# Analyzing cause in social movements : synthesizing, structuring and focusing social movement theory using Aristotle's four causes with a final cause heuristic

Shane Drennan

A thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

2022

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Abstract

Social Movement Theory is a compilation of theories and methods from myriad fields of study. Because social movement theory borrows from so many disciplines, making sense of social movements is driven more by epistemological bias than by a deep understanding of what social movements do for society. I use Aristotle's "four causes" to give methodological structure to social movement theory, and I use "final cause" as a heuristic to focus and deepen social movement causal analysis.

This thesis is dedicated to resolving social movement theory methodologically, but I accomplish several antecedent tasks. First, I engage Aristotelian causation and his 'final cause' so structure and focus social movement theory, demarcating different types of teleological cause. Second, I posit three Natural Teleological drivers of community, justice and power that are integral in making social movements emerge when societies find an imbalance in these three social forces. Lastly, I propose a social movement causation model synthesizes social movement and related research across five causation levels: Natural phenomena, institutional constraining and enabling structures, lifeworld causation and meaning interpretations and understandings, agent-initiated and often goal directed actions, and resultant observable events. Following my exploration of the Egyptian and Syrian 'Arab Spring' movements, I find that nonviolent social movements emerge for the sake of sociopolitical reform and evolution and violent social movements are for the sake of destroying something that is offensive and seems unalterable to society so that the people can rebuild that aspect of society anew.

General Acknowledgements

place and taught me to take care of the people so the people can take care of the mission – you're sorely missed, Mike. Thank you for helping me see who I want to be and making me who I've become.

Lastly, I would not be here without family. I want to thank my Mom, my brother, and my newer parents (because 'in-laws' doesn't do our relationship justice) for being supportive and generous in every way imaginable over the years, long before I even considered university. Dad, you, more than anyone, inspire me to always keep putting one foot in front of the other, just because of who you are… and sometimes because I'm afraid you're behind me. A huge thank you to our closest family friend, "Miss Meg," who kept my wife sane and my kids smiling through this several-year journey, just by being the tremendous person she is. And most importantly, I want to thank my wonderful little family for being there for me in every way imaginable. This hasn't been easy and I'm so very sorry I can't give you back those several years of weekends with you three. I missed too much of you and I won't anymore. Gabriel, Isolda, and my amazing wife Si, you held my hand every step of the way and I don't know if I could have made it without you. You three are my final cause.

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Introduction – Causation in Social Movements

<u>Structuring and Focusing Social Movement Theory Using Aristotelian Causation and Teleology</u>

> "I consider extremely fruitful this idea that social life should be explained, not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness, and I think also that these causes are to be sought mainly in the manner to which the associated individuals are grouped." Emilie Durkheim Revue Philosophique, December 1879 (quoted in Levison 1974, 50).

How can social movement theory (SMT) be used to answer broader and deeper questions about social movements? SMT in aggregate seems to explain functionally *how* social movements emerge. But, beyond the collective action theory explanation that groups form to secure what individuals cannot (Olson 2002, Smelser 1965), SMT actually leaves us with few answers as to *why* movements emerge, and *why* they form and act the way they do. For example, social movement scholars would tend to answer the question, "Why in similar environments are some social movements nonviolent and others violent?' with analyses about groups' identities,[1] messages or "frames,"[2] resources,[3] perceived opportunities to act and effect change,[4] or individual and collective emotions.[5] But these and most SMT approaches are best suited to answer 'how?' questions like '*how* do movements attract members' and '*how* do they develop certain repertoires;' not '*why?*' or '*what for?*'. The goal of this thesis is to synthesize SMT into a methodological structure that can better grapple with 'how?' *and* 'why?' questions, which are complementary but causally distinct. Rethinking our analytical epistemology to consider what social movements and their particular actions are ultimately *for the sake of* in a society, we understand causation in social movements more deeply and search for answers more broadly than current SMT practice.

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1 For examples of theoretical discussions of identity analysis in SMT see (Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994, Jasper and Polletta 2001, McAdam and Snow 2000, Stryker, Owens, and White 2000).

2 For discussions and critiques of the frame analysis approach see (Benford 1997, Benford and Snow 1992, Benford et al. 1986, Gamson and Ryan 2009).

3 For the theoretical genesis of Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) in SMT see (McCarthy and Zald 1977a). For further reading on RMT see (Jenkins 1983, Klandermans 1984, Diani 2000, Ekland-Olson, Snow, and Zurcher Jr 1980, Passy and Giugni 2001, McAdam 1990)

4 For discussions on the political opportunity approach in SMT see (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010, Kurzman 1996, Merton 1995, Meyer and Minkoff 2004, Meyer 2004, Alimi 2003, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

5 For overviews on the applications of emotions analysis and social movements use of emotions see (Flam and King 2007, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009, Jasper 1998, 2011).

On 17 December, Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest injustices he endured at the hand of the Tunisian government and its representatives. This single act of public protest in the form of self-destruction set the region on fire with protests, social movements, and war. Tunisians took Bouazizi's act as a launchpoint for (mostly) nonviolently demanding justice and regime change throughout the next month until 14 January when Tunisian president Zine El Abidin Ben Ali stepped down. On 17 January in Cairo, in what was surely a copycat act intended to ignite the same fervent demands for justice in Egypt, Abdou Abdel-Monaam Hamadah self-immolated near the Egyptian parliament building. Few took notice. Why?

On 25 January, rather than an act of self-destruction, Egyptians seized upon the National Police Day holiday to nonviolently protest against president Hosni Mubarak, his regime and their practices, of which the police were a key enforcement arm. Over the next two weeks, the Egyptian security services eventually followed the Tunisian example and supported the Egyptian people's demands for Mubarak's resignation. On 11 February, after several lesser political gestures trying to assuage Egypt's widespread protests, Mubarak too stepped down.

Throughout the next few months, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and several other states in the region experienced varying degrees of protest, some lasting and others dwindling or stamped out by state security services. Most of these social movements aiming to change their countries' political representatives and structures were nonviolent, but some were violent; however, every state used its inherently and often actually violent security services to repress opposition. Watching these events unfold, we are left with some lingering questions. Why did these movements happen when they did and not before - even a week before in Egypt's case? Why did they happen where they did and not elsewhere? Why were some nonviolent and others violent? In this thesis, I will only take up the latter question, but I propose a heuristic and an analytical method for answering the former and other broad 'why?' questions.

In addition to difficulties with 'why?' questions, SMT is incoherent concerning 'how?' questions, owing to its myriad approaches, each offering a partial explanation. Using the same example of

nonviolence and violence, social movement studies explore aspects of nonviolent[6] and violent[7] movements and what may help these repertoires to emerge, but not in a comparative manner[8] and not with consideration to what each does beyond 'succeed.' At best, social movement research finds that nonviolence works better than violence,[9] but that does not explain whether one repertoire is better in some contexts or if one better for achieving a particular type of change. In addition, none of the individual SMT approaches grapple with the question of what drives movements to engage in violence or nonviolence beyond movement elites' strategy decisions. Although SMT scholars often use multiple approaches from various disciplines to answer questions about collective action groups and their properties and actions,[10] the field lacks a structure for integrating approaches or, more importantly, uncovering what it is about social movements that are more and less relevant to the question at hand. Engelhardt & Moore, for example, critique SMT for lacking social theory. They claim SMT approaches are descriptive hermeneutic studies that inadequately ask 'why?' questions, arguing specifically for a Marxist class-theory underpinning of social movement studies (Engelhardt and Moore 2017). Chalcraft, who takes a Gramscian social historical approach his social movement analysis, laments:

> The main argument marshalled here with respect to theories of social movements of all kinds is that they are insufficient tools for connecting contentious mobilization to larger questions of power, historical context and change, and they pay insufficient attention to the all-important work of the construction of the collective subject. The way that classical social movement theory has multiplied intervening variables to account for the gap between grievance and action has actually left the link between the larger context and contention ever more difficult to fathom, as intervening variables become ever more numerous and un-prioritized. There is no way to know which variable to pick or why it should so be picked. The lack of an overall explanatory theory tends to collapse our ability to connect contention to the structures and grand transformations that are undoubtedly present in the political field, as a result of both political settlements and the unequal distribution of wealth, position and status honour (2016, 538).

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6 Most SMT research concerns nonviolent contentious politics, especially social movement analysis under the "new social movement" rubric (Buechler 1995a, Melucci 1980). For general descriptions of social movements and nonviolence see (Nepstad 2015, Schock 2003, White et al. 2015).

7 For applications of SMT approaches to understanding collective violence see (Della Porta 2009, 2013, Goodwin 2012, Gorringe 2006, Tilly 1975).

8 For a few exceptions see (Wasow 2015, Taylor and Van Dyke 2004, Traugott 1995).

9 See for examples (Nepstad 2015, Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, White et al. 2015).

10 For good examples that explicitly analyze multiple SMT variables see (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, McAdam 1990, McCammon et al. 2007, Voss 1996, Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994, Taylor 2000b). For critiques on SMT's reach into various scholarly fields see (Caren 2013, Opp 2009, 1-22).

Chalcraft's charge that SMT is incapable of answering the broader and deeper questions about how groups challenge other groups (mostly governments) concerning the distribution of power and justice in governance summarizes the questions that prompted my work here. Making sense of social movements should be underpinned by a deep understanding of what social movements do for society.

The key goal of this thesis is to propose a heuristic and analytical model that synthesizes SMT approaches while driving analysts to consider how their work complements broader and deeper questions about social movements, which are constructed from and *for the sake of* society. Kurki (2006, 2008) recognized a similar problem with the field of international relations and resolved that political analysis benefits from a shift in epistemology. Rather than conceiving of cause as 'if A then B' or 'where A is present then B is likely,' we should adjust our understanding of all that composes causation. Instead of proposing a complex formula that interlaces all the historical antecedent conditions and causes that result in a given event type, she suggests a reconsideration of what we mean by 'cause' and a return to an Aristotelian 'four causes' epistemological paradigm (2008, 23-123, 218-234, 189-310). I borrow from Kurki's example and create an Aristotelian 'four causes' analytical model that emphasizes 'final cause,' or teleology, as a structuring and focusing heuristic to synthesize SMT and related approaches and theories. This model, I argue, helps analysts think about and understand the way SMT's and other social sciences' how?-focused approaches fit together to explain deeper 'why?' questions about social movements, and also improves our 'how?' analyses by structuring them within a 'why?' explanandum.

To achieve this lofty goal of making SMT better at answering 'why?' questions like 'why nonviolence or violence?' I make several incremental contributions along the way. First, I engage Aristotelian causation and propose using 'final cause' as a structuring and focusing analytical heuristic, distinguishing among different concepts of teleological cause, and emancipating teleology from the often-accompanying deterministic and orientalist notions. Second, as a deep teleological heuristic, I posit that

social movements emerge from people's social Nature[11] when there is an imbalance in the force of *community* that draws people together, the force of *justice* that requires people in a community to interact in some agreed upon manner, and the force of *power* that establishes some form of governance or distribution of tasks for the community's cohesion and prosperity. Finally, I construct my causation model that spans five causation levels: Natural phenomena, constraining and enabling institutions, lifeworld[12] causation and meaning interpretations and understandings, agent-initiated and often goal directed actions, and resultant observable events. I borrow the term 'levels' of causation from Searle's description of levels in his 'hierarchy of facts' (1996) and Bhaskar's causal 'levels of reality' which he also terms 'strata' (1979, 2013b).

The causation model and the analytical steps I took to build it are my key contributions to SMT methodologically, but I also employ the model to uncover the deeper and broader causes of social movement nonviolence and violence. I explore nonviolence and violence in the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Spring cases and, as a summary conclusion, I find that social movement nonviolence emerges when more evolutionary change achieves a better balance of community, justice and power whereas violence emerges where more revolutionary change is required to break down community, justice and power structures and relationships before rebuilding them. Albeit a simple conclusion, like pedaling a bicycle, there are a lot of forces and mechanics that contribute causally to a simple outcome of balancing and moving forward. Answering why nonviolence or violence emerges helps uncover those causal forces and mechanics and also how they work in concert.

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[11] I use the capitalized form of 'Nature' to indicate and highlight references to phenomena belonging most closely to the natural sciences – biology and biological drivers that necessitate certain psychological, social psychological and social actions and reactions, e.g. consumption, procreation, survival, etc.

[12] I borrow the term from Husserl (Carr 1970, Husserl 1970).

I.1: A Note on the Thesis Structure

Because thesis deals with and merges two distinct theoretical fields – theories on causation and SMT – I will develop the topics as they relate to my argument mostly separately, switching between philosophy-based causation theory and SMT in the next few chapters until I can bring them together. In the remainder of this chapter, I will first define the concept of 'social movement' by synthesizing the concept's definitions over the decades to establish what I, and it seems most SMT scholars, are describing when we speak of social movements. I will then overview SMT approaches to show the diversity and often disparity of the research field that I aim to synthesize using Aristotelian causation and a common definitional starting point. I will highlight references to cause, especially any deeper and broader conceptualizations, as I describe SMT approaches. This overview will be brief as numerous scholars have already dedicated significant space to detailed SMT reviews that my review would only largely repeat.[13] Then, in Chapters 1 and 2, I leave SMT aside temporarily to explore Aristotelian causation with an emphasis on final cause and teleology. Teleology does the most work in my model and throughout this thesis, so I dedicate the most space to philosophically and analytically clarifying some of the debates and conflations of different kinds of teleological causality that often make the concept difficult to use. These chapters form the basis of my argument to use teleology as an analytical structuring and focusing heuristic. In Chapter 3, I return to SMT and explore other scholars' attempts to structure and focus the field and highlight their strengths and weaknesses. In Chapter 4, I begin using Aristotelian causation, also drawing upon Kant's and Hegel's contributions to teleological analysis, to uncover the deepest level of sociological causal forces I engage in the thesis.[14] I present three integral drivers of social movements and society writ large - community, justice and power - as a base causal layer from which I explore that which results from the interaction of community, justice and power in practice. In Chapter 5, I construct my final

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[13] See for examples (Opp 2009, Crossley 2002b, Della Porta and Diani 1999, Diani 1992).

[14] Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and others seek even deeper Natural Teleological causes, including the cause of nature (Naturzweck), which remains unanswered. Attempting to solve these millennia-old philosophical puzzles is not useful to this thesis or my arguments, so I do not engage them further than acknowledging the arguments and that these causal forces may exist.

analytical causation model and begin engaging the pointed question of nonviolence or violence

emergence via existing scholarship. I draw from scholarly thinking on nonviolence and violence at

different causal levels to pave the way for exploring the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Spring case studies in

the remainder of the thesis. Chapters 6 and 7 are largely lifeworld descriptions of Egypt and Syria that

give a 'thick description' to the social movement milieus. Other authors descriptions of Egypt and Syria

are far more exhaustive,[15] but I use some of their key findings to describe the Arab Spring movements'

heritage and the milieu in which they incubated for years. In Chapter 8 I use my analytical structure to

bring together the often disparate analyses on Egypt's and Syria's Arab Spring movements by always

focusing on final cause – what social movements are for, both Naturally and functionally – as argued

throughout the thesis. With this analytical structure and focus, I aim to demonstrate and encourage

analysis to bring a range of scholarship together by seeking what some social movement phenomenon is

for within the broader and deeper puzzle of society.

I.2: Defining 'Social Movement'

The most cited texts in social movement studies[16] recommend broadening the analytical

contextualization of social movements studies to include historical and cultural impacts upon the social

and political spheres in which movements occur and act (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, xiii). Opp

(2009, 34-40, quote on p 40) suggests defining social movements in a manner that is appropriate and

theoretically fruitful, that is, a definition that "encompasses a rather wide variety of phenomena and

captures those activities social movement scholars are interested in." Because research conceptualizes

social movements in numerous ways and as this thesis aims to draw social movement research programs

together under a common framework, it is necessary to create a broad definition that can incorporate

social movement related research across an array of disciplines. The definition must also be analytically

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[15] See for examples (Chalcraft 2016, Gerges 2019, 2016, 2013, Dabashi 2012, Wickham 2013, 2002).

[16] I conclude what are regularly referenced social movement texts based on my research results found in the table
below listing the most cited scholarly texts related to "social movements" and "social movement theory."

fruitful so that it specifies the object of inquiry as separate from similar but taxonomically different explanandum.

Diani (1992) and Opp (2009) give significant space and time to combing prominent and widely recognized social movement scholarship, combining and then distilling an inclusive definition that still has enough specificity for analytical utility. However, it is unclear how Opp and Diani selected the texts from which they compiled their lists of definitions, suggesting a possible selection bias. Also, Diani's definition is from 1992 and Opp's concept is from 2009,[17] and recent influential texts on social movement may have shifted the concept in the field. Critiques aside, Diani's and Opp's definition construction methods are indeed rigorous and similar to my aim of inclusivity, so I will use their method of compiling and analyzing scholars' concepts of 'social movement.'

To begin creating a definition of 'social movement' I used the bibliometric tools Web of Science and Google Scholar[18] to find the 15 most commonly referenced works on "social movements"[19] and "social movement theory."[20] I then extracted the definition of 'social movement' if the author defined it, or compiled a loose definition from the work based on the author's use and discussion of social movements. Next, I generated a list of all the words used in those definitions or extracted concepts of

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[17] It is interesting to note that Opp (2009, 33-41) does not define social movements in the end, instead defining 'protest groups' as an umbrella category.

[18] Recent studies have noted the utility of Google Scholar as a competent bibliometric tool, especially in fields of study that aren't as well cataloged by Web of Science or Scopus which focus on natural sciences with little inclusion of social science research (Marx and Bornmann 2015, Franceschet 2010). Further, where Google Scholar and Web of Science holdings are similar, Google Scholar's citation index is proportionally comparable (Bornmann et al. 2016, 2778). Important to this thesis that aims to draw social movement studies from different disciplines under a common framework, Google Scholar has been found to perform better at returning unbiased cross-disciplinary bibliometrics (Harzing 2013, 1074, italics in original).

[19] Google Scholar and Web of Science returned the following 15 most cited works for the term "social movement": (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 4-5, Benford and Snow 1988, 213-214, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 1-20, Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2008, 321-322, Hobsbawm 1971, 1-12, Klandermans 1996, 2, McCarthy and Zald 1977b, 2, Boli and Thomas 1999, 7, Taylor, Whittier, and Morris 1998, 349, Anyon 2014, Zald and Ash 1966b, 329, Diani and McAdam 2003, 1, Diani 1992, 13, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009, 1, Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998).

[20] Google Scholar and Web of Science returned the following 15 most cited works for the term "social movement theory": (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 1-20, Stern et al. 1999, 82,83, Taylor, Whittier, and Morris 1998, 349, Garrison 1992, 55, 56, 61, 65, 71, Morris and McClung Mueller 1992, 21-22, Taylor 1989, 762, Benford 1997, 410, Davis and Thompson 1994, 142, Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997, 3, Wiktorowicz 2004b, 3, Gusfield 2009, Buechler 1995b, 441, Meyer and Whittier 1994, 277, Davis et al. 2005b, 7, Diani 2000, 387).

'social movement' and found the most regularly used terminology. The resultant list of terms highlights several common key elements, namely: mobilization, action, organization, identity, actors, collective, politics, activism, claims, frames, interaction, opportunities, processes, resources, change, and the public. From these terms representing the most recurring and central themes to SMT and social movement research, and working from Opp's and Diani's methods for creating a good definition, I created the following conception of 'social movement':

> *Social movements are the people, organizations, processes and ideas mobilized into non-state groups using various forms of collective action to publicly contend with and demand change from another social sector or structure to rectify a perceived injustice that affects more of society than just the movement's participants.*

In my definition I omitted several frequently used traditional SMT approach terms like 'frames,' 'opportunities,' 'resources,' and 'identities' to unbias the concept, include alternative approaches, and encourage a broader understanding of causation, while maintaining explanatory power. I also omitted the term 'protest' because of its loaded meaning (Opp 2009, 33-40) to allow for expanded and updated understandings of public contention. For instance, 'protest' does not easily summon the idea of online-based collective action like citizen journalism, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, terrorism, or revolutions – phenomena that are often described as social movements and use SMT analytical approaches.[21] Whereas one may argue these are forms of protest in a broad sense, including the term 'protest' is more problematic than useful, and "contentious collective action" suffices.[22] As a result, I contend that my definition keeps with Opp's (2009, 42) conclusion concerning defining social movements: "It is preferable to keep a definition simple and treat interesting features not included in the definition as dependent or independent variables."

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[21] See for examples (Della Porta 2012, Gentry 2004, Meijer 2005, Monaghan 1999, Snow and Byrd 2007, Breuer, Landman, and Farquhar 2014, Foran 1997b, Goodwin 1997, Kamrava 1999, Kurzman 1996, 2004, Lachmann 1997, McAdam and Sewell Jr 2001, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997, Tarrow 1993b, Tilly 1978, 1996).
[22] Of note, Opp's (2009, 41) definition of protest centers on collective action.

I.3: The Evolution of SMT

Social movement research focuses on different aspects of movements, changing with general trends in the field's research. In this section I will review the evolution of SMT approaches that began largely with collective action theory and then evolved to resource mobilization theory and political opportunity analysis, which gave way to frame analysis and identity analysis. These research field shifts and splinters impacted the concept of 'social movement' as an object of SMT research. While there are outlying approaches to social movement research, the aforementioned are the most prominent, still used, and representative of SMT's analytical trend.

I.3.1: Collective Action Theory

SMT began largely from collective action theory (CAT), which problematized social movements as market responses to changes in the scarcity of goods where 'goods' are the movements' and participants' desires, formed by socio-political and economic structure of the public goods market. Mancur Olson's (2002) CAT posits that some incentivization or coercion (i.e. a grievance) beyond a rational choice causal analysis of reward of the good itself causes people to take risks and act collectively to secure collective goods.[23] People seek belonging to and building a good society in addition to any immediate collective action goals (e.g. laws concerning social justice). Oliver argues the lack of free-ridership in collective action indicates something drives mobilization beyond individual grievances alone (Oliver 1993, 273-274). Building upon Olson, Walsh & Warland (1983) and Opp & Hartmann (1989) find that people participate rather than freeride because of an inflated perceived individual agency for effecting change and the satisfaction people find in the act of contributing to shaping their societies. The social desire for solidarity and individual purposive incentives (Hirsch 1986, Hildreth 1994, Knoke 1988) complement or supplant the personal and material incentives of Olson's (1986) rational choice component of his CAT. Oliver (1993, 280) warns that "cost/benefit models have predictive value when the right costs and benefits

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[23] For example, Turner (1996) points to the self-interests achieved in adhering to behavioral and participatory norms as compelling incentives to act.

are included, but different costs and benefits seem salient in different circumstances, and no one has offered a coherent theory to predict these variations."

Within CAT is an ungirding final cause of social movements. CAT seeks to answer *why* social movements occur by identifying what collective social drivers encourage movements to emerge. Whereas most of CAT approaches focus on goal directed behaviour, Heise's concept bridges Natural human social drivers with socially structured meanings and understandings of the world. Heise's micro-level model of individual action and affect-control theory suggests that people have expectations of what a good state of things should be and then act accordingly where necessary until they establish congruence between their fundamental values, which may shift, and the event or situation in question. Heise (1979, 5, 8, italics in original) postulates that, "people often arrive at a definition of a situation that does not really fit the immediate setting, whereupon they go on to *shape* the setting so that it does fit" and that people will often only abandon a definition "when maintaining it becomes impossible." That people can change their definitions of situations is evidence of structuration in CAT. That people have an expectation of some good state, whatever that state is, suggests CAT implies that people Naturally want to achieve a 'good' situation or state, even if achieving it means shifting what 'good' means.

While SMT moved away from CAT, replacing it next with resource mobilization theory (RMT), RMT theorists should not ignore the explanatory power of CAT, as Crossley argues in his SMT synthesis that I highlight in Chapter 3. Social movement participants act without a cognizant desire to maximize personal gains. But, it would be unwise to ignore the lure of gains beyond the altruistic betterment of society. If some movement participants still desire to gain socially, politically, and economically from their place in the movement, then CAT is not anachronistic; it does, however, only partially explain social movement causation.

I.3.2: Resource Mobilization Theory

Evolving from CAT which analyzes why movements occur, RMT seeks to explain *how* social movements emerge, progress and decline by networking and mobilizing other movements.[24] McCarthy and Zald (1977a, 1213) claim RMT "provides a corrective to the practical theorists, who naturally are most concerned with justifying their own tactical choices, and it also adds realism, power, and depth to the truncated research on and analysis of social movements." Structuralist RMT presupposes that "social movements are normal, rational, institutionally rooted, political challenges by aggrieved groups" (Buechler 1993, 218). McCarthy's and Zald's (1977b, 2) original RMT concept understood movements as incentive-based, "voluntary collectivities that people support in order to effect change in society" composed of organizations "that consciously attempt to coordinate and mobilize supporters." In effect, RMT is largely a functional analysis of the necessary and sufficient causes for movements to happen.

Structuralist RMT research can be divided into two categories that attempt to explain movement growth: individual and inter-group mobilization. Concerning individuals, McAdam (1990), Snow et al (Ekland-Olson, Snow, & Zurcher Jr, 1980), and others[25] point out that previous activists are highly likely to protest again, especially if they are embedded in social networks involved in political contention. Personal social ties make it difficult for potential participants to claim precluding "extra-movement" demands (Snow, Zurcher Jr, & Ekland-Olson, 1980, p. 793). However, there is no consensus on how network types enable different kinds of individual drives to activism in a particular environment (Donatella Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 121-126). Tarrow (Tarrow 2011, 166) analyze how coopting powerful actors, or "influential allies" to "act as friends in court, as guarantors against repression, or as acceptable negotiators on their behalf" influences movement actions, especially dangerous actions

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[24] See for examples (Collins 2001, Eckert and Jenkins 1986, Goldfrank 1979, Lachmann 1997, McAdam 1985, 1986, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 197).
[25] For a good compilation of network analysis literature that includes several studies supporting this concept see (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994).

(Crossley, 2002).[26] Alliances broaden social movements' human, financial, and material resources networks.

RMT later shifted to analyzing resource mobilization as a function of agency through networks, which required attention to identity dynamics (Diani 1992, 13, Brewer and Silver 2000) and other cultural aspects that link individuals and movements goals, norms, attributes, and meaningful action.[27] Ideological flexibility helps movements extend their network (Stern, 2003, pp. 28-29) while identity-linked emotions of shame, fear and anger motivate people to join social movements to (re)gain a sense of agency through solidarity against injustice, eventually building a sense of pride for taking action (Britt and Heise 2000). Culturalist RMT analyses are better suited to explain *how* small resource deprived movements like Boko Haram can progress from fighting with farming implements to acquiring military weaponry and controlling entire states of a country (Walker 2016, 29, 207). Whereas resource mobilization may help explain movement functions and actions, it is minimally explanatory for some movement phenomena, and is ill equipped to explain deeper '*why?*' or '*what for?*' questions because it focuses on '*how?*' functional causes. RMT's mobilization incentives suggest participants join *for the sake of* attaining some goal, a functional analysis, but a partial one. Accordingly, RMT should be considered one integral component of a broader social movement causation analysis.

I.3.3: Political Opportunity Analysis

Political opportunity analysis remains one of the most dominant structure-oriented approaches in SMT, elucidating functionally *how* political and security environments affect *how* movements form and recognize that they can make demands upon their target audience and effect change (Voss 1996, Siegel 2011, Lichbach 1987). The structuralist perspective sees political opportunity as determined and signaled largely by state institutions (e.g. Smelser 1965, Eisinger 1973) through shared histories of structure/agent interactions (Remaoun 2000) involving threats or acts of physical, social, psychological, and/or economic

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[26] See also Rucht (2012).
[27] Diani's (2000) own revision of the concept of social movement is exemplary.

sanctions (Davenport and Inman 2012, 620) similar to deterrence/compellence theory.[28] Culturalist and agent-centric perspectives find political opportunity as more of a process whereby actors test and realize their efficacy in affecting change. The dialectic perspective analyzes the interaction among structures and agents as creating perceived and real political change affecting opportunities (Morris and McClung Mueller 1992). Tarrow's (2011, 32) updated political opportunity definition in 2011 emphasizes the dialectic of opportunity structuration[29] as "sets of clues":

> By political opportunities, I mean consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national – sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics. By threats, I mean those factors – repression, but also the capacity of authorities to present a solid front to insurgents – that discourage contention.

Tarrow (2003, 141-160, 202) found governments may choose to repress contention, but later relax in a cycle of "repression and facilitation." Drawing from the political opportunity approach, the cycles of contention (Tarrow, 1993, 2003) and dynamics of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2003) approaches hypothesize that the more fluctuation there is in opportunities to access the polity because of structural openings and closures, the more likely new social groups are to challenge the old guard (Tilly 1978, 52-55, 172-188), especially where there is a history of power (Albrecht 2010b, 20, Della Porta 2013, 17).

Structural analyses find repression deters activism sometimes and other times it backfires (Van Dam 2011, Hinnebusch 1990, 2012, Lichbach 1987) Brockett, (1995) Kalyvas (2009) and others[30] Brockett (1995, 121-129) argues that widespread repression even against onlookers stokes mobilization fires in those who tried to avoid the conflict, but that the widespread repression strategy will eventually work by attriting active and potential opposition. Kalyvas (2009, 32-144) posits more nuanced studies reveal violent contention emerges where repression and opposition are spatially and temporally neither

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[28] For examples on deterrence/compellence theory see (Schelling 1966, Jakobsen 2007, Schultz 2001, Stein 1992, Lebow and Stein 1990, Smith 2006, Baldwin 1979, Sagan and Waltz 1995).
[29] This, or course, refers to the structuration dialectic (Bourdieu, 1994, 2005a, Crossley 2002b, 168-191, Giddens 1979, 2009). I will discuss structuration in detail in Chapter 2.
[30] See for examples (Alimi 2003, 2007b, 2009, 2007a, Obrien and Li 2006, Davenport 2007, Davenport and Inman 2012)

overwhelming nor absent, and where the populace generally (but not completely) favors one side. But Della Porta (2013, 284) suggests that if movement makers[31] frame indiscriminate and violent means of repression as unjust, they could encourage the movement to respond violently. Several studies analyzing patterns of nonviolent and violent contention suggest that when government repression constricts nonviolent means of political agency, fringe groups may resort to violence,[32] but not always.

Regarding opening political agency opportunity, analyses find structures project perceptions of access through rules, norms and practice, while agents test their actual agentic accesses (Schwedler 2007, Wickham 2011). Governments can maintain a hard line concerning when, where, and how they allow access, while justifying repressing activism through securitization language (Davenport 2007, Murer 2012, 572-574). Conversely, sometimes during contention states will open official channels for political opportunity and agency to placate protest (Rochon and Mazmanian 1993, 539-541, Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004, Bernstein 2009) or provide access through co-optation – even co-opting terrorists occasionally (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 470-473, Coy and Hedeen 2005, Jenkins 1998, 212-214). However, groups' demands are rarely fully met and many of the oppositionists remain disenfranchised, disempowered and re-humiliated, sometimes turning to violence and framed as terrorists, anarchists, or other pejoratives.[33] There is no clear answer as to when splinters will emerge, but alternative political opportunity analyses can provide insight into when people seek access and join in repressive and dangerous times and places.

Agent-centric analyses argue movements are causally more directly linked to participant perceptions and actions. Kurzman (1996, 2004) contends opportunity is not just dictated by the structure; rather, it is also created by agents even in the most unlikely of situations like 1979 Iran, and can amass to

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[31] I use the term "movement makers" rather than "movement elites" to convey a broader concept of who wields agency within a social movement, especially in flatter, non-hierarchical social movement structures.

[32] See for examples (DeFazio 2013, 476, Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004, Lawson 2005, Shorter and Tilly 1974, 81-84, Tarrow 1993a, 284-285)

[33] See for examples (Zald and Ash 1966b, 338, Stearns and Almeida 2004, 495, Sadiki 2002, Davenport 2007, Murer 2012, 572-574).

a point where it could not be stopped, innervating cognitive liberation[34] even in the less ideologically committed and motivated. Chesters (2012, 147) conceptualizes social movements as, "spaces of knowledge production about the limits and possibilities of agency and structure within a given society." Kurzman argues that, by every traditional measure of political opportunity analysis, the 1979 Iranian revolution should not have been possible – the regime was severely repressive and proved for many years its adeptness at crushing even a hint of contention. In addition, there were no signs of opportunity change in the political environment. He highlights how activists' *beliefs* in change through nonviolent protest *created* political opportunity in the Iranian revolution. Because the people believed the movement could not be easily repressed and that violence was less likely, more were willing to take the perceived lower risk of participation.[35] Byrd and Snow (Snow and Byrd 2007) highlight how Iranians constructed this opportunity through framing mechanisms, underscoring the agent aspect of repression and political opportunity construction. By creating an opportunity through *imagining* what could be and then acting accordingly, the power structure in place is broken. Kurzman's argument concerning the 1979 Iranian revolution is a very important one – that political opportunity is undoubtedly a dialectic construct, and not something that is easily measured.

Studies reveal that social movements reconfigure political opportunity, what it means to be political and to have agency, at a socially deep level by simply protesting where most would assume change was impossible. Wickham (1994, 2002) describes how Islamists[36] reconfigured Cairo's disadvantaged

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[34] This is a phrase coined by McAdam (1985). However, I find Nepstad's (1997) exploration of the concept the most instructive for understanding how cognitive liberation works, using frames (specifically, Benford and Snow's (2000) diagnostic, prognostic, and mobilization frames) as her point of investigation. She draws upon Piven and Cloward (1977), identifying it as a process involving, "a three-stage shift in consciousness: first, individuals no longer perceive the system as legitimate or just; second, those who once saw the system as inevitable begin to demand change; and third, those who normally considered themselves powerless come to believe that they can alter their lot in life" (Nepstad 1997, 470-471).

[35] In a similar vein, Khasnabish's (Khasnabish, 2007) research points out that the impetus for the changes in values, meanings, and opportunities of the original committed few is their "political imagination." Once imagination is spurred into action, the possibilities for what may happen become wide open.

[36] The term 'Islamist' is often problematic. Several scholars note the variation in Islamist and Salafist interpretations of how Islam should be included in and guide daily life and politics (Ayoob 2006, Wiktorowicz 2004, Abdul Rauf 2015). Chalcraft (2016, p 536) summarizes the point saying, "Islamism is not primordial or congenital but

populace's entire value set toward spiritual rather than economic rewards, removing much of the government's coercive power and facilitating the Muslim Brotherhood's power challenge to Cairo.[37] Fierke (2012a) shows how agents can create opportunities and shift power structures in the most repressive of situations through imagining what could be and then acting accordingly, regardless of the consequences. Additionally, Khosrokhavar (2012, 174-231) describes a litany of political opportunity mechanisms that are hard for governments to detect. Repression, rather than submission, begets radicalization and militancy (Della Porta 2013, 284, White and Fraser 2000). Ideology, rather than a place of retreat and solace, becomes the impetus for action. Participation, rather than an aim at government capitulation, becomes the goal (Gecas 2000, Kaplan and Xiaoru 2000). In this new game where opportunity is the chance to participate and regain dignity and with less concern for winning the fight, structural repression loses its potency.[38] When societies change the game and reimagine the rules, even momentarily, people seek avenues to make their desired changes more permanent.

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constructed and diverse." There is no consensus in scholarship on how groups should be labeled beyond rightly demanding that we recognize and understand the nuances of types and degrees of religiosity in Muslim communities and societies. For example, the term 'fundamentalist' may be an accurate description of many Salafists who simply desire an adherence to the fundamentals of Islam and the Salaf, it is often and dangerously conflated with the more charged 'extremist' and 'jihadist' epithets; Tablighi Jama'at Salafis are very different from al-Qa'ida Salafis, although the both aim to establish a righteous Islam-based society (Wiktorowicz 2004). Rather than attempting to define Salafism, Islamism, and political Islam to box groups and individuals into monolithic definitions, this thesis proceeds by highlighting how and where actors include and use tenets from Islam in its myriad historically, geographically, and culturally (re)configurations; it also underscores how different inclusions of Islam as a part of everyday life and politics affects interactions with Western (read: largely Christian-based) actors (Gerges 1999). Understanding how actors draw upon the rich and deep cultural meanings in frames that resonate on a political, spiritual and emotional level is key to understanding how those meanings are reinterpreted and used We can supplement Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, etc. for the term 'religion' in the four causes formula above as every religion is involved in politics in largely the same way – to achieve a 'good' society (Ayoob 2006, pp. 4-6). Analysis must realize that religion ubiquitously seeps into political decision making because of personal and state histories that privileged religion or politics at different times (Dalacoura 2018). Ignoring the relationship of religion and politics is just as analytically mistaken as placing too much emphasis on the relationship. Nuance in understanding religion, politics, and social movements is necessary for good analysis. Hence, labels alone are insufficient; an understanding of how religion and politics inform social meaning is far more accurate.

[37] See also (Gecas 2000, Kaplan and Xiaoru 2000).

[38] In a similar vein, Khasnabish's (2007) research points out that the impetus for the changes in values, meanings, and opportunities of the original committed few is their "political imagination." Once imagination is spurred into action, the possibilities for what may happen become wide open. This line of thought also gets at the "moments of madness" (Tarrow 1993a) or "moments of excess" (Dennis et al. 2011 2011) thesis.

Regarding individual seizures of political opportunity, scholars find that in times of political structure and opportunity flux, people join or leverage existing networks to affect the changes they desire. McAdam's (1990, 1985, 1986, 1996) and others' social network analysis approach[39] highlights access perception variations depend upon historical activism or personal ties to activist networks. McAdam (1999, 51) finds people usually join established organizations rather than create new ones, despite some political and/or ideological differences (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003). But Goodwin and Jasper (2009, 57) point out that networks are only a necessary (not sufficient) component of social movements because "bigots don't join civil rights campaigns just because they are in the right network." The Arab Springs witnessed new networks emerge via 'swarming movements.'[40] 'Leaderless resistance'[41] "self-directed activism" Gecas' (2000, 102-103) and Earl's, Copeland's and Bimber's (2017) research questions the impact of preexisting networks. Digital and social media have made connectivity easier, but social movement organizations and structural forces[42] still nudge[43] people into political discourse online like friends in a coffee shop. So where in this ever-shifting landscape of structures and agents vying for power through repression and access can we find what exactly drives movements to emerge when and how they do?

Scholars admit political opportunity analysis cannot answer everything and should combined with other SMT approaches (e.g. Tarrow 2011, 28). Political opportunity analysis must be, at least in part, a hermeneutic approach where research must seek a Weberian understanding of the activists' lifeworld that they construct through praxis and constant testing, especially in the cognitive liberation phase where

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[39] See for examples (Davis et al. 2005a, Magouirk, Atran, and Sageman 2008, Lim 2013, Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Nicholls 2009, Keck and Sikkink 2002, Sageman 2004, Ekland-Olson, Snow, and Zurcher Jr 1980).

[40] See for examples (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001b, Fisher 2015)

[41] For readings on leaderless resistance see (Beam 1992, Kaplan 1997, Leader and Probst 2003, Beckstrom and Brafman 2006, Joosse 2007, Sageman 2011, Michael 2012).

[42] This argument is similar to the concept of a 'leaderless resistance.' The term 'leaderless' is a misnomer and to refers to a movement relying largely on broadcast-action forms of contention rather than two-way communicated operations. For reading on leaderless resistance see (Beam 1992, Kaplan 1997, Leader and Probst 2003, Beckstrom and Brafman 2006, Joosse 2007, Sageman 2011, Dobratz and Waldner 2012a, Joosse 2012, Michael 2012).

[43] I use the term "nudge" purposefully here, borrowing from and Sunstein and Thaler's concept (2008),to mean the intentional and sometimes unintentional placement of pieces of information so that people will take notice and want to act.

people can come to believe than anything, any change, is possible.[44] Indeed, I apply this kind of political

opportunity approach, a hermeneutic analysis producing a thick description of the lifeworld, in the

Egyptian and Syrian case studies in Chapters 7 and 8.

I.3.4: Frame Analysis

SMT scholars borrowed from RMT and political opportunity analysis and proposed analyzing

movement discourse or 'frames' to understand *how* movements' 'speech acts' and 'acts of speech' during

mobilization and contention affect social movement phenomena. Mead (1967) posits there is no social

agent without language[45] and that language "appeals to people's sense of agency, encouraging them to

develop the capacity for collective action in framing contests" (Mead quoted in Gamson and Ryan 2009,

173). Frames make abstract structures real (Marsh 1982, 52), affective and responsible for socio-political

circumstances,[46] and frame resonance vis-à-vis those structures drives mobilization (Crawford and

Lipschutz 1998, 3-43) dependent upon how frame resonate to effect the "intensity of *political discontent*"

(Opp, 11).

Benford and Snow, who have regularly researched from the framing perspective[47] define social

movement frames (1988, 137) as schemata that "selectively punctuat[e] and encod[e] objects, situations,

events, experiences, and sequences of action." Social movements are ideologically-driven goal-directed

organizations (1986, 464-466) acting as "signifying agents" and "carriers and transmitters of mobilizing

beliefs and ideas" which "produce meaning for participants, antagonists and observers" (1988, 197-198).

Movement framing dynamics ascribe temporal and contextual meanings and understandings (Benford et

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[44] This line of thought also gets at the "moments of madness" (Tarrow, 1993) or "moments of excess" (Dennis, Harvie, Milburn, Nette, & Watts, 2011) thesis.

[45] I take the 'community view' of Wittgenstein's 'private language' argument and assume that language is a social mechanism; see (Wittgenstein 2009, 244-271, Canfield 1996): .

[46] This concept of frames is an amalgamation of several works concerning frames in social movements (Goffman 1974, Benford et al. 1986, Benford and Snow 1988, 1992, Taylor 2000a, Westby 2002, Gamson and Ryan 2009, Matesan 2012).

[47] See for examples (Benford et al. 1986, Benford and Snow 1988, 1992, Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994, Benford and Snow 2000, Cress and Snow 2000, Snow and Byrd 2007, Benford 1997)

al., 471, Lalich 2004, 222), justify action, and form in- and out-groups (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003). The result is discourse by "political leaders, intellectuals, journalists, other opinion makers, and the public moving information" for their ends (Murer 2012, 567-568). Hence, frame analysis is important to creating a thick description of how people understand opportunity, agency, power, justice, and all that makes up society and governance.

SMT scholars group frame analyses into three facets – frame task analysis, frame process analysis, and frame scope analysis. Benford and Snow's (1988, 2000) framing task, process and scope analysis approaches to understanding frame dynamics are widely used and accepted in SMT analysis.[48] These answer questions about what movements are trying to accomplish, how they try to do so, and what they use to accomplish their goals. Diagnostic, prognostic, and mobilization framing tasks identify the problem, propose solutions, and call people to arms respectively through frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation processes (Benford and Snow 1988, 2000). Frame bridging links ideologically compatible frames; frame amplification idealizes, embellishes, clarifies and/or invigorates an attractive movement frame; frame extension expands a movement's character, often borrowing from another movement or organization; and frame transformation creates new or different movement frames that vastly change the movement's scope and direction or fracture it. Strategic, local, and personal frame scopes (Benford and Snow 2000, 618-619) describes how ideologically movement discourse resonates. Strategic frames are the broad political, religious, and social issues, often referred to as 'master frames' (Benford and Snow, 619).

Strategic frames give us some of the better insight into what social movements are broadly *for the sake of* because 'master frames' are what social movements across geography, culture, and time call for (Benford and Snow, 619). Benford and Snow categorize 'master frames' as those that are inclusive, flexible, and resonant, finding the following master frame types: rights frames, choice frames, injustice

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[48] See for examples (Mooney and Hunt 1996, Nepstad 1997, Futrell 2003, Taylor 2000a, Westby 2002, Gamson and Ryan 2009, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003).

frames, environmental justice frames, culturally pluralist frames, sexual terrorism frames, oppositional frames, hegemonic frames, and a "return to Democracy" frame. But, I argue, all of these master frames weave the common threads of justice and power.

Rights and choice frames seek some group's rights or choices they are denied by an unjust power holder or structure - civil rights, human rights, children's rights, and general economic and social rights[49] – which are philosophically debated in social theory literature.[50] The SMT master frame categories of injustice[51] and environmental injustice[52] frames are self-evidently linked to justice. However, the target of the movements' frames, the power holder or structure that maintains injustice, is a key component to understanding the locus of injustice.[53] Culturally pluralist frames are those that seek social justice where social (and often political) praxis via institutions and structures repress some section of people.[54] Sexual terrorism and sexual violence frame analysis surrounds antiviolence movements fighting the perpetrators and power structures allowing or encouraging violence against women.[55] Hegemonic frame analysis is most closely linked to Gramscian concepts of cultural counterhegemony as the basis for creating sustainable, social revolutions that displace the entirety of extant repressive structures.[56] Benford and Hunt summarize well the centrality of domestic power politics in hegemonic contests:

> At the core of these contests over meaning are differences regarding conceptions of power... What is it? Who has it? Who doesn't? How is it wielded? Who ought to have it? How should it be used? While movement actors attempt to raise and answer these questions, institutional elites seek to maintain their "hegemonic ideology" by sustaining their definitions of the situation… by ". . . shaping. . . perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that . . . [people] accept their role in the existing order of things . . ." and by controlling the agenda (Benford and Hunt 1992, 37).

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[49] See for examples (Tate 2007, Borland 2004, Isaac et al. 2016, Goodwin and Pfaff 2001, Blumberg 2009, Bellafronto 2005, Katz and Woodhouse 2005, McAdam 1990, West 2009, Price 2010, 42).

[50] See for examples (Hume 2013, Moore Jr 1979, Pritchard 1972, Rawls 1998).

[51] See for examples (Sharp 1996, Della Porta and Rucht 2013, Bühler 2002, Glasius and Pleyers 2013).

[52] See for examples (Taylor 2000a, Benford 2005, Robinson 2008, Lockie 2004, Leader and Probst 2003, McCright and Dunlap 2015, Ostrom 2010, Joosse 2012)

[53] See for examples (Joosse 2012, 2007, Engelhardt and Moore 2017, Taylor 2000a)

[54] See for examples (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, Friedman and Thiel 2016, Nash 2001, McAdam 2000, Foran 1997a, Tilly 1995quote on p. 6, Melucci and Avritzer 2000, Berbrier 2014, Dobratz and Waldner 2012b).

[55] See for examples (Al-Rawi 2014, Taylor 1989, Programme 2010, Bellafronto 2005, Berry 2015, Nesiah 2013, Ponzanesi 2014, esp. chapters 1, 5, and 9)

[56] See for examples (Carragee and Roefs 2004, Carragee 1993, Karlberg 2012)

These 'master frames,' all concerned with different concepts of power and justice, are often purposefully vague and inclusive, allowing more pointed framing and identity work to leverage them. But, master frames often justify rather than mobilize (Frampton 2010, 24), may be esoteric and not well understood by participants (Horgan 2012, Loc. 2697), and can thus be twisted and used by governments (Albrecht 2010a, 23). Master frames are most effective when linked to local and personal frames.[57]

Local frames bridge, extend, and amplify master, strategic frames to local actions and conditions, giving better meaning to philosophical and polemic themes.[58] Likewise, movement makers and recruiters bridge and extend strategic and local frames to personally experienced injustices, forming new schemata through which new and existing activists can diagnose the problem, and prognosticate the solution (Barsalou 2002, Benford and Snow 1992). A body of research suggests extending strategic diagnostic strategic, local and personal injustice frames to local and personal agency-promoting prognostic and mobilization frames is key to driving action, especially violence.[59]

Frame analysis, in all its forms, typically focuses *how* frames function to mobilize movements. However, the approach may help deepen SMT by answering *why* movements emerge or what they're for if we interrogate frames for underlying individual, movement, and societal teleologies – the end-state goals toward which people movements and societies proceed.

I.3.5: Identity Analysis

Identity analysis explores collective and social identity and is central to SMT's culturalist turn. Identity features more frequently in 'social movement' definitions in recent prominent literature than any

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[57] For further reading on the frames and frame resonance approach see (Benford and Snow 2000, Edelman 2001, Keck and Sikkink 2002, Benford and Snow 1988, Wiktorowicz 2004b).

[58] See for examples (Alami 2013, Basil, Fahamy, and Sayah 2012, Online 2012, Saleh 2012, Lynch 2012, Ayoob 2004, 6, Benford et al. 1986).

[59] See for examples (Jasper 2014, 229-250, De Koning and Meijer 2010, Al Aswany 2011, 61-64, Wickham 2002, 189-199).For readings on agency and social movement mobilization in general see (Brewer and Silver 2000, 167-168, Gecas 2000, 103, Keicolt 2000, Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994, Greenberg and Stevenson 2000, Lockie 2004, Selbin 1997).

other SMT independent variable.[60] Collective identity studies take a structuration perspective[61] where the concept of the self is a dynamic "compromise between idealized images and imputed social identities" (Snow and Anderson 1987, 1348). The approach explores *how* movements use group identity practices to change the identity-linked aspects of the target structure.[62] Social identity studies, on the other hand, seek to explain *how* individual and movement identities cause mobilization.[63]

Although inherently a culturalist approach, SMT identity analysis retains a structural focus as political opportunities and structure-generated in- and out-group meanings are often central to explaining to goal of generating movement participation.[64] This may be because the structure is often still the referent 'other' used to show what the movement is not (Wilkinson 1971, 88-102, 125-150). Crawford and Lipschutz's study on ethnic violence (1998, 4-5) finds that during massive, rapid structural changes where one or both sides "have broken the rules and norms by which access to political and economic resources was once granted," collectivities are likely to form strong in and out-groups.[65] Movements can use identity politics to generate a range of actions (Toft 2005, 595) and emotions (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009). Even where peoples seem homogenous, identity-linked violence can emerge as a function of rapid identity restructuring following a traumatic political event (Della Porta 2013, 283, Das 1996). It may be telling that collective identity scholarship outside of SMT is also structure-centric despite critiques that scholars allow structure to dominate theory and analysis.[66] Combining social identity scholarship strands, it seems individual and social movement identities are formed through a dialectic:

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[60] See for examples the definitions of 'social movement' by Diani (1992, 13, 2000, 387) and Morris (1992, 21-22). Mobilization is the most regularly noted variable in social movement definitions, but it is almost exclusively the dependent variable of social movement studies. I do not give the same prominence to identity in my definition to keep the conceptual focus on why social movements emerge and what they're for, leaving the questions of what all they are made of more to SMT analysis.

[61] See for example (Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994).

[62] See for examples (Bernstein 2009, McAdam and Friedman 1992).

[63] See for examples (Klandermans and De Weerd 2000, 74-76, Melucci 1988, Taylor, Whittier, and Morris 1998)

[64] See for examples (Melucci 1995, 43, Melucci and Avritzer 2000, Klandermans and De Weerd 2000, Nardi and Bolton 1991, Rubin 1984, Bernstein 2009, 264, Whittier and Taylor 1984, 358)

[65] See also Murer's (2012) work on the rapid manipulation of identities in moments of sociopolitical change.

[66] See for examples (Wendt 1987, 1999, Friedman and Thiel 2016, Duchesne 2016, 58, Alexander 2011, Fontaine 1981).

agentic mechanisms bring out common identities among participants while structural forces drive

individual and movement identities to emerge in support of a social cause or in opposition to a social

injustice that is often rooted in structural institutions.

From a social identity perspective we find a crossover among psychology, social psychology, and

SMT to fill the dearth of culturalist-centric social movement identity studies.[67] SMT social identity

research analyzes individuals interactions with movements, encountering dialectic processes of identity

convergence and construction (McAdam and Snow 2000, Creed, Scully, and Austin 2002) linked to

framing processes and participation actions (re)informing individual and group identity (McAdam and

Snow 2000, 53, Stryker 2000). Successful mobilization frames actuate some common motivating self-

identity. Is identity resulting from participation then just internal framing of the activity by self-assigning

meaning and identity to memories?

From this self-identity/movement identity tradition emerged the perspective that many may

participate *for the sake of* participating – being part of something greater than themselves – more than

they participate *for the sake of* what the movement says it wants (Gamson 1992a, 56). Jasper's (2014)

culturalist investigations move beyond mobilization and show how movement identity informs repertoire

of contention[68] construction, and how emotions produce and are products of movement identity, among

other effects (Jasper 2014, 85-87). Several studies explore bridging these striated identities and exploring

how micro-macro "identity work" processes affect what individuals and movements do.[69] McAdam and

Snow (2000, 42, 47) describe how identity seeking[70] and identity appropriation[71] processes lead to three

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[67] See for examples (Stryker, Owens, and White 2000, Gamson 1992a, Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008, McCright and Dunlap 2015).

[68] I draw upon Tilly's (1986, 4-5) and Tarrow's (1993a) concepts of a 'repertoire of contention' to denote the set of contentious action tools social movements may call upon constrained and enabled by social movement dynamics and structure/agent dialectics.

[69] See for examples (Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994, Gamson 2009, Stoecker 1995, Reger, Myers, and Einwohner 2008, Jasper and Polletta 2001, Snow and Anderson 1987, 1348).

[70] The process of finding individuals and groups that have analogous identities from the process of constructing meaning around similar symbols and within similar boundaries (McAdam and Snow 2000, 48).

[71] The process of movement elites and recruiters co-opting existing networks with collective identities with enough congruence to make melding the two collective identities possible and, hopefully, beneficial (McAdam and Snow 2000, 48).

overarching dialectic individual/group identity processes: collective identity construction; individual/group collective identity linkage; and individual and collective identity maintenance. They then (2000, 49-53) outline four identity construction sub-processes: identity amplification, consolidation, extension, and transformation. Most SMT identity studies seek answers through this identity work paradigm that is complementary to frame analysis approaches.

Klandermans and De Weerd's (2000) study that crosses social identification and collective identity is a rare example of a holistic identity analysis approach. Several studies outside traditional SMT use truly culturalist and social psychological approaches exploring emotions (Britt and Heise 2000, Taylor 2000b), social identification (Brewer and Silver 2000), and self-esteem (Aronson and Owens 2000, Kaplan and Xiaoru 2000, Baumeister, Dale, and Muraven 2000) related to social identification and collective identity. But, these studies still explore identity in from a functional perspective, seeking to "account for participation and non-participation parsimoniously" (Stryker 2000) through reductionist, single-variable 'if A then B' explanans. I argue that seeking 'if A then B' explanations stymie SMT identity analyses and that a holistic explanation of movement phenomena requires reconsideration of what identity does beyond just mobilization or individual goals.

The above outlined SMT approaches – CAT, RMT, political opportunity analysis, frame analysis, and identity analysis – are not the only approaches in SMT, but they are the key ones used and form the basis of most analytical and methodological offshoots. Recent scholarship has attempted to update and upgrade these approaches by giving better and deeper context and theoretical substructure. But do these studies improve our SMT analysis, or do they add more 'intervening variables' as Chalcraft derides? A little of both, I argue. In the following section I will explore some recent SMT literature as it relates to analyzing the Arab Spring movements to highlight some theoretical improvements and remaining theoretical issues.

I.4: Recent Updates to SMT in the Arab Spring Context

SMT as described above shows the evolution of the field, but it remains a generally mid-level theoretical practice. There are some implicit deeper theories underpinning SMT borrowed from broader sociology (which I engage in Chapters 3 through 5), but a more explicit employment of theory would help deepen and synthesize the field. For example, the above noted debates on the political opportunity approach, which is arguably one of the most 'why movement?' causally-focused approaches, emphasize the difficulty in using 'intervening variables' to understand where and when social movements emerge.[72] Indeed, much of the world was caught off guard when the Arab Spring movements emerged, despite knowing that many of those states were ripe with contention (Lynch 2014a, 6). Some recent analyses find two key theoretical concepts that may enable broader and deeper 'why?' explanations – Gramscian hegemony and teleology.

Several scholars highlight the long-burgeoning contention between structures and agents that conditioned the social and political fields so that "a 'spark' kindles a 'prairie fire'" (Zedong 1966b, 7). Chalcraft, for example, answers his complaints against SMT with Gramsci's post-Marxist theory of cultural counterhegemony (vice a purely economics/classist driven theory)[73] to show how several states and their citizens interacted over centuries to create a milieu in which daily contention percolated up to cyclical, visible social movement contention. He argues that SMT would benefit from a thick description that pays "attention to the all-important work of the construction of the collective subject" in understanding the emergence of a transgressive contentious politics (2016, 24-25, 538-539, quote on p 538). Gramsci, he finds, provides a better means for understanding how the "ideational, economic and political mechanisms of hegemonic expansion… are intimately linked with the existence of a [Bourdieuian] political field" wherein structures and agents constantly renegotiate power structures and relationships (2016, 29-35, quote on p 35). This counterhegemony prepares the ideological battlefield so

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[72] See also Chalcraft's (2016, 19-29) arguments against causality as espoused by pure political opportunity or resource mobilization approaches.

[73] For recent examples using updated economics-based theories explaining Arab Spring social movement causality see Kadari 2014, pp 80-106 and Zurayk and Gough 2014, pp 107-131).

that 'activists can draw upon them to launch their projects' (2016, 40-46, esp p 43) through ideology and identity-based mobilization and solidarity mechanisms (2016 5,45) that can help them overcome timidity instilled by histories of brutal repression (2016, 548-549).[74]

In a similar analytical and methodological vein but largely from the state-structure analysis perspective, Gani and Tripp comb Syrian history to reflect the Syrian state's expertise at constructing a Syrian identity-based form of nationalism and solidarity vis-à-vis Israel and the West. The picture Gani (Gani 2015) paints of the Syrian milieu partly explains why the Syrian revolution found it difficult to amass a unified cultural counterhegemony cum social movement against the al-Asad regime. Similarly, but focused on state power theory, Tripp analyzes that Arab leaders' abilities to build their states' nationalism around a cult of personality was "the ultimate act of appropriation" (Tripp 2014, 137) that centralized both state-citizen identity and state power upon their rule. Gani also describes the geographic spread of Syria's protests and activists (many outside Syria), the disparity in injustice frames among ethnically and ideologically diverse Syrians, and Damascus' expertise at crushing, dispersing, and disallowing even growing opposition that impeded mobilization (Gani 2015, 131-148). Likewise, Tripp (2014, 142-154) argues that power politics and contention failed in Syria partly because the geographic dispersion and disjointed mobilizing ideologies of Syrian protesters disallowed a unifying occupation of public spaces to challenge and publicly break the state's coercive power. Gerges (2015, 10-13) also finds demographic diversities in the Arab Spring movements, especially in Syria, affected their abilities to effectively unify and contend with the state.

