

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAMES VI AND I AND CARLO  
EMANUELE I, DUKE OF SAVOY

John Thompson

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAMES VI AND I  
AND  
CARLO EMANUELE I, DUKE OF SAVOY.

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH. D. SUBMITTED  
by  
J. THOMPSON.

## Declaration

hereby declare that the following thesis is based on the results of research carried out by me, that the thesis is my own composition, and that it has not previously been submitted for a higher degree.

The research was carried out in the National Library of Scotland, the British Museum, the Public Records Office, and the Archivio di Stato of Turin under the direction of the Reverend Professor Baxter, D.D.

J. Thompson.

## Certificate

I certify that John Thompson M.A. has spent nine terms in research work under my direction and that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance No. 16. (St Andrews) and is qualified to submit the accompanying thesis in application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

J. H. Baxter.

## Career.

matriculated in the university of St. Andrews in 1931 and followed a course leading to graduation in arts until 1935.

In September 1935 I commenced the research Anglo-Italian relations which is now being submitted as a Ph. D. thesis.

I was appointed in 1935 to a Carnegie Research Scholarship.

J. Thomson

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN JAMES VI AND I  
and  
CARLO EMANUELE I, DUKE OF SAVOY.

Some explanation of the disreputable interior and exterior of this thesis must stand as preface to it.

Most of the research work was done during my tenure of a Carnegie Research Scholarship, from 1935 to 1938. At the end of that time it seemed to me that the information I had acquired was not of overwhelming importance and did not need to be set before the world at once. The subject of Anglo-Italian relations interested me and I hoped to work leisurely, increasing my knowledge more for my own pleasure than for any other reason. The outbreak of war found me with a vast accumulation of notes and transcriptions bearing on the relations of James I with Savoy, and a considerable amount of matter relating to Anglo-Italian relations in general. There seemed to be no probability of using these notes till after the war. Chance had it that I was stationed for the winter of 1940-41 in Southampton, where I was able to get facilities for work that a soldier seldom gets. During these months I found it possible to make a coherent narrative of the notes on this earlier period. The necessity for speed and the inadequacy of space for storing must justify the bad typing and the shabby pages.

There are certain other explanations and justifications necessary. I have preferred to set the documents I have quoted in the text rather than in an appendix: it seemed redundant to paraphrase badly what was already said well. The manuscripts in the Archivio di Stato of Turin and in the British Museum Additional Manuscripts 32,025 were written in English, French and Italian. The French I have quoted as they stand, the Italian I have translated. The final note on Anthony Shirley is not particularly relevant. I have included it because the fresh information seemed to be of some interest and because I wanted a home for it. The little bibliography at the end is not so much a bibliography as a list of the works referred to in the footnotes. It seemed pointless to swell the list with a host of secondary works I had occasion to look at.

It is impossible to name all the people and institutions who have helped me. Space forbids. But I cannot end this thing without setting down how much I owe to the encouragement and learning of the Reverend Professor Baxter and of Signor Eugenio Passamonti.

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**THE PRELIMINARIES.**

Before beginning any detailed examination of Anglo-Savoyard relations in the early part of the seventeenth century it will probably be wise to give a short account of the history of Savoy from the accession of Carlo Emanuele in 1580 at the age of 19(1), or at least to indicate generally the main lines of his foreign policy and something of the state of his territories; for it is there that will be found the motives for his attempts to ally his house with that of the Stuarts.

The state to which he succeeded lay like a cushion between the Spanish lands in Italy and France, and to both it presented frontiers that were not clearly defined nor guarded by natural obstacles.(2) This state was split into two parts by the western arm of the Alpine crescent, into Savoy on the French side and into Piedmont on the Italian side. Rapid communication between the two for defence was clearly impossible, particularly in winter time. Then, as now, the people seemed to be well made and hardy, but both they and their lands had suffered bitterly during the wars under Emanuele Filiberto.(3) The two powers flanking the state presented two very different aspects.

(1) G.Curti Carlo Emanuele I ~~1580-1604~~ p.2

(2) See the account of the Relation of Savoy to its

neighbours by Contarini in Relazioni degli stati europei

*serie III. V. I* pp. 77-80. (3) See Cambridge Modern History Vol.111 pp

399-413 for state of savoy after the war.

In the person of the semi-independent governor of Milan Spain presented itself as a great militant power, from whose influence Venice alone of the states of Italy was absolutely free; France was on the threshold of the wars of religion. Considering these two, the states which had held all Italy at their mercy, the young Duke must have decided that the future was with Spain, and at the opening of his reign he committed himself into the Spanish camp. In 1584 he married the Infanta Caterina, the second daughter of Philip II(1), and with her he doubtless hoped to get a friendship that would preserve his lands and independence better than could his own arms, and that would permit him <sup>to carry</sup> out some of those tasks that he seems to have set himself from the beginning of his reign, if his later actions may be considered as a proof of his original intentions.

All these tasks concerned the rectification of the frontiers of his duchy. The first of them was the recovery of the marquisate of Saluzzo, which had passed into the hands of France when Gabriele, the last independent marquis, had died at the hands of Canacciolo and Strozzi, the free captains, in 1548.(2) To Savoy its importance was very great; Emanuele Fil-

(1) Curtio p. Cit. p.14. See the marriage treaty in Faites de la royale maison de Savoie Turin 1836 Vol Tom. 1 p.142. (2) C, Manfredi Carlo Emanuele I e il trattato di Lione in Carlo Emanuele I Principe di Savoia (Ed. Rinaudo)

ibertero had not exaggerated more than usual when he described the French occupation of it as "una spina nel cuore", for it meant that the French had a gate open through the Alpine passes by which to pour into Italy, and a gathering place to rest troops and accumulate supplies for the thrust south; and cis-Alpine Piedmont would be the first state overrun. To add Saluzzo to the lands of Savoy was a legacy of Emanuele Filiberto to Carlo Emanuele. The second of these tasks was to restore Geneva to his lordship. In this Carlo Emanuele could expect with some hopefulness the help of Spain, since the reconquest of Geneva could be considered as a crusade against a nest of heretics. But in the third no help could be looked for from Spain; opposition had rather to be feared. This third task was the occupation of Montferrat. Montferrat was now part of the lands of the Gonzaga, to whom it had passed in 1536 by the marriage of Federico, the first of the Gonzaga, to Margherita, the heiress of the Paleologhi.(1) In decreeing Montferrat to the Gonzaga Charles V had indeed reserved the right of the house of Savoy, but the reservation meant little.(2) Montferrat gaped like a bite in the eastern

(1) R. Quazza Mantova e Montferrato alla vigilia della di successione in Atti della R. Accademia Virgilliana Vol. XIV p.17n (2) Cambridge Modern History Vol. III p.402

frontier of Piedmont, and the Gonzaga were remarkable for their dependence on Spain, even among the minor princes of Italy. By 1603 Carlo Emanuele had completed one of these tasks, had abandoned, more or less finally, another, and had the third still to attempt. The treaty of Lyons in 1601 had finally given him Saluzzo, after a long and bloody enough struggle, in exchange for Bresse, Bugey, Varomey and a few other places on the Rhone, and 100,000 scudi.(1) But perhaps that gives a wrong impression. It would be truer to say that, if he ultimately gained from the consolidation that resulted from the exchange, he was forced to make it, unwilling, by French arms.(2) Unable to overcome the resistance of Geneva in spite of many attempts, Carlo Emanuele at length agreed to a definite treaty with the town, the treaty of St. Julien, which was signed in the July of 1603.(3), and tried to forget, if he could not abandon, his claims over the town. The attempt on Montferrat still lay a great way off.

The possession of Saluzzo made a difference to the political outlook of Carlo Emanuele. Henceforth, even if Savoy proper lay open to French attacks, the

(1) J. Dumont Corps universel diplomatique Tom.V Pte 11 p.11 (2) Cambridge Modern History Vol.111 p.419

(3) Dumont Op. Cit. p. 26

administrative centre of the state which was Piedmont could be kept safe from all but overwhelming odds from the west. There was, therefore, less to be feared from France than from the governor of Milan in the east, and for the future the military activities of the state were to be directed southwards and eastwards into Italy, not westwards into France. Certainly the results of the treaty of Lyons were far from satisfying. In consolidating his states it had robbed him of the richest part of them; for Bresse was not only extremely fertile, it was the chief centre of industry in Savoy, particularly of the textile industry.(1) The result was that, though much of the danger from France was removed by the treaty, the idea that he had suffered from the superior power and diplomacy of Henri IV and had been forced to make a disadvantageous bargain kept Carlo Emanuele for some time from seeking to establish cordial relations with France. The opinion of Henri IV which he set down in his political testament is the best indication of the emotions that were to guide Savoyard relations with France during the two or three years that were to follow the signing of the treaty of Lyons. It

(1) Relazioni degli stati europei cit. Serie III Vol.1 p.49.

is counsel to his son to act with great prudence when dealing with Henri IV, for he was both cunning and powerful, to refrain from giving any undue cause of suspicion to him, and, at the same time, not to show fear of him(1). It was a respectful but not friendly opinion. The immediate effect of the treaty, then, was to push Carlo Emanuel further into the arms of Spain, although it was obvious that his interest in Montferrat would pull him out of that embrace as soon as any opportunity of accomplishing anything in Montferrat should present itself.

Before beginning to examine the relations between England and Savoy it is necessary to say something of the relations between James as king of Scotland and Carlo Emanuele, for it was from the relations established between Scotland and Savoy that the future relations between the courts of London and Savoy were to arise, rather than from the previous relations between England and Savoy.(2)

It was fairly late in his reign in Scotland that James began to have dealings with the court of Savoy, and the motives that led him to begin negotiations are not too clear. Federigo Sclopis

(1) E. Ricotti storia della monarchia piemontese Vol.3 p.419

(2) For the earlier relations between Savoy and England see F. de Filippi The relations of the house of Savoy with the court of England, or Sclopis Relazioni tra la casa di Savoia ed il Governo Britannico (1714, 0 - 1815)

*relazioni tra la casa di Savoia ed il Governo Britannico (1714, 0 - 1815)*

now argued, not very convincingly, that David Riccio was a Savoyard, that through him Mary carried on an extensive correspondence with Savoy, and through Savoy with the other princes of Italy, and that James was merely carrying on his mother's policy in negotiating with Savoy.(1) The first two parts of his argument are irrelevant here. The second is not, and it can best be countered by asking why James waited till 1599 to open negotiations with Savoy. Another motive, and a likelier one, was suggested at the time by Henri IV. There is a letter of his of the 10th of November 1602 to de Beaumont, the French ambassador in England, which is significant here. It runs: "J'ay sceu que l'on parle de donner en mariage au prince d'Ecosse la fille aisnee du duc de Savoye, s'imaginant, non sans fondement, que s'ils pouvoient gagner le dict Roy d'Ecosse, ce sera un instrument propre pour quelque jour me faire du mal, et a mon royaume."(2) Henri was considering the matter from the side that was most dangerous to France, from the Savoyard side, and did not trouble to consider what were the motives that led James to open negotiations with Savoy (for the initiative seems to have come from Scotland). It is at least possible,

(1) F. Sclopis Op. Cit. p.257

(2) A. Teulet papiers d'etat relatifs a l'Ecosse Tom. 3 P.661.

however, to assume that James could see as clearly as anyone the dangers to France of an alliance between Scotland (to which England might soon be added) and Savoy, and to deduce that he opened negotiations with Savoy in order, through fear, to incline Henri IV to a renewal of the Auld Alliance, and so to have the support of France in any trouble that come on Elizabeth's death.

It is possible, indeed, but it seems too cunning, too suggestive of a novel, to belong to the world of real politics. Yet it cannot be dismissed as purely fanciful; James was as shrewd a man as ruled in Europe at the time, and from what can be inferred of his mental processes elsewhere, that reasoning might be his. Still, I suspect that the humdrum explanation of the opening of these negotiations is this: finding an agent who was about to go to Savoy on his own business James gave him a general letter to the Duke, his intention in doing so being no more than to keep on good terms with a prince who could do him little good and little harm. Finding the soil good in Savoy he scattered some more letters, and so came, by chance almost, to keep in contact with the court of Savoy. That is also pure conjecture, but in the absence of anything giving definite information about James' motives conjecture is the only

thing possible.

The first of the Scottish agents that can be found going to Turin is William Chisholm, bishop of Vaizon, for whom there is a letter of credence dated 29th September 1599.(1) This William Chisholm was the nephew and successor of another of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(1) Lettere di principi, Lettere di Giacomo VI e I No.1

~~10~~ 10

the same name, who had r signed the see of Vaizon to this agent in 1584(1). The present bishop was a distant kinsman of Balnerino, the secretary(2), and of Sir Edward Drummond(3). It was to solicit a red hat for him that Drummond carried the famous letter to the Pope "in the year of God 1598, or thairby"(4). This Chisholm had earlier had dealings with King James or, at least with his agents. There is a letter of Thomas Morgan's to him "then in Savoya in Chiambrie" under the date January 1590, and while the contents are irrelevant here it is interesting to see the two men working together as early as 1590(5). Later, a letter from Edinburgh of the 18th of November 1595 mentions "that a person was directed by the King of Scots to Avignon(6) to speak with a gentleman of Scotland, Mr William Chesholm, bishop of Veson within the Pope's dominions, to know secretly of him what familiar dealing there was between the King of Spain and the Pope, concerning the invasion of England and Scotland."(7) At some time after this he seems to have been in Scotland and to have been given the following letter to Carlo Emanuele I, which I set down because it does not seem

(1) Vide "Chisholm" in D.S.P. and Ste Marthe Gallia Christiana in Provincias distributa ~~Paris 1718~~ Tom.1 p.236

(2) ~~Pitcairn Criminal Trials ed. Vol. 2 p.569~~

(3) Cal. Scott. P. Vol.XI p.15 (4) Pitcairn Op. Cit. P.569

(5) Cal. Scott. P. Vol.X p.229

(6) Vaizon or Vaucluse is a little to the north of Avignon.

(7) Cal. Scott. P. Vol.XI p.503

(8). Pitcairn. Criminal Trials of Scotland. Vol. 2.  
p. 569

to have been printed before in this country.

"Monsieur mon Cousin,

Encores que la distance des lieux et  
"rare commodite des porteurs a tant empeche le desir que  
"nous avons de vous monstrier l'affection que nous vous  
"portons, et la souvenance qui nous est encore fraische  
"de l'honneur que nous receusmes de feu Monsieur vostre  
"pere nostre parrain, quoy qu'il arriva tard et en un  
"temps bien incommod dont l'obligation quasi hereditaire  
"vous demeure: est ce que nous ne le mettrons point en  
"oubly quand le moyen se presentera de vous donner la  
"preuve. Et maintenant ce gentilhomme, nostre par nais-  
"sance et par domicile au pape s'en retournant a Vaizon  
"dont il est Nous luy avons donne charge de vous visiter  
"de nostre part et demander continuation de ceste frat-  
"ernite qui est entre nous, et qu'elle soit par toutes  
"bonnes occasions renouvellee. Et d'autant que le porteur  
"est digne de creance nous luy avons communique quelques  
"affaires qui nous touchent esquelles par vostre conseil et  
"avis en demandons estre aidez auquel il vous plaira ad-  
"iouster pleine foy en ce qu'il dira de par nous, Qui  
"sommes et demeurerons jusques au tombeau etc."(1)

It will be seen that the letter does not contain any great thing to cause a stirring over the Alps. It has the colourlessness that characterises James' first letters in affairs of this sort. The chief interest rather lies in the last phrase. What were the things that were to be propounded orally by Chisholm? It may be that he was commissioned to put forward tentatively a proposal for a marriage of an Infanta of the house of Savoy to the Prince of Scotland, but that is not likely in the early stages of such an affair - and the opening of letter suggests that nothing has passed between the two for some time. And, unless James was very ignorant of the state

(1) ~~Torino, Archivio di Stato~~, Lettere di Giacomo VI e I no.1  
Holyrood 29th September 1599

of Savoy, it cannot have concerned finance or trade. In fact it looks very much as if Chisholm's business was to suggest that the two states had several things in common and that they might profit from an exchange of letters: in short to do no more than open discussions, for which the situation of his see so near the borders of Savoy made him very suitable. It seems to be all that can be said of these first, tentative negotiations.

There may have been about this time another letter sent from Scotland to Savoy. In a letter to the King, of October 24th 1608, Balmerino wrote of the letter that Drummond was carrying to the Pope (1), and added-"To which letter, among others of that kind written to the Duke of Florence, Savoy and some Cardinalls in favoure of the said Bishope (all presented be me to your Ma. one day in the morning, when your Ma. was going a hunting in haste) your Ma. did sett your hand." (2) It is, of course, possible that these letters were never delivered, but were drafted only, to get the King to put his hand to the desired letter to the Pope. That is not likely, but the letter to Savoy does not now exist at Turin and I can find no trace of it elsewhere.

The first letter of James' did not remain long un-

(2) Pitcairn Criminal Trials cit. Vol.2 p.588

(1) See A.O. Meyer, Clemens VIII und Jakob I von England. pp. 5-10 and Calderwood History of the Kirk of Scotland, Vol. 5, pp. 740-741

answered. A reply, of equally general terms doubtless, was sent from Turin on June 24th 1600(1). I have not been able to identify the bearer of that letter. He may have been a Savoyard of whom no trace has survived in Scotland; Edward Drummond, returning from Rome may have brought it(2); or Thomas Morgan may have brought it. The letter is lost and it does not seem possible to identify the bearer or find out the contents.

Sir Thomas Morgan was the bearer of the reply to this missing letter of Carlo Emanuele's. Morgan had served Queen Mary during her lifetime(3), having entered her service from that of the Earl of Shrewsbury(4), and the references to him during her lifetime are very numerous. One of the "matters wherewith the Queen of Scots is to be charged" in June 1572 is "her servant Morgan's practices with Parry to kill the Queen of England."(5) There is a letter of Mary's to Morgan dated July 27th 1586(6); and a little earlier, on July 12th 1586, she had written to Beaton in Paris asking him to pay Morgan's pension(7). After the death of the Queen there seems to have been a split in the

(1) It is mentioned in a letter quoted Infra p. ~~22~~ (2) This is possible. In Feb. 1601 there is a reference to Drummond as arrested for trafficking with the Pope. i.e. he was in Scotland then. (H.M.C. Ear and Kellie MSS Vol.1 (1904) p.47)

(3) This may help to bolster the theory of Sclopis Supra p. ~~20~~

(4) C.S.P. Scot-Leliz Vol.2 p.909 (5) Ib. Vol.1 p.356

(6) H.M.C. Salisbury MSS Pt.XIII p.296

(7) C.Scott.P. Vol.VIII p.519

ranks of her followers. On May 10th 1587 (Corneillis?) was writing to (Burghley?), "They are divided into two factions. Allen, Parsons, Owen and that flock desire to advance the King of Spain's title. Morgan, Paget, Lord Paget, Throgmorton and theirs rest for the King of Scots, whom Morgan says he will never forsake, as the pledge which the Queen his mistress left."(1) The uncertainty about the authorship of the letter detracts from its value as evidence, but there seems little reason to quarrel with the statement it makes about Morgan: and it is pleasant to find one whose reputation is none of the best expressing such noble sentiments. By 1590 he was in touch with the Duke of Savoy and the Bishop of Vaison, from both of whom he acknowledged letters in January 1589/1590, offering at the same time to enter into the service of Savoy(2). Whether he was ever taken into Savoyard service I have been unable to discover, but it is significant that the next reference to him should be as the bearer of letters from Scotland to Savoy; it increases the probability that he carried to Scotland the reply of Carlo Emanuele to James' first letter. The letter which he took to Savoy runs:

"Mon Frere et Cousin. Ce n'a pas este faulte de  
 "bonne volonte que iusques a cest' heure n'avons

(1) Calendar of Scottish Papers Vol.1X p.411  
 (2) Ib. Vol.X p.229

"faicte response aux vostres du 24me de Janvier 1600  
"car oultres les grandes affaires dont pour la plus part  
"nous avons este empesches et les detestables machinations  
"conspirez contre nostre vie desquelles dieu par sa grace  
"nous a conserve, il ne nous a semble propre durantes  
"les troubles qui vous sont tombees sur le bras avec le  
"Roy Treschretien vous disturber de voz plus serieuses  
"cogitations. Mais maintenant qu'il a pleu a dieu vous  
"remettre en bonne paix et que la commodite se presente  
"de vous renvoyer le Sieur Thomas Morgan tant pour con-  
"gratuler au bon succes de voz affaires que de vous re-  
"mercier de l'affection hereditaire que nous portez.  
"vous supplions croire que, comme voz devanciers ont  
"ayre les nostres, nous sommes de pareille volonte dis-  
"posez d'y continuer, et d'y adiouster toutes les bonnes  
"occasions pour la plus ferme conservation d'icelle.  
"Nous vous remercions de l'honneur qu'il vous a pleu  
"faire a nostre ambassadeur, lequel nous a fait fidel  
"rapport par sez lettres de ce qui est passe entre vous.  
"Nous vous recommandons l'evesque de Vaizon nostre subiect  
"et vous prions le favoriser en ce qu'il aura affairé de  
"vous. Et d'autant que le Sieur Honnore d'Urfe un de  
"voz plus fideles serviteurs s'est monstre nostre tres-  
"affectionne, et que quelques uns de sez parents se sont  
"renduz noz subiectz et serviteurs vous prions que si  
"par le passe la valeur et fidelite vous l'a recommande  
"que pour l'amour de nous il soit d'autant plus estime  
"a l'avenir. Quant au dict Morgan le fidel service par  
"luy fait a la feu Royne nostre treshonoree mere dur-  
"antes ses troubles, auquel il a continue vers nous  
"depuis sa mort nous avoit donne grand desir de l'avoir  
"retenu pres de nous, mais ne le pouvantz faire pour  
"tresgraves respectz nous vous le recommandons comme  
"nostre serviteur tresaffectionne. Et vous prions en  
"ce qui depende de nous n'en faire autre estat que de  
"celuy qui est etc."(1)

The words "l'honneur qu'il vous a pleu faire a nostre ambas-  
sador etc." are interesting. From the context it is clear  
that they cannot refer to Whisholm of Vaizon, and the only

(1) Torino, Archivio di Stato, Lettere di Giacomo VI e I no.2  
Endorsed "Le Roy d'Escosse 1600"

~~SECRET~~ 71

possible conclusion is that Drummond or one of the other Scottish agents in Italy who has not yet been connected with Savoy is referred to. The date of the letter is vague, the endorsement of "1600" being the only date given. Certain references in the letter, however, make it possible to fix the date of writing more accurately. Since the endorsement was made at Turin the style must be new style; the conspiracy mentioned by James would be that of Gowry, and the letter, therefore, written after August 5th 1600 when Gowry made his famous attempt(1); the peace made between France and Savoy would be that of Paris~~(2)~~. But, since the fighting broke out again soon after the signing of that treaty, in August 1600~~(2)~~, it must be presumed that the letter was written before the news of that renewal of the war reached Scotland, and that the letter was therefore written some time before the end of September 1600 at the latest. I say it must, and say that largely because I would have been better pleased to have been able to date it later. Fixing the date in the early autumn of 1600 makes Morgan spend an unconscionable time at Turin or on the way to Turin: for he was not in Paris, returning from his mission, till December 1601<sup>3</sup>(4). And, if Morgan went straight to Turin, it makes the people

(1) Pitcairn Criminal Trials cit. Vol.2 p.208 ~~(2)~~

(2) Cambridge Mod. Hist. Vol.3 p.418 <sup>3</sup> ~~(2)~~ H.M.C. LXth Report Pt.2 Appendix (Elphinstone Papers) p.196b

who received the letters in Turin singularly remiss in replying; for their replies were not sent off till the autumn of 1601(1). However there seems to be no other way of interpreting the endorsement and the clues of the letter, and the late autumn of 1600 must be accepted as the date of writing of the letter.

The replies show that the King had not been content to address the master only. Some of the servants, too, were considered worthy of his favour. There are letters of Don Gio Matteo Santi of September 30th 1601, and of Honore d'Urfe of November 4th to the King in reply to letters of his.(2) Writing to the King Morgan himself described how he dealt with the letters. "As I sayde alreadye his A. (Altesse, presumably) had your Maiesteis letter to him directed, Monsieur Durfi had your Maiesteis letter to him addressed, as it shall appeare unto your Maiestie by his letter inclosed. And having had experience of the merits of Don Juan Matteo Santus and his twoo brethren, gentlemen Piemontois de la camera e de la bocca de son A., and of their good disposition towards your Maiestie, I gave one of your Maiesteis letters to the said Don Juan Matteo Santus."(3) The replies of the servants are for-

(1) Infra (2) H.M.C. 1Xth Report Pt.2 Appendix (Elphinstone Papers) pp 196 & 197. ~~(3) Ib. p. 196~~ The reply of Santi is quoted in full in Fraser The Elphinstone Family Book. Vol. 2. p. 149. (3) H.M.C. IXth Report Pt. 2 Appendix (Elphinstone Papers) ~~pp 196~~ p. 196.

mal politenesses. That of Honore d'Urfe, which is the more interesting of the two, expresses the author's willingness to serve the King in any way he can, and offers a prayer that he may be able to draw closer the liens between Scotland and Savoy.

There the Scottish correspondance with Savoy ends, so far as I can find both in Britain and in Turin. A few letters exchanged, nothing agreed upon, if anything was proposed, and a little excitement roused in Europe. Of the reaction of Henri IV enough has already been said(1), but he was not alone in being curious about the new diplomatic exchanges. The Master of Grey, attempting no doubt to curry favour by exhibiting his own knowledge of European affairs and the use this knowledge would be to Scotland, wrote in the December of 1600 to dissuade the King from continuing further with Carlo Emanuele, and to persuade him that the Grand Duke of Tuscany was a far superior ally. "As for the Princes of Italy," he wrote, "D.D. of Savoy and Lorraine they be meine and followers of the rieiant princes." (2) The point of this remark for us is that so well-informed a person as Grey should have thought it worth while treating seriously the idea of an alliance between Scotland and

(1) Supra (2) H.M.C. Salisbury MSS Pt.X (1904) p.414  
It is an interesting speculation whether Grey had more definite information to found his belief on than is now available.

Savoy. And even that very sober body, the Spanish Council of State, could suggest in a memorial to Philip III that the Catholic faith might be restored to Scotland by the marriage of the prince of Scotland to an Infanta of Savoy(I). There this negotiation with Savoy of the king of Scotland rests, finished when it had hardly begun. It had been not quite fruitless; the way had been opened for negotiations between Savoy and the united kingdom.

(I) C.S.P. Span. Vol. 4 p. 691

The policy of uniting the two houses of Stuart and Savoy that had been hinted at in these earlier negotiations was to be the policy of Savoy for the next ten or more years, and this marriage diplomacy almost the sole tie between the two states. The initiative had now of necessity passed to Savoy as the less important of the two. James had little to gain by tying his house to that of an Italian princeling(1), while his own status as the head of a considerable European power made him the more welcome as an ally for Savoy. In 1603, soon after the accession of the Stuarts to the throne of England, Carlo Emanuele had expressed in his political testament his determination to ally himself with the Stuarts(2), in order both to give his house stability and dignity after the loss of prestige at Lyons, and to raise it in the councils of Europe. In 1604 Priuli, the Venetian ambassador in Turin, could inform his Senate that the Duke had already begun negotiations with England for the marriage of his eldest daughter to prince Henry of England (The girl was that Dona Margherita whom Fra Gio Balbi described in 1602 as "prudentissima, sana e poco bella(3), and who was later to be married to the

(1) The suggestion of Passamonti in Relazioni Anglo-Sabauda dal 1603 al 1625 in Bollettino storico-bibliografico Subalpina 1934 p.289 that a Savoyard ambassador was welcomed in England in 1603 because a Franco-Spanish invasion was imminent is far fetched. (2) Ricotti Storia cit. Vol.3 p.437. (3) Bertolotti curiosita storiche

young Gonzaga(1)) but was suspending them till peace should be made between Spain and England so that the girl should have the weighty support of her uncle Philip 111(2). Priuli went on:

"He (Carlo Emanuele) has left the uncle to look after the interests of his daughter, hoping that the desired results will follow. He is of the Opinion that, since the king of England wishes Universal peace, the creation of a blood tie between the two crowns will best insure him against what the difference of religion might otherwise threaten. At the same time he urges this business on himself, partly for the sake of his daughter, and partly through fear that the Most Christian King may devise something to the advantage of the Grand Duke, with whom his rivalry has almost reached the point of open enmity."(2)

The proposed treaty between England and Spain consequently found a warm supporter in Carlo Emanuele. In a memorial obviously inspired by him Verrua, the Savoyard ambassador in Rome, set out the advantages to both countries of finding some *modus vivendi*, recommending as the best means of making a stable peace the marriage of the children of England and Savoy:

"For renewing the friendship between the kings of Spain and England one might propose, as the strongest tie that nature and the law of God have given, the marriage of a princess of Savoy with the prince of England. And since the Infanta Isabella has no children the king of Spain might transfer her claims to the throne of England to the house of Savoy. These claims which are well-established and real might be

(1) R. Quazza Mantova e Montferrato etc cit. p.17

(2) Relazioni degli stati europei cit. Serie 3. Vol.1 p.58

given as a dowery by the king of Spain to the princess his niece."(1)

The memorial went on, with a shrewd knowledge of the mental make-up of king James, to hold out the prospect that, with so sure a peace made, James would be able to arbitrate between the Low Countries and Spain.

I cannot find any indication of the use that memorial was put to. After James' accession to the throne of England he received as ambassador from Savoy George Giencure, Marquis de Lullin(2), sent to congratulate with him on his new dignity, and it is possible that the memorial formed the basis of his instructions. It is possible but not likely. The only surviving account of his audiences shows that they passed in compliment and reproof from the king for the attempt lately made by Savoy against Geneva. The author of the account was the Sieur de Soulli Aniorrant, sent by Geneva as envoy to England, and as a Genevan he may be supposed to have observed closely, if suspiciously, the activities of Lullin in England. His account reads:

"Icy je ne peux passer sous silence l'envoy du Marquis

(1) Gran Bretagna, Negoziazioni Mazzo 1. Quoted more fully in Passamonti Relazioni etc.cit. pp. 273-279.

(2) His letter of credence, dated October 1st 1603 is Harleian MSS 1760 f.57. His letter of recedence, dated January 13/23 1603/1604 is Lettere di Giacomo 1 No.3. He was in Brussels returning to Savoy by February 2nd. (H.M.C. Portland MSS Vol. 1X p.156.)

de Lullin son Ambassade & audience du 23 Decembre 1603. Son harangue fut faite en grand apparat, mais fort bas et en fort peu de mots, le lendemain que l'Ambassadeur de Polougne demeure court, s'estant trouble sur le milieu de la sienne. Ce ne furent que congratulations et tesmoignages de desirs d'union & correspondance d'amitiez; et entendis qu'il dict que le duc son Maistre avoit cest honneur d' estre descendu de la maison de Saxe, alliez de la maison de Danemark, & qu'il avoit eu telle amitie entre les Pere & Mere de S.M. et de S.A. que le feu Roy & Reyne d'Escosse avoyent envoye prier le duc Philibert Emmanuel d'estre un des Parrins du Roy, mais il n'adjousta pas que la Reyne d'Escosse fut fort offensee de ce que le duc Philibert y envoya fort tard apres le baptesme l'Ambassadeur arriva qui fust renvoya et ne fut receu son maistre pour parrin.(1)

Le 30 Decembre je suppliy S.M. qu'en cas que le dict Sieur de Lullin advenast quelque chose au desavantage de Geneve, qu'il pleust a S.M. nous prester l'aultre oreille, et en cas qu'il n'en tint aucun propos que S.M. fit tumber son propos sur ~~xx~~ l'Escalade entreprinse en temps de paix & tesmoigner son affection envers Geneve & le desir qu'il a que la paix soit entretenue dont S.M. ayant eu souvenance presser de pres le dict Sieur de Lullin sur l'Escalade dont s'estant le dict Sieur Ambassadeur defendu sur leurs excuses ordinaires, de nos bled emmenez contre leurs deffiances de dessus leurs terres, en quoy n'ayant contente S.M. comme sa dicte M. me dict, lorsque luy presente vos lettres sur ce subject du 28 Janvier trop tard envoyees & qui neantmoins donnerent contentement a S.M. pour avoir desia fait ce dont elle estoit suppliee par les dictes lettres. Le dict de Lullin pour conclusion dict que son Maitre avoit S.M. en tel respect qu'il feroit tousiours sadicte M.te juge des differends qu'il avoit avec Geneve."(2)

The mission of Lullin had not been too successful. The shadow of Geneva, which was so often in the future to fall over Carlo Emanuele's negotiations in England, had darkened this first one.

(1) The Savoyard ambassadeur was "Monsieur la Croco". Historie and Life of King James Sext. p.5 (2) S.P.Switzerland Bundle 1 No. 138 & 139. It is a transcript of Fol. 200 du Vol. de l'annee 1605 des registres du Conseil de Geneve. I have copied the copy accurately.

In England voices were not wanting to proclaim the match, and on June 26th 1603 Scaramelli the Venetian secretary in London was writing to the senate of the rumour then current, that the Spanish and Archducal envoys were bringing great offers of a match either of the prince of Piedmont to the princess Elizabeth or of prince Henry to an infanta of Savoy.(1) Even in Madrid it was taken for granted that the marriage proposals would be pressed forwardly. In October 1604 the Venetian ambassador in Madrid, Contarini, wrote home that they were then in Madrid expecting the secretary Ronaccio from Turin to urge Philip on in his advocacy of the marriage negotiations.(2) It was a fair beginning. Then for some reason came a blank period.

It was James who reopened these negotiations, or rather, who gave Carlo Emanuele an opportunity to reopen them, after a lapse of nearly six years. In 1609 James' book, "The premonition" (3) was finished and ready to be distributed to all those mighty monarchs and free princes who were likely to accept it(4).

(1) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. X no. 15. (2) Ib. No. 290

(3) An Apologie for the Oath of Allegiance together with a Premonition to all Moste Mightie Monarches London

April, 1609. (4) ~~Harxite~~ C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XI no. ~~301~~ 527

(Their number was not large. No Catholic prince could accept it though it was offered(1)) The copy for the Duke of Savoy, bound in velvet with the arms and corner pieces of gold(2), was given to Barclay to carry(3), who was also to take those copies destined for Lorraine and Bavaria(4). The note of his being commissioned to take the book is dated June 10th 1609. His letter of credence, which is dated June 11th, runs:

"Monsieur mon Cousin

Ayant a vous communiquer quelque chose qui ne touche pas moins a l'honneur et seurete de tous autres Princes Chretiens qu'a la nostre, Nous vous avons envoye le Sieur de Barclay Gentilhomme de nostre chambre pour en estre porteur vous priant de luy donner acces en temps convenable pour la vous représenter; ne doubtans point que la chose ne vous soit agreable puis qu'elle vous concerne autant que nous mesmes, qui demeurons en toutes occasions etc."(5)

When Barclay left England, or when he arrived in Turin I have been unable to find out; there is a gap between June 11th and August 8th, when Badoer, the venetian resident in Turin wrote that Barclay had left Turin without presenting ~~his~~ the

- (1) For its reception in Venice see L.P.Smith Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton. Vol.1 p.100-107  
 (2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XI no. 527. (3) Barclay is described as a French poet in C.S.P.Dom. 1603-1610 p.506  
 (4) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XI no.527 (5) Lettere di Giacomo 1 No.4.

book(1). Carlo Emanuele must have declined it tactfully, however. From England in November 1609 Correr, the Venetian ambassador, wrote that the king was delighted with the Duke of Savoy and the king of Hungary for the reception they gave his envoy, for although they declined the book they accepted his letters(2) It was a trivial enough business on the face of it, and no note seems to remain of any discussions that Barclay may have had in Turin, but it was a good opportunity for Carlo Emanuele to reopen negotiations with England. His reply to James is accordingly very complimentary.

"Monseigneur

J'ay veu le gentilhomme porteur de ceste avec toute l'affection que je doy et porte a V.M.te et ouy fort attentivement ce qui estoit de sa charge suyvant qu'il luy a pleu m'en escrire par sa lettre du XIe de Juin dernier. Cest une faveur tuschante que V. M.te me faict d'avoit eu souvenance de moy. Je luy en confesse une obligation particuliere, et la supplie croyre que en toutes occasions je rendray preuves des services tresumbles que je luy ay voue, ainsy que je m'asseure elle aura desia peu entendre par son Ambassadeur resident en Espagne; et que j'ay prie de nouveau ledit gentilhomme de dire a V. M.te en luy faisant recit des justes causes que j'ay eu de ne pouvoir satisfaire entierement au desire de V. M.te pour n'offenser ma propre conscience. Lesquelles de me prometz de sa bonte seront receues selon le sens de ma bonne intention, puis que hors ce respect il ny a chose en quoy je ne tesmoigne a V. M.te que je veux desmeurer ~~X~~ a tousiours etc."(3)

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XI no.579. (2) Ib. No. 714

(3) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.57. August 4th 1609.

Nor was this mission ~~of~~ Barclay's to be the only one for which Savoy was indebted to James before he formally reopened negotiations. ~~again~~ Returning from his embassy in Venice Sir Henry Wotton, either at the invitation of the Duke or of his own inclination (for I can find no letter of credence for him) travelled by way of Turin(1). He arrived there on January 8th 1611, and for the next few days was in frequent communication with the Duke ~~(2)~~ (1). What passed between them is unknown, but for the rest of his days Wotton was a strong advocate of a marriage alliance between Savoy and England; and it is not stretching probability too far to assume that in Turin he was either converted to the opinion that such a marriage would best serve both England and the cause of Protestantism in Italy, or was confirmed in that opinion ~~(2)~~ (2)

In England, if no active negotiating had taken place to further them, the Savoyard marriage plans had never been abandoned completely. In October 1607 and, later, in 1608 the marriage of the princess Elizabeth to the prince of Piedmont had been

(1) L.P. Smith Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton  
Vol.1 p.114 (2) Ib. p.115

discussed as a means of coming to better terms with Spain(1); and again in 1610 the Spanish ambassador in England, seeing the rapprochement between Henri IV and Savoy, had suggested such a marriage as a means of breaking it(2). It was with these encouragements, then, that Carlo Emanuele decided to send an ambassador into England to reopen negotiations for a marriage and a closer alliance.

He did not lack reasons. His position in Europe had changed considerably since 1603. The death of his Spanish wife in 1597(3) had weakened the family tie that bound him to Spain, but the menace of France had, at first, enabled necessity to maintain the link that kinship no longer supplied. The treaty of Lyons had removed the menace, and the years following had removed the bitterness of the treaty. By 1605 Carlo Emanuele was growing reconciled to the irrevocable alienation of the rich lands of Bresse, and was beginning to see the advantages of an alliance with France(4); and the sharpness of his perception was not diminished by the death of the prince of Piedmont in Spain, with the suspicion, common enough

(1) S.R. Gardiner History of England Vol. 2 pp. 23 & 27

(2) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XII no. 111 (3) Relazioni degli stati europei cit. Serie 3 Vol. 1 p. 149n

(4) Giovanni Curti Carlo Emanuele I cit. p. 68

at the time, of foul play(1). The birth of a son to Philip III(2) had further weakened the ties between Spain and Savoy, for there was no chance of any of the house of Savoy profiting from their mother's descent from the Hapsburgs, or from a marriage with an infanta of Spain. The immediate <sup>result</sup> of the revulsion from Spain was to bring to a glow those notions of a united Italy, free from foreign interference, that were afterwards to make the name of Carlo Emanuele so honourable in Italian history, and to turn his eyes westwards to France.

There were offers from Henri IV to incite him. In 1605 Carlo Emanuele had been offered for a neutrality friendly to France rich livings and assignments for his sons in France, and for an offensive and defensive alliance the return of Bresse and aid to attack the Spanish lands in Lombardy(3). It was tempting, but the suspicion of the ability of Henri IV created at Lyons was not to be easily removed, and for a time these offers were ignored. The undertaking that was most likely to involve a clash with Spain, the restoration to his state of Montferrat, Carlo Emanuele sought to accomplish peaceably by the

(1) Prince Filippo died February 9th 1605 (Relazioni degli stati europei Serie 3 Vol.1 p.103. See too

P. Orsi Il Carteggio di Carlo Emanuele I in Rinaudo Op. Cit.

(2) G. Curti Op. Cit. p. 49. ~~(3)~~

marriage of his eldest daughter, that Margherita "sana e poco bella" who had earlier been destined for prince Henry, to Francesco Gonzaga(1). The effect of the marriage was that the settlement of the problem was postponed for a time. But, if that problem could be shelved and with it the need for an agreement with France, the insistence of Henri could not be disposed of so easily. It was part of that king's "Great design" to augment very considerably the state of Savoy and raise the Duke to the rank of king, or so Sully alleges. "Semblant a propos en suite de telles propositions & ouvertures a faire au Pape luy declarer comme le Duc de Savoye est dispose de se porter entierement a les embrasser, afin que ce tesmoignage de bonne volonte luy facilitast l'obtention de l'erection de la Lombardie, du Piedmont, de la Savoye & du Montferrat en titre de royaume."(2) Even if the general design was not the king's but ~~an~~ a project fathered on him by Sully, this, the Italian part, seems to have been an idea of the king's. By 1607 he was suggesting an alliance between France and Savoy, and suggesting that it should be cemented by the marriage of Madame Elizabeth to the prince

(1) Supra. For the marriage treaty see Traites de de la maison de savoie cit. Vol.1 p.245.

(2) Duc de Sully Memoires ou oeconomies royales Tom.IV p.65

of Piedmont(1). A period of delays followed that ruffled the small patience of Carlo Emanuele. De Jacob was sent from Turin to invite Henri IV to declare war at once on the Spanish and to send troops to Piedmont to evict them from Lombardy(2). The treaty of alliance between France and Savoy was signed in 1610. At Brusol on April 25th Bullion and Lesdiguières(3) signed the treaty of that name, offering Carlo Emanuele some 14,000 men paid by France with which to attack the Spaniards in the Milanese, and being promised in return the raising of the Savoyard fortress of Momigliano on the borders of Dauphiné(4). The king, considering the inconvenience likely to be caused the Hapsburgs by the attacks in Italy worth the money spent, sought no territorial advantages for France in Italy.

Whatever hopes Carlo Emanuele may have built on that treaty were soon demolished. The death of Henri IV on May 14th, a few weeks after the treaty was signed, left him in a worse position than almost ever before. He was left exposed as about to make an attack upon the Spanish lands in Italy, and

(1) G.Curti Op. Cit. p.90. (2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XI no.657. (3) For Lesdiguières part in Franco-Savoyard relations see G. Dufayard de la Haysse de Lesdiguières (4) Traites de la maison de Savoie cit. Vol.1 p.284

left bare of support; for Lesdiguiere's was forced to inform him that the treaty was no longer valid(1). In all the stormy course of his reign few moments can have been <sup>more</sup> bitter~~er~~ than that on which he sent his son Filiberto to Spain to crave pardon for his misdeeds, and to crave it humbly, on his knees(2). For the future no hope lay in the queen mother of France, nor in Luynes. It was to the hostility of Lesdiguieres to a Spanish Italy alone that Carlo Emanuele could look in France/ for the future. It was the need, then, of finding some buttress to his state, the need of allying himself with some power that might protect him from reprisals from the Milanese, where some 30,000 men were reported to be under arms(3) that probably induced the Duke to send an envoy into England.

- (1) E. Armstrong The Constable Lesdiguieres in E.H.R. Vol.X p.457.  
 (2) G.Curti Op. Cit. p.100  
 (3) Cambridge Modern History Vol.3 p.690

MARRIAGE NEGOTIATIONS 1. 1611 and 1612

The first of the Savoyard Ambassadors sent to England to renew the marriage negotiations was Ruffia, Claudio Cambiano di Ruffia, Conte di Cartignano. He arrived in England on March 22nd 1611 and was met at Gravesend both by Sir Henry Wotton and by the Master of Ceremonies, Sir Lewis Lewkenor(1). His reception and treatment in England were very splendid, though Ottaviano Lotto, the Tuscan agent, looking on jealously thought the splendour used rather to repay Carlo Emanuele for his reception of Wotton than to show how highly Savoy was valued in England(2). Ruffia himself was more than satisfied with his reception. Writing home on April 1st he informed his master that the courtesy of his welcome and the frequency with which he was accorded audiences surprised and caused envy to all(3). No letter of instructions seems to have survived for this first mission of Ruffia's, but Carlo Emanuele hinted at the business of his mission in the letter of credence that he carried:

"Monseigneur

Je me suis tousiours tant promis de la faveur et bienveillance de V. M.te et de l'honneur quelle me fait et a toute cette sienne (sic) mayson de nous tenir pour ses tres humbles serviteurs, que i'espere aussi qu'elle agreera l'extreme desir que i'ay de mobliger plus estroitement a V. M.te par de nouveaux et ~~de~~ plus forts liens en recevant les graces des quelles la supliera le conte de cartignan mon ambassadeur. V. M.te me fera la

(1) Lettere Ministri (Inghilterra) Mazzo 1. Ruffia to C.E. March 23rd. 1611. (2) C. Guasti Di un Trattato di Nozze fra la Casa di Savoia e i Reali di Inghilterra p.57.

(3) Lettere Ministri (Ingh.) . Mazzo 1.

faveur sil luy plait de l'ouyr avec toute benignite et luy donner la creance quelle feroit a moy mesme, s'asseurant que comme ie suis poussé a celia par une ardente volonte que iay de luy pouvoir randre tres-humble service aussi ie benieray le iour que V. M. te me fera cette grace avec l'honneur de ses commandements etc"(1).

The new and stronger bonds between Savoy and England that Carlo Emanuele desired were to be established by the marriage of the prince of Piedmont to princess Elizabeth and of an infanta of Savoy to prince Henry. It was to make the first moves in these negotiations for a double marriage that Ruffia was sent to England.

The shadow of Geneva that had fallen over Lullin's mission was to fall over this first mission of Ruffia's. In February the magistrates of Geneva had written very anxiously to inform the king that Savoyard troops were lying on the frontiers of their city, and to ask him for help(2). Later, in March, Sir Thomas Somerset was writing to the same effect to Salisbury(3). Ruffia's first business had to be the defence of his master from these charges, and, though he may have given a satisfactory defence, the irritation caused by the fear of a threat to Geneva must have made his proposals less well received.

