Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies
Supplement 141

Themes in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy

KEELING LECTURES 2011–18

Edited by Fiona Leigh

ICS INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS

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DIRECTOR & EDITOR: GREG WOOLF

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FIONA LEIGH

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SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS

2021

The cover image shows a painted *hydria* from Attica, *c*. 450 BC.

ISBN 978-1-905670-90-1 (paperback)
ISBN 978-1-905670-93-2 (PDF)
ISBN 978-1-905670-94-9 (epub)

Designed and typeset at the Institute of Classical Studies, University of London.

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PREFACE

Stanley Victor Keeling was a Lecturer and Reader in the Department of Philosophy at University College London until his retirement in 1954, where, during World War II, he also served as Head of Department. Upon his death in 1979, his wife having predeceased him, Keeling left his estate to a friend and former student with the wish that, if possible, he would like to see an annual lecture on Greek philosophy given at UCL by a distinguished scholar of international note in the field. This friend (who wished to remain anonymous) generously supplemented Keeling's estate, making possible not only the annual S. V. Keeling Memorial Lecture in Ancient Philosophy (since 1981), but also a series of Keeling Colloquia in Ancient Philosophy (the first in 1994), and the Keeling Graduate Scholarship (since 2008). In 2013, the anonymous donor passed away and left a further legacy which resulted in an expansion of the Graduate Scholarships programme, and the creation of the Keeling Centre in Ancient Philosophy at UCL in 2016. In addition to the annual memorial lecture, colloquia, and scholarships programme, the Keeling Centre now also hosts a Keeling Scholar in Residence, an annual Graduate Conference in Ancient Philosophy, a Keeling Research Fellow (from time to time), occasional visiting academics, and supports numerous events in ancient philosophy in and around London.

Curiously, S. V. Keeling did not himself specialise in the field of ancient philosophy. Educated at Trinity College Cambridge (BA Philosophy), UCL (MA Philosophy), and Toulouse-Montpellier (Doctorat ès lettres), Keeling's philosophical work was for the most part centred on Descartes and McTaggart. His principal published works were an annotated edition of McTaggart's work, *Philosophical Studies* (London 1934), a monograph entitled *Descartes* (London 1934), and the 1948 annual British Academy Master Mind Lecture, which Keeling gave on Descartes (*Proceedings of the British Academy* 34 [1948], 57–80). Keeling nonetheless had an abiding affection for, and a firm belief in the central importance of, ancient Greek philosophy. It is said that in Paris, where he moved after retirement and remained until his death, he and his wife often read Greek philosophy to one another in the evening after dinner. This was the period in which he conceived his wish to foster and promote ancient philosophy at UCL, for the benefit of students and academics at UCL, but also in London more generally.

***

The papers in this volume comprise the S. V. Keeling Memorial Lectures in ancient philosophy from 2011–18, with an additional paper from Gisela Striker, based on her 2004 Keeling Lecture (previously unpublished), and with the exception of the 2012 Keeling Lecture given by Richard Sorabji (since absorbed into his *Moral Conscience Through the Ages* [Chicago 2014]). The reader will find that in their published form the papers have often preserved elements of their original delivery as lectures, and so frequently retain a certain oral style. (In addition, individual authors' choices in relation to minor stylistic matters, *e.g.* the marks used to indicate long vowels in transliterations of the Greek, and the style of abbreviation of ancient texts used, has also been retained.) It is hoped that the papers thus preserve the

character of a lecture, while setting out and arguing for their readings of ancient texts in a manner appropriate to written scholarly work.

F. V. L., London 2020



Stanley Victor Keeling

KEELING PUBLICATIONS

Previously published S. V. Keeling Memorial Lectures

Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers, ed. R. W. Sharples (UCL Press, London: 1993)
Perspectives on Greek Philosophy, ed. R. W. Sharples (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2003)

Previously published Keeling Colloquia

Aristotle and Moral Realism, ed. Robert Heinaman (UCL Press, London: 1995)
Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism? ed. R.W. Sharples (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2001)
Plato and Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Robert Heinaman (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2003)
Philosophy and the Sciences in Antiquity, ed. R.W. Sharples (Ashgate, Aldershot: 2005)
The Eudemian Ethics on the Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck, ed. Fiona Leigh (Brill, Leiden: 2012)
Particulars in Greek Philosophy, ed. R.W. Sharples (Brill, Leiden: 2009)
Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Fiona Leigh (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2020)
Moral Psychology in Ancient Thought, eds Fiona Leigh and Margaret Hampson (forthcoming: Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2021)

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Gábor Betegh is Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Christ's College Cambridge. He works on ancient philosophy, in particular on ancient metaphysics, cosmology, theology, and the connections between ancient philosophy and the history of religions.

Susanne Bobzien is Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University and Senior Research Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford. Previously, she was professor of philosophy at Yale University and taught at The Queens' and Balliol Colleges, Oxford. She is the author of several books, including *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*, and has published numerous articles both in contemporary philosophy and in ancient philosophy, with a focus on logic, paradoxes, and vagueness as well as determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility. She is a Fellow of the British Academy.

