Refugees unwelcome: Narcissistic and secure national commitment differentially predict collective action against immigrants and refugees

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Abstract

Two studies (N_1 = 193; N_2 = 598) were conducted in Poland to examine the role of two types of ingroup commitment (i.e., national narcissism and national identification) as predictors of attitudes towards immigrants and refugees (disadvantaged groups) and intentions to engage in collective action against them. As predicted, national narcissism (but not national identification) was related to more hostile intergroup attitudes and greater willingness to engage in collective action against refugees and immigrants. The positive effect of national narcissism on intentions to engage in collective action against immigrants and refugees was mediated by attitudes towards those groups. These results show that applying a more fine-grained approach to ingroup commitment (e.g., national narcissism vs. national identification) among advantaged group members allows for a better understanding of their intergroup attitudes and behavioral intentions to actively oppose the rights of disadvantaged social groups via collective action.

Keywords: Ingroup commitment; National narcissism; National identification; System-supporting collective action; Intergroup attitudes

Introduction

"Today immigrants, tomorrow terrorists!," chanted more than 5,000 people marching through Warsaw on September 12, 2015. The protesters gathered in the city center to demonstrate against accepting several thousands of asylum seekers that Polish government agreed for in response to the European refugee crisis. At the very same time, in a different part of the city, another event was taking place. The "Refugees welcome" rally, attended by about 1,000 individuals, aimed to show that, contrary to the popular belief, Polish society was ready to accept refugees fleeing the civil war in Syria. "Solidarity with all people," read banners held by the protesters (The Economist, 2015).

What motivated the participants of these two events to abandon their daily routines and take to the streets? Why do members of host societies find it necessary to engage in certain forms of political behavior to display their support or opposition toward newcomers? These questions are at least partially answered by social psychologists, who have been successful in determining the structural and psychological antecedents of collective action (see van Zomeren, 2016, for a review). However, not all types of advantaged groups' activism received the same degree of scholarly attention. Although past research identified a number of factors that facilitate solidarity-based collective action (e.g., Górska et al., 2020; Louis et al., 2020; Mallett et al., 2011; Russell, 2011), relatively little is known about the circumstances that prompt members of advantaged groups to engage against the interests of the disadvantaged (for exceptions see Osborne et al., 2019; Shepherd et al., 2018; Stefaniak et al., 2020; Thomas et al., 2020). Our goal was to address this gap by testing the role of two types of group commitment—national narcissism and national identification—in shaping advantaged social group members' engagement in collective action against disadvantaged groups.

Predictors of collective action against the disadvantaged

Collective action refers to activities undertaken in order to achieve political goals of a group, for example through protests or civil disobedience (van Zomeren, 2016; van Zomeren et al., 2018). These activities may be either normative (e.g., signing petitions, peaceful protests) or nonnormative (e.g., boycotts, violent protests; see Radke et al., 2020). While most collective action research focused on what motivates people to engage in collective action on behalf of their ingroups (see Thomas et al., 2020; van Zomeren et al., 2008), there is emerging, but much scarcer, literature on engagement on behalf of other groups (Radke et al., 2020). It demonstrates, among others, that members of advantaged groups engage in collective action on behalf of the disadvantaged when they genuinely want to improve the status of the latter. Such motivation is particularly likely when they recognize the illegitimacy of their own advantage (Saab et al., 2015), experience a sense of co-victimization and common identity with the disadvantaged (e.g., Subašić et al., 2011), and are not strongly identified with their ingroup (Lowery et al., 2006). Some advantaged group members might engage in collective action to help the disadvantaged but do so only to the extent that such help does not affect the overall intergroup hierarchy (Radke et al., 2020; Radke et al., 2018). Their engagement may also be a function of a personal cost-benefit calculation (e.g., van Zomeren & Spears, 2009) or their motivation to act in line with deeply held beliefs about what is right and wrong (e.g., Russell, 2011).

Research on collective action against outgroups is yet scarcer. This may be a serious neglect, since social movements do not typically operate in a vacuum. It is common that progressive social movements meet with counter movements, as is the case with the Black Lives Matter and All Lives Matter movements in the U.S. (Osborne et al., 2019), the pro- and anti-gender equality movements in Europe (Kuchar & Paternotte, 2017) or the anti- and pro-refugee protests in Germany (Al Jazeera, 2016). Thus, recent theorizing argues that besides support (or lack thereof) for *system challenging collective action*—that is activities that aim

to change the status quo (i.e., progressive movements that aim to reduce inequality; Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019)—it is necessary to investigate *system-supporting collective action*. This latter type of collective action captures people's engagement in activities that oppose social change and aim to preserve the existing intergroup hierarchies, for example through engagement *against* disadvantaged social groups (Hasbún López et al., 2019; Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019). Although system-supporting collective action relates to intergroup hostility (e.g., Stefaniak et al., 2020, Study 1), its political motivation to preserve the social and political status quo means that it goes beyond dislike of the outgroup(s) in order to realize the advantaged social group's political goals.

The likelihood of advantaged groups' members engagement in system-supporting collective action increases when they perceive intergroup relations as inherently antagonistic (Stefaniak et al., 2020), when they see themselves as native owners of their land (Selvanathan et al., 2021), when their perceptions of inequality decrease (Jost et al., 2017; Piff et al., 2018), when they hold more negative attitudes towards the disadvantaged (Shepherd et al., 2018; Stefaniak et al., 2020, Study 1), and when their advantaged ingroup identification increases (Osborne et al., 2019; Selvanathan et al., 2018; Thomas et al., 2020). Stronger ingroup identification among the advantaged groups motivates them to protect their ingroup (Ellemers et al., 2002) and its advantage (Osborne et al., 2019), though in an article by Ulug and Tropp (2021), identification related negatively to pro-racial justice collective action in only one of two studies. Weakly identified members of advantaged groups, in contrast, do not tend to have social identity protection concerns, and thus are more likely to acknowledge, feel guilty about, and challenge the illegitimacy of their advantage (Wohl et al., 2006). However, the existing research on advantaged group members' engagement in system-supporting collective action has not taken into account the existence of different types of group commitment (Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020).

