

'THE AFFIRMATION OF BEHAN?'
**AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICISATION PROCESS OF THE
PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT THROUGH AN
ORGANISATIONAL ANALYSIS OF SPLITS FROM 1969 TO 1997**

John F. Morrison

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews**



2010

**Full metadata for this item is available in
Research@StAndrews:FullText
at:**

<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3158>

This item is protected by original copyright

‘The Affirmation of Behan?’

An Understanding of the Politicisation Process
of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement
Through an Organisational Analysis of
Splits from 1969 to 1997.

John F. Morrison
School of International Relations
Ph.D. 2010

SUBMISSION OF PHD AND MPhil THESES REQUIRED DECLARATIONS

1. Candidate's declarations:

I, John F. Morrison, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 82,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I was admitted as a research student in September 2005 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. in May, 2007; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2005 and 2010.

Date 25-Aug-10 Signature of candidate

2. Supervisor's declaration:

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Ph.D. in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.

Date 25-Aug-10 Signature of supervisor

3. Permission for electronic publication: *(to be signed by both candidate and supervisor)*

In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews we understand that we are giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. We also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. We have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below.

The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic publication of this thesis:

(iii) Embargo on both all of printed copy and electronic copy for the same fixed period of 1 year on the following ground(s):

Publication would be in breach of law or ethics

Date 25-Aug-10 Signature of candidate

Signature of supervisor

Table of Contents

List of Tables vii

List of Figures ix

Abstract x

Acknowledgements xi

Introduction P.1

Chapter 1: Function of an Organisation

1.1 Introduction P.7

1.2 The Organisation p.8

1.3 The Terrorist Group as a Political Organisation: Public Goods and Externalities P.10

1.4 Survival and Maintenance P.14

1.5 Support P.19

1.6 Loyalty P.26

1.7 External Factors P.28

1.8 Chapter Summary P.29

Chapter 2: Intra-Organisational Conflict

2.1 Introduction P.30

2.2 Reasoning for Intra-Organisational Conflict P.31

2.3 Alternative Hypotheses p.33

2.3.2 March and Simon Model of Organisational Conflict P.33

2.3.2 The Pondy Model P.35

2.3.3 Weinberg and Richardson Model P.36

2.4 Intra-Organisational Conflict in Terrorist Organisations P. 38

2.5 Chapter Summary P.41

Chapter 3: Exit, Voice and Entry

3.1 Introduction P.42

3.2 Voice P.43

3.3 Exit P.48

3.4 Entry P.53

3.5 Chapter Summary P.57

Chapter 4: Theory of Splits

4.1 Introduction P.58

4.2 Organisational Splits P.59

4.3 Process Model of Split P.63

4.3.1 Dyck and Starke Process Model of Breakaway Group Formation P.63

4.4 Splits in the Terrorism Literature P.67

4.4.1 Application of the Hirschman Model P.70

4.4.2 Application of the Irvin Model P.73

4.4.3 Application of the Miller Model P.74

4.5 Splits: How Terrorism Ends? P.75

4.4 Post-Split Competition P.79

4.5 Hypothesised Process Model P.83

4.6 Chapter Summary P.84

Chapter 5: Aims of the Present Study and Hypotheses

5.1 Introduction P.86

5.2 Organisational Aims and Hypotheses P.87

5.3 Individual Hypotheses and Aims P.92

5.4 The Functionality of Splits as a Process P.93

5.5 Chapter Summary P.94

Chapter 6: Methodology

6.1 Introduction to Methodology P.95

6.2 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis P.96

6.3 Interviewing P.98

6.3.1 Sampling Procedure P.99

6.3.2 Participants P.101

6.3.3 Interview Methodology P.103

5.4 Interpretative Data Analysis P.105

5.6 Validity P.106

5.7 Chapter Summary P.108

**Chapter 7: Introduction to Interview Analysis: The Macro-Process of Irish
Republican Involvement in the ‘Troubles’**

7.1 Introduction P.110

7.2 Splits in the Irish Republican Movement P.112

7.3 Splits as a Process P.115

7.4 Chapter Summary P.117

Chapter 8(a): 1969/70 The Origin of the Macro-Process

8a.1 Introduction P.118

8a.2 Stage 1: The Origins of 1969/70 P.120

8a.2.1 Public Support: Weakened P.121

8a.2.2 Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment P.123

8a.2.3 The Origins of Factionalism P.125

8a.3 Stage 2: Factional Development P.130

8a.3.1 Policy Changes: Too Much Too Soon? P.134

8a.3.1.1 Armed to Political P.136

8a.3.1.2 Politically Left-Wing P.138

8a.3.1.3 Abstentionism P.141

8a.3.1.4 National Leadership P.143

8a.4 Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split P.145

8a.4.1 Preparation for Split P.147

8a.4.2 Republican Expectations and Leadership Disconnect P.150

8a.4.2 External Influence: Fianna Fail P.157

8a.5 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation P.158

8a.5.1 The Split P.159

8a.5.2 Competition for Support P.161

8a.5.3 Personality Clashes and Trust P.164

8a.5.4 Overview of Split P.166

8a.6 Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation P.167

8a.6.1 Competition P.169

8a.6.1.1 Competition for Membership and Support P.170

8a.6.1.2 New Enemy: Violent Feuds P.172

Chapter 8(b) 1986: The Beginning of the End

8b.1 Introduction P.176

8b.2 Stage 2: Factional Development P.178

8b.2.1 Voice: Questioning of Strategy P.183

8b.2.2 IRA Restructuring and Northern Prominence P.189

8b.3 Successful Application of Voice: Transition of Power: One Step at a Time P.192

8b.3.1 Strengthening in Alternative Support: Benefits of Circumstance P.194

8b.3.2 Control of Voice P.196

8b.3.3 Strategy Change: One Step at a Time: Armed to Armed and Political P.198

8b.3.4 Leadership Change P.203

8b.4 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation P.207

8b.4.1 Change in Political Strategy: Abstentionism P.211

8b.4.2 Preparation for Split P.215

8b.5 Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split P.219

Chapter 8(c) 1997: The Steps into Peace

8c.1 Introduction P.226

8c.2 Historical Analysis of 1997 Split P.229

8c.3 Change in Strategy: Armed and Political to Political P.238

8c.4 Factionalism P.240

8c.5 Gradualism: One Step at a Time P.244

8c.6: Preparation for Change: Support P.249

Chapter 9 Discussion and Conclusions

9.1 Introduction P.256

9.2 Present Study Findings P.257

9.2.1 Testing of Stage-Based Process Models P.258

9.2.1.1 1969/70 P.259

9.2.1.2 1974 P.260

9.2.1.3 1986 P.260

9.2.1.4 1997 P.261

9.2.2 Organisational Perspective P.261

9.2.3 Individual Perspective P.266

9.3 Contribution P.268

9.4 Future Research P.270

9.5 Conclusions P.272

Bibliography P.273

Appendix A Table of Interview P.287

Appendix B Complete Interview Schedule P.291

Appendix C Ethical Issues in the Research P.298

Appendix D Consent Form P.302

Appendix E The Stage-Based Data Analysis Process P.303

Appendix F 1974: The Officials Divide Again P.311

Appendix G Why Do People Become Dissidents? P.335

List of Tables

- Table 6.1: Participants involved at the time of the 1969/70 split P.102
- Table 6.2: Participants involved at the time of the 1974 split P.102
- Table 6.3: Participants involved at the time of the 1986 split P.102
- Table 6.4: Participants involved at the time of the 1997 split. P.102
- Table 6.5: Participants who exited the Movement at a time other than a split. P.103
- Table 8a.1: Participants who discussed 1969/70 split P.119
- Table 8a.2: Factionalism due to Armed Strategy P.131
- Table 8a.3: Factionalism due to Political Strategy P.132
- Table 8a.4: Factionalism due to Political Strategy P.132
- Table 8a.5: Factionalism due to Left-Wing Political Strategy P.132
- Table 8a.6: Factionalism due to Abstentionism P.133
- Table 8a.7: Factionalism in National Leadership P.133
- Table 8a.8: Intra-organisational conflicts between Left-Wing Politicisers and Religious Old-Guard p.134
- Table 8a.9: Membership Expectations: Weapons P.152
- Table 8a.10: Membership Expectations: Defence P.152
- Table 8a.11: Public Expectations: Defence P.153
- Table 8a.12: Disconnect between membership expectations and Leadership strategy P.153
- Table 8a.13: Leadership Unprepared P.153
- Table 8a.14: Influence of Fianna Fail in developing the Provisionals P.157
- Table 8a.15: Significance of Personality Clashes P.165
- Table 8a.16: Influential Individuals: Old-Guard P.165
- Table 8a.17: Influential Individuals: Local Leadership P.166
- Table 8a.18: Violent Feuds P.172
- Table 8b.1: Participants who discussed 1986 split P.177
- Table 8b.2: 1974/5 ceasefire beginning of 1986 process P.179
- Table 8b.3: The importance of debates within the Prisons P.184
- Table 8b.4: North/South Factionalism P.191
- Table 8b.5: Old Guard/New Guard Factionalism P.191

<u>Table 8b.6: National Leadership Factionalism P.192</u>
<u>Table 8b.7: Strengthened Public Support P.196</u>
<u>Table 8b.8: Merger of papers P.197</u>
<u>Table 8b.9: Leadership Distancing P.199</u>
<u>Table 8b.10: Change from Armed to Armed and Political Strategy P.202</u>
<u>Table 8b.11: Change of Abstentionist Policy to Dail Eireann P.212</u>
<u>Table 8b.12: Adams/McGuinness Leadership Preparation for Change P.216</u>
<u>Table 8b.13: Pre-Change Securing of Support P.216</u>
<u>Table 8b.14: Old-Guard Influential Individuals P.218</u>
<u>Table 8b.15: Lessons learned P.223</u>
<u>Table 8c.1: Participants who discussed the 1997 split. P.228</u>
<u>Table 8c.2: Change in Strategy from Armed and Political to Armed P.238</u>
<u>Table 8c.3: Factionalism: Armed/Political P.240</u>
<u>Table 8c.4: Factionalism: North/South Divide P.241</u>
<u>Table 8c.5: Gradualism: One Step at a Time P.245</u>
<u>Table 8c.6: Preparation for Change P.249</u>
<u>Table 8c.7: The Importance of Internal Support P.250</u>
<u>Table 8c.8: The Importance of Timing P.250</u>
<u>Table 8c.9: The Application of Leadership Distancing. P.250</u>
<u>Table 8c.10: Usage of ‘internal methods’ in 1996 Army Convention. P.254</u>
<u>Table F.1: Participants who discussed the 1974 split P.312</u>
<u>Table F.2: Change of Armed Strategy P.314</u>
<u>Table F.3: Centrality of Seamus Costello to the 1974 Split P.320</u>
<u>Table F.4: Post Split Violent Feuds P.330</u>

List of Figures

Figure C.2: Row from the Stage 3 'Group' analysis results table of 'Denis' P.307

Figure C.3: Extract from the super-ordinate table for the theme of Voice. P.309

Abstract

One of the foremost reasons for the success of the Northern Irish Peace Process has been the ability of the national leadership of the Provisional Republican Movement to bring the majority of their membership away from the armed campaign and towards the acceptance of peaceful politics. This dissertation analyses how they were able to achieve this. This is carried out by considering the processes of the four major splits in modern day Irish republicanism from 1969 to 1997. Each split was analysed so as to derive why the split took place and why one side was more successful than the other in the aftermath. The cases were used to test a stage-based process model of split designed by the author. The data from thirty-eight semi-structured interviews were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). This analysis treated the three Provisional splits as three micro-processes within the macro-process of Provisional Republican involvement in the 'Troubles', as it did the two Official splits with respect to the Official macro-process of involvement. The results of the analysis showed that the success of the later Provisional leadership was significantly tied to their method of changing strategies, tactics and policies one step at a time rather than by attempting to implement a variety of substantial changes within a short space of time as the leadership of the 1960s endeavoured to. This research outlines how the acceptance of peaceful politics for a terrorist organisation is a gradual stage-based process and that in order to be successful that the significant changes must be implemented in a patient manner.

Acknowledgements

The process of this PhD has been long, and at times arduous. There was no way that I would have been able to make it through it without the help, friendship and support of so many amazing people. I would first of all like to thank Dr. John Horgan for encouraging me to move over to St. Andrews to do this PhD, and for his constant support when things weren't running so smoothly at the beginning. Similarly I would like to give the warmest thanks to Dr. Michael Boyle for his insightful, thorough, and often times witty supervision. I have the utmost respect for any man who can calmly tackle what was initially a 150 page first chapter on organisations and split, and come out the other side laughing and joking while still pointing me in the right direction. Without either of these men I would never have been able to finish this.

I would similarly like to thank all those who were not officially affiliated with this dissertation but gave me academic guidance and support through. I would especially like to thank all the staff within the School of International Relations, St. Andrews and the librarians at the Northern Irish Political Collection in the Linen Hall Library, Belfast.

To my friends and colleagues in St. Andrews, Edinburgh, Sligo, Dublin, Belfast and all around the globe. I am very lucky to have met each and every one of you. You are now free to comfortably ask me “when are you going to be finished that ‘essay’?” without fear of a backlash. It's done at last! I thank you all for your friendship, support, humour and interest in my work. Two people deserve a particular mention. Faye Donnelly I will never forget how you calmed me down all those years ago when I was about to drop out of this whole PhD. Thank you. Alison Careless and everyone in 5 Union St. you went out of your way to welcome me into your home in the last stressful few weeks of this work. It made it so much easier. Thank you.

Throughout my four and a bit years doing this work I have lived with a variety of amazing people. I would love to thank them all personally. However, there are three people who deserve special thanks in this regard. David Miles for making my move from

Ireland to Scotland so easy and Ricky and Janette my comrades in 'Team Channing' my time in Belfast with you guys was one of the best years I have ever had.

To everyone who agreed to give up their time to meet or be interviewed by me I will forever be grateful. There would be no PhD without you. Similarly I am forever indebted to all those who helped arrange interviews and meetings for me. In this regard I would especially like to thank Tommie Gorman of RTE for both welcoming me to Belfast and allowing me to 'use his name' in my attempts to meet with numerous people. This opened so many doors for me, doors which would have stayed shut without you.

I have the most amazing family, both immediate and extended, and they have excelled themselves in support and love throughout these years. This is especially true of my three siblings Una, Kevin and Brendan. You are more than my brothers and sister, you are my best friends. Also to Grandma, Ita Stephens, you have always shown nothing but love and support to me in this and all of my endeavours down through the years. *Gra Mor*. However, above all others who have been mentioned in these acknowledgements I don't know how to thank my amazing parents Barbara and Peter Morrison enough. You have gone beyond the call of parenting in your support of me throughout these years. I love you both so much, and will never forget what you have done for me.

I would finally like to acknowledge the pain and suffering which so many people in Northern Ireland, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland have endured throughout the years, be it at the hands of paramilitaries, security forces or governments. Nothing is worth the death, injury and permanent trauma which has been endured. It is up to us all to make sure that we never return to those days.

John F. Morrison

June 10th, 2010

University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

Introduction

The Northern Irish peace process is internationally recognised as having brought an end to the conflict commonly referred to as ‘The Troubles.’¹ The involvement of the British and Irish governments as well as their American allies is rightly credited as playing a major role in achieving a lasting peace. However, without the positive actions and compromises of the Northern Irish actors, both those violent and peaceful actors, the achievement of peace would have been impossible. Central to this was the movement of the Irish Republican Movement, in particular the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), from the employment of terrorism² as a tactic towards the exclusive adoption of peaceful politics.³ Without this action and their continued commitment to peaceful politics any progress in the peaceful development of the six counties of Northern Ireland would have been extremely difficult.⁴

The continued success of the peace process is reliant on the commitment of the leaders of the various Northern Irish organisations, both violent and non-violent, to the utilisation

¹ While this is the case there have been significant failures of the process and consequently there are those who are highly critical of the process. See Dingley, J. (2002). Peace in Our Time? The Stresses and Strains on the Northern Ireland Peace Process. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 25(6), pp.357-382

²For the purpose of this work there will not be an extensive discussion outlining the ins and outs of the debate. For the purpose of this dissertation any use of the word ‘terrorism’ refers to the employment of violence or the threat of repeated violence by the individual or group intent on bringing about a social or political effect. The aim of this action is to bring about a state of fear in a wider audience than the direct physical victims of the initial act or threat of violence. A terrorist incident should be defined by the use of violence or the threat of violence to bring about social or political change, not by the specific motive of the perpetrators. Therefore terrorism is a tactic which can be employed by any individual or group, whether they be state or non-state actors. See for example, Schmid, A. & Jongman (2005). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction), pp.1-38; Richardson, L. (2007). *What Terrorists Want*. (London: John Murray), pp.19-39; Horgan, J. (2005). *The Psychology of Terrorism*. (London: Routledge), pp. 1-47; Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 1-41; Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), pp. 777-794; Silke, A. (1996). Terrorism and the Blind Man’s Elephant, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 8(3), pp. 12-28; English, R. (2009). *Terrorism How to Respond*. (New York: Oxford University Press). Pp.1-26.

³ This belief that the Republican change in strategy was a dominant factor in the success of the peace process is supportive of the position taken in Hayes, M. (1998). The Evolution of Republican Strategy and the ‘Peace Process’ in Ireland. In *Race & Class*, 39(3), pp.21-39

⁴ The same is true for those other Republican groups as well as the Loyalist paramilitaries who renounced violence.

and promotion of peaceful politics.⁵ However, what is more important is that the majority of their organisational membership similarly ascribe to the power of politics as opposed to the employment of the gun and the bomb. A leadership promoting peaceful politics is only constructive if they convince their internal membership and support of its benefits. It has been the ability of the leadership of the modern day Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein to successfully convince the majority of its membership of the benefits of peaceful politics which has ensured their continued involvement in the continuing peace process.

This has been a slow gradual process. In order to fully understand the entire process one must assess Irish Republicanism from as far back as the early 1960s. The present dissertation aims to do this by focusing on the splits in the movement from 1969/1970 to 1997. Each of the four splits can, to a degree, be regarded as a result of the leadership of the time aiming to bring a stronger political emphasis on the movement. The level of politicisation within each of the splits was different, as was the resulting strength of the parent and breakaway organisations. Therefore one of the most important parts of the research is to assess why one leadership was more successful than the other in successfully convincing the majority of their membership to support their politicisation process. In total there are four separate splits analysed. These are:

- **1969/70:** The IRA and Sinn Fein splits to form Official Sinn Fein and the Official IRA on one side and Provisional Sinn Fein and the Provision IRA on the other side of the split.
- **1974:** The Official Republican Movement⁶ splits which sees the creation of the Irish Republican Socialist Movement consisting of the Irish National Liberation Army and the Irish Republican Socialist Party.
- **1986:** A split in the Provisional Irish Republican Movement where a group led by Ruairi O'Bradaigh, among others, leave to form Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA.⁷ And;

⁵ Dixon, P. (2002). Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation? The Choreography of the Northern Ireland Peace Process. In *Political Studies*, 50, pp.725-741.

⁶ Official IRA and Official Sinn Fein

- **1997:** The Provisional Irish Republican Movement splits which sees the formation of the 32 County Sovereignty Committee⁸ and the Real IRA.⁹

The splits should not be regarded as separate entities. They are intrinsically linked within the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles.’ The 1969/70, 1986 and 1997 splits are contained within the Provisional process of involvement in the ‘Troubles’ while the 1969/70 and 1974 splits can be considered part of the Official process of involvement in the ‘Troubles.’ As the history of Irish Republicanism, and splits in the movement, precedes 1969 and has continued beyond 1997 the choice of this dateline needs to be explained. For the majority of observers the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ began with the extensive violence of 1969 and was brought to a close in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.¹⁰ While there was paramilitary hostility before 1969 and after 1998 this can be regarded as taking place during different phases of the history of the Northern Irish conflict.

The start date of the research, 1969, is resonant within Irish Republicanism for a number of different reasons, one being the failure of the Goulding leadership of the IRA and Sinn Fein to bring the Irish Republican Movement away from violence and towards the acceptance of parliamentary politics, resulting in a dramatic split in the movement, a split which continues to effect both Irish and British society and security to this day.¹¹ Alternatively the end date of 1997 can be regarded as being the point in time where the Provisional Irish Republican Movement, then the largest grouping of Irish Republican paramilitaries, ultimately moved to reject the further dominant use of violence in order to achieve their goals, and accepted a peaceful political approach.¹² Consequently the

⁷ While Republican Sinn Fein to this day deny any formal affiliation with the Continuity IRA it is credible to mention the two groups as being affiliated.

⁸ This group is now known as the 32 County Sovereignty Movement.

⁹ 32 County Sovereignty Movement deny any official affiliation with the Real IRA. However it is widely acknowledged that 32CSM acts as the political wing of the Real IRA.

¹⁰ This agreement is also often referred to as the Belfast Agreement.

¹¹ While this is a brief description of what happened in 1969 it is dealt with more in depth later in the dissertation.

¹² This is not to say that there was no Provisional violence after this date. However the events leading up to and during this split can be regarded as vital in the process of the Provisionals ultimately announcing their permanent ceasefire and the decommissioning of their weapons.

choice of these four specific splits has provided the researcher with an opportunity uncommon among much previous research on organisational splits. The four splits can be viewed as a continuum, with each of the four interconnected.

The research analyses the splits from both an organisational and an individual perspective. Unlike much of the terrorism literature the dissertation does not automatically class the splits as a form of 'end of terrorism.' Not all splits are analogous to the end of the terrorist group and some can be more accurately regarded as the naissance of a terrorist organisation. The 1969/70 split which saw the birth of the Provisional IRA is a clear example of this.

While fundamentally analysing why and how the splits took place, at both an organisational and an individual level, the present research additionally allows one to see how and why the Provisional leadership of the late 1990s was able to succeed where the Goulding leadership of 1969/70 failed, by convincing the majority of Irish Republicans to accept the use of peaceful politics, as opposed to the dominant use of violence, to achieve their aims and goals.¹³ Therefore while the research at first glance is analysing splits in Irish Republicanism it is also, at a deeper level, assessing how the leadership of the Republican Movement has successfully moved the majority of its membership away from a long campaign of terrorist violence and into the arena of peaceful politics. The research similarly provides an opportunity to assess why certain groups and individuals deemed it necessary to move away from this politicisation process at certain points in time. Therefore the success of the Northern Irish peace process cannot be fully understood without first of all understanding these four splits, their results and the reasoning behind each of them. In essence the research is not only looking to the reasoning for the splits but also to their functionality in allowing for Republican involvement in the peace process.¹⁴

¹³ While this is only referring to the 1969/70 and 1997 splits the 1974 and 1986 splits also play a vital role in the process and need to be analysed in order to gain the most comprehensive understanding possible.

¹⁴ This is distinct from the peace process literature which focuses on the success from a counter-terrorism perspective and looks at the actions taken in policy and legislation. This research looks to how one of the groups of illegal actors internally brought their membership away from the application of terrorism as a tactic and towards the acceptance of peaceful politics. See Guelke, A. (2007). *The Northern Ireland Peace*

The chosen splits can, and will, be looked at in two separate ways. They can be analysed as individual stand alone case studies of organisational splits. Similarly they can, as detailed above, be analysed together as a series of intertwined splits within the one movement. They are presented in the dissertation as four stage-based micro-processes within the macro-process of Republican involvement in the Troubles. This analysis is achieved by comparing and contrasting the two sides within each of the splits, as well as comparing the results of each of the individual splits. Throughout the research there is the acknowledgement that the tactics of the Irish Republican Movement are not, and rarely have been, solely reliant on the use of terrorism. It is a movement which has often times had armed and political wings working parallel to, and often times with, each other. This relationship between the use of armed struggle and politics¹⁵ is a theme which is acknowledged by many to have played a central role in each of the splits. In order to appreciate the aims and achievements of modern day 'mainstream' republicanism it is important to first of all understand and contrast the actions and attitudes of the movement today with that of the vast majority of republicans in the late 1960s and 1970s.¹⁶ The present study utilises the cases of the splits to achieve this understanding.

This research has been carried out predominantly through the utilisation of semi-structured interviews with Irish Republicans who were involved across the splits. These participants represent both leadership and membership levels of Irish republicanism. The interviews were analysed using the analytical approach of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). While the interview data provided the main body of the analysis the results of this analysis were validated through the use of primary and secondary sources.

In order to carry out this the analysis has aimed to answer two core organisational questions as well as two core individual questions of splits. The organisational questions

Process and the War Against Terrorism: Conflicting Conceptions? In *Government and Opposition*, 42(3), pp.272-291.

¹⁵ See Weinberg, L. and Pedahzur, A. (2003). *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*. London: Routledge. pp.105-118.

¹⁶ Alonso, R. (2004). Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), pp.695-713. (p.698)

look at the process of split while the individual questions assess the individual reasoning for allegiance.

QO1. Why did each of the splits take place when they did?

QO2. How did each of the splits take place?

QI1. Why do individual members decide to exit from an organisation to join or set up and new organisation?

QI2. Why do individual members decide to stay with a parent organisation at a time of split?

What follows is first an analysis of political organisational theory, followed by an examination of research on organisational splits. These chapters take an interdisciplinary look at the issues and are not over-reliant on one specific body of research. The dissertation then proceeds to detail the aims of the research as well as the methodology employed. As the four splits are being treated as four micro-processes within the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the Troubles the results of the analysis are presented as three separate sub-chapters and one appendix. The 1974 split is presented as an appendix so as to differentiate it from the splits involved in the Provisional process of involvement. In order to gain a greater understanding of the origins and consequences of each of the splits these must be read together. The findings are drawn together in the final chapters where the relevance and importance of the research is discussed.

Chapter 1

Function of an Organisation

“The study of international relations must be made an interdisciplinary enterprise, drawing its discourse from all social sciences, and even further.”¹⁷

1.1 Introduction

In recent times there has been an undoubted proliferation of academic interest in the tactic of terrorism, and the organisations which utilise it. However, even with this abundance of research there are still too many significant gaps in the literature produced. One of the fundamental areas often ignored is that of the internal conflicts within the terrorist groups. These groups, akin to all other organisations, are not homogenous groups of people who agree on all matters pertaining to the group, its goals, and strategies.¹⁸ Members disagree, factionalise and sometimes split. By acknowledging these facts researchers open themselves up to assessing features of the organisations which may move our understanding of terrorism a significant step forward. While the work carried out on internal organisational conflicts in terrorist groups is sparse, this is not to say that it is completely non-existent.¹⁹ However, terrorism researchers are still decades behind their contemporaries analysing economic, religious and social-movement organisations. This should not discourage researchers from approaching the topic, on the contrary. As the quote which opened this chapter indicates the study of international relations has to be interdisciplinary in nature, drawing on the methodologies, findings and discourses from all areas of the social sciences and beyond. Consequently this dissertation proposes the application of organisational and social-movement organisational theory to the analysis of splits in terrorist organisations in general and splits in the Irish Republicanism specifically.

¹⁷ An Editorial. (1957) *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1/1. pp.1-2. (p.1)

¹⁸ Rapoport, D.C. (2001). Introduction. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. London: Frank Cass. pp.1-10 (p.1)

¹⁹ Crelinsten, R.D. (1987). The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. (London: Frank Cass.) pp.59-89; Irvin, C.L. (1999). *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

These first four chapters outline the theoretical underpinnings of the present research, much of which has been developed from economic, political and social-movement organisational theory, while not ignoring the theories and findings from previous terrorism research. The present chapter focuses the function of an organisation. Included in this analysis are the issues of support, intra-organisational conflict and organisational survival. The purpose of the chapter is to lay a foundation for chapters 2, 3 and 4 which develop the discussion to detail issues pertinent to our understanding of organisational conflicts and splits.

What follows in the present chapter is a detailed, critical account of the theoretical approach utilised in the present research. Throughout this account there is a concerted effort to consider the theories and findings from interdisciplinary fields. The six main issues covered within the chapter are.

- The Organisation
- The Terrorist Group as a Political Organisation
- Organisational Survival and Maintenance
- Support
- Loyalty, and
- External Factors.

Throughout the discussions it is emphasised how each of these issues are important in understanding splits in terrorist organisations.

1.2 The Organisation

A split in human organisations is the result of internal debate, disagreement and/or conflict which ultimately results in one faction of the organisation deeming it necessary to move away from the parent organisation in order to establish a new group more in line with the viewpoints and expectations of that section of the membership. With this understanding splits are the result of specific intra-organisational dynamics.

Consequently in order to fully understand why and how a split takes place, and the resultant choices made by members, the researcher must first of all appreciate

organisational purpose, aims and function. This is not to say that the importance of external factors is diminished. As no split is completely unaffected by external forces one must be aware of the environment in which splits take place and how certain external actors and actions can affect the internal dynamics of organisations.²⁰ However, in order to effectively assess the influence which external and environmental factors may have on an organisation it is the organisation itself which must first be clearly understood.

It is proposed that terrorist organisations should be analysed and appreciated as a form of political interest group.²¹ Similar to 'regular' political organisations the terrorist group aims to achieve collective values, which involve bringing about change in specific political and social conditions.²² The difference between a terrorist organisation and other political organisations is the reliance on violence and the threat of violence as a tactic.²³ Reference to groups as terrorist organisations and their members as terrorists does not imply their exclusive use of terrorism as a tactic, as these organisations have the ability to, and do, utilise non-violent tactics in their pursuit of goals. These terms are purely implied for individuals and groups which place a significant emphasis on the application of terrorism. Other political organisations and actors have the ability to utilise violence or the threat of violence as a tactic, without being classified as a terrorist or a terrorist organisation. Therefore terrorism is but one tactic available to political organisations.²⁴ The application of this claim with the case study of the Provisional Republican Movement will display that terrorism is but one activity of many which has been utilised by the movement, other tactics employed include non-violent political protest, constitutional politics and organised crime. An organisational perspective has in the past been applied to gain a greater understanding of terrorist group behaviour,

²⁰ Balser, D.B. (1997). The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organisations. *Social Forces*, 76(1). Pp.199-228; Khadka, N. (1995). Factionalism in the Communist Movement in Nepal. *Pacific Affairs*, 68(1), pp.55-76. (p.56)

²¹ Oots, K.L. (1989). Organisational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups. *Terrorism*, 12, pp.139-152. (p.139)

²² Crenshaw, M. (1987). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. London: Frank Cass. Pp.13-31. (p.13)

²³ Crenshaw, M. (1985). An Organisational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism. *Orbis*. Pp.465-489. (p.465).

²⁴ *Ibid* p.466

formation and decline²⁵ as well as advancing our knowledge of organisational learning.²⁶ The knowledge gained from these and other studies has shown the utility of the organisational perspective.

1.3 The Terrorist Group as a Political Organisation: Public Goods and Externalities

Before it is possible to fully assess and appreciate that terrorist groups should be categorised as political organisations one must first of all appreciate what constitutes a political organisation. At first sight the organisational activity of a political organisation and its members is directed at achieving politically relevant goals, goals which represent the beliefs of the membership.²⁷ The aims and goals of the organisation can be constituted as the achievement of public or collective goods. A public or collective good is one which cannot be withheld from any member of the eligible community or country. Even non-organisational members or non-contributors are eligible to the consumption of the goods achieved.²⁸ There are three essential characteristics to public goods.²⁹ There is an under provision of public goods as the population are unable to, or lack the incentive to, supply the goods for themselves. The consumption of public goods by one actor does not diminish the consumption by another. And the final characteristic is that non-contributors cannot be excluded from their consumption. It is these three factors which differentiate a public good from a private good.³⁰ In stating this it is notable to point out that it can be argued that there are very few purely public goods, and that the 'publicness' of the goods is a matter of degree.³¹ This contention stipulates that there are very few

²⁵ Oots (1989)

²⁶ Jackson, B.A. (2005). *Aptitude for Destruction Volume 1: Organisational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism*. Pittsburgh, PA: RAND; Jackson, B.A., Baker, J. C., Cragin, K., Parachini, J., Trujillo, H. R. and Chalk, P. (2005). *Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: Case Studies of Organisational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*. Pittsburgh, PA: RAND.

²⁷ Wilson, J.Q. (1974). *Political Organisations*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. (p.10)

²⁸ Oots, K.L. (1986). *A Political Organisational Approach to Transnational Terrorism*. Westport, Connecticut: Green Wood Press. (p.45); Hirschman, A.O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. (p.101)

²⁹ The defining characteristics have similarly been divided in two by Samuelson, excludability and exhaustibility. This definition excludes the under provision of public goods. See Gupta, D.K. (2008). *Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation and Demise*. London: Routledge. (p.36)

³⁰ Oots (1989) p.140

³¹ Stokey, E.B. and Zeckhauser, R. (1978). *A Primer for Policy Analysis*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. (pp.306-309). Cited in Oots, K.L. (1986). *A Political Organisational Approach to Transnational Terrorism*. Westport, Connecticut: Green Wood Press. (p.45)

goods which are open to the full consumption by the entire public, whether they be tangible, such as transport infrastructure, or intangible goods, such as a new government.

When the concept of public goods is applied to terrorist groups it becomes clear that similar to other political organisations the ultimate or purposive aim of terrorist groups is the achievement of a public good for a specific population. Republican paramilitaries, aim to achieve an independent unified thirty-two county socialist Ireland. ETA thrives to achieve an independent Basque country. Among the aims of Al-Qaeda is the overthrow of what they believe to be illegitimate regimes in Arab and Islamic Countries and replace them with a Caliphate. Al Qaeda wish to create a single state for all Muslims governed by sharia law.³² Each of these aims can be separately defined as a public good. It is not necessary for the good to meet the approval of all of the population. It is regular that the achievement of such goods will be viewed negatively by certain members or groups within the population. With the case of Northern Ireland the Unionist population, as well as some others across Ireland and Britain, would look upon the achievement of a united Ireland as a negative public good. There are those who may look positively on one aspect of the achievement, but negatively on another. Staying with the Irish Republican example some may be positively disposed to a united Ireland while simultaneously viewing a socialist state as negative, or vice versa. As with all political organisations the goals of a terrorist organisation can evolve over time. This may occur due to a number of internal and external factors, many of which will be dealt with over the course of this chapter. One case of goal evolution can be observed in the strengthening of the socialist element of the aims and goals of the Irish Republican Movement in the 1960s. These changes and evolutions in goals are generally initiated by the leadership of an organisation and it is more likely that they will be successfully brought about, especially if the changes are in anyway controversial, when the leadership³³ are at a moment of strength and have the support of the membership and the relevant external actors. If this is attempted at a time of weakness for the leadership the change is less likely to be

³² Rapoport, D. C. (2003). The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. In . In Kegley Jr., C. W (ed.) (2003). *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Pp. 36-52

³³ Or the individuals or groups wishing to implement the change

successful and may, in extreme circumstances, lead to intra-organisational conflict, factionalism and possibly split.

In their pursuit of public goods or otherwise the actions of terrorist organisations, and all other political organisations, may lead to externalities; both positive and negative. An externality is when an actor is affected by the actions of others which are beyond the affected individual's control.³⁴ A negative externality with regards the use of terrorism as a tactic is the fear experienced by members of the wider public after a violent attack, or threat of attack. It has also been noted that actions by terrorist groups may lead to private benefits for the organisation itself. The example is cited of a bombing campaign against political targets by the group increasing the stature of the movement.³⁵ While this is at times the case it is also true that the actions of a terrorist organisation can and does have negative internal effects. For Real IRA the Omagh bombing of August 1998 proved to have a significantly negative impact on the organisation as a whole with arrests, infiltration and it being next to impossible to recruit.

The advancement of the pursuit for specific collective public goods can be regarded as one of the foremost similarities between the terrorist group and other political organisations but the focus must not purely be on the aims and goals of the organisation. Crenshaw outlines further parallels between terrorist organisations and non-violent political organisations regarding organisational structure and decision making processes. She outlines the similarities in four distinct areas. The premise suggests that both forms of organisation have defined structures and processes by which collective decisions are made. Within the organisation there are functionally differentiated roles for individual members. There are recognised leaders in positions of formal authority. Finally, and in relation to goals, it is proposed that the organisation has a collective set of goals pursued as a unit, and that the group takes collective responsibility for their actions in the pursuit of these goals.³⁶ This should not be interpreted as suggesting that all terrorist groups are

³⁴ Oots, (1986) p.46.

³⁵ Siqueira, K. (2005). Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organisations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2), pp.218-236. (p.221)

³⁶ Crenshaw, (1985), p.466.

homogenous in organisational structure, tactics and goals. Similar to other political organisations there are numerous different options open to each individual terrorist organisation. If one is to consider the question of leadership there are numerous forms available to, and applied by, different terrorist organisations and their non-violent contemporaries. Groups which have been classed together as terrorist groups are often times extensively different in their leadership structure. Some may be dictated by a dominant figurehead, others led by a collective national leadership and others reliant on individual local leaderships to lead the local memberships. This is parallel to some of the options available to non-violent political organisations.

By focusing on the terrorist organisations, rather than the terrorist acts or motives, as a determining factor in the process of terrorism significant advancements can and have been made in our theoretical understanding of comparisons of terrorist groups.³⁷ By analysing the organisational process of the group one can integrate multiple aspects such as ideology, social conditions and individual motivations.³⁸ If the terrorist group is to be regarded as a political organisation it is clear that the terrorism researcher must also recognise the dilemmas and recommendations faced by those researching non-violent political organisations. It has been proposed that if those studying economic or political organisations paid closer attention not just to the work analysing other forms of economic or political organisations but also social-movement organisations that significant advances will be made in both fields.³⁹ In respect to this the following sections will not only look in detail at organisational aspects similar to splits in political and terrorist organisations, but also look to the findings and theories advanced with respect to other forms of organisations and social-movements.

With respect to organisational splits it is necessary to understanding the overall purpose of a political organisation, the acquisition of specific public goods, before it is possible to fully appreciate the reasoning for the split. Therefore the function of this chapter is to

³⁷ *Ibid*, Pp.465-466.

³⁸ *Ibid*, p.472.

³⁹ Campbell, J.C. (2005). Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organisations and Social Movement Research. In Gavis, G.F., McAdam, D., Richard Scott, W. and Zald, M.N. (2005). *Social Movements and Organisation Theory*. (pp. 41-68). New York: Cambridge University Press. (p.41)

achieve an understanding of the function of a political organisation before outlining the processes of organisational conflict and split in the subsequent chapters.

1.4 Survival and Maintenance

“Whatever else organisations seek, they seek to survive.”⁴⁰

As the previous section has detailed the purposive aims of political organisations in general, and for the purpose of this research terrorist organisations specifically, is the attainment of a specific form of public goods. While this contention is accurate the attainment of the public good is not always the immediate aim of an organisation. In order to be able to achieve an organisation’s ultimate aim of the attainment of their preferred public goods their immediate aims must be the survival and maintenance of the organisation.⁴¹ This is the basic tenet at the heart of all organisational theory. The attainment of the goal is contingent on maintenance of the identity of the organisation.⁴² Therefore the minimal and immediate goal of every organisation must be survival.⁴³ It has been stipulated that organisations will become more conservative in their strategies and tactics if the survival and maintenance is somehow challenged.⁴⁴ This may prove to be a facet of the organisational approach which is the inverse in terrorist organisations. The reality for terrorist organisations may be more in line with the assertion by Zald and Ash⁴⁵ in reference to social-movement organisations which states that in times of competition for support there may be a shift in goals which may be towards the centre, but may also move the group more towards the extremes. In relation to terrorist organisations it is observed that in order to avoid the departure of significant sub-groups of an organisation a formerly moderate membership may at times have to radicalise their

⁴⁰ Wilson, p.10.

⁴¹ It is argued later in this section that survival is not always the immediate aim of the organisation.

⁴² Firey, W. (1948). Informal Organisation and the Theory of Schism. *American Sociological Review*. 13(1). Pp.15-24. (p.18)

⁴³ Crenshaw (1985) p.473

⁴⁴ Zald, M.N. and Ash, R. (1966). Social Movement Organisations: Growth, Decay and Change. *Social Forces*, 44(3). Pp.327-341 (p.327). This is referred to by Zald and Ash as the Weber-Michels model.

⁴⁵ Zald and Ash (1966) p.332.

tactics and strategies.⁴⁶ Therefore at certain stages the terrorist actions may aid in the survival of this organisation.⁴⁷ This is a complex role for the organisation to play as if they over radicalise they risk losing the more moderate membership and external support. However, if they are not radical enough the risk lies in losing the more radical elements of the membership and support. The example of the Real IRA's bombing of Omagh displays the over radicalisation of tactics, with detrimental effects for the survival of the organisation. The organisational approach therefore acknowledges the challenges faced by the leadership of a terrorist organisation to maintain the survival of the group.⁴⁸

The cornerstone of any organisation's survival must be the group's ability to recruit new members. If a group fails to recruit, retain and regenerate membership the survival of the organisation is unfeasible.⁴⁹ With respect to terrorist organisations in particular the issue of membership regeneration is critical. The nature of terrorism leads to a high turnover of membership for a number of different reasons, included among these are arrest, burnout⁵⁰ and death. Therefore the organisation must be able to constantly recruit new members and regenerate a fluctuant membership in order to maintain their survival. The leadership concern for organisational maintenance and survival is dominant especially when there is a change in membership sentiment and a growing lack of interest in the organisation⁵¹ or a lessening in support for the direction in which the organisation is taking. These issues come to the fore especially at a time of organisational change or strain, which can lead to organisational split as is detailed in Chapter 4.

It is at times of change where survival is under the most threat. In order to maintain survival the leadership must persuade the membership and supporters that the proposed changes are necessary and beneficial for the organisation in the pursuit of the attainment

⁴⁶ Crenshaw (1985), p.483

⁴⁷ Schelling, T.C. (1991). What Purpose can "International Terrorism" serve? In Frey, R.G. and Morris, C.W. (Eds.) (1991) *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*. Pp.18-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited in Siqueira, K. (2005). Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organisations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2), pp.218-236. (p.225)

⁴⁸ Crenshaw (1985), p.487.

⁴⁹ Oots, (1989) p.144

⁵⁰ Ross, J.I. and Gurr, T.R. (1989). Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States. *Comparative Politics*, 21(4), pp.405-426. (p.409).

⁵¹ Zald and Ash (1966). P.339

of their purposive goal, the public goods. If the leadership fails to convince the majority of the membership of the importance of these changes they face the possibilities of the exit of a significant proportion of the membership and an organisational split. It is necessary to outline how these changes will benefit the future acquisition of the ultimate outcome for the group, the desired public good. Similar to times of tactical and strategic change the survival of the organisation is threatened with the presence of rival organisations. These rival organisations may come in the form of rival terrorist groups or non-violent political organisations. This presence leads to competition between the groups for membership and support. At times of competition the leadership must convince their membership and supporters to stay with their organisation as opposed to joining the alternative. The issue of competition from rival organisations becomes especially pertinent in the aftermath of a split as a split by definition results in the development of a new breakaway organisation with similar goals and ambitions to the parent organisation. As has been detailed above at this time of competition with the risk of losing members the leadership may radicalise their tactics and strategies in order to maintain the survival of the organisation.

Oots⁵² states that it is unlikely in the naissance of an organisation that the leadership do not support the political cause of the group. However, with the changing times and circumstances the leadership may wish to bring about change to the political cause or the strategies of the group, or possibly both. This desire for change may be held by the original leadership of the organisation, or alternatively by a new fresh leadership. These changes are deemed necessary in order to bring about the central aim of the organisation through methods deemed acceptable by the leadership. Therefore it is proposed here that while at the core survival of the organisation is what the leadership wish to achieve the leadership ultimately desires the survival of a group in a form they respect and recognise. In the discussions of organisational survival there is often an assumption that the survival and maintenance of the group requires the maintenance of the vast majority, if not all, of the membership. Therefore the presence of a split is deemed to be detrimental to this survival. However, with a more detailed inspection schisms and splits can in certain

⁵² Oots (1989) p.141

extreme circumstances be regarded as functional for group survival.⁵³ This claim may seem counter-intuitive with the simplified notion of the maintenance of group solidarity for the sake of the survival of the organisation. It has been noted that within a terrorist group it is important to achieve consensus rather than a majority in order to bring about change.⁵⁴ However, with more considered reflection the maintenance of group solidarity can at times prove detrimental for organisational survival and advancement, and the hope for consensus can on occasion stifle progress. At times of extreme intra-organisational conflict and debate the leadership will often times feel that they have to compromise their position in order to accommodate and retain the membership of some of their detractors, and therefore surrender their vision for the organisation. Therefore this can severely interfere with the organisation's pursuit of the specified public good. If it comes to the stage where they believe that they are over compromising in order to appease their internal detractors a split, or a minimal 'hiving off' of detractors believed to be holding back or disrupting the organisation, may be in the best interests of the leadership and the progress of the or group. If nominal group solidarity is maintained for too long in such an environment the leadership is in danger of losing their position of power within the organisation or maybe maintaining the existence of a group whose aims, strategies and tactics they do not fully ascribe to. Therefore the immediate aim for the leadership should not be purely considered as the survival of the organisation but the survival of the organisation in a form they ascribe to, applying the strategies, tactics and purposive aims which they stand by. At a time of extreme intra-organisational conflict and compromise, for the sack of survival the organisation can often times threaten to change to an unrecognisable state in comparison to the aspirations of the leadership. Alternatively if the leadership is unable to achieve the changes they deem necessary within the organisation they may reconcile if the organisation is deemed to be moving in the direction of their desired change. The type of change or debate which has the potential of causing internal division within an organisation is evidently a change which is viewed as highly significant by the membership. Therefore it is at times necessary for the leadership to be patient in bringing about these changes and acknowledge that it may be a

⁵³ Balser (1997), p.224.

⁵⁴ Rapoport, D.C. (2004). Series Editor's Preface. In Bowyer Bell, J. (2004). *The IRA 1968-2000: Analysis of a Secret Army*. London: Frank Cass. P.x

slow process to satisfy a significant proportion of the membership that the proposals are to the benefit of the organisation. If these changes are particularly dramatic or rapid they could lead to the defection of those who related to the original model.⁵⁵ However, if the introduction of the change is gradual a number of these potential defectors may be convinced of the benefit of the change.

A similar argument can be put across for the internal detractors. If they believe that they are members of an organisation whose direction they no longer agree with or ascribe to there are three options available to them loyalty, voice and exit.⁵⁶ If their loyalty to the organisation outweighs their aversion to the direction of the movement they will carry on as members and remain silent about their concerns. However, if they wish to remain in the organisation but change the direction, aims or strategies of the group they will voice their concerns internally and try and bring about the changes they believe necessary. If the application of the tactic of voice fails to bring about the change(s) they wish the final option is that of exit. Members will only exit when the form and direction which the organisation has taken outweighs any loyalty which they have to the organisation and/or the leadership. Their exit can take three distinct forms. They can exit the organisation and cease all organisational participation. They can exit and join a rival organisation. The final option is that they can exit and set up a splinter organisation developed in a way supportive of their beliefs. Therefore the immediate aim for these detractors, and the leadership, is not purely the survival of the group but the survival of an organisation which they consider worthwhile and whose aims, tactics and strategies they believe in.

For an undesignated period of time after a split there is a higher consensus and consistency internally within the organisation, be it the parent organisation or the splinter organisation, and therefore maintenance can take a back seat to the development and evolution of the organisation and its goals. This time period of consensus can be quite short especially if the split results in the drawn out competition for membership and

⁵⁵ Della Porta, D. (2009). Leaving Underground Organisations: A Sociological Analysis of the Italian Case. In Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (Eds.) (2009). *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*. London: Routledge. pp.66-87. (p.76)

⁵⁶ Hirschman (1970)

support. This is especially the case if there is a near even split in personnel. In such circumstances the competition for membership and support can be heightened as both groups and leaderships are evenly matched in strength and appeal. However, if the parent organisation's leadership can successfully isolate the defectors and keep their numbers and support small they will be in a stronger position to move forward with the development of the organisation than prior to the split. Therefore the aim of both leaderships, of the splinter and parent organisations, at a time of split must be to retain or gain the support of as many of those members and supporters occupying the middle ground between the two factions, while also retaining the support in their own specific sectors. This is not to purely maintain the survival of the organisation but to maintain the survival of an organisation in a form, or as close to a form as possible, which they believe in.

1.5 Support

In the study of any organisation it is essential to clearly understand the support structure in place. For the purpose of this specific study the analysis of support is crucial as it is clear that without sufficient levels of support members may exit to form or join separate organisations.⁵⁷ The researcher must assess the levels of sympathy and connections between the organisation and the larger community.⁵⁸ This larger community should not only just be assessed as the community within the organisation's immediate geographical location but should also include the wider national and international communities of which the organisation is reliant upon for different forms of support. The importance of a strong support base for a terrorist organisation is widely acknowledged. The continued actions of the organisation can be viewed not only as a means to achieve the political aims of the group but also to achieve, maximise and retain support from members and followers alike.⁵⁹ The differing levels of support for an organisation prove crucial for its survival and may have a significant influence on the progress of the group in attaining

⁵⁷ Jones, S.G. and Libicki, M.C. (2008). *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. Pittsburgh: Rand Corporation. p.13.

⁵⁸ Reich, W. (1990). Understanding Terrorist Behaviour: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological Inquiry. In Reich, W. (Ed.) (1998). *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Pp.261-280. (p.278).

⁵⁹ Siqueira (2005) pp.220-222

their goals. This is true for non-violent political and social-movement organisations as well as terrorist groups. This section outlines the importance of organisational support for the progress and survival of the group while also outlining various methods utilised in order to strengthen or gain the support for a specific organisation, strategy or tactic. Correspondingly the damaging affect which a drop or complete loss of support can have on an organisation and its goals is similarly analysed. The levels of support for an organisation and its policies fluctuate with time and circumstance,⁶⁰ and in order for the group to survive and develop it must modify itself sufficiently so as to maintain and boost its support.

At the most basic level the types of support available to an organisation can be divided into two distinct categories, external and internal. Levels of external support have been noted as vital in both the formation and breakdown of the terrorist organisation.⁶¹ It is acknowledged that this external support generally is sourced from sympathetic governments or other terrorist organisations as well as public support groups.⁶² The forms which this support can take have been listed as financial, training, weapons, organisational and operational.⁶³ While the concrete physical and operational support provided externally may be the most measurable form perhaps the most constructive, and with its withdrawal the most destructive, category of external support for a terrorist organisation is the public sympathy for the group from the immediate surrounding community.⁶⁴ The power of public support can even be utilised by those authorities attempting to bring terrorism to an end as it can be one of the most important factors in the application of negotiations.⁶⁵ The presence of strong public sympathy for a terrorist

⁶⁰ Shriver, T.E. and Messer, C. (2009). Ideological Cleavages and Schism in the Czech Environmental Movement. *Human Ecology Review*, 16(2). Pp.161-171. (p.168)

⁶¹ Oots (1989) p.145

⁶² *Ibid*

⁶³ Alexander, Y. and Kilmarx, R.A. (1979). International Network of Terrorist Movements. In Alexander, Y. and Kilmarx, R.A.(Eds.) (1979). *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response*. New York: Praeger Press, pp.40-51. Cited in Oots, K.L. (1989). Organisational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups. *Terrorism*, 12, pp.139-152. (p.146).

⁶⁴ For a comprehensive overview of the role which public opinion plays in terrorism see Hewitt, C. (1992). Public's Perspectives. In Paletz, D.L. and Schmid (Eds.) (1992). *Terrorism and the Media*. London: Sage Publications. Pp.170-207

⁶⁵ Cronin, A.K. (2006). How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups. *International Security*, 31(1), pp.7-48. p.26

organisation can have a direct influence on the levels of external financial and operational support attained.⁶⁶ This sympathy can be displayed as either passive or active support. With respect to terrorist organisations the active support of the community can include acts such as financial support, providing safe houses and entering the organisation. Alternatively the community can provide passive support which entails a supportive *lack of action*. Passive support may involve ignoring signs of group activity, failing to report matters to the authorities or expressing support for the organisation's objectives.⁶⁷

The weight which public support carries is apparent within social-movement organisations. Similar to terrorist organisations they too must mobilise resources from their communities. This mobilisation of support can prove to neutralise opponents,⁶⁸ both internal and external. In comparison with the community support supplied for constitutional political organisations the support required for terrorist organisations is more constant and requires a near total commitment on the part of the community supporters.⁶⁹ If a terrorist organisation can mobilise a strong public support for their goals and activities, they will prove more difficult for authorities to counter. It is noted that nationalist separatist terrorist organisations are most affected by a fluctuation in public support and sympathy. These groups claim to be representatives fighting for the rights of a very specific population. Therefore the support for their actions from this community provides the organisation and its representative claims with a degree of legitimacy. If and when this support is weakened or withdrawn and there is a public backlash against the group and its actions it proves very difficult for the organisation to convincingly claim a representative status. The power which this community support, both passive and active, provides is therefore most apparent when it is removed.

If the organisation misjudges a specific action, strategy or goal this may result in a fall in popular support, leading at times to a significant modification of methods, tactics or

⁶⁶ Crenshaw, M. (1999) On How Terrorism Ends. In United States Institute for Peace (1999). *How Terrorism Ends: Special Report*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp.2-4. (p.4)

⁶⁷ Cronin (2006). p.27

⁶⁸ Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2008). *Social Movements: An Introduction (Second Edition)*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. P.137; Zald and Ash (1966) pp.329-330

⁶⁹ Della Porta, D. (2009) p.75.

strategies or even to the downfall or split of the organisation.⁷⁰ There are certain terrorist actions which may prove to increase the support of committed ideologues, while concurrently resulting in a drop in public support,⁷¹ and alternatively there are those which result in a drop in support from the ideologues and a rise in support from the public. If the organisation is to survive and succeed it is necessary for the maintenance of both forms of support, and therefore a delicate balancing act is required by the leadership.

As has been clearly stated the withdrawal of public support or sympathy can have a detrimental affect on the group and its goals, or result in significant changes in the strategies, tactics or goals. Two of the oft cited examples of a dramatic fall in public support come with the murders of two separate politicians, Aldo Moro and Pierre Laporte, murdered by the Italian Red Brigades and the FLQ respectively. Both of these murders were defining moments for the groups as they were influential in turning public opinion against the organisations. In the aftermath of the Laporte murder, combined with the October Crisis, the FLQ saw a significant drop in public sympathy. While there was still a significant proportion of the Quebecois population who supported the attainment of an independent Quebec the support for achieving this through violent means significantly reduced. The aftermath of the murder also saw the rise of the Parti Quebecois (PQ) who advocated the achievement of an independent Quebec through non-violent means. While the combination of these events did not bring about the complete elimination of the FLQ they succeeded in causing considerable damage to the group in that it would no longer be able to operate with the degree of support necessary to make group operations viable.⁷² Similarly the drop in public support for the Italian Red Brigades, and more importantly a significant drop in internal organisational support including defections from the membership, in the aftermath of the Moro murder provided the Italian government with the opportunity to introduce innovative counter-terrorism initiatives which in turn significantly debilitated the group. With the impetus of public support a previously divided government was able to introduce reduced prison sentences for members of the Red Brigades in exchange for information. The timing of this offer of repentance

⁷⁰ Cronin (2006) p.27

⁷¹ Siqueira (2005) p.223

⁷² Ross and Gurr. (1989). Pp.412-414.

coincided with a strong perception of failure among the membership, and a significant public backlash and proved vital in the government's successful strategy to bring about the effective end of the organisation.⁷³

In examining public support and sympathy it is important to note that terrorist organisations claiming to act on behalf of a minority community do not automatically attain a strong social base of support from these communities.⁷⁴ This support may fluctuate over time, or in some instances may never be present.

While external support garners more attention than internal among organisational analysts the role of internal support is just as important for the survival and development of the organisation. Without a significant level of internal support for the actions and strategies of the organisation from the membership, the group would never be able to attain their goals, bring about the changes deemed necessary for the advancement of the organisation and its aims or even achieve survival. As has been noted in the organisational literature an organisation is more likely to succeed in the implementation of proposed change and adaptation if they succeed in generating employee or membership support for the proposed changes, rather than simply overcoming resistance. The resistance to change may in fact be better regarded as reluctance to change. Therefore it is within the role of the leadership, or detractors, if they wish to successfully implement proposed changes to overcome this reluctance.⁷⁵ A leadership is dependent on the support of various sections of the membership in order to successfully implement its vision for the organisation. Dependent on the structure, history and purpose of the group the support of different members will carry diverse strengths. Within an organisation such as the Provisional IRA with a multi-level leadership, where there is an Army Council and Executive as well as the GHQ and occasionally the General Army

⁷³ Crenshaw, M. (1991). How Terrorism Declines. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3(1), pp. 69-87 (pp.82-83); Crenshaw (1987) (p.25); Jamieson, A. (1990). Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2(1), pp.1-20. (pp.9-19)

⁷⁴ Crenshaw (1985), p.469.

⁷⁵ Piderit, S.K. (2000). Rethinking Resistance and Recognising Ambivalence: A Multidimensional View of Attitudes Toward and Organisational Change. *The Academy of Management Review*, 25(4), pp.783-794. (p.783).

Convention,⁷⁶ the acquisition of the support from a significant proportion of the different leadership elements, and ordinary membership, can prove vital for the implementation of any contentious change in policies, strategies or tactics. Without this internal support the implementation of changes and policies will prove a challenge, and in the most extreme circumstances may even result in the demotion or expulsion of the proposing individual(s). Even in organisations led by a central figurehead there is still the need for internal support with regard to significant changes and policies. While the lack of such support is less likely to result in the demotion of the leader it may provide justification for non-compliance or defection among those unreceptive to the policies, strategies or tactics. If this is the response by a significant proportion of the membership it will result in the weakening of the organisation.

Within the sphere of internal support there are various different actors who can possibly lend their support to specific initiatives or policies of the organisation. Each of these actors contributes to the advancement of the organisation in differing ways. Numerous methods and tools are utilised in order to gain the support of the membership and the relevant individuals and groups within that membership. Terrorist organisations are heavily reliant on the legitimising power of historical referencing in support of their policies or actions. This entails linking the proposed or utilised tactics and strategies to the historical underpinnings of the organisation. The call for support may reference the names of past leaders or fallen comrades, as well as historically important events in order to justify the new proposals or the continuation of current strategies. The advent of the PIRA provides a case in point where one of the opening lines of the ‘Where Sinn Fein Stands’, a 1970 document which illustrates the justification of the existence of the new Provisional Movement, reads “We take our inspiration from the past.”⁷⁷ This statement is situated in order to link the armed and political actions of the new Provisional movement

⁷⁶ For analysis command structure of the PIRA see Horgan, J. and Taylor, M. (1997). The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2(1), pp.1-32

⁷⁷ Sinn Fein Education Department (1979). *Where Sinn Fein Stands*. Republican Lecture Series No.1. This example is also cited in Horgan (2005) p. 30

to Republican history.⁷⁸ Republicanism to this day looks to its history in order to justify their actions and the formation of new splinter groups.⁷⁹ Groups not only look to the history of their own struggle, but to the wider international history of revolutionaries in order to gain the validation for their methods and policies. They may link their actions to those of distant armed struggles without obvious connection to their own, in doing so placing themselves as a continuation of the wider revolutionary history.⁸⁰

The legitimacy gained by historical referencing is made stronger if the organisation, or detractors, can gain the public support of an influential individual from a significant historical period. The legitimising powers of such an authority figure can influence previously undecided sections of the membership to support the proposals of the leadership or their detractors, depending on which side the figure is sponsoring. The legitimising power of the individual endorsement need not always come from their historical affiliation with the movement but may also derive from their charisma “by virtue of which he is set apart from other men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”⁸¹ The influential power of an individual’s endorsement for organisational change often comes at a time when they have not previously aligned themselves with the proposed change,⁸² therefore through example making an adjustment in opinion more acceptable among the rest of the membership. The wider the range of influential individuals supporting a specific proposal the more likely it is to be widely accepted by the membership. Therefore in an organisation with both political and armed wings if authoritative figures from both the past and present of each wing back a proposal it is more likely to be successfully approved. These individuals need not always be members, past or present, of the organisational leadership. The figures, for example, may have been involved in

⁷⁸ Terrorist organisations not only use history as a tool for the justification of actions to its own members but as a weapon of justification to be used against its enemies and opponents. Bowyer Bell, J. (1998). *The Dynamics of Armed Struggle*. London: Frank Cass. Pp.253-254.

⁷⁹ Horgan (2009). *Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement From Radical and Extremist Movements*. London: Routledge. p.22

⁸⁰ Crenshaw (1987) p.19

⁸¹ Weber, M. (1947). *Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*. New York.

⁸² Dyck, B. and Starke, F.A. (1999). The Formation of Breakaway Organisations: Observations and a Process Model. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44(4), pp.792-822. (p.807).

important operations for the organisation and through this participation had gained the respect of the membership. Horgan cites the importance of role models as a source of authoritative legitimacy in the justification of violent action or reaction.⁸³ However, the role model is but one possible category of influential individual. The resultant affect of an influential individual's opinions or actions does not always manifest itself in a role following reaction by the influenced individuals. It is therefore necessary to acknowledge the potential for negative as well as positive influential individuals. While the positive impact of a person's opinion or action has been detailed equally the opinions and actions of a figure who is viewed negatively by sections of the membership may have the converse affect on these members. By stating this there is the acknowledgement that individual members and sections of the membership, as well as external supportive actors, may be influenced to take the opposite view to an individual who they perceive in a negative manner.

1.6 Loyalty

It is proposed here that in order to gain support for a specific change or initiative within the organisation it is important to convince the membership and supporters of the value of such changes and initiatives with the greater good of the organisation and its goals and ambitions in mind. The ability to convince the membership of the benefits of these proposals can in the most extreme circumstances prevent the exit of sections of the membership and ultimately an organisational split. However, this is not the sole means of gaining membership support. Often the most powerful tool available in achieving support and solidarity is in appealing to a membership's organisational loyalty. The development of loyalty can be built over time through ideological indoctrination and the emphasising of the external threat. The benefit of this loyalty is most noticeable, and important, at times of strains or changes where there is the possibility of organisational exit but members decide to remain with the group. Therefore it is posited that at a time of competition it is vitally important for a leadership to inspire loyalty among members.⁸⁴

⁸³ Horgan, J. (1998). From the Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618, pp.80-94. (p.88)

⁸⁴ Crenshaw (1985), pp.484-485

For an individual to remain loyal to an organisation at a time of competition, doubt or strain they must feel an intense connection with the group's organisational goals.⁸⁵ Jamieson cites the example of those founder members of the Italian Red Brigades who even though they were uneasy with the handling of kidnap of Aldo Moro were compelled to support the action out of loyalty to the organisation.⁸⁶ Therefore the presence of loyalty can significantly slow down and make less likely the process of membership exit.⁸⁷ The presence of membership loyalty does not guarantee total compliance and submission. Those individuals who remain with the group purely out of loyalty will feel a greater need to voice their concerns and try to bring about internal change which they feel will benefit the organisation, or indeed they may wish to block proposed changes which they regard as detrimental. If they themselves are not an influential individual with the ability of bringing about or blocking these changes they will certainly expect that someone else in a more powerful position will act in order to, in their eyes, improve the organisation.⁸⁸ In the presence of intense loyalty to a group the option of exit is no longer characterised as just organisational exit but is viewed as treason, defection or desertion.⁸⁹ With this exceedingly negative framing of exit for loyal members it becomes extremely difficult to justify and commit to exit. While this makes exit difficult for a loyal member, it does not deem it impossible. In circumstances where the loyal member is significantly disillusioned by the direction of the organisation, to the point of exit, they may frame their departure from the group not as treason or treachery but as an act of loyalty and those who are remaining with the original organisation as being treacherous to the wider struggle. They may deem that their loyalty is not to any specific organisation or leadership but to the wider struggle and its historical goals.⁹⁰ Such a framing of exit is present at times of splits where the splinter accuses the parent organisation of betraying the aims and ideology of the historical struggle.

⁸⁵ Zald and Ash (1966), p.329.

⁸⁶ Jamieson (1990), p.17

⁸⁷ Della Porta (2009), p.75; Hirschman (1970), p.38

⁸⁸ Hirschman (1970), p.78

⁸⁹ *Ibid* p.98

⁹⁰ Della Porta and Diani (2008) p.151.

1.7 External Factors

While the presence, or absence, of support is strongly reliant on the organisation one must not discount the importance which external factors have on the level of support from the internal and external communities. The organisation is not a closed system; the environment plays a vital role in the development of an organisation and its aims.⁹¹ By focusing exclusively on the organisational structure and internal debates one may fail to discern the influence of external factors on support levels within and outside of the organisation. Changes in the larger society in which the organisation operates may lead to growing support of previously dormant communities, therefore widening the support base of the movement.⁹² Equally the external environment may have a negative affect on the support levels both internally and externally. In their study of schisms in the Czech environmental movement Shriver and Messer acknowledged the negative influence which economic hardship had on support for the movement.⁹³ External environmental factors such as economic stability and public confidence in the constitutional political system must be considered when assessing the underlying principle behind a rise or fall in organisational support. In order to have more chance of success in implementing proposals or change it is beneficial for the leadership, or detractors, to be in control of as many factors as possible and that external factors play as minimal a part as possible. Therefore the timing of changes is vitally important in gaining sufficient support from internal and external actors. The role which external environmental factors play must be more widely examined in order to gain a clearer understanding of organisational processes and actions.⁹⁴ While the environment affects the levels of support to a degree it may also go so far as shaping the changes necessary for the maintenance of the organisation. The leadership may find that due to factors beyond their control in the external environment that in order to maintain and strengthen their support they have to alter their goals and tactics.⁹⁵ The leadership may at times even deem it necessary due to

⁹¹ Pondy, L.R. (1967). Organisational Conflict: Concepts and Models. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 12(2), pp.296-320. (p.306)

⁹² Singh, M.P. (1981). *Split in the Predominant Party: The Indian National Congress in 1969*. New Delhi: Shakti Malik Abinav Publications. p.24

⁹³ Shriver and Messer (2009), p.165.

⁹⁴ See Balsler (1997)

⁹⁵ Zald and Ash (1966) p.328

environmental factors that organisational structure itself must be radically changed.⁹⁶ Considering the specific issue of splits the influential factors must be categorised as internal organisational factors or external environmental factors.⁹⁷ These external features include governmental policy, economic or social circumstances or even distant international conflicts and movements. In relation to social-movement organisations general societal changes can determine to a large extent the direction taken by the organisation.⁹⁸ With respect to terrorist organisations specifically it has been acknowledged that in generating governmental counter-terrorism policies the policy makers must not only consider the internal factors affecting an organisation but also the external. Central to this must be an analysis of the ties which the terrorist group has to outside groups who support them and the affect of representative claims made by the organisation.⁹⁹

1.8 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a foundational understanding of the function of political organisations. It has shown how this can be applicable to achieving a better understanding of terrorist organisations which are deemed to be political organisations. While the purposive goal of the organisation may be the achievement of a specific public good(s) the immediate goal must be defined as organisational survival, or at times the survival of the organisation in a form or direction favoured by the leadership and/or membership. In order to maintain this survival it is vital to maintain both support and membership loyalty. While these two factors are vital in the maintenance of survival and support it is equally necessary to factor in the constantly changing external factors which can have a significant effect on organisational survival. These factors all have a significant influence on the reasoning for and results of organisational splits.

⁹⁶ Singh (1981) p.26

⁹⁷ Khadka, N. (1995). P.61

⁹⁸ Markides, K..C. (1974). Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus. *American Ethnologist*, 12(2), pp.309-330. (p.309)

⁹⁹ Crenshaw (1999), p.2.

Chapter 2

Intra-Organisational Conflict

2.1 Introduction

Across organisations unless a group is able to continuously overcome its limits and apply flexible and innovative organisational techniques the group is liable to some degree of internal conflict.¹⁰⁰ Therefore with this near inevitability of groups facing conflict at some stage of their existence it is clearly worthy to have in place a framework to aid in explaining and understanding this process. The present dissertation is ostensibly assessing organisational splits. However, the most comprehensive evaluation of this must analyse the intra-organisational conflicts which precede the formal division of the organisation. This is because it is posited that each organisational split is preceded by some form of intra-organisational conflict. Before assessing this in detail it is necessary to specify that only in extreme circumstances of conflict do actual splits occur. The majority of cases are resolved through some form of compromise, without any of the factions deeming it necessary to break away from the parent organisation. While clearly assessing the existence and development of tensions and factions within the organisation the study of intra-organisational conflict can demonstrate the capacity of conflict research to detail a wide variety of organisational behaviour due to the dynamic nature of the conflict process.¹⁰¹

The present chapter assesses the theoretical underpinnings of intra-organisational conflict in general prior to the subsequent evaluation of organisational split in Chapter 4. This develops on the foundation of organisational understanding presented in Chapter 1.

It is evident that conflict is a feature present in all forms of human organisations,¹⁰² and therefore this chapter once again borrows from the wider organisational literature in order to gain a comprehensive understanding. Across conflicts in various areas a number of the

¹⁰⁰ McCormick, G.H. (1987). *The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism*. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. London: Frank Cass. Pp.109-126 (pp.123-124)

¹⁰¹ Pondy (1967), p.319

¹⁰² Rapoport (2001), p.1.

patterns and processes present are repeated from one conflict to the next.¹⁰³ This statement does not just entail all intra-organisational conflicts but all conflicts whether they are intra or inter organisational in nature. Therefore as well as assessing the processes involved in internal conflicts there is a brief outline of how a specific model of international relations conflict theory¹⁰⁴ may be applied to garner a greater understanding of the patterns and processes present within intra-organisational conflict.

The chapter is laid out as follows.

- Reasoning for intra-organisational conflict
- Alternative Conflict Hypotheses
- Intra-Organisational Conflict in Terrorist Groups

2.2 Reasoning For Intra-Organisational Conflict

Large scale organisations can be viewed as an amalgamation of individuals and groups seemingly brought together by the incentives to achieve a specific set of goals. The ends and means of these separate individuals and subgroups may at times conflict with the policies and viewpoints of the organisational leadership.¹⁰⁵ Internal conflict can transpire in political organisations for a number of different reasons. The most fundamental grounds for intra-organisational conflict specifically within terrorist organisations can be regarded as a disagreement over the ultimate purpose of the group,¹⁰⁶ the pursuit of the designated public goods. While at a fundamental level internal conflict can often times be portrayed as a disagreement over the organisation's purposes, and therefore a divergence of goals,¹⁰⁷ there are clearly alternative causes, often times linked but not entirely explained by organisational purpose. Conflict may arise by the desire to change policies and practices of the leadership,¹⁰⁸ the presence of theoretical¹⁰⁹ and ideological

¹⁰³ An Editorial (1957). *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1/1, pp.1-2. (p.2)

¹⁰⁴ The Weinberg/Richardson Model

¹⁰⁵ Zald and Ash (1966) p.328.

¹⁰⁶ Rapoport (2001) p.2

¹⁰⁷ Balser (1997), p.202.