Lesley Brown is an emeritus member of the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Oxford, and a former Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford. She has published extensively on Plato's *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. More recently she has worked on issues arising from agreement in Plato. Beside the essay in this volume, recent articles include 'Aristotle (with the help of Plato) against the claim that morality is "only by convention" ' in *Ancient Philosophy Today: DIALOGOI* 1.1 (2019) and 'Rethinking Agreement in Plato' in *Virtue, Happiness, Knowledge: Themes from the work of Gail Fine and Terence Irwin* (Oxford 2019).

Gail Fine is Professor Emerita at Cornell University (where she taught from 1975 until her retirement in 2017), Visiting Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Oxford University, and Senior Research Fellow Emerita at Merton College, Oxford. She is the author of *On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms* (Oxford 1993), *Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays* (Oxford 2003), and *The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus* (Oxford 2014). She is also the editor of the *Oxford Handbook of Plato* (Oxford 2008; 2nd ed. 2019), and of *Plato 1 and 2*, in the *Oxford Readings in Philosophy* series (Oxford 1999). She has also written over fifty articles in ancient philosophy.

Dorothea Frede studied Philosophy and Classics at Hamburg and Göttingen, and was a lecturer, assistant, and associate professor in the United States from 1971 to 1991. She has held a professorship at Hamburg University (1991–2006), was co-editor of *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (1994-2004) and Adjunct Professor at the University of California Berkeley (2006–11). Her main publications include: *Aristoteles und die Seeschlacht* (Göttingen 1970; a shorter version in English OSAP 1985); *Plato, Philebus, translation with introduction and notes* (Indianapolis 1993); *Platon, Philebos, Übersetzung mit Kommentar* (Göttingen 1997); *Aristoteles. Nikomachische Ethik. Übersetzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert* (Berlin 2020). She has also written many articles and contributions to books on Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy, and on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. She is a member of the Akademie der Wissenschaften, Göttingen.

Margaret Hampson is an IRC Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin, and an associate of The Plato Centre, Trinity College Dublin. Prior to joining TCD, she worked as Research Associate at the Keeling Centre for Ancient Philosophy, UCL and completed her PhD in the Department of Philosophy, UCL, in 2017. Her research engages primarily with Aristotle's ethics and moral psychology, with a particular focus on moral habituation and the concept of the fine, though she has wider interests in Plato's account of moral development and Hellenistic theories of the emotions. She has published in journals such as *Phronesis* and *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,* and has work forthcoming in edited collections on Plato and the history of habit.

Fiona Leigh is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Director of the Keeling Centre for Ancient Philosophy at University College London. Her main interests lie in ancient philosophy, especially Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, and moral psychology, and she has published a number of papers in ancient philosophy, mainly on Plato, in journals and collected volumes such as *Phronesis* and *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.* She is also the editor of *Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford 2020), of volume 3.2 of *The Australasian Philosophical Review* (2020), of *The Eudemian Ethics on the Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck* (Brill 2012), and is an Associate Editor for the journal, *MIND*.

A. A. Long is Professor Emeritus of Classics and Irving Stone Professor of Literature Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, where he is also an affiliated member of the department of Philosophy. Before moving to the USA in 1983, he held teaching positions at the Universities of Otago, Nottingham, and Liverpool, and at University College London, which is his alma mater. Long is the author of *Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics* (2nd. ed., Berkeley & Los Angeles 1986) and co-author with D. N. Sedley of *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (Cambridge, 1987). His most recent books include *Greek Models of Mind and Self* (Cambridge, Mass. 2015); *Seneca. Letters on Ethics*, with Margaret Graver (Chicago 2015); and *Epictetus. How to be Free* (Princeton 2018).

Malcolm Schofield is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy and Fellow of St John's College at Cambridge, where he has taught since 1972. He is probably best known for his co-authoring (with G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven) of the second edition of *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1983). *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge 1991) and *Plato: Political Philosophy* (Oxford 2006) are among his major solo publications. More recently he edited the collection *Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC* (Cambridge 2013). He is the author of many papers on the philosophy of Cicero, whose political philosophy is the subject of his latest book, now in production at Oxford University Press.

David Sedley (born London 1947) took his BA at Trinity College Oxford in 1969, and his PhD at University College London in 1974. He was Dyson Junior Research Fellow in Greek Culture at Balliol College Oxford, 1973–75. He then taught until his retirement in 2014 at the University of Cambridge, where he became Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy from 2000, and remains a Fellow of Christ's College. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, an International Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and an Honorary Fellow of Trinity College Oxford. He has edited *The Classical Quarterly* (1986–92) and *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (1998–2007). His books

include *The Hellenistic Philosophers* (1987, with A. A. Long), *Plato's Cratylus* (2003), *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus* (2004), and *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity* (2007), based on his 2004 Sather Lectures at UC Berkeley.

Gisela Striker is Walter C. Klein Professor of Philosophy and of the Classics, Emerita at Harvard University. She has worked mainly on Hellenistic philosophy (a collection of her *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* was published by Cambridge University Press in 1996) and on Aristotle's logic. Her translation with commentary of Aristotle's *Analytics Book I* was published in 2009 in the Clarendon Aristotle Series.