In his proposals, indeed, Ruffia met with less success than had perhaps been expected in Turin. The

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 No.61

(2) S.P.Switzerland Bundle 1 No.166. February 6th

(3) Ib. No.174 March 20th. See also Winwood Memorials of Affairs of State. Vol.3. pp. 265, 268 etc.

proposal of a double marriage was rejected immediately, on the grounds that the prince of Wales was too young to contract a marriage, and Ruffia had not a commission to treat of the marriage of the prince of Piedmont with princess Elizabeth alone. A paper in the collection of State Papers (Savoy) gives the following account of Ruffia's work in England.

"L'occasion du Voyage de l'Ambassadeur a este a deux fins: l'une pour rendre raison des mouvements presents de son maistre; l'autre pour faire instance de quelque estroit Alliance entre le Roy et luy.

Touchant le premier, Il a dit que son maistre avoit este contraint de se tenir arme, comme il estoit encore, pour le juste subject qu'il avoit de deffiance et de soupcon contre l'Espagne, n'estant pas aussy bien assure de la France; Mais a proteste qu'il avoit nul desseing, comme one s'estoit imagine, contre Geneve.

Pour le second point qui concerne l'Alliance, Il se tint du commencement sur les termes generaux; mais par apres le Roy ayant commis quelques uns de son Conseil pour traiter particulierement avec luy: Il leur declara qu'il avoit charge de proposer un double Mariage entre les enfans de sa Ma.te et ceux de son M.re, Scavoir l'un entre le prince de Savoye et Madame la Princesse, & l'autre entre Mons.r le Prince de Gales & la Fille de Savoye.

Sur premicrement luy fut demande, si sa Commission estoit si limitee, que sans traiter des deux Mariages ensemble, Il ne luy estoit pas permis de traiter d'un seul. A quoy respondant qu'il ne pouvoit l'un sans l'autre; On luy dit, que c'estoit chose non attendue qu'il deust parler de celuy du Prince, Duquel la fortune, le jeune age (qui pouvait bien encore attendre) & l'esprit estoyent tels qu'il ne se pourroit pas assubjettir a de telles prescriptions. & que quand l'occasion se presenteroit, Il voudroit avoir luy mesme la liberte de son choix; fust ce pour le plus grand

parti de l'Europe. Et que puis que sa Commission estoit si limitee il n'en falloit plus parler.

L'Ambassadeur repliqua, Qu'encores que sa charge fust si restraainte, Neantmoins a son retour son M.re se pourroit declarer sur l'autre Mariage seulement.

La dessus on luy dit, qu'au cas que cela advint Sa Ma.te desirant de traiter rondement trouvoit bon, afin qu'un affair de telle importance ne fust point trop <sup>ARD</sup> que l'on advisast des ceste heure ~~xx~~ s'il ne s'y pourroit point presenter quelques difficultes qui fussent cause ~~cause~~ d'en frustrer la negociation. Sur quoy le Ambassadeur s'eslargit par un long discours a donner de grandes assurances de la resolution de son M.re au cas que la chose en vint si avant, comme qu'il bailleroit plus tot la carte blanche a sa M.te que de l'atraindre a des conditions disagreeables. Neantmoins on trouva bon de venir au point & luy demander quelle assurance on donneroit a la Princesse d'avoir l'exercice libre de sa Religion pour elle et sa famille en Savoy. A cela il apporta beaucoup de difficultes de la part de son M.re fondees sur le scrupule de la Conscience et sur l'obligation qu'il avoit au Pape, & a la Religion Catholique.

Sur quoy on lui allegua l'exemple de Lorraine; mais il respondit qu'il y avoit beaucoup de difference entre la Lorraine et eux pour ce regard; parce que son M.re avoit ses Pais sur la frontiere d'Italie & un Nonce maintenant resident en sa Cour. On luy coupa broche la dessus & luy dit on peremptoirement, que pour la faire Royne de tout le Monde, le Roy ne l'abandonneroit en sa Religion.

Mais l'Ambassadeur adjoutta, qu'en faisant les deux Mariages il avoit charge d'offrir par voye de reciproque, la mesme liberte pour ce regard a la Princesse en Savoye, que l'on voudroit ottroyer a leur Infante en Angleterre. Sur lequel propos on prit advantage de refuser l'objection du scrupule qu'il avoit allegue pour la Conscience de son M.re, laquelle n'en pourroit ~~pas~~ pas estre moins interessee, ny plus justifiee en ceste action la pour avoir induit le Roy a faire le mesme. Mais ledit Ambassadeur n'insista pas davantage alleguant le defaut de son pouvoir.

Cependant il a este honorablement entretenu, festoye et caresse avec toute sorte de courtoisie et de faveur; comme a la verite le subject venu sembloit meriter. En cest negociation il a voulu faire paroistre que l'Espagne n'y avoit point de part, pensant faire

par la plus valoir son marche, mais le jugement que l'on en fait est tout autre.

En ceste conference tenue avec ledit Ambassadeur le Roy luy protesta ouvertement, que tant s'en falloit qu'il voulust abandonner Geneve & les amis qu'il avoit en ces quartiers la, qu'il n'avoit aucune persuasion ny mesme Contract de Mariage qui le peust divertir de les diffendre si on les attaquoit;"(1)

So the account runs, and if it ends by noting that Ruffia was entertained very honourably, it makes it clear also that his negotiations did not proceed easily. The religious division was deep in itself, and may, in addition, have been used simply as an instrument to thwart the marriage proposals. On the morning after Ruffia's arrival in London, on the 25th of March Lotto, the Tuscan agent, was writing home about the proposals that Ruffia was to make, "Intelligent opinion, as I understand, has it that they will treat with Ruffia, and then dismiss him with doubts and vague hopes. The general opinion seems to be that princess Elizabeth is destined for the Prince Palatine(2)."

Ruffia's task was not made easier by some of the other agents in the English court. Both the french and the tuscan were fiercely opposed to any alliance between England and Savoy, and did all in their power to upset whatever Ruffia could effect. On April 7th Carrer, the Venetian ambassador in London,

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle No.62. See also a letter of Salisbury's of April 3rd in Winwood Memorials cit.

Vol.3 p.271

(2) C.Guasti Di un Trattato di Nozze cit.

informed the Doge and Senate of the attitude of the French ambassador to Ruffia; "The French have shown signs of great suspicion and have done all they could to damage the reputation of the Duke of Savoy and to upset an alliance between two Princes, both of whom border on France. And this happened that the French ambassador after naming an hour when the Savoyard could return his visit, shut the door in his face on the ground that he had first visited Spain."(1) While earlier, on February 24th of that year, even before Ruffia could arrive in England, Correr could write that the suspicions of Lotto were aroused by the very fact that he was to be sent(2). The reasons are not far to seek. In France the queen mother would find danger in the alliance of her two neighbours; and as a Medici she would look with ill-will on any attempt to raise the status and reputation of Savoy above those of her Tuscan kin, the more so that a Tuscan marriage had already been suggested for the prince of Wales(3). Against this opposition Ruffia had, rather surprisingly in view of the recent tension between Spain and Savoy on the death of Henri IV, the support of Alonso di Velasco, the Spanish ambassador(4). One of the volumes of the

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.199. (2) *Ib.* no.181. (3) C. GUASTI DI un Trattato di Nozze cit. p.56

(4) C.S.P.V en. Vol.XII nos 202 & 204

Harleian Miscellany has a paper that gives an explanation of this attitude of the Spanish ambassador that may have some truth in it. It is "A Relation of the Carriage of the Marriages that should have been made between the Prince of England and the Infanta Major." The relevant part runs:

"At the same time that the Spanish Ambassador made the first Overture for the Prince of Piedmont (for the Motion thereof came from him as so directed by the King of Spain, as he affirmed and shewed in Writing) he said, that in Case his Majesty should be pleased to make the like Overture to the King his Master, for the Prince of Wales, to match with the Infanta, he did assure himself, that his Majesty should receive a kind and an honourable Answer; intimating indeed, that the Intent of this match with Savoy was to be as a forerunner of the match desired betwixt the Prince and the Infanta by which all Difficulties in Matters of Religion might be facilitated."(1)

And it was not from the other agents alone that Ruffia encountered opposition. It is probable that the general feeling in England was against the marriage alliance with Savoy. There is a significant letter of Sir Dudley Carleton's, one of the ablest diplomats of his age and a man whom later events were to prove to be no enemy of Savoy, which in stressing the unfairness to the English prince and princess of the proposed marriage alliance and the small value it would be to England must have been echoed by many in England.

(1) Harleian Miscellany vol.VIII p.2.

The letter reads:

"Our Prince is yet too yong, and when he comes to mans estate he shall have libertie of his owne choise: For the La. Elizabeth we must first have assurance of free exercise of religion w.ch will be hardly yealded on this side the mountaines. So as this is in effect honesta ~~responctio~~ recusatio, and the alliance (indeede) besides all other impediments is of small use to our crowne but the Duke (we heare) was framing consequences as yf the matches were allready concluded: and spared not to threaten the French Agent by way of discourse w.th a league betwixt himself, England, this state(1), and the united provinces, whorby to besiege France on all sides."(2)

The difficulty that arose from the earlier contract of marriage between the Prince of Piedmont and a daughter of France(3) Ruffia smoothed over lightly, alleging that, "The prince had never liked this contract nor consented to it; and now that the Queen of France wished to defer this marriage till the king is of maturer age, both their highnesses have thought it well not to bind themselves to an event so exposed to accidents."(4)

With a definite refusal given to what he had been authorised to propose Ruffia had no reason to remain longer in the country. And the fact that some hope of effecting the single marriage alliance had been held out to him would encourage him to use

(1) Carleton was writing from Venice.

(2) Stowe MSS 172 f.24. Carleton to Edmondos April 30th O.S.

(3) Supra (4) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.200

haste in returning for fresh instructions. His letter of recedence is dated March 30th (O.S.)(1), and, as it is likely that he would leave shortly after receiving it, his departure may be assumed to have taken place on the 1st or 2nd of April. If he did not achieve much in this first mission he cannot have been sent altogether empty away. He must have thought the omens in England sufficiently good for him to be able to report to his master that there would be a good hope of success if he continued to press for the marriage of the princess Elizabeth to the prince of Piedmont. His report must have been in some such terms, for soon after his arrival in Turin Carlo Emanuele was writing to James in words even more effusive than was customary to thank him for his favourable reception of Ruffia, and to announce his intention of sending him back to England shortly;

"Monseigneur

le contentement que j'ay receu par le rapport que le Conte de Cartignan mon Ambassadeur me fit a son retour de l'honneur que V. M.te se daigne me fere de la continuation de ses bonnes graces et d'avoir aggree le tesmoignage de mes volontez a son service est si grand, que ie ne scaurois trouver paroles suffizantes pour le représenter a V. M.te puis mesme que cela ne se pourroit fere que par quelque grande occasion de luy rendre ~~service~~ treshumble service, ainsi que V. M.te m'a si estroitement et recentemente obligé: c'est aussi la cause qui me la fera desirer toute ma vie, comme j'espere que Dieu & V. M.te m'en feront la grace. Cependant j'ay bien voulu l'en remercier

(1) Lettere di ~~xxx~~ Giacomo I No. IX

en toute humilite et arfection par ces deux motz, lesquels debvant estre bien tost ensuyvis du mesme Conte que ie renvoie par devers V. M.te pour la conclusion (s'il plaira a Dieu) de ce qu'il a projecte sur les affaires, dont il luy a parle en mon nom. Je supplie V. M.te me favoriser de sa bienveillance, et croire que rien ne me scauroit arriver plus a souhait que lors que ie pourrai paroistre par quelques bons effectz etc." (1)

The forces that had been working against him continued to operate after Ruffia's departure from England. The hostility of Maria de' Medici to any rapprochement between England and Savoy continued as strong or stronger than before. With the genius of her house for such affairs she interested Paul V in preventing the marriage of the heir of the house of Savoy to an heretical princess, the more that that princess was of the greatest heretical power in Europe. The pope rose to the lure. Paolo ~~da~~<sup>da</sup> Cesena, the provincial of the capuchins, who had been so famous in the dispute between the Pope and Venice(2), was sent to Turin to prevent any marriage of the Prince of Piedmont to the princess Elizabeth(~~the~~); and perhaps the part that Carlo Emanuele had played in the dispute between Venice and the papacy may have helped to determine the person of the agent as well as the instructions that he was to receive(3). The essential thing in these instructions

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.68 May 31/June 10 1611

(2) See L.Pastor History of the Popes Vol.XXV p.195.

(3) De Magistris Carlo Emanuele I<sup>a</sup> contesa fra la  
republica di Veneta e Paolo V

was this, that Fra Paolo should try to turn the thoughts of the Duke from the English marriage. But he was also supplied with reasons for use in dissuading the Duke, reasons partly of faith and partly of politics.

"The first point is this: his Highness, as a father, is bound to seek for the prince his son the best things he can, and the greatest good that Christians can have is the health of that soul which Christ our Lord bought with His precious blood. They should therefore flee all occasions that may lead it into danger.

The afore-mentioned marriage can produce nothing but ill effects, dangerous not to the prince only but to his successors also; for it is well known what can be wrought by continuous intercourse with those tainted with heresy, what influence wives have over their husbands, and what trouble can come from an unsuitable marriage.

His Highness would be placing in danger of contagion from heresy not his own house only, but all his subjects, all Italy, for we know how desirous is the king of England of making heresy grow everywhere, especially in Italy.

His Highness should not love his own soul so little as to be willing to offend so greatly against the Divine Majesty. He is bound to give an account to God of all the ills that may flow from such a marriage which the sacred canons and councils have so bitterly condemned.

After your Reverence has treated of these interests of the soul, you will pass to reasons of state, and will show that this linking in marriage is not useful, and is not honourable to the Duke or to the prince his son. It is not useful because the lands of his Highness are surrounded on every side by heretics, who have occupied several parts of his state, and it will not be any advantage to him to have heretics within his own house, giving them a opportunity of growing in favour and power, and of stirring up and feeding quarrels between husband and wife. It is not likely to be useful for another reason: that in his time of need he can put little trust in England because of its remoteness, and because that king desires nothing more than the ruin of

*the help and protection of*  
^

Catholic princes, and the dissemination, as we have said, of heresy in Italy.

Indeed it may be dangerous to him, for it may make him suspect to the French, who may perhaps believe that this marriage alliance has as one of its objects an intervention in their affairs when an opportunity arises. It is not necessary for his Highness to give the French this ground for suspicion.

As good Catholics his subjects cannot find this marriage pleasing, and inwardly their love and devotion towards their Highnesses will wane, and towards their descendants, to whom the ill-affected can always object as impud with the false doctrine they learned from their mother. "(1)

These weighty reasons against the marriage, with the knowledge that in his power to annul the marriage the pope held the stronger position, made Carlo Emanuele realise that it would not be expedient to run head down against the papacy. To meet the papal weapons he had to find others of a like kind. These weapons he found in the answers of the most eminent theologians of his state to the papal arguments. The most satisfactory of the replies seems to have come from padre Isidoro, the provincial of the order of St. Paul in Piedmont ~~and~~ and a considerable canonist(2). He denied that in the present problem the arguments of the pope were valid, and went on to argue that in all such cases, if there were any hope of an heretical wife's being converted, it was permissible for a Catholic husband to cohabit with her, and that, therefore, since

(1) Letter of Cardinal Borghese dated 13th August 1611  
Original in V. Siri memorie recondite Vol.2 pp.559-562

(2) Passamenti ~~Relazioni~~ Relazioni cit 1934 n. 301.

it was likely that the princess Elizabeth would be converted (a premise probably supplied by the customary optimism of the Duke) it would be no great sin for the prince to marry and live with her. Then, more daringly, he argued that there was no need for a Catholic prince to seek papal consent before marrying a Protestant, for so the doctors had declared<sup>(1)</sup>. If not made it was a strong check, though the possibility that the pope might declare the marriage null left the advantage with him, in the opinion of contemporaries<sup>(2)</sup>.

On the other board Carlo Emanuele was preparing to send his alfiere Ruffia to the attack again. He did not lack encouragement. On his return from England, in addition to the satisfactory report that he must have made, Ruffia had drawn up a memorial setting out the great strength that England drew from its position and the advantages that would come to Savoy from an alliance with England:

"There is no doubt that today the king of England is the arbiter between the crowns of France and Spain, because if he inclines to any side the other can ill defend itself. In the first place I can say that if he were to direct not indeed all his forces, which would be too much, but part of them only against the crown of France his designs would succeed; in France there are a million and a half people living in the Calvinistic faith, and they are constantly soliciting the king of England to take them under his protection. If these ~~xxxx~~ men were to take up arms

(1) Passamonti Relazioni cit 1934 ~~437~~ pp. 301 seq.

(and they would easily muster 40,000 foot and 4,000 horse) and unite their armed forces under a strong king such as the king of England I do not see how the crown of France could adequately defend the country. What this strong king can do against the crown of Spain is widely known; Flanders is the proof. The great armadas from the Indies, both East and West, are alike within the grasp of that king, and he can, further, invade the coasts of Spain. And he cannot be attacked by any ruler in the world, except by God, since the kingdom is made inaccessible by the great tides of the sea and the vast numbers of the rocks which prevent anyone who has not had long experience of the waters from approaching the coasts with a fleet.

We can say then, since it is an indisputable fact, that the conclusion of a marriage between the prince of Piedmont and the princess of England would increase the prestige of your Highness in domestic affairs. Through it, too, you could some day reach the goal of all your thoughts, to be bound up neither with France nor with Spain, neither of which two kings wish an increase in the greatness and power of the house of Savoy. On the other hand the king of England will do everything in his power to increase the greatness of that house. When your Highness has suddenly seized Geneva and wished to overrun the paese del Vaud nothing will hold back the French but the alliance between your Highness and the king of England. And, when will your Highness have a more opportune moment than at present when France has a child-king and is ruled by the queen and her council who do not wish war? Your Highness may rest assured that, if the Spanish seem to view favourably this marriage with England, they do it solely to draw you from a friendship with France, exactly as the French will do all they can to prevent this marriage. They understand plainly the danger in which they are, the more so that they foresee that other great alliance which the world and I hold to be inevitable and which will make one of our infantas queen of Spain, God grant it be soon. I conclude that, if the king of Spain should decide to give your Highness the infanta his daughter for the prince of Piedmont, she would not be so useful to you as the princess of England would."(1)

Those were Ruffia's inspiring arguments. They obviously confirmed Carlo Emanuele in his resolve to press on with

(1) Storia della Real Casa, Matrimoni. Mazzo 25, inserto 7.

Translation. Original in Passamonti Op, Cit. 1934 pp.296-297

the English marriage negotiations.

By July 1st 1611 a servant of Ruffia's had arrived in England with letters for the king, for Salisbury, for Northampton, for Lord Wotton and for Sir Henry Wotton, and with the news that Ruffia himself hoped soon to be back in England to negotiate for a marriage of the prince of Piedmont to the princess Elizabeth(1). Some time, however, was to elapse before Ruffia came again to England. He was still in Turin on October 2nd(2), and he probably did not leave there till after the 7th of that month(3). It was not till November 21st that he had his first audience with James(4). But he prepared the ground for his arrival fairly well; from Besançon he sent one of his company, Fulvio Pergamo, into England to find out how opinion was running and what was the best line of country to follow. "On the 16th of the present I arrived at Besançon and from there immediately sent Pergamo on to London with letters to Wotton and Giovan Marco(5). I told Pergamo to come and meet me at Dover, so that I might learn from his advice how to conduct myself in these negotiations."(6) It was

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.267. Letters from Ruffia to the king and Salisbury and of the Duke to the king of the 8th and 10th of June are in S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 Nos 64-68.

(2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.345. (3) He probably took the letter from the Duke to Salisbury, S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.70

(5) Giovan Marco "a Genoese sometime musician to the Duke and now to the Queen of England" (C.S.P.Ven Vol.XII no.551)

(6) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo. Ruffia to the duke Oct. 20th.

1 Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo I Ruffia to Duke Nov. 30th <sup>uke</sup> 1611.)

a useful move. When he reached England he found Pergamo and the Gioan Marco waiting for him with the news that the king was incensed at his delay in returning(1). And with this information to guide him he could proceed more easily to his audience, going, perhaps, like a second Whittington with the "cattoparde" which Carlo Emanuele had sent the king "pour servir a ses recreations"(2)

At his first audience on November 21st Ruffia set himself to excuse his long delay in returning, giving as the reasons his own indisposition, Spain and the ill-will of certain ministers. Over the first he did not linger but passed on to expand the second. The good offices of Spain earlier, he explained, in trying to bring about the marriage had put Carlo Emanuele under a certain obligation to Spain. Ruffia had, therefore, thought it proper to communicate the results of his earlier negotiations in England to the Spanish ambassador there. Philip III had expressed his pleasure at the degree of success reached, and had offered his <sup>e</sup>rvices in the future negotiations. Carlo Emanuele had induced him to write to Rome to persuade the pope that the marriage would not be prejud-

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1, Ruffia to Duke, Nov. 30th

(2) Lettere di Giacomo I no.VII. the beast lost favour when at Theobalds it "seized a white red-deer calf nursed up there by a woman entertained for the purpose."

(~~Nichols~~) Nichols Progresses Vol.2 p.433)

icial to the catholic faith, and to Velasco, his ambassador in England, telling him to assist the savoyard minister. The time taken by these letters to travel accounted, for the delay. For the third point Ruffia complained that, while the negotiations between England and Savoy were afoot, the English ambassador had seen fit to tell not only the queen mother and the Council but also the Savoyard ambassador in France that James had no intention of troubling himself with the proposals made by Savoy. The king accepted the excuses graciously, but when Ruffia sought to take advantage of this benignity to open negotiations the king cut him short, informing that he was about to leave for Theobalds, and that a committee would discuss the matter with him(1).

The instructions which Ruffia had received were very full, and show the mind of his master clearly:

"When you have arrived in England and obtained audience of the king you will make reverence in our name and say that, in accordance with what we wrote to him in our last, we are sending you back to his court to thank him humbly for the many proofs of his good will that he gave us in your person at your first mission, for the readiness with which he was pleased to lend ear to the proposals of marriage, and for the friendly reply which he gave you in agreeing to, approving and accepting the proposal for a marriage of the prince our son to the princess his daughter. We have received this graciousness of the king's respectfully, as befits the greatness of the favour. You will thank him humbly for it in our name, and will offer him in return not only a readiness on our side to obey his wishes but also our person, our sons and our friends in his royal

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1, Ruffia to Carlo Emanuele, Nov. 30<sup>th</sup>

service, assuring him that when God grants us the favour of being able to serve the princess we will treat her in such a way that she can learn from her own experience how deeply rooted is our affection to that royal house.

In the matter of the dowery, we have no intention of bargaining and remit it to the greatness and liberality of his Majesty who, as he bears an equal love to his daughter, cannot fail to show it in this occasion. You ought not, then, to fence about anything, but accept whatever the king thinks good to declare. The greatest difficulty comes from religion which is a thing of so great moment for this house and state, the propugnaculum of Italy in this part. We venture to hope that the king, taking into consideration our needs, will not take it ill if you beg him for some greater favour and a friendlier declaration on this point than he gave you the first time, so that we may with greater pleasure and freedom welcome and serve the princess and that she and the prince may live together with unity of soul and the contentment that cannot be found without unity of faith. This will come by inducing the princess, or having the king induce her, to accommodate herself to the religion of her husband. This will remove all scruples about mortal sin such as there might be if the marriage were celebrated without the certainty, or at least the almost certain hope, that the princess would come over to our faith. If the king should not show any greater inclination to this course than before you will at least see to it, without breaking off negotiations, that he is induced to be contented with remitting the question to the king of Spain and abiding by his decision. We on our side promise to be bound by that decision.

Of course you must treat of all this with much skill and discretion. If the king inclines to this course of action he will not inform you of it openly but will use obscure means, so that you may be openly assured of her readiness by the princess without the king's appearing to know. You must proceed very cautiously but must never abandon this last point, the remission of the case for decision to the king of Spain. Of all that you can find out about this and about the disposition of the king to this marriage inform us by an express courier, so that we may know how to govern ourselves. We believe that the king, with a sound respect for his people,

will be very circumspect in this point of religion, so as not to appear opposed to or wavering in his own faith. It will be necessary for you through those Catholic ladies who know the queen to find out what you can of the disposition of the princess and to urge them to use even persuasion with her; for when you have won that she has solemnly declared, with her mouth at least, that she wishes to become Catholic and have in this way removed all scruples, you can press the king to take the advice of the king of Spain. You have seen from the decisions of the theologians that this underground work is not only permissible but even praise-worthy; by it you will be able to bring the treaty to a successful close. You must use every effort, act carefully in finding out and informing us what is reported to you about the disposition of the princess, and you must try, if it is possible at all, to hear what she says yourself, or to have from her something in writing, so that none of the Catholic ladies, out of zeal for the faith or desire to see the marriage brought about, may report words to you that the princess will afterwards repudiate."(1)

Militating against the success of Ruffia's mission were several events that had taken place since the last time that he was in England, and had fundamentally altered the conditions under which he was to work. On June 29th of that year Lotto was writing home, "It has been understood for some time that the Palatine of the Rhine has set out with the same end in view as Savoy; and the general opinion is that the French will give more assistance to his designs than to those of Savoy."(2) This project of marrying

(1) Storia della Real Casa, Matrimoni. Mazzo 25, inserto 7. Italian original quoted in Passamonti Op. Cit. 1934 pp. 305-308. Full powers for Ruffia are in Add. MSS 32,023 A ff.30,31. (2) C. Guasti Di un Trattato cit. p. 57

the princess, to the young Palatine had, indeed, been bruited earlier in the year(1), and all through the summer Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador in London, was writing home about the match(2). The Protestantism of the Palatine helped his suit, and the fact that he was backed by the Duc de Bouillon and the French ambassador gave him the backing of the Scots at court, still mindful of the Auld Alliance(3). If nothing definite had been concluded by the time of Ruffia's return at least a strong body of opinion had been created in favour of the German and against the Italian match(4). It was against that feeling that Ruffia would have to fight. Nor was that his sole concern. The death of the queen of Spain had left Philip III free to seek another alliance, and there was talk that he intended to gain the friendship of England by seeking the hand of the princess Elizabeth(5). On the 9th of December Foscarini wrote to the Doge and Senate: "during the first days that the ambassador of Savoy was here his suspicions were aroused by the rumours of a possible marriage between the Princess Elizabeth and the King of Spain, and he begged the Spanish Ambassador to tell him the truth, for

(1) Gardiner History cit. Vol.2 p.137. (2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII passim. (3) Ib. no.202. (4) C.S.P. Dom. 1611-1618 p.97 "Opinion against Italian matches."  
 (5) Ib. p.90 Chamberlain to Carleton.

if this were the case he would withdraw, and if his Catholic Majesty should take from the Prince of Piedmont the chances of this match, it was to be hoped that he would find the Prince another bride not less well-born."<sup>(1)</sup> This was not a very serious problem in 1611, however; but the suspicion that the Spanish ambassador had joined the French and Tuscan in opposing the Savoyard marriage proposals remained. It was not lessened by the vague answer that Ruffia received from the Spanish ambassador when he charged him with working against the interests of Savoy<sup>(2)</sup>.

His poverty, too, stood in the way of success for Ruffia; his shallow purse could not hope to compete with the wealth of France and Spain as a source of pensions. To his master he wrote of this: "Among all venal courts this has the first place, and with my little bait I can fish for little fish only, fish of no substance; one big one could snap them all up."<sup>(3)</sup>

And, finally, he may have had the hostility of both the queen and Salisbury to contend with. Anne had possibly committed herself to the side of the Medici earlier, and to opposition to the Savoyard proposals. Lotto

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.388. (2) Lett. Min. (Ingh.)

Mazzo 1, Ruffia to Carlo Emanuele, December 14th

(3) Ib.

wrote of the queen's attitude in August of that year, "The queen's majesty said that she considered the Duke of Savoy an untrustworthy prince, and that she would much rather ally her house with the Grand Duke of Tuscany (col patrone serenissimo) than with the Duke of Savoy. I am convinced that these words were spoken in all sincerity and good faith."(1) This, of course, cannot be accepted at its face value; Lotto was too much concerned to put the best meaning on any words that were spoken for him to be considered a good witness. But even before he wrote an outside observer had described the queen as favouring the Tuscan proposals(2), and if the Savoyard and Tuscan proposals were not now incompatible the rivalry between the two houses was sufficient for a supporter of the one to favour the other. Salisbury was bluntly opposed to any dealings with Savoy, "pointing out the importance of caution in the present projected alliance of France and Spain."(3)

With these hazards in his way Ruffia met the committee appointed to deal with him, a committee composed of Salisbury, Lennox, Northampton, Suffolk and one other. With them he discussed his proposals.

(1) C. Guasti Di un Trattato di Nozze cit. p.61 Lotto to Secretary August 12th. Italian. (2) Correr in C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XI no.175

(3) C.S.P. Dom. 1611-1618 p.104

Salisbury began almost at once to raise the point of religion and little business was done at this first meeting, Ruffia fighting shy of dealing with a committee that was in part at least hostile. The next day he sought out the king at Theobalds and there ~~went over with him~~ (both) the events of his meeting with the committee and sought to treat directly with the king. His account of his audience with the king is contained in a long dispatch of the 30th of November, which also contains details of his meeting with the committee(1). The account of his audience with the king reads:

"I gave him an account of my recent meeting with his deputies and asked him, in the matter of religion, not to consider the readiness of your Highness to serve him so much as his own reputation. He should not hold your Highness to something impossible nor make him run the risk of damnation, of a declaration of nullity and of an everlasting distaste between husband and wife, who as they are two in one body so they should be one will and one faith. If his reputation did not allow him to sanction this in Britain he should at least exhort his daughter to live in Piedmont in accordance with the will of the prince. The king here said to me that last time I proposed a double marriage, that he would place himself in the position of your Highness and ask what you would say if you were called to make the princess of Piedmont live as a heretic. I replied ~~that~~ that there were reasons as good on our side which might be used to overthrow his argument, yet if his Majesty thought it fit that the question should be remitted for judgment to the king of Spain, who had been the prime mover in the whole affair, I hoped that he would be able to give a decision that would satisfy his Majesty. Here the king went on to tell me how the pope had taken the negotiations. He had

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Ruffia to Carlo Emanuele November 30th. Italian.

been informed that the pope had forbidden this marriage, fulminating excommunications and exaggerating everything. In reply I told him that up to the day on which I left there had been nothing more from the pope than hortatory letters, that I knew of nothing beyond that, and added that the Conte di Vische, the ambassador of your Highness had sent his secretary to Turin to carry that letter. This news made the king very thoughtful for he loves this daughter dearly and will have to find some means of succour for her in the needs that may arise when he is distant from her. He thought too that he could see how ill disposed to your Highness were your neighbours, both the French and the Spanish, and, adding the pope to their number as a third, he was inclined to doubt very seriously for the safety of your Highness' lands. ~~—~~

Ruffia disabused <sup>him</sup> of that fear as best he could but the audience proceeded with no great profit to him, and it was plain that the king had no great opinion of this Savoyard match.

There the discussions ended for a time, Ruffia meeting neither the king nor the committee, till at the news that the Duke of Wirtemberg was coming to England to treat for the marriage of the young Palatine to princess Elizabeth, and spurred on by fresh instructions that a certain Badata had brought him from Turin Ruffia began to protest against the delay (1). As a result he was promised an audience as soon as the king should return to London (1), though intelligent opinion had expected him to leave at once after his last audience with the king (2). To quieten him someone informed him of the

(1) Letts. Min. (Igh.) Mazzo 1 Ruffia to C. E. December 20th.

(2) Winwood Memorials cit. vol. 3 p. 301. John More to Winwood.

king's interest in and sympathy for the Catholic faith. Ruffia reported it eagerly: "I am eager to tell your Highness that this is likely to do great service to the Catholic faith. The king is deep in the study of the faith and is already reconciled to the intercession of the saints and to purgatory. At present he is deep in the doctrine of transubstantiation and admits already the reality of the holy sacrament."(1) With the princess herself Ruffia had had a short audience that was little more than a formality. Mindful of his instructions he had attempted to induce her to sign some sort of declaration of her willingness to change her faith but her natural prudence was too great for her to do so(2). He had now to rely on the good-will of the king. And in any future dealings that he might have with the king he was to be handicapped by his resolve not to invoke the king of Spain as arbiter now that that king might be himself a suitor for the hand of princess Elizabeth.(3)

After the king's return to London Ruffia had his final audience for the discussion of business on January 1st, and the words that the king then used showed plainly enough that the negotiations for the marriage of princess Elizabeth to the prince of Pied-

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Ruffia to C. E. December 14th

(2) Passamonti Relazioni cit. 1934 p.315. (3) Lett. Min.

(Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Ruffia to C. E. January 1st

mont had failed:

"Speaking of the marriage the king that a fatherly love compelled him to examine well the possible consequences; for the junction of his forces to those of your Highness could not but make this treaty unpopular among your common foes. This would not matter so much if the distance between the states were not so great, and if the pope did not make so many difficulties over the treaty. For his part he thought very little of this last difficulty but he knew that it would appear very huge in the eyes of your Highness. He concluded by saying that, once the opposition of the pope was ended and he could think that one at least of the two kings was well disposed, he would esteem the prince of Piedmont above all other princes."(1)

It was a polite dismissal, and Ruffia must have understood plainly enough that his mission had failed to secure its objects. With the promise that an English ambassador would shortly be sent to Turin he was dismissed, leaving England on January 12th(2), after securing the release and deportation of some priests(3).

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1, Ruffia to C. E. Jan., 1st 1612.

(2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol. XII no. 399. His letter of recedence, of which Passamonti makes use to show how well James was affected to Carlo Emanuele, though it is no more than a formality, runs: Mons.r mon Cousin, Ayant ouy a diverses fois et amplement le Conte de Cartignano vostre Ambassadeur Nous confessons volontiers que le Subject de sa charge nous avons a grand honneur et l'election de sa personne a grand contentement. Car quant a la chose il n'y a aultre en laquelle pouviez faire demonstration plus claire soit d'affection a nous mesmes, soit de respect a nostre Estat. Et quant a luy il s'est acquitte et de si grande discretion en l'agissement de l'affaire et de si bon tesmoignage de son zele envers nous, que nous en demeurons entierement satisfait. De l'un et de l'autre nous recognoissons estre si fort vostre redevable que nous en demeurons un desir perpetuel a vous en revenger a l'equivalent. Ce que plus amplement vous ferons cognoistre au plustost par une ambassade

The first person chosen to fill this embassy to Savoy was Lord Hay, but almost immediately afterwards Sir Henry Wotton was substituted for him(1). The reasons which James gave for sending Wotton are interesting. They were that he was sent as a reward for his past services to the king, and because it had been reported that Carlo Emanuele had received him very well at his return from Venice(2); and they suggest that the business he had to transact was such as to need a man would be welcome to the Duke personally. Various accounts of this business have been given. Ruffia himself is reported to have said that he was sent to England not so much to conclude a treaty as to induce the king to send an ambassador to Savoy with whom Carlo Emanuele could himself negotiate(3). Or, again, Logan Smith is of the opinion that James, in addition to any business that might be discussed, wished in any case to enter into nearer terms of friendship with Savoy, and to prepare the way for sending an agent to reside in Savoy(4). The main reason for the sending of Wotton was probably this:

(2) contd expresse laquelle nous resolvons de vous envoyer tant pour vous rapporter responce et determination sur le subject propose, comme pour vous declarer de combien bonne part, et a quelle grande obligation nous tenons la proposition etc" (Lettere di Giacomo 1 no.X. Dec. 30th.

(3) C.S.P.Dom. 1611-1618 p.112.

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII nos 415-419. (2) Lettere di Giacomo 1 No.VI Letter of credence for Wotton March 7/17 1612.

(3) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.415. (4) L.P.Smith Life of Sir Henry Wotton Vol.1 p.120

the hint which de Velasco had given in 1611 that the hand of the infanta Anne of Spain was to be had for the prince of Wales for the trouble of asking had been proved false by the news of the double Franco-Spanish marriage(1). The problem was now to find a wife for the prince(2), now a little older than when the king had informed Ruffia that the boy's youth prevented him from making any marriage treaty for him(3). If that wife were to be a Catholic ~~the~~<sup>an</sup> daughter of the Duke of Savoy or a sister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany were the likeliest candidates(4); and it was probably to find out on what religious conditions and with what dowery a Savoyard infanta could be had for prince Henry that Wotton was now sent to Turin.

On March 18/28 1612 Wotton set out(5), with a splendid train. Among that train, it is worth noting, were at least three men who were later to be found working in or for Savoy: William Parkhurst was one, who was to be left in Turin as unofficial English agent after Wotton's departure(6); another was Rich, who in 1614 was commissioned to raise men for service in Savoy(7); the third was Albertus Morton, later the

(1) Gardiner History cit. Vol.2 pp 138,139. (2) Ib.  
 (3) Supra p. (4) L.P. Smith Life of Wotton cit. Vol.1  
 p.120. (5) Court and Times of James I Vol.1 p.163  
 (6) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 n 0147 (7) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.X111

first English agent officially resident in Turin(1).

A docket in the Calendar of Domestic State Papers throws an amusing sidelight on the determination of the English court to combine magnificence in the embassy with strict economy. It authorises the Lord Chamberlain and some other noblemen "to view certain obsolete and broken jewels in the tower, and consider which and how many of them may be altered into other forms, to be sent as tokens to the Duke of Savoy."(2) What was done with these broken jewels I do not know. They may have been used in making the jewelled sword, valued at £16,000, or in adorning the ten ambling horses, richly caparisoned which Wotton took with him as presents to Carlo Emanuele(3). The ambassadorial train moved slowly, and it was not till May 4/14 that Wotton had his first audience with Carlo Emanuele(4). Of his business in Turin the chief source of information seems to be the dispatches of Gussoni, the Venetian ambassador there; and they seem to give little enough detail of his work.

In his entertainment and treatment at Turin Wotton could find nothing to complain of, and, on May 18/28, he could describe himself to Lord Pembroke as writing "among these infinite honours and enter-

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 No.112. (2) C.S.P.Dom. 1611-1618 p.112. (3) L.P.Smith Life of Wotton cit. Vol.2 p.1  
 (4) Ib. Vol.1 p.121 (5)

tainments."(1) But this could not hide the fact that his mission was not likely to succeed. The proposals that he had to make were so incompatible, according to Gussoni, that no wisdom could reconcile them. They were, first, an alliance between England and Savoy to oppose Spain and rectify the balance upset by the Franco-Spanish marriage agreements and, second, to obtain the sanction of the king of Spain for the marriage of the prince of Wales to an infant a of Savoy, a marriage that James was willing to permit only when Spanish acceptance of it was known. Even Wotton at his first coming to Turin had confessed to Gussoni that he thought the difficulties insuperable(2). Carlo Emanuele, however, was prepared to make great concessions to have an alliance with England, and the prospects of success grew more favourable. Indeed on May 27th Gussoni wrote of an audience that he had had with the Duke in which the Duke "gave him to understand that he still had great hopes of an alliance with England. Though he could not offer such a dowery as the Grand Duke of Tuscany was proposing, still the nobility of his blood was such that great sovereigns might quite well seek to ally themselves with him."(3) On May 18/28 Albertus Morton, Wotton's

(1) L.P.Smith Life of Wotton cit. Vol.2 p.7 (2) This is is Smith's version of Gussoni's dispatch, Ib. Vol.1 pp.121-122). (3) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII No.537

nephew(1), was sent into England with Fulvio Pergamo(2) who took a miniature of the infanta maria to court(3). Meanwhile the Duke was making great efforts to raise a dowry worthy both of himself and of the groom, and protesting to Wotton that he was a free sovereign and would in no wise be bound by the pope or the king of Spain(4). All this is, unfortunately, second hand information, but for want of better it must be accepted. It is probable enough, too, and it agrees with what other information there is. Thus it is clear that Carlo Emanuele offered a fairly large dowry from a letter of Northampton's to Rochester of October 7th, where he states that, with two others appointed by the king, he has examined Sir Henry Wotton's about the Savoy match and finds that the offered dowry of 700,000 crowns is less than was expected(5). Some progress had been made before Wotton could bring back so clear an offer.

A few days before June 17th Wotton left Turin, leaving behind him his secretary, Parkhurst, to act as English agent(6), and made his way slowly through Germany to return to England report his negotiations(7). On August 14th he was at court, praising the infanta

- (1) L.P.Smith Life of Wotton cit. Note on Morton in appendix  
 (2) Pergamo arrived on June 1st (H.M.C. Laing MSS Vol.1 (1914) p.127 (3) Smith Op. Cit. Vol.1 p.122. ~~14~~)  
 (4) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.570 (5) C.S.P.Dom. 1611-1618 p.150. (6) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.124 (7) L.P.Smith Op. Cit. Vol.1 p.123

Maria, (The candid Fra Gio Balbi had already described her as "di honesta bellezza e sana"(1)) lauding the Duke as a progressive ruler, and doing all he could to interest the king in Savoy(2). Apparently he had been desired to do something of the sort before he left Turin. In his letter of recedence Carlo Emanuele tells that he has asked Wotton to represent his gratitude to the king(3).

(1) Curiosita Storiche Piemontese cit. p.398.

(2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol XII no.609

(3) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.77. It runs:

"Monseigneur,  
 les obligations des quelles ie me sens redevable a V. M.te partant de demonstrations de bien veuillance et les si rares et pretieux presents dont il luy a pieu m'honorer par l'Ambassade de M.r le chevalier Voton gentilhomme de sa chambre, tout (sic) si grandes et si signalees que mal aysement ie les pouvois représenter a V. M.te sans l'ayde du mesme S.r Chevalier . Ie lay donc prie de m'assister en cet office ce que m'ayant promis, il ne me reste que d'en rendre comme ie fais a V. M.te les treshumbles remerciemens que ie luy en dois la supliant de croire quelle aura tousiours toute autorite de disposer de moy et de mes enfans, et que ie tiendray a grand heur de pouvoir employer l'espee et les chevaux des quels V. M. ma fait la grace et tout ce que iay en ce monde pour son service, ainsy que ie feray de tres bon cœur et en desireray tousiours les occasions. Du reste ie sais aussi estre particulièrement favorise de V. M.te en l'election qu'elle a faicte dudit chevalier pour m'envoyer, le quel iay (Two or three words missing) et il s'est si dignement comporte et acquite de sa charge que ie demeure fort satisfait de luy, et V. M.te aussi luy en doit scavoir bon gre et l'honorer comme tresprudent ministre, du quel puisque V. M.te scaura toutes les particularites de ce qui s'est passe icy pendant son sejour, ie ne l'ennuieray pas d'une plus longue lettre et m'en remettray a luy, suppliant etc."

Until the death of prince Henry the attempts of Carlo Emanuele to unite his house to the Stuarts by the marriage of one of the infantas to that prince were to be the most important thing in Anglo-Savoyard relations. In these attempts Wotton was to play some part, and it is possible to wonder how great a part he had in firing the Duke to press on with~~em~~ them busily. Logan Smith has shown enough of his character and aims - his opposition to the Spanish and Papal power in the north of Italy, and his fostering of the reformed faith there(1) - to make it plain that he had a considerable interest in furthering the marriage. In northern Italy the Spanish power could be overcome only by removing the pretext of religion; that could be removed only by introducing religious reform into Italy; and that could best be effected through Savoy, by linking it in marriage with a great Protestant house. At all times after his first mission to Turin Wotton did all in his power to bring about this marriage.' A zeal for the welfare of his faith and of the free Italian states probably inspired him, though Isaac Wake thought that he had been bribed to work for the marriage(2), and it is certain that he had a considerable financial interest in the success of the negotiations, the promise of

(1) L.P. Smith Life of Wotton cit. Vol.1 p.115

(2) ib. ~~ib.~~ Vol. 1 p.125

twenty five or thirty thousand scudi if an infant of Savoy became princess of Wales(1). It is worth noting too, that in carrying out a scheme in which his principles were engaged Wotton was never closely bound by his instructions, or lack of instructions. He had given a proof of this in Venice in 1606 when he <sup>had</sup> promised the Venetians help from England in their struggle with the papacy and had been reprimanded for doing so without authorisation(2). Given this predilection for a policy of bringing about an alliance between England and Savoy, and his habit of exaggerating his instructions when interest led him it is at least likely that at his embassy to Turin in 1612 Wotton painted James' desire for a marriage between the prince of Wales and the infant Maria rather more vigorously than strict truth would have permitted. That is conjecture, but the character of the man and the subsequent behaviour of Carlo Emanuele justifies it.

Nor were these conjectured words of Wotton's the only things to fire Carlo Emanuele to greater efforts to link his house with the Stuarts. He was urged, too, by the fact that on May 28th 1612 James had entered into an alliance at Wesel with the princes of the Protestant Union(3). Now in any danger that threatened Savoy he would,

(1) Storia della Real Casa, Matrimoni Mazzo 25, inserto 7  
 Instructions for Gabaleone. (2) L.P. Smith Op. Cit.  
 Vol.1 p.83. (3) T. Rymer Foedera Tom. XLII pp 714-719

if he were bound in an alliance with England, have at least the chance of drawing to his aid not England alone, but the princes of the Union also, particularly if the danger to his states came from the Hapsburg lands in Italy; for that Union which was directed against the Hapsburgs in the north could not well have seen an ally of the king of England's overwhelmed by the Hapsburgs in the south. If nothing else came from these German states the friendly neutrality, which the alliance of Savoy with England would compel them to, would be useful enough if trouble should come from Milan. It was a cogent reason for pressing on the renewal of this marriage proposal.

MARRIAGE NEGOTIATIONS II. 1612 - 1613.