Other scholars use more traditional SMT approaches to seek new knowledge from the Arab Spring cases. Gerges describes the Arab Spring revolutions as a period where people transformed their environments of fear of the state and general passivity into spaces where active agents mobilized in collective solidarity to challenge state hegemony and renegotiate meanings of what good, legitimate

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[74] See also (Chalcraft 2014 pp 159-175).

governance is (2015, 3). He uses standard SMT frame analysis of the Arab Spring discourses to promote a nuanced understanding to the overarching injustice frames demanding *karamah* (dignity) to help explain repertoire of contention and political opportunity creation, especially if we intend to assume democratization as the goal. Dignity in in the context of the cultures wherein the Arab Spring revolutions took place is different from most Western concepts and must be given thick meaning and understood in a Weberian (*verstehen*) way.[75] Of particular relevance to this thesis, Gerges notes, "the types of repertoires have substantial impact on the very nature of protests and shape the trajectory of contention" (Gerges 2015, 6-10 quote on p 8). While repertoires affect contentious politics trajectories, I argue in this thesis that certain repertoires emerge because they are better at putting movements on the path to certain teleological goals. Also drawing from traditional SMT, Hosseinioun finds that the "more universal calls for freedom, rights, dignity and justice" are shared in the Arab and Western worlds' social movements' frames, identities, and modes of contention.[76] She asserts (2015, 62) that an "increasing gulf between rights demands that a government either use ornate rhetoric or greater force to remain in power" creating "artificial balances" that "are ultimately unsustainable and unreliable" in the information age," which supports Chalcraft's counterhegemony thesis.

Amid these updated takes on SMT that provide much needed thick descriptions and better understandings of the environments in which the Arab Spring movements emerged, we are still left with little methodological direction if we seek '*why?*' causation. Chalcraft's Gramscian theory only tells us that counterhegemonies lay the foundations for social movement makers to pursue their agendas further explaining '*how?*' but without answering '*why?*' movement questions. Gramscian historiography does not explain why nonviolence or violence emerges; Chalcraft seems to leave that to analyzing movement elites' choices. Lynch (2014a, 12) declares that "Why some protest movements turned to armed

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[75] Dabashi (2012) also requires a non-Orientalist, non-Western, culturally cognizant and grounded conceptualization of the impetuses that drove these movements.

[76] Dabashi likewise highlights the universality of a demand for dignity and justice in a deconstructed reading of Arab Spring frames (2012, 57).

insurrection while others remained relatively peaceful even in the face of extreme provocation is one of the most vital questions raised by these cases." Several authors above note that the presence or absence of unifying frames and identities help explain where movements held out or fell apart, but we still need to account for the state-structure coercive forces in the contentious power politics that played out over the months and years following Bouazizi's spark. One unifying analytical concept that creeps into several recent studies is teleology, although most scholars reject the concept because of teleology's often-accompanying orientalist and democratization theory biases. But teleology is exceptionally useful, especially if aligned more closely with Aristotle's 'final cause' and unencumbered by these biases.

Aristotle is not generally consulted to explain social movements. When 'final cause' in the form of the concept of teleology is highlighted, it usually negative. For instance, Chalcraft (2015, 15) finds that, "historical sociology has often suffered from a Eurocentric teleological modernism, and structural, processual, material and class determinism." Similarly, Gerges (2015, 3) declares that despite the different Arab Spring episodes of contention sharing some connections, "they are not part of a deliberate unified movement that is moving toward a common goal. It is this teleological understanding of history that particularly frustrates Western observers." He notes (2015, 6) that social movements do not necessarily produce desired effects with the same mechanical regularity of nature and encourages research to "critically reflect on the extent to which labels such as the Arab Spring or Arab Awakening do generate teleological, romanticized or even Orientalized notions." Likewise, Gani points to the Western often orientalist and hubristic democratization theories that assume the 'Arab world's' ruling regimes will eventually give way to the triumph of democracy (2015, 128-130). These understandings of 'teleology' are linked to the determinism of democratic peace theorists or, at best, Wendt's (2003) 'logic of recognition' that orders the world by eventually restructuring polities so that all actors (states) are recognized as agentic and their input is important to the overall structure. While current scholarship views democratic peace theory and its offshoots as the dominant teleology-linked theory, I argue that is a

narrow interpretation of the concept which is much more useful when cleaved from Western-biased determinism.

In support of teleological analysis, Dabashi (2012, 253) says, "The Arab Spring has made it clear that the critique of totalism and teleological thinking must become paramount and permanent, and that the idea of total revolution has morphed into an open-ended revolution." His conception of teleology, that societies move toward some telos without ever necessarily reaching it, is the most similar to the way I use the concept here. Also in line with the way I use teleology-based analysis in this thesis, Dabashi warns, we must decolonize theory, really deconstruct it to its essence, before we can rebuild our analysis around something emancipated from of our geographical biases (2012, 46-55). This, he argues, requires extracting the fundamental components of teleology from an Orientalist reading of 'modernization' and the 'First World' or the 'West' vs the 'Third World,' the 'Arab World' or the 'Muslim World.' Through this kind of analysis we find the common goals of all peoples and societies – a "cosmopolitan worldliness" (2012, 75-88, 114-118). Dabashi suggests that the goal of the uprisings was the apolitical and moral virtue of dignity (*karamah*), which "is an end in itself, caused and conditioned by the revolutionary uprisings." What we observe, he claims are 'open ended revolutions' that are the manifest symptoms of the peoples' struggle for dignity (241-249). In this thesis, I take up Dabashi's recommendation that we think about revolutions teleologically without assuming the telos is Western democracy. But, because the concept of teleology is laden with biases of what ideal societies and governments are, I must first unpack teleology, starting with Aristotle's 'final cause' and then working through some philosophical history to clarify a purer concept of teleology and teleological analysis.

I.5: Conclusion

Above, I introduced SMT and provided a definition of the concept of 'social movement' to begin laying the foundation of much deeper theoretical, epistemological, and methodological work throughout the rest of the thesis. I also showed some recent theoretical advances in SMT that help, but do not quite

resolve, the problem SMT has with answering '*how?*' *and* '*why?*' questions in a deeper, structured and focused manner. In the following two chapters, I will explore how we can use Aristotle's 'four causes' paradigm with an emphasis on final causes as a heuristic for focusing analysis. Whereas Aristotle subsumes different concepts of teleology under his final cause, I will tease out different concepts of teleology to resolve lingering issues with teleological analysis. I argue through a more critical and philosophical conception of teleology, or teleologies, we can bring Aristotle's elegant analytical model back into use and give better structure and focus to the field of SMT while uncovering some deeper causes of social movements.

Chapter 1 – Types of Cause

Aristotle's Four Causes and Philosophy's Issues with Teleology

Milja Kurki (2006, 2008) reintroduces the Aristotelian concept of causation to the field of international relations which, when underpinned by philosophical realism, she argues, deepens and broadens our analytical understanding of the field. She posits this approach encourages three things: a reinvestigation of the constraining and enabling forces; a rethink concerning epistemology and hermeneutic attempts to acquire knowledge; and methodological plurality. She suggests reintroducing Aristotelian causation to international relations will emancipate the field from Hume's reductionist concept of 'cause' that pervades the natural and social sciences, making the divisive epistemology arguments irrelevant.

Building upon Kurki's work, I argue Aristotelian causation is similarly useful for SMT, especially when using final cause as a focusing heuristic. Social movement studies begin with observable events and outcomes and attempt to use empirical or qualitative hermeneutic studies to explain how one set of events leads to another. I argue explaining social events by other social events is not the only way to understand social movement phenomena and that Aristotle's four causes can help deepen and broaden social movement studies just as Kurki did concerning international relations. However, to use Aristotle's four causes to improve SMT, it is necessary first to understand the philosophy behind the concept, especially the concept of final cause and teleology. First, it is useful to understand why Aristotle's four causes lost favor in scientific and social scientific studies.

Thinkers in the scientific revolution largely abandoned Aristotle's model of material causes, formal causes, efficient causes, and final causes. Physical sciences' scholars reduced the concept of 'cause' to only actions (efficient causes) occurring among substances (materials, but not viewed as causal). Many social sciences followed the same paradigm of what constitutes 'cause.' However, in exploring the debate on Aristotle's four causes, there is no indication that the scholars who challenged these concepts for

explanation in the physical sciences intended for them to be abandoned by social sciences.[77] But, once the field of scientific inquiry turned to 'if a, then b' and scientific analyses required regularity pattern observations to be considered sound science, most researchers eschewed Aristotelian causation. Social science researchers who sought explanation beyond positivist analysis gradually distanced their work from overtly seeking causality in favor of hermeneutic explanation.

Like Kurki, I argue that 'cause' should not be considered a dirty word in social scientific inquiry and that if we wish to holistically explain social phenomena, Aristotle's 'four causes' can help. Using final cause as a heuristic focuses analysis while deepening and broadening it. Even if one uses the four causes model as a framework for synthesis and not to theorize about natural social ontology, four causes is useful for understanding *how* structuralist and culturalist SMT approaches are complementary. This would represent a progression from accepting simply *that* they are complementary. Although SMT approaches focus their analysis within one of these 'four causes' and often include aspects of the other three, they are not understood in this framework and thus claim to be either positivist social science investigations, or disengaged from causality. Using an Aristotelian model returns analysis to cause, albeit in broader and deeper sense, while also structuring and focusing analysis.

This chapter will review a few of the philosophical points and debates concerning Aristotle's four causes and causal studies in the social sciences before engaging them more deeply concerning social movements throughout the remainder of the thesis. I will give a general overview of material, formal and efficient causes as they are largely unproblematic except for the word 'cause' attached to materials and forms – a point I will address. Then, I explore the scientific revolution's rejection of Aristotle's causal paradigm that stems largely from their disagreements with final cause and teleological analysis and explanation. Whereas many thinkers in the scientific revolution reject Aristotle's final cause and the concept of teleology because it was too near to explaining away phenomena like divine intent, which is unknowable, the later philosophies of Kant and Hegel found great use in teleological explanation. In the

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[77] I support this below exploring some of these debates of Aristotle's four causes, teleology, and scientific inquiry.

next chapter, I address final cause epistemological problems, by distinguishing between Natural

Teleology (an innate or designed goal or telos for things where materials, forms and actions are for the

sake of that telos), functional teleology (for a known end state or purpose, a number of antecedent

variables and event types must exist and occur), and 'goal directed behaviour' (agents deducing that if

they do a, then b will be or occur, and then acting accordingly).[78] Unpacking final cause in this way

clarifies the different ways in which we think of a 'goal' so that the final cause is again made analytically

useful for social movement studies. I base this demarcation of final cause concepts in Kant's and Hegel's

thinking before later using it against SMT.

1.1: Aristotelian Causation – The Four Causes

Aristotle presents his philosophy on causation in *Physics, Book II*, and applies it in *Politics*[79] and

Ethics.[80] His 'four causes', as the concept has become known, consists of "that from which a thing is

made and continues to be made", "the form or pattern (i.e. the formula for what a thing is...)", "the

original source of change or rest", and "what something is for" (Aristotle 1996, 39) which is often

rendered "the [cause] for the sake of which" (Johnson 2005, 65). These are more commonly known as the

material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause, respectively. Aristotle declares that these

are the ways we use the word 'cause' or the ways we answer 'why' questions about things and events

(Annas 1982).

<u>1.1.1: Aristotle's Material Cause</u>

Aristotle views material cause as the matter involved in an event - that which is being affected.

Central to Aristotle's material cause is that matter, "is not the passive and inert principle it has long been

pictured to be. It is a powerful and potential principle that lies at the base of the most cataclysmic

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[78] This is derived largely from Taylor and his chapter distinguishing purpose and teleology (1965, 3-25).
[79] See for example (Reale 1990, 337-338).
[80] For an excellent analysis of Ethics and final cause see (Hughes 2001).

upheavals taking place on our planet…" (Wallace 1997, 55) It constrains and enables formal causes insofar as one type of material affected by one forming force will be shaped differently from another affected by the same force (Kurki 2006, 27). Consequently, two different types of matter with the same formal and efficient causes, will not result in the same outcome.[81] Material causes are causal only when they are put in context of the object or concept in question. Kurki relates that marble of an object is not causally significant until it is understood as the material of a statue (2006, 27-28) – an artefact with formal, efficient, and final causes. Material causes are then necessary (but not sufficient) causation components with specific properties affecting the object or event. The marble statue is necessarily heavy not because of its form, artist, or purpose; it is heavy because, ceteris paribus, it is made of marble and not balsa wood. But to say that something made of marble is necessarily heavier than something made of balsa wood is not true if the marble artefact is much smaller. Furthermore, if one tried to make a statue from another material in the same conditions, water for instance, they could not create the same form.

Questions arise concerning the scale of material causes we should investigate. Wallace (1997) highlights the infinite divisibility of matter that one may be tempted to engage in. Any substance can be further reduced to subcomponents and its material composition can be deconstructed. Bhaskar points out that, when engaging an individual, one engages everything the individual has come in contact with and been influenced by, "including institutions, traditions, networks of relations and the like—which are irreducible to people" (Bhaskar quoted in King 1999, 271). Objects and events are more than the sum of their parts. Although it may be enticing to deconstruct an object or event to its most basic and indivisible parts, it would be unwise and fruitless to do so. Socrates makes this point about analyzing his sitting in jail. He mocks the idea that the cause of his sitting in jail could be reduced to the "bones and sinews, and the bones are hard and have joints… and the sinews can be contracted and relaxed… and so… make me able to bend my limbs now, and that is the cause of my sitting here with my legs bent" (Hassing 1997,

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[81] In Kant's resolution of causality, responding to Hume's concept, he explicitly includes material causes, noting that different substances have different innate causal powers that effect different end states of the substances involved in an event. See for example Watkins' description of Kant's position especially as it relates to Hume's concept in (Watkins 2005, 230-297).

214). Answering why Socrates was sitting in jail with an answer about his physiology, albeit technically correct, misses the point that he was in jail because he accused of a crime. Reducing the materials involved in any event too far misses the forest for the trees.

1.1.2: Aristotle's Formal Cause

Aristotle describes the formal cause as "the form and the pattern, that is the definition of what the thing is, including the genus to which the thing belongs and its differentiae" (Taylor 1969, 54). Formal causes, for Aristotle, are the set of characteristics that define something to be one specific manifestation of an object, different from others with the same or similar materials. Wallace makes the point that formal causes are what we immediately recognize and allow us to categorize things. Two people may be very different in how they look, but we still know them as people. Likewise, two trees may be made of different wood and have different shapes, but we still know them as trees. And because we can classify things according to their forms, we can understand differences between things and begin to speculate about their material and final causes, even if we do not have knowledge of them through prior observation or experience. Without this analytical understanding of forms and their importance, Wallace asserts (1997, 56-57, quote on p 57), "We would be limited to cataloging individual after individual, without ever being able to discern natural kinds, that is, the substantial features they have in common, notwithstanding the many ways they differ numerically within a species or class."

When considering formal causes for things people create, formal causes are the design the creator has in mind or the form it is inclined to take because of its final cause – its purpose. It is important for the Aristotelian formula to maintain a separation between the formal cause of a thing (its design and specific manifestation) and the force forming the material into that thing. Although form may be affected by external forces because of the intended design, those external forces themselves are not the formal causes - those forces are the efficient causes of, or reacting with, the material of the thing itself. Taylor (1969, 55) underscores this point noting that Aristotelian formal cause is "a characteristic or set of characteristics

of that thing, not an external causal agency operating on the matter of that thing." Like the material causes, scientific revolution philosophers argue that form is not causal.

Form, according to Bacon, Descartes and others, is merely the outcome of previous material and efficient causes (Hassing 1997, 38-42). The crux of the argument against formal causes is that forms are not inherent. Hence forms have no causal power but rather are the result of causal powers. Strauss took this further, adding:

> Contrary to Aristotle's view according to which multitudes have a natural fitness either for being subject to a despot or a life of political freedom, fitness for either form can be artificially produced if a man of a rare 'brain' applies the required degree of force to the multitude in question; compulsion can bring about a 'change in nature.' (quoted in Hassing 1997, 38)

This anti-determinist view of causality eschews the notion of formal causation, insinuating that if humans had the full knowledge of all the antecedent variables of an object, its form would be known and therefore not causal. Newton advances this point in *Principa* asserting that any substance can be manipulated into any form, given the proper force, "and that all the intermediary degrees of qualities can be successively induced in it" (quoted in Hassing 1997, 40). However, these arguments, similar to the arguments against final cause, relate most closely to forms of things in nature, or engendered and unchangeable characteristics that are the essence of an object. But none of Aristotle's formal cause detractors would take issue with the concept that the form of an object affects its telos, ceteris paribus. Take for example a large sheet of silk. If a person jumped out of an airplane with a piece of silk folded into a series of knots, connected to that person by numerous strings, the purpose, or telos, of that silk would not be to safely parachute its passenger to the ground and the jumper would probably die. Unknotted, the piece of silk would catch air and lower its passenger slowly to the ground. The same parachutist and their equipment's material cause (silk) with a different formal cause (open sheet or series of knots) has a different efficient cause (slowing or not slowing) and different final cause (a parachute or a series knots flapping above a falling person). Clearly, the formal cause of one thing can be directly related to the final cause of another: the person probably jumped out of the plane *for the sake of* fun, which is clearly not the telos where the parachutist knotted the parachute's silk, more likely *for the sake of* death. The question then is not

whether something can be transformed into something else. Instead, the formal cause is the actual form of the artefact or phenomenon and how that formal cause affects the explanandum.

1.1.3: Aristotle's Efficient Cause

Aristotle's 'efficient cause' is "the original source of change or rest" (Reale 1990, 39). It is "the producing agency or factor that sets into motion" (Hughes 2001) some thing or some event. As examples, Aristotle suggests "a seed, a doctor, a planner, and any other kind of agent: they are all causes in the sense that they initiate change or stability" (Aristotle 1996, 40). Efficient causes are the 'pushing and pulling' forces that put a thing into motion. Kurki criticizes that focusing on this kind of 'cause' as only the kind we should investigate has made scientific investigation reductionist and blind to the greater causation puzzle (2006, 147-188, 2008). Efficient causes are often extrinsic according to Aristotle. They are the most obviously causal variables in an 'if a, then b' understanding of what constitutes a cause. However, efficient cause is directly linked to the other three Aristotelian causes (Kurki 2006, 219-230).

Efficient causes in social sciences are the agents and their actions that form or set in motion social phenomena, but we must be careful to not reduce efficient causes to only 'if a, then b.' In social movement studies, efficient causes are actions by and involving movements like frame, identity, and emotion 'work,' resource mobilization, and contentious exchanges. If using traditional SMT models like the dynamics of contention perspective or Opp's structural-cognitive analysis,[82] the Humean understanding of efficient cause where 'a' precedes 'b' holds. But, from a structuration or an Aristotelian causation paradigm, requiring 'a' to precede 'b' is somewhat problematic. Kurki points out that the tendency to require 'a' before 'b' temporally disallows the mutually constitutive nature of many social phenomena (2006, 179-181). Likewise, Giddens' (1979, 2009) and Bourdieu's concept of structuration does not require a temporal placement of the structure's existence or the agent's understanding of the structure. Rather, it is the collective understanding of the structure that gives meaning and reality to the

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[82] See Chapter 3 for descriptions of these SMT models.

structure and habitus all at once (Bourdieu 1977, 2005a, 1994). And, even if it were possible to determine

the starting point of structuration, Kurki posits (2006, 180), "the requirement of temporal priority of the

form 'X must be prior to Y' confuses more than it clarifies." The temporal nature of our current

understanding of efficient cause is not the only problem.

In addition to considering causation atemporally, there is a further broadening of what affects

things in Aristotelian causation. Aristotle distinguishes between proper and accidental efficient causes, or

that which is immediately or intentionally affective and that which is somewhat removed from the

immediate event or unintentional, but still affects some thing or outcome.

1.1.4: Proper and Accidental Causes as Efficient Causes

For Aristotle's argument, the entity shaping the material, and only that entity, truly knows the

material and its end design; this type of formal cause is termed "proper" or "prior" cause. On the other

hand, materials can and often are formed by forces that have no knowledge of the material and do not

intend to shape it; this type of formal cause is "accidental."[83] (Aristotle 1996, 38-48) A drunk driver may

hit a house, causing a hole, but the driver's intention certainly was not to make a new door for the

unsuspecting and unlucky residents. Concerning social events, accidental causes can be even more

determinative in a final cause than goal directed behaviour. For instance, Bouazizi self-immolated as

personal protest and draw attention to his own plight. But his act resonated across the world, a

precipitation of effects that Bouazizi did not foresee and certainly did not intend. Bouazizi's act of protest

accidentally caused (partly, but significantly) the Arab Spring revolutions. Similarly, when a government

represses, it intends to quell dissent, but repression can galvanize resistance.[84] These accidental causes are

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[83] The debate of accidental causes in this sense should be viewed as somewhat different from the debate concerning chance and *per accidens* – the concept that events that are surprising are not necessarily unpredictable. Rather surprise events are unforeseen because the observer does not understand the entirety of the relevant substances and forces involved. For a full explanation concerning *per accidens* see (Allen 2015).

[84] Accidental causes in the Aristotelian sense are not analogous to what Carr describes as "accidental causes" (2001, 91-102). Carr uses the term 'accidental' in a number of ways, but mostly in the familiar sense of something that happened unintentionally. Importantly, Carr's accidental causes are what Hewitson describes as 'singular' causes

so ubiquitous and so important to our social world that Marx remarks, "men make their own history but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves."[85] Accidental efficient causes are just as important as those proper efficient causes that are intended and, if human, known by the force causing them to occur.

<u>1.1.5: Aristotle's Final Cause</u>

Aristotle's 'final cause' is "the end", "what something is for," (Aristotle 1996, 39) or "the [cause] for the sake of which" (Johnson 2005, 65). For artefacts and human constructed phenomena, this end goal, or telos, is the result of material, formal, and efficient causes in some specific combination. Aristotle uses the example of why a man goes for a walk, which is *for the sake of* his health (Aristotle 1996, 39). Health, or a healthy man, is the material, formal and final cause sought, designed and executed (efficient cause). Aristotle clarifies that teloses may be achieved through different series or a compilation of many of the first three causes, all leading (hopefully) toward the end:

> And then there is everything which happens during the process of change (initiated by something else) that leads up to the end: for example, the end of health may involve slimming or purging or drugs or surgical implements; they are all for the same end, but they are different in that some are actions and some are implements (Aristotle 1996, 39).

This plasticity of different material, formal, and/or efficient causes leading to the same final cause is important to Aristotle's four causes analytical model and is exceptionally important for understanding social phenomena where it is rare to have a sterile ceteris paribus of material, formal and efficient causes.[86]

Aristotle uses 'four causes' language and refers to final causes throughout his works, albeit implied rather than explicitly. For example, his most famous use of final cause for the state is found in Politics:

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and not 'repeated' causes. That is, singular causes are events that hold little explanatory power because they are insignificant to the event and, if repeated without the other more causally important variables, the same outcome would not occur, per Hewiston's review of "accidental causes" in history scholarship (2014, 91-93).

[85] This quote was taken from Hollis' and Smith's point that, in international relations, actions take place in situations that are structured by social constraints (1990, quote on p 5).

[86] I expand upon chains and plasticity in means to ends in Chapter 5.

> …the state comes into existence… for the sake of a good life… Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part… The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-suffing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole (Aristotle quoted in Reale 1990, 337-338).

Moreover, his entire argument in *Ethics* is teleological in nature. Aristotle presents his argument for pursuing and attaining eudaimonia, or happiness/fulfillment (depending on the translation) as the ultimate goal for human life (Hughes 2001). While Aristotle's final cause examples like someone going for a walk are of simple phenomena, his broadest concepts are underpinned by his theory that a Natural Ontology or the Natural forces that drive people biologically (which drives people socially) are what Teleologically drives everything we do.

Final cause is the most debated aspect of Aristotle's four causes, and arguably why the scientific revolution abandoned Aristotelian causation. I will unpack this concept show its use for analyzing social movements in the following chapters. First, it is useful to first examine why philosophers and scientists rejected final causes so we can determine if their critiques maintain for social movement studies.

1.2: Final Causes: Critiques, Uses and Different Kinds of Teleological Analysis

The concept of causation moved away from Aristotle's long accepted 'four causes' beginning largely with the scientific revolution throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Scholars argued it was deterministic and not explanatory, reading final cause as a form of determinism. However, most thinkers, including scientific revolution theorists, often accept and use each of Aristotle's four causes use for social sciences, albeit not under the same names. Just as Aristotle implicitly invokes final cause in *Politics* and *Ethics*, scientific explanation often uses teleology, but without explicitly acknowledging it. Following the scientific revolution, Kant and Hegel reengaged final cause in their works on epistemology, theorizing teleological analysis at the levels of Naturalism and agentic functionalism, which are essential to the model I propose. Upon exploring scientists' and philosophers' critiques of these issues, I find the problems are resolvable at least for social sciences and, importantly, deepen SMT while providing better analytical focus and structure.

<u>1.2.1: Final Cause and Teleology</u>

The sciences have found Aristotle's 'four causes' problematic because of his concept of final cause and teleology, especially concerning Natural things but not necessarily for human-made objects or social phenomena. That god could be invoked as the final and unknowable cause for aspects of nature that are difficult to explain made scientific revolution thinkers leery of the concept. However, what intentionally created objects (artefacts) are *for the sake of* is not argued against. Social phenomena occupy some space between nature and artefacts and are difficult to place for scientists and philosophers alike. Although Aristotle uses examples of each of these things for his explanation of final causes, I argue it is more useful to explore each separately and understand 'final cause' in two ways – Natural Teleology and functional teleology, the latter of which applies to both Naturally and humanmade intentionally constructed things.[87]

For Natural things, Aristotle uses the example of the oak tree; for mechanical objects, a chair; and for psychological/social things, someone going for a walk.[88] In each of these, the telos has a different degree of discernibility. Of Nature, the Telos is only speculated upon and is the crux of the final cause debate which has lasted for centuries. Natural Teleology implies some innate tendency toward an intrinsic goal (that may or may not be reached) or intelligent design for the thing itself. Scientific inquiry of Natural Teleology requires positivistic or subjective speculation from observing substances and interactions urged toward some end by Teleological forces. Accordingly, Natural Teleology has been charged with anthropocentrism or dismissed as tautological. Whereas the final cause of natural things may seem opaque, Aristotle's example of an acorn's final cause being an oak tree seems rather simple and self-evident. Surely, some similar simple analyses of Natural Teleology can be made elsewhere.

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[87] Of note, although I briefly summarize scientists' problem with Teleology concerning natural things here, I engage the discussion in greater depth below. I do this because much of the information in that section is more useful in explaining my use of teleology from a social movement perspective than simply giving a short history of the debate over Teleology as background.

[88] Aristotle used teleological language throughout *Ethics* and *Politics*, but his explanation of final causes is made most explicit in *Physics*.

For mechanical objects, teleology is simple because it is a functional teleology. A mechanical object is designed for a specific purpose. Even if it is utilized for something other than its purpose, the telos can often be discerned from the object's evident mechanical function, so long as it can perform that function if properly employed. A chair is for sitting in, even if one can use it as a stool to reach something high. More simply, the creator of the mechanical object could be asked "what did you make this thing to do?" Likely because of the simplicity of identifying purposed for objects that humans intentionally create, this form of teleology is not challenged, but it is often ignored. Whereas this form of teleology may seem too evident to be worth including, it is extremely useful as a heuristic in structuring and focusing functional analysis.

Psychologically and socially constructed things occupy a middle ground between Natural and human constructed objects. The reason some social thing exists or occurs, or why that social thing or occurrence is possible is often assumed to be evident. But there are countless reasons why social things exist and why social actions occur. Although an analyst may ask why someone did something and the answer satisfies, the questioner may have not ascertained if the answer given was true or what actually caused the action and event. In other words, understanding the goal does not explicate what was necessary and sufficient for the achievement of the telos.[89] Moreover, the underlying social impetus of action in question may remain a mystery if the answer is a justification and not the motivation. When answering why someone went for a walk with the answer 'for health,' we accept that walking is good for one's health. However, if someone walked for their health but walking was actually bad for their health, then we can surmise they walked *for the sake of* satisfying a belief or desire more than they walked *for the sake* of physical health. Accordingly, social sciences' philosophical traditions divide teleology into studies of behavior, will, and reasons,[90] which must be approached from philosophical, sociological and

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[89] A full explanation of this point is in the section on teleology below.
[90] Hewitson's (2014, 151-158) explication of the theoretical debates surrounding reasons as causes (or not) draws attention to the extent to which reasons effect actions and how reasons are affected by causal conditions that "change the decision matrix." However, reasons are often moral justifications after actions as noted by Pareto: "Man, although impelled to act by nonlogical motives, likes to tie his actions logically to certain principles; he therefore invents these a posteriori in order to justify his actions" (Pareto 1991, 6).

psychological perspectives, complicating analysis. Studying teleology in social sciences from various approaches is useful, but final cause analysis must be part of a four causes structure and focused on the broader '*why*?' explananda.

Scientific investigations of the world during the scientific revolution gradually moved away from asking why things in Nature occur the way they do and focused entirely on 'how' Nature works in the name of scientific modernization.[91] However, there is a common misreading of the critiques from scientific revolution intellectuals concerning Aristotle's four causes, especially regarding final causes and teleology. Indeed, scientific revolution thinkers' and their followers' rejection of Natural Teleological explanations for events is confined to natural sciences - that things in Nature have an innate Teleology and progress toward some "good" (ideal or designed) end. But, these philosophers often give explicit exception to things of human design and social phenomena. Below, I will relay some of the key thoughts on final cause and teleology throughout the last few centuries to elucidate how we moved away from Aristotle's four causes because scientists wished to focus on efficient causes alone.

Descartes famously eschews Aristotle's formula stating "we must not inquire into the final, but only the efficient causes" (Kurki 2006, 31). Although he does not deny the possibility of Teleology, he says that "... the species of cause termed final, finds no useful employment in physical [or Natural] things; for it does not appear to me that I can without temerity seek to investigate the [inscrutable] ends of God" (McFarland 1970, 44). In contrast, regarding Teleology in *Méditations*, Descartes refers to God's intended ends concerning the human mind and brain *for the sake of* preserving health (Hatfield 2008, 412). And throughout his writings on 'Sensation,' Descartes refers to actions that are "conducive to the continued well-being of the body", inferring that the Natural Teleology of human life involves preservation.[92] Indeed, Hatfield suggests that Descartes accepts Teleology for both matters of divinity and those of a social human nature (Hatfield 2008, 412). Moreover, as Descartes proffered that "a cause must

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[91] As noted in the introductory chapter, SMT followed a similar epistemological evolution. There are, of course, exceptions to this within the physical sciences, especially biology, which analyzes growth and change having implicit goals of individual and species survival.
[92] For a full explication of teleological overtones in Descartes' writings see (Simmons 2001).

contain *everything* that comes about in its effect,"[93] he would likely find no fault in including material and formal causes in 'why' explananda, and was thus not quite as reductionist as is often portrayed from his famous outburst against final cause.

Bacon also staunchly opposed Teleology for biological things saying that, "Inquiry into final causes is sterile, and like a virgin consecrated to God, produces nothing" (Woodfield 1976, 3). Central to his rejection of Teleology is his critique of its anthropocentric nature. He believes explaining things as purposive in the way people act purposively is detrimental to objective scientific inquiry in the physical sciences. He declares that teleological explanation for Nature "rather corrupts than advances the sciences." But, he makes an exception in the same sentence for teleological investigations "such as have to do with human action" (McFarland 1970, 43-44). However, Bacon is generally dismissive of teleology and does not delve critically into the subject. It seems his understanding of teleology is superficial and conflated with 'goal directed behaviour' – a concept I explore further below.

Kurki (2006, 2008) and others (Winch 2007, xi-xii, Popkin 1979) highlight Hume's role in constricting the concept of 'cause' to observable 'if A then B' positivism. Like Descartes and Bacon, Hume's argument against final cause focuses on instilled or innate purposes of Nature. His main contention is that a Natural Teleology paradigm tends toward anthropocentricism as people throughout history explain the final cause of something as *for the sake of* human use and life, rather than for its own sake or Nature's sake (Popkin 1979, 78-84). Likewise, he and other thinkers[94] find people tend to explain things they can't understand citing religion and unknowable intelligent design rather than putting in the scientific work to find better explanations than 'because god made it so.' Accordingly, he determined that we must derive laws about Nature from discrete units of information that can exist separate from all other components of causal explanation (Saikal 2004, 11).

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[93] Author's emphasis (Broughton 1985, 107-108).
[94] For examples, Descartes and Bacon as noted above; also Spinoza (Popkin 1979, 70-74) and Kant as described below (McFarland 1970, Watkins 2005).

But, Hume does not wholly reject the idea that there is an ordering of Nature and that there is some

Natural Telos toward which all living things act *for the sake of*. He asserts:

> The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or knitting-loom. It's cause, therefore, it is more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation or vegetation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be something similar or analogous to generation and vegetation (Hume quoted in McFarland 1970, 54).

Hume goes on to say,

> Now if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual circulation of matter in it produces no disorder: A continual waste in every part is incessantly repaired: The closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: And each part or member, in performing its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole (Hume quoted in McFarland 1970, 105).

So, Hume does not completely reject final cause. Rather, he seems to find it a more fruitful scientific

pursuit to answer 'how?' explanandum rather than seek an ultimate 'why?' final cause explanans of

Nature or even final cause explanans of Natural phenomena.

Like Bacon, Hume does not challenge using a teleological heuristic for intentionally designed

things, especially where the designer is identifiable (i.e. the designer was a person and not a reference to

some deity). Hume says that "A purpose, an intention, or design strikes everywhere the most careless, the

most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it"

(McFarland 1970, 44). Oddly, although Hume reduces our current concept of 'cause' and condemns

Aristotle's four causes (Kurki 2006, 2008), he evidently finds scientific utility for teleology for the things

people create. In fact, he even suggests that the Nature has an innate plasticity wherein Natural things find

different ways to reach some Telos. He posits, "Experience... proves, that there is an original principle of

order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to

ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance" (McFarland 1970, 52).

Hume's concept of teleological plasticity seems closest to current understandings and

interpretations in philosophy akin to Braithwaite's "plasticity" - a selection of choices, many of which can

lead to the same end (Woodfield 1976). Similarly, regarding epistemology and our aggregation of

knowledge *for the sake of* a greater understanding of everything, Bacon suggests that "all partitions of

knowledge be accepted rather for lines and veins, than for sections and separations" (Barnouw 1981, 612). Pearl (2009, 417) underscores the point that there is potential for interdicting factors in any situation and that, "intervention amounts to a surgery on equations (guided by a diagram) and causation means predicting the consequences of such a surgery." But, Pearl points out (2009, 420) that we tend to relegate lesser causal factors so that in our studies the "rest of the universe is then considered *out* or *background* and is summarized by what we call *boundary conditions*." Likewise, whereas Hume largely ignores teleological '*why?*' explanations in favor of more constricted '*how?*' analyses in scientific practice, his epistemology is more akin to Kant (below) and Pearl's point above, preferring to relegate final cause to the background while deducing answers to '*how?*' questions from observations.

Although Hume, Descartes, and Bacon, are credited with reducing scientific inquiry to the most parsimonious and observable variables, they are not quite as reductionist concerning teleology for social and some Natural phenomena, even if they do not engage in teleological analysis. Kant and Hegel, on the other hand, brought *thinking* about teleological investigation back to the fore of the philosophy of science, even if they did not quite bring teleological analysis back into common practice.

1.2.2: Kant and Hegel on Teleology as a Heuristic

Kant and Hegel gave significant philosophical attention to the concept of final cause and teleological explanation with each finding slightly different utilities for teleology as a heuristic. Kant believed that teleology should remain a backdrop heuristic that encourages investigation to proceed as if there were an order to Nature. Hegel, on the other hand, championed a more active role for teleology in scientific and philosophical inquiry, seeking what the Teleology of Nature is. But Kant and Hegel found it difficult to resolve how we could or should (respectively) use teleological explanation for *both* things that we create, and the things Nature creates.

1.2.2.1: Kant and Teleology

Kant revisits and grapples with Teleology throughout his works, but most directly in the second half of his "Critique of Judgement," his 'Third Critique.' He separates final cause into "what he calls 'relative' (relative) and 'internal' (innere) purposiveness of Nature" (McFarland p 98). He says that "a thing exists as a Natural purpose if it is (though in a double sense) both cause and effect" (McFarland p 101). Kant also uses the term 'external' (aussere) as a synonym for relative purposiveness and the term 'absolute' as a synonym for internal purposiveness (McFarland p 98). So, Kant explicitly conceptualizes Natural Teleology (internal purposes) and contrived functional teleology external to the thing in question differently; a distinction I find necessary to clarify final cause analysis and teleological explanation.

Kant deconstructs Natural final causes into the final cause of Natural (read: biologically created) things (Naturzweck) and the final cause of Nature itself (Zweck der Natur). Whereas there are likely similarities between the final cause of Nature as a whole and the Natural final cause of a thing of Nature, Kant suggests we can do well to estimate the final cause of a Natural thing because we can observe it, often from beginning to end; we are outside of it. But we cannot estimate the final cause of Nature itself because we cannot go beyond Nature to observe it as a whole. He uses the example of vegetation and that we can see its components that are internally *for the sake of* its growth, existence, and reproduction and externally it may be *for the sake of* consumption by an animal which is then consumed by a man, "But we do not see why after all it should be necessary that men should in fact exist" (McFarland, p 112). This supports Kant's assertion that we can use Natural teleological investigation as a heuristic for discovering further systematic unity; but, we should always question our teleological hypotheses since we can never be fully sure that we understand the teleological chains of this being *for the sake of* that, further *for the sake of* another in a complete system of Nature (McFarland, pp 113-114).

Regarding functions within Natural things, Kant recognizes the value in analyzing teleologically the mechanics of Natural things and the correlated Humean 'if A then B' causality of intentions and mechanical function. However, he does not suggest that we can replace internal purposiveness with mere mechanical function.

A fundamental force, which creates an organization, must therefore be thought of as a cause operating on the basis of purposes, and in such a way that these purposes must be basic to the possibility of the effect. But we know such forces according to their intentional basis, through experience, only in ourselves, that is to say, in our reason and will, as the cause of the possibility of certain effects directed entirely toward ends, namely, artifacts. Reason and will are with us fundamental forces, of which the latter, insofar as it is determined by the former, is the capacity to produce something according to an idea, which is called the purpose (McFarland 1970, 64).

His skepticism regarding finding a Teleology of Nature, and his resolve to seek objective mechanical functional teleology should not be reduced to understanding Kant as valuing only efficient causes (e.g. deVries, p 56); quite the opposite. He says, using obvious 'four causes' language, "the cause which accumulates the appropriate material, modifies and fashions it, and puts it in its proper place, must always be estimated teleologically" (Kant quoted in McFarland p 111). For Kant, a thing does not come to be solely because the right chemical materials are proximal - there is a Natural inner purposiveness that drives something of Nature to come to be and to continue to be (McFarland p 111). However, Kant notes that a thing's external purposiveness (i.e. something used for some end) does not necessarily signal internal purposiveness of the thing used (McFarland, p 100). An animal eating a fallen apple, Kant would posit, does not mean the apple is *for the sake of* the animal's survival; that apple's final cause is still becoming an apple tree. On a Teleology of Nature itself (Zweck der Natur), Kant sought to use functional teleology as a passive heuristic and ordering principle for how everything interacts in Nature, but he did not resolve if there is definitely a Teleology of Nature. He declared that although we must presuppose purposive relationships among things in Nature if science is to be a non-futile pursuit, that does not necessitate us to presuppose innate purpose in things of themselves to investigate how things work, or what causal forces there are (McFarland 1970, 92). Kant argues that, within Aristotelian philosophy concerning things in Nature "these ideas [what is an ideal or perfect thing] are none the less completely determined in the Supreme Understanding, each as an individual and each as unchangeable, and are the *original causes* of things."[95] Postulating on the randomness or systematic arrangement of things in Nature such as "sand, the neighbouring sea, the winds, or even animals with their footprints," he declares:

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[95] My emphasis. Here Kant is referring to Plato's concept of intelligent design as teleologically instructing 'creatures' to attempt to form into the ideal of its kind (McFarland 1970, 44, Gelvin 2005, 40).

"Hence, it would seem that the cause of the production of such an effect could not be contained in the mere *mechanical operation* of Nature, but as if, on the contrary, a conception of such an object, as a conception that only *reason* can give and compare the object with, could be what contains causality."[96] He finds that Teleology is "intended to aid us merely in completing the unity of Nature in accordance with universal laws" (McFarland 1970, 32-37). Specifically, he says that Teleology "postulates a complete unity in the knowledge obtained by the understanding, by which this knowledge is to be not a mere contingent aggregate, but a system connected according to necessary laws" (McFarland 1970, 66).

Leaving the Teleology of Nature aside, Kant proposes we use a Natural Teleological heuristic to take mechanical explanation as far as we can: "no one has ever yet questioned the correctness of the principle that when judging certain things in Nature, namely organisms and their possibility, we must look to the conception of final causes [Endursachen]" (Kant quoted in McFarland, p 123) Teleology serves investigation as "a heuristic principle for researching the particular laws of nature, even granted that we would want to make no use of it for explaining nature itself" (Kant quoted in Kreines, p 127). This heuristic, Kant believes, is as accurate as we can be since we cannot fully understand the final cause of Nature itself because of our part in it. Kant supposes that either human reason or Nature itself encourages us to seek Natural Final Causes. However, because we could never truly understand the final cause of Nature itself, we must rely on Natural Teleological investigation only as a heuristic for hypothesis-making and seeking functional teleological causation in Natural things and events (McFarland pp 123-124).

In the end, Kant resolves teleological and mechanical explanation as complementary and not contradictory (McFarland pp 128-120; Kreines, pp 128-130). He states:

> It is at least possible to regard the material world as mere appearance and to think as its substrate a thing-in-itself which is not appearance. Further, we may endow this substrate with a corresponding intellectual intuition (even though it is not ours). We should thus be provided with a supersensible, although unknowable, real ground of nature, to which we ourselves belong. So it would be possible to consider according to mechanical laws that which is necessary in nature as an object of sense. At the same time we could consider according to teleological laws the agreement and unity of its particular laws and the forms resulting from them, which must be judged by us to be contingent as

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[96] My emphasis (McFarland 1970, 44) .

far as mechanical laws are concerned... Thus we should judge nature according to two principles, without the mechanical mode of explanation [Erklarungsart] being excluded by the teleological as if the two principles contradicted one another (Kant quoted in McFarland, pp 128-129).

I read and use Kant in this way: I may assume that much of what a living thing does is *for the sake of* individual and species survival, and I can call this a Natural final cause. A person eats to live and has sex to reproduce. Because a person enjoys eating and having sex does not mean that the purpose of those acts is joy and not living and reproducing; rather, I would then assert that the biological, psychological and social reactions that constitute joy in eating and sex are *for the sake of* encouraging those behaviors. Here, the Natural Teleology heuristic relates the mechanics of emotion to the mechanics of survival. Emotions and other internal urges are an aggregation of Natural Teleological causation *for the sake of* some further final cause. Further, I do not have to know why people exist in the first place, as per Kant above, or what mechanical or other teleological purpose people have in a Teleology of Nature to deduce the Natural Final Cause nexus of joy and survival. In essence, we can uncover median Natural Teloses without necessarily knowing the Teleology of Nature itself.

Moreover, this deduction is not tautological; it is indeed falsifiable. We can observe instances where people derive joy from destroying life. So, we would not say that joy is always *for the sake of* survival. And we can observe instances where eating and sex do not lead to living or reproduction. So, we must further refine how joy in eating and sex are *for the sake of* individual and species survival so that the hypothesis of causation is falsifiable, but not false.

1.2.2.2: Hegel and Teleology

Hegel's thoughts on Natural Teleology build from Kant and urge us to seek the Teleology of Nature rather than just using the possibility as a heuristic. Zwez (2014) distinguishes Hegel's and Kant's concepts of Teleology as constitutive and regulative respectively, and DeVries (1991) calls them functional and intentional respectively; both are good descriptions. Hegel points out that if we deconstruct something into its physical components, reconstructing the chemistry and physics of a thing does not explain it as a whole thing or the part it plays in Nature (Zwez 2014, 57-59); hence, living beings must be

explained Teleologically. He analyzes, "The organism is a manifold, not of parts but of members" that "are what they are only by and in relation to their unity" and as a means to an ultimate and holistic end. We do not understand blood by the chemical compounds that make up blood, but by what blood does *for the sake of* a living organism. Without understanding what blood is for, our scientific inquiry would halt at the lines of chemistry and we would understand very little about the world (Kreines, pp 142-144). Through attempting to gain an understanding of something's "Reason" (the necessity or logic of a thing's constitution), we drive at a more complete understanding of why things are the way they are, in addition to why they are ordered as such – "a higher method of observing nature."[97] Hegel emphasizes reproduction as Teleological in the Aristotelian final causation sense insofar as a biological thing has in its Nature the final cause of "produc[ing] itself as another individual of the same species" so that "the product is, is also the producer." Hegel resolutely takes the Aristotelian view of teleology that a thing's genesis, "which was an act of presupposing, now becomes its production" (Kreines, p 144-147, quote on p 144). This is a step further toward formulating a holistic Teleology of Nature than Kant who was satisfied to analyze parts' functions to the whole. Kant notes "It is necessary for [anything to be regarded as a product of nature] that its parts should combine to form the unity of a whole by being reciprocally causes and effects of each other's form" (McFarland, p 104). Hegel's extension of Kant encourages us to use Natural Teleological analysis as more than functional analysis since we could analyze physical and chemical reactions supporting an apple's functions ad infinitum, or we could simply say that the (Kantian internal) final cause of an apple is to grow an apple tree. Hegel believes we can indeed see the forest for the trees if we sometimes step back from analyzing the reproduction of cellulose.

Hegel's emphasis on holistic scientific understanding through Teleological analysis does not discount the utility of mechanical explanation or scientific inquiry that seeks to find laws of Nature. However, he believes that law-governed mechanical functional teleological explanation does less than Natural Teleological explanation can (Kreines, p 148). For, in Hegel's view, if we believe that science can

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[97] Hegel quoted in (DeVries 1991, 53)

only improve our ability to predict patterns by identifying powers and interactions, "then we must always remain ignorant of the real explanations of things, or else nothing ever happens for any reason at all" beyond materials knocking per chance against each other and reacting according to the laws of physics and chemistry (Kreines, pp 149-150).

Concerning Teleological explanation, Hegel is more confident than Kant in that he believes we can use a Natural Teleological heuristic to build toward and deduce the Teleology of Nature. He views Teleological explanation in Nature as how we seek Nature's functional and constitutive Ontology – Natural forces that drive and guide materials to form the way they do *for the sake of* some end (DeVries 1991, Zwez 2014). In this way, Hegel brings final causes back into scientific explanation in such a way that Natural Ontology is what we aim to eventually uncover through scientific investigation of Humean causal interactions of particularly formed materials. Contrary to Kant, Hegel sees Natural Teleological explanation as that which should be prioritized above mechanical teleology. He does not view the Teleology of Nature quite as incomprehensible or as futile a pursuit as Kant does (Kreines, p 151).

Kant's and Hegel's concepts of teleology and how final causes can be analytical useful are indeed different, but they would agree that Natural Teleological inquiry is not anachronistic as did many of their philosophical and scientific predecessors. The scientific revolution moved physical and social sciences away from Aristotle's four causes mostly because of the contested final cause, but had no quarrel with teleology regarding mechanical or social things as I find above.[98] However, they did often conflate intentional behavior under this heading of teleology; a problem I explore next. In seeking to hone science into their modern concepts of objectivity, the 'four causes' baby is thrown out with the bathwater and holistic explorations of 'why' explananda are often reduced to studies of a single variable or a few variables that fail when tested against complex phenomena like social movements. Despite Kant's and Hegel's attempts to re-deepen and re-broaden analysis, teleology remains largely absent from the social sciences, at least as an overt analytical mechanism or heuristic. But, I argue, if we unpack final cause into

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[98] For a good overview concerning the misreading of Aristotle's concept of teleology by numerous philosophers through the ages see (Johnson 2005).

Natural Teleology and mechanical functional teleology, final cause is an exceptionally useful heuristic for epistemologically deepening inquiry while structuring and focusing analysis. Kant and Hegel struggled to use teleological analysis as a singular heuristic to explain everything. But, focusing on one phenomenon – e.g. social movements – and demarcating Natural Teleology from functional teleology and from goal directed behaviour makes it easier to use final cause as a heuristic lynchpin in a complete four causes analysis.

1.3: Conclusion – Summary and Next Steps

In this chapter I reviewed Aristotle's four causes and highlighted how the sciences generally moved away from Aristotelian causation, favoring a Humean 'if a then b' causality paradigm for scientific explanation. Whereas material and formal causes are made largely implicit and less problematized than efficient causes in the post-Humean paradigm, they are not contentious like Aristotle's final cause and teleological explanation. But, I argue, problematizing material and formal causes is an important part of holistic analysis, improved further by a final cause heuristic.

Despite scholars' issues with teleology, the four causes and teleological explanation are not completely absent from recent scientific and even social-scientific investigation, perhaps best evidenced by Kurki (2006, 2008). She reintroduces Aristotle's 'four causes' as an international relations phenomena analytical model to broaden and deepen our concept of causation. She rebukes that (2006, 286-287) "epistemologically, methodologically and ontologically reductionist and parsimonious frameworks tend to oversimplify and, hence, fail to explain" why events occur and in what ways. Kurki seeks to rectify this analytical poverty through Aristotle's 'deeper' and 'broader' concept of causes, namely the 'four causes' (2006, 1-20). Opening the concept of cause up to more than 'if a, then b' encourages understanding the underlying structures that develop objects' relationships and precursor events resulting in the observable.

Kurki argues not *just* for methodological plurality to find different laws in the same positivist epistemology. Rather, she suggests, we can seek the forces and relationships driving similar or different events through positivist accounts of events and constructivist explorations of meanings, contexts,

reasons, and varying structurations of actors' habitus and praxis. This methodological pluralism and inclusivity, she posits, encourages "*an alternative interpretive horizon*" that exceeds rationalism and Humean epistemology (2006, 189-241, esp pp 239-241). Aristotelian causation does not require positivist and empiricist observations to make sense of the social world through systematic unbiased experience (2006, 15, 99-106, 155, 159-161). 'Flat' analyses of observables would no longer ignore constructivist analyses of socially created dynamic structures.[99] Furthermore, social structures are dynamic (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, Fierke 2012b, Bourdieu 2005a, 1994). So, finding observable regularities in events is not always possible and reduceable to Humean causality – patterns may well be only superficial correlations.

I posit Aristotle's 'four causes' is useful for SMT similar to how it Kurki showed its use for international relations. Just as Kurki attempted to bridge international relations epistemological divisions, I argue that we may synthesize structuralist and culturalist SMT approaches in the Aristotelian 'four causes' causation construct. I contend that a 'four causes' analysis of social movements may uncover some ontological underpinnings driving movements phenomena. Additionally, a four causes outlook on movements may encourage new research methods relying on a revised epistemology for accumulating knowledge and understanding social movements. However, to make the four causes paradigm useful for SMT, the concepts of final cause, teleological explanation, and ontology need to be unpacked and resolved.

In the next chapter I unpack the different concepts of teleology and ontology in philosophy and sociology and explain how each is important to a striated analytic model of causation. Distinguishing concepts of final cause is important to my method as final cause is the heuristic upon which I build my broader and deeper SMT analytical mode. If we use the same term to describe different concepts, we cannot progress analytically. In addition, these concepts of final cause constitute the three deepest levels

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[99] Kurki rails against the 'flat' ontology of the Popperian positivist tradition which rejects deeper contextual understandings of events throughout her book, but especially attacks the superficial nature of positivist and rationalist approaches in Chapter 3 (2006, 88-123).

of causal explanation in the model, so clarifying the distinction is paramount. From this heuristic basis, I

will then build out my four causes analytical model for SMT.

Chapter 2 – Levels of Cause

<u>Concepts of Teleolology and Ontology in Philosophy and Sociology</u>

The beauty of the four causes is the simple elegance of the analytical model – just four causes. But its complexity is hidden in its final cause, which is arguably the most valuable of the four causes. It is the crux of my analytical 'agenda' as it does more and requires doing more than material, formal, or efficient causes in guiding explanation. Final cause – what something is *for the sake of* – is not a straightforward concept. It requires significant unpacking to understand the different ways we think about what something is for or what the end state (telos) of a thing is. Through understanding the different ways we talk about final cause and teleology, we can demarcate them analytically and then synthesize these concepts into a holistic analytical model rather than using the same lexicon to talk past one another. Unpacking the concept of final cause forms the basis of the remaining analytical process in a 'four causes' causation model that I will apply to social movement research

When thinking about a 'final' cause, it may be tempting to seek the most final of all causes, the telos of all supporting teloses. But such a task is unadvisable and not useful for furthering causal explanation in SMT. Take for example the ultimate final cause of being what one is meant to become, qua Aristotle (Woodfield, p 4). If the purpose of a natural thing is to be what it was created to become – a rosebud to a rose or a baby to an adult – then surviving to a point should be all that any species seeks to do. However, people do many things that have little to do with survival. We eat, seek shelter, and reproduce *for the sake of* individual and species survival. But it would be difficult to explain how watching a cat video on YouTube has anything to do with survival. Yet, millions of people do just that every day *for the sake of* enjoyment and entertainment. 'Because it was fun' and 'because people seek pleasure and fun' are satisfactory teleological explanations if we can simply accept that humans are generally inclined to pleasure. We could try link enjoyment and entertainment to survival, but it would complicate analysis more than it clarifies. This originating concept of survival is a satisfactory and

undeniable explanation for many actions. However, it is only one of many complementary or conflicting Natural Teleological explanations and it is unnecessary to try and link all human action to survival.

Rather than trying to aggregate all things into an ultimate telos, it is useful and sufficient for SMT studies to seek teleological explanation that is further down the chain of precipitating final causes. We must still delve as deep while not diluting the analytical power of the teleological heuristic in SMT analysis. We must still see a logical chain of progression from social movement material, formal and efficient causes to the teloses we use to guide analysis. Trying to extend a teleological chain too far would be akin to Laplace's Demon, and indeed fruitless in the way the Scientific Revolution thinkers viewed teleological explanation. If we set aside seeking to understand the full Ontology of Nature, and proceed between Kant's claim that we should analyze functional teleology while accepting a Teleology of Nature without seeking it, and Hegel's position that we should seek the Teleology of Nature. We can proceed assuming that there is potentially some superstructure and that substructures that probably aggregate into, we allow an ultimate Natural Teleology to tug at our explanations, but not consume them. By keeping teleological explanation close to the phenomenon in question, final causes remain a useful heuristic for focusing analysis rather than widening it to include too much.

We can come to know a final cause or the teleology of a thing or action because we can observe the effect with some regularity or relate it to some similar cause and effect. It is in this way we hypothesize, adduce, and test our assumptions. We deduce teleologies from speech or actions. We try to predict an end or goal and try to reach it intentionally because we see the effect and desire it. However, we can fail even if we seem to do all the same things. The hedonism paradox is a prime example. Just because collecting stamps make Anna happy does not mean that collecting stamps will make Mike happy, no matter how closely he mirrors Anna's collection. Here, the telos for Anna is the action of stamp collecting and the process is what makes her happy. Mike seeks the telos of happiness but does not understand a stamp collection isn't what generates happiness. It is the process that is pleasurable, and only if that process is pleasurable to that person. So, Mike fails to achieve happiness despite his goal and actions *for the sake of* happiness. In addition, some final causes may simply beyond our comprehension because we will never

observe the ultimate effect, as is the argument against a Teleology of Nature that I note from Kant's critique below. Moreover, we may not have the capacity to observe some teleological causation because it is beyond human (and even our machines') senses' capacity to perceive and understand. Sayer, a critical realist, relayed this aptly in describing transcendental realism exclaiming, "wouldn't it be extraordinary if our senses were coextensive with all of the phenomena of the universe" (Sayer, p 133).

In this chapter I will first differentiate among Natural Teleology, functional and agentic teleology, and goal directed behaviour. I will then distinguish among Natural Ontology, critical realist ontology, and the 'lifeworld.' I do this to place these concepts into the first four levels of causal analysis in my model. The last level of my model is the observable resultant events that people observe, interpret, and understand as evidence of causal effects and as being causal impetuses themselves. I will not explore this last level here because it is more easily understood and explained within the context of a particular phenomenon. As such, I will give the observable events level due treatment in reviewing social movement phenomena throughout the remainder of this thesis.

2.1: Natural Teleology, functional teleology and 'Goal Directed Behaviour'

Above, I broadly described some differing concepts of final cause and teleological explanation which I term Natural Teleology, functional teleology, and goal directed behaviour. It is useful, and necessary I argue, to divide final cause into Natural Teleology and functional teleology. I make this distinction because it forces a rethink and hopefully a broadening of epistemology by urging researchers to seek and understand causation beyond human agency and intentionality. In addition to Natural Teleology and functional teleology there is intentionality, or 'goal directed behaviour,' which is often subsumed under teleology – I argue it should not be. These distinctions are important because attempts to reconcile the three into a single concept of teleology makes teleological analysis too difficult to be useful. Each is useful at distinct analytical levels with strong theories in philosophy and sociology to support them. Following, I will draw the distinction among these three related but different concepts, similar to how Woodfield distinguished the three concepts in his seminal work on teleology (Woodfield 1976).

Only with this distinction and placement can we resolve issues regarding final cause for SMT and effectively use a four causes concept of causation for SMT.

2.1.1: Natural Teleology

Natural Teleology is what is often debated and is the central critique of the intellectuals of the Scientific Revolution and those following in their tradition as reviewed in the last chapter. It is also the least familiar concept, so I will give more space to explaining Natural Teleology than functional teleology or 'goal directed behaviour' below. Natural Teleology is the concept that there is some design to things that orders materials, forms, and actions in such a way that they are moving toward some unknown goal or end by design, as with Kant's and Hegel's thoughts on a Teleology of Nature. This end could be designed by a deity or simply a direction toward which all Natural things are drawn, like matter is drawn by gravity. Implicit in this concept of Natural Teleology is that there is a constitutive and functional Teleology of Nature that drives and orders Natural things toward the ultimate end (Zweck der Natur). Kant and Hume make the possibility of a Natural Teleology most explicit in postulating that there seems to be some order to things in Nature, although they do not commit to what that order is. Kant suggests we should seek to understand how things function within a likely order of things whereas Hegel encourages us to seek what that order is to uncover the Teleology of Nature.