INTRODUCTION

MARGARET HAMPSON AND FIONA LEIGH

Established in 1981, the annual S.V. Keeling Memorial Lecture in ancient philosophy at UCL is given by a scholar of international renown in the field on any topic of their choice in ancient philosophy, up to and including the works of Plotinus. There is no particular topic or text upon which any Keeling Lecturer is asked to speak, and so there is no given theme that unifies any set of Keeling Lectures, except those arising by chance. So it is with the current volume of papers arising from the Lectures, most of which were given between 2011 and 2018 (the exception is Gisela Striker's paper, based upon her 2004 Lecture). As it happens, however, the nine papers that make up the volume, on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Cicero, can be said to present a happily balanced mix of papers concerned either with a question or issue in 'practical philosophy' (moral or political philosophy), or with a topic within 'theoretical philosophy' (metaphysics, epistemology, or logic), or, in some cases, with an enquiry that straddles the two. The papers in each case contribute novel arguments and insights to an existing or hitherto unseen scholarly debate, or on a textually based problem or question.[1]

In chapter 1, 'Agreements, contracts, and promises in Plato', Lesley Brown asks how important a role do the notions of agreement, consent, and contract play in Plato's philosophy. The concept of agreement (*homologia*; to agree, *homologein*), as Brown points out, can take a variety of forms, each of potential philosophical significance: (i) agreement can take the form of a logical relation between propositions or beliefs, and between one's beliefs or avowals, where 'to agree' is to be consistent with, or consonant with, or to correspond to; (ii) it can take a declarative form, where one agrees that… or declares that…, marking one's assent to a proposition, or concord with another; and (iii) it can take a more performative or promissory form, where one agrees to do or to undertake something. Recently, Brown has investigated the topic of agreement in its declarative form and its significance within the Platonic corpus.[2] Since to say that 'A agrees that P' can often convey the thought that A agrees with the speaker or a third party—that is, that the speaker or third party also holds that view—many have assumed a particular significance attaches to Socrates' frequently asking his interlocutors 'do you agree that P?'. For, this question suggests that P is a view also endorsed by Socrates—and perhaps Plato too. But Brown argues that agreement in its declarative form need not be taken to indicate agreement with another and can instead simply mark a subject's assent to a proposition; thus, nothing can be inferred from the use of *homologein* about the beliefs of anyone other than the subject who claims to agree.

In her paper for this volume, Brown turns her attention to the performative or promissory sense of agreement—agreeing to do such-and-such—and the related notions of promising, contracts, and consent. This sense of agreement, like the declarative sense, appears

[1] As they are based on lectures delivered to an audience, many of the papers have retained their oral style of delivery.

[2] Brown 2018.

throughout the Platonic corpus, and in a variety of contexts. It is discussed in the everyday ethical context of keeping one's promises (*Crito*, *Republic* IV), in an ethical-cum-political context, as a potential foundation for justice (*Republic* II, *cf. Protagoras*), and even in the context of philosophy of language, where agreement or convention is mooted as a candidate theory for the correctness of names (*Cratylus*). Each of these discussions has been a topic of much scholarly interest in its own right, and in examining Plato's treatment of agreement in each of these areas, Brown draws on and contributes to recent work by Nicholas Denyer, Rachana Kamtekar, and others.[3]

In tracing Plato's treatment of agreement through these various contexts and discussions, however, Brown reveals a common reluctance on the part of Plato's characters to accord a major importance to agreement in each of these areas. Whilst it is agreed that everyday morality requires that one abides by one's agreements or promises—with the important proviso that such agreements are just—great antipathy is shown towards any attempt to ground justice or morality in agreement. Brown thus shows how, in this respect, Plato stands in stark contrast to many modern moral and political philosophers (notably Rawls, Gauthier, and Scanlon)[4] who give a foundational role to agreement in justice and moral philosophy. Yet Brown also shows that the antipathy shown to agreement as a foundation for justice also explains Socrates' reluctance to accord a major role to convention in the correctness of names; an area in which convention and agreement might otherwise be thought to play a benign and perhaps even necessary role. Moreover, Brown offers a diagnosis of this common antipathy towards agreement as a basis for justice and the correctness of names, that connects it with certain deeper and widespread Platonic concerns. For agreements, as Brown notes, can be made by and sustained by ordinary people, not merely by experts, and they can change—and this precludes them occupying a foundational or explanatory role.

Gail Fine's '*Epistêmê* and *doxa*, knowledge and belief, in the *Phaedo*', chapter 2 of this volume, examines the concepts of *epistêmê* and *doxa* (generally translated as 'knowledge' and 'belief' respectively) in the work set on the last day of Socrates' life. It is an understatement to say that while these concepts are central to any understanding of Plato's epistemology and metaphysics, they have been the subject of not inconsiderable controversy. One source of debate concerns the proper objects of these powers or states. Until the publication of two seminal articles by Fine, the traditional view took it that *epistêmê* was of or 'set over' Forms, while *doxa* was of or 'set over' the participants in Forms, items in the sensible world ('sensibles'). Fine challenged this so-called 'Two Worlds' view (TW) as a reading of the *Republic*, arguing instead that belief is set over true and false propositions, and knowledge over true propositions.[5] A further, but connected, debate concerns the nature of the cognitive states or powers, *epistêmê* and *doxa*, themselves in the dialogues: can they be straightforwardly mapped on to our contemporary conceptions of knowledge and belief, or are they distinct notions, peculiar to ancient thought, or to Plato? The latter is thought to be suggested by TW: if *epistêmê* and *doxa* range over separate classes of objects, it seems they cannot be assimilable to contemporary notions of knowledge and belief, whereas if knowledge is justified true belief, knowledge and belief can range over the same objects.