Two types of group commitment and their relation with intergroup attitudes

Recent research and theorizing in the area of group identification shows that people may relate to their groups in at least two, qualitatively different ways. Crucially for the present research, the two types of group commitment—defensive and secure—show vastly different patterns of relations with indicators of intergroup hostility (Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020). Specifically, the defensive type of group commitment, which stems from the frustration of individual and collective needs, relates to more negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., Marchlewska et al., 2020). In contrast, secure group commitment, built on the foundations of secure self, does not necessarily lead to outgroup derogation. In fact, it emerged as a predictor of positive intergroup attitudes, also towards the largest immigration groups in a particular country (e.g., Marchlewska et al., 2020). In this work we focus on commitment to a particular group: one's nation. In line with previous research, we operationalize defensive national commitment as national narcissism (Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020)—a grandiose image of one's national group that is contingent on external recognition of its worth (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Secure (i.e., non-narcissistic) national commitment is defined as an unpretentious investment in the national ingroup, independent of the recognition of the group in the eyes of others (Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020).

Collective narcissism is linked to increased perceptions of threats to the ingroup (Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020). Consequently, collective narcissists are chronically predisposed to see outgroup members as threatening and conspiring against the ingroup (Marchlewska et al., 2019) and may resort to hostility and aggression in order to defend their ingroup from real or imagined enemies (e.g., Marchlewska et al., 2019). For instance, American national narcissism predicted prejudicial attitudes towards Chinese (Cai & Gries, 2013) and

undocumented Latinos in the U.S. (Lyons et al., 2013), while Polish national narcissism predicted anti-Semitism (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012) and prejudice towards ethnic minorities (Cichocka et al., 2017). Polish national narcissism was also negatively related to engagement in collective action in solidarity with disadvantaged groups (e.g., refugees), suggesting that those who commit to their advantaged group in a defensive way are generally less prone to respect minority rights (Górska et al., 2020). It also explains why national narcissists support populist leaders and parties that engage in stigmatization and exclusion, turning minorities into second-class citizens. In other words, national narcissism is associated with a general preference for anti-immigrant political rhetoric. For example, it was linked to support for Donald Trump in the U.S. (Federico & Golec de Zavala, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2018) and support for the conservative Law and Justice party in Poland (Marchlewska et al., 2018). National narcissism was also linked to support for leaving the European Union, with its explicitly pro-diversity policies, among Poles and Brits (Cisłak et al., 2020; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018).

Because collective narcissism assumes a positive evaluation of the ingroup, it is positively correlated with conventional measures of ingroup identification (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). However, when their overlap is co-varied out, we can observe the effects of a secure, non-narcissistic, ingroup commitment which is based on a strong individual self and associated with lower sensitivity to threats (Cichocka et al., 2017). For these reasons, secure national identification (free from the narcissistic components) is usually linked to more favorable outgroup attitudes (Cichocka et al., 2018). For instance, securely identified individuals reject beliefs in outgroup conspiracies and feel respect and trust towards outgroup members (Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020). Similarly, Górska et al. (2020; Study 3) found that

secure identifiers feel comfortable when interacting with outgroup members, which in turn relates to stronger group-based empathy.

With the exception of one article (Górska et al., 2020), research on collective action engagement has not investigated the potential predictive utility of differentiating the types of ingroup commitment. To address this gap, the present work analyzes the two distinct types of ingroup commitment as predictors of intergroup attitudes and the associated intentions to engage in system-supporting collective action. The two types of ingroup commitment show a distinct pattern of relations with attitudes towards outgroups (e.g., Marchlewska et al., 2020) and have been linked to engagement in system-challenging collective action (Górska et al., 2020). Based on those results, we expected that positive intergroup attitudes would be predicted negatively by narcissistic ingroup commitment (H1a) and positively by secure ingroup commitment (H1b) among advantaged group members. Moreover, we expected that, by predicting less positive intergroup attitudes, narcissistic ingroup commitment would have a positive indirect effect on intentions to engage in system-supporting collective action (H2). By contrast, secure ingroup commitment was expected to exert a negative indirect effect on willingness to engage in system-supporting engagement by predicting more positive intergroup attitudes (H3).

Overview of the present studies

To examine the associations between different types of ingroup commitment among advantaged group members and system-supporting collective action, two studies were conducted. Poles' willingness to engage in collective action against accepting immigrants and refugees (i.e., the disadvantaged groups) in Poland served as the context of our research. Poland is one of the most ethnically and culturally homogenous countries in Europe and at the same time it is characterized by generally high levels of intergroup hostility (Zick et al.,

2011). These sentiments became particularly pronounced during the refugee crisis (Narkowicz, 2018). They were further solidified and emboldened by the newly elected (and still in power) majority party, conservative Law and Justice, that withdrew from the previous administration's pledge to accept 7,000 refugees in 2015 (Narkowicz, 2018).