The key problem of Natural Teleology is that the deepest, inherent Telos of Nature and Natural things is unknown and, many argue, unknowable. Attempts to deduce Ontological constitution and function are charged with being anthropocentric and subjective, as noted above by Kant;[100] however, some scholars have tried. MacIntyre suggests that a Natural Telos of society is utopia (Bielskis 2008). For MacIntyre, "natural law" drives a society toward its "common good", its Teleological end. But, because state societies incorporate so many divergent understandings of immediate common goods (i.e. the best state of socio-political affairs possible at present, not the Aristotelian ideal state) MacIntyre says they are

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[100] See also Wright's discussion of anthropomorphism in teleological explanation (Wright 1976, 12-21).

doomed to live in contention. As noted in the last chapter, Kant left the question about a Teleology of

nature unresolved but concluded that it is not detrimental, and potentially useful, to operate under the

presupposition that societies move Teleologically toward some equilibrium.[101] This is similar to Wendt's

(1999) suggestion that states in the system of anarchy are moving toward some Teleological end, without

knowing exactly what that end is. Whereas I do not claim that any of these hypotheses are correct, the

idea that societies are underpinned by balance and Naturally meander via contention and change toward

some Telos is a more useful heuristic and better supported by history than hypothesizing society has no

Teleology and is completely anarchic and chaotic – history suggests individualistic social anarchy is not

the natural order for people, or most animals for that matter.

An alternative Natural Teleological hypothesis is that all Natural things tend toward progress *for

the sake of* survival or actions *for the sake of* what is good. Wright makes the case that Natural functions,

especially evolution, are *for the sake of* progress. He claims that any adaptations are Naturally

Teleologically for bettering a living organism's chances of survival. This applies to both defensive and

predatory functions (Wright 1976, 84-108). Woodfield picks up Wright's and others' arguments that

Natural things may act and adapt *for the sake of* individual and species survival. He also makes the case

that survival may not be good and that Natural things are driven by what is ultimately good – good for the

individual, good for the species, and good for Nature as a whole. Death and destruction of an individual

or species may be 'good' for another species or for Nature as a whole (Woodfield 1976, 113-140). These

ideas hint toward a Teleology of Nature for living organisms, a project Hegel would believe to be the

ultimate goal of knowledge seeking.

Findlay (1964) finds Hegel's concept of final cause and Natural Teleology is close to Aristotle's

intent. Hegel urges us to understand final causes as that which drives everything toward some ideal end,

an Aristotelian 'form,' "not simply to study things as they are, and to collect concepts which more or less

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[101] This is echoed in economics and economic sociology theory in the equilibrium concept of Pareto-efficiency, albeit in a more deterministic fashion. See for examples (Ross 1973, Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman 1997, Beckert 1996).

cover their peculiarities, but rather to see in them approximations to rather full, rich types which they do not adequately represent at all" (Findlay 1964, 7). Hegel's Natural Teleology is also the most useful for investigating social constructs of universal ontological social forces like 'good,' 'bad,' and 'justice.' If, for example, we accept that there is something of Nature that causes people (and potentially other animals) to seek justice for wrongdoings, we can then use a hermeneutic approach to the structuration of what 'justice' means to answer questions involving acts related to justice. We interpret ontological social forces and strive toward their Aristotelian 'form,' which is made an imperfect practice by our differential structuration of the ideal of those 'forms.'

If teleology is used in the above manner, the critique that teleological explanation is deterministic and tautological can also be resolved. I resolve it this way. If we expand Kant's concept of teleology beyond being a passive heuristic, we can use Teleological explanations of Natural things to guide our functional teleological analyses, allowing for mechanical variances introduced by chance or intent. Here, it is useful to refer again to Braithwaite's and Woodfield's uses of plasticity in teleology (Woodfield's, pp. 39-54). If we assume that the purpose of a plant is *for the sake of* individual and species survival and that it will grow for those purposes, that does not mean that we cannot alter its form as it grows by using different soils or kinds of light. The same seed would grow differently given different conditions, but that does not contradict the fact that it will try to grow because it is biologically programmed to. We can also say that people will do different things to shape a social movement and its actions, successes, and specific goals. And if we could replicate the environment exactly and alter a movement's material, formal and efficient causes, the outcome would likely be the same, but the social movement would always be *for the sake of* effecting some change. In my conception of how we bring agency, mechanism, and teleology together, a final cause drives something toward some end, but how it proceeds and where exactly it ends up in relation to its Natural final cause is determined by agentic actions and the mechanics of material and formal causes interactions.

Following Kant, I do not suggest we must hypothesize about the ultimate Teleology of Nature as a necessary precondition for using teleological explanation as a hermeneutic for understanding Natural

phenomena. I do not say that *the* ultimate purpose of humans is this or that. Likewise, I do not attempt to explain that society is ultimately *for the sake of* some telos that is then *for the sake of* humanity with some grand Natural purpose, as Aristotle seeks in *Politics*, or as Hegel aims toward. This conceptualization of final causation can be read as lying between Kantian and Hegelian concepts of teleology. By asking what some broad phenomenon is *for the sake of* Naturally Teleologically, we predispose our causal inquiries and explanations to better complement and build upon each other. But we do not need to necessarily ask what that broad phenomenon is further for the sake of in a grand Teleology of Nature to find satisfactory causal explanations about the phenomenon in question. Kant's insistence that for teleology to be explanatory that "parts (as far as their existence and their form are concerned) are possible only through their relation to the whole" (Kant quoted in Kreines 2015, 84) is useful both as a heuristic for median Natural Teloses and as a background guiding heuristic that one final cause likely serves a greater, aggregate final cause.

Hegel's insistence that we could try to piece together teleological analyses toward some ultimate Natural final cause helps resolve Kant's philosophy's distance from accidental or external causes. However, we do not have to adopt a pure Hegelian position on seeking the Teleology of Nature to use his quest as an analytical guide. My conception of Natural Teleology lies between Kant's passive heuristic and Hegel's active search for Nature's final cause. Again, I posit using median Teloses, rather than Hegelian ultimate Teleology of Nature, as an analytical guiding heuristic for understanding cause and some order in Nature as Kant resolves. We can say that social movements are for the sake of effecting some change like we can say an acorn is *for the sake of* becoming an oak tree with confidence and without knowing what the entire system of Nature or society is working toward. By positing phenomena are for this or that median Natural Telos, without seeking *the* Telos of Nature, we guide inquiry to seek how material, formal, efficient and final causes contribute to some further final cause.

Setting a hypothesized telos and aiming all analyses of phenomena toward that telos could be tautological, so it is necessary analyze alternative material, formal and efficient causes that could result in the same telos and hypothesize alternative teloses for the same material, formal and efficient causes.

Rather than plasticity, this is more akin to what Woodfield terms the 'cybernetical approach.' The cybernetical approach posits that, given a goal, there may be multiple mid-point goals and structural restrictions that constrain and enable the path to the goal. The goal seeker receives and interprets progress feedback and revises the path (Woodfield 1976, 182-199). Woodfield's cybernetical approach applies to Natural Teleology where there is no contrivance or sentient intent in the case of plants and animals adapting and evolving to overcome adverse conditions. But the cybernetical approach also applies to functional teleology and goal directed behaviour where the creator has a goal in mind and intentionally aims and re-aims (goal directed behaviour) material, formal and efficient causes that function (functional teleology) to reach a goal in mind.

2.1.2: Functional teleology vs. Goal Directed Behaviour

The second type of teleology is functional teleology. This type of teleological analysis seeks the necessary and sufficient conditions that drive a thing's emergence and give it the ability to do what it does or be what it is. It is, in effect, an analysis of the material, formal, and efficient causes required to bring about the thing of phenomenon in question. In this type of teleology, the goal is known because it is articulated by the creator, or the end state is known because we observe it. These mechanistic explanations are the bulk of SMT approaches, which I explore in the following two chapters. Because functional teleological analysis is what we do most regularly when we explain how something reaches an end, I will not expound upon this kind of analysis much other than to distinguish it from intentionality because they are different and require different kinds of analysis. It is necessary to drive an analytical wedge between functional teleology and 'goal directed behaviour' so we can use each discretely and appropriately.

To distinguish functional teleology from goal directed behaviour, take the example of a person building a chair. We know that, from the shape of a chair and from the traditional use of a chair and from our desire to sit somewhere with our legs bent at approximately 90 degrees and our upper body in an upright position that chairs are good places to sit. What's more, we can ask the person who built the chair

what it is for. Without ever having seen a chair before or knowing what a chair might be for, the creator could tell us that he built the chair for people to sit and we would assume that the purpose of the chair – its telos – is for people to rest in. Most would say that this would suffice a chair's final cause as being *for the sake of* someone who wants to sit down. But, what if, upon walking up to the chair, we realize the chair is actually very small – so small that even a toddler could not sit in it. Despite the builder's intent to build a chair for people to sit in, he measured wrong. The builder did not build something *for the sake of* sitting on in Aristotelian final cause terms because a thing's final cause, or actual purpose, is different from the maker's intended purpose, which is an efficient cause. The efficient cause of intent may be congruent with an artefact's final cause, but it is not in this case. However, a child may find use for it as a doll's chair. So, despite the creator's intent, the chair is *for the sake of* play and not *for the sake of* rest. Here, the functional teleology of the chair – a thing *for the sake of* play – did not meet the goal directed behaviour of the builder – to build something for people to sit and rest upon. In goal directed behaviour, the efficient cause (the person) that is part of the holistic cause of the thing may not achieve the goal because they simply did it wrong. In functional teleology, the goal is only not reached if an external cause intervenes. This is the difference between functional teleology and goal directed behaviour.

We can make the distinction between functional teleology and 'goal directed behaviour' in social scientific terms – it is what is *believed* to be necessary and sufficient and all that constitutes what *is actually* necessary and sufficient.[102] The decision to attempt something is an efficient cause – it is the 'agent that initiates change,' in Aristotelian efficient cause language (Aristotle 1996, 40). If the attempt fails, the person likely did not understand the functional teleology of their goal. Having a goal in mind and acting is an *attempt* to act teleologically – formal and efficient causes of people's ideas and intents, or their 'goal directed behaviour.' Actions that *do* contribute to goal attainment are functionally teleological.

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[102] MacIntyre (1969, quote on p 70) made the connection between beliefs and actions nothing that "actions are uninterpretable and unidentifiable apart from beliefs," but qualifies that beliefs do not necessitate actions. MacIntyre posits that beliefs are only part of causal formulae wherein intervening beliefs or events must also be considered.

So, while there is a dialectic between 'goal directed behaviour'[103] and functional teleology of an event, the decision itself is not teleological - it is simply 'if a, then b' 'goal directed behaviour'.

A social event example that distinguishes between functional teleology and goal directed behaviour is in the concept of revolution. The word revolution describes both the efficient cause and the final cause. A revolution is understood as an action that necessitates an outcome; that is, the act of the revolt results in a mass, rapid and forceful change in government. We also understand from this single word many of the material and formal causes related to the efficient and final cause, such as a non-state, the mass of a state's citizens whose beliefs about governance have formed in such a way that they believe the in-place structure to be incompatible. On the other hand, a revolt that fails is not a revolution. Importantly, we know the final cause of a revolution without knowing the material, formal and efficient causes that are necessary and sufficient for revolution in a specific time and place, but we do know that they were present. Functional teleology then helps identify what people construct that is necessary and sufficient for some end. In fact, studies on revolutions typically begin with the telos and then attempt to sort out the immediately necessary (closing in on sufficiency) material, formal, and efficient cause variables. Hence, the utility of considering the telos of a movement is in understanding the material, formal, and efficient causes that contribute to the phenomenon in question (if they are sufficiently present) or the nonoccurrence (if they are not sufficiently present). Functional teleology helps create a framework for working backwards or forwards through the material, formal and efficient causes that achieve some phenomenon, which can then be linked to the natural emergence of the phenomenon *for the sake of* some Natural Telos.

'Goal directed behaviour' provides us with an explanation of why a single decision, or a set of decisions, was made because someone or some group wanted to reach a goal; it does not tell us which decisions were necessary and sufficient to drive the actions that actually achieved the goal. However, analyzing 'goal directed behaviour' is particularly useful in predicting what actions people will take in

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[103] This is how Wright (1976, 31-57) suggests we expand upon Taylor's restrictive definition of teleology vs. 'goal directed behaviour.'

certain situations. In analyzing 'goal directed behaviour', it may be best to undertake an anthropocentric and cultural-anthropological approach to understanding why people believe that certain actions result in certain goals - the teleological dialectic between action decisions and the goal. Because we are dealing with human social phenomena, we have a deeper understanding of intangible underlying forces that drive phenomena, like 'justice,' because we experience them whereas we do not experience and understand other aspects of nature, like being a flower (Wright 1976, 23-57).

As argued above, I posit what is commonly understood as teleology should be understood in three ways, one of which is not teleology at all. Natural Teleology guides us to seek *why must* something be or occur. Functional teleology structures and focuses analysis on *how it is possible* something is or occurs, analyzing *how* necessary and sufficient material, formal and efficient causes make *possible* the phenomenon or event. 'Goal directed behaviour' analysis brings attention to the *reasons and motivations* people have for doing things to achieve some end, which explains why there is often disparity between intent and achievement.

2.2: The Use of Teleological Explanation

I have thus far deconstructed thinkers' concepts of teleology into three distinct concepts. Natural Teleology is most closely linked to naturalism and innate biological, psychological and sociological drives to act. Functional teleology is means-ends analysis where a creator uses material, formal and efficient causes to create some thing or end state, or where we can work backward from a thing or end state with an unknown creator and deduce what was necessary and sufficient for it coming to be. Lastly goal directed behaviour, a desire or purposeful action, is not a final cause – it is an efficient cause or, in Aristotle's terms "a seed, a doctor, a planner, and any other kind of agent: they are all causes in the sense that they initiate change or stability." These agents attempt to act teleologically, but they and their attempts are efficient causes. My next task is to fit these three concepts into my causal model as they relate to the somewhat more concrete concepts of ontology and lifeworld. However, they do not quite fit neatly.

I divide causation into five 'levels', a term borrowed from and based on Searle's (1996) and Bhaskar's (1979, 2013b) works on the striated levels of reality that complement Aristotle's four types of cause. These levels are 1) the Natural Ontological level, 2) the institutional ontological level 3) the lifeworld, 4) the agentic goal directed behaviour level, and 4) the observable actions and outcomes level. In each level, there are more than one of Aristotle's causes. Most levels consist of two of Aristotle's causes – either final and efficient or formal and material; the critical realism level includes all four causes. This is because critical realism's concept of ontology is a midpoint between pure naturalism and structurationism. Having demarcated the boundaries of teleology into naturalism and functionalism, it is now necessary to make the same distinctions in the concept of ontology.

Like the last chapter, I give the most space to final causes for two reasons. First, as noted in chapter 3, the concepts of final cause as Natural Teleology and functional teleology (as part of human agency) are often conflated with intentions and reasons as they relate to goal directed behaviour in the social sciences; they are different. Final causes drive questions about how underlying Natural Teleological forces drive a social movement to act and how agentic actions informed by agents' lifeworld are constrained and enabled by ontology. Second, final causes are largely missing from SMT and therefore require the most instruction. Many recent social theorists consider phenomenology as ontology, leaving no analytical room for realist concepts of underlying Natural forces. After all, what term indicates something deeper than ontology? As such, SMT only attempts to elucidate social structuration forces underlying observable phenomena and does not dive deeper. Using generalizations of observations, e.g. that identity is important to social movements, we can then begin to create hypotheses about Natural Teleological and agentic teleological final causes (as both figure into social movement phenomena) and the corresponding causal forces of ontology and structuration.

In the following section, I distinguish among Natural Ontology, institutional ontology, lifeworld, structuration, and goal directed behaviour to build an outline of my analytical framework that incorporates Aristotle's four causes. I argue that assuming and not actively engaging a structuration paradigm makes SMT epistemologically narrower than it probably should be.

Levels of Causation	
Natural Ontology/Natural Teleology – Final and efficient causes	Real, intangible forces and structures driven by nature and innate human impetuses (i.e. unadulterated biological, psychological, and social) affecting actions and effecting outcomes that are independent of and preexist any social constructs.
Institutional ontology/critical realist teleology – Final, efficient, formal and material causes.	Real, intangible forces and structures driven by longue durée social, political, and economic structures and institutions that preexist everyone living in them but are not independent of a continuous historical chain of the people who construct and reify them.
Lifeworld – formal and material causes	That which composes structures, institutions, rules, and norms. Lifeworld results from the dialectic structuration of habitus through praxis that people draw from to interpret meaning and construct beliefs about the world and their agency within it.
Agency/functional teleology – final and efficient causes	Agency in the form of intentionality and goals where people's reasons, motivations, justifications and intentions coupled with their corresponding actions drive them to some end. In functional teleology, we know the end because it has occurred or because it is intimated by a person or group and we observe the actions that are necessary and sufficient for the end. People use feedback from observations and intentionally act trying to achieve goals.
Observable – material and formal causes	Actions, evets and phenomena that can be observed and inferred or interpreted from individuals' and collectivities' behavior.

2.3: 'Ontology' in Classical/Naturalist Realism, Critical Realism, and Social Structurationism

Because final cause and the related concept of ontology in philosophy and natural sciences are understood differently from the social sciences and sociology specifically, it is necessary to delineate different fields' uses of the term ontology. Understanding ontology differently means that what is considered 'ontological' and a final and efficient cause in sociology paradigms would be considered material and formal causes if understood from a classical realist or a natural science perspective. I will draw out the connection between Natural and functional teleology and ontology as it relates to naturalism,

critical realism, and structurationism with some introductory engagement with SMT; I will more deeply

engage SMT approaches in the following two chapters. My descriptions of these theories will be brief

simplifications because my focus is not an exegesis of political and social theory, but these concepts

require introduction as they underpin much of SMT. My description of ontology as it relates to Natural

Teleology will be the shortest because I have engaged Natural Teleology above already with some

reference to Natural Ontology. In addition, I dedicate a significant section to uncovering Natural

Ontological drivers of social movements in Chapter 5. My engagement with critical realism and

structurationism will be lengthier, especially because they overlap and because structurationism is the

implied theoretical backbone of SMT. The point of this overview is to highlight how researchers'

epistemologies and methodologies are biased by their acceptance of one epistemological paradigm,

neglecting others that are relevant and explanatory.

2.3.1: Natural Ontology and Classical Philosophical Realism

The classical philosophical realist tradition views ontology as is what is real, or the "science of

being" (Lowe 2006, 3-5, Kukla 1998) that is most closely linked to a naturalist concept of causation.

Kurki conceptualizes this as that which is affected by a 'natural necessity' in the ontological underpinning

of the world that has, "certain real properties and causal powers" that constrain and enable events,

sequences, and relationships (2006, 196-197, quote on p 197). Niiniluoto (Niiniluoto 2014) suggests that

realism has three common criteria: mind-independence, causal power, and knowledge by abductive

reasoning. Ontological forces cause observable action, human action in the case of social movements,

which is different from human intentionality and agency causing action caused. The ontology of human

sociality is a mess of causal interactions that push and pull people to do things. Gravity forces an apple to

fall straight to the ground unless aerodynamics, wind, and other mitigating forces act upon the apple's

trajectory. Testing the theory of gravity and finding that it is not the only force acting upon an apples'

differing trajectories does not mean that gravity is false, just that gravity is not the only causal force. Reed

clarifies:

Real structures are the underlying generative mechanisms and processes that scientific theory references and that explain the behavior of things in the world. Thus [empirical] "facts" are indeed transitive and socially produced in the sense that they require humans to experience and process them, but real structures are not, and hence science retains a real referent, and thus its intelligibility and rationality (Reed 2008, 104).

In social sciences, classical realists search for ontological forces that drive individuals' and states' actions. Power, for example, is a commonly theorized force especially in the political realist tradition.[104] Power instigates people's actions seeking some form of power. What exactly 'power' is in nature is unclear; we simply know that we want something we innately understand as 'power.' Other candidates for Natural Ontological forces in naturalist concepts of social science realism are system equilibrium, and rational choice; the latter underpins early SMT approaches. Realism in sociology aims to unearth the underlying properties of social life that are "ahistorical, whose efficacy is determinative, and whose workings are mechanistic" (Reed 2008, 105-106).

For a thought experiment to cleave naturalist realism (or as Reed (2008) calls it, "strict realism") from critical realism as used in sociology, imagine everyone over the age of 1 day disappeared. The world would be left with only infants. Now, imagine these infants somehow survived individually in a coma-like state until they were old enough to survive in a completely wild, natural world. The human world would then consist of young people with no knowledge of anything. We can assume they would be driven by Natural instinct – survival as a basis and everything that extends from it. In this world people have no historical biases of society, modes of production, understandings of power structures, norms of social interaction, etc. If we can say that this or that type of structure *must* emerge because no matter how many times we reset the human race it always emerged, then we could say that specific type of structure is Naturally Ontological because it preexists any human knowledge of it ever and is independent of agency. Humans *must* order into that specific type of societal structure because it is of our nature and biological requirement to do so. This would be to claim that there is a determinism in the Nature of people that requires them to evolve to this or that structure. This determinism is of the Natural instinct variety and we

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[104] See for examples (Morgenthau 1964, Waltz 1979, Gilpin 1984, Carr 2014, Klosko and Rice 1985).

could liken it to the determinism of consumption and procreation – things we are biologically predisposed

to do. However, given the array of societal structures, trajectories of social evolution, and modes of

production throughout history, I posit that we cannot claim to know what type of social structures will

emerge. Hence, no form of society that we name by its mode of production or governance is Naturally

Ontological – none preexist our creation of that specific type.[105] What *is* Naturally Ontological, is that

some structure will emerge.[106]

2.3.2: Institutional Ontology

Institutional ontology as described by critical realism cuts across three categories: observable

objects and events; socially created and imagined structures and rules governing actions; and underlying

structures and forces. Bhaskar and most critical realists consider that which causes something but

preexists our perception of it to be real (Alvesson 2009, 41). The key difference between critical realists'

and structurationists' concepts of causal structures is that critical realists argue longue durée institutions

like modes of production or social (e.g. tribal) structures have causal powers that pervade society and

endure despite attempts to change them. The material, ideational, artefactual or social objects with which

people interact are largely observable but are causal. Kurki notes that while, "estimates can be made of

what my happen in the future" these predictions must be "based on understanding the social structural

environment and its complexity," which is strongly constrained and enabled by the structures critical

realists consider ontological (2006, 196-218, quote on p 216). Habermas summarizes ontological

causation in critical theory with a description of the effects of a capitalist society:

> capitalist modernization follows a pattern such that cognitive-instrumental rationality surges
> beyond the bounds of the economy and the state into other, communicatively structured areas of
> life and achieves a dominance there at the expense of moral-political and aesthetic-practical
> rationality" resulting in "*a colonization of the lifeworld*… the imperatives of the sub-systems make
> their way into the lifeworld from outside – like colonial masters coming into a tribal society – and

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[105] This is the argument King (King 1999) makes against the critical realists' claim of ontological structures,
although I disagree with King and find a middle ground for critical realism below.
[106] I will refer to this point of this thought experiment later when making the claim that communality is Naturally
Ontological.

force a process of assimilation upon it (Habermas quoted in Callinicos 1999, 287, italics in original).

We can discern norms and rules surrounding those objects' causal forces through discourse or inference. But the underlying structures and forces that make possible the causal power of objects acting according to rules and norms (or breaking them) constitutes critical realists' institutional ontology.

Critical realists call these ontological structures and forces that drive action 'mechanisms,' (Bhaskar 2013b, Alvesson 2009, Danermark, Ekstrom, and Jakobsen 2001) an analog used possibly intentionally in the SMT 'dynamics of contention' approach, but done without direct reference to critical realism (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003). Alvesson (2009, 42) summarizes that for critical realists, "Causality refers to the nature of an object, which tells us what a certain object can or cannot do in terms of its effect… Objects have power connected to their structure; the mechanisms which produce effects are outcomes of this structure." A judge can cause someone to go to prison due to the real status of their position and authority within the structure of governance. The judge's role is a socially structured designation assigned to a person that is only accepted in a specific structure created, interpreted, and accepted by other people in a given society. Social constructionists would focus on the structuration of society that grants the judge power. Critical realists instead analyze the real power and causal potential a judge has, regardless of how much a guilty prisoner refuses to recognize their power, stemming from the near-omnipresent institution of jurisprudence.[107] The structure enabling the judge's power is a mechanism for critical realists and would be considered ontological. Whereas one may argue, like King (King 1999, see also below) that critical realists' concepts of 'ontology' are still only historically-developed, human-made constructs, Habermas' point above punctuates that critical realism indeed occupies a middle ground between pure Naturalism and social structuration.

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[107] This is, of course, debatable as noted in Fierke's "warden's dilemma" (2012a, b) wherein power structures can be challenged. However, power structures are slow and often resistant to change, making the extant structure real and causal in the meantime.

Because critical realism's ontology is different from Natural Ontology, but also different from Lifeworld and structuration, critical realism's ontology occupies a middle ground. Bhaskar conceptualizes this space between Natural Ontology and social constructionism and posits:

> we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis, designating the 'slots', as it were, in the social structure into which active subjects must slip in order to reproduce it; that is, a system of concepts designating the 'point of contact' between human agency and social structures. Such a point, linking action to structure, must both endure and be immediately occupied by individuals (Bhaskar, 1979, p. 51).

Critical realists argue institutions and mechanisms constrain, enable, and drive action in society. For example, someone born into a Western capitalist society would be driven to consume, compete, and produce differently from someone born into an Eastern or Middle Eastern socialism-based society. Or, more starkly, someone consciously living and interacting in a modern nation-state would act different from someone living in a tribal culture that is secluded from and ignorant of state boundaries and laws. And the nation state must be analyzed as different from modes of production, contra Marx, understanding the ontological nation-state real forces driving actions that are different from, but in conjunction with, that which derives from capitalism, socialism, communism, etc. Skocpol notes the "international states system as a transnational structure of military competition was not originally created by capitalism. Throughout modern world history, it represents and analytically autonomous level of transnational reality – *interdependent* in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it" (Skocpol 1979, 22). Everything about different societal institutional structures inform the way the people in them construct their understandings of reality, cause, norms, etc. and pervades every aspect of life and doing. And whereas people can act to change those historically longstanding institutions, much of what they do will unintentionally reify those institutions and mechanisms with change only occurring over the longue durée. In effect, critical realists argue institutions and mechanisms are so historically grounded and pervasive in society that they are here to stay. However, some structurationists would disagree with this.

King claims that, contra Bhaskar, "Social reality is coextensive with the individuals involved in it and is neither more nor less than those individuals" (King 1999, 272). He posits:

Even though roles are independent of an individual, who might fill them, roles do not pre-exist all individuals. A role only exists because a wider network of individuals in the past and up to the present recognise a role's existence and have certain expectations about what the role's purpose is and, therefore, what someone who takes on that role should do. Thus, the position of bank manager certainly pre-exists any particular incumbent but it does not pre-exist nor is it autonomous of all the other individuals who work or have worked in the bank. The role of bank manager exists insofar as others recognise such a role's function and bank managers who fill this role are judged on whether they perform their duties adequately by the other people in the bank. A role is independent of any individual filling it but not of the wider network of individuals in which it is embedded and which individuals recognise it. There is no such thing as a role which is not known by anyone and, therefore, it is wrong to say that roles are autonomous or objective. To argue that the role is emergent from individual practice is simply to fail to recognise this wider network which gives the role meaning and power. In the end, emergence's claim that society is more than individual practice even though it is the result of individual practice results from the adoption of too narrow a perspective, where the social theorists do not consider all the individuals together who have contributed to this social phenomenon (King 1999, 273).

King critiques Bhaskar at the level of Naturalism, noting that only established institutions have institutional roles, but this seems to conflate Bhaskar's critical realist view of ontology with Natural Ontology. King points out that we cannot say that the role of 'banker' preexists all humanity. However, we could say that the role of 'leader' as one who leads a specialized task for a group is present in many hierarchical animal species, and certainly in humans. 'Leader' is thereby Ontological from a Naturalist perspective. The Natural role of leadership preexists the specialized leader, or 'bank manager,' who is part of the socially constructed and reified banking institution. In this scenario then, an analysis of 'bank manager' bridges the Natural Ontological role of 'leader,' the ontological institution of 'bank,' and the socially constructed understanding of *that* bank manager's powers, functions, and duties. Rather than being coextensive with social reality, critical realism elucidates the bridge between Natural Ontological forces that drive general functions and behavior, and the social structuration of society that constrains, enables, and gives specific contextual meaning to those functions and behaviors.

2.3.3: Lifeworld and Structuration

The other end of the spectrum concerning what drives events is social constructionism, which rejects classical and critical realist concepts of ontology. Social constructionism (and the more extreme sociological lines of scholarship that are social relativism and deconstructionism) is the culturalist turn in sociology writ large that gives analytical primacy to human interpretation, eschewing universal laws of

what must be. 'Ontology' for social constructionists, if it is called that, is the social creation, reification and changing of rules, norms, culture, and social and political structures that govern and inform people's actions and choices. These concepts owe largely to the writings of Husserl (Carr 1970, Husserl 1970, Ricœur et al. 2007), Habermas (1992), Giddens (1979, 2009, 1993), Berger and Luckmann (1991), Searle (1996, 2006), and Bourdieu (1977, 2005a, 1994, 2005b).

The 'insider' hermeneutic perspective claims there are no causal rules or forces beyond those that the actors construct in their minds and others' minds,[108] repurposing the term 'ontology' to mean the structuration of habitus and praxis that constrains and enables actors (Smith and Hollis 1990). Giddens (1979, 2009) takes these seemingly opposing paradigms and combines them in a dialectically forming and reforming interactive system of structuration, often applied, if implicitly, in SMT.[109] Giddens work on structuration (1979, 2009, 1993), the dialectic of a society forming institutions that drive rules and norms according to which society is then expected to act, is the basis for social constructionism. Bourdieu introduces the concept of habitus (1977, 2005a, 1994), which is the resultant milieu of structuration. He terms the process of structuration 'praxis,' or the practice of creating and reifying social constructs of institutions, rules and norms. However, Bourdieu treats habitus largely in its 'doxic,' or unchallenged, state. Whereas he leaves room for change by breaking doxa, there are undoubtedly instances where habitus is anything but doxic. Consider, for example, a child who has grown up in Helmand province, Afghanistan since 2001 or in the West Bank. To them, conflict is normal. Praxis of contention is habitus. Therefore, analysts must be careful to not conceptualize habitus as complacent and doxic, or what western European and North American societies would consider 'normal.' Instead, as Crossley briefly hints at (2002b, 189-190), habitus can be a contentious one. In the case of social movements, conflict and

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[108] Ontology is an underlying structure that is unchangeable. That constructivists conceive of the structure of international relations as constantly reformed suggest they reject ontology in favor of social structuration (Berger and Luckmann 1991, Alvesson 2009, Searle 1996, Wendt 1992).
[109] See for examples (Benford 1997, Crossley 2002b, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, Maclure and Denov 2006, Armstrong and Bernstein 2008, Buechler 1995b).

resistance are praxis and habitus for career activists (Valocchi 2013). However, the structuration of habitus through praxis is the result of still deeper forces.

The most inclusive account of structuration that leans toward exploring ontology and borders on a critical realism approach in Searle (1996, 2006), although his use of the term 'ontology' differs from my use in this thesis. Searle regularly uses the example of money to argue that there is a relationship between what he calls "ontologically objective" materials like paper and ink (material and formal causes per Aristotle), and "ontologically subjective" meanings ascribed to the green inked symbol "20" and other markings on a particular shape and type of paper. That relationship between objective and subjective ontology represents money. Further, he argues, there are "epistemologically objective" acceptances of the "ontologically objective" brute facts and subjective meanings that one can exchange that paper for goods that both parties agree are worth 20 dollars. This only works though if the two parties share the same socially constructed meaning of that money; my 20-dollar bill is meaningless and nearly worthless to a society without a mechanism for currency exchange.[110] Searle links tangible materials to their representations in a social structure and indicates how some objects have objective meanings while others have subjective meanings. These are useful articulations in the link between materials and meaning creation and understanding, but I disagree with Searle's use of 'ontology' as I find it misleading. Ontology is objectively real and efficiently causal. His examples of paper and ink as money and earth formations as mountains indicate his definition of "objective ontology" is better conceptualized from an Aristotelian perspective as material and formal causes. Paper and ink are objectively real, but they are not efficiently causal in trading for goods or services. Money only has a final cause in its use; a 20-dollar bill is only a piece of inked paper if it remains at the bottom of the ocean.

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[110] Taking social constructionism further, poststructuralists like Derrida (Caputo 1997) and Foucault (1995) even question the ability of people to share a construction of the world such that no utterance is a perfect representation of a thought, feeling, meaning, observance, etc. because language is incapable. Poststructuralism, or the more accurately descriptive term 'deconstructionism,' call into question our assumptions about human portrayals of history, requiring a historiographical excavation of each utterance.

Whereas Searle's distinction attempts to clarify the term 'ontology,' there are other concepts and better terms describing human imagined, created and reified structures in sociology, such as Husserl's "lifeworld," Giddens' "structuration," and Bourdieu's "habitus." While each of these have nuanced conceptual differences, at the core, each refer to the way people believe their lives are governed by invisible forces like culture and laws. Moreover, as Lockie (2004, 50) observes, structuration is the core of how movements can reconfigure habitus:

> The social is conceived from this perspective as radically relational. Action, intentionality, consciousness, subjectivity and morality all derive from relations between entities rather than from either individuals or totalities. Questions of what agency is and whether it may be attributed to non-humans are seen as irrelevant since agency and power are themselves relational effects.

Because 'ontology' has a clearer and more useful meaning in classical realism and critical realism as it relates to Aristotle's four causes, I do not adhere to the social constructionist definition and use; the term 'lifeworld' is more accurate.

As argued by Kurki, social constructionists', social relativists' and critical realists' views on what is knowable about an objective ontology likely stem less from a rejection of the classical realism (though poststructuralists scholars argue we are incapable or find it difficult to perceive and/or linguistically express a realist social ontology),[111] and more of a rejection of positivism. A key problem is that positivists believe, "that one can perceive the world without making assumptions about the nature of the phenomena under investigation. It's notion that knowledge can simply reflect the world leads to uncritical identification of reality and rationality" (Agger 2013, 24). Bhaskar famously terms this problem, the 'epistemic fallacy,' finding fault with the Humean claim that,

> ontological questions can always be rephrased as epistemological ones. The anthropocentric and epistemic biases of classical philosophy led to the dissolution of the concept of the ontological realm, which we need to render intelligible the transitive process of science. In this way the world, which ought to be viewed as a multi-dimensional structure independent of man, came to be squashed into a flat surface whose characteristics, such as being constituted by atomistic facts, were determined by the needs of a particular concept of knowledge (2013b, 35).

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[111] See for example (Searle 1996, 149-197).

By taking the observable as the only acceptable knowledge, social constructionists and critical realists argue that positivism is myopic because, "the kind of knowledge that is produced depends on what problems we have and what questions we ask in relation to the world around us" (Danermark, Ekstrom, and Jakobsen 2001, 26). Whereas social constructionists and social relativists view the realist ontological level as unknowable and the positivist epistemology as superficial, critical realists seek to bridge the two traditions.

Ontology, in this model's vernacular, is not the sociologically constructed and understood set of rules by which a society engages in all aspects of sociopolitical life. That construction is the "lifeworld," owing to structuration of society through praxis that results in habitus.[112] Ontology is also not the objectively real observable natural things or artefacts – "brute facts" as Searle terms them. Those are objects or Aristotelian material and formal causes if forms are considered; they usually are. I make this distinction between ontology and the socially constructed lifeworld because it is useful to understand they are two separate pursuits of knowledge. To search for knowledge of ontology and ontological forces is to search for what (pre)exists independent of our conscious understanding and interpretation of it and the resulting hypotheses are falsifiable. To search for a complete understanding of a lifeworld is to understand people's subjective perspectives or the intersubjective construct of social rules determined by the actions of people in society; all of which are in a constant, if slow, state of change. But in making this distinction, we are left with the problem of reconciling these useful concepts. Lowe describes the importance of the concept of ontology and our subjective understanding of the world:

> Each special science aims at truth, seeking to portray accurately some part of reality. But the various portrayals of different parts of reality must, if they are all to be true, fit together to make a portrait which can be true of reality as a whole. No special science can arrogate to itself the task of rendering mutually consistent the various partial portraits: that task can alone belong to an overarching science of being, that is, to ontology. But we should not be misled by this talk of 'portraits' of reality. The proper concern of ontology is not the portraits we construct of it, but reality itself (2006, 4).

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[112] Searle (2006, p 15), on the other hand, terms the structuration of society an ontological subjectivity. He proposes that anything that exists and is given linguistic meaning that is not a physical fact is not ontologically objective and therefore not real in the philosophical realism sense.

2.4: Conclusion - Teleology, Ontology, and a Four Causes Model for Social Movement Analysis

In this chapter I have demarcated among Natural Teleology, functional teleology, and goal directed behaviour, and also among Natural Ontology, institutional ontology, and the lifeworld. I used these concepts as a basis for rebuilding how we think of social movements in deeper and broader ways. Rather than rejecting any of the philosophical and sociological concepts, I included them all in a stratified manner, albeit rebranded, each level important and interactive with the others (with the exception of Natural Teleology which is only affective). I find five causal levels, each of which relate partly to Aristotle's 'four causes.' Four levels I derive partly from Searle's work (1996) and partly from Bhaskar (2013a), while including the Kantian/Hegelian Natural Teleology level. Whereas I clarified the first four analytical levels, I have heretofore omitted the fifth level.

The fifth level of social movement causation is the observable, which Bhaskar (2013a) terms empirical, and is composed of the actions, evets and phenomena that can be observed and inferred or interpreted from individuals' and collectivities' behavior. These events are material and formal causes in that they are made from ideational materials that are observed actions or interactions, and they have ascribed meanings that give a specific and meaningful 'form' to the event. People vocalizing in unison in church is fundamentally socially different from people vocalizing in unison in a picket line. People sleeping near each other in tents in the woods is fundamentally socially different from people sleeping in tents on Wall Street. This level of social causation comprises the bulk of social movement research that I explore in the following two chapters.

To link this chapter and its concepts to the rest of the thesis, I offer this overview of how these levels act in the analytical model I propose later. People act *for the sake of* some Natural drivers, three of which I explore in Chapter 4. Those actions reify or reform sociocultural institutions that constrained and enabled them in the first place Those (reformed) institutions will constrain and enable future actions while informing individuals' lifeworld understandings of institutions while giving the observed actions

meaning. Each new action informs individuals' lifeworlds by deepening understanding and enriching meaning of the actions they observe and perceive as corresponding reactions. Agents draw upon their lifeworld understandings of institutionally constrained and enabled causation to determine how people and groups can act to reach goals. If they are part of the group trying to reach a goal, they can intentionally contribute their actions toward that goal or telos. Once people act intentionally *for the sake of* some goal, those actions again affect the (re)forming of constraining and enabling institutions, the changes in the material and formal causes of lifeworld understandings and meanings, and the reassessment of intentional teleological efficient causes. Concurrently, Natural Ontological drivers (e.g. community, justice and power) continue to instigate this action-reformation-feedback loop of the other four levels of causation. In this explanation I began with observed actions because an observed phenomenon is an analytically simple place to begin. But, it must be understood that these material, formal, efficient, and final causes among the five causal levels are often simultaneously constitutive.

The five levels of causation are interactive and dialectically constructive and constitutive, except for Natural Teleology. Natural Teleology is only affective because Natural forces exist independently of and are unaffected by the actions, constraints, and enablers at the remaining four levels just as gravity is not affected by the objects it causes to fall. Natural Ontological drivers that instigate people's actions set in motion the Aristotelian causes in the remaining levels.

Throughout the remainder of the thesis I will apply the theoretical concepts of teleology, ontology, and the four causes to constructing and applying a four causes model of SMT synthesis and analysis. SMT analysis pursuing various approaches have relatively explicit links to institutional ontology and structuration concepts, albeit rarely named as such. CAT, RMT and political opportunity approaches are well postured to analyze from a critical realist perspective the longue durée structures that are deeply ingrained in societies and preexist, constrain and enable social movement actions. And the structuration aspects of those structures and institutions that movement participants understand, test, and sometimes seek to change or destroy are well analyzed in frame, identity, and more recent political opportunity

analysis approaches. Indeed, Crossley and Opp attempted to synthesize SMT and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly posited researching the dynamics of contention as a focusing heuristic for SMT. In the next chapter I will explore these works to seek insight into how other researchers might envision broadening, deepening, structuring and focusing SMT.

Chapter 3 – Social Movement Theory Syntheses

<u>Attempts to Structure and Focus SMT</u>

Social movement analysis in current SMT scholarship lacks a clear starting point and SMT's numerous approaches makes it difficult to pick the right approach or approaches for a given question (Engelhardt and Moore 2017, Chalcraft 2016, 19-29). SMT scholars who have long studied social movements have attempted to resolve the complaint that SMT lacks structure and focus by synthesizing, structuring and focusing SMT, but their efforts found varying degrees of purchase. Crossley, who recommends synthesizing SMT using a hybrid CAT and Bourdieuian structuration model, provides an excellent survey of the SMT field at the time and made an interesting case for bridging structuralist and culturalist approaches. However, I find no evidence that Crossley's model was ever used, even by Crossley in his own social movement research. Opp also gives an extensive overview of SMT approaches and introduces another hybrid synthesis model he terms 'structural-cognitive' synthesis. Opp's model is an economics theory-based synthesis that attempts to account for and valuate the spectrum of SMT variables. Again, Opp's model found little practice in SMT. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's *Dynamics of Contention* (2003) is more of a focusing heuristic than a synthesis model and has influenced SMT significantly since its publication. Research following *Dynamics of Contention* often referenced and included the authors' recommendation to focus analysis on changes in societies, structures, movements, and especially the structure-agent dialectic, but the heuristic seems to only have increased the approaches to SMT rather than draw them together.

In this chapter I will explore Crossley's, Opp's, and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's attempts to synthesize, structure and focus SMT. The below should be read as a critique but also as an exploration of the very useful aspects of these three efforts to guide SMT research. The key contributions of these three works is their use of sociological and philosophical theory, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, in trying to improve the SMT field. I will highlight these theory contributions to social

movement studies, which I will then use in the following chapter to begin adding more theory and approach method substance to my own model.

3.1: Social Movement Causation - Where to Begin?

To broadly and most deeply conceptualize social movements, we first need to surmise what ontological forces make it so that 'movements must…' i.e. movements must emerge, movements must affect change, movements must use frames to draw people together, etc. We know social movements try to affect state policies and state-linked structures. Movements' speech acts and acts of speech take aim at the state as a top-down driver of policy, and at the social sphere as a bottom-up driver of normative change (Meyer and Whittier 1994). But what beyond human decision drives movements to emerge to seek change? More importantly, how can we find those deeper causes? As Collier (1994, 144) notes, "when we find the garden muddy in the morning, we assume a real rainstorm, though we slept through it; a murder victim implies a murderer, even though one might never be identified."

Some SMT 'why?' questions should work from the deepest level owing to a natural Teleological final cause, and finishing with observed events. Others would be begin better at the observable and seek causation at the deepest level.[113] Others still may begin with lifeworld constructions like frame resonance, constructed identities and prominent cultural ideologies (Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994, Zuo and Benford 1995b, Benford 1997), and proceed to dialogue with the rest of the causal levels. Bhaskar (2013b) claims we naturally attempt to work through these levels, or strata, to uncover the complex interaction of social causation.

Several scholars have debated the extent to which researchers must peel back the layers before we can consider our investigations sufficiently explanatory. Lockie highlights SMT's structurationist foundation that biases scholars' epistemes:

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[113] Bhaskar argues that this is the only way we accumulate depth of knowledge (2013a, 66-67).

"social movement theory has allowed sociologists to…[remain] firmly embedded in one of the most basic assumptions of sociology; that 'social facts' should always be explained by other 'social facts' (Durkheim, 1938). Social movements have been conceptualized in terms of social processes and causes ranging through macro-social structural change, contradictions within the capitalist mode of production, the inability of existing political institutions to adapt to change, conflict over access to resources, newly emerging political opportunities and individual motivations…" (2004, 42)

Lockie's summary of SMT lends to Baker's (1982, 12-13) suggestion to "reconstitute the context (or more usually the plurality of contexts) in which that phenomenon takes on meaning as human action." Hewitson builds upon Baker and claims that historical events result from social and structural institutions' power seeking interactions, often based upon ideology derived from discourse and interpretations of non-discursive institutional frameworks of action (2014, 40-41). Molnar posits the multiplicity of causal inputs produces a "polygeny" effect where any effect has a multitude of causal inputs, each asserting some power and effect on the event (2003, 194-195), resulting in similar but slightly different outcomes. Likewise, Dray allows for causation beyond the Humean sense (1957, 103), but only insofar as the variable must be 'crucial' and a necessary condition without which the event in question would not have taken place. Within this causal multiplicity, we must seek salience.

Social movement research often either investigates one explanan, sometimes as *the* cause for an occurrence, process or characteristic, or rejects the idea of exploring causes, at least in the 'why movement' explanandum family. Rarely are movement explanandum explored as a plurality of resources and materials, particularized characteristics, actions and processes, and goals and outcomes. Rather, SMT proceeds as Carr (2001, 99) charges: that scholars sift through all of the antecedent variables and select those 'facts' that are, "significant for his purpose, so from the multiplicity of sequences of cause and effect he extracts those, and only those, which are historically significant; and the standard of historical significance is his ability to fit them into his pattern of rational explanation and interpretation." For SMT to move beyond this selection bias, we must epistemologically and methodologically broaden and deepen our meaning of 'cause.'

Understanding cause in the multivariate nature of social movements in context requires locating movement phenomena as interactive processes that affect and are affected by ontological and phenomenological forces (Puddephatt and Prus 2007). Hewitson (2014, 89) notes that it may be impossible to make a distinction between conditions and causes for an event. He posits that conditions should be understood as more than that which makes an event possible, "but rather as further series of actions and physical constraints affecting the outcome of a specified act." He resolves:

> Why-questions and the explanations which correspond to them and necessitate a selection of evidence and an ordering of 'causes' according to their 'salience' or significance in respect of the question posed, since without such selection and ordering, given the impossibility of simple description, explanation itself would not be possible (2014, 161).

Hewitson's salience ordering seems a logical approach for the complexities of understanding social phenomena.[114]

In the introductory chapter, I reviewed the more prominent SMT approaches to begin finding evidence of deeper and broader causation in social movement studies than scholars make explicit. In doing so, I discussed SMT approaches as if they were either in competition with or ignorant of each other to maintain focus on each discrete approach. But, applied social movement research generally includes several approaches, albeit unintentionally and unsystematically. Rather, the intercausal nature of what composes social movement phenomena makes SMT causal explanations almost inextricable from each other and readers encounter bleed-over even in focused studies. For instance, how could one analyze political opportunity or identity creation without including the framing procedures and mechanisms used to describe why people must seize an opportunity or unify through or against some common identity? Similarly, should one describe resource mobilization movement and repertoire construction ignorant of group identity influences? It is possible to study movement characteristics or actions disregarding contributory factors; but it would be of limited explanatory value, and likely to raise more questions than answers.

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[114] It is worth noting that Hewitson's (2014) concept is similar to Aristotle's concept of covariate and multivariate causation.

3.2: Structured Approaches to SMT Synthesis

SMT studies in the past two decades increasingly include multiple approaches, or aspects of these approaches, suggesting synthesizing various SMT approaches into a more comprehensive and structured framework will aid analysis. Crossley (2002b) and Opp (2009) provide two of the most comprehensive synthesis attempts while McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2003) postulate a dynamics of contention heuristic for focusing analysis. Crossley's Bourdieuian CAT-based model and Opp's structural-cognitive model attempt to bring myriad SMT approaches under a more cogent methodological construct. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's dynamics of contention model seeks to broaden SMT and encourage investigating movement interactions with people, organizations and structures rather than seeking static snapshots of traditional SMT variables. I find each to be complex, while still lacking deep enough theoretical and philosophical grounding. Crossley's synthesis remains vague and has not been practiced by the author or others. Opp's model, which has also not been used again, reconfigures all social, cultural, psychological and social psychological (in addition to economic) variables into a multifaceted rational choice framework. He charges that employing SMT without theory means that most research is merely factor explanations applied on an ad hoc basis (2009, 41, 121-135, 331-373). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly emphasize social movement dynamics, and only loosely group the processes and mechanisms they uncover. Whereas each has faults, each also has value in deepening, structuring and focusing SMT.

3.2.1: Crossley – Bourdieu, Smelser, and Social Movements

Crossley is one of few SMT scholars to explicitly base his analysis on structuration theory. What's more, he engages structuration and other rational actor-based theories deeply before bridging the two. Crossley (2002b, 168-191) suggests mapping SMT approaches into Smelser's collective behavior theory undergirded by Bourdieu's[115] structure/agency dialectic concept. Crossley sets out to "pull together a

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[115] One of Bourdieu's (1977, 1994, 2005a) key propositions is that social phenomena must be understood as a dialectic of agents acting within social and political structures and involving capital, resulting in a "habitus" within

range of scattered insights… into a persuasive, parsimonious and coherent perspective… without lapsing into an unhelpful and incoherent eclectic mishmash."[116] Whereas Crossley's synthesis was never really used, even by Crossley in his following works, his attempt uncovers some clues as to what social movements are *for the sake of* in society,

Crossley's is influenced by Mead's and Bourdieu's works that bridge philosophy and sociology, and by Smelser's and Blumer's economics-based collective action models. Crossley uses Mead's concept of symbolic interactionism to describe how movements collectively understand, define and interact with the world.[117] He then uses Blumer's assigning of rational social values to Mead's symbolic interactions to suggest that instinctive reactions are closely linked to learned behavior (2002b, 18-22). Blumer's three stage collective behavior model demarcates social unrest and elementary collective behavior, elementary collective groupings, and finally social movement emergence that derive from shifting meanings and normative expectations based on symbolic interactionism.[118] Crossley likewise finds Blumer's concepts to be a starting point for a more holistic analysis. He disagrees with Blumer's concept of 'strains,' which are the anomalous subjects of contention (2002b, 24-26) because, he argues in agreement with Smelser, that contention is a regular part of the structure/agent dialectic and symbolic interactionism. Blumer's "crude crowd psychology" concerning contention's emergence, he argues, could be bettered if 'strains' were understood as stimulated instances of intensified social interaction, or what Durkheim calls "collective effervescence." Collective effervescence must be understood within longue durée historical context as periods of social and intellectual meaning and relationship reconstruction (Crossley 2002b, 26-27, 36-37, 52). Strains resulting in collective effervescence happen because of 'moral shock' (Jasper 1998), changes in the "moral economy of the crowd" (Crossley 2002b, 42), or, more simply stated, due to a society's

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which all things social, especially human actions, are informed and constrained because of the system of norms that have been constituted by a history of actions that dictate what is and isn't acceptable.

[116] Conversely, Wickham (2013, 247) values, "complexity over parsimony in the analysis of Islamist movement politics and, by extension, in the study of social movements and contentious politics more generally."

[117] Snow also (2001b) finds symbolic interactionism to be lacking, but uses it as a base for building a more holistic analysis of how social movements ascribe meanings.

[118] For criticisms of Blumer's symbolic interactionism approach see (Stryker 1988, Maines 1988, Huber 1973).

perceived changes in acceptable deprivation. He also disagrees that strains, or contention, indicates something is wrong, arguing that strains partly constitute actors; they are more than just problems actors work through (2002b, 168). Crossley (2002b, 52) emphasizes that, "the intrinsically conflictual nature of some social systems… entail exchange and competition over scarce resources and… their boundaries are very often moving because they are themselves a stake in such struggles."

Crossley's overarching critique is that Smelser's social movement analysis framework is structurally biased, focusing on exogenous conditions. He (2002b, 177-178) prefers Bourdieu's dialectic structuration and habitus formation paradigm. Still, he finds that Smelser's concepts of structural conduciveness to movement emergence, structural strain, formation of generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization of participants, and operation of social control all reflect several more developed SMT analytical veins (2002b, 50, 186-189, table on p 187) that can be deepened using Bourdieu's structuration theory.

Smelser's concept	The 'new' version
Structural conduciveness	Political opportunities
Structural strain	Generally ignored
Growth and spread of generalized belief	Frames, grievance interpretation, attributions, cognitive liberation, insurgent consciousness and delegitimation
Precipitating factors	Suddenly imposed grievances
Mobilizing of participants for action	Resource mobilization, networks, communication channels
Operation of social control	Social control, media

Crossley's 'Value Added' model (2002b, 187)

Crossley (2002b, 175) argues that locating agents and their actions within, and as part of, the structures they contend with, thinking in terms of 'habitus' drives analysts to understand that:

> Agents act, think, reflect, desire, perceive, make sense, etc. but they always do so by way of habits inherited from the local locations in which they have socialized, which are in turn shaped by wider dynamics of the social world. It is for this reason that specific frames can be resonant or not, and that some hardships will count as grievances or strains for some groups, where others may not. It is also for this reason, as just noted, that social movements can have a biographical impact: because they are one context within which certain structures of the habitus may be remade.

Here, activism is a form of habits in the socio-political activism field – Bourdieu considers activism and political contention that which changes but does not constitute habitus (2002b, 185-186). Rather than calling non-contentious or low-contentious social states something else, Crossley suggests that they are simply different forms of habitus. In this transition from doxa to unrest, an alternative set of habits (i.e. repertoires of contention) "kicks in" (Crossley 2002b, 184-186). Crossley notes in his concluding remarks a very brief and nascent concept formation of a habitus of contention (2002b, 190): "Movements and protest make habitus that make movements and protest." He highlights that habitus is more than just the stimulated responses from agents, it is their feel for the game, its rules, and the field within which they play (2002b, 179). Unfortunately, these last crucial concepts where he deals with Bourdieu are not engaged deeply or dialogued with the rest of the SMT literature, so his vision for how habitus and doxa relate to his neo-Smelserian framework is unclear.

A similar problem is in Crossley's lack of dialogue between structuration and SMT in his framework (2002b, 177-178). Curiously, despite his philosophical engagement with Bourdieu, he does not dialogue with key structuration works theorists like Berger and Luckmann (1991) and Searle (1996) or explain his attack on Smelser's point that contention emerges from imbalance (2002b, 52). That social systems are inherently conflictual and competitive does not contradict Smelser's point and does not falsify the argument that social, political, economic, or other imbalances cause social movements. Per Bourdieu, structuration creates habitus resulting in doxa, a social balance in the form of oppositional force equilibrium.[119] Balance is not necessarily justice or harmony; it is acceptance and a tacit if tenuous agreement to not significantly alter the socio-political dynamic. Any changes in the socio-political dynamic must be quickly counterbalanced; the scenario resembles riding a bicycle. Numerous forces act upon this rolling vehicle (i.e. society, or a section of society composed largely in some Bourdieuian field) resulting in an upright and forward moving object. Increase or decrease any force too much (e.g. favoring

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[119] An exception to the oppositional force argument is prateo efficiency where all of society has everything it needs and wants and functions in equilibrium. Since such equilibria appear to be extremely rare, it is likely the natural state is more of an opposing force balance rather than a contention-free harmony.

one social sector too much or repressing another) without compensating and there will be a crash. If we understand movements like this, we can conceptualize of social movements as one force that keeps society moving forward and not crashing into civil war. So, furthering Crossley and Smelser and using Bourdieu, we could posit social movements are *for the sake of* balancing structures and people's demands for change in society. This Natural final cause, that social movements are for the sake of balancing people's desires for change vis-à-vis a reluctant structure, may seem self-evident, but will come in handy as a Natural Ontology heuristic throughout the rest of the thesis.

Crossley finds Bourdieu's social 'fields' encourages researchers to "*identify, map and explore the structural conditions* which give rise to specific strains and grievances in a very detailed and focused way" when analyzing "relations of domination," or power structures. Crossley claims, "the concept of fields *suggests a model of movements in its own right*." This is the first point where he brings in movement studies, engaging McCarthy and Zald's RMT briefly. But, he does not reengage his critiques of the other micromobilization processes of internal opportunity and network structures (2002b, 105-113), cognitive liberation (2002b, 113-117), biographical availability (2002b, 117-119),[120] repertoire construction (2002b, 127-133), frame-work (2002b, 133-143), and contentious cycles (2002b, 143-147). He says that analyzing fields' "*conditions of struggle*" requires political opportunity structures and repertoire creation analysis (Crossley 2002b, 180, italics in original), noting that "*different constraints and logics* come into play" (Crossley 2002b, 180, italics in original). Crossley also links Bourdieu's political field participation motivations to Smelser's concept where idiosyncratic are values placed on some ambiguous thing obtained through participant action. Similar to Opp (discussed in greater detail below) he believes that RMT is useful if we think of political power as having a profit-maximizing draw for movement participants (2002b, 181-182).

Crossley's Bourdieuian reinterpretation of Smelser's analytical model is well-placed to reinclude the useful elements of structural movement analyses in the field. However, his argument lacks the

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[120] For his overall critique of internal opportunity and network structures, cognitive liberation, and biographical availability see (Crossley 2002b, 119-126).

necessary specificity to make use of Smelser's framework. For example, he posits a social movement heuristic should be based on the Bourdieuian concept of habitus structuration, but only one of his studies (2002a) employs his Smelserian synthesis framework he puts forward. Most of his later studies either synthesize SMT approaches in ad hoc ways or ignore synthesis altogether.[121] Likewise some who claim Crossley's synthesis is useful do not use it (Vincent and Stackpool-Moore 2009, 639). Lastly, and most importantly, he does not theoretically or methodologically extrapolate how most SMT approaches should work within a Bourdieu-informed Smelserian framework of collective behavior. So, while Crossley unearths a number of problems with SMT and highlights the benefits of Bourdieu and Smelser, his synthesis framework is incomplete at best, feeling more like an attempt to force contemporary SMT approaches into Smelser's structure-centric model.

Whereas Crossley does not employ Bourdieuian field analysis systematically to benefit SMT, his point that political power is a key social movement goal is again much deeper than I think he envisioned. We can reconstruct Crossley's critiques and proposals above to seek how the long-standing structural conditions of various social fields (critical realism) are viewed as constraints and enablers (structuration) in people's attempts to gain power (Natural and functional teleology). By taking up several of Crossley's unstructured proposals, we can use them to help draw together the first four levels of my model.

3.2.2: Opp – Structural-Cognitive Model

Opp (Opp, 2009) sees social movement studies as plagued by "factor explanations" in the form of numerous SMT analytical veins. He finds SMT approaches are ad hoc and post hoc examinations of a given dependent variable (outcome or event) identified by guessing what is causally germane (Opp, 2009 pp 22-31). He posits synthesizing SMT approaches into a "structural-cognitive model" that incorporates culturalist (micro) factors under "cognitive processes" and "incentives" that are affected by structural

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[121] See for examples (Crossley 2003b, Crossley 2006, 2008, 2007, Crossley and Ibrahim 2012, Crossley 2005b, 2002c, Crossley et al. 2012, Crossley 2002d, Crossley 2003a, 2004, 2005a).

(macro) variables. Whereas Opp's critique of the myriad disparate "factor" approaches from SMT is fair, his synthesis is unwieldy, feels forced, and is unused like Crossley's synthesis.

