



The Value of Further Education in Security Sector Reform: Autoethnographic Reflections from Palestine, Lebanon, and Georgia

An Jacobs & Norma Rossi

To cite this article: An Jacobs & Norma Rossi (2022) The Value of Further Education in Security Sector Reform: Autoethnographic Reflections from Palestine, Lebanon, and Georgia, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 16:4, 393-412, DOI: [10.1080/17502977.2021.2004004](https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2021.2004004)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2021.2004004>



© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group



Published online: 20 Dec 2021.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 1392



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

The Value of Further Education in Security Sector Reform: Autoethnographic Reflections from Palestine, Lebanon, and Georgia

An Jacobs ^a and Norma Rossi ^{b*}

^aDepartment of Social and Political Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK; ^bDepartment of Defence and International Affairs, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley, UK

ABSTRACT

Although Security Sector Reform (SSR) is widely regarded as a vital element of peacebuilding, its implementation has remained largely disappointing. In recent years, the academic literature has witnessed an intensifying debate on the need to close the policy-implementation gap in SSR. This article contributes to the debate on the need for a second generation SSR by exploring the value of further education (FE) programmes through an autoethnographic approach of FE courses delivered in Palestine, Lebanon, and Georgia. We argue that FE can enhance a holistic approach to SSR, contributing to horizontal and vertical integration and fostering a long-term strategic vision.

KEYWORDS

Education; international conflict resolution; second-generation security sector reform; conflict-affected environments; autoethnography

Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become an increasingly prominent component of the wider peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction and conflict resolution agendas. As one of many peacebuilding tools, SSR supports the (re)construction and enhancement of security sector institutions, reflecting ‘the principles of democratic oversight, transparency, and good governance’ (Juncos 2018). While the importance of SSR in conflict-affected environments has been widely recognised, a growing body of academic literature has evidenced a ‘mixed and incomplete record’ for SSR processes (Jackson 2018, 1). Scarce evidence of successful and effective SSR efforts (Bakrania 2015) indicates a gap between aspirations of SSR reforms strategically planned by external actors on the one hand, and the operational implementation of such efforts on the other (Jackson 2018, 2). Criticism about imposed Western liberal democratic principles (Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2014), a largely top-down institutional focus overlooking legitimacy on the ground, and the dominance of technocratic approaches to SSR (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010), have intensified the debate about the need for a second-generation SSR (Donais 2018; Jackson 2018, 5).

CONTACT An Jacobs  an.jacobs@ntu.ac.uk

*The authors are listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally to this work. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the British Ministry of Defence.

© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

The emerging literature on second-generation SSR shares the notion that SSR is a complex and context-specific process, without ‘a single template’ (Ansorg and Gordon 2019, 3). It promotes a holistic approach to SSR, delineating vital SSR characteristics such as horizontal inclusivity of state and non-state actors within the host state, vertical inclusivity between local and international actors, and sustainable political solutions over technical adjustments (Donais 2018; Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018). However, while the second-generation debate has encouraged different approaches to SSR, less has been written about which SSR tools help achieve better operational outcomes.¹

Building on the growing body of second-generation SSR literature, this article evaluates further education (FE) as a specific SSR tool.² There have been a range of bilateral and international actors such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF), that have used training and education programmes as an SSR tool in conflict-affected environments, but little is known about the impact of such programmes. A substantial amount has been written about the link between education and peacebuilding (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hymel and Darwich 2018; Milton 2018), but academic literature on how (further) education can contribute to SSR is scarcer. One related contribution from Macphee and Fitz-Gerald (2014), explores the potential advantages and practical challenges of delivering a UK-accredited higher education course in security sector management to military officers in Ethiopia. Their article primarily focuses on the course’s learning material and the practicalities of exporting a course to Ethiopia but does not discuss the value of FE for SSR. Celermajer and Grewal (2013) explore how human rights education could play a more prominent role in SSR and emphasise the difficulty of measuring the impact of training and education on SSR. Other scholars touch upon the value of training and education as a tool in SSR to enhance the expertise of law enforcement officers (Nathan 2004), but how useful education really is in the context of SSR remains largely unknown.

To explore this further, we draw upon findings from a week-long international conflict management course that we designed to support the UK’s Defence Diplomacy framework. Under this framework, the UK delivers various courses (covering topics such as leadership, counterterrorism, and communication) to security stakeholders in partner countries. SSR can be considered an ‘implied task’ within this framework (Hills 2000, 47). It furthermore emphasises the need for building long-term relationships, a much-discussed aspect of SSR (Sedra 2018). We draw upon our experience of running the international conflict management course for security stakeholders in Lebanon, Palestine, and Georgia (the latter course included representatives from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia).

Our methodological approach is collaborative autoethnography, by analysing our personal experience in designing and delivering this course. Autoethnography has proven valuable in educational research, as it allows us to study the ‘space between the self and practice’ (Starr 2010, 1). While autoethnography is a very diverse and multi-faceted method (Charmaz 2006, 397; Stahlke Wall 2016, 1), following Chang (2013), we understand autoethnography both as a very personal and highly social process, through which authors ‘examine how they have interacted with other people within their socio-cultural contexts and how social forces have influenced their lived experiences’ (Holman Jones, Adams, and Ellis 2013, 107). Autoethnography as a method is not

limited to telling ‘personal stories’ as it allows reflection on and offers insights into the ‘understanding of social realities through the lens of the researcher’s personal experiences’ (Chang 2013, 108). In this specific context, our personal experience provides insights into the effectiveness of FE in achieving a more holistic approach to SSR. In following an ‘analytical-interpretive’ approach to autoethnography (Chang 2008, 141–148), we combine the accounts of our experience with other academic inquiries on education and SSR to speak to the broader field. To counterbalance the inherent limitations of autoethnography due to our positionality as course facilitators, the evidence used constitutes self-reflective and self-observational memos, memories of specific events which took place during the courses, as well as feedback from course participants.

Our contribution to the second-generation SSR literature is twofold. First, we assess the usefulness of FE as an SSR tool to support a more holistic approach to the reform processes. The second contribution of this article is methodological. SSR programmes have measured implementation predominantly through quantifiable measures such as surveys and conflict assessments (OECD 2007). By introducing autoethnography to assess the effectiveness of an SSR tool, this article introduces new methodologies in SSR to evaluate its implementation on the ground. It therefore not only speaks to wider debates about second-generation SSR, and the role of education in conflict resolution, but also to discussions about how to assess the impact of SSR specifically, and peacebuilding efforts more broadly.

This article proceeds as follows. It first engages with existing scholarly work on second generation SSR. Building on the plurality of this scholarship, we define ‘holistic approach’, a key focus of second-generation SSR, across three dimensions; horizontal inclusivity, vertical inclusivity, and political embeddedness (Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018). Second, we articulate the rationale for connecting the literature on education to scholarship on peacebuilding and SSR, and we outline three key aspects to take into consideration when designing FE courses - course participants, methods, and content. Third, we apply autoethnography to analyse our experience of delivering FE courses to security stakeholders in Lebanon, Palestine, and Georgia to draw conclusions on the usefulness of FE as a tool in SSR and of autoethnography as a methodological approach in this context.