To date, attention has largely focused on texts such as the *Republic* and the *Meno*; in her paper, Fine advances the debate concerning our understanding of *epistêmê* and *doxa*

[3] See Denyer 2008; Kamtekar 2004: 131–70.

[4] Rawls 1971; Gauthier 1986; Scanlon 2000.

[5] Fine 1978: 121–39; Fine 1990: 85–115. *Cf.* 2004: 41–81.

by turning our attention to the *Phaedo*. This chapter forms a pair with a recently published article in the *British Journal of the History of Philosophy*, where Fine argues that in the *Phaedo* Plato did not endorse TW.[6] With this result in mind, Fine argues in her paper for this volume that Plato's treatment of *epistêmê* and *doxa* in the *Phaedo* does not reveal these to be radically different concepts to 'knowledge' and 'belief' and that his conceptions of these states are closer to modern views than has sometimes been thought. In doing so, she engages with recent work by Jessica Moss and others who have argued that the notion of 'belief' cannot be assimilated to that of *doxa* in Plato, because the latter is in some texts presented as broader than the notion of belief (*Republic* X), and in others rarer than belief (*Theaetetus*), and is, moreover, closely tied to the notion of an appearance (*phantasia*).[7] Fine's paper also takes issue with claims in the literature that *epistêmê* in Plato ought not be understood as compatible either with contemporary notions of knowledge as something like understanding (most recently argued by Whitney Schwab), or with a more narrow ancient notion of knowledge as restricted to Forms rather than sensibles (as *e.g.* Lloyd Gerson has contended).[8] Fine's strategy is first to isolate the concepts of belief and knowledge before asking whether different conceptions or instantiations of these concepts are found in a close reading of the passages relevant to *epistêmê* and *doxa* in Plato's *Phaedo*.

In chapter 3, 'Socrates' "Second Voyage" (Plato, *Phaedo* 99d–102a)', David Sedley argues, contrary to the majority of scholars, that neither the method of hypothesis Socrates describes in his philosophical autobiography in the *Phaedo*, nor the final argument for the soul's immortality in that dialogue—of which the second voyage is an integral part—depend on the existence of Forms. Sedley begins by drawing attention to a distinction that has gone largely unnoticed in translations and the critical literature, namely the distinction at 101d1–3 between 'the hypothesis itself' and 'the safe part of the hypothesis'. Most translations have rendered the latter 'the safety of the hypothesis', as if the hypothesis were itself deemed safe, but, as Sedley argues, this is both insensitive to the Greek construction and entails a conceptual oddity. The distinction Socrates draws in the context of his investigation of causes, argues Sedley, is between (i) the hypothetical postulation of transcendent entities, Forms, as causes of the possession of attributes or properties by the separate individual things that partake of them, and (ii) a causal claim at the heart of this hypothesis, namely that the F (or F-ness) makes F things F, stripped of metaphysical assumptions about the nature of F (for instance, transcendence and separation). Whilst the claim that 'the F itself makes F things F' is assigned only a hypothetical status so long as it has not been proven that there is an F itself, the claim that 'The F makes F things F' is almost trivially true; it is the 'safe part' of the hypothesis.

The significance of this structural feature of this methodological passage is revealed when we turn to the sequence of safe causal answers that then follow. One section here is typically assumed to refer explicitly to transcendent Forms, namely 101b9–c7, where Socrates explains the cause of 'coming to be two' in terms of 'having a share in twoness'. But the structure of the passage that Sedley outlines precludes such a reading, which, Sedley shows, is not mandated, as is frequently supposed, by the use of key terms there (*metaschesis*, 'getting a share in', and *ousia*, 'being'). Thus, argues Sedley, when Socrates claims that there is no other way of each thing coming to be (*e.g.* 'two') except by sharing in the being of what it shares in ('twoness'),

[6] Fine 2016: 557–72.

[7] Moss 2014: 213–38; Lorenz 2006. *Cf.* Moss and Schwab 2019 (which paper however coincided with Fine's chapter and so is not treated at length).

[8] Schwab 2015, Gerson 2003; *cf.* Burnyeat 1980: 163–91.

he is arguing that things come to be such as they are ('two') because they come to possess that specific property ('being two'). The many scholars who have criticized the adequacy of citing F (or F-ness) as the cause of something being F have missed the great strength of Socrates' causal theory and the strategy it gives rise to. By starting out with a 'safe' but explanatorily thin cause (such as F-ness), one can cautiously proceed to more informative and robust causal explanations that retain the self-guaranteeing truth of the 'safe' core, such as the claim that fire, as essentially hot, brings heat to other things and so makes them hot.

Of course, the reliability of the 'safe part' of the hypothesis is no warrant for acceptance of the hypothesis itself, and so, Sedley argues, Socrates provides recommendations of the kind of use and stages of testing appropriate to hypotheses when they are systematically applied to the phenomena to be explained. He warns against 'clinging' to a hypothesis before it has been adequately tested and goes on to provide a demonstration of testing a successful hypothesis, in his argument that it is by 'tallness', rather than 'by a head', that one person is taller than another (100e–101b). The successful testing of a hypothesis, then, does not establish the existence of what it hypothesizes—testing does not vindicate the hypothesis in that sense. This, Sedley suggests, in the case of Forms awaits further proof and analysis in the *Republic*. So, once tested, the hypothesis and its 'safe', explanatorily reliable, and fruitful core, is suitable for deployment in the final argument for the immortality of the soul, without presupposing or relying upon the existence of Forms.