Before beginning these new negotiations for a marriage between one of his house and a heretic Carlo Emanuele thought fit to obviate any risk of papal intervention. Fra Orazio, who could be relied upon to deal favourably with any projects likely to benefit Savoy, was instructed to examine the question whether it was possible to marry one's daughters to heretics, with particular reference to the present contemplated marriage of the infanta Maria to the prince of Wales. The result of the examination must have been more than satisfactory to Carlo Emanuele. St. Thomas was cited to prove that in the primitive church it was permissible to cohabit with a Gentile or Jewish husband or wife. No promise of conversion was required, the hope of conversion was sufficient excuse. Expediency, too, was used to prove the merits of such an action, when, for example, it might convert a realm to the faith, or introduce a public celebration of Catholic rites, or, at least, protect a persecuted church and give support to Catholics deprived else of all human aid. Then, taking as his examples several men who had been converted by noble-hearted women, Fra Orazio ended: "perhaps there is no human means so well fitted to convert, or pervert, a prince as a woman. For she is called mulier as if moliens cor, because she can soften a hard, obstinate heart. I therefore give my opinion that the mar-

riage can and should take place."(1) With the hazard of papal opposition driven Carlo Emanuele was able to move forward more freely.

Fulvio Pergamo had been sent back to London with Albertus Morton as the bearer of a miniature of the *infanta* Maria to the king(2). Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador believed that he had been sent to cut across the threads of the Tuscan negotiations for the marriage of a sister of the Grand Duke to the prince of Wales(3). That may be true, but it is difficult to prove and there seems to be no evidence of any kind that Pergamo received any considerable commission to act as agent for his master. His function seems rather to have been that of intelligencer. It was not till Gabaleone(4) arrived in London on August 13th 1612 that there was a regularly-commissioned Savoyard agent in London(5).

Gabaleone's instructions, dated July 23rd, were very full:

"Instructions for you Gio Battista Gabaleone.

You will post in all haste to London, pretending to go no farther than Lyons for our affairs. When you have arrived there you will say that you are going to Paris to discuss with the royal agents the passage of merchandise through Flanders. At Paris you will say that you are going to Antwerp on private business. Instead you will take the road for Calais and London.

(1) Storia della Real Casa, Matrimoni Mazzo 25, inserto 7. Italian. Treated more fully in Passamonti Relazioni cit. 1934 pp.493-495. (2) Supra. (3) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.555. (4) He was Audi tor Fiscal OF CARLO Emanuele.

(5) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C. E. 23rd August.

When you have arrived you will find out from Fulvio Pergamo the state of the marriage treaty for the prince of Wales. If a treaty has been concluded with Florence, there is no need for you to disclose that you have ~~been sent~~ to work for a treaty of marriage, nor that you have been sent by us. If, however, the the treaty for the infantia Maria is still afoot, you will tell him to take you to Sir Henry Wotton, who was ambassador here. To him you will deliver your letter of credence and you will tell him that, at the news of the conclusion of the treaty of marriage with Florence which we have received from Rome and elsewhere, we have not been able to avoid a certain feeling of resentment. At the same time, since we are not absolutely sure of the truth of this news, because the news that we have received from Pergamo of the words that Lord Wotton used to him is of a contrary sense, torn between fear and hope we have sent you to that court to learn the truth about the state of this negotiation so that you could inform us of it in all haste. We are confident that Wotton (Sua Signoria) if he has not found the treaty concluded with the other party, will have the good offices he promised us and sought to have the honour and merit towards his own masters and towards this house of bringing to the treaty to the desired perfection. If he tells you that it is true that the Florentines pursue these negotiations eagerly and with great offers of money, and that he ~~feels~~ fears that the king through poverty inclines to that side, you must reply that it is incredible that so great a king should make no difference between the two houses. At the same time he knows that ~~we will~~ not haggle over money, that you have come to assure him of that, and that all that matters in the amount of the dowry is that his Majesty states his wish. But we beg him not to weigh, one against the other, my daughter and the Florentine, for there is so great a difference of station between them that we should resent this form of treating more than anything else.

If he informs you that the king believes that our intentions are good, but that he believes our state to be largely exhausted through the passed wars and through our recompensing the services we have received, you will reply that though we should wish to have more wealth so that we could show the king our desire to serve him by the value we set on the favour and honour that we hope to receive of him, yet we can pay a large part of the dowry in ready money and give good security for the rest. You will say that you have come to bring assurance of this.

You will tell him further that we have treated in Asti with the Marquis of Hinojosa, the governor of Milan,

about this negotiation, in accordance with the agreement we came to with Wotton himself. The governor welcomed the ~~idea~~ idea warmly and offered eagerly to work for the effecting of the treaty and to write about it to the king of Spain. We hope that he will intervene actively.

When speaking of the Florentine proposals there is no harm in telling him that, besides our reasons for inducing the king to accept my offer rather than that of Florence, reasons that the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ good sense of Wotton will recall, there is a fresh one. It is ~~that~~ the conclusion of the marriage between prince of Sulmona, the heir of the papal house, with the daughter of Don Virginio, the nephew of the Duke of Florence, through which Florence is so linked with the pope that there is no doubt that the pope, taking advantage of this new relationship, will ever seek to introduce some innovation in the religion of England. Leave it to Wotton's judgment whether or not this should be considered.

Finally assure Wotton of the complete confidence that we have in him. Tell him that we do not wish to act in this negotiation except through him. To make him the more willing promise him, in addition to the gratitude of this house and of my daughter if she should become queen of England, that if he brings the negotiations to a successful end he will receive a present of twenty five or thirty thousand scudi. If at your arrival you find that the negotiations have been taken out of his hands, as may well have happened in view of the death of Salisbury whose creature he was, or that it has come out that he is dealing with Florence as someone alleged then you should negotiate with Northampton or someone else who will have greater credence. About that you should take the advice of Pergame or Lord Rich. You have been given letters for the latter and should confide in him our commission and be advised by him."(1)

Two things emerge from those instructions that are of some importance. The first is that Gabaleone, at first, was not a regular Savoyard agent, that he was merely the messenger from Savoy to Wotton to whom Carlo Emanuele was resolved to commit the whole negotiation of the marriage

(1) Storia della Real Casa, Matrimoni, Mazzo 25, inserto 7  
Italian. Original in Passamonti Relazioni cit. 1934 pp 498-501.

treaty. The second is the excessive fear that Carlo Emanuele had of the Tuscan negotiations. Gabaleone's first work in England was to spike the Tuscan guns.

This menace from Florence was now much greater than it had been at the time of Ruffia's mission. The conflict between Savoy and Tuscany in England was not now one of prestige alone. As early as February 1611 Lotto had been sent from Florence to England to open negotiations for the marriage of the prince of Wales to the second sister of the Grand Duke(1), and he had continued to work to achieve this end throughout 1611 and the early part of 1612, without any great measure of success(2). Indeed these negotiations were as long-continuing as the Savoyard, for they too had begun before 1603(3). Gabaleone judged Lotto a dangerous obstacle, and before ever he arrived in England he was picking up and reporting rumours that the prince of Wales was definitely assigned to Florence(4). The chief cause of his master's apprehension, apart from the wealth of Florence with which he could scarcely hope to compete, was the news from Rome that the Tuscan agents there were definitely seeking papal dispensation for the match; ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup>

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol. XII no.175 (2) Ib. passim; C.Guasti Di un Trattato di Nozze cit. (3) See J.D.Mackie James VI and Ferdinand I of Tuscany (4) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) mazzo I Gabaleone to C. E. August 8th 1612

that news Carlo Emanuele was driven to conclude that the success of the Tuscan diplomacy in England was greater than in fact it was(1). In his work Gabaleone was to find that the over-eagerness of Lotto and his masters had done more to defeat the success of the Tuscan negotiations than anything else.

More than this opposition from Florence had to be met, however. On April 26th the Duc de Bouillon had arrived in England as ambassador extraordinary from France to propose a marriage between the prince of Wales and one of the daughters of Henri IV,<sup>(2)</sup> and was continuing to work throughout the summer for this end<sup>(3)</sup>. James could hope to gain much besides the dowry from the French match. He could hope for the working together of English and French ministers for common interests, particularly for supporting the States of the United Provinces. An alliance with France would create, now that England was in alliance with the Protestant Union, a bloc of states by which peace and stability might be brought to north-western Europe. That was an end for which the king would do much. But there is little need to trace deeper the workings of the French and Tuscan ministers to countermine Gabaleone. The point of drawing attention to them is to

(1) See Passamonti Relazioni cit. 1934 pp 502-506 for an account of Tuscan dealings with Rome and the fears of the Duke. (2) T. Birch Life of Henry, Prince of Wales p. 275. (3) Ib. passim; Winwood Memorials Vol. 3 passim.

show that they existed and that Gabaleone was not unopposed in his work.

Opinion in England, too, though divided, was not favourable to Savoy, or so it would seem from the fragments available for learning contemporary opinion about this Savoy match. Sir Walter Raleigh condemned mercilessly both the Savoyard and the Tuscan matches, and lent his weight to the side of France, making out a strong case against the Italian matches as likely to be injurious to the prestige and prosperity of England(1). Challoner, the prince's secretary, confided to Andrea Cioli, the Florentine secretary, that he considered the chief virtue of these negotiations with Savoy was that England and Spain could use Savoy as an intermediary, and added as his own opinion that it would be better for the two countries to come together directly without troubling to use Savoy(2). If to Challoner the community of interest which he believed existed between Savoy and Spain was a thing in favour of Savoy it was otherwise among the people. The opinion, formed during the earlier years when Savoy was tied by marriage and interest to Spain, that Savoy was as much under the domination of Spain as any other Italian princeling persisted in England,

(1) Somer's Tracts Vol.2 pp 197-207.

(2) C.Guasti Di un Trattato di Nozze cit p.276. Dispatch of Cioli's dated July 9th 1612.

so that even when Savoy ~~when Savoy~~ was on the point of war with the Spanish in the Milanese opinion in England was to have it that there was secret understanding between Savoy and Spain(1). Cioli now found that the suspicion of a close dependence of Savoy upon Spain was a reason in England for transferring to Savoy part of the anti-Spanish feeling, and that Gabaleone's negotiations were by that weakened. Perhaps Sir John Holles summed up better than any other the objections of the average man, or of the average political man, in England to the Savoyard marriage. He did not concern himself with the complexities of politics, preferring to argue - and it would be a telling argument - that the Savoyard princess was Catholic, that she would therefore be under the domination of the pope, that the the pope and the Spaniard worked together for ill, and that all true-born Englishmen must, therefore, resist the marriage. The tail-piece of his picture of the ills she would bring in her train is worth quoting: "The Prince resorts to his sermon, his Savoyard to the mass; he to his prayers she to her confession; either have their train; these ghibellines, these guelphs; where is then that unity, that tie and knot of marriage, one bed, one board, one flesh, one soul, one God."(2)

(1) Infra p.

(2) H.M.C. Portland MSS Vol. IX (1923) pp. 41-46.

For the prince himself there is a third-hand account that he was opposed to any marriage between himself and a Catholic(1). That may be so, but it is certain that, though he had not expressed his opinion of any of the proposals very clearly, he preferred the French as the most expedient. Writing to his father on October 5th 1612 he could say: "But if you, laying aside the little piece of disgrace in being served after another, will respect rather which of these two will give the greatest content and satisfaction to the general body of Protestants abroad, then I am of opinion that you will sooner incline to France than to Savoy"(2) I think that that is the clearest expression of the boy's opinion before his death.

The opposition of the clergy Gabaleone, on Wotton's advice, resolved to meet before it affected his negotiations. Enclosed in one of his dispatches is a memorial of a letter to be written to the archbishop of Canterbury:

"Memorial of what is to be written to the archbishop of Canterbury in the opinion of Sir Henry Wotton.

That although his His Highness is a Catholic prince and has raised his daughters in that faith, in which he wishes them to continue, yet if your reverend lordship will inform yourself of the actions of his

- (1) S.P.Venice Wake to Carleton.1612 is the sole date.  
 (2) Birch Life of Prince Henry cit. p.311

Highness, you will find that he does not allow himself to be dominated by his Holiness so easily as some other princes."(1)

If the letter was sent it was of no great service. In the October of that year Gabaleone was complaining of the opposition of the English clergy(2).

The king was on progress when Gabaleone arrived in England, and he and Wotton set off to join him. Gabaleone had his first interview with the king (his own lack of status makes it impossible to call it an audience) on August 18th, when the talk turned mainly on the activities of Florence. Gabaleone's own account runs:

"His Majesty was dining in public and the prince in private. While he was dining we all went into the hall. As he had already been told of my coming and saw me with Fulvio Pergamo he knew me for a stranger to the court. When dinner was ended he took Wotton by the hand and led him into the room where the prince was. The three men stayed there for some time reading the letters of your Highness, of the Count of Cartignano and of Wotton's secretary(3), <sup>and</sup> discussing the cause of my coming, the discussions at Rome, the dowry, and perhaps myself. At the discussion and the reading of my letters the king was astonished, although he had already been advised about the negotiations in Rome. What weighed most with him was that your Highness should have thought that he would come to any decision without informing you of it. He had me and Pergamo called into the room in the presence of the prince and of Wotton. After making reverence to him and to the prince I told him that he would have understood the cause of my coming and the great desire of your Highness to remain in his favour and to proceed with the treaty begun with such good-will of the king's. He replied, smiling, 'We have learned it all, and from Rome and from our ambassadors elsewhere we have been informed of the rumours that the Duke of Florence has spread, and

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1. Insetto Gabaleone. No date. *Italian*  
 (2) Ib. Gabaleone to C. E. 12th October. (3) William Parkhurst



"Monseigneur

Come ie ne desire rien plus en ce monde que de pouvoir tesmoigner a V. M.te la volonte que iay de luy rendre tres humble service, tout ainsi ne me pouvoit il arriver rien plus a souhait que de scavoir par le rapport des miens qui sont a la cour de V. M.te la continuation de ses affections en mon endroit, et la franchise avec la quelle il luy plait d'user envers moy, C'est pourquoi ie me suis resolu pour en rendre tres humbles remerciements a V. M.te et me conformer aux afferes qui se traittent, a tout ce qu'elle daignera me commander, denvoyer a V. M.te une Ambassade tele que merite le respect que ie luy dois, la quelle ie ferai partir tout incontinent apres que i'en aurai le conge de V. M.te. Et si cependant il luy plaisoit pour gagner temps de fere traiter avec Jehan Baptiste Gabaleon un de mes domestiques qui est a la cour de V. M.te sur ce qui concerne le dot, ie luy envoie ordre et pouvoir de le fere, et tout ce qu'il promettra en mon nom sera ratifie de mes Amb.rs et observe par moi avec la punctualite que les faveurs de V. M.te et ma parole m'obligent, et sur ce ie prie Dieu etc"(1)

The plenary powers for Gabaleone to treat and conclude about the dowry were sent in reply to his letter:

"Cher bien ame et feal

Aiant veu par vostre derniere lettre les esperances que lon vous a donne en cette cour la de la bonne yssue du mariage que presentement s'y traite entre Monsieur le Prince de Galles, et l'Infante ma fille, et qu'il est necessaire a cet effect que vous ayez autorite, et pouvoir de traitter, arrester et promettre de la somme du dot que nous aurons a desbourser a ma dite fille. Par la presente, que nous voulons, et declaron avoir la mesme force et vigueur comme sil fust un acte iure, nous vous donnons toute autorite et pouvoir d'accorder et promettre la somme et quantite du dit dot. Promettant en foy et parole de prince d'agreer, advouer et observer intierement de nostre coste tout ce que par vous sera come dessus promis, et ce avec l'obligation de tous noz biens."

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no. 76 August 21/31 1612.  
 (2) Add MSS 32,023 A. 7th September 1612.

The attitude of the queen had completely changed. Instead of the hostility to Savoy that Ruffia had found, Gabaleone found her opposed to the Florentine negotiations and welcoming those of Savoy. Before the end of August Wotton had gone to her to report on his mission to Turin and to discuss the marriage proposals. He found her inclined to favour the Savoyard claims(1). The certainty of her favour was confirmed to Gabaleone in an audience he had with her on September 23rd. His own account of this audience is this:

" She said to me, 'Come here and let us speak quietly; there is someone there of the Florentine faction who may hear us.' Then she added the following words: 'Well, you have been to the king with the letters of his Highness. What did he say to you? How do you think he will welcome this treaty?' I replied, 'From the good-will that his Majesty shows in words of such kindness towards his Highness I cannot but think that everything will go well.' Here I gave a minute account of what his Majesty had said to me, in particular of the distinction he made between nobility of the bloods of the two houses. Then, smilingly, she said: 'I have no doubt that the king will consider well this point, for there is a great difference between the daughter of a great prince such as the Duke of Savoy, whom we hold as of a royal house, and the daughter of a merchant.' Your Highness may imagine if these words made me open my eyes. And since I had told her about the authorisation sent me by your Highness to treat about the dowry, she asked me what the king had said about that. I replied that he had put me off till he should come to Hampton Court where he would summon the Council and tell me his mind about this and about the coming of ambassadors from Savoy, and that he had promised to treat as willingly with your Highness as your frankness merited. She asked me further whether I had spoken with the prince of Wales. I replied that I had and had also given him letters. Her Majesty then said, " so far all goes well. I know that the king

(1) Let. Min. (Ingh.) Marzo I. Gabaleone to G. E. 1st Sept.

likes the Duke very much. I should prefer him to give his decision without the Council, since it is a matter that depends on his own decision. I shall do all in my power. I see that here we cannot discuss as I should like, but within a few days I shall be at Hampton Court. Come to me there without betraying that I have summoned you. I shall speak to both, and I hope that all will go well. The main decision lies with the prince, and he may listen to me."(1)

There is little need to follow the ramifications of the work of the contending parties in England in the early autumn of 1612. It is enough to note that they existed and that the king was long to decide between their claims. On October 5th the prince was writing to his father: "Now if your Majesty be resolved, that your Majesty treat any further with Villeroy(2) in this business, under your Majesty's correction I hold it best there be made a stay of the banker Gabaleone's going into Savoy; and withal to make a little delay of the Ambassade, which should come from the Duke of Savoy for that purpose, untill your Majesty be resolved which way to go."(3) It is an unimportant enough remark, but it shows that even in the beginning of October the prince had not heard of any end to his father's swithering between the claims of the various candidates.

*Of* ~~for~~ the rest of his work in England the best account is given by Gabaleone himself. He tells of the

- (1) Lett. Min (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C. E. 29th September <sup>Italian</sup>  
 (2) He was French ambassador in England. (3) Birch Life of Prince Henry cit. p.311

appointing of a committee to negotiate with him, of the replies he prepared to the questions that committee was likely to ask him, and of the postponing of the negotiations on the illness of the prince.

"I went to Theobalds to the king and found him left for Royston. I followed him with Wotton in accordance with his instructions to have his decision about the negotiations. He listened to me willingly and confirmed again his passed good-will towards your Highness, and since in making a decision the points that his Majesty wished to have cleared up before the coming of ambassadors, and his will about the dowry had to be considered, and a certain amount of writing done, it seemed best to him, so advised by Wotton, to remit the business to the Council, or to a part of it, with complete authority to come to a decision. When we reached London Wotton, who had been so ordered by the king, went to the earls of Northampton, Suffolk and Worcester and gave them their written commissions. They accepted the task, but, thinking of the gravity of the business and the reputations of other counsellors, they wished first to send a a courier to the king and beg him that at least some of the other counsellors might have a part in the decision, so that in the future too much arrogance should not be attributed to them. The king sent back the courier to inform the committee that he approved their request, and that, since he would himself be in London within a few days, at the arrival of the Prince Palatin~~ka~~, he would give the decision with the advice of the Council. This postponement was interpreted by Florence as being to their advantage, and for a few days they made a great uproar with new parties and great offers, which suddenly disappeared.

Meantime, while the king was still at Royston, I went to the queen to learn from her as a protectress of your Highness, whether there was anything to fear from Florence. She said many things in favour of your Highness and ended with these words spoken in French. 'Per Dio, if the prince my son chooses the daughter of Florence as his wife I will give him my malediction, and, since we do not like to have in our company the daughter of a merchant, you need have no doubt that if the prince takes my advice he will choose no other wife than the daughter of my cousin the Duke of Savoy, whom I honour and love as a prince

of a great house, and whom I know the king to value highly. . . . .

I let several days pass and then through the Earl of Northampton, I reminded the king of your Highness' desire for a decision. He had me told that he had remitted this business to seven of the Council by whom several points would be put before me. I have learned from Wotton that they will concern these subjects: first, that his Majesty desires that Savoy should not come into conflict with Geneva or the Pays de Vaud without informing him of the reasons so that he may be able to intervene as friendly arbiter; secondly, whether the exercise of religion of the infanta Maria is to be public or private; thirdly, that I should be definite about the dowry. If I gave satisfactory answers the king would write to your Highness to have the ambassadors sent, but he wished to have this cleared up before their coming so that there should be no other delay but a straightforward drawing up of a contract of marriage. I prepared the replies though unwillingly, fearing to do anything that would displease your Highness. I was, however, bound by necessity, and to prevent your rivals from being more fortunate I decided to reply in this wise, after telling Wotton of my answers and learning from him that they would be acceptable: first, about the differences with Geneva I said that your Highness would deem it a favour if the king would intervene as arbiter, and that if the Genevans remitted their complaints to him your Highness would do the like, being assured that he would administer favourable justice if he resolved to honour the house of Savoy so much as to take the infanta for the princess of Wales; for the second point I said that I did not know what more your highness could demand beyond liberty of conscience for the infanta Maria and her household, and the "contradotte" which it is customary for the husband to give the wife; that for the point of conscience your Highness will not ask more than the freedom of worship for the infanta and her household privately, and that for the 'contradotte', since it depends on the liberality of the king, your Highness will agree to whatever the king pleases; for the third point, which concerns the dowry, that I leave the matter in his Majesty's hands; provided that the sum asked does not pass your Highness' resources no difficulty will be made, for I have orders not to haggle but to proceed with the same frankness that your Highness wishes to have from his Majesty.

These replies, Wotton assured me, would have been accepted. The day fixed for the meeting came and I was told to meet the Council at two in the afternoon. I went there and found that the Counsellors were all with the king. I waited for a time and then they came back. The earl of Northampton as the eldest Counsellor spoke and told me that the king regretted having to put off the decision. The causes were his own absence, the coming of the prince Palatine. That very day he had called them together to put before me some points to clear up before the coming of the ambassadors, but since an unexpected illness had befallen the prince of Wales who is the object of the negotiations, and since the king had not been able to speak to him, the negotiations could go no further for the present until the prince was better again."(1)

That meeting with the Counsellors took place on November 5th(2). On November 6/16 the prince died and all the negotiations of Gabaleone came to nothing. He could do more for the present in England. Early in December he took leave of the king(4), and left shortly afterwards. With him must have gone the knowledge that if his mission had failed, he had acquitted himself well, that the king had thought sufficiently well of his merits to knight him(5). Perhaps he could be sure that he would not be long out of England, that his master would be willing to continue the interrupted negotiations with the new prince of Wales as their object. He himself before he left England wrote to the Duke of the Duke of York:

- (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1, Gabaleone to C. E. 12th Nov.  
 (2) C.S.P. Ven. xxx Vol. X11 no. 686. (3) Birch Life of Prince Henry cit. p. 358 (4) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. X11 no. 710  
 (5) H.M.C. Report X11, Appendix pt. 1 (MSS of the Earl of Cowper Vol. 1) 1888 p. 77

"I could wish, since Fate has willed the death of prince Henry, that the Duke of York were a little older, so that we could take up the thread of our negotiations again with him; but I understand that he is only twelve or thirteen years old and is rather delicate. France and Spain will carry on with their designs since we, by the disparity of the ages of the ~~aw~~ prince and the infanta, are shut out. Still I will not fail to be watchful of what is going on. The Duke of York is the darling of the queen, and she is so completely, completely I repeat, devoted to your Highness that she would welcome the infanta more than any other princess. When an occasion presents itself I will do my utmost to learn her wishes, so that when your Highness sends the ambassador to condole with the king he will know what is best to do. If any of the Counsellors make reference to this business I will not forget it, and at my return, which will be as soon as possible, I will give your Highness a full account."(1)

It is obvious from that extract that Gabaleone was still convinced that a marriage alliance could be effected with England. He had not, indeed, exaggerated when he spoke of the disparity of the ages; the infanta Maria was born on the February 8th 1594(2), and was thus at the end of 1612 a nubile girl of almost nineteen; Charles was a boy of twelve. The gap was too big to be easily bridged.

Of the Duke's will to bridge it, however, there was no possible doubt. On January 23rd (O.S.) Parkhurst, the unofficial agent in Turin, wrote to Rochester of an audience he had had of the Duke the preceding day. The Duke, with many apologies for his delay, had informed him of his intention of sending the Marchese Villa to Eng-

(1) Lettt. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. Nov. 12th Italian. (2) Bertolotti Curiosita Storiche Piemontesi cit. p.398.

land to offer condolences on the death of the prince of Wales. The Duke then added that he intended also to send Gabaleone back to renew the marriage negotiations.

"He then sayd, That he would send the Cav.re Gaballeon with him for assistance in a second treaty of marriage which he ment to propound unto his Ma.tie induced thereunto by these reasons: I think it his Ma.ties interest to see the Prince have issue as soone as his age cann permitt to w.ch end the Infanta here is fitter then either a daug<sup>ter</sup> of France or Spaine for with her ~~the kingxxxxxxx~~ in 3 or 4 years the king may enjoy what with the other hee cannot hope for in lesse then 8 or 9 years. The in supposition of his Ma.ties mortality if the Prince should bee matched with either of the two latter and so left both young under a mixt goverment of strangers thorough their iealousies, parties of some and pretences in England with instigation from Rome and her adherents they might rather give counsell of disunion than otherwise: which doubts cease here, the Infanta being of riper years, and bread (as shee hath beene) capable of advertisements and my estats so situated as I must be alwayes bound to labor the enlarging of his Ma.ties kingdoms. All other reasons which his Ma.tie did accept off in my former treaty shall concur in this. This much I purpose to propound and then conforme myself to whatsoever his Ma.tie shall think fittest for his royall service."(1)

Gabaleone had probably confirmed his master in this hope of continuing the negotiations. On February 15th he was writing to an unknown correspondant in England of the discussions they had had together about the possibility of marrying prince Charles to the infanta Maria, and reiterating the advantages of the match(2). More particularly he had drawn up a list of those in England to whom it would be xx

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.84 January 23rd/ February 4th (sic)  
 (2) Ib. no. 90. February 15th 1613.

advisable to make presents. The list is this:

"Note of those to whom presents should be given.

To the queen a fine cabinet or crystal casket.  
 To the prince some 'gallanteria'.  
 To the princess something of the same sort with gloves of Spain and other finery, but let the queen's be the better present.  
 To the Prince palatine some fine Spanish horses and let them be sent to his own house.  
 To Madame Drummond(1) some jewels or a necklace of at least 2000 scudi in value.  
 To the Earl of Northampton a fine reliquary.  
 To Viscount Rochester a handsome insignia (insegna) of diamonds.  
 To the wife of the Secretary, Lake, some jewels or a necklace of the value of 1000 scudi.  
 to the wife of Sir Thomas More, the prince's tutor, a necklace worth from 600 to 800 scudi.

To Sir Henry Wotton as a year's payment of his pension, 2000 ducaboni.

To the queen's secretary	200 ducatoni.
To Sir Albertus Morton, nephew of Sir Henry Wotton	1000 ducatoni.
To Sir Lewis Lewkenor	500 ducatoni
To the secretary of Viscount Rochester	200 ducatoni.
To the secretary of the Earl of Northampton	200 ducatoni.
To the secretary of the Great Chamberlain	200 ducatoni
To Benjamin Rudlon, gentleman of the secretary of Pembroke	400 ducatoni.
To Biondi(2)	200 ducatoni." (3)

Whether all these people received their presents I do not know, but the drawing up of the list is proof that Gabaleone meant to succeed in his next mission, and that he had

- (1) Jane Drummond, Countess of Roxburgh, a former governess of the royal children (Nichols Progresses Vol.2 p.647)  
 In 1612 she had been markedly pro-Tuscan. (Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1. Gab. to C.E., Sept. 29th, 1612)
- (2) See note on in L.P. Smith Life of Wotton cit. Appendix. Gabaleone had left him in England to watch Savoyard interests. (3) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1. February 12th, 1613 (Italian)

learned something of the methods necessary for success in England.

Whatever was to be the success of his matrimonial negotiations with England Carlo Emanuele now found that he could ~~recount~~ draw a little on the credit he had stored up through them; and in the beginning of 1613 he needed all the resources that were available to him, for complications had come in Italy. That daughter, Margherita, who had been married to Francesco Gonzaga in 1608 had been left a widow in 1612(1). Mantua itself was a male fief and passed automatically to the cardinal Ferdinando Gonzaga, the brother of the dead Duke(2). Montferrat, however, had come to the Gonzaga through a female, and the legal heiress was now the daughter of the late Duke, Maria, the grand-child of Carlo Emanuele. The claims of the house of Savoy to Montferrat(3) as well as its situation deep within the front-

(1) R. Quazza Mantova e Montferrato alla Vigilia della Guerra di Successione p.17 (2) See genealogical table in H. Vernon Italy 1494-1790.

(3) The rights of Savoy to Montferrat derived specially from the marriage of Aimone the Peaceful, the seventeenth Count of Savoy 1291-1343, to Iolanda the daughter of Teodoro Paleologo, Marquis of Montferrat. The marriage contract had stipulated that if the male line of Paleologhi failed Montferrat should devolve on the house of Savoy. In addition there was a claim from the marriage of Carlo I, the fifth Duke of Savoy, to Bianca, the daughter of Guglielmo VIII Paleologo. When the line of Paleologo had failed in 1533 the emperor, Charles V, granted Montferrat to Federico II Gonzaga, married in turn to Maria and Margherita, the daughters of Guglielmo IX Paleologo. The rights of Carlo the Good, the ninth Duke of Savoy, had been left unaffected by the Imperial decision. For the whole question see N. Gabiani Carlo Emanuele I e

iers of Savoy, made Carlo Emanuele the more eager to have the custody of the child. Between Savoy and Mantua there had been disputes about this and about the return of the dowry of Margherita but these seemed to be ending quietly when, on April 23rd, Carlo Emanuele raided Montferrat and occupied Trino, Alba and Moncalvi(1). Both sides massed troops and it seemed likely that a considerable war would begin.

Parkhurst here intervened in a manner that must have been very welcome to the Duke, and that showed how closely he himself followed the methods of Watton his master, by coming to Vercelli where the Savoyard army lay. The reasons that he gave for his action show plainly his position.

They were that he thought it better to be <sup>t</sup>at Vercelli because his presence there might be of service to the Duke in treating, by giving the impression that he had the support and countenance of the king; that James' remarkable demonstrations of favour towards Savoy justified his action; and that he could <sup>not</sup> prejudice the king's interests because he was not the official English agent in Turin(2)

As if to accentuate the part that James had played in the wars Carlo Emanuele solemnly thanked Parkhurst for the assistance he had received from his master, telling him

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.128 Parkhurst to Rochester, April 25th/ May 5th 1613. (2) Ib.

that his success (It was the day after Trino fell) was due to the magna omnia under which he had fought. He had there first used the sword that James had sent him, he had begun the action on St. George's day, and the English gunners(1) had played a valiant and notable part. And finally, as if determined to drag his master into the dispute, Parkhurst made representations to the Duke about Geneva and was persuaded himself to go there:

"The action wherein hee was now engaged was likely to be repugned by the French Queene; and they of Geneva and Berne as ib were under protection likely to bee sollicitated to take this advantage of molesting him on that quarter; wherefore and bycause his Ma.tie had enlarged himself in the behalf of Geneva towards his Highnes in former treaties, which in a kind were yet on foote, I offered to his prudent consideration whether it were not fitt to advertise them of Geneva of this treaty renewed with his Ma.tie whome hee had made arbitor of his differences with them, and to happily prevent such hinderances as might follow in his future treaty in England, and by dissuading them (who naturally fearing each motion of his underpretence of surveyes and doubts of emboscadoes make divers incursions to the damage of his subiects) make this present advantage of their friendship. Heere hee tooke me asyde by the arme, and thanked me for this proiect, and sayd it was most necessary ~~for~~ to his purposes; that if I would write or goe unto them and advise them hereof it would beare much more credit from me. I sayd that his wisdome would iustifie me and therefore I would obey him in what he should give me credit; hee thanked me againe and answered hee

(1) Captains Easton and Heath, the English pàrates, had come into Villa-Franca, the chief port of Savoy, in February 1613 (S. P. Savoy Bundle 1 no.92). Easton and his men were summoned to Turin and treated well, for the Duke was eager to get seamen to protect his shores against the ravages of other pirates, and ~~to us~~ against Savona when an occasion should arise. Besides, Easton had a brave tale of a gold-mine, which the Duke was eager to exploit (Ib. no.98). Easton seems to have been a considerable man of his trade. Gussoni alleges that he had fourteen vessels under his command. According to this same account Easton entered

would consider hereof and call for me the same evening.  
 . . . . . Att the appointed tyme I was called  
 for againe when the Duke told me hee thought it would  
 not displease his Ma.tie if I should transport my-  
 self to Geneva and so to Berne to the foresayd effect,  
 and likewise to entertaine them with a treaty of  
 league and to divert them if it might bee unto his  
 Ma.ties protection. This I answered that I had no  
 authority to deale with them in any kind; yet I should  
 rely uppon his Highnes for the event of what hee  
 should command me in."(1)

At the Duke's request Parkhurst  
 set out from Turin for Geneva on May 14th with Ruffia,  
 both acting as the ministers of Savoy. A summary of his  
 instructions is given by Parkhurst himself, and runs:

"The Contents of my instructions att Turin sent me  
 by the Duke.

To remonstrate to those of Berne and Geneva, That his  
 Ma.tie of Great Bretagne having made knowne unto his  
 Highnes how much it would please him that there might  
 follow no further inconveniences, disgusts nor differ-  
 ences betweene the Canton of Berne, the Citty of Geneva  
 and him was content with his wonted benignity in favor  
 of his Highnes to shew a desire that the sayd differ-  
 ences might have a frendly conclusion, and with satis-  
 faction of all parties.

For which so singular favor his Highnes kissing  
 his Ma.ties most royal hands offered most readily to  
 obey him not only to end those differences frendly  
 but also to remitt unto his Ma.tie all arbitrement and  
 authority to command what should stand with his pleasure  
 to bee executed by his Highnes as he will do in other  
 case and action of his.

Therefore perceiving how the arts and pers-

(1) contd. Villa-Franca to put himself under the Savoyard flag  
 and have its cover for his buccaneering exploits (C.S.P.Ven.  
 Vol.XII no.780). He and his crews served as gunners at Trino  
 probably to give his master a proof of their skill and useful-  
 ness.

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.128.

(2) Ib. No.147 Parkhurst to Rochester May 31/ June 10th 1613.

wasions used with those of Berne and Geneva by other potentates to embarque them in some action which might breake the course of these good beginnings of this buisnes, accompanied with the Conte di Cartignano from his Highnes have thought good to make knowne unto the SS.ri aforesayd the state wherein this buisnes standeth that on their part they may cooperate in conformity to the good pleasure of the sayd king and not be deceived with passion and interest of others which heretofore they have proved and been abandoned in best occasion. And the danger, peradventure, would bee now the like or greater since these rumors and differences as it were accomodated that might light upon them which happily would not bee to their profit.

With these remonstrations finding good disposition in them you shall procure to fasten accord and make sure that his Highnes may rest certayne for the present that in those parts they will not move.

But if they shall vary, and that you perceive his Highnes cannot rest with all security you shall give present advice that his Highnes may make such preventions as his service requires.

From the Marquis of Lance

To remonstrate to those of Geneva not to suffer that any passe thorough their Citty w.ch might offend his Highnes estates, but wholly to stand to their treaty ratified at S. Giuliano."(1)

At Geneva on the 19th of May Parkhurst negotiated with two of the magistrates of the town, and made the representations that his instructions warranted. He remained there for ten more days while question and answer passed between Geneva and Berne(2). If little was effected in either of the places directly the fact that neither took advantage of Carlo Emanuele's preoccupation in Montferrat to make any innovation is enough to show that Parkhurst's mission did not fail. The

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no. 157.

(2) Ib. no. 147

consequent, and inevitable, rumour that Savoy had the support of England, in fact, did an immense amount to increase the prestige of Carlo Emanuele in Italy and Switzerland.

Though the king repudiated Parkhurst, informing Foscarini that "that person is no Secretary of mine, but a certain individual left behind by Wotton without my orders," and hinting that Carlo Emanuele had used Parkhurst with no other object than to create the impression that he had English support, exactly as he had used Easton and his men and called them "English troops"(1) (All of which was undoubtedly true) it was not enough to still the rumours that Savoy was encouraged in his bold courses by English support. From Venice on June 21st Carleton wrote to Winwood, "Amongst other his (Carlo Emanuele's) Artifices, to let the world understand there was great Correspondency between him and his Majesty, as likewise with the Protestants his neighbours, (by which he did not a little Countenance himself) he sent Mr. Parkhurst, Secretary to Sir Henry Wotton to Geneva to negotiate for him; at which not only that town, but the Protestant Cantons and others of the Religion took a great Alarm, presuming that he would not have come without order from

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XII no.147.

his Majesty. . . . Those in Switzerland and the Grisons have written to me to know the ground thereof, out of a desire to conforme their Causes to his Majesties liking."(1)

It was very skilful diplomacy of the Duke's. Without needing to wait for the inevitable refusal of James to any proposal that he should intervene on Savoy's behalf to help him in a difficulty of his own making, he had drawn to his own advantage his frequent negotiations with England, and the fact that the knowledge of them was widespread. The bootless sending of a few envoys to England had enabled him to use all the prestige of England in Protestant Switzerland.

On April 4th 1613 the Marchese Villa, ~~xxxx~~ Don Francesco di Villa, Marchese di S. Michele, left Turin on his embassy of condolence(2). He was to be concerned, however, with much more than condolence. He carried, for example, letters to a large number of the members of the English court, in an obvious attempt to create a Savoyard faction there(3), and his instruct-

(1) Winwood Memorials Vol.3 p.464. (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.109. His letter of credence is Ib. no.111

(3) The full list of those who received letters is:  
The Duke of Lennox; the Earls of Shrewsbury, Pembroke, Worcester, Suffolk, Northampton, Southampton; Madame Drummond; Viscounts Rochester and Fenton; the Lord Chancellor; Archbishop of Canterbury; Lord Arundel; Sir Henry Wotton, Albertus Morton, Sir Robert Rich, Sir Thomas

ions make it plain that he was sent to renew the marriage negotiations:

"you will go as quickly as possible to England, travelling by France, which is the shortest road. When you have arrived in London and been admitted to audience with the king you will condole with him in our name on the loss that he has suffered in the death of the late prince of Wales his son. You will tell him that the news of his loss was received here with deep sorrow, both through our respect for their Majesties and at the loss itself, for by it were destroyed our hopes of linking ourselves more closely by the tie of kinship with his Majesty, and of receiving the favours that he, with so great benignity, had given us cause to hope for. You will assure him that, if our hopes were not fulfilled yet on our side his majesty will have that same deep-seated affection and obligation that he could have promised himself if the marriage had taken place."

There follow instructions about informing the king of the death of the Duke of Mantua, and congratulating him on the marriage of the princess Elizabeth. The instructions continue:

"While you are at audience dealing with these formal matters do not begin to treat with the king about anything else, unless you are asked to do so, but all the time you must keep on dealing with our friends, particularly with those of whom Gabaleone will tell you, to find out about the rumoured treaty of marriage between the present prince of Wales and the second daughters of France and Spain. If you find that negotiations are not very far advanced with either of these two crowns and can see an opening to begin negotiations yourself, you will beg, or get someone else to beg, his Majesty to continue in that same friendly disposition that he showed to us the earlier negotiations; for those reasons that might have induced the king then

to prefer my daughter to all others are still strong.

If they say to you that there is a greater difference in their ages, the prince of Wales being only thirteen years old and the infanta Maria roughly seventeen, you will have to admit it. At the same time you will point out that even if this is so, if the prince were to marry in Savoy, he would have issue out of a Savoyard infanta more quickly than out of any other of the others who have been considered. They are so young, these others, that when the prince has reached an age suitable for marriage he will have to wait a year or two more for them to come to an age to bear children. This point, the shorter time required to have children, seems an essential point, for it will assure the succession the sooner. And there is left now one male only.

You will put before the king as well the fact, that if he marries his son into this house it will do more to keep his kingdom settled than will a marriage with either of the other two houses. Their power must ever be regarded with suspicion by the English, for they may make it their aim to see to it that England does not flourish but lives in confusion with continual turbulences. This objection may be urged against Spain in particular from the desire that the Spanish must have to avenge past defeats and to secure Flanders and the navigation to the Indies. A greater opportunity will be given to these emotions to find outlet in action through a marriage, and it is possible that they will engineer an uprising, probably under the pretext of religion. This risk is the greater and the more worthy of consideration that the males of the English are two in number only: the prince and the king. And these dangers cannot come from a marriage with a Savoyard infanta. Indeed our aims are utterly different, for it is our interest to see that crown great and respected for years to come. As this is a very nice matter, concerning both crowns, you must make trial of it very delicately and in case of necessity only, never before you are sure of the trustworthiness of the person to whom you speak about it, so that there may not result from it something injurious to our negotiations and in our prejudice.

If the king shows his wonted favourable disposition and you have occasion to discuss the terms of the proposed treaty you will understand that the dowry is to be the amount already proposed and agreed on, seven hundred thousand scudi, which will be paid partly in ready money and partly before an agreed date. The

limits of time within which it must be paid, together with the sureties you will arrange; they have already been discussed with Gabaleone. If, however, though we do not think it likely, they ask for a greater sum, you may say that, though his Majesty is master of all our goods, yet you had hoped that the former amount would not be changed. If the difference is no more than fifty or a hundred thousand scudi, do not hesitate to conclude the treaty. If it is greater make a delay and write to tell us. Do that immediately. As for religion, it is essential that the infanta must not be expected to change hers. She and all her household and train must have the right to live according to our faith, the Catholic and Roman faith. At the same time, in order to avoid any public scandal, we are prepared to consent to her having this exercise of her faith private, with a private chapel in the palace, where she and her household may have a sufficient number of priests to perform the necessary rites and administer the Holy Sacraments according to the use of the Roman Church.

In initiating this treaty of marriage you must find out first from the king himself (for the different policies they have may make his ministers uncertain instruments) whether he will be willing to allow the intervention of the king of Spain, whose niece the infanta is. To find this out you can say to his Majesty that we have learned there is some tension between himself and Spain over the question of Virginia; that the continuation of good relations between them seems to us very necessary to us for the good of Christendom, particularly at the present moment when the crowns of France and Spain are allied; that we hope, when his Majesty thinks fit and asks us, to be able to act as mediator and arrive at a satisfactory decision; and that we are encouraged in this now by the fact that the king of Spain is showing great favour to us and our house. Our success will be greater in drawing up an agreement when this marriage between our daughter and the prince of Wales is arranged, for her relationship to the king of Spain will give us an admirable pretext for intervening."(1)

From these instructions it will be seen that Carlo Emanuele

(1) Negoziazioni (Gran Bretagna) Mazzo 1. Italian .

Original in Passamonti Relazioni cit. 1934 pp.522-527.

Villa had in addition to make representations about Geneva( Ib. 1935. p. 97.

was resolved to press on vigorously with the marriage negotiations.

Villa arrived in London on the 11th of May(1), and from the time of his first audience on the 18th(2) found that the hopes of success his master may have had were not too well founded. At this first audience the business discussed was chiefly Carlo Emanuele's incursion into Montferrat(3). The king's annoyance at that, and his irritation later at the use Carlo Emanuele made of Parkhurst was to lie like a pall over Villa's mission. And this atmosphere was not improved by the news of the honourable entertainment given to Easton in Savoy. As early as March many English merchants who had suffered at the hands of Easton were inquiring angrily of Pergamo, who had remained behind in England, what redress they could have from the Duke(4). ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1. Pergamo to C.E., May. 12th

(2) Ib. Villa to same May 18th. (3) Ib.

(4) ~~XXXX~~ Ib. Pergamo "al Ministro" March 23rd.

On June 22nd the king wrote to Carlo Emanuele:  
"mons.r mon Cousin

Le sieur Estienne some (?) Marchant et Alderman de nostre Cite de Londres s'est plaint a nous que quelque moys passes le Pirate Eston qui s'est refugie a vous et vist sous vostre protection comme on dict luy ravist sur la mer une navire appèlee la Concorde et les biens dont elle se trouva chargèe revenant du Levant que luy est une perte trop griesve a porter, et d'aultant que nous confions que ceste sorte de gents odieuse au genre humain ne vous est moins a degoust qu'aux aultres Princes et que le respect de nostre amitie a nonpeu de puissance envers vous, Nous vous prions si ainsy est que ledit Eston

When at length the king could be induced to speak with him about the marriage negotiations, he would not give Villahany definite reply until he had spoken with the queen who was then absent from London. It is unlikely that he desired her advice. The reply was probably a device to postpone coming to a decision. Villa thus reports the audience:

"I said to the king, 'Since it is drawing near the time of my departure, with your Majesty's leave I would remind you of the desire of the Duke my master to join himself closer in services, kinship and understanding with your Majesty. He replied graciously, pleading as his excuse for not having spoken of it to me earlier the absence of the queen and his inability to discuss it with her. He was going to Windsor to meet her and would there discuss the matter with her, and we could then speak of it.'" (1)

Whatever were the results of the king's colloquy with the queen no decision had been reached when the time came for Villa to leave London. He left England on July 3rd.(2), and on the Sunday before that date he went to Greenwich to take leave of the king and queen.

- (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Villa to C.E. June 29th.  
 (2) Ib. Gabaleone to same July 5th.

(4)contd. est en vostre iurisdiction que vucillez tant honorer le droict commun des gents, et la bienvueillance que vous portons que de faire tant que ledit Eston restitue non seulement la navire, mais aussy les biens qui se trouveront entre ses mains appartenants audit Estienne Some (?). Et nous aurez obligez a la pareille en cas de vostres Subjects." (Lettere di Giacomo 1 no.XIV.)  
 For the king it is a stern letter .

