and ‘public security’ have become prominent staples of the communal and political discourse. The changing realities of contemporary life brought on by the globalisation of world markets, diversity in the work force, immigration, and terrorism means that society today is far more diverse, economically interdependent, and pluralistic than ever before.⁷¹ Yet at the same time, this interconnected world has left society more vulnerable to shocks and disruptions that can come from anywhere in the system.⁷² This vulnerability is leaving people feeling more prone to risk and terms like ‘public safety’ and ‘public security’ are playing a much larger part in contemporary discourse. Stripping away ‘public’ which was discussed previously leaves the terms ‘safety’ and ‘security’ and both warrant further investigation and discussion.

In 2007, the think tank Demos completed a report titled *National Security for the Twenty First Century*, which analysed whether or not the current national security architecture was designed appropriately to manage contemporary risks. A part of that process involved asking a group of experts across a spectrum of disciplines to develop a working definition for the word ‘security’. The group decided that “...security was considered to be the confidence and capacity of the individual, community and state to anticipate and respond effectively to the threats or hazards that may endanger their safety.”⁷³ Security and safety are terms that often used interchangeably by society, but interestingly, the Demos definition offers a sense of priority; security must be in place before there can be safety.

In many ways, the codified notion of a ‘security’ was first established in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Although the Treaty is largely regarded as the culminating end of the religious wars of the 17th century, imbedding the concepts of sovereignty, independence, and

⁷¹ Charlie Edwards, *National Security for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Demos, 2007) 22.

⁷² Ibid, 22.

⁷³ Ibid, 63.

non-interference which paved the way for the development of the nation-state system that remains in Europe today, perhaps more subtly but no less significantly it established that people should be afforded fundamental rights and privileges.⁷⁴ Within the Treaty there are several references to public security, public tranquillity, public benefit and security, and secure passage.⁷⁵

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, “security has meant the protection of the state- its boundaries, people, institutions, and values- from external attack.”⁷⁶ In more recent years, it was narrowly construed to manage the existential threats to national sovereignty, most notably, those associated with the Cold War.⁷⁷ During the Cold War, security was conceived in militaristic terms where the only viable actors (threats) were other nation states.⁷⁸ However, the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991 ended the Cold War and in what seemed like an overnight unravelling of events, the nation-state security risks that had prevailed for the previous half century were gone. The “bipolar structure in the world” suddenly disappeared and with it, the traditional approach to security.⁷⁹ The void that was left allowed the flexibility to reconsider the notion of security in more liberal, complex, and humanistic terms.⁸⁰ However, the rapid and unbounded expansion of the conceptual notions of security also meant that there was little agreement on its meaning. As a new order was being established, fundamental questions were being asked like security for whom?⁸¹ Conversely, if security could be defined should insecurity also be defined? In context, “the anonymous face of grinding poverty” would certainly serve as an example of a person living

⁷⁴ James Mayall, “Security and Self-Determination,” In *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, ed. William Bain (London: Routledge, 2006) 106.

⁷⁵ Avalon Law, “Treaty of Westphalia,” Articles XLVII, LXVIII, LXIX, and LXX, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp, [Accessed 1 February 2010].

⁷⁶ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 78.

⁷⁷ Sven Bislev, “Globalization, State Transformation, and Public Security”, *International Political Science Review*, Sage Publications 25, no. 3, 282.

⁷⁸ Frederic Volpi, *Transnational Islam and Regional Security* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008) 121.

⁷⁹ Fredrik Bynander, “Securitising Submarine Intrusions,” in *Threat Politics*, ed. Johan Eriksson (Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2001) 124.

⁸⁰ Bain, *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, 2.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 2.

in an insecure environment, but was it a valid question worthy of inquiry?⁸² As Mayall notes, “...only in the industrial west is the concept of *social* (emphasis added) security a public, rather than a purely private concern.”⁸³ Mayall’s reference highlights the difficulty of assigning precise definitions to who is secure and who is not in a dichotomous modern world where people in many countries experience a daily concern over fundamental survival while those in the West presume their continued existence will remain unchanged.⁸⁴ As academics and others were wrestling with these fundamental concepts, a new dimension unfolded that again changed the entire landscape of security, the terrorist’s attacks of 11 September, 2001.

In the West, the events of 11 September 2001 brought home the idea that Western societies were no longer immune to the ‘wicked problems’ associated with transnational terrorism.⁸⁵ For the second time since the end of the Cold War, the notion of ‘security’ had to again be fundamentally reconsidered. As the West struggles to find ways to appropriately manage its threats from terrorism many have been left with increasing uncertainty and a sense that there is “pervasive climate of fear.”⁸⁶ However, in fairness to the events of 11 September and subsequent attacks around the world, it is important to understand that terrorism is one element of the current security paradigm. Globalisation, crime, immigration and others all add to a growing sense of insecurity.⁸⁷

Although there remains a spectrum of thought on what security is or should be, it is well documented in the literature that “security is a fundamental justification of state sovereignty... and that between the two... there is a legal and moral connection.”⁸⁸ This notion reflects the “classic liberal assumption” that a state’s primary function is to provide

⁸² Bain, *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, 2.

⁸³ Mayall, “Security and Self-Determination,” 101.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 100.

⁸⁵ Edwards, *National Security for the Twenty-First Century*, 11.

⁸⁶ Bain, *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, 5.

⁸⁷ Edwards, *National Security for the Twenty-First Century*, 28.

⁸⁸ Robert Jackson, “The Safety of the People is the Supreme Law,” in *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, ed. William Bain (London: Routledge, 2006) 23.

protection and security for its people.⁸⁹ However, at what cost and to who's detriment? Stating that "Security is mainly about sacrifice," Bigo and Tsoukala also write "The knowledge of who needs to survive, be protected from what, also supposes knowing who is going to be sacrificed."⁹⁰ These words prophetically dramatise the notion that 'security' is not universal, even within societies and brings back the question of 'security for whom'? It is therefore easily understood that when even a well respected think tank like Demos suggests that "...security in the twenty-first century demands a far more radical approach than has been suggested thus far," at least some members of society are going to become increasingly uncomfortable.⁹¹

Synthesising some of the theories developed by Thomas Hobbes, Bain writes "Few would dispute the view that civil association should be to the benefit of citizens; that laws should attend to the welfare of the many; or that safety of the majority should prevail over the interests of the selfish or seditious factions."⁹² In Hobbes' day, a time with far fewer people and when society was far less pluralistic than today, such logic was infinitely more rational. However, simplicity has long been replaced by the complexity of highly diverse societies and greater awareness to human diversity. This can be demonstrated using a press release during the French crackdown on terrorism following a wave of attacks in 1995-

We have reintroduced border control, including those countries with whom we have signed the Schengen agreement; we have twenty-eight mobile squadrons of police and army patrols. Since July 26th we have stopped and searched more than 660,000 people and more than 28,000 vehicles.⁹³

⁸⁹ Jennifer Jackson Preece, "Cultural Diversity and Security After 9/11," *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, ed. William Bain (London: Routledge, 2006) 149.

⁹⁰ Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, *Terror, Insecurity, and Liberty*, Eds. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (Oxon: Routledge, 2008) 2.

⁹¹ Edwards, *National Security for the Twenty-First Century*, 64.

⁹² Bain, *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, 1.

⁹³ *Le Monde*, 31 August 1995, cited in Volpi, *Transnational Islam and Regional Security* (Oxon: Routledge) 128.

In reference to the above quote, Collyer places things in perspective by offering the following-

The effect of the police operation of this scale is predictable; hundreds of thousands of perfectly innocent, legally resident foreign nationals, or French citizens were stopped on the grounds that they looked Algerian. It was not uncommon for individuals to be stopped six or seven times each day. The dangers posed to French society by these attacks are clear, and the government had an obligation to protect its citizens, but it is in these situations where the referent of security becomes blurred; who was being protected from whom?⁹⁴

Collyer's comments provide a good example of not only the best of intentions going astray but also the adverse impacts that such actions can have on segmented members of society. Intuitively, an argument can be made that when 'security' is made more prominent, the greater chance there is for insecurity. As an example, placing soldiers at an airport in order to foster the notion that the environment is secure might also suggest an attack was imminent and create a sense of insecurity.⁹⁵ Whether placing soldiers at the airport or on the street, somewhere there exists an imaginary line that on one side evokes reassurance and on the other, anxiety.

'Security', at least in the Western sense, is typically subordinated to the government on behalf of its citizenry as a mechanism of response to a perceived threat.⁹⁶ However, when 'security' measures are implemented, there is often an underlying sense of urgency and that the "...issue takes priority over everything else."⁹⁷ Within the public discourse, the usual inference is that there is at least tacit approval that "...legitimizing the use of force..." may be

⁹⁴ Michael Collyer, "Migrants, Migration, and the Security Paradigm," in *Transnational Islam and Regional Security*, Ed. Federic Volpi (Oxon: Routledge, 2008) 128.

⁹⁵ Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, "Military Activities within National Boundaries," in *Terror, Insecurity, and Liberty*, eds. Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (Oxon: Routledge, 2008) 129.

⁹⁶ Bigo and Tsoukala, *Terror, Insecurity, and Liberty*, 1.

⁹⁷ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) 33.

necessary or that government may “...take special powers in order to provide for the safety of its citizens.”⁹⁸ As Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde state “...by saying ‘security’ a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming the right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.”⁹⁹ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde’s comments confirm that all emergencies are not equal in scope or severity, that there is a sense of priority, and that special circumstances require special measures. Additionally, their comments verify that this is a normal function of government and part of the ‘legal and moral’ duty previously mentioned. However, Digo and Tsoukala clarify when the risks are prolonged and ‘security’ becomes institutionalised, than a perpetual state of emergency exists.¹⁰⁰

As nation states seek to manage their moral and legal obligations to their citizenry, occasionally circumstances allow more power to be seized than should have otherwise been afforded; this can occur by overstating the threat or by misrepresentation. Here Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde also confirm that when threats are overstated there is the risk that ‘security’ can become “... a referential practice...not necessarily because a real...threat exists, but because the issue is presented as a threat.”¹⁰¹ The result is a permanent shift of power. When threats are misrepresented significant questions can also be raised about the abuse of power.

The discussion above confirms that in a free, open, and democratic society, ‘security’ issues require balance. This segues with the previous discussion that communities and states have a quid pro quo relationship. Loughlin and Walker elaborate on this theme saying “governmental power is generated from the ‘consent of the people’ and that, to be sustained and effective, such power must be divided, constrained, and exercised through distinctive

⁹⁸ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security* 21.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Bigo and Tsoukala, *Terror, Insecurity, and Liberty*, 33.

¹⁰¹ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 24.

institutional forms.”¹⁰² Perhaps a prime example of this is the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay in which a number of basic human rights have been set aside, not the least of which is the fundamental principle of habeas corpus.¹⁰³

In a security environment that is no longer preoccupied by the threats of state actors but from “social threats,” one of the evolutions of security practice has been to look inward.¹⁰⁴ Navari writes “...we live in a borderless world...the targets are not states, but persons.”¹⁰⁵ While there is undoubtedly a moral high-ground to eliminating inward threats such as crime, poverty, health care, anti-social behaviour, and unemployment, there is also some cause for concern, particularly in areas of criminalisation, immigrants, and migration.¹⁰⁶

The Demos group lends some perspective here-

In the past decade, the government has passed some 53 acts of Parliament dealing with counterterrorism, crime and criminal justice. Strikingly, this figure exceeds by ten the total number of such acts (43) passed in the 100 years leading up to 1997. In the process, the government has created somewhere between 1018 and 3023 new criminal offenses and by 2006 the Blair government had spent more per head on law and order than any other country in the OECD.¹⁰⁷

Immigrants and migration can also create a sense of uneasiness within the concepts of security, especially when the focus turns inward. Preece writes “Minority ethnic and cultural identities may be tolerated within the home where distinct languages, traditions, myths, and memories may be preserved, provided they do not conflict with, nor in any way undermine

¹⁰² Marin Loughlin and Neil Walker, *The Paradox of Constitutionalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 1.

¹⁰³ Christian Olsson, *Terror, Insecurity, and Liberty*, 147.

¹⁰⁴ Cornelia Navari, “Globalisation and Security: much ado about nothing?,” *The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People*, ed. William Bain (London: Routledge, 2006) 116.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Collyer, *Transnational Islam and Regional Security*, 119.

¹⁰⁷ Edwards, *National Security for the Twenty-first Century*, 28.

the prevailing civic culture.”¹⁰⁸ Preece’s statement reflects the idea that cultural diversity including freedom of religion has been a development of civil society which has evolved over several centuries. However, she goes on to say that “Once the ethnic bond is accepted as the *raison d’être* [reason for being] of the state, cultural diversity is a fundamental threat.”¹⁰⁹ Preece’s comments confirm that security is often based on the notion of a homogenous unit to be defended, the state with national security and the local population with public security, but both are complicated by immigration. This concept returns to the fundamental idea of security for whom, and the assertions of Bigo and Tsoukala that “security is mainly about sacrifice, who needs to survive and who is going to be sacrificed.”¹¹⁰

The examples, practical points, and the legal and moral issues on the topic of security could be discussed *ad infinitum*, but arguably security should be conceived in terms of balance; applying the correct methods in the correct amounts at the correct time. Furthermore, the hard question of whether or not the ‘security’ proposed has the potential to become a self-sustaining or referential process should be part of the process. Lastly, when the focus is directed inward, are sufficient checks and balances in place to insure that no one is sacrificed in the process? When these questions are not answered satisfactorily, arguably there is a larger problem; the failure of normal political discourse.¹¹¹

D. Public Safety

‘Public safety’ is another associated term that is often used interchangeably with ‘public security’. However, although they are closely related, each has a different meaning. As before, stripping away the adjective, ‘public’, and exploring more closely what constitutes ‘safety’ will aid in understanding its meaning. Although the Treaty of Westphalia included

¹⁰⁸ Preece, “Cultural Diversity and Security After 9/11,” 143.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Bigo and Tsoukala, *Terror, Insecurity, and Liberty*, 2.

¹¹¹ Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *Security*, 29.

the fundamental notions of safety, it did little to explain them. Fortunately, around the same time as Westphalia, the well known 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes was writing about safety and the sovereigns.

Hobbes wrote about many subjects but his interpretations of natural law which included detailed treatises on the concepts of peace and safety, and the duties of the sovereigns are most pertinent to the discussion here. Unlike some philosophers, Hobbes wastes no time getting right to the point. Beginning with the fundamental responsibilities of ‘safety’ he writes “All of the duties are implicit in this one phrase: *the safety of the people is the supreme law*.”¹¹² Continuing, Hobbes narrows his focus and explains just how the sovereigns are supposed to provide for that safety stating “The sovereign... provides for the citizens safety only by means of laws, which are universal. Hence, he has done his duty if he has made every effort, to provide by sound measures for the welfare of as many of them as possible for as long as possible.”¹¹³ His comments not only assign responsibility and define the mechanism for how the responsibility is to be carried out, he provides a clear example of the historical relationship between the government and its people.

Aside from assigning responsibility to the notion of safety, Hobbes also elaborates on just what ‘safety’ means stating “By *safety* one should understand not mere survival in any condition, but a happy life so far as that is possible. For men willingly entered commonwealths *which they had formed by design* in order to live as pleasantly as the human condition allows.”¹¹⁴ Hobbes’ treatise continues with additional references to providing “...not only what they need...but what they need to be strong.”¹¹⁵ Although some might argue that the words of Hobbes are utopian or idealistic by today’s standards, he clearly articulates the importance of ‘safety’ in the 17th century.

¹¹² Thomas Hobbes, *On the Citizen*, eds. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 143.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 144.

In more recent times, 20th century psychologist Abraham Maslow adds more dimension to the concept of safety. Maslow is probably best known for what is commonly known as his ‘hierarchy of needs’ by exploring the so called ‘psychological drives’ that motivate people’s five fundamental levels of existence: physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, and self-actualisation.¹¹⁶

In each level of need, Maslow provides examples of what is required. The following are examples of those things assigned to each level of need. Physiological needs refer to those that insure survival such as food, water, and oxygen.¹¹⁷ ‘Safety’ needs include all of the physiological needs but also require a host of other components: “security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector; and so on.”¹¹⁸ Belonging includes the love and affection that comes from family, friends, and relationships.¹¹⁹ Self-esteem includes a “stable, firmly based” sense of “self-respect, self-esteem, and esteem for others.”¹²⁰ Finally, self-actualisation is achieved when “an individual is doing what *he*, individually, is fitted for.”¹²¹

Maslow’s premise is that each “need” is organised in “hierarchal order”.¹²² Although Maslow makes some exceptions, before an individual can move from one level to the next, all of the elements of the previous level must also be intact.¹²³ It is clear that Maslow envisions security as a fundamental element to obtaining one’s safety. However, he also brings an additional dimension to the notion by saying that security is a fundamental process of obtaining protection, free from fear, anxiety and chaos. Although the terms remain hierarchal, they are also clearly relational.

¹¹⁶ Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1970) 35.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 39.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 43.

¹²⁰ Ibid, 45.

¹²¹ Ibid, 46.

¹²² Abraham Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 3rd ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1999) 168.

¹²³ Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 39.

Weighing in on the relational notions of safety is sociologist Ruth Simpson who discusses danger and what constitutes a threat. In Simpson's view, although there are some objective concepts associated with danger, most are empirical and do not encompass all of the threats that exist at any given moment.¹²⁴ Because danger is rarely known, she contends that the objective sense to 'safety' is equally limited. As an example, it is common knowledge that certain snakes can be a threat to humans but if someone were walking in the woods they could unknowingly walk up to a poisonous snake and feel safe up to the moment they got bit. It is in this construct that Simpson argues that "safety and danger are intersubjective ... and products of social construction."¹²⁵ In this sense, Simpson develops the argument that safety and danger "...involve inference, interpretation, as well as observation."¹²⁶ Taken a step further, because safety and danger are both subjective and interpretive, she concludes that "perceptions vary across cultures and geopolitical lines."¹²⁷ When applied to 'specific groups' Simpson argues that there can be "prejudicial fears" that result in "classifying all members of the group as dangerous and marking as exceptions any who threaten the stereotype."¹²⁸

E. Process, Power, and Exclusion

In addition to understanding some of the fundamental terms used in this thesis, it is also useful to understand the theoretical mechanisms through which the 'public' and government interact, and how selected actions are negotiated. The fear of terrorism and the demands of increased 'public safety' and 'public security' in the post 9/11 and 7/7 environment has brought individuals, communities, and government together in

¹²⁴ Ruth Simpson, "Neither Clear Nor Present: The Social Construction of Safety and Danger," *Sociological Forum* 11, no. 3 (1996), 550.

¹²⁵ Simpson, "Neither Clear Nor Present", 550.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 551.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 553.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 554.

unprecedented ways. However, that process is much more complex than simply invoking the ‘will of the people’ as the average middle school textbook might suggest.

Community fears and insecurity have increasingly become a part of the social discourse as concerns over “personal safety and personal liberties” are thought to be threatened.¹²⁹ However, despite anxiety by some and a seemingly sympathetic posture of government, others argue that public expectations are unrealistic.¹³⁰ Additionally, because the UK is a pluralistic society, fundamental questions are again raised about whose safety, whose security, and whose liberty are being threatened, and whether all segments of society have an equal voice. This notion of safety, security, and liberty transcends rapidly from being an altruistic and egalitarian concept to one of identity politics where allegations of exclusion tug at the very concept of democratic society. Exploring the mechanisms of government and the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of that process will help situate the perceptions of public safety and public security in a multicultural society such as the UK.

Although Britain is a country based upon democratic principles, like all other democracies, its processes have had to perpetually ‘adjust’ in order to meet contemporary needs. As an example, the evolution away from the privatisation of Conservative Thatcherism to the communitarian principles of New Labour demonstrates a fundamental change in how the ‘public’ and government interact. Whereas Thatcher sought to “substitute the state... for making choices ...of individual citizens,” New Labour proposed “to expand the political process” and the “relationship between the community and state.”¹³¹ These changes not only suggest a change in the way that individuals and government came to interact but that democracy within Britain was becoming more liberal and more participatory. This radical notion of democracy is a perfectly normal process according to Gill who adds what would be

¹²⁹ Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd, and Paul Whiteley, *Citizenship in Britain*, (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2004) xv.

¹³⁰ Philip Haynes, *Managing Complexity in Public Services* (Berkshire, Open University Press, 2003) 126.

¹³¹ Mohammad Habeebullah and David Slater, “Community Government,” in *Community and Public Policy*, eds. Andrew Glen, Paul Henderson, and Jerry Smith (London: Pluto Press, 1993) 151.

considered “moderate and liberal” today would have been seen as decidedly “radical in the 19th century.”¹³² However, if democracy is in a constant state of evolution, can it be said that its fundamental principles and values still exist? The answer is a definite maybe.

Britain, the United States, and many other countries adopted what has been traditionally called representative democracy. As the name suggests, citizens elect representatives to run the government on their behalf through a legislative body.¹³³ There are several reasons for this type of functionality within government but two of the more time honoured and prominent ideas are that because people were historically unable to congregate collectively it was impossible to legislate directly, and that people do not have the time or willingness to devote to the process of government.¹³⁴ Irrespective of why the process evolved, a fundamental principle of a representative democracy is that governmental power is generated from the ‘consent of the people’ through their elected representatives to develop policy and enact law.¹³⁵ However, over the past several decades there has been a decline in societal participation and overall trust in government.¹³⁶ Increasingly, politics is seen as a “remote arena populated by powers beyond their control pursuing interests that do not reflect the needs of the public...”¹³⁷ This sentiment not only suggests that there is a fundamental disconnect in the very principles of democratic society, but that there is systemic exclusion that transcends even the traditional concerns of exclusion over race, religion, class, and ethnicity. However, despite the arguments by some who suggest that there is wide spread systemic exclusion, it would not be fair to adopt that notion as *carte blanche* as the following discussion demonstrates.

¹³² Graeme Gill, *Bourgeoisie State and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 15.

¹³³ Ian Budge, *The new Challenge of Direct Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) 47.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 18.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Shawn Rosenberg, *Deliberation, Participation, and Democracy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 1.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

Following the Thatcher years, the government increasingly began to embrace the idea of partnership and terms like “involvement, participation, and citizenship” increasingly became staples of the political discourse.¹³⁸ In what Thompson calls “a radical transformation,” public policy development has become an increasingly collaborative process in which communities, business, and volunteer groups are in partnership with government.¹³⁹ Additionally, these partnerships challenge the way that governmental power and processes have been used, or have at least evolved to be understood.¹⁴⁰ This notion of partnership is essentially a hybrid of representative democracy when compared to its historic foundations or its contemporary adaptations. Perhaps more appropriately called deliberative or partnered democracy, this hybrid is viewed by some as “preventative medicine” and a “partial remedy for the social and political deterioration” that exists today.¹⁴¹

One of the fundamental elements of government is power and references to power are often made within the literature and the public discourse. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, governmental power is extended through the will of the people but it is not uncommon for individuals to feel alienated in their ability to influence public policy. This posits a viable question of whether or not governmental power has become referential? Perhaps the notion that government seizes and retains power was best conceptualised by Max Weber who saw “...the state as an autonomous organization with an extraordinary means to dominate.”¹⁴² Although there is no mention of power, the idea of being autonomous with the ability to dominate certainly removes any doubt that there is tremendous power involved. This idea is further expanded by Bauman who states “Modern power was first and foremost about the entitlement to manage people, to command, to set rules of conduct and extort obedience to

¹³⁸ Habeebullah and Slater, *Community and Public Policy*, 139.

¹³⁹ Neil Thompson, *Community Care* (Dorset: Russell House Publishing, 2005) xi.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Rosenberg, *Deliberation, Participation, and Democracy*, 1.

¹⁴² Joel Migdal, *State and Society* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 8.

the rules.”¹⁴³ Despite the notions of equal rights and an equal distribution of power within democratic societies, the mechanistic structure of the state is arguably an imperfect system that results in unequal opportunity to voice one’s opinion and be heard about the things that affect one’s life.¹⁴⁴ The dichotomous relationship between the people and the state, the notion of power, and the inclusive or exclusive nature of that connection is summarised well in the works of Migdal.

According to Migdal, the state has a normal tendency to want to control the social aspects of the state; the greater the control, the greater the compliance and ultimate legitimacy of its leaders.¹⁴⁵ However, community leaders and politically active social organisations have similar requirements for control in order to meet community needs and establish the legitimacy of its leaders.¹⁴⁶ The result is that there is a competing yet symbiotic relationship; communities erode state power through the influence of local society yet state power cannot be maximised without help and support from that society.¹⁴⁷

Migdal uses the preceding example to demonstrate that because of the relationship between state and society, and the competition for power, that not everything is open for negotiation; that society and government pick those issues of mutual interest or concern. Returning briefly to the notions of public safety and public security, at face value, it would be easy to suggest that these issues are without question an issue of mutual interest and concern. However, while that is true superficially, these issues are rapidly complicated by inhibited consensus and solidarity as Migdal explains.

“First...urbanization, migration, tourism, mass media, and women’s liberation, and other powerful processes” have all created an expanded public space with a broad diversity of

¹⁴³ Zygmunt Bauman, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World* (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 40.

¹⁴⁴ Richard Belamy and Dario Castiglione, *Re-imagining Political Community*, eds. Daniel Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998) 160.

¹⁴⁵ Migdal, *State in Society*, 52.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 56.

interests and views.¹⁴⁸ Some of those individuals and interests have assimilated into existing social structures while others have formed new ones. Second, the claim of egalitarianism within the various conventions of society becomes “insidious” because it challenges the established paradigm and “feelings of entitlement” by suggesting that all voices should be heard equally.¹⁴⁹ Lastly, as a combined output from the first two, the development of new structures within society and the rejection of egalitarianism “...have precipitated counterclaims and contentious struggles” about who belongs in the public space and what issues should be debated.¹⁵⁰ Thus the competing nature of community means that it is simultaneously an inclusive and exclusive process.

Within any mix of society, and especially one that is as diverse and multicultural as the UK, competing interests will always be contentious as one group attempts to have their voice heard over another. Even issues such as public safety and public security that are superficially thought of as universal and uncontested, will always generate different perspectives about how that task should be accomplished. The competing interests, the difference of opinions, and the inability of government leaders to hear all of the possible view points, much less satisfy everyone simultaneously, means that some will be included and others excluded in that process. Those on the outside looking in will naturally ask the question- whose safety, whose security, and whose liberty is being negotiated?

F. Bringing it All Together

This chapter began with the premise that different words mean different things to different people. Each of the terms, public, community, public safety, and public security have all been discussed across a spectrum of thought. Additionally, process, power, and

¹⁴⁸ Migdal, *State in Society* 166.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

exclusion have been discussed to help situate even the most seemingly neutral of terms like public safety and public security in the complex political environment. The interpretation of terms is decidedly malleable and it seems appropriate to conclude that both government and non-government group's attempt to appropriate terms like public and community and impose their definitions on others. As an example, when government uses public as a prefix for safety and security, it takes on a passive aggressive quality; it is difficult to argue against but there is also an element of control involved. Thus terms are open for interpretation and re-interpretation based on who they are used by and in what context they are used.

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, defining these terms and how they will be used in this thesis is necessary so that the framework of the thesis is understood and ambiguity is reduced. Additionally, by establishing the meaning of these terms, a contextual point of reference can be established that exposes how the state and 'target communities' use and experience the same terms which lies at the heart of this thesis. To that end, each term will be defined.

'Public', because of its amorphous nature, must be envisioned in its broadest sense. Whether that means it is conceived in the Habermasian sense of the public sphere, society at large, government, or the publicum and demos of ancient Greece, collectively *we* all make up the 'public'. Public does not however transcend national boundaries. Global societies collectively represent humanity, not the 'public'.

What is not public? Public is not a segment of society, the elite, the poor, or a division within the larger group. Although there are differences in race, religion, ethnicity, social status, and financial fluency, and sometimes those differences are exploited, there is no escaping the fact that society at large is the 'public'. Additionally, when used as an adjective, 'public' will retain its breadth of purpose and utilitarian meaning.

‘Community’, is a term that is nearly a contradiction to itself. It is simultaneously subjective and objective, strong and weak, defined and amorphous. It represents a borderless construct that is clearly permeable, yet often with clear lines of distinction that establish ‘us versus them’. As Cohen posits, ‘community’ occupies the place that is greater than kinship but less than society. In its simplest and most common form, community represents a defined geographical area. However, in a more abstract notion, it is a sense of belonging to something larger than one’s self, whether that is a group, an ideology, or a cause.

What is not Community? Community is not all of *us*. Although *we* are all humans and share the same planet, there is a limited sense of belonging, and belonging is fundamentally what community is about. Therefore, any reference to the global community is a misnomer. Community is not a construct of one, two, or perhaps even three, four or five people. It is bigger than that. It is not about numbers, it is about belonging, and sometimes that belonging transcends established boundaries whether they are objectively or subjectively construed.

Public Security must be conceived as a hybrid concept that results as a conjunction of both terms. As noted above, public means all of *us* regardless of the social/societal divisions that make *us* unique. Although security can also be thought of in individual terms, ‘public security’ refers to those actions taken to respond effectively to the threats or hazards that may endanger the public’s safety.

What is not ‘public security’? ‘Public security’ is it is not universalised. It is applied with at least some degree of precision and discretion to facilitate a desired outcome. ‘Public security’ represents a set of actions taken because a relative state of emergency exists, that necessitates extraordinary action, and that special powers may be needed to insure the public’s safety.

‘Public safety’ must be again be conceived as a hybrid concept that results as a conjunction of both terms, and as already noted, public means all of *us* regardless of

social/societal divisions. Safety on the other hand is more abstract and only exists when those things that threaten *us* are absent. Safety is a universalised basic human right that includes living life to the fullest extent possible, to flourish, and to be free from fear, anxiety and chaos.

What is not safety? Safety is not mere survival or existence. In this context, ‘public safety’ is only achieved when a state of equilibrium exists that allows all individuals to live life free from fear, anxiety, and chaos, and to flourish.

In closing, normative concepts of power and discourse within democratic societies confirms that there are balances of power within the state/communal/individual relationship. Although every person has a voice in contemporary society, that voice is often not heard until there is sufficient momentum. Frequently, that momentum is only gained through mobilising the collective sense of community where one speaks for the many. However, even then that voice can be tempered by the competing masses. The result is that despite democratic societies being the clear leader from other forms of government in the twenty first century, practices of inclusion and exclusion are an inherent part of the democratic system. This remains true even when such universalised notions like public safety, public security, and liberty are being decided.

Democracy is, has, and will always be about satisfying the majority. Inherent in that process though will be those who are left behind to ask whose safety, whose security, and whose liberty are we negotiating? It is those voices who rise to challenge the status quo. Furthermore, those voices often argue that radical change is needed which is precisely the topic of discussion contained in the next chapter.

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Chapter III

Literature Review of Key Terms- Radicalisation and Marginalisation

“He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit. He who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation...The mujahid is full of hope.”¹

The following continues to review the pertinent literature and develop the key terms and concepts that began in Chapter II but narrows the focus to those components that are central to the topic of this thesis, radicalisation and marginalisation. Like some of the terms from Chapter II which are routinely accepted but rarely defined, radicalisation and marginalisation fall into that same category; although they are commonly used in today’s vernacular, they clearly mean different things to different people. This chapter will deconstruct the notions of radicalisation and marginalisation but will remain contextually close to how both relate to ‘Islamic’ radicalisation.

Radicalisation, as will be explored, defines a new way of looking at old problems, or at least the perception of problems, and suggests an entirely new approach. That is not to suggest that radicalisation is always benign nor is to suggest that it is a typically successful approach, only that radicalisation in today’s public discourse is often perceived narrowly as a component of Islamic fundamentalist ideology when in fact it has a much broader scope and origin. Radicalisation occurs in all religions and has been a part of nearly every social and political process in every country around the world.

To facilitate a better understanding of radicalisation, a multi-pronged approach will be used. First, an abbreviated overview of radicalism in Britain will be explored. The examples

¹ Sheikh Yussuf Al-Qaradawi, cited in Iain R. Edgar, *The Dream in Islam: From Qur’anic Tradition to Jihadist Inspiration* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2011) 77.

provided are not intended to represent a comprehensive examination of radicalism, but rather to develop a sense of historical perspective and context of what constituted British radicalism in the past. Second, the notion of radicalism will be explored in detail. As mentioned above, radicalism is often narrowly perceived within the contextual (mis)understandings of Islamic fundamentalism without any appreciation for its broader meaning. By deconstructing the notional elements of radicalism a more thorough understanding of its normative concepts and constituent parts can be established.

Within some contemporary literature, it is suggested that before radicalisation occurs, individuals and/or groups will have been marginalised in some way. As such, some discussion will be devoted to understanding the role of marginalisation as well. This becomes somewhat of a slippery slope in that marginalisation and/or radicalisation are often considered as products of larger social and political processes. Where appropriate, the correlating issues of immigration, assimilation, community, religious identity, social agency, multiculturalism, citizenship, and nationalism will be included but will be limited to providing additional clarity and support for the larger discussion.

Finally, social and political problems rarely escape the attention of sociologists and psychologists who often explain behaviour through the lens of various modelling theories. Although these theories will not be explored in mass or in detail, it would be in error not to include at least some of the more prevalent psychosocial theory that is associated with radicalisation literature. Included will be some exploration and familiarisation of Social Identity Theory, Social Network (Group) Theory, and Relative Deprivation Theory to determine their relevance and in some cases historical place in the discourse on radicalism.

A. Historical Radicalism in Britain

As noted, radicalism has a long history in nearly all social and political processes of society. Although the current struggles with radically politicised Islam are uniquely cast and defined, developing a better understanding of radicalisation and its processes is needed rather than simply accepting that “radicalism...is what happens before the bomb goes off.”²

Additionally, focusing solely on the current challenge of ‘Islamic radicalisation’ has the accompanying risk of adopting too narrow a view without any appreciation for the broader concepts of ‘radicalism’. One way to understand the conceptual nature of radicalism is to explore its historical past. Although the following is a very abbreviated and incomplete version of British radicalism, it offers a valuable perspective.

Arguably one of the most radical times in British history began around 1520 when Martin Luther, a German theologian, published several pamphlets challenging the legitimacy of the Roman Catholic Church.³ Luther challenged the papal doctrine that salvation could only be obtained through the church, that faith alone was not sufficient to avoid God’s punishment, and that atonement was only achieved through the ‘sale of indulgence’ (simony).⁴ In Luther’s opinion, man was inherently flawed, and therefore only the word of God as reflected in the Bible should have ultimate authority over man, not the hermeneutical interpretations of the church through its hierarchal human order.⁵ Luther’s challenge to the church was not only a radical manifestation of faith but also confronted the sociological order in which the church and ‘secular’ rulers shared power.

As Luther’s challenge to the church and throne gained momentum, over the next hundred or so years hundreds of Protestant ‘radicals’ were convicted of the crime of heresy

² Peter Neumann, “Introduction”, in P.R. Neumann, J. Stoil, and D. Esfandiary (eds.) *Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence* (London: International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2008) 4.

³ Peter Milward, *The English Reformation: From Tragic Reality to Dramatic Representation* (Oxford: Family Publications, 2007) 14.

⁴ Jason Edwards, *The Radical Attitude and Modern Political Theory* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 8.

⁵ Milward, *The English Reformation*, 31.

under the successive regimes of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary (I) of England, and Elizabeth I. In the 16th and 17th centuries, heresy was a crime punishable by death and those convicted were burnt at the stake.⁶

Although Protestantism became the accepted religion of Britain, religious radicalism continued. Following the civil war in the 1640s, Parliament came under intense scrutiny for allegedly protecting its own members through ‘accommodation with the King.’⁷

Parliamentarians were accused of falling under the control of the ‘Presbyterians’ who allegedly sought “...a national Presbyterian church-state that would prohibit and suppress dissenting Protestant sects.”⁸

Leveraging the notion that the church and state could be challenged, the Levellers rose and advocated a utopian society in which there was complete freedom of religion, arguing that “...each Christian should be allowed to find their own path to salvation.”⁹ This radical notion, they argued, should even be extended to ‘the Catholics’ who should be able to practice their faith without interference.¹⁰

Around the same time, the Diggers emerged and subscribed to what could now be best classified as a Marxist ideology. Their Leader, Gerrald Winstanly, claimed that “...reason and righteousness were manifest in the common ownership of the earth...[while]...working the common lands, and patiently waiting for the rich to voluntarily give up their property and goods.”¹¹

In the eighteenth century, more radical movements swept Britain. The Tories, who retained the majority power of Parliament and supported “...the doctrines of divine right, indefeasible hereditary succession, non-resistance, and passive obedience” were challenged

⁶ Milward, *The English Reformation*, 31.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Edwards, *The Radical Attitude*, 36.

⁹ Ibid, 39.

¹⁰ Newton, *Papists, Protestants, and Puritans*, 57.

¹¹ Ibid, 58.

by a small number of radical Whigs.¹² The Whigs insisted that the authority of government should only be accepted in exchange for the protection of natural and inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property.¹³ Moreover, they believed that “Should the civil government betray the trust placed in it...then the people were... free to resist the government in order to defend their inalienable rights.”¹⁴

During the later portion of the eighteenth century, the Jacobins were empowered by the news of the newly created American Constitution and the French Revolution, and rallied against the ruling aristocracy for political reform seeking fundamental changes in constitutional arrangements, economic reform, ‘manhood suffrage’, demands for representation, and the redistribution of parliamentary seats.¹⁵ This was also the time of the British Enlightenment and radical leaders exercised their influence through the newly created social and media opportunities of the time; newspapers, organisations, clubs, and societies were the vanguard of a new public sphere where ‘radical ideologies’ could be discussed and debated.¹⁶

During the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment continued and the rise and collective voice of the middle classes was forever established.¹⁷ Two groups, the Chartists and the Anti-Corn Law League were most notable of that period. The Chartists argued for reform in six areas: annual parliaments, equal electoral districts, the secret ballot, universal manhood suffrage, abolition of property qualifications for voting, and salaries for Members of Parliament.¹⁸ The Anti-Corn Law League protested against the policy of import tariffs on

¹² H.T. Dickinson, *The Politics of the People in Eighteenth Century Britain* (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1994) 192.

¹³ Ibid, 193.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ H.T. Dickinson, *British Radicalism and the French Revolution 1789-1815*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) 3.

¹⁶ Ibid, 2.

¹⁷ Paul Adelman, *Victorian Radicalism: The Middle-class Experience, 1830-1914* (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1984) 1.

¹⁸ Margot Finn, *After Chartism: Class and nation in English radical politics, 1848-1874* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 48.

foreign imports because it meant that merchants at the dock would have to speculate on the cost of corn.¹⁹

At the turn of the twentieth century, some of the unfinished democratic reforms of the previous century remained and communism found a small number of sympathisers.²⁰ Things remained relatively quiet until the 1960s when a new era of British radicalism began that included a resurgent but limited communist movement, the Women's Liberation Movement, the counter-culture, and of course the violence that erupted over 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland.²¹

From a historical view, radicalism in Britain has transitioned through several epoch's. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, radicalism was primarily cast in terms of religious freedoms. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, radicalism became a mechanism for democratic reform in the spirit of nationalism. In the twentieth century, radicalism emerged as personal rights for the proletariat, equality for women, the withdrawal from mainstream society by the counter-culture, and an ethno-nationalist/separatist struggle in Northern Ireland. Although today's label of radicalism is rapidly applied and its association with violence is assumed, its historical origins offer a much broader perspective. That is not to suggest that the radicalism of today is benign, only that even a historical perspective as limited as this one may be useful in conceptualising it appropriately.

As noted previously by Gill, what would be considered 'moderate and liberal' today would have been seen as decidedly 'radical in the 19th century.' Furthermore, the historical examples of radicalism demonstrate that radicalism is most accurately conceived as a benchmark against the prevailing societal and state norms and practices of the time, destabilising established concepts of safety and security.

¹⁹ Miles Taylor, *The Decline of British Radicalism 1847-1860* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 32.

²⁰ Leela Ghandi, *Affective Communities* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006) 179.

²¹ David Bouchier, *Idealism and Revolution: New Ideologies of Liberation in Britain and the United States* (London: Edward Arnold, 1978) 4.

B. Concepts of Radicalism

Similar to Purdy's reference in Chapter II to the word 'public', which he states is 'over used and under thought', so seems the words radical and radicalism. Although they are prominent lexicons in today's discourse, their meaning seems loosely applied and ill defined. As an example, contemporary dialogue often makes references to radical Islam, radical ecology, radical politics, and radical economics. There are radical approaches to civil rights, women's rights, gay and lesbian rights, environmental issues, and theology. There is even the concept of radical peace. In the world of science and medicine, there are radical theories, radical approaches, free radicals, and just plain radicals. However, despite the wide usage of the term 'radical' there is little to define it. Questions remain whether the term 'radical' carries the same meaning when applied broadly, how that meaning relates to individuals, and more acutely, how it might be applied to contextually understand radicalised Islam, violence, and terrorism.

Before exploring the conceptual formations of radicalism, it might help to place it in context to better understand why this discussion is important. Radicalism and terrorism are terms that frequently get intermingled in today's jargon and more often than not subsume some degree of violent outcome. However, as noted above, there are numerous forms of radicalism and not all of them engage in violent behaviour. Although it might be true that terrorist acts are perpetrated by radicalised individuals, it is also true not all radicals engage in terrorism. Thus the link between radicalism and terrorism, although frequently assumed, is not absolute. A report produced by the Global Futures Forum which discusses the relationship of radicalisation to terrorism and socio-political violence reinforces this idea by stating, "...radicalisation is a process, not an end unto itself, and it does not necessarily lead to

violence.”²² Mandel, one of the few individuals writing on the conceptual nature of radicalism, expands on this theme stating that “...although radicalisation increases the potential for ...violence, it does not necessitate any of them.”²³ Mandel extends the logic of this argument even further and challenges the status quo by stating “Simply put, radicalisation cannot be a sufficient cause of terrorism because most radicals are not terrorists.”²⁴ Mandel’s suggestion implies that not only is there a potentially large gap in the understanding of radicalism but that gap may extend into the fundamental understandings of traditional terrorism studies.

To explore the meaning of radical it seems appropriate to return to the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) as a starting point. According to the OED, ‘radical’ is defined as “relating to or forming the root, basis, or foundation of something; original, primary.”²⁵ In this context, the definition appears to be logical when applied to the scientific references above. However, this definition does not provide immediate lucidity in the socio-political sense. Fortunately, the OED offers additional clarification to this domain. In the socio-political sense the OED defines ‘radical’ as “advocating thorough or far-reaching political or social reform; representing or supporting an extreme section of a party.”²⁶ Surprisingly, the OED even contains a direct reference to Britain’s historical past defining a ‘radical’ as “belonging to, supporting, or associated with the extreme wing of the Liberal Party which called for a reform of the social and parliamentary system in the late 18th and early 19th cent[ury].”²⁷

²² Global Futures Forum (2006), *Radicalization, Violence, and the Power of Networks*, pg.6, cited in D.R. Mandel, *Radicalization: What does it mean?* In T.Pick and A. Speckhard (eds.) *Home-Grown Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009) 102.

²³ David Mandel, *Radicalization: What does it mean?* In T.Pick and A. Speckhard (eds.) *Indigenous Terrorism: Understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalisation and among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009) 102.

²⁴ Mandel, *Radicalization: What does it mean?* 102.

²⁵ Oxford English Dictionary, “radical,” (Oxford University Press, 2009)

http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50196101?query_type=word&queryword=radical [Accessed April 30, 2010].

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Other sources support OED's socio-political definition as well. For instance, *A Dictionary for Modern Politics* defines 'radical' as "...anyone who advocates far reaching and fundamental change in a political system. Literally, a radical is one who proposes to attack some political or social problem by going deep into the socio-economic fabric to get at the fundamental or root cause and alter this basic social weakness."²⁸ Similarly, *Blackwell's Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, defines radicalism as "...a disposition to subject existing arrangements to critical questioning; and to advocate the reform or abolition of those which cannot be given principled justification."²⁹

Within these definitions there appears to be enough consistency to begin to draw some conclusions about the term 'radical' within a socio-political context. A 'Radical', refers to someone who seeks to examine the root or core of an issue, examines it, challenges its fundamental principles, and advocates reform. Similarly, 'radicalism' refers to that collective process taking place. However, despite the simplicity of the definitions, there remain many unanswered questions. For instance, when is radicalism acceptable and when is it not? Why do some individuals resort to violence while others do not? And, at what point does radicalism become threatening to the well-being of society? The answers to these questions can become somewhat obscured because of the diversity of radicalism in contemporary society.

Unlike the radicals of the 18th and 19th centuries who were narrowly associated with those advocating parliamentary reform, in the mid 20th century and onward, radicalism diversified considerably.³⁰ More contemporary forms of radicalism include a wide range of ideological perspectives and according to Pugh includes an eclectic group of "...creative

²⁸ David Robertson, *A Dictionary of Modern Politics* (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1985) 280. Also see Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no.4 (2010).

²⁹ David Miller (ed), *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) 416.

³⁰ John Button, *The Radicalism Handbook: A complete guide to the radical movement in the twentieth century*, (London: Cassell, 1995) 19.

artists, suicide bombers, anti-capitalists, tree-huggers, and anarchists.”³¹ The variety of radicalism today has meant that there is a diversity of ideas of what it means to be radical. The result is that there is no longer a simplistic and universally accepted definition.³² This complexity has also meant that separating the good from the bad is not easy to do. First, the absence of a universally accepted definition means that radicalism can mean anything to anybody.³³ Thus, radicalism is largely perceptual; one man’s radical is another man’s socially conscious activist. Second, there is widespread agreement that radicals are ‘ordinary people’ and not “...insane psychopaths suffering from mental illnesses.”³⁴ As such, radicals do not stand out in society any more than anyone else. Third, unless someone articulates their viewpoints in some public display, there is no way of knowing where a person stands on any particular issue. These attributes suggest that by every measure, someone who subscribes to the most extreme ideological perspective would be indiscernible in their community or society at large unless that person wanted to be recognised. Additionally, even if that person made his/her views known to others, only those with dissenting views would consider that person radical. This relative orientation to others, whether individually, a group, the community, or society means that radicalism is grossly subjective, and in a democratic society where “...freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression are fundamental freedoms, simply having or expressing radical views is a protected right and not legally problematic.”³⁵

Given that radicalism is a highly contextual and subjective term and legally permissive in most societies, differentiating when it should be considered problematic is not an easy task. Radicalism that leads people to be positively engaged in their community while

³¹ Jonathan Pugh, *What is Radical Politics Today?* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 3.

³² COT Institute for Safety, Security, and Crisis Management, *Causal Factors of Radicalization* (The Hague: COT Institute for Safety, Security, and Crisis Management, 2008) 6.

³³ Button, *The Radicalism Handbook*, 7.

³⁴ COT, *Causal Factors of Radicalization*, 5.

³⁵ D. Elaine Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism* (Ottawa, CA: Public Safety Ministry, 2009) 4.

being respectful of the democratic and pluralistic parameters of society is generally accepted.³⁶ But, when individuals begin to demonstrate intolerance and threaten the established democratic order of society, radicalism is no longer tolerated.³⁷

Although there are differing opinions on what constitutes socially acceptable and unacceptable radicalism, there does seem to be a conceptual dividing line. Those subjectively considered ‘moderate’, even though ‘radical’, are not typically perceived as threatening. However, those who are considered ‘extreme’ are considered problematic.³⁸ These subjective distinctions of ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ are used commonly as labels but do little to further real understanding; using one ambiguous and subjective term to define another with the same qualities is problematic. Since there is much more consensus in what constitutes extremism, and it is more relevant to understanding the problematic areas of radicalism, the focus of discussion will remain largely on defining what it means to be extreme.

The distinction between moderate and extreme is captured cogently by Precht who defines extremism as “...immoderate uncompromising views and measures beyond the norm” and further states that “...extremist groups pose a threat to public order...”³⁹ This argument is supported by Sloodman and Tillie who argue that while radicalism is legitimate, its final form “...(extremism) is seen as the antithesis of democracy.”⁴⁰ Their argument is further leveraged by stating that extremism “...refuses to accept democratic values and principles, and presents its own ideology as the only universally valid one which must be forced upon the population, if necessary by force.”⁴¹ In short, radicalism is only acceptable provided it does not become intolerant, uncompromising, or use violence to undermine

³⁶ Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, *The Edge of Violence* (London: Demos, 2010) 38.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Thomas Precht, *Home Grown Terrorism and Islamic Radicalization in Europe: From conversion to terrorism*, (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007) 17.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Marieke Sloodman and Jean Tillie, *Processes of Radicalisation: Why some Amsterdam Muslims become radicals* (Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2006) 15.

⁴¹ Sloodman and Tillie, *Processes of Radicalisation*, 15.

democratic principles. Pressman weighs in on this notion as well and resolves any remaining ambiguity to this argument by simply stating that “Violent extremism...is a[n] unlawful action and an attack on the norms and values of society.”⁴² This conceptual dividing line is helpful in discerning what constitutes good (socially tolerant) radicalism from bad (socially intolerant) radicalism.

As noted, radicalism does not always lead to violence but that does not mean that is benign either, and that uncertainty can be especially threatening to governmental entities. Several government bodies have established their own definitions of radicalism, and unsurprisingly, they differ from those previously discussed. Rather than defining radicalism as a concept, the focus of government is much more narrowly oriented on the subversive elements of radicalism and those activities that are not tolerated within their respective societies. Perceived as threatening, governmental definitions rapidly associate radicalism with violence and a disruption of the democratic legal order.

In Britain, radicalism has been identified as one of the four strategic drivers for terrorism and is defined as “...the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups.”⁴³ In the United States (US), the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons, defines radicalisation as “...the process by which inmates who do not invite or plan overt terrorist acts adopt extreme views, including beliefs that violent measures need to be taken for political or religious purposes.”⁴⁴ In the Netherlands, the Dutch define radicalism as “An increasing willingness to pursue and/or support fundamental changes in society, possibly by undemocratic means, which are in conflict with or could pose a threat to the democratic legal order.”⁴⁵ The European Council defines radicalism as “...the

⁴² Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*, 4.

⁴³ Home Office, *CONTEST* 2009, 40.

⁴⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, *A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers* (Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2004) 6.

⁴⁵ General Intelligence and Security Service (AVID), *2008 Annual Report* (The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2008) 86.

phenomenon of people embracing opinions, view, and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism.”⁴⁶ Lastly, and returning again to the US, the *Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007* defines ‘violent radicalization’ as “...the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change.”⁴⁷ Interestingly, in the examples provided, only the US, and only relatively recently, has made any distinction between radicalism and violent radicalism. In the British, EU, and Dutch examples, radicalism and violence are assumed to be related and thus radicalism is cast in a pejorative context. Although the evidence suggests that governmental bodies often correlate radicalism to violence, it may be more likely that those concerns stem from their position of responsibility to protect public safety and ensure public security than articulately defining what ‘they’ view as radicalism. These differences of perception are likely the result of personal verses professional orientation, similar to the differing perceptual notions of ‘public’ discussed in chapter II.

Although there are differences in how governmental bodies and others define radicalism, they do provide at least the beginnings to frame the conceptual notions of what constitutes radicalism and under what circumstances it is acceptable. However, despite a quasi conceptual construct of radicalism, there is little clarity on its associated characteristics. In other words, little insight is provided about what it means to be radical beyond exploring the roots of a particular issue and seeking fundamental changes in society by either legal or illegal methods.

It would be impossible to list all of the associated characteristics for each individual or radical issue. Even if it were possible, there would certainly be perceptual disagreements among those who are practicing radicals, those who study radicalism, and the governmental

⁴⁶ COT, *Causal Factors of Radicalization*, 6.

⁴⁷ United States Congress, *Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007* (H.R. 1955) (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2007) 2.

bodies that seek to legislate and contain the limits of radicalism. However, given that the concern of this thesis is with radicalism associated with extreme Islamic ideology, the identification of relevant characteristics narrows significantly. A study of *Salafi Jihadists* by Sageman in 2004 challenged the traditional conventions and what was ‘known’ about violent extremists. Sageman set the stage for additional study and assessment and the development of a more thorough understanding of radical characteristics within this demographic.

Sageman studied individuals in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Morocco, and Indonesia and focused on three primary areas of behaviour: social, psychological, and situational.⁴⁸ Data for Sageman’s conclusions were derived from several subsets of the three primary areas and included: geographical location, socioeconomic status, education, faith as youth, occupation, family status, mental illness, terrorist personality (including pathological narcissism, paranoia, and authoritarian personality), age, place of recruitment, faith, employment, relative deprivation, friendship, kinship, and discipleship.⁴⁹ Although Sageman’s work was initially challenged, subsequent studies by Baker, Nesser, Precht, and Silber and Bhatt all led to similar conclusions.⁵⁰ The work by the preceding scholars is not all-inclusive of in terms of what needs to be known about those who become engaged in extremist violence and terrorism, but it does begin to establish a basis for some of the more identifiable characteristics within the radicalised *Salafi Jihadist* groups studied and paves a path for more inquiry.

One of the more notable outcomes of the work completed by Sageman, Bakker, Nesser, Precht, and Silber and Bhatt, is a project by Pressman. Pressman combined the work of Sageman and the others with ‘ten areas of question’ developed by the United States Secret Service for assessing those prone to political violence, and developed a risk assessment tool

⁴⁸ Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terrorists Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 2004) 70 & 96.

⁴⁹ Ibid, chp. 3&4.

⁵⁰ Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*, 8.

that could be used to evaluate those “...factors known to be relevant to the process of radicalisation leading to violent extremism...”⁵¹ Assessment tools such as these have been used in United States and Canadian law enforcement community for decades and are considered sound tools for evaluating the risk of violence in criminals.⁵² Although the model that Pressman chose was originally developed for violent offenders, by comparing the known risk factors between what she refers to as ‘radicalised violent criminals’ and ‘non-radicalised violent criminals’, Pressman was able to isolate those characteristics associated uniquely with radicalism and construct a risk assessment tool that could be specifically applied to radicalised individuals.⁵³

Pressman’s tool evaluates twenty-eight individual attributes within five domains using Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ). SPJ is the same methodology used in other accepted risk assessment tools in use today.⁵⁴ The tool, titled Violent Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA), is accompanied by a guidance document for each of the twenty-eight attributes and assesses whether the risk factor is low, medium, or high within each category. A summary assessment of the characteristics associated with radicalisation include: whether or not an individual subscribes to a particular ideology and does he/she justify the use of violence to achieve their goal; is there a perception of injustice against either him/her-self; if some injustice is present, is there an identified target (perpetrator) responsible for that injustice; can the target be dehumanised; is the individual ready to die for the cause; is there a feeling of alienation from society and rejection of democratic values; is there a measure of hate towards the world; is there a need for bonding to a like minded group; is the individual hostile towards the collective national identity; is there a low degree of empathy towards those outside of the group or those close to the individual; does the individual frequent radical

⁵¹ Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*, 31.

⁵² *Ibid*, 12.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 16.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 21.

websites; does the individual reside in a community where there is support for violent action to achieve the same goals; is the individual in contact with others considered extreme; is there demonstrated anger over governmental decisions on foreign policy or other actions that are contrary to the individuals views; has the individual been exposed to domestic or political violence; have other family members participated in or advocated violence; has the individual been arrested for violence in the past; has the individual received 'military training' from non-state entities; did the individual travel abroad and attend non-state sponsored training camps; is there a glorification of violence; has the individual experienced a shift in ideology; will the individual reject the notion that sometimes violence is necessary to achieve certain goals; has the perception of the 'enemy' changed; is there an interest in democratic participation; is there support for de-radicalisation from his/her family or community; what sex is the individual; what is his/her age; and, what is his/her marital status?⁵⁵

Pressman's assessment tool seems uniquely situated as one of the latest methodologies for evaluating those "...factors known to be relevant to the process of radicalisation leading to violent extremism as well as committed political terrorists."⁵⁶ Although VERA is still quite new and will have to stand the test of efficacy and professional scrutiny over time, for now it provides a valuable source of insight into the characteristics of violent radicalism. Moreover, by using Pressman's tool and attenuating some of the responses, some general notions of the earlier stages of radicalisation can be postulated. For instance it seems relevant to suggest that radicals most likely lean more towards an ideology rather than a socially accepted difference of opinion; that radicalism involves identifying where change must take place; that social protest is sometimes warranted over actions or lack of action by government; that individuals feel some sense of distance from main stream society; that individuals feel more secure around those who perceive the world in similar ways and reinforce their views by following

⁵⁵ Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*, 35.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 21.

like minded publications and/or websites; and, there is a sense of injustice. Although these notions are not authoritative or validated, subjective reasoning would suggest that they provide logical conceptualisations in the understanding of what it might mean to be on a path of radical thinking.

Developing a radical mindset is one thing but when radicalism becomes extreme and manifests in the form of violence that becomes an even greater concern. Worth noting is that although violence perpetrated by ‘radicals’ and violence perpetrated by ‘ordinary criminals’ are both criminal acts, the motivations of each are quite different. As early as 1990, scholars such as Crenshaw drew clear distinctions between these two forms of criminal behaviour. Accordingly, Crenshaw argues that violent extremism (terrorism), although emotionally charged, is channelled through “collective decision making processes” and is perpetrated because of an ideological commitment.⁵⁷ Those who engage in such acts often think of themselves as “...bringing about a better society for all” and justify their actions by believing that they are “...acting in the interest of the collective good...”⁵⁸ This, as Pressman notes, is in stark contrast to ‘ordinary criminal’ behaviour which is often a result of “...momentary rage or impulse...or motivated by monetary gain or personal vengeance.”⁵⁹ These definitions suggest that radicalism is not only a conscious decision carried out through a rational thought process, but is also one that is often deliberated by the individual, and in some cases with others. This idea suggests that radicalism carries with it a far more strategic perspective that is developed over time. In contrast, ‘ordinary criminals’ act in ways that is more immediate with the primary goal of personal benefit. This orientation begs two questions: first, is radicalism always a conscious effort of strategic choice; and, second, is radicalism a process with a beginning and an end?

⁵⁷ Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) 15.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*, 7.

There appears to be considerable consensus in the literature that radicalism is a strategic choice based on one's orientation and world view. This idea is perhaps best stated by Giddens who confirms that radicalism is "...not just about bringing about change but controlling such change so as to drive history onwards."⁶⁰ However, like all things, exceptions are possible and is sometimes seen when otherwise 'moderate' individuals become engaged in confrontational positions with those in authority. The term 'moderate', noted previously, is highly subjective and for the purposes of the following discussion will be used contextually to refer to someone who does not initially advocate or intend to use violence.

The exception in this case is the phenomenon of 'unintended radicalisation'. First noted during the student anti-war movement in the United States in the late 1960s it can be explained within the psychology of personal identity and intergroup relationships. As students would congregate to 'protest', there was typically a corresponding law enforcement presence to ensure that public order was maintained. When two opposing groups form within close proximity to one another, one of the outcomes of that association is that personal identity often becomes associated with that of the group and each group becomes defined by the perception of the other.⁶¹ In other words, in group environments, one's identity is largely determined by the perception of the other group.