Second generation SSR: Towards a holistic approach

The last two decades have witnessed a growing number of SSR programmes in conflict-affected environments, as well as an intensification of related academic and policy debates. Outlining our contribution to this growing debate, this section proceeds in three steps. First, we show that the impetus towards a ‘second generation SSR’ has been shaped by a weak track record of SSR implementation (Donais 2018, 31–32; Jackson 2018, 8). Second, we engage with the concept of ‘holistic approach’ to map out dimensions considered essential to remedy the shortcomings of SSR by the second-generation SSR scholarship (Sedra 2018, 49). Third, we observe that, while a more holistic approach is key to improve the effectiveness of SSR, an assessment of the value of specific SSR tools or methods on the ground is still largely lacking. This reproduces the gap between policy aspirations and successful implementation, which second generation SSR aims to address.

The late 1990s are considered a turning point in the visibility of SSR, and its rise to prominence in both security and development agendas. EU and NATO enlargement policies are important early examples of SSR, providing support to post-communist eastern European countries in their transition towards democracy and membership (Ekengren 2016). However, SSR became increasingly used as a peacebuilding, democratisation, and good governance tool in various fragile and conflict-affected environments (Jackson and Bakrania 2018, 13). This is often referred to as first generation SSR; based on a clear blueprint of the (re)construction of Weberian state institutions, informed by Western-centric liberal democratic assumptions (Sedra 2018).

However, the weak track record of successful SSR programmes (Donais 2018, 31–32; Jackson 2018, 8) revealed a gap between policy and implementation (Gordon 2014; Sedra 2018). Detzner (2017) demonstrates that in Africa, which has seen the highest number of SSR programmes, a lack of understanding of the local security situation and a failure to ‘ensure local ownership of reform efforts’ have undermined implementation (116). The disappointing operational reputation of SSR (Sedra 2018) and ‘notable lack of evidence of success’ (Jackson 2018, 8), have emphasised the need to improve SSR implementation, steering the academic debate towards a ‘second-generation SSR’.

This debate challenges and refines a range of issues that were considered standard in ‘orthodox’, first-generation SSR approaches. It reflects critiques to the broader liberal peacebuilding agenda, its normative agenda of democratic principles and state-centric top-down approaches, with the Weberian state as a clear end-result (Jackson 2018). Though diverse in outlook, emerging literature on second-generation SSR shares the conviction that SSR is a complex and context-specific process, unsuitable for a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ (Ansorg and Gordon 2019, 3). Rethinking the conceptualisation and operationalisation of SSR, the second-generation debate has focussed on multiple aspects. These include the need to involve non-state security providers in the process (Deneckere, Neat, and Hauck 2020; Schroeder and Chappuis 2014), a questioning of liberal-western assumptions shaping the process (Andersen 2011; Jackson 2011; Sedra 2017), a search for ways to achieve a more endogenous transformation prioritising local instead of international needs (Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2014, 214), and the centrality of understanding SSR as a political rather than a technocratic process (Jackson 2018, 8; Wilén 2018).

The need for a paradigm shift is also reflected in the policy world. While international involvement in SSR has continued to grow, the emerging SSR-specific guidelines and frameworks reveal an ongoing search to enhance operational impact. In 2014, the UN adopted its first SSR-specific UN Security Council Resolution (2151), emphasising not only the importance of SSR as such in the context of stabilisation and peacebuilding, but also the significance of local ownership and inclusivity. The EU’s Joint Communication on ‘elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support SSR’ reflects the growing EU ambition of a comprehensive approach to SSR (Deneckere, Neat, and Hauck 2020), including understanding the bigger picture, enabling inclusive national ownership, and engaging with ‘systematic political and policy dialogue’ (EC and HR/VP 2016). The African Union’s (AU) ‘Policy Framework on SSR’ was adopted by the AU Assembly in 2013, emphasising the need for an Africa-specific framework reflecting African needs (Ecoma 2011). In a similar fashion, the Economic Community of West-African States (ECOWAS) has launched its own regional ‘Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and

Governance' (2016). These new international frameworks confirm the importance of SSR in peacebuilding as well as the need to improve implementation.

While challenging the orthodox approach to SSR is necessary, as Donais argues (2018), it leaves us with a level of uncertainty about the ends and means of SSR, 'in other words, we are no longer entirely sure where we want to go – or how to get there' (31–32). The very terms shaping the debate, such as local ownership, inclusivity, and political contextualisation have faced intense contestation over conceptual meanings and operational implications (Donais 2018, 32). To make the underlying principles of the second generation SSR 'meaningful and applicable in practice', an argument has been made for a 'coherent, holistic and integrated' SSR (Sedra 2018, 49). The need for a holistic approach to SSR has become widely accepted in the second-generation debate, but its meaning remains unclear. Traditionally, a holistic approach concerns the involvement of different institutions within the state, as SSR is envisaged to encompass 'the entire spectrum of security institutions, including the military, police, intelligence services, and the penal system' (Bendix and Stanley 2008, 1). This perspective is reflected in the policy-making world. For example, a 2011 World Bank report refers to the holistic approach as the necessity to engage multiple actors across the security sector (World Bank 2011), and similarly, DCAF states that 'adopting a holistic vision of SSR requires understanding of the interconnected nature of the various components of the security and justice sector' (DCAF 2017, 6). This, however, still represents a state-centric definition of 'holistic', as seen in 'orthodox SSR'. Instead, by building on the plurality of the second-generation SSR scholarship, we define 'holistic approach' across three key dimensions; horizontal inclusivity, vertical inclusivity, and political embeddedness (Jackson 2018; Sedra 2018).

Horizontal inclusivity relates to the involvement of a multiplicity of stakeholders operating on the same level. It often refers to a range of state institutions, but in fact goes beyond that by connecting 'different fields of policy and praxis, across sectors such as security, development, governance, human rights, and even economic and social policies' (Jayasundara-Smits 2018, 455). Horizontal inclusivity is vital to a holistic SSR, across a range of security providers (such as the police, the armed forces, and intelligence agencies) and management and oversight bodies (such as relevant ministries, commissions, and parliamentary committees) (DCAF 2017). More recently, it has also embraced non-traditional and non-state security actors (such as self-defence groups, private military companies, and tribal judiciary systems) as vital stakeholders (Donais 2018). In fact, disregarding non-state actors in SSR programmes introduces an additional risk (Wilén 2018), as many conflicts originate in 'neglected peripheries' (Detzner 2017, 122).

Secondly, recent years have seen an enhanced focus on vertical inclusivity (Donais 2018), which refers to bringing together different actors at multiple levels involved in the process, 'from the supranational and international, to regional, national, municipal and local' (Jayasundara-Smits 2018, 55). Vertical inclusivity therefore emphasises the need for international actors to engage vertically in SSR processes beyond traditional one-directional top-down approaches.