Different types of commitment to an advantaged ingroup were operationalized in reference to national identity (i.e., as national narcissism and secure national identification), while system-supporting collective action was operationalized as collective action against immigrants and refugees. Study 1 analyzed data collected among participants of the Independence March – a Warsaw-based, nationalist event organized annually to celebrate the National Independence Day (November 11th). In 2018, when the study was conducted, the march gathered over 250,000 individuals (Pankowska, 2018). Our aim was to examine whether national narcissism served as a negative, while secure national ingroup commitment as a positive predictor of attitude toward immigrants, and whether attitude toward immigrants mediated the associations between different types of national ingroup commitment and support for anti-immigrant collective action. To check whether our results depended on the type of collective action, we assessed normative and nonnormative forms of anti-immigrant engagement. Considering that, in contrast to its normative counterpart, nonnormative collective action stems from extremely negative attitudes toward an outgroup (Shuman et al., 2016; Tausch et al., 2011), the indirect effects we expected could be more strongly pronounced for the latter.

An additional aim of Study 1 was to address unsystematic sampling typical of research among protest participants. Although social psychologists do collect data during protest events (e.g., Górska et al., 2020; Study 2; Saab et al., Study 1), sample selection process is rarely reported in depth. It is possible, therefore, that at least some studies populating collective action literature rely on haphazard recruitment of participants. Certain

protesters—for example, those standing/walking on the fringes of a demonstrating crowd or those who share some demographic features with the interviewers—may have a higher chance of being recruited than others. This *interviewer selection bias* (Eckman & Koch, 2019) may lower the degree to which a sample is representative of all individuals participating in a given protest and, therefore, compromise research conclusions. To minimize the risk of collecting a biased sample of demonstrators participating in the Independence March, we employed a sampling procedure recommended by Walgrave and Verhulst (2011).

Study 2 was a two-wave survey of Poles intended to verify our theorizing with longitudinal data. We expected that the two forms of national ingroup commitment would have opposite over-time effects on participants' attitude toward refugees. Furthermore, we hypothesized that, by changing attitude toward refugees, different modes of ingroup commitment would exert longitudinal indirect effects on support for collective action against refugees. In particular, while the indirect effect of national narcissism was expected to be positive, the indirect effect of secure national ingroup commitment was presumed to be negative.

This research has been approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of Warsaw. Data and code necessary to replicate the analyses presented in this contribution may be downloaded from the Open Science Framework Repository:

https://osf.io/qv9mx/?view_only=2d8ea228f0f04d41b25164a23e070312

Study 1

Method

Participants and Procedure

Data collection took place during the Independence March and followed a well-established protest survey method developed for the *Caught in the Act of Protest:*

Contextualizing Contestation project (van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). The full research team consisted of 31 individuals, out of whom nine served as pointers, 16 were interviewers, and the remaining six observed the walking crowd and coordinated the team's work. The researchers were divided into smaller teams consisting of at least two persons: a pointer and up to three interviewers. The task of the pointers was to select participants according to a random selection procedure. To ensure a fair dispersion of the questionnaires among the protesters, pointers counted rows of the marching column and indicated every x-th person in every n-th row, minimizing the selection-bias. This is especially (but not only) important at right-wing events where the interviewers also have to establish contact with potentially hostile respondents (e.g., openly extremist individuals or hooligans). The role of an interviewer who accompanied a given pointer was to invite a selected protester to the study by handing out a paper-and-pencil questionnaire or asking for an email address for the invitation to the electronic questionnaire.

In total, 1,123 protesters were approached during the protest and invited to participate in a study designed to understand the views of the Independence March participants. The interviewers informed the approached protesters that participation in the study was voluntary and individual responses would not be identifiable in any way. Seven hundred eighty individuals were willing to accept the invitation to fill in a questionnaire (725 decided to take the envelope with the mail-in questionnaire, 55 gave us their email address). Of the 780 participants who agreed to fill out the questionnaire, 193 (24.74%) sent it back to us. The final sample consisted of 58 women and 134 men (one person did not state their gender) aged between 19 and 83 ($M = 45.68$, $SD = 15.79$).

Measures

The measures were embedded in a larger questionnaire that included scales of various social and personality psychology constructs (e.g., need for cognitive closure; Kossowska et al., 2012).

National identification was measured with three items taken from Cameron's (2004) Social Identity Scale: "I feel strong ties to other Poles" (Ingroup Ties), "In general, I'm glad to be a Pole" (Ingroup Affect), and "Being a Pole is an important reflection of who I am" (Ingroup Centrality). The response scale ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

National narcissism was gauged with the 5-item Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; sample item: "If Poles had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place"). The response scale ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).[1]

Attitude towards immigrants was measured using the Feeling Thermometer (Alwin, 1997) that ranged from -50 (*extremely cold/negative feelings*) to +50 (*extremely warm/positive feelings*).

To measure *normative collective action intentions*, we asked participants to report how likely they were to engage in three activities (i.e., demonstrating, petition signing, distributing posters and flyers) in order to restrict immigration to Poland (1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very likely*).

Nonnormative collective action intentions were assessed with three items. Participants were asked to declare how likely they were to engage in three activities (i.e., blocking the streets, occupying state buildings, destroying state property) to restrict immigration to Poland (1 = *very unlikely*, 7 = *very likely*).

Covariates were gender (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*), age, education (1 = *none*, 2 = *primary school*, 3 = *middle school*, 4 = *vocational school*, 5 = *high school*, 6 = *university degree*, 7 =

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[1] For items comprising the national narcissism scale, see the Online Supplement.

PhD or higher, 8 = *other* [coded as a missing value]) and political conservatism (0 = *left*, 10 = *right*).