¹⁰⁸ Burke Rochford Jr. E. (1989). Factionalism, Group Defection, and Schism in the Hare Krishna Movement. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 28(2), pp.162-179. (p.163)

¹⁰⁹ Ryan, B. (1989). Ideological Purity and Feminism: The US Women's Movement from 1966 to 1975. *Gender and Society*, 3(2), pp.239-257.

differences or conflicting proposals of dealing with organisational difficulties.¹¹⁰ Nonetheless there are also those conflicts which occur not out of any strategic, tactical or ideological disparity but can be established on purely personal or selfish grounds. In most human organisations there are individuals and groups who feel that they simply cannot work with, or for, specific others and therefore clash on personal grounds. Alternatively there are those who believe that they should be in a position of leadership as opposed to the present occupiers of the position(s). These personal and self serving rationales are at times, but not always, at the heart of intra-organisational conflict. If the terrorist organisation, or internal dissident, is to capitalise on the internal and external support described in the previous chapter these internal conflicts must be portrayed as disagreements over purpose, strategies or tactics.¹¹¹ Therefore while the conflicts may be framed as taking place on organisational, strategic and tactical grounds the sources and membership divisions during conflict will only sometimes reflect this. The resultant division, and at times factionalism, of the organisations often times arise from long standing,¹¹² and sometimes dormant, cleavages. These divisions can occasionally be simply portrayed as a social-regional cleavage, one born out of elite career ambition,¹¹³ or a battle between the old-guard and new-guard of the membership and leadership. At times a number of the previously mentioned factors may be in play throughout, or at different stages, of a conflict. Therefore the researcher must be open to the possibility of a multi-level conflict which is capable of adapting and evolving throughout its existence. During the course of a conflict new actors may become active as it evolves, and additional divisive issues may be brought to the fore which can solidify, strengthen or weaken the divide. Researchers should never apply a blinkered approach to conflict by focusing on a sole factor in the hope of finding an explanation, as across conflicts there is rarely one solitary reason which can exclusively explain the actors' rationale. Similarly the assessment of all aspects of a conflict must be considered from the point of view of each side of the dispute, failing to do so will clearly result in the production of biased and incomplete analysis. The very nature of conflict designates that what one side may

¹¹⁰ Della Porta (2009) pp.77-78

¹¹¹ Rapoport (2001) p.3

¹¹² Burke Rochford Jr. (1989), p.163; Stark and Banbridge (1985), p.101

¹¹³ Singh (1981), p.23.

identify as disrespectful and unfounded opposition the other may view as a desire to protect the organisation's best interests.¹¹⁴

2.3 Alternative Conflict Hypotheses

By introducing the topic of intra-organisational conflict the present chapter has taken a brief general look at a series of reasons for the establishment of conflicts across organisations. Developing from this the present section analyses three separate models of conflicts and assesses their applicability to the present analysis of organisational splits. Two of the models assessed were originally put forward as organisational models of conflict and are therefore intuitively applicable to the topic at hand. These are the 1993 analysis by March and Simon¹¹⁵ and the model developed by Pondy.¹¹⁶ The final model analysed here is that of Weinberg and Richardson.¹¹⁷ Distinct from the previous two models the Weinberg-Richardson model was a process model originally designed to assess terrorism as a form of inter-organisational conflict. However, it is proposed here that an adaptation of this process model may also be applicable to the investigation of intra-organisational conflict, and ultimately split. These final two models are deemed specifically important in the present research as they propose a stage-based process model of conflict, a proposal which is advanced in the analysis of the splits in Republicanism.

2.3.1 March and Simon Model of Organisational Conflict.

In their analysis of organisations March and Simon identified three main classes of organisational conflict; *individual conflict*, *organisational conflict* and *inter-organisational conflict*. As will be displayed in the general discussion and analysis of splits each of these three categories of conflict play a role either before, during or after a

¹¹⁴ Piderit (2000), p.785

¹¹⁵ March, J. and Simon, H. (1993). *Organisations: Second Edition*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. P.132. In this analysis they generally define conflict as 'a breakdown in the standard mechanisms of decision-making so that an individual or group experiences difficulty in selecting an action alternative' and 'thus, conflict occurs when an individual or group experiences a decision problem.' (p.132)

¹¹⁶ Pondy (1967)

¹¹⁷ Weinberg and Richardson (2004). Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe. In Silke, A. (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*. London: Frank Cass. pp.138-160.

split. In the situation of individual conflict, where an individual is at conflict in their own decision making process, it is ascribed that conflict arises from one or more of three reasons. These explanations for the rise of conflict can be individually labelled as *unacceptability*, *incomparability* and *uncertainty*. It is proposed that internal conflicts arise when an individual has a decision to make regarding their support or opinions of proposed or actual organisational actions or policy. Within a split the individual may be at conflict with themselves due to decisions of allegiance prior to the split with the development of rival internal sub-groups and also in the aftermath of split with the formation of the breakaway organisation. With the instance of *unacceptability* an individual can assess the probability of outcomes associated with each of the available alternatives of action. Supplementing this they may be able to indicate a preferred alternative. However, this alternative is not considered satisfactory. In the case of *incomparability* the individual can identify the probability distribution of outcomes but unlike *unacceptability* they *cannot* identify a preferred alternative. Finally for the situation of *uncertainty* the actor is unaware of the probability distributions connecting choice of action and outcome.¹¹⁸

The second form of conflict identified by the authors is that of organisational conflict. This can be divided into two forms inter-individual conflict and inter-group conflict. This is where individuals or sub-groups conflict within an organisation. For the purpose of the analysis of splits inter-group conflicts is the most pertinent as a split is the result of two conflicting sub-groups dividing post-conflict to form two autonomous organisations. Inter-group conflict within an organisation occurs in one or more of three situations; when there is a perceived requirement for joint decision-making within the organisation, a difference of goals or a difference in the perception and interpretation of reality.¹¹⁹ The groups most susceptible to inter-group organisational conflict are those with joint decision-making structures in place. Within organisations which are very much goal oriented the area of power-relations and authority provides one of the most important

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.133.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, p.141

areas of conflict.¹²⁰ Therefore within such organisations, in which terrorist groups can be included, the role of the leadership and authority figures must be clearly understood. In a terrorist organisation the role of the leadership is not just focused on entrepreneurial and purposive goal orientated actions. The leadership must provide the membership with the confidence to partake in what is a dangerous lifestyle. Parallel to this the leadership must also provide the organisation with its political focus and direction for action.¹²¹

Therefore if a conflict is centred around challenges to the leadership and their decisions this can have the most substantial affect on the organisation. If there is a sustained challenge to the leadership by the membership of an organisation, and returning to the previous chapter a lack of support, it can become impossible for the leadership to sustain the organisation.¹²² The final form of organisational conflict outlined by March and Simon is that of inter-organisational conflict. While this is relevant to the analysis of organisational splits this topic will be dealt with in the discussion of competition in Chapter 4.

2.3.2 The Pondy Model

It has been proposed that conflict can be regarded as a dynamic process which can be analysed as a sequence of conflict episodes.¹²³ Pondy outlined a five stage process model of conflict. The five separate stages put forward are as follows;

1. Latent Conflict (conditions)
2. Perceived Conflict (cognition)
3. Felt Conflict (affect)
4. Manifest Conflict (behaviour), and,
5. Conflict Aftermath (conditions)¹²⁴

If Pondy's stage-based model is to be applicable to organisational splits the instance of split would take place in the fourth stage of manifest conflict (behaviour). This will take place after the foundations of the conflict are laid in the initial stage and after the conflict

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, p.142

¹²¹ Oots (1989), p.142.

¹²² Zald and Ash (1966). Pp.333-334.

¹²³ Pondy (1967), p.299.

¹²⁴ *Ibid*. p.300

is both perceived and its affects felt within the organisation in the third. If an internal conflict cannot be adequately resolved one of the dissenting sub-groups must exit the organisation if the organisation is to be able to deal with normal organisational purpose. It follows that in the presence of the exit of one of the dissenting factions internal conflict will diminish.¹²⁵ Alternatively if a split is to be avoided this would similarly take place in the penultimate stage. In this instance as opposed to split there would be an internal conflict resolution. The conflict aftermath is very much dependent on the result of the fourth stage of manifest conflict. If there is a split the aftermath may be notable for inter-group competition between former allies. If the conflict is resolved the organisation can develop their pursuit of the intended public goods. In situations where a split does not take place but the conflict is only nominally resolved this may prove to be the antecedent for future more volatile intra-organisational conflicts.

2.3.3 Weinberg/Richardson Model

A number of the features which characterise conflict in one area can similarly characterise it in others.¹²⁶ This assertion is furthered by Weinberg and Richardson who have applied a stage-based process model of conflict theory to the assessment of terrorist campaigns in Western Europe.¹²⁷ While their three stage model was for the purpose of explaining and understanding terrorist campaigns it is proposed in the present research to advance the assumption of transferability of themes across conflicts by adapting the Weinberg-Richardson model to the assessment of intra-organisational conflict and ultimately organisational splits. While the actors in the Weinberg-Richardson model are the terrorist organisation and the state, when transferred to assess intra-organisational conflicts the actors are two conflicting sub-groups within the organisation. With analysis of the model similarities become apparent between it and the previous detailed intra-organisational models.

¹²⁵ Balser (1997), p.224

¹²⁶ An Editorial. (1957) *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1/1. pp.1-2. (p.2)

¹²⁷ Weinberg and Richardson (2004). Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe. In Silke, A. (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*. London: Frank Cass. pp.138-160.

The three stages proposed can be explained under three headings;

1. Identification of Distinct Separate Identities
2. Widening of Conflict
3. Spiralling of Conflict

Within this model a distinction between the two groups is first identified. The original model outlines that these differences can take the form of economic status, religious belief or other such distinctions. When applied to groups within terrorist organisations the division may take the form of old-guard/new-guard, left-wing/right-wing, regionalism or other such separations. This identity of separate groups does not constitute a rationale for conflict. At least one of the groups must have a grievance with the other and set out a way which they believe will be able to remove it. While the presence of grievance(s) and a plan to eliminate these does not always lead to conflict it is proposed as a necessary first stage. The probability of violent confrontation only transpires when one of the parties makes the strategic choice to contend with the other.¹²⁸

In the second stage, as conflict intensifies, the single issue dispute becomes a wider more general dispute between the groups. This widening of the conflict draws in a number of previously external or uninvolved actors. It is when the grievances can be generalised and put forward as a threat to the identity of a group, or sub-group, with a significant membership who strongly identify with the organisation that the possibility of conflict arises.¹²⁹ Within terrorist organisations this threat may, as previously indicated, be framed as a threat to the historical legitimacy of the organisation. In application to intra-organisational conflict while one sub-group may frame this as a threat they do not frame it as a threat to the sub-group but to the organisation or the movement as a whole. Within this stage of the conflict the aim of the groups involved may be diverted from the stated goal of the organisation to a concentration of damaging their opponents in conflict. This can be viewed in violent feuds between former comrades which occur in the aftermath of

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, pp.140-141.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p.141.

numerous terrorist splits, an issue which will be dealt with in more detail when discussing the issue of post split competition.

The third stage of the model details how the conflicting actors are entrapped in conflict. The conflict must first undergo a process of de-escalation before a resolution is possible.¹³⁰ As detailed in previous sections in order for a resolution to be feasible the timing and conditions must be right, and often times influential individuals may require a change of heart. If an aggressor faces significant resistance from their supporters and/or membership they may have to forsake the conflict in order to retain this membership and support. Alternatively a conversion may take place where influential actors on one side are persuaded of the merits of their opponents' position and thus convert to their viewpoint.¹³¹ In such circumstances it is clear that one must again consider the roles played by influential individuals in organisations and groups.

This framework was developed in reference to international conflict, a model applied to explain western terrorism. It is here posited that such a framework, with minor alterations, can prove beneficial in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of intra-organisational conflicts and resultant splits. The present research proposes that when applied to intra-organisational conflict that the split would take place in the crossover between stages one and two of the conflict. However, if the split is to be avoided stage two must be bypassed and stage one must move straight into the third stage where de-escalation and resolution of the conflict takes shape. Such a framework can prove indispensable for those wishing to understand and explain splits in terrorist organisations.

2.4 Intra-Organisational Conflict in Terrorist Organisations

While the above analyses outline and describe the different forms and stages of the process of conflict in general what follows specifically looks at intra-organisational conflict within terrorist organisations. There is an assessment of central issues which can bring rise to conflict and how the organisations deal with internal struggles.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, pp.143-144.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, pp.144-145

As suggested earlier terrorist groups are organisations which operate in very close, secretive and security conscious environments. While the emphasis on organisational security is put in place so as to protect the group and its members from external threats it does not always prove beneficial in protecting the membership against the internal threat posed by intra-organisational conflict. This is detailed in the case of the Japanese Red Army outlined by Horgan. In this extreme case fourteen members of the group were tortured and killed by their fellow members after an argument about ideological issues pertaining to the organisation.¹³² While not all intra-organisational conflicts end in such circumstances it is clear that ideological disagreements about the direction the organisation should be taking are some of the most common foundations for intra-organisational conflicts within terrorist organisations. These internal conflicts can lead to debates and arguments about the optimum strategies for a specific situation or the organisation as a whole.¹³³ These ideological differences are not the sole cause of intra-organisational terrorist conflicts. In the case of splits the intra-organisational conflict leads to the presence of rival organisations competing for the same resources, supporters and members. Irvin, in specific reference to militant nationalist organisations outlines five key conditions which can lead to the presence of intra-ethnic competitors.¹³⁴ The first situation is that of a divergence of opinion with regard the relationship between the armed and political campaign. The general argument is about whether the armed campaign can be subordinated by the political one, or vice versa. This relationship between the political and armed wings is similarly noted by Crenshaw as a potential source of conflict. Distinct from Irvin, Crenshaw points to the barrier which is often placed between the political and armed wings so as to retain the legality of the political wing. The independence generated for the terrorist group from this can potentially lead to conflict.¹³⁵ Subsequent to the armed and political relationships the definition and selection of 'legitimate' targets for violent attacks can lead to confrontation within the organisation. This is a dilemma faced not just by terrorist groups but by all armed forces,

¹³² Horgan (2005), p.144.

¹³³ Della Porta (2009), p.77

¹³⁴ Irvin (1999), p.41.

¹³⁵ Crenshaw (1985), p.468.

legal or illegal. The selection of targets can have a significant affect on an armed campaign and the reaction taken by the immediate and wider targets as well as the levels of support given to the armed campaign or the organisation in general. Following on from this Irvin outlines how the presence of leadership rivalries, specifically with respect to the armed wing can invariably lead to internal conflict. The present author argues that the presence of leadership rivalries within the political wing should be equally focused upon, especially if and when there is a definite agenda on behalf of one sub-group to move the organisation further away from military action and closer to a political approach, or vice-versa. The penultimate issue covered is that of the effect of regime repression on organisational proliferation. This repression can be structural and behavioural repression. While it is not inferred in the original text the repression can be either external repression by the legitimate government or security forces, or alternatively internal repression by the organisational leadership of the political and/or armed wings of the organisation. The final factor is in regard to organisational coalition or alliance. Irvin maintains that particularly for left-leaning ethno-nationalist groups the presence of alliances with radical organisations drawn from other ethnic groups can invariably lead to internal conflict.¹³⁶ This final factor put forward is one which not only has a significant impact on militant nationalist groups but on all organisations, both violent and non-violent. Zald and Ash outlined that in social-movement organisations if an organisational leadership is not fully committed to a coalition of groups that this can result in a conflict due to the manoeuvring for power within the overall leadership of the alliance.¹³⁷

It is proposed in the present research that if one can consider and combine aspects from each of these explanations of intra-organisational conflict that this can only benefit the researcher in achieving the most complete analysis of intra-organisational terrorist conflicts and splits as is possible. The stage-based models outlined earlier are remodelled in Chapter 4 to aid in the development a stage-based model of splits.

¹³⁶ Irvin (1999), p.41.

¹³⁷ Zald and Ash (1966), p.335.

2.5 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this short chapter was to expand on the previous chapter and use that foundation to outline the reasoning for intra-organisational conflict. While this dissertation is nominally analysing organisational splits each split is preceded by an intra-organisational conflict. Therefore it is necessary to understand the conflict prior to being able to understand the split. There were three alternative hypotheses outlined prior to detailing the reasoning for conflicts within terrorist organisations. Throughout it was clear that a stage-based process model was suitable to explain conflict, and therefore resultantly proposed as appropriate for understanding the process leading up to split.

Chapter 3

Exit, Voice, and Entry

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter outlined the theoretical underpinnings to intra-organisational conflict. As a continuation of this discussion what follows is an examination of the options present for those individuals who are dissatisfied with the organisation in which they are a member. Hirschman outlined the presence of two options open to disillusioned members, these are exit and voice.¹³⁸ While Hirschman's examination of these options, as well as the earlier detailed loyalty, is developed to assess such circumstances of dissatisfaction within economic organisations the assessment is extended to be similarly applied for political organisations. Crenshaw outlined how this model can be similarly applied to provide similar explanations for terrorist groups.¹³⁹ What follows is a detailed analysis of Hirschman's position which is then applied to enhance the understanding of splits. The Hirschman model not only helps in the explanation of splits but also provides a guideline as to why certain actors exit at specific times and why others may prefer to utilise voice instead of exit. Similarly it moves on to propose under what circumstances these members will forgo voice and exit the organisation.

Following on from a discussion of both exit and voice the concept of organisational entry is examined. Within the majority of studies of organisational splits and their circumstances the analysis will focus on organisational decline and membership exit. However, it is proposed here that organisational entry must similarly be considered. This is an innovation made by the present author to make the Hirschman model applicable to splits. While the action of split invariably requires members to leave behind a parent organisation it similarly entails the entry into a new group. Consequently any study of splits would be incomplete without the acknowledgement of the antecedents to organisational entry. Normally one would intuitively place any discussion of entry before that of exit. Within the confines of splits this order is reversed. The exit from the parent organisation precedes any entry into a new group.

¹³⁸ Hirschman (1970), p.4

¹³⁹ Crenshaw (1985), p.483

Throughout there is a clear respect for the heterogeneity of individuals and their motives. This respect of difference acknowledges that there is no hard and fast rule as to why someone will exit or enter any organisation. Therefore the reasoning for any individual's leaving or entering need not mirror that of their fellow members. Leading on from this an individual's decision to split need not be same as the core reasoning behind the organisational split. With this order considered the present chapter is laid out as follows.

- Voice
- Exit
- Entry

The work of Hirschman has been given its own separate chapter as it is central to the theoretical understanding of individual and organisational action during the course of intra-organisational conflict and split. It is similarly central to the development of the hypotheses for the research displayed in Chapter 5.

3.2 Voice

When one is dissatisfied with the quality of product produced by an organisation and wishes to enhance this quality, rather than exit the organisation, they will voice their concerns in order to change and improve the product. While the language used in this statement may be regarded as overly economic this can be modified so as to prove relevant in a discussion of political organisations. A similar statement may read that if a member, or group of members, disagree with the policies, strategies, outputs or goals of the organisation they may articulate their concerns in order to bring about what they deem to be requisite changes within the organisation. In Hirschman's terms this represents the members utilising the option of 'voice.' This can be regarded as any attempt to bring about change rather than exiting the organisation, either collectively or individually, at a time of decline.¹⁴⁰ Before this discussion can proceed it must be noted that throughout his 1970 study Hirschman constantly refers to a drop or decline in 'quality' as being the impetus for the utilisation of exit or voice. The 'quality' of product,

¹⁴⁰ Hirschman (1970), p.30

strategy or policy is particularly subjective in nature. It would be more accurate to state that those who *in their opinion* perceive a significant deterioration in the quality of product, policy or organisation will choose to utilise the options of either exit or voice.¹⁴¹ This provides the grounding for one explanation as to why some members will not utilise either option during a period of what by some may be perceived as deterioration. Those who neither exit nor voice concerns may believe that the output or product provided has not deteriorated in quality and may have improved in their eyes.

With specific reference to the target of the public good the perception of this need not always be as a result of the good being sought but may equally be the result of a change in the wider environment and therefore a change in the expectations of the membership and supporters of the organisation. A change in the environment can lead to a change in the priorities of a desired public good.¹⁴² The success of voice in bringing about desired change will increase, to a certain point, with its volume. As with exit voice can be overdone and if used to excess may in fact prove to have a negative effect on the organisation.¹⁴³ Those who persist with constantly voicing concerns on various issues often times only succeed in minimising the influence of their own opinions. Therefore voice must be somewhat selective in order to be most effective. This selectivity must not only be with regard to issue, but also with timing. If voice is applied at a time of weakness for the leadership, and therefore a leadership in greater need of membership support, it is more likely to bring about the implementation of the proposals of the agents of voice. If this is to have the proposed effects a degree of patience is also required. It is therefore most productive when voice brings the perceived failings of an organisation to the attention of the relevant parties within the leadership and provides them with sufficient time and opportunity to respond and/or amend these perceived failings.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ Hirschman (1970), p.48

¹⁴² The entire good being sought need not always change but the importance of it in the eyes of the membership might,

¹⁴³ Hirschman (1970), p.31.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p.33

In the rare situations where the option of exit is unavailable voice is the only tool offered to disenchanted members to display their dissatisfaction.¹⁴⁵ For those who also have the opportunity to exit if they believe that by voicing their concerns this may be effective in bringing about the necessary change exit is postponed, and if the sufficient changes are brought about exit will no longer be deemed necessary.¹⁴⁶ It is by remaining involved with an organisation that one can exercise the most significant influence. Therefore once someone has exited they no longer have the option of voice. However, by voicing one's concerns there is still the opportunity to exit at a future date.¹⁴⁷

With respect to determining what type of member utilises voice and when, Hirschman's study provides an astute insight. It is proposed that those members who care most about the quality of a product, or in the case of political organisations a policy, strategy or goal, are the most active agents of voice within an organisation. Consequently they will be the most likely to exit when there is what they perceive to be a significant deterioration in quality.¹⁴⁸ With this rapid exit at a time of perceived quality deterioration the organisation is also deprived of its strongest voice.¹⁴⁹ If voice is to have a significant impact, while these individuals are still present, the individuals utilising it must be placed significantly within the organisation.¹⁵⁰ It is much easier for leadership figures to ignore or dismiss the grievances of an ordinary member than a fellow member of the leadership, or other influential individuals. Similarly the type of organisation may also prove relevant when assessing the influence of voice.¹⁵¹ It has been identified that within terrorist organisations specifically voice may be regarded as a more serious threat than exit. Within many of these organisations voice can be regarded as an act of mutiny.¹⁵² Crenshaw proposes that this may be due to the belief that terrorist organisations are founded as groups who prefer to utilise action rather than discussion as a tool. Consequently the leadership may see any form of voice as a questioning of their

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p.37

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid*

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.47

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.51

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pp.70-71

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p.74

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p.121; Crenshaw (1985), p.484.

legitimacy.¹⁵³ While this may be true it is proposed that if the leadership is to be most successful in implementing, and gaining support for, any form of significant organisational or strategic change that they must be prepared to actively engage with voice. If they can successfully convince the majority of the membership, and perhaps convert some if not all of the agents of voice, in the necessity of change they will have a stronger and more robust organisation. This is central to ones understanding of the determination of the result of a split.

Throughout Hirschman's discussion voice is predominantly referred to as a tool for the rank and file speaking out against the leadership. However, it should also be considered as a tool of the leadership. In order to successfully implement any significant proposed changes the leadership must gain support both internally and externally. The achievement of sufficient support will maintain and progress the organisation in a form deemed acceptable to the leadership. Therefore similarly to those rank and file members who wish to show their disagreement with the organisation a leadership seeking reform must actively voice why they deem it necessary to implement such change. Through this form of voice the leadership is, similar to rank and file detractors, denouncing the structure, strategies or goals of the organisation in its current appearance and in turn are calling for reform. When voice is utilised as a tool of protest against the leadership the remonstrated against may wish to defend their position. When voice is used as a tool of the leadership to call for organisational change the defence may come from the rank and file membership. This defence of the organisation in its current form generally comes from those traditionalist members who do not approve of proposed changes. It is proposed here that voice should not be considered as a one sided event. In order to produce the best analysis possible voice must be considered a two-sided dynamic process. This enables the analysis of the original action of voice as well as the subsequent responses. Dyck and Starke propose the nature of voice is dependent on the reception which it receives from the target audience and have suggested that dependent on the

¹⁵³ Crenshaw (1985), p.484

reaction voice may exist in one of three forms; *tolerated*, *resisted* and *militant* voice.¹⁵⁴

This ascribes to the notion of voice as a dynamic process.

When discord arises in the rank and file it is most likely to start as a passive conversation between detractors with minimal confrontational action taken. If and when the position held by detractors is legitimised to some degree by a figurehead or influential individual the group is more likely to develop a stronger group identity and commit themselves in attempting to bring about their desired change, leading to active resistance on the part of the leadership, or proponents of the status quo.¹⁵⁵ This change in determination, identity and action can be accounted for by a number of factors. When the dissension is coming from a less influential level of membership the leadership are content to tolerate the protestations and not actively interact with them as they are aware that a reaction will aid in the criticisms gaining a wider audience. When the dissenters' viewpoints are actively sponsored by an influential individual within the organisation it may prove to be detrimental for the leadership *not* to respond. If the leadership wish to maintain and promote their position they must now defend against the accusations of their internal detractors. Therefore with the active support of an influential individual voice has moved from being tolerated to resisted. It can further change form if and when voice and the reaction to it spreads wider than the original issue of discontent. In these circumstances there may be a direct questioning of the suitability of the leadership as a whole, not just a questioning of their judgement on the original issue. The reaction to this challenge may become more militant in nature and can lead to the attempted disparaging, segregation or expulsion of the dissenting voices, or the overthrow of the leadership.

There may be a number of different policies, strategies or tactics which members disagree with, however, it is only those which they deem to be altering the very essence of the organisation and its values which they are most likely to concentrate on and persist

¹⁵⁴ Dyck and Starke (1999), p.817

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, pp.803-804

with.¹⁵⁶ The peripheral issues, while vocally disagreed with, are often times not actively pursued or protested against. It is clear that voice can be overdone and consequently the power of dissent can diminish. As a result those dissenting voices must choose their battles wisely. This is especially true within organisations, such as terrorist groups, where voice can be viewed as an act of mutiny. Detractors weigh up the benefits and costs of their dissent before deciding whether to actively pursue an issue. If as a result of this rationalising process the costs outweigh the benefits then they are less likely to over actively provide a dissenting voice. However, in those situations where they believe that the very essence of the organisation is potentially being harmed with the proposed action the rationalising process for that particular group or individual then deems the benefits of dissent outweigh their negative consequences. This rationalising process does not only encapsulate the results which success or failure bring but the degree of support which the dissenters gain both internally and externally by challenging the leadership on this issue. This is only one specific aspect which is considered. If the divisive issue is deemed a defining component of what that organisation aims and stands for, and therefore what it is to be a member irrespective of the levels of support those who hold this issue in such importance will actively voice their opposition.

3.3 Exit

So far in the dissertation the antecedents to exit have been discussed in depth, with only limited reference to the formal departure of individuals or sub-groups. The most obviously defining factor of a split is the exit of a number of actors from the organisation to form a new group. This organisational exit is generally preceded by some form of voice, hence it's positioning within the chapter. What follows is a discussion of organisational exit in general and exit from terrorist organisations specifically. Hirschman's model of is assessed and applied in order to explain the conditions pertinent to organisational exit and why some individuals exit and when. Developing on from this there is a discussion as to why the exit of some groups and individuals leads to the

¹⁵⁶ Sani, F. and Reicher, S. (1999). Identity, Argument and Schism: Two Longitudinal Studies of the Split in the Church of England over the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 2(3), pp.379-300. p.296

establishment of a new group while the only quantifiable result from the exit of others will be a lessening in numbers of the original organisational membership.

In outlining who exits and when Hirschman makes a distinction between those who exit an organisation through deterioration in quality and those who exit upon the raising of membership cost. Hirschman proposes that those who care most about the quality of a product are the strongest proponents of voice. It is these individuals who will be the first to exit with a significant perceived drop in the quality of the product or policies proposed. In their membership they are likely to be amongst the most active and vocal actors. However, when the cost of membership significantly rises this will not negatively affect their membership. This rise in cost will not even bring about a consideration of exit. The escalation in membership cost brings about the exit of marginal actors within the organisation, those who care least about the quality of the product produced or policy pursued.¹⁵⁷ An extension of these hypotheses proposes that those who exit due to a drop in quality are more likely to set up new organisations after their exit than those who exit due to a rise in cost. This extension is considering that there are no closely competing organisations already there. If there is an existing organisation with a perceived to be superior product quality conscious members may in turn join this organisation as opposed to developing their own. This membership of the competitor organisation, similar to the previous membership, will not be dependent on cost. Consequently the quality conscious actor may join an organisation with a higher quality product even if the cost of membership is significantly higher in the new organisation.¹⁵⁸ These quality conscious members are the ones more likely to have the most to lose personally with deterioration in quality. In relation to political and terrorist groups this may include those who personally tie their memberships and political beliefs to a specific policy of the organisation. When this is changed, or proposed to be changed, remaining with the organisation can prove detrimental to how they define their political viewpoints and strategic and policy support. The change in quality may create a breakdown in the cognitive and ideological linkage between the member and their beliefs and the policies

¹⁵⁷ Hirschman (1970), p.47.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p.49

and strategies of the organisation.¹⁵⁹ Therefore this perceived drop in quality provides members with a choice to ‘actively stay’, and activate their option of voice, or to ‘actively flee’, and activate their option of exit.¹⁶⁰ The weakening of quality must be substantial in order for these members to even consider exit.¹⁶¹ With their exit the perceived quality of the product and policies produced by the organisation will continue to deteriorate.¹⁶² The degree of quality differs from actor to actor. Therefore quality is in the eye of beholder.¹⁶³ In those organisations, such as terrorist groups, where voice is considered mutiny and exit treachery, the intention and the result of either one or both of these actions by quality conscious members is carried out with the intention and result of destruction rather than reformation.¹⁶⁴ The concentration of any new organisation created by the exiting members frequently places a strong emphasis on damaging the parent organisation. This new organisation will not contain all of the members who disagree with the parent organisation on the specific issue which provoked exit. There will be those who fundamentally disagree with the organisation, and who may even actively voice this opposition, but who decide to stay. These individuals have chosen to ‘actively stay’ with the parent organisation as they believe that they will be more successful in fighting for reform from within rather than exiting and starting afresh by founding a new autonomous group.¹⁶⁵ Equally their decision to stay with the original group may be intrinsically tied to their organisational loyalty.

Crenshaw acknowledged that governments and security forces wishing to counter the terrorist threat should be aware of the opportunities for exit within terrorist groups and should seek to incorporate these opportunities in their wider strategy of counter-terrorism. She cites the example of the Red Brigades in the aftermath of the murder of Aldo Moro. The authorities successfully dropped the cost of exit in light of the disillusionment within

¹⁵⁹ Burke Rochford Jr (1989), pp.162-163

¹⁶⁰ Hirschman (1970) pp.49-50

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, p.53

¹⁶² *Ibid*, p.99

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, p.48

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.121

¹⁶⁵ See for example those who fundamentally disagreed with the Church of England ordaining female priests, yet stayed within the Church even when the opportunities were there to exit. Sani and Reicher (1989)

the organisation by offering new, non-violent incentives and therefore increased opportunities for exit. Leading on from this example Crenshaw suggests that counter-terrorist initiatives should not be directed at defeating the terrorists militarily but by promoting discontent and dissent within the organisation.¹⁶⁶ Therefore counter terrorism initiatives benefit greatly with a clearer understanding of both how and why members leave terrorist groups, the physical exiting of the organisation but perhaps more importantly why and how they psychologically disengage from terrorism.¹⁶⁷ This final stage of the process of terrorist involvement,¹⁶⁸ psychological and physical disengagement and exit, is the stage which there is the least research about, yet it is this phase which may be most beneficial in understanding if one is to counter the threat of terrorism.¹⁶⁹

Horgan notes that terrorist disengagement can take place at either a physical or psychological level and can be influenced by push or pull factors, or a combination of both. It is proposed that an actor need not be psychologically disengaged from terrorism to physically disengage from the act or the group, and vice-versa.¹⁷⁰ In relation to an individual's motivations to disengage this may be influenced by perceived negative aspects or circumstances within the organisation (push factors) or positive external factors which entice an individual or group away from terrorism and/or the terrorist group (pull factors).¹⁷¹ What has been covered so far with regards to the Hirschman model of exit has been physical organisational disengagement motivated by push factors. As always one must be aware of the environmental circumstances in which a specific action takes place or opinion is formed. The application of pull factors as proposed by Horgan deals with this issue sufficiently. One common pull factor with regards to organisational exit is the presence of an alternative. While members may be disillusioned with the route being taken by the organisation¹⁷² they may not necessarily wish to exit and form a new

¹⁶⁶ Crenshaw (1985) p.483 and p.488

¹⁶⁷ Horgan, J. (2006). Disengaging from Terrorism. *Jane's Intelligence Review*. (pp.34-37). P.34.

¹⁶⁸ See Horgan (2005) for a discussion of terrorist involvement as a process from initial engagement with the terrorist group to involvement with the terrorist group to disengaging from the terrorist group.

¹⁶⁹ Horgan (2006), p.35

¹⁷⁰ Della Porta (2009), p.68

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp.34-35.

¹⁷² Horgan (2005), p.149

organisation. If there is already a convenient existing alternative this facilitates an easier exit for the individual or group. As referenced earlier the rise of the PQ provided discontented FLQ members with an alternative constitutional route to their purposive goal of an independent Quebec.¹⁷³ Pull factors need not even be predominantly related to the organisation itself. Some of the most common reasons for exit from a terrorist organisation are personal to the exiting individual. Active terrorism is often times a barrier to leading a normal life. Therefore the opportunity for career progression or the desire to start a relationship may ‘pull’ an individual away from their involvement with the group.¹⁷⁴

One of the most common rationales for exit is that of disconnect, a push factor. This refers to the leadership being disconnected from the expectations which the membership and supporters hold for them. When there is a significant level of disconnect it is more likely that the organisational leadership will implement, or attempt to implement, divisive policies or strategies. This is not just true for terrorist organisations but it is the case for all forms of human organisation. Within the context of terrorist organisations, as well as other political organisations, it can easily happen that the leadership can become increasingly isolated from their membership as well as the individuals and groups which they claim to represent. This is displayed by Adriana Faranda, a former member of the Red Brigades, when discussing the lead up to her departure from the organisation.

“By that time the Red Brigades could no longer speak any language except their own.”¹⁷⁵

This displays that disconnect need not only be conveyed through the policies and strategies of the group but can also be exhibited in how the organisational leadership present themselves and their viewpoints to their members and supporters. This sentiment is echoed in a quote from an Official IRA member.

¹⁷³ Ross and Gurr (1989).

¹⁷⁴ Horgan (2005), p.146.

¹⁷⁵ Jamieson (1990), p.13.

“[The Leader] brought the trouble on himself by not being in touch with the mood on the ground.”¹⁷⁶

If they are not actively consulting with their members and supporters leaders will not be informed of the expectations on them. Consequently it is more likely that they lose support and members as they become disillusioned with the wide gap between what they expect of the organisation and its leadership and the reality of what the actual leadership actions and sentiments are.

3.4 Entry

In order for a split to take place a group of members must invariably leave a parent organisation to form a new group. This specific action of split consequently involves organisational exit. It similarly involves the development of and entry into a new organisation. Therefore if one is to comprehend the phenomenon of organisational split they must clearly understand why individuals join organisations as well as exit. With respect to a split the exit from the organisation and the entry into the breakaway group are inter-dependent. Intuitively one should cover entry into an organisation prior to exit. But in the case of splits it is exit which precedes entry and this is why entry is dealt with here after exit. While not identical to the initial entry of individuals into a new organisation there are parallels which need to be drawn upon.

Within the study of splits one should not treat those entering the new organisation as a homogeneous grouping. A complete overview of organisational entry with respect to splits must respect the heterogeneous nature of those joining the new organisation. This heterogeneity can be on a variety of levels. At the most basic level the diversity is displayed in the levels of experience of those entering the new organisation. Prior involvement in the parent organisation may have been at leadership or rank and file levels of membership. With specific reference to terrorist organisations one must also consider whether the individual was involved in the armed or political wing of the organisation, or perhaps both. The variety of roles within any one organisation establishes that this new

¹⁷⁶ Horgan (2005), p.148

membership may have come from diverse organisational backgrounds and therefore had diverse organisational experiences. This may lead one to propose that the rationale for entering the new organisation, and previously leaving the parent organisation, may differ from member to member judging on their previous organisational experience. While this focus is on those who have been previously involved in the parent organisation there are also those who are joining an organisation without any previous organisational experience of any sort. The rationale for their entry must similarly be independently considered. This consideration of previous experience is only the tip of the heterogeneous iceberg. Building on from this differentiation must be a similar respect for the timing of entry. Not all dissidents join the new organisation at the point of inception. There are those who remain after the split and at a future date exit so as to join the dissident group, and there are those organisational novices who will join the group at a time other than the point of inception.

The organisational approach to terrorism stipulates that recruits join for various reasons, not always centrally tied to ideological commitment.¹⁷⁷ Similar to the rationale influencing exit entry into a terrorist organisation, or any other organisation, may be personal rather than political or ideological. As a significant proportion of new recruits moving into terrorist organisations are young adolescent males their entry into the group may be more linked to a sense of rebellion as well as belonging, comradeship and the desire for social status.¹⁷⁸ This desire to join a terrorist organisation in order to enhance an individual's appearance to others is a common characteristic of nationalist and separatist groups. These groups are more likely to be integrated within the community and while a significant proportion of the members of that community may not agree with the tactics and strategies of the terrorist group they may respect their goals.¹⁷⁹ Taking this all into consideration a strong ideology or purposive goals will not be sufficient to attract a significant number of new recruits to any organisation. The leadership must therefore be able to put in place sufficient personal and social incentives to attract and

¹⁷⁷ Crenshaw (1987), p.19

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, p.20; Crenshaw (1985), pp.473-478; Horgan (2006), p.34; Horgan (2009), p.143; White and Fraser (2000), p.325; Irvin (1999), p.34

¹⁷⁹ Crenshaw (1987), p.20.

retain recruits, and these at times may be supported by material incentives. If an organisation is unable to retain and attract recruits the organisation itself will decline and cease to operate.¹⁸⁰ Some members may even join an organisation without being fully aware of the purposive goals, these are often times later learned through active involvement with the organisation.

The geographical location in which a person resides can have a significant impact on them joining a specific group. The influence of this regionalism can derive from the influential individuals living in the area, as well as the historical and modern day circumstances relating to the locale. These geographical areas may be as small as an apartment block or housing estate, or as large as a country or even continent. Terrorist organisations can invariably find it easier to recruit in specific areas as opposed to others.¹⁸¹ Within certain areas the organisation's ideals are entwined with local aspirations.¹⁸² These ideals can be in reference to the purposive goals of a movement or a more specific goal with respect to the local area. A terrorist organisation may have a specific role to play in a geographical region which supersedes the purposive goal of the organisation in the eyes of local members. Such a role may be in regional defence or local policing. If the organisation is providing a specific public good for the area and its residents this may persuade individuals not just to support the actions but they may also be encouraged to join. As was stated earlier the purpose of a political organisation is to supply a public good for the membership as well as the greater public they claim to represent. While there may be a larger public good the organisation is aiming to achieve for the entire population there are at times regionally specific public goods they wish to achieve. At a time of split regionalism proves one of the most dominant rationales in choice of whether to remain a member of the parent organisation or join the newly established dissident group. This can be especially true for the ordinary rank and file members whose membership is not as closely tied to ideological and purposive elements. Members often times tie their membership to that of local influential individuals. These may be family members, friends or the local leadership. If a member who they trust and

¹⁸⁰ Oots (1989), pp. 143-144

¹⁸¹ Oots (1986), p.54

¹⁸² Bowyer Bell (1998), p.250

look up to is adamant on joining the dissidents or alternatively staying with the parent organisation this may have a significant influence on the choice made. Tied to this if the vast majority of the membership within a designated geographical area are members of one specific organisation then the cost of membership of their rivals rises dramatically. All of these choices are made in the context of the situation.¹⁸³ Horgan posits that in order to fully understand the rationale behind a person's initial engagement with a terrorist organisation one must be fully aware of the personal factors, setting events and the social, political and organisational context.¹⁸⁴ The personal factors are in reference to the psychological factors experienced by the individual during the process of initial involvement. These may often overlap with the setting events which consider the past contextual influences on an individual. These factors are unchangeable as they have taken place in the past. The final factors are those of the social, political and organisational context. This refers to the terrorist organisation itself, its social standing and how it portrays its aims, strategies and ideology.¹⁸⁵ These variables provide more structured headings for the discussion which preceded.

With all of these variables considered it shows that the decisions made by any one individual are meaningful for that person at that point in time. A person can only make a decision based on their knowledge and beliefs at any specific point in time. This viewpoint is in tune with the rational choice perspective applied to terrorism. This approach places emphasis on the consequences of a specific behaviour.¹⁸⁶ The individual weighs up the costs and benefits of a specific action with the information and knowledge they have at that point in time, and as a result comes to a decision as to what action to take, if any. This process is extremely personal in nature and need only be relevant to that individual. For each person different factors carry different weight in their decision-making process. This individual perspective works well when applying organisational theory as it considers individual actors as rational beings. Rationality need not always be

¹⁸³ Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2006). A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(4), pp.1-17. (pp.3-4)

¹⁸⁴ Horgan (2009), p.143.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp.143-144

¹⁸⁶ Taylor and Horgan (2006), p.13.

tied to the purposive goals of the organisation but are tied to the rational processes and intentions of each individual member.

3.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter has introduced and developed the organisational work of Hirschman¹⁸⁷ to aid the explanation of split. It is proposed that in the process of split the exit of the breakaway group is preceded by their voicing of concerns over the perceived drop in quality of the organisation or a specific aspect. While the original model outlines the reasoning and process of exit, loyalty and voice it is proposed here that when modified to fit organisational splits it is necessary to also consider organisational entry, which follows exit. The allegiance of individuals post-split is not always linked to the reasoning of split, and may not even be tied to any specific organisational factor.

¹⁸⁷ Hirschman (1970)

Chapter 4

Theory of Splits

4.1 Introduction

What has been detailed in the dissertation to date has been an analysis of some of the important factors which need to be initially considered before one can gain a detailed understanding of organisational splits. However, while a reduction in support, intra-organisational conflict and membership exit and entry may have their parts to play in organisational splits they do not always lead to schism. Therefore what follows in this chapter is a theoretical analysis of why and how organisational splits take place. In keeping with the design of the preceding chapters the analysis begins with an examination of the literature on organisational splits before narrowing the discussion to focus on splits in terrorist organisations. While in the main the analysis focuses on the lead up to and the act of split it has been deemed important that the section should not just finish with the splitting of the organisation. The actual split should never be regarded as an endpoint, but merely as the end of the beginning of a process whose effects are invariably visible for some time after the event of the split. Consequently this section concludes with an analysis of the situation in the aftermath of the organisational split, focusing predominantly on post split inter-organisational competition prior to outlining the hypothesised process-model for splits to be tested in the research. Therefore the chapter is laid out as follows

- Organisational Splits
- Process Model of Splits
- Splits in the Terrorism Literature
- Splits: How Terrorist Groups End?
- Post-Split Competition

Within these sections there is, where relevant, a critical analysis of existing models and theories of splits.

4.2 Organisational Splits

Preceding the split of an organisation the group will factionalise through different forms of intra-organisational conflict as has been described in Chapter 2. Some researchers regard the intra-organisational conflicts and wider societal changes as being the primary causal variables of organisational split.¹⁸⁸ The factionalism of the group predominantly grows from the call from certain sections of the organisation for a change in policies and/or practices.¹⁸⁹ However, these factions may have their roots in previously long-standing cleavages between sub-groups.¹⁹⁰ For this reason analysts of splits must have clear understanding of the historical precursors, as they may prove informative in the search for a viable explanation. Similarly they must not stop their analysis at the point of split as the far-reaching effects may prove more significant than the action itself. As was observed in the analysis of the 1969 split in the Indian National Congress the effects of the split can be significantly observed for a decade and beyond in subsequent political trends and forces.¹⁹¹ It may be found in this historical analysis that the organisation has endured a number of different splits throughout its existence. One can then assess whether or not there is any recurring theme which can provide an insight to the organisational split under examination.

Balser describes factionalism as concerning groups belonging to the same organisation 'that come into conflicts as they pursue different goals, strategies and tactics, stemming from their diverging interests.'¹⁹² This description can prove to be significantly misleading as in the course of organisational factionalism the divided groups do not always differ on all three of the factors detailed by Balser. For example it is common that divided factions will be in agreement on the purposive goals they wish to pursue, however, have become factionalised in their views as to how best to achieve these goals. A clear example of this is evident in Khadka's analysis of factionalism in the Nepalese Communist movement where the movement was divided into two factions, both of which wished to abolish the existing monarchy, however, one wished to do so through

¹⁸⁸ Singh (1981), p.22.

¹⁸⁹ Burke Rochford Jr, (1989), p.163

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid*; Stark and Banbridge (1985), p.101.

¹⁹¹ Singh (1981), p.2.

¹⁹² Balser (1997), p.200

democratic means and the other through people's agitation.¹⁹³ This example illustrates the presence of agreement on goals but a split occurring due to a disagreement on how best to achieve these goals.

While the existence of factions and internal organisational disagreement may prove difficult for an organisation their presence do not always lead to organisational split. A split only occurs when one of these factions deems it necessary to leave the organisation to form a new group, and the two major predictors of the development of factionalism, and ultimately split, have been noted as being the 'heterogeneity of the social base and the doctrinal basis of authority.'¹⁹⁴ Consequently larger organisations may be deemed more susceptible to organisational factionalism and split as the larger the organisation the more heterogeneous it is likely to be. Khadka's example of the Nepalese Communist movement once again illustrates this as it was observed that the larger the movement got the more internal feuds and factionalism proliferated.¹⁹⁵ However, this should be only regarded as a prologue to our understanding of factionalism and splits, and we must question whether it is in fact the heterogeneity of a group's social base that can be the cause of a large group's factionalism. There may be other factors at play within a split which may at first have been explained by heterogeneity. Each case of factionalism¹⁹⁶ or split must be taken on its own merits and they must be analysed as to why and how each individual case occurred. For example what may be regarded as the result of heterogeneity in one case may be the result of a clash of personalities in another.¹⁹⁷ Therefore while the theoretical proposals of Zald and Ash and others may prove useful as guidelines, a guideline on what can be expected is all that they can really be. They must not be treated as true for each split until it has been applied and tested against the individual case.

¹⁹³ Khadka (1995), p.67

¹⁹⁴ Zald and Ash (1966), pp.336-337.

¹⁹⁵ Khadka (1995), p.57.

¹⁹⁶ The very nature of an organisation dividing into factions displays a certain form of heterogeneity and therefore this notion of heterogeneous groups being more susceptible to splits is a tautology.

¹⁹⁷ Kaur, K. (1999). *Akali Dal in Punjab Politics: Splits and Mergers*. New Dehli: Deep and Deep Publications. p.3.

With respect to the issue of doctrinal authority Zald and Ash noted that those organisations concerned with questions of an ultimate ideological truth and theoretical matters are more susceptible to splits than those affected by less theoretical matters. Within this proposal it is not the actual ideology but the ideological concerns leading to the questioning of organisational authority and the behaviour of the leadership which will eventually split the organisation.¹⁹⁸ Therefore if one is to ascribe to this claim it would follow that if the leadership can adequately deal with this questioning and convince the doubting membership of their authority and behaviour they can lessen the magnitude of a split, or completely fend it off. Again this does not posit that those organisations less fixated with theoretical and ideological truths will not split, it is merely saying that they are less likely to do so.

In organisational splits internal and external factors interact differently from case to case and therefore the way in which factionalism and schism occurs varies from organisation to organisation, and even in an organisation which experiences multiple splits each individual case may take place for differing reasons. While organisational split may be regarded as the dependent variable each individual split may be best explained by a distinct set of factors or by the same set of factors with varying degrees of importance.¹⁹⁹ These factors must be considered alongside the effects of the external environment, as if one only considers the internal factors their analysis will be incomplete. Similarly no analysis should view one specific factor, be it internal or external, as being fully responsible for an organisational split.²⁰⁰ In their 2009 examination of schism in the Czech environmental movement Shriver and Messer noted that multiple factors contributed to the factionalism and splits within the movement.²⁰¹ While the movement's ideology proved to be a major contentious issue within the Rainbow Movement²⁰² the authors also noted the important roles which the changing political situation and debates on organisational tactics and strategy similarly factored in to the explanation of the

¹⁹⁸ Zald and Ash (1966), p.337.

¹⁹⁹ Balser (1997), p.207.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, pp.224-225; This can be seen as one of the criticisms of Khadka's (1995) analysis of factionalism in the Communist movement in Nepal. While a number of different splits are analysed the explanation of each individual split is attributed to one individual factor.

²⁰¹ Shriver and Messer (2009), p.163.

²⁰² A Czech environmental organisation.

organisation's splintering.²⁰³ Therefore what is portrayed here can only be regarded as a framework of different circumstances in which an organisation may factionalise and ultimately split.

All forms of human organisations go through a variety of different disagreements and conflicts, yet not all of these conflicts result in split. The question must be then asked as to what forms of conflict result in organisational schism. Sani and Reicher propose that splits will only develop from those conflicts which the sub-groups, or at least one of the sub-groups, deem to be potentially threatening to what they consider to be the very essence of organisational identity. This is reflected in the inability of the conflicting groups to compromise on tactics, strategies and/or goals as this would result in a compromise of identity. The authors therefore concluded that identity should not just be perceived as correlating with schism but as being a causal antecedent.²⁰⁴ Not all members will classify the same issues as being a defining element of identity and therefore may regard organisational split as unnecessary when others deem it unavoidable. This depends on how important each issue is perceived by the individual actors and sub-groups. Similarly it relies on the opportunities individual members believe they will have to change the organisation internally through the application of voice as described in the previous chapter. It is proposed that those who believe they will have significant opportunities will forego the chance to split and will stay with the parent organisation and attempt to influence internally.

Throughout the literature looking at organisational splits the act of schism is often times referred to as being a result of the decline or failure of the organisation.²⁰⁵ However, this is too narrow a viewpoint to take and could lead researchers to discontinue their analysis of the parent organisation in the aftermath of the split. While it may be true that the split may be illustrative of a declining organisation Balser has shown through her analysis of

²⁰³ Shriver and Messer (2009), pp.168-170

²⁰⁴ Sani and Reicher (1999), p.296; See also Sani, F. and Reicher, S. (1998). When Consensus Fails: An Analysis of the Schism Within the Italian Communist Party (1991). *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 28, pp.623-645.

²⁰⁵ This is true also within the realms of terrorism research. As a later section of the chapter illustrates the issue of splits in terrorist groups invariably resides in the end of terrorism literature.

four separate social movement organisations that the organisation can prosper in spite of split. She cites the examples of Earth First! and the American Federation of Labour as being two cases of organisations who succeeded and developed positively in the aftermath of a split.²⁰⁶ This finding is in line with the proposal that organisational split can provide a positive impact on an organisation and can prove a vital step in the group's survival and prosperity. Balser cites these findings as being supportive of Simmel's view that schism can be utilised by an organisation in order to deal with internal conflict and external threats.²⁰⁷

4.3 Process Model of Split

It is proposed that organisational splits may be best explained by the design of a suitable process model which may be utilised to analyse and describe the various events and actions in the lead up to and during a split. This is an expansion of the position taken in Chapter 2 which stated that intra-organisational conflicts are best explained through the application of a process model. Therefore if splits are considered as the result of an intra-organisational conflict it follows that they should similarly be considered to the result of an extended process. This section critically analyses one such model put forward by Dyck and Starke after their analysis of splits in various self governed American churches.²⁰⁸

4.3.1 Dyck and Starke Process Model of Breakaway Group Formation

In their attempts to develop a process model for the development of breakaway organisations, and therefore splits, Dyck and Starke indicate that splinter groups form

“when a group of organisational members, frustrated by their inability to implement change in their parent organisation, leave it and start up a new organisation in which they are free to implement their ideas.”²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Balser (1997), pp.225-226.

²⁰⁷ Simmel, G. (1955). Conflict. Free Press. Cited in Balser, D.B. (1997). The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organisations. *Social Forces*, 76(1). Pp.199-228. (p.226)

²⁰⁸ Dyck and Starke (1999).

²⁰⁹ Dyck and Starke (1999), p.792.

While it is true that splits can and do occur in such circumstances this does not account for the fact that splits can similarly take place with the exit of members diametrically *opposed* to changes which were successfully implemented, or proposed to be implemented, during their membership of the parent organisation. By deciding that splits can only take place with the departure of proponents of change this closes analysts off to the possibility of different kinds of splits taking place.

Even though there is this fundamental disagreement over the nature of when splits can and do take place it is still beneficial for the present study to assess the process model proposed in what, in spite of the incomplete definition of splits, is a noteworthy piece of work. The authors propose a six stage process model in order to explain organisational splits. At the end of each stage there is a trigger event which moves the process on a stage. This model is largely based on their research on self governed churches in the United States of America. The model which they have proposed has drawn not only on their own fieldwork and research but has similarly benefited from an appreciation of the proposals of some others who have been previously described. The six stages and their corresponding five trigger events are:

Stage 1: Relative Harmony	<i>Trigger Event: Conflicting Ideas Event</i>
Stage 2: Idea Development	<i>Trigger Event: Legitimising Event</i>
Stage 3: Change	<i>Trigger Event: Alarm Event</i>
Stage 4: Resistance	<i>Trigger Event: Polarising Event</i>
Stage 5: Intense Conflict	<i>Trigger Event: Justifying Event</i>
Stage 6: Group Exit ²¹⁰	

As was clearly stated in the introduction to Dyck and Starke's model this does not give a clear picture of all forms of splits. Due to the sample cases they investigated, and in turn based their model upon, the authors only observed those splits which resulted in a

²¹⁰ See Dyck and Starke (1999), pp.804-811 for a detailed description of each stage of the process and the trigger events.

breakaway movement formed by the proponents of change. However, it is proposed here that not all splits take place in this way, and that by viewing all splits within the proposed model of Dyck and Starke one may be closing themselves off to assessing splits taking place with the exit of proponents of the status quo.

It is suggested that one must consider a number of further forms of organisational split. The first of these being the exit of rank and file members opposed to the leadership's proposed or actual changes. It is hypothesized that this exiting group will be largely made up of old-guard members wishing to maintain the organisation, its strategies, tactics and goals as they were. The second situation to be considered is when a leadership proposing the maintenance of the status quo is overthrown by proponents of change. In the aftermath of this event the former leadership may exit the organisation to set up a breakaway group. In this situation it is proposed that the former leadership will again invariably be largely constituted and led by members of the organisational old-guard. It is clear that if these two forms of organisational split are to be considered that a further form of organisational split brought on by the exit of proponents of change must similarly be considered. This category of split will take place when the leadership are the proponents of change but are overthrown by a section of the membership wishing to retain the status quo. In the aftermath of the coup the old leadership leave to form a new organisation based on their beliefs and ideals. In this final situation the new leadership of the parent organisation will more than likely be the members of the old-guard. In essence what is being proposed here is that the breakaway organisation will not necessarily be configured of proponents of change from the parent organisation. The make-up of the new breakaway organisation will be more accurately described an organisation consisting of individuals who were unsuccessful in their attempts to either bring about change or maintain the status quo within the parent organisation. Therefore it is important which sub-group is in control at the time of split. At this stage these are simply hypothetical proposals which need to be further analysed and tested. It is similarly necessary to take into account breakaway groups formed in the aftermath of their expulsion from the parent organisation. It is likely that this form of organisational split will prove to be

significantly different from all forms of voluntary split.²¹¹ Equally one must also consider the possibility of organisational splits in the aftermath of the death or exit of a charismatic leader or influential individual.²¹² With the death, incarceration or simple exit of a dominant leadership figure there can be a struggle to succeed them as leader of the organisation. From the ensuing conflict for leadership those unsuccessful in their pursuit of power may split to form their own autonomous grouping. The critical difference in these new organisations will not be in organisational ideology, goals, strategies or tactics but in the personalities holding leadership positions. This form of conflict and schism is most likely in those organisations without a clearly organised and communicated succession plan.

While the stage model proposed by Dyck and Starke is flawed due to its omission of a number of separate possibilities of split it may still prove useful for those wishing to assess the phenomenon. One of the most noteworthy contributions which the study made is in its inclusion of an assessment of when splits do *not* happen. This second section of their research again focused on self governing congregations which were involved in intra-organisational conflict but were resolved and did not conclude in the exit of any members. The subsequent model proposed from the analysis of the results proved very similar to their model describing the formation of breakaway organisations. The models are identical until the fourth stage of *resistance*. While in model of group exit this stage is followed by a polarising event in the model describing split avoidance the polarising event is replaced by a *harmonising event* where the two groups agree on working together in spite of their differences. This event is illustrated by the two groups listening to each other and trying to find a common ground. During this event the identity of the subgroups are weakened by members focusing on the overall organisational identity rather than that of the divisive groups.

This event is followed by the final stage of the process, the stage of *dissonant harmony*. This should not be considered as identical to the opening stage of relative harmony as the

²¹¹ Balser (1997), p.225

²¹² Leatham, M.C. (2003). "Shaking Out the Mat": Schism and Organisational Transformation at a Mexican Ark of the Virgin. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 42(2), pp.175-187. (p.175).

conflict is not fully resolved, but the members are actively working together for the good of the overall organisation. This is often times noted for a number of compromises on both sides which are necessary for organisational survival.²¹³

Throughout their study Dyck and Starke drew strongly on the findings and proposals of Lau and Murnighan,²¹⁴ among others, and in their conclusions found support for Lau and Murnighan's proposals of when organisational division can be strengthened or weakened. Their conclusions suggest that these divisions will be accentuated when sub-groups meet independently of other organisational members, and when individual sub-group members gain the support of fellow sub-group affiliates in their attempts to implement changes. The divide is also further strengthened with the heightened competition between sub-group and status quo members and the increased grouping together of dissident members into a sub-group.

The results of the second part of their study propose that these divisions can be weakened, and therefore splits can be staved off, when there is an open exchange of information between the proponents of changes and those who wish for status quo maintenance. A similar result was observed when minority group views were acknowledged and recognised at an early stage. Finally the divide diminished when members met outside of their sub-groups and identified with the larger organisation as a group.²¹⁵ The only proposal of Lau and Murnighan's which was not supported was that of a weakening of division with the organisation grouping together to tackle an external threat. This does not refute the claim it merely illustrates that there was no unifying external threat in the case studies identified with the research.

4.4 Splits in the Terrorism Literature

Splits in the organisational literature have been analysed so far in the chapter. What follows now is an analysis of how the terrorism literature has viewed the same

²¹³ See Dyck and Starke (1999), pp.811-816 for a detailed description of each stage and the relevant trigger events.

²¹⁴ Lau, D. and Murnighan, J.K. (1999). Demographic Diversity and Faultlines: The Compositional Dynamics of Organisational Groups. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, pp.325-340.

²¹⁵ Dyck and Starke (1999), p.818.

phenomenon. Terrorist groups are ‘not monolithic entities that remain constant over time.’²¹⁶ Similar to all social organisations they adapt to their changing environment, an adaptation which may at times result in the splintering of the group.²¹⁷ Few terrorist organisations have successfully evaded the effect of organisational split in some shape or form. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) can all trace their roots to splits within the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) nominally over the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.²¹⁸ Similarly between 1965 and 1975 the Basque separatist movement saw the development of numerous splinter groups breaking away from ETA, among these were ETA-berri, ETA-VI, ETA (politico-militar) and ETA-Zutik, each group claiming to be the true representatives of the movement.²¹⁹ While not always leading to organisational split the Islamist movements in Afghanistan, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iran and Sudan were all brought into serious crisis due to factionalism up to the late 1990s.²²⁰ Recent times have even seen the splintering of sections of the Al-Qaeda movement. However, what may be considered as a splintering in Al-Qaeda would sometimes more accurately be described as the fragmentation of a terrorist coalition, as opposed to splits in a terrorist group. This was illustrated in 2009 by groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) leaving the Al Qaeda movement which it had joined two years previously.²²¹ As this organisation was an autonomous group prior to joining Al-Qaeda their movement away from the group must be considered in a different light to the formation of a completely new breakaway organisation.

In the lead up to splits in the terrorist organisation, as with the splits in all other human organisations, the group divides into two distinct factions. One of the most common

²¹⁶ Crelinstein (1987), p.61.

²¹⁷ *Ibid*

²¹⁸ Cronin, A.K. (2009). *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p.68.

²¹⁹ Zirakzadeh, C.E. (2002). From Revolutionary Dreams to Organisational Fragmentation: Disputes over Violence within ETA and Sendero Luminoso. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(4), pp.66-92. (p.74).

²²⁰ Gerges, F. (1999). The Decline of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt. *Survival*, 41(1), pp.113-125. (p.114)

²²¹ Blair, D. (July 9, 2009). Extremist Group Announces Split from Al-Qaeda. www.telegraph.co.uk.

divides put forward is between the militant and the political factions, ostensibly those who wish to continue the armed struggle and those who suggest that it would be more productive to advance their goals through non-violent political means.²²² However, the partition is not always this uniform in nature. One has to take into account a number of different factors such as regionalism, membership overlap between the militant and political and the membership's political aspirations. While there may be political and armed factions in an organisation, and an overlap between the two, this does not suggest that either of these wings is united themselves. Crelinsten in an analysis of the internal dynamics of the FLQ outlines that the most divisive factions within the organisation were not strategic between politicians and militants but ideological between Trotskyites and Maoists.²²³ Similarly the divide may have its origins in a leadership struggle²²⁴ with the membership aligning behind either the potential or actual leadership.²²⁵ This division may be portrayed by the sub-groups as being based on organisational strategy, however, the membership's decision's of who to support may be similarly based on a number of other more diverse factors such as personality, regionalism and loyalty.

While the reasoning for the factionalism may vary across organisations, and across time periods, it is clear that factionalism is not at all uncommon among terrorist organisations,²²⁶ and especially among the larger organisations.²²⁷ Factionalism can be more common within larger organisations²²⁸ as the larger the organisation the greater diversity of opinion there is likely to be with regards the organisational objectives.²²⁹ Crenshaw has proposed that the proliferation of factionalism in these organisations may be largely due to the terrorist group's aversion to internal dissent, or to borrow the parlance of Hirschman they are averse to 'voice', and often regard it as more detrimental than exit. Therefore the organisations may promote separately functioning sub-groups so

²²² Siqueira, K. (2005), p.219

²²³ Crelinsten (1987), p.60.

²²⁴ Oots (1989) noted that a leadership struggle may be initially motivated by the significant material benefits, prestige and other psychological rewards gained by leaders of political organisations.

²²⁵ Oots (1989), p.149

²²⁶ Crenshaw (1985), p.483

²²⁷ Oots (1989), p.149

²²⁸ This is consistent with Dyck and Starke (1999), p.818.

²²⁹ Oots (1989), p.149

as to resolve intra-organisational conflict.²³⁰ While not always destructive for the organisation this can at times, especially when there is a significant proportion of membership discontent, be extremely debilitating for the group in the pursuit of their goals. Therefore it is proposed here that the most successful and long lasting terrorist organisations have other mechanisms to deal with their most divisive internal conflicts, mechanisms which may be best explained by returning to the work of Albert Hirschman.

4.4.1 Application of the Hirschman Model

In a treatment of the division between two firms or political parties, and their competition for membership and support, Hirschman describes how one of the competing parties may achieve greater success. The situation outlined refers to the ideological division being positioned along a finite linear scale from left to right. If the parties initially place themselves at the midpoints of their respective right and left halves this can prove the ideal situation for the voters as it will be clear for the majority of them where their allegiances lie as ideological distance between them and the parties' policies will be minimised.

However, the situation changes if and when one of the parties, for argument's sake the one on the left-hand side of the scale, is able to shift its location without incurring any negative cost while the party on the right-hand side feels ideologically or otherwise tied to their existing position on the scale. In such a situation a vote-maximising party will invariably move their position towards the right of the scale. As long as their position remains towards the left of the other party they should retain a hold on their far-left voters while stealing new voters from the right-wing party by moving in towards their terrain.²³¹ The advancing party must be careful in such a situation not to move too far towards the right as their party's position may become indistinguishable from their competition's and

²³⁰ Crenshaw (1985), p.484

²³¹ Hirschman (1970), pp.66-67.

this may result in the emergence of a third party maximising on left-wing voter discontent and disillusionment.²³²

It is hypothesised that a similar model may be applied to factionalism within terrorist organisations. Consider the previously referred to factionalism between those in support of militant strategies and those advocating political strategies. If the political advocates see themselves as being tied to their proposed strategies and would not advocate any move along the linear scale towards the militants but the militants regard their position as more flexible this then provides a distinct opportunity on which the militant leadership can maximise. If they move their position along the scale closer towards the political advocates' while still retaining a militant basis they are more likely to gain the support of the undecided members and supporters while still retaining their core militant support and perhaps stealing some of the voters from the political advocates. Such a movement can significantly marginalise the faction who feel tied down and can negatively impact on the influence which they hold within the movement. Therefore if the factionalism ultimately results in a split it will be, in this hypothetical situation, the militants who are more likely to emerge with the largest levels of support and membership. This supports the previously stated position from Chapter 1 that the leadership will aim to insure the survival of the organisation in a form as close to their ideal as possible. Therefore while the new position taken up by the militants may not be their ideal it at least retains the survival of the movement, and a large proportion of the support and membership, closer to their ideals than if they had retained their original position which may have resulted in a more dramatic split between the two factions. The tied down position of the political advocates in this situation results in minimal levels of support and membership for their grouping in the aftermath of the split and therefore leaves them in a weaker position to attain their objectives. Throughout an organisation's existence there may be a number of such linear factionalisms, sometimes more than one may be occurring at a time over different issues, and therefore a successful and long lasting organisation will have to be

²³² Just because this description describes the parties as being left-wing or right-wing this does not automatically translate as the parties' having left-wing and right-wing political view but merely refers to the positioning of the parties along a non-specified linear scale.

constantly aware of such dilemmas and deal with them adequately without having a perceived drop in quality of their policies, strategies and goals.

This interpretation of Hirschman's model of party and firm competition may prove informative in how we tend to look at organisational splits. Within the terrorism literature when there is a focus on splits there is often the assertion that the splitting of organisations can be utilised, or manipulated, in counter-terrorism initiatives so as to isolate and nullify the radical factions of the organisations.²³³ While this can be considered accurate it may prove more worthwhile to look at the benefits of such a situation in a somewhat different way. Policy makers and counter-terrorism practitioners can benefit more by regarding such intra-organisational conflict and factionalism not specifically as an opportunity to merely split off 'pragmatists from radical rejectionists'²³⁴ but as a more positive opportunity to get a larger proportion of the supporters and membership to advocate a more political solution to their perceived problem. Within the terrorist movement and their support network at any one time there will generally only be a percentage who are tied down to a particular viewpoint or strategic policy. In the case of organisational splits the more successful splits from a counterterrorism perspective may not always be those with a clean divide between the militant and political. The most successful will possibly be those splits which result in the political faction making slight compromises²³⁵ and convincing the undecided membership and supporters, and some of the staunch militants, to join and support their grouping. This will result in a larger membership and support structure for those who eventually wish to achieve their objectives through political means. If in the same situation the political faction had believed themselves to be significantly tied down to their position they would have achieved significantly less support both externally and internally. While their position in this situation may have been more in line with that of governmental policy their position is largely inconsequential if they cannot gain sufficient levels of support within their given community and membership. However, in the situation where they have altered

²³³ Cronin (2009), p.68; United States Institute for Peace (1999). *How Terrorism End Special Report*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace. (p.1); Crenshaw (1999)

²³⁴ United States Institute for Peace (1999), p.1.

²³⁵ Therefore moving along the linear scale closer in policy to the militants.

their position in order to gain a larger degree of support and membership they will have more influence and effect and therefore will be able to bring a larger grouping on a more gradual process towards politicisation and democratisation, and consequently isolate the more militant faction weakening their position. In essence what is being proposed here is that splits should not be looked at as a single act where governments and counter-terrorist officials see the radical factions of organisations isolated. They should be regarded as an opportunity to bring as many members as possible closer to the acceptance of non-violent strategies. Therefore organisational splits and factionalism must be analysed to establish how the political wing can best gain the highest levels of membership and support, and therefore lessening the influence of the militants. In such situations they must be perceived as a step in the gradual process towards politicisation. Eventually if the political grouping can maintain their high levels of membership and support they may be able to move their position, and that of their followers, back to their original one of a purely political position. In an ideal situation the grouping will not have to compromise their political strategies at any point and will be able to bring the majority of the membership and support along with them in the implementation of a purely non-violent political strategy. However, this is not always the case in reality and the political advocates will have to gradually introduce their supporters to non-violent political strategies.

Leaders need to ease in to transition and make sure not to alienate their base. Alienation of the base can make it extremely difficult to make any progress.²³⁶ Such a transition can require a significant amount of patience on behalf of all actors both externally and internally, and the timing of changes in policy must be carefully decided so that the leadership are in maximum control and external events play as minimal a negative effect as possible. Similarly often times they may wish to manipulate the external and internal sentiment at the time of significant incidents which may move people's strategic leanings closer to their ideal political position.

²³⁶ Miller, F.D. (1983). The End of SDS and the Emergence of Weathermen: Demise Through Success. In Freeman, J. and Johnston, V. (Eds.) (1999). *Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties*. (pp.303-324). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC. (p.312)

4.4.2 Application of the Irvin Model

This interpretation of Hirschman's model may be streamlined in conjunction with Irvin's 1999 model. In this she proposes that the opportunities, constraints and resources within which the organisation defines its goals and selects its strategies can be affected by three separate factors. These are regime responsiveness, organisational resources and the absence or presence of competing political groups prepared to work with the governments. The interaction between these three variables is said to influence the respective size and influence of three categories of members; *ideologues*, *radicals* and *politicos*. Similarly the interaction is said to set the strategic context in which the members choose among the variety of violent and non-violent strategies available to them.²³⁷ Taking all of this into consideration the interpretation of Hirschman's model of inter-group competition will say that at an appropriate time an alteration in the strategy adopted by the *politicos*²³⁸ closer towards that of the *ideologues*,²³⁹ without significantly compromising their original position will possibly attract a significant proportion of the *radicals*²⁴⁰ and even convince a small proportion of the *ideologues* to join them. This does not specify that merely by moving their strategy slightly 'to the right of the line' that they will automatically gain more supporters for their position. They must justify and legitimise their position and strategy using a combination of the tools available to them. This can be a gradual process of gaining support around the regime from membership and supporters at all levels and waiting for the right time to bring about any proposed changes. They may need to utilise the support and legitimisation given to them by various influential individuals and position themselves within the historical context of the movement. Essentially they must convince a significant proportion of the membership and support that the position they are taking and the strategies and tactics they are suggesting are for the good of the organisation and their purposive objectives, the specified public goods as detailed in Chapter 1. They must simultaneously convince a significant proportion that their strategy is not just good for the organisation and its

²³⁷ Irvin (1999), p.25

²³⁸ Those members who support a strategy of 'base-building and political education.' Irvin (1999), p.29

²³⁹ Those who are 'drawn to action more than political discussion' Irvin (1999), p.25

²⁴⁰ Those who prefer active struggle but also are more willing than *ideologues* to 'compromise, though not necessarily abandon, movement principles if those sacrifices appear likely to win real concessions from the incumbent regime.' Irvin (1999)

objectives but that is also *better* than those being put forward by their internal competitors or any other alternatives which may be on offer at the time.

