BEYOND THE COLONIZATION OF HUMAN IMAGINING AND EVERYDAY LIFE: CRAFTING MYTHOPOEIC LIFEWORLDS AS A THEOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO HYPERREALITY

Reno E. Lauro

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ST MARY’S COLLEGE

INSTITUTE FOR THEOLOGY
IMAGINATION & THE ARTS

BEYOND THE COLONIZATION OF HUMAN IMAGINING AND EVERYDAY LIFE:
CRAFTING MYTHOPOEIC LIFEWORLDS AS A THEOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO HYPERREALITY

A THESIS SUBMITTED BY

RENO E. LAURO

TO THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY
FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ST ANDREWS SCOTLAND
2010
I, Reno E. Lauro, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 89,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted for the degree of Ph.D. in Theology in September 2005; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between 2005 and 2010.

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This work takes up urban historian Lewis Mumford’s concern for the phenomena of planned and imposed ordering of human life and societies. Mumford (and others) suggests the problem consists in the use of external plans, technologies (and media) to manipulate, dominate, and even coerce forms of life. It is seen at its worst in war, and even forced systems like Nazism and Stalinism. But these phenomena also take more attractive and seemingly enriching forms. We will focus (along with Daniel Boorstin and Umberto Eco in their own way) on forms which have massively developed in 20th and 21st century society: market and consumer saturation, shaped by dominating mass electronic media. This situation is developed imaginatively, and inventively, yet problematically, in Jean Baudrillard’s theory of Hyperreality—a critique of the Western hyper-consumer and media saturated world. But his methods and pictures are not followed here. We take up a very different approach and diagnosis; This approach has become increasingly multidisciplinary: phenomenological, praxeological, anthropological, and philological. We build it up in a reading of human lifeworlds in philosophers Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein, and anthropologist Tim Ingold. This work does not go in for a picture of language (and cinema) as a system of signification, but as Ludwig Wittgenstein describes it, as tools always already involved in forms of life. We also offer a unique characterization of corporeal imagining and the imaginative creation of lifeworlds, paving the way for what is described as philological resistance: this resistance is seen in the development of a certain praxeological philology and fully realized in the 20th century author J. R. R. Tolkien’s mythopoeic concerns. We focus particularly on what we call the double-transfer: the cyclic structure between human artistry and life-world building, each shaped by the other. We endeavor, along with Mumford and others, to counter colonization and find various less manipulated and un-coerced forms of life, and their informal organizing structures. We examine in detail Tolkien’s literary and philological project; and the 20th and 21st century’s first art form—cinema. Through the philosophical exploration of cinematic craft in Gilles Deleuze, and in the craft of Terrence Malick we see, and are taken up in, the inextricable relationship between how we make, what we make and how we live everyday life.
I am so very grateful for the lives who have made this work possible.

There are the teachers in my life who have opened my eyes to new possibilities of thought and being: David, Bob, Dale, and Terry. And certainly there is Augustine and Rosario Batlle who paid for me to visit them in Spain for a month … a life-altering classroom for an idealistic 19 year old.

Trevor Hart, who saw potential in a 250-word proposal, and then helped me imagine what more it could be. Thank you, thank you, thank you. Michael Partridge, whose insight, conversations, and stories will forever be dear to me; and whose rigorous notes and mind have made me a better scholar and human being. And amongst other things, thank you for coining the splendid term “Double-transfer”, which crystallized a great many thoughts.

Much of the intellectual stimulation for this work took place at TASTE coffee house in St. Andrews. Little writing was ever accomplished, but many long and memorable hours were spent ranting, reading Being and Time, or discussing the finer points of Eco, Bergson, Spengler, Hume and Nietzsche with Iain Munro and Martin Otero Knott. Both are trusted intellects and will be lifelong friends.

Heartfelt gratitude goes out to Richard and Anke Martin for the use of their home as a monastic retreat during the darkest days of this work. The final drafts of chapters 1 thru 4 came together because of their graciousness and the sweet songs of the Carolina Chickadees in their backyard.

My Dad took me to my first film festival (Charlie Chaplin no less) when I was 9, and taught me to love history, good stories, and to wonder at the mystery of it all. Mom has dined with kings and princes of this world, and encouraged me to dream big, and to be a tenacious advocate of what is good, right, and just. In both of them I experience the love and grace of God.

Certainly, this work would never have been possible without my brother Tony, an adventurer with the heart of a poet, with whom long hours were spent in the Yoda Fortress, digging for treasure, and tunneling through Minnesota snow drifts. Here’s to age never overcoming the dreams of youth.

My little boy Dylan, who has only ever known his babbo to be working on his ‘dissertation’, you are bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh, and have certainly raised the stakes in this fight my love.

May this work stand as a witness and testimony to the belief that the ways things are is not the way they must be ...
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Man is a creature who makes pictures of himself, and then comes to resemble that picture.

IRIS MURDOCH

Here’s to the future.  
The only limits are the limits of your imagination.  
Dream of the kind of world you want to live in;  
Dream out loud, at a higher volume.

BONO
So Joseph went after his brothers, and found them at Dothan. They saw him from a distance, and before he came near to them, they conspired to kill him.

They said to one another, ‘Here comes this dreamer. Come now, let us kill him and throw him into on the pits; then we shall say that a wild animal has devoured him, and we shall see what will become of his dreams.’

GENESIS 37:17B-20
NRSV
The Paris Universal Exposition of 1900 was a grand celebration of the technological achievements of the 19th century and a dazzling showcase for the tools of progress in the coming 20th century—the new age of the machine. The expo boasted bio-diesel engines running on peanut oil, Edison’s Kinetoscope and Gaumont’s debut of film with sound, moving sidewalks, escalators, the world’s largest refracting telescope and wireless telegraphy. But of all the marvels on display, it was the electric dynamo that troubled the American humanist and historian Henry Adams (1838-1918) in his prescient essay “The Dynamo and The Virgin”. Adams was bewildered that nothing in his 19th-century classical education prepared him to comprehend what he stood before in the great hall of the dynamos. “In these seven years [since the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893] man had translated himself into a new universe which had no common scale

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of measurement with the old. He had entered a supersensual world, in which he could measure nothing except by chance collisions of movements imperceptible to his senses, perhaps even imperceptible to his instruments, but perceptible to each other, and so to some known ray at the end of the scale.”

“The Dynamo and the Virgin” is part of the well-known collection of essays by Adams entitled *The Education of Henry Adams* (1907).

Adams, the great grandson of the second President of the United States of America, John Adams, and grandson of the fourth President John Quincy Adams, opens *Education* with the closing of “the old universe” of his forefathers in 1844 and the dawning of a new one – symbolized in the opening of the Boston and Albany Railroad – which would only leave fragments of the old order of things in its wake. Far from poetic exaggeration, one cannot underestimate the radical alteration to daily life Adams laments. More technological and social change occurred in the last 50 years of the 19th century than in the previous thousand. Adams learned to see the dynamo as more than simply ‘technology’ – indeed the dynamo was the most expressive symbol of ultimate energy, force, and infinity in the modern world. The nearest example to that truly metaphysical force of 1900, says Adams, was the cross of Constantine in 310 A.D. and its millennium-and-a-half presence throughout Europe. No, this was not the cross of Puritan America to which Adams referred; it was the ancient cross of the Old World whose force was felt in the mystery of the Virgin goddess, a universal primordial life force the church fathers recognized as *theotokos*, the God bearer. “Symbol or energy, the Virgin had acted as the greatest force the Western world ever felt,” Adams later says, “and had drawn man’s activities to herself more strongly than

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2 Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* (New York: The Modern Library, 1931), 383-384; the comment ‘these seven years’ is in reference to the 1893 Chicago’s World Fair.

3 Henry Adams, ibid., 5.
any other power, natural or supernatural, had ever done; the historian’s business was to follow the track of the energy;” he continues to formulate, “to find where it came from and where it went to; its complex source and shifting channels; its values, equivalents, conversions.” It was this creative and literally life shaping and life giving energy—the same creative energy which gave forth the great cathedral at Chartres, “the highest energy known to man”, says Adams— that was threatened by the new power and energies symbolized by the machine.

Criticism of this shift in cultural dominance and importance sensed by Adams should not be mistaken for luddism; this is a matter far deeper and broader than the simple distrust of complex tools. “In the symbol of the Dynamo,” notes Leo Marx, “Adams represents an industrial society that threatens, as no previous society has threatened, to destroy the creative power [of humanity] embodied in the Virgin.” Even the silent mechanical power of the dynamo, and the force it was capable of unleashing, was more than simply the sum total of its mechanical components. The symbolized powers and significance of the machine go beyond anything purely mechanical. Lacking the vocabulary, Adams can only describe the deeper element of this complex phenomenon as a ‘metaphysical’ quality that required awe, reverence, and even prayer. These are responses at quite a different level to that of the technological.

Now, taken alone, Adams’ quixotic observations of the machine’s substitution for the divine, and mechanical power for creative energy in the West, may seem tantamount to histrionics; however, Adams is not alone in sensing a phenomenon far more complex than the rapid development and use of, and dependence on, new mechanical tools. From the late 19th century to the mid 20th this epochal shift, and the

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4 Henry Adams, ibid., 388-389.
6 Henry Adams, ibid., 380.
question of its ethical and broadly human trajectory, come up in their own way, in the
works of such diverse figures as John Ruskin, Marcel Proust, William Morris, Friedrich
Nietzsche, Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, J. R. R. Tolkien, Martin Heidegger, Lewis
Mumford, Daniel Boorstin, Michel de Certeau and Jean Baudrillard – all of whom will
be voiced in the following pages. And so, it is the quality of this epochal shift, and the
ethical and human trajectories within this new economy⁷, with which this work is
deeply concerned. By further investigating the effects of this complex phenomenon –
including the relationships between power and creativity, order and organizing, the
subsequent demands on everyday life levied by the emerging economy of consumption
and communication made possible by mass industrial technology, and how others have
articulated that phenomenon throughout the 20th century – the picture of a particular set
of ethical concerns emerges. Primarily, I will characterize some of the concerns in this
work as those provoked by a world dominated by the aims of the technological
colonization of everyday life. What is meant by this characterization will be unpacked
chapter by chapter, but what is at stake are the evaluative concerns about a trompe
l’oeil ethic behind this ever expanding technological colonization.

These evaluative concerns demand theological reflection. However, when we
consider how slight the move is between, on the one hand, the discussion of
colonization and decolonization that is introduced in Chapter 1, and on the other, the
theological language of evil and redemption in the work of J. R. R. Tolkien, we can see
how this thesis develops a certain way to speak theologically in a materialist economy
of consumption and mass communication. As Charles Winquist points out in Desiring

⁷ Unless stated otherwise, the use of the word “economy” will be from its Greek origin, oikonomia,
which means management of the house. Certain forms that will occur and reoccur are the
economy of consumption, the economy of communication, and the economy of economics.
Theology, in a post-Christian West “there is no sanctuary for theological reflection.”

The thesis, then, will respond to a world dominated by the aims of the technological colonization of everyday life with a tactical theology, as suggested by Winquist, that “works within, through, and against the strategies of dominant discursive practices.”

This tactical use of theology is similar in character to Michel de Certeau’s descriptions in *The Practice of Everyday Life*. De Certeau uses the examples of immigrant life practices (such as North Africans living in France) subverting dominant forms of life, and the practices of colonized indigenous populations (North Africans living under French colonial rule) who have been inverted, subverted and transformed through the imposition of a colonizing culture.

Two different sorts of roles played by people in this colonized society are characterized in his distinction between strategy and tactics. (A.) Strategy is built on the rational calculation and manipulation, or control, of life ways in a ‘mapped’ place. It is the Cartesian attitude of “a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution)” which coercively postulates and delimits place thereby allowing for “the mastery of place over time”; the control of place through panoptic transformation of other practitioners into ‘objects’; a knowledge only made possible by control. (B.) Tactics by contrast, are modalities of practices that resist being defined by place (they resist the ordering of the warp yarn), and stand in guerilla resistance to the more “technocratic (and scriptural) strategies” that conform to prescribed models in the creation of place. Tactics are nomadic and weak; they make space for the making

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9 Charles E. Winquist, ibid., 127.
11 Michel de Certeau, ibid., 29.
of life and the growth of organization. Tactical space is always the space of the power-
less ‘other’. 12

As suggested by de Certeau, and appropriated by Winquist, the following chapters will tactically insinuate theological uses in the varied spaces of the dominant technological and material economy of the 21st-century West. Indeed, the theological concerns overlap with the emerging ethical concerns that arise when considering the ordering and the organizing of human forms of life in a post-industrial age of consumerism and the hyper-proliferation of electronic media. Implicit too, are necessary preliminaries to a tactical theology which properly incorporate and build on the relationships between who we are as human beings, what and how we craft and build up, and how we dwell meaningfully and in meaningful spaces. This work is informed by a vision of the Good (and all its implicit theological background), and also rests firmly in understandings of the doctrines of creation, humanity and givenness.

One principal theological question animating this investigation, then, is: Why do we need to be engaged in the arts? The simple answer is that what is identified as our greatest threat – our powers to imagine, make and craft – is also our greatest hope. When Tolkien says in 1931, “we make still by the law in which we’re made”, there is an implicit understanding that ignoring our call to be creators does not negate that call. 13

And here too there is an implicit theological vision.

Chapter 1 begins with a structural metaphor, or perhaps better a synecdoche – the city. On the one hand, the city stands as the quintessential example of human imaginative and active powers, yet on the other, human beings have had an ambivalent and at times tenuous relationship with ‘the city’ and all it implications. Life in the city has taken innumerablenumberforms, across the evaluative spectra of good and bad and evil,

12 In Christ’s teaching and example the powerless is also sought and cultivated.
genuine and ersatz and so forth. The holy scriptures of the Judeo-Christian tradition, in fact, begin in a garden and end in the divine city of New Jerusalem, passing through a series of cities whose lifeworlds embody varying moral, imaginative, and religious qualities, and their ways of life: Sodom, Jericho, Jerusalem, Babylon, Athens, Rome and ultimately the holy city of New Jerusalem. Simplifying the scene, it will soon become apparent through the work of American humanist Lewis Mumford that in the city we see two broad tendencies in tension: to organize the patters of life (life ways and communities developing naturally), and to order them (through a consolidation and application of power). And central to that tension is the relationship between human beings and technology. With the tension further aggravated in an industrial age of mechanical reproducibility, Daniel Boorstin and Umberto Eco broaden our understanding of the 20th-century implications for daily life. Indeed, as we will see, the story is thoroughly muddled when we reach the age of mass-produced media and mass-consumed things—including the anesthetic use of art and what we’ve come to call entertainment.

There is perhaps no 20th-century figure more dramatic in his pronouncements, and controversial in his findings about an age of electronic media and mass production, than Jean Baudrillard—to whom Chapter 2 turns. Baudrillard is a complicated figure who conceptually and rhetorically extends the complex story explored in Chapter 1. He begins his career as a Marxist sociologist who then, after his radical disillusionment with Marxian philosophy and struggle after the failures of the 1968 student riots in Paris, turns towards a radical post-Marxian nihilist critique of the post-World War Two West and what he sees as its calamitous mass consumer and mass media culture. His pronouncements culminate in the nebulous and hyperbolic term Hyperreality, which was famously bastardized into meteoric fame and fortune in the 1999 film The Matrix.
In *The Matrix*, we are confronted with a hyper-sleek, neo-noir reality which we soon find to be nothing more than a simulation, fabrication, and representation of the world (a fictional city in fact), meant to cover over the wasteland of the real and the secret imprisonment of human beings by machines. Much time will be spent in Chapter 2 attempting to unpack what leads up to and is entailed by Baudrillard’s conception of Hyperreality; however, as will soon be apparent, the concept proves to be far too theoretical and is built upon principles it purports to reject.

Chapter 3, then, is concerned with a new methodological approach (philosophically, anthropologically and sociologically) to help make sense of this ever-complicating set of phenomena. It also constitutes a departure from the theoretical games of Jean Baudrillard, moving towards more grounded methods and tools for the re-articulation of a more complex historical phenomenon, gleaned from the work of Mumford, Boorstin, Eco, and even in some of Baudrillard’s earliest writings. And it gives a better-grounded approach to Tolkien and Malick in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3 is a brief look at three scholars (Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Tim Ingold) whose work represents a methodological approach to world—which redraws body/world and body/perception characterizations. My application of this methodology is not purely ‘phenomenological’ per se, but is focused on broadening and deploying the richness of what has been characterized as *Lebenswelt*, the lifeworld, and what that characterization implies for the questions that have been raised thus far. One major feature of this new methodology is captured in Michel de Certeau’s previously mentioned *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Although the ‘whole’ of Manhattan Island could be seen from the 110th floor of the old World Trade Center in New York City, says de Certeau, that totalizing view removes the observer from the ‘grasp of the city’ – the earthed practices which shape its avenues, alleyways and shops. Very similar to
Lewis Mumford, de Certeau is highly suspicious of what he calls the ‘concept city’ – a product of the voyeuristic (scopic) desire to step outside the human body’s concrete and mobile encounter with the everyday in the attempt to transform the “bewitching world” into text to be read with the “celestial eye of the gods”.\textsuperscript{14} “The panorama-city”, warns de Certeau, “is a ‘theoretical’ (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and a misunderstanding of practices.”\textsuperscript{15} This reference, then, succinctly summarizes the wrongheaded picture – also exemplified in later Baudrillard’s concept of Hyperreality – from which Chapter 3 moves away. Suggestively we could say that Chapter 3 is a return to bodies and to forms of life. In agreement with De Certeau, we want walkers of the labyrinth, not voyeurs; de Certeau organizes a return to the “dark space” below – to the practitioners, the walkers, the bodies. Only there, he says, can we begin to reclaim “an ‘anthropological,’ poetic and mythic experience of space”.\textsuperscript{16} In The Practice of Everyday Life, however, tactical “walkers” and their tactical experience of space, both poetic and mythic, are strategically written over by imposing and controlling maps. As described by the great Argentine essayist Jorge Louis Borges, it is the map that replaces and becomes the territory of the Empire. De Certeau describes this phenomenon as the colonization of space.\textsuperscript{17} Inspired by this delineation made by de Certeau, a new characterization of Baudrillard’s ‘hyperreality’ phenomenon is made use of in Chapter 3 and beyond – the colonization of human forms of life.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{14} Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 92.
\textsuperscript{15} Michel de Certeau, ibid., 92-93.
\textsuperscript{16} Michel de Certeau, ibid., 93; Ian Buchanan notes in Michel de Certeau: Cultural Theorist (London: Sage, 2000) that although reference to Lefebvre is limited to one footnote (p.205 n.5) it is ‘momentous’. “From this point of view as well,” notes de Certeau, “the works of Henri Lefebvre on everyday life constitute a fundamental source.” We might also note that Lefebvre was an early influence on Baudrillard.
\textsuperscript{17} Michel de Certeau, ibid., 121.
\textsuperscript{18} Michel de Certeau, ibid., 121.
As a result of this profoundly different explication of the problem and the presentation of a different methodology, the imaginative wall of Cartesian fictions (mind/body dualism and subject/object relations) is breached and the possibilities of response break wide open. Chapter 4, then, explores the theologically profound, historical and imaginative philology of J. R. R. Tolkien (1898-1972). The chapter continues to draw us further into a new way of exploration, here especially built up from a unique and complex philological/philosophical/anthropological picture of the corporeal imagination and its involvement in everyday life. Traces of Tolkien’s broad and different characterization of a philology, and his approach to how human beings imagine, create and live, surfaces in Neapolitan philosopher Giambatista Vico (1668-1744), the imaginative philosophical philology of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), and the philological craft and politics of the pre-Raphaelite, and Arts and Crafts Movement founder, William Morris (1834-1896). It also connects readily with the kind of approach we built up with Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Ingold in Chapter 3. Each in their own way testify to a particular brand of praxeological recovery of meaningful forms of life inextricably and primordially linked to the complex fabric of day-to-day living, which calls us to confront, resist and transform the colonization of the world around us. Tolkien’s mythopoeic resistance to colonization, also, situates him well within the broader nexus of concerns voiced by Adams in “The Dynamo and the Virgin”. And finally, in Chapter 5, the matter is taken up within the context of the first great art form of an age of mechanical reproducibility –cinema. The great two-volume work on cinema, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image by Gilles Deleuze, is connected back to the methodology presented in Chapter 3; and the

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19 As this rather clumsy set of characterizations suggests, this is a very diverse phenomenon noted and investigated in many disciplines; however, for brevity in this introduction let us call it philological—which is the term taken up in chapters 4 and 5.
American Director Terrence Malick—who himself did philosophical work on Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, and even met Heidegger and translated a work by him—is lifted up as an example of this broad philological practice at work in a media age.

The current situation in the West is particularly characterized by the uncertainty and plurality of all embracing markets and new forms of communication. The economies of hyper-capitalism—ecologically unsustainable—seem to be built on marketing-machines pushing ever-new market formed types of work, carries and goals; and ever new forms of entertainment to fill voids of ‘boredom’ in lives that have been over-colonized by consumer media. Not simply things, or activities, but ‘Lifestyles’ (and a vast array of products and paraphernalia to support those lifestyles) are sold. Even God is offered in the language and trappings of entertainment and carrier goals. These seemingly benign—and even seemingly enriching—image machines are built up using practices which in the last century were turned to the purposes of not so benign (and often visibly ugly) systems of ordering: for example, turning people into Nazis, or following Communist totalitarian dreams. In Lewis Mumford, however, we find that this kind of concern with effects of technology on human living goes back quite a long way. Certainly the imposition or ordering by colonization and war goes right back to the beginnings of recorded civilization. But it is this 21st century phenomena of life colonized by consumerism and mass media that is of central concern here.

As will become apparent, the varied expressions of post-industrial consumer media turn out to have multiple uses which can be evaluated. When we evaluate these varied expressions they can be seen to be sometimes good and person developing, sometimes devaluing of people, and sometimes colonizing them. They may be dehumanizing and they can be surely evil. They can also perform anesthetic functions
or they can have an entertainment function –sometimes these are difficult to
distinguish. Some forms of entertainment can be useful and benign but some can also
be devaluative. The word is a tricky one. All of which, however, are related to the
double transfer of media to do this work.

In the spirit of Jacques Ellul we can say that this concern with forms of life, and
the their values, is also a religious question. Both as simply human, and as religious
people, we must attend to and engage with this world, and with other people, in the
practices of daily living. In this, crafts and arts, like those of imaginative literature and
cinema, properly engaged with the other practices of life, can play their own distinctive
roles. Literary, cinematic and television work, accompanied and complemented by
reflective and imaginative philology, phenomenology and anthropology, can challenge
and resist colonizations; such art can clarify, explore and foster rebuilding and (in
Mumford’s terms) reorganization of people, life ways, and societies.

This, then, is not an argument that can be demonstrated in proofs. Rather than
looking for a Q.E.D. (*quod erat demonstrandum*) at the end of this work, we might
rather find Q.E.F. (*quod erat faciendum*), as Euclid did to distinguish exemplar
‘constructions’ from the demonstration of logic in the proof. This work does not have a
‘linear’ form. Rather than the mapped journey of a navigator it is the trace of a
wayfinder –giving each form of life its proper attention. That is the ultimate character
of this work. Its theology is appropriate to such wayfinding; and its style and manner is
similarly appropriate.
Chapter 1

LIFE IN THE TROMPE L’OEIL CITY

“To believe, therefore, that human culture has reached a marvelous final culmination in the modern metropolis one must avert one’s eyes from the grim details of the daily routine. And that is precisely what the metropolitan denizen schools himself to do: he lives, not in the real world, but in a shadow world projected around him at every moment by means of paper and celluloid and adroitly manipulated lights: a world in which he is insulated by glass, cellophane, plofilm from the mortifications of living. In short, a world of professional illusionists and their credulous victims.”

LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY

Cities –from their beginnings as small mud hut hamlets to the growth of the expansive megalopolis– are a central part of and determinate in how human beings have come to socially organize and order human life. As a central and unifying phenomenon in the history of civilization, we use the metaphor of the city –both historically and mythically– as an expression of human wonder, human hope, and human ills. However, when we begin to excavate exactly what is the relationship between how human beings organize life –through specific cultic, artistic, economic and private life practices– and how human beings order their life –by means of managing, classifying and directing social expressions– a tension begins to emerge. Initially, we can sense the trace of this tension in the distinct origins and uses of the words themselves. To ‘organize’ (in its verbal form) is of Middle French origin meaning to give an organic structure to. Deriving from the classical Latin ‘organum’ via the ancient Greek noun ‘organon’ (from which we get ‘organ’) the meaning of the word through the ages has been applied to tools, instruments –both mechanical, such as an instrument of war or music, and natural, such as an instrument of sense and faculty– and the common modern usage of a bodily organ. To organize human life then is to

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gather as a means of action or operation with the purpose of carrying out some specific function or functions.\textsuperscript{21}

Tension arises when we obscure and obfuscate that ‘the city’ (a precarious generalizing term, and here partially ‘metaphorical’, or better, synecdochical, whose problematic use will be addressed in this chapter) is not only how human beings organize but also how they order human forms of life. The use origins of the English word ‘order’ are uncertain according to the *Oxford English Dictionary*. The noun has its roots in the classical Latin ‘ordin’ perhaps related to the cognate ‘ordiri’ which meant to lay a warp before weaving; there is also the classical Latin ‘ordo’ (which survives today as the rarely used noun) meant to row a group of the same profession, social class, rank and position. The weaving example is quite elucidating here since the warp yarn is that pre-woven form through which the weft yarn is woven to make cloth. The classical Latin ‘ordo’ then, which has a much more specific technique-derived definition in the *OED* – if the weaving use of the word is taken to be originary that is – denotes “a thread on the loom” (the warp yarn) before weaving begins. In this way a working picture emerges: **to order human life is to literally pre-scribe the form in which human life gathers, weaves and shapes.**

Now, of course, etymology does not determine correct usage – nor correct metaphors – but by breaking these unique words open a trajectory for the dissertation comes forth. Crudely, these often intertwining traces are detectable in the rubrics of ‘power’ and ‘creativity’. These words immediately cease to be informative, however, since their own lexical baggage accompanies them; nevertheless, this is the place to

\textsuperscript{21} *Oxford English Dictionary* ; *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 3rd ed., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993). It is revealing to note that the word “organ” shares the same Indo-European root *werg* with work, wrought and orgy. The modern English word “orgy” comes to us by way of the Greek ‘orgia’ used to denote secret rites and worship. The connections between labour, craft, and cultic practice, revealed in the Indo-European *werg*, and what this has to do with the metaphor of ‘the ersatz city’, will be unpacked further in the course of the dissertation.
start. This uneven break in civilization—which between how human beings ‘organize’ and ‘order’ forms of life⁴⁴ and how it manifests in practices of ‘power’ or ‘creativity’—is taken head on in the work of American historian Lewis Mumford. As will soon become evident, Mumford links strong evaluative critiques to these radically different pictures in light of the maturation of human civilization through history and the role ‘technology’ plays in that development. I will draw on Mumford’s work, then, to further elucidate the meaning of these two activities in relation to human living.

**LEWIS MUMFORD: TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION**

Lewis Mumford’s *The City In History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects* (1961) is a complex historical investigation uncovering the social forces behind urban development in Western civilization, and does an admirable job identifying the truth and folly in any attempt to parse the tension between the organizing and ordering inherent in cities. “In seeking the origins of the city,” says Mumford—who whose work is heavily indebted to Scottish biologist, botanist and urban theorist Sir Patrick Geddes—“one may too easily be tempted to look only for its physical remains. But as with the picture of early man, when we center on his bones and shards, his tools and weapons, we do less than justice to inventions like language and ritual that have left few, if any, material traces.”⁴⁵ As with many species of animals, human beings are fundamentally social creatures whose gathering must have originated as an instinctive act. As human beings, however, we are not simply ‘social’ creatures in the cosmopolitan sense of the word, but, as will be noted in the later work of Martin

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⁴⁴ Here, the term ‘forms of life’ is a reference to the whole of the daily activities of a people. This term is drawn from its use by Ludwig Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* (which echoes the characterization of ‘lifeworld’ [Lebenswelt] introduced by Edmund Husserl and developed in their own ways by Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, et al.) and will be further unpacked and used prominently in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

⁴⁵ Lewis Mumford, ibid., 5.
Heidegger, human beings are fundamentally social creatures with a primordial relationship to nature and the cosmos. So, as Mumford points out, the first evidence of human communal gathering seems to be centered on cultic practices which allowed people to articulate better this ineffable relationship between themselves, their craft, nature and the mysteries of the cosmos –rituals for birth and death, dream interpretation and the observance of seasons. These archaic gatherings were probably temporary meetings centered on cairns or caves. However, as the forms of life of the social group became more diversified and complex, so did their dwellings. As people began to share common social heritage, temporary gatherings gave way to hunting camps, then to permanent hamlets, perhaps centered on a shrine containing some powerful relic, and these eventually grew into villages to meet the developing needs of the community. With the birth of the city then, the “many functions that had heretofore been scattered and unorganized were brought together within a limited area, and the components of the community were kept in a state of dynamic tension and interaction.”

While expansive, Mumford’s study holds the tension between the uniqueness of specific peoples and the particularity of place, without neglecting the common human event that is the city. On the level of ‘city as human event,’ Mumford notes an unforeseen element which emerges in the social development of the city. As a means of expressing sacred and secular power, the city also became the site of ordering human life and “beginning as a representation of the cosmos, a means of bringing heaven down to earth, the city became a symbol of the possible.” The importance of what it means to say that cities are not only how human beings organize (or organically gather) but also how we order human forms of life is painfully transparent when examined briefly in a specific historical example –the traumatic collision of civilizations and

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24 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 31.
25 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 31.
subsequent European colonization of the New World in the sixteenth century. Anthropologist Jack Weatherford offers an illuminating historical anecdote.

On October 2, 1491, the city of Santa Fé (Holy Faith) was founded on the plains outside of Granada, the last Moorish stronghold in Spain, by the monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella as a military base from which the siege of the Alhambra would take place over the course of the next year. The rectangular shaped city had two major streets that formed a cruciform pattern with a plaza in the center. “When Columbus and the subsequent conquistadores arrived in America,” says Weatherford, “they used the plan of Santa Fé for virtually every city they founded.” Since the practice of the new European invaders was to build cities and center power in those places already inhabited, however, the common practice of Spanish colonization in the Americas was to raze existing cities and impose a new order based on a new urban design. This new urban design, Santa Fé, was a working metaphor for the consolidation of Spanish European order –both sacred and secular– in the New World. Great Mesoamerican cities such as the puma-shaped Cuzco and the Aztec Tenochtitlán (the city on the lake) –organized and ordered by their own unique expressions of life– were erased and written over like a palimpsest. The memory of this systematic reordering of the New World urban landscape still survives in place names such as Santa Fé de Bogotá, Colombia, Santa Fé del Rosario, Argentina, and even Santa Fe, New Mexico, in the United States. Weatherford’s stark examples vividly reveal that there is indeed much at stake in how humans ‘order’ or ‘organize’, and they stand as a reminder that any

\footnote{26 While appropriate meanings already begin to come forth in this example, the term ‘colonization’ will be taken up in greater detail and put to use in an alternative methodology later in the dissertation.}

discussion of an imposed order \textit{qua} colonization is accompanied by enormous ethical concerns.

Mumford also notes many historical examples of imposed order. The first such example in \textit{The City in History} is the centralization and crystallization of urban space in the citadel. Early on, the citadel centralized previously scattered and decentralized village economies that sometimes spread throughout entire valley and regional systems.\(^\text{28}\) Far from simply a symbol of military power, the citadel centralized wealth (economic power) and provided religious meaning (the power of meaning) as a reflection of the cosmos. Throughout history these examples take on different expressions but function in the same way. Whether in expressions of Baroque power through an architecture which led to, among other things, a new planning emphasis placed on streets and traffic rather than neighborhoods, or in the depressed Coketown, completely colonized and ordered by late nineteenth and early twentieth century capitalism, the result is the same: \textit{human forms of life can be disconnected from one pattern of living and forcibly shaped to conform to another.}

This ‘disconnect’ is felt in Mumford’s critique of regional planning in \textit{The Culture of Cities} (1938). Mumford critiques the ‘Oblomovs’\(^\text{29}\) of architecture and planning who evade reality, make “idle pictures and diagrams”, and construct “buildings outwardly without roots in their landscape”.\(^\text{30}\) Here Mumford’s language echoes the semiological language of signification (and in some ways anticipates the semiological concerns of Umberto Eco and Jean Baudrillard, who will be discussed later), but with a significant twist. On the one hand Mumford displays an obvious concern for what Gale Carrithers describes as Mumford’s contention “against signs

\(^{28}\) Lewis Mumford, \textit{ibid.}, 34, 35.

\(^{29}\) A Russian literary character who exemplifies superfluous living.

banefully divorced from referents.” When the plan (sign) has no connection to ‘reality’ (referent) on the ground then the results can be disastrous to forms of life. However, Mumford is not a semiologist; rather than trading in signs and referents, Mumford is a historian deeply concerned with human life practices. Proper planning aligns geography and economy with “human purposes”, says Mumford, “[…] what is planned is not simply a location or an area: what is planned is an activity-in-an-area or an area-through-an-activity.” Mumford’s attention to life practices and forms of life over and against systems of correlation will increasingly play a crucial role in the discussion of order and organizing.

In The City in History, after thirteen chapters of detailed anthropological, sociological, and historical unpacking of the development of urban space, Mumford introduces the ‘new’ economic force of capitalism, and the dramatic effects this new epoch has had, and continues to have, on urban development. “The growth of the commercial city,” says Mumford, “was a slow process, for it met with resistance in both the structure and the customs of the medieval town . . . But the final result of capitalism was to introduce the modes of the market place, in a universal form, into every quarter of the city: no part of it was immune to change, if this could be brought about at a profit.” The new emphasis on reordering to support the emerging needs of capitalism –leading to a rapid decrease in rural living and increase in urban populations– “found their ideal expression in new city extensions” notes Mumford. As early as the seventeenth century these new city extensions, from lot to avenue, were treated “as abstract units for buying and selling, without respect for historic uses, for

32 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 376, 379.
topographic conditions, or for social needs.” Mumford then further unpacks the complex origins and developments of this tension between the forces of organization and the new epoch of imposed order on the urban landscape of Western European and American cities by addressing the advent of technological advancement. What makes the character of this new epoch particularly pervasive and different from preceding epochs, says Mumford, is the coupling of capitalism with the new technological advancements of the first and second industrial revolutions. “Whether our scientific technology should be controlled and directed for the purposes of life, or whether life shall be regimented and repressed in order to promote ceaseless expansion of technology”, warns Mumford whilst pondering the future of ‘city’ in the West, “is one of the main questions before mankind today.” These evaluative concerns will continue throughout Mumford’s work and will become more evident over the course of this chapter. It is the intent of this dissertation to explore these values –both ‘good’ and ‘bad’– associated with the colonization of human forms of life and to see how these values are further complicated in an age of media and virtual technologies.

**TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION: A HOPEFUL ARCHAEOLOGY**

Lewis Mumford reminds us that it takes spectacles far less dramatic than the invasion of a colonizing army to reorder the life practices of a city. A prolific writer, Mumford’s first great study was the prescient investigation *Technics and Civilization*.
(1934). “During the last thousand years”, says Mumford, “the material basis and the cultural forms of Western Civilization have been profoundly modified by the development of the machine.”37 Rather than focusing on the modern limited industrial term ‘technology’, Mumford favors the term technic, for which he excavates broad meaning from the Greek ‘techne’, in an attempt to reveal it as historically situated in a complex lifeworld. Technics, says Mumford, greatly concerned with the associated values, “are the results of human choices and aptitudes and strivings, deliberate as well as unconscious . . . [they exist] as an element in human culture and [they promise] well or ill as the social groups that exploit [them] promise well or ill.”38 Inspired by the work of his mentor Sir Patrick Geddes, Mumford constructs Technics and Civilization around a complex archaeology –best described as an “over-lapping and interpenetrating phases” of ‘the machine’.39 ‘The machine’ goes beyond simple technological artifacts. “When I use the term ‘the machine’ I shall employ it as a shorthand reference to the entire technological complex. This will embrace the knowledge and skills and arts derived from industry or implicated in the new technics, and will include various forms of tool, instrument, apparatus and utility as well as machines proper.”40 Although “mechanization and regimentation are not new phenomena in history: what is new is the fact that these functions have been projected and embodied in organized forms which dominate every aspect of our existence.”41 Certainly, Mumford suggests, other civilizations in history –the Chinese, the Arabs, the Greeks, the Romans– have all had access to and achieved a high level of “technical proficiency” without succumbing to,

38 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 6.
39 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 109.
40 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 12. (emphasis mine)
41 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 4. (emphasis mine)
or being dominated by, technological aims. Only a civilization like ours, dominated by *the aims of technics*—a point which will be addressed later—would use archeological evidence of past technology, such as the 2006 publicity over the Antikythera Mechanism, to support the myth of mechanical and technological progress. “They had machines”, argues Mumford of other civilizations, “but they did not develop ‘the machine.’” It remained for the people of Western Europe to carry the physical sciences and the exact arts to a point of no other culture had reached, and to adapt the whole mode of life to the pace of the capacities of the machine.”

Mumford’s genealogy of ‘the machine’ reveals that the mechanization of the West was not simply imposed upon life practices through sweeping societal events such as the industrial and second industrial revolution, but is a far more complex phenomenon “developing steadily for the last seven centuries [. . .]. *Men had become mechanical*”, Mumford points out, “before they perfected complicated machines to express their new bent and interest”. Certainly, any attempt to view the mechanization of the West as an event imposed from the outside is complicit in the problem. Mumford then, is concerned with “a reorientation of wishes, habits, ideas, goals”—the role of ‘the machine’ in the life practices of Western Civilization. From the clock to Protestant ethics and, eventually, to capitalism, in the human habits and forms of life which

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42 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 4.
43 The Antikythera Mechanism is a second century B.C.E. tool comprised of cogs and wheels used as a solar, lunar, planetary and astrological calendar which could also calculate eclipses. The language found in a December 1, 2006, Associated Press article is very telling. “It was a pocket calculator of the time. . . . We have the latest technology available to understand this mechanism, yet the technological quality in this mechanism puts us to shame . . . The design of the mechanism is very wonderful, making us realize how highly technological the ancient Greek civilization was.” Without any attention to the manner in which the Antikythera Mechanism (or better Antikythera Tool) functioned within the lifeworld of the Greek civilization, broad sweeping comparisons and similarities are made between the way technology functions in our civilization and theirs. While this is just one example it certainly represents a standard mode (e.g. Associated Press) in which technological history, and knowledge is disseminated.
44 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 4.
45 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 3. (emphasis mine)
46 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 3.
created new abstractions and calculations in a quest for greater power, lay the
foundations for ‘the machine’. Speaking of the rise of capitalism, Mumford says,

Capitalism turned people from tangible to intangible: its symbol, as Sombart observes, is the account book: ‘its life-value lies in its profit and loss account.’ . . . it tended to replace the direct ‘economy of needs’ and to substitute money-values for life-values. . . . One abstraction re-enforced the other. . . .

In time, we were more at home with abstractions than they were with the goods they represented. . . . Men became powerful to the extent that they neglected the real world of wheat and wool, food and clothes, and centered their attention on the purely quantitative representation of it in tokens and symbols: to think in terms of mere weight and number, to make quantity not alone an indication of value to the mechanical world picture.

This *eotechnic* phase, as Mumford calls it, is an era of complex social, political and economic preparation of life practices which expansively runs from roughly the 10th to the mid 18th century (and a delayed climax in 1850’s America). The most long lasting legacy of the *eotechnic* phase was the emergence of a “rift between the mechanization and humanization, between power bent on its own aggrandizement and power directed toward wider human fulfillment”.

Mumford marks 1750 as a significant threshold for industry –led by the use of coal, iron and steam– “to consolidate and systematize the great advances that had been made. . . . [in which] a new phase, with a different source of power, different materials, different social objectives [took hold]. This second revolution multiplied, vulgarized and spread the methods and goods produced by the first . . . its success could be gauged

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47 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 9-106.
48 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 23-25.
49 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 111.
50 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 150.
only in terms of the multiplication table.”51 This paleotechnic phase, the second technic
wave, says Mumford, roughly lasts till the dawn of the turbulent twentieth century. It is
a period in Western history characterized by Mumford as a disastrous interlude in
which the dark abysses of a “quantitative conception of life”, regulated through
conflict, stimulated by power and guided by a blind doctrine of progress, were
explored.52 Human gains were small during this phase, says Mumford, life was starved
and struggled for existence, workers were degraded and nature was destroyed.

The third and final wave in Mumford’s archeology is the nascent neotechnic
phase, which marks the thirty years of the 20th century. Mumford’s articulation of the
neotechnic phase must be approached with both caution and interest by the 21st century
reader. Written before the Second World War, Mumford displays a certain amount of
hope and naïveté, which he abandons and later radically redacts in The Myth of the
Machine series (1967, 1970), written during the Cold War. Mumford explains,

behind this wave, both in technics and in civilization, are
forces which were suppressed or perverted by the earlier
development of the machine, forces which . . . tend toward a
new synthesis in thought and a fresh synergy in action. . . .
[T]he machine ceases to be a substitute for God or an orderly
society; and instead of its success being measured by the
mechanization of life, its worth becomes more and more
measurable in terms of its own approach to the organic and the
living.53

Whereas the rise of the machine was the rise against the organic and living, Mumford
sees the organic and living profoundly changing and ‘assimilating’ the machine through
our absorption of its largely negative historical lessons (e.g. “objectivity, impersonality,

51 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 151.
52 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 210.
53 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 5.
neutrality”). With the neotechnic phase”, says Mumford, “… the scientific method, whose chief advances had been in mathematics, took possession of other domains of experience: the living organism and human society also became the objects of systematic investigation [. . .]. Instead of mechanism forming a pattern for life, living organisms began to form a pattern for mechanism.”

The final chapters of *Technics and Civilization* are put to the test in the ensuing decades and are taken up with great ferocity in his final magnum opus, *The Myth of the Machine* series. Gale H. Carrithers, Jr. describes Mumford’s transition best:

> What occasion, what evil day, what question prompted *The Myth of the Machine*? . . . The mass killings driven by Axis paranoia and megalomania, the mass killings aerially engineered by the Allies in a “logic” of war abhorrent to Mumford, the loss of the one of the only two children in the Mumford’s nuclear family to infantry operations in what Mumford throughout deemed a just and necessary war of defense against totalitarianism, thirty-five years of life . . . Mumford had come to recognize that technological myth tends to reinforce itself.56

In the two volume *The Myth of the Machine* Mumford identifies a radical difference between the *Biotechnic* and the *Megatechinic* and how both fall under the shadow of the *Megamachine*.

**BIOTECHNIC VS. MEGATECHNICS AND THE MEGAMACHINE**

Mumford’s earliest articulations of the organic and creative human activity called *biotechnics* –and which are to be understood here as a largely positive value in his characterization– are in the form of a broad sketch that lacks detail. In *Technics and*
Civilization Mumford briefly notes that the biotechnic age, what he hopefully believed was the impending move from the paleotechnic to neotechnic period in human history, was just on the horizon. In Cultures in Cities (1938), the follow up to Technics and Civilization, Mumford argued that this early twentieth century biotechnic shift was “in the same embryonic state that capitalism and mechanism were in the seventeenth century”. Before World War Two, Mumford hopefully claimed that biotechnics represented a shift in civilization away from a historically infantile and then adolescent political economy of the machine – which resulted in dehumanizing beliefs and practices – towards an embrace of more humane and organic modes of living. “As John Ruskin put it”, says Mumford, “There is no Wealth but Life; and what we call wealth is in fact wealth only when it is a sign of potential or actual vitality. . . . [C]reative activity is finally the only important business of mankind, the chief justification and the most durable fruit of its sojourn on the planet. . . . [U]nless we socialize creation, unless we make production subservient to education, a mechanized system of production, however efficient, will only harden into a servile byzantine formality, enriched by bread and circuses.” Although Ruskin’s characterization is broad it certainly, and clearly, makes known Mumford’s positive evaluation of biotechnics and the ethical centrality of human creative activity. After World War Two, however, Mumford’s hopeful, if not near ‘idyllic’ conception of biotechnic went through radical revision.

57 Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 32; With great prescience, Mumford says that it is capitalism and war which are the greatest obstacles to moving forward with biotechnics. cf: Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 353.

After World War Two, President Dwight D. Eisenhower again brought this ominous duo – this time described as a Military Industrial Complex – to the attention of the American public during his January 17, 1961 farewell address. President Eisenhower warned of “an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government.” (the complete speech can be found in Appendix 1) The American Presidency Project, “Dwight D. Eisenhower Farewell Radio and Television address to the American People January 17, 1961,” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12086&st=&st1=. (emphasis mine)

58 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization, 378, 410.
Mumford refines his characterization of human technics in his two-volume work *The Myth of the Machine* (1967, 1970). In the first volume, *Tehnics and Human Development* (1967), he broadens his definition of biotechnics – originally described as a new stage in the history of human technics – to include “man’s total equipment for life”: of which “tool-technics” are but a “fragment”. This move towards a more originary understanding of the Greek *techne* is true to Mumford’s focus on human activity and practices. “To consider man, then, as primarily a tool-using animal,” says Mumford in the introduction, “is to overlook the main chapters of human history. . . . [T]he primary locus of all his activities lies first in his own organism and in the social organization through which it finds fuller expression. . . . [T]hus, technics, at the beginning, [were] broadly *life-centered, not work-centered or power-centered*.”

The problem is the ‘mechanization of humanity’ through totalitarian technics, or *megatechnics*, by the complex political economy of the *megamachine*. As with the re-characterization of biotechnics, however, one should not too quickly think that megatechnic, nor the ominous sounding megamachine, are abstract entities that Mumford paints with broad strokes. Mumford roots these conceptions in history providing sufficient historical detail to bring these abstractions down to earth. The origins of the megamachine are found, not in the Industrial Revolution, says Mumford, but in the dawn of civilization itself and the first inclination towards the ordering of “an archetypal machine of human parts” as a mirror of the Cosmic order –

60 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 9. (emphasis mine) Here Mumford’s insight significantly, although not directly, aligns his work with Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Tim Ingold. All of whom will be brought into the conversation in Chapter 3, and whose insight stands in contrast with Jean Baudrillard and his picture of hyperreality.
61 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 237.
the Divine Kings of the ancient world.\textsuperscript{62} Although the name complicates understanding, Mumford’s ‘megamachine’ becomes a metaphor for the abstract ordering of a human lifeworld – literally the mechanization of humanity. The genius of Mumford’s move is to situate the mechanization of humanity at the dawn of civilization itself. The ethical dilemma of organizing, ordering and tool use is a primordial condition of human existence. The megamachines of the ancient Divine Kings, says Mumford, represent the archetype for all future complex ‘machines’; rather than mechanical components, the megamachine is made of human components – “political and economic, military, bureaucratic and royal . . . aided by the discipline of astronomical science and supported by the sanctions of religion [. . .]. This was an invisible structure composed of living, but rigid, human parts”.\textsuperscript{63} Megatechnics – the technical equipment of a megamachine – is “the currently accepted picture of the relation of man to technics . . . marked by his invention of tools and weapons for the purpose of achieving mastery over the forces of nature . . . in which he will have not only conquered nature, but detached himself as far as possible from the organic habitat.”\textsuperscript{64} This dominant ‘picture’ must be challenged by a properly rearticulated description. In The Culture of Cities, Mumford gives an early description of the historical trajectory of mechanized human technics evidenced, he says, in “ravaged landscapes, disorderly urban districts, pockets of disease, patches of blight, mile upon mile of standardized slums, worming into the outlying arms of big cities, and fusing with their ineffectual suburbs. In short: a general miscarriage and defeat of civilized effort.”\textsuperscript{65} At the heart of this blight, Mumford later points out, are the practices of mapmaking and abstract planning – technics of power–

\textsuperscript{62} Lewis Mumford, ibid., 11, 12, 163ff; also see Lewis Mumford, The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects, 55-93.


\textsuperscript{64} Lewis Mumford, ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{65} Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities, 8.
which lack care for “social meaning” and the complicated “realities of life”. This problematic trajectory and its practices, then, are at the heart of the ethical concerns of this investigation.

One fundamental analysis we can derive, then, from Lewis Mumford is that not only is the very nature and character of ‘city’ changing, but the demands of change on the human lifeworld are dramatically pronounced and also form the deteriorations and losses in that overall lifeworld. As Mumford so lucidly points out, certainly the changing nature and character of ‘city’ has a radically negative effect on what it means to be human being. In fact, Mumford notes in volume two, *The Pentagon of Power* (1970), that “there is little doubt that at least in most industrially developed countries the Megatechnic Complex is now at the height of its power and authority, or is fast approaching it.”

Mumfordian biotechnic approaches to human ordering and organizing, therefore, that will remain relevant throughout this study as characterizations of modes of resistance are, in his words, “web of life”, “complex interplay”, “harmonious adjustment”, and “ecological balance”. Although speculative and incomplete, in Mumford’s biotechnic we leave any claim of luddism behind. As we will later see in the work of J. R. R. Tolkien in Chapter 4, Mumford sees two possible trajectories for human technological use: one is in service of power, order and domination; but the other possibility is in service of the imaginative, organic and expansive possibilities for forms of life. However, we are still left with the problem and must endeavor to go further.

It should be clear by this point that Lewis Mumford seeks to characterize major human/social/civilization changes which have been, and are currently, taking place.

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66 Lewis Mumford, *ibid.*, 375. Mumford’s inclusion of mapmaking and abstract planning is mentioned in anticipation of the work of Tim Ingold in Chapter 3.
This change is not value neutral, but can be—and often is—explicitly harmful to human beings (and nature as a whole) in a variety of ways and whose ‘anti-life’ mapping and planning should be resisted at every turn. We must now ask the first of many questions: how does this increased emphasis on ordering manifest itself in our 21st-century Western context and what effect does it have on human organizing and human life practices? In other words, what harm is it doing? What losses, devaluing and suffering occur in its wake? More explicitly, the door is now opened to investigate what I will continue to refer to as the ‘colonization’ of human lifeworlds and human imagining. More questions emerge: what colonizing and reordering pressures are thrust upon the organizing (organic) life practices of everyday human life in the 21st-century West? Why should we resist, and what can be done to resist? These themes will be explored through a variety of key characters: Daniel Boorstin, Umberto Eco, Jean Baudrillard, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tim Ingold, J. R. R. Tolkien, Gilles Deleuze, and Terrence Malick—all of whom take up these similar themes in their work and point to a variety of resistances in some cases. Before moving on to possible modes of resistance, however, we must first pursue the unique problems posed by Mumford’s phenomenon of mechanized human ordering in our post-industrial age of electronic media. This second line of questioning—the ersatz, the fake, and the hyperreal—will further complicate the issues raised thus far by Mumford. To this end I will examine Daniel Boorstin’s ‘unreal’ pseudo-event and Umberto Eco’s journalistic investigation of ‘hyperreality’ in America. However, to begin, a more focused meditation on a historically contingent phenomenon may help to elucidate this emerging question: the Petit Hameau of Marie Antoinette.
**PETIT HAMEAU: FOLLY AND THE ERSATZ VILLAGE**

Nestled among the grand edifices of Versailles is a bucolic garden stage set known as *Petit Hameau*. Constructed by architect Richard Mique and painter Hubert Robert for Marie Antoinette, *Petit Hameau* was a working hamlet of twelve cottages complete with a mill, farmhouse, bakery, dairy, henhouse, aviary and dovecote. During the last years of her reign, milkmaids drew milk from docile handpicked cows (washed clean so as not to offend the 18th-century aristocratic sensibilities of the *dauphine* and her entourage) into monogrammed pails, and made butter in porcelain churns. In the larger historical context of 18th-century ornamental farms (*ferme ornée*), however, *Petit Hameau* was not a unique occurrence. “Throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century,” says William Howard Adams, “we are repeatedly faced with subtle illusions and manipulation of reality in the French garden. Real trees became stage props, and artificial lakes became rivers.”

Furthermore, Marie-Antoinette’s *hameau* is not even an original design but is a copy of one built by the Prince de Condé, and as a *ferme ornée* it is much less extravagant than those built by the Duc d’Orléans, the Comtesse de Provence and the Duc de Chartres, which boasted windmills, dairies made of marble and Greco-Roman temples dedicated to a variety of Romantic ideals.

This was not a folly, in a specific architectural sense of the term, since the *Hameau* was not frivolous at the expense of the practical; albeit working at a limited output, with a scarce population, it was a ‘working’ hamlet where people lived, produced and consumed. However, in terms of being an actual ‘country hamlet’ we

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71 The official website of the Chateau de Versailles makes the point to include in the description of La Hameau de la Reine, “Contrairement aux idées reçues, ce Hameau n’était pas une création d’opérette. *C’était une véritable exploitation agricole*, dirigée par un fermier, dont les produits alimentaient les cuisines du Château.”; Chateau de Versailles, “La Hameau de la Reine,” http://www.chateauversailles.fr/fr/123_Le_Hameau_de_la_Reine.php. (emphasis mine)
must press the question, what about the *Petit Hameau* was ersatz, and does it matter; can it be harmful? According to the *OED*, to call the *Petit Hameau* ersatz is to say that it is both an imitation of a genuine artifact—an object which is also judged to be an inferior imitation. The *Hameau* may have been a working farm but it most certainly was not genuinely rustic (it was aged to appear rustic) nor was it genuinely a Norman *hameau* (it was not built to suit the Norman lifeworld) on which it was modeled. The cottages were constructed with “lattice windows and stucco made to imitate worn, cracked brickwork and half-timbering.” Inside, rooms were far from rustic; designed with all the comforts and luxury of the *Petit Trianon* and Versailles, *Petit Hameau* afforded scaled luxury whilst providing an Elysium from the privileged confines of the French royal palace and indeed the ‘modest’ *Petit Trianon* itself.

While there is no room to investigate the complex biography of Marie-Antoinette nor the socio-political situation of late 18th-century France, it is important to note that, ironically, construction of *Petit Hameau* was indebted to the later writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre and Claude-Henri Watelet. Biographer Joan Haslip suggests that although Marie-Antoinette probably never read Rousseau, his exaltation of “the charms of rural life” was one influential voice (in a complex nexus of influences) which made English gardens and Arcadian villages quite

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72 Antonia Fraser, *Marie Antoinette: the Journey* (London: Phoenix, 2002), 247; In many ways, this kind of illusory construction anticipates temporary movie studio sets or even the themed villages of Disney and Epcot which are built to recreate, with great detail, a particular time and place.

73 William Howard Adams provides some information about the interior of other similar faux villages in *The French Garden: 1500-1800* (London: Scholar Press, 1979). “The tiny jewel rooms of the rustic thatched cottage at Rambouillet, the *Chaumière de Coquillage*, were completely covered with the most intricate and refined shell work, inlaid in delicate mosaic. Among Le Rouge’s plates there is a plan for a garden farm building, complete with an inviting hay loft suitable for amorous rompings. When the door was opened, however, as if one had stumbled upon a vision in a magic forest created by the Brothers Grimm, the unsuspecting visitor was confronted with the interior of a richly appointed tent such as that of a Roman general on an Eastern campaign, embellished with banners, armour, and other antique military appointments” (122).
the fashion among the aristocracy of the time. To mention Rousseau here is, of course, quite significant in light of what has already been said by Mumford. Rousseau’s later work developed a deep suspicion of sophisticated and civilized (urban) society; he believed that the gradual abandoning of the simple solitary life corrupted the Natural man and argued for a return to more ‘natural’ (and morally ‘better’) forms of life. “I ask which –civilized or natural life– is the more liable to become unbearable to those who experience it?”, wrote Rousseau. In many ways this echoes Mumford’s call to return harmonious models of human living which more resemble “living organisms and organic complexes (ecosystems)” and better reflect the complex interplay of lifeworlds. If indeed the Petit Hameau is indebted to Rousseau –and here it seems to be reasonable to assume so– then this turn towards a ‘bucolic’ form of life may function as a possible ‘de-colonizing’ tactic.

It seems Marie Antoinette may have sincerely believed she embraced these ideals. “Life there,” says Antoinia Fraser, “clearly represented some attempt at finding a lost paradise.” Biographers Haslip and Fraser both note one classic example pointing to the dauphine’s sincere embrace of the pastoral life. When Marie turned thirty in 1785 she no longer wore the elaborate wigs, jewelry and dress of the aristocracy, wearing only simple white muslin dresses and a straw hat. This now generates yet another evaluative question –one that may be unique to an ‘ersatz’ setting: while there may be some historical evidence to suggest that Petit Hameau functioned as a ‘real’ natural escape for Marie Antoinette, as extolled by Rousseau, did it also serve to further entrench her into an artificiality removed from the realities of French suffering?

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Haslip notes one critique by the Marquis de Bombelles who wrote, “A lot of money has been spent on giving the Queen’s ‘hameau’ the aspect of poverty. By spending a little more, Her Majesty would have been able to improve the conditions of those who are really poor within a radius of twenty miles or so and turn their hovels into decent homes … to imitate in a place given over to amusements the unfortunate existence of your fellow beings seems a somewhat heartless thing to do.”77 Quite contrary to the writings of late Rousseau, Petit Hameau did not simply function as an escape from the ‘corrupt’ luxury of Versailles and the Petit Trianon, into a more virtuous natural setting, it also served –however naïvely and unintentionally– as an escape from the realities of the actual (‘real’) impoverished French countryside.

Herein lies the rub: were the ferme ornée, specifically the Petit Hameau, a harmless or harmful expression of late 18th-century French aristocratic life? On a more fundamental level the rather banal question of whether or not Petit Hameau was a ‘real’ or spurious hameau is a central concern. Fundamentally, questions of ‘real’ or spurious immediately bring to mind the nature of reality and problematically its ‘representation’, truth and illusion –questions which go back, in the Western philosophical tradition, to Anaximander and Heraclitus. The recipe is now thoroughly complicated. With Mumford the question of the colonization of human lifeworlds was raised; now, with the Petit Hameau, we introduce the question and possibility of the ‘real’ or ‘spurious’ character of colonization. How do things become ersatz –and why can that be harmful to human forms of life? Is the pursuit of aspect –a trompe-l’œil ethic as suggested by the Marquis de Bombelles– an illusory endeavor and/or morally reprehensible? And more broadly speaking in anticipation of Tolkien, what is the complex relationship between the kind of fantasy designed to flee from everyday reality, often with

detrimental effects such as Marie Antoinette’s *Hameau*, versus escaping a spurious ‘reality’ into a true or real fantasy, and the life practices that occur in both? Obviously, many larger questions are left unanswered. Some answers begin to unfold, however, through an engagement with a monograph situated at a unique moment in Western civilization—Daniel Boorstin’s *The Image*.

**Daniel Boorstin’s Mass Media Consumer-Village(s)**

“It is only a short step from exaggerating what we can find in the world to exaggerating our power to remake the world. Expecting more novelty than there is, more greatness than there is, and more strangeness than there is, we imagine ourselves masters of a plastic universe. But a world we can shape to our will—or to our extravagant expectations—is a shapeless world.”

With an increase in mass reproductive technology, mass produced commodities, and mass communication arts, the trajectory and ethical concerns of technics described in the work of Lewis Mumford is greatly complicated in unexpected ways. This unique phenomenon in human history is the subject of American historian Daniel J. Boorstin’s groundbreaking work *The Image: or, What Happened to the American Dream* (1961). Begun as an essay examining a critical juncture in American history and the history of mass communication—the first televised U.S. presidential debate between John F. Kennedy and Richard Milhous Nixon in 1960, and subsequently the effects of the televised event on the American culture—a central aim of *The Image* is to investigate the broader effects of what he terms the ‘Graphic Revolution’ of the 19th century on 20th century American society. “By a giant leap”, argues Boorstin, “Americans

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79 The book is also known by its alternate subtitle, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*.
80 See Godfrey Hodgson’s Obituary for Daniel Boorstin in the *Guardian* Monday March 1, 2004 http://www.guardian.co.uk/obituaries/story/0,3604,1159014,00.html. In the majority of Baudrillard scholarship, Boorstin is commonly overlooked as a primary influence on Baudrillard, but William Merrin notes that *The Image* is a critical source for Baudrillard’s *Consumer Society*. 
crossed the gulf from the daguerreotype [photograph] to color television in less than a century.

Consequently, Americans were thoroughly unprepared for the effects of this radical transformation of daily life. The rapid growth in technological advancement meant that the “ability to make, preserve, transmit, and disseminate precise images – images of print, of men and landscapes and events, of the voices of men and mobs”– not only transformed the manner in which we craft and disseminate information, but subsequently, has also transformed the manner in which we live our everyday lives.

Technological themes found in Boorstin’s work relevant to this discussion, then, are the nature of copying and fabrication in an industrial age; and specifically the nature of copying as relevant to mass communication. But Boorstin goes far beyond these in his examination of the uses and influences of technology in a culture. Especially significant are the forms and effects of image reproduction, and the practices associated with it, on daily life; this includes, but is not limited to, the possibilities of the manipulation of people and societies –a point in common with the questions and concerns of the ersatz.

In Boorstin’s The Image, then, both the concerns raised by Lewis Mumford about technology and its effects on human lifeworlds, and the problems and questions raised by the ersatz Petit Hameau now converge.

Rather than being concerned with built environments and their effects, however, Boorstin finds the information infrastructure and its effects on the architecture of the human imagination at least as (and maybe more) relevant to the transformation of

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81 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 13; Daguerreotype is an early photographic method developed by Louis Daguerre which works by exposing an image directly onto the polished surface of a silver coated plate. The patent was awarded in 1839 and was the preferred method of exposure before the advent of the collodion process around 1850 which was the precursor to the gelatin emulsion exposure.

82 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 13; It should be noted that there is a broad and complex meaning behind Boorstin’s use of the term ‘image’ that will be discussed shortly.

83 It should also be noted, in anticipation of what is to come in Chapter 2, Boorstin’s investigation is treated in a much more limited and specific manner, and with greater historical complexity compared to what we will find with Jean Baudrillard’s hyperreality.
everyday life. What is unique about Boorstin’s investigation – and germane to this study – is that he takes his critique off the map of traditional political economy, targeting a wholly new epochal menace. “It is not the menace of class war, or ideology, of poverty, of disease, of illiteracy, of demagoguery, or of tyranny,” he says, “[. . .] it is the menace of unreality.” For Boorstin, this “thicket of unreality” (which will be taken up in yet another way in Chapter 2), created from the world of our own making, as he says, separates America [and by implication, all who are influenced in these ways by America] from the facts of everyday living. America, says Boorstin, falls victim to these illusions because of extravagant and excessive expectations born from, what he perceives to be, the belief that Americans are masters of their environment. It should be pointed out, however, that these expectations of extravagance and excessiveness (a characterization noted by Umberto Eco in his collection of essays, Travels in Hyperreality) also have a direct link to the nature of industrialization, mass production and mass consumption rather than to simply an intrinsic quality of a people; the scale of the problem seems to be sui generis to the practices of this specific historical epoch.

Whatever the origins of excess may be herein is the root of the issue Boorstin seeks to explore —Americans are deceived because they expect more than the world can offer. To further compound the problem, this illusion making, says Boorstin, has become the business of America: a country of ‘consumers’ rather than ‘citizens’.

A central driver of this phenomenon of ‘unreality’ is a flood of pseudo-events, brought into being through a particular brand of communication and entertainment.