Opp faults SMT approaches that are not overtly causally explanatory, revealing a reductionist causal epistemology grounded in economistic theory. His 'mobilization' definition (2009, 140) is telling: ""Mobilization" refers to activities of a movement organization or of an individual actor to gain more control over goods that contribute to achieve the goals of the movement organization or the individual actor." Similarly, he wedges identity into a rational choice model, proposing that identity drives individuals' purposes, and that individual goal attainment is informed by rational choice (2009, 214) – a clever extension, but a step too far. Opp searches for 'if a then b' identity causality whereas Melucci and other identity approach proponents,[122] whom he critiques, seek social movements' constitutive elements. Moreover, he carefully picks his fights with the identity approach, only engaging static concepts of identity and what it does for social movements. Interestingly, despite his scathing criticism if not outright rejection of most of the dynamics of contention concepts, he does not fault the assertion that polarization through identity construction increases the chances of openly manifest political contention. While he ignores the value of identity's constitutive nature due to the weaknesses he found in Humean causality, he does not explain why he uncritically accepts the constitutive element of rational choice, that humans are utility maximizers.

Opp claims that one of the accomplishments of his structural-cognitive model is that it systematically includes the frame analysis approach in a way that qualifies how frames influence individuals' rational choices to participate. However, Opp conflates frames with lifeworld, assuming that

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[122] See for examples (Aronson and Owens 2000, Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994, Bernstein 2009, Britt and Heise 2000, Clemens 1996, Creed, Scully, and Austin 2002, Gamson 2009, 1995, Hatina 2007, Jasper and Polletta 2001, Klandermans and De Weerd 2000, McAdam and Friedman 1992, Melucci 1995, Melucci and Avritzer 2000, Reger, Myers, and Einwohner 2008, Salameh 2010, Snow and McAdam 2000, Stryker, Owens, and White 2000, White and Fraser 2000, Whittier and Taylor 1984).

social movement frames are an accurate thick description of activists' understandings of their world.[123] He also conflates habitus and praxis at the individual (micro) level with movement goals at the movement (meso) level. It seems that although he recognizes the categorization of diagnostic, prognostic, and mobilization frames (2009, 258), he does not draw a connection between frame categories and frame analysis, or how frame processes are tied to their substance. Accordingly, Opp's critique that the framing approach is too broad is probably due to his reading of the framing approach as how individuals' and movements' give meaning to praxis and understand habitus. Rather, the framing approach describes framing as a *process* by which individuals and movements interact with habitus and praxis while pursuing movement goals.

Opp makes one interesting advance concerning the frame approach. He uses balance theory as a heuristic to explain the framing relationship between individuals and movements. He proposes that the reason movements effectively mobilize is positively related to their abilities to resonate their causes with individuals' values. Where there is value incongruence, mobilization results from individuals reconciling the differences in their beliefs and values with movement participants because they are otherwise attracted to the movement or its members. This is similar to the above analyses and Heise's (1979) work that bring social balance to the fore of sociological theory. In line with his key thesis, Opp suggests frames and balance theory can be understood from a rational choice perspective and modeled using "modern computers and algorithms" that "allow the handling of a large number of cognitive elements and cognitive structures." This of course presupposes Opp has somehow identified, defined, and quantified the causal power of all of a society's relevant cognitive elements and structures.

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[123] I use the term "lifeworld" as coined by Husserl (1970) to mean the sociologically constructed idea of "the world" as interpreted and understood by individuals interacting with and subjectively defining every aspect of the self and all that impacts upon and interacts with the self. The concept of the lifeworld is often conflated with the concept of ontology, which is the objectively real set of objects and forces that constitute all things. I will engage the concepts of the lifeworld and ontology further in Chapters 5 and 6. For a good, critical discussion of the concept of the lifeworld see (Carr 1970).

Opp argues well that existing political opportunity approaches are too subjective and his way of relating it to RMT is logical. But his rational choice perspective of social movement phenomena obviates the structuration aspect inherent in political opportunity; political opportunity is, as noted in the previous chapter, often very subjective. He notes that quantifiable objective political opportunity analysis by way of observable structural environmental characteristics is nearly impossible because the current political opportunity perspective is too soft; actors perceptions of milieu changes are too subjective (2009, 167-171). He charges that by labeling opportunities as political, discursive[124], organizational,[125] cultural,[126] economic,[127] cognitive,[128] and emotional opportunities[129] to engage in movement activities, we water down the concept and make it analytically useless (2009, 171-172). So, Opp prefers the following political and goal-oriented definition: "opportunities are elements of the environment that objectively or subjectively are relevant for goal attainment but cannot be controlled by actors." This contradicts his own example of a constitution as political opportunity structure. People in societies makes laws interpreting the constitution, evidencing that political opportunity set by foundational societal documentation is malleable. Actors are the only ways opportunities are controlled.

Relatedly, Opp proposes defining resources as "discretionary goods whose use actors can control" (2009, 178) and that RMT and the political opportunity approach should be conceptualized as an analytical pair. RMT explores the agent-affectable variables, whereas political opportunity, for Opp, is the unchangeable milieu within which agents vie for agency. However, this superficial conception of resources and opportunity ignores structuration, taking structures as something movements react to and within, not something they engage with, actively (re)structure, and continuously change. I contend most

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[124] (Giugni et al. 2005, McCammon et al. 2007, Molaei 2015)
[125] (Diani and McAdam 2003, 105-122, Sutton and Vertigans 2006)
[126] (Borland 2004, McAdam 2000)
[127] (Beckert 1996, Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, Krueger 2008, Looney 2005)
[128] (Beckford and Walliss 2006)
[129] (Whittier 2001, Guenther 2009)

social movement scholars would find the same fault's with Opp's reconfiguration of social movement concepts.

Following his critique and rework of SMT concepts, Opp shoehorns SMT and other sociology and psychology analyses into a rational choice model, calling everything usable by the movement a resource or a good (2009, 139): "Resources are goods (i.e. everything that has utility) which individual or collective actors can control." Doing this reduces social movements to rational actors with resources available to expend for some gain. Because Opp considers everything that constitutes a movement (e.g. people, identities, ideologies, emotions, networks, etc.) resources or goods, it is difficult to discern what about movements is more causally salient and impactful regarding a particular phenomenon in question. Subsequently, it is unclear how researchers should ascertain how movements and movement makers interact with, combine, and use those resources for some end.

Opp's "Structural-Cognitive Model" of social movement phenomena (2009, 335)

In the end, Opp's reconfiguration of SMT concepts makes bringing together SMT research into his analytical model impossible without subscribing to his new definitions. His model is inclusive, highlighting where 'other factors' outside traditional SMT consideration impact social movement processes, but it is unclear what those factors are. Moreover, his model is prohibitively complex and without any practical application of the holistic analysis he proposes. Furthermore, Eder (2015, 36) notes in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements* that social movement scholarship has already "gone beyond the confines of this model."

3.2.3: McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly – Dynamics of Contention

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's "Dynamics of Contention" is one of the most widely cited works on social movements and political contention. They critique SMT for using largely static approaches and models to analyze and explain social movements because the nature of movements is constant motion and change. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly worked to pinpoint where types of actions and interactions were related to traditional SMT approaches, but underexplored. As such, the dynamics of contention model is best understood as a heuristic that guides analysis to explore change as explanatory and elucidatory more than static assessments of variables.

Investigating social movement dynamics helps explain many things, but McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's model does not provide a coherent model for synthesizing SMT approaches for three reasons. First, the authors identify too many processes and mechanisms to be analytically useful if one desires to use their work in a holistic study of social movements. Second, their focus on mechanisms and processes redirects research attention to a very granular level of causal explanation, ignoring broader and deeper causation. Third, the authors' historical methodological and epistemological biases lead the dynamics of contention approach to merely find new ways to use old approaches. Indeed, Chalcraft (2016, 22-29) finds similar problems with the Dynamics of Contention model.

The dynamics of contention approach proposes a multitude of mechanisms and processes that cause certain things about contentious actors and actions. The authors find that the numerous mechanisms they identify occur either in some pattern or in a unique order, leaving the researcher wondering if causal mechanisms' similar sequences are indeed causal patterns or just coincidences. "Dynamics of Contention" espouses to seek regular contentious politics mechanisms and processes and to (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 7), "examine comparatively the causal processes discernable in… episodes of contention, and component mechanisms and processes." They explicitly do not seek causal explanation in the form of "necessary and sufficient conditions for mobilization, action, or certain trajectories." Accordingly, they claim that dynamics of contention are not reducible to laws or set events sequences engaged in by set actor types. They find that (2003, 223) antecedent events, elite decision making, and an intersection of causal processes and mechanisms lead "to outcomes that could not have been predicted with either structural or cultural determinism." They do offer an analytical framework (2003, 44), but claim that it is elucidatory of cause rather than explanatory; they observe how but do not explain why.

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly outline numerous mechanisms and processes throughout "Dynamics of Contention." They conceive of three overarching types of mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational (2003, 25). They identify the following cognitive mechanisms:

- identity shift (27-28)
- identity threat (261)
- certification/decertification (120, 198)
- object shift (127, 144)
- category formation; including three sub-mechanisms: intervention, borrowing, and encounter (134, 142)
- threat and opportunity perceptions (112-113)
- perceived environmental uncertainty (111)

They identify the following environmental mechanisms:
- diffusion of contention to new sites and actors (13, 67-69)
- opportunity spirals (228-263)
- repression (261)
- withdrawal of financial or military support (204)
- imposition of economic sanctions (204)
- granting aid to insurgents (204)
- direct military intervention by foreign states (204)
- withdrawal of foreign support (204)

- infringement of elite interests (198)
- suddenly imposed grievances (198)

They identify the following relational mechanisms:
- brokerage (91)
- competition for power in political space (67-69, 243-263)
- cross-class coalition formation (271)
- central cooptation of intermediaries (264)
- dissolution of patron-client networks (264)
- commitment (261)
- tactical innovation (261)
- radicalization (261)
- formal organization (120)

They relate most of these mechanisms back to identity theory (2003, 157), which seems to be central to

their analytical paradigm.

The authors offer a further analytical level (2003, 12), social processes, which "consist of

sequences and combinations of causal *mechanisms*." They find the following numerous processes

inherent to contention: mobilization processes, mobilization structure appropriation, opportunity

perception, threat perception, framing processes, and repertoire innovation. They assert (2003, 43)

"Attribution of opportunity or threat is an activating mechanism responsible in part for the mobilization of

previously inert populations." The social appropriation of existing mobilization helps groups overcome

organizational and resource deficits (2003, 43). Framing is a process involving people using language to

construct contention for other people and groups involved in, or observing, a conflict (2003, 43). They

perceive repertoire creation as a process of collective action innovation (2003, 43). Innovated repertoires

and contentious performances involve interpretations of collective identity and inherited action modes

that guide groups to select acts of speech by which they make claims upon other actors or structures

(2003, 48). They posit that contentious political episodes[130] incorporate one or more of the above-named

mechanisms in one or many of these processes. However, it is unclear how these processes are different

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[130] It is worth noting that McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly account for analytical bias concerning the determination of a contentious episode's boundaries (2003, 29). They "see episodes not as natural entities but as observers' lenses, bounded and observed according to conventions established by participants, witnesses, commentators, and analysts of past episodes. We insist on self-conscious creation of comparability in delineating episodes…significantly affect which mechanisms and processes become visible."

from traditional RMT, the political opportunity approach, and the frame analysis approach aside from their emphasis on the *dynamics* of these approaches over the static instances and attributes of each variable.

Crossing the micro, meso, and macro levels of society, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly describe causal mechanisms and processes operating in three spheres: mobilization, actors, and trajectory (2003, 34-35 and exemplified throughout part II of the book.). Bringing mechanisms, processes, and spheres together analytically, they investigate multiple cases of 'episodic contention' that they label social movements, revolutions, nationalism, or democratization. They find that (2003, 274, Table 9.1) although the same mechanisms occur in the same processes within each type of contentious episode, the conditions and sequences of the processes and applications of the mechanisms differ enough to make searching for generalizations about "big structures and sequences" futile. In one example, they elucidate 21 "sample mechanisms and processes promoting democratization." However, to include each of their contentious politics mechanisms and processes in a holistic analytical method would complicate any analysis excessively, as they admit (2003, 276). It is at this point of analytical aggregation that finding use for their dynamics of contention perspective is difficult.

The second problem with the dynamics of contention approach is that, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's investigations of granular level mechanisms lends to ignoring broader structural and social dynamics that also affect contention.[131] Their critiques of other authors' ignorance of the movement dynamics suggest they believe the dynamics of contention model is more analytically holistic than others' analyses, or at least that it can link other works and fill in their gaps. For example, they criticize others' studies of the anti-slave movement that led to the American Civil War for narrowly only exploring elite politics (2003, 162-170). They undertake a thorough study of pre-Civil War American politics and find both normative and structural changes that instigated contention and eventually war. But, their own

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[131] See for example Opp's full critique of "Dynamics of Contention" (2009, 304-326).

investigations of brokerage, identity shift, radicalization, and convergence still ignore that the Confederates speculated and acted in large part because they believed their British and French partners in trade would back them militarily (Hubbard 1999, 2000).[132] Tarrow's own emphasis on the importance of allies suggests the authors were likely aware of but chose to exclude the international impacts on the dynamics of American southern states' secession. The decision to analyze some factors and not others lends credence to Opp's (2009, 315-317) critique that the dynamics of contention approach still uses ad hoc factor explanations for events. Exploring the dynamics of contention, even when coupled with traditional SMT approaches, still lacks a theoretical grounding that epistemologically and methodologically broaden their search for the missing causal elements of social movement.

The dynamics of contention approach would benefit from being underpinned with causation answers to their base 'environmental mechanism' questions like "under what conditions and through what processes do viable contenders to state power emerge?" At the micro-macro level, they seek conditions that make the social mechanisms' necessity closer to sufficiency,[133] and identify conditions under which those mechanisms are less causally potent (2003, 33). Actors may use the same or different mechanisms and processes resulting in similar or drastically different outcomes. Hence, they claim their concepts of causes in social movements is more similar to molecular biology than physics (2003, 23). But, I posit, the difference is in accounting for causal mechanisms' salience in finding a likely outcome or 'trajectory.' Episodes of contention begin with variations in structures and agents, and they may use different mechanism and processes or in different sequences to effect the same outcomes. But this issue of causal pathways could be resolved using a functional teleological heuristic and engaging Braithwaite's plasticity theory.

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[132] See discussion above on the impact of allies in mobilization and movement progress.
[133] Even though they specifically say that they aren't looking for necessary and sufficient qualities of movement characteristics and variables that result in "whole classes of episodes" (2003, 13, quote on p 312), they do not outright reject the search for necessary and sufficient conditions at a micro or possibly meso level (2003, 84, 126).

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's concepts of structuration and episodes of contention are somewhat problematic concerning causation. They see political actors as "'observers' abstractions from continuously negotiated interactions among persons and sets of persons;" this is in line with Bourdieu's and Giddens' theories of habitus and structuration. This owes in part to their position that there is much "difficulty of reconciling individualistic images with interactive realities" because (2003, 138), "Political actors typically give individualized accounts of participation in contention," despite being part of a collectivity. While I do not argue against this point, which is similar to Crossley, this concept is somewhat misleading at face value, which they do account for in their study of the French Revolution (2003, 57-62).

Individuals tend to take snapshots of society and structures and hold those memories for a time. Individuals' and groups' decisions are made based on snapshot understandings of structures and agency, or, at best, projected interactions of the two (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 60), similar to predicting chess moves, but in a game where the rules are bendable. There are still believed-in categories and capabilities of actors and moves, but they can change within some limits,[134] especially in times of increased uncertainty. Without a clear way forward, they suggest analysis must consider both static and dynamic perceptions (2003, 60-61). Crossley's work is similarly problematic. Both works perceive things about movements as being dialectically and dynamically constructed by agentic movements, structures, competing groups, and environmental impacts. I do not disagree. But, there is little clarification or evidence concerning what that dialectic dynamic construction looks like, how it is applied in practice, and what it does. Whereas it may be left to future researchers to pick up their theoretical points and apply them, such a central conceptual and methodological point requires better explanation and evidence to be useful.

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[134] For further reading on changing the rules of social power games, see (Fierke 2012a, b).

The third problem with the dynamics of contention approach is that the authors' research biases are apparent and probably drove them to continue asking functional 'how' questions rather than deeper 'why' questions about social movements' purposes *for the sake of* society. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly and other authors charge that social scientific inquiry drives us to find and interpret things to fit our epistemologically determined analytical methods (Stryker, Owens, and White 2000, 28-29, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003). But McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly were instrumentally involved in the development of core SMT approaches like opportunity, frame and identity analysis for decades at the time they wrote "Dynamics of Contention." making them undoubtedly epistemologically and methodologically biased toward their own SMT approaches. The centrality of identity, opportunity (especially repression effect), networks and frames in their identified mechanisms[135] indicates these biases. Their continued focus on identity is especially prominent.

"Dynamics of Contention" ascribes centrality to collective identity concerning the intersection of framing processes, opportunities and threats perception, mobilization, and repertoire construction (2003, 57-62, for example). In their five-step analytical procedure they include identity in each step, but identity only figures in one of their many models and tables, and in the relatively small role of interacting with the category formation process (2003, 60-61). They find that actor and identity constitution is an interactive process involving social appropriation, innovative action, attribution of threat/opportunity, identity shift, category formation, and certification/decertification mechanisms, but do not indicate exactly the way identity processes fit into their analytical model. Moreover, these have been central findings of identity studies for some time before "Dynamics of Contention."[136] The authors' point of elucidating mechanisms and processes (e.g. identity-based mechanisms and processes) surrounding traditional SMT approaches is

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[135] See the above list.
[136] See for examples (Whittier and Taylor 1984, Cohen 1985, Snow and Anderson 1987, Leve et al. 1992, McAdam and Friedman 1992, Benford, Hunt, and Snow 1994, Gamson 1995, Melucci 1995, Stoecker 1995, Taylor, Whittier, and Morris 1998, McAdam and Snow 2000, Stryker 2000, Stryker, Owens, and White 2000, Jasper and Polletta 2001, Creed, Scully, and Austin 2002).

imperative to fully understand political contention. But renaming these without directly pointing to something different about causal correlation is old wine in a new bottle.

The greatest utility of identifying processes and mechanisms operating throughout different spheres is in the questions that linger after working through their cases. For instance, that revolutions' processes and mechanisms affect trajectories contingent upon events and leadership decisions (2003, 193-225), does not help much. However, analyzing commonalities in how some elites harm other elites' interests, suddenly imposed grievances upon the populace, and 'decertification' processes interact helps uncover how abrupt changes in agents' expectations of their governments, and perceived agency through allying with defecting elites instigates movement progress. The remaining point of investigation is to discover what about those processes influence movement success and failure – a point of further research I believe McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly intended to inspire others to undertake (2003, 33).

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's work encourages research into *how* social movements function and act; efficient causes in Aristotelian terms. Centrally problematizing movements' and their opponents' processes and mechanisms by which they mobilize and contend is different from SMT's prior focus on movements' materials and forms as causally explanatory. SMT did not ignore actions and interactions previously, but "Dynamics of Contention" emphasized the need to understand the process of movements' efficient causes akin to understanding that there are multiple pushes and pulls on any moving object that affect its trajectory and destination. By bringing analytical attention to event sequences, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's work lends well to analyzing efficient causes in a four causes analytical model. Probably the most important contribution the "Dynamics of Contention" makes to SMT is underscoring the plasticity and salience of social movement actions and effects. That is, different mechanisms and processes can produce the same outcomes and the same mechanisms and processes can produce different outcomes. If guided only by a functional teleological heuristic (not to mention a Natural or institutional teleological heuristic), exploring the plasticity of contentious dynamics may uncover some interesting clues to final causes in social movements.

3.3: Conclusion - Summary and Next Steps

Crossley's CAT-based synthesis model, Opp's structural-cognitive model, and McAdam's, Tarrow's and Tilly's dynamics of contention heuristic are all laudable attempts to weave SMT approaches into some methodological structure. Although they are mostly complementary, it would not suffice to aggregate these models. They give methodological direction, but they are too restrictive and still lack the required theoretical and epistemological depth. They are overly restrictive because they do not encourage reaching beyond traditional sociology, psychology and economics analytical methods. Pointing to existing methods, these syntheses inadvertently stifle questions about epistemology and ontology beyond the structuration paradigm. Furthermore, it is difficult to discern from these models where a starting point for analysis should be – should we pick some or use all approaches to see if the prescribed analytical approach works? If we do not use everything, what in these methods helps discern SMT approaches' causal salience? The above methods still need better and simpler instruction, which can be resolved using a 'four causes' method undergirded by a final cause heuristic.

The key weakness of Crossley's, Opp's, and McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's methods is that they remain focused on the *what?* and *how?* questions about social movements, with little focus on *why?* questions beyond assuming rational choice. Their compilations of what composes social movements in specific ways and sequences for some outcome draw together SMT well, but they do not compel thinking much beyond how we already think about social movements. Despite investigating what movements are made of, what forms they take on in mobilization and contention, and how they operationalize their people, organizations, processes and ideas, these authors still do not analyze why movements occurred in the first place beyond injustice, threats, and opportunities.

By broadening our understanding of cause to accept that social phenomena are messy amalgams of myriad materials, their forms, actions, and end-states SMT analyses can better approach 'why' questions. Social movements are not just a limited set of 'independent' variables. This may seem counterintuitive – that accepting the multivariate nature of social movements can make understanding and explanation

easier. But, I argue that Aristotle's four causes framework is methodologically and theoretically inclusive, while using final cause and teleological analysis as a guiding heuristic focuses analysis so that we aren't trying to include everything *qua* Opp. Moreover, broadening our concept of causation does not require specialized or esoteric knowledge. Instead, we simply need to ask *why?* and then as *why?* again. We need to keep digging to the root causes. By asking what something is *for the sake of*, which guides questioning why something is the way it is, we venture more deeply into structuration and Natural social Ontology. In the following chapter, I will continue uncovering final cause related to social movements at the Natural Teleological and functional teleological levels, extrapolated from SMT literature and concepts of social movement 'success.'

Chapter 4 – What are Social Movements *For The Sake Of?*

<u>Social Movement Natural Teleology</u>

In this chapter I will argue that social movements are, at their base Natural cause, *for the sake of* rebalancing community, justice and power in societies. Put another way, societal imbalances acting against the Natural Ontological forces of community, justice and power innervate Natural social rebalancing and Bhaskarian 'mechanisms' that drive the emergence of, and cause changes in society via, social movements. With this deepest layer of social movement causation, I can begin applying the four causes method of analysis to SMT using the multi-layer model I introduced in Chapter 2 that I adapted from Bhaskar's and Searle's striated levels of reality.

In the last chapter I reviewed SMT syntheses, pointing to causal language in SMT and broader sociology where applicable, especially as it relates to final cause and teleology. In the following chapters I will apply the model to the question, 'why are some social movements nonviolent and other social movements are violent?' Before tackling that question, in this chapter I will lay the groundwork of creating the final cause heuristic that will underpin the remainder of my analysis. I will first assess what social movements are Naturally Teleologically *for the sake of*. By elucidating some of the Natural Teleology of social movements, and what I assess are some of the most salient causes, I concurrently identify part of the Natural Ontology of society that drives social movements to emerge like gravity drives an apple to fall. Natural Ontological forces drive movements' emergence, but also affect their Natural reactions and cognitive decisions at the lifeworld and functional teleology levels, part of which is the emergence of a nonviolent or violent repertoire of contention.

To find Natural Teleology, I seek why social movements must emerge and what they do *for the sake of* their societies. But SMT is not explicit about movements' final causes. SMT assumes movements seek 'success' but it is unclear what 'success' means. In the final section of this chapter I will review what we mean by 'success' in social movements and in SMT literature to find links between movement

intentionality, articulated as goals in their frames, and how movements are *for the sake of* society in general. I find that explicit definitions of success are often related to public policy and polity changes. This is curious considering more recent SMT literature analyzes individual and group goals that are more social, cultural, and normative in nature. I find defining social movement success by a movement's public policy objectives ignores other and deeper goals, both at the individual participant 'micro' level and at the whole-of-society 'macro' level. SMT's emphasis on policy successes is likely a function of SMT as a mid-level theory – policy success is a midpoint between micro/individual goals and broader societal goals. Understanding whom 'success' is for informs what 'success' we're talking about. This first section will not define social movement 'success.' Instead, it will highlight that there is more than one kind of social movement success. Accordingly, social movement teleological analysis does not have just one telos that we must consider.

4.1: Social Movement Natural Teleology: Community, Justice and Power

I argue social movements emerge, regularly throughout history, because of broader societal desires for changes in community, justice and power. People throughout history form in- and out-groups. Within those groups, people have roles and determine who leads, even if leading is only for tasks that benefit the whole group. And when someone in the group does something others believe is wrong, the group requires some action to make up for the wrong. This is the basis for considering community, justice and power as Naturally occurring forces that affect society.[137] Whereas there are undoubtedly additional Natural Teleological forces driving human action like competition versus cooperation or the even deeper Natural

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[137] Another Natural Telos of society that critical realist and Marxist analyses would argue for is the production of common or shared goods. See for examples (Engelhardt and Moore 2017). However, a modes-of-production analysis is better left to explaining the constraints and enablers at the critical realist level of causation regarding social movements. A modes of production analysis is probably more closely causally linked and better suited to a Natural Teleological analysis of society or of governance, which is beyond my scope, so I will not engage it further herein.

Teloses of individual and species survival, I will show below that community, justice and power are most directly relevant to SMT.

I posit that social movements are Natural Teleological phenomena driven in large part by the Natural Ontological impetuses of community, justice and power. These Natural Ontological drivers percolate through the critical realism, lifeworld, and intentional functional teleology levels, resulting in observable social events, of which social movements are one type. Simply stated, the Natural drivers of community, justice and power make social movements to emerge. In this section, I will further this Natural Teleological argument by including insights from philosophy and sociology, and dialogue those theories with SMT scholarship regarding community, justice and power as being of Nature or intrinsic to human social behavior.

In the preceding chapters that review SMT literature I highlighted the recurring ideas of community, justice and power that underlie much of SMT. Because community, justice, and power pervade SMT, I contend they indicate something deeper about social movements than just how movements do things or what they say they want. Social movements generally only articulate the functional teleological goal of justice insofar as they profess to intentionally act *for the sake of* justice. However, constructing in and out-groups via identity work and framing work, and their aim to achieve public goods, indicates they act *for the sake of* community. Additionally, social movements' actions that are outside of the government-sanctioned agency mechanisms indicates they are *for the sake of* reconfiguring social and/or political power structures power because the institutions in place are somehow unacceptable to the movement and the swathe of society it represents. These three key drivers are more useful in explaining social movements than just contributing to our understand of how movements accomplish stated objectives or easily implied objectives like resource mobilization. Community, justice and power are three key clues amidst the landscape of sociological explanations that tell us why social movements must emerge in the first place.

Social movements are *for the sake of* community insofar as they benefit the cohesiveness of more people than just the participants themselves. Movements emerge to give agency to a broader community wishes to remain together, but demands some structural, institutional, or social change vis-à-vis an 'other' who commits or is somehow responsible for some grievances. The emergent social movement community is the active arm representing a larger social group desiring change, some or much of which may remain publicly inactive. This identity-based movement and broader social group does not necessarily intend secession though it may sometimes be the case or occur during contentious interaction with the 'other' if remaining together is impracticable. Furthermore, that people have always divided into groups rather than cooperating everywhere and always indicates that establishing community is part of the Natural Ontology of the human (and indeed many animals'!) social world.

Carneiro finds that humans are overwhelmingly social creatures (Carneiro 1970), and beyond the relatively rare hermitic exceptions, our very social history supports the argument. But we also divide ourselves into competitive groups wherein we surrender some freedoms in exchange for some things the group provides vis-à-vis other groups. Evolutionary biologists seek to explain cooperation and competition from a genetic survival perspective – that cooperation at some level benefits both individual and species survival but there is a limit where an increase in cooperative group size diminishes survival benefits.[138] Humans are naturally social creatures whose, "individual capacities to cope with the environment are quite unimpressive, while the collective capacities of human society have now reached the point where they may be able to destroy all forms of life" (Moore Jr 1979, 8). Moore goes on to assert:

> The need to cooperate with other human beings produces a new and distinct system of causation for human behavior. Social causation will not work without some of the qualities and capacities that innate human nature provides. But it has to be understood in its own terms. Together with biological or innate factors, social causation – a very shorthand and inadequate way of expressing

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[138] See for examples: (Boyd and Richerson 2009, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Palmer, Fredrickson, and Tilley 1997).

the fact that there are lots of other human beings in the world with whom it is necessary to come to terms – creates the actual human nature we can see and study.

From that nature of living together stems the requirements of people to establish acceptable social coordination of authority, work and distribution of what the society produces together.

Several philosophical theories seek to understand this group affiliation Teleologically of our Nature, but the exact Natural drive remains a puzzle. Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues that people enter into the social contract of a community, society, or government, submitting themselves to the requirements of that society and receiving the benefits of the collective that far exceed the potential of the individual (Engel 2005). Hobbes, on the other hand, sees society as a war of all against all where group commitment is purely for maximizing self-interest. Binmore notes that we see both of these forms of sociality in other animals (Klosko and Rice 1985). But, he is skeptical that "we can say anything definitive at all about the social contract that cultural evolution is likely to select when the choice is left blowing in the wind" (Binmore 1994, 167). But, Binmore (Binmore 1994, 226) does find that some social contract must Naturally emerge, if for nothing else, because we have empathy and can imagine ourselves being in need in the future – we will give when we can so that others will give to us when we need. Binmore's thinking, that our Natural tendency to coalesce in communities produces the institutional constraints that we reify, echoes several philosophers that theorize about the emergence of institutions, which either replace or act concurrent with the Natural drive of community.

Hume, Bhaskar, Marx and Popora explore the emergence of social institutions from some Naturally embedded and/or socially institutionalized drive to form communities. Hume's thinking is akin to critical realism whereby he believes the original social contract that "had its origins in the woods and deserts" has long evolved past a voluntary contract. He sees the institutions of governments as supplanting the original Natural social contract with what we constructed and reified over millennia resulting in the individual duties of justice, fidelity, and allegiance that are independent of the Natural human necessities of society (Baker 1960, xl-xliii). Bhaskar's critical realism better straddles Naturalism and social structurationism, viewing institution construction as emergent from social interaction of a community of individuals where

the institution is greater than the sum of its parts (Bhaskar 2013b). Marx likewise views institution

construction and participation by individuals as existing "independent of their will," but deriving from

modes of production; production itself he views as the basic Natural impetus for the rest of social

interaction, i.e. legal, political, and intellectual life (Marx 2010, 92). Porpora synthesizes Marx's Giddens'

and Durkheim's theories on the emergence of institutions as a material cause "which (1) has an existence

independent of consciousness; (2) has causal effects independent of consciousness; and (3) obeys physical

laws (Porpora 1993, p. 215).Porpora's use of goal directed behaviour as the analytical centerpiece for

understanding social interaction suggests humans are Naturally driven to work toward objectives,

constrained and enabled by the "emergently material phenomena" that are the sociocultural institutions

we create. But, Porpora argues the Durkheimian centrality of Natural physical laws is analytically less

important than the Giddensian and Marxian understandings of institutions that constrain and enable our

actions.

SMT's identity analysis and frame analysis partly explain some of the social constructs that

movements, societies and individuals interact with to construct social movement subcommunities. SMT

views framing and identity work as the prime mechanisms for constructing a group within, but opposed

to, a governmental or societal superstructure. Identity and frame analysis approaches from SMT implicitly

accept that people form groups for reasons – a social movement to affect change being one – and explain

how the mechanism works. Tarrow outlines social movement connective mechanisms:

> …bringing people together in sustained interaction with opponents requires a social solution –
> aggregating people with *different demands and identities* in different locations in concerted
> campaigns of collective action. This solution involves first, mounting collective challenges;
> second, drawing on social networks, *common purposes, and cultural frameworks*; and, third,
> building solidarity through connective structures and *collective identities* to sustain collective
> action (Tarrow 2011, 8, my italics).

But framing and identity work is used to create out-groups just as much as it is used to build the

movement in-group. Bringa highlights the use of names to demarcate Muslims from Christians in Bosnia

for centuries and that it is normal within Bosnian culture to clarify religious lineage in casual conversation

if the name is ambiguous (Bringa 1995, 18-29). This historical identity demarcation facilitated conflict in Bosnia along religious and ethnic identity lines. While social movement framing and identity work can serve multiple purposes, at their most basic functions they are functionally teleologically *for the sake of* establishing who belongs to the social movement community and who belongs to the 'other' the movement acts against.

SMT is useful in researching how frames and identity helps build communities of people we call movements. But we must look to philosophy and sociology, as above, to understand why people form communities in the first place. Philosophy, supported by sociology and even evolutionary biology as noted above, tells us that humans must form groups because we are Naturally Teleologically driven to do so. Whether that drive is *for the sake of* individual and species survival, individual interest maximization, or a product of socially constructed and historically reified institutions is debated; and I admit I have not furthered thinking on the topic as it is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I have done is show that there is a Natural Teleological drive to create in and out groups with longue durée historically grounded institutions and structures shaping those group creations. As such, social movements are partly *for the sake of* community.

4.1.2: Justice

Much natural law derives from biological drives to survive like seeking food, shelter, and procreation, and the necessity of living cooperatively in society to secure those needs. From these innate human goals, justice derives, "in some fundamental sense from what it means to be human, that is, an inviolable individual with needs and capabilities, and a rightful participant in the common good of society" (Cahill 2006, 84). Moore finds "for very many human beings… social order is a good thing in its own right, one for which they will often sacrifice other values" (Moore Jr 1979, 22) of which justice is one value, indicating the interpretation of what is 'just' is malleable. Scholars throughout history have sought a fundamental form of justice. For example, Cahill summarizes Aquinas' and Aristotle's thoughts

on justice and "natural law" which is that "human beings share certain basic characteristics and experiences that are recognizable by reason, indicative of happiness, and part of the good life for human beings" (Cahill 2006, 84). But the fundamental form of justice remains elusive, like an absolute center of gravity.

Philosophers deduce from human interaction that justice is an innate and inseparable component of society. Hume's concepts on what causes people to consider justice are that which relates to people's treatment of each other and to claims of property. Hume argues that justice would be "useless" in a society where everyone sought to and only did good for each other and where everyone had everything they needed and wanted. While these arguments could be challenged, Hume's point on the Natural derivation of justice is stronger: "human society, or even human nature could not subsist, without the establishment of it… As justice evidently tends to promote public utility and to support civil society, the sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger, thirst, and other appetites, resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human breast, which nature has implanted for like salutary purposes" (Hume 2013, quote on p. 41). Likewise, linking justice to community, Rawls argues that justice maintains communal bonds by balancing wrongs and rights (Rawls 1998, 3-6).

Moore's *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* seeks to elucidate "a conception of innate human nature, innate in the sense of being prior to any social influences but not necessarily immune to them, for which not only physical deprivations are noxious but also psychic ones" (Moore Jr 1979, 7). Moore posits it is difficult to ascertain Natural Tele of good justice and authority in a society – "a Platonic charter to which all members of the society except the socially obtuse and politically deaf would agree" (Moore Jr 1979, 18) – extracted from the social baggage that accompanies humanity is unlikely to be found. However, he argues, "it is obvious that human beings do have something that can be called innate needs" concerning justice (Moore Jr 1979, 5) that we can see the effects of as people "test and *discover* the limits of obedience and disobedience" (Moore Jr 1979, 18). He argues that "social rules

and their violation are crucial components in moral anger and a sense of injustice" (Moore Jr 1979, 5). But, to reach a realization of moral injustice, people must become somewhat independent from that which does them some harm while no longer believing the harmer to be "just, permanent, and inevitable" (Moore Jr 1979, 461-462). Understanding where the demarcation of just and unjust actions based on societal rules, in Cahill's view, "must be locally nuanced and inductively reached." (Cahill 2006, 101).

The structure of community, from tribes to nation-states, are not only responsible for determining their nuanced shared meaning of justice; these community structures must also have a mechanism for ensuring unjust actions are corrected. While those justice enforcing mechanisms react to infractions, they simultaneously recreate the meaning of justice as praxis. Binmore claims that, "appeals to fairness that ignore the realities of power are doomed, because the underlying balance of power is what ultimately shapes the interpersonal comparisons necessary for fairness judgements to be meaningful" (Binmore 1994, 257). But, Moore finds "there are certain punishments that one ought not to inflict on other human beings because they are too painful and degrading" (Moore Jr 1979, 29). In this way, the meaning of justice is wrapped up in pre-infraction notions of the concept and in socially constructed norms of what it means for the power holder in society responsible for justice to harm another justly. Where society agrees with (and this is different from just accepting) repercussions for infractions, the power structure can be said to be interpreted as just. Where power holders are believed to act unjustly the Natural Ontological forces that drive people to demand justice in turn drive people to create a social movement Teleologically *for the sake of* achieving justice. Beliefs concerning justice and movement emergence is most closely linked to the SMT concept of 'cognitive liberation', which is, in McAdam's words, "two socially shared and constructed perceptions: that some aspect of life is a) illegitimate, and b) subject to change through group (as opposed to individual) action" (Traugott 1995, 227-228).

As noted in Chapter 3, SMT's frame analysis approach strongly implies that social movements are, at least functionally teleologically, *for the sake of* effecting justice. Social movement 'master frames' almost exclusively refer to some injustice perpetrated against a community the movement represents by a

community the movement demands justice from. This finding from social movement frame analysis approaches also corresponds to the concept of 'social movement' I define above – that social movements act to rectify a perceived injustice. The concepts of justice and injustice are partially socially structured, but often preexist the extant social structures they are ingrained in. Movements respond to or affect shifts in the socially constructed meanings of justice. But, I argue, because there is always and everywhere some concept of justice and injustice, that justice is innate and part of the human Natural Ontology of society. To bridge SMT's functional teleology of justice with the social Natural Teleological drive of justice, it is useful to bridge philosophy and sociology scholarship on the subject to SMT frame analysis and potentially emotions analysis that relate to feelings of or stemming from injustice.

4.1.3: Power

Social movements are *for the sake of* some gaining power and agency for the movement and its represented group via public contention with the 'other' group who are acting unjustly. The targets of the movement's claims are often a political structure, societal institutions, or cultural norms that pervade enough of society to be found offensive and unjust by the people of and which the social movement represents. The emergence of the movement itself indicates that some aggrieved populace believes there is an imbalance of power concerning the movement's demands which only a collectivity can positively affect. Movement emergence *for the sake of* power, more specifically, *for the sake of* a fair balance of power among members of society, indicates the Natural Ontological drive of power over one's self and sometimes over others also drives social movement formation and actions. Indeed, Giddens claims that, "There is no more elemental concept than that of power" (2009, 283).

There has always and everywhere been some system of power where there is community. Whether the structure is that of a nation-state or a tribal system that assigns certain roles to those who are best suited for them, power structures pervade. Moore asserts that, "Human beings use authority to coordinate the activities of a large number of people. It reaches into all spheres of social life and exists to some

degree in all known societies, even those primitive ones that lack regular chiefs." Moore finds that authority is found in two general conditions – cooperation and coercion – and that almost every scenario involves varying degrees of both (Moore Jr 1979, 15). The universality of power lets us safely assume that there is an ontological force driving some people to seek power – power is *for the sake of* creating a structure that enables communities to function. Giddens argues that scholarship must strive, "for a *reconstruction* of the nature of power as inherent in the constitution of social life," in conceptualizing the constitution of society (italics in original, 2009, 227-262, quote on p 227).Within this power structure, where a community of people form all aspects of the structure and require distributions of some things that affect their lives to be just, the structure's job is to maintain balance or "equilibrium" so that people within the group act according to rules (Binmore 1994, 277). The exact power system is socially constructed, but that power systems always emerge indicates that power is Naturally Ontological.

Taking the commonalities of conflict and power in theories of the genesis of government,[139] why must movements occur is linked to why must governments occur. If in broad Aristotelian terms the government is "*for the sake of* a good life" (Politics, 1252b27-3) for those it governs, then justice and power balance, which are also prominent in Aristotle's concept of governance (Bluhm 1962), are ways that governments provide the good life. This is the same as a man walking *for the sake of* his health – it is one of many ways he can do something for his health. If we ask why someone goes for a walk, we can give multiple final cause answers – *for the sake of* physical health, *for the sake of* thinking and improving intellect, *for the sake of* improving friendship by walking with a friend. These final causes can occur simultaneously. Movements must occur because they are the way people correct injustice and an imbalance of power on a societal level. There may be other social mechanisms, but movements are certainly historically pervasive. Social movements (which can include nonviolent and violent movements that are often labeled insurgencies, revolutions, or civil wars) are manifestations of ontological forces

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[139] This borrows from political theory, historiographical hypotheses of state genesis (Carneiro 1970), and sociological explorations of the state (Giddens 2009).

correcting governments' own Natural Teleological failures. When citizens exhaust government

sanctioned corrective mechanisms (e.g. voting, dialogue with political representatives, judicial processes,

etc.), movements must emerge (Rawls 1998, 382-391). It is worth quoting Rawls at length on this point:

> Indeed civil disobedience (and conscientious refusal as well) is one of the stabilizing devices of a constitutional system, although by definition an illegal one. Along with such things as free and regular elections and an independent judiciary empowered to interpret the constitution (not necessarily written), civil disobedience used with due restraint and sound judgement helps to maintain and strengthen just institutions. By resisting injustice within the limits of fidelity to law, it serves to inhibit departures from justice and correct them when they occur. A general disposition to engage in justified civil disobedience introduces stability into a well-ordered society, or one that is nearly just (1998, 383).

Moore's description of power realization and understanding in society is similar:

> Rulers know that there are certain bounds to their power beyond which they cannot expect compliance… Meanwhile the standards of approval and condemnation exist among the subjects and form the source of these limits… and their existence is both manifest in and discovered by intermittent testing of each other's reactions (Moore Jr 1979, 18).

We find similar descriptions of power dialectic construction throughout sociology and SMT.[140]

Power is central to the vein of sociology SMT derives from, which is that of Giddens, Durkheim,

and Bourdieu, to name the more prominent thinkers. Giddens summarizes the relationship between

agents, agency and power:

> to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including those deployed by others. Action depends upon the capability of the individual to 'make a difference' to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to 'make a difference', that is, to exercise some sort of power (Giddens 1984, 14).

From SMT, a few scholars explicitly analyze the importance of power and power structures to social

movement emergence, formation, and interactions. McAdam finds that the core drivers of any social

movement are the desire for justice, agency within a power structure, and group cohesion based on some

identity (Traugott 1995, 228). McAdam and others[141] picked up on these three components of social

movements. For example, Gamson's *Talking Politics* where he outlines how in/justice, the power struggle

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[140] See also my discussion of Bourdieu's dialectic structuration of power structures the section where I review Crossley's SMT synthesis in Chapter 3.

[141] See for examples (Della Porta and Diani 2006, Williams 2004, Benford and Snow 2000).

for agency, and the creation of a 'we' and a 'they' are basic components what social movements do (Gamson 1992b, esp chapters 3-6). Della Porta and Fillieule describe the "configuration of power and protest policing" wherein the social movement participants, the police, the government, the media, and the public all engage in power struggle. The movement seeks agency, in part via the media and the public who can act as influencers upon the government and its supporters. Meanwhile the government seeks to control the movement using the police force, and sometimes the media, to contain the movement's actions and messaging to the government's desires and advantage. Della Porta's and Fillieule's (2007) policing protest description is strikingly similar to Fierke's (2012a, b) Warden's dilemma.

Tarrow is the most explicit writer on the effects of power regarding social movements, particularly in his highly regarded book *Power in Movement.* He claims that "Movements – and particularly the waves of movement that are the main catalysts of social change – are part of national struggles for power" (Tarrow 1998, 25). He links political opportunities and movements' abilities to effect justice, or the extant construct of justice, as integral to the power structure. Tarrow finds that, "changes in political opportunities and constraints create the most important incentives for initiating new phases of contention. These actions in turn create new opportunities for both the original insurgents and for latecomers, and eventually for opponents and power holders" (Tarrow 2011, 12). And while he sees frames, especially master frames, as integral to everything about social movements, he assesses the pervasiveness of the contrived community vis-à-vis the 'other' is most important in determining the movement's ability to exercise power (Tarrow 2011, 11). He summarizes, "[Social movements] have power because they challenge power holders, produce solidarities, and have meaning within particular population groups, situations, and national cultures" (Tarrow 2011, 8). Whereas it was likely unintentional, Tarrow's book indicates there is an inextricable link among the creation of a community in the form of a social movement, the society's and movement's concepts of justice, and the movement as a key mechanism in agents' struggles for power.

While there are likely other Natural Teloses that are important to social movements, the pervasiveness of community, justice and power in SMT and sociology literature suggests they are probably some of the more important Teloses. But, key problem remains with my assertion that social movements are *for the sake of* community, justice and power. How can something have more than one final cause? The answer is simple, but may be unsatisfying – community, justice and power are median Natural Teloses. Like chewing food is *for the sake of* getting nutrients which is further *for the sake of* individual and species survival, community, justice and power are *for the sake of* some further Telos of society. Seeking the Teleology of society is far beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I will postulate one further heuristic that gives analytical guidance to explaining social movements; that is, we use the concept of social balance as an analytical assumption. Where there is social balance among the Natural Ontological forces of community, justice and power, social movements remain dormant. Where there is imbalance, social movements emerge.

4.2: Bringing Community, Justice and Power Together as Social Balance

Where there is balance among the Natural Ontological forces of community, justice and power, an extant governance structure maintains. These forces are in a continuous pull on society and people have a tendency to act *for the sake of* each Natural Telos if circumstances shift, actuating one or all of these drivers.[142] Power and associated authority are related to justice and community insofar as community requires its empowered people in government act justly (Emerson 1962). But individuals' concepts of justice are determined by the epistemic structuration of the meaning of justice (Moore and Aweiss 2003, Stock 2003, Moore 2003), making the desired application and outcome of justice interactive, intersubjective, and different for everyone and changing over time (Rawls 1998, 40-45). The dynamic nature of social structuration of power and justice makes balance tricky and tenuous. Read and Miller

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[142] This borrows from Bhaskar's concept of "natural tendencies and causal powers" where he concludes that, "When we know what a thing is we know what it will tend to do, if appropriate circumstances materialize" (Bhaskar 2008b, 221-230, quote on p 230).

(Read and Miller 1994, 216) summarize balance theory at the cognitive (lifeworld) level, as "cognitive consistency or balance in terms of interacting fields of forces, where each of the cognitive elements in the system influenced the other elements such that the final outcome was the result of all these forces acting together." When there is an imbalance, contention emerges. Natural Teleological drivers are constrained and enabled via institutional structures which are then interpreted and assigned meaning at the lifeworld level. Movements emerge because they are a socially Natural response by people urged to restore balance in social institutions that they then interpret, think through, and act according to. As Skocpol invoked Wendell Phillips: "Revolutions are not made; they come" (Skocpol 1979, 17).

Social movements then are Teleologically *for the sake of* correcting communality, justice and power. However, this is not to say that movements will always emerge. Like an apple held above the ground by its stem denying gravity's effects until it is ready, if a government effectively employs counter-movement measures (e.g. repression or other 'social anesthetics' in Barrington's terminology (Moore Jr 1979)), movements will remain dormant but potential events. Moore makes this point from a social contract philosophical standpoint:

> Although the social contract inherent in relationships of authority is always undergoing testing and renegotiation, and in revolutions may collapse almost completely… there are certain forms of violation of this contract that quite generally arouse moral anger and a sense of injustice among those subject to authority. Where we do not find this anger, we will usually find certain repressive mechanisms at work (Moore Jr 1979, 23).

Likewise, regarding nonviolence and power, Mattaini notes, "Structural opposition is always maintained not by a single individual but by an entire system" (Mattaini 2013, 8). By conceiving of movements and governments in this way, we understand how the Natural Ontology of society affects the impetus of people. Using the Ontological forces of community, justice and power, we reconceive our epistemology before engaging the next causation level where people begin to have their say. Moving from a Natural Ontology through to the causation of phenomenology follows Bhaskar's strata and Searle's striation of causation who notes, "a socially constructed reality presupposes a nonsocially constructed reality" (1996,

191). Bhaskar posits concerning social *real* Natural Ontological forces causing *actual* events which

sometimes are *empirically* observable that

> … for the transcendental realist the stratification this form of explanation imposes upon our
> knowledge reflects a real stratification in the world. Without the concept of real strata apart from
> our knowledge of strata we could not make sense of what the scientist, striving to move from
> knowledge of one stratum to knowledge of the next, is trying to do: viz. to discover the reasons
> why the individuals which he has identified (at a particular level of reality) and whose behaviour he
> has described tend to behave the way they do. Without this concept the stratification of science
> must appear as a kind of historical accident, lacking any internal rationale in the practice of science
> (if indeed it is not denied altogether in a reductionist and ultimately phenomenalist account of
> science).

Using SMT approaches that analyze empirically observable behavior (e.g. identity work, framing work,

cycles of contention, etc.) we likewise seek causation at different strata, with Natural Teleological

hypotheses as a heuristic.

If we take seriously the idea that there is a Natural Teleology of society, we can analyze

movements as more than discrete events to be deconstructed to their component parts' effects upon the

movement and ultimately the outcome. While this may be attractive and a step in the right direction if we

analyze movement properties, processes, actions, outcomes, etc., giving analytical attention to material,

formal and efficient causes in an ordered and inclusive schema, it is still not far enough. Understanding

movements Teleologically requires understanding that movements are the material, formal and efficient

causes that come together because something fundamentally and Naturally requires their emergence.

Movements then should be understood as a constant potential that will emerge if something in the social

world requires them. This idea that movements are a constant potential borrows from Harr'e and

Madden's (1975, 68) concept of causal power so that "'X has the power to A' means 'X (will)/(can) do A,

in the appropriate conditions in virtue of its intrinsic character." It also borrows from the critical realist

causal strata that intransitive *real* forces drive the emergence of *actual* events, some of which are

empirically observable. The forces opposing the movement determine how great that requirement must be

before the movement manifests. If the requirement is great, but repressive or mitigating processes are

equally great, the movement will not occur; or, at the very least, it will not be successful (Tarrow 2003, 20). In effect, repression or some other form of mitigation is the counterweight to grievance.

We can combine the concepts of balance and the Teleological drivers of community, justice and power I present above to make a simple, but valuable final cause heuristic composed of three intertwined hypotheses:

1. Imbalance of power: Where people in institutional authority positions wield too much power and other actors functioning within or against those institutions lack too much agency, the unempowered will view the greater structure as maintaining an unjust society or community.

2. Imbalance of justice: Where structure-linked injustices are too great and a righting mechanism that corrects those wrongs is absent, some people will view the structure and/or its institutions as responsible for an imbalance of power in the society or community.

3. Imbalance of community: Where the community is imbalance and not functioning for the good of the people, people demarcate new social boundaries and will view the power structure as illegitimate and unjust.

None of the above statements are particularly enlightening at face value. However, when employed as a Natural Teleological heuristic, they help us to conceive of social movement actions in different and deeper ways. The above hypotheses can be used to rethink causation in SMT in these three ways.

First, concerning the imbalance of power, we use the guiding hypothesis that an imbalance of power will drive people to view the structure as unjustly arbitrating over a given society. So, where some people in a society believe they lack some level or kind of agency they should have, they will construct frames and separating identities that label the structure, its institutions, and/or its power holders as unjust representatives of the society they are supposed to be for. A movement will emerge, unless it is repressed, and contention will continue until the social movement and the structure, institutions and power holders it challenges reform the power structure so that a new balance of power is understood and believed in by the people. That balance of power may be in the form of greater repression, more agency for the movement

and those it represents, and/or a new construction of what the power structure is and should be. Hence, social movements are *for the sake of* power.

Second, concerning the imbalance of justice, we use the guiding hypothesis that an imbalance of structural/institutional perpetrated (in)justice will drive people to view the structure as having a wrongful preponderance of power over the society it is meant to compose. So, where the people believe there are pervasive injustices within their society that aren't being corrected through the structure's institutions, they will construct frames and separating identities that seek to correct those injustices by redistributing power and agency in enacting justice through structural and institutional reforms. A movement will emerge, unless it is repressed, and contention will continue until the social movement and the structure, institutions and power holders it challenges rebalance justice. That balance of justice may be realized via movement-demanded actions, institutional justice reforms and/or through a reformed understanding of what justice is. Hence, social movements are *for the sake of* justice.

Concerning an imbalance of community, we use the guiding hypothesis that an imbalance of community will drive people to create new community boundaries including people it believes will fulfill the desired functions of a community and rightfully distribute justice and power. Where people demarcate new boundaries of the in and out groups composing their society, the extant power structure will be viewed by the out-group as illegitimate and unjust. This community imbalance and the perceived or real injustices and power misalignment will drive social movement emergence to drive a rebalance in community. The rebalance of community may come from a shift in the locus of power in the ways as noted above, a shift in justice in the ways noted above, or in a new understanding of what the community is, driving the formation of new social lines. The new community boundaries will include those who the people believe can function for the good of society and aim to mitigate or marginalize those who are viewed as detrimental. Hence, social movements are *for the sake of* community

4.3: Did We Win?! - Defining and Understanding 'Success'

SMT is unsatisfactory and incoherent in defining 'success.' As described above, what social movements are for as a function of Nature is different from (albeit often related to) what movements' leaders and participants say they are for. Like discussing different kinds of teleology, when we describe social movement success, we can mean participant (micro-level) goals, group (meso-level) goals, or societal (macro-level) goals.[143] SMT largely considers what social movements claim they want to do as the goal, which is goal directed behaviour and not necessarily exactly what drove the movement to emerge. If society has a fractured community, sweeping social injustice, and a centralized despotic power structure, a social movement in the form of a revolution may emerge to mend community, reinstate justice, and distribute power. If the emergent movement removes part of the structure responsible for those things (e.g. a state president) but does not affect those things, society remains imbalanced and our analysis of what that movement was for is misled. Like the Greek practice of 'purging' (bulimia) *for the sake of* health as resulting in the same healthy end as exercise like Aristotle suggested, what needs to be done is sometimes different from what we believe we must do *for the sake of* some telos. Stepping back from individuals' and groups' proposed means and goals and analyzing what society needs to function well, we can see that just the existence and actions of social movements may satisfy a rebalance of community, justice and power even if they 'fail' to reach what they say they want. Just because I want to be rich does not mean I was created to be rich. To understand what social movements are *for the sake of*, we must understand what societies require, and how social movements are created to further those requirements; this is the basis of teleological analysis.

SMT literature does indicate that social movements are *for the sake of* affecting community, justice and power in society, but these societal forces are scattered among approach types and analytical levels in SMT scholarship. As highlighted in the introductory chapter and the last chapter regarding SMT

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[143] This mirrors Snow's (2001a) delineation of identities as personal, collective, and social.

approaches, sometimes these drivers are explicit (justice largely from frame analysis and power largely from opportunity analysis), and other times implicit (community as implied by identity, othering, and in/out group formation). In addition, community, justice and power drivers are scattered among levels. We can investigate how community, justice and power affect and are affected by actions at the a micro individual/movement (e.g. *for the sake of* mobilization) level, the meso intra-movement level (e.g. *for the sake of* movement cohesion), and the macro external sociopolitical level (e.g. *for the sake of* effecting change in the polity and society). I argue finding what 'succeeding' is regarding social movement Natural Teleology heuristically guides the remaining final cause analysis (and later the material, formal and efficient causes) in various SMT approaches and throughout the levels of causation. First, reviewing social movement success at the micro, meso and macro levels helps uncover further SMT approaches that feed the broader causation model.

SMT explores individual final causation through micromobilization research and individual and social psychology related to movement participation.[144] Identity is probably the most common SMT approach germane to individual participation final causes.[145] Emotional gratification also drives individuals so that participation itself is the goal.[146] Ontological forces affecting governments and society (e.g. justice and dignity, power, and society, etc.) are mostly found in micromobilization 'frame resonance' analyses[147] that seek intentional motivation. Surely, SMT micromobilization explanations should be related to intra-movement goals and extra-movement goals to understand deeper causation affects beyond the efficient cause of individual and group desires.

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[144] See for examples (Bergesen 2007, Beyerlein and Hipp 2006, Borland 2004, Isaac et al. 2016, Klandermans 1984, Melucci 1988, Oegema and Klandermans 1994, Van Dyke 2003, Snow et al. 1986).

[145] See foe examples (Alexander 2011, Aronson and Owens 2000, Bernstein 2009, Brewer and Silver 2000, Creed, Scully, and Austin 2002, Gecas 2000, Gusfield 2009, Hayes 2011, Kaplan and Xiaoru 2000, Keicolt 2000, Klandermans and De Weerd 2000, Leve et al. 1992, Markus and Kitayama 1991, Melucci 1988, Snow and McAdam 2000, Stryker 2000, Stryker, Owens, and White 2000, Taylor 2000b, Postmes and Jetten 2006).

[146] See for examples (Collins 2001, Fierke 2012a, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000, Jasper 1998, 2012, Markus and Kitayama 1991, Norgaard 2006a).

[147] See for examples (Benford and Snow 1988, Berbrier 2014, Matesan 2012).

Much SMT work concerns the meso level. SMT is largely an internal movement goal directed behaviour analysis where research implies congruence between movement makers' intentions and the movement's organizational purpose of growing its ranks.[148] Identity work,[149] resource mobilization,[150] and most other traditional SMT analysis assumes movement growth is a necessary intermediate goal for political and social success. These analyses are often linked to individual participant final causes like bettering self-esteem and creating a sense of community through identity work,[151] coupled with the requisite framing work via network mobilization structures.[152] But SMT does not step back from its granular analysis of how movements grow to ask what a movement is *for the sake of* regarding the movement itself. Growing numbers is a useful tactical objective, but answering why movements attract members with the answer, '*for the sake of* the movement's growth' is tautological and unsatisfactory. What strategic endogenous goals do movements realize? For instance, if participation itself is a goal, what is it that movements do or are *for the sake of* universally and intrinsically concerning their participants? Martin, McCarthy and McPhail (2009, 825-826) suggest a larger collectivity is linked to the perception of its righteousness and potential for engaging the state. If true, growing numbers is more than a tactical advantage, it is a means for projecting and self-reassuring righteousness. Macro-level analysis would benefit from asking what effects are achieved beyond what the movement says it is trying to achieve.

In the traditional SMT paradigm, macro-level success is measured by political or social change related to the movement's injustice frames.[153] For example, one of the most prominent recent studies

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[148] See for examples (Klandermans 1986, Tilly 1978, Lachmann 1997, Voss 1996, Brewer and Silver 2000, McCarthy and Zald 1977a).

[149] See for examples (Snow and McAdam 2000, Reger, Myers, and Einwohner 2008 , Jasper and Polletta 2001, Smith 2013, Einwohner 2006, Greer and Hauptmeier 2012, Snow 2001a), framing (Voss 1996, Benford and Snow 1988, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, Robinson 2008, Cooper 2002, Snow et al. 1986, Mooney and Hunt 1996).