4.4.3 Application of the Miller Model

In line with the organisational way of thinking it may be useful to understand ways in which organisations can maintain their levels of support and membership, and therefore maintaining organisational unity. Miller in a study of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and Weathermen movements of the late 1960s early 1970s provided four key criteria which can aid in the progression and maintenance of an organisation. He indicates that the structure must be flexible as the circumstances will change for the grouping and a structure which works well for the organisation at one time, and at that specific size, may not necessarily be beneficial for the organisation during another time period when they have grown or shrunk in size. The organisation must plan how to recruit new members and also how to use and maintain their support once they join. The leadership must address any gaps between membership expectations and strategic and tactical realities. This does not necessarily require a full compromise on the strategies and tactics but leaders must actively consult with their members and if possible convince them of the benefits of their proposed position. The final point addressed by Miller is that the organisation must focus on their primary enemies rather than focusing their resources on intra-organisational conflicts, or inter-organisational conflicts with former comrades in the aftermath of splits.²⁴¹ If an organisation can successfully consider these four points they will be more successful in bringing along the membership to their way of thinking and therefore minimise the opportunities available to any internal factions wishing to take over the organisation or developing a successful and appealing alternative organisation.

4.5. Splits: How Terrorist Groups End?

In their 2008 study Jones and Libicki noted that of the six-hundred and forty-eight terrorist organisations they analysed that one hundred and thirty splintered, this includes

²⁴¹ Miller (1983), pp.323-324.

twenty-six of the forty-five religious terrorist groups in their sample.²⁴² While their statistical analysis may prove enlightening their viewpoint on the nature of splits must be considered significantly flawed. Throughout their analysis of the splintering of terrorist organisations they continuously refer to it as a way in which a terrorist group ends.²⁴³ This fails to acknowledge in full the complete process of a terrorist split. An organisational schism need not constitute the end of the parent organisation, as by definition it is only a section of the membership which are leaving, and therefore the parent organisation can still remain in existence. It can prove more accurate to describe an organisational split as a way for a new terrorist organisation to form, or the end of an organisation as a unified political movement.²⁴⁴ While the parent organisation may change in membership levels, and possibly strategy, tactics and goals, the organisational split does not necessarily constitute the end of this group as can be viewed from the examples cited previously, as well as in the case studies of splits in the Irish Republican Movement. The problems which needed to be acknowledged with the Dyck and Starke model of organisational split are therefore similarly faced here. The viewpoint taken is much too narrow to constitute an accurate description of all forms of splits.

While it is clear that organisational splits do not purely constitute the end of terrorist groups there are comparable elements which play a significant role in both actions. Therefore it would be narrow-minded to completely discount what this literature has to offer to the enhancement of understanding. For years the terrorism literature has widely ignored the need to engage in a detailed and wide reaching analysis of the factors contributing to the end of terrorist organisations. What research there was mainly concentrated on the analyses of individual case studies, from the demise of the European left wing terrorists²⁴⁵ to the deterioration of radical Islam.²⁴⁶ In recent years this has begun to change with a number of books, and reports being published exclusively looking at the end of terrorist groups, the end of terrorism or disengagement from terrorism, or at

²⁴² Jones and Libicki (2008), pp.35-36

²⁴³ *Ibid*, p.10, p.13, p.36

²⁴⁴ Oots (1989), p.142.

²⁴⁵ See for example Jamieson (1990); Weinberg, L. and Eubank, W.L. (1987). *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*. London: Westview.; Horchem, H.J. (1991). *The Decline of the Red Army Faction. Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3(2), pp.61-74

²⁴⁶ Gerges, (1999); For a list of some of the case studies which have been analysed see Horgan (2009) p.20.

least dedicating a significant section to these subjects.²⁴⁷ However, while up until recently there has been a dearth of literature theoretically assessing the disintegration of terrorist organisations the three most informative studies on the subject can be dated back to the 1980s and to this day they provide the foundations for a number of the modern day approaches to the topic. The studies referred to are those of Ross and Gurr,²⁴⁸ Oots²⁴⁹ and Crenshaw.²⁵⁰ Both the works of Crenshaw and Ross and Gurr developed their own individual theoretical interpretations of the decline of terrorist organisations. In their separate works they each developed a list of conditions which may produce the demise of the terrorist group.

Through their research on the decline of terrorism in Canada and the United States²⁵¹ Ross and Gurr outline four principal conditions which may precipitate the decline of the terrorist organisation and/or their utilisation of the tactic of terrorism. These can be divided into two separate groups, external and internal conditions as illustrated below.

External Factors:

- Pre-Emption
- Deterrence

Internal Factors:

- Burnout
- Backlash

The external factors described are *pre-emption* and *deterrence* and the internal factors *burnout* and *backlash*. In this framework the external factors refer specifically to counterterrorist policies and actions, while the internal factors are general conditions which reduce the organisation's capabilities to continue utilising the tactic of terrorism.

²⁴⁷ See for example Horgan (2009); Gupta (2008); Cronin (2009); Jones and Libicki (2009)

²⁴⁸ Ross and Gurr (1989)

²⁴⁹ Oots (1989)

²⁵⁰ Crenshaw (1987). *How Terrorism Ends*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987.

²⁵¹ Ross and Gurr (1989), p.406.

In her analysis of the end of terrorist organisations Crenshaw initially stipulated that a decline in terrorism can take place due to three factors. Those conditions detailed by Crenshaw are

- Physical Defeat
- Abandonment of the tactic of Terrorism
- Organisational Disintegration

Rarely is it that any of these conditions take place independently of one of the others. Crenshaw went on to develop her theory further by looking at the end of terrorism rather than merely the end of the terrorist organisation with a later paper. Similar to Ross and Gurr she noted that it is important in bringing about an end to terrorism to consider both internal organisational and external factors. Considering how governmental policy can actively respond to terrorism she outlined four separate strategies which can possibly be implemented in order to tackle the terrorist threat. These were

- Deterrence
- Criminal Justice
- Enhanced Defence
- Negotiations²⁵²

Acknowledging the role these variables may have in ending a group or at least their utilisation of the tactic of terrorism she acknowledges that the end of terrorism will come about due to one or more of five separate situations.

- Success
- Preliminary Success
- Organisational Breakdown
- Decline in Support

²⁵² Crenshaw (1999), pp.2-3.

- New Alternatives²⁵³

Within the context of organisational splits it is likely that of these five separate factors *organisational breakdown* and *dwindling support* may prove to have the most significant effect.

Other more recent authors have developed their own lists of conditions which can bring about the end of terrorism or the end of the terrorist group.²⁵⁴ There proves to be a significant overlap between their contributions and those of Crenshaw and Ross and Gurr. There is one point raised by Gupta²⁵⁵ that terrorists may transition from political terrorism to other forms of criminal activity. Within Crenshaw's factors this may come under the heading of new alternatives. It may also take place in the aftermath of organisational success, or preliminary success, as the organisation no longer has the need for the application of terrorist violence they may now revert to other forms of criminal activity to fill the void left by the lack of terrorism. This is a significant factor which is and must continue to be appreciated by governments and policy makers alike

4.6 Post-Split Competition

Any analysis of an organisational split should not end with the split itself but must continue by looking to the aftermath of the event and what takes place in the months and years subsequent and the consequences, both organisational and otherwise. While the intra-organisational competition for membership and support is a distinguishing feature of the lead up to a split this competition, in its new inter-organisational form, intensifies in the aftermath when there are two distinct organisations vying within the same populations for membership and support.²⁵⁶ The decision as to which faction to side with may have been made by many in the lead up to the split but a number of individual members and supporters may remain undecided, or may even have been unaware of the developing factionalism within their organisation. It is only when the division is no

²⁵³ Crenshaw (1999) p.2-3

²⁵⁴ Cronin (2006), pp.17-18; Cronin (2009), p.8; Gupta (2008), p.100, p.161.

²⁵⁵ Gupta (2008), p.100, p.161

²⁵⁶ Oots (1989), p.147.

longer internal, and there exist two autonomous organisations, that many members and supporters will make the decision as to which group to side with.

The competition between organisations so close in origins and objectives requires the leadership of each group to be responsive so as to distinguish their organisation from their competitor's and therefore make membership and support more attractive. This can often lead to a shift in goals or strategies employed by the organisations, which can move closer towards the centre or alternatively towards the extremes.²⁵⁷ The direction of the movement is often times dependent on the positioning of their competitor and how best to distinguish their group. The movement in position is not always one sided in nature and Della Porta and Diani have noted that the 'institutionalisation of one organisation can go along with the radicalisation of another.'²⁵⁸

Due to the identical origins of both organisations this distinction and competition will not be for the purposive objectives but for the immediate goals, strategies and tactics. This competition can often times distract the organisations from the pursuit of their purposive objectives with an over-proportionate amount of time and energy being spent on competition between two groups who to many external observers may be regarded as indistinguishable in nature. As the conflict intensifies purposive goals are often times displaced by the aspiration to harm and inflict injury on the rival organisation. This can lead to growing animosity between the two groups,²⁵⁹ and may lead to a redefinition of enemy in the eyes of some members. No longer are these former allies merely rivals, they can become enemies, irrespective of their closeness in goals. Invariably both groups share a common enemy, be it organisational, governmental or societal. However, they are distracted by the perceived necessity to undermine former comrades, and therefore may concentrate more on the developing competition.

The level and degree of inter-organisational competition is often times reliant on the span of the divide. In a situation where there is one organisation in the aftermath of the split

²⁵⁷ Zald and Ash (1966), p.332

²⁵⁸ Della Porta and Diani (2008), p.151

²⁵⁹ Weinberg and Richardson (2004), p.141

which is significantly larger than the other they will not see as much of a need to compare and justify their positions against those of their competitors. Due to their dominance they will tend not to perceive their former allies as a threat to their position, and can consequently pay more attention to moving the organisation forward in the pursuit of their goals. Conversely their rivals will be in too weak a position to effectively challenge the stronger party's position. However, if there is a relatively even split the competitive situation is accentuated. Both sides will perceive the other as a threat to their position, or their potential dominance within the relevant communities. This can result in a near disregard for their ultimate objectives and an over-zealous concentration on demeaning their movement competitors. Ryan witnessed this while researching American feminist organisations of the 1960s and 70s. Within the feminist movement there was a considerable level of 'painful personal attacks' against inter-organisational competitors.²⁶⁰ This climate of competition had a significant debilitating effect on the movement as a whole.

Competition can result in the mutual enticement of members or supporters over from one group to the other,²⁶¹ or alternatively can demoralise people to the consequence of them moving away from the movement completely. For those organisations reliant on a very specific population for membership and support the level of competition can become intensified due to the finite potential communities which they can draw from. Therefore for ethno-nationalist organisations the existence of a competing ethnic group can be particularly threatening.²⁶² Within such a situation if a group can assemble a package of both purposive and selective incentives which is perceived to be better than those of the competing organisation, it will be able to entice new and rival members to join their group faster than their competitor can. With respect to those individuals willing to move from one organisation to another in such a competitive situation they will be most likely to be those who choose organisational affiliation mainly due to the selective incentives on

²⁶⁰ Ryan (1989), p.254

²⁶¹ Hirschman (1970), p.28

²⁶² Irvin (1999), p.40.

offer. Therefore competitive organisations will often find the need to increase the supply of these selective incentives²⁶³

The resulting competition for support, membership and resources can result in a significant variation in organisational behaviour.²⁶⁴ With respect to terrorist organisations this change of behaviour can result in a significant rise in the intensity of violence.²⁶⁵ Due to the fact that terrorist organisations by definition are committed to the application of violence as a tactic to achieve their political targets one of the principal competitive arenas becomes the armed struggle.²⁶⁶ This can be witnessed in an escalation of violence in the pursuit of organisational membership and support or alternatively competition can result in the naissance of inter-organisational violent feuds between the former allies. Violent acts are often times utilised to display the potential, capabilities and dominance of the perpetrator in comparison to their rivals. Therefore the main purpose of the act may in actual fact be an attempt to undermine competitors and prove the strength of the organisation to their members and supporters, as well as potential future recruits on each of these fronts. Schiller outlines that the purpose of the simultaneous attacks by Abu-Nidal on El-Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna airports in December 1987 was not linked to their pursuit of an independent Palestine but instead was an act designed to humiliate Yasser Arafat in the eyes of the sympathetic Italians and Austrians.²⁶⁷ It has also been indicated in reference to those groups utilising the tactic of suicide bombing that in the presence of multiple insurgent organisations, each competing for public support, there can be an increase in the scope and quantity of suicide bombings as a show of strength from each of the particular organisations.²⁶⁸ Such violent actions in a competitive environment can similarly be conceived in order to attract the necessary financial resources from external supporters in order to maintain the organisation's

²⁶³ Oots (1989), p.148

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*; Hirschman (1970), p.44; Crenshaw (1985), p.473, p.483

²⁶⁵ Crenshaw (1985), p.486

²⁶⁶ Irvin (1999), p.41

²⁶⁷ Schiller, D.S. (1987). A Battlegroup Divided: The Palestinian Fedayeen. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. (pp.90-108). London: Frank Cass. P.90

²⁶⁸ Bloom, M. (2005). *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press. p.78.

struggle, as well as providing the ability for the organisation to develop the supply of the selective incentives necessary to attract and maintain membership.²⁶⁹

External sponsors will not financially support an organisation unless it believes that it has the ability to act and achieve its stated aims. Often times the only way to display this ability for action in a competitive environment is by mounting extensive violent actions or campaigns of violence. In this competitive situation, with the heightened threat of exit due to the existence of a new close alternative, the leadership of the organisation must continually attempt to distinguish their organisation from that of their competitors in order to prevent the defection of the membership, support and sponsorship to their rivals. If the membership perceive the alternative grouping to be more actively pursuing their objectives they will be more likely to defect.²⁷⁰ Therefore the increase in violent activity in a competitive arena can be a display of strength and the greater potential to achieve the targeted objectives.²⁷¹

4.7 Hypothesised Process Model

Through the analysis and consideration of the various models of intra-organisational conflict and split, as well as the extended research from the organisational and terrorism literature, the theoretical section of this dissertation concludes with the design of two stage-based process models, one of split and one of split avoidance. The first model presented is the stage-based process model of split.

Stage 1: The Origins of Split

Stage 2: Factional Development

Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split

Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

Stage 5: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*; Oots (1989), p.148

²⁷⁰ Crenshaw (1985), p.486

²⁷¹ Jones and Libicki (2008), p.13

The second is the proposed model of split-avoidance

Stage 1: The Origins of Conflict

Stage 2: Factional Development

Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice

Stage 4: Organisational Change *or* Maintenance of Status Quo

Stage 5: Aftermath of Conflict: Re-Organisation

As is displayed above both processes are identical for the opening stages with the origins of split or conflict which may date back a significant length of time. However, with the factional and conflict development brought about through a combination of long-standing cleavages and invariably a proposed organisational change the critical stage which decides the outcome of the conflict is Stage 3. It is proposed that the actions which take place within this stage determine whether the conflict is resolved or results in split. If one of the developing sub-groups accentuates their position by actively preparing for split, due to what they deem an irreconcilable conflict perceived to be threatening to organisational identity, then the third stage brings about the inevitability of split. However, if one or both of the sub-groups successfully apply compromise and voice then a split is avoided through either the maintenance of the status quo or the successfully supported implementation of organisational change.²⁷² In the aftermath of split there is competition for both membership and support with each organisation trying to justify and legitimise their position. Both the parent organisation and the breakaway group need to organise and re-organise in some way. During split avoidance the organisation has to similarly re-organise as if there is not an adequate re-organisation in the aftermath of conflict the residue may lead to further conflict and possibly split.

These are presented as falsifiable models, and it is recommended that they are tested across organisations. They will be tested in the present research.

²⁷² It is proposed that in the case of split avoidance this organisational change may be less extreme than the originally proposed change which may have caused the conflict as compromise may have been needed for split avoidance.

4.8 Chapter Summary

The aim of the present chapter has been to complete the theoretical analysis which began in Chapter 1. This has been carried out by specifically looking at the theory of splits. The analysis of the existing theoretical literature has been carried out in a critical manner with a number of suggestions made so as to adapt and strengthen the existing theories. The research must not stop with the event of the actual split as the consequences of the split both internally and externally can prove vital to our overall comprehension of the phenomenon itself. The transition from intra-organisational conflict to inter-organisational conflict in the aftermath of the split has been focused on in this regard. The past four chapters have been designed to illustrate the theoretical background to the research before moving into the core of the present study which is the analysis of splits in the Irish Republican Movement from 1969 to 1997. The final section of the chapter outlines the proposed stage-based process model for testing. Two separate models have been developed one for the occurrence of split and the other for split avoidance.

Chapter 5

Aims of Present Study and Hypotheses

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of the previous four chapters was to outline the theoretical underpinnings to the present research. From this a set of theoretical hypotheses has been developed for testing to compliment the four core research questions, two assessing the splits from an organisational perspective and two from an individual perspective.

QO1. Why did each of the splits take place when they did?

QO2. How did each of the splits take place?

QI1. Why do individual members decide to exit from an organisation to join or set up and new organisation?

QI2. Why do individual members decide to stay with a parent organisation at a time of split?

As with the four core questions the hypotheses have been similarly divided into those assessing the splits from an organisational and an individual perspective. The present chapter proposes these hypothesisises and signals, in reference to the findings from the theoretical chapters, where they have been derived from.

Throughout the previous chapters the analysis of the theories of split has been extensive and has critically developed the organisational and individual theories of organisations, intra-organisational conflict and split. From this a theoretical basis for understanding has developed. The purpose for the remainder of the dissertation is to see whether these are relevant and applicable to the case study of splits in the Irish Republican Movement from 1969 to 1997. While it would desirable to test all of the proposals put forward in previous research this is not achievable. Similarly other assertions while previously

presented as theories of split would be better described as tautologies of split, and therefore would be meaningless to test, but still necessary to emphasise. Central among these tautologies are that splits are the result of what is perceived, by at least one of the sub-groups, to be an irreconcilable intra-organisational conflict. If the conflict at the centre of the split was not deemed to be irreconcilable there would be no purpose of split. Therefore the analysis should not test whether the conflict is perceived to be irreconcilable but at what stage this perception is formed, and why. With respect to the assertion that heterogeneous organisations are more susceptible to split,²⁷³ the very fact that the group is splitting indicates that the original organisation was heterogeneous to some definable degree. This tautology deems it unnecessary to test the organisations for heterogeneity. However, what is beneficial is the analysis of what forms of heterogeneity makes the organisation susceptible to split. This is testable in the analysis of the interview data through the discernment of what heterogeneities are emphasised by the participants.

While the hypotheses proposed are testable within the current case study of splits in the Irish Republican Movement the results of this analysis should not be deemed representative of all forms of split and therefore require future testing within other contexts.

5.2 Organisational Aims and Hypotheses

At the most basic level the present study aims to assess why and how each of the four designated splits in the Irish Republican Movement took place when they did. Through the theoretical analysis from the previous chapters a number of hypotheses have been developed to be tested alongside the answering of these research questions. Displayed below are the hypotheses with reference to their theoretical origins.

While the purposive goals of all political organisations are the acquisition of a specified public good this is preceded by the immediate goal of organisational survival. It is

²⁷³ Zald and Ash (1966), pp.336-337.

posited that organisational survival is at the centre of the actions of all organisations.²⁷⁴ With respect to organisational split the concept of survival must be further developed. With the presence of two competing internal sub-groups it may seem counter-intuitive that the immediate goal of both factions would be the same, but yet are competing against each other and hence a basic understanding of organisational survival would determine that the nature of a conflict puts this goal at risk. However, in the case of a conflict over an issue which is deemed threatening to organisational identity²⁷⁵ the notion of survival does not purely constitute the maintenance of the same membership and organisational set-up. For both sides in the conflict, those proposing change as well as those opposing it, the immediate goal is proposed to be the survival of the organisation in a form they respect and recognise. Therefore the first hypotheses states

HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.

Every human organisation is beset by intra-organisational conflicts. However, not all of these conflicts result in split. Therefore in order to understand organisational split it is necessary to understand if there is a specific form of conflict which precedes split. Sani and Reicher²⁷⁶ propose that splits will only take place when the issue at the centre of the conflict is deemed to be threatening to the organisational identity by at least one of the sub-groups involved. The heterogeneity of organisations results in the organisational identity being perceived differently by the diverse members and sub-groups. Therefore the issue of perception is central to the second organisational hypothesis which states

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

Splits are often times perceived as a stand-alone event determined by an individual conflict. However, it is proposed that they may actually be the result of long-standing

²⁷⁴ Firey (1948), p.18

²⁷⁵ See HO2

²⁷⁶ Sani and Reicher (1999), p.296;

cleavages between the sub-groups.²⁷⁷ This is in support of the assertion that splits are best explained as a stage-based process rather than a one-off event. Process models can aid in illustrating the development of the division to the point of split. Therefore the third hypothesis reads as follows.

HO3. The roots of the splits will be in previously long standing cleavages.

As will be detailed in the next chapter these and all of the research questions and hypotheses will be approached through the application of interview based methodology, and analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). The data was generated through a series of interviews from both sides of each split at both a leadership and rank and file level. In the process of answering each of these two core organisational questions and assessing the relevance of the hypotheses the research is drawing assessment as to whether or not the processes involved in the lead up to the splits fit in the relevant theoretical process models and theories of conflict and split which were outlined in the previous chapters.

With the assessment of why and how the organisations split there will be a similar assessment as to why and how certain groups were more successful in attracting members and supporters than others were. This provides the research with the next questions in regard to organisational splits.

QO3 i). What are the factors necessary to successfully attract members and supporters during the course of and after an organisational split?

The obvious question which leads on from this is:

QO3 ii). What are the factors which deter members and supporters from joining a group during the course of and after an organisational split?

²⁷⁷ Burke Rochford Jr. (1989), p.163; Stark and Banbridge (1985), p.101

In the process of answering these questions it is necessary for the researcher to apply a judgement for each of the four splits as to which sides were most successful, or unsuccessful, in the lead up to, during and after each case.²⁷⁸ Success in the aftermath of split is not a single factor issue. The most obvious measure of success is with regard to the physical number of members within the movement. However, one must also consider the comparative levels of support for each group in the aftermath of split. This must consider both active and passive support, the levels of finances and weapons acquired from external sources as well as the support of the immediate public through for example the usage of safe-houses. This far removed in time from the events, and with the clandestine nature of the organisations being analysed, it is difficult to scientifically assess accurately the exact levels of membership and support for each group. Therefore the most accurate way to assess the levels of strength for each group in the immediate aftermath of split is through talking to those who were organisational members at the time of split, as well as in the aftermath. It is important to assess the perceptions of both sides of the divide, as well as well informed external observers, in order to attain the most accurate reflection. This has been carried out through the interview process which will be described in the next chapter. It was complemented with an extensive review of the literature written about the Irish Republican Movement. This has included literature written about the extensive Irish Republican Movement as well as ones about specific groups and individuals, and the Northern Irish 'Troubles' and peace process as a whole. This similarly included reviewing the literature produced by the groups and external observers from the times of split in their newspapers and pamphlets. Each source assessed, while differing slightly in some aspects, gave the same general assessment of the results of each split.

It is accepted that at the time of split in 1969/70 that the division between the groups was relatively even in nature. However, in the subsequent years the Provisional Movement gained control of the majority of membership and support. Regarding the 1974 split those who left to form the Irish Republican Socialist Movement are deemed to have been in the minority, but a sizeable minority. Both the 1986 and 1997 splits are regarded as

²⁷⁸ This should not be confused with a value judgement of the proposals of each sub-group.

being weighted significantly in favour of the Provisional leadership. While the research question can assess the reasoning behind these groups' successes and failures a number of hypotheses relevant to successful recruitment of membership and support at time of split have also been developed from the theoretical base which require testing

Hirschman²⁷⁹ outlined in relation to political organisations that at a time of intra-organisational factionalism the sub-group who are less 'tied' to their position are more likely to gain more support than the sub-group who is unwilling to modify their position. During a significantly divisive conflict where there are two groups taking diametrically opposite positions with a number of members undecided on their position if one of the sub-groups is willing to move their position closer to the 'centre' they are more likely to gain the support of the undecided members than a sub-group who are firm in their position. Therefore in the aftermath of a split the sub-group more willing to compromise is expected to gain the larger support. However, if both groups are willing to compromise it is expected that a split will be avoided.

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of a split.

The final area to be assessed from an organisational perspective in this research is the situation of split aftermath. As has been noted any research on organisational splits must not finish at the point of split as the effects of the split are just as important, and often times more important, than the process of split. For the purpose of this section of analysis the research question reads as follows.

QO4. What are the significant consequences of the split?

It is proposed here that the consequences will predominantly centre on inter-organisational conflict and the change of focus of the relevant organisations. In the aftermath of a significant organisational split the goals of the two resulting groupings are

²⁷⁹ Hirschman (1970)

transformed. They are now competing with each other for membership and support. Therefore their roles have changed from allies to competitors as a result of the split. In this competitive environment it is proposed that there will be an increased animosity between the organisations and that purposive goal aspirations are often replaced with the 'need' to harm the structure and credibility of the rival organisation.²⁸⁰ Leading on from this supposition is the development of the final organisational hypothesis to be tested.

HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation.

5.3 Individual Hypotheses and Aims

At the heart of the research when looking at splits from an individual perspective are questions of allegiance and the rationale behind this. It is proposed that the rationale behind the choice for national leadership members will be significantly linked to the reasoning for the organisational split. Those members with a significantly low level of experience in the organisation will make their decisions of allegiance at a time of split based on local issues and influences such as influential individuals and regionalism. The Hirschman model goes further than link a person's decision to their organisational level or experience. He outlines the importance of an individual's expectations of what they wish to achieve through their organisational membership as a deciding factor. In this he distinguishes between those quality conscious member and those whose membership is based on selective incentives. The hypotheses assessed from this delineation of levels of experience are as follows.

H11: The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split.

H12. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be predominantly tied to local influences and situations.

²⁸⁰ Weinberg and Richardson (2004), p.141

H13. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the parent organisation.

The testing of each of these hypotheses will be carried out through the analysis of the collected interview data as well as the relevant primary sources. While the majority of the interviewees were sought due to their experiences of organisational splits there were also those who exited the movement at a time other than a split. Therefore this adds an extra aspect to the data whereby there can be a comparison between the four sets of individual members' data; these being the data of those who left at a time of split, those members who stayed with the parent organisation at the time of split, those who left the organisation at a time other than split and those who stayed with the organisation at a conflicting stage other than a split. This multi-layered analysis can supply a richness and depth to the results which would have otherwise have been unavailable if the researcher solely assessed the data from the time of the splits. The methodology to carry out this research is detailed in the next chapter after which the results of the analysis are presented, prior to a discussion of the relevance and applicability of the results.

5.4 The Functionality of Splits as a Process

The theoretical analysis of both intra-organisational conflicts and splits has indicated that splits should not be looked at as an event but rather as a result of a process. A number of stage-based process models have been developed to explain the phenomena.²⁸¹ Therefore the present research, in consultation with previously proposed stage-based process models, aims to test the proposed model of organisational split as proposed in Chapter 4 on splits in the Irish Republicanism.

Throughout this stage of the analysis there is an appreciation of the necessity to identify the specific form of split and not to consider splits as homogeneous processes. This will therefore test if the model fits each form of split. Fundamental to this stage of the

²⁸¹ See for example Dyck and Starke (1999); Pondy (1967), p.299; Weinberg and Richardson (2004). pp.138-160.

research is the understanding that the four splits analysed are not stand-alone entities but are interconnected micro-processes within the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the Troubles. However, it similarly aims to establish the organisational functionality of the splits. Therefore the establishment of the process model aims not only to understand the reasoning for the splits but also to determine the functionality of the splits as individual entities and as a macro-process

5.5 Chapter Summary

The present chapter provides a bridge between the theoretical analysis of the previous four chapters and the case specific methodology and analysis which follows in the rest of the dissertation. The purpose of the chapter was to outline the research questions, aims and hypotheses derive from the theoretical analysis which is to be applied to the case studies of splits in the Irish Republican Movement. The questions and hypotheses have focused on the organisational reasoning for the splits as well as the individual member rationale for allegiance during and after the splits. Parallel to these aims is the establishment of appropriate stage-based process models in order to explain both the reasoning and functionality of the splits as individual micro-processes within the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the Troubles.

Chapter 6

Methodology

“A central tenet of the approach below is that our primary objective should be to understand those who engage in the behaviour. It is not our job to condemn, to condone or to find some objective ‘truth’.”²⁸²

6.1 Introduction to Methodology

The primary objective for any social scientist must be to gain as comprehensive an understanding of their subject as possible. It is this aspiration that was at the core of the development of this methodology. For too long there has been an almost irresponsible reliance on secondary and tertiary sources within terrorism research, to the neglect of the development of new data.²⁸³ This is not to say that the use of secondary and tertiary sources should be completely disposed of. However, if one wishes to gain a clearer understanding of those individuals, and the groups, involved in political violence there is the necessity to listen to them. While access to participants may be difficult to achieve it is far from impossible.²⁸⁴ The present chapter outlines how the author developed and implemented an interdisciplinary²⁸⁵ methodology aimed at garnering a comprehensive understanding of splits in the Irish Republicanism from 1969 to 1997. This methodology was multi-layered including the use of both primary and secondary sources in conjunction with the analysis of the data derived from an extensive interviewing process. Through the application of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), an approach to qualitative research predominantly used in health psychology, there was an analysis of

²⁸² White, R.W. (2000). Issues in the Study of Political Violence: Understanding the Motives of Participants in Small Group Political Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring, 2000*, pp.95-108. (p.95)

²⁸³ This point has been outlined by a number of different authors in the past, however the problem still exists. See for example Schmid, A.P. and Jongman, A.J. (2008). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (Third Edition)*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers; Horgan, J. (2004) The Case of First-Hand Research. In Silke, A. (Ed.) (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends Successes and Failures*. (pp.30-56). London: Frank Cass; Brannan, D.W., Esler, P.F. and Anders Strindberg, N.T. (2001). Talking to ‘Terrorists’: Towards an Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 24*, (pp.3-24).

²⁸⁴ Horgan, J. (2004).

²⁸⁵ In his 1988 book Taylor outlines how the complex nature of terrorism requires the application of an interdisciplinary approach to research. See Taylor, M. (1988). *The Terrorist*. London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers Ltd.

the data generated from the interviews. As with all noteworthy interview methodologies there was respect and awareness for the numerous ethical issues which arise in such research.

6.2 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis

A variation of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) was employed as the methodological tool to analyse the primary data generated from the series of interviews. IPA is a qualitative research technique which has predominantly been used in health psychology.²⁸⁶ However, recently academics from outside of health psychology have utilised it in their research. IPA studies have ranged from an analysis of the sexual decision making of gay men²⁸⁷ to terrorism research. In their 2007 paper Mark Burgess and colleagues interviewed both former members of the IRA and peaceful civil rights activists to assess how they interpreted the social conditions in a post Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland. The researchers deemed IPA to be the appropriate methodological tool for their project as it provided the researchers with an appropriate tool to analyse complex issues that directly impact on the lives of individual participants and their decision making process.²⁸⁸ This methodology allowed the researchers to gain an insight into how individuals make sense of their social circumstances.

IPA is phenomenological in nature in so far as it entails a broad examination of a participant's lived experiences and an individual's personal perception or account of an object and/or event. Unlike other techniques it does not aim to produce an objective

²⁸⁶ Examples of this range from studies of individual personal experiences of bone marrow transplants to individual experiences of spinal cord injuries. Holmes, S. Coyle, A. and Thomson, E. (1997). Quality of Life in survivors of bone marrow transplant. *Journal of Cancer Nursing*. Dickson, A., Allan, D., and O'Carroll, R. (2008). Biographical Disruption and the Experience of Loss Following a Spinal Cord Injury: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. *Psychology & Health*, 23, pp.407-425.

²⁸⁷ Flowers, P., Smith, J.A., Sheeran, P., & Beail, N. (1997). Health and Romance: Understanding Unprotected Sex in Relationships Between Gay Men. *British Journal of Health Psychology*, 12, pp. 197-230.

²⁸⁸ Burgess, M., Ferguson, N. and Hollywood, I. (2007). Rebels' Perspectives of the Legacy of Past Violence and the Current Peace in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 28, No. 1. (pp.69-88)

record of the object or event itself.²⁸⁹ In essence IPA is broadly concerned with how people think and what they believe to be important and relevant about the issue²⁹⁰ under discussion.²⁹¹ Fundamental to the success of IPA as a methodology is the acknowledgement of the dynamic process of analysis, a process in which the researcher plays an active role.²⁹² Throughout the interview process, in which the participant is being asked about their own perceptions and understandings of specific lived experiences, the participant is trying to make sense of their world and the experiences and decisions they are being asked about. Therefore when it comes to the interpretation stages of the process the researcher is fundamentally trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world.²⁹³ Consequently this form of analysis is declaring that the participants who are interviewed are the experts on the topic at hand, as it is an interpretation of *their* beliefs which will take prominence throughout the research. It is not pertinent whether or not these beliefs contain an absolute truth of the situation, what is important is that the factors or themes which the participants deem important come to the fore in the research. In IPA the assumption is that the data collected will indicate how the participants perceive and make sense of the issue under scrutiny.

Across the social scientific disciplines, and beyond, it is vital that the research questions are not altered to suit any one particular methodology; if anything it should be the methodologies which are adapted to suit the questions. This is a view which has widely been embraced by IPA practitioners.²⁹⁴ Individual researchers must resolve how best IPA may suit their specific research questions, if at all. It is believed that the present research has successfully adapted the IPA technique to the benefit of the study.

²⁸⁹ Smith, J.A. and Osborn, M. (2008). Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In Smith, J. A. (Ed.) *Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods. Second Edition.* (pp.53-80). London: Sage Publications.

²⁹⁰ In the case of the present research this is splits in the Irish Republican Movement.

²⁹¹ Smith, J.A., Jarman, M., and Osborn, M. (1999). Doing Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In Murray, M. and Chamberlain, K. (Eds.), *Qualitative Health Psychology: Theories and Methods* (pp. 218-239). London: Sage Publications.

²⁹² Smith and Osborn (2008)

²⁹³ *Ibid*

²⁹⁴ *Ibid*; Smith et al (2009).

The nature of many previous IPA studies has led to the researchers regarding 'traditional criteria' for evaluating research quality, such as reliability, as inappropriate in assessing their work.²⁹⁵ While this may have been the case in previous research the political and historical relevance of the issue at hand and the nature of the participant group assembled have enabled the research results to be assessed under the 'traditional' headings of both reliability and validity. While still maintaining the focus of the research on the individual participants' views and perceptions the availability and prevalence of secondary and tertiary sources such as speeches and policy papers from the time of the splits has provided the author with further valuable resources to strengthen the analysis.

IPA projects are principally concerned with issues which affect the individual actor, the decisions which they make and how this affects their life. One of the central research questions of the current project is 'why and how did the splits take place in the Irish Republican Movement?' At first glance IPA may be deemed an inappropriate technique for answering this question. However, while this question is dealing with a group action²⁹⁶ the application of IPA has gone on to ascertain what the important factors in splits are in the opinion of individual actors on either side of the split and at different levels within the groups. Therefore in dealing with the group level questions of the research IPA has enabled the researcher to establish why and how the splits took place in the opinion of different groups of individuals. This is keeping with the philosophical origins of the technique as the researcher is concentrating on individual perceptions and opinions.

6.3 Interviewing

There are a number of ways of applying the IPA technique. However, the most common, and most widely recommended method,²⁹⁷ is through the utilisation of semi-structured interviews. The following sections detail how an extensive set of semi-structured interviews were planned, administered and analysed. While the interview technique has

²⁹⁵ See for example Riggs, E.H., and Coyle, A. (2002). Young People's Accounts of Homelessness: A case study analysis of psychological well-being and identity. *Counselling Psychology Review*, 17(3), pp. (5-15).

²⁹⁶ The split

²⁹⁷ Smith, J.A., Flowers, P. and Larkin, P. (2009). *Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and Research*. London: Sage: Publications.

been developed in accordance with IPA recommendations the opinions and findings of terrorism and political violence researchers have also been widely consulted in order to create the most robust interview methodology possible.

*“The fact remains that one must find out how participants understand the struggle, how their organization operates, and so there can be no substitute for talking with them.”*²⁹⁸

The core purpose of this thesis has been to gain a significant understanding of both individual and group actions and decisions which eventually culminated in the splits. Through this process of understanding it similarly wished to assess how the Provisional leadership were able to bring the majority of their membership towards the acceptance of peaceful politics. The research has relied extensively, but not exclusively, on data collected through interviews with individuals involved at various levels of the Republican Movement. Each interviewee was involved in at least one split in the Irish Republican Movement between the years 1969 and 1997.

6.3.1 Sampling Procedure

A lot of the success of a research project depends on a well thought out sampling procedure.²⁹⁹ Within the present research purposive sampling was utilised.³⁰⁰ In order to gain as complete an understanding as possible of each split it was necessary to meet and speak with individuals involved on both sides of each split.³⁰¹ Where possible the researcher aimed to meet with members of both the national leadership and the rank and

²⁹⁸ Rapoport, D. C. (2000). Series Editor’s Preface. In Bowyer Bell (2000). *The IRA 1968-2000: Analysis of a Secret Army*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. P.viii

²⁹⁹ White (2000); See also Silke, A. (2001). The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13. No. 5. (pp.1-14)

³⁰⁰ This is the recommended method of sampling with regards to IPA. See Smith et al (2009). It is not proposed that the sample acquired was fully representative of the make-up of the groups. This is a close to impossible task due to the clandestine nature of the organisations. However, with the knowledge gathered of organisational make-up the sampling strived to come as close as possible to a representative sample.

³⁰¹ Horgan, J. (2004). The Case for First Hand Research. In Silke A. (Ed.) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. Pp. 30-56.

file membership.³⁰² As each of the splits involved the break-up of both the political and armed groups it was deemed appropriate to meet with members from both respective groups. The main determining factor in the sampling was that the participant had been involved in at least one of the splits being analysed.

There is no consensus among researchers as to how best to procure interviews with individuals involved, or previously involved, in terrorism and/or its related political activity.³⁰³ This observation is epitomised in the present research, as numerous methods were applied in securing interviews with relevant individuals.³⁰⁴ Contacts were made through formal correspondence with the political wings of the organisations. Requests were made with these contacts to speak to specific individuals or to general members who had been involved in the split.

The use of trusted intermediaries proved one of the most valuable resources throughout the research process. These intermediaries were both internal and external to the Republican Movement. Without one specific contact from the Irish national media it is very likely that the researcher would never have been granted interviews with various members of the Sinn Fein leadership.

The use of snowballing as a sampling technique is widely appreciated by both terrorism and IPA researchers alike.³⁰⁵ At the end of many of the interviews participants were asked if they knew of anyone else who might be willing to partake in the research. From the contacts gained through this process further interviews were organised.

With specific reference to the Real IRA and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement there proved to be significant problems in arranging interviews. While the author gained access to two leading members of the 32CSM and one leading member of the Real IRA

³⁰² Horgan (2005). *The Psychology of Terrorism*. London: Routledge. Here the author recommends where possible to gain access to members at as many levels of the organisation as possible.

³⁰³ Horgan (2004); Horgan, J. (2005).

³⁰⁴ The application of numerous methods in securing interviews is very common in those researchers taking part in primary research. See for example Taylor, M. and Quayle, E. (1994). *Terrorist Lives*. London: Brassey's.

³⁰⁵ Smith et al (2009); Horgan (2004)

attempts to meet with other members proved challenging. In late 2008 contact was being made with a number of members of the Real IRA on behalf of the researcher. Initial indications were that three specific individuals would be willing to meet at a later date in 2009. However, after the Massereene Barracks attack³⁰⁶ it became apparent that these interviews would no longer be possible. Indication was given that members of the organisation were at the time only speaking to approved journalists. At this stage of the research all available avenues had been exhausted and it was resolved that no further attempts would be made to arrange any more interviews.

6.3.2 Participants

In total thirty-eight individuals were interviewed between October 2007 and March 2009.³⁰⁷ Of the thirty-eight interviewed thirty-five of the interviews were recorded while two of the participants³⁰⁸ requested for the meeting not to be recorded. During these interviews the researcher took detailed notes which were written up immediately after.³⁰⁹ The interviews with Roy Johnston were administered through email contact.³¹⁰ The organisational allegiances of the participants are contained in the tables below. Each table represents those who were involved in each particular split.

³⁰⁶ On March 7th 2009 the Real IRA murdered two British soldiers, Mark Quinsey and Patrick Azimkar, at the Massereene Barracks in Co. Antrim.

³⁰⁷ See Appendix A for a list of all interviews

³⁰⁸ Mick Ryan and 'Conor'

³⁰⁹ Mick Ryan read the author's notes after each meeting to verify that they were an accurate reflection of what he had said.

³¹⁰ In his 1997 study of racist and right wing violence in Scandinavia Tore Bjorgo had a number of interviews which were conducted in the form of written correspondence. Bjorgo, T. (1997). *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators and Responses*. Otta: Tano Ashcherougs Fonteneserie.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined the group after initially joining the other group	Total
Official Republican Movement	3	2	4	1	10
Provisional Republican Movement	3	2	13	3	21
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	7	4	17	4	32

Table 6.1: Participants involved at the time of the 1969/70 split

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Member	Total
Official Republican Movement	2	4	6
Irish Republican Socialist Movement	1	4	5
Undisclosed	0	1	1
Total	3	9	12

Table 6.2: Participants involved at the time of the 1974 split

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	7	7	0	14
Republican Sinn Fein/Continuity IRA	5	1	2	8

Table 6.3: Participants involved at the time of the 1986 split

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	8	1	9
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	3

Table 6.4: Participants involved at the time of the 1997 split.

The previous information portrays the make-up of the participants involved at the time of the individual splits being analysed. However, there were also a number of participants

who exited their Movement at a time other than a split. The majority of these individuals exited organised Irish Republicanism completely. However, the two participants who left the IRSP and/or the INLA did so to join Republican Sinn Fein and/or the Continuity IRA. The make-up of these individuals is displayed in Table 6.5:

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Total
Official Republican Movement	1	3	4
Provisional Republican Movement	1	3	4
Irish Republican Socialist Movement	0	2	2
Irish Republican Movement (prior to 1969/70 split)	1	0	1

Table 6.5: Participants who exited the Movement at a time other than a split.

6.3.3 Interview Methodology

Each interview was conducted in a semi-structured manner.³¹¹ This provides the best data for the application of IPA.³¹² The semi structured nature of the interview provides many advantages to both interviewer and participant alike. The method allows the interviewer to be freer in questioning and probe areas of interest which arise and it provides more opportunity than a structured interview to place the participant at ease as the interviewer can follow the participants' interests and concerns. In the semi-structured interview the specific ordering of the questions is not essential. This style of interviewing is more akin to a conversation and therefore allows the researcher to modify the initial questions with respect to the responses of the participants.³¹³

Prior to the meetings an interview schedule was developed, outlining the major questions and issues which were necessary to raise in the process of the interview. It was the intention of the researcher for these questions to be very open ended, general, questions so that the answers provided by participants were reflective purely of their own beliefs and opinions and were not influenced or led by the wording of the question. Where these questions did not bring a detailed response from the participant there were also probing

³¹¹ Similar to Alonso (2007) and Burgess et al (2007)

³¹² Smith and Osborn (2008)

³¹³ *Ibid*

and event specific questions prepared to instigate a more in-depth response. None of the questions prepared for the interview schedule contained any of the author's own value judgements, as it was vital that the participants were not influenced in any way by the researcher's opinion.³¹⁴ The questions were neither loaded nor double-barrelled in nature as the use of such questioning techniques can lead to problems regarding the validity and reliability of the responses given by participants.³¹⁵ Researchers applying any form of interview methodology must be constantly aware of the wording of their questions; as the wording of a particular question is phrased can have a significant influence on the type of answer given by the participant.³¹⁶

The questions dealt with both individual and group hypotheses as well as the individual and group research questions. With regards to probing questions asking about the relevance of specific events these were initially developed from the extensive reading of relevant sources about the splits. The interview schedule was constantly being developed throughout the interview process with unexpected issues coming to the fore in previous interviews.

As Appendix B displays there was a comprehensive interview schedule prepared for each separate split at both an individual and group level as well as splits in general and situations where there was no split. There was no single interview were all of these questions were asked of the participant. Generally speaking the majority of the interviews were taken up by the open general questions.³¹⁷ This dominance of the open general questions provides a stronger level of data and the answers to these questions can be more reliably referred to as the genuine viewpoints of the participants than the more specific questions which follow them in the interview schedule.

³¹⁴ Fife-Schaw, C. (1995). Questionnaire Design. In Breakwell, G. M., Hammond, S. and Fife-Schaw, C. *Research Methods in Psychology*. 174-193 London: Sage Publications

³¹⁵ Worcester, R.M. (1991). *British Public Opinion: A Guide to the History and Methodology of Political Opinion Polling*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

³¹⁶ Silke (2001)

³¹⁷ Questions in the interview schedule which appear in italics.

As has been clearly indicated in the preceding paragraphs there was detailed preparation completed prior to the interviews in general and individual interviews specifically. However, as is to be expected no amount of preparation can change the willingness of participants to talk about issues which they do not wish to, and it was never the intention of the author to do so. Across the course of the interviews there were certain individuals who indicated that they wished not to talk about specific issues. These issues were generally, but not always, to do with illegal activities and/or membership of the armed wing of the movement. With specific reference to membership of the IRSP and INLA there was an extensive desire not to talk about what happened in the years following the split of 1974. While they would discuss the feuds between them and the Official Republican Movement they were silent about the subsequent feuds with groups such as the Irish Peoples Liberation Organisation (IPLO). It was clear from the responses of these participants as a group that there was still considerable tension both locally and nationally regarding certain events. As it was indicated that the discussion of such issues could possibly compromise the safety of the participants ethics and common sense designated that the issue should not be probed any further. The foundation of all ethical research is that the safety of the participant and the researcher should not be compromised in any way. With this taken into consideration it is clear that any significant indication of risk by the participant had to be treated with the utmost respect and appropriately dealt with.³¹⁸

6.4 Interpretative Data Analysis

When the interviews had been completed the author conducted a detailed interpretative analysis of the data.³¹⁹ This was carried out through a multi-stage analysis of the data. Throughout each stage the author constantly referred to the original interview transcripts so as to be confident that the themes and mechanisms arising from the interpretation were an accurate reflection of what the participant had originally detailed, and had not been influenced in any way by the previous knowledge or expectations of the researcher. During each stage of the analysis process the relevant analysis of each individual

³¹⁸ A detailed examination of the ethical issues pertaining to this research is contained in Appendix C and the consent form is in Appendix D

³¹⁹ Smith and Osborn (2008)

transcript was completed before progressing to the subsequent interview. As this process progressed from stage to stage themes that initially started as being broad evolved, where necessary, to become more refined and focused.³²⁰ These stages were informed by previous IPA methodologies which have been incorporated and adapted in order to form the most productive analysis technique for the present research.³²¹

6.5 Validity

The issue of validity is not strongly associated with the application of IPA, or terrorism research for that matter.³²² However, there was a concerted effort in the present research to produce results which could be considered as valid as possible. There were a number of measures taken in order to obtain the validity of results.

The rigorous analysis process, coupled with an unbiased questioning technique is the predominant validating method applied. It has been noted that some of the main criteria in the validation of research are commitment and rigour.³²³ At each stage of the research process the author has endeavoured to be as rigorous as possible. This rigour and commitment is exemplified in the multi-stage analytic process. Throughout this process there was a conscious effort that the interpretation of the data stayed true to the initial intentions of each of the participants.

During the sampling process there was a concerted effort to access the opinions of participants from both sides of the splits at both an ordinary member and leadership level. These individuals were also questioned as external observers to the splits which they had not participated in. This purposive sampling was strengthened by the presence of those who had left a Republican group at a time other than a split. They could speak as people with no present affiliation with any group. This sampling process can be regarded as a form of triangulation whereby the opinions of people and groups of differing perspectives

³²⁰ This is in agreement with how most IPA studies are interpreted. See for example Burgess et al. (2007)

³²¹ For a detailed description of the stage-based process see Appendix E

³²² Silke (2001).

³²³ Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in Qualitative Health Research. *Psychology & Health*, 15, (pp.25-228); Yardley, L. (2008). Demonstrating Validity in Qualitative Psychology. In J.A. Smith (Ed.), *Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Methods (2nd Edition)*. London: Sage.

were taken into consideration before final conclusions were made.³²⁴ As well as the opinions of different groups being analysed so too were the opinions of members at different levels of these groups. Therefore the viewpoints of both leadership and ordinary or rank and file members were able to be compared and contrasted.

Throughout the interview process there was reference by various participants to specific documents and/or speeches which had a significant influence on the splits for them at an individual level and/or for the split at a group level. The regularity of this occurrence indicated the important role which these sources had to play in the research. Therefore throughout the write up of the results section of the analysis some of these are referred to in order to support or at times question the validity of the results. The sources analysed included policy documents, speeches, influential journalistic articles, as well as statements of support or opposition. While a number of these sources were brought to the attention of the researcher by interview participants there were also a variety of documents which were sourced independently during the process of the research. These documents provided a more complete awareness of the context in which the split took place. While the interview data gathered provides an unrivalled insight the use of these documented sources offers information and opinions untainted by years of thought and debate. One can argue that an interview based research project separated by as significant a timescale between event and interview as this one is can be adversely affected by the deterioration or distortion of memories. While this may be the case it is not believed to have had a significant impact on the present research. With specific reference to those documents which detailed why and how the splits took place they have not been considered as portraying absolute truths. Alternatively they should be regarded as reflections of the opinions of the authors and/or the leadership of the groups at the time of production. These documents were often times produced so as to have influence the membership and/or support of the group as well as the potential membership and/or support.

³²⁴ Yardley (2008)

A final process of dealing with the issue validity was the application of verification techniques. These techniques were specifically applied when a participant was introducing a new event which had previously not arisen in previous interviews or research. In such cases it was important for the research to specifically verify the timing and authenticity of these events described. This was carried out so as to validate whether or not these specific events could possibly have had an affect on the split at a group level and/or the decision making process of the individual being interviewed. This verification process involved the research consulting various reference books and newspaper articles from the time of the events being referred to. This is a variation of the process outlined through the use of Republican published documents and speeches. However during this verification process external sources were also utilised. This process was extremely necessary when the participant referred to specific murders and/or attacks as well as specific speeches and meetings. The implied importance of these events had to be verified in accordance with the series of events being described. With regards to certain cases it transpired that events which participants had attributed significance to in the lead-up to the split had actually taken place after the split. During this verification process the inaccuracies on behalf of the participants generally affected the description of the split from a group point of view. The participants rarely made factual errors when detailing their own individual decision making process.

6.6 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to outline how the research was completed. The utilisation of a purposive sampling techniques based on the triangulation of opinions was integral to the development of significant sample group to interview about the splits. The sample included individuals from all groups at all levels. The interview data was analysed using IPA. This included a multi-stage analysis in which the interview transcripts were analysed at both an individual and a group level. The interviews were carried out in a semi-structured manner. The importance of research ethics was dominant at all stages of the research, and was especially important with regards the safety of individual participants as well as the researcher. The present research has approached the importance of validity in the utilisation of a rigorous interview and analytical

methodology as well as the triangulation of opinions through the purposive sampling of participants and the analysis of significant secondary and tertiary documents produced in or around the time of the splits.

Chapter 7
Introduction to Interview Analysis:
The Macro-Process of Irish Republican Involvement in the
‘Troubles’

7.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters have outlined the theoretical and methodological background to the research. What follows in the subsequent sub-chapters is a detailed illustration of the results gathered through the analysis of data.³²⁵ The subsequent chapters focus on answering the four core organisational and individual research questions:

QO1. Why did each of the splits take place when they did?

QO2. How did each of the splits take place?

QI1. Why do individual members decide to exit from an organisation to join or set up and new organisation?

QI2. Why do individual members decide to stay with a parent organisation at a time of split?

This has been carried out through the application of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). These results are introduced in a process based thematic manner. The description of each of the stages of the process is supported through the utilisation of quotes from members of both sides of each of the splits, at all levels of membership. This has not aimed to attain an absolute ‘truth’ about what happened during each split. What is more important here is the understanding of how each side appreciated what happened during the process of each split. It is this perception which is important to the research as it is through this that the organisational decisions of the time were made. The utilisation

³²⁵ The analysis of the 1974 split is in Appendix F.

of each point of view provides a more comprehensive understanding of each split and the relevance of particular themes to each side is gained.³²⁶

It was the initial aspiration of the research to analyse why and how splits do not take place in certain situations so as to strengthen the findings of why and how they do take place. While this issue was raised in each individual interview it has been deemed that the data gathered is insufficient to be utilised in a valid and reliable manner in most parts. However, it is believed that the analysis of outcomes of splits goes some way to answering this question as it assesses how one side can minimise the impact of an impending split. This is embedded in the final research questions.

QO3 i). What are the factors necessary to successfully attract members and supporters during the course of and after an organisational split?

QO3 ii). What are the factors which deter members and supporters from joining a group during the course of and after an organisational split?

These questions move the research beyond an historical analysis of ‘why’ and ‘how’ the splits took place and introduce what is believed to be the most worthwhile contribution of the study. It provides a more analytical assessment of the successes and failures by each side during the splits. By asking the above questions our understanding of how the Provisional leadership in time brought the majority of their membership away from armed conflict and towards peaceful politics is greatly enhanced. This comparative analysis provides a foundation to our understanding of how the Northern Irish peace process was able to be the success it is.

As has been stated in previous chapters this analysis of the splits does not finish with the action of organisational split. The analysis looks beyond the official division of the group

³²⁶ While the individual’s perception is central to the analysis certain points raised are validated where necessary through reference to relevant sources.

and looks at the effects which the splits had in the immediate and long-term aftermath. It is within this analysis that the final organisational research question is assessed.

QO4. What are the significant consequences of the split?

This assessment focuses on both the immediate and long-term consequences of the splits. As the splits are being treated as micro-processes within the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the 'Troubles' there is an observable overlap between the consequences of one split with the subsequent organisational schism. Therefore the aftermath of one split is similarly being assessed as the origin of the next.

On a broad level this analysis is endeavouring to answer these core research questions through the analysis of the interview data gathered. However, throughout the process of analysis the set of organisational hypotheses introduced in Chapter 5 are similarly tested. Therefore while the analysis is exploratory in its attempts to answer the general research questions it is simultaneously testing the more specific hypotheses which have been developed through the analysis of the relevant theoretical literature.

7.2 Splits in the Irish Republican Movement

The history of the Irish Republican Movement is beset by splits, from the aftermath of the Treaty of 1921 to the modern day. For many observers this prevalence of splits may be regarded as the defining feature of the Republican Movement. The oft quoted line by Brendan Behan is regularly cited in reference to this historical frequency of split.

“Brendan Behan famously said ‘the first thing on the Republican agenda is the split.’”³²⁷

This reference to Behan is often used as a reflection not only of the predominance of splits within the Irish Republican Movement but as an illustration of how this regularity of split sets the movement aside from other organisations. However, while the regular

³²⁷ Gerry Adams

occurrence of splits can, and should, be regarded as a defining characteristic of the history of Irish Republicanism this does not mark it out as unique. A more accurate reflection of the situation would suggest that the incidence of splits is reflective of the situations experienced in all human organisations rather than as a unique trait of Irish Republicanism. This assertion is supported by Richard McAuley, a senior advisor to Gerry Adams within Sinn Fein, and a former prisoner and member of the Provisional IRA.

“The reality is that in almost any political party, any political organisation, any political movement you care to think of in the history of humanity somebody has disagreed with the leadership at some point and gone off and done their own thing, and sometimes more than once. So Republicans are no different than anybody else, God help us it is almost part of the human condition. We like to disagree.”³²⁸

This dispelling of the uniqueness of the Irish Republican propensity to split allows one to analyse their occurrence in a more constructive and pragmatic manner. It allows the research to move away from looking for any unique feature of the movement which may leave it susceptible to split and instead analyses the normality of this organisational occurrence.

The present research classes each of the four case studies as occurrences of splits. This is not in line with the assessment by the current leadership of Sinn Fein. While acknowledging the presence of organisational division they are averse to refer to 1986 and 1997 as instances of ‘splits’.

“You see you need to be careful about using the word ‘split.’ When you consider what happened in 1986, what happened at the beginning of all of this was a fairly major split between the Official Republican Movement and the Provisional Republican Movement. But in the aftermath of all of that we had all sorts of situations with for example the formation of the INLA and the IPLO, which really

³²⁸ Richard McAuley

were offshoots from the Official Republican Movement. But in terms of what was known as the Provisional IRA right through there were two big situations that had to be dealt with, which were the 1986 situation and I think that clearly there was a split but it wasn't a 50/50 split it wasn't even a 60/40 split it wasn't even a 70/30 split. So be careful with the use of the word split. In terms of the situation in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, even lesser so again, with probably only less than five percent of people deciding that this was not the way to go. So I wouldn't have regarded that as a split, so if you like those people tried to cause a split and it was fended off, it was defeated by the strategy put in place by the leadership of Republicanism of Sinn Fein, and indeed the leadership of the IRA were hugely supportive of the process of drawing the Unionists in, and the British government into peace negotiations.”³²⁹

The aversion to the use of the word, which for many is regarded as analogous to failure, is a method utilised so as to protect and enhance this leadership's legacy. It is with great pride that they define their leadership as one which has successfully avoided splits, where others have failed to do so.

“...it was the ability of this leadership not to have splits is I think probably the real part of it which is unprecedented in Republican history.”³³⁰

In the present research each of the four case studies are individually, and collectively, analysed as instances of organisational split. However, it is recognised that the outcome of each is considerably different. The case of 1969/70 is regarded as a close to even divide. With respect to 1986 and 1997 in particular the results of these are significantly weighted in the favour of the Provisionals. Rather than ignoring these situations the present research has analysed them as cases of split so as to observe why and how there was such a distinct difference in the results of each case. While the current Provisional leadership may wish to be acknowledged as the only leadership to have avoided split they

³²⁹ Martin McGuinness

³³⁰ Gerry Kelly

would be more accurately described as a leadership who successfully lessened the impact of two splits in 1986 and 1997. This provides the researcher with the opportunity to interpret how they managed to be as successful in attracting such significant levels of membership and support for their position, and why and how the Goulding leadership was unsuccessful in this regard in 1969/70.

7.3 Splits as a Process

Numerous researchers have deemed it both constructive and accurate to assess splits as the culmination of an organisational process. While the analysis of the present data shows that a split must not be regarded as the endpoint it does, however, show that a process model is the best way of detailing how and why a split takes place. Within the process based assessment one can observe the reasoning for the successes and failures of sub-groups in the lead up to, during and after the splits. In the analysis of each stage there is a focus on the themes which have been deemed relevant. A number of the most prominent themes are repeatedly relevant across stages.

The stages during each of the splits are not necessarily uniform and during each individual process the length of time to move from one stage to another varies. Even though there may appear to be a uniformity of themes an in-depth reading of the analysis will show that these factors can carry different degrees of importance and consequence across cases. It is this variation in influence of different factors which can prove most significant in the outcome of the split.

While the presentation of the analysis may suggest that these are ultimately four independent case studies the three 'Provisional' splits should be looked upon as three separate stages of Provisional involvement in the 'Troubles.' While the 1974 split is part of the overall Republican involvement in the 'Troubles' the split of 1969/70 meant that this organisation had moved on to a separate process of left-wing Republican involvement in the 'Troubles.' One can gain a greater understanding of the causes, results and consequences of the cases by simultaneously analysing each individual split as a micro-process within the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the

‘Troubles’ rather than looking at each as an independent case study. This is why the three Provisional splits have been presented as sub-chapters rather than individual standalone chapters.³³¹

In other studies the comparison of unrelated splits may present the analysis of each equivalent stage side by side. However, due to the interconnected nature of these splits it has been deemed beneficial and informative to present them splits chronologically so as to examine the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the ‘Troubles.’ Therefore rather than viewing the splits as individual entities they are assessed and presented as processes which had a significant effect on each other. This is signified in the fact that the micro-process of 1969/70 split in general, and the split aftermath in particular, must also be regarded as the opening stage for both the 1974 split in the Official Republican Movement and the 1986 split in the Provisionals.

Throughout the analysis there is reference to the number and make-up of participants who indicated the importance of specific themes. This is not to be perceived as a detailed quantitative analysis. Instead it is used to illustrate where relevant the divide in importance across groups and across levels of membership within each of the groups.

The results sub-chapters are based upon the analysis of the interview data. However, where necessary and viable the researcher has validated the themes raised through the analysis of both primary documents produced at the time. This is referred to within various footnotes. Similarly previous secondary analysis is referred to for verification purposes. The use of such materials strengthens the validity of the results displayed, and does not detract from the importance of the viewpoints of the participants. Often times the documents referred to were donated to the author by interview participants to support their opinions and analysis of the situation.

³³¹ This is a belief shared by the Republican groups themselves. See IRSP (date unknown). Brief History of the IRSP in *IRSP Information Sheets*.

7.4 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce to the reader to the layout of the analytical results sub-chapters. The results chapters have been divided into three separate sub-chapters, one for each of the Provisional splits being analysed, with the analysis of the 1974 Official split contained within Appendix F. These have been presented as sub-chapters rather than individual chapters as the splits are viewed as inter-connected micro-processes within the macro-process of Provisional Republican involvement in the 'Troubles'. They should therefore be read in unison so as to have a more complete understanding of the splits from both an organisational and individual perspective.

Chapter 8(a)

1969/70: The Origin of the Macro-Process

*'The tinder piled up and it went on fire in '69.'*³³²

8a.1 Introduction

The origins of each of the splits lies in the years and decades previous. A thorough analysis must look a number of years back in order to gain the most comprehensive understanding of not only the cause but the significance of each individual micro-process to fully understand the entire macro-process. Many would suggest that this analysis should not just focus on the actions of the years previous but that there should initially be a clear foundation of understanding of the Republican history from generations past, an opinion put forward by Sean O'Bradaigh in his assessment of the origins of the 1969/70 split.

*"I suppose you can find the proximate roots of it, the immediate, within a couple of years and then you can find the approximate roots going back even further. I suppose the approximate roots are going back to the Treaty almost, because each time this comes up we are coming up against the same question, 'do we recognise the Free State?' ... Will we maintain the Republican position or will we go and take part in [Dail Eireann].'"*³³³

A clear understanding of Republican history enhances ones understanding of each of the splits. However, the majority of interviewees focused the 'proximate roots' of the divides. The origins of the splits were detailed to lie in the years previous to the ultimate organisational divisions. While those of extended organisational experience, especially at a leadership level, at the time of each of the splits were able to go into the most detail about the significant events of the years previous those with less operational experience at the very least acknowledged the significance of specific incidents, policies and strategies

³³² Anthony Coughlan

³³³ Sean O'Bradaigh

from previous years. The process leading up and including the split of 1969/70 has been identified as the derivation of Irish Republican involvement in Troubles.

Of all the splits 1969/70 is the one which has most defined modern day Irish Republicanism. It resulted in the birth of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein as well as the formal introduction to Republicanism of many of its most influential modern day actors. The significance is observable throughout all elements of Irish Republicanism from 1969 to today. Therefore without a clear understanding of this divide one cannot completely understand modern day Irish Republicanism.

In total thirty-five participants discussed the 1969/70 split. Table 8a.1 displays the make-up of these participants.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	3	2	5	1	11
Provisional	3	2	16	1	22
External³³⁴	0	0	0	1 (IRSM)	1
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	7	4	21	3	35

Table 8a.1: Participants who discussed 1969/70 split

The present chapter presents the process in the lead-up to the 1969/70 split. The process has been divided into 5 stages. The dominant themes are illustrated within the sub-sections of each stage. These are the themes which the analysis showed to be the most important in each of the separate stages. They should not be interpreted as separate sub-stages but as, at times, overlapping themes relevant during the specific stage of the process. The title of each stage illustrates the stage's dominant characteristic and function. The title of each sub-section illustrates the dominant themes described. Analysis presented in this and each of the sub-chapters was guided by the analysis of the interview data. However, this was expanded to also include relevant primary and

³³⁴ This refers to individuals who were not involved in this particular split but referred to it in the interview process

secondary sources. This strengthens the validity of the analysis presented in each of the sub-chapters.

The five stages identified in the process of the 1969/70 split are supportive of the model proposed in Chapter 4:

Stage 1: The Origins of 1969/70

Stage 2: Factional Development

Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split

Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation.

The fifth and final stage of the micro-process must also be regarded, in combination with the rest of the split process, as the opening stage of the micro-processes of the 1974 and 1986 splits.

8a.2 Stage 1: The Origins of 1969/70

While the ‘approximate’ origins of the split lie within the history of Irish Republicanism each of the participants interviewed who had extended experience prior to 1969 identified the culmination of the Border Campaign of the late 1950s and early 1960s as the requisite starting point for any understanding of the ‘proximate’ origins of the split.³³⁵ Similarly six of the participants without extensive Republican experience discussed the effect of the aftermath of the Campaign. However, for the majority of new recruits to the movement in the lead up to and after 1969/70 the origins of the split through their own experiences took place in the immediate lead up to the formal division of the movement.

Of those participants who outlined the importance of the aftermath of the Border Campaign all agreed to its transitional nature. This is reflected in the analysis of those from both sides of the split.

³³⁵ For description of the Border Campaign see Coogan, T.P. (2000). *The IRA*. London: Harper Collins. Pp.297-329.

Within this first stage of the 1969/70 split the dominant themes to be covered are

- Public Support: Weakened
- Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment
- The Origins of Factionalism

8a.2.1 Public Support: Weakened

One of the major consequences of the Border Campaign was that there was deterioration in the public support for the Movement and what it could offer the general public of Ireland. This was a campaign which initially gained the support of the people.³³⁶ However, this support was short lived and in 1962 the Army Council of the IRA officially declared its end. Whatever support the Republican Movement had gained at the beginning of the campaign had dissipated, and was probably even lower than it had been prior to the beginning of the operation. This decline was evident in the weakening of both passive and active support.

“After beginning the campaign it was obvious that we didn’t have enough weapons or support, safe houses etc.”³³⁷

This lack of support was a result of a public feeling that the Republican Movement was not representative of the beliefs of the wider Irish population in general, and the nationalist population particularly. There was disconnect between the actions and beliefs of the Republican leadership and the populations they claimed to represent. With this decline in support it proved extremely difficult for the IRA to operate to any significant degree of success. The Irish public were not supportive of any form of armed action to achieve a united Ireland. This proved a critical issue in the failure of the campaign. It is recognised by those within the Movement that in order to sustain any form of military campaign they needed support within the community. Without this support the armed

³³⁶ This support was displayed at the election of four Sinn Fein candidates to the Dail in 1957, each of whom was an abstentionist candidate.

³³⁷ Mick Ryan

campaign invariably fails. This would later prove to be a lesson which future generations of Republican leaders would bestow on new recruits.

“It is vital you cannot sustain a military campaign without the support of a substantial section of the population... Why the 56 campaign failed is because the Republican Movement had become isolated from the people, had become divorced from the people, had become elitist, had become obsessed with ending partition and had turned a blind eye to issues like unemployment and poverty and emigration and bad housing.”³³⁸

This reaffirms that if a movement is to gain the public support it requires it is first of all necessary to make their groups objectives relevant among their existing and potential support base.³³⁹ During the Border Campaign the focus of the leadership was not on those issues of importance to the general Irish population. Instead there was perceived to be an almost blinkered focus on the achievement of a united Ireland and the ending of partition. This issue of disconnect with the wider public was one which was sought to be addressed in the aftermath of this failed armed campaign.

With the end of the Border Campaign in 1962 the deterioration of support for the Irish Republican Movement continued. Even for those who remained supportive of the movement there was a heightened disillusionment with its trajectory. This lack of support led to a drop in the finances of the movement and resultantly a drop in their accessibility to new weapons and artillery.³⁴⁰ Without a significant degree of public support it proves impossible to succeed in achieving objectives, unless they can alter the issues which have distanced them from the population they claim to represent. Each of the interviewees across the splits emphasised the importance of public support in determining the results of an intra-organisational conflict.

³³⁸ ‘Paul’

³³⁹ Oots (1989) p.145

³⁴⁰ This is why it is essential for organisations to continue to recruit new members and support so as to maintain organisational survival and therefore the continued actions of the group should look to maximise support Siqueira (2005) pp.220-222

8a.2.2 Membership: Exit, Weakening and Disillusionment

This disillusionment with the IRA and Sinn Fein within the public sphere was reflected in the membership with a number of members exiting at both armed and political levels.³⁴¹ The Border Campaign was seen by members as a failure. This is a view put across by both sides of the split. This is illustrated in the quotes below, the first from Tomas MacGiolla the 1960s president of Sinn Fein and after the split president of Official Sinn Fein and the second from ‘Alex’ an influential Belfast IRA member who was among those Belfast Republicans who overthrew the Belfast IRA leadership and refused to support the national leadership of Cathal Goulding in 1969. ‘Alex’ was an influential northern member in the formation of the Provisional IRA and in the aftermath of the 1986 split chose to support the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein.

“When the campaign eventually ended, that’s the 1950s campaign, which was Operation Harvest...It was a disaster from the very beginning and after a couple of years there were many people who already were disillusioned and didn’t want the campaign and wanted it to stop. It went on for another four years.”³⁴²

“The Border Campaign was a fiasco, looking back on it now it was a total fiasco. I don’t think they had a clue to be honest with you about what they were up against.”³⁴³

As with the public this operational failure resulted in the disillusionment of large proportions of the organisational membership which in turn brought about the exit of members who neither saw the possibility of success nor agreed with the strategies and tactics of the organisation at that point in time.

³⁴¹ The disillusionment within the movement during the Border Campaign is illustrated in an extensive IRA statement from April 1964. The IRA outlined the fractious nature of the relationship between the IRA and Sinn Fein during the Border Campaign, and especially when the campaign was called off by the IRA. IRA Department of Publicity. (April, 1964). *IRA Army Council Statement*. (p.5)

³⁴² Tomas MacGiolla

³⁴³ ‘Alex’

As well as a large number of members exiting the movement there were also a significant number either interned or on the run. With large proportions of the IRA leadership on the run for the concluding years of the campaign the standing and relevance of IRA was further weakened. There were also those who were forced to exit for reasons not directly related to the Republican Movement, largely due to economic issues. As with all sectors of the population this significantly affected the IRA and Sinn Fein during the 1950s and 60s as numerous existing and potential members were forced to emigrate, and in turn the majority of them ceased active involvement with the movement. Therefore the public good which the Republican Movement were aiming to achieve, a united Ireland, was significantly detached from the public goods desired by the majority of the population, economic stability.³⁴⁴

The aftermath of the Border Campaign resulted in such a detrimental weakening of the IRA that it can be considered from both a morale and physical capability point of view that it was at one of its weakest points. Resultantly in the aftermath of the campaign even within those areas which historically, would be considered as strong Republican regions the membership levels were extremely sparse. This was evident in the Republican heartlands of Belfast where the IRA membership was close to non-existent.