84 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 240. (emphasis mine)
85 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 3.
86 As recently as March 23, 2010, this language was alive and well in President Barack Obama’s claim during the signing into legislation of a monumental healthcare bill that Americans shape their own destiny … it is their character.
87 In fact “America” could be regarded as a symbol — with the spread of globalization, industrialization, and mass media.
88 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 4.
practices made possible by the technological leap of the before-mentioned ‘Graphic Revolution’. In many ways Boorstin’s ‘pseudo-event’ is a synthetic phenomenon. “Verisimilitude”, says Boorstin, “took on a new meaning . . . vivid image came to overshadow pale reality.” Such pseudo-events are convenient, graspable and easily digestible; they seek to become the standard of knowledge and spawn other events in kind; they are also characterized by a production value that implies reproducibility, power and profit. Our concerns with these phenomena are closely related to the ethical concerns raised about the tromp l’œil ethics plaguing the Petit Hameau. They contribute to the tyranny of a complex collection of fabricated and commodifiable social productions –made possible during an age of mass image production (photography, television, and cinema)– which must be addressed to understand the pervasive nature of the pseudo-event.

89 This critique of ‘unreality’ should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the radio and television industry. The critique was originally made by esteemed American journalist Edward R. Murrow’s October 15, 1958 ‘wires and lights’ speech before the Radio-Television News Directors Association in Chicago: “Our history will be what we make it. And if there are any historians about fifty or a hundred years from now, and there should be preserved the kinescopes for one week of all three networks, they will there find recorded in black and white, or color, evidence of decadence, escapism and insulation from the realities of the world in which we live. I invite your attention to the television schedules of all networks between the hours of 8 and 11 p.m., Eastern Time. Here you will find only fleeting and spasmodic reference to the fact that this nation is in mortal danger. There are, it is true, occasional informative programs presented in that intellectual ghetto on Sunday afternoons. But during the daily peak viewing periods, television in the main insulates us from the realities of the world in which we live. If this state of affairs continues, we may alter an advertising slogan to read: LOOK NOW, PAY LATER.”; Radio-Television News Directors Association, “Industry Leaders: Edward R. Murrow Speech,” http://www.rtnda.org/pages/media_items/edward-r.-murrow-speech998.php. (emphasis mine)

90 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 13.

91 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 39-40.
Boorstin offers a few dated yet still relevant concrete examples, which give insight into the workings and character of the pseudo-event. He calls the ‘news leak’ an example of the pseudo-event par excellence. This form of “cloaked news” is an elaborate, intentionally orchestrated, and organized way of disseminating what is supposed to be information, interjecting formative or leading questions or even offering loosely founded suggestions into the public sphere. These ‘leaks’, says Boorstin, are organized around dinners between state officials and select members of the media who gather together almost ritualistically under a well defined set of rules to ‘pass’ information. What are simple truths, proclamations of policy, hopes or un-truths, is always unclear. The reporter, who lives in a “penumbra between fact and fantasy”, is then tasked with “a way of weaving these threads of unreality into a fabric that the reader will not recognize as entirely unreal”. Boorstin cites the March 26, 1955, *New York Times* headline which read: “U.S. Expects Chinese Reds to Attack Isles in April; Weighs all out Defense.” A few days later, however, a counter headline was written: “Eisenhower Sees No War Now Over Chinese Isles.” Boorstin reveals the source of the contradiction. In the first story, the Chief of U.S. Naval operations offered an off-the-record ‘opinion’ to Washington reporters at a dinner like the one described earlier. Of course, the fact that it was simply opinion was either not known or could not be revealed by the reporter. The second story did not come from President Eisenhower himself but from his Press Secretary who had a greatly differing ‘opinion’ from the Chief of Naval Operations over the matter. However complicated, and archaic, this process is certainly only further complicated in the current media environment. Boorstin asks a question whose relevance persists: was there any real news here at all?

93 Daniel J. Boorstin, *ibid.*, 32-34.
While the transformation of media techniques over the last fifty years and the effects of the global rise of 24-hour news media cannot be pursued here, Boorstin’s question, magnified under the scope of history, is far deeper and more troubling than might have been initially considered in 1961. As Boorstin himself points out, the rise of the pseudo-event has confused the ‘roles’ of actor and audience. Between the rise of so-called reality television and reality celebrities, camera phone news reporting, personal ‘soundtrack’ devices like the iPod, publicity stunts such as the recent ‘Balloon Boy’ hoax in the States, advertising, chat shows, and documentaries, (the list could go on quite long), mass media has a daily effect on how we see and participate in everyday living. The trajectory of this everyday phenomenon has precedent.

Boorstin cites the relationship between the popularity of the ‘quiz-show’ format in 1950’s America and the Presidential debates of 1960. Not ‘debates’ in the sense of the great Lincoln-Douglas debates of the 19th century –these made-for-television events were “clinical examples”, says Boorstin, of how the pseudo-event is “made, why it

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94 A relevant case in point is the controversial reporting by Judith Miller of the *New York Times* on suspected WMD in Iraq. Miller was responsible for ten erroneous *New York Times* articles leading up to the Iraq invasion of 2003. Most notorious were her December 20, 2001, article “An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites”, based on the testimony of the now discredited ‘Curveball’ informant; the September 7, 2002 article “U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts”, which quotes ‘unnamed’ American officials and intelligence experts; and her April 2, 2003, article “Illicit Arms Kept till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to Assert”, which was written without actually talking to the ‘source’.

95 On October 15, 2009, in Fort Collins, Colorado, USA, the parents of 6-year-old Falcon Heene reported that he had floated away in a 20 foot in diameter homemade helium balloon. Although unverified, every major news outlet in America quickly covered the incident. The balloon rose to altitudes of 7000 feet and traveled fifty miles before landing. However, after landing, the balloon was found to be empty; Falcon was soon found in the attic of the Heene house. Once featured on the reality television show *Wife Swap* – allegations soon arose that the event was a publicity stunt after Falcon revealed that it was done “to get a show” on CNN.

96 Especially significant here is the *Twenty One* quiz show scandal of 1958 involving the intellectual media darling and professor of English at Columbia University, Charles Van Doren. After a record-winning streak, being featured on the cover of *Time* magazine, and appearing on major news networks it was revealed that the *Twenty One* quiz show was fixed; Van Doren was given the answers before hand by producers Jack Barry and Dan Enright. The scandal and its significance to the American public was the subject of the 1994 film *Quiz Show* directed by Robert Redford. Redford explores effectively the relationship between entertainment, corporate interests, and mass communication in 1950’s America.
appeals, and of its consequences for democracy in America.Indeed, the only real thing a two-and-a-half minute answer given for the camera reveals about the qualifications of being President of the United States is an emphasis on pseudo-qualifications, Boorstin laments. Famously, the first critical debate was decided by ‘image’. When polled, the viewing public believed Kennedy won the day not because he was the better debater, (indeed Nixon stuck close to the points and refuted many of Kennedy’s claims), but because Kennedy looked spry, and energetic addressing the viewing audience whilst Nixon looked pale, tired and unshaven. Ultimately, because of the nature of the television ‘quiz-show’ format, “the television-watching voter was left to judge, not on issues explored by thoughtful men, but on the relative [perceived] capacity of the two candidates to perform under television stress.” This problem is now further complicated as we have no doubt entered a phase in American history where a new form of ‘Presidential branding’ may now become the norm. Barack Obama’s campaign of ‘hope’ was branded with his own logo (fig. 1) and greatly popularized with an iconic ‘silk screen’ image (fig. 2) – no doubt reminiscent of the folk branding of Che Guevara (fig. 3). Boorstin anticipates this broader ‘shift’ in the effects of the pseudo-event on daily life in his characterization of image-thinking.

97 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 41.
98 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 43.
100 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 43.
101 See Naomi Klein, “Naomi Klein on how corporate branding has taken over America,” The Guardian, January 16, 2010, Guardian.co.uk, Culture, Books, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/jan/16/naomi-klein-branding-obama-america. Because of the tactical similarity between the Shepard Fairey ‘Obama-Hope’ print and the Jim Fitzpatrick ‘Heroic Che’ print, how they function in a consumer society should be taken up with greater detail. While there is no room here to follow that trajectory the 2008 documentary Chevolution, directed by Lois Lopez and Trisha Ziff, is an excellent place to start.
THE VALUE OF THE IMAGE

Up to this point, the pseudo-event has been treated as a phenomenon of, and problem with, facts. Boorstin, though, continues to develop the pseudo-event into the world of value we are confronted with “pseudo-ideals”, or what he more effectively calls the Image.\textsuperscript{102} However problematic and idiosyncratic the term may be, the importance of noting the phenomenon of the pseudo-ideal is to unpack the power of the commodifiable ‘image’ and its ability to shape and transform the everyday world –for good and ill. Ultimately, says Boorstin, “the Graphics Revolution has produced new categories of experiences” which go beyond empirical reliance on “common-sense tests of true and false”.\textsuperscript{103} Boorstin explains that the pseudo-ideal is possible when normative guides or markers such as ‘tradition’, ‘reason’, and ultimately ‘God’ no longer serve as the guiding star of a society because a society can easily shape itself with “synthetic, believable, passive, vivid, simplified, and ambiguous” images.\textsuperscript{104} To echo Henry Adams, the most extreme and theologically significant result is that even the power of God is replaced by a commodifiable ‘image’ in American society, says Boorstin; planned to be reported and believed in, experience of God is offered up as pseudo-event, the biggest celebrity of all, who is viewed like a television show –at

\textsuperscript{102} Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 185.
\textsuperscript{103} Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 211.
\textsuperscript{104} Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 185.
And if the proper image can ‘sell’ God, a president, a car, a suit, and perhaps even a lifestyle, Boorstin notes, “why can it not make America herself –or the American Way of Life– a saleable commodity all over the earth?” One major sign of the tyrannical image “is, of course, the rise of advertising” and its influence over American society since the second-industrial revolution.

It should be pointed out, however, that Boorstin is not trying to equate advertising to ‘propaganda’. On the contrary, Boorstin wants to distinguish the ‘pseudo-event’ from propaganda, which he connects (rather naively I might add) solely to totalitarianism and totalitarian societies. Propaganda, he says, is misinformation dependent on emotional appeal used to manipulate and control. Propaganda is outright falsehood while the pseudo-event is the ambiguity of truth. There is “honesty” in the pseudo-event based on the desire for facts and the need to be educated; while propaganda replaces facts with opinion and inflammatory conjecture. In short, while propaganda is a matter of over-simplification, the pseudo-event, says Boorstin, is a matter of over-complication. This point becomes muddled, though, when we consider the practices of corporate and personal branding. While there is no room to adequately examine topic propaganda, it should at least be noted that propaganda, public relations and advertising techniques share a common heritage detailed more closely in Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion (1922) and Edward Bernays’ Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923). As Iain Munro points out in Information Warfare in Business, many contemporary advertising and public relations principles and techniques are

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105 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 183.
106 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 183.
107 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 205.
108 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 34.
specifically based on the work of Edward Bernays in the 1920’s and 1930’s.\textsuperscript{109} Specifically relevant to this conversation is that Bernays—whose most notorious reader was Josef Goebbels—claimed that if human communication was reduced to a mechanical process of simple stimulus and response through the use of stereotypes, images, clichés and ‘brands’ in mass media, then human opinion could be modified on a grand scale. Indeed, Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky famously take this more cynical view in their 1988 text \textit{Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media}. Chapter one of that text, entitled \textit{A Propaganda Model}, begins with this declaration: “The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of a larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role \textit{requires systematic propaganda.”}\textsuperscript{110} This perspective to the situation, with its broad sweeping proclamation of systematized propaganda, goes far beyond the scope of Boorstin’s ‘image’ and would require a belief in quite a sinister conspiracy of activists. The distinguishing aspect for Boorstin, then, is that, rather than a sinister ‘plot’, he finds examples of the pseudo-event in banal cultural practices such as tourism, the cult of celebrity, and publishing. Even more problematic than an organized conspiracy of control is how the pseudo-event finds its way into the very fabric of American values.

Whether we are speaking of a ‘public-image’ or a corporate brand, Boorstin’s characterization of the image is the same: the image is “a value-caricature, shaped in


three dimensions, of synthetic materials." There is a distinction in Western industrial societies—not always clear—between what is presented in the public sphere and what is really happening on the ground. And this is the first point Boorstin makes; the image (like the pseudo-event) is synthetic. The image is also very believable. Hyperbole is made to seem a convincing truth through the strategic use of superlatives balanced with understatement. So, in this Steinway piano ad from 1920 (fig. 5, certainly a product of Bernays’ influence), we see the synthetic image of the piano being associated with the image of timeless piano playing: *The Instrument of the Immortals*. Whereas only 20 years earlier—while the association with past greatness is still made in the copy—the focus is on the piano itself (fig. 4). This shift from “brand-name” to “name-brand” puts the emphasis on the consumable brand rather than the product. “This is quite a natural way to distinguish commodities in the age of the celebrity and the best seller”, argues Boorstin.\footnote{Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 186.}

Because the image is supposed to be “congruent with reality”, it can also be called ‘passive’; the producer of the image—the company, person or institution—merely needs

\footnote{Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 199.}
to fit the projected image rather than strive towards it. “Once the image is there,” says Boorstin, “it commonly becomes the more important reality, of which the corporations conduct [or persons, nations, etc.] seems mere evidence; not vice versa.” There of course is a range of the ‘passive’ that should be considered. While some passive images are easily lived into and sustained, other ‘passive’ images can only work through the use of force and the centralization of power. Such is the example in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. The Passive image is aided when the image is both simplified and ambiguous. It should both be simpler than the object it represents and it should become something to everyone. This fixation on image, however, breeds a climate of what Boorstin calls image-thinking.

Image-thinking is in some ways a more problematic, yet no less prescient, concept. Problematic because in many ways image-thinking is characterized, in contrast, by what it displaces – ‘ideals’. Principally, we might say that ideals are values – rooted in tradition, history or God, and grounded in and informed by the practices of everyday living; and they in turn form our practices. Ideals are those characteristics of everyday living which “we actively strive towards, not what we fit into.” Ideals have a claim on us – we serve them. Image-thinking, however, is a type of consumer thinking about everyday life in which images are consumed to serve whatever purposes we choose.

Ultimately, we have thoroughly underestimated the effects of advertisement on everyday living, says Boorstin. We might be tempted to think that it would be problematic to make too much of image-thinking, but the implications – while not totalizing in a conspiratorial sense – are broad and pervasive. In fact Naomi Klein takes

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113 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 188-189.
114 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 197.
115 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 197.
116 Daniel J. Boorstin, ibid., 205.
up this type of ‘consumer thinking’ in *No Logo* (2000). Klein, however, describes this phenomenon as a type of ‘colonization’ – an interesting characterization that was noted in the introduction and will be taken up in Chapter 3. The problem is further complicated when the more contemporary ‘post-branding’ technique of *lovemarks* is also considered. Invented by Saatchi & Saatchi CEO Kevin Roberts, *lovemarks* is an advertising technique aimed at producing an unreasonable passion and loyalty towards a product. Clearly the situation is rapidly growing out of control. These issues – from Mumford’s concern with the built environment to Boorstin’s concern with the architecture of the human imagination – are taken up in yet another way by Italian scholar Umberto Eco who introduces a new term for us to consider: Hyperreality.

**Umberto Eco Travels in Hyperreality**

In 1975, Italian polymath Umberto Eco published an essay translated as *Faith in Fakes* (*Il costume di casa* 1973, *Dalla periferia dell’impero* 1977, *Sette anni di desiderio* 1983) which is, as he describes it, “a journey into hyperreality, in search of instances where the American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate the absolute fake”. The essay is part of a larger collection of essays published in the U.S. as *Travels in Hyperreality* (1986). While the collection is insightful, only the initial essay will be used to further the explanation of the phenomenon. Eco goes far beyond Boorstin in development, thinking and observation concerning the ‘copy’ / ‘reproduction’ – which is ersatz, fake, illusory, or even hyperreal. In the erudite spirit of Alexis de Tocqueville and with the ironic and buffoonish innocence of National Lampoon’s Clarke W. Griswold, Eco journeys

through the American landscape and uncovers a unique phenomenon—not unlike what Lewis Mumford and Daniel Boorstin have attempted to articulate before him—an **American obsession with simulacra and counterfeit realities**. The essay, originally written as a series of articles, has the feel of a travelogue. New insights and realizations can be traced along the landscape; the destination cannot be guessed from the point of departure. The essay is not intended to be academic but spontaneous, “personal”, “emotional” and “political”—that is the way it will be approached.120

Eco’s essay begins with a visit to an exhibit of holographs in New York City. Some banal and others erotic, these virtual representations prompt Eco to comment. “Holography could prosper only in America, a country obsessed with realism, where, if a reconstruction is to be credible it must be absolutely iconic, a perfect likeness, a ‘real’ copy of the reality being represented.”121 What is it about the American lifeworld that nourishes Eco’s contemplation about ‘the real’, copies, and representation? Eco cannot resist offering a brief semiological explanation—which incidentally echoes concerns Mumford has voiced about the American lifeworld—to help make sense of this confusing phenomenon. “To speak of things that one wants to connote as real, these things must seem real. The ‘completely real’ becomes identified with the ‘completely fake’. Absolute unreality is offered as real presence. The aim . . . is to supply a ‘sign’ that will then be forgotten as such: *The sign aims to be the thing, to abolish the distinction of the reference, the mechanism of replacement.*”122 As mentioned before, this bears a striking similarity to Mumford’s concerns about the larger phenomenon of ‘signs’ being divorced from their ‘referent’ that often occurs when planners create maps and plans on paper with no knowledge of the actual life practices and terrain of the

120 Umberto Eco, ibid., ix-xii.
121 Umberto Eco, ibid., 4.
122 Umberto Eco, ibid., 7. (emphasis mine)
Like Mumford, Eco is a historian with an attention to complexity and particularity. He is far from dramatic and sweeping in his semiological pronouncements (unlike those of Baudrillard), however, there is here certainly an active, pervasive and very real phenomenon of American forms of life that must be sussed out. “There is, then, an America of furious hyperreality,” claims Eco, “which is not that of pop art, of Mickey Mouse, or of Hollywood movies. There is another, more secret America (or rather, just as public, but snubbed by the European visitor and also by the American intellectual [of the 1970’s]); and it creates somehow a network of references and influences that finally spread also to the products of high culture and the entertainment industry.”

It is this ‘secret America’ that Eco continues to explore, but it is the nascent ‘network of reference and influences’ that haunts Eco’s tempered investigation and which we will keep in mind in the following chapter. Continuing, Eco says the hyperreality phenomenon can be identified by two slogans of American advertising: Coca-Cola’s “the real thing”, and the everyday use of the term “more” – in the sense of ‘extra’ or ‘an-other’. Eco’s journey in search of hyperreality is a search, he says, “of instances where the American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate the absolute fake . . . and falsehood is enjoyed in a situation of ‘fullness’, of horror vacui.”

MUSEUMS AND DUPLICATION

Eco pursues these questions through an investigation of what can only be described as an American museographical obsession. He progressively explores a vast array of kitsch museums such as the LBJ Presidential Library, the Museum of the

123 Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities*, 375-381.
124 Umberto Eco, ibid., 7. (emphasis mine)
125 Umberto Eco, ibid., 8.
126 Umberto Eco, ibid., 5.
City of New York, Old Beth Page Village, a variety of Wax Museums, houses (Xanadu) and inns (The Madonna Inn) that function as kitsch museums, ‘real’ museums (J. Paul Getty Museum), and finally imitation cities and spaces like Disney (land and world) and Marineland. He continually describes this American obsession—or at least makes an anological parallel—to the European Wunderkammer or ‘cabinets of curiosity’. America’s Wunderkammer sensibility suggests, “there is a constant in the average American imagination and taste, for which the past must be preserved and celebrated in full-scale authentic copy; a philosophy of immortality as duplication.”

Eco is suspicious of a connection between American economic interests, the American obsession for simulacral reproduction and its roots in the Old World. There is then to be noted a link between the “ravenous consumption of the present”, says Eco, and “the ‘past-tizing’ process . . . in its alternate process of futuristic planning and nostalgic remorse.”

Ultimately, questions similar to those raised by Marie Antoinette’s Petit Hameau begin to emerge when Eco turns his attention to more complex sites such as Old Bethpage Village.

A fully working reconstructed mid-nineteenth century Long Island, New York village, Old Bethpage Village has echoes of Petit Hameau filtered through the kitsch museums of America. According to the official website:

The “209-acre village includes an assortment of homes, farms and businesses . . . Buildings are selected based on their architectural detail and historic significance. The goal is to establish a representative sampling of historic structures . . . After buildings were moved to the village, they were carefully restored to a specific point in their history, and the lives of the former occupants thoroughly researched. Each structure has been scrutinized for clues to its role in community life, and

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127 Umberto Eco, ibid., 6.
128 Umberto Eco, ibid., 9-10.
authentic hardware, shingles and glass sought—with the help of wills, deeds, and inventory lists—so the structures could be authentically furnished (in some cases with pieces original to the building).  

According to another website, the village recreates its historical atmosphere by “illustrating agricultural, domestic and commercial activities through the actual practice of crafts and skills . . . costumed interpreters . . . [who] portray farmers, teachers, storekeepers, blacksmiths, civic leaders, and the others who made up a community of the mid-1800’s.” Again, while sympathetic to the aims of this working museum, Eco—who is more concerned with the anecdotal potential of the village—adds another level of intrigue to the investigation: to claim that the village is reconstructed “as it was” is genetically impossible. The variety of sheep they would have had in those days, he points out rather loosely [in 1975], had black noses and no wool and were genetically bred out. Although eco-archeologists have attempted to revive the breed the National Breeders Association has met them with resistance. Eco asks, “who are the real falsifiers of nature?” So, with Old Bethpage Village we are confronted with many familiar issues which arose with an investigation of Petit Hameau: questions about authenticity, closeness, and exactness of copies, simulations and representations. However, rather than being reserved for a ‘noble’ few, Old Bethpage Village is a democratized simulation, created—not for a Rousseauian escape from the cities of men—but for mass consumption and entertainment.

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131 Umberto Eco, ibid., 11-12.
Up to this point it seems that what is of value is an authenticity of information over the authenticity of the thing itself; an authenticity of the visual over an authenticity of the historical. Like Mumford and Boorstin, however, Eco continues to resist a totalizing picture of the hyperreality phenomenon. What we are left with then is a complex picture of ‘competing’ cultural phenomena in America. There is certainly what can only be described as a hyperreality, or hyperrealities, in the American landscape. Eco’s hyperreality is an American obsession with substitutes for the real – more real than real– built on excess and fullness, consumption and nostalgia. But Eco also identifies a complex system of ‘resistance’ to hyperreality built upon notions of ‘real cities’ and ‘living architecture’ and a strong (philological) sense of history and depth to the world around us. Eco further complicates the matter with his visit to the J. Paul Getty Museum in Malibu, California.

The Seeds of Semiological Confusion

The Getty Museum obeys the ‘rules’ of modern notions of art museum, says Eco –of which Wright’s Guggenheim Museum is the model. An aseptic exterior is filled with authentic works of art. It is a wonder then that Eco balks at the “drearily authentic pictures”. The bewildered curator of the Getty Museum is in a quandary: how do you authentically display the past in a hyperreal setting like the surrounding Los Angeles? Can it ever be divorced from its proper lifeworld, and associated life practices, and be understood in the same way? “It’s easy to give a neutral setting to visitors who can breath in the Past a few steps away,” Eco protests, “who reach the neutral setting after having walked with emotion, among venerable stone. But in California, between the Pacific on one hand and Los Angeles on the other, with

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132 Umberto Eco, ibid., 15-16.
133 Umberto Eco, ibid., 32.
134 Umberto Eco, ibid., 31.
restaurants shaped like hats and hamburgers, and four-level freeways with ten thousand ramps, what do you do?” It is actually the parts of the museum the curator is most embarrassed about which piques Eco’s interest. An imaginatively yet carefully reconstructed Villa of the Papyruses of Herculaneum. Not necessarily better than the ‘real thing’ but certainly “more” than the original, to use Eco’s loaded word, since the original Villa is still buried near Vesuvius. Eco is taken aback by the Getty Museum’s attempts to “reconstruct a credible and ‘objective’ past.” And herein lies the rub for Eco. An investigation that began in “irony” and “repulsion”, as he describes it, now raises significant questions about “The Real”, the authentic and what it means to say “The Fake” in the activities and practices of human living. If a museum were to cast a statue from a 5th-century B.C. Greek original – what is “Fake” about it and how is it any different than a Roman copy of a 5th-century B.C. Greek original? What if we found the original ‘mould’ and cast in it? Or a more contemporary example may suffice. Marcel Duchamp’s original readymade artwork Bicycle Wheel only existed as a photograph since the original 1913 work was lost. Duchamp reconstructed it in 1951. Does this ‘perfect’ reconstruction abate the fetishistic desire for the original? If so, the copy ceases to be “The Fake” and becomes the original, says Eco. Daniel Boorstin has already made much of this concern in his pseudo-event but Eco brings new insight to the problem and reveals the problem to be much broader than the pseudo-event had anticipated.  

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135 Umberto Eco, ibid., 33.  
136 Umberto Eco, ibid., 34.  
137 Umberto Eco, ibid., 36.  
138 This question takes an interesting turn in cinema. During the production of Terrence Malick’s The Tree of Life I spent some time working in the props department. One day I was asked to prepare a jug of water for a scene which involved some yard workers. Not only was the jug ‘period’ – as they call it – but the ice trays were as well. Ice cubes cast as they were back in 1956 for a scene to recreate the lifeworld of 1956.  
139 Umberto Eco, ibid., 39.
As is evident with the Roman copies of Greek originals, questions about the authentic, ‘the Real’, and what it is to be a ‘fake’ are not solely a post-industrial phenomenon. Eco, however, sees something new (and sinister?) in the American pursuit and uses of imitation – “Amusement cities”. Eco initially notes that a city like Las Vegas is indeed an “amusement city” but because it is not an “absolute fake” – it is a “real” city with residents, industry and commerce – he shifts his gaze. Strange occurrences like “ghost towns” (both those ‘archeologically’ real and those invented) which thrive in accordance with the Western myth; themed villages and so called “wild territories”; places like Disneyland and the mega Disneyworld (larger than the island of Manhattan) – “the quintessence of consumer ideology” and the Sistine Chapel of hyperreal America – take simulation into a new category of problems only possible in a world where industrialism and capitalism (and now post-industrialism) have a firm hold on the everyday comportments of human living. “The pleasure of imitation, as the ancients knew, is one of the most innate in the human spirit,” says Eco, “but here we not only enjoy a perfect imitation, we also enjoy the conviction that imitation has reached its apex and afterwards reality will always be inferior to it.”

Eco describes Disneyland as “the city that imitates a city”; what is radical about some place like that is not simply its production of the illusion but its stimulation of the desire for the illusion – a phenomenon which spreads pandemically like a virus through channels of entertainment and mass consumption. And what is to be made of the more ‘natural’

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140 Umberto Eco, ibid., 40.
141 Umberto Eco, ibid., 40. Thirty years later, this phenomenon is even more radically problematic than the idea of a dedicated “Amusement city” and will be addressed further in the following Baudrillard chapter.
142 Umberto Eco, ibid., 43, 48.
143 Umberto Eco, ibid., 46.
Marineland type animal parks where children and adults alike go to see whales, dolphins and seals ‘perform’? Unlike the wax museums where “all is sign but aspires to seem reality”, ponders Eco, “in the Marinlands all is reality but aspires to appear sign.” What is this curious relationship between the industry of entertainment and American living? Is it really as isolated and confined to ‘entertainment use’ as Eco would hope? Although written in the early 1970’s –what seems like a life age away– his writing even at the time makes a case for the pervasive problem of an illusory ethic evident in the Petit Hameau. Thirty years on, how deep does this problem run?

**The ‘Folly’ of the Ersatz Cities: What is at Stake?**

One purpose of this chapter has been to provide a clearing –as meager as it may be– in the hopes of illuminating a central challenge to all those who fall under the ever globalizing umbrella of 21st-century Western techno-capitalism and its ersatz cities. As is clear from Mumford, Boorstin, and Eco, political economy of this type goes far beyond gadgets, entertainment and bling: it trades in practices, values and forms of life –the very structure of reality itself– and in the self-serving hopes (and it at least partly succeeds) of modifying the world in its own image. We have also seen the fundamental role mass media and communications have had in colonizing the imaginations and life-forms of people and creating a mass consumable and profitable ersatz city. The ersatz city carries these devaluing possibilities in two directions: on the one hand there is simple self-deception, and on the other there is domination, along with the devaluing of life in service of power. These possibilities exist in both totalitarian and democratic-capitalist societies. As Lewis Mumford has identified (and later supported by Boorstin and Eco), there is a certain emphasis on the reordering of life space and life-forms to

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144 Umberto Eco, ibid., 52.
support the emerging needs of capitalism, consumer addiction, and the desire to possess the unique, the rare, or the lost. In the hopes of better articulating this historically situated phenomenon we will now turn to a radical thinker and divisive figure – Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007). While problematic and extreme in a certain French style, Baudrillard is insightful and revealing in his extremity. Baudrillard sees the problem like no one else and has his finger on a particular form of corruption – the corruption of authentic and poetic life practices, and the human relationship to anything beyond the ‘material’ – a relationship to the ineffable and the symbolic.
Chapter 2

DISNEYFYICATION
AND THE PROBLEM OF
JEAN BAUDRILLARD’S HYPERREALITY

"Somebody was trying to tell me that CDs are better than vinyl because they don't have any surface noise. I said, 'Listen, mate, life has surface noise.'"

ATTRIBUTED TO JOHN PEEL

An engagement with the work of Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) affords the opportunity to ask a question which ties the problems raised by Marie Antoinette’s Petit Hameau back to Lewis Mumford’s concerns about human technics and his conclusions in The City in History, Daniel Boorstin’s unreal ‘pseudo-event’ in The Image, and Umberto Eco’s vertigo-like Travels in Hyperreality: what effects do a pervasive political economy of mechanical reproduction,\textsuperscript{145} the rapid growth of the media industry over the past 50 years, and the emerging medium of virtuality have on the complex dynamics of organizing and ordering human living raised by Mumford and further complicated by Marie Antoinette’s ‘ersatz village’? Baudrillard’s project and genre is radically different to what was encountered in chapter one, however. While Mumford, Boorstin, and Eco are all grounded in a historical, and activity-based analysis of the problem at hand, Baudrillard is quick to move, to generalize, and is far more dramatic in his pronouncements. Although he begins with traditional Marxian and Neo-Marxian critiques, Baudrillard’s work becomes increasingly wild and speculative. However, now that the questions have been asked in chapter one, Baudrillard’s

\textsuperscript{145} Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory (London: Continuum, 2004), 59, 65-66. Hegarty notes that Baudrillard takes Benjamin’s premise that an age of mechanical reproduction fundamentally “changes the nature of a work of art” but is highly suspicious of Benjamin’s conclusions that mechanical reproduction would offer “a new site of cultural struggle . . . the masses would know and then change reality”. Rather, Baudrillard applies Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media – specifically the concept that the “medium is the message”– to his own developing analysis.
rhetorical tactics both raise what is at stake and in some ways make them better known. To begin, we can say that a political economy of mechanical reproduction makes it possible to reproduce the *Petit Hameau* experience on a scale previously unimaginable to pre-industrial and pre-capitalist societies. Rather than such an experience being reserved for the *dauphine* and her entourage, now a massive percentage of the Western world can regularly ‘escape’ into a complex and functional, albeit spurious, and sometimes and in some ways devalued and harmful world, ordered on the principles of money and profit for the purpose of consumption (during work and leisure).

Similar to Eco’s critiques of amusement cities like Disneyworld, Baudrillard recognizes the unique opportunity Disney theme parks afford in the West to have such a *Petit Hameau* experience. The social microcosm of the Los Angeles Disneyland, says Baudrillard, “is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of simulacra.” What exactly does Baudrillard mean by the “perfect model” and “all the entangled orders of simulacra”? Without answering these questions immediately, we must first observe that Baudrillard makes a sleight of hand that can only be attempted in a synthetic age of mechanical reproduction; it is a move we must address in order to understand what he means by the *perfect* model and his generalization about the orders of simulacra: Disney, he asserts, is a space which only obfuscates the fact that the greater Los Angeles urban area is actually the *Petit Hameau* space. Los Angeles, he says, is continually reassured of its ‘reality’—or as he says, continuously feeds ‘reality’ as from a power station and receives a recycled imaginary as from a waste treatment plant—by Disneyland’s commodified and branded version of a childish and imaginative space. In other words, Los Angeles seems ‘real’ by contrast with the imaginary Disneyland. “Disneyland is presented as imaginary”, says Baudrillard, “to make us believe that the

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rest is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and the America that surrounds it are no longer real, but belong to the *hyperreal* order and to the order of *simulation.*" What is ‘hyperreal’ and what is ‘simulation’ must still be unpacked, but suffice it to say, a strange symbiosis occurs in Baudrillard’s formulation. Los Angeles is not necessarily ‘hyperreal’ because of Disneyland (whatever Baudrillard means by this must still be deciphered) but feeds and relies on Disney for its sense of ‘the real’. There is, then, an uncanny effect of *Disneyfication* which occurs in Los Angeles and across the greater United States; Disneyfication is a slow and sporadic metamorphosis of the urban landscape—driven by a culture and national identity engulfed in consumerism—which uses the ‘unreal’ consumer aesthetic and ethic (ways of life and values) of “amusement cities” such as Disney as part of its order (or to draw on an earlier image—it’s warp). Baudrillard’s move is dramatic and controversial but nonetheless identifies an emerging late 20th-century Western pattern of rampant simulacra (certainly sensed by Mumford, Boorstin and Eco) in a technologically driven consumer society, making his work a necessary point of reference and a fascinating conversation partner in any further discussion on the topic.

**BAUDRILLARD: SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE CONTRA SEMIOTIC**

Baudrillard’s thoughts on simulacra, simulation and hyperreality cannot be adequately addressed without first understanding his thoughts on the semiotic order and its opposition to what he calls ‘symbolic exchange.’ Media theorist William Merrin notes in his application of Baudrillard’s work to media theory —*Baudrillard and the Media*— that “readings which focus on [Baudrillard’s] description of the contemporary world often overlook or underplay his opposition to it and fail to seriously consider his

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147 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 12. (emphasis mine)
critical concept of the symbolic which serves as the basis of this opposition.”

Merrin’s insight into Baudrillard is not novel however, and is supported by the work of other Baudrillard scholars such as Mike Gane, Gary Genosko, Charles Levin and Paul Hegarty. If Baudrillard’s entire project relies on his essential and specialized use of these terms—the symbolic and the semiotic—then they must be unpacked before moving on.

Gary Genosko reminds us that “the symbolic has taken numerous forms over the course of Baudrillard’s theorizing”, and therefore this chapter will only be concerned with the development of the idea of the ‘symbolic’ during Baudrillard’s highly experimental yet productive first decade of theoretical development, beginning with his work with Henri Lefebvre on the journal *Utopie* and its end roughly demarcated by *La Précession des simulacres* in 1978. The origin of Baudrillard’s ‘symbolic’ is heavily indebted to Marcel Mauss’s ethnographic work on the ‘potlatch exchange’ in *The Gift* and George Bataille’s unique reworking of Mauss’s gift exchange as a universalized ‘general economy’ in *The Accursed Share*. Bataille’s ‘solar’ principle of expenditure says that human beings—like the sun—want to give in excess without return. The economy of capitalism was an artificial ‘order’ that is imposed and learned, thus ‘colonizing’ (my term here) and suppressing our primordial

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149 It is important to note that Baudrillard’s sense of ‘symbolic’ and ‘semiotic’ are heavily intertwined and any parsing, as with any complex work, is an artifice with the emerging danger of sounding tautological.


151 *La Précession des simulacres* was published again in 1981 as the first chapter of *Simulacres et simulation*. By 1981 it seems Baudrillard became confined by the limits presented by his thoughts on ‘hyperreality’ and from there begins to advance his material from the previous decade in a more highly aphoristic style which proves to be unnecessary for our purposes.
tendencies. Following Bataille, Baudrillard ignores rigorous ethnographic work in his broad formulation of the ‘symbolic’, in favor of a unique distillation of the term for use in a rhetorical genre. Douglas Kellner notes, “Bataille and Baudrillard presuppose here a contradiction between human nature and capitalism. … [they] are presenting a version of Nietzsche’s ‘aristocratic,’ ‘master morality,’ in which value articulates an excess, an overflow and an intensification of life energies.” At its most general, Baudrillard’s ‘symbolic’ is an operational nexus of primitive (pre-capitalist) exchange based on “an incessant cycle of giving and receiving at odds with accumulation, scarcity, production, necessity, surplus and even survival”; it functions as a radical alternate ‘weaving’ of everyday life, in support of his larger critique of the current ordering of human life in the post-industrial West. The rhetorical power of Baudrillard’s alternative symbolic economy (literally oiko-nomos: to manage or order the house) is that it stands outside of the present ‘economy of economics’. “Symbolic exchange’ thus emerges as Baudrillard’s ‘revolutionary’ alternative to the values and practices of capitalist society”. There are problems, however, with Baudrillard’s broad-brush approach.

Anthropologist Robert Hefner points out that Baudrillard’s “ethnographically fantastic” analysis runs roughshod over anthropological data and his “romanticized symbolic” offers little help to people living in the present world. While this critique is important to bear in mind, and is certainly valid, Baudrillard’s ‘symbolic’ should not be mistaken for a naïve and nostalgic primitivism or cavalier anthropology. We must

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153 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 42, 43.
154 Gary Genosko, ibid., xv.
155 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 44.
remember that Jean Baudrillard is not an anthropologist but a critical theorist, trained in sociology, working within the context of European Post-Structuralism, and his notion of ‘the symbolic’ is intended to function in a radically different manner than Mauss’s study on the potlach. Baudrillard’s symbolic is, as Gary Genosko refers to it, an ‘anti-semiological’ ‘asignifying imaginary’ which is constructed, not as a nostalgia for primitivism but, as an organ of effraction (literally to break open), meant to oppose the current ‘economy of economics’ and semiological order.\(^{157}\) What then is the ‘semiotic’, which Baudrillard offers the symbolic against, and what does it have to do with economy?

Baudrillard’s definition and use of the ‘semiotic’ is just as cryptic in his writings as the before-mentioned ‘symbolic’. The semiotic is a ‘house of order’ (economy) – an “institution of total signification” that swallows up everything, in a sense, dependent on the mediating term, ‘the real’.\(^ {158}\) The mode of representation – the sign – and the interaction between multiple signs is taken to be ‘reality’ rather than the referents to which they point.\(^ {159}\) Here of course is the fatal flaw in Baudrillard’s work which will be taken up later in the chapter and in chapter 3: his dependence on a correlative understanding of truth and ‘reality’ to make his point of resistance – literally sawing off the branch on which he sits. This encompassing semiological order, nonetheless, is targeted for effraction by Baudrillard’s symbolic and the alternative values of symbolic exchange. The ‘real’ in Baudrillard’s system is “only the simulacrum of the symbolic” and “reality as referent” is a “controlled re-creation of the

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\(^{157}\) To Baudrillard, the potlatch is a form of symbolic social organization at odds with the semiotic ordering of our modern economy. Their incongruity is never more evident than in the example of the outlawing of potlatch by the Canadian government in 1884. “What bothered the officials was the impression of economic waste. The Indian Reserve Commissioner Sproat reported that ‘it is not possible that Indians can acquire property, or become industrious with any good result, while under the influence of this mania.’” Charles Levin, Jean Baudrillard: A Study in Cultural Metaphysics, (Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall, 1996), 279.

\(^{158}\) Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory, 37, 49-67.

\(^{159}\) Douglas Kellner, ibid., 63.
Far more broad and pervasive than the linguistic and epistemological semiotic systems laid out by Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (although certainly dependent upon them), Baudrillard’s semiotic is fed from two sources: a particular understanding of the historical trajectory of theories about simulacra beginning with Plato’s critique of simulacrum qua images in *The Republic* part V book X;\(^{161}\) and a particular reading of the transformation of Western economics since the Renaissance – specifically, with a focus on the radical effects of the first and second industrial revolutions and the advent of electronic media.

Historically speaking, the human relationship to the semiotic is exacerbated by the second industrial revolution and the advent of mass communication. In *The Evil Demon of Images* (1987), Baudrillard launches into a radical critique of “the *perversity* of the relation between” cinema, media images and technological images and “its referent, the *supposed* real”.\(^{162}\) What must be doubted in a hyperreal world, Baudrillard continues, “is the *reference principle* of images . . . this strategy by means of which they always appear to refer to a real world, to real objects, and to reproduce something which is logically and chronologically anterior to themselves.”\(^{163}\) At its heart, *The Evil Demon of Images* is fundamentally a critique of realism as correlation, and judged by a “conformity to reality” with a naïve *trompe l’oeil* hermeneutic – propagated in the American (and later broader Western) landscape, says Baudrillard with an ear towards


161 One problem, in particular, that will be undermined and replaced in Chapter 3 is Baudrillard’s deployment and dependence on the conception of the simulacral ‘image-picture’ for his larger project. Baudrillard’s *The Evil Demon of Images* – perhaps the only one of later Baudrillard works that I will cite in my investigation – proves to be a useful dialogue partner because it is a rare focused meditation on a particular topic, Simulacra qua ‘Images’. With the term ‘evil demon’ Baudrillard makes an implicit (if not explicit) reference to Plato’s *The Republic* part V book X.


163 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 13. (emphasis mine)
Boorstin, by “photographic, cinematic and television images”.\textsuperscript{164} Once again, Baudrillard is heavily dependent on the Platonic conception of simulacra in his critique. “The art of representation, then,” says Plato, “is a long way from reality. … [T]his maker of images, knows nothing of reality, but only the appearance.”\textsuperscript{165} Their conformity –launching into an ethical critique of this historically new breed of ‘images’– is “diabolical”.\textsuperscript{166} However, something is suspicious and even awry in Baudrillard’s evaluative critique.

Here Baudrillard goes beyond Eco’s hyperreal “amusement cities” and speaks of the diabolical simulacral nature of hyperreal events such as the eerie similarities between the hypothetical movie \textit{The China Syndrome} released just twelve days before the \textit{actual} Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the U. S. state of Pennsylvania. In this case the movie event informed the reading of the actual historical event. What we have here is a strange metamorphosis of Boorstin’s pseudo-event. Baudrillard senses something far more pervasive than simply ‘fabricated events’; the film version of a near nuclear meltdown has an effect on the way in which we \textit{consume} the ‘media spectacle’ of the ‘actual’ near nuclear meltdown –both are simulacra. At this point, more is required to make sense of this phenomenon.

Baudrillard’s response to the Western obsession with ‘image’, as representational fidelity, is an unconventional \textit{Manichean} understanding of simulacra. Crudely, what he means by invoking Manichean belief is a pre-Cartesian, ‘irrational’, quasi-dualist understanding of simulacra: “What the heretics posited”, says Baudrillard speaking of the heretical movement which had a foothold in North Africa during the second, third and fourth centuries A. D., “was that the very creation of the world, hence

\textsuperscript{164} Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 13-14.
\textsuperscript{165} Francis MacDonald Cornford, trans. \textit{The Republic of Plato} (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 328, 331.
\textsuperscript{166} Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 14.
the reality of the world, was the result of the existence of the evil demon. . . . the reality of the world is a total illusion”.167 This statement would appear to be self referentially incoherent since ‘illusion’ is dependent on the fact that there is something ‘real’ in which to deceive or mislead. However, Baudrillard’s rejection of belief in the “objectivity of the world” in favor of the conception of illusion is predicated, not on an “irreality or non-reality”, but as “a mise en jeu of the real.”168 “The principle fundamentally and from the very beginning”, claims Baudrillard, “is that there is no objectivity to the world”, only a bringing into play of ‘the real’ –as mise en jeu would suggest.169 The function of art, in his Manichean interpretation, is to “posit the power of illusion against [a perceived or the idea of] reality.”170 In symbolic economies, art has a social occult function: art is a form of magic. The power of representation to correlate to ‘real things’ must be in doubt –thus the hope of achieving fidelity is a ‘demonic’ endeavor, to Baudrillard, which actually obfuscates rather than illuminates. This ‘illusory’ understanding / function / use of simulacra is, however, lost through the course of history and is usurped by a semiological relationship to the world in which ideas of the ‘real’ and of ‘representation’ are made central.171 What is at stake for

167 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 43-44. (emphasis mine)
168 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 44-45.
169 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 45.
170 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 53. It should be noted that ‘illusion’ is not used here in a negative sense.
171 Precisely when this epochal shift occurs is unclear in Baudrillard’s writing. There are two separate genealogies of simulation—one centered on the economy of the economic and the other related to thinking about, and pictures of, imaging and representation—which will be discussed later in this chapter. One must wonder though, if Baudrillard is attempting to reference St. Augustine with his invocation of the Manichees, and in some way the complicity of the Western Christian onto-theological tradition in the rise of the ‘semiotic’? It is after all Augustine, a former Manichee himself, who, in De Dialectica, De Magistro, De Doctrina Christiana, and De Trinitate, rejects the dualism of the Persian teaching, and lays the foundation for medieval semiotics (taken up by Roger Bacon). Ultimately, a critique of Augustine’s verbum mentis is far too large a project to adequately address within the confines of this study.

While Baudrillard’s conception of “a mise en jeu of the real” and concatenation of signs are offered as a compelling alternative to the Augustinian foundations of semiotics in the West, they miss the mark. Baudrillard’s ‘anti-Platonic’ and ‘anti-realist’ picture is completely void of the engagement of language and thought in Lebenswelt. I will forward a conception of language heavily reliant on
Baudrillard will be discussed with greater detail in the next section. As Mike Gane points out, Baudrillard confounds the reader with his use of specialized and theoretical terms and vocabulary, thus always keeping meaning at bay.\textsuperscript{172} What is certain is that the usurpation of the ‘symbolic’, in favor of the ‘semiotic’, has had disastrous consequences on human living because it separates us from our primordial relationship with the everyday practices, objects, and world – it is simply ‘unnatural’.\textsuperscript{173} It is for this last reason that, while I will be highly critical of Baudrillard’s characterizations and method, my exploration is ultimately sympathetic to his concerns.

The effect of the domestication of the sign in semiology, argues Baudrillard, is a ‘dis-enchanting’ materialist notion of ‘the real’ – reality.\textsuperscript{174} Baudrillard only offers two anemic genealogies of the ‘semiotic’ (which will be discussed later in this chapter) in attempting to trace the epochal shift from the ‘symbolic’ to ‘semiotic’. What emerges from these genealogies is an interrelated picture of a developing Western ‘economy’ of consumption and communication. This economy is driven by consumption and the advent of mechanized communication techniques, “conceived [and produced] according to their reproducibility” says Baudrillard, in a new age of mechanical reproduction. These practices and techniques, ordered by semiological calcification, become ‘coded’ in late modernity – what Baudrillard calls the age of simulation; now, however, we are ahead of ourselves and must first track Baudrillard’s sketches of the development of the conceptions of ‘simulation’ and ‘hyperreality’ with greater detail, before we move on to a critique.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein’s \textit{Philosophical Investigations} and J. R. R. Tolkien’s linguistic driven mythopoeia – both of which critique Augustine’s \textit{verbis mentis} in their own right – as an alternate ‘response to hyperreality’ – one ultimately rooted in the Christian tradition but highly critical of this particular vein of thought.

\textsuperscript{172} Mike Gane, \textit{Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty} (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 10.

\textsuperscript{173} Douglas Kellner, \textit{Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond}, 41-43.

\textsuperscript{174} Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 47.}
EARLY BAUDRILLARD: ‘UTOPIE’

Baudrillard’s gradual development of the conception of the symbolic, and of its subsequent destruction in the semiotic, can be traced through his earliest work with the journal *Utopie* (1967-1978), founded by Henri Lefebvre and a group of radical left architects and social critics in 1966, and echoed throughout his earliest works: his first monograph *The System of Objects* (1968) and its follow-up *The Consumer Society* (1970); his departure from Marxian theory in *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (1972) and *The Mirror of Production* (1973); and still later in *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (1976). As with any chronology, Baudrillard’s involvement with the journal *Utopie* is not so easily demarcated. *Utopie* represents almost two decades (from 1962/63 to 1978) of influence and struggle with the sociology, anthropology, philosophy, economics and political commentary of neo-Marxist Henri Lefebvre. In a 1997 interview Baudrillard recalls his acquaintance with Lefebvre as a relationship which “nourished” his sociological thoughts; but at the same time

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175 Merrin points out that in much of his later work Baudrillard “increasingly discovers the exiled symbolic surviving in the ‘radical otherness’ of non-western cultures, from the Aborigninal Australians to Islamic culture, and his critique of the west’s historical attempt to incorporate these cultures into its own semiotic system through ‘a discourse of difference’ sees the electronic media as contributing towards this global homogenization and control.” William Merrin, *Baudrillard and the Media*, 57; Jean Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, trans. James Benedict, London: Verso, 1993 111-174. The relationship between the symbolic and the semiotic will become more apparent in the following pages but one must ask proleptically, what role does neo-liberal economics and emerging globalization proliferated by organizing bodies such as the World Trade Organization play in –what Baudrillard might call– the semiotic colonization of the non-western world? If the world is indeed becoming ‘flat’, then is it possible to escape the ‘code’ of Disneyfication? A better question might be, is it possible for a lifeworld to embrace the technology of mass communication but still be organized by other ‘non-western’ principles, as is the case with Japan? (see also Baudrillard, *The Transparency of Evil* and Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*) These questions are directly addressed later in this chapter and they will be unpacked further at various points in the dissertation.

176 Baudrillard’s fourth book *The Mirror of Production* (1973) will not be included in this treatment, as the text involves Baudrillard’s critique of classical Marxism, which goes beyond the scope of this chapter. While many of the concepts in *Mirror* will be referenced in one form or another, I seek primarily to track Baudrillard’s idea of Hyperreality and art in an age of ‘mechanical reproduction’. Also, Baudrillard’s *Seduction* (1979) will only be addressed in terms of its relevance as a transitional period in the development of the fourth order of simulacra and possible modes of resistance.
Baudrillard desired to articulate his own critiques of urbanism and everyday life, which went against much of Lefebvre’s work.\(^{177}\) Lefebvre was a complicated figure whose work was focused on combining the political, economic and philosophical thought with studies of everyday life. He was deeply concerned with the predilection in modern consumer society to abstract “commodities from any real human context . . . needs and desires were increasingly subject to manipulation by outside forces.”\(^{178}\) One aim of his “‘critique’ of everyday life was to restore an authentic relationship between people and objects, to make objects more responsive to actual needs.”\(^{179}\) Like most French intellectuals, Lefebvre’s work shifted focus after the failure of the May ’68 protests. Between 1968 and 1974 Lefebvre’s work was focused on “the significance of urban conditions of daily life (as opposed to narrow concentration on work-place politics) as central in the evolution of revolutionary sentiments and politics.”\(^{180}\)

Baudrillard too was radically disillusioned after May ’68 and he sought a language to make sense of its failures. Later in the ’97 interview Baudrillard contrarily admits that “in the end, Lefebvre was never really a reference for me, nor a model”\(^{181}\). Baudrillard simply could not adhere to what he describes as Lefebvre’s set rhetoric, naïve positions and “phobic” disdain for psychoanalysis and semiology. It would be more ‘radical’ thinkers like Marcuse, Foucault and Barthes who helped Baudrillard make sense of the failures of the 1968 social upheaval. Baudrillard recalls his Utopie days as, “an experimental period . . . [wherein] we tried a bit of everything at the


\(^{179}\) Rex Butler, ibid., 26.


\(^{181}\) Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 29.
moment.”

We get a sense of this crosspollination in William Merrin’s description of Baudrillard’s earliest ideas on the emergence of the sign and simulation which, he says, stems from a concern with “the Marxist critique of consumer society as representing not an increase in individual freedom but the penetration of control, constraint and alienation throughout everyday life, and to structural and technical analyses of the operation of this society and its production of the individual.” Some of Baudrillard’s more significant essays, such as “Requiem for the Media” (Oct. 1971), “The Mirror of Production” (May 1972), “Marxism and the System of Political Economy” (Feb. 1973), “Stereo Porn” (Mar./April 1976) and others all found their way into many of his texts. “My first books,” notes Baudrillard, “[The System of Objects and The Consumer Society] . . . were the hybrid and intertwined results of all these contributions. . . . [A]t once a bit serious and traditional, with an experimental tone at the same time.”

Baudrillard’s dissertation and first book The System of Objects (1968) highlights the birth of the ‘semiotic’ in western societies and the rupturing of the ‘symbolic’ in the midst of consumer relationships to objects, goods, and services. With Lefebvre, and others at that time, Baudrillard “claimed that the contemporary stage of capitalism is distinguished from earlier socioeconomic formations precisely by the increased importance of commodity culture within both production and social reproduction –the ways in which society reproduces itself in individual thought and behavior.”

Although his first book is primarily concerned with the human encounter (for better or worse) within a world of objects and signs, Baudrillard is mainly, and problematically, concerned with the human subject in relation to an external world of objects and signs. This point will be directly addressed and refuted in Chapter 3; however, the ethical

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182 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 29.
184 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 29.
185 Douglas Kellner, Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond, 8.
concerns which gave rise to The System of Object will continue to be relevant throughout my work. Douglas Kellner points them out succinctly: “the thrust of Baudrillard’s analysis is that the new technical world of objects leads to new values, modes of behavior and relations to objects and to other people.”\(^{186}\) As has been noted, The System of Objects is both heavily indebted to Henri Lefebvre’s sociology of everyday life and constitutes a radical break from Lefebvre towards the structuralism in Roland Barthes\(^{187}\) and the radical social critique of Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School, which Baudrillard says he read early on before they were translated.\(^{188}\) Ultimately, Baudrillard’s post-1968 experience was marked by a radical disillusionment with Marxist critique and its ability to speak to what he saw as the unique problems of the times. “In any case,” notes Kellner, “Baudrillard’s analysis suggests that the Marxian problematic of revolution is severely undermined in a technological society in which change and revolution are integral to the system itself”.\(^{189}\)

Baudrillard’s use and extension of Roland Barthes’s semiology in System constitutes the unique turn in his work, and so some time should be spent with Barthes. At the center of Barthes’s critique is a pervasive and insidious “presumption of innocence [in the novel, in everyday social relations, or the image]: something which Barthes sees as a characteristic corruption of modern bourgeois society.”\(^{190}\) This ‘innocence’ is described by Barthes as a “naturalness” with which petit-bourgeois

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\(^{186}\) Douglas Kellner, ibid., 10.

\(^{187}\) See William Merrin, Baudrillard and the Media, 16, 30; and Rex Butler, Jean Baudrillard: The Defense of the Real, 26.

\(^{188}\) Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 28. It is also clear that Baudrillard is indebted (in more implicit ways) to Lewis Mumford’s Technics and Civilization, which Baudrillard specifically cites in the chapter The Metafunctional and Dysfunctional System: Gadgets and Robots; and in his own way Daniel Boorstin’s The Image.

\(^{189}\) Douglas Kellner, ibid., 11.

\(^{190}\) Terence. Hawkes, Structuralism & Semiotics (London: Routledge, 2003), 86.
society “dress up” reality to hide harmful ideologies – what Barthes calls “anonymous ideology”. To Barthes, objects “are taken up not in terms of their use or function but primarily to communicate . . . [they] form a kind of language, within which such values as use and function become merely rhetorical.” This phenomenon is something special to an industrial epoch so dependent on advertising, public image and mass communication. There is an implicit semiological relationship between objects, images and meaning, says Barthes: the connotative (or ‘coded’) element, which functions to encode cultural and ideological meaning into the otherwise neutral denotative (‘non-coded’) form. The denotative form is made up of a signifier and signified. The classic example Barthes uses in his *The Rhetoric of the Image* (1964) is the Panzani pasta advertising image. Barthes unpacks the hidden meaning behind packages of pasta surrounded by fresh red and green vegetables and hung in a fishing net revealing a coded structure of meaning.

Baudrillard’s decade long road to hyperreality begins, Butler argues, when Baudrillard takes Barthes’s series of isolated studies and extends the conclusions to their limit. He claims that objects only have meaning in relation to other objects, and that consumers only desire this sign-object relationship rather than the objects themselves. While Baudrillard’s work is problematic on many levels, what is important for this study is his identification and contrast of two competing forms of ordering and/or organizing (in Mumford’s terminology): consumerism, semiotically ordered, over and against patterns of a more authentic human (symbolic) exchange relationship. “For Baudrillard”, says Merrin, “the sign is born when [the human activity of symbolic

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193 Note the presence here too of the same familiar picture of language and meaning.
exchange] is broken, a process of the transformation of all relations and meanings into signs to be combined, appropriated and consumed.” Baudrillard’s development of this heavily generalized picture of the death of the symbolic in the emerging fabric of consumer sign-objects represents the foundation of all his other work. In his next book Baudrillard sets out to identify the role electronic media plays in consumption.

According to Baudrillard translator Chris Turner, Baudrillard does not consider The Consumer Society (1970), originally written on a publisher’s commission, to be on the trajectory of his developing theory at the time. However, what we do have in The Consumer Society is Baudrillard’s first foray into the role electronic media plays in the destruction of symbolic exchange through the ubiquity of the semiotic order. Unlike the symbolic order—which is not ‘accessed’ like a mainframe or a hard-drive by pre-industrial and non-western societies but is inhabited, as Hegarty says, “through the ambivalence of exchange which is not one of fixed values, separate from its enactors”—the semiotic order provides access to a ‘real world’, emphasized (by the semiotic order) to fill the void left by the dissipating symbolic. “For Baudrillard,” says Douglas Kellner, “the entire [western] society is organized around consumption and display of commodities through which individuals gain prestige, identity, and standing.” Western society lives consumption, consumes consumption, and speaks consumption—it expresses itself as consumption. One unintended (or intended?) consequence of this phenomenon is that use-value is undermined by the political economy of sign-value. Consumers, he says, no longer relate “to a particular object in

194 William Merrin, Baudrillard and the Media, 17.
195 Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 2n.
196 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory, 23.
its specific utility, but to a set of objects in its total signification.”

The apparatus of electronic mass media is essential then in the social construction of ‘the real’ –literally a real-lization of the real– “by translating the symbolic into the semiotic” through the matrix of consumption. Citing Boorstin, the everyday life of the western world is reordered into a “neo-reality of the model”, claims Baudrillard, using the blueprint of the commodity simulacrum as the organizing principle.

Baudrillard’s third book, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign* (1972), extends his radical critique of the semiotic to now include the category of ‘the real’. As we will see, ‘the real’, then, becomes a ‘key’ to the other ‘ills’ that Baudrillard is concerned with. Merrin points out that this may be the most significant and overlooked development in Baudrillard’s work, and represents a crucial step in understanding what he means by the ‘hyperreal order’. Douglas Kellner argues that *Critique* completes Baudrillard’s attempt to extend a neo-Marxist framework and extend Marxist political economy. Baudrillard adds ‘sign-value’ to Marxian ‘use-value’ and ‘exchange-value’, to supplement what Baudrillard sees as Marx’s misreading (or underestimation) of late capitalism. The book begins with a critique of the traditional empiricist hypothesis of human needs (the ‘hypothesis’ that people are driven by basic needs usually supported by lived evidence like food, clothes, and shelter) and the model of object use-value (the view that objects are appropriated based on how they are of functional-use to us in our lives), to address the problem of sign value covered in his previous works, *System* and *Consumer*. “Far from the primary status of the object

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199 William Merrin, ibid., 30. (emphasis mine)
200 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 126.
201 William Merrin, ibid., 31.
203 Merrin notes that Baudrillard deviates from Marcuse’s critique of ‘false’ needs produced in capitalist societies, and rejects the ideas of “essential human needs” altogether. 1) Consumption is a
being a pragmatic one which would subsequently come to over determine a social value of the origin,” says Baudrillard, “it is the sign exchange value (valeur d’échange signe) which is fundamental”.\textsuperscript{204} Use-value is what people theorize about to rationalize the loss of symbolic exchange and support the myth of the practical application of the commodity. For this reason, Baudrillard says that a theory of objects cannot be based on needs but on “social prestations” and “signification”.\textsuperscript{205} It might be easy to critique Baudrillard by saying that he fundamentally misreads Marx or has left Marx altogether; but it is important to point out that Baudrillard’s suspicion of use-value and lived-evidence is not built on a suspicion of practice, but on a suspicion of ideological value placed on ‘objects’. “For Baudrillard”, says Mike Gane, “Marx was not sufficiently radical in his analysis . . . his conception of communism was trapped within the matrix of the cultural order of rationalization and therefore could not be other than its (bad) mirror-image.”\textsuperscript{206} Rather than contrasting use-value with exchange-value, Gane continues, Marx should have contrasted symbolic exchange with commodity exchange;

\textsuperscript{204} Jean Baudrillard, \textit{For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign}, 29.

\textsuperscript{205} “Prestation” is “rare in English or French” comments translator Charles Levin. Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary cites the word’s roots from the Latin meaning a \textit{performing}, a \textit{paying} and from Old English Law meaning the \textit{payment of money} and also \textit{the rendering of service}. (Prestation. Dictionary.com. \textit{Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary}. MICRA, Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Prestation)

\textsuperscript{206} Mike Gane, introduction to \textit{Symbolic Exchange and Death} by Jean Baudrillard (London: Sage Publications, 1993), x.
in contrast then, “Baudrillard appears more radical, and more primitive”. It should be clear by now that the striking feature of Baudrillard’s early decade is a radical departure from traditional political economic models in favor of what he believes to be the more radical critique of semiotic models.

Baudrillard’s contrast of symbolic exchange to sign exchange highlights his emphasis on the erosion and truncation of social relation (and subsequently social action), over and against those who, ironically, continue to focus on everyday practice as a strategy to confront an emerging post-war consumer society. In Chapter 9 – “Requiem for the Media”, originally published in Utopie 4 as “Requiem pour les media” (1971)– Baudrillard extends Marshall McLuhan’s critique of Marx, to highlight the effects of an emerging consumer media culture on this developing western industrialized phenomenon. “[McLuhan] is saying that Marx, in his materialist analysis of production, had virtually circumscribed productive forces as a privileged domain from which language, signs and communication in general found themselves excluded.” Baudrillard extends his critique further –going beyond the reorganizing neo-reality model originally presented in Consumer– by questioning the category of ‘reality’ altogether.

Rather than simulacra and the semiotic order ‘eclipsing’ or doing away with ‘the real’, the very notion of an objective, external, concrete reality (in which Merrin notes “use value and needs, and the signified and the referent” are included) is critiqued as a product of the sign. “Through this mirage of the referent,” Baudrillard says, “which is nothing but the phantasm of what the sign itself represses during its operation, the sign attempts to mislead: it permits itself to appear as totality . . . and parades about as

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207 There is probably a strong argument to made here that Baudrillard’s concerns are more about the failures of Marxism in France during the late Spring of 1968 rather than a reading of Marx himself.
208 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 164.
the reality principle of meaning.”209 The legitimating relationship between the sign and
the real, and the real and the sign is a vicious circle –their relationship is illusory
according to Baudrillard.210

**BAUDRILLARD’S HISTORICAL GENEALOGY OF SIMULACRA**

In *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (1976) Baudrillard further characterizes the
problem of ‘the real’ in modern technological information societies, based on “his
thesis that in societies where *symbolic exchange* is the dominant principle, cultures do
not relate to the ‘reality’ of the world but to the world and cosmos in narrative, fable, as
radical illusion.”211 The book begins with chapters on ‘the end of production’ and ‘the
order of simulacra’, and continues to makes use of the link between electronic media
and its effect on a consumer society, which he already began to hint at in *The
Consumer Society* and further developed in chapter nine of *For a Critique of the
Political Economy of the Sign*, discussed earlier.