[150] See for examples (McCarthy and Zald 1977a, Klandermans 1984, 1986, Jenkins 1983, McCarthy and Zald 2001).

[151] See for examples (Baumeister, Dale, and Muraven 2000, Hogg, Meehan, and Farquharson 2010, Markus and Kitayama 1991, Stryker 2000, Gecas 2000, Aronson and Owens 2000).

[152] See for examples (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, Voss 1996, McCammon et al. 2007, McAdam 1990, 1986).

[153] See for examples (Eckert and Jenkins 1986, 70-72, Diani 1992, Kurzman 1996, Tsutsui and Shin 2008, 397, Kane 2003, Skrentny 2006, Johnston 1994).

codifying movement success uses two criteria (Chenoweth and Schock 2015, 432), "(1) it achieved all of its stated objectives (in terms of the removal of an incumbent leader through irregular means, antioccupation, or secession) within a year of the peak of its activities; and (2) it had a distinguishable effect on the outcome, such that the outcome would likely not have occurred without the campaign." But this concept of what the goal of all social movements is – directly effecting immediate policy change - is narrow, made clear by aforementioned research showing movement impacts on culture, identity, emotions, and other non-policy related effects. Moreover, as movements struggle for justice, SMT analysis only rarely includes the dignity aspect of justice.[154] Like Chenoweth and Schock's concepts of success, most SMT concepts of 'justice' are of the legislative sense and comprised of governments' and societies' distributive, retributive, or compensatory actions. But clearly social movements achieve more than policy changes.

Concepts of social movement success beyond policy and structural reform are not commonplace, but they expand our understanding of what success means to movements and their participants. For instance, Zald and Ash make a distinction between "expressive incentives" and "purposive incentives" (1966a, 331) indicating that individuals' and subsequently their movements' goals are not solely political. Myer and Whittier (1994, 278-282) conceive of movement successes broadly as policy and cultural changes, and participants' identity reconfiguration, owing in part to their longue durée analytical approach to the US feminist movement from the 1960s to the 1990s. And Bernstein posits that variance in goals aimed at "political and policy outcomes, mobilization outcomes, and *cultural outcomes*" explain why different movements react differently to the same opportunity (Bernstein 2003, 356-359, my italics). Bernstein (2003, 364-369) subsumes identity formation and change, discursive impacts upon social norms, and the reformation of shared meanings under the broad rubric of 'cultural impacts.' Despite her

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[154] For examples of movements intentionally or unintentionally affecting dignity see (Nussbaum 2009, Cordourier-Real 2010, 70-72, Glasius and Pleyers 2013, Bühler 2002, Pritchard 1972, Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010).

emphasis on emotions in the role of shifting goals from political to cultural, she stops short of conceptualizing emotional gratification as a goal itself.

In any of the above SMT definitions of 'success,' social movements do not always achieve their goals.[155] However, recall that because A is *for the sake of* B does not mean that A will always achieve B if there are mitigating causes. So, we must understand social movement teleology as different from how their slogans define success. Movements are not necessarily *for the sake of* what their frames say they are for. By stepping back and understanding the broader final causation picture, one may realize that movements unintentionally achieve a societal telos – some balance of communality, power, and justice – while failing to meet stated objectives. For example, failed movements are *for the sake of* future movements from a waves or cycle of contention perspective (Koopmans 2004). To understand final causes and what movements are for beyond their rhetoric, we must reconfigure our interpretation of social movement 'success' with respect to micro, meso and macro goals.

It may seem that everything about movements and politics effects everything else (Franzese 2009) and that everything could or could not be considered a goal. Indeed, there is a high degree of intercausality among movement attributes and actions *for the sake of* effects in micro, meso and macro spaces. But, we can clarify this somewhat by defining what a social movement is,[156] and what it does at the micro, meso *and* macro levels, shedding light on what the social movement is *for the sake of*, rather than just what people use social movements for personally and for the organization itself.

4.4: Conclusion – Summary and Next Steps

Because movements, their characteristics, processes, and actions are outcomes constructed by opposing forces, any analysis about movements must be understood in this process of Teleological necessity wherein everything about a movement is dialectically constructed by countervailing material,

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[155] See for examples (Bernstein 2003, Jackson et al. 1960, Johnston 1994, Oegema and Klandermans 1994, Piven and Cloward 1977, Weed 1991).
[156] See introductory chapter.

formal, efficient, and final causes. Using a Natural Teleology paradigm problematizes movements as something that is driven by, but is more than, human intent and desire. It also recognizes there are situations where social movements do not occur regardless of the forces that normally drive them to emerge. In critical realist theory, this non-emergence is where real forces drive change, but other real forces maintain stasis, so that they do not materialize in actual and empirical events. SMT and other analyses of contention that I explore in the next chapter investigate where movements occur and where they don't, and how and why. Presupposing a constant potential energy for movement emergence neither detracts from our ability to analyze the material, formal and efficient causes of movements' success, nor does it preclude our questions about why movements formed and operated the way they did *for the sake of* their cause. Rather, it encourages us to assume that movements are always waiting to happen because societies have not reached their Natural Teloses and that movements will emerge when the necessary and sufficient conditions are met.

In the following chapter I will bring SMT approaches the related different concepts of 'cause' concerning society and social movements into the four causes model. As noted previously, this model is not simply a grid of Aristotle's four causes with SMT approaches assigned to each box. Instead, I derive this model from the combination of Aristotelian causation, concepts and understandings of final cause as Natural Teleology and functional teleology, concepts of ontology in Naturalist concepts of realism and critical realism, and SMT research that elucidates what causes movement or movement phenomena. While the model is an elegant means for structuring and focusing social movement analysis using final cause as an analytical lightning rod, the model also incorporates myriad philosophical and sociological concepts. As such, the model is intended to be instructive as to how to think about social movements and to guide analysis to be broader and deeper than most SMT research is – not a plug-and-play algorithm for holistic social movement investigations.

Chapter 5 - The Four Causes Analytical Model Practical Application

<u>Exploring Social Movement Nonviolence and Violence *For The Sake Of*</u>

<u>Community, Justice and Power</u>

In this chapter I will use the question of 'why do some social movements use nonviolence and others use violence?' to further develop and fill out my analytical model. In the last chapter, I found that social movements are Naturally Teleologically *for the sake of* rebalancing societal community, justice and power. This next step of practically applying the question of nonviolence or violence emergence in social movement repertoires and actions helps place SMT and related scholarship in the remainder of the model. I will apply existing scholarship and thinking to understanding social movement nonviolence and violence at the Natural Teleological, institutional ontological, lifeworld, agentic goal directed behaviour, and observable levels in the analytical model. At each level, I will revisit the theories and scholarship concerning the general concepts of that level that I highlighted in previous chapters. In addition, I will review SMT scholarship that claims to explain nonviolence or violence as it applies to that level. Whereas the model I present demarcates five levels of causation, theoretical and social movement literature is not quite as neatly divided. Similarly, when social movements act, the entirety of causation is often at play and at least partly relevant and causally explanatory at other levels. Hence, this model is best used as a final cause-focused heuristic to structure and focus analysis, but understanding that causation at one level almost certainly implies and includes causes at other levels.

In addition to understanding causation at each level, we must also seek which of Aristotle's four causes apply to each level. To do this, we can deconstruct the question of social movement nonviolence or violence into four (causes) explananda: What are nonviolent movements made of? What unique forms do nonviolent movements take? What actions make nonviolent movements so? What are nonviolent movements for; what do they achieve? These explananda apply to different causal levels, as noted in the below table. We must also ask the same questions of violent movements and distinguish our answers to

each question by the factors that drive nonviolence or violence in social movements. Exploring social movement nonviolence and violence as composed of and by material, formal, efficient and final causes at the Natural Teleology, institutional, lifeworld, functional teleology, and actual/observable event levels completes the framework of my model before applying it to the Egyptian and Syrian cases in the next three chapters.

5.1: General Overview of the Four Causes of SMT Model

Aristotle postulated his four causes as the four ways we answer questions about our world. Four ways to answer questions seems simple. But a single and simple answer is not usually a complete explanation for the complex, multivariate nature of social phenomena. One person may walk *for the sake of* health, but one thousand people walking together is certainly *for the sake of* something greater than each individual's health; health in the case of a march is just a happy side-effect. Frames, identities, emotions, resources, etc. may do something for a social movement, but these material and formal causes make the movement in such a way that it does something specific *for the sake of* the broader society. This is the causal link between social movements' functional teleologies resulting from intentional actions forming social movement materials, and how that specific resultant movement does something *for the sake of* society – also a functional teleology. As explored in the last chapter, we can deduce that what social movements (in general and specific types of movements) do *for the sake of* society indicates the Natural Teleological function of social movements. Social movements emerge because the Nature of people as social animals drives them to emerge like the nature of people drives them to work together for survival.

Continuously referring functional final causes back to likely Natural final causes throughout analysis makes synthesizing all four causes of social movements a more logical and holistic pursuit; emphasizing goal directed behaviour and functional teleology misses much of the causal equation. For example, a social movement may intend to make a society just (goal directed behaviour and meaning construction of 'justice' at the lifeworld and functional teleology levels) and create a power structure they

see fit (lifeworld and institutional levels derived). However, if that movement is a racist right-wing movement that only represents a small minority of its society, the balance of community, justice and power in that society is unlikely to shift much in favor of the movement absent significant coercive mechanisms. In this case, Natural Teleology that drives the whole of society negates the goal directed behaviour and functional teleology of the movement.

In addition to including Natural Teleology, we must consider the plasticity of functional teleology to best understand what is likely to emerge. Asking what a social movement action or characteristic is *for the sake of* functionally teleologically and Naturally Teleologically and what else could be for the same telos draws multiple explanations into a single analytical framework. History suggests that both nonviolence and violence can change governments and that both emerge from the same cultures, and indeed at the same time as seen in the 'Arab Spring' revolutions. If nonviolence or violence achieves 'success' better, and social movements are indeed completely agency driven, then poor leadership decisions should be the only reason a movement uses the less successful repertoire. If nonviolence and violence work better in different milieus and scenarios, then the key to success is, as many SMT and other conflict analysts suggest, simply picking the right repertoire at the right place and time. But, movements emerge because something is amiss in a society's community, justice and power, and I argue that nonviolent or violent repertoires emerge because one is better *for the sake of* rebalancing toward society's Natural Telos. Whereas goal directed behaviour and intent can counteract Natural Teleology like a sheet of paper's aerodynamics counteracts the straight downward pull of gravity, that Natural Teleological drive remains a real and causal force. A divided, unjust and power imbalanced society can maintain if the ruling elite exert enough coercion and deterrence upon the populace to force compliance. To understand the interaction among that which composes movements and their causal implications at various causal levels, it is necessary to revisit what social movements are.

To relate SMT approaches to their Aristotelian cause, I refer to and deconstruct my definition of social movements: Social movements are the people, organizations, processes, and ideas mobilized into non-state mechanisms using collective action forms of contention to publicly interact with and demand

change from another social sector or structure to rectify some injustice that affects more of society than just the movement's participants. We can unpack this definition to find evidence of the four causes of social movements.

Material causes: people, organizations, processes and ideas

Relevant SMT approaches: RMT, identity, frames, emotions

Formal causes: a non-state mechanism, forms of contention (also, material causes' specific forms)

Relevant SMT approaches: RMT, identity, frames, emotions,

Efficient causes: mobilized, collective action, publicly interact, demand change[157]

Relevant SMT approaches: CAT, RMT, identity work, framing work, political opportunity

Final cause: rectify some injustice that affects more of society than just the movement's participants

Relevant SMT approaches: identity, frames, emotions, political opportunity

I explore these four causes as they apply to each level of causation and elucidate the links between nonviolence or violence and cause at each level, resulting in the below analytical model.

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[157] Because social movements dialectically interact with another social sector or structure, we must remain cognizant that other actors' proper or accidental efficient causes constrain and enable movements' formal causes.

Social Movement Levels of Causation	
Natural Ontology/Natural Teleology – Final and efficient causes	Real, intangible forces and structures driven by nature and innate human impetuses (i.e. unadulterated biological, psychological, and social) affecting actions and effecting outcomes that are independent of and preexist any social constructs.
In social movements	Community, justice, power, or other Natural Tele effecting societal balance.
Institutional ontology/critical realist teleology – Final, efficient, formal and material causes.	Real, intangible forces and structures driven by longue durée social, political, and economic structures and institutions that preexist everyone living in them but are not independent of a continuous historical chain of the people who construct and reify them.
In social movements	Modes of production-based structures, familial structures, governance and jurisprudence institutions.
Lifeworld - formal and material causes	That which composes structures, institutions, rules, and norms. Lifeworld results from the dialectic structuration of habitus through praxis that people draw from to interpret meaning and construct beliefs about the world and their agency within it.
In social movements	Weberian understandings of who 'society' or 'community' is and should be, shared concepts of what 'justice' is and should be, and believed power structures and agency mechanisms based in historical praxis and habitus.
Agency/functional teleology – final and efficient causes	Agency in the form of intentionality and goals where people's reasons, motivations, justifications and intentions coupled with their corresponding actions drive them to some end. In functional teleology, we know the end because it has occurred or because it is intimated by a person or group and we observe the actions that are necessary and sufficient for the end. People use feedback from observations and intentionally act trying to achieve goals.
In social movements	Social movement actions, interactions with those they demand change from that are intentionally directed toward the movement's goals for its participants and for the greater society.
Observable – material and formal causes	Events and phenomena that can be observed and inferred or interpreted from individuals' and collectivities' behavior.
In social movements	Social movement nonviolent and violent actions and interactions with their contenders that constitute an interpretable event correlating with the movement's articulated agenda (e.g. a protest against unjust policies, a building seizure representing certain power holders, cooptation of allies, or an armed attempt to capture territory).

5.2: Natural Teleological Level

To understand the emergence of nonviolence or violence, this model problematizes community, justice and power as efficiently causal in that they drive social movement dynamics to change society Teleologically. This is different from traditional SMT that passively accepts that community, justice and power are part of social movements, Community drives people to create groups and group boundaries. Power drives people to create power structures within those groups. Justice drives people to consider whether people within those groups and power structures are doing right or wrong. Because we are speaking about Natural Teleology, we must be careful to conceptualize achieving the Telos of community, justice and power as different from what the movement says it wants. The Natural Telos is where the whole of society, the push from the movement and the likely resistance from those it makes demands upon, find balance of community, justice and power and come to rest. Sociopolitical structures become unbalanced, movements emerge and contend with those structures, and the movement subsides as sociopolitical structures reach a new balance. So, each Natural Telos of community, justice and power are for a further Telos of society. Aristotle would say these Natural final causes instigate functional change (efficient cause) that drives something toward its Telos like survival instigates the creation and formation of animals' teeth (Falcon 2006). When we ask, 'why do nonviolent and violent social movements emerge?' we are asking largely a final cause question about the inherent Teleological Nature of society and the phenomenological structuration of society, all supported by material, formal, and efficient causes. Crosswhite (2013, 139) posits the same:

> "And just as we puzzle over the nonviolent "force" of reasons, we puzzle also over violence that often seems to be hiding in the ways we inculcate shame and justice where they are missing, or prevent those who are lacking them from disrupting the social order… *and* we know that this ideal – which cannot be denied or mitigated without yielding to violence – can never be achieved, that the ideal does not belong to history but creates it."[158]

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[158] It is worth noting Crosswhite's observed relationship among nonviolent and violent actions and feelings of shame and justice. I will highlight the relationship among these emotions and actions below and in the following three chapters.

Incalculable literature is dedicated to understanding violence, so this section will give a brief overview of theories on violence that can be most closely related to social movements. On one end of the spectrum, a Hobbesian social ontology perspective posits people and states are innately violent, suggesting violence is a Natural Telos. However, structurationists reject the natural predilection thesis and argue that violence is a meaning-bound means-ends mechanism that people use for some intended telos. Within SMT, violence is seen almost purely from the latter point of view, but there is analytical use in asking why both nonviolent and violent repertoires seem to naturally emerge, sometimes at the same place and time.

At the Natural Ontology level, several philosophers and theorists posit violence is innately of human Nature. Modern thought on politics and violence often takes Hobbes as the initial point of argument or departure.[159] The Hobbesian and similar Machiavellian perspectives on violence is that humankind is indefinitely seeking power and rule over others through violence or the threat thereof. This belief in the ontological nature of power as an insatiable driver and harbinger of violence pervades political realism (Klosko and Rice 1985, Wendt 1992, Elman and Jensen 2014), especially neorealism (Waltz 1979, Williams 1996, Axelrod and Keohane 1985), underpinning centuries of political philosophy and policy. Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is politics by other means (1989, 87) and Mao's belief that power emerges from the barrel of a gun (1966a, 61) underscore this philosophical position on humankind's sociopolitical ontology. Keane (2004, 93) relays that this strand of political philosophy is an easy one to accept "because the view of human nature as violent has a certain intuitive appeal, especially when 'the facts' seem to speak for themselves." For realists following Hobbes' theory, people use violence because they are naturally violent; the tautology is evident. Moreover, because violence destroys whereas nature drives survival and growth, the Hobbesian causal explanation seems paradoxical, suggesting

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[159] See for examples (Rule 1989, 18-52, Arendt 1970, 5, Gurr 1968, Frazer and Hutchings 2008).

violence *for the sake of* an ultimate Natural Telos of destruction is unlikely. Perhaps Hobbesian and related theories on violence find better purchase at the institutional and lifeworld causation levels.

Rather than believing violence is the Natural mechanism that underpins all social action, it is best to understand violence as one Natural mechanism that can emerge when driven by other Natural forces. When we ask 'why do some social movements use nonviolence and others use violence?' we seek to understand how the Natural Teleological drivers of community, justice and power encourage the emergence of nonviolence or violence – efficient causes that are *for the sake of* community, justice and power. We apply it like this: 'what does nonviolence do that is different from what violence does to achieve community, justice and power for the society the movement acts within and upon?' To clarify, nonviolence does something for the entire society that either satisfies opposing groups to live together in community, or brings opposing groups close together; violence does the same for community, but in a different way or where nonviolence doesn't work. Likewise, nonviolence does something to satisfy the desire for justice by all parties involved in contention that is different from what violence does. Lastly, nonviolence does something to the balance or structure of power in a society that is different from the effects of violence on power structures and the exercise of power. At this point in analysis of the Natural Teleological level regarding nonviolence or violence and how they are *for the sake of* community, justice and power, we have few answers beyond the unsatisfactory realist theories on violence, and must proceed to the next causal levels of analysis.

The method so far posits there the Natural Teleological forces of community, justice and power drive the functional teleological emergence of social movement nonviolence or nonviolence where one does something fundamentally different from the other *for the sake of* those Natural Teloses. What those differences are, we are heretofore unsure. So, we allow the preliminary Natural Teleological level analysis to rest as a heuristic backdrop to our analysis through the other levels of causation. We next must seek to understand the emergence of violence and nonviolence in general and in social movements because of the forces of institutions, especially regarding community, justice and power.

5.3: Institutional Ontological Level

Institutions constrain and enable (efficient cause) social movements' uses of nonviolence and violence *for the sake of* community, justice and power. For example, encompassing institutions like governments often include a jurisprudence institution as part of their power centralization that requires people of the community or society to submit injustice disputes to the government's arbitration. However, in decentralized communities, injustice dispute settlements may be much more anarchic. Accordingly, it is necessary to elucidate the salient affective institutions that constrain and enable nonviolence and violence *for the sake of* community, justice and power.

Recent critical theorists and sociologists reject the notion of humans' strong predilection to violence. They search instead for longue durée social and structural institutions encouraging violence, often resulting from power dynamics. Foucault (1995), for example, views violence as a means-end power mechanism for establishing and reasserting control derived from decades of praxis and gradual normative restructuration. Gerlach (2010) proposes that mass violence is a process of peoples' perceptions of drastic changes in their capital and power – either greater or lesser – within which the winners and losers use violence against the other.[160] Arendt (1970) likewise views violence as utilitarian, but only for short term goals like dramatically publicizing grievances, especially where there are perceived power shifts. But, she claims that violence is manifest evidence of a lack of power, which is in opposition to the historical notion that violence is power exercised. In addition to structural conditions, violence may also be socially enabled or constrained.

Merton's (1938) strain theory and Cloward and Ohlin's (2013) opportunity theory, which Merton later incorporated (1995), highlight the role access to legitimate institutions, or denial thereof, plays in driving deviant and violent behavior. They posit denied access to that which is believed rightful drives resentment and action toward violent rebellion against the denier. Wallace (1970) found that where

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[160] Gerlach's argument is similar to Klare's supposition that war largely derives from contestation over resources (2002).

system is open, people will work within the system or use nonviolence at worst; if closed, violence is likely to emerge as the repertoire of choice, which is often dealt with in kind. But access perception can be manipulated via extra-legislative means. Lyons, Velez and Santoro highlight governments' successful identity work to give the (false) perception of incorporation makes violence less likely (2013) as they frame some of their members who already have agentic structure access as identifiable with some or all of the movement.

SMT's political opportunity approach analyzes how movements seize power opportunities to collectively interact with and challenge extant structures related to economic, political, ideological, and military functions (Mann 1986, 1-32, esp p. 28). At its core, the political opportunity approach investigates domestic power dynamics where movements balance against the government by allying with other powerful actors, and where opposing sides use nonviolent and violent deterrence and coercion to achieve political objectives (Kalyvas 2009, 365). Arendt views that violence is a power holder's last resort to maintain the status quo power structure against a challenge (1970, 47), and Geertz posits authoritarian regimes prioritize 'stability' above all and certainly above citizens' welfare (1989, 238-239). Once violence breaks, governments risk losing their monopoly on violence, especially if their violent arms refuse to obey commands (Arendt 1970, 48-49). These theories oppose the Hobbesian perspective that people and institutions are Naturally violent since stability and maintenance of power is the goal of most institutions.

Some scholars suggest government type drives the emergence of social movement repertoire. Some institutions like authoritarian regimes use violence with some regularity and make the strong claim that they maintain power and stability (e.g. Hafiz al-Asad's Syria as seen in Chapter 7). It is possible that violence and nonviolence are simply different manifestations of the same community, justice and power balancing force that emerge from different institution types, and social movements act in kind.[161] But

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[161] Several scholars draw links between government types and the emergence of violence or nonviolence. For prominent examples see (Keane 2004, Melucci and Avritzer 2000, Kitschelt 1986, Schwedler 2007, Olson 1993, Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010, Ryan 1994).

power in social movement contention is about *reconfiguring* power structures and finding change

affecting agency and not just who has the monopoly on violence and how. Moreover, nonviolent and

violent social movements emerge in all types of societies. Social movements' interactions with different

institution types undoubtedly affect their trajectories differently. However, a society's institutions'

predilections to nonviolence or violence does not necessarily portend the same from its social movements.

Hence, we must seek further explanation at the next causal level.

5.4: Lifeworld Level

Social movement phenomena are grounded in historical sociopolitical contexts and must be

analyzed as part of the dialectically constructed lifeworld from which they emerge. Whereas it may be

tempting to view the lifeworld as efficiently causal because it affects movement actions, we should

instead view culture, norms, institutions, structures, etc. as constraining and enabling like different metals

constrain and enable how well a wire conducts electricity. Frames, identities, alliances, opportunity

perceptions, and contention events have socially constructed meanings and understandings that require

historical and cultural contextualization (Jabri 1996, 78), as well as salience ordering – not everything

matters the same always. It is also necessary to analyze each material cause in its lifeworld context of its

respective formal, efficient and final causes – social movement variables are anything but

'independent.'[162] To extract social movements material, formal and efficient causes I return to my

definition:

> *Social movements are the people, organizations, processes and ideas mobilized into non-state*
>
> *groups using various forms of collective action to publicly contend with and demand change from*
>
> *another social sector or structure to rectify a perceived injustice that affects more of society than*
>
> *just the movement's participants.*

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[162] Lowe (2006, 13-15) makes the same argument against "pure trope" theorists, that each component of a thing does not have an ontological independence.

Because social movements are foremost collectivities of people, we must understand what constitutive elements of people are important to social movements. Contentious actors use pre-contention lifeworld memories, meanings, beliefs, emotions, rituals, symbols, language, practices, identities and moral principles to create action-inspiring frames regarding current events (Jasper 2014, 48-49, Wiktorowicz 2004a). SMT frame analysis takes mobilization as its implied functional telos,[163] but framing processes also create within-group cultures and change people's normative beliefs about society as a whole (Eyerman and Jamison 1991). Similarly, identity work posits most of how movements use identity linked to the lifeworld is *for the sake of* building a movement as noted in Chapter 3. A society's lifeworld forms from the structuration of what people believe their community should be as largely nonviolent or violent, what 'justice' means in nonviolent and violent praxis, and what power structures are and what they should be like as violent or nonviolent (formal and material causes).

To determine what is relevant from the lifeworld milieu, we observe the social movement in question and identify what community, justice and power changes it wanted to make. We investigate what about the society's understanding and practice of good community, justice and power made people interpret the offending actor's actions as offensive, incompatible, or just anachronistic and in need of reform. Offenses and incompatibilities in the cases of social movements are largely blamed on political and/or social structures and institutions. Methodologically, we must seek how people internalize and are constrained and enabled by institutions, and what about the institutions' community, justice and power the movement and its sympathizers deemed wrong. We must construct a historiography of how the structure became offensive from the rebelling sect's beliefs about what good community, power, and justice should be.[164] These are the ideological lifeworld material and formal causes the movement and its

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[163] See for examples (Voss 1996, Snow et al. 1986, Cress and Snow 2000, Cooper 2002, Robinson 2008, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, Benford and Snow 1988, Benford et al. 1986, Zuo and Benford 1995a, Westby 2002).
[164] This is a key point of Chalcraft (2016) and other historians who explain social movement emergence in longue durée analyses. See for examples (Gerges 2013, 2019, 2016, Wickham 2013, Gani 2014, Wickham 2002).

opposition will use to affect each other's and their society's views concerning all involved parties and what the movement claims are injustices.

Several scholars speak to the social structuration of violence. Keane posits "violence has *social* roots, and that it is therefore *contingent* and *removable*," (2004, 97) if society can assuage an emerging emotional climate of humiliating helplessness that necessitates violent reactions to regain respect (2004, 99-102)[165]. Of course, what is humiliating, even at a whole of society level, is a result of the structuration of humiliation (Margalit 1997, 149-150). In their anthropological exposition on violence, Aijmer, et al (2000) describe violence's meaning construction as a phenomenon used to destroy, or to lionize victims of violence for their tenacity. Feierstein's (2014) "social practice" understanding of genocidal violence suggests that groups "construct their identity, the identity of others, and the otherness of the Other" thereafter the genocidal actor "creates, destroys, or reorganizes relationships within a given society." Feierstein posits (2014, 206), like Murer (2012), that ethnicity is a myth used for othering in times of conflict through rapid social structuration of imagined populace divisions to suit the needs of the perpetrator of violence.[166] Combining the structuralist and the structurationist perspectives in a dialectic description of why violence emerges will produce a more complete picture.

Some studies suggest culture drives violence and some social groups look to violence before any other means of contention to effect justice. This is especially true in cultures where violence used for justice can be correlated with heroism, excitement, and a required response lest one be viewed as cowardly (Cashmere 1991). Pargeter (2009, 1033) and Abu-Nimer (2000) suggest that the proclivity toward violent rebellion in post-independence Arab societies stems from a collective historical narrative and identity of how justice must be achieved. McDougall (2006, 62-63) and Remaoun (2000) highlight the social construction of a country's revolution as an epic, heroic, violent tale that celebrates its martyrs

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[165] For further examples on the link between humiliation and violence see (Gilligan 2003, Biggs and Andrews 2015, 417, Crow and Grant 2009, Bufacchi 2007, 131-171, Phillips and Cooney 2005, Bramsen and Poder 2018). For a philosophical distinction between a just (egalitarian) society and a 'decent' society that lacks systemic humiliation, see (Margalit 1997).
[166] See also (Brown 2014).

and their deeds. Abu-Nimer, who has conducted numerous nonviolent resistance workshops, observes that some Arab cultural norms make participants apprehensive to nonviolence because they believe power holders and their Western backers promote nonviolence as an ameliorative mechanism for avoiding real change (2000, 2001). But Isaac, et al., find that Western activists undergo extensive nonviolence training to preempt violent reactions (2016), suggesting that nonviolence is also not intrinsic to Western societies' justice constructs.

Some researchers find that movements' frame-work can influence repertoire construction and legitimation and choice more than appeals to personal benefit by appealing to emotive cultural morals (Steinberg 1995). Hagan, Kaiser and Hanson (2016) argue that violence is more likely when movements employ a "legal cynicism frame," claiming unjust and illegitimate rule. Ginges and Atran (2009) find that "moral commitments to collective sacred values" drives violence more than self-maximization. So, where a people collectively construct a meaning of strong injustice around some action, *and* cultural aspects of that people's lifeworld demand violent retribution, individuals and groups are likely to respond violently. For example, Abu-Nimer (2000, 118-201) points to Hassan Hanafi's philosophical analysis of injustice that require jihad in the classic "struggle" or "endeavor" sense; all of which permit, if not necessitate, violence *for the sake of* fighting occupation, oppression, economic disparity, dividing Muslim lands, advancing the Muslim world, maintaining identity, and a global Islamic renaissance.

The political opportunity perspective observes that modes of contention are linked to opportunity increases and contractions. Tarrow's (1995) research found that nonviolent activism challenging and opening the power structure that garners repression causes violent activism in response. Brown (2014, 144) suggests that in geographic locations with weak central-state political influence, local institutions dominate socio-political discourse and must draw upon local ideals, meanings, and histories to effect action. Gerlach (2010, 461) posits that when society perceives they are in crisis they, "turn extremely violent in what is a temporary process" and "longer-term negative attitudes and prejudices are radicalized." Mao, the epitome of a violent social movement practitioner, likewise believes violence

quickens a revolution that would otherwise languish and dissipate (1966a, p160). This suggest Arendt is right and the direr the situation seems, the more likely people are to resort to violence (1970, 75) and the perception of direness is linked to a perceived loss in power (1970, 87).

Emotions are closely related to socially constructed meanings, but also occupy a close link to natural Teleology. Social natural ontological forces drive emotions as reactions to social events that are simultaneously meaningfully interpreted through and using lifeworld cultural constructs (Jasper 2014, 109-110). People share emotions related to perceived good or bad executions of power and justice concerning their communal structures. Burton (1997, 16-40, quote on p 31) finds that violence ensues when the emotional identity needs of community are not met which is "whenever conditions deny to people and to their identity groups a role in society which gives personal recognition and a sense of belonging." When movements emerge, partly Teleologically because of and constituted by these emotions, they use framing processes to amplify, extend, bridge, and even attenuate emotions, resulting in some intended or unintended event. Further, emotion-based movements are at least partly *for the sake of* satiating those emotions. If a movement emerges because a group of people are angry about an injustice, the movement's final cause is to assuage that anger, likely through some justice execution or structure reformation that allowed the injustice to occur in the first place.

These above social constructions of nonviolence and violence as (il)legitimate and (un)necessary may stimulate lifeworld predilections toward one repertoire and relegate moral, ethical, and political goal-oriented arguments to the background. However, the material and formal causes of the lifeworld that an actor draws upon can often be manipulated at the agentic functional teleology level where people use history for their own desires.

5.5: Agentic Functional Teleology Level

At this level, we seek to understand the functional teleology of what the social movement achieves using nonviolence or violence (efficient cause) as it aims for some goal regarding community, justice and

power (final cause). We ask, 'how do movements use and form people, organizations, processes and ideas?' and 'what did they actually achieve for the broader society compared to what they wanted to achieve?' We seek the necessary and sufficient actions that resulted in the observed end state (final cause). Those necessary and sufficient social movement dynamics of contention 'mechanisms' and 'processes' (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003) are framing work, identity work, emotion work, opportunity capitalization, and resource mobilization *for the sake of* effecting people's perceptions of who the 'we' and 'they' communities are, what justice should be in practice, and how, by whom and when power should and can be exercised through social movement 'processes' and 'mechanisms'. Plainly establishing these efficient causes and functional teleologies provides a basis to inquire about repertoire formation.

'Goal directed behaviour' provides us with an explanation of why movements decide to do things to reach a goal, analytically leaning heavily on the above dynamics of contention processes and mechanisms. Seeking 'goal directed behaviour' is particularly useful in predicting movement leadership decisions.[167] It also explains how movement trajectories are affected, as in the case of nonviolent protest training to redirect a natural or cultural predilection to react violently.[168] But, goal directed behaviour analysis must not be confused with teleological analysis – intents may affect paths and ends, but they alone do not necessitate them.

A social structuration analysis that directly asks what violence can be *for the sake of* beyond traditional policy 'success' is largely absent from SMT. Outside of SMT Bufacci (2007, 4) makes a strong case of the functional teleology regarding violence in that that it is an instrumental means to some other end; he posits justice, on the other hand, is an end itself. Crosswhite also finds that nonviolence and violence are both means to the same end of justice, albeit inter-implicated in a natural Teleology of justice. He takes this notion in a Clausewitzian direction, suggesting nonviolence is violence by other

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[167] This suggestion borrows from Wright's discussion of the direction of behavior (Fierke 2012a, 23-57).
[168] See for examples (Abu-Nimer 2000, Isaac et al. 2016, Mattaini 2013, Vukosavljevic 2007).

means (2013, pp 134-173). SMT would benefit from asking pointedly what violence does, at least functionally, for social movements and society.

SMT is replete with functional analyses of how nonviolent repertoires emerge and how they achieve movements' stated goals, and even how movements intentionally choose violent tactics.[169] Key SMT approaches that explain how nonviolence and violence emerge are found in analyses of resource mobilization, identity work, framing work as speech acts and acts of speech, political opportunity and repression, and emotion work. Whereas RMT, identity and framing work, and political opportunity approaches are almost exclusively 'how?' explanans, research on the role of emotions in SMT occupies a unique space that is a functional teleological analysis with strong Natural Teleological causal implications; after all, emotions are inarguably natural drivers of action.

Analyzing functional teleology, social movements' material and formal cause as the constitutive groups, networks of groups and their resources, often viewed from a resource mobilization in SMT.[170] To reconfigure or reify social understandings of power-structures and their repressive capacities interpretations, movements and the opposition engage in resource mobilization through frame, identity, and emotion work leveraging existing networks to form alliances and supplement their power claims.[171] Social movements intentionally mobilize different kinds of resources – specialists, money, messaging apparatuses, politicians and political influencers, weapons, etc.[172] *for the sake of* creating a stronger movement. Allying with violent groups, like gangs, militaries or terrorist groups, shifts the mode of contention toward the emergence of violence.[173] Even in cases where nonviolent groups network with

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[169] See for examples (Martin, McCarthy, and McPhail 2009, Gurr 1968, Rule 1989, Tilly 1975, Taft and Ross 1969, Goodwin 2012, Gil 1996, Kalyvas 2009, Della Porta 2009, Eisner 2009).
[170] See for examples (Crossley et al. 2012, Crossley 2007, Diani and McAdam 2003, Diani 2000, Steenkamp 2014, De Koning and Meijer 2010, Passy and Giugni 2001, Ekland-Olson, Snow, and Zurcher Jr 1980).
[171] See for examples (Collins 2001, Eckert and Jenkins 1986, Goldfrank 1979, Lachmann 1997, McAdam 1985, 1986, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 197, McAdam 1990, Ekland-Olson, Snow, and Zurcher Jr 1980, Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994).
[172] For examples of RMT describing networks as mobilizing various resources important to movements see (McCarthy and Zald 1977b, 2001, Jenkins 1983, Klandermans 1986, 1984, McCarthy and Zald 1977a).
[173] See for examples (Fisher 2015, Steenkamp 2014, Sageman 2004, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001a, Magouirk, Atran, and Sageman 2008, Cloward and Ohlin 2013).

other nonviolent groups that have tangential historical links to violence, governments can draw the connection to violence, in the case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood[174] and in the case of Tunisia's 1984 Gafsa massacre (Allani 2009, 261, Vandewalle 1988, 609-612) to justify violent repression. The opportunity construction and frame, identity and emotion work used in resource mobilization transforms the entire society's lifeworld understanding of the group as something more and different; meanwhile, the contending 'other' uses the same mechanisms often to deter mobilization and action. The key to successfully using RMT in a four causes method is to consider what movements use to attract and mobilize resources.

SMT often presumes that identity is important and *for the sake of* social movement mobilization and "constitutes a major part of claim making" which can "strongly affect both collective action and its outcomes" (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 55). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly are making assertions about political contention in general, but there is evidence (including their own) that collective identity may, in some cases, be less causal in mobilization than in other functions.[175] Opp asserts (2009, 230), "if there is protest, there need not be a collective identity. But if there is a collective identity, there is some likelihood that it influences protest – depending on its strength and other incentives." Opp's suggests identity's teleology is in large part *for the sake of* attracting people to the movement, regardless of which dynamic process the movement uses identity work for.

If identity is *for the sake of* attracting people to a movement, how can it be for encouraging nonviolent or violent modes of contention across different movement types? Research suggests where nonviolence or violence are prevalent parts of cultural identity, that mode of contention is likely to emerge in social movements.[176] For example, people link masculine identities to using violence to "be a man" across different cultural contexts.[177] And studies on ethnic violence overwhelmingly link violence

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[174] I explore this in the following chapter.

[175] See for examples (Jasper 2014, 229-233, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003, 54-62, Jasper and Polletta 2001).

[176] See for examples (Ellens 2007, Wieviorka 2009, 33-34, 145-148, Kelsay and Johnson 1991, 107).

[177] For examples of how "being a man" is constructed in different cultures see (Cohen and Nisbett 1994, Hong 2000, May 1998, 30, Bourdieu 1977, pp. 159-163).

in identity formation to the emergence of mass violence through strong 'othering' identity work.[178] Brown (2014, 159) finds that groups use identity-based frames to ascribe meaning to violence and attract powerful domestic elites. The resultant new group is then more likely to use violence (Gurr 1968, 277). Also from an RMT perspective, movements may use violence to create theatrical scenes (Vicari 2013) that attract the emotional attention of sympathizers. Even in the case of nonviolent South African anti-apartheid groups, the "nonviolent action" of a "toyi-toyi dancing, mock AK-47 toting thug" (Schock 2003, 710) communicated a violent history and intimated it is still an option, sending a mixed signal of group repertoire to observers (indeed Stephan & Chenoweth (2008, 16) note the difficulty of classifying mixed cases such as South Africa). So, even when identity work is *for the sake of* a nonviolent group's mobilization, onlookers may believe the group's history lends to the potential for violence and respond in kind. The above suggests nonviolent or violent repertoire emergence results from social identity constructions by both the movement and observers, and not an innate Natural Teleology of human violence, contra Hobbes.

Regarding the functional teleologies of nonviolence *for the sake of* community, several practitioners and scholars highlight the constructive aspect of nonviolence [179] that can be understood as framing actions in the form of 'acts of speech (Fierke, 2012). Butler and Rothstein (2007) promote nonviolence to justly resolve differences and build community consensus as resolution. But, Epstein (1991) espouses contention is only truly nonviolent if the movement is created, maintained and practiced through consensus building, which she admits is an arduous process where violence often threatens to creep in. Similarly, Thomas and Lewis (2013, 11) find that nonviolence is better at building a communal psychological connection and identity alignment among onlookers and the movement. Sharp (1996, 241) highlights Niebuhr's moral analysis of nonviolence in the Christian tradition as, "the type of coercion which offers the largest opportunities for a harmonious relationship with the moral and rational factors in social life." If true, all groups should tend toward nonviolence with violence requiring quite a bit of

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[178] See for examples (Straus 2015, Feierstein 2014, Gerlach 2010, Murer 2012).
[179] See for examples (Abu-Nimer 2000, Spence and McLeod 2002, Abu-Nimer 2001, Vukosavljevic 2007).

convincing (Apter 1997). Reaching down to the Teleology of community, Woon's work on othering finds

that where a group frames the other as inherently incompatible, violence emerges. Where groups use

unifying language suggesting that 'they' are like 'us' and that 'we' can change the structure for a common

good, nonviolence emerges (Woon 2011, 291). Nonviolence then should be understood as more than just

the absence of destruction; it is a potential social movement dynamic 'process' *for the sake of* building

community. Inversely, where community and consensus about justice and power are strong, nonviolence

is most likely to emerge; where a society is divided about justice and power, then social movement

violence should likely emerge.

Powerholders and institutions contending with social movements may also engage in nonviolent

tactics that are functionally *for the sake of* community building, if only on the surface and temporarily,

which is further *for the sake of* restoring their power. Governments co-opt opposition groups or engage in

'authoritarian upgrading' practices of "reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and

manage changing political, economic, and social conditions" (Heydemann 2007). But authoritarian

upgrading political, economic and social changes are mostly rhetorical and superficial, aimed at

ameliorating while seeking strong allies and internal means for repressing contention.[180] Arendt (1970,

72) and Sorel (1999) find that power holders effect false climaxes in revolutions through compromise and

co-optation where revolutionaries subside before achieving their original goals. If the incumbent regime

can create a perceived acceptable balance of power and justice, at least for the group and its members, co-

optation succeeds. Access can be selective as in co-optation, or extensive in the case of structural reform.

When powerholders' nonviolent answers to social movement demands (e.g. allowing institutional access)

are selective or their promises are believed to be false, the imbalance of justice and power grievances can

deepen and exacerbate societal divides.[181]

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[180] For additional descriptions of governments using co-optation as a partial strategy of "authoritarian upgrading"
see (Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012, Hinnebusch 2012, Pierret and Selvik 2009). See also (Blaydes and Rubin 2008,
470-473, Meyer 2003).
[181] The case of Bashar al-Asad's authoritarian upgrading attempts as explored in Chapters and 8 exemplify this
point.

SMT often suggests access openings build community and encourage nonviolence whereas exclusion divides community and instigates violence, but repression certainly works in some instances.[182] Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) describe how Cairo gave accesses to social movements and citizens in general to assuage contention, and then closed access when it felt challenged, precipitating a violent social movement response. But closing access and repressing social movement demands does not necessitate social movement violence. If a structure's repressive mechanism is geographically pervasive and is meaningfully experienced by most of society (Bourdieu 1977, pp. 164-171), a movement will likely not form or will decline (Ortiz 2007, Kalyvas 2009).

Davenport and Inman (2012, 620) describe repression as the use and threat of physical, social, psychological, and/or economic sanctions to coerce people to act in a certain way concerning contentious politics. SMT analyses suggest that reactions to anti-movement repression are dependent upon the type, breadth, intensity, target specificity, duration, and timing relevant to the movement's trajectory (Tarrow 2011, 32, Kalyvas 2009). Wiktorowicz and Hafez (2004), Della Porta (2013, 284), and Tarrow (1995, 101-105) all note the connection between repression and movement nonviolence and violence, generally finding repression drives collective violence.[183] But when regimes, especially authoritarian regimes, apply coercion to an entire unaligned community effectively, increasing the price of participation to include participants' loved ones and community, adherents become more likely to abandoned the cause (Brockett 1995, 126-129). Since repression can result in either outcome, it is likely the material and formal causes of repression that partly determine the reaction, a key material and formal cause of repression being emotions.

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[182] See for examples (Crawford and Lipschutz 1998, 4-5, Toft 2005, 595, Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004, 66-67, Eisinger 1973, Crossley 2002b, Della Porta 2013, 17, Tilly 1978, 52-55, 172-178, Albrecht 2010b, 20).
[183] See also Davenport's and Inman's research concerning government repression in the cycle of contention described as the "Law of Coercive Responsiveness" in (Davenport and Inman 2012, 622-623, Davenport 2007, 7-10).

Several scholars note the role of emotions functioning for social movement mobilization.[184] Movements instigate negative or positive emotions *for the sake of* mobilization, but also *for the sake of* repertoire formation, sometimes intentionally and at other times unintentionally. Emotion research from psychology and sociology indicate that emotions like humiliation and anger encourage destructive (violent) behavior[185] whereas hope encourages constructive (nonviolent) action (Butler and Rothstein 2007, Nepstad and Smith 2001). Destructive and constructive emotions are omnipresent, but movement makers form emotions using framing work that amplifies one set of emotions over another which encourages a movement's nonviolent or violent repertoire formation and execution.[186] In addition, the opposing structures and society in general dialectically form the movement's collective emotions through their own framing work (Kemper 2001, Norgaard 2006b). For example, a movement can culturally contextualize and frame events as humiliating using shared meanings of past events, and constructed cultural definitions of what interactions loosely constitute humiliating injustices (Margalit 1997, 149-150). Movements attempt to capitalize upon people's reactions to humiliation, which the above research suggests naturally trends toward violence unless otherwise checked through culture or some other structural repressive means. However, Natural Ontology linked to an emotion may drive unintended reactions regardless of the movement's intent to use emotions in some goal direction – again, intents do not necessitate ends.

Social movement emotion research broadens our interpretation of movement goals beyond just policy change. Schehr argues (1997, 1-13) that in addition to political effects, we must at least consider movement success as effective positive changes in the lifeworld structures of identity, culture, norms, meanings, and emotions. Bühler (2002) finds that only when movement participants felt their actions gained respect were they satisfied. Wood (2003, 1-19) uncovered an emotional means-ends motivation in

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[184] See for examples (Collins 2001, Flam and King 2007, Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009 2009, Jasper 2011, Wood 2003, 1-19, Fierke 2012a, Markus and Kitayama 1991, Norgaard 2006a).
[185] See for examples (Wood 2003, 1-19, Taft and Ross 1969, Jasper 2011, 296-297, Opp 2009, 185, Crow and Grant 2009, 32).

[186] See for examples (Goodwin and Pfaff 2001, Charlesworth 1991, Jasper 1998, 2012)

El Salvadorian movements whose participants wanted to fight to "not be seen as slaves" despite their slim chances of winning. Similarly, Taft and Ross (1969) found American labor strikes violence arose from frustration and anger at employers' rigidity, their continued denial of access to workplace change affecting mechanisms, and their forceful repression of the strikers' protests. Jasper's (2011, 296-297) analyzes that collective emotional exercise of anger through violence can be the goal instead of policy effects. And De Rivera and Páez (2007) summarize of a body of social movement emotions research that finds "anger may be understood as a perception that there is a challenge to what ought to exist, an enhancement of the body's power, and an instruction to remove the challenge" often resulting in "strong collectivist violence." These studies indicate that, at the group level, collective action participation itself can satiate negative emotional urges.

Humiliation, shame, guilt and anger are common negative emotional drivers of both nonviolence and violence found in SMT and psychology research. Gilligan (2003) explicates historically, philosophically, and psychologically that violence against authority naturally precipitates from the experience of humiliation, the shame of bearing that humiliation, and the guilt of not reclaiming respect through retort or revenge against the authority. Fletcher (2013, 27-28) suggests that shame results from the dominated person feeling their loved and esteemed families and peers no longer respect them. Wood (2001) found humiliation and shame were linked to feelings of powerlessness, and people use violence to regain dignity. According to Einwohner's study of resistance in the Warsaw ghettoes (2003, 652), "it was only once the ghetto fighters became aware of the hopelessness of their situation that they began to plan for resistance."[187] Crow and Grant (2009, 32) claim that "the psychological effect of growing up impotent and humiliated in a postcolonial world dominated by Western military establishments is devastating to the personalities of Arab children. Only through violent struggle can this syndrome of weakness be broken." And Pearlman (2013) found that higher collective humiliation and lower fear in the Arab Spring states motivated people to take action to regain individual and collective dignity. These studies suggest the aim

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[187] See also (Opp 2009, 185).

of violence is to break down the humiliating repressive power structure and force a reconfiguration of structural power praxis, regaining some dignity and respect from the repressor and from society writ large.

But there are competing hypotheses on emotions and their outcomes as violent or nonviolent movements. For example, Woon (2011) finds that fear generates nonviolence, whereas Kemper (2001) finds that fear combined with hate results in violence. Nepstad (2001) found that missionaries turned activists experienced guilt about what their own country did to exploit people, anger toward the power structure that perpetrated injustice, and hope that the people of their mission could build something. Other studies also suggest that shame can lead to either nonviolence or violence (Nepstad 1997, Nepstad and Smith 2001, Goodwin and Pfaff 2001), depending on hope for the future. So, the experience of shame, humiliation, guilt and anger are motivators, hope or hopelessness for reform seems to be the vectoring emotion or cognition. Hope and hopelessness then are efficient causes that directly reform action-driving emotional amalgamations that achieve some telos. These emotions also lead movements to believe or disbelieve there is chance for change.

The above functional teleological approaches to explaining how movements intentionally, and sometimes unintentionally, affect the emergence of nonviolence are key components of a holistic SMT analysis. Analysts can use identity and framing work approaches, and political opportunity approaches, and emotion work analyses to explain how social movements drive repertoire emergence. But, as Ball suggests (2004, 36), "No matter how individualistic we like to think we are, our deeds are often the invisible details of a larger picture." Because the focus in SMT is often on mobilization with little nuanced analysis to how movements succeed in this 'larger picture,' there is often little explanation of what social movement nonviolence does compared to what social movement violence to society. By reviewing the above functional analyses of SMT nonviolence and violence emergence, we have some clues as to how social movements' repertoire choices affect societies. We also uncover some of what in

society may drive those repertoires to emerge in the first place, with emotions occupying a strong bridge between functional *'how?'* and Natural *'why?'* final cause explanations.

5.6: Observable Actions Level

At the level of observable actions, social movements and those they contend with observe and interpret the movement's and opposition's nonviolent or violent interaction and determine if they are achieving their goals. Analysis in this level explores that which composes the movement and the opposition at the point of contention – mostly in the form of events and interactions. SMT approaches that explain movement phenomena like framing actions, identity work, and resource mobilization can be used to describe nonviolence and violence as instances of contentious discourse, interactions and dynamics. Much of these material and formal causes that constitute movements and what they oppose movement makers draw from the lifeworld, but they are formed specifically for purpose in the minds of those involved and observing actors during contention.

Several SMT approaches explore social movement material causes of people, organizations, processes and ideas. Culturalist approaches explore movement participants' cultures and shared experiences (relayed as social movement frames), emotions, and identities present in social movement dynamics. Structure-oriented SMT approaches explore movement material causes as networks (explained by RMT), and perceptions of structural constraints and enablers (political opportunity). Without these materials, movements could not be. But each material may not be salient to the phenomenon of interest; the researcher must ascertain which matter most to the actors and observers who interpret and internalize these instances. Movement formal causes are closely inextricable from material causes. But, the nuanced differences in cultures and shared experiences, emotions, identities, networks, and perceptions of structural constraints and enablers severely change the trajectory of any social movement. Understanding social movement composition idiosyncrasies helps uncover how the phenomenon in question emerged.

Concurrently and at the same level, social movements, those they contend with, and the rest of the society observe and interpret the movement's and opposition's interaction and reconceive their understandings of what their society's new community, justice and power are at the lifeworld level (material and formal causes). Research at this level analyzes interactions in the historical context of people's memories, understandings, meanings and interpretations of contentious acts in their specific environment, and the corrective actions they take with the intent of reaching social movement explicit goals. Events only have meaning because of participants and observers lifeworld-oriented understandings of them. However, analysis must also consider that movements and their participants may act *for the sake of* Natural Teleological ends because they are Naturally driven to, and that Natural ends like satisfying the emotions linked to justice may drive actions that differ from the movement's intended goals. It is at this level that we observe how a movement's 'success' and satiation of Natural social Teloses may see a social movement end without achieving what it said it wanted.

Movement elites use the action and reaction feedback mechanism to guide the movement and affect participants' decisions to join, act within, and leave. This is the point well-argued throughout "Dynamics of Contention" wherein McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005) highlight that social movements must be understood as more than static objects of activism within individuals can choose to participate or not. Rather, movements are processes that are made up of an ever-changing array of inputs and constraints within the structure/agent dialectic. As noted above, several scholars suggest shifts in institutional access and repression correlate to the emergence of nonviolence or violence. If true, social movements and those they challenge should simply choose the most effective repertoire.

Recently, Stephan and Chenoweth found that nonviolence succeeds more than violence (2008), similar to Taft's and Ross' findings over four decades earlier (1969). In this view, nonviolence is clearly *for the sake of* effecting political change better than violence is. But, Davies (2014) points out that several nonviolent Arab Spring movements failed despite similar circumstances to Egypt's and Tunisia's successes – cases he hesitates to call success. Davies critiques Stephan and Chenoweth's coding of

nonviolence, noting that nonviolence successes aren't necessarily long-lasting or real insofar as regimes can make legislation changes without effecting any palpable reform. Still, Stephan and Chenoweth's point that nonviolence succeeds often suggest that movements should seriously question the utility of violence if SMT scholars are right and movements indeed learn from past performances (Eyerman and Jamison 1991, Tarrow 1993a, 302).

History is replete with examples of violent social movements in the forms of revolutions, insurgencies, civil wars, or terrorist groups, of which many have succeeded in effecting political change.[188] Indeed, studies on social movement dynamics involving coercion and deterrence refer almost exclusively to the threat or use of violence.[189] Does this mean that violence is just a suboptimal means for effecting change that people choose because they don't know the best way? Or could these findings mean that, because Stephan and Chenoweth do not give full context to each case, that nonviolence and violence are differentially successful depending on context. Or, are nonviolence and violence *for the sake of* different final causes? By analyzing social movement interactions with their opponents and their shifts in direction, we can uncover how event sequences, the dynamics of contention, indicate to the movement and its challenger where the balance of community, justice and power is shifting to concerning the movement, the structure and institutions, and society as a whole.

5.7: Conclusion – A Synthesis and Next Steps

We can combine the above scholarship to create this general hypothesis to work from: social movements draw upon, shape and use culture, emotions, identity, networks and societal constraints and

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[188] For examples within SMT literature, see (Eckert and Jenkins 1986, Lewis and Metzger 2009, Breuer, Landman, and Farquhar 2014, Foran 1997a, Goodwin 1997, Kurzman 1996, McAdam and Sewell Jr 2001, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1997, Skocpol 1979, Tarrow 1993b). My inclusion of revolutions, insurgencies, civil wars and terrorist groups under the social movement rubric fits with my definition, whereas several scholars conceptualize social movements as different from these war-like domestic conflicts. See for examples (Sewell 1990, Tilly 1975, Gerlach 2010, Kalyvas 2009, Remaoun 2000).
[189] See for examples (Lichbach 1987, Smith 2006, Lebow and Stein 1990, Stein 1992, Trager and Zagorcheva 2006, Bell et al. 2013, Jakobsen 2007, Schultz 2001).

enablers to build consensus or create divisions and effectively seize opportunities to effect justice, (re)balance power, and satisfy collective emotions related to community, justice and power. The urgency of the opportunity, the type of injustice, the pervasiveness and depth of the power imbalance and the kind of collective emotions that drive the movement will ultimately drive the movement's mode of contention. How those involved and observing these dynamics of contention determines how the Natural Teloses of community, justice and power are rebalanced. SMT approaches can deeply explore one strain of material, formal, efficient and final cause (e.g. how frames highlighting repression is *for the sake of* seizing an opportunity nonviolently or violently). However, we can use the 'four causes' analytical model with a focus on final causes to bring together existing research and seek unique conclusions about movement phenomena – the emergence of nonviolence or violence, for instance.

Elucidating causation in social movements is a convoluted business. Mann remarks (1986, 4), agreeing with Marx, Durkheim and Weber that, "Societies are much *messier* than our theories of them." In the Arab spring context, Povey (2016, 3) declares, "Much of the literature on the 'Arab Spring' has been geared towards identifying one major causal factor underlying the uprisings. This approach is problematic as it is based on the assumption that these uprisings constitute a break in history and a new and distinct phenomenon in the region." Povey views the 'Arab Spring' uprisings as deriving from and part of the line of the countries' histories and not simply as a function of the right processes put in place – much relies on the material and formal causes of the lifeworld and the ontological forces of institutions. She highlights the causal significance of pre-existing labor movements, state/society dynamics, and international hegemonic/imperialistic state's influence in social movement strategies.

When attempting to apply a four causes framework to a question about movements, there are never only 'four' variables. This framework guides thinking around four types of cause that affect and are affected by several causal levels, from causes of Nature to observable effects. The analytical process I outlined above is intended to be instructive but the approaches I included are not comprehensive. There are undoubtedly other social movement elements that other researchers will highlight as germane. If those

elements are analyzed in the same structured four causes analytical method, they can integrate into my existing model. To reiterate, the analytical process from the table and analytical description I outline above is:

1. Identify ontological final causes of the phenomenon.

    Use Naturalist realist sociology and philosophy theories to consider why the specific social movement phenomenon occurs as part of Nature.

2. Identify institutional structures that constrain and enable social movement phenomena.

    Use critical realist theories on institutions' effects upon people's actions and relate SMT approaches that elucidate which institutions are the most causally salient in affecting the emergence and trajectory of social movement phenomena.

3. Identify lifeworld elements likely related to those final causes concerning the phenomenon.

    Use and synthesize broader sociology, social psychology, and anthropology theories and existing research to gain a Weberian understanding of the situation leading up to and at the time of the movement and contention.

4. Identify what the actors tried to do and what they actually did.

    Use and synthesize approaches from and existing research from SMT and other middle-range theories from politics, sociology, or other fields to find what may explain actors' intents and underlying motivations.

5. Identify what the actors used and how they used it as part of the phenomenon.

    Use and synthesize approaches and existing research from SMT, sociology, and social psychology to elucidate how understood people, organizations, ideas and events in ways that affected the movement's outcome.

To use the question for the next chapter as an example, 'why are some social movements nonviolent and others violent?' we are obviously inquiring about one aspect of a movement's formal cause. Each of the above movement material, formal and efficient causes are interrelated in the way they effect

nonviolence and violence. Collectively, movements act and interact with culture, emotions, identity, networks, and political opportunities *for the sake of* many things at the micro, meso and macro levels of causation. What's more, each final cause is made of material, formal and efficient causes that may be *for the sake of* something else as well. But Aristotle's four causes does not encourage determinism. We must be cognizant of the all that effects movement repertoires and other things that we inquire about, but we do not need to include everything in our analyses. This SMT 'four causes' analysis is most useful when maintaining focus on the final cause question at hand.

In the remaining chapters I apply the four causes social movement analysis in the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Spring revolutions. In Chapters 6 and 7 I aim to establish an understanding of the milieu in which the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Springs occurred. The goal is to provide a thick description that conveys the institutional constraints and enablers Egyptians and Syrians experienced before and during the Arab Spring. This thick description provides a cursory Weberian 'understanding' of what social, cultural, political, and economic institutions constrained, enabled and drove actions in Egypt and Syria. Having this lifeworld-level understanding, one is better prepared to analyze *how* Egyptians and Syrians ascribed meaning to the events they witnessed before and during the Arab Spring, and *why* Egyptians and Syrians acted intentionally *for the sake of* collective goals; these *how?* and *why?* explananda are the aim of Chapter 8.