“When I got out I reported back to the Republican Movement...I think there was only about eight people in the Movement in Belfast, most of them just didn’t come back in... So basically it was starting from scratch all over again.”³⁴⁵

This deterioration in the membership cannot purely be blamed on the failure of the Border Campaign and outward migration. The weakening of the movement was taking place prior to the Border Campaign. As with the deterioration in support many people no longer saw the relevance of joining the IRA or Sinn Fein. As a result there were very few members in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Republican Movement for the most part was a deteriorating group irrelevant to the vast majority of the population of Ireland, and

³⁴⁴ This can be regarded as a ‘push’ factor for both members and supporters, Horgan, (2006).

³⁴⁵ ‘Alex’

therefore ineffective in operations and in attaining objectives. It is invariably the levels of membership, and their choices of who to side with in an intra-organisational conflict and the resultant split, which decides the successes and failures of either side.³⁴⁶

8a.2.3 The Origins of Factionalism

The fragility of Republicanism in the aftermath of this campaign emphasised the need for a re-evaluation in order to maintain organisational survival.³⁴⁷ This necessity resulted in an overhaul of the national leadership, a move widely supported. The new leadership with Cathal Goulding as the IRA Chief of Staff distanced their policies from the armed struggle and placed a greater emphasis on a left-wing political approach.³⁴⁸ They realised that in order to achieve the basic aim of organisational survival that they needed to first of all reconnect with both their membership and support base. The emphasis was placed on making the aims and strategies of the organisation relevant to the wider Irish population. At this stage of the process the new leadership were largely setting about re-organising both the IRA and Sinn Fein. This resulted in moving away from the armed struggle and the introduction of new strategies and policies largely centred on politically left-wing ideals.

The left-wing political policies espoused by the Goulding leadership at this time were significantly removed from the policies traditionally promoted by the organisation. For many of the traditional old-guard within both the IRA and Sinn Fein these policies would have been considered negatively as ‘extreme socialism.’ This led to discontent among a number of old-guard traditionalists at this initial stage of the process of split, a discontent which resulted in a number of them exiting. This theme is resonant throughout each of the micro-processes and is supportive of

³⁴⁶ Throughout this and the subsequent sub-chapter there is an analysis of individual participants’ allegiance choice in the aftermath of and process of the splits. The reasons established in these sub-chapters are generally focusing on reasons linked to the reasons for organisational split. However, allegiance choice is often times made for non-split related reasons. For an analysis of some of these factors see Appendix G

³⁴⁷ English (2003) P.83

³⁴⁸ For an explanation of the choice of Goulding as Chief of Staff See Bishop and Mallie (1987). Pp.33-34

HOL. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.

HOL. The immediate objective for all organisations is the survival of the organisation. While this requires the recruitment of new members it also requires the maintenance of the existing support. Times of significant change within an organisation are the most likely times of membership exit. Therefore it must be the aim of the organisational leadership to convince a significant majority of the membership of the necessity for these changes. At this stage of the process the exit of these members was not as damaging to organisational survival as it is in later stages. The necessity for change in the movement provided the Goulding leadership to adjust the policies and strategies to fit better with their aspirations for the left-wing politicisation of the movement

The new left-wing ideology advocated by Cathal Goulding and his affiliates was largely influenced and formulated by some of the new members and advisors introduced to organised Republicanism at the dawn of the new leadership. The most influential of these was Dr Roy Johnston.³⁴⁹

One of the methods he utilised to open debate within the movement, as well as externally, was the development of the Wolfe Tone Society in 1963. This group was made up of individuals who were predominantly external to the movement. In their meetings they discussed the future development of Republicanism in Ireland. The ideas generated from the Society in turn influenced much of the positioning of Republican policy of the time. These groupings were predominantly made up of left wing political activists and academics. Some of the most prominent voices were those promoting and supporting the politicisation of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The politicisation process took place independent of the Wolfe Tone Society. However, it was within these meetings that many of the influential policies were developed in depth and resultantly adopted either in

³⁴⁹ For an account of Johnston's view of Irish Republicanism in the 1960s see Johnston (2006) pp.167-289.

part or completely by the leadership.³⁵⁰ Prominent to this influence was their distancing from armed Republicanism.

While the promotion of peaceful political strategies was the cornerstone of the leadership's re-organisation this was not fully supported by all members. Many of the old-guard traditionalists were wary of the growing left-wing influence within the movement. This rise of left-wing ideals coupled with the demotion of the armed campaign resulted in the origins of internal factionalism.

“It was only after I came out [of prison], because from the inside you are cut off, it was only after I came out. When you seen the way these people were going. Their attitude was that physical force was unwanted...they were following the Communist Party line and objectives...It was not long till you realised that that is what was happening and people who were objecting to it were dismissed.”³⁵¹

While a number of members exited the movement as a result of their discontent, and others were dismissed from the organisation, there were also those traditionalist members who stayed and internally displayed their dissatisfaction. There were a number of disgruntled members at this stage of the process but they could not yet be considered an organised dissident faction. There were dispersed showings of rebellion, none of which characterised as an organised campaign against the strategic policies of the leadership. For many the origins of their discontent lay in the downgrading in importance of the IRA and the resultant decline in military training and operations. There were small regional pockets of Republican activists who resisted this move and continued with small scale armed training and operations.

For the new leadership and their advisors the IRA was seen as an out of date entity, one which in its historical form could stand in the way of the politicisation and rise of Sinn Fein. They wished for IRA members to become political and less militarily minded, and

³⁵⁰ This is an example of the application of voice in the attempt to change the direction of the movement.

³⁵¹ 'Alex'

hence required all IRA volunteers to join Sinn Fein.³⁵² This promotion of political strategies in the place of the armed campaign was resisted by some volunteers who carried on with the utilisation of physical force Republicanism in spite of the national leadership's wishes.

“The IRA was considered moribund, virtually moribund, at that time. I mean there was obviously some grouping there in the background...He [Goulding] was trying to get Republicans to go political... Famously of course there were incidents, there was some trading dispute down in the west, there was some action some boats were blown up.”³⁵³

This discontent was not extensively on display in the initial periods of this stage of the process. However, towards the end as the left-wing political direction was becoming firmly established the voices of discontent became louder and more constant. This could not yet be considered as a highly organised dissident sub-group at this stage.

Not all of the discontent can be seen to originate as a result of strategy or policy specific issues. There were also some personality based issues at the heart of this initial factionalism. While this was evident in some instances at a national leadership level it was similarly illustrated locally in the Republican regions of Ireland. As with all human organisations internal grievances need not always be with strategic, tactical or policy based disputes. Some of the factionalism and ultimately the decisions made by individuals during the process of split can be seen to have their basis in personal as well as, or at times in spite of, strategic and policy issues. This is illustrated by Dolours Price in her description of the Republican community in Belfast in the 1960s.

“I knew the Sullivans and Billy McMillen and all the people that became Stickies.”³⁵⁴ I would have known them all before there was any idea of splits,

³⁵² This is further support for HO1

³⁵³ Anthony Coughlan

³⁵⁴ This is a derogatory term used to refer to members of the Official Republican Movement. The origin of it can be seen in the different ways that the members of the Officials and Provisionals attached their

discussions or talk. I would have heard my father talk about...he didn't like that crowd, he didn't like Billy McMillen. A lot of personality things went on. He didn't like Billy McMillen on a personal basis and didn't like Malachy McGurran, didn't like Billy Sullivan and Jimmy Sullivan."³⁵⁵

This displays that while much of the factionalism may have been policy and strategy driven throughout the process of split that people's affiliations may have originated from their personal attitude to the people on either side of the divide. This is a theme which will be dealt with in Appendix G.

This present stage viewed as the origin of the 1969/70 split provides significant support for four of the organisational hypotheses.

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

HO2. The emerging change of focus by the movement at this stage was for a number of the old-guard traditionalists seen as detrimental to the organisational identity. For many of them they would have been significantly sceptical of an extreme left-wing influence on the movement especially when it was detracting from the armed campaign and the pursuit of a united Ireland. This change of focus was due in part to the growing heterogeneity of the membership with the introduction of a number of left-wing politicisers with no desire to continue the armed campaign. Not only was there a divergence of policy related viewpoints at this stage but there was also a clash of personalities.

At this early stage of the intra-organisational conflict the dissidents were still of the belief that the division could be resolved by internal measures rather than by exiting to form an autonomous organisation. They were attempting the utilisation of voice in an attempt to

commemorative Easter lilies. After 1969/70 the Officials attached their lilies to their clothes using an adhesive gum, hence the name 'Sticky', and the Provisionals used a pin. The Provisionals for a time were referred to as the 'Pinheads' or 'Pinnies' but this did not last as long as term 'Sticky.'

³⁵⁵ Dolours Price

bring about change while also defying orders. A number of small units were still actively preparing for an armed campaign, thus defying the intentions of the leadership and illustrating their belief that there was still the possibility of resolving their grievance and partaking in future armed campaigns. However, the most resonant reason for the avoidance of split at this stage was that the dissidents were not adequately organised to exit in a collective manner to form a new grouping or to overthrow the exiting leadership.

8a.3 Stage 2: Factional Development

The Republican Movement of the late twentieth century is defined by its policies and actions in Northern Ireland. However, the policies and strategies employed in the immediate aftermath of the Border Campaign focused predominantly on actions in the Republic of Ireland. The purposive goal of the movement was still the unification of Ireland. However, this was not the immediate priority of the new leadership. Their central aim was organisational survival and is therefore supportive of

HQ1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.

HQ1. In order to begin thinking about unification they first had to re-establish some degree of membership and public support. This led to the re-organisation of the movement and the establishment of more left-wing political tactics. Therefore the leadership were revising and expanding the public goods which they were aiming to achieve, and in doing so they were attempting to become more relevant to the Irish public. While this was successful to some degree in gaining support and recruiting, to a small degree, a new breed of left-wing political supporters it also led to discontent within the organisation. This discontent was mainly from the traditionalist old-guard. The central theme can be defined as development of the organisation into a form close to the leadership's ideal. Parallel to this, however, must be regarded the emerging dissident specific theme of survival of the traditional values, policies and tactics. This is dissident aim is supportive of

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

HO2. While this conflict does not cause organisational split at this stage of the process it is during this stage that it is identified as threatening to organisational identity, and therefore the dissidents begin to attempt to maintain the survival of their intended organisational identity.

Throughout the process it is the competition between the aims of the dissidents and the leadership which decides the outcome of the split. In this stage concrete strategic and policy changes were attempted by the leadership through internal constitutional reform. While this succeeded in firmly placing their agenda on the table one of the most significant developments from this was the growth and organisation of a dissident sub-group.

Within this politicisation was the introduction of multiple actual and proposed changes. The most significant result of this was multi-platform intra-organisational conflict. Twenty-five interviewees, ten Official and fifteen Provisional, outlined the nature of the factionalisms within the movement in the lead up to the 1969/70 split. A number of these participants described a variety of separate conflicts which were developing concurrently. The tables below illustrate some of the intra-organisational conflicts taking place within the movement at this stage. This demonstrates the diversity of conflicts which were taking place at the time.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	2	2	0	0	4
Provisional	1	0	2	0	3
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	3	2	2	0	7

Table 8a.2: Factionalism due to Armed Strategy

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	3	2	0	0	5
Provisional	1	1	1	0	3
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	4	3	1	0	8

Table 8a.3: Factionalism due to Political Strategy

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	3	2	0	0	5
Provisional	1	1	1	0	3
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	4	3	1	0	8

Table 8a.4: Factionalism due to Political Strategy

With respect to factionalism due to political strategy of the movement at this stage the analysis shows that there were a number of different political elements which were causing factionalism at the time. This is illustrated in the tables below.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	1	2	0	0	3
Provisional	1	2	0	0	3
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	3	4	0	0	7

Table 8a.5: Factionalism due to Left-Wing Political Strategy

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	3	2	0	0	5
Provisional	1	2	0	0	3
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	4	4	0	0	8

Table 8a.6: Factionalism due to Abstentionism

Much of the factionalism within the movement can be defined by the strategy or issue over which the conflict is based. However, the location within the movement where the conflict was dominant is similarly important. Two key areas within the movement were identified by participants, these are within the national leadership and in the membership between the religious old-guard and the left-wing politicisers. The most dominant of these two was the developing factionalism within the national leadership which eventually contributed most to the split. The make-up of participants outlining the importance of these factionalisms is presented below. Most notable in the factionalism in the national leadership is the fact that five members of this leadership emphasised its importance.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	2	0	2	0	4
Provisional	2	1	2	0	5
External	0	0	0	1	1
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	5	1	4	1	11

Table 8a.7: Factionalism in National Leadership

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	1	2	0	0	5
Provisional	1	0	2	0	3
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2	2	2	0	6

Table 8a.8: Intra-organisational conflicts between Left-Wing Politicisers and Religious Old-Guard

What follows now is analysis of why and how these factionalisms developed and their importance in the micro-process of the split. As has been stated above the central theme to this stage is *policy changes: too much too soon*.³⁵⁶ Within the analysis of this theme there is a focus on some of the changes and proposed changes made under the following headings.

- Armed To Political
- Politically Left-Wing
- Abstentionism

Similarly there is the analysis of the specific factionalism within the national leadership

8a.3.1 Policy Changes: Too Much Too Soon?

The foundations of factionalism were laid in the initial stage with the emphasis being placed on the development of a left-wing political movement and the downgrading in

³⁵⁶ For the dissidents these policy changes can be considered as push factors each contributing to their exit from the organisation. The net result of each of them combined makes them a more prominent cumulative push factor than if there was only one change. Horgan, J. (2006); The significant proposed changes in tactics and strategies of the leadership brought about intra-organisational conflict, Burke Rochford Jnr. (1989) p.163

importance of the IRA. However, it was not until the full extent of the proposed changes was nationally apparent that the dissident factions became more vocal and organised. Five interviewees, four Provisionals two at a leadership level and one siding with the Goulding leadership in a leadership advisory capacity, outlined the prominent role played by the outlining of and voting on a set of proposals for change at both General Army Conventions of the IRA and Ard Fheiseanna of Sinn Fein in 1965 and 1966. While there were multiple proposed changes put forward by the leadership the one which caused the most discontent among the dissenters was the issue of abstentionism.³⁵⁷ The changes proposed that the abstentionist policies to all three parliaments, Dail Eireann, Westminster and Stormont, would be dropped.³⁵⁸ For many traditionalist members these policies were the cornerstone of what it was to be an Irish Republican. In essence this coupled with the other proposed changes were read by the dissenters as the politicisation of the Irish Republican Movement and the downgrading of the armed struggle and therefore threatening in their eyes to the organisational identity.

“When you added it up the aim was quite clear, it was to convert a revolutionary republican movement into a constitutional party. Although that wasn’t said as such that was the affect of it and in keeping with that, as was logical, the IRA was to be run down.”³⁵⁹

For O’Bradaigh and many other leadership and experienced members the most important, and damaging, of the proposed amendments was the dropping of the abstentionist policies. However, there were multiple other proposed and real changes which were taking place in the movement at both a political and armed level simultaneously. The politicisation of the movement, combined with a heightened emphasis on the civil rights movement, provided multiple platforms for internal dissent. The analysis of the interview data suggests that the leadership were trying to change too much too soon and therefore this provided a stronger support for the development of dissenting sub-

³⁵⁷ For a discussion of Sinn Fein as an abstentionist party see Maillot, A. (2005). *New Sinn Fein: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty First Century*. London: Routledge. Pp.8-20.

³⁵⁸ MacStiofain, S. (1975). *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*. London: Gordon Cremonisi. Pp. 92-93.

³⁵⁹ Ruairi O’Bradaigh

groups.³⁶⁰ The opinion that the leadership were trying to do too much too soon was delineated by seven participants, three Officials and four Provisionals. Of these seven participants six were experienced members prior to the split in 1969/70 and one Provisional was a new recruit in 1968. The thematic analysis of the present stage of the process outlines the key areas of proposed strategic change as well as the actions taken by the movement at this time and how they contributed to the strengthening and development of intra-organisational conflict on a number of different fronts. What follows is the analysis of some of the changes being implemented and proposed at this time at the effect they had in causing both factionalism and intra-organisational conflict. The themes are

- Armed to Political
- Politically Left-Wing
- Abstentionism³⁶¹

There is similarly analysis of factionalism specifically within the national leadership. The excess of the changes and factionalisms illustrates the notion that the leadership were trying to change too much too soon.

8a.3.1.1 Armed to Political³⁶²

Central to their politicisation of the movement the leadership wished to downgrade the importance of the IRA. The roles of the two wings of the movement, Sinn Fein and the IRA, were reversed and the objective was for the IRA to promote the political policies of Sinn Fein.

³⁶⁰ This is supportive of the belief that if organisational changes are dramatic and rapid that they could lead to the significant exit of those tied to the original model. Della Porta, (2009), p.76; See also Piderit (2000) p.783

³⁶¹ It is also acknowledged that there was minor factionalism due to Republican involvement in the civil rights movement and also between the traditional Catholic membership and the left-wing.

³⁶² The dominance of the debate about and relationship between the armed and political strategies in each of the four splits supports the assertion by both Irvin (1999), p.41 and Crenshaw (1985) p.468 of the centrality of these strategies and their relationship in intra-organisational conflicts within terrorist organisations

*“In the IRA the Army had democratised. The Army was used to promote Sinn Fein. We didn’t say this is how you have to vote but the policies should determine who should vote in what way.”*³⁶³

While there were many would be Provisionals who saw the need for a strong political party their opinion was that this should work in unison with the IRA. Therefore they believed in the need for a movement which was both political *and* armed, not one or the other.

*“I thought that the two could go in tandem...This was all being phased out. Goulding said at an army meeting in Connaught that ‘the time is long past going around barns with a Thompson.’”*³⁶⁴

This downgrading of the IRA specifically and the armed struggle in general was too severe for some members. The weakening of the IRA and the armed campaign was seen to be weakening the entire movement and its opportunities to achieve its objectives. There were even those who would ultimately remain loyal to the Goulding leadership, and some who would be considered part of that leadership, who believed in the need for a strong IRA.

*“In 1965 I resigned as Quartermaster. I felt that the Movement had to get weapons, had to re-arm. Even a small amount would have been helpful.”*³⁶⁵

Some of the major forces behind this politicisation have, with hindsight, come to believe that the only significant achievement of the process should be viewed as negative. In no way did they turn the Republican Movement into a strong political force. The primary consequence of this pursuit of politicisation must ultimately be regarded as the split of 1969/70. While it must not be viewed as the sole cause of the split it must certainly be regarded among the primary factors.

³⁶³ Mick Ryan

³⁶⁴ Des Long

³⁶⁵ Mick Ryan

“The politicisation of the Republican Movement in the 60s, what did it lead to? It led to the famous split which was a disaster. In retrospect if I was back in my twenties again I am not so sure I would have followed the same political force.”³⁶⁶

At this stage of the process a number of opponents to this expressed their discontent to this downgrading of what many regarded as an essential element of the strategy of the Irish Republican Movement. This dissatisfaction was expressed at both leadership and rank and file levels and predominantly but, not exclusively, among members of the IRA.

“Most of the IRA felt that the only way to achieve a 32-county independent Ireland was by military force alone. They saw Sinn Fein as separate. This was never thought out fully. It was my view that the IRA was there to complete the job which was ‘suspended’ in 1921. My view was that the struggle was just in hiatus.”³⁶⁷

The discontent within the membership and among certain elements of the leadership with respect to the downgrading of the armed struggle is viewed by many as the most decisive element at play in both the reasoning for and the result of the split.

“That [the split] was always going to come because it was kind of based on very basic, you are either for armed struggle or you are not, or you are for politics.”³⁶⁸

While for many this may have been the dominant element it was not the sole intra-organisational conflict in the lead up to 1969/70.

8a.3.1.2 Politically Left-Wing

The political development was very much moving towards the left. To a large extent they were moving the organisation away from the traditional republican ethos and it was becoming dominated by left-wing political ideals and values. With the low levels of membership and support they were shaping what could have been perceived as an

³⁶⁶ Anthony Coughlan

³⁶⁷ Mick Ryan

³⁶⁸ Dolours Price

entirely new organisation. The emphasis of debates both locally and nationally were no longer military based but were focused on the alleviation of perceived social injustices. In its new form the organisation was almost unrecognisable from the traditional Republican Movement.

This change to a socialist approach in turn brought with it a modification on the purposive goals of the organisation. The movement would have historically considered itself to be a left-leaning political and armed movement. However, this stronger emphasis on socialism brought the aspiration for the organisation to achieve a thirty-two county socialist republic to prominence. This required members and supporters not only to aspire to a united Ireland but to a *socialist* united Ireland. For many of the future Provisionals the prominence of socialism in the place, to a large extent, of the pursuit of a united Ireland was significantly and negatively moving the goals of the movement in the wrong direction.

“You had the introduction into the Republican Movement of a degree of socialism, which was extreme, which was a diversion really. If that becomes the main thrust then the question of national liberation becomes a bit of a side show from there on.”³⁶⁹

This shift towards a left-wing set of goals isolated a significant proportion of the traditionalist membership and support. When this is coupled with the downgrading of the IRA a larger and more significant section of the population were effectively isolated. By changing the goals and strategy of a movement from the pursuit of a thirty-two county Irish Republic through the use of armed struggle to the pursuit of a thirty-two county Irish socialist Republic by political means the leadership were, in a short space of time, severely altering the emphasis of the organisation. Resultantly their new aspirations could now realistically only be supported and aspired to by a different and somewhat narrower base.

³⁶⁹ Sean O’Bradaigh

One specific element within the left-wing proposal put forward towards the end of this stage of the process was a proposed coalition with likeminded left-wing parties and movements for the purpose of promoting the left-wing aims of the combined movement.³⁷⁰ This proposed union acquired the moniker of National Liberation Front [NLF].³⁷¹ When proposed this succeeded in heightening the traditionalist's apprehension of the new left-wing strategy. The issue was seized by the growing dissenting sub-group as a negative example of the direction the movement was taking. They began to spread their message of distrust of the left-wing trajectory which the movement was taking.³⁷²

*“As the movement was moving more towards the left he [Sean MacStiofain] started to talk to people on his side locally about how this wasn't right for the Movement. MacStiofain was very much anti-Communist. However, there were very few people within the IRA who would have been Communist...He was against the dropping of abstentionism and the leftward trend of the Movement.”*³⁷³

These voices of dissent were negatively portraying the Goulding leadership as being Communists and emphasising what they perceived to be the negative aspects of the left-wing political ideology being put forward. Some of the strongest voices of discontent came from a number of influence old-guard traditionalist Republicans who had left the movement in the aftermath of the Border Campaign but had since returned due to their disillusionment with the direction of the movement under this new leadership. The influence of this returning old guard in conjunction with the influential dissidents who had remained provided a legitimisation for the position of the dissidents.³⁷⁴

³⁷⁰ This proposed coalition was central to the intra-organisational conflict as proposed by Irvin (1999), p.41

³⁷¹ In Cathal Goulding's oration in Bodenstown in June 1967 he stated 'to all radical and progressive groups, to all individual revolutionaries, the Republican Movement should be a rallying ground, the point of unity.' This can be seen as a call for what became known as the NLF. Goulding, C. (July 1967). Bodenstown '67: Oration by Cathal Goulding. In *United Irishman*, pp.10-11

³⁷² This is a classic example of the initial utilisation of voice prior to exit to see if they could change the internal workings of the movement and opinions of the leadership and membership. Hirschman (1970)

³⁷³ Mick Ryan

³⁷⁴ This is supportive of the Dyck and Starke model which posits the presence of legitimising voices in favour of the dissidents as a trigger event for the progress of the process of split. See Dyck and Starke (1999), pp.804-811

8a.3.1.3 Abstentionism

To the fore of many people's analysis of the 1969/70 split is the issue of abstentionism, an issue which is later revisited in the lead up to the 1986 split.³⁷⁵ Historically the Republican Movement viewed the three parliaments as institutions which by their very nature promoted the partition of Ireland.³⁷⁶ Therefore any Sinn Fein member who was elected to any of the three houses would abstain from taking their seats on strategic and policy grounds. This became an issue debated within the leadership of both Sinn Fein and the IRA as well as in the Wolfe Tone Society. For the new leadership this policy was seen as a burden debilitating the progress of their politicisation of the movement.

When in the mid 1960s this was brought to an initial vote, along with a variety of other proposals, the vote was to drop the abstentionist policy completely for all three parliaments. This was read in turn by some members as the recognition of the legitimacy of the three parliaments and the acceptance of partition. For many at that time abstentionism was a central tenet of Irish Republicanism, and for some this continues to be the case. It was considered to be beyond a strategy or tactic but was regarded as a principle and even part of their ideology. Therefore the proposed change of these policies was viewed by many of the old-guard as significantly threatening to organisational identity. Since the partition of the state there was the acceptance that the organisational position was the denouncement of the legitimacy of each of the parliaments and now the leadership were proposing an alteration to this strategy by recommending the policy's abolition. Interviews with members of both sides of the split indicate the deep rooted and historical sentiment that went with the abstentionist policy.

³⁷⁵ For an analysis of debates on republican abstentionist policies see Lynn, B. (2002). *Tactic or Principle? The Evolution of Republican Thinking on Abstentionism in Ireland, 1970-1998*. In *Irish Political Studies*, 17(2), pp.74-94

³⁷⁶ Abstentionism was also a dominant theme in Sinn Fein at the beginning of the twentieth century. See Pyne, P. (1974). *The politics of parliamentary abstentionism: Ireland's Four Sinn Fein Parties 1905-1926*. In *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 12(2), pp.206-227

*“Abstentionism was always a Republican policy. For instance today’s situation, how can you say you are a Republican and have to run this state with the British?”*³⁷⁷

*“The suspicion of taking seats was deep rooted. [Future] Provisional leaders like the O’Bradaighs [Sean and Ruairi], [Eamon] MacThomais, [John Joe] McGirl and others had spoken publicly at meetings recruiting into Sinn Fein and the IRA under the guise of not taking seats. They said that the Dail would corrupt you. Then these people were asked by the leadership to consider that what was once a mortal sin was suddenly no longer so.”*³⁷⁸

While this may be phrased as a singular policy change in practice this proposal elicited three major changes in policy. These were hugely significant changes individually, but by proposing to drop the policy to all three parliaments the leadership were calling for a monumental turnaround in strategy. For many participants retrospective analysis says that the Goulding leadership may have been better advised to alter the position with respect to one parliament at a time. The leadership believed in taking their seats in each of the three. However, if they could not bring a significant portion of the membership and support with them this change was to be inconsequential.

The overriding theme of this stage with respect to strategic changes, ‘too much, too soon’, is not only applicable to the full range of strategic and policy changes but is specifically applicable to the issue of the proposed changes in the abstentionist policies. When these are combined with the various other concrete and proposed changes the leadership was always likely to isolate a large number of their supporters, as well as fellow members of the leadership.

This retrospective analysis may suggest the obvious problems to be faced by trying to impose these changes to the abstentionist policies. However, at the time it was believed

³⁷⁷ Alex

³⁷⁸ Mick Ryan

that in order to sustain the existence of the movement that drastic changes were needed. The leadership inferred that they would be more likely to attract new members and supporters if they were to take their seats and be seen to be actively involved in the political set-up, rather than being the eternal external agitators.³⁷⁹ In order to maintain organisational survival one must not only attract new membership and support but they need also to preserve a significant proportion of their old-guard and bring them along with them. For many of the traditionalist old-guard these sweeping changes to a deep-rooted policy was to prove ‘too much, too soon.’ The stance taken by both sides of the conflict provided the basis for continuous and developing factionalism from the mid 1960s up until the official division in Sinn Fein in 1970.

With this battery of fluctuation, change and proposed change tensions mounted within the membership and across the leadership resulting in intense intra-organisational conflict and factionalism.

8a.3.1.4 National Leadership

One of the clearest examples of factionalism was within the national leadership.³⁸⁰ This was particularly evident in the IRA Army Council. During the mid to late 1960s this seven person council was divided evenly with three sitting members supportive of politicisation and three in favour of the advancement of the armed campaign and one, Tomas MacGiolla, generally described as taking a ‘neutral’ position until his final decision to side with the Officials.³⁸¹ This division was also evident within the leadership of Sinn Fein as well as within other factions of the Republican leadership. It is alleged by Provisionals under their title of ‘internal methods’ that the Goulding leadership manipulated who would take vital roles within the organisation so as to push forward their socialist agenda.

³⁷⁹ Hanley and Millar P. 40.

³⁸⁰ This is supports the claim that areas of power-relations is one of the prominent venues for intra-organisational conflict. March and Simon (1993), p.142

³⁸¹ White, R.W. (2006).

“People had largely been identified as to what side they took in this brewing situation and because the people in favour of all these things were in charge of the Army, and they had a very good say in Sinn Fein as well, and they controlled the newspaper The United Irishman, then they were in the position to use great influence.”³⁸²

As the mouthpiece of the movement the Republican newspaper, the United Irishman, was a powerful tool to put across the preferred message of the movement to the membership. Therefore at a time of intra-organisational conflict whichever side was in editorial control were better positioned to transmit and justify their viewpoints to the wider membership. In the lead up to the split the left-leaning leadership was in control of the paper. Therefore, they decided what was to be published and, at times more importantly, what was to be omitted from the publication

This factionalism within the national leadership while evident during this stage of the process grew in strength and significance in the final stages.

HO1. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

HO1. & HO2. The presence of these multiple proposed changes and the resultant intra-organisational conflicts was seen as threatening to the organisational identity of the movement by a larger proportion of the movement than it was deemed to be during the last stage. The multiple changes inevitably isolated a growing number of members and resultantly created a stronger dissident sub-group. These intra-organisational conflicts were not only threatening to the organisational identity on an individual level. The

³⁸² Ruairi O’Bradaigh

immediate aim of organisational survival was not given the attention it required by the leadership at this time of multiple change as it was significantly isolating a larger proportion of the membership with each proposed change and therefore strengthening the dissidents. While it was deemed threatening to the identity it was still viewed to be reconcilable. Due to the fact that the votes for change were being defeated throughout this stage the internal dissenters believed that the issues could be solved internally. In marked contrast to the opening stages the dissidents were becoming more organised at this stage.

8a.4 Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split

The opening two stages of this process may be regarded as laying the groundwork for the split. However, this third stage should be regarded as the most critical in deciding the outcome of the division. Each of the thirty participants who discussed the 1969/70 split emphasised the importance of the actions taken, or not taken, by the IRA in the summer of 1969. This is therefore regarded as the most dominant reasoning not only for the split taking place but also as the dominant factor in deciding its outcome. While the opening two stages created situations where sections of the membership and supporters were disillusioned with the direction the movement was taking, these dissidents while expressing their concerns had yet to garner a sufficient degree of internal or external support for their position. Without this support any move away from the parent organisation would have proved counterproductive and the resulting splinter group would have been close to irrelevant within the wider society. However, in late 1968 and early 1969 the situation in Northern Ireland began to gain widespread national and international attention. Civil rights marches were attacked by loyalist groups as members of the RUC and B-Specials stood by. At other times officers themselves baton-charged and injured marchers. With growing violence and the resultant riots on both sides of the sectarian divide there were community calls for the IRA to defend the communities and provide weapons. However, the leadership resisted as it was not their intention to get involved in armed conflict. They wished to maintain their plans to politicise the Republican Movement. The Northern Irish situation came to a fore in August 1969 with

incidents such as the Battle of the Bogside³⁸³ and the ensuing sectarian rioting across Northern Ireland.³⁸⁴ In Belfast hundreds of houses were burned to the ground, leaving thousands of people, mainly Catholics, homeless. By August 14th the British government sent army troops into Northern Ireland. The events of 1969 proved vital in the process leading up to the split, and the escalation of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.³⁸⁵ The violence and the calls for weapons provided a new impetus to the dissident sub-group. The dissidence was now purely focused on the need for defence and an armed strategy. This was especially the case with the returning old-guard members.³⁸⁶

“I think the split in the early seventies was down to a lot of republicans on our side were old-style republicans. And the whole thing that was happening in Belfast and Derry, where people were burnt out of their homes, I think the reactionary element took over.”³⁸⁷

The growing tensions within the organisation cemented the inevitability of split. Throughout this period the mounting tension in Northern Ireland and the perceived inaction of the IRA succeeded in bringing back additional old-guard members to those who had already returned. Many attempted to defend the Republican communities. Parallel to this a growing number of young Northern nationalists became involved in the defence of their communities. While this was not always under the auspices of the IRA a number of the young recruits went on to join and played a crucial role within the Provisional movement in the aftermath of the split. For twenty-one of the thirty-two participants this stage of the process represented their first involvement with organised republicanism and signalled the beginning of the split in their eyes.

³⁸³ This refers to rioting which followed the Apprentice Boys of Derry march on August 12th.

³⁸⁴ For discussion of the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ see O’Dochartaigh, N. (2004). *From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles. (Second Edition)*. Cork: Palgrave.

³⁸⁵ Weinberg and Richardson (2004) (p.156) cite the ensuing communal riots in Belfast and Derry during the summer of 1969 as the precursor to the escalation of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland.

³⁸⁶ For a specific account of an individual old-guard member’s return to the movement see Anderson Pp.152-186

³⁸⁷ Joe Doherty

Within this ten month time period the voices of dissent grew louder and reached a wider audience. The dissidents became more organised and began to prepare for the eventuality of split. The Goulding leadership continued their push for constitutional change, to drop the abstentionist policies and put forward their left wing objectives and policies.³⁸⁸ Their desire for organisational change was parallel to a weakening of their position and support, and the strengthening of the alternative being provided by the ‘Provisionals.’ While no official split was to take place until late 1969 it is noted that it is when referring to this third stage of the process that participants start to prominently refer to two distinct Republican groupings, the ‘Officials’ and the ‘Provisionals’. This is particularly prominent in reference to defence provided in Republican areas by the returning old-guard who became founding members of the Provisional IRA and the failure to provide defence and weapons by future Officials. This deliberate labelling of groups shows how it was within this period that the two distinct groups began to take shape, a move which rendered the split inevitable.

Within the analysis of this stage the dominant themes focused on are:

- Preparation for Split
- Republican Expectations and Leadership Disconnect
- External Influence: Fianna Fail

8a.4.1 Preparation for Split

As the situation in Northern Ireland grew more hostile at the end of 1968 and the beginning of 1969, especially with incidents such as the attacks on marchers at Burntollet Bridge, the growing dissident grouping became more organised and vocal in their dissent. They called on the leadership to refocus their strategies on armed struggle and to move away from left-wing political proposals being put forward. In these months there were preparations made by leading ‘Provisionals’ for the upcoming split. They sounded out

³⁸⁸ This is illustrated in the publication of *Ireland Today* in March 1969 which was a report resulting from the development of a review commission in the Ard Fheis of 1969. Even though it acknowledged membership reticence towards entering Stormont and Westminster it still advised that the abstentionist policies should be dropped. Republican Education Department for the Commission set up by the 1968 Ard Fheis (March 1969.). *Ireland Today: and some questions on the way forward (including 1969 Addendum)*

individuals for recruitment and support by criticising the 'Communist' trajectory that the movement was taking. They strengthened their position in opposition to the politicising leadership. This was carried out across Ireland at a local level.

“In early 1969 I called in to Ned Dempsey in Carlow. Ned told me that he had had a visitor from Belfast, Liam Burke and Miles Shevlin, the Dublin solicitor. They were criticising the ‘Communist takeover’ of the Movement...[Sean] MacStiofain would have been in touch with each unit and was finding out from them what was going on locally. As the Movement was moving more towards the left he started to talk to people on his side locally about how this wasn’t right for the Movement.”³⁸⁹

As this took place on the side of the dissidents the national leadership were also putting forward their case for politicisation. They promoted their preference for left-wing Republicanism and dropping the abstentionist policies. It was their aim to prevent a split and continue the promotion of their political strategies, even in light of the events in Northern Ireland. However, they were aware from 1968 that a split was inevitable due to the growing organisation by the dissident sub-group. It was their task then to lessen the impact of the split.

“I personally from the beginning of my contact had hoped that an actual split could be avoided; people who were unable to adapt to a socially critical political approach would, we expected, drop out individually. It became evident however that a split was being organised prior to the 1968 Ard Fheis which launched the ‘Garland Commission’ process; this latter was a conscious attempt to counter it... We did our best to avoid it happening, on the whole; we tried to bring everyone along the political road, but the proto-Provisionals were organising against us all the time.”³⁹⁰

³⁸⁹ Mick Ryan

³⁹⁰ Roy Johnston

“And there was an escalating situation, and just as a final push was being made by Cathal Goulding and company in ‘68 at the Ard Fheis...They employed full time organisers, and the full time organisers were sorting us out as to probables and possibles and all the rest of it.”³⁹¹

For the dissidents their most national show of dissent came at the re-interment of Peter Barnes and James McCormack³⁹² in Mullingar in July 1969. At the graveside Jimmy Steele, one of the leading Belfast old-guard, gave a speech which was to send out a signal to all both within and outside of Republicanism that there was a growing dissenting faction who significantly disagreed with the course of action being taken by the leadership. This speech is acknowledged by both sides as a significant moment in the process of the split and ultimately the development of the Provisional IRA. In his speech Steele sidestepped the issues of civil rights and instead promoted and defended the use of force by the IRA. He also showed his contempt for left-wing politics and the notion that members were to be “more conversant with the teaching of Chairman Mao than those of our dead comrades.” He was dismissed from the IRA due to the criticisms of the IRA in the speech. However, the sentiments he portrayed had effect throughout the movement. It put forward an alternative voice to that of the politicising leadership.

“With the Jimmy Steele speech in Mullingar in July 1969 they were laying the groundwork for what was to come”³⁹³

While this was the public face of the internal dissidence the preparation for the split on behalf of both sides was continuing. On the side of the dissidents members of the national leadership such as Sean MacStiofain and Ruairi O’Bradaigh were being very vocal in their criticisms and their intentions if this left-wing politicisation continued.

³⁹¹ Ruairi O’Bradaigh

³⁹² Two IRA volunteers who had been hanged in Birmingham in 1940

³⁹³ Mick Ryan

“MacStiofain was letting me know since July 1969 ‘we are never going to accept a vote on the Dail, Stormont, Westminster and the NLF. We are hoping you will be on our side.’”³⁹⁴

This continued with the dissidents actively approaching members of both the rank and file membership and leadership to side with them on the issues causing intra-organisational conflict. In the aftermath of the ‘pogroms’ of August 1969 their organising moved beyond the pursuit of support for their position and now included the acquisition of IRA arms and artillery for future use.

“After the pogroms the organisation of dissidents started taking place. At one point in August 1969 weapons from a HQ dump were given to MacStiofain by the person in charge of that particular dump. I find it amazing that MacStiofain was left in as Director of Intelligence.”³⁹⁵

As this took place and the situation in Northern Ireland became more violent the Goulding leadership pushed ahead with their politicisation process. They realised that in order to be successful that this required additional effort and promotion on their behalf and they similarly attempted to recruit new members to advance their position.

“Around August 69... Goulding and Garland came to me and I was invited to join the IRA...I think they were inviting me because they thought I might be helpful to them and they wanted me to maintain the political line on top, tried to maintain the hegemony of the political line, better able to do it than Roy they put it.”³⁹⁶

With the majority of people now calling for the IRA to defend the areas under attack and to provide weapons the appeal for the promotion of the political process was out of touch and disconnected with the expectations which the public had for the IRA and Sinn Fein.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid*

³⁹⁵ *Ibid*

³⁹⁶ Anthony Coughlan.

8a.4.2 Republican Expectations and Leadership Disconnect

The escalating violence in Northern Ireland raised the expectations of many in the nationalist areas, and across the rest of the island, for the IRA to defend the communities and to provide weapons for the newly forming defence committees. In the years previous many of these people regarded the IRA as an obsolete grouping. But in light of the violence this viewpoint changed. Many now desired an IRA presence to supply defence and weapons. However, the intentions of the leadership were disconnected from these expectations as they wished to continue their politicisation process and not for the IRA to act as a defender of the communities.³⁹⁷ This was deemed to be one of the most critical factors in deciding the result of the split. For many members the split did not take place because of abstentionism or left-wing politics, but it was the result of the failure of the national leadership to defend the people they claimed to represent during these months.

*“So the ’69 split, yes you were aware of, in simplistic terms I would have said. If you had said to me in January ’70 “what is the split over?” I would have turned around and I would have said to you “The IRA leadership sold us out, they left us defenceless, they sold the guns, they decommissioned”*³⁹⁸

The expectation of both the Republican membership and the public at this time was for weapons and defence of the regions. However, participants acknowledged that the national leadership’s actions and sentiments were significantly disconnected from these expectations. As Table 8a.13 displays this belief that there was a significant disconnect between membership expectations and leadership strategy was most dominant among the Provisionals, and especially from those who joined the movement in or around the time of split. Even if the leadership wished to meet the expectations of their public and membership it was acknowledged that they were unprepared for the circumstances of the summer of 1969. All of these observations are analysed below and the make-up participants detailing this is displayed in the following tables.

³⁹⁷ MacGiolla on August 13th 1969 said that the Irish government should act in defence of the republican and nationalist communities. This was distancing the IRA from the responsibility of doing so, but also portrays a disconnect between the leadership and its membership. MacGiolla, T. (August 13th, 1969). *Republican Statement on Northern Crisis*.

³⁹⁸ Danny Morrison

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	2	0	1	0	3
Provisional	0	1	6	0	7
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	3	1	7	0	11

Table 8a.9: Membership Expectations: Weapons

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	2	1	0	0	3
Provisional	2	1	8	0	11
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	5	2	8	0	15

Table 8a.10: Membership Expectations: Defence

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	1	1	1	0	3
Provisional	2	0	5	0	7
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	4	1	6	0	11

Table 8a.11: Public Expectations: Defence

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	3	2	2	0	7
Provisional	2	2	9	0	13
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	6	4	11	0	21

Table 8a.12: Disconnect between membership expectations and Leadership strategy

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	1	0	1	0	2
Provisional	1	0	2	0	3
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	3	0	3	0	6

Table 8a.13: Leadership Unprepared

It is recognised by members of both sides that this failure by the leadership to provide defence and weapons for the nationalist communities of Northern Ireland strengthened the position of their internal detractors. No longer was the internal conflict dominated with the pros and cons of abstentionism and left-wing politics, issues which did not affect everyday lives. The issues of defence and the supply of weapons did have this significant impact. In light of this there were now people who years previously had dismissed the relevance of the IRA calling for them to defend them and disapproving when this defence did not arrive.

It is at this stage that the process moves from intra-organisational conflict to a process of split. This can be explained through the utilisation of four hypotheses.

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of a split.

HO2. & HO4. For the old-guard traditionalist members one of the most dominant historical purposes and identities of the IRA was that of Catholic and Nationalist defenders. However, in this time of violence perpetrated against and by these communities the IRA leadership was hesitant to subscribe to this identity. This is due to the heterogeneous nature of the membership at this stage. Within the movement there were two diverse standpoints being put forward. There were the old-guard traditionalists, many just recently returned, calling for decisive armed action and defence by the IRA. In stark contrast to this was the viewpoint of the politicisers who did not wish for the IRA to partake in an armed campaign any longer. In the lead-up to and during the summer of 1969 it was clear that neither side were willing to compromise on their position and therefore creating the inevitability of split. The discontent about the IRA's reluctance to partake was not just present within the movement but also among the general public.

“And then you had the explosion of all of 1969. You had a very, very strong sense of anger at the IRA's lack of preparation for the defence.”³⁹⁹

There was a large number of new recruits entering the movement at this time who were not joining due to their views on left-wing politics or the much debated abstentionist policies, or even the target of attaining a united Ireland.⁴⁰⁰ They were joining so as to get arms to protect their families and communities.

“The discontent came in afterwards when there was a panic ‘where do we get guns?’ All people wanted was guns. Even people of a left wing persuasion would

³⁹⁹ ‘Paul’

⁴⁰⁰ See Appendix E for an analysis of individual reasoning for group allegiance

have sold their political beliefs to get their hands on guns to defend the areas, not for philosophical reasons, but in order to have protection for the families in those areas."⁴⁰¹

While there were a small number of weapons supplied to defend the communities these were mainly provided by the old-guard traditionalists. This significantly strengthened the dissidents' standing among young recruits and the public whose expectation was for the IRA to defend the communities. It was not just would be 'Provisionals' who regard the failure to provide weapons and defence at this stage as a mistake by the Goulding leadership. There are those who sided with the leadership, and those who advised them, who believed that if they had met the expectations of the population that the result of the split could have been significantly different, or could even have been avoided.

*"It is regrettable perhaps that Goulding and company didn't have a few more guns on the Falls Rd in August 69 to defend the locals. That might have enabled them to keep on top of the situation politically."*⁴⁰²

While these sentiments are put forward with the benefit of hindsight at the time of the events the policies put forward by and actions taken by the Dublin leadership was severely disconnected from those of their membership and public. In the months after the failure of the leadership to provide defence for the communities in August 1969 was used and manipulated by the 'Provisional' leadership to further strengthen support for their position and their movement away from the leadership.

*"The pogroms were the catalyst which aided the Provos, and they are manipulating the facts of what happened then and in events after."*⁴⁰³

The view of a large proportion of the people within the effected areas was that it was the role of the IRA to defend them. However, this opinion was not shared by the national

⁴⁰¹ Sean O'Hare

⁴⁰² Anthony Coughlan

⁴⁰³ Mick Ryan

leadership. They no longer saw their role as that of Catholic defenders. They saw this as an opportunity for the British army and the RUC to defend the areas against the loyalists and the B-Specials, a viewpoint which only succeeded in cementing the idea of leadership disconnect in the minds of many.

“Goulding would have seen things politically; it was an opportunity where a clash could occur. With the British troops coming in and Loyalists, or some Orange elements or B-Specials going around parishes. It was an ideal situation for a clash between ultra-loyalism and the British authorities, who were supposed to be in charge of law and order. That is the view that I would have ascribed to at the time.”⁴⁰⁴

The sense of leadership abandonment was uppermost in the minds of those in the worst effected areas. This further accentuated a growing notion of north/south divide within the movement as the belief was that the national leadership, based in Dublin, had the time and space to develop and debate political policy and were therefore disconnected from the daily hardship for Republicans in Northern Ireland. They were unaware of what was needed in the communities on a day to day basis.

“I would say that either there would be a lot more ideology taught in Dublin than there ever would have been in Belfast and that is understandable because we were dealing with the constant threat of Loyalist attack and pogroms. We had to live with that notion. So that was uppermost in most people’s minds, not the ideology of each according to their needs and from each according to their means, or whatever.”⁴⁰⁵

Even if the Goulding leadership had seen their role as that of Catholic defenders it is unlikely that they would have been able to provide any adequate form of defence for the population. This lack of preparedness was criticised both during and after the events.

⁴⁰⁴ Anthony Coughlan

⁴⁰⁵ Dolours Price

“And of course some of the people who had been active in other campaigns, but not so active in the sixties, some of the older people who had come back were very critical of this lack of preparedness. Because it was clear to everybody, including me as a young person that things were getting into a very serious situation.”⁴⁰⁶

8a.4.2 External Influence: Fianna Fail

Officials claim that a significant amount of responsibility for the Provisionals’ development rests with key members of Fianna Fail, the governmental party of the Republic of Ireland at that time.⁴⁰⁷ This is illustrated in Table 8a.14.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	2	2	1	0	4
Provisional	0	0	1	0	1
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	3	2	2	0	7

Table 8a.14: Influence of Fianna Fail in developing the Provisionals

This viewpoint was promoted by the Officials in the aftermath of the split, and was used as a justification for their failure to become the dominant Republican force.⁴⁰⁸ The argument put forward was that certain members of Fianna Fail were wary of the electoral challenge which they could meet from a successfully politicised left-wing Sinn Fein. Therefore they sought to split the organisation by funding the development of the Provisionals if they would move away from the Dublin leadership and concentrate exclusively on Northern Ireland.

⁴⁰⁶ Gerry Adams

⁴⁰⁷ Oots (1989) p.145

⁴⁰⁸ See Official Republican Movement (1971) *Fianna Fail and the IRA*.

“In the 1960s it went from inactivity to the revival of republicanism, from non-involvement to very active involvement in issues like fish ins, land, ground rents, rivers, lakes, mortgages societies, housing etc.”⁴⁰⁹ We were really beginning to make headway. People weren’t saying that this is wrong. Participation in the Dail and more action in councils would have benefited from this growing support. Fianna Fail feared this. The IRA were now involved in the civil rights movement and fighting the Brits. It wasn’t just disorganised loyalist mobs in pogroms but they were supported by the state to force the IRA into action and divert the focus to the armed campaign. This brought an effective end to the IRA/Sinn Fein impetus in the south, the concentration had been in the south.”⁴¹⁰

Information was reaching the Republican leadership from early 1969 that individuals were being approached by representatives of Fianna Fail members and they were discussing the possibility of a breakaway group, and how they could help in its development. The people approached were predominantly old-guard Republicans who would have been believed to have been against the left-wing politicisation of the Republican movement. For any politically violent organisation, especially a newly developing one, they must have sources of finance as well as the availability of weapons and artillery. The accusation from the Officials is that the Provisionals acquired a significant proportion of this from members of the Fianna Fail party, most notably cabinet ministers Charles Haughey and Neil Blaney with the assistance of Irish army intelligence officer Captain James Kelly.⁴¹¹

8a.5 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

During stage 3 it transpired that a split in Irish Republicanism was to be inevitable. However, it is in stage 4 that the split took place. Continuing on from the previous stage the ‘Provisionals’ attempted to maximise their position due to the circumstances of the time, especially with the perceived failure of the leadership to provide weapons and defence. A number of divisive issues came to the fore in the years leading up to 1969.

⁴⁰⁹ Economic agitations used by the Irish Republican Movement in the 1960s

⁴¹⁰ Mick Ryan

⁴¹¹ O’Brien, J. (2000). *The Arms Trial*. Dublin: Gill and McMillan.

But it was the divided opinion on IRA responsibilities at this time which accelerated the process.

“I get a sense that in the autumn of 1969/1970 things start to move very, very quickly. I think what is happening is the lid is off and there is an entirely new situation for everyone and the situation has a momentum after August 69 which is in a way very different from what went before.”⁴¹²

The split officially took place in both sections of the movement over the issue of abstentionism. However, there were numerous issues at the heart of the conflict but most notably it was the continued failure of the IRA to defend communities which ultimately decided the outcome. While the specific regional sections moved away from the leadership prior to the Army Convention and Ard Fheis, most notably the Belfast IRA, the official split took place in the aftermath of these two national conventions. The split took place in the IRA prior to the one in Sinn Fein. The purpose of the description of this stage is to illustrate how the Goulding leadership attempted to minimise the effect of the split while continuing with their politicisation of the Republican Movement. Concurrent to this is an analysis of how the ‘Provisionals’ attempted to maximise their position and gain as much support as possible.

Within the present stage the themes focused on are:

- The Split
- Competition for Support
- Personality Clashes and Trust

This is followed by an overview of the split process.

8a.5.1 The Split

At the will of the national leadership during the Army Convention of 1969 a vote was taken on two of the main divisive issues of the time, the development of a National

⁴¹² Tom Hartley

Liberation Front and the abolition of the constitutional abstentionist policies.⁴¹³ Both votes were passed by their required majorities.⁴¹⁴ In the days and weeks after the Convention the dissidents formed the Provisional Army Council and the Provisional IRA.⁴¹⁵ Among the leadership figures within this breakaway grouping were Sean MacStiofain as Chief of Staff alongside fellow leadership figures such Ruairi O’Bradaigh and Daithi O’Conail and a number of the Belfast Republicans who had exited prior to the Convention, people such as Leo Martin.

When the split within the IRA took place in December 1969⁴¹⁶ Sinn Fein remained theoretically intact. However, this all changed when at the Ard Fheis of January 11th 1970 a number of political dissenters staged a walk-out.⁴¹⁷ Akin to the IRA Army Convention there was a vote taken on the dropping of the abstentionist policies. When the vote was taken this received a simple majority but not by the necessary two-thirds.⁴¹⁸ Following what was effectively a defeat for the motion a new motion was called from the floor by Seamus Costello for the Ard Fheis to recognise the vote that was passed at the Army Convention the month previous. With the calling of this motion there was the walk-out of dissidents. This was due to the fact as a non-constitutional vote it only required a simple majority to be passed, a vote the dissenters knew they would be defeated on. The dissenters, a number of whom had been present at the Army

⁴¹³ The NLF vote required a simple majority and the abstentionist vote required a two-thirds majority; This continuation of the politicisation of the movement is in contradiction with belief that organisations will be more conservative when there is a threat to organisational survival, Zald and Ash (1966) p.327. While the acceptance of peaceful politics may be looked upon as more conservative than the ‘radical’ option of armed violence within a long-standing armed group such as the IRA there is a reversal of roles with political participation as more radical for the membership than armed action. This suggests that the leadership were dismissive of the significance of the threat to organisational survival and hence continued with their politicisation. This is further proof of the disconnect between them and their membership. In the aftermath of the split there was a reticence to partake in armed conflict against the British or loyalists and again jeopardised the survival of their organisation.

⁴¹⁴ MacStiofain pp.134-135 for a Provisional analysis of these votes; Patterson Pp.140-141 for an academic analysis.

⁴¹⁵ The birth of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein from this split, and their growth in the years after, shows how it is irrational to classify splits within the end of terrorism literature.

⁴¹⁶ Provisional IRA were already generating a significant amount of support around the country.

⁴¹⁷ During the Ard Fheis the Sinn Fein leadership were still attempting to prevent a split from taking place, or at least significantly weaken the support for the Provisionals. This is displayed in the final sentiments of MacGiolla’s presidential address. “I...close with an appeal to all members of the movement, once our decision has been made, to close ranks, and face the enemy forces together. MacGiolla, T. (January 11th, 1970). *Sinn Fein Oraid an Uachtarain Tomas MacGiolla ag Ard-Fheis 1969*.

⁴¹⁸ Feeney (2002) p.250

Convention as well, after their walk-out elected a new 'caretaker Sinn Fein Ard Chomhairle' [Executive]. They were ready for the eventuality of defeat and had prior to the Ard Fheis put plans in place for the development of a new political party to align itself with the newly developing Provisional IRA. The events of late 1969/70 support a number of the hypotheses, but one in particular.

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of a split.

HO4. The continued push by the national leadership for the politicisation of the movement should a distinct reluctance to compromise. In the lead-up to both the Convention and Ard Fheis they were aware of the preparations for split on behalf of the dissidents. However, they were reluctant to adapt to the changing circumstances and the changing expectations of the membership and public. They were therefore unwilling to compromise. By fixing themselves to their politicising position and not moving their strategies and policies in anyway closer to the dissidents' position they as a result experienced a more damaging split than may have otherwise taken place.

What follows now is the analysis of two dominant themes which were identified by participants in this fourth stage of the Provisional/Official split. These themes are *competition for support* and *personality clashes and trust*. The focus here is not on why the split took place. Rather this assessment outlines these two issues in relation to how both sides acquired, or attempted to acquire, sufficient support for their position during the split.

8a.5.2 Competition for Support

With the inevitability of the split the main task for both sides during this stage of the process was to attempt to secure and retain as much support as possible. The Officials wished to minimise the effect of the divide while their Provisional adversaries hoped to accentuate the split. They were competing for the support of both IRA and Sinn Fein members. This task principally took place in the aftermath of the split as the two groupings vied for membership and support. It essentially started in the mid to late 1960s

as members of both sides were canvassing across the country. However, at this stage of the process the main competition was to gain the adequate numbers of support among those attending both the Army Convention and the Ard Fheis.

For the Goulding leadership the years leading up to the split had seen them attempting to fend off or postpone a split. It was their belief that by doing so their politicisation process would be in a stronger position to succeed. If it were not for the events of 1969 they may have been right.

“While we had been pushing for this for a while we wanted to slow it down at that stage [1969], we were just trying to avoid a split. I always felt, and Cathal did too that the longer you avoid splits, the better you will be, the stronger you will be. You would be developing where you weren’t developed before.”⁴¹⁹

While survival is at the cornerstone of all organisational behaviour the leadership put this in jeopardy by retaining the membership of the internal dissident grouping for too long. The dissidents were preparing for a division for a number of years previous to the actual split. However, if the leadership had pre-empted this move away in the years prior and forced their exit the emerging breakaway organisation would have been significantly weaker in membership and support due to the inability to adequately prepare. It was purely a result of the Northern Irish situation of 1969 and the early 1970s that the emerging Provisionals emerged in such a dominant position within Republicanism close to their formation.

The accusation from the Provisionals is that the national leadership’s attempts to acquire more support for their position, and postpone a split, was carried out through what they define as ‘internal methods’. They contend that the Officials manipulated the makeup of the delegates at both the Army Convention and the Ard Fheis so as that the votes would be falsely weighted in their favour. This was accomplished by failing to collect a number

⁴¹⁹ Tomas MacGiolla

of known dissidents for the Convention while also bringing an excess of delegates from areas where the support for their position was strong.

“The split came first in the army before Sinn Fein and the Limerick and Clare delegates to the Army Convention were left behind, they were not picked up. On the night of the 22nd and 23rd of December those who didn’t agree with the result of this convention met in Athlone and set up the Provisional Army Council.”⁴²⁰

In addition to this the Belfast IRA and others who had exited the movement pre-split were not eligible to attend.

This tactic succeeded in helping the Goulding leadership achieve their two-thirds majority. This though only solved the short-term issue of passing the vote. They had not succeeded in fending off or postponing a split. The real competition for support was to take place in the months and years after the split.

For the Ard Fheis a similar tactic of delegate manipulation was deemed to have been used. The Provisionals contend that new supportive cumanns were developed, as some dissident ones were closed down.

“There are a whole lot of rules, all organisations have rules, but inevitably like in all organisations it slips a bit. You are supposed to have a meeting of the Cumann every month, but you might only have ten a year, you mightn’t have one in August because someone is always away on holidays. There is always little bits and pieces like this.”⁴²¹

This accusation of corruption provided further rationale for their movement away from the politicising leadership. They embraced the issue and utilised it as they sought to

⁴²⁰ Des Long

⁴²¹ Sean O’Bradaigh

achieve dominance in the resultant recruitment contest. It provided yet another justification in their eyes for their movement away from the parent group.

By placing an overemphasis on organisational survival the leadership had actually weakened the movement. A united movement is only beneficial when the viewpoints are also united rather than having irreconcilable intra-organisational conflicts internally damaging the group. Therefore the notion of organisational survival should not be confused with full membership retention and unity. In extreme situations of intra-organisational conflict it is at times more beneficial for the survival of the movement to allow the dissidents exit prior to them organising, strengthening and significantly damaging the organisation.

8a.5.3 Personality Clashes and Trust

“You just can’t extricate personalities as a factor in any situation.”⁴²²

To date the analysis of this split has mainly focused on the issues which were dividing Republicanism in the 1960s. However, while much of the reasoning for the divide was organisationally based one must also appreciate that personality also played a significant role. The role played here was two fold. This theme had a significant influence on why the split took place, but it also played a role in deciding the outcome of the split. While much of a person’s decision making process was based on the organisationally divisive issues, be they to do with the armed or the political strategy, the influence of the allegiances of others also impacted on this choice. At times the decision was made dependent on what side trusted individuals were joining.

“Many people made up their mind on the basis of who was on particular sides, people they trusted and liked more...It was not clear cut hard political people deciding. It was human factors that were deciding why some people went with one

⁴²² Tom Hartley

side over another, and this is not in hindsight. The political orientation would have counted but to what degree with certain individuals is unclear.”⁴²³

Conversely the allegiance of others who were less trusted, or simply disliked, may have had a negative impact on the choice made. Some of these personality clashes also played a significant role in the split actually taking place in the first place. This is especially relevant with respect to personality clashes at a leadership level. Nine participants, three outlined the role which personality clashes played in creating the split.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	1	0	1	0	2
Provisional	2	0	4	0	6
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	4	0	5	0	9

Table 8a.15: Significance of Personality Clashes

While these personality clashes were not the main cause of the schism they were certainly a dominant factor throughout. Related to the theme of significance of personality twenty-one participants outlined the importance of influential individuals in the outcome of and the reasoning for the split. Twelve of these participants were Provisionals and nine Officials. Each of them alluded to the influence of individual members of the national leadership with the most dominant individuals mentioned being Cathal Goulding and Roy Johnston. Seventeen participants outlined the influence of the old guard while a further thirteen discussed the influence of specific members of their local leadership. This is illustrated in the tables below and is developed in Appendix E which looks at the role of influential individuals in allegiance choice.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total

⁴²³ Mick Ryan

Official	2	1	3	0	6
Provisional	1	2	7	0	10
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	4	3	10	0	17

Table 8a.16: Influential Individuals: Old-Guard

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	2	1	3	1	7
Provisional	0	3	3	0	6
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	1
Total	3	4	6	1	14

Table 8a.17: Influential Individuals: Local Leadership

8a.5.4 Overview of the Split

In the stages previous the reasons for intra-organisational conflict were detailed. These included abstentionism, politicisation, the influence of left-wing political thinking, the decline of the armed strategy and the failure of the IRA to meet Republican expectations in 1969. No one single issue can, or should, be perceived as being the sole reason for the split of 1969/70. Each contributed to the justification for a split on behalf of the Provisionals. A statement issued by the Caretaker Executive of the Provisional IRA on January 17th 1970 outlined what they believed to be the main reasons for the split. These were; the recognition of the parliaments by the Goulding leadership, the creation of a formal alliance with radical left wing groups, the influence of ‘extreme socialism’, internal methods,⁴²⁴ how the northern Catholics had been ‘let down’ by the IRA⁴²⁵ and campaigning for the retention of Stormont.⁴²⁶ The Official Republican Movement issued a number of statements through their newspaper the United Irishman, and other forums noting their perception of the split. In these statements they comprehensively outlined the rationale for their economic, social, political and military decisions in the 1960s.⁴²⁷ Significantly they placed an amount of the responsibility for the development of the

⁴²⁴ This referred to the suspensions and rigging of important votes.

⁴²⁵ Crenshaw (1985) (p.483) and (2001) (p.22)

⁴²⁶ Cited in Sinn Fein Education Department (1979).

⁴²⁷ The United Irish man (January, 1970). The IRA in the 70s. In *The United Irishman*. P.8

Provisionals with Fianna Fail who they believed had funded and armed the Provisionals as they feared the competition which they would have faced from a political left wing Republican Movement.⁴²⁸

What must be acknowledged though is that the combination of the issues and the changes which the IRA and Sinn Fein were going through did accentuate and significantly affected the outcome of the split. If the split had been purely about abstentionism, for example, the exiting Provisionals would have been a significantly weaker organisation with a lower level of support. This is due to the fact that only those with an intrinsic reluctance to the dropping of the abstentionist policy would have sided with them.

There is variance in the emphasis on issues and events across participants. However, each interviewee was in agreement that the violence in Northern Ireland of 1969 and the IRA's inability to provide defence and weapons was the most significant factor in deciding the outcome of the split. The schism was predicted to take place anyway due to the disillusionment with the politicisation process. However, it was the decisions made by the Dublin leadership especially in August 1969 and the inadequacy of the IRA at this time which succeeded in making the Provisional IRA a more dominant force in the aftermath of the split. This is a belief echoed across allegiances and across generations.

A split does not end with the official division of the organisation and the formation of a breakaway group. It is important to analyse the aftermath and the effect of the split. Due to the fact that this research is treating the four splits as micro-processes within the macro-process of Republican involvement in the 'Troubles' this final stage of the 1969/70 split should also be considered as the opening stage of the 1974⁴²⁹ and 1986 splits. In order to fully understand both of these micro-processes one must consider the consequences of and continuations of the process which led up to the division of 1969/70.

⁴²⁸ Official Republican Movement (1971) *Fianna Fail and the IRA*.

⁴²⁹ See Appendix F

8a.6 Stage 5 and Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-organisation

Following the formal split in the movement the main undertaking for the Officials was re-organisation after the significant depletion of their membership and leadership.⁴³⁰ For their part the Provisionals had to develop a whole new organisational structure from scratch. One of their first tasks was the development of their own newspaper, *An Phoblacht*. This was viewed as a priority as they needed to set out their purpose and their account of the splits to the Republican public.⁴³¹ For both groups the organisational newspaper was seen as a vital tool. The Provisionals realised that it was of immediate import in the initial organisation of the splinter group. The decision to publish *An Phoblacht* was made at the same time as the development of the leadership structure and the first issue was published in February 1970.

“There were four members of the Ard Comhairle, and then the elected a number of people as a Caretaker Executive. The expression that was used in the army was a Provisional Executive and a Provisional Army Council, until such time as the position could be regularised. So similarly in Sinn Fein Caretaker Executive and a decision to launch a new newspaper and so on.”

The re-organisation was an extensive process in itself. It required a significant amount of national and regional organisation. As well as the structuring process it also required the training of new recruits and the acquisition of weapons.

“It [re-organisation] was an ongoing thing. Even after the Provisional campaign started, it is an ongoing thing weapons and training. The main thing in Belfast was to make sure that areas were properly sufficient at defending themselves. It was a

⁴³⁰ For an Official analysis of the 1969/70 split see The United Irishman. (January, 1970). *The IRA in the 70s*. p.8.

⁴³¹ Within the first issue of *An Phoblacht* the Caretaker Executive of Provisional Sinn Fein outline to their membership and supporters what they saw as the five main reasons for the split from the Officials. Sinn Fein Caretaker Executive. (February, 1970). Attempt to Takeover the Republican Movement. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.4-5.

long struggle, it seemed an age but when you look back on it now it boils down to months.”⁴³²

While the split took place December and January of 1969/70 the dynamic nature of the process meant that in certain sections of the membership the true effects of the split were not felt until some time after. There was a number of members and supporters who were oblivious to the fact that a split had even taken place, or if they were conscious to the fact there were some unaware of the defining differences between the two groups. For this reason there were a number of new members who initially joined one group before leaving to join the other some time after the split.⁴³³

Many of the Republican regions were bitterly divided between Officials and Provisionals in the aftermath. However, there were other areas which still cooperated together. The bitterness that was displayed immediately in areas such as West Belfast was not necessarily the case in every Republican community.

“Even in 1970 we had a joint commemoration, Easter commemoration in Drumbo, at that time because we said we would not let anybody interfere with us and we would go ahead with the Donegal Tir Conaill commemoration committee and not have any Dublin interference in it or anything like that so we had a joint commemoration at that time in 1970 in Drumbo.”⁴³⁴

The organisation and re-organisation of the groups were the priorities in the immediate aftermath of the split. However, the dominant theme throughout this stage was that of *competition*. Therefore the themes focused on in this final stage of the micro-process are:

- Competition
- Competition for Membership and Support
- New Enemy: Violent Feuds

⁴³² ‘Alex’

⁴³³ See Appendix E

⁴³⁴ Joe O’Neill

8a.6.1 Competition

The immediate consequence of any split is that of inter-organisational competition. The two groups competed on a number of fronts, but most notably for membership and support. In the aftermath of split the Officials and Provisionals were not just competing for the membership of people from the original Republican Movement but also for numerous new recruits. They therefore had to actively recruit and justify the position of the group in contrast to that of their opposition.⁴³⁵ In the direct aftermath of the split the two organisations were relatively numerically even in membership and support terms. Both sides were trying to prove that they were stronger than their opposition and that they were the legitimate voice of Republicanism. As a result of this, acting in conjunction with the acrimonious nature of the split, this competition resulted in the outbreak of violent feuds between former comrades. Twelve participants, six Officials and six Provisionals, emphasised the violent feuds which engulfed Republicanism in the years after the split. This is following section is supportive of

HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation.

8a.6.1.1 Competition for Membership and Support

For any organisation to sustain survival they must be able to constantly recruit new members as well as maintain the membership which they already have. When there is another organisation vying to attract membership and support from the same population this task becomes more challenging, especially when the population is too small to successfully accommodate the survival of two similar groups. Therefore the aftermath of a split leads to intense competition for membership and support between the two organisations in what is a finite population. In the aftermath of the 1969/70 split it would be remiss to assume that what was necessary to attract support and membership across Republicanism was the same in each region. The split of 1969/'70, and the subsequent

⁴³⁵ In the Provisional IRA's Easter Message 1970 they outlined their intentions. 'Irish freedom will not be won by involvement with an internal movement of extreme socialism.' Provisional Army Council (April 1970). No Opportunity Will Be Lost: Army Council's Easter Message. In *An Phoblacht*, p.1.

splits, saw divisions form in the support structures in place in the US as well as Ireland.⁴³⁶ As is detailed in Appendix G in the account of *regionalism* the location of a specific population had significant impact on what their expectations were in the organisation. In the aftermath of 1969/70 in Belfast the issues of community defence and the acquisition of weapons were at the forefront for people when considering which of the two groups to support or join. This caused significant problems for the local Official IRA as the national leadership was reluctant to supply weapons for an armed strategy against the security services and/or the loyalist paramilitaries, yet the Provisional campaign in the area was building and a significant number of Republicans were joining the new breakaway group. This again revisits the theme of *leadership disconnect*. The national leadership wanted to avoid an armed campaign. However, the Belfast membership was demanding it.

“The Provisional campaign intensified and the pressure was on the Official leadership in Belfast to implement a more robust policy of defence and retaliation against the British. It was obvious that [Billy] McMillen [Belfast leader of the OIRA] was walking a tightrope with what needed to be done in Belfast and what the Dublin leadership were requiring...it was obvious that the Dublin leadership were embarking on a course of strategies and tactics which were far removed from the situation in Belfast. They didn’t seem to realise that the Provisionals were creating a situation which would make a lot of their strategies and policies impossible to implement.”⁴³⁷

Initially the split was characterised by the evenness of the divide. However, in the long run the competition for membership and support was numerically won by the Provisionals.⁴³⁸ This is mainly due to the aggressive nature of their tactics in contrast to

⁴³⁶ See O’Dochartaigh, N. (1995). ‘Sure, it’s Hard to Keep up with the Splits here’: Irish-American Responses to the Outbreak of Conflict in Northern Ireland 1968-1974. *Irish Political Studies*, 100, pp.138-160.

⁴³⁷ ‘Paul’

⁴³⁸ This was acknowledged by Official Sinn Fein in a statement in July 1972 in which MacGiolla stated that ‘the Provisional Alliance appears to be in the antecedent’ they ‘have won publicity because their demands are simple, easily presented and easily understood.’ MacGiolla, T. (July 1972). *Where we Stand: The Republican Position*. Pp.5-6

the more controlled response of the Officials to the violence on the streets of Northern Ireland. Their violent reactions to loyalist and British attacks significantly raised their profile and support. While the Officials did not completely adhere to a purely political strategy their armed response was more considered and restrained than that of the Provisionals. However, when it came to their armed reaction to the Provisionals there was a significant difference.

8a.6.1.2 New Enemy: Violent Feuds

At times of intense competition for membership and support between violent political groupings this often results in violent feuds.⁴³⁹ This is especially true in intensely bitter feuds such as 1969/70, and similarly when the divide is relatively even. From the outset of the competition between the Officials and Provisionals was expressed in the form of violent feuding. It proved to be the prominent theme in the aftermath of the split, as is displayed in the table below.