Most significant to *Symbolic Exchange and Death* is Baudrillard’s historical
genealogy of the political economy of simulacra, which further complicates his picture
of simulacra. Although William Merrin praises Baudrillard’s genealogy, from a media
and communication studies background, for “restoring a historical and philosophical
dimension that the contemporary field clearly lacks”, it is equally problematic because
of his attempt to delineate the development of the problem of simulacra according to a
series of epochs or eras “definable in terms of their dominant simulacral productions
and their epistemological effects” rather than socioeconomic formations.212 Strikingly

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209 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 162.
210 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 155.
211 Mike Gane, *Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty*, 34. (emphasis mine) Note that the concept of
‘radical illusion’ is explained in greater detail in his 1987 publication *Evil Demon of Images*.
212 William Merrin, ibid., 36.
similar to Lewis Mumford’s genealogies in *Technics and Civilization* and *The City in History* mentioned in Chapter 1, Baudrillard’s genealogy of the political economy of simulacra begins with its birth in the archaic feudal caste societies of the West, and then passes into the age of the counterfeit—a period which Baudrillard says lasts from the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution. This is the first order of simulacra; the emancipated ‘modern sign’ is no longer limited nor obligated by feudal social constraint but is proliferated by demand; “relieved of every constraint,” says Baudrillard, “universally available, the modern sign nevertheless still simulates necessity by giving the appearance that it is bound to the world.”

The industrial era of ‘automation and the robot’ ushers in the second order of simulacra, large-scale production. Here Baudrillard cites Walter Benjamin as the first to identify—through his discussion of works of art—“that reproduction absorbs the process of production, changes its goals, and alters the status of the product and the producer.” He also cites Benjamin’s identification of “technology as a medium rather

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214 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 55. “[Benjamin] shows [the effects of mechanical reproduction] in the fields of art, cinema, and photography,” Baudrillard continues, “because it is there that new territories are opened up in the twentieth century, with no ‘classical’ tradition of productivity, placed from the outset under the sign of reproduction.” (55-56)

Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936) [better translated as “The Work of Art in its Age of Technological Reproducibility” from the original German *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit*; also note version two of this essay, a more recent edit by Benjamin never published in his lifetime, published in Walter Benjamin: *Selected Writings* Volume 3 1935-1938, trs. Edmund Jephcott, Howard Eiland, and Others, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 101-133] explains that, although there has always been ‘reproducibility’ in art such as bronzes, coins or woodcuts, mechanical reproduction is a wholly new phenomenon in human history.

His main thesis is that “the age of mechanical reproduction separated art from its basis in cult”. Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 226. Benjamin goes on to investigate the relationship between the change in the function of art, specifically since the introduction of photography in the early 19th century and its growing popularity during the second industrial revolution, and the change in the production of art. Strikingly similar to Baudrillard’s concerns in *Symbolic Exchange and Death*—and no doubt the source—Benjamin points out that “to an ever greater degree the work of art reproduced becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.”
than a ‘productive force’ (at which point the Marxian analysis retreats)” as another crucial contribution in the analysis of the order of simulacra.

The third order of simulacra, simulation, occurs when “[t]echnique as a medium gains the upper hand not only over the product’s ‘message’ (its use-value) but also over labour power [. . .]. As soon as dead labour gains the upper hand over living labour, serial production gives way to generation through models . . . they are no longer mechanically reproduced, but conceived according to their very reproducibility.”

Unlike the first stage of the counterfeit which necessarily presupposes difference and operates on the natural law of value, or the second machine-driven stage of serial reproduction which relies on a market law of value, in this stage of the simulacra there is no longer ‘imitation’ of models, per se, but a replacement by a structural modular code or the structural law of value.

Baudrillard likens the code—the third order of simulacra which determines the ordering system of the law of value—to DNA and makes the parallel (in 1976) that just as we cannot escape our DNA so we cannot escape the code. “The great man-made simulacra pass from a universe of natural laws into a universe of forces and tensions,”

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(Benjamin 1969, 224) Also see Jean Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, 56. The unique value of a work of art—its ‘authenticity, its ‘aura’—is shucked from its “fabric of tradition” by two sensibilities of mass reproduction in late modernity: 1) overcoming spatial distance and 2) “overcoming the uniqueness of everyday reality”. (Walter Benjamin, ibid., 220-224) In the wake of art’s extraction from the fabric of the ritual by means of mechanical reproduction, and driven by the sensibilities of mass reproduction, a new base for art emerges, the political.

Cinema is Benjamin’s quintessential example of mechanized art which, through its very mechanized conception satisfies the urges of the mass reproduced sensibility. Through film speed, sound, editing, shot selection and mass distribution—the very technique of film—cinema offers the spectator “an aspect of reality which is free of all equipment”. (Walter Benjamin, ibid., 234) Of course, now that we are 70 years on from Benjamin’s essay and we have the benefit of perspective of cinematic history and theory, I will examine what attempts have been made and it may be possible to return this ‘aura’ and uniqueness to cinema—despite its nature of technological reproduction—in Chapter 5.

Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 56. The third order of simulacra, and Baudrillard’s phrase ‘conceived according to their very reproducibility’, has the familiar echo of Martin Heidegger’s *Gestell* or ‘enframing’.
he says, “and today pass into a universe of structures and binary oppositions.”

Baudrillard cites Thomas Sebeok’s biosemiological model of the genetic code as the “prototype” for all systemic signification, and Jacques Monod’s Nobel Prize-winning work on genetic expression, as the myths which drive the ‘code’ of third order simulacra. “In fact,” Baudrillard warns, “[Monod’s discourse] is itself a result of the never innocent decision to objectify the world and the ‘real’. … [Monod] postulates the coherence of a specific discourse, and scientificity is doubtless only the space of this discourse, never manifest as such, whose simulacrum of ‘objectivity’ covers over this political and strategic speech.”

Here Baudrillard attempts to cite an epochal sensibility which includes authority of science as complicit in the concatenation of the sign. Digitality then moves the myth of this information binary ‘code’ from ‘the laboratory’ to the banal corners of society. Following Boorstin, reality is selected, edited, tested and recomposed; “at the end of this process of reproducibility,” says Baudrillard, “the real is not only that which can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced: the hyperreal.”

Undergirding this entire ‘scientific’ system, of course, is the problematic belief in an objective ‘real’ as a semiological category and its corresponding rhetoric.

**Nietzsche, Hyperreality and Disneyfication**

With the ‘birth of hyperreality’ we must note Baudrillard’s embrace of Nietzsche over Marx. As Douglas Kellner describes, after 1976 Baudrillard moves

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216 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 57. However, today we know that our DNA does not necessarily determine us; as recent studies have suggested environmental factors may have more impact on genetic expression than originally believed. Baudrillard himself admits, “it remains to be seen whether this operationality is itself a myth, whether DNA is itself a myth.” (Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 60) This possibility of ‘cheating the code’ will be discussed in further detail later.

217 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 61.

218 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 61-73.
from a more formal structuralism to an extreme variant of “poststructuralist positions about language, reference and the absence of ‘the real’ . . . to dissolve the concepts and problematic of social theory and radical politics altogether.”

It is at this point that any remaining concern with the complexities of ‘everyday life’ as a point of reference is jettisoned in Baudrillard’s theoretical framework. “Down with all hypotheses that have allowed belief in a real world” Baudrillard proclaims aphoristically citing Nietzsche in *Symbolic Exchange and Death*. Subsequently, this move puts Baudrillard in a radically different position from even Nietzsche himself. As has been highlighted thus far, Baudrillard’s work from 1968 to 1976 is a gradual move away from the conventional Marxian understanding and critique of political economy and, as Mike Gane says, an abandonment of “the hope of social revolution on the model of 1789 or 1917”. As mentioned earlier, Baudrillard, like many intellectuals at the time, was disillusioned with the failures of the May 1968 protest and general strike in France and with the ultimate silence of Marxist leaders such as Louis Althusser, who notoriously critiqued student protesters as forwarding an infantile leftism. “Baudrillard moves from Marx to Nietzsche as a more prescient thinker,” Gane later says, “and argues that there subsequently ensues a crisis in the culture which comes to affect all levels: science, art, technology, politics.” Baudrillard’s most apparent shift to a lyrical style and nihilistic framework happens in *Seduction* (1979) – gone are the scholarly referencing apparatus and sociological theory in favor of more rhetorical literary and artistic allusions. In

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220 Jean Baudrillard, ibid., 61. There is no direct citation in the text, only an implied citation, however, Baudrillard is probably citing Friedrich Nietzsche’s *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Will to Power*.
221 Mike Gane, *Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty*, 40.
222 Mike Gane, ibid., 40.
223 Seduction, as a principle, is far too involved to adequately address here as it runs parallel to simulation through much of Baudrillard’s later work and reflects shift in Baudrillard’s thinking regarding the relationship of the symbolic versus the semiotic and a new found belief in the
The Precession of Simulacra (1978), Paul Hegarty and Mike Gane have suggested that
Baudrillard’s newly developed four orders of simulacra is an allusion to Nietzsche’s
“collapsing the ‘true’ and ‘apparent’ worlds” and the pattern of perceived access to the
real in the Twilight of the Idols aphorism How the ‘Real World’ Finally Became a
Fable. Hegarty makes the link between Nietzsche and Baudrillard apparent.
“Simulation is the contemporary form of imagining there is a true reality. Nietzsche,
like Baudrillard, insists there have only ever been different ways of making such a
mistake”. Hegarty, however, is generous in aligning Baudrillard so close to
Nietzsche. Douglas Kellner correctly suggests that Baudrillard is not such a close
reader of Nietzsche and only draws on him stylistically and rhetorically. However
close or disingenuous a reader of Nietzsche Baudrillard is, he turns from a social theory
with any concern for everyday life towards “what Habermas calls the ‘dark writers of
the bourgeoisie’ and a specifically French Bohemian and Nietzschean tradition which
extends from Baudelaire through Bataille . . . Gide and Sartre, and appears in Blanchot,
Klossowski, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard and others.” How then does
Baudrillard move from a particularly structuralist theory of the simulacra and extend it
into the perpetual complexities of the marketplace and the social fabric of the first
world West?

Jean Baudrillard’s first text devoted to the topic of Hyperreality is Simulacra
and Simulation (1981) (a collection of essays written for the journal Traverses) – the
most famous of which is “The Precession of Simulacra” (1978). A highly problematic

creative power of language. Rex Butler, Jean Baudrillard: The Defense of the Real, 71, 100-107; also see
William Merrin, Baudrillard and the Media, 38-42; Mike Gane, Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty,
15, 37-38. However, since this chapter is concerned with Baudrillard's development of
Hyperreality, I will not pursue this rhetorical device any further.

224 Paul Hegarty, Jean Baudrillard: Live Theory, 52; Mike Gane, ibid., 15.
226 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 91.
227 Douglas Kellner, ibid., 91-92.
text on the surface, *Simulacra and Simulation* “avoids all resort to referencing and empirical substantiation” and, along with *Seduction* (1979), represents a radical stylistic shift in Baudrillard’s work.\(^{228}\) The essay is difficult to read and even more problematic to understand. However, we should not be deceived by Baudrillard’s pataphysical\(^{229}\) surface play. As Mike Gane sympathetically points out in *Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty*, “there is as yet no analysis of Baudrillard’s writing which is adequate or altogether convincing”.\(^{230}\) Based on Gane’s assertion, I will draw from *Simulacra and Simulation*, and more specifically its first chapter, “The Precession of Simulacra”, as the last great work in Baudrillard’s first decade of theoretical development “replete with sociological and philosophical language that comes through from Baudrillard’s formative period”,\(^ {231}\) rather than dismiss the text as a break from his earlier work. Consequently, it must also be said that *Simulacra and Simulation* represents the first great book of Baudrillard’s ‘nihilism’ of the Hyperreal. Baudrillard develops yet another genealogy of the simulacrum, which includes a *fourth order of simulacra*: hyperreality, which is linked to the problem of representation, and offers an engagement with Nietzsche’s ‘wager on representation’ that is traditionally grounded on a higher reality and humanity’s ability to ‘mediate’ the real through

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\(^{228}\) Mike Gane, *Jean Baudrillard: In Radical Uncertainty*, 24.

\(^{229}\) Pataphysics is a nonsensical pseudo-philosophy, adopted by Baudrillard, meant to parody the theory and methodology of modern science. The term was coined by Alfred Jarry, best known for the play *Ubu Roi* (1896).

\(^{230}\) Mike Gane, ibid., 24.

\(^{231}\) Mike Gane, ibid., 24. Gane’s work is important because, in an attempt to rescue Baudrillard from critiques of racism, sexism and absurdity, Gane identifies the totalizing language of hyperreality as an attempt by Baudrillard to highlight the radical gestalt shift of lost relation which occurs in the West under the rule of the semiotic. Gane reminds the reader that it is Baudrillard’s “view that writing should not aim to capture the real world, but should exist as its poetic challenge.” Mike Gane, foreword to *Mass Identity Architecture: Architectural Writings of Jean Baudrillard*, by Francesco Proto (Chichester: Wiley-Academy), x. For example, rather than a proto-fascist hyperbole and polemical spin, Baudrillard’s attack against the “artificial memory” of the 1978 NBC mini-series *HOLOCAUST* as the “restaging of extermination” is the only radically anti-fascist stance to take. (Baudrillard 1994, 49-51) This is one of the radical problems presented by hyperreality and will be addressed in the project as a whole.
representation. In this genealogy Baudrillard moves beyond the simple determinacy of the code mentioned earlier; and by the forth order of simulacra, ‘the real’ –a product of the semiotic order– is itself simulated through the apparatus of electronic media. The epoch of Hyperreality emerges when it is no longer the difference between the simulation and the real that is of concern (as it was with Eco), but it is the disappearance of the real into the simulation, and a simulation of simulation organizes the world. To Baudrillard, this goes far beyond a ‘local’ phenomenon; hyperreality is a total system of signification.

Baudrillard’s radical extension of the hyperreal into the American landscape – and through much of Western Europe by means of capitalist expansion since the end of the Second World War– appears to be on an entirely different order than anything Mumford, Boorstin or Eco ever envisaged. Returning to Baudrillard’s critique of Los Angeles by way of Disneyland it is easy to situate the role the code of consumption and the phantasmagoric commodity plays in the ‘Disneyfication’ of the city. ‘Disneyfication’ is by no means a fiction; “Disney’s image as an icon of American culture is consistently reinforced through the penetration of the Disney empire into many aspects of social life.”

The monorail at the Bush airport in Houston, Texas, and the underground monorail system connecting the U. S. Capital to the Dirksen and Hart Senate Buildings are modeled after Disney’s; malls model their retailing strategy

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232 Jean Baudrillard, *The Procession of Simulacra*, 5. The genealogy of the ‘image’ simultaneously develops and contradicts (in so far as he jettisons any notion of a history of political economy) his order of simulacra in *Symbolic*. Baudrillard, begins with 1) the “reflection of a profound reality”, also called the sacramental order, then becomes 2) a masking of reality, also called the maleficence order, 3) there then emerges an absence of reality in ‘representation’, also called the order of sorcery and finally 4) there is no relation to reality nor does it belong to the order of appearances – “it is its own pure simulacrum” and the order of simulation. (Jean Baudrillard, *The Procession of Simulacra*, 5.) This fourth order is called hyperreality.


after Disney’s “themed environments”; New York’s famous West Forty-Second Street Times Square –including studios for Disney-owned news corporation ABC– have been largely renovated by the Parent Company; none is more disturbing, however, than the model American town built and run by Disney –Celebration, Florida.

The first of its kind in a “branded world”, residents of Celebration live “the fully branded experience” and, for Disney, represent the achievement of the “ultimate goal of lifestyle branding: for the brand to become life itself”, as Naomi Klein argues in No Logo. Celebration, Florida, is quite simply a ‘branded village’. Celebration is thoroughly an ordered colony of the Disney Empire and something far more insidious than Naomi Klein’s “branded village”. Although the image and likeness of Mickey Mouse is prohibited in Celebration –the village is the brand. With Celebration it is no longer the difference between the simulation of a town and a real town (as Eco judged it) but, in Baudrillard’s terms, it is the disappearance of a real town into the simulation; Celebration is a ‘hyperreal village’. Here, however, we begin to make the turn. Celebration is a terribly complex situation to unpack. While it certainly shows signs of ‘hyperreality’, as described by Eco and Baudrillard, Celebration is a thriving lifeworld replete with its own set of complex practices. Whilst the branded village of Celebration, Florida, affords the opportunity to examine Baudrillard’s hyperreality from the ground

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237 Naomi Klein, ibid., 182.
in the hopes of seeing Baudrillard’s concerns in a more empirical way there is no room for that investigation here.

**Towards a New Methodology**

Not only do the problems and questions of the ersatz, as originally highlighted in Marie Antoinette’s *Petit Hameau*, arise in a phenomenon like Celebration; but its existence can arguably be seen as an exposed nerve on the American landscape, revealing a far greater problem – the relationship between hyperreality and *consumerism*. ‘Disneyfication’ is a term used to identify a much larger phenomenon in the West, described in great detail by Lewis Mumford in *The City in History*. While the growth of capitalism helped the West overcome the limitations of the medieval economy, “capitalism tended to dismantle the whole structure of urban life and place it upon a new impersonal basis: money and profit.” 238 As the growth of urban landscapes and the creation of new cities coincided with the growth of capitalism, argues Mumford, “the nature and the purpose of the city had been completely forgotten”. 239 New city extensions under capitalism – often built for the sake of capitalist interests rather than human needs and activities – were treated as consumable and digestible abstract units built for the purpose of advancing personal profit and gain. 240 “This metropolitan world, then,” says Mumford, “is a world where flesh and blood are *less real* than paper and ink and celluloid.” 241 Similar to Boorstin’s conclusions regarding the pseudo-event and technological advancements, Mumford extends Boorstin’s critiques by making connections between an obfuscation of ‘the real’ and the emerging capitalist urban landscape. In general, Baudrillard’s own historical genealogy draws

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239 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 419.
240 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 421-426.
241 Lewis Mumford, ibid., 547. (emphasis mine)
heavily from Mumford’s view of the city in human history. However, how far can we follow Baudrillard in particular?

The questions and problems raised by Jean Baudrillard (and anticipated with greater historical and anthropological detail by Lewis Mumford, Daniel Boorstin and Umberto Eco) are both historically relevant, and pose potentially ominous ethical and theological dilemmas, and therefore are cause for concern and response. Baudrillard offers a unique articulation of a specific historical phenomenon, and an equally enticing possibility of response through a recovery of the poetic and religious as forms of tactical resistance towards the ordering of human lifeworlds. However, the challenges, which are general, but which in Baudrillard’s case are framed by his process of extending Marxian critiques of consumerism, and the post-structuralist critique of semiotics, to the entire fabric of Western civilization, are legion. Baudrillard is brash, broad sweeping, and admittedly experimental with his work. On the one hand, we are faced with the imprecision of a broad brushstroke and, on the other, we must address Baudrillard’s unique attempt to provide an all-consuming and total critique of the problems of global marketing practices (its ideologizing, propagandizing, power and control-seeking) and consumer activities, by saying that it is, in effect, the entire ‘pitch’ which is faulty and any specific tactics we try to implement as forms of resistance ultimately fall impotent. Ultimately, Baudrillard’s assessment of late 20\textsuperscript{th}-century Western civilization –along with Mumford and Boorstin– can profitably be developed in a new, different framework and approach.

Far from a simple rejection of Baudrillard, the following chapters build upon the fault-lines that have been pointed out thus far and constitute a radical reworking of Baudrillard’s assessment of the scene and his subsequent critique. Aside from Baudrillard’s highly idiosyncratic ‘way’, there are several points in his work that must
be addressed; it is from these points where I will levy a re-articulation of hyperreality. Broadly speaking, Baudrillard’s dependence on a ‘platonic-cartesian’ formulation of picturing and criticism is of fundamental importance in my critique of his work. How good is his picture of ‘representation’, ‘simulacra’, and more generally, ‘simulacrization’? Although he begins with Marxian and neo-Marxian critiques, Baudrillard’s most dramatic pictures are largely theoretical imaginings drawn from Plato, Descartes, and structural linguistics. Certainly Umberto Eco suffers from a similar ‘cartesian’ picturing, stemming from his particular use of linguistics, but yet, Eco’s pronouncements are based on first person investigations and Eco resists building them up into a metaphysics. Baudrillard’s ‘platonic-cartesian’ picturing of human beings also leads to a crucial and fundamental misstep in his developing thesis during his first decade of work. Fundamentally, Baudrillard’s picture of the totalizing ills of hyperreality are only possible because of his faulty anthropology of human living and, subsequently, of the role of the human imagination (sometimes absent, other times totally colonized) in the activities of everyday life. Rather than moving on to any direct response to ‘hyperreality’, the task of the next chapter will be to introduce a new methodology and approach towards this unsettling characterization of the ‘hyperreality phenomenon’, and a re-articulation of the greater ethical issues at stake.

Andrew Ross’s investigation of the complex lifeworld of Celebration already shows that in order to make any further use of Baudrillard’s hyperreality insights a new methodological approach will be necessary to re-articulate the phenomenon and the complications of hyperreality. When we seek to examine and re-conceive hyperreality from the ground, the variables are far too many: the human lifeworld is far too complex for the ‘cool logic’ of the ‘code’ to be made to stick. With that said, there are some very real ethical issues at stake. The problem of hyperreality is fundamentally an anti-human
phenomenon to Baudrillard, which separates us from true human living as pictured in ‘symbolic exchange’. Essentially, **Baudrillard argues that we are prevented from living a true human life because of the hyperreal ordering principle.** This truncation is directly related, then, to a manner in which late-capitalist societies (specifically the U. S. A. where an estimated 70% of the nation’s wealth comes from consumer spending) are ordered through the logic of consumerism; and meaning becomes normative through the logic of mass communication.242 However, the question remains: how viable and satisfactory is Baudrillard’s picture of hyperreality as an evaluative device? Because of his idiosyncratic dependence on ‘platonic-cartesian’ pictures of representation, signification and truth, and his lack of on the ground applicable examples, Baudrillard fails to adequately characterize human forms of life thus weakening his ability to speak to complex lifeworlds. It is for these reasons that a new approach and methodology is now needed.

Chapter 3

THE COLONIZATION OF HUMAN LIFEWORLDS:
A QUESTION OF METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

This chapter will concern itself with 1) outlining a brief history of what might be anachronistically called the philosophical ‘return’ to human bodies, the complexity of lifeworlds (Lebenswelt), and human forms of life (Lebensform), specifically focusing on the work of Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein and contemporary anthropologist Tim Ingold in the hopes of 2) uncovering a problem far more invasive and ominous than previously articulated in chapters one and two, and laying out the scaffolding for a new methodological approach in the hopes of highlighting possible forms of resistance. Roughly divided into two unequal parts, or movements, this chapter constitutes ‘the turn’ away from Baudrillard’s rhetorical and nihilistic theoretical games towards a re-articulation of the complex historical phenomenon we’ve gleaned from the work of Lewis Mumford, Daniel Boorstin, Umberto Eco, the example of Marie Antoinette’s Petit Hameau, and even in Baudrillard’s earliest work. This chapter will specifically focus on crafting a new characterization of this ‘hyperreality’ phenomenon; I will describe this characterization as the colonization of the human imagination and human forms of life.

LEBENSWELT: BODIES-IN-THE-WORLD

To methodologically speak of a ‘re-turn’ to bodies-in-the-world is to presuppose that there ever was a turn away. In the modern philosophical tradition, the turn away from the body-in-the-world towards a mis-characterization of detached rational cognition as the sole arbiter of truth judgments is credited to the 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650). Briefly, to speak of a ‘Cartesian’ philosophy
is to advocate an erroneous emphasis on the division of the ‘res cogitans’ (the thinking thing) and the physical world (res extensa, which includes the corporal). In the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition, Cartesian philosophy methodologically argues that the former is the only reliable faculty to make truth judgments because it is viewed as ‘non-physical’ and, while subject to error, is incorruptible in a metaphysical sense. The hope of this rationalist tradition was “to provide philosophy with the exactness of mathematics” and was built on the belief that “simply by operating according to the appropriate method [the mind] can discover the nature of the [external] universe.” In Descartes’s own words we can hear this mathematical metaphysics and its problematic aim. “These long chains of reasoning, each of them simple and easy . . . have given me an occasion for imagining that . . . there is nothing so far distant that one cannot finally reach nor so hidden that one cannot discover. . . and thus make ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature.” In the Cartesian subject/object characterization of the universe everything is epistemologically present and knowable to the thinking subject through the proper cognitive method. This ‘Cartesian’ dichotomy of a non-physical mind (res cogitans) extending out into a world of ‘things’ (res extensa) became a calcified presupposition in Western philosophy for the next three hundred years, and even surfaces in the French Structuralism (which draws heavily on a science of signs or semiology) that greatly influenced Baudrillard’s move away from Henri Lefebvre. However, as Gilbert Ryle points out, “it would not be true to say that the official theory derives solely from Descartes’ theories, or even from a more widespread

243 The term Cogito or ‘the thinking mind’ comes from Descartes epistemological dictum ‘cogito ergo sum’ (I think, therefore I am) —a statement with broad sweeping implications— found in both his Discourse on the Method (1637) and Principles of Philosophy (1644).
anxiety about the implications of seventeenth-century mechanics”. Ryle goes on to provide a succinct historical genealogy of the modern problem:

Scholastic and Reformation theology had schooled the intellects of the scientists as well as of the laymen, philosophers and clerics of that age. Stoic-Augustinian theories of the will were embedded in the Calvinist doctrines of sin and grace; Platonic and Aristotelian theories of the intellect shaped the orthodox doctrines of the immortality of the soul. Descartes was reformulating already prevalent theological doctrines of the soul in the new syntax of Galileo. The theologian’s privacy of the conscience became the philosopher’s privacy of the consciousness, and what had been the bogy of Predestination reappeared as the bogy of Determinism.

In the late 19th and early 20th century a particular strand of Western philosophy (specifically in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger) argued that the subject/object problem was not simply a ‘modern’ problem but was as old as metaphysics itself. One of Nietzsche’s philosophical concerns was with what he saw as the philosophically academic tendency towards detached rational problems; Nietzsche, instead, sought to return philosophy to the “true and urgent problems of life.”

Nietzsche’s writings stylistically and radically undermined the presuppositions of rational academic discourse with his use of poetic language, anecdotes and metaphors in his writings. In his first major work, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), Nietzsche articulates what he sees as the fundamental problem in the Western philosophical tradition – a dichotomy between the rational and aesthetic experience. He explains that the ‘aesthetic vision’ of the archaic Greek world manifest in the worship of the gods Dionysus (the god of aesthetic revelry) and Apollo (the god of rational order who

248 Cf: November 20, 1867 letter from Friedrich Nietzsche to Erwin Rohde. (emphasis mine)
balanced their daily existence) was suppressed by the Hellenic culture of Socrates and his student Plato.249 “The artist, we say, this maker of images, knows nothing of the reality, but only the appearances”, says Plato.250 Indeed, in his The Republic, Plato goes so far as to say that poets are to be kicked out of the Republic of the philosopher king.

Although the Western metaphysical tradition can be traced back to Socrates and Plato, Nietzsche certainly had the metaphysics of German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in mind as he wrote. Kantian philosophy (by way of modifications by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel), specifically Kantian metaphysics and Kant’s critical theory of knowledge, is precisely the ‘academic’ philosophy detached from everyday living that Nietzsche opposes. Specifically, it is Kant’s division of the noumenal (timeless) world of “things-in-themselves” and phenomenal world of “things-as-they-appear” (which we know through our senses and which separate us from the timeless noumena) that is most problematic to a philosopher like Nietzsche so concerned with an everyday world of action. “All philosophers share this common error”, derides Nietzsche in Human, All Too Human (1878, 79, 80).251 “Automatically they think of ‘man’ as an eternal verity, as something abiding in the whirlpool, as a sure measure of things. Everything that the philosopher says about man, however, is at bottom no more than a testimony about the man of a very limited period. Lack of a historical sense is the original error of all philosophers.”252

Martin Heidegger also viewed the rationalist tendency and the ‘Cartesian’ subject/object dichotomy as part of the larger Western metaphysical tradition – however, Heidegger also considered Nietzsche within that problematic tradition. The

249 The greatest assault is laid out in chapters xxiv, xxxv and xxxvi of Plato’s The Republic.
252 Friedrich Nietzsche, ibid., 51.
basis of Heidegger’s philosophy was a “destruction of the history of philosophy” with
the express purpose of investigating and recovering the “question of the meaning of
Being”.253 His approach to the problem was a return to the question of “fundamental
ontology” –the lack of this approach to ontology was ultimately Nietzsche’s greatest
handicap. Dermot Moran succinctly articulates Heidegger’s concerns: “Heidegger
rejected traditional metaphysical approaches to the question of Being as having
misunderstood the nature of beings by understanding them as ‘things’ [. . .].
Heidegger’s central insight is that traditional metaphysical understanding is actually a
sedimentation of a kind of everyday set of assumptions about reality”.254 Like
Nietzsche, Heidegger saw the philosophy of Immanuel Kant as the key exemplar of the
Cartesian subject/object dichotomy in the modern tradition. “Kant adopts this definition
of the ego as res cogitans in the sense of cogito me cogitare except that he formulates it
in a more fundamental ontological way. He says the ego is that whose determinations
are representation in the full sense of repraesentatio. . . . The ego is a res, whose
realities are representations, cogitations. . . . Representations are determinations of the
ego, its predicates.”255 Here Heidegger brings to our attention once more the integral
relationship between the Western metaphysical tradition and the tradition of simulacra
or representation particularly important to this dissertation. Heidegger’s philosophical
project is immense, and parts of it will be unpacked with greater detail in the pages to

reminds us in Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study that the question can be traced back to Plato’s
Sophists: “For obviously you have long been familiar with what you mean when you use the
expression ‘being’. We, however, who once thought we understood it, have now become perplexed”. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London
1977), 29.
254 Dermot Moran, ibid., 196-197. One point that must be immediately addressed is Heidegger’s
tendency to generalize terms, or better yet his tendency to turn everyday terms into specialized
technical language. So, when he makes note of “a kind of everyday set of assumptions” we should
ask, whose everyday assumptions? This particularity will be addressed later in the chapter.
255 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1988), 126. (emphasis mine)
follow—in the process, we will address the topic of simulacra in the hopes of re-characterizing its role in the human lifeworld with this new methodology.

What follows, then, is a brief look at three scholars (Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Tim Ingold) whose work represents a methodological approach to world—which redraws body/world and body/perception characterizations—that will be deployed in the remaining chapters. This coming together of related methodologies is both A) anti-‘Cartesian’ and B) increasingly interdisciplinary. This chassis is also to be found in the abandoned doctoral dissertation of filmmaker Terrence Malick: *The Concept of ‘World’ in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Wittgenstein* that is now only known from a passing assertion in the introduction to his translation of Heidegger’s *Vom Wesen Des Grundes.* Malick notes, “the ‘world’, on [Heidegger’s] definition, is not the ‘totality of things’ but that in terms of which we understand them, that which give them measure and purpose and validity in our schemes. [. . .]. [T]he ‘world’ is meant to be that which can keep us from seeing, or force us to see, that what we have is one. Heidegger’s concept is quite like Kierkegaard’s ‘sphere of existence’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’.” For this reason, the methodology is not purely ‘phenomenological’—in the tradition of Brentano and Husserl—per se, but is focused on broadening and deploying the richness of what has been characterized as *Lebenswelt,* the lifeworld, and what that characterization implies for the questions that have been raised thus far. Finally, this move should not be seen as a step back—historically speaking—from the post-structuralist and post-modern problems raised in Baudrillard’s

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256 It should be noted that while Kierkegaard was part of Malick’s original dissertation proposal he will not be examined in detail here. In the first part of the 19th-century Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) developed an approach, and an ‘existential’ presentation of philosophy, which greatly influenced Heidegger and Wittgenstein (amongst others). Kierkegaard’s philosophy made use of a laying-out of ‘existence-spheres’ which are in effect forms-of-life and of-being-a-person.

work. Indeed, this move is to say that an ‘alternate route’ forward – one not considered in Baudrillard’s work – may enliven our understanding of ‘hyperreality’ and better grasp its ethical implications for the 21st-century world.

HEIDEGGER: BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

One central concern in the work of Martin Heidegger is the phenomenological task of returning to ‘things themselves’ by getting underneath the philosophical constructions we put upon them. Heidegger proceeds by developing what he calls a fundamental ontology, a phenomenological (and in its own way ontological) investigation of basic deep structures of human being-in-the-world with others; and with and through that, of other ‘modes of being’ that are there disclosed. As part of this investigation he seeks to exhume Greek thinking about Being, entities and their relationship to un-hiddenness – that is what ‘opens’ entities to us and makes our ‘dealings’ (Umgang) in the world and with entities possible. First and foremost, fundamental ontology is concerned with what it means to be a human person living in the everyday world. As Being-in-the-world (In-der-welt-sein), human persons are interconnected to world and things in the world; we are inextricably linked – ontologically – in a nexus of continual concern with our everyday dealings. Heidegger says, “the world is disclosed essentially along with the Being of Dasein, with the disclosedness of the world, the ‘world’ has in each case been discovered too.”

Involved entities (what Heidegger calls ready-to-hand) are unhidden in relation to the use and concerns of human beings. And one further key to the more complex patterns of human living is

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259 Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, 25.
understanding the human person’s ability to project (entwurf) its own possibilities of Being-in-the-world through its practices, including those of art and technology –not as a pre-conceived ‘plan’ but as a fundamental and primordial part of what it means to be a human person always already involved in the world.

**The Worldhood of the World**

*And the Phenomenological Structure of World*

In order to describe the character of Being-in-the-world Heidegger must initially re-articulate the philosophical character of ‘world’ (which he describes as *the worldhood of the world*) and its phenomenological structure –that is what it is, to experience world as world. Of significance to Heidegger is how the concept of ‘world’ is something so seemingly trivial that the Western philosophical tradition (from Socrates and even including Nietzsche) has largely taken it for granted, and misconceived world. This taking for granted and misconception of ‘world’ has problematically led to artificial distinctions placed between subject and objects, and self and world (e.g. Cartesian dualism) –which Heidegger seeks to demonstrate to be false. Of concern to Heidegger, then, is how “traditional ontology operates in a blind alley”

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261 It should be noted that there is strong evidence to suggest that Heidegger’s characterizations of Being and *Dasein in Being and Time* is greatly influenced by Eastern philosophical and religious thinking; more specifically, as Richard May makes the strong argument in *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources*, was his exposure to German translations of Daoist classics and Zen Buddhist texts. Fully embracing this influence may or may not be cited as a motivation for what has been described as the ‘turn’ (or more literally, but not necessarily more accurately, ‘reversal’) in Heidegger’s work (*die Kehre*) after the publication of *Being in Time*. William Richardson, S. J., in *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, originally, and controversially, describes this in terms of Heidegger I and Heidegger II. There is no room or time to fully explore that particular reading of his work; what will be said about my approach to Heidegger’s turn is that: 1) As Father Richardson suggests in a new preface to his book, this ‘shift’ has been largely overstated and should be approached as a going deeper into what Heidegger began in *Being and Time,* 2) if there is a ‘change’ or ‘reversal’ to be considered, I follow Hubert Dreyfus’ suggestion, in his Fall 2007 UC Berkley lectures on Heidegger, available online, that Heidegger’s turn was simply a recognition that to speak of *Dasein* ‘broadly’ was a mistake and rather there are differently situated characterizations of *Dasein* to be made; 3) these two points make a satisfactory account of Heidegger’s growing emphasis on dwelling without overstating the differences, per se, between dwelling and activity.
when trying to describe the world’s ‘worldhood’\textsuperscript{262} In taking into account entities, or things in the world, ‘world’ is something already presupposed. This act of presupposing world in this traditional way results in a taking into account of ‘things’ (substances) in the world by assigning value-predicates to self-sufficient beings (i.e. the subject names objects removed from their involved world) and results in the de-worlding of things, says Heidegger. “The concept of world, or the phenomenon thus designated, is what has hitherto not yet been recognized in philosophy.”\textsuperscript{263} In the Western tradition, then, ‘to be’ is to ‘be’ a substance (\textit{res}), which Heidegger calls presence-at-hand [\textit{Vorhandenheit}] and because it deprives the world of its worldhood is not suitable for \textit{Dasein}.\textsuperscript{264}

Rejecting this ‘atomistic’ view of things in ‘the world’, worldhood as such, in Heidegger’s more holistic characterization, takes \textit{Dasein}’s (there-being) Being-in-the-world as always already involved in a structure of significance as primary. Rather than accepting the traditional characterization of ‘Things’ (\textit{res}), Heidegger returns to the original Greek term for things –\textit{pragmata}– “that is to say, that which has to do with one’s concernful dealings (\textit{praxis})”\textsuperscript{265} The Greeks, however, and here Heidegger means particularly Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, left this term “obscure” and understood \textit{pragmata} as proximal substances or “mere Things”. In the hopes of recovering the originary character of \textit{pragmata}, Heidegger deploys the term equipment (\textit{das Zeug}). Heidegger calls the Being of equipment –as a thing always “in-order-to”– readiness-to-hand (\textit{Zuhandenheit}).\textsuperscript{266} Heidegger calls the ‘sight’ by which \textit{Dasein} grasps and deploys the structure of equipment in its everyday concernful dealings circumspection

\textsuperscript{262} Martin Heidegger, \textit{ibid.}, 94.
\textsuperscript{263} Martin Heidegger, \textit{The Basic Problems of Phenomenology}, 165.
\textsuperscript{264} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, 67, 94.
\textsuperscript{265} Martin Heidegger, \textit{ibid.}, 96-97.
\textsuperscript{266} Martin Heidegger, \textit{ibid.}, 97, 98.
What Heidegger means to imply with *Umsicht* is that *Dasein* and readiness-to-hand are taken up together in everyday concerns. The totality of this manifold structure Heidegger calls “significance”.\(^{267}\) Over and against the traditional Western philosophical tradition, our involvement always and already in and with a world of significance –taking up activities and practices in order to take a stand on our own Being– ‘is’ the structure of the worldhood of the world.

The whole of these relations, everything that belongs to the structure of the totality with which the Dasein can in any way give itself something to be understood, to signify to itself its ability to be, we call significance *[Bedeutsamkeit]*. This is the structure of what we call world in the strictly ontological sense. …World is a determination of the Dasein’s being. This is expressed from the outset when we say that Dasein exists as being-in-the-world. The world belongs to the Dasein’s existential constitution. World is not extant but world exists.\(^{268}\)

The phenomenon of the world, then, is characterized as a “meshing” of the worldhood of the world and the structure of Dasein’s equipmental relations –that is, Dasein’s ‘coping’ with being-in-the-world through skills and practices. Although the primordial structure of Dasein and its interconnected relationship with the other two modes of Being, present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, will be further unpacked, world and Dasein should be further characterized in its relation to ‘other’ Daseins.

**MITSEIN AND MITDASEIN**

As an essential part of his characterizations of the existential structure of Dasein –“who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness”– Heidegger emphasizes a critical equiprimordial, multi-personal and social component in his phenomenology.\(^{269}\)

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\(^{267}\) Martin Heidegger, ibid., 120.


\(^{269}\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 149.
Although some philosophers have criticized Heidegger for not giving a greater emphasis to this social component, “Heidegger seeks to show that while there are a plurality of centered disclosing activities, these activities presuppose the disclosure of one shared world.”

In division one, chapter four, of *Being and Time*, the social sphere is not to be interpreted as an additional aspect of *Dasein* but is an existential characteristic of *Dasein*—which Heidegger calls *Mitsein* (being-with) and *Mitdasein* (Dasein-with). Of significant importance to Heidegger is revealing the character of everydayness—the “they”, or as Hubert Dreyfus translates it “the one” in *Dasein*’s being-with.

Heidegger begins by posing the question of the ‘who’ of *Dasein* and exploring a phenomenologically adequate answer. The ‘who’ of the everyday *Dasein* must be considered in its proximal environment; *Dasein* is absorbed in the world. Rather than a present-at-hand self sufficient ‘substance’, in the tradition of Plato and Descartes, the who of *Dasein* is the being who takes a stand on its own Being in and with the everyday concerns and activities of the world. This existence in-the-world, on which *Dasein* takes a stand, is always already shared or public. When considering the work-world of the craftsman, as Heidegger does, the Being of *Dasein* is proximally situated in relation to the equipment the craftsman uses and the ‘Others’ for whom the work is done, and also by whom the work is received. By ‘Other’, however, Heiddeger wants to be clear “we do not mean everyone else but me …” but rather “the world is always the one that I share with Others.”

Heidegger is clear on this point: when we say Being-in-the-world, the world of *Dasein* is a *Mitwelt* (with-world) and Being-in, per se,

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271 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 149.
272 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 153.
273 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 154-155.
is always a being-with other Daseins – and so the Being of Dasein must be characterized as Mitdasein (Dasein-with). In this way, the very structure of what it means to be a human being is to ever be there-being-with; and the world of Dasein, says Heidegger, is lived as a with-world.\textsuperscript{274} The existential structure of Dasein and of ‘Others’ always ever is equiprimordially situated in, with, and for others. Somewhat similar to Sorge (care) – which is seen in the comportment which Dasein has towards equipment ready-to-hand – Heidegger characterizes Dasein’s Being towards ‘other’ Dasein as Fürsorge or solicitude.

\textbf{BEFINDLICHKEIT, VERSTEHEN AND DIE REDE}

Existentially, the Being of Dasein, says Heidegger, is disclosed spatially in-the-world as a ‘there-Being’. The ‘there’ in Heidegger’s description means that to be human is to be specifically situated in a ‘location’, both proximally present and being towards the distant (more accurately, our thereness implies that the ‘distant’ is less remote or Entfernheit) in all our trajectories and concernful dealings in everyday life. In taking its ‘there’ with it, the existential-ontological structure of Dasein is such that it brings its disclosedness with it in its proximal activities. The ‘there’ of Dasein means that “it is itself the clearing [Lichtung]\textsuperscript{275} and “only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way”, says Heidegger, “does that which is present-at-hand [that which is hidden and inaccessible] become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark.”\textsuperscript{276}

\textsuperscript{274} Martin Heidegger, ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{275} Hubert Dreyfus points out that in Lichtung [Licht means light and Lichtung is literally a clearing in the forest that lets the light in] Heidegger “relates Dasein’s openness to the tradition which extends from Plato to the Enlightenment of equating intelligibility with illumination.” Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 163.
\textsuperscript{276} Martin Heidegger, ibid., 171.
borrow a helpful description from Hubert Dreyfus, the existential-ontological structure of *Dasein* moves in-the-world as a field of disclosure.\(^{277}\)

Being-there is equiprimordially constituted as *Befindlichkeit, Verstehen*, and *das Rede* – the latter articulates both *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* in everyday proximal activity. What this means is that the existential everydayness of *Dasein*, situated in a nexus of cares in-the-world, is constituted by, and manifested in, these particular phenomena. Being-there as *Befindlichkeit* – “the state in which one founds oneself” – is a recognition of ‘our’ attunement (*die Stimmung*) to the phenomena of our everyday cares of being-in-the-world and with and through that, our attunement to ‘the world’. Contrary to the Macquarrie and Robinson translation [state-of-mind] however, *Befindlichkeit* is not a subjective mental activity nor is *die Stimmung* an exclusively subjective psychological “inner-state”. *Stimmung* implies a far more corporal and holistic mode of being-in-the-world. Heidegger’s word choice here is, as always, provocative and revealing; *Stimmung* literally means the tuning of an instrument.\(^{278}\) According to Heidegger, then, “the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to *die Stimmung*”.\(^{279}\) *Stimmung* runs deeper and wider than rationalist notions of ‘cognition’ – indeed, all forms of ‘cognition’ grow out of, and build on, *Stimmung*. Alternatively, Hubert Dreyfus points out that *die Stimmung* is not to be interpreted as a “third-person, objective behavior”.\(^{280}\) Rather, *die Stimmung* is a situational-in-the-world comportment

\(^{277}\) Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 163.
\(^{278}\) Martin Heidegger, ibid., n172.
\(^{279}\) Martin Heidegger, ibid., 173.
\(^{280}\) Here, Dreyfus cites Wittgenstein as an example of a “modified behaviorist approach”; however, Fergus Kerr’s *Theology After Wittgenstein* makes it clear that this is an erroneous suggestion. According to Hubert Dreyfus’s 2007 lectures on Heidegger, made public on Apple Corporation’s *iTunes U*, Dreyfus suggests that a new edition of his commentary on *Being and Time* will have significant corrections. Perhaps this will be included in that updated volume?
in a public nexus –as *Being-in-the-world*– which reveals. Said differently, *die Stimmung* encompasses our own directedness/adaptation/behavior towards, in relation to, and involvement with, our everyday concerns and the ‘entities’ involved in them. Because *die Stimmung*, as a mode of revealing, is not something ‘we have’ but is always something ‘we are in’ –as Dermot Moran claims, “a way the world itself appears”– we can never rise above nor detach from ‘the world’ in order to gain insight. Heidegger calls the recognition of the situated disclosure of *Dasein grundstimmung* –a recognition of ‘thrownness’ We are thrown into a situated nexus of beliefs, practices signs and symbols; this everyday *Stimmung* “determine not just what we do but *how things show up for us.*”

*Verstehen* –the second way of Being-in-the-world by which Heidegger characterizes the equiprimordial constitution of *Dasein* in its ‘there’ and often translated into English as ‘Understanding’– is not to be confused as primarily a cognitive state. “It might be said that understanding [as achievement, *Verständnis*] is a type of cognition and, correspondingly, understanding [as act, *Verstehen*] is a specific type of *cognitive comportment.*” However, Being-there as understanding is the projection [*Entwurf*], or literally the throwing, of *Dasein* into the possibility of its Being-in-the-world, and thereby and therewith, the ‘possibility-aspect’ and ‘possibility-dimension’ of ‘world’. “In the projecting [*Entwurf*] of the understanding [*Verstehen*], entities are disclosed in their possibility.” This point is significant to note, as *Verstehen* will continue to play a crucial role in the unfolding of the dissertation. In his *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains that *Verstehen* is the condition by which human

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281 Dermot Moran, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 241
282 *Geworfenheit*
283 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 172.
284 Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 275. (emphasis mine)
there-beings project the possibilities of being. “It is the condition of possibility for all kinds of comportment, not only practical but also cognitive”.286 Understanding is not only the unveiling of Dasein’s possibility but it is the unveiling of Dasein as the possibility it projects. “As projecting,” Heidegger says, “understanding is the kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities.”287 Understanding, as existentially primordial projection, is the claim that the there of Being is inextricably tied, not only to its comportments, but also more importantly to the possibilities of Being.

Although Heidegger does not spell it out, principally, we can say that Verstehen also brings to light the primary involvement of the human imagination in our everyday lives. How we will comport ourselves, the equipment we will craft, and who we will be are dependent on human imagining such possibilities. Beyond simple logical contingency, this characterization is a far deeper and ontologically more originary concept of possibility. Heidegger says, “[the Human being] is in every case what it can be and in the way in which it is its possibility . . . as projecting, understanding is the kind of Being of [the Human being] in which it is its possibilities as possibilities.”288 As we move forward and play out this move, then, it is important to note that the projection of possibilities by a there-Being—who is existentially-ontologically characterized by those possibilities–in modes of revealing, disclosing, and unconcealing are indeed a central feature to Dasein because there is a fundamental existential relationship between who we are, how we comport ourselves and the manner in which we dwell in-the-world.

286 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems in Phenomenology, 276.
287 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 185.
288 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 183-184.
Finally, *das Rede* is the third specialized Heideggarian feature of the equiprimordial constitution of *Dasein* in its ‘there’. *Rede* is far deeper and more varied than basic linguistic ‘discourse’ (as Macquarrie and Robinson gloss it). Heidegger, however, uses *das Rede* to show the ontological foundation of language by first establishing a necessary link between *Befindlichkeit*, *Understanding* and hermeneutical concerns which arise from signification. *Rede* (literally talk) is glossed by Dreyfus as ‘telling’ and includes various non-linguistic senses of the English ‘tell’ to deliberately accentuate the inclusion of its non-linguistic deployment in Heidegger’s usage. Dreyfus points out that in English the transitive function of ‘to tell’ implies the ability to distinguish. The ability to distinguish or make sense of a variety of phenomena and equipment (*das Zeug*) is a knowledge acquired through use and activity. “In complex domains”, says Dreyfus, “one does not have words for the subtle actions one performs and the subtle significations one articulates in performing them.”

So, like *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen*, *das Rede* discloses the ‘thereness’ of Being-in-the-world. *Das Rede*, however, also allows for ‘thereness’ to be Articulated (note capital A) verbally, through language, by “attaching words to significations” in a variety of life practices.

Rather than being “the sum total of all the words printed in a dictionary”, verbal language (*die Sprache*) exists in-the-world (dwells) with *Dasein* before being expressed as a disclosure of signification. *Dasein* dwells in language. Rather than a

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289 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 215.
290 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 217. cf: Ludwig Wittgenstein
291 cf: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 121; Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems* 208; Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 217-218; Heidegger makes a monumental leap in his argumentation when he says ‘*Die Hinausgesprochenheit der Rede ist die Sprache*’ (Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204n). If *das Rede* is to be effectively argued as being ‘pre-linguistic’ or existing in-the-world before an occurent (however not limited to being occurent) disclosure of signification then it should follow that it can (and has been in various cultures) be expressed in non-linguistic terms such as image, sound and/or crafts in the exercising of various skills in intelligent practices. Heidegger himself says, “it is not the case that first there are the words, which are coined as signs for meanings, but just the reverse—it is from the Dasein which understands itself and the world, from a significance-contexture already
characterization of language as the sum total of tonal expressions which correspond to abstract ideas or entities, “language is used in a shared context that is already meaningful, and it gets its meaning by fitting into, and contributing to, a meaningful whole”. Without the ‘shared context’ – which cannot be overlooked when articulating the significance of das Rede – verbal communication would be reduced to the Cartesian fallacy of an isolated subject/mind passing information on to another isolated subject/mind discussing a tertiary object. Heidegger says,

communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, such as opinions or wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another. Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a [Mitbefindlichkeit] and a co-understanding. In [das Rede] Being-with becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has not been taken hold of and appropriated.

Heidegger goes on to point out that as constituent of Being-in-the-world das Rede partly originates ‘outside’ (not to be understood in the ‘Cartesian’ sense) as the ‘making known’ of Befindlichkeit, which is the recognition of our attunment [die Stimmung] to unveiled, that a word accrues to each of these meanings.” (Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems, 208-209)

Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 219; Dreyfus’s language must be taken to task here. Anticipating the chapter on Tolkien’s project of philological recovery, it is conceivable that Heidegger’s work makes room for not only language used ‘in a shared context that is already meaningful’ (Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 219. emphasis mine) but ‘in a shared context that was meaningful’. Also, the shared context and general activity in which language is and was used must take into consideration particular linguistic and grammatical elements which make up a language particular to a people such as, but not limited to, phonological and morphological traits. (E.g. Tolkien’s constructed language and legendarium based on his aesthetic appreciation and nostalgic attraction to the name Earendil) With this we can also add the variety of possible shared contexts which might be or become meaningful and/or might be imagined to be meaningful. Here we should immediately think of J. R. R. Tolkien and what this means for the possibilities of what might be called ‘serious’ fantasy, fiction, and numerous other crafted lifeworlds. What do these elements tell us about a specific people and the manner in which they dwell/ed in-the-world? These concerns take Heidegger’s philological/poetic philosophy to task – especially in light of epochal and aesthetic concerns demonstrated thus far.

In Wittgensteinian terms: private language (and the above picture of communication) is incoherent.

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 205.
phenomena in-the-world. And, as we will see, Verstehen is once again principally involved and drawn upon in this ‘making known’ / ‘recognition’. This is not to say that ‘outside’ implies its origination external to a subject, but rather, communication of the ‘thereness’ of Being –through the ‘disclosure’ of features of our Umwelt– is inextricably linked to the proximal nexus of existential concernful dealings and equipmental significations. “That is”, Dreyfus says that among its other uses, “Dasein uses language as a tool to point out aspects of its shared world.”

This is highlighted by two possibilities which arise from das Rede: hearing and silence, both of which are contrasted to ‘idle talk’ [Gerede].

Hearing, a basic necessity for linguistic das Rede, discloses the link between das Rede and Verstehen. Heidegger points out that hearing, rather than being pictured as the exclusive claim of the subjectivity of an isolated listener, is about being-in-the-world with others. “Being-with”, he says, “develops in listening to one another [Aufeinander-hören]”. Even more primordial is hearkening [Horchen] which is the hearing –not of abstract sounds but– of sounds Dasein is situated in-the-world with. Rather than the general or abstract, a ‘noise’ or a ‘sound’, I hear the fan of my computer spinning, the truck’s engine revving, the keys of my computer being struck; I hear my office mate asking me a question, and hearken to the call for help, I act accordingly, and so on. I not only hear but I exist in and with what I hear; and furthermore, I verstehe what I am hearing. As mentioned previously, verstehen “is not a mode of cognition but the basic determination of existing.”

295 Heidegger notes that “in ‘poetical’ discourse [das Rede], the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s state-of-mind [Befindlichkeit] can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 205.

296 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 221.

297 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 206.

298 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems in Phenomenology, 277-278.
to register but to transform or add to Dasein in a way that wasn’t with Dasein before. It is always involved, and involved in action and practices.

Heidegger also claims that keeping silent is a possibility of das Rede. This raises the question; how can silence be a possible expression of discourse [das Rede]? If human discourse reveals the possibility of being (that is Verstehen) and the state in which one finds oneself (that is Befindlichkeit), then, as Heidegger puts it, reticence to enter into discourse ‘speaks’ –and discloses– volumes. Of course reticence is not the only form of silent expression. It is certainly possible to find little ‘reticences’ in one’s bodily and facial expressions. And often lovers or friends are able to be silent and still be-with, expressing a great deal. In order to make his point more clearly, Heidegger contrasts silence with a new term –Gerede– to describe a loquaciousness that buries understanding under the trivial; it is an ‘everyday’ talk that ‘uproots’, and ‘cuts off’, and is closely related to our ‘fallennes’. Gerede [literally translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as ‘idle talk’] could be best described as Rede which does not dwell. “Idle talk . . . is the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein’s understanding”, Heidegger says, “when that understanding has been uprooted.” Great care must be made in the explication of Gerede since a strong sense of value judgment could, and has been, associated with this concept. Heidegger begins his discussion of Gerede by pointing out that it should not be associated with “a ‘disparaging’ signification”:

299 I will gloss das Rede as discourse in order to show the word’s approximate value as an English translation.
300 ‘Falleness’ is a particularly important but problematic description in Sein und Zeit. In the pull of the everyday the ‘authentic’ life suffers. So, for example, Gerede is an ‘inauthentic’ mode of ‘discourse’. This is tremendously insightful because it levies a value judgment –although Heidegger claims it does not– on particularly unhelpful modes of Being-in-the-world. However, two points need to be made. First, the critique of ‘everydayness’ is particularly problematic. Heidegger links fallenness to das Man or ‘the They’ which implies a sense of ‘mass’ logic, action or communication, which in some ways makes sense, but to link the ‘inauthentic’ to everyday ‘idle chatter’ is altogether problematic. This brings me to the second point. We do live authentic and meaningful lives of deep communication, relationships, and activities in the midst of everydayness. This contradiction must be played out further.
301 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 214. (emphasis mine)
**Gerede** “constitutes the kind of Being of everyday Dasein’s understanding and interpreting”. And yet, when this phenomenological analysis is situated in the context of being-in-the-world the results could be (and have been) otherwise. Questions abound. What kind of people, what kind of art, what kind of writing slips into Gerede? The simple answer is that we all do slip into Gerede and quite often, especially in the company of others, for the pull of the ‘everyday’ leads to a getting lost in ‘what one does’. What does Gerede look like in the lived world? Nevertheless, there is a debilitating superficiality and quality of alienation inherent in Gerede which merits an attentive phenomenological reading. Communication is the expression of das Rede. Heidegger says this occurs on two levels: first, communication on an everyday level allows for general understanding however, the primordial structure of Being-with articulated in das Rede is glossed over in everyday communication. Mitbefindlichkeit is greatly impoverished and Dasein’s ability to ‘hearken to’ is truncated as superficiality permeates Dasein’s nexus of signification –and as a result, Dasein’s Being. Because of the interpenetrating relationship of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and Being-with, this existential uprooting is the distortion of (or perverting of) “the act of disclosing [Erschliessen] into an act of closing off [Verschliessen] [. . .]. Ontologically this means”, he later says, “that when Dasein maintains itself in idle talk, it is –as Being-in-the-world– cut off from its primary and primordially genuine relationships-of-Being towards the world, towards Dasein-with, and towards its very Being-in.” In short, deception and triviality –even unorganized and unintentional– affects us ontologically.

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302 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 211.
303 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 213-214.
Questions raised in the Baudrillard chapter concerning an independent and verifiable reality (now seen in the larger tradition of post-Cartesian demands for ‘proofs of the external world’) are intimately related to previously addressed (‘linguistic’) concerns surrounding the nature of the sign. As already mentioned, Heidegger’s ultimate critique of the semiological view of the sign is the position “that signifying is an ontologically basic relation” between signifier and signified. Heidegger’s overall picture of Being-in-the-world and Being-there effectively dismantles Baudrillardian picturing in principle and in detail. In contrast to that view of signification, Heidegger (and similarly Wittgenstein as we will soon see) sees the sign as an item of das Zeug whose meaning is imbedded in a particular activity, which in turn, is situated in a complex nexus of concernful dealings In-der-Welt. Following this phenomenological reading of the sign, Heidegger similarly reconsiders the philosophical question concerning the problem of reality along with the problem of Truth. This account unfolds from what has already been described about Being-In as such.

Previously, Heidegger has insisted on the originary relationship of Dasein (Being-there) as In-der-Welt-Sein (Being-in-the-world). Hubert Dreyfus says, “human beings are never directly in the world; we are always in the world by way of being in some specific circumstances.” This situatedness is never split between a subject and an object which would betray the previously mentioned necessary relationship of the concernful dealings of Dasein and equipmental entities. What follows from this nexus is a radical hermeneutics of Being which re-evaluates spatiality and ultimately what constitutes reality.

304 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 100.
305 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 163.
The question begins with considering what is the ‘There’ (Da) in the notion of Being-there (Dasein)? What are the implications of ‘there’? Does ‘there’ imply a specific locality in a relationship between a subject and object? Doesn’t the noun ‘there’ suggest a division between ‘here’ and ‘yonder’? Heidegger says, “Dasein begins its ‘there’ along with it. If it lacks its ‘there’, it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein”.\(^{306}\) In a latter essay, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, he develops this idea when he refers to being-there and spatiality: “to say that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations. And only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces by their very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in going through spaces we do not give up our standing in them.”\(^{307}\) Heidegger develops the situatedness of Dasein in the originary notion of Lichtung in Sein und Zeit.

*Lichtung* is another difficult Heideggarian term to translate –not because its meaning is elusive (*Lichtung* carries a double meaning: it literally means a clearing in the forest but it also refers to the illumination or lighting [Licht] that clearing allows in) but in the way the term is applied. *Lichtung* is an aspect of the situatedness of Being-there as Being-in-the-world situated in specific circumstances. Ontologically –and by this I mean “the existential-ontological structure of this entity”, as Heidegger refers to it\(^{308}\)– Dasein, as In-der-Welt-Sein is Lichtung. “Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way,” Heidegger claims, “does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light [Licht] or hidden in the dark.”\(^{309}\) There is no ontological break or split (subject/object) between Dasein and entities In-der-Welt.

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\(^{306}\) Martin Heidegger, ibid., 171.


\(^{308}\) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 171.

\(^{309}\) Martin Heidegger, ibid., 171.
As has been highlighted, *Dasein*, as *In-der-Welt-Sein*, is inextricably linked, ontologically, to an everyday nexus of concernful dealings; and in this, to all the things/features that are involved in them. Any discussion, however, of a human being’s inter-connection to the world and the things in the world must necessarily turn towards an epistemological discussion of *reality* and *truth*. Heidegger offers a highly critical examination, undermining, and in effect dismantling the ‘Cartesian’ and Kantian traditions previously mentioned. To begin, “Heidegger wants to reformulate and thereby dissolve the philosophical problems concerning the possibility of knowing an independent reality.”\(^{310}\) The ‘problem of reality’ is inherited from the philosophical principle and pictures of knowing through perception (*noein*) built up within an overall picture of ‘separated’ ‘subject’ (or consciousness) and ‘object’ (‘thing’) that are supposedly related by ‘representations’ / ‘images’ which are ‘in’ the subject.\(^{311}\) In Heideggarian terms, this ‘picturing’ uproots occurrent objects from their equipmental nexus of everyday comportments. This ‘idle’ tendency is compounded by the (‘Cartesian’) philosophical project to ‘prove’ this uprooted Reality external to the observer-subject. Heidegger wants to demonstrate, however, that “to *have faith* in the Reality of the ‘external world’, whether rightly or wrongly; to *prove* this Reality for it, whether adequately or inadequately; to *presuppose* it, whether explicitly or not . . . presuppose a subject which is proximally *worldless* or unsure of its world, and which must, at bottom, first assure itself a world.”\(^{312}\) The ‘scandal of philosophy’, Heidegger asserts, is the repeated attempt –or the very conception of an attempt– to prove the

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\(^{310}\) Hubert Dreyfus, *ibid.*, 246.

\(^{311}\) As has been noted earlier, Baudrillard is highly critical of this picturing (e.g. ‘the semiotic’) however much of his own picture of resistance (‘the symbolic’) and his diagnosis of the ‘problem’ (‘hyperreality’) are dependent on this characterization.

\(^{312}\) Martin Heidegger, *ibid.*, 250. (Heidegger’s use of quotations and emphasis)
existence of an external, independent and verifiable reality. There have only ever been variations of this problem.

Attempts to solve such a ‘problem’ range from realism, which privileges the ontic reality of objects which correspond to representations or images through some judgment of verisimilitude, to idealism and the internal accessibility of objects (to a subjective consciousness) in an otherwise external Reality (‘object’ ‘things’) in the res cogitans. The inherent fallacy of this project is a misunderstanding of Dasein and In- der-Welt-Sein. “Part of the trouble”, Dreyfus says, “is that the tradition does not distinguish between the ‘world’ (universe) as a totality of objects and the world as the organized equipment and practices in which Dasein is involved, indeed, in terms of which Dasein defines itself.” We need to understand why Dasein “has the tendency to bury the ‘external world’ in nullity ‘epistemologically’ before going on to prove it”?

Dreyfus notes Heidegger’s use of ‘Curiosity’ [neugier] – a form of ‘falling’ associated with gerede– to highlight the essential fallacy traditional ontology makes in a discussion of reality. This fallacy originates by privileging an uprooted notion of perception and claims that “ultimate reality is made up of context free independent substances.”

Understanding the susceptibility of Dasein to falling and its impact on a discussion about reality is vitally important, as “intelligibility” is relative to Dasein; apart from Dasein there is no intelligible or unintelligible. The articulation of the

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313 The use of this term by Heidegger, beginning in the introduction of Sein und Zeit, is a reference to part IV of Descartes Discourse on Method and the tradition which was discussed earlier in the chapter.
314 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 248.
315 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 250.
316 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 246. See also Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 214-217.
317 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 257.
world—through das Rede\textsuperscript{318}—involves the emergence of reality. This is what Heidegger means when he says, “the world is disclosed essentially along with the Being of Dasein; with the disclosedness of the world, the ‘world’ has in each case been discovered too.”\textsuperscript{319} However, this does not imply that occurrent entities only ever ‘are’ when they are in relation to Dasein as das Zeug. Heidegger is very specific in pointing out “the fact that Reality is ontologically grounded in the Being of Dasein, does not signify that only when Dasein exists and as long as Dasein exists, can the Real be as that which in itself is.”\textsuperscript{320} Reality is dependent upon the intelligibility of Dasein but what is Real ‘is’, with or without Dasein.