Relating the model's levels to their corresponding Aristotelian causes, the following two chapters explore and extract Egyptian and Syrian institutions and sociopolitical/cultural lifeworlds to establish the material, formal and efficient causes that caused the movements to emerge and act. I draw out sociopolitical and cultural contentious and cooperative aspects of the structure/agent dialectics. These include social movement materials, their forms, and their uses in Egypt's and Syria's Arab Spring revolutions that set the stage for nonviolence or violence. Because institutions and lifeworlds are interwoven, it is best to describe institutional and lifeworld dialectics in Egypt and Syria chronologically. However, I will make reference throughout Chapters 6 and 7 where institutions and the corresponding

lifeworld interpretations of those institutions were affected by and aimed to satisfy the Natural

Ontological final causes of community, power and justice.[190]

Following the institutions and lifeworld descriptions of Egypt and Syria, I apply the 'four causes'

analytical synthesis concerning the differential emergence of nonviolence and violence in Chapter 8. I

consider why either repertoire could have emerged, analyzing material, formal and efficient causes related

to their respective cultures and shared experiences, emotions, identities, networks, and perceptions of

structural constraints and enablers. In this analytical synthesis section, I draw upon and include social

movement research that investigates traditional SMT variables to elucidate what drove the eventual

majority practice of violence or nonviolence in Egypt and Syria.

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[190] As a methodological note, I researched Egyptian and Syrian institutions and lifeworlds prior to researching SMT analyses that claim to elucidate violence and nonviolence in the Arab Spring to reduce my analytical bias concerning pre-Arab Spring Egypt and Syria. However, I maintained a broad SMT analytical mindset when researching pre-2011 Egypt and Syria and the events of the initial uprisings, extracting research related to various SMT approaches; namely political accesses, movement and regime frames, accesses and repression, networks and alliances, culturally charged identities, and motivating emotions.

Chapter 6 - Egypt

Egyptian Institutions and Political Lifeworld

In this chapter, I will explore the emergence of Egypt's Arab Spring revolution as derived in part from Egypt's institutions and lifeworld – the second and third levels of my analytical model. Whereas the model describes these as separate levels, as noted in the last chapter, each level is closely tied to the others. This is especially the case for the institutional and lifeworld levels. Below, I describe the development of Egyptian institutions and the corresponding lifeworld social perceptions of what being part of the Egyptian community meant, what Egyptian justice was, and where and how Egyptian power was derived, held and exercised. At the point of the Arab Spring, and at many historical points before 2011, Egyptians acted for the sake of rebalancing Egyptian community, justice and power. In SMT terms, these 'episodes of contention' were some of the more public, observable and tested instances of the structure/agent dialectic concerning community, justice and power.

Societal structure and institutions cause people's lifeworld interpretations about who is and should be part of their community, what justice means and what good justice looks like, and how people and structural institutions interact in power situations. Agents' and structural institutions' interactions create the extant lifeworld that defines who is and should be allowed inclusion, and how justice is and should be meted by jurisprudence institutions, and where the balance of power is and how it should be in practice. These lifeworld understandings of institutions reify the structure which has its own causal ontology, driving people to act largely according to its rules and to reproduce it. However, institutions evolve and adapt over time, so the reproduction of those institutions is never a perfect replica of what it derives from. And occasionally a large collectivity of people come to determine the structure and one or more of its institutions require a more radical change. It is from this collective understanding and determination a social movement emerges.

In the case of Egypt, social movements were a normal part of the country's history. The modern Egyptian state formed from a social movement where military, civil and religious leaders determined that the British role in Egypt's extant community, justice, and power structures in the first half of the 20th century was wrong. The dynamics of contention and politics of the Egyptian Free Officers' Movement are beyond the scope of this thesis and beyond many of the 'Arab Spring' actors' memories. However, it is worth noting that Egypt was reformed by a social movement – a revolution – built by a broad cross-section of Egyptians that emerged from a collective recognition that Egypt and Egyptians were living amid a community, justice and power imbalance. The regularity of social movements following the Free Officers' Movement indicates Egypt remained in a struggle to find that balance.

Egypt's presidents and their institutions' practices attempted to create an Egyptian community that supported the government, believed in the justness of the institutional structures they built, and accepted the concentration of power within the central government. Cairo's policies formed Egyptians' perceptions of their accesses to the country's institutions and their agency within those institutions. Belief in access and agency shifted between hope for improvement to belief that Egypt's power and justice structures were too rigid and tightly controlled by Egypt's elite to allow for change and betterment. As I will show in Chapter 8, SMT's political opportunity approach focused on access and repression dynamics hypothesizes these shifts in perceptions of hope and hopelessness drive nonviolence and violence respectively.

Egyptians' lifeworld understanding of Cairo's social, political, and economic institutions shifted from those supporting the people through programs and opportunities, to that of an interlocking series of institutions designed only to support a bloated, self-serving and corrupt structure buttressed by an ever growing repressive security institution. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak used a series of intuitional carrots and sticks to create a community of Egyptians that believed in the justness of Egypt's power structures. Each president used their legislative institutions to create programs that gave thier citizens the perception that Cairo was just and cared for its constituents. With the failures of Nasser's pan-Arabism and its promises

of an Egypt-centric Middle East fading, Cairo looked to other ways to unify its community of citizens. Some institutional practices, like the Graduate Appointment Policy, drove a leftist/socialist community that trusted in and was dependent upon Cairo while others, like Mubarak's exponential growth of the security services coopted many directly into the government's power structure who would otherwise be left feeling almost completely powerless. But, for Egyptians left without benefit from Cairo's economic dependence and cooptation efforts, or when those efforts failed to deliver on their promises, opposition groups presented alternatives.

Each of Cairo's failures changed Egyptians' lifeworld understandings of Cairo's institutions' promises and efficacy, sometimes driving the people to search quietly, or at least keep an open ear, for alternatives. Egypt's migration from its rural areas to the cities where Islam was a familiar communal bond amid the strange cosmopolitan lifestyle created a moat of dissent surrounding the seemingly impenetrable walls of the government-sponsored middle and upper urbanite classes. With little access to Cairo's inner circles, Egypt's Islamist groups created a new community, a cultural counter-hegemony, focused on spiritual wealth and communal wellbeing in contrast to the Western-looking consumerist and finance-centric cultures of cosmopolitan Egypt. Where Egyptians' lifeworld understandings of their country's institutions were accessible and malleable, Egypt witnessed a growth in sanctioned nonviolent political opposition and opportunity. Where Egyptians understood the actions of Cairo's judicial and security institutions to be denying access and attempts to change, the country witnessed violence. These shifts in Egypt's institutions and lifeworld understandings of community, power and justice dialectics among Cairo, Egypt's elites, and the rest of Egypt set the stage for the events of Egypt's 2011 Arab Spring revolution.

6.1: Egypt from 1952 to 2011 – Egypt's Lifeworld and Institutions *For The Sake Of* Community, Justice and Power

Egyptian non-state political actors used a spectrum of nonviolent and violent modes of contention to try to change the government throughout much of Egypt's history following the 1952 independence coup. The government and movements continuously reformed the structure/agent power dialectic via public interaction and discourse, policy and practice changes, and a growing disparity between the government's and citizens' vision of Egyptian identity and culture. While this is not atypical praxis, Egyptian movements have been especially vociferous. The early-2011 Egyptian political lifeworld was formed from the institutions of government legislation and practice, myriad opposition avenues and allies, decades of contention cycles, a strong institution of the civil society's sociopolitical and cultural counterhegemony, and injustice grievances that gave Egyptians a firsthand lifeworld understanding of the institutions that constrained more than they enabled agency. The meanings Egyptians ascribed to citizens' interactions with government and security institutions that were supposed to deliver justice and a balance of power to the community were built from decades of Egyptian lifeworld experiences with and often against these institutions. Egyptians understandings of their historical, extant, and potential agency to affect justice and power balances in their community undergirded the regular, episodic contention with the regime. Because movements build and innovate their repertoires in part from past performances and understandings of how certain actions created differentially emotive and energizing responses from structures and agents (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004, 265-266), Egypt's Arab Spring repertoire surely included nonviolent and violent options.

Each post-independence president introduced and distorted Egypt's legislative and judiciary bodies to their advantage. Egypt's legal and security institutions' manifest in its laws and its judiciary and security practices formed the backbone of the regime's power structure. Egyptian regimes created several laws designed to maintain their monopoly on power and influence. Some of the more prominent and repressive laws are:

- Emergency Law – extended police powers, extra-judicial military courts use, social and non-government political groups and activities control and censorship, constitutional rights suspension
- Law 32 of 1964, Law of Associations – restriction and monitoring of all associations' activities
- Law 97, Antiterrorism law of 1992 – death sentence (often via military tribunal) for belonging to a terrorist organization
- 1992 Private Mosques Nationalization – private mosques' submission to government supervision and surveillance
- 1993 Syndicates Law – government appointment of syndicates' board members
- Law 93, Press Law of 1995 – prohibited articles defamatory of the president and his family or 'destabilizing' to the Egyptian state and polity (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 122, 127-128, 130) [191]

The government's implementation and manipulation of these laws legitimized the regime's practices as 'just,' but only on the surface. Despite legality, Egyptians viewed the repressive praxis as an illegitimate and unjust use of power, and sought to circumvent or undermine the structure.

6.2: Nasser's Post-Independence Egypt: Down with the Muslim Brotherhood, Up with Socialism

In 1952 Gamal Abdel Nasser led the Free Officers Movement, removing the British monarchy's residual control and influence, and establishing the independent Egyptian Republic. During the 1950s Nasser institutionalized socialism and Pan-Arabism in Cairo's policies and rhetoric to unify Egyptians and establish Egypt's central place in the Arab world. As an experienced military man, he tried to drive Egyptians to focus on Cairo's international successes over his domestic shortfalls. His turn to the secular ideals of socialism and pan-Arabism were a point of contention for many of his religiously inclined supporters.

Nasser established authoritarian rule by endearing Cairo to its citizens while stamping out any dissent. He channeled domestic political opposition in Egypt by creating a single-party political system dominated by his National Democratic Party (NDP), which enraged many Egyptians who sought a plural political structure following the monarchy. As a counterweight, Nasser tried to coopt citizens through the

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[191] 'Publication crimes' like printing of "mendacious information," "false rumors," or "defamations," in particular if these were directed against the state, its representatives and its economic interests, or if they endangered public order." Punishment for these crimes ranged from minimal sentencing to five years imprisonment (Kienle 1998, 223).

1964 Graduate Appointment Policy that created a system of government employment for all university educated Egyptians. This policy made working for the government easier and attractive to poorer Egyptians who wanted to move up to the middle class (Wickham 2002, 27-31).

Nasser's single party system was particularly insulting to the Muslim Brotherhood because, prior to the coup, Nasser made arrangements with Brotherhood leaders to give Islam a central place in the government (Sullivan and Jones 2008, 50), allowing the Brothers political participation. In response, the Muslim Brotherhood rebuked Nasser and publicly declared his government incompatible with Islam (Abu-Lughod 1995, 53, Kepel 1985, 28-29, 37-53, Qutb 1981, 10, 21-22). More severely, a Brotherhood faction attempted to assassinate him in 1954, planting the seed of the long-standing power struggle between Egypt's Islamists and the regime (Hopwood 1985, 62, 88-89). Following the assassination attempt, Nasser banned the Muslim Brotherhood, led a large-scale crackdown on Islamists throughout Egypt, and further restricted political agency to his political party alone.

In addition to restricting formal politics, Nasser disallowed informal political opposition institutions. Wickham (2002, 35) analyzes that Nasser "suppressed the potential agents and sites of mobilization" banning independent student unions, firing or demoting disloyal professors, creating the Ministry of Higher Education, and implementing the University Guard to control student political opposition (2002, 29). But, in the mid-1960's, Nasser relaxed state-implemented campus security practices and allowed nonstate-run university media and student organizations to exist, effectively creating political space for opposition opportunities.

The 1967 Six Day War defeat by Israel humiliated Cairo, incubating Egyptians' doubts about their state's political, military, and economic strength as functions of Nasser's socialist and pan-Arabism agenda. The population looked to Islam as a source of dignity, effectively embracing the Muslim Brotherhood. Nasser shifted his Egyptian identity promotion toward Islam and away from Pan-Arabism, maintaining socialism's centrality, to recover support from disenchanted Egyptians (Hopwood 1985, 97-

100). This swing between embracing and distancing from Islamism would continue through Anwar Sadat's and Hosni Mubarak's presidencies.

6.3: Sadat's Youth Cooptation and Swaying Policies Toward Islamists and Leftists

Wickham (2002) details Sadat's interactions with the education and labor sectors and with Egypt's Islamist movements, explaining some of how Egyptians' understandings of their places in the political system fomented the dissent of the 1980s and 1990s. She finds Sadat's attempt to champion a Muslim Egyptian identity while giving limited access and agency to Islamists failed when he harshly repressed power challenges by Islamists, resulting in a cycle of expansion and repression.

Sadat rapidly expanded Nasser's graduate employment policy in the late 1970s and subsequently citizens' expectations of government jobs to minimize opposition and increase support. His policies increased university students by 50 percent, half of whom wanted state jobs, a sector that only increased by an average of 6.3 percent between 1977 and 1981. Still, the state employed approximately one third of Egyptians and accounted for 70 percent of all new employment by 1984. Wickham (2002, pp. 35-38, 42, quote on p. 35) argues coopting educated Egyptians into government institutions was the regime's (including Mubarak's government's) attempt to "inoculate potential targets of mobilization..." despite the heavy financial burden of doing so. The burden would prove too much.

The graduate employment program backfired as the government could not sustain its employment promises. State employee wages costs doubled every 3.6 years during the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite Cairo cutting salaries by 23 percent between 1974 and 1984 and establishing a 3-year government employment waiting period in 1979 that reached 10 years by 1985. Those who believed themselves upper-middle class educated Egyptians were now relegated to low wage positions waiting on their promised government jobs. Meanwhile, their 'lower class' laborer counterparts were enjoying the benefits of the late 1970's economic watershed with wages tripling in some sectors (ibid 37-42). Cairo tried to appease the disenchanted through work retraining schemes, rather than enacting unpopular laws

constricting or retracting the government's employment scheme (Ibid 51). But Cairo's attempts to redirect employment were insufficient and did not change citizens' distrust of the government's word or its efficacy. Egyptians in the late-1970s and early-1980s reconfigured their lifeworld perceptions of the Cairo's institutional efficacy at fulfilling its promises for all Egyptians vice those who already had access and power.

Sadat's policies drove many Egyptians to reconfigure their identities, creating a space for citizens to search for alternatives to the regime's sociopolitical agenda. His liberalization policies eroded the middle class' purchasing power and social standing (Osman 2011, Loc 1383), relegating once comfortable families to Egypt's slums. The educated who believed themselves part of Sadat's Egyptian middle class were systemically disallowed access to jobs in the same government that encouraged them to get an education specifically for those jobs. Culturally, socially, and financially lost university graduates responded positively to Islamists' invitations and other opposition structures accessible through their university networks (Wickham 2002, 157-159). This large-scale identity shift of Cairo's periphery toward the disenfranchised Islamist groups was a key lifeworld change responding to Egypt's intuitional power and justice (mal)practices.

Cairo's promise of education and employment changed Egyptian cities' cultural identity by drawing Egypt's religious rural citizens to its universities. Kepel (2003, 215-222) suggests that young transplanted rural Egyptians in the cities partly explains the concentration of Islamism in the urban periphery. Kepel posits that conservative migrants from rural or Bedouin societies tended toward more conservative Islamist groups because they were culturally and socially disoriented in the liberal urban environment. Islamists used identity amplification and extension to attract the new urbanites' search for social identity by reintroducing Islam as a familiar social structure. Ansari (1984, 141) hypothesizes that Sadat's cities' liberal consumerist cultures were so shocking to the rural Egyptians that "the resort to Islam was more a sign of social protest than a way of life."

From the late 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood, other Islamist organizations, and, to a lesser degree, other political groups provided social services, extra-governmental political participation, and an appealing identity to disenchanted citizens. These groups coopted existing, even official structures, such as university and professional unions when afforded the opportunity. Wickham (2002, 148) finds that the emergent Islamist activists' counterhegemonic frames delegitimized the regime and "paved the way for new forms of civic engagement detached from - and opposed to - formal political institutions and elites." Islamists gained ground by providing services and creating alternative value systems for the disenfranchised. Islamists were helping the less fortunate where Cairo's social welfare institutions did not. Islamists actions were a more resonant frame than the regime's empty rhetoric (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 125-129).

Sadat's policies and practices almost certainly instilled a sense of limited social and political agency in Egypt's leftists and Islamists at different times. Cook (2007, 76) summarizes that for decades Cairo created various inlets for political opposition because the ruling party believed these contention release valves were the best method to "diffuse, co-opt and/or deflect political opposition." Sadat's lower echelons' polity openings, especially for local and professional association elections, empowered Egypt's professional associations' members, who were largely left-leaning Nasserist socialists. He intended to enfold professional syndicates into his power structure, but they were recalcitrant and openly critical of state policies (El-Ghobashy 2005). Sadat disliked the strength and popularity the syndicates were gaining and sought to limit the professional associations' political and social agency (Kepel 1985, 138, 142-144, Wickham 2004, 215-216).

The rise in the political left was at odds with Sadat's vision for economic liberalization (infitah) (Osman 2011, Loc 1383). As a countermeasure, Sadat allowed and even encouraged Islamist participation in local politics, especially in the universities, which was undoubtedly the source of the 1970s Muslim Brotherhood membership watershed (Kepel 1985, 138, 142-144). Cairo allowed Islamists to participate in local politics and granted Islamists access to the press exemplified by the Brotherhood's 1976-1981

widely distributed media mouthpiece, al-Dawa' (Ibid 103-128). Sadat allowed Gama'a Islamiyaa camps

in the mid 1970's to operate, hoping they would lure Egyptians from the left (Ibid 139). But, after

another Islamist group (al-Takfir wal-Hijra) assassinated a former minister, the government cracked down

on Gama'a Islamiyya camps and university activities (Ibid 148-149). Concurrently, Sadat portrayed

violent groups like al-Takfir wal-Hijra as Muslim Brotherhood militant arms or secret armies to justify his

power grab from Islamists across Egyptian society (Kepel 1985, 170, Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999,

21). Finally, in September of 1981, Sadat ordered the group disbanded and completely destroyed

(Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 23), signaling a full break in Sadat's support for Egypt's Islamists and

ending his use for them against the left.

In this praxis of limited political agency, some Islamists probably believed they could still malleate

the structure to drive change if their efforts were not too much too soon. Others likely believed the failed

program to reform the structure indicated that the structure needed to be completely destroyed, uprooted

and replaced. In October 1981, Gama'a Islamiyyah members assassinated Anwar Sadat. Following

Sadat's assassination Cairo imprisoned countless Muslim Brotherhood, Gama'a Islamiyya, and other

Islamist groups' members, signaling the doors for Islamist political agency were indeed shut.

6.4: Mubarak's Access and Repression Regarding Egypt's Islamists and Professional Associations

For three decades Mubarak's structure and its opponents interacted, regularly reforming

perceptions of power, justice, and agency. Egypt's citizens experienced vacillating agentic political access

and violently repressive restriction. Like Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak provided direct access to Egypt's

structure through government employment, but state workers had little real agency. Most research

concerning extra-legislative political contention under Mubarak focuses on Islamist organizations.

However, other avenues existed, and some research also investigates professional associations and less

formal social movements that vied for access and agency. Egypt's citizens created a sociopolitical

lifeworld composed of varying degrees and types of perceived agency and a strong counterhegemony by

regularly testing the structure/agent dialectic via myriad forms of protest, assessing government reactions. Egyptians' beliefs in their agency depended on their placement and access to political groups and their observation of the regime's dealings with contention.

Throughout his rule, Mubarak used a policy of "selective accommodation" whereby he came down hard on militant and violent Islamist organizations, but almost courted nonviolent groups at times (Wickham 2002, 103-104). Wickham (2002, 65-67) assesses Mubarak's limited political liberalization was designed "to strengthen the authoritarian system by enhancing its capacity to contain and moderate dissent." The central government tried to limit Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist activities by allowing them some access and opportunity. But when access seemed to cede too much power, the government returned to repression. It often invoked Law 93/1995 and 96/1996, known as the Press Law, prescribed heavy fines, and imprisoned individuals for publications damaging to the economy and/or national interests - a provision interpreted to the NDP's needs (Cook 2007, 71). Repression drove some oppositionists frustrated with attempts to work within structural confines to radicalization. When repression relaxed, some radicalized Islamists splintered from nonviolent groups and turned to other forms of expression, including political violence (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004).

6.4.1: State Jobs and Unemployment

Sadat's university education and government employment policies left Mubarak with a bloated, expensive, and inefficient government. University educated Egyptians held out for their promised socially well-respected government jobs, taking part time work or electing unemployment. Still, citizens joined the NDP as a political inroad and as a mechanism for showing allegiance to Mubarak, easing repression, and securing benefits. But Egyptians understood from Cairo's practices that the NDP was not a real avenue for effecting change (Wickham 2002, 85-89).

Approximately 25 percent of university educated Egyptians worked outside Egypt in the 1980s, which relieved some of the government pressure to employ its citizens. But, starting in the mid-1980's

hundreds of thousands of degree-holding Egyptian repatriated, resulting in approximately one-third of the Egyptian workforce and three-fourths of unemployed citizens having degrees by 1985. Conflict in the gulf in the late-1980s to early-1990s drove more Egyptians to repatriate, exacerbating the problem. US estimates put Egyptian unemployment in 1991 between 2.5 and 3 million, of which approximately 78 percent held degrees at the intermediate and/or university level (Ibid 42-43).

To lower state employment but maintain popular support by not breaking its promises Mubarak made government work less attractive (not unattainable) while encouraging private-sector employment. One minister noted the plan was to "give graduates the opportunity to take the decision for themselves on a voluntary basis: lift the restriction on taking leaves, offer retraining in areas where jobs are available in the private sector, and keep the government pay scale as low as possible, to discourage them from entering the system." But the result was that smart, capable, middle- and upper-class Egyptians sought private-sector employment. Less capable, lower class, or otherwise discriminated citizens comprised the bulk of lower-echelon government services. In effect, government employment became a mechanism for coopting and appeasing the "poor graduate" who "will get mad, grow a beard [*yirabbi da'nu*, to become religiously committed], and curse the government, holding it responsible for his problems.." (C. R. Wickham, 2002, pp. 46-49). But, Mubarak did not aim to constrict government employment in every sector.

Whereas most government jobs were desirable only for stability and status and were diminishing, working for the expanding security services added (corrupt) financial benefits and the allure of the services' inherent power. Owen (2012, 47) notes that Egypt increased its intelligence services budget from 3.5 to 4.8 percent between 1987 and 1997 and increased police from 9 to 21 percent of total government employment. In 2002, the Ministry of Interior had one million police, security and intelligence personnel, rising to three million in 2010. Egypt's security apparatuses were well funded, unlike other public-sector fields like medicine and law; the 2006 security budget was $1.5 billion. Security services personnel furthered their economic benefits through clientelism and other forms of

corruption. Enlisted personnel (military service was conscripted, which the government used indoctrinate and instill loyalty in Egypt's youth) and the socially elite officer corps were encouraged to seek extra-military economic opportunities and kickbacks through coercion. The police and intelligence services were similarly corrupt and used their power for personal gain and probably for some, the emotional pleasure of wielding power (Ibid 44-46). Furthermore, Mubarak facilitated moving from military privilege to civilian privilege by giving ex-officers governorships and other political leadership roles (Cook 2007, 68). The security services were the easiest and most direct means for an Egyptian to gain power and money.

Egyptians wanting to effect political change could ostensibly join an opposition political party. Mubarak introduced legislature allowing new political party establishment throughout the late-1980s and early-1990s, and even presidential election reform via Article 76 in the mid-2000s. But Egyptians learned that only the NDP, largely run by Mubarak's son Gamal, had any real power (Wickham 2002, 67-68, Hamzawy 2005, 132) and others were not meaningfully part of the polity. For example, the Political Parties Committee, headed by a top NDP official, rejected al-Wasat's legal party status four times between 1996 and 2009 (Mikhail and Perry 2011). During elections, the government used legislation and coercion to hamstring political opposition while giving NDP and NDP-aligned independent candidates "unrivaled financing and access to the state media" (Cook 2007, 70). Because many believed Gamal Mubarak was Hosni's presidential successor through the same corrupt system, Al Aswany (2011, 4-10, 51-55) suggests Egyptians believed revolution was the only way to effect any real structural political change. Although political opposition was legal, it was not part of Egypt's longstanding political institution.

6.4.2: Opposition Avenues

Throughout Mubarak's rule, several actors beside the Muslim Brotherhood tried to garner formal and informal political influence. In the 1980s and 1990s, Gama'a Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad

attempted to use violence to grow their ranks with disaffected Egyptians and force Mubarak to change state policies. And in the 2000s Egypt's professional associations and youth movements used nonviolence to appeal to Mubarak and potential allies to change the regimes repressive and corrupt policies and practices (Kepel 1985, 130-152, Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 74-85). Each actor succeeded and failed in different ways, but their aggregate actions furthered the cultural counterhegemony that rejected Mubarak's system and created opportunity spaces for political opposition.

The Muslim Brotherhood has been the most prominent and successful at accessing the state legislative structure, despite government repression following any Islamist-linked violence. Following Sadat's assassination, the Brotherhood disengaged from Egyptian politics. It attenuated its *takfir* (excommunication for being un-Islamic or false regarding Islam, justifying jihad of the sword) and *murtadd* (apostate) references to the regime, but maintained the government was misguided and needed severe reform or replacement. The group's strategy in the 1980s turned toward within-system change coupled with grassroots social reform to transform Egypt into an Islamic society (Kepel 1985, 126-128, Wickham 2002, 137-147). Hamzawy (2005, 135) describes the Brotherhood's political strategy as gradual inclusion aiming to metastasize throughout the government, rather than confrontation or immediate power grabs. The Brotherhood's incremental insertion strategy was logical in the face of government repression, but it did not convince everyone.

Egyptians were unsure of the Brotherhood's political reform plan and vision for all of Egypt's citizens, but it was the most enduring and powerful opposition to the government. Individuals Wickham interviewed viewed the Muslim Brotherhood's slogan of "Islam is the solution" as a weak guise members used to justify seeking power and financial gain while providing no real political structure reform plan (Wickham 2002, 83-84, Munson 2001). Blaydes (2010, 175) highlights that the Muslim Brotherhood was purposefully ambiguous regarding several potentially polemic issues including: "a) the ultimate limits of political pluralism, b) restrictions to personal and civil liberties, c) the status of women, d) the status of religious minorities, e) the relationship between the group's leadership and the rank and file, and f)

acceptable uses of violence." Some of Wickham's interviewees believed that the Brotherhood was little more than an inept option (2002, 83), and Hatina (2007, 170) found that many perceived the group as nepotistic, exclusive, and controlling similar to Mubarak's system. Others voted for Brothers because they believed they were trustworthy, honest, and moderate (Al Aswany 2011, 197-199). The Brotherhood's slogan was no real plan, but its stance against the despised regime made support gathering possible without a detailed 'solution.' As Wickham observed (2002, 114), "Their primary goal is to build a new majority, not articulate a new program."

The Muslim Brotherhood's successes are largely due to their placement in Egyptian society and politics between the people and the regime. Pettit (2015) describes how even seemingly inert acts of defiance and cultural shift by everyday Egyptians came to subconsciously underpin a counterhegemony of resistance. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, the group provided welfare and other social services to Egypt's disadvantaged, especially in urban areas. It established Islamic associations and organizations of some type "everywhere, in every nook and cranny in urban neighborhoods, markets, and villages across the country," (Ibid Wickham 2002, 105). The presence of a "parallel Islamic sector", as Wickham calls it (2002, 93-118), that provided welfare and spiritual services to the lower and middle classes, made an Islamist system appealing. For example, the Brotherhood's quick response to provide aid to the 1992 Heliopolis earthquake victims and the government's delayed and lackluster efforts punctuated the group's social commitment to Egypt's citizens and the government's ineptitude. Moreover, the government's blocking of Muslim Brotherhood relief efforts signaled to the populace that the Brotherhood was for the people while Cairo was for itself, only feigning care for its citizens to uphold its image (Cook 2007, 85-90). The Brothers used their social works as a political platform to demand political freedom, institutional legislative reformation, and condemn the government's unjust use of its power to detain and torture political activists (Cook 2007, 83-84, Wickham 2002, 193-194).

The Muslim Brotherhood also inserted itself between Cairo and Egypt's jihadists who violently wedged open Cairo's power cracks. In the late 1980s and 1990s, Gama'a Islamiyya, Islamic Jihad, and

Takfir wal-Hijra conducted a spate of attacks to uncompromisingly demand Egyptian political and social reform to fundamental Salafi practices.[192] In a 1995 interview the leader of Gama'a Islamiyya relayed the jihadists' sentiment concerning political change, stating "the only way to express yourself in this world is through force, the only language that is understood" (Qasim et al. 1996, 41). Gama'a aimed to "establish Islam as a totality in each soul, and over each *shibr* [handbreadth] of land, in each house, in each organization, and in each society," accomplished through worship and establishing the caliphate and *shari'a*" (Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 84-85). Islamic Jihad stated it desired "toppling the impious ruler who has abandoned religion," a clear reference to Mubarak (Gerges 2005, 45). The groups' guerrilla nature made sanctions and negotiations extremely difficult. Although not popular, jihadist actions showed Egyptians that the regime's security institutions were neither omnipotent nor omnipresent.

The jihadists peaked in 1997 with Gama'a's Luxor attack coordinated with al-Qa'ida's Ayman al-Zawahiri, after which Mubarak used the full might and reach of his security services to find and remand anyone suspected of having links to violent groups. Subsequently, Mubarak's government used Muslim Brotherhood leaders to negotiate with jihadist groups and deradicalize their members, resulting in a formal ceasefire (Gunaratna and Ali 2009, 278-279), moderated rhetoric (Blaydes and Rubin 2008, 471-473, Rashwan 2009, 126-127), and Gama'a Islamiyya's and Islamic Jihad's written apologies to the Egyptian people (Wiktorowicz 2004a, 161, Lav 2009). That the jihadists did not return to their same violent capacity following the Brothers' intervention suggested to Egyptians that their efforts may have worked. Supporting and protecting the people where the government could not, the Muslim Brotherhood showed how community institutions based on Islam were the solution for at least some of the citizens' problems.

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[192] For examples of the Muslim Brotherhood's mediating roles see (Cozzens 2009, 494, Sullivan and Abed-Kotob 1999, 77, Gerges 2005, 10, Kepel 1985, 74-95, Murphy 2002, 65).

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood's relationship with Cairo warmed and Mubarak allowed the group to be involved in and create cultural and social institutions to draw people away from jihadist groups. In the universities, the Brotherhood gained control over student union boards, and influenced faculty, administration and councils. By the early 1990s, the Brothers were on numerous prominent professional union boards (Cook 2007, 88-89, Wickham 2002, 191-192). In 1992 they held the majority within the national bar association (14/25 seats) which meant that the Muslim Brotherhood was a viable and accessible opposition to Cairo's rule of law, albeit only in the regular courts and not in Mubarak's pervasive extrajudicial military courts (Kienle 1998, 222). This power was too much for Mubarak who used jihadist violence as a pretext for again cracking down on the Brotherhood (Cook 2007, 89). During the 1995 elections the government arrested 49 Muslim Brotherhood candidates and remanded 14, creating a sense of quickly constricting structural participation and opposition opportunity in Egypt's political institutions.

The Muslim Brotherhood continued to demonstrate its resilience and served as a beacon for Egyptians' obstinate desire to challenge Mubarak's system. Most Brothers ran as independents during elections to avoid arrest, but their supporters knew their affiliation. In the 2000 parliamentary elections the Muslim Brotherhood won 17 seats, which was more than the other 15 opposition parties combined (Hatina 2007, 169-170). In 2005, the group attained 87 parliamentary seats, sending a clear signal to Egyptians that it had created opposition opportunity space in Cairo's central political institutions and that Muslim Brotherhood membership was becoming decreasingly risky.

Several other groups were less successful at entering Egypt's parliamentary political system. Abdel Rahman (2002, 25) posits this is partly because when the Mubarak regime gave opposition groups political operating space, they repressed each other, but some formed alliances. For example, al-Wasat (Arabic for "the center") is a Muslim Brotherhood splinter group composed of moderate former Muslim Brotherhood members, liberals, Copts, and others, with women holding some of the party's top

positions.[193] The al-Wasat party advocates "respect for the constitution and rule of law; the defense of freedom of belief and opinion; fostering national unity; reducing social disparity; the right to develop communal institutions with minimal government interference; condemning terror; and seeking a constructive dialogue between the state and the Islamic trend." But, the Muslim Brotherhood's political and religious campaign against al-Wasat effected the resignation of 46 of the original 74 members of the party who then joined the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Wasat reached out and joined forces with Nasserist leftists and established government-sanctioned cultural organizations following repeated political party application rejections (Hatina 2007, 161-163, 167-169, Mikhail and Perry 2011). Another party, al-Wafd, sought to stir debate and opposition more than provide a program for change represented by their ambiguous 2005 election slogan, "we have been suffocated" (Sharp 2005, 3). But Hinnebusch (1984, 115, 155) highlighted that Wafd leaders' longstanding personal ties were their key political entry mechanism, making the party seem nepotistic and elitist to some and of little real political consequence. Despite some political opposition plurality, the Muslim Brotherhood and its allies continued to wield the greatest political opposition potential and power.

The 2005 election process is a good example of the duality of Egyptian political freedom and the regime's institutionalized authoritarian upgrading practices. Before 2005, the president was nominated by the People's Assembly with a two-thirds majority and then subjected to a public referendum. In 2005, Cairo allowed additional candidates to run. Although the legislature (Law 40/1977) had provisions that allowed competition, the NDP manipulated the requirements for establishing to disqualify most applicants (Cook 2007, 69). Moreover, Law 174 required that "any independent candidate seeking to run would need the support of 250 elected politicians drawn from the People's Assembly, the Shura Council or upper house, and the provincial councils."(Sharp 2005, 2) As the NDP was the heavy majority throughout these bodies, support for opposition candidates was extremely scarce. Funding was also an issue. The "Citizens Rights and Democracy" paper, an amendment to Law 40, stipulated that parties seeking legal

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[193] See for examples (Ayoob 2004, 5, Baker 2003, 192-193, Hatina 2007, 164).

establishment must provide proof of their funding sources, none of which can come from outside Egypt (Cook 2007, 70). The result was Mubarak's reelection by 88.6 percent. Following the elections, Mubarak arrested one of his two opponents in the referendum and removed the other from his position within his party (Ghonim 2012, 35). Legally, Egypt allowed political opposition, but in practice, Mubarak's rule seemed unbreakable.

During Mubarak's rule, state security apparatuses held extensive dossiers on anyone involved in activism or who held significant intellectual, political, or financial clout. Any government related profession required a security clearance involving checks on individuals' links to opposition groups (Ibid 2-3). Hence, most legal parties that operated within the confines of the system were unable to attract a significant support base; the Muslim Brotherhood seems the exception. Wickham (2002, 77) noted that, "Egyptian commentators have argued that Egyptian political culture is increasingly characterized by alienation (*al-ightirab*), defeatism (*al-salbiyya*), and indifference (al-la-mubalah)." Under this system of surveillance and repression, especially given Egypt's resource expenditure on its security apparatuses, state-level politics likely seemed beyond most citizens' power to affect.

Some Egyptians expressed they believed their best chance to effect change was in local and non-government politics, which was also a means for exercising advantage across government institutions (Kienle 1998, 224-228). Members of the Local Popular Councils (local government bodies) were granted better access to government services, and most used their positions to bribe educators for their children's grades and pay doctors for immediate and better treatment (Al Aswany, 2011, pp. 181-184). According to Ghonim (2012, 30), "The higher up in the chain you were, the less restricted you were by the law." Al Aswany (2011, 61-64) describes that non-governmental elections garnered massive turnouts by Egyptians who waited patiently, some losing time at work. When asked if they participated in parliamentary or presidential elections, local council and club voters stated they did not want to participate in a rigged, corrupt system.

6.4.4: Sociopolitical and Cultural Counterhegemony

Beginning in the mid-2000s, Egyptians' lifeworld perception of their political agency and opportunity shifted. Egypt's Islamists built a sociocultural counter to Cairo's vision for decades. Networks, ideals, cultural norms, welfare services, and a sense of communality for many Egyptians existed outside of, and often counter to, state structure and institutions. As noted above, during the 2000s the Muslim Brotherhood successfully challenged Cairo's stranglehold parliamentary politics, signaling to all Egyptians that the polity was not immutable and could be changed. By the late 2000s, Egyptians capitalization on secure communication and virtual meeting spaces, impending changes in the political landscape, and signals from powerful allies shaped citizens' political power and agency perceptions. Citizens began to shed what al-Aswany describes as a sense of hopelessness imbued by the structure and its institutions (Ibid).

Cairo's decades-long informal housing sector practices in the poorer areas provided a social network structure within which movements could proliferate and grow a counterhegemony beyond Mubarak's reach (Ismail 2000, 364). Wickham (2002, 123-124) finds activism abounded Cairo's bulging ghettos because they were beyond state and away from competing extra-state institutions (e.g. Nasserist organizations). She points out these *sha'abi* neighborhoods were populated by the poorer "lumpen intelligentsia" (unemployed university-level degree holders) newlyweds who maintained connections to Islamists from their university social ties; some were Islamist student-leaders themselves. This lumpen intelligentsia rejected Cairo's corrupt consumerist, clientelist treatment of society in favor of a more Islam-centric lifeworld, practicing resistance without directly challenging the system (1994, 508). The unemployed educated younger Egyptians constructed new identities and values, esteeming community and religion over the self. Hence, collective action became a duty to something greater than the self, rather than a risk/benefit assessment of participation (Ibid 150-151). Even Gamal Mubarak's propagandists claimed that, if Egypt were to have truly free and democratic elections, the Muslim Brotherhood would win (Al Aswany 2011, 8-9).

Parallel to the Islamist trend, a more secular civil society movement emerged in the 2000s. In 2005 a grassroots coalition of oppositionists called the Egyptian Movement for Change, or Kefaya! (a transliteration of the Arabic word for 'enough') protested the corruption and repression inherent in the Egyptian electoral system. In addition, dozens of Egyptian judges protested the 2005 election system as fraudulent and corrupt but were quickly shut down. Cairo's security services beat, sexually assaulted, and otherwise intimidated election protesters (Hamzawy 2005, 132-133). But public contention continued, and social movements grew. In April 2008 Egyptian workers and the Kefaya! Movement conducted a general strike protesting the regime's treatment of its laborers and citizens. Cairo responded, but its treatment of the Kefaya! protesters was less harsh than its reactions to the Islamist movement, leading the populace to believe in the movement's agency and effectiveness. Kefaya!'s openness was also attractive to a breadth of citizens. Despite citizens' desires to effect change, a general air of fear concerning political contention among most citizens undergirded their lifeworld perception of Cairo's political and security services institutions (Ghonim 2012, 32-38).

Ghonim suggests the internet allowed Egyptians to build an inclusive and empowered movement in the relative protection of the virtual realm before taking to the streets in January 2011. As a key movement maker, Ghonim piggybacked on the popularity of the Egyptian 'blogosphere' and youth movements already engaged in online activism, partly because the internet provided a layer (albeit thin) of security from Egypt's security services. Ghonim used the image of Khaled Said, a young man photographed after being beaten to death by two secret security personnel in the streets of Alexandria, as a graphic injustice frame distributed via social media to build an inclusive and inspired opposition (2012, 58-83). He epitomized the feeling of protection and opportunity the internet provided in a post on his "We are all Khaled Said" page (2012, 74):

> "Do you know why the media are attacking Facebook? Because it does not receive bribes to publish false stories... and it does not succumb to security pressure and delete a story... Facebook became our means to express our opinions, ambitions, and dreams without pressure from anyone... Now our message reaches as far as their biased newspapers... But our message is our own... We are Egyptian youth who love one another, care for one another, and have a voice."

Ghonim determined that, "It was critical to rely on members to produce content that would engage everyone in feedback and discussion" to generate continued support for the 'We Are All Khaled Said" movement. Keeping the movement accessible and meaningful was necessary to make it a grassroot, inclusive, and consequently enduring phenomenon. As Ghonim relayed (2012, 91), "It was important for everyone to feel responsible and relevant." He deliberately named the call to the 25 January protests, "January 25: Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption and Unemployment" to project access to every disenfranchised individual with any or all of those grievances (2012, 136). He observed that participants felt pride when they heard or read about people discussing their contributions to the movement (2012, 92). Of the "We are all Khaled Said" page members, "75 percent said that they felt like they owned the page and that the causes it promoted were their own causes" (Ghonim, 108). Ghonim's experience suggests that belief in agency is amplified when participants believe their contributions are unique and valuable to other participants, regardless of actual effects upon the structure.

Just before the Arab Spring, emboldened Egyptians also created traditional political alliances. Previously, resistance risked repression at best and death at worst (Al Aswany 2011, vii). But in 2010, members from the media, former politicians, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Democratic Front, Al-Karama, Al-Wasat, Revolutionary Socialists, Egyptian Women for Change, and the April 6 Youth Movement created the National Association for Change. The Association aimed to create a social and political wave against Mubarak so massive that security services could not knock it down (Ghonim 2012, 44). Participants recorded, criticized, monitored, and exposed Egypt's corrupt system in the 2010 elections via social media networks. For example, Al Aswany (2011, 39-42) published an article exposing and criticizing the Ministry of Interior's elections rigging and calling it tantamount to bearing false witness in Islam, a major religious transgression. Likewise, prominent political figure Mohammed El-Baradei and the National Association for Change publicized a list of "El-Baradei's Seven Demands for Change" that called for sweeping state-level structural reforms (Ghonim 2012, 44-45). El-Baradei and his supporters used the internet to highlight common issues plaguing Egyptians' daily lives and give citizens access to

change affecting mechanisms like online petitions, online opinion polls, the times and places of protest activities, etc. (Ibid). Circumventing the previously restrictive legal and media mechanisms empowered the populace in ways that were unrealizable before. Connected online and street political activists in 2010 created a sense of broad Egyptian communality and solidarity *for the sake of* changing Mubarak's power-wielding institutions.

The 25 January 2011 protest ignited a nationwide atmosphere wherein the whole of the Egyptian population could express their desire for change, unstoppable by Mubarak and his reluctant security services. The Egyptian people's actions, looking out for one another's welfare and personal safety, created an environment where all Egyptians felt that they had unfettered access to a communal and inclusive movement (Al Aswany 2011, viii-ix, Ghonim 2012). This sense of community and protection that existed outside of and in opposition to the Egyptian regime's decades-old repressive structure beckoned activists to participate and fence-sitters rise against state structural repression and drive real political reform.

6.5: Conclusion – The Early-2011 Egyptian Political Lifeworld and State-Level Change

Through over four decades of legislative manipulation and (extra)judicial repression praxis, the Egyptian government believed it had "taught Egyptians to accept anything" (Al Aswany, 2011, p. viii). The regime used a combination of institutionalized carrots and sticks to garner support via dependence and preempt or coopt dissenters. Its incentives were small for most and large for a select few who capitalized on their government roles to realize personal gain through corruption. Concerning challengers, Cairo used its full coercive power to physically, economically, and socially punish anyone who didn't fall in line with the president's and his services' authorities and demands.

Despite Cairo's reach, opposition to presidential power remained. Egypt's Islamists, largely composed of Muslim Brotherhood adherents, openly battled Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. They and other civil society groups over the years created a counterhegemony and subverted Cairo's omnipotent image.

These groups built spaces and opportunities for formal and informal political opposition. More importantly, they shifted Egyptians' lifeworld-level value system and understandings of the power structure away from Cairo's program, championing communality and a vision for betterment through change and subtle resistance. And over the decades, the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups won significant battles and gained some acquiescence and power distributions from Cairo.

At the point of revolution, Egypt's activists, opposition, and fence-sitters likely believed the revolution could go either way, cautiously optimistic in their 'moment of madness.' Little indicated that Egypt's protest groups would turn to violence to effect change. The key to understanding why nonviolence maintained lies in assessing what resource mobilization, identity, frame and emotion work efficient causes utilized which lifeworld material and formal causes, and teleologically what kind of change Egypt's revolutionary movement was *for the sake of*. Before I analyze the agentic functional teleology of Egypt's dynamics of contention and the observed and interpreted events and interactions, I will explore the Syrian 'Arab Spring' institutional and lifeworld levels in the next chapter. This allows a better comparison of the cases' dynamics of contention in the last chapter and a final synthesis indicating causation back down to the Natural Teleological level as a conclusion.

Chapter 7 – Syria

Syrian Institutions and Political Lifeworld

Syria experienced less public political contention under the al-Asad family rule than post-independence Egypt and far less social movement violence (Gani 2015). Despite Syria's historical lack of social movement violence, Syria's 2011 nonviolent and violent Arab Spring protests put the country on the cusp of following Egypt's nonviolent or Libya's violent example for several months before slipping into civil war. Syria's 2011 Arab Spring movement was underpinned by statewide changes in power, justice, and community under Bashar al-Asad. Bashar effected a decade-long citizen political agency and power decrease, a structural power shift from Hafiz's Ba'athi institutions, expanding informal political and jurisprudence praxis, uncertain domestic and international allies' support, and increasing identity rifts. Violence eventually emerged from the formation and use of Syria's history and culture, emotions concerning government/citizen dynamics, identities, networks, and the dynamics of repression and agentic political access. The combination of these material, formal, and efficient causes encouraged violence *for the sake of* division, emotional satisfaction, capitalizing on opportunities, effecting justice, and structural power reconfiguration. Syria's lifeworld and the political contestation dynamics necessitated violence to satisfy Syria's opposition over what nonviolence could do.

Syria's decades-ruling al-Asad family and the Syrian institutions they emplaced and exercised were designed to create a Syrian community centralized upon nationalism above all other identities, favoring stability and security over political freedoms and power. Damascus' policies formed Syrians' lifeworld understandings of how politics in Syria and the Middle East should be practiced. Hafiz's Ba'ath Party gave Syrians limited and local capacity to affect change, which seemed to be just enough agency to appease the Syrian populace and stymie the kind of popular thirst for increased access and agency that Cairo witnessed. Unlike Egypt's undulation between allowing and denying access to its power structure, the Hafiz controlled social, political and economic institutions remained largely the same – closed to

anyone outside the Ba'ath Party and the Syrian military elites. However, when Bashar assumed power and removed Syrians' limited agency and access and empowered a petit bourgeoisie, he inadvertently drove Syrians to believe their hope for a stable and secure livelihood was also removed. As I analyze based on the Syrian lifeworld in Chapter 7, Syrians seemed unsure if the al-Asad institutions were completely rigid and unwilling to reconfigure Damascus' power institutions justice praxis. But, as it became clear that Bashar would refuse to cede any real power and heavy-handedly repressed his people throughout the 2011 protests, the lifeworld hope for change within a framework of stability under Bashar again faded and was replaced with calls for revolution.

Unlike Egypt, Syria did not have the same historical level of non-state actors seeking and finding political opposition space. While Syria similarly saw an influx of its rural citizens to the cities seeking education and economic opportunities, and those Syrians likewise felt out of place in the cosmopolitan culture and sought spiritual solace in Islam, Syria's urban Islamists were not institutionalized as politically oppositionist like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. Syrian professional associations enjoyed a rare and brief opportunity for gaining political power against the al-Asad regime, but Hafiz's expert cooptation followed by repression of the remaining dissidents muted that burgeoning power challenge. Curiously, while the Syrian regime used its political, legal, and educational institutions to systematically repress Syrian Kurds, Kurdish political opposition to Damascus' policies remained quiet for most of the al-Asad rule and well into the revolution. Syrian civil society movements existed too but were very cautions and rarely dared to attempt political opposition. However, the vociferous protests that grew from localized grievances against Bashar's security institutions held much broader grievances against the regime's entire structure of power and justice institutions, evidenced by the spread of protests throughout its 2011 Arab Spring and the devolution of the country into the still raging civil war. Below I relay the Syrian sociopolitical lifeworld construction under Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad. SMT often focuses on short-

term dynamics. However, I posit that sociopolitical structure shifts and the upending of Hafiz's[194] longstanding stabilizing institutions under Bashar drove much of what required violence to satisfy a reformation of state power and justice practices. As such, I give greater attention to Hafiz al-Asad's lifeworld than most SMT analyses on the Syrian uprising to underscore how Bashar's changes likely affected Syrians' beliefs about what the state should be.

7.1: 1970-2011: Syria's Lifeworld and Institutions *For The Sake Of* Community, Justice and Power

The Syrian lifeworld is derived in large part from the country's myriad social, religious, and ethnic identities, each with distinct geographies across Syria's lands. Syrians institutionalized distinct power, economic, justice and identity structures for centuries within those self-imposed boundaries. Under the al-Asad family rule, Damascus used the breadth of its power via its security, media and economic institutions to forge and enforce a unified Syrian national identity above all else, centered on a (claimed) uniquely Syrian polity that challenged Israel and the West. The al-Asad-run Ba'athi political institution centralized Syria's power upon the president, but for decades it also distributed just enough localized power and agency to give the regime's power praxis a thin but convincing façade of political and economic justice. However, just as Damascus' centralized power institutions built unity, diminutive changes and stagnation in access and agency also drove disenfranchised Syrians to reconsider their diverse historical identities and construct the central aspects of dissidents' sociopolitical lifeworlds.

Hinnebusch (1990, 20-26, 24, 51-57, 62-66 71-80) describes historical Syrian culture as divided among the trader urbanites, nomadic desert dwellers, and rural agrarian peasants whom both the urbanites and Bedouin preyed upon. In the 20th century, increased education and urban career opportunities for rural Syrians drew them to cities where they staffed the lower-middle class government professions like teaching, government administration, and military officers. The centuries-old class politics remained, and

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[194] I use Hafiz and Bashar al-Asad's first names throughout this work rather than full or last names to distinguish which Syrian president I am referring. I do not use first names diminutively; only for simplicity.

rural intellectuals radicalized toward socialist revolutionary politics recycling and amplifying radical socialist frames through Syria's education structure that they largely administered. With the French withdrawal from Syria in 1946 the rural intelligentsia believed a Syrian socialist reform could correct the "national bourgeoisie" structure. Between 1946 and 1970, the Syrian military officer corps usurped one another in 18 successive coups, ostensibly over which Ba'athi social system was best for the country. The military power struggle purged the long-ruling Sunni Nasserist urbanite middle class and other religious and sociocultural sects until the minority Alawite rural lower-middle class Syrians finally held power (Hinnebusch 1990, 81-91, 105-119, Van Dam 2011, 34-61). Hafiz al-Asad's successful final coup allowed him to promote his vision for a nationalistic Syrian identity, creating the new lifeworld through which Syria's 'corrected' Ba'ath party would thrive.

7.2: Post-Independence Syria: Hafiz al-Asad's Political Structure

Hafiz understood the tenuous balance of Syria's mixed population and created a structure that used political and social institutions to coerce and compel Syrians to keep the country stable and unified.[195] Hinnebusch (1990, 9) called Hafiz's system "authoritarian-populism" which crushed opposition while providing social and economic assistance to maintain an acceptable and stable living standard, legitimized through institutions that leveraged "personal or primordial loyalties, charismatic leadership, ideological mission, or bureaucratic legality." George (2003, 3) notes that although citizens quietly complained about the government's human rights abuses and undemocratic institutions, "Syrians do credit the regime with bringing stability." Stability was a recurrent Syrian frame and key driver of sociopolitical contentment concerning the government's power distribution and justice practices.

Hafiz used Ba'athi institutions pragmatically to create a popular, pervasive, and enduring power structure that unified Syria behind him (George 2003, 9-11). He used the popular elements of previous

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[195] The al-Asad regime is often cited as regularly violating human rights by human rights watchdog organizations (George 2003, 12-13).

Ba'athi ideals like personal struggle, Arab nationalism, socialism, and the centrality of Islam in government and society to craft Syria's image to appeal to the diverse population (Van Dam 2011, 17-18, George 2003, 3, Lawson 2010, 152). He diminished secularism by imposing a superseding Syrian Arab identity and opening Ba'ath party access to any 'citizen'[196] who gave up their historical ethnic identity, which many sects capitalized upon. Hafiz also re-enfolded many sects purged during the post-independence coups, including the urban and bourgeoisie Sunnis. A strong difference among sects' effectiveness and power concerning policy influence likely remained (Van Dam 2011, 78), but the historical lack of challenges suggests most were content.

Hafiz used the Syrian *assabiyya*[197] cultural frame to promote nationalist and populist policies via his Ba'ath structure. Kayapinar (2010, 238) describes the centuries-old cultural construct as a political dynamic that "turns an individual into a political being and the masses into cohesive socio-political units." Jundab bin Anbar bin Tamîm's pre-Islamic poetry epitomizes *assabiyya*: "Help your brother be he oppressor or oppressed." Asleb bin Abdallah elaborates "If I do not help my brother when he acts unfairly, how can I help him if he is treated unfairly?" (Abu-Nimer 2000, 254) Hafiz used the closeness of his Ba'ath system to the rural agrarian and urban middle classes to create a sense that his government was working in solidarity with Syrian citizens and their Arab brethren, be his regime oppressors (most often against his people) or oppressed (by Israel and the West). Although the exact phrase *assabiyya* may not pervade the Syrian discourse like the topics of Israel and the West, it underpins many facets of Syrian beliefs, opinions, and actions. Gani (2014) recounts how the al-Asads expertly used identity work in the form of othering vis-à-vis Israel and the West, and used frame extension to link historical Syrian pride to

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[196] As discussed below, most Kurds were not official Syrian citizens.
[197] The structure of *assabiyya* is preferential, based on the relationship between the individuals in question. The closer to the immediate family unit ('*usra*), the heavier the onus of *assabiyya*. These concentric rings of unquestioning loyalty extends from the '*usra* (immediate family) to the '*ashira* (extended family) and finally to the *qabila* (tribe). However, *assabiyya* is not confined to familial relationships; the concept extends to "close contact" relationships, typically constructed through long histories (e.g. childhood friends) or times of trial and hardship. Whereas familial *assabiyya* is common in rural and Bedouin contexts, "close contact" *assabiyya* is the more common type of solidarity built in urban and professional settings, often through religious and/or political narratives (Abu-Nimer 2000, Kayapinar 2010).

the pride of opposing those foreign hegemonies to create a modern, political Syrian *assabiyya* that drove

support for Damascus and al-Asad.[198] Syrians, through Hafiz's leadership were, ""standing up" to the

Americans and showing solidarity with the Palestinians" (Gani 2014, 96). Weeden relays how Hafiz

blended his rhetoric of Syria solidarity with an institutionalization of Hafiz's image as a 'gallant knight'

leading his people, believed by them or not, creating a discursive power that reified his vision of a Syrian

nationalism. And Phillips (Phillips 2012, 40-72) highlights Hafiz's ability to layer and institutionalize his

cult of personality with pan-Arab nationalism, historical Syrian symbolism, and Syrian state nationalism,

with undertones of Islamism, emphasizing each where it suited his political aims best.

The government instituted its Ba'athi agentic access structure across Syria, although agency was

limited to local and largely apolitical issues. Hinnebusch (1990, 2012, quote on p 97) describes Hafiz's

Ba'athi clientelist and cooptation "that cut across sectarian and urban–rural divides, incorporated a

constituency that spanned the middle class and the peasantry, and represented the interests of a sizeable

regime coalition." The endemic Ba'ath structure provided widespread (if minimally effective) access and

ideological agency to Syrians while maintaining the populace's pulse, exerting control where necessary.

The government stamped the Ba'athi brand on the ever-popular villagers' welfare services and political

access mechanisms for local grievances and claimed Syria's national technological advancements as

Ba'athi triumphs (Hinnebusch 1990, 180-185).

They Syrian Ba'ath structure, while acceptable, was only locally effective, patrimonial, and

undemocratic. Lower-level politicians, "largely confine[ed] themselves to local politics where they are

movers and shakers" (Hinnebusch 1990, 172). Hafiz's system coopted traditional tribal, social, and

otherwise historical power structures, giving longstanding power holders government roles, especially

loyalists (Van Dam 2011, 18). Local political issues dominated campaigns, altogether avoiding the

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[198] Seale, drawing upon Durkheim, Goffman, and Scheff, declares that social bonds and solidarity with our fellow people is the most fundamental of human motives, one which "keeps us alive" (Seale 1998, 30).

dangerous territory of "high politics." High politics was reserved for a few elite local leaders (e.g. *maktab al-fallahin*, the farmers' bureau) who made observations and recommendations for trickle-down policies affecting their constituency. The clientelist system derailed any truly democratic and egalitarian input; the elite had the most affective access and were the greatest financial contributors to the patronage structure (Hinnebusch 1990, 149-152, Owen 2012, 52). But Hafiz buttressed his corrupt and repressive institutions by presenting alternatives as even bleaker.

Gani (2014) describes Damascus' cunning use of its own tumultuous history and that of other unstable Arab states to frame Syrian stability with gradual reform as the best path to improvement. She notes how Syrians' fear of its past chaotic political and security environments drove many to value stability and acceptable living standards over the uncertainty that could accompany broader and deeper reform. Conflict with Israel yielded mixed results at best and disaster at worst (e.g. the Six Day War). Western colonialism provided countless detrimental examples of European involvement in Arab. And the U.S. intervention track record in the last half-century has made asking for American assistance in political reform an unattractive option. So, with little hope for beneficial support from outside powers and Syria's relative stability tied to its non-Western system of Syrian governance and representation, Damascus was able to convince its citizens that their lot was comparatively good and would only get better through *Syrian* means.

To supplement the perception of political access, the al-Asad regime promoted open membership to the Ba'ath and other *legal* political groups. Under Hafiz, the Ba'ath rose from 10,000 full members and 25,000 candidates to nearly 375,000 members and candidates in 1980 and nearly 540,000 (8.4 percent of the population above the minimum required age) in 1984. Concomitantly, the regime grew the national political party, the Progressive National Front (PNF), from 65,398 in 1971 to 1,008,243 in 1992. Membership eased regulations and promised privilege, education, military positions, economic benefits, and protection through government placement (Hinnebusch 1990, 178-179, 188-189). The regime coopted even more Syrians by increasing public sector civilians from 236,000 in 1970 to 1.215 million in

1991. The al-Asad regime aimed to preempt dissent by offering employment in government institutions and the accompanying limited agentic access. But, the flood of Ba'athists and government workers meant agency was diluted, which informed citizens' lifeworld understandings of their political potency.