In chapter 4, 'Politics and divinity in Plato's *Republic*: the Form of the Good', Anthony Long's focus is an examination of the precise relation between divinity and politics in that work. To the modern, Western reader, the connection between these topics might not appear immediately obvious; indeed, the suggestion that these are intimately connected might even be worrisome to the reader more familiar with the *separation* of church and state. But, as Long makes clear, Plato in the *Republic* is not advocating a theocracy, if by that we mean a political system administered by a priestly college, nor indeed is the notion of divinity that informs Plato's politics one that is adequately captured by the notion of god or gods. Rather, Long argues, Plato invokes the notion of divinity as such, assigning to this the role of absolute ruler, and in virtue of which we might establish policies and rulers that are as excellent as possible.

Throughout the corpus, Plato has Socrates speak of 'the god' (singular), 'gods', or 'divine things', and this alternation between the singular and plural is one reason Long favours the term 'divinity' over 'god' or 'gods'. But as he also notes, Plato has Socrates use the term *theios* in a way that signifies the divine quite generally, leaving open its referents: Plato calls the Forms divine, and in this way signals that the term *theios* needn't signify any kind of being with the mind and intentions of a person. As Socrates' description of the initial stages of the young guardians' education early in the text reveals, divinity has two characteristic marks (to which the stories told to the young guardians must adhere): (i) it is absolutely good (that is, always beneficent and never harmful), and (ii) it is immutable, simple, and never deceptive. Long's novel interpretation thus takes the Form of the Good to be divinity *par excellence*. The Sun analogy illustrates the goodness of the Form of the Good, for it not only provides benefit to humans insofar as it provides the analogue of the sun's illumination, but also rules over the intelligible realm and bestows existence on the Forms that are its constituents. It is also, of course, unchanging and true. Moreover, Socrates calls the sun 'god' in the course of the analogy, and it would be perverse, surmises Long, for Socrates to attribute divinity to the sun and resist attributing it to the Form of the Good, which is after all the superior item under illustration. The Form of the Good is not a particular god, but rather the essence of divinity.

This divine principle provides a basis for the intelligible structure of reality, and the goal of political philosophy is represented by Plato as achieving access to this divine order, assimilating it intellectually and implementing its practical application for the social good—achievable through the mathematical and philosophical training outlined in the middle books of the *Republic.* Interestingly, then, far from advocating a traditional theocracy, Long argues that Plato essentially secularizes theocracy, making it tantamount to the rule of philosophical reason. This study also points to what may have been the true concern underpinning the indictment and execution of Socrates by the Athenians on the grounds of impiety: the extraordinary idea that the world's supreme divine power is absolute goodness, and this is to be accessed neither in the temple nor through ritual sacrifice, but through our own rational faculty and capacity to do philosophy.

Gábor Betegh, in his 'The ingredients of the soul in Plato's *Timaeus*', chapter 5 of this volume, enquires into the deeply mysterious account of the Demiurge's creation of the world soul by mixing all together two kinds of portions of each of 'being', 'sameness', and 'difference' in Plato's *Timeaus*. The passage at 35a–b and those that immediately follow it have long raised a host of questions for the reader: should the talk of 'mixing', and the suggestion that the soul is composed of ingredients, be taken literally, or should they rather be read metaphorically, as Timaeus' own description of his long account as a *mythos* allows? What to make of the sudden introduction of the Forms of Being, Sameness, and Difference into the picture, and the apparent distinction between the Forms and the corresponding properties, as attributes, *i.e.* those of being, sameness, and difference? In what sense are these Forms either central to the constitution of soul, or explanatory of its nature (or both)? To these Betegh adds another: what explains Timaeus' silence on his usual method here? That is, why does he not explicitly adopt the explanatory procedure, roughly, of reverse engineering, whereby practical reasoning is attributed to the Demiurge, given the materials and limitations he works with, and aims at the production of the phenomena?

As with other scholars before him, Betegh notes the probable relation to Plato's discussion of the so-called 'greatest kinds' in the *Sophist* (254–59), which prominently features the Forms or kinds, Being, Sameness, and Difference. The interpretation offered, however, goes far beyond the usual observation of apparent relevance and suggested connections. Beginning with the suggestion that Plato intended the reader to engage in the method of reverse engineering herself, Betegh argues that there is textual evidence that the *explanandum* is the cognitive function of the soul, specifically, its ability to formulate *logoi*, meaningful statements, by which rational beings are able to think about and at times track the way the world is—incorporating both Forms and sensible objects—so as to come to know that world. Again, with other scholars, Betegh takes Plato to be working with a 'like from like' principle in the account of the production of soul, but departs from the common metaphysical reading of the mixture as a mixture of the categories of 'being' and 'becoming', which produces soul as an ontological intermediary. Instead, by drawing on various passages from the *Sophist*, he argues for a cognitive reading of the *Timaeus* whereby the soul's constitution from Being, Sameness, and Difference, and the corresponding attributive properties, furnish it with the capacity to be receptive to the world, similarly structured by relations of being, sameness, and difference. The soul's constituents furnish it with the general structure of judgements—the silent *logoi* occurring inside the soul as thought—while the world provides the appropriately structured material for the content of those judgements.