Inevitably, this discussion of Reality and the Real in relation to Dasein directly relates to a discussion of ‘truth’. As with the problem of ‘Reality’, Heidegger hopes to undermine the traditional notion of ‘truth’ as the correspondence between the thinking-assertion of an occurrent subject and, or very often, an occurrent object.\textsuperscript{321} Heidegger’s fundamental trajectory throughout his Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) is to question the underlying picture of the subject-object relationship and resituate our understanding of Dasein on the continuum of Being—which has been done thus far. To the question of ‘truth’, then, Dasein ‘is’ that being which presupposes there is truth because the there-being ontologically resides primordially ‘in the truth’—“[‘truth’] is a kind of Being which belongs to Dasein”.\textsuperscript{322} However, because of ‘falling’ the “state of [Dasein’s]  

\textsuperscript{318} “The intelligibility of something has always been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in discourse, is what we have called ‘meaning’. That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the totality-of-significations [Bedeutungsganze]” (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 203-204) Also cf: Sections 19, 20, 21 for Heidegger’s discussion of worldliness and occurrentness.
\textsuperscript{319} Martin Heidegger, ibid., 247.
\textsuperscript{320} Martin Heidegger, ibid., 255.
\textsuperscript{321} The tradition of the adaequatio intellectus et rei from Parmenides, and Aristotle to Aquinas and Kant.
\textsuperscript{322} Martin Heidegger, ibid., 270. (Heidegger’s italicized emphasis)
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Being is such that it is in ‘untruth’.323 This seemingly contradictory logic must be unpacked further. Walter Biemel reminds us that to say that Dasein is ‘in the truth’ is not to say that Dasein ‘possesses’ truth but that Dasein is situated to ‘disclose truth’ “thus making entities available to itself, inquiring about them, explaining them, forming them and so on”.324 This inextricable relationship between Dasein, disclosedness, and ‘truth’ is of fundamental importance to Heidegger’s re-description of ‘truth’ – or more accurately, his recovery of what he believes to be a primordial understanding of ‘truth’ as ‘unhiddenness’, or aletheia (ἀλήθεια), found in the fragments of Heraclitus.325 “Heidegger’s aim”, Biemel reminds us, “is by no means to provide merely a more literal translation [of aletheia] but, on the contrary, to bring into view the experience which is associated with this phenomenon.”326 Heidegger’s aim of recovering the forgotten meaning of aletheia can be found in Heraclitus: “logos is declared to be that which tells us how it is with things – the foolish forget it; it sinks back into hiddenness for them.”327 Heidegger connects this originary picture of ‘truth’ as ‘illumination’, the play between unhiddenness and hiddenness, between light and dark, back to Dasein in the previously mentioned Lichtung. This ‘clearing’ makes truth claims possible; for Heidegger, the basic character of Dasein is disclosedness.328

On a more ordinary level then, truthful assertions are simply part of the vast array of das Zeug, which functions as scaffolding in Dasein’s attempt to make sense of the world. The relationship between assertion and ‘occurrent object’ “gets its meaning and its ability to refer by being embedded in a set of shared practices – practices that

323 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 264.
324 Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, 64.
325 The fragments of Parmenides and Anaxamander are also very important to Heidegger but since Heraclitus is specifically mentioned in Being and Time I will make the point with him.
326 Walter Biemel, ibid., 63.
327 Walter Biemel, ibid., 63. (emphasis mine)
328 Martin Heidegger, ibid., 263.
make meaning and reference possible as long as the practitioners dwell in them.”

How then is un-truth possible? Dreyfus points out two possibilities. On a practical level, one source of untruth can be attributed to the misuse or un-skilled use of assertions as *das Zeug*. However, on an existentially primordial level, because Dasein is ‘falling’ it always runs the inevitable risk of ontologically being-in a state of untruth or concealedness. For instance, the ‘idle’ use of assertions occurs when “we try to stabilize such evidence and preserve it in language beyond the time and place in which it occurs.”

In the later writings of Maritn Heidegger, both *Art* and *Technology* are identified as two possible, related, but very different modes of unconcealing (revealing) the hidden truthfulness of entities. Heidegger –along with Baudrillard, Mumford and Boorstin (as well as Tolkien and Malick)– is similarly concerned with the emerging role of mechanization in the early 20th century and its effects on what it means to be a human being. For him, art is a mode of revealing grounded in the everyday practices of being-in-the-world. Through art, not only do we reveal entities as Being-in-the-world truthfully, but later Heidegger argues the only authentic way for *Dasein* (there-being) to comport, to live, to practice is to dwell poetically (*ποίησις / poïesis*), bringing forth from hiddenness what is not yet present. We dwell as poetic beings whose craft is ontologically bound to who we are and the kind of world we live in. As a practiced craft and an expression of technical skill (*τέχνη / techne*), Heidegger compares and contrasts art with another mode of revealing –technology.

Heidegger reminds us that technology does not simply do something; it is a mode of revealing: *because of this involvement with us, it shapes the way we live, and take in the world*. Reminiscent of what has already been said by Lewis Mumford and

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329 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 273.
330 Hubert Dreyfus, ibid., 274.
Jean Baudrillard, technology is not to be viewed merely, or even mainly, as instrument or means but rather as essential to the manner in which we relate to other entities, to the world and to each other. When we live and reveal technologically there is always the possibility –though not a necessity– of what Heidegger calls enframing (*Gestell*). Enframing is a mode of disclosure that reveals everything as *Bestand*: the transformation of our craft, ourselves and the world into things to be used, a *thing-resource* or ‘stock’ to be utilized, commodified, harvested and bulldozed. Through enframing we come to see and use everything as usable, commodifiable stock and become alienated from our existential state of *dwelling*.

The manner in which human beings *are* as mortals, says Heidegger, is dwelling. At our most primordial, dwelling comes to pass in our preservation of what he calls the *fourfold*. The fourfold is the poetic unity of earth, sky, divinities (or what Heidegger calls “the holy sway of the godhead, [who] appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment”), and mortals –in each, says Heidegger, “we are already thinking of the other three along with them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.”

Our poetic unity is related to what he calls *die Stimmung* or a recognition of ‘our’ attunement to the phenomena of our everyday cares of being-in-the-world. As a primordial mode of revealing *die Stimmung* is not something ‘we have’ but is always something ‘we are in’ –“a way the world itself appears” as well as a how-we-are, and a way-we-are. In very basic terms we can say that we get tuned up through our sensitivity, our letting be and bringing forth. This primordial poetic state is in fundamental contrast with the state that ‘sees’ only technological usability and commodifiable stock. And so, we enter a new epoch of human existence, laments Heidegger. In this new epoch we are threatened by the possibility that we may be ‘cut

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off” from more primordial and meaningful modes of disclosure and ways-of-being. While similar in concern with Baudrillard’s ‘age of simulation’ and ‘hyperreality’, Heidegger’s concerns are far more grounded and workable in everyday activities.

We move, now, from phenomenology concerned with human being and living to phenomenology concerned with human forms of life particularly concerned with language. Many of Heidegger’s characterizations about Being-in-the-World, language, and lifeworld, find resonance in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who may best be described in this context as a ‘linguistic phenomenologist’. In anticipation of J. R. R. Tolkien’s work in Chapter 4, Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* is particularly useful in further articulating the relationship between language use, human activities, and forms of life. Like Heidegger, Wittgenstein believes that the philosophical problem of self and world can be addressed through a description of language use in everyday comportments. These “language-games” will allow us to move beyond some of the more problematic elements in Heidegger while maintaining his phenomenological insights regarding meaningful forms of life. The two share perspectives on embodied people and living in the world, perspectives which free them from Cartesian and other distortions.

**WITTGENSTEIN: FORMS OF LIFE**

Like an image out of Lewis Mumford’s work, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) imagines language as a labyrinth-like city. A maze of old houses, some in a state of disuse, with a mix of newer homes all surrounded by newly developed neighborhoods and boroughs all orderly and uniform. There are even vast sections of the city which are forgotten and covered over –abandoned in favor of contemporary...

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uses and/or razed by an emerging order like the fate of the Aztec Tenochtitlan or the puma-shaped Inca city of Cuzco. This description of human living as being embedded within the complex weave of life, as Fergus Kerr describes it, and the acquisition of language, meaning, and a sense of world in human activity, is not only a direct challenge to the Cartesian subject/world dichotomy and the pictures of language, knowledge and human living which have emerged from that dichotomy, but are also closely tied to the picture of human living and world previously mentioned and built up in the work of Martin Heidegger. Indeed, Wittgenstein says, “to imagine a language means to imagine a life-form” [eine Lebensform]; speaking a language is part of a complex and historically contingent social nexus of human comportments and practices.333 “To equate the self with the world of experience”, says Fergus Kerr speaking of Wittgenstein’s later work, “is a radical way of bringing it out into the open, so to speak, without eliminating it. The ‘I’ is not hidden in the head; it is the world viewed.”334 In contrast to the external Forms of Plato, Descartes’s Cogito and Kant’s noumenon, Wittgenstein cryptically says, “essence [das Wesen] is expressed in grammar.”335 What Wittgenstein means by these obviously highly specialized uses of ‘grammar’ and ‘language’ must be unpacked further to see how his work aids in the critique put forward in this chapter and plays a role in the development of a new methodology.

In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein’s response to the presuppositions of Cartesian dualism, the metaphysics of presence, and false pictures of reference, shows how truth and meaning is understood through the study of language and how language functions in human living. The Investigations begin with a critique of a

334 Fergus Kerr, ibid., 98.
335 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ibid., 98.
particular characterization of language found in the fourth century *Confessions* of St. Augustine:

> When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified [quarum rerum signa essent]; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.  

In this example, says Wittgenstein, we are clearly confronted with a traditional picture of language as words that correlate to meaning and stand as representations for external objects.  

Fergus Kerr points out in *Theology After Wittgenstein* that Wittgenstein “must have known that, in electing to start his book with a conception expressed by Augustine, he was invoking the decisive representative of that interweaving of metaphysical anthropology with Christian faith that remains the background of modern Western thought.” In contrast, Wittgenstein bids us to imagine a different scenario altogether:

> I send someone shopping, I give him a slip marked “five red apples”. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked “apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the

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337 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ibid., 2e. We also confront the very familiar picture of a human being – here historically influenced by the Neoplatonic tradition– as a private, self-contained mind that encounters the external world.

338 Fergus Kerr, ibid., 39.
series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them by heart—up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.\textsuperscript{339}

This banal example is deployed to draw attention back to what is given in human existence. “Language is a conversation that is interwoven with the characteristic activities of human life.”\textsuperscript{340} Wittgenstein notes, there is no need to speculate as to the nature of words and meaning; we are only concerned with how the words are “used”—how they are embedded, in this case, in the particular activity of ‘shopping’. A word’s particular usage within the day-to-day existence and activity is what Wittgenstein calls grammar. Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation reveals the oversimplified and assumed picture of language that is handed down to us.\textsuperscript{341} It is this oversimplified picture that is the source of misunderstanding and wrong headed philosophical pictures of the world.

Wittgenstein’s investigation of language use is aided through the distinguishing description “language-games”. “Wittgenstein’s concept of a language-game is clearly to be set over and against the idea of language as a system of meaningful signs that can be considered in abstraction from its actual employment.”\textsuperscript{342} What he intends by his talk of “language-games” is to re-characterize language, both its acquisition and deployment, as an activity woven into the daily comportments and practices of human living. “When we look at such simple forms of language”, says Wittgenstein, “the mental mist which seems to enshroud our ordinary use of language disappears.”\textsuperscript{343}

Reminiscent of Heidegger’s das Zeug and das Rede, Wittgenstein imagines words as
tools in a tool-box to be deployed for use (sometimes skilfully and other times not so skilfully) in the appropriate activity – such as selecting and purchasing ‘five red apples’. In contrast, Augustine’s description of a child’s language acquisition, says Wittgenstein, presupposes that the child has his own language, albeit ‘foreign’, in which he ‘thinks’ or ‘talks to himself’ in his attempts to correlate the words of the ‘new’ language to objects and actions. Rather than simply a discussion of language, then, Wittgenstein contrasts these two scenarios in order to re-imagine a conception of self (in the world). All of this is to say that language acquisition and use are not isolated activities but are “embedded in the significantly structured lives of groups of active human agents” – within the complex weave of human living.

Like Heidegger’s das Zeug, Wittgenstein’s picture of language-games is built up from the question: “What are signs?” As Wittgenstein describes in his preliminary study for the Philosophical Investigations entitled The Blue and Brown Books, language games are a rejection of the generalizing tendency to treat the meaning of words as images (or ‘things’) that ‘correlate’ to the word. Rarely, Wittgenstein says later on, do we use language according to a strict ‘calculus’ of rules; in radical contradistinction, language-games disclose the originary concern with the ways in which we use signs:

The foundation of the ability to play a game lies in training; the ability to play it is mastery of a technique. Playing games is a human activity, and its existence presupposes common reactions, propensities, and abilities. The ‘gap’ between rules

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345 Ludwig Wittgenstein, ibid., 13–14; see also the excellent explication in Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, 38-42, 56-57.
346 Marie McGinn, ibid., 51.
and their application, which is bridged by training and familiarity with the practice of playing, is in plain view.\textsuperscript{349}

Rather than being hidden in minds or laid over ‘things’, Wittgenstein’s language investigation reveals how meaning, knowledge, and use are all tied up and embedded into the ‘teeming swarm’ of human activity – into daily life.

Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, in their different ways, help to provide the scaffolding for a new methodological approach into the problems of hyperreality and the other varied problems emerging. Far from a retreat from the postmodern questioning raised thus far via Eco and Baudrillard, the concern in the first part of this chapter has been to rearticulate the incredibly complex character of human being-in-the-world. There is also an inherent theological question that demands to be addressed: in light of the problems discussed thus far, how do we articulate the nature of ‘true’ existence in everydayness? Heidegger and Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenological’ approach to living and being a person, and language’s role in this, make room for meaningful space, and the ability to craft, discourse, and dwell there.

\section*{Part II:}
\textbf{Tim Ingold’s Meshwork Praxeology: Tactical Lines of Wayfaring, Mapping and Inhabitation}

Continuing to build upon the alternative methodology already suggested in this chapter, I aim to offer a different approach to the questions raised in Chapter 1 and subsequently broadened, albeit problematically, in Chapter 2. I will draw on the writings of anthropologist Tim Ingold, whose work is endemic of the increasingly interdisciplinary nature of scholarship attuned to the complex weave of human forms of

life. Principally, I aim to 1) re-characterize many of the early principles behind Baudrillard’s hyperreality as constituting a *colonization of the human imagination and human forms of life*; and highlight the importance of 2) the ‘de-colonization’ of the human imagination through 3) acts of nomadic guerrilla resistance (of which crafting lifeworlds that reveal poetic modes of being and expressing in the world is a part) that rupture the fabric of the prosaic colonizing order. To accomplish this response I will show that human imagining, often disesteemed and mis-characterized in the Cartesian tradition as an inferior image picture faculty of correspondence to an external world, is firmly situated at the epicenter of the hyperreality phenomenon because it is a comportment integrally related to a broad range of human activities embedded within forms of life.

What I want to highlight, and will subsequently function as a central critique of Baudrillard’s early development of hyperreality, is what Baudrillard mis-characterizes as the ‘semiotic order’: As has been discussed in part one, to speak of a ‘semiotic order’ –the calcification of an ‘external’ structural phenomena (order)– is to mis-characterize and violently truncate the human lifeworld. In place of Baudrillard’s ‘semiotic order’ I will draw on a much more helpful characterization –of which the human imaginative life, expressed in everyday practice, is central– *the colonization of the human lifeworld*. To speak of the colonization of the human imagination (what in fact makes hyperreality such an insidious ethical dilemma) is not simply the colonization of a mental faculty (e.g. the way we think) but is the colonization of the way we creatively live and express the everyday in human endeavors. In this way, I hope to jettison the Cartesian subject/object dualism implicit in Baudrillard’s structuralism while preserving his radical understanding of the effects of hyperreality on human values, judgments and activity. Thus, what becomes of central concern is highlighting the loci of ordering and
organizing in the activity of human beings in the world. It will be the burden of the remainder of this study to highlight the relationship between human activity-in-the-environment and human imagining—as an activity of rehearsing the possibilities of agents-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{350}

\textit{A NEW ECOLOGY}

Tim Ingold brings tremendous insight to the relationship between people and animals and our attempts to be at home in the world. Not ashamed to say that his previous attempt to articulate the meaning of a ‘built’ environment actually contributed to the problem, Ingold seeks “a completely new way of thinking about organisms and about their relations with their environments; in short, a new ecology”.\textsuperscript{351} His previous attempt resulted, he confesses, in precisely the Cartesian dualist problems discussed thus far—“that unlike all other animals, humans live a split-level existence, half in nature, half out; half organism, half person, half body, half mind”.\textsuperscript{352} Ingold’s revamped meditation on the topic resembles all that has been said thus far about Heidegger and Wittgenstien. Ingold’s rearticulated position is a rejection of Cartesian conceptions of the agents of human living as self-contained individuals confronting an external world and assimilating it to our formal designs. Rather, Ingold suggests that the world becomes a meaningful environment precisely because it is inhabited by ‘agents-in-the-environment’ or Being-in-the-world.\textsuperscript{353}

The starting point for all Cartesian accounts of human attempts to be at home in the world is an imagined \textit{separation} between the perceiver and the world. The perceiver

\textsuperscript{350} This is a characterization more fully explored as being closely related to the German \textit{Verstehen} in Appendix 2 and, in its own way, in Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{352} Tim Ingold, ibid., 172.
\textsuperscript{353} Tim Ingold, ibid., 173.
brings significance and meaning to an externally encountered world. Ingold highlights this Cartesian imaginary in a quote from anthropologist Clifford Geertz: “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.” Here Geertz sets other animals apart from human beings whose ‘webs of significance’ are to be understood as human constructed frameworks of meaning which are “inscribed in a separate plane of mental representation” and written over an external world of nature in an attempt to have a meaningful relationship with ‘reality’. The essence of this ‘building perspective’, as Ingold calls it, is that human beings make a world before we live in it. This conception of world and what it means to be a human in the world has fostered a particularly unhealthy expression of human living.

On the other hand, this ‘building perspective’ is most unlike the animal lifeworld where there is no concept of ‘nature’ or an ‘environment’ composed of ‘neutral objects’. Rather, an animal’s ‘environment’ is never untangled from the activity of their lifeworld. Ingold draws on the work of German biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944), who was the first to call this tangled weave of a world the animal’s Umwelt. Ingold contrasts the ‘building perspective’ with a very similar sounding, but substantially different description of Umwelt from Uexküll. “As the spider spins its threads,” says Uexküll, “every subject spins his relations to certain characters of the things around him, and weaves them into a firm web which carries his existence.” If the Geertz quote was a description of the self-contained individuals of the ‘building perspective’, then Uexküll lends insight into what Ingold characterizes as a ‘dwelling perspective’. Although Uexküll is speaking of non-human subjects and environments, Ingold turns to phenomenological insight to show that Uexküll’s observations are relevant to human living. Principally, Ingold draws on Martin

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354 Tim Ingold, ibid., 173.
355 Tim Ingold, ibid., 174.
Heidegger (who does away with all aforementioned constructed dichotomies of human living and environment), and on his essay “Building Dwelling Thinking”.

In “Building Dwelling Thinking” Heidegger probes the relationship between building and what it means to be a human being. He begins by rhetorically asking if “houses in themselves hold any guarantee that dwelling occurs in them?” If we examine the etymology of the German *bauen* (to build) we find its originary meaning in the Old High German *buan* –to dwell. What then does it mean to dwell? This originary meaning is now lost, says Heidegger, but we can sense a ‘covert trace’ of its meaning in the German Nachbar, neighbor. The etymology of Nachbar reveals its meaning to us as the ‘near-dweller’ (Nachgebauer). Rather than in-activity, to dwell is one of many activities we engage in throughout the course of our day. The near-dweller may work with me over here but ‘dwells’ over there. What’s more, says Heidegger, *bauen* reveals the nature of our dwelling; the German *bauen* is etymologically related to *bis*, be. So to say, *ich bin* (I am) is really to mean I dwell. The manner, then, in which human beings are (*ich bin*) on earth as mortals is as dwellers and the manner is which we dwell is to cultivate —or as George Steiner suggests, it is an act of ‘conservation’. Steiner says that for once the English can reveal the complex play on words as does the German, to *attend* (to be present) is to tend to (to care for). Returning to the relationship between building and dwelling we must say with Heidegger that, rather than dwelling because we build, we build “because we are dwellers”, and we build, amongst other things, dwellings (e.g. houses / homes).

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357 This observation is corroborated theologially in the prologue to the Gospel of John: “The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.”
While it is true that human beings have the ability to ‘envision forms’ before they are built – concedes Ingold – it is wrong to think that we ‘construct the world’ by virtue of our own ‘conceptions of the possibilities of being’. These ‘conceptions’ of world construction would be a return to the representational/correlation view of the human imagination as a self-contained and purely ‘mental’ ‘faculty’ within a self-contained individual who reconstructs, imports, and corresponds conceptual representations to an external world. Our immersion in, and handling of, possibilities is of a different kind altogether – and with this then goes a different, more realistic, and far better picture of imagination. Ingold takes Heidegger’s meditation on dwelling to mean “that the forms people build, whether in the imagination or on the ground arise within the current of their involved activity, in the specific relational contexts of their practical engagement with their surroundings.”

Borrowing a phrase from Merleau-Ponty – we must come to see that the world is the homeland of our thoughts. “This envisioning”, says Ingold in an attempt to counter such fictions with another form of imagining, “is itself an activity carried on by real people in a real world environment”. The need thus arises to re-characterize human imagining in its various activities – in language, intelligence, technology and art – in order to account for and to show its proper place in our dwelling-in-the-world.

Counter to many Cartesian claims about the supremacy of human reason over and against an external world, which presuppose that “intelligence is the faculty of reason, language its vehicle and technology the means by which a rational understanding of the external world is turned to account for human benefit”, Ingold makes the bold (if not rhetorical) counter claim that in fact “there is no such thing as

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360 Tim Ingold, ibid., 186.
361 Tim Ingold, ibid., 186.
362 Tim Ingold, ibid., 186. (emphasis mine)
technology, or language, or intelligence, at least in pre-modern or non-western societies”.

Rhetorical drama put to the side, we might more clearly say that pre-modern and non-western societies have built up dramatically different pictures of what these particular activities look like. In his chapter “The Poetics of Tool Use”, Ingold attempts to rearticulate and re-characterize the nature of these activities from the starting point of the ‘dwelling perspective’ of human Being-in-the-world. Ingold first investigates what he believes to be the historical fetishizing of language in the West along with a certain picture of what language is and how it works. In order to highlight a different picture of language, one which ‘dwells’, Ingold proposes yet another rhetorical move: what is the difference between music and speaking? What can we learn about speech and language when it is situated in a musical phenomenon? Drawing on the work of Alfred Gell (1945-1997), Ingold suggests that we may glean insight from the ‘song-like’ speech patterns of the Umeda people of Papua New Guinea. The Umeda’s song-speech –meaningful expressions of the Umeda lifeworld– echoes Merleau-Ponty’s insight “that the words, vowels, and phonemes are so many ways of ‘singing’ the world” when they are returned to their complex nexus of meaning. When language is considered in light of a ‘dwelling perspective’ –human living in a world already teeming with significance– we break the shackles of colonial oppression with a characterization of language as ‘wayfinding’ and mapping. Ingold says, that in light of a ‘dwelling perspective’ language more resembles poetry or song. Words, like tools, “are all embedded within a total pattern of verbal and non-verbal activity, a form of life”.

Meaning in speech is not ready-made but “inheres in the relations between

363 Tim Ingold, ibid., 406.
364 Tim Ingold, ibid., 410.
the dweller and the constituents of the dwelt-in world’. The differences between speech and song then are of ‘degree rather than kind’.

Here we are reminded of Wittgenstein and Heidegger’s characterization of the manner in which words ‘acquire’ meaning. In this essay, Ingold retraces Wittgenstein’s critique of the largely Western conception of language acquisition in *Philosophical Investigations*. In the process, Ingold refers us to the difference between mapping and maps, wayfinding and navigating, which will be further unpacked in this chapter. The “orthodox view” of language acquisition in the West is dependent on the erroneous picture of self-contained minds able to *navigate* through a world of objects by constantly drawing on images inscribed on a mental *map*. However, when we say, that “[m]eaning is in the mind, not in the world –it is assigned to the world by the subject”, says Ingold, “… there is presupposed a division between a subject, in whose mind these representations are found, and an objective world ‘out there’”. This colonizing picture of language is a recent perspective in human history and one which is comprehensively rejected by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*.

Ingold applies this insight to tool use and makes a similar comparison between technology, tools and craftsmanship –or technical artistry. Ingold asks, what is the difference between learning to use a ‘tool’ and learning to play a musical instrument? Indeed, like song, Ingold wants us to see playing a musical instrument as the prototypical instance of tool-use in the ‘dwelling perspective’. In a technologically literate society, tool use is most commonly accompanied by a theory of tool use –rules or algorithms embedded within the head of the tool operator. The ‘colonial’ picture of

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366 Tim Ingold, ibid., 409.
367 This view is similar in many ways to what is forwarded in Chomskian linguistics.
368 Tim Ingold, ibid., 408.
369 Tim Ingold, ibid., 407, 412.
370 Tim Ingold, ibid., 414.
a highly skilled tool operator is someone with 1) a highly detailed rulebook or algorithm inside their head and 2) possessing a high level of speed in which they are able to access the data. Once again we can draw on Ingold’s map and navigation metaphor (by way of de Michel de Certeau) to make sense of this erroneous picture. A picture of ‘skilled practice’ as the expert recreation of mental representations stored in a rule book or algorithm is dependent on every act being “thought out in advance”; tool use in this picture is reduced to a ‘calculus’ of “attention precedes response”.

When this picture of tool use is applied practically, however, to a ‘simple tool’ such as a lasso – which depends so much on movement and rhythm like the playing of an instrument– or driving a car it all begins to break down. By contrast, the skilled practitioner “is able continually to attune his movements to perturbations in the perceived environment without ever interrupting the flow of action, since that action is itself a process of attention.” Ingold also draws on his own experience of cello playing to make his point. To successfully play a musical instrument one must lose oneself in the activity of playing the instrument. When you pause to think, even for a fraction of a second, about playing, the music can become rote, imprecise and uneven, and one often begins to make mistakes. Ingold says, “this is not to say that I cease to be aware, or that my playing becomes simply mechanical or automatic: quite the contrary, I experience a heightened sense of awareness, but that awareness is not of my playing, it is my playing.” Certainly, when the “attention precedes response” view of skilled tool-use is applied to activities such as the lassoing of reindeer or playing in an orchestra, argues Ingold, these activities become impossible. Rather than the application of objective knowledge, then, this embodied knowledge, which emerges in

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371 Tim Ingold, ibid., 415.
372 Tim Ingold, ibid., 415.
373 Tim Ingold, ibid., 413.
374 Tim Ingold, ibid., 415.
a practical examination of music playing or lassoing, is what Ingold calls *enskilment* – the inseparable activity of learning and doing situated within the context of practical engagement that involves dwelling-in the instrument and the music, or the tool and the task.  

A reconsideration of both language and tool-use from the starting point of human agents-in-the-environment leads to a necessary re-investigation of prejudices surrounding dichotomous conceptions of human ‘intelligence’ and ‘imagination’. Once again, following the map/navigation metaphor, the rationalist picture of human intelligence usually falls along the lines of a cognitive faculty that *detaches from activity* to postulate an external world only to reapply representational constructs – the map– to an external world with no meaning. This picture echoes Ingold’s description of navigation that *travels over* the surface and has already been characterized as *colonization*. Alternatively, ‘Intelligence’ in the context of the ‘dwelling perspective’ is always involved in activity. A dwelling being “does not encounter stones. He encounters missiles, anvils, axes or whatever, depending on the project in which he is currently engaged.”

But what do we call the ‘mental’ activity going on when we are not in the current, Ingold asks? Ingold calls this *imagination*: “the activity of a being whose puzzle-solving is carried on within the context of involvement in a real world or persons, objects and relations” characterized by three points. First, “imagining *is* an activity: it is something people *do*” within the context or ‘current’ of activity. Second, the relationship between the ‘projected form’ and the ‘material artifact’ can be characterized as *rehearsal*. And third, imagining is an activity of an ‘agent-in-the-environment’; it is a particular puzzle-solving within the relational “context of

[^375]: Tim Ingold, *ibid.*, 416.
[^376]: Tim Ingold, *ibid.*, 417.
[^377]: Tim Ingold, *ibid.*, 419.
[^378]: Tim Ingold, *ibid.*, 418.
involvement in a real world of persons, objects and relations.” 379 Ultimately, Ingold’s description and characterization of ‘imagination’ in “The Poetics of Tool Use” proves to be too narrow. Ingold’s 2007 book *Lines: A Brief History* offers more pictures to build upon and carry this chapter along. Imagination is an originary mode of dwelling; rather than traveling over the colonizing map in the activity of the imagination we *wayfind along*.

**Colonization and Lines of Resistance**

To begin to characterize the colonization of the human imagination we must first jettison any notion of the colonization of an ‘imaginative faculty’ or a battle within the ‘minds’ of people; rather it is to talk about the colonization of space (more precisely, multiple spaces) and the trajectories within that space. Indeed, imagining is a poetic knowing as *sensory attunement* to “the relational context of the perceivers’ involvement in the world . . . by engaging directly, in a practical way, with the objects in [an agent-in-the-world’s] surroundings”. 380 Imagining is the activity of rehearsing and projecting (throwing) the possibilities of agents-in-the-environment. To speak of imagining is to speak of *dwelling* within a lifeworld—an Umwelt, which is the environment of human activity, concern and engagement within which ‘agents-in-the-environment’ craft, use tools, and sing the world with language. In his essay, “Globes and Spheres: The Topology of Environmentalism”, Ingold draws out this unique characterization of the colonization of the human imagination by contrasting the apprehension of the world as ‘sphere’ versus the world as ‘globe’. The conception of world as globe is characterized by a view of the world as “pure substance, physical matter, presenting an opaque and impenetrable surface of literal reality upon which

379 Tim Ingold, ibid., 419.
380 Tim Ingold, ibid., 213.
form and meaning are overlain by the human mind”; the world is known by the “cognitive reconstruction” of mental representations—a map. The globe is a “tabula rasa for the inscription of human history” which is conquered and ordered. Ultimately, “the world as a globe is,” contends Ingold, “a colonial one. It presents us with the idea of a preformed surface waiting to be occupied, to be colonized first by living things and later by human (usually meaning Western) civilization.” (fig. 6)

Unlike the picture of world as globe, which is all surface and is viewed as something separate from the observer-traveler, the sphere is perceived from within and the activities from within are guided by a cosmology. Whereas the globe is traveled on and over, the sphere—like the Scala Naturale (fig. 7) of Giovanni Camillo Maffei (1564)—is traveled through. “Traditional cosmology”, says Ingold, “places the person at the center of an ordered universe of meaningful relations, such as that depicted by Maffei, and enjoins an understanding of those relations as a foundation for proper conduct towards the environment.”

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381 Tim Ingold, ibid., 213.
382 Tim Ingold, ibid., 214.
383 Tim Ingold, ibid., 214. (emphasis mine)
384 We will find Tolkien’s *The Silmarillion* is of no exception.
385 Tim Ingold, ibid., 216.
In “To Journey Along a Way of Life: Maps, Wayfinding and Navigation”, an essay that builds on the work of de Certeau, is a detailed investigation into the essential differences between ‘wayfinding’ and ‘navigation’, ‘mapping’ and ‘map making’. Drawing on a classic ethnographic study of Micronesian seafaring, wayfinding, says Ingold, is not “following a course from one spatial location to another”; rather, it is “a movement in Time, more akin to playing music or storytelling than to reading a map”. Wayfinding trajectories through the environment—in the case of the Micronesian seafarer through the cosmological sphere— are dependent “upon the attunement of the traveler’s movements in response to the movements, in his or her surroundings, of other people, animals, the wind, celestial bodies, and so on”, says Ingold. Like listening to music or experiencing a story unfold, Ingold emphasizes that “we know as we go, not before we go”. Rather than a movement from point-to-point on a map, trajectories are movements through time; travel, continues Ingold, involves a series of openings up and closings off of unhidden surfaces in our environment—or what he calls vista regions. “Throughout the voyage [the Micronesian mariner] remains, apparently stationary, at a center of a world that stretches around as far as the horizon, with the great dome of the heavens above. But as the journey proceeds the island of embarkation slips ever farther astern while the destination island draws ever closer.” Ingold stresses how the world has no ‘surfaces’ in this characterization—the trajectories of agents-in-the-environment move through space rather than over a surface.

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386 Tim Ingold, ibid., 238 (emphasis mine). This emphasis on a movement in time over space will be picked up again in Chapter 5 and Gilles Deleuze’s characterizations of cinema.  
387 Tim Ingold, ibid., 242.  
388 Tim Ingold, ibid., 239.  
389 Tim Ingold, ibid., 240.
Ingold deepens and broadens his description of human trajectories through lifeworlds and the phenomenon of colonization in *Lines: A Brief History* (2007). More than simply a history of lines and the nature and production of lines, Ingold is interested in the curious “relation between various types of lines and surfaces.” More specifically, he says regarding the history of Western writing, “the ways in which [lines] were understood depended critically on whether the plain surface was compared to a landscape to be traveled or a space to be colonized, or to the skin of the body or the mirror of the mind.” Ingold explores a variety of lines. There are lines made by rupturing a surface such as cuts, cracks and creases. There are the ever problematic ghostly or imaginary lines, which, although they occupy no physical space *per se*, have physical consequences. These “imaginary but consequential lines” include Aboriginal songlines, survey lines, lines that tell stories such as the constellations, and lines of energy such as meridian lines in acupuncture and eastern calligraphy. And then, says Ingold, there are all sorts of lines which simply “don’t fit”, such as vapor trails, lightning forks and scent trails.

It is, however, Ingold’s description of ‘threads’ and ‘traces’ that is central to *Lines*. The distinguishing characteristic of ‘threads’ is that they are *not drawn on surfaces*. Ingold’s list includes, but is not limited to: a ball of wool, a skein of yarn, a fungal mycelia, a cat’s cradle, roots and rhizomes, a fishing-net, the needle of a conifer, a plump-line, an electrical circuit, the leaf of almost any deciduous tree, a suspension bridge. This description becomes more problematic when Ingold includes Celtic knots, south Indian *kolam*, the looping art Abelam –crafted by the people of the East Sepik Province in Papua New Guinea– and zig-zag lines of the Shipibo-Conibo of the

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391 Tim Ingold, ibid., 39.
392 Tim Ingold, ibid., 44-51.
393 Tim Ingold, ibid., 41.
Peruvian Amazon. While ‘threads’ naturally occur in nature, Ingold points out that the actual “making of threads is a human speciality” and has been argued by some to be the most ancient of human arts.\textsuperscript{394} As we will see with the labyrinth, \textit{threads dissolve surfaces}.

‘Traces’, then, are “any enduring mark left in or on a \textit{solid surface} by a continuous movement.”\textsuperscript{395} In turn, these (specifically human) traces can be further identified as additive marks “superimposed upon the substrate” and reductive “lines that are scratched, scored or etched into a surface”.\textsuperscript{396} It should be clear now that there is no clean delineation between threads and traces (and their respective relationship to surfaces). A thread, such as a Celtic knot, is crafted by making a reductive or additive mark on some surface —say stone. What must be further unpacked is how the trace is \textit{transformed} into a thread by the very specific line, in this case the Celtic knot. Indeed, “each stands as a transform of the other. . . . it is through the transformation of threads into traces”, argues Ingold, “that surfaces are brought into being”.\textsuperscript{397} But perhaps more importantly, and in the interests of the dissertation, Ingold says the converse is also true.

The most archetypal transformation of trace into thread (not just in Western civilization, notes Ingold, but in the world) is the labyrinth or maze. Greek, Celtic, or Indian, the labyrinth “has remained a powerful image of movement and wayfaring in a world of the dead that is believed to lie beneath the surface of the world of quotidian experience. . . . [T]he dead have to thread their way \textit{through} its interstices.”\textsuperscript{398} When entering the labyrinth the traveler moves beneath the mapped surface into a realm only

\textsuperscript{394} Tim Ingold, ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{395} Tim Ingold, ibid., 43. (emphasis mine)
\textsuperscript{396} Tim Ingold, ibid., 43.
\textsuperscript{397} Tim Ingold, ibid., 51.
\textsuperscript{398} Tim Ingold, ibid., 53.
ever known, in part, throughout the duration of the trajectory; the trace is transformed into a thread as the surface dissolves, says Ingold. Conversely, in stitching and weaving “we find the most obvious examples of how surfaces are constituted from threads, and of how traces are generated in the process.” Ingold notes the etymology of ‘line’ from Samuel Johnson’s *Dictionary*:

> [O]ne of the meanings of the word (the seventeenth and final entry in his list) is ‘lint or flax’. Lint is derived from the Latin *linea*, which originally meant a thread made from flax, *linum*. These threads were woven into cloth that we now call linen, and that could be used to line garments by providing an extra layer of warmth. . . . The verb ‘to weave’, in Latin, was *texere*, from which are derived our words ‘textile’ and –by way of the French *tistre* –‘tissue’, meaning a delicately woven fabric composed of a myriad of interlaced threads.

Similar to knitting and crocheting, stitching is the creation of a surface from a continuous line of yarn. “The surface we perceive,” says Ingold, “is not the knot but the space taken up by it.” This practice, then, is literally the materialization of a surface by transforming the thread –in this case the skein of yarn– into a trace. Reminiscent of what has already been mentioned in the opening paragraphs of Chapter 1, Ingold describes the role of the ‘warp’ and ‘weft’ in weaving. He adds that the ‘line’ on the blanket (in this case a Navajo blanket) exists as part of an ordered system which creates the “the perception of a continuous line on a coherent surface. . . . [This] gives the line the appearance of a trace.”

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399 Tim Ingold, ibid., 55-57.
400 Tim Ingold, ibid., 62.
401 Tim Ingold, ibid., 61.
402 Tim Ingold, ibid., 62.
403 Tim Ingold, ibid., 62-64.
Although not inclusive of all types, these two kinds of lines, the thread and the trace, are significant to human bodies in the world because they shape our relationship to world: either by creating surface or by dissolving surface. Ingold next turns to human trajectories through the world and what affect these lines have on that activity. In chapter three, “Up, across and along”, Ingold investigates the effects of modernity on ‘the line’. More specifically, Ingold is concerned with the modern fragmentation of line—in the fields of travel, mapping, and storytelling—“into a succession of points or dots” which has shorn “the movement that gave rise to it.”

Echoing the work of Lewis Mumford, the ultimate consequence of the modern fragmentation of the line has been the negative affect on the manner in which we characterize ‘place’: from a complex interlaced knot composed in movement and growth to the static node. “To an ever-increasing extent, people in modern metropolitan societies find themselves in environments built as assemblies of connected elements.”

Here, Ingold reveals that a study of ‘lines’ is fundamentally about the manner in which human beings “inhabit” and “dwell” and how in practice the modern metropolitan inhabitant can “thread their own ways through these environments, tracing paths as they go.”

Drawing on studies of Rudy Wiebe’s comparison of native Inuit conceptions of movement and travel with that of the British Royal Navy in Playing Dead (1989), Ingold describes two unique modalities of travel (the movement in time through space) – the wayfarer and the transport. The most radical and distinguishing characterization of the wayfarer, and seafarer for that matter, is that ‘traveling’ is not a “transitional activity” but “a way of being”; in contrast, transport is a “destination-oriented” activity.

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404 Tim Ingold, ibid., 75.
405 Tim Ingold, ibid., 75. (emphasis mine)
406 Tim Ingold, ibid., 75.
Rather than “reduce the activity of walking to the mechanics of locomotion, as though the walker were a passenger in his own body” the wayfarer traverses along ephemeral “lines of growth” where the traveler is always attentive to the environment, and in many cases dependent on attentiveness for survival. In contrast, the transport travels across the surface of the environment “in such a way as to leave their basic natures unaffected.” The transport traveler journeys from point-to-point only to re-enter the environment at their destination. Ingold will later call this mis-characterization of travel an illusion. Not to be mistaken, however, Ingold makes it clear that the wayfarer and the transport traveler are not distinguished by technological sophistication but by the bond between body and topography. One inhabits the environment; the other is largely cocooned from the environment and travels across the surface from point-to-point-to-point. “Every such line is tantamount to a way of life”, Ingold asserts.

Ingold borrows a description from Henri Lefebvre to conclude –the ‘meshwork’. Unlike the lines of a network, which Ingold says only join ‘dots’; the meshwork is the complex reticulate nexus of life “whose movements weave an environment that is more ‘archi-textural’ than architectural” and is constituted by lines of ‘entanglement’ rather than the connection of points. For this reason, Ingold believes wayfaring to be a primordial mode of dwelling for both humans and animals. There is, however, a fabricated human ‘equivalent’ to the reticulate meshwork, which Ingold calls lines of occupation. This imperial network is “surveyed and built in advance of the traffic that comes to pass up and down them. They are typically straight

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Tim Ingold, ibid., 75. Iain Munro has a similar comparison of Nomadism (which T. E. Lawrence describes as a way of life) and the Guerrilla (who is goal oriented). However, Munro finds many similarities in the two modes of resistance. Cf: Iain Munro, Information Warfare in Business: Strategies of Control and Resistance in the Network Society (London: Routledge, 2005).

Tim Ingold, ibid., 77.

Tim Ingold, ibid., 80.

Tim Ingold, ibid., 80, 81.
and regular, and intersect only at nodal points of power. Drawn cross-country, they are inclined to ride roughshod over the lines of habitation that are woven into it”. This theme of habitation versus occupation is further developed in Ingold’s examination of the relationship between ‘mapping’ and ‘knowing’.

There is an originary relationship between archaic ‘maps’ and storytelling, says Ingold, making an implicit reference to de Certeau’s tour describers. Such ‘maps’ were made to describe journeys –real or mythic– and were only ever intended for contextual use. These ephemeral, and often evanescent, traces are quickly discarded when their use comes to an end. Such sketch maps, as Ingold calls them, are not ‘representations’ of territories and terrain but ‘re-enactments’ of actual journeys. The trace is often an extension of gestures and grows as the narrative grows.

To get to my house from your house you’ll need to go south on Highway 1 –also called MoPac because it follows the old Missouri Pacific Railroad line. Take the highway south until you cross the river. Once you cross the river you will pass three exits. After the third exit get in your right lane because the left lane is an exit only. You’ll pass over the green belt and then take your next immediate right exit. Turn right at the first light. Right again at the next light. Right at the first stop sign. You’ll see a sign called Travis Country when you turn. Follow the road as it bends to the right, dips down the ravine and back up. Your second left at the top of the ravine is High Meadow Street. Turn left and the house will be on the next left corner with the four trees in the front yard.

What counts in a sketch map, says Ingold, “are the lines, not the spaces around them. … They are drawn along, in the evolution of the gesture, rather than across the surfaces

411 Tim Ingold, ibid., 81.
412 This banal example is used to illustrate Ingold’s point. In the coming chapter on J. R. R. Tolkien more mythic and legendary examples, such as the Icelandic Saga of the Volsungs and the Welsh Maginogion will become much more relevant.
on which they are traced.”\textsuperscript{413} Citing de Certeau’s \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life}, in the development of modern cartography these travel narratives were fragmented, compressed and reconstituted by spatial representations. In the modern map, then, lines are drawn across the framed (or contained) surface of the map. The lines on the map “signify occupation, not habitation”;\textsuperscript{414} they represent political boundaries, roads, railroads, and etcetera. This vast “network of point-to-point connections”, says Ingold, parallels the “destination-oriented transport” traveler.\textsuperscript{415} What is so significant, here, is that “both kinds of lines embody in their formation a certain way of knowing.”\textsuperscript{416}

\textsuperscript{413} Tim Ingold, ibid., 84-85.

\textsuperscript{414} Tim Ingold, ibid., 85. (emphasis mine) This news report from the U. S. state of Georgia testifies to Ingold’s description. “Hickory Level is one of hundreds of places that have \textit{occupied} spots of Georgia’s official road maps until the state un-cluttered the map this year.” 515 small towns – described as “place holders”– were removed from the official Georgia Dept. of Transportation map because they were deemed numerically insignificant.


Environment editor Michael McCarthy adds yet another level of complexity to Ingold’s description. “Churches, cathedrals, stately homes, battlefields, ancient woodlands, rivers, eccentric landmarks and many more features which make up the tapestry of the British landscape are not being represented in online maps [such as Google Maps], which focus on \textit{merely providing driving directions}, said Mary Spence, President of the British Cartographical Society.” The Independent UK News. “Internet Maps Demolish British History” by Michael McCarthy, August 29, 2008. The Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/internet-maps-demolish-british-history-912333.html

\textsuperscript{415} Tim Ingold, ibid., 85, 86.

\textsuperscript{416} Tim Ingold, ibid., 87.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Far from a simple discrediting of Jean Baudrillard’s hyperreality, what begins to emerge is a new—and in many ways a far more complex and ethically insidious—characterization of hyperreality as the colonization of human lifeworlds (both intentional and unintentional) through the materialization of surfaces, the occupation of space, and the fragmentation/truncation of human trajectories through the world into destination and consumption-oriented transportation across the surface of the globe. To continue the thread begun in Chapters 1 and 2, my ‘response’ to hyperreality will continue to utilize the synecdoche of ‘the city’ to highlight the significant role (the centrality even) of human practices and trajectories in the way we inhabit or occupy, organize or order everyday life. Pushing the metaphor further, this chapter can be seen, in retrospect, as a survey of the complex issues surrounding the construction of ‘new developments’ in the city—and especially those developments that demand a remapping of the city according to the schematic of its new order. As described by Tim Ingold, the colonization of the human lifeworlds is primarily the inscription of an alien order—and alien ‘economy’ (literally oikonomia; the rule of the house)—over indigenous modes of activity-in-the-environment. In the closing pages of “Up, across and along”, Ingold succinctly identifies the phenomenon:

Perhaps what truly distinguishes the predicament of people in modern metropolitan societies is the extent to which they are compelled to inhabit an environment that has been planned and built expressly for the purposes of occupation. The architecture and public spaces of the built environment enclose and contain; its roads and highways connect. Transport systems nowadays span the globe in a vast network of destination-to-destination links.\footnote{Tim Ingold, ibid., 102.}
Maps and mapmaking over *mapping*, representation based navigation over *wayfinding*, moving across over moving *along*, occupation over *inhabiting* and *dwelling*, and the world as globe over the *cosmological sphere*; the result has harmful and even dehumanizing affects on human bodies, human activities, and lifeworlds. Following the model of political colonization we can say that the colonization of human imagining is dependent on 1) infrastructure (a new ordering apparatus which begins with the picture of world as globe), 2) propaganda (forms of media output which actively attempt to manipulate spatial trajectories through the inscription of reflexive responses to the newly applied ordering apparatus), and 3) force. Although this alien order is constituted by its own particular modes of activity it always stands ‘outside’ (or more precisely, is imposed upon) the indigenous environment thus alienating agents form indigenous forms of life.

However, if anything is to be learned from this chapter it is that “life will not be contained, but rather threads its way through the world along the myriad lines of its relations.”\(^{418}\) Lines of movement and trajectories of activity, which thread and dissolve surfaces of control and power, function as acts of resistance. These tactical activities are precisely the forms of resistance that must now be pursued. What we learn from Ingold is that colonial structures

\[\text{are ceaselessly eroded by the tactical manoeuvring of inhabitants whose ‘wandering lines’ (linges d’erre) or ‘efficacious meanderings’ –in de Certeau’s words– undercut the strategic designs of society’s master-builders, causing them gradually to wear out and disintegrate. Quite apart from human beings who may or may not respect the rules of play, these inhabitants include countless non-humans that have no heed for them at all. Flying, crawling, wriggling and burrowing all}\]

\(^{418}\) Tim Ingold, *ibid.*, 103.
over and under the regular, linearized infrastructure of the occupied world, creatures of every sort continually reincorporated and rearrange its crumbling fragments into their own ways of life.\textsuperscript{419}

If indeed wayfinding is a primordial mode of dwelling for both humans and animals, as Ingold suggest, then we should turn to Ingold’s example of animal wayfinding as a form of resistance. However, as we will see in the next chapter on J. R. R. Tolkien, central to the colonization of human lifeworlds is the colonization of the human imagination. Hence, a consideration of human imaginative practices (of which Baudrillard’s work certainly takes account of in the form of electronic media, e.g. television, cinema, internet, et. al.) is in order. The task ahead is one of recovery. The task is to exhume the role of human imagining in the day-to-day practices of human lifeworlds and what role it plays in wayfinding. Indeed, it will be in the exhumation of the remnants of modes of being in the world that more resemble the organic (animal) resistance described by Ingold that will be central to any resistance to colonization.

To push the metaphor further, the remaining chapters will excavate forgotten and abandoned neighborhoods of ‘the city’ –forgotten modes of inhabiting– and deploy their organizing techniques as forms of nomadic guerilla resistance against the complex ordering demands presented by postmodern consumerism, and against this newly articulated phenomenon of hyperreality. The work of Tim Ingold will remain central to an exploration for models of resistance to hyperreality in the remaining pages. We will return to Ingold’s study of ‘sketch maps’, ‘storylines’, and ‘wayfinding’ in subsequent chapters exploring the mythopoeia of J. R. R. Tolkien (Chapter 4) and also the cinema of Terrence Malick (Chapter 5).

\textsuperscript{419} Tim Ingold, ibid., 103.
In the *Philosophical Investigations* Ludwig Wittgenstein says, “To imagine a language means to imagine a *life-form*.”\(^{420}\) To effectively make claims about the imaginative project of J. R. R. Tolkien (1892-1973), we must pay close attention to the meaning of this statement. I aim to show that Tolkien’s enjoyable yet seemingly innocuous fantasy, found in *The Silmarillion*, *The Hobbit*, and *The Lord of the Rings*, is actually an expression of a complex and subversive sensibility where one’s practice of human imagining is characterized as a **philological practice of praxeological recovery tied to the fabric of day-to-day existence**; it can be coupled—and is so coupled in Tolkien to—a **call to confront, resist and transform** the occupation of lifeworlds by living out recovered forms of life. Imaginative resistance and revealing is constructed upon J. R. R. Tolkien’s (*theological*) belief that *imaginative craft* is not a dreamer’s flight from the ‘real world’ but, as Tolkien himself says, is an ‘escape into reality’\(^{421}\) to excavate clarity of vision and to allow us to see everyday life-forms and comportments “as we are (or were) meant to see them.”\(^{422}\) This ‘Philological Imagination’ deals—through language, in *its* way— with past, present and possible forms of life. Imagination brings these together and enables our dealings with them—both ‘literary’ and practical, and even potentially practical. The history of this

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\(^{420}\) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 7e.

\(^{421}\) Tolkien’s radical, yet unsophisticated, insight must ultimately be rearticulated. I should also note that in Chapter 5 I will endeavor to show the relationship between this and Bresson’s picture that “all that is not true in the real must be jettisoned.” Robert Bresson, *Notes on the Cinematographer*, trans. Jonathan Griffin (Kobenhaven: Green Integer, 1997), 139.

characterization of a “corporeal philology” begins, at least, with 18th-century Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744); and, with a more direct influence on Tolkien, its broader interests are felt in another way through the work of English artist, businessman, and political philosopher William Morris. There is no room to fully investigate these unique voices and, for broader detail, the reader is directed to Appendices 2 and 3.

To bring out broader and deeper insights into Tolkien’s description and his own practice of imaginative craft— and their implications for daily existence— I will first investigate philology as a practice of imaginative recovery in Tolkien’s work. Only then will I begin to deploy my central thesis: to unpack Tolkien’s project of mythopoeic resistance and address similarities in it with philosophical contemporaries such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger, to build upon work covered in chapter 3.

PHILOLOGY

It was a line from Cynewulf’s Crist which initially set Tolkien’s legendarium in motion: eala earendil / engla beorhtast / monum sended (Hail, earendel, brightest of angels, above the middle-earth sent unto men). What or who was earendil was the question from which Tolkien's saga of Middle-earth was born. “I felt a curious thrill,” Tolkien later wrote, “as if something had stirred in me, half wakened from sleep. There was something very remote and strange and beautiful behind those words, if I could

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423 This section will deal with a highly specialized—or better—a ‘rarified’ characterization of philology described in the OED as the ‘love of logos’—of learning, of deep understanding; certainly as expressed in literature, but also more broadly and deeply. This built up picture of philology in the ‘old sense’ can be traced through and seen in the work of Nietzsche, Coleridge, Grundtvig, Hamann, Herder and Vico. It rests on a particular characterization of ‘literae humaniorum’—‘classics’—that involve the study of history, philosophy, and culture. While this characterization—on a whole—was ‘outmoded’ by the modern understanding of philology as something more like ‘linguistics’, this ‘old sense’ is to be deployed here as a part of an anti-Cartesian mode of moving forward.
grasp it, far beyond ancient English.”\(^{424}\) This characterization of the nature of language as life and people ‘behind’ words is what will be taken up here and will be further developed in the remaining chapters. Much of Tolkien’s life-long work on his legendarium was a project of recovery through poetic verse, mythology and his own invented languages prompted by a search for answers or clues to what turns out to be a very basic philological question; who or what was éarendel? This admittedly hypothetical question was one of a well-trained student of philology, near the turn of the 20\(^{th}\) century, using a technique developed in the 19\(^{th}\) century by the German philological scholar August Schleicher (1821-1868) called ‘asterisk-reality’ (or ‘*-reality’); the asterisk indicates the recovery and reconstruction of a word, a language, and even an entire life-world, “never recorded, but nevertheless could, [and] is even on the whole likely to have existed”.\(^{425}\) Having lexically glossed éarendel as light, a celestial body and a person, Tolkien philologically sub-created an originary life-world – an ‘asterisk-reality’– which poetically held all three meanings in one.

Tom Shippey was the first Tolkien scholar to insist that philology is “the only proper guide to a view of Middle-earth”.\(^{426}\) Since the publication of his essay “Creation from Philology” (1975), and his book The Road to Middle-earth (1982), much has been written about Tolkien as philologist. Without retracing steps, then, the question relevant to this discussion is: what role, if any, does philology play –specifically Tolkien’s

\(^{424}\) Humphrey Carpenter, Tolkien: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), 64.


\(^{426}\) Tom Shippey, The Road to Middle-earth 8. It should be noted however that Shippey is also very critical of Tolkien's 'mis-use' of philology. He argues that Tolkien overreaches and goes beyond what can and should be done with philology. It is my assertion that Shippey's critical stance on Tolkien, while he is the first to recognize Tolkien' philological technique, reflects this divide between a more 'rare' practice of philology –now, on a whole, abandoned– and a picture of philological practice in the 'old sense' which we will see in the work of Vico.
characterization and practice of philology— in lending insight into the colonization of human forms of life and the possibility of acts of resistance as discussed thus far? In order to answer this question both a brief history of philology, as an academic discipline, and more broadly and uniquely as fitting in with a praxeological approach to world, along with the circumstances surrounding its fall from favor in Western academia, is necessary.

Tolkien battled fiercely throughout his academic career to keep philology a relevant field of study at Oxford. In his “Valedictory Address to the University of Oxford” in 1959, Tolkien’s departing salvo to the Oxford English department, he referred to philology as “the foundation of humane letters”. Tolkien’s explicit reference to the literae humaniores is to say that philology is more than simply a scientific study of grammar, morphology, syntax, phonology and semantics but is in fact the foundation of all classical scholarship, and the Humanities in the West. As the bedrock of Western scholarship the philologist also represents a particular kind of scholar. A philologist is a practitioner of interdisciplinary scholarship—a literary paleontologist; not only attentive to the study of language, but to the broader literary meanings, history, anthropology, and philosophy; in short, the philologist should be attentive to the complex life-forms in which the language was situated. This interdisciplinary description of the philologist—which characterization of language hearkens to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations—is echoed in The Ring of Words: Tolkien and the Oxford English Dictionary:

Trying to make sense of an enigmatic word-form requires the exercise of linguistic skills, but this very activity leads the researcher into a wider realm of history or of legend (imagined history): it calls upon the interplay of the imagination with the

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known facts. The reconstruction of word-forms goes hand in hand with the imaginative recreation of the lost world in which they are supposed to have been used. 428

Philology, then, as Tolkien practiced it, includes the recovery and reconstruction of lost forms of life through language, specific words, broader literary expressions, and, of course, literature and its contexts: language in use (and here Tolkien's practice links up with what has been described earlier about Wittgenstein and the praxeological approach). Although Tolkien’s philological views were a minority opinion in the early 20th-century they certainly were in a distinguished 19th-century company. During the preceding century Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm (1785-1863 and 1786-1859) prodigiously compiled and wrote books on German grammar and word meanings, mythology, heroic legends and fairy tales. Nikolai Grundtvig (1783-1872) saw an essential relationship between his philology and theology. He wove his philological study of Iceleandic and Anglo-Saxon poetry into his interpretations of Christianity and his hymns, as well as writing the first modern Beowulf translation which helped spur a revival of Danish nationalism. Like Grundtvig, the Finn Elias Lönnrot (1802-1884) created the ‘asterisk epic’ *The Kalevala based on Finnish poems and folklore. 429 For good –and in some cases for ill– this particularly mythological focus of philology was supported and spurred by the work of comparative philology. As early as 1786, Sir William Jones argued for a common Indo-European (IE) language source of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Gothic, and Celtic. The comparative study of phonological and morphological shifts in

these disparate languages served as the foundation for the Grimm-Grundtvig-Lönrot work and is one of the fields of which Tolkien was an ‘inheritor’.\footnote{Tom Shippey, \textit{J. R. R. Tolkien: Author of the Century}, 10-13. It is important to mention that comparative philology associated with mythic nationalism also came with problems and it should be noted that this particular branching of philology had its detractors. Max Müller, the first Chair of Comparative Philology at Oxford, described myth as a problematic disease of language. Carlos Riobo notes that Ezra Pound, who profoundly influenced Modernism, rejected the 19th-century ‘Romantic Philology’ that lead to “cultural identity, defined in part through national texts purported to reflect essential and transcendent qualities of the nation, and created rivalries both among their own inhabitants and with neighboring nations.” In its stead, Pound chose to identify his poetry with the ‘Philology of Dante’ described by Riobo as “a discipline based on the intrinsic value of the literary work regardless of temporal constraint or national affiliation”. Carlos Riobo, “The Spirit of Ezra Pound’s Romance Philology: Dante’s Ironic Legacy of the Contingencies of Value,” \textit{Comparative Literature Studies}, Vol. 39, No. 3 (2002): 201-222. Similarly, Umberto Eco expresses his own concerns, in \textit{The Search for the Perfect Language}, trans. James Fentress (Oxford, Blackwell, 1995), for the particular use made of broad philological work tied to ideas about nation (‘monogenetic’ and ‘nationalist hypothesis’). The ‘virtual’ Indo-European language didn’t claim to be the root of all languages, only the ‘Aryan’ language. Eco says, “we know only too well that the Aryan myth had political consequences that were profoundly tragic. …At the end of a thousand-year long ideal voyage to the East in search of roots, Europe had at last found some ideal reasons to turn that virtual voyage into a real one –for the purposes not of intellectual discovery, however, but of conquest.” (Umberto Eco, ibid., 104-106). Considering Pound’s fascist sympathies, however, it seems the ‘Philology of Dante’ was no less susceptible to corruptions of power. Equally, while Eco wants to maintain a sensitivity to “side-effects” he concedes that Indo-European scholars were right “at the level of linguistic science”. (Umberto Eco, ibid., 105) All the more then, to make a direct link between 19th-century comparative philology enamored of culturally and geographically contingent myths, and the horrors of 20th-century conflicts (to Eco’s credit he in no way is attempting to make this link but to emphasize the need to explore ‘polygenetic’ aspects of language), is not only a certain mischaracterizations of Tolkien’s philology but historically naive. Tolkien most certainly knew well that these things (like all human practices) can be misused. “The right to ‘freedom’ of the sub-creator is no guarantee among fallen men that it will not be used as wickedly as is Free Will.” J. R. R. Tolkien, \textit{The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien}, ed. Humphrey Carpenter and Christopher Tolkien, comp. Christopher Tolkien (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 194. Furthermore, what is accomplished in Tolkien’s hands certainly undermines the strength of these critiques.}

It is of primary significance that the relevance of philology, at least as Tolkien practiced it, went into virtual extinction and was replaced in academic departments with distinct ‘literature’ and ‘linguistics’ disciplines during the same nexus of time in Western civilization already noted by Mumford, Boorstin and Baudrillard –from the dawn of the second industrial revolution c. 1870 through the blooming of the media age, which for arguments sake we can identify as the year of Tolkien’s \textit{Valedictory Address} and one year before the televised Kennedy/Nixon debates, c. 1959. Christiana Scull and Wayne Hammond note that the first \textit{OED} definition of philology circa 1906
already considered the definition of the broad discipline, which included the study of literature in the ‘wide sense’ and classical scholarship, “now rare in general sense”. 431 The development of semiotic theory by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and the American mathematician-philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) came into academic prominence throughout Europe, slowly making diachronic432 philological studies démodé and defining them, too, as a part of 'theoretical linguistics'. Indeed, the first holder of the Merton Professorship of English Language and Literature at Oxford (established in 1885), A.S. Napier, was partially responsible for the bifurcation of the English syllabus in 1908.433 The language is revealing: “Napier stated that ‘the [Oxford English School] has to provide for the needs of two classes of students –those who are primarily students of language, and those who are primarily students of literature”. 434 Napier’s use of ‘language’ here is also very telling. Tolkien referred to those in the English School who decried ‘language’ as pompous epigones who lacked imagination. Furthermore, the very title, *The School of English Language and Literature*, was a misused “bogey”, said Tolkien:

the word *English* is not an adjective, but a noun in loose composition. …And if any should say ‘English what?’, I would answer: ‘For a thousand recorded years *English* as a noun has meant only one thing: the English Language.’ …Nonetheless I think that it was a mistake to intrude *Language* into our title in order to mark this difference, or to warn those who are ignorant of their own ignorance. Not least because *Language* is thus given, as indeed I suspect was

432 What de Saussure referred to as the historical analysis of ‘linguistic system’.
intended, an artificially limited and pseudo-technical sense which separates this technical thing from *Literature*. This separation is false, and this use of the word ‘language’ is false.\(^{435}\)

Rather than “degrade” *language* or *literature*, Tolkien preferred the terms *Lang.* and *Lit.* when speaking of these artificially divided, ‘specialized’, “limited and pseudo-technical” subjects.\(^{436}\) Through the influence of Saussureian semiotics and other linguistic approaches, then, *Lang.* was focused on synchronic (and diachronic, in its own way) analysis of language –*linguistics*– while *Lit.* was remanded to the care of ‘critics’.

Although Tolkien witnessed the ‘death’ of the broad interdisciplinary approach to the field of philology in his lifetime, nineteenth century philology had a profound impact in the field of continental philosophy. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was trained as a classical philologist at Leipzig and taught at the university of Basel from 1869-1879 as professor of classical philology. James Porter makes the strong case in *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future* (2000) that not only did Nietzsche never abandon his philological training but that his philosophical writings were indeed a complex extension of his philological training –“a form of philology. … [P]hilology as a form of cultural criticism … [in which] he embodi[ed] the theory directly in his writing.”\(^{437}\) Although it is clear from Nietzsche’s posthumously published essay “We Philologists” that he grew to become disgusted with the direction the academic profession took, his philosophy drew on, and developed around, philology’s interdisciplinary techniques of recovery and reconstruction to shed light on the

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\(^{436}\) J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 230.