Gabaleone thus reports the audience:

"On Sunday the Marchese went to Greenwich to take his leave of the king. The queen and the prince were there. After he had made his compliments and the king had replied in terms of great courtesy, begging him to assure your Highness of his affection and of his resolution to prove the good friend of Savoy in all occasions, as he would prove by deeds if he would use him, the Marchese requested him to say whether he welcomed the continuation of the marriage treaty, and whether he would give any reply. The king answered that he was still quite willing to treat with your Highness, but that he could not yet give a precise answer, for he had not yet had an opportunity to treat with the queen or the Council about it. But since I was remaining here he would be able to continue the negotiations with me."(1)

Carlo Emanuele can have had little satisfaction from the reply. If Villa had done little to advance his master's ~~marriage projects~~ marriage projects he must have found the time pleasant enough in England with a supper and a banquet and a play in Holborn from Sir Robert Rich, and a great entertainment at the Lord Mayor's with Wotton always in attendance(2). And he did not leave London till he presented the queen with a casket of rock crystal, a suit of Milanese armour to the prince, and to the king "a tiger, a lioness and a lynx, which died on the road"(3)

On June 2nd Gabaleone had arrived in London(4) and it would seem from his letter of credence(5) solely to

- (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. July 5th. Italian. (2) Winwood Memorials cit. Vol.3 p.461.  
 (3) C.S.P.Dom. 1611-1618. (4) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. June 9th. (5) It is S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.122.

represent to the king the just excuses his master had for invading Montferrat. When it became apparent, however, that Villa was not to receive an answer within a short time it was resolved to retain Gabaleone as agent in England. On the last day of June full powers were drawn up for him in Turin, similar in terms to those he had received the previous year(1). He was to remain in England negotiating for this marriage during the rest of 1613. On him the brunt of the work fell, and his work is the chief thing of interest in Anglo-Savoyard relations for the next of the year.

The main obstacle in his way was to be the rivalry of France. The proposals made earlier for a marriage of prince Henry to Madame Chretienne, the second daughter of Henri IV had been changed after prince Henry's death to proposals for the marriage of prince Charles to the same princess. On November 9th, three days after the death of prince Henry, Rochester was writing to Edmondes in Paris, "You have heard of the late fatall accident befallne us by the ordinary way. The businesse of this is to will you to beginne the same motion for a match for Madam Christine with the new Prince Charles, betwixt whom there is a fibness of age. . . . His Majesty's pleasure

(1) ~~xxxxxxx~~.Add. MSS 32,023 A

is, that you set this afoot presently, as of yourself, and deal with the same personnes you dealt with before."(1) These negotiations with France seem to have continued throughout the winter, and in Italy, before ever Villa left Turin, Gussoni, the Venetian ambassador there, had heard that the the match between England and France was almost completed(2). On June 3rd Beaulieu in Paris was writing to Trumbull that the Duke of Lennox had arrived there, and that, though he was not directly charged, contrary to all expectation, to enter into marriage negotiations, he was to smooth the ground for them to proceed. Beaulieu thought that before the Duke left he would be authorised to make the public demand for Madame Chretienne(3). If Lennox had eventually to leave without making any definite offer it was rather because James found the time not yet ripe for such an overture than because he was unwilling to contract in France(4). In May in England an unknown writer set out his thoughts in a "Politique Dispute aboute the Happiest Marriage for the Most Noble Prince Charles", arguing against the Savoyard match and for the French, after a delay(5). It was significant of the way that the tide was running in England before Gabaleone arrived there. The rivalry

(1) T. Birch Negotiations between the Courts of England France and Brussels p.372. (2) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XII no.797  
 (3) Winwood Memorials cit. Vol.3 p.465 (4) Ib. p.474.  
 (5) C.S.P. Dom. 1611-1618 p.183

that was to exist between France and Savoy was reflected in the actions of the ministers of the two states in England. In his first letter from England Gabaleone was writing, "The French ambassador has not called upon the Marchese Villa, to the amazement of everyone. This ambassador is a man of little good-will, who does everything in his power to impede the treaty of marriage between the prince of Wales and our infanta. He has on his side the Duke of Lennox. . . . The two spread the rumour that your Highness does not have the means to give a dowry proportionate to the need of this king."(1) It was these advanced negotiations with France that Gabaleone thought he would have to break through to succeed.

The Spanish ambassador, de Velasco, continued to look favourably on Gabaleone's efforts. Of him Gabaleone wrote, "Don Alonso with whom I have worked in concert as your Highness instructed me and as the Marchese did before, has shown himself very well disposed to me. He has given me the help of his advice in these negotiations; he has informed me the information he receives; and he has shown a great desire that the opposing party should not have any advantage over us."(2) Throughout the summer Gabaleone was to keep the Spanish

(1) Lett. Min.(Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. June 9th.

(2) Ib. ~~same~~ e to ? August 30th

ambassador informed of his work and receive help from him(1). Northampton too seems to have been favourable to the Savoyard proposals. Writing to his master on September 3rd Gabaleone thus described an interview that he had with him:

"When I left Don Alonso I went to the lodgings of the earl of Northampton, which were a short distance away. I found him alone. He received me very courteously and asked me to tell him what I had been doing after I had given him a copy of the four points(2) that I sent to the king. I did so, and from my account he learned that I had followed his advice in my interview with the Viscount(3). He was pleased with the way the negotiations were going, with my optimism and hope that all would go well, and with my continuing in the same and informing him of what I was doing. He said that he would always advise me how best to conduct myself, and that when the negotiations came before the Council or the king spoke to him of it he would let your Highness see how good a friend and servant of yours he was. To encourage me he said that at Salisbury the queen had spoken favourably and had declared herself on the side of your Highness, and that she was very pleased that I had won over Rochester."(4)

The reference to Rochester is significant. Under the influence of Northampton Rochester, who had been involved in a quarrel with Lennox and Hay, the chief supporters of the French match, was now inclining to the Savoyard match as a means of upsetting them(5). But it is possible to doubt the truth of the statement about the queen.

At Villa's last audience Gabaleone spoke with the queen

- (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 passim. (2) Infrap.  
 (3) i.e. Rochester. (4) Lett. Min.(Ingh.) Maz zo 1 Italian  
 (5) Gardiner History cit. Vol.2 p.225

and found her, if favourable to Savoy, of the opinion that the difference in ages was too great to be easily overcome. Gabaleone reports the audience:

"I said to her that your Highness continued in your wonted disposition to prove how devoted a servant he was of their Majesties, and that, though God had willed the ending of our last negotiations with the death of the late prince, you still wished, if you were deemed worthy, to continue the negotiations with the present prince Charles; that the ambassador had signified as much to the king and had found in him the customary good disposition; and that she would have learned this from the king, for he had told the ambassador that he meant to speak of it to her as soon as he saw her. The queen replied, 'Indeed the king has not spoken of it to me. He must have forgotten. It is true that we have not been much together.' She went to say, 'You know how much I esteem my cousin, and how much I desired that marriage, and still desire it. I see one difficulty only. It is the unequalness of the ages, since I understand that the infanta maria is twenty two.' Then she asked me how long ago the Duchess of Savoy died. I replied, begging her to believe that the difference in the ages was not so great as she had been given to understand, that this was a design of the French faction to prevent your Highness from being gratified in your just desire; that ~~the~~ truth was potent; and that, on my honour the infanta was not more than seventeen."(1)

from other sources the queen found out that the girl's real age was considerably more than seventeen(2), and for the future her treatment of Gabaleone was flavoured with suspicion(3).

Gabaleone began his negotiations vigorously, drafting a memorial to be laid before the king in which

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. July 5th. *Italian*  
 (2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.13. (3) Lett. Min. (Ingh.)

he set out the main reasons for preferring the infanta Maria as a wife for prince Charles. To an unknown correspondent he wrote, asking him to lay the points before the king:

"The points which I consider worthy of remark are no more than four in number. Firstly it is to be believed that the greatest desire that his Majesty has is to see the succession to the throne established, and for that the infanta Maria is the likeliest of all the daughters of the kings and princes of Christendom. The prince of Wales is thirteen and the infanta about seventeen. These two in three years can have children, especially since the prince, by the grace of God, is healthy and vigorous and the daughters of the house of Savoy are usually fertile. The difference in ages ought not to be regarded, particularly among great princes where, as in this case, the need of succession is the chief end.

Secondly the birth of the infanta should be considered. Besides being the daughter of a Duke whose greatness all the world knows, and his Majesty has a hundred times deigned to proclaim, she is the niece of the king of Spain, and, as that king loves her dearly, this marriage may act as a bond of relationship between the two greatest crowns of the world. These two, with the Duke of Savoy, could overcome any power that ventured to attack them. I am not silent about the noble qualities of the lady who has been so well trained in her duties that without doubt his Majesty, the prince and all the kingdom would receive great satisfaction from her.

Thirdly, if the marriage takes place the dowry that his Highness will pay will be satisfactory. He does not wish to haggle and will trust himself in his Majesty's hands, assured that he will take into consideration his means. And, if it stands with his Majesty's liking, his Highness will send the infanta at once into England to their Majesties, so that the marriage may be consummated in due time, and he will even send with her that part of the dowry that is agreed on, the remainder being payed at a fixed time. The prince will so be married to a princess capable, in whatever accident befall the state, of taking and giving counsel, the daughter of a prince who has no pretention to the throne and no old-rankling quarrel with England, but who has instead

an obligation to preserve it and to keep it united and in obedience to its king, both through the tie of kinship and through a desire to see his own descendants benefit.

Fourthly, it is to be considered that in matters of religion this marriage is not only the least injurious, because his Highness has no commitments in the kingdom and is distant from it, but it may also be very useful soon, since for the differences with Geneva and the Pays de Vaud the Duke will always hold it a favour for the king to deign to act as arbiter. He is assured that the king will always have particular care for his rights, especially if he were to favour him so far as to take the infanta for his daughter. The free use of her religion is asked only for herself and for those of her train, as was agreed in the treaty that was being negotiated at the time of the death of the late prince of Wales; and the Duke promises that the priests who come with will be a reasonable number, and that none will be Jesuit, in conformity with his Majesty's desires.

This is all that occurs to me at present."(1)

It was a remarkably clever piece of work. It camouflages in a masterly the difficult way the difficulty of marrying a mere boy to a nubile girl, and it plays on the fears of the king in suggesting the dangers that the unlikely Spanish marriage might bring, or the likelier French one. Almost all the arguments that Gabaleone used were the common stock of the Savoyard proposals and had already been used elsewhere, as in Villa's instructions, but he seems to have presented them in a more telling manner than ever before. But for all its

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no. 186. Gabaleone to ? July 3rd. Italian. An almost illegible, contemporary translation is Ib. no.188. Passamonti quotes a version, dated July 19th (Relazioni cit. 1934 pp. 531 & 532). His is probably the version submitted to the king. It does not seem to have been part of a letter.

cleverness it did not avail much to forward Gabaleone's negotiations. The summer dragged on with little achieved. About the middle of July he had an audience of the king, but it gave him little satisfaction. The king contented himself with giving an outline of the negotiations with France, with expressing his good-will to Carlo Emanuele, and with postponing any discussion with Gabaleone till a later date(1). At an interview that Gabaleone had with Lake shortly afterwards the secretary criticised the vagueness of the memorial in some of its points and, by stressing the eagerness of France to conclude the marriage treaty and the large dowry that was offered, made it plain that the French match was preferred. Gabaleone reports the interview thus:

"He said that he had received my letter and that for ~~the~~ Rochester with the four points that I had set out in writing(2), and that he had faithfully gone over them with, and explained them to Rochester, since he did not understand Italian. He had shown them, too, to the king, who, he believed, had found them satisfactory and had ordered him to translate them into English. After speaking to the king Rochester had ordered him to tell me that his Majesty was well-disposed to your Highness, but that France would not let him live, pressing him to give a definite answer, especially now that the difficulty of the public use of the Catholic religion which at first they had demanded had been overcome. For the dowry they ~~are~~<sup>were</sup> willing to give nine hundred thousand scudi, half in ready money and the rest at a fixed time. For this purpose the secretary of the English ambassador in Paris was here, sent by his master and

- (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1, Gabaleone to C.E. July 19th.  
 (2) The letter quoted supra pp. 106, 107 may be the letter referred to.

the Duke of Lennox. Besides, the Scots were doing all in their power to help the concluding of this treaty. For that reason, since in the points that I had made about the dowry and about the religious question it seemed to him that I had not been clear enough, he desired me to be clearer so that he could represent them, with other considerations, to his Majesty to make him understand that the treaty with your Highness would be more advantageous than that with France. He also asked me, in the matter of the dowry, to speak of a fixed sum as did France, since the deciding factor would be the greater or lesser amount of the dowry. He urged me constantly to be definite."(1)

In that advice of Lake's by itself there was nothing to rouse doubts, not even in the advice given by Rochester a few days later, stressing, too, the large amount that Maria de' Medici was prepared to pay as dowry and the need for Savoy to be definite about the sum available for dowry(2) But they were not isolated incidents. Instead of the fairly ready reception accorded to Savoyard agents come to treat of such matters Gabaleone found little but neglect. Throughout the summer he received no further audiences, and such interviews as he had with Lake or Rochester were to given to him rather by these men as private individuals than as servants of the king. And Gabaleone could not but find another hint of the change of the king's heart towards Savoy in the treatment of those men who were seeking to take service in the Savoyard armies or in the ships under Easton. In reply to representations made by Foscarini the king agreed to impose a ban on such volunteers, and

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. July 24th  
 (2) Ib.

Foscarini could report confidently to the Doge and Senate that, "The Earl of Northampton and others have impressed upon me that the promise made by the King to me not to allow more people to set out from here in favour of Savoy and the ordinance in conformity have been greater than appears, because when he made peace with Spain he declared that he left to his subjects their natural liberty to serve whom they pleased in war; . . . that the king's subjects are for the most part ruled by his desires, but that he has never made a formal promise and ordinance as he has now done to please your Excellencies, in which he has gone further than for the King of Denmark."<sup>(1)</sup> If the ordinance was founded partly on the fear that the men who went to serve in company with Easton might fall into his piratical practices, there can be little doubt that it was founded too on disapproval of Carlo Emanuele's action in invading Montferrat.

*Sabaleme*

The good relations ~~he~~ had formerly had with the Spanish ambassador, and the support that he had had from the Spanish faction in England was disappearing. In August Sarmiento arrived in England to take up his duties as ambassador<sup>(2)</sup>. He came, it was reported, to offer the marriage of the second daughter of the king of Spain to

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.12 July 12th.

(2) Ib. no.42.

prince Charles, offering such a dowry as the king should choose to name. He had besides the support of the queen.(1) It was not till the end of November that Gabaleone learned this(2), but from the beginning Sarmiento made it plain to him that the wiser course would be for him to withdraw from the struggle, stressing the difficulties that stood in the way of his success - the difference in the ages of the prince and the infanta Maria, and the difficulty, considering the costs of the war, that the Duke would have in raising the dowry(3). It was no great matter on the surface that Sarmiento had come, merely an addition to the number of the competitors for the hand of the prince, but, in addition to the wealth of Spain with which Savoy could not hope to compete, Gabaleone could now hope for little. He had needed Spanish support to stand against France. He could not now maintain a three-cornered struggle. Even in the everyday matter of making bribes he was to find that he could not compete with Spain, and that the little faction he had built up on promises was collapsing when the promises were not fulfilled. On November 28th he wrote to his master:

"Your Highness wrote to me in your letter of July 21st that you would very shortly send me some provision to

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII nos 136 & 194. Gardiner History cit. Vol.2 p.224 (2) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. November 28th. (3) Ib.

satisfy those I have made promises to, and Signor Crotti wrote in his letter of September 23rd that he would send me a duplicate of your Highness' letter of the 22nd of the same, and some other particulars of the points that I wrote about. I have received the letters, and my man has returned, but I have received no provision of money nor a reply to the points I raised. Yet it was most necessary, particularly to provide me with a sum of money to distribute among those to whom it was promised last year, and to enable me not only to keep the friends I have made but to make others, as will be necessary if the whole business is not to pass through the hands of men who are more Spanish than English. I am beginning to win the friendship of a secretary of the Council, who alone is responsible for the ciphers, and who knows the most secret business of the Viscount Rochester. They all need money, and now, seeing that the promises made in the past are not fulfilled, my friends are turning away, and this Don Diego is advised of everything that happens because he pays."(1)

Carlo Emanuele could not now well continue. He could not oppose Spain diplomatically in England, for in Italy there was still a chance, though a slight one, that he would have the support of Spain in his dispute with Mantua, and a far greater chance that he would be drawn into a war with the Spanish governor of Milan. He could not afford, whichever of the two chances mastered, to alienate Spain by continuing to seek for the marriage of one of his daughters with the prince of Wales. From Gabaleone's reports he must have seen that his marriage negotiations would not succeed, and the hope of their success would have been the sole reasonable excuse for opposing Spain. Passamonti sums the position up well. "Carlo (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 Gabaleone to C.E. Nov. 28th. *(Italian)*

Emanuele was too intelligent not to understand the situation. He could not fight against Spain and needed the amity of James to carry out his political designs. Bound by marriage to Philip III the king would be useful to him as a kindly intercessor at the court of Madrid in the many problems that he had, from the succession of Mantua to that of the protestant Swiss and Germans. When from Gabaleone's reports he understood the state of the negotiations, and perceived that even the French candidature was ceding before the Spanish, he desisted substantially from proposals. In appearance he carried them on so as not to give satisfaction to all those in Italy and in Europe generally who had followed attentively his negotiations and would have rejoiced at his failure. But he did not make this the principal object of his English diplomacy."<sup>(1)</sup>

(1) Passamonti Relazioni cit. 1934 p.539.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WAR IN ITALY. 1613 - 1614.

by the summer of 1613 the war with Mantua was of greater importance than anything else to Carlo Emanuele. And it was no more than the beginning of a greater war that was to keep Savoy under arms for another five years almost. Mantua could not hope to stand alone against Savoy, and if the war had proceeded straightforwardly between the two states Monferrat must inevitably have fallen within a short time into the hands of Carlo Emanuele. The house of Gonzaga, however, was noted for its dependence on the Spanish power in Italy, and could hope before long that the Spanish forces in the Milanese would weigh the balance in its favour. And more than the ordinary obligations of supporting an ally that was almost a vassal would urge the Spanish governor to assist Mantua. The tireless energy of Carlo Emanuele, something of that curious, fierce vitality that has burned in the house of Savoy longer than in any other of the ruling houses of Europe, the strong position of his lands among the hills, the desire that he had for Italian unity, the Spanish policy in Italy, "parcere subiectis et debellare superbos", all would join to induce the successive governors of Milan to prevent the Duke from waging a victorious war against Mantua. To that may be added as causes the curious independence of these men and their desire to win some fame and perhaps some wealth by waging a successful war their period of office in Italy. Against the

the united forces of the Spanish Milanese and of Mantua then, Carlo Emanuele was to make head. When the wars were ended Isaac Wake, the English agent in Turin, could sum up the achievements of Savoy moderately but exactly.

He wrote:

"This parte of the worlde doth owe unto Charles Emanuel Duke of Savoy the dicoverie (sic) of one greate secret, which is, That the Spaniards are resistible in Italy, for hee did make his party good against them when not a sworde in all Europe was drawne out against them, & they employed against him all the power of their monarchy. Marcellus was the first that made the Romanes see Hannibalem potuisse vinci, and after hee had once beaten him hee never thrived. The Spaniards have speed little better in these partes since the Duke of Savoy appeared against them. For whereas the Ministers of Spayne did govern all the princes and states of Italy with *Tal e la mente del Rey, es menester mortificar tal prencipe et di castigare talo Republica*, nowe they speak the language of Christians, and doe recommend themselves unto those whome heretofore they did despise. If France doe not abandon him hee will bee a dangerous thorne in the side of the Spaniards, for hee hath an undaunted courage, infinite experience, incredible vigilance, & an active spiritt, an able body beyond the proportion of his yeares, the love of all souldiers, the affections and hearts of his subjects, inventions to finde mony as fast as hee hath & doth dispense it liberally, and, which doth crowne his happiness, all his children of both sexes have abilities to govern a farr greater state then his."(1)

The rights, on either side, of the dispute between Savoy and Mantua are irrelevant here, but the Spanish intervention is not. Despite the rumours that had drifted about London of Savoy's being altogether Spanish and that had helped to kill Gabaleone's negotiations, Carlo Emanuele

(1) Stowe MSS 135 f.111

had come early into conflict with the governor of Milan. On June 15/25 1613 Parkhurst wrote from Turin to Rochester that an envoy had come to Turin from Milan two days before, with order from the governor that the Duke was "to cease his armes and remitt such places as hee had imported in Montferate into the hands of some third; otherwise by order from his Ma.te hee was compelled presently to appeare in armes against him, and the first place hee would ~~ex-~~<sup>should</sup> pugne ~~could~~ be Trin." Carlo Emanuele at once ceased hostilities, sent an embassy to Milan, and began to disband his forces(1). Five days later Parkhurst could report that Carlo Emanuele had restored Trino to the Duke of Mantua, urged on, doubtless, by the news from Spain that the prince of Piedmont could not obtain audience of the king of Spain until his father had surrendered the places he had seized in Montferrat(2). As Savoyard disarmament increased the demands of the governor of Milan increased in firmness and extent until they reached the point where they were summed up in a memorial, probably drawn up by Parkhurst, entitled, "The substance of the Go.r of Milan his reasons to the Duke for quartering certayne Spanish companies in Piemont."(3) The permission sought was not granted (and it could not well be; to grant it was to

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.177. (2) Ib. no.179 Parkhurst to same June 20/30. (3) Ib. no.185.

sacrifice the liberty of Savoy), and Spanish troops were massed on the frontiers of Piedmont(1). All through the autumn till winter made military action impossible messengers and contradictory statements passed between Milan, Madrid and Turin. One sample will do for analysing to show the general structure and practice. An envoy from Milan, Don Zanchio di Luna, arrived in Turin on July 5th, the substance of his errand being to inform the Duke that, on learning of the restitution of the places in Montferrat, the king of Spain had hastened to embrace the prince of Piedmont, and had sent expressly to Mantua to have the princess Maria conducted thence(2); had assured the prince that he would see to the disarming of Mantua and Milan, and had asked that Carlo Emanuele should disarm and give quarter to some Spanish infantry in his lands(3). From Spain itself Vittorio Amadeo gave another account of the wishes of the king. That king, he alleged, had given order to the governor of Milan to restore the daughter to the mother, but had not mentioned Savoyard disarmament, and seemed quite content to believe that once the girl was restored the trouble would end. In Milan the Conte Crivelli, the Savoyard agent there, had it that the governor was ordered from Spain to remove the girl from Mantua

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.199. Parkhurst to Rochester August 8/ B. (2) Maria was the heiress to Montferrat whoever had the guardianship of her could control Montferrat during her minority. (3) S.P.Savoy Bundle 1 no.181 Parkhurst to Rochester 8th July.

but not to surrender her to Savoy, nor to force the Duke to disarm and make restitution for the damage he had done in Montferrat(1). With these conflicting reports in his ears, ignorant of how far the governor of Milan was acting on his own hand, Carlo Emanuele could do no more than keep what men he had on foot and hope for the best, dismissing di Luna with a vague reply. And so the year dragged itself out.

1614 found the two parties facing one another still. It is in this tension and consequent action that Carlo Emanuele continued his English diplomacy, seeking to find in England a counter-poise to the weight that was against him in Italy. The intervention of James in favour of Carlo Emanuele and peace in Spain and Italy, the attempts of Carlo Emanuele to induce the king to act as intermediary between himself and the States, the princes of the Union, Venice and the Protestant Swiss, and the help in men and money given by James to help in the struggle with the Spanish forces in Italy, these were to be the main things in Anglo-Savoyard relations for the next few years. The materials for the period are not so abundant as they are for the earlier period, but they are sufficient to outline the picture of events fairly clearly, and after Isaac Wake ~~was~~<sup>is</sup> left to lie in Turin his dispatches give very sharp detail. The picture of events takes on a

(1) S.P. Savoy Bundle i no. 201. Parkhurst to ~~the~~ Rochester  
 (but don't read)

a more dramatic aspect, for Savoy becomes one of the storm centres of Europe.

Gabaleone had remained on in England as agent even after it was seen that the marriage negotiation he had been sent to forward were dead or moribund(1), but he was not regarded as satisfactory in Turin. The true reasons for this are not clear, but it is certain that on one occasion the Duke told Parkhurst that Gabaleone was "persecuted and oppressed dalli Francesi"(2), and on another that "his dispatches savored of Spanish familiarities with him", that he was seeing things too much through Spanish eyes(3). It may be true. Gabaleone had gone to England expecting to work with the Spanish ambassador against the French. He had been on good terms with de Velasco and, at first, with Sarmiento(4). He may not have been able to adapt himself to his master's changed policy, to the policy of hostility and suspicion towards Spain, particularly now that the masterful Sarmiento was Spanish ambassador. Whatever the reasons Gabaleone was to be recalled(5) and in his place Scarnafigi sent(6).

Scarnafigi arrived in London on April

- (1) See his dispatches in Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1  
 (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no.14. Parkhurst to Somerset May 4th 1614. (3) Ib. same to same June 17/27. (4) Supra pp  
 (5) His last letter from London is dated July 31st 1614. His letter of recedence is dated July 17/27 (Lettere di Giacomo 1 no.XV.) (6) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no. 9. Parkhurst to Somerset 20th February. Antonio, conte di

6th 1614(1), and left again on May 13th(2), a first tentative visit of the new envoy. He was instructed to mention the renewal of the marriage negotiations(3), but beyond that scrap of information there seems to be little to show what the real nature of his instructions was. For his work during this brief visit, indeed, three entries in the Calendar of State Papers Venetian seem to be the only sources. The first, dated April 25th, notes that Scarnafigi has had audience of the king and has offered him carte blanche in the marriage negotiations, giving as his master's reasons for venturing to renew the negotiations, that the king has not yet replied definitely to France(4). On May 9th F Oscarini wrote that Scarnafigi was pushing his proposals and had the support of those who were of the Savoyard faction. Finally, on May 23rd, he wrote, "The Count Scarnafes has at last received the King's answer to his proposals for a marriage. He says that as negotiations are proceeding with France he cannot and ought not to listen to others."(6) So much was patent.

(6)contd. Scarnafigi. "This Gentleman descendeth from a principall family in Piemont and hath very straight alliance and the friendship of a creature with the Conte di Varua (i.e. Verrua) a most active minister and potent in this court: Hee hath bene heretofore diversely employed in his Highnes important affayres att Rome and elsewhere." (S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no.9. Parkhurst to Somerset, Feb. 20th. (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 1 gabaleone to C.E. April 10th. (2) Ib. Same to same, May 18th. (3) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no.14. Parkhurst to Somerset May 4th. (4) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XlIII no.241 (5) Ib. no.249 (6) Ib. no.258

But it is difficult to believe that Carlo Emanuele was so ignorant of the diplomacy of his day, or so optimistic, as to send Scarnafigi to England solely to make an offer of marriage that was bound to be refused, and it is pertinent to ask why, two days after Scarnafigi's return to Turin, the Duke should summon Parkhurst to assure him of the infinite obligations he had received from the king(1). The words may have been used conventionally, but it is possible to suppose that they were spoken without the sarcasm that would underlie them if all the result of Scarnafigi's mission had been the refusal of the marriage proposals; to suppose that Scarnafigi had been sent to seek some form of help, material or diplomatic, from the king, with the marriage proposals tagged on for camouflage like a peacock's tail. The assurance of obligation would imply that such help was at least promised.

The conjecture is strengthened by a letter of Parkhurst's of June 8th to Somerset, where he tells of a request made to him by the Duke for the help of the English ambassador in Venice in bringing about better relations between Savoy and the republic. The letter runs:

"On the 30th of May his Highnes called me unto him, And sayd, Hee desired to communicate with me a thought of his which in some kind tended to his Maiesties service, and

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no.31 Parkhurst to Somerset June 5/15.

importantly to his and the present condition of affayres here. That hee wished such Princes in Italy as rann loyntly with his Ma.ties designes might likewise x goe even amonge themselves. The State of Venice x uppon his motion in Monferat, thorough the suggestions of some, and the iealousies of others, distatched themselves from his frendship: notwithstanding they had since diversely made him conceave by the Duke of Modena (who had sent hither therein) and others, a desire in them to retorne againe with him: which then and hitherto had beene neglected: Now findinge the of buisines (sic phrase) here require so much, and being still advertised of the continued intents of the Senat, and himself principally depending on his Ma.ties protection, which likewise is so much considered in the sayd Rep.ca hee could thinke of no meanes so powerful for the reintegration of this frendship, and the obliging both parties to his Ma.tie as by any lost part of his Royal pleasure appearing therein: And hee had sent for me to this effect. That I would accompany with my letters unto Sir Dudley Carleton a private messenger whome hee would send to Venice unto him to remonstrate such reasons and interests as might move him to bee soone in this reconciliation. Whereunto I replied, That his Ma.ties ministers could not but desire with him th'advancement of his designes, yet if itt would please him to heare my opinion, I must wish his Ma.tie might first bee advertised therein, whose immediate pleasure could only direct and authorize his Vassals in buisinesse of such weight. Hee sayd, The advertisement and retorne would aske much tyme which in this season was pretious, and hee desired only of me to advertise barely th'Ambass.r. That the Duke of Savoy had requested me to accompany his messenger with a few lines unto him, who might uppon the place consider, and so operate, as hee should find the ouverture concurre with his Ma.ties affayres. Heere I thought it ~~xxx~~ my duty to proffer him that point of my service."(1)

On June 17/27 Parkhurst wrote again to Somerset setting down the reasons used in Turin for seeking a better understanding with Venice. They were that Carlo Emanuele was eager to make peace with Mantua and to include Venice

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no.27

in the treaty, and, if Mantua should prove stubborn, that the Venetian Senate might be induced by Carleton to persuade the Duke of Mantua to follow a rational course for the sake of liberty in Italy. The English ambassador was to be the means of bringing Venice and Savoy into line facing Spanish Milan(1). Five days earlier Parkhurst had written asking James to authorise Carleton to use the necessary good offices in Venice(2). With that request, reinforced as it was by the plea of the Duke himself(3), the king complied(4).

Taking the first steps towards a settled understanding with Venice, Carlo Emanuele had sent an ambassador, Giacomo Pescina, to Venice with powers to open discussions and a letter to Carleton seeking his help(5). Without waiting for instructions Carleton intervened. On July 14th he appeared before the Cabinet, and asked for leave to introduce Pescina, saying:-

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no. 36      (2) Ib. no.32  
 (3) See the letter from Carlo Emanuele to James Ib no. 40  
 (4) Ib. no. 58. September 19th.  
 (5) C.S.P. Ven. Vol.XIII no. 310

"From the very beginning of the troubles of Montferrat your serenity informed of what passed there and of what policy you intended to pursue, charging me to procure the co-operation of my king in the interests of peace. In this task I was assisted by his natural inclination towards universal peace and by his well-known desire to fall in with the wishes of the republic. The result has been delayed a good while, but better late than never, and at length the Duke of Savoy shows a disposition to consent to a reasonable settlement of his differences with the Duke of Mantua. He considers that the first steps towards this will be to renew friendly relations with the republic. He recognises that the republic in these negotiations must have the position belonging to her as a great power in this province, while he claims his own right to treat in this matter as a free prince. Moved, as I said, by the desire of the favour of this republic, he sent some days ago to the city Sig. Giovanni Giacomo Pescina, a senator of his council, with letters of credit to me, asking for my good offices to procure him access to your serenity so that he might represent the friendly disposition of His Highness and his desire that the good relations which have existed between his house and the republic in the past may be no longer interrupted. I received these advances with great satisfaction, and sent off to my king for instructions, and at the same time I advised Sig. Pescina to withdraw from the city till the reply should arrive. But new movements of arms in the state of Milan have aroused the just suspicions of the princes of this province, and it appears that the Duke of Savoy has been asked to settle his differences with Mantua. He has, therefore, sent a special courier to the Senator to ask me not to delay to treat about his waiting upon your Serenity in order to present the letter of the Duke and to wait to know if he will be admitted. Wherefore I judge that I ought not to fail in my duty to the common weal in general and to the republic in particular."(1)

Carleton's intercession was sufficient for the Savoyard envoy to be admitted and allowed to present his case(2). It was none too early. The reply that Pescina got was vague, a mere expression of the republic's desire to see an end of the troubles in Italy(3). But, in fact, the Senate was better disposed than their answer showed. The Spanish ambassador was sought out and asked to write

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.310. (2) Ib. no.311. (3) Ib. no.339

to Milan and Madrid and point out the desire of the republic that some measure of disarmament should be ~~xxxx~~ adopted there to correspond with Savoyard disarmament(1). Of this pescina was informed on July 26th.

The republic, then, was not unfriendly, and Parkhurst and Carleton could take some credit for having, of their own authority, done something to promote peace in Italy and help Carlo Emanuele. The responsibility for their action was to be shared by ~~xxxx~~ the home government when the king approved Carleton's action. And Carleton's good offices for Savoy did not end there. On August 11th he again came before the Cabinet to assure it of the satisfaction that Carlo Emanuele had from the reception of Pescina, and of his resolve to send a resident ambassador to Venice, adding, "I am charged to say how much the king will be gratified if your Serenity will send a representative of your own to the Duke of Savoy, who has already selected a subject of his own to represent him here." (2) It was agreed to ~~send~~ an ambassador ~~to~~ Savoy (3), and on August 14th a letter was sent to Turin to inform the Duke of the friendship of Venice (4). Finally a Venetian ambassador, Renieri Zeno, was sent to Turin as resident (5). Even

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.339. (2) Ib. no.358 (3) Ib. no.383. (4) Ib. no.364. (5) relazioni degli stati europei cit. Serie 3. Vol.1 p.212. He had his first audience on Nov. 14th (Ib.)

without prompting Carleton inclined to favour the cause of Savoy, it would seem. In the September of 1614 he expected to leave Venice, and, in what he imagined would be his final audience, he delivered a long speech asking the republic to consider the damage done by Spanish aggression, and the valiant resistance put up by Savoy:

"The prince who is now suffering proposes to disarm, but he wishes to do so with safety and honour. This is only just and reasonable, and if the other side does not accept it would be wise to exhort him to remain armed lest he be subjected when it would be too late to have recourse auxilio et defensoribus, as help from a distance would not arrive in time. This prince deserves the favour of your Serenity from every point of view, but especially because he has not, like the other princes of the province, followed the triumphal car of the common enemy."(1)

In England by the September of 1614 it had become apparent that the king could see the real issues in the dispute in Italy, and was inclined to favour Savoy. Discussing the situation with Foscarini he is reported to have said,

"That the Duke had previously been a Spaniard in sympathy and had founded his hopes in that ~~quarter~~ quarter, but he has changed now and treats with sincerity. That having seen that the Spaniards wanted everything for themselves and that he could not advantage himself or expect anything but ill, he revised his views and changed, and if the matters are arranged, your Excellencies will have a large share of the honour. That the governor of Milan displays too much violence; that it is not reasonable that he should remain armed and that Savoy alone disarm. He expressed other ideas to the disadvantage of Spain, showing a feeling and a spirit divided between hope and fear about the accommodation or a total breach. He declared that the troubles of the duke would cause him to take his part; that Spain is great enough and he cannot and will not permit her to become greater; that the annihilation of Savoy would be of too

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.392

great prejudice not only to the princes of Italy but to those far off as well, and he certainly will not allow him to fall."(1)

That can be taken as a fairly good indication of the king's mind. It can be safely assumed that Foscarini was giving a true report of his audience; Venice was not yet committed to either side in the quarrel and he had, therefore, no motive for twisting the king's words to suit the opinions of his masters. It is a fairly safe conclusion that the king had a will, if not the means, to help Savoy, and that he would not lack the support of all those men of England who retained the old hostility to Spain.

In Italy the long-gathered storm had burst once the harvest was ended. On September 5/15 Parkhurst wrote that the governor of Milan had invaded Piedmont and occupied Stropiana, and that Carlo Emanuele had sent his cavalry raiding into Montferrat wasting the country(2). Through the autumn the war lasted with little gain to either side till it was ended, for a short time at least, by the first treaty of Asti, signed on December 1st 1614(3), by which it was agreed that Carlo Emanuele should disarm first and the governor within twenty days after. Savelli, the papal nuncio in Turin, and the Marquis de Rambouillet, the French ambassador, signed as guarantors of the keeping of the terms of the treaty. To no great purpose. The terms were not

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.383, September 7th. (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no.54. (3) Traité de la maison de Savoye cit. Tom. 1 pp. 290-294.

observed, and James was forced to let his anger with the governor boil over in a letter to Carlo Emanuele:

"Monsieur mon Cousin

Après que nous eussions reçu l'advertissement de l'accord, arresté entre vous et le Gouverneur de Milan, les nouvelles arrivèrent icy, des violences qui vous ont esté faictes, par l'armée d'Espagne, contre tout droict et equité. Ceste indigne procédure nous prenons en très mauvaise part; et nous vous prions croire, que nous en resentirons, non moins, que si cest affront eust esté fait à nostre personne. Ce qui nous fait vous prier trèsinstantment, de ne perdre point le courage, ny de succomber à des conditions iniques, ou peu honorables; car nous sommes résolus, ou de vous procurer la paix, avec de seurte et honneur, ou nous et nos amys, nous embarquerons en vostre querelle, de telle vigueur que tout le monde recognoistra, que nous sommes etc" (1)

In the autumn of that year Scarnafigi returned to London from Turin, arriving there on September 8th(2). The cover of the marriage negotiations had been removed, and Foscarini learned that there were two main objects of his mission - to justify Carlo Emanuele's past conduct(3), and to invite James to make a defensive alliance to include England, Savoy and whatever other states he should wish(4). It was a roundabout way of asking to be admitted to the alliance between England and the princes of the Union of March 1612. Foscarini believed that he would be successful, remembering the words that James had used about Spanish aggression and the need to meet it in Italy. On

(1) Lettere di Giacomo I no. XX December 15th 1614

(2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol. XIII no. 188. (3) This is confirmed by a letter of the Duke of Sept. 19th (S.P. Savoy Bundle 2. no. 58. (4) C.S.P.Ven. Vol. XIII no. 387. Sept. 11th.

September 19th Foscarini again wrote that James had been enlarging to the French ambassador his ideas about Savoy and Spanish aggression, and had promised that now he would grant leave to all who wished to go and serve Carlo Emanuele(1). And more than that. Scarnafigi had put before him a proposal more definite than before for an alliance between England and Savoy with Venice, or the States, or the princes of the Union included, and had asked for four thousand English foot to succour his master(2). A few months before these proposals would have been brushed aside with vague words. Now the king seems to have pondered them, and reshaping them, made them his own, as if he truly appreciated the dangerous state in which Carlo Emanuele found himself. At an audience which Foscarini had shortly after this time he found the king full of these notions.

"He afterwards spoke of the state of the times, of the attempts of the Spaniards in several places, and that those things led everyone to take heed and to make sure of his own things. He advised your Serenity to come to a good understanding with the duke and to reconcile him if possible with Mantua, and to join in the alliance which Savoy offers, together with the Swiss and the Grisons; so that all being joined together would form a union with the princes of Italy for the defence and general profit of all, speaking the same language and all children of your serenity to whom it belongs to form such a union. . . . He said, in conclusion, that with regard to his confederacy; he will always be ready with all his friends. He referred to the request made by Savoy for 4000 infantry, displaying an inclination to grant it, but for defence alone."(3)

(1) O.S.P. Ven. Vol.XIII no.399 (2) Ib. No.408 Sept. 26th  
~~xxxxxxx~~ (3) Ib. no. 410

from London Scarnafigi passed to the States, leaving England on October 10th(1), in the hope of enlisting aid for his master there. He must have set out with the opinion that affairs were marching more quickly and to a more definite end than was usual in England; and he would be the more inclined to that opinion that Somerset as well as the king had shown him favour(2). It may not have been the merits of his cause alone that speeded his business in England. The old trouble looked like breaking out again in the Low Countries where Spinola and Maurice of Nassau were moving their forces, and that might mean a war of religion(3). Any help given to Carlo Emanuele would be useful to detain Spanish forces in Italy, and, therefore, profitable to the States as well as to James' allies of the Union. That the king realised this can be seen from the action of Sir Thomas Edmondes, the ambassador in France, who, in his master's name, begged the queen not to put pressure on Carlo Emanuele to make him disarm, and not to recall the French volunteers that were in his forces, for if the Spanish did not need to maintain an army in Italy all their force could be directed against the States(4). Then, before Scarnafigi set out for the

(1) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XIII no. 441. (2) Ib. (3) Cambridge Modern History Vol. 3 p. 733. (4) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XIII No. 416.

Hague, James had charged the ambassador of the States in England to write to his masters asking them to favour the Savoyard proposals, and to give as much help as they could to Carlo Emanuele, as a thing useful to themselves. Whatever were the motives that were leading James to work for Carlo Emanuele at this time there can be no doubt that he was bestirring himself. The eldest son of Lord Rich was commissioned to raise four thousand men and to hold them ready for a signal from Savoy; adventurers to Savoy were encouraged(1); the king expostulated with the French amb-

(1) Sandelands is a good example of these men. On October 6th 1614 James wrote in his favour to Savoy: "Monsieur mon Cousin, Ce porteur le Chevalier Sandelands ayant grand'envie de se trouver pres de vous, et a celle fin nous ayant souvenste fois treshumbliement supplie luy donner licence de se rendre a vostre service, Nous avons non seulement ottroye sa requeste mais aussy (l'ayants eu prouve suffisante de sa valeur et fidelite; comme de celui qui depuis son enfance ha tousiours este pres de nous) l'avons bien voulu recommander a vous, et vous prier de le vouloir favoriser comme gentilhomme qui de quelconque service au quelk il vous plaira l'employer l'acquittera en homme de bien: a quoy faire nous nous asseurons qu'il sefforcera tant plus pour ne dementre point ceste nostre recommandation." etc (Lettere di Giacomo 1 no.XVII.) In the spring of 1615 Sandelands was serving in Savoy. Carlo Emanuele wrote of him to the king: "La bonne relation que Mons.r le sieur Carleton ambass.r de V.M. m'a faite des qualitez et vertes du S.r Jacques Sandelands m'occasions den fere election pour m'en prevalloir en cette guerre que me font les Espagnols. Et a cet effect ie luy ay despecher une commission pour me lever deux cens Maistres."etc (S.P.Savoy bundle 2 no.288)

Easton and his men were still serving the guns in Savoy. Of them Carleton wrote: "The Duke hath 8000 men with 7 field peices, wherof the English which came with Easton have still the charge, and every one of them at theyr going from hence in theyr caps and fethers putt a Jacobus peice for a jewell, which shewes these poor mens goode minde

ambassador at the reported withdrawal of the French troops from Savoyard service; Sarmiento was snubbed when he complained of the levying of troops in England for Savoy; and the Dutch ambassador was made send an envoy to his masters to learn their intention about giving assistance to Savoy(I). The material aid promised from England is thus summed up by Foscarini:

" I have been told that the Count of Scarnafigi, having received from the king the promise of 4000 infantry, negotiated jointly with Rich to obtain twenty vessels to transport them. Meeting with difficulties in this and seeing that it would be very costly, he has gone to Holland, purposing to obtain them of the States. He was given to understand that if the war was gone on with the king would shut his eyes and he would find a quantity of vessels which might be employed against Spain, sailing under the duke's flag."(2)"

If as great an activity and as good a disposition were to be found in the States, and if this inclination in England lasted, Scarnafigi needed to fear little for the success of his mission.

(I) Contd. towards their prince and countrey, to which they have done as much honor as comes to have their names in a gazetta and to be sung about Lombardie in ballads." (S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no.323 Carleton to Chamberlain April 13th 1615.)

Sir Edward Herbert was also in Turin serving the Duke. He had come there with Carleton in the spring of 1615 (S.P. Savoy Bundle 2 no. 333). The Protestants of Nimes had declared their willingness to serve Savoy with seven or eight thousand men, and Herbert was sent there with 12,000 crowns from the Duke. (Ib. no. 290).

(1) C.S.P. Ven. Vol.XIII nos 429 and 441  
 (2) Ib. no. 469.

Sir Henry Wotton was then English ambassador in Holland, and with him Scarnafigi sought to work. Information about this work is not plentiful; Wotton was writing much less frequently than his office demanded at the time, and no dispatch of Scarnafigi's seems to remain. There are two accounts, one at second or third hand from Foscarini(1), the other a brief summary contained in a letter from Biondi to the king. They both agree in saying that the cautious Barneveld refused to give any assistance to Savoy until James had proved his intention of helping with more than promises. Biondi's account runs:

"Sir Henry Wotton, your Majesty's ambassador, charged me, since I was with him at Xanten, to come here with the Conte Scarnafigi to help him in his negotiations. So advised by prince Maurice we approached Barneveld. Scarnafigi treated with him and informed him of the desire of his Highness to have the friendship, and, if necessary, some assistance from the States. The difficulties in the way were examined. Barneveld is decided to do nothing, since the States could not contribute to the security of Savoy unless your Majesty showed the way, not with advice and counsel but with your example. On the advice of Barneveld Scarnafigi has decided to return to England." (2)

On November 4th, then, Scarnafigi arrived back in London (1) with this answer that the States were waiting for James to give the lead. ~~With~~ The onus of making a beginning in assisting Savoy now lay on James, and Scarnafigi's work was to make the giving of it speedy and plenti-

(2) S.P.Holland bundle 70 no.125. Biondi to James 15/25 October. Italian. (1) C.S.P.ven. vol.XIII no.478

(1)

ful. At the first audience after his return, however, it became apparent, though much was promised, that with the need of doing instead of saying something James' early enthusiasm for the cause of Savoy had vanished. On Scarnafigi's informing him of the answer he had from Barneveld, James tried to shift the responsibility thus laid on him, arguing that, though he was quite ready to implement his promises, the Dutch should give the lead; for they were near the end of their truce with Spain, and it was to their interest to foment all who were hostile to Spain, and to give aid to all who were in arms against Spain(1) - an argument that had the disadvantage of being pertinent. On the 14th of November the Council met to discuss the affairs of Savoy. The main things treated were the nature of the help to be given to Savoy, the best means of dealing with the States to make them cooperate, and the question whether Scarnafigi should stay in London, return to the Hague, or return to Turin to inform his master of the progress of his mission. For the first, despite the cooling off of the fervour for Savoy, it was decided to provide and pay 4,000 infantry, or the money necessary to pay as many mercenaries, and for the second that the king should speak to the ambassador of the States and also instruct Wotton to perform the necessary offices at the Hague.