In the case of the early anti-war protesters, law enforcement frequently regarded the students as radical and hostile, and treated them accordingly. The result of that action was that the protestors began to think of themselves as being radicals and the personal barriers against civil disobedience and violence became more easily removed.⁶² Subsequent studies

⁶⁰ Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: the future of radical politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) 2.

⁶¹ John Drury and Steve Reicher, "Collective Action and Psychological Change: The Emergence of New Social Identities," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 39, no. 4 (2000), 581.

⁶² Robert Endleman, *Deviance and Psychopathology: The sociology and psychology of outsiders* (Malabar, FL: Robert Krieger Publishing, 1990) 236.

following confrontations of ‘non-violent moderates’ have developed similar conclusions.⁶³

The rate of occurrence in the transition from ‘moderate’ to ‘radical’ is not known so specific numbers cannot be provided. However, it would appear that for some, radicalisation can occur by circumstance and for others by rational choice motivated by some strategic or analytical orientation, bound only by the variables of time and degree.

The other question, whether radicalisation is the result of a process with a beginning and an end, is partially answered by the first; circumstance, as in the case of the ‘student radicals’, may be one of the variables that cause an individual to begin adopting a radical ideology. An additional perspective on the beginning process of radicalisation comes from Ongerling, who while testifying before the United States Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee stated that radicalism is a “...process of personal development whereby an individual adopts even more extreme political or politico-religious ideals and goals, becoming convinced that the attainment of these goals justifies extreme methods.”⁶⁴ However, although Ongerling’s statement helps define the mental process of adopting a radical ideology, her reference to ‘an individual adopts even more extreme political...’ would suggest that the radicalisation process has already begun and thus only provides a portion of the answer. At least one of the missing pieces might best be encapsulated by Button who characterises early radicalism saying “...the first stage of radical change is knowing that something is very wrong... If you are moved to righteous indignation by the injustice seen or read about, you will probably want to know more, until you are convinced that something must change.”⁶⁵ Additionally, what is helpful about Button’s statement is that he clearly refrains from associating any value statements with the conceptual

⁶³ S.D. Reicher, “The Battle for Westminster”, *European Journal of Social Psychology* 26, no. 1 (1996), 128. Also see Drury and Reicher, “Collective Action and Psychological Change,” 581.

⁶⁴ Lidewijde Ongerling, Testimony before the United States Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (27 June 2007), <http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/292.pdf> [Accessed May 9, 2010].

⁶⁵ Button, *The Radicalism Handbook*, viii.

nature of the radicalisation process which again reinforces the idea that radicalisation is highly contextual, subjective, and a state of mind.

While Button's statement is useful in understanding the beginnings of radicalisation and Ongerling's definition brings clarity to understanding the middle processes, the end point of radicalisation is much less obvious. To some, like Silber and Bhatt, the final phase of radicalisation culminates in a terrorist attack, or at the least taking up *jihad* and fighting overseas.⁶⁶ Others, like Precht, say that "...only a few end up becoming terrorists...the rest stop or drop out of the radicalisation process at different phases."⁶⁷ This undefined end-point is what challenges scholars, governments, and those charged with providing public safety and security the most because it suggests that radicalism is not only indistinguishable but is also truly an idiosyncratic process.

Despite the abundant sources of information and references to radicalism, nearly all are anecdotal and focus on causal, situational, or mechanistic methodologies. Although helpful, they provide little enhanced understanding on radicalism itself and collectively illustrate a fundamental lack of understanding of why some people radicalise, others do not, and what drives those who do to ultimately resort to violence. What seems clear though is that radicalism is fundamentally about identity shift and the subsequent transition and reorientation of how one perceives him or herself and the world around them. Although the process is idiosyncratic in both who is affected and to what degree, as that identity shift increases so does the relative degree of radicalism.

⁶⁶ Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York: NYPD, 2007) 9.

⁶⁷ Precht, *Homegrown Terrorism and Islamic Radicalization in Europe*, 5.

C. Concepts of Marginalisation

The role of marginalisation is well referenced in radicalism and terrorism literature and is frequently mentioned as a prominent cause of radicalised violent behaviour. However, despite its prominence and often accepted correlation to both radicalism and terrorism, its meaning is not well defined. Complicating the issue even further is that the notion of marginalisation is often conceived as an amalgamation of larger social and political processes. This equates to a slippery slope when trying to isolate the conceptual nature of marginalisation and how it relates to radicalisation; what came first and its relative degree of influence over other associated factors seems a witch's brew of ideas that span the spectrum of goal posting on one end to summary dismissal on the other, with a large degree of contention and varying uncertainty in the middle.

Perhaps the best place to start the discussion on marginalisation is to begin by understanding that marginalisation is a multifaceted term that is often culturally and geographically conceived. In the United States (US), terms like 'ghettoization', 'marginalization', and 'the underclass' mean roughly the same thing but are often used contextually depending who is being described.⁶⁸ In the UK, the term 'social exclusion' is typically used rather than the US terms because it is perceived to be more socially acceptable, allowing the debate over social policy to take place without offending those who might find the other terms insensitive.⁶⁹ Regardless of which term is used, most represent similar stereotypical notions of "...several generations of people from ethnic minorities, living in ghettos and in receipt of welfare, cut off from mainstream society, and representing a threat to it."⁷⁰ Stated more plainly, those that exist near, on, or over the margins of mainstream society are considered marginalised. For uniformity, the term 'social exclusion' will be used

⁶⁸ Tania Burchardt, Julian Le Grand, and David Piachaud, "Introduction", in Hills, Le Grand, and Piachaud (eds) *Understanding Social Exclusion* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 2.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 3.

⁷⁰ Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud, *Understanding Social Exclusion*, 2.

predominately in the following discussion but should be understood to be synonymous with ‘marginalisation’.

According to Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud, the term ‘social exclusion’ first appeared in the works of Weber who “...saw exclusionary closure as an attempt of one group to secure for itself a privileged position at the expense of some other group through a process of subordination.”⁷¹ However, the term’s widespread use appears to have come from France, where in the 1970’s, it gained popularity as a way to describe those on the “...margins of society who were cut off from regular sources of employment and the income safety nets of the welfare state.”⁷² In Britain, the term did not gain prominence in the mainstream political discourse until 1997 when Tony Blair and New Labour came to power, adopted the concept wholly, and established the Social Exclusion Unit in the Cabinet Office.⁷³ That is not to suggest that previous prime ministers such as John Major or Margaret Thatcher were unaware of the problem, only that ‘social exclusion’ was not made a part of the Conservative political dialogue of the time. For instance, following her re-election in 1987, Mrs Thatcher chose other words to reference the same problems declaring “we must do something about those inner cities.”⁷⁴

In order to grasp the complexities and challenges of social exclusion, a multi-sided view of how it is conceived may help. In the 1970s, the French seemed distinctly focused on economic issues as the major cause of social exclusion. The statement ‘cut off from regular sources of employment and the income safety nets’ suggests that little if anything other than economics was considered. However, just two decades later a report to the European Commission (EC) expanded the notion considerably. The report to the EC listed four fundamental systems within society and suggested that a failure of integration into any of the

⁷¹ Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud, *Understanding Social Exclusion*, 1.

⁷² John Pierson, *Tackling Social Exclusion*, (London: Routledge, 2002) 4.

⁷³ Ibid, 5.

⁷⁴ Michael Jacobs, “Margaret Thatcher and the Inner Cities”, *Economic and Political Weekly* 23, no. 38 (1998), 1942.

four resulted in social exclusion: the democratic legal system, the labour market, the welfare state, and the family and community system.⁷⁵ Expanding on each topic, Commins notes the following:

One's sense of belonging to society depends on all four systems. Civic integration means being an equal citizen in a democratic system. Economic integration means having a job, having a valued economic function, being able to pay your way. Social integration means being able to avail one's self of the social services provided by the state. Interpersonal integration means having family and friends, neighbours and social networks to provide care and companionship and moral support when these are needed. All four systems are therefore, important. In a way the four systems are complementary: when one or two are weak the others need to be strong. And the worst off are those for whom all systems have failed.⁷⁶

By the end of the 20th century, researchers at the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE), at the London School of Economics offered a simplified concept of social exclusion by defining it simply as "An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically resident in a society but (b) for reasons beyond his or her control, he or she cannot participate in the normal activities of citizens in that society, and (c) he or she would like to so participate."⁷⁷ Similarly, Golding states "...social exclusion is the process of becoming detached from the organisations and communities which the society is composed of and the rights and obligations they embody."⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Jos Bergham, "Social Exclusion in Europe: Policy Context and Analytical Framework," in Graham Room (ed), *Beyond the Threshold*, (Bristol: Policy Press, 1995) 18.

⁷⁶ P. Commins, *Combating Exclusion in Ireland 1990-94: A Midway Report*, (Brussels: Observatory on National Policies to Combat Social Exclusion, Commission of European Countries, 1993), cited in Graham Room (ed), *Beyond the Threshold*, (Bristol: Policy Press, 1995) 18.

⁷⁷ Tania Burchardt, Julian Le Grand, and David Piachaud, "Social Exclusion in Britain 1991-1995," *Social Policy and Administration* 33, no. 3 (1999), 229.

⁷⁸ Peter Golding, "Conclusions," in Room, *Beyond the Threshold*, 243.

These definitions appear problematic at many levels. In the CASE definition, the ‘normal activities of citizens’ is not defined and significant questions arise regarding who would be capable of making such a distinction, assuming it were possible in the first place. The result would seem that the notion of social exclusion is so broad that it can mean anything to anybody. Golding’s definition is equally troubling. As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘community’ is an abstract notion and a borderless construct limited only by the degree of symbolic association the individual has to the group, religion, area, or ideology. Even though ‘community’ implies a sense of belonging which can, in some circumstances, exist over long periods of time, it is also fleeting and immeasurable. Thus, Golding’s references to ‘organisations and communities’ and the ‘rights and obligations they embody’ are similarly unquantifiable.

The associated ambiguity of what constitutes social exclusion has resulted in a number of differing approaches and conceptual orientations. Broadly characterised, some have accepted the notion that social exclusion will never be defined and instead of seeking a comprehensive cure, have sought to work on specific problem areas such as homelessness, drug abuse, teen pregnancy, political and community participation, antisocial behaviour, etcetera.⁷⁹ Others believe that identifying and correcting the lack of participation in what they believe are the most important aspects of society is the best approach. A 1998 report submitted to the Social Exclusion Unit on behalf of the Institute for Public Policy Research suggested using four lead indicators for measuring social exclusion: “the proportion of the population falling below 50 percent of average household income; the ILO unemployment rate; the proportion of 16-year-olds failing to get at least 20 GSCE points; and the Standard Mortality Ratio in Social Class IV/V in relation to other classes.”⁸⁰ Regressing momentarily

⁷⁹ Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud, *Understanding Social Exclusion*, 5.

⁸⁰ P. Robinson and C. Oppenheimer, *Social Exclusion Indicators: A Submission to the Social Exclusion Unit* (London: Institute of Public Policy Research, 1998) cited in Hills, Le Grand, and Piachaud (eds), *Understanding Social Exclusion*, 5.

to return to the overarching question of what constitutes social exclusion (marginalisation) and its role in radicalisation, it seems convoluted at best to identify any of these associated problems let alone a viable measurement that predisposes anyone to any form of radicalisation. Granted, there are and have always been social problems which need to be addressed but the unbounded nature of what constitutes social exclusion and any definable link to radicalisation seems highly problematic.

Another major division that seems to run between the different ideological positions on social exclusion regardless of what form of exclusion is being discussed is the element of blame. Some suggest that those who are excluded are “to blame for their own plight” while others suggest that the state is to blame “...because the welfare system has eroded personal responsibility.”⁸¹ These characterisations have been historically exemplified by such arguments as young men choose crime and idleness over effectively engaging in society and therefore continue to “marginalise themselves from mainstream social and economic life.”⁸² Simultaneously, the opposing argument is that “...monetarist economic policy, labour market deregulation, and authoritarian social welfare policies from the latter 1970s through the 1990s are...the causal factors behind...Britain’s underclass.”⁸³ The former argument that the poor and disadvantaged are products of their own making, as well as the later suggesting that it is all government’s fault have largely gone out of vogue, conceived as politically isolating and socially insensitive. In its place has been a Communitarian approach implemented by New Labour in the early 2000s under the concept of ‘joined-up’ partnerships and programmes such as New Deal for Communities. Intended to reduce social exclusion by lowering “worklessness [sic] and crime” while simultaneously increasing health, skills, and housing so that “...within 10-20 years, no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live,”

⁸¹ Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud, *Understanding Social Exclusion*, 4.

⁸² Robert MacDonald and Jane Marsh, *Disconnected Youth? Growing up in Britain’s poor neighbourhoods* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 7.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 8.

New Labour's Third Way Communitarian approach has sought to appease both ends of the spectrum.⁸⁴ This 'middle-way' assumes governmental responsibility but also places an equal portion of the burden on individuals to correct their own position. Implemented in 2001, and one of the foremost strategies to reduce social exclusion, the New Deal for Communities (NDC) has eclipsed its ten year mark, yet many problems remain. This raises the referential questions of how much responsibility government and individuals should each assume and what the limits of that responsibility should be. Extending the argument into the realm of radicalisation and violent extremism, even if NDC were a complete success, it seems difficult to make the conceptual link that this would somehow diminish the threat of radicalised violent behaviour.

The ebb and flow of responsibility is not easily defined in part because the margins of society are not always clear. From a political, legal, and anthropological perspective, the mainstream of society (those living within the margins) define what the norms and accepted behaviours of a given society are. For those that have exceeded the rule of law, the margins are reasonably well defined, but for those who are economically disadvantaged, culturally different, or ideologically misaligned within the mainstream, the accepted margins and corresponding threat are not as clear. This argument is well articulated by Das and Poole who confirm that those on the periphery conceived as "insufficiently socialized" require the state to "function in a state of exception" attempting to "manage or pacify" them either through "force or conversation".⁸⁵ This notion suggests that the state naturally falls into a position that it must apply some degree of security measures in order to manage the socially excluded 'other'.

The ever-present problem is that societies are not static entities and so the state is in a perpetual process of renewal whereby it has to redefine its laws and acceptable practices if it

⁸⁴ Cabinet Office, *A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal* (London: The Cabinet Office, 2001) 8.

⁸⁵ Veena Das and Deborah Poole (eds.) *Anthropology in the Margins of the State* (Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research, 2004) 10&13.

is to retain legitimacy while simultaneously maintaining public safety and security.

Additionally, a careful balance must be maintained between the potential for violence on the margins and the functions of the state. Thus the idea that the margins are always changing to accommodate the current paradigm seems understood; the question is how much should the state and or society accommodate the margins and should everything be up for negotiation?

This concept is aptly stated by Asad-

In modern liberal societies, public arguments over economy, racial discrimination, multiculturalism, medical ethics, pornography, gender identity, religious education, and a host of other questions are not only endless, they are each carried out through statistical discourses in which figures and their meanings are presented and contested and policies formed. Certainty gives way to contestable estimates of probability⁸⁶

If, as Asad suggests, everything is left up for negotiation, the problem becomes overtly complex because in trying to decide the multitude of issues facing contemporary society, new laws or other administrative or judicial actions have to be made and implemented with a reasonable degree of impartiality. Additionally, the potential result of trying to accommodate the grievances by those on the fringe is that these new challenges potentially expand the margins of the state to include everything rather than the borders established by the majority of society. Within the narrowed context of radicalism and extremist violence, where the state perceives it must use increased measures of security, the question of where the borders are and security for who becomes irreconcilable. Ironically, this is not a new problem for Britain. Paraphrasing Locke and the challenges of religious domain to the ideological power of the early modern state, Asad provides the following-

... political conflicts over religious doctrines appear to be incapable of final solution by rational means, whereas everyone could agree on such things as social unrest and

⁸⁶ Talal Asad, "Where are the Margins of the State," in Das and Poole, *Anthropology in the Margins of the State*, 286.

political persecution were sources of harm to life, limb, and property in this world...let us therefore attend to the harms of this world about which we can all be certain, rather than the harms of the next world, on which we will never agree.⁸⁷

Integration

If, as the literature suggests, social exclusion is a potential cause of radicalisation, then its antithesis, social inclusion, would seem the logical cure. However, inclusion, or more appropriately termed integration by government when referencing immigrant or ‘ethnic’ populations, has historically been a contentious issue in the UK. Historically, those who migrated to the West have been perceived as a synonym for social problems and a threat to the welfare state.⁸⁸ Specifically, “black and Asian” immigrants have been seen as being particularly problematic requiring their numbers be strictly ‘controlled’.⁸⁹

As mentioned in Chapter II, the UK experienced significant immigration in the second half of the 20th century with large numbers of people coming from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and other ‘old commonwealth’ countries. During that time, immigration policy sought to assimilate rather than integrate those arriving to the UK; assimilation referring to a policy in which minority communities of immigrants are granted equal rights and equality provided they adopt the culture of the host country verses a policy of integration where differences are acknowledged but accepted.⁹⁰

Early immigration policy preferred assimilation over integration over fears that that unless immigrants adopted UK values, there was a threat that the character of British society could be lost.⁹¹ This fear appeared particularly prevalent in relationship to ‘non-white’

⁸⁷ Asad, “Where are the Margins of the State?” 286.

⁸⁸ Heinze Fassman and Rainer Munz (eds.) *European Migration in the Late Twentieth Century* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1994) ix.

⁸⁹ James Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 10.

⁹⁰ Stephen Tansey, *Politics* (London: Routledge, 1995) 124.

⁹¹ Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*, 13.

populations whose numbers government wanted to control. By limiting the number of immigrants and expecting those who came to adopt a British identity, it was conceived that British society and 'Britishness' could be maintained.⁹² These concerns were not far from the surface of British politics and was reflected in a 1978 television interview with Margaret Thatcher who stated that people were "...really rather afraid that the country might be swamped by people with a different culture"⁹³ Similarly, even as late as 1990, Norman Tebbit, a Member of Parliament made his infamous comment "A large portion of Britain's Asian population fail to pass the cricket test. Which side do they cheer for?"⁹⁴ Despite the eventual move away from assimilation to one of multiculturalism, Britain's struggle for effective integration of its immigrant population has become a lingering and problematic legacy. However, more concerning is that within the marginalised population, those who are radicalising are not just failing to integrate; they are actively seeking to withdraw from the political process and society at large.

A 2009 report published by the University of London states that "Muslim youth are not only alienated from the politics at the national level, but also at the community level... where community elders...are often of a different makeup...to those they seek to represent."⁹⁵ The result is that engagement and representation is sought through "...radical Salafi movements and groups."⁹⁶ Some argue that this 'active withdrawal' is more than apathy or simple choice, it "fundamentally calls into question the symbolic authority of the state."⁹⁷ This argument is expanded by Sloodman and Tillie who argue that those who lose confidence in government as a result of a growing mistrust in social and political systems

⁹² Hampshire, *Citizenship and Belonging*, 60.

⁹³ Margaret Thatcher, TV Interview for Granada *World in Action*, 27 January, 1978, <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=103485> [Accessed 17 May 2010].

⁹⁴ Darcus Howe, "Tebbit's Loyalty Test is Dead," *New Statesman*, 03 July 2006, <http://www.newstatesman.com/200607030029>, [Accessed 17 May 2010].

⁹⁵ Mina Al-Lami, *Studies in Radicalisation: State of the Field Report* (London: University of London, 2009) 7.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Saul Newman, "Anarchism," in Jonathan Pugh (ed.) *What is Radical Politics Today?* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) 229.

seek out association with others where their voice will be heard.⁹⁸ This loss of social agency brings back Asad's fundamental questions on the margins and marginalism; how much should be left open for negotiation, where should the margins be established, and how much security is necessary in order to maintain public safety and public security?

D. Psychosocial Relevancies

A significant effort was made by early terrorism researchers to provide an explanation why radicalised individuals would resort to violence. Logically conceived, those who became radicalised to the extreme and crossed over to employ violence must surely have had some prominent form of mental illness. Furthermore, if those traits could be identified then there was some hope that profiling or other pre-emptive measures could be employed as a defensive strategy to limit vulnerability and attack. Although there was some promising work done by researchers who concluded early on that terrorists had significant psychopathy, those conclusions have since been set aside.⁹⁹ In fact, more commonly, terrorism researchers now conclude that violent extremists are absent of any definable mental illness and are decidedly ordinary people who lead unremarkable lives.¹⁰⁰

Despite the acceptance that terrorists do not fit conveniently into a psychological classification, does not mean that psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and others do not seek to understand the processes and influences that lead those to their radical mindset, extremism, and violence. Within the literature there remain frequent psychosocial references and various subsets of larger psychological theory. The following discussion is not intended to provide a comprehensive understanding or analysis across the spectrum of psychological theory, but rather to provide an introduction to three of the more frequently referenced

⁹⁸ Sloodman and Tillie, *Processes of Radicalization*, 16.

⁹⁹ John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2005) 50.

¹⁰⁰ Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, 6.

psychosocial models: Social Identity Theory, Social Network (Group) Theory, and Relative Deprivation Theory.

Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory (SIT) is credited to the work of Tajfel and Turner who developed and advanced a number of theories on group and intergroup conflict.¹⁰¹ Working mostly off of the existing theory of ‘realistic group conflict’ developed by Sherif and Sherif, Tajfel and Turner formulated new ideas on how individuals and groups relate to one another, and how groups collectively interact with each other.¹⁰² Fundamental to SIT is the notion of self-esteem and the influences that both ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-groups’ have on the individual.

One of the key elements of Tajfel and Turner’s theory is that the perception of unequal resources such as power, prestige, or wealth “...can promote antagonism between dominate and subordinate groups.”¹⁰³ This antagonism and conflict causes the latter to reject its subordinate status and develop a positive group image while the former does “...everything possible to maintain and justify the status quo.”¹⁰⁴ This process can involve a number of actions but typically include each group redefining themselves through the adoption of a more positive conceptual framework, a newly formed collective identity, the hardening of positions, and redefining the ‘other’ negatively so that the status of the ‘out-group’ is devalued.¹⁰⁵ The outcome of this process is that the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’ both establish positions of conceptual superiority increasing the likelihood of conflict with the other.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” in William Austin and Stephen Worchel (eds) *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Monterey, CA: Crooks/Cole Publishing, 1979) 33.

¹⁰² Tajfel, and Turner, “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” 36.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 38.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 39.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 38.

This reorganisation of relationships and the hardening of positions are illustrated well in the following example from the English Defence League (EDL). The EDL's mission statement states "The English Defence League (EDL)...was founded in the wake of the shocking actions of a small group of Muslim extremists who, at a homecoming parade in Luton, openly mocked the sacrifices of our service personnel without any fear of censure."¹⁰⁷ The EDL's position clearly foments a sense of 'in-group' identification, and a hardening of positions while simultaneously adopting a corresponding devaluation for the 'out-group'.

Another key element of Tajfel and Turner's theory is that an individual's self-esteem is partially derived from his/her perception of self, but also how he/she relates to and is valued by the 'in-group', and how the 'in-group' is perceived by the 'out-group'.¹⁰⁸ The example of the student anti-war protesters and their relationship to the police provided previously is classically derived from this notion. Although these are only two examples, the theories developed by Tajfel and Turner have been widely used to explain individual and group processes associated with radicalism and in the extreme, terrorism. As Muldoon notes, "Much of the current research emanating from both Europe and North America points to the centrality of social identities in causing and maintaining conflict."¹⁰⁹

Social Network (Group) Theory

Whereas, Social Identity Theory defines how individuals and groups relate to one another, Social Network Theory (SNT) seeks to explain the structure of organisations, their formal and informal associations to other organisations and people, and their discrete ties to other groups and individuals in the outside world. The growth of SNT has been tremendous

¹⁰⁷ English Defence League Mission Statement, <http://englishdefenceleague.org/about-us/mission-statement/> Accessed 08 August 2012.

¹⁰⁸ Tajfel and Turner, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," 38.

¹⁰⁹ Orla Muldoon, "The Psychological Impact of Protracted Campaigns of Political Violence on Societies," in Andrew Silke (ed) *Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences* (West Sussex: Wiley and Sons, 2003) 163.

and has expanded far beyond understanding simple social networks. Today, SNT is used broadly in multiple disciplines of the social and physical sciences including sociology, anthropology, geography, biology, social psychology, informational science, and organisational studies.¹¹⁰

Conceived by Barnes in the 1950s, social network theory began as a way to understand the relationships between friends, neighbours, and their respective social environment by conceiving and defining what was considered their ‘primary social world’.¹¹¹ As SNT grew conceptually, it was found that it could be a useful tool in assimilating the connections and inter-connections of individuals across a spectrum of different cultural and organisational milieu. One of its more interesting characteristics is that it provides a better understanding of how individuals living in close proximity could also live in completely different social worlds while those living great distances from one another could remain closely connected; physical contact was not only found to be irrelevant but individuals were not required to even know one another in order to maintain close relationships.¹¹² These relationships provide additional dimension to some of the concepts discussed in Chapter II such as the work of Tonnies and the Chicago School Urbanist’s in the exploration of ‘community’ and the notion of ‘imagined communities’ developed by Anderson.

The expanse and complexity of SNT soon required that if its multitude of relationships were going to be understood, an ontological tool would have to be developed and from that need Social Network Analysis (SNA) was created. SNA is essentially a topographical mapping tool that uses ‘points or nodes’ as reference points and cross-cutting lines to illustrate various links and relationships. SNA is effectively layered in a multi-dimensional way that it can distinguish such things as single or multi-stranded relations,

¹¹⁰ Marjolein Caniels and Henny Romijn, “Actor Networks in Strategic Niche Management: Insights from social network theory,” *Futures* 40, no. 7 (2008), 614.

¹¹¹ Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing, *Social and Cultural Anthropology: The key Concepts*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2007) 325.

¹¹² Ibid.

dense versus dispersed associations, and when clusters or groups exist independently or make up larger structures, it can combine people, places, times, dates, organisations, information, and commodities.¹¹³

Understanding the fundamental concepts of SNT and SNA is helpful in explaining the various iterations of the organisational structures associated with contemporary terrorism studies especially when comparing groups like al Qaeda and Hezbollah who have traditionally used a hierarchical organisational structure. Thus, SNA is often seen as an exceptional tool for understanding complex problems, including the deconstruction of terrorist networks.¹¹⁴ However, there are also limitations to SNA in that it may establish links or relationships to individuals, groups, places, and organisations but it does not explain what those relationships entail.¹¹⁵ In other words, a relationship that is discovered between a known extremist and another individual should only be considered reliable in establishing that there is link between the two. It should not be used as confirmation that the second individual is an extremist or make other value judgments about his/her character without some other reliable methodology.

Relative Deprivation

The notion of relative deprivation was developed by Gurr and articulated in his seminal book *Why Men Rebel*. According to Gurr, “*Relative deprivation* (RD) is defined as an actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities.”¹¹⁶ Stated more plainly, RD refers to those things in life that people believe they should be able to attain but cannot. Additionally, when those aspirations cannot be met, the

¹¹³ Rapport and Overing, *Social and Cultural Anthropology*, 327.

¹¹⁴ Roger Mac Ginty, “Social Network Analysis,” lecture, University of St Andrews, April 26, 2010

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970) 24.

frustration-aggression mechanism takes over and violence is frequently the outcome.¹¹⁷ Gurr posits that the “...the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude for violence.”¹¹⁸ Furthermore, “...public order...can only be maintained...when means are provided ...for men to work towards the attainment of their aspirations.”¹¹⁹

Relative deprivation is cited frequently in terrorism literature and appears closely related to the concepts of marginalisation. However, there is inconsistency in agreement as to whether or not RD is a factor in radicalisation and violence. The COT Institute for Safety, Security, and Crisis Management (COTISSCM) takes up this issue highlighting both sides of the debate. Discussing Islamic radicalisation and violence, they state “Many scholars have provided support for the hypothesis that relative deprivation can trigger violent, collective action...”¹²⁰ The COTISSCM balances the argument, by stating that “...Neither absolute nor relative deprivation can provide a satisfactory explanation for these phenomena.”¹²¹ As a result, what follows is not a recommendation that RD be adopted or dismissed as an adjunctive theory to help explain radicalisation and extremist violence but will draw attention to some of its apparent inconsistencies which should be considered when evaluating assertions that RD is a to blame for individual or personal action. This is not to suggest that relative deprivation is not a well conceived and valuable explanation to explain certain forms of violence, only that its application to contemporary Islamic extremism and violence is unclear.

Gurr’s fundamental premise of RD remains strictly focused within the confines of political violence and the linear progression of discontent, the politicising of issues, and actualised violence.¹²² Although the idea of discontent and politicising of issues can be found

¹¹⁷ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 36.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 9.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, x.

¹²⁰ COT, *Causal Factors of Radicalization* 22.

¹²¹ Ibid, 23.

¹²² Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 14.

within the notions of radicalisation, most agree that the progression to violence is idiosyncratic.¹²³ Additionally, Gurr frames his analysis within the context of revolution, guerrilla war, coups, and conspiracy which he attributes to the progressive path of turmoil and conspiracy, ultimately culminating in internal war.¹²⁴ Although Gurr does mention terrorism, it is done solely as a tactic perpetuated by an unidentified mobilised force.¹²⁵ This is also potentially contradictory in that terrorism is often seen as “the likeliest way to set the political agenda” when there is “a failure to mobilise support.”¹²⁶

Gurr also speaks about what he terms ‘conversion’, defining it as “...the abandonment of some or all the norms and beliefs that establish existing expectation levels and provide the means for their attainment, and their replacement by new beliefs that justify increased or different expectations.”¹²⁷ Although ‘conversion’ seems as though it fits neatly into the radicalisation process there seems to be a contradiction that follows when he further states “exposure to a new way of life or to ideologies depicting a golden millennium seldom themselves generate either dissatisfaction or new expectations.”¹²⁸ Although the concept of relative deprivation is cited frequently in radicalisation and terrorism literature, and at face value it seems to be a convenient way of explaining why some individuals radicalise and engage in violence, its underpinnings are sometimes contradictory which suggest it is unstable as a tangible means of explanation.

Lastly, whether attempting to associate relative deprivation or marginalisation as a significant cause of radicalisation and violence, there appears to be inconsistency in both the profiles and histories of those engaged in violence. More directly, it would seem logical that

¹²³ Bartlett, Birdwell and King, *The Edge of Violence*, 7.

¹²⁴ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 10 and 11.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 212.

¹²⁶ Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice,” in Walter Reich (ed) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 1990) 17.

¹²⁷ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 101.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 121.

those driven to extremism and violence in particular would fit the profile better and would reference their dissatisfaction with their own social and economic experiences. Following the 7/7 London bombings Mohammad Siddique Khan left behind a taped video message in which he states “Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetrate atrocities against my people all over the world.”¹²⁹ Other examples such as the 9/11 hijackers, the Glasgow airport bombers, and Fort Hood incidents suggest that the “...socio-economic deprivation theory does not explain why some well off Muslims...who do not lack education or resources also engage in ‘jihadist’ operations.”¹³⁰ Last, and perhaps the most glaring of inconsistencies is that given the liberal definitions to the terms marginalisation and relative deprivation, and the vast numbers of individuals that would fall into these categories, there is a conceptual problem trying to explain why more are not being radicalised and engaging in violent acts; the overwhelming majority of poor people do not radicalise and do not engage in violence. Although the crux of marginalisation and relative deprivation is unbounded in scope and lies in the ‘perception’ of one’s position relative to others or what he/she aspires to have, there appears to be significant gaps in applying either theory confidently.

Despite the three psycho-social theories being commonly found in radicalisation and terrorism literature, all seem to have their shortcomings. Although each and undoubtedly others might be useful in conceptualising or explaining certain things, none appear to be able to stand alone as a viable and comprehensive tool. This seems consistent with Borum’s assessment who acknowledges “Like all approaches to understanding or explaining human behaviour, a psychological approach has advantages and disadvantages.”¹³¹ Metaphorically, there is not one tool in the toolbox that does it all. Which tool to select seems largely dependent on understanding the job at hand. In the case of this thesis, understanding and

¹²⁹ Al-Lami, *Studies in Radicalisation*, 7.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 5.

¹³¹ Randy Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism* (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004) 4.

managing the threat of radical Islam is its focus. Conveniently, it is the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter IV

Generalising the Current Threat- Radicalised Islam

“Who are the terrorists? I can tell you who they are. They are, shall we say immigrants of a certain ethnicity, from a certain area, mostly Asian, who are of a certain religion, and come to this country to put bombs on their body and blow us up.”¹

This chapter is designed to provide some generalised background on what is often referred to as ‘radical’ Islam. The discussion is relatively brief and is not intended to be an all inclusive in-depth discussion. Rather, this chapter serves as a bridge between the theoretical concepts in Chapters II and III, and the real world contemporary development of the UK counter-terrorism policy/strategy environment in Chapter V. Importantly, it would be in error to make wide-sweeping generalisations about radicalised Islam as there is no cookie-cutter ideological platform that all groups subscribe to. Islam, including its ‘radicalised’ offshoots, varies significantly by sect and geographical location. One only needs to consider the differences between Sunni’s, Shi’a’s, Ahmadiyya’s, Barelvi’s, and Sufi’s to appreciate that there is remarkable diversity in Islamic teachings, beliefs and practices. However, to understand the impetus behind the UK’s counter-terrorism policy and strategy environment, some conceptual positioning of the threat is needed. The following discussion provides an overview of the more general principles of radical Islam and the UK. For a discussion on the specific ideological orientation of those included in this study, please see Chapter VIII. Before concluding, there is a brief but contextually important discussion that profiles some of the issues that have strained government/Muslim relations in the UK.

As discussed in Chapter III, the UK has a long history of managing radicalism, extremist violence, and even terrorism. In more recent times, the ethno-nationalist/separatist ‘Troubles’ of Northern Ireland that date back to the 17th century erupted into a sustained

¹ Impromptu interview with citizen 4.1, 07 April 2011.

campaign of violence between 1969 and 1997 and gave the UK a firsthand view of modern ‘terrorism’. Though violence still continues in Northern Ireland its occurrence is significantly reduced. However, as discussed in Chapter I, the threat of religiously inspired terrorism has been quick to take its place in the UK psyche.

According to documents from the Home Office “...the most severe threat comes from those who hijack the peaceful religion of Islam as a basis for their attacks.”² Similar messages are also carried on official government websites stating “...Al Qa’ida and similar groups are at present the main terrorist threat to the UK and our interests overseas.”³ A recent EU report on terrorism from EUROPOL confirms that across many member states “Islamist terrorism is...perceived as the biggest threat...”⁴ Although the UK is not a reporting member to EUROPOL other than providing limited statistics on ‘terrorist’ actions in Northern Ireland, the report specifically references the UK stating “...individuals motivated by extreme right-wing views, acting alone, pose far more of a threat than the current networks or groups.”⁵ Ironically, the Home Office and EUROPOL statements were made despite there being only one ‘Islamist’ attack which occurred in Italy during the 2009 reporting period out of the 294 total incidents submitted by the other 26 member states.⁶

Despite the numerical odds that suggest differently, Britain’s concern over Islamic terrorism and lone actors may not be unfounded. A recent report completed by RAND concludes that the US and its coalition partners, the largest of which is Britain, has been largely successful in decreasing the function of al Qaeda leadership.⁷ However, the report also confirms that despite the success of suppressing al Qaeda’s leadership, the containment

² Home Office, *Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2008) 3.

³ Home Office, “Office for Security and Counter Terrorism,” <http://tna.europarchive.org/20100419081706/http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorist-threat/> [Accessed 22 May 2010].

⁴ Europol, *TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report* (The Hague: EUROPOL, 2010) 6.

⁵ Ibid 37.

⁶ Ibid, 50.

⁷ Angel Rabasa, et al, *Beyond al Qaeda: The Global Jihadist Movement* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) xx.

of their Manichean ideology has not been realised; it continues to spread and find resonance.⁸ What has emerged is a “...disaggregated entity that is more difficult to predict and pre-empt.”⁹ This ‘disaggregated entity’ equates to a multi-headed hydra that arguably leaves public safety and security services in the precarious position of not knowing where, when, how, or who the next threat will come from, in a social environment where extremists can and do hide in plain view. Last, and most importantly, the absence of attack is not and should not be a reliable indicator of the presence or absence of threat any more than the socially constructed notion of ‘safety’, as discussed in Chapter II, is a reliable indicator of the absence or presence of danger. What it suggests is that greater inquiry is needed to understand the disparity between perception and occurrence.

Both the TE-SAT and RAND reports discuss the threat of radicalised ideology very similarly and both acknowledge that threats emanate from both individuals and groups. However, the RAND report is clearly oriented on the threat posed by groups whereas the TE-SAT report sees the threat coming from individuals. This difference of perspective is one that bifurcates terrorism studies and is exemplified by the ongoing and sometimes fierce debate between noted terrorism scholars Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman. Hoffman’s position has softened somewhat in recent years but he argues that the structured hierarchal order of al Qaeda and its affiliates present the greatest threat to the West.¹⁰ In contrast, Sageman argues that since 2003, the threat has changed to one of ‘leaderless *jihad*’; local networks of small groups or individuals who function independently, making them much more difficult to detect and control.¹¹ These two positions are easily characterised by the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7 respectively and both, along with the Europol report must be taken seriously.

⁸ Rabasa, et al, *Beyond al Qaeda*, 11.

⁹ Ibid, xx.

¹⁰ Peter Neumann, *Joining al-Qaeda: Jihadist Recruitment in Europe* (Oxon: Routledge, 2008) 19.

¹¹ Ibid, 18.

When describing the threat of ‘Islamic Radicalisation’ the TE-SAT and RAND reports use terms commonly found within the broad spectrum of terrorism literature such as Islamist, Salafist (*Salafiya* or *Salafi*), or jihadist. Perhaps because the authors are constructing a conceptual sense of radicalised orientation or referring to the extremes of society, the terms used are often cast in their most pejorative sense rather than their accepted meanings. A case in point is the word ‘*jihad*’ which is typically conceived in the West to mean some variation of Muslims killing innocent civilians in the name of Allah, when in fact it has several different meanings such as striving to lead a good Muslim life, spreading the message of Islam, or supporting the struggles of those in Palestine.¹² To aid in understanding some of the more commonly referenced terms, including those that will be used in this chapter and beyond, please see the glossary of terms at the front of the thesis.

A. Salafism

As mentioned in the various quotes and reports contained in the previous pages, Salafism is often cited as the primary link to Islamic radicalism. This is not to suggest that it is always the case or that Salafism is intrinsically problematic, only that because it is cited so frequently, some explanation is warranted. Within the narrowed focus of the UK and Western Europe, the term ‘global Salafi jihad’ is repeatedly used to describe the al Qaeda inspired Manichean ideology of ‘home-grown terrorists’ determined to carry out attacks in the West.¹³ However, official government references almost exclusively use the term ‘Islamist’ rather than any reference to ‘Salafism’, presumably to focus on the politicising of issues and avoid any derogatory reference to the religious term ‘*Salaf*’. This distinction is important because

¹² John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 26.

¹³ Jerald Post, *The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 226.

not all *Salafi*'s advocate violence yet the conjunction of Salafi-jihadist is commonly found.¹⁴ In both non-violent and violent Salafism there is a perception that the world is in need of guidance and those who adopt *Salafi* teachings often seek to make changes within their own personal life or within society based on their Islamic faith and purest teachings of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*.¹⁵ In this sense, *Salafi*'s are often perceived as fundamentalists, a term that originated in 20th century America to describe ultraconservative Protestants who advocated returning to the teachings of the Holy Scripture, believing in its inerrancy, and following it literally.¹⁶ Given that the Qur'an is the central guiding principle in Islamic life and that it is unquestioned because it represents the revealed word of Allah, an argument can be made that Islamic orthopraxy contains 'fundamentalist' elements but not in a pejorative sense.¹⁷ Moreover, as Pressman clearly noted, freedom of religion even when expressed through a radical viewpoint remains a protected legal right.

Salafi and *Salafi-Jihadist* ideology are both rooted in Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy; the Qur'an is the last and final word of God delivered to mankind before the end of days, revealed to the Prophet Muhammad through the archangel Gabriel, and is intended for all times and all places.¹⁸ Additionally, because Islam represents the true word of God, it is the responsibility of all Muslims to promote the word of God and the Islamic faith.¹⁹ Within this orthodoxy, the time of Muhammad and the first generation of Muslims is considered the golden age because it was the time when Islam was in its purest and most pristine form.²⁰ Muhammad and his companions (*sahaba*), including the 'First Four

¹⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 28, no. 2 (2005), 75.

¹⁵ Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam."

¹⁶ Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.) *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 2.

¹⁷ Ibid, 4.

¹⁸ M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, *The Qur'an: A new translation by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) ix.

¹⁹ Ibid, 314.

²⁰ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 106.

Righteous Caliph's' (sometimes referred to as the Rightly Guided Caliph's) represent the idealised personal characteristics and piety that everyone should strive for and that *Salafi's* aspire to recreate.²¹ Like other forms of radicalism, it is the degree of tolerance and the actions of its participants that determines whether or not it is socially acceptable.

The term Salafism, as will be shown developed in the early 20th century although its beliefs and practices have a much longer lineage.²² Fundamental *Salafi* belief is that Islam and the world has strayed too far from the straight path.²³ Within Islam, there is no separation between the social and the political; it is a religion that defines politics, law, education, social life and economics, and is therefore an all encompassing 'way of life'.²⁴ Because Islam deals with all aspects of life rather than just faith, it must continually seek new answers to the questions that arise within contemporary society. That process has gone through several iterations since Islam began but is now applied through the 'science of law' or jurisprudence (*fiqh*).²⁵ Islamic legal doctrine (*shar'iah*) is developed from four sources: the Qur'an which is considered immutable; the *Sunnah* of the Prophet captured in the *hadith* (the words, deeds, and approvals of the Prophet which is considered scientifically authentic); analogy (*qiyas*); and, the consensus of the scholars (*ijma*).²⁶ The two primary sources of guidance are the Qur'an, written in the 7th century, and the *hadith*, which was developed over time but compiled by the two most authoritative sources, Bukhari and Muslim, in the 8th and 9th centuries respectively.²⁷ The inherent challenge of providing contemporary direction to the *ummah* (worldwide Muslim community) based on historic documents written is tremendous. To effectively manage this problem, Islamic scholars trained in *fiqh* must use interpretation

²¹ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 46.

²² John L. Esposito (ed.), "Salafi", *Oxford Dictionary of Islam*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) *Oxford Reference Online*, <http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t125.e2072> [Accessed 24 May 2010].

²³ Sageman, *Understanding Terrorist Networks*, 4.

²⁴ John Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) 163.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 79.

²⁶ Sidahmed and Ehteshami, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 4.

²⁷ Muzzamil Siddiqi, Lecture, Chapman University, 3 March, 2009.

(*tafsir*), analogy (*qiyas*), and consensus (*ijma*) in order to direct the community.²⁸ *Salafi*'s in particular and other reformers have taken issue with the practice of *tafsir* arguing that it has resulted in too much innovation (*bid'a*) and is a primary reason why the *ummah* has strayed from the straight path and the original teachings of Islam.²⁹ As a result *Salafi*'s often reject both *qiyas* the *ijma* and accept only the Qur'an and *hadith* as authentic forms of Islamic jurisprudence.³⁰

Fiqh divides and legislates human behaviour into five categories: forbidden (*haram*), discouraged (*mukruh*), neutral (*mubah*), recommended (*mustahabb*), and obligatory (*fard*).³¹ Within *fard*, there are also two subdivisions: *fard 'ayn*, an individual obligation; and *fard kifayah*, an obligation to the community (*ummah*).³² These injunctions of either personal or communal obligation are commonplace within extremist narratives extolling those to fight back against perceived injustices.

The focus of *Salafi* religious practices is clearly oriented on the idealised notion of the early Islamic community when the religion was in its purest form. Part of this ideology is contextually fixed on the period immediately following the migration (*hijra*) of Muhammad and his followers from Mecca in 622 and the establishment of Medina as the first Muslim community.³³ In Islam, the early period of Medina was/is considered the model Islamic state where rights and duties were guaranteed under the 'Constitution of Medina' and personal identity was determined by faith irrespective of tribal bonds.³⁴ This idealised community serves as the focal point for contemporary Muslims to view themselves as part of the global

²⁸ Salam and Ehteshami, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 3.

²⁹ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 47.

³⁰ Sageman, *Understanding Terrorist Networks*, 4.

³¹ Chris Horrie and Peter Chippindale, *What is Islam* (London: Virgin Books, 1997) 51.

³² Anthony McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7: The Radicalisation of Islam in Britain* (London: The Social Affairs Unit, 2006) viii.

³³ Ibid, 9.

³⁴ Esposito, *Islam*, 12.

Islamic community irrespective of race, ethnicity, or nationality.³⁵ This concept of a global *ummah* fits comfortably within the notion of Anderson's 'imagined community' discussed in Chapter II.

Within *Salafi* ideology there is often conflict and disagreement about living in a society that is governed by the laws of man verses those handed down from God.³⁶ Although most Muslims accept living in a secular society, *Salafi*'s idealise Medina as the perfect society because it was ruled under Islamic law, and considered "the vehicle for realizing God's will on earth."³⁷ During the Medinan period, revelations of the Prophet provided guidance on such issues as "marriage, commerce and finance, international relations, war, and peace" and firmly established within Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy of the time that there was no separation between religion and politics; the only law was that which was sent down from God to His messenger.³⁸

Reformers

In order to understand current day *Salafism*, some of its history must also be known and although sources vary, there are arguably four primary reformers that have significantly influenced the *Salafi* movement: Ibn Taymiyya, Mohamed ibn Abd al Wahhab, Mawlana Abul A'la Maududi, and Sayyid Qutb. A brief introduction to each follows with emphasis given to those elements that have relevance to contemporary *Salafism*.

Ibn Taymyya (1263-1328) was a noted Islamic scholar who lived during the time that the Mongols were conquering Muslim lands. The Mongols frequently adopted the religious practices of the lands they conquered but continued to follow the Yasa code of laws rather

³⁵ McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7*, 9.

³⁶ Salam and Ehteshami, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 10.

³⁷ Esposito, *Islam*, 11.

³⁸ Haleem, *The Qur'an*, xviii.

than Islamic law (*shar'iah*).³⁹ Resisting the Mongols was problematic because there is an injunction in Islam that Muslims should not fight other Muslims.⁴⁰ In order to overcome this problem Taymiyya was asked whether or not the injunction applied to the Mongols.⁴¹ Taymiyya's analysis was that because the Mongols did not abide by *Shar'iah*, they were essentially 'false Muslims' and could be fought by those true to the faith.⁴² Functionally, this declaration was derived from the Kharijite concept of *takfir*; the excommunication of one Muslim by another, allowing the former to be killed by the latter.⁴³ Taymiyya's analysis has been used by reformists such as Mohamed ibn Abd al Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, and others who have used it to challenge the West or the legitimacy of Muslim rulers by labelling them as apostates and thereby justifying violent action.⁴⁴

In the 18th Century, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, believing that the *ummah* had ventured too far from the straight path, and that the only authentic sources of guidance that Muslims should follow were the Qur'an and *hadith*, set out to purify Islam on the Arabian Peninsula.⁴⁵ After joining ranks with Muhammad ibn Saud, al Wahhab, like Taymiyya and the Kharijites before him, used the concept of *takfir* to cleanse large areas of Arabia of idolaters by destroying their shrines, including the tombs of the Prophet, his companions, and Hussein, and numerous holy sites in Mecca and Medina.⁴⁶ Those that resisted or failed to adopt Wahhab's vision of Islam were believed to be pagans and were massacred.⁴⁷

Although the term Wahhabism, referring to the austere form of Islam practiced by Wahhab, is often seen in terrorism literature and is used synonymously with *Salafism*, it more

³⁹ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 46.

⁴⁰ Haleem, *The Quran* (4:92), 59.

⁴¹ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 8.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Esposito, *Islam*, 47.

⁴⁴ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 60.

⁴⁵ Esposito, *Islam*, 120.

⁴⁶ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 47.

⁴⁷ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 8.

accurately a Western construct. For Wahhabism to be a legitimate term, those who ascribe to that belief would then revere Wahhab, which would be in opposition to the very beliefs of Wahhab himself; veneration of the person rather than the belief.⁴⁸ As a result, *Salafism* is the more appropriate term.

Mawlana Abul, A'la Maududi, a 20th century theologian in India, perceived that Muslims had ventured off the straight path and into what he termed the 'modern *jahiliyya*' (period of paganism and ignorance before Islam).⁴⁹ Active during the time of the British rule in India, Maududi conceived that British and French neo-colonialism was largely to blame for Islam's decline.⁵⁰ Maududi sought to re-establish Muslim society through a mixture of endorsing the past while embracing modernity, thereby establishing a new pan-Islamic enlightenment.⁵¹ Part of his reformist concept was to develop a vanguard of political activism who would advocate a central theme of re-establishing God's sovereignty. Additionally, this vanguard would espouse the Manichean view that the world was divided into those who belonged to the "party of God" and those who belonged to the "party of Satan."⁵² Furthermore, any Muslim who "adhered to human-made laws" was automatically part of the latter.⁵³ Although Maududi did not advocate violence, his Manichean world view has survived to this day and is firmly implanted in al Qaeda ideology.

While Taymiyya was instrumental in creating some of the foundational concepts of modern day *Salafism* and Wahhab demonstrated with great lethality how those concepts could be put into use, it is Sayyid Qutb who significantly politicised and expanded *Salafi* doctrine. Qutb borrowed from both Taymiyya and Maududi, the duty of Muslims to wage

⁴⁸ Wiktorowicz, *A Genealogy of Radical Islam*, 94.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 78.

⁵⁰ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 47.

⁵¹ Ibid, 50.

⁵² Wiktorowicz, *A Genealogy of Radical Islam*, 78.

⁵³ Ibid.

war against the apostates and the need to counter ‘modern *jahiliyya*’ respectively, and applied it to Wahhab’s violent practices aimed at returning Islamic society back to the original teachings of Islam.⁵⁴ Qutb conceived that only a vanguard movement could restore the true faith of Islam, that rejection of all innovation was required, and that the only guidance that was needed was that of the Qur’an and *hadith*.⁵⁵

Qutb, much like Maududi, attributed much of the decline of Muslim society on the corruption and faithlessness of Muslim governments, mainly from neo-colonial influences, and thus saw an inherent conflict with the West.⁵⁶ As a result, he adamantly opposed Western concepts of democracy, socialism, and nationalism, as inherently contrary to fundamental Islamic beliefs.⁵⁷ Casting the world in terms of good and evil, Qutb promoted the traditional concept that the world was divided into spheres: the abode of Islam (*Dar al Islam*) and the Land of War (*Dar al harb*).⁵⁸ However, as long as there was no true Islamic system anywhere in the world, no treaties could be developed or honoured, thus the entire world was a place that Muslims should wage *jihad* (fight) in order to restore the Islamic faith to its proper place.⁵⁹ Three quotes from Qutb sum up his ideology well.

Only in the Islamic way of life do all men become free from the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the worship of God alone, deriving from Him alone, and bowing before Him alone.⁶⁰

It is the very nature of Islam to take initiative for freeing the human beings throughout the earth from servitude to anyone other than God; and so it cannot be

⁵⁴ Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 9.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 10.

⁵⁶ John Esposito, “Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam,” in Louise Richardson (ed) *The Roots of Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2006) 149.

⁵⁷ Salam and Ehteshami, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 32.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 30.

⁵⁹ Salam and Ehteshami, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 31.

⁶⁰ Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Cedar Rapids, MI: The Mother Mosque Foundation, nd) 11.

restricted within any geographic or racial limits, leaving all mankind on the whole earth in evil, in chaos and in servitude to lords other than God.⁶¹

That every aspect of life should be under the sovereignty of God, and those who rebel against God's sovereignty and usurp it for themselves should be oppressed.⁶²

The preceding discussion is not intended as an in-depth study of *Salafism* but rather an introduction to some of the fundamental *Salafi* tenets and historical past. Although much of the current 'Islamic terrorist threat' that is communicated from groups and governments around the globe is attributed to *Salafism*, there is no simple explanation between *Salafi* belief and violence. Moreover, it must be remembered that there are both violent and non-violent Salafis. At its core, *Salafi* piety adheres to the belief that mankind has strayed too far from the straight path and the world is in need of guidance. Furthermore, that guidance is best found in the Qur'an and ways in which the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and *sahaba* lived during the earliest days of Islam.

Islam has evolved through several epochs and the examples demonstrate that it is the methods employed by the reformers rather than the religious orientation that matters. Individuals like Taymiyya, Wahhab, Maududi, Qutb, and Osama bin Laden will forever be present, providing their own interpretations of Islam with the clarity and conviction of the true believer. Understandably, those few who resort to violence and carry out attacks like 9/11 and 7/7 will remain at the forefront of the policy maker's mindset and positionality (sic) means everything.

⁶¹ Qutb, *Milestones*, 73.

⁶² Ibid, 35.

B. The UK

Returning the focus once again to the UK, there appears to be several incidents that have been instrumental in radicalising some members of the Muslim community including the Salman Rushdie affair, the First Gulf War, the war in Bosnia, 9/11, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁶³ Although there are surely other factors, these in particular appear to have led to a linear progression of increasing hostility between British Muslims and their government. Frustration and real or perceived discrimination have caused some to exclude themselves from the broader society and create new communal groups often oriented on religion.⁶⁴ The quest for personal security and belonging has meant some have adopted *Salafi* religious practices.⁶⁵

According to Mc Roy, prior to the Rushdie affair British Muslim ‘activists’ were primarily concerned over issues of race rather than religion. However, when Rushdie’s book was published and Mrs. Thatcher rejected Muslim demands to have the book banned, rather than conceiving it as a right of free speech, it led to a perceived lack of political influence, allowed more extreme individuals and groups to manipulate a sensitive issue, and the entire focus became a matter of religion.⁶⁶ The perceived lack of political influence was exacerbated by a relatively tepid reaction by Arab governments to the entire affair. This was considered by many UK Muslims as evidence that corrupted Middle East governments and the West were now co-conspirators.⁶⁷ Taking advantage of the hostility that was brewing, the Ayatollah Khomeini from Iran issued his famous *fatwah* sentencing Rushdie to death. Khomeini’s actions provided a common galvanising platform for UK Muslims to rebel

⁶³ McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7*, 2.

⁶⁴ Stephan Vertigans, *Militant Islam: A sociology of characteristics, causes, and consequences* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009) 76.

⁶⁵ Al- Lami, *Studies in Radicalisation*, 7.

⁶⁶ McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7*, 10.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 13.

against both the Thatcher and Arab governments bringing religion to the forefront of their political orientation.

When the First Gulf War began and Britain participated as a member of the US led coalition, British Muslims now sensitised to the issue of religion, perceived the action as the West meddling in Middle East affairs while simultaneously ignoring other conflicts such as Palestine and Kashmir.⁶⁸ Accordingly, many felt that British foreign policy towards the Middle East seemed disproportionately selective. This imbalance was exacerbated when the British government refused to intervene in Bosnia allowing some to stir up even more dissension by suggesting the government's refusal to help Muslims in Bosnia, where they were both secular and 'white', raised significant issues about relative security for Muslims in the UK where most were 'brown'.⁶⁹ This further damaged relations because it recast the issue into one of both race and politics.

Finally, the increased level of suspicion and resulting Islamophobia following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, propelled by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have allowed some Muslims to find credence that the world may truly be divided into the spheres of *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*.⁷⁰ Add into the mix the continued influence of antagonists through the web or other social media and it is not surprising that some will conclude as Button poignantly states 'that something is very wrong' and the process of radicalisation will begin.

Although those that step over the line and resort to violence represent a very small minority, it is a threat that is complex, multifaceted, and must be managed effectively. Tackling radicalisation is arguably the key to managing that threat in an environment that is all too often manipulated by media sensationalism and where there is tremendous political

⁶⁸ McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7*, 15.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 23.

⁷⁰ Vertigans, *Radical Islam*, 27.

pressure to provide maximum levels of public safety and security. The next chapter explores the government's response through the legislative environment and its counter-terrorism policy, CONTEST.

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Chapter V

CONTEST- Post 9/11 Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the UK

“I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.”¹

This chapter’s discussion will move away from the conceptual notions that dominated the earlier chapters and will focus on understanding the tangible elements of counter-terrorism policy that have been implemented in the UK security environment since 2000. Because this thesis explores whether a link can be made between radicalisation and the policy environment, it is critical that the later is understood. The concepts, goals, and structure of current counter-terrorism policy for the UK are found in the strategy document *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism*.² First developed in 2003, CONTEST was the informal name given to a collection of strategies and abstract frameworks from which public safety and security organisations could work from to counter the threat of international terrorism within the UK.

The discussion on CONTEST is provided to explain the primary conceptual roadmap that defines how internal security is envisioned and the theoretical mechanisms to achieve that security. To do so, the four primary workstreams of CONTEST, Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare will be explored from a macro perspective so that the strategy’s overarching conceptual basis is understood. Emphasis however will be placed on Pursue and Prevent as those sub-policies create the most friction between Muslims and the state, and have the most relevance to this thesis. Within CONTEST, both hard and soft power mechanisms are used to facilitate desired outcomes and so some discussion will be devoted to the uses of each where

¹ Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Speech, 1964 Republican National Convention, Available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/daily/may98/goldwaterspeech.htm> [Accessed 03 April 2012].

² Home Office, CONTEST 2011.

applicable. This discussion is not undertaken as an analysis of policy or strategy but rather to facilitate a better understanding of the perception of threats that face the UK, its response to those perceived threats, and the policy, legislative, and strategic actions taken to support that response. In that spirit, CONTEST is accepted as given. At the same time, CONTEST did not materialise on its own and thus some positioning of CONTEST within the politics of New Labour and more recently the Conservative Liberal Democratic Coalition Government along with the broader perception of risk within UK society will be explored.

Lastly, although the threat of Islamic terrorism is thought of as a new and decidedly different kind of threat to UK security, one which requires a new approach, it will be argued that at least the early development of CONTEST was more a product of the UK's Northern Ireland experiences than a new and novel 21st century approach to counter-terrorism. Finally, a concluding assimilation of policy, strategic, and legislative actions is offered so that the environment is understood contextually.