In his inaugural address, “Homer and Classical Philology”, given at Basel in May of 1869, Nietzsche closes by inverting a quote from Seneca: “Philosophia facta est quae philologia fuit.” In this way he “wish[ed] to signify that all philological activities should be enclosed and surrounded by a *philosophical* view of things”.

Nietzsche desired a broader characterization of philology—one far more philosophical, relevant, and immediate. His first book, *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), came as a shock to his philological colleagues at Basel and was equally problematic to the ‘academic’ philosophers of the time. *Tragedy* is both a decidedly philological (as Nietzsche understood it) exploration of Greek Tragedy, and—following in the tradition of Arthur Schopenhauer—a critique of Western philosophical traditions which emphasize the rational over the aesthetic, the eternal over the immanent, and the ideal over activity; Nietzsche viewed such philosophies as a pox on the Prussian society of his day. Later, works such as *Human, All Too Human* (1878) and *On The Genealogy of Morals* (1887) draw on interdisciplinary philological techniques with the express philosophical purpose of commenting on Nietzsche’s historical context.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “We Philologists,” trans. by J. M. Kennedy, in *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, Vol. 8, ed. Dr. Oscar Levy (Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1911), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18267/18267-h/18267-h.htm#WE_PHILOLOGISTS. In aphorism 94 Nietzsche offers a simplistic and childish, although insightful, list of comparisons between ‘The Greeks’ and ‘The Philologists’: “The Greeks render homage to beauty” while The Philologists are “babblers and triflers”; “The Greeks develop the body” while the Philologists are “ugly looking creatures”; “The Greeks speak clearly” while The Philologists are “stammerers”; “The Greeks are religious transfigurers of everyday occurrences” while The Philologists are “filthy pedants”; “The Greeks are listeners and observers” while The Philologists are “quibblers and scarecrows”; the list goes on. (153) And yet, however vehement Nietzsche’s critique may appear, “We Philologists” is still very philological in its praise of Greek culture. Rather than the ‘scientific’ philology of his day, Nietzsche championed the ‘poetic-philology’ of Goethe: “Goethe as a German poet-philologist; Wagner as a still higher stage: his clear glance for the only worthy position of art. No ancient work has ever had so powerful an effect as the *Orestes* had on Wagner. The objective, emasculated philologist, who is but a philistine of culture and a worker in ‘pure science,’ is, however, a sad spectacle.”(181) Of Goethe, Nietzsche later says, “Goethe grasped antiquity in the right way—invariably with an emulative soul. But who else did so?” (183)

Although not a philologist by training, aspects of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) could certainly be described as ‘philological’ in this broad ‘Nietzschian’ sense. Although Heidegger develops his own ‘cultural critique’ later in his writings, he concerns himself early on with the philosophical ‘forgetting of Being’ and a phenomenological methodology required to address such a forgetting. Among his many early influences, Heidegger cites the lectures of German theologian Carl Braig (1853-1923) and specifically Braig’s text, *On Being: Outline of Ontology* (1896). Regarding the text Heidegger says, ‘the larger sections of the work give extensive text passages from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Suarez, always at the end, and in addition the etymology for fundamental ontological concepts.’

Dermot Moran notes that Braig’s *On Being* even contained the phrase ‘the Being of beings’ which surfaces in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* as a central feature. This etymological tracing is quite revealing because central to Heidegger’s thesis in *Sein und Zeit* is the forgetting of the meaning of Being – from Plato to Nietzsche – and the need to exhume an originary understanding. Heidegger's link between a broad form of philology and a philosophy with broader ontological concerns echoes the praxeological concerns which go back at least to the work of the 18th-century philosopher Giambattista Vico. For Heidegger, there was also a relationship between a philological approach to philosophy, and a move away from a particular built-up picture of subjective humanism, towards this ontological description of human living in a new, existential and phenomenological sense – a view, I will argue, Tolkien shares. It should be noted that Tolkien scholars such as Verlyn Flieger argue that Tolkien’s closest and ‘primary’ philological influence

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was Owen Barfield. The reader is directed to Appendix 4 to see how that assertion is connected to my broader thesis.

**Tolkien’s Mythopoeia**

This broad characterization of philology was established in order to better understand the complex philological exploration of forgotten life-worlds in the work of J. R. R. Tolkien. As was suggested, we know from Tolkien’s letters that Owen Barfield’s *Poetic Diction* confirmed his instincts to move beyond the perceived limits of his classical training in comparative philology and towards a broader and deeper Vichian-like philology. While some of Barfield’s work is echoed in much of Tolkien’s characterizations about philology, it is also the recovery, craft and protest of William Morris that might best reflect Tolkien’s broader *praxeological impulses*. Tolkien, however, a devout Roman Catholic, deploys his philological project to theological ends in a way not explicitly set forth by Morris or Barfield. The effect, either intentional or not, is the articulation of a unique theology of being, craft, and imagining that defines his work—both academically and artistically—after 1931. Tolkien’s first major articulation of this broader philology project was the poem *Mythopoeia* (1931).

... man, sub-creator, the refracted light
through whom is splintered from a single White
to many hues, and endlessly combined
in living shapes that move from mind to mind.
Though all the crannies of the world we filled
with elves and goblins, though we dared to build
gods and their houses out of dark and light,
and sow the seed of dragons, ’twas not decayed.

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442 In 1931 Tolkien also wrote *A Secret Vice*, in which he reveals the importance of invented languages—specifically his own invented languages—to the practice of Philology and the human imagination. We should also note a distinction between Tolkien’s poem and ‘mythopoeia’ as a concept. The former will be indicated by italics and the later by being un-italicized.
We make still by the law in which we’re made.\textsuperscript{443}

In *Mythopoeia*, it is apparent that Tolkien has taken his private philological musings and connected them to—or better still, transformed them into—a proto-theological anthropology of human imagining, which reached its full completion with the essay “On Fairy-Stories” (1939 referenced as *OFS*), further explored in the *The Lord of the Rings* (1954-55 referenced as *LOTR*), and was succinctly summarized in the playful short story *Smith of Wooton Major* (1967). The integral relationship between the works of the imagination, who we are as human beings, and how we comport ourselves is captured by Tolkien in his concept of \textbf{sub-creation}. If the philological basis for Tolkien’s scholarly project of imaginative fiction is clearly laid out in *OFS*, then *Mythopoeia* is his philosophical treatise on the ‘ontology’ of imaginative craft. Written for his friend C. S. Lewis in response to a heated theological discussion between the two regarding the relationship of ancient myth and true myth, *Mythopoeia* is a poem surprisingly not so much about ‘myth’ \textit{per se} as it is about a theology of \textit{poësis} (ποίησις)—a theology of making, creating and bringing forth.\textsuperscript{444}

Tolkien’s articulation of a theological anthropology that characterizes humanity as creative-being made to refract the light of God through the creative imagination is a significant development in his work. Throughout his legendarium, light is an originary substance by which all things are made, and it is the responsibility of those who inhabit Middle-earth to refract this originary light in the endless battle against the horrors of darkness. In Tolkien’s view, the \textit{activity} of sub-creation binds human beings, the land


\textsuperscript{444} This view is contrary to most who argue that *Mythopoeia* is about myth and how myth functions. (See “The Great Chain of Reading” by Gergely Nagy in *Tolkien the Medievalist* edited by Jane Chance London: Routledge, 2008) While that aspect of mythopoeia is indeed important, to miss the anthropological / ontological statement Tolkien makes in his poem is to miss the point entirely.
(topology), and artistic craft into an Elvish harmony—a mode of poetic dwelling in creation. Corruption, however, has caused us to lose sight of this originary mode of Being-in-the-world. Echoing Barfield’s archaism, it is Tolkien’s hope that we may recover, through sub-creation, a living sensibility of the integral relationship between Being-in-the-world as creative beings, creating, and the way we live our lives.

You look at trees and label them just so,
(for trees are ‘trees’, and growing is ‘to grow’);
. . . a star’s a star, some matter in a ball
compelled to courses mathematical
amid the regimented, cold, Inane,
where destined atoms are each moment slain.\textsuperscript{445}

The wisdom of this living sensibility is evident in Tolkien’s critique in the opening stanza where he rejects the ‘materialism’ so prevalent in the scientism and industrialism of his age. There is simply more to reality than just matter, insists Tolkien. Indeed, the material realm is far deeper and broader than the sum total of its parts. This picture is echoed years later in C. S. Lewis’s \textit{The Voyage of the Dawn Treader}. Tolkien’s mythopoeic is no doubt an inspiration for the conversation between Edmund, Eustace and Ramandu: “In our world,” said Eustace, “a star is a huge ball of flaming gas.” Ramandu—a retired star reminiscent of Tolkien’s éarendel—answers, saying, “even in your world, my son, that is not what a star is but only what it is made of.”\textsuperscript{446}

Tolkien’s unique philological response to the problem raised in the opening stanza goes far beyond the conventions expected of academic comparative philology.

Yet trees are not ‘trees’, until so named and seen —
and never were so named, till those had been
who speech’s involuted breath unfurled,

\textsuperscript{445} J. R. R. Tolkien, \textit{ibid.}, 85.
faint echo and dim picture of the world,

...digging the foreknown from experience

and panning the vein of spirit out of sense.\textsuperscript{447}

This image of panning the vein of spirit out of sense is a metaphor that works on multiple levels. Tolkien’s fundamental claim is that there is an implicit (theological) relationship between language, reality, and imagining. His rejection of what he saw as enemies of life—fascism, abject materialism, and modernism—demands a ‘recovery’, not a nostalgic retrieval for the novelty of what once was, but because it is the purpose of human existence. Here we can draw parallels to Martin Heidegger’s ‘philological’ retrieval of an originary characterization of truth—as in the Heraclitian fragment—and his re-articulation of the dwelling of Dasein in truth (\textit{aletheia}), which Heidegger translates as unhiddenness (\textit{Unverborgenheit}). To speak and act truthfully is to dig and pan from hiddnness, and—one might also add— to do the inverse is also true.

There is, then, a definite change in Tolkien’s work after \textit{Mythopoeia}. All through the thirties, Tolkien made great strides in his academic output, crafting some of his finest and most lasting papers. In 1932 Tolkien completed a rough and incomplete draft of \textit{The Hobbit}\textsuperscript{448} and wrote the first part of the Vichian \textit{Sigelwara Land}. Verlyn Flieger’s description of \textit{Sigelwara Land} as a combination of “philology with a leap of imagination . . . the penetration into a lost attitude of mind, the participation of his own imaginative faculty with that of a people long gone” certainly resonates with what has been said thus far.\textsuperscript{449} Tolkien wrote the second part of \textit{Sigelwara Land} in 1934 and published another scholarly investigation of language with “Chaucer as a Philologist:

\textsuperscript{447} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 86. (emphasis mine)
The Reeve’s Tale. It is clear by this period that Tolkien was in full pursuit of the ability to penetrate “beyond normal human perception into another reality, one always present but not readily accessible”, and recover new understanding through language. Although there is no evidence of a direct connection, it should be pointed out that Tolkien’s characterizations of language are strikingly similar to those of Wittgenstein. Indeed, when Wittgenstein says that language is like a city—some of which is in a state of disuse—this matches up nicely to Tolkien’s ‘archaeological’ digs into the past, through language, to recover ‘lost’ forms of life. This is never more apparent than in Tolkien’s lasting essay “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics”.

Presented as the Sir Israel Gollancz Memorial Lecture to the British Academy, in “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics” (1936) we sense yet another monumental development in Tolkien’s craft. Tolkien fuses his ever-transforming thoughts on philology, myth and their ability to reveal something true about ‘reality’. Tolkien begins his classic essay with this simple allegory:

A man inherited a field in which was an accumulation of old stone, part of an older hall. Of the old stone some had already been used in building the house in which he actually lived, not far from the old house of his fathers. Of the rest he took some and built a tower. But his friends coming perceived at once (without troubling to climb the steps) that these stones had formerly belonged to a more ancient building. So they pushed the tower over, with no little labour, in order to look for hidden carvings and inscriptions, or to discover whence the man’s distant forefathers had obtained their building material. Some suspecting a deposit of coal under the soil began to dig for it, and forgot even the stones. They all said: ‘This tower is most interesting.’ But they also said (after pushing it over):

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450 Actually “read to the Philological Society in 1931”; see Humphrey Carpenter, *Tolkien: The Authorized Biography*, 38.
451 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 9.
‘What a muddle it is in!’ And even the man’s own descendants, who might have been expected to consider what he had been about, were heard to murmur: ‘He is such an odd fellow! Imagine his using these old stones just to build a nonsensical tower! Why did not he restore the old house? He had no sense of proportion.’ But from the top of that tower the man had been able to look out upon the sea.452

Drawing on Tolkien’s philological strategy of ‘getting inside words’, Flieger explains that “the old stone is the myth-infused Old English language . . . [and] the older hall from which the stones originally came can be read as the ancient heritage of myth, legend, and history that informed the poet’s diction [. . .]. The house in which he actually lived, for which some of the old stone had been used, would be the living language that he spoke. [. . .] The tower, of course, is the poem itself” where Tolkien says we can look out upon the sea.453 At the moment, however, when Flieger seems poised to tie her exegetical reading of the ‘Tower Allegory’ together she missteps and says, “there is no allegorical correlative to the sea, and the vision thus suggested cannot be tied to any specific meaning.”454 She goes on to cite a tower/sea reference in LOTR and some unnamed references in The Silmarillion. But even this attempt to make a correlation is unnecessary, she says. The reader

does not need to know that history in order for the passage to be effective [effective for whom, I ask!]. The episode invites comparison with the final line of the allegory in the Beowulf essay. In both instances, the effect comes less from the images of the tower and sea than from the stated or implied desire to climb up and look outward to the immense unknown. Tolkien’s use of this idea in both the essay and [LOTR] suggests that for him it transcended allegory to express an

453 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 15.
454 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 15.
indefinable but very real attribute of the human psyche: the desire to seek something without knowing what it is.\textsuperscript{455}

While on a whole it seems she correctly interprets Tolkien’s project and his tower allegory, her bungling of the ending reveals a fatal flaw. Ultimately, Flieger is too Cartesian in her own reading of Tolkien. Indeed, it is precisely what Tolkien looks out from the tower to see that makes his project so significant; the very fact that Tolkien looks out to the sea, and how he looks out to the sea leads us to understand that Tolkien is not simply writing imaginative tales of fancy but is making claims about the nature of language, imagination and our \textit{Umwelt}. Words are not ‘containers’ that hold myth but are pieces of a form of life in disrepair –in the Wittgensteinian sense– from whose vantage point we can see the world anew. This position naturally results from and leads to a radically different reading of the \textit{Beowulf} lecture than Flieger would suggest.\textsuperscript{456}

\textsuperscript{455} Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 16.

\textsuperscript{456} There is an important theological reading that must be added to my critique of Flieger, however. In the context of Tolkien and Barfield I will summarize it in footnote form. I would suggest that the tension Flieger senses –between light and dark / \textit{OFS} and \textit{BMC}– would be more accurately characterized as the tension between fallen existential finitude and the in-breaking of Christ’s eschatological reality. The so called darkness and the light can be delineated but cannot be separated because the whole of creation –for good and for ill– is held together by \textit{Providence}. In the language of the \textit{Silmarillion}, Providence is Eru (“who in Arda is called \textit{Ilúvatar}”) incorporating the discord (negation of heart) of Melkor into the grand divine harmony.

Theologically we can say that darkness is, but it never has the final say nor does it ever exist independently of God’s final yes to life. So, in the appropriate reinterpretation of \textit{BMC} and \textit{OFS} would be that \textit{BMC} reveals that –paraphrasing Tolkien—whether the gods go or come the monsters remain and what is required of humanity is to remain of good cheer and have courage in the face of that fallen reality. This is in stark contrast to Flieger’s vainglorious interpretation of \textit{BMC} that “the point of the poem is the beauty and doomed glory of such a battle, made more beautiful and more glorious precisely because its inevitable end is death.” (14) Death is not beautiful for Tolkien, rather, it is courage driven by hope in the face of death –a reality exemplified by the imaginative monsters in the story– which is beautiful. \textit{OFS} then, is a theological statement which takes place in the world of \textit{BMC}. While a fallen world suffers a “long defeat” there are moments when we can glimpse (and often taste and smell) a different reality. This joy, this sentimental longing, this \textit{Sehnsucht} (as deployed by Rudolf Otto) is the nostalgia, which accompanies a glimpse of the way things ought to be, but are not yet; Tolkien calls this the \textit{evangelium} or eucatastrophe. \textit{OFS} is not a new reading of \textit{BMC} but an extended meditation on the nature of a story such as \textit{Beowulf}.

Ultimately Flieger gets it right when she quotes Tolkien from \textit{BMC}, saying that despite the presence of monsters the \textit{Beowulf} poet “is still concerned primarily with \textit{man on earth}” and “the phrase ‘man on earth,’ with its emphatic italics, is the key to Tolkien’s reading of the meeting of paganism and Christianity in the poem and in his own philosophy as well.” (18) Tolkien is
The sea, in fact, has a tremendous personal symbolic significance to Tolkien, and any time he mentions it, it cannot be taken lightly. Carpenter notes that Tolkien was plagued as a child by a recurring dream of the sea—a Great Wave—devouring the land. The Great Wave is later incorporated into the myth of the destruction of Númenor and in the landing of the survivors of Númenor at the Gulf of Lune where the Elves and Men of the West keep an ever vigilant watch over the waters to the Undying Lands. But the waters of the sea are not just mere water … as though there was ever such a thing. Tolkien notes in the Ainulindalē:

But the other Ainur looked upon this habitation set within the vast spaces of the World, which the Elves call Arda, the Earth; and their hearts rejoiced in light, and their eyes beholding many colours were filled with gladness; but because of the roaring of the sea they felt a great unquiet. And they observed the winds and the air, and the matters of which Arda was made, of iron, and stone and silver and gold and many substances: but of all these water they most greatly praised. And it is said by the Eldar that in water there lives yet the echo of the Music of the Ainur more than in any substance else that is in this Earth; and many of the Children of Ilúvatar hearken still unsated to the voices of the Sea, and yet know not for what they listen.

Over these waters Ælfwine sails to Tol Eressēa (The Lonely Island) and hears the Lost Tales of the Elves. And of course, there is Eärendil the Mariner who sails the straight path across the seas to Valinor to plead and intercede for the safety of Middle-earth. To Tolkien the waters of the sea are life giving and life taking, they represent order and

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Humphrey Carpenter, ibid., 170.

chaos, but most importantly the waters of the sea contain the hypnotic music of the earliest notes of creation.

Against this reading, Flieger’s assertion that “there is no allegorical correlative to the sea” has undoubtedly missed the mark. On the contrary, the sea plays a crucial and primeval role in Tolkien’s allegory of the Tower, not only to get inside of words, but –as Vico postulated– to ponder a reality (a life-world) now lost in a prosaic age.

When we stand atop the tower and look out unto the sea we sense the trace of the way things could be, and in many cases, ought to be. There is then an intense ethical element to Tolkien’s philological and literary craft that must now be addressed. This ethical element echoes much that has already been said regarding the ordering of human forms of life and the possibilities of resistance.

**MYTHOPOEIC RESISTANCE: RECOVERY, ESCAPE, CONSOLATION**

The Thirties culminate in Tolkien’s definitive manifesto of his philological project, the *OFS* lecture in 1939. The lecture is intimately linked to Tolkien’s development of the idea of mythopoeia –the culmination of his thoughts on language, myth and imagination before his major work on *LOTR* and presents the most systematic treatise available in Tolkien’s vast corpus of imaginative work for

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459 “[OFS] was revised and expanded for inclusion in *Essays Presented to Charles Williams*, reissued together with *Leaf by Niggle* in *Tree and Leaf* in 1964, which volume was subsequently folded into *The Tolkien Reader.*” Verlyn Flieger, *Splintered Light*, 11.

460 Bradley J. Birzer notes, in his excellent study entitled J. R. R. Tolkien’s Sanctifying Myth (Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2004), that Tolkien “considered this essay especially explicative of his own thinking and analysis on a range of subjects. In fact, he later claimed that he had written [LOTR] to demonstrate much of the argument presented in ‘On Fairy-Stories’.” (Birzer 33) What Birzer is referring to are several letters found in the Humphrey Carpenter edited collection *The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien*. See letters 163 (to W.H. Auden), 165, 181 and letter 234 where Tolkien says, “I had to think about [the contemporary delusions about ‘fairy-stories’], however, before I gave an ‘Andrew Lang’ lecture at St Andrews on Fairy-stories; and I must say I think the result was entirely beneficial to *The Lord of the Rings*, which was a practical demonstration of the views that I expressed.” (Carpenter 310) This in no way implies that Tolkien’s motivation for writing LOTR can be reduced to simple ‘demonstration’. Indeed, its origins are far more complex! The point to be taken here is that LOTR is an ‘embodiment’, a ‘fleshing out’ in literary practice, of the theory found in OFS.
deciphering a discernable project of *Faërie*.\(^{461}\) Primarily concerned with the nature of artistic creation and consequently its possible philosophical and theological implications, Tolkien develops ideas established in his 1936 *Beowulf* lecture.

The fairy-story, or *Fantasy*, “is a natural human activity”, claims Tolkien.\(^{462}\) While fairy-story is an exploration of a perilous yet enchanted land—which Tolkien refers to as Faërie—its primary concern is always with the practices of human beings in the real or primary world. “Faërie”, Tolkien argues, “contains many things besides elves and fays, and besides dwarfs, witches, trolls, giants, or dragons: it holds the seas, the sun, the moon, the sky; and the earth, and all things that are in it: tree and bird, water and stone, wine and bread, and ourselves, mortal men, when we are enchanted.”\(^{463}\) Tolkien believed that fairy-story would aid in the “re-enchantment” of the real world and provide a more authentic mediation of reality than the Modernist “Robot-Age” in which he and the rest of his shell-shocked generation found themselves. Tolkien’s concerns about the nature of language, reality, the human imagination, and human forms of life culminate in the penultimate rubric of Tolkien’s *OFS* entitled *Recovery, Escape, Consolation*.

\(^{461}\) Tolkien offers no explanation for his spelling of *Faërie*. There is a direct reference in *OFS* to the first instance of *Fairy* in the OED: a poem by 14th-century poet John Gower: “as be were of faiëre”, which Tolkien immediately re-interprets as, “as if he were come from Faërie”. One possible source may be William Morris. In the prologue to *The Earthly Paradise* Morris writes of wanderers finding “a nameless city in a distant sea / White as the changing walls of Faërie.” As pointed out in Appendix 3, *The Earthly Paradise* is a possible source for Tolkien’s earliest complete work *The Book of Lost Tales*. Whatever the source of the spelling, Tolkien’s point is twofold. Faërie is not a subject but a place (a ‘real’ place in time) and its spelling is an integral reference to Tolkien’s distinction between what he is arguing for in *OFS* and the traditional Victorian notion of Fairy which was relegated to a status of diminutive fancy. “The definition of a fairy-story”, says Tolkien, “what it is, or what it should be—does not, then depend on any definition or historical account of elf or fairy, but upon the nature of Faërie: the Perilous Realm itself, and the air that blows in that country.” (OFS 114)


\(^{463}\) J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 113.
To understand what Tolkien means exactly by ‘recovery’ requires some investigation. On the surface, we know that Tolkien views fairy-story as a means of recovering the enchantment of creation because it is concerned, not with other worlds, but with our real world. “Fantasy is made out of the Primary World, but a good craftsman loves his material [...]. It was in fairy-stories that I first divined the potency of the words, and the wonder of things, such as stone, and wood, and iron; tree and grass; house and fire; bread and wine”, he says. However, ‘recovery’ is not simply a linguistic recognition of the real world – it is philological. Here we must momentarily diverge, on principle, from Vichian philological recovery. It is fair to make a direct parallel with Vico’s description of recovery and Platonic anamnesis which Vico certainly inherited through his reading of Renaissance natural philosophy. However, to attempt to make the same parallel between Tolkienian recovery and Platonic anamnesis (or even suggest Tolkien was a Platonist), as Verlyn Flieger attempts to do in Splintered Light, simply because his characterization of recovery ‘resembles’ it, would be incorrect. Tolkien’s recovery is not a concern for an external and eternal nature of ‘words’ and ‘things’ but with their use in particular forms of life. To clarify what this means we are well served to recall Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, “to imagine a language means to imagine a life-form”. This is not to say that – to the other extreme – recovery simply serves or can be reduced to didactic purposes as R. J. Reilly or Paul Kocher attempt to claim. Recovery is far broader and

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464 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 147.
465 The exception to be made, of course, would be the influence of philosophy of Baruch Spinoza on Vico, as suggested by Isaiah Berlin.
466 Verlyn Flieger, Splintered Light, 25; Unfortunately, Scull and Hammond’s dependence on Flieger in their usually thorough Reader’s Guide renders the entry on Recovery useless.
467 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 7e.
deeper than seeing “morality as morality by prescinding from this or that moral act”\textsuperscript{468} or than gaining “fresh knowledge of ourselves and the world about us, and of the kindly insight we once had into other species, other minds.”\textsuperscript{469} Tolkien was concerned with the recovery of a more poetic –better yet, a mythopoeic– form of life with its own ethical and moral characterizations contrary to what he perceived to be prevalent in the early 20\textsuperscript{th}-century Europe. Tolkien argued that fairy-story could enliven us to a more authentic encounter with the alienating world which this prosaic “Robot-Age” offered, and aid in the “re-enchantment” of the real world –which includes food, music, water, rocks, trees, architecture, sunsets, and the like. Perhaps this is what Tolkien means when he says that recovery includes a “return and renewal of health” and a freedom from “triteness”, “familiarity”, and a “possessiveness” of the everyday world.\textsuperscript{470} In Heideggerian terms we could say more broadly that recovery is a continual excavation and return to a relationship with the hiddenness of the world lost in forms of life that no longer participate in, and with, creation but rather overwrite and truncate intended interconnectedness on the procrustean bed of technological alienation.

\textit{Escape}

The second ultimate aim of fairy-story is to provide a means of ‘escape’. The first inclination may be to ask, “Escape \textit{from} and to \textit{where}?" It is important to immediately make the distinction that Tolkien is not talking about a pleasant lie or falsehood which is an erroneous view taken up by Nicholas Wolterstorff in his book \textit{Art in Action}. In reference to Tolkien’s project Wolterstorff says, “Sometimes we prize the


\textsuperscript{470} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 146.
world of a work of art for its falsehood in various respects to what we believe actuality to be like. We want for a while to burrow into a world significantly different from our actual world. We want for a while to escape the drudgery and pain, the boredom, perplexity, and disorder of real life." Here, Wolterstorff completely misses the point; Faërie is not a falsehood, but a land just as problematic and complicated as any other life-world. If anything, Middle-earth is more real than the world in which we live!

After spending months in the rat-and-lice-infested trenches of World War One, Tolkien—and many of his generation—realized the mechanized and prosaic counterfeit projection of the modern world has robbed us of the possibility to express authentic lifeworlds and have an encounter with the enchanting “magic” of the reality of this world which is God's creation. Tolkien says, “a real taste for fairy-stories was wakened by philology on the threshold of manhood, and quickened to full life by war.” With Romantic exploration in the shadow of Modernist collapse, Tolkien proposes a project of restoring human vision and forms of life—ways of being a person, of living, of living-together. He says we are called to see “things as we are (or were) meant to see them” by rejecting “possessiveness” and “appropriation” so evident in “the Robot Age”. In imaginative escape “we still deal with life and death, comfort and discomfort. We merely escape progressivism and the progressive dream, which reduces all of complex reality to a mere shadow of creation’s true wonders.” Escape is not an escape from reality—or as Tolkien calls it, the “flight of the deserter”—but is an escape into reality from the prison that is the Post-Cartesian preoccupation with appropriation (manifest as ‘taking over’ taking ‘possession’ and consuming as capital utility), which

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472 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 135. The connection Tolkien makes between words, imagination and reality will be explored in the next section.
473 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 146.
474 Bradley J. Birzer, ibid., 39.
reduces the land and the people to physical commodity and cogs of a “robot age”. Tolkien harshly critiques such activity as would confound this significant distinction when he says, “they would seem to prefer the acquiescence of the ‘quisling’ to the resistance of the patriot. To such thinking you have only to say ‘the land you loved is doomed’ to excuse any treachery, indeed to glorify it.”

The implications for possibilities and imagination in our “Escape” are astounding. “For creative Fantasy”, says Tolkien, “is founded upon the hard recognition that things are so in the world as it appears under the sun; on a recognition of fact, but not a slavery to it.” What is ‘real’ is not only what can be verified, but sometimes what is ‘verified’ is often much less ‘real’ that what we imagined. “The maddest castle that ever came out of a giant’s bag in a wild Gaelic story is not only much less ugly than a robot-factory,” comments Tolkien, “it is also (to use a very modern phrase) ‘in a very real sense’ a great deal more real.” As with the case of the Christian prophetic tradition, often what is imagined is more real than what can be verified. Trevor Hart explores this connection in his essay “Imagination for the Kingdom of God?”. “It is precisely imagination,” he says, “the capacity which is able to take the known and to modify it in striking and unexpected ways, which offers us the opportunity to think beyond the limits of the given”. We can project Hart’s insight even further: the ‘known’ includes the ‘possible’, or that which is beyond the limits of the given. Using terms already discussed we can say that imaginative understanding (Verstehen) includes the projection of the possibilities of being; the philological imagination (asterisk reality) reveals that the ‘known’ and the ‘possible’ are indeed given in

476 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 144.
477 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 150.
everyday human life. The radical proposal from Tolkien, then, is the belief that the human imagination can enliven our perception. And even more radical, he claimed there is connection between a renewal of perception and a transformation of action – that finally, there is the hope to enliven our actions to shape the world around us.

**CONSOLATION**

Tolkien describes consolation as the “oldest and deepest desire, the Great Escape: The Escape from Death”. Fairy-Story, Myth, and the Gospels collide in an in-breaking of eschatological hope; Tolkien explains the production of this collision: “The consolation of fairy-stories, the joy of the happy ending: or more correctly of the good catastrophe, the sudden joyous ‘turn’” – in his one word: *eucatastrophe*. The developing relationship between the imaginative, the theological and the primary world will be addressed in at the end of the chapter, but, it is important to note the significance of Tolkien’s *eucatastrophe*. Ultimately, Tolkien is concerned with the anthropology, the sociology and ethics of Christian hope – or the way in which humans experience Christian hope in the complex weave of the human lifeworld. “It seems that for protean people it is difficult to believe that the hope, goodness, and love which they so avidly imagine could be actual in and true of the primary-world.” Here, Tolkien’s claim about the imaginative and mythopoeic also functions theologically. As Trevor Hart echoed earlier, as in the case of the Jewish prophetic tradition and the anticipatory witness of Christian eschatology, the ‘known’ and the ‘possible’ are not only given but transform the primary world. When the heavy clouds of sorrow envelope us in the midst of *dyscatastrophe*, the ‘happy ending’ functions as an in-breaking of fleeting

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“Joy beyond the walls of the world”.\textsuperscript{482} By this point in \textit{OFS} it is clear that Tolkien’s mythopoeic project – his philological discussion of Faërie, ‘reality’ and language, is at the very least, a powerful anti-modern ethical philosophy, and at its highest aspirations, a unique theological claim. “But in the ‘eucatastrophe’” Tolkien says, “we see in a brief vision that the answer may be greater – it may be a far-off gleam or echo of \textit{evangelium} in the real world.”\textsuperscript{483} To Tolkien, the prophetic function of fairy-story is \textit{eucatastrophe}, which challenges what some people take to be the sum total of the “facts” of this world by denying nihilistic doom to have the final say. This is an extension of his legendarium and extended to \textit{LOTR}. A closer examination of the character of that life-world is in order.

\textbf{\textit{Smith of Wootton Major: Philology as Wayfinding and Elvish Craft}}

In the unheralded tale \textit{Smith of Wootton Major} (1967 referenced as \textit{Smith}), Tolkien writes a deceptively simple narrative of imaginative recovery, sub-creation and its relationship to human community and everyday life. Gifted with the fay-star, the villager Smith regularly visits the uncanny and perilous land of Faërie to explore and survey its wondrous sights. Villager Smith’s excursions are not mere fancy – or escape into a detached cognitive world – but are deeply \textit{transformative} experiences. With each successive trip to Faërie, Smith returns with clarity of vision which he then incorporates into the everydayness of life back home. “The traveler in the realms of fantasy, as Tolkien insists in his doctrine of Recovery, is no mere dreamer but brings back a freshness of vision, which brightens and beautifies everything \textit{he sets his hand to.}\textsuperscript{484} The key phrase here, “everything he sets his hand to”, suggests recovery is a practice

\textsuperscript{482} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 153.
\textsuperscript{483} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{484} Paul Kocher, \textit{Master of Middle-earth: The Achievement of J. R. R. Tolkien}, 176.
that informs the activities of agents-in-the-world. In the tale, there is little distinction between art, craft and disclosing the realities of Faërie for Smith, who creates practical tools and objects of delight with a new level of skill and aesthetic mastery, as a result of his travels in Faërie. Describing Smith’s works Tolkien says, “they were beautiful, for he could work iron into wonderful forms that looked as light and delicate as a spray of leaves and blossom, but kept the stern strength of iron, or seemed even stronger.”

Here is the heart of Tolkien’s philological imagination.

Verlyn Flieger’s chapter on Smith, in her book A Question of Time: J. R. R. Tolkien’s Road to Faërie (1997), examines Tolkien’s final treatment of a human traveler “between the worlds” and offers some unique insights that beg further discussion. The theme of traveling between worlds is as old as Tolkien’s legendarium and began with the traveler Eriol whose saga is collected in The Book of Lost Tales (1983, 1984). Drawing on a previously unpublished essay, Fleiger postulates that Tolkien still wrestled with the philosophy and theology involved in the relationship and interdependence between Faërie (now spelled by Tolkien as Faery) and the everyday human world. Smith is his attempt to work out those questions one last time—a ‘farwell’ to Faery, says Paul Kocher, “a passport to his successors”.

What we find in Smith, and confirmed in Tolkien’s own words, is that Faërie—or the philological imagination—is “necessary for the health and complete functioning

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487 Flieger suggests that this change in spelling may represent a shift in Tolkien’s view on the relationship between Faërie and our everyday world. Although she does not pursue this thesis, her hypothesis is based on the radical shift in tone between the dark and listless tone of Tolkien’s poem The Sea-bell and the hopeful and interdependent tone of Smith.
488 Paul Kocher, ibid., 180, 181.
of the Human as is sunlight for physical life”. I quote Tolkien’s rare reflection on the imagination at length:

Faery represents at its weakest a breaking out (at least in mind) from the iron ring of the familiar, still more from the adamantine ring of belief that it is known, possessed, controlled, and so (ultimately) all that is worth being considered—a constant awareness of the world beyond these rings. More strongly it represents love: that is, a love and respect for all things, ‘Inanimate’ and ‘animate,’ an unpossessive love of them as ‘other.’ This light will be respected, and they will also appear delightful, beautiful, wonderful even glorious. Faery might be said indeed to represent *Imagination* (without definition because taking in all the definitions of this word): esthetic, exploratory and receptive; and artistic; inventive, dynamic, (sub)creative. This compound—of awareness of a limitless world outside our domestic parish; a love (in ruth and admiration) for the things in it; and a desire for wonder, marvels, both perceived and conceived […]

This primordial interdependence of the imagination and everydayness is reflected in the topography of *Smith*. Drawing on Medieval and Renaissance narratives, the woods or forest is Tolkien’s topographical boundary for the Faërie world. Woods is glossed in OE as *wudu* but also notably as *wode* in ME which can also be glossed as ‘mad’; the Anglo-Saxons translated the Norse god Oðinn (oð) as Woden—the god of poetry and madness. Indeed, the philology of ‘Wooton’ is literally from the OE as the town [tūn] in or by the wood. In fact, Wootton Major is a philological asterisk reality for the ‘real’ English town of Wootton in Oxfordshire. In *Smith*, Tolkien shows us two contiguous worlds; the human world dependent on the Faërie world for its spiritual and

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489 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 236.
490 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 246-247. (emphasis mine)
491 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 263 n.5.
physical wellbeing. Tolkien’s narrative device, says Flieger, allows him to “conceive a geography both magical and mappable … one gets there by walking.” Here we should take note of Flieger’s use of terms already discussed in chapter 3 (Ingold) and make sense of them in light of what has already been said.

**PHILOLOGY AND WAYFINDING**

Flieger’s talk of ‘maps’ and travel are not unique. Tolkien’s penchant for topographic details and his hopes to create an inner consistency of ‘reality’ through them have been well documented. Tom Shippey dedicates a chapter of *The Road to Middle-earth* to Tolkien’s use of maps and place names in *LOTR*; this is what Shippey calls Tolkien’s “cartographic plot”. Tracing its development, Shippey estimates there are forty or fifty names in *The Hobbit*, whereas *LOTR* contains well over 600. Yes, there are maps in *The Hobbit*, but nothing like the topological maps of Middle-earth and various geographic details drafted by Tolkien for *LOTR*. Shippey also notes that characters in *LOTR* even “talk like maps”. To his point, Shippey cites an odd statement by Tolkien in one of his letters: “I wisely started with a map, and made the story fit.”

In light of all that has been said and all that Tolkien has said about the philological origins of his legendarium, how is this to be read? Shippey’s explanation, that the purpose of such devices is to make such places “isomorphic with reality”, is unsatisfactory. “In the modern world we take [place names] as labels, as things accordingly in a very close one-to-one relationship with whatever they label.” Not only unsatisfactory, Shippey’s explanation reeks of exactly the representational

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492 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 250. (emphasis mine)
494 Tom Shippey, ibid., 101.
mapmaking and navigation we are trying to move away from and is hardly in keeping with Tolkien’s philological sensibilities.

In offering an alternate characterization we should begin by recalling Tim Ingold’s admonition that “every map is necessarily embedded in a ‘form of life’.”⁴⁹⁵ Contrary to this, Shippey’s explanation (and use of ‘isomorphic’) attempts to artificially divide the languages, people and activities of middle earth from their topography. This is precisely the definition of colonization established in chapter 3. Maps and globes, says Ingold, share a common trait, “[they present] us with the idea of a preformed surface waiting to be occupied, to be colonized first by living things and later by human (usually meaning Western) civilization.”⁴⁹⁶ 

There is an alternate reading available for Tolkien’s use of place names and the ‘map-like’ speech of his characters. We begin by benefiting from Heidegger’s description of Dasein, das Rede and ‘reality’. Remember, language is a tool used in a shared context and, in the midst of activity, the world is already infused with meaning. So, while there may be a ‘reality’ or an ‘external world’, the only ‘world’ we are ever in is this nexus of shared meaning. Here we may graciously relent from our assault on Shippey and momentarily consider what he later says regarding the ‘cartographic plot’. Shippey points out that Tolkien’s narrative ‘plot’, in the Modernist sense of the word, takes a back seat to maps, names and languages.⁴⁹⁷ While this certainly doesn’t let Shippey off the hook it does offer us more insight into our re-reading of the ‘cartographic plot’.

Ingold suggests that the ‘cartographic’ equivalent to the literary plot is the tourist route-plan across the surface of a map.⁴⁹⁸ The plot is a point-to-point-to-point

⁴⁹⁶ Tim Ingold, ibid., 214. (bold emphasis mine)
⁴⁹⁷ Tom Shippey, ibid., 117.
journey over a prescribed and surveyed territory. Alternately, the line on the sketch map is similar to storytelling. The storytelling line travels along, and the places, characters and events of a story do not ‘exist’ but ‘occur’ as events in the midst of an activity. Ingold references studies done on the storytelling of the Siberian Khanty whose translation of story as way reflects their practice of never finishing a story but allowing the story to go on until all who are listening have fallen asleep. Or the Orochon hunters who are more interested in the events of their hunting journey than the actual killing of the prey (climax and conclusion in a plot). The story listeners then do not navigate the plot, per se, but are wayfinders – what Ingold calls the originary mode of dwelling—along the meandering line of the story. Although these are examples of oral transmission, Ingold says that there is an equivalent in the Ancient and Medieval written tradition—and here, there are two significant points to be made. Congruently, they are that Ancient and Medieval writers and readers were not ‘tourist navigators’ but wayfinders.

Ingold cites Michel de Certeau’s *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984), in which he compares the modern writer to the isolated Cartesian subject. The external world is something to be conquered and possessed, the surface is to be inscribed and constructed upon by the detached subject. “Just as a society is created in the space of colonial rule, or a city erected in the space encompassed by the plan, so the written text is produced in the space of the page.” While this treatment may not be entirely fair – indeed, there has been much to champion in modern literature – the point to be made is

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499 Tim Ingold, ibid., 90. This characterization has much in common with Gilles Deleuze’s description of the crisis of the action-image and its fully realized beyond the action-image in ‘modern’ cinema and as seen in Terrence Malick’s *The New World* in Chapter 5.


501 Tim Ingold, ibid., 16.

502 Tim Ingold, ibid., 13.
the manner in which writing and reading function in a larger nexus of practices that have proven to be detrimental to civilization on the whole. And in this we begin to understand the utter disdain for modern literature and literary criticism that prompted Tolkien’s retrieval of Medieval subject and form. The Medieval practice was wholly different; Medieval writing “was understood not as something made, but as something that speaks.”

We read with our ears and listened with our eyes. De Certeau specifically has the Bible in mind, but Ingold shows that practice is detectable from Antiquity to the Renaissance. One practice particularly relevant to this chapter is the monastic practice of reading out of the *voces paginarum*, the ‘voices of the page’:

If the reader were to begin to read this page out loud, or even at low murmur, they would begin to hear a ‘voice’. This voice, though it may sound your own is by no means yours; the voice is mine. You may attempt to dismiss this voice as a figment of the imagination but rest assured this voice is our conversation. We hear this conversation in the Anglo-Saxon verb *ræd*, to read, which means ‘giving advice or counsel’ and later extended, says Ingold, to “explaining something obscure” and finally “the interpretation of ordinary writing.”

Here then is Tolkien’s philological wayfinding, sensed by Verlyn Flieger’s insight of “mapping” and “walking”, and reduced to a colonizing device in Tom Shippey’s “isomorphic”, “catographic plot”. Writing as navigation, and reading as tourist plot-following, is precisely the modern practice Tolkien sought to avoid in his philological craft. “In wayfaring, by contrast,” says Ingold, “one follows a path that one has previously traveled in the company of others, or in their footsteps, reconstructing the itinerary as one goes along.”

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503 Tim Ingold, ibid., 13; Michel de Certeau, ibid., 136-137.
504 Tim Ingold, ibid., 14-15.
505 Tim Ingold, ibid., 15-16.
crudely put it, why Tolkien’s characters “speak like maps”; Tolkien’s characters are *mapping* and *wayfinding*—and we are called to do likewise.

**THE PHILOLOGY OF ELVISH CRAFT**

At the heart of Tolkien’s legendarium is the relationship between Elves (described by Tolkien as the first-born of Middle-earth) and humans in their ongoing struggle with the seduction of Middle-earth by Melkor. Whereas Tolkien argued that by the early twentieth century human beings had lost their greatness of life and civilization (a claim he shared with many other scholars of his time: Oswald Spengler, Christopher Dawson, Romano Guardini), there was once a day—many ages ago—when they more closely resembled the great mandate of mythopoeic sub-creation. Through craft, song, and sub-creative imagination, the Elves of Tolkien’s legendarium built, dwelled, and lived with a meaningfulness that elevated the lives of men but is now lost. Tolkien describes this tragedy in his ‘recovery’ of the greatness and downfall of the Númenórian civilization, which at one time held close council with Elves before being seduced by the deceiver Melkor.\(^\text{506}\) To Tolkien, the Elves characterize all that was once great, noble, and whole in humanity. “The Elves,” Tolkien comments in one letter,

represent, as it were, the artistic aesthetic, and purely scientific aspects of Human nature raised to a higher level than is actually seen in men. That is: they have a devoted love of the physical world, and a desire to observe and understand it for its own sake and as ‘other’—sc. as a reality derived from God in the same degree as themselves—not as a material for use or as

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\(^{506}\) It is interesting to note that Tolkien’s story about the Númenórians was originally conceived as a ‘time-travel’ story prompted by C.S. Lewis. “Human beings don’t travel through time in a machine”, commented Tolkien about the challenge. Presumably they travel through imaginative philological recovery. Cf: Appendix 2 to see how this was anticipated, in his own way, in the philology of Giambattista Vico and how it broadens our reading Tolkien.
a power-platform. They also possess a ‘subcreational’ or artistic faculty of great excellence.507

‘Elvish craft’, then, seems to be the greatest indication of an authentic and embodied mode of being-in-the world as sub-creator for Tolkien: as those who fully dwell in their environment, craft with a high level of embodied and aesthetic skill (as extolled by Ruskin and Morris before him), and who –through their craft, song and imagining– resist and transform unhealthy imaginings of human existence that manifest as colonization of space and practice.

As mentioned before, in Smith of Wooton Major, Smith recovers this authentic and embodied ‘craft’ when he journeys to Faërie. We should not be tempted to fall for the Victorian (if not malnourished) picture Verlyn Flieger paints of Smith being ‘enriched’ by his experiences.508 If indeed Faërie is like “sun for physical life”, as Tolkien insists it is, then we are far more than ‘enriched’ by our journey; we are enlivened to transform the everyday. This reading of Elvish craft in Smith, then, is confirmed elsewhere in Tolkien’s writings where he refers to ‘craft’, ‘magic’ and ‘technology’ all as modes of revealing –to echo Heidegger. Tolkien calls ‘Elvish Magic’ “Enchantment”: it resembles a tool, or more precisely a characterization of a particular kind of tool-use, a type of art used in the service of his doctrine of recovery, escape and consolation. “Faëire itself may perhaps most nearly be translated by Magic –but it is magic of a peculiar mood and power, at the furthest pole from the vulgar devices of the laborious, scientific, magician.”509 The ‘Magic’ of the Elves is an artistic craft free from the seduction of ‘Power’ and the desire to dominate the Primary World,

508 Verlyn Flieger, ibid., 229, 237.
and it is used in the service of unconcealment—it reveals something true about ourselves and the world which may have been obfuscated or occluded.

There is another form of Magic which Tolkien links to a privation and corruption of the sub-creator. This ‘Sauronic’ form of magic is used to further a sub-creator’s possessive love of the primary-world, power and technological immediacy. It is a degraded or commodified form of art, a technique concerned with power and domination of the primary world. Whereas Sauronic magic seeks to control and alter the primary world (i.e. Saruman the White or the Modern ‘Robot Age’) for one’s own ends, Elvish Enchantment “lies, open or concealed, pure or alloyed, the desire for a living, realized sub-creative art, which (however much it may outwardly resemble it) is inwardly wholly different from the greed for self-centered power which is the mark of the mere Magician.” An echo of Tolkien’s poem *Mythopoeia* can be heard in these words and in the characterization of humanity as sub-creator who is called to refract (to open up, reveal, disclose, and unconceal) the light of God through the activity of the human imagination intimately involved in the world—in forms of life.

We can say, then, that there are two modes of revealing available to a sub-creator: one mode opens and reveals the other closes, calcifies and possesses. Tolkien’s response to the dehumanizing effects of a rapidly emerging technological 20th century is a philology of life-forms—exemplified in Elvish dwelling, song, craft and imagination. Tolkien’s life work is concerned with the ways in which we are to respond

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510 From the Greek τέχνη (techne) literally meaning craftsmanship but from which we also get the word technology.
512 In letter number 155 (probably dated some time in 1954) Tolkien further divides his conceptual understanding of magic between magia and goetia yet adds the caveat that both ‘sides’ use both types of magic—what is important is the motive or the purpose. *Magia* is the Latin root for ‘magic’ and according to a footnote by editor Humphrey Carpenter *goetia* (γοητεία) is the Greek word from which we get Sorcerer (γοης). *Magia*, Tolkien says, is used by the enemy to “bulldoze” and by the Elves and Gandalf for beneficial purposes, while the evil uses of *goetia* are linked to power and terror. The Elvish *goetia*, by contrast, is described as artistic and used in the service of unconcealment.
to Sauronic powers, the wraithing of goodness and the transformation of humanity into orcs. There are serious implications in Tolkien’s *Mythopoeia* about a relationship between who we are, what we create, where we live and how we live. Tolkien believed a poetic *habitus*—exemplified in the lives of Elves and to a lesser and more problematic degree in the race of Men in his legendarium— is required to resist the dehumanizing forces he encountered in his context.

**The Ethics of Philological Resistance**

“Man is both a seed and on some degree a gardener, for good or ill.”


It is clear from Tolkien’s personal correspondences that by the dawn of World War Two Tolkien’s philological practice and literary craft was actively fused to, what might be described as, an *ethics of philological resistance*. The remainder of this chapter, then, will trace—in Tolkien’s own words (mostly from his revealing letters)—the relationship between his philological project and the ethical concerns raised in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. Humphrey Carpenter, editor of Tolkien’s letters, notes that unfortunately between 1918 and 1937 very few of Tolkien’s letters survive. However, beginning in the turbulent latter years of the 1930’s and continuing until his death in 1972, we do have, says Carpenter, a long uninterrupted stream of letters. Rather than biographical, an approach we know Tolkien detested, my excavation through Tolkien’s letters might be broadly described as philological. These letters reveal the very important religious and moral issues inextricably tied up with his life, work, and world. This approach to philology is commensurate with the characterizations made earlier in

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the chapter and the reader should tie the themes in Tolkien’s letters back to what has already been said by Tim Ingold and Lewis Mumford.\textsuperscript{514}

Of particular concern in understanding the letters is Tolkien’s idiosyncratic language. His consistent application of the term Orc (and Orc-like), for instance, is in fact quite Augustinian. A reference to people who have not only been corrupted, and turned into something they originally were not, “Orc” becomes a favorite descriptive term for Tolkien to put a finger on people whose lives and persons have been ‘colonized’, and who in turn attempt to colonize others, with forms of life which are counterfeit, dehumanizing, and more or less evil. Tolkien confesses, however, that all too often stories are too ‘clear cut’ when it comes to putting a finger on Evil. In real life, he says, “we started out with a great many Orcs on our side.”\textsuperscript{515} Again, in another letter, he insists that he considers Orcs “as real a creation as anything in ‘realistic’ fiction … only in real life [exterior life] they are on both sides. … which means a motley alliance of orcs, beasts, demons, plain naturally honest men, and angels.”\textsuperscript{516} His colorful and imaginative language is evident in such passages. Similarly, he uses ‘hobbit’ for good people of a certain character.

And even more important (and potentially more misleading) is his idiosyncratic use of the term ‘Machine’. In a letter to Milton Waldman, Tolkien says: “By [the Machine] I intend all use of external plans or devices (apparatus) instead of development of inherent inner powers or talents –or even the use of these talents with the corrupted motive of dominating: bulldozing the real world, or coercing other wills. The Machine is our more oblivious modern form though more closely related to Magic

\textsuperscript{514} See Appendix 3 to explore its connection to William Morris.
\textsuperscript{515} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 78. (emphasis mine)
\textsuperscript{516} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 82.
than is usually recognized.”

And in relation to what has already been suggested about Tolkien’s view on the different expressions of magic in Middle-earth, he says: “The Enemy, or those who have become like him, go in for ‘machinery’ – with destructive and evil effects – because ‘magicians’, who have become chiefly concerned to use magia for their own power, would do so (do do so). The basic motive for magia – quite apart from any philosophic consideration of how it would work – is immediacy: speed, reduction of labour, and reduction also to a minimum (or vanishing point) of the gap between the idea or desire and the result or effect.”

In yet another letter, this time to his son Christopher, Tolkien wrote: “Well the first War of the Machines seems to be drawing to its final inconclusive chapter – leaving, alas, everyone the poorer, many bereaved or maimed and millions dead, and only one thing triumphant: the Machines. As the servants of the Machines are becoming a privileged class, the Machines are going to be enormously more powerful.”

Tolkien’s concerns about the Machine do not end there, however. In his letters Tolkien reveals a “tragedy and despair” in all machinery laid bare. Citing Victorian author Samuel Butler and again echoing Morris, and seemingly Jevons paradox – Tolkien warns that attempts to actualize desire and create power go wholly unsatisfied; “labour-saving machinery only creates endless and worse labour.” The impotent modern striving for satisfaction, then, is thoroughly complicated by the theological reality of ‘the Fall’. Once again, Tolkien’s

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517 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 145-146.
519 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 111.
520 Perhaps Tolkien is referring to Butler’s article “Darwin Among the Machines” (1863), which postulated the ability of machines to evolve into a dominant ‘species’ who might one day supplant human beings. Alas, there is no room or time to pursue this line of thought.
521 Put forward by English economist and logician William Stanley Jevons in The Coal Question (1865), Jevons paradox is simply the observation that new sources of energy that make consumption efficient will decrease price and increase use thus nullifying gain. There is no evidence that Tolkien was aware of Jevons paradox but his writings certainly reflect the core of Jevon’s observations.
ethical concerns reveal an intensely theological preoccupation: the failures of our
desires to be satisfied using the machine are compounded by turns “to new and horrible
evil.” Here Tolkien shares similar concerns, suspicions, and a radical disillusionment
also expressed in the work of Lewis Mumford after World War Two where Tolkien’s
terms of “mass planning, organizing, and regimentation” are to be taken in the sense of
‘ordering’ at the cost of living ‘organizing’. Tolkien viewed ‘imposed visions’ of forms
of life as a significant challenge to the moral efficacy of sub-creation.

This, then, also raises another related, and more complex, theme in his letters:
Tolkien’s struggle to articulate the relationship between the secondary world of his
stories and the primary world of everyday life –which he refers to as ‘real life’ or the
‘external world’. Tolkien’s struggle to articulate the ‘real’, through the language of his
stories, however, provides us with a ‘philological key’ to his letters and work. This
struggle to articulate is one of two legs of –what might best be called– the double-
transfer of imaginative craft: this double-transfer is central to understanding Tolkien’s
ethics of philological resistance. This characterization will be explored more fully in
the conclusion; however, in short, the double-transfer of imaginative craft is simply
this: the realization that the craftsman is one who draws on ‘real life’ and can put it into
his work (in Tolkien’s case his story); but conversely, the work now has the ‘power’ to
transfer the forms and values which it portrays back to the everyday-lifeworld of the
craftsman. This concern is echoed in Iris Murdoch’s postulate that, “Man is a creature
who makes pictures of himself, and then comes to resemble that picture”.

The primary and integral relationship between being and activity, then –both in
personal comportment, in making and doing, and in the negative case of imposed forms
of life, and the active living relationship between these, and imaging and sub-creation–

is evident in all of Tolkien’s subsequent letters. Specifically, as the writing of LOTR progressed, there was an ever increasing emphasis on the everydayness of the hobbits. And in general, the hobbits are major representatives of one kind ordinary human living and of its informal and very human organization. This insistence on everyday life is never felt more powerfully than when years later in 1951, in summation to an extensive summary of his work to Milton Waldman, Tolkien reflects on “the theme of the relation of ordinary life (breathing, eating, working, begetting) and quests, sacrifice, causes, and the ‘longing for Elves’, and sheer beauty” seen in the simple ‘rustic’ love of Sam and Rosie as “absolutely essential” to the character of the chief Hero (Sam).^524

But after 1940 Tolkien’s letters become preoccupied with the troubling and rapidly transforming state of the world around him, its effects on everyday life, and the articulation of a ‘resistance’. They often have a very dark and pessimistic cast in the way he shows up evil in particularly stark ways. Later, he begins to be concerned about, and to criticize, forms of life already developing during the war, and likely to continue afterwards. He fears for the future of good ways of life.

Tolkien’s objections to the many developments of the Modern post-war world need to be seen in relation to his own self-imposed limits (moral and theological) on sub-creation, however. As vehement as were his objections to the changing landscape, ‘living in the past’ is certainly beyond one of those limits. In a very revealing letter to Naomi Mitchison, Tolkien says,

I am not a reformer nor an ‘embalmer’! I am not a ‘reformer’ (by exercise of power) since it seems doomed to Sarumanism [using the Machine to impose reforming plans by coercion]. But ‘embalming’ has its own punishments. … [T]he Elves are not wholly good or in the right … because with or without [Sauron’s] assistance they were ‘embalmers’. They wanted to

^524 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 161. (bold emphasis mine. Italics belong to Tolkien)
have their cake and eat it: to live in the mortal historical Middle-earth because they had become fond of it (and perhaps because they there had the advantages of superior caste), and so tried to stop its change and history, stop its growth, keep it as a pleasaunce, even largely a desert, where they could be ‘artists’ – and they were overburdened with sadness and nostalgic regret.525

Mentioned numerous times in this chapter, and the last, Tolkien was not a luddite and did not fear ‘machines’, or suffer from a sentimental longing for what has been ‘lost’.526

In the earlier letters Tolkien mixes personal foibles and dislikes with generally thought-out comments and dislikes. In a very regional yet effective example that would be right at home in Mumford’s work, Tolkien was quite vocal about his dislike of ‘planning’ and ‘planners’; he was specifically disheartened about the “design of destroying Oxford” after World War Two in order to accommodate growing automobile traffic.527 As early as 1943 Tolkien began to sense and express a great dislike for what he called the emerging imposition of “American sanitation, morale-pep, feminism, and mass production” which he tries to summarize with the phrase “americo-cosmopolitanism”.528 There are other very concrete critiques. On a trip to Birmingham – where Tolkien went to Prep-school – Tolkien was pleased to report that the only real damage the city has sustained, thus far in the war, “has been the growth of great flat featureless modern buildings.”529 And although “wireless” technology (radio?) had some potential for good, Tolkien exclaims “it has in fact in the main become a

525 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 197.
526 Recall how Tolkien discusses the different forms of ‘magic’ and how that relates to machines and the Machine.
527 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, 235. In yet another observation dated 1971, which would be right at home in Mumford’s writings, Tolkien laments how distressing he found the “horror of the American scene … polluted and impoverished to a degree only paralleled by the lunatic destruction of the physical lands which Americans inhabit”. J. R. R. Tolkien, Letters, 412.
528 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 65.
529 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 70.
weapon for the fool, the savage, and the villain to afflict the minority with, and to destroy thought.” \(^{530}\) Echoing Heidegger, he laments; “listening in has killed listening.” \(^{531}\) Much like Tolkien’s lament of the uses of wireless technology, his disdain for “the infernal combustion engine” is followed by the unfulfilled wish, “(more difficult still since humanity and engineers in special are both nitwitted and malicious as a rule) that [the internal combustion engine] could have been put to rational uses –if any.” \(^{532}\) By ‘rational’, we will see, that Tolkien meant, by the end of the war, (echoing William Morris and Mumford) the machine should be at service of humanity rather humanity reshaping its life and world for the machine.

After almost five long years of conflict on the continent, Tolkien’s thoughts about the emerging industrial-militarized West break wide open in a May 6, 1944 letter to his son Christopher. The job of the War –which included all major characteristics of a Fallen world: including mass planning, organizing, and regimentation– was “an ultimately evil job”, lamented Tolkien. \(^{533}\) He certainly thought resistance to Hitler’s Third Reich was necessary \(^{534}\) but he was deeply concerned with the ‘how’ (the means) of resistance; and with the life-forms which followed. Tolkien believed the cost of all war was high; and in this last war the price of victory was not just in capital, or lives, but the very soul of the West: “we are attempting to conquer Sauron with the Ring [that is to conquer an evil tyrant with use of the same evil means he uses] … But the penalty is, as you will know, to breed new Saurons, and slowly turn Men and Elves into Orcs.” \(^{535}\) Indeed, in another letter he insists, “[y]ou can’t fight the Enemy with his own

\(^{530}\) J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 72.
\(^{531}\) J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 72.
\(^{532}\) J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 77.
\(^{533}\) J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 78.
\(^{534}\) And indeed took personal exception to the way in which Hitler co-opted Germanic and Norse myth for twisted purposes.
\(^{535}\) J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 78.
Ring without turning into the Enemy; but unfortunately Gandalf’s wisdom seems long ago to have passed with him into the True West”. 536 ‘Destruction’ in the form of degradation and the loss of valuable life-ways through design, control and dominance, then, is at the heart of the matter when Tolkien says that LOTR is about ‘Power’, ‘Domination’, and to a greater degree, ‘Death’ and ‘Immortality’. 537

Tolkien has his own very distinctive way of involving the ethical and theological in the stories and myths he writes. In two letters to family friend Robert Murray, S. J. (1953 and 1954), Tolkien reveals a great deal about how he purposely kept theological concerns in his work within certain constraints. 538 LOTR is “of course a fundamentally religious and Catholic work; unconsciously so at first, but consciously in the revision. That is why I have not put in, or have cut out, practically all references to anything like ‘religion’, to cults or practices, in the imaginary world. For the religious element [however] is absorbed into the story and symbolism.” 539 This is not to say that Tolkien’s theological concerns were so subterranean that they were non-existent – on the contrary– the very structure of the life-world reveals its theological concerns as well as the occasional peep-hole (or bore-hole) which would allow “only the most attentive” to see. 540 One key to Tolkien’s theological and ethical dimension can be seen by considering why he petitioned to Rayner Unwin, however futilely, to publish The Silmarillion with LOTR. As Tolkien explains in detail to Father Murray, there is a definite “mythological-theological situation” leading up to, and involving, that moment in history. In Heideggarian terms we might say that when we open to the first page of LOTR we enter into an always already involved world – complete and complicated.

536 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 94.
537 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 235.
538 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 201.
539 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 172.
540 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 201. Tolkien notes Faramir’s Númenórean prayer and Gandalf telling Frodo: “behind that there was something else at work, beyond any design of the Ring-maker’s”.

(This will also be one the major themes to surface when we explore cinema in Chapter 5.) Understanding, entering into, and using the story of the rings depends (as in real life) partly on entering into the living past. There is no room or time to fully explore the details of his linking of ethics and religion into story, but we may note at least some of his general comments on this. Of relevance is Tolkien’s insistence that, although monotheistic, the Third Age of Middle-earth is a world of ‘natural theology’.541 “The only criticism [by Harvey Breit in a 1955 New York Time Book Review] that annoyed me was one that it ‘contained no religion’”, writes Tolkien, “[…] It is a monotheistic world or ‘natural theology’. The odd fact that there are no churches, temples, or religious rites and ceremonies, is simply part of the historical climate depicted … I am in any case myself a Christian; but the ‘Third Age’ was not a Christian world.”542 The Númenóreans, for instance, worship Eru ‘the One’ at the summit of a mountain but **they had no temple** and, indeed, while Númenórean influence lasted there would be no temple.543 “The Númenóreans thus began a great new good, and as monotheists;” Tolkien explains, “but like the Jews (only more so) with only one physical centre of ‘worship’; the summit of the mountain Meneltarma ‘Pillar of Heaven’ –literally, for they did not conceive of the sky as a divine residence– in the centre of Númenor”544 Tolkien’s summary is succinct and revealing; ‘truth’ is revealed historically and philosophically rather than ‘religiously’.545 Particularly in the later letters, we find page after page in which seriously ethical and religious discussion is conducted in and via discussion of his whole mythological and historical legendarium.