Group	Leadership	Member Involved Prior to the End of the Border Campaign	Entered Republican Movement in or around 1969/70	Joined group significantly after 1969/70	Total
Official	2	1	2	1	6
Provisional	1	2	4	0	7
External	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Total	3	3	6	1	13

Table 8a.18: Violent Feuds

This feuding was especially visible in areas such as west Belfast where the two groupings were living in close proximity and the split had been particularly personal. There was significantly more expected of the armed Republicans here with respect to defence and weapons. The community was visibly divided.

⁴³⁹ For an account of the feuds from the perspective of the Officials see Six County Executive of the Republican Clubs (1974). *Pogroms!* Six County Executive of the Republican Clubs.

“It was very, very difficult and realising then that the situation had been brought about whereby the community of the Falls Rd would never be the same again, the community on the Falls Rd. would be torn apart, it would never be the community which we had known, a sense of disillusionment if you can’t unite the people of the Falls Rd. how are you going to establish a thirty two county Republic, a thirty county socialist Republic, there was a sense of disillusionment there.”⁴⁴⁰

However, while Belfast was the most visible location of violent feuds between the groups it would be wrong to state that feuds were isolated to Belfast or to Northern Ireland as a whole.

The split of 1969/70 created tensions within the wider Republican community that were not largely repeated in the aftermath of the other splits. While there was feuding after each of the other three, especially after 1974, it was never again as all consuming for the entire Republican population as it was in 1970. The two groups shared a common enemy, the British, and a common goal, the unification of Ireland. In spite of this much of their concentration at this time was given to dismantling each other’s organisational structures. The national Official leadership intended not to get involved in the any form of armed campaign but the attacks on them by Provisionals provoked a response.

“We made the decision that we wouldn’t get involved in the situation in the north, but we began to get involved then in the north. Also the Provos later in 71 or 72 got involved in shooting us, our members, and our members were responding.”⁴⁴¹

In essence they each had a new enemy. This was a very different form of enemy though. It was one who knew the tactics and strategies which would be employed in certain circumstances as they had until very recently been comrades.

⁴⁴⁰ ‘Paul’

⁴⁴¹ Tomas MacGiolla

“Similar feelings must have been felt in the Civil War. These people knew our methodology, and now they were our worst enemy.”⁴⁴²

This was demoralising for much of the membership and support, especially those who were not actively involved in the actual split. For many Officials it seemed like there were weapons made readily available when they wished to fight against the Provisionals, but yet not when they wished to attack the British or loyalist forces.

“We began to ascertain that there was a trend here whereby you could get access to weapons if it was trouble with the Provisionals, you never get access to them if you were wanting to defend an area against the British Army or otherwise incursion. There was a question mark over that and why this was happening.”⁴⁴³

As with the split itself the reasoning for the feuds could be ascribed to the policy and strategic differences between the two groups. However, more often these feuds were personality driven, with some former comrades using this as a method of settling old scores. The bitterness of this split is still evident in certain communities to this day, forty years after the split took place.

“Certainly there are people to this day who have a whole bitterness towards the Stickies, and Stickies who hold bitterness towards the Provos. That is still there, its myopic, but it is still there.”⁴⁴⁴

In response to the escalating violence by both republican and loyalist paramilitary groups in the early 1970s in August 1971 the British parliament passed legislation which introduced internment without trial for suspected paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. This resulted in a large number of suspected members of both the Provisional and Official IRA being interned in prison for an indefinite period of time. This led not only to members of both groups being incarcerated but to a number of innocent civilians unjustly accused of

⁴⁴² Mick Ryan

⁴⁴³ ‘Paul’

⁴⁴⁴ Richard O’Rawe, April 9th 2008

paramilitary membership and activity being interned for extended periods of time. This caused additional anger among the nationalist and republican communities of Northern Ireland, anger which resulted in a larger number of new members entering the groups than may have without this aggressive measure.

The Republican feuds on the streets and in the prisons continued. However, so did the Republican offensive against the British and loyalists. There were similarly loyalist attacks against Republicans and at times highly questionable tactics employed by the British forces. The end of the 1960s and the turn of the 1970s saw Northern Ireland engulfed in a protracted conflict, 'The Troubles', which would last for close to thirty years. This conflict at times spread to Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. Throughout the 'Troubles' the actions of each of the conflicting groups resulted in the injuries, death and distress of innocent civilians. The conflict was to see three more significant splits in Irish Republicanism. While none of these three were as dramatic and defining as their predecessor of 1969/70 each was significant in their own right.

Chapter 8(b)

1986: The Beginning of the End

8b.1 Introduction

The mid 1970s and early 1980s in Northern Ireland are rightly remembered as being among the most violent years of the Troubles. Perhaps paradoxically the analysis shows that this period should also be considered as the beginning of the Republican Movement's gradual advance towards the acceptance of peaceful politics. The culmination of this was the split of 1986 and 'mainstream' Republicanism's dropping of the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann. The present split is analysed as a successful politicisation process on behalf of the Provisional leadership of the 1980s. While there was a split in both the IRA and Sinn Fein this was a relatively minor split when compared especially to 1969/70. Therefore the focus of the analysis of the present micro-process is on how the Adams/McGuinness leadership successfully maintained their core membership while politicising the organisation. It is acknowledged that the 1986 split is a different form of split from 1969/70 and 1974. 1969/70 was a split resulting from the dissident faction exiting to form an autonomous organisation and 1974 resulted from the expulsion of the dissident faction. As will be displayed 1986 was the result of the original dissenting faction gaining power from the old leadership. Subsequently the former leadership left with a group of supporters to form their own organisation as they did not agree with the changes brought in by the former internal detractors.

The opening stage of this process has already been outlined in the detailing of the aftermath of the 1969/70 split. In the years after that split the Provisional Movement embarked on an extended terrorist campaign across Ireland and Great Britain resulting in the deaths of service men and women, innocent civilians and fellow paramilitaries. Their campaign was mainly focused on aggressively countering British presence in Northern Ireland. However, they also entered into violent feuds with the Official IRA and loyalist paramilitaries.

In total twenty-two participants were actively involved in the 1986 split, Table 8b.1 illustrates the organisational makeup of the participants which also includes those external observers who referred to the split in their interviews.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	7	7	0	14
RSF/CIRA	5	1	2	8
External Observer	3 (2 Officials and 1 IRSM)	4 (1 Official and 3 IRSM)	0	7
Total	15 (3 external)	12 (4 external)	2	29 (7 external)

Table 8b.1: Participants who discussed 1986 split

As with the previous two sub-chapters the present chapter presents the analysis of the 1986 split as a stage-based micro process. Similar to the 1969/70 split the analysis of the 1986 split has illustrated that it was a five-stage micro-process. The significant difference between the two splits lies in the third stage of the process. While the function of the third stage of the 1969/70 split was the inevitability of and the preparation for the split in the process in the lead-up to 1986 there was a transition of power from the old-guard leadership to the new-guard leadership of Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness. A distinct difference also lies in the final stage detailing the aftermath of the split. While the aftermath of both 1969/70 and 1974 are notable for the violent feuds which took place this was not the same in the aftermath of 1986. This is explained by the dominance of the Provisional Movement in the aftermath of this split and the weakness of the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein. Identical to the previous sub-chapters the sub-sections of each stage describe the dominant themes within this stage of the process and should not be considered as separate stages or sub-stages.

The stages of the process of the 1986 split does not fit the model of split. For the first three stages it fitted with the model for split avoidance. However, even with the successful application of voice resulting in a change of leadership and strategy this still resulted in an organisational split. However, it is argued that this was a minor split in comparison to 1969/70 and the split of the small grouping which formed the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein were a minority grouping who deemed the political

changes as significantly threatening to the organisational identity, even with the compromises.

Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-organisation⁴⁴⁵

Stage 2: Factional Development

Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice: Transition of Power

Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

Stage 5: Aftermath of Split.

8b.2 Stage 2: Factional Development

The initial stage of this process was analysed as the aftermath of the split in 1969/70. It was significant for the feuds which took place between Provisionals and Officials. However, with respect to the process of split the most notable consequences were the introduction of internment and the influx of a young, mainly northern, membership into the Provisionals. Many of this young membership, as well as those who joined in the late 1960s, played a significant role in shaping the course of Irish Republicanism. It was under their leadership that the Provisional IRA took part in a sustained terrorist campaign during the Troubles. However, it is also under this leadership that the majority of the Irish Republican Movement accepted the necessity for peaceful politics in the place of armed force. This majority move to peaceful politics began here in the process of the 1986 split, a move that partly originated in the debates between many of the interned and imprisoned Republicans. The present stage analyses the developing intra-organisational conflicts within the movement in the mid to late 1970s and assesses how these were significantly different to those present in the process of 1969/70. There is also a continuous examination of the growing influence of the new, mainly northern, leadership and the direction they wished to take the movement.

All of the active participants acknowledged that the process of change in the 1986 split began in the mid 1970s. While the RSF/CIRA participants generally did not agree on one specific event to signify the instigation of this change the majority of Provisional

⁴⁴⁵ This stage is analysed in stage 5 of the 1969/70 split in sub-chapter 8a.

participants were in agreement. Twelve Provisionals specified that the Provisional ceasefire of 1974/75 was the beginning of the change. One member of the RSF/CIRA leadership also identified this as the starting point for the split. This is illustrated in Table 8b.2.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	5	7	0	12
RSF/CIRA	1	0	0	1
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	6	7	0	13

Table 8b.2: 1974/5 ceasefire beginning of 1986 process

The cessation referred to was initiated in December 1974 after a meeting between leading Republicans and Protestant clergymen⁴⁴⁶ in Feakle, Co. Clare. In the aftermath of the Feakle talks discussions continued between the Provisionals and intermediaries about the possibility of a December ceasefire. The Provisionals announced a ten day cessation on December 20th 1974. This was extended to last until January 17th, while the Provisionals negotiated with NIO officials. However, the Republicans brought it to an end as their demands had not been met. The end of the ceasefire was marked by continued bombings and attacks in both England and Northern Ireland. The following month on February 9th the Provisionals announced an indefinite ceasefire and again entered into negotiations with the British. Key to their demands was the construction of a plan for British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. These talks and ceasefire eventually came to a close with no development on the Provisionals demands.⁴⁴⁷ The ceasefire officially ended in November 1975. However, during the period of the ceasefire there was growing unrest within the Provisional movement about the handling of the talks by the leadership. A number of members broke the ceasefire, often times claiming their actions under names other than the Provisional IRA. This discontent was evident not only within the communities but also among the Republican prisoners and internees.

The talks were led on the Republican side by Ruairi O’Bradaigh and Daithi O’Conail who are characterised by many as principal members of the old southern leadership of the

⁴⁴⁶ Members of this group were in contact with the Northern Ireland Office (NIO)

⁴⁴⁷ Bew and Gillespie. Pp.95-105; Bowyer Bell, J. (1989). *The Secret Army: The IRA (Revised Third Edition)*. Dublin: Poolbeg. Pp. 414-423

time. These negotiations have been much maligned by the Provisionals as having a detrimental effect on the movement. However, O’Bradaigh defends his and the leadership’s position of entering into and continuing with the negotiations.

“The invitation was from the British government to ‘discuss structures of British disengagement from Ireland.’ Now how could one refuse that? Except that they were being deceitful, but how could one refuse that?”⁴⁴⁸

His position is that the Republican negotiators were led to believe that there was a possibility of achieving British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. However, there was a failure to agree on the proposed timeline, and that the British would not publicly announce their intention for withdrawal.

The ceasefire and the protracted negotiations have been criticised both during and in the years after their existence. In both instances criticisms have principally, but not exclusively, come from the newly emerging northern leadership of the time. The accusation is that the lengthy nature of the combined cessation and talks, which resulted in no real benefits for Republicanism, led to a sense of disillusionment among the membership and supporters. There was a growing belief that the Provisional leadership of the time had effectively run its course. They no longer knew how to move the Republican movement forward and it was therefore time for a new leadership to take over.

“I think it [1975 ceasefire] had a big effect. If you like the then, and I stress then, young leadership would have seen that period as a time where the old days, it was totally out-manoeuvred by the British in terms of how they were dealing with them, what was on offer and the reality of it. After that had run its phase it was time to move on.”⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁸ Ruairi O’Bradaigh

⁴⁴⁹ Pat Doherty

The viewpoint expressed is that the leadership of the time were politically naïve and consequently unable to pragmatically deal with the British. They had brought the movement as far as they possibly could, and therefore it was time for a change, both in personnel and policy.

“In terms of the ceasefire, this is without being overly critical, I think the leadership was military as opposed to political. That doesn’t mean you can’t be military and political or that you can’t have military thoughts when you are political, but really I think it was politically naïve. I mean the Brits were saying things like they were going to leave, but they weren’t. They were saying that there was an economic argument that it was inevitable to leave. But all of that was frankly a bit of bullshit to try and prolong the ceasefire and make it harder for them to go back to armed struggle, to all of those things.”⁴⁵⁰

Throughout the negotiations there were critical voices coming out especially from the prisons about the way the national leadership was handling the situation and questioning the benefits which they talks and ceasefire had for the Republican cause. The criticisms were chiefly coming from leading northern republicans, people such as Gerry Adams and Ivor Bell. These people had a significant influence on the prison population, as well as on republicans external to the prison.

“People who were in jail, like Adams and Ivor Bell and other people who were querying what was going on and their influence would have been felt amongst the prison population, some of whom were coming out of jail and also in late August 1975 Adams started to write for Republican News...So there was a big lot disillusioned about what was going on in ’75. And also it had been felt that the IRA had lost its way.”⁴⁵¹

⁴⁵⁰ Gerry Kelly

⁴⁵¹ Danny Morrison

The longer the negotiations went on without any significant benefits for the republican cause the more demoralising it became for the membership. The newly emerging leadership used this demoralisation as an opportunity to begin their gradual takeover of the movement both politically and militarily.

“To be quite critical I think that there wasn’t a particularly strong view of British objectives at the time, and the ceasefire then created tensions. I suppose then at that point you have a new...the other side of the ceasefire in late 1975/76 you begin to see a new leadership emerge, a leadership that has brought the movement right along to where we are today.”⁴⁵²

The members of this new leadership, which gradually came into position in the late 1970s and early 1980s, look upon this an essential transition which was carried out for the good of republicanism. While not arguing with the point that it was these negotiations which laid the foundations necessary for the new leadership to take over four of the rank and file members, three of who became independent dissidents in the 1980s or 90s and one who joined the 32 County Sovereignty Movement in 1998, were critical of the move to acquire power which was taken. They specify that individuals within this newly emerging leadership were using the situation for their own personal and selfish benefits. It was not necessarily the case that they were opposed to the actions of the O’Bradaigh leadership at the time. However, they saw this as an opportunity to utilise the disillusionment within republicanism not only to acquire positions of power but to also isolate certain leadership members.

“I think it was probably called for the best reasons, but I think it was used by certain individuals within the Provisional Movement to enhance their status.”⁴⁵³

This is a similar argument to the one put forward in the last sub-chapter with respect to Seamus Costello’s moves to take power within the Officials in the lead up to 1974.

⁴⁵² Tom Hartley

⁴⁵³ ‘Una’

However, in the present situation it was more a collective leadership rather than an individual seeking to takeover.

Those republicans who exited in 1986 believe that the criticism of the 1975 leadership was mainly utilised in the years subsequent to the events as opposed to at the time. Some of these emerging leaders were already in positions of power at the time of the ceasefire and negotiations, yet failed to speak out against them at the time. However, in the years later they utilised the situation to critically assess the old leadership. They wished to frame this as a failed leadership, one which had significantly damaged the republican cause. There was not necessarily the purely negative sentiment among the rank and file at the time. Many saw the benefits of the extended ceasefire as it allowed for those on the run to return home and for the IRA to re-organise where necessary.

“There seemed to be developments only in terms of entering into truces, we didn’t see these truces in the way Adams and McGuinness would later, you also have to bear in mind McGuinness was seen by us as a key leader and he wasn’t making his opposition to the truce known then in the way that he would later.”⁴⁵⁴

The poor handling of the 1975 ceasefire and negotiations became a prominent aspect in the subsequent years of the negative portrayal of the ‘old southern’ leadership by their new northern counterparts. It was utilised to illustrate how they were out of touch and were unable to move republicanism forward. However, it most notably provided the catalyst for a more focused discussion to take place about the utility of a more dominant political strategy to work alongside the armed campaign.

8b.2.1 Voice: Questioning of Strategy

The 1986 split is exemplified by the successful start to the politicisation process within the Provisionals with the dropping of the abstentionist policy to the Dail. This politicisation was only made possible by the extended process of internal debate at both leadership and rank and file levels. One of the most prominent forums for this strategic

⁴⁵⁴ Anthony McIntyre

debate was within the Republican prison populations. This is an observation recognised by eleven participants as is illustrated in Table 8b.3.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	3	5	0	8
RSF/CIRA	2	1	0	3
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	5	6	0	11

Table 8b.3: The importance of debates within the Prisons

Throughout the 1970s a large proportion of Provisional republicans were either imprisoned or interned. The prison populations ranged from national and local leadership figures down to ordinary rank and file members. Within the prisons the inmates organised as they would on the outside in an organisational command structure. At this time, especially from the mid 1970s on leadership figures within the prisons such as Gerry Adams were openly questioning the direction the movement was taking, and the long term strategies of the national leadership. The external context of a weakening Republican Movement meant that the Republican community was more receptive to critical questioning of the long term strategy. Within this context prisoners were being asked to think not just militarily but also politically. They were advised to educate themselves on other revolutionary struggles, as well as the Irish one, and see how this could be applied to the situation in Northern Ireland. There was encouragement to look beyond a purely armed campaign and to develop their political thinking. Critical to this, and in stark contrast to the Goulding leadership of the 1960s, was that the prison leadership was not calling for a complete move away from the armed struggle but that a continued armed campaign would be complemented by a strengthened political strategy. This important differentiation allowed this discussion to be more inclusive and did not isolate as many as the political discussions of the 1960s.

I remember Gerry Adams in the jail. We were all sitting there and he says ‘you know the armed struggle is only a means to the end, not the end. Youse are politicians.’ And people said ‘we’re not really, we’re army’. ‘No you have to develop your consciousness in here...Politics is important and the armed struggle is only a means to an end, and not the end.’ So everything I think we see now with

Sinn Fein today, I think Adams and them people actually foreseen that. They probably knew that the armed struggle was outmoded, but you couldn't do it because you would have been overthrown, the army would have turned against them.”⁴⁵⁵

These discussions led to the gradual acceptance of the utility of the introduction of a political element to the republican struggle. The prisons provided the time and the space for the republicans to actively discuss, argue and think about how this could add to or detract from the armed struggle. It provided the perfect platform for those in favour of a more political struggle to introduce to and convince others of the necessity of this political element while simultaneously questioning the present tactics of the movement.

“So I think out of the perhaps initial very violent background, and then people through internment and imprisonment, actually having the time. Because when you were in prison you were removed from that day to day almost kind of survival, or conflict. They began to reflect these arguments, began to examine whether the current kind of structures of republicanism was fit for purpose.”⁴⁵⁶

An inevitable consequence of these discussions about the importance of a political element was the debate surrounding electoral politics. As in the lead up to 1969/70 there was an innate scepticism about republican participation in electoral politics. However, within the confines of the prison environment the pros and cons of republican involvement were discussed. There were those within the prisons who were strong advocates of electoral involvement and they utilised their time inside to discuss and open others up to the possibility. The debate was one which continued both within the prisons and externally within the republican community through the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The gradual and continuous process of the discussions went on to shape the strategic path taken by the movement.

⁴⁵⁵ Joe Doherty

⁴⁵⁶ Mitchell McLaughlin

These discussions over the long term strategy of the movement taking place within the prisons had an obvious influence on those who were present and taking part in the process. However, they also had an external influence on the wider republican community. Within republican circles throughout the 1970s and 1980s the republican prison population were held in high regard. Their opinions and actions were listened to and appreciated. While many externally would not have been privy to the breadth of the internal discussions taking place there was the strategic utilisation by the prisoners of the republican publications to outline their critical analysis of the republican struggle. The most prominent example of this is the series of articles believed to be penned by Gerry Adams but published under the pen name 'Brownie' which appeared in the northern Republican newspaper *Republican News* between August 1975 and February 1977. While detailing his experiences of prison life the articles also provided a vehicle for 'Brownie' to be critical of national leadership while also putting forward the recommendation of placing a stronger emphasis on the political element of the struggle. These articles proved significantly influential within the republican population as they introduced the wider community to the debates and discussions which were taking place within the prisons at the time. 'Brownie' was one of the methods utilised to gradually introduce this debate into the wider republican population.⁴⁵⁷

Those who stayed with the Provisionals after the split look to these political debates within the prisons as a positive and necessary step in the process of modern day Irish Republicanism. However, those who exited to form the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein regard this in a negative manner. They deem it as the start of the downfall of the 'true' Irish republicanism. The influence of these debates, both within and outside of the prisons, are seen by them as moving the focus away from the armed campaign and towards a corrupt and illegitimate political process. An obvious divide was forming between the northern and the southern leadership and within the prison the northern influence is blamed for the ultimate acceptance of Dail Eireann. The blame is laid at their door for not fully understanding the significance of dropping the abstentionist policy to

⁴⁵⁷ See for example Brownie (October 18 1975). Active Abstentionism. In *The Republican News*. P.6.

the Dail. This was an ‘illegitimate’ prospect one that could not be supported in the eyes of those who eventually moved away from the Provisionals in 1986.

“I have a suspicion that that [the discussion to drop abstentionism to the Dail] originated probably in Long Kesh camp in the 1970s and again it is people looking for a shortcut to an all Ireland Republic and I have a suspicion that it was... Well inevitably it was in Long Kesh, it was mostly Northern people. I do feel that unfortunately within the north there is this kind of foolish attitude towards the twenty-six county state.”⁴⁵⁸

The obvious influence of these prison debates came with the impact the prisoners had upon release. Many of the leaders of the discussions within the prisons acquired prominent positions within the national and local leadership of the IRA and Sinn Fein. There were great expectations that leaders such as Gerry Adams while introducing the political element to the campaign would also lead the Provisionals in a sustained and successful armed resistance against the British presence in Northern Ireland.

“I think in Adams people had a great expectation of him. I think in many ways Adams was trying to influence the debate out there with the Brownie columns and influence Seamus Twomey, who was Chief of Staff of the IRA. It started with the 1975 ceasefire.”⁴⁵⁹

Within their leadership roles they extended the discussions which had taken place and introduced the issues to the wider population. They did this through internal local discussions but also through public speeches and addresses.

“I remember at Bodenstown, maybe about 1978 or thereabouts, or in some keynote interview or speech, it might not have been Bodenstown, saying that there could be no military victory for any side that the problem in the north was a political

⁴⁵⁸ Sean O’Bradaigh

⁴⁵⁹ Anthony McIntyre

problem and it needed a political solution. That caused all sorts of controversy in a certain generation of republican leaders, and for me it was just so obvious.”⁴⁶⁰

While many of the proposals put forward by them were deemed contentious by some of the older traditional membership they also ensured that they gained significant levels of support from this section of the membership as well. This is a factor which proved crucial in eventually passing the proposals both in this micro-process as well as within 1997. In order to be successful it was necessary for this newly emerging leadership to gain an air of legitimacy by achieving the support of influential members from all sections of organised republicanism.

The presence of this gradual introduction of critical voice at this stage of the process provides support for:

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of the split.

HO4. Even though this process did eventually result in a split within the movement it was a minimal division of the organisation. The actions and preparation taken by the Adams/McGuinness leadership throughout the process significantly contributed to minimising the effect of the split. The gradual introduction of critical voice was one of the most significant factors at play. The similarities between the intentions the Goulding leadership and the achievements of the Adams/McGuinness leadership are unmistakable. Goulding wished to fully politicise the movement and bring it away from the armed campaign, but failed. However, it was the Adams/McGuinness leadership who gradually achieved this with the Provisionals. This ongoing politicisation started here with the application of voice and compromise. The critical difference between the two situations is that, as stated in sub-chapter 8a, the Goulding leadership attempted to change too much too soon. In contrast the Provisional leadership of the late 70s and early 80s gradually introduced the idea of a strengthened political arm to the movement while stating that

⁴⁶⁰ Gerry Adams

they wished to maintain the armed struggle. This showed a connection between the dissenting voices and the membership and wider republican population. It was a respect for context. As the years and decades after show the leadership only introduced significant changes when they believed that they had the support of the majority of members. It is through this continued application appreciation for context and membership sentiment that this was achieved.

8b.2.2 IRA Restructuring and Northern Prominence

While the debates about the introduction of a stronger political element were beginning in the mid 1970s the main focus of the northern leadership at this stage was the restructuring of the entire organisation, specifically the IRA. They advocated the IRA becoming a cellular organisation⁴⁶¹ more capable of adopting the ‘long war’ strategy which was proposed. This strategy of a long war was articulated by Jimmy Drumm in Bodenstown in June 1977.⁴⁶² This is one of many examples of the utilisation of the legitimising voice of the internally respected old guard to put forward the newly emerging strategic argument. This is a tactic reminiscent of the original Provisionals using Jimmy Steele in the late 1970s to put forward their criticisms of the Goulding leadership. The proposal was that this armed strategy was to go hand in hand with a new form of political pressure.⁴⁶³ However, at this stage the assertion was that the armed strategy was still to take prominence. While the young northerners were gaining prominence within the movement they were still aware that they needed the support from some of the older members in order to bring about the changes they wished and to retain this air of Republican legitimacy.

Part of the restructuring of the IRA in the late 1970s saw the division of the army into the northern and southern commands. With the vast majority of the armed campaign taking place within Northern Ireland the Northern Command, in conjunction with the Army Council and GHQ, took charge of the active service operations and the Southern

⁴⁶¹ The IRA was restructured in the late 1970s

⁴⁶² Drumm, J. (June 18th, 1977). Annual Commemoration of Wolfe Tone, Bodenstown: Oration Given by Jimmy Drumm. In *Republican News.*; White, (2006) p.258.

⁴⁶³ Frampton, M. (2009). *The Long March: The Political Strategy of Sinn Fein, 1981-2007*. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Pp. 10-11

Command acted primarily in a quartermaster role in the supply of safe-houses and training. This accentuated a growing divide within the movement between the northern and southern republicans. For some northerners there was resentment in taking orders from those who were geographically separate from the daily struggle.

“In human terms quite naturally, people would resent what they considered to be people who were a hundred miles from the warfront giving orders, and you also had this conception of what was cynically called ‘long rifles’, people who were very far away from it. There was that element of it.”⁴⁶⁴

This establishment of the divided Northern and Southern Commands was seen by some of the southern IRA members as a means by which the emerging northern leadership could take further control of the day to day running of the armed campaign. While this was not the viewpoint of all southern republicans there was a small minority who viewed it as such, and in turn believed that their role was being diminished and their viewpoint isolated.

“They got the Northern Command up and running and by 79 they had complete command of the whole lot and more or less pushed out the southern section of the movement.”⁴⁶⁵

The ultimate factionalism of the movement was established over the issue of abstentionism to the Dail. However, for many volunteers the divide was more accurately defined as one which was north/south in nature. In the comparative analysis of this and the 1969 split some of the most prominent differences are within the area of intra-organisational conflict. The prelude to 1969 was defined by the multiple intra-organisational conflicts which were taking place at the one time. This succeeded in strengthening the campaign of those opposed to the proposed changes of the Goulding leadership. In contrast the years prior to 1986 are defined by the narrow focus of the

⁴⁶⁴ Danny Morrison

⁴⁶⁵ Joe O’Neill

conflict. This is as a result of the gradual introduction of changes and proposed changes. The strategy in turn proved successful in isolating a small minority of dissenters and earning the support of the vast majority of members and supporters. The conflicts in 1986 were predominantly located within the national leadership as opposed to 1969/70 which were more evident across the entire organisation. The 1986 conflicts did not spread across the movement until the split was inevitable, and even then it did not have a significant effect on the membership. In essence 1969/70 was the consequence of a collection of intra-organisational conflicts which engulfed the entire membership. In contrast 1986 can be seen as a power struggle within the leadership which was accompanied by tensions surrounding the gradual politicisation.

Throughout the interview process fifteen participants, five RSF/CIRA and seven Provisionals, described the developing intra-organisational conflict at this stage as being a north/south divide, as is illustrated in Table 8b.4.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	4	3	0	7
RSF/CIRA	2	1	2	5
External Observer	1 (1 IRSM)	2 (1 Official and 1 IRSM)	0	3
Total	7 (1 external)	6 (2 external)	2	15 (3 external)

Table 8b.4: North/South Factionalism

A further five, described it as a division between the old guard traditionalists and the new guard.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	2	2	0	4
RSF/CIRA	1	0	0	1
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	3	2	0	5

Table 8b.5: Old Guard/New Guard Factionalism

The prevailing description any factionalism which was in place at this stage was described as intra-organisational conflict which was centred on conflicts taking place within the national leadership. Thirteen participants outlined that the main conflict was

taking place within the national leadership of the organisation, the majority of whom were members of the leadership themselves.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	4	5	0	14
RSF/CIRA	4	0	0	8
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	8	5	0	13

Table 8b.6: National Leadership Factionalism

While the analysis initially pointed to the presence of intra-organisational conflict between the old guard and the new guard, as well as between the northern and southern membership of the movement, upon closer analysis of the data this does not give a fair reflection of what was actually taking place. The emerging divide was not between the northern and southern membership, or between the old members and new members. The minor divide was concentrated within the leadership structures and was between the mainly the old-guard southern leadership and the northern leadership. The new northern leadership actually had the support of much of the northern old guard, as well as the southern new membership. Therefore the grouping forming in resistance to change was principally concentrated within the southern national leadership. However, at this stage of the process the strategic change was merely being discussed and it was not until the subsequent stage that concrete changes were actively proposed and initiated.

8b.3 Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice: Transition of Power: One Step at a Time

From the early 1970s paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland were granted ‘Special Category’ status. This meant that they did not have to wear prison uniforms or take part in prison work with non-political prisoners.⁴⁶⁶ However, in March 1976 this status was withdrawn. This resulted in protest by the Republican prisoners in the years which followed. Initially a number went on what has become know as the blanket protest. This form of protest involved prisoners refusing to wear prison uniforms and therefore only wearing their blanket wrapped around them. As this protest was not bringing about the changes wished for by the prisoners they adopted a new strategy in 1978 where they

⁴⁶⁶ Coogan, (2000) pp. 180-187

combined the blanket protest with a dirty protest. This new strategy involved prisoners smearing the walls of their cells with their own excrement.⁴⁶⁷ While this was attracting more public and media attention it still was not bringing about the changes in prisoners' status. In light of this October 1980 saw the adoption of a protest strategy used the world over, and historically frequently used by Irish Republicans; the hunger strike. The 1980 hunger strike saw seven Republican prisoners in Long Kesh simultaneously start their strike. This strike was led by Brendan 'Darky' Hughes, the OC of the Provisionals in Long Kesh.⁴⁶⁸ The seven prisoners continued their strike until December 18th when it was believed that one of the strikers was within hours of death. Hughes was informed that negotiations had been fruitful and that their demands had been met. The strike was therefore stopped without any fatalities. However, it soon transpired that the demands were not met to the full satisfaction of the prisoners. Therefore in March 1981 a new hunger strike was started, this time led by Bobby Sands. One of the major differences between the two hunger strikes was that the 1981 strikers started at staggered intervals for maximum impact. Again the strike was not having the intended impact of the prisoners' demands being met by the British government. Therefore when a by-election was called for the Fermanagh-South Tyrone Westminster seat the Republican Movement decided that Bobby Sands would stand as the Sinn Fein abstentionist candidate, an election which he subsequently won. This shift in strategy saw a swell in public support and sympathy for the prisoners and in turn the Republican Movement. The Republican thinking was that Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, would not let an MP die on hunger strike.⁴⁶⁹ However in May 1981 Bobby Sands became the first of ten hunger strikers to die while on strike. His election was followed by the election of two of his fellow hunger strikers as abstentionist TDs in the Dail Eireann general election of June 1981. It was not until October 3rd 1981 that the strike was called off.

The results of the analysis for this stage show how in this period the new politicising leadership were able to significantly move forward their agenda and gradually implement

⁴⁶⁷ Bishop and Mallie, pp.278-289.

⁴⁶⁸ During the hunger strike Bobby Sands took over as OC.

⁴⁶⁹ This is how the strikes were being framed by the Republicans, that the Thatcher government was letting these men die.

some of their desired changes while simultaneously achieving more control and power within the movement at both an armed and political level.

8b.3.1 Strengthening in Alternative Support: Benefits of Circumstance

The late 1970s is noted as a period of significant disillusionment for the Provisional membership. The campaign was not seen to be making any advance in their objectives of British withdrawal and the unification of Ireland. The IRA membership was coming to this realisation and as a result a significant proportion were leaving the movement.

“I think people got to the point that they were getting out, they just weren’t going back. I got out of prison I met loads of people saying ‘Joe, pressure from the parents, pressure from the wife, I got married, I’ve got a job, I have to think of my kids and family, I don’t think it’s worth it anymore, I don’t think the revolution is going anywhere.’”⁴⁷⁰

Coupled with this was a lack of public support for the extended Provisional armed campaign. The nationalist communities of Ireland were supportive of political rather than armed campaigns. This weakening of public support had played a significant role in the disillusionment of the membership. With the hunger strike campaign and particularly the election of Bobby Sands there was a perceived growing support for Republicanism through the elections of Sinn Fein abstentionist candidates in both the Republic and Northern Ireland.⁴⁷¹ However, the subsequent gradual weakening of support, particularly in the Republic, in the years after the hunger strikes signified that this support was context specific rather than an actual strengthening in support for Provisional Republicanism.

“So whilst in the June ’81 general election in the south of Ireland the H-Blocks and the hunger strikes had an impact to the extent that Kieran Doherty, who was later to die in August ’81 was elected TD for Cavan/Monaghan and Paddy Agnew who

⁴⁷⁰ Joe Doherty

⁴⁷¹ For accounts of the hunger strikes see O’Rawe, R. (2005). *Blanketmen*. Dublin: New Island; Beresford, D. (1987). *Ten Men Dead: Story of the 1981 Hunger Strike*. London: Grafton

was 'on the blanket', and who was from Louth, was elected to Leinster House as TD for Louth. In February '82, when another election was called, that vote had completely disappeared, just completely disappeared. So it had come out emotionally in an emergency as a one off.⁴⁷² I believed, several of us believed, that there was a major lesson to be learned from this."⁴⁷³

This show of electoral success during the hunger strikes displayed to them, and more importantly it displayed to the rest of the movement, the benefits that a strong political element to the Republican campaign could bring.⁴⁷⁴ It provided tangible evidence of the benefits of political involvement.⁴⁷⁵

"It was a huge event, and it made it easier for us to convince the movement, or the bulk of the movement that we could be involved here in politics and it wouldn't interfere with the progress of the armed struggle. In fact arguably propaganda wise it enhanced it, dove-tailed with it."⁴⁷⁶

However, as with the Goulding leadership of the 1960s they intimated that the abstentionist policy was impeding any further political success during non-emotionally arousing times. The emotionally exaggerated Republican electoral success of 1981 therefore provided the necessary impetus for the young leadership to gain more power within Republicanism and significantly strengthened their position in wishing to politicise the movement. The theme of strengthened public support at this stage of the process proved to be one of the most dominant factors in the success of the Adams

⁴⁷² This shows the need for modification of strategies as support for political organisations fluctuates with time and the organisation needs to adapt to this in order to maintain any significant level of support. Shriver and Messer (2009), p.168

⁴⁷³ Danny Morrison

⁴⁷⁴ The mobilisation of support for the political changes helped to neutralise the internal dissent from the competing sub-group. Della-Porta and Diani (2008) p.329-330

⁴⁷⁵ The most significant results from Republican involvement in electoral politics was that it opened dialogue between the Republicans and other political actors, but it similarly exposed the IRA and Sinn Fein to the negative public response to their ongoing terrorist campaign. Neuman, P.R. (2005). *The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Case of the IRA. Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28(6), pp.941-975. See also Guelke, A. and Smyth, J. (1992). *The Ballot Bomb: Terrorism and the Electoral Process in Northern Ireland. Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(2), pp.103-124 for an analysis of electoral involvement across the sectarian divide.

⁴⁷⁶ *Ibid*

leadership in gradually implementing their politicising strategy. Twenty participants emphasised the importance of this theme in the overall process of the politicisation of the Provisional Republican Movement not only within this micro-process but within the entire macro-process.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	5	7	0	12
RSF/CIRA	3	1	1	5
External Observer	1 (1 Official)	2 (2 IRSM)	0	3
Total	9 (1 external)	10 (2 external)	21	20

Table 8b.7: Strengthened Public Support

However, even with this growing support for the politicisation of the movement did not just grow from the electoral successes achieved by Sinn Fein. There was a concerted effort through a variety of methods which resulted in the ultimate acceptance of the strengthening of the political element.

8b.3.2 Control of Voice

As has been already intimated in this process the Republican newspapers provided a vital vehicle for the leadership to get their desired message across. Therefore as with the 1969/70 process when there are developing factions within the movement the editorial control of the paper, and with it the control of potential national voice, proved a significant tool which was actively utilised. Until January 1979 there were two Provisional newspapers *Republican News* which was southern based and under the editorial control of the traditionalist elements of the southern leadership and *An Phoblacht* northern based and under the control of the emerging young northern leadership. In January 1979 when Deasun Breatnach stepped down as editor of *Republican News* Danny Morrison, editor of *An Phoblacht* and close ally of Adams, came down to Dublin with his staff from Belfast and merged the two papers to form *An Phoblacht/Republican News*. This move proved significant as the young northerners now had control of the propaganda of the movement and could push their views without fear of alternative points of view within the movement being easily put forward. Five

Provisionals outlined the importance of the control over what opinions and articles are disseminated to the membership.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	3	2	0	5
RSF/CIRA	3	1	0	4
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	6	3	0	9

Table 8b.8: Merger of papers

This theme also signifies an important step in the gradual process of the northern leadership acquiring control of the movement.

“I became aware that this was part of the politics of change within the movement, the old guard being pushed out, and Danny and Adams and co. moving into Dublin coming from Belfast, becoming national figures. That was all part of the changing of the guard, for want of a better word.”⁴⁷⁷

This merger proved to be a significant stepping stone in the strengthening of the politicisers’ position. It provided them an open platform for expressing their views, policies and strategies and simultaneously weakened the voice of those old-guard traditionalists. The membership and supporters of the movement were reliant on the newspaper to provide them with much of their organisational information and policy arguments. Therefore the merger of the papers was a move which gradually diminished the traditionalists’ support base.

In the years leading up to the 1986 debates and abstentionist vote the newspaper was utilised as a tool at the forefront of the debate. However, with it in the editorial control of those advocating the dropping of the abstentionist policy the debate, and other policy changes, within the paper was very one-sided with the arguments for politicisation at the forefront of opinion pieces published. So therefore in the years leading up to the 1986 vote there was active and patient campaigning for this change in political strategy within

⁴⁷⁷ Richard O’Rawe

not only the IRA and Sinn Fein but also through the medium of *An Phoblacht/Republican News*.

*“My point being is that therefore prior to 1986 debates were also carried out in An Phoblacht, in preparation for the ground, we were chipping away and the argument for continued abstentionism in the Twenty-Six Counties. So you had a debate going on inside the IRA, you had an An Phoblacht debate, you had a Sinn Fein debate over a period of years prior to 86.”*⁴⁷⁸

While there was a growing appreciation for the need for a stronger political strategy among the membership there were significant elements within the organisation who were yet to be convinced that the dropping of the abstentionist policy was the way for this to be best achieved. Therefore it was important that the leadership did not force this change upon them but gradually and continuously put forward their arguments for this change while simultaneously stifling the potential for stronger counter-arguments to be put forward by their internal rivals.

8b.3.3 Strategy Change: One Step at a Time: Armed to Armed and Political

The key to the success of the politicising Provisionals in the 1980s was the gradual process of the changes introduced. The ‘young northerners’ only officially brought forward their proposed changes when they were certain that they had sufficient levels of support across the movement.⁴⁷⁹ At times when they did not have this support they postponed the changes until a time they did, a tactic they utilised across the peace process. This is in stark contrast to the Goulding leadership of the 1960s who tried to change too much too soon. They pushed forward with votes of abstentionism, NLF and other votes when there were significant levels of opposition across the movement. This respect for timing and support proved the most significant asset in the ongoing support for the leadership across the entire peace process, a process in which they successfully

⁴⁷⁸ Danny Morrison

⁴⁷⁹ This gradual introduction of change allowed the leadership to ease their base into the transition and therefore succeeded in only alienating a small number of members. Miller (1983), p.312

brought the Provisional movement gradually away from terrorism and towards the acceptance of peaceful politics.

One of the tactics utilised throughout this process, in the lead up to 1986 and in the years after, was the distancing of the leadership from contentious proposals and debates until it was clear that majority support was in place. This is a tactic which was discussed by eleven participants.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	1	4	0	5
RSF/CIRA	4	1	1	6
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	5	5	1	11

Table 8b.9: Leadership Distancing

In the local and national debates about potential changes to both the armed and political strategies it was rarely the key leadership figures who introduced the potential for change to the debates. They often utilised republican actors external to the leadership structure to ‘test the waters’ prior to their official backing of the proposal. It was only when the feelings towards the proposals were significantly positive that the leadership officially endorsed it.

“Adams doesn’t declare himself until he is absolutely certain that the ground is correct. He wasn’t talking about dropping abstentionism, certainly not at a local level, he may have been talking about it at an Ard Comhairle level that we need to revise our strategies. I am aware that at Ard Comhairle level there was friction as early as in the early eighties. In fact there was friction earlier, even before the hunger strikes.”⁴⁸⁰

This tactic enabled the key figures to distance themselves from any unsuccessful attempt to implement a controversial change in strategy, and therefore it was more difficult for

⁴⁸⁰ Richard O’Rawe

their internal detractors to accuse or blame them. It also allowed them to take the credit when such changes were successful. However, it was largely down to the groundwork in the months and often years beforehand that allowed for this success. The continuous implementation of this distancing tactic is one of the key reasons for the success of the drastic changes implemented by the leadership. It is similarly part of the reason for the prolonged dominance of Republicanism by this leadership.

This patience in the implementation of change allowed the leadership to portray an image of being significantly connected with the expectations of their membership and the communities they claimed to represent. This sets them apart from the disconnect present at the end of the Goulding leadership. It was their relevancy to their base at specific times which maintained their organisational dominance and strength ahead of any internal detractors.

“It’s incontrovertible that that kind of seminal formative revolutionary debate, the fact that we had to engage with republicans right throughout, just to prevent the split from being more catastrophic than it was required that you headed off and you started debating this and discussing this. To win the debate required an engagement and negotiation and it was an important lesson that was taken into the peace negotiations, you negotiate with your base every step of the way.”⁴⁸¹

This is a process which was take place both within the IRA and Sinn Fein. While this took a considerable amount of time the end result is that the leadership were in a stronger position due to the mandate given to them by their base.

While this process is looked upon positively by the Provisionals those who formed or supported Republican Sinn Fein and/or the Continuity IRA see it otherwise. They regard the tactic less as a form of consultation with the base and more a process of demanding the acceptance of the leadership stance until there is an overall consensus. They contend that the Adams/McGuinness leadership forced a consensus on topics by suppressing

⁴⁸¹ Mitchell McLaughlin

active debate within the organisation and placing known supporters of their position within leadership positions across the country. This is a similar accusation to that which was directed at the Goulding leadership.

“Every OC in every county was a Belfast man. So they were controlling the Army and then they went for Sinn Fein. The only group that they didn’t control was the Executive of the Irish Republican Army.”⁴⁸²

This claim of suppressed debate was put forward by each of the RSF/CIRA participants as well as two former Provisional members, who are both independent/freelance dissidents. Even if this was the case the analysis of the data indicates that the leadership successfully portrayed the guise of active and constructive engagement with the base.

The key failure of the Goulding leadership was the downgrading in importance of the armed campaign from their long-term strategy. This coupled with the further wholesale changes to the organisation provided a strong platform for the detractors to base their dissent on and therefore attract stronger support, and in the aftermath of the split greater levels of membership. Conversely the success of the 1986 leadership was their maintenance of the armed strategy to continue alongside the stronger political element. This maintenance of the traditional armed campaign placated a significant proportion of would be detractors.

“With the dual strategy you could maybe see that the fact that the armed struggle was going on was giving people a sense that there wasn’t a sell out happening.”⁴⁸³

The fact that there was a slow gradual implementation and proposal of change, rather than immediate wholesale change, allowed the membership and support to acclimatise to the benefits of the implemented change before any further change is proposed. In the situation where the previous change had a perceived positive impact on the movement

⁴⁸² Des Long

⁴⁸³ Pat Doherty

and had aided in the progress of the organisation in the pursuit of their purposive goals membership are more likely to be receptive to the idea of further changes. This movement from a purely armed strategy to a combined armed and political strategy⁴⁸⁴ was deemed to be one of the most important factors in the post split strength of the Provisionals by seventeen participants as illustrated in Table 8b.10.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	4	7	0	11
RSF/CIRA	2	1	2	5
External Observer	0	1 (1 Official)	0	1
Total	6	9 (1 external)	2	17

Table 8b.10: Change from Armed to Armed and Political Strategy

The retention of the armed campaign is deemed to be the major factor which kept the PIRA largely intact, an assertion which is supported by those five leadership figures of the armed wing of the movement.

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of a split.

HO4. While a split was not avoided in 1986 the application of compromise and voice successfully lessened the effects of the divide. It was this appreciation and respect for the sentiments of their base which allowed the newly forming leadership to prosper. They were aware that the radical changes they wished to implement were only possible at a time when there was sufficient levels of support throughout the movement. Therefore they were keeping themselves constantly aware of the sentiment and levels of support. By implementing changes in this gradual manner of one step at a time they displayed their willingness to compromise. While they may have wished to implement more sweeping changes there was awareness that this would strengthen the position of their internal detractors. As was displayed in 1969/70 the implementation of too many isolating policy and strategy related changes at the one time can prove detrimental to the

⁴⁸⁴ This is often referred to as the 'Armalite and Ballot Box' strategy, see Taylor, P. (1998). *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Pp.281-282.

aspirations of the leadership. Therefore a strategy of one step at a time weakens the detractors' position and therefore weakens any potential competition in the aftermath of a split and provides the organisation with the opportunity to focus on purposive goals rather than having to change focus to competition for membership and support. The strategy of maintaining the armed campaign as well as strengthening the political wing of the movement resulted in the isolation of a small number of dissenters. The pledge to continue the armed struggle ensured the support of a wider grouping. Any move to call an end to the armed strategy would have resulted in a stronger RSF and particularly a stronger CIRA.

For many Republicans during the Troubles one of the most defining features of the Provisional Movement was its ability to mount a significant armed campaign against the British 'occupation' of Northern Ireland. Especially for many of those northern Provisionals partaking in almost daily violence across the six counties of Northern Ireland any threat to this element of the movement's make-up would have been defined as threatening to the identity and purpose of the movement. Therefore it was essential for the maintenance of strong support for the gradual changes being made at this stage that the armed campaign be retained as a fundamental element of the strategy. If it was not retained the exiting group would have been more likely to have had a much stronger armed grouping than the Continuity IRA which developed in the aftermath of the split of 1986. As will be portrayed

8b.3.4 Leadership Change

As with the strategy changes implemented and proposed the transition of power was similarly a gradual step by step process. Throughout the 1970s the young northerners and their supporters gained and retained leadership positions within both the IRA and Sinn Fein, and in doing so took the place of many of those less supportive of the direction they wished to take the movement. The result was a leadership, local and national, more supportive of the gradual transformation of the organisation. Those internal detractors who exited to join or support the Continuity IRA and/or Republican Sinn Fein in 1986, as well as a number of freelance dissidents and Provisionals, maintain that this was carried

very purposively and at times aggressively. The Adams/McGuinness leadership deemed that they required to get rid of certain individuals within the movement so as to achieve the necessary control of both the IRA and Sinn Fein so as to progress the movement in the manner they wished.

*“He got out and the first thing he done when he got out was to remove Billy McKee as Brigade OC, and then get himself elected onto the Army Council. I think he was also Adjutant General of the IRA around then. But that’s what he did, and he started by getting the majority of people who were on the Council, who were in his pocket, and once he had that he had control of the Movement.”*⁴⁸⁵

The accusation by four participants, two RSF/CIRA, one freelance dissident and one member of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, was that the removal of a number of those in disagreement with the newly forming leadership was done by violent means. This was either carried out directly through executions or indirectly by sending IRA members on missions which the leadership knew they would not return from. This forceful removal was not a tactic used against all dissenters. It was principally used to eliminate those individuals who were deemed to pose a threat to the progress of the new leadership.

*“They would have conspired to get rid of people who posed a threat to Adams, people who were charismatic, people who had leadership qualities, who would have posed a threat to Adams’ position.”*⁴⁸⁶

Within the Republican Movement the greatest threat posed to the progress of the northern leadership came from the old-guard traditionalist leadership, especially well respected leaders like Ruairi O’Bradaigh and Daithi O’Conail. Within Sinn Fein they held the positions of President and Vice President respectively and were also heavily influential within the IRA leadership. These individuals were the main figures within the leadership

⁴⁸⁵ Richard O’Rawe

⁴⁸⁶ Una

maintain the traditionalist Republican position. Their respected and lengthy history within the movement in the view of many members legitimised their position. Due to the respect within which they were held by all members an obvious removal would have been significantly damaging to their internal opposition. Therefore they attempted to force their resignations. They did so by calling for the removal of the Eire Nua policy.⁴⁸⁷ This was a policy seen by O’Bradaigh, O’Conail and other members of the old guard traditionalists as a fundamental part of the purposive goals of the movement. It was their view that the desired public good that the Republican Movement should aim for was the federalist united Ireland outlined in the document. O’Bradaigh in particular was one of the most vocal advocates of the policy.

“The major disagreement with the Eire Nua programme was that the Adams crowd knew that if you could outmanoeuvre O’Bradaigh on it you could outmanoeuvre him both strategically and organisationally, and you could undermine him within Sinn Fein.”⁴⁸⁸

The first attempt to remove the policy from the constitution took place in the 1981 Ard Fheis where they received a majority. However, this did not meet the requisite two-thirds majority. They did receive this majority in 1982. This constitutional withdrawal of the policy highlighted the growing tensions within the leadership of the movement and in 1983 O’Bradaigh, O’Conail and Cathleen Knowles all stepped down from the Ard Comhairle⁴⁸⁹ of Sinn Fein. In O’Bradaigh’s resignation speech as president of Sinn Fein he highlighted his belief about the dangers of constitutional politics and the need for the Republican Movement to stick to its ‘basic principles.’⁴⁹⁰ They saw this as a drop in the quality of Republican policy. These resignations saw the further rise of the new leadership with Adams taking over as president of Sinn Fein. For the likes of O’Bradaigh

⁴⁸⁷ With the structuring of the Provisionals in the early 1970s *Eire Nua* was developed. This was approved as policy in 1971. This promotes the federalisation of a united Ireland, divided into four federations, one for each province. In the 1980s the Adams leadership believed this to be, and sold it as, a ‘sop’ to the loyalists and unionists. Feeney, pp. 320-321.

⁴⁸⁸ Cathleen Knowles-McGurk

⁴⁸⁹ Directly translated as ‘high council’ this is the political party’s executive.

⁴⁹⁰ O’Bradaigh, R. (November 13th, 1986). *Statement by Outgoing President Ruairi O’Bradaigh to the Ard Fheis of Sinn Fein*

and O’Conail the removal of Eire Nua was seen to be threatening to the identity of the movement, and they consequently stepped down from their positions of power within the movement. However, it was not threatening enough to yet justify their exit from the entire organisation.

This vote against the Eire Nua policy was not designed due to a significant disagreement with the policy. It was part of a process of removing those who threatened the newly forming leadership.

“The people who thought as I did just felt they weren’t wanted.”⁴⁹¹

This period of time from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s showed can be defined as a steady rise to power of this young northern leadership. A clear part of this progress to gain significant control they changed a number of significant policies while removing from power the advocates of these policies which they considered to be holding them back.

“I just felt that Ruairi was just not up to the job of what the struggle needed... no one could stand in the way of progress.”⁴⁹²

The aftermath of this significant change in leadership is defined by the process to remove the abstentionist policy to the Dail. However, as was detailed the leadership did not link themselves to this sensitive issue until they believed that they had enough support to successfully change they policy.

“When Gerry Adams took over in 1983 he said that he was quite happy with the policy of abstentionism. I think it was 1985 before the leadership decided that they would go public on it and the following year they were very very public on it. They

⁴⁹¹ Ruairi O’Bradaigh

⁴⁹² Danny Morrison

did it in a devious way. They don't try to persuade, they tried to instruct and demand."⁴⁹³

This stage in the lead up to the 1986 split is analysed as a contrast to the equivalent stage of the 1969/70 process. While the Goulding leadership attempted to change too much too soon and therefore significantly strengthened the dissidents membership and support the Adams/McGuinness leadership changed policy one step at a time and as a result weakened support for the traditionalists. Most notable within this differentiation is the maintenance of the armed campaign in the 1980s as opposed to its significant destabilisation in the 1960s.

However, the success of the 1986 leadership and the failure of the 1969/70 must not be purely attributed to their own internal organisational actions. For the Goulding leadership the violence in Northern Ireland played a more significant role in the post-split strength of the Provisionals than any abstentionist or left wing policy. And in the early 1980s it was the hunger strike campaign and specifically the election of Bobby Sands and others which provided the impetus for a strengthened political strategy. Without this demonstration of the potential for political involvement it is unlikely that the Republican membership would have been as easily convinced of the worth of strengthened political strategy.

8b.4 Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

With the apparent decline in support for electoral Republicanism in the mid 1980s, and the rise of constitutional alternatives such as the New Ireland Forum⁴⁹⁴ and the Anglo Irish Agreement,⁴⁹⁵ it was felt that major political change was needed by the movement. In response to this the internal debate was re-opened within the IRA and Sinn Fein about the possibility of dropping the abstentionist policy. However, while the Goulding leadership had tried to change this policy for all three parliaments in one go the Adams

⁴⁹³ Anthony McIntyre

⁴⁹⁴ Frampton pp.47-48

⁴⁹⁵ Murray, G. and Tonge, J. (2005). *Sinn Fein and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation*. Dublin: O'Brien. Pp.136-152

leadership were only proposing the dropping of abstentionism to Dail Eireann, the least objectionable of the three. For many Republicans the abstentionist policy was more than a tactic it was a defining feature of what it was to be an Irish Republican. However, the proposal to drop the policy only to the Dail, while still continuing with the armed struggle, proved less divisive than the more comprehensive changes proposed by the Goulding leadership in the late 1960s. As with all constitutional amendments this change required a two thirds majority.

After the General Army Convention of 1986, which saw the vote to drop the abstentionist policy to the Dail passed, those opposed to the change, mainly from the outgoing Army Executive, met to develop a new armed movement. This is supportive of

HI3. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the parent organisation.

HI3. Those leaving the IRA and Sinn Fein in 1986 were leaving due to the perceived drop in quality of the product produced by the organisation and therefore continued their involvement in organised Republicanism by setting up a new political and armed organisation.⁴⁹⁶ They placed a stronger emphasis on the abstentionist policies than those who remained with the movement.

The exiting Executive contacted Tom Maguire, the last surviving member of the last all Ireland Dail and a member of the Old IRA, and in 1987 he issued a statement⁴⁹⁷ declaring the legitimacy of the Continuity Executive as the true IRA, while discounting the claims to legitimacy of the ongoing Provisional IRA.⁴⁹⁸ While the existence of an armed wing was heavily suspected it was not until 1994 at a graveside salute to Tom Maguire that the

⁴⁹⁶ Hirschman (1970), p.47

⁴⁹⁷ O'Bradaigh, R. (1997). *Dilseacht: The Story of Comdt. General Tom Maguire and the Second (All Ireland) Dail*. Dublin: Elo Press

⁴⁹⁸ Maguire had similarly declared the Provisionals to be the legitimate IRA in 1969.

Continuity IRA were brought to the public's awareness.⁴⁹⁹ The argument is posited that the declaration of the existence of the Continuity IRA at this stage of the peace process, when the Provisionals had declared a ceasefire, is due to Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity representing a certain group of Irish Republicans who will support and organise military activity for as long as there is any sort of British presence in Ireland. The announcement of the Provisional ceasefire made the need for this 'true' form of Republicanism all the more pressing.⁵⁰⁰ However, it must also be noted as is supported by the interview evidence that in the direct aftermath of the split in the PIRA that it took a significant amount of time for an efficient dissident armed structure to form.

As with 1969/70 in the aftermath of the IRA divide there was a similar cleavage within Sinn Fein at the 1986 Ard Fheis. The vote for the dropping the abstentionist policy to the Dail required a two thirds majority due to its constitutional nature. One of the methods utilised by the leadership to succeed in their aims was to obtain the support of prominent Republicans from the IRA and Sinn Fein, but most importantly from a number of old guard Republicans, in order to legitimise their proposals. This support is apparent in the range of speakers who spoke in favour of the change in the 1986 Sinn Fein Ard Fheis. Supporters of the change varied from the new leadership of Adams, McGuinness⁵⁰¹ and Morrison to old guard Republicans such as John Joe McGirl and Joe Cahill⁵⁰² as well as prominent IRA prisoners such as Gerry Kelly who sent a letter of support from prison in Amsterdam where he was being held after escaping from Long Kesh and going on the run.⁵⁰³ The support of these and other prominent individuals as well as a number of years

⁴⁹⁹ The first public statement by the Continuity IRA Council was issued in February 1996. They declared that their origins had come from 'the gerrymantered General Army Convention of 1986 which deserted the All-Ireland republic and accepted the partitionist and collaborationist 26-County State.' O'Ruairc "Runai", B. (February, 1996). 'Revolutionary' IRA Emerges. In *Saoirse*, p.9.

⁵⁰⁰ White and Fraser (2000) (p.324)

⁵⁰¹ One of the tactics used by McGuinness, and others, during his speech was to undermine the running of the Movement by O'Bradaigh and his allies during the 1970s, claiming that they nearly destroyed the Movement in the ceasefire of the mid 1970s. Irvin, p.23

⁵⁰² For John Joe McGirl's and Joe Cahill's speeches see Sinn Fein (1986). *The Politics of Revolution*. pp.20-22 Both of these speeches give reference to each man's historical standing and allegiances

⁵⁰³ The use of such individuals was trying to resonate loyalty among members to the organisation and its history. It shows an awareness of the power of loyalty at times of competition Crenshaw (1985), pp.484-485.

of ground work in securing the vote proved successful as in the 1986 Ard Fheis⁵⁰⁴ the motion was passed and Sinn Fein members elected to Dail Eireann were constitutionally allowed to take their seats in the parliament. With the passing of this bill a small number of delegates walked out of the venue and ‘continued’ the Ard Fheis in a different location where they declared the establishment of Republican Sinn Fein. While their decision to split took place in 1986 it is argued that the decisions of individual members of Republican Sinn Fein can be traced to a combination of their ‘upbringing and an identification with the movement’s ideology.’⁵⁰⁵ For many of their membership active politics in Dail Eireann was not only considered anti-Republican but there was also the view that involvement in the parliament would lead to corruption and a focus on politics.⁵⁰⁶ At the inauguration of the ‘new’ party in 1986 the members present did not admit to the presence of an armed-wing affiliated to the party. From an individual perspective it has been noted that there are two distinct reasons for choosing which side to support and/or join in the aftermath of a split one is a sense of ‘we-ness’ or solidarity with members on one side of the split and the second are ideological reasons in the form of support or opposition to constitutional politics.⁵⁰⁷ This argument may be applied to any of the splits with the notion of ‘we-ness’ staying the same but the ideological reasons changing to ‘support for reasoning of the split.’ Neither Republican Sinn Fein nor the Continuity IRA has ever gained the levels of support or membership of the Provisionals. However, to this day they are considered as one of the most dangerous paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland.⁵⁰⁸

⁵⁰⁴ This Ard Fheis had been preceded by an Army Convention vote where the vote was also passed. However there are accusations that this vote was rigged in a similar manner to the alleged fixing of the 1969 vote.

⁵⁰⁵ White and Fraser (2000) (pp.332-333)

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid* p.336; For Republican Sinn Fein’s justification of their movement away from ‘mainstream’ Republicanism see Republican Sinn Fein (November 2nd, 1986). Historic Sinn Fein Declaration. In *Republican Bulletin/ Iris na Poblachta*.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p.342

⁵⁰⁸ See Twenty-Second Report of the Independent Monitoring Committee, November 4, 2009. Paragraphs 2.2-2.9

This exit of Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA is seen as functional for the advancement of the politicisation of the Provisional Movement and it liberated the organisation of some of the leading dissenting voices.⁵⁰⁹

8b.4.1 Change in Political Strategy: Abstentionism

As has been detailed throughout this chapter the politicisation process up to 1986 was a gradual process marked by individual strategy changes designed to cause minimal dissension at the time of actual change. The changes had all been preceded by internal discussions and were only voted upon or implemented when the leadership believed that they had the support of the majority of the movement. This was the same with the case of dropping the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann in 1986. The Adams/McGuinness leadership, and their internal supporters, entered into discussions across the movement in order to gauge levels of support for the change to what was a sensitive issue.⁵¹⁰ These discussions continued up to the day of the Convention as well as at the Ard Fheis. As with all potentially divisive strategy changes it was extremely important for the leadership to prepare the ground in the years prior to ensure their desired result. This was especially true with the change of the abstentionist policy as it had been the centre of splits in the past. It was a divisive issue, especially for those members in the Republic of Ireland as they were to be the ones most affected by the change, and at the time they were more representative of old-guard traditional republicanism than their northern colleagues, many of whom had initially engaged with Sinn Fein and the IRA in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

“I think in broad terms and this is very broad it wasn’t seen as such a fundamental issue in the north, it would have been certainly in some places in the south. It would have certainly been to some older members a real fundamental and defining issue of what the party was about.”⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁹ Balser (1997), p.224.

⁵¹⁰ Part of this process was to emphasise the electoral successes of party in the past as well as their drawing membership’s attention to the utility of active involvement in politics. See Adams, G. (1985). *Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1985: Presidential Address*. Wolfe Tone Society Publications. p.3.

⁵¹¹ Pat Doherty

The change of the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann proved to be one of the most dominant themes with respect to the 1986 split. This is illustrated in Table 8b.11 which illustrates the make-up of the twenty participants who discussed the issue.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	6	5	0	11
RSF/CIRA	5	1	1	7
External Observer	0	2 (2 Officials)	0	2
Total	11	8 (2 external)	1	20 (2 external)

Table 8b.11: Change of Abstentionist Policy to Dail Eireann

As with the Goulding leadership before them the northern politicisers led by Adams and Morrison regarded the abstentionist policy as a burden suppressing their political progress. The electoral support for Sinn Fein significantly dropped in the Republic during elections detached from emotionally arousing moments. While the hunger strikes had seen a dramatic rise in the electoral success of the party the vote returned to its pre-hunger strike base-level in the years after. This decline had not been echoed in Northern Ireland. The key difference was in public acceptance of the political institutions. As the northern nationalist and republican populations failed to recognise Stormont and especially Westminster as legitimate governing bodies they were more willing to accept the continuation of the abstentionist policies to these institutions than the southern electorate who for the most part regarded Dail Eireann as their rightful legislator. Therefore for many southern nationalists a vote for abstentionist Sinn Fein was seen as a wasted ballot. This was a viewpoint recognised by the young leadership and therefore they saw it necessary to remove the inhibiting policy. Therefore the continued advocating of southern abstentionism was deemed as a significant obstacle in their attempts make republicanism relevant to southern base.

“So in 1983, after that election in ‘83/84, it was quite obvious that unless we were prepared to go in to Leinster House that vote was going to remain at rock bottom and could rise occasionally.”⁵¹²

⁵¹² Danny Morrison

It was here where the core difference between the two extremes on either side of the debate lay. The politicians viewed twenty-six county abstentionism as a tactic which had failed, and was debilitating Republican progress. On the other side of the divide lay the old-guard traditionalists who viewed abstentionism as a cornerstone of Irish Republicanism, closer to part of Republican ideology than a tactic.

“Abstentionism was a policy that had been elevated to a principle” ⁵¹³

Even though it was northern republicans who were pushing for the dropping of the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann, and old guard southern Republicans leading the calls for policy maintenance, both sides required to widen their support base. As with all intra-organisational conflicts there were firm advocates on either side of the divide. However, there were similarly those undecided members who required convincing by either side before deciding their position. The arguments applied by both sides to justify their position to the Republican base were polar opposites. The justification put forward by those advocating a policy change suggested that abstentionism in the south was hampering Republican progress. It was argued that without a change in policy that Republicanism would remain irrelevant to majority of residents within the Republic of Ireland. However, this argument was constantly supported with a reaffirmation of the commitment to armed struggle. This therefore narrowed the prospective support base for the dissenting voices. The main task for the new leadership was to convince those undecided members that political involvement did not equate to a weakening of Republican standards and tradition. This was made simpler by the electoral successes of the years previous.

“I suppose the fact that Bobby Sands was able to be elected and of course the other elections, Kieran Doherty and Paddy Agnew and all of those gave the sense that there was people out there who would respond to Sinn Fein if they were more

⁵¹³ Sean McManus

proactive in engaging in politics and that electoral politics was something that they had to engage in."⁵¹⁴

On the other side of the divide, in stark contrast, the old-guard traditionalists relied upon historical referencing and moral principle based arguments to justify their aversion to the arguments for policy change. Their arguments were principally based on the belief that abstentionism was not a tactic which could be utilised or dispatched when the leadership saw fit. Abstentionism, to them, was a historical principle at the centre of what it was to be 'true' Republicans. This was a principle which could not be removed by any leadership at any point during the struggle. The only parliament they would recognise was a thirty-two county parliament elected by the entire population of Ireland. Electoral acceptance of any of the three parliaments would, in their opinion, leave the movement morally bankrupt and would equate to a move away from 'true' Republicanism.

"Then in 1986 whenever the Provos decided to recognise Leinster House at the Ard Fheis of 1986, we left, walked out of the Ard Fheis, because it was never in the constitution of the Republican Movement that you recognised partitionist assemblies...So those who walked out of the Mansion House in 1986, walked out with the Republican Movement intact, its principles its beliefs and its constitution. Those who remained in the Mansion House dissented from the principles and beliefs of the Republican movement by recognising a partitionist assembly"⁵¹⁵ ...Those who remained dissented from the Republican Movement and had no right to call themselves Republican after that, because each step they've taken has been further and further and further away from the movement and its goals."⁵¹⁶

As they held abstentionism as a fundamental part of Republican identity those who left to form both the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein did so as they believed that an

⁵¹⁴ Pat Doherty

⁵¹⁵ This shows dissidents are classifying their loyalty not to any organisation but to the historical aims of Irish Republicanism in general. They are loyal to a movement, not any one organisation. Della Porta and Diani p.151. Zald and Ash, (1966) p.328

⁵¹⁶ Geraldine Taylor.

acceptance of seats in Dail Eireann was threatening to organisational identity. This is therefore supportive of

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

As has been stated above the advocates for a change in policy were successful in receiving the necessary two-thirds majority at both the Army Convention and the Ard Fheis. The Provisional leadership under the guidance of Adams and McGuinness when compared to the politicising Goulding leadership had positioned their policy more strategically to enable the undecided membership to side with them as opposed to the O'Bradaigh leadership who were firmly tied to their positioning on the issue of abstentionism. The key in this regard was the ability of the new leadership to continuously vocalise their intentions to continue the armed struggle in unison with a now stronger political strategy. The positioning of the two internal sub-groups emphasised the perception that of a progressive Adams leadership as opposed to the O'Bradaigh and O'Conail leadership who displayed no ability to move the movement forward, a leadership unable to adapt with changing circumstances. Related to this was the issue that the changes implemented by the new leadership were not seen to be significantly threatening to organisational identity by the majority of the movement. This is due to the minimal nature of change coupled with the continued reaffirmation of the continuation of the armed struggle.⁵¹⁷

8b.4.2 Preparation for Split

It is essential to detail the policy related differences between the two sub-groups in the analysis of the result of all splits. However, it is equally necessary to understand the non-policy related issues which significantly impacted upon the result. The previous splits emphasise the necessity for pre-split preparation whether it be in organising a breakaway group at both armed and political levels or alternatively preparation on behalf of the

⁵¹⁷ An emphasis of the continuation of the armed campaign was present throughout the early to mid 1980s See McGuinness, M (June 22nd 1986). *Bodenstown '86*. London: Wolfe Tone Society Publications. p.2.

leadership to weaken the potential for a strong breakaway group. In 1969/70 the pre-split preparation on behalf of the would be Provisionals enabled the new movement to start their armed and political campaigns immediately at the point of inception, while the pre-split preparation on behalf of the Official leadership in advance of 1974 considerably weakened both the INLA and IRSP. While the IRSM had also prepared for the division the pre-emptive actions of the Officials curtailed this preparation and in turn the IRSM was never the dominant Republican movement it could potentially have been. With respect to the 1986 divide the pre-split preparation was truly one-sided. The preparations for change were dominated by the Adams leadership at both armed and political levels. In contrast those wishing to avoid organisational change were noticeably unprepared for a split. This is portrayed in the analysis of the interview data from those on both sides of the divide. As displayed in Table 8b.12 seventeen participants referred to the preparation for change which ultimately resulted in their successful passing of the vote to remove the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	5	7	0	12
RSF/CIRA	3	1	1	5
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	8	8	1	17

Table 8b.12: Adams/McGuinness Leadership Preparation for Change

Central to this pre-change preparation, and therefore central to the post-split Provisional dominance, was the emphasis placed on gaining internal support for all policy related changes prior to putting them to a vote. This sets the Adams/McGuinness leadership aside from their predecessors in the Goulding leadership of the 1960s. For Goulding's changes the organisation wide support was not there to the same extent as with Adams and McGuinness. The importance of this pre-change securing of support is displayed in Table 8b.13.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	5	6	0	11
RSF/CIRA	4	0	1	5
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	8	6	1	16

Table 8b.13: Pre-Change Securing of Support

As displayed above this appreciation of the benefits of this preparation was from both sides of the divide.

“Adams and them were better organised. Adams is a very smart politician and tactician. Nobody can deny that...On the other side, on the army side with regard the Continuity, they hadn’t even a water pistol because they had secured all the dumps in between times before this thing took place. They had secured all the dumps and all the guns were in their control.”⁵¹⁸

This pre-split preparation was all carried out in order to minimise the possible effects of a divide on the movement. A stronger post-split organisation maximises the potential for the movement to achieve organisational goals, and to maintain organisational survival.

“The most important thing in the course of the struggle and one of the priorities I think for us at all times was to keep as many people with us as we could to prevent as far as possible any fragmentation or slippage from the edges. We were never going to keep everybody. In the course of the struggle you’re always going to lose some folks.”⁵¹⁹

An essential part of this pre-split preparation with respect to 1986 was securing the support of influential individuals within the movement for each sub-group’s policy positioning. For many members individual allegiance was decided not by arguments for or against abstentionism, but by the positioning of individual members whom they trusted and respected. It was a priority of the Adams leadership to secure the support for change from a broad range of legitimising figures within the movement. The O’Bradaigh/O’Conail sub-group had the ability, through their lengthy and influential membership and leadership of the movement, to provide a claim to the historical continuity of the struggle. They provided a link to the pre-1960s IRA in opposition to the relatively inexperienced involvement of Adams and his supporters. Therefore one of the

⁵¹⁸ Joe O’Neill

⁵¹⁹ Richard McAuley

essential, and most beneficial, steps taken by the leadership was taken in securing the support of other influential old-guard republicans which lessened the continuity claims of O’Bradaigh, O’Conail and others. The importance of the influential old-guard was referred to by sixteen participants in total, with each of the RSF/CIRA referring to the importance of this for them. This supports the position taken in this research that there was an over-reliance from this sub-group on the historical past of the movement and in turn a dearth of progressive planning for how the movement was to move forward.