A. CONTEST

Within the UK, there exists a hierarchal order of security policy with CONTEST being just one component of a larger integrated security framework. At the top, the UK National Security Strategy establishes the overarching approach to security for the UK from both domestic and international challenges. Published in March 2008, the *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom* represents the first ever overarching strategy developed and lists a number of 'threats and risks' that include: terrorism, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, trans-national organised crime, global instability and conflict from failed and fragile states, civil emergencies, poverty, climate change, competition for

energy, and state led threats.³ Unlike the Cold War era and prior, when threats were conceived to emanate from other nation states, today's threats to the UK are considered as increasingly complex, unpredictable, and interrelated.⁴ Within the category of terrorism, the *National Security Strategy* states that "The United Kingdom faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists, claiming to act in the name of Islam"...and... "At any one time the police and the security and intelligence agencies are contending with around 30 plots, 200 groups or networks, and 2,000 individuals who are judged to pose a terrorist threat."⁵ In response to that threat, the UK more than doubled its counter-terrorism resources since 2001 and sought to increase spending more than three-fold by 2011.⁶

While the *National Security Strategy* identifies threats from both international and domestic sources, the *National Risk Assessment* (NRA) and *National Risk Register* (NRR) assess those threats that are strictly domestic. Developed in 2008 to assist communities and emergency responders understand and plan for the types of emergencies they might face, the NRR lists twelve separate hazards that include: major transport accidents, major industrial accidents, animal disease, attacks of critical infrastructure, coastal flooding, inland flooding, non-conventional attacks, severe weather, pandemic influenza, attacks on crowded places, attacks on transport, and electronic attacks.⁷ The NRR is the non-classified public version of the NRA, a classified governmental document that evaluates both threat and risk to the UK.⁸ The various categories of threat, hazard, and risk comprise those incidents that are considered serious enough to require response by central government to manage the incident. Additionally, the hazards and threats listed are considered 'possible' over a five year

³ Cabinet Office, *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2008)

⁴ Cabinet Office, *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom*, 2.

⁵ Ibid, 10.

⁶ Ibid, 27.

⁷ Cabinet Office, *National Risk Register* (London: The Cabinet Office, 2008) 5.

⁸ Ibid, 43.

outlook.⁹ The NRR was updated in 2012 but changed its format such that ‘risks of terrorist and other malicious attacks’ and ‘risks of natural hazards and major accidents were discussed and displayed independently leaving them difficult to compare.’¹⁰ However the 2008 report, despite the absence of a threat assessment, lends itself quite well to providing some perspective on threat.

Within the NRR, each of the twelve ‘risks’ have been evaluated using two criteria, relative impact and relative likelihood, and then placed on a two dimensional graph (see figure 5.1 below).




Figure 5.1: National Risk Register 2008, pg.5

The report confirms that the risk with the greatest impact is considered to be ‘pandemic influenza’ followed by ‘coastal flooding’, ‘major industrial accidents’, and ‘inland flooding’. However, the risk with the greatest likelihood is considered ‘attacks on

⁹ Cabinet Office, *National Risk Register*, 4.

¹⁰ Ibid, 7.

transport’.¹¹ Additionally, of the twelve risks identified, four are listed as attacks and three of those lead the pack in terms of likelihood: ‘attacks on transport’, ‘electronic attacks’, and ‘attacks on crowded places’. The last identified attack risk, ‘non-conventional attacks’, still ranks sixth in the overall field of likelihood, only surpassed by ‘severe weather’ and ‘pandemic influenza’.¹²

As noted previously, CONTEST is the informal name given UK’s current counter-terrorism strategy. Although developed in 2003, it was not publicly disclosed until 2006 and became the UK’s first long-term strategy for countering international terrorism.¹³ Despite the delay in revealing the details to the public until 2006, CONTEST was leaked to *The Times* in 2004 that characterised it as “...one of the most ambitious government social engineering projects in recent years.”¹⁴ Citing excerpts from the document, Winnett and Leppard wrote “...the cabinet secretary wanted nothing less than a blueprint to win the “hearts and minds” of Muslim youth.”¹⁵ CONTEST was updated and expanded in 2009 and again in 2011 where the name was first contained in the title. All three versions of CONTEST clearly state that the aim of the strategy is to “...reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.”¹⁶ While not explicit in the 2006 version, both the 2009 and 2011 versions make clear that “...there is very often no clear distinction between international and what is sometimes called ‘home grown’ terrorism.”¹⁷ The 2006 and 2009 versions also acknowledge that because portions of the policy remain secret, only a partial account of the strategy is provided. Whether the redacted elements are specific to domestic or foreign activities, or both, is not made clear.

¹¹ Cabinet Office, *National Risk Register*, 5.

¹² *Ibid*, 5.

¹³ Home Office, CONTEST 2006, 1.

¹⁴ Robert Winnett and David Leppard, “Britain’s Secret Plans to Win Muslim Hearts and Minds,” *The Times*, 30 May 2004, Available at <http://www.lexisnexis.com/UK> [Accessed 9 June 2010].

¹⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁶ Home Office, CONTEST 2006, 9.

¹⁷ Home Office, CONTEST 2011, 17.

Like the *National Security Strategy*, CONTEST is direct in what the perceived threat to the UK is, stating “The principal current terrorist threat is from radicalised individuals who are using a distorted and unrepresentative version of the Islamic faith to justify violence.”¹⁸ This articulation of threat, although worded differently, is consistent with those carried on government websites, and the EUROPOL and RAND reports discussed in Chapter IV. To define the threat more specifically, CONTEST 2009 elaborates stating the Islamic threat comes from four sources:

...the Al Qa’ida leadership and their immediate associates, located mainly on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border; terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qa’ida in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, and Yemen; ‘self-starting’ networks, or even lone individuals, motivated by an ideology similar to that of Al Qa’ida, but with no connection to that organisation; and terrorist groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as Al Qa’ida but which have their own identity and regional agenda.¹⁹

Additionally, although the 2009 CONTEST strategy states that the major terrorist threat comes from the four sources listed above, it also states that the strategy contains ‘programmes’ relevant for tackling terrorist threats from any quarter.²⁰ The intent of this statement is unclear and seems somewhat contradictory given the obvious and consistent reference to ‘Islamic extremism’. Furthermore, a later statement in the 2009 document provides that “This strategy also does not address the threat from domestic extremism (such as the threat from animal rights).”²¹ There is also clear distancing in all three documents from the policies and ‘improved structures’ in place for Northern Ireland to ‘counter terrorism’ there.²² Acknowledging that “...the frequency of these attacks has increased significantly,

¹⁸ Home Office, CONTEST 2006, 1.

¹⁹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 11.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid, 59.

²² Ibid.

from 22 in 2009 to 40 in 2010” and “There have been 16 attacks to end of June 2011 including the murder of police constable Ronan Kerr in April 2011” the 2011 strategy remains steadfast that the “Responsibility for dealing with Northern Ireland Terrorism (NIRT) rests with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.”²³

The 2009 version of CONTEST diligently attempted to articulate where and how the current threat environment evolved and is the most detailed of the three publicly available versions. Referencing the evolution of Islamic terrorism and providing examples such as the Munich Olympics, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the bombing of Pan Am 103, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the origins of Al Qa’ida, the first *intifada*, the Algerian Civil War, and the Salman Rushdie affair as predecessors to the current environment, it asserts that a new and more internationalised form of terrorism has evolved which is ideologically linked to the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Abul-Ala al Mawdudi.²⁴ According to the 2009 document, “By the early 1990s, propagandists for terrorism in Algeria and Egypt had settled in the UK.”²⁵ As Islamist organisations grew and prospered by the freedoms afforded by UK society, London became a centre of extremism; magazines were published supporting the Algerian based Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Al Qaeda’s media information centre was established, and groups advocating violent *jihad* took over prominent mosques such as Finsbury Park and used them as recruitment bases for radicalisation, propaganda, and fundraising.²⁶ The infusion of radical Islamists in UK society did not go unnoticed and prompted French counter-terrorism officials to coin the term ‘Londonistan’ which was later popularised by author Melanie Phillips.²⁷

With widening support in the UK, British nationals were being recruited and sent to Afghanistan or Pakistan for training before travelling to Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kashmir to

²³ Home Office, CONTEST 2011, 29&40.

²⁴ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 24.

²⁵ Ibid, 29.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Melanie Philips, *Londonistan: How Britain is Creating a Terror State Within* (London: Gibson Square, 2006).

fight alongside their ‘Muslim brothers’.²⁸ Unsurprisingly, after returning home, some focused their efforts to planning attacks within the UK.²⁹ Although the 9/11 attacks brought the notion of Islamic terrorism to international focus, clearly, the watershed moment for the UK was the 7 July bombings, and the attempted bombings of 21 July 2005. Whether those events facilitated the release of CONTEST in 2006 (then titled *Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy*) is unclear but as early as 2006, the government was publicly acknowledging that their efforts had “...achieved some significant successes in dealing with potential attacks by Islamic terrorists, since before 2001.”³⁰ They were also quick to state that “...the threat is potentially still increasing and is not likely to diminish significantly for some years.”³¹

To address the threat of international terrorism, CONTEST was developed around four primary workstreams, Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare with the stated strategic goals for each: Pursue- to stop terrorist attacks; Prevent- to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism; Protect- to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack; and Prepare- where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.³² The overall structure of CONTEST clearly makes it a comprehensive strategy; stopping attacks, preventing extremism, responding effectively when needed, and minimising the impact arguably covers the field of possibilities. Furthermore, because the strategy is designed to be all encompassing, the government is keenly aware of the need to insure the “...activities across the four main workstreams...are coherent and complementary.”³³

The design of the workstreams and their respective goals are further explained in the document as attempts to address the complexities and strategic factors that drive current

²⁸ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 29.

²⁹ Ibid, 30.

³⁰ Home Office, CONTEST 2006, 8.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 13.

³³ Ibid, 80.

extremist ideology. The 2009 and 2011 versions of CONTEST have consistently listed four longer-term strategic factors:

1. Unresolved regional disputes and conflicts (particularly Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Iraq) and state fragility and failure.
2. Violent extremist ideology associated with Al Qa'ida, which regards most governments in Muslim Countries as 'un-Islamic' or apostate; claims that these governments are sustained by western [sic] states who are engaged in a global attack on Islam; and considers violent action to be a religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims.
3. Modern technologies, which facilitate terrorist propaganda, communications and terrorist operations.
4. Radicalisation- the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups. Radicalisation has a range of causes (including perception of our foreign policy), varying from one organisation to another.³⁴

Within each of the workstreams there are numerous programmes and mechanisms in place as supporting instruments to achieve each. Some of the more pronounced programmes are discussed below.

Pursue

Of all the workstreams, Pursue unquestionably uses the most aggressive and at times contested methods to achieve its goals. Designed around the fundamental principle that “The most immediate priority for the government is to stop terrorist attacks, the Pursue workstream...aims to reduce the terrorist threat to the UK and UK interests overseas through

³⁴ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 11.

the detection and investigation of terrorist networks and the disruption of their activities.”³⁵

Although Pursue activities are prominently articulated in the CONTEST strategy, it should not be forgotten that the police remit has always included pursuing those involved in terrorism and other crimes. However, since the adoption of CONTEST and specifically within the Pursue workstream, intelligence activities have been significantly increased and a number of legislative actions have been passed that have allowed for considerable expansion of police powers and security service activities. Between 2001 and 2008 “...the size of the security service doubled, GCHQ’s Terrorist Team grew significantly...the JTAC... has grown by 60%, and the number of police personnel dedicated to counter-terrorism work has grown by over 70%.”³⁶ There has also been a greater merging between the police and the security services (MI5). That merge is reflected in a 2007 statement by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Clarke, “There can be no doubt that the most important change in counter-terrorism in the UK in recent years has been the development of the relationship between the police and Security Service...”³⁷ Although Clark’s reference to the relationship between the police and security services being ‘the most important change’ is probably a debatable topic, police powers and the relationship between the police and intelligence services has grown considerably in recent years.

In order to facilitate the mission of Pursue, the police, security and intelligence agencies, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), Her Majesty’s Treasury, United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) and ‘other Pursue stakeholders’ use a variety of hard and soft power mechanisms to achieve their goals.³⁸ Within the Pursue arsenal, arrest is one tool but not the only one utilised. Others include, expanded right of entry, stop and search

³⁵ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 62.

³⁶ Ibid, 64.

³⁷ DAC Peter Clark, public lecture 24 April 2007, http://cms.met.police.uk/news/major_operational_announcements/terrorism/dac_peter_clark_s_speech_on_counter_terrorism [Accessed 9 August 2010].

³⁸ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 70.

powers, pre-charge detention, proscription, control orders (now Temporary Prevention and Investigation Methods—TPIM's), asset freezing, interception of electronic communications, deprivation of citizenship, deportation, and exclusion from entering the UK.³⁹ Outside of the UK, the Ministry of Defence (MOD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) engage in programmes to support the overall mission of Pursue but little about them is contained in the strategy.

Although all measures within Pursue could arguably be considered 'hard power' methods, arrest, detention, stop and search, and control orders/TPIM's would certainly top the list. These activities seem in contrast to traditional UK policing who have historically subscribed to the "...doctrine of minimal force in their policing of protest, unrest, and public disorder."⁴⁰ As Wilkinson notes "In Britain, police regard themselves as citizens in uniform, dependent on the support and confidence of the general public and not a paramilitary force sent in to coerce the population."⁴¹ However, CONTEST states firmly that "...the Government will take only those measures necessary to address the threat and that are proportionate to it."⁴² The last statement and changes in police tactics make clear the level of concern by government. In addition to government's concern regarding the threat, there is also concern that the actions taken may be perceived as draconian. To counter that stigma, numerous references are made regarding principles and values in both the 2009 and 2011 policies. For instance-

Our response has included changes to our laws to reflect the threat we face, but has at all times upheld the principles and values of the UK as a liberal democracy. Our approach to national security in general and to counter-terrorism in particular is grounded in a set of core values. They include human rights, the rule of law,

³⁹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 68.

⁴⁰ Paul Wilkinson, *Homeland Security in the UK* (London: Routledge, 2007) 10.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 56.

legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all.⁴³

Prevent

If the Pursue strategy represents the final safety net to stop a terrorist attack from taking place, then the Prevent strategy can best be described as government's plan to eliminate, or at least significantly diminish that threat from evolving. Prevent's stated goal is to "...stop radicalisation, reducing support for terrorism and discouraging people from becoming terrorists."⁴⁴ However, as stated, radicalisation is just one of four strategic drivers of terrorism. The others include: "conflict and instability, ideology, and technology."⁴⁵ These additional 'drivers' are best described as shared responsibilities between domestic and international efforts. Underscoring the strategic focus of the previous statements, the 2011 policy makes clear that "We do not believe that it is possible to resolve the threats by simply arresting and prosecuting more people."⁴⁶ Although there is no clear dividing line, domestically the focus of Prevent is clearly on radicalisation whereas the remaining three are managed mostly through international efforts. Internationally, the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) is the lead agency for implementing Prevent strategy outside of the UK and is active in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the US.⁴⁷

Although Prevent was incorporated in the unreleased 2003 version of CONTEST, it was considered incomplete.⁴⁸ Following the 7 July 2005 bombings and subsequent consultation with Muslim community leaders, four areas of additional work were recommended and included in the Prevent workstream of the 2006 strategy including:

⁴³ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 56. (reprinted from the *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom*, 2008, 6.)

⁴⁴ Ibid, 82.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Home Office, CONTEST 2011, 11.

⁴⁷ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 85.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 82.

campaigns to address the motivation for violence; creating an environment hostile to those who glorify terrorism and attempt to radicalise others; addressing the political and economic problems that lead to radicalisation; and developing a better understanding of Prevent (what leads to radicalisation and what is effective in mitigating that process) in order to build future programmes more effectively.⁴⁹

In 2007, the government revised the Prevent strategy based on “...intelligence...open source material... and a more comprehensive understanding of the factors driving radicalisation in the UK and overseas.”⁵⁰ Significantly expanded, the revised Prevent strategy included more departments, more integration with policing, links local and international issues, better metrics, and a larger budget.⁵¹ The newly enhanced 2007 version listed five main objectives.

1. To challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices
2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support those places where they operate
3. Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment, or have already been recruited by violent extremists
4. Increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism
5. Address the grievance which ideologues are exploiting⁵²

In 2010, Prevent was again reviewed and a new policy was released in 2011. Major changes included: addressing radicalism leading to all forms of terrorism; removing integration efforts and making them the remit of the Department of Communities and Local Government; a major reduction in funding; and refusing to work, fund, or otherwise engage

⁴⁹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 85.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 83.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid, 80.

with those considered extreme.⁵³ Furthermore, the objectives (now referred to as the three I's: individuals, ideology, and institutions) were significantly reduced in number and scope.

1. Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it
2. Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support
3. Work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the internet, and health) where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address⁵⁴

Within the CONTEST framework, there has been a consistent and conscious effort to balance the predominately hard powers associated with Pursue and soft powers used in the Prevent activities. This effort is acknowledged by the statement "...we have to manage the negative impact that Pursue activity can have on communities and therefore our Prevent agenda; but Pursue operations are also necessary to support our Prevent objectives...and Prevent interventions need to be considered for Pursue type problems."⁵⁵ This balanced approach is also reflected in the *National Security Strategy* which states "We need to respond robustly, bringing those involved to justice while defending our shared values, and resisting the provocation to over-react."⁵⁶

Resisting the urge to over-react and balance the use of hard power while simultaneously attempting to 'win hearts and minds' through soft power mechanics is undoubtedly a difficult undertaking. In order to measure progress and manage all of the workstreams within CONTEST, a metric was established titled Public Service Agreement 26

⁵³ Home Office, CONTEST 2011, 12.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 59.

⁵⁵ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 80.

⁵⁶ Cabinet Office, *National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom*, 28.

(PSA 26).⁵⁷ PSA 26 has the same stated goal as CONTEST 2009, “...to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism” and is supposed to measure progress across three outcomes: “...building resilience in domestic communities; counter-radicalisation work in key domestic sectors and services; and interventions in overseas priority countries.”⁵⁸ Within PSA 26, the only reference to measurement comes from the following statement “Each of these four objectives is underpinned by small number of outcome measures. These will be used to monitor and assess the cross-government counter-terrorism effort over the next three years.”⁵⁹ It is unclear exactly what the metrics are, whether assessments will occur at specified intervals or if there will be one assessment at the end of the three year period, or whether PSA 26 was carried over following the transition from New Labour to the Conservative Liberal Democrat coalition government. Citing national security issues, PSA 26 is not published.⁶⁰ As a result, there is no publically available source that measures the effectiveness of any of the workstreams, balance of power, or overall effectiveness of the CONTEST Strategy.

Protect

While the aims of Pursue and Prevent are to stop terrorist attacks from occurring, Protect and Prepare both acknowledge that attacks may be unavoidable. As such the workstream of Protect is designed “...to reduce the vulnerability of this country and its interests overseas to terrorist attack.”⁶¹ In order to achieve its stated goal, Protect seeks to harden critical infrastructure, crowded places, the transport system, borders, and interests

⁵⁷ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 86.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Her Majesty’s Treasury, *PSA Delivery Agreement 26: Reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2007) 2.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 104.

overseas and maximise “...protection against threats from insiders and from the misuse of hazardous materials.”⁶²

As an example of efforts to harden different sectors determined to be vulnerable to attack, the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) was established in 2002 and provides “...expert security advice to those responsible for crowded places and for storing chemical, biological, radiological, and explosive material” through 250 Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA’s).⁶³ Since May 2006, the CTSA’s have provided “...advice to over 500 sports stadia, 600 shopping centres, and over 10,000 city and town centre bars and nightclubs.”⁶⁴ Similar efforts are underway in the transportation, maritime, rail, and underground systems.

Securing the UK’s borders and identifying who is coming into and leaving the country is also a priority within Protect. The United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) has implemented its electronic borders system (e-Borders) and has begun issuing biometric visas to better identify those individuals entering and leaving the country.⁶⁵ The UKBA’s stated goal was to expand the e-Borders programme so that by 2010, 95% of all passenger and crew movements into and out of the country can be checked against a national terrorism watch-list before their travel begins.⁶⁶ It remains uncertain if that goal was obtained.

Domestically, the CONTEST strategy also advocates increasing personnel security in those jobs associated with national infrastructure and other sectors where ‘exploiting legitimate access’ could create significant vulnerability.⁶⁷ New recommendations are now in

⁶² Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 104.

⁶³ Ibid, 107.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 109.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 112.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 109.

place for increased pre-employment screening, conducting ‘personnel security risk assessments’, and ongoing personnel security.⁶⁸

Last, the most controversial recommendation within the Protect framework was arguably the plan to issue national identity cards containing each person’s biometric information. Although highly encouraged, the identity card scheme was not mandatory for UK nationals.⁶⁹ Established in 2008, the National Identity Scheme (NIS) was introduced as a way to “...bring real and recognisable benefits for each of us...”⁷⁰ Heavily marketed, the NIS delivery included several examples of the benefits the card would bring and proposed that it would “...make life easier...help protect you from identity theft...reassure us all...help protect the country...and make it harder for criminals.”⁷¹ However, the controversy surrounding the identity card plan was substantial. Following the Queen’s speech in May 2010, the Identity Documents Bill was introduced to Parliament and received ‘Royal Assent’ in December cancelling the scheme altogether.⁷² According to Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg “Cancelling the scheme and abolishing the National Identity Register is a major step in dismantling the surveillance state.”⁷³

Prepare

The final workstream of CONTEST is Prepare. As noted above, Protect and Prepare both acknowledge that a terrorist attack may not be avoidable. As such, Prepare’s aim is to “...mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack where it cannot be stopped.”⁷⁴ This focus has

⁶⁸ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 109.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 114.

⁷⁰ Home Office, *Introducing the National Identity Scheme: How the Scheme will work and how it will benefit you* (London: Identity and Passport Service, 2008) 3.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Home Office, “Protection of Freedoms Bill,” <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/about-us/legislation/protection-freedoms-bill/> [Accessed 11 August 2012].

⁷³ Home Office, “Identity cards and National Identity Register to be scrapped,” http://www.ips.gov.uk/cps/rde/xchg/ips_live/hs.xsl/1691.htm [accessed 13 August 2010].

⁷⁴ Home Office, CONTEST 2011, 92.

remained consistent within all three CONTEST policies and with both governments. Fundamental to the Prepare effort is to build resiliency and capability against the threats outlined in the National Risk Register (NRR).⁷⁵ The response, relationships, and responsibilities for all emergencies are outlined in the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act (CCA).⁷⁶ Thus, the key principles of Prepare use both the NRR and CCA to insure that an effective response capability is maintained, that the national critical infrastructure continues to operate or when disrupted can be rapidly restored, and that the appropriate management structures are in place at the local, regional, and central levels to manage any incident, including those involving chemical, biological, or radiological materials.⁷⁷

Official Assessment

As mentioned in the discussion on PSA 26, there is little information that is publically available that measures the effectiveness of CONTEST. One of the few sources that are made available is the annual report to Parliament. A report by the Home Secretary delivered to Parliament in March 2010 provided a summary of activities across the four workstreams of CONTEST. Citing some 11,000 attacks around the world which killed 15,000 people and injured 30,000 others, and the absence of attack in the UK, the report concluded “...that to date CONTEST has achieved its aim.”⁷⁸

B. Legislative Actions

As mentioned in the discussion on Pursue, there have been a number of legislative actions passed that have allowed for considerable expansion of police powers and security

⁷⁵ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 118.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 119.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 121.

⁷⁸ Home Office, *Pursue Prevent Protect Prepare: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, Annual Report* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2010) 27.

service activities to support the UK's counter-terrorism efforts, and specifically those perceived necessary to combat international terrorism perpetuated by Islamic extremism. Since 2000, there have been five major pieces of anti-terrorism legislation passed by Parliament: the Terrorism Act of 2000, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001, The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005, the Terrorism Act of 2006, and the Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008.⁷⁹

Although there is some discussion of these legislative actions in the CONTEST document, it lacks sufficient detail and omits key provisions necessary to understand the breadth of actions taken. In order to provide a more thorough understanding of the laws deemed necessary to counter the terrorist threat that has evolved since the mid-1990s, a brief explanation of the main points of each legislative action follows.

Terrorism Act 2000

The Terrorism Act of 2000 (TA 2000 or TACT) is the most significant of the five legislative actions because it consolidated previous counter-terrorism policy into one piece of law.⁸⁰ It begins by expanding and redefining 'terrorism' under British law as "...the use or threat of action where the use or threat is designated to influence the government or to intimidate the public and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, or ideological cause."⁸¹ Prior to this act being passed, terrorism had been defined under the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (PTA 1974), as "...the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear"⁸² The expansion of the definition not only

⁷⁹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 68.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ UK Parliament, *Terrorism Act 2000* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2000) 1.

⁸² UK Parliament, *Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1974) 7.

allowed the concept of terrorism to be broadened, including that terrorism could be religiously and ideologically motivated, but that certain actions, even though not violent, could have a significant impact on the public, and therefore constituted an act of terrorism. Additionally, the definition that first appeared in PTA 1974 and added to subsequent ‘temporary provisions’ up until PTA 1989 had been limited to the offences associated with Northern Ireland. Now, terrorism as defined in the TA 2000 was applied to all of the UK.⁸³

TA 2000 also contained other significant elements including: the proscription of organisations and made it an offense to belong to such organisations (Part II); criminalised fundraising for terrorism and allowed for asset forfeiture (Part III); allows police to cordon off certain areas, to deny entry, and order those inside to leave (Part IV); expanded the power of police to stop and search people and vehicles (sometimes referred to as Section 44) ; to arrest and hold people for up to 48 hours without warrant (Part V); and provided criminal offences for individuals engaged in weapons training, directing a terrorist organisation, or incitement of terrorism overseas (Part VI).⁸⁴

Lastly, the provisions associated with terrorism prior to the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000, were dominantly associated with Northern Ireland which were adopted under ‘temporary’ or ‘emergency provisions’ and subject to annual renewal. The Terrorism Act 2000 not only set forth terrorism law for the entire UK, it removed any requirement for annual renewal.⁸⁵

Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001

Following the attacks of 9/11, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA 2001) was passed in December 2001. ATCSA 2001 strengthened and clarified some

⁸³ UK Parliament, “Explanatory Notes to Terrorism Act 2000,” <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/notes/contents> [Accessed 2 July 2010].

⁸⁴ UK Parliament, *Terrorism Act 2000*, Sections I through VI.

⁸⁵ UK Parliament, “Explanatory Notes to Terrorism Act 2000.”

of the provisions contained in TA 2000. Notable provisions of ATCSA 2001 included: granting additional powers to the Treasury to freeze and seize financial assets of those suspected of engaging in terrorist acts (Parts I&II); allows those persons designated as an ‘international terrorist’ to be held indefinitely while awaiting deportation (Part IV); prohibits the transfer, use, or possession of certain biological agents, toxins, and nuclear materials (Parts VI and VII); allows police to photograph and fingerprint those suspected of terrorist activity in order to confirm their true identity (Part 10); and expands police authority to stop and search (Part 10).⁸⁶

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005

The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA 2005) was passed to allow ‘control orders’ to be imposed on those persons believed by the police or intelligence services to be engaged in terror activity but because of lack of evidence or other mitigating circumstances cannot be prosecuted or removed.⁸⁷ Defined as an “...order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism,” control orders have a range of powers that include: the restriction of possessing certain articles or substances; restricting the use of certain services or facilities; restricting the type of work or other occupation; a restriction on communications with other persons; restricting a person’s place of residence or who is given access to that residence; prohibition of being at certain places or areas at specified times or days; restrictions within, into, and out of the UK including surrendering one’s passport; allowing the search of premises or oneself by authorities; a requirement to allow electronic monitoring of a person’s

⁸⁶ UK Parliament, *Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2001) Parts I, II, IV, VI, VII, and X.

⁸⁷ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 13.

movements, communications, and other activities; and a requirement to report in person at specified days and times.⁸⁸

The concept of ‘control orders’ also embodies a certain inherent irony. As mentioned, control orders are imposed on individuals who ‘intelligence’ sources indicate are involved in terrorist activity but because of a lack of sufficient ‘evidence’ they cannot be prosecuted or removed. However, when ‘control orders’ are imposed, individuals must comply or they can be found guilty of an offence resulting in a prison sentence of up to five years.⁸⁹

Terrorism Act 2006

Adopted nine months after the 7 July 2005 bombings, the Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006) “...extend[ed] previous counter-terrorism legislation to ensure that UK law enforcement agencies had the necessary powers to counter the threat to the UK posed by terrorism.”⁹⁰ TA 2006 created new terrorism offenses including: the encouragement, including glorification of terrorism (Part I); dissemination of terrorist publications (Part 1); receiving training for terrorism (Part 1); attending a place used for terrorist training (Part 1); additional proscription measures for organisations who glorify or promote violent extremism (Part 2); and extended the detention without charge period up to 28 days (Part 2).⁹¹

⁸⁸ UK Parliament, *Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2000) 2.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 13.

⁹⁰ UK Parliament, “Terrorism Act 2006 Explanatory Notes, ”

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2006/en/ukpgaen_20060011_en.pdf [Accessed August 15, 2010].

⁹¹ UK Parliament, *Terrorism Act 2006* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2000) pgs 2, 3, 7, 9, 19, and 22.

Counter-Terrorism Act 2008

The Counter-Terrorism Act of 2008 (CTA 2008) expanded the collection and sharing of information about terror suspects between the police and security services.⁹² Additionally, police could also collect and retain DNA samples from individuals under control orders (Part 1), and expanded asset freezing powers and forfeiture (Part 3).⁹³

Collectively, the five legislative actions approved by Parliament since 2000 have greatly expanded both the police and security services activities in support of the UK's counter-terrorism efforts. Nearly every outcome of those legislative actions can be found to enhance the Pursue effort within CONTEST: terrorism is more broadly defined; organisations can be proscribed; provisions have been made for asset freezing and forfeiture; police can cordon areas, deny entry, stop and search, and detain without charge; persons suspected of terrorist activities can face unlimited detention while awaiting deportation; prohibitions on photography, fingerprinting, and DNA collection have been greatly reduced; control orders, previously only seen in Northern Ireland became applicable throughout the UK; and a generalised expansion of offenses relating to terrorism were put in place. All of these provide support for the Pursue workstream and all arguably constitute 'hard power' methods. This collective overview of the legislative actions is not provided to argue whether or not they constitute a measured response. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the policy environment is accepted as given. Instead, it is provided to better understand the breadth of actions taken so that the perception of threat is better understood, and to explore the historical legacy of anti-terrorism law.

⁹² UK Parliament, *Counter-Terrorism Act 2008* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2000) 1.

⁹³ *Ibid*, 24.

Links to Northern Ireland

As mentioned, one goal of Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000) was to provide the tools necessary to manage the new threat of ‘international terrorism’ and to consolidate previous legislation into one permanent law. Among other things TA 2000 consolidated the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996, both of which were developed specifically to manage the threats associated with Northern Ireland, into its legislation.⁹⁴ The end result is that much of TA 2000 simply consolidated laws specifically developed for Northern Ireland, applied them to all of the UK, and simultaneously removed the provision that they were temporary or required a periodic review.

Reviewing some of the major components of the five legislative actions since 2000, many have a direct legacy to the measures developed for Northern Ireland. For instance, proscription, stop and search, and arrest and detention without warrant, all of which are components of TA 2000 can also be found in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1973.⁹⁵ The right to cordon areas, including the denial of entry and to disperse individuals, all contained in TA 2000, can also be traced back to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1978.⁹⁶ Asset freezing and forfeiture, another component of TA 2000, is also found in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989.⁹⁷ Unlimited detention while awaiting deportation, found in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and Security Act of 2001, is rooted back to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989.⁹⁸ Receiving various forms of terrorist training which was criminalised under the

⁹⁴ UK Parliament, *Terrorism Act 2000*, 2.

⁹⁵ UK Parliament, *Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973) pages 12, 9, & 8 respectively.

⁹⁶ UK Parliament, *Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973) 16.

⁹⁷ UK Parliament, *Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1973) 5.

⁹⁸ UK Parliament, *Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 1989*, 24.

Terrorism Act 2006 was also included in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1975.⁹⁹ This is surely not an all-inclusive list but the examples clearly link the higher profile components of contemporary counter-terrorism policy to those policies associated with Northern Ireland. This legacy is also not a coincidence. In 1995, Lord Lloyd Berwick, a former law lord was asked to review the current provisions to fight terrorism and submit a report on his findings.¹⁰⁰ That report was submitted to Parliament in October, 1996.¹⁰¹

Berwick's report was made in anticipation of sustained peace in Northern Ireland. As mentioned, the various provisions to fight terrorism in Northern Ireland were nearly all done under temporary measures. Following the ceasefire and in anticipation of a future formal agreement, which ultimately became the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, Berwick was asked to assess what was needed for future legislative tools in the fight against terrorism. The following summarises that request.

To consider the future need for specific counter-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom if the cessation of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland leads to a lasting peace, taking into account the continuing threat from other kinds of terrorism and the United Kingdom's obligations under international law; and to make recommendations.¹⁰²

As the report confirms, Berwick's purview was not limited to re-establishing 'normalcy' in Northern Ireland. Although Berwick looked intently at the UK, he clearly exercised his latitude to explore 'the continuing threat from other kinds of terrorism' beyond Britain's borders. Berwick was assisted by Professor Paul Wilkinson from the University of

⁹⁹ UK Parliament, *Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1975* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1973) 6.

¹⁰⁰ Lord Lloyd Berwick, *Inquiry Into Legislation Against Terrorism* (CM 3420) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1996) v.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, i.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, v.

St Andrews who supplied data from both RAND and the University of St Andrews.¹⁰³

Studying terrorist trends over a ten year period between 1985 and 1995 in the UK, Germany, Italy, France, and the United States, including nuclear smuggling and the rise in suicide attacks in Israel, Berwick's report clearly represented an international view.¹⁰⁴ Berwick summarised his findings stating "The threat seems to be more diffuse..." and "New groups and ideologies have emerged using new methods which are more lethal and indiscriminate than the old."¹⁰⁵

Following the submission and deliberation of Berwick's report by Parliament, the government responded by publishing its proposals for future legislative actions. In 1999, the Home Office issued a report citing a quote by Prime Minister Blair stating "The fight against terrorism has taken on a new urgency. The past year's global roll call of terror includes Luxor, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Omagh, and many others."¹⁰⁶ The proposal contained provisions to make the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 permanent.¹⁰⁷ Additionally, the proposal contained a new definition of terrorism, allowances for proscription, exclusion, freezing and forfeiture of terrorist finances, the powers of arrest, detention, stop, search, entry, and seizure, stronger port and border controls, and the retention of many of the Northern Ireland specific arrangements including the Diplock Court arrangements and Army powers.¹⁰⁸ The proposal concluded with a request that any 'comments' be received by 16 March 1999.¹⁰⁹ Ironically, the proposal suggested its recommendations were undertaken to take "a fresh look at the existing arrangements to counter terrorism, to see how they can be improved and

¹⁰³ Berwick, *Inquiry Into Legislation Against Terrorism*, viii.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, 3.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Home Office, "Legislation Against Terrorism: A summary of the Government's Proposals," <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ERORecords/HO421/2/oicd/terrsum.html> [Accessed 8 July 2010].

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

modernised...”¹¹⁰ With remarkably little press coverage, that proposal ultimately led to the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000).

Berwick’s report and the cascade of legislative actions that followed set the tone for the counter-terrorism climate that exists today. Notwithstanding an extended discussion on threat verses government response, it is clear that the UK government is using every means available and then some to provide for public safety and public security. In CONTEST 2009, a statement by Gordon Brown seems to both justify the actions taken and the need for further measures declaring “This new form of terrorism is different in scale and nature from the terrorist threats we have had to deal with in recent decades.”¹¹¹ What seems apparent from Brown’s statement is that the ‘hard power’ measures associated with Northern Ireland continue to be conceived as necessary and may even to be expanded to manage the current threat, but that they are also simultaneously limiting. As such, the development of the other workstreams has been designed to provide for a more comprehensive policy. What remains elusive and challenging though is the objective degree of threat. Given that all of the counter-terrorism legislation and policy except for the 2011 version of CONTEST was developed under New Labour, some exploration of its strategic political positioning is warranted.

C. Risk, Society, and New Labour

As discussed in Chapter II, the occurrence or lack thereof of an event is not an accurate measurement of threat any more than the socially constructed notion of safety is an accurate determination of the presence or absence of danger. When placed in the context of providing public safety and public security from acts of terrorism, all of these relationships become difficult to reconcile because the stakes are high and lives are on the line.

¹¹⁰ Home Office, “Legislation Against Terrorism.”

¹¹¹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 6.

Compounding the problem is that the public's expectation of government to provide safety and security is also high so those responsible for that safety and security must often implement measures based on where they believe the threats exist rather than wait for events to occur to justify the actions taken. This reality means that governments will typically err on the side of caution rather than risk the fallout of an event that could have been prevented. As Ignatieff argues "One reason we balance the threat and response poorly is that the political costs of under reaction are always going to be higher than the costs of overreaction."¹¹² This could be perceived as taking the path of least resistance but it can be argued that the opposite is also true. Although the political risks may be diminished in some circles, security, as discussed in Chapter II, often comes at the expense of others and so a new complexity is created; the rhetorical question of whose safety, whose security, and whose liberty easily becomes a platform for identity politics.

Although a Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government assumed power in mid-2010, CONTEST and the five anti-terrorism legislative actions all came into being under the government of New Labour. That statement is not made to praise nor criticise the actions taken by New Labour, or suggest that things would have been better, worse, or even different under a Conservative, Liberal, or any other government structure. It only acknowledges who was in power and so that some of the political realities at that time are understood.

New Labour came into power in 1997 after eighteen years of successive Conservative governments headed by Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Following Tony Blair's election as party leader in 1994, Blair and a handful of other powerful Labour leaders sought to renew and 'modernise' the party by distancing it from the "...post-war politics of 'Old Labour'... and

¹¹² Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004) 58.

the ‘New Right’ of Thatcherism.”¹¹³ According to Blair, “Our challenge is to forge a new and radical politics for a new and changing world.”¹¹⁴

In what could easily be called a highly effective relabeling and marketing strategy, Blair and the others rebranded New Labour as a “...moderate right wing group of social democrats.”¹¹⁵ Advocating that a new approach was necessary, the party’s 1997 manifesto states that “In each area of policy a new and distinctive approach has been mapped out, one that differs from the old left and the conservative right.”¹¹⁶ That change, and New Labour’s new identity, was embodied in a Communitarian ‘Third Way’ agenda that promoted the core values of equal worth, opportunity for all, responsibility, and community.¹¹⁷ Embarking on what amounted to a policy of ‘reverse Thatcherism’, namely there is nothing *but* society, New Labour reached out to the masses.¹¹⁸ Blair and the others understood that positioning New Labour in the political centre was not only critically necessary to shed both Conservative and ‘Old Labour’ stigmas, it was where public support had to be won if they were going to be successful against the Conservatives; it meant that New Labour could seek support from a broader base of both liberals and conservatives who were neither staunchly liberal nor staunchly conservative.¹¹⁹ Of course, obvious pandering to both sides would be problematic but Tony Blair convincingly explained that “The Third Way is not an attempt to split the difference between Right and Left. It is about values in a changed world.”¹²⁰

Implementing its ‘reverse Thatcherite’ Communitarian agenda, New Labour began a systemic process of re-evaluating the policies and programmes of government. Although Blair acknowledged “Some things the Conservatives got right... We will not change them,” a

¹¹³ Matt Beech, *The Political Philosophy of New Labour* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006) 101.

¹¹⁴ Tony Blair, *New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country* (London: Fourth Estate, 1996) 3.

¹¹⁵ Beech, *The Political Philosophy of New Labour*, 106.

¹¹⁶ Labour Party, “1997 Labour Party Election Manifesto,” 1. <http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour-manifesto.shtml> [Accessed 19 August 2010].

¹¹⁷ Tony Blair, *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century* (London: Fabian Society, Pamphlet 588, 1988) 3.

¹¹⁸ Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) 4.

¹¹⁹ Beech, *The Political Philosophy of New Labour*, 106.

¹²⁰ Blair, *The Third Way*, 1.

large number of committees were established to review virtually every aspect of the welfare state.¹²¹ Review groups looked at everything from public spending across all sectors, to the minimum wage, welfare reform, pensions, long-term care, and even social exclusion.¹²² History will be the ultimate judge, but New Labour's legacy may one day be known as the party that sought to study everything ad nauseam. As Blair admitted, "Our approach is 'permanent revisionism', a continual search for better means to meet our goals based on a clear view of the changes taking place in advanced industrialised societies."¹²³

Despite the commitment to 'permanent revisionism', Blair argued for pragmatism stating "...what matters is what works..."¹²⁴ However, Blair also understood that the world had changed considerably since Labour had last been in power and that in the new globalised world, "...travel, communications and culture are becoming international, shrinking the world...The key issue facing governments is how to respond."¹²⁵ Determined not to repeat the same mistakes as the Conservatives, Blair understood that "... the Tories were far too slow to recognise the signs of social breakdown..."¹²⁶ Additionally, at least in Blair's opinion "The irony is that the politics of the right have ended up destroying the very thing they were designed to create; individual security and fulfilment."¹²⁷ Noting that in the contemporary globalised world, the 'old certainties of the Cold War' had been replaced by the newer 'insidious threats of organised crime, terrorism, drugs, and international environmental degradation', Blair advocated a new but balanced approach of "Not a shopping list of fail-safe policy prescriptions; still less an attempt to reinvent the wheel where existing policies

¹²¹ Labour Party, "1997 Labour Party Election Manifesto," 1.

¹²² John Hills, *Thatcherism, New Labour and the Welfare State* (London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, CASE Paper 13, 1998) 19.

¹²³ Blair, *The Third Way: New Politics for the New Century*, 4.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Blair, *New Britain*, 118.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 207.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 245.

and institutions are broadly successful.”¹²⁸ However, at least in the context of terrorism, the mass adoption of previous counter-terrorism policy appears to have taken place.

Within the milieu of policy review, commitment to ‘permanent revisionism’, and the pragmatic approach of ‘what matters is what works’, it is not clear whether New Labour, conceived, at least early on, that the counter-terrorism policies developed for ‘Irish terrorism’ were adequate and applicable for the newer threats of ‘Islamically’ (sic) based international terrorism or if like others, the nature of the evolving threat was not fully known. However, despite the early adoption of many ‘hard power’ mechanisms that came from the experiences of Northern Ireland, it also seems that over time, those mechanisms alone were considered insufficient and that a more comprehensive policy was needed. That conclusion is evidenced by the expanding breadth of counter-terrorism legislation and policy between 2000 and 2010, and resonates in Gordon Brown’s statement “This new form of terrorism is different in scale and nature from the terrorist threats we have had to deal with in recent decades”.¹²⁹ However, the ever-expanding definition of terrorism and the UK’s legislative responses has also led to controversy and antagonised some members of the public.

A 2010 article in *The Guardian* which contained an interview with the retired head of the Muslim Contact Unit, a counter-terrorism squad within the Metropolitan Police, concluded that “Britain’s fight against terrorism has been a disaster, because its ‘flawed, neo-conservative’ direction alienated Muslims and increased the chances of terrorist attacks...”¹³⁰ Within the same article, another source is cited, adding “There are probably more radicalised Muslims, their attack plans are more adventurous and the UK remains under severe risk.”¹³¹ These comments highlight not only some of the controversy that exists within the counter-terrorism environment, but also demonstrates the difficult challenges that government

¹²⁸ Blair, *The Third Way*, 7.

¹²⁹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 6.

¹³⁰ Vikram Dodd, “Terrorism policy flaws ‘increased risk of attacks’, says former police chief”, *The Guardian*, 7 July 2010.

¹³¹ Dodd, “Terrorism policy flaws ‘increased risk of attacks.’”

representatives face when trying to develop and implement what is hoped to be a measured and effective policy. Assuming momentarily that the allegations made within *The Guardian* article have at least some merit, then some insight is also generated as to the potential outcomes of government policy influenced by strong public expectations to provide public safety and public security, the prospective costs of over-reaction, and the complexity that can be created when identity politics react to the implementation of security measures. These core elements of how public policy is delivered and received by public safety agencies and their constituencies are central issues in this thesis.

As mentioned, one of Blair's cornerstones was a belief in 'what matters is what works'. However, as Ignatieff clarifies "What works is not always right...and... What is right doesn't always work."¹³² As an example, some within the counter-terrorism environment contend that, at times, fighting terrorism requires its own violence, and that coercion, deception, secrecy, and the violation of rights may be required in order to preserve the safety of the majority.¹³³ The other side of that argument is that upholding human and constitutional rights define the core values of a democratic society organised under the rule of law and must be preserved at all costs.¹³⁴ The approach and methods used in the above examples clearly spans the spectrum of philosophies and tugs at the very fabric of what it means to live in a democracy and how it should be protected. At one end of the spectrum the consequentialist argument is that actions taken to save lives and preserve security cannot be wrong if they succeed.¹³⁵ The other end of the spectrum is the libertarian view which would argue that some actions remain wrong even if they work.¹³⁶ Perhaps somewhere in the middle, is the belief that the "...constitution is not a suicide pact; rights cannot so limit the

¹³² Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil*, 9.

¹³³ Ibid, viii.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 34.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 7.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

exercise of authority as to make decisive action impossible.”¹³⁷ However, it is in that middle ground where the elusive search for balance takes place and where controversy finds the most traction. As discussed previously and in detail in Chapter II, security often comes at a cost. Similar to the statements in *The Guardian* article, that cost is clearly articulated by Dworkin who states “...the trade-off is not between our liberty and our security... but between our security and their liberty...which means the freedoms of small suspect groups, like adult male Muslims...”¹³⁸

The notions of threat, risk, and the appropriate response not only vary widely within the public discourse, they often drive public sentiment influencing individuals and government alike. Additionally, as has been stated, the relationships between threat and occurrence, safety and danger, is mostly irreconcilable. However, this amorphous reality does not diminish the public’s demands for safety, if anything, those demands are increased. Risk and threat are clearly influenced by tangible events such as 9/11, 7/7, the Glasgow Airport attack, and numerous disrupted plots that serve as clear evidence that risks are present. However, it is also true that the perception of risk and threat is simultaneously being compounded by television, computers, and the mass media which significantly influence the extended public sphere that has been created in the contemporary globalised world.¹³⁹ Globalisation has created an environment where risk is no longer compartmentalised but is perceived to exist from multiple sources. This inundation of risk, the insecurity it breeds, and the reactions of both the public and government are the driving factors in what Beck calls the contemporary ‘World Risk Society’.¹⁴⁰ Beck explains that “As the bipolar world fades away, we are moving from a world of enemies to one of dangers and risks.”¹⁴¹ The result is that

¹³⁷ Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil*, 40.

¹³⁸ Ronald Dworkin, “The Threat to Patriotism,” in *Understanding September 11* (Craig Calhoun, ed. New York: New York Press, 2002, 273-285), cited in Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil*, 32.

¹³⁹ Beck, *World Risk Society*, 144.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, 3.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

because the public is more aware of the risks, those risks (hazards) begin to dominate the “public, political, and private debates” influencing both public perception and government action.¹⁴²

The influences to the public’s perceived vulnerability typically translate into demands for more security and greater public safety from the perceived threats. However, the actions taken by government to meet those demands also create reactions as the *Guardian* article highlighted and is typified by the rhetorical question of whose safety, whose security, and whose liberty. This reaction starts a rebounding effect of escalation and calls into question whether government is doing enough to protect them. As Beck states “The more modern a society becomes, the more unintended consequences it produces, and as these become known and acknowledged, they call the foundations of industrial modernization into question.”¹⁴³ As more demands are made, more counter-measures are taken, and both risk and the perception of risk is increased because of the unintended consequences produced as modern societies seek the ‘logic of control’.¹⁴⁴ Beck argues that “The more we attempt to ‘colonize’ the future with the aid of the category of risk, the more it slips out of our control.”¹⁴⁵ This damaging cyclical effect is what Beck calls ‘reflexivity’.¹⁴⁶

This discussion establishes an interesting possibility that at least some risk may be self-induced, not because it is real but because it is perceived to be real and the actions taken exacerbate both real and perceived risk in a vicious escalating cycle. Thus, the sources of danger are no longer limited to ignorance, but of knowledge.¹⁴⁷ This blend of ignorance and

¹⁴² Beck, *World Risk Society*, 72.

¹⁴³ Ibid, 119.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, 139.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 109.

¹⁴⁷ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage Publications, 1992) 83.

knowledge seems reminiscent of Plato's 'Allegory of the Cave' where "The world of the visible is thus devalued *en bloc*, but is not lost as a point of reference."¹⁴⁸

D. All Things in Context

The counter-terrorism environment that exists in the UK today is arguably a product of many historical influences. The 'Troubles' of Northern Ireland, a liberal immigration policy, changes in the political landscape, globalisation, risk perception, foreign policy, and international alliances have all influenced how public safety and public security is envisioned and implemented. However, while reasonably logical and linear in its trajectory, significant controversy and questions remain. What kinds of relationships do/should communities and their government share? Is the potential erosion of liberty and human rights warranted and will the outcomes of those actions increase or decrease security? Has globalisation functionally changed what it means to live in a free and open contemporary society? And, are these things open for negotiation or does government have a right to unilaterally implement what it deems necessary? Reflective of some of these larger issues is the latest Strategic Defence Review which for the first time is titled the Strategic Defence and Security Report.¹⁴⁹ The name change suggests that the threats are no longer perceived as being 'outside' the UK but that the 'enemy from within' must also be considered. Similarly, the latest version of CONTEST (2011) dropped the reference to international terrorism in its title and now is simply called *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism*.

Currently, the issues appear polarised. Government, and the public at large either through direct lobbying or tacit approval, have arguably adopted the consequentialist position

¹⁴⁸ Beck, *Risk Society*, 73.

¹⁴⁹ Parliament, "Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010)," <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmdfence/345/34502.htm> [Accessed 14 January 2011].

that actions cannot be wrong if they work to preserve the safety and security of society. However, as identity politics continue to find traction, the very actions intended to provide that safety and security may be driving some to radicalise, even to extremes, and undermine that very effort. At issue for many is not that a threat exists, but to what degree and what the appropriate response should be; some arguing that not enough has been done while others arguing that personal freedoms have been transgressed.

As if the environment were not already convoluted enough, Crelinsten argues that “An important element...in understanding the emergence of terrorism in any society is an appreciation of the forms that counter-terrorism has taken in that society.”¹⁵⁰ Crelinsten’s comment suggests more than a casual relationship between political violence and state power; it suggests that they are potentially an extension of one another. Crelinsten develops his arguments around the notion that violence is a form of communication.¹⁵¹ As will be discussed in later chapters, communication will have particular relevance.

Within the milieu of consequentialist/libertarian debate exist groups such as Liberty, a civil libertarian group, who challenges the government stating “...the ‘War on Terrorism’ rhetoric and policy of recent years has been misguided and often counter-productive to addressing violent extremism.”¹⁵² On the other side of the debate are groups of ‘assembled experts’ like those represented in the DEMOS report from Chapter II who advocate that security must be in place before there can be safety. As the UK becomes a more ‘securitised’ society finding any consensus on balance is going to be increasingly unlikely. The debate on these issues is clearly complex and arguably will not be reconciled until the perception of threat and vulnerability dissipates in both camps. In the meantime, security is fast becoming

¹⁵⁰ Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model”, *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 2 (2002), 78.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Liberty, *From War to Law* (London: Liberty, 2010) 3.

referential and institutionalised leaving most with a wavering sense of relative safety in a highly globalised and uncertain world.

Peeling away the onion and returning more narrowly to the development, delivery, and receipt of counter-terrorism policy, there are a few issues and a couple of watershed moments that dominate the debate and are worth noting. The first is that despite the pronouncements that the newest wave of terrorism is ‘new in scale and nature’, there was wholesale adoption of core elements of counter-terrorism policy from ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland rather than the development of a new and novel 21st century approach. Furthermore, most of the ‘tools’ adopted from the Northern Ireland experience were ‘hard power’ methods; expanded right of entry, stop and search powers, pre-charge detention, proscription, control orders all support the Pursue workstream. Although the argument can be made that terrorism is still terrorism regardless of its motivational underpinnings and therefore the experience and practices of Northern Ireland are still applicable, it is also true that terrorism is nothing more than a tactic and that the motivation behind it is where the battle is either won or lost. This is precisely why the Prevent workstream exists; to challenge the radicalisation process.

The challenge to radical ideology, and in fact all community engagement activities within Prevent, including those by police and fire agencies, were under the jurisdiction of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) up until 2008.¹⁵³ DCLG’s historical remit has been to function as the central government’s liaison to the community, providing basic social services and setting “...policy on supporting local government; communities and neighbourhoods; regeneration; housing; planning, building and the environment; and fire.”¹⁵⁴ However, in 2008 Prevent was relocated to the Office of Security

¹⁵³ Home Office, *The Prevent Strategy: A guide for Local Partners in England*, Ref: 288324 (London: The Stationery Office, 2008) 65.

¹⁵⁴ Communities and Local Government, “About Us,” <http://www.communities.gov.uk/corporate/about/> [Accessed 25 October 2010].

and Counter-terrorism (OSCT) for better coordination across all branches of government.¹⁵⁵

As the name implies, OSCT is part of the Home Office and “...provides strategic direction to the UK’s work to counter the threat from terrorism.”¹⁵⁶ This move created suspicion within Muslim communities because the strategy was not only situated within a broader counter-terrorism policy environment but now “...it was implemented by a team dedicated to counter-terrorism.”¹⁵⁷ Many came to view Prevent as nothing more than “*Pursue in sheeps’*[sic] clothing.”¹⁵⁸

The difference in the 2007 and 2011 Prevent objectives, starkly contrasts the ideological differences to counter-terrorism between Labour and the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition governments. The revised list of objectives in 2011 did not add anything to what had already been established, however there were significant reductions: no longer was there support for mainstream voices; it would no longer address the grievances which ideologues exploit; and it would no longer disrupt those that promote violent extremism (at least through the Prevent strategy).

Despite its criticisms, there is no question the government’s commitment to Prevent remains strong. To understand the political and organisational commitment and the complexities and coordination challenges that government faces, the following organisational chart for Prevent is provided (see figure 5.2).

¹⁵⁵ Parliament, *Preventing Violent Extremism* (London: The Stationery Office, 2010) 5.

¹⁵⁶ Home Office, “About the office of security and counter-terrorism,” <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/OSCT/>, [Accessed 12 August 2012].

¹⁵⁷ Institute for Community Cohesion, cited in UK Parliament, *Preventing Violent Extremism* (London: The Stationery Office, 2010) 8.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.




Figure 5.2: The Prevent Strategy: A guide for Local Partners in England (2008), pg 68.

However, despite government's obvious commitment to Prevent, it continues to draw criticism from numerous quarters including the conservative right such as this 2010 article by Douglas Murray titled "The Prevent Strategy: a textbook example of how to alienate just about everybody."¹⁵⁹

Secondly, as discussed in Chapter III, there is a clear link to foreign policy actions abroad and security at home. Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, there was significant empathy by Western nations and no doubt a stark reminder to everyone worldwide of the vulnerability that exists. Both of those emotions were captured in the newspaper *Le Monde*

¹⁵⁹ Douglas Murray, 'The Prevent Strategy: a textbook example of how to alienate just about everybody', *The Telegraph*, 31 March 2010.

the day following the attacks which headlined and ended its article with a simple statement “Today we are all Americans.”¹⁶⁰ The 11 September 2001 attacks also became a galvanising moment for even closer UK/US relations. Blair’s comment from that day reflects the beginning and closeness of that relationship:

This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. We therefore here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.¹⁶¹

The ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought about considerable international criticism but probably none more than from Muslims and the Islamic world. Viewed as a ‘war against Islam’ and exacerbated by Bush’s comment that the US was waging a ‘crusade’ against terrorism, Britain’s association with the US and its military action in Iraq and Afghanistan has meant that it too has become a focal point for criticism.¹⁶² That criticism, justified by Muslims but dismissed by the state, has no doubt resulted in widening the divide between British Muslims and the state.¹⁶³

Perhaps the greatest impact on the UK came after the 7 July 2005 bombings and attempted bombings of 21 July 2005. These two events were watershed moments because they firmly demonstrated that Britain was vulnerable to attack.¹⁶⁴ Immediately following the

¹⁶⁰ Jean-Marie Colombani, “We are all Americans”, *Le Monde*, Paris, September 12, 2001, available at http://www.worldpress.org/1101we_are_all_americans.htm [Accessed 9 October 2010].

¹⁶¹ CBS News Special Report, “Aftermath of Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon,” September 12, 2001, http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T10310379964&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T10310379967&cisb=22_T10310379966&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=166768&docNo=8 [Accessed 10 October 2010].

¹⁶² “Don’t Mention the GWOT,” *The Economist*, 7 July, 2007, available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T10310379964&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T10310379967&cisb=22_T10310379966&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=166768&docNo=8 [Accessed 10 October 2010].

¹⁶³ McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7*, 39.

¹⁶⁴ Steve Hewitt, *The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism on the Home Front Since 9/11* (London: Continuum, 2008) 50. Also see McRoy, *From Rushdie to 7/7*, 51.

21 July attempted bombing, police, already weary from the 7 July attack, were under tremendous pressure to ‘find the bombers’. That pressure undoubtedly led to the killing of Jean Charles Menezes at the Stockwell underground station.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, media coverage of the bombing and attempted bombing undoubtedly swayed public opinion resulting in a favourable environment to pass additional legislative action, notably criminalising the encouragement and glorification of terrorism, dissemination of terrorist materials, additional proscription measures, and increasing the detention period from 14 to 28 days.

The discussion in this chapter clearly demonstrates that a multitude of influences have created the current counter-terrorism environment in the UK today. Understanding that environment and its potential link to radicalisation serves as the contextual framing for this study. The next chapter will outline how that understanding will be obtained and what mechanisms will be used to achieve that goal.

¹⁶⁵ David Leppard and Liam Clark, “Mixed up messages that killed Menezes”, *Sunday Times* (London), 15 January 2006, Available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T10315226255&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T10315226259&cisb=22_T10315226258&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=332263&docNo=4. Also see Hewitt, *The British War on Terror*, 50.

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Chapter VI: Methodology

*“While nothing is easier than to denounce the evildoer,
nothing is more difficult than to understand him.”*

-Dostoevsky

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss how the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted. Additionally, some of the more fundamental questions about the thesis will be answered such as why this study is relevant or even necessary. At the beginning of this thesis, a single research question is asked; Do current UK counter-terrorism strategies intended to increase public safety and public security, exacerbate marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism within the Muslim community? Arguably, the research question could easily be answered with a simple yes or no response. However, although that response might answer the question, it serves little to broaden the understanding of how or why that may or may not be true. It is only through exhaustive research and analysis that the how and why are truly understood. In order to obtain that level of understanding, this thesis utilised a field research component to better comprehend the issues so that the research question could be thoroughly answered.

Like any coherent research project, there must be some methodological structure that guides how the research is conducted and analysed. Without that rigour, the research would wander aimlessly, there would be no clear beginning or end, and the analysis and conclusions would be difficult if not impossible to justify.¹ In order to manage those complexities, this chapter provides the roadmap (research design and methodology) for how that methodological structure was developed, how the fieldwork was conducted, who was studied, how long the study period was, the criteria selected to make sense of the data (See Chapter IV

¹ Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) 8.

for a complete analysis), and the obstacles involved. Additionally, as a researcher, whether formally or informally, it is natural to develop a best estimate as to what the expected outcome(s) might be.² Those preliminary estimates, sometimes referred to as ‘guestimates’ are listed in the form of assumptions and hypotheses so that the framework for predicting and analysing the outcome(s) against the data as it was obtained is better understood. Furthermore, although this thesis posits one question for consideration, it is also true that there are multiple subsets of questions that naturally follow. Those subsets are important and will be defined because they not only help answer the main research question, they help understand the nuances and complexities that exist.