541 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 220.
542 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 220.
543 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 204, 205. (emphasis mine)
544 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 204.
545 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 207.
So, in the broad philological sense that has been discussed, Tolkien’s ethics of philological resistance took up theological and religious concerns without taking up its specialized—and sometime debilitating—language. This is never more apparent than when the War drew to a close and Tolkien began editing his OFS paper for publication—which Tolkien urges his son Christopher to read. Here we see his language briefly take on more traditional theological concepts—explicitly—to describe the full force of his philological project. In Tolkien’s conclusion in his earlier poem Mythopoeia the role allotted to sub-creation means that human artistry is the basic structure of what it means to be a human being. It is no wonder, concludes Tolkien, revisiting this tenet, that “man the story-teller would have to be redeemed in a manner consonant with his nature: by a moving story”\textsuperscript{546} Here, Tolkien has the Easter narrative, and to a lesser extent the other miracles, in mind. As mentioned earlier, the story of ‘Eucatastrophe’ and ‘Consolation’, which has its climatic point in the resurrection of the “supreme Artist and Author of Reality”\textsuperscript{547} is felt in veiled forms, not only throughout history, but in our own sub-creation. After rereading The Hobbit he tells his son he “had suddenly in a fairly strong measure the ‘eucatastrophic’ emotion at Bilbo’s exclamation: ‘The Eagles! The Eagles are coming!’ …. And in the last chapter of The Ring that I have yet written I hope you’ll note, when you receive it (it’ll soon be on its way) that Frodo’s face goes livid and convinces Sam that he’s dead, just when Sam gives up hope.”\textsuperscript{548} We too live in ‘stories’ and are redeemed by a great living story. “All stories feel like that when you are in them. You are inside a very great story!”, exclaims Tolkien to his son.\textsuperscript{549}

\textsuperscript{546} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 100-101.
\textsuperscript{547} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{548} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{549} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 78.
In the life-world of *LOTR*, then, is Tolkien’s ethics of philological resistance and it is thoroughly grounded in real events and the primary world. When asked in a letter if *LOTR* was about ‘Atomic power’ Tolkien offered up what he thought the central theme of the story was about. After a letter full of reflection, insights, and revisions he ultimately concluded by writing: “The story is really a story of what happened in B.C. year X, and it just happened to people who were like that!”

In another letter Tolkien clarifies that ‘‘Middle-earth’, by the way, is not a name of a never-never land without relation to the world we live in […]. It is just a use of Middle English middle-

*erde* (or *erthe*), altered from Old English *Middangeard*: the name for the inhabited lands of Men ‘between the seas’. … [I]maginatively this ‘history’ is supposed to take place in a period of the actual Old World of this planet.”

Viewed in this way, we can say, that fundamentally, *LOTR* is a story about the cares, concerns and activities of particular peoples in a certain place at a certain time in history.

In Tolkien’s ethics of philological resistance we see what is at stake in our characterization of the double-transfer as it operates in technologically sophisticated societies. Before moving on to Chapter 5, and the further complications and possibilities presented by the technological artifice of cinema, a note should be given in summary of the new methodology now established in Chapters 3 and 4. It is clear that the problem of the “ersatz city” is a far more complicated matter than Jean Baudrillard’s characterization of hyperreality captures. Rather than an imprisonment in the totalizing semiological structure of hyperreality, what is central in our view and understanding, now, is the colonization (and decolonization) of meaningful spaces and meaningful forms of life. Beyond this complex structure (or structures) of colonization are new clearings hewed and forged for meaningful forms of life and meaningful

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550 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 246.
551 J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 220.
spaces to flourish in a technological age. In Tolkien, we see the possibility and necessity of the corporeal imagination and its implicit theological function; and the primordial relationship between what we make and how we live. What is clear from Tolkien’s letters is how inextricably linked were his ethical and theological concerns about art, technology and the teeming swarm of human forms of life. It is in the detailed language, world, relationships, activities, and concerns of Middle-earth and in Tolkien’s act of crafting that life-world where we encounter his resistance to the encroaching colonization of the economy of consumption and communication whose structure comes out of the emerging mechanized world of the early 20th century. In a letter to publisher Milton Waldman Tolkien says:

Anyway all this stuff [It is, I suppose, fundamentally concerned with the problem of the relation of Art (and Sub-creation) and Primary Reality] is mainly concerned with Fall, Mortality, and the Machine. …It has various opportunities of ‘Fall’. It may become possessive, clinging to the things made as ‘its own’, the sub-creator wishes to be the Lord and God of his private creation. He will rebel against the laws of the Creator –especially against mortality. Both of these (alone or together) will lead to the desire for Power ….

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However, in a post-industrial world we must now ask: what comes of this characterization of philological resistance when the medium is mechanized, digitized and altogether artificial? This is where Chapter 5 now turns.

Chapter 5

CORPOREAL CINEMA: OVERCOMING MISGIVINGS ABOUT PETER JACKSON’S THE LORD OF THE RINGS IN THE CINEMATIC PHILOSOPHY OF GILLES DELEUZE AND TERRENCE MALICK’S THE NEW WORLD

‘Give me a body then’: this is the formula of philosophical reversal. … Life will no longer be made to appear before the categories of thought; thought will be thrown into the categories of life … It is through the body (and no longer through the intermediary of the body) that cinema forms its alliance with the spirit, with thought. ‘Give me a body then’ is first to mount the camera on an everyday body.

--GILLES DELEUZE

Artificial light is simple. It is a specific color temperature and feel. But, natural light is complex and sometimes chaotic.

--EMMANUEL LUBEZKI

In this chapter I wish to push the picture of philological recovery to one of its greatest possible limits –that being a ‘cinematic philology’ which frees bodies, peoples and lives to new possible trajectories of activity. In so doing, I hope to show that certain approaches to the practice of cinema should be taken as an ethical activity inextricably and primordially linked to human imagining, everyday lifeworlds and the trajectories of bodies, people and lives throughout. There is the unique possibility in cinema (and more generally in the moving image) to see the scene of human living like never before;\footnote{Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), xiv.} in cinema it is possible to tear down the colonizing non-places of supermodernity, and in turn, build up meaningful spaces and forms of life in resistance to the tendencies of colonization described thus far. In order to effectively make this point we must delve deep into the structure of cinema.

Like Chapter 3, this chapter is divided in two parts. The first part will concern itself with the complications and negative effects of a cinema of representation.
Relevantly, this problem will be taken up in the shortcomings of Peter Jackson’s *The Lord of the Rings* films and their ultimate betrayal of Tolkien’s mythopoeic concerns discussed in Chapter 4. This critique will be further articulated in Gilles Deleuze’s characterizations of the nature of cinema and cinematic practice, through what he calls the Action-Image. Part II will follow Deleuze’s turn to a ‘beyond’ the cinema of the Action-Image, and follow his historical discussion of ‘the crisis of the action-image’ and the emergence of a ‘modern’ cinema in the wake of the Second World War. Part II will then conclude with an exploration of Terrence Malick’s 2005 feature film *The New World*, and explore its Deleuzian structure, and how Malick’s film is, in many ways, more faithful to Tolkien’s philological vision of mythopoeia than the actual cinematic adaptation of *The Lord of the Rings*.

It should be noted that I spent the better part of two years working for Mr. Malick during the production of his most recent film *The Tree of Life* (2011). As one might expect, that experience has granted me a particularly close insight into how Mr. Malick works. However, my experience has also led me to realize how utterly inadequate it is to approach cinema from primarily narrative and biographical trajectories. Speculations about ‘influences’ and ‘thematic references’ are meaningless once the utter complexity of craft and imagination is considered. This is precisely the approach Gilles Deleuze takes in his two volume philosophy of cinema. Only when we come to see how cinema is about bodies (embodied people) and the chaotic teeming swarm of life can the power of cinema to return us to our bodies in-the-world be negotiated.
PART I: THE BETRAYAL OF A CINEMA OF REPRESENTATION

Far from concerning ourselves with the nature of the cinematographic image or images, this chapter will focus on the activity and technique of cinema and our ability to experience and participate in interpenetrating lifeworlds. We will, then, address through the cinematic writings of Gilles Deleuze and the cinematic craft of Terrence Malick concerns about art, technology and how we, as human beings, dwell and project the possibilities of being in the world. Beyond simply seeking out ‘thematic’ and textual elements in film, my intention is to delve into how filmmakers craft (their technique) in order to unpack their concerns. Ultimately, this investigation will yield insight into how their craft and films function as models for corporeal imaginative resistance. Indeed, it is in exactly how filmmakers craft that we will find our turn towards a horizon of concerns that function as a project of poetic de-colonization of the possibilities of being in the perilous consumer atmosphere of the 21st-century West.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE LORD OF THE RINGS AS FILM

In 2001 New Line Cinema released The Fellowship of the Ring, the first of three films directed by Peter Jackson based on J. R. R. Tolkien’s epic The Lord of the Rings. Jackson’s films were a stunning cinematic achievement; after the final film, The Return of the King, released in 2003, the adaptation was over nine hours in length and eleven and a half hours in an extended DVD format. And despite Tolkien’s original fears – voiced in response to a proposed 1958 film treatment which he found to be ‘careless’, ‘reckless’, prone to ‘exaggeration’, “and in the intrusion of unwarranted matter owing
to not perceiving where the core of the original lies—Jackson’s films have been praised for being ‘faithful’, however flawed, realizations of Tolkien’s saga of Middle-earth. Taking into consideration all that has been said up until this point about the colonization of human lifeworlds, the corporeal imagination and Tolkien’s mythopoeic philology of resistance, The Lord of the Rings as a motion picture trilogy offers an unexpected turn into the craft of cinema, which extends, broadens and deepens the possibilities of what has been discussed in previous chapters and, in many ways, was anticipated in Vico, Morris and Tolkien. What is it exactly, then, that makes Jackson’s films ‘successful’; and in what ways, if any, does he come short in worlding the mythopoeic form of life? Most importantly, in what ways can we gain insight into what Tolkien’s mythopoeia looks like lived out daily in Middle-earth; and how can Jackson’s films and his cinematic craft inform our living of mythopoeia as a corporeal practice of resistance in our own lives? Working from the fact that LOTR is a cinematic adaptation of a text, it should be noted that there is a long and problematic tradition in film criticism—since at least the sixties— that continues to ‘read’ film semiotically as ‘text’—rather than something other and new— which must be addressed here. This error of ‘reading’, and subsequently valuing, cinema as text and representation is evident in Tom Shippey’s essay, “Another Road to Middle-earth: Jackson’s Movie Trilogy”.

**THE PERILS OF A CINEMATIC PHILOLOGY**

Shippey focuses on Jackson’s faithfulness to the ‘narrative core’ of LOTR and apologetically explains that any smaller changes and/or omissions (i.e. giving dialogue from one character to another, changing locations of an event, or compressing time sequences, etc.) are done in the spirit of the narrative, and quickly glosses over tenuous

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terrain explaining how these differences should be taken as examples of the limitations and possibilities of differing media rather than as egregious alterations. Now, one must confess that on one level Tom Shippey is absolutely correct. Peter Jackson’s films are tremendously successful and manage to ‘say’ and ‘convey’ many of Tolkien’s ‘messages’. The films are faithful to the story’s “narrative core”, while remaining sensitive to what Tolkien referred to as “the core of the original”, which is, as Shippey says, “the Ring and what we are told about it by Tolkien: Its effect is always corrupting; no-one, no matter how strong or virtuous, can be trusted with it; it cannot simply be buried or hidden but must be destroyed in the place of its forging.” There are questions of course with the suitability of a ‘narrative core’ of LOTR and one must take caution with Tolkien’s talk of the original (in other letters he specifies other ‘cores’ or centers). Indeed, there are entire featurettes included in the extended DVD version of the film in which Jackson, Walsh and Boyens speak at length about Tolkien’s life, and their strategy to include, or be faithful to, as much of Tolkien’s story and themes ‘as possible’ in their ‘screenplay’. Jackson explains how he, Fran Walsh, and Philippa Boyens managed to ‘crack’ the story’s ‘code’ with an initial ninety-page film treatment. With this limited literary fidelity noted, however, Shippey’s essay ultimately exposes itself as an abandonment of reason for madness when it comes to the

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555 Tom Shippey, “Another Road to Middle-earth: Jackson’s Movie Trilogy,” in Understanding The Lord of the Rings: The Best of Tolkien Criticism, ed. Rose A. Zimbardo and Neil D. Isaacs (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 236. There is one unbalanced instance where Shippey critiques the films for missing “much of the philosophical ‘core of the original’” due to narrative omissions and constraints. But here, and this will be addressed shortly, Shippey is hopelessly focused on the limitations of cinema to tie together complex narrative threads to make deeper philosophical points. However, cinema does not rely on ‘narrative threads’ to create meaning. What of the use of music, sounds, and camera movement to reinforce meaning?

556 Tom Shippey, ibid., 238. Actually, even here Shippey seems to miss the nuanced mark. Tolkien calls the ‘heart of the tale’: “the journey of the Ringbearers.” (see J.R.R. Tolkien, The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien, 271.)

557 These featurettes function as part documentary of their creative process and part ‘propaganda’ package. Indeed, since proof of their fidelity to Tolkien is a paramount marketing strategy. It should be noted that Tom Shippey is one of many scholars who speak about Tolkien’s life and work.
craft of cinema. In an attempt to make the point that Jackson and company succeeded where Morton Zimmerman’s 1958 film proposal failed, Shippey falls prey to unhealthy assumptions about literature versus film. Referring to Tolkien’s slow pacing and unveiling of the story he says:

Tolkien, however, set his adaptors a serious problem in the way that he communicates them. … In the narrative medium of prose this has many advantages […]. But whatever the cause or the effect, it must have been clear from very early on that the narrative medium of film could not cope with such a roundabout and leisurely unrolling.\(^{558}\)

There are, then, two common assumptions about the craft of cinema of which we should be highly suspicious in this summary and to which Shippey, based on the citation above, obviously falls prey in his essay: 1) the belief that the ‘possibilities’ of cinema are limited to the translation of ‘textual and narrative’ messages into narrative visual representations; 2) cinematic action and events should be expected to be easily marketed, sold, and consumed.

In the case of Jackson’s LOTR trilogy, what Shippey manages to overlook altogether in his ‘textual and narrative’ reading of the films is how the viewer is made to sense and experience what is written, visually, through a faithfulness to the complexity of Tolkien’s lifeworlds. The films allow us to feel what it is to move – however fleetingly– through a living Middle-earth. If all sound were removed from the films, and nothing was known about dialogue, the rich and complex interwoven tapestry of Middle-earth would still be felt from scene-to-scene through its wardrobe, props and sets. With the help of conceptual artists Alan Lee and John Howe, and an army of craftsmen, Jackson managed to ‘excavate’ and (re)create Middle-earth down to the smallest artistic details. Jackson recalls:

\(^{558}\) Tom Shippey, ibid., 238-239. (emphasis mine)
I think one of the remarkable things about reading *LOTR* is that you go into this world which is, you know, fairy tale. There’s dragons, and there’s trolls, and there’s hobbits and there’s elves. And it’s amazing how authentic –genuinely authentic it feels that you start to believe that it could possibly be history. That somehow Tolkien found some lost parchment—some secret parchment that we don’t know about that he really took all this from a true historical events. It has that degree of believability about it. I guess the way that we tried to hint at the depth, which is all the film can really do, is partly in our design process. … I didn’t want ‘movie’ design. I didn’t want ‘fantasy’ movie ‘Hollywood’ sort of style of design. I wanted something authentic. 

Jackson says he and his design team approached their research as though Middle-earth was a historical reality; locations were treated as through they were the ‘actual’ locations for the events described by Tolkien. Far from whimsical, this exhumation of the lost life-worlds of the third age of Middle-earth—a cinematic asterisk reality—was endeavored with philological complexity. The wardrobe, props, sets, and landscapes were all crafted with a special sensitivity to the unique expressions—including geography, language, comportments and craft of Middle-earth (of different peoples e.g. Númenóreans, Men, Elves, Hobbits, Dwarves, Orcs)—that arise from the diverse and complex life-worlds. “We wanted to make it look like you could look at a piece of architecture and tell if it was Dwarven or Elven immediately just by looking at it”, explains WETA Workshop designer and sculptor Daniel Falconer speaking about the

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560 Allan Lee, *Designing Middle-earth*, ibid. John Howe attributes this fact to the strength of the LOTR films. Rather than use props that have been created for other films, everything in Middle-earth (furniture, textiles, pipes, weapons, etc.) was designed and crafted with special attention paid to the particular lifeworlds of each distinct culture and the history of art in Middle-earth. To accomplish this feat, craftsmen from around New Zealand were recruited to forge weapons, build furniture, cast ‘the one ring’, make saddles, blow glass, carve wood, make pottery, make barrels and buckets, and make wagon wheels, and etcetera.
design process, “If you looked at a weapon and then you looked at the architect you could tell which cultures were the same and which were different”\textsuperscript{561}. Not just made to ‘appear’ authentic, Jackson hired scores of local craftsmen – blacksmiths, wood workers, potters, furniture makers, and etcetera – to make the props and wardrobe by hand.

On an entirely other level of detail, an additional layering of design was incorporated into the film to account for the history of art in Middle-earth. John Howe and Alan Lee, say:

\begin{quote}
Much of Middle-earth was actually constructed by the Numenorians. So the bones of the architecture of Middle-earth were actually constructed by a people who are no longer there. So, some hint of this has to come through. The idea of layers of civilization going back over thousands of years is a very hard thing to do in a film or achieve on a film set. But just by layering much more design into the development, into every part of the film – whether its props or costumes, armor or buildings – that we would ever actually see in the film but its presence would be felt in a sort of strange way.\textsuperscript{562}
\end{quote}

Although he was probably never conscious of the fact – it would certainly be appropriate here to describe the work of Peter Jackson and his art department as ‘philological’ in the broad sense that has been discussed. “It’s almost as if you’re digging things out of the ground rather than actually creating them”, John Howe says later. Questions raised in Chapter 1 regarding \textit{Petit Hameau}, the Getty Meuseum, and Old Bethpage Village unexpectedly return – but here with some clearer answers.

Like the \textit{Petit Hameau}, ‘Hobbiton’ is built to have the ‘appearance’ of authenticity and is sustained by an economy that – in many ways – betrays its purpose.

\textsuperscript{561} \textit{Designing Middle-earth}, ibid.
\textsuperscript{562} John Howe and Alan Lee, \textit{Designing Middle-earth}, ibid.
We might say the craftsmanship of Jackson’s Hobbiton pales in comparison to the *Petit Hameau*, since Hobbiton was built strictly as a temporary village of façades, rather than a working farm to be inhabited; in this way, Jackson’s Hobbiton is truly *ersatz*.

If one were to visit the ‘set’ of Hobbiton in New Zealand (as seen in fig. 8) today, it would have the appearance of stripped, gutted and abandoned ancient ruins. However (and this point will be carried through to the end of the chapter when the set design of Terrence Malick’s *The New World* is considered, through the craft of filmmaking –in the framing, shooting and cutting of the film), Hobbiton is transformed into a living and breathing lifeworld that is far more ‘real’ than life in the *Petit Hameau*. To what degree of success this is done throughout Jackson’s films, and the deeper implications of this cinematic lifeworld as a whole, will be taken up in the remaining pages of this chapter.

**The Significance of Cinematic Technique**

On the level of camera framing, camera movement, and editing, Jackson’s treatment of Tolkien’s Middle-earth on the whole (especially the theatrical release) feels rather conventional. Through an insistence on conforming to a certain pre-established formula of cinema as industry (dominated by a technique Deleuze describes as ‘The Action-Image’) Jackson’s films, in some ways, actually betray Tolkien’s epic. Shippey acknowledges the fact that Jackson’s films are in “some respects” (a very

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*Tours available through [www.hobbitontours.com](http://www.hobbitontours.com).*
conservative assessment), simply an “action movie” and a “special effects movie”.

Shippey, however, apologetically explains this away as an inevitable consequence of the “nature of the differing media”. Shockingly, he says:

an author –especially an amateur author like Tolkien, who never gave up his ‘day job’– invests nothing in the creation of his work except his own spare time, and loses nothing except his own time in the event of failure. A moviemaker, however, operating with a budget measurable in millions of dollars per day, very obviously has to consider recovering the return on his expenses, and is accordingly susceptible to ‘audience pressure’: he has to guess what his audience will like and won’t like and adjust his production accordingly.564

This is pregnant with bias and assumption about the ‘economic’ value of activity and work and craft, the role of human artistry in the art/industry of cinema, and notions of entertainment and consumption; all of which affirms the relevance of this chapter within the schema of the dissertation as a whole.

In a post-production featurette discussing the editing of the film, editor John Gilbert mentions, “New Line [Cinema] said early on they wanted a rollercoaster of a movie and that was always on the back of my mind constructing it.”565 The addition of the Midgewater Marsh566 sequence in the ‘extended cut’ is a fine example of how the filmmakers’ desire to include shots and sequences which only serve to expand our experience of Aragorn and the Hobbits’ journey to Rivendell –most notably Aragorn’s singing of the Lay of Luthien and his explanation of the Lay to Frodo– is ultimately imposed upon by a decision based on an economic/entertainment model of cinema, to

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564 Tom Shippey, ibid., 236-237.
565 Editor John Gilbert, Post-Production: Putting All Together, The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (Platinum Series Special Extended Edition), DVD, Directed by Peter Jackson. ‘New Line’ is a reference to New Line Cinema the production company whose money was used to film the three LOTR films.
566 This is a particularly dreary interlude on the journey from Bree to Rivendell.
‘quicken the pace’ of the story for the theatrical release. These types of economically driven decisions – done in the name of nebulous terms such as ‘pace’ and ‘entertaining’ – are especially apparent in the exclusion of the ‘Scouring of the Shire’ in *The Return of the King*. To the point, however, there is no evidence in Jackson’s schlock horror background to suggest that there is any particularly careful thought on the nature of cinema and directing.567 While much has been made during the course of the three *LOTR* films of Jackson’s particular attention to the nuances of acting and the many multiple takes afforded each scene; yet, aside from ‘selling scale’ (making human actors appear hobbitish in size) no real attention is given to betraying the commercial formula.

With this said, perhaps the finest and most effective element in Jackson’s trilogy was never seen in the cinema. Jackson’s extended meditation on what it means to be a Hobbit and the lifeworld of Hobbiton offer a particularly enticing glimpse into what exactly a mythopoeic cinema might look like. The shire sequence in the extended special feature edition of the film is far more effective and truthful than the theatrical release. In one movement, the camera glides over the map of Middle-earth and reveals Hobbiton situated in the Shire (fig. 10), then pulls back to reveal the ‘map’ (fig. 11) laying in the cluttered Hobbit hole of Bag End (fig. 12), and finally dollies in to reveal Bilbo Baggins dwelling comfortably in his Hobbit hole (fig. 13).568 With the aid of some off screen (o. s.) narration – a rough summary of Tolkien’s prologue – the lifeworld of the Hobbits is introduced to us. Through a series of non-linear (and non

568 In both the theatrical and the DVD extended special feature edition of the film Jackson introduces us to the landscape of the Shire through the map. Here we should recall all that has been said about lifeworlds and maps in chapter 3. Jackson, like Tolkien, understands that ‘mapping’ and ‘wayfinding’ is the way through Middle-earth rather than ‘navigating’ or appropriating a ‘map’.
narrative) cuts we see hobbits tending to their daily activities: farming, playing games, communing, smoking, gardening, and etcetera.

The whole sequence—which includes the introduction of Frodo and Gandalf—is over 10 minutes long and incorporates over 30 separate cuts to the Hobbit lifeworld alone (fig. 14-19). It achieves a delicate yet resplendent balance of simplicity, nostalgia and Romanticism where time and space stand still.
But despite all the attention to faithfully re-creating and inhabiting the Hobbit lifeworld, questions still persist about Jackson’s films as a whole. Although it would be foolish to recognize Jackson’s *LOTR* as anything but a grand achievement in the art and craft of filmmaking we must ask: Why does mythopoeia ultimately feel so ‘conventional’ in the hands of Jackson? Where is the ‘poetry’ and ‘unity of body, language and world’ that seems implicit in the corporeal imagination of Vico, Barfield and Tolkien? Ultimately, the concerns about a cinema beyond ‘text’, representation and illustration run far deeper and are far more pervasive than what has been critiqued in Tom Shippey’s assessment of Peter Jackson’s movies. The continuing burden of this chapter is to speak of a cinema that allows the viewer to experience a corporeal imagination lived in lifeworlds, to glimpse the mythopoeic life in action, and to free bodies to new meaningful trajectories of possibilities.

**DELEUZE, BERGSON, AND THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE**

Gilles Deleuze’s ‘cinematic philosophy’ laid out in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* wonderfully complements the poetry of the corporeal imagination and the various trajectories of resistance and decolonization of human forms of living discussed in the preceding pages. Specifically, Deleuze is concerned both with a direct challenge to structuralist readings of cinema which reduces film to semiological systems and linguistic patterns of ‘representation’, and with forwarding a cinema of immanence and hope that resists colonization by political
and commercial powers, which, in many ways, render Tolkien’s ‘mythopoeia’ impotent in Peter Jackson’s *LOTR* movie trilogy. In the preface to his book, *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, D. N. Rodowick traces a predominately Anglo-American semiological preoccupation with film theory back through the translation and publication of the 1970s British film theory magazine, *Screen*. Rodowick points out that the literary semiotics, Lacanian psychology and Althusserian Marxism of the French *Tel Quel* group—which Jean Baudrillard also drew from—heavily influenced the editorial perspective of *Screen*.\(^6^9\) This then is significant because, indeed, Deleuze’s approach to cinema falls in perfectly well with the critique of Baudrillard’s ‘hyperreality’ detailed in the previous chapters. Deleuze—who in effect re-imagines how to approach cinema, and reassesses the possibilities of cinema—desires to move away from wrongheaded pictures of representation and false dualisms, and to return cinema back to human bodies in the world—back to immanence.

Deleuze, however, does not take a strictly ‘phenomenological’ approach to this endeavor—and in many ways Deleuze could be considered ‘post-phenomenological’—but draws on Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) philosophy of time and movement to re-characterize the cinematic artifact and cinematic practice.\(^5^7^0\) While the depth and breadth of Deleuze’s unique philosophical scaffolding on cinema is far too rich and expansive to give an adequate treatment here, his insistence on the ‘pre-linguistic’ hermeneutical possibilities of being-in-the-world echoes many of the concerns raised by Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Most significantly, Deleuze’s characterization of


\(^5^7^0\) It should be noted that Henri Bergson’s work on body and duration was extremely influential to the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty though it also attracted much criticism from them as well.
cinema as a craft of “pre-verbal intelligent content” and “a new praxis of images and signs”, which together ‘return’ bodies to world (through the cinema artifact), is indeed necessary and very useful in this final movement, and is the trace by which we will wayfind through his work. I will apologize ahead of time to the reader for what is often a complex taxonomy dependent on numerous specialized terms which encompass intricate schemas. Indeed, there is even a glossary of terms in the English edition of Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 to help keep track of the many formulae.

In order to re-characterize cinema as a unique practice and craft which stands apart from the ‘logic’ of signs and narration, Deleuze essentially begins with a question famously posed by André Bazin: What is cinema? Deleuze, however, takes a wholly new trajectory. Cinema 1 begins with what Deleuze sees as the fundamental cinematic mechanism – the mechanical ‘decomposition’ and ‘recomposition’ of movement – and with the practice of crafting cinema at its most basic level – the frame, the ‘shot’, camera movement and cutting. Because these two descriptions are vital in understanding Deleuze’s project, some time will be spent on them, before discussing how they are relevant to the movement-image and the time-image of volumes one and two respectively. Drawing heavily on Henri Bergson’s durée, or ‘duration’, a philosophical characterization of movement, time and being, Deleuze endeavors to reveal the relationship between what fundamentally appears to be a banal mechanical effect, and human being-in-the-world. For the purposes of this chapter we might loosely define duration as time immanent in the changing eventful world and woven

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573 Deleuze plays with the French word for shot, plan, which in another sense also means plane in order to disrupt any confusion with the English notion of ‘shot’ as a still image.
into its patterns of events and actions. But how to characterize, no less picture through cinema, this movement, without creating abstract images or illusory representations? Indeed, it is Deleuze’s “emphasis on categories of movement and temporality, in relation to visualization or imagining,” through which he will levy his “[…] critique of theories of signification in both contemporary philosophy and film theory.” Of particular interest to Deleuze, and to this chapter, is Bergson’s characterization of ‘duration’ as “a concept of time, which is not a transcendent category or an external measure, but is immanent to things.”

In duration, says Deleuze, “movement is distinct from the space covered. … [S]pace covered is divisible, whilst movement is indivisible … the spaces covered all belong to a single, identical, homogeneous space, while the movements are heterogeneous, irreducible among themselves.” In Time and Free Will (1889), and later modified in Matter and Memory (1896), Bergson uses music and musical notation to highlight the character of duration. Much more than the representation of individual notes on a page sequenced in time, music is the movement of indivisible, interconnected and heterogeneous notes, says Bergson. “In a word, pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another, without any affiliation with number: it would be pure

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574 This definition is crude and does no justice to Bergson’s élan vital which is the creative energy of all ‘Being’ or matter in the universe, nor to Bergson’s broader characterization of durée as the expansion and contraction of the Whole of the universe. However, since the trajectory of this section is crafted to characterize a philological cinema, rather than to unfold Bergsonian philosophy with great detail, I will proceed, with caution, in appropriating Bergson to those ends.
575 D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 6.
577 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 1.
heterogeneity.” Movement, then, cannot be ‘reconstituted’ by adding together instants in time, positions in space or immobile sections. In doing this, says Deleuze, all you achieve is “adding to the positions, or to the instants, the abstract idea of a succession, of a time which is mechanical”. Deleuze uses the shorthand equation \textit{immobile sections + abstract time equals movement} to refer to this illusion.\footnote{Henri Bergson, \textit{Time and Free Will: An Essay on the immediate Data of Consciousness}, trans. F.L. Pogson (George Allen & Unwin: London, 1910), 104.}

Although Deleuze desires to use Bergson’s picture of \textit{duration} to forward his own characterizations of cinema, he must contend with the fact that at the end of \textit{Creative Evolution} (1907) Bergson specifically condemns cinema, and the ‘cinematographic illusion’, as the culmination of an illusion that replicates (and reinforces) the paradoxical fallacy of movement, space, and time –essentially a representation of movement via a dissection of space.\footnote{Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1: The Movement-Image}, 1. (emphasis mine)} Rather than being contradictory, however, Deleuze feels this should only deepen our reading of Bergson’s thesis on movement and cinema in \textit{Creative Evolution}. Drawing on Bergson’s earlier characterizations of duration, Deleuze points out that while the physical artifact of film may merely be a series of static images (or ‘photogrammes’),\footnote{Henri Bergson, \textit{Creative Evolution}, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1944), 331–333.} cinema (from the Greek \textit{kinemo} / movement) is something wholly new; cinema –like music– gives us an “intermediate-image” or ‘median image’ \textit{[l’image moyenne]} apprehended as an “impression of continuity”\footnote{Photogrammes can be a confusing choice of terminology. Perhaps ‘instants’ is a better word here since Deleuze rejects the idea that cinema is composed of separate ‘photographs’. Indeed, the closest cinema comes to the photograph is the long exposure photograph \textit{(photo de pose)} which, he says, “belongs to the other lineage”. (Gilles Deleuze, \textit{Cinema 1: The Movement-Image}, 5).} at twenty-four frames per second. Cinema gives an impression which is in many (not all) ways very like our continuous ‘experiencing’ of ‘the world’. “In short,” says Deleuze, “cinema does not give us an image to which

\footnote{Gilles Deleuze, \textit{ibid.}, 5. Also see Paola Marrati, \textit{Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy}, trans. Alisa Hartz, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 8.}
movement is added, it immediately gives us [an image-movement]."\textsuperscript{583} But how can he say this? According to Deleuze, the Bergson who wrote Creative Evolution, was well aware of the characterization of “mobile sections” or “image-movements” from his earlier musical picturing of duration in Matter and Memory. To what does Deleuze ascribe the discrepancy? To put this into a historical context, D. N. Rodowick points out that Bergson’s critique of cinema would have been directed towards the scientific motion analysis and single set-up camera work which dominated in the earliest days of ‘cinema’. This ‘primitive cinema’, which drew from scientific observation of certain features of the mechanical powers, painterly perspectives and stage aesthetics, had little in common with the sophisticated techniques which Deleuze believes makes cinema a unique art form.\textsuperscript{584} Cinema, says Deleuze, conquered its own ‘essence’ and rediscovered the movement-image through its own evolution.

The evolution of the cinema, the conquest of its own essence or novelty, was to take place through montage, the mobile camera and the emancipation of the viewpoint, which became separate from projection. The shot would then stop being a spatial category and become a temporal one, and the section would no longer be immobile, but mobile.\textsuperscript{585}

This cinematic duration, then, is something wholly new –but how and to what effect? The questions that must be answered before moving on to examine the practices of filmmakers, and which lie in the scope of this chapter and the dissertation as a whole,

\textsuperscript{583} Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 2. (emphasis mine) I have also modified the English rendering of Deleuze's l'image-movement' from 'movement-image' to image-movement in order to respect the emphasis placed on the second part of the hyphenated word in the French.

\textsuperscript{584} D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 21. This period can be best summed up in the motion experiments of Edward Muybridge and physiologist Étienne-Jules Marey, the Eddison and Dickson Kinetograph (“the first true motion-picture camera” which used a perforated celluloid strip) in America and the Lumière Cinématographe in France, and even the fantastical films of George Méliès. And although Edwin Porter developed the first sophisticated use of intercutting and panning shots in The Great Train Robbery (1903) it was not until D. W. Griffith’s work began in 1908 that cinema as a wholly new art form was born.

\textsuperscript{585} Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 3.
are: 1) what is the significance of cinematic duration for a cinema of human bodies-in-the-world; and 2) what techniques in the crafting of cinema (over other techniques) accomplish Deleuze’s imagining of cinema?

Taking into account the ‘evolution of cinema’, Deleuze undoubtedly goes beyond Bergson through Bergson. Deleuze contends there is not one, but three Bergsonian theses on movement which must be taken into account in Creative Evolution; the first being only an introduction, whilst the second and third go hand-in-hand. The second thesis “makes possible another way of looking at the cinema” –a way which goes beyond cinema as the “apparatus of the oldest illusion”.

Rather than reduce everything to the ‘same’ illusion, Bergson distinguishes between (generally speaking here) an ‘ancient’ philosophical and a ‘modern’ scientific theory of time and movement –both of which suffer from the same error in equating movement to “immobile sections + abstract time”. While there is no room to go into a detailed recounting of the history of theories of time and movement in the metaphysics of Western philosophy and the scientism of modern mathematics (indeed neither does Deleuze), in relation to the second thesis Deleuze points out the obvious: “to recompose movement with eternal poses [philosophical metaphysics] or with immobile sections [of immanent ‘any-instant-whatever’ (instant quelconques) materials as in modern mathematics, science and proto-cinema] comes to the same thing: in both cases, one misses the movement because one constructs a Whole, one assumes that ‘all is given’, whilst movement only occurs if the whole is neither given nor giveable [sic].”

As D. N. Rodowick puts it, in Bergson’s second thesis on movement, Deleuze “is to judge

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586 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 8.
587 Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, Muybridge. Some of these concerns are evident in the creation of ‘non-standard analysis’ by Abraham Robinson. A theory of ‘hyperreal’ numbers, non-standard analysis contends with infinities of points.
588 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 7.
whether the cinema is the perfection of the world’s oldest illusion (the Plato-machine of Jean-Louis Baudry), or the culmination of modern scientific thought, or finally, whether it augurs a new conception of movement and duration.”

The third option here is what Deleuze seeks, and will become significant to this chapter and the dissertation as a whole.

Generally speaking, Bergson holds that both ancient philosophical and modern scientific attempts to reconstitute movement suffer from the same (metaphysical) ‘cinematographic’ failure; they both build up pictures of movement based on ‘privileged instants’ or ‘immobile sections’ and “in so doing it perpetuates the illusion that temporal succession is only the unfolding of spatial juxtaposition”.

In both approaches, duration, the movement of human being-in-the-world, is ‘missed’ in favor of an abstract representation of life in ‘time’ built up from spatial pictures, which “leads us to believe that time is nothing but the artificial setting into motion of a whole that is already given at once”. This point flows into Bergson’s third thesis. Movement as “a translation in space” is an expression of something ‘profound’, says Deleuze: movement “is a mobile section of duration … the change in duration or in the whole”.

The ‘Whole’ –borrowed from Bergson– is the dimension of duration characterized as “the opening of time as change, the opening of the Universe or being.” To say, then, that movement-images are mobile sections of duration is to say that movement and time are congruent –thus, cinema, rather than being the culmination of an abstract metaphysical illusion, is indeed something wholly new. But what is movement in relation to duration?

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589 D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 23.
590 Paola Marrati, ibid., 15.
591 Paola Marrati, ibid., 15.
592 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 8.
593 Paola Marrati, ibid., 17.
Deleuze then rearticulates duration as an open “Relation” (indeed the ‘whole’ does not imply ‘closed’, says Deleuze, but is constantly ‘open’ and in flux) between ‘sets’ of mobile sections and the changing whole. “We can therefore say”, argues Deleuze, “that movement relates the objects of a closed system to open duration, and duration to the objects to the system which it forces to open up. … Through movement the whole is divided up into objects, and objects are re-united in the whole, and indeed between the two ‘the whole’ changes.” Through his rearticulated relationship between the ‘sets’ and the ‘whole’ of movement, Deleuze’s Bergsonian thesis allows him to move from the re-characterized cinema artifact to the actual crafting of cinema: the relationship between frame, the shot, cutting and cinematic film as a ‘whole’.

**The Perils and Promise of the Action-Image**

With the unique characterization of the image-movement in place, Deleuze further describes its practical components: A) **the frame** –the art of choosing cinematic elements; B) **the shot** –which determines the image-movement and relates it to the whole; and C) **montage**, the process and technique by which image-movements are assembled and arranged. D. N. Rodowick points out that the same description of a “modulation of wholes and sets in the [image-movement]” is also applied to these three practical elements. Because of this, each practical element, with its own unique character, must be considered with some detail.

**The Frame and Out-of-field**

The cinematic frame, which is a mobile field ‘selected’ by the camera and includes actors, sets, props, different textures of light, different locations, etcetera, is

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595 D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, 44.
the basic organizing principle in cinema. As a unique set or ‘closed system’, the varied elements of the frame can be further broken down into ‘sub-sets’ revealing an insistence on legibility. Deleuze, however, is quick to point out that past comparisons between the legibility of the cinematic frame and ‘language’, or semiological readings (as in the cinema writings of Umberto Eco and Christian Metz), are not justified. Rather, Deleuze draws on the principles of information systems in order to make sense of the varied and complex parts of the frame. While information systems have not been previously mentioned here, there is another picture of non-linguistic meaning that has been discussed, which can also lend insight into the ‘Deleuzian frame’. The complex Heideggarian characterization of *das Rede*, or ‘telling’, discussed with great detail in chapter 3, shares many of the characteristics of non-linguistic ‘distinguishing’ and ‘making sense of’ to which Deleuze points.

Returning to Heideggerian phenomenology is important in characterizing our ability to distinguish and make sense of a variety of phenomena and equipment (*das Zeug*) as a knowledge acquired through community, use, and activity. This description reveals a vital link between everyday human lifeworlds, the lifeworld of cinema and, more specifically, the lifeworld of the frame. To this end we should also add Heidegger’s characterizations of *Sorge* (care), *Fürsorge* (solicitude), and *Besorgen* (concern) to the lifeworld of the frame. Simply put, we are caught up in life and, rather than re-producing a phenomenon [*mimesis*], however skillfully accomplished, the elements of the frame are caught up in life as well. Not to be confused with a psychological state, ‘care’ is the characterization of human living in world –and all of the involvement-structure activities, comportments, projects and ‘concerns’— being an

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issue for human living in the world. As Heidegger once explained to Hubert Dreyfus, “Sein geht mich an”; “being gets to me.” There is more than simply ‘data’ or ‘information’ within the frame; whether implicit or explicit, the lifeworld of the frame implies a vast array of activities, projects and concerns – a world of going-on – and of our involvements in it.

The cinematic frame is not to be mistaken, then, with the frame of the ‘photograph’; As André Bazin pointed out, the photographic frame “embalms time” as a mould, a “luminous imprint”, an “immobile section”. Although the frame itself (the cinema screen being “the frame of frames”) is a practice of artificial limitation, directors have sought different ways to work with this limitation, says Deleuze. Some directors saturate the frame to the point that the primary action takes place deep into the frame, a technique pioneered by Orson Wells in Citizen Kane (1941). “Thus,” notes David Cook writing about Welles’ deep focus framing, “in a single shot, Welles is able to communicate a large amount of narrative and thematic information which would require many shots in a conventionally edited scene.” In a frame pregnant with meaning (fig. 20) the young Charles Foster Kane plays with his sled “Rosebud” (the last words to come out of Kane’s mouth when he dies isolated and alone as an old man) in the background whilst his mother signs over guardianship of

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599 David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Film (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996), 396; This comment makes apparent the character of the ‘shot’ as a fluid element of cinema that stands between the frame and montage.
the boy to Mr. Thatcher, a representative of Kane’s estate executors, as a weak-willed father looks on in the foreground.

Other directors have made efforts to rarify the frame. This technique is particularly evident in the films of Yasujiro Ozu (1903-1963) whose ‘empty frames’ and ‘voided frames’ correspond to the Zen aesthetic *mu* –the integral relationship between the flowers and empty spaces in Japanese flower arranging.  

“By showing us nothing, these shots draw our attention to the surrounding something in the same way [...]. It is generally true that the longer the screen remains empty, the more our attention is drawn to off-screen as opposed to on-screen space”, Cook reminds us.  

Far from a ‘photographic still’, Ozu’s technique is intended to expand the boundaries of the frame (fig. 21).

![fig. 21 Tokyo Story (1953)](image)

What is significant to Deleuze is the fact that although framing is an act of limitation the frame is neither divisible nor indivisible but *dividual* [dividuel] –or

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600 David A Cook, ibid., 846. There is a very relevant connection between Zen aesthetic and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which should be pointed out. Reinhard May’s, *Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on his Work* (London: Routledge, 1996), provides a fascinating look into Heidegger’s great interest in and certain indebtedness to German translations of Taoist and Zen Bhuddist literature.

601 David A Cook, ibid., 847.
always sharing in the meaning of other frames through a qualitative change from one to the other. Although the frame can also be artificially divided ‘geometrically’ (both internally and in relation to the parts of the system), in a manner which precedes the elements of the frame, or dynamically through physical gradations, “the set”, says Deleuze, “cannot be divide into parts without qualitatively changing each time”.  

So unlike the photographic image, the cinematic frame is mobile and active – even when it attempts to isolate or rarify its environment as in Ozu’s empty set. Of significance, here, is the deframing of the frame through the ‘point of view’ of the camera. Because every ‘set’ is not a ‘closed set’ but opens up to the Whole, the selective points of view of the camera – whether it be the ‘empty’ framing of Ozu, Dreyer’s faces cut by the edge of the frame, or Bresson’s disconnected parts – “refer to another dimension of the image.”  

It is as if the camera ‘stands-in’ for our involved human being in the world and, even more, draws us in. The deframing of the frame is a technique which enables the camera to fill the frame with lifeworld and meaning, even beyond the artifice of the frame.

This combination of technique, image and lifeworld is developed even further in Deleuze’s observations on the out-of-field [hors-champ] element. “If framing’s operation is to choose the elements present in the image,” notes Paola Marrati in Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, “it necessarily gives the limits to this very image. But what do the limits of the frame open on to?” This out-of-field dimension, says Deleuze, “refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly present” and generates two further characterizations of framing. In one sense, the out-of-field testifies to the homogeneous continuity of frame sets which form “a universe or

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602 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 16.
603 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 16, 17.
604 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 22.
605 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 17.
plane \([plan]\) of genuinely unlimited content”. Sets are ‘threaded’ together, as Deleuze describes it, although the connection does not necessarily need to be to another frame but can also be to ‘sound’, with its world connections.\(^{606}\) Here Deleuze singles out Bresson and points to his *Notes on the Cinematographer*. “A sound must never come to the rescue of an image,” says Bresson, “nor an image to the rescue of a sound. … Image and sound must not support each other, but must work each in turn through a sort of relay.”\(^{607}\) The brief opening sequence of single frame shots from Ozu’s final film, *Autumn Afternoon* (1962) (fig. 22-28), is an example of this threading Bresson suggests in his *Notes*. The story—like so many of Ozu’s films—is about one man’s dignified resignation to Japanese modernization and the eventual departure of his daughter after marriage. We begin with the selective framing of a baseball stadium in the evening and its coverage on television (a symbol of modernization), being watched by some young executives in a restaurant, all of which is ignored by three older men having a traditional dinner together in a secluded room. The disembodied voice of the stadium announcer and television commentator—a symbol of technological reach—relay and connect the spaces.

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\(^{606}\) ‘Sounds’, here, should be taken in a Heideggarian immersion sense [cf: Chapter 3].

fig. 22

fig. 23

fig. 24

fig. 25

fig. 26

fig. 27

fig. 28
In another sense the out-of-field testifies to a “more radical Elsewhere”. When the ‘thread’ which traverses and binds the out-of-field sets together into a whole is thick, or noticeable and apparent –indeed the whole is the thread– the series of closed systems are added together, *space to space*. “But”, argues Deleuze, “when the thread is very fine, it is not content to reinforce the closure of the frame or to eliminate the relation with the outside. … [T]he finer it is –the further duration descends into the system like a spider– the more effectively the out-of-field fulfills its other function which is that of *introducing the transspatial and the spiritual into the system* which is never perfectly closed.”\(^6^{08}\) Here Deleuze specifically cites the almost two dimensionality of Carl Theodore Dreyer’s ‘closed’ frames which open to immanent duration and possibly more.\(^6^{09}\) In Dreyer’s final film *Gertrud* (1964), a tragedy about the unfulfilled search for love, we can glimpse what Deleuze references (figs. 29 and 30).

Criticized as being ‘uncinematic’ and openly jeered when viewed at the 1964 New York Film Festival, Dreyer’s framing in *Gertrud* is static and closed. Throughout the film *Gertrud* is literally framed into an almost two dimensional space using preexisting geometric and dynamic limitations within the frame. Only the elegant yet spectral

\(^6^{08}\) Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, 18-19. (emphasis mine)

\(^6^{09}\) Here Deleuze is elusive. “Dreyer made this into an ascetic method: the more the image is spatially closed, even reduced to two dimensions, the greater is its capacity to *open itself on* to a fourth dimension which is time, and on to a fifth which is Spirit, the spiritual decision of Jeanne or Gertrude.” Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 19.
movement of the camera during extremely long takes provides framing variation; yet extending the frame into a larger out-of-field set is not Dreyer’s concern. As Deleuze says, “the more the image is spatially closed, even reduced to two dimensions, the greater is its capacity to open itself on to a fourth dimension which is time, and on to a fifth which is Spirit, the spiritual decisions of Jeanne [The Passion of Joan of Arc, 1928] or Gertrud.”610 Nothing is perhaps more emblematic of this than the framing of the final shot of Gertrud (fig. 31). The film ends with an elderly Gertrud saying goodbye to her friend Axel Nygren one last time; she closes the door and ever so slowly bells begin to toll. Dreyer holds the empty frame an inordinate amount of time—open to duration and, perhaps, to the eternal mystery that Gertrud sought and into which she has now passed.

![fig. 31](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**The Shot**

The ‘shot’—for indeed there are many different kinds of ‘shots’ which share the same characterization—can most accurately be described as the *image-movement*, a mobile-section of duration that ‘extracts’ movement from moving bodies to provide a temporal perspective or relief. The shot “modifies the relative position of immobile sets … the translation of the parts of a set which spreads out in space” (frames), and expresses “change in the whole which is itself transmitted through these modifications” and “the change of a whole which is transformed in duration”.611 As hinted earlier, it

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610 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 19.
611 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 20, 21.
was the emancipation of the shot from a single set-up, theatrical-like point of view (Melies) that rescued cinema from its own photographic ‘essence’. In the proto cinema of Melies, for example, there was not only “no communication of mutually referring variable sets” (frames) in the one camera set-up but movement remained ‘attached’ to bodies and things which pass “from one spatial shot/plane [plan] to another”, says Deleuze. Melies’ films were essentially filmed theatrical productions. In Melies’s *A Trip to the Moon* (1902), for example, when the plan to fly a rocket to the moon is ‘described’ and mocked by the ‘president’s’ peers, there are no close-ups or cutaways, there is only a single master shot for entrance, explanation and ‘action’. The scene ends when the actors exit stage left and again enter stage left, via a simple editorial dissolve, for a new scene. It was for this reason Bergson critiqued proto-cinema as an image in movement.

The development of the dynamic range of the mobile camera ‘shot’, what Bergson could not foresee, makes the ‘extrication’ of mobility possible. “This [‘extrication’] is not an abstraction,” says Deleuze, “but an emancipation. … By producing in this way a mobile section of movements, the shot is not content to express the duration of a whole which changes, but constantly puts bodies, parts, aspects, dimensions, distances and the respective positions of the bodies which make up a set in the image into variation.”612 Here then is the essence of the image-movement, movement is extracted from bodies in space.613 Somewhere between, but not equidistant from, the frame and montage, the shot circulates, sub-divides and reunites objects and sets “into a duration which is immanent to the whole of the universe.”614 The shot involves us in this duration in the world. Returning to Welles’ depth of field (figs. 32-

612 Gilles Deleuze, *ibid.*, 24.
613 Gilles Deleuze, *ibid.*, 24.
614 Gilles Deleuze, *ibid.*, 21.
we see how a single shot camera movement—itself a form of in-camera montage—transforms the ‘frame’ into a mobile section of duration. In a single shot sequence we are granted a glimpse into the single most important event that sent Charles Foster Kane’s tragic life in motion. The young Kane is playing in the snow and sliding on his sled Rosebud. The camera begins to dolly back and reveals his mother who calls out, “be careful, Charles! Pull your muffler around your neck, Charles!” The mother’s voice is interrupted by the voice of Walter Parks Thatcher, a banker who is attempting to secure guardianship of young Charles, “Mrs. Kane, I think we shall have to tell him now.” The voice of young Charles, who continues to play, can be heard in the ever increasing distance. “Yes, I’ll sign those papers now Mr. Thatcher”, says Mrs. Kane. With Mrs. Kane in the foreground, Mr. Kane, who is a weak-willed and violent character, launches into a pitiful protest. But Mrs. Kane’s mind is made up and, with the boy playing in the distant background while his innocent youth is about to be signed away, Mrs. Kane begins to finalize the deal. The tension escalates as the dialogue of all four characters overlap (a technique pioneered by Welles): Mr. Kane’s protest, Mrs. Kane’s resigned plea to Mr. Kane to “stop all this nonsense”, Mr. Thatcher’s cold and efficient explanation to Mr. Kane that he has no say in the matter, and the sounds of young Charles playing in the distance. Mr. Kane goes back to close the window and silence the sound of young Charles but Mrs. Kane goes and opens the window calling out to him one last time.

David A. Cook, ibid., 397.
The shot, however, is not the only way movement is extracted and the imagemovement is crafted, says Deleuze. Editing (montage) – the assemblage and organization of shots in a particular sequence – can also extract movement from bodies and things to free the camera from constant movement and with this, it can extract and present much of the depth and complexity of a lifeworld.

**MONTAGE AND THE ACTION-IMAGE**

The ‘Whole’ of cinema – the change in duration which occurs between the beginning and end of the film – is ‘released’ from the image-movements of the shot through the craft of montage, or editing. “The only generality about montage”, Deleuze points out, “is that it puts the cinematographic image into a relationship with the whole;
that is, with time conceived as the Open."^616 Indeed, Deleuze points out that since the advent of classical cinema the image-movement has more often been associated with montage than camera movement alone.

In fact, and here then is the second radical step in Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema, montage is a technique of ordering and organizing by which great directors express their own philosophical characterization of the everyday through their “technique” and “concrete practices". ^617 Deleuze believes the image-movement reflects a particular grasp of existential immersion of human being-in-the-world, and specifically, the image-movement of ‘classic cinema’ in Cinema 1 is such a grasp that eventually comes to crisis after World War Two. In this way, a discussion of cinema plays out as part of the larger conversation, begun in Chapter 1, about how human beings ‘organize’ and ‘order’ forms of life and how it manifests in practices of ‘power’ or ‘creativity'.^618 Furthermore, this insistence on the vital importance of montage as

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^616 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 56.
^617 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 56.
^618 The coming together of ‘Hitler and Hollywood’ on a large scale in the propaganda machines of fascism is something to be considered, then, in relation to the ordering and organizing of cinema. “This was the death-knell for the ambitions of ‘old cinema’: not, or not only, the mediocrity and vulgarity of current production but rather Leni Riefenstahl, who was not mediocre”, says Deleuze. (Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 159.) Deleuze cites the work of Serge Daney [1944-1992] and Paul Virilio, who have theorized about the *mises-en-scène* of the everyday civil lifeworld; “what has brought the whole cinema of the movement-image into question are ‘the great political *mises-en-scène*, state propaganda turned *tableaux vivants*, the first handling of mass humans’, and their backdrop, the camps”, says Deleuze citing Daney. (ibid., 159) “And the situation is still worse if we accept Virilio’s thesis: there has been no diversion or alienation in an art of the masses initially founded by the movement-image; on the contrary the movement-image was from the beginning linked to the organization of war, state propaganda, ordinary fascism, historically and essentially.” (159)

We can now add one more example of ‘the ersatz city’ to the discussion in chapter 1 – Theresienstadt concentration camp in the Czech fortress city of Therezin. An 18th-century fortress and garrison town, the Gestapo turned Therezin into a Jewish ghetto during World War Two. Not only did the Gestapo reorder the purposed design of the fortress city –an act meant to constrict and regulate the organizing trajectories of those now trapped inside– but they also made a propaganda film show what life in the ‘model’ camp looked like. *Ein Dokumentarfilm aus dem jüdischen Siedlungsgebiet (Terezin: A Documentary Film of the Jewish Resettlement*, referred to by survivors as *Der Führer schenkt den Juden eine Stadt (The Führer Gives the Jews a City)*), was filmed in 1944 to take advantage of an ersatz ‘beautification’ project in Therezin intended to dupe the Red Cross and the Danish government regarding the care and state of Jews in the ghetto. The camp was, in effect,
creating meaning in the cinematic craft is of great importance to directors such as Robert Bresson and Terrence Malick, who will be discussed towards the end of the chapter.

“Montage is composition,” says Deleuze, and even more radically, montage is “the assemblage [agencement] of [image-movements] as constituting an indirect image of time. … [S]imultaneously in the individual movement-image and in the whole of the film.” Deleuze is quick to point out that an indirect image of time is not to be mistaken for the homogeneous time or spatialised duration critiqued by Bergson but is “an effective duration and time which flow from the articulation of the [image-movements]”.

As we shall soon see, the indirect image of time is built up from a certain organic and action-based characterization of the image-movement that is dependent on movement and montage. “The [image-movement] provides only an indirect image of time because time is reduced to intervals defined by movement and the linking of movements through montage.” Deleuze identifies another type of montage that emerges after World War Two, which produces a ‘direct image of time’ – where “time pierces through the image itself directly and without the mediation of a succession of [image-movements]” but this will be discussed in the next section. It is for this reason, Deleuze generally refers to the pre-war technique of montage and its turned into a film set. A complete copy of the film no longer exists (only 25min of an approximately 90min film) but Susan Tegel's erudite reconstruction in Nazis and the Cinema (Continuum: London, 2007) gives us a glimpse. “What we see”, says Tegel, “are people leading active, purposeful lives, working hard, and engaged in sensible leisure activities such as reading, knitting, sports or enjoying themselves on sunny days, giving ‘an impression of a completely normal life’.” (Susan Tegel, Nazis and the Cinema, 223.) These ‘activities’ were of course completely fabricated for the camera – the mise-en-scène of a lifeworld.

Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 31, 56. (bold emphasis mine)

Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 31.

D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, 11. Rodowick also points out that this organic image-movement is a projection of a particular characterization of Truth. “The noosigns of the movement-image”, he says, “derive from a belief in the possibility of action and the stability of Truth.” (12-13 bold emphasis mine)

Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 39.
cinema as ‘classical cinema’ (although instances of direct images of time can be found in classical cinema) to be distinguished from the ‘modern cinema’ which arises after World War Two. By highlighting four distinct pre-War editing styles which produce indirect images of time, Deleuze endeavors to describe how time and narrative emerge from the assemblage and composition of image-movements through the technique of editing.

Deleuze points out four distinct schools of classical montage each expressing their own practical and philosophical compositions of the image-movement. The organico-active (or empirical) American montage established in the work of D. W. Griffith; the Soviet organico-dialectical montage of Sergi Eisenstein designed as a critique of Griffith’s bourgeois aesthetic; the prewar French poetic-quantitative (or quantitative movement) and the decidedly non-organic and non-psychological German expressionist montage. The latter three are indebted to, and attempt to break from, Griffith’s organico-active model. While there is no space to go into the rich details of each tradition, and Deleuze reminds us that this list in no way represents a hierarchy or evolution, it is their shared ‘organic’ characteristics of narration (gloss: simple sort of story line) and the efficacy of human actions to change given milieus (changing situation in a behaviorist style) that allows them to be grouped together as a description of ‘classical cinema’. Here, Deleuze makes a difficult transition; although these pre-war schools differ greatly in their approach and method of montage, what makes them all ‘classical’ is a similar editorial logic of movement and space. The montage of classical cinema abides in a certain ‘Realism’ based on a shared philosophical belief in the efficacy of action coupled with a particular model of Truth. A character doesn’t go into

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623 It should be noted that the dialectical montage of Sergi Eisenstein (also Vsevolod Pudovkin and Alexander Dovzhenko) was heavily criticized by the Soviet ‘experimental director’ Dziga Vertov for “being carried along in Griffith’s wake, for imitating the American cinema, or for a bourgeois idealism.” Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, 41.
a room and just end up on a ship. But that example—although a practical logic—is still too simplistic.

D. N. Rodowick uses an example from Buster Keaton’s *Sherlock Jr.* (1924) to make Deleuze’s point clear. There is a short sequence in *Sherlock Jr.* where Keaton divides himself in a dream (fig. 41) and enters the cinema frame. Through a series of shots and match cuts (figs. 42-44) Keaton moves from space to space: a city street, a cliff, a jungle, a desert, an ocean, a snowy mountainside. “Keaton’s movements”, says Rodowick, “from one shot to the next link incommensurable spaces through what modern mathematics terms a ‘rational’ division. … [E]very division, no matter how unlikely and nonsensical, is mastered by this figure of rationality where the identification of movement with action assures the continuous unfolding of adjacent spaces.”

That is, Keaton is to be taken to have made these transitions in this simple sequence.

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624 D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, 3.
Time, then, is subordinate to movement and activity in this editorial Realism. “What constitutes realism is simply this: milieux and modes of behaviour,” says Deleuze, “milieux which actualize and modes of behaviour which embody.” Deleuze refers to this ‘Realism’ as the action-image, which is “the relation between the two and all the varieties of this relation.” Because the realism of the action-image has most commonly been associated with American cinema, and although the other schools of pre-war cinema attempt responses to the organico-active innovations made by D. W. Griffith, the techniques of Griffith should be acknowledged before moving on to the structure of the action-image.

American filmmaker D. W. Griffith (1875-1948), who almost single handedly transformed the proto-cinema of Dickson, Lumiere, Méliès and Porter into the ‘American cinema’ we currently know today, is recognized as having originated the basic techniques of ‘organic’ narration which uses the logic of action and spatial continuity in the linking of image-movements. Griffith’s style was either embraced or reacted to by his contemporaries but his work and innovations were not to be ignored. Deleuze highlights three specific editing techniques developed by Griffith: the close-up (and a variation of the close-up known as the cut-in), parallel montage, and concurrent and convergent montage. The insertion of the close-up (the affection-image), Deleuze says, “does not merely involve the enlargement of a detail, but produces a miniaturisation of the set, a reduction of the scene … the close-up endows the objective set with a subjectivity which equals or even surpasses it”. In The Greaser’s Gauntlet (1908) Griffith match cuts from a medium long shot of a man at a hanging tree, who has been rescued from a lynch mob, to a full shot of the man thanking the woman who

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625 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 145.
626 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 145.
627 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 31, 32; this ‘psychological’ subjectivity will be questioned in the crystal-image of volume 2, which will forward the thesis of duration as subjectivity.
rescued him, to heighten the emotional impact of the event. Griffith also famously experimented with a close-up to heighten the emotional state of a wife waiting for her husband at a train station in *Enoch Arden* (1908). In both instances, Griffith discovers the emotional impact of alternating between long, medium and close-ups; this alternation “allow[s] the audience to move gradually into the emotional heart of the scene”.

*Parallel alternate montage* is the alternation of parts in a binary relationship—men and women, rich and poor, town and country, North and South, interiors and exteriors, etc. – which succeed each other according to a rhythm. Film historian David Cook suggests that this technique was a prefiguring of a subjective camera later ‘perfected’ by the German director F. W. Murnau. In *After Many Years* (1908) Griffith would cut between Annie Lee and her shipwrecked husband to emphasize “the psychological burden and uncertainty of their separation” and in *A Corner in Wheat* (1909) he cuts between a shot of a gorging wheat tycoon and hungry sharecroppers.

*Concurrent and convergent montage*, also known as crosscutting, is very similar to the aforementioned technique. Crosscutting is the alternation of fragmented but concurrent (and not always concurrent) action, which continues to alternate until the separate spatial and temporal realities climax—either together or missing each other. Widely known as the “Griffith last minute rescue” the crosscutting would continue to increase in tempo raising the tension of the action until resolution. These editorial techniques represent an ordering technique used to both shape meaning and elicit viewer response.

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628 Ken Dancyger notes an apocryphal story about how the Biograph executives (the production company Griffith was working for at the time) were worried that the audience would interpret the close-up as a decapitation. Dancyger points out that the almost immediate adoption of the close-up by other directors and the continued acceptance by the audience shows otherwise. Indeed, without any ‘training’ whatsoever by the audience, the close-up was understood as a smaller set of the whole.


631 As early as Griffith’s eighth film, *The Fatal Hour* (1908), he attempted to crosscut between three separate actions. David A. Cook, ibid., 66.
Importantly, Griffith’s techniques point to the varied nature of the shot which makes the action-image possible.

While there is no space to go into great detail, what can be said is that the cinema of the image-movement is never made up of one kind of image but is an assemblage (a montage) of three distinct varieties –perception-images, affection-images, and action-images. Deleuze takes these terms directly from the first chapter of Bergson’s *Matter and Memory*, describing and linking the cinema of the ‘frame’ to the meta-cinema of human living. “The action-image forms a set wherein perceptions, affections, and actions relate organically in a sensorimotor whole”, says Rodowick. The perception-image, associated with a wide angle ‘long-shot’, relates movement to ‘bodies’; the action-image, associated with a medium-shot, relates movement to ‘acts’; and the affection-image, or the close-up, which relates movement to a ‘quality’, bridges both. What binds them together as the *action-image*, and this is the central point which we’ve been making, is their adherence to a particular form (or in this case formula) of organic ‘action’ –a supposedly ‘realistic’ sequence of actions which we believe will change the milieu or situation(s) of the character. It is this ‘action-schema’ Deleuze believes is overturned in post World War Two ‘modern’ cinema.