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	4	4	0	8
RSF/CIRA	5	1	2	8
External Observer	0	0	0	0
Total	9	5	2	16

Table 8b.14: Old-Guard Influential Individuals

In this respect John-Joe McGirl, Joe Cahill and others spoke out in support of the change in the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann. The support of these influential individuals from both the Republic and Northern Ireland significantly strengthened the case for change. This was complimented by the wide variety of support for the change from all sections of Republicanism at both armed and political levels as well as from Republican prisoners. This does not suggest that RSF/CIRA did not gain the support of influential Republicans. In 1969 Comdt. General Tom Maguire, the sole survivor of the Second Dail,⁵²⁰ in the eyes of many members legitimised the existence of the burgeoning Provisional IRA by declaring his support for the breakaway grouping.⁵²¹ In 1986 he transferred his support to the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein.⁵²² The support of Maguire and other influential traditionalist Republicans⁵²³ was utilised by those calling for the maintenance of the status quo as a historical legitimisation for their position.

⁵²⁰ The last Dail to be elected by the electorate of the thirty-counties of Ireland

⁵²¹ He wrote “I hereby further declare that the Provisional Executive and the Provisional Army Council are the lawful Executive and Army Council respectively of the IRA and that the governmental authority delegated in the Proclamation of 1938 now resides in the Provisional Army Council and its lawful successors.”

⁵²² Maguire, T. (October 22nd, 1986). *Entering Leinster House: A Veteran Speaks*.

⁵²³ The Continuity also gained support of people such as George Harrison and Tom Falvey who ran the American gun-running for the IRA. “We categorically reject any move for elected representation to enter into the Leinster House government, an institution imposed in Ireland in 1922 by British guns and bayonets, to serve the interests of British imperialism.” Harrison, G. and Falvey, T. (October 1986). *Open letter to the Irish Republican Movement*.

However, this support was negated to a large extent by the cumulative support from across the movement and across the generations acquired by the Adams leadership.

*“I think people like John Joe McGirl and Seamus Twomey and Joe Cahill and having their support was actually crucial. In a historical sense it would have been nice to have Tom Maguire on our side. I know they went to see him and spoke to him, not really to seek his endorsement but just really to appraise him of what was happening. He didn’t agree with it. I suppose every generation has to decide for itself how it is going to advance the struggle, and not be hampered by decisions of previous generations, but be mindful of their experiences as well.”*⁵²⁴

The importance of influential individuals in decisions of allegiance is further developed in Appendix G.

8b.5 Stage 5 and Stage 1:⁵²⁵ **Aftermath of Split**

The aftermath of the previous two splits are notable for the intense competition for membership and support between the two resultant groupings, leading to violent feuds between the two sets of former comrades. However, this competition was not evident in the same intensity after the 1986 split. Due to the dominance of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein, and the resultantly weak Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein, there were not the extensive feuds which were the embodiment of the previous splits. For the Provisionals the Continuity were not seen as a significant threat to their position within Republicanism and consequently the Continuity were in no way strong enough to mount any significant offensive against a grouping which had, in the years since their split from the Officials, acquired the title of ‘mainstream’ republicanism. For the Provisionals the results of the votes at both the Army Convention and the Ard Fheis allowed them to continue with the politicisation of the movement while maintaining a significant terrorist campaign. However, for the breakaway group the years after were dominated by their immediate objective for organisational survival. This included the necessity of acquiring

⁵²⁴ Pat Doherty

⁵²⁵ The aftermath of the 1986 split constitutes the opening stage of the next split in 1997.

weapons, the recruitment of membership and support and the maintenance of the numbers who originally exited with them.

While both the Provisionals of 1969 and the INLA of 1974 accumulated a reasonable stockpile of weapons and artillery in the lead-up to and in the aftermath of their splits this was not the case for the Continuity IRA of 1986. As has been stated above members of both Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA admit that they had failed to prepare for the eventuality of split. Resources were close to non-existent for the new organisation. Therefore in order to organise any form of armed organisation this necessitated the founding members attempting to acquire arms and finances from internal as well as external supporters and members. The Continuity IRA accuse leading Provisionals of threatening them against setting up a new armed grouping and similarly Republican Sinn Fein indict that in the naissance of the new political party that members and potential members were warned by Provisionals not to join or support the new movement. As has been already stated these threats never reached the scale of violent feuds.

“Next thing we set up [Republican Sinn Fein] and we got ourselves an office and we hadn’t a penny. On the other side, on the army side with regard the Continuity, they hadn’t even a water pistol because they [the Provisionals] had secured all the dumps in between times before this thing took place. They had secured all the dumps and all the guns were in their control...The next thing anyway myself and O’Bradaigh was called to a meeting in Sligo and we were threatened by [Martin] McGuinness and Pat Doherty and they had two henchmen outside the door, and told that we would be shot if another army was set up”⁵²⁶

While the 1986 splits did not result in violent feuds similar to 1974 and 1969/70 one of the comparative outcomes was the refocusing of the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein with respect to who their main enemy was. It is the belief of the Provisionals that the Continuity’s and Republican Sinn Fein’s exploits was not concentrated on bringing an

⁵²⁶ Joe O’Neill

end to British presence in Northern Ireland. Alternatively their focus was on condemning the actions and intentions of the Provisionals.

“We became the focus [of RSF] over and beyond the role of the British and the Irish governments, we became the focus of the energy of Republican Sinn Fein. They spent their time examining what we were doing and criticising it, rather than providing an alternative that would address the question of independence and self-determination.”⁵²⁷

This is an accusation made against the Continuity and especially RSF by Provisionals as well as the other Republican groupings and freelance dissidents. However, it is not one confessed to by the membership of the organisation in question. Such an admittance would constitute for many the failure of the organisation’s actions and goals. While not admitted to by members and supporters it is borne out through the interviews. During the interviews each of the participants across all the organisations were questioned about the modern days activities of their respective groups. During this section of the interviews each RSF and Continuity IRA member placed more emphasis on criticising the Provisional Republican Movement and its leadership rather than emphasising the actions of their own organisation. It was also noted that four members and supporters were actively critical of the actions of both the armed and political wings of their own grouping. This signifies the failure of both Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA to make any significant impact on Irish Republicanism.

“It [the ineffectiveness of the Continuity IRA] is embarrassing, it is not good enough, nothing anywhere near good enough.”⁵²⁸

Through their critical analysis of the Provisional Republican Movement, and the constant historical referencing, they were constantly framing themselves as the ‘true’ Republicans. This belief is further emphasised within the chosen title of the armed wing, *Continuity*

⁵²⁷ Mitchell McLaughlin

⁵²⁸ James Scullion

IRA. It is their belief that as they have not altered the Republican stance or political strategy that they are the only organisation who should be considered as 'true' Irish Republicans maintaining the stance of historical figures throughout Republican history. These criticisms while mainly focused on the Provisional Movement spreads across all of the Republican organisations both dissident and mainstream. This is especially true among the old-guard leadership figures such as Ruairi and Sean O'Bradaigh. However, even if they wish to portray themselves as 'true' Irish Republicans this is not a message which has resonated among the wider Republican community. Since their inception in 1986 both the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein have failed in attracting any significant level of support, a point which is acknowledged and accepted as a failure of the movement by those members of the movement as well as those external. No matter what the intentions or strategies of an organisation nothing can be achieved without an adequate level of support, both passive and active.

8b.6 Split Summary

The 1986 split was the micro-process which effectively began the politicisation of the Provisional Republican Movement. However, it is necessary to emphasise that the origins of this divide lie within the process of the 1969/70 split. This longevity of the process supports

HO3. The roots of the splits will be in previously long standing cleavages.

HO3. While the actors from the politicising side of 1969/70 divide had left to form the Officials many of those old-guard traditionalists opposing them stayed and played the same role in the 1986 split. The Republican cleavage of the abstentionists and non-abstentionists continues throughout the movement from its inception up to the present day. Therefore for a cleavage to be long-standing the actors do not necessarily have to be the same, but the reasoning for cleavage needs to remain constant.

Without the rejection of the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann the gradual movement towards the full acceptance of peaceful politics would not have been possible. The

contrasts between the attempted politicisation by the Goulding leadership and the 1986 success of the Adams/McGuinness leadership have been portrayed throughout the analysis. The Adams/McGuinness leadership changed policy one step at a time as opposed to the Goulding leadership who tried to change too much too soon.⁵²⁹ The contrasting affects of the two tactics are borne out in the resultant strengths of the parent and breakaway groups in both instances. The method employed by the 1986 Provisionals successfully maintained the vast majority of the membership and were therefore able to continue with their politicisation process in the years after. This is in stark contrast to the dramatic split of 1969/70 which resulted in violent feuds and a significantly depleted Official IRA. It is posited that the Adams/McGuinness leadership of the years preceding 1986 had learned from the mistakes and experiences of the Goulding leadership of the 1960s.⁵³⁰ The modern leadership did not attempt multiple political and armed strategy changes in unison. Their strategy was to maintain a strong armed campaign throughout their gradual politicisation of the movement. This therefore assuaged a number of potential dissidents who saw the armed campaign as central to the purpose of the movement. This incremental change was only viewed as threatening to organisational identity by a small portion of the membership. This therefore weakened the dissident grouping numerically, and the pre-split preparation weakened their potential resources. The concept that the 1986 leadership had learned from the mistakes is acknowledged by twelve participants in total, seven of which are members or supporters of RSF/CIRA. This is portrayed in table 8b.15

Group	Leadership	Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional	3	1	0	4
RSF/CIRA	4	1	2	7
External Observer	1 (Official)	0	0	1

Table 8b.15: Lessons learned

As Table 8b.15 illustrates this is a theme deemed significant by seven of the eight participants who were either members or supporters of Republican Sinn Fein and/or the

⁵²⁹ If organisational changes are dramatic and rapid that they could lead to the significant exit of those tied to the original model. Della Porta, (2009), p.76

⁵³⁰ For a justification of the changes in the Irish Republican movement in the 1980s from the point of view of the Provisional Movement see *The Politics of Revolution*. Pp.1-2.

Continuity IRA. For those members this perception of the Adams/McGuinness leadership learning from the mistakes of Goulding's tenure is portrayed in a negative manner. They regarded it as a cynical and calculated political move to deceive members and supporters of their true intentions for the organisation. The belief of these participants is that it was always the intention of the Adams/McGuinness leadership to fully politicise the movement and therefore the maintenance of the armed strategy at this stage was purely to maintain a strong internal support base in their gradual politicising process. A similar assessment is given to their alteration of the abstentionist policy solely to Dail Eireann.

“Number one the Provos had learned from the mistakes the Stickies had made and they didn't put forward the three parliaments they put forward the one, number two they insisted that they were keeping the war going, and that was regarded by many people... as the engine of the whole thing.”⁵³¹

For those four Provisionals who accepted that lessons had been learned from the process of the 1969/70 split while they did acknowledge the importance of gradualism their emphasis was on the value of engaging with the Republican base. One of the most significant themes within the micro-process of 1969/70 was the disconnect between the intentions of the leadership and the expectations of the base. This is deemed to be one of the most significant factors contributing to the result of the 1969/70 split. Similarly it was the 1986 leadership's ability to connect with and engage the expectations of their membership which significantly contributed to their success. This engagement with the base at times required significant convincing and negotiating on the part of the leadership. It was necessary for them to first convince their membership of the necessity for, and the benefits of, proposed change. It is only when they had convinced the majority that they actively attempted to implement the proposals.

Without the gradualism of change and the engagement with the base it is likely that the result of the split would have been a much more even divide numerically. However, it is essential to similarly acknowledge the context in which both splits took place. In

⁵³¹ Ruairi O'Bradaigh

1969/70 the Goulding leadership was at a significantly weak point with respect to internal and external support. It was perceived that they had failed the northern republican and nationalist communities by not supplying adequate defence for them. During this time the expectations of both the membership and the public was that the Republican Movement was there to take significant armed action in the defence and protection of the Republican communities. Therefore the leadership's push to change the political policies of the organisation was met with contempt by a large proportion of the membership and community. This is in contrast with the situation in the lead up to 1986. In the aftermath of the electoral success of Bobby Sands and others there was a belief within the movement that Sinn Fein could potentially make significant electoral advances. Therefore the context of the early to mid-1980s provided opportunity to successfully implement political reform with the movement. This reform, and the emphasis on gradualism, continued right through to present day Republicanism.

Chapter 8 (c)

1997: The Steps Into Peace

8c.1 Introduction

The 1997 split in the Provisional Republican Movement is the final micro-process in the macro-process of republican involvement in the ‘Troubles.’ This process resulted in a split in the Provisional IRA bringing about the formation of the Real IRA and a split in Sinn Fein which culminated in the formation of the breakaway group the 32 County Sovereignty Committee.⁵³² These two groups publicly deny an official connection to each other. However, it is widely recognised that the 32CSM is the political affiliate of the Real IRA. This was supported in the interview with ‘Conor’ who was a leading founding member of the Real IRA.⁵³³

“Representatives from the Army who wanted to split met with the political people (32County Sovereignty Committee) to decide how best to frame the split.”⁵³⁴

As has been previously detailed 1997 was not a major split in Republicanism. Only a small minority of individuals left either the IRA or Sinn Fein. The majority of these left from the PIRA Army Executive,⁵³⁵ with very few political members exiting. The ability of the Provisional leadership to maintain the support of the majority of the membership and fend off a major split allowed for the continued success of the peace process. They successfully maintained the support of those within the middle-ground of Republicanism. These were neither politicisers nor pure advocates of a continued armed campaign. Therefore by convincing the majority of them the leadership maintained their power within Republicanism.

⁵³² Now 32-County Sovereignty Movement.

⁵³³ See also Clarke, L., Sheehan, M., McManus, J. and Ryder, C. (August 23rd, 1998). Out of Darkness. In The Sunday Times.

⁵³⁴ ‘Conor’

⁵³⁵ This is resonant of the split in the PIRA in 1986 where the founding members of the CIRA were predominantly from the Army Executive.

This is a net result of the gradualism of change applied by the Adams/McGuinness leadership throughout the process. They eased the membership into the transition.⁵³⁶ As in the previous splits this was accomplished by gaining the support of influential individuals across the movement. The process in the lead-up to 1997 should be regarded as the continued politicisation of the Irish Republican Movement culminating in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.⁵³⁷ The split had the positive aspect, from the viewpoint of the politicisers, of removing the internal detractors from the movement.⁵³⁸ This allowed the process to continue to the present day with the acceptance of Sinn Fein to take seats in Stormont, the signing of the St. Andrews Agreement, the republican acceptance of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the successful power-sharing of Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in the devolved Northern Irish Assembly. While Northern Irish politics and maintenance of peace continues to be a difficult and highly sensitive process with stumbling blocks along the way the progress made on all sides since 1997 has made Northern Ireland a much safer and developing country.

It is the belief of the author that the lead-up to the 1997 split in the Provisionals should, like the other three splits, be regarded as a micro-process within the macro-process of Republican involvement in the Troubles. However, due to a number of interview based difficulties it cannot be presented as such in the present sub-chapter. As was detailed in the Chapter 4 there were significant difficulties in gaining interviews with members of either the Real IRA or the 32 County Sovereignty Movement. In total three members were interviewed, one member of the Real IRA and two from the 32CSM. The two 32 CSM members were unwilling to discuss the split in the PIRA and therefore there was in total one participant able to give the Real IRA side of the process. Equally only one of

⁵³⁶ Miller 1983 p.312.

⁵³⁷ Paragraph 25 of the Agreement states that “those who hold office should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be excluded or removed from office under these provisions.” Multi-party Agreement (10 April 1998.) *The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement.*, p.9

⁵³⁸ The Real IRA ultimately left the movement due to the Provisional leadership acceptance of the potential for a power-sharing political agreement in place of the use of armed force; See Dingley, J. (2001). The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy and Purpose Behind the Incident. In *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24(6), pp.451-465; This is supportive of the assertion by Balsler which stated that splits can be used to end intra-organisational conflict and remove any internal threat to the desired path for the organisation. Balsler (1997), p.226.

the 32CSM members, Francie Mackey, was actually involved in the split in the political movement. ‘Una’ did not join the 32CSC until 1998, a year after the actual split, therefore she stated that she was unable to speak with any significant authority about why and how the split took place. However, the micro-process of the 1997 split is not only notable for the exit of the Real IRA and 32CSC. Throughout the process a number of individuals left the movement on their own rather than with a group due to their disagreement with a specific action, policy or strategy by the Provisionals. As Table 8c.1 displays four of the participants interviewed became freelance republican dissidents during this process.⁵³⁹ They therefore give an alternative perspective to the process than either the Provisionals or 32CSC/RIRA.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	8	1	0	9
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	0	3
Freelance Republicans	1	3	0	4
External	2 (2 RSF/CIRA)	3 (2 RSF/CIRA, 1 IRSM)	1 (RSF/CIRA)	6
Total	13 (3 external)	8 (6 external)	1 (1 external)	22

Table 8c.1: Participants who discussed the 1997 split.

While there were nine participants who were either ordinary members or leadership figures within the Provisionals during this process a number of them were dismissive of the 1997 split and were unwilling to talk about the actual split in any great detail. However, they were more willing to talk about the general politicisation process within the Provisional Movement. Therefore the present sub-chapter will not be presented as a stage-based micro-process. It is instead presented by first of all detailing a historical analysis of the split 1997 split as well as the modern day situation in Northern Ireland. This is then followed by the analysis of a number of the dominant themes which influenced the outcome of the 1997 split and the continued politicisation of the Provisionals between 1986 and 1997. Four specific themes are focused on in the

⁵³⁹ For an analysis of the reasons why people become freelance dissidents and what this entails see Appendix G. pp. 355-357

analysis, two of which are considered major factors in why and how the split took place. These two themes have been identified as *Change in Strategy* and *Factionalism*. The final two themes have been deemed significant in the result of the split, why the Provisionals were significantly stronger in the aftermath of the split. These themes are *Preparation for Change* and *Gradualism*. As with the previous sub-chapters the themes are supported with the utilisation of quotes gathered during the interview process.

8c.2 Historical Analysis of 1997 Split

The aftermath of the 1986 split saw the continued politicisation of the Provisionals. In 1987 Sinn Fein published ‘Scenario for Peace’ a document which called for an all-Ireland constitutional conference while also replacing the central Republican demand of ‘Brits out’ with one of national self determination.⁵⁴⁰ The following year one of the major advances on the road to a peace process took place with the initiation of talks between Gerry Adams and John Hume the leader of the constitutional nationalist SDLP.⁵⁴¹ While there was denial on behalf of the IRA of the possibility of a ceasefire coming from the talks, the meetings clearly showed the intent to the Republican leadership to look beyond the exclusive use of force. These talks were to prove important as it revealed to republicans and nationalists the possibility of a pan-nationalist front,⁵⁴² a concept the Adams leadership wished to expand on. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s there were significant advances made within the Provisional IRA and Sinn Fein on the move away from an armed campaign. These advances allowed the leadership to enter into, often times secret, negotiations with the British and Irish governments. While the Republican Movement put forward their proposals for the advancement of the peace process to the governments in the form of a document developed throughout the process of the Hume-Adams talks⁵⁴³ Albert Reynolds and John Major⁵⁴⁴ in 1993 negotiated a separate document called the Downing Street Declaration.⁵⁴⁵ This declaration was seen

⁵⁴⁰ Frampton, p.59

⁵⁴¹ Moloney, pp.279-281.

⁵⁴² Frampton, p.91

⁵⁴³ Mallie, E. and McKittrick, D. (1996). *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process*. London: William Heinemann. Pp.189-212 and 270-275.

⁵⁴⁴ The two national premiers at the time.

⁵⁴⁵ English, R. (2006). *Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland*. London: Pan Books. Pp. 403-407.

as a setback in the Republican Movement as it deviated from Hume-Adams but more importantly it saw the Irish government being more willing to negotiate with the British government as opposed to the nationalist and Republican communities,⁵⁴⁶ while also being seen to be more favourable to the Unionist communities. The Army Council rejected the Downing St. Declaration. However, Adams convinced the Council not to reveal their rejection immediately and to ‘play for time.’ They therefore called for clarification on points within the document, while also touring the island to take soundings from their constituencies on their thoughts and aspirations for the movement.⁵⁴⁷ This is a tactic which proved highly beneficial for the Republican Movement as the grassroots membership did not feel aggrieved for not being consulted on major decisions. While it has been noted that these years saw the advancement of the politicisation of the Republican Movement it must also be observed that parallel to this were some of the most vicious attacks ever committed in the name of Irish Republicanism. Included among these was the unprecedented use of what has been referred to as the ‘proxy bomb’ in 1990. This is where Catholic civilians were at gunpoint forced to drive explosive laden vehicles to British army checkpoints where they would be remotely exploded by members of the Provisional IRA. So negative was the backlash from all communities to the use of such a tactic that the Provisionals ceased its use, but maintained other violent tactics.⁵⁴⁸

In 1994 major inroads were made in the burgeoning peace process. In February of that year Gerry Adams was granted a forty-eight hour visa to the United States by President Bill Clinton, a gesture which showed America’s expectation that Adams would be able to deliver a move for the Republican Movement away from the armed struggle. Similarly the Irish government removed the broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein members. These actions can be regarded as a show of faith in the possibility of the Sinn Fein leadership bringing about a cessation of violence. From early to mid 1994 the possibility of such a ceasefire was being discussed at leadership levels within the Provisional Movement. The

⁵⁴⁶ Frampton, pp.91-92.

⁵⁴⁷ Moloney pp. 417-418; This shows a continuation of the leadership’s embracing of active voice with their membership.

⁵⁴⁸ See Bloom, M. and Horgan, J. (2008). Missing the Mark: The IRA’s Proxy Bombing Campaign. *Social Research: An International Quarterly*, 75(2), pp.579-614.

topic was first broached in discussions about the possibility for a short exploratory cessation. While talks had collapsed between Republicans and the British they continued between Republicans and the SDLP and the Irish government, and therefore shifted from targeting British withdrawal to the establishment of a pan-nationalist front.⁵⁴⁹ These talks developed a blueprint for future Republican strategies and actions. However, what the Republican leadership was telling their membership was different to what they were telling the other negotiators.⁵⁵⁰ While negotiations were often times fraught eventually on August 31st 1994 the Army Council of the Provisional IRA announced a four month ceasefire, which was later extended. This announcement was in the acceptance of a fourteen point proposal issued by Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds.⁵⁵¹ This cessation was greeted with celebrations across the whole island of Ireland as well as in Great Britain.⁵⁵²

However, while there were celebrations outside of the Republican Movement, throughout this period there was growing unease among a number of members of the IRA and Sinn Fein that the leadership were moving away from the ultimate aim of the movement, Irish unity. This discontent was at rank and file level but more worryingly for the Army Council it was most prominent within the Army Executive, which had largely been excluded from the negotiation process to that date. They felt that little or no progress was being made on behalf of Republicans and this was being held back by the British government's refusal to sit down with Sinn Fein officials while also standing firm on the need for a significant move by the Republicans on the issue of decommissioning. Within the Executive the discontent was led by the Quartermaster General Michael McKevitt and the IRA Director of Engineering Frank McGuinness. However, these were not the only strong voices of discontent as high ranking members, such as Brian Keenan, also voiced their disapproval. In January 1996 the Executive called an extraordinary General Army Convention. It was clear to the Army Council that the intention of the Executive was to

⁵⁴⁹ *Ibid.* pp.418-422

⁵⁵⁰ The membership was being told that the option of the armed struggle was still there while the constitutional nationalists were informed that the leadership wished to move forward with purely political strategies. This is best illustrated through the use and manipulation of the TUAS document. *Ibid.* p.423; Bean, K. (2007). *The New Politics of Sinn Fein*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Pp.118-120.

⁵⁵¹ Moloney pp.424-425.

⁵⁵² McDonald, H. (2008). *Gunsmoke and Mirrors: How Sinn Fein Dressed Up Defeat as Victory*. Dublin: Gill and MacMillan. Pp.149-151.

bring an end to the ceasefire and end the Adams leadership of the Movement. In a move to prevent this the Army Council met in the same month and called an end to the fifteen month ceasefire. This was dramatically illustrated with a bomb in Canary Wharf in London on February 9th 1996.⁵⁵³

When the Convention eventually took place in October 1996 the Adams leadership had regained some of the faith of the membership due to a number of ‘successful’ IRA attacks on British security targets. However, they still faced considerable dissent among certain members of the Executive and other delegates. The majority of the motions tabled at the convention were critical of the peace process and sought to weaken the power of the Army Council to call extended ceasefires and decommission weapons.⁵⁵⁴ One of the most important votes came with the election of the new Army Council by the new Executive. While it initially seemed that the newly elected Executive would be able to fill the seven man Council with dissident voices alongside Gerry Adams the last minute vote of confidence for the peace process from newly elected Executive member Brian Keenan⁵⁵⁵ and the inability of Frank McGuinness to attend the Convention⁵⁵⁶ the new Council was elected and consisted of a majority of members loyal to the Adams-McGuinness leadership and therefore the peace process.⁵⁵⁷ In the aftermath of the 1996 convention the tense atmosphere continued within the leadership and membership of Sinn Fein and the IRA. In the months following the Convention both Adams and Martin McGuinness issued statements about the possibility of another unequivocal ceasefire and Sinn Fein entering into talks parallel to beginning the process of decommissioning.⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵³ Moloney, pp.433-441.

⁵⁵⁴ George Mitchell issued six principles of non-violence which would govern political talks. De Breadun, D. (2008). *The Far Side of Revenge: Making Peace in Northern Ireland*. Cork: The Collins Press. Pp.15-16

⁵⁵⁵ This is supportive of Dyck and Starke stating that the power of the influential individual endorsement is most significant at a time when they were not previously aligned with that position. Dyck and Starke (1999), p.807

⁵⁵⁶ McGuinness missed one of his connecting pick-ups to the Convention

⁵⁵⁷ Moloney, pp.445-454 and Mooney, J. and O’Toole, M. (2003). *Black Operations: The Secret War Against the Real IRA*. Meath: Maverick House. Pp.22-23

⁵⁵⁸ Moloney pp. 454-457.

One of the major breakthroughs for the entire peace process came with a change of government in Britain. The Conservative government of John Major was replaced with the electorate voting Tony Blair's Labour Party into power. One of Blair's most significant cabinet appointments was that of Mo Mowlam to the position of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Within weeks of her appointment Mowlam gave the Republican Movement the assurance that if they declared a ceasefire that they would be admitted to all-party talks. This removed the obstacle of decommissioning for the leadership. However one of her most impressive achievements at this time was simultaneously convincing the Ulster Unionists to participate in these talks.⁵⁵⁹ In response to this in July 1997 the Army Council voted to call another ceasefire. This ceasefire was justified to the Executive on tactical grounds and with the rising electoral popularity of the Sinn Fein party and the combined pressure of the British and Irish governments the British had set a firm date of September 15th for the start of talks which would be concluded in May 1998. However, there was still distrust of the Adams leadership from the Executive especially from McKeivitt, Frank McGuinness and Brian Gillen. They believed that another ceasefire would only succeed in weakening the IRA. The ceasefire was therefore called without the full support of the Executive.⁵⁶⁰

While the issue of the ceasefire was strengthening the divisions between the Army Council and the Executive it was the Mitchell Principles⁵⁶¹ which heightened the tension to the point of split. The Executive detailed that signing up to the principles would be denouncing the purpose of the IRA and therefore would be unconstitutional. With members of the Sinn Fein negotiating team such as Adams, Martin McGuinness and Pat Doherty not only members of the political party but also the Army Council they were faced with a dilemma. With the Council and the Executive in deadlock over whether this was unconstitutional or not another General Army Convention was convened to decide on the matter. It was clear that the Army Council had prepared well for the

⁵⁵⁹ Taylor, *Provos*, P.354.

⁵⁶⁰ Moloney, pp.464-473.

⁵⁶¹ Guelke, A. (1999). Political Violence and Paramilitaries. In Mitchell, P. and Wilford, R. (Eds.) (1999). *Politics in Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Westview Press. Pp.29-53. (pp.44-45)

Convention⁵⁶² and had assured that they were surrounded by supporters of their standpoint on the matter of the Mitchell Principles, their leadership and the relationship between the Executive and the Council. However, one of the key factors which swung in their favour was the Belfast Commander Brian Gillen changing his affiliation to support Adams' position at the last minute, similar to what Brian Keenan had done the year previously. The entire Convention went in favour of the Adams faction, with support being given to them to enter Stormont talks. The new Executive, while still dissident to the Adams leadership was only so by a margin of two votes. At their first meeting however five key members resigned from the Executive led by the Quartermaster General Michael McKeivitt and the head of the Engineering Department Frank McGuinness. Along with them came the majority of the engineering department and all the Southern Command's quartermasters. They went on to set up a group they titled Oglai na hEireann, but who are constantly referred to as the Real IRA. The official reasoning for the split was given as the acceptance of the Mitchell Principles.⁵⁶³ The armed group was aligned with the political dissidents the 32-County Sovereignty Committee who were led by figures such as Francie Mackey and Bernadette Sands-McKeivitt, the wife of Michael McKeivitt and sister of Bobby Sands. This group formed from dissident members of Sinn Fein in December 1997 in opposition to the signing of the Mitchell Principles and in support of the right for Irish Republicans to use armed struggle in the pursuit of national sovereignty.⁵⁶⁴ The Sovereignty Committee set itself up as a political pressure group, and under the leadership of Mackey and Sands-McKeivitt went about drafting a paper to present to the United Nations accusing the British of denying Ireland of its right to national sovereignty.⁵⁶⁵

In the aftermath of the split the Real IRA became the most dangerous of all the dissident groups. They wished to set themselves apart from the PIRA.

⁵⁶² A Republican source informed that the Convention was "...for Sinn Fein to get the Green Light from the IRA to stick with the peace process, but really it was more about keeping the republican movement together." O'Reilly, E. (August 23rd, 1998). Mickey McKeivitt: Life and Times of a Quartermaster. In *The Sunday Business Post*.

⁵⁶³ Moloney pp.468-479; Taylor (1998) pp.355-363.

⁵⁶⁴ Taylor (1998) pp.358-359.

⁵⁶⁵ Mooney and O'Toole, pp. 47-49; See *Submission by 32 County Sovereignty Committee to United Nations*

*“We urged members that they must kill a British soldier face to face, no sniper, with a gun as the Provos hadn’t done that in years and this would prove that they were different.”*⁵⁶⁶

On August 15th 1998 they were responsible for one of the worst atrocities throughout the whole history of the Northern Irish Troubles. They detonated a bomb in the Co. Tyrone town of Omagh. This bomb killed twenty nine people in total, as well as two unborn babies and injured three hundred and ten others.⁵⁶⁷ In the years after Omagh although they continued their campaign they were decimated with arrests and departures, and it proved close to impossible to recruit new members.

*“The Omagh bombing stopped the influx of new recruits and support, and made people leave who were loyal before.”*⁵⁶⁸

Among the most high profile arrests were those of McKevitt and Liam Campbell the Director of Operations and Colm Murphy⁵⁶⁹ who was arrested for conspiring to cause the Omagh bombing. In October 2002 McKevitt and other imprisoned members of the Real IRA issued a statement calling on the organisation to discontinue activity.

In recent years the Real IRA has reorganised and they are now embarking on a new campaign of violence.⁵⁷⁰ However, they have also faced a split of their own with the development of a small splinter group in 2006 called Oglai na hEireann.⁵⁷¹ This split is believed to have taken place largely on grounds of competition for leadership. The name Oglai na hEireann has proven to be confusing for analysts and policy makers alike. This is a name, meaning *Volunteers of Ireland*, which has been adopted by every group declaring themselves to be the Irish Republican Army but has taken specific

⁵⁶⁶ ‘Conor’

⁵⁶⁷ De Breadun, pp.168-172.

⁵⁶⁸ ‘Conor’.

⁵⁶⁹ Murphy was acquitted on February 24th 2010.

⁵⁷⁰ Breen, S. (February 4, 2008).

⁵⁷¹ Breen, S. (March 15, 2009). Unshakeable Believers in the Power of the Bullet. *Sunday Tribune*

prominence in recent times. This is the name used by the Real IRA in 1997 at the time of the split. However, it has also been used by splinter groups from the Real IRA and intermittingly by the Continuity IRA in claiming responsibility for attacks. Similarly to the Real IRA the Continuity IRA are now facing growing factionalism within their own ranks. It is believed that some of the recent attacks credited to the group have been undertaken without the consent of their Army Council. There is growing unrest within the movement as some of the younger members believe that the Republican Sinn Fein members who dominate the Army Council are holding the movement back and are reducing the chances for the organisation to develop their strategies and tactics.⁵⁷² While the presence of these three dangerous splinter groups is worrying what is more worrying is the evidence that they are willing to work together on both a political and military level. This dates back as far as the Omagh bombing.⁵⁷³

“It was a relatively new organisation; there may well have been liaisons with other Republican groupings in the organising and the carrying out of.”⁵⁷⁴

On a political level members of these groups, and others, are now working together in groups such as the Republican Network for Unity and the New Republican Forum. One of the most prominent modern day political dissident republican groups is Eirigi.⁵⁷⁵ This group was initially established in April 2006 in reaction to the Sinn Fein recognition of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. While Eirigi does not have a military wing a number of their members have been implicated with paramilitary groups such as the Real IRA, most notably Colin Duffy who has been accused of involvement in the murder of two British soldiers at the Massereene barracks in March 2009. Similarly the Republican Network for Unity is a political grouping without a military wing. However a number of their members have been strongly linked by the security services and Sinn Fein to the ongoing activities of the Real IRA. Prominent among these accusations is the allegation that Tony Catney, a former Sinn Fein Director of Elections and life sentence prisoner for

⁵⁷² Mooney, J. (October 4, 2009). Real IRA may be the winners of the Continuity’s big split. *The Sunday Times*.

⁵⁷³ Breen, (February 4, 2008)

⁵⁷⁴ Francie Mackey

⁵⁷⁵ See www.eirigi.org

a sectarian murder, is the leader of the Real IRA in Belfast. This is a claim which Catney regularly denies, however he often prefixes his denial by saying that if he was the Real IRA boss for Belfast he would not admit to it.⁵⁷⁶

While the peace process is internationally acknowledged to have been successful it is unmistakable that the Republican threat is still prominent across Ireland and Great Britain.⁵⁷⁷ However, in contrast to the ‘war’ waged by the Provisional IRA these new dissident groups are much smaller groupings, with little or no support, utilising different tactics and strategies from their Provisional predecessors. There is a stated specific targeting of Catholic members of the PSNI and members of the British Army. However alongside the threat to the security forces the dissidents are now also targeting their former comrades in Sinn Fein and across ‘mainstream’ Republicanism. While these and other differences are clear to see it is vital in order to gain an understanding of the groups, their origins and membership that one assesses the splits and groups that have come before them and the changes they went through.

8c.3 Change in Strategy: Armed and Political to Political

As the historical analysis of the split illustrates the major change in the Provisional Republican Movement in the process of the 1997 split was a change from an armed and political strategy to a predominantly political strategy. As will be described in the sections outlining the importance of gradualism and pre-split preparation this continuation of the politicisation process was successful for the Provisional leadership due to their continuation of only making significant changes one step at a time and ensuring that they had significant levels of internal support prior to attempting these changes. However, as with the previous splits the leadership were unable to convince all the membership of the importance of the change and a minority deemed this move away from the armed strategy as significantly damaging to the organisational identity. For as long as there was a British presence in Ireland the armed strategy was seen by the

⁵⁷⁶ Barnes, C. (July 19, 2009). Killer: I’m No Terror Boss. *Sunday Life*. See also Catney on RTE, *Prime Time*, February 16th 2010.

⁵⁷⁷ See IMC Reports 22 and 23 and Tonge, J. (2004). ‘They Haven’t Gone Away, You Know.’ Irish Republican Dissidents and Armed Struggle. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(3), pp.671-693.

dissidents as central to the Irish Republican strategy, and therefore any removal of the strategy would be deemed as threatening to what they perceived to be the organisational identity. Hence this is supportive of

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

This change in strategy was identified by six of the participants as a significant factor in the 1997 split as displayed in Table 8c.2

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	4	1	0	5
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	0	3
Freelance Republicans	0	1	0	1
External	1 (1 RSF/CIRA)	0	0	1
Total	7(1 external)	3	0	10

Table 8c.2: Change in Strategy from Armed and Political to Armed

For those who moved away from the Provisionals to form the Real IRA in particular the rejection of the armed strategy which came with the acceptance of the Mitchell Principles proved too significant a change for them to countenance. While there had been cessations throughout Republican history the agreement amounted to a permanent move away from any form of armed strategy by the Provisional Republican Movement, and the acceptance of a devolved Stormont Assembly. For a minority of the movement this proved to be too significant a change, one which significantly threatened the organisational identity.

“It’s when people signed up to the Mitchell principles and went on to sign up to the Good Friday Agreement that there had to be a split because they signed up to things which were completely the opposite to what Republicanism stands for.”⁵⁷⁸

⁵⁷⁸ ‘Una’

There was a view within sections of the Provisional Movement that the PIRA was at its strongest point in history, both in manpower and in its arsenal. For some of those aware of the significance of the armed faction's strength there was a belief that the armed campaign should therefore be continued, and possibly intensified.

“The Army were stronger than ever in the lead up to 1997. If weapons were there, prior to split, why couldn't we use them?”⁵⁷⁹

However, this was not a view shared by the majority of the movement. While the PIRA was significantly strong in both regards it was not believed that an accentuated armed campaign would benefit the pursuit of a united Ireland. The belief among the leadership and their supporters was that the context of the situation had changed and that there were no longer any benefits in, or support for, an armed campaign. Their retrospective analysis of the situation outlines that, as with the abstentionists who moved away in 1986, the 1997 dissidents had confused a tactic with a principle.⁵⁸⁰ To the dissidents the armed campaign was, for as long as there was a British presence in Ireland, a principle of the Movement. However, for the politicisers this was a tactic that was utilised within a specific context to serve the purpose of that time. In their eyes its employment no longer had a purpose.

“I think it is mixing up principles with tactics or strategy. Whatever you think of the armed struggle people went into it because they thought that that was the only choice. An armed struggle, in my opinion, always has to be the last choice, the choice that you had no choice but to make.”⁵⁸¹

For the dissidents it was not just the ending of the armed campaign, it was everything that came with this which provoked their exit. In their minds this was analogous to the failure of the armed strategy and therefore the pointlessness of over thirty-years of what they constituted as 'war.' They could not be convinced of the acceptance of political

⁵⁷⁹ 'Conor'

⁵⁸⁰ See Lynn (2002), p.74-75

⁵⁸¹ Gerry Kelly

participation in a Northern Irish state which they failed to recognise. In essence they saw the politicisation of the movement as a betrayal to what they held as their republican principles. This was the net threat of the proposed changes. However, for those internal advocates of politicisation they regarded the context to have made the need for political participation as pertinent and as a strategy from which they could achieve much more than through armed action.

“I think politics was relevant, and again we were in a new phase in the developing peace process. The view that politics equalled betrayal was still strong among some of those people, and we couldn’t bring them around to the various challenges that the peace process threw up. They saw that as moving away from the fundamentals of Republicanism. They never really proved the case they just... I suppose the Mitchell Principles gave them a bit of a challenge and that is where they made their stand. But again they weren’t a major... The vast, vast majority of the movement stayed together.”⁵⁸²

With this change in strategy came internal factionalism and conflict. This mainly took place within the PIRA.

8c.4 Factionalism

As the previous section suggests the main factionalism within the movement during this split was between those who were committed to the politicisation of Republicanism and those who wished to retain the armed campaign. This is illustrated in Table 8c.3

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	1	0	0	1
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	0	3
Freelance Republicans	0	3	0	3
External	0	0	0	0
Total	3	4	0	7

Table 8c.3: Factionalism: Armed/Political

⁵⁸² Pat Doherty

As has been stated earlier the focus of the intra-organisational conflict was within the PIRA leadership. Similar to both the 1986 and 1969/70 splits some have looked to define it as a divide between northern and southern republicans,⁵⁸³ an opinion put forward by six of the participants, as displayed in Table 8c.4.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	2	0	0	2
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	0	0	2
Freelance Republicans	0	2	0	6
External	0	0	0	0
Total	4	2	0	6

Table 8c.4: Factionalism: North/South Divide

This north/south divide is portrayed very differently by those who left to form the dissident groupings and their former allies who stayed within ‘mainstream’ Republicanism. This points to the power of local influences and regionalism even among those at leadership levels and therefore would seem to counter.

HI1: The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split.

And suggests an extension to

HI2. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be predominantly tied to local influences and situations.

so as to include leadership members.

⁵⁸³ While the majority of those who moved away to form 32CSC and the RIRA were from the Republic of Ireland the majority of southern republicans stayed with the Provisionals after the split. Similarly not all northern republicans stayed with the Provisionals and some left to join 32CSC or the RIRA.

For the dissidents the regional divide both during and after the process of split was as a result of the northern leadership's failure to focus any significant attention on either the role of the southern membership or the potential for progress within the twenty-six counties. This led to a sense of alienation among the southern leadership and membership.

*"I think that it [the north/south divide] is very true in the Provisional Movement following 86. The northern leadership alienated the south, there is no doubt. It is only in later years that they moved with their southern project. But prior to the more recent electoral successes in the south following 98, prior to that there was no great push in the South for electoral politics."*⁵⁸⁴

However, within the Provisional leadership the view of and explanation for the north/south divide comes from a different standpoint. For them the reasoning is not due to an abandonment of southern republicanism, in their eyes it is best explained by their distance from the epicentre of the struggle. For those living in Northern Ireland they had to experience the daily effects of a maintained armed campaign and were critically aware of the lack of support within the Republican communities or across the wider nationalist population for a sustained campaign. There was an awareness of the need, and potential, for an alternative strategy. In their eyes the southern members still advocating an armed campaign were able to distance their lives from the daily consequences of an extended armed campaign.

*"It was interesting that the shaving off in almost all these incidences was southern based, not entirely, but mostly...People who are affected you will find have a more practical application of their beliefs than people who are sometimes just a couple of hundred yards away, sometimes people who are further away from the epicentre."*⁵⁸⁵

⁵⁸⁴ Francie Mackey

⁵⁸⁵ Gerry Kelly

Looking beyond the northern/southern divide within the split the core reasoning for the schism, as illustrated earlier, was the debate over the purpose and necessity of a continued armed campaign. For those departing the Provisionals to continue to administer and support the continuation of an armed strategy they framed their justification as lying in the fact that a united Ireland had not yet been achieved. Therefore they portrayed themselves as ‘morally’ committed to the continuation of the struggle until a stage when this ultimate objective had been achieved. It was only then that they would justify calling for a discontinuation of the violent campaign.

“We didn’t pick up guns for this agreement. Morally we couldn’t stop as we hadn’t gotten what we start out to get.”⁵⁸⁶

This is supportive of

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

HO2. As was detailed in the previous section they deemed this to be significantly threatening to the organisational identity of the movement. However, in contrast those advocating the change regarded the need for an armed campaign to be over and the context of the situation of the time was providing the need for a different approach to Irish Republicanism.

“It’s just he [McKevitt] wouldn’t wake up and smell the coffee that the reality is the war was over.”⁵⁸⁷

This divergence of positions ultimately caused the split within the movement. However, it did not solely explain the result of the division.

⁵⁸⁶ ‘Conor’

⁵⁸⁷ Joe Doherty

8c.5 Gradualism: One Step at a Time

Throughout the process of the 1986 split one of the most dominant themes which explained the reasoning for Provisional dominance in the aftermath of the divide was the gradual nature in which changes were made or proposed. This strategy allowed members and supporters to become accustomed to the implications of each individual change prior to the introduction of the next. While this inevitably prolonged the armed campaign it similarly weakened the position of potential dissident groupings. As was demonstrated with the 1969/70 split when there are a number of potentially divisive changes made or proposed within a short space of time the position of the dissident grouping is strengthened. When there is only one change made at a time this isolates the potential dissidents who will view this as threatening to the organisational identity of the movement. Due to the positioning of the 1997 split at the end of the macro-process of republican involvement in the Troubles one must not only consider the changes being made within the movement at the time of and in the immediate lead-up to the split. The 1997 split must be seen as a continuation of the macro process of Provisional republicanism and is therefore a continuation of the process began with the 1969/70 split. Therefore the politicisation of the movement in the lead-up to 1997 was a continuation of the politicisation process which was identified in the last sub-chapter as having started in 1975. Therefore the gradualism of the 1997 process is a continuation of the gradualism which was introduced in the process of the 1986 split.

As with 1986 the changes implemented by the Provisional leadership in the lead-up to 1997 were potentially divisive within the movement and therefore in order to maintain organisational survival, unity and the survival of their politicisation process they needed to ensure that the implementation of the internal disruption caused by the changes was minimal. Therefore there was the continuation of the application of gradualism which had been largely successful in maintaining organisational unity in the lead-up to 1986. This is a viewpoint accepted by both the Provisionals and the 32CSC/RIRA as is displayed in Table 8c.5.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	3	1	0	4
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	0	3
Freelance Republicans	1	3	0	4
External	1 (1 RSF)	0	0	1
Total	7 (1 External)	5	0	12

Table 8c.5: Gradualism: One Step at a Time

For the dissidents they looked upon this strategy of gradual change as reflective of the ‘dishonesty’ of the Adams/McGuinness leadership. By changing policies and strategy in this gradual manner they were, in the eyes of the dissidents, betraying the trust of their membership and support network. The view portrayed by the dissenting voices was that the leadership were never fully honest with their members about the direction in which they were taking Provisional republicanism. However, even though they were critical of the use of this strategy of gradualism in implementing desired changes they were similarly complimentary of the effectiveness of the strategy, even if they did not agree with the overall strategy of change implemented.

“It was broken down to single issue and that was the only issue being dealt with, as if all of the issues weren’t co-related. That allowed the leadership the breathing space throughout the whole period to go that one step closer.”⁵⁸⁸

As the above quote from Mackey suggests the application of gradualism was necessary for the maintenance of organisational survival and cohesion as well as the successful continuation of the politicisation process. This is a view supported by the Provisional leadership who acknowledge that this gradual nature change was a necessity in order to achieve the successful politicisation of the majority of the movement.

⁵⁸⁸ Francie Mackey

“It’s a protracted thing. If you look at the situation where in 91 or 92 or whatever it became public that the SDLP and Sinn Fein were in discussions and had been in discussions with the Dublin government, channels had been opened up with the British and all this stuff led in turn to the first cessation and then to the breakdown of that cessation nearly eighteen months later and then to a new cessation in 97 and then to the Good Friday Agreement in 98 and all that has flowed after the Good Friday Agreement. It’s all, none of it has been done (clicks fingers twice to indicate quick succession of changes) it’s always we’re looking for clarification. Obviously we did want that, but there would be other times we did want clarification obviously so that we could have fuller discussion in republicanism to inform people and to try and bring people with you. There is not much point having an organisation if it fractures and if you’re not able to try and hold it as a coherent working group.”⁵⁸⁹

The final sentence within the above quote emphasises the core point at the heart of the gradualism. When an organisational leadership sees the necessity to implement a battery of significant changes to the direction taken by the group they will only be successful if and when they are able to convince the majority of their membership and support of the benefits and necessity of these changes. While it is possible that they may have wished to implement all of the changes which took place over the twenty-three year period from the beginning of the politicisation in 1975 to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 it was feasible to convince the majority of the membership of the necessity of all of the changes. Similarly the context of the situation did not always permit or suggest the realistic potential of these changes. Therefore the changes had to be implemented in a gradual manner, one step at a time, in order for the organisation could successfully reach a point where the majority of the republican membership were able to reach a point of acceptance of a series of significant changes which enabled Sinn Fein to successfully engage in the peaceful of modern day Northern Ireland where they share the office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister with the Democratic Unionist Party. Each of the changes successfully implemented by the movement from the mid 1970s right up to today

⁵⁸⁹ Sean McManus

have been part of a process of the politicisation of modern day Republicanism. This dissertation posits that the historical changes within Sinn Fein policy could not have been possible without a number of the changes which preceded them both in policy and organisational structure. The mistakes of the Goulding leadership in trying too much too soon were the lessons learned by the Adams/McGuinness leadership in implementing a strategy of gradual change.

“There could have been much more disaffection, not necessarily splits, but I think people at each stage became accustomed to what had just happened and then were much more prepared and ready to adopt the next stage. You know if you had said walking around the place in the yard August 1994 “we’re going to be supporting the amendment of Articles 2 and 3,⁵⁹⁰ ending the Northern abstentionism, supporting a new police service, the IRA is going to first of all open its dumps, its precious dumps, you know these weapons that had been painstakingly smuggled into the country, open its dumps, then seal its dumps forever, and that Martin McGuinness was going to end up in government with Ian Paisley”. I mean that was so fantastic, and fabulous, if you had said that to me in July 1994 I would have been sending for the men in white coats. But as things progressed you could see that each decision you took had a repercussion or a ramification and I don’t think that anybody from either side, I don’t think Paisley for example back in July 1994 thought that “in ten years time I’ll be in government with the former Chief of Staff of the IRA”, because that would have been again too much for him. I think that once people had it in their hearts that they were going to make peace and they were going to stabilise it and it was the best deal that we could get, even though you cannot do justice to the dead or the sacrifices of the dead, but this is the best shape you can make of it, and you have to go and do it, you have to go in in good

⁵⁹⁰ These were articles within the Irish Constitution which were a territorial claim to Northern Ireland as a legitimate part of Ireland. *Bunreacht na hEireann* (1937). This proved to be one of the most contentious issues in bringing unionists, loyalists, nationalists and republicans to work together. However, these were removed from the Irish constitution with the passing of the Good Friday Agreement in May 1998 and were effectively amended when the agreement came into force in December 1999.

faith, even if it means doing unpalatable things, if it means sitting down with former enemies, you know.”⁵⁹¹

This theme of gradualism is further support for

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of a split.

HO4. Hirschman⁵⁹² states that the sub-group within a political organisation most flexible in their policy and strategic positioning are more likely to gain more supporters than those who are fundamentally fixed to their position and unwilling to compromise in any way. As was displayed in the process of the 1986 split this proved to be detrimental to Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA with respect to the politicisation of the movement. Due to their insistence on the provision of both the armed campaign and the abstentionist policies they were unable to successfully compete for membership and support with the politicising leadership who were maintaining the armed campaign while only changing the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann. This maintenance of the armed campaign while also preserving the abstentionist policies to Stormont and Westminster drew their policies closer to the developing sub-group of Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA. They therefore were able to recruit the majority of the membership to their position and thus attract a number of potential dissidents to ‘mainstream’ Republicanism. This was a strategy which continued throughout the peace process. It was only when the leadership had established a base of membership and support that they moved on to implement the next significant change. Therefore their position was gradually moving along the scale from armed to political and in the process they were maintaining the majority of internal support and thus isolating the dissidents who could not gain any significant strength as they were in the minority at each stage of the process of change.

⁵⁹¹ Danny Morrison

⁵⁹² Hirschman (1970)

8c.6 Preparation for Change: Support

While the success of the politicisation of the movement is largely down to the gradual nature of the changes implemented this does not fully explain the situation. Many of the changes implemented throughout the process of the 1997 split were potentially divisive in nature. Therefore as with the changes implemented in the 1986 process there needed to be significant preparation made by the leadership prior to implementing the amendments. This required the assurance of sufficient support for the changes and as a continuation of the 1986 process this was carried out through the application of internal dialogue with the membership. The importance of support had to be viewed as both an immediate aim as well as a longitudinal target. In essence the leadership needed to be sure that they could have specific votes passed without significant levels of divisiveness manifesting in the long-term as a result. The importance of this preparation for change and internal support was seen by the participants among the most decisive factors in the successful implementation of change in the movement, and significant within this was the respect for timing of change. In order to successfully implement potentially divisive changes the context and timing needed to compliment the need for change. It was most receptive to change when the leadership proposing it was in an internally strengthened position and therefore had the support for their own personal leadership and not just for the changes they were proposing. A strengthened position for them enhanced the trust the membership had in them. Therefore as with the 1986 process they implemented the strategy of, where possible, distancing themselves from introducing divisive issues until the point where they were confident of internal support for both them and the change. The importance of these themes within the 1997 micro-process is illustrated in the tables below.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	4	1	0	5
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	0	0	2
Freelance Republicans	1	3	0	4
External	0	0	0	0
Total	7	4	0	11

Table 8c.6: Preparation for Change

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	5	0	0	5
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	0	3
Freelance Republicans	0	3	0	3
External	2 (2 RSF/CIRA)	3 (1 RSF/CIRA, 1 IRSM)	0	5
Total	9 (2 external)	7 (3 external)	0	16

Table 8c.7: The Importance of Internal Support

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	4	0	0	4
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	1	0	0	1
Freelance Republicans	0	1	0	1
External	0	0	0	0
Total	5	1	0	6

Table 8c.8: The Importance of Timing

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	0	0	0	0
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	0	3
Freelance Republicans	0	2	0	2
External	0	0	0	0
Total	2	3	0	5

Table 8c.9: The Application of Leadership Distancing.

The leadership's preparation for change does not just refer to the immediate lead-up to the ultimately divisive Army Convention of 1997 this preparation includes all the major changes implemented from 1986 onwards. One specific example six of the participants, including all three of the 32CSC/RIRA members, was the preparation which preceded the August 1994 ceasefire. In order to ensure organisational support for the cessation the leadership had been preparing all levels of membership and support for this possibility for a significant period prior to the actual declaration. This was highlighted both in the

external Republican community and within the Republican prison communities. The leadership met with their communities to discuss the potential for a cessation and to gauge the levels of support of resistance within these communities to the proposals, and the entire politicisation process. They were also preparing members for what they could realistically expect from the process and how this would benefit the entire process seeking to achieve their ultimate and immediate goals.

“That’s what was good about coming up to the ceasefire I think Adams and the people went out into all the Sinn Fein Cumanns. And in the prison [Martin] McGuinness and Gerry Kelly was almost in there every other week, the British allowed them to come in. Everybody went into the canteen, McGuinness was there asking questions and taking questions preparing everybody for ‘you know the reality is we’re going to enter negotiations, we might not get a united Ireland. Be realistic look at the bigger picture.’”⁵⁹³

It was this persistent preparation and engagement with all levels of membership which allowed the leadership to gauge the sentiment within the movement and as a result they were aware when the timing for change, in this case a cessation of IRA violence, was right. This preparation prior to each change, not just the 1994 ceasefire, allowed for them to gauge the levels of support and the potential for splits within the movement. Therefore they were able to pursue their desired course at the most opportune time when their leadership was not being challenged and also when the opposition to the proposed change was at its weakest point. Therefore the more control the leadership had over the context in which the changes were implemented the more potential they had for success. However, as the violence in the summer of 1969 showed, the leadership does not always have control of the external context in which the change is being made. Therefore the most opportune time for change, in order to maintain organisational survival, is when external events have as minimal impact on the internal changes as possible.

⁵⁹³ Joe Doherty

As was detailed in Chapter 7, which introduced the analysis chapters, the modern day Provisional leadership do not regard 1997 as a split in the Movement. They see it more as a split which was fended off by their internal dialogue in the lead-up to the potentially divisive moments.

“So I think that it took considerable skill, dialogue and debate and management to insure that what happened then didn’t turn out to be a re-split, which is what the Real IRA people and the 32 County Sovereignty Movement were trying to bring about. So it was fended off then.”⁵⁹⁴

This is not a completely accurate depiction of the situation as a split was not fended off. But the dialogue and debate and preparation for change did result in a weakened dissident grouping. With respect to the two divisive Army Conventions, 1996 and 1997, the pre-change preparations were carried out through both ‘above board’ recruitment of influential individuals to support their position and what the Provisionals in the aftermath of 1969/70 referred to as ‘internal methods.’ This support was gained through the dialogue as detailed above.

Similar to 1986 it was essential for the leadership to have the support of influential individuals both locally and nationally to successfully to maintain the backing of the majority of the movement. These individuals and groupings within the movement provided legitimacy to the position being taken by the leadership. These influential individuals from within the Republican Movement and across Republican history were convinced to lend their support to the proposed actions of the leadership at times of potential conflict. As was stated in the historical examination of the split Brian Keenan,⁵⁹⁵ a well respected senior IRA activist and strategist, moved from being a disapproving voice within towards the peace process to one of the most effective

⁵⁹⁴ Martin McGuinness

⁵⁹⁵ See interviews with Keenan in *An Phoblacht* for his account of his Republican past; *An Phoblacht* (March 27, 2008). An IRA leader is Born. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.4-5; *An Phoblacht* (April 3, 2008). From Civil Rights to Armed Struggle. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.6-7; *An Phoblacht* (April 10, 2008). Revolutionaries have to be Pragmatic-Wish Lists are for Christmas. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.10-11

proponents of change during the 1990s. His move from dissenter to supporter provided invaluable legitimacy to the leadership's position and proposals.

“At key stages in all of this key people in local areas and at a regional area were wheeled out to say that this was 100% sound. If a key person known in the locality to be in the IRA, if that person says that something was right well then it was taken as right and that they must have had some reassurances.”⁵⁹⁶

The above quote provides further support to the leadership's use of distancing in their advocating of change. The ability of the Sinn Fein leadership to publicly distance themselves from the decision making of the IRA leadership gave them extra time in the external negotiation process as was detailed by Sean McManus in his previous quote where he mentioned the leadership calling for 'clarifications.' However, internally within the organisation the support and use of key figures such as Keenan allowed them to distance themselves from the initial suggestion of troublesome proposals such as decommissioning or the dropping of abstentionism to Stormont. It was similarly important for them to acquire the support not only of influential individuals but also influential regional divisions of the movement. Throughout the Troubles the central area of the Provisional IRA was always Belfast. This is where some of the most active units were based and where a significant number of prominent leaders were stationed. In September 1969 the significance of the Belfast IRA denouncing of the Goulding leadership is seen by many as one of the most significant moments in the beginning of the Provisional IRA.

“That was the beginning of the split; that is where it happened first. In Belfast the IRA split and they set up the Provisional IRA.”⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁶ Francie Mackey

⁵⁹⁷ Thomas MacGiolla.

Similarly when the politicising sub-group of the Provisional leadership acquired the support of the Belfast IRA it was clear to the dissidents that a dissident majority was impossible and that they would have to leave the movement rather than take it over.

“Once the Adams faction had the Belfast members on their side we knew that they couldn’t take a majority.”⁵⁹⁸

As was suggested earlier in the section this support was not always gained through ‘legitimate’ means. For the necessary success of Army Convention votes in particular there was the usage of what the Provisionals of the 1969/70 split entitled ‘internal methods.’ This was particularly enforced in the Army Convention of 1996. This is a point referred to by six participants, although none of them were affiliated to the Provisionals in the aftermath of the split, as is illustrated in Table 8c.9.⁵⁹⁹

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Membership	Supporter	Total
Provisional Republican Movement	0	0	0	0
32 County Sovereignty Committee/ Real IRA	2	1	0	3
Freelance Republicans	0	3	0	3
External	0	0	0	0
Total	2	4	0	6

Table 8c.10: Usage of ‘internal methods’ in 1996 Army Convention.

As was outlined in the historical analysis in the introduction to this chapter the 1996 convention was potentially extremely damaging for the Adams leadership. In light of this they are reported to have organised for influential dissidents such as Frank McGuinness and others not to be picked up for the Convention so as to ensure that the vote to support and re-elect them was passed. This was to ensure the immediate survival of the movement and their leadership. But it was coupled with the maintenance, and regaining, of support throughout the movement so as to ensure the longitudinal survival of the leadership.

⁵⁹⁸ ‘Conor’

⁵⁹⁹ It would not be expected that the Provisionals would admit to this.

“That is actually the Army Convention where people were not brought. They were left on the sides of roads and stuff, so that Adams could get the vote. He had that all planned well in advance.”⁶⁰⁰

This is an accusation made by each of the dissident groupings at each of the times of splits, it is also an accusation which precedes the 1969 birth of the Troubles. However, the ability of a leadership to survive one vote through such means does not guarantee the survival of their process. They additionally require the longitudinal support of the majority of their membership and base. This is what the Provisional leadership have achieved and this is one of the major reasons for their ability to maintain the politicisation of the movement, a macro-process which dates back to the end of the Border Campaign and continues to the modern day.

“Clearly you didn’t bring all people with you. But one of the accomplishments of the leadership of both Oglagh na hEireann and Sinn Fein is that they brought by far the majority of their members with them into the process, through the process and out the other side of the process. I don’t think it was humanly possible to avoid some of the disaffections.”⁶⁰¹

⁶⁰⁰ Dolours Price

⁶⁰¹ Mitchell McLaughlin

Chapter 9.

Discussion and Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

The initial purpose of this dissertation was to contribute to, and advance, the understanding of splits across the fields of social science by focusing on four splits in the Irish Republican Movement from 1969 to 1997. The work was predominantly based within the discipline of International Relations, terrorism research specifically. In spite of this the theoretical and methodological foundations span wide across the social sciences and is therefore notable for its inter-disciplinarity. In order to make the necessary advances in all aspects of and terrorism research the various disciplines need to engage with one another so as to develop the most comprehensive understanding possible, as no individual field has all the answers.⁶⁰² The theoretical understanding of splits in the Irish Republican Movement has been advanced here by engaging with the existing literature while also assessing the potential contributions to be made by, among others, economic theory,⁶⁰³ the analysis of organised religion,⁶⁰⁴ and the methodologies of health psychology.⁶⁰⁵

There are necessary advances to be made in the study of splits in both organisational and terrorism research. In the general organisational literature the discourse needs to move beyond why and how splits take place and focus more on the functionality of the splits across different types of organisations. The present research has strived to advance this by utilising the splits as the basis for a stage-based process model to analyse the politicisation of Irish Republicanism. Specifically the research aspired to assess the mechanisms by which the Provisional Republican Movement moved from an extended terrorist campaign to the acceptance of the value of democratic politics. The inter-connectivity of these splits allowed the researcher to assess the split both in a

⁶⁰² An Editorial. (1957) *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1/1. pp.1-2. (p.1)

⁶⁰³ Hirschman (1970)

⁶⁰⁴ Sani and Reicher (1999); Dyck and Starke (1999)

⁶⁰⁵ Smith, Jarman, and Osborn (1999).

comparative manner, while also assessing the extended process of politicisation across the given time-line.

The analysis of splits in terrorist groups is still in its naissance and is stunted by its constant inclusion in the 'end of terrorism' literature. It is too blinkered to assess the splits purely in this manner. As the present research has shown the occurrence of an organisational split is not analogous to the end of terrorism or the end of the terrorist group. Approaching the topic from this standpoint fails to acknowledge the variety of forms of split which have no relationship with the end of terrorism literature and by considering it with this notion of finality will invariably fail to appreciate the long-term effects which the split may have. To illustrate this point the 1969/70 split, which was central to the present analysis and a split which continues to shape modern day Ireland and Northern Ireland, may be either described as a significant stage in the Official IRA's move away from terrorism or most notably the birth of the Provisional IRA. Similarly each of the other three splits analysed saw the establishment of new terrorist groupings. Therefore it proves more accurate to describe an organisational split as a mode of terrorist group formation, or the end of an organisation as a unified political movement rather than as an end of terrorism.⁶⁰⁶

Within the analysis sub-chapters and appendices the presentation of the results has been presented parallel with a discussion of their meaning and relevance. Therefore while there is a further, more focused, discussion of some of the main findings the concentration of this concluding chapter is on the assessment of the contribution which the research has made and to point the way forward for future studies. Within this there is also a critical analysis of the methodology applied

9.2 Present Study Findings

Through the previous sub-chapters there was a detailed discussion of the relevance and importance of the results with specific reference to the split being analysed. While there was also a continuous comparison and contrast with previous processes throughout the

⁶⁰⁶ Oots (1989), p.142.

present section brings these findings together and outlines the main findings of the research. This is discussed with reference to the research questions, hypotheses and firstly the testing of the proposed models of organisational split and split avoidance.

9.2.1 Testing of Stage-Based Process Models

At the end of the theoretical chapters there were two stage-based process models proposed. There was one proposed for organisational split

Stage 1: The Origins of Split

Stage 2: Factional Development

Stage 3: Inevitability of and Preparation for Split

Stage 4: Organisational Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

Stage 5: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation.

The second model proposed hypothesised split-avoidance

Stage 1: The Origins of Conflict

Stage 2: Factional Development

Stage 3: Successful Application of Voice

Stage 4: Organisational Change *or* Maintenance of Status Quo

Stage 5: Aftermath of Conflict: Re-Organisation

It was proposed that the third stage of the models was what invariably decided the result of the conflict and factionalism. The two models were identical for the first two stages. However, with either the preparation for split or the successful application of voice the conflict was either resolved or accentuated resulting in split. These models were developed by first considering a number of separate models, stage-based process models and otherwise. These were from across the organisational and terrorism literature.

The model of split was tested using the data gathered through the extensive interview process on the first three splits.⁶⁰⁷ Due to the insufficiencies with the data gathered for the fourth and final split the researcher was not capable of testing it on this case. Similarly due to the insufficiencies of the data the model of split avoidance was unable to be tested on and conflict which avoided split. The three Provisional splits tested were considered micro-processes within the macro-process of Provisional involvement in the 'Troubles' and similarly the two Official splits considered two micro-process within their involvement in the 'Troubles.'

9.2.1.1 1969/70

The case of the 1969/70 split was supportive of the hypothesised model of split as the analysis of the interview data, and separate validating sources, indicated that this split went through each of the five proposed stages. Within this specific process the vital third stage was marked by the pre-split preparation of the Provisionals and the continued disconnect between the Goulding leadership and the expectations of the Republican membership and public. This process resulted in the split of the movement in 1969/70, a split which was accentuated by the Northern violence of August 1969 and the perceived failure of the IRA to defend the nationalist communities. The evenness of this divide invariably resulted in a change of focus in both groups from the purposive goal of gaining a unified Ireland to damaging their former allies in the violent feuds between the Officials and Provisionals. The dominant theme throughout this split was that of 'too much too soon' in reference to the excessive changes the Goulding leadership tried to bring about. These ranged from left-wing political strategy to the dropping of the abstentionist policies. Within this split the Goulding leadership tolerated voice for too long in the third stage rather than resisting it and thus strengthened the position of the dissidents.⁶⁰⁸ However, they learned their lesson for the 1974 split.

⁶⁰⁷ 1969/70, 1974 and 1997

⁶⁰⁸ See Dyck and Starke, p.817

9.2.1.2 1974

The split of 1974 did not fit the proposed model. The proposed third stage was bypassed by the expulsion of Seamus Costello and colleagues by the Official leadership. This resulted in the process not being a five-stage model but a four-stage model due to the forced exit of those who formed the IRSM. While the 1969/70 split could be marked as a standard organisational split the case of 1974 is an example of forced split. While it was a forced split there was preceding factionalism notable for Seamus Costello's pursuit of power and the Official leadership's imposition of the strategy of defence and retaliation. Due to the bypassing of the third stage of the process the IRSM were never able to properly prepare for either split or organisational change. Resultantly they had neither a sufficient organisational structure nor leadership succession plan in place to adequately survive the resultant violent feuds or make a significant extended political impact.

9.2.1.3 1986

The 1986 split in the Provisionals resulted in the formation of the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein. However, it did not fit in the process model for organisational split. It was closer in fit to the model for split avoidance. The third stage of this split is marked by the success of the new-guard in taking over the leadership from the old-guard of O'Bradaigh and O'Conail, and simultaneously gradually implementing some of their proposed changes. However, in the fourth stage where the avoidance model suggests that the conflict should have been resolved a minor split took place with the successful dropping of abstentionism to the Dail. The dissidents were the residual old-guard who had not accepted the gradual politicisation of the movement, and therefore moved away to form their autonomous organisation. Even though a split did take place it did not support the proposed process model. This suggests that the proposed model is suitable to model relatively even divides. However, when the divide results in one significantly dominant organisation, with the other weak, the split avoidance model is a better fit. The success of the Provisionals during this process is notable in contrast with the Goulding leadership of 1969/70 for the implementation of change one step at a time, and therefore its isolation of dissidents and consequently the ability of the Provisionals to move on from the split and develop their politicisation process.

9.2.1.4 1997

The 1997 split is the final micro-process in the macro-process of Provisional involvement in the ‘Troubles.’ It also sees the continuation of the politicisation of Republicanism by the Adams/McGuinness leadership. Due to the insufficient interview data gathered with respect to this split the researcher was unable to adequately test the proposed model of split. However, it is posited that similar to the 1986 split this would fit the model of split avoidance better as it sees the success of the leadership in implementing its changes through the successful application of voice. This saw the majority of the Provisional Movement moving from an armed and political strategy to a political strategy with the acceptance of both the Good Friday Agreement and the Mitchell Principles. Similar to 1986 there was a residual group of dissidents who broke off to form their own organisation, the Real IRA and 32 County Sovereignty Committee. The success of the leadership in the continuation of the politicisation was determined by the continuation of gradualism and preparation for change through their constant consultation with their base. This process continues today and allows the Provisional Movement to successfully engage in the democratic process of the devolved government of Northern Ireland.

9.2.2 Organisational Perspective

At the centre of all organisational theory is the immediate goal of organisational survival. If a political organisation is to have any chance of achieving the purposive goal of achieving a specified public good it is essential that they first maintain organisational survival. This is as true for violent political organisations as it is for peaceful democratic political organisations.⁶⁰⁹ However, much of the organisational literature has looked at organisational survival at the basic level solely of maintenance of a unified membership. In reality this is not always beneficial for the progress of the organisation to their desired goal. Therefore it was deemed more accurate to hypothesise.

H01. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.

⁶⁰⁹ Oots, (1989) p.144

It is the addendum of 'in a form which they respect and recognise' to the traditional survival hypothesis which more accurately describes the immediate goal of an organisation, especially at a time of split. Each of the splits showed that both sub-groups were not aiming for the survival of the organisation just for the sake of survival. They wished that if the organisation was to survive that the basis of the surviving organisation would be in a form which they respected and recognised. It was deemed that there was no point in remaining within the organisation if it was not at least deemed to be moving in the direction of the group they aspired to. Therefore if the survival of the organisation at a basic level of maintenance of a unified membership is stunting the desired progress of the leadership, or a rival sub-group, a split may prove beneficial in this regard as it rids the parent or breakaway organisation of the internal detractors deemed to be holding the organisation back.⁶¹⁰

At the most fundamental level the research was aiming to analyse why and how each of the splits took place. In this regard the analysis of the interview data for each of the splits, coupled with the examination of relevant sources, has supported the second hypothesis.