Lastly, there were two areas of research and information management that required special consideration. The first is that this thesis explores a subject that is imbedded in the national security of the United Kingdom and there were legitimate concerns about how sensitive information, should it have become known, would be managed. The second is that the use of human subjects in research has associated ethical concerns and the welfare of participants had to be considered. This chapter discusses both the national security concerns and those associated with using human subjects, and articulates the methods that were used to manage and mitigate those issues.

A. Research Importance

As previously noted, part of the discussion in this chapter is dedicated to what makes this study relevant and what contributions it makes. Although the Problem Statement is included in the Introduction, it is restated here.

The UK security environment is driven by the UK National Security Strategy, the National Risk Register, and within the narrowed focus of counter-terrorism, the CONTEST

² King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 102.

strategy. Beginning with adoption of the Terrorism Act 2000 on 24 July, 2000, and perpetuated by the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, the UK's legal and counter-terrorism strategic environment expanded significantly in the spirit of providing additional public safety and security. However, despite "...general acceptance and support of CT measures" by the general population, within the broader Muslim community, the policies are often perceived as "violating civil liberties and human rights."³ In particular, actions that have been undertaken by public safety agencies to maximise public safety and security, such as 'stop and search' and '14 day detention' by the police are often perceived as "unfair, unjust, and discriminatory."⁴ Despite good intentions, fundamental questions remain regarding the application and efficacy of counter-terrorism strategy implementation at the local level. More specifically, police and fire agencies may be at risk of losing critical ties to the communities they serve, and the policy environment delivered through strategies like CONTEST that are designed to make communities safer from extremist violence may be driving some individuals to adopt more radicalised and potentially violent ideology.

One way to react to the Problem Statement above might be to implement more and more security measures until the problem goes away. There is evidence to support the argument that in the most oppressive regimes, terrorism is not a problem; Stalin's Soviet Union and Hitler's Nazi Germany are good examples of oppressive regimes that were terrorism free.⁵ However, the addition of more and more security simultaneously begins to challenge the very nature and fundamental values of a free and open democratic society. These challenges, as discussed in Chapter II, manifest in decidedly different ways but in one form or another can erode traditional notions of freedom. In a society like the UK, which is built on a group of core values that include "...human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and

³ Home Office, *What perceptions do the UK public have concerning the impact of counter-terrorism legislation implemented since 2000?* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2010) 42 and 3.

⁴ Ibid, 2.

⁵ Arie Kluglanski and Shira Fishman, "The Psychology of Terrorism: Syndrome versus Tool Perspectives," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 no.2 (2006), 196.

accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all,” the erosion of those rights represents more than a simple trade off of a little more invasiveness by government for a little more security, it begins to challenge its core fundamental principles.⁶ This concern is perhaps well articulated in Deputy Prime Minister Clegg’s comment regarding national identity cards when he stated “Cancelling the scheme and abolishing the National Identity Register is a major step in dismantling the surveillance state.”⁷ Clegg clearly understands that there cannot be a surveillance state residing harmoniously within a free and open society without challenging the very notion of what it means to be ‘free and open’.

Within the realm of government, police and fire agencies are often where the greatest interaction of community and government takes place, and where the most basic of needs are provided; public safety and public security.⁸ It is also where significant portions of government policy is delivered and personalised. In many ways, police and fire personnel become ‘the face of government’ at the local level, and given that everything is fundamentally ‘local’, their role is critically important. Communities require safety and security as basic needs and it is usually a police officer or fire-fighter that provides those services.

Within the narrowed focus of counter-terrorism, the policies carried out by public safety agencies while simultaneously providing for the basic needs of the community are sometimes perceived as being in opposition to one another. This juxtaposition is acknowledged in the opposing forces that embody the Pursue and Prevent workstreams

⁶ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 56.

⁷ Home Office, “Identity cards and National Identity Register to be scrapped,” http://www.ips.gov.uk/cps/rde/xchg/ips_live/hs.xsl/1691.htm [accessed 13 August 2010].

⁸ London Fire Brigade, “Your Safety,” <http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/YourSafety.asp> [Accessed 25 October 2010] also see Metropolitan Police Services, “Special Operations,” http://www.met.police.uk/so/counter_terrorism_security_advisers.htm [Accessed 25 October 2010].

within the CONTEST strategy discussed in Chapter V.⁹ Additionally, ‘The Troubles’ of Northern Ireland are replete with examples where laws and policies perceived as draconian or discriminatory resulted in a vicious cycle of increasing mistrust and violence towards police and fire department personnel and the communities they served.¹⁰ Drawing comparisons between the current concerns of ‘Islamic’ terrorism and those associated with ‘Irish republicanism’ can be a thorny issue but an argument can be made that today’s stereotyping of Muslim communities as ‘suspect’ is reminiscent of the categorisation endured by Irish Catholics who “... bore the brunt of stereotyping, profiling, and stigmatisation” during ‘The Troubles’ of Northern Ireland.¹¹ Similarly, it would be incorrect to assert that Islam alone is the driving force behind ‘Islamic’ violence any more than Catholicism was the driving force for violence among groups such as the Provisional IRA.¹² However, the fact remains that when policies were perceived as draconian or discriminatory, trust between the community and public safety agencies suffered. Whether or not a similar cycle of mistrust leading to violence by ‘at risk’ Muslims reacting to the current counter-terrorism environment will unfold over time is unknown but similarities do exist and give reason for concern.

One event that deserves mentioning is the murder of Stephen Lawrence on 22 April 1993. Although the Lawrence case was a racially motivated murder of a black teenager by a group of white youths, some similarities in community sentiment can be argued. In the case of Stephan Lawrence, criticism of the way the police conducted the investigation from the black community led to an inquiry chaired by Lord Macpherson. Macpherson’s report concluded that the MPS demonstrated “...professional incompetence, institutional racism and

⁹ Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 86.

¹⁰ Joanne Klein, ‘The Failure of Force: Policing Terrorism in Northern Ireland’, in Stacy McGoldrick and Andrea McArdle (eds) *Uniform Behavior: Police, Localism, and National Politics* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006) 97- 98.

¹¹ Robert Lambert, ‘Police and Muslim Communities in London: Countering Al-Qaida Influence and Islamophobia,’ in Thomas Pick, Anne Speckhard, and Beatrice Jacuch (eds) *Home-Grown Terrorism: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Radicalisation among Groups with an Immigrant Heritage in Europe* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009) 68.

¹² Lambert, “Police and Muslim Communities in London,” 69.

a failure of leadership by senior officers” in conducting the investigation surrounding Stephen Lawrence’s death.¹³ This is not mentioned to suggest that the MPS failed to take corrective action following the murder of Stephen Lawrence. On the contrary, by many accounts the MPS has changed considerably since the Macpherson report. However, despite those changes many young south Asian men are convinced that they are victims of ‘targeted policing’ and hold onto the legacy that the MPS remains an agency that is incompetent, institutionally racist, and devoid of leadership.¹⁴

Obtaining the proper balance of providing security without the perception that public safety agencies are being heavy-handed is a difficult and dynamic process. It is also one that will never have consensus. Arguably the key is to exercise only enough power and implement only enough security to facilitate acceptable risk while being mindful of the rule of law so that safety, security, human rights, privacy, and dignity for all are maintained. It is also a fundamental element of this thesis.

B. Research Question and Related Subsets

As stated, this thesis begins with one (seemingly) simple research question: Do current UK counter-terrorism strategies intended to increase public safety and public security, exacerbate marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism within the Muslim community? This question is intentionally provocative not only to generate interest but because it reflects the ongoing debate between government, the broader public, and some members of the Muslim community.¹⁵ This debate is exemplified by Migdal’s explanation from Chapter II that society is made up of competing spheres vying for ‘their’ voice to be heard, from

¹³ Lord William Macpherson, *The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1999) 317.

¹⁴ Javaid Rehman, “Islam, War on Terror, and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom: Dilemmas of Multiculturalism in the Aftermath of the London Bombings,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 29, no. 4 (2007) 852.

¹⁵ Dodd, “Terrorism policy flaws ‘increased risk of attacks.’”

Maslow who argues that safety and security are some of the most fundamental of human needs, and from Bigo and Tsoukala who argue that security for one group typically comes at the expense of another.¹⁶ When these broader issues are considered while simultaneously thinking about the research question, several sub-questions begin to emerge: Is the threat and response balanced? Are some security measures more contentious than others and what is the risk/benefit outcome? Will some radicalise and move on to violent extremism regardless of any preventative actions taken? Are current theories on radicalisation and extremism sound? Are government prevention programmes simply engaging with those who are concerned about the same issues rather than those that are truly at risk for radicalisation? Can Muslim communities effectively manage those at risk within their own community structure? What does the ultimate government/community partnership look like and is it realistic? Should the entire notion of terrorism be reconsidered as an infrequent but natural occurrence within societies? How can the nature of risk and perception of risk be managed more effectively in the contemporary globalised world? What is the sustainability of domestic and international counter-terrorism efforts?

These sub-questions are not developed with the notion that all will be answered. Each could easily become the central topic for another thesis. They are provided to appreciate the complexity of the discussion that is taking place within the larger public sphere and to understand that the discussion in this thesis is just one part of that debate. Additionally, by contemplating some of the related sub-questions associated with the research question, additional perspective can be achieved even though the questions have not been answered.

¹⁶ Migdal, *State in Society*, 166., Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, 39., Bigo and Tsoukala, *Terror, Insecurity, and Liberty*, 2.

C. Assumptions and Hypotheses

As stated previously, it is normal to develop a personal estimate as to what the outcome of a study or research project might be. In academia, that estimate or ‘guestimate’ as it is sometimes called, is typically referred to as a hypothesis and fundamentally represents the anticipated outcome of a study based upon what the researcher knows about the subject before the study is undertaken.¹⁷ The idea of forming a hypothesis is rooted in quantitative research as an essential requirement to test the outcome of the data collected.¹⁸ However, because qualitative and quantitative research methods differ, how a hypothesis is used often differs depending on the type of research that is taking place. In quantitative research, a hypothesis is used to *test* the outcome of the data whereas in qualitative research, a hypothesis is used to help *understand* the data.¹⁹ This fundamental difference has led some like Miles and Huberman to differentiate between the two types of hypothesis, suggesting that instead of using the term hypothesis in qualitative research, a more appropriate term would be ‘proposition’.²⁰ However, changing terminology seems more semantic than substantive and as a result this thesis will continue to use the more traditional term, hypothesis.

Included in Chapter III were some preliminary hypotheses such as the idea that because marginalisation could not be sufficiently defined or measured, it was therefore highly problematic when used as an explanation why some individuals resort to violence, or that Gurr’s explanation of relative deprivation could not be confidently applied as a tangible explanation of the radicalisation process because his analysis was based within the context of revolution leading to civil war. Similarly, although Social Identity Theory is being used

¹⁷ King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, 102.

¹⁸ Joseph Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach* (London: Sage Publications, 2005) 69.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Mathew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis* (London: Sage Publications, 1994) 75.

extensively in Europe and North America to explain individual and intergroup processes associated with radicalism and extremism, and although it initially does seem to fit, the extent that it can be applied universally remains unproven.

In addition to making certain hypotheses, there are also assumptions that are included in any research project. Assumptions allow the researcher to conceptualise who might be willing to participate in the study, how access to individuals and groups can be obtained, the type of data that can be acquired, and the relevance of theory to argue, prove, or disprove certain points.²¹ Collectively, these assumptions serve a greater purpose than articulating simple statements, musing, or ‘thinking out-loud’, they begin to define the theoretical framework, content, and structure of the research plan.²² In perspective, whereas a hypothesis serves as a prediction of a research outcome, assumptions are the building blocks from which the procedural elements come together.²³

There is also a more subtle and implicit nature to assumptions; they define the researcher’s predisposition to the facts as he/she understands them.²⁴ That is not to say that the assumptions are purely isolated products of the researcher’s understandings. More appropriately they represent a collective of what he/she knows from academia and popular sentiment reflected in the media. According to Guba, these assumptions or predispositions significantly influence the researcher within his/her own “paradigm or worldview” because they articulate “a basic set of beliefs that guide action.”²⁵ This idea is expanded further by Creswell who argues that assumptions define the “...nature of reality (ontology), how the researcher knows what he or she knows (epistemology), the role of values in the research (axiology), the language of research (rhetoric), and the methods used in the process

²¹ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 36.

²² Ibid, 33.

²³ John Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (London: Sage Publications, 2007) 16.

²⁴ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 36.

²⁵ E.G. Guba, *The Paradigm Dialog* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990) 17. In Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (London: Sage Publications, 2007) 19.

(methodology).”²⁶ All of these notions underscore the importance and influence that assumptions have in the development of the research plan. Furthermore, because the research plan serves as the methodological vehicle to answer the research question, its construction is critically important. This thesis relied on the following assumptions and hypotheses as its essential building blocks.

Assumptions-

1. That living in a Muslim community and observing the interaction that takes place between police and fire service personnel and their constituencies, a sense of the degree of trust and cooperation that exists could be subjectively evaluated.
2. That both public safety agencies, Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade would be willing participants in this study.
3. That interviewing public safety personnel and members of the community on the same topics, differences in perspective could be obtained.
4. That the field research would establish a viable semi-ethnographic portrait of selected communities and the individuals that make up those communities.
5. That by developing a semi-ethnographic portrait of selected communities and individuals, some general prepositions could be developed that link the current counter-terrorism environment with sentiments from the community.
6. That a sense of cause and effect could be established that answers the research question definitively.
7. That a better understanding of radicalism and extremism would be one of the outcomes of this study.

²⁶ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 16.

8. That those public safety agencies involved would be interested in learning the conclusions of this study and benefit by the knowledge gained.
9. That others in public service, academia, and policy makers would find relevance in this study and that the overall available knowledge of providing public safety and public security in the contemporary counter-terrorism world will be advanced.
10. That this study would serve as a stepping stone for additional work in the field of studying and understanding 'Islamic' radicalisation and extremism in Western societies.

Hypotheses-

1. Some individuals will radicalise to the extreme irrespective of preventative actions taken by public safety agencies.
2. The effects of hard power used by public safety personnel do exacerbate marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism by some within the Muslim community.
3. The short term benefit of maximising public security will be overshadowed by a marked decline in public safety/community relations especially by those at the margins.
4. The loss of social agency will cause greater numbers to move to the extreme and risk will increase over time.
5. The true benefits of the Prevent workstream may be that there is a positive influence on community relations in areas not associated with terrorism.

D. Research Design

At its core, this thesis seeks to explore the current public safety and public security counter-terrorism environment within the greater London area. This research focuses on the delivery and receipt of counter-terrorism policy within selected Muslim communities.

Whereas current policy evaluation is determined by the Home Office in a top down perspective relying heavily on quantitative data, this research was uniquely focused bottom up at the government/community interface.

In contrast to the Home Secretary's report to Parliament discussed in Chapter V in which she concluded that because there had not been any terror attacks in the UK, CONTEST was a success, it is argued that quantitative data alone should not be used as the basis for such conclusions because it represents nothing more than a macro vision or output. This argument is underscored by the EUROPOL report mentioned in Chapter IV and similarly by data collected by Coolsaet and Van de Voorde; although experts agree there is significant threat, there is a relative lack of Islamically (sic) inspired terrorist incidents in Western Europe.²⁷ Coolsaet and Van de Voorde characterise the environment as "...a broken thermometer whose mercury has shattered into a multitude of small blobs, all highly toxic, but not specifically related to one another."²⁸ Arguably the error the Home Secretary made in relying solely on quantitative data to judge the success of CONTEST is expressly tied to the discussion in Chapter II where it was established that the socially constructed notion of safety had no relevance to the real absence or presence of danger. Furthermore, the limitations of the macro quantitative view are easily demonstrated in Neumann's comment "radicalism...is what happens before the bomb goes off."²⁹

²⁷ Rik Coolsaet and Teun Van de Voorde, "Jihadi Terrorism: Perception and Reality in Perspective," in *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalism Challenge in Europe*, (ed) Rik Coolsaet (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2011) 20.

²⁸ Ibid, 23.

²⁹ Neumann, *Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence*, 4.

In order to understand the bottom up view at the community government interface and how that might relate to marginalisation and radicalisation, analysis was derived primarily from the development of qualitative sources. As noted above, the choice of methodologies was influenced by more than a lack of numbers, it was specifically made because it is the most appropriate for this type of research. Qualitative methods specifically allow the researcher to describe and analyse the nuanced patterns of relationships that exist in these types of environments.³⁰ This notion is reinforced by Creswell who argues that qualitative research is the most appropriate when there is a need to “...study a group or population...or hear silenced voices.”³¹ Additionally, whereas quantitative data often represents macro trends, using qualitative data allowed for more discrete information to be considered.³² It allowed the researcher to “...decipher details, complexities, and subtleties...” that would otherwise go unnoticed.³³ Last and most importantly, as Miles and Huberman argue, “...the findings from qualitative studies have a quality of undeniability.”³⁴ The ‘undeniability’ (sic) that Miles and Huberman refer to is of course dependant on the quality of the research. However the same factual ‘undeniability’ significantly influenced the choice of methodologies for this research; by studying individuals and small groups whose voice is often never heard, patterns of sentiment could be ‘discovered’ long before they would manifest as numbers in a quantitative study.

Where appropriate and available, some quantitative figures are included as supporting documentation in the form of demographics, arrests, and/or convictions on terrorism related charges, etcetera. Similarly, some empirical data is used when appropriate but this research was designed to develop new data appropriately cast as the latest available.

³⁰ Miles and A. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis*, 75.

³¹ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 39.

³² Ibid, 40.

³³ Miles and A. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis*, 17.

³⁴ Ibid, 1.

As discussed in Chapter V, UK counter-terrorism policy and law serves as the overarching backdrop for this study but this is not a policy analysis project; the policy and the legislative environments are accepted as given. Instead, this research concentrated on two critical areas: the dynamics of interaction by public safety groups (police and fire) who are perceived as the purveyors of counter-terrorism policy for the communities they serve; and, how those programmes, policies, and laws are consumed and reacted to by individuals and groups in selected Muslim communities.

Notionally, within the contemporary counter-terrorism environment, there is a simultaneous and dynamic top down and bottom up process that occurs. Policy is legislatively created and where applicable, passed down and filtered through police and fire service organisations to the communities they serve.³⁵ Communities either accept or reject those policies which largely influence public safety/community relations. Obviously, when there is wide-spread acceptance then there is no problem. However, when there is not, tension can lead to a vicious cycle of increasing mistrust and propensity for violence.³⁶

E. Case Studies

This thesis uses case studies to facilitate some of its discussion, arguments, and conclusions. The studies that are developed are intended to focus on the two distinct areas noted in the Research Design: public safety organisations who work directly with the community; and, communities, groups and selected individuals. These two distinct groups represent the interface where policy meets reality and fits comfortably with Habermas' notion of competing 'public spheres'. By segmenting these two groups into their own spheres, it facilitated profiling some of the preventative actions taken by public safety agencies to

³⁵ Peter Gill, *Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1994) 80.

³⁶ Klein, "The Failure of Force," 98.

engage positively within their communities and the community reactions to those efforts. Secondly, it promoted understanding how and why some individuals are reacting negatively within the current anti-terrorism environment and what is driving that reaction.

Although the two main groups are constructed and segmented purposefully to represent the interface of where policy meets reality, there are two additional spheres that require inclusion. The first is ‘other government’. As mentioned above, there are numerous preventative actions and influences at work, many of which originate from outside of the public safety organisations. For instance, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) serves as a central coordinating body for policing on ‘terrorism and allied matters’ and many of the ‘community engagement’ programmes that are being used by the police are developed by ACPO (see Chapter VII for more).³⁷ Similarly, because the fire service is linked to the Department of Communities and Local Government, many of its community engagement programmes are coordinated through DCLG.³⁸ Finally, think tanks and local councils were often found to be in positions to offer great insight and in some cases influence.

The other group that required inclusion is the radical fringe. If the goal of the policy environment and public safety agencies is to reduce the threat of radicalisation and extremism that ultimately lead to terrorism, then understanding those that are considered radical or extreme and what effects the current environment has on them has tremendous importance. They also represent what should be the ‘target audience’ of UK counter-terrorism efforts.

There are several reasons that the use of case studies was warranted for this type of research. Most generally, they are compatible with qualitative research methods. As Smith observed “...the terms ethnography, field methods, qualitative inquiry, participant

³⁷ Association of Chief Police Officers, “Terrorism and Allied Matters.” <http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/TerrorismAndAlliedMatters.aspx> [Accessed 03 February 2011].

³⁸ Department of Communities and Local Government, “Fire and Emergencies,” <http://www.communities.gov.uk/fire/> [Accessed 03 February 2011].

observation, case study...have become practically synonymous.”³⁹ More specifically, because this study involves understanding the relationships that exist between public safety practitioners and the communities they engage with, case studies provided a valuable mechanism for that to take place. As Gerring notes “...case studies are often useful for the purpose of elucidating causal mechanisms, and this obviously affects the plausibility of an X/Y relationship.”⁴⁰ Perhaps a more basic explanation is that case studies allow researchers to frame the characteristics of real-life events in ways that make them more understandable.⁴¹

It is acknowledged that a select number of case studies should not be used to make wide assumptions or generalisations about individuals or groups. Any conclusions or assessment should always be tempered by the circumstances and framework established, and through critical analysis. In context, this study was not designed to be all encompassing. It is a study of Muslims and Muslim community sentiment as the recipients of counter-terrorism policy in London. Its capacity was limited to the work of a single researcher working to develop a semi-ethnographic snapshot of those individuals and groups studied in order to further the understanding of how counter-terrorism public policy is delivered and received, and whether or not that policy can be linked to radicalisation. Although some generalisations are confidently established about the communities and individuals studied, it remains a snapshot and those same generalisations when applied to other individuals and communities would potentially be false. In its simplest sense, it is a study about public safety/community relations, those who are perceived to be ‘at risk’, and those who exist on the margins.

Finally, by organising the different elements (public safety agencies, other government, community and individuals, and the radical fringe) into case studies, perspectives could be explored and contrasted within a tighter framework for analysis.

³⁹ Miles and Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis*, 1.

⁴⁰ John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practice* (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 42.

⁴¹ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (London: Sage Publications, 2009) 4.

F. Methodological and Analytical Approach

This research used an integrative methodological and analytical approach; methodologically, it is firmly rooted in ethnography and uses social constructionism and social movement theory as its analytical orientation. The rationale to use an integrative approach is easily justified and multi-faceted. First, it was chosen specifically to build a contextual framework that allowed the ground truth to be discovered. Years of professional experience working in a local government public safety organisation exposed the all too frequent reality of unbalanced hubris brought about by organisational culture. As a result, obtaining a holistic first-hand understanding of the social implications of policy rather than focusing, as government does, on the action/reaction cycle driven by threat, that truth was more likely to be discovered. Put in more academic terms, combining ethnography, social constructionism, and social movement theory, the attributes of each integrated and complemented one another well so that the realities that influence individuals, small groups, and competing spheres could be understood.

The construction of an integrated contextual framework did more than satisfy a fundamental desire to discover the truth; it reflects a growing trend in social science research to use multiple approaches to *understand* nuanced complex environments. As Borum notes, it is no longer “...a task for a single theory or discipline. Any useful framework must be able to integrate mechanisms at micro (individual) and macro (social cultural) levels.”⁴² Nor is Borum alone in his thinking. Maxwell argues a similar position concluding that using a single theory or rigid methodological approach imposes both practical and ethical problems because there is a very real risk of “...shoehorning questions, methods, and data into preconceived categories and preventing the researcher from seeing events and relationships that don’t fit

⁴² Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism 1: A Review of Social Science Theories,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011), 8.

the theory.”⁴³ Moreover, Chapter III discussed the multitude of influences that could lead to radicalisation. To suggest that ‘one theory’ could explain such a dynamic environment would be in error. As such this research rejects the use theories such as positivism which is premised on the notion that ‘scientific’ research is only valid when it is capable of being re-created and supported by quantitative data derived from precisely formulated theories, or reductionism, which seeks to eliminate all other sources of influence so that a single cause is all that remains.⁴⁴ These approaches are neither appropriate nor realistic. Thus an integrated approach was used: ethnography to understand the realities on the ground; social constructionism to understand how an individual’s world view is conceived and influenced; and social movement theory to understand group dynamics. Each will be discussed in more detail.

Ethnography

Ethnography is not only the starting point for this discussion it served as the bedrock for this research because it provided a full account of the lived experience and experiential life world of those studied.⁴⁵ Drawing on those concepts, this study used a semi-ethnographic approach focusing on those aspects of the ‘lived experience’ that specifically related to the interaction and relationships that exist between public safety agencies and their constituencies in the counter-terrorism environment.⁴⁶ As a point of clarity the term ‘semi’-ethnographic is used because this research focused narrowly on those issues related to counter-terrorism rather than ethnography which suggests a broad study of all aspects of the lived experience.

⁴³ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 46.

⁴⁴ Harold Kincaid, “Positivism in the social sciences,” in E. Craig (Ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1998) <http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/R017>, [Accessed 11 December 2010].

⁴⁵ Paloma Gay-Blasco and Huan Wardle, *How to Read Ethnography* (London: Routledge, 2007) 9.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 43.

As repeatedly stated, this thesis was designed to be decidedly pragmatic and sought to determine the ‘ground truth’. A fundamental tenet of ethnographic research is to ‘see’ things first hand rather than rely on data collected by others.⁴⁷ The importance of this is perhaps best summarised by Silke who in 2001 found that “...80 per cent of all research on terrorism is based either solely or primarily on data gathered from books, journals, the media, or other published documents.”⁴⁸ Silke’s criticism of terrorism research at the time was characterised by his statement “It exists on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious.”⁴⁹ In other words, very few were doing the ‘hard work’ of primary research.

Silke was not alone in his criticism. Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg were equally concerned by the lack of actual interaction by researchers and those deemed the sources of threat by saying “...terrorism studies seems to have virtually placed a premium on *avoiding* first-hand contact with the subjects of their research.”⁵⁰ Although many engaged in terrorism research such as Horgan, Wiktutowicz, Kenney, Sageman, and Silke to name some of the more well known, have put significant effort into developing primary data through first-hand contact with their subjects, there remains an argument that many remain content to work with secondary and tertiary empirical data without contributing much new to the discipline.

As a former practitioner who over time saw first-hand the failures of theory over praxis, it was important to avoid the abstract theoretical world that Silke, Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg became critical of. Given a need and desire to develop primary data, the ethnographic approach quickly stood out as a viable candidate because it is personalised and

⁴⁷ Chad Oliver, *The Discovery of Humanity: An Introduction to Anthropology* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981) 49.

⁴⁸ Andrew Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 13, no. 4 (2001), 12.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ David W. Brannan, Philip F. Esler, and Anders Strindberg, “Talking to “Terrorists: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 24, no.1 (2001), 7.

provides additional meaning rather than remaining abstract. As Kottak states “Ethnographers are in a position to recognise, and indeed are themselves caught up in, the web of personal relations and problems encountered by those they study.”⁵¹ Kottak’s statement is reinforced by Atkinson and Hammersley who add “The value in ethnography is documenting what really goes on behind *official* fronts.”⁵²

Equally important, as a viable research tool, ethnography has flourished in recent years and especially in environments where researchers have sought to capture the “irreducibility of the human experience.”⁵³ Joseph, Mahler, and Auyero put this in perspective-

The revival of ethnographic research within sociology is undisputed. New journals, new books from major presses, and new hires at top research departments all attest to the renewal, growth, and increasing relevance of the ethnographic craft among sociologists.⁵⁴

The ‘irreducibility of the human experience’ that embodies ethnography and the prominence that it has gained in social science made it a very viable choice. However, despite the intrinsic benefits and popularity of ethnography, one area that it has limited popularity in is the political arena. In one study it was found that “...out of 215 articles published in the last 10 years in sociology’s main journal devoted to ethnography, the *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography*, only 15 focus on politics as their main subject.”⁵⁵ In another study, a review of “...the *American Journal of Political Science* and the *American*

⁵¹ Conrad Phillip Kottak, *Antropology: The Exploration of Human Diversity* (New York: Random House, 1982) 12.

⁵² Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley, *Ethnography: Principle and Practice*, 3rd ed. (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2007) 235.

⁵³ Paul Willis and Matt Trondman, “Manifesto for Ethnography,” *Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies* (Sage Journals) Vol. 2, no. 3 (2002), 394.

⁵⁴ Lauren Joseph, Mathew Mahler, Javier Auyero, *New Perspectives in Political Ethnography* (New York: Springer 2007) 1.

⁵⁵ Joseph, Mahler, and Auyero, *New Perspectives in Political Ethnography*, 1.

Political Science Review for the last 10 years (1996–2005) [found that]... Out of a total number of 569 and 369 articles, respectively, only one article relies on ethnography as a data-production technique.”⁵⁶ The dearth of ethnographic research in the political arena is perplexing and raises the rhetorical question- aren’t politicians supposed to be interested in what their constituency thinks? Intuitively, Bayard de Volo and Schatz take a similar stance arguing “...ethnographic methods remain critical to political analysis.”⁵⁷ Joseph, Mahler, and Auyero help put things into perspective by stating-

...in concentrating, almost exclusively, on the models, charts, regressions, and correlations of standard political research, social science has missed a significant aspect of the ongoing reality that is politics: namely it has missed the nitty-gritty details of politics, its “day-to-day intricacies”..., its “implicit meanings”..., its passions, and its sacrifices...; in other words, the pace of political action, the texture of political life, and the plight of political actors have all been cast into the shadows created by the unnecessary and deleterious overreliance on quantitative methods in both political science and political sociology.⁵⁸

The relative lack of ethnographic study in this type of environment coupled with the criticism of Silke, Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg all support the argument that there is in fact something missing from more ‘traditional’ methods. This argument is further supported Kalra whose discussion on racism and anti-Muslim sentiment since the July 2005 bombings makes clear-

...there has never been a more urgent moment for scholars to gather and address the new vicissitudes and contours of Britain’s racial landscape... Is there an agenda that

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Lorraine Bayard de Volo and Edward Schatz, “From the Inside Out: Ethnographic Methods in Political Research,” *Political Science and Politics* 37, no. 2 (2004), 268.

⁵⁸ Joseph, Mahler, and Auyero, *New Perspectives in Political Ethnography*, 2.

can redeem the ethnographic form to add clarity to the urgent issues that face racialised [sic] minorities in Britain today?⁵⁹

Thus the choice to strongly leverage ethnography as the foundational research methodology for this study as discussed is supported at multiple levels. Perhaps this is best stated by Bayard de Volo and Schatz who firmly argue that there is opportunity “for ethnographic work to offer potentially profound contributions to the body of knowledge about social and political life.”⁶⁰

Before concluding, Kottak’s earlier comment about researchers being ‘caught up’ in their research suggests that a certain sense of responsibility goes along with ethnographic research; the role of the researcher should encompass more than just documenting facts and observations about the lived experience of others, it should at least in part, tell their story and that is what this thesis attempts to do.

Social Constructionism

As noted, the second component of this integrative approach is social constructionism (SC). SC was a useful analytical tool in this kind of environment because it provided a fundamental understanding of the individual by explaining “...the social processes that are involved in our conceptualising the world, including our own machinations and states.”⁶¹ This is grounded in a basic psychological premise that people see the world based their own “...internal map of reality, not reality itself.”⁶² By extension, the social processes that influence one’s own internal map mean that there can be numerous individual realities or

⁵⁹ Virinder S Kalra, “Ethnography as Politics: A critical review of British studies of racialized minorities,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29, no. 3 (2006), 466.

⁶⁰ Bayard de Volo and Schatz, “From the Inside Out,” 268.

⁶¹ Thomas Dickens, “Social Constructionism as Cognitive Science,” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* 34, no. 4 (2004), 333.

⁶² Randy Borum, “Understanding the Terrorist Mindset,” *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* (2003), http://works.bepress.com/randy_borum/7 [Accessed 6 April 2012], 8.

epistemologies. As Mallon notes “While human culture and decisions have impacts on numerous features of the world, the impacts on humans are *sui generis* [unique].”⁶³ This is a simple premise but an important one because it established the foundation for understanding individuals and the necessary appreciation that they act uniquely based on their own individual ‘lived reality’. In addition to the individual epistemologies that exist, it is also acknowledged that there are an equal number of ontologies that exist. Put in other terms this can be stated as cause (ontology) and effect (epistemology). Although the emphasis of this research will focus more on the epistemological orientation of individuals, their own ontologies must also be considered. Functionally, the ontological discussion will be kept to minimum in favour of avoiding excessive, potentially contentious, and a never-ending string of abstract theoretical discussions.

Notwithstanding the statement above it is not enough to simply explain what people think but one should also contextualise why they think the way they do. Here again the mixture of ethnography and social constructionism is useful in explaining how those individual realities come about. As Borum explains “More useful are systematic drawn stories and lessons...That kind of knowledge is what is desperately needed...to advance our understanding of radicalisation.”⁶⁴ Borum’s reference to ‘stories and lessons’ is precisely on target with an ethnographic approach and hints that those ‘stories and lessons’ are a major component in understanding the process of radicalisation. Here, the ontological elements of SC are extraordinarily useful in filling that gap. A fundamental tenet of SC, often referred to as the ‘linguistic turn’ in social psychology, is to view “...all of our conceptions as a product of language.”⁶⁵ This, according to Dickens means that “...the ways we understand the world

⁶³ Ron Mallon, “A field guide to Social Constructionism,” *Philosophy Compass* 2, no.1 (2007), 98.

⁶⁴ Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011), 46.

⁶⁵ Dickens, “Social Constructionism as Cognitive Science,” 333.

are formed by the ways in which we interact with each other in our local cultural milieu.”⁶⁶

This provides great insight about how personal realities are constructed within the local environment and beyond. It also brings into the discussion the role of culture which until relatively recently was largely absent in terrorism studies. Brannan et al are quite clear on this issue stating-

There is one fundamental issue relevant to such understanding that is rarely mentioned in terrorism studies...This is the issue of culture...the social dimensions of culture, that is, the unique collection of social roles, institutions, values, ideas, and symbols...radically conditions the way in which members see the world and respond to its challenges.⁶⁷

The formation of local culture through its collection of social roles, institutions, values, ideas, and symbols as a product of language also creates certain hierarchies and certain kinds of power-relations.⁶⁸ As Johnson and Cassell note “...any discourse is seen as empowering those people with the right to speak and analyse while subordinating others...”⁶⁹ Thus the importance of understanding the ontological nature of the local culture, whether community or organisationally based, formed through the use language, is critical because it allows the researcher to comprehend the structure of the local environment and appreciate those things that most influence how people see their world.

From both an epistemological and ontological perspective, SC provides a rich approach to understanding individual and small group attitudes and dynamics within a localised environment. It encompasses a loose set of frameworks that helps make sense of the constructive powers of the human mind by concentrating on conversations, conventions, and

⁶⁶ Ibid, 335.

⁶⁷ Brannan, Esler, and Strindberg, “Talking to “Terrorists,” 14.

⁶⁸ Dickens, “Social Constructionism as Cognitive Science,” 349.

⁶⁹ Phil Johnson and Catherine Cassell, “Epistemology and work psychology: New agendas,” *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology* 74, no. 2 (2001), 137.

cultural traditions.⁷⁰ Borrowing from Drake, Hosking and Morley sum this up well by saying “...the human mind as a device...has evolved to the point that it is exquisitely tailored to make sense of the world. Give it the slightest clue and off it goes, providing explanation, rationalism, [and] understanding.”⁷¹ It is also acknowledged that the epistemological and ontological influences of SC go beyond understanding those that are researched; they also influence the approach and analysis of the researcher.

Social Movement Theory

The final component of this integrative approach is social movement theory (SMT). Whereas ethnography is useful in getting at the gritty truth of the lived experience, and social constructionism is useful in understanding social processes that affect the attitudes and behaviour of individuals, culture, and small group dynamics, SMT is useful in understanding how ordinary people come together and form alliances to ‘confront elites, authorities, or other opponents’ by engaging in ‘contentious politics’.⁷² By creating these alliances or spheres, arguments or grievances can be projected collectively through symbolic action.⁷³ The use of contentious collective action such as protests has become a staple for the radical fringe that exists in London. As discussed in Chapter III, acting on personal grievances is one of the milestones in the radicalism process. Understanding some of the mechanisms that motivate these groups to form and how they interact with authorities segues well with the overall theme of this thesis. SMT has also gained its place in radicalisation studies as Zald and

⁷⁰ Dian-Marie Hosking and Ian E. Morley, “Social Constructionism in Community and Applied Social Psychology,” *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* 14, no.38 (2004), 318.

⁷¹ Ibid, 321.

⁷² Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 6.

⁷³ Steven Buechler, “New Social Movement Theories,” *The Sociological Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (1995), 442.

McCarthy confirm “One of the most promising theoretical frameworks applied to understanding radicalization processes...is Social Movement Theory.”⁷⁴

As noted earlier, the field portion of thesis broadly assembles the data in the form of case studies. Although that approach was undertaken to manage and build an effective framework for reporting the data, it also works well with SMT. As the name implies, social movements involve more than one or two actors. They constitute some sort of collective, alliance, or group. This is confirmed by Della Porta and Diani who characterise social movements as “conscious actors making rational choices...”⁷⁵ They go on to say “We will consider social movements...as (1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual [sic] issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms of protest.”⁷⁶ Although networks or collectives can mean many things, they clearly represent more than the individual. Robinson congeals the amorphous meanings of networks, collectives, and alliances by simply calling them ‘groups’ saying “SMT generally focuses on groups as the proper unit of analysis in explaining collective action.”⁷⁷ This simplification allows groups to be framed as ‘case studies’ irrespective of group characteristics.⁷⁸ Furthermore, Robinson explains that SMT generally uses a three pronged approach to case studies. First, how changes in political opportunity impact the increase or decrease collective action. On a grand scale, that could include something as significant as globalisation, but on the other end of the spectrum, and more importantly to this study, locally it could mean legal changes or changes in domestic policy.⁷⁹ Second, what the mobilising structures are of the collective, whether informal or formal, open or underground,

⁷⁴ Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, *Social Movements in an Organizational Society* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994) 2. Cited in Borum, *Radicalization into Violent Extremism 1: A review of Social Science Theories*, *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011), 16.

⁷⁵ Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1999) 9.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 16.

⁷⁷ Glenn E. Robinson, “ Hamas as Social Movement,” in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed) *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004) 115.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ Robinson, “ Hamas as Social Movement,” 116.

and how these affect recruitment, another pertinent issue.⁸⁰ Third, and perhaps most importantly, SMT assesses culture so that the stories, symbolism, and histories are understood.⁸¹

Another factor for including SMT into this integrated approach is that SMT acknowledges and in fact gives focus to the reality that social movements often create counter-movements. Counter-movements can exist in different forms but certainly the police, as an instrument of the state, are frequently identified as the biggest source of ‘institutional control’.⁸² As Della Porta and McCarthy explain “Protest policing is a particularly relevant issue for understanding the relationship between social movements and the state.”⁸³ Another example of a counter-movement pertinent to this study is the English Defence League (see Chapter VIII for more).

In conclusion, the addition of SMT to both ethnography and social constructionism makes for a well-rounded methodological/analytical approach. As has been discussed, these three factors complement one another well and offered alternative methods of analysis to fill in the gaps where they occurred. Using Ethnography as a foundational base, credibility and ‘undeniability’ (sic) are established by factually reporting the ‘irreducibility of the human experience’ of those studied. Social constructionism theory provides a fundamental understanding of the individual, including the epistemological and ontological influences that make up his/her worldview. Lastly, social movement theory provides the understanding of how alliances form to ‘confront elites, authorities, or other opponents’ by engaging in ‘contentious politics’. Finally, using these three as an integrative approach combined the micro (individual) and macro (social cultural) levels of analysis which made for a far more

⁸⁰ Ibid, 115.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 209.

⁸³ Della-Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*, 209.

effective framework, and one that is complementary to the inductive reasoning of qualitative research.⁸⁴

G. Reflexivity

Reflexivity refers to the influential nature that the researcher has on the research process because of the nature of the research, the questions he/she asks, and sometimes merely because of his/her presence.⁸⁵ Because this study is semi-ethnographic and qualitative in nature, it is inherently reflexive. The influences of that reflexivity manifest in two ways. First, when the researcher is an outsider to the community, group, or individual that he/she is studying, those that he/she interacts with will often temper their responses because the outsider is present.⁸⁶ Secondly, researchers themselves are not subjectively neutral and their own experience, values, and world views create their own biases towards whatever is being studied.⁸⁷ This reality was acknowledged in the discussion on social constructionism where the epistemological and ontological influences were admittedly found in both the researcher and those that are the subjects of his/her research. Some of that reflexivity or bias is clearly contained in the assumptions and hypotheses listed previously such as a better understanding of radicalisation and extremism will be an outcome and that policy makers will find relevance in this study.

More generally, the presence of a white non-Muslim male from outside the community and the organisational structure of the public safety agencies became immediately identifiable because of the foreign American accent. That identification undoubtedly carried with it all the preconceptions, misconceptions, and stereotyping of not only being an outsider, but an American outsider. It would be naïve to think that interaction with any group or

⁸⁴ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 19 & 38.

⁸⁵ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 109.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 108.

individual would not be tempered by the presence of the researcher and potentially more so by an American researcher in an environment such as this. That is not to suggest that the information obtained was intentionally misleading, only to acknowledge that as an outsider, the presence of the researcher inherently affected the data. Because reflexivity is a natural part of qualitative research, Creswell states that the best method of managing its influence is to acknowledge the “cultural, social, gender, class, and personal politics that we bring to the research.”⁸⁸ There is also the argument that data collected through ethnography is often obtained through developing trusted relationships rather than random sampling, making the process is inherently biased.⁸⁹ This is arguably true but in this case it was done intentionally and part of the research design. This research was not about reflecting the viewpoints of the masses. It is/was about exploring the views and reactions of those who are reacting most to the current counter-terrorism environment. As a result, the researcher recognises the inherent reflexive influences and biases of researcher and subject, whether intentionally constructed or not, and especially so when semi-structured interviews were conducted by those who sought to have their voice heard.

H. Data Collection

This study, and in fact this entire thesis was designed pragmatically within a number of ethical and practical limitations provided by the subject and the context. As repeatedly noted, it fundamentally sought the ‘ground truth’ by exploring the daily realities that challenge public safety personnel and Muslims alike in the current security environment. It is no coincidence that the research design, research methodology, and data collection methods were chosen to leverage the researcher’s public safety background. Years of professional experience of implementing United States counter-terrorism policy at the local level

⁸⁸ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 179.

⁸⁹ Bayard de Volo and Schatz, “From the Inside Out: Ethnographic Methods in Political Research,” 269.

repeatedly demonstrated that conceptually sound policies developed by central government were often problematic at the local level. Without question an empirical study based on concepts and theory would have been much easier. However, few if any of the realities would have been found, much less explored. As a result, the decision to engage in extensive fieldwork was chosen as the best method to understand and analyse the ‘ground truth’.

Before deciding on exactly who, where, and what to study, a series of exploratory trips to London were completed to build the relationships that would be needed for the fieldwork. These early exploratory ventures took place on 6 through 12 June, 27 June through 2 July, 19 through 20 July, and 28 November through 1 December, 2010, and included meetings with current and retired personnel from Metropolitan Police Services, London Fire Brigade, and Muslim leaders in the greater London area. Although in many ways the specifics would not be identified until several months later, the exploratory trips progressively solidified the decisions about data collection, including whom and what would be included in the case studies. They also significantly influenced the development of the Problem Statement contained in Chapter I by hearing first hand from practitioners what the local issues were. Those meetings ultimately resulted in the decision to collect data from the four primary groups:

1. Public safety agencies: Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and London Fire Brigade (LFB)
2. Other government
3. Community groups and individuals
4. The radical fringe

Macro and micro elements

There are several reasons why the above groups were selected. First, MPS and LFB are the two primary public safety service providers for the greater London area. They are, as previously discussed, the face of government at the local level. Additionally, MPS in particular is often criticised for its use of hard power in the contemporary counter-terrorism environment.⁹⁰ While LFB does not suffer from the same stigmas that plague the MPS, their role in creating effective bonds between ‘government’ and the ‘community’ while simultaneously providing public safety and security remains critical. Furthermore, because this thesis explores the delivery and receipt of counter-terrorism policy at the local level, both agencies became the natural choices.

At the community level, the boroughs of Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest were selected. The choice to use entire boroughs as data elements was twofold. First, during the exploratory trips to London, there was consistent agreement that the most prominent threat of violent extremism emanated from ‘east London’ and that Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest were areas of particular concern.⁹¹ Although empirical terrorism arrest statistics by borough are not publicly available, the arrests of twelve men on terrorism related charges on 20 December 2010 are consistent with those concerns; those arrested were from Cardiff, Stoke, and east London.⁹² Additionally, rather than attempting to work across all of London’s 32 boroughs, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest are home to some of the greatest concentration of Muslims; representing 36 percent and 15 percent of the population respectively.⁹³ See Map 6.1 for geographic reference.⁹⁴


⁹⁰ Rehman, “Islam, War on Terror and the Future of Muslim Minorities in the United Kingdom,” 831.

⁹¹ Exploratory discussions by author with public safety and community representatives June 8, 9, 28, 29, and 30, 2010.

⁹² Adam Gabbatt, Vikram Dodd, Steven Morris, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Anti-terror Police Arrest 12 in UK Raids,” *The Guardian*, 20 December 2010.

⁹³ Dobbs, Green, and Zealey, *Focus on Ethnicity and Religion* (Totton: Hobbs the Printers Ltd, 2006) 66.

⁹⁴ “Muslims in Britain,” <http://guide.muslimsinbritain.org/guide3.html> [Accessed 3 July 2010].



Map 6.1: Muslims in Britain.org

In addition to selecting which boroughs to concentrate research efforts in, two other locations warranted exploration; the North London Central Mosque (also known as the Finsbury Park Mosque) and the Brixton Mosque (also known as Masjid ibn Taymeeyah). These mosques are located in the boroughs of Islington and Lambeth respectively (see Map 6.1 above for geographic reference). During the late 1990s and early 2000s notable figures such as convicted terrorists Richard Reed and Zacarias Moussaoui, and militant preachers such as Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed, and Abdullah al Faisal were all prominent figures at either the Brixton or Finsbury Park Mosques.⁹⁵ During the exploratory trips to London, both Mosques were contacted and some preliminary information was received about the transition both organisations went through to expel their radical elements and reorganise as moderate non-violent places of worship. As a result, both became

⁹⁵ Jon Moran and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence, Security, and Policing Post-9/11: The UK's Response to the War on Terror* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 129; also see Michael Kenney, *Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy* (Middleton, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2008) 64.

invaluable resources to help understand the complexities and challenges that communities face in fighting extremism including the challenges they still face.

The second reason that entire boroughs were selected as data elements is that the community engagement teams that operate within the MPS and those that function within the LFB are also organised along the borough plan. This made for an effective and manageable match.

The last two data collection sources came from communities and individuals. This is not to suggest that they were in any way the least significant. In fact, they were the most significant for two very important reasons. First, organisations and communities are made up of individuals, without which those organisations and communities would cease to exist. Additionally, the behaviour of those organisations and communities is largely reflective of the individuals who make up those collectives.⁹⁶ This is precisely on target with the previous quote by Dickens; “...the ways we understand the world are formed by the ways in which we interact with each other in our local cultural milieu.”⁹⁷ In that sense, the collective sum of those individuals provided the macro element of this study because they constitute the communities and organisations that are being studied. Second, radicalisation as discussed in Chapter III is an individual process. Although groups of like-minded individuals may come together and may further perpetuate the adoption of radical ideology, it is ultimately the individual who becomes a security threat. In that sense, individuals also provided the micro element of this study.

Data collection for the field research included two primary methods: semi-structured interviews and participant observation.⁹⁸ These methods were selected because they are consistent with qualitative research methodology, a semi-ethnographic approach, and

⁹⁶ Derek Rollinson, *Organisational Behaviour and Analysis* (Harlow: Pearson Education UK, 2005) 3.

⁹⁷ Dickens, “Social Constructionism as Cognitive Science,” 335.

⁹⁸ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 9.

maximised research opportunities.⁹⁹ Additionally, because this was largely a field research project it would have been impossible to conceive of all possible research opportunities. As a result the use of snowballing techniques was employed. See section titled *Modification of the Original Plan* for more on snowballing.

By studying the four groups (Metropolitan Police Service and London Fire Brigade, other government, community groups and individuals, and the radical fringe), collecting data through semi-structured interviews and participant observation, and utilising snowballing techniques whenever possible, they combined well as an effective way to discover the ‘ground truth’ about the delivery and receipt of counter-terrorism policy in London’s contemporary security environment. Additionally, by exploring the daily lives and realities that challenge both public safety personnel and Muslims alike, a more thorough understanding of the discrete and nuanced influences that determine individual and group agency was achieved. Understanding individual and collective group agency is arguably an integral part of what is needed to answer the thesis question.

Timeframe

The fieldwork portion of this study was designed to last ten months. It was set to commence on or about 15 February 2011 and continue until 15 December 2011. However, flexibility was built into the plan so that it could be either lengthened or shortened to accommodate the overall research goal of intimately understanding the current environment and answering the research question confidently. Furthermore, this remains a very dynamic environment and in the spirit of developing the latest data available, some modification of the timeframe was both anticipated and needed. As such the first interview was done on 08 March 2011, and the last data from the fieldwork was collected on 01 June 2012.

⁹⁹ Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design*, 132.

Modification of the Original Plan

Nothing ever goes exactly according to plan and given the dynamic nature of ethnography, that notion was anticipated in this study. As noted above, although the fieldwork had anticipated start and end times, it required modification to maximise data collection and understanding. Moreover, although this research began by interviewing two key contacts, where that might lead was uncertain. That uncertainty, embraced within ethnographic methodology, allowed opportunity and the data to drive the research rather than limiting it to being carried out within a bounded structure. Thus, the use of ‘snowballing’ techniques was embraced so that new data could be discovered even when it was not anticipated.¹⁰⁰ Another reason ‘snowballing’ was used is that when roadblocks were encountered, it allowed for detours to be created with the least amount of disruption.¹⁰¹ For more on how this was maximised, see Issues, Obstacles, and Opportunities below.

Information Management, Ethics, and Safety

At the beginning of this chapter, two areas of concern were mentioned that required special consideration: the management of sensitive national security information should that information become known; and, the ethical use of human subjects in research. The following discussion outlines those steps taken to mitigate and manage both issues.

As discussed, this thesis explores a subject that is imbedded in the national security of the United Kingdom. Fundamentally, it explores radicalism that could lead to extremism and potentially violence. Additionally, working in cooperation with the Metropolitan Police Services and London Fire Brigade, there was a high potential to be exposed to personal

¹⁰⁰ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 102.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

information about individuals who they or the researcher came in contact with. The right of privacy is not only expected by individuals, it is a vested right codified by Parliament under law. In November, 1998, Parliament passed the Human Rights Act which adopted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).¹⁰² In Article 8 of the ECHR, fundamental human rights are established and include:

1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.¹⁰³

In addition to the basic human rights listed above, there are professional codes of conduct that are expected of every public safety employee. As a career fire officer with 29 years of experience, the researcher is well experienced in the expectations of privacy, confidentiality, and professionalism and those professional principles were applied during this study.

There was also the potential to be exposed to information associated with national security and criminal activity. Specifically on the topic of national security, the researcher was required to complete a research protocol for Metropolitan Police Services (MPS). As a component of that protocol, the researcher requested that a security clearance be provided although it was not deemed necessary by the MPS. Any exposure to sensitive information whether collected intentionally or not has been excluded from the thesis; only information

¹⁰² UK Parliament, "Human Rights Act 1998," <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/introduction> [Accessed September 17, 2010].

¹⁰³ European Convention on Human Rights, "Article 8," <http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#C.Art8> [Accessed September 17, 2010].

meeting the criteria of ‘open source’ is contained in the thesis. Last, had any information become known that a serious crime was being planned or had been committed, any promise of confidentiality would have been void and the appropriate law enforcement agency notified. Fortunately, that was not necessary.

The second area that required special attention was the use of human subjects in research. Before the fieldwork for this research began a plan was developed and submitted to the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) for approval. The plan discussed the overall aspects of the research and listed those steps necessary to mitigate and safeguard against any potential adverse consequences to the human welfare and wellbeing of those included in the research. This research was not anticipated to raise any significant ethical issues and most concerns were managed by anonymising (sic) the participants and/or their organisations, and obtaining consent when formal interviews were conducted. Some additional safeguards were needed to protect those that work in government such as omitting the dates of interviews. This was done because of the proliferation of computerised ‘work diaries’ that are used and the ability of supervisors to query information. As a result, a secured ‘master list’ of interviews has been maintained but no interview dates are included in the citations or bibliography for those in government service. As a result of those safeguards, the research plan was approved by UTREC on 14 January 2011 (reference no. IR7117).

Finally, researcher safety is something that always needs to be considered. In the case of this study, nearly all of the field research took place in the greater London area with the exception to one trip to Lebanon. While there is always the possibility of finding oneself in danger, the researcher drew on his years of professional experience working with marginalised populations in inner-city environments and his past knowledge travelling extensively in the Middle East collecting data and interviewing individuals in conflict areas.

Consequently, the element of risk was considered minimal and no formalised risk mitigation plan was developed.

I. Issues, Obstacles, and Opportunities

In order to conduct this research in a semi-ethnographic manner, the researcher moved to the London borough of Tower Hamlets. Tower Hamlets has the largest Muslim population of all London boroughs and that is where much of the work took place. Living in the same community that was studied was not only a logistical necessity, it provided the perspective needed to appreciate the full flavour of the lived experience.

Living and working in the same area that much of the research took place of course facilitated data collection but more importantly led to a richer understanding of the environment. Whether simply observing how people went about their daily lives, attending community meetings, or having a multitude of casual conversations with those in the community, a much more personal appreciation of the daily realities took place. One could not help but run into the same people, some of whom were subjects of this research and others not, in a variety of situations. The transformation over time was subtle but routinely seeing those individuals alone or with their families meant that the human component could not be ignored. It also facilitated ease of access. On several occasions the telephone would ring and an invitation to meet on short notice was received resulting in grabbing a coat and immediately running out the door for a spontaneous meeting. This added greatly to the data and unquestionably affected the reflexivity of the researcher and those included in the research.

The human element that developed over time unquestionably became the greatest example of reflexivity during this study. The repeated interaction with individuals meant that a gradual complex process of becoming an ‘insider’ while simultaneously remaining an

‘outsider’ took place. The more time that was spent with the various research subjects, the more personal the relationship. The result naturally became a source of trust and empathy for researcher and subject alike. Although there were clear areas of disagreement, there were also areas that one could not help but agree with. Whether cast terms of grievances or seeing first-hand the affects of state power on individuals and their families, the gap between insider/outsider, researcher and subject, narrowed over time.

The insider/outsider role and the undeniable human aspect also meant a certain degree of personal conflict was at times present and that required ongoing consideration and reconciliation in order to maintain as much neutrality as possible. As Hoffman and others have noted, one of the most notable observations of those that fit the pejorative label of ‘radical’, ‘extremist’, or ‘terrorist’ is how “disturbingly normal” they actually are.¹⁰⁴ That ‘normality’ was certainly found in this study and it became a powerful reflexive influence that affected researcher and subject alike.

The first interview was conducted on 08 March 2011 and in all, 117 separate interviews were conducted with 102 different individuals. The interviews broadly range from a Member of Parliament at one end of the spectrum to those that make up the radical fringe at the individual/community level at the other. By far, the largest single group interviewed was individuals who represented no one but themselves. This was followed by those that represented community based organisations who were well positioned to provide a collective sentiment for those they represented. Combined, this demographic of individuals and community/organisation leaders represented 58 percent of all interviewees (See Appendix 1 for complete data source statistics). Although there was not a set target for data collection from each group, emphasis was placed on this combined demographic so that the ‘lived experience’ could be documented. In contrast, only two individuals were interviewed that

¹⁰⁴ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, xi.

were in a position to affect policy. This is consistent with previous statements that this research was designed as a bottom up view to understand the ground truth and that the policy environment is accepted as given.

Consistent with doing a semi-ethnographic study, emphasis was placed broadly on understanding individuals, communities, and organisations. In addition to conducting interviews, the researcher attended ten protests, six community meetings, five academic workshops, three practitioner conferences, and one terrorism court proceeding in which two of the nine defendants lived within a few blocks of the researchers residence.

While the general focus of data collection remained on the delivery and consumption of counter-terrorism policy at the local level, this manifested in rather broad terms. Issues of identity, trust, equity, religion, foreign policy, ethnic culture, power, organisational culture, fairness, nationalism, legality, social networks, economics, political orientation, political expediency, and competitiveness all surfaced as part of the broader milieu. To suggest that this is anything less than a very complex environment would be in error. However, once consumed, digested, and internalised there is no question that all of these relate back to the key terms and concepts discussed in Chapters II and III: public, community, safety, security, government, radicalism, marginalism, and extremism.

The use of snowballing was absolutely essential in conducting this study. What began with two primary gatekeepers, a police contact and a fire contact, led to interviews with over 100 individuals. It is worth noting that the two primary gatekeepers helped make some very important initial introductions but did not serve as the primary points of contact within either the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) or London Fire Brigade (LFB). That task was assumed by two others (see below).

The need to develop relationships with gatekeepers in these types of organisational environments is a necessity, not an option. In public safety organisations, access would not

have occurred without the help of those on the inside. It is also acknowledged that gatekeepers have a vested interest in how their group or organisation is portrayed and ultimately 'guide' the researcher to those individuals that will provide the desired information. This reflexive relationship between researcher and gatekeeper is articulated well by Sanghera and Björkert who write "Gatekeepers sometimes attempt to control who does research on what topic, who you speak to, and the research findings."¹⁰⁵ Overcoming that influence was sometimes difficult but tenacity and drilling down as deep as possible proved effective; as mentioned 117 interviews were conducted during this research. The role of the gatekeepers was none the less critical. They provided invaluable perspective so that the local public safety organisational environment could be understood historically and culturally, and facilitated introductions with other organisations and individuals.

As noted above, there were two points of primary points of contact for the public safety agencies; one for the MPS and one for the LFB. It is also worth noting that except for the initial interviews conducted with each of them, the discussions, debates, meetings, emails, and telephone conversations numbered in the dozens and are not represented in the overall number of interviews conducted.

Although there were a significant number of interviews completed for this research, there were also significant challenges. Some were easily engaged and accessible but they were the exception rather than the rule. This was consistent across the spectrum of individuals and organisations. In some cases, requests for interviews were denied but it was more common for emails and phone messages to simply be ignored. This became commonplace especially once individuals were informed about the nature of the discussion. As an example, numerous requests (over ten) were made to one of the lead contacts for Preventing Violent Extremism in the borough of Tower Hamlets. Requests were made via

¹⁰⁵ Gurchathen Sanghera and Suruchi Thapar-Björkert, "Methodological Dilemmas: Gatekeepers and positionality in Bradford," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13, no.3 (2008), 549.

email, telephone, and through a colleague. Despite continued attempts over a four month period, all went unanswered. Similarly, a request was sent to a Member of Parliament for the local area. The reply received stated “Unfortunately, due to the high number of similar requests that Rushanara receives and the pressures on her diary, we are not able to accommodate your request at this time.”¹⁰⁶ In other instances, after multiple emails a meeting would be arranged weeks or months in advance only to be cancelled a few days before it took place. Although the public safety agencies were a little more accessible, there were still challenges in gaining access, especially with top management.