In her 'Aristotle on the importance of rules, laws, and institutions in ethics', chapter 6, Dorothea Frede tackles a longstanding source of contention between interpreters of

Aristotle concerning the role of general rules within his ethics. On the so-called 'particularist' interpretation of Aristotle's ethics, he is taken to deny a role for general rules as prescriptive guides to action, and to emphasize instead the need for particular judgements on a case-by-case basis. The particularist interpretation finds its most prominent advocate in John McDowell, who in a series of influential articles[9] not only denies that morality could be captured in anything like a set of general rules, but emphasizes in particular the role of perception in filling the gap between general advice and decisions about particular actions. In favour of such a particularist interpretation would seem to speak (i) Aristotle's repeated caveats concerning precision in ethics, and his emphasis on the requirement for individual agents to determine in any case what is appropriate; (ii) his emphasis on the role of experience over general knowledge in determining what to do in any situation; and (iii) his picture of moral education, emphasizing as it does the need for habituation and training over instruction. But the particularist interpretation has its detractors too, in the form of 'universalists' or 'generalists' who affirm the role of general rules in Aristotle's ethics. Prominent amongst these is Terence Irwin (2001), who affirms the role of generalizations in ethics, with the acknowledgment that ethical generalizations are 'usual', rather than necessary, and often inexact. In this way, Irwin argues, ethical rules are not dissimilar to rules as they feature in the natural sciences, where in contrast to fields such as mathematics, they hold only 'for the most part', and not of necessity.

In her paper for this volume, Frede examines afresh the role of general rules within Aristotle's ethics, and, like Irwin, concludes that they do play an important role for Aristotle. Like Irwin, too, Frede shows that the putative evidence in favour of rule-scepticism does not support that conclusion, although Frede's treatment of this evidence extends beyond the remarks on imprecision and the role of perception in ethics that are the main focus of Irwin's earlier discussion. Rather than suggesting, as Irwin does, that Aristotle's remarks about the imprecision of ethics are intended to signal the 'usual' rather than 'necessary' status of ethical rules, Frede argues that such remarks are designed to make the point that not all cases are alike, and that many general rules call for qualification. And this by no means amounts to a denial that there are general rules about what is to be pursued or avoided, what is good or bad, and so on. The well brought-up person, Frede argues, will have knowledge of general rules, and Aristotle's discussion of the voluntary makes clear that ignorance of universal principles or laws counts as no excuse where moral action is concerned. That many general rules will require qualifications and must be adapted to the particulars of a situation explains also Aristotle's emphasis throughout the ethics on the need for experience. Whilst routine cases allow for the fairly unreflective application of rules of thumb, more difficult cases require much calibration of options, and depend on an agent's experience of such varied possibilities. Finally, whilst Aristotle's account of moral education places habituation and training at its centre, such training is not rote, and will crucially involve explanations and justifications for why certain actions are wrong, why others are fine, and so on.

Frede's paper, however, not only arbitrates in the debate between particularists and universalists, but—having secured a role for general rules and laws in Aristotle's ethics—introduces a much less explored question of the role of political institutions within Aristotle's ethics. Political institutions, one might suppose, fall within the scope of Aristotle's *Politics*, not his *Ethics.* Yet whilst these receive little explicit mention in the *Ethics*, Frede argues that

[9] McDowell 1979: 331–50; 1980: 359–76; 1996: 19–35; 1998: 23–49. See also Wiggins 1980: 221–40. For a more moderate particularist interpretation, see Price 2005: 191–212.

the importance of institutions underpins Aristotle's distinctions between, and concern with, the virtues of liberality, magnificence, *megalopsychia* (magnanimity), and *philotima* (love of honour). Thus, where it is often assumed that Aristotle's ethics will shed light on certain issues in his politics, Frede shows how certain typically political concerns might shed light on concepts within his ethics.

In chapter 7, Gisela Striker, in her 'Mental health and moral health: moral progress in Seneca's *Letters*', addresses the question of the nature and extent of Stoic therapy. Like other Hellenistic schools, the Stoics regarded philosophy not simply as an intellectual exercise, but as aimed at the art of living, and philosophical teaching not simply as a means of instruction, but as a kind of therapy for the soul. That philosophy should be understood specifically as a form of 'therapy' is importantly connected with a view of our psychic condition as something that can be understood in terms analogous to that of physical health. And just as the aim of those who care for the body is to bring us into a good bodily condition, so too the aim of the Stoic therapist is to bring us into a good psychic condition. Since the publication of Martha Nussbaum's highly influential *The Therapy of Desire,* the last quarter of a century has seen an increased interest in the notion of Stoic therapy and the questions that arise in connection with this conception of philosophy.