Thirdly, scholars have suggested replacing the predominantly short-term technocratic approach of first-generation SSR with a politically embedded approach, reflecting an understanding of power structures 'beyond the capital' (Jackson 2018, 8). To engage with SSR processes from a well-informed position about local stakeholders and political complexities, what is needed is an approach which emphasises 'process rather than

structures, and analyses of hidden politics' (Jackson and Bakrania 2018, 11). This requires a long-term plan, and a 'shift from the short-term interventions of international actors to the long-term relationships among domestic ones' (Donais 2018, 44). Such an enhanced local understanding can ensure a more 'politically sensitive and realistic reform' (Sedra 2010, 115). Political sensitivities and complexities have too often been underestimated in reform processes, and a more 'nuanced understanding of security contexts' will help international actors to 'become more creative and flexible in negotiating the tensions between international norms and local realities' (Donais 2018, 43). To avoid a 'one-size-fits-all' approach to SSR, holistic approaches need to go beyond the state-centric perspective, requiring a detailed understanding of 'local realities of power [and] informal security and governance structures' (Sedra 2018, 60–61). Given the gap between the international blueprints and domestic security structures, comprehensive studies of 'how domestic voices and interests shape reform processes' are increasingly important for the success of the SSR (Schroeder, Chappuis, and Kocak 2014, 214).

While these three dimensions are by no means exhaustive, they help construct a more comprehensive conceptualisation of the holistic approach as discussed in the second-generation SSR debate. Thinking holistically about the process does not only mean involving a plurality of agencies within the state, but also coordinating different stakeholders horizontally and vertically in a multi-sectorial understanding of security, and to involve these actors with a focus on long-term political engagement.

However, despite an extensive debate about the underlying principles that can improve SSR implementation, the literature says little about which specific SSR tools could support a holistic approach to SSR and how they would enhance effectiveness. The need for a discussion about understanding the impact of SSR has been highlighted by several scholars. Schroeder (2010), for example, focuses on measuring the quality of security sector governance through a range of indicators, while Sedra (2018) suggests introducing 'other types of data previously excluded from security sector analysis, whether it be demographic, sociobiological or economic in nature' (54). Nevertheless, these suggestions still provide little insight into the value of specific SSR tools. Addressing this is crucial, as the continuing lack of understanding of what works in practice risks amplifying the policy-implementation gap. We contribute to this debate by exploring the value of FE as a specific tool in SSR, and whether it can help achieve a more holistic approach to SSR. In the next sections, we discuss our experience of designing and delivering FE programmes for conflict-affected audiences, and how this can contribute to a holistic SSR approach.

SSR through further education: Rationale and design

In this section we evaluate to what extent FE can support a holistic approach to SSR. We first illustrate the rationale behind linking the literature on education to scholarship on peacebuilding and SSR. Second, we outline three key aspects to consider when designing FE courses in this context: course participants, methods, and content.

There is a growing body of literature connecting peacebuilding with education (Hymel and Darwich 2018). Collier and Hoeffler, for example, have argued that male enrolment in secondary education is statistically significant in reducing the risk of conflict (2004, 588). While much of this literature focuses on 'basic education', Milton has claimed that it is

necessary to refocus our attention to understand how FE, and especially higher education, ‘can support or undermine peacebuilding’ (Milton 2018, 87). Acknowledging the key role 18–25-year-olds can play in post-conflict societies, an emerging body of academic literature puts particular emphasis on the potential of FE for good governance and leadership development in post-conflict environments (Fontana 2017, 2; Jacobs and Rossi 2017). As stated in a 2002 World Bank report, FE is essential to develop the ‘social capital’ that is central to ‘good governance and democratic political systems’ (World Bank 2002, 23). This growing interest in FE in the field of peacebuilding and conflict management has concentrated on higher education, with ‘recent research suggesting that universities have a role in nurturing developmental leaders who enable positive change and better governance in low-income and conflict-affected states’ (Fontana 2017, 2). While still in its infancy, this literature has established a positive link between higher education and good governance (Brannelly, Lewis, and Ndaruhutse 2011). While many peacebuilding programmes include elements of training, examples of – especially tertiary – education as a peacebuilding tool are much less frequent, and relevant studies are rare (Millican 2018).

The emerging discussions in scholarship have informed our underlying assumption that FE can capitalise on the positive correlation between education and peacebuilding and help achieve a more holistic SSR. This assumption informed the rationale behind our course design and inspired our pedagogical choices. We consider the course participants, methods, and content to be key aspects to enhance pedagogical efficiency, as discussed below.

First, the UK’s Defence Diplomacy courses are designed for key stakeholders in the security sector. Stakeholders are brought together in classroom-size groups of up to twenty participants, allowing for a participant-focussed and interactive learning environment. The purpose is to bring together a wide variety of actors. While our courses have predominantly included officials from state-based security agencies, oversight and legislative bodies, they also provide the opportunity to bring in non-state security providers and civil society representatives. Including officials from both military and civilian institutions reflects the comprehensive nature of the reform process (Faleg 2018; Martin et al. 2016). It is important to have senior officials of key security institutions on board, as they will lead on shaping the reform of their respective institutions and will play a vital role during and after the transition period. Similarly, the involvement of civil society representatives brings benefits to reform processes, and existing strategies to engage them in SSR have been ‘decidedly limited in terms of both depth and breadth’ (Donais 2018, 33). In our courses, we had civilian and military participants from different state institutions, but representatives from civil society did not take part. However, we introduced pedagogical activities to consider the role of civil society and non-state actors in international conflict management in general and SSR specifically. In the empirical analysis below, we reflect on bringing these actors together as course participants.

Second, the pedagogical methods are primarily aimed at putting participants in charge of their own learning experience. This is to avoid FE programmes being used as a form of paternalistic governance. Although education has been a tool of colonial and neo-colonial domination (Hendricks and Leibowitz 2016; Rizvi, Lingard, and Lavia 2006), the interactive and participant-focussed approach suggested in this contribution is aware of this tension

and aims to achieve the exact opposite. Indeed, FE can open a space to foster a critical and open engagement between external actors and local stakeholders. The course designers and facilitators therefore need to be aware of potential Western-centric assumptions to avoid taking on an imposing and intrusive role in the educational process. This can give participants the impression of claims to Western superiority or of the replication of neo-colonial relations in the reproduction of knowledge. Indeed, education carries the inherent risk as outlined by Minnis (1990, 90), to translate into ‘the imposition of an arbitrary cultural system by an arbitrary power’. It is important to acknowledge the delicacy and complexity of this issue and to use pedagogical methods that maximise participant ownership of the learning process. For this reason, we applied interactive and participant-focussed pedagogical methods.

Research shows that teaching methods based on students’ active engagement facilitate their ownership of the learning process (EUA 2019). Rather than ‘lecturing’ course participants in a more traditional, passive learning environment, they are encouraged to learn by doing. As Lewis (2015) has highlighted, rather than being consumers of knowledge, course participants will also be its authors and creators. While there is no fixed definition of ‘active learning’, we understand it as a diverse range of pedagogical approaches and activities, ‘that emphasise the importance of participant ownership and activation’ (EUA 2019, 3). It aims for the participants to construct their own learning, and to develop a critical engagement with the teaching material. With this in mind, and to maximise the inclusivity and active involvement of all participants on the course, we applied a variety of pedagogical activities. These included a mix of small group activities such as conflict analysis and presentations, open discussions, semi-structured class debates, poster design, and mediation through simulation exercises. This made it a dynamic course, accommodating different learning styles, central to fostering an inclusive environment. Importantly, many pedagogical activities were conducted using a fictitious case study, which helps to ‘mitigate preconceived [...] ideas [...] about real-world conflicts’, ‘allows participants to explore alternative options in problem-solving exercises’ and gives the course facilitators the ability to ‘guide the learning process more effectively’ (Jacobs and Rossi 2019).