Gaining access to those individuals pejoratively labelled as terrorists, extremists, or Islamist’s, also presented its unique challenges. Before long, the label of ‘CIA spy’ was attached to my presence by one of the leading members. This was anticipated given the nature of the group and as Atkinson and Hammersley confirm “...field researchers are frequently suspected, initially at least, of being spies...”¹⁰⁷ In some cases, the CIA spy label was overcome and with others it was not. Despite the pejorative labelling, access to this group was fruitful and typically achieved by attending their protests, making contacts, and then following up via text messages to set up personal interviews. Accessing this group also required access through the police cordons and barricades at protest sites but there was no pass or other authorisation provided by the MPS. In several instances the police attempted to deny access but determination prevailed and access was gained by ‘sneaking’ in with the media or slipping into ‘the pen’ with the crowd of Islamists as they entered the area.

As mentioned, a total of ten protests were attended and of those six were organised by Muslims Against Crusades (MAC), a group that formed in 2010, or by Anjem Choudary,

¹⁰⁶ Rushanara Ali, email received 26 October 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Paul Atkinson and Martyn Hammersley, *Ethnography: Principle and Practice*, 3rd ed. (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2007) 63.

former leader of the proscribed al Muhajiroun group.¹⁰⁸ Many of the principal individuals historically associated with al Muhajiroun would attend MAC organised protests so it was to no one's amazement that when MAC was proscribed on 10 November 2011 the Home Secretary Theresa May commented "I am satisfied Muslims Against Crusades is simply another name for an organisation already proscribed under a number of names including Al Ghurabaa, The Saved Sect, Al Muhajiroun and Islam4UK."¹⁰⁹

In addition to meeting and arranging to interview the 'extremists' at protest events, access was provided for the researcher to join online chat rooms (Paltalk) and to become 'Facebook friends' with several individuals from the above mentioned group(s). The relationship was an extremely delicate one and opportunities for access would open for a period then shut down. The cycle of access then no access became a consistently recurring theme throughout the research period.

These examples of who was contacted and how are provided to demonstrate the challenges across the spectrum of 'communities' that were studied. Although many of the obstacles encountered could be classified as procedural or cultural, it should also be noted that there is a major stigma that surrounds this topic and it exists across the spectrum of communities studied. Even those from the mainstream were often reticent and accusations that the researcher worked for the police or security service were common. Despite the challenges, the data obtained was rich and provides a window into a world that few ever see. The next two chapters report that data.

¹⁰⁸ Protests attended: Osama bin Laden Eulogy, 06 May 2011, Grosvenor Sq; Islamic Emerits March, 30 July 2011, Walthamstow; United East End, 03 September 2011, Whitechapel; English Defence League Protest, 03 September 2011, Aldgate; You've Lost the War Protest, 11 September 2011 Grosvenor Sq; Stop the Massacre, 01 October 2011 Syrian Embassy; Trade Unions Protest, 30 November 2011, Lincoln's Inn Fields; United Ummah, 02 December 2011, Grosvenor Sq; Protest Against American Soldiers Urinating on Dead Afghans, 20 January 2012, Syrian Action Committee, 01 June 2012, protest against the massacre of children in Houla Syria. It is also noted that the United Ummah protest was not organised under the MAC banner but did result in the arrest of 20 'MAC' members for meeting as members of a proscribed organisation.

¹⁰⁹ Home Office, "Terror Organisation Proscribed," 09 November 2011, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/mac-proscription> [Accessed 10 November 2011].

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Chapter VII

Case Studies from Fieldwork

“The first casualty of war is truth”
-Aeschylus

The following is the first of two reporting chapters that delivers the raw results of the data obtained during the fieldwork portion of this thesis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis uses a semi-ethnographic approach and a bottom-up orientation to discover the ground truth within and about the current counter-terrorism environment. The reporting in this chapter develops a semi-ethnographic portrait profiling the lived experience of those studied and contains data from individuals and groups that make up the first three of the four macro case studies: public safety agencies, other government, and communities and individuals.

Critically, the information contained in this chapter needs to be considered, measured, and contrasted against the information and themes contained in previous chapters. Specifically the notion of public, community, public safety, public security, and process, power, and exclusion from Chapter II is highly relevant to the discussion that follows. Furthermore, the idea of what it means to be marginalised and radicalised, the intent of government policy, and how groups and individuals deliver and consume that policy should be weighed against the data that follows. Understanding the real life manifestations of these notions is critically important to appreciate the lived experience of individuals and that understanding is further needed in the analysis chapter.

The data for this study was obtained using semi-structured and unstructured interviews, and participant observation. In all cases the interview and observation data is

primary; it was obtained first hand and directly from the source. There is some limited quantitative data from government sources included but only to support the larger discussion.

Structurally, the reporting of the three macro case studies, public safety, other government, and community and individuals included in this chapter will be done by group. By developing the case studies in this manner, each of the groups can be understood more easily, the environment can be explicitly defined, and the ‘ethnographic snapshot’ that is developed will assist in framing some of the information that will be used later in the analysis chapter. Nothing has been sanitised and this is not an aseptic environment. It is an unfiltered reporting of what people think, how they feel and what they say.

A. Macro Case Studies

Public Safety Agencies

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is a massive organisation. Founded by Sir Robert Peel in 1829, it covers an area of 620 square miles, protects a population of approximately 7.2 million people, and employs 32,500 officers, 14,200 staff, 230 traffic wardens, and 4,300 community support officers.¹ When Peel organised the MPS, he did so with the belief that the police should be integrated members of the community.² The department strives to keep Peel’s legacy alive and diligently works to have its force seen ‘as citizens in uniform’ but that notion is decidedly challenged in today’s counter-terrorism environment.³ In truth, the police units that are included in this research are trying to manoeuvre through a very complex and challenging policy environment. They are attempting

¹ Metropolitan Police Service, “About the Metropolitan Police Service,” www.met.police.uk/about [Accessed 23 February 2011].

² Metropolitan Police Service, “History of the Metropolitan Police,” www.met.police.uk/history/definition.htm [Accessed 23 February 2011].

³ Wilkinson, *Homeland Security in the UK*, 10.

to manage their statutory obligations on one hand without affecting the wholesale alienation of the community on the other.

The MPS has long been involved in counter-terrorism because of the historical conflicts in Northern Ireland. Specialist counter-terrorism units can be traced back to 1883 when ‘Special Branch’ was created in response to the ‘subversives and revolutionaries’ of the time, the Fenians.⁴ Special Branch has long been rooted in the intelligence side of policing whereas its organisational cousin, the Anti-Terrorist Branch was formed as an investigatory squad in the 1970s.⁵ Special Branch and the Anti-terrorism Branch were consolidated in 2006 into what is now the Counterterrorism Command (SO15).⁶ Proudly posted on the MPS website “The command’s overriding priority is to keep the public safe and do all it can to ensure that London remains a hostile environment for terrorists.”⁷

Due to the size of the MPS and limitations of this thesis, it would be impossible to succinctly build a comprehensive profile for the entire organisation. Instead, research efforts were focused on those groups tasked with interacting with Muslim communities; the Muslim Contact Unit and the Prevent Community Engagement Teams, both are organised under SO15.

The Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) was conceived in late 2001 following the invasion of Afghanistan and became operational in January 2002.⁸ The MCU was conceptualised as a way to engage and partner with Muslim leaders so that the nature and extent of the terrorist threat to London could be better understood.⁹ Put more candidly, one officer confided that “...the MCU was established to avoid the same mistakes we made with the Irish who were all

⁴ Bernard Porter, *The Origins of the Vigilant State* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1987) 9.

⁵ Interview with police officer 2.2.2.

⁶ Metropolitan Police Service, “Special Operations,” www.met.police.uk/so/counter_terrorism.htm. [Accessed 23 February 2011].

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Robert Lambert Interview, 20 May 2011.

⁹ Ibid.

viewed with suspicion, when only a handful were involved in violence. We didn't want to make the same mistakes with the Muslims.”¹⁰

The MCU remains today much like it did in 2002, a small group of nine highly dedicated officers, five of whom are Muslim, who are committed to the premise that counter-terrorism is not solely defined within the counter-terrorism agenda but is about building trusted partnerships within the community across a spectrum of issues.¹¹ Because of that fundamental premise, the MCU selects its personnel very carefully. Unlike other functional groups which survive a steady stream of people who “pop in for couple of years to get the box ticked for the next promotion and then move on, the MCU is involved in long-term work and people need to be there for the long haul to gain the trust and credibility of the community.”¹²

Although the size of the MCU has not changed, its role has expanded by providing advice, coordination, support, and facilitation between Muslim community leaders and groups, and other policing units. For example when the Imam of the Muslim Welfare House in Finsbury Park was murdered on 02 September 2011, MCU officers responded, providing coordination and facilitation for other MPS personnel, and support and information to community leaders to stopgap potential reactions. One of the most important aspects of policing in this environment is information management.¹³ As one officer put it “Issues gain momentum through myth, rumour, and conspiracy, and it needs to be controlled before it gets out of hand.”¹⁴

Despite the coordination and support provided by the MCU to other MPS groups, MCU officers are often seen as ‘pariahs’ within the police force. As one officer confided “even fellow officers see us as someone who’s gotten too close, someone whose gone

¹⁰ Participant observation, 24 May 2011.

¹¹ Interview with police officer 2.8.2.

¹² Interview with police officer 2.9.2.

¹³ Participant observation, 24 May 2011.

¹⁴ Interview with police officer 2.2.2.

native.”¹⁵ Things can be equally challenging between the MCU and Muslim community leaders. Although the MCU has successfully built many strong relationships, it is not universal. At some mosques, they are still likely to have the door slammed in their face.¹⁶

The Prevent Community Engagement teams were introduced in 2007 following the roll out of the Prevent strategy highlighted in Chapter V.¹⁷ The Prevent teams have a bigger organisational footprint but they still only number approximately 45 officers.¹⁸ Originally piloted across four boroughs (Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Newham, and Hounslow), they now have a presence in all boroughs.¹⁹ Boroughs with a higher concentration of Muslims are considered ‘high priority’ and have higher numbers of Prevent officers assigned.²⁰ The ‘high priority’ boroughs normally have three Prevent officers assigned whereas boroughs with a minimal Muslim population share one.²¹ Theoretically the teams were created to partner with the community, thus advancing the Prevent strategy of ‘stopping people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism’.²²

The Prevent teams became functional in 2007/2008. Their first tasks were to make their presence known and to ‘map’ their communities as a way of looking for opportunities to engage.²³ This plan backfired for a number of reasons. First, when Prevent was implemented, the Home Office did little else than announce it was part of CONTEST.²⁴ There was no media campaign or any coordinated effort to introduce the policy to the public. Given that Muslim communities had only been exposed to the Pursue side of the CONTEST strategy, they became immediately suspicious of additional SO15 officers in their midst.²⁵ As one

¹⁵ Interview with police officer 2.9.2.

¹⁶ Interview with police officer 2.13.1.

¹⁷ Interview with police officer 2.5.1.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Interview with police officer 2.12.1.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 80.

²³ Interview with police officer 2.12.1.

²⁴ Interview with police officer 2.6.1.

²⁵ Ibid.

officer lamented “It was a lot easier when I was borough based and not part of SO15. Now that they know we’re from SO15, no one wants to talk to you.”²⁶ The government’s failure was not limited to addressing the public. As one officer stated “when we started there was virtually no direction as to what we were supposed to do. We had to make it up as we went along.”²⁷

Like the MCU, the Prevent teams help facilitate access for other MPS officers and to the community. Trust between immigrant communities and the police remains tentative often because immigrants retain historical legacies from their countries of origin where the police cannot be trusted. A Prevent officer provided the example of a victim of domestic violence who would not call 999 to ask for help but did reach out to a female Prevent officer she knew and that facilitated further action.²⁸

Prevent teams, like their MCU counterparts, are sometimes stigmatised as being soft and outside of traditional policing. Part of this can be attributed to MCU and Prevent team activities being coordinated centrally which means they are not part of normal borough policing or objectives.²⁹ Friction also exists with MCU and Prevent team officers, and those who use harder traditional policing methods. As stated by one officer “Pursue is extremely tainted in the eyes of the community and it makes it difficult to do our jobs.”³⁰ Another confided-

As a police officer, before 1984, I could stop you for no reason. I could search you or your car anytime I wanted to. It was perfectly legal. But in 1984 PACE was implemented and that changed how policing was done. There were guidelines we had to follow. With Pursue, we’re right back to 1983 again.³¹

²⁶ Interview with police officer 2.12.1.

²⁷ Interview with police officer 2.5.1.

²⁸ Interview with police officer 2.12.1.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Interview with police officer 2.7.1.

³¹ Interview with police officer 2.13.1.

The MCU and Prevent teams work hard to build strong community relationships and this can create friction at times between the MCU, the Prevent teams, and the community because of overlapping turf. Although both the MCU and Prevent teams are centrally coordinated, the Prevent teams are borough based while the MCU is organised geographically by city quadrant (north, south, east and west). Both have considerable investment and interaction with faith and community groups in their respective areas. For completely different reasons, a Prevent team might visit a mosque only to have the same mosque visited that same day by the MCU. The Police/mosque relationship is delicate. Too much police presence can easily undermine the credibility of mosque leaders with their congregation. As one officer confided, “If I go to a mosque to talk about Prevent, I have to be careful where and when I do that because when I leave, I’m going to leave them with a pile of shit that will be difficult for them to sort out.”³² The delicate police/community relationship also leads to friction between the MCU and Prevent teams. As one officer confided “We had someone here from the MCU last week...Of course they want us to tell them what we’re doing and we’re saying, no, fuck off, you should be telling us what you are doing.”³³ Despite occasional intergroup friction, both groups are quick to put the needs of the organisation first.

One of the most challenging issues to pin down was the sense of threat. Although each borough has a counter-terrorism intelligence officer, it was made clear that they would not be willing to discuss the current threat analysis. This is attributed to the fact that intelligence reports are not available in the public domain. Additionally, intelligence documents are generally not widely distributed even within secure environments such as the police. Individuals still have to demonstrate there is ‘a need to know’ which is often not the case for those tasked with community engagement. Similarly, attempts to categorise the threat posed by Al Muhajiroun (AM) could not be quantified (for more on AM and threat see

³² Interview with police officer 2.13.1.

³³ Interview with police officer 2.5.1.

Chapter VIII). One senior officer who was in contact with Omar Bakri Mohammed and Abu Hamza in the late 1990s and early 2000s said “We knew they were there but did not see them as much of a threat.”³⁴ That is not to suggest that because AM was not considered a threat then that the police do not consider them a threat now. The Association of Chief Police Officers lists AM as one of the nine groups it monitors and several sources confirmed that AM is the only organised ‘extremist’ group operating in London. However, despite AM being considered a threat from an organisational perspective, individual officers seem to take them in stride as being just another part of the broader milieu that makes up London.

Last, despite the considerable resources the MPS has dedicated to community engagement, it is necessary to keep things in perspective. Out of approximately 1700 who work in the Counter-terrorism Command, there are approximately 53 who do street level community engagement under Prevent.³⁵ That is not to argue that the approach is imbalanced but does establish a sense of priority. Additionally, it means that those who are tasked with the ‘softer’ side of policing have a lot they are responsible for. For a list of community engagement programmes that are delivered by the police, see the section titled ‘Other Government’ and the discussion on ACPO.

London Fire Brigade

The London Fire Brigade (LFB) was formed in 1862 when insurance companies determined they could no longer provide fire protection to the city of London because it was too expensive.³⁶ With a staff of 7,000 they are now the third largest fire-fighting organisation

³⁴ Interview with police officer 2.2.2.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ London Fire Brigade, “Metropolitan Fire Brigade,” <http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/metropolitanfirebrigade.asp> [Accessed 13 March 2011].

in the world.³⁷ The LFB is no stranger to the realities of terrorism either. It endured the Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing campaigns that occurred throughout London from 1973 to 2000 and in 2005 responded to the 7 July bombings.

The LFB has been very careful about how it has positioned itself in the counter-terrorism environment and much of that can be traced back to the IRA. During ‘The Troubles’, the police and military were targeted regularly but the fire department mostly avoided casualties by making it clear they were not part of the police.³⁸ That legacy has remained and as one fire officer explained “We make it clear to the public that we do not have a defined role with the police on counter-terrorism.”³⁹ That publicly stated position has allowed the fire department to maintain positive community relations despite its statutory duty to be prepared for acts of terrorism.⁴⁰

Prior to 9/11 the fire department saw terrorism as the exclusive remit of the police and was “very much outside the CT world.”⁴¹ However, since 9/11 LFB has steadily increased its capability and capacity to respond to terror events, be more involved in the information/intelligence sharing environment, and carry out its statutory responsibilities within the CONTEST workstreams. Yet, those activities are clearly very carefully negotiated. When queried about the LFB’s role in CONTEST, the reply received was “LFB is actively engaged in all *three* strands of CONTEST.”⁴² This typifies LFB’s strategic distancing from anything that might be even remotely associated with the police or with Pursue. Even LFB’s disclosure regarding response was decidedly muted; “CBRN is not a hidden activity but it is

³⁷ London Fire Brigade “About Us,” <http://www.london-fire.gov.uk/whoweare.asp> [Accessed 13 March 2011].

³⁸ Interview with fire officer 1.10.3.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Parliament, *Civil Contingencies Act 2004*, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office) 1.

⁴¹ Interview with fire officer 1.8.3.

⁴² Interview with fire officer 1.2.2.

not advertised either. We only advertise our capabilities to those [strategic partners] that call for service.”⁴³ Put more plainly one officer stated-

The fire brigade is generally not as concerned about the threat as the police. If there is an attack, it won't be us who has to answer why it was missed. We'll just be the ones who have to clean it up.⁴⁴

LFB's role in CONTEST is more limited than just staying away from the stigma of the police and the Pursue workstream, it has distanced itself from Prevent too. As one officer explained, “Prevent is a sensitive issue. If a borough publicly adopts Prevent then it essentially admits that it has a radicalisation problem and that is not something most boroughs want to publicly acknowledge.”⁴⁵ Instead, LFB has opted for a more universal approach to CT; one that emphasises community safety and community cohesion.⁴⁶ As one officer explained “Radicalisation is not necessarily different from other social problems. Anti-social behaviour, gangs, whatever, it's all about people who are vulnerable and are being channelled down a path that is unproductive.”⁴⁷ Another stated “If you do a map overlay of the most deprived areas, those with the lowest community cohesion, and those that are most likely at risk for radicalisation, they would fit nearly on top of one another.”⁴⁸ Interestingly, as the previous quotes confirms, LFB is keenly aware of the link between social agency, marginalisation, and radicalisation. LFB's selective approach is exemplified by the following. LFB was invited by the police to be a part of a programme called Workshop to Raise Awareness about Prevent (WRAP). After attending the first couple of meetings, it

⁴³ Interview with fire officer 1.2.2.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Interview with fire officer 1.9.3.

⁴⁶ Interview with fire officer 1.8.3.

⁴⁷ Interview with fire officer 1.9.3.

⁴⁸ Interview with fire officer 1.8.3.

decided it would not participate because it (WRAP) was “too focused on the AQ threat and terrorism”.⁴⁹

LFB’s universal approach is probably best characterised by a week long programme it runs called Local Intervention Fire Education (LIFE) for kids 13-17 years old. Participants are referred by schools, local councils, youth offending teams, and the police because they have offended or are at risk of offending, they lack confidence, have low self esteem, lack a strong identity, or have no positive role model to follow.⁵⁰ The programme uses a mixture of drills and classroom activities to improve motivation, self-confidence, discipline, team-building, and communication skills.⁵¹ LIFE has been highly successful and recently completed its 500th week long class. Programme evaluation is completed by the LFB’s statutory partners who evaluate participants at the end of the programme, then at 3, 6, and 12 month intervals and report the results back to LFB.⁵² The programme was largely funded through local councils but in 2008 money became short and funding was reduced. Some of LIFE’s participants clearly fall within the Prevent agenda but when LFB was offered Prevent money to run the programme it chose not to accept it because the reporting and governance requirements were inconsistent with LFB’s universal approach to community safety and cohesion. As one officer stated “We couldn’t take the money because the programme had to be for Muslim kids and could only be done at the mosque. It was just too restrictive.”⁵³ Ironically, when the LIFE programme was mentioned to those involved with the Channel programme at MPS, they had never heard of it (see section titled ‘Other Government’ for more on Channel).

⁴⁹ Interview with fire officer 1.3.2.

⁵⁰ Interview with fire officer 1.5.2.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

Without question, LFB's LIFE programme has been its most publicly oriented approach to CT. But LFB is also facing pressure from above to expand its terrorism remit. One of the ways that is happening is the development of a closer working relationship with the police and local council. As one fire officer put it-

We are doing a lot more now with the police and local council. If they have a community event, only a few people will show up. But when the pump arrives and the doors are open, there are people and kids crawling all over it. So even though we may not be directly involved with whatever the organisation is doing, we can still be a valuable partner.⁵⁴

Despite an increased commitment to interagency cooperation, some internal and external conflicts emerge. Following a multi-agency interdisciplinary exercise in 2000 called Trumpcard, greater coordination between the police and fire departments was encouraged. While each agency worked well on their own, there were no real joint response plans.⁵⁵ Following 9/11, that coordination was further necessitated and the Interagency Liaison Officer (ILO) programme began.⁵⁶ The ILO's assist with interagency coordination on emergency incidents and serve as designated points of contact for the fire department on terrorism related issues.⁵⁷ All ILO's have security clearances and access to intelligence based on a need to know basis which is determined by the police. As one fire officer confided "Information sharing has increased since Mumbai but interagency communication is kept at arm's length."⁵⁸ Put more abruptly another stated "Nope, we don't get shit."⁵⁹ The response to this topic spanned the spectrum but does raise the question of how threats might be

⁵⁴ Interview with fire officer 1.9.3.

⁵⁵ Interview with fire officer 1.1.2.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Interview with fire officer 1.4.2.

⁵⁹ Interview with fire officer 1.2.2.

perceived differently by each organisation and how the fire department should prepare and participate.

There is clearly a lower overall sense of threat by the fire department. In part that may be because of some inherent scepticism regarding the intelligence they receive. As one officer explained “The problem with intelligence is that at some point...there is a subjective assessment that takes place and who is to say that that assessment is right? What you end up with many times is an assessment based on a whole bunch of other subjective assessments and if you get one part wrong, the whole thing could be wrong.”⁶⁰ Unlike the police and intelligence services that expanded significantly after 7/7, the fire department’s expansion was much more tempered and mostly limited to expanding its hazardous materials capability. When asked what effects 7/7 had on LFB the answer was “After 7/7 not much really changed. Even Londoners pretty much took it in stride...the day after 7/7 people got right back on the buses and tubes.”⁶¹

There is also some criticism towards the government and its assessment of threat. As one assessed-

There’s a disconnect in the top down approach. It’s the people on the ground who should be advising the government on what they need across all the emergency services. The government is a nanny state in the truest sense. They want to control everything, and anything that is perceived to threaten anyone is dealt with harshly.⁶²

LFB has carefully constructed its positioning and image on all counter-terrorism issues but its role is changing and not just in the Prepare and Protect workstreams of CONTEST. When queried about where this might lead, a couple of themes surfaced. The first

⁶⁰ Interview with fire officer 1.10.3.

⁶¹ Interview with fire officer 1.8.3.

⁶² Interview with fire officer 1.10.3.

is that the fire service is uniquely positioned to engage with the community. As one officer noted “...everybody loves the fire service and that is the advantage we have.”⁶³ More specifically, another officer said “That relationship means that the fire department is uniquely positioned to deliver the CT message to the community that the police just don’t have. We would have to make sure we also maintained our neutrality so that there was no perception we were spying on them.”⁶⁴

These are new and expanding roles for LFB and given the LIFE programme only began in 2002 it will take some time for this to evolve. In perspective, one officer commented “Prior to LIFE, LFB had little or no public engagement- we were just the ones behind the big red doors. But now we fully understand the benefits of community engagement.”⁶⁵ Although some are thinking about how LFB can expand its communication with the community on CT related issues, they are small in number. More than one source remarked “The biggest challenge remains changing organisational culture.”⁶⁶

Despite the organisational struggles and occasional conflict, the MPS and LFB personnel that were interviewed were all highly professional and dedicated. They work hard to negotiate a positive result despite what can only be described as a challenging political, organisational, and societal environment. Most notable though are the differences in approach. The police, despite their desire to be seen as citizens in uniform, maintain a 1700 member strong counter-terrorism structure with less than 60 officers actually engaging with the community. That engagement is mostly done through access and facilitation. The fire service, although limited in scope has absorbed the CT environment into their existing remit and engagement is accomplished through community safety and cohesion. As one fire officer

⁶³ Interview with fire officer 1.9.3.

⁶⁴ Interview with fire officer 1.10.3.

⁶⁵ Interview with fire officer 1.5.2.

⁶⁶ Interview with fire officer 1.6.3.

stated “It’s all about understanding the human terrain and being able to contextualise it objectively.”⁶⁷

B. Other Government

As discussed in the previous chapter, coordination and influence often comes from outside public safety agencies. The ‘other government’ groups span several organisations such as elected officials, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Department of Communities and Local Government, Association of Chief Police Officers, local council, and finally ‘think tanks’. These groups are included because they either influence or reflect how policy is carried out. Because ‘think tanks’ are outside of the normal government structure, their names will not be disclosed in the interest of anonymity.

As mentioned, there were two individuals who were in a position to directly affect policy; Jim Fitzpatrick, a Member of Parliament for Tower Hamlets and Lord Carlile of Berriew, the Independent Reviewer of Counter-terrorism Policy from 2001 to 2011. Carlile was also appointed to provide independent oversight of the Prevent strategy review in 2011.⁶⁸ To frame the discussion that follows, it is helpful to present things from a top down perspective which means that Lord Carlile is the natural starting point.

One of the main reasons Lord Carlile was appointed the independent reviewer of terrorism policy was for his commitment to defending human rights.⁶⁹ However, there is little publicly available on Carlile’s recommendations other than a series of reports on the use of control orders between 2006 and 2011. Despite Carlile’s reputation as a staunch advocate for human rights, Carlile supported the use of control orders throughout this period using the

⁶⁷ Interview with police officer 2.14.2.

⁶⁸ Lord Carlile, “Recent Changes in Terrorism Law: An Insiders Perspective,” Lecture, Kings College, 03 September 2011.

⁶⁹ Lord Carlile, “Submissions to the ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel,” www.ejp.icj.org/img/carlile-transcript.pdf [Accessed 06 February 2012]. Also see BBC News, “Terror Laws Watchdog Lord Carlile Appointed CBE,” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16365590> [Accessed 26 August 2012].

argument of ‘proportionality’. It also appears that Carlile became far less an advocate of human rights over time. Beginning in 2006, his statement “I remain of the view that control orders remain a largely effective necessity...” solidifies his position.⁷⁰ In later reports, he states that “There is ample evidence of co-operation [sic] between the authorities and those communities [Muslim] whose compliance with the law is often an example to others.”⁷¹ In Lord Carlile’s final 2011 report, he states “The control order system continued to function reasonably well in 2010 despite some challenging court decisions and unremitting political controversy.”⁷² The court decisions that Carlile is referring to include the European Court on Human Rights (ECHR) which concluded that control orders in the case of *A. and Others v. the United Kingdom* were in conflict with Article 5, the right to liberty, and a similar decision by the House of Lords which necessitated a complete review of the control order scheme.⁷³

When the coalition government came to power in 2010, a review of UK counter terrorism strategy was completed. This was premised by a statement from the Home Secretary, Theresa May, in July of 2010, who was quoted to say that she was “...looking at correcting the ““mistakes”” made by the Labour government...”⁷⁴ Given the coalition government’s publicly stated position that the previous policy environment was flawed, that Baroness Neville Jones, Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism, echoed Theresa May’s position when she stated “...the mistakes have blotted out a good deal of the progress,” and that Carlile was the independent overseer of those flawed policies, it seems

⁷⁰ Lord Carlile, *Fourth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2010) 10.

⁷¹ Lord Carlile, *Fifth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2010) 36.

⁷² Lord Carlile, *Sixth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2011) 1.

⁷³ European Court of Human Rights, “Judgment *A & Others v. the United Kingdom*,” <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=3&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=3455/05&sessionid=88595278&skin=hudoc-pr-en> [Accessed 15 March 2012].

Also see- “House of Lords Opinions,”

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldjudgmt/jd071031/homejj.pdf>, [Accessed 15 March 2012].

⁷⁴ Duncan Gardham and Tom Whitehead, “Civil liberties drive by Coalition government sees review of key counter-terrorism legislation,” *The Guardian*, 13 July 2010.

incomprehensible that Carlile was then asked to provide oversight on the Prevent review, another highly contentious policy.⁷⁵ This seems even more puzzling when contrasted to the latest CONTEST document which refers to “...our fundamental values and... advances our commitment to human rights and the rule of law.”⁷⁶ During the course of this study, the researcher queried Lord Carlile about the timing and any pressure regarding his departure as the independent reviewer of CT policy and position as the independent overseer of the Prevent review. His reply, “No, I decided it was time for me to step down. The reason I stayed on to oversee the Prevent review was because I was already vetted and it just made sense.”⁷⁷

Arguably, these examples reflect not only on Lord Carlile but also the government’s lack of understanding of how these powers and policies are perceived by the community (see the forthcoming discussion on communities), its unremitting commitment to stay the course, and incongruent use of hard and soft power mechanisms to respond to the threat.

The other public official that was interviewed was Jim Fitzpatrick, Member of Parliament for Tower Hamlets. Mr Fitzpatrick was asked how the community was reacting to the current CT environment. His reply was surprising; “Counter-terrorism is just not a prominent concern in my district”⁷⁸ He continued by saying “I don’t detect any theme that the Prevent policy or stop and search is being directed at a particular group. I get the same number of complaints from other groups.”⁷⁹ Mr Fitzpatrick’s remarks on this issue silently raised the obvious question about whether complaints from the community were overstated. That question was put to rest by two additional remarks; “There have been a number of

⁷⁵ Baroness Neville-Jones, “A new Approach to Counter-Radicalization,” Council on Foreign Relations, 01 April 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/new-approach-counter-radicalization/p24579> [Accessed 06 June 2011].

⁷⁶ Home Office, CONTEST 2011, 10.

⁷⁷ Lord Carlile interview, 03 September 2011.

⁷⁸ Jim Fitzpatrick interview, 07 November 2011.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

people arrested in Tower Hamlets but no one is asking why.⁸⁰” The inference was that although several people had been arrested, there was a tacit presumption of guilt. Perhaps most telling though was one of his final comments “When I am out in the community, I get a sense of things not being right”⁸¹

Within the Home Office, the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) and Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) have partnered for years on CT policy and implementation. The OSCT retains overall responsibility for national CT policy but the remit of DCLG is to facilitate integration within the community.⁸² As explained by one DCLG employee “A lot of the risk from terrorism comes from communities that are not properly integrated and don’t share the British identity.”⁸³ Drawing a parallel from the Northern Ireland experience, there was agreement by both OSCT and DCLG interviewees that “...since the early 80s, the UK has realised that its security strategy could not be effective without community engagement.”⁸⁴

One of the primary means for assessing resiliency to terrorism was through a programme run by DCLG called National Indicator 35 (NI35). NI35 was intended to measure the effectiveness of community engagement with Muslim communities by local councils.⁸⁵ As a part of the Prevent agenda, local councils were encouraged to build partnerships with Muslim communities and thus implicitly furthering integration.⁸⁶ However, many local councils viewed NI35 and more generally, Prevent as problematic. As one interviewee confided “We ...did NI35 reporting... but NI35 was very subjective and was often politicised and open for abuse.”⁸⁷ NI35 was ultimately discarded because of widespread pushback by

⁸⁰ Jim Fitzpatrick interview, 07 November 2011.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Interview with DCLG representative 5.5.3.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Interview with Home Office representative 5.5.2.

⁸⁵ Home Office, *Self-assessing Local Performance Against NI 35* (London: Office of Public Management, n.d.)

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⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Interview with local council representative, 5.9.2.

local councils who questioned its effectiveness and because it was seen as ‘paternalistic’.⁸⁸ DCLG staff explained saying “It’s the Secretary of State’s policy to allow boroughs to self-govern and for us it was just too hard to try and keep track of NI35 reporting on 300 local authorities.”⁸⁹ Additionally, there was no report card ever developed that kept track of how effective communities were under NI 35 guidelines.⁹⁰

The clarity of the community engagement/integration/Prevent/counterterrorism theme was well articulated with the following statement “If you look at Prevent as a strategy, then integration is an approach to achieving that strategy.”⁹¹ Ironically, despite the importance of ‘integration’ and ‘shared values’ articulated in policy documents, those assigned to DCLG to work on integration only number approximately 25.⁹² Similarly, despite the widespread acceptance of the fire service by the public, both the DCLG and Home Office acknowledged that their role has been under-used in assisting schools, youth groups, and mosques to deliver messages on integration, cohesion, and CT. Both the DCLG and Home Office agreed that “they are much more trusted in the community than the police and use that strong non-police identity to deliver the message very well.”⁹³

When the latest CONTEST document was released in June 2011, a follow-up interview with OSCT was conducted. The question was asked- What kind of response are you receiving from the community on the new Prevent strategy? The reply- “The public may not be any more pleased, but they understand it better.”⁹⁴ One of the provisions of the new strategy is that it is supposed to address all forms of extremism so the opportunity was also taken to ask about the threat posed by the English Defence League and the likelihood that they

⁸⁸ Interview with Home Office representative 5.5.2.

⁸⁹ Interview with DCLG representative 5.5.3.

⁹⁰ Interview with Home Office representative 5.5.2.

⁹¹ Interview with DCLG representative 5.5.3.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Interview with Home Office representative 5.5.2

⁹⁴ Ibid.

will be proscribed. OSCT sources confirmed that proscription was not likely because “...the EDL is a public order problem unlike the AQ groups who are more violent.”⁹⁵

A considerable portion of this research explored how government and communities interact on CT related issues. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) coordinates several community engagement projects at a national level such as: Act Now which is designed for community members who play the role of a CT investigation team so they better understand the issues facing the police; Operation Nicole which targets local council and other government groups so that they better understand how a counter-terrorism case is developed and acted upon; Conviction which profiles the radicalisation of Isa Ibrahim who was convicted of planning to bomb a Bristol shopping centre; Channel which is a diversion and support programme for those at risk of radicalisation; Operation Archer which is an internal police programme designed to minimise community impacts from arrests and other incidents; Operation Hindsight which targets other statutory partners and uses radicalisation case studies to highlight where opportunities were missed to intervene; the National Community Tension Team which monitors issues that could have a national impact and suggests measures to reduce community reaction and impact; and the Shanaz Network which seeks out engagement with Muslim women.⁹⁶

The scope of police activities for engagement should not be underestimated. There is considerable effort taking place to reach out to communities. However effort does not automatically equate to success and adjustments always have to be made. For instance, the Act Now programme was largely successful in non-Muslim areas but when it was delivered to Muslims there was considerable pushback. As one officer noted “Basically it gave the message that here we go again, the police want to show us another example that Muslims are

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Act Now, Operation Nicole, and Conviction interview with police officer 2.3.2; Channel interview with police officer 2.4.2; Operation Archer and Operation Hindsight interview with police officer 5.7.2; National Community Tension Team interview with police officer 5.1.2; and Shanaz Network interview with police officer 5.13.2.

terrorists.”⁹⁷ To overcome the stigma, another version was developed for Muslim audiences where Muslim community members play the role of CT officers who investigate the EDL.⁹⁸ As the interviewee shrugged his shoulders and laughed he said “Once we did that it became much more popular.”⁹⁹

Channel is another dynamic programme. Each Channel intervention is ‘customised’ to the needs of the individual. This was clarified as “If sports will do the trick, then they are guided into a sports centre. If it’s vocational skills that are needed, then they are guided into a training programme.”¹⁰⁰ As one officer explained, Channel is not only important because it ‘safeguards’ individuals, “Channel is a cornerstone of the new Prevent policy.”¹⁰¹ However, cornerstone or not, the truth is that Channel is highly stigmatised and especially so in Tower Hamlets, the borough with the largest Muslim population. When this reality was explored, the explanation provided was that “Tower Hamlets is a politically charged environment because of the demographics in that area. Channel still exists but under a different name.”¹⁰² Tower Hamlets uses the name ‘Social Inclusion’ for young people and ‘Safeguarding Adults’ for those over 18.¹⁰³ Incidentally, this is also the borough where Jim Fitzpatrick is the MP.

One of the oldest programmes is the National Communities Tension Team (NCTT). The NCTT was established by ACPO soon after 9/11 and even pre-dates CONTEST. It became a permanent unit in 2004.¹⁰⁴ The NCTT collects data from each of the 43 police agencies in the UK and one collectively from Scotland. The information is developed into a weekly thematic intelligence product which is sent back to the submitting agencies and to ‘other partners’ such as the Home Office, local government, and the Foreign Office.¹⁰⁵ The

⁹⁷ Interview with police officer 2.3.2.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with police officer 2.4.2.

¹⁰¹ Interview with police officer 5.9.2

¹⁰² Interview with police officer 2.4.2.

¹⁰³ Interview with police officer 2.5.1.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with police officer 5.1.2.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

report establishes a national barometer and allows local agencies to forecast potential problems in their jurisdiction.

The NCTT thematic report focuses on nine groups: Muslim communities, Jewish communities, Sikh communities, Asian communities, Middle Eastern communities, Traveller/Roma communities, the right-wing/extreme right wing, the English Defence League, and al Muhajiroun (AM) including its successor groups like Muslims Against Crusades (MAC).¹⁰⁶ The report colour codes each group red, amber, or green to indicate whether tension is rising, falling, or is unchanged.¹⁰⁷ The themes not only establish who the government monitors but is another source of validation that AM and MAC has been raised to the top of Islamist groups to be monitored. As will be explicitly discussed in the next chapter, AM and MAC is where this researcher focused much of his efforts.

One promising engagement effort is the Shanaz network. This programme is in its infancy but has tremendous potential. Government efforts to date have largely left women out of the equation because they are statistically not involved in terrorist violence. The only female thus far to use violence in the UK has been Roshonara Choudhry when she stabbed MP Stephen Timms on 14 May 2010.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, Home Office reports confirm that females only account for six percent of those arrested and charged with a terror related offense, typically for a supporting role.¹⁰⁹ However, while women are not as prone to engage in violence, they are the quiet observers of the Muslim community environment. As one officer said “Women are the heart of the home and the family and they should not be overlooked. They instil their values while they raise their children. They are incredibly

¹⁰⁶ Interview with police officer 5.1.2.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Robin Simcox, Hannah Stuart, Houriya Ahmed, and Douglas Murray, *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*, 2nd ed. (London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2011) 300.

¹⁰⁹ Home Office, *Operation of Police Powers Under the Terrorism Act 2000 and Subsequent Legislation: Arrests, Outcomes, and Stops and Searches* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2011) 12.

important.”¹¹⁰ Additionally, “...the police tend to engage with Imam’s, in mosques, and other community groups where women are not always welcome”.¹¹¹

In contrast to the groups above, a significant ideological shift becomes apparent at the local council level. Whereas central government and the police use hard (Pursue) and soft (Prevent) power mechanisms within a security driven approach, those interviewed from local councils were decidedly committed to using a ‘community cohesion’ approach. As one local council member explained, “If you want to prevent extremism, the only way to do that is through community cohesion.... our approach has always been about community cohesion, not Prevent or counter-terrorism.”¹¹² This sentiment was echoed by another local council member who said “From the local council perspective, Prevent is seen as counter-productive to community cohesion because it’s too narrowly focused.”¹¹³ Interestingly, these sentiments mirror those of LFB quite closely.

The realities of how hard and soft power policies from central government actually play out in the community are characterised well by the next few comments obtained from local council staff. “SO15 officers always do things the same way. They go in with their guns blazing and it just drives the community in the opposite direction.”¹¹⁴ “Prevent is viewed as highly contentious by mosques and seen as stigmatising Muslims and therefore it’s largely rejected by the community.”¹¹⁵

The comments above highlight the significant differences in approach by local councils. Even if the ‘hard’ aspects of securitisation are removed and only the ‘soft’ mechanisms of engagement are considered, considerable differences remain. Despite a renewed push by central government, many local councils are reluctant to have anything to

¹¹⁰ Interview with police officer 5.13.2.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Interview with local council representative, 5.11.3.

¹¹³ Interview with local council representative, 5.9.2.

¹¹⁴ Interview with local council representative, 5.11.3.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

do with Prevent because of the ideological differences that prevail; central government has traditionally been committed to promoting integration (equal access and opportunity) whereas local councils are committed to promoting social cohesion (shared attitudes and values).¹¹⁶

Discussions with ‘think tank’ representatives tended to parallel those of local council. Curiously, although the ‘think tanks’ contacted were some of the most respected by government, they were also some of the most critical. As one person confided, “A major revamp of strategy [CONTEST] is needed, especially the Prevent strategy.”¹¹⁷ This comment was surprising not only because of its candidness, but because it was made within months after the latest release of Contest. In another discussion on the differences between Labour and the Coalition Government’s approach came this comment “Under Labour, they took the approach that ‘we may not like them but we are willing to engage’...The current government appears to be much more ideologically oriented.”¹¹⁸ A co-worker added “Suppressing the community’s voice may be the biggest problem.”¹¹⁹

The issue of open dialogue became a consistent thread of discussion for all think tank groups interviewed. More often than not the sentiments generally followed statements like this “Government actions within Prevent are that they refuse to engage with people they don’t like... If the same principles were applied to Northern Ireland, no dialogue would have ever taken place with individuals like Gerry Adams.”¹²⁰

The frustration levels are clearly running high. During one interview with a group who has been involved in numerous national projects within the Pursue and Prevent workstreams it was confided “[Redacted] is re-evaluating its strategic plan as a result of the conflict that exists between the work it is doing for the MPS and its own research on how

¹¹⁶ Ted Cantle, *Community Cohesion: A new Framework for Race and Diversity* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 48&83.

¹¹⁷ Interview with think tank representative 6.5.2, 20 January 2012.

¹¹⁸ Interview with think tank representative interview 6.7.2, 09 May 2011.

¹¹⁹ Interview with think tank representative 6.8.2, 09 May 2011.

¹²⁰ Participant observation from conference guest speaker, 15 March 2011.

communities are being impacted.”¹²¹ The summary assessment might be stated simply as- ‘ouch’.

C. Communities and Individuals

The discussion on communities and individuals will be relatively general at this point with emphasis given to establishing the mood of the community. As noted during the discussion on social constructionism in Chapter VI, Dickens confirmed that “...the ways we understand the world are formed by the ways in which we interact with each other in our local cultural milieu.”¹²² Thus the formation and mood of the local community provides critical insight to how the community is reacting to the current counter-terrorism environment. Furthermore, “...the social processes that are involved in our conceptualising the world...” has direct correlation to the thesis question.¹²³ Although provided in raw form here, much of the information that follows will be synthesised later in the analysis chapter.

The following discussion spans the eclectic group that ranges from mainstream Muslim organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain to individual Muslims. However, before entering into the discussion on community perceptions, the opportunity will be taken here to refute the polemic argument that some of these organisations, especially the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) and the Islamic Forum Europe (IFE), should not be included in representing ‘mainstream’ Muslim sentiment. The MCB serves as an umbrella organisation with over 500 affiliates, is the largest Muslim organisation in the UK, and represents tens of thousands of individuals.¹²⁴ Similarly, the IFE is the largest single Muslim organisation in London with a membership of 4-5 thousand.¹²⁵ While some have chosen to

¹²¹ Interview with think tank representative 6.6.2., 13 July 2011.

¹²² Dickens, “Social Constructionism as Cognitive Science,” 335.

¹²³ Ibid, 333.

¹²⁴ Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 13 December 2011.

¹²⁵ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

criticise both organisations, the undeniable truth is that these organisations represent a microcosm of the mainstream.¹²⁶ Any argument that they do not represent the often cited ‘silent majority’ is dismissed for lack of tangible evidence to the contrary. Moreover, this thesis focuses on those communities and individuals where the government/community relationship is strained because those are the groups and individuals that are most at risk of radicalising. Both groups as will be demonstrated have had their disagreements with government over policy.

It should come as no surprise that the top down view varies from the bottom up view. Whereas government groups are tasked with providing ‘public safety’ and public security’, Maslow would surely argue the recipients of that service, communities and individuals, are concerned with their own personal safety and security. Thus how government policy actually affects them matters significantly. These notions are arguably influenced by subjective orientation; the top down view is impersonalised and driven by threat whereas the bottom up view is personalised and driven by safety, security, and equity.

At a very macro level, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) serves as a political advocacy group for Muslims and is based on the premise that “...what is good for society should be good for Muslims, and vice versa.”¹²⁷ During the MCB interview, one issue that surfaced quickly was that Muslims have become increasingly resentful of being equated with terrorism.¹²⁸ That resentment has led many to greater advocacy and political participation, both of which are often viewed as threatening by government. However, although those actions may make those in government uncomfortable, the MCB strongly advocates its members to seek better community relations and work for the good of society as a whole,

¹²⁶ See “Government Suspends Links with Muslim Council of Britain over Gaza,” *The Times*, 23 March 2009, and Andrew Gilligan, “Islamic Radicals Infiltrate the Labour Party,” *The Telegraph*, 27 February 2010 as examples.

¹²⁷ Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 13 December 2011.

¹²⁸ Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 28 November 2011.

neither of which can be accomplished by remaining silent.¹²⁹ Furthermore, much of the advocacy and political participation is in response to the legislative environment and MCB sources confirmed “There is no question that people are more politicised since the adoption of TA2000.”¹³⁰

As a representative body, the MCB has publicly and consistently denounced all acts of terrorism through its press releases.¹³¹ After forming in 1997, the MCB enjoyed a good relationship with government, at least until 2006. However, the MCB advocates across a wide spectrum of issues and its relationship with government changed dramatically after it ran an article in the *Times* criticising the war between Israel and Lebanon, and another in the *Guardian* that was critical of the UK’s participation in Iraq.¹³² Following the publication of those articles, the government distanced itself from the organisation and eventually severed all official ties in 2008.¹³³ The rebound effect was surprising; instead of losing community support, the MCB’s relationship with Muslim communities soared.¹³⁴

Amongst the spectrum of issues the MCB advocates for, it has carefully crafted its notion of shared values including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths. These shared values are consistent with those found in government policy documents such as CONTEST and those mentioned in David Cameron’s 2011 Munich speech. However, despite Cameron’s comments on how a stronger local identity should be accomplished, namely for Muslims to be able to say “Yes, I am a Muslim... but I am also a Londoner too” the MCB view is that there is dissonance between

¹²⁹ Muslim Council of Britain, “About the MCB,” <http://www.mcb.org.uk/aboutmcb.php>, [Accessed 15 September 2011].

¹³⁰ Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 13 December 2011.

¹³¹ See <http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/press.php> for a list of press releases, 1997 to present.

¹³² Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 13 December 2011.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 28 November 2011.

the government's words and actions.¹³⁵ The MCB characterised the government's position as one that believes Muslims should be active as citizens, not Muslims.¹³⁶ This represents more than a nuanced contrast to MCB's position that what is good for society should be good for Muslims and vice versa.¹³⁷ More appropriately, it represents the polarised positions of government and Muslims in the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society that the UK has become.

Speaking with another large Muslim based organisation, the Islamic Forum Europe (IFE), the divisions become much clearer. Like the MCB, the IFE advocates on behalf of Muslims and strongly encourages people to engage in community issues and the democratic political process.¹³⁸ The IFE has also absorbed its share of criticism and with similar results. In March 2010, Channel 4 aired a documentary titled, Britain's Islamic Republic, in which Andrew Gilligan accused the IFE of being an Islamic fundamentalist group. The result...membership increased.¹³⁹

The IFE was not shy and characterised the relationship between Muslims and the British Government rather bluntly.

Pre 9/11, Muslims generally associated themselves with and were in support of the government. We didn't shy away from being critical but it was much more of a partnership. Post 9/11, Muslims feel like the government is trying to vilify us.¹⁴⁰

When queried about IFE's advocacy on Muslim issues to the government, the response was equally candid. "The government continues to rely on groups like Quilliam and

¹³⁵ David Cameron, "PM's Speech at Munich Security Conference," <http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2011/02/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference-60293> [Accessed 10 March 2011]

¹³⁶ Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 13 December 2011.

¹³⁷ Interview with MCB representative 3.3.3, 28 November 2011.

¹³⁸ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Policy Exchange who have no credibility with the community and it's backfiring.”¹⁴¹

Criticism towards Quilliam and Policy Exchange was not limited to the IFE either. It became a recurrent theme with many that were interviewed. In an effort to balance the discussion, attempts were made to interview representatives from both organisations. However, requests to Policy Exchange were ignored and Quilliam declined.¹⁴²

Discussions with the IFE also included how the Pursue and Prevent workstreams were affecting Muslims in London. The answers were not only surprisingly sharp but began what would become a pattern of similar responses and sentiments.

The reaction has been that many Muslims no longer trust the government or the police... even though they may be concerned about someone in their neighbourhood, they're not going to call the police because they don't trust them.¹⁴³

The first Prevent policy targeted AQ suspects. The second Prevent policy began to target political voices. But now the third Prevent policy has tried to define which Muslims were acceptable and which were not. The result is that the entire Muslim community is now targeted.¹⁴⁴

There is a place for both Pursue and Prevent but it needs to be approached differently because all it has done is increased suspicion between Muslims and the government. With regard to Prevent, the whole thing needs to be scrapped. The way it has been managed, packaged, and delivered is all wrong. What this has done is it is radicalising the community and it gives ammo to the extremists.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

¹⁴² Email received from Quilliam Foundation, 16 January 2012.

¹⁴³ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

As representatives of the wider community, the MCB and IFE comments suggest there is at least some perception of injustice and a feeling of alienation present. Both are consistent with some of Pressman's observations on radicalism that were listed in Chapter III.

During the course of this research several community meetings were attended and passively listen to whatever the audience chose to discuss. Although the next few pages largely consist of what individuals are saying, they provide significant insight on what the community sentiment is. In May 2011 during a meeting on anti-Muslim hatred at East London Mosque several comments were made-

The result of Prevent and programmes like it has been to drive Muslim dialogue underground. Has anybody here heard anyone in the mosque talk lately about the mujahidin? Nobody talks about these things because they are scared to have these types of discussions.¹⁴⁶

Young people in Birmingham are more than ever adopting an identity that it doesn't matter who they are talking to, their teachers, the police, or others on the street, there is a pre-conceived notion that they are Muslims and should not be trusted.¹⁴⁷

The general mistrust of Muslims has created a greater sense of Islamic agency. Rather than driving people to become more British, it has driven people to identify with and become more Islamic.¹⁴⁸

At another community meeting at East London Mosque (ELM) to discuss events in Bangladesh, the discussion on possible Western intervention quickly morphed to one of foreign policy and the war on terror. One man stood and said "If you pray, fast, give *zakat*, and go on *Hajj* you are considered a good Muslim. But if you speak out about injustice they

¹⁴⁶ Participant observation 21 May 2011.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

call you a radical fundamentalist.”¹⁴⁹ It should be noted that the meeting facilities at ELM easily hold 1,000 people. Each time the venue was packed to capacity and each time the comments received a roar of applause.

At a workshop on Prevent in central London, one individual characterised his experiences with the following comment-

The prevent strategy criminalises people unnecessarily. It draws you inward...I used to be clean shaven...but then I grew a beard. The only time that I realised that my beard was being used against me was when I was arrested for being a suspected terrorist. When I was released without charge I came out and I swore that I would never shave my beard because they used it against me. They politicised my identity and they used the way I looked against me. Yes, I have been drawn inward, yes I have been radicalised.¹⁵⁰

At an event at University College London one individual characterised things this way “There’s a cold war going on between Muslims and secular society since 9/11. Camps are being formed and people are being polarised along religious and political lines.”¹⁵¹ During the discussion another participant raised the issue of *jihad*, noting that it is either acceptable or not depending on the stance of government: Libya, good *jihad*; Iraq and Afghanistan, bad *jihad*; Bosnia, bad *jihad*; Afghanistan/Soviet War, good *jihad*.¹⁵²

Things are no better when the police host the event. In 2011, the police began to sponsor events at local mosques between senior police managers and a restricted guest list of community leaders. The intent is to increase dialogue and partnership. One such event began with the opening comments

¹⁴⁹ Participant observation 03 October, 2011.

¹⁵⁰ Participant observation 15 October 2011.

¹⁵¹ Participant observation 05 December 2011.

¹⁵² Ibid.

We [the police] are not going to solve this [radicalisation] without the support of the Muslim community. This is not about us telling you what we want you to know. It's about us [the police] understanding the needs of the community so we can do our jobs better, so we can support you.”¹⁵³

However, it was not until several presentations were delivered and a lunch break before the audience was finally allowed to ask questions. In response to a presentation on Schedule 7 stops at ports of entry, one participant spoke up. “My son travels two times a year from London to Geneva and every single time he is stopped. If this is not profiling what is? How are we supposed to explain this to our children?”¹⁵⁴

Once that question was allowed, several more followed including a handful of general comments came from the audience as well. They included-

We need to be able to talk about jihad openly but people are too scared because you'll think we're terrorists.¹⁵⁵

You say that Section 44 stops are no longer taking place but we are still being stopped on a regular basis.¹⁵⁶

Muslims feel vulnerable because we can't talk about the things that are going on in the world.¹⁵⁷

Although the police listened patiently and sympathetically, there was limited response to the questions and comments. Although not specifically stated, there was a clearly a schedule and the police wanted to insure that they got to say what they wanted to say.

¹⁵³ Participant observation 06 October 2011.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

By late in the afternoon it was clear that tensions were running high. Community leaders were unhappy not only because they wanted to vent their grievances but because the police had refused to take questions or comments until their presentations were completed, prioritising their pre-determined schedule over actual dialogue. Responding to a senior police commander who fatefully made the statement “Prevent has helped with the communication between the police and Muslim communities”, a member of the audience offered his assessment. “You know about Prevent, what the government calls it is one thing. What the police call it is another. For us, we just call it shit.”¹⁵⁸ Not surprisingly, the meeting ended shortly thereafter. This event was also the first in a series that MPS gatekeepers had offered access to as a component of this research. Following the event, that offer was rescinded.

Leveraging the opportunity to meet days later with some who attended the meeting even more candid responses were received. From one attendee-

For us, safety is the number one community issue but the police are not engaging in a proper way.¹⁵⁹

All the time people are targeted because of how you look, your religion, or the country you come from.¹⁶⁰

Last year there was a meeting between members of the community, the police, and central government. It was very hostile. Even the women that were there were hostile to the police.¹⁶¹

The problem is that if you are Muslim they think you are a terrorist.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Participant observation 06 October 2011.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with community leader 3.19.3, 31 October 2011.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

The policies have stigmatised the community and this will come back to the government. Safety will never be achieved as long as they think of us that way.¹⁶³

The government should never go against the community and that is what is happening.¹⁶⁴

Don't look at the Muslim community as a whole, look at who are the problems. Muslim Leaders push those in the community to be good members of society but it is becoming increasingly difficult.¹⁶⁵

David Cameron's speech in Belgium [Munich], when he said multiculturalism and all that is dead, increased the divide in British society...that speech just emboldens the terrorists.¹⁶⁶

Prevent makes it sound like Islam is the problem and Muslims are a worse problem.¹⁶⁷

Everyone wants to live in safety and security but nobody wants to be stigmatised, profiled, or stereotyped. When that happens, people are going to react.¹⁶⁸

The government is not interested in what mainstream moderate Muslims have to say. They only listen to groups [like Quilliam and Policy Exchange] who don't represent the community.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ Interview with community leader 3.19.3, 31 October 2011.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

I see a big problem coming.¹⁷⁰

Despite the critical nature of the comments above, there is another level of complexity worth noting. They came from an individual who has years of experience working cooperatively with the police and explained that the problem is often the result of mixed messages. Using the example of a serious crime that was occurred at his facility he offered “...the police did a really good job but when they stop people on the streets or try to engage, they paint everyone as terrorists.”¹⁷¹ The result is reminiscent of ‘good cop, bad cop’ being played out at a macro organisational level but without the benefits that are supposed to accompany such activities.

From another attendee-

After 7/7, that’s when the paranoia really started. My son was stopped all the time because he was Asian and he carried a bag [backpack]. They [the police] began to stereotype immediately.¹⁷²

Muslim people are still being targeted. We are still being stopped and searched for no reason.¹⁷³

There is a lot of accumulated hostility and I’m not sure the message was received.¹⁷⁴

The summary assessment of the comments above clearly demonstrate that from a community perspective there are strong feelings that people are being stereotyped as a security threat, Islam and Muslims are the problem, there is growing hostility between the Muslim community and the police, and the police are not engaging effectively. Moreover,

¹⁷⁰ Interview with community leader 3.19.3, 31 October 2011.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Interview with citizen 4.13, 12 October 2011.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

whatever positive gains are realised are quickly being erased because of pushback by the community.

A follow-up interview was also done with the police officer who coordinated the event. His response- “The [redacted] event at [redacted] went very well. It’s probably the best one we’ve done....Where else can the community have that kind of interaction with senior police officers?”¹⁷⁵ If as Crelinsten argues, terrorism is largely a form of communication, presumably because other forms have failed, the preceding quotes do not promote an optimistic view.

Given the frustration and hostility demonstrated towards the police, the opportunity was taken to ask some of those that attended the police sponsored event what they thought of the way the fire department engaged with those who were ‘at risk’ within the community. The response was always positive and generally consistent with “Everyone loves the fire department because since we were all very young we have understood that the fire department is there to protect us and for our safety.”¹⁷⁶ From another respondent-

There are no problems with the fire department; they have the trust of the community. Their role could be expanded but they would have to keep the same social cohesion approach. There is no way the fire department could deliver the Prevent programme without losing credibility.¹⁷⁷

Given the controversy over Prevent in general and Channel in particular, the question was asked whether the Muslim community would likely respond more positively to a programme like LIFE. The following comment sums the sentiment up well- “If I had a child that was at risk of offending or being drawn into extremism and had a choice to send him to a programme run by the fire department or a programme run by the police, I wouldn’t give it

¹⁷⁵ Interview with police officer 2.9.2.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with citizen 4.13, 12 October 2011.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with community representative 3.1.3, 31 October 2011.

another thought; I'd pick the fire department. Programmes like Channel just alienate the community”¹⁷⁸

Several interviews with smaller community organisations were also included in this research. Because some of these groups receive government funding their names will not be used.