Hafiz used his Ba'ath-led legislative institutions to frame the government favorably through popular policies like the 1981 Land Reform Act, but shadowed its rewards with the looming threat of repression to secure support and deter opposition. In 1990, Hinnebusch (1990, 270-271) found that, "Where village dissidence exists, it appears as likely to take a nationalist-left form, as in the Homs village, as a conservative one; whatever their disenchantment with the Ba'th regime, most villagers have no love for the city landlord or merchant who historically dominated them." However, he warned presciently that, "peasant alienation or indifference are probably major threats to the regime's rural base."

Hafiz used international political issues, like the Palestinian cause, to create a Syrian lifeworld belief in a unifying supranational duty against Western hegemony to distract from Damascus' domestic failures (George 2003, 5-7) For example, Hafiz rallied the Syrian people behind their government for the October 1973 war with Israel to redirect attention away from their growing dissatisfaction with the new constitution (Hinnebusch 1990, 135-145, 2012, 96) Russia courted Hafiz and maintained a strong relationship with Bashar, further distancing Syria from Israel's Western supporters. Even if citizens disliked Damascus' political structure and practices, alliance with the West would be treated with skepticism and reluctance; the al-Asad political rhetoric long poisoned the well of international influential allies.

7.2.1: Hafiz al-Asad's Security Institutions

Hafiz continuously grew Syria's security institutions, obligating much of the Syrian population to the regime. He increased the military exponentially following the Six Day War when the Syrian military had approximately 50,000 soldiers. In the 1973 war with Israel, the Syrian army numbered 170,000 and in the mid-1980s, the Army was approximately 20 percent of Syria's workforce, still with a disproportionate

Alawite representation in the officer corps (Hinnebusch 1990, 164, Zisser 2011). By the time Bashar took power, the army was around 500,000 strong. Hafiz also grew the state security apparatuses to approximately 65,000 by the early 1990s, not including the several hundred thousand part-timers, collaborators, and informers on the al-Asad payroll. In the 1990s there was approximately one state security person per 150 citizens (George 2003, 2, Perthes 1997, 146-147, 193). Hafiz ensured military and security services' loyalty by allowing them to demand patronage from their business ties, similar to Egypt's practices (Hinnebusch 2012, 97, Zisser 2011). Hafiz's system funded enough loyal military and security services across religious, tribal, and social sects that they had the personnel and networks to coerce and repress the rest of the population to the president's will. If dissent among the ranks existed under Hafiz, it was quickly muted (Hinnebusch 1990, 164).

7.2.2: Opposition Avenues

Hafiz's political institutions ostensibly allowed opposition, but in practice the system smothered challenges with legislation, Ba'ath and clientelist networks, and securitization turned physical repression. Many Syrians in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s looked to professional and Islamic organizations for agency. Syrian women formed civil society groups that were largely apolitical, and Syria's Kurds weakly politically engaged. But, as noted above, he complemented repression with political inroads that gave enough perceived agency and stability to balance against social demands for power and justice reforms.

7.2.2.1: Muslim Brotherhood

Syria's Muslim Brotherhood was a very different institution from its Egyptian counterpart. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, first active in the 1940s (Lawson 2010, 138-139), aimed to reform Syria into a *shari'a*-based (Islamic law) society. Throughout Syria's al-Asad rule, the group's relationship with the president declined. Batatu notes that in the early years of his presidency, Hafiz regularly supported the brotherhood ideologically and monetarily, even declaring during one Ramadan, "You and I… need one

another: I need to hear from you yearly, for through your words I sense not only your feelings but the feelings and the desires of the people, anxious as I am, being a fellow countryman at the topmost point of responsibility to seek only what the people want" (Batatu 1999, 261-278, quote on p 262). Later, the Muslim Brotherhood railed against the ruling Alawi Ba'athists oppression of Syrian Sunni Muslims and accused the regime of supporting Syria's Israeli, Jewish, and other foreign enemies (Van Dam 2011, 89-96, Lawson 2010, 139-140). The Brotherhood avoided conflict with most other Syrian religious sects, focusing instead on cultivating alliances within Syria's farmers, shopkeepers, and manufacturers regardless of religion (Lawson 2010, 138-140). However, Syria's Muslim Brotherhood was not as pervasive as the Egyptian Brotherhood and the Syrian Brothers never gained the cultural lifeworld foothold belief that it was a viable political opposition institution like the Egyptian Brothers enjoyed.

When the Ba'ath came to power in 1963 and pushed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood out of the official polity, the Brotherhood pushed back with violent attacks against Ba'ath politicians and political offices. When Hafiz took power in 1970, he courted the Muslim Brotherhood and often heeded their concerns, despite some mixed messages resulting from splits within the Brotherhood (Batatu 1999, 261-271). Following the Hama disturbances in 1973 largely instigated by Islamists, al-Asad changed the constitution to require the president to be Muslim but still did not designate Islam as the state religion (Hinnebusch 1990, 292-293). In response, the Brotherhood's radical offshoot, the Fighting Vanguard, attacked several Ba'ath interests including the 1979 Aleppo Artillery School Massacre. In 1980 Hafiz enacted Law 42, which made Muslim Brotherhood membership (and, in practice, affiliation) illegal and punishable by death. The Brotherhood bit back in 1980, proclaiming the government *taghut* (an Islamically unjust tyrant) and calling on the president to reestablish the "full rights, freedoms and dignity of all Syrian citizens, including the rights of minority groups" (Lawson 2010, 146-148, quote on p 146). Violent exchanges continued between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime, culminating in the 1982 Hama Massacre wherein Syrian soldiers killed tens of thousands of Syrian civilians and Muslim Brotherhood members in a month-long battle; hundreds of soldiers also died (Lawson 2010, 145-149).

The Hama Massacre reformed Islamists' and the general Syrian political lifeworld regarding entry into contentious politics so vastly that some Syrians even refused to acknowledge the incident; an elderly Hama resident even denied that the destroyed Hama "Great Mosque" ever existed (George 2003, 16). Following the Hama Massacre, most Brothers fled the country. For decades, Brothers were deemed Israeli agents, extremists, and subverting the nation and Islam, polarizing Syrians, and inadvertently pushing many into the Muslim Brotherhood camp (Van Dam 2011, 89-96). But the Hama Massacre and subsequent repression irreversibly crippled the Brotherhood, which tried unsuccessfully to gain popular or government favor through liberal or conservative rhetoric and domestic alliances based on government and public signals (Lawson 2010). The Muslim Brotherhood reacted to repression with radicalization and to access with compromise. Reform, not revolution, would underscore the Islamists' and other dissenting groups' frames, creating a Syrian lifeworld understanding that direct contention was a risk with little chance of reward until 2011.

7.2.2.2: Professional Associations as Control and Opposition Mechanisms

The government used formal legislative and informal political and security service institutions to control potential opposition (Hinnebusch 1990, 176). During the 1970s and 1980s, the regime arrested or purged politicians and political parties that tried to insert opposition party opinions into legislation (Ibid 172). For example, the government used the Maktab al-Fallahin (the Agriculture Bureau) as an intelligence and control mechanism over agricultural workers' political lean through its control over the General Federation of Peasants (GFP), which encompassed most of Syria's agro-business unions. Of note, the agriculture business was probably one of the friendliest to the Ba'ath and the al-Asad regime, owing its socio-economic progress to Hafiz's structure. As such, the regime used the Maktab/GFP system for mobilizing GFP members in support rallies against the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s (Ibid 202). Hafiz transported peasants armed with pro-regime banners and slogans from their farms into the cities

(Starr 2012, 29) to intimidate or displace dissenting Sunni bourgeoise urbanites (Hinnebusch 1990, 163-164).

Professional associations provided a rare inlet for Syria's non-elites' "open and vocal opposition to Ba'ath rule," (Moore and Salloukh 2007, 66, 71) but only temporarily. In 1980 syndicates "organized extraordinary congresses" to call for vast political and security practice reform; hundreds were arrested or killed (Ibid 67). On 9 April 1980, the government passed a decree dissolving all professional associations. Targeting judicial associations, the 1981 Law No. 39 declared that the Syrian bar must act "in conformity with the principles and resolutions of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party," requiring consultation with the Ba'ath Regional Command and dictating all activities be "attended by a party representative" (George 2003, 103-104). The regime pressed on, and by mid-1980 it had arrested hundreds of doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and lawyers (Moore and Salloukh 2007, 67). Hafiz's government claimed the arrests protected Syria from foreign influences bent on causing disruption and disunity. Hafiz's ability to use the breadth of his political and security institutions to bend the Syrian people to his will shaped the Syrian understanding of his services' actions as final and unchallengeable.

Gradually, the regime allowed professional associations to reconstitute under the Ba'ath party, though they never had the same agency as they enjoyed before 1980. Professional associations, syndicates, and unions fell under the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU), a body governed by the Ba'ath (State 2011, 30-31). Limited political access through professional associations continued, but they were no longer a means for opposition.

Kurdish Political Access in Hafiz's Structure

Hafiz used Syria's legislative and judicial institutions to create a socioeconomic and political milieu that repressed Kurds' abilities to exercise any agency against the regime. Syria's Kurds were some of the most deprived and least empowered residents. Despite the contention examples of their Iraq- and Turkey-based counterparts, they were not as politically active and were rarely violent. Hafiz created

alliances with prominent Kurdish leaders, Jalal Talabani, the future Iraq president, and Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK in Turkey (Ziadeh 2009, 7) who publicly supported Hafiz's policies concerning Syrian Kurds (Gambill 2004). Domestically, the Kurds were weak. Sinclair and Kajjo (2011) found the most effective Syrian Kurdish parties operated outside of Syria. In the late 1990s, the Kurdish rights Yakiti Party emerged and established ties to powerful exiled Syrians (Leverett et al. 2005, 85). But, Syrian Kurdish expatriate movements demanding political representation and authority in Kurdish regions, recognition of the Kurdish language as an official language, and other basic citizen rights were largely ineffectual within Syria's borders (Gambill 2004, Miran 2002).

Hafiz built a legislative structure that repressed Kurds at a grassroots level. Concerning culture, Kurdish language official use and lessons were illegal, and the government often rejected Kurdish names for newborns (Ziadeh 2009, 4, Gambill 2004). Legally, Damascus denied many Kurds full citizenship. According to Ziadeh (2009), Kurds in Syria were grouped into three categories: a) Syrian Kurds resident in Syria since 1945; b) foreign Kurds with no citizenship (approximately 200,000 in 2008); and c) "concealed" Kurds (approximately 80,000 in 2008) who had foreign fathers and Syrian citizen mothers, or two "concealed" parents. In practice, non-citizen Kurdish children could not attend secondary school or university. Even citizen Kurds were systematically denied access to professional associations and consequently the professions themselves. Additionally, Syria requires citizenship to legally recognize marriage. Ziadeh (2009, 4) assessed in 2009, "The lack of equal opportunity in marriage and family life, education, and employment creates a vast climate of frustration among denationalized Kurds, particularly youth, making them feel more like a burden to society than active members in it and depriving them of hope for the future."

Despite, or probably because of Hafiz's effective cultural and legislative repression of Syria's Kurds that dangled Syrian citizenship just out of reach, they overwhelmingly valued Syrian nationalism above Kurdish identity according to a 2004 survey (Ibid, 5). Furthermore, the survey was taken during a time when Syrians hoped Bashar would change some of his father's policies, suggesting Hafiz's use of

his government institutions structured the Kurdish lifeworld so that Syria's Kurds believed change was best affected within the system and not by opposing it.

7.2.2.3: Syria's Women's Groups

Women's movements' access to the Syrian polity was probably limited more by Syria's longstanding social institutions derived from centuries-old culture than Damascus' political, judicial, security, and economic institutions. For example, the Syrian Women's League (SWL) operated outside of the legal system since 1949 (Bellafronto 2005) and were occasionally repressed, but Damascus took SWL seriously and gave its appeals lengthy reviews, according to an EU report on women in Syria (Programme 2010, 24, 31-38). The Qubaysi movement under Hafiz was the most prominent women's movement. It is an Islamic movement (Islam 2012, 161, 170) but is explicitly apolitical, focusing on bettering society through religious and secular education, attaining jobs that contribute to the economy, and doing charity work (Ibid 161-162, 173). Islam posits that Damascus only allowed Qubaysi to maintain a near monopoly on Syrian women's religious education because of its apolitical ideology and alignment with Syrian Ba'athi ideals (2012, 162).

7.2.3: Hafiz's Syria in Summary

Hafiz used the breadth of Syria's legislative, judicial and security institutions to crush dissent while channeling most citizens into his Ba'athi system, obligating and indoctrinating Syrians to his structure. In the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s the occasional nonviolent social movement and the rare violent contention occurred. Hafiz's authoritarian populism balanced citizens' desires for justice and power through a lifeworld structuration that made Syrians believe effecting local politics and welfare needs was enough; "high politics" contention would only be detrimental. His systematic lifeworld formation through social, cultural, and economic coercion and deterrence worked until his death. And just as Machiavelli warned,

the leader who fought hard to wrest power from an incumbent ruler held his position far better than the ruler whose father gave him his crown.

7.3: Bashar al-Asad's Syria: A Structural Shift

When Hafiz al-Asad died in 2000, Bashar replaced his father's authoritarian populism exercised largely through Syrian Ba'athi institutions with a loyalist petit bourgeoisie while either ignoring or forcefully repressing Syrians' growing demands for justice (Hinnebusch 2012, 101-102). Many Syrians shifted their lifeworld-based beliefs about of the president's role in justice and power distribution and hoped that Bashar's modernization promises would actually manifest in change for the better. But, in the decade following his father's death, Bashar diminished the Ba'ath that gave a modicum of power to the people and consequently the Syrian populace's perception of citizen agency. When the people demanded their government provide the same stability as before and liberalize the political system, they were promptly crushed. As Syria's citizens increasingly looked inward to solve their problems, they reformed their lifeworld-derived beliefs about their own agency vis-à-vis Bashar's new political institutions and reconceptualized the al-Asad power and justice structure as anachronistic and impedimental.

Leading up to his presidential succession, Bashar's backers promoted him as a harbinger of modernization, technological progress, and liberalization. Syrian citizens in 2000 hoped Bashar's vision for Syrian-style democracy was genuine and possible despite old-guard power brokers' resistance (George 2003, 30-33). Bashar promised "change within a framework of continuity," (George 2003, 1) but Syrians soon realized this was merely authoritarian upgrading lip service (Heydemann 2007).

In the mid-2000s Syrian citizens demanded political change, likely prompted by Lebanese state reform following Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri's assassination. Even the long-repressed Muslim Brotherhood requested government power redistribution, democratic election reform, and 'state of emergency' removal under a claimed unified banner with leftists, the civil society movement, and others (George 2003, 91, Lawson 2010, 150-151). Bashar promised to accelerate security, party politics

legislation, and Kurdish citizenship reforms during the 2005 Ba'ath party congress, signaling nonviolent contention was garnering agentic access (Aita 2006, 6). However, when Bashar decided that he would delay any decisions until he could further discuss with his committees leading up to the 2007 presidential election, Syrians interpreted that decision as a signal that his promises were to be ever dangling carrots. Bashar's promised change slow roll put cracks in the regime's wall that Islamists and neo-liberalists were wont to fill (Hinnebusch 2012, 98).

Change under Bashar was not the kind the Syrian people wanted. According to Hinnebusch (2012, 99), he cut public services funding and aimed to increase control over his patronage networks. He dissolved professional associations' Ba'ath party "second-rank branch and sub-branch leaderships" to consolidate his power. But the political maneuver removed the regime's only real connection to Syrian people. Grievances normally resolved through Ba'ath party channels were increasingly taken to alternative redress systems, such as tribal or other local extra-judicial mechanisms, fostering independence from Bashar's state. In addition, a diminished Ba'ath also meant a weakened surveillance and control system (Haddad, Bsheer, and Abu-Rish 2012, 207-209).

Concerning economic institutional change, Bashar introduced "social market" liberalization policies and neglected Hafiz's social system that encouraged rural poor- and middle-class mobility (Hinnebusch 2012, 98). Bashar seemed to assume that liberal market forces would replace the Ba'ath's social services and hoped his economic plans would raise Syrian's standard of living so that they would ignore their diminishing political agency. His "public narrative" of his new "social market economy" did not convince (Abboud 2014). The economy did not grow, and Syrians voiced discontent with increased unemployment, poverty, and the government's ineptitude or indifference in finding resolutions (Aita 2006). Middle-class Syrian urbanites were increasingly forced out of subsidized homes by real estate speculation. And as government-funded pension, education, and employment programs dwindled, so did Syrian citizens' belief in their government's legitimacy and justness (Hinnebusch 2012, 99-102). Syrians interpreted and understood Bashar's actions as breaking Damascus' 'social pact' and robbing the poor to

fee the rich, replacing his father's successful stability and solidarity narratives is failed promises of economic advancement (Sottimano 2014).

To supplement the reduced state social service funding, Bashar lifted Hafiz's restrictions on Islamic charitable organizations. As a result, approximately 80 percent of Damascus' charitable organizations in the mid-2000s were faith-based Sunni-linked groups (Pierret and Selvik 2009, 601). For example, the Union of Charitable Associations in Damascus instituted the marriage fund (formally known as the Love and Compassion Fund) giving thousands of young people the money they needed to marry and begin their adult lives (Ibid 603-604). In 1990's Syria, "Without a job, a young man cannot save enough money for marriage, and without marriage, lives remain in limbo" (Khalil 2009, 57). Damascene young adults owed more of their livelihood to religious leaders than to the regime. Bashar soon understood the shift in Syrian loyalties.

Islamists' government relationships remained a tenuous but critical social power sharing structure. Bashar needed Islamists to supplement his weakened state social services and their ideological support base, evidenced by his desperate attempts to cheerlead for Hizballah's ideologically charged fight. Damascus had long funded Hizballah fighters while quietly denying the group political access (Byman and Kreps 2010, 6-9, 11-13, Blanford 2011a, Norton 2009, 102). Still Bashar used Syria's Hizballah link to claim regime progress in its publicized goal to "recover the Golan Heights lost to Israel in 1967 and to obtain a peace agreement that acknowledged Syria's pivotal role in the region" (El-Hokayem 2007, 38). He rushed to frame and amplify Syria's role in Hizballah's successful standoff with the Jewish state in 2006, selling Hizballah paraphernalia with Hafiz's and Bashar's faces alongside Nasrallah's (Norton 2009, 149, El-Hokayem 2007, 42), despite Iran's primary role and Syria's minimal influence or logistics (Zisser 2011, El-Hokayem 2007). Hizballah's political distancing and occasional conflict with Damascus throughout the 2000s (Byman and Kreps 2010, El-Hokayem 2007, 44, Rabil 2007, 4-49) probably made Bashar's claim to Hizballah's victories less potent and convincing. With such a tenuous claim on

Hizballah successes, Bashar was forced to allow some leeway to Syria's Islamists as he needed Islamists support as much, if not more, than they needed his.

One further major change to Hafiz's policies concerns Syria's mass communication institutions. Bashar's technocratic attempts to modernize Syria's communication infrastructure exacerbated the rise of Syrian opposition. Under Hafiz the al-Asad regime controlled the media through state or al-Asad loyalist ownership. The government monitored messages and banned unfavorable content, especially if it criticized the al-Asad family (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 9). Bashar's attempt to liberalize Syria and reduce popular tension by introducing global communications diminished Hafiz's messaging control. Social movements used the internet and mobile communications to build networks, mobilize activism, and expose regime oppression to anyone who could help (Hinnebusch 2012, 104). Revolution without social media occurs regularly, but the timing of Bashar's communication infrastructure liberalization facilitated a burgeoning revolutionary proclivity.

Despite Bashar's liberalization policies, he remained staunchly anti-Western and extended the Palestinian struggle frame to the Syrian nationalist cause and duty to oppose the West (Hinnebusch 1990, 135-145, 2012, 96, George 2003, 5-7). Bashar framed himself as a national and regional security guarantor vis-a-vis US and Western hegemony following the 2003 US-led Iraq invasion (Hinnebusch 2012, 103, El-Hokayem 2007, 43) Both al-Asad's instilled the idea that only organically Syrian (read: an al-Asad creation) power and justice constructs were legitimate; borrowed political reform ideas were treason (George 2003, 84). Despite citizens' problems with Syria's political structure and practices, they were unlikely to seek Western allies; al-Asad political rhetoric had long poisoned the well. With Russia and Iran as al-Asad guarantors and citizens' lukewarm view of the West, Syria's dissenters likely shared a lifeworld-level perception that they lacked many powerful international allies throughout the 2000s.

7.4: Syria's Social Movements

Social movements seemed to grow quickly under Bashar, likely because he diluted Hafiz's effective Ba'athi access and control mechanism. Unlike Egypt under Mubarak's allowance and repression vacillation, Syria's opposition was overwhelmingly nonviolent during Bashar's decade of structural policy and practice changes. One may argue that the doctrines of Syria's civil society movement and women's rights advocates are inherently nonviolent, but the argument does not hold for those Islamists and Kurds who turned violent in the second half of 2011. Hence, violence was an opposition option as derived from some, if not all, Syrians' lifeworld-constructed beliefs of how the people could contend with the regime, despite little civilian-perpetrated violence prior to 2011.

The civil society movement[199] in Syria was a collectivity of elites and intelligentsia who met regularly to devise ways to activate, "all citizens and all social classes and political forces, intellectuals and producers and creative people, in order to encourage the development of civil society... and the establishment of a state of justice and rights... for all its people, without favor or exception.." (George 2003, 34, quote on p 182). It called upon Bashar to: repeal the Emergency Law, give amnesty to political prisoners and exiles, grant freedom of speech and public assembly, end the patronage state, establish judiciary independence, distribute state wealth, and end sexual discrimination (Ibid, 178-179, 183-187). The movement maintained a nonviolent and public call upon Bashar to enact his promised changes, but Bashar still subjugated Syria's civil society (Khosrokhavar 2012, 188). The regime arrested numerous movement elites for "tax evasion," "defaming the regime," "seeking to change the Constitution by illegal means," "weakening the national sentiment and conveying false news," "hindering the authorities in the exercise of their duties," and "incitement to confessional strife" (George 2003, 56-61, Khosrokhavar 2012, 202). The regime repeatedly arrested prominent activists using formal and extrajudicial military courts, sometimes throughout decades as with Haitham Maleh, president of the Foundation for the

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[199] 'Civil society' in the Syrian context is a philosophical and practical focus on the socio-political aspects of Syrian society; a 'what should be' forum for those interested in changing socio-political aspects of Syrian society.

Defense of Syrian Human Rights (Khosrokhavar 2012, 183). Despite official, extrajudicial, and other forms of coercion, the civil society movement remained active nonviolently throughout the Arab Spring revolution and into Syria's civil war.

Women's groups also remained nonviolent prior to and during the Arab Spring in the face of judicial, political and social institutional repression. Bashar used Syria's legal institutions to minimize women's groups' access to the polity, according to the UNHCR (Bellafronto 2005). Islamists accused women's movements of heretical feminism and labeled them Western agents to socially and politically repress members (Programme 2010, 31-38) using their Ba'ath connections; women's groups legally fell under Ba'ath and government purview (Bellafronto 2005). The regime threatened individual female activists like Suhair Atassi who came from a Syrian nationalist family but used social media to call for Emergency Law repeal and greater civil rights for all Syrians, including Kurds (Khosrokhavar 2012, 201-202). Likewise, the regime repeatedly arrested or otherwise harassed longtime human rights activists Tuhama Maarouf and Raghda al-Hassan throughout the 1990s and 2000s (ibid 202). Despite systemic institutional repression of women, Syrian women found ways to participate in politics at every level, but only within Syria's strict social and political confines concerning women's roles.

Bashar shifted between allowing Syria's Islamists access to the country's economic institutions and the linked political access avenues, and denying Syrian Islamists any role beyond the strictly Damascus-dictated religious institutions. Syria's Islamists rose to social and political power because Bashar needed them to supplement the government's inept NGOs like the Syrian Trust for Development (Pierret and Selvik 2009, 597), but Islamists did not shift the power structures as much as they believed. Bashar lifted sanctions on Islamic charities' domestic business and foreign funding streams that often came from Gulf country supporters (Hinnebusch 2012, 102-105, Heydemann 2007, Pierret and Selvik 2009, 596-599). Capitalizing on Syria's liberalized media sector, Saudi-based exiled Sunni cleric Sheikh Adnan al-Aroor encouraged dissent and criticized the al-Asad regime through his television program that was widely watched in Syria (Khosrokhavar 2012, 206). The charities business relationships quickly extended to

politics. Pierret and Selvik (2009, 599) report that in the 2007 elections in Damascus, "all main lists of independent candidates in Damascus were composed of a majority of businessmen accompanied by a religious figure." Prominent Islamists, like Damascus-based Zayd Group members, acquired senior government positions and demanded government repercussions against 'un-Islamic' (often feminist) acts or groups (Ibid 608). Still, Bashar maintained oversight on charities' activities and assets (Hinnebusch 2012, 105) and in the late 2000s, Damascus curtailed some freedom it had given to the increasingly powerful Islamic charities. Usama al-Rifa'i, the spiritual head of Zayd Group, summarized the emerging Syrian Islamist sociopolitical construct of power:

> [Syria's] leaders have no other choice but to reflect the desire of their people and to raise the flag of Islam… If they don't reflect this desire, they will lose their credibility and in the end, they will lose everything in this world… and God will replace them with better people (Pierret and Selvik 2009, 609).

A brief violent interaction between Islamists and the regime followed, and Bashar consequently reinstated heavy restrictions and removed several Islamist leaders (Ibid 609).

In addition to Syria's nonviolent Islamist groups, Syria hosted a network of smugglers who moved foreign fighters into Iraq in the 2000s (Borgen 2008, Rubin 2010, Levitt 2009), some of which Bashar probably at least tacitly allowed (Alhaj 2012). Although Watts suggests that Syrian smugglers were not as committed to violent jihad as the groups they supported would have liked (Watts 2008, 5), the network that smuggled fighters through Syria and into Iraq eventually became the network that fueled the Syrian jihadist groups, beginning with al-Nusra Front (Lister 2016).

Views differ on how Kurds understood their political access and agency within Syria's Damascus-dominated political, and educational institutions. Ziadeh suggests most Kurds sought non-Kurdish-centric groups or attained official government roles. Syria's Kurds joined established political organizations or politically minded groups and were part of the civil society movement or the Coordination Committee, which is a joint Arab-Kurdish group aimed at promoting human rights with a heavy emphasis on Kurdish issues (Ziadeh 2009, 5-6). However, Sinclair and Kajjo describe more than a dozen independent well-established, stringently organized, and tacitly allowed Kurdish political parties and three coalitions,

suggesting accessing one was largely open and possible (Sinclair and Kajjo 2011). The Kurdish lifeworld-based perceptions of their political access and agency amidst Syria's institutional power mechanisms likely lies somewhere in between.

It must be noted that Syria's Kurds weren't completely nonviolent under Bashar. Gambill (Gambill 2004) analyzed that when Bashar alleged the US put Syria next on its hit list, Syria's Kurds believed the US would probably interdict al-Asad's repression, fueling the March and April 2004 clashes between the Kurds and the regime's recently stationed troops in eastern Syria. The military killed dozens of Kurds, injured hundreds, and arrested thousands (Gambill 2004). The Syrian Kurds mistakenly calculated US military policy and dedication to defend repressed peoples, but the conflict indicated an undercurrent of Kurdish resistance, prefiguring violence if nudged that way.

7.5: The 2011 Syrian Political Lifeworld and State-Level Change

The Syrian lifeworld understanding of agency and opportunity composed of Syria's social movement networks and allies, diverse identities, culture of *assabiyya*, and the shifts in agentic political access and repression made the country's Arab Spring teeter between nonviolence and violence. Sparse contention and protest throughout the 2000s made collective action less established and ingrained as political agency praxis compared to Egypt's decades-cultivated sociocultural and political counterhegemony. During Syria's Arab Spring, Bashar conceded to some justice demands to re-enfold key power holders where possible, repressed others, and constricted opposition avenues. Disparate domestic movements with myriad identities and international allies complicated Damascus' and the opposition's calculus of the changing power balance.

In early 2011 Syrian activists circumvented the Damascus-dictated media institution and capitalized upon the non-state and international media interest in the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere to relay their plight, earning the nickname the 'Syrian YouTube Revolution.' The citizen journalist movement to expose regime peaceful protest repression was slow starting. In the beginning,

Syrians lacked the technological capacity to circumvent the regime's control mechanisms. Bashar's Syrian Electronic Army shut down the internet at will (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 13), published defamatory articles about media outlets, including al-Jazeera, and defaced or destroyed anti-regime content (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 13-16, Khosrokhavar 2012, Youmans and York 2012, 323). However, over a few months the movement gained momentum and Syrian diaspora supporters, "smuggled cell phones, cameras, and laptops into Syria for documenting protests and violence" (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 9). Non-Syrian supporters like the hactivist group Anonymous helped citizen journalists and Syrian hactivists evade Bashar's cyberwar units (Khosrokhavar 2012, 157). An increased and regular stream of Syrian activists' anti-regime videos and pro-revolution propaganda resulted in an understanding that Damascus was no longer the only messenger of life in Syria (Hinnebusch 2012, 107, Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 9-17). With citizen journalism rising, Syrians increasingly became the arbiters of the broader lifeworld perceptions of justice and power in practice in the Syrian community.

Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn (2012) report the most popular and consistent opposition injustice frames concerned humiliating repression and human rights violations, with Deraa providing an initial spark. Deraa was a long-marginalized town on the Jordanian border with a strong tribal *assabiyya* culture and "defiant identity" whose citizens "felt let down by the central power, despised by the ruling clique and humiliated by the representatives of the distant state and of the presidential party" (Filiu 2011, 88). On 6 March 2011, Deraa security services captured several youths from a small protest. The Deraa governor responded to residents' calls for their children's release by telling the protesters to give him their wives so he can procreate new children. The governor's humiliating language precipitated exponential nonviolent protest growth met with regime violence over the following weeks; but protests remained localized (Alhaj 2012). Later, the image of the tortured and murdered body of 13-year-old Hamza al-Khatib who was arrested during the May 2011 Deraa protests instigated further and broader protests (Khosrokhavar 2012, 186)). When citizen media publicized calls for support did not garner a response, Deraa's residents began calling for violent insurrection (Hinnebusch 2012, 107-110), suggesting their

diminishing justice and agency hopes necessitated violence for Deraa's citizens. The Ministry of Information responded, "The Syrian regime is deeply concerned about the safety and well-being of children... It is terribly wrong for parents to endanger their children and to put them in harm's way by making them join protests and demonstrations, when they should be at home watching cartoons" (Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 15). Filiu (2011, 88) reports that Damascene protesters retorted by turning the pro-regime slogan of "We shed our soul and blood for you, Bashar [al-Asad]" into, "We shed our soul and blood for you, Deraa."

Protesters championed a community that spanned all Syrian peoples, promoting Syrian unity and demanding the al-Asad family and its loyalists resign. Fadwa Soliman, a famous Alawite actress and activist, contradicted Damascus' claim that protesters aimed at a sectarian power grab on al-Jazeera stating, "we Syrians are one people... there is no sectarianism in Syria" (Khosrokhavar 2012, 218). Protesters championed universal rights like "personal freedom," "education," "national pride," and a better life (Macleod 2011). The Syrian Centre for Media director said, "The most important message is that people can make the change. Before it was always army officers that lead a coup" (Ibid). Anti-Bashar slogans ranged from abdication demands to warnings that, "Your turn has come, Doctor [Assad]!" referring to Qaddafi's fate, executed on the spot by opposition forces (Khosrokhavar 2012, 236). Other protesters took aim at Bashar's family and prominent state representatives (Ibid Khosrokhavar 2012, 207, 244). Even with protests mounting and frames promoting broad, inclusive citizen rights, Syrians were still reluctant to participate, evidencing the lasting Syrian lifeworld perception of an impenetrable regime reinforced through decades of institutionalized repression and control As one observer noted, pointing out cameras in an internet cafe, "Everything here is under control, even if it looks open" (Macleod 2011).

Syria's Islamists and Kurds were cautiously reserved early in Syria's revolution, likely owing to their experiences in challenging Syria's political and security institutions in the past. Syria's Muslim Brotherhood was reserved, likely owing to historical regime repression and partly because Syrians viewed the group as an ineffectual "pensioner's club" (Lund 2013, 11). Likewise, Syrian Kurds, who experienced

some of Bashar's greatest and most overt injustices, initially declared "This is an Arab uprising and we are not Arab" (Starr 2012, 38-39). Khosrokhavar (2012, 130) describes 6 May 2011 Kurdish demonstrations where they chanted, "The Syrian people are one" and "Freedom, freedom, peaceful, peaceful." The lingering effects of the al-Asads' ruthless repression and Kurds' initial belief that the revolution was hopeless probably initially curtailed Kurdish activism (Starr 2012, 38-39). However, as evidenced by the later Islamist and Kurdish violent revolutionary currents, opposition was not absent; it was merely dormant.

Bashar attempted to give Syrians the impression that he would change Syria's legislative and judicial institutions for the better, responding to protests by conceding some demands which was characteristic of Syria's authoritarian upgrading tradition (Hinnebusch 2012, Pierret and Selvik 2009). The government lifted the emergency law, which was probably the most poignant, recurring injustice cry in Syrian contentious politics; however, the policy change had no real effect. Bashar attempted to regain Ba'ath and tribal leadership support by raising state employee wages and offering other privileges. Following the 15 April 2011 protests, Bashar released several jailed protesters and promised government reform like curbing police authorities, removing extrajudicial courts, forcing several unpopular cabinet members to resign, granting political prisoners amnesty, and legalizing more political parties (Khosrokhavar 2012, 248, Times 2011). For the Islamists, the regime closed Syria's newly opened first casino, and reinstated teachers dismissed for wearing the *niqab*.[200] But, for all its concessions, the regime refused to concede that democracy, other than an al-Asad brand of 'democracy,' was a plausible and viable answer to Syrians' power and justice grievances (Hinnebusch 2012, 108-109).

Bashar used his security and media institutions to respond in a traditional Syrian repressive fashion. He claimed that "Peaceful demonstrations were used as a pretext under which armed men took cover," and continued framing opposition as foreign agents' work (George 2003, 73-79, Khamis, Gold, and

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[200] A traditional face veil worn by pious, often fundamentalist, Muslim women.

Vaughn 2012, 9-15, quote on p 15). For example, the regime sentenced a blogger to five years in prison for "expressing her desire to serve a post-Baath Syria and her open letter to Barack Obama (in support of the Palestinian cause) as criminal collusion with a foreign power" (Filiu 2011, 53-54). In another early-2011incident, the regime sentenced a young woman arrested in 2009 to five years imprisonment for posting political views and poetry online and allegedly giving state information to the US, which led to the attempted assassination of a Syrian officer in Cairo that disabled him (Khosrokhavar 2012, 185-186, Al-Jazeera 2011). According to Filiu (2011, 53-54), Bashar's "warning was clear to the whole cyber-community." Bashar projected the traditional al-Asad strongman image that any concessions would be on his terms alone.

Bashar's violent response to activism also formed a significant part of Syrians' understanding of the Syrian power structure. An activist involved in the early-2011 protests describes Syrian security apparatuses' interrogation and torture techniques in gruesome detail, often hardening activists' resolve (Haddad, Bsheer, and Abu-Rish 2012, 210-224). But Syrian security forces and their cronies, the *Shibiha*,[201] also attacked oppositionists' loved ones. The government warned that if protesters became violent they would be shot, and admitted to killing (though not torturing) protesters (Starr 2012, 31-33). It seemed the cost of any mode of contention was violence against activists, their loved ones, and their communities.

Eventually Syria's disparate Arab Spring coalesced into more traditional structures to concentrate political influence, giving the resistance a more structured resource and sustenance network. Filiu (2011, 89) claims the initial resistance was generally leaderless and coordinated by numerous "local coordination committees," unaligned citizen journalists, and hacktivists. However, in August of 2011, the Syrian

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[201] *Shibiha* is derived from the Arabic *shibih* which translates to "ghost," thought to derive from the Rolls Royce Silver Ghosts these men drove. The *Shibiha* is a mafia-like Assad family cartel often used as a deniable regime enforcer. During the growing 2011 uprising, the term *Shibiha* was broadened to mean any unofficially regime-employed thugs who violently coerced and repressed oppositionists. For example, in May 2012 *Shibiha* militia members in Taldou, Homs province, repressed civilian demonstrators and bystanders with heavy weaponry. One woman described the sectarian nature of *Shibiha* activities: "If they see he's a Sunni from his family name, they take him away and kill him" (BBC, 2012).

Muslim Brotherhood, civil society members, Damascus Spring signatories, local coordination committees, and some Assyrian and Kurdish groups created the Syrian National Council (SNC) to present a unified front and a central point for diplomacy and negotiation. In October 2011, military defectors led by Syrian top officers who Bashar replaced with loyalists or forced to retire (Hinnebusch 2008, 275, 2012, 99, Gambill 2002) and other armed groups formed the Free Syrian Army (FSA) (Khosrokhavar 2012, 228-229). But because of the military's historical sectarianism, the FSA was not likely viewed as an egalitarian group intending to share post-revolution power. These tenuous structures were Syria's opposition's mechanism for officially engaging external allies.

7.5.1: Powerful Allies' Unclear Support

Throughout the first half of 2011, Syrians' lifeworld perceptions of international support for their opposition to Bashar, especially Western support, shifted between hopelessness to hope based on the confusing and mixed signals they receive from other nations' rhetoric and actions concerning Syria and the broader Arab Sprig. Syria's anti-regime movements' social media and citizen journalism injustice frames garnered international support, intentionally or unintentionally, and supported internal movement goals like other Arab Spring revolutions. In January 2011 Western governments encouraged the Tunisian military to take control of the government and informed Ben 'Ali that they would not support or accept him per the Tunisian people's will (Angrist 2013, Youm 2011). In February the US encouraged Mubarak to cede his presidency while encouraging the Egyptian military to protect its civilians. In March NATO forces began military strikes in Libya supporting their revolution. Although Syrians were not necessarily enamored with Western states, Western powers' actions indicated they would at least protect civilians and support their demands for change. Syria's Arab Spring activists tried to make sense of the mixed messages concerning Western support.

From the beginning of the major protests in mid-March 2011 until 18 August when the US, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the EU called upon Bashar to step down (Myers 2011), the US swayed

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between politically and militarily supporting protesters and supporting Bashar. In January 2011 the US reinstated an ambassador in Syria for the first time in five years (Blanford 2011b). The ambassador, the President Barak Obama, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and other prominent policy-makers indicated they supported Bashar in reforming Syria, and rejected Western intervention (Goodenough 2011, Mohammaed 2011). Conversely, Senator Lieberman, chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and chairman of the Armed Services Airland Subcommittee, stated in a televised interview, "There's a precedent now that the world community has seen in Libya, and it's the right one, 'we're not going to stand by and allow this Assad to slaughter his people like his father did years ago.'" (Mohammaed 2011) US policy-makers continued to publicly debate intervening, ambiguously called upon Bashar to stop repressing and listen to the people, and avoided calling for a definitive administration change (Goodenough 2011, News 2011a, French 2012, Times 2011). Moreover, Russia's supporting Bashar probably made Syrians question Western opposition commitment if it chanced war with Russia. Amid these mixed signals, Syrian activists declared they could not figure out how to actuate these influential allies (Rosenthal 2014).

In August Western powers finally took a stance on Syria's Arab Spring. On 2 August 2011, with reports of Syrian military mass violence in Hama, every member of the UN Security Council – including Syria's close ally, Russia – agreed the violence in Syria must end (MacFarquhar and Gladstone 2011). While the UN Security Council did not consider military action, international powers indicated they did not support Bashar's repression. Following another two weeks of regime violence, Obama unequivocally called for Bashar to abdicate the presidency. Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the EU issued similar statements (Myers 2011). This international consensus on removing Bashar seemed to be the signal Syria's Arab Spring protesters sought.

Following the 18 August calls for Bashar to step down, mass protests occurred throughout Syria, despite a continued crackdown. Some of those killed were soldiers who disobeyed orders to shoot protesters. The Syrian revolution official Facebook page designated 19 August 2011 "Friday of the

Beginnings of Victory." When asked about the massive protests despite regime violence, one activist stated simply, "Today people felt more confident" (Bakri 2011).

<u>7.5.2: Bashar's Undermining of Hafiz's Syrian National *Assabiyya* – Defying a Cultural Institution</u>

Hafiz al-Asad created a structure of Damascus-aligned institutions centered around the powerful Ba'ath party that instilled a sense of Syrian nationalism through state institutions that helped citizens maintain an acceptable living standard and agency to effect local betterment. Bashar diminished the Ba'ath and state social programs, breaking down the relationship most Syrians understood they had with the state – agentic access to address local grievances but not 'high politics.' Bashar privileged the growing elite urban business sector and neglected the regime's longstanding commitments to its rural and tribal people. Further, he supplanted their political representation via the Ba'ath with his petit bourgeoisie loyalists. Citizens replaced Hafiz's state welfare mechanisms that instilled the Syrian sense of 'stability' with their own non-state institutions. Middle- and lower-class Syrians watched al-Asad-linked elites prosper as their socioeconomic situation declined, with Bashar neglecting or exacerbating inequity. This cycle of tribal co-optation drifting into neglect in Syria falls in line with the cyclical social theory of *assabiyya* as relayed by Ibn Khaldun:

> Assabiyya has often disappeared (at the time the state grows senile) and pomp has taken the place it occupied in the souls of men. Now, when in addition to the weakening of assabiyya, pomp too, is discontinued, the subjects grow audacious vis-a-vis the state, because the presumption of pomp remains. Therefore, the state shields itself by holding on to pomp as much as possible, until everything is finished (Kayapınar 2008, 398).

Bashar's weakened state *assabiyya* and inability to otherwise maintain support likely led him to "hold on to pomp as much as possible" in the face of citizens challenging his broken promises.

7.6: Conclusion – Summary and Next Steps

The al-Asad social, political, economic, security and media institutions built citizens' lifeworld understandings of Syrian society that for decades believed stability was more valuable than a democratic

political power structure and that Syrians had no choice but to accept the al-Asad institutionalized justice and power praxis. Syrian society was less accustomed to using violence as a mode of contention than Egypt. But the Syrian community was fractured, its power structure shifted far away from Hafiz's stabilizing Ba'athi institutions and included then excluded Islamist institutions, and jurisprudence praxis seemed to become less *for the sake of* Syria's people and more for the benefit Bashar and his petit bourgeoisie. Syria's citizens seemed to believe they could effect mass, rapid change for their country and for Syrians through nonviolence, as evidenced by Egypt's revolution. But Bashar's promises and praxis diverged too much, and each episode of contention slapped the protesters in the face with the humiliating reality of Bashar's injustices and concentration of power. Bashar's changes in Syria's political and security institutions through his devolution of the Ba'ath party and its action arms drove citizens to downgrade their lifeworld-derived beliefs of their own power and efficacy against Syria's repressive intuitions.

The key to understanding why nonviolence or violence emerged lies in assessing what resource mobilization, identity, frame and emotion work efficient causes utilized which lifeworld material and formal causes, and teleologically what kind of change Egypt's revolutionary movement was *for the sake of* coupled with assessing what kind of change Syria's revolutionary movement was *for the sake of*. In the following chapter I draw from the Egyptian and Syrian institutions and lifeworld descriptions to relate what social and political material, formal, and efficient causes affected their 'Arab Spring' repertoires of contention. I describe what material, formal, efficient, and most importantly, final causes drove Egyptians and Syrians to use nonviolence *and* violence – both were repertoires that seemed likely to emerge. The movement's agentic actions opposing the government urged nonviolence and violence *for the sake of* building communality or creating divisions, satisfying emotions, effectively capitalizing on opportunities, and effecting a justice and a balance of power. We know that Egypt's Arab Spring was largely nonviolent and Syria's Arab Spring turned violent, but several sociocultural elements that SMT typically analyzes suggests these could have gone either way. I will compare the four causes of these cases to demonstrate

how asking what Egypt's and Syria's 'Arab Spring' movements were *for the sake of* elucidates better why they occurred the ways they did.

Chapter 8 – Agentic Functional Teleology, Events, and Movement Repertoire Emergence

<u>Analyzing Egyptian Nonviolence and Syrian Violence Emergence</u>

In this chapter, I will engage the remaining levels of my SMT causation model – agentic functional teleology and observable events – concerning the question of why the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Springs used nonviolence and violence, and what the repertoire and actions were ultimately *for the sake of*. In Chapter 4 I argued that, at a deep causal level, social movements are Naturally Teleologically *for the sake of* restoring balance to a society's community, justice and power. In Chapter 5 I explored how social movement nonviolence and violence might be functionally teleologically *for the sake of* society's Natural Ontological forces of community, justice and power; existing literature gave competing answers. However, in reviewing violence and nonviolence related to community, justice and power, two themes emerged: positive emotions and hope for sociopolitical progress encourages nonviolent reform, and negative emotions and pessimism about sociopolitical reform encourages destruction as a precursor to rebuilding anew. More simply, positivity and hope are functionally teleologically *for the sake of* nonviolence whereas negativity and hopelessness are functionally teleologically *for the sake of* violence. I will explore these themes in the context of Egypt and Syria below.

Egyptians and Syrians experienced structural and cultural shifts leading up to the Arab Spring events of late-2010/early-2011, as described in Chapters 6 and 7. These shifts in institutional praxis of justice and power changed Egyptians' and Syrians' lifeworld understandings of their environments. Longstanding beliefs that regime-perpetrated injustices and the imbalance of power in their president-centric governments became more readily recognized through citizen journalism and citizens' efforts to create spaces for opposition, or at least space for quiet communal disenchantment and dissent. To analyze how Egyptian and Syrian citizens created the massive, rapid and forceful movements turned revolutions, one must use several SMT approaches that begin from the agentic teleological level and the actual observable level. Using the model I propose, included again just below, we can investigate intents and observations to explain how movement makers acted because of and within sociopolitical institutions and

structures, drawing upon their communities' shared lifeworlds, and formed the identities, frames, and

repertoires that we witnessed emerge in 2011.

Social Movement Levels of Causation	
Natural Ontology/Natural Teleology – Final and efficient causes	Real, intangible forces and structures driven by nature and innate human impetuses (i.e. unadulterated biological, psychological, and social) affecting actions and effecting outcomes that are independent of and preexist any social constructs.
In social movements	Community, justice, power, or other Natural Tele effecting societal balance.
Institutional ontology/critical realist teleology – Final, efficient, formal and material causes.	Real, intangible forces and structures driven by longue durée social, political, and economic structures and institutions that preexist everyone living in them but are not independent of a continuous historical chain of the people who construct and reify them.
In social movements	Modes of production-based structures, familial structures, governance and jurisprudence institutions.
Lifeworld - formal and material causes	That which composes structures, institutions, rules, and norms. Lifeworld results from the dialectic structuration of habitus through praxis that people draw from to interpret meaning and construct beliefs about the world and their agency within it.
In social movements	Weberian understandings of who 'society' or 'community' is and should be, shared concepts of what 'justice' is and should be, and believed power structures and agency mechanisms based in historical praxis and habitus.
Agency/functional teleology – final and efficient causes	Agency in the form of intentionality and goals where people's reasons, motivations, justifications and intentions coupled with their corresponding actions drive them to some end. In functional teleology, we know the end because it has occurred or because it is intimated by a person or group and we observe the actions that are necessary and sufficient for the end. People use feedback from observations and intentionally act trying to achieve goals.
In social movements	Social movement actions, interactions with those they demand change from that are intentionally directed toward the movement's goals for its participants and for the greater society.
Observable – material and formal causes	Events and phenomena that can be observed and inferred or interpreted from individuals' and collectivities' behavior.
In social movements	Social movement nonviolent and violent actions and interactions with their contenders that constitute an interpretable event correlating with the movement's articulated agenda (e.g. a protest against unjust policies, a building seizure representing certain power holders, cooptation of allies, or an armed attempt to capture territory).

Several SMT approaches complementarily explain how social movement elites and participants act intentionally and functionally teleologically *for the sake of* nonviolent or violent contention emergence, as reviewed in the introductory chapter and Chapters 4 and 5. First, an SMT approach analyzing political opportunity, which includes analyses of repression and access to change affecting political structures, can partly explain why nonviolent or violent repertoires emerge – accessible malleable structures encourage nonviolence while inaccessible and rigid structures encourage violence. Movement makers will intentionally act (agentic efficient and final causes) to exploit or create opportunities to access the polity and drive change. Second, using SMT's frame analysis, it is possible to analyze how they will draw upon lifeworld constructs of history, culture and emotions (material causes) to form frames (efficient and formal causes) *for the sake of* satisfying social emotions and demands for justice (final causes). Movements frame justice and power praxis amidst their histories and cultures in the context of struggle against their governments to appeal to certain collective emotions that unite, divide, instigate, assuage, or even satisfy the society. Third, SMT's identity analysis can be used to understand how participants and their movements construct (efficient cause) in- and out-group identities (formal cause) that relays the justice of the movement and the injustice of the power holders it rallies against. I will explore how the social movements and the extant structures formed and reformed identities in ways that sometimes built greater community and consensus, and at other times drove deeper and seemingly insurmountable divides between the 'us' and the 'them' – divides that in extremis drive people to believe that installing a just and power-sharing community is possible only if the unjust power structures are uprooted and/or destroyed. Fourth, using an SMT-focused network analysis can help explain how movements and participants extend their group to other groups and form alliances that also partly determine the movement's repertoire of contention. Movements' material causes are the people, ideas and resources they are made from. By allying with nonviolent or violent people, ideas and resources through network extensions, the movement itself reforms (formal cause) to include its allies' repertoires and may act (efficient cause) according to its new makeup. This holistic analysis of *how* and *why* violence and nonviolence emerge addresses *how* social movements act within their institutions and draw from their lifeworlds to form political

opportunities, frames, identities and networks *for the sake of* rebalancing community, justice and power. This chapter elucidates how intentional agentic actions and functional teleology drive nonviolence or violence to emerge *for the sake of* the Natural Teleological final cause of rebalancing community, justice and power.

Below I will use SMT approaches to briefly explore *how* the Egyptian and Syrian social movements of the Arab Spring emerged and formed nonviolently and violently respectively. These SMT analyses will be overviews rather than full and detailed analyses because the aim of this chapter and the broader thesis is to propose a new way of thinking about causation in social movements and how to synthesize existing SMT analyses to uncover answers to broader *why?* questions. So in the following sections I will use abbreviated versions of SMT approaches that analyze political opportunities, frames and frame work, identities and identity work, and social movement networks and alliances to create summary analyses that show how each of these approaches partially and complementarily explain social movement nonviolence and violence emergence.

The analyses below will leverage the analyses and descriptions I provided in earlier chapters that contribute to cause at the remaining two levels to complete my holistic analytical method of explaining social movement nonviolence and violence. I will draw from the work done earlier in this thesis regarding Natural Teleological drivers of community, power and justice and the emergence of nonviolence or violence *for the sake of* those final causes. I will also draw from the descriptions of Egypt's and Syria's political, social, economic and security institutions and lifeworld-derived understandings regarding causation and meanings of community, justice and power praxis. SMT approaches explain how movement makers work to shape the social movement's understandings of its political opportunities, injustice frames, in- and out-group identities, and its networks and allies prior to and during episodes of contention. I will include research that directly concerns movement makers' beliefs of agency and their acts within and against their countries' structures that they designed intentionally to teleologically affect the changes they wanted to see concerning their communities and their governments' justice and power praxis. And finally, I will describe how movements dialectically interacted with structures and institutions

to drive everyone involved and watching to reform their understandings of the Egyptian and Syrian communities, as well as what is and should be good justice and power praxis. I will provide analyses of why Egypt and Syria could have used nonviolence or violence based on broadly similar material, formal, efficient and final causes at every level. However, I find that ultimately the emergence of nonviolence or violence stems from broad social understandings of structural and institutional abilities and proclivities to rebalance community, justice and power; understandings movements gain from interpreting the dynamics of contention and progress (or regress) in the observed structural reform dialectic. Hence this section builds from and draws upon the earlier work done concerning the first three levels of my social movement causation model and continues analysis through the final two levels to complete a holistic social movement analysis using final cause (both Natural Teleology and functional teleology) as a heuristic.

8.1: Why the Egyptian Movement Could Have Used Violence

The following sections will show how SMT approaches could explain how certain factors could be functionally teleologically *for the sake of* a violent Egyptian Arab Spring.

8.1.1: SMT's Opportunity Analysis: Repression and Access - Violence *For The Sake Of* Seizing Opportunity and Balancing Power

As noted in Chapter 5, SMT scholars argue that when people experience an expansion and then retraction of access, often manifested in changes in repression, protesters will seize or create probably nonviolent activism opportunities when they believe access is opening and repression lessening; people tend toward violence when access closes and repression increases. This scholarship suggests *how* movements' repertoires emerge but does not quite explain *why*. Egyptians almost certainly learned from the Tunisian nonviolent revolution that the time was right for collective action to change their political power structures. Egypt's Arab Spring was a nonviolent social movement attempt to open political access and redistribute power away from Egypt's "president for life" (Owen 2012). Much of Egypt's social

movement praxis was historically nonviolent, especially in the preceding decade, but there were occasional outbreaks of violence and violent groups that remained. Oppositionists across the spectrum could have interpreted and reacted violently to Mubarak's signs that he would not acquiesce. Despite lacking conventional weapons, Egyptians could have clashed violently with police, rioted, destroyed buildings and symbols of Mubarak's power, and allied with violent groups that desired a violent coup. Indeed, increased repression and the perception of diminishing agentic access via protest during January and February 2011 very likely could have urged the movement toward violence *for the sake of* seizing a fleeting, constricting opportunity that forces state-level confrontation to reconfigure state-level political power in Egypt.

In 2004, Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) used the 'cycles of contention' theory to explain how Cairo's repression changes incubated Egyptian political opposition and activism in general. For decades the Egyptian regime swung between repressing and allowing social movement activity, even coopting nonviolent Islamists when Cairo needed to use them to deter violent groups. This 'cycles of contention' hypothesis is a strong argument for how violence emerged throughout the 1990s and portended similar violence as the January 2011 movement mirrored Egypt's historical cycles of contention. Cairo initially tacitly allowed protests. But Mubarak's historically credible threats to repress activists, government-imposed curfews, the regime's killing of hundreds of activists while detaining thousands (Haaretz 2011), and Mubarak's initial public refusal to step down should have indicated the movement's opportunity would soon recede. Even with an insubordinate military, Mubarak's capable and loyal state security apparatuses could still mete out the same punishments against citizens they had for decades. Egyptians surely remembered how police, intelligence, and other state security apparatuses remanded, abused, tortured, and killed citizens with impunity. In addition, the belief that Gamal Mubarak would succeed this father should have indicated access would either remain the same or worsen, given the recent succession of Hafiz by Bashar al-Asad. Cairo's repression, albeit not overly strong or broad, coupled with the

indications that the Mubarak rule would sustain were a recipe for social movement violence per SMT political opportunity approaches, but the protests remained largely nonviolent. Why?

<u>8.1.2: SMT's Frame Analysis: Frames Forming and Using History, Culture and Emotions - Violence *For The Sake Of* Satisfying Emotions, Effecting Justice</u>

SMT's frame analysis is an obvious approach for understanding what social movements intend to effect and how they intend to affect change, especially concerning injustice framing as noted in Chapter 5. Using a political opportunity analysis that highlights Cairo's long history of violently and humiliatingly repressing its citizens, one can contextualize a frame analysis of Egyptians' calls for economic, political and social justice that calls for or stimulates the use of nonviolence or violence *for the sake of* rebalancing the Egyptian community's justice and power dialectic. By 2011 Egypt's citizens had a half-century history of violence and humiliating repressive acts perpetrated by corrupt state and state-sanctioned extrajudicial apparatuses against its citizens that instilled anger and a culturally constructed demand for violent vengeance for some of its citizens. The country's history is replete with examples of detainment, torture, and Cairo's use of the Emergency Law and military courts to crush political opposition and create a complacent society. Presidential assassination attempts (and success) and the rise of Egypt's jihadists in the 1980s and 1990s evidences that movement makers had ample cultural and emotional material they could frame and use to encourage violence against an unjust government. Ghonim relayed that Egypt's activists had to work hard to keep people from reacting to repression with violence, echoing findings from Abu-Nimer (2000, 2001) and Isaac, et al., (2016) that during practice, suggesting the emotional materials that naturally drive violence were present. Indeed, several injustice frames of the January and February protests could have instigated violence if they resonated properly amidst other violence encouraging causes. Lynch (2014a, 9) observes:

> … mobilization also contained an element of emotion and anger; it was not simply the revelation of thresholds but the transformation of underlying preferences for and beliefs about the moral legitimacy of regimes. The demand for dignity and the shattering of the barrier of fear – two slogans often heard – speak more about changing identities and values than about updating calculations of risk and opportunity.

Egypt's 25 January protests demanded "bread, freedom, dignity and social justice." These demands

rang throughout Tahrir Square and many Egyptian cities' streets. The calls for 'bread' and 'freedom'

without further specificity are unlikely drivers of violence. The 'bread' frame could have been interpreted

by some Egyptians to mean that the government was incapable of providing its citizens even the most

basic needs. Cairo championed socialism and the middle class, but failed to support either; instead

perpetuating a corrupt clientelist system favoring a few loyal elites. Whereas it may be argued that

relative deprivation and economic injustice instigates violence, the ubiquity of relative deprivation

without violence or even related activism suggests it is not a powerful driver of action. So, if depravation

does not drive action, what may? From a cultural structuration standpoint, Abdul Rauf (Abdul Rauf 2015,

47-61) finds that Muslims in general require a government protect its allegiant community through

consultation and fulfillment of just and fair jurisprudence, and part of just governance is economic (Abdul

Rauf 2015, 56, 73-74).,[202] Egyptian Muslims may have viewed Egypt's decades-long economic decline

and failure to provide economically[203] as an endemic injustice in the structure. Economic injustice was so

bad that Cairo required either severe reform (likely the majority of Egyptians) or a complete

reconstruction (found in the demands that Islam be central to government).

That Egyptians demanded freedom indicated they believed they were repressed. Freedom is a

largely universal but somewhat vague call to action. The disagreements over the new Egyptian

constitution in 2012 following Mubarak's resignation indicate the Egyptian social construct of 'freedom'

was not universal (Owen 2014). Because the Egyptian meaning and understanding of 'freedom' was

structurated differently among its citizens (Adorno 2003, Bhaskar 2008, Norrie 2004), the desire for

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[202] Abdul Rauf's (2015) summary of what Muslims across the world believe are the fundamentals of good
governance is derived from his "Shariah Index Project" which was a six-year "working group of scholars
representing the spectrum of Islamic legal and political thought, including Sunni and Shi'i scholars of
jurisprudence" from numerous countries.
[203] See for example Zurayk's and Gough's (Zurayk and Gough 2014) analysis of Egypt's agricultural policies that
they claim drove its Arab Spring and Chalcraft's description of how Egypt's cultural counterhegemony was
incubated in and because of Cairo's policies that ballooned the lower classes (Chalcraft 2014).