HO2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

This was found to be the essential element across the four splits. Throughout their existence human organisations, both violent and non-violent, invariably become involved in some form of intra-organisational conflict. However, not every conflict results in split. In light of this the present research has found that those conflicts which do result in split are deemed to be threatening to the organisational identity by at least one of the conflicting sub-groups.⁶¹¹ Across the four splits the threat to the organisational identity was focused on the strategy and functions of both the political and armed wings of the movement. In each of the four splits an element of the movement was proposing a

⁶¹⁰ Balser (1997), p.226

⁶¹¹ See Sani and Reicher 1998

strengthening of the political nature of the organisation. This was a common theme throughout. However, the degrees of proposed politicisation varied, and therefore the results of the splits were accordingly different.

It was found that when the leadership tried to implement multiple strategic and organisational changes, which could be perceived by others as threatening to organisational identity, within a short space of time that they are less likely to be successful in retaining the majority of the membership and support than a leadership which proposes and implements their desired changes with a greater degree of gradualism. This is most apparent when one compares the split of 1969/70 with those of 1986 and 1997. The proposal of the Goulding leadership in the mid to late 1960s to politicise the movement by moving the IRA away from any form of armed campaign, coupled with the proposed abandonment of the abstentionist policies and the promotion of left-wing political ideals succeeded in isolating a large number of members and supporters. The internal division was further accentuated by the perceived failure of the leadership to adequately defend the Republican communities in the summer of 1969. The scale of these proposed changes and the perception of organisational inaction contrived a situation where the position of the dissidents was strengthened. This is in contrast with the split of 1986 where the leadership gradually brought through their politicisation while retaining the armed strategy throughout. This succeeded in appeasing a number of potential detractors and resultantly weakened the position of the dissidents. This gradualism allowed the leadership to ease their membership into the organisational transition from a terrorist movement into the democratically political organisation they are today. This retention of the core of the membership throughout was vital to the success of the politicisation process, and therefore the constant engagement with and appreciation of the expectations of the base was essential to the successful implementation of change. This gradualism eventually allowed the leadership to bring the majority of their membership away from terrorism and towards peaceful politics. The importance of gradualism in the success of a sub-group suggests that the more focused the reasoning for split the less dramatic the divide will be. This analysis further supports the fourth organisational hypothesis.

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of a split.

The compromises made through the gradualism of the 1986 and 1997 processes allowed the Adams/McGuinness leadership to retain the core supporters of the politicisation process while simultaneously attracting the support of those members whose viewpoint was between the two extremes of politicisation and continued non-politicisation. The leadership managed to succeed in this starting their politicisation relatively close to position of their dissenters and thus gaining and retaining the support of the majority of the membership.⁶¹² Therefore the sub-group most willing to compromise weakened the ‘push’ factors away from them while simultaneously weakening the ‘pull’ factors of their rivals.⁶¹³ Invariably in each of the splits it was the sub-group most ‘tied down’ to their strategic and ideological positioning which was the weaker grouping in the aftermath of split. While it is not illustrated in the present research it is proposed that if both sub-groups are willing to compromise on their position that a split will be avoided completely.

This research has shown that it is vital not to look upon organisational splits as single events but to view them as processes, often times based on long-standing cleavages.⁶¹⁴

HO3. The roots of the splits will be in previously long standing cleavages.

While the actors changed across the process the cleavages within Irish Republicanism remained constant. There has always been a divide between the politicisers and the proponents of a strategy based primarily on armed action. What changed was the degree of politicisation and armed involvement, and hence the strength of both groups. Due to

⁶¹² This is supportive of the Hirschman (1970)

⁶¹³ Horgan (2006)

⁶¹⁴ Burke Rochford Jr. (1989), p.163; Stark and Banbridge (1985), p.101

the long-standing nature of these cleavages the application of a stage-based process model was crucial in understanding each of the splits as well as the entire macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the 'Troubles.' The analysis sub-chapters have shown that the inter-connected nature of the four splits deemed it essential to first of all understand the earlier splits, and their processes, prior to accepting the full relevance of the later divisions.

The process models developed for the first three splits have suggested that the critical stage in respect to the outcome of the split comes in the immediate aftermath of Stage 2 'factional development.' It is proposed that the actions taken within this third stage had the most significant influence on the outcome of the split, and therefore the make-up of the groups in the aftermath of split. In 1969/70 this third stage was notable for the pre-split preparation of the Provisionals but most significantly the failure of the Goulding leadership to supply weapons or defend the Republican communities. The combination of these two factors building on the factional development from the previous stage ultimately weighted the split in favour of the Provisionals. Within this stage the leadership showed a disconnect between their organisational aspirations and their membership and support base resultantly weakening their position and strengthening that of the Provisionals. This is in contrast to the third stage of the 1986 process which is notable for the relatively smooth transition of power from the old-guard traditionalist leadership of Ruairi O'Bradaigh, Daithi O'Conail and others to the new-guard politicising membership of Adams and McGuinness. While the Goulding leadership lost their base support in the equivalent stage in 1969/70 Adams, McGuinness and colleagues retained and strengthened their internal support within the lead-up to 1986, and resultantly isolated and weakened the dissenting voices which in 1986 broke away to form Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA. For the process of 1974 this third stage was bypassed by the Official leadership to force the exit of Seamus Costello and his supporters. This pre-emptive expulsion proved debilitating to the IRSM as they did not have the utilisation of a post factional development period to adequately complete their preparation for the formation of a new armed and political organisation. It is proposed

that as a result of this that the INLA has almost constantly been involved in feuds ever since.

The fifth and final organisational hypothesis stated that

HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation.

It was found that significant inter-organisational conflict, and therefore the hypothesised substitution of goals, only came in situations of a relatively even organisational divide. In the situations where one of the resulting organisations was significantly more dominant than their former allies that the stronger organisation were able to prioritise the pursuit of their purposive goals while their weaker opponents had to focus on basic level organisational survival and did not have the means to significantly challenge or harm their rivals. This is most notable in the aftermath of 1986. However, when there was a more even split the focus of both groups did as hypothesised shift from focusing on their purposive goals to that of harming their Republican rivals. This is best illustrated in the aftermath of both 1969/70 and 1974 where the organisations became embroiled in violent feuds which for many defined their organisational existence. This is especially displayed in the months and years after 1974 where the INLA was actively recruiting members purely for their participation in the feuds against the Officials rather than for the pursuit of a thirty-two county socialist Ireland.

9.2.3 Individual Perspective

In order to gain a more extensive understanding of the micro-process of splits, as well as the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the 'Troubles', it was deemed necessary not only to not only understand the organisational reasoning for the splits but to additionally analyse the rationale for individual allegiance choice. While the analysis of the organisational processes of splits is the main body of the dissertation the assessment of individual allegiance is equally significant. This aided in determining the reasons for

success of one side over the other, and assessed the influence of both organisational and non-organisational rationales for allegiance. It was proposed that

HI1. The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split.

The analysis of the individual interview data failed to support this hypothesis. The data suggested that the outline of those whose allegiance was tied to the reasoning for the split was much narrower than first hypothesised. It showed that only those central to the leadership of the conflicting sub-groups rationalised their allegiance pre-dominantly on the reasoning for the split. While others were influenced by the reasoning for split their allegiance choice was shared between this and personal and local factors as referred to in the second hypothesis

HI2. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be predominantly tied to local influences and situations.

Among the personal and local issues which proved dominant were the themes of influential individuals, regionalism, timing, context and age.⁶¹⁵

The final individual hypothesis tested in the research was derived from the work of Hirschman.⁶¹⁶ It hypothesised that.

HI3. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the parent organisation.

This was supported in each of the splits with those exiting to form the breakaway organisation adjudging that there had been a significant drop in the product being

⁶¹⁵ See Appendix G

⁶¹⁶ Hirschman (1970)

produced by the parent organisation. If one is to take the 1986 split which formed the Continuity IRA and Republican IRA as an example it is clear that the small group of exiting dissidents were encouraged to do so as they saw the abolition of both Eire Nua and the abstentionist policy to Dail Eireann as a significant drop in quality of the Provisional product. The converse of this can be seen in the rise of freelance dissidents in across dissident republicanism recently. These individuals no longer ascribe any organisational allegiance and therefore are not concerned with the overall quality of the output of the dissident organisations.

9.3 Contribution

Every body of research aims to make a significant contribution to their respective field, and this dissertation has been no different. It is believed that the contribution has been made both to the general realms of organisational and terrorism research as well as to the specific. The basis of the research has been understanding and not condemnation. By moving beyond condemnation one can gain a greater understanding and it is believed that only through understanding can the threat of terrorism be countered or eased. The understanding sought here has been two-fold. At the base level the dissertation aimed to understand both why and how the four splits analysed took place, and whether this was consistent with previous organisational research on splits. However, parallel to this the research was assessing how the Provisional leadership of the late 1990s was able to successfully bring the majority of their membership away from an extended terrorist campaign and towards the acceptance of the political process of which they are now central.

Both of these levels of understanding have been developed through an active engagement with the interview data gathered and the relevant academic literature. The research has developed two falsifiable stage-based process models, one for organisational splits and the other modelling the avoidance of split. As section 9.2.1 shows the model of split avoidance is suitable for the modelling of minor splits. However, as it was untested for its intended purpose it is unclear whether it is suitable for modelling split avoidance. The analysis of these four splits, and in particular the three Provisional splits, has put

forward a model of how a terrorist organisation can move from the application of terrorism as a tactic to the acceptance of peaceful democratic politics. As this research has only tested Irish Republicanism it does not suggest that these models are generalisable, and therefore it is recommended that they be tested externally from Irish Republicanism.

While the process models mentioned above detailed above outline the organisational incidence of split and split avoidance the research has also provided an insight into individual allegiance choice and individual involvement in the split. There has been an adaptation of the Hirschman model⁶¹⁷ to aid in the explanation of splits from an individual perspective. It was proposed that individual involvement in splits, when the individual sides with the dissidents, will follow the process of

1. Voice
2. Exit
3. Entry

This model displays the interdependence of exit and entry at a time of split. This variation of an economic model displays the interdisciplinary nature of the work, a feature which should, but does not always, dominate the research of terrorism.

While contributing to the academic literature the understanding gained from this research may also have a role to play in the development of future policy. Within the realms of counter-terrorism it is necessary to understand the problem before one can solve it. This research contributes significantly to this understanding. It is proposed that the policy related lessons from this not be seen as the normal negative opportunity of merely split off 'pragmatists from radical rejectionists'⁶¹⁸ but as a more positive understanding of how to get a larger proportion of the supporters and membership to advocate a more political solution to their perceived problem. With sufficient consideration and understanding it is

⁶¹⁷ Hirschman (1970)

⁶¹⁸ United States Institute for Peace (1999), p.1.

believed that successful positive counterterrorist strategies can be developed not with the target of split the group but by developing so that the politicisers can gain more support and therefore move the organisation away from terrorism and toward the acceptance of the political process. It is posited that this will benefit the wider society in the long-run as the politicisation rather than decimation of the movement seen to strengthen the political process and weaken the call for violence, and thus lessen the extent of organisational recidivism.

9.4 Future Research

The scope that this dissertation allows for the development of future research is extensive. As has been proposed already it is preferable that in order to test the legitimacy of the stage-based process models which have been developed that these be tested on other organisational splits, not just within terrorism. It would be informative for the progress of the understanding of organisational splits if the models were tested on a variety of organisations. It is therefore proposed that this research should be continued to analyse splits in other terrorist organisations, political parties, economic institutions as well as criminal organisations and religious groupings. The more testing of the proposed models the stronger they will become. This proposed research should be carried out to analyse not just why and how the splits took place but also assess the functionality of these cleavages. One of the weaknesses of the present research has been its failure to extensively assess the external factors which may have played a role in the splits.⁶¹⁹ Therefore it is proposed that future researchers take this more into consideration than was done in this dissertation.

The significant gap in the results of the research on Provisional involvement in the ‘Troubles’ remains in the split of 1997 which formed the Real IRA. There is still much research needed on this division and the function it played in the peace process. As was detailed within the methodology chapter it is exceedingly difficult to gain access to members of this group. Within this analysis greater attention should also be paid to the role of the British and Irish governments, as well as the unionist, nationalist and loyalist

⁶¹⁹ Balser (1997)

communities, in successfully bringing through a successful peace process. This continuation of the analysis of the Northern Irish 'Troubles' and peace process may also take into account those splits which took place since 1997, namely the formation of both Eirigi and Oglagh na hEireann.

While this continued analysis of splits in Irish republicanism may seem like the logical next step for the research it is proposed that Unionist involvement in the 'Troubles' and beyond should similarly be considered. This similarly can assess splits within Unionism, most recently with the development of the Traditional Unionist Voice in 2007 when Jim Allister left in protest at the DUP taking their seats alongside Sinn Fein in a devolved assembly.⁶²⁰ For many the DUP members and supporters the opposition to involvement in former members of the IRA in electoral politics was a formative part of their organisational identity. However, the Paisley Snr. leadership managed to bring the majority of their party and membership towards the acceptance of sharing power in Northern Ireland with Martin McGuinness, the former PIRA Army Council member, as Deputy Prime Minister. It would be interesting to assess whether similar processes brought the DUP and their membership to this position as it did the Provisional Republican Movement.

It is suggested that where appropriate that future terrorism and political research utilises the analytical methodology of IPA. However, this should only be utilised when the research requires the phenomenological interpretation of data. It should always be the case that appropriate analytical techniques and methodologies are utilised and/or adapted to fit the research question rather than adapting the question to fit a specific methodology.

⁶²⁰ Rankin, A & Ganiel, G. (2008). DUP Discourses on Violence and their Impact on the Northern Ireland Peace Process. In Hayward, K. and O'Donnell, C. (Eds.) *Peace and Conflict Studies: Special Issue on 'Political Discourse as an Instrument of Conflict and Peace: Lessons from Northern Ireland.* Pp.115-135. (p.129)

9.5 Conclusions

In conclusion it is believed that the present dissertation has made a significant contribution not just to terrorism research but to organisational research in general. Through the application of a semi-structured interview methodology and the employment of IPA as an analytical technique two separate models for split have been developed; one modelling organisational split and the other modelling split avoidance and minor organisational splits. Parallel to this it has detailed how the Provisional Republican Movement, in contrast to the IRA they split from in 1969/70, were able to bring the majority of their movement away from terrorism and towards the acceptance of the utility of peaceful politics. Central to this was the application of gradualism in changing the trajectory of the movement. Throughout this process the continuous engagement with, and connection to the base made the preparation for change less dramatic and resultantly lessened the effect of the split. For thirty-years Northern Ireland entwined in an extensive violent conflict, one which claimed thousands of innocent lives. Central to this conflict was the Provisional IRA and their political cohorts in Sinn Fein. It would be easy to condemn the actions of both groups. However, that has not been the purpose of the dissertation. The dissertation has aimed to understand how the majority of this movement were eventually convinced to leave beyond their violent past and accept the necessity for peace. This is what the research set out to achieve, and it is believed that a significant understanding has been realised.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Adams, G. (1985). *Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1985: Presidential Address*. Wolfe Tone Society Publications.
- Bunreacht na hEireann/Constitution of Ireland. (1937)
- Fleming, F. (May 28th, 1970). *Joe McKelvey Republican Club invitation to conference of radical and progressive organisations*.
- Harrison, G. and Falvey, T. (October 1986). *Open letter to the Irish Republican Movement*.
- IRA Department of Publicity. (April, 1964). *IRA Army Council Statement*.
- MacGiolla, T. (August 13th, 1969). *Republican Statement on Northern Crisis*.
- MacGiolla, T. (January 11th, 1970). *Sinn Fein Oraid an Uachtarain Tomas MacGiolla ag Ard-Fheis 1969*.
- MacGiolla, T. (July 1972). *Where we Stand: The Republican Position*.
- MacGiolla, T. (1975). *The Making of the Irish Revolution: A Short Analysis*. Repsol Pamphlet No.17.
- Maguire, T. (October 22nd, 1986). *Entering Leinster House: A Veteran Speaks*.
- McGuinness, M (June 22nd 1986). *Bodenstown '86*. London: Wolfe Tone Society Publications
- McManus, S. (October 31st, 1986). *Opening Address by Sinn Fein Chairperson-Sean McManus*.
- O'Bradaigh, R. (November 13th, 1986). *Statement by Outgoing President Ruairi O'Bradaigh to the Ard Fheis of Sinn Fein*
- Official Republican Movement (1971) *Fianna Fail and the IRA*.
- Republican Education Department for the Commission set up by the 1968 Ard Fheis (March 1969,). *Ireland Today: and some questions on the way forward (including 1969 Addendum)*.
- Republican Sinn Fein (November 2nd, 1986). *Historic Sinn Fein Declaration*. In *Republican Bulletin/ Iris na Poblachta*.
- Republican Sinn Fein (March, 2000). *Eire Nua: A New Democracy*.
- Sinn Fein (1968). *General Secretary Report: To All Cumainn and Comhairli Ceantair*.

Sinn Fein (1986). *The Politics of Revolution*.

Sinn Fein Education Department (1979). *Where Sinn Fein Stands*. Republican Lecture Series No.1.

Sinn Fein Education Department (1979). *The Split*. Republican Lecture Series No. 1.

Sinn Fein Press Release (November 13, 1983). *Presidential Address of Ruairi O'Bradaigh to the 79th Ard Fheis*.

Six County Executive of the Republican Clubs (1974). *Pogroms!* Six County Executive of the Republican Clubs.

Submission by 32 County Sovereignty Committee to United Nations.

Multi-party Agreement (10 April 1998.) *The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement*.

Twenty-Second Report of the Independent Monitoring Committee, November 4, 2009.

Twenty-Third Report of the Independent Monitoring Committee, May 26, 2010.

Secondary Sources

An Editorial. (1957) *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1/1. pp.1-2. (p.1)

Alexander, Y. and Kilmarx, R.A. (1979). International Network of Terrorist Movements. In Alexander, Y. and Kilmarx, R.A.(Eds.) (1979). *Political Terrorism and Business: The Threat and Response*. New York: Praeger Press, pp.40-51. Cited in Oots, K.L. (1989). Organisational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups. *Terrorism*, 12, pp.139-152.

Alonso, R. (2004). Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), pp.695-713.

Alonso, R. (2007). *The IRA and Armed Struggle*. London: Routledge.

Anderson, B. (2007). *Joe Cahill: A Life in the IRA*. Dublin: O'Brien Press.

Balser, D.B. (1997). The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organisations. *Social Forces*, 76(1). Pp.199-228.

Bean, K. (2007). *The New Politics of Sinn Fein*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Beresford, D. (1987). *Ten Men Dead: Story of the 1981 Hunger Strike*. London: Grafton

Bew, P. and Gillespie, G. (1993). *Northern Ireland: Chronology of the Troubles 1968-1993*. Dublin: Gill and MacMillan.

- Bishop, P. and Mallie, E. (1987). *The Provisional IRA*. London: William Heinmann.
- Bjorgo, T. (1997). *Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns, Perpetrators and Responses*. Otta: Tano Ashcherougs Fonteneserie.
- Bloom, M. (2005). *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bloom, M. and Horgan, J. (2008). Missing the Mark: The IRA's Proxy Bombing Campaign. *Social Research: An International Quarterly*, 75(2), pp.579-614.
- Bowyer Bell, J. (1989). *The Secret Army: The IRA (Revised Third Edition)*. Dublin: Poolbeg.
- Bowyer Bell, J. (1990). *IRA Tactics and Targets: An Analysis of Tactical Aspects of the Armed Struggle 1969-1989*. Dublin: Poolbeg.
- Bowyer Bell, J. (1993). *The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967-1992*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Bowyer Bell, J. (1998). *The Dynamics of Armed Struggle*. London: Frank Cass.
- Brannan, D.W., Esler, P.F. and Anders Strindberg, N.T. (2001). Talking to 'Terrorists': Towards and Independent Analytical Framework for the Study of Violent Substate Activism. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24, (pp.3-24).
- Burgess, M., Ferguson, N. and Hollywood, I. (2007). Rebels' Perspectives of the Legacy of Past Violence and the Current Peace in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 28, No. 1., pp.69-88.
- Burke Rochford Jr. E. (1989). Factionalism, Group Defection, and Schism in the Hare Krishna Movement. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 28(2), pp.162-179.
- Campbell, J.C. (2005). Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organisations and Social Movement Research. In Gavis, G.F., McAdam, D., Richard Scott, W. and Zald, M.N. (2005). *Social Movements and Organisation Theory*. (pp. 41-68). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Collins, E. and McGovern, M. (1997). *Killing Rage*. London: Granta Books.
- Coogan, T.P. (1996). *The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace*. London: Arrow Books.
- Coogan, T.P. (2000). *The IRA*. London: Harper Collins.

- Crelinsten, R.D. (1987). The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. (pp.59-89). London: Frank Cass.
- Crenshaw, M. (1985). An Organisational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism. *Orbis*. Pp.465-489.
- Crenshaw, M. (1987). Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. (Pp.13-31) London: Frank Cass.
- Crenshaw, M. (1987). *How Terrorism Ends*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1987.
- Crenshaw, M. (1991). How Terrorism Declines. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3(1), pp. 69-87.
- Crenshaw, M. (1999) On How Terrorism Ends. In United States Institute for Peace (1999). *How Terrorism Ends: Special Report*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, pp.2-4.
- Cronin, A.K. (2006). How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups. *International Security*, 31(1), pp.7-48.
- Cronin, A.K. (2009). *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- De Breadun, D. (2008). *The Far Side of Revenge: Making Peace in Northern Ireland*. Cork: The Collins Press.
- Della Porta, D. (2009). Leaving Underground Organisations: A Sociological Analysis of the Italian Case. In Bjorgo, T. and Horgan, J. (Eds.) (2009). *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*. (pp.66-87). London: Routledge.
- Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2008). *Social Movements: An Introduction (Second Edition)*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Dickson, A., Allan, D., and O'Carroll, R. (2008). Biographical Disruption and the Experience of Loss Following a Spinal Cord Injury: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. *Psychology & Health*, 23, pp.407-425.

- Dingley, J. (2001). The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy and Purpose Behind the Incident. In *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 24(6), pp.451-465.
- Dingley, J. (2002). Peace in Our Time? The Stresses and Strains on the Northern Ireland Peace Process. In *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 25(6), pp.357-382.
- Dixon, P. (2002). Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation? The Choreography of the Northern Ireland Peace Process. In *Political Studies*, 50, pp.725-741.
- Dyck, B. and Starke, F.A. (1999). The Formation of Breakaway Organisations: Observations and a Process Model. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44(4), pp.792-822.
- English, R. (2003). *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*. London: MacMillan .
- English, R. (2006). *Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland*. London: Pan Books.
- English, R. (2009). *Terrorism How to Respond*. (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Feeney, B. (2002). *Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years*. Dublin: O'Brien Press.
- Fife-Schaw, C. (1995). Questionnaire Design. In Breakwell, G. M., Hammond, S. and Fife-Schaw, C. *Research Methods in Psychology*. London: Sage Publications, pp.174-193.
- Firey, W. (1948). Informal Organisation and the Theory of Schism. *American Sociological Review*. 13(1). Pp.15-24.
- Flowers, P., Smith, J.A., Sheeran, P., & Beail, N. (1997). Health and Romance: Understanding Unprotected Sex in Relationships Between Gay Men. *British Journal of Health Psychology*, 12, pp. 197-230.
- Frampton, M. (2009). *The Long March: The Political Strategy of Sinn Fein, 1981-2007*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Gerges, F. (1999). The Decline of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria and Egypt. *Survival*, 41(1), pp.113-125
- Guelke, A. (1999). Political Violence and Paramilitaries. In Mitchell, P. and Wilford, R. (Eds.) (1999). *Politics in Northern Ireland*. (pp.29-53). Oxford: Westview Press.
- Guelke, A. and Smyth, J. (1992). The Ballot Bomb: Terrorism and the Electoral Process in Northern Ireland. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 4(2), pp.103-124

- Gupta, D.K. (2008). *Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence: The Life Cycle of Birth, Growth, Transformation and Demise*. London: Routledge.
- Hanley, B. and Millar, S. (2009). *The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Worker's Party*. Dublin: Penguin Ireland.
- Hayes, M. (1998). The Evolution of Republican Strategy and the 'Peace Process' in Ireland. In *Race & Class*, 39(3), pp.21-39
- Hayes, P.J. and Campbell, J. (2005). *Bloody Sunday: Trauma, Pain and Politics*. London: Pluto Press
- Hewitt, C. (1992). Public's Perspectives. In Paletz, D.L. and Schmid (Eds.) (1992). *Terrorism and the Media*. (pp.170-207) London: Sage Publications.
- Hirschman, A.O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations, and States*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Hoffman, B. (2006). *Inside Terrorism*. (New York: Columbia University Press)
- Holland, J. and McDonald, H. (1994). *INLA: Deadly Divisions*. Dublin: Torc.
- Holmes, S. Coyle, A. and Thomson, E. (1997). Quality of Life in survivors of bone marrow transplant. *Journal of Cancer Nursing*, 1(3), pp.106-116.
- Holsti, O. R., Hopmann, P.T., and Sullivan, J.D. (1973). Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Cited in Oots, K.L. (1986). *A Political Organisational Approach to Transnational Terrorism*. Westport, Connecticut: Green Wood Press.
- Horchem, H.J. (1991). The Decline of the Red Army Faction. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 3(2), pp.61-74
- Horgan, J. (1998). From the Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 618, pp.80-94.
- Horgan, J. (2004) The Case of First-Hand Research. In Silke, A. (Ed.) (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends Successes and Failures*. (Pp.30-56). London: Frank Cass.
- Horgan, J. (2005). *The Psychology of Terrorism*. (London: Routledge).
- Horgan, J. (2006). Disengaging from Terrorism. *Jane's Intelligence Review*. (pp.34-37).
- Horgan, J. (2009). *Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement From Radical and Extremist Movements*. London: Routledge.

- Horgan, J. and Taylor, M. (1997). The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2(1), pp.1-32
- Irvin, C.L. (1999). *Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country*. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
- Jackson, B.A. (2005). *Aptitude for Destruction Volume 1: Organisational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism*. Pittsburgh, PA: RAND
- Jackson, B.A., Baker, J. C., Cragin, K., Parachini, J., Trujillo, H. R. and Chalk, P. (2005). *Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: Case Studies of Organisational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups*. Pittsburgh, PA: RAND.
- Jamieson, A. (1990). Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2(1), pp.1-20.
- Johnston, R.H.W. (2006). *Century of Endeavour: A Biographical and Autobiographical View of the Twentieth Century in Ireland*. Dublin: Tyndall Publications.
- Jones, S.G. and Libicki, M.C. (2008). *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaeda*. Pittsburgh: Rand Corporation
- Lau, D. and Murnighan, J.K. (1998). Demographic Diversity and Faultlines: The Compositional Dynamics of Organisational Groups. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, pp.325-340.
- Leatham, M.C. (2003). "Shaking Out the Mat": Schism and Organisational Transformation at a Mexican Ark of the Virgin. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 42(2), pp.175-187.
- Lynn, B. (2002). Tactic or Principle? The Evolution of Republican Thinking on Abstentionism in Ireland, 1970-1998. In *Irish Political Studies*, 17(2), pp.74-94
- Kaur, K. (1999). *Akali Dal in Punjab Politics: Splits and Mergers*. New Dehli: Deep and Deep Publications
- Kelley, K. (1982). *The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA*. Kerry: Brandon Books
- Khadka, N. (1995). Factionalism in the Communist Movement in Nepal. *Pacific Affairs*, 68(1), pp.55-76.
- MacStiofain, S. (1975). *Memoirs of a Revolutionary*. London: Gordon Cremonisi.

- Maillot, A. (2005). *New Sinn Fein: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty First Century*. London: Routledge.
- Mallie, E. and McKittrick, D. (1996). *The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process*. London: William Heinemann.
- March, J. and Simon, H. (1993). *Organisations: Second Edition*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.
- Markides, K.C. (1974). Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus. *American Ethnologist*, 12(2), pp.309-330
- McCormick, G.H. (1987). The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. (pp.109-126). London: Frank Cass.
- McDonald, H. (2008). *Gunsmoke and Mirrors: How Sinn Fein Dressed Up Defeat as Victory*. Dublin: Gill and MacMillan.
- McGuire, M. (1973). *To Take Arms: A Year in the Provisional IRA*. London: Quarter Books.
- McKittrick, D., Kellers, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C. and McVea, D. (2004). *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children Who Died Through The Northern Irish Troubles (Second Revised Edition)*. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing.
- Mikolus, E. F. (1981). *Combating International Terrorism: A Quantitative Analysis*. PhD dissertation, Yale University. Cited in Oots, K.L. (1986). *A Political Organisational Approach to Transnational Terrorism*. Westport, Connecticut: Green Wood Press.
- Miller, F.D. (1983). The End of SDS and the Emergence of Weathermen: Demise Through Success. In Freeman, J. and Johnston, V. (Eds.) (1999). *Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties*. (pp.303-324). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC.
- Moloney, E. (2002). *A Secret History of the IRA*. London: Penguin Books.
- Mooney, J. and O'Toole, M. (2003). *Black Operations: The Secret War Against the Real IRA*. Meath: Maverick House.
- Murray, G. and Tonge, J. (2005). *Sinn Fein and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation*. Dublin: O'Brien.

- Neuman, P.R. (2005). The Bullet and the Ballot Box: The Case of the IRA. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28(6), pp.941-975.
- O'Bradaigh, R. (1997). *Dilseacht: The Story of Comdt. General Tom Maguire and the Second (All Ireland) Dail*. Dublin: Elo Press
- O'Brien, J. (2000). *The Arms Trial*. Dublin: Gill and McMillan.
- O'Callaghan, S. (1999). *The Informer*. London: Corgi Books.
- O'Dochartaigh, N. (1995). 'Sure, it's Hard to Keep up with the Splits here': Irish-American Responses to the Outbreak of Conflict in Northern Ireland 1968-1974. *Irish Political Studies*, 100, pp.138-160.
- O'Dochartaigh, N. (2004). *From Civil Rights to Armalites: Derry and the Birth of the Irish Troubles. (Second Edition)*. Cork: Palgrave.
- O'Rawe, R. (2005). *Blanketmen*. Dublin: New Island.
- Oots, K.L. (1986). *A Political Organisational Approach to Transnational Terrorism*. Westport, Connecticut: Green Wood Press
- Oots, K.L. (1989). Organisational Perspectives on the Formation and Disintegration of Terrorist Groups. *Terrorism*, 12, pp.139-152.
- Patterson, H. (1997). *The Politics of Illusion: A Political History of the IRA*. London: Serif.
- Piderit, S.K. (2000). Rethinking Resistance and Recognising Ambivalence: A Multidimensional View of Attitudes Toward and Organisational Change. *The Academy of Management Review*, 25(4), pp.783-794.
- Pondy, L.R. (1967). Organisational Conflict: Concepts and Models. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 12(2), pp.296-320.
- Purdie, B. (1990). *Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland*. Belfast: Blackstaff.
- Rankin, A & Ganiel, G. (2008). DUP Discourses on Violence and their Impact on the Northern Ireland Peace Process. In Hayward, K. and O'Donnell, C. (Eds.) *Peace and Conflict Studies: Special Issue on 'Political Discourse as an Instrument of Conflict and Peace: Lessons from Northern Ireland*. Pp.115-135.
- Rapoport, D.C. (2001). Introduction. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. (pp.1-10) London: Frank Cass.

- Rapoport, D. C. (2003). The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. In . In Kegley Jr., C. W (ed.) (2003). *The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. (Pp. 36-52) New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Rapoport, D.C. (2004). Series Editor's Preface. In Bowyer Bell, J. (2004). *The IRA 1968-2000: Analysis of a Secret Army*. London: Frank Cass.
- Reich, W. (1990). Understanding Terrorist Behaviour: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological Inquiry. In Reich, W. (Ed.) (1998). *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*. (Pp.261-280). Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Richardson, L. (2007). *What Terrorists Want*. (London: John Murray).
- Riggs, E.H., and Coyle, A. (2002). Young People's Accounts of Homelessness: A case study analysis of psychological well-being and identity. *Counselling Psychology Review*, 17(3), pp. 5-15.
- Ross, J.I. and Gurr, T.R. (1989). Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the United States. *Comparative Politics*, 21(4), pp.405-426.
- Ryan, B. (1989). Ideological Purity and Feminism: The US Women's Movement from 1966 to 1975. *Gender and Society*, 3(2), pp.239-257.
- Pyne, P. (1974). The politics of parliamentary abstentionism: Ireland's Four Sinn Fein Parties 1905-1926. In *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 12(2), pp.206-227.
- Sani, F. and Reicher, S. (1998). When Consensus Fails: An Analysis of the Schism Within the Italian Communist Party (1991). *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 28, pp.623-645.
- Sani, F. and Reicher, S. (1999). Identity, Argument and Schism: Two Longitudinal Studies of the Split in the Church of England over the Ordination of Women to the Priesthood. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 2(3), pp.279-300.
- Schelling, T.C. (1991). What Purpose can "International Terrorism" serve? In Frey, R.G. and Morris, C.W. (Eds.) (1991) *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice*. Pp.18-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited in Siqueira, K. (2005). Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organisations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2), pp.218-236.

- Schiller, D.S. (1987). A Battlegroup Divided: The Palestinian Fedayeen. In Rapoport, D.C. (Ed.) (2001). *Inside Terrorist Organisations*. (pp.90-108). London: Frank Cass.
- Schmid, A. and Jongman (2005). *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction)
- Schulze, F. (2004). Breaking the Cycle: Empirical Research and Postgraduate Studies on Terrorism. In Silke, A. (Ed.) (2004) *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Successes and Failures* (pp.161-185). London: Frank Cass and Co.
- Shaughnessy, J.J., Zechmeister, E.B. and Zeichmeister, J.S. (2003). *Research Methods in Psychology: Sixth Edition*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Shriver, T.E. and Messer, C. (2009). Ideological Cleavages and Schism in the Czech Environmental Movement. *Human Ecology Review*, 16(2). Pp.161-171.
- Silke, A. (1996). Terrorism and the Blind Man's Elephant, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 8(3), pp. 12-28.
- Silke, A. (2001). The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 13. No. 4, pp.1-14.
- Simmel, G. (1955). "Conflict." Free Press. Cited in Balsler, D.B. (1997). The Impact of Environmental Factors on Factionalism and Schism in Social Movement Organisations. *Social Forces*, 76(1). Pp.199-228.
- Singh, M.P. (1981). *Split in the Predominant Party: The Indian National Congress in 1969*. New Delhi: Shakti Malik Abinav Publications
- Siqueira, K. (2005). Political and Militant Wings within Dissident Movements and Organisations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2), pp.218-236.
- Smith, J.A., Flowers, P. and Larkin, P. (2009). *Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, Method and Research*. London: Sage: Publications.
- Smith, J.A., Jarman, M., and Osborn, M. (1999). Doing Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In Murray, M. and Chamberlain, K. (Eds.), *Qualitative Health Psychology: Theories and Methods* (pp. 218-239). London: Sage Publications.
- Smith, J.A. and Osborn, M. (2008). Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In Smith, J. A. (Ed.) *Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research Methods. Second Edition*. (pp.53-80). London: Sage Publications.

- Stokey, E.B. and Zeckhauser, R. (1978). *A Primer for Policy Analysis*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. (pp.306-309). Cited in Oots, K.L. (1986). *A Political Organisational Approach to Transnational Terrorism*. Westport, Connecticut: Green Wood Press.
- Taylor, M. (1988). *The Terrorist*. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers Ltd.
- Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2006). A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(4), pp.1-17.
- Taylor, M. and Quayle, E. (1994). *Terrorist Lives*. London: Brassey's.
- Taylor, P. (1998). *Provos: The IRA and Sinn Fein*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Taylor, P. (2001). *Brits: The War Against the IRA*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S. (2007). *Contentious Politics*. Boulder Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.
- Tonge, J. (2004). 'They Haven't Gone Away, You Know.' Irish Republican Dissidents and Armed Struggle. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(3), pp.671-693.
- United States Institute for Peace (1999). *How Terrorism End Special Report*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace.
- Walsh, P. (1994). *Irish Republicanism and Socialism: The Politics of the Republican Movement 1905 to 1994*. Belfast: Athol Books.
- Weber, M. (1947). *Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*. New York.
- Weinberg, L. and Eubank, W.L. (1987). *The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism*. London: Westview.
- Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. & Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004). The Challenges of Conceptualising Terrorism, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 16(4), pp. 777-794.
- Weinberg and Richardson (2004). Conflict Theory and the Trajectory of Terrorist Campaigns in Western Europe. In Silke, A. (2004). *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, (pp.138-160). London: Frank Cass.
- White, R.W. (2000). Issues in the Study of Political Violence: Understanding the Motives of Participants in Small Group Political Violence. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 12, No. 1, (Spring,2000), pp.95-108.

- White, R.W. (2006). *Ruairi O'Bradaigh: The Life and Politics of an Irish Revolutionary*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press
- White, R.W. and Fraser, M.R. (2000). Personal and Collective Identities and Long-Term Social Movement Activism: Republican Sinn Fein. In Stryker, S., Owens, T.J. and White, R.W. (Eds.) (2000). *Self, Identity, and Social Movements*. (pp.324-346) Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Wilson, J.Q. (1974). *Political Organisations*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Worcester, R.M. (1991). *British Public Opinion: A Guide to the History and Methodology of Political Opinion Polling*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in Qualitative Health Research. *Psychology & Health*, 15, pp.25-228.
- Yardley, L. (2008). Demonstrating Validity in Qualitative Psychology. In J.A. Smith (Ed.), *Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Methods (2nd Edition)*. (pp.235-251). London: Sage.
- Zald, M.N. and Ash, R. (1966). Social Movement Organisations: Growth, Decay and Change. *Social Forces*, 44(3). Pp.327-341.
- Zirakzadeh, C.E. (2002). From Revolutionary Dreams to Organisational Fragmentation: Disputes over Violence within ETA and Sendero Luminoso. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 14(4), pp.66-92.

Media Sources

- An Phoblacht (March 27, 2008). An IRA leader is Born. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.4-5.
- An Phoblacht (April 3, 2008). From Civil Rights to Armed Struggle. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.6-7.
- An Phoblacht (April 10, 2008). Revolutionaries have to be Pragmatic-Wish Lists are for Christmas. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.10-11.
- Barnes, C. (July 19, 2009). Killer: I'm No Terror Boss. *Sunday Life*.
- Breen, S. (February 4 2008). 'War Back On - Real IRA'. *The Sunday Tribune*.
- Breen, S. (March 15, 2009). Unshakeable Believers in the Power of the Bullet. *Sunday Tribune*.
- 'Brownie' (October 18, 1975). Active Abstentionism. In *The Republican News*. P.6.

- Clarke, L., Sheehan, M., McManus, J. and Ryder, C. (August 23rd, 1998). Out of Darkness. In The Sunday Times.
- Drumm, J. (June 18th, 1977). Annual Commemoration of Wolfe Tone, Bodenstown: Oration Given by Jimmy Drumm. In *Republican News*.
- Goulding, C. (July 1967). Bodenstown '67: Oration by Cathal Goulding. In *United Irishman*, pp.10-11.
- Magill (November 13th, 1986). *Cover Story*.
- Maguire, T. (February, 1996). Statement of recognition by Comdt General Tom Maguire. In *Saoirse: Irish Freedom*.
- Mooney, J. (October 4, 2009). Real IRA may be the winners of the Continuity's big split. *The Sunday Times*
- O'Bradaigh, R. (March, 1970). Where Sinn Fein Stands: Open Letter from Chairman of Caretaker Executive. In *An Phoblacht*, p.1.
- O'Reilly, E. (August 23rd, 1998). Mickey McKevitt: Life and Times of a Quartermaster. In *The Sunday Business Post*.
- O'Ruairc "Runai", B. (February, 1996). 'Revolutionary' IRA Emerges. In *Saoirse*, p.9.
- Provisional Army Council (April 1970). No Opportunity Will Be Lost: Army Council's Easter Message. In *An Phoblacht*, p.1.
- RTE, *Prime Time*, February 16th 2010.
- Sinn Fein Caretaker Executive. (February, 1970). Attempt to Takeover the Republican Movement. In *An Phoblacht*, pp.4-5.
- The United Irishman (January, 1970). The IRA in the 70s. *The United Irishman*, p.8

Internet Sources

- Eirigi Homepage. www.eirigi.org
- Blair, D. (July 9, 2009). Extremist Group Announces Split from Al-Qaeda. www.telegraph.co.uk.

Appendix A

Table of Interviews

Participant	Date	Splits Discussed	Allegiance after split⁶²¹
Geraldine Taylor	October 15 th 2007 and January 23 rd 2009	1969/70; <i>1974⁶²²</i> ; 1986; <i>1997</i>	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: RSF/CIRA
Roy Johnston	November 29 th 2007, December 19 th 2007, January 17 th 2008, February 3 rd 2008 and February 21 st 2009	1969/70; <i>1986</i>	1969/70: Officials
Danny Morrison	January 21 st 2008	1969/70; 1986; <i>1997</i>	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals
Mitchell McLaughlin	January 24 th 2008	1969/70; <i>1974</i> ; 1986; <i>1997</i>	1969/70: Officials then Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Gerry Adams	January 30 th 2008	1969/70; 1986; <i>1997</i>	1969/70: Officials then Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Joe Doherty	February 1 st 2008	1969/70; <i>1974</i> ; 1986; <i>1997</i>	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Fra Halligan	February 6 th 2008	<i>1969/70</i> ; <i>1974</i> ; <i>1986</i>	1986: IRSM
Ruairi O'Bradaigh	February 20 th 2008	1969/70; <i>1974</i> ; 1986; <i>1997</i>	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: RSF/CIRA

⁶²¹ As it was unclear whether some participants were on the armed or political side of the split, or both, each grouping has been given a non-committal all encompassing title. This does not mean that the individuals was involved in both the armed and the political groups

⁶²² Each split in italics specifies that the observer discussed this split as an external Republican observer

'Denis'	February 29 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1986	1969/70: Officials 1974: IRSM
Harry Donaghy	March 6 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1991	1974: Officials 1991: ORM
Sean O'Hare	March 6 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1991	1969/70: Officials 1974: Officials 1991: ORM
Anthony McIntyre	March 8 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals
Richard O'Rawe	April 9 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals
Dolours Price	April 21 st 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals
Cathleen Knowles McGurk	May 13 th 2008	1969/70; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: RSF/CIRA
'Una'	May 14 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: 32CSM/RIRA
Pat Doherty	May 19 th 2008	1969/70; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Sean McManus	May 29 th 2008	1969/70; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Des Long	June 7 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1986	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: RSF/CIRA
Joe O'Neill	June 10 th 2008 and August 13 th 2008	1969/70; 1986	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: RSF/CIRA

Martin McGuinness	June 23 rd 2008	1969/70; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Officials then Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Francie Mackey	June 25 th 2008	1969/70; 1986; 1997	1986: Provisionals 1997: 32CSM/RIRA
'Paul'	August 10 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals then Officials 1974: IRSM
Paddy Woodworth	August 15 th 2008	1969/70; 1974	1969/70: Officials 1974: Officials
Sean O'Bradaigh	August 17 th 2008	1969/70; 1986	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: RSF/CIRA
Richard McAuley	September 12 th 2008	1969/70; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Thomas MacGiolla	September 15 th 2008	1969/70; 1974; 1992	1969/70: Officials 1974: Officials 1992: Workers Party
Martin McGonagle	December 18 th 2008	1974; 1986	1974: IRSM
Tom Hartley	January 6 th 2009	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
'Conor'	January 12 th 2009	1986; 1997	1986: Provisionals 1997: 32CSM/RIRA
Mick Ryan	January 22 nd 2009, February 2 nd 2009, February 16 th 2009,	1969/70; 1974;	1969/70: Officials 1974: Officials

	March 18 th 2009, March 24 th 2009		
'Alex'	January 23 rd 2009	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: RSF/CIRA
James Scullion	January 23 rd 2009	1986; 1997	1986: RSF/CIRA
Anthony Coughlan	January 31 st 2009	1969/70; 1974; 1986	1969/70: Officials (advisor)
Gerry Kelly	February 4 th 2009	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Provisionals 1986: Provisionals 1997: Provisionals
Patrick Kennelly	March 10 th 2009	1969/70; 1974; 1986	1969/70: Officials 1974: IRSM 1986: RSF/CIRA (joined in 1998)
'Frank'	March 11 th 2009	1969/70; 1974; 1986; 1997	1969/70: Officials 1974: IRSM 1986: RSF/CIRA (joined in 1998)
Mick Murtagh	March 11 th 2009	1969/70; 1974; 1986	1969/70: Officials 1974: Officials

Appendix B

Complete Interview Schedule

Engagement

1) Why and how did you first become involved as an active Republican?

1a) When did you first become involved with the Republican Movement?

1969/70 Split

2) What do you believe were the major factors in the 1969/70 split?

2a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1969/70 split lie?

2b) What effect if any did public support have on the split?

2c) Why did the split take place at the time it did?

2d) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on the split?

2e) When did it seem that a split was inevitable?

2f) Why do you believe that the Provisionals were more successful in attracting members than the Officials?

2g) In the lead up to the split was there active campaigning on the part of either group for the purpose of gaining support?

2h) What effect if any did the pogroms of 1969 have on the eventual split?

2i) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so what were these factions based on?

2j) What effect if any did the Socialist agenda have on the split?

2k) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on the split?

2l) What effect if any did the proposal of the National Liberation Front have on the split?

2m) How did the group reorganise/organise in the aftermath of the split?

2n) What effect if any did external/international support have on the split?

- 2o) What effect if any did Fianna Fail have on the split?
- 2p) What effect if any did the Wolfe Tone Society have on the split?
- 2q) What effect if any did the fact that the proposal was to drop abstentionism from all three parliaments as opposed to from just one have on the split?
- 2r) What effect if any did the return of many of the old guard have on the split?
- 2s) What effect if any did the declaration of support from Tom Maguire have on the split?
- 3) *Why did you choose to stay with the Officials/ join the Provisionals?*
- 3a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice?
- 3b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice?
- 3c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision?
- 3d) How was the split reflected in your local area?
- 3e) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on your decision?
- 3f) What effect if any did the issue of Socialism have on your decision?
- 3g) What effect if any did the proposal of the National Liberation Front have on your decision?
- 3h) What effect if any did the pogroms of 1969/70 have on your decision?
- 3i) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on your decision?
- 3j) What effect if any did the old guard have on your decision?
- 3k) What effect if any did Tom Maguire's declaration have on your decision?
- 3l) What effect if any did the Wolfe Tone Society have on your decision?
- 3m) What effect if any did the actions of Fianna Fail have on your decision?
- 3n) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision?

1974 Split

4. *What do you believe were the major factors in the 1974 split?*

4a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1974 split lie?

4b) What effect if any did public support have on the split?

4c) Why did the split take place at the time it did?

4d) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on the split?

4e) When did it seem that a split was inevitable?

4f) What effect if any did the 1972 ceasefire have on the split?

4g) What effect if any did the tactic of defence and retaliation have on the split?

4h) What influence if any did Seamus Costello have on the split?

4i) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so what were these factions based on?

4j) What effect if any did the Socialist agenda of the Movement have on the split?

4k) What effect if any did external/international support have on the split?

4l) How did the group re-organise/organise after the split?

5) *Why did you choose to stay with the Officials/ join the Irish Republican Socialist Movement?*

5a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice?

5b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice?

5c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision?

5d) How was the split reflected in your local area?

5e) What effect if any did the national leadership being based in Dublin have on your decision?

- 5f) What effect if any did the tactic of defence and retaliation have on your decision?
- 5g) What effect if any did the 1972 ceasefire have on your decision?
- 5h) What effect if any did the Socialist agenda of the Movement have on your decision?
- 5i) What effect if any did Seamus Costello have on your decision?
- 5j) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision?

1986 Split

- 6) *What do you believe were the major factors in the 1986 split?*
- 6a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1986 split lie?
- 6b) What effect if any did public support have on the split?
- 6c) Why did the split take place at the time it did?
- 6d) When did it seem like the split was inevitable?
- 6e) What effect if any did the 1975 ceasefire have on the split?
- 6f) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on the split?
- 6g) What effect if any did the 1981 hunger strikes have on the split?
- 6h) What effect if any did the elections of Bobby Sands and others following the 1981 hunger strikes have on the split?
- 6i) What effect if any did the dropping of the Eire Nua policy have on the split?
- 6j) Why do you believe that the Provisionals were more successful in gaining membership than Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA?
- 6k) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so what were these factions based on?
- 6l) What effect if any did the merger of the papers have on the split?
- 6m) What effect if any did the change of leadership have on the split?

- 6n) What effect if any did the fact that only abstentionism to Leinster House was proposed to be dropped as opposed to all three parliaments have on the splits?
- 6o) What effect if any did the support of prominent members of the IRA and Sinn Fein from both the new and old guard of the Movement have on the split?
- 6p) What effect if any did the Brownie letters have on the split?
- 6q) How did the group go about organising/reorganising after the split?
- 6r) What effect if any did the declaration of support from Tom Maguire have on the split?
- 7) *Why did you choose to stay with the Provisionals/ join Republican Sinn Fein and/or the Continuity IRA?*
- 7a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice?
- 7b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice?
- 7c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision?
- 7d) How was the split reflected in your local area?
- 7e) What effect if any did the 1975 ceasefire have on your decision?
- 7f) What effect if any did the issue of abstentionism have on your decision?
- 7g) What effect if any did the 1981 hunger strikes have on your decision?
- 7h) What effect if any did the elections of Bobby Sands and others following the 1981 hunger strikes have on your decision?
- 7i) What effect if any did the dropping of the Eire Nua policy have on your decision?
- 7j) What effect if any did the merger of the papers have on your decision?
- 7k) What effect if any did the change of leadership have your decision?
- 7l) What effect if any did the fact that only abstentionism to Leinster House was proposed to be dropped as opposed to all three parliaments have on your decision?

7m) What effect if any did the support of prominent members of the IRA and Sinn Fein from both the new and old guard of the Movement have on your decision?

7n) What effect if any did the Tom Maguire's declaration have on your decision?

7o) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision?

1997 Split

8a) Where do you believe the origins of the 1997 split lie?

8b) What effect if any did public support have on the split?

8c) Why did the split take place at the time it did?

8d) When did it seem like the split was inevitable?

8e) What effect if any did the 1994 ceasefire have on the split?

8f) What effect if any did the Mitchell Principles have on the split?

8g) Were both sides actively campaigning prior to the split?

8h) Were there obvious factions within the movement in the lead up to the split? If so what were these factions based on?

8k) What effect if any did the Downing St. Declaration have on the split?

8l) What effect if any did the Peace Process as a whole have on the split?

8m) What effect if any did the growing political involvement of Sinn Fein have on the split?

8n) How did the group go about organising/reorganising after the split?

9) *Why did you choose to stay with the Provisionals/ join the Real IRA and/or the 32 County Sovereignty Committee?*

9a) Was there anyone who had a significant influence on your choice?

9b) Was there any specific event which had an influence on your choice?

- 9c) Did the Republican newspapers have any affect on your decision?
- 9d) How was the split reflected in your local area?
- 9e) What effect if any did the 1994 ceasefire have on your decision?
- 9f) What effect if any did the Mitchell Principles have on your decision?
- 9g) Were both sides actively campaigning prior to the split?
- 9h) What effect if any did the Downing St. Declaration have on your decision?
- 9k) What effect if any did the Peace Process as a whole have on your decision?
- 9l) What effect if any did the growing political involvement of Sinn Fein have your decision?
- 9m) What effect if any did public sentiment have on your decision?

Splits in General

- 10) In your opinion in general what causes a split?*
- 11) In your opinion in general what makes one side more successful than another in gaining support during a split*

No Splits

- 12) Was there ever a time when you believed a split to be inevitable but it was somehow fended off? If so how?*
- 13) In general what can prevent a seemingly inevitable split?*
- 13a) Why was there no split at the time of the 1994 ceasefire?
- 13b) Why was there no split at the time of the 1972 ceasefire? (This is in reference to the 1972 splits of both the Officials and the Provisionals)
- 13c) Why was there no split with the recognition of the PSNI?

Appendix C

Ethical Issues in the Research

As should be the case in all social science research the present project placed an emphasis on the necessity of a strong ethical approach. This ethical approach started at the development of the research plan and continued into the interviewing and analysis of the data. It was vital throughout that the safety and requests of the participants were at all times taken into consideration. When dealing with any participants, especially those discussing sensitive information, it is necessary to constantly consider the possible future implications of the research findings and how they are presented. As well as the safety of the participants it is equally critical that the researcher's safety is always respected. For these reasons researchers should avoid placing themselves in compromising positions. This avoidance can only be guaranteed with prior preparation and thought about the research questions and methods.⁶²³ This ethical awareness must be carried throughout the entire project including the competent and thorough analysis of the collected data.⁶²⁴

One of the key elements in the ethical application of interview techniques is the appreciation of the importance of informed consent. The researcher has an ethical obligation to make sure that each participant understands what their research entails, the possible risk if any, and how and where the research findings will and may be used.⁶²⁵ Before an interview starts the interviewer must make every effort to obtain informed consent while also making clear to each participant that they are free to withdraw or refuse to answer specific questions if they do not wish to. In the present research one of the tools which was utilised by the researcher in this regard was that of a consent form.⁶²⁶ This was given to participants to read prior to each interview starting. This took place after the participant had been told about the purpose and aims of the research. Due to the fact that there was the intention to use participants' actual names one of the most sections of this form contained an option for each participant asking whether they wished

⁶²³ Horgan (2004)

⁶²⁴ The author's use of a comprehensive multi-stage analytical structure has ensured that the data has been analysed and interpreted in a sound ethical manner while still not losing the original meaning.

⁶²⁵ See Shaughnessy, J.J., Zechmeister, E.B. and Zeichmeister, J.S. (2003). *Research Methods in Psychology: Sixth Edition*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

⁶²⁶ See Appendix C.

to have their name used or not. Interviewees were given the option to wait until the completion of the interview to make this decision. In reality it was found that the majority of participants were more than willing to have their names used beside their quotes and decided this even before the interview took place. There were four participants who requested to stay anonymous and therefore agreed to the use of an alias. There were also two individual who wished to have part of their interviews used alongside an alias while using their real name for the rest of the interview. On reflection by the researcher, and in consultation with the participants, it was decided that in order to provide anonymity to the requested sections that it would be necessary to do so for the whole transcript and therefore all of the sections used would be presented alongside an alias and at no stage would the participants' real names appear. Of the four who requested full anonymity there was one participant who refused to sign the consent form. However, they did give verbal consent for their quotes to be used alongside an alias. Throughout the interview process after there were requests made by some participants for specific sections of their interviews not to be used, a request which was always respected by the researcher. An additional requirement of certain participants was to view the transcript of their interview, or the sections which were to be used, prior to final approval, once more this request was accommodated by the author.

While the above are some of the critical ethical measures taken during the interview process the centrality of the ethical approach continues into the analysis and presentation of results. Through these processes the author ensured not to exaggerate or change anything which had been said by participants and took every precaution possible not to misinterpret or assign false meaning to their articulations. As has been observed above the safety of the participant is the basis of all ethical research. The selection of extracts from interviews was made with this in mind. When it was believed the use of certain sections may possibly compromise the safety of the participant and/or the researcher these sections were omitted from the final write-up. This did not in any way undermine the value of the research.

At each stage of the research process the necessary precautions and preparations were taken and made in order to deal with all envisioned ethical dilemmas. However, ethical research is a dynamic process which needs to be closely monitored throughout.⁶²⁷ Ethical dilemmas often arise unexpectedly and it is the duty of the researcher to deal with these dilemmas accordingly. During the course of the research one of the participants who had requested to view the completed verbatim transcript of their interview indicated by phone that there was a small unspecified section of the transcript which was not to be drawn on for the research. There were attempts made between participant and researcher to organise a subsequent meeting to distinguish which elements of the transcript were suitable for use. Regrettably due to health reasons the participant was no longer able to meet. This provided a significant ethical dilemma for the research. The participant had indicated on more than one occasion that they were adamant to have their views expressed in the research. However, having stated that there was an unspecified section which was to be omitted the author could ethically not include any of the participant's stated views without their permission.⁶²⁸ This issue was discussed between the author and his supervisor as well as with the departmental ethics advisor. Under the recommendations of both actors the university's ethics board sat to discuss the matter.⁶²⁹ Simultaneous to the board discussing the matter the author was contacted by the trusted intermediary who had organised the initial interview.⁶³⁰ They indicated that the participant had transferred their consent to a leading member of their group who would meet with the author and review the transcript. Prior to the meeting between the author and this affiliate there was a meeting between the original participant and affiliate to discuss what had been said during the original interview and what they believed should possibly be omitted. Subsequently the affiliate met with the researcher to further discuss the transcript and the possibility of omitting some of what had been said. During this

⁶²⁷ Smith et al (2009)

⁶²⁸ Even though the participant had signed the consent form after the interview this new disclosure made this consent form null and void.

⁶²⁹ While this issue was discussed with these external actors at no point was the identity of the participant or their group revealed to anyone and no one was ever told of the contents of the interview. Even after the situation was resolved the identity of participant or group was at no time specified.

⁶³⁰ They were already aware of the situation as it was through them that the participant had indicated that they would no longer be able to meet with the author due the health reasons.

meeting there was a further examination of the original transcript by both parties. At the end of the examination and discussion, and with the prior meeting with the original participant, it was declared that all of the original interview could be utilised. It had been decided by the affiliate and participant upon reflection that the entire contents of the interview was appropriate for use. It was never indicated to the researcher at any stage what specific section or sections had been considered for omission. During this specific situation and throughout the course of the research the wishes of the participants were always put first with regards as to what could and could not be included in the research.

Appendix D Consent Form

John Morrison,
School of International Relations,
University of St. Andrews,
Library Park,
Fife,
KY16 9AX
Scotland.

I _____ agree to allow John Morrison to record our conversation and use quotes from it for his doctoral thesis for the School of International Relations in the University of St Andrews, Scotland, and any subsequent publications deriving from this research. As a researcher Mr Morrison agrees to respect the right of the interviewee to anonymity and confidentiality. I am aware that I can request this interview to be terminated at any point in time.

I agree to allow my name to be used by Mr Morrison, alongside quotes from our conversation, in his doctoral thesis and/or publications deriving from this research.

I request Mr Morrison not to use my name, alongside quotes from our conversation, in his doctoral thesis and/or publications deriving from this research.

Interviewee

John Morrison (Researcher)

Date

Appendix E

The Stage-Based Analysis Process

Stage 1

After each individual interview was completed the recordings were transcribed verbatim. The dialogue between the researcher and participants was not edited in any way. For the majority of interviews the transcription was completed within forty-eight hours of the interview. Appendix A shows that there were certain times when there was a cluster of interviews taking place within a short space of time. In these situations there was a backlog of interviews which had to be transcribed. These were individually dealt with in chronological order. With respect to the two interviews which the author was not permitted to record, notes were taken during the interviews which were written up in the immediate aftermath of each meeting.⁶³¹

After the transcription of each interview the preliminary analysis took place. During this process the transcript was read and re-read so as to familiarise the researcher with the text. During each reading the left-hand margin was used to annotate any themes and/or events which were being discussed in specific sections of the text. These notes were either descriptive or thematic in nature, and were very general. During the initial readings not every section of each text was annotated as the more detailed analysis was to take place in future stages. The purpose of this stage was to familiarise the author with the texts. It is at this stage of the analysis that a process of deductive reasoning started. This process continued in the subsequent stages whereby the analytical results were deduced up in the columns.

Stage 2

After the interviews had been transcribed the second stage of analysis started. During this stage of analysis each transcript was more thoroughly analysed. Every transcript was analysed concurrently under three headings; Group, Individual and Engage/Disengage. When analysing under the heading of Group the author was interpreting sections of the

⁶³¹ These interviews were with Mick Ryan and 'Conor'.

texts where the participants were discussing why and how they believed each individual split had taken place. This included the detailing of significant events lead up to the split. Similarly when the author was analysing the data under the heading of Individual the interpretation was of the sections where the participants' individual reasons for choosing one side over the other were detailed. The final analysis during this stage took place under the heading of Engage/Disengage. Here the sections where participants detailed the rationale and mechanisms of their initial engagement with the Republican Movement were analysed as well as their disengagement from the group or any role within the group. The analysis of disengagement and engagement also entailed interpreting the rationale and mechanisms behind participants leaving one group to join another during the splits under analysis. Throughout each of these analyses there was constant reference to the original transcripts and the annotations from stage 1 of analysis.

For each separate participant an individual table of analysis was constructed to organise and display the interpretations of this stage of analysis. For the analysis of the interviews at a group and individual level the tables were divided into four separate columns and multiple rows. Each row dealt with one individual section of the transcript, while the four columns provided the four separate headings under which the analysis of each section was constructed. From left to right the columns were:

- **Split:** In this column it was specified which of the four splits was being discussed in the analysed section; the split was exhibited with the years in which the split took place. In the sections where the participant was discussing situations where a split had been avoided this was annotated as 'No Split' and when splits in general were being discussed this was simply displayed as 'Splits in General'. There were also occasions where the participants dealt with issues relevant to modern day Republicanism, on these occasions the annotation 'Modern Day' was placed in this left-hand column.
- **Theme:** In this next column the initial themes arising from the analysis of the separate sections were displayed. These themes were very general and not influenced by any existing theories; this initial interpretation of themes was reliant on what was contained within the transcript. The annotations produced in

the first stage of analysis were used for reference. In some cases more than one theme was required to illustrate the author's initial interpretation of the section being analysed. The open method of interpretation employed during this stage of analysis allowed for new themes to be identified as the interpretation was not constrained by prior research or findings.

- **Description:** For each section which was being analysed there was a brief synopsis of what had been said by the participant during the interview. This was to accompany the emerging themes so as to illustrate the origins of the interpretations.
- **(Page, Line):** The final column of the analysis table indicated the location of the analysed section. Prior to any analysis of the transcript each page and line was individually numbered. In this column the page and line location indicated the starting point for each analysed section. Each line was not separately analysed instead the transcripts were divided into manageable sections which were analysed and displayed in the separate rows of the interpretation table.

With respect to the Engagement/Disengagement section of the analysis the interpretation table was very similar to both the Individual and Group tables. The only difference was that the column 'Split' was replaced with 'Engage/Disengage'. In this new column it was indicated whether the interpreted section was detailing the engagement with or the disengagement from a group. With regards the movement from one group to another during or after a split the section was often annotated as both 'Engage' and 'Disengage'; this is due to the fact that often times there was an overlap in these sections dealing with the reason a person left a group as well as why they joined a specific new group

Stage 3

Stage 3 of the analysis provided a more organised set of themes and sub-themes. The aim of this stage was to organise the emerging themes into manageable groups under the headings of the emerging super-ordinate themes.⁶³² Two separate methods was applied in

⁶³² A 'super-ordinate' theme can be regarded as an over-arching theme which encompasses the overall character of an organised cluster of sub-themes.

the organisation and development of the super-ordinate themes and sub-themes. These were the methods of abstraction and subsumption.⁶³³

The purpose of abstraction was to identify patterns between emergent themes in order to develop a super-ordinate theme. During this process similar themes are placed together and a new name for the cluster was developed. A clear example of abstraction can be seen in the development of the super-ordinate theme of 'Process of Change.' During stage two of the analysis twelve separate themes emerged from the interpretation of interview data which during the abstraction process of stage three were able to be brought together under the super-ordinate theme heading of 'Process of Change.' During this process the super-ordinate themes can be considered as the higher level theme and the themes within the cluster are sub-themes of this higher level theme.

The process of subsumption is very similar to abstraction. The only difference is that a theme which had already been identified during analysis acquires the super-ordinate status as it proved a beneficial higher-level theme which could bring together a series of related themes. A clear example of this can be seen with the promotion of the theme of 'Leadership' to super-ordinate status during this analysis. Under this super-ordinate theme of 'Leadership' there were twenty-one dominant sub-themes. A number of the sub-themes were not exclusively tied to one specific super-ordinate theme. This is especially true for the descriptive sub-themes. If the example of the super-ordinate theme of 'leadership' is continued the sub-themes of 'weakening' and 'strengthening' are two examples of sub-themes which are present under the heading of a number of other super-ordinate themes as well. In the case of leadership they are referring to the strengthening or weakening of the leadership of the Republican Movement. However, they similarly act as sub themes for other super-ordinate themes such as 'Group' and 'Support'.

Similar to the previous stage of analysis the results of this stage of the process were represented using analysis tables. Instead of the three sets of analysis tables of stage 2 the results of stage 3 of the analysis were represented in two sets of tables. This is due to the

⁶³³ Smith etc al (2009)

fact that the ‘Individual’ and ‘Engagement/Disengagement’ tables were merged together to form one dominant ‘Individual’ table. This decision was made as there was a significant overlap between both sets of tables and they were both dealing with the decision making process of the individual participants. The development of the tables during stage 3 of the analysis was similar to the methodology utilised in the previous analysis stage. During the processes of subsumption and abstraction the stage 2 tables were referred to as well as the original interview transcripts to assure that the resulting super-ordinate and sub-themes were reflective of the original meaning of the participant. ‘Individual’ and ‘Group’ results tables were developed for each participant, and the analysis was carried out one participant at a time.

The layout of the tables was similar to those of the stage 2 analysis however in place of the ‘Description’ column was a ‘Sub-Theme’ column and the ‘Theme’ column was replaced by the ‘Super-Ordinate Theme’ column. The ‘Split’ and ‘(Page, Line)’ columns remained the same. With respect to the sub-themes it was regular that there was more than one sub-theme in reference to an individual super-ordinate theme. These sub-themes were ordered with the higher order sub-theme presented first and the lower-order sub-theme last in the list. Essentially the lower order sub-themes were sub-themes to the higher order sub-themes. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 below which is a row extracted from the Stage 3 ‘Group’ analysis results table of ‘Denis’. This extract is in reference to a section starting on page 2 line 3 of the participant’s interview transcript where he is discussing the 1969/70 split. In this section the super-ordinate theme identified was ‘Membership’ and the higher order sub-theme was ‘Expectations’, with the lower order sub-themes being ‘Armed’ and ‘Weapons’. Therefore this row of analysis shows he was discussing the importance of membership expectations to the 1969/70 split. In this particular section he was specifically detailing the expectations of the armed membership for weapons.

Split	Super-Ordinate Theme	Sub-Theme	(Page, Line)
1969/70	Membership	Expectations: Armed: Weapons	(2,3)

Figure C.2: Row from the Stage 3 ‘Group’ analysis results table of ‘Denis’

Concurrent to the processes of both subsumption and abstraction there was a re-analysis of the themes which arose from stage 2 of the analysis. During this re-analysis it was found that certain themes identified were weakly connected to the original data and therefore were disposed of or modified so as to be more reflective of the original text. Through this process the themes became more reflective of the data. The criteria for the process of pruning were specific to each separate case.

Stage 4

In the fourth stage of the analytical processes the results of the previous stages were re-organised under the headings of the super-ordinate themes. While stage 3 identified the presence of the super-ordinate themes these were still represented in individual participant tables. The purpose of this final stage of analysis was to combine the results of the previous stages and represent them in sets of tables organised under the headings of the individual super-ordinate themes. This analysis was carried out theme by theme rather than participant by participant. As with all other stages there was constant reference to the results from the previous stages as well as to the original transcripts. This was to insure that the super-ordinate and sub themes were reflective of the original sentiments portrayed by the participants. The researcher was ultimately assessing the developed themes for their relevance to their parent data. This analysis minimised the chances of human error and/or researcher bias.

During this analytical stage a new set of tables was developed to outline the presence of specific super-ordinate and sub themes across individual participants and splits. These tables were developed at both an Individual and a Group level.

For each super-ordinate theme there was a table constructed representing which participant transcripts insinuated the importance of this theme. The table consisted of a column for each of the splits and a row for each participant who suggested the importance of this theme. An X was placed in the corresponding column for the split which the theme had been associated with by the participant. Figure 4.3 below illustrates the layout of the table. These rows have been extracted from the 'Group' table for the super-

ordinate theme of ‘Voice’. The Xs marked in the table represent the splits for which the participants discussed the theme of ‘Voice’. In the case of Martin McGonagle the table illustrates that in his interview he discussed the theme with regard to the 1974 and 1986 splits as well as when he was discussing splits in general and modern day events. When one moves down through the tables of higher and lower order sub-themes it becomes clearer as to what was been dealt with in each interview.

Participant	1969/70	1974	1986	1997	No Split	Splits In General	Modern Day
Francie Mackey				X	X		X
Fra Halligan	X						
Martin McGonagle		X	X			X	X

Figure C.3: Extract from the super-ordinate table for the theme of Voice.

The development of these tables provided a clearer picture of what themes were dominant for each of the splits. Unlike previous tables the stage 4 tables did not indicate each specific time that a theme was dealt with by a specific participant, neither did they indicate the specific location of the theme in the transcript. For these reasons it was important during the write up of the interpretative results to once again use the resultant tables from each of the separate stages of analysis along with the original interview transcripts. The development of these tables during stage 4 of the analysis provided the opportunity to compare which themes were dominant across splits as well as across groups and across membership levels within the groups.

The purpose of this stage of analysis was not to create a quantitative data to take away from the importance of the original words of the participants. The aim of stage 4 of the analysis was to make the themes which had arisen during all stages of analysis more accessible and retrievable for the researcher during the final stage of analysis. The creation of these tables provided an extra tool so as to assure that the most precise analysis of the data was possible.

While this is detailed as the final stage of analysis in this chapter the accurate conclusion of the analysis process comes during the write up stage of the analysis. This stage

utilised all of the tools created in the four stages detailed above and is comprehensively outlined the subsequent chapters of the research. As will be displayed in the results chapters the four splits have been presented as four micro-processes with the macro-process of Republican involvement in the Troubles. Each stage of the process was developed through the interpretative evaluation of the results from the previous four stages to analyse the dominant themes which took place at different times in the process leading up to the organisational split. In order successfully outline the stages of the processes the results had to be first validated.

Appendix F

1974: The Officials Divide Again

Introduction

As the process for the 1969/70 split came to a close two new processes of splits began. This appendix covers the relatively short process which resulted in the division in the Official Republican Movement resulting in the formation of the Irish Republican Socialist Movement (IRSM) which consists of an armed wing, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and a political wing, the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP).

In 1974 the Official Republican Movement court martialled and expelled Seamus Costello, in the aftermath of which he developed the IRSM in conjunction with a number of other erstwhile Officials. Therefore there is an obvious difference between this and the other splits. The 1974 split was a result of the expulsion of a leadership figure. The other splits resulted from the voluntary departure of key leadership figures. However, similar to the others the 1974 divide was the result of an organisational stage based process. By the time of the divide the Officials were a significantly smaller grouping than their Provisional rivals. Even with the relatively small size of the group though the 1974 split should still be regarded as significant in the macro-process of Irish Republican involvement in the Troubles.

Of the participants interviewed only twelve individuals were involved in this split. There were six who stayed with the Officials and another six who joined the IRSM. Of these two of the Officials and one IRSM were members of their organisation's national leadership. One additional IRSM member was to become a member of the national leadership but at a time significantly detached from the split. It is acknowledged that various subsequent splits happened within the IRSM in the years after their initial split from the Officials. However, due to the sensitive and volatile nature of the issues none of the members involved were willing to talk about these splits in any detail. Therefore there can only be a cursory acknowledgement of their existence.