Analytic strategy

To verify our hypotheses, we estimated a series of structural equation models. Model 1 (Figure 1) included five latent variables: national narcissism, national identification, attitude toward immigrants,[2] as well as normative and nonnormative collective action. While national identification and national narcissism were specified to predict attitude toward immigrants as well as normative and nonnormative collective action, attitude toward immigrants served as a predictor of the two types of collective action engagement intentions. Collective action residuals as well as exogenous variables were allowed to covary. The goal of Models 2 and 3 was to check the robustness of our results by accounting for the covariates (i.e., gender, age, education, and political conservatism) and handling the violation of multivariate normality assumption[3] with the robust Maximum Likelihood estimator (MLR), respectively.

Missing data (3.9%), which met the MCAR condition, $\chi^2(314) = 330.76$, $p = .247$, was handled with Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML).[4] The 95% CIs for indirect effects (H2 and H3) were obtained with bootstrapping (10,000 re-samples). All models reported in Studies 1 and 2 were estimated using Mplus 8.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017).

Results

Table 1 presents intercorrelations, descriptive statistics, and reliability for the variables assessed in Study 1. Participants exhibited stronger national identification (*M* = 4.55, *SD* = 0.60) than national narcissism, *M* = 3.50, *SD* = 0.95, *t*(186) = 14.97, *p* < .001, *d* = 1.10. At the same time, both the mean level of national identification, *t*(189) = 35.59, *p* <

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[2] Treating attitude toward immigrants as a single-item observed variable did not change the results.

[3] As shown by the significant values of Mardia's skewness (g1 = 3119.64, p < .001) and kurtosis (κ = 19.90, p < .001) values.

[4] For the analyses using listwise deletion in Studies 1 and 2, see the Online Supplement.

.001, d = 2.58, and the mean level of national narcissism, t(188) = 7.20, p < .001, d = 0.53,
were significantly higher than the midpoint on a response scale (3). Attitude towards
immigrants was negative (M = -16.34, SD = 24.64) and differed significantly from 0, t(184) =
-9.02, p < .001, d = 0.66, the latter representing the neutral attitude. Participants were more
willing to engage in normative (M = 4.48, SD = 1.99) than nonnormative collective action, M
= 1.87, SD = 1.33, t(181) = 20.23, p < .001, d = 1.50. Importantly, while the mean level of
normative collective action was above the midpoint of the scale (4), t(186) = 3.31, p = .001, d
= 0.24, the mean level of nonnormative collective action was significantly below it, t(181) =
21.67, p < .001, d = 1.60.

Model 1 (Figure 1) exhibited satisfactory fit to the data, χ^2(80) = 152.77, p < .001,
CFI = .941, RMSEA = .069, 90% CI [.052, .085], SRMR = .065. Favorable attitude toward
immigrants was predicted negatively by national narcissism, B = -12.12, SE = 3.54, β = -.31,
p = .001, and positively by national identification, B = 8.49, SE = 4.09, β = .18, p = .038.
Importantly, the difference between these effects was significant, $\Delta\chi^2$ (1) = 10.58, p = .001.
Normative collective action was predicted positively by national narcissism, B = 0.64, SE =
0.27, β = .24, p = .018, and negatively by attitude toward immigrants, B = -0.03, SE = 0.01, β
= -.41, p < .001. The effect of national identification on normative collective action did not
reach significance, B = -0.39, SE = 0.28, β = -.12, p = .161. At the same time, nonnormative
collective action was predicted positively by national narcissism, B = 0.92, SE = 0.27, β =
.32, p = .001, and negatively by national identification, B = -0.73, SE = 0.29, β = -.21, p =
.012, as well as attitude toward immigrants, B = -0.03, SE = 0.01, β = -.40, p < .001.

There was a positive indirect effect of national narcissism on normative engagement
against immigrants via a more negative attitude toward this group, IE = 0.34, SE = 0.12, 95%
CI [0.15, 0.63]. Likewise, the indirect effect of national narcissism on nonnormative
collective action was also positive and significant, IE = 0.35, SE = 0.12, 95% CI [0.17, 0.65].

In line with our expectations, the indirect effects of national identification on normative, $IE =$ -0.24, $SE = 0.12$, 95% CI [-0.52, -0.02], and nonnormative collective action, $IE = -0.25$, $SE =$ 0.13, 95% CI [-0.52, -0.003], by more positive attitude toward immigrants were negative and significant.

In Model 2, $\chi^2(120) = 231.37$, $p < .001$, CFI = .917, RMSEA = .070, 90% CI [0.06, 0.08], SRMR = .060, attitude toward immigrants was predicted negatively by national narcissism, $B = -10.16$, $SE = 3.45$, $\beta = -.27$, $p = .003$, but not by national identification, $B =$ 6.62, $SE = 4.05$, $\beta = .14$, $p = .102$. Still, the effects of the two modes of national commitment on attitude toward immigrants differed significantly, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 7.64$, $p = .006$. The indirect effects of national narcissism on normative, $IE = 0.27$, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [0.10, 0.55], and nonnormative, $IE = 0.26$, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI [0.11, 0.53], collective action against immigrants remained significant. However, the indirect effects of national identification on normative, $IE = -0.18$, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [-0.42, 0.05], and nonnormative, $IE = -0.17$, $SE =$ 0.11, 95% CI [-0.39, 0.06], engagement via more positive attitude toward immigrants were no longer significant.[5]

Applying MLR estimation (Model 3; $\chi^2(80) = 147.52$, $p < .001$, CFI = .930, RMSEA = .066, 90% CI [.049, .083], SRMR = .065) led to similar results as Model 1. National narcissism predicted normative, $IE = 0.34$, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [0.12, 0.56],[6] and nonnormative, $IE = 0.35$, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [0.14, 0.57], collective action indirectly via more negative attitude toward immigrants. At the same time, more positive attitude toward immigrants mediated the negative effect of national identification on normative, $IE = -0.24$, $SE = 0.11$, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.02], and nonnormative, $IE = -0.25$, $SE = 0.12$, 95% CI [-0.48, -0.02], anti-immigrant engagement.