Amongst the milieu of issues that exist within the community and one that is capitalised on extensively by the radicalised extreme fringe is the legislative environment. One Muslim organisation that works on civil rights issues characterised things this way-

The policy environment is driving a wedge between Muslim communities and the government but when we speak out, we are accused of not having British values. We see ourselves as British Muslims and we think we should be able to criticise issues that affect society here.¹⁷⁹

The domestic environment is beginning to take its toll and it's important to understand the cumulative effect. Stop and search, detention without charge, trials without juries, may all seem minor when viewed in isolation but when they are all lumped together they become quite serious and that fundamentally changes the way the police and community interact.¹⁸⁰

Much of what is in place here today is because of Tony Blair. Blair said that the rules of the game have changed. What Blair did was essentially tear up habeas corpus and the Magna Carta. Blair created the most Orwellian government we have ever seen.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ Interview with citizen 4.13, 12 October 2011.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with community representative 3.21.3, 10 March 2012.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

If the present trend continues the abuse of power will be institutionalised. There are no positive outcomes and it will drive those already on the fringe to join groups like al Muhajiroun or worse.¹⁸²

[Lord] Carlile has created a whole new block of extremists. Pretty much everybody would classify those who engage in violence as extremists and we're OK with that. But what Carlile has done is that he has classified those who are non-violent as extremist as well. He has criminalised a significant portion of society just because they disagree with the government. It means the government has now become the thought police. Carlile is the most illiberal Liberal I have ever seen.¹⁸³

There are problems in the Muslim community because of accountability. It's just like the Quilliam group, when you're paid to find witches, you find witches everywhere.¹⁸⁴

Because this interviewee mentioned Al Muhajiroun specifically, the question was asked how Muslims perceive Al Muhajiroun.

Al Muhajiroun scares the hell out of most Muslims and they don't want to have anything to do with them. Some of their argument starts out OK but it's what they want to do about it that scares us. They want shar'ia. We live in a Western culture because that's how we want to live. We don't want shar'ia here.¹⁸⁵

Speaking with another organisation that has experience working with prison populations, a discussion on stop and search, control orders, and arrest yielded this comment-

¹⁸² Interview with community representative 3.21.3, 10 March 2012.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

Just by arresting those people, we have promoted radicalism. They tell their friends and family, and even though they are released, they and others are radicalised. Maybe just a little, but they are radicalised.¹⁸⁶

The comment above opens up another vast area of discussion about not only what the immediate impacts of arrest are but also the potential impacts that hard and soft power mechanisms are having on the family, friends, and others loosely connected to those arrested, stopped, searched, etcetera. Although not specifically contextualised to this environment, some of Granovetter's work, specifically the Strength of Weak Ties, in which he argues the power and influence of weak associations is highly important, underscores the potential negative impact and significance of unintended consequences in this environment.¹⁸⁷

In a discussion with a group that interacts extensively with Muslims who have been on control orders or have been imprisoned overseas, things were characterised this way-

Although there was support from the broader Muslim community following 7/7, that quickly vanished. The government lost its credibility because of its own actions. As a result, some Muslims feel that the only way they can get their message across is through violence.¹⁸⁸

One of the most disturbing interviews came from a group that works extensively with Muslim children and young adults. During the interview, this comment was made. "We are seeing kids even as young as ten developing hostility and hatred towards the state"¹⁸⁹ When asked how they were being influenced the following was provided "Mostly social interaction, things like Facebook, MSN, but also from home, they are learning it from their parents

¹⁸⁶ Interview with community leader 3.18.3, 25 October 2011.

¹⁸⁷ Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *The American Journal of Sociology* 78, no.6 (1973).

¹⁸⁸ Interview with community representative 3.10.3, 13 July 2011.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with community leader 3.6.3, 14 October 2011.

too.”¹⁹⁰ This suggests a very ominous prediction; not only is the environment radicalising segments of the adult Muslim population but an entire new generation of marginalised and radicalised youth are being raised.

At the individual level, the dialogue and sentiment remained the same. Despite the pejorative reporting towards groups like the MCB and IFE who have been labelled as ‘fundamentalist’, the interviews conducted during this research across the spectrum of community groups and individuals were all very similar to those of the MCB and IFE. The issues were the same, the grievances were the same, and the predicted outcomes were the same; equity is lacking, personal safety and security is being eroded, there is a palpable sense of betrayal, and if things do not change, it will become worse. As one individual cogently put it, “The government needs to stop talking about ‘perceived grievances’. My grievances are not perceived, they’re real.”¹⁹¹

Amidst all of the comments, from those at the policy level to individuals on the street, there was one perspective universally accepted; terrorism is nowhere near the top of the list of concerns. This is in stark contrast to the government’s National Risk Registry discussed in Chapter V. At the street/community level, the focus is decidedly about crime and social issues. In part, this explains the difference in community sentiment towards the police and fire department; the police continue to engage using a security driven approach whereas the fire department uses a public safety/community cohesion driven approach. Not only does this question the effectiveness of the police approach to community engagement it raises questions about the likelihood of success of the entire Prevent agenda. As one police officer appropriately characterised things “Terrorism is about number 16 on the list of problems communities identify with. It’s all about gangs and drugs, and all of the other things that go

¹⁹⁰ Interview with community leader 3.6.3, 14 October 2011..

¹⁹¹ Interview with citizen 4.25, 05 December 2011.

on.”¹⁹² Another stated “When you ask people in the community about terrorism, they just kind of shrug their shoulders. They generally see the EDL as a bigger threat.”¹⁹³

The lack of effective community engagement also means that individuals will seek answers from other sources, namely the internet, where information can be problematic. A university chaplain characterised things this way “The effects of the anti-terrorism environment are real but much of what is being discussed is no longer being discussed in public. They [university students] spend their nights on YouTube and Facebook and pick up all kinds of rubbish.”¹⁹⁴ Similarly, the leader of a south London mosque offered “Instead of silencing those that offer a different perspective, let’s start embracing dissent and get things out in the open.”¹⁹⁵ A student from another university who had been involved with various Muslim groups on campus had this to say-

There is a need to go back and allow frank and open discussion on campuses. The more radical the better because that is how people hear alternative perspectives and make rational choices. Not that religion can necessarily be argued as a rational choice.¹⁹⁶

The anti-terrorism policies are making people very wary of the government and police. But people still have very real questions that need to be answered. The opportunities to openly address those questions and to have a real debate are very limited, if at all. Where can anyone go to hear a debate between Anjem Choudary and someone else from the community? It just doesn’t happen, so people go to Google and when they do, groups like Al Muhajiroun are there waiting with all of the answers they need.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² Interview with police officer 2.14.2.

¹⁹³ Interview with police officer 2.5.1.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with citizen 4.28, 06 December 2011.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with citizen 4.17, 26 October 2011.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with citizen 4.30, 10 December 2011.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

Even members of the police were found to advocate similar sentiments. As one police officer stated “We could easily solve this issue [radicalism] if we could just allow a credible debate on Islam. But that would mean that we would have to allow those that are seen as extreme to be a part of the debate, and that isn’t allowed.”¹⁹⁸

The comments from all of the various groups interviewed clearly defined the social positioning and orientation of the current counter-terrorism (CT) environment. It is also clear that the orientation of each of the case study groups (police, fire, and community) has become polarised. The police are attempting to the best of their ability to negotiate a very complex and politically charged policy environment. Consistent with public safety organisational culture, many had varying degrees of criticism about how incongruent CT policy impacted their ability to do their jobs. For instance the use of ‘hard’ policing actions such as stop and search and the negative impacts that has had on those tasked with carrying out the ‘soft’ policing of community engagement. Nevertheless, each police officer interviewed ultimately set aside any intra-department conflict and supported the organisation as a whole.

The fire department, partially the result of its organisational culture and partially the result of careful strategic positioning has cautiously chosen ways to engage that maintains positive community relationships while simultaneously providing support to the police and other statutory partners. Similar to local councils, the LFB’s approach is decidedly universalised and solidly committed to maximising community safety and cohesion. It is equally committed to defining where its boundaries are. Like the police, the fire department personnel were all supportive of the organisation and all demonstrated a high degree of professionalism.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with police officer 2.9.2.

The groups and individuals that make up the communities were consistent and firm in their message; equity is lacking, personal safety and security is being eroded, there is a palpable sense of betrayal, and if things do not change, it will become worse. All of the above echoes Button's statement that something is very wrong. Although the antecedents are different, this also seems classically similar to Putnam's work on the historical decline of American social networks and disenfranchisement of individuals in the democratic process mentioned in Chapter II. The erosion of social capital/agency and its relationship to radicalism will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IX, Analysis. Finally, before leaving the discussion on groups and individuals, optimistically, despite the anger, criticism, and absence of meaningful engagement, there remains an unrelenting offer to engage and a flickering sense of hope that opportunities remain to positively affect the community/government relationship.

As the policy environment continues to evolve, the players are defined, and the camps are formed. However, this discussion has been on the mainstream not those on the fringe. Those on the fringe, those pejoratively labelled as terrorists, extremists, or Islamist's, those that most consider the threat, those that CT policy is in response to, have not been discussed. They are next.

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Chapter VIII

Al Muhajiroun and other Radicals

“You have to see their facial expressions, smell the tea and cigarettes while hearing the call to prayer to have the full impact of what a person is saying.”¹

This chapter continues to deliver the results of the fieldwork. However, whereas the previous chapter concentrated on public safety organisations, other government, and ‘the mainstream’ this chapter will develop a portrait of those considered on the fringe; those pejoratively labelled as radicals, extremists, or terrorists.

Like the discussion in the previous chapter, the information that follows needs to be considered, measured, and contrasted against the key terms of public, community, public safety, public security, and process, power, and exclusion. Furthermore, because the discussion that follows is based on the observations and actual discussions with those that meet the pejorative societal labelling of radical and extreme, there is the opportunity to consider the theoretic/academic definitions of what it means to be marginalised and radicalised that were established in Chapter III to real life individuals and events that form the data contained below.

In addition to reporting the findings of the fieldwork, the following discussion develops two important areas. First, it deconstructs the ideology of AM and Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) so that it can be understood, and makes sense of how and why these groups do what they do. Second, it profiles the real world effects that government policy has on groups and individuals considered radical or extreme. Understanding these key concepts is required so that the discussion in the next chapter, Analysis, makes sense.

¹ David Brannan, Email received 05 April 2012.

As noted in the previous chapter, several sources confirmed that Al Muhajiroun (AM) or its successor groups like Muslims Against Crusades (MAC) remain the primary radicalised extremist group with any substantial membership currently operating in London. That is not to suggest that they are the only group or that every Islamist shares the same ideological framework. It does stand to reason though that because AM is the group the police are most concerned about, they provide valuable insight into how and why people are radicalising and moving to the extreme.

If AM is the primary extremist group currently operating in London then it logically follows that they would also be a prime source of the current threat. Without access to government intelligence reports it is impossible to qualify or quantify that threat but AM is included as one of the 47 ‘terror’ groups currently proscribed by the British government.² It is widely reported that AM disbanded under threat of proscription in 2004 but immediately reformed under the names of Al Ghurabaa and The Saved Sect. The government responded by proscribing Al Ghurabaa and the Saved Sect both of which are referred to as ‘splinter groups’ of Al Muhajiroun, and lists AM, Islam4UK, Call to Submission, Islamic Path, London School of Sharia, and Muslims Against Crusades as alternative names for the same proscribed organisation, AM.³

The most publicly available source of threat information comes from the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC), now part of the Henry Jackson Society, where researchers evaluated UK convictions for Islamist terrorism related offences between 1999 and 2010. The CSC concluded that of those individuals with ties to proscribed organisations, AM exceeded Al Qaeda (AQ) in convictions; 18 to 13 percent respectively.⁴ Additionally, when considering

² Home Office, “Proscribed Terrorist Groups,” <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/proscribed-terror-groups/proscribed-groups?view=Binary>, Accessed 19 March 2012.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed, and Murray, *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*, xii.

eight major terror plots in the UK between 2001 and 2007, the CSC concluded that AM members were second only to AQ in terms of involvement; 16 to 29 percent respectively.⁵

The CSC report is quite detailed and has gained widespread readership. Without undermining the argument above, the CSC report needs to be approached with some degree of caution. It is almost entirely developed from media sources and rather than footnoting specific details, it includes a list of ‘sources’ at the end of each individual profiled which is incredibly difficult to reconcile to the facts presented. In fairness to its authors, the report is very well researched, analysed, and presented but the overwhelming dependence on media sources, which are not always accurate, suggests a cautious approach is prudent.⁶ However, that did not deter Lord Carlile from demonstrating his support in the foreword where he writes “The first edition impacted policy and was a vital resource for governments, security services and agencies, and academic readers worldwide....This new edition builds upon that...”⁷ Clearly concerning is the influence of media on the policy environment.

As noted in Chapter VI, access to AM members was typically achieved by attending their protests and then following up with interviews. In total, six AM protests were attended and numerous interviews were conducted either at protest sites or at a later date. The opportunity to attend the protests provided a first-hand perspective on what the group’s issues were, how they organised themselves, and how they interacted with other groups including the police and English Defence League (EDL). Follow-up interviews also provided the opportunity to understand individual members more thoroughly. Last, access was provided to online ‘chat rooms’ and to become ‘Facebook friends’ with several ‘members’. This provided a first-hand opportunity to observe what they collectively discussed and what the ‘hot topics’ were.

⁵ Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed, and Murray, *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*, 292.

⁶ See Appendix 3 for discussion on media reporting and the sentencing of nine individuals in Woolwich Crown Court, February 2012.

⁷ Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed, and Murray, *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*, Xii.

A. The Protests

Osama bin Laden Eulogy

Four of the six London protests organised by AM between May 2011 and January 2012 were conducted in front of the US Embassy in London. The first protest attended occurred on 06 May 2011. It was organised as a eulogy for Osama bin Laden and general protest against US and British foreign policy. There were approximately 250 Muslims including approximately 40 women and children, 100 police, and 75 EDL members in attendance.⁸ The Muslim demographic was dominated by 18 to early 30 year olds and perhaps 10 who were either leaders of the group or senior lieutenants who also functioned as stewards.

The police were decidedly casual in their affect and effectively separated AM from the EDL in what became a repeated site management plan; AM was segregated into 'pens' on North Audley Street and the EDL was segregated into 'pens' on South Audley Street with Grosvenor Sq. in the middle.

During the protest, the crowd held placards such as 'Islam will dominate the world' and 'Muslims will annihilate the crusaders' while listening to several speakers who delivered similar messages over and over again; 'Osama bin Laden was a noble man who was not afraid to speak out for the Muslims', followed by 'death to America', 'Obama burn in hell', 'democracy hypocrisy', 'the *shar'iah* is coming', calls for '*jihad* and Muslim unity', and several references to Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, all supported by several Qur'anic verses mixed in with a steady stream of '*La Illah Ila Allah, Muhammad Rasoul Allah*' (There is no God but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God).⁹

⁸ Participant observation, 06 May 2011.

⁹ Ibid.

The EDL took advantage of the event and delivered their message as well. There were repeated chants of ‘E...D...EDL, E...D...EDL’ followed by ‘Bin Laden was a terrorist’, ‘Muslims fuck off and go home’, ‘you’re all a bunch of fucking terrorists’, ‘I pay for your benefits’, and ‘if you want *shar’iah* so much, go back to Iraq, or Afghanistan, or wherever the fuck you come from’.¹⁰

At the end of the protest, AM stewards consulted with the police and a demobilisation plan was developed. Before leaving, the stewards addressed the group so that their members knew that they would leave as a group, where they were going, and no matter what happened on the way back, they were supposed to remain together. To maintain public order, the police escorted the Muslims back to the tube station, blocking off traffic along the way so that the protestors could keep moving. The EDL also accompanied the procession but were kept at a distance by the police. At one intersection a group of construction workers made a remark and four or five protestors attempted to confront them but the group was quickly corralled back to the main group by the stewards. The organisational principles carried out by the Muslims, police, and EDL were consistent with each protest attended.

Islamic Emirates March

On 30 July 2011 another protest was carried out in support of AM’s newly created Islamic Emirates Project. The Islamic Emirates Project was formed to encourage Muslims to live in enclaves within Britain where *shar’iah* could be applied and practiced.¹¹ In a press conference held the day before, Anjem Choudary spoke about the reasons for the project-

This call for *shar’iah*, the commanding of good and the forbidding of evil is an obligation upon Muslims wherever they are. The Messenger *sallallahu ‘alaihi wa*

¹⁰ Participant observation, 06 May 2011.

¹¹ Anjem Choudary, “Islamic Emirates Project,” Press conference, www.muslimsagainstcrusades.com, accessed 29 July 2011.

sallam (May the blessings and the peace of Allah be upon him) said that it was not allowed for you to live among the non-Muslims without distinguishing yourself... We have no choice... we cannot integrate into the pornography, alcohol, drugs, prostitution, thug life, loutish behaviour of English society... our only option is to change the society.¹²

The protest included a procession that began near Leyton tube station and ended at Walthamstow Central, an area with a large Muslim population. In all, approximately 150 protesters of the same 18 to early 30 year old demographic managed by the same leaders participated. During the 90 minute walk, the group carried placards such as ‘stop Christian terrorism- establish Islamic emirates’, ‘*jihad* against Christian extremists’, ‘democracy hypocrisy’, ‘*shar’iah* for UK’, and when prompted by someone yelling the attribute ‘*Takbir*’ (God is great) the protestors would respond in unison with ‘*Allahu Akbar*’ (God is great). During the procession, there were many affirmations of faith ‘*La Illah Ila Allah, Muhammad Rasoul Allah*’ while Abu Izzadeen addressed those watching the procession-

We the Muslims have come to the street today to call for what? For the implementation of *shar’iah*. It may sound strange, even terrifying, but let me inform you, Islam has the solution to your problems. Islam provides a complete and utter detailed system of life. How you relate yourself as a human being, to protect your mind, to give you dignity, to provide for you the basic needs you have or you need as a human being.¹³

As the procession passed, people on the street stopped what they were doing to watch. Many took pictures or talked quietly amongst themselves. Many showed the expression of

¹² Choudary, “Islamic Emirates Project,” Press conference.

¹³ Abu Izzadeen, Islamic Emirates March, 30 July 2011.

shock. The reaction of community members was not supportive, even with other Muslims as the following impromptu interview revealed-

There is a space in society for legitimate complaint but I don't think this incendiary or inflammatory way of raising the issue is helpful...I don't think this is going to gain the Muslim community any favours from the non-Muslim community in terms of developing an understanding of what the grievances are.¹⁴

Near the end of the march the procession was slowed while police cordoned off two pubs where EDL members had gathered. Although the group passed without incident, once passed, a few EDL members not in the pub charged the group and a brief fight broke out. Order was quickly restored by both the police and Muslim stewards.

9/11- You've Lost the War

On 11 September 2011 another protest was held outside of the US embassy. This time the theme was to highlight that ten years after 9/11, the US and British military were still engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. The scene management plan remained the same; Muslims on the north and EDL on the south. Before the protest began, a group of approximately 25 EDL members circled around to the north side of the Muslim 'pen' and began chanting "U...U...USA, U...U...USA."¹⁵ The Muslim response was immediate but orderly, "*Allahu Akbar, La Illaha Ila Allah, Takbir...Allahu Akbar,*" while thrusting their placards towards the sky.¹⁶

Muslim protestors numbered approximately 120 including approximately 12 females and six children. Once again the same demographic of 18 to early 30 year olds managed by the same leaders was repeated. There were approximately 150 Police and 40 male and female

¹⁴ Interview with citizen 4.38, 30 July 2011.

¹⁵ Participant observation, 11 September 2011.

¹⁶ Ibid.

EDL members present.¹⁷ During the protest Muslims once again held placards including ‘United States terrorist state’, ‘Afghanistan graveyard for American soldiers’, and ‘Our dead are in paradise, your dead are in hellfire’.¹⁸ During the protest, leaders made a series of speeches to vent their grievances-

We Muslims do not care about the 3,000 who died on 9/11... We only feel the pain and suffering of the women and children you have been killing.¹⁹

You will never win the war... Not only did your towers come crashing down on 9/11 but also over the last 10 years all of your precious ideas, all of your values have been crushed into rubble. Democracy, liberalism, freedom, where are they today? They have been replaced by national security, by non-combatants, euphemisms used in order to slaughter and kill innocent men, women, and children.²⁰

Do not be fooled by your politicians. This is not about security. It is a war against *al Islam*, a war against belief. George Bush said this is a crusade. Tony Blair said I prayed before I went to war, It is a religious war against the Muslims.²¹

An unwitting member of the press yelled out ‘you started it!’ to which Abu Izzadeen replied-

Really? Is the occupation of Palestine invited by the Muslims? Is the occupation of Kashmir invited by the Muslims? Is the occupation of Afghanistan invited by the Muslims? Is the occupation of Iraq because of 9/11? Open your eyes!²²

¹⁷ Participant observation, 11 September 2011.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Sayful Islam, You’ve Lost the War Protest, 11 September 2011.

²⁰ Anjem Choudary, You’ve Lost the War Protest, 11 September 2011.

²¹ Abu Izzadeen, You’ve Lost the War Protest, 11 September 2011.

²² Ibid.

Izzadeen's reply received a roar of support from the protestors leaving the journalist shaking his head and at a loss for words.

The Protest lasted approximately two hours. The usual demobilisation meeting and instructions took place before the police escorted the group back to the underground. But this time the EDL was in hot pursuit yelling their usual array of derogatory remarks ("you're all fucking scum...if you don't like it here, fucking leave!") just inches behind the police who were just a few feet back from the Muslims. When the group reached Kensington Gardens, the police reversed the crowd to take another route. In the confusion, the EDL seized the opportunity to charge the crowd and several skirmishes broke out. Several EDL members were arrested. Another indecisive moment occurred at Marble Arch and the EDL once again charged the crowd. Several more were arrested. Once on Edgware Road, the EDL broke into multiple groups and began a series of clashes at the front, back, and sides of the procession. The police were clearly stressed and struggling to maintain order. At the top of Edgware Road, the EDL began throwing rocks and bottles and numerous fights immediately broke out. The police brought out the batons and several were arrested.²³

Support for Syria

On 01 October 2011 a protest was held against the Assad regime in Syria. The protest began with a procession from Edgware tube station to the Syrian Embassy at Belgrave Square. In all there were approximately 150 protestors including 25 females and 10 children. Once again the demographic remained the same. The police numbered approximately 40, possibly downsized because no EDL were present. The protestors held the usual placards, 'O Muslims rise, *jihad* for Syria', 'Zainab al Hosni, victim of Syrian terrorism', and Stop the

²³ Participant observation, 11 September 2011.

massacre of Muslims in Syria' while various leaders delivered speeches.²⁴ The mood of the police and protestors was decidedly calm. When the protest ended, everyone casually left to go their own way unescorted.

United Ummah Protest

On 02 December 2011 a protest was held at the American embassy. The theme was to protest against the recent drone attacks that killed Anwar al Awaki and his son in Yemen. There were 34 protestors, well in excess of 100 police, and less than 20 EDL. Unlike the other protests, there were no placards, there was only one female with an infant, and the mood was extraordinarily tense from the start.

A speech was delivered criticising the US for its actions and encouraging those in attendance that "The best *jihad* is to speak the word of truth. That is your role as Muslims."²⁵ Following the protest there was a group prayer. At the end of the prayer, the police moved in and began arresting those in the 'pen'. There was a lot of pushing and shoving on both sides and once it was over, 22 were arrested, 20 for belonging to a proscribed organisation.²⁶

Within an hour of the arrests Anjem Choudary posted this tweet "Police have kettled in & arrested all the Muslims who were demonstrating outside the US Embassy today against the murderous US drone strikes."²⁷ This was immediately followed by another stating "They used aggressive tactics beating Muslims and treating them heavy handedly [sic] including young boys with no reasons given or rights explained."²⁸ The last in the succession was "This

²⁴ Participant observation, 01 October 2011.

²⁵ Abu Baraa, United Ummah Protest, 02 December 2011.

²⁶ Participant observation and confirmation with police commander 02 December 2011.

²⁷ Anjem Choudary, Twitter post, <https://twitter.com/#!/anjemchoudary/status/142614802806747136>.

²⁸ Anjem Choudary, Twitter post, <https://twitter.com/#!/anjemchoudary/statuses/142614802894815232>.

latest assault is evidence of the brutal apartheid reality in which Muslims suffer under the UK Cameron. Among them is Sh. Abu Izzadeen.”²⁹

Islamic Observatory Centre Protest

On 20 January 2012 a protest was organised by the Islamic Observatory Centre and *Minbar Ansar ul Deen* (Literally- pulpit of helpers for the Muslim way of life) to protest against the US government following press reports that US soldiers had urinated on dead Muslims in Afghanistan. Only 11 protestors showed up and police far out-numbered the protestors. The EDL whose numbers were equally small still attempted to charge into the Muslim ‘pen’ which resulted in two arrests. Protestors held placards such as ‘American Justice = Guantanamo Bay’, and ‘Afghanistan, graveyard of empires’ while a short 15 minute speech was delivered, after which the protest ended and the police escorted the protestors to a nearby Mosque.³⁰

Summary of Protest Themes

Although there were references to personal and public safety and security, the themes of the protests were always focused on international events, foreign policy, and supporting the global ‘*ummah*’ (Muslim community). The exception to that was the Islamic Emirates march which did focus on domestic issues but was couched in religious orthopraxy. When speeches were made or the audience addressed, it was always done by individuals such as Choudary, Izzadeen, Baraa, and Islam who are clearly intelligent, experienced, and articulate. Although some of the subject matter was antagonistic and not always received well by the

²⁹ Anjem Choudary, Twitter post, <https://twitter.com/#!/anjemchoudary/statuses/142614802695453696>.

³⁰ Participant observation, 20 January 2012.

audience, the summary assessment must be that it was done by design, not because of a lack of skill or intellect.

There was also a certain irony to the events. The Muslim protestors typically brought their wives and children to the events and relied on the police for their own personal safety from the EDL who were clearly more aggressive and violent. This reality convolutes the comments made by OSCT personnel in the previous chapter about groups such as AM who articulate portions of the AQ narrative being more violent than the EDL who are seen as a public order problem. It also requires pause and critical evaluation of the discussion from Chapter III in which Pressman, Precht and others define what is and is not socially tolerant radicalism.

In concluding the discussion on the protests, they served three critical purposes. First, they facilitated access for more interaction with AM members and other like-minded individuals so that primary data could be obtained. Secondly, remembering that one of the signs of radicalisation is action, they established what issues motivated individuals to take to the streets. Last, they provided a first-hand view of the interaction between the radical fringe (social movement) and police (counter-movement), all of which are discussed in Chapter IX, Analysis.

B. Al Muhajiroun, the Organisation

As a precursor to discussing the viewpoints of some of its members, some basic information about the ideological positioning of the organisation is provided on the next few pages. What follows is not intended to be all encompassing but rather serves as an introduction and provides some background material for the discussion that follows.

Al Muhajiroun in the UK was formed by Omar Bakri Muhammad (OBM) in 1996.³¹ Although AM was disbanded in 2004, the group has continued to operate under a number of successive names. As one protestor commented “Muslims Against Crusades, Islam 4UK, it’s all still part of Al Muhajiroun.”³² The government has taken adverse action against AM on three separate occasions (2006, 2010, and 2011) by proscribing it in whatever name it was using at the time but in each instance it has rebounded virtually unscathed and possibly stronger.³³

The ideology of AM is decidedly *Salafi* and is outlined in a book written by OBM titled *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah*. Published in 2004, the book establishes that the only way to achieve *jannah* (paradise) and eternal happiness is to follow the example of the Prophet.³⁴ This is not significantly different from traditional Islamic Sunni concepts but OBM’s methodology to achieve that goal quickly diverts from more mainstream thought. OBM begins his intellectual framework by citing a Hadith by Timidhi in which he quotes-

...The people of Israel divided into 72 sects, my Ummah will divide into 73 sects, all of them will be in the hellfire, and one of them will be in paradise. We asked, Which one is saved? The Prophet (saw) said, The one that is with me and my Companions.³⁵

OBM uses the Hadith by Timidhi as the foundational starting point for a discussion on *Ahl ul-Sunnah wal-Jama’ah* (the people of the Sunnah and the group) which in turn equates to the central ideological structure of AM. This is done by developing a series of arguments that support the notion that he and his followers intend to be the ‘one saved sect’ while the other 72 are sent to the hellfire. OBM cites a number of passages from the *Qur’an* and *hadith*

³¹ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

³² Interview with MAC member 4.9, 01 October 2011.

³³ Home Office, “Proscribed Terrorist Groups.”

³⁴ Omar Bakri Mohammad, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah* (London: Ad-Dawah Publications, 2004) 10.

³⁵ Sham il-Timidhi Hadith no. 2565, quoted in Omar Bakri Mohammad, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah* (London: Ad-Dawah Publications, 2004) 10.

ultimately establishing that “The single saved sect will be known as ...*Ahl us Sunnah wal Jama'ah*.”³⁶

The principal guidelines of the ‘one saved sect’ are reinforced continuously but all coalesce around the idea that *Ahl us Sunnah wal Jama'ah* must strictly follow the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. OBM develops the argument that to be successful they need to differentiate themselves from the other sects and not allow themselves to be ‘misguided’. Using a *hadith* by Maalik he reinforces that argument “*I left with you two things. As long as you hold firm to them after me, you will never be misguided, the Book of Allah, and my Sunnah.*”³⁷

The notions of strict adherence to the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* and the avoidance of misguidance are repeatedly emphasised and the orthodoxy becomes narrower with the development of each new argument. The true nature of this strictness begins to take shape when OBM profiles a *hadith* by Bukhari which says “*Be careful from innovation in the deen, every innovation is misguidance.*”³⁸ *Deen* is usually taken to mean ‘way of life’ and OBM uses it to establish that his followers should live their lives by following the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* explicitly without innovation. This argument is reinforced by a reference from the *Qur'an* “*On the day of judgment the people will be faces bright or dark*” which is explained in a *hadith* by Abbas “*Those people whose faces will be bright will be Ahl us-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah, and those whose face will be dark will be Alh Al Bid'ah wal Firqah.*”³⁹ *Ahl Al Bid'ah wal Firqah* means those people who use innovation are the deviant sects.

OBM argues that to avoid *bid'ah* (innovation) and deviance one must follow the examples of the *Sahaba* (companions of the Prophet) and the next two generations that

³⁶ Omar Bakri Mohammed, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah*, 25.

³⁷ Muwatta' Imaam Maalik Hadith no. 168, quoted in Omar Bakri Mohammad, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* (London: Ad-Dawah Publications, 2004) 37.

³⁸ Sahih Bukhari, Vol. 13, page 149, quoted by Omar Bakri Mohammad, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah* (London: Ad-Dawah Publications, 2004) 38.

³⁹ Unreferenced sura and Hadith, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah*, 49.

followed; the *Tabi'een* and *Tabi' Tabi'een*.⁴⁰ The rationale as to why they should follow the *Sahaba* and those that immediately followed is reinforced with a quote from Ibn Taymiyyah who referencing the same group came to the same conclusion “*They are called Ahl us-Sunnah because they always follow the Shari’ah and Jama’ah because they are united together without even meeting.*”⁴¹ Extending the argument even further OBM states that it is not enough to follow the *Sunnah* but that they must follow it in their sayings and actions; publicly calling for good and forbidding evil.⁴² In other words belief is not enough, it must be combined with action. To fortify the notion that they are on the right path, OBM uses a *Hadith* from Sunan ad-Darimi which says “*Three things you should not let people take away from you, to command good and forbid evil, to follow the Sunnah and Jihad for the sake of Allah.*”⁴³

To foment the notion that they are the only true believers, OBM makes a bold statement “The people of Sunnah do not call for unity with other groups who are upon the *batil* [falsehood] and deviance, because they are on the Haqq [truth].”⁴⁴ The proposition that *only they* know the truth begins an interesting cycle of self-affirmation and intra-group dynamics. The first is that there is wholesale rejection of any religious interpretation other than that of the *Sahaba*. OBM states that “Ahl us Sunnah wal Jama’ah only accept the understanding of the Messenger Muhammad (saw) and his Companions as they are the best to understand the text...They do not accept the understanding of anybody else...”⁴⁵ This is quickly followed by “Since Ahl us Sunnah wal Jama’ah stick firmly to the understanding of the Sahabah...they follow the Haqq [truth] and have no need to debate with people of

⁴⁰ Omar Bakri Mohammed, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah*, 49.

⁴¹ Omar Bakri Mohammed, quoting Ibn Tayniyyah, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah*, 50.

⁴² Omar Bakri Mohammed, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah*, 54.

⁴³ Ibid, 31.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 56.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 61.

ration... rather they stick to and submit to the meanings of the Divine Texts literally in accordance to the Best Generation (Sahaba).”⁴⁶

Finally, a consistent theme with AM is that Islam is preordained to dominate the world. OBM closes quoting a Hadith from Fath ul-Baari “*There will always be a sect in my Ummah, that will always be united and (know what they are calling for) dominating (all others).*”⁴⁷

In summation, AM’s ideological position is that they intend to be the one saved sect, *Ahl us Sunnah wal Jama’ah*, and in order to so they must follow the example of the Prophet (*Sunnah*) and the *Qur’an* in a literalist sense; they reject unity with other groups, choose literalism over rationalisation, and disallow any interpretations of Islamic principle that are inconsistent with the *Sahaba*. Their faith must also be one of action and they must publicly command good and forbid evil. Finally, because Islam is prophesised to dominate over all other religions, they work to facilitate that prophecy.

In context, the actions, speeches, placards, and topics from the protests all fit comfortably within the ideological framework. Their struggle (*jihad*) is an obligation that manifests both personally and publicly, and the fact that it is couched under that banner of *shar’iah* is not surprising. In fact it fits perfectly.

C. The Radicals

During the course of this research numerous interviews were conducted with those who are pejoratively label as radicals, extremists, Islamists, or terrorists. In most cases, the interviews were conducted at the protests or afterwards but who is actually a member of AM verses those who are either students or share a similar ideological orientation cannot be

⁴⁶ Omar Bakri Mohammed, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah*, 62.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 64.

verified. Most of those interviewed were at least ideologically aligned with AM, however additional interviews were conducted with individuals who were former Guantanamo Bay detainees, on control orders, or members of Hizb ut Tahrir. In some cases, those interviewed had been convicted under terrorism act (TACT) offenses such as incitement to commit murder, inciting racial hatred, or terrorism fund raising.

There were several reasons for interviewing this collective: to understand them better including their lived experience; to equate individual ideological commitment to group ideology and dynamics; to explore the reasons why they became active as radicals; to understand how they communicate and about what issues; to understand the macro effects government policy has had on the group; and whether or not government policy could be found as a causal link for people to join or leave the group, moderate their positions, or cause them to radicalise further. Stated more plainly, if radicalism is to be understood, the only way to do that is to speak with those who are radicalised. These issues clearly relate to core questions of this thesis and are discussed in detail in the next chapter, Analysis. Although the data that follows is raw, it provides an unfiltered view of the ‘radicals’ and ‘radicalism’ contained in this study.

Omar Bakri Mohammed

To frame the discussion that follows, it is once again helpful to present things from a top down perspective which means that Omar Bakri Mohammed (OBM), the founder and leader of the AM network is the natural starting point. As previously discussed, AM is the largest radical Islamist group currently operating in London and many consider it a significant threat. As a result, understanding OBM is critically important because his day to day organisational management, guidance, and ideological interpretations has tremendous

influence on his followers. Thus, to understand what is happening on the ground in the UK, one must understand OBM.

The interviews with OBM were extensive, in-depth, and candid, and completed over a three day period in Lebanon where he now lives in exile. OBM is a very intelligent, open, and charismatic individual, and his role as AM's organisational leader remains firmly entrenched. OBM capitalises on the mystical leader persona by delivering live nightly lectures and guidance on Paltalk to established AM groups in the UK, USA, Canada, Denmark, Holland, Germany, France, Sweden, India, Australia, Mauritius, Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudia Arabia, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Qatar, Lebanon, and Belgium and other followers around the globe.⁴⁸

Although OBM's background is widely reported by the media, on the internet, and some scholarly work, he is quick to say that most of what is written about him is not correct.⁴⁹ Referencing most writings that say he was born in Aleppo, Syria he said frustratingly "I never saw Aleppo in my life... and I was born in 1960, not 55, not 58, not 57, 1960!"⁵⁰ As a way to set the record straight, the following is a first-hand account.

OBM was born in Beirut, Lebanon, on 20 January 1960 and grew up in a traditional orthodox Muslim family.⁵¹ His father had three wives and he was one of 28 children.⁵² As a young child, he was selected by his father to be a scholar of Islam which follows the tradition in the *ash-Sham* region (Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Syria).⁵³ OBM was educated in the *madrassa* (religious school) system from the age of five and lived in Beirut until 1976 when he got married.⁵⁴ In 1976, Lebanon was choked by civil war and he and his wife, who was

⁴⁸ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 17 April 2012.

⁴⁹ See work by Kenney, Horgan, and Wiktorowicz for more

⁵⁰ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

then 14, fled to Saudi Arabia where they lived until 1984.⁵⁵ OBM continued his studies in Saudi Arabia where he studied under several *ulema* (Islamic scholars).

From an early age, OBM became involved in various Islamic groups and movements. In Lebanon, he was a member of the Islamic Scouts (*Ebad ul Rahman*) and the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan*).⁵⁶ After moving to Saudi Arabia he joined the Shar'iah Students before starting Al Muhajiroun, The Khilafa Movement in 1983.⁵⁷ When his activism became critical of the Saudi government, he was arrested.⁵⁸ Upon his release, Saudi officials told him he could no longer live in Saudi Arabia.⁵⁹ He left Saudi Arabia, entered Britain in 1984 as a political refugee, was granted the right to stay in the UK in 1986, and became a UK citizen in 1994.⁶⁰

In the UK he continued his activism and began preaching his concept of Islamic orthopraxy at the Muslim Welfare House in Finsbury Park. During the interview, OBM commented "That is the first place I went, where I started to preach, they are now 180 degrees against me."⁶¹ This comment would have gone unnoticed except that at the police hosted community engagement event mentioned in the previous chapter, members of the Muslim Welfare House were some of the most vocal and critical of the police. Thus they are equally critical of radical extremist ideology and police/policy efforts to confront it.

In 1986, OBM was recruited to lead Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) in Britain. At that time HT and The Khilafa Movement shared the same objective; reinstate the Caliphate by preaching, commanding good and forbidding evil, engaging in a political struggle against man-made law, and seeking the support from the army to overthrow the regime.⁶² OBM is quick to

⁵⁵ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

reinforce his position that whether with HT or AM, his activities are both a political and social struggle, not fighting. Politically, his ideological position is to challenge man-made laws and replace them with the divine law of *shar'iah*. His activities are designed to encourage the masses to rise and engage in widespread social action. In his own words-

We don't carry weapons. Rather we believe jihad is not important at all. Why? *Jihad* [fighting] is against occupiers but we are not under occupation in Britain, or in the West, or America. So we are in an ideological struggle to change people's views and ideas. To change their own behaviour....So if I change your thoughts and ideas, you become a Muslim. No need to fight me. You will carry the same struggle.⁶³

Critically, the quote above is quite general and there are some significant nuances that deserve explanation if HT and AM are to be understood. First, OBM led HT in Britain from 1986 until he resigned in 1996. His departure was the result of ideological differences he had with the HT leadership. Those differences can generally be grouped into three areas: activism and media; support for foreign efforts; and desired domestic outcomes.

According to OBM, the first tension between he and HT came about because he began organising various protests and conferences to maximise media coverage so that grievances and ideological principles could be communicated to a wider audience. OBM's protests began in 1989 outside the Odeon Theatre against the film *The Last Temptation of Christ* which offended him because of its sexual references.⁶⁴ His reaction was "Why do you want to defame our beloved messenger Jesus...Is this how you really feel about him?"⁶⁵ The protests became a regular activity culminating in the 1994 Khalifa Conference held at Wembley Stadium in which he called for "...*jihad* in Palestine and Kashmir."⁶⁶ Over time, OBM also discovered that the protests and conferences proved to be an excellent recruitment

⁶³ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

tool for disaffected youth. Although effective, HT leadership was uncomfortable with such high profile exposure and began sending communiqués asking OBM to curtail his activities.⁶⁷ Interviews with both OBM and HT representatives confirm that HT then and now is committed to working quietly and intellectually.⁶⁸

The next problem came about when OBM began sending ‘brothers’ to Bosnia in 1993/1994 to carry food, do charity work, and to fight.⁶⁹ At that time HT was engaged in collecting money and doing charitable work in Bosnia but sending people to fight crossed a philosophical line and caused more tension.⁷⁰ OBM explained his actions saying “Islam says to me fight those who fight you and support your Muslim brothers who attack you wherever they are... I believe as a Muslim you carry God’s commands wherever you are.”⁷¹

The more OBM pushed forward, the more HT leadership pushed back. A 1995 rally in Trafalgar Square in which OBM called for the Queen to embrace Islam highlighted the final difference in ideological positions between OBM and HT leadership. OBM’s fundamental belief is that Muslims should call for the *khilafa* (Caliphate) wherever they are.⁷² HT’s belief is that in non-Muslim countries they should work to establish a positive Muslim identity, apply Islamic understandings to contemporary issues, and counter negative views about Islam.⁷³ These differences became irreconcilable and on 16 January 1996, OBM resigned as head of HT in Britain.⁷⁴

For OBM, the 10 years with HT were extremely valuable. They taught him how to recruit effectively, how to maximise and manipulate the media, and most importantly how to be an opposition group and remain within the law.⁷⁵ A few months after leaving HT, he

⁶⁷ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁶⁸ Taji Mustafa interview, 02 August 2011.

⁶⁹ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁷⁰ Taji Mustafa interview, 07 September 2011.

⁷¹ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Taji Mustafa interview, 02 August 2011.

⁷⁴ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

established AM and brought all of those skills to his new following with two important additions; a strict *Salafi* belief and a consistently communicated belief in the Covenant of Security.⁷⁶ These two ideological themes work in companion with one another; it allows AM's central religious doctrine to be extremely conservative and radical, and at the same time establishes a line (violence) that should not be crossed. This position places AM extremely close to the line of legality and into the crosshairs of government.

As noted, AM's *Salafi* doctrine is well defined but its methodology warrants further clarification. According to OBM, "The belief in Islam has three pillars: conviction in the heart, testified by the tongue, and practiced willingly by the limbs."⁷⁷ He also plainly states-

It is not our policy in the UK to establish the Islamic State because only God knows where. But we believe in provocation. We believe in the policy of provocation.⁷⁸

This statement is cleverly worded because as noted above, OBM actually does believe in calling for the Caliphate in Britain but seeks to achieve that through a mass social movement. For OBM, that methodological approach came from studying a variety of political ideologies including communism, capitalism, Marxism, socialism, and Islam. OBM explains-

In order to study and understand the history [of these movements] I had to also study their opponents... Especially when I was with HT I studied international politics.. [To make change] some form of confrontation between the people...the uprising of the proletariat... against the landlords is necessary. In Islam that is called *fiqh al tadafu*... or *tawahush*- to make disorder in societies and then make something better. In order for us to make change we have to make some form of anarchy, make uprising. That will make people rise for themselves and fight.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁷⁷ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 17 April 2012.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 18 April 2012.

Mixed up in the milieu of radicalism, religious duty, and social change is the notion of Covenant of Security which OBM mentioned repeatedly during the interview. According to OBM, this is the core principle that defines how Muslims are required to interact with non-Muslims in the West.⁸⁰ The basis for this relationship has both spiritual (Qur'an) and historical (Treaty of Hudaibiya) roots. According to OBM-

God said if you live among non-Muslims you must carry my call. Otherwise if you live among them you are one of them... So to live among them I must call them to Islam, and to command good and forbid evil. In exchange, their own life and property have sanctity regardless of their own religion. Whether they believe in Islam or not, or are Jews or Christian or atheists or even secular people, their own life, their own properties have sanctity. In return I expect the same. But I must call them to Islam, command good, forbid evil. The law in Britain never forbid that. Rather guaranteed under pretext called freedom of speech. Guaranteed for you to carry what you believe; freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of expression... I practice my own rights which is God who grant me that... we believe that the whole earth belongs to God.⁸¹

This notion of Covenant of Security is something that is mentioned constantly in the nightly lectures. In addition to providing a religious directive that prohibits people from engaging in violence, it conveys the message that AM's followers have a responsibility in Britain to engage in *dawah* (calling people to Islam) and to publicly voice their objection to things that are deemed to be in opposition to God's will. For OBM and his followers, the Covenant serves as a contract with both rights and obligations. But with any contract, both parties have obligations and given that it is couched in ultra conservative religious doctrine without being codified on paper and signed by both parties, it becomes a one sided agreement

⁸⁰ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁸¹ Ibid.

from a secularist perspective. That is not to suggest that the British government is not aware of the concept only that its commitment to religious freedom and free speech come from different philosophical roots. This begs the question, what happens when Muslims perceive the Covenant has been broken? OBM's response to this was direct-

The Prophet said that God ordered me to fight people until they accept Islam or accept living under a Covenant of Security with me. If they do so, their own life and property will be secure...and if we [Muslims] violate that, we violate the command of God...So I believe the key issue in the West is not to violate the Covenant of Security...because the one who believes the Covenant of Security has been broken has no choice but to fight or emigrate.⁸²

Given this thesis seeks the ground truth in how UK CT policy is being reacted to at the community and individual levels, the obvious question that followed was what impacts have these policies, including proscription had on AM? According to OBM "When the police began to crack down on AM activities...that provoked the youth...and some members left because they wanted to do their own operations."⁸³ OBM was also quick to say that he and Britain's current AM *muatamin* (leader) struggle to keep the youth in check and that is why they constantly reference the Covenant of Security in their talks.⁸⁴ Furthermore, policy has driven much of the discussion underground and people are going to 'Sheikh Google' and 'Sheikh Yahoo' for answers.⁸⁵ According to OBM, people are finding *fatwa*'s (religious decrees) from Iraq, or Afghanistan and applying them to Britain which is completely inappropriate. "It is like wearing summer clothes in winter. It's a disaster."⁸⁶ OBM also warned that further securitisation could breach the Covenant of Security by saying-

⁸² Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 16 April 2012.

⁸³ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 17 April 2012.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

The new law of terrorism it makes life difficult for the brothers. It forced the brothers to go underground, forced some people to be split, forced some people to radicalise more, force people to play into the hand of the *jihadists* and into the hand of Sheikh Google and Sheikh Yahoo from Afghanistan and abroad. And this is where I found in the long run, this is going to be a security problem for the government... You are the one who keeps pressuring, pressuring, pressuring until the bomb goes off.⁸⁷

In concluding the interview with OBM, the issue of recruitment was once again discussed and two themes surfaced. The first, as mentioned previously, is that media coverage has been a great recruitment tool for AM. As such, the EDL has been incredibly effective at helping AM recruit new members by keeping them in the spotlight.⁸⁸ The second is that recruitment is based on a three pronged intellectual approach: problems, solutions, and actions.⁸⁹ OBM confirmed that this intellectual approach has worked well because it is based on ‘rational argument’ and “Islam provides all the answers.”⁹⁰

In summation, AM activities under the leadership of OBM, including the demonstrations against US and UK foreign policy and selected domestic issues, its effective manipulation of the media to extend those messages, all of which are couched in ultra-strict *Salafi* doctrine serve their purpose extraordinarily well. It satisfies not only the tenets of their religious doctrine but serves to recruit new members. Furthermore, despite all of this being framed around the principles of a Covenant of Security, it is not surprising that they are viewed as extremely radical by the West. Moreover, the notional differences of what constitutes security and for whom becomes exceedingly complex. Many of the concepts from Chapter II such as ethnic cultural identities are only tolerated when they don’t conflict with

⁸⁷ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 17 April 2012.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 18 April 2012. For more on OBM see Jon Ronson “The Tottenham Ayatollah” (1997); Quintan Wiktorowicz *Radical Islam Rising* (2005); John Horgan and Tore Bjoro *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (2008) and Michael Kenney et al “Organisational Adaption in an Activist Network (2012).

⁹⁰ Ibid.

prevailing culture and security for some may create insecurity for others is certainly relevant. Additionally, if as Pressman notes one of the characterisations of radicalism is demonstrated anger over foreign policy and that extremism challenges the norms of society then it is not surprising that OBM and AM are considered extremely radical and a security threat.

Anjem Choudary

As previously mentioned, Anjem Choudary is the former leader of al Muhajiroun. Given that AM is a proscribed organisation, Choudary was quick to distance himself from any group saying “I am not part of any organisation currently. I am also wise enough not to say something that would get me arrested.”⁹¹ The interviews with Choudary focused mainly on the notion of security and the impacts that government policy has had on Muslims. Choudary is clearly a very intelligent and articulate individual and when asked about the impacts that CONTEST has had on Muslims, his reply touched on several points in rapid succession-

CONTEST and Prevent in particular attempts to strip Muslims of the identity and make them adopt a British version of what it means to be Muslim.⁹²

It means they have to support the government and obey the law of the land even when it means that the government is responsible for killing Muslims in places like Iraq and Afghanistan and live under laws that are made by man rather than those that have been handed down by the creator.⁹³

⁹¹ Anjem Choudary interview, 19 May 2011.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

It means that they are forced to accept things like pornography, alcohol, and adultery all of which are against Muslim beliefs.⁹⁴

It means that they must tolerate the intolerable.⁹⁵

It means that have to accept a distorted version of Islam propagated by puppet organisations like the Muslim Council of Britain and Quilliam.⁹⁶

It means that *jihad* is restricted to a personal level.⁹⁷

David Cameron in his Munich speech said that multiculturalism is dead. This is exactly what the government wants because it forces people to adopt British ways.⁹⁸

All of these actions are done subtly. It is like draining the fish tank slowly so that the fish don't know what is happening to them.⁹⁹

In light of his responses, the next logical question was whether he thought government policy was driving people to adopt a more radical political or religious position? His response was equally candid saying-

The most radicalising factors are the government policies themselves. The internet revolution and all of the social networking sites means that all of the things that are going on in the world that affect Muslims are now available for everyone to see.

⁹⁴ Anjem Choudary interview, 19 May 2011.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

Today there is a whole generation of young Muslims who are looking at what is going on and wants their voice to be heard but that is not tolerated here.¹⁰⁰

Given that AM has survived despite a number attempts by government to have it disbanded, the question was asked- what effects has proscription had on the organisation?

We have never been more popular since we've been banned. It provides a great opportunity for *dawah*. The draconian laws in Britain are a joke and people see right through them. An example is the 2006 Terrorism Act which attempts to legislate what we can and cannot think about...Am I breaking the law when I smile just a little bit thinking about 9/11? When Islam4UK was banned, this made others, including non-Muslims want to join...The British government has become the best recruiting tool that anyone could possibly hope for.¹⁰¹

Before ending the interview a final question was posed about how he saw his role as being the last of the vanguard of radical Muslims from the late 1990s and early 2000s. He simply said "It mostly means that I have a lot of responsibility."¹⁰²

Hizb ut Tahrir

Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) is another sizable radical organisation that has captured the focus of government. Because much of the ideological positioning of HT was brought out in the previous section on OBM/AM, the focus of this discussion will be on contemporary issues. Unlike AM, HT does not normally engage in protests so access to interview members was limited to a couple of past and present members. One distinction worth noting from the outset and confirmed from several sources is that there is a stark difference in HT and AM

¹⁰⁰ Anjem Choudary interview, 19 May 2011.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

demographics. HT spokesperson Taji Mustafa explained that HT's approach is more intellectual so "...when you look at HT members, they tend to be doctors, lawyers, and accountants."¹⁰³ This contrasts with AM whose members are generally younger and from the working class.

The discussions with Mustafa included many of the same themes that were explored with AM and with similar responses, although without weaving in the religious ideology. Speaking specifically about the legislative environment Mustafa is critical because from a HT perspective it is fundamentally built on the wrong premise—that there is something wrong with Islam and it needs to be fixed.¹⁰⁴ Using Prevent as a case in point, Mustafa said "Prevent is a good example of how the government perceives that some Islamic values are a problem and needs to be addressed...Any policy that targets peoples beliefs that are not linked to violence is a problem."¹⁰⁵ Mustafa used the example of two school age boys, one white non-Muslim and one Asian Muslim to demonstrate his point-

The white kid talks about foreign policy and the government's action in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya. He is acknowledged as being mature, enlightened, and dialled in. The Muslim kid talks about Palestine, Kashmir, or even the same things and he may be referred to the police because he might be a terrorist.¹⁰⁶

Mustafa expands on the theme by saying-

Britain's security is being conflated because of politics and political expediency. This came up recently when Cameron pointed to Labour saying they were soft on extremists...the coalition government has 'narrowed the goalposts' on the entire topic of security. They have made choices about who they will talk to and who they won't

¹⁰³ Taji Mustafa interview, 02 August 2011.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

based on their Islamic Identity. And some of these groups have been very effective at channelling the frustration that many Muslims feel into productive activities.¹⁰⁷

When Mustafa was asked the question about whether he thought government policy was driving people to adopt a more radical political or religious position his answer was more tempered but similar to that of Choudary's-

The range of people who have been touched by counter-terrorism is quite broad. It doesn't matter who you talk to, the average Muslim teenager walking down the street or the Muslim lawyer driving his Mercedes, they have either been directly touched by the policy or know someone close to them that has. Whether it is stop and search or a family member or friend has been arrested, they know about it... But the real defining issue is foreign policy. Muslims have the concept of the *ummah* and when other Muslims are being killed, even if its not here in the UK, Muslims identify with that and if it involves actions by their government, they are going to protest about it.¹⁰⁸

Referencing the case of Babar Ahmed, a Muslim who was arrested after 9/11 for supporting terrorism and has been imprisoned for six years without charge while awaiting extradition to the US Mustafa said "If this is the kind of British values the government wants British Muslims to adopt, then we don't want to have anything to do with it."¹⁰⁹ That discussion created the opportunity to ask about the policy environment-

Pursue has been a problem but the police do law enforcement and that is what is expected. People don't like it but they accept it. In the Prevent strategy, the problem is Islam. The policy demonises fundamental concepts and ideas that are a big part of Islam simply because they are different than Western society...It's not about Islam,

¹⁰⁷ Taji Mustafa interview, 07 September 2011.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

7/7, or violence. It's about forcing Muslims to subscribe to a British version of Islam and people are rebelling.¹¹⁰

Given the criticism towards the Prevent strategy, Mustafa was queried about the different approaches the police and fire departments were using to engage with the community. His reply-

The fire department has a positive relationship with the community because they promote community safety through their school and smoke alarm programmes. The fire department is not seen as being a part of Prevent and that is a good thing. Prevent is a police led and intelligence led programme that sees Muslims as potential terrorists and is not there for the betterment of the Muslim community. It's a way to spy on Muslims and gather intelligence in an ever widening net. Now they [police] want schools to report on their kids and doctors to report on their patients. It's pernicious.¹¹¹

In an effort to explore how membership in AM and HT has changed over time and whether that could be linked to the policy environment the leaders of both organisations were queried but without success. In the case of AM, OBM said that he didn't mind talking generally about the organisation but would not talk about membership. In the case of HT the following reply received "We have and continue to see people convert to Islam and join HT. This has occurred historically and continues."¹¹² Not to be dissuaded, an attempt was made to quantify, albeit tangentially, the popularity of the various websites associated with these groups over time. To facilitate that process, contact was made with ACPO who monitors extremist internet traffic. Two requests were made and both went unanswered.

¹¹⁰ Taji Mustafa interview, 07 September 2011.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Taji Mustafa email, 07 August 2011.

Muslims Against Crusades

Although Muslims Against Crusades (MAC) clearly has a close association with AM, interviews with OBM, MAC organisers, and individuals who are familiar with both groups all confirm they are like minded but not the same group. This may simply be the result of AM distinctions about who is a ‘member’ and who is a ‘student’ but it does raise a question about how well the government actually understands these groups. An interview with one of the founders of MAC confirmed that he conferred with AM leadership before establishing MAC and they endorsed the idea.¹¹³ This sort of like minded ideological positioning without firm attachment to one group or another was also found to exist at the demonstrations where people would come to protest but deny further association.

When queried about the impetus for establishing MAC one of the founders explained “...we found that Muslims had been backed up against the wall in this country. Especially after 7/7, Muslims were being condemned.”¹¹⁴ The notion of being ‘backed up against the wall’ was explored and his explanations provided more detailed –

Every Muslim is being painted with the same brush especially after 7/7...and we need to see things in the right context. These things are happening because of your own foreign policy.¹¹⁵

If I were to even download a magazine, I would be arrested.¹¹⁶

If you want conflict...look towards your own kind of intolerance...people are not going to sit back and wait for you to slaughter them.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Interview with Citizen 4.6, 03 August 2011.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

Muslims are going to start forming their own...cells...and people are going to start pursuing different stuff.¹¹⁸

His comments were decidedly defensive in nature and when explored in more detail, Pressman's familiar theme of oppression surfaced as he explained "Many of the contacts that I speak to, they find that they are being alienated, they are being oppressed."¹¹⁹ This was generally not present in interviews with more 'mainstream' Muslims discussed in the previous chapter but it is decidedly present in the Facebook posts and Paltalk discussions of ultra pious fringe. The core of *Salafi* ideology focuses on the time of the Prophet so it is not surprising that they would explain their current environment as being similar to the oppression the Prophet Muhammed experienced in Mecca. Despite the historical orientation there is also an interesting sense of contemporary social ownership and community responsibility made clear in the following statements-

I need to stand my ground and I'm not going to come with my begging hand out. I was raised up in this society. I am a citizen of this country. This land belongs to me as much as it belongs to anybody else...We need a transparent society and a government that can run the affairs of society in the right way.¹²⁰

With the riots...we were out there, outside the mosque ourselves at night patrolling...we were not there for violence, but we don't want our community getting wrecked. We don't want our homes getting wrecked.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Interview with Citizen 4.6, 03 August 2011.

¹¹⁹ Interview with citizen 4.6, 13 September 2011.

¹²⁰ Interview with citizen 4.6, 03 August 2011.

¹²¹ Interview with citizen 4.6, 13 September 2011.

These statements not only reflect on the contemporary issues but also the Islamic concept of commanding good and forbidding evil, and the religious obligation for activism. Although the religious obligation is easily explained, the manner in which they chose to express that obligation required clarification. The answer to that question was delivered in rather stark terms-

The reason we do what we do, I know our actions may seem very radical, but the majority of media today are headline junkies...if you don't give them a story, they don't want it. If I was in a mosque speaking, nobody is going to listen. When I speak about controversial things, people will listen, and controversial things need to be spoken about. We need to speak about the moral decadence of society to bring about a revolution. It needs to be done. Yes it may cost me my life, but hey, I've got paradise.¹²²

The interview naturally included some discussion on CT policy and how he and others were affected. Although he stated that he knew several people who had been or were presently on control orders, he was reluctant to comment about the affects of those policies. Instead, he spoke in more general terms-

I think after the events of 9/11 and 7/7... the police have been harsh to Muslims in general. There have been frequent stop and searches...I have been stopped and searched. So yea, it does alienate people...they don't find that the authorities are actually there to serve them, they discriminate...There is that kind of institutional racism.¹²³

I think I lost one of my jobs because of MI5. I used to work in the underground...and one of the MI5 guys, he came down to my manager and asked a lot of questions. My

¹²² Interview with citizen 4.6, 03 August 2011.