(1) C.S.P. Ven Vol. XlIII no. 486. Foscarini to the Doge and Senate November 14th.

The last question was left over.(1) Scarnafigi immediately took advantage of the definite offer of men, and of a supplementary offer of munitions, and began dealings with Rich for raising the men in England, a task that Rich had already begun, and seeing to transports for them from Holland(2). James himself was not slow in dealing with the ambassador of the States, urging on him the need of keeping Spain occupied in Italy. He wrote, too, to Wotton to make representations to Maurice of Nassau on behalf of Carlo Emanuele.

It was decided, too, to send back to Turin Albertus Morton, who had been agent there earlier in the year(3). His letter of credence is very general in its

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.499. Foscarini to D. & S. Nov. 21st

(2) Ib.

(3) Albertus Morton was the nephew of Sir Henry Wotton (D.N.E. with whom he had been on his first embassy to Venice, and on his mission to Turin(Supra p. ). He went out to Turin as English agent on or before July 2nd. 1614 (C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.301). There does not seem to be any letter of credence or instruction left from that first period of duty. It is not clear how long he was in Turin. The letter of credence for his second mission is S.P.Savoy bundle 2 no.112 (in which bundle his correspondence in Turin is also to be found), and Lettere di Giacomo 1 no.XVIII. It is dated December 8/18 1614, and is the common formality. No instructions for him seem to have survived. He arrived in Turin for this second period before February 2nd 1615 (H.M.C. Buccleugh (Montague House) MSS Vol.1 1899 p.160.) During ~~most~~ of the spring of that year there were frequent appeals from him to be allowed to return home because of ill-health (See S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 passim). He finally left Turin on June 13th 1615 (C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.865.) Abiography will be found in L.P.Smith Life of Wotton cit. Appendix x.

terms and nothing can be learned from it of any instructions he may have received, yet Foscarini had found out from some unknown source that Morton carried "letters to the Duke in which he (i.e. the king) will bind himself to pay the 400,000 crowns, and grant the levying of troops and munitions in his dominions if an accomodation cannot be arranged, and declare open war on Spain, and the agent will confirm the same by word of mouth."(1) It is likely, to express the thing as lightly as can be, that Foscarini's unknown informant was exaggerating when he declared that James would make war on Spain, and when he fixed the financial help to be given at so large a figure. But the statement cannot altogether be ignored; Foscarini had also learned that Carleton was to be transferred from Venice to Turin to cooperate with Zeno in establishing a firm peace(1). In that he was correct. It was with these promises, then, and the knowledge that James was writing earnestly on behalf of Carlo Emanuele to the States, the Palatine and the other princes of the Union that Scarnafigi had to be content. On the last day of the year he and Morton set out for Turin(2). They travelled by way of France, where Morton was apparently instructed to use his utmost efforts to induce the government to intervene in the war, either by trying to secure a peace that

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.543. (2) ib. no.562. Scarnafigi's letter of recedence is Lettere di Giacomo I no.XIX

It is dated December 8/18.

would be satisfactory to Carlo Emanuele, or, failing that, by assisting him openly with arms. Morton carried letters to Conde, Bouillon, Rohan and Nevers, the men of the faction opposed to the queen regent(1), as well, and was himself to exhort them to further the passage of troops to Savoy and to support in the Council any representations that Edmondes might make in favour of the Duke(2). At last, before crossing the hills, Morton came to Lesdiguieres at Grenoble and spoke with him of the Italian war, finding him of the opinion that a just peace followed by the formation of a league of England, France, the states, the Union, Venice and Savoy would serve best the interests of the free princes of Italy and of Europe, and that, if peace could not be achieved, Carlo Emanuele would best be served with money to pay mercenaries(3). With that prudent opinion in his ears Morton set out to cross the hills and begin a mission in which he was to be eclipsed by the greater light of Carleton.

(1) Cambridge Modern History Vol.IV Chapt.4 or Francois de Mezeray L'histoire de France sous les regnes de Louis XIII et Louis XIV for the parties in France at this time.

(2) C.S.P.Ven Vol.XIII no.562. (3) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 no. 165. Morton to Winwood January 13/23 1614/1615.

SIR DUDLEY CARLETON IN TURIN AND THE TREATY OF  
ASTI.

At his arrival in Turin Morton found the country dispirited, weary of the war and wishing an end of it. The Duke was insistent that he must have at once the aid promised by James or be forced to disarm and see Piedmont overrun when the end of the winter brought the beginning of the campaigning season proper. He was resolved to send Scarnafigi at once into England to get the first instalment of the £25,000 he had been promised(1). Morton set to work immediately to effect what he could. There is a letter of his of January 22nd (O. S.) to Carleton, the English ambassador in Venice, urging him to point out to the Venetian Senate that if they intended to do anything to help Savoy and bring peace into Italy they should do it at once, since that might prevent the war of raids from growing into a formal war. The letter is worth quoting:

the  
^ "On Tuesday last I wrote unto yr. Lordp. and withall, by meanes of the Venetian ambassador heere resident, sent suche letters as I had received from Mr. Secretary in England about yr. Lordships coming hither, which is much desired, and as I am made beleive heere, the hast of it is the most necessary circomstance. Since which time I have been earnestly intreated to move yr. Lordp. to the passing of some offices there in senate before yr. departure to this purpose, That if the Venetians doe intend hereafter in case the Duke should be oppressed by the Spaniard to yeeld him any succor, (which by many remonstrances they have labored to make me capable of) that then they may be pleased to consider how

(1) S.P. Savoy. bundle 2. No.168 Morton to Winwood, January 21/ February 3rd (sic) 1615

at the present, with much lesse charge they may doe it, and happily by their appearing in the buisines, facilitate the peace of Italy, which hath so long been suspended. Bycause the Spaniard at the present, as they say, arming to the number of thirtythousand, besides what he hath already, doth it in this confidence, that the duke will be assisted from no part. of which nope when he shall fayle they doubt not heere but he will ~~xx~~ with as much desire embrace this peace as the duke himself, who pretendeth nothing more. This is the effect of what was delivered unto me, in many words, and I have taken the boldnes to present it in this hast to your Lordship; who knowing now much his matie doth desire the quiett and advancement of this house will according as it shall appeare fitt to yr. owne wisdome, favor it in that place. From whence if any demonstration of assistance be drawen, either by arming to any greater number upon their confines, or by supply of monyes; I was willed to say that it would neere be construed as an effect of his Majestyes favor and protection over the duke, wrought especially by your Lordship!(1)

Carleton needed no such urging. Before ever that letter was received, or even written, on January 12/22 he had appeared before the College to make, in offering the customary New Year good-wishes, a violent attack on Spanish policy in Italy and a plea for Savoy. "Have the Spaniards always observed a due regard for others?" he asked, "and have they not always seized every opportunity to diminish the dignity and authority of other princes and states? Have they not always raised difficulties by sea and land and a mortal war against peace; have they not always as it were maintained Hannibal ad portas, a band of theives and assassins, known as the sbirri of the house of Austria who prey upon the merchants and the surrounding country with their ships?"

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 2 . No. 172. Morton to Carleton,

I know what I am speaking about when I say that the leading Ministers of that Crown had a project not long ago to divide the dominions of this republic with the common enemy, a project never thought of in the division of the Empire into East and West." It was a strong argument to use in Venice, and from it Carleton could pass easily to speak of the assistance that James intended offering to Savoy and to inquire how far the Republic would go to defend Savoy from Spanish aggression.(1)

But however much Carleton as a private Englishman may have wished to use the authority that his diplomatic status gave him to help Carlo Emanuele in the struggle with Spain, he could have effected little without the support and authorisation of the home government. This he was soon to get. The need of supporting so constant a suitor as Carlo Emanuele with some stronger prop than a mere agent, the facility with which Carleton could be transferred to Turin, and, perhaps, the knowledge<sup>s</sup> that the withdrawal<sup>for</sup> ~~for~~ a few months of the English ambassador would make the Republic realise more clearly than almost any other action the importance that the English government attached to the maintenance of the status quo in Italy were probably the motives that led James to order Carleton to transfer himself to Turin. The course of action he was

(1) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XLII No. 589

to follow there is best described in the letter of instructions:

"Now having acquainted that state (i.e. Venice) with the cause of your remove, we require you with all possible speed laying aside all sort of ceremonies, which often hinder the substance of negotiations for there is periculum in mora to transport your selfe to the Court of the Duke of Savoy whome you shall not surprize, for our Servaunt Albert Morton our Agent with him whome we have retourned in diligence and given in charge to assist you in this businesse doth advertize him of your coming, when you are arrived to the Duke informe your selfe both by him and his Counsaile of the present conditions and State of his affaires. In the entry of your conference with him give him full assurance of our love and faithful affection and let him know that if we were as neare ~~unto~~ him in neighbourhood and vicinity of place as we are neare unto him in most hartly and fervent love, but as the case standeth with him Amicus qui longe est non est amicus, such is the affection we beare him that we would support him though with the hazard of our owne crowne but now all circumstances considered the distance of place wherin we live which enforceth an impossibilitie of sending him succour of men either by land or sea especially in this season of the yeare and if we understand them aright the State of his affaires cannot have patience to attend the spring we hold nothing more expedient for his service then upon conditions honourable and advantageous to make if not a sure and a fast peace yet a temporary and provisionall surcease of Armes which that he may do with greater confidence and assurance we have commaunded you to attend his person allwaies to be present upon all occasions to use the mediation of our name the better to countenance the iustnes of his cause, which though of it selfe it ought to have sufficient force to preserve the Duke from violence and oppression, yet if you find that assisted with the favor ~~and protection of our~~ of our protection, the Duke can find no reason in this treaty but that they will impose upon him uniuert and unworthy conditions such as you shall find shall either make him contemptible to the world or hereafter unserviceable to his State and freinds, we then authorize you from us and in our name to give him all encouragement to upholde and maintaine him selfe with this assurance that we will not come single but that our freinds and Allies shall concurre with us for his assistance, for as the states

generall of the united provinces returned answeare to the Count Scarnaffis whome we recommended by our letters effectuously to them that they would follow both our counsaile and example so we will give them that example in the contribution of our aide to the reliefe of the Duke as they shall not refuse to foliow, unlesse they will, which we know they will not doe, altogether refuse our unity and alliance. At the Duke's court you shall find our Agent Albert Morton to whome we have given in charge as he passeth by in our name to visit the Mareschel of de Desdiguires at Grenoble to whome we have written and earnestly recommended the cause of the Duke both by giving him thanckes for the favors he hath already done him and praying him to continew all friendly offices which we wish him to put upon our accompt. by the answeare which the Marschall doth returne you will be able to make iudgment how the Duke may be enabled to subsist, for as before we have said, supplies of men from us he cannot expect, which must come out of France and from France to Dolphine or else cannot passe."(1)

These instructions are a fairly clear indication of the English government's intention of supporting Savoy, and James' intention of maintaining the independence of that state is made even plainer in a letter written to Carleton by the secretary the day after the instructions had been drawn up:

"Only you shall receive this from me by letters which Morton received from his Ma.ties mouth, that though he desire nothinge more then that there should be concluded betweene the Duke and Governor of Milan a firme and assured peace, yet rather had he that noe peace at all should be concluded then that the Duke of Savoye should be repatriated with Spaine, and that hee and his house, as heretofoor they have done, should hold their dependance upon the K. of Spain; you therefore (for such is his Ma.ties pleasure) will have care so to carry the conduct of this negotiation, that the Duke of Savoye and all other princes of Italy, may plainly acknowledge that not only the countenance of his Ma.tie hath procured this Duke the peace he shall obtaine upon an honorable and advantagious conditions but that it must be the protection of his Ma.tie which shall assure it when it is obtained.(2)

(1) Add. MSS 18,640 f.1. 5<sup>th</sup> December, 1614

(2) Egerton MS. 2813. f. 9. Secretary to Carleton  
8<sup>th</sup> December, 6<sup>th</sup> 1614

Carleton probably received that letter on or shortly before the 10th of February, 1615. On that date he appeared before the Cabinet, presented his letter of recall, and informed the Doge of his intention of obeying his orders immediately.(1) At the same time he made two requests that would lessen his own difficulties in Turin - the first that Zeno, the Venetian ambassador in Turin, might be instructed to work with him for peace; the second that Venice would mass troops on the frontiers to give weight to their joint efforts. His first request was granted; to the second he got a vague, not unfavourable reply.(2) It was a small service, but Carleton knew that the interest of Venice in preventing the Spanish power in Milan from growing too overweening would make of Zeno something more than a friendly neutral, and, indeed, was later to write of him, comparing him with the marquis of Rambouillet, the French ambassador, "I have cause to remember the question in scripture Unus aedificans aliter destruens quid prosit illis nisi labor?"(3)

On February 4/14 then Carleton took the road over Italy by Vicenza and Verona for Turin, where he arrived on the 16/26 of the same month(4), and where he was to spend some five arduous months. They were to bring a temporary peace, indeed, for Carlo Emanuele but little peace for himself who had grown used to the ordered quiet of Venice.

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIII no.636 (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 2 No.188  
 Carleton to the King 21 Feb./ 3 March 1615 (3) Ib. No.236  
 Carleton to ? 6/16 March 1615. Carleton's letter of credence  
 to Savoy will be found in Carleton MS 2813. fol. 2.  
 (4) S.P. Savoy Bundle 2. No. 256 Carleton to Chamberlain.

very soon after his arrival in Turin the difficulties became apparent. At a meeting of the foreign ministers in Turin Carlo Emanuele spoke of his desire for peace and reconciliation with the Governor of Milan. To Carleton, thinking ingeniously, the obvious move, (and it was probably that desired by Carlo Emanuele) was for the three ambassadors, the Marquis of Rambouillet, the French ambassador, Zeno, the Venetian, and himself, to make a joint representation to Mendoza(1), the Governor of Milan, requesting him to make some attempt at conciliation. He suggested this and found that neither of the others would work with him(2). The reasons are not deeply hidden; as the minister of a Protestant state Carleton was precluded from working in concert with, or even from recognising the Papal Nuncio, Savelli; Rambouillet customarily worked with Savelli in following a pro-Spanish policy; and, despite the intentions of Venice, Zeno could not risk becoming tied in the estimation of the court with an heretical minister working in opposition to France and Spain, though he and Carleton were later to work together more closely. But, if he could not perform the necessary offices with the Governor in company with the other ministers in Turin, Carleton was still set on performing them. On the 6/16 of march he was writing to inform an unknown correspond-

(1) Don John de Mendoza, Marquis of Hinojosa, Spanish Governor of Milan. (2) C.S.P.Ven. Xlll no.692, Zeno to the Doge and senate March 10th, 1615

ent that he had sent his secretary, Isaac Wake, to milan to persuade the Governor of Carlo Emanuele's peaceful bent.(1)

The letter Wake carried runs:

"In my passage through milan I have been so much honoured that I shall remain under an eternal obligation. My master, the king of Great Britain, has directed me to come to these parts. The ministers of the other princes have brought about an almost exact balance between peace and war. Your authority which has been so happily employed in other parts of Europe upon other occasions, may decide the scales for a peace which is so much desired by all. I was therefore much pleased to find that your Excellency was not disinclined for peace, if it could be obtained with honour and reputation for your king. After I arrived in this court and had observed your good will, both in public matters and towards this prince, so far as your duties to the king allowed, I thought it right to inform you of the disposition of this prince to give every satisfaction to this king in the interests of peace. As a proof of this, His Highness having heard that he rested under the imputation of not having given satisfaction upon a point of honour, considering the difference of the interested parties, immediately called together on the 13th inst. the ambassador of France, the ambassador of Venice, myself, and the English resident here, and in the presence of us all declared his readiness to give every satisfaction in his power consonant with the liberty of an absolute prince, promising to effect this when the way has been opened to an accommodation. He charged us to inform our masters of this his purpose, and to make it public where we thought fit! (2)

There was small success to Wake's journey. The reply he took back to Carleton was a blunt, perhaps exaggerated, statement of mendoza's own position as a humble agent of the king of Spain with no power to ~~xxx~~ treat.

is which submitted under  
 "Your letter has caused me great satisfaction. Your Excellency puts two points to me, if my memory serves me right, one to assure me of the goodwill of the king of Great Britain towards my king, the other is that you went to Turin by your master's orders in the interests and service of His Catholic Majesty. Now I hear from you what took place ~~at~~ Turin on the 13th in the ~~the~~ presence of the ambassadors. No other ambassador of those present has in-

(1) S.P. Savoy Bundle 2 no. 236. (2) C.S.P. Ven. vol. X111.

No. 408.

formed me of what took place; and I did not expect it, because I ~~have~~ told each of them more than once the king has taken this affair out of my hands and is dealing with it by himself."(1)

Careton had had no great success in his first few weeks in Turin, and he admitted it frankly and humbly to the king, stressing the failure of the other ambassadors to co-operate with him, the Governor's refusal to treat, and the way in which his own work had become of necessity more an encouragement of the Duke to resist aggression than arbitration.(2)

It was not through Careton alone that James was working to give what help he could to Carlo Emanuele, nor upon the two parties most directly concerned; in France and in Spain his ministers were working to mollify the attitude of these two powers to Savoy. These two had now to be considered as one in their relation to Savoy, for their interests in the dispute were identical. To Spain the only satisfactory ending of the trouble would be the complete disarmament of Carlo Emanuele; for by that only could the risk of Savoyard encroachment on Monferrato and even on the ~~milanese~~ Milanese, when the troubles, now coming to a head in the north, necessitated the transference of Spanish troops from Milan to the Low Countries, be met. And, besides, there was the prestige of Spain in Italy to be considered; it would

(1) C.S.P. Ven. vol. XIII No. 708

(2) S.P. Savoy, Bundle 2. Number 245.  
Careton to the King 6/16 March, 1618.

be lessened if the peace made with Savoy were not a clear indication of savoyard submission. To the Queen mother in France the decisive victory of Spain in Italy, either by arms or by diplomacy, was equally necessary. So long as the war in northern Italy dragged on she could not risk the marriage with Spain on which her heart was set; the disturbances so near the frontier might give an excuse <sup>for</sup> an occasion of violent action to the Huguenots or the princes of the blood to whom the strict orthodoxy and the autocratic tendencies of Spain were equally distasteful. Her interests, as Sir Thomas Edmondes the English ambassador in Paris saw, was to force Carlo Emanuele to a disarmed tranquility that would detract nothing from the prestige of Spain.(1) Against this common interest Edmondes in Paris and Sir John Digby in Spain had to work.

Early in the new year Edmondes began to make representations to de Villeroy in favour of Savoy, and if the effect was not great the action was at least proof that James intended to work in France to derend Carlo Emanuele.

"Afterwards I told him (de Villeroy) that his Ma.tie had given me charge to recommend unto the Q. the affaires of the Duke of Savoye, for the supporting of that Prince from being ruined by the K of Spayne, and that for the desire w.ch his Ma.tie had, that the sd. difference might be compounded by waye of Treatie, he had not onely dispatched his Agent out of England into Savoye with expresse charge to performe all good office therein, but had also sent direction to his Ambassador at Venice that, as occasion

(1) S.P.France Bundle 63. No.413 Edmondes to Winwood  
1/11 may 1615

should require, he should likewise transport himself to Turin, to assist with the more authoritie, for the effecting of the sd. Treatie; wherein I desired that they would give direction to their Minister to concurre carefully with his Ma.ties. Mons.r de Villeroy nereupon made a long speeche unto me, in condemning the Duke of Savoyes action for having unadvisedly embroyled himself in this warre; saying that there was no reason that other Princes should be bound to wedd his exorbitant passions; and that the promises which had ben made ~~him~~ him of assistance, served but to doe him harme because the same made him the more obstinate, & yett it could be of no more worth ~~unto~~ unto him then wynde. for, said he, how will you be able to transport men out of England to him by sea? I answered him that if his Ma.tie would undertake to succor him, it should not be with wynde; for that, though it was true, that his Ma.tie could not commodiously transport men unto him; yett notwithstanding he could assist him with monie whereby he might be furnished with men nearer at hand. But that his Ma.tie did so much desire the conserving of the publicke peace, as his counsellis to him should tend to no other end, then to accomodate his differences by Treatie; whereof he would make their Ministers to be witnesses. But if his Ma.tie should fynde, that notwithstanding any ~~such~~ conformitie w.ch the Duke should shewe to yeald to reasonable conditions there should be a purpose to proceede to the ruining of him, his Ma.tie could not but hould himself bound in honor to imploye himself for the assisting of him in what he might; as it could not be denied but that they also were deeply bound to doe the like in respect of their greater interest. Though by his discourse I found that he did not very well like that his Ma.tie should interpose himself in that Treatie; yett in conclusion he tould me, that our Agent at his coming to Turin might advise with the marquis of Rambouillet about these affairs."(1)

To the Spanish ambassador, to a man of his own status, Edmond ~~could~~ could speak more freely and be sure that his words would be carried to Villeroy. The ambassador informed him of Phillip's intention of dealing sharply with Carlo Emanuele, and Edmond, a little moved, replied with a plea

(1) S.P.France Vol. 63 No.231 Edmond to Winwood, January 9/19  
1615

for reasonableness that was almost a threat:

"I told him howe dangerous it might be to put the sd. Prince who was full of courage into dispaire: w.ch might perhaps force him to runne more violent courses then was to be wished, wherewith it being likelie that the expression of his distresse would stirre up extraordinarie frends for his assistance, the same might produce greater inconveniences then could nowe be well foreseene: Therefore I prayed him to consider whether it would not be best that his M.r should remitt to the publick the private discontentment which he had conceived against the Duke, specially at the instance of the twoe crownes of Great Britaine & France & of all other Princes w.ch did interpose themselves for the ~~making~~ making of a reconciliation betweene them."(1)

Later, too, when it became apparent that the central government was doing all in its power to damn up the trickle of good soldiers that flowed over the Alps from France into Piedmont, Edmondos again intervned to support the agent of Savoy in his request that they be allowed to pass freely.

"Upon the instance w.ch was made unto me by the Agent of Savoye that I would employe myself in his name, to stay the publishing of the prohibition for the passing of anie troupes to the service of the Duke of Savoye, I did therein deale with Mons.r de Villeroy and Mons.r de Puysieux, letting him knowe that the often commandements w.ch I ~~ex~~ had received from his name to recommend to the King and Queene the affaires of the Duke of Savoye, did bynde me to take notice of the restraints w.ch they were in hand to publish, & thereupon to desire them, that they would not doe a thinge w.ch should be so much to the prejudice & discountenancing of the Duke of Savoye, at this tyme that the twoe Crownes were employing themselves to make a peace for the sd. Duke; wherein it imported not to give anie advantage to the King of Spayne w.ch might make him to stand upon unreasonable termes against the Duke. They answered me that it was a thinge w.ch was not permitted in anie state to suffer publicke levies to be made without the licence of the Prince; & that they were bound to have a care, that in giving waye to the gratifying of the Duke of Savoye they did not on the other side, give cause of just offence to

(1) S.P. France, Bundle 63 No. ~~251~~ 269: Edmondos to Winwood  
January 30th/ February 9th 1614/1615.

the King of Spayne. Whereunto I replied that there was alwayes a liberty left to voluntaries to imploye themselves in foraine services; & if more were affected to go to the service or the Duke of Savoye then of the Spaniardes, the checking of them in that desire would be interpreted to be donne out of partialitie against the sd. Duke, whereof I prayed them to represent the considerations to the Queene; w.ch they both promised to doe."(1)

His representations were of no service to Savoy(1), but they are a useful proof of James readiness to work for Carlo Emanuele.

If these negotiations with the French central government had no great success, however, Edmondes was able, by working with private individuals, to maintain and even augment the flow of French troops to Savoy. His means was the Duke of mayenne, who was still in disfavour at court for his share in the "levee de boucliers" of the preceding year and who had ties of blood and territory to savoy. From him came the first move. Early in January 1615 Edmondes was informed that, if James were willing to pay them, mayenne could muster and lead men to the service of Carlo Emanuelexxx. The sum that James would be expected to pay was fifty thousand crowns, as a first instalment. It seemed to Edmondes to be an admirable means of assisting Carlo Emanuele without ~~incurri~~ incurring any of the odium that would result from more direct intervention, and he counselled the Secretary to commend it to the king.(2) Mayenne himself informed the Duke of his intention of coming to his aid with a force of horse and foot. Morton, writing to Winwood on January 30th (O.S.), could tell him that Mayenne had offered to come to Savoy

(1) S.P. France, syn dle 63, No. 343 Edmondes to Winwood, March 12/22. (2) Ib. No. 231 Same to same, Jan. 9/19

with 12,000 foot and 2,000 horse (a gross exaggeration), and that part of ~~his~~ Scarnafigi's business in London(1) would be to ask that "his Majesty would be pleased to cause to be made over into his hands fifty thousand crownes, of such monyes as he shall lend or give the duke heere."(2) A little later Carlo Emanuele did indeed write to James requesting that the money necessary to finance Mayenne be paid over:

" Monseigneur,

Les nouvelles que j'ay des resolutions assurees des Espagnols de me fere la guerre estant arrivees a Paris aussi bien qu'icy, il a semble a messieurs l'Amb.r de V. M.te et de Boulion d'accepter l'offre que monsieur du Mayne fait de me venir assister ~~aux~~ en cette guerre avec ~~6~~ 6000 hommes de pied et 500 chevaux, et mont mande dire quilz en auront escript a V. M.te et supplie de fere & tenir a Paris 50 ou 60 m. scudi pour cette levee a bon compte des graces quelle se daigne de me fere. Je la supplieray donc bien humblement si elle le treuve bon de le fere remettre al Auditeur Frecia mon Agent a Paris par la voye que V. M.te iugera plus a propos. affinque par ce moien ie puisse estre secouru en conformite des ravorables intentions de V. M.te alaquelle ie seray etc" (3)

The surprising thing is that the Secretary was authorised to reply to both Edmondes and Morton not with empty words but with a clear promise of help. On February 18/28 Winwood wrote to Morton that the king was prepared to pay for mayenne's levies as soon as

(1) See below p. for Scarnafigi's mission to England.

(2) S.P. Savoy bundle 2, No. 180. (3) Ib. No. 213. February, 1615.

he was marching to Savoy at the head of at least 6,000 foot and 500 horse(1). Edmondes must have received a reply in much the same terms, for on February ~~12/22~~ 12/22 he was writing home:

"Forthwith after I had received your Honors letters of the 28th of Januarie I repayed to Mons.r de Mayenne, & acquainted him howe much his Ma.tie did approve & commend the generous resolution which he had taken for the assisting of the Duke of Savoye; for his perseverance wherein, I encouraged him by all the good arguments that I could use unto him, & lett him knowe that when his Ma.tie should understand more certainly & particularly from him howe he intendeth to proceede to the ~~sd.~~ execution of the same, his desseigne, he would then satisfie him, howe farr he would also for his parte contribute to the sd. Dukes assistance. The Duke acknowledged great thanckes unto ~~him~~ his Ma.tie for the favorable opinion which it pleased his Ma.tie to conceive of him; & tould me that it was true he had a purpose to employe himselfe for the assistance of the Duke of Savoye & for that purpose, that he presumed he could carrie him good numbers of men, but that he could not of himself furnish the meanes without assistance."(2)

The money, 50,000 crowns, was paid over to Edmondes, after a good deal of trouble, with instructions to keep the receipt of it and the payment to Mayenne secret.(The news of the use it was to be put to was, however, widespread in the states that were involved in the dispute, in Spain and Venice for example(3)) Edmondes sent a receipt for it on April 14/24(4). Finally on may 20/30 Edmondes wrote that he had paid the money

(1) S.P. Savoy Bundle 2, No. 182. (2) S.P. France, Bundle 63, No. 295 Edmondes to Winwood, February ~~12/22~~ 12/22, 1615.

(3) See S.P. Spain Bundle 21, and C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XIII, passim

to Mayenne who was using it to good effect:

"Mons.r du Mayenne doth still persist in his resolution to undertake that voyage; having with the monies w.ch I have now caused to bee entirely delivered, sent away his Captaines to make their levyes; who have bounde themselves to render their Troupes within three weekes in Savoye." (1)

This readiness to provide for a supply of troops may go on the credit side of James in these negotiations.

In Spain Sir John Digby was doing what he could to turn the government to a more reasonable course, but without any great success. He could not appeal to the Spanish ministers as a neutral to one of the combatants after the news of the financial assistance given by James to Carlo Emanuele had spread to Spain, and, besides, Lerma protested that the Spanish government had no other desire than to settle the difficulties in Italy by a fair treaty and had instructed the Governor of Milan to go as far in working for peace as honour would allow.(2) ( He was probably speaking sincerely; the independence of the Spanish governors and viceroys in Italy at this period is notorious and explains the attitude of mendoza.) When Digby, acting under precise instructions from home, did venture to make some representations in favour of the Duke of Savoy he was snubbed and thrown on the defensive by Lerma's accusing James of subsidising savoy and of permitting the violent anti-Spanish speech of Carleton's

(1) S.P. France Bundle 63, No. 429. Edmondes to Winwood, May 20/30. (2) S.P. Spain Bundle 21, No. 36. Digby to Somerset February 11th, 1615

in Venice to go unchecked.(1) It was a sharp answer, but, with renewed instructions from England to do so, there was no course left to Digby but to repeat his representations a few weeks later:

"May it please your most Excellent Ma.ty

According to the Directions given me in your Ma.ties letters of the 21st of May I have dealt with this king and his ministers, touching the Assurance w.ch the Duke of Savoy may have, ~~it~~ in case he shall first Disarme, and cause his Army to be dissolved. I have also signified unto them the Dukes desire of having your Ma.ty engaged for the performance of what shall be promised on this kings part."(2)

The reply is lost out that is no great matter. The extract from Digby's chronicle of his representations shows James working to help Carlo Emanuele in Spain; and the effort is as important as the achievement.

With Berne, ~~There~~ though there was no English minister resident there, James was able to effect a good deal ~~through~~ through Carleton and Edmondos. His influence there was of the greatest value to Carlo Emanuele, to whom the friendship or even the neutrality of Berne was of the first importance; from Berne came not only the risk of an attack from the rear on Piedmont when Savoyard arms were directed eastwards against Montferrato, there came too the hope of good mercenaries; and through the gate of Berne the mercenaries, if any were to come, of the Protestant north must pass. Considering

(1) S.P. Spain Bundle 21, no. 78. Digby to Somerset, April 3rd.  
(2) Ib. No. 124 Digby to James, June 30th, 1615.

all these things Carlo Emanuele had early entered into negotiations with Berne, and had made use of a former English agent to forward them.(1) The fresh threat from Milan sent him back to seek a closer union with Berne, and sent him to seek the help of English diplomacy in effecting it. That help was not refused him. To a letter from Berne asking him, as the minister of a sovereign on whom they could rely, what reliance could be placed on the promises made by Carlo Emanuele during the negotiations he was then conducting with that state and how well James was affected towards him,(1) Carleton replied that he had express order to help in making a firm treaty. The letter is worth quoting:

"Quant a cela dont VV EE desirant d'estre informees cest a dire l'affection et volonte que porte sa Ma.te a l'Al.se du Duc de Savoye, outre ~~que~~ que la bonne et reciproque correspondance qu'a este par tant d'annees observee entre elles, et le soign avec lequel sa Ma.te embrasse ~~maintenant~~ maintenant les affaires de son Alt.se vous en pourra donner satisfaction infalible. Je vous diray de plus que sa Ma.te en ce present traiste de pacification entre son Al.se et votre Rep.que (dont elle a este advertie par lettres de son Agent qui reside icy aupres de son Al.se) m'a commande expressement de vous consoler en ceste procedure, et apporter de plus tout ce que depend de moy per conduire ~~l'edit~~ l'edit affaire a bon part. Je prendray la dessus l'hardiesse estant aussy a cest neur invite par la cortesie de VV EE de leur escrire selon les occasions que se presenteront a fin de porter en avant un oeuvre si heureusement incommence; sans toutesfois le precipiter, me gouvernant par la sincerite que je pourrois d'heur a l'autre observer aux procedures de ce Prince icy, lequel jusques a cest neur chemine de bon pied. Il n' moins de besoign de bon oeil pour veoir son present danger, estant menace d'un enemy bien fort d'un coste, e travaille des soupcons non leigeres de l'autre, se fiant fort ~~peu~~ peu de ~~ceux~~ ceux

(1) Supra p. (2) S.P. Savoy Bundle 2 No. 294

Carleton to ? 2/12 April, 1615.

qui luy promettent dans peu de jours la paix."(1)

Thereafter Carleton was to interest himself actively in the attempts to bring about some surer treaty between Savoy and Berne. His part was to be that of mediator, smoothing out difficulties and not intervening unless he was called upon. There was some difficulty, for example, about fixing the place where deputies of the two states might conveniently meet. At the request of Carlo Emanuele Carleton wrote to request those of Berne to agree to the meeting's being held within the confines of the state of Savoy rather than at St. ~~Morritz~~ Morritz, and added to his letter a preamble about his instructions to do everything in his power to help forward the treaty.(2) And Carleton was not the only English minister ~~working~~ working for Carlo Emanuele with Berne. In France Edmondès was assuring an agent from Berne of James' interest in the well-being of Savoyard affairs, and of that of the other Protestant princes:

"The gentleman that was sent hither from the Canton of Berne being very well satisfied upon the Conference which he ~~has~~ hath ~~had~~ had with my self & ~~some~~ sondrie others in this place, touching the jealousies w.ch they conceived for contracting an Alllyance with the Duke of Savoye, is departed from hence very well resolved to persuade his Masters to proceede to the accomplishment of the sd. Treatie, upon the assurance w.ch we have given him, that the sd. Dukes cause is favored by his ma.tie & other Protestant Princes; & that the sd. Duke will not also make difficultie, in making of this new Alliance to confirme the <sup>old</sup> Treaties, & renounce his former pretentions to the Country of Vaux. To w.ch

(1) S.P.Savoy bundle 2 No. 276. Carleton to Berne 21/31  
 march, 1615. (2) Ib. No. 319. same to same, April, 10/20

effect I have dealt both with the Agent of Savoye here, & likewise written to Sir Dudley Carleton, to further the expedition of the sd. Treatie: Whereupon the Duke may be assured that those of Berne will not onely hinder the passage of anie Troupes through their Countries to the service of the K. of Spayne, but also that he may be assisted at hand with them in all occasions, with good numbers of men."(1)

James, moreover, was prepared to do more ~~far~~ than the prudence of his ambassadors would permit them to do without express order.

To an attempt made by Carlo Emanuele to induce him to write directly to Berne in his Master's name to demand passage through their lands for John of Nassau and those men he had raised in the Low Countries for service in Savoy Carleton was forced to reply that, though he was ready to work for a treaty of which one of the fruits might be the right for Savoyard mercenaries to pass through Berne, he could not request that right particularly; it was too near an act of hostility to Spain for him to do it without express authorisation.(2)

James had no such scruples. On May 23rd Winwood wrote to Carleton ~~xxxxxxx~~ that the king had been pleased to grant certain requests which Scarnafigi had made. One of them was that James would write to Berne asking the rulers of that canton to give free passage to the four hundred horse which Count John of Nassau was leading to the service of Carlo Emanuele.(3) James' letters were efficacious, for, shortly

after the signing of the Treaty of Asti someone (It was probably (1) S.P. France, ~~Vol~~ Bundle 63, No. 373. Edmondes to Winwood, March 22nd (O.S.) (2) S.P. Savoy, Bundle 3, No. 39. Carleton to the Secretary, May 15/25. (3) Ib. No. 61. Winwood to Carleton, May 23rd, 1615

Carleton) was writing to Berne to inform the rulers of Carlo Emanuele's gratitude to them for having given permission for the troops to pass.(1) The general attitude of the king can, indeed, best be seen in a letter of his to the Elector Palatine:

"Monsieur mon ~~fr~~ fils,

Sur les instances que ~~le~~ le Duc de Savoye nous a faictes comme aussy quelques uns des ses Ministres, a quelques uns des nostres: nous avons donne charge tant a nostre Ambassadeur ~~xxx~~ resydent en France, qu'a celuy qui de nostre part se tient aupres dudit Duc, de traicter en nostre nom avec les Magistrats du Canton de Berne, non seulement pour le renouvellement des ~~vielles~~ vieilles Alliances desia contractees, entre ledit Duc et leur Canton, mais aussy d'en fayre de nouveau, s'il y en avoit besoin, pour l'avancement de la cause commune. Et si nosz advertissements ne nous trompent ~~pas~~ pas, les Magistrats de Bearne y sont tous portees et resolus de le fayre; ~~je~~ je a quoy nous vous prions de tenir la main. Car nous affectionnons fort le Duc de Savoye, non seulement pour le respect que de tout temps il a porte en particulier a nostre personne, lequel nous confessons avoyr este plus qu'ordinayre, mais pour la iustice de sa cause, iugeants estre chose nullement endurer, qu'un Prince Souverain et absolu seroyt gourmande ~~par~~ par la violence de qui que ce soyt."(2)

Even in the levying of these men

John of Nassau had not lacked English help, though it was given through Wotton, the English ambassador at the Hague, who was ill at ease there and who had not the same influence that he had in Venice.(3) Nassau had arrived in Holland early in April, probably, to recruit men for Savoyard service there.(4)

(1) S.P. Savoy, Bundle 3, No.229. Undated, no signature.

(2) S.P. Germany(81), Bundle 14, No. 52. James to the Elector Palatine, April 12th, 1616.

(3) For Wotton in Holland see L.P.Smith Life of Wotton cit. Vol.1, pp. 134 - 143.

(4) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XIII No.776. Foscarini to Doge and Senate, April 23rd.

In his efforts to interest Barneveldt and Maurice in the ~~defence~~ defence of Savoy he had the support of Wotton. Nassau had three things to obtain of ~~these~~ the States: the first, permission to levy four hundred horse within the States; the second, their connivance, if not their authorisation, for some Dutch ships to enter the service of Carlo Emanuele and lie between Genoa and Barcelona to harass Spanish lines of communications with Italy; and the third, some "Corseletts, Pikes, Powder and other munition amounting to the Valewe or some thirteene thowsande pounds sterlinge."(1) His requests were not received well and even Wotton could not move the States to any great generosity:

"Nowe touchinge his ma.ties commaunds to me for the excit- inge of the states to assiste that Duke I have dealt sundrye tymes therein with Barneveld, with the Counte Maurice and with the intelligentest of the rest. To whome I have remon- strated howe muche it importes us to nourrishe that diversion and howe proper an instrument the said Duke is to intangle the Kinge of Spaine, but I have most of all pressed them with the shame of the refusall consideringe that the Kinge my master with whome they are otherwise soe allied doth invite them unto it bothe by Counsayle and by example. Not- withstanding all which nothinge hath yett bin donne for they stande aux escoutes harkeninge after the arrivall of the conte scarnafigi."(2)

~~But here again the lack of success is unimportant, the efforts that James was making through Wotton are what matter.~~ Earlier, too, before Nassau had returned to the Hague from Turin, Wotton had been ordered to inform the States that James was dispatching money to Edmondes for the use of Carlo Emanuele, that he intended

(1) S.P. Holland Bundle 71, No. 366. Wotton to the secretary, May 4/14, 1615. (2) Ib.

sending further subsidies, and that he confidently expected that the States would join him in this, for the safety of Savoy from Spanish attacks affected them so closely.(1) Wotton's success was no greater here if Biondi(2) may be believed. On April 24th he wrote to Carlo Emanuele that when Wotton received these orders he went at once to Barneveldt and Maurice. He found them differently disposed. The first was not enthusiastic and argued that the States were now so menaced by war that they could think of none but themselves, and that if it did come to push of pike the diversion would be of more service to Carlo Emanuele than financial help would be. Maurice approved of James' intentions but promised no more than that he would give any negotiations with the States the weight of his influence.(3) It is likely, though not certain, (for Wotton's references to Savoy in his letters could be more plentiful) that Barneveldt's opinion prevailed and that Wotton's work <sup>was</sup> of no value. But that is unimportant. Here, too, it is the intention which actuated James' diplomacy and not the results of it that matters.

Carlo Emanuele was now prepared to play a more active part in these diplomatic exchanges. Some time early in April Scarnafigi was sent back to England to act as Savoyard ambassador.(4) Scarnafigi arrived in England on April 28th (O.S.) 1615~~ix~~ and had his first audience two days later.(5)

(1) S.P. Holland. Bundle 71. NO. 337. Secretary to Wotton, April 1st  
 (2) See ~~Vol. P.~~ Smith Op. Cit. ~~xxxxx~~ Vol.2, Appendix, for account of Giovanni Francesco Biondi, (3) Lett. Min. (Ingh.), Mazzo 2. Biondi to Carlo Emanuele April 24th. (4) His letter of credence is dated 9th April, S.P. Savoy, Bundle 2, No.282

(5) S.P. Savoy, Bundle 3. No. 10. Wake to Barleton, May 3/13

The business which he had to discuss is best given by quoting his instructions; ~~which are not to be revealed~~ ~~to any person~~ for they reveal much of the mind of Carlo Emanuele;

"Although in our letters to his majesty written after your arrival we have humbly thanked him not only for the singular favours with which he is pleased to treat ~~us~~ me and all this House but also for the succours which he has declared himself willing to give us for our defence in this war that the king of Spain is carrying on against us and for the many offices that he has been pleased ~~to~~ in this matter to use for us both of himself and through his ministers, yet, so great is the obligation we have to his majesty for all these things that we can never sufficiently repay our debt. In order, however, not to omit things that are in our power we have decided to send you back to that court to repeat ~~our~~ our thanks by word of mouth, more effectively and with the kindly words that you can use. His majesty then will know that if he treats with us in a manner appropriate ~~to~~ to his greatness we recognise his graciousness and repay it with obligation. These complimentary words spoken you ~~will~~ will give his Majesty an account of the state in which you left things here, of the great preparations that the Spaniards are making to usurp this state of mine, of what they have already done in the ~~neighbourhood~~ neighbourhood of Roccaverano, of the orders from Spain in the letters, of the limits to which we have reduced ourselves to prove to the world our desire for peace in accordance with the wise counsels of his Majesty and his ministers, of the published manifesto, and, finally, of the levies we are making to preserve ~~our~~ our lands from the greed of Spain. The Spaniards, however, cannot long remain without feeling the effect of his majesty's graciousness ~~in~~ in promising us so great a help in money. At the same time we would beg him to be so good as to give order for its immediate payment, and you, if it is paid in English bills in a foreign town, will try to get it paid from Geneva or Nuremberg, for these appear to be places commonly used by English financiers, and they are safe places.

You must also beg his majesty to be so

good as to continue the offices he has hitherto used with the States, with the palatinate, and with the other princes of Germany to dispose them to help us in this war. This is of considerable importance. And, since these states may easily held back from declaring themselves if they are not first certain that we will come to no agreement with Spain in which they are not included, you may promise his majesty that, if we receive such aid, we will never make peace without his consent. His Majesty can then assure these princes of this, with the understanding that they too do not make peace without us. If his majesty should wish for a league offensive and defensive of these states and ourselves and a declaration of the help each is prepared to give the others in case of need, you will express our great readiness. And, if you can draw the negotiations to the point that all the others are obliged to come to our aid with 6,000 foot and 500 horse in case of need, and we on our side to their aid with 2,500 foot, do not hesitate to accept the conditions and promise that as soon as we are informed we will send to ratify the treaty. But, if you see that they would prefer to have us send more than 2,500 and not to send themselves more than 4,000 foot and ~~3000~~ 500 horse, you must give us full information at once so that we can tell you our intentions.

At the same time it will be necessary to bring into this league Venice and the Swiss, so that if I am attacked I can have swift and ~~max~~ powerful assistance, which will be sufficient till the more ~~and~~ distant allies can help me. And so, if the others are attacked on that side, we will be able to create a vigorous diversion, which, as its effect will be great, will bring a prompt relief to the defenders. You must do what is necessary to bring ~~this~~ this about and keep us informed, step by step, of all that you do and of all that you are requested to refer to us. We remit to his Majesty the right of nominating the members of this league and of deciding any disputes that may arise among us with the passage of time."

Scarnafigi was then ordered to obtain the right of levying four thousand men in England and Dutch transport for them.

Carlo Emanuele went on:

"If the ships are not ready for service, or ~~if~~ if the

levies are ready for the journey try to get othr vessels raddy in time for them, so that they can arrive as soon as possible. Speed is important here, as you know. Take the oppportunity to send us a skilful engineer witha good number of gunners. As fer munitions of war we have charged Sassi to have sent to us from Holland a thousand barrels of powder and a thousand breast-plates, If you learn that they have been sent it will be sufficient if you send us five hundred barrels of powder from England; otherwise it must be a thousand, with six thousand breast-plates and a thousand muskets. If the ships and men can strike a blow at Spain on the way out so much the better."(I)

From his first audience Scarnafigi drew little satisfaction. He took exception to the instructions that had been sent to Carleton (2) as too conciliatory, ( and consequently dislik<sup>ed</sup> the whole attitude of the English government to the troubles in Italy), and he found that he had misunderstood James' former promises of monetary assistance to Carlo Emanuele, and had consequently over-estimated the amount. Scarnafigi seems formerly to have understood and reported to Carlo Emanuele that James was willing to pay towards the cost of the war in Piedmont the sum of £100,000 , besides what might be precured from the States. At his first audience Winwood made it plain that James' intention had been that Carlo Emanuele should receive that sum from England and the States together.(3) Winwood, besides.

(I) Negoziazioni, Gran Bretagna. Mazzo I. Italian: Original in Passamonti Relazioni cit. 1935 pp102-105

(2) Infra cit.