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[5] For the detailed results of all models tested in Studies 1 and 2, see the Online Supplement.
[6] Since bootstrap CI has better empirical coverage than MLR CI (Lai, 2019), the 95% CIs for the indirect effects obtained in Model 1 may be more accurate than those obtained in Model 3.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 were supportive of our theorizing. Regardless of controlling for the covariates or accounting for the violation of the multivariate normality assumption, national narcissism emerged as a negative predictor of attitude toward immigrants and exerted positive indirect effects on both normative and nonnormative collective action against immigrants, which was consistent with H1a and H2. In line with H1b and H3, national identification was a positive predictor of favorable attitude toward immigrants and had a direct negative effect on nonnormative collective action as well as negative indirect effects on normative and nonnormative engagement against this group. The presence of the direct effect shows that for highly (and securely) identified Poles there may have been other factors responsible for their unwillingness to engage in nonnormative collective action, besides negative intergroup attitudes (one possibility could be group-image concerns, see Jiménez-Moya et al. 2015). It is important to note, that the indirect effects of national identification lost significance when we accounted for the covariates. This was probably due to the fact that the sample size in Study 1 was rather small ($N = 193$). Thus, Study 2 was intended to account for this limitation by relying on data collected in a large nationwide survey of adult Poles.

Study 2

Method

Participants and Procedure

Study 2 aimed at replicating the results of Study 1 with longitudinal data. It was administered as a part of a two-wave nationwide survey of Polish adults conducted by an external research company. The two measurement points were separated by a six-month interval. The first wave of the study was carried out in September and October of 2018, the second in March and April of 2019. At each measurement point, data collection was performed

with the use of computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI).[7] To obtain a representative sample in the first wave, random sampling with the national identification database (PESEL) as the sampling frame was employed. Of 1,000 respondents who completed Wave 1, 602 (60.2%) participated in Wave 2.[8] After excluding four respondents who did not declare exclusively Polish nationality, the final sample consisted of 598 individuals (261 men and 337 women) who took part in both waves and responded to the studies' variables (age range from 18 to 75; $M = 45.26$, $SD = 14.43$).[9]

Measures

Aside from the measures presented below, the study questionnaire included scales measuring other psychological constructs (e.g., gender conspiracy beliefs; Marchlewska et al., 2019) that were unrelated to the current research.

To measure *national identification*, we employed the same three items as in Study 1.

National narcissism was assessed in the same way as in Study 1.

Attitude towards refugees was gauged with the Feeling Thermometer (Alwin, 1997) ranging from -50 (*extremely cold/negative feelings*) to +50 (*extremely warm/positive feelings*).

To assess *normative collective action intentions* against refugees we asked participants how likely they were to engage in three activities (i.e., petition signing, demonstrating, distributing posters and flyers) expressing opposition to the acceptance of refugees by Poland. The response scale ranged 1 (*very unlikely*) to 7 (*very likely*).

The *covariates* involved gender (0 = *female*, 1 = *male*), age, education (years of full-time education; $M = 12.92$, $SD = 2.80$), settlement size (1 = *rural area*, 2 = *town up to 20,000 residents*, 3 = *town between 20,001 and 100,000 residents*, 4 = *town between 100,001 and*

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[7] As respondents tend to under-report illegal behavior in face-to-face interviews (e.g., Kleck & Roberts, 2012), we did not measure nonnormative collective action intentions in Study 2.

[8] The contract signed with the research company specified the retention rate to be no lower than 60%.

[9] For comparison of the respondents who participated in two measurements and individuals who dropped out from the study, see the Online Supplement).

200,000 *residents*, 5 = *city with more than 200,000 residents*), and political conservatism (1 =

left, 7 = *right*).[10]

Analytic strategy

To examine the longitudinal effects of national narcissism and national identification,

a series of two-wave autoregressive cross-lagged panel models (Selig & Little, 2012) were

tested. Model 1 (Figure 2) included four latent variables—national narcissism, national

identification, attitude toward refugees and anti-refugee collective action—assessed across

two measurement occasions. Exogenous variables, as well as Time 2 residual terms were

allowed to covary. The half-longitudinal indirect effects corresponding to H2 and H3 were

defined as the products of two parallel cross-lagged effects (see Cole & Maxwell, 2003) –

Time 1 national narcissism on Time 2 attitude toward refugees and Time 1 attitude toward

refugees on Time 2 collective action (H2) as well as Time 1 national identification on Time 2

attitude toward immigrants and Time 1 attitude toward immigrants on Time 2 anti-refugee

engagement (H3).

Similarly to Study 1, we examined the robustness of our results. In Model 2 we

adjusted for Time 1 covariates such as gender, age, education, settlement size and political

conservatism. In Model 3, we accounted for the violation of multivariate normality

assumption[11] by employing MLR estimation. As data were MCAR (3.2%), χ^2 (2917) =

2963.37, p = .270, FIML estimator was used to handle missing values. To obtain 95% CIs for

indirect effects, bootstrapping with 10,000 re-samples was applied.

Results

Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, reliability, and correlations among

variables in Study 2. Both at Time 1, $t(589)$ = 20.73, p < .001, d = 0.85, and Time 2, $t(595)$ =

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[10] In comparison to Study 1, Study 2 used a different response scale to assess political conservatism. This was because the studies presented in this contribution were conducted as parts of two larger projects that differed in the measurement of political conservatism.