Deleuze describes the formula of the action-image as SAS’ or, Situation addressed by Action which results in a new Situation (signified by the apostrophe). “Action properly speaking” claims Rodowick, “is motivated by a protagonist, whose actions and reactions are constituted as physical movements in a struggle with the

633 “The operation under consideration”, argues Deleuze, “is no longer elimination, selection or framing, but the incurring of the universe, which simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible action on things.” Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, 67.
634 D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, 72.
Deleuze goes into great detail describing the role movement plays in the organic interlacing of actions and milieux, making room for all the different genres of cinema. What is of great importance however is that SAS’ is not simply a cinematic technique or a mere formula of entertainment but is also a complex philosophical expression. The Soviet filmmaker Sergi Eisenstein critiqued Griffith’s editorial techniques because he believed that Griffith’s films, and the formula by which they were made, were the result of a particular way of seeing the world. “Eisenstein’s strength thus lies in showing that the principal technical aspects of American montage since Griffith – the alternate parallel montage which makes up the situation, and the alternate concurrent montage which leads to the duel – relate back to this social and bourgeois historical conception.”

Through a dialectical montage Eisenstein was able to change “the interval, as well as the whole [tou]“ of cinema in a way that was completely distinct from what Eisenstein perceived as an American bourgeois mythos. In the end, however, Deleuze points out that whether the montage is crafted in an organico-active (Griffith) or organico-dialectic (Soviet/Eisenstein) style, their shared philosophical assumption is a belief in the efficacy of human actions to change given milieux.

Finally, in some cases the action-image may be alternatively formulated as ASA’ or Action disclosing a Situation and moving to a new Action (signified by the apostrophe). Deleuze refers to this as the ‘small form’ of the action-image and is evidence of a unique possibility in the action-image – the possibility of going beyond the action-image. ASA’ is characterized by elliptical, or episodic, situations only partially disclosed as fragments by actions. “From action to action, the situation

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636 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 68.
637 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 154.
638 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 38.
639 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 70.
gradually emerges, varies, and finally either becomes clear or retains its mystery”, says Deleuze. The small form of the action-image, then is characterized by both what is not given and by what is not directly given (specifically, slight differences in actions resulting in an infinite difference between situations); both rely on a breakdown in the logic of the behaviorist schema on which the ‘large form’ of the action-image is so dependent. Although the small form of the action-image is found in all of cinema (large productions, B-movies and low budgets films), Deleuze likes the example of Charlie Chaplin’s ‘burlesque’ cinema to make his point –“a genre which seems to be exclusively devoted to the small form”, says Deleuze. On the one hand Deleuze cites Chaplin’s A Woman of Paris [Public Opinion] (1923). A gap of a year in the life of Marie St. Clair is left blank whilst the audience is left to decipher by her new clothes and behavior what has happened (she has become the mistress of a wealthy man). Erotic images are inferred from the reaction of the spectator. And an arrival of a train is read on the passing lights on Marie’s face. Here it is interesting to note the role limitation (most often financial, but not always) plays in the need for cinematic innovation, which leads to the ASA’. So, for instance, Deleuze points out that Chaplin shows the arrival of the train through light and shadow because he didn’t have a real French train to show. This relationship between constraint and innovation, says Deleuze, is significant in post-war Europe and the developments of Italian Neorealismo and the French Nouvelle Vague –most notably, the birth of what Deleuze calls the time-image [l’image-temps]. Deleuze turns to other Chaplin films to highlight the

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640 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 164.
641 Indeed movies can pass between the SAS’ and ASA’ (as was the case with Eisenstein) or directors can make one movie in the SAS’ form and then make the next in an ASA’ form (as was the case with John Ford).
642 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 173. Deleuze makes the exception for the cinema of the American silent film star Buster Keaton (1895-1966), whose genius seems to be the insertion of the burlesque into the ‘large form’. Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 177-181.
second expression of the small form. We see a heartbroken Tramp appear to shake with grief because he was left by his love, but when he turns around we see him shaking a cocktail. In Soldier Arms (1918) the Tramp is in the trenches of World War One tallying points for himself, then the enemy, after every gunshot—as though he was playing a game of darts. The slight difference of action in these sequences reveals the enormous divide in situations. “For Chaplin knew how to select gestures which were close to each other and corresponding situations which were far apart, so as to make their relationship produce a particularly intense emotion at the same time as laughter, and to redouble the laughter through this emotion.”643 This was Chaplin’s originality and genius, claims Deleuze.

CONCLUSION

To conclude this first part it is important to reiterate Deleuze’s characterization of cinema as a unique technology which has too often been complicit in the philosophical tendency to build up abstract representations of life. Indeed, the patterns of representation in the indirect image of time, rendered in the action-image, are susceptible to the colonizing tendencies described thus far. Not only susceptible, the action-image, dependent on organic and action-based characterization of movement and space, is complicit for the very reason that it must occlude its own preference for abstract representations of life. More dramatically, the broader connection between the ‘culmination’ of the mises-en-scène of the action-image in the cinema of Leni Reifenstal, and the totalitarian mises-en-scène of the Nazi lifeworld, connects the critique of Peter Jackson’s LOTR films to the larger ethical concerns that have been cited. This cinematic ‘illusion’ is of the same economy as the scopic desire to step

643 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 174.
outside the human body and transform an external world into theoretical simulacrum. This is also the same economy of the mega machine and simulation that gives rise to a new economy of consumption and communication. However, because Deleuze is concerned with the cinematic artifact and varied cinematic practices he sees the possibility for other philosophical expression in other cinematic practices. We note with Deleuze that cinema has other possibilities and tendencies which oppose and make possible other philosophical tendencies: these are the possibilities of concreteness, particularity and detail. In this way it is not the technology, nor the artifice of cinema, that is in question, but the technique, use and values to which it is devoted. It is at this point where we can finally delineate between the disastrous economy of consumption and the economy of communication in a post-industrial age. All this goes with the cinema of the time-image to which we now turn.
PART II: BEYOND A CINEMA OF REPRESENTATION

“The cinema does not just present images, it surrounds them with a world.”644

CINEMA 2: THE TIME-IMAGE

A radical transformation in the projection of the possibilities of cinema arises after the global societal failure culminating in, and continuing after, World War Two. These changes and assumptions about cinema have deep connections with what has been discussed in the previous chapters, about the characterization of human being-in-the-world, and about how we order and organize lifeworlds through a projection of the possibilities of being. The crisis that Deleuze diagnoses in cinema relates deeply to philosophy and social understanding, and some of the problems he sees relate closely to those that have been noted in other chapters. Broadly speaking, this transformation in cinema stems from a general Western crisis, relating to an Enlightenment picture of knowledge of the world, and so too the Enlightenment picture of the world itself, including the faulty characterization of what was thought to be ‘progress’, and the faulty characterization of autonomous people controlling events in the world. This final point is, in many ways, the culmination of this crisis, which was manifested, in its most brutal possibility, in the Fascist and Communist blueprints of ‘order’. This philosophical crisis, anticipated long before World War Two, but certainly felt broadly after it, stems from “social, economic, political, moral, and [other issues] more internal to art, to literature and to the cinema in particular”, argues Deleuze; and all these issues, and the various responses to them, eventually surface in particular expressions of cinematic technique.645 In the world of art, particularly, Deleuze points out how this vast constellation of issues found a voice in American Lost Generation literature (John

644 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 66.
Dos Passos) and in the French *nouveau roman* (Alain Robbe-Grillet), long before it made its way to film. Deleuze rightly asks whether or not this crisis of the action-image can reasonably be presented as something new to cinema? As we have just seen, the action-image itself is a complex expression of classical cinema, which involves both this characterization and the desire of directors to “limit or even suppress the unity of action, to undo the action, the drama, the plot or the story” in the structure of the SAS’ and ASA’.

Classical cinema had always been haunted by a beyond-the-image-movement—a phantom Deleuze calls a direct time-image which takes body already in classical cinema, and is fully embodied in modern cinema. Deleuze describes five conditions which act as a sort of scaffolding—he describes them as an ‘envelope’—for the crisis of the action-image; and these conditions should be addressed before discussing a cinema beyond the image-movement, taken up by Deleuze in volume two of his cinema study—l’image-temps.

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646 Deleuze makes specific reference to the work of American John Dos Passos (1896-1970) and French novelist Alain Robbe-Grillet (1922-2008) in his attempts to articulate the crisis of the action-image.

647 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 209-210; In his documentary *Directed by John Ford* (1971), American director Peter Bogdonovich recalls a story about the American director John Ford that speaks to this point. *How Green Was My Valley* (1941) was a film about a Welsh family’s struggle during the turn of the twentieth century in the South Wales coalfield. The context in which the story is told is how the old Hollywood studios would force directors to recut portions of their films or use certain shots. Ford had legendary low ‘shooting’ ratio—he would film just what he ‘needed’ and wanted, nothing more. So during the filming of a dramatic scene in which the new vicar, Mr. Gruffydd (Walter Pidgeon), marries away the eldest daughter of the Morgan family, Angharad (Maureen O’Hara) with whom he’s had a silent romance, to the mine owner’s son, Ford filmed her leaving the chapel in a long shot (perception-image). Angharad comes down the stairs with her new husband and the villagers bid them off with warm farewells. In the distance we see the lonely figure of the vicar watching his true love go away. Ford was then asked if he would like to shoot a close-up (affection-image) of the vicar to which his response was, “Why? They’ll just use it!” These craft decisions, then, change the potentialities of cinema. It enables us to ‘get into things’ and to more richly participate in lifeworld, a concern ‘modern cinema’ and Tolkien also shared. So, although ‘modern cinema’ may not be more beautiful or better than classical cinema, as Deleuze says, we might say that it is a more philological and mythopoetic practice of cinema—it allows us to dig deeper.

The Crisis of the Action-Image

Although SAS’ and ASA’ movies were still being made after World War Two—and, as Deleuze points out, were still the most financially successful in the post-war West—the new ‘soul’ of cinema was, as he sees it, expressed in Italian Neorealism. In 1942 Cesare Zavattini (screenwriter of Shoeshine 1946, Bicycle Theives 1948, and Umberto D 1952) proposed a new kind of Italian cinema, a cinema that did away with ‘contrived plots’, sets, and professional actors, and returned to the concerns and textures of ‘everyday life’. In the midst of almost total societal collapse in Europe, the Italian neorealists raised new existential and social concerns through cinematic technique, and in the process brought cinema to a crisis—a crisis of the action-image.

Deleuze roughly places and dates the beginning of the crisis of the action-image to 1948 and the releases of Roberto Rossellini’s Germania, anno zero and Vittorio De Sica’s Ladri di biciclette, both of which represent Italian Neorealism at the height of its powers. It should also be noted that in Cinema 2, Deleuze highlights the pre-and post-war cinema of Japanese director Yasujiru Ozu as significant to the crisis of the action image. Although Ozu did not directly influence the development of ‘crisis’ in European cinema, and was only returned to after his final film, An Autumn Afternoon (1962),

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649 The ‘crisis of the action image’ is a curious beast in Deleuze’s taxonomy of cinema and should be put into context. Although Deleuze dates the crisis of the action image after the second World War, the ‘crisis’ to which he speaks was already ‘felt’ in the late 19th century. Indeed, leading up to and after World War One, European culture was experiencing a crisis of Modernity. This crisis was reflected in the literature of Proust and Dostoevsky, the philosophy of Bergson and Heidegger, and of course, in the work of those who went through the trauma of World War One—Wittgenstein and Tolkien.

650 David A. Cook, A History of Narrative Film, 424.

651 Credited with ‘starting’ Italian Neorealism, this was Rossellini’s third neorealist film after the tremendously influential Roma, città aperta (1945) and Paisà (1946). And although Roma, città aperta was recognized as something ‘new’ and innovative it still held onto a ‘melodrama’ consistent with the SAS’ and ASA’ form.

652 Less famously Luchino Visconti’s La terra trema was also released that year. Deleuze’s rough timeline for the crisis of the action-image is Italy 1948; France 1958; Germany 1968. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 215.
Deleuze dramatically points out that Ozu invented a cinema of seeing [optical situations] and hearing [sound situations].

Fundamentally, pure optical images [opsigns] and, later, with the development of synchronous sound, pure sound images [sonsigns] are distinct from the action-schema of organic montage. Within the action-schema, situations [milieu] –usually shown with the perception-image or the long/wide shot– extend into action via the affection-image. This technique is visible in the formula SAS, which Deleuze says can be found, with some degree of variation, in most of ‘classical cinema’. Because “action floats” in the ether of the optical and sound situation, the logic of the action-schema is ruptured. “Daily life allows only weak sensory-motor connections to survive, and replaces the action-image by pure optical and sound images”, argues Deleuze. Ozu’s cinematic technique is built on this logic. It replaces activity with the banal, the ordinary, the everyday; we see and hear other ‘things’. Using a different technique to dwell on the banal particularity around us our sensitivity to them is richer and deeper. Ozu’s camera is usually fixed and low, and when the camera does move it is generally very slow. His editing favors, what Deleuze calls the montage-cut, “a purely optical passage or punctuation between images, working directly, sacrificing all synthetic effects.” One only needs to return to the opening sequence of An Autumn Afternoon, described earlier, to see these techniques come together. These techniques force us to wrestle with the image differently than we would the action-schema. Regarding the status of the image-movement, Deleuze claims it “has not disappeared, but now exists

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653 There is something to be followed up here; if, as was pointed out earlier, there is a relationship between the zen and Taoist expression in Ozu’s films and Heideggarian philosophy, then it should be of no surprise that Ozu was able to anticipate the crisis of the action image and the development of the time-image.
654 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 4.
655 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 15.
656 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 13.
only as the first dimension of an image that never stops growing in dimensions." The inclusion of Ozu, then, is significant because, although Italian neorealism returns to the textures of the everyday, Deleuze wants to go beyond the socio-economic descriptions of Italian neorealism given by other theorists, in order to address the way the structure of classical cinema, as a craft, was disrupted and changed as a result of this crisis.

Above all else, we should remember that the crisis of the action-image stems from a philosophical crisis [philosophy in its broadest human sense] of belief. “We hardly believe any longer that a global situation can give rise to an action which is capable of modifying it”, says Deleuze. This ‘philosophical crisis’, manifested in a

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657 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 21.
658 Referencing film critic and theorist André Bazin (1918-1958) Deleuze says, “neo-realism therefore invented a new type of image … and showed that [it] did not limit itself to the content of its earliest examples.” Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 1.
659 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 211; Here, a more detailed explanation is warranted. On the surface, this statement may seem to suggest a current of nihilism running through Deleuze's Cinema volumes. This may be the case. However, although he rules out the restoration of a belief in “another world” or the belief “in a transformed world”, Deleuze wants to make room for the belief in “body”, or bodies-in-the-world, and returning discourse to bodies-in-the-world. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 167. Indeed, in Cinema 2 Deleuze insists on a return to belief through the cinema of image-time by giving words –discourse– back to flesh. Citing Roberto Rossellini, Deleuze says, “the less human the world is, the more it is the artist's duty to believe and produce belief in a relation between man and the world.” Gilles Deleuze, ibid.,165. It is the power of 'modern cinema', says Deleuze, to restore our belief in the world –through the body. Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 166. And, although Deleuze is clear that this belief is 'post-metaphysical', he does cite Kierkegaard and Pascal as a model of faith that restores humanity and the world back to us. (Gilles Deleuze, ibid., n.301) When it comes to the arguments I have laid out in my own work, Deleuze's return to belief by returning discourse to the body, through the techniques of 'modern cinema', seems to be on the same trajectory –that of a corporeal imagination in everyday life. So what is to be made of Deleuze's 'collapse of belief' in light of what has been said thus far in the dissertation?

On the one hand we have already addressed the broader historical scope of this questioning, signs of which are found in the works of Proust, Nietzsche, and Tolkien for example. But on the other hand Deleuze’s insistence on a 'collapse of belief in the efficacy of human action' in the world must also be considered a highly contextualized phenomenon. This turn in cinema is dealing with a very specific time in the history of the Western World and the trajectory of that ‘turn’ in Japan and through Europe towards America is very specific. One might cite the massive efforts of reconstruction on the continent as proof to the contrary. But it seems that Deleuze sees something far deeper and more ominous –a collapse of the Cartesian belief in logic and action that has been addressed thus far.

So, I want to simultaneously and hesitantly affirm two points regarding this quote. What Deleuze is getting at is a crisis forged in the world. Regardless of what was to come after, this crisis was a crisis of what led to this point (including a World War only thirty years earlier). The belief in Christian empires bringing stability to the planet was revealed to be a myth. The world as they
new kind of cinematic ‘image’, brought into question the efficacy of action to transform particular situations (or milieus). “The soul of the cinema demands increasing thought, even if thought begins by undoing the system of action, perceptions and affections on which the cinema had fed up to that point.” Italian Neorealist cinema forged five particular characteristics by which this crisis (as noted on page 43) can be identified and the action-image brought into question. Deleuze makes clear that these characteristics only make possible (they “form an envelope” of “necessary external conditions”), but certainly do not constitute, the new cinematic image.661

First, in line with what has been said in previous chapters, in the crisis of the action-image there is a turn away from ‘globalizing’ (or synthetic) situations towards more dispersive situations, which follow multiple characters that are sometimes only loosely related.662 Here, we should recall the distinction made in chapter 3 between the ordered map and its ‘artificial lines’ and the organizing of time and space through wayfaring. ‘Artificial lines’, or lines of occupation, are built up from straight surveyed lines and imperial nodes. The artificiality of this architecture usually ignores lines of habitation and the reticulate ‘archi-textural’ meshwork of human living. Whereas the lines of the ordered map “signify occupation, not habitation”, Ingold describes wayfinding as “a movement in Time” not unlike storytelling or playing music.663 Indeed, Michel de Certeau cites a practice of ‘mapping’ he calls touring carried out by tour describers. This evanescent sketch map, only ever intended for

knew it had come to a devastating end, and the cinema that stood outside that context (early Ozu), or came out of those ruins (late Ozu and Italian neorealism), and the discussions that followed (French New Wave, German New Wave, and New American cinema) grew from those seismic shocks. But, what was discovered—a cinematic technique which allows for a richer and deeper experience of the everyday world—is not limited to such a crisis of belief. That is the direction in which this chapter hopes to push, and the manner in which Deleuze’s ‘crisis of belief’ is here taken.

660 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 210-211.
661 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 216-219.
662 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 211.
663 Tim Ingold, Lines: A Brief History, 85; Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill, 238.
contextual use, emphasizes ‘re-enactment’ of a journey along, over and against ‘representation’ of a movement across space. In keeping with the observations made by Tim Ingold, Michel de Certeau, and Henri Lefebvre in Chapter 3, ‘the city’, says Deleuze “ceases to be the city above, the upright city, with skyscrapers and low-angle shots, in order to become the recumbent city, the city as horizontal or at human height, where each gets on with his own business, on his own account.”

Second, when globalizing, generalizing and synthetic situations are abandoned there is a weakening, uncertainty and fragmentation of those links that make the SAS’ structure possible. Rather than the neat logic of situation giving way to action giving way to a new and changed situation, reality, in the crisis of the action image, plays out as “lacunary as much as dispersive” and “chance becomes the sole guiding thread”.

Third, the behaviorist sensory-motor logic of the classical action-image is replaced by what Deleuze calls the ‘stroll’ or the ‘voyage’ (e.f. Ingold’s wayfinding and de Certeau’s touring) – an activity detached from the logic of the action-schema. Here Deleuze draws on an urban studies term to describe this new cinematic phenomenon: the any-space-whatever (l’espace quelconque). Once again we run headlong into familiar concerns raised by de Certeau in Chapter 3 and Mumford in Chapter 1. The any-space-whatever is a ‘modern’ urban phenomenon associated with “the undifferentiated fabric of the city” and its effect on human being-in-the-world. Inspired by Deleuze’s former student Pascal Augé and closely related to Marc Augé’s non-lieu (nonplace), the any-space-whatever is a characterization of particular

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664 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, 211. (emphasis mine)
665 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 211.
666 Deleuze would want to say that the ‘stroll’ or ‘voyage’ in the crisis of the action image is an activity detached from its affective structure. While I agree with Deleuze, in the sense that this is indeed a what makes the crisis of the action image possible in Italian Neorealism and the French New Wave cinema, for the purposes of this dissertation as a whole I want to emphasize the historical contingency of this statement.
667 Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, 212. (emphasis mine)
depersonalized, transient, and ultimately alienating urban spaces, unique to ‘supermodernity’, which are designed to be passed through rather than engaged and appropriated (e.g. airport terminals). Citing the American new wave director John Cassavettes, Deleuze says, “it is a question of undoing space, as well as the story, the plot or the action.”

Fourth, the most complex characteristic of the crisis of the action-image is what Deleuze refers to as an acute consciousness of cinematic clichés. With the breakdown in a belief in the efficacy of human action after World War Two, and with the depersonalized any-space-whatsoever of the modern urban landscape, also comes the breakdown of the action-schema of organic montage. What is left in its wake to maintain the whole – “without totality or linkage” – is a ‘melodrama’ in which we no longer believe. Deleuze is keen to point out that this dissatisfaction with the cliché is not simply a cinematic invention. Indeed, says Deleuze, the American Lost Generation novelist John Dos Passos (1896-1970) anticipated the problem of cinematic clichés, and the techniques to expose them, in his novels. Writing when cinema was still just emerging from its ‘proto form’, Dos Passos’s work characterized the post-World War One landscape as a “dispersive and lacunary reality, the swarming of characters with...

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668 Augé, Marc, Non-places: introduction to an anthropology of Supermodernity, trans. John Howe London: Verso, 1995); also In the Metro, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), xviii; see also the excellent post by Dr. William Brown (University of St. Andrews) http://www.facebook.com/topic.php?uid=2232336063&topic=9891 (accessed 4 Nov. 2009 10:45am cst); and the reference to the lecture in which l'espace quelconque may originate for Deleuze: http://www.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=174 (accessed 4 Nov. 2009 10:55am cst); Tim Ingold should also be referenced here. This ‘passing through’ space is very much akin to the way the traveler cuts ‘across’ surface in contrast to the wayfinder’s attuned passage ‘along’. As mentioned in chapter 3, Ingold makes it clear that the wayfarer and the transport traveler are not distinguished by technological sophistication but by the bonds between bodies, life-forms and topography. One inhabits the environment; the other is largely cocooned from the environment and travels across the surface from point-to-point-to-point.

669 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 212.

670 Reducing human activities to melodramatic incidents would be vastly too limiting. While clichés are certainly related to, and often manifest as, melodrama, this suspicion of clichés is philosophically more deep-seated.
weak interferences, their capacity to become principal and revert to being secondary, events which descend on the characters and which do not belong to those who undergo or provoke them” and which manifest as sound and visual slogans.671 This dissatisfaction is precisely what Deleuze sees in the post-World War Two filmmakers on the Continent. Their radical dissatisfaction with the calamitous world around them was heightened by the false representation of those lifeworlds, linked together with clichés, and the radical abuse of those clichés by systems of power. The greater significance, then, is to understand that the devastating impact of the cinematic cliché is not just a concern about ‘hiding images’, but more importantly, a concern about hiding ‘realities’—lifeworlds—by using images in a certain way.

There is a similarity between the way in which Deleuze characterizes the cliché and Heidegger’s description of Neugier—‘curiosity’. Neugier is a particular manner of encountering the world in the everydayness of being-in-the-world, which, when not being taken up with a concern for being-in-the-world, sees and acts in a detached, idling, and unrooted (from-life) way. “It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty”.672 Closely related to ‘idle talk’ [Gerede], Heidegger describes the character of curiosity as uprooted, “never dwelling anywhere [Aufenthaltslosigkeit] … everywhere and nowhere.” If we remember from the previous discussion on the cinematic frame that das Rede (telling) and Heidegger’s characterizations of Sorge (care), Besorgen (concern) and Fürsorge (solicitude) describe the non-linguistic ways in which we make sense of the lifeworld of the frame, then we can now describe Neugier as a casual and shallow activity of ‘making sense’ of the lifeworld of the frame. So when Deleuze cites Bergson in his description of the cinematic cliché, saying, “we do not perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive

672 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 216.
less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic interest, ideological beliefs and psychological demands”, we hear echoes of Heidegger’s uprootedness. But there seems to be more in Deleuze’s cliché—something deeper and far more insidious. The crisis of the action image reveals “a civilization of the cliché where all the powers have an interest in hiding images from us … in hiding something in the image.” This ethical element in Deleuze’s description of the cliché as a tool of ordering human forms of life (which culminates in the Fascist cinema of World War Two) reveals his characterization of the crisis of the action image—as a response to the cinematic cliché—to have a similar trajectory of concerns to previous chapters.

The fifth and final characteristic of the crisis of the action-image raises an important point moving into Deleuze’s second volume. Deleuze refers to this as the condemnation of the plot. On one level, as Rodowick observes, homogeneity in the action-image now takes the form of a ‘global plot’ or conspiracy [complot] in which the characters journey engulfed. As in De Sica’s Bicycle Thief, this conspiracy sometimes manifests as ironical, at other times as parodic (as in Godard’s Alphaville), or even as paranoiac (as often found American new wave films). There is, however, a more practical point to be made, which Deleuze alludes to in Cinema 1 and expands upon in Cinema 2. The ‘plot’ also suggests the conspiratorial difficulty cinema has in escaping the moral and aesthetic bankruptcy of the cinematic action-image. “But how can the cinema attack the dark organization of clichés,” asks Deleuze “when it participates in their fabrication and propagation, as much as magazines or

674 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 20. (bold emphasis mine)
675 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 77; see also Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 214.
676 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 62-65.
television?677 In Cinema 2 Deleuze later says of the cinematic ‘industry’ and what he describes as its “internalized relation with money”: “the cinema as art itself lives in a direct relation with a permanent plot [complot], an international conspiracy which conditions it from within, as the most intimate and most indispensable enemy.”678 Cinema had only managed to parody, and would continue to do so until a beyond the movement-image was made possible.

With these five descriptive framing principles, Deleuze goes on to include in his characterization of the crisis of the action-image (as expressed in Italian neorealism, and separately, in the post-war films of Yasojiru Ozu) the general development of ‘purely optical’ and ‘sound’ situations, which were described earlier in the work of Ozu. As a reminder, optical and sound situations are cinematic techniques that do not extend into action nor are induced by action.679 When montage becomes irrational and the logic of conflict and action erodes, then we are dependent on “seeing and hearing as decipherment rather than following an action”.680 In Roberto Rossellini’s Germania Anno Zero (1948), the young boy Edmund Koeler strolls the devastated streets of post-war Berlin (figs. 45-47), his lifeworld devastated, and his activities seemingly impotent, his family life broken.

677 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, 214; Deleuze’s metaphors are notoriously fluid (e.g. the nomadic war machine), mixing biological and technological descriptions, and should not be confused with the distinction between ordering and organizing established in chapter one. We should also recall Daniel Boorstin’s The Image, and the ‘conspiracy’ of the pseudo-event.
678 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 75.
679 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 2, 17.
680 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 74-75.
Through street after street of rubble, abandoned buildings, and construction—a menagerie of any-space-whatever—neither the boy (nor we) no longer believes in the efficacy of action to affect milieu. Robbed of the logic of sensory motor linkages, the cinematic lifeworld no longer articulates its logic through activity and SAS’; we are left to “grasp” at the vast complexity of the sights and sounds of the post-war German lifeworld.681 “In neo-realism, the sensory-motor connections are now valid only by virtue of the upsets that affect, loosen, unbalance, or uncouple them: the crisis of the action-image.”682 But the rubble of post-war Europe is of course a dramatic and raw example of the any-space-whatever, and the social content of Italian neorealism may mislead the radical changes in technique, perhaps a more reserved and less Western example may help the point.

The common concern in all of the films of Yasujiro Ozu is the everyday banality of Japanese home life. There is a stillness and emptiness in Ozu’s films that resists convention. His camera work has very little movement, there are long ‘still life’ codas, and the only punctuation is a simple cutting technique emphasizing optical passages rather than action. In Ozu’s films, says Deleuze, “the action-image disappears in favour of the purely visual image of what a character is, and the sound image of what he says, completely banal nature and conservation constituting the essentials of the

681 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 17.
682 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 5-6.
script. … Daily life allows only weak sensory-motor connections to survive, and replaces the action-image by pure optical and sound images”.

Seeing and hearing replaces action in Ozu’s films, and because the sensory motor links are weak “there is no universal line which connects moments of decision … spaces are raised to the state of any-space-whatevers, whether by disconnection, or vacuity”.

But if the action-image is undone what is the character of this new cinematic image?

**THE CRYSTALLINE STRUCTURE OF THE TIME -IMAGE**

"The past is never dead. It's not even past."

WILLIAM FAULKNER

REQUIEM FOR A NUN

![Image of a scene from a film](fig. 48)

Demonstrating both the structure and depth of classical cinema in *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, Deleuze’s characterization of the crisis of the action-image brings volume 1 of his philosophy of cinema to a close. Central to understanding *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, then, is the disclosure of the crisis of the action-image as

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683 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 13-15. “this is why”, says Deleuze, “the only things that count are the choice of actors according to their physical and moral appearance, and the establishment of any dialogue whatever, apparently without a precise subject-matter”. This is certainly true for a director like Robert Bresson who does not use the term ‘actor’ but ‘models’.

684 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 15.
more than simply a stylistic change in ‘taste’, but as a philosophical response to the power and devastating ruin of what has just been described as the cinematic cliché – which culminated in the fascist cinema of the 30’s and 40’s – and an attempt to find a beyond the image-movement. Ultimately, however, and although significant, the crisis of the action-image alone does not constitute a beyond the image-movement Deleuze seeks. The move beyond is characterized by a triple reversal in the structure of classical cinema – the first two movements Deleuze addressed in the crisis of the action image. First, the cinematic image is freed from its dependence on sensory motor links; and second, the logic of the action-image is replaced by pure optical [opsigns] and sound [sonsigns] situations – a cinema of seeing and hearing. The third move, says Deleuze, and this is what ultimately frees the cinematic image from the destructive power of clichés and towards a truly ‘modern cinema’, the cinematic image had to become open to direct image-time (chronosigns), ‘readable’ images (lectosigns), and ‘thinking’ images (noosigns) – the character of which are inextricably linked to bodies, time and memory.685 In the place of the organic representation of the action-image comes, what Deleuze calls, the crystalline image characterized by an explicit focus on time and a rethinking of the craft of montage.

A beyond the image-movement does not mean the end of the image-movement, per se, nor does it imply a ‘progression’ towards something “more beautiful”, “more profound”, or “more true”, says Deleuze. But indeed, there is a different quality altogether in a beyond the image-movement of modern cinema – most significantly, it is not grasped as action-schema.686 It is important to note, once again, that although “pure optical and sound images, the fixed shot, and the montage-cut do define and

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685 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 22.
686 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 39. It is of course not shackled either by conventions of narrative or ‘story’.
imply a beyond of movement”; time is still subordinated to movement (an indirect image of time dependent on montage) and does not constitute a direct image of time. Deleuze addresses in Cinema 2 how time is freed from its subordination to movement in the action-schema of the cinematic image-movement wherefore movement becomes a perspective of time (here Deleuze specifically has Welles and Renais in mind) creating a situation where the visual and sound elements must be ‘read’ not just seen and heard. This shift, and its characterization, must now be explored.

Deleuze returns to the craft of montage to continue his characterization of time free from a subordination to movement, and to re-characterize movement as a perspective of time. Why montage? D. N. Rodowick helps clarify: “Deleuze’s definition of montage is broad, as befits an expression of the whole. More than style of cutting, montage expresses a logic of composition … that informs the system of the film both globally and in each of its parts. … Montage indicates a particular organizing principle or agencement of images”. So, in D. W. Griffith, Sergi Eisentein and Pier Pasolini we see how these different organizing principles are integrally linked to conceptions of time. While Deleuze mentions four unique styles of montage in classical cinema – the previously mentioned organico-active (or empirical); the Soviet organico-dialectical; the prewar French poetic-quantitative (or quantitative movement) and the decidedly non-organic and non-psychological German expressionist – it is now clear that these unique organizations of images represent two very different “chronosigns” of the movement-image, as Rodowick says. We should recall Deleuze’s generality about montage; montage puts the cinematographic image in

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687 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 21.
688 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 21.
689 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, 51.
690 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 66; D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 52.
691 D. N. Rodowick, ibid., 52.
relationship with the whole. One aspect is time as the immensity of past and future, the other presents time as interval—the variability of the present.

As discussed earlier in the chapter, there are two discernable sides to the image-movement. On one side, there is the frame, which opens towards objects whose relative positions are in space. The other, montage, is in relation to the whole—which expresses change—and is in time, argues Deleuze. The shot, then, is divided between these two ‘sides’—the frame towards objects and montage towards the whole. Deleuze’s first thesis here is that because montage constitutes the ‘whole’, as described earlier, it “gives us the image of time.” However, says Deleuze, in classical cinema montage only yields an indirect image of time precisely because time flows from montage and the linking of one present image-movement to another. Montage, then, is more than juxtaposing ‘images’ it is “an activity of selection and coordination, in order to give time real dimension, and the whole its consistency”. The nature of the practice of montage in the action-image implies that the image-movement always ever is in the present. Deleuze adds one more seemingly contradictory element—because montage is dependent on the nature of the image-movement as a whole that changes—“the shot must therefore already be a potential montage, and the movement-image, a matrix or cell of time.” Cinematic time is, then, both dependent on the image-movement and flows from montage. “According to Pasolini,” says Deleuze, “‘the present is transformed into past’ by virtue of montage, but this past ‘still appears as a present’ by

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693 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 56-57; D. N. Rodowick, *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine*, 52.
695 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 33.
696 There is an illusion in the montage of the action-image that you are always in the now and what came before is in the past and the current now will soon pass into the past replaced by a new now.
697 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 34.
virtue of the nature of the image.”698 These are the poles of the indirect representation of time in classical montage. Each movement-image can only subordinate time if movement is ‘normal’. Here Deleuze defines ‘normal’ as the presence of an equilibrium, which grants the viewer the ability to assign and recognize movement in order to make sense of the story.

‘Normal’ movement also implies the possibility of aberrant movement in cinema –movement that lacks a center-of-observation, or what Deleuze calls equilibrium.699 Aberrant movement in a ‘beyond the image-movement’ does not mean, however, that movement comes to an end and the subordination of time to movement is called into question; indeed, although it was avoided in practice, aberrant cinematic movement is as old as cinema itself.700 This aberrant movement can often be felt in the ‘unsophisticated’ cuts, or false continuity cuts, in the proto cinema of the Lumières and

698 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 34; we should also note that elsewhere Deleuze makes a philosophical comparison between Pasolini, who might be called post-Kantian since “the conditions of legitimacy are the conditions of reality itself”, while the semiological school of Christian Metz would be Kantian. It is this post-Kantian tradition that we continue to pursue. Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 276 n. 8.

699 The deeper implications of Deleuze’s aberrant movement is evident in Nathaniel Dorsky’s characterization of intermittence in his long essay Devotional Cinema (Berkley: Tuumba Press, 2003). Dorsky’s title comes from his belief that cinema can act as an interruption of our everyday or, as Dorsky says, “it subverts our absorption in the temporal and reveals the depths of our own reality; it opens us to a fuller sense of ourselves and the world.” Nathaniel Dorsky, Devotional Cinema, 16. As we have seen, the error of cinematic mimesis (the false representation of reality in the organic action-schema) is our absorption into the temporal / material – the illusion of a ‘solid continuum’. What Dorsky tries to describe, and what Deleuze has shown, is that film is greater than the sum of its parts, but only, however, when we consider the parts separately. The importance of intermittence, then, is that it inextricably links the artifact of cinema to the way we experience human existence. So, for instance, a technique as simple as the camera pan often feels artificial because we do not experience the everyday in that manner. I am sitting at my desk typing and I see each word come forth. My attention is then drawn to my coming into the room –and now back to the monitor and then quickly to the words themselves as I type. Again, like Deleuze, Dorsky says that this puts a radical emphasis on the technique of montage. Rather than filling the gaps with the illusion of continuity, we might say that a technique of intermittence, or what is often called jump-cuts, is actually more ‘true’.

700 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 38; There is a fascinating journal article in The Moving Image (v. 3, no. 1, Spring 2003) entitled “Fragmentation and Segmentation in the Lumière Animated Views”, by André Gaudreault with the assistance of Jean-Marc Lamotte, which reports on the presence of this phenomenon in Lumiére and Edison films. The false continuity cut was not limited to proto cinema, however, as Deleuze points out in Cinema 1.
Edison; it can also be taken for granted in watching someone run a mile and the runner always stays in front of you. However, Deleuze anticipates the importance of aberrant movement to a beyond the movement-image in his description of the false continuity cut early on in *Cinema 1*.

The whole intervenes elsewhere and in another order, as that which prevents sets from closing in on themselves or on each other— that which testifies to an opening which is irreducible to continuities as well as to their ruptures. It appears in the dimension of a duration which changes and never ceases to change. It appears in *false continuities* [faux raccords] as an essential pole of cinema. … False continuity is neither a connection of continuity, nor a rupture or a discontinuity in the connection. False continuity is in its own right a dimension of the Open, which escapes sets and their parts. It realises the other power of the out-of-field, this elsewhere or this empty zone, this ‘white on white which is impossible to film’.  

‘Aberrant movement’, then, is an ironic term. Rather than being ‘aberrant’, it really calls into question and undermines the false picture of time subordinate to movement through indirect representation, and makes room for a direct presentation of time to surface, by promoting the validity and ‘everydayness’ of aberrant movement. “What aberrant movement reveals is time as everything, as ‘infinite opening’,” Deleuze states, “as anteriority over all normal movement defined by motivity [motricité]: **time has to be anterior to the controlled flow of every action**, there must be ‘a birth of the world that is not completely restricted to the experience of our motivity’  …if normal movement subordinates the time of which it gives us an indirect representation, aberrant movement speaks up for an anteriority of time that it presents to us directly.”

With the sensory-motor schema no longer functioning to select and coordinate  

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702 Gilles Deleuze *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 36. (emphasis mine)
perception-images and action-images, montage takes on a new function: the concern for ‘linking’ images by way of sensory motor logic –what happens in an image– is now replaced by a concern for what an image shows. A new-found insistence on the shot then opens the direct image of time to, what Deleuze calls, “that Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the one they have in space.”

And of significance in the crystalline image is how direct images of time function in the cinematic image.

Here Deleuze returns to Bergson to further characterize the time-image. Bergson describes two different kinds of ‘recognition’ in Matter and Memory. The first is an automatic or habitual recognition. This always already involved recognition is a sensory-motor recognition that functions through, and is extended by, movement (e.g. “the cow moves from one clump of grass to another, and, with my friend Peter, I move from one subject of conversation to another”).

In cinematic terms, Deleuze introduced this concept in volume 1 with the relationship between the close-up (the affection-image), the medium shot (the action-image) and the long or point-of-view shot (the perception-image). The habitual sensory-motor recognition ‘extended’ by movement links the perception-image to the action-image.

The second Bergsonian ‘recognition’ is attentive recognition. Rather than ‘extending’ recognition through movement, says Deleuze, with attentive recognition we constantly return to an object, each time emphasizing new contours and characteristics, anew. Whereas, in automatic or habitual recognition objects of recognition are constantly extended through movement –cinematically associated with the sensory motor image– the object of attentive recognition remains the same but constantly passes through different planes of time. Cinematically Deleuze associates this with pure

703 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 37.
704 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 42-43.
optical and sound images. Although initially it may seem that the pure optical image is poorer, as compared to the sensory-motor image, because it constitutes an abstract description rather than ‘the thing itself’, Deleuze says this is false. Related to the previous characterization of the cliché, Deleuze contends that the ‘objective’ sensory-motor image retains an emphasis mainly on that which interests us about the object whereas the more ‘subjective’ attentive recognition, through restraint of image, emphasizes “the inexhaustible, endlessly referring to other descriptions”.

Indeed, our attentiveness and recollection (here Deleuze introduces the term “recollection-image”) forms an ever widening and rich ‘circuit’. Bergson’s classic illustration below helps to elucidate.

Whereas O is the object of recognition, Circle A is the immediate recollection of the object. As reflection expands –here represented by circles B, C, and D– so do the ever-rich planes of the object (B’, C’, D’). One of the examples Deleuze likes to use when describing Bergson’s thesis is from Roberto Rossellini’s *Europa 51*. Martin Scorsese described *Europa 51* as a secular hagiography –*The Flowers of St. Francis* told in post-

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705 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 43.
war Europe. Ingrid Bergman plays a wealthy and materialistic socialite living a cocooned existence in post-war Rome, whose life is devastated after the death of her son. In order to regain a purpose for living she goes to the poorer parts of Rome to help those in need. Her journey takes her through the any-space-whatevers of Rome’s post-war tenements where she learns to become a ‘seer’. Absolutely alienated from her environment she no longer recognizes a ‘factory’ when standing before it: “I thought I was seeing convicts”. Becoming a ‘seer’ she (and we) now ‘see’ differently, or better, she sees for the first time.

It should be made clear at this point that the subjectivity of the recollection-image is not an attempt to describe a psychological state of mind. Deleuze wants to offer a new sense and characterization of subjectivity, distinct from that associated with the organic montage established in the movement-image. In the latter sense of subjectivity, it was the affection-image (the close-up) that bridged the gap between the ‘stimulation’ (perception-image) and the ‘response’ (action-image). The affection-image functions as the psychology of the character’s action or the action of the event – as he says, it ‘fills’ the gap (in the sensory-motor logic). “Now, on the contrary,” Deleuze goes on to explain, “the recollection-image comes to fill the gap and really does fulfill it, in such a way that it leads us back individually to perception, instead of extending this into generic movement.”

We turn then from ‘recollection’ as time in us (that needs to come out to explain), towards a characterization of ‘recollection’ as an ever deepening experience of us being in time. The question that persists in order to fully characterize the direct time image is to reconcile the status of the cinematic

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707 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 46. As noted earlier in the chapter, the recollection-image is introduced along with attentive recognition.
708 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 72.
‘present’ in relation to time and recollection. Here Deleuze draws on Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* one last time.

Marrati notes, “for Bergson, at least, just as movement cannot be made of immobilities, the past cannot be ‘made’ with the present.” The first thesis is that although the *actual image* is in the present it never passes into the past axis but always ever coexists, as a different modality, with its own past—a *virtual image*. What is the necessity of a ‘virtual image’? It undermines the subordination of time to the action-schema and an illusion of a measurable temporal *present* by revealing the present to be co-existent with the past. To elucidate this paradoxical description Deleuze utilizes a second Bergsonian thesis and diagram from *Matter and Memory* (fig. 50). If ‘point’ S in the inverted cone represents the actual present, or better, “the most extreme condensation of the past”, then sections AB, A’B’, and A”B” represent the coexistent dilation of the ‘past’ virtual–image.

![fig. 50 The ‘sheets’ of the past coexistent with the present](image)

The present passes but the past does not ‘pass’; the past always ever is preserved as a virtual image, or, as Bergson refers to it, *pure memory*. “Every moment of our life presents the two aspects,” says Deleuze, citing Bergson, “it is actual and virtual,

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709 Paola Marrati, ibid., 74.
perception on the one side and recollection on the other”.710 We have a crystal-image, then, when there ceases to be a chronological distinction between the ‘present’ actual-image and its own temporally ‘past’ virtual-images. “What constitutes the crystal-image is the most fundamental operation of time […]. Time has to split at the same time as it sets itself out or unrolls itself: it splits in two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the present pass on, while the other preserves all the past. Time consists of this split and it is this, it is time, that we see in the crystal.”711 This non-chronological coexistence in time and its crystallization is the ontological structure of the direct time image. And now that time is disclosed in a ‘direct image’, the technique of montage—which previously sought and still sometimes seeks to show time through the action-schema—completes the changes begun during the crisis of the action-image. Dispensing with the crucial link between the affection-image and the action-image, the emphasis in the direct time-image is on a new characterization of subjectivity—durations revealed as ontological rather than psychological. With its closest artistic kinship to be found in the literature of Marcel Proust, the direct time-image reveals that “the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round.”712

710 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 77.
711 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 78-79.
712 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 78-79.
FILMMAKERS OF THE TIME-IMAGE

“You see Thompson, it isn’t enough to tell us what a man did. You have to tell us who he was.”

*Citizen Kane* directed by Orson Welles (1941)

We can then classify filmmakers of time as being particularly emblematic of this characterization of cinema –Ozu, Welles, Godard, Resnais, Tarkovsky; I might also include contemporary directors such as Alexander Sokurov, Béla Tarr and Terrence Malick. For Deleuze, Orson Welles’s *Citizen Kane* is the first great film of a cinema of time. *Citizen Kane* is a journey through the sheets of time, not to discover what a man did, but who he was. “Here time became out of joint and reversed its dependent relation to movement; temporality showed itself as it really was for the first time, but in the form of a coexistence of large regions to be explored.”713 The film opens (figs. 51-59) with all the paradoxical characteristics of non-chronological time –the crystalline structure of event and memory. These are, as Deleuze describes them: “the pre-existence of a past in general; the coexistence of all the sheets of past; and the existence of a most contracted degree.”714 Snow fills the environment (milieu) of a dying man’s death chamber and slowly fills the frame, only to reveal a small cabin in a new environment. Soon, the snow and the small cabin will be our entrance into the first flashback into Kane’s childhood. The snow, then, ‘signifies’ the thoughts and memories of a dying man about his childhood. Just as quickly the second environment is contained within a small globe in the man’s hand. He whispers the word, “Rosebud”. “The signifiers of memory or virtuality (snow, the ornament) crystallize around the moment of Kane’s death and last word –“Rosebud”. But at the same time, the actual dissolves into the virtual. The moment this word is spoken it becomes opaque and

714 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 96.
mysterious; its meaning disappears among the layers of memory superimposed in the image.”

The globe falls and breaks. Two shots—one of the broken snow globe—break the \textit{crystal} and return us to the ‘objective’ or ‘actual’.

After Kane’s death we travel through the sheets of time in Kane’s life through a newsreel only to re-emerge in a small movie theater filled with reporters. The editor wants more. “You see Thompson,” says the editor, “it isn’t enough to tell us what a man did. You have to tell us who he was.” This of course is the manifesto of \textit{Cinema 1} and \textit{Cinema 2} in a nutshell—the move away from the action-schema to the ontology of the time-image. The film’s structure, of discontinuous leaps through time, is captured at the end of the film as Kane’s life unravels after his second wife has left him. He walks past two great mirrors in a hallway revealing the many sheets of time we have explored.

\footnote{D. N. Rodowick, \textit{Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine}, 93.}
in his life (fig. 60). We might imagine Bergson’s ‘cone’ superimposed over the time-image; it is the last time we see Charles Foster Kane in the film.

Finally, then, it was Welles’s development and use of depth-of-field – and its ‘cone-like’ use of the lens – that stands apart for Deleuze. Although there has been the use of ‘depth’ in cinema since it’s earliest days’ it was artificially produced by compositing two separate images, but was generally not the norm of the studio system of the 1930’s and ’40’s, when Kane was made. Welles, and cinematographer Greg Toland, developed cameras, lenses, and lighting techniques to increase depth-of-field in ways more akin to how the human eye works, allowing multiple regions or planes to interact. Deleuze, however, wants to be clear that Welles’s use of depth of field was more than simply an aesthetic decision, tool or technique. Rather than depth-of-‘space’, Welles – argues Deleuze citing Bergson and French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty – emphasizes depth-of-duration. So, for instance, when Kane goes to see Jed Leland – his former partner with whom he started his newspaper – to finally fire him, Deleuze say that his walk to the office is the break with Leland. Kane delves into the past, one last time, to rid himself of his former partner (and his conscience). Deleuze
says, “The hero acts, walks and moves; but it is the past that he plunges himself into and moves in: time is no longer subordinated to movement, but movement to time […]. This is the function of depth of field: to explore each time a region of past, a continuum.”

This is not to say however that depth-of-field is the only way to show a direct time-image, or that the direct time-image is the only use of depth-of-field, Deleuze later re-affirms. But what Welles did accomplish is the use of depth-of-field as a tool to explore memory by passing through multiple ‘sheets of the past’.

In the opening pages of Cinema 1 Deleuze says “the great directors of the cinema may be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects and musicians, but also with thinkers. They think with movement-images and time-images instead of concepts.”

To conclude Cinema 2 Deleuze articulates this picture further; the great cinema authors become “philosophers or theoreticians” –albeit in new ways– in the practice of their craft. As is now apparent, the great directors do not merely ‘think’ in movement and time-images but they also explain, discover, express

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716 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 103.
717 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, xix.
718 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 269.
and show with their ‘tools’ through the body. There is nothing–no referential ‘sign’ or ‘metaphysical reality’–‘behind’ the cinematic image. Meaning is in the activities and lifeworld of cinema. Citing Bergson, Paola Marrati speaks of “the problem with a philosophical and theoretical attitude to generalization [of cinema] that misses the specificity of its objects of inquiry. … What must be grasped are cinema’s own characteristics.”

We are implored to ask, then, as Fergus Kerr does in Theology after Wittgenstein: why is what we say and do not ‘significant’ enough … “why do we retreat from our world; why do we withdraw from the body in the hope that more direct illumination about our minds and about the gods is to be found by gaining access to something other than what we say and do?”

By undoing space and freeing characters to “stroll” and “voyage” through the cinematic lifeworlds we see the scene of Ingold’s wayfinder or de Certeau’s touring tactician in the crisis of the action image. The time-image has no “surface” to be colonized. In the crystalline structure of the time-image we see, and experience, the complexity of embodied corporeality with trajectories, like Ingold’s lines, that dissolve surfaces and run through space. All of this is accomplished despite some potentialities and tendencies, but because of others, in the nature of cinematic technology and its explicit artifice. The chapter now turns to a contemporary practitioner of the cinematic craft –Terrence Malick– whose insistence on an exploration of the mysteries and poetry of changing, moving, and living bodies in the world will help bring this chapter and this investigation to a conclusion.

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719 Paola Marrati, Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, 49.
TERRENCE MALICK’S *THE NEW WORLD AS PHILOLOGICAL CINEMA*

“Your film will have the beauty, or the sadness, or what have you, that one finds in a town, in a countryside, in a house, *and not* the beauty, sadness, etc. that one finds in the photograph of a town, a countryside, or a house.”

ROBERT BRESSON

We now return to where this chapter began, with the possibilities and failures of a cinematic adaptation of J.R.R. Tolkien’s *The Lord of the Rings*. The exploration of a new characterization of cinema, and cinematic practice, in this chapter, was intended to enable us to assess the greater possibilities of ‘seeing’ and ‘living’ the mythopoeic concerns of Tolkien’s saga, in a way which Peter Jackson’s films largely failed to do. In short, Jackson’s films failed to return the ethics of philological resistance (implicit in Tolkien’s work and explicit in his letters) back to our bodies; what, then, would it look like for that to happen? This new characterization of cinema takes up the philological and phenomenological concerns outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. Cinema, however, takes up these concerns in a new way – rather than being dependent on words, cinema shows. Rather than simply illustrating, cinema *draws us in* to experience and participate in its lifeworld subjectively. Through the cinematic frame we delve into life: the world is there, people are there and relationships are there in a way unimaginable before the advent of the movement-image. In short, through cinema we are caught up in a lifeworld.

The concern from the beginning, however, has been the possibilities of human imagining and human forms of life in a technological age, and what unique problems and concerns arise from such an age. And in many ways, with cinema, the enemy is already in the gates. As has been noted, cinema is a tool that has been used to *colonize*

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in both the most banal manners (e.g. Disneyfication and the Hollywood image machine) and the most horrendous ways (totalitarian propaganda and the “aestheticisation of politics” \(^{722}\)) possible. In its specific and broad ethical implications, this is a concern of which Jean Baudrillard was well aware. And yet, I have endeavoured to show that a more sophisticated apparatus of diagnosis, critique, and response was needed – and this also applies to cinema. We might say, then, that through an over reliance on the ‘illustration’ and visual ‘representation’ of Tolkien’s written word and his story, through basic and clichéd uses of the action-schema, for the express purposes of producing an easily consumed and digestible ‘story’ and entertainment spectacle in order to maximize financial gain, Peter Jackson’s _LOTR_ films fail to deepen our experience of the everyday and to enable us to enter into Tolkien’s mythopoeic landscape in a way that restores a deeper sense of ourselves in the world as corporeal creatures. Not only do they fail in this regard, but they also contribute to the problem of belief in the 21\(^{st}\)-century West, as already suggested by Deleuze, and serve as a tool of colonization (through appeals to sentimentality and nostalgia) despite their best intentions. \(^{723}\)

To conclude this chapter, I propose that American director Terrence Malick’s _The New World_ (2005) is a film that accomplishes what Peter Jackson could only have hoped to do. Malick’s _The New World_ is a film that not only “restores belief” – returning discourse to things, people, and life in-the-world, “before or beyond words” – in a way we would recognize from Deleuze’s assessment and characterization of cinematic craft and technique, but it also broadens and deepens our experience of the

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\(^{723}\) The road to hell is paved with good intentions.
everyday through a cinematic technique that honors the philological and mythopoeic concerns described in Chapters 3 and 4.\footnote{Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 166-167.} Like Italian director Roberto Rossellini, Malick’s films reject a sorrowful and infantile art that revels in the loss of world, and seek to craft with “a morality which would restore a belief capable of perpetuating life”.\footnote{Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 166.} As with J. R. R. Tolkien, Malick is a scholarly figure who has chosen to express his erudition through artistic craft. He studied philosophy with Stanley Cavell at Harvard before going to Magdalen College in 1965 as an Oxford Rhodes scholar. Although he left before completion, Malick worked with Gilbert Ryle on *the concept of world* in Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Kierkegaard—a topic that sits well with the methodological approach of this thesis.\footnote{In the introduction to his scholarly translation of Heidegger’s *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, Malick acknowledges the similarity between Heidegger’s conception of ‘world’ and Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’. While I have briefly addressed this connection in Chapter 3, and have adopted their approach in my investigation of Tolkien’s mythopoeia, one can only speculate how Kierkegaard’s philosophy would have played into Malick’s investigation. Indeed, we are offered a glimpse when Deleuze cites the existential theology of Kierkegaard in *Cinema 2*. Deleuze briefly cites the theology and philosophy of Kierkegaard and Pascal as a model of ‘corporeal’ faith (belief) that restores humanity and the world back to us, which is consistent with Deleuze’s cinema of body and world. (n.301) This, of course, is built on the reasonable assumption that Malick did not jettison his philosophical questioning and concerns when he left Oxford. Indeed his meeting with Heidegger, translation of Heidegger’s paper, and notation of the similarities between Heidegger and Wittgenstein, all occurred after leaving Oxford and were concurrent with his entrance into the American Film Institute in 1969. This move is a rejection of philosopher Robert Sinnerbrink’s weak assertion that 1) “we should be wary of reading [*The Thin Red Line*] solely through the lens of Malick’s biography” and 2) “the fact that Malick was a teacher of philosophy and translator of Heidegger shouldn’t automatically prompt us to assume that he makes ‘Heideggarian’ films”. Both points seem to fly in the face of a phenomenological picture of a person’s *thrownness*, and existence as *In-der-Welt-Sein* and *Mitsein*—all of which is well shown in Malick’s films.}
in a technological era, with Malick we complete the move away from semiological models of representation and correlation, towards lived forms of life that the craft of cinema explores in its own ways. Malick, moreover, also engages with the ethical considerations raised thus far—the colonization of human forms of life through the illusory ordering of daily life which ignores the complexity of human corporeality—and manages to craft an intensely ethical cinema without being reductionistic, simplistic or moralistic. In Malick’s hands the craft of cinema becomes a reflexive and ‘philological’ tool; through the techniques of ‘modern cinema’ he reawakens the question of human existence, shows us communities in depth by investigating and showing the depth and breadth of the human lifeworld.

On the surface, *The New World* (2005) is a retelling of the American foundational myth and the stories of Captain John Smith, Pocahontas (the daughter of the native King Wahunsenacawh of the Powhatan Confederacy), tobacco farmer John Rolfe and the founding of the Jamestown colony (1607) —but, far more significantly, Malick’s *The New World* is also a triumphant example of cinema as myth and myth as cinema. Thematically similar to *The Lord of the Rings* (and fitting the characterizations made in chapters 4 and 5 of Tolkien and his work), *The New World* is a historical meditation on the complex interconnectedness of people, place, and living; how that balance is transformed by colonization using power and technology; and the possibilities of new life and reawakening. More broadly, many of the issues raised and lines-of-(in)sight developed in Chapters 1 and 3 are also present in Malick’s *The New World*. 
So for example, as evident in these frame stills from *The New World*, we see (fig. 62) *dwellers* and *wayfinders* who move *along* versus the English ships of Christopher Newport (in the distance) which literally move *across*; we see (fig. 63) the flag of colonizing conquest (whose very shape is that of an imposed order) set above the organic new world landscape; (fig. 64) the axe of domination clearing the landscape; and finally, (fig. 65) the fortress upon the razed landscape that artificially re-orders and excludes the lifeworld of the *dweller*. However, far from offering a theoretical exposition of what his films are about, or making an attempt to give an biographical explanation of Malick’s concerns through an overly simplistic journalistic analysis, it is his *technique* –and what his technique shows and reveals– that ‘speaks’ legion, and will be the focus here on out.

Because Malick’s films resist psychological, cognitive and narrative reduction, favoring a delving into and revealing the kind of personal and life details that Heidegger includes with Befindlichkeit, Stimmung and Verstehen, and, as Deleuze points out, favor direct images of time over an action-schema, we can characterize his films as ‘modern’ in the Deleuzian sense. The observations of Carina Chocano’s December 23rd *Los Angeles Times* film review confirm this Deleuzian preoccupation:
The New World “doesn’t resist interpretation so much as it wanders away from it in an incandescent brume of wonder, dread and awe [. . .]. What we get is not an ‘objective’ or dispassionate view of the world but rather a series of subjective, experiential perspectives. He neither strives for verisimilitude nor spectacle but for an alchemic blend of both”.\footnote{Chocano, Carina, The New World movie review December 23, 2005 http://www.calendarlive.com/movies/chocano/cl-et-world23dec23,0,3965530.} Of course, Chocano’s insight isn’t entirely accurate because the very concept of ‘interpretation’ is under question and actively undermined. It doesn’t quite ‘wander away’ from interpretation as so much as go for something else altogether. Remaining true to this kind of insight, however, attention must be paid to the opposing poles of the frame and montage in Malick’s film craft in order to reveal a cinema that both ‘restores’ and ‘de-colonizes’. It is the possibility of both restoration and decolonization, then, that we want to see emerge clearly in what follows.

**FRAME**

The teeming swarm of life felt in Malick’s cinema begins with the crafting of the frame – the basic organizing principle in cinema. Far from embalming time, Malick simultaneously fills the frame with the energies of life, and works to expand its boundaries. In The New World, Malick’s crafting of the frame begins, however, with both light, and depth-of-field. The crafting of a particular shot or a scene, as a whole, is dependent on camera movement, lens selection, film stock and how a scene is lit. Malick’s most recent collaborator Emmanuel Lubezki, director of photography (DP) for The New World (2005), and upcoming The Tree of Life (2010), lends further insight into their cinematographic methodology. “We, in the camera department, would think of ourselves as the 5 o’clock news team,” he says, “capturing reality in front of us. It
would just happen to be the reality of a different century.”  

One should not mistake, however, what Lubezski suggests as ‘5 o’clock news team’ for a style and technique of ‘critical distance’ or even ‘objectivity’. Rather, it is the techniques of the nature documentaries of David Attenborough or the war correspondence of Fergal Keane—a ready and fluid camera that allows us to enter into a space and capture the unexpected energy of light and life rather than the pre-ordered set up of classical cinema—that are more relevant to what Lubezski suggests.

Initially, Malick and Lubezski were to embark on a biopic about the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto ‘El Che’ Guevara, which was to be filmed in Bolivia following a very specific ‘dogma’ established by the collaborators. In many ways a continuation and culmination of Malick’s approach to cinematography, the two decided on a subjective approach—personal in the sense of Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Deleuze (in the body, in presentation, in life) rather than biased, ‘internal’ and Cartesian—that would, amongst other things, shed the use of cranes, rigs and artificial lights (for the most part) relying only on natural daylight; and shed much that can be anticipated in a more controlled setting. This stripped-down documentary approach also relies on the freedom to shoot all 360 degrees at a moment’s notice, and move from location to location as the light dictates.

Although the Che movie was scrapped, the naturalist

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729 The term ‘dogma’ is the shorthand term used by Malick to refer to what amounts to a complex philosophically informed approach, and a methodology involving hand held cameras, natural light, back lit characters and subjects, and a deep field of focus and movement.

730 Although Lubezki’s comments are specifically referring to The New World, they are very much valid for his second collaboration with Malick where the same cinematographic ‘dogma’ was applied. On the main set of The Tree of Life—which was a very different kind of production from much of The New World, situated in the ordered space of an actual neighborhood in rural Texas—equipment, vehicles and crew were constantly camouflaged, obstructed or in motion to allow the camera (handheld or ‘steadicam’) the 360-degree freedom to capture the topography of the meetings, encounters and relationships in the fullness of its depth and texture. Scenes were scheduled according to the position of the sun and production shifted from location to location as
'dogma' was immediately applied to Malick’s *The New World*. This attention to light, and the opening up of the contingent and spontaneous elements in the world, is described by Lubezski with greater clarity and detail:

[Terry] is always looking for those moments that are unplanned – those happy accidents that breathe reality into a story. *For him, the behavior of the people, nature, even where the wind blows are all moments to capture.* These are ‘happy accidents’ that can’t happen on the stage because you are always restricted to walls or props. And, to artificial light [sic.].

Artificial light is simple. It is a specific color temperature and feel. But, *natural light is complex and sometimes chaotic.* A bounce from the floor or a reflection from the sky can do so much.

Terry’s desire to free the actor also freed us from the artificial. The many elements and feelings that the natural environment and light evoked contributed to our desire to capture this story in a different way. When you stop using artificial light, it’s hard to say let’s just ‘turn something on’ and match the feeling.\footnote{731}

What becomes obvious, then, is not just the concern with artificial light but the *artificialities* of the classical form.\footnote{732} Malick desires to free the energies of life – from the simple, predictable and ordered techniques of classical cinema – and reveal the spontaneous elements and moments of the real through the ‘chaos’ of natural light and the natural world, and the freedom of the camera to record the spontaneity of everyday light changed throughout the day. Exterior shots were done in the early morning and late afternoon light while interior shots were saved for the noon hours while the sun was overhead.\footnote{731} Pauline Rogers, *ibid.,* \footnote{732} This move away from artificialities also extends to the work of the art department and longtime collaborator Jack Fisk. Having worked with Malick since his first film *Badlands*, Fisk is the person most responsible for the physical space within Malick’s films. Fisk builds ‘reality’ for the camera frame. In the construction of the Jamestown fort and the Natural’s village, for instance, Fisk used all local materials that would have been used in the original construction – the wood, the clay, etc. – and built according to archived drawings and descriptions in order to overcome artificialities of classic set design.
reality. The favoring of this ‘complex’ and ‘chaotic’ energy over simple schematic and representational substitutes is reminiscent of Fergus Kerr’s characterization of Wittgenstein’s ‘forms of life’ in Philosophical Investigations. Kerr relevantly says, “The prejudice of a crystal-clear analysis of reality [cf. PI 108] has given way to seeing life as an immensely intricate carpet, and, if that is still too static an image, as a teeming swarm . . . the swarming carpet of human activity, cannot be captured in any representation.” Q’Orianka Kilcher, who plays Pocahontas in The New World, recalls Malick as a “very spur-of-the-moment kind of director”. “He would see a tall funnel field”, she continues, “or a tall grass from somewhere over there and he’d be like, ‘Oh, oh, Q’Orianka, can you take your shoes off and just run through the field? Be the wind! Be the wind! Good, good.’” In this way, then, even ‘objective narrative’ is seen as artificial in the course of film production. A moment such as the one described by Q’Orianka Kilcher may not be ‘scripted’, per se, but is a moment where the ‘poetry presents itself’ to fill the frame with an energy and meaningfulness which would otherwise be lost to a more ordered and literally dogmatic approach. In another instance during the production of Malick’s 1998 return to cinema, The Thin Red Line, actor Nick Nolte recalls a pivotal scene with fellow actor John Cusack:

I shot a scene with John Cusack maybe 10 times . . . I said, “Terry, I think we have it.” He said, “Wait, didn’t you tell me

733 To put this in historical perspective, when Malick was filming Days of Heaven with the great French New Wave cinematographer Nestor Almendros in 1970 he ran into a considerable amount of resistance and derision from his union film crew who came out of the practices of the classical Hollywood cinema machine. Days of Heaven was also shot, for the most part, in natural light and was one of the first films to make extensive use of the handheld panaglide system. Almendros, who made films with François Truffaut and Eric Rhomer recalls in his autobiography that the technique he and Malick used was to ensure that the frame remained “as close to reality as possible”. (Almendros 20) These techniques were consistent with ‘modern cinema’ and the Italian neorealist, and various new wave, desires to escape the inauthenticity of the studio system.