(3) S.P. Savoy Bundle 3 no. 10

had not hesitated to point out to him the exorbitancy of his demands for men:

"In discourse, I have remonstrated to the Count the exorbitancy of this demaunde; now impossible a thinge it is, by lande to conduct 4000 English into Pyemont; now chargeable and expencefull it ~~wilbe~~ wilbe to convey them by sea. I heare nowe the Count will quitt this proposition for men; and only will insist for provision of ~~a~~ money."(1)

With the increasing urgency of Carlo Emanuele's appeals for help, however, it seems that James became more generous in his promises to Scarnafigi, and, even, more generous in his actions. By the end of May, indeed, Scarnafigi was beginning to use the language of desperation:

"The Count is no whit satisfied with the overture that your L.p is now to make to the Duke in his Ma.ties name, but cryeth out that his M.r is like to be betrayed as those of Wesel, that the malice of the Spanyards is ~~so~~ to great to end in peace, or to rest before they have ruined that Duke if it may lye in their power, that their drift is only to get time, whereby to consume him w.th the weight of his owne burden. That ~~that~~ their breach of promise w.th the Pope and the Queen of France in the Treatyes their ministers made are sufficient documents of what may be expected of their like dealing w.th his Ma.tye; That if in obedience to his Ma.ty the Duke should disarm, it would not after lye in the kings power to restore his state ~~to~~ unto him if the Spanyards usurpe it as they may do, when they ~~find~~ find no resistance, & where their power may do hurt there is no trusting to their good nature. Hereuppon he is resolved to goe againe unto the king to press anewe the performance of that promise long since

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 3. No.6. Winwood to Carleton, 3/13 May, 1615.

pretended to be made."(1)

His indignation was not without effect, for it secured for him those letters to the canton of Berne which have already been mentioned, it induced the king to proffer through the Tuscan agent in England a request to the Grand Duke that he would furnish Carlo Emanuele with a hundred thousand crowns, and it gave him licence to buy powder and arms in England and to export them.(1) Yet James remained convinced that by fair words and diplomacy he could secure a firm peace. In an audience that Foscarini, the Venetian ambassador had with him he spoke at length of Carlo Emanuele's need of peace and of his own efforts to induce him to disarm and to believe that the Spanish would immediately follow suit(3) Scarafigi could not be induced to hold that view. In an audience that he had towards the end of June he begged the king (if Foscarini is to be believed) to have Carlo Emanuele included in the Union and to procure for him the assistance of the States and of the Union if he were driven to war. So far he was merely carrying out his instructions. But he went on, either so ordered by fresh instructions or using his own knowledge of the

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 3. No.10. Wake to Carlston, May 3/13  
~~121x121x121x121x~~ (2) Ib. No.61. Winwood to Carlston, May 23rd  
 (3) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XIII no.838. Foscarini to the Doge and Senate, June 5th.

English court, to ask that the eighty thousand crowns which the States were due to pay to James in September might be paid to Carlo Emanuele and that all who wished to serve Carlo Emanuele with armed ships might have ~~xxxxxx~~ licence.(1) Scarnafigi's emphatic language had probably stirred the government to a realisation of Carlo Emanuele's position, for the answer was surprisingly favourable. Foscarini gives a synopsis of this answer but the minute of the original is almost certainly contained in a paper in the State Papers, Foreign (Savoy and Sardinia). It is headed "Answer to the D.e of Savoys Amb.r Demands", and, though the sole date is 1615, the correspondance of the answers to the requests that Foscarini mentions makes it safe to quote as ~~the~~ a note of the official reply of the English government. It runs:

" 1. Le traite qui sa Ma.te a fait avec les Princes de l'Union sera mis entre les mains de Mons.r l' Ambassadeur, et alors sera laisse a la discretion du Seigneur Duc de Savoye, ou d'entrer en ligue avec tous les ~~et~~ Confederez ionctement, ou a part avec sa Ma.te & separeement avec tous les aultres Alliez et Confederez, et le mesme ordre sera pris avec la Republique de Venise.

2. L'Ambassadeur de sa Ma.te n'estant a present a Venise, mais resident a Turin, l'Ambassadeur de Venise resident aupres de sa Ma.te sera prie en son nom d'effectuer de sa part tout ce que l'Ambassadeur de son Altesse a desire.

3. sa Ma.te desia a donne charge a son Ambassadeur

(1) C.S.P. ven. Vol.XIII. No.889.

resident en Hollande de faire serieuse instance aux Estats Generaux, de donner ayde et secours a son Altesse, la quelle sera reiteree tres instamment sans delay ou remise.

4. ~~xxx~~ Sa Ma.te recoit annuellement des Estats Generaux, la somme de 40 milie liuures sterlinges dont 30 milie liuures sont employez et assignez pour le payement des Garnisons des villes cautionaires, assavoir de la Brille et de Flusshinge.

5. La charge est desia donnee a l'Ambassadeur de sa Ma.te, resident a Turin, de ne permettre point, que son Altesse desarme, sans que l'assurance soit donnee de la part du Roy d'Espagne ou de licencier son armee tout a faict, ou de faire transporter hors d'Europe.

6. Sa Ma.te promet en cas que son Altesse ne puisse obtenir la paix soubz des Conditions iustes et honorables, d'assister et proteger sa dicte Altesse, non seulement a part soy, mais coniuictement avec tous ses Alliez & Confederez contre toutes violences qui seront attentees, tant contre son personne que contre son Estat.

7. Moyennant que caution suffisante soit baillee & qu'ils ne deviendront point pirates, & Sa Ma.te donnera conge a ses subiects de se mettre en mer, et se renger au service de son Altesse."(1)

It is a complete and not unsatisfactory answer to the points that Scarnafigi was ordered by his instructions to raise, and if the first two points were not answered so precisely as Carlo Emanuele might have wished the ~~same~~ ideas underlying them were to remain with James and inspire other negotiations.

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 3. No.209

In Turin, meanwhile, Carlo Emanuele was preparing, though slowly, for the clash that now seemed imminent, though Carleton was of the opinion that this slowness in arming showed Carlo Emanuele's belief that the end of the matter would be peace.(1) The Pope, dreading possibly the contagion of heresy that might spread in northern Italy if it came to war and reinforcements came to Savoy from the north ( and, indeed, Cardinal Delfino mentioned his fears of this to Simon Contarini, the Venetian ~~in~~ ambassador in Rome(2) ), was striving to bring about some kind of peace, exhorting Carlo Emanuele to disarm and to submit his differences to the Emperor, and promising in return to move the Governor of Milan to do the ~~like~~ like.~~xxx~~ (3) His proposals were not heeded(4), but by the end of April Carlo Emanuele was inclining a little to the side of peace, though perplexed by the contrary counsels of the ambassadors, for Rambouillet was insisting that he disarm first and Carleton that honour demanded a simultaneous disarming of Savoy and the Governor.(5) And the prospects of a break-down in the peace negotiations were not lessened by the sending to Turin from Paris of a certain Gueffier to convey to ~~Gueffier~~ <sup>RAMBOUILLET</sup> the final

(1) C.S.P. Ven. Vol.Xl11. No.739 Zeno to Doge and Senate April 7th. (2) Ib. No.706 Contarini to same, March 21st. (3) Ib. No.753. Zeno to same, 14th April. (4) Ib. Same to same, 14th April. (5) Ib. Same to same, April, 28th

terms (and they were not conciliatory) to which Carlo Emanuele must agree if he were to have the protection of France. They were that he should disarm and disband all his foreign troops except for such garrisons as his father had maintained, promise not to attack Mantua, and submit his dispute with Mantua over Montferrat to the arbitration of the Emperor. In return for this he was promised French protection.(1) These conditions the Marquis of Rambouillet put before Carlo Emanuele at a meeting at Valfenera on April 30th/ May 10th, urging him to accept them on the grounds that they had proved acceptable to all other princes and their ministers in the courts both of France and Spain. And he went so far that he affirmed constantly ~~that~~ he left both the Venetian Amb.r here and my self of the same opinion." So Carleton described ~~the~~ Rambouillet's arguments.(2) The suggestion that Carleton approved the terms ~~as~~ ~~stated~~ startled the Duke not a little, and to gain time and verify the statement he broke off the negotiations, suggesting that all the ministers at his court should meet him in a conference in a short time.(2)

The statement that Carleton did approve the French proposals was almost certainly a misinterpret-

(1) C.S.P. Ven. Vol.XIII. No.783. Zeno to Doge and Senate, May 5th. (2) S.P. Savoy.Bundle 3. No.1 Carleton to the Secretary, May 1/11.

ation of his opinion at the time, but Rambouillet was soon to be proved an accurate prophet. The English government had come to the opinion that only in accepting the French proposals could Carlo Emanuele have any hope of an assured peace. On May 3/13 Winwood sent further, very relevant, instructions to Carleton, instructions that show how the king's mind was working. They were to inform him that the king accepted in principle the French proposals, but wished to have them modified in one or two details - by imposing a limit of time within ~~which~~ which the Governor of Milan had to disband his forces, and by suggesting an alternative to remitting the decision of the Montferrat question to the Emperor, for example. These instructions run:

"My Lorde,

his Ma.tie having read y.r letters of the 14th and conferred w.th the Ambassador Scarnaffies the last of Aprill, which he did at Chesterforde Parke, where I then was present, hath commaunded mee with all diligence to give yow these & directions, which I doubt not but yow wilbe carefull faithfully to followe for the good of his service, and the service of the publicke which doth hould therein an especiall interest. I pray yow therefore first, to take a reviewe of y.r former Instructions, and ever to have in y.r consideration the cause of your employment with the Duke, which is (if possibly ~~it may be done~~) that may bee done) by the mediation of his Ma.ties authority, to procure him a safe and an assured peace, upon worthie and honorable conditions. Nowe the conditions which are tendered unto him from Spaine, and as we understand from Fraunce, presse upon him: since the

king of Spaine is content wholly to quitt that point of submission, which wee confess was a pill of hard digestion, his Ma.tie doth thinke that if they may be qualified and somewhat tempred, ought not to bee by the Duke refused, nay rather they ought to bee for the good of the publicke repose ~~xxx~~ willingly accepted and cheerfully imbraced. For, concerning the first, his Ma.tie doth hould it reasonable that the Duke of Savoye should first disarm, and bee content only to keepe his ordinarie Garrisons, for the defence of his Contrey upon those conditions; that the king of Spaine or his Mynisters which there ~~governe~~ governe his affaires, doe bynde themselves in such a convenient tyme, as betweene them and the Duke shalbe agreed on, likewise to disarm and ~~x~~ dissolve his Armie. But, if the Mynisters of Spaine, only shall promise to retire their Armies from the frontiers of Pyemont, and not absolutely to lycence it and dissolve it, or to transport it into some other parts, unless it bee to transport it out of Euerope: his Ma.tie doth hould it not only dangerous to the Duke, but preiudiciall to the quiett of Christendome. Therefore this is to bee y.<sup>r</sup> first tenant of this first condition, that the Duke disarming, the king of Spaine within a short and ~~peremptorie~~ peremptorie tyme, must likewise disarm, that is, breake and dissolve his Armie.

Now, that the Duke may be assured, that when he hath dissolved and dismissed his forces, he shall not lie open and exposed to the ravage and violence of the Spaniard, but that likewise the king of Spaine shall really and faithfully observe, what on his parte is promised, by him or his Mynisters: because the ~~the~~ Duke hath reason to suspect the proceedings of Fraunce, and not soly to relie upon that caution which the French Queene hath promised, which is to receave him and his State into the protection of that Crowne, if after his disarming, he shalbe invaded or molested by Spaine: for the Dukes more full assurance, and for the certaine establishment of his affaires; his Ma.tie is graciously pleased, out of the kindness of his affection to the person of the Duke (whom I can assure you he doth tenderly love) and out of his assiduell care, for the preservation of the common repose of Euerope (if the Duke shall require it) to ioyne with the French king in the caution; that after the Dukes disarming the king of Spaine shall not invade or trouble

his State, and in case he shall doe it, his Ma.tie doth promise to protect him, not only with his private assistance but with the ioynt association of his common freinds and allyes. And to that purpose his Ma.tie doth authorize yow by vertue of these directions, by any solempe & Act that shalbe conceived by the Duke or his learned Councill, formely to ingage him. This if I rightly understand it ~~is~~ is the mayne difficulty of yo.r negotiation; for if evre it bee accorded with their tymes and circumstances that both the Armies shalbe ~~disaligned~~ dissolved, the other two ~~conditions~~ conditions will easily bee accomodated. For the second, which is: that the Duke of Savoy shall bynde himselfe not to assaile the Duke of Mantua, yow yo.r self write, that the Duke of Savoy doth not intende it, and therefore wee suppose he will not refuse to give any reasonable assurance, to suffer the Duke of Mantua to live in peace and quiett by him.

Concerning the third article, that their difference of Montferrat should be referred to the decicion of the Emperor, which by the Duke of Savoy doeth seeme unreasonable, because the Emperor hath already declared against him; and soe the same man should bee boeth Judge and partie: his Ma.tie doeth concurr in opinion w.th the Duke, that it is against all reason, that the decicion should be referred to the person of the Emperor, whoe hath prejudged himselfe to bee a partie: But his Ma.tie doeth thereby declare that with noe reason the Duke can refuse to referr this decicion to the Chamber of the Empire, which is in all ~~causes~~ causes, of what nature and importance soever, the competent Judge betwene ~~the~~ those parties, whose States and Dominions infeofe, have their dependaunce on the Emperor. Soe nowe you see his Ma.ties ~~intensions~~ intensions, and understanding of these thrie conditions, presented to the Duke; which lymitted and qualified, as you see by his Ma.tie, are founded upon soe much reason and equitie as neither partie wee hope, wilbe soe careles of their owne private, or soe respectles of the publike good as to refuse them.

Nowe the better to facilitate this busines, which for many reasons I wish may have a happie ende, I cannot but advise yow, effectually to laboure, that during this negotiation there may bee a suspension of Armes, and a surseance of all acts of Hostility; for inter arma leges silent, and to treat of peace in

words and yet to be in armes on the feilde is a thing both incongruous and mali ominis."(1)

In the weeks following the dispatch of these instructions there were several meetings held between the Duke and the ambassadors, held mainly at Asti which the Duke had made his headquarters while he was with his army. They were none of them of any great importance. Rambouillet had spread the news that both Carleton and Zeno ~~were~~ were to expect letters from their ~~govern~~ governments instructing them to agree to the French proposals, and until these letters arrived <sup>neither</sup> of them would discuss any definite proposal as a public minister but merely give the Duke his opinion of it as a private man. On May 21/31 and again two days ~~later~~ later the ambassadors met Carlo Emanuele, and, though the meetings passed in the discussion of the French terms, nothing was decided and the sole good that came of them was the decision to seek an armistice.(2) On the 4th of June this armistice was arranged, to be prolonged from day to day till the English and Venetian ambassadors should receive their instructions.(3)

On the day that the last meeting at Asti had been held, Carleton's letter or ~~an~~ instruction reached him, too late ~~to use it~~ for him to use it at the meeting.

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 3. No. 6. (2) Ib. No. 67 Carleton to James, May 24th (O.S.) . (3) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. X111. No. 836. Zeno to Doge and Senate, June 4th.

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He immediately informed the Duke of its contents and was a little surprised to find him not altogether satisfied, having ~~he~~ evidently expected English backing if he chose to run a stronger course:

"The Duke acknowledged hereupon great obligation to y.r Ma.ty w.th terms of extraordinary thankfulnes, professing to be ready to spend his owne life and his Childrens in y.r service; but for the matter of the ~~the~~ peace I might perceave by him, now it came to conclusion, he expected other ~~advice~~ advice from y.r Ma.ty and that yow would rather have ~~a~~ counselled him to ~~not~~ continue the warres. for after some ~~his~~ discourse w.ch he used how the warres in these partes were more beehooofull in many respects to y.r Ma.ty & y.r frendes then the peace, he fell into an admiration how possibly France and Spaine could effect so much w.th y.r Ma.ty by practise and persuasion as to make you advise the peace, seeing Wezel (he was sure) would not be restored when the Spaniard should be once free of this diversion, the marriages betwixt France & Spaine could not be hindred & for a match (w.ch he heard was in ~~the~~ treaty betwixt y.r Ma.ty & Spaine) he was well assured it was not meant by the Spaniard, but onely entertained in Spaine whereby to divert y.r Ma.ty from giving him assistance in nis ~~a~~ warres."(1)

It seemed indeed as if the long-protracted negotiations were wearying ~~again~~ again the small patience of Carlo Emanuele.

To speed these negotiations Carleton decided to use what influence he might have in Milan to induce the Governor to make ~~concessions~~ concessions equivalent to those demanded of Carlo Emanuele, being further urged by the Duke to draw from the Governor some ~~part~~

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 3. No.113. Carleton to James, June 10/20, 1615.

further ~~grant~~ guarantee of his security if he disarmed. Carleton ~~receiving~~ accordingly went to Milan shortly after the meeting of June 3rd. The interview with Mendoza produced no good beyond illustrating the mentality of a Spanish governor. Carleton began by outlining James' efforts to secure a reasonable peace - the work of the English ambassador in Spain and his own work in Turin in inducing Carlo Emanuele to agree to peace proposals. He informed Mendoza how, now that James learned that Philip was prepared to grant peace upon the French terms, he himself had been instructed to work, and had, indeed, worked successfully, to induce Carlo Emanuele to accept peace upon the French terms. There were two points in these proposals ~~which~~ which James and the Duke wished <sup>Mendoza to answer:</sup> ~~to have an amplification~~ ~~from Mendoza:~~

"The one, after the Duke had disarmed that he would promise not to offend him; the other, that he would declare how he meant to dispose of his army. In the first point he answered readily (& so bid me assure y.<sup>r</sup> Ma.<sup>ty</sup>) he would not ~~o~~ offend the Duke when he had actually disarmed, the warr w.ch was made upon him by the K. of Spaine being to no other end then to force him to disarm. In the second, he sayde, he was sorry he could give me no better satisfaction, in that this was the thing the Duke of Savoy still aymed at, to have this glory that he did not disarm without setting the law to the K. of Spaine to disarm likewise; which (he sayde) the Duke must never expect. I told him this particularitye tended as much to the publicke tranquillity as the Dukes security, in that

all other Princes and states had reason to demand satisfaction in this point. Hereupon he fell into some questions; first, what reason I had to aske of him (who was Minister for the K. of Spaine who had so many kingdomes & provinces in these partes as Naples, Sicily, Milan etc. wherein to distribute his men) how he meant to dispose of them? I answered him I was not so indiscrete as to come to these particularities but in general whether, and in what time, he would dissolve this army now presently in the field. He fell from this to an other question, whether in case y.r Ma.ty should raise an army in England you would take it in good part the Spanish Amb.r should demand of you how you meant to dispose thereof? I answered him that this was a matter very usuall amongst all Princes w.ch were in amity & friendship, both to demand & give satisfaction in these cases whereby to free the world from iealousie & suspition, & that I assured my self y.r Ma.ty would not fayle to give the Amb.r a satisfactory answer. He asked me hereupon what suspition y.r Ma.ty being so farr remote could conceive? I told him y.r Ma.ty for the care of the common quiet endeavoured herein rather to free others from suspition then y.r self. This, he sayde, was the D. of Savoy, in whose respect he would not (to use his owne wordes) satisfie Domine Dio though he should send un Angelo di Paradiso to aske him the question."(1)

On that position the governor remained and the influence of Zeno, who had an interview with him on the following morning, could not move him from it.(2) If peace were to come to Italy that summer it could only come by Carlo Emanuele's acceptance of the French terms unquestioningly.

By the middle of June he had come to see that if he were to avoid a crushing war with no allies he must accept these terms, or such parts of them as

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 3. No.113. Carleton to James, 10/20 June, 1615. (2) C.S.P. Ven. Vol.XIII. No.844. Zeno to Doge and Senate, June 10th.

Rambouillet could not be persuaded to modify. That decision made, ~~the~~ the negotiations moved, as Carleton phrased it, like a motus naturalis, velocior in fine quam in principio; for the ambassadors gathered in the two coaches in a field outside Asti had now a fairly clear field. Their first difficulty was to be the governor of Milan, who would not consent to put his hand to any treaty that might be framed, and who would not, as Carleton and Zeno had found, even give any definite information about the dispositions of his forces after ~~such~~ a treaty was signed. The difficulty was met, ingeniously enough, by the French ambassador's agreeing to send to Mendoza two letters, the first containing a note of all the articles of the treaty that affected the king of Spain, the second a note of the articles that depended for their fulfillment on Mendoza himself. A written reply from Mendoza promising to accomplish all those things that were required of him would be accepted by the ambassadors as a sufficient guarantee of his readiness to abide by the treaty. There were bickerings, too, over the wording of the treaty, Rambouillet taking offence that the Duke's promise to license his army should be qualified by the words "et questo s'intende per la presente occasione", fearful that he might soon find another occasion. He would not be satisfied till the wording

was changed to "del presente essercito". There followed discussions about the phrasing of the preface, about the order of signing and the like. Finally the greatest difficulty of all was settled. It was impossible for Carleton to put his hand to any document that the Papal nuncio signed, and it was only by an agreement that two treaties should be drawn up, one to be signed by all except Carleton, the other by all except the nuncio that agreement was reached. "And so we were brought to agreement (like an English jury) by fasting, we having remained there with out moving full twelve howers. Et sic finitur fabula."(2)

On June 21st, then, the three points that Rambouillet had first proposed were incorporated, with some slight modifications, in the second Treaty of Asti.(3) The treaty proper was signed by the French ministers and Carlo Emanuele only. Carleton and Zeno signed separate declarations of their masters' readiness to assist Carlo Emanuele if, once he had disarmed, the Governor of Milan refused to disarm or attacked him. Carleton's declaration reads:

"I, Dudley Carleton, Ambassador extraordinary, in view of the aforesaid things, and especially of the promise

(1) Pietro Francesco Costa, bishop of Savona. (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 3. No.113. Carleton to James, June 10/20.  
 (3) Text will be found in Traites publics de la royale maison de Savoie. Turin 1836. Tom.1,pp.295-299.

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of the governor of Milan to dispose of his forces when His Highness disarms; accept the agreement and promise in the name of my king that if the Spaniards attempt anything directly or indirectly against the safety of His Highness, contrary to their word, His Majesty will take His Highness into his protection and give him all assistance necessary for his protection."(1)

Carleton's action in signing was approved by the English government, and on July 3rd Winwood sent an emphatic ratification:

"My Lorde,

Though since the receipt of y.r last letters by Symmons the Poste you have had from me, and what then I wrott I addressed to Venice, where I presume you are; yet the importunity of the Count Scarnaffies whoe out of zeale to his masters service gives us noe rest neither night nor day doeth importune me to sende these unto you, or in y.r absence to Mr. Wake, whereby your former warrant shalbe reitterated to assure the Duke that his Ma.ty doeth and allowe, all what you have done, and that he ever will hould the person and State of the Duke, not only in a particuler recomendation, but in his carefull and powerfull protection. Therefore the Duke may rest assured, that if after this disarming, and dissolving of his Forces, hee shalbe assayled, or molested, by Spaine, his Ma.tie will endeavour ever to protect him, not only by way of defence, to his person, ~~but~~ but of offence to his adversaries. And whereas by an Article of the Treaty it is agreed, that the decition of the different betwene the Duke, and mantua, should bee referred to the Emperor, his Ma.ty doeth understande, that it is not intended, of the person of the Emperor, but to the Chamber of the Empire, where the Emperor is president in cheife.

His Ma.ty doth promise (whereof you may give the Duke assurance) to imploy himselve to the Kinge of Spaine, that without unnecessary remises, and delays, his cause may be determined within the prefixed and assigned tyme."(2)

By June 25rd, then, the main business ended with the receipt of the Governor of Milan's reply  
(1) C.S.P. Ven. Vol. XlIII. No. 897. Original in Traité de la maison de Savoie cit. p. ~~299~~ 299.

(2) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 3. No. 226. Winwood to Carleton, July 3rd.

to Rambouillet's letters.(1) Though Carleton was to remain on in Turin till July 21st there was little for him to do except to receive his share of the compliments that Carlo Emanuele was lavishing on all who had had a part in the peace negotiations. It was indeed a matter for congratulation. The difficulties had not been small. Exaggerating a little, Carleton had described them to his familiar, John Chamberlain:

"I am here employed in a treaty of peace by those that will not treat one with the other, the Spaniards refusing absolutely to treat with this Duke. I am commanded to joyne w.th other ministers of Princes in this treatie without order taken that they should joyne with me, and the French amb.r who hath the chiefe auctoritie doth avoyde any partner (the Nontio onely excepted) as much as he may. Occasions offer themselves to treat with the Governor of Milan to whom I have no letters of credence: and in conclusion not a pennie of money I have heard of for some months."(2)

And if the treaty was to be of little worth in permitting Carlo Emanuele to live in peace in his states the fault was not primarily James'. He had acted with more earnestness and more vigour in these five months of negotiations than, perhaps, he had acted in foreign affairs since he had come to the throne of England.

(1) The letters and the reply are in Denmilne MSS 33-1-13, No. 68.

(2) S.P.Savoy. Bundle 3. No.149. Carleton to Chamberlain June 11/21.

Isaac Wake in Turin

1615-1618

The Treaty of Asti had been signed and ratified but the Good effects that had been expected from it, <sup>did</sup> not ~~not~~ appear, or rather they vanished after a short appearance; and for the next two years the hostilities between the Duke of Savoy and the Governors of Milan were to be more or less intently pursued. To the good correspondance that he had established with England Carlo Emanuele clung desperately; for England and the English bloc were the only friendly states to whom his aggressive spirit had never caused alarm; and in the years following the signing of the treaty they were the only powers from whom he could expect assistance. If his choice had not been one of necessity it would be possible to accuse him of a lack of perspicacity. As if wearied by the flush of diplomatic exertions that had preceded the Treaty of Asti James became less and less inclined to intervene to support Savoy, and such exertions as he did make were of a set pattern, as if his mind had become fixed in the belief that those methods of diplomacy that had proved effective in bringing about the treaty were the best for all possible occasions. And even if the will to assist Savoy had been strong the means were not to James' hand; the very heavy burden of

debt (Gardiner gives the total in the autumn of 1615 as £700,000(1) ) which lay on him made it impossible for him to undertake any extraordinary expenditure for foreign affairs; and the difficulties of transporting men from England to Savoy made financial help the most valuable to Carlo Emanuele. These then were the circumstances in which the English resident in Turin had to work, and it is interesting to see how even in these lean years he and Carlo Emanuele could bring forth a little fruit. This resident was Isaac Wake, Carleton's former secretary, who began his work in Turin after Carleton's departure for Venice(2)

The first few weeks after the signing of the treaty found Carlo Emanuele of a very tranquil mind. The Montferrini, whom before the fear of Savoyard arms had kept in subjection, now took advantage of his promise not to molest them to commit various outrages along the frontier. Carlo Emanuele contented

(1) S.R.Gardiner History cit. Vol.2, p.364

(2) C.S.P. Ven. Vol.XIII. No.933. Zeno to Doge and Senate, July 21st. Wake's letter of credence, dated May 20/30 runs : "Monsieur mon Cousin, Nous envoyons par devers vous le Sieur Isaac Wake pour tenir la place du Sieur Albert Morton nostre Agent aupres de vous lequel son indisposition nous a fait rappeller par deca, et la place duquel la correspondance qu'il y a entre nous requiert que nous ne laissions vuide et despourveue de quelque ministre ~~de~~

himself with vain requests to the Duke of Mantua to control them.(1) To a request from the Protestant Assembly at Grenoble that he would aid them with 2000 men and 500 horse if they rose,,though he could see how much their project of hindering the Spanish marriage was to his advantage, he gave a negative answer.(2) With this good spirit in the Duke met by a like disposition in Mendoza to implement the Treaty of Asti, despite French attempts to dissuade him, Wake could hopefully believe that there was to be a quietening in northern Italy; and he was strengthened in this belief by the talk of a double marriage between the houses of Savoy and Mantua, between the Duke of Mantua and the Infanta Dowager, his brother's

(1) Contd. de nostre part bien affectionne a l'entretene, veu mesmes que les occasions presents de voz affaires le semblent exiger. Nous avons donne charge par son moyen a nostre Ambassadeur a present demeurant aupres de vous de traicter avec vous de certains poincts qui vous touchent, et concernent le bien de voz affaires, auquel partant vous prions d'adjouster toute foy et creance, comme aussy audict Sieur Wake & quand il sera seul demeure aupres de vous; sur ce vous priant de vous asseurer que nous avons vostre et la conservation d'iceluy autant recommande que de Prince quelconque nous demeurons etc." Lettere di Giacomo VI e I. No. 22.

- (1) Add. MSS 18,639. F.25. Wake to Secy. August 10/20  
 (2) Ib. f. 39 Same to same September 3/13

widow, and between Leonora, the sister of the Duke of Mantua, and the Prince of Piedmont.(1) Indeed things were marching in such a train that Wake grew suspicious, fearing, especially when he learned that the Governor of Milan was prepared to disarm without any formal attestation of Savoyard disarmament but merely on the simple word of Carlo Emanuele, that the rapprochement would result in Carlo Emanuele's granting permission to the Governor to dismiss his troops through Piedmont into the Low Countries. It was not to the interest of England to see the menace of Spanish force transferred from one distant, friendly state to another, nearer one, and Wake immediately made representations to the Duke:

"As soone as I had this information I repayred to the Duke and acquainted with what I had understood desiring him to think well uppon the matter before he yielded to any such motion, and to consider that the clause of the Spanyards not demanding passage through his state six months after the Treaty, reflected uppon the safety of such frends of his, the other on side the mountains as had shewed themselves most forward in his favor, during the time of his troubles: that the forces which the Spanyardz would have passe this waye could not be employed but either in France or Germany, which would alarme the Princes of the union in the one place and those of the religion in the other, of both whose safety his Ma.ty being very tender would be sorry they should be affrighted with so great jealousy, as the coming of such an armye towards them would cast upon them.

The Duke would not take notice unto mee of any such ouverture made unto him directly, but answered mee very categorically, that he would be more precise in observing that part of the capitulations which concerned his frends then that which concerned

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 4. No. 23. Wake to Secretary, October 29. (O.S.), 1615

himselfe."(1)

Wake's alarm was ill-founded. A change was soon to come in Milan that would drive peace from Italy. One section of the Spanish in Milan had become scandalized by the reasonableness of Mendoza in implementing the Treaty of Asti. As Wake phrased it, "The Governor of Milame is generally exclaymed against in these parts for his ill managing of that affaire, and some of the principal Commanders have taken such an indigation against him for it, that they talke of making themselves Capuchines rather than they will live under his Commaund."(2) These men were to find in the new Governor, Don Pedro of Toledo, a man to their liking. Even before his arrival, in November 1615, <sup>Carlo Emanuele</sup> was growing apprehensive, for rumour had carried words let fall by Toledo that showed his intention of dealing with the Duke in a manner very different from what the Treaty demanded(3); and his apprehension was the better founded that he had himself disarmed fairly loyally(4), and that Toledo brought bills of three hundred thousand crowns to maintain his troops.(5) Toledo's earliest move showed his intentions clearly enough:

"As soone as Don Pedro arrived, the first act he did was the staying of Lance-Knights and the Napolitans and the reinforcing his troopes which his predecessor

- (1) S.P.Savoy. Bundle 4. No.13. Wake to Secretary, October 15/25  
 (2) Add. MSS 18,639 f.9. Same to same. August 6/16. (3) Ib. f. 110  
 (4) Same to same November 13/23. (4) see the attestation  
 in S.P.Savoy. Bundle 4. No.20. (5) Add. MSS 22, 18,639 f.122

had begunne to reforme, pretending that he would not innovate anythings in the army: and when Claudio Marini(1) presented himself unto him to passe such Offices with him as he had done with Don Giov. he excepted against him as not being legalised, in that he had not a particular lettere from the King unto him."(2)

For the next two years Toledo was to display the uncontrolled aggressiveness of the Spanish viceroys in Italy at its worst.

With this man the efforts of Marini and Mangeant, the French ambassador and agent who were charged to certify Carlo Emanuele's disarmament and to induce the Governor of Milan to follow him, were of no avail, if indeed they were seriously made; for both the ministers were suspect as being pro-Spanish.(3) Carlo Emanuele felt himself forced to appeal to James. In the Duke's name, then, Wake wrote to the king on November 17/27.

"The Duke of Savoy . . . requireth mee to present unto y.r Ma.tie his humble requeste for that protection, which you have bene pleased to promise him by the Formall Act, which Sir Dudley Carleton in your Ma.ties name inserted in the Treaty of Asti and that you will take into your Princely consideration that daunger that hee is subiect unto as long as that Armie is kept on foote, which he presumeth will soon be dissolved, if your Ma.tie will interpose your authoritye. . . In particular he desireth your Ma.tie gratuslye to favoure his cause with a word of Expostulation unto the Spanish amb.r and to give order to Sir John Digbye to speake the like language in Spaine, and lastly to send two letters of Credit hither, one for the Duke of Mantua and an other for the Gov.r of Milan, that in case of any

(1) French ambassador in Savoy. (2) Stowe MSS 135. f. 98, an account by Wake of the Spaniards' non-observance of the treaty of Asti. (3) C.S.P.ven. Vol.XIV, no. 212

Innovation your Minister here maie treatte with them according to such instructions as your Ma.tie shall think fitt to give him." (1)

How far James acted is not clear, but in his narrative of the events of this time Wake stated that James did all the things that he was required to do. (2) On January 3/13 the secretary wrote to tell Wake that James had ordered the required letters of credence to be prepared. His efforts cannot have had any great effect, for Carlo Emanuele continued to treat with Toledo as a vassal almost. Parella, who had been sent to Milan as a Savoyard envoy extraordinary to induce Toledo to implement his part of the treaty of Asti, brought back an answer that shewed what estimation Toledo had of the Duke and his guarantors. It was that the king of Spain could not so far lose honour as to abide by the terms of the treaty, but that he would concede much to the Duke as an act of grace; and that, while he would not disband his troops, he would consider sending them into the Low Countries. (3) Two days before Carlo Emanuele had expressed to Donato

(1) S.P. Savoy MBundle 4 No. 33 . (2) Stowe MSS I35 f.98  
 (3) S.P. Savoy Bundle 4 No. 80 Jan.8/18 I6I5/I6.

the Venetian ambassador in Turin, his doubts about James: "England is far off and it is uncertain what will come forth from the mind of a king so tardy, the friend of ease and quiet."(1)

In his negotiations, indeed, Wake was forced to act almost alone. The depredations of the Uscochi of the Croatian litoral had forced Venice to make reprisals in Istria in 1615, and from those reprisals had grown a full-dress war with the Archduke Ferdinand. Engaged, then, on her eastern front against one branch of the Hapsburgs, Venice could not but fear an attack on her western front if Toledo was to maintain an overwhelming army on foot. The Republic was more than willing to join with Carlo Emanuele in any measures that would rid Italy of the Spanish forces. Since, then Venice and Savoy alike were indifferent where these forces went provided they left Italy, the second part of the reply that Parella brought back reawakened Wake's alarm, for the interests of England demanded that these forces be disbanded in Italy. And his anxiety was not lessened by Donato's pressing the Duke to give these Spanish troops passage.(2)

Against the pressure of these two in-

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No.154. Donato to Doge & Senate.

(2) Add. MSS 18,639 f. 158.

terests, with no clear instructions from home Wake could do little except plead for time, asking the Duke to withhold permission for the passage of these troops till he had a reply from James, and listen to the biting response that, through James' apathy, if the Spaniards insisted on passing, the forces of Savoy could not hold them back.(1) Even when he did receive letters from England their vagueness made his task no easier. James contented himself with urging the need for delay in giving passage and for informing the princes of the Union if the Spanish troops should pass. And the very threat of action that his letter carried was a gentle one, not to enhearten an ally or discourage an enemy. "If the Spaniard shall attempt to force his way, his Majesty accounting that as a violence, and overt act of hostility will not be wanting to declare himself for the maintenance of the Duke both in his state and person, and hath all ready given order to his ambassador in France to prepare the French King to ioyne with him in soe hon.ble a resolution."(2) Besides, as the summer lengthened, the rumours increased in Italy that James intended entering the Spanish camp by marrying

(1) S.P.Savoy. Bundle 4. No.101. Wake to Secretary, February, 15/25. (2) Add. MSS 18,639 f.177.

prince Charles to a Spanish Infanta, and the Spanish agents in Italy did not hesitate to amplify the consequences of such a marriage, to the dejection of all those in Italy who looked to England for support against Spain.(1)

Things could not continue in this state. The constant menace from the Spanish troops on his eastern frontier and the apathy of his guarantors turned Carlo Emanuele to resolve on a more active course. By the middle of April he was re-arming rapidly, holding musters of men everywhere in Piedmont(2), and throughout the summer he continued to add to his forces.(3) On June 13th Lesdiguieres arrived in Turin and at a conference there urged Carlo Emanuele to continue his rearming, promising himself to send such troops to Piedmont as would be necessary to secure the state. On the following day the Venetian ambassador paid to Carlo Emanuele the fifty thousand ducats necessary to pay these troops(4), for it had become apparent to the Republic that their only hope of safety, now that Toledo seemed to have abandoned his intention of dismissing his troops to the Low Countries, was to enter into an alliance or understanding with Savoy, so that attacks or feints from

(1) Add. MSS 18,639 f.214. Wake to Secretary, August 1/11.

(2) Ib. f. 177. (3) See S.P.Savoy, Bundle 4, passim.

(4) S.P.Savoy, Bundle 4. ~~Bundle~~ No.163. Wake to James,

June 19, 1629.

Savoy might draw the menace of Toledo's forces from the Western frontier of Venice.(1) By August 26/ September 5th Carlo Emanuele was in the field at the head of an *esercito volante*, hovering on the confines of Montferrat, and drawing the forces of Toledo to meet him.(2) On September 12/22 Spanish troops came into conflict with a regiment of this *esercito volante* at Villanova, and two days later, at Motta, the first pitched battle of the new war took place.(3) There was little heed now to James' pleas for disarming and trusting to his word, and there is little point in tracing his useless efforts at using a diplomacy that had no backing of force or resolution. To his every mild plea for peace Carlo Emanuele could quote, as he did once to Wake, "Dum Romae consulitur Saguntum oppugnatur."

One example of James' representations to Savoy at this time is, however, worth quoting, not because it had any effect on Carlo Emanuele or on the conduct of the war, but partly because it seems to show a remarkable change in James' attitude towards Savoy, to show him very much under the influence of Spain, and partly because it illustrates the diplomatic method,

(2) S.P.Savoy, Bundle 4. No. 196. Wake to Secretary, September 3/13. (1) Add. MSS 18,639 f.173.  
 (3) S.P.Savoy, Bundle 4. NO.200. Wake to Secy., Sept.15/25

that of making representations to Spain and France, which had been effective in the months preceding the signing of the Treaty of Asti, in use again. On November 6/16 Wake described an audience he had had of the Duke:

"Concerninge his Ma.ties partiaall affection to him I did give him that assurance which the instructions that I received from y.r honor did warrant unto me, but withall I signified unto him that the Spanish Ambassador had confidently assured his Ma.tie that the Kinge of Spaine desireth nothings more then to live in peace and quietnes, and w.th noe prince more then with the Duke of Savoy: That for his part he had fully observed the treaty of Asti, and if there were any default it proceeded from the Duke, who since the conclusion of the Treaty had contracted secret confederatyes with the State of Venice. That it beinge impossible for his Ma.tie at soe farr distance to discern clearly who had the right of the cause, he could not in reason of state hastily declare himselfe in favore of the one or other party, and that howsoever he was resolved to mayntayne his worde and his honor in protecting this Prince from violence and oppression, yet he could not neglect the amitye he holdeth with other princes. That besides the many and effectuall offices which he had already passed with the French kinge in favor of the Duke of Savoy he had now given the lord Roos Commission to treat very earnestly with the kinge of Spaine for the effectuation of the Treaty of Asti, whereof he did expect a good issue." (1)

So early as the end of January of 1616, indeed, Edmond in Paris had been instructed to represent to the French government the need of forcing the Governor of Milan to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Asti (2), and his representations continued throughout the year. (3)

(1) S.P.Savoy. bundle 4. No. 248. Wake to secy. Nov. 6/16  
 (2) S.P.F.France. Bundle 65. No. 47. Edmond to Secy.

January 23/February 2nd, 1616. It. (3) Ib. Bundles 65 & 66  
 Passim.

The work that Scarnafigi was doing in England in the autumn of 1615 and in 1616 was largely representing to James the violation by the Spanish in Milan of the terms of the Treaty of Asti, and trying to persuade him to implement the promise made in his name by Carleton. Scarnafigi was to find heavy going. The news of the arrival of Don Pedro of Toledo, of his refusal to disband his troops, and of his intention to seek a passage through the lands of Savoy for those of his troops that were to pass to the Low Countries reached him towards the end of December, together with instructions to inform the king that Carlo Emanuele depended for his security on those who had guaranteed the execution of the treaty.(1) On January 12th he had audience of the king but could draw little satisfaction from him, nothing more than a promise to send letters to Milan and to Spain to speed the execution of the treaty.(2) Again in March Scarnafigi was no more successful in inducing James to make a definite statement about the assistance that he would give to his master, for James was set in the belief that the Spanish troops in the Milanese were directed not so much against Savoy as against Venice.(3) Even later, when the danger to Savoy was seen to be more real and Scarnafigi pressed

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No. 128. Barbarigo to Doge & Senate, December 25, 1615. (2) Ib. No.148. Same to same, January 14th, 1616. (3) Ib. No.219. Same to same. March 19.

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not for general help in maintaining the treaty but for money to pay troops with, James continued to discuss the question gently and vaguely.(1) The negotiations dragged on in this fashion, James meeting the urgent demands of Scarnafigi with vague promises, throughout the early part of 1616, till by June it seemed even to the blindest that James had no intention of intervening either with men or money to support Carlo Emanuele. Lionello, the Venetian secretary, found even Scarnafigi bordering on the knowledge of this: "He does not know what to think about the determination of the king, as he and his ministers are deeply committed to do great things if the Spaniards do not behave straightforwardly, but on the other hand he knows how easily they change their minds here when any difficulties themselves in the way of effecting promises, as he has had experience of this in his past negotiations for his master."(2) James' poverty was partly to blame, partly too was the influence of Sarmiento, the Spanish ambassador, who was sparing no effort to thwart any hope Scarnafigi had of receiving help.(3)

By the end of the summer, however, when it had become apparent that diplomacy was not to bring peace to Italy, Scarnafigi had evidently more success.

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XLV.No.256. Barbarigo to Doge & Senate. April 19th, 1616. (2) Ib. No.311. Lionello to same (3) Ib. No.449. same to same. September 30th.

He received, probably at an audience on September 16(1), a definite promise of munitions and permission to draft and present a memorial outlining the kinds of assistance that would be most useful to his master.

"At the last audience that I had of your majesty I received, among others, two special favours. The one was the grant of munitions, for which I thank your Majesty with all possible sincerity in the name of his Highness. The other was to make you a memorial of the nature of the assistance that would be most useful to Piedmont. It seems to me that your best decision will be to supply it with men. On your Majesty's side the following are the good effects which will follow from that course; you will not have to seek about for that quantity of money which you would have to if you resolved to give assistance in money alone; the money that you do spend will come into the hands of your own subjects, and so no one can complain of the taking of money out of the realm; because the money is to be distributed through your own states they will be the readier to supply it; the disbursement will be in the hands of your own ministers, who can see to it that there is no waste; you will set up a school of war to train officers and men (and the truce in Flanders makes these few in England now); you will give a new lease of life to many who, well-born and brought up in easy circumstances, live with no occupation and for want of run foul of the law; you will skim your lands of such men and of vagabonds and in doing so will make these men more fitted to serve you; you will so far increase your prestige among your friends and will be so dreaded of your enemies that you may be certain of a decisive voice not in Italy alone but in all Christendom; your example will constrain the States and the Princes of Germany to follow you, and with their help there can be no doubt of success; you will put the Duke of Savoy under a great obligation, who, in any case, is ready to place at the disposal of your Majesty and your realm himself, his state, and his offspring;

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No.433. Lionello to Doge and Senate. September 16th.

you will place Spain under the necessity of seeking peace, if for no other reason than through fear for the religion, for with Dutch in Venice and English in Savoy their nearness will be too dangerous to Rome and to the quiet of its states; and, lastly, you will renew the English name in Italy, a name that was so renowned in the factions of Guelf and Ghibelline.

These are the good effects that his Highness will receive from such assistance: the reputation of being aided powerfully by a powerful king not forgetful of his friends and of their common interests; the service of men, faithful and of a warlike disposition, to whom he can entrust the defence of his states without fear; the backing of a country to balance the other(1), which cannot but arouse suspicion through its very strength; and the certainty that this will be the true way to end the war and bring peace.

Your Majesty, too, might consider adding to the first kind of assistance a second, slightly different. He might send four or six of those ships of war that are now wasting in the river to guard the coasts of Savoy.

But, since all cannot be done suddenly, because his present forces are more costly to the Duke my master in garrison than on campaign where they can live on the country, and because the season now necessitates their withdrawing into garrison, I humbly beg your Majesty to consider the danger of a mutiny or other worse accident and to add to these your favours that of aiding the Duke with a sum of money to pay his troops with; and with that the munificence of your Majesty will be in all respects complete."(2)

The memorial did not persuade James to supply men or money or ships, but he did not swerve in his resolve to supply munitions. At an audience in the middle of October Scarnafigi was ordered to draw up a written note of the quantities that he required so that the Lieutenant of the

(1) I.e. France, the other guaranteeing power.

(2) Trans. Original Lett. min. (Ingh.), Mazzo 2. Scarnafigi to ~~SALESMAZIO~~, the King, September 27th, 1616

Tower, might draw from his stores the quantities he

required.(1) Scarnafigi's note was framed very generally:

"Since your majesty in accordance with your royal promises made to his Highness through his representatives and ~~through me~~ to me, and with your obligation under the Treaty of Asti is pleased to decide to aid the Duke against the disturbers of <sup>the</sup> Peace of Italy, I come humbly to inform you that I being commissioned to treat of general, not of particular things cannot and should not entreat a powerful king to adopt any particular course, save to follow that to which his own greatness will turn him. Yet since your Majesty otherwise commands me, I will set aside the request for money and at present limit my petition to a request for war material, such as artillery, powder, shot, matches or fuses for arquebuses, and lead. As for quantities I would that your Majesty considered his own greatness, the greatness of the danger, and the need that his Highness has of them, having in the past years used an extraordinary amount in the Piedmontese forces, and being under the necessity of keeping in the 'Mari di Provenza', in the fortresses of different provinces a great quantity of these munitions in such a war against so strong a foe."(2)

Even this limited assistance was to be of little value.