The third element concerns the course content. First, the amount of time allocated to the course is important as it needs to reflect work patterns and availability of the prospective participants. Taking part in a course constitutes an interruption to participants’ professional roles and therefore time is limited. The duration of the courses under the UK’s Defence Diplomacy framework was one working week. Second, because these FE programmes are designed for practitioners, it is important to focus on content of value to the participants’ professional context (Sutherland 1999). Arriving with a good understanding of the cohort and the roles and institutions represented is therefore vital. Third, approaching the course from a strategic angle addresses the need to go beyond a merely technocratic approach to SSR – as discussed in the second-generation debate – by focussing on broader political-strategic issues relevant to the subject of the course (Jackson 2018). With this in mind, we designed an international conflict management course, including topics such as causes and consequences of conflict, conflict analysis, mediation, peacebuilding, international law and the use of force, institutional reform, societal post-conflict reconstruction (including SSR processes), and grass-roots conflict transformation.

These three core components – a diverse audience, a pedagogical approach based on active learning, and relevant strategic course content and material – aim to maximise the synergy between peacebuilding and FE to enhance the holistic dimension of SSR. The next section discusses the results of our efforts, by drawing on our experience in Lebanon, Georgia, and Palestine.

Empirical findings from Lebanon, Georgia, and Palestine

This section uses autoethnography to analyse the extent to which FE programmes can contribute to achieving a more holistic approach to SSR. Reflecting on our experiences from delivering the weeklong international conflict management course in three different countries, we use a combination of self-reflective and self-observational memos, analysis of and reflection on course participants feedback, as well as memories and the re-counting of specific events witnessed during the courses. In this we follow what Stahlke Wall (2016) has defined as a ‘moderate approach to autoethnography’ (1–9), by complementing this material with other academic insights. The analysis addresses the aspects of audience, method, and content to understand the opportunities and limitations of FE as a tool to achieve a more holistic approach to SSR.

A horizontally inclusive audience

First, we evaluate how having a particular audience for FE programmes can generate positive effects on SSR, especially on the horizontal integration of various state and non-state security actors. Delivering FE to a broad range of actors in-country, instead of flying a select group of representatives out to courses in Western military or civilian HE institutions, encourages local embeddedness, and enhances the likelihood that participants will ‘pass down the lessons learned’ (Hills 2000, 52–53). Placing the courses into the local context widens the range of stakeholders that can be involved and enhances the potential for including both state and non-state actors, civilian and military institutions, security providers and oversight bodies, as well as national and societal organisations, while simultaneously connecting them.

Our experience provided useful insights. The audience varied significantly across the three courses. In Georgia, the audience was a multinational mix of professionals from Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, composed of both civil service personnel from different ministries as well as military officers. In Palestine, the course was attended by mid- to senior-ranking officers across the different Palestinian security services, while in Lebanon, the audience was drawn entirely from officers from the Lebanese Armed Forces, reflecting a wide range of military ranks. Three key aspects arise from this. First, FE has the potential to foster inter-agency horizontal integration through the specific format of interactive FE courses. Second, our experience shows potential to also integrate civil society actors. Third, this integration can bring to existing inter/intra-institutional tensions and challenges to the surface.

A clear sense of how such horizontal integration can make a difference emerged from the course in Georgia. We observed how participants across the three countries interacted constructively and professionally throughout the week, which helped create a positive learning environment. In their feedback, participants stated that they welcomed the

possibility of having ‘open debates on controversial issues regarding conflict management’ and that ‘it helped understand the views of other participants, which was useful since we all come from a very fragile region of the South Caucasus’ (Georgia, Civil Servant). From our own observation during the course and from conversations with participants, these courses seemed to offer a rare opportunity for security stakeholders from the three countries to meet and engage in conflict-related debates. The course opened the possibility of dialogue between the participants, in a way that would not be possible with one-to-one training or elite courses in Western institutions. As Beck et al. (2015) state, groupwork in FE generates mutual reliance, which promotes solidarity and co-determination (445). This impression was corroborated by participant feedback: ‘I also liked that the group was diverse. Different cultural backgrounds made discussions extremely interesting. People (all of us) left their comfort zones and put themselves in others’ shoes’ (Armenia, Civil Servant). This feedback suggests that the educational experience enhanced the cross-cultural and cross-national understanding beyond mere knowledge-gathering and indicates the possibility of mutual understanding and recognition. Developing this ‘empathic’ understanding is considered key for efforts of sustained conflict resolution by both the education and peacebuilding literature (Kester 2017; Parker 2016) and is therefore an important part of the SSR process.

In turn, the Palestinian experience showed how FE courses can also function as informal channels where ideas about the reform processes can be exchanged. The educational environment creates proximity between various stakeholders, facilitating informal conversations in the margins of the programme. The HE literature has shown the value of breaks between learning activities, to create space for students to continue the discussions in a less formal manner and consolidate their learning (Bachnel and Thaman 2014). We observed that course participants in Palestine engaged in informal conversations during breaks, both amongst themselves and with us. This was also reflected in the feedback of the course, with various participants noting that one of the aspects they valued most was the ‘participation of representatives from different security services’ (Palestine, CI Feedback). The – often intense – debates between representatives from different institutions also demonstrated the competing challenges across agencies, further highlighting the need for horizontal integration. The course enabled these discussions in a safe environment and enhanced dialogue and understanding between key security stakeholders.

As Ansorg and Gordon (2019) observe, SSR is shaped by a ‘multitude of different security actors which can lead to multiple patterns of co-operation and contestation within programmes’ (3). Our experience in Lebanon demonstrates how the diversity of perspectives is also present when only a limited number of institutions is represented, albeit less obviously so. In Lebanon the audience consisted of officers from across the Lebanese Army Forces, with varying ranks (including Second Lieutenant, Captain, Colonel and Brigadier), representing various branches of the Lebanese Armed Forces. We witnessed that ‘the complex multi-confessional, socio-political fabric characterized by deep rooted historical divisions’ of Lebanon is even reflected within the same institution (European Commission 2013, 1). It underscored the importance of considering both intra- and inter-institutional differences. A clear example of this occurred during the final exercise, where participants outline their approach to a crisis in a fictitious state in small groups. One element of the discussion focusses on the legality of international intervention.

Two officers of different ranks and regiments found themselves strongly disagreeing about this element and at one point during the discussion, the more senior officer stated that his younger colleague might be arguing well, but he had never been to war. A sense of discomfort spread around the room and the conversation slowly faded away. Later during the day, we reflected on the senior officer's comment in this context. The younger officer had been side-lined from the discussion based on his lack of experience in war. This helped us understand that while the internal divisions within the Lebanese Armed Forces are seen as a legacy of the divisions during the Lebanese Civil War (Blandford 2018), another potential schism exists between those who have experienced war and those who have not. Second, it underscored that horizontal integration in multi-agency SSR must also acknowledge and understand intra-agency divisions. It emphasises the importance of both inter-institutional horizontal integration and intra-institutional vertical integration to support a holistic approach.