734 Fergus Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, 65.

you once did 75 takes for James L. Brooks?” We ended up shooting that scene with me and John for the rest of the day. It went from scripted-dialogue scene to me making up dialogue to total silence to John making up dialogue to Terry shouting dialogue at us during pauses.736

Far from a day of wasted takes, as someone used to the ordered structure of classical cinema might think, this is a day of capturing a wide spectrum of ‘moods’, attunements and energies of particular life settings in the world. Every take and frame can then be sifted during the editing process to construct the scene. The depths of life and time are far more complex than the ‘classical’ narrative form of cinematic craft can capture.

As Deleuze points out, like many directors of the time-image Malick also makes extensive use of a deep-field of focus. The combination of natural light and depth-of-field allows us to see what the eye sees in the hopes of removing attention away from the explicit artificiality of the medium and draw us further into the frame. And resisting its ‘pictorialness’, Malick largely confines the movement in the frame away from the camera or towards the camera on a kind of z-axis plane. As though the cone of the crystal image was turned horizontally, this z-axis plane of the camera makes possible direct images of time within the frame. For example, when the English ships arrive the camera steadicams with the naturals (fig. 66-68) as they rush from their village to the shore, to glimpse the uncanny arrival.

However, as Deleuze says of Welles’s depth-of-field movement, Malick’s z-axis movements “carry out a temporalization of the image or form a direct time-image … where people and things occupy a place in time which is incommensurable with the one they have in space.”737 We are not simply traveling through space but traveling through time. We travel out of a primeval forest with its archaic inhabitants—who dwell

736 People Magazine January 18, 1999
737 Gilles Deleuze, ibid., 37.
with corporeal imaginations— from an undefined past into the ‘future’ and the arrival of the technologically advanced Europeans.
The Naturals run like deer through the forest—their movements teeming with life and nobility. Although some critics have disregarded Malick’s portrayal of the Naturals as being overly stylized, he expands the possibilities of cinema by having them literally tell their story through their bodies in a way which Deleuze and Tolkien might recognize. Choreographer Raoul Trujillo (himself a Native American) reflects on Malick’s approach to the movement of the Naturals:

The most important thing that came out of this is how important it is to bring the body language of the Indian people into this, to speak the language of memory and just remembering that we can tell the story our own way through our bodies . . . What Terry wants to see more than anything else,” says Trujillo, “is that . . . what separates you guys from the English is that you people are in complete harmony with the earth and the universe and everything that exists.”

This, then, has been one of the major themes of the dissertation from the beginning: Malick imagines and retrieves the life-form of a people in harmony with their landscape through 21st-century corporeality. Because bodies matter to Malick, before discourse and before language, his cinema is able to be a practice of decolonization. Extending the possibilities of cinema, it restores back to us the dignity and wholeness of dwelling, wayfaring and imagining discussed in earlier chapters, thus leading onto the possibility of decolonization.

739 And chosen because he is a Native American.
The other pole of Malick’s craft of ‘modern cinema’, then, is montage. Chris Wisniewski offers some insight into Malick’s editing craft in an article entitled “A Stitch in Time”. Both reaffirming and missing what Deleuze has said about montage in ‘modern cinema’, Wisniewski notes, “the relationship of each scene and shot to the narrative is frequently indeterminate; images, moments, and sequences don’t so much build as accumulate. … Sound and image conspire to upend our sense of time and story in The New World”. In these failures to understand and the points they miss, Wisniewski’s comments are obversely revealing. Rather than building what we would classically understand as a cinematic narrative through the organic structure of the SAS’, on the one hand, Malick’s frames and scenes are far deeper and richer than simply the ‘accumulation’ of images and the telling of a story; on the other, they reveal, relate, show and express the complexity of both world and the experience of world through the body … or in this case the experience of a new world. Wisniewski points out one particular sequence in The New World, which I will appropriate to illustrate Malick’s montage. After John Smith’s return from ‘captivity’ to the Jamestown colony, and after suffering a long winter of want, and separation from the ‘Princess’, Smith makes a bartering expedition back into the deep forest (fig. 70). The seasons change in but an instant. His return to the Edenic topography is heralded by the one shot transition from a windswept snowdrift over an icy pond to a peaceful dogwood in bloom (fig. 69), which begins the sequence. We hear birds singing, the sounds of the oars in the water, and finally the un-translated voice of a shaman pre-lapped over Smith landing on shore. These should be recognized, from our earlier discussion of the crisis of the action-image, as pure optical and sound images. Malick uses the frame to open up aspects and

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prospects of understanding; and to make connections far deeper than narrative exposition, or a frame in service of the action schema, could ever allow.

Initially the scene has a conventional mix of close-ups and over-the-shoulder return shots which is to set up Smith’s emotional conflict (figs. 71, 72). As Deleuze points out in Cinema I, in classical cinema the close-up (affection-image) is a basic tool of editing that allows the viewers to situate themselves within the lived and expressed psychology of a character during a scene; and it bridges perception of the milieu to action which changes the milieu. The underlying structure has been described as the SAS’ and ASA’ formula of the action-schema. The close-up also sets up the “eyeline match” cut which –especially during a conversation between two characters– allows us to see a character psychologically grow (or resist growth) throughout the duration of the scene. Edward Dmytryk says in his classic text on Hollywood editing, On Film: Editing, “good drama is . . . always cause and effect, action and reaction, even when no physical activity is involved [. . .]. [I]n all good films it is essential that the characters grow . . . through their reactions either to physical crises or to verbal stimuli. These are the ‘moments of transition’ . . . [and] such moments contain two elements . . . ‘delivery’ and the ‘reaction’.”

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742 Edward Dmytryk, On Film Editing: An Introduction to the Art of Film Construction (Boston: Focal Press, 1984), 47.
With Malick it is very different. He resists this formula and эффracts the classical form—expanding the depths and possibilities of the scene—with a brief insert of Pocahontas in the past (fig. 73), in a deep field of vision, and then a close-up of John Smith (fig. 74) as the shaman’s voice continues to pre-lap and post-lap the shots in an untranslated language we do not understand. Is this a memory?

Yet again Pocahontas breaks into the scene (fig. 75) and then we return to John Smith—who this time is close to tears (fig. 76).

We return one last time to Pocahontas and John Smith—the voice of the Shaman gone, and the characters are finally in a two-shot to signal their proximity—where the
sequence now stays. Malick uses these separate events, and their ability to be simultaneously present to Smith (recall Deleuze’s circuit of ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’), in order to expand his relatings—between Pocahontas and Smith, between her ‘world’ and ‘Smith’s world’—and to give depth to Smith’s own life and situation.

For a moment it seems as though the two may kiss (fig. 78) and just as suddenly that moment is revealed to be just as evanescent as the previous. Malick quickly jump-cuts to Pocahontas walking towards John Smith (fig. 79)—moving not simply through space but time.

The sequence continues on, for several more shots, but now with a sound bridge provided by John Smith’s voice-over. Everything comes to an end as we abruptly cut to
Smith again—presumably during the initial bartering scene although there is no indication—his face is now hot with tears (fig. 80). The sequence finally concludes with Smith’s boat returning to Jamestown fort; only the back of Pocahontas is visible in the foreground (fig. 81).

Once again Wisniewski is provocative yet misses the mark, when he says, “it becomes evident by the end of the sequence that Malick is actually cutting between two separate events, allowing them to flow into one another without establishing how they relate to one another in the chronology of the narrative . . . sound and image conspire to upend our sense of time and story”. Yet, while separate in the simplistic sense of narrative, they are far from separate in life and experience—they are joined in Smith. Time is the only subjectivity afforded us. The affection-image yields no insight into a simplistic schematic cognitive realm, nor the illusory access to the causes and resolutions of the picture; we only encounter the tender complexity of relational bodies in time. By expanding the possibilities of cinema Malick helps us make connections we might otherwise miss, blow over, or force into ‘standard’ patterns of ‘world shaping’ by imposing a kind of narrative order.

745 Chris Wisniewski, ibid.,
CONCLUSION

The New World begins with the sky and earth meeting over the surface of the waters. Out of the rich sounds of the forest there is an invocation: “Come Spirit. Help us sing the story of our land. You are our Mother. We a field of corn. We rise from out of the soul of you.” Like Tolkien’s description of the theological and religious in his own work, Lloyd Michaels recognizes the “natural religion” embodied in Pocahontas and her journey. The possibilities of this natural religion are glimpsed fleetingly in Malick’s Days of Heaven; and its uncertainty in an age of the machine is explored in The Thin Red Line. However, in a way reminiscent of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, the mytho-historical nature of The New World affords Malick the opportunity to explore the rich depths and truth of this natural religion, and to explore and apprehend how its truth lays claim on our everyday lives.

Unlike Jackson’s betrayal of Tolkien’s vision, Malick is not dependent on narrative and the psychological artifice of the action-schema for his own exploration; rather, Malick explores lifeworlds—bodies (embodied people with life-ways) in time. Indeed, drawing on a point Deleuze makes in Cinema 1, D. N. Rodowick makes a fascinating comparison that is helpful here. While the indirect image of time, which subordinates time to the variable present, is similar to the Newtonian modernist conception of time, the open duration in the direct time-image is akin to exploring the Western theological conception of time. This insistence on exploring the infinite (and) depth of worlds rather than pictures, or representations, is echoed in the notebooks of French filmmaker Robert Bresson whose cinematic explorations were also motivated theologically. “Your film will have the beauty, or the sadness, or what

744 Lloyd Michaels, Terrence Malick (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 91.
745 D. N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, 52, 53.
have you, that one finds in a town, in a countryside, in a house, and not the beauty, sadness, et. [sic] that one finds in the photograph of a town, a countryside, or a house."  

What we have then is a brief picture of Terrence Malick as a craftsman painfully aware of the inadequacies of, and negative relationships between, cinematic illustration, representation and human forms of life; but creatively aware of hitherto largely untapped possibilities in the craft, and of how they can be used. He actively works against certain classical theories and practices of the craft, and, in some ways, against the very nature of the craft as an entertainment commodity and industry, to open the depths of the scene of human living through the complexity of his new conception of the craft. In Malick’s cinema we see both an inherent understanding of the human situation, which fits well with what has been described in the work of Mumford, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Ingold, de Certeau, Tolkien and Deleuze, and the quest to ‘uncover the real’, ‘restore’ and ‘de-colonize’ through ‘poetic’ craft. Malick’s cinema is ‘poetry’ crafted by a ‘poet’ working in destitute times; but though we may use the word ‘poetry’ for this, let us not lose sight of the fact that Malick is working with a different craft and in a different medium; and with these, Malick’s cinema becomes a project of radical de-colonization of the human imagination (encompassing and exploring the possibilities of human living) from the ordering so prevalent in the 20th- and 21st-century media-consumed West. Fully aware of the inherent problems of the craft of cinema, Malick’s craft does not reduce the imaginative possibilities of cinema to simple and commodifiable image-pictures, narratives, or schematics of human causation. Malick’s films are not films about subjects but are the subjects; his films are not containers for some message but are constructed as lived and personal.

746 Robert Bresson, Notes on the Cinematographer, 70. (emphasis mine)
projections of the realities and possibilities of human living –“a visual investigation of the human situation, of our living in the world”.747 Stanley Cavell reflects on all of this eloquently, “I think one feels that one has never quite seen the scene of human existence –call it the arena between earth (or days) and heaven– quite realized this way on film before.”748 This livable encounter is fundamental to the de-colonization of the human imagination and human forms of life, and is a first step towards that de-colonization.

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CONCLUSION:
CATHEDRAL BUILDING,
THE CRAFTSMAN,
AND PRAXEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE

The great Swedish director Ingmar Bergman (1918-2007) once lamented how art had lost its “basic creative drive” when it became separated from worship. “It severed an umbilical cord”, says Bergman, “and now lives its own sterile life, generating and degenerating itself.”

Rather than the modern cult of the singular ‘virtuoso’ and the “ruthlessly efficient sausage machine” of the film industry cults, Bergman wanted the aim of his films to be associated with something more like the building of a cathedral, and to imagine himself working as an anonymous artist – simply playing his part– crafting nothing more than a “a dragons’ head, an angel, a devil – or perhaps a saint– out of stone”.

When lightning struck the great cathedral of Chartres and burnt it to the ground, recalls, Bergman, “master builders, artists, laborers, clowns,

750 Ingmar Bergman, ibid., 22. Bergman’s allusion to the Cathedral is apropos to the phenomenological concerns of this work as well. We should note Heidegger’s reading of the Greek Temple in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Echoing what has already been discussed about ‘world’ in Being and Time, Heidegger reveals how both the “work-being” of the temple life-world and the actual work of building the temple (including the materials and tools used in that work) “opens up a world”. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Perennial, 1975), 44, 41-48.
noblemen, priests, burghers” came from all over France to help rebuild the cathedral on its Romanesque foundation.\(^\text{751}\) Otto von Simson’s account of Gothic architecture and the aesthetic concerns of the Medieval lifeworld adds insight and complexity to Bergman’s rumination. The anonymity of the builders of Chartres reflects the desire of the Medieval lifeworld to create a meaningful space that would reflect a theological reality. “After all,” writes von Simson, “the ‘analogical’ interpretation to which the church might lend itself was a function of the edifice as legitimate and nearly as important as the liturgical one. The beauty of the basilica was experienced in terms of such analogical significance. Man’s thinking and experience are never divided into airtight compartments. Just as our own art and taste are related to our view of the world, so the design of the medieval cathedral builder and its impressions upon contemporaries were colored, and indeed inspired, by the metaphysical vision that dominated medieval life.”\(^\text{752}\) The cathedral grows out of, and in turn forms and feeds into, the lives of the forgotten people who built it and their contemporaries. These ‘anonymous’ craftsmen made nothing short of a ‘symbol’ of heaven, and a high water mark for human artistry, which reflected back on Western civilization for the next 500 years.

Whilst the ‘gothic’ expressions of architecture came to an end, and other expressions took their place, in Bergman’s desire, and von Simson’s account, we glimpse a fragment of the creative ‘energy’ Henry Adams feared would eventually be lost to the cult of the ‘dynamo’ after the World’s Fair of 1900. Of course, Bergman will never be remembered simply as an anonymous artist, but rather, as one of the great ‘cathedral builders’ of the Western world. However, what Bergman’s wistful hope for a

\(^{751}\) Ingmar Bergman, ibid., 21-22.
meaningful cinematic craftsmanship and von Simson’s insight does accomplish in light of Adams’ concern is to put the trajectory of this dissertation into (a theological) perspective: making is an existentially primordial activity that opens up, or imposes upon, lifeworlds and meaningful forms of life.

As Henry Adams suspected, and as has been the contention of this dissertation, we live in the light of what we make. In Chapter 4 this existentially involved and cyclic structure, between human artistry and lifeworld building, is described as the double-transfer. Simply put, we can put life in its everydayness into our work; but conversely, the work crafted now has the ‘power’ to transfer back to the everyday-lifeworld of the craftsman and his or her fellow people. Lewis Mumford shows us that even the way we build cities and arrange societies falls under the double-transfer (Baudrillard shows this too, but, as is now clear, in more extreme ways). Mumford came to realize after World War Two our ever-growing servitude to ‘the Machine’ and the ‘mechanization’ of the Western lifeworld. Mumford’s life-work was focused on revealing how that servitude was reflected in the way we build the world around: the way we lay out roads, build buildings, and order those spaces for people, all fall under the scope of the double-transfer. Mumford, however, reveals this modern use of the double-transfer to be nothing more than a procrustean bed bent on truncating life rather than allowing it to flourish.

There is, then, the ethical and theological element to be considered: living in the world we both encounter, and foster, expressions of both the good and counterfeit (and variously ‘evil’) forms of life. These powers, on the one hand, have made possible bad, evil, ersatz, anesthetic life ways, and on the other, good, flourishing, sub-creative, and kind. There has been no space in this thesis to discuss these values (good and bad) in a more detached, analytic, and critical way, but they have been constantly been calling
out, albeit tactically. They appear in the weave of the narrative and the surrounding shrubbery along the trace. Always spoken from the margins, this tactical theological concern has been addressed through the active resistance found in the work of Lewis Mumford, Jean Baudrillard, Tim Ingold, J. R. R. Tolkien and Terrence Malick to ‘recover’ us from less meaningful (and often sub-human) forms of life, which constantly threaten our lives and life-ways in minor and major ways. In wayfinding with these people we have seen how the power of the double-transfer, especially in mythopoeic literature and cinema, opens up (or constricts) life space.

The task of this dissertation has been to make an intelligible clearing for “active resistance” in light of the ethical and theological concerns described thus far. It is worth noting how J. R. R. Tolkien’s mythopoeic project is dependent on the tactical implementation of greater ethical and theological concerns. These concerns are present in his personal letters which reveal his broader moral and theological question realized by his writings. “Myth and fairy-story must, as all art, reflect and contain in solution elements of moral and religious truth (or error)”\textsuperscript{753}. Indeed, we must take Tolkien’s explicit mythopoeic project of sub-creation to heart. We are created and called to create, but because we are always already involved in an interdependent world of significance (our lifeworld), ignoring this mandate, and the fundamental structure of what it means to be a human being-in-the-world, is done at great peril. We are both gardener \textit{and} seed, says Tolkien. His own mythopoeic lifeworld, recorded in the various sagas of Middle-earth, stands as a meaningful space for us to dwell and to reclaim what it means to dwell meaningfully in an industrialized world. One may not agree entirely with his particular tactical decision but it indicates the power of this kind of tactical craft.

\textsuperscript{753} J. R. R. Tolkien, \textit{The Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien}, 144.
We might, in conclusion, then, put forward a primordial question which inhabits this tactical work: *Am I the keeper of ways of life?* The ethical burden of the Judeo-Christian tradition makes room for only one answer: by all means, yes! Dreaming of the world we want to live in—out loud; at a ‘higher volume’—is not just the burden of prophets. It is the burden of us all. It is not only the claim that God’s coming kingdom has on the present, and not only the claim that this world matters; but, as Tolkien so eloquently realized, it is the claim that we are made and called as living craftsmen to participate in God’s reconciliation with creation. We must take human artistry seriously because everything we make, and the world we build, lays claim on us. And even something as grand as a city or as banal as a spoon is included in that work.
PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER JANUARY 17, 1961 FAREWELL ADDRESS:

My fellow Americans:

Three days from now, after half a century in the service of our country, I shall lay down the responsibilities of office as, in traditional and solemn ceremony, the authority of the Presidency is vested in my successor.

This evening I come to you with a message of leave-taking and farewell, and to share a few final thoughts with you, my countrymen.

Like every other citizen, I wish the new President, and all who will labor with him, Godspeed. I pray that the coming years will be blessed with peace and prosperity for all.

Our people expect their President and the Congress to find essential agreement on issues of great moment, the wise resolution of which will better shape the future of the Nation.

My own relations with the Congress, which began on a remote and tenuous basis when, long ago, a member of the Senate appointed me to West Point, have since ranged to the intimate during the war and immediate post-war period, and, finally, to the mutually interdependent during these past eight years.

In this final relationship, the Congress and the Administration have, on most vital issues, cooperated well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship, and so have assured that the business of the Nation should go forward. So, my official relationship with the Congress ends in a feeling, on my part, of gratitude that we have been able to do so much together.

II.
We now stand ten years past the midpoint of a century that has witnessed four major wars among great nations. Three of these involved our own country. Despite these holocausts America is today the strongest, the most influential and most productive nation in the world. Understandably proud of this pre-eminence, we yet realize that America's leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace and human betterment.

III.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology--global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle--with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small, there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense; development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in basic and applied research--these and many other
possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage—balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat. But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

IV.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.
Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

V.

Another factor in maintaining balance involves the element of time. As we peer into society's future, we—you and I, and our government—must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without risking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow.

VI.

Down the long lane of the history yet to be written America knows that this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect.

Such a confederation must be one of equals. The weakest must come to the conference table with the same confidence as do we, protected as we are by our moral, economic, and military strength. That table, though scarred by many past frustrations, cannot be abandoned for the certain agony of the battlefield.

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the lingering sadness of war—as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and
painfully built over thousands of years--I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little I can to help the world advance along that road.

VII.

So--in this my last good night to you as your President--I thank you for the many opportunities you have given me for public service in war and peace. I trust that in that service you find some things worthy; as for the rest of it, I know you will find ways to improve performance in the future.

You and I--my fellow citizens--need to be strong in our faith that all nations, under God, will reach the goal of peace with justice. May we be ever unswerving in devotion to principle, confident but humble with power, diligent in pursuit of the Nation's great goals.

To all the peoples of the world, I once more give expression to America's prayerful and continuing aspiration:

We pray that peoples of all faiths, all races, all nations, may have their great human needs satisfied; that those now denied opportunity shall come to enjoy it to the full; that all who yearn for freedom may experience its spiritual blessings; that those who have freedom will understand, also, its heavy responsibilities; that all who are insensitive to the needs of others will learn charity; that the scourges of poverty, disease and ignorance will be made to disappear from the earth, and that, in the goodness of time, all peoples will come to live together in a peace guaranteed by the binding force of mutual respect and love.
GIAMBATTISTA VICO: THE PHILOLOGY OF THE CORPOREAL IMAGINATION

The ‘philological’ work of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Tolkien all echo aspects of the complex theory of poetic forms of life anticipated by the early 18th-century Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744). To label his work as ‘ahead of its time’ would be an understatement; historian Isaiah Berlin credits Vico with being the first scholar in the West to launch an assault on theoretical pictures and descriptions of human knowing, acting, and living built up from certain strands of Enlightenment logic and reasoning in the late 17th and early 18th century. Although he anticipates Johann Georg Hamann by fifty years or more, much of Vico’s unique work –“which embraces social anthropology, the comparative and historical studies of philology, linguistics, ethnology, jurisprudence, literature, mythology, in effect the history of civilization in the broadest sense”754 –was largely overlooked; like Kierkegaard in provincial Copenhagen, Vico was never read, nor understood, in his time and was quickly forgotten in the backwater Kingdom of Naples.755 As will become apparent, the view developed in Vico’s later work –primarily the Third Edition of The New Science (1744)– closely resembles certain phenomenological views on language, imagination and human practice in the world associated with Heidegger and Wittgenstein as discussed in the previous chapter.756 It is also not a far stretch to describe Vico as a philologist –among other things. His characterization of history, language, story and

756 The description of Verstehen suggested by Isaiah Berlin is a direct reference to the originary characterization by Wilhelm Dilthey. For the purposes of the dissertation, this further specialized characterization of Verstehen by Martin Heidegger will be drawn into the conversation.
practice anticipate descriptions of philology offered thus far. Concerned with how humans live and know, Vico’s work—which was out of step with his time—is an example of the complex interdisciplinary practice of the *litterae humaniores* mentioned by Tolkien in his 1959 “Valedictory Address”. “He was steeped in the literature of humanism,” says Berlin, “in the classical authors and antiquities . . . . His mind was not analytical or scientific but literary and intuitive.” A student and professor of rhetoric, Vico’s earliest work was a defense of imagination, rhetoric and the classics—the essential elements of a humanist education—which had become passé in the light of their wholesale rejection by Descartes in *Discourse on Method*. At stake for Vico was the preservation of the classical techniques of learning, thinking and imagining as he conceived them. Vico writes in his *Autobiography* that he endeavored to cultivate good Latin prose so he could enter “into their spirit, by means of philosophical

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757 Isaiah Berlin, *Against the Current*, ed. Henry Hardy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 93. It should be clarified that ‘literary’, here, is not to be taken in the sense of ‘linguistic’ or ‘textual’ but as *litterae as in litterae humaniores*.


759 Alexander Bertland, “Giambattista Vico”, *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/vico.htm. Also see Giambattista Vico’s *Autobiography*. In it Vico recalls: “[Vico] heard that the physics of René Descartes had eclipsed all preceding systems [. . .]. [R]eturning to Naples at the time when the Cartesian physics was most in vogue, Vico heard this assertion [that Descartes’s metaphysics would drive Aristotle’s from the cloisters]. . . . But in respect of the unity of its parts the philosophy of Descartes is not at all a consistent system [. . .]. With this learning and erudition Vico returned to Naples a stranger in his own land and found the physics of Descartes at the height of its renown among the established men of letters. . . . [B]ut in the *Meditations* of René Descartes and its companion piece his book *On Method*, wherein he disapproves the study of languages, orators, historians, and poets”. Giambattista Vico, *The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1975), 128-137.
criticism, just as the Latin authors of the sixteenth century had done. It will soon become apparent that Vico’s ‘philology’ in *The New Science* shares many similarities with Tolkien’s own philological project (although I should note that there is no hard evidence to support a claim that Tolkien had any knowledge of Vico’s work). It will be useful to our understanding of philology, then, to investigate Vico’s theories if we are to adapt and develop Tolkien’s philological work beyond recent scholarship and to the purposes of the dissertation as a whole.

As has been stated, Vico’s concerns and pictures are similar in many respects to those of Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Tolkien in that they ask: what is the nature and relationship of *human forms of life, language and the world*? For Vico, language, myths, history and institutional behavior were the lines to follow for a broader and deeper human understanding of self and the world. Most significant to Vico’s complex philology is his “master key” — the assertion that there was a time when humans lived and expressed a poetic mode of being in the world, or as Vico calls it, a “wholly corporeal imagination”. In the third edition (1744) of *The New Science*,

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761 While there are no specific records, it is certainly possible that Tolkien could have had contact with Vico’s work through his Oxford colleague R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943) who translated Benedetto Croce’s *The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico* into English. Scull and Hammond note in an online addenda to their detailed *The J. R. R. Tolkien Companion and Guide Vol. 1: Chronology* (2006): By 14 January 1936 Tolkien assists R. G. Collingwood, the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford and a colleague at Pembroke College, “untiringly with problems of Celtic philology”, as Collingwood will write in the preface (dated 14 January 1936) to Books I–IV of *Roman Britain and the English Settlements* by Collingwood and J. N. L. Myres (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936; 2nd ed., 1937), vii. On 264, Collingwood mentions in a footnote regarding Sulis, the goddess of the hot springs at Bath, that ‘she is traditionally called Sul; but Professor Tolkien points out to me that the Celtic nominative can only be Sulis, and our authority for believing that even the Romans made a nominative Sul on the analogy of their own word sol – perhaps meaning the same – is not good. The Celtic sulis may mean “the eye”, and this again may mean the sun.’ [http://mysite.verizon.net/wghammond/addenda/chronology.html](http://mysite.verizon.net/wghammond/addenda/chronology.html) (accessed 12/07/09)


Vico argued that humans in the “first age” of humanity expressed themselves in a more originary way, what Homer calls, “the language of the gods”;\(^{764}\) with much irony Vico claims,

> From these first men, stupid, insensate, and horrible beasts, all the philosophers and philologians should have begun their investigations of the wisdom of the ancient gentiles. . . . .

Hence poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile world, must have begun with a metaphysics not rational and abstract like that of learned men now, but felt and imagined as that of these first men must have been, who, without power of ratiocination, were all robust sense and vigorous imagination.\(^{765}\)

By corporeal imagination, then, Vico means a sensibility wholly enfleshed, proximally situated (to borrow a term from Heidegger) in the world, living a ‘poetic’ unity of word, act and thing.\(^{766}\) As Vico says, humans lived ‘poetic’ lives because “the first poets were such by nature [not art]”.\(^{767}\) Here Vico’s characterization of corporeal imagination shares much in common with the characterization of language and human forms of life in Heidegger and Wittgenstein, described in the previous chapter. Specifically, we should recall Heidegger’s characterization of Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and das Rede.

*Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, and das Rede* are all, as Heidegger points out, equiprimordially constitutions of human being in the world. The latter –*das Rede*– articulates both *Befindlichkeit* and *Verstehen* in our everyday connections and activity in the world. *Befindlichkeit* –which has been roughly translated as “the state in which

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\(^{765}\) Giambattista Vico, *ibid.*, 116.


\(^{767}\) Giambattista Vico, *ibid.*, 75.
one founds oneself”– is a ‘recognition’ of our attunement (die Stimmung) to the phenomena of our everyday human living in the world and with and through that, our attunement to ‘the world’. This corporal and holistic mode of being literally implies the tuning of an instrument and runs far deeper than simple characterizations of cognition – a point Vico’s work would resonate with; our attunement is not something we ‘have’, then, but is a state we are always ‘in’. With Verstehen we are exposed to a unique characterization of cognitive activity which reveals the existentially originary link between world, activity, and possibility. This cognitive comportment –often translated as ‘understanding’– is inextricably linked (‘poetically’ we might say in Vichian terms) to an ‘attunement’ to our being in our environment, and our ‘telling’ (both linguistic and non-linguistic) in and through our bodies, and our environment. This ‘telling’, das Rede, reveals that all of this activity occurs ‘pre-linguistically’. We articulate through activity long before, and always along side, what we formulate and construct with ‘language’.

By the publication of the Third Edition of Scienza Nuova (1744), then, Vico had virtually dismantled the Enlightenment assumptions of his time and created a wholly new methodology for humane studies centered on a philological reading of human activity, historical context and human imaginative understanding. To Vico, the field of ‘history’ (first addressed by Vico in Diritto universale 1720-2768) was understanding through philology769—a recovery and reconstruction of previous or other forms of life through the human imagination. Benedetto Croce notes, “Cartesianism … confined to universalizing and abstractive forms, ignored the individualizing … [and] shrank in

768 Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 47.
769 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 165.
horror from the tangled forest of history: Vico plunged eagerly into that department” 770. Berlin’s assessment of Vico’s historical practice echoes elements of Wittgenstein and Tolkien. Through wrongheaded illusory pictures of human living and language we have ‘forgotten’ our originary mode of being. It is our task to exhume and recovery those lifeworlds:

Gradually, as human experience changed, this once natural, speech, which Vico calls poetical, lingered on as turns of phrase in common [prosaic] speech whose origins had been forgotten or at least were no longer felt, or as conventions and ornament used by sophisticated versifiers. … the task before those who wish to grasp what kinds of lives have in the past been led in societies different from their own is to understand their [life] worlds: that is, to conceive what kind of vision of the world men who used a particular kind of language must have had for this type of language to be a natural expression of it. 771

This philological exploration and recovery was vital to Vico’s rejection of Cartesian anthropology because he believed, and this is the point that Luft argues has been greatly misunderstood in Vico, that humans being-in-the-world as poetic creatures is an anthropological truth in every age. 772 In Heideggarian terms we might say that it is a primordial facet of what it means to be a human being immersed in the world. In The New Science Vico describes three distinct ages of human creativity: the age of the poet God who creates and binds together language, action, and world; the second age of the natural poets who live, move and have their being with a ‘corporeal imagination’; and then there is the ‘third age’ –our modern age. Although the corporeal imagination is

771 Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current, 97-98. (brackets and emphasis mine)
772 Sandra Rudnick ibid., 9, 12.
present in the third age, its ‘truth’ has been obfuscated by the illusory project of the Cartesian subjective subject/knower. What Vico’s picture of an originary poetic mode of being affords us, then, is the possibility of exhuming this originary lifeworld – not unlike Heidegger’s hope in Sein und Zeit, Wittgenstein’s hope in his Philosophical Investigations and Tolkien’s belief in the power of philological recovery– revealing it to be an essential part of what it means to be human.

Rather than ‘conscious records’, then, mythology and language are the favored tools of imaginative philology – they are troves that embody the unique expression of each civilization’s form of life and characterizations of reality. Vico argued history to be the crown jewel of all humane disciplines; keeping in line with his views of human activity in the world, his characterization of history is “a collective, social experience extended through time . . . a perpetual ‘intentional’ activity”. Berlin adds, “the successive patterns of civilization differ from other temporal processes – say, geological– by the fact that it is men –ourselves– who play a crucial part in creating them”. To Vico, the study of history, as also of myth and language, allows us to ‘enter into’ (imaginatively participate in) the activities of past human lifeworlds and

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773 Sandra Rudnick Luft, ibid., 9.
775 Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current, 45.
777 Berlin reminds us of the close link between Vico and Renaissance natural philosophy which, Vico says, “contributed so much to poetry, history, and eloquence that all Greece in the time of its utmost learning and grace of speech seemed to have risen again in Italy”. Giambattista Vico, The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, 132. A form of verum/factum resurfaces the Renaissance humanism “belief in magic as the acquisition of power by the subject over the object by re-entering it, immersing oneself in it, and so re-assimilating it to oneself” (Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder, 34) – specifically in the work of Pico della Mirandol (1463-1494). We also hear it in Venetian philosopher Francesco Patrizi (1529-1597): “to know is to be united [Coitio] with what one knows”. (Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder 33; ‘cognitio, nihil [est] aliud, quam Coitio quaedam cum suo cognobili.’) And in Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639): “to know is to become what is known”. (Berlin 33) And again in Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – with whom Berlin says Vico was certainly familiar: “If we could demonstrate physics, we would make it.” (Berlin 33; ‘Si physica demonstrare possemus, faceremus.’)
gain a greater knowing of what it means to be human. Through the humane studies, then, we can exhume lost modes of human activity throughout history; through the unique human capacity of “reconstructive fantasia”. This kind of understanding is only possible per caussas—“through causes”. Not to be confused with a correlation of events or an observational knowledge, as we would understand it, knowledge per caussas is a deliberate activity oriented knowledge that allows us to attend to “those internal relationships and interconnections between thought and action, observation, theory, motivation, [and] practice, which is precisely what observation of the external world, or mere compresences and successions, fails to give us.” To exercise knowledge per caussas we must attend to a modificazioni of our minds [mente]—which is the unique ‘attention’ each person brings to the hermeneutical process. Although Berlin wholly ignores the term corporeal imagination in his writings on Vico, he does make the bold connection between Vico’s imaginative activity of fantasia and what Berlin elsewhere describes as “imaginative understanding”; rather than an “Absolute Idealism”, argues Berlin, Vico’s modificazioni of the mente is mandated on humanity’s vivid and “unique capacity for imaginative insight and reconstruction”—or what has

Indeed, Vico’s philosophical and philological concerns regarding ‘the true’ and ‘the made’ are echoed some 150 years later in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. In the earlier cited “We Philologists” Nietzsche too confronts the ‘a priori’ rationalism which crept back into philological studies: “To overcome Greek antiquity through our own deeds: this would be the right task. But before we can do this we must first know it!—There is a thoroughness which is merely an excuse for inaction. Let it be recollected how much Goethe knew of antiquity: certainly not so much as a philologist, and yet sufficient to contend with it in such a way as to bring about fruitful results. One should not even know more about a thing than one could create. Moreover, the only time when we can actually recognise something is when we endeavour to make it. Let people but attempt to live after the manner of antiquity, and they will at once come hundreds of miles nearer to antiquity than they can do with all their erudition.—Our philologists never show that they strive to emulate antiquity in any way, and thus their antiquity remains without any effect on the schools.” Friedrich Nietzsche, We Philologists, 179. (bold emphasis mine)

779 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 31.
780 Isaiah Berlin, ibid., 129.
already been characterized as Verstehen. Although Berlin more than likely has Dilthey’s historicism in mind when he mentions Verstehen, he misses the opportunity (as does Luft) to connect Vico’s corporeal imagination to Heidegger’s radical characterization of Verstehen as a radically unique species of ‘knowing’.

Problematically, Luft is forced into a narrow reading of Heidegger, specifically Heidegger’s relationship to ‘language’, because of her strong dependence on Derrida’s characterizations of language, writing and ontology. This is primarily evident early on in her book when she agrees with the idea that “What Heidegger calls the forgetting of Being is simply the forgetting of Writing”. In contrast to the approach taken by Luft, I appropriate Vico’s work to my reading of Tolkien and philology resting on the methodology already deployed in Chapter 3.

WILLIAM MORRIS: PHILOLOGICAL CRAFT AS PRAXEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE

The influence of William Morris, Pre-Raphaelite artist and leading figure in the Arts and Crafts Movement, on J. R. R. Tolkien’s views of artistic craft and literature are well documented in Tolkien scholarship, and to cover them in detail would be impractical. The pressing questions about Morris and Tolkien that are so vital for this chapter are: what does a 19th-century painter, writer, architect and craftsman of furniture and textiles have to do with what has been described, thus far, as a 'philological imagination' and how does it manifest as human praxis in everyday life? What is of significance to this chapter, and the dissertation as a whole, is Morris’s specific spirit of praxiological resistance – to the industrialized colonization of the English landscape and 19th-century English forms of life – through the recovery of a particular picture of how artistic craft, history and myth relate to everyday life. When considered abstractly, Morris and Tolkien appear as radically different species. Morris was a 19th-century artist and active socialist; Tolkien was a 20th-century conservative,

However, both Morris and Tolkien saw colonization by a market-driven industrialized form of life as morally reprehensible, and as students of past lifeworlds—specifically the lifeworlds of the Western European and Nordic Medieval epoch—“saw in them clues to an alternative way of living, different from the shabby, materialist, and industrialized world around them.” In contrast to the modern industrialized sensibilities of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Morris and Tolkien’s artistic sensibilities not only drew inspiration from the medieval epochs but worked from its picture of art as a practice thoroughly embedded in human forms of life and inextricably linked to an applied praxis.

A PHILOLOGICAL INTEREST

It should be briefly noted that Tolkien’s rejection of early 20\textsuperscript{th} century industrialized forms of life, and Modernism as a whole, was predicated on his belief that the appropriate response to the ‘trauma’ of industrialized warfare was a protest and resistance built on the recovery of past sensibilities, practices and forms rather than a rejection of them (such as that found in the absurd abstraction of the Dadaists, the rejection of history and embrace of mechanization by the Bauhaus architects, and the

\textsuperscript{785}This is a label which should immediately be qualified since Tolkien described his political opinions as leaning towards “Anarchy”, “abolition of control” or “to 'unconstitutional' Monarchy” (Letters of J. R. R. Tolkien no. 52), and his economic views held much in common with Roman Catholic Distributist thought which had its origins in Pope Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum.


\textsuperscript{788}Francis Frascina et al., Modernity and Modernism: French Painting in the Nineteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 9; “This attitude is related by Baudelaire to a particular experience of modernity … an experience which is always changing, which does not remain static and which is most clearly felt in the metropolitan center of the city.” (9,10); See Charles Baudelaire’s 1863 essay The painter of modern life and his use of the term modernité.
disjointed narratives, psychological introspection, and individualism of 20th century Modernist literature. Opposed to the usual and wholly unsophisticated claim of luddism or worse, a sentimental nostalgia for the past, Tolkien’s ‘philological art’ was a sophisticated philosophical and theological statement on the nature and purpose of human imagining, human craft, and human living. “Unlike many others shocked by the explosion of 1914-1918,” says John Garth, author of Tolkien and The Great War, “[Tolkien] did not discard the old ways of writing, the classicism or medievalism championed by Lord Tennyson and William Morris.” Indeed, Tolkien lost two of his three best friends in combat (G.B. Smith and Rob Gilson), all of whom, together with Christopher Weisman, formed the ‘Tea Club and Barrovian Society’ at the King Edward’s School in Birmingham; a group, whose values Tolkien likened to the medieval and romantic concerns of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood (to be discussed later). This sense of loss and strong desire for recovery are detectable in one of Tolkien’s earliest poems related to his legendarium –Kôr: In a City Lost and Dead– a fourteen-line rhyming couplet expanded to the 140-line Kortirion Among the Trees, written while Tolkien was on a week-long leave in November 1915. “Tolkien struck the first note of the mood that underpins his entire legendarium: a wistful nostalgia for the world slipping away”, says John Garth, “[...] a ‘wistful song of things that were, and could be yet’.” We might say, then, that Tolkien was drawn to the Pre-Raphaelite

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789 I should note here that this statement by no means implies that Modernism can be reduced to simply a traumatic response to World War I. Indeed, we might well include the effects of Darwin’s The Origins of the Species, Einstein’s theory of ‘Relativity’, heavier than air flight, Marx, Freud, Jung, Nietzsche, Bergson –and the list goes on. All of which, of course, lie outside the scope of this chapter. Here World War I is focused on because we know from Tolkien’s own letters that, aside from the crude effect of Industrialism, the War had a tremendous impact on his thinking.


791 This is a reference to English writer, traveler, and student of languages George Borrow (1803-1881).

792 John Garth, ibid., 14.

793 John Garth, ibid., 109; Also see Reno E. Lauro, “Poems by Tolkien: The History of Middle-earth”.
sensibilities of someone like William Morris because of the shared recognition that art in the lifeworld of the Medieval epoch revealed something missing in their own industrialized times.

Art in the medieval epoch knew no distinction between the artist and the craftsman, simply because the duty and attention of the artist was never detached from the comportments of daily life. “Art in those times was still wrapped up in life”, says historian Johan Huizinga succinctly, for “[...] it had to be enjoyed as an element of life itself, as the expression of life’s significance.”794 Morris believed the feudal craftsman to be an artist of the highest and most fulfilled caliber, whose work was summed up in architecture; in the ability to take care of a basic need and “express the thoughts and aspirations that stir in us. …”, says Morris, “architecture would lead us to all the arts”.795 Indeed, for a thousand years, declares Morris, Medieval craftsmanship, dreams and hopes spread across Europe.796 Drawing on the strategy he so admired in Morris, Tolkien applied this recovery of a lost artistic praxis (sensibilities, activities, and possibilities) towards a resistance of the dehumanizing mechanization –indeed the colonization– of everyday life.

NO WEALTH BUT LIFE

Fifty years prior, William Morris’s disdain for, and resistance of, capitalist mass production and societal mechanization drew his attention to the everydayness of the so-called ‘lesser Decorative Arts’. Drawing on the more holistic –and in Morris’s opinion more dignified– Medieval picture of art, Morris’s life-work is a case for the necessity

of mending of the modern industrialized unraveling of the Fine Arts, or Great Arts (architecture, painting and sculpting; what we now commonly refer to as Art), and the so-called Decorative Arts which, as Morris says, gave the ‘great arts’ a mooring to everyday life. The Decorative Arts (“house-building, painting, joinery and carpentry, smiths’ work, pottery and glass-making, weaving”797, etc.) are concerned with proximal matters—to borrow a word from Heidegger, or our everyday use and activity in the world— and enrich everyday living with beauty, truth, and pleasure. However, warns Morris, the separation of the ‘Great Arts’ from the Decorative Arts is, on the whole disastrous for the ‘Arts’ and subsequently for human living:

[T]he lesser ones become trivial, mechanical, unintelligent, incapable of resisting the changes pressed upon them by fashion or dishonesty;” says Morris, “while the greater, however they may be practiced for a while by men of great minds and wonder-working hands, unhelped by the lesser, unhelped by each other, are sure to lose their dignity of popular arts, and become nothing but dull adjuncts to unmeaning pomp, or ingenious toys for a few rich and idle men.798

Concerned with the dignity and ‘happiness’ of the user and craftsman, Morris, privy to the horrors of late 19th-century industrialized England, already anticipates the disastrous consequences Tolkien will experience in his lifetime: science in the service of “the counting-house and the drill-sergeant”, the greed of modern commerce leveling “venerable buildings”, blackening rivers and hiding the sun with the belching of industry.799 In How We Live and How We Might Live, Morris laments the machinery, war and inequality produced by commerce—the result of which is the attempted

798 William Morris, ibid., 494-495.
799 William Morris, ibid., 513, 514.
'mechanization’ of humanity.\textsuperscript{800} Again, in The Aims of Art, Morris laments the reduction of the craftsman to a ‘workman’, along with the reduction of the workman to ‘machine’ –in short, to a condition of slavery. “It is necessary for the system which keeps them in their position as an inferior class that they should either be themselves machines or be the servants to machines,” claims Morris, “in no case having any interest in the work which they run out. To their employers they are, so far as they are workmen, a part of the machinery of the workshop or the factory”.	extsuperscript{801} Here we should attend to Heidegger’s warning of the reduction of Being to gestell or a standing reserve / ‘inventory’; rather than being used in the service of increasing life, mechanization is in service of “profit-bearing wares”. In The Lesser Arts moreover, Morris laments, “it is [by] allowing machines to be our masters and not our servants that so injures the beauty of life nowadays. […] [I]t is the token of the terrible crime we have fallen into of using our control of the powers of Nature for the purpose of enslaving people”.	extsuperscript{802} But like Tolkien, it would be a seductive mistake to label and dismiss Morris as a luddite. His, How A Factory Might Be and Useful Work versus Useless Toil, reveals that he desires, again like Tolkien, to reclaim wisdom to wield such power.

Jeffrey Skoblow’s Paradise Dislocated: Morris, Politics, Art, for example, brings to light what he calls Morris’s “aesthetics of immersion”. By this he means an aesthetics which is radically attuned to physical details because its concern is life in the world, “an imagination of habitation, a nontranscendental, sensuous mode of praxis”.\textsuperscript{803} Citing John Reed’s Victorian Conventions (1975), Skoblow writes that Morris “resisted

the decadent impulse to fashion a world of memory within the imagination, and sought instead to draw the racial [sic] memory back from the self to be applied to the world of the present at large".  

Here, of course, the term ‘imagination’ is used to describe the illusory, solipsistic Victorian fancy; as J. R. R. Tolkien referred to it: imagination as a work of quislings—the flight of the deserters.

Echoing his mentor John Ruskin, history and nature must be the two teachers of the artisan if this undoing is to be mended. Here, Morris specifically references Ruskin’s The Nature of the Gothic; on one level, Morris believes the study of history is to educate the craftsmen to identify beautiful forms. “If you can really fill your minds with memories of great works of art, and great times of art” he writes, “you will, I think, be able to a certain extent to look through the aforesaid ugly surroundings”.

This is not, however, a matter of copying the forms of the past, claims Morris: “if we do not study the ancient work directly and learn to understand it, we shall find ourselves influenced by the feeble work all round us, and shall be copying the better work through the copyists and without understanding it”. Rather than simply a noetic response, Morris has a wholly other level of interest; he believes the historical study of the decorative arts is a way into, and an act of retrieving the life of the past. In Morris’s Romantic vision of ‘the art that is life’, the small-scale hand building of medieval furniture, for example, is more than simply an act of fancy and mimicry, it is the highest form of protest imaginable—the recovery of a ‘systematic’, “careful and laborious practice” attuned to life and immersed in the world; and the recovery of

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804 Jeffery Skoblow, ibid, 4. (emphasis mine)
806 William Morris, ibid., 506.
807 William Morris, ibid., 505.
various expressions of that immersed life from ages past. “I say when I think of all this,” Morris contemplates, “I hardly know how to say that this interweaving of the Decorative Arts with the history of the past is of less importance than their dealings with the life of the present: for should not these memories also be a part of our daily life?” Once again, this concern with daily life—past, present and presumably the legacy left for life in the future—is not simply a matter of nostalgia for past forms of life, but is an ethical mandate. This ethic begins, for Morris, with the study of Nature. That is to say, “everything made by man’s hands has a form, which must be either beautiful or ugly; beautiful if it is in accord with Nature, and helps her; ugly if it is discordant with Nature, and thwarts her; it cannot be indifferent”. Here seems to be the radical shift in Morris’s work from a private and personal art to a public and social; the craftsman, says Morris, is not simply to imitate nature, but on a more holistic level of corporeal imagination, “the hand of the craftsman is guided to work in the way that [nature] does”. This vision of craftsmanship and art is reminiscent of Tolkien’s elves—“the web, the cup, or the knife, look as natural, nay as lovely, as the green field, the river bank, or the mountain flint”. It is for these reasons then that Morris believed that it was impossible to separate art from morality, politics, and religion, and which led to—or at the very least informed—his socialism and his eventual founding of the Socialist League in 1884.

In a short essay entitled How I Became A Socialist, Morris writes, “the study of history and the love and practice of art forced me into a hatred of the civilization which,
if things were to stop as they are, would turn history into inconsequent nonsense, and
make art a collection of the curiosities of the past, which would have no serious relation
to the life of the present.”814 To this end, Morris started his own practices and built his
own ‘factories’ which stood outside of the sphere of “the great intangible machine of
commercial tyranny which oppresses the lives of us all”, as he once remarked
presciently, echoing Lewis Mumford’s megamachine. There was ‘The Firm’ at Red
House (Morris, Marshall, Faulkner & Co.), a company of artists and craftsmen which
consisted of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. When work expanded to Merton Abbey,
writes the distinguished Socialist historian E. P. Thompson, in William Morris: 
Romantic to Revolutionary, “a method of work was built up distinct from normal
commercial practices.”815 Morris attempted to create an environment where the pleasure
and creative life of the craftsman would flourish, rather than enabling servitude to the
machine. Some thirty years later Morris added Kelmscott Press to his endeavors. It
should be said, without irony, that there was a gulf between how Morris believed a
factory should be run and how his companies were run in actuality. Morris, himself,
laments in 1892:

Except with a small part of the more artistic side of the work,
[…] I could not do anything (or at least but little) to give this
pleasure to the workman, because I should have had to change
their methods of work so utterly that I should have disqualified
them from earning their living elsewhere. You see I have got
to understand thoroughly the manner of work under which the
art of the Middle Ages was done, and that is the only manner
of work which can turn out popular art, only to discover that it

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is impossible to work in that manner in this profit-grinding society.\textsuperscript{816}

Count Harry Kessler, who set up Cranach Press, noted that Morris’s Press “looked like any printing works, just that, since only hand-presses are used, there is neither steam nor smoke, so everything can be kept cleaner”.\textsuperscript{817} Perhaps it was this inability to fully retrieve that form of life –despite his rigor of study and authenticity of practice– that leads Thompson to suggest the true target of Morris’s ire was not ‘the machine’ but the unbridled capitalist system that made men slaves of profit and mechanized forms of life.\textsuperscript{818} It must certainly have been the reason why Morris embraced socialism as a necessary alternative to the capitalist machine of his day. Fiona MacCarthy offers generous insight in \textit{William Morris: A Life for our Time}. Although Merton Abbey and Kelmscott Press were far from ‘revolutionary workshops’ of Morris’s socialist theory: pressmen were given an extra five shillings a week for blistered hands, the workmen were paid higher than average wages, Morris was generous with time which was afforded to the workers to do the best job possible, and the Press had its own celebrations and outings called ‘Wayzegooses’.\textsuperscript{819} Perhaps it was from this struggle, between doing and knowing how things could be, that Morris found outlet in his own imaginative literature: \textit{The Earthly Paradise} (1868-1870), his translation of \textit{The Story of Sigurd the Volsung and the Fall of the Niblungs} (1876), \textit{The Dream of John Ball} (1888), \textit{A Tale of the House of the Wolfings and All the Kindreds of the Mark} (1889) and \textit{News from Nowhere} (1890). There is no room to explore this conjecture here, however; instead, the point to be made in regards to Tolkien is this: Morris and Tolkien share unique projects of cultural resistance—a \textit{praxeological resistance}—built on the

\textsuperscript{816} E. P. Thompson, ibid., 105; citing \textit{Clarion}, November 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1892.
\textsuperscript{818} E. P. Thompson, ibid., 649.
\textsuperscript{819} Fiona MacCarthy, ibid., 621-622.
recovery of a lost artistic *praxis* (sensibilities, activities, and possibilities), and aimed at resisting and decreasing dehumanizing mechanization, and what has been described as the colonization of everyday life.\(^{820}\)

\(^{820}\) In terms of ‘hyperreality’ we may also include ‘digitization’ and ‘virtualization’ of everyday life.
Owen Barfield’s *Poetic Diction* (1928) has been widely credited with being a great influence on J. R. R. Tolkien’s philological project, so a few words should be given to examine the strength of that thesis. Admittedly, there is very little reference to Barfield in Tolkien’s writings. Humphrey Carpenter mentions in *The Inklings* that, “not long after [Poetic Diction’s] publication, [C. S.] Lewis reported to Barfield: ‘You might like to know that when Tolkien dined with me the other night he said à propos of something quite different that your conception of the ancient semantic unity had modified his whole outlook and that he was always just going to say something in a lecture when your conception stopped him in time’.”

We also know from a September 1937 letter to Tolkien’s publisher, Allen & Unwin, that Tolkien reveals a philological remark credited to Owen Barfield in *The Hobbit.* He says, “the only philological remark (I think) in The Hobbit is on p.221 (lines 6-7 from the end): an odd mythological way of referring to linguistic philosophy,” and a point that will (happily) be missed by any who have not read Barfield (few have), and probably by those who


823 One should also take into account the rich tradition of ‘ordinary language’ of J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle in the Oxford of the 1940s and ’50s. To think that Tolkien’s was simply a ‘linguistic philosophy’ would miss how broad and deep that tradition was, and perhaps allow one to see the links between it and Tolkien’s own work, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.
However, because J. R. R. Tolkien was a subtle and enigmatic figure, it is difficult to accurately extrapolate the extent and the details of any influence that Owen Barfield’s *Poetic Diction* had on his project. While these letters are certainly valuable in pointing out that Tolkien had read *Poetic Diction*, and indeed had sympathy with Barfield’s project, there is certainly a gulf between being empowered to say something (as Tolkien was according to Lewis’ letter), and exactly how one articulates what one feels empowered to say.

On the one hand we might point out how this seemingly throw away comment is a testament to Tolkien’s subtlety; the ‘lone’ philological remark by Bilbo is far from disposable; in fact, it deals with the entire structure of Tolkien’s invented world and should not be taken lightly. Here we can certainly see that Tolkien felt a great sympathy with Barfield’s conception of language. However, on the other hand, we must be cautious when we speak of Tolkien, his imaginative project, and his characterization about life and ‘language’. Barfield’s characterizations about language are ultimately far too Cartesian to assert the claim that his theory is “the very foundation and basis of [Tolkien’s] invented world … central to the theme of the *Silmarillion*”, as does Verlyn Flieger.

Owen Barfield’s *Poetic Diction* is a striking work of genius buried under the weight of 20th century Modernism, linguistics and semiotics. Echoing the Vichian concerns that have been addressed thus far, Barfield describes his book as “not merely a theory of poetic diction, but a theory of poetry: and not merely a theory of poetry, but

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825 “To say that Bilbo’s breath was taken away is no description at all. There are no words left to express his staggerment, since Men changed the language that they learned of elves in the days when all the world was wonderful.” (*The Hobbit* chapter 12) We should also note the Vichian ‘three ages of the world’ here, and the ‘forgetting’ and ‘obfuscating’ that occurs in the third age of man.
a theory of knowledge”. In Poetic Diction, Barfield endeavors to recover an originary (although not necessarily existentially primordial) relationship between poetry, living, and understanding. Briefly, and problematically, Barfield describes his work as a theory of ancient semantic unity. The ‘ancient’ here refers to his belief that there was an originary epoch in which humans dwelt, expressed, and acted in a poetic unity with their environment. This ‘alpha-thinking’, as Barfield would later call it, slowly became desiccated as human sophistication grew. As the ‘purely rational’ and ‘anti-poetic’ took hold in humanity, language began to fracture through the “birth of hitherto unknown antitheses,” Barfield says, “such as those between truth and myth, between prose and poetry, and again between an objective and a subjective world”. Similar to Vico, Barfield argues that through the imagination we can once again see these “forgotten relationships” – the poetry between human existence and the world around us. However, this is where the ‘philological’ similarities with Vico end, and our move towards what Tolkien found relevant in Barfield begins. A brief critique of Barfield is necessary to separate Tolkien from Barfield’s work before we highlight the deeper corporeal, praxeological, and phenomenological significance of Tolkien’s mythopoeia in chapter 5.

In the foreword to the second edition of LOTR, Tolkien testifies that his work on the developing Silmarillion – the foundational work of both The Hobbit and LOTR— “was primarily linguistic in inspiration”. The question that has been raised thus far, however, focuses on what Tolkien means when he deploys the term ‘linguistic’. Elsewhere Tolkien says, “a real taste for fairy-stories was wakened by philology on the

828 Owen Barfield, ibid., 94.
threshold of manhood, and *quickened to full life by war*”.\(^{830}\) Here a fuller picture begins to emerge. It would be reckless to assume that Tolkien’s work was “primarily linguistic” simply because it was philological.\(^{831}\) We begin to see a clear admission by Tolkien that *because* his questions originated with philology they were driven by broader existential and theological questions that the rapid and radical transformation of a lifeworld can bring to bear. Precisely because his work was philological, in the sense deployed in this chapter and in the sense I propose Tolkien built up, we can begin to see that his characterization of ‘language’, and his own philological work, were far broader than the narrow definition of ‘linguistic’ one might try to pigeonhole Tolkien into. I have stated earlier that this is the error Tom Shippey makes in *The Road to Middle-Earth* and in his assessment of Tolkien’s craft; and one from which Verlyn Flieger, in her *Splintered Light: Logos and Language in Tolkien’s World*, thinks she has found an escape through Owen Barfield.

*(Archaism and Strangeness)*

Two particular characterizations in *Poetic Diction* with which Tolkien no doubt had some sympathy, and which should be taken up in the rest of this chapter are *Archaism* and *Strangeness*. Although sympathetic, Tolkien differs greatly from Barfield’s characterizations in his own work. Whereas noted Tolkien scholar Verlyn Flieger quickly attempts to cement ‘linguistic’ and ‘philological’ similarities between Barfield’s project and Tolkien’s, it is clear (and is apparent in Chapter 4) that Tolkien had a much broader conception of language and philology than Barfield or Flieger give

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\(^{831}\) Aside from the broad understanding of ‘philological’ established in this chapter, Tolkien’s influence by the Anglo-Catholic revival of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries must be taken into account.
account of—one that actively concerns the body and human forms of living. Barfield’s ‘archaism’, drawn from the philological work of Max Müller, is built on the picture that there is a historical ‘progression’, or ‘digression’, of language in human history from the poetic to the prosaic. It is the task of the poet to recover, and return us to, what has been lost in an age dominated by prosaic thinking. A return, says Barfield, is a turn away from a sophistication that cauterizes the senses and the soul—either transforming words and meaning beyond recognition of their original power and intent, or discarding them altogether. The classic literary example of this archaism, one which certainly caught Tolkien’s attention, was the Romantic Revival’s attention to nature, and the use of outmoded Medieval phrases or words which had not gone through the 18th- and 19th-century ‘industrialization’ and ‘abstraction’. Indeed, Barfield proudly notes, “archaism chooses, not old words, but young ones.”

The defining feature of the ‘poetic mind’ in Barfield’s archaic ‘poetic age’ is the ‘true-metaphor’—an originary state of poetic unity and participation with world. Rather than an age of heroic bards saturating the world with meaning—as philologist Max Müller suggests—the people of the ‘poetic age’ walked in the ‘footsteps of nature’ never ‘conscious’ of the ‘true metaphor’ they wielded. However, we should also note that Barfield’s concern with archaism reveals, not a preoccupation with body, but a preoccupation with mind. Tolkien’s excitement no doubt swelled when Barfield wrote:

832 Much could be made here of Flieger and Barfield’s Cartesian conception of ‘perception’ and how that differs from the phenomenological characterization made by French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which is intractably linked to the body. While there is no time to pursue Merleau-Ponty’s description, we may point out that it is rooted in the Heideggarian phenomenology outlined in chapter 3.
833 Barfield notes in an afterword written in 1972: “If the book does anything, it erects a structure of thought on the basis of a felt difference between what it calls ‘the Prosaic’ and ‘the Poetic’. ... It should be noted [however] that Poetic Diction does not simply exalt the Poetic at the expense of the Prosaic, but emphasizes their essential relation, their dependence on each other, and indeed their interpenetration.” (Poetic Diction, 221-222)
834 Owen Barfield, ibid., 164.
835 Owen Barfield, ibid., 165.
“Our sophistication, like Odin’s, has cost us an eye; and now it is the language of poets, in so far as they create true metaphors, which must restore this unity …”⁸³⁶ And indeed, as Barfield goes on to describe (in the tradition of Percy Bysshe Shelley) how forgotten —yet before-unapprehended— relationships can once again be seen with the imagination, one can certainly see how Verlyn Flieger too quickly attempts to connect this originary use of language to Tolkien’s own philological project, which she hinges on a ‘changing of perception’ and ‘creating a world with language’. But we should not be quickly seduced by Barfield’s own emphasis on “restore”. Barfield’s complete sentence reads thus: “Our sophistication, like Odin’s, has cost us an eye; and now it is the language of poets, in so far as they create true metaphors, which must restore this unity conceptually, after it has been lost from perception.”⁸³⁷ ‘True archaism’, then, as Barfield points it out, is a return to a particular conceptual understanding which is an extension of Romantic philosophical Idealism.⁸³⁸ As will become apparent in chapter 5, although Tolkien’s project may be situated along a trajectory that comes out of Coleridge’s Romantic project, Tolkien’s philological project is concerned with something very different: a primordial quality of being, a return to an originary lifeworld much as characterized in chapter 3 and, more particularly, as in Vichian corporeal imagination, or the philological craft of William Morris.⁸³⁹

Similarly, strangeness is very much related to archaism, in that it is a new and transformative mode of seeing. Ultimately, however, as becomes apparent with Barfield’s description of ‘archaism’, without an attention to the body in the world, we

⁸³⁶ Owen Barfield, ibid., 87.
⁸³⁷ Owen Barfield, ibid., 87. (bold emphasis mine)
⁸³⁸ By this I mean to imply aspects of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism by way of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth.
⁸³⁹ Owen Barfield, ibid., 163. Barfield later notes: “The view that human perception is not simply reception of impacts on the physical organism, but involves an unconscious activity of the mind, is at least as old as Coleridge’s ‘primary imagination’.”(Poetic Diction, 217.)
can say that Barfield’s strangeness is most unlike anything in Tolkien’s project. Barfield’s characterization of strangeness is concerned with the poet’s ability to draw out from a ‘different plane’ that which “arouses wonder when we do not understand; aesthetic imagination when we do.”\textsuperscript{840} Tolkien would have recognized this characterization from the work of G. K. Chesterton, whom both Barfield and Tolkien acknowledge. Indeed, in his epic essay, \textit{On Fairy-Stories}, Tolkien cites Chesterton’s \textit{Mooreeffoc –or Coffee-room} –as seen by Dickens. Tolkien, however, believed there was only a limited power in Chestertonian Fantasy –a power which revealed the queerness of those things in our world that have become trite and familiar– because it was limited. Here, Tolkien’s ‘theological turn’ –missing in Flieger’s enthusiastic promotion of a Barfield-Tolkien connection– takes Tolkien in a different direction with a ‘recovery’ of that which is lost. Indeed, a freshness of vision was the ‘only’ virtue of Chestertonian Fantasy, argues Tolkien.\textsuperscript{841} As is apparent in Chapter 4, to which we now turn, Tolkien will take this characterization of a strangeness that arises from a different plane and apply it to the power of Creative Fantasy –based on the principles of Recovery, Escape, and Consolation– to make things ‘new’ … an echo of “\textit{evangelium in the real world.”}\textsuperscript{842}

\textsuperscript{840} Owen Barfield, ibid., 177.
\textsuperscript{842} J. R. R. Tolkien, ibid., 153-157.


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