Lionello, who had seen the stocks of munitions in the Tower, thought them of very poor quality.(3) As for the quantity Lionello learned on December 8th that a ship was about to be charged with a hundred thousand barrels of powder, twenty tons of matches and twenty tons of lead to be sent to Savoy(4), though the strange <sup>ness of the</sup> proportions makes it possible that he was misinformed. And even in receiving this poor substitute for the protection promised by the treaty of Asti Carlo Emanuele was deprived of the right he

(1) E. Passamonti Op. Cit. 1935 p.111. (2) S.P. Savoy, Bundle 4 No.216. Scarnafigi to James, September. (3) C.S.P. Ven. Vol.XIV. No.468. (4) Ib. No.543

valued most highly, the right to use it as a means of proving the active intervention of England on his behalf; nor Scarnafigi had to make a pretence of buying the munitions through Burlamachi and Calandrini to prevent James from becoming embroiled with Spain.(1)

With a despairing gesture Carlo Emanuele had written directly to James to seek assistance in December:

"Monseigneur,  
Je suis tres asseure que mon Amb.r aura adverty V. M.te de temps en temps de tout ce qui succede depuis trois mois en ca que les Esp. ont invahy mes estats, tant au fait de la guerre que du traite de paix qui a tousiours este entre-tenu par eux plus par malice qu'avec intention quilz ayent du repos de leur voysins et du public, ainsi que V. M.te le pourra iuger par sa singuliere prudence par l'yssue dudit traite la quelle luy sera representee audt. Amb.r si V. M.te l'aura agreable. Or estant les choses aux termes qu'elle entendra, le traite d'Ast rompu, et celluy de l'accord, l'ennemy loge dans mes estatatz, j'ose tant plus importuner V.M.te de ses graces et de sa protection qu'il a semblé que sa reputation et dignite y est grandement offencee des Esp.s et tant plus engagee a ma defence. Je la supplie donc en toute humilite de m'en favoriser si a temps que j'en puisse ressentir le fruict que iay tousiours espere de la grandeur et magnanimite de V. M.te et croire qu'elle obligera a ismais un Prince et une maison qui tascheront de le meriter en rendant a V. M.te et sa couronne toute sorte de treshumble service etc"(2)

There is no sign that his prayer was effectively answered, and there is little point in

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No.523. Lionello to Doge & Senate, November 24th. (2) S.P.Savoy. Bundle 4. No.258.

prolonging the dreary recital of urgent requests for help from Scarnafigi followed by vague replies that were tantamount to refusals. It dragged on through the early part of 1617 till Scarnafigi left the country to return to Turin in the middle of March.(1) The fact that Biondi, a man of little status and of no fixed allegiance, was left to fill his place shows that Carlo Emanuele had finally realised the futility of expecting great things from England.

Before Scarnafigi left England, however, he undertook two things that are worth mentioning. The first was the giving of letters of marque, or the equivalent, to certain English seamen to authorise them to seize Spanish shipping and take it into the Svaoyard port of Villafranca. The sole account of this that I can find is in a letter of Lionello's, but it is not surprising that notice of it is not elsewhere; according to Lionello, Scarnafigi took care that news of his action should not reach the English government. "An English pirate is in the Downs with two ships. He left here with licence to go in search of pirates, but I know that he had patents from the ambassador of Savoy that if he captured any

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No.694. Lionello to Doge & Senate, March 17th.

Spanish ship he might go to Villafranca to sell it. Lord Rich had the same licence. He sent three ships buccaneering. As he has done so most secretly, without the knowledge of his king or his ministers, I beg your Excellencies to keep it ~~secret~~ hidden, because if it came out His Majesty would be highly offended with Scarnafis, much harm would be done and various heads would fall. The ambassador of Savoy issued these commissions in order to harass the Spaniards as much as possible, and also because when these ships go to Villafranca His Highness may use them as he may think necessary from time to time."(1)

The other business was of graver import. Genoa had sunk from its former greatness but it was still the greatest port of north-western Italy and one of the greatest financial centres. It was the chief gateway through which Spanish, Neapolitan or Sicilian reinforcements came to Milan, and it was the centre from which the successive Spanish governors were accustomed to draw the ready coin to pay their troops. It might, indeed, be considered a part of the Spanish dominions in northern Italy and as such it would be a legitimate prey to Carlo Emanuele if he

(1) C.S.P.ven. Vol.XIV. No.631. Lionello to Doge & Senate, February 10th.

could surprise or force it. Scarnafigi sought to acquire the means, the armed ships and the seamen, in England; and he flew high for his admiral, seeking to have the leadership of the expedition entrusted to Sir Walter Raleigh. At the beginning of the year Lionello found out that Scarnafigi was treating of important affairs with Winwood and the king, and, by a direct approach, discovered, though he was sworn to secrecy, that the ~~object of~~ <sup>purpose</sup> was to have Raleigh's expedition to Guiana diverted and changed to a surprise attack on Genoa in company with some French vessels. From the king Scarnafigi required the use of some ships and the initial wages of the seamen. Both James and Winwood were well disposed to the attack at first, for it promised great wealth, ~~at first~~ and Winwood was even prepared to invest several thousand crowns in the ~~expedition~~.(1) Venice, too, was to be invited to join in the attack, which was to be carried out, if finally the king consented, by sixteen royal ships as well as those of Raleigh and other private adventurers.(2) That final consent was not given. On February 3rd Lionello wrote that while James was ready to help Carlo Emanuele in such an enterprise with his naval forces, he was in no wise prepared to (1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No.603. Lionello to Doge and Senate, January 19th. (2) ~~1~~ Ib.No.611

entrust the command of it to Raleigh.(1) With that decision Scarnafigi's attempt to redeem his lack of success in England by a stroke that would benefit his master immeasurably failed.

The information from these Venetian dispatches, which are the only sources used by Edwards in his account of the relations between Raleigh and Scarnafigi(2), seems too highly coloured. They impute too great a readiness to participate in this buccaneering expedition to James. At the same time there is evidence from other sources that in 1617 Carlo Emanuele had the intention of attacking Genoa if he could get English aid. In June Wake described how the Duke had asked him to return to England to inform the king of the merits of his intention:

"At this last Audience the Duke of Savoy did treat with me a second tyme very confidently concerninge the enterprize of Genoa and by his discourse it should seeme that he is resolved ~~hazarder~~ ~~be~~ ~~pacquet~~ if his Ma.ty will undertake the business. He doth professe that he hath not communicated that designe to any but to the Prince, Sig.re Crotti his cheife Secretary, and the Count Scarnaffis, and that he will not speake thereof with any but those that doe already knowe of the project. And because the indisposition of the Count Scarnaffis will not permitt him to tra~~v~~aille againe soe speedily and that he doth not judge Biondi fitt to be trusted with a busines of such consequence did with much

(1) U.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No.825.

(2) E.Edwards Life of Sir Walter Raleigh. 1868. Vol. 1  
pp.574-584.

importunity presse me to make a poastinge voyage into England to informe his Ma.tye of all that might be sayde pro et contra in that busines, and of such memorialls as he would consigne unto me."(1)

The extract adds nothing to the knowledge of Raleigh's part in the enterprise, but it shows clearly that there was a project of an Anglo-Savoyard attempt on Genoa in 1617.

In Turin Wake was to have more success in a piece of work that contributed materially to the security of Savoy, in acting as honest broker between Carlo Emanuele and the canton of Berne. The need for a better understanding with Berne had long been apparent to Carlo Emanuele, and the work that Carleton had done to smooth the approach to an alliance(2) had been followed up by Savoyard diplomats. But it had become apparent to him that English aid, if not essential, would be at least useful to him. His title to the Pays de Vaud, which had been wrested from the house of Savoy in 1536 by Berne(3) was still good(4), and his general aggressiveness and particular attempts against Geneva had aroused an apprehension among the Protestant cantons that needed a neutral guarantee of his respectability to allay. On the other side Berne was not averse, given this guarantee, from entering into an

(1) Add. MSS 18,640 f.64. (2) Supra p. (3) See K. Daendliker short History of Switzerland 1899 p. 147  
 (4) "Baron de Vaud" was part of his official title.

alliance with Savoy. In October 1615 Surian, the Venetian agent, found that the Lords of Berne were quite willing to enter such an alliance if James would assure them that the Duke would abide by the terms of it (1), and Baron d'Arlac, the Bernese ambassador in England, informed James in January 1616 that his masters were quite willing to begin negotiations with Carlo Emanuele. (2) With this lively inclination on both sides Wake's work was not to be too difficult.

By November 1615 Carlo Emanuele had begun to move Wake to write for authority to take part in these negotiations and to give the Savoyard negotiations the weight of the prestige that James had in the Protestant cantons:

"He (Carlo Emanuele) continueth to treat with the state of Berne an allyance that he desireth to contract with them, and assuring himselfe that your Ma.ties mediation, would much facilitat the buisnesse he hath required mee to move your Ma.tie in his behalfe, to countenance that negotiation with your authority, and to send a letter of credit to your Minister here, which may authorize him to passe such offices with state, as your Ma.tie shall thingk fit, in your Princely wisdome, to ordaine." (3)

The request was not refused. Wake was provided with a letter of credence to Berne to use as his discretion prompted. (4) By March 9/19 1616 he had begun to use the

(1) C.S.P.Ven. vol.XIV.No.57. (2) ib. No.144. (3) S.P. Savoy. Bun da 4. No.33. Wake to James November 17/27.

(4) S.P.Switzerland Bundle 1. No.210. James to states of Berne, 29th December, 1615

powers given him to take a direct part in <sup>a</sup>preparing  
the treaty:

"I have likewise with his advise, written to the state of Berne, and signified unto them the charge that I have from his Ma.tye to facilitate the Alliance, which the Duke of Savoy desireth to contract with them, and I have requested them to specifye unto mee, the difficultyes that present themselves, and what they require of the Duke, that I may before<sup>n</sup> transporting my selfe thither so dispose him to reason, that my voyage may be of some effect. By their answer I shall see what nope there is of a good conclusion, and I will be sure not to adventure his Ma.ties honor in that commission, or any other, without having assurance of an honorable issue of his mediation."(1)

Little was done in the stir and preparation for war of the summer of 1616, but with the coming of winter and of a respite of arms Carlo Emanuele turned once again to consider an alliance with Berne, urged, no doubt, by the knowledge that spring would not bring peace, and by the hope of obtaining a supply of Bernese mercenaries to stirfen his forces. On November 7/17 he approached Wake to suggest that Wake, whose letters had already had so good an effect in inclining the Bernese to treat, should accompany the Commissioners who were going from Turin to Berne to treat for an alliance.(2) Wake deemed that his influence would not be of value if he went at a time when the treaty of alliance was still

(1) S.P.Savoy. Bundle 4. No.108. Wake to Secy., March 9/19.  
(2) ~~Add. MSS 18,640 f. 22~~ (2) Add. MSS 18,640 f. 22

unshaped, and that it would be better to reserve it till the closing stages of the treaty when he might induce the parties to agreement by compromise. All he would consent to do was to write to Berne to ask for the levy of three thousand men for service in Savoy. The Savoyard minister, Moriton, then, went to Berne alone in December after Carlo Emanuele had drawn from Wake the promise that if Moriton's efforts were at all successful Wake himself would pass to Berne, "to receive for his Ma.ty the honor of concluding that league w.ch will be very advantagious for the publique and for the private interests of both these states."(1)

Moriton's preliminaries were successful, and on February 10/20 Wake and Gabaleone set out for Berne.(2) Wake himself was to make no proposals, leaving the particularities of the treaty to Gabaleone, and holding his own part to be rather that of conciliator.

Gabaleone began by offering in Carlo Emanuele's name to resign the claim of Savoy to the Pays de Vaud in return for a supply of men, and even in

(1) Add. MSS 18,640 f.23

(2) Ib. f.39

this first step Wake had to intervene to bring about agreement:

"The maine difficulty did consist, (as your Honor hath long since understood) in the resignation of the province of Vaud, in lieu whereof the Duke of Savoy did require a present secours of 4m. men armed & payed by that state, for the space of four months. They, with much adoe, were drawn to offer him 3 m. for three months, & after many dayes dispute it was not possible to content S. re Gabaleon with less then what his Master demanded, nor to procure that state to give more then they had offered: This contestation growing endles both parties resolved to refer themselves unto mee with promise to stand to what I should arbitrate therein; which office I could not well refuse to undertake though it had in it some danger, in regard of the difficulty of contenting both parties. But considering that my employment there was to act as mediator, I did accept that charge, & taking the middle way to be the most safe I did cut of one thousand from the number of men, which the Duke of Savoy did demand, & added one month to the time which the state of Berne did offer: whereunto both parties did subscribe and seemed to be wel satisfied; so that for the resignation of that Province, the Duke of Savoy is to have 3 m. men payed by that state for the space of four months."(1)

That bargaining over numbers and time took no little time, and Wake turned the interval to good profit, forwarding the treaty by direct dealing with some of the people concerned:

"During this interim I did in private talke with the cheifest ministers of this state in the most effectual and confident maner that I coulde, unto whom I did represent that their title to the province of Vaud, was not so cleare as they did seeme to make it, and that, it being very problematical in it selfe, they should doe wisely to serve themselves of this present coniuncture, and putt it out of question, w.oh they might doe w.th gratifieinge the Duke of Savoy w.th some competent secours. . . . To the same purpose i did write letters to the Prince Palatin, the Marques of Baden and ~~Palatin~~

(H) S.P. 2.5 (1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 5. No. 41  
Wake to secretary 30th May, 1617

Turlach, and the State of Zurich, and havinge observed that those Princes and States had greate power and authority in this place, I did by informinge them Of the true state of this businesse give them occasion to contribute theire best offices towards the advancinge of the treaty in hand, w.c.n everye one of them hath donne severally."(1)

With the problem of the numbers solved, the drawing up of the articles of alliance began, and that too proved a lengthy business:

"When the difficulty was overcome (which seemed insuperable) we descended to project the articles of the confederation, which did hold us in dispute a whole month, they being 29 in number. And in truth considering the slowe pace which all common wealths do hold in their negotiations, & the natural diffidence, & cautelous proceeding of the Helvetian nation, it is a wonder that in so short a time, we could come so neare as we have done, to adjust the capitulations. For Signore Barbarigo who treated the Venetian league with that state & Zurich consumed two whole yeares in that country before he could come to any conclusion, notwithstanding that he had not such a difficulty to overcome, as the resignation of a province; and that Common wealths do symbolize better among themselves, then with Souverainge Princes.

The Duke of Savoy did desire to have the league conceived in such termes, that it might be defensive against all, & offensive against such as should unjustly molest one or the other party, or usurpe upon the publique liberty. But they of Berne would not indure the word offensive, notwithstanding any restrictions wherewith it might be tempered: so that I was inforced to enlarge the word defensive with some circumlocutions that might give the Duke of Savoy some sorte of satisfaction & yet not prejudice the state of Berne: and this is the onely point that is not yet throughly cleared.

On the other side they of Berne did require to have Geneva comprised in this Alliance, not onely in the reserve at the end, wherein all their Allies

are named, but in a particuler article apart: which the Duke of Savoy would by no means indure, alleaging that Geneva being a common wealth no way subordinate to berne, they ought to treat their owne affayres by themselves, & that if they required any thing at his hands, he would refer unto his Ma.tie the decision of any difference that might arise betwixt him and that Towne.

This answer would not satisfie the Bernesi, in regard of the great interest they have in the conservation of this Towne, & they of Geneva understanding that Savoy did refuse to have them included did take the alarm so hot, as if there had been Annibal ad portas."(1)

Gabaleone's commission did not permit him to decide these questions of himself, and, seeing that his efforts would move the Bernesi to no further concessions, Wake thought fit to go himself to Turin to lay the facts before the Duke; he could explain the condition of affairs better than could an ordinary courkier, and he could hope that he might persuade Carlo Emanuele to moderate some of his terms. Wake travelled by Geneva and took the opportunity there of feeling the pulse of the town:

"In my passage by Geneva I was infinitely importuned by these SS.ri to be their Advocat in this buisines, which charge I did willingly undertake, as presuming that his Ma.tie would be wel pleased if by his authority that poore Towne might be secured, not onely a periculo but a metu periculi. My abode there was onely one night & halfe a day, during which time I did comfort them with the assurance of his Majesties good affection towards them, & I was by them extraordinarily honored, in contemplation of his Ma.tie whom they do adore in that place above all Princes upon earth."(1)

The journey had not been made in vain. Wake was able to persuade the Duke to agree to the

(1) D.P.Savoy Bundle 5. No.41. Wake to Secreta ry. May 30th (O.S.)

Bernese terms, or rather to agree to remit the decision to Wake, who accepted the terms:

"After two dayes spent in treating first with the Duke then with the Prince & lastly with their Counsel, I did find, that the paines of my voyage was very wel employed, for they were pleased to give so much credit unto what I did remonstrate unto them, that they referred unto mee the decision of those points w.ch were controversed in the articles, & did readily accept such temperamenti, as I proposed unto them for the adjusting of some circumstances wherein they were not of accord with Berne. By this means I have procured the Towne of Geneva to be included in this Allyance which in truth is more then I could ~~have~~ hoped to have obtained: But the Duke of Savoy doth so much respect his Ma.tie, that he protested, he would agree to anything how disadvantageous so ever, rather then his Ma.ties intervention in this buisines should prove unfruitfull, and I refer it to your Honors wisdom, whither his Ma.tie may take particuler notice thereof, considering that it is a point which the late French king could not obtaine in his two Treaties at Vervins & Lions."(1)

There had been other difficulties to meet than the delays and obstinacy of the parties to the treaties: there was active opposition from those who saw a danger in the strengthening of Carlo Emanuele that would result from the treaty. Casale, the Spanish ambassador in Switzerland, was from the beginning at pains to point out to Berne the great disadvantage that would result to that ganton from the treaty, in that it would antagonise the kings of France and Spain and the Emperor, and he offered to induce the Catholic cantons to take Vaud into their

(1) S.P. Savoy Bundle 5. No. 41.

protection if in return ~~Berne~~ would proceed no further with the treaty with Savoy.(1) Freiburg and Lucerne were also eager to destroy the embryo alliance:

"But above all others, the Jesuits of Friburg and Lucerene are most intraged partly for the envy they beare unto this State and partly because their malitious genious cannott indure to see peace and frindshippe established amonge neighbours, it may be also, that they are the more offended because his Ma.<sup>tye</sup> doth interpose himselfe in this godly and Christian worke. . . . Since my comeinge hither they have assembled a dyet at Lucerne of all the Popish Cantons and have procured letters to be written to this State, in the name and by the consent of the little or Popish Cantons wherein they doe take notice of the treaty in hand betweene the Duke of Savoy and this State and doe protest for their parte formally against it, alleaginge that they have interest therein in virtue of the Common league, w.ch doth oblige the Swisshes to defende one the other, and that they knoweinge assuredly that the kinge of Spaine will be offended with this Allyance, and revenge himselfe of the State of Berne, they of the other Cantons shalbe interested in the defence of this State and be drawn by that occasion into troubles and expence w.ch they will not understand and there fore doe protest against the cause that the effect may be prevented."(1)

Despite this opposition the treaty was signed on June 23rd 1617(2), and ratified by Carlo Emanuele on August 1/11, with much credit given to Wake.(3) On July 14/24 Wake had been present at Ivrea to see the arrival of the first Bernese

- (1) Add. MSS 18,640 ff. 40 & 41. Wake to secy. March 9/19  
 (2) See text in Traites publics cit. Tom.1. Pp 304-319  
 (3) S.P.Savoy bundle 5. No.123. Wake to Secy. August 9/19

troops that were sent under the terms of the treaty.<sup>1)</sup> He could take some satisfaction from his work: it had been carried out in a short time; he might reflect that without his mediation the two parties would never have agreed; and some very solid fruits of his labours were passing before him. In this at least Carlo Emanuele's English diplomacy had paid a dividend.

That same jealousy for the welfare of the Protestant states and people that had dealings with Carlo Emanuele which Wake had shown in having Geneva included in the treaty, and which is, indeed, one of the most attractive things in all the relations between England and Savoy, was seen again the following year when the Protestants of Saluzzo were threatened, or were thought to be threatened, with oppression. When the news reached England, Wake was immediately ordered to interpose himself and restrain Carlo Emanuele from any rash course. He did so, though these Protestants were threatened with punishment for civil and not for religious offences, and became a pledge to <sup>the me</sup> ~~the me~~ for the good conduct of the other:

" They (the Saluzziani) do repayre unto mee dayly,

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 5. No.98. Wake to Secretary, July 20/30, 1617.

and I am their caution unto the Duke of Savoy for their modest carriage hereafter, as likewise I am their warrant and assurance from the Duke that he will not give way unto any proceeding against them, without my participation and approbation."(1) In the same way the credit of England with Savoy and Geneva was used to ameliorate the commercial relations between the two states. Genevan merchants had at one time enjoyed the privilege of free trade with Savoy (and the large proportion of the Genevan corn supply that came from Savoy made this privilege of value), but this privilege had been lost for some time. Wake's representations were sufficient to restore it;

"The Towne of Geneva hath employed an Agent hither of late, to procure an exemption of Taxes and Imposts for their merchants traficking in these parts. In vertue of antient privileages, which have in former times been granted by the Princes of Savoy unto that Towne, but not executed in these latter yeares, by reason of ill Intelligence, that hath passed betwixt this Duke, and them. He did bring letters unto me from his Masters, wherein they did very earnestly desire me to undertake their protection, and that as I had assured their Towne from danger by including it within the Treaty of Berne, so I would be a meanes to relieve them from the wrong which was done unto them by this unjust exacting those Impositions, contrary to their antient Immunities. I could not deny them my assistance in soe just a cause, and I have prevayld soe farre with the Duke of Savoy that the Agent is returned with as much satisfaction as he could have wished, having ob-

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No. 59. Wake to Secretary 3rd September, 1618.

teined new Patents for the Confirmation of those  
antient privileges."(1)

In the August of that same year Wake was able to remove from Geneva the burden of the fear that Carlo Emanuele was mediating another escalade. The rumour had been spread, apparently, by ill-wishers of the Duke in the hope that it might weaken the alliance between Savoy and Berne.(2) Wake took it upon himself to persuade the Genevans that Carlo Emanuele had no intention of assaulting their town.

"Messieurs,

Il y a quelques semaines que j'ay entendu par un sourd bruit, qu'on parloit sous main de quelque mauvais dessein projeté contre vostre ville, & qu'avez retenus prisonniers quelques uns suspects d'avoir machiné une trahison contre vostre estat. Vous croirez que d'abord ceste nouvelle m'estonna fort, puisque scavez le zele que j'ay tesmoigné d'avoir de vostre bien, & que ~~xxxx~~ occasions qui se sont presentées de vous faire service, je n'ay pas manqué de rendre mes actions conformes a la bonne volonté, que le Roy mon Maître vous port. Apres avoir bien pensé plusieurs jours sur le improbabilité de l'affaire (selon ce ~~que~~ qu'on me l'avoit figure) je commençois a croire, qu'on avoit envie de me donner un faulx alarme, & je mesprisois l'avis tant plus, par ce que de vostre part on ne me manda rien de cela. Mais ayant appris depuis que la Ville de Paris en est tout pleine, & qu'a Lyon & ailleurs on en parle au desavantage de S.A.S. de Savoye, sur ce subject j'ay pensé estre mon devoir de vous convier par ce petit de lettre, de me faire l'honneur que de me donner part de ce qui c'est passé, afin que ie puis employer le credit du Roy mon Maître avec S.A.S. pour vous en faire tirer raison de ceux qui seront trevez coupables.

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 5. No.278. Wake to Secretary,  
13/23 March, 1618.

Il vous plaira Messieurs me pardonner ceste hardiesse & de croire qu'en ceste affaire il y va beaucoup de ma reputation, & que je seray fort blasme, de n'avoir este le premier a vous en advertir, si par deca on avoit traite la moindre chose contre vostre estat, ayant charge expres d'esveiller pour vostre bien, ce que je n'ay manque de faire avec tout sort de fidelite, & diligence, comme il vous a pleu tesmoigner au Roy mon Maistre par vos lettres, de quoy ie vous suis fort obligé. Mais ie ne puis pas respondre pour les resveries de gens particuliers, s'il y en a tels, qui par vanite, ou malice, auront songes a tels chimeres, ou inventes semblables impostures, pour vous mettre en ialousie sans propos. Bien vous puis ie assurer avec verite que S.A.S. de Savoye, n'a jamais pense a cest affaire (comme estant trop contrarie a la generosite de son ame) & qu'elle desire de cultiver tout sort de bon voisinage avec vous aultres Messieurs & de s'en revancher de la bonne voiente que l'avez tesmoignez en ces occasions passes, & a Monseigneur le Prince, quand il fust en Savoye."(1)

The other matter that

Wake was to take in hand had been long brewing. It was the admission of Carlo Emanuele to the Protestant Union, or rather into the bloc of states formed by the alliances between England and the Union and the States and the Union. It had been long a project of Carlo Emanuele's. In the autumn of 1614 Scarnafigi had been charged to seek admission to this bloc for Savoy as a state whose policy was anti-Spanish(2), and again in 1615 he had received similar instructions.(3) The idea of bringing savoy into the bloc was not displeasing to James. He seems to have had in mind some <sup>great design</sup> of creating a group

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No.47. Wake to Geneva, August 1618

(2) Supra p.

(3) Supra p.

of friendly states including England, the States, the princes of the Union, the Protestant Cantons, Savoy and Venice, formed not for aggression but for defence against the encroachments of Spain, Occupying the inner lines and separating the northern from the southern Hapsburg lands this group would have a strong position strategically. There was no Sully to set down James' plan for him in sharp detail, but it is possible to judge from his actions that some such design lodged with him. One can take as proofs his many efforts to persuade the States that in helping Savoy they were defending their own interests, the work done by Carleton and Edmondes to incline Berne to an alliance with Savoy, work that culminated in the treaty negotiated by Wake, or Carleton's successful efforts to restore good relations between Venice and Savoy after the opening of the war of the Mantuan succession. With this good disposition in James to have Savoy and the Union allied the characteristic persistence of Carlo Emanuele could be relied on to achieve much.

In the spring of 1615, when James was spending so much activity for the security of Savoy, he wrote urgently and strongly to the Elector Palatine, urging him to consider the fate of Savoy was bound to that

of the Union, and recommending him to admit Carlo

Emanuele to the Union if he should ask to be admitted:

"Votre Union est fort interessee en cette cause (i.e. the protecting of Savoy): et comme vous en voz lettres avez remarque fort prudemment, si on laisse perir de cette facon un Prince, tel qu'est le Duc de Savoye, allie a tant de Princes, voyre un Prince de l'Empire, cest chose de mauvais exemple; et que pourront tous les aultres Princes, tant ~~de~~ d'Italie que de Germanie attendre que hodie mihi cras tibi. Mais vous autres Messieurs estez obliges tant plus, d'avoyr soing de ce pauvre Duc, a cause qu'il desyre d'entrer en traicte avec vous, et se rendre de vostre Union, lequel s'il recherche, a nostre advis, il merite d'estre receu. Cest tout ce que nous avons pour le present a respondre a voz lettres du ~~15me~~ 25me du passe. Vous estant protecteur de l'Union penserez s'il vous plaist au faict de Savoye, auquel tous Princes sont engages, qui ne s'appuyent entierement sur la grandeur d'Espagne."(1)

The letter was possibly inspired by the knowledge that a certain Goveani, who left Turin for Heidelberg on May 1st, was about to be sent to the Union from Savoy to seek help and a defensive alliance.(2)

It appears that this first mission of Goveani's was not very successful. The reply that he received was that the Elector Palatine did not think it now necessary (for, before he had finished treating, the news of the signing of the treaty of Asti had reached Germany) to assist Carlo Emanuele with troops, but that he would send 3,000 men if it should prove necessary.(3)

(1) S.P.Germany (81). Bundle 14. No. 52. James to Elector Palatine, 12th April, 1615. (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 3. No. 39. Carleton to Secretary, May 15/25. (3) C.S.P.Ven. Vol. XI. 11. No. 909. Zeno to Doge & Senate, July 7th.

Before the news of the failure of Goveani's mission had spread to England James sent to assure Carlo Emanuele that he had taken upon himself the task of securing the admission of Savoy to the League of England, the States and the Union, if Carlo Emanuele would approach the Union himself directly:

"Because the Duke doth soe instantly desire (which he houldeth to bee an honor and safty unto him) to bee received into the League which the Princes of the Union have contracted with his Ma.ty and the States of the United Provinces; his Ma.ty is graciously pleased to take upon his charge, and soe doeth authorize you to declare to the Duke, that he shalbe received into this union, upon the selfsame termes and conditions as his Ma.ty hath treated, with this caution, that the Duke sende his Commissioners or mynisters, authorized with full power to the Princes of the Union to treat and conclude with them."(1)

In England Scarnafigi was ~~supplied with~~<sup>promised</sup> a copy of the articles of alliance between James and the princes of the Union so that after seeing them Carlo Emanuele might decide whether he wished to ally himself with the league as a whole or with the individual members of it separately.(2) This readiness in England was met by a like readiness in Turin. Even after the signing of the treaty of Asti, when the immediate need of the alliance had disappeared, Carlo Emanuele was very insistent with Carleton that he do all in his

(1) S.P.Savoy. Bundle 3. No.61. Winwood to Carleton, May 23rd, 1615. (2) Supra p.

power to forward it(1), and in November he was pressing Wake to use his good offices with the king to the same end:

The Duke "hath further required mee to renewe his sute unto your Ma.tie for the incorporating him into the union of the Princes of Germany, the effecting whereof he seemeth very much to desire and expecteth with devotion to receive the articles of that confederation, which (he sayth) Sir Dudley Carleton, at his instance, writ for long since, and when he shall upon the sight of them understand the state of that buisines he will send Commissioners to Heidelberg, to conclude as much as shall belong unto him."(2)

It is obvious from that letter that the promise to supply scarnafigi with the terms of the alliance with the Union had not been fulfilled.

The greater menace that the new year brought to Savoy strengthened this resolve of the Duke's. With a clearer knowledge of the functions of the Union he prepared to send another minister to Heidelberg to negotiate an alliance, and sought the help of Wake's influence:

"The Duke of Savoye hath lately signified unto mee a purpose that he hath to send some person of quality to the Prince Palatine, to conclude his incorporation into the body of that Union, and the reason of his long deferring to proceede ~~therein~~ therein, hath been his misunderstanding that confederation, which some of his Counsell have made him beleve to have been contracted onely for the propagation of our Religion. But having since better understood, that it respecteth the conservation of the publique libertye, he seemeth resolute to enter therein and hath desired mee to signifye so much to the Prince

(1) Denmilne MSS. 33-1-13. No. 65. Carleton to King. June 29<sup>th</sup>  
 (2) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 4. No. 33. Wake to King. Nov. 17/24

Palatine, and to make way for the reception of a person whom he intendeth to employ thither very shortly."(1)

This eagerness in Turin was met by an equal willingness to help in London. Sir Henry Wotton, returning to his embassy in Venice in the spring of 1616, was directed to travel by way of Heidelberg where he laid before the Elector Palatine the English plan for an alliance between the Union and Savoy. He was successful in drawing from the Elector Palatine the promise that he would propose to the other members of the Union that an alliance be made with Savoy.(2) Passing from Heidelberg to Turin, where he arrived on May 14/24(3), Wotton, at an audience ~~with the Duke~~ two days later, plied the Duke with reasons for seeking an alliance with the Union, and received a favourable answer:

"Now, Touching oure owne precedent conferences They were spent aboute foure mayne poyntes.  
 1.The League of this Duke with the Protestant Union.  
 2.The League of the Venetians with the sayed Union.  
 3.The way(?) of a stricter coniunction betweene the Venetians and the Duke.  
 4.And lastly, The meanes how to open the passe of the Grisons which is surely of all the most important.  
 Of the three last whereof I must beseeche your Ma.tie to expect an accoumpt from Venice. For though they have been heere premasticated (as

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 4. No.108. Wake to Secy. March 9/19.  
 (2) Smith Life & Letters of Wotton cit. Vol.1 p.145.  
 (3) S.P.Savoy . Bundle 4. No.149. Wake to Secy. May 21/31.

I may terme it) yet that is the proper place for their digestion. Therefore now only concerning the Dukes collegation with the United Princes. I have disposed him unto it by your Maties counsayle and desire, by the qualitie of his owne person being a member and Prince of the Empire as the Count Palatine stiled him in his answer to me, by his owne conjunction in discent and blood with the Principal Almain Houses, by the hope that the Venetians will enter in with him: having newly made very good demonstrations towards that united bodie by their Ambassador Sig.r Vincenzo Gussoni who had been with the C. Palatine but foure or five dayes before me. And lastly I moved him by the Argument of Arguments his owne necessitie as farr as it might be manerly touched. Upon this he made two doubts. The one in substance, The other in forme, The substantiall was whether he might enter into it: the end of the Union being (as he thought) only for the mayntenance of the reformed religion. In this we rectified his misconception, showing him that the scope of the sayed Union was only for the publique tranquillitie and preservation of themselves by a collected strength from oppression, which did well appeare in this that betweene the Princes themselves and States united there was some difference in poynt of faythe: And while I was thus discoursing he was content to help me himself: alleaging the Swizzers his neighbours who though of contrarie or different religion were combined for the common interest both together and with other Princes. Hereupon he resolved to enter into Treatie aboute it. But then came in the formal doubt how it might be donn handsomely and safely. Wherein after some debatement we fell upon this. That the proper Center for this buisnesse would be your Maties Court, for these reasons following. First, for that it might there be handled with least noyse and most expedition: both the Duke and the Venetians having with your Matie continually Resident Ambassadors. Next, Because your Matie was Head of the sayed Union, and mediator of these farther conjunctions. And lastly, For that in the Count Palatines answer to me he referred himself concerning this mater to what had been formerly

signified unto youre Maiestie as the fountayne from whence it was to be fetched. To be short. The Duke resolved after these discourses to make very speedily two dispatches, The one, to his Ambassador Resident in youre Ma.ties Court with power and Instructions to Treat. The other a preparatorie message by an expresse Gentleman to the C. Palatine and the other Princes to intimat his desire, and to move them upon the foresayed reasons to appoynt some with sufficient power for this purpose in youre Ma.ties sayed Court.(1)

By the end of August Carlo Emanuele was moving more rapidly. Count Ernest Mansfeld was commissioned to raise 4,000 landsknechts and 500 horse in the lands of the princes of the Union for service in savoy. A certain Aurelio Biandra accompanied him to Heidelberg as precursor of de Monthou, who was to go there later as Savoyard ambassador. Biandra's commission was "to prepare those Princes to receave the Duke of Savoy into a fayre correspondence with them, and to begin to oblige him by succoring him in his present necessity, as he wil be ready to do the like for every one of them when they shal stand in the breach as he doth at this present." With that commission and Wake's commendation to the Elector Palatine Biandra set out, and, perhaps, if the princes of the Union had realised how soon they were to stand in the breach his reception might have been more cor-

(1) S.P.Venice. Bundle 21.No.98. Wotton to James, May 22/  
June 1st, 1616. (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 4. No.189.  
Wake to secretary, August 18/28.

dial. It appears that neither his mission nor that of de Monthou later was well received: there was no agreement to help Savoy among the members of the Union who were waiting to see how far England and the States would move before committing themselves.(1) In the April of the following year, when it was apparent that the two missions from Turin had failed, the Elector Palatine wrote to James explaining the difficulties of the Union and justifying the actions of himself and the other members:

"Sire,

Monsieur le Duc de Savoye ayant faict exposer a nostre Assemblée, par son Ambassadeur, l'estat de ses affaires, et requis non seulement d'estre receu en nostre Union, mais aussi assiste d'une notable somme de deniers, et d'un bon nombre de gens de guerre, J'ay represente a Messieurs les Princes et Estats Unis avec moy, ce que par cydevant il a pleu a Vostre Majeste m'escrire sur le subject de ladite reception en nostre Union. Lesquels recognoissants les sincereres intentions de V.M.te ont tesmoigne unanimement estre autant desireux d'y correspondre par toutes sortes de bons offices que tresaffectionnez au bien dudit Seigneur Duc, comme d'un Prince de tel merite. Mais parce que la forme de nostre dite Union a ses bornes certaines et prefixes qu'on ne peut bonnement outrepasser, et que les villes ont leur reserves particulieres, je m'asseure que V.M.te et ledit Seigneur Duc, qui en est desia informe, ne trouveront mauvais que par autres voyes nous entretenions une bonne intelligence et amitie avec luy telle que nous luy portons, et en suite de laquelle nous souhaiterions bien fort pouvoir par l'assistance qu'il

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XIV. No.753. Surian to Doge & senate, May 9th, 1617.

demande, contribuer aux moyens plus expediens pour le preserver d'oppression, et remettre en seurete: En quoy je rencontre pareillement beaucoup de difficulte, et principalement en ce que les affaires de l'Empire sont en un estat tres dangereux, et que les soudains mouvements advenus tant en France qu'en autres royaumes et pays circonvoisins nous convient (sic) et obligent a pourvoir a nostre propre interest et conservation: jointt aussi que quelques uns des principaux Electeurs et Princes Unis, la presence desquels eust este singulierement necessaire en une deliberation de si grande importance ne sont peu se trouver en nostre dite Assemblée a cause des empeschements qui leur sont survenus. Pour lesquelles considerations, on n'a peu pour ceste heure donner autre responce a ladite demande, que celle qui est contenue en la declaration faicte, tant en general pour tous les unis, qu'en particulier par nous autres les Electeurs et Princes."(1)

so far then the efforts of Carlo Emanuele and James to join Savoy in alliance with the princes of the Union had failed. But a beginning of negotiating had been made and contacts established that were to be of value to the Union and to Savoy in the troubled years that were to follow.

With the Governor of Milan's restoration of the great Savoyard fortress of Vercelli on June 15th 1618(2), it seemed that the long war of the Mantuan succession was finally ended. There were, indeed still a few problems left to be solved, particularly that of the order of dismissal of the troops on

(1) S.P.Germany (81). Bundle 15. No.30. April 23rd 1618.

(2) C.S.P.Ven. VOL.XV. No. 404.

either side, and on August 14th James wrote to <sup>inform the Duke</sup> ~~that he had~~ <sup>authorised</sup> Wake to go to Milan to try and smooth these difficulties out.(1) It was not necessary for Wake to go there. About the beginning of August the Duke of Fera had arrived in Milan and taken over the governorship, and his more pacific disposition brought the hope that peace would return to Savoy.(2) Convinced that he had now little to fear from Milan Carlo Emanuele began to disarm in good faith.(3)

The war had been a testing period for Anglo-Savoyard relations. There had been a certain amount of successful negotiating in little things but the formal tie that bound the two states together had been very much weakened by James' refusal to carry out his obligations under the treaty of Asti. After the war the direction of Savoyard diplomacy began to change. The change was not rapid, indeed, and Carlo Emanuele never lost contact with England altogether, but the disenchantment of the Mantuan war seems to mark the beginning of a less optimistic view of the potentialities of England and the Protestant bloc.

(1) Lett. di Giacomo VI & I. No. 26.  
 (2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No. 34. Wake to Secy. August 10/20.  
 (3) Ib. ~~xxxxxxx~~ No. 63. Same to ? Aug. 24/Sept. 3.

THE FINAL YEARS 1618--1625.

Events in Germany were largely to dominate Anglo-Savoyard relations for the rest of James' days, and the diplomatic exchanges of the two states were now often no more than scraps of by-play in the main drama. The importance of this German war had in the relations between the two states was increased by the decay of other things of common interest. The end of the Mantuan war had seen the threat of Spanish arms, which had been the chief cause of Carlo Emanuele's turning to seek English help, finally removed from Savoy. The marriage of the prince of Piedmont to Madame Chretienne, the second daughter of Henri IV(1), brought a good understanding between France and Savoy, an understanding that was to increase with the increase of power of Richelieu. The treaty of March 1618 between Savoy and Venice(2) strengthened the position of Savoy in Italy, particularly now that the German war removed from Venice the fear of a renewal of the Hapsburg attacks from the north. And the alliance of the three states in February 1622 to restore the Valtelline(3) left Carlo Emanuele free to take part in a concerted offensive. That aggression is a clear proof that a real need for English support no longer

(1) Guichenon Histoire genealogique cit. Tom.1 pp.828-829

(2) Traites publics de la maison de Savoie cit. Tom.1 pp.320-322.

(3) Ib. pp.324-330

existed. And when to this strengthened position of Savoy is added the vacillation and apathy of James' foreign policy towards the close of his life, and particularly in the opening of the German troubles when Carlo Emanuele seemed prepared to act decisively, it will be seen that the ties which had bound the two states were bound to be weakened. It is the object of this final section to follow the threads that remained.

The early attempts of Carlo Emanuele to enter into an alliance with the princes of the Union had not been his only relations with members of that body. Three years earlier, in 1615, Prince Sigismund of Brandenburg and Count Ernest of Mansfeld had come to Turin to suggest that when the k<sup>ing</sup>ship of the Romans fell vacant on the death of the Emperor Matthias, Carlo Emanuele might well be the candidate for election of the Union.(1) It was a notion to inflame Carlo Emanuele, and, if little trace of his hopes appeared in the activities of the next few years, the flame remained bright. It had driven him to seek so urgently admission to an alliance with the Union, and now, with the emperor growing old and the insurrection in Bohemia seeming to weaken irrecoverably the

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No.144. (Infra)

house of Hapsburg, it burned fiercer. To win the favour of the more solid of the members of the Union, and particularly of the Elector Palatine, he took advantage of the respite of arms in Italy to send some of his mercenaries north to assist the Bohemians. Count Ernest of Mansfeld who had been serving in Savoy with a force of German mercenaries(1) was sent north to serve the Elector Palatine, the troops being paid by Savoy:

"That your Majestie may further see the devotion that this Prince hath unto your service, and the desire wherewith he is inflamed to requite in part the obligation he doth owe unto your majestie for your royall protecting his person and howse, as sone as he understood that the affaires of Germany did beginne to be imbroyled and that some dangerous innovation was threatened in those partes, he did give me in charge to dispatch a currier expresly unto the Prince Pallatine and to make offer unto him of two thowsand men payed and defrayed under the conduct of the Count Ernest Mansfelt who hath expresse order from the Duke to serve the Prince Elector with his Regiment, wheresoever his Highness shall be pleased to employe him for the defence of the publique libertye.

It doth fall out very happily that these troupes are at this present within three dayes iorny of the Palatinate, as having marched out of the State of Berne shortly after the restitution of Vercelli with purpose to retire unto theyr howses after the 24 July by this account, at w.ch time theyr month did expire, and they were to receave their last paye. But uppon the newes of the troubles thretned in Germany the Duke of Savoy hath retayned these troupes for a longer

(1) supra. P. Y

time, and he hath anticipated theyr paye for the month of August, that they may be the more willing to serve whersoever the Prince Palatine shal thinke fitt to employ them."(1)

To avoid any possible reproach of renewing the war with Spain, however, Carlo Emanuele first made the troops over to Wake, and it was from Wake that the official order to serve the Elector Palatine came.(2) Later in the same year Christopher von Dohna was in Turin as envoy of the Union to seek further help for the Bohemians(3), and he did not seek it in vain. If Zeno's statement that he received the sum of twenty thousand ducats(4) is not correct, it is at least certain that he had cause to go away reasonably satisfied:

"After sundrie audiences given unto the Baron Dona he is at length dispatched with as much satisfaction as he could expect or desyre. For he hath carried with him a reasonable some of monie to paye the troupes which are entertayned in those parts and a promise that theyr paye shal be continued until such time as I maye go into England and send back unto this Duke a Gentleman of his, whome he hath appointed to go along with me. He hath further treated with the Venetian Amb.r very earnestlye to procure that state to concurre with him, and he is resolved very shortlye to dispatch the Count Carlo Scaglia, in the quallitie of Extraordinary Amb.r unto them with commission to incite those Sig.ri not to let passe the faire occasions that seeme to offer themselves unto them at this present."(5)

The effect of the two gestures had been to put something

(1) S.P. Savoy. Bundle 6. No. 1. Wake to James July 13/23, 1618  
Quoted in Gardiner Letters illustrating the relations between England and Germany cit. pp 4 & 5

(2) S.P. Savoy Bundle 7. No. 2 pp. (3) S.P. Ven. Vol. XV. No. 568.  
(4) ibid. No. 591. (5) S.P. Savoy Bundle 6. No. 131. Wake to Secy. 5 Nov.

on the credit side for Savoy with the Union.

To push still further his claims to the kingship of the Romans Carlo Emanuele resolved to enlist the support of James. He had, indeed, been watching the affairs of the Empire closely for some time, and had determined to obtain for Wake permission to return to England at once whenever the turn of events should make it seem profitable. On August 6th Wake wrote at the instance of the Duke to ask for this permission:

"I have further in charge from the Duke of Savoy, humbly in his name to request his Ma.tie, that he wilbe pleased to let me make a voyage into England to inform his Ma.tie of a business of importance which may not safely be committed to paper, and wherewith this Prince will not trust any minister of his owne. No man in this Court hath anie knowledge of this affaire but the Prince of Piedmont and Sig.r Crotti the principal Secretary and although Sig.r Gabaleone is shortly to transport himselfe into England yet this Duke wilnot by any meanes communicate the buisines unto any more persons then those who have already notice of it. If his Ma.tie will be pleased to gratifie the Duke of Savoy herein I would humbly desire your Honor to procure that my license may bee illimited and that it may be left free unto mee to go when I shal find that his Ma.ties service doth require it. For this buisines which the Duke of Savoy doth presse so much, and which is indeed of importance is not yet full ripe, and it is subject to many casualities, which may quite overthrowe it, and it may so fall out, that upon this instance of the Duke of SAVOY I may be commaunded to go for England in hast, when perhaps the occasion which doth nowe move the Duke to require it, may be quite ceased. For my owne part I shal always account it a singular happines, when

I may have the honor to kisse his Ma.ties hands uppon any occasion whatsoever, but I would be very sorry that his Ma.ties should expect some great matter of negotiation, when perhaps I shal bring nothing. In which regarde I hould it my duty to advertise your Honor of the casualties unto which this affaire is subiecte, though I must confesse, that perhapps it may be ripe shortly, and perhapps it likewise it may come to nothing."(1)

This permission was granted.(2) By the November of that year Carlo Emanuele had decided that the time was ripe for sending Wake back to England to lay before James a full account of the relations between Savoy and the Union and to seek his advice, if not his active help, for the future. Wake's instructions run:

"Memoire de ce que Sieur Isaac Wake Resident du Roy de la Grande Bretaigne aupres de S.A.S de Savoy, a de remonstrer a S.M. de part de S.A.