Our courses had diverse audiences, including multiple civilian and/or military agencies and institutions within the state, reflecting to varying degrees the inclusivity concerns raised in the second generation SSR debates. A key limitation was the absence of civil society representatives and non-state actors. We attempted to remedy this shortcoming through our pedagogical choices; by explicitly including questions about civil society and non-state groups in group discussions and simulations, and by allocating specific roles to these stakeholders in simulation exercises. This allowed at least for the 'hypothetical' presence of non-state groups and civil society, which was generally welcomed by course participants. For example, in Palestine a course participant noted that one of the key aspects of the course was 'building trust and engaging civil society' (Colonel, Palestine). During a conflict simulation exercise in Georgia, we noticed that the civil society groups became the vector used by course participants to express their more conciliatory views, which allowed them to reengage with the discussion. Overall, although limited in this regard, our experience demonstrates the potential value to directly include civil society representatives in FE courses to support horizontal inclusivity in SSR.

A vertically inclusive method

As a second aspect, we evaluate how adopting a specific pedagogical philosophy can enhance vertical inclusivity on the course. We found that interactive and participant-focussed methods can serve two purposes regarding enhancing vertical integration in SSR: they promote mutual understanding between external and domestic actors, as well as between security officers of varying ranks within the same institution.

As Goetze (2019) argues, hierarchically structured peacebuilding missions regularly prioritise external knowledge over local knowledge, with the latter being 'largely ignored' (13). Instead, engaging in a learning process with key local stakeholders, external actors can challenge their own perspectives about the context in which they operate. This will enhance collective knowledge and understanding, and it will re-negotiate the traditional roles between international and domestic actors, which can help create a more constructive working environment. During our one-week course, we observed increasing mutual trust between the course participants and ourselves as course facilitators. In all three courses, the first day of the course represented a challenging testing ground, and we often felt an initial diffidence. This can be explained by a combination of factors.

The introductory nature of the first day played a role: while some of the course participants already knew each other, others did not, and we were keen to break the ice rapidly and enhance participant involvement across the group. Another factor might have been the language barrier – for us as course facilitators to speak in a language different from participants' usual working language created some initial distance. Finally, in Palestine and Lebanon, being the only two women in a classroom with course participants from strongly male-dominated professional environments added a gender imbalance to the equation.

In all three courses, we felt that an appropriate choice of pedagogical methods was essential to overcome participants' initial reserved attitude. Using open-ended and participant-led discussions, neither the external nor domestic actors occupy the role of the 'instructor', thereby disrupting the unidirectional nature of traditional educational programmes and helping to overcome the first-day diffidence. During the course, we aimed to navigate and facilitate the discussions while avoiding foreclosing findings or ending conversations prematurely. In maintaining an open dialogue, even in situations where opinions diverged significantly, we observed that such a pedagogical approach contributes to re-socialise external and domestic actors, moving from an 'us versus them' dichotomy towards mutual collaboration. Feedback across the three courses reflected this; in all three contexts, the participants found open discussions and active exercises the most enjoyable aspects of the course. To the question what they most appreciated about the course, the 'interactive manner between tutors, students, and amongst students themselves' and 'the exercises and discussions' emerged as the overriding answers.

This is particularly important in reshaping relationships that can be perceived as pre-determined, such as the one between external and domestic actors. Similarly, participant-focussed, and active FE programmes in SSR can help create partnerships, which in turn, can re-shape the perceptions of roles, identities, and challenges. Vitaly, this socialisation process must involve both external and domestic actors, rather than merely re-socialising locals to the values and norms of the donors (Sigel and Hoskin 2013). As Georgina Holmes (2019) argues in relation to the UN's approach to training peacekeeping forces, the training process is not an uncontested space with one-directional instructions from the external to the domestic (21). The course uses pedagogical tools such as participant-led debates, simulation games with roleplay, and poster-design and presentation in smaller groups. These tools have allowed for a gradual increase of trust and understanding amongst participants as well as between participants and course facilitators.

Sharing this week of intense debates and discussions challenged our understandings and pre-conceived ideas about the course participants' reality, and it confirmed that 'a dialectical relationship between teachers and students is [...] based in a cultural conflict of identity' (Starr 2010, 1). In Palestine for example, we witnessed how our interactive approach kept participants engaged throughout the week and promoted a sense of ownership of the learning process. When discussing the value of the course during the final exercise, the mutual trust between participants and facilitators allowed for honest discussions about the Palestinian security services and the challenges they face. Similarly, in Georgia, the participants from Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia showed an initial level of scepticism towards us as course facilitators. As we are both originally from western European states, our understanding of conflict and operational realities was questioned by course participants. However, following the first participant-led debate in the

afternoon of the first day, we shared our own learning points with the group, which noticeably broke down barriers and enhanced participant engagement. Finally, in Lebanon, the feedback from course participants highlighted that discussing conflict resolution in an ‘interactive manner between tutors, students, and amongst students’ was one of the most appreciated elements of the course (Major, Lebanon). Conversations with course participants over the course of the week also emphasised that they were fully conducive of an approach to learning that draws as much on the facilitators’ knowledge as it does on the participants’ own experience.

However, building trust takes time, and we must acknowledge that the week-long timeframe of the course has been a limitation to further these relations. From our perspective, this meant that by the time a sense of comfort and trust was established between us and the participants, the course was coming to an end. This impression was shared among the participants across all three courses, with 25% of the participants explicitly indicating on their feedback form that they would have preferred a longer course with more time for discussion.

In addition to breaking barriers between the international and the local, we also witnessed that our pedagogical methods enhanced vertical inclusivity between professionals of different seniority, especially in hierarchical organisations such as the military and the police. One advantage of an interactive approach is the promotion of equal interaction between security officers within the same organisation. Rather than seeking to achieve consensus amongst practitioners, we aim to create a safe environment where opposing views can be discussed, and mutual engagement may result in the consideration of compromises and solutions. Welcoming differing views and experiences is conducive to a pluralist debate and can promote a constructive dialogue between participants. As the previous section has discussed in relation to the case of Lebanon, FE courses can also become the context in which existing tensions surface. However, we noticed how FE courses also offer a favourable environment to develop constructive relationships between junior and senior officials, which can help smooth transition processes in SSR. This is particularly important in hierarchically structured organisations, where junior officers with recent operational experience may struggle to have their voice heard for future strategic planning. Indeed, Gippert (2016) claims that in Bosnia and Kosovo, the ‘absolute hierarchy of the senior police leadership’ prevented junior officials from embracing reform processes they considered legitimate if their senior officers were opposed to it.

We asked professionals with different levels of seniority to cooperate in small groups throughout the week and observed that differences in rank and experience gradually faded out as the focus shifted towards pulling professional resources to perform well as a group. During the mediation exercise in Lebanon, for example, where existing hierarchies were initially very prominent within the groups, a real sense of loyalty developed towards the group and the role that group represented throughout the exercise. We witnessed on several occasions during this course how officers of a lower rank or with less combat experience provided vital input to strengthen the group’s argument. Mediation simulation, in particular by using a fictitious conflict, allows for the learning experience to be less affected by real-world roles (Jacobs and Rossi 2019). Hierarchies can play out in group work but can also temporarily be set aside. We noticed from our experience in Georgia, that the more diverse the group is (in terms of seniority, but also in terms of

gender and professional background), the easier it is to overcome existing hierarchical differences. This demonstrates that vertical and horizontal inclusivity can reinforce each other.