¹²³ Interview with citizen 4.6, 13 September 2011.

manager called me up and asked if I was Al Qaeda. I had to leave my job after that... so yes it does affect families.¹²⁴

I am living in security so I don't need to be violent. People like you will come down and speak to me so maybe I can get my voice through. Maybe we can work something out. Maybe we can live harmoniously sided by side. But if you constantly have an iron fist on top of my head...I'm going to have to do something.¹²⁵

His last comment allowed the opportunity to ask about the fire department and their relationship with the Muslim community.

"...obviously they have a bigger role in society...The fire service, they need to be more aware of what is happening. You know those firemen [on 9/11] did not have to lose their lives. If they spoke out beforehand, if they engaged in certain politics, if they looked toward the foreign policy of their own country...I don't think that something like that would have taken place. Those men did not have to put their lives at risk.¹²⁶

The discussion also touched briefly on the role of the mosque and what types of discussions were taking place inside-

I don't know who does not support the *mujahidin* [Muslim fighter] today. If you go to any mosque, as moderate as they may seem, as secular as they may seem...you find that the night prayers, every one of them makes dua [prayer] or supplications for the *mujahidin* of Afghanistan or Somalia.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Interview with citizen 4.6, 13 September 2011.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

This comment of course begged the question about the role of the *imams* (prayer leader and typically an Islamic scholar) in guiding the community.

As for some of the *imams*...As long as they can line their pockets with money, you know Prevent money...people are not really taking them seriously...people are seeing the true sides of these *imams*. We call them scholars for dollars.¹²⁸

Given the significant interaction between the police and mosque leadership through the Prevent agenda, this comment again suggests that the influence of some mosque leaders may be compromised because of their relationship with the authorities. This brings additional clarity to the discussion in the previous chapter as to why the police are having the door slammed in their face.

Although it was acknowledged that in some ways the current environment is drawing Muslims closer together, the comment above and below suggests that the Muslim community is also being divided because its own insecurity. Furthermore, that insecurity may be leading some down the path of radicalisation and violence.

Even some Muslims are scared to talk to other Muslims about these issues because what you find is that many of the Muslims work for the police. Many Muslims work for the system so you cannot trust anyone in the community. I think that radicalisation is something that happens to somebody alone. People like Roshonara Choudhury for instance. She was radicalised...by what she saw. She had no engagement with any kind of group. So you see the effects on society. You prep yourself to do certain stuff...people start to take matters into their own hands...what you get from speaking to people generally is that people think like that. They think that, you know what? This is what I feel like doing. I don't know how people restrain themselves. When

¹²⁸ Interview with citizen 4.6, 03 August 2011.

people are pushed right to the edge, they feel like it is their responsibility to do something.¹²⁹

Once again, as discussed in Chapter III, a hallmark of radicalism is action and the above quote suggests that ‘action’ is decidedly a topic of discussion within the Muslim community. This concept is explored in more detail in Chapter IX, Analysis.

Before leaving the discussion on MAC there are few points that are worth noting. The proscription was timed to stop another protest and potentially violent confrontation between MAC and EDL members the following day at the Royal Albert Hall. Although both MAC and EDL sympathisers stayed away from Royal Albert Hall, the EDL attempted to turn their aggression on supporters of the ‘Occupy’ movement camped out at St Paul’s Cathedral causing police to intervene and arrest 176 EDL members.¹³⁰ Although MAC publicly supported the Covenant of Security their proscription may have been significantly influenced by an October MAC press release that threatened MP Mike Freer by stating “We warn Mike Freer and every other MP in Britain that their presence is no longer welcomed in any Muslim area and that examples such as Stephen Timms [the MP stabbed by Roshonara Choudhury] should serve as a piercing reminder of this.”¹³¹

Following the MAC proscription on 10 November 2011, a discussion with a police contact regarding the efficacy of proscription against groups like MAC and AM received this reply “What a fucking waste of time. The only people that benefitted from that were the media and Theresa May. They’re not going anywhere.”¹³² From the other end of the spectrum a contact close to AM had this to say-

¹²⁹ Interview with citizen 4.6, 13 September 2011.

¹³⁰ Sandra Laville, “Police arrest EDL members to ‘avert planned attack’ in London,” *The Guardian*, 11 November 2011.

¹³¹ “Mike Freer, Finchley and Golders Green MP, Threatened by Extremist Muslim Group,” *Huffington Post*, 29 October 2011. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/10/29/mike-freer-finchley-and-g_n_1065237.html [Accessed 12 November 2011].

¹³² Police officer 2.15.2 telephone conversation.

MAC did not want to get banned but they thought they were going to for several months and it finally happened. There are always good and bad things that happen with these things. The good part is that the ban exposed many people to MAC's call and shows the failure of the current government. More people are coming to Islam because of what happened to MAC. I am getting more calls and emails now than ever before.¹³³

Last, MAC's proscription ultimately led to the arrest of 20 individuals at the 02 December 2011 protest. Following the arrests, police searched each of their homes and confiscated various items before they were released.¹³⁴ Months went by without any decision on the charges they faced. After four and a half months, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decided in late March not to press charges.¹³⁵ This raises a number of unanswered questions including: What purpose does proscription actually serve? Is there a fracture developing between the political and judicial with the MPS caught in the middle? And what impacts did the arrest and subsequent raids on their homes have in radicalising the arrestees, their families, and friends?

An opportunity surfaced to interview someone who had previously been convicted and imprisoned for TACT offenses and also knew several of those arrested on 02 December. His explanation helped put things in context-

You want to know the impact? Have you ever been to an Asian wedding? Asian weddings, they have guest capacities of 5-600 people...those 5-600 and plus more people know all about...the bride and groom. Something happens in that one house like an arrest, those 5-600 people know about it...They pin you down. They make you sit in a room. They handcuff you while they go through your personal belongings;

¹³³ Citizen 4.14 telephone interview, 21 November 2011.

¹³⁴ Interview with citizen 4.35, 13 December 2011.

¹³⁵ Police officer 2.14.2 telephone conversation.

inch by inch, cardigan by cardigan, sock by sock...while laughing and joking. And so you got these 20 houses...and they are hopeless and helpless to stop that from happening...People are thinking what can I do to avenge that atrocity and the terror they suffered...now the government might be having a complete hold over all the mosques...but that lone wolf, that lone individual, how on earth are you going to stop him?¹³⁶

The opportunity was also taken to ask him about the impacts on his family following his arrest-

Right now to this day, if there is loud knock at the door...the children are worried that it's another raid on their house. They're worried that their father is going to be taken away from them. They're worried that their game consoles, their iPads, iPods, computer games, Nintendo, Wii's, everything they have will be taken away for examination by the police. This is what happened to them on the previous occasion...Relatives of mine who...were just interested in the pop-star lifestyle, chasing the glamour, glitz, young girl who had everything to look forward to and she said no. Why is my first cousin sitting behind bars? Now she's got her views.¹³⁷

Individual Radicals, Extremists, Terrorists, and other Deviants

This fieldwork relied heavily on snowballing techniques and exploited every opportunity to speak with individuals so that a sense of the sentiment, the socially constructed realities, and intra and extra group dynamics that exist within this segment of population were understood. The data that follows was obtained from a variety of individuals that ranged from former Guantanamo Bay detainees, those on control orders, individuals who have past

¹³⁶ Interview with Citizen 4.35, 15 January 2012.

¹³⁷ Interview with Citizen 4.35, 13 December 2011.

convictions for terrorism offences, and myriad others who have adopted extremist ideology.

What follows is a thumbnail view from some of those interviews/conversations-

They think we're all the same. That we're extremists just because we speak out on issues that we think are wrong.¹³⁸

There is a very clear sign that there is a rule for some and another for others. This is just going to infuriate the people.¹³⁹

There were four bombers on 7/7 and I don't remember how many more were arrested as accomplices. So out of all the Muslims here in this country, why does the government treat all of us like were terrorists?¹⁴⁰

After I was put on control orders, I was very resentful. It made me begin to look at things in a very different way. I suppose that is expected. But the biggest harm that control orders have is to the community and how they feel they are being treated.¹⁴¹

The British government because of their policies has labelled all Muslims as terrorists. Why we are not allowed to protest like any other group? I mean we do, but we're seen as a threat.¹⁴²

The police began arresting people because they could be identified from other protests. Does that mean that you are subject to censorship and arrest just because you are a Muslim and want to protest against British foreign policy, something that is unpopular with white non-Muslims in Britain as well? It goes to show you how much

¹³⁸ Interview with citizen 4.9, 01 October 2011.

¹³⁹ Interview with citizen 4.35, 13 December 2011.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with citizen 4.10, 01 October 2011.

¹⁴¹ Interview with citizen 4.4, 13 July 2011.

¹⁴² Interview with citizen 4.7, 01 October 2011.

the government doesn't want anybody to be critical of them. It also makes Muslims more determined to speak out when they see things like that happen.¹⁴³

Now the government wants to regulate what you read and if you read the wrong things you can be arrested for thought crimes.¹⁴⁴

...then you have your terrorism legislation which is completely focused and geared to a Muslim which fits him like a glove. What's an extremist Muslim? If he prays five times a day, if he has a beard, if he fasts during the month of Ramadan they are the telltale signs which put the whole of the Muslim community in the box of extremist, radical extremist, and the road to terrorism.¹⁴⁵

The moment the Muslims come out to vent their anger in a peaceful manner, not in a violent manner, in a demonstration they get labelled as terrorists, radicals, fanatics...¹⁴⁶

Muslim identity is being forced by the domestic and foreign policies of the government. Even if it does not immediately affect me, it will eventually because it affects my friends and family.¹⁴⁷

I think people feel like they are being pushed to the edge of what they can tolerate. Even though we live under a Covenant, not everyone believes in that. Different people believe different things. If things keep going the same way, some will consider the covenant broken and take action.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Interview with citizen 4.26, 06 December 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with citizen 4.29, 06 December 2011.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with citizen 4.35, 15 January 2012.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with citizen 4.14, 14 October 2011.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with citizen 4.29, 06 December 2011.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with citizen 4.9, 01 October 2011.

I do believe in the Covenant of Security, that we do live here in peace with the people. We do not fight them. But that doesn't mean that we are not allowed to express our views.¹⁴⁹

...its stuff like this [court sentencing] that makes us radical. You can't sit back and watch stuff like this happen and not want to fight back.¹⁵⁰

...we get portrayed as violent extremists...but why is it that we bring our wives, why is it we bring our children to these demonstrations?¹⁵¹

If they keep treating us like we are criminals, they shouldn't be surprised if we act like criminals.¹⁵²

I have lots of young people come to me and say I want to do *jihad*... I tell them that they need to think very carefully about the decisions they make because once you go down that path there is no coming back.¹⁵³

The summary assessment of the comments above is there is consistency in the belief that like their mainstream counterparts who see themselves labelled as a suspect community, those on the fringe believe they are being labelled as terrorists for speaking out.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with citizen 4.14, 14 October 2011.

¹⁵⁰ Interview with citizen 4.36, 09 February 2012.

¹⁵¹ Interview with citizen 4.14, 14 October 2011.

¹⁵² Interview with citizen 4.10, 01 October 2011

¹⁵³ Interview with citizen 4.29, 06 December 2011.

D. Chapter Summary

As discussed in Chapter III, every society has people who exist on the fringe and in truth there are many fringes. Radical Islamic groups are just one of the groups in that spectrum. What is clear and consistent across the organisational, ideological, leadership, and individual perspectives of the radical fringe is that they are ultra-pious, reject man-made law, rely heavily on religious history to guide and justify their actions, and believe that they have a duty to act.

What is also clear is that although the majority of their focus remains on foreign policy, there is attention given to domestic issues, and both are couched within a narrow religious orientation. Like their more mainstream counter-parts, the radical fringe feel that equity is lacking and their personal safety and security is being eroded. However, unlike their mainstream counterparts who equate the lack of equity, safety, and security to a sense of betrayal, these notions are being reconstituted and transmitted across the formal and informal networks of the radical fringe as religious oppression. The importance of these transmitted ‘lessons and stories’ as Borum explained in Chapter V should not be underestimated. Another contrast to the mainstream is that the radical fringe lacks optimism for a positive community/government relationship and relies on the three pillars of belief to guide their daily existence: conviction in the heart, testified by the tongue, and practiced willingly by the limbs. As OBM explained “If I deliver the message, I receive a reward whether you accept it or not.... I am successful as a Muslim”¹⁵⁴

The sense of oppression and absence of optimism, counter-balanced by the promise of a religious reward, makes for a precarious and highly volatile social environment. Many of Pressman’s hallmark indicators of violent radicalism are present: ideological positioning, injustice, alienation, rejection of democratic values, bonding and contact with others

¹⁵⁴ Omar Bakri Mohammed, Interview, 17 April 2012.

considered extreme, anger over government policy, attribution of blame, and challenging societal norms to name a few. However, how much of that is directly tied to counter-terrorism policy and whether that is exacerbating the situation requires additional exploration. That exploration is undertaken in the next chapter, Analysis.

What is clear is that radical Muslims will continue to challenge government policy where it is considered in conflict with their religious beliefs. Furthermore, that challenge has the potential to escalate unless it is managed effectively. As one former Guantanamo Bay detainee explained- “People need to understand that Muslims want to restore their role in the world and not be remembered as someone whose only contribution was perfecting the IED.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ Interview with citizen 4.29, 06 December 2011.

Chapter IX: Analysis

*Muslims, Jews, and Christians have to find ways to live side by side peacefully...
When we die, we're all going to the same place: no matter what... the address on the front of
the envelope is still the same.¹*

This purpose of this chapter is to analyse the results of the fieldwork findings and answer the research question. Whereas the previous two chapters were ‘descriptive’ and presented the results of the fieldwork, this chapter is designed to make sense of them. As discussed explicitly in Chapter VI, this thesis is qualitative in nature and thus seeks to *understand* the data rather than *test* or model the data in different environments. Even though much can be inferred by reading the fieldwork reporting chapters, the data is raw and requires a framework to be understood properly. It is also important to understand the data contextually. This thesis serves as a ‘snapshot’ and follows the general nature of descriptive or emic research methods. As much as possible, it portrays a first-hand view of how people are reacting to the CT environment and is not intended to be universalised as would be the case in inferential or etic methods. It uniquely constructs a portrait, bound by both geography and time.

Before explaining the actual framework for analysis it is helpful to re-visit the basic definitions of radicalisation and marginalisation that were discussed in Chapter II. There are two reasons that this is important. Firstly, those terms are contained in the research question which is answered at the end of this chapter so they must be clearly understood and contextualised. Secondly, the majority of the analysis will be developed using a modified version of Pressman’s 28 point Violent Extremism Risk Assessment tool (VERA) tool discussed in Chapter III. Because the modified VERA tool evaluates those factors known to be relevant to the process of radicalisation, they must be established.

¹ Interview with individual 4.13, 12 October 2011.

As outlined in Chapter VI and reported in Chapter's VII and VIII, four macro case studies were developed: public safety groups (MPS and LFB); other government; communities and individuals; and radicals. For clarity, it should be understood that the case studies and frameworks developed are constructed in a way to answer the research question, not to compare and contrast, or give equal time and attention to each group. This thesis is about radicalisation and whether or not the delivery of CT policy at the local level can be linked to that process. Finally, in answering that question, it serves as an information tool so that the complexities and subtleties of the 'lived experience' are plainly understood in the gritty environment where policy meets reality.

A. Radicalisation Revisited

As extensively discussed in Chapter III, radicalisation is defined in many ways and there is no universal definition. However, a working definition is needed so that the research question can be answered within the context of this thesis. The opportunity is also taken here to say how radicalisation should not be defined and that is best exemplified by the British government's 2009 and 2011 CONTEST strategies. In the 2009 version of CONTEST the British government defined radicalisation as "...the process by which people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups."² In 2011, the definition was changed to say "Radicalisation refers to the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism."³ Rather than being developed in a dispassionate manner, both definitions are arguably politicised. This argument links back to the discussion on cognitive dissonance in Chapter III and why 'radical' politicians are acceptable when 'radical' others are not. When definitions are changed to suit the person,

² Home Office, CONTEST 2009, 40.

³ Ibid, 36.

group, or situation this naturally becomes problematic. Additionally, both definitions link radicalism to violence which is not only unfounded but contradictory to the government's own internal workings. A 2010 report from the Department for Communities and Local Government concluded that "Terms such as 'radicalism', 'extreme', 'Islamist' and 'fundamentalism' are too often conflated to mean 'violent extremism', even though those who ascribe to one of these terms do not necessarily support, or engage, in violence."⁴ It should come as no surprise that when significant flaws exist in the government's definition of the very thing that it is trying to prevent, problems follow.

For the purpose of this analysis, Button's characterisation of radicalisation will be used as a working definition; "...the first stage of radical change is knowing that something is very wrong... If you are moved to righteous indignation by the injustice seen or read about, you will probably want to know more, until you are convinced that something must change."⁵ The argument for using Button's statement is that it can be universalised. It can be applied across the spectrum from radical jihadi's to politicians, yet captures the key themes of radicalisation as summarised in Chapter III: knowing something is wrong; righteous indignation; injustice; and convinced that something must change. Button's statement is also congruent with the reflexive orientation of this thesis; that radicalism is fundamentally a cognitive shift in identity and the subsequent transition and reorientation of how one perceives himself or herself and the world around them.

B. Marginalisation Revisited

The other term that requires defining is marginalisation. As discussed in Chapter III, the entire concept of marginalisation and its influence on radicalisation is amorphous and

⁴ Sanah Sheikh, Chih Hoong Sin, Ewan King, Asima Shaikh, *Literature of Attitudes Towards Violent Extremism Amongst Muslim Communities in the UK* (London: Department of Communities and Local Government) 54.

⁵ Button, *The Radicalism Handbook*, viii.

inherently intangible. Nevertheless, despite those qualities, a working definition is needed so that the research question can be answered. However, before offering a definition, it is worth re-visiting a couple of other terms so that ‘marginalisation’ is understood in specific context to this thesis. Those terms are ‘agency’ and ‘social capital’. Although much of the conceptual terminology was discussed in detail in Chapter II, these terms were purposefully left untouched so that they might make more sense following the reporting chapters. Furthermore, as will be argued, both terms have conceptual links to marginalisation.

The *Collins Dictionary* defines ‘agency’ as “...any human action, collective or structural as well as individual, which ‘makes a difference’ to a social outcome.”⁶ Although there is debate among psychologists regarding how much power individuals actually have in overcoming ‘structural constraints’ this definition is helpful for two important reasons. First, the terms ‘human action’ confirms that ‘agency’ is a verb. Secondly, the terms ‘make[s] a difference’ and ‘social outcome’ confirms that there is a sense of ownership and belonging. Thus ‘agency’ is about the power of individuals, individually or collectively, to influence their social environment and there is a sense of belonging to that environment. However, without getting into an extensive discussion on the debate amongst psychologists, at least some of the ‘structural constraints’ are found in the nature of identity. Wren discusses this by first saying that identity is made up of three distinct components: “...“personal identities,” which are self-ascribed; “individual identities,” which are other-assigned identities; and “social identities,” which consist of voluntary self-identification with social groups...”⁷ Thus the power of ‘individuals’ and in turn ‘individual agency’ is directly affected by the manifestation of identity which is assigned by others. This concept is exactly synchronous to the discussion on Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory from Chapter III. Wren goes on

⁶ *Collins Dictionary of Sociology*, “agency,” <http://www.credoreference.com/entry/collinssoc/agency> [Accessed September 09, 2012].

⁷ Mary Wrenn, “Agency, Identity, and the Great Crisis: A Veblenian Perspective” *Journal of Economic Issues* 46, no. 2 (2012) 403.

to say that “Social identity is the result of the individual agent’s personal identity interacting with the surrounding institutional structure and the other-assigned, individual identity.”⁸ In other words, social identity is the product or outcome of one’s personal identity influenced by one’s individual identity.

In the narrowed focus of this thesis, many of the quotes from the reporting chapters clearly confirm that the collective Muslim identity has been stereotyped as the ‘suspect other’. The assignment of that identity has meant that some feel disenfranchisement, are untrusting of government, and are withdrawing from the democratic process. When compared to the conceptual notion of Putnam’s ‘social capital’ discussed in Chapter II, it matches perfectly.

Finally, many of those interviewed articulated a sense of exclusion because of limited opportunities for real dialogue on the issues that affect society. Not only does this link to ‘agency’ and ‘social capital’, an argument can be made that even Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation has connections because it takes into account the “...discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities”.⁹

Although the idea of marginalisation remains a slippery slope, when considered against the backdrop of agency, social capital, identity, and relative deprivation, it begins to make much more sense. As such, the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion’s definition seems best-

An individual is socially excluded if (a) he or she is geographically resident in a society but (b) for reasons beyond his or her control, he or she cannot participate in the normal activities of citizens in that society, and (c) he or she would like to so participate.¹⁰

⁸ Wrenn, “Agency, Identity, and the Great Crisis,” 404.

⁹ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 24.

¹⁰ Burchardt, Le Grand, and Piachaud, “Social Exclusion in Britain,” 229.

C. Modified VERA Assessment

In Chapter III significant discussion was devoted to Pressman's approach to radicalisation and her development of a 28 point assessment tool. Pressman's assessment tool was given prominence for three reasons. First, it represents a collection of attributes that Pressman aggregated from others who study radicalisation. Thus it is not one person's view but represents a critical and collected view of other academics. Second, it lists 28 specific points of reference that relate to radicalisation. This is uniquely progressive in a discipline which Silke, Brannan, and Strindberg would undoubtedly argue has been historically dominated by anecdotal evidence, and oriented on causal, situational, or mechanistic methodologies rather than specific attributes. Third, its construction has been developed around Structured Professional Judgment, a professionally accepted format for risk assessment that has been used for many years and proven effective. Moreover, VERA is currently being piloted in Australia's prison system and has been independently validated with a 'high degree of agreement' by the Australian National Offender Management Service.¹¹ These reasons give Pressman's tool credibility and uniqueness in the field of radicalisation research.

Using all of Pressman's 28 assessments would be unrealistic in the context of this thesis. Additionally, the tool was devised to assess "factors known to be relevant to the process of radicalisation leading to violent extremism."¹² However, as previously discussed, it logically follows that removing those factors that have clear links to violence and attenuating the characteristics of those that remain, the earlier stages of radicalisation are discoverable. As such, there were six general characteristics of radicalisation developed in Chapter III:

¹¹ Elaine Pressman, Email received 05 February 2010.

¹² Pressman, *Risk Assessment Decisions for Violent Political Extremism*, 21.

1. Radicals most likely lean more towards an ideology rather than a socially accepted difference of opinion.
2. Radicalism involves identifying where change must take place.
3. Social protest is sometimes warranted over actions or lack of action by government
4. Individuals feel some sense of distance from main stream society.
5. Individuals feel more secure around those who perceive the world in similar ways and reinforce their view by following like minded publications and/or websites.
6. There is a sense of injustice.

These characteristics overlay neatly with the descriptive nature of radicalisation by Button. Using the above six characteristics as benchmarks to demonstrate the cognitive shift of radicalisation has taken place, an analytical framework is put forth to critically discuss the fieldwork data from the previous two chapters. Although the primary orientation will remain on radicalisation, where marginalisation is also a factor, it will be noted.

Attribute 1: *Radicals most likely lean more towards an ideology rather than a socially accepted difference of opinion*

Clearly groups like Hizb ut Tahir and Al Muhajiroun have an unmistakably defined ideological frame of reference. To varying degrees, they reject man-made law and openly advocate reinstating the *khalifah*. In the case of AM, they subscribe to a strict *Salafi* doctrine that is described in detail in the book *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama'ah*. This was reinforced during the OBM interview and there was no ambiguity when he stated “We don’t carry weapons...we are in an ideological struggle to change people’s view and ideas.”¹³ Similarly, another AM interviewee gave this response “We are not an opposition political party, rather

¹³ Interview with Omar Bakri Mohammed, 16 April 2012.

we are opposition government. We are saying that your whole fundamental government and ruling is flawed...”¹⁴

When speaking to those who most would classify as radicals or extremists, there is unfettered acknowledgement that they see themselves as radicals too. During the interview with Anjem Choudary he said “Radicals are a necessary part of every society because they bring about change. Yes, I am a radical but in my case the term is used negatively.”¹⁵ Similarly, one of the MAC representatives characterised himself by saying “I do have very radical views because we need radical views to change society.”¹⁶ Finally, near the end of the OBM interview, his long term adoption of ideologies became abundantly clear when he reflected and said-

I was...with the Sufi's in the beginning, with the Islamic Scouts, Muslim Brotherhood, then Khilafa Movement or Jamaat al Islami type, then I become HT, then jihadist, then I become Salafi Jihadist, then I become pro al Qaeda...nothing left now but to become al Qaeda.”¹⁷

The ‘radicals’ interviewed as part of this research, including those who are the leaders, were clearly found to subscribe to an alternative ideological platform. However, none of them equated their adoption of radical ideology specifically to UK CT policy. This was true with even the most recently recruited members. However, CT policy is referenced extensively in online chat rooms (Paltalk), Facebook, Youtube, and websites to air grievances, arguing that Muslims are being oppressed and their oppression is no different than the oppression the Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) faced in Mecca.¹⁸ Articulation of these grievances exploits the notion of marginalisation and creates a wider cognitive opening where

¹⁴ Interview with citizen 4.35, 15 January 2012.

¹⁵ Anjem Choudary interview, 19 May 2011.

¹⁶ Interview with citizen 4.6, 03 August 2011.

¹⁷ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 18 April 2012.

¹⁸ Participant observation, Paltalk, Facebook, Youtube, anjemchoudary.com, muslimsagainstcrusades.com, salafimedia.com, izharudeen.com, February 2011 to present.

an alternative radicalised ideological platform can be presented for those who are interested enough to listen. It is also used to reinforce ideological positioning, reassuring those who have already begun to align themselves intellectually with the group that the choice they made was the correct one.

A prime example of the CT policy/ideological interface can be found in the document *Islamic Prevent*.¹⁹ Developed and released to coincide with the release of the revised 2011 Prevent Strategy by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government, the document states that “It tries to deal with certain ideas which are based on Islam and the teaching of Muhammad (saw) and tries to replace them with ideas which are not based on the teachings of Islam.”²⁰ It goes on to list 18 points that can be roughly segregated into three themes: identity, orthopraxy, and security, and each rebuffs some element of government policy. In more general terms, it defines terrorism as “...those who are using force against a community...for political purposes.”²¹ The document goes on to say-

This is precisely what the US and British are doing in their domestic policies and...their foreign policies. From the draconian laws and innocent people in Prisons [sic] back home and around the world to the occupation of Muslim land and mass murder of innocent men, women, and children; the US and UK governments are today the biggest exporters of terrorism.²²

This is just one example but represents a baseline narrative that is repeated over and over again across multiple channels of information and social networking platforms.

¹⁹ Anjem Choudary, *Islamic Prevent: Preventing Secular Fundamentalism and the Occupation of Muslim Land*, www.anjemchoudary.com/press-releases/islamicprevent [Accessed 18 June 2011].

²⁰ Ibid, 3.

²¹ Ibid, 27.

²² Ibid.

Attribute 2: *Radicalism involves identifying where change must take place*

The identification of grievances and where those grievances emanate from is clearly in place with those encountered during this study. Perhaps the most obvious examples come from the protests where there is clear opposition to government foreign and domestic policy. The death of Osama bin Laden, the ten year anniversary of 9/11, the killing of Anwar al Awlaki, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have all served as convenient vehicles to voice opposition towards the US and UK governments. Placards such as ‘death to America’, ‘Muslims will annihilate the crusaders’, ‘stop Christian terrorism’, and ‘United States terrorist state’ all communicate a focused point of reference as to where specific grievances lay. More specifically, speeches at the various protests leave no doubt who the recipients of criticism are. During the Osama bin Laden protest Choudary said “The biggest oppressor, the biggest criminal in the world today is Barak Obama and his henchmen, and his allies.”²³ The allies he was referring to were unmistakably Britain. During the 11 September 2011 protest, Izzadeen addressed the crowd saying “Do not be fooled by your politicians. This is not about security. It’s about a war against *al Islam*.”²⁴

Although the US carries the brunt of the blame by Islamist groups, there is anger and frustration towards the UK government because of its complicity and support for the ‘War on Terror’. A MAC posting following the 10th anniversary of 9/11 makes this point clear “Muslims in Afghanistan have been engaged in a brutal war in Afghanistan against occupying forces for 10 years, led by America and its adopted poodle Britain.”²⁵ Quotes such as these represent a troubling reality because they are endemic across the spectrum of social media platforms used by those included in this study. Facebook, Paltalk, Twitter, and hosted websites, are replete with anti-government rhetoric; it is ubiquitous. Examples such as this

²³ Anjem Choudary, OBL Eulogy Protest, London, 06 May 2011.

²⁴ Abu Izzadeen, You’ve Lost the War Protest, London, 09 September 2011.

²⁵ Muslims Against Crusades, “Cheryl Cole Visits Afghanistan Amidst Rivers of Muslim Blood,” 15 September 2011, www.muslimsagainstcrusades.com, [Accessed 15 September 2011].

Twitter post are commonplace “The queen is amongst the many tyrants in this world, she has achieved much...Genocide, massacre, stealing other countries resources plus more.”²⁶

Another commonly used approach is to post stories from mainstream media that highlight the struggle between Muslims and government. An example is this article *The Telegraph* ran titled “Suspect argues security measures are stopping him finding a wife.”²⁷ The article highlights the legal battle of a man on control orders (now TPIM’s) for the past five years who is arguing that the government has prevented him from having a ‘normal social life’. The article was posted on muslimprisoners.com under the heading ‘UK control orders restrict Muslim from getting married’, then ‘Tweeted’ and posted on Facebook which allowed it to proliferate across the vast array social networking sites.²⁸

Whatever is ‘hot’ at the moment is immediately picked up and broadcast; the release of Abu Qatada from prison, the extradition of Abu Hamza to the US, court cases such as the conviction of the book seller Ahmed Fawaz, the nine sentenced in January 2012 for plotting to blow up the London Stock Exchange, the events in Syria, Libya, Burma, Kashmir, Palestine...the list goes on at infinitum but a common anti-government theme is always present.²⁹

Social networking and public protest are all being used to argue that Muslims are being treated unfairly, oppressed, imprisoned, and killed on a domestic and international level, and the US and UK governments are identified as being responsible for those actions. There is no doubt that the Islamists/radicals/extremists included in this study have leveraged those arguments to recruit new members and reinforce ideological framing, arguing that Islam and the implementation of *shari’ah* is needed to change a corrupted and failed political

²⁶ Izharudeen Twitter post, 03 June 2012, <https://twitter.com/#!/Izharudeen1> [Accessed 03 June 2013].

²⁷ Tom Whitehead, “Terror suspect argues security measures are stopping him finding a wife,” *The Telegraph*, 20 June 2012.

²⁸ Muslim Prisoners, “UK control orders restrict Muslim from getting married,” www.muslimprisoners.com [Accessed 23 June 2012].

²⁹ Participant observation Facebook, Paltalk, and Twitter February 2011 to June 2012.

system. However, more concerning is that these arguments are being used to indemnify the actions of those who choose to engage in violent acts. This is exemplified by one of the speeches during a protest on 11 September 2011 in which the speaker said “When attacks like 9/11 happen, it is not us that call for it. Rather it is you who incites the Muslims to cause these events.”³⁰ Another example is a post from *SalafiMedia.com* which makes this point chillingly clear by arguing the actions of Roshonara Choudary (the woman who stabbed MP Stephen Timms) were not wrong because-

...the hadith says whoever makes ijthad [draws a conclusion based on the Qur'an and hadith] and is wrong, they will have one reward. And whoever was correct will have two rewards...so there is nothing...dispraised for those who...have a different opinion regarding the Covenant of Security.³¹

The various types of framing, grievance/source/solution, are being exploited to their fullest potential and are by being broadcast across a spectrum of social media. This creates a synergistic combination of Granovetter's 'power of weak ties' with Beck's argument that “...the sources of danger are no longer ignorance but knowledge” to create a well defined socially constructed reality that Muslims are being oppressed and the source of that oppression is the government.³² However, even though virtually all of those interviewed who would be considered Islamists/radicals/extremists identified the government as the prime source of domestic and international problems, it was not established that that was what actually caused them to become radicalised, at least not directly. More commonly, the issue of identity surfaced. As one interviewee explained-

³⁰ Unknown speaker, You've Lost the War Protest, London, 09 September 2011.

³¹ Abu Baraa, “Regarding the Actions of Sister Roshonara Choudary,” *SalafiMedia*, 17 November 2010, <http://salafimedia.com/qaa/item/1200-regarding-the-actions-of-sister-roshonara-choudary.html#intemCommentsAnchor> [Accessed 16 November 2011].

³² Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, 83.

Being brought up here [Britain]...you become a victim of that society...drugs, music, and all the corruption under the sun...and you realise what am I doing with my life? Who am I? What is my identity?...[T]he turning point for me was when the planes went into the twin towers...It made me think about what happened...CNN, they radicalised me by showing me who Osama bin Laden was. I wanted to learn...who he was...what is his call...what does it mean to be Muslim?... That was basically the turning point for me.³³

Thus the link between identity and government policy becomes convoluted as a singular causal effect. At least in the course of this study it would be appropriate to consider the earliest stages of radicalisation by those now associated with the radical fringe as a trajectory that begins with identity, exposure to international events, followed by a reassessment of government policy that creates a window of opportunity to consider an alternative ideological reality. Once that space is open, and a new socially constructed reality is considered, radicalisation begins and the transition and reorientation of how one perceives him or herself and the world around them takes place. As individuals become active in protest and other forms of public dissent, government policy pushes back and marginalisation is realised, which further extends radicalisation.

More troubling is what was found by those not already considered radical. The widespread criticism by 'mainstream' Muslims towards the government tells a much more ominous story. Much of the discussion in Chapter VII explicitly demonstrated that there is a lot of anger and mistrust towards the government. There is also an interesting contrast between the anger that is coming from the Islamists/radicals/extremists and their mainstream counterparts. Whereas the Islamists/radicals/extremists have chosen to focus their anger towards government, mostly because of foreign policy, those who are not radical are focusing

³³ Interview with citizen 4.14, 14 October 2011.

their anger towards government because of domestic policy. That is not to suggest that foreign policy is being ignored as the following quote from a Muslim community group leader makes clear-

The tying together of British and American policy is a big issue. Britain has become America's poodle. Are we really living in the post-colonial era?³⁴

Although foreign policy is an issue for Muslims, like any other demographic, those in the mainstream rarely brought it up during the interviews. Instead, they chose to vent their frustrations regarding domestic policy. At the very least, this would suggest that the identity of mainstream British Muslims remains that of a British citizen influenced by societal norms, and the rule of law. In contrast, the Islamists/radicals/extremists more frequently identified themselves as part of a worldwide *ummah*, where man-made law is rejected, and British societal norms have far less influence. However, despite the mainstream holding on to their British identity, social agency is clearly being eroded.

The frustration and anger towards government is coming from numerous quarters within the Muslim community. As one mosque manager explained, "The government still does not engage with the community and there is a sense of betrayal."³⁵ During a discussion with a focus group a question was asked about how much people were talking about government counter-terrorism policy and its effects on them, their families, and friends. There was universal agreement when one young female said "The younger generation talks about it a lot and they are angry. There is definitely anger and a hardening of sentiment towards the government."³⁶ During the same conversation a male participant spoke up and said "People talk a lot about what the police are doing and people are scared."³⁷ During

³⁴ Interview with community representative 3.21.3, 10 March 2012.

³⁵ Interview with community leader 3.8.3, 19 July 2011.

³⁶ Interview with focus group participant 4.19, 31 October 2011.

³⁷ Interview with focus group participant 4.22. 31 October 2011.

another interview this comment consolidated what many were saying “People feel like they are being targeted just because they’re Muslim and there is a sense of victimisation. There is a huge air of mistrust between the community and the police.”³⁸ These quotes clearly suggest a sense of marginalisation.

The true impact of these sentiments will need to be assessed over time but two issues seem present. First, within the mainstream Muslim community there is widespread anger and frustration over the current counter-terrorism policies and that anger is clearly directed at a defined source, the government. Second, the erosion of social agency is creating a rising potential to open the cognitive window of opportunity for increasing numbers of individuals to consider an alternative ideological reality. These two issues arguably suggest the building blocks of radicalisation are firmly in place within the Muslim community. Irrespective of policy intentions, the socially constructed realities offer a very different truth to those who are negotiating the day to day ‘lived experience.’

Attribute 3: *Social protest is sometimes warranted over actions or lack of action by government*

Social protest is widely used by those that constituted the radical fringe in this study. As discussed extensively in Chapters VII and VIII, there was regular social protest up to the time that MAC was proscribed. Protest themes were generally oriented on foreign policy although the 30 July 2011 Islamic Emirates Protest focused on domestic issues. The value of protest was also clearly articulated by OBM who embraced protest as an effective recruitment tool, a means to draw in the media so that grievances could be articulated, and fulfil a

³⁸ Interview with citizen 4.30, 10 December 2011.

religious duty to command good and forbid evil demonstrated through the 3 pillars of faith: “conviction in the heart, testified by the tongue, and practiced willingly by the limbs.”³⁹

The use of social protest is also well rooted in social movement theory. As Della Porta and Diani note, social movements generally coalesce around four attributes: they are “(1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual [sic] issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms of protest.”⁴⁰ Using Della Porta and Diani’s attributes, it is arguable that AM, MAC, and Hizb ut Tahrir qualify as fledgling social movements despite the more pejorative labels of Islamists, radicals, and extremists that government and the media use.

The dichotomy of being considered a ‘social movement’ verses the more pejorative and threatening Islamist/radical/extremist label used within government policy is best exemplified by actions and comments of the police. As noted in Chapter VII, the police are striving to keep Peel’s legacy alive and want be seen as ‘integrated members of the community’ while at the same time keeping the public safe by doing “...all it can to ensure that London remains a hostile environment for terrorists.”⁴¹ Groups like the MCU, Prevent Teams, and ACPO are fully committed to and explore a variety of ways to interact positively with Muslim communities. This commitment is illustrated by the sheer breadth of programmes developed by ACPO and extensive integration of Prevent as depicted in the organisational chart contained in Chapter V. However, many of the police interviewed were clearly frustrated at having to constantly manoeuvre around the counter-terrorism label and the negative impacts that Pursue has had within the Muslim community. As the one officer said, “With Pursue, we’re right back to 1983 again.”⁴²

³⁹ Interview with Omar Bakri Mohammed 17 April 2012.

⁴⁰ Della Porta and Diani, *Social Movements*, 16.

⁴¹ Metropolitan Police, “Special Operations.”

⁴² Interview with police officer 2.13.1.

The protests provide excellent examples of what both sides are dealing with and afford a rare view of the gritty environment where policy meets reality. Although some criticism exists over the way police manage protest events, such as male officers watching Muslim females too closely and allegations that female officers were being lined up in front of male protesters as a display of power to demonstrate who was in charge, the negative comments from the radicalised faction were actually quite rare. In fact, there seemed to be good coordination and cooperation between protest leaders and those policing the event. Moreover, from a participant observing and intermingling closely with both police and protestors, the police were noted to be dispassionate, respectful, and professional during each of the protests attended. This was even the case at the 02 December 2011 event when 20 were arrested for being members of a proscribed organisation. Where problems start however is often after the arrest.

As discussed in Chapter VIII, following the 02 December arrests, each of the protestor's homes were raided and similar to the raid and arrest of citizen 4.35, numerous items including computers, electronic games, and mobile phones were confiscated by police or security services. An interview months later with one of the protestors put things in perspective when he said-

I still have to use this rubbish phone. The police still have my good one so I'm stuck with this one. They still have my computer, laptop, Wii, and XBOX too. It's been six months and I still don't know when I'll get my stuff back. I expected when they dropped the charges, they would have given me back my stuff. If there was something on my computer, they wouldn't have dropped the charges so I don't know what's going on.⁴³

⁴³ Interview with citizen 4.42, 01 June 2012.

The delay in returning personal property seemed odd and to determine if this was a unique situation or not, citizen 4.35 who was arrested for TACT offenses was re-contacted to see how long it took for him to have his property returned; his reply- “five years.”⁴⁴ The examples here lend credence to the idea that unwanted protest not only results in the loss of freedom of speech through proscription, but includes additional extrajudicial punishing actions. Combined, they foster a contentious reality between ‘radicals’ and police, harden sentiments, and increase radicalism.

On 01 June 2012, a protest in front of Regents Park Mosque and was organised by ‘The Syrian Action Committee’ to protest the massacre of children in Houla, Syria.⁴⁵ This was the first protest since the 02 December protest where numerous AM members were present, including many who were arrested at the December protest. As is normally the case, there were two Safer Neighbourhood’s police officers there to assist with traffic control when Friday prayers end. Neither knew anything about the protest, inquired what was going on, and confirmed that there was no permit obtained.⁴⁶ A short while later, four additional police officers arrived but soon left. The protest ultimately went forward and lasted approximately 45 minutes.⁴⁷ Despite proscription, which makes it illegal for three or more members of a proscribed group to meet, no arrests were made, and police presence was negligible.⁴⁸

The example above raises several questions about proscription. In the case of AM/MAC, at least one of the desired outcomes of proscription was to limit their ability to protest. This places police and protestors in a unique and complex relationship; protestors want to vent their grievances and the police, to their credit, are comfortable with allowing that to happen when the issue is considered legitimate. However, this raises a serious question narrowly within the context of AM and MAC whether proscription is genuinely about

⁴⁴ Text received by citizen 4.35, 28 June 2012.

⁴⁵ Text received from Anjem Choudary, 01 June 2012.

⁴⁶ Conversation with unknown police officers by researcher 01 June 2012.

⁴⁷ Participant observation 01 June 2012.

⁴⁸ UK Parliament, *Terrorism Act 2000*, 7.

reducing threat or a political tool to silence unwanted voices. If it is the former then anytime proscribed members come together they should be arrested, which is not happening. If it is the latter, then proscription increases marginalisation because it prohibits people from participating in the normal activities of society. Similarly, proscription increases radicalisation because it removes the right of free speech and instils a sense of targeted injustice. Lastly, proscription allows for another anti-government platform to be created where individuals can be recruited to embrace an alternative ideological reality.

The discussion above demonstrates that protest is more than a simplistic one dimensional issue and that several associated actions and effects need to be considered. The radical fringe is unquestionably committed ideologically to protest but extrajudicial police actions and the policy of proscription, when used as a tool to silence unwanted political voices, is arguably increasing marginalisation and radicalisation. Equally concerning is that these actions are effectively used to recruit those who are vulnerable including those who are the closest to those experiencing the negative effects of suppression; friends and family members.

Attribute 4: *Individuals feel some sense of distance from mainstream society*

There is evidence from both the radicalised and mainstream individuals contacted during this study, that a growing number of Muslims no longer feel they are a part of mainstream society. The loss of social agency comes from different lived experiences but there is an argument that those lived experiences are no longer as separated as they once were.

Within the radicalised group, the separation from ‘mainstream’ society is a complex mixture of ideology, government practice, and pejorative labelling. The ideological component was clearly articulated by Choudary when he explained during the Islamic

Emirates Press conference “...it was not allowed for you to live among the non-Muslims without distinguishing yourself...”⁴⁹ Choudary’s comment is rooted in AM’s *Salafi* ideology and is a reminder to those who are members of *Ahl us Sunnah wal Jama’ah*, that they must avoid the trappings of British society and culture. Furthermore, the ideology of *Ahl us Sunnah wal Jama’ah* not only guides Muslims away from non-Muslims but away from other Muslims as well. This is rooted in the belief that those who will be saved must be part of the one saved sect of true believers out of the entire 73 sects that make up the Muslim *ummah*. This notion is reinforced by statements such as “The people of Sunnah do not call for unity with other groups...”⁵⁰ Thus AM’s radical Islamic alienation is both a means and an end.

The link between alienation from mainstream society and government practice can be demonstrated through several examples such as control orders, stop and search, and arrest and conviction rates (see Appendix 2 for more on arrest and conviction) but none is more universalised to the radical fringe than proscription. Whereas control orders, stop and search, and arrest discussed in Chapters VII and VIII affect the social agency of individuals and secondarily those that they associate with, proscription effectively does it in mass by eliminating the ability of individuals to gather and legally protest. That statement is not an endorsement of the message being delivered but rather an observation from the many protests where protesters were conscientious, orderly and compliant with police directives. Furthermore, from the protests attended, far more arrests of EDL protestors were observed than Muslim protestors which again suggests that the proscription of AM/MAC was done to silence a politically unacceptable voice rather than some other security/safety issue. Support for this argument is also found in Hizb ut Tahrir whose ideological orientation is very similar to AM but chooses not to engage in protest and thus has not been proscribed. These effects do

⁴⁹ Anjem Choudary, “Islamic Emirates Project,” Press conference.

⁵⁰ Omar Bakri Mohammed, *Ahl ul-Sunnah Wal Jama’ah*, 56.

not go unnoticed and to suggest that proscription functionally limits the ability to any degree of those affected to interact would be extraordinarily naive.

Although the proscription of AM/MAC has limited their ability to engage in public protest, the interaction of individuals from those groups in places like Paltalk, Facebook, Twitter, and *halaka* meetings (study circles) has gone unchanged. In fact, proscription has clearly emboldened the narrative that they are being oppressed which increases both marginalisation and radicalisation of those who subscribe to that ideology. Worse yet, proscription as discussed in the previous section is exploited and used as an effective recruitment tool. Choudary's comments from Chapter VIII reinforce that argument-

The most radicalising factors are the government policies themselves.⁵¹

We have never been more popular since we've been banned. It provides a great opportunity for *dawah*.⁵²

The British government has become the best recruiting tool that anyone could possibly hope for.⁵³

Nor is Choudary alone in those kinds of statements. As another operator of an Islamist website stated during his interview "More people are coming to Islam because of what happened to MAC. I am getting more calls and emails now than ever before."⁵⁴

Proscription is not the only policy that is creating a loss of social agency. During the interviews with Taji Mustafa from Hizb ut Tahrir, Mustafa touched on numerous points such as "the goal posts are being narrowed on the entire topic of security", the problem with the

⁵¹ Anjem Choudary interview, 19 May 2011.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Telephone interview with citizen 4.14, 21 November 2011.

Prevent strategy is that “the problem is Islam” and on and on.⁵⁵ Mustafa’s comments for this discussion are best consolidated in three statements. The first is “It’s not about Islam, 7/7, or violence. It’s about forcing Muslims to subscribe to a British version of Islam and people are rebelling.”⁵⁶ The second, contextualised during the discussion on the case of Babar Ahmed, Mustafa said “If this is the kind of British values the government wants British Muslims to adopt, then we don’t want to have anything to do with it.”⁵⁷ Last, when probed about the effects of policy and HT recruitment, Mustafa wrote “We have and continue to see people convert of Islam and join HT.”⁵⁸

On an individual level, similar sentiments are being articulated. During an interview with someone who had been on control orders he confided that the experience “...moved him to indignation” and that “he began to look at things in a very different way.”⁵⁹ This is almost verbatim from Button’s characterisation of radicalisation.

There exists the polemic argument that there are always negative reactions when government takes punitive action; no one emerges from prison espousing that they had it coming and are better for it. Government must take steps to ensure public safety and security. The difference is that those who are sent to prison have been tried and convicted of a crime. Those who are subjected to proscription, control orders, stop and search...are not, they are just members of a community. This discussion could go on indefinitely with additional examples but there is clearly a loss of social agency taking place by both the radical fringe and by mainstream society. Although ideology plays a major factor within the radical fringe in separating those adherents from mainstream society, there should be no doubt that the policy environment is equally effective at increasing marginalisation and radicalisation within

⁵⁵ Taji Mustafa Interview 07 September 2011.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Taji Mustafa email, 03 August 2011.

⁵⁹ Interview with citizen 4.4, 22 August 2011.

that group. Furthermore, those same policies are being used as an effective tool to separate, recruit, and radicalise others.

Within more mainstream Muslim society, the examples provided in Chapter VII demonstrate the growing uneasiness and loss of social agency within the Muslim community. The comments during the IFE interview sum up the reaction to the policy environment all too well “The reaction has been that many Muslims no longer trust the government or the police... What this has done is it is radicalising the community and it gives ammo to the extremists.”⁶⁰ Most alarming is that the average person on the street, Muslim organisations, faith leaders, the police, community groups, university representatives who were interviewed for this research all had similar comments; there is a palpable loss of social agency and separation from mainstream society by mainstream Muslims.

To what degree people are actually radicalising and what that outcome will eventually be is easier predicted than quantitatively proven at this point. However, comments like this one from the leader of a community group clearly erode optimism “The policies have stigmatised the community and this will come back to the government. Safety will never be achieved as long as they think of us that way.”⁶¹ The comment ‘they think of us that way’ was a summation that all Muslims are potential problems and that policies like Pursue and Prevent which manifest as stop and search, detention without charge, and overt and covert intelligence gathering are all justified. From a Muslim community perspective, these actions increase marginalisation because people sense they cannot participate in the normal activities of society without being watched, stopped, and arrested; in short they have become the suspect ‘other’.

To help understand the trajectory of radicalisation within the mainstream, returning to some of Borum’s work is helpful. In Chapter IV, the discussion on social constructionism

⁶⁰ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

⁶¹ Interview with community representative 3.19.3, 31 October 2011.

highlighted the role of ‘stories and lessons’ in establishing the ontological and epistemological orientation of individuals. Furthermore, as Button makes clear, there is arguably a cognitive shift associated with radicalism which changes how individuals see themselves in the world and their worldview. In response to those changes, Borum concluded that there were often ‘observable markers’ of individuals involved in extremist groups.⁶² His argument coalesces around the idea that there is a pathway of ideological development that leads to extremism. The following quote and diagram support his argument-

The process begins by framing some unsatisfying event or condition as being unjust. The injustice is blamed on a target policy, person, or nation. The responsible party, perceived as a threat, is then vilified – often demonized – which facilitates justification for aggression.⁶³




Figure 9.1: Understanding the Terrorist Mindset, pg 9.⁶⁴

Using Borum’s diagram above and applying the examples provided in Chapter VII, it is arguable that many within the mainstream have progressed through the first three stages of radicalism; it’s not right, it’s not fair, and it’s your fault. There is no agreement among scholars about what makes people progress to the final stage of radicalism, however, within the mainstream Muslim community there is arguably a cognitive shift in identity including a

⁶² Borum, *Psychology of Terrorism*, 28.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Borum, “Understanding the Terrorist Mind-Set,” 9.

transition and reorientation in how people perceive themselves and the world around them. In short they are being radicalised.

Attribute 5: *Individuals feel more secure around those who perceive the world in similar ways and reinforce their views by following like minded publications and/or websites*

Like any group, people coalesce around others who share the same interests, concerns, or other bonds. This notion certainly embodies the concept of ‘community’ from Chapter II and Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory from Chapter III. Within the radicalised fringe there is a vibrant social network where individuals share thoughts, post messages, provide religious education, offer guidance and interpretation, and debate issues. As discussed earlier in this chapter, that social network creates and reinforces its own socially constructed reality and much of it is anti-government.

The reality consumed through the social network of the radical fringe is influenced by some truth, some myth, and some faith, and all combine to create a social sphere where like minded individuals congregate. Chapter VI’s discussion on social constructionism and the magnitude that ‘stories and lessons’ have on individuals and groups is vitally important because it explains the impacts of how government policy is told and retold, consumed and digested, until it becomes fact to those in that social sphere.⁶⁵ As Hosking and Morley note “Social descriptions as we may say, are never neutral.”⁶⁶ Those ‘facts’ influence the way in which individuals conceptualise their world and create the unique ‘local cultural milieu’.⁶⁷ Whether those stories and lessons are real, exaggerated, or imagined is immaterial to their final manifestation, they are ultimately consumed as reality. When OBM says “the new laws

⁶⁵ Randy Borum, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no.4 (2011) 46.

⁶⁶ Hosking and Morley, “Social Constructionism in Community and Applied Social Psychology,” 323.

⁶⁷ Dickens, “Social Constructionism as Cognitive Science,” 335.

on terrorism is not about fighting al Qaeda, it is about suppressing Muslims” or Choudary rebuff’s the Prevent policy, or the plight of Babar Ahmed is discussed, they all ultimately become the ground truth within that social sphere.⁶⁸ The stories and lessons simply serve as the ontology to support that truth. The realities that are formed within that sphere become the epistemological platform from which those within that sphere view their world.

This ‘reality’ begs the question of which came first, the chicken or the egg? In other words did the CT policies cause people to feel marginalised which led to their radicalisation or did the social sphere exploit their vulnerability to adopt an alternative worldview and ideology? This could be debated at length but in actuality, it doesn’t matter. The fact is that the social environments of both the radical fringe and mainstream Muslims believe that the policies are unjust and that is causing adverse reaction, marginalisation, and further radicalisation. The only difference in the groups is how each discusses the issue.

Although the same kinds of social networking are available to the mainstream, it was not found that they engage in the same level of daily involvement as the radical fringe. However, given the opportunity to meet and voice their opinion there is no doubt about the sentiments. Numerous examples of this were provided in Chapter VII but generally follow the example given by a random citizen at the East London Mosque who said “If you pray, fast, give zakat, and go on Hajj you are considered a good Muslim. But if you speak out about injustice they call you a radical fundamentalist.”⁶⁹

The irony of the social mobilisation that is occurring, much of which is motivated by grievances towards government policy and interacting with the police, creates windows of opportunity for those with a more radical perspective to offer alternative solutions. This notion came up in several interviews and was summed up well by this statement “Prevent and Pursue gives individuals like Anjem Choudary, and organisations like MAC and Hizb ut

⁶⁸ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview 16 April 2012.

⁶⁹ Participant observation 03 October, 2011.

Tahrir the opportunity to exploit whatever vulnerabilities exist.”⁷⁰ The previous statement has particular merit because it was given by someone who has worked closely with individuals over many years to guide them away from radicalisation. Thus the opportunity to exploit controversial policies and provide ‘the answers’ to those who are willing to consider a different reality in many cases is having exactly the opposite impact of what those policies were intended to achieve.

Attribute 6: *There a sense of injustice*

By now it should be clear that the radical fringe uses the notion of injustice to its maximum capacity. The concept of injustice is often framed around a narrative which argues that Muslims in mass are treated unfairly throughout the world. One needs to look no further than the messages delivered during the protests highlighted in this study to establish that fact. At another level, injustice is being framed around the argument that those pious few who take to the streets to protest are being oppressed. This fits within Borum’s model from the previous section but also extends his model into a new dimension; injustice is not just part of the ideological development but becomes a sustainable multi-purpose concept. As discussed in various areas of the last few chapters, injustice/oppression is being used for recruitment, ideological orientation, reinforcement of choice, and to instil a greater sense of piety.

The fundamental value of oppression is that it supports the Manichean view that the world is divided into two camps; good and evil, dark and light, righteous and Godless, *iman* (faith) and *kufr* (disbeliever), *tawhid* (oneness of God) *shirk* (polytheism). During the interview with OBM this topic was discussed and he made clear his belief that the world was divided by saying-

⁷⁰ Interview with community leader 3.6.3, 29 October 2011.

I believe in the clash of civilisations, it is inevitable. That is part of my belief...I am pro clash of civilisations because we believe the truth and falsehood must confront each other.⁷¹

In a macro sense, the radical fringe through its social network uses injustice and oppression to reinforce the concept that the world is a divided place of us versus them. Furthermore, anything that lends itself to support that idea is widely circulated. In reality what is posted is made up of some opinion, some truth, some myth, and some faith. For instance this post by MAC demonstrates the opinionated reaction and sense of injustice following the sentencing of Bilal Ahmed for an internet post-

Britain's crooked judicial system firmly has its cross-hairs on the Muslim community...Muslims in Britain are now under siege...The double standards of the British judicial system are clear, blatant and deliberate. They hate Muslims and the Islamic aqeedah (belief).⁷²

In another example, an individual posted this update on Facebook following his release from prison-

Al-hamdu lillah I'm free again. Well actually I'm on bail until October. Foolish police are trying to make another case against me. This time it's "Conspiracy to defraud." They took computers from my home, laptop, iPad and other stuff. They have no evidence. They are just randomly arresting a lot of Muslims now who live close to the Olympic park in east London - trying to show the public they are in control and stopping things before they happen. May Allah make it easy on the Muslims.⁷³

⁷¹ Interview with Omar Bakri Mohammed, 16 April 2012.

⁷² Muslims Against Crusades, "12 Years for an Internet Post," 02 August 2011, www.muslimsagainstcrusades.com, [Accessed 10 November 2011].

⁷³ Facebook post by citizen 4.45, 13 July 2012.

As noted, myth also plays a role in what is circulated. An article titled *3rd of March 1924* was posted on the website Izharudeen.com. The article called for Muslims to unite and work towards re-establishing the *khilafah* which “...was abolished by Mustafa Kamal with the help of the British and European collaborators.”⁷⁴ The article included the following quote attributed to the British Foreign Minister at the time-

We must put an end to anything which brings about any Islamic unity between the sons of Muslims. As we have already succeeded in finishing off the Khilafah so we must ensure that there will never rise again unity for the Muslims whether it be intellectual or actual unity.⁷⁵

The above quote is quite powerful and having not seen this before, the author was contacted to establish its source. Attribution was given to Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, Conference of Lausanne, 20 November 1922.⁷⁶ However after an extensive search, the attribution could not be confirmed. Despite its apparent lack of authenticity, it circulated widely, no doubt becoming truth to many who read it.

Injustice and oppression are also used to instil a greater sense of piety. There is frequent association to the current struggles and oppression to those during the time of the Prophet in Mecca. An article posted on the *SALAFIMEDIA* website extensively outlines the *aqeedah* (belief) of the *salaf* (companions of the prophet) ends with this quote from the Qur'an-

And (remember) when the disbelievers plotted against you (Oh Muhammad [SAW]) to imprison you, or to kill you, or to get you out (from your home, i.e. Makkah); they

⁷⁴ Izharudeen, “3rd of March 1924”, <http://www.izharudeen.com/3rd-of-march-1924.html> [Accessed 06 March 2012].

⁷⁵ Lord Curzon, 20 November 1922, cited in “3rd of March 1924”, <http://www.izharudeen.com/3rd-of-march-1924.html>, [Accessed 06 March 2012].

⁷⁶ Email received from subject 4.14, 7 March 2012.

were plotting and Allah too was planning, and Allah is the Best of the planners.