On the question of the nature and extent of Stoic therapy, and its connection to their conception of psychic health, Striker urges us to see the ways in which Stoic psychic therapy extends far beyond the treatment of the passions that is the focus of much contemporary scholarship. The aim of Stoic therapy is to bring the subject towards virtue, part of which involves the eradication of false beliefs about what is good and bad. Passions, according to the Stoics, are constituted by value judgements—fear is a belief about some impending evil, joy a belief about some good—but since, for the Stoics, only virtue is truly good, the judgements which constitute the passions are necessarily false and must be eradicated.[10] Many commentators, then, have focused on the Stoic conception of the passions and the means by which they are to be eradicated.[11] But, as Striker notes, even when the worst excesses of the passions have been left behind, there remains a long way to go to attain virtue. Through an examination of Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius*, Striker outlines a stage of psychic therapy that is the psychic analogue of Plato's gymnastic training, which promotes strength and beauty in the body once its diseases have been eradicated. Striker thus explores what psychic strength and beauty amount to and how these are established once the 'diseases' of the soul (*i.e.* passions) have been eradicated. Striker's examination of Seneca also reveals a stage in moral development, not recognized by all Stoics, wherein the subject has achieved the state of a Stoic 'sage' but does not yet realize it, and so fails still to achieve the supervenient benefits of wisdom that are crucial to happiness.

Through her examination, however, Striker also approaches the less-explored question of the relation between Stoic therapy and the modern practice of psychotherapy: what similarities are there between these practices, and in what way do they diverge? Striker reveals a number of interesting points of contact between the two practices, though in the respect that the two share a commitment to treating psychic disorder, Striker notes that Stoic therapy is in some ways narrower than modern psychotherapy: it recognizes only the passions as the source of psychic disorders, and not the host of factors that are recognized by modern

[10] For an introduction to the Stoic theory of value, see Sharples 1996; Long 1974 [reprinted 1986]; Schofield 2003: 233–56.

[11] In addition to Nussbaum 1993, see Brennan 2003: 257–94; Brennan 2005; Graver 2007.

psychotherapists. In other ways, however, Stoic therapy is much broader in its scope than any version of modern psychotherapy, for it aims at more than restoration of 'normal' mental and social functioning, promising real moral improvement. Striker argues, however, that the kind of guidance offered by the Stoics might nonetheless be seen as an ally or complement to modern psychotherapy, and insofar as it forms part of a more comprehensive perspective on what is needed for a happy human life, there may well be a continued relevance to the Stoic conception of care of the soul.

In his 'Debate or guidance: Cicero on philosophy', chapter 8 of this volume, Malcolm Schofield takes up an issue that has continued to exercise philosophers: that of reconciling the debate-driven nature of theoretical philosophy with its practical aims. The source of the tension, as Schofield sees it, lies in the fact that philosophy, insofar as it aims at truth, requires vigorous debate and invites challenges to any proposed conclusions; yet insofar as it seeks also to inform our practical lives, offering guidance in practical matters, what it offers must be definite, and convey the appearance, at least, of definitiveness. The problem is most acute in the fields of moral and political philosophy, where the topics of academic investigation are those that impinge most directly on our practical lives, and the aims of the philosopher are, at once, to uncover truths in these matters and to offer guidance as to how we should live. In contemporary philosophy, the tension between these two aspects of moral and political philosophy is most apparent in the treatment of utilitarianism or other forms of maximizing consequentialism in philosophical ethics and public policy respectively: within philosophical ethics, such theories have been subject to much scrutiny, and have emerged from this in an unfavourable light, whilst in the sphere of public policy, utilitarian approaches are accepted, without question, as the only plausible candidates in decision making.[12] This tension—between philosophy understood as debate, and as guide to living—is by no means new, however, and perhaps nowhere is it more apparent than in the writings of Cicero. For Cicero's philosophical outlook was closely aligned with that of the academic sceptics, emphasizing the lack of certainty and the need always to consider opposing arguments, yet at the same time Cicero was clear that philosophy is a guide for life (*Tusculan Disputations* 5.5) and such guidance is what he claimed to offer his readers. In fact, as Schofield shows, this tension is not merely apparent to Cicero's readers, but was a subject of focus for Cicero himself, who not only articulates in various places the difficulty of reconciling these aspects of philosophical pursuit but also offers strategies (both explicit and implicit) for dealing with such difficulties in various contexts. In his contribution to this volume, Schofield thus traces Cicero's treatment of these issues across four texts—*De Legibus*, *De Officiis*, *De Republica,* and the *Tusculan Disputations*—with a view to showing how debate and guidance can be reconciled, at least in the view of one ancient philosopher.

Despite Cicero's alignment with the outlook and methodology of the Academic sceptic school, in which vigorous debate was encouraged and the possibility of certainty disclaimed, as Schofield points out we see in a number of texts a certain eschewal of debate. In *De Legibus*, the character Cicero seemingly abandons the freedom of the Academic sceptic to consider any philosophical question as he judges best, adopting a scholastic approach favoured by certain authority figures, and moreover advocating for the startling claim that debate about the matters in question is to be silenced. His reason for doing so, Schofield argues, has to do with his specific and practical aim of bringing stability to cities and maintaining the condition of citizens, a task which requires the identification of principles that can be

[12] For discussion, see Wolff 2006: 1–22.