To sum up, participant-owned and active learning processes enhance vertical inclusivity between the international and local, as well as between different levels of seniority within or across local institutions. Building positive professional inter- and intra-institutional relations contributes constructively to transitional SSR processes and long-term sustainability. It also enhances the long-term effectiveness of reform processes by avoiding over-dependence on senior officials. Through small group discussions and debates, FE courses not only engage key security stakeholders in the specific aspects of their everyday role, but also offer them a space to consider the reform process from a more strategic perspective and contextualise it in the broader political and institutional architecture. We now look more closely at how the range of topics covered on the course can contribute to this aspect.

A politically embedded course

Our final element of holistic SSR concerns building a long-term strategic vision embedded in a thorough understanding of local political complexities. While vertical inclusivity can enhance the mutual understanding between the local and the international as well as between various levels of seniority in relevant agencies, the specific topics covered can be tailored to the needs of the local context and can encourage more joined-up reform strategies. While tactical-level training is widespread in SSR programmes, introducing FE allows for the development of a shared strategic vision of the reform process across participants, which is vital to enhance horizontal inclusion and reinforce a stronger coherence between different domestic actors. Empirical studies of EU SSR efforts in the Palestinian Territories and Georgia have shown that bringing together key domestic security stakeholders to allow for reform efforts to be guided by a shared political and strategic direction can be challenging (Bouris 2014; Simons 2014). Active learning and appropriate course content can help participants engage with the strategic level and discuss the broader political processes within which SSR is embedded.

Our course was designed to foster an understanding of international conflict management with a view to apply the acquired skills and knowledge in the participants' own professional environments. The course covers a range of related topics, including conflict analysis, peace enforcement, mediation, peacebuilding, grassroots approaches to post-conflict reconstruction, political reform, security sector reform, and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration. While the course makes use of a fictitious case study throughout the week, real-world examples are also discussed, and – depending on the participants' preference – the final day either applies the topics discussed to the participants' own political context or brings all the topics together in a fictitious exercise. The discussions concerning these different topics emphasise their inherent political character. The selection of the course material contributes directly to a political rather than a technocratic approach to SSR, which is a crucial aspect of second generation SSR (Jackson 2018). From our discussions with the groups, it emerged how a strategic vision can only result from a political process rather than technical and operational training. In other words, the course material directly links strategic vision with political embeddedness.

In all three courses, course participants with different positions and experience were enthusiastically engaged in the learning activities across the range of subject areas. It became clear throughout these activities that the operational level influences the strategic and vice versa. In Lebanon, for example, the discussion on the legality of war influenced perceptions of both mid-ranked and senior officers in the Lebanese Armed Forces. This became clear when discussing their own professional environments during the end-of course exercise. In a similar way, Palestinian security officials discussed the political and legal frameworks of international conflict management at great length, allowing them to reflect on their existing perceptions and understanding. As one participant said, ‘it was important for me to better understand international law and political agreements in conflict management’ (Palestine, Lt Cl). The Palestinian participants in fact explicitly requested for the final (fictitious) exercise to be replaced by an application of the course content to their own professional challenges, to link the learning to their daily jobs and own professional context.

In Georgia, the course allowed for the interplay of perspectives about international conflict management between theoretical expertise of civil servants on the one hand and operational expertise of military officials on the other. We observed this exchange during the mediation exercise, when participants playing the role of UN representatives informed those representing the government, opposition, and rebel groups about the legal limits and the political value of a ceasefire agreement. During the post-simulation reflection, several course participants highlighted that this made them realise how important a legally sound and politically workable agreement is. One participant later stated, ‘I hope to use this knowledge in my future [...] professional duties’ (Georgia, Major).

The strategic focus of the course contextualises the topic in a broader political framework, within which participants’ own operational realities can be discussed. FE courses provide a safe environment where strategic visions can be discussed across stakeholders, while tackling topics relevant for the wider context of SSR. The participant-focussed and interactive pedagogical methods of the course facilitated discussions on relevant topics amongst participants, sharing their ideas, suggestions, and understanding.

Although we observed that course participants were intensely engaged in the topics covered during the course, one issue that arose from the feedback related to the length of the course. While one participant in Georgia stated, ‘I liked how effectively the course topics covered almost every aspect of ICM in just five days’ (Georgia, civil servant), several participants across the three courses in fact expressed the need for a longer course to build foundations for shared strategic views and processes. Five days is indeed very short to allow ample time for reflection and to allow for FE to contribute to strategic SSR reform processes. As one Major in the Lebanese Army confirmed; ‘the course is already loaded with information, but it needs more time for a better educational outcome. A five-day workshop on this subject is not enough’.

To sum up, from our experience in Lebanon, Palestine, and Georgia, strategically relevant course content can enhance a shared strategic understanding of the political context of SSR reform processes, and therefore contribute to a more holistic approach to SSR. However, a five-day course provides insufficient time to build a long-term shared strategic vision on complex SSR issues.

Conclusion

This article has assessed the value of FE in SSR through an autoethnographic methodology. It speaks directly to wider debates about peacebuilding, second generation SSR, the role of education in conflict-affected environments, and ways to measure impact. By analysing our experience of the International Conflict Management course that we designed for the UK Defence Engagement Programme and delivered in Georgia, Palestine, and Lebanon, we argue or have argued that FE contributes to a more successful implementation of a holistic approach to SSR.

Vertically, a non-hierarchical learning environment provides a platform for knowledge exchange which can enhance understanding across international, national, and local levels. Horizontally, the inclusion of a wide range of state and non-state, traditional and non-traditional security sector stakeholders can enhance local coordination and dialogue between different actors. This encourages the design and implementation of context-specific and tailor-made SSR programmes, while avoiding the implementation of a one-size-fits-all model. The content of the course can cultivate a joint strategic SSR vision between participants across relevant sectors and institutions, and at the very least help acknowledge the highly political and complex nature of the process. Methodologically, this paper demonstrates how autoethnography can be applied to assess the effectiveness of SSR tools, FE in particular. It therefore contributes to the second-generation SSR literature, which seeks to narrow the SSR policy-implementation gap.

The limitations emerging from our analysis involve inclusivity, gender imbalance, and measuring long-term success. First, as our audience was limited to state officials, we did not have civil society representatives. Through roleplay, participants experienced the potential involvement of civil society representatives, but in practice this could present several context-specific challenges, including for example which groups can be represented on the course (as places are limited). Second, it also raises the question of gender balance, which stays largely unaddressed in our experience. In two of the three courses the audience was exclusively male. Our positionality as female (external) course facilitators, as well as gender mainstreaming on the courses would need further exploration. Finally, while a key contribution of this exploratory study is methodological, introducing an autoethnographic account to assess the implementation of SSR does not measure the long-term impact of a perceived short-term success. Due to the nature of the course content, the results of FE programmes are less immediately tangible than tactical-level training. Further research into the long-term impact and how to measure it is therefore needed.