In total twenty-three participants discussed the 1974 split. Of these twenty-three twelve were involved in the split and eleven were external observers. The make-up of the participants is illustrated in Table F.1.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Member	Total
Official Republican Movement	2	4	6
Irish Republican Socialist Movement	1	4	5
Undisclosed	0	1	1
External	4 (2 RSF/CIRA and 2 Provisional and 1 Official advisor)	7 (1 RSF/CIRA and 6 Provisional)	11
Total	7	16	23

Table F.1: Participants who discussed the 1974 split

As with the sub-chapter which detailed the 1969/70 split the present analysis has detailed the 1974 split as a stage based micro-process. Distinct from the 1969/70 split the analysis of the 1974 split has identified four stages as opposed to the five stages of the previous split. This is due to the forced nature of the organisational exit and breakaway group formation brought on by the pre-emptive actions of the Official leadership against Seamus Costello and his followers. As with the sub-chapters outlining the other three splits the dominant themes which have been identified in the analysis of the present split are detailed in the sub-sections of each stage. These should not be regarded as separate themes but as themes dominant during that specific stage of the process. The title of each stage illustrates the stage's dominant characteristic and function. The title of each sub-section illustrates the dominant themes described.

The stages of the 1974 split are

Stage 1: Aftermath of Split: Competition and Re-Organisation⁶³⁴

Stage 2: Factional Development

Stage 3: Forced Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

Stage 4: Aftermath of Split: Multiple Feuds.

⁶³⁴ This stage has been detailed within Chapter 8a

This does not fit either the models of split or split avoidance. It may more accurately be described as a model of forced split. Within this framework the Official leadership effectively bypassed the third stage of the hypothesised model from Chapter 4 and forced a split by expelling members. This expulsion declined the dissidents the opportunity to adequately prepare for either split or change.

Stage 2: Factional Development

The previous split analysed is notable for the variety of intra-organisational conflicts in the lead up to the divide. In contrast the 1974 split had one central intra-organisational conflict. The factionalism within the movement in the lead up to this split was focused on armed strategy. In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday⁶³⁵ the Army Council of the Official IRA ordered that any British soldier, on or off duty, was to be shot.⁶³⁶ Following these orders on May 25th the Derry Officials ‘arrested’ and executed Ranger William Best as he walking through the Creggan. This proved to be one of the most unpopular attacks ever sanctioned by the Officials and resulted in numerous protests against the movement. This came in the aftermath of three other publicly disparaged Official attacks in which innocent civilians proved the main casualties.⁶³⁷ By May 29th the Official GHQ in Dublin declared a ceasefire⁶³⁸ and issued an order to all members that they were to only attack in situations of defence or retaliation, and this had to take place within forty-eight hours of the initial event and the resultant attack had to be approved of and justified by Dublin HQ. This policy proved to further factionalise the movement as members found the process frustrating and restricting.

⁶³⁵ January 30th 1972, British paratroopers shoot dead thirteen people participating in a civil rights march in Derry.

⁶³⁶ Crenshaw (2001) (p.22) and (1985) (p.483) outlines that the Officials’ heightened use of violence against both the Provisionals and British at this stage of the conflict, and in the direct aftermath of the split, can be understood as former moderates consenting to collective radicalisation in order to prevent the departure of a sub-group.

⁶³⁷ These attacks were the Aldershot barracks bombing where the casualties were all civilian and included the death of a Catholic priest, the murder of Minister for Home Affairs John Taylor and Sidney Agnew a Protestant resident of Mountpottinger East Belfast who was due to give evidence against three Officials charged with hijacking a bus.

⁶³⁸ Bowyer Bell, (1990), p.21.

This second stage of the process starts with this change in armed strategy in 1972 and focuses on the developing factionalism between members wishing to expand the armed strategy and their internal rivals aspiring for the movement to restrain all forms of armed conflict. This is regarded as an extension of *disillusionment* and *disconnect* which originated in the first stage in the aftermath of the 1969/70 split. Nine participants talked outlined the importance of this change in armed strategy to the outcome of the 1974 split. Most notable in this, as displayed in Table F.2 is that each of the IRSM members interviewed outlined the central role of the change in the armed strategy.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Member	Total
Official Republican Movement	2	1	3
Irish Republican Socialist Movement	1	4	5
Undisclosed	0	1	1
External	0	0	0
Total	3	6	9

Table F.2: Change of Armed Strategy

Membership Disillusionment and Leadership Disconnect

The composition of the Official Republican Movement in the early 1970s was diverse. The national leadership was still predominantly based in Dublin. They were extolling a purely political strategy with the complete removal of the armed component. In line with their left-leaning non-sectarian political philosophy they wished to reach out to the unionist and loyalist communities in order to work together in the fight for the working classes. While this may have been viewed from Dublin as the right course of action it was met with disdain by many members and supporters across Northern Ireland. It was difficult for them to accept such an overture to the loyalist communities when Republican areas were facing numerous sectarian attacks perpetrated by members of these communities. The northern Officials attempted to voice this discontent and concern about the strategy to the national leadership. These concerns were even being voiced by some of those who would stay with the Officials in the aftermath of the split, people such as Liam [Billy] McMillen.

“The other paramilitaries were involved in very, very grizzly sectarian murders. I remember Liam McMillen at the September 1972 Ard Fheis reading a quotation from one of the pamphlets, a Loyalist pamphlet, to try and emphasise to the southern membership of Official Sinn Fein the depth of the sectarian bigotry among Unionists, essentially the Unionist population in the North, how deep it was. We thought that overtures to Loyalist paramilitaries at this point in time were being interpreted by Loyalist paramilitaries as a sign of weakness and it was actually giving them a greater confidence to commit more sectarian murders; that was our belief. This created a greater increase in tension within the Official Republican Movement.”⁶³⁹

This factionalism was not solely based in Northern Ireland. There were militant Officials across Ireland who were sceptical of the policy, as displayed in the quote below from Patrick Kennelly a Limerick Republican who was a member of the INLA leadership at the time of the split.

“I would have been happy to go along with that if they kept fighting the Brits but they came along with a policy that said ‘we are trying to get contact with the Loyalists, get the Loyalist involvement’, which was a load of rubbish. They weren’t going to make any move, Loyalism weren’t going to make any move towards any Republican organisation, irrespective of socialism, I don’t know if the Loyalists had any socialism in them, I don’t think they would have had any socialism.”⁶⁴⁰

With respect to the immediate target of organisational survival this again fits with one of the dominant themes of the 1969/70 process, ‘too much too soon.’ The violence in Northern Ireland was at an all time high and the Official membership was being targeted by the British, Provisionals and the loyalist paramilitaries. For the northern membership which was taking the force of these attacks they wanted their leadership to take decisive action to aid in this struggle and provide them with the ability to fight back.

⁶³⁹ ‘Paul’

⁶⁴⁰ Patrick Kennelly

The predominance of violence in Northern Ireland at this time had provided a context where a significant proportion of the Official membership advocated a stronger armed campaign on behalf of the organisation. The ‘defence and retaliation’ strategy was seen as providing too many constraints and was viewed by many to be debilitating in the fight against the Provisionals and loyalist paramilitaries as well as the British occupation.

“At the time we had to be active in defence and retaliation. There was little done in retaliation as there were so many factors to take in to consideration; the time element, we had to be sure who carried out the attack which we were retaliating against so we couldn’t be seen to be starting the aggression. There was a good deal of disgruntlement and frustration with the in built conditions, the conditions of defence and retaliation. We had to contact GHQ before any operation and know the organisation responsible. The retaliation had to be carried out within 48 hours of the attack so it wasn’t looked as us starting a fresh campaign. Therefore it was very difficult to implement.”⁶⁴¹

While they were being personally constrained by their leadership in taking part in any significant offensives the Official membership were seeing the Provisionals acquiring an abundance of weapons. For many this was to prove disheartening.

“But as things got worse in the north the Provos were at the forefront of defending the Catholics at the time when there was a lot of pressure with pogroms and setting fire to homes. As that progressed and got worse people within the Official Sinn Fein Movement were, the Official IRA, were beginning to get disillusioned because they saw that the Official IRA were standing back and weren’t sort of taking the lead, the Provos were taking the lead. A lot of fellas that were in the Official Sinn Fein Movement, the Official IRA, they wanted to bring physical force back to the forefront of policies.”⁶⁴²

⁶⁴¹ Mick Ryan

⁶⁴² Mick Murtagh

As Director of Operations at this time Seamus Costello found the strategy of defence and retaliation debilitating and from an early stage voiced his discontent. While supportive of the need for the party to have a strong political basis he believed that in light of the Northern Irish context that the priority at that time should have been having a strong IRA.⁶⁴³ He believed that the strategy promoted by the national leadership was naïve and had misguided priorities.

“Costello would have been for greater engagement by the Official IRA. As Director of Operations a key element for him was the failure to implement ‘defence and retaliation’ due to the restrictions placed. Costello was very upfront with his complaints... From then on Costello realised the frustration of local Directors of Operations in the North about not being able to take action. The leadership didn’t want to take action against the UDR as this would turn into a sectarian war. Costello’s reaction was ‘so what if it turns into a sectarian war?’ This proved to Costello that the Republican Movement in the north was driven to a situation of appeasement of the Protestant working class... There should have been stronger emphasis on IRA military action against the British. Costello saw the role for the political but thought that the IRA should have been carried out as a primary role, not a secondary role.”⁶⁴⁴

The dominant theme at this stage of the split was that of disillusionment among the rank and file membership at the failure of the national leadership to implement a ‘strong’ armed strategy. This was coupled with a significant leadership disconnect to their northern membership. This disconnect between membership expectations and leadership actions resulted in heightened division within the group between those calling for a purely political campaign and those wishing for stronger armed action. This stage of the process lends support to three of the organisational hypotheses.

⁶⁴³ Ironically it was originally Costello who toured the country to ‘sell’ the ceasefire to members in 1972. Holland and McDonald, p.19.

⁶⁴⁴ Interviews with Mick Ryan

H01. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.

H01. In light of the constant violence within the republican and nationalist areas of Northern Ireland at this stage of the process, and the specific violence directed against the Official IRA members and supporter by the Provisionals, a significant number of the Northern Irish membership in particular felt that the survival of the organisation was under threat. The threat to survival of the organisation at this stage was twofold. The physical threat to the survival of the organisation was in the death of members due to the ongoing feuds and violence and there was similarly a numerical threat to organisational survival due to ongoing competition for membership with the Provisional IRA.⁶⁴⁵

H02. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

H02. In the aftermath of the 1969/70 split and in light of the ongoing violence described a number of longstanding Officials as well as those new members revised their perceived organisational identity. This was particularly true in the areas most affected by violence. A significant number of the members in the worst effected regions believed that the OIRA should have a stronger armed presence both in a defensive and agitational manner. However, the majority of the national leadership still professed the necessity of a restrained use of the armed strategy, with many denouncing any use of violence at all. Therefore they believed that due to the strict promotion of the defence and retaliation strategy and the deficiency of weapons to partake in offensives that the purpose and identity of the organisation was being diminished. At this stage the attempted to rectify this perceived threat through the application of voice. This was particularly carried out by the local leadership as well as disapproving national leadership figures such as Seamus Costello.

⁶⁴⁵ As is illustrated in Appendix G a number of young members who joined the Officials during this stage of the Troubles left to join the Provisionals due to their disillusionment with the organisation.

HO4. The sub-group most willing to make compromises is the one most likely to be successful in the aftermath of a split.

HO4. It was unmistakable at this stage of the process that the national leadership were unwilling to compromise on what they believed to be the necessary role and strategy employed by the organisation. The continued application of what the defence and retaliation strategy, which the advocates of a strengthened armed campaign believed to be purposively restrictive, and the active engagement with the loyalist and unionist communities illustrated even in the aftermath of the application of critical voice on behalf of the disillusioned that the national leadership were unwilling to compromise. This continued strict adherence to their stated principles and strategies outlined to the emerging dissidents that the growing conflict was possibly irreconcilable.

As a consequence of the active and continuing politicising campaign by the Official leadership the organisation at this stage was a significantly heterogeneous grouping. A significant proportion of the organisational leadership was very much in favour of the politicisation of the movement. However, in the context of the violence this was significantly disconnected from the expectations of a significant proportion of the membership. This heterogeneity of viewpoints about both the short term and long term strategic prioritising of the group provided a fertile setting for a possible split.

Preparation for split

This split more than any of the others was driven by one dominant individual. As is displayed throughout the process it was Costello who was the predominant voice in the call for a more militaristic Official IRA. Each of the participants who participated in the 1974 split, as well as three external observers, indicated the centrality of the leadership of Seamus Costello to the split as is illustrated in Table F.3.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Member	Total
Official Republican Movement	2	4	6
Irish Republican Socialist Movement	1	4	5
Undisclosed	0	1	1
External	0	3 (Provisional IRA)	3
Total	3	12	15

Table F.3: Centrality of Seamus Costello to the 1974 Split

At the Army Convention of 1972 he put forward the motion for the continuation of the armed campaign, and the motion was passed. In the year subsequent it was clear that Costello was making moves to form a new more militant armed group, a move which was countered by the rest of the national leadership. The discontent already illustrated transformed into decisive action. A section of the membership, led by Costello, started to form a more organised dissident grouping with the possibility of moving away from the OIRA. Costello was actively putting forward arguments for the reinforcement of the armed strategy. Even though he could not rely on the support of the majority of the movement he did have the backing of a significant minority. It was with this minority that he began to prepare a dissident organisation. Costello's voicing of discontent was not restricted to the national leadership. His misgivings about the organisation's armed strategy were also promoted to the discontented rank and file. In specific areas where there was significant discontent especially among the local leadership Costello's strategy was welcomed as an alternative to the restrictive 'defence and retaliation.'

“Costello acted as subversive in the Army and Sinn Fein, and was not just restricted to the Army Council and Sinn Fein. He was going along the route of pandering to dissatisfaction at local level.”⁶⁴⁶

The strategy latched on to the sentiment of those who had joined the organisation to take part in an armed struggle. The argument put forward to them by Costello and his supporters at a local leadership level was that while there was the necessity for a strong political strategy that in order to have any chance of achieving the organisation's ultimate

⁶⁴⁶ Mick Ryan

objective that there must similarly be a strong armed campaign. This was a strategy which appealed to many at the forefront of the conflict.

“Our attitude was we didn’t want to be like that [purely political]. If we’re going to have weapons we wanted to use them, and that’s what we joined the movement for... So what we were saying was ‘yes there needed to be a certain political direction, but the gun is an extension of politics’. Throughout history the gun is an extension of politics, it just depends what way you use it. But they didn’t want the gun in the politics, the Officials didn’t want...the gun in the politics at all. So people were all getting disillusioned. Most people, the old ones who were still there were starting to go ‘what’s the point?’... Then came the mention of going back [to an armed campaign] and eyes lit up.”⁶⁴⁷

With these growing levels of support for his alternative strategy Costello’s stance transformed from changing the movement’s armed strategy to preparing for a takeover of the leadership, or alternatively splitting to form a new Republican organisation. Acting on this sentiment necessitated significant preparation. The possibility of a split was clear from 1972. However, Costello wished to gain greater levels of support or if at all possible the support of the majority of the movement.

“The reason it didn’t happen was because Costello wanted to take the whole Movement. He could have gone in Autumn of 72, that is when a split could have taken place.”⁶⁴⁸

In his preparations for a split, or alternatively a coup, Costello through his role as Director of Operations had gained the loyalty of units across the island. A number of these would carry out his orders ahead of those of Cathal Goulding.

⁶⁴⁷ ‘Denis’

⁶⁴⁸ ‘Paul’

“The Derry people wouldn’t take any orders from Cathal, they would only take orders from Seamus Costello. He went up to find out and Costello had all the Derry unit in his hands and had policies to do this and do that and the other, and was all military action in other words. The Provos were at it at this time and we weren’t, we were doing nothing, and Costello said that we should be doing something.”⁶⁴⁹

As he gained the backing of a significant minority his preparation moved on to include the securing of sufficient levels of weapons for the potential new grouping. For the participants interviewed this was a key issue. Eight interviewees, three Officials and five IRSM, outlined the importance of this pre-split preparation through the attempted acquisition of armaments. However, the Official leadership, and those loyal to Goulding, were privy to these preparations and countered this by disarming and discontinuing the rearming of units suspected of dissidence. This move was made so as to weaken any possible coup or future external opposition. The disarming of units was taking place when it became apparent to the leadership of the possibility of another split.

“At that stage the unit that we were in, the Fianna and the Army in Divis Flats [Belfast] were known as a head cases because they were always wanting guns, they were always firing out operations, ‘can we get this? Can we do that? Can we have more weapons? I want more weapons. Give us more. Let us do. Come on we do...So we were finding then that weapons weren’t coming into the areas, just whatever weapons you had, you had. And then you would be asked for maybe someone would want a Shorty and it was going out of the area, but it wasn’t coming back.”⁶⁵⁰

⁶⁴⁹ Tomas MacGiolla

⁶⁵⁰ ‘Denis’

“They were strapped for arms. The Official IRA ensured that they would disarm most of us at the time. A lot of fellas in Limerick and Clare and Cork and Waterford guns were taken off them months before the split.”⁶⁵¹

The Officials had learned their lesson from the experience with the pre-split Provisionals and were now taking decisive action to prevent or at least minimise the effects of the split. As will be displayed in the subsequent sections this pre-split intervention by the Official leadership proved significant in affecting the subsequent strength of the dissidents. By not allowing them to adequately prepare for the formation of a new group, as the Provisionals had been allowed in the lead-up to 1969, the dissidents were therefore a much weaker organisation in the aftermath of split. This is not solely in reference to numerical strength and the possession of weapons. The dissidents had also failed to prepare a significant organisational structure for the new impending new movement. In the aftermath of the split in the resultant violent feuds Seamus Costello was killed and without a clear succession plan the organisation once again entered into further conflict and feuds, this time purely due to a leadership struggle.

This stage of the process suggests the significance of the desire for power as a dominant factor in the lead up to the 1974 split.⁶⁵² This is an issue which was not hypothesised within the Chapter 5. However, it may prove significant in the analysis of splits and coups led by influential or charismatic individuals rather than groups. The influence of Seamus Costello as the predominant leader of the dissidents was one of the overarching themes within this stage. It is proposed here that his growing dissidence was not solely motivated by the wish for a more combative armed campaign. Although it is clear that he believed in the necessity for an armed campaign it is not clear whether his motivation for dissidence was linked to a belief that the leadership strategy was threatening to the organisational identity. It is posited that his dissidence in particular was also linked to his

⁶⁵¹ ‘Frank’

⁶⁵² This is supports the claim that areas of power-relations is one of the prominent venues for intra-organisational conflict. March and Simon (1993), p.142; It is similarly supportive of the claim that in armed movements that leadership rivalries can invariably lead to intra-organisational conflict.

wish for control of the organisation.⁶⁵³ At this stage of the split Costello was putting forward claims for control. However, in order to gain sufficient control of the organisation he needed significant levels of support both numerically in members and physically with respect to weapons and artillery. Therefore it was necessary to frame his push for leadership with the discontent within certain sections of the organisation. This desire for power is particularly illustrated in the quote from Tomas MacGiolla detailing Costello's Derry specific usurping of leadership control.

Stage 3: Forced Exit and Breakaway Group Formation

This awareness of Costello's organisation of dissident factions led the rest of the national leadership to take steps to remove him from a position of power and ultimately expel him. The first major move against Costello by the leadership came in the wake of the 1973 Official Sinn Fein Ard Fheis where he was accused, alongside a number of his supporters, of vote rigging by the national leadership. Although his dissidence was focused upon the armed campaign and the military leadership he had also attempted to utilise his influence within the political wing to gain ground.

*“His conspiracy would develop into ‘Goulding, Garland and Ryan are going soft.’ He was conspiratorial and undermining our credibility. It became more than opposition and change at Army Council. He also wanted to change things secretly at local councils and had lists of voters at Ard Fheiseanna.”*⁶⁵⁴

Official IRA units around the country were briefed on multiple accusations against ‘Vol. Clancy’⁶⁵⁵ by leading members of the movement. Ultimately on February 21st 1974 an Official IRA Court of Inquiry dismissed Costello from the movement. Upon being dismissed Costello requested a court martial. When this was convened he was accused of undermining the IRA through his conduct, misappropriating army funds and faction building. The ‘judges’ of this court martial found him guilty on all charges and he was

⁶⁵³ This form of split may be more analogous to a national revolution than an organisational split. See Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S. (2007). *Contentious Politics*. Boulder Colorado: Paradigm Publishers. Pp.155-161.

⁶⁵⁴ Mick Ryan, February 16th 2009.

⁶⁵⁵ This was a codename used for Costello.

dismissed 'with ignominy.'⁶⁵⁶ When it came to his membership in Sinn Fein he was originally suspended for a six month period but was subsequently dismissed from the political party, along with a number of his supporters, as he did not adhere to the guidelines of his suspension.⁶⁵⁷ He was officially dismissed from the party after a vote to reinstate him was defeated at the 1974 Ard Fheis.

In the aftermath of the court martial the Official leadership de-briefed the national membership on the reasoning for the judgement. Within the ranks of the northern membership in particular this was at times met with anger due to what Costello loyalists believed to be an unfair ruling. Many believed that his positioning with respect to a strengthened armed campaign was justified in light of the situation across Northern Ireland. However, not all of these people angered and vocal in their concerns exited in the formation of a Republican new grouping. A number of these critiques stayed out of loyalty to the movement, and at the dismay of having to develop yet another movement from scratch so soon after the split with the Provisionals.

“Costello had been court martialled in June/July 74. I remember we were all called to a meeting in Cyprus St, it was the Officials then headquarters in Belfast, and Goulding was brought up. The entire membership were summoned to the meeting and they read out the whole details of Costello’s court martial and why he had been dismissed...It was a witch hunt. They wanted to get rid of Costello. Costello was also basing his position on moves which had been made by a lot of people in Belfast and in Derry saying to him to take a firmer line. Some of those people when it came to the crunch then backtracked and stayed with the Officials.”⁶⁵⁸

The position of those calling for an armed campaign in the place of the politically led movement of the time was understood and empathised with by many of those who stayed

⁶⁵⁶ Hanley and Millar, Pp.271-272.

⁶⁵⁷ Costello competed in a county council election as an 'Independent Sinn Fein' candidate even though he had been informed that this was against the guidelines of his suspension.

⁶⁵⁸ 'Paul'

on in the movement. For those northern Republicans especially who remained with the Officials in 1974 the calls for a re-focusing of the armed campaign was not wholly uncalled for.

“People at the coalface here, you will notice that any splits that happened here were to do with weapons or military tactics or things. They didn’t have the luxury of sitting back and falling out over philosophical issues.”⁶⁵⁹

With the imposed exit of Costello and a number of his internal supporters the decision for them then was to either remain external to organised Republicanism as independent dissidents or to develop a new organisation. As they collectively believed in the need for a strong republican socialist armed campaign they selected to set up the Irish Republican Socialist Movement. They were joined in the new movement by a number of disillusioned members who had not been dismissed from the organisation. There was also a portion of the disillusioned that chose to join the Provisionals.

With Seamus Costello regarded as the figurehead for a stronger armed campaign his dismissal from the movement was regarded by many of those exiting to join the IRSM as a sign that the intra-organisational conflict about the strengthening of the armed struggle had reached an irreconcilable stage. With the development of the IRSM they now had a new alternative more in line with their beliefs and expectations for an Irish Republican organisation.

Breakaway Group Formation

Even though the split was predominantly a division from within the OIRA the organisation which was initially publicly developed was a political party, the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). The new party included former members of the Official Republican Movement alongside a number of prominent civil rights figures such as Bernadette McAliskey (nee Devlin). One of the main features which differentiated the IRSP from Official Sinn Fein was the new party’s dismissal of the potential for beneficial

⁶⁵⁹ Sean O’Hare

engagement with the loyalist paramilitary groups on socialist issues.⁶⁶⁰ However, for a large proportion of the membership the most notable differentiating factor was the presence of an armed campaign. Unbeknownst to purely political members of the IRSP Costello, along with a number of former Official IRA members, set up a new left-wing paramilitary organisation the People's Liberation Army (PLA). This organisation was the precursor to the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a name it changed to in 1975.

The rationale for the initial clandestine nature of the armed wing was twofold. Firstly the armed leadership were aware that the existence of an armed wing would compel the political recruits to leave the organisation, an exit which took place during the walk out from the 1975 Ard Fheis. These political figures gave the new movement an air of legitimacy which was needed in order to have Costello's desired political impact. This provides further support for the power based proposal contained within a previous stage of this process. Costello's wish for power was not confined to power within the Irish Republicanism. This desire spread externally to his desire for personal political success at times ahead of the purposive goals of a united Ireland. This is an observation which was made by four members of the Official movement, two in a leadership position. With his new movement he wished to gain significant political success and therefore recruited these politically legitimising figures. However, he was aware that in order to achieve this political success that he would need to retain both their legitimising presence as well as the core Republican grouping who expected the organisation to provide a strengthened armed campaign. This may be a further explanation for hiding the presence of the armed wing from the purely political membership.

Due to the pre-emptive moves by the Official leadership to expel Costello and commandeer weapons the armed grouping was not fully ready for a sustained armed campaign. The pre-emption of his move away by the Official leadership had impaired

⁶⁶⁰ Walsh, P. (1994). *Irish Republicanism and Socialism: The Politics of the Republican Movement 1905 to 1994*. Belfast: Athol Books. P.147.

the preparations for a new movement. They had yet to acquire adequate arms or personnel, even though they had been recruiting and organising months prior to the split.

“So what happened was when we were still there we hadn’t officially put a resignation in because what we needed to do was to stay underground until we got ourselves strong, until we got ourselves organised in units and OCs and adjutants and brigades, because it wasn’t just a case of walking away. The Officials wouldn’t let you just walk away one on one. You needed to do it on block when it wouldn’t have been just as simple, that’s the theory.”⁶⁶¹

Due to the need for organisational stability and maintenance the armed movement did not wish to declare their existence until they had developed a sufficiently ready and equipped paramilitary organisation. They were wary that due to the animosity on the ground that they would be faced with the prospect of entering into a violent feud with their former comrades.

“Seamus didn’t want it to become public knowledge until they had acquired finances, weaponry, had drilled and trained and were in a position to launch attacks on a proper scale.”⁶⁶²

However, it was this very mistake which they needed to avoid that defines the path of the organisation for the rest of the twentieth century.

“What happened with the INLA/IRSP was Costello had made a blunder of making it public to effect that he had a new power a new political power in the Irish Republican Socialist Party. People in Belfast had forewarned him that that was dangerous, unless they were in the position to militarily defend themselves. The Belfast people knew their city better than Costello and they knew that the Official

⁶⁶¹ ‘Denis’

⁶⁶² Fra Halligan

*IRA and Liam McMillen would not tolerate another organisation, and would come down heavily.*⁶⁶³

Stage 4: Aftermath of Split: Multiple Feuds

As with all splits the aftermath of 1974 was notable for the competition for membership and support. The leadership of both sides were aware of the necessity of a strong membership and support in order to have any chance of achieve the organisation's immediate aim of survival, let alone their purposive goal.

*“They [organisational policies] may be the best in the world but that is irrelevant if you haven't got people putting their support behind you you are going no where.”*⁶⁶⁴

The result of this pursuit of membership and support was the explicit regional division of previously Official dominated areas. For example in the aftermath of the 1969/70 split the Lower Falls Road and Divis Street area stayed loyal to the Goulding leadership. As a result of 1974 this was further sub-divided with Divis Street moving to the INLA and Leeson Street and other nearby Official areas staying loyal. This regional divide coupled with the post-split hostility resulted in some of the most violent feuds in the history of Irish Republicanism.

*“Everybody came out, Divis Flats was a no-go area for the Sticks, it actually became known as Planet of the Irps.”*⁶⁶⁵⁶⁶⁶

Alongside the influence of Seamus Costello these feuds were the most dominant theme throughout the analysis of the 1974 split as is displayed in Table F.4. Each participant involved in the split, as well as four external observers, commented in detail about the feuds.

⁶⁶³ 'Paul'

⁶⁶⁴ Martin McGonagle

⁶⁶⁵ Irps was a slang term used to refer to the Irish Republican Socialist Movement

⁶⁶⁶ 'Denis'.

Group	Leadership	Ordinary Member	Total
Official Republican Movement	2	4	6
Irish Republican Socialist Movement	1	4	5
Undisclosed	0	1	1
External	1 (1 RSF/CIRA)	3 (1 RSF/CIRA and 2 Provisional)	4
Total	4	12	16

Table F.4: Post Split Violent Feuds

As with all splits both groups wished to put forward the impression that they were the true republican socialist group, and also that they were the stronger of the two groups.

“In paramilitarism there is a lot of macho attitude, ‘we are the real ones and we should do this and we should do that.’ Then I think you had a situation where each side thought the other side was going to do something and you better not show any weakness. That kind of thing builds up and then tensions build up and tensions build up and then something happens.”⁶⁶⁷

With the new organisation trying to put forward an air of political legitimacy these violent feuds were to prove a significantly regressive step. Not only did both organisations lose a number of significant figures through interment and death, but the IRSP in particular was degraded by the exit en masse of a considerable proportion of their newly recruited political membership. This inevitably stunted any political growth.

“In hindsight it [feuds] didn’t allow the politics to flourish the way it should have been...I think that that done more damage than Costello’s stance. With political people once the guns came out and the Officials attacked them, which was a very deliberate thing, people said ‘right I don’t want part of that. It is bad enough having the British out after us but you know...’ that scared a lot of political people as well.”⁶⁶⁸

⁶⁶⁷ Sean O’Hare

⁶⁶⁸ Martin McGonagle

Both groups lost significant leadership figures through the violence, the most significant for the Officials was the murder of Billy McMillen in 1975. However, the defining death of the entire feud was that of Seamus Costello in 1977. As a result of Costello's death the INLA became embroiled in additional feuds as there was no obvious successor to Costello within the movement.

“Another year or two of him living would have just maybe, he would have had more people politically aware, or organisationally aware, and would have left the Movement on a stronger base. That’s not his fault unfortunately, but him leaving at that particular time in a transitional period where we were just out of the feud, people were banged up in jail. We were just starting to get back on our feet, and then bang. The man who had started it everybody looked up to, he was the one we were going to follow, bang away. It was like cutting the head off, so you needed somebody else to take his place who was as charismatic, who was as strong, who had his leadership qualities and who was as politically aware as him. Unfortunately there wasn’t that one there at that particular time, there was just that many issues.”⁶⁶⁹

It was this issue of internal feuding which would define the IRSM right up to the 1990s. During the feud with the Officials a number of new members were recruited purely for the purpose of partaking in the feuds. These new members had little to no aspirations for a socialist Irish Republic. Their sole purpose in the movement was to take part in combat against the Officials. When a number of these new recruits became involved in a leadership battle in the aftermath of Costello's death it led to the development of a number of new smaller Republican organisations, which to a large extent were violent criminal gangs with little to no political aspirations. The net result of all of these feuds was the loss of public support, a necessity for organisational survival, for all groups involved.

⁶⁶⁹ ‘Denis’

“Unfortunately what happens with any feud is the public don’t support feuds at all. In the time that you are involved in the feud you’re ignoring the public entirely and this applies to all groups because the public come out and protest about feuds. But the attitude of a feud is if you step down you get destroyed and walked on and you have to do to them what they have done to you, and a bit more maybe.”⁶⁷⁰

The INLA feuds in the aftermath of the death of Costello succeeded in decimating the organisation, and none of the resultant groups ever made as significant an impact on the Troubles as the Provisionals.

“The first split with the IPLO and Gerard Steenson in Belfast, he wiped out quite a good few of the INLA figures at the time, but eventually they shot him. They cornered him in some part of Belfast and shot him. That seemed to put an end to that feud. There have been several feuds after that.”⁶⁷¹

This stage provides further support for

HO5. In the presence of significant inter-organisational conflict the purposive goals of the organisation will be substituted with the aspiration of harming the rival organisation.

HO5. This is particularly illustrated in the recruitment by the INLA of a violent criminal membership with no link to Irish Republicanism for the sole reason of taking part in the feuds. No longer was the organisational priority the achievement of a unified socialist Irish Republic. The perceived necessity now was to harm their rival organisation, the Official IRA and secure organisational power and survival in this competitive environment. Even though the purposive goal of the two groups was the same the concentration was now on destroying the rival Republican organisation. Therefore it similarly lends support to a further hypothesis.

⁶⁷⁰ Sean O’Hare

⁶⁷¹ Patrick Kennelly

HOL. The immediate goal for each sub-group at the time of split is organisational survival in a form which they respect and recognise.

HOL. At this point of group inception and immediate aftermath of a close split, similar to the aftermath of 1969/79, this immediate goal of organisational survival is accentuated. Due to the closeness in strength of the two rival organisations they are both competing for organisational survival.

The resultant feuds in the aftermath of the death of Seamus Costello further suggests the presence of a power driven motivation for organisational split. However, due to the insignificant level of data gathered on this it requires further investigation.

Regarding the Official Republican Movement they rebranded themselves as ‘Sinn Fein The Workers Party’ with a purely political focus, later dropping all titular signs of their Republican past by becoming ‘The Worker’s Party.’ This party had a small amount of electoral success particularly in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland before splitting again with the foundation of Democratic Left in 1992.⁶⁷² The reason for this split was twofold, those exiting wished for the party to recognise free market economics and they were against the continued existence of the Official IRA, even though it was existent in name alone.

⁶⁷² There was one other minor split in 1991 when a small number of members left to form the autonomous ‘Official Republican Movement’ as they believed that the party had moved away from its Republican heritage too much.

Split Summary⁶⁷³

It has been illustrated here how the 1974 split in the Official Republican Movement was distinctly different from the other three splits analysed in the present research. The dissident faction within the movement was predominantly led by one figurehead leadership figure rather than a group of likeminded dissidents. While this figurehead, Seamus Costello, had significant levels of support from sections of the membership due to his stance on the armed strategy the split can be seen not only as a result of armed strategy based dissidence but also due to Costello's aspirations of power. The split is also distinct as the impending split or coup was pre-empted by the Official leadership and they took decisive action through the safeguarding of weapons from known dissidents and the expulsion of Seamus Costello from the movement. The even nature of the divide in the aftermath of the split as with 1969/70 resulted in a significant level of violent feuds and therefore a shift in the immediate goals of the new movements. The focus was now on weakening their Republican opponents as opposed to fighting against the British presence in Northern Ireland or loyalist attacks on nationalist and Republican communities.

⁶⁷³ For an Official analysis of Irish Republicanism from the early 1960s to 1975 see MacGiolla, T. (1975). *The Making of the Irish Revolution: A Short Analysis*. Repsol Pamphlet No.17. In this MacGiolla outlines that the intentions of the Republican Movement was not to settle for a 32 County Free State but that there was an intention to change the way the political system in the whole of Ireland was to work. They wished to 'organise the people to build a revolution and not just build an army to start a campaign.' In this document, which was originally a speech given to the Boston Irish Forum, he outlines his analysis of the 1969/70 split as well as detailing how Republicanism should move forward. The points he raised in this document are resonant of what took place in over two decades after with the success of the peace process. In this he outlined the necessity to achieve peace for the people's benefit and in order to achieve this among other points he outlined the necessity for amnesty for political prisoners, the reform of the police and the abolishment of 'repressive legislation.' He also detailed that 'only when people can move about and talk without fear can progressive ideas once more flourish.' (p.5). It is the ability for this peaceful dialogue which proved to be the cornerstone of the peace process of the 1990s and early 2000s.

Appendix G

Why Do People Become Dissidents?

Introduction

Throughout the analysis of the splits in the main body of the dissertation there was focus on the micro-processes of the splits and the macro-process of Republican involvement in the 'Troubles.' Within this analysis there was a focus on the reasoning of why and how the splits took place from an organisational perspective. Within this analysis there was a focus on why and how the splits took place, and therefore when individual reasoning for allegiance was referred to it was in reference to the reasoning of the split. However, while individuals may acknowledge a specific organisational reason or reasons for the split taking place this is not analogous to their own individual reason for allegiance choice before, during or after the formal divide. While there are individuals who do make allegiance decisions based on the rationale for the divide there are similarly non-organisational factors which influence. The organisational approach stipulates that recruits join organisations for a variety of reasons, not all of which are tied to ideological commitment.⁶⁷⁴ Therefore the purpose of this appendix is to look beyond the divisive strategies and focus on individual specific reasons for allegiance choice.

The results are represented in a thematic framework. The analysis of the individual allegiance data demonstrated the importance of a variety of themes in decisions of allegiance. The focus is on three of the most prominent of these themes, as well as assessing the issue of freelance dissidents and the switching of organisational allegiance. They are demonstrated across splits displaying the importance of each of the themes during the different micro-processes. The chapter is shaped specifically to deal with the question 'why do people become dissident Republicans?' The results of the analysis demonstrate that the choice of allegiance is not always specifically connected to the defining feature of the organisation's policies, strategies, tactics and goals. Predominantly it was found that the most important factors were those which were more

⁶⁷⁴ Crenshaw (1987), p.19

personal to the individual rather than specific to the organisation of their chosen allegiance.

Before the results of the analysis are displayed it is important to acknowledge the heterogeneity of terrorist actors.

Heterogeneity

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of terrorist actors and their actions there must first of all be a clear respect for the heterogeneity of individuals who engage in terrorism across groups, and even within individual movements and organisations. This heterogeneity may be analysed and assessed in a variety of ways. However, for the purpose of analysing why individuals become dissident Republicans it is posited that two of the most informative heterogeneities are those of timing of dissident affiliation and prior Republican experience. An understanding of these as well as other factors will contribute to enhancing our understanding of what contributes to these critical choices.

With respect to the timing of dissident affiliation one must consider whether or not an individual chooses their affiliation at the time of, or alternatively a significant time after, the relevant organisational split. Did the individual become a dissident at the group's inception or during a period of time afterwards? It is to be expected that the reasons for dissident affiliation at the time of a split will more likely be intrinsically linked to the cause of the intra-organisational conflict and split than for those who join the dissident organisation during a period significantly detached from the separation of groups. This appreciation for timing, however, must only be considered as the foundation level to a multi-faceted understanding of dissident affiliation. The analysis must similarly assess the level of experience and organisational rank of the dissident prior to their decision to dissent. This analysis must distinguish between those with an extended history of experience and those newly affiliated with organised Republicanism.⁶⁷⁵ Within these considerations one must be aware of the role, if any, played by the actor within the local

⁶⁷⁵ Within this assessment it must be acknowledged that the length of time one has been a member is not always analogous to level of experience. This must include an assessment of the level of commitment and activity during the period of membership.

and/or national leadership and therefore the influence they may have had in, and the knowledge they may have had of, the decision making processes. Parallel to this must be an appreciation that at times in historically enduring movements, such as the Irish Republican Movement, there are those outside the leadership who hold a significant influence in the movement and over members and leadership alike. This influence may come from the historical significance of their previous actions or a previously held leadership position. Therefore, with the assessment of the level of influence of individual members it is insufficient merely to divide the membership into the categories of 'leadership' and 'rank and file members.' These categories must be further scrutinised to acknowledge the different levels of experience and influence which may exist among the two categories. The heterogeneity does not, and the analysis must not, stop with timing, experience and rank. There must be a similar appreciation of the roles which age, regionalism and other factors can play in the decision making process. Within the following pages there will be a careful assessment of the roles which these factors can and have played, while still acknowledging that the factors assessed are far from an exhaustive list of influential variables.

Why do People Become Irish Dissidents?

The current focus of the media, security and policy makers tends to be on those members of groups such as the Continuity and Real IRA but in the analysis of dissident Republicanism one must not overlook the fact that the original Republican dissidents of the Troubles are those who shifted their allegiance away from the Goulding leadership of the old IRA to the development of the Provisional IRA. This extended history of organisational dissidence and split, not just in the same conflict but within the same movement, presents the opportunity to analyse in a more reliable manner the relevant issues and themes which arise in an individual's decision to dissent and switch allegiance from 'mainstream' Irish Republicanism. This opportunity is reflected throughout the appendix as there is continuous reference, not just to the rationale of the post 1986 dissidents, but also to some of those original dissenters from the late 1960s and early 1970s. While they originated as dissident the process that is modern day Irish Republican activism has gradually re-defined that group as 'mainstream' Republicans. During the

interview process the themes involved in the development of the dissension of the original 'Provos', while not identical, display the same underlying factors as those of the modern day dissidents.

Throughout this appendix there is continuous reference to individual reasoning for organisational exit which precedes joining or establishing an alternative Republican group, and becoming a dissident. The form of exit outlined does not constitute an overall disagreement with the organisational aims but suggests a disparity with a specific attribute, or attributes, of the parent organisation, whether this be a strategy, tactic, personality, goal or structure. Reflecting on the issues which can drive individuals and groups to organisational exit and the development of, or enrolment in, alternative groups not all individuals who have the same disagreements will react in the same manner. In order to take the significant action of leaving to develop a new autonomous group individuals must view the conflict at the centre of their exit as significantly threatening to what they believe to be the organisational identity. This is supported by Francie Mackey a leading member of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM). In 1986 Mackey disagreed with the decision to drop the abstentionist policy to the Dail. However, he did not regard it as an issue which warranted the formation of an independent group or his or other's exit from the organisation.⁶⁷⁶

*"At a personal level I disagreed with going into Leinster House, but it wasn't a significant enough issue to create a major split in the Republican Movement."*⁶⁷⁷

Converse to this are the views and actions of Ruairi O'Bradaigh, Daithi O'Conail and others who left the Provisionals to develop the new political and armed groups of Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA. They regarded the dropping of this section of the abstentionist policy, coupled with the removal of Eire Nua, as a denouncement of what it was to be regarded as 'true' Irish Republicans.

⁶⁷⁶ Mackey chose to 'actively stay' with the organisation as he believed there was no justification to exit and therefore felt he could have more of an impact if he stayed. See Sani and Reicher (1999)

⁶⁷⁷ Francie Mackey

“...our attitude was that the people who did that [accept that elected Sinn Fein members could take their seats in the Dail] had broken the constitution.”⁶⁷⁸

This is supportive of the belief that organisational exit is preceded by a change or action perceived to be threatening to what the dissidents regard to be their organisational identity.⁶⁷⁹

HQ2. The conflict at the centre of a split is, for at least one of the sub-groups, threatening to the organisational identity.

It is similarly supported by the organisational theory posited by Hirschman who states that quality conscious members will exit when they believe there to be a significant drop in the quality of the ‘product’ produced or promoted by a group.⁶⁸⁰

HI3. A quality conscious member will exit the organisation to join or set up a new organisation when there is a perceived drop in the quality of the product produced by the parent organisation.

HI3. The exiting members of Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA can be regarded as defining their membership very much in terms of what they believed to be the core values of Irish Republicanism, and central to this was the rejection of what they believed to be partitionist parliaments. In the language of Hirschman their continued membership was defined by an adherence to the ‘quality of the product’ produced by Sinn Fein and the IRA. Central to this adherence was an unremitting rejection of the three parliaments while continuing the armed struggle to achieve a united Ireland. However, when there was a significant drop in the quality of this policy, namely an electoral acceptance of Dail Eireann, they could no longer recognise themselves as ‘true Republicans’ if they continued with the Provisionals, and therefore left to form their own group. Each of the participants from the Continuity IRA and/or Republican Sinn Fein

⁶⁷⁸ Ruairi O’Bradaigh

⁶⁷⁹ Sani and Reicher (1998); Sani and Reicher (1999).

⁶⁸⁰ Hirschman (1970). (p.47)

considered this to be a significant drop in the quality of the product produced. Countering this, it can be proposed that those who remained with the Provisional Movement did not deem this to be a significant drop in the quality of the product or policies being adhered to and promoted by the Movement. On the contrary many believed this to be an improvement in quality and a change necessary to bring about the group's purposive goals. This is in stark contrast to those freelance dissidents described at a later point.

This rationale for the splitting of the groups does not always equate to each individual's motivation for their own personal dissent, even if they do leave to join this same dissenting organisation. It would be unwise to just focus on the reasoning of the leadership and those others intrinsically tied to and aware of the divisive issue. It is never the case that every individual member is aware of the full context of the disagreement. They can only come to their decision in light of the information which they have at any one time. Therefore, in order to gain a fair and accurate reflection of the overall spectrum of membership dissent, the reasoning of all levels of the rank and file membership is just as, if not more, important to understand. As with initial engagement into a terrorist group a person's exit or dissidence can be regarded as the result of a gradual process. This can be true at both leadership and rank and file level. As was displayed in the previous main body of the dissertation, in order fully to understand the origins of Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA, one must start by analysing the aftermath of the 1969/70 split, and the origins of the Real IRA have to be traced back to the aftermath of 1986. Similarly, in order to understand an individual's defection often one must understand the process leading up to this dissent in the previous years. This was reflected in an interview with a leading 32CSM member, who was once imprisoned for their role in a Provisional IRA attack. While they did not leave the Provisional Movement until 1998 their discontent can be traced to the early 1990s.

“My real concern with the Provisional Movement started to come about in the [early] 1990s when I began to feel that the people at the top were more concerned

with furthering their own agenda than they were with following the Republican agenda and that began to cause me problems...”⁶⁸¹

This supports the claim that a clear understanding is not achieved by focusing purely on the action of dissent or exit, but by first assessing the origins and process of this dissent. The process of exit and dissidence can be influenced by numerous factors, with some more pertinent than for others. These factors need not always be related to the stated factors of organisational split, or even any ideological, strategic or tactical differences with the parent organisation. The diversity of factors is reflected in the subsequent sections which focus on the importance of timing, influential individuals, regionalism and age. The following appendix should be viewed as support for

HI2. The explanation of allegiance for a member with a low level of experience will be predominantly tied to local influences and situations.

However, it also shows that this hypothesis should be expanded to include members with high-levels of experience as the local and personal influences equally effect their allegiance.

Timing and Context

As has been stated here already the reasons behind individuals joining or developing dissident organisations should not be regarded as being uniform in nature. Some of the key factors at play are those of context and timing. The individual reasons for dissidence can vary from time to time and across contexts. One of the most obvious issues of timing is whether dissidence takes place at a time of dissident organisation inception, i.e. does it occur at the time of the split? If it does take place at this time it is assumed that the rationale for the dissidence of leadership members at least is likely to be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for organisational split.

⁶⁸¹ ‘Una’

III: The explanation of allegiance for a member of experienced membership and leadership will be intrinsically tied to the reasoning for the organisational split.

However, it must similarly be assumed for those rank and file members, who are not fully aware of the reasons for the split,⁶⁸² that their reasoning will not be as intrinsically tied to the rationale of schism. The assumption that dissidence at a leadership level is tied to the reasoning for the split does not mean that this reasoning is tied to the *official* reason for the divide. In an interview with a leading member from the Provisional IRA Executive and Engineering Department of the mid to late 1990s, a man who was a founding leadership member of the Real IRA, the reasoning behind the 1997 split is detailed.

“The Army split on practical issues...prior to the split certain weapons were not being used, not allowed to be used. If weapons were there prior to the split, why couldn't we use them? We had new weapons coming from Libya that were never used, or even announced.”⁶⁸³

This not only reveals some of the issues at the heart of the organisational split, but also the individual's own personal reason for dissidence. Within his role on the IRA Executive and within the Engineering Department, and through strong links with the Quartermaster General of the time, he was very well informed of the issues at the heart of the intra-organisational conflict as well as the operational capabilities of the IRA. This reasoning similarly displays a discrepancy between his cited 'practical issues' for the split and the official reasoning of acceptance of the Mitchell Principles.⁶⁸⁴ While the two issues are not completely unrelated the dissident leadership was aware that in order to secure as much support as possible they would have to frame the origins of the new group in a more acceptable manner. With national and international support for the peace

⁶⁸² At times of split there are rank and file members who are fully aware of the relevant issues, but this does not constitute all members.

⁶⁸³ 'Conor'

⁶⁸⁴ A set of principles put forward by Senator George Mitchell in addition to his report on decommissioning which essentially required any paramilitary groups entering in to talks to commit to the use of exclusively peaceful means in the pursuit of their political objectives. Guelke, A. (1999). *Political Violence and Paramilitaries*. In Mitchell, P. and Wilford, R. (Eds.) (1999). *Politics in Northern Ireland*. Oxford: Westview Press. Pp.29-53. (pp.44-45)

process, and a growing appreciation of the value of political solutions among a large section of the Republican Movement, if they had simply announced that they were splitting on the issue of use of new arms it would have proved near impossible to gain any level of credibility or support.⁶⁸⁵ This is a view which was appreciated by the dissident leadership at the time.

“Representatives from the Army who wanted to split met with the political people (32County Sovereignty Committee⁶⁸⁶) to decide how best to frame the split. We had to be seen to be splitting on an issue.”⁶⁸⁷

While the reasoning for exit and dissidence at a leadership level may have originated to a large extent over the issue of use of arms, those less informed rank and file members who chose their affiliation on what they believed were the issues of split were not doing so on an entirely informed basis but with the information which had been issued to them by their national or local leadership. Therefore, the reasoning for organisational affiliation, be it dissident or mainstream, is disparate due to levels of information available to the relevant actor. In some instances at times of split potential members, especially those with no previous Republican affiliation, may have little or no idea of the rationale of schism or the differentiation between the groups. This was quite common in the late 1960s early 1970s when there was a large number of new recruits wishing to join the IRA. These potential recruits at times were not aware of the differences between the Officials and Provisionals, and, in some instances in the immediate aftermath of split, were not aware of the existence of any division at all. In such circumstances decisions are not made on the basis of differing organisational strategies, tactics or goals but of other issues less tied to the ethos and strategies of the group but more to do with the individual's opportunities for membership and the influence of others around them where they lived.

⁶⁸⁵ Across social and political movements whether they be violent or non-violent if the organisation is to gain any degree of success it is vital that they have a significant degree of support. If they do not attain this the achievement of goals as well as the survival of the organisation becomes increasingly difficult.

⁶⁸⁶ This was the original name for what is now known as the 32 County Sovereignty Movement.

⁶⁸⁷ 'Conor'

“At that particular time the Official IRA was at war as well with the British, so I mean they would be operating at one end of the street shooting machine guns at the army, and the Provisionals would be at the other end. I didn’t really know, I was just too young...I didn’t really understand it [the difference between the Officials and Provisionals] until I went into prison.”⁶⁸⁸

This description by Joe Doherty of his early days as a young Provisional IRA member in West Belfast is similar to the experience of many other young recruits at the time. Their affiliation was not decided by their views on abstentionism, the National Liberation Front or socialism. The extended beliefs and ideology of the individual groups did not matter to them. They wanted to join the IRA to protect their communities in the short run. For a number of new recruits at that time their initial involvement with the IRA was not even strongly linked to the aspiration for a united Ireland. The relevance of the context of their mobilisation and choice of group was not linked to the inner workings and debates within the Irish Republican Movement, it was influenced by what they saw on the Falls Road, the Short Strand and in the Bogside. They were influenced by their peers and the influential individuals local to them. This is a description which is as true today across both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as it was in 1970. What follows is a description of some of these factors beyond the internal debates and ideologies which play a significant role in an individual’s movement into dissident Republicanism.

Influential Individuals

Throughout organisational involvement in the Republican Movement, and within other political and terrorist groups, decisions made by members are often significantly influenced by the viewpoint of another individual. This individual may be a peer, comrade, leadership member or relative. These influential individuals can have either a negative or a positive influence. They need not even be members of the Republican Movement for their actions and viewpoints to play a role in the decision-making process. Throughout the research every interviewee, without fail, detailed the significant role played by at least one influential individual in their decision-making processes. Nowhere

⁶⁸⁸ Joe Doherty

was this more relevant than at the time of choice of group affiliation. It was found that the beliefs and actions of influential individuals can at times have more of an influence than policy or strategy.

As was detailed in the previous section, as well as the main text, at the end of 1969 and throughout 1970 there were numerous new Republican recruits assessing whether to join the Officials or the Provisionals. To many of these the intricate ideological and strategic issues involved at the heart of what had first been an intra-organisational dispute but had now become an inter-organisational dispute held little or no significance. However, one of the factors which time and again proved vital in their decision-making process was that of the position and views of influential individuals. The group they eventually joined was often the one containing members to whom they could most relate on a personal level, or for whom they held the most respect. For some, the influential individual was a national or local leadership figure. However, the choice for others was similarly influenced by the rank and file members of each group. The period of time in the aftermath of the 1969/70 split was on occasion confusing for potential new recruits to the Republican Movement. They had to decide between membership of the Officials or Provisionals. This competition between groups, and confusion for recruits, caused a number of young members to switch allegiance after their initial recruitment. Often this was heavily influenced by their negative opinions of the individuals they encountered in their first group, or the positive influence of the members of the group they went on ultimately to join, and at times there was a combination of both.⁶⁸⁹ One individual who switched initial allegiance was Martin McGuinness who in late 1970 joined the Official IRA initially unaware of the difference between the two groups, or even the existence of two separate IRAs.

“Both of us [McGuinness and a friend] decided that we would join what we believed to be the IRA at the time. Now at that time the IRA was going through its own turbulence in terms of the split and so forth. At that stage my knowledge of

⁶⁸⁹ This observation is in line with the description of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors outlined by John Horgan in detailing disengagement from terrorism. See Horgan, J. (2006), pp.34-37.

who was the IRA would have been like everyone else's, you would have thought there was only one IRA and this whole turbulence occurred because of different approaches and different ideas and suggestions about how things should go forward. For us we joined what we believed to be the IRA in Derry."⁶⁹⁰

However, after a period of initial engagement McGuinness realised that the group he had joined was not what he thought he had initially signed up for. His disillusionment stemmed from what he perceived to be the group's inaction and his dissatisfaction with the local membership he had encountered. Coupled with this push factor of his negative opinion of the Official IRA membership was the pull factor of his respect for and friendship and familiarity with a number of prominent local Provisional IRA members.

*"Well I suppose it was mostly being unimpressed by the people that we met [in the Official IRA] after we effectively joined [which pushed us away]...In terms of then joining the Provisional IRA, I was familiar with some of the people who were associated with the Provisional IRA. In fact I realised that I was probably more familiar with some of the people who were in the Provisional IRA than I was with some of the characters I met in the Official Republican Movement. The Keenan family were a leading family in Derry city at the time and I had been a long time friend of Sean Keenan Junior, who is now sadly deceased, and also familiar with his father, and his father's role in the Citizen's Defence Group in Derry, and I was also familiar with the fact that he had spent a very long period in prison as a result of internment, in total from maybe fourteen to sixteen years."*⁶⁹¹

This example of McGuinness, a former leading member of the Provisional IRA and now Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, displays both the negative and positive influences that certain individuals can have on affiliation choice. While this illustrates the persuasive powers of influential individuals on young less informed new recruits, their impact continues right up to experienced and leadership levels.

⁶⁹⁰ Martin McGuinness

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid*

In each of the four major splits, as was alluded to in the analysis of organisations, one of the most effective strategies employed to attract support and membership at the time of intra-organisational conflict and split was the use of well respected influential individuals to legitimise the position taken by a specific group or sub-group. These influential voices were used in the preparation for the split, at a personal level as well as at significant membership meetings, General Army Conventions and Ard Fheiseanna. The success of such a strategy is acknowledged by all sides as numerous members, fully aware of the dispute at the heart of the schism, were influenced by the position taken up by respected figures within the movement, people who they trusted. The effectiveness of these influential individuals is clearly illustrated by Mick Ryan, a former leading member of the IRA in the lead up to the 1969/70 split and then a leading member of the Official IRA, in the decision making process of a number of Republican members in the aftermath of the split between the Officials and the Provisionals.

“Many people made up their mind on the basis of who was on particular sides, people they trusted and liked more...It was not clear cut hard political people deciding. It was human factors that were deciding why some people went with one side over another, and this is not in hindsight. The political orientation would have counted but to what degree with certain individuals is unclear.”⁶⁹²

The employment of these influential voices was effectively utilised by the Provisionals at both a military and political level of involvement in the lead up to and in the process of the 1986 split. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the 1986 Ard Fheis where Sinn Fein delegates voted on whether or not to drop the abstentionist policy to the Dail. The Adams leadership, which was proposing this change in electoral policy, was able to call upon the support of a variety of influential individuals from both the old and new guard at political and military levels. Similarly the O’Bradaigh and O’Conail faction, who would later go on to form Republican Sinn Fein and the Continuity IRA, sought to legitimise their stance by gaining the support of the well respected Republican leader General

⁶⁹² Mick Ryan

Commandant Tom Maguire. However, with respect to the use of influential individuals it is clear that the Adams leadership had the upper hand, and this legitimising support from such a respected group of influential individuals proved vital in their maintenance of large levels of support. The chairman of this 1986 Ard Fheis, Sean McManus, held an ideal position to view the effect which these individuals had.

“To have people of the calibre of John Joe McGirl get up, other people like Fergie Albert McGovern who would have been from Cavan would have been significant as well. People like Joe Cahill obviously as well, older republicans who had been through the mill, who had seen stuff and I’m sure there were hundreds if not thousands who had seen them as an inspiration, certainly hundreds of delegates who would have seen them as inspirational figures and they would have been to some degree swayed.”⁶⁹³

The role played by influential individuals while significant at the time of split remains important throughout all stages of involvement. These influential individuals are needed to retain support and membership, especially in the smaller dissident groupings. They not only exert their own positive influence on members and supporters, but at times they help to neutralise the negative influence which the leadership of Sinn Fein and ‘mainstream’ Republicans can have on their membership.

The negative impression of the current Sinn Fein leadership among certain individuals, groups and regions is manipulated so as to strengthen and gain membership and support. This is especially prevalent with reference to Sinn Fein’s opinion of dissident Republicans. At times this is manipulated or exaggerated by dissidents in order to promote opposition to the mainstream Republicans among their members, supporters and potential recruits.

⁶⁹³ Sean McManus

“They always have to find a term. I don’t know what anyone else thinks but if he [Gerry Adams] calls me a dissident to me it’s a badge of honour.”⁶⁹⁴

The above quote is taken from an individual who in his own right could be classed as an influential individual in Republican West Belfast. He was prominent in the development of the Provisional IRA in the area in 1969. However, in the aftermath of the 1986 split he left the Provisionals to support the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein. This quote is relevant for two main reasons. The most obvious is his use of the critical opinion of Gerry Adams within certain populations to revise the negative connotations normally associated with a label such as ‘dissident’ and transfer a more positive ‘badge of honour’ onto the term. However, it is the legitimacy which he, as an influential individual, gives to the dissidents that is most interesting. It is assumed here that he uses similar sentiment when speaking to both potential and existing supporters and members of the dissident community. Without such legitimisation provided by influential individuals it proves more challenging for people to associate themselves with the smaller dissident Republican groups.

Regionalism

The geographical location in which a person lives can have a significant impact on them joining a specific group. The influence of this regionalism can derive from the influential individuals living in the area, as well as the historical and modern day circumstances relating to the locale. These geographical areas may be as small as an apartment block or housing estate, or as large as a country or even continent, and therefore with respect to geographical influence on Irish Republicanism one must look beyond whether a person is situated north or south of the border. Terrorist organisations can invariably find it easier to recruit in specific areas as opposed to others.⁶⁹⁵ As was detailed in the opening chapter in certain areas the organisation’s ideals are often entwined with local aspirations.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹⁴ ‘Alex’

⁶⁹⁵ Oots (1986), p.54

⁶⁹⁶ Bowyer Bell (1998). p.250

At a time of split regionalism proves one of the most dominant rationales in the choice of whether to remain a member of the parent organisation or join the newly established dissident group. This can be especially true for the ordinary rank and file members whose membership is not as closely tied to ideological and purposive elements. Members often tie their membership to that of local influential individuals. These may be family members, friends or the local leadership. If a member whom they trust and look up to is adamant on joining the dissidents or, alternatively, staying with the parent organisation this may have a significant influence on the choice made. Tied to this is the fact that if the vast majority of the membership within a designated geographical area are members of one specific organisation the cost of membership of their rivals rises dramatically. The most unmistakable example of the influence of regionalism is in West Belfast where there have been clear divisions with respect to regional affiliations during and after the Republican splits. After the 1969/70 split most of the Falls Road would have been Provisional dominated while areas very close by such as Divis Street and Leeson Street would have been under the control of the Official IRA, with a significant proportion of the residents there siding with those groups. This has earlier been illustrated by the Joe Doherty quote.

“...they [the Official IRA] would be operating at one end of the street shooting machine guns at the army, and the Provisionals would be at the other end.”⁶⁹⁷

With the split in the Official IRA in 1974, resulting in the formation of the INLA, regionalism further came into play.

“Even at the time of the split in 74/75 all of the Divis Flats unit and 99% of na Fianna [the youth wing of the Irish Republican Movement] all went to join the INLA and it was the opposite in Leeson Street, 98/99% percent stayed and only one or two left.”⁶⁹⁸

⁶⁹⁷ Joe Doherty

⁶⁹⁸ ‘Denis’

This dramatic division does not reflect a division of political views or beliefs. This reflects the power of regionalism and the influential individuals within these specific areas. Leeson Street and the Divis Street Flats are in particularly close proximity to each other, yet the division at this time of schism displays the power and influence of the allegiances of the local leadership and other influential individuals in the area. As is evidenced by the example of na Fianna this influence can be particularly visible among young recruits, a finding which is described in more detail in a later section.

As with the previously detailed factors the theme of regionalism is just as dominant today as it was in the 1970s. There are specific regions across the island of Ireland where certain groups, be they dissident or 'mainstream' Republicans, are dominant. One can look to areas such as the city of Limerick as a stronghold for the Continuity IRA. This is often worn as a 'badge of honour.' The local leadership of the area not only take pride in the strength of their recruits on the ground in the area, but also those from the area imprisoned for their role in dissident group activities.

“What we say is this there is youth in our organisation in Limerick. Limerick is very strong, Limerick is one of the strongest parts of Republican Sinn Fein in the south, even if you go to any part of the country. They are capable of doing anything...A lot of them would be political, most of them would be political. But within our youth are armed units, among the Continuity. Even now we had one of our members arrested lately, he is in Portlaoise [prison]. We had a lot of people in Portlaoise from Limerick. Going back years and years no matter what movement there was always a very militant element in it.”⁶⁹⁹

This statement from a Republican Sinn Fein and Continuity IRA activist not only takes pride in the regional involvement in dissident Republican activity, both militant and political, but also in those prisoners from the area in jail in Portlaoise. The power of regionalism is similarly seen across the island of Ireland. Other small clusters similarly show the dominance of specific Republican groups in a region. The combination of

⁶⁹⁹ 'Frank'

regionalism and influential individuals often overpowers any political or ideological differentiation.

Age

Throughout this appendix there has been continued reference to the recruitment and affiliations of young Republicans. The importance of focusing on young recruits, especially young males, is supported by the findings of the most recent Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) reports. In reference to dissident Republican groups it states that:

“The majority of recruits are inexperienced young males”⁷⁰⁰

This has been the result of a deliberate targeting of young males by the various dissident groups. One needs only look to the Republican Sinn Fein press conference in the aftermath of the Continuity IRA murder of PSNI officer Stephen Carroll in March of 2009. This press conference showed the young RSF press officer Richard Walsh positioned beside three young males from the Craigavon area outlining how he believed they had been unfairly treated by the PSNI. This can be seen as a deliberate attempt by the group to appeal in particular to young males, as that dissident group and their militant wing the Continuity IRA would be perceived among some people as being overly populated by old guard traditionalist Republicans, a reputation in need of alteration in order to maintain their survival.

The young modern-day recruits would have no clear memory of the Troubles, and in some cases would not even have been born. Therefore the dissident leadership have the opportunity to glorify active involvement in militant Republicanism. Their positioning of influence within specific areas provides them with the ability to influence, shape and form the beliefs of this youthful population, in some instances with no relevant alternative narrative clearly available to the young recruits and potential recruits. Active membership in a militant group can appeal to a young male’s sense of adventure and

⁷⁰⁰ Independent Monitoring Commission Report 22, paragraph 2.7.

rebellion. This sense of adventure is not reliant on an in-depth knowledge of the defining ideological issues relevant to a specific group, but on the framing of what active involvement will entail, the status among the peer group and a simplified justification based on the aspirations for a united Ireland. This is once again resonant of the situation, particularly across Northern Ireland, during the early 1970s.

“At that stage there was three of us from the bottom of the Falls Road, Divis St area and this guy approached us and asked if we wished to join the Republican Movement. Dream come true. ‘Certainly, yes, incognito, cloak and dagger, a chance to do something.’ In yourself you were a big lad, you were swore in it was ‘Sssh don’t say this, don’t say that.’”⁷⁰¹

The above quote shows how easy it can be to appeal to a young male, in this case a thirteen year old boy, to join a violent Republican grouping. It was the status and adventure of membership and involvement which appealed to the young boys, rather than any particular desire to achieve the national or even local goals of the movement. While this case is an example of young male recruitment in 1970 this is also relevant today. The findings of the IMC report are backed up by a statement which has already been referred to earlier in the appendix in relation to the Continuity IRA.

“What we say is this there is youth in our organisation in Limerick. Limerick is very strong.”⁷⁰²

Taking all of this into consideration a strong ideology or purposive goals will not be sufficient to attract a significant number of new young recruits to any organisation. The leadership must be able to put in place sufficient personal and social incentives to attract and retain recruits without which these dissident organisations will not last for any significant amount of time.⁷⁰³

⁷⁰¹ ‘Denis’

⁷⁰² ‘Frank’

⁷⁰³ Oots, K.L. (1989), pp. 143-144.

Change of Organisation

Traditionally when looking at dissidents one would focus on those who move from one group to another after a split between the two organisations. With respect to dissident Republicans such splits have seen the former members of the Provisionals joining or setting up the Continuity and Real IRA, and former Official IRA activists developing and joining the INLA. However, this transfer of groups need not always be from the parent organisation to their own dissident groupings. There are cases within the Irish Republican context where individuals, or groups of individuals, have moved from one dissident organisation to another. One such example is that of a large portion of the INLA and IRSP membership of Limerick and Clare moving over to the Continuity IRA and Republican Sinn Fein in 1998. If one is assessing these groups on purely ideological and political grounds this movement, and especially the acceptance of these new members into CIRA and RSF, would seem counterintuitive. The leadership of the CIRA and especially RSF go to great lengths to frame themselves as the only 'true' Republican Movement, and dismiss and disparage the actions and beliefs of all others who had taken a different course at any time during the history of the Irish Republican Movement. They are publicly wary of those who have historically taken an 'extreme socialist' political standpoint or criticised and disposed of the abstentionist policy which they hold as the cornerstone of Irish Republicanism. This standpoint would suggest an inherent distrust of all members past and present of the Irish Republican Socialist Movement or the Official Republican Movement. It was these individuals who they moved away from during the split of 1969/70 when they were part of the Provisional Movement denouncing the Goulding leadership of the Irish Republican Movement. However, when the case of the movement of Clare and Limerick INLA and IRSP members is looked at in more detail it is clear that ideological and political beliefs and concerns played little or no part in the choice of organisational affiliation, or acceptance and recruitment into the movement. This departure took place in the aftermath of the 1998 INLA ceasefire, when it became clear to the dismay of these members that their organisation, the INLA, was no longer going to continue with the armed Republican struggle. However, they still believed in the viability of an armed struggle in the pursuit of a united Ireland. At this stage they

viewed the pursuit of this purposive goal to be more important than any political or ideological standpoint.

“There is an armed struggle and they [RSF and CIRA] hardly have deviated since 1921, they have the same policies, there is a lot to be said for it. The struggle is above everything else, there is nobody bigger than the struggle, not Leinster House Stormont or Westminster or any of those places. The struggle for national reunification of the country, that would be a priority....The Continuity or RSF was the only group I could see holding on to the Irish Republican end of things. The Provos had accepted, had a ceasefire and soon afterwards they decommissioned, we could see all this coming on board. The Provos asked me to join them, but I wasn't going to join the Provos.”⁷⁰⁴

The above quote from Patrick Kennelly outlines his, and his former INLA comrades', justification for joining Republican Sinn Fein. For this grouping, a collection of individuals with extensive experience in and knowledge of the armed Republican movement, political and ideological beliefs were surpassed by the imperative of continuing the armed struggle. This further supports the fundamental proposal of the present appendix. In order to understand why a person becomes a dissident Irish Republican, or a specific kind of dissident Republican, it is important to acknowledge that the reasons for dissidence are often independent of the political and ideological stance taken by a particular organisation, and is more reliant on a rationale external to these beliefs.

Freelance Dissidents

While a number of dissidents will choose to change organisational affiliation there are similarly those who have decided to continue their Republican activism in an independent or freelance manner. These individuals will at times offer their 'services' to a variety of armed dissident Republican groups for specific actions. The growing threat of freelance Republicans has been acknowledged as being very serious in nature.

⁷⁰⁴ Patrick Kennelly

“There are...now indications that former republican terrorists have as individuals provided services in some instances to dissident republican groups, which even if occasional can significantly add to the threat.”⁷⁰⁵

These individuals are often recruited for their specific skills for an individual action by the local or national leadership of the dissident group. Similar to the case of those Republicans switching organisational allegiance from the INLA to the CIRA and RSF the continuation of an armed Republican struggle outweighs any individual ideological or political belief structure. The freelance nature of their activism, and their organisationally independent Republican belief structure, leaves them open to assisting a variety of Republican groups in individual campaigns or actions.

“I probably agree with most of what they [32CSM] say. I also agree with a lot of what Republican Sinn Fein say. I also agree with quite a lot of what the INLA would say, I would have a lot of common ground with a lot of different groups. But I wouldn't be comfortable lending my total allegiance to one group...If it came to the bit, and it is not going to come to the bit, but if it came to the bit where I was needed to do something and I approved of it, I would certainly do it. But as it stands it is all different little groups and I believe that there is so little separating them all that they are not necessary.”⁷⁰⁶

Dolours Price, the former Provisional IRA activist, outlines above the rationale by which she and others justify their organisationally independent Republican activism, and at times their association with the actions of specific dissident groupings. Her justification moves on to the hypothetical situation whereby she is requested to aid one of these groupings. She has outlined what is probably true for a number of independent dissident Republicans. They would be willing to take part in an action for a number of these groups if it were something of which they approved. Therefore, unlike the

⁷⁰⁵ Independent Monitoring Commission Report 22, paragraph 2.7.

⁷⁰⁶ Dolours Price

organisationally committed Republicans they can in a sense pick and choose the actions with which they wish to be associated, be they armed or political.

If the violent dissident Republican threat is to be successfully countered one must not only focus on the dissident groups but also on those freelance dissidents operating independently of organisational ties and leadership orders.

Summary

The purpose of the present appendix has been to offer an understanding of the rationale behind an individual's decision to become a dissident Irish Republican. While these dissident Republican groupings often define themselves by their political and ideological belief system, this is not always reflected in the reasoning behind a person's decision to become a dissident or in their choice of dissident affiliation. An analysis of the interview data gathered has pointed to the importance of the factors of *timing, context, influential individuals, regionalism* and *age*. While not an exhaustive list by any means, if one is to come close to an understanding of dissident group affiliation and selection, the importance of these issues must be acknowledged and appreciated. It is this understanding which must first be in place before any policy is developed to counter the current threat posed by these small but dangerous groups.