accepted by a broad swathe of thinkers, and the observance of a number of constraints. As it seems, where a philosophical foundation for civic life is sought, principles which provide such a foundation need not be true but must be fit for purpose; they must be accepted on the authority of philosophers who have shown it to be carefully considered; and dissent regarding such principles is to be silenced. But it is not only when developing the basis for a practical legislative project that Cicero thinks it best to eschew debate, for in *De Officiis* we see the exclusion of debate where what is on offer is individual moral guidance. Where debate does play a role it is as a precursor to such guidance, as something to be recollected by the giver of advice, when considering what moral positions are the most persuasive. But debate must not be included alongside such guidance. In the various dialogues that make up the *Tusculan Disputations*, however, Schofield suggests we see an attempt by Cicero to reconcile guidance with debate. Here, in various places, Cicero's writings display an essentially Socratic structure, from which philosophical guidance, or therapy, then flows. The key difference between these dialogues and the other texts discussed, argues Schofield, lies not in the subject matter as such, but rather in the respective audiences and their assumed moral and intellectual conditions. Where an audience is assumed to be in a state of good moral health, argumentation is not needed in the delivery of advice. But when the moral condition of an audience is poor, such discussants must be argued out of their mistaken views. To the extent that Cicero recognized the importance of consensus if philosophy is to speak with authority, Schofield shows that he is thus in alignment with the views of contemporary political philosophers, such as Jonathan Wolff, who emphasizes the need to draw more people into a consensus view, so that policy can be more widely endorsed.[13]

Last, but certainly not least, in the final chapter of the volume, chapter 9, Susanne Bobzien makes the case for the startling view that the renowned German logician, Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) plagiarized the Stoics' logical work, at least in the single, unified form it was available to him at the time via the first volume of Carl Prantl's *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (*History of Western Logic*, never translated into English), published in 1855. Bobzien starts by establishing the very high likelihood that Frege read Prantl's multivolume *Geschichte der Logik im Abendland*, and points out that his knowledge of Greek and Latin would have enabled him easily to read the copious presentation of Stoic fragments in the footnotes. She also notes that Frege's work shows an acquaintance with Aristotle's logic. Most of Bobzien's paper, however, is focused on establishing the cumulative textual support for her principal contention of plagiarism.

The textual evidence is organized around the positions of the Stoics (and their appearance in Prantl) on a number of central topics in logic, each of which is then paired with Frege's corresponding position on the same topic as found in his many published and posthumously published later works and letters. The substantial agreement that Bobzien claims can be found between the two logical systems is underpinned, in her view, by a single central conception held in common by both the Stoics and Frege, namely that of 'incorporeal contents' of both thought and communication, which are given expression in language. These contents were called *lekta* by the Stoics, while in general Frege made use of the term 'sense' (*Sinn*). Accordingly, each of the topics Bobzien surveys concerns a philosophical issue pertaining to the question of the relation between these contents and their expression in language: incomplete and complete contents, assertoric contents (or propositions), commands, questions, indexicals, first-order logic and universalization, and a range of topics falling under

[13] Wolff 2011: 4–5.

the general area of propositional logic, namely, negation, contradictories, double negation, compound propositions (with binary connectives), conjunction, disjunction, conditionals, and sentences with causal content.

Bobzien's cumulative case is constructed by carefully considering a large number of cases in the original Greek, Latin, or German (though the reader needs none of these). Her study reveals a striking correlation between Frege and Stoic logic as it is found in Prantl: there is a very large number of parallel cases between the two, elements of Stoic logic not in Prantl are missing in Frege's logical work, and some minor differences between Stoic logic and Frege's logic can be traced to a misrepresentation or misconstrual of the Stoic position in Prantl. Moreover, if Frege did have knowledge of Stoic logic, Bobzien argues, it is much more likely that he would have obtained it from the single work of the day that collected the logical fragments, rather than by separately consulting the scores of Greek and Latin works in which they were interspersed.

One example of similarity between the two is on the topic of assertoric contents (or propositions). As Bobzien notes, an important achievement in Frege is the distinction between expressing and asserting the content of a thought. In many respects, however, the details of Frege's account parallel the Stoic account of assertibles (*axiômata*). For instance (although there are further parallels on this topic), both the Stoics and Frege claim that the relevant content (a thought for Frege, an assertible for the Stoics) is uttered when stated, that the assertoric content (thought or assertible) is said or expressed thereby, and that the assertoric content is also asserted thereby. One difference concerns their respective views about expression of emotion. Bobzien sets out the Stoic emotivist position, whereby the content said with sentences that contain such expressions go beyond assertibles by addition of the emotional element, and become something neither true nor false. But Prantl misconstrues a sentence in Ammonius and takes the Stoics to understand such expressions as 'containing the True and the False'. Similarly, Frege considers emotive expressions as a compound of a thought, which has a truth value, and an emotion-eliciting element.

Bobzien concludes that the weight of evidence, consisting in over a hundred parallels, makes it extremely unlikely that Frege did not consult and draw on Stoic logic—in particular, on the logic of Prantl's Stoics—in articulating his own logical works. The question whether he did so consciously or whether he regarded it unnecessary to acknowledge the role of Stoic thought in the formation of his own considered views, is deliberately left open.

Important new arguments and textual observations, then, are brought to bear by the various distinguished authors in this volume on a wide range of topics within ancient thought, ranging over the spheres of practical and theoretical inquiry. The contributions to theoretical philosophy take in Stoic logic (Bobzein), Platonic epistemology (Fine), and Platonic metaphysics (Sedley) and mind (Betegh), while those on topics and debates in 'practical' philosophy are on particularism in Aristotle's ethics (Frede), the role of agreement in establishing what is just in Plato (Brown), and the role of Stoic therapy in the good life (Striker). Finally some chapters draw on both spheres of philosophical discourse – on divinity, metaphysics, and rule in Plato (Long), and on the tension between unfettered debate in theoretical inquiry and the determineness required from practical philosophy as guide in Cicero (Schofield).

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