Notes

1. In addition to making funding streams available, SSR programmes have generally applied mentoring, guiding, advising and training by experienced international subject matter experts (OECD 2007, 76).
2. We make reference to further education to indicate that we are suggesting educational programmes for adults that are stakeholders in the security sector. This may include higher education (when accredited) but is not limited to it.

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the course participants in Palestine, Lebanon, and Georgia for their contributions during the course and for generously sharing their experience and expertise with us. We would also like to thank Nigel Hughes and Malte Riemann for commenting on the paper at various stages of the process. Finally, we would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

An Jacobs is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University and a Visiting Fellow with the Institute for Diplomacy and International Governance at Loughborough University London. Her research interests include education in conflict resolution, EU crisis management, security sector reform, securitisation, gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding, and military education. She has published in a range of peer-reviewed journals, including *West European Politics*, *Security Dialogue*, and *European Security*.

Norma Rossi is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and a Visiting Research Fellow at the University of Reading. Her research focuses on the co-production of authority and subjectivity at the intersection between legal, political and social dimensions with a specific focus on war and security. She has published in various peer-reviewed journals including *Global Crime*, *Small Wars Journal*, *Journal of Civil Wars*, *Peace Review*, and *Defence Studies*.

ORCID

An Jacobs  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5078-4075>

Norma Rossi  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5825-5047>

References

- Andersen, Louise Riis. 2011. "Security Sector Reform and the Dilemmas of Liberal Peacebuilding." *DIIS Working Paper* 2011:31, online. <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/122261/1/68472118X.pdf>.
- Ansorg, Nadine, and Eleanor Gordon. 2019. "Co-operation, Contestation and Complexity in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 13 (1): 2–24. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1516392
- Bachnel, Rachna, and Richa Ghay Thaman. 2014. "Effective Use of Pause Procedure to Enhance Student Engagement and Learning." *Journal of Clinical Diagnostic Research* 8 (8): XM01–XM03. doi:10.7860/JCDR/2014/8260.4691.
- Bakrania, Shivit. 2015. *Security and Evidence Mapping*. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Beck, Eevi, Tone Dyrdal Solbrekke, Molly Sutphen, and Ester Fremstad. 2015. "When Mere Knowledge is not Enough: The Potential of Building as Self-determination, Co-determination and Solidarity." *Higher Education Research & Development* 34 (3): 445–457. doi:10.1080/07294360.2014.973373
- Bendix, Daniel, and Ruth Stanley. 2008. "Security Sector Reform in Africa: The Promise and the Practice of a New Donor Approach." *ACCORD Occasional Paper* 3 (2): 1–58. https://journals.co.za/content/accordo/3/2/AJA16083954_25#metrics_content.

- Blandford, Nicholas. 2018. "The United States–Lebanese Armed Forces Partnership: Challenges, Risks, and Rewards." *Atlantic Council*, May 7. Accessed July 22, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-united-states-lebanese-armed-forces-partnership-challenges-risks-and-rewards/>.
- Bliesemann de Guevara, Berit. 2010. "Introduction: The Limits of Statebuilding and the Analysis of State-Formation." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4 (2): 111–128. doi:10.1080/17502970903533652
- Bouris, Dimitris. 2014. *The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories: State-building Without a State*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Brannelly, Laura, Laura Lewis, and Susy Ndaruhutse. 2011. "Learning and Leadership: Exploring the Linkages between Higher Education and Developmental Leadership." *Developmental Leadership Programme, CFBT Education Trust*. Accessed July 16, 2019. <https://res.cloudinary.com/dlprog/image/upload/research-paper-18-learning-and-leadership-exploring-the-linkages-between-higher-education-and-developmental-leadership>.
- Celermajer, Danielle, and Kiran Grewal. 2013. "Preventing Human Rights Violations 'From the Inside': Enhancing the Role of Human Rights Education in Security Sector Reform." *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 5 (2): 243–266. doi:10.1093/jhuman/hut012
- Chang, Heewon. 2008. *Autoethnography as Method*. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Chang, Heewon. 2013. "Individual and Collaborative Autoethnography as Method." In *Handbook of Autoethnography*, edited by Stacy L. Holman Jones, Tony E. Adams, and Carolyn Ellis, 107–122. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
- Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. "The Power of Names." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 35: 396–399. doi:10.1177/0891241606286983
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." *Oxford Economic Papers* 56: 563–595. doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064
- DCAF. 2017. *A Women's Guide to Security Sector Reform. Training Curriculum*. Washington, DC: Inclusive Security and DCAF.
- Deneckere, Matthias, Ashley Neat, and Volker Hauck. 2020. "The Future of EU Security Sector Assistance: Learning from Experience." *ECDPM. Discussion Paper* 271: 1–44.
- Detzner, Sarah. 2017. "Modern Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform in Africa: Patterns of Success and Failure." *African Security Review* 26 (2): 116–142. doi:10.1080/10246029.2017.1302706
- Donais, Timothy. 2018. "Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Vertical Integration." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 12 (1): 31–47. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1426681
- Ecoma, Alaga. 2011. "The Emerging Regional Policy Frameworks for SSR/G in Africa: Prospects and Opportunities for the AU and ECOWAS." Paper presented at the BISA-Africa & International Studies ESRC Seminar Series: 'African Agency in Peace, Conflict and Intervention', University of Birmingham, April 7.
- Ekengren, Markus. 2016. "Chapter 7: The Challenge of a Broadening Security Agenda for EU Security Sector Reform." In *The Politics of Security Sector Reform: Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union's Global Role*, edited by Ekengren Markus, and Greg Simons, 101–126. Abingdon: Routledge.
- EUA (European University Association). 2019. "Promoting Learning in Universities." 2019 European Learning and Teaching Forum. Learning and Teaching Paper #5. Accessed July 16, 2019. <https://eua.eu/events/24-2019-european-learning-teaching-forum.html>.
- European Commission. 2013. "Action Fiche for Support to the Lebanese Security Sector for Stability and National Cohesion." CRIS number: ENPI/2013/024-431. Accessed November 20, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2013_5040_aap_action_fiches_en_024431.pdf.
- European Commission (EC) and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). 2016. "Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform". JOIN/2016/031 final. Strasbourg: EU. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN:2016:31:FIN>.
- Faleg, Giovanni. 2018. "Report on EU Comprehensive Approach to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding." EU-CIVCAP. Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU CIVILIAN