[11] As evidenced by Mardia's kurtosis (κ = 21.22, p < .001) and skewness (g1 = 8197.44, p < .001) coefficients.

21.29, $p < .001$, $d = 0.88$, participants showed stronger national identification ($M_{T1} = 4.24$, $SD_{T1} = 0.82$, $M_{T2} = 4.19$, $SD_{T2} = 0.87$) than national narcissism, $M_{T1} = 3.34$, $SD_{T1} = 1.05$, $M_{T2} = 3.22$, $SD_{T2} = 1.07$. At the same time, the mean levels of national identification, $t(594) = 37.15$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.51$ at Time 1 and $t(596) = 33.38$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.37$ at Time 2, and national narcissism, $t(591) = 7.78$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.32$ at Time 1 and $t(595) = 5.04$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.21$ at Time 2, were higher than the midpoint of a response scale (3). Attitude toward refugees was negative ($M_{T1} = -7.20$, $SD_{T1} = 22.30$, $M_{T2} = -11.74$, $SD_{T2} = 19.67$) and significantly lower than 0 both at Time 1, $t(557) = 7.62$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.32$, and Time 2, $t(566) = -14.22$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.60$. Normative collective action intentions ($M_{T1} = 2.07$, $SD_{T1} = 1.57$, $M_{T2} = 2.17$, $SD_{T2} = 1.55$) were significantly lower than the scale midpoint (4) both at Time 1, $t(566) = 29.33$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.23$, and Time 2, $t(583) = 28.55$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.18$. With some minor exceptions, correlation coefficients observed in Study 2 replicated the pattern of results found in Study 1.

Model 1 (Figure 2)[12] fitted data well, $\chi^2(231) = 454.29$, $p < .001$, CFI = .970, RMSEA = .040, 90% CI [.035, .046], SRMR = .040. National narcissism and national identification assessed at Time 1 exerted opposite effects on attitude toward refugees measured at Time 2, $\chi^2(1) = 16.11$, $p < .001$. Specifically, while the longitudinal effect of national narcissism was negative, $B = -4.02$, $SE = 0.88$, $\beta = -.21$, $p < .001$, the effect of national identification was positive, $B = 3.23$, $SE = 1.20$, $\beta = .13$, $p = .007$. On the other hand, Time 1 attitude toward refugees served as the negative predictor of Time 2 collective action against this group, $B = -0.01$, $SE = 0.003$, $\beta = -.15$, $p < .001$. Other cross-lagged effects were not significant (all ps > .171).

The indirect effect construed by the multiplication of the path from Time 1 national narcissism to Time 2 attitude toward refugees and the path from Time 1 attitude toward

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[12] Prior to hypothesis testing, full scalar invariance was established (see the Online Supplement).

refugees to Time 2 anti-refugee collective action was positive and significant, *IE* = 0.04, *SE* = 0.02, 95% CI [0.02, 0.08]. At the same time, the indirect effect created by multiplying the path from Time 1 national identification to Time 2 attitude toward refugees and the path from Time 1 attitude toward refugees to Time 2 anti-refugee engagement was negative and significant, *IE* = -0.03, *SE* = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.07, -0.01].

Accounting for the covariates in Model 2 ($\chi^2(311)$ = 551.83, *p* < .001, CFI = .968, RMSEA = .036, 90% CI [.031, .041] SRMR = .036) did not affect the results in a theoretically meaningful way. The longitudinal indirect effect of national narcissism on anti-refugee collective action was positive and significant, *IE* = 0.03, *SE* = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.06]. Likewise, by predicting more positive attitudes toward refugees, national identification continued to exert a negative indirect effect on collective action over time, *IE* = -0.04, *SE* = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.08, -0.01].

Our conclusions remained unchanged also when MLR estimation was employed (Model 3), $\chi^2(231)$ = 424.22, *p* < .001, CFI = .968, RMSEA = .037, 90% CI [.032, .043], SRMR = .040. While the longitudinal indirect effect of national narcissism on engagement remained positive, *IE* = 0.04, *SE* = 0.01, 95% CI [0.01, 0.07], the corresponding effect of national identification was negative, *IE* = -0.03, *SE* = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.06, -0.004].

Discussion

Using a nationally representative sample of Poles, Study 2 provided longitudinal evidence for the hypothesized links between national narcissism and national identification, attitudes towards refugees and normative collective action against them. Specifically, we found that Time 1 national narcissism was a negative predictor (H1a) whereas Time 1 secure national identification was a positive predictor (H1b) of positive attitude towards refugees at Time 2. Positive attitude towards refugees at Time 1 was a significant negative predictor of normative collective action against them at Time 2. Crucially, and supporting both H2 and

H3, we found a significant positive indirect effect of national narcissism on normative collective action against refugees and a significant negative effect of secure national identification on normative collective action against refugees via attitudes towards them. With regard to normative collective action, Study 2 replicated the effects found in Study 1 using longitudinal data.

General Discussion

In two studies conducted in the context of Poles' (i.e., an advantaged social group) attitudes towards immigrants and refugees coming to their country, we obtained strong evidence for the divergent pattern of associations between narcissistic and secure national commitment and willingness to engage in system-supporting collective action (operationalized as collective action against immigrants and refugees). Using a cross-sectional (Study 1) and a longitudinal (Study 2) design we showed that national narcissism, a grandiose, but insecure, commitment to one's national group (Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020), was related to more negative intergroup attitudes, whereas secure national identification related to more positive intergroup attitudes. In turn, more positive attitudes towards immigrants and refugees were negative predictors of willingness to engage in normative (Studies 1 and 2) and nonnormative (Study 1) collective action against them. Importantly, national narcissism and secure national identification had, respectively, positive and negative indirect effects on support for collective action against disadvantaged social groups via intergroup attitudes.