'freedom' without an emotional modifier or further injustice specificity could not drive repertoire and action. Citizens' concurrent calls for dignity and social justice were just such modifiers.

Egyptian's calls for dignity and social justice probably partly informed repertoire formation and the movements' modes of contention. Dignity and its antithesis, humiliation, encourage or discourage violence, depending on how they are used. But, as Al Aswany describes (Al Aswany 2011), Egypt used humiliating repression successfully for years with only the victim or the victim's family responding out of cultural duty while others and onlookers bowed to their oppressors. For instance, Blaydes and Rubin (2008, 467-468) recount cases where a man's wife was dragged into the street in her nightclothes and arrested. The husband responded by killing the police officer responsible because he humiliated his wife. In another instance, the police removed an elderly man from his home, stripped him bare from the waist down, and beat him severely on the buttocks in plain public view. The police threatened to do the same to his daughter if he did not cooperate with their demands. But, during protests, Egyptians broke the yoke of fear with one citizen declaring they "would rather die in Tahrir Square than have [Mubarak] govern me and live in humiliation" (Pearlman 2013, p. 398). If humiliation stimulates violence, Egypt's Arab Spring movement makers had plenty government perpetrated humiliation to draw from and build frames to argue for violence.

Finally, Egyptians demanded "social justice." Justice is a concept similar to freedom, interpretable in myriad ways, but broadly refers to changes that require deep social reform that is often directed and supported by state structures (Al-Ali 2012). That Egyptians called specifically for "*social* justice" in their protest chants indicated citizens believed Cairo's injustices were symptomatic of Egypt's Cairo-centric and presidentially driven social structures. The injustices many citizens experienced could not be fixed by altering a few laws – structural change had to be vast and deep enough that Egypt's social structures would become just. As one Egyptian put it shortly after Mubarak's downfall, "Mubarak's biggest crime was not the billions that he stole. It was not even the millions of lives that he ruined, or the health of the Egyptians that was damaged from all the cancerous food that he imported, or from the poverty that he

subjected people to in the squatter neighborhoods. It was robbing us of our ideals, our morals. This was

his biggest crime" (Hamdy 2012, 46).

8.2: Why the Egyptian Movement Could Have Used Nonviolence

The following sections will show how SMT approaches could explain how certain factors could be

functionally teleologically *for the sake of* a nonviolent Egyptian Arab Spring.

8.2.1: SMT's Opportunity Analysis: Repression and Access *For The Sake Of* Seizing Opportunity and

Balancing Power

As noted above and in Chapters 1 and 5, SMT's opportunity analysis suggests that when citizens

see accesses opening and repression lessening, they are likely to adopt nonviolent modes of contention.

People choose to use (as goal directed behaviour) specific modes of contention *for the sake of* certain

goals that best achieve within their historically-derived lifeworld interpretations of likely institutional

responses to their methods carrying their messages. That the Egyptian revolution was called the

"Facebook revolution" and the successful Tunisian revolution named the "Twitter revolution" indicated

activists believed strongly in the power of citizen journalism though solidarity. Using online media to

support street protests, and with the example of Tunisia's revolution, social media gave Egyptians an

effective agentic access mechanism to change their country's power structure. Because Tunisia was the

only example, and it was successful, Egyptians held high hopes that they could replicate those events in

Cairo (Ghonim 2012, 74). Any indications that what worked in Tunisia was working in Egypt (e.g.

protests with minimal repression, allies in security services and other nation-states, etc.) likely drove

Egyptians to emulate what they saw, coupled with what they knew of Egyptian structures.

Egyptians likely understood their opportunities to affect change in large part by the actions of the

military and other security services vis-à-vis protesters. Probably partly because Mubarak failed to repress

the Arab Spring movement as he had political opposition in the past, Tahrir Square's activists remained

nonviolent and hopeful that nonviolence would achieve real change. Although Mubarak pushed back against protesters, the killed and arrested were small figures compared to the hundreds of thousands of protesters daily (News 2011b). Nonviolent protest continued in Egypt despite strong regime violence killing approximately 1,000 protesters and injuring thousands more in just a few weeks, indicating that a history of violence and intuitional violence does not necessitate violent reactions (Povey 2016, 149). However, Povey's (2016, 150) claim that Mubarak "tried every strategy to cling to power" and that he departed because nothing could stop the protests may overplay the agentic power of Egypt's activists. Mubarak indeed still had the option of increasing repression and violence if his forces would comply. Successful coercion requires the target audience receive a strong message relaying intensity and capacity to sustain and increase repression if necessary (Jakobsen 2007, Schelling 1966, Kalyvas 2009). Because Mubarak's efforts were too little too late, his attempts to drive protest down stirred further resistance. Patel, Bunce and Wolchik (2014) analyze that protesters' beliefs in their safety in their community's numbers and their abilities to mobilize rapidly and unexpectedly made them more confident they could demand real change while avoiding repression.[204]

In addition to Mubarak's failure to effectively coerce Egypt's Arab Spring movement, movement makers neutralized one of Cairo's key repressive mechanisms – the military. Activists accessing the military as a gateway to Mubarak likely held the perception that structural access was changing. Because Mubarak used military tribunals to control the populace and gave military elites' prominent political roles, the military's refusal to obey Mubarak signaled a shift in Cairo's repressive structure. If the military with its political influence and violent capacity remained neutral or even supportive of the protests, activists likely believed they could reform the injustices embedded in Mubarak's structure.

In addition to analyzing security services' actions, SMT's political opportunity approach analyzes legal and political policy opportunities and changes, especially where those changes are likely impactful

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[204] For a description of how Egyptians also used geography to circumvent repression see (Schwedler and King 2014).

in practice and not just 'authoritarian upgrading,' to use Hinnebusch's phrase. Leading up to the 25 January protests, Egyptians saw a potential for a shift in Egyptian state-level policy constrict due to Gamal Mubarak's impending assumption of the presidency after Hosni retired. The movement's calls for bread, dignity, freedom, and justice suggest Egyptians were fundamentally distressed by the regime's treatment of its citizens. Gamal's platform and expected changes for Egypt were evidently believed to be insufficient to legitimize the unjust government. Moreover, Gamal's change promises were probably widely perceived as empty. However, when Mubarak gave up his presidency and Gamal rescinded his candidacy, Egyptians likely saw access to executive-level politics as open as they had been in memorable history (Haaretz 2011). But only if the Mubaraks conceded the presidency would movement makers like the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed el-Baradei see Cairo's access mechanisms and power structure as malleable (Reuters 2011). Because the president was understood as the locus of Egyptian repression and power imbalance, the vacant position without an appointed successor for the first time since independence created a communal hope that Egypt could reform its institutions from the top-down (Abu-Nimer 2000, 120-121).

8.2.2: SMT's Network Analysis: Networks and Allies *For The Sake Of* Balancing Power

SMT's network analysis, deriving from McAdam's "Freedom Summer," Tarrow's "Power in Movement" and others,[205] look at how activists used frame and identity work to draw support from (usually preexisting) allies, especially where allies are not directly affected by the injustice and power imbalances. Often, the power of these allies determines not only the repertoire of the movement, but importantly the response of the movement's opposition. Whereas allies may create strength, they also force all parties to reconfigure their lifeworld and institutionally derived interpretations of what the likely end goals are and will become, and what the new rules of the dynamics of contention are. Mubarak suffered three key alliance shifts toward the anti-regime movement that likely informed his reaction

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[205] See also (Crossley 2002, Rucht 2012).

calculus. First, the military indicated it would not obey the president and supported citizens' rights to protest. Second, US President Obama directly told Mubarak that "an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful and it must begin now," which was relayed via mainstream news (News 2011b). And third, the military allied with Mubarak's key political opposition power holders, the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammed el-Baradei.

The first two of these alliance shifts happened in the successful Tunisian example, suggesting they should suffice to oust Mubarak. Further, the Islamists' and secularists' alliances solidarity against Mubarak and alliance with the military suggested that opposition political elites who had an insider's view of the system, probably believed they could reform the political structure as they. And because the Muslim Brotherhood's and el-Baradei's visions for political reform were so deep and broad, their alliance with the military and strong stance against Mubarak alone indicated they believed the president's departure would open the structure enough to make the changes they desired. Davies (2014) claims activists and their non-military allies misinterpreted the military's intentions. Regardless, Egyptians at the time believed they and their allies could reform the system into one that gave its people bread, dignity, freedom, and social justice. This belief made violence unnecessary.

Whereas many within Mubarak's security apparatuses remained loyal to the president, the military signaled it would not openly continue to do his bidding. Military commanders refused to fire on citizens and even allowed activists to include them in their protests (Henderson and Ganguly 2015, 51-52). The protesters seemed to read the army's neutrality in the streets as support, despite the continued military tribunals against thousands of activists in the months following the 25 January protests. Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces allied and cooperated with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists early in Egypt's uprising. Activists (rightfully) distrusted and protested the military's control over post-Mubarak reform, but allowed the Brotherhood and other Islamists to assuage their fears that not enough would change (Martini and Taylor 2011). The relationship between the military and the Islamists, whom

Egypt's citizens knew intended sweeping reforms for the political structure, intimated that the emerging power dynamics would shape a structure very different from Egypt's 'presidents for life' (Owen 2012).

The US alliance signals also shaped Egyptians' beliefs about the possibility, type, and depth of change they could hope for from their efforts (Lesch and Haas 2012). US rhetoric concerning political reform began with then President Obama's 2009 Cairo speech calling for "justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings" (Gerges 2012, 4). In the early days of the protests, Obama called for Egypt's military and security services to protect its citizens, and for the Egyptian government to immediately embrace and enact the people's desired change. On 4 February, Obama urged Mubarak to negotiate with "a broad representation of the Egyptian opposition" and "address the legitimate grievances of those who seek a better future." However, US special envoy Frank Wisner suggested on 5 February 2011 that Mubarak should remain in power during Egypt's transition. Shortly after, on 11 February Obama reiterated his encouragement to the military to maintain a peaceful transition following Mubarak's decision to step down (Dreyfuss 2011). Whereas the US did not state it would militarily back Egypt's protesters, the administration's largely consistent message to the military, the people, and the government insinuated it would maintain its good relationship with Egypt's military as long as it acted in the civilians' interests (Stein 2012, 48-50, 54-55). Other international powers indicated a waning support for Mubarak as well (Henderson and Ganguly 2015, 50-51). The close US relationship with the Egyptian military and rejection of Mubarak projected a power shift to Egypt's protestors and military commanders.

8.2.3: SMT's Identity Analysis: Identity *For The Sake Of* Consensus and Community Building

Identity analysis is a key approach in SMT scholarship as noted in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 3 especially regarding McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly's "Dynamics of Contention" and it deserves attention in understanding how the Arab Spring movements' identities partly drove nonviolence or violence. However, rather than explaining *how* these movements used identity work to generate participants, I use it to describe *how* movements created communal inroads or barriers as contentious politicking mechanisms

for the sake of their societies' justice and power institutions and praxis. Egypt's Arab Spring allies and frames indicated the inclusivity of the social movement's identity. Protesters were largely Egypt's Sunni middle and lower-class citizens and the 'lumpen intelligentsia' of Egypt's cities. The government and the military were staffed by the same religious, ethnic, and class identities as the protesting Egyptians. The alliance between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood suggested that Egypt's unsatisfactory structure was not the military's fault. Moreover, the military's promise to ensure truly democratic elections free from Mubarak's traditional repressive use of the military to sway votes (El Rashidi 2013, 56-57, Wickham 2013, 148-169) made deep structural reform seem viable and real. Accordingly, there was a lack of othering frames beyond staunchly excluding a corrupt and neglectful Mubarak. The unifying identity work messages that existed before and during the revolution like 'We are all Khaled Said' and "We are Egyptian youth who love one another, care for one another, and have a voice" are emblematic of the movement's inclusivity and belief of collective Egyptian agency (Ghonim 2012, 74-92).

If Egypt's citizens believed sociopolitical change required violence, we would have likely seen some form of othering emerge. Recall that political violence in Egypt came mostly from hardline Salafi jihadis, often splintering from nonviolent groups. Jihadi groups used *takfir* to construct the Egyptian state power-holders as the 'other' apostate offenders of Islam who must be destroyed because their offense is irredeemable and destructive to society, and the gradual change hoped for by moderate Islamists was unacceptable (Ayoob 2006, 9-10; Dalacoura 2018, 319). A Salafi jihadi bent could have re-emerged, as in the 1980s and 1990s, as those who desired an Islam-centric form of governance likely saw the entire Egyptian structure, not just the president, as being irreparable and incongruent with a Salafi society. As a moderating factor, Hamid and Mandaville (2018, 13) argue, "the strength of mass-based Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, can make it more difficult for Salafi organizations to gain traction (since they are often appealing to the same conservative constituencies)." Because reform did not appear to require violence, because Egyptians of all sociopolitical walks believed the new military/Muslim Brotherhood/US-backed structure of democracy would guarantee access to effect

executive-level change, othering remained minimal and nonviolence sustained. Egyptians of all kinds of religiosity and political currents likely hoped they and their inclusive movements that collectively represented the majority of society could drive the kind and depth of change they believed good and necessary.

8.2.4: SMT's Frame Analysis: Frames Forming and Using Culture and Emotions *For The Sake Of* Generating Hope, Increasing Access

Social movement frames often describe what they want and sometimes indicate *how* they want to achieve it; but, analyzing frames in context helps explain *why* movements are acting when, where and against what they do act. The Egyptian lifeworld at the point of the 2011 revolution remained a time and place where political opposition and activism was still believed to be dangerous and should be avoided. However, political opposition was not without precedented minor victories. Although Ghonim relayed the sentiment of his friends and families who feared opposing the regime, many Egyptians, including Ghonim, regularly openly demonstrated. Fear deterred some whereas the immediate social and emotional gratification of protesting and hope for political rewards made activism rewarding enough for others to chance repression (2012). Indeed, regular protest activity suggested Cairo tacitly allowed activism if it supported Mubarak's policies or at least did not concern domestic politics. El Rashidi (El Rashidi 2013, 52) recounts how in Cairo, "there would be days, sometimes months, when there would suddenly emerge glimmers of some promise of change. The pace would quicken, energy would mount, momentum would build." In some cases political protest helped change legislation (El-Mahdi 2009, 52). The mixture of fear and hope found in Egyptian protesters' frames and post-event descriptions of their environments very likely pervaded Egyptian society concerning politics and protest in January 2011.

In addition, Egyptians understood how Cairo framed its position vis-à-vis the movement's demands through its physical responses, relying upon its decades-old security-services' repression. By interpreting repression and access as frames with Mubarak's actions speaking much louder than his empty words,

Egyptians engaged in a very active performative discourse. As noted above, many Egyptians experienced or closely witnessed Cairo's humiliating repression either directly through security services acts or indirectly through the government's policies that kept so many in jobs and a class they believe was below their social and educational status. Interestingly, although the military and security services were the arm of Mubarak's humiliating actions, fueled by Egypt's tacitly allowed corruption that added insult to injury, protesters did not overwhelmingly blame anyone other than Mubarak. This suggests that the target of protest indicates the type of dissatisfaction and dissent of the protesters. The general lack of violence against police and military personnel suggests that Egyptians focused less on the humiliating execution of political policy and more on hope that they could change the root causes. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood highlighted that Egypt's laws only required few adjustments, the removal of the Emergency Law and the denial of political competition as the key offenses, to make Egypt just again (Wickham 2013, 187). Egyptians seemed to hope that changing the president would "[break] down the hierarchy of human relations and oppression" and change the power structure, altogether reforming structure/agent power relationships and alleviating the pervasive humiliating security services praxis.[206] Where relationships can still exist if it is believed they can be reformed enough, nonviolence can maintain. The practice of protest and the accompanying hope that the impossible – ousting Mubarak – could happen (Dennis et al. 2011, Tarrow 1995, Nepstad and Smith 2001, 163), likely temporarily displaced the violence inciting emotions of humiliation and anger.

Egyptians may have recalled Islamist violence against the regime and surmised that violence would likely incite repression and risk losing their military ally, which in the Tunisian example and indeed Egypt's own history, seemed key to removing the president. The frames promoting unity, hope, and love indicated Egyptians wanted to rebuild their nation with the military as a partner.

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[206] This is the key argument of Galián's (2015) anarchism theory of Egypt's Arab Spring; quote on p. 352.

Here it is useful to point out the parallel that researchers have drawn between Egypt's nonviolent revolution and Tunisia's and the differences in the eventual political power outcomes. Both movements convinced the military to disobey executive orders to violently repress protesters. Moreover, the military in both cases showed solidarity with the opposition. Given the successful ousting of Ben Ali, the Egyptian alliance with the military gave Egyptians great hope that they could effect the same. However, in Tunisia Ben 'Ali and his predecessor Bourguiba kept the military weak, financially and politically favoring and using other security services and government sectors for physical, economic, and social repression. In Tunisia, the military was largely outside the power and injustice structure. So, if the military in Tunisia helped wrest power from the incumbent regime, it would be well placed to reallocate power and justice from the other security services. Tunisia's military was less likely to keep the status quo structure and more likely to effect structural justice and power changes that satisfy ontological imperatives. The Egyptian military, on the other hand, was an integral part of the president's corrupt political power structure, so significant structural change threatened the Egyptian military power holders far more than Tunisia's. This may explain why Egypt's democracy lasted only one year before the military seized power from Morsi in 2013 (Tahhan 2018).

8.3: Why the Syrian Movement Could Have Used Nonviolence

The following sections will show how SMT approaches could explain how certain factors could be functionally teleologically *for the sake of* a nonviolent Syrian Arab Spring.

8.3.1: SMT's Opportunity Analysis: Repression and Access *For The Sake Of* Seizing Political Opportunity to Effect Justice

The Syrian context access and repression lifeworld understandings was different from Egyptians and likely drove Syrian groups to sway between nonviolent and violent modes of contention. Decisions about modes of contention *for the sake of* Syrian goals were derived from a different history and

lifeworld-derived predictions of institutional responses. The regime's rhetoric indicated it would give

some access opportunities while its actions painted a somewhat different story, prompting Syrians to look

beyond their borders to create opportunities to affect change. Like Egypt, Syrian activists capitalized upon

citizen journalism, the internet, and social media platforms to describe and show their plight. Citizens

used video-capable phones, sometimes smuggled in, to capture state repression against activists, as noted

above. This platform for voicing grievances to Syrians and the international community broke the

perception of al-Asad's omnipotence. Lynch (Lynch 2014b) describes how new media helps create the

perception of opportunities, push the issue of contention and violent repression of citizens into the public

sphere, and drive regimes to act according to their allies norms or risk losing their allies. Hacktivists

assisting and supporting Syrians helped circumvent the Syrian Electronic Army's efforts (Hinnebusch

2012, 107, Khamis, Gold, and Vaughn 2012, 9-17, Khosrokhavar 2012, 157). International media outlets

republishing citizen journalism gave activists access that undoubtedly reformed Syrians' understanding of

agency and power structures (Filiu 2011, 89, Hinnebusch 2012, 104), almost certainly fomenting hope

they could ally with domestic and international powers to nonviolently effect change.

Throughout Syria's 2011 Arab Spring protests Bashar conceded several key demands as detailed

above, indicating nonviolent protests were working. Dismissing several key government figures indicated

Bashar's commitment to institutionally addressing some Syrians' grievances. Bashar's end to the

Emergency Law would likely have given Syrians hope that the government was reforming its repressive

practices and granting agentic access through nongovernment channels if the government's actions were

not hypocritical. The reality of regime practices probably made citizens severely skeptical of Bashar's

structural reform rhetoric. Damascus' releasing political prisoners and activists and the concurrent arrests

of others also probably indicated similar disparity between policy and praxis. However, Syria was similar

to Egypt's nonviolent revolution where government repression and violence accompanied Mubarak's

promised reforms. Eventual violence may have been a function of Bashar's longer use of obvious

hypocritical authoritarian upgrading practices in 2011 that made Syrians eventually lose hope in

nonviolence's effectiveness. But, as authoritarian upgrading has been used to stymie opposition for decades, Bashar's practices were likely to have done little to encourage nonviolence or attenuate opposition, absent other factors.

8.3.2: SMT's Network Analysis: Networks and Allies *For The Sake Of* Shifting Power Structures

As noted above, it would be difficult to analyze Syria's Arab Spring political opportunities absent an analysis of the networks and allies the opposition (and the regime) sought to encourage or discourage from the fight. The Syrian social movement had few opportunities to gain powerful domestic allies. Political opposition to Bashar was lacking, and Syria's diverse demography made it so that a successful movement must involve a cross-section of Syrian society. Its hopes to secure disaffected military composed largely of non-Alawite soldiers seemed a good potential for mimicking the Egyptian and Tunisian examples, especially given the strength of Syria's military forces. Moreover, although most Syrian activists initially did not want international intervention, Western powers still voiced support. The Syrian uprising's diversity, military defections, and international allies probably helped drive the movement's nonviolent repertoire, at least until those causes were counteracted by others.

The Syrian social movement had few established nonviolent groups to network from. Unlike Egypt, Syria lacked high levels of activism from liberal movements like Kefaya! or an endemic counterhegemonic organization like the Muslim Brotherhood, which Syria decimated and drove underground following the 1982 Hama uprising and massacre. Established domestic nonviolent groups were largely informal, like the civil society movement or Islamist charities in some of Syria's cities. As such, Syrian protests were engendered by diverse ethnicities and ideologies where historical differences were set aside in favor of a holistic Syrian social movement against common injustices (Kahf 2011). The inclusivity of Syria's diverse social movement partly should have encouraged nonviolent contention (Opotow, Gerson, and Woodside 2005).

Nonviolence likely seemed a viable option to Syrians when powerful domestic (military) and international allies supported reform. In Egypt and Tunisia where the military ignored the president's power and refused to turn on the protesters and the West rejected the president nonviolence triumphed. In Syria, some military defections occurred, which could have signaled that the military was not completely loyal, especially the majority Sunni soldiers, and may eventually support protesters, which could have encouraged nonviolence to continue (Nepstad 2013). However, military defections and insubordination never reached the scale seen in Egypt or Tunisia (Donker 2012).

The unsure positions of international allies proved especially problematic and influential on Syrian dynamics and modes of contention in 2011. As noted in Chapter 7, the US and other nations vacillated on the type and level of support they intended for Syria's Arab Spring. Top military officers dismissed by Bashar and subsequently allied with the anti-regime movement signaled that at least some of Syria's military commanders supported the revolution (Hinnebusch 2012, 99, 2008, Gambill 2002). The US Ambassador's and French Ambassador's protests with Syrians in Hama in July 2011 signaled Western solidarity with the anti-Assad movement (Times 2011). Also, several top US officials warned Bashar concerning his violent tactics against protesters (French 2012, Mohammaed 2011) and urged him to address "the legitimate demands of the Syrian people" (Goodenough 2011). US sanctions against Syria further strengthened the perception that the US would back Syria's citizens' demands (French 2012, Goodenough 2011, Times 2011). In Egypt and Tunisia, overt political support by powerful Western nations effected a peaceful removal of their presidents, likely indicating strong Western support could drive the same change. Meanwhile, Syria's state media machine framed international involvement in Arab governments as a "fearsome model" that "led to Libya's fragmentation, uninhibited tribalism, and a dramatic lack of security" (Heydemann and Leenders 2014, 84).

<u>8.3.3: SMT's Frame Analysis: Culture and Emotions *For The Sake Of* Consensus Building and Shifting Power Structures</u>

Syrians experienced less historical praxis of opposition dynamics against the regime's institutions than Egyptians and consequently had less defined and shallower oppositional frames than its Egyptian counterparts to draw upon. Accordingly, Syria's protest frames were either extremely vague or extremely specific, and initially focused on policy reform rather than deeper demands like Egyptians' calls for social justice. Syria's movement makers used universal injustice frames that should have created a sense of unity and consensus across regions and identities, even in the face of regime attempts to discredit protesters by claiming protests represented a small group of sectarian radicals (Khosrokhavar 2012, 218, Macleod 2011). Each protest location demanded certain local changes, but the overarching message was universal. Syrians wanted policy changes that lightened Damascus' security services' hand upon the population. These unifying and inclusive frames should have encouraged the movement to lean toward nonviolence.

Activists' initial overarching demand from Bashar was 'freedom,' with little further specificity. For example, when Bashar promised to reform Kurdish citizenship laws, Syria's Kurds called for "freedom, not citizenship" (Times 2011, MacFarquhar and Stack 2011). Because the concept of 'freedom' is a social construct (Adorno 2003, Bhaskar 2008a, Norrie 2004) and means different things to each of Syria's local populations, acceptable changes for the entire populace is difficult to discern and enact. Droz-Vincent (Droz-Vincent 2014) highlights Syrian's extended 'freedom' frames to more localized and specific injustice frames, effectively unifying different religious and ethnic sects. The Syrian movement used universal injustice frames to incite enough of the populace with messages that resonated at the ideological, local political, and personal levels that the mass of protest could shift the balance for power and agency in favor of the citizens.

Personal accounts of activism in Syria indicate that the act of protest reformed citizens' perceptions of the structure, its repressive capacity, and reduced the emotional climate of fear and

humiliation. Protest then in the Syrian context was partly an end in itself – the act of protest was *for the sake of* satisfying citizens' personal and social desires to stand up to the regime and regain respect. The Syrian emotional climate approaching and into the Arab Spring was trepidatious where citizens believed achieving freedom was more difficult than in Egypt and Tunisia (Pearlman 2013). But Syrian protests throughout 2011 reconfigured activists' structure perceptions and shifted the social emotional climate from fear to hope. One Syrian relayed that the act of nonviolent protest was enough for "you visualize all the walls of fear and the markers of humiliation falling… because for the first time you can hear your voice" (Pearlman 2013, 309). Another activist described the protest climate as 'confident' following the 18 August Western powers' demands for Bashar to step down (Bakri 2011). By shifting the disenfranchised Syrian emotional climate toward hope and confidence, Syrians rethought activism's agentic capacity to reform the extant power structures.

8.3.4: SMT's Identity Analysis: Identity Work *For The Sake Of* Consensus Building

Several unifying identity work mechanisms emerged in the Syrian uprising. First, protesters declaring "the Syrian people will not be humiliated" indicated activists wanted to emotionally bridge every citizen who experienced repression and regime violence (Leenders 2012). Second, the Kurds' initial refusal to participate in the Syrian Arab Spring because they adhered to the Syrian identity, only wanted a peaceful introduction of freedom, and claimed the revolution was an Arab event evidenced the ingrained Hafiz ideological legacy of Syrian-national *assabiyya* (Starr 2012). Kurdish leaders may have hoped to capitalize upon their Syrian loyalty to secure greater citizenship rights following Bashar's conflict with the protesters, but Kurds at the time possibly also believed in and would have maintained their Syrian identity if Bashar rewarded them accordingly. Third, that some from Bashar's Alawite sect joined protests chanting, "One, one, one, the Syrian people are one" where activists "hugged each other, Sunnis and Alawites " (Kahf 2011) indicated protesting Bashar's repression had a unifying effect superseding sectarian cleavages. With the sum of Syria's movement makers' identity work that tried to include all

Syrian citizens in their quest for dignity through reformed justice and power institutional structures and praxis, the Syrian Arab Spring identity could have driven the movement to remain nonviolent. Despite positive emotions and unifying identity work from Syria's movement makers, Syria's Arab Spring eventually turned violent.

8.4: Why the Syrian Movement Could Have Used Violence

The following sections will show how SMT approaches could explain how certain factors could be functionally teleologically *for the sake of* a violent Syrian Arab Spring.

8.4.1: SMT's Opportunity Analysis: Repression and Access *For The Sake Of* Seizing Opportunities to Effect Justice and Rebalance Power

Using a structuralist SMT political opportunity analysis, it is possible to see how Damascus' political and security institutions' signals that they were not really willing to change should have driven Syrians to use violence *for the sake of* forcing Syria's decision makers to reconsider the costs of fighting its own people. Moreover, as Bashar removed the Ba'athi political and economic institutional accesses, Syrians increasingly saw little opportunity to affect even their local and personal grievances. Syria's citizens seemed to tolerate Hafiz al-Asad's ruthless authoritarianism because he instituted an agentic access mechanism through the Ba'ath and provided relative social, political, and economic stability. Violent rebellion emerged in the late-1970s and early-1980s, but Hafiz crushed the opposition and redirected grievances back into Ba'ath channels. He supplemented his Ba'ath surveillance with strong and pervasive military mechanisms, state and informal intelligence apparatuses, police, and informants sniffing out political opposition for arrest and torture, exile, or death. In effect, Hafez's structure balanced repression with controlled and monitored political agency.

As overviewed in Chapter 7, Bashar diminished Hafiz's Ba'athi political access, opened and then closed political access to Islamists and citizens via global communication, and disenfranchised Syria's

middle and lower classes by reducing state support while favoring upper class desires and practices. Disempowering the Ba'ath system reformed Syria's power structure from Hafiz's quasi-socialist system to the loyal petit bourgeoisie structure flaunted elite influence as middle and lower classes lost their access. Although Bashar briefly opened access to Islamists to balance citizens' loss in state welfare, which probably reformed Syrians' conceptualization of 'stability' and a just state, he quickly and violently reneged when they gained too much political power (Pierret and Selvik 2009). Bashar attempted to balance his centralizing power shift by creating an emotional climate of fear in the populace through his metastasizing violent security services' and *Shibiha* thugs, despite the largely diminished Ba'athi surveillance mechanism. Throughout the 2000s, Bashar's policies shifted political access and the Syrian power structure, forcefully relegating many citizens, leaving them hopeless for a better life under Bashar.

It is also useful to analyze Syrian access to institutions in the form of the mass, broadcast internet communications platforms of social media and citizen journalism and the regime's response to citizens' attempts to create various kinds of political opportunities from their keyboards. Bashar sought to liberalize Syria by modernizing its communication infrastructure as part of his technocratic authoritarian upgrading policies. But Syria's citizen journalists and social movements used the internet and social media to contend with, highlight, and correct state-perpetrated injustices. Bashar responded by restricting access to communication platforms and used his Syrian Electronic Army to constrain online activism. But the relative anonymity the internet provided made Bashar incapable of repressing online activism as effectively as he could repress street protests and civil society gatherings. For the decade leading to the Arab Spring, Bashar's citizens saw their political agency constrict and repression either maintain or increase.

In the early phases of Syria's Arab Spring the movement shifted the power balance through the rhetoric aimed at challenging the extant structure/agent dialectic, at least on the surface. Syria's citizens initially demanded reforms, like lifting the 'state of emergency,' ending corruption, and liberalizing the political structure (Donker 2012, 12-14). They followed with more specific demands like dismantling the

security services, revising their jurisdictions and authorities, and releasing political prisoners (Times 2011, Marsh and Tisdall 2011). Bashar acquiesced to several demands, as noted above, indicating increased access and a power reconfiguration. Removing key personnel signaled affective executive-level access, but not an institutional structural access mechanism like the Ba'ath or free elections. Moreover, the state of emergency retraction with concurrent violence against protesters likely indicated that Bashar did not intend to allow citizens a mechanism to voice grievances through protest. Indeed, Bashar imprisoned the first person to apply for lawful protest (Marsh and Tisdall 2011), evidencing Bashar's decrees were still only ameliorative authoritarian upgrading attempts. Protesters subsequently shifted their calls for reform to demanding Bashar and his political positioned loyalists and family members step down (Khosrokhavar 2012, 207, 236, 244, Times 2011, Droz-Vincent 2014). In effect, Bashar's political liberalization rhetoric and repressive actions probably created a cycle of contention effect that signaled a quickly diminishing political opportunity and possibly threatened reduced agency once he reconsolidated power. The movement's power challenge followed by regime repression likely drove the movement to grasp the fleeting opportunity and, if necessary, destroy the structure altogether. Analyzing the aggregate political opportunity in Syria's Arab Spring, protesters apparently viewed the Bashar regime as incapable of reform, requiring it to completely dismantle *for the sake of* creating a new, just power structure.

8.4.2: SMT's Frame Analysis: Culture and Emotions *For The Sake Of* Satisfying Culturally Constructed and Emotions-Based Injustices

As described in Chapter 5, negative frames can drive violence to emerge from social movements. But, as seen in the case of Egypt, negative frames and the corresponding emotions may contribute to and even be necessary for violent repertoire emergence, but negative frames and emotions alone are not sufficient to drive violence in movements. Humiliation and dignity appeared in Syrian frames, but not as prominently as in Egypt. Leenders (Leenders 2015) provides evidence that Daraa's activists sought dignity through emancipation from Bashar's repression and were proud of their accomplishments,

suggesting emotional satisfaction for some protesters. However, Syria had long humiliated its rural Sunni and Kurdish populations through legislation and praxis that treated rural Syrians as second-class citizens and Kurds as intrinsically lesser than Arabs, possibly partially explaining Syria's Sunni Islamists' and Kurds' eventual turn to violence. However, as Gani (Gani 2014) points out,[207] the al-Asad's ability to frame Syria as the protector of a genuine Arab and Syrian identity surviving the encroaching glove of the West that thinly sheathed the hand of Israel made Syrian's more proud of their country than they were ready to allow Western assistance. The brutal and humiliating punishment of the al-Asad regimes was, in effect a lesser evil than taking the hand of the West. Egypt, for its accords with Washington and Israel, could not claim the same pride of resistance. Still, it seems Syrians had a breaking point and Bramsen and Poder posit that the feelings of indignation and humiliation in the Syrian (and Egyptian) context eventually became unbearable and drove action (Bramsen and Poder 2014), and where humiliation continued, violence emerged.

8.4.3: SMT's Network Analysis: Networks and Allies *For The Sake Of* Breaking Down Power Structures

As noted by McAdam's (1990) "Freedom Summer" analysis of network activation, people will seek to draw existing allies into their contention before seeking unrelated allies. However, Donker finds Syrians had a general lack of mobilization through networks because Syria's protesters did not have many politically inclined organizations to link to and pull from. He notes that many networks that built the revolution were formed during protests (Donker 2012). This left protesters with two remaining allies that seemed to work in Egypt and Tunisia: the military and international powers.

Activists had less success in accessing and convincing the Syria military writ large to allow their extra-legislative push for the president to make changes or step down, although defections did bolster the eventual violent insurgency's ranks. Since Hafiz's 1970 coup, the Alawite minority ran Syria's military,

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[207] See also Lesch (2012) for a description of the origins of Syria's turn away from the U.S..

which was diversely staffed, including a heavy Sunni representation. Syria's military had a potential for

sectarian fracture since its inception, held together by Hafiz's and Bashar's economic military service

incentivization through clientelism. Sunni's were the majority defectors in the Arab Spring and

subsequently ran most local coordination committees and the FSA. That some Alawites began defecting

from the Hafiz's carefully cultivated Alawite-run military (Springborg 2014, 147) undoubtedly shook

Bashar. But defections were limited, and Bashar still wielded the military to kill and otherwise repress

protesters (Donker 2012, Nepstad 2013). Additionally, Bashar's non-military security services were

arguably as powerful as the military, making social movement alliance with the potentially fractious

military of limited effectiveness. The divisions in the military may explain part of the tun to violence. But

the turn to violence it is probably less a function of sectarian othering and power struggles, and due more

to defectors' intimate understanding of the rigidity of the remaining al-Asad power structure.

Syria's protesters initially rejected foreign interference, and international powers remained out of

the conflict for a while. But Western support signals seemed to bolster activists' hope and resolve, and

eventually partly affected the turn to violence. Western policymakers, especially US legislators and state

representatives, supported protesters' demands on the al-Asad regime. However, mixed messages from

the US that oscillated between calling Bashar a partner and a reformer, to supporting protesters

'legitimate' claims against the regime, to decrying anti-movement violence, to signaling it would

militarily support the movement, sent mixed signals to Syria's Arab Spring movement makers. When

President Obama and several other Western leaders called for Bashar to step down in August 2011, the

emotional climate shifted somewhat from fear to confidence, suggesting protesters believed and hoped

they could convince Bashar to step down. However, as Bashar staunchly refused to leave, backed by

Russia as a powerful international guarantor, reform seemed less likely. When foreign powers intimated

they would support the FSA (Krieg 2016), if unofficially, the movement shifted further toward violence.

Because Syrians could not secure a military ally that would guarantee peaceful agency, and the social and

political drivers that require a power and justice rebalance still existed, the movement used its international allies' support to violently force Bashar out.

8.4.4: SMT's Identity Analysis: Identity *For The Sake Of* Creating Divisions

As noted above, Syria's protesters worked to build a national and unified opposition identity likely because, like Hafiz did, activists realized Syria's peoples had plenty of differing ethnic, economic, and religious identities. If the movement had cracks, the regime would exploit them. Othering was easier in Syria than in Egypt. Hafiz al-Asad created a sense of national Syrian unity devoid of religious and ethnic sectarianism, despite his marginalizing Syria's Sunnis, Islamists, and Kurds. Hafiz's Syrian nationalist rhetoric, his state welfare mechanisms that provided basic services to most Syrians, and his championing the Syrian middle class seemed to reduce the perception of state-perpetrated sectarian favoritism. However, Bashar further excluded Sunnis from his government and military and increased the divide between the upper class and the middle and lower-class identity groups. Worse, Bashar's policy shifts toward Islamists in the mid- to late-2000s drove a further identity wedge between Syria's Sunni population and the regime. Bashar's maintenance of his father's policies toward the Kurds may account for their initial abstinence from the fray. Although the Kurds were a structurally disadvantaged identity group, their lifeworld of relative disadvantage remained constant. But, once protesters realized that Bashar would not sufficiently reform Syria, Sunnis and Kurds easily created identity-based groups *for the sake of* destroying Bashar's offensive government to establish a new, balanced power and justice structure that would serve their individual purposes. It became clear that Hafiz's work and Syrian protesters' work to create unifying identities could be easily undermined by those who sought to exploit the longstanding underlying identity divisions and the identity-base inequities in Syrian society.

8.5: What Social Movement Nonviolence and Violence are Naturally Teleologically *For The Sake Of*

I have explored the cases of Egypt's and Syria's Arab Spring revolutions and sought what determines drove the movements' modes of contention toward nonviolence or violence. I found that nonviolence emerged from: cultural constructs of justice through nonviolence; positive emotions like hope and pride derived from action; unifying identity work; alliances with actors using nonviolence; and agentic access or opening political opportunity. Conversely, I found that violence emerged from: cultural constructs requiring violence for justice; negative emotions like humiliation, shame, guilt, and hopelessness; othering identity work; alliances with violent actors; and closed access, repression or closing political opportunity. Exploring these in the contexts of Egypt and Syria, I found one further final cause of social movement nonviolence and violence that wound through everything. That is, nonviolence is *for the sake of* change where it is sufficient to reform the offensive structure, and violence is *for the sake of* change where the offensive structure must be destroyed and built anew because sufficient reform is perceived as improbable. I draw out this further final cause in a brief revisit of the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Spring cases.

8.5.1: Egypt: Nonviolence *For The Sake Of* Reforming Society's Balance of Community, Justice and Power

Egypt's nonviolent revolution and the movement-structure dynamics indicated Egyptians understood nonviolence was sufficient to change the regime. The cultural justice constructs, emotions, identity work, networks and alliances, and the access and repression dynamics combined to give protesters a sense that the structure was malleable. Whereas one could argue that Egyptians were wrong, evidenced by the short-lived democracy and return to authoritarian military rule a year after their first free elections, the revolution still vastly reformed the structure, if temporarily. Moreover, this indicates that

repertoire emergence is determined largely by underlying societal beliefs in the balance of its community, justice and power rather than by some objective measurement of what that balance should be.

Egypt's history of contention and Muslim Brotherhood-fostered cultural counterhegemony created the bedrock upon which the revolution was constructed. Egyptians learned that violence against the regime only returned sweeping repression, justified by Cairo to protect Egypt's security. The only winners in Egypt's violent contention was the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1990s that helped deradicalize violent jihadists. The Brotherhood used its limited favor with Mubarak and its freedom to operate unofficially in the periphery, providing economic, spiritual and emotional support where Cairo could not. The group built a counterhegemony and political operating space that spoke to the ideologies and emotions of many Egyptians, further reforming their lifeworld to reject the regime's projected culture, ideals, and power praxis.

Several key drivers of repertoire determination *for the sake of* community, power, and justice shifts in the form of culture, emotions, identities, alliances, and political opportunities combined in a way that nonviolence emerged as the method for effecting state-level change. Egyptians likely believed that violence was ineffectual and generally unjust based on their experiences with domestic jihadist groups. The Islamist violence perpetrated by Gamma Islamiyyah and EIJ that many Egyptians viewed as repugnant, coupled with the Muslim Brotherhood's role in deradicalization and creeping government power suggested that nonviolence was sufficient to affect the kind of broad change Egyptians wanted. The Egyptian Arab Spring nonviolent protests using universal injustice frames were emblematic of their desire to reform the structure for all Egyptians, including those who made up the power holding structure and institutions that long repressed them. The regime-instilled negative emotions of humiliation, shame and guilt were in Egyptian society for decades leading up to the revolution through violence and intentional cultural taboo violations, but a feeling of pride in their nonviolent actions, hope for popular change like in Tunisia, and love for all Egyptians rang throughout discourse. Mubarak attempted to provoke identity fractures, securitizing protests as a threat to the country, but only succeeded in othering himself from the unifying Egyptian society. Egypt's Arab Spring found powerful allies in Western

governments that stopped backing Mubarak, the Egyptian military that guaranteed their safety, and the eventual alliance between the popular Muslim Brotherhood and the military. The combination signaled a coalition of Egypt's citizens, a key counterhegemony an existing power institution, and a very strong international guarantor. Through these alliances, disaffected Egyptians saw repression fade, opportunity and access to affect change, and a communality across the breadth of Egyptian society.

8.5.2: Syria: Violence *For The Sake Of* Breaking Down Before Rebuilding Society's Balance of Community, Justice and Power

The Syrian sociopolitical lifeworld lacked the same kind of counterhegemony and access mechanisms as Egyptians had through the Muslim Brotherhood and local governance bodies. Hafiz's use of the Ba'ath party was an effective constraining and enabling mechanism for much of the Syrian populace. Bashar's diminution of the Ba'ath removed that agentic access and likely drove many Syrians to seek extra-governmental power mechanisms, simultaneously removing a key intelligence and coercion mechanism. Because Syrians did not have a longstanding alternative to affect structural agency or a culture of resistance like Egypt's movements, their Arab Spring movement suffered from a lack of unity. Syrians came together in protest, but ethnic, religious, and class divisions remained too stark to be overcome by unifying frames that espoused a common intuitive understanding of what, in general, better community, justice, and power would look like. Just as importantly, Hafiz used official policy changes and the military to maintain his father's authoritarian upgrading practices throughout 2011, signaling the structure remained quite under control.

Syria's Arab Spring that aimed to reconfigure community, power, and justice was engendered by many of the same material causes as Egypt - culture, emotions, identities, alliances, and political opportunities. The difference is in the forms and efficient causal actions surrounding those materials. Syrian culture lacked the same activist lifeworld praxis that Egyptians lived for decades, with Bashar's repressive means and practices growing as he consolidated power. Syrians saw distributive justice diminish under Bashar who repressed and humiliated the populace and provided less for his people than

Hafiz. It seems Hafiz understood the danger of Syria's centuries' old ethnic and religious identity differences and hostility, while Bashar ignored Hafiz's unifying, if tyrannically implemented, Ba'athi system that championed Syrian nationalism above all else. Once Bashar shifted policy and ostracized Sunni middle-lower classes and further repressed Islamists, Syria's Sunni's became an outgroup. Kurds were always an outgroup, just repressed effectively through Hafiz's policies and identity conformity practices. And while Egyptians saw the West as a guarantor of nonviolent change in Tunisia, Syrians saw the West as a military ally that destroyed the stolid Libyan regime so that Libyans could rebuild it themselves. The examples across the Arab world undoubtedly instilled a 'moment of madness' sense in Syria, and Bashar's policy changes and protest allowance in some instances may have excited a sense of agency in some Syrians. But his continued military and security forces' repression against his people, contradicting his new policies and rhetoric, signaled neither he nor his government were going to change much for the better, and that things may worsen, shifting emotions from hope to hopelessness that the structure could evolve. Without a long-standing positive, unifying means to change the power holders and structure, especially with tentative allies, Bashar's tightening grip on power and widespread murderous repression indicated he did not intend real power distribution and justice practice change. With Syria's 2011 emotional and political climate of increased repression with little hope for gaining domestic allies in the current structure, Syrians came to understand real power and justice changes for Syrian society could only come from destroying the extant structure and building it anew.

Although nonviolent reform in Syria may have been possible had Bashar stepped aside, the nature of Syria's structure-perpetrated social injustices that were endemic to much more than Bashar alone made violence much more likely than nonviolence in any case. If Bashar stepped aside, would Syria's Arab Spring have remained nonviolent? Was a free, democratic election of a new head of state truly the minimum power rebalance and injustice correction measure? The examples of Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt suggest that removing the head of state can satisfy a revolutionary movement, at least temporarily (Davies 2014). Or, were Syria's power and justice imbalances concerning sects that the structure in place had 'othered' for decades so deeply embedded that Syria's Sunnis and Kurds required more than a new head

of state? The continued nonviolent groups' efforts in Syria throughout the civil war suggest that nonviolence was believed viable for some. But, Syria's Sunnis' and Kurds' eight-year strong and continuing commitment to the war, even with unsure alliances from the West, suggests that sufficient nonviolent reform required something much broader and deeper than a new president. Syria's demography and systemic social injustices drove violence, regardless of Bashar's removal, because the remaining structure would likely have been believed to still be unrepresentative of all Syrians, unjust, and would likely have a lingering power imbalance. Bashar's removal of the Ba'athi agentic power and justice institutions and his exacerbation of Syria's propensity to sectarian othering very likely created conditions that encouraged violence over nonviolent protest.

8.6: A Further Four Causes Synthesis

The above four causes can be further related to an even greater teleological chain of this *for the sake of* that. As such, I can synthesize the findings and analysis in Egypt's and Syria's Arab Springs into a simpler but still ontologically deep explanation. The cases of Egypt and Syria suggest that culture, emotions, identity, networks, and repression and accesses (material causes) shape interpretations (formal causes) of whether evolving or destroying and rebuilding the power holders and structure (efficient causes) is sufficient *for the sake of* achieving good communality, balanced power, and satisfying justice requirements (final cause). Accordingly:

Nonviolence emerges where –

    a) a social movement's lifeworld justice constructs determine nonviolent contention satisfies emotions and ideals offended by a power holder's practices, and

    b) the movement perceives the power holder or structure can and will sufficiently reform to stop offending those emotions and ideals.

Violence emerges where –

    a) a social movement's lifeworld justice constructs determine violent contention satisfies emotions and ideals offended by a power holder's practices, and

b) the movement perceives the power holder or structure cannot or will not sufficiently reform to stop offending those emotions and ideals, requiring the power holder or structure's removal before rebuilding.

Or, even simpler, nonviolence is *for the sake of* reforming where possible and violence is *for the sake of* destroying where necessary. If true, this supports Arendt's postulation that power is the structure of obedience and order whereas violence is a last resort that "appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power's disappearance" (Arendt, 1970, p. 56). Whereas Arendt was speaking from a structuralist perspective, the concept holds from an agent-centric view as well. Violence breaks down the power structure relationships that dominate and humiliate, opening the way for a new power configuration, which could be more or even less shared depending on the outcome of violence. Egypt's indications it would change its power structure and Syria's indications it would not change, and the resultant Egyptian nonviolent reform and Syrian violent revolution support this finding.

In Egypt and Syria, the movements called for Hosni Mubarak and Bashar al-Asad to step down, indicating at least the president had to change. But Egyptians determined they could leave most of the structure intact. The military representing structure-aligned power and security, and the Muslim Brotherhood representing grassroots social empowerment and change would work together to reform the government to satisfy Egypt's citizens' grievances. Egyptians' understanding that the structure could change was heavily informed by the relative lack of violent repression and the Muslim Brotherhood's history of making progress within the extant structure. Conversely, Syrians came to believe the structure must be destroyed before it could be rebuilt to justly represent its citizens. While Bashar made overtures, he refused to step down. Moreover, Bashar's severely repressive actions falsified his compromise discourse, showing Syrians that the power structure could not or would not change meet their emotional and ideological needs concerning justice, power, and communality. Bashar and his entire system must be replaced so that Syria's disempowered, disenfranchised, and relegated populaces could build a better state. The combination of these material, formal, and efficient causes interacting throughout the levels of causation effected Egypt's nonviolent and Syria's violent Arab Spring social movements.

Conclusion

<u>Key Contributions and Direction for Future Work</u>

As many scholars who I review in this thesis note, SMT and social sciences in general are very messy fields. In this thesis I have presented a means for making better analytical sense of SMT and, I hope, of social movements themselves. Kurki revived an Aristotelian 'four causes' causation as a means for deepening and broadening international relations scholarship. I built from Kurki's work and used Aristotle's final cause and the concepts of Natural and functional T/teleology as a guiding heuristic to think deeply about *why* social movements happen in the first place and then *why* things about social movements emerge in this or that form. I mapped these four causes into a model of causation that spans Naturalist Ontology, long-standing institutions, lifeworld structurations of social reality, agent intentionality and functional teleology, and actual observable events. While the model is still not simple, the final cause heuristic that underpins it all – constantly referring analysis back to what something is *for the sake of* – gives structure and focus to this complex field that is riddled with competing (which are sometimes complementary) hypotheses.

The original goal and intended contribution of this thesis was to help structure and focus SMT so that researchers could better use SMT analytical approaches to explain social movement phenomena more broadly and deeply. To do this, I needed to accomplish several intermediary steps that also contribute to our understanding of causation in social movements. First, I showed how we can broaden our understanding of what holistically composes social movement causation by using Aristotelian causation that considers what something is made of as a material cause, what it is formed like as formal cause, what actions are involved as efficient cause, and what it is *for the sake of* as final cause. Second, I argued for and showed how using teleology as a guiding heuristic structures and focuses SMT which includes numerous and often competing factors and approaches. Third, I borrowed from philosophy and sociology to create a model that included those four causes as affective at the Natural, institutional, lifeworld, functional, and observation levels of causation. Fourth, I posited three deep, Natural Ontological causes –

community, justice and power – that I argue are essential to much of what drives people to create and act within and against social movements. Finally, I used the model to analyze why a certain repertoire of contention emerges amidst and because of the above elements interacting, constraining and enabling throughout the striated levels of causation. This thesis and the central synthesis model not only helps structure and focus SMT, the underpinning final cause heuristic encourages researchers to think differently about understanding and explaining social movements.

To untangle causation in social movements, I needed to peel back the layers of the material, formal, efficient and final causes from observed events down to Natural forces that are essential drivers of human interaction. In Chapter 1 I described Aristotelian causation and began laying the groundwork for explaining how SMT approaches and broader sociology approaches and theories could use the four causes. But, Aristotelian causation and concepts of teleology did not fit immediately or neatly with SMT. To structure SMT into my final cause focused model, I needed to first tease out different kinds of teleological analysis – one of Nature and one of function – so that we do not conflate these two types of analysis. In Chapter 2, I furthered my discussions on final cause and teleology, distinguishing among Natural Teleology, functional teleology and 'goal directed behaviour,' describing how each are distinctly useful in causal analysis by social scientists leveraging different theoretical approaches. Turning to SMT in Chapter 3, I showed how existing attempts to synthesize and focus SMT furthered our understandings of social movements but did not result in any usable or used standard method. To begin deepening SMT, Chapter 4posited three Natural Ontological forces of community, justice and power that drive social movements to emerge *for the sake of* restoring societal balance, which is an undergirding final cause of social movements writ large.=. Following my work drawn largely from philosophy to explain and uncover the deep, Natural Ontological level of causation in social movements, Chapter 5 uses theories and concepts from Critical Realism, broader sociology, and SMT to complete the five-level model of causation in social movements. Finally, in the last three chapters I explored the question of why nonviolence or violence emerge as a social movement repertoire in the context of the Egyptian and Syrian Arab Springs. In Chapters 6 and 7, I analyzed institutional-level and lifeworld-level material, formal,

efficient and final causes of society in the decades preceding the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Syria. Chapter 8 is a comparative analysis of the functional teleology of the Egyptian and Syrian revolutions where agentic goal directed behaviour attempted to cause the changes they desired against structural institutional resistance, resulting in the outcomes we observed. Using existing SMT analyses and related research, I found that nonviolence emerges where the movement and those it represents believes progress through evolution can resolve imbalances in community, justice and power. Conversely, I found that violence emerges when relationships and structures need to be destroyed before institutions of balanced community, justice and power can be rebuilt anew. In summary, this thesis proposes a new model for causation analysis in social movements, posits some interesting findings about social movement repertoire of contention creation and emergence, and encourages social movement scholars to reconsider how we fundamentally think about social movement research and analysis.

The question '*why nonviolence or violence?*' is only one of many '*why?*' and '*how?*' questions this model can guide scholars in answering. Every analysis does not need to seek causal explanation at every level or include every SMT or other factor that may be salient and effective. What my SMT causal model does is to encourage the user to think of where their research fits within the broader SMT field and how their research can or does help explain deeper '*why?*' questions about social movements. Understanding what a social movement is made of, how it is formed, the actions it undertakes, and what it is *for the sake of* regarding the society it emerged from encourages our '*how?*' questions about frames, identities, networks, mobilization, etc. to seek deeper and broader '*why?*' causal implications. By seeking in what way even an acute '*how?*' causal explanation may part of a broader and deeper picture of the social movement in context, we make our analysis better and better for future SMT research to build upon.

I posit researchers can use this model as a basis for answering any 'how?' or 'why?' question about social movements, but there are two directions that are especially pertinent that would address two central contemporary concerns of social movement and domestic contention. First, to build from and test the specific 'why does nonviolence or violence emerge?' question, it would be useful to seek to understand

the emergence of terrorist violence as different from protest violence. Second, deepening the social movement nonviolence versus violence question using the prominent identity analysis focus from SMT may elucidate which type of identity work is symptomatic of which type of underlying or emerging repertoire.

Like SMT, terrorism studies is a loose compilation of myriad theories and approaches, all attempting to explain how terrorism occurs; indeed terrorism studies sometimes utilizes SMT.[208] Terrorism scholars seek to explain how people become involved in or leave terrorist groups,[209] what structure/agent dynamics drive people to turn to terrorism,[210] and what about a society or social group makes it inclined to use or experience terrorism.[211] Whereas understanding the phenomenon is inherently problematic, evidenced by a lack of an agreed upon definition of 'terrorism' (Schmid 2004), understanding and analyzing terrorist violence as inherently different from protest violence may uncover some broader and deeper causes of terrorist violence. The key assumption in a study seeking to explain types of violence is that terrorist violence is *for the sake of* something different from protest violence, evidenced by the different target – terrorists target the general civilian populace rather than protesters who often target people and entities representing the governing structures (Martin, McCarthy, and McPhail 2009). Researching the differences in social movement violence could elucidate what institutional mechanisms, lifeworld understandings, and what group intentions and goals drive people to use terrorist violence over other repertoires of contention.

A second future avenue is analyzing identity work in this model using a final cause heuristic concerning the emergence of nonviolence or violence in protest episodes. This direction would deepen the findings of this thesis and the very central identity analysis approach in SMT. Identity politics are central

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[208] See for examples (Snow and Byrd 2007, Meijer 2005, Gentry 2004, Della Porta 2012).
[209] See for examples (Singh 2013, Rubin 2010, McCauley and Moskalenko 2008, Cronin 2009, Crenshaw 1991, Bjørgo and Horgan 2009, Horgan 2008).
[210] See for examples (Trager and Zagorcheva 2006, Boyle 2008, Wilkinson 2006, Abrahms 2007, Aldrich 2009, Scheuer 2005, Sandler 1995, Lutz and Lutz 2010, Pedahzur 2006).
[211] See for examples (Meijer 2005, Krueger 2008, Blaydes and Rubin 2008, Steenkamp 2014, Gerlach 2010).

to much of SMT as noted throughout this thesis and identity politics are almost certainly a key cause of the repertoire of contention formation. Putting these analytical pieces together is difficult in many scenarios, but identity conflicts like ethnic or religious contention often seem to require violence to emerge *for the sake of* these identity-based teloses. Identity-oriented conflicts are emblematic of how violence emerges *for the sake of* destroying because the 'other' is offensive just by existing. We can observe this most readily in the case of strong othering where movement makers declare the ethnic, religious, or political identity that is inextricable from the power holder the source of the offense. Islamist violence used this discourse in Egypt and elsewhere in declaring governments *taghut*, *kuffar*, or apostate, assigning an identity so offensive to Islam that the government must be destroyed and replaced.[212] Cases of genocide are similar in that identity is constructed to justify annihilating the 'other.'[213] However, identity discourse must be understood as symptomatic of a perceived incompatibility and the violence the power holder and power structure praxis necessitate. Violence is not merely a movement concocting an identify for its tactical objectives. Rather, it is a movement finding the people representing that which is deleterious to communality, power, and justice can be categorized generally according to some particular identity that is believed intrinsic to their offenses. As Holslag (2015) finds, "one can only *solidify* a "Self" by destroying the "Other" in all its aspects: cultural, social and physical." Haas (2012, 518) notes that identity work can also amplify the intensity of conflict and drive violent foreign powers, "intervene on behalf of their religious, ethnic, or ideological brethren." Rather than searching for a reason to destroy, identity conflicts are likely a function of people searching for the reasons underlying their grievances and finding some common identity denominator. However, the hypothesis that exclusive and strong othering identity work portends violence requires further exploration.

This thesis is intended to provide a model and heuristic for structuring and focusing causal analysis in social movements that researchers can use to answer any question about how social movements form

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[212]See for examples (Al-Zawahiri et al. 1998, Gerges 2005, Kelsay and Johnson 1991, Romerijn-Stout 2010, Wiktorowicz 2004a).
[213] See for examples (Holslag 2015, Feierstein 2014, Gerlach 2010, Straus 2015).

and act or why they form and act. By using Aristotle's four causes to identify what things about the movement are important to the question and what forms those things take as they are actively causal toward some end we include all types of cause (material, formal, efficient and final) that need to be involved in analysis. Then, we use each of those elements to understand the full breadth and depth of causation a) because of our Natural social drives, b) because of the societal institutions we interact with and within, c) because of our lifeworld understandings of our environments, d) because of how intentional actions affect other actions, and e) because of what we observe. While this model is not as parsimonious as single SMT approaches or social theories, it is indeed a structured and focused method for analyzing all that composes complex social movement phenomena. Assessing the causal implications of social movement material, formal, efficient and final causes through five levels of causation may seem daunting, but there is elegance in the focus and clarity of referring each analytical string back to the guiding heuristic question, 'what is this ultimately *for the sake of*?'

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