- CAPabilities for Sustainable Peace. Deliverable 4.3, March 23. Accessed July 16, 2019. https://eucivcap.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/eu-civcap_deliverable_4-3.pdf.
- Fontana, Giuditta. 2017. *The Impact of Higher Education on Developmental Leadership and on Good Governance*. K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.
- Gippert, Birte Julia. 2016. "Exploring Local Compliance with Peacebuilding Reforms: Legitimacy, Coercion and Reward-seeking in Police Reform in Kosovo." *International Peacekeeping* 23 (1): 52–78. doi:10.1080/13533312.2015.1100966
- Goetze, Catherine. 2019. "Learning in Peacebuilding – Mission Impossible?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 13 (3): 340–356. doi:10.1080/17502977.2019.1610990
- Gordon, Eleanor. 2014. "Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its People?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 8 (2-3): 126–148. doi:10.1080/17502977.2014.930219
- Hendricks, Cheryl, and Brenda Leibowitz. 2016. "Decolonising Universities isn't an Easy Process – but It Has to Happen." *The Conversation*, May 23. <https://theconversation.com/decolonising-universities-isnt-an-easy-process-but-it-has-to-happen-59604>.
- Hills, Alice. 2000. "Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform." *Contemporary Security Policy* 21 (1): 46–67. doi:10.1080/13523260008404244
- Holman Jones, Stacy, Tony E. Adams, and Carolyn Ellis, eds. 2013. *Handbook of Autoethnography*. New York: Routledge.
- Holmes, Georgina. 2019. "Enhancing Operational Effectiveness? Pre-deployment Training for Tactical-level Rwandan Female Military Peacekeepers." In *War Amongst the People. Critical Assessments*, edited by David Brown, Murray Donette, Malte Riemann, Norma Rossi, and Martin A. Smith, 125–146. Havant: Howgate Publishing Limited.
- Hymel, Shelley, and Lina Darwich. 2018. "Building Peace Through Education." *Journal of Peace Education* 15 (3): 345–357. doi:10.1080/17400201.2018.1535475
- Jackson, Paul. 2011. "Security Sector Reform and State Building." *Third World Quarterly* 32 (10): 1803–1822. doi:10.1080/01436597.2011.610577
- Jackson, Paul. 2018. "Introduction: Second-Generation Security Sector Reform." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 12 (1): 1–10. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1426384
- Jackson, Paul, and Shivit Bakrania. 2018. "Is the Future of SSR non-linear?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 12 (1): 11–30. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1426548
- Jacobs, An, and Norma Rossi. 2017. "Educating Conflict Management and Practicing Peacebuilding: The Case of Lebanon." *E-International Relations*. December 9. <https://www.e-ir.info/2017/12/09/educating-conflict-management-and-practicing-peacebuilding-the-case-of-lebanon/>.
- Jacobs, An, and Norma Rossi. 2019. "Best Practices in Academic Contributions to UK Defence Engagement: Teaching International Conflict Management in Chile." *Army Wish Stream Journal* Spring 2019: 78–80.
- Jayasundara-Smits, Shyamika. 2018. "From Revolution to Reform and Back: EU-Security Sector Reform in Ukraine." *European Security* 27 (4): 453–468. doi:10.1080/09662839.2018.1523145
- Juncos, Ana E. 2018. "EU Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Reform or Resist?" *Contemporary Security Policy* 39 (1): 95–118. doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.1391625
- Kester, Kevin. 2017. "The Case of Educational Peacebuilding Inside the United Nations Universities: A Review and Critique." *Journal of Transformative Education* 15 (1): 59–78. doi:10.1177/1541344616655888
- Lewis, Desiree. 2015. "'Another University is Possible': Thoughts on students protests and universities in Postcolonial Africa." *Los Angeles Review of Books*, December 9. <https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/another-university-is-possible-thoughts-on-student-protests-and-universities-in-postcolonial-africa/#>.
- Macphee, Paula-Luise, and Ann Fitz-Gerald. 2014. "Multiplying a Force for Good? The Impact of Security Sector Management Postgraduate Education in Ethiopia." *Journal of Peace Education* 11 (2): 208–224. doi:10.1080/17400201.2014.898625
- Martin, Mary, Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Chris Van der Borgh, and Georg Frerks. 2016. "Theoretical and Methodological Framework." DataverseNL, V1. Accessed August 19, 2019. <https://hdl.handle.net/10411/20855>.

- Millican, Juliet, ed. 2018. *Universities and Conflict. The Role of Higher Education in Peacebuilding and Resistance*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Milton, Samson. 2018. "The Two Faces of Higher Education in Conflict and Peacebuilding." Chap. 5 in *Higher Education and Post-Conflict Recovery*, 87–119. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Minnis, John R. 1990. "Adult Education as Socialization: Implications for Personal and Social Change." *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) / Revue de la Pensée Éducative* 24 (2): 88–94. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-65349-5_5
- Nathan, Laurie. 2004. "Obstacles to Security Sector Reform in New Democracies". *Berghof Research Center*. https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue2_nathan.pdf.
- OECD DAC. 2007. *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris: OECD.
- Parker, Christina. 2016. "Pedagogical Tools for Peacebuilding Education: Engaging and Empathizing With Diverse Perspectives in Multicultural Elementary Classrooms." *Theory & Research in Social Education* 44 (1): 104–140. doi:10.1080/00933104.2015.1100150
- Rizvi, Fazal, Bob Lingard, and Jennifer Lavia. 2006. "Postcolonialism and Education: Negotiating a Contested Terrain." *Pedagogy, Culture & Society* 14 (3): 249–262. doi:10.1080/14681360600891852
- Schroeder, Ursula. 2010. "Measuring Security Sector Governance – A Guide to Relevant Indicators." *DCAF Occasional Paper* 20: 1–61. https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/OP_20_SCHROEDER_FORM.pdf.
- Schroeder, Ursula C., and Fairlie Chappuis. 2014. "New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local Agency and Domestic Politics." *International Peacekeeping* 21 (2): 133–148. doi:10.1080/13533312.2014.910401
- Schroeder, Ursula C., Fairlie Chappuis, and Deniz Kocak. 2014. "Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance." *International Peacekeeping* 21 (2): 214–230. doi:10.1080/13533312.2014.910405
- Sedra, Mark. 2010. "Towards Second Generation Security Sector Reform." Chapter 6 in *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, 102–116. Waterloo, Ontario: Centre for International Governance Innovations (CIGI).
- Sedra, Mark. 2017. *Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Evolution of a Model*. New York: Routledge.
- Sedra, Mark. 2018. "Adapting Security Sector Reform to Ground-Level Realities: The Transition to a Second-Generation Model." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 12 (1): 48–63. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1426383
- Sigel, Roberta S., and Marilyn B. Hoskin. 2013. *Education for Democratic Citizenship*. New York: Routledge.
- Simons, Greg. 2014. "Security Sector Reform and Georgia: The European Union's Challenge in the Southern Caucasus." In *The European Union as an Actor in Security Sector Reform: Current Practices and Challenges of Implementation*, edited by Oya Dursun-Ozkanca, and Antoine Vandemoortele, 134–155. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Stahlke Wall, Sarah. 2016. "Towards a Moderate Autoethnography." *International Journal of Qualitative Method* 15 (1): 1–9. doi:10.1177/1609406916674966.
- Starr, Lisa J. 2010. "The Use of Autoethnography in Educational Research: Locating Who We Are in What We Do." *Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education* 3 (1): 1–9.
- Sutherland, Peter. 1999. "A Study of the Learning of Mature Adult Students on a Professional Course." *Journal of Further and Higher Education* 23 (3): 381–389. doi:10.1080/0309877990230308
- Wilén, Nina. 2018. "Examining the Links Between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Troop Contribution in Post-Conflict States." *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 12 (1): 64–79. doi:10.1080/17502977.2018.1426680
- World Bank. 2002. *Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- World Bank. 2011. *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-8439-8.