These results contribute to the literature in several ways. First and foremost, they provide the first longitudinal evidence for the association between collective narcissism and greater willingness to engage in system-supporting collective action. Only one previous article (Górska et al., 2020) investigated the role of collective narcissism as predictor of collective action support and engagement, however, it focused exclusively on system-challenging collective action, that is activities that aim to change the status quo towards

greater equality (Jost et al., 2017). The current work provides a better understanding of how the type of ingroup commitment (secure vs. narcissistic) among advantaged group members relates not only to their attitudes towards disadvantaged social groups but also their behavioral intentions to actively oppose their rights.

Second, Study 1 recruited participants during an actual collective action event and employed a standardized sampling technique as suggested by Walgrave and Verhulst (2011). Using this approach constitutes an important methodological contribution to the collective action literature as the results that we found may be considered relatively free of selection bias (e.g., a tendency for interviewers to recruit more approachable protesters; van Stekelenburg et al., 2012) and provide a more reliable insight into motivation of people who are likely to join such events. The use of longitudinal panel data in Study 2 also addresses the recent call for identifying temporal correlates of protest behavior (Thomas et al., 2020).

Third, this work investigated determinants of intentions to engage in system-supporting collective action—a relatively new avenue in collective action research (Jost et al., 2017; Osborne et al., 2019). As such it provides some much needed evidence on what drives advantaged groups' intentions to oppose the rights (and in the case of refugees also well-being) of others.

Finally, the presented research also addressed a pressing real-world social problem of increasing hostility towards immigrants and refugees. In the context of the refugee crisis unfolding in Europe since 2015, many countries witnessed unprecedented levels of hostility towards the newcomers, both in terms of negative attitudes towards them (Goodwin et al., 2017; Kende et al., 2019) and the public's engagement in active, often massive, protests against accepting refugees (e.g., Voice of America, 2016). This was the case also in Poland where different types of anti-refugee actions took place. For example, in 2015 supporters of the right-wing KORWiN party organized a demonstration in Kościelisko aimed to prevent

refugees from reaching Poland. Korwin-Mikke, the leader of the KORWiN party and a deputy to the European Parliament, stated (during the Parliament's proceedings on September 9th, 2015, dedicated to the migration crisis): "We are destroying Europe. This is a policy of Europe's fall (...). This is flooding Europe with human rubbish who do not want to work" (PM//rzw, 2015). Negative attitudes towards refugees were easy to observe not only among politicians, but also throughout Polish society. For instance, violence was widely accepted as a way to deal with the refugee crisis (Winiewski et al., 2017).

Our results point to a possible, but so far uninvestigated explanatory mechanism of these reactions—narcissistic commitment to one's advantaged ingroup. Previous research focusing on different modes of national commitment showed, for example, positive links between national and European glorification and negative attitudes towards immigrants (Kende et al., 2019). Kende et al. (2019) also found that attachment to Europe (but not nation; i.e., Hungary) predicted positive attitudes towards immigrants whereas Verkuyten and Martinovic (2015) showed that a less ingroup-centric identity was a positive predictor of intentions to protest discrimination of immigrants in the Netherlands. Our studies extend these findings by showing the differences between narcissistic versus secure mode of national commitment. In our research, national narcissism emerged as a significant predictor of negative attitudes towards newcomers to one's country (thus replicating previous findings on collective narcissism and intergroup attitudes, e.g., Marchlewska et al., 2020 and Verkuyten et al., 2022) and intentions to engage in collective action against them (e.g., protests). By contrast, secure national identification predicted more positive intergroup attitudes and lower intentions to engage in collective action against immigrants and refugees. This shows that it was not simply people who more strongly identified with their nation who were willing to demonstrate their hostility towards vulnerable outgroups. Rather it was those whose national identification is based on unsatisfied individual and collective needs and who seek constant

external validation of their group's greatness (i.e., collective narcissists; Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020).

Limitations and future directions

Our findings are subject to several limitations. First, despite employing a very advanced data collection method, the sample size in Study 1 was rather small, which could be responsible for the nonsignificant effect of national identification when the covariates were controlled for (Model 2). As shown by Monte Carlo simulation,[13] collecting data from at least 550 individuals was necessary to obtain a significant positive effect of ingroup identification on intergroup attitudes.

Second, Study 2 involved only two measurements which necessitated making the stationarity assumption (Cole & Maxwell, 2003). Specifically, by positing that the product of two parallel cross-lagged effects is equivalent to a full longitudinal mediation, we implied that the causal relationships between the variables of interest do not change over time (i.e., are exactly the same between Time 1 and Time 2, and Time 2 and Time 3). As at least three measurement occasions are necessary to check whether the stationarity assumption holds, future studies testing H2 and H3 should plan for no less than three waves.

Third, in terms of study design, we only used a one item measure of intergroup attitudes (the feeling thermometer) that captures simple evaluation of outgroups in both of our studies. Given that multi-item scales typically show superior psychometric properties (Judd et al., 1991), future studies would do well to employ longer, and more nuanced measures.

Additionally, we asked about attitudes towards immigrants (Study 1) and refugees (Study 2). Even though we obtained similar results in terms of our main assumptions, the two target groups are markedly different. The former leave their country voluntarily, whereas the

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[13] See the Online Supplement.

latter are typically forced to do so by various circumstances. Our data did not allow for meaningful comparison, but we hope that future research would explore the difference in the strength of relationships between different forms of national commitment and collective action against immigrants versus refugees. For example, it would be worth checking whether the effects of national narcissism on intentions to actively oppose the rights of disadvantaged social groups would be stronger in case of groups that pose not only symbolic, but also realistic threat to narcissistic worldviews.