(EMQ al-Anfaal, 8:30)⁷⁷

The notion of injustice is not limited to the radical fringe. It also is becoming a prominent topic with the mainstream. During many of the interviews, when discussing how CT policy was actually affecting the average Muslim on the street comments such as these were common-

They feel like they are being targeted just because they are Muslim and there is a sense of victimisation⁷⁸

People talk a lot about what the police are doing and people are scared⁷⁹

I think it's worrying when the police do what they want to do and no one can stop them. We can't fight back⁸⁰

The quotes above along with the discussion and supporting data contained in Chapter VII all lead to an undeniable conclusion; there is a sense of injustice felt by the mainstream. Although the mainstream does not manipulate the sense of injustice in the same ways the radical fringe does, it is nevertheless present.

Summary Assessment of Analysis

The analysis of the data within the six attributes demonstrate that even though mainstream Muslims and the radical fringe fit into the framework in different ways,

⁷⁷ SALAFIMEDIA, "Our Aqeedah," <http://salafimedia.com/aqeedah/tawheed/item/728-our-aqeedah.html>, [Accessed 18 July 2012].

⁷⁸ Interview with citizen 4.30, 10 December 2011.

⁷⁹ Focus Group interview with subject 4.22, 31 October 2011.

⁸⁰ Focus Group interview with subject 4.18, 31 October 2011.

marginalisation, radicalisation, and in some cases extremism, are taking place. Additionally, the way counter-terrorism policy is actualised at the community/government interface is clearly to blame. It should also be clear that the problem is not because of efforts by the MCU, the Prevent Teams, or the LFB, the problems emanate from the policies themselves. The evidence also makes clear that there is frequent ontological and epistemological overlap in each of the six attributes discussed; they are not mutually exclusive. This confirms that the marginalisation and radicalisation taking place is both complex and multi-faceted, and unfortunately from a policy perspective, there is no ‘quick-fix’ available.

Although those from the mainstream included in this study have not adopted the same kind of ideology as the radical fringe, there should be no mistake that there is a cognitive shift in identity taking place including a reorientation of how they perceive themselves in the world and the world around them. This is precisely what radicalism is and what this thesis set out to discover. Moreover, when an entire segment of population begins using terms like ‘there is a lot of accumulated hostility’, ‘we no longer trust the government or the police’, and ‘I see a big problem coming’ the messaging could not be clearer. As discussed in Attribute 4, it is arguable that many within the mainstream have progressed through the first three stages of Borum’s radicalism model. The final tipping point to the last stage, dehumanising the enemy, is clearly an individualised and idiosyncratic process but at that point the barriers to violence are effectively removed. It should not have to be said that this is cause for concern.

In the case of the radical fringe, the correlation of policy to radicalism is somewhat more complex. As noted in Attribute 2, interviews with those who were already radicalised more often than not confirmed that their journey into radicalism was a trajectory of identity, exposure to international events, and a reassessment of government policy that led them to consider an alternative ideological position. As they became active in protest and other forms of public dissent, government policy pushed back increasing their sense of marginalisation

and solidifying their radicalisation. The similarities of identity, international events, and the radical fringe, and the loss of social agency, domestic CT policy, and the mainstream are all too close for comfort. Equally concerning is the data from the radical fringe confirms that CT policy is being used to recruit new members and is reinforcing and hardening the sentiment of those already radicalised. Again, the messaging could not be clearer.

The discussion and conclusions at this juncture clearly answer the fundamental research question. Current UK counter-terrorism strategies intended to increase public safety and public security do exacerbate marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism within the Muslim community. Thus it can be confidently stated that although well intended, the very policies that are supposed to increase public safety and security are in some cases having the opposite effect by undermining the safety and security of mainstream Muslims, the radical fringe, and ultimately society at large.

To add perspective to these conclusions, Crelinsten's work is helpful in understanding the action/reaction cycle within a terrorism and counter-terrorism framework. Drawing on the famous dictum of Karl von Clausewitz, that 'war is an extension of diplomacy', and from Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. that 'the riot is the language of the unheard', Crelinsten argues that both government and society communicate and react in anticipated ways.⁸¹ Crelinsten labels government as 'the controllers' and opposition groups as 'the controlled' whereby the controllers rely on social control, government, criminal justice, and in extreme cases internal war to manage society.⁸² Similarly, the controlled react or communicate through deviance, dissent, crime, and revolution.⁸³ The action/reaction of the controllers and the controlled form corresponding 'dyads' (social control/deviance, government/dissent, criminal justice/crime, and internal war/revolution) which are influenced by additional transitional actions.⁸⁴ The

⁸¹ Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism," 77.

⁸² Ibid, 79.

⁸³ Ibid, 77.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

transitional actions of the controllers are through politics, security and intelligence, and state terrorism whereas the controlled react through protest, subversion, and insurgent terrorism.⁸⁵

An illustration of Crelinsten's model is shown below in the Figure 9.2.




Figure 9.2: Crelinsten, Placing Terrorism in Context⁸⁶

Crelinsten's visual model is not necessarily intuitive but he argues that the action/reaction/reaction cycle follows a zigzag pattern across a linear plane. In other words, when social control does not sufficiently limit deviance, political pressure is applied and government takes a stronger role. When government takes a stronger role, the opposition group reacts through protest and dissent. When the opposition group engages in protest and dissent, government increases its 'security' and intelligence actions, and so on. Crelinsten argues that "The legitimacy of the controlled tends to follow an inverse relationship with that of the controller..."⁸⁷ Specifically within a counter-terrorism context "If counter-terrorism infringes on the rights of too many citizens... then it risks providing both a justification for terrorism...as well as an incentive for recruitment to violent opposition groups."⁸⁸

Crelinsten uses a variety of examples to justify his point such as limiting free speech, the ability of groups to engage in non-violent protest, militarisation of the police,

⁸⁵ Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism," 77.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 79.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 80

⁸⁸ Ibid.

criminalisation of various forms of expression, harsher sentencing, special tribunals, intrusive surveillance and intelligence gathering, arrest and detention with subsequent release without trial, and monitoring or targeting particular segments of society such as religious groups, or classes of individuals who may be a source of trouble all lead to the action/reaction cycle where individuals and institutions adopt more extreme politicised and polarised positions.⁸⁹ Although the examples above only represent government reactions to a perceived threat, they become all too familiar within the UK context. Furthermore, and more concerning is that Crelinsten argues the action/reaction cycle, if not held in check, can evolve into a self-fulfilling prophecy; violent action.⁹⁰

Pressman's Modified VERA Assessment

The discussion contained in this chapter supports the idea that the modified attributes derived from Pressman's VERA tool is a viable framework for assessing marginalisation and radicalisation in this type of study. Furthermore, Button's definition of radicalisation, the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion's definition of marginalisation contextualised by the concepts of agency and social capital, and Borum's Ideological Development Model all complement one another and integrate effectively within the modified attributes. Moreover, analysing the data through the combined perspective of social constructionist and social movement theories fits well within the framework established because both the ontological and epistemological orientations of individual and group dynamics are explained, allowing the data to be understood in realistic terms based on the 'lived experiences' of those studied.⁹¹

The addition of Crelinsten's model further reinforces the arguments and conclusions made in the analysis by adding explanation and understanding of the action/reaction cycle

⁸⁹ Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism," 89.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 100.

⁹¹ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 69.

within a terrorism and counter-terrorism context. Thus the amalgamation of Pressman's modified VERA tool, Borum's model of observable markers, and Crelinsten's model of contextual communication all combined as an effective multi-faceted analytical framework. Critically, they combine in a way that allows the earliest signs of the cognitive shifts of radicalisation to be discoverable so they can be explained through the micro (individual) and macro (social) processes present. In this study, that approach allowed radicalisation to be considered and viewed from a variety of trajectories. Stated more bluntly, the amalgamated framework was road tested and it worked well in this environment.

Another added benefit of this framework is that allowed data from each of the four case studies to be included. That provided added depth and understanding as to how those with different backgrounds actually conceive themselves and their world, including the complexities they must negotiate. In the words of Miles and Huberman this approach provided the ability to "...decipher details, complexities, and subtleties..." of the lived experience that would have otherwise gone unnoticed.⁹² Understanding those complexities is vital because the things that drive people to radicalism are multi-faceted, not mutually exclusive as the analysis confirmed. Without approaching this study in this way, the nuanced patterns of relationships that exist in these types of environments would not have been discovered. As Maxwell argues "...using a single theory or methodological approach imposes both practical and ethical problems..."⁹³ Thus by combining Pressman, Borum, and Crelinsten into an integrated framework, the data had sufficient depth and problems were avoided.

The next chapter returns to some the concepts of safety and security along with some of the basic terminology that this thesis began with: public; community; public security; public safety; and process, power and exclusion.

⁹² Miles and A. Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis*, 17.

⁹³ Maxwell, *Qualitative Research Design*, 46.

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Chapter 10: Conclusion

“I Promise by all mighty God to fulfil all the divine commandments of all mighty Allah. If they breach any covenant of security with us, let them die for what they believe and let us die for what we believe...Let us find ways to live in peace.”¹

This thesis began as a personal journey by a single researcher to discover the ground truth about the counter-terrorism environment in the UK. The ultimate goal was to analyse whether or not UK counter-terrorism policies were adding to or undermining the very safety and security they attempt to create. As a way of discovering that truth, an ethnographic approach was used so that the lived experience of those considered ‘at risk’ and those that constitute the radical fringe could be discovered, documented, and analysed. As noted in the methodology chapter, one of the benefits of doing primary research is the ‘undeniability’ (sic) that comes from interacting one on one with individuals and seeing firsthand ‘the irreducibility of the human experience’. Although the preceding chapters provide a window into a world that few ever see, it remains a snapshot bound by geography and time.

In several ways the UK is ahead of many other countries, including the US, in how it has designed and delivered its counter-terrorism policy. There are many lessons here that other countries can and should learn from. More critically, there are some lessons that the UK still needs to learn if it will ever achieve the safety and security it desires. Despite a historical capacity for tolerance, the UK has simultaneously marginalised and radicalised a significant portion of its society through its counter-terrorism policies.

Reacting to the rise of religiously inspired terrorism in the late 1990s, and despite acknowledging that the motivations of religiously inspired terrorism were different, the UK embraced the wholesale adoption of counter-terrorism policies from its Northern Ireland experiences. Exacerbated by the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, five pieces of counter-terrorism

¹ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 18 April 2012.

legislation were passed, the CONTEST and National Security Strategies were developed, and all focused inward on social threats. Although well intended, those policies and legislative actions led to the creation of another ‘suspect community’ who views government reactions and policy as draconian.

Although a comprehensive counter-terrorism review was completed in 2011, the changes were semantic rather than substantive; reducing the arrest to charge period from 28 to 14 days, eliminating control orders and replacing them with TPIM’s, and eliminating the section 44 stop and searches and replacing them with section 47A stop and search provisions had little impact on the real world experiences of those in the community.² People are still being stopped, questioned, and the underlying sense of betrayal and mistrust remains unchanged. Within the radical fringe, proscription and extrajudicial measures used against those designated as extremists has hardened sentiments even further.

When the coalition government released the new Prevent Strategy in 2011, it was met with further criticism from the Muslim community. Perceived as government’s attempt to define what constitutes a good Muslim and a bad Muslim, the policy is viewed as the latest in a series that stigmatise Muslims at best as a suspect community and at worst, terrorists.³ Given the indifference by the Home Office captured in the quote “The public may not be any more pleased, but they understand it better” the Muslim argument is underscored.⁴ If the Prevent workstream exists as the strategy states “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” there is considerable dissonance in how there is any chance of success given the widespread rejection by the Muslim community. In consideration of all the data obtained, one conclusion that can be made is that the soft power of Prevent has ultimately proven to be more damaging than the hard power of Pursue because in the view of many, it universally equates Muslims with terrorism (see Appendix 4 for more on Prevent).

² Home Office, *Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers*, (London: The Stationery Office, 2011) 4.

³ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

⁴ Interview with Home Office representative 5.5.2.

In Chapter II a conceptual/normative orientation was provided on the ways that process, power, and ultimately exclusion manifest as identity politics. This thesis has demonstrated the real world implications of those processes including the absence of meaningful dialogue. This is exemplified by the police officer who said “We could easily solve this issue [radicalism] if we could just allow a credible debate on Islam.”⁵ Similar comments came from across the spectrum of groups and individuals. Thus another conclusion from this research must be that risk could be reduced by simply engaging in meaningful discussion. However, that seems increasingly unlikely given that any dialogue would certainly involve discussions on both domestic and foreign policy and government has made it clear that those issues are not open for discussion.

Beyond the issue of credible debate, all groups within the four case studies placed significant emphasis on the importance of effective engagement. However, as noted, out of the 1,700 who work in SO15 less than 60 are doing street level engagement. That balance not only reflects the operational priorities of the MPS it reflects the difference in how the police and the community perceive what is needed to achieve public safety and public security. Moreover, the examples of effective engagement or lack thereof highlighted in the contrasting approaches used by the police and fire departments clearly suggest that as long as central government and the police use a securitisation approach to engage with Muslims and Muslim communities, they will gain little ground.

The issue of globalisation and proliferation of social networking has also brought the entire notion of security to centre stage. Although government uses the mantra of security within its rhetoric, it is arguably those who are affected by it, who ultimately dissect and discuss it in detail, and consume it that will largely determine whether security will be realised or not. Moreover, as demonstrated, security is conceptualised and used in different

⁵ Interview with police officer 2.9.2.

ways by different groups across a spectrum of thought. Within the framework of this thesis, UK CT policy represents one end of that spectrum and the Covenant of Security articulated by OBM represents the other. Simplistically, the data from this study can be reduced and summarised in three comments that effectively describe the impacts of security policy at the community level. First, from the mainstream “...many Muslims no longer trust the government or the police...What this has done is it is radicalising the community and it gives ammo to the extremists.”⁶ Second, “When the police began to crack down on AM activities...that provoked the youth ...and some members left to do their own operations.”⁷ Third, “The most radicalising factors are the government policies themselves.”⁸ Combined, these three comments summarise the data in the reporting and analysis chapters, and send an undeniable message. Current UK counter-terrorism strategies intended to increase public safety and public security are exacerbating marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism within the Muslim community. This not only undermines the safety and security for the masses, it is the antithesis of what those policies and strategies intended to achieve.

A. Hypotheses Revisited

In Chapter VI, five hypotheses were developed and although they won't be discussed in detail, a summarised response is provided.

Hypothesis 1: *Some individuals will radicalise to the extreme irrespective of preventative actions taken by public safety agencies.*

This thesis has at the bare minimum demonstrated that radicalism has been a historical part of Britain going back as far as the time of the Reformation. As a natural

⁶ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

⁷ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 17 April 2012.

⁸ Anjem Choudary interview 19 May 2011.

occurring event, there should be no reason to believe that radicalism will ever diminish and especially now in such an interconnected and globalised world. Whether the antecedents focus on domestic or international issues, there will always be those who have opposing views, will want their voice heard, and take action; that is radicalism.

Hypothesis 2: The effects of hard power used by public safety personnel do exacerbate marginalisation, radicalisation, and extremism by some within the Muslim community.

There is no doubt that hard power has exacerbated marginalisation, radicalism, and extremism within both the mainstream and radical fringe. This is a key element that was embedded within the research question and was answered clearly in the reporting and analysis chapters. Although the mainstream and radical fringe react in different ways, there should be no misunderstanding that the link exists. However, as demonstrated, this link should not be conceptually limited to the use of hard power but also include the detrimental effects of soft power mechanisms.

Hypothesis 3: The short term benefit of maximising public security will be overshadowed by a marked decline in public safety/community relations especially by those at the margins.

The breakdown of public safety/community relations is already taking place and not just by those on the margins of society. The lack of trust and increasing sense of fear towards the police and government is becoming embedded within mainstream Muslim communities and can be directly attributed to the impacts of the policy environment. For those already considered radical, public safety/community relations is being further eroded by the spectrum

of enforcement activities that are being employed, pushing some closer to the edge of violence.

Hypothesis 4: *The loss of social agency will cause greater numbers to move to the extreme and risk will increase over time.*

The overall marginalisation and disenfranchisement that is occurring in both the mainstream and radical fringe was discussed at length in the analysis chapter. Specifically within the radical fringe, the continued loss of social agency is causing many to adopt a more radicalised position. As radicalisation increases, it logically follows that risk, and specifically violence, will follow in step. This is precisely explained in the models of Borum and Crelinsten. For a real world example of this see Appendix 3.

Hypothesis 5: *The true benefits of the Prevent workstream may be that there is a positive influence on community relations in areas not associated with terrorism.*

There is some evidence that Prevent may produce benefits beyond the counter-terrorism environment. However, where Prevent has been most successful has overwhelming been with people not at risk for radicalisation (the stated aim of Prevent). Given there are substantial ‘degree’s of separation’ between those who are at risk and those who are not, combined with the marginalising factors that seem entrenched within the Prevent workstream, it would be difficult to argue that on balance the benefits of Prevent.

B. Achievements and Advancement of Knowledge

The value of any PhD is often framed around the idea that to be successful it has to advance knowledge. Therefore the question is posed, has this thesis met that criteria and in what ways? Arguably, this thesis has advanced knowledge in several ways.

1. This thesis adds to the understanding of marginalisation and radicalisation within the narrowed context of the counter-terrorism environment by exploring some of the earliest and most nuanced signs of radicalisation. Understanding those early nuanced signs from a real world perspective help further the understanding of the factors that lead to the cognitive shift in identity associated with radicalisation.
2. This thesis advances the understanding of the real world implications of the action/reaction cycle between the community and public safety practitioners and how those actions affect the community/government relationship.
3. This thesis advances the understanding of the realities and real world social implications that are being embedded in individuals and communities as a result of counter-terrorism policy in the UK.
4. This thesis advances terrorism studies in general by developing and analysing primary research data.
5. This thesis helps fill an existing void of comprehensive ethnographic research within the political and social sciences.
6. Most importantly, this thesis tells the story of the lived experiences of those in the mainstream and radical fringe, voices that are often muted by the process, power, and exclusion of political processes.

C. Limitations and Further Study

As has been stated, the capacity of this thesis was limited to that of a single researcher working to develop a semi-ethnographic portrait to advance the understanding of how counter-terrorism public policy is delivered and consumed, and whether or not that policy could be linked to radicalisation. Although some facts have been confidently established, it remains a snapshot in time bound by access, geography, and numerous other factors. Any generalisations or inferential conclusions to other individuals, groups, or communities are expressly denied.

Where to go from here is the million pound question, however two key areas stand out. The first is a continued need for those doing research in what is loosely bound as ‘terrorism studies’ to develop primary data. This remains a very dynamic environment and things change rapidly. Secondly, the tertiary effects of counter-terrorism policy on family and friends remains significantly understudied. More research is needed.

D. Concluding Remarks

This thesis began by exploring some of the basic terminology and concepts that define how societies function; public; community; public security; public safety; and process, power and exclusion. Given all the information in the previous chapters, revisiting these concepts again provides a final perspective.

In Chapter II it was argued that society at large is the ‘public’. Whether conceived in the Habermasian sense of the public sphere, society at large, government, or the publicum and demos of ancient Greece, collectively *we* all make up the ‘public’. It was also argued that ‘community’ was not a construct of one, two, or perhaps even three, four or five people. Community is about belonging, and sometimes that belonging transcends established boundaries whether they are objectively or subjectively construed.

The concepts of ‘public security’ and ‘public safety’ were also discussed. Public security was argued to mean those actions taken to respond effectively to the threats or hazards that may endanger the public. However, some degree of precision and discretion was needed to achieve that outcome. Similarly, safety was argued to be a universalised basic human right that includes living life to the fullest extent possible, to flourish, and to be free from fear, anxiety and chaos. Moreover, public safety is only achieved when a state of equilibrium exists that allows all individuals to live life free from fear, anxiety, and chaos, and to flourish.

In summation, *we* all make up the ‘public’ and *we* rely on the government to provide the necessary public security to minimise the threats and hazards that endanger *our* safety. For society to flourish *we* need to be able to live *our* lives to the fullest extent possible, free from fear, anxiety, and chaos. As Asad was quoted in Chapter II “...political conflicts over religious doctrines appear to be incapable of final solution by rational means.”⁹ Much to the dismay of the political elite and groups like the EDL, a few will continue to challenge the boundaries of society. Furthermore, the failure of policies like proscription to disassemble groups like Al Muhajiroun means that they are here to stay. Although they are small in number and to many they constitute the ‘dangerous other’, they meet the definitions of ‘community’ and ‘public’ and are therefore part of British society. Importantly though, radicalism in a social/political context must be de-politicised and universalised as is the case with Button’s definition so that it can be understood, applied, and measured across a spectrum of individuals from radical Muslims to politicians. Changing the definition to meet the desired outcome as government has is to no one’s benefit. In fact, it causes additional problems.

⁹ Asad, ‘Where are the Margins of the State?’ 286.

The balance of providing public safety and public security is a delicate one. Paraphrasing Bigo and Tsoukala from Chapter II, who needs to survive and who is going to be sacrificed must be critically considered in deciding that balance. However, as has been implicitly and explicitly argued throughout this thesis, attempting to secure the safety and security of the masses at the expense of the ‘dangerous other’ undermines the safety and security for all. That balance is arguably missing in the UK counterterrorism policy arena and needs reconsideration.

One observable fact is that in many ways, the radical Islamic message is self-limiting internally and externally. At least within Al Muhajiroun, the demographic evidence supports the argument that people enter the group, stay a few years, and move on. If that were not the case, a broader demographic would be represented. This was confirmed during the OBM interview when he was asked specifically about the demographics and challenges he faces in maintaining his membership. His response “It doesn’t matter...we plant the seed and if people want to cultivate it, it’s up to them” confirms that they have their own internal challenges of recruitment and membership retention.¹⁰

Similarly, external limitations were also noted. As discussed in Chapter VIII, during the Islamic Emirates March, people (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) were generally unsympathetic to the message. As one individual explained “There is a space in society for legitimate complaint but I don’t think this incendiary or inflammatory way of raising the issue is helpful.”¹¹ The resistance to the message was also noted during one of the focus group discussions. The question was asked whether they ever had any contact with MAC or AM. The reply received was “We know the people and what they stand for. When we talk

¹⁰ Omar Bakri Mohammed interview, 17 April 2012.

¹¹ Interview with citizen 4.38, 30 July 2011.

about them, we just think ha ha!”¹² These types of reactions illustrate the effectiveness of social control.

Given the self-limiting influences that affect Al Muhajiroun, another conclusion from this study is that if the goal of policy makers is to provide public safety and public security by limiting the membership of groups like AM, then social control and the inherent internal challenges of debate, recruitment, and retention of its members will be far more effective than any government policy. As demonstrated, proscription simply does not work. Most critically, the UK policy environment and its subsequent erosion of social agency have put at risk the most powerful and effective counter-terrorism tool it has, the community.

It should not be forgotten that ‘community’ is fundamentally about ‘belonging’. The evidence from both Chapters VII and VIII confirms that as the Muslim community loses social agency, they become more receptive to messages from the radical fringe. This is more than counterproductive, it is the antithesis of what the policy was meant to achieve.

As argued, ‘public safety’ is only achieved when a state of equilibrium exists that allows all individuals to live life free from fear, anxiety, and chaos, and to flourish. The findings of this study suggest a different reality is present within the groups and individuals studied; fear and anxiety are present. Although government has a duty to provide public and public security, it also needs to remember the entrapments of referential securitisation. The identification of mainstream Muslims as another suspect community and the removal of the rights to protest and free speech within the radical fringe has undermined the safety and security of everyone by creating a platform for recruitment into radicalism. As the adage goes, sometimes doing less is more but that will take political courage to find the right balance before public safety and public security are universalised to their maximum potential. That is not to suggest that the coveted British values that feature prominently in the political

¹² Interview with citizen 4.23, 31 October 2011.

discourse should be surrendered. It is more important than that. It means having the courage to fully embrace democratic values, engage in meaningful debate across a spectrum of issues, and allow dissenting voices to be heard without reprisal. Only through those processes will a truly inclusive and empowered society be achieved. Anything less will leave an increasing number to ask whose safety, whose security, and whose liberty is being threatened and government will be left to explain that radicalism is just something that happens before the bomb goes off.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview Data Statistics

People Interviewed

LFB	10
MPS	12
Community Reps	20
Individuals	43
Other Gov	13
Academics	<u>4</u>
Total	102

Total Interviews by Group

LFB	13
MPS	15
Community Reps	21
Individuals	47
Other Gov	17
Academics	<u>4</u>
Total	117

Group/Organisation/Community Affiliation versus Individuals Ratio

Groups	61 (52%)
Individuals*	56 (48%)

Five follow-up interviews with individuals representing group affiliation were personal interviews (Individuals 47, Academics 4, and 5 personal interviews with group representatives)

Community Leaders and Individuals versus All Others

Community/Individuals	68 (58%)
All others	49 (42%)

Government versus non-Government

Government	45 (38%)
Non-Government	72 (62%)

Appendix 2: Terrorism Arrest and Conviction in the UK

Although somewhat tangential in approach to the main discussion in this thesis, there are some telling signs that emerge from the arrest and conviction rates for terrorism related offenses compared to that of non-terrorism arrest and conviction rates in the UK. The Home Office has published two key documents on this subject. The first is *Statistics on Terrorism Arrests and Outcomes Great Britain 11 September 2001 to 31 March 2008*, published in May 2009 and the second follow-on report *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches*, was published in October 2011.

In theory, one should be able to argue that, and in fact the Home Office has attempted to make the case that, arrest and conviction rates for terrorism related and non-terrorism related crimes are similar. That similarity would suggest that the development of evidence, arrest, and successful prosecution is consistent with well established and effective policing. However, if those two statistics are out of balance then two possible explanations could logically be postulated. The first is that if arrest and conviction rates for terrorism offenses are higher than the norm for 'normal crime', then it might be explained as the result of increased targeting due to the severity of the threat. This is consistent with normal policing practices such as would be the case when a particular area experiences a high rate of burglary, car theft, or prostitution and police enforcement is stepped up resulting in an increase in arrests and convictions.

The other side of this issue would be when arrest and conviction rates are lower than the norm for 'normal crime' which would suggest that the occurrence of a particular crime is infrequent or that enforcement is not being done because the crime is minor and rarely enforced such as loitering in an area with high unemployment. This is also consistent with

normal policing practices. However, when arrest figures are up and conviction figures are down, two areas of concern surface. The first is that the police and security service are potentially exercising their authority without due care. The second is that if the statistics demonstrate that they have a disproportionate and adverse affect on a particular segment of society, in this case Muslims, then the government potentially exposes itself to allegations of discrimination and bias. More on target with this thesis is the potential link between government policy, exercised through police and intelligence service powers, and any adverse affects on Muslims and their families that could lead to the erosion of social agency and ultimately radicalisation.

Although the latest report is packed full of facts and figures, it is written in a way that is difficult to reconcile. However, once dissected, some troubling inconsistencies begin to emerge. For instance, the 2011 report contains this statement-


A comparison was carried out between rates of arrest to charge for terrorism-related offences with rates of arrest to prosecution for persons aged over 18 for recorded crime offences. The comparison shows 46 per cent of those aged 18 and over arrested for recorded crime offences were prosecuted in 2010/11, compared with 37 per cent (up from 35% in 2009/10) of terrorism-related offences resulting in a charge.¹

The inconsistency in the quote above is notable; rates of ‘arrest to prosecution’ for non-terrorism recorded crime versus rates of ‘arrest to charge’ for terrorism related offences. Given that the report was developed by statisticians in the Home Office, attempting to make comparisons on two dissimilar statistical elements is perplexing and clearly problematic. Furthermore, the report attempts to overcome this inconsistency in a footnote which says-

¹ Home Office, *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2011) 10.

“...due to the large proportion of terrorism-related charges awaiting prosecution in 2010/11 a comparison between terrorism-related charging rates in 2010/11 and recorded crime prosecution rates is the most accurate measure possible. Most terrorism-related charges result in prosecutions.”²

This clarification helps argue their point but only temporarily. A few pages later in the same document the report states “In total 58 percent of persons charged for terrorism-related offences have been convicted since 11 September 2001.”³ Moreover, as the above quotes verify, the report routinely mixes statistics from ‘2010/11’ with those since ‘9/11’ making it extraordinarily difficult to confidently assess as the following graph (Appendix Graph 1) illustrates.



Appendix Graph 1: Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation: Arrests, outcomes and stops and searches (2011) pg 10.

The graph above immediately follows the statement “A comparison was carried out...” leading the reader to suggest that the two are related when in fact that may not be the case. Although it is all a bit confusing, it appears that the graph shown as Appendix Graph 1

² Home Office, *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation*, 10.

³ Ibid, 13.

actually relates to a previous paragraph that states “For all charges since 11 September 2001...65% of these were under terrorism legislation with the remaining 35% under non-terrorism legislation.”⁴ The statement is made to demonstrate that not all terrorism related cases are charged and prosecuted under the various terrorism offenses, that some, even though there is a nexus to terrorism are prosecuted under normal criminal (PACE) law.⁵

There is little empirical evidence in the report about rates of arrest and prosecution for non-terrorism related crime and the report acknowledges this by stating “... data on charges for recorded crime offences are not collected centrally.”⁶ However, the statement “The comparison shows 46 per cent of those aged 18 and over arrested for recorded crime offences were prosecuted in 2010/11” leads one to conclude that in non-terrorism crime, 46 percent are *successfully* (emphasis added) prosecuted.⁷ Although not stated it would seem reasonable to conclude that because of professional consistency in both policing and the Crown Prosecution Service that figure of 46 percent would remain fairly consistent year to year. Furthermore, because it is the only figure provided, for the purposes here, it will be used as the dissection continues.

When the 2011 report was made public, a news release accompanied the report which stated that “Eighty-eight per cent of defendants tried in 2010/11 for terrorism related offences were convicted.”⁸ Contrasting the 88 percent conviction rate in the news release to the report’s statement “In total 58 percent of persons charged for terrorism-related offences have been convicted since 11 September 2001” would suggest an impressive increase rate of

⁴ Home Office, *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation*, 10.

⁵ Ibid, 9.

⁶ Ibid, 10.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Home Office Statistical News Release, “Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation - arrests, outcomes, stops and searches, Great Britain, 2010/11” (13 October 2011) Available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/hosb1511/> [Accessed 16 October 2011].

efficiency by the police, domestic security service (MI5), and Crown Prosecution service.⁹ This was also one of the noted goals from the Government's 2011 Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers which states "...every effort must continue to be made to gather evidence and prosecute."¹⁰ These figures also suggest that there are significantly higher rates of prosecution for terrorism related offenses (58 percent since 9/11 and 88 percent in 2010/2011) than non-terrorism cases which are reported to be 46 percent.

However, here again the report is difficult to reconcile. In the first instance the report compares arrest to conviction versus arrest to charge in non-terrorism versus terrorism cases respectively. In the second instance it is comparing charge to conviction rates. To try and bring some clarity to all of this there must be like units of comparison.

Since 11 September 2001, the report states that "...there were 1,536 arrests under the powers in section 41 of TACT and 427 under other legislation (e.g. the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984)."¹¹ This means that in total, 1963 persons have been arrested for terrorism and either charged under TACT or PACE legislation. The report goes on to say that-

421 suspects have been charged for terrorism-related offences, of whom 343 were prosecuted. Of these, 122 were convicted under terrorism legislation and a further 124 were convicted of non-terrorism legislation offences but considered terrorism-related.¹²

Distilling the numbers the following summary can be drawn. In total 1963 persons have been arrested for terrorism since 11 September 2011. Of those arrested 421(21 percent) were charged. Of those that were charged, 246 (58 percent) were eventually convicted.

⁹ Home Office, *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation*, 13.

¹⁰ Home Office, *Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers: Review Findings and Recommendations* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2011) 40.

¹¹ Home Office, *Operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent legislation*, 9.

¹² Ibid, 13.

However, the arrest to conviction rate (256 divided by 1963) is at a dismal 12 percent. This contrasts significantly to the 46 percent arrest to conviction rate for non-terrorism cases.

There is a viable argument that sometimes arrests have to be made before sufficient evidence is available for prosecution in order to ensure public safety. However, the rate of occurrence of that necessity is not discoverable without significant access to police, security service, and Crown Prosecution personnel and records which very few have access to. Similarly, the impacts of those actions on individuals, family, and friends is an area of research that is largely absent in current reporting. Although there is frequent references made by individuals in both the mainstream and radicalised groups that arrests have a radicalising effect on them, their families, and their friends it is difficult to assess the true impacts of those actions. Thus the balance between pre-emptive interdiction and the adverse affects of arrest remains unquantifiable.

In London, two organisations were identified that actively support the families of prisoners convicted of terrorism related offenses and both were contacted in hopes of arranging interviews with family members to bring additional clarity on this issue. In both cases those requests, although initially promising, went unfulfilled. This is an area worthy of additional research but until such time that occurs, the following quote will have to suffice-

Just by arresting those people, we have promoted radicalism. They tell their friends and family, and even though they are released, they and others are radicalised. Maybe just a little, but they are radicalised.¹³

¹³ Interview with community leader 3.18.3, 25 October 2011.

Appendix 3: Sentencing Discussion, Media Conflation, and Policy

The following discussion is provided to explore by way of example the links that exist between criminal activity, media reporting, and its potential impact on public policy makers. It also expands on the comment from Chapter VII that the CSC report needs to be considered cautiously within its own context and framework. Of particular concern is the degree of influence the media has had on policy makers. As noted in the CSC report, Lord Carlile stated the report has “...impacted policy and was a vital resource for governments, security services and agencies...”¹

As mentioned in Chapter VII, the opportunity was presented to monitor the sentencing of nine individuals from London, Stoke, and Cardiff who had planned to bomb the London Stock Exchange in the fall of 2010. The sentencing took place over four days at Woolwich Crown Court and was closely monitored by the media, the police, and other Islamists, all of which were in attendance. During the sentencing phase, news sources were quick to report that six of the nine awaiting sentencing were taught by Anjem Choudary, former leader of al Muhajiroun. Reports typically included statements such as “A gang of Muslim extremists inspired to launch a deadly UK terror campaign by hate preacher Anjem Choudary were jailed for a total of nearly 95 years today.”² It was also reported that Conservative MP Patrick Mercer called for Anjem Choudary’s arrest stating “This is yet another nail in Anjem Choudary’s coffin. No one can doubt his connections with active and highly dangerous terrorists who pleaded guilty to their crimes.”³ The same report that carried Mercer’s comment also included some comments by Anjem Choudary who admitted that he

¹ Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed, and Murray, *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*, Xii.

² *The Telegraph*, “Terrorism Gang Jailed for Plotting to Blow up London Stock Exchange” *The Telegraph*, 09 February 2011 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/9072455/Terrorism-gang-jailed-for-plotting-to-blow-up-London-Stock-Exchange.html> [Accessed 09 February 2011].

³ Dominik Lemanski, ‘Bomb Plotters are My Students, Admits Choudary’, *The Daily Star*, 05 February 2012 <http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/view/233685> [Accessed 05 February 2011].

had contact with the individuals but said that they were not part of ‘the organisation’.⁴ He was also reported to say that they had attended his lectures and demonstrations, that he was not aware of their activities, and that he and his followers were engaged in an “...ideological and political struggle.”⁵ Choudary’s comments are consistent with the ideological positioning of AM expressed during the interviews with Omar Bakri Mohammed and with Mr. Choudary.

During the sentencing remarks, the Judge read from a multi-page document that was also provided to those in attendance which explained his rationale for the sentences he was about to deliver. Before delivering the sentences he stated-

...they fell under the influence of radical or extremist clerics who preached an obligation, by way of jihad, to engage in struggle not only fighting non-Muslim occupiers of Muslim lands, but also extending the fight to attack civilians within the United Kingdom. This particular doctrine, which rejects the concept of the “covenant of security”... is espoused by Al Qaeda [sic] based in the Arabian Peninsular [sic] (AQAP) and is associated with radical preacher known as Anwar Al Awaki, now dead, whose aims including attacking Western Countries by any means possible.”⁶

In the case of *Chowdhury & Others*, the nine who had planned to blow up the London Stock Exchange, there was significant discussion by the group expressly on whether or not the Covenant of Security had been broken or if it applied at all.⁷ In the end, one of the defendants, Usman Khan, concluded “Brothers like Anjem, they aint going nowhere...He believes in the Covenant.”⁸ He further communicated to the others that there could only be

⁴ Lemanski, ‘Bomb Plotters are My Students, *The Daily Star*, 05 February 2012.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Judge Justice Wilkie, *The Queen v. Mohammed Chowdhury & Others Sentencing Remarks*, 09 February 2012.

⁷ Participant observation, Woolwich Crown Court, 07 February 2012.

⁸ Usman Khan, Woolwich Crown Court, 07 February 2012.

three results: “There’s victory, what we hope for, there’s *shahada* [death as a martyr], or there’s prison.”⁹ Kahn went on to say to his wife “The one I really can’t do is prison.”¹⁰

Throughout the sentencing, there was consistent discussion about the group, their association with Anjem Choudary, where they got their ideology from, and how it was discussed amongst those involved in the plot. On the final day of comments, the principal prosecutor, Andrew Edis concluded that although the individuals facing sentencing had been in contact with Choudary, they were not part of his following.¹¹ Essentially, he surmised that some of the members of the group engaged for a period of time then moved on to seek their own ideological positioning. Edis also concluded that “Anjem Choudary, although radical in his beliefs, acts within the confines of the law and supports the covenant of security.”¹²

The importance of the discussion above is not to argue for or against any individual(s) or ideological positions but does raise serious questions about the accuracy of reporting and its influence on public policy. When MP’s like Mercer make public pronouncements (assuming momentarily that his statements were accurately reported) calling for the arrest of individuals like Choudary because “No one can doubt his connections with active and highly dangerous terrorists...” the rhetorical polemic argument then becomes are individuals guilty simply by association? Furthermore, what does this say about the gap between the political the judiciary who concluded that Mr. Choudary acted within the law? These arguments have salience to the CSC report which relies significantly on media sources, and particularly to Lord Carlile’s comments that the report “...impacted policy and was a vital resource for governments...”¹³ Given that Lord Carlile is a practicing barrister (QC) and served as the Independent Reviewer of Counter-terrorism Policy from 2001 to 2011, his position on how

⁹ Usman Khan, Woolwich Crown Court, 07 February 2012.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Participant observation, Woolwich Crown Court, 09 February 2012.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed, and Murray, *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections*, Xii.

government relies on media appears seems highly contextualised.¹⁴ Although unsubstantiated media reporting would never be allowed in the courtroom as evidence, it is not only accepted by Carlile but ‘vital’ in shaping counter-terrorism policy.

The above discussion is not intended to be critical of the CSC report or its authors. As noted, it simply needs to be considered within its own context and framework. However, these distinctions become significant because it highlights the potential problems of conflation through flawed social network analysis, often the result of media reporting, and the need for critical analysis of what constitutes social movements versus criminal behaviour. Although the line can be thin at times it does need to be defined and should not be based on media reporting.

¹⁴ Parliament, “Lord Carlile of Berriew” <http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/alexander-carlile/26889> [Accessed 20 September 2012].

Appendix 4: Additional Information on Prevent

When the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition Government came to power in May 2011, one of the first things that it did was announce that it would engage in a comprehensive review of UK counter-terrorism policy. In a press release dated 29 July 2010, the Home Office announced it would “...look at the issues of security and civil liberties in relation to the most sensitive and controversial counter-terrorism and security powers and... provide a correction in favour of liberty.”¹ This initial review concentrated on the Pursue workstream of CONTEST. Then on 12 November 2010 another press release was issued stating that a review of the Prevent strategy would also be undertaken.² The Home Secretary Theresa May stated “I believe the Prevent programme isn't working as well as it could and that is why we are reviewing it. I want a strategy that is effective and properly focused.”³ May also announced that Lord Carlile would be overseeing the review.⁴

The Prevent review began on 10 November 2010 (two days before the press conference) and as would be expected, a questionnaire was developed and input was taken from a variety of sources including: local councils, police, community and religious institutions, academics, and think tanks.⁵ Following a three month consultation period, the Prevent strategy was re-written and the newly revised strategy along with a new version of CONTEST was released in June 2011. A press release accompanied the release of the Prevent strategy summarising its key components: it would remain an integral part of

¹ Home Office, “Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers” <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/ct-terms-of-ref/counter-terrorism-terms-of-ref?view=Html> [Accessed 30 March 2011].

² Home Office, “Home Secretary Announces Prevent Review” <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/press-releases/prevent-review?version=1> [Accessed 12 November 2010].

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Home Office, *Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2011) 17. Also available at <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-summary-consultation?view=Binary> [Accessed 20 June 2011].

CONTEST; it would now address all forms of terrorism although al Qaeda inspired terrorism remained the biggest threat; it would now-tackle non-violent extremism; it would separate counter-terrorism work from integration work; it would increase the ability to evaluate and monitor outcomes against stated objectives; and it would no longer fund extremist groups.⁶ Additionally, the new strategy was more narrowly focused on what is commonly termed the “three I’s”: individuals, ideology, and institutions.⁷

The 2011 version of Prevent is significantly detailed and outlines not only what the strategy objectives are but adds explanation to justify its strategic orientation. There is not enough space in this appendix to critically analyse all of the issues contained in the newest document but a few areas are worth noting.

As mentioned in Chapter VII, Lord Carlile was asked to oversee the Prevent review and as was noted, given the criticism from the community and from government, the decision seems a curious one. That is not to suggest that Carlile has full ownership of any policy but the data contained in Chapters VII and VIII do suggest that there is considerable hostility towards him and Prevent. This is summarised well in the two comments below.

[Lord] Carlile has created a whole new block of extremists. Pretty much everybody would classify those who engage in violence as extremists and we’re OK with that. But what Carlile has done is that he has classified those who are non-violent as extremist as well. He has criminalised a significant portion of society just because they disagree with the government. It means the government has now become the thought police. Carlile is the most illiberal Liberal I have ever seen.⁸

The first Prevent policy targeted AQ suspects. The second Prevent policy began to target political voices. But now the third Prevent policy has tried to define which

⁶ Home Office, “Prevent Strategy 2011,” <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/> [Accessed 25 June 2011].

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Interview with community representative 3.21.3, 10 March 2012.

Muslims were acceptable and which were not. The result is that the entire Muslim community is now targeted.⁹

Another area worthy of mention is the new policy says that “...one of the most damaging allegations made about *Prevent* in the last two years has been that it has strayed into the area of *Pursue* and become a means for spying on Muslim communities.”¹⁰ It also says “We can find no evidence to support those claims.”¹¹ As noted in the strategy, data was collected but only for ‘project monitoring’ and ‘community mapping’.¹² Furthermore, the strategy argues that the information that was gathered was done legally and protected in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.¹³

The issue of spying might be easily dismissed as Muslim paranoia except that even local councils were increasingly distancing themselves from the previous Prevent policy because they were uneasy with the type of information the police were collecting. An investigative paper titled *Spooked* by Kundnani interviewed several community workers who were running various programmes and youth projects and concluded that “...there is strong evidence that Prevent-funded services are being used by counter-terrorism police for information gathering and that the line between the Prevent strand and the investigative Pursue strand of the CONTEST strategy is being blurred in a way that is wholly counter-productive.”¹⁴ This allegation was supported by Shami Chakrabati from Liberty. In a video interview, Chakrabati stated-

This is reminiscent of some of the lessons that I thought had been learned in other European countries in the last century about what you do to a society when you turn

⁹ Interview with IFE representative 3.16.3, 13 October 2011.

¹⁰ Home Office, *Prevent Strategy* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2011) 31.

¹¹ Home Office, *Prevent* 2011, 6.

¹² Ibid 31.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Arun Kundnani, *Spooked: How not to prevent violent extremism* (London: Institute for Race Relations, 2009) 28.

neighbours on neighbours, you turn community group on community group; you break down those ties of intimacy and confidence and trust that actually bind a society together...I don't see how this Prevent agenda equates with either preventing extremism or promoting human rights.¹⁵

Similar to local council concerns, the fire service as discussed in Chapter VII has refused to accept Prevent funding because of the reporting and governance requirements.¹⁶ It has similarly distanced itself from the Home Office's Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP). Developed by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), WRAP encourages frontline personnel to "...use existing expertise and professional judgment to recognise and refer potentially vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation."¹⁷

The issue of how much information, what kinds of information can be collected, who should be collecting the information, and how that information will be used will never be fully reconciled. However, when police counter-terrorism activities placed 218 security cameras in predominantly Asian areas of Birmingham as they did under Operation Champion, it will require much more than government's denial that it is not spying to restore the trust of the community.¹⁸

Another contentious area is who is being funded and supported within Prevent. The policy states that Prevent is not a police program and should not become one.¹⁹ However, the policy also acknowledges that "The number of people employed by the police to deal with

¹⁵ Shami Chakrabati, Video interview imbedded in Vikram Dodd, "Government Anti-Terrorism Strategy Spies on Innocent" The Guardian, 16 October 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/oct/16/anti-terrorism-strategy-spies-innocents?INTCMP=SRCH> [Accessed 21 September 2012].

¹⁶ Interview with fire officer 1.11.2.

¹⁷ Home Office, *Prevent* 2011, 57.

¹⁸ BBC News, "Birmingham Project Champion Spy Cameras Being Removed," <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-birmingham-13331161> [Accessed 22 September 2012].

¹⁹ Home Office, *Prevent* 2011, 95.

Prevent exceeds the numbers who have been employed by local authorities.”²⁰ This reality is also found in the following *Prevent* budget figures. In total, *Prevent* funding was: £47 million in 2009/10; £37 million in 2010/11; and £36 million in 2011/12.²¹ In 2010/11, £24 million of the total £37 million was allocated for the police (64 percent).²² The 2011 *Prevent* strategy also provides some of the budget figures for DCLG. No figures are provided for 2011/2012 but by subtracting the money that went to DCLG in 2009/2010 (£16.55 million) an estimate of how the police were funded during that period can be extrapolated; again it was 64 percent.²³ The combination of the police having the majority ownership of *Prevent* and the fact that *Prevent* is coordinated by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism continues to stigmatise *Prevent* as nothing more than “*Pursue* in sheeps’[sic] clothing.”²⁴

One last area that deserves discussion is the policy states that there is “...no evidence that *Prevent* work has damaged police and Muslim community relations. We believe the evidence points in the opposite direction.”²⁵ That statement is largely developed from a report by Innes, Roberts, and Innes which is repeatedly cited in the new *Prevent* strategy. However, the details of the report tell a much different story and suggest that that statement is taken out of context.

The conclusion about police/Muslim relations is based on data from the British Crime Survey (BCS) from which Innes, Roberts, and Innes state “*Prevent* policing has not caused widespread damage to police-Muslim community relations.”²⁶ Furthermore, they show the data that they derived their conclusion from; a 2008/2009 survey that compares Muslim men

²⁰ Home Office, *Prevent* 2011, 35.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 101.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Institute for Community Cohesion, cited in Parliament, *Preventing Violent Extremism* (London: The Stationery Office, 2010) 8.

²⁵ Home Office, *Prevent* 2011, 99.

²⁶ Martin Innes, Colin Roberts, and Helen Innes, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing: A Report to the Association of Chief Police Officers* (Cardiff: Universities’ Police Science Institute, University of Cardiff, 2011) 9.

versus non-Muslim men ranking of police as either excellent or good.²⁷ However, given that Prevent was not introduced until 2007 and the authors acknowledge that “...no significant innovations in public-facing delivery” occurred until 2009, is not surprising that negative opinions would be absent. The other reason that the BCS report did not reflect on Prevent is that it did not ask any direct questions about experiences or perceptions of Prevent policing.²⁸ The BCS report is much more generalised. Finally while Innes, Roberts, and Innes do say that Muslims are more likely than the general population to give police a positive rating they also say that “...there was strong sense in the data of Prevent being a ‘tainted brand’.”²⁹

The purpose of this discussion is not to conveniently stand back and throw stones at government policy. Not only is that too easy, it is neither fair nor productive. Furthermore, it is clear that government has a defined responsibility and that it is acting in a way that it believes is meeting that responsibility. Thus there is no underlying conspiracy theory or suggestion that government is consciously suppressing Muslims. In context, it is about understanding Muslim reaction so that public safety and public security are maximised. In that regard, if “The aim of Prevent strategy is to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” then it shouldn’t drive people who are already wary of government down the road of radicalism and closer to the edge violence.³⁰ Critically, the data contained in Chapter’s VII and VIII of this thesis confirm that is exactly what this strategy is doing. While Prevent may be accepted by the masses, it is not the masses that are affected by it or are at risk of further radicalisation and violence; it is those who are already critical of government. No matter how many times government attempts to justify its actions as ‘safeguarding’ it is what happens in the community and with those at risk that matter.

²⁷ Innes, Roberts, and Innes, *Assessing the Effects of Prevent Policing*, 8.

²⁸ Ibid, 99.

²⁹ Ibid, 6.

³⁰ Home Office, *Prevent* 2011, 24.

Appendix 5: Threat and Muslim Demographics

The following further expands the discussion from Chapter V. As noted, the 2009 version of CONTEST is the most detailed and as such much of what is included here is derived from that document.

Within CONTEST 2009, there is no ambiguity about the nature of the threat, stating “...the greatest threat at present is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam.”¹ The document goes on to explain that because the greatest concern is within the Islamic community, that much of the work will be focused in areas where Muslim’s live.² However, there is no specificity as to which communities are prioritised in terms of risk. Instead, CONTEST simply provides that “The groups of most concern to the UK...have a very wide geographical range.”³ The document goes on to list the Near East, Iraq, South Asia, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and South East Asia as areas of concern.⁴ Although CONTEST appears to cast a wide net, suggesting that Muslim’s from all areas are a potential concern, there appears to be some clues that narrow the field.

The CONTEST document makes numerous references to Pakistan, which seems appropriate given that Pakistanis, as discussed in Chapter II, represent the single largest Muslim population in the UK. However, that focal point narrows quickly with the statement “Al Qa’ida...maintains contact with cells operating in the UK, in which British-Pakistanis constitute the single largest ethnic group.”⁵ Additionally, the document also states that the “Most significant terrorist investigations in the UK have links to Pakistan...”⁶ Although CONTEST does not elaborate on whether the perception of threat is because the Pakistani

¹ Home Office, *CONTEST* 2009, 81.

² Ibid

³ Ibid, 34.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid, 33.

⁶ Ibid, 100.

community is the largest and therefore the most susceptible, or because direct links have been established through the intelligence and investigative process, the concern regarding Pakistanis is unmistakable.

Although not nearly as prominent as the references to Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Somalis are also mentioned as people of concern and their countries of origin. In the Prevent section, CONTEST discusses the UK's international efforts aimed at "...understanding the causes...of radicalisation...in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Somalia."⁷

Although the references are at first focused on the radicalisation taking place in East Africa and South Asia, the discussion quickly turns to the UK stating that "Developments in Pakistan, Bangladesh, or North Africa can all have significant impact on the respective diaspora communities here."⁸ Additionally, Somalis are referenced in the statement "A small percentage of refugees from other countries (notably Somalia and Kurdistan) have also had a significant impact on the security of a number of European states, including the UK."⁹ Even though the publically released version of CONTEST 2009 is quite general and attempts to avoid explicit statements about any area or group, it would appear that the greatest concern is focused on Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Somalis.

Some of the detail that is lacking in the publically released CONTEST document however, can be found in other sources. In 2009, the Heritage Foundation published a compilation of terror plots in the UK for the period beginning September, 2001, through April 2009. Like the CONTEST document, the Heritage Foundation study focused heavily on Pakistan and justified their reasoning stating "Of the 87 individuals in the data set who have been convicted or punished in some way, at least 19 had family ties to Pakistan..."¹⁰ The

⁷ Home Office, *CONTEST* 2009, 93.

⁸ Ibid, 99.

⁹ Ibid, 42.

¹⁰ Ted R. Bromund and Morgan L. Roach, *Islamist Terrorist Plots in Great Britain: Uncovering the Global Network* (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2009) 3. Also available at www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/bg2329.cfm.

report continues by saying "...a minimum of 27 had sought or received training in Pakistan or Afghanistan."¹¹ Besides Pakistan, the next area of greatest concern was listed as North Africa, including the countries of Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt.¹² According to the Heritage Foundation study "At least 13 individuals with family ties to North Africa were connected to terrorist plots."¹³ However, the figures above only reflect those 'convicted or punished'. In all, the Heritage Foundation report identified 172 individuals involved in 30 plots.¹⁴ Of those identified as being 'involved', Pakistanis comprised the largest single group (56) followed by Algerians (29),Caribbeans (6), Ethiopians (5), and Indians (4).¹⁵ In contrast to the conclusions from the CONTEST document, only three Somalis and one Bangladeshi were identified in the Heritage Foundation Report.¹⁶ However, and perhaps more alarming, 80 individuals were identified as UK citizens and the UK ranked second behind Pakistan as the country where terror training took place.¹⁷

As discussed in Chapter II, most Muslims in the UK immigrated during the 1970s onward with the majority coming from commonwealth countries. Seeking economic advantage, large numbers of Pakistanis and others came to the UK and has remained there ever since. However, despite significant numbers of immigrants from the 1970's to present, detailed information about Muslims living in the UK is limited. It was not until the 2001 census that questions regarding religion were even collected (except for Northern Ireland).¹⁸ Furthermore, as late as 2008, the Office of National Statistics admits that there remains "no single, all-inclusive system in place to measure movements of population into or out of the

¹¹Bromund and Roach, *Islamist Terrorist Plots in Great Britain*,3.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, 15.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Joy Dobbs, Hazel Green, and Linda Zealey, *Focus on Ethnicity and Religion* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 2006), xvi.

UK.”¹⁹ Although the 2011 census has been collected, the vast majority of the data has not yet been released. As a result, much of the available data is derived from the 2001 census.

According to the Home Office using statistics obtained from the 2001 national census, there were 1,588,890 Muslims living in the United Kingdom.²⁰ When making comparisons with the total population, Christians were reported to be the largest group at 71.8 percent and Muslims represented a modest 2.8 percent of all UK residents.²¹ However, despite their relatively small numbers, Muslims accounted for the second largest religious group in the UK.²²

As an ethnographic snapshot, approximately 38 percent of the UK’s Muslim population lives in London. The remainder lives throughout the UK with sizable numbers living in west Midlands (14 percent), the North West (13 percent), and Yorkshire and Humber (12 percent).²³ However, the geographic distribution of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is particularly limited; 95 percent of all Pakistanis and 97 percent of all Bangladeshis live in England.²⁴ Within London, Muslim distribution is significant with the greatest concentrations living in the tower Hamlets (36 percent) and Newham (24 percent) areas.²⁵

The UK’s Muslim inhabitants are ethnically dominated by Asians who constitute 74 percent of the total population.²⁶ Within the Muslim population as a whole, Pakistanis represent the largest majority (43 percent), followed by Bangladeshis, Indians and other Asians (16 percent), and Black Africans (6 percent).²⁷ Of all the Muslim’s living in the UK in

¹⁹ Office of National Statistics, *Migration Statistics 2008*, Office for National Statistics (Newport: Office for National Statistics, 2009) 8. Also available at www.ons.gov.uk

²⁰ Dobbs, Green, and Zealey, *Focus on Ethnicity and Religion*, 21.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid, 60.

²⁴ Ibid, 46.

²⁵ Ibid, 66.

²⁶ Office for National Statistics, *Focus on Religion* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2004) 5. also available at <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/focuson>

²⁷ Dobbs, Green, and Zealey, *Focus on Ethnicity and Religion*, 72.

2001, 46 percent were born there.²⁸ However, despite the fact that over half had been born in and emigrated from other countries, 65 percent of all Muslims living in the UK identified themselves as having a British identity. Of those born in the UK, the numbers are even higher with 93 percent describing themselves as British.²⁹ Those numbers suggest an interesting juxtaposition between the assimilation concerns discussed in Chapter II and what the majority has adopted as national identity.

Unfortunately, the economic and education numbers for Muslims in the UK are not encouraging. According to the Office of National Statistics, in 2004, 33 percent of all Muslims that were of working age had no qualifications- no degrees or other supporting qualifications.³⁰ That number represents the largest percentage of any group within the data set. As a result, it is not surprising that Muslims ranked highest in the UK's unemployment numbers (13 percent) and were most likely to live in social accommodation housing (28 percent).³¹

Although these 'demographic snapshots' provide some insight as to who is in the UK, where they came from, and why they are there, the information from official sources remains limited. However, like any other community, it seems safe to say that 'the Muslim community' is a collection of people from all areas, ethnicities, and backgrounds.

As stated in CONTEST and *The Guardian* article, there are clear concerns about and within the Muslim community regarding both terrorism and counter-terrorism policy. In March 2010, the Home Office released the results of a 'Rapid Evidence Assessment' (REA) which was undertaken to "...reveal insights into the perceptions that the UK public have of

²⁸ Office for National Statistics, *Focus on Religion*, 6.

²⁹ Ibid, 7.

³⁰ Ibid, 12.

³¹ Dobbs, Green, and Zealey, *Focus on Ethnicity and Religion*, 98.

the impact of CT legislation.”³² Not surprisingly, the study revealed that “Muslim communities perceive some aspects of CT legislation to be unfair, unjust, and discriminatory.”³³ The report goes on to say that Muslims have “...a lack of trust in the police...” and that the lack of trust and confidence towards UK authorities “...could have a detrimental effect on the willingness of Muslim communities to accept and support current and future CT legislation.”³⁴ Equally unsurprising is that when the UK general population was surveyed, the Home Office reported that there was “...majority agreement, or support for, certain CT measures even though they may erode civil liberties.”³⁵ Perhaps the report could have just as easily stated that amidst the sea of media influence, legislative actions, anti-terrorism legacies, political wrangling, criticisms, policies, controversy, events, disrupted plots, threats, and real or imagined perceptions of risk, these comments reflect what remains a labyrinth of opinion on how best to provide public safety and public security in a modern globalised world where the threats and risk are as diverse as the people and communities affected.

³² The Home Office, *What Perceptions do the UK Public Have Concerning the Impact of Counter-terrorism Legislation Implemented Since 2000?* (Occasional Paper 88) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2010) 1. Also available at <http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/occ88.pdf>

³³ Ibid, 2.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid, 41.

Appendix 6: University Ethics Committee Approval



University of St Andrews

International Relations School Ethics Committee

14 January 2011

Doug Weeks
School of International Relations

Ethics Reference No: <i>Please quote this ref on all correspondence</i>	IR7117
Project Title:	Islamic radicalisation leading to extremism (title not finalised)
Researchers Name(s):	Doug Weeks
Supervisor(s):	Dr Roger Mac Ginty

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered at the IR School Ethics Committee meeting on 15 December 2010. The following documents were reviewed:

- | | |
|--|----------|
| 1. Ethical Application Form | 15.12.10 |
| 2. Participant Information Sheet | n/a |
| 3. Consent Form | n/a |
| 4. Debriefing Form | n/a |
| 5. External Permissions | n/a |
| 6. Letters to Parents/Children/Headteacher etc... | n/a |
| 7. Questionnaires | n/a |
| 8. Enhanced Disclosure Scotland and Equivalent
(as necessary) | n/a |

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (<http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf>) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely

pp Dr. J.S. Murer
Convenor of the School Ethics Committee
Cc: Supervisor

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