Lastly, both studies were conducted in the same political context—the context of Polish people's attitudes towards refugees and immigrants. While being able to replicate the pattern of results across two studies is promising, we cannot be sure that it would emerge if similar research was conducted in other cultural contexts. Having said that, we do believe that the well-established links between collective narcissism and secure ingroup identification with a host of intergroup outcomes make it likely that system-supporting collective action would be differentially predicted by the two types of group commitment also in other countries.

Practical Implications

Previous research has demonstrated many negative consequences that come with narcissistic ingroup commitment (e.g., conspiracy beliefs and outgroup hostility, Marchlewska et al., 2019; ingroup disloyalty, Marchlewska et al., 2020 or science denial, Cisłak et al., 2021; see Cichocka & Cisłak, 2020, also for a review). The current research provides further evidence that collective narcissism is associated with negative psychological and societal outcomes. Specifically, it strengthens negative attitudes towards newcomers and fuels aggression towards disadvantaged groups. It seems clear that those high in national narcissism refuse to help people in need and thus, not only hurt innocent individuals, but also

create a negative image of their national ingroup in the eyes of others. Thus, this body of research speaks to the importance of discovering psychological factors that attenuate national narcissism (or boost secure national commitment instead). Previous research found that increasing feelings of personal (Cichocka et al., 2016) or group control (Marchlewska et al., 2018) could serve as a way to reduce narcissistic ingroup commitment. Future research could investigate whether these types of interventions might boost positive attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, and reduce intentions to engage in collective action against them.

Conclusion

Across two studies—one conducted among participants of a right-wing march recruited using systematic protest sampling methodology, the other using a national sample panel data—we found that narcissistic commitment to one's advantaged social group (e.g., a nation) predicted more hostile attitudes towards immigrants and refugees and a desire to engage in collective action against them (i.e., system-supporting collective action). In contrast, secure identification with an advantaged group was associated with more positive intergroup attitudes and, in turn, with lower desire for collective action engagement against them. Taken together, these results suggest that applying a more fine-grained approach to analyzing group commitment allows better prediction of people's hostile attitudes and behavioral intentions towards vulnerable outgroups.

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Table 1

Reliabilities, means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for the variables assessed in Study 1

	α	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. National identification	.80	4.55	0.60	–							
2. National narcissism	.81	3.50	0.95	.27***	–						
3. Attitude toward immigrants	–	-16.34	24.64	.06	-.23**	–					
4. Normative collective action intentions	.89	4.48	1.99	-.04	.32***	-.46***	–				
5. Nonnormative collective action	.76	1.87	1.33	-.20**	.25***	-.45***	.51***	–			
6. Gender (0 = female, 1 = male)	–	0.70	0.46	-.16*	-.11	-.11	.05	.11	–		
7. Age	–	45.68	15.79	.14	-.02	.30***	-.12	-.27***	-.12	–	
8. Education	–	5.46	1.07	-.03	-.17*	.12	-.17*	-.19*	-.17*	.05	–
9. Political conservatism	–	8.66	1.43	.30***	.29***	-.17*	.28***	.03	.08	.05	-.10

*** *p* < .001. ** *p* < .01. * *p* < .05.

Note. *Ns* ranged from 176 to 192.

Table 2

Reliabilities, means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for the variables assessed in Study 2

	α	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. National identification T1	.81	4.24	0.82	–											
2. National narcissism T1	.88	3.34	1.05	.38***	–										
3. Attitude toward refugees T1	–	-7.20	22.30	-.07	-.07	–									
4. Normative collective action T1	.85	2.07	1.57	-.02	.09*	-.16***	–								
5. National identification T2	.85	4.19	0.87	.43***	.15***	-.05	-.05	–							
6. National narcissism T2	.88	3.22	1.07	.20***	.60***	-.07	.05	.36***	–						
7. Attitude toward refugees T2	–	-11.74	19.67	-.01	-.17***	.47***	-.07	-.06	-.23***	–					
8. Normative collective action T2	.83	2.17	1.55	.04	.05	-.21***	.33***	-.04	.09*	-.16***	–				
9. Gender	–	0.44	0.50	-.05	-.01	-.05	.08	-.08	.02	-.07	.08*	–			
10. Age	–	45.26	14.43	.14***	.08	-.02	-.04	.16***	.07	-.05	-.07	-.07	–		
11. Education	–	12.92	2.80	.09*	.01	-.06	.04	.10*	.04	-.02	.04	-.08	-.27***	–	
12. Settlement size	–	2.46	1.50	.07	-.01	-.07	.06	-.02	.03	-.01	.03	.01	.05	.02	–
13. Political conservatism	–	4.30	1.80	.20***	.32***	-.10*	.09*	.17***	.32***	-.21***	.06	.10*	.06	.03	.03

*** $p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$.

Note. *Ns* ranged from 486 to 598.

Figure 1. Antecedents of collective action against immigrants (Model 1, Study 1).

Note. Coefficients are standardized estimates. While solid lines represent significant ($p < .05$) effects, dashed lines represent nonsignificant ($p \geq$ .05) nonsignificant effects.

*** $p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$.

Figure 2. Antecedents of collective action against immigrants (Model 1, Study 2).

Note. Coefficients are standardized estimates. While solid lines represent significant ($p < .05$) effects, dashed lines represent nonsignificant ($p \geq$ .05) nonsignificant effects.

*** $p < .001$. ** $p < .01$. * $p < .05$.