Au premier lieu il fera scavoira S.M. que ia trois ans et plus le Prince Sigismonde de Brandenburg et le Counte Ernest de Mansfelt, venants de Lion a Turin apres que la guerre d'Ast fust fini traict-erent avec S.A. de Savoy des affaires d'Allemagne, et lui prierent de vouloir entretenir une bonne et estroicte correspondance avec les Princes de l' Union, lesquels estoient fort disposes (selon le rapport de ces deux seigneurs) d'employer tout leur pouvoir pour faire eslire sadite Altesse Roy des Romains, en la premiere Dyette Electorale qui se convoqueroit. S.A. ayant entendu la proposition faite par les susdits seigneurs les prist de vouloir remercier a son nom les Princes d'Allemagne, qui avoient tesmoignes une si bonne volonte en son endroit, et de les asseurer que de son coste elle

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No. 10. Wake to Secretary, August 6th  
 (2) ib. No. 97. Same to same 21Sept./ 1 October.

ne manqueroit de bien correspondre avec eux. De ce que concernoit son particulier, elle ne fist semblant de vouloir rien entendre pour alors.

Trois ou quatre mois apres les dits seigneurs de Brandenburg et de Mansfelt, estans de retour en Allemagne, et aians traictes avec les Princes, des- pecherent vers S.A. un Sedanois qui se disoit Mons.r de la Voz, avec des lettres et d'Instructions, par lesquelles ils convierent sadite Altesse a vouloir declarer son intention, sur l'election de sa personne en Roy de Romains, luy promettant tout sort de bonne assurance de part des Princes de l'Union. Mais par ce que les affaires n'estoient point meurs en ce temps-la, S.A. ne vouloit s'engager, ains renvoya ledict le Voz avec des lettres de remerciement, sans aucune declaration.

Peu apres survint la guerre que le sieur Don Pedro de Toledo fist si mal apropos a S.A. la quelle dura deux ans et plus. En ce temps icy ~~XXXX~~ S.A. avoit bonne occasion d'en faire faire de ses amis, et ayant eu tres grandes assurances, par le Conte de Mansfelt, que s'elle vouloit rechercher les Princes de l'Union, elle les trouveroit entierement portes a luy secourir, elle se resolut de les convier a faire honneur a eux mesmes, et service au publique en luy envoyant quelque secours contre ennemi commun. Et pour les induire plus facilement a ce faire S.A. commanda a Mons.r le Conte de Mansfelt de faire dresser deux Regiments de deuz mille hommes pour chaque Regiment, et les transporter en Piedmont, avec esperance que les princes de l'Union voudroient payer les dits troupes selon l'intention que le Conte de Mansfelt l'avoit donne souvent fois.

De plus S.A. depescha le sieur de Monthou en qualite ~~de~~ d'Amb.r vers lesdits Princes, pour ce mesme effect, le quelle eust pour responce, que les Princes en feroient les mesmes, que feroient Messieurs les Estats ~~du Pais~~ Bas, mais ceste parole n'a pas este suivy des effects, par ce que du Pais bas on a eu quelque de secours, mais d'Allemagne rien du tout, et les deux Regiments du Conte de Mansfelt ont tousiours desmeurez sur le bras de sadite Altesse.

Non obstant tout cecy, quand la paix de l'Italie fust assuree par la restitution de Verceille, S.A. ayant entendu que Mons.r le Prince Palatin avoit a se resentir de quelque outrance fait par l'Evesque de Spires, et que les Bohemiens, qui confinent avec le Palatinat, estoient en mauvaise mesnage avec le Roy

Ferdinand tout aussy tost elle fist orrre audit Prince Palatin de deux mille hommes des troupes du Conte de Mansfelt pour en disposer ou mieux luy sembleroit, ou pour ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ son particulier ou pour la liberte et dignite publique.

Ce secours est venu si a propos pour Messieurs de Boheme qu'il les a garde de ne se perdre , et peult estre qu'ils auront a ceste heure le moyen de s'affranchiret eslire pour leur Roy qui mieux leur semble. Surquoy les Princes de l'Union ont despeches le Baron de Dona vers S.A. pour luy remercier de ce gran bien que l'Allemagne reconnoissoit de recevoir de sa main, et luy promettre tout ce qu'il pouroit attendre desdits Princes par voy de gratitude. De plus ils ont supplies S.A. de vouloir continuer le paye desdits troupes encor pour quelques mois, ce que S.A. les a accorde, et continuera a payer le dit Regiment iusques a ce que le sieur Wake ~~puix~~ puis aller en Angleterre et renvoyer un a Turin avec la responce de S.M.

Puis que donc les affaires de d'Allemagne sont a present en tel estat, qu'il semble chose assez facile de porter la Couronne de Boheme sur la teste du Prince Palatin, et par ce moyen gagner le principal suffrage pour l'election d'un Roy des Romains S.A. a iuge bonne de ne reietter tout a fait les propositions qui luy ont estes si souventes fois reiterees de la part des Princes d'Allemagne. Mais par ce que l' affaire y est de tres grande importance , et que malaisement on pourroit venir au bout d'un si grand designe sans avoir une appuye qui soit grande et assuree, elle n'a pas voulu s'engager sans qu' elle soit conviee a passer oultre par ceux qui ont le moyen de luy soustenir.

C'est pour quoy S.A. a prie le sieur Wake de faire le voyage d'Angleterre a present, pour remonstrer a S.M. tout ce qui s'est passe en cest affaire, et la supplier de vouloir departir a S.A. la faveur de son conseil et avis, par le quel S.A. desire de se gouverner. Si S.M. iuge l'affaire faisible S.A. de Savoy ne manquera pas d'employer sa parsonne pour la conservation de la liberte et dignite publique, mais sans que S.M. y met la main et se declare de la partie, il seroit trop hazardeuse de s'engager plus oultre.

Le tout estant remis a la prudente consideration de S.M. elle est suppliee tres instament, a vouloir declarer sa resolution au plus tost que luy sera

possible, puis qu'il y a desia cinq mois que les deux mille hommes sont payes pour S.A. et luy ont couste pres que 80m ducats."(1)

And, as if the king-  
ship of the Romans would not satisfie his vaulting spirit, was looking, too, to obtaining the crown of Bohemia, despite his statement about the ~~aspirations of that~~ ~~Electoral~~ Elector palatine's hopes of that Crown. On February 10th 1619 Gabaleone had arrived back in London as Savoyard ambassador.(2) Shortly afterwards, at an audience of the king, he turned to speak of the affairs of Bohemia and straightforwardly whether James intended to support the claims of the Elector Palatine to the throne of Bohemia. His reason for wishing this information he gave as this, that his master could withdraw his claims to that throne if they ran counter to the wishes of James.(3)

The death of the emperor Matthias on March 20th (4) quickened the tempo. Wake, now Sir Isaac Wake(5), was sent back to Turin with orders to travel by Heidelberg.(6) Of his work at Heidelberg

(1) S.P.Savoy. Bundie 6. No.144.  
(2) Lett. Mn. (Ingh.) Mazzo 3 Gabaleone to Carlo Emanuele February 15th.  
(3) Ib. Same to same, February 16th  
(4) Cambridge Modern History. Vol.1 Vp.25  
(5) He was knighted on April 9th. J.Nichols Progresses of James I. Vol.3 p.533  
(6) His letter of credence, dated April 10th, 1619 is in Lett. Giacomo VI & I No.28.

little trace has survived, but it is likely that he urged the Elector Palatine to caution. It is certain, at least, that the reply that he took back to Turin, whither he had returned at the beginning of June,(1), was not one of encouragement but of cooling advice:

"Att my first Audience with the Duke of Savoye after having presented unto him his Ma.ties letters, I did lett him knowe the Commission I had received from his Ma.tie to passe such offices for him with the Princes of Germany as the present coniuncture of affaires in those partes did permitt. I did further tell him, that the extraordinarie affection his Ma.tie did beare unto the person of his Highness and to all of his Howse had made him give a more willinge eare unto those overtures, then he had bene otherwise to doe to any newe proiecte. But because these Innovations did in his Ma.ties Iudgment seeme to threaten a greate deale of danger, he had given mee in charge earnestly in his name to desire his Highness to weighe in a iust and equall Ballance his owne strength, and the power of all his friendes, and seriously to consider whether all of them together had power sufficient to wrest 2 such Crownes out of the handes of the Princes of Austria whoe are and will infallibly bee supported with all the forces of Spaine. Above all I did most earnestly desire him to make sure worke in Fraunce, and not to thinke that any good could be done in this Buisnesse unlesse he could ioyne the French King to favoure the designe, assuring him, that when it should appeare unto his Ma.tie that there was not onely possibility, but some probabilitie alsoe in the designe, he would not bee wantinge to declare himselfe in ravoure of his Highness when he might doe it to some purpose."(2)

- (1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XV no.904. Padaro to Doge & Senate June 9th, 1619. (2) Add. MSS 18,641 ff.56,57  
 Wake to Buckingham June 5/15. quoted in Gardiner  
Letters illustrating etc cit. pp. 107 v lll

It was wise advice ~~advice~~ but perhaps not so necessary as James had imagined. Before Wake's return to Turin the Prince of Anhalt had been there as unofficial ambassador of the Union. He had drawn up a list of the things that the Union wished of Savoy, the Capitulations of Rivoli, and had induced Carlo Emanuele to agree to perform them.(1) The demands were these: that Carlo Emanuele would continue to pay Mansfeld's troops; that he, together with the Venetians, would lend one and a half million crowns to assist the Bohemians; that he would induce Louis XIII to intervene to put off the summoning of an Imperial diet until the question of Bohemia should be settled; that he would persuade Louis of the expediency of following the policy of Henri IV in Germany; that he would persuade him to use his efforts to prevent the Imperial title from remaining hereditary, and to induce ~~the~~ the Bishop of Triers to vote for Carlo Emanuele as a means of encompassing this; and, finally, that Carlo Emanuele would persuade Louis to help the Bohemians with men ~~and~~ <sup>OR</sup> money.(2) Perhaps these demands were too great, or perhaps reason had had time to grow during Wake's absence.

(1) R. Quazza La politica di Carlo Emanuele I durante la guerra dei trent'anni in Biblioteca della società storica subalpina Vol. 28 120. P. 11.

(2) Add. MSS 18,641 ff. 55 & 56.

Whatever the cause, Wake found Carlo Emanuele less fiercely set on intervening in Germany than he had been at his departure, and found him grown suspicious of the intentions of the princes of the Union, though still resolved to take a gambler's chance in the Imperial elections. ~~xxxxxx~~ (1). And while that chance remained Carlo Emanuele was to continue well disposed to the Union.

For the rest of the summer Wake was to act as much as the agent in Turin of the Union as to act as the agent of England. He was not helped in his work by the equivocal attitude of James towards Savoy, an attitude that was probably determined by the state of the Spanish marriage negotiations. The alliance which had been contracted between Savoy and Venice(2) had been recommended often enough in the past to both parties by James. Now that it was contracted he welcomed it coldly, or seemed to, and Wake was forced to explain the appearance of coldness by accusing Gabaleone of misrepresenting James:

"This Prince did at my first audience in a modest fashion seeme to wonder at the cold entertaynement his Ma.tie had given unto the newes, which (since my departure) Sig.r Gabaleon did carry him, of the league contracted betwixt the state of venice and this Duke and that his

(1) Add. MSS 18,641 ff.55,56.

(2) See text in Traites publics de la maison de Savoie cit. Tom. 1. Pp. 320-322.

Majestie being desired to declare himself chief of this Confederation, and to bring along with him the States of the United Provinces, and the Princes of the Union did seeme rather to dislike then to approve thereof; whereat this Duke did the more wonder, in that his Ma.tie had not only conselled and advised him thereunto very often, but (as he was pleased to say) commanded him to take that course, which he had now entered into in obedience to his Ma.ties commands. I am verily persuaded that Sig.r Gabaleon did either misunderstand his Ma.tie or willfully mistake him, and it is not the first time that he hath soe donne. (1)

That might have been accepted as an explanation in Turin if there had not been other incidents to show that James was now setting little store on the part that Savoy was playing in the group of anti-Hapsburg powers. The chief of these incidents was this. The troops that Mansfeld was leading in Bohemia were paid from the beginning by Carlo Emanuele. (2) Before Wake left for England it had been agreed that the Duke should continue paying ~~these~~ them until Wake brought back information about James' intentions. He had now returned and had brought no instructions about this.

"The Count of Mansfelt hath dispatched a Gentleman hither in dilligence to desyre of the Duke of Savoy 100 m. Crownes towards the reinforcing of his broken Regiment with newe recrewes, and the Duke of Savoy hath returned him back this answere that he had promised to continue that Regiment onely so long as I might conveniently go into

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6.No.158. Wake to Secy. June 5/15.  
 (2) Supra p.

England and returne back again to Turin, and that now he doth account himselfe free from that ingagement Considering that I have not moved him in his Majesties name to continue for any longer time the paye of those troupes. I must confesse I have purposely beene silent therein because I had no Commission from his Ma.tie to speake to that purpose, and finding that the Duke of Savoy hath already spent upon those troupes 200 m. Crownes since I first sent them to the Prince Palatine, and that in Germany they have not hitherto requited this singular benefitt with any eminent demonstration of Gratitude I dare not presume without warrant from my Master to passe anie such office in favor of third persons."(1)

Yet in spite of this uncertainty about James' intentions Wake's first efforts to help the Elector Palatine were well met. On June 20/30 Frederick wrote to Wake asking him to press the Duke to try to have the German cavalry in Venetian service transferred to the Union.(2) Wake found no difficulty in persuading the Duke to intervene with the Venetian ambassador.

"I must confesse I was not to trouble my selfe much in perswading the Duke of Savoy to imbrace this motion for I did find him most ambitiously ready to lay hold of any occasion wherein he might gratifie the Prince Palatine, and those other Princes of the Union, and that I might be a witness of the reality of his proceedings he did send for the Venetian ~~ambassador~~ Amb.r and mee together to audience, and after having acquainted the Amb.r with the state of the buisines in my presence, he did earnestly desyre him to represent unto his Masters the interest they had in the conservation of the publique liberty, the advantage

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. NO.183. Wake to Secy. June 9th (O.S.)  
 (2) Ib. No. 175

that would redound unto their state by fomenting a warre on the other side the mountaines against their professed enemye, and keeping the fyer farre from theyr owne howses, the meanes those Princes had to requite such a kindnes, when any occasion should bee presented unto them, the improbability that there was of being troubled with any innovation in Lombardy, considering the modest disposition of the Duke of Feria and the small forces that remaine on foot in the State of Milan, the best part of which residue the Spaniards do pretend likewise to transport elsewhere.

After the allegation of which reasons he did interpose his particuler earnest request to have the Princes gratified for his sake, and did not onely offer to put the obligation of this favor to his owne account, but to oblige himselfe for the security of the Venetians during the absence of these troupes, and to furnish them within the space of 25 dayes, with as much and as good Cavalarie, if any occasion should require."<sup>(1)</sup>

Venice would not permit the troops to leave her service, to Wake's annoyance<sup>(2)</sup>, but his active intervention had shown the continued<sub>^</sub> of Carlo Emanuele to the Union.

A little later came another opportunity for him to prove it. In July Feria from Milan wrote to request permission for 2,500 men to pass through Savoy on their way from Milan to the Low Countries. The request put Carlo Emanuel in a difficulty: he was bound by express conventions to allow these men to pass, but the knowledge that they would be a standing threat to the Princes of the Union made him reluctant. He, therefore comprised<sup>on</sup>, assuring Feria of his readiness to let

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No.195. Wake to secy. July 12/168

them pass but seeking details of numbers, time of departure and the like to give himself time to warn the Union of their coming. And he was the more inclined to this policy that he did not believe there was any intention of sending the troops out of Italy, and that the proposals were a ruse; for if he refused permission the Spanish would have occasion of dispute with him, and if he granted <sup>it</sup> they could calumniate him to the Union. At the same time he declared to Wake his readiness to close the Alpine passes to these troops if the Union and the States would provide him with the means. Wake, acting still as the agent of the Union, hastened to write to Heidelberg to give warning of the ~~approach~~ intention of Feria and to find out how far the princes would help Savoy if he closed the passes. (1) Wake's action was commended by the Secretary, Naunton, and he was authorised to perform the like again if the need should arise:

"Sir,

His Majesty allows very well of that which you advertise that you have donne with that Duke and with the Venetian Ambassador at the Prince palatines request, and leaves it to your own discretion to do good offices in the like cases when you cannot speedily receive particuler direction & warrant, so as you use not his Majesties name without commission, which I dare undertake for you you will not do. So with my affectionat commendations I commit you to God etc"

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No.195. (2) Ib. No.226. 27th August

But if Wake had found a readiness to help the Union in these two things in Carlo Emanuele the turn of events was soon to alter his disposition.

On August 16th Frederick was elected king of Bohemia, and two days later Ferdinand was elected Emperor.(1) The shock to Carlo Emanuele was the greater that he found that even those members of the Imperial diet from whom he might have expected some backing had not supported his claims. Wake recorded his surprise:

"I may not conceale from his Majesties knowledge that the Duke of Savoy doth take it somewhat unkindly that in the election at Franckfort the Ambassadors of the Prince Palatin and M. Brandenburg did propose the King of Denmark in the first place, the Duke of Saxe in the second, the Archduke Ferdinand in the third, the Archduke Albert in the fourth, the Duke of Savoy in the fifth and the Duke of Baviere in the sixt, and that they did insist wholly upon this last without making any instance for the Duke of Savoy which is somewhat different from the hopes that had by them been given at severall times, and not so much as the Duke of Savoy doth pretend to have deserved at their hands."(2)

The effects of the election in Turin were soon apparent. On September 18th the new king of Bohemia wrote again to Wake to request him to use his good offices with Carlo Emanuele to obtain assistance from him:

(1) Gardiner History cit. Vol.3. P.309  
(2) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No.251 Wake to Secy. 20/30 Sept.

"Mons.r

C'est sous la confiance et certitude que je prens de vostre sincere affection envers moy, et tout ce que regarde le bien de ceste maison, que je vous fay ce mot en particulier pour vous dire, que les Estats de Boheme m'ayants par la pluralite de voix defere a la Couronne, J'ay envoye envers le Roy de la Grande Bretaigne, pour entendre son prudent advis touchant la resolution que je doy prendre; et pource que l'entretienement de l'amitie et bonne volonte que Mons.r le Duc de Savoy a jusques icy tesmoigne envers les dits Estats pour l'interest commun y est autant utile que necessaire, je vous prieray tresaffectueusement de contribuer vos bons offices envers iceluy, et le disposer de plus en plus a y continuer: singulierement a ce qu'il luy plaise ne desister de sa liberalite a l'entretienement des troupes du Conte de Mansfelt, ains de la continuer encores, conjointement avec la bonne intelligence qui est entre nous, et a laquelle je correspondray de mon coste tres-sincerement, ainsi que je l'en assure par les lettres que je luy escri. Vous m'obligerez de mesme de tenir la bonne main a ce que par l'entremise du dit Seigneur Duc et la vostre la Seigneurie di Venise puisse estre conviee et disposee a assister lesdits Estates d'une bonne somme de deniers pour ayder a supporter les fraiz de la guerre, comme aussy a ce que ledit Seigneur Duc veuille par le moyen de Monsieur le Prince de Piedmont son fils rechercher et induire le Roy tres-chrestien a embrasser et favoriser ce bon parti, en consideration de l'interest commun."(1)

Part of this request Wake complied with, though reluctantly, holding it an indignity to seek further favours for men who had shown so little gratitude for those shown them formerly, and he would not move the Duke to continue the payment of Mansfeld's troops.(2) In this

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No.249. Elector Palatine to Wake September 18th. (2) Ib. No.289. Wake to Secy. 18/26 Nov.

reluctance to make further representations for the Elector Palatine Wake was acting unconsciously (for he does not seem to have received instructions) in full accordance with the views of the home government. In the October of 1619 James was writing to the Elector Palatine to inform him of his inability to assist him with diplomatic offices until it had been made plain to the world that he himself had had no part in influencing the election of the Palatine to the kingship of Bohemia

"Monsieur mon tres cher fils

Nous avons receu les lettres que nous avez escrites le 16 du passe, par lesquelles vous nous requerez en premier lieu de vouloir interceder envers l'estat de Venise pour les induire a assister ceux de Boheme de la somme de 200000 ducats pour ceste guerre; et puis de vouloir aussy exhorter le Duc de Savoye par nos lettres a continuer ses bons offices en vostre endroit. Lesquelles instances de votre part ont este secondees par les lettres que le Vicomte de Doncaster notre Ambassadeur nous a aussy escrites a votre requisition a mesme fin, par lesquelles il nous requiert de plus en votre nom de vouloir induire les Venetiens & le Duc de Savoye a vous conceder le titre de Roy; & que s'ils laissent passer aucunes troupes de gens de guerre par ~~leur~~ leur pais, de vous en vouloir au preailable donner advis & a vos alliez. Sur quoy ce que nous avons a vous dire est, premiere-ment pour ce qui touche le fait de nostre intercession envers ceux de Venise, que nous ne pouvons pas sortir des termes, ny forcer les raisons que nous vous avons declarees par le Baron de Dona, qui sont que jusqu'a ce que nous ayons purge le point de notre honneur & de notre integrite envers le monde, en nous justifiant de n'avoir eu aucune part ny cognoissance du procedes des Bohemiens au fait de votre assumption a la

Couronne de leur Roy.me nous ne pouvons aucu-  
 ment nous porter a fere une telle proposition  
 Comme vous desirez; car de professer publiquement  
 une chose, & par soubz main de nous en dementir  
 seroit action trop contraire & prejudiciable a  
 notre honneur, etc. (1)

That definite refusal of the king's to use his in-  
 fluence in Italy for Frederick implied that, for the  
 time at least, Wake could not represent both England  
 and the Union at Turin, and that the main means of  
 communication between Savoy and the Union had ceased  
 to function.

There is little point in tracing the relations  
 between Savoy and the Union further. They have an  
 increasingly smaller part in Anglo-Savoyard relations  
 after 1619. James seems, indeed, to have withdrawn  
 from his too nice scruples about intervening diplomat-  
 ically for Frederick, and Wake, now grown unwilling,  
 continued to act as unofficial agent for the Elector,  
 making the customary requests to Carlo Emanuele for  
 men or money or the blocking of the passes to the  
 Spanish troops, requests that were bound to be refused.  
 Thus in the September of the following year a request  
 for a loan was politely evaded:

"I have passed this weeke an office with the Duke  
 of Savoy (in virtue of a Commission sent unto me

(1) Add. MSS 12,485 f.38. James to Elector Palatine,  
 October 1619.

from the King of Bohemia) for an imprest of 100 m. crownes, whereof one halfe was desyred to bee received at this feast of St. Michael, and the other at Christmas or Easter following, uppon good caution which the sayde King of Bohemia doth offer of his owne and of the States of that kingdom, either for the repayement of the monny when the warre shall bee ended, or the furnishing this Duke (when his occasions shal require it) with such companies of horse or foot, as shall bee equivalent to the monny demanded. This motion hath been neither accorded, nor yet refused by the Duke of Savoy. For although it be hard for him (considering the vast expences that he hath made since the coming of Madame into this Countrye) to put together the halfe of the summe required in so fewe days, yet did he professe to bee so partially affected unto the prosperity of the Affaires of that king, that he would force himselfe to the uttermost of his power to gratifie him as soone as conveniently he might. But because the troubles in the Val-Tellina did threaten a storme to arise in Italye, and that he was now in Treaty with the Venetians, and the Mareschal d'Edisquieres to procure the infranchising of the Grisons, he did doubt that he should be forced to take Armes for the defence of the Libertye of Italye, and in that case he did assure himselfe that so great an advantage would redound unto the service of the king of Bohemia, that he would be content to surcease this demand, and thinke the monny of this Prince better spent in making a diversion in Italye then in continuing the warre in Germanye."(1)

The manner of the refusal was polite, but it was a plain refusal; and it is a matter for speculation how much the mildness of the form in this, as in many other refusals, was due to the good opinion that Carlo Emanuele had of Wake, whom long-acquaintance and his own painstaking nature had commended. That refusal did not end the pleas that came from the north. One last despairing

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 7. No.194. Wake to Secy. 20/30  
September 1620

petition may be mentioned, for the treatment that it received both from Wake and from Carlo Emanuele proves that Anglo-Savoyard cooperation to help the Elector Palatine was definitely ended. A letter of Wake's describes the petition and the answer it received:

"The Agent of England hath received this last weeke a letter from the Pr. Palatine addressed unto the D. of Savoye and earnestly recommended unto S.r Isaac Wake to be by him delivered unto the D. of Savoye and seconded with his best offices for the procuring a favorable answer. It did containe an ample relation of the present state of his affaires, an exaggeration of the violence wherewith the Emperor and howse of Austria did continue to persecute him, a remonstrance of the interest that all Princes, and free states had in his preservation, and the danger that the Losse of his States would drawe upon manie of them especially upon the D. of Savoye and the Venetians, his resolution to goe shortly into the feilde and to advenyer his life for the defence of the publique libertye. The assurance he had of being protected by his Majestie with whose powerfull assistance, he did hope to repayer the ruines of his decayed fortune, The confidence that he had in the love that the D. of Savoy had formerly professed unto him which did make him believe that in his present necessitie he would not abandon him, and because he had understood that the Duke of Savoye had rayseed forces of good consideration, he did conclude with an earnest request to bee assisted with so manie troupes of foote and horse as might conveniently bee spared.

This letter the Agent of England did present unto the D. of Savoye upon the 8th of this month st. o n. o but he did forbear to second it with anie one syllable as not having order from his Majesty to that purpose. The Duke of Savoye did read that letter twice in the presence of Sir Isaac Wake and after having

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considered a little upon it, he sayde, that he must be forced to intreate Sir Isaac Wake to receive a verball answere from him, because he had never written unto the Pr. ~~Palatine~~ Palatine since his being King of Bohemia and did not thinck it fitt to beginne now, when it was doubtful whether he would retayne that title beeing desired by his Majestie to relinquishit. He did further desire that his answere might be written in cifre, because the present times were very dangerous, and it might much prejudice his Affaires if anie declaration of his good affection to the Pr. palatine shoud come to the notice of the Emperour. The substance of the answere which the Duke of Savoie did by word of mouth deliver unto Sir Isaac Wake was this -

That he did account himselfe beholding unto the Pr. Palatine for the free communication he had made unto him, of the particular state of his present affaires. That he should never be deceived in the opinion he had conceived of the good will of the D. of Savoie upon whose constant affection no variety of fortune should ever make anie alteration. That as he had a very sensible, and compassionate feeling of his present adversitie, so he did much comfort himselfe with an assured hope that those cloudes which had of late eclipsed the prosperitie of the Prince Palatine would shortly be dispelled by the sunshine of that protection which was promised unto him by his Majesty. That he did well know and see cleerly, that the losse of the two palatinates would drawe by consequence the losse of the best part of Germany and that the Duke of Savoie and the Venetians should shortly after be made to drinck of the same cup. That if it were in his power to contribute anything to the assistance of the Prince Palatine he would not be wanting to let him see by effects that he was his true and faithful friend, but that really he had not at this present any such great forces as the Prince Palatine did imagine, his ordinary Garrisons at Asti and Vercelli beeing very much decayed, and the Regiment of Lorrains which he thought fit to rayse not long since, and are entertayned in Chablois and Faucigny beeing of small consideration to send forth, and necessary

for the defence of Savoie, from whence he cannot remove them until he see what the Fr. King will resolve to do with those of the religion because he doth much doubt that there is some mischeife intended unto Mons.r des Diguieres."(1)

With that refusal Wake's work as mediator for the Elector and the Union in Turin may be considered at an end. Neither a regard for his own interests nor his relations with England had permitted Carlo Emanuele to intervene in the German war after the first hopes of its promises had waned, and the confused state of James' own mind about the dispute had prevented him from putting any effective pressure on Carlo Emanuele to make him intervene.

Gabaleone had arrived in London on February 10th (2), to remain there for two years and more as Savoyard ambassador. His work can be divided into four main sections: the improvement of the relations between England and France; an attempt to renew the Anglo-Savoyard marriage negotiations; the defence of his master against the charge of persecuting the Protestants of Saluzzo; and the negotiations about the Valtelline. Of these the last two were to be the most important things in Anglo-Savoyard relations for the rest of the life of James.

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 9. No.85. Wake to Secy. April 1622. Words underlined in cipher. (2) Supra p.

The relations between England and France had been strained, over petty incidents, since the beginning of 1618. Desmaretz, the French ambassador in England took offence because he had not been invited to a masque of the prince's. He was supported in Paris and recalled. His secretary got into deep waters through his association with Raleigh, and was *also* recalled. Mayerne, the king's physician, was deported from France. Beecher, the English resident in France, was refused audience and recalled. There is no point in tracing the causes of the dispute further.(1) It is sufficient to note that by the end of 1618 the relations between the two countries were very bad. It was a source of some concern to Carlo Emanuele who was in the midst of his negotiations for the marriage of the Prince of Piedmont to Madame Chretienne, and one of Gabaleone's duties was to incline James to meet French advances to reconciliation half-way, the complementary work in France being done by the Savoyard ministers there to negotiate the marriage.

At his first audience on February 12th Gabaleone acquainted the king with his master's desire that the two states should be reconciled, and was met

(1) An account of the dispute will be found in C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XV. Pp xxxvi - xxxvii.

by a long account of the causes and incidents of the quarrel, an account that ended, however, in a promise to try to ameliorate the relations between England and France, and in a demand for advice. Gabaleone could counsel the king to send an ambassador to France and could tell him that the French government were awaiting his decision to do so before sending an ambassador to England.(1) These representations were effective. On April 10th Contarini, the Venetian ambassador in France noted that the Marquis of Tresnel had been appointed ambassador to England (2), and by May 22nd Sir Edward Herbert had left England to go as ambassador to France.(3) The first part of Gabaleone's mission had succeeded.

The second part was to fail, as, indeed, Carlo Emanuele must have expected, for James was too deeply involved in the Spanish marriage negotiations to have an ear for other proposals. And, besides, Winwood, the Secretary, who had been well-disposed to Savoy during his life, had vacated the Secretaryship with his life some eighteen months earlier. Of his death and its effects upon the affairs of Savoy in London Biondi had well written,

(1) Lett. Min.(Ingh.) Mazzo 3. Gabaleone to Carlo Eman. February 15th, 1619. (2) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XV. No.830

(3) C.S.P.Dom. Vol. 1619-1623 P.46

"This blow is mortal for me, not only in my personal affairs at this court (in which I can say that I have had no other protector in all these years) but in those things that concern the service of your Highness. He has left a memory of himself as the most incorrupt Englishman of the court."(1) Of the people that remained some few might be thought well-affected to Savoy, and Gabaleone could cultivate them - the Countess of Bedford, the Duke of Lennox, the Earl of Pembroke, Edmondes and even Buckingham, but he could find none that were devoted solely to Savoy.(2) The support that he could reckon on at the English court was less than at any former time when Savoyard marriage proposals were afloat in England.

Early in April Gabaleone was writing about opinion in England about the marriage of the Prince, opinion that was probably expressed more clearly when the king's illness in the early part of 1619 seemed likely to be fatal.(3)

"This illness gives the Council occasion to think of what is necessary for the maintenance of the state, seeing that the line of succession to the throne is represented by one prince, and makes the Council wish to see the prince married as soon as possible to a princess fit to bear children. The English people generally would prefer that, if a princess

- (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 2. Biondi to Carlo Eman.  
12th Nov. 1617. Translated. (2) Ib. Mazzo 3 passim  
 (3) Gardiner History cit. Vol.3. ~~px293~~ P. 295

of his own faith and of a rank worthy of him could be found, he should marry her rather than any Catholic princess. The Catholics and the partisans of Spain would prefer him to marry an Infanta of Spain, the former for their own protection, the latter for the profit they could hope to draw from such a match. The incorrupt English, if a princess of his own faith cannot be found and the prince of Wales is forced to marry a Catholic princess, would prefer that he should marry rather an Infanta of Savoy than an Infanta of Spain, both because the Savoyard would be likelier to bear children quickly, and because your Highness has no other interest nor design in England than to see to its safety and unity. The king knows all this and approves, but the need of money and the hope of having a large dowery from Spain make him irresolute."(1)

That account of opinion in England may be thought biased by Gabaleone's desire to put the best complexion on his own work, but it is confirmed by an English letter written almost certainly about this time:

"Their is at this tyme great dealling from all hands to have the Prince in match. . . . Savoye wold have him, and Florence, bothe of them; but as their is noe resolutione soe I doe think that if Savoye be abill to performe quhat he promises ne shalbe our man; first to let theis tuo Kings know that if thaye did neglect us thaye must see that wee will neglect them(2); nyxt, he is the best of eurye Duke bothe of antietye and allyence in tyme past; and the last is, she is a woman alreddye and the tuo Kings dochtters are bothe of them verrye young."(3)

The reports that Gabaleone sent to Turin must have inclined Carlo Emanuele to the belief that he might have a possibility of success

(1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) MAZZO 3. Gabaleone to Carlo Eman. April 5th. 1619 Jabon (2) France and Spain had been referred to earlier. (3) H.M.C. Mar & Kellie Vol.2 (1930) p.92. Fenton to Mar 1618 or 1619

if he renewed his marriage negotiations with England, though Pesaro, the Venetian ambassador in Turin, found him indifferent and pessimistic about them.(1) On March 2nd Queen Anne had died and the occasion of sending an extraordinary ambassador from Savoy to condole with the king on his loss was made an occasion for renewing the marriage proposals. The person chosen as extraordinary ambassador was Guido Villa, Marchese di Cigliano, the son of that Francesco Villa who had earlier been Savoyard ambassador to London.(2) He arrived in England on October 7th(3) and had his first audience four days later.(4) His letter of instruction has not survived, so far as I can discover, but Wake gave a summary of it that is probably accurate enough:

"His principall charge is to performe the ceremony of condolence for the death of the Queen, who is gone to heaven and he hath order likewise to render unto his Majestie all possible thanks for the honor he hath been pleased to do unto the Duke of Savoy in passing over for his sake, and in his contemplation, the impertinency of those French Ministers, whose indiscreet behaviour had given iust occasion unto his Ma.tie of offence.

He will likewise humbly desyre his Ma.tie to strengthen the confederation which the Duke of Savoy hath contracted with the State of Venice, by his declaring himselfe

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XV. No.895. (2) Nichols Progresses of James I vol.3. Pp568. (3) Lett. Min. (Engl.) Mazzo 3. Gabaleone to Carlo Emanuele October, 7th 1619  
 (4) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XVI No. 45. marioni to Doge & Senate, October 11th.

head and chiefe of that Allyance and bringing the States of the united Provinces and the Princes of the union along with him, and perhaps he will likewise be a suitor unto his Majestie that in case the Treaty of Marriage with Spaine should encounter such difficulties as could not be overcome his majestie would be pleased to thinke upon a daughter of this Duke. I am not sure whither the Marquis will adventure to passe this last office, because it is left to his discretion, with reference unto such information as he shal have there of the proceeding of the former Treaty, which if he shal find to be in a fayre waye of concluding, then to say nothing, but to suppress this part of his Commission by passing it over in sylence."(1)

Whether or not Villa put forward the proposal is not clear. If he did make it the answer he received cannot have been satisfactory, for after he left England, on October 17th,(2), no more is heard of it.

It seems, indeed, as if the protection of the Protestants of Italy and Switzerland which James had undertaken had again some part, as it had earlier(3), in determining the failure of these Anglo-Savoyard negotiations, though, naturally, a subsidiary part. And certainly the complaints of these protestants were to make Gabaleone's residence in England unpleasant at times. The trouble began in Saluzzo where, in addition to a long-established Protestantism, the memory of former independance of Savoyard rule would not yet be dead. In July the first stirrings came when Diodati, a Genevan

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6. No.228. Wake to Secy. Aug.28th 1619

(2) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) mazzo 3. Gabal. to Carlo Emanuele

October 25th. (3) Supra p.

minister then in London, was instructed to represent to the king the need that the Protestants of Saluzzo had of freedom of worship. On July 19th Gabrieleone wrote to his master:

"The heretics of the Marquisate of Saluzzo seem to have written to commend themselves to the town of Geneva in order that the Genevans might make representations to the king of England through a minister of theirs who is here called Diodati about granting the right to their own faith to the Saluzziani. Diodati has had recourse to the Archbishop of Spalatro(1) as the most zealous for the reformed faith, and between them they have drawn up a petition to be presented to your Highness by the English agent, a summary of which is enclosed with this letter. The archbishop has written a letter to the confraternity of heretics of the Marquisate of which too I enclose a copy."(2)

It appears that James listened favourably to the representations of Diodati and de Dominis, for attached to that letter was a summary of the petition with a note that Wake was to present it, not as coming from the two Protestants but in the king's name. The terms were simple: Carlo Emanuele should give his faithful Protestants freedom of worship in their valleys, or should give them leave to go and serve God where they would.

Later in the year a fresh rumour spread to London, that Carlo Emanuele was planning to

(1) Marc'Antonio de Dominis. A Catholic renegade who arrived in England at the end of 1616. C.S.P.Dom. Vol.1611-1618. P.414. See accounts of in e.g. D.N.B. or Nouvelle biographie generale. (2) Lett. Min. (Ingh.)

*Manns-3. Translated.*

purge his lands of all heretics. Two men of Saluzzo who had been killed, Monge and Marchisi, (though Wake was later to write that their deaths were merited(1) ) were acclaimed as protestant martyrs and a subscription was begun for their heirs.(2) Of the reaction in England Gabaleone wrote:

the "At the news of the edict which your Highness has published, that within one year all the heretics of your state must leave, men here have grown very excited. There have recently come from Geneva letters written by a minister called Diodati to the Calandrini and Burlamachi telling how your Highness has had put to death two heretics who have died as martyrs for the religion. The news of the letters is flying through the city with the exaggeration that in Piedmont men of the protestant faith are being butchered. As a result ~~this~~ people are very displeased, especially now that there is a rumour that your Highness has been declared General of the catholic army (Generale dell'armata catholica)."(3)

And the ill-will of the people was not diminished by the Spanish ~~ambassadors~~ agents' spreading the story far and near as an example of Carlo Emanuele's resolute Catholicism. It disturbed Gabaleone and he was not finally at ease till Buckingham informed him of the king's attitude to the matter:

"Monsieur,

Sa Majeste s'~~apprenant~~ appercoit que estant avec luy a Londres vous aviez ~~l'esprit~~ l'esprit un peu trouble de peur qu'on n'entrast en apprehension, sur le discours qui courroit de quel-

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 7.No.39. Wake to Secy. 8/18 March 1620  
 (2) C.S.P.ven. Vol.XVI No.250. (3) Lett. Min. (Ingh.)  
 Mazzo 3. Gabaleone to Carlo Emanuele Decemb er 27th.

ques uns de nostre Religion mis a mort au pais de son Altesse. Mais sa majeste ayant tant d'experience de la douceur & moderation de son Altesse envers eux ne s'en doubta nullement, et n'estima ce discours qu'un Libelle mal fonde & l'avorton de quelque esprit leger. Depuis sa venue icy elle a receu avis de Mons.r Wake son Agent aupres de son Altesse, comment le tout s'est passe, & que c'estoyent deux meschants garnements, faisant bien profession de nostre Religion, qui avoyent este condamner par la iustice a mort pour leurs crimes. Ce qui fera prendre l'occasion a sa Ma.te d'en esclaireir le monde en semant par tout, en tant que se pourra faire, cest advertissement de la verite du fait, comme ce jourdhuy mesme elle la publie en plein assemblee de sa Cour. Dequoy Je me suis haste de vous faire part, afin de vous oster au plustost toute fascherie en cest endroit etc.\*(1)

The letter of Wake's to which Buckingham had referred had been unusually sharp and likely to impress upon the king the emptiness of the rumours about persecution in Savoy, for he protested that it would be the last time that he would make representations to the Duke in favour of these Protestants who were being stirred to open revolt by the Genevans.(2) Even there, however, the trouble did not end. The Genevans had sent into England copies of the letter written from Saluzzo to Diodati containing an account of the death of the two men and an attack on Carlo Emanuele, and <sup>this</sup> ~~these~~ letter had been translated, printed and circulated through London. Gabaleone had again to have recourse

(1) Lett. min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 3. Jan. 25 / Feb. 4th 1620.

(2) Add. MSS 18,641 F.132.

to Buckingham, from whom he received a satisfactory reply:  
"Mons.r

Avant que vos lettres venissent a mes mains  
J'avois oui S.M. donner ordre pour la severe punition  
de ceux qui avoyent ainsy public ceste lettre en  
Anglois que vous m'avez envoye: s'estant extremement  
fasche qu'une telle faussete s'imprimast icy dont  
elle avoit eu avis contraire de Son Agent par de la,  
lequel encor depuis l'a confirme en mesme sens par  
autre lettre, et dit de plus que les subiects de S.A.  
au Marquisat de Salusses desadvouent ladite lettre  
qu'en a fait imprimer."(1)

The letter was burnt publicly, probably on March 4th 1620.(2)

Yet, though every satisfaction was given to  
Gabaleone in England, th<sup>e</sup> king's interest in the fate of  
the Saluzziani did not weaken. On June 11/21 1620 Wake  
wrote to acknowledge fresh orders to help them as much as  
he could and as much as their occasions required.(3)

This care for the Protestants was not limited  
to those under Savoyard rule. The English interest in  
protecting Geneva from even the suspicion of encroachment  
by Savey was still alive. In the spring of 1621, when it  
seemed likely that there would be a shortage, the export  
of grain

- (1) Lett. Min. (Ingh.) Mazzo 3. Undated.  
(2) Ib. Gabaleone to Carlo Emanuele March 7th 1620  
(3) Add. MSS 18642 f.4

from Savoy was prohibited by decree. The chief sufferers were the Genevans; and they feared, besides, that the prohibition was a means of putting pressure on them for political ends. Wake was asked to use his good offices for them with the Duke, and he succeeded in drawing from him the promise that Geneva would have the first claim on any spare grain.(1) Apparently it was found possible to allow grain to be exported, for in the December of that year James was writing to thank Carlo Emanuele for granting the Genevans permission to export it, and to request him to continue this freedom of export to them:

"Monsieur mon Cousin,

Estans advertis par nostre Agent resident pres de vous, comme a sa requisition faite en nostre nom il vous auroit plu permettre le transport du bled de vostre pais de Savoye en la Ville de Geneva, nous ne pouvons que vous remercier tres affectueusement du respect qu'il vous a plu deferer si volontairement a nostre instance en cest endroit & de la faveur que vous avez rendue en cela a ceux de ladite Ville; laquelle nous vous prions, avec la mesme affection, de leur vouloir continuer, en leur laissant la traite libre d'udits bleds, ainsy qu'ils ~~ont~~ en ont jouy par cy devant; comme aussy de ne permettre qu'il soit rien fait ou innove de vostre part qui puisse alterer ou nuire aucunement au repos de leur estat. Ce que nous recevrons pour un effect & tesmoignage particulier de vostre bienveillance en nostre endroit, laquelle nous reconnoissons au reciproque envers vous par tous offices & en toutes occasions ou nous vous pourrons gratifier.etc" (2)

The end of that letter was

- (1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 8.No.76. Wake to Secy. 3/13 April.  
 (2) Lett. di Giacomo 1. No.XXXIV December 9/19 1621.

more than formal words. In the summer and early autumn of 1621 there was talk of an attack on Geneva either by Savoy or by France. Carlo Emanuele himself alleged that Geneva was about to be overrun from France and offered to guarantee the liberty of the city if it would acknowledge his suzerainty.(1) The proposal was probably a device to obtain the overlordship of the city peaceably, but there may have been some ground for fearing that France would attack.(2) With the excuse of this fear, then, the Duke tried persistently to have Wake write to the magistrates of Geneva to make them see reason and agree to his having some authority over them, a request that Wake persistently refused to gratify without specific orders from England.(2) In both Geneva and Berne it was feared that this desire of the Duke to protect Geneva would result in his making an attack on the city if his wish was refused. Mayerne, the king's physician, who had returned to his home in Berne in 1620(3), was ordered by the magistrates of Berne to represent to the king the fear they had of an attack on Geneva or on the Pays de Vaud from Savoy.(4) On February 21st Wake

(1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XVII no.114. Pesaro to Doge & Senate, August 2nd. (2) S.P.Savoy. ~~Bundle~~ Bundle 8, No.202. Wake to Secy. Oct. 2/12. (3) Add. MSS 12,485 f.66. (4) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XVII.No.344. February 25th.

received instructions from the king to represent to Carlo Emanuele James astonishment at hearing from good sources of the possibility of an attack on Geneva or the Pays de Vaud, and his determination, since the treaty between Savoy and Berne had been signed after English mediation, to intervene in any dispute.(1) Whether Wake's representations were effective or whether Carlo Emanuele had in fact no intention of proceeding against Geneva for the rest of 1622 the suspicion was a little allayed and Wake had few offices to perform for Geneva.

James' final intervention with Savoy for Geneva was in 1624. On September 28th 1623 the magistrates, finding again that they were deprived of their grain supplies from Savoy, and fearing that part of the forces under arms in Savoy would be directed against them, wrote to James asking him to make representations to Savoy in their favour.(2) The response was an appeal to Carlo Emanuele to leave the Genevans unmolested:

"Monsieur mon Cousin

Il y a quelques années que nous intervînmes envers vous en faveur de Ceux de Geneve, a ce que vous leur voulussiez laisser libre la traite des Bleds de vos Pais, en conformite du Traite de

- (1) S.P.Savoy.Bundle 9.No.104. Wake to Calvert,May 2nd,1622  
 (2) S.P.Switzerland Bundle 2. No.74.

Paix que vous avez avec eux; a quoy sur notre requisition, vous feistes pourvoir alors, & nous receusmes cela pour un tesmoignage particulier de votre bien veuillance en notre endroit. Mais ilz nous ont fait entendre que depuis, & tout nouvellement encore, vous auriez fait defenses tresexpresses de mener aucuns bleds ny autres grains en ladite Ville, & que vos officiers ne permettroient pas seulement a ceux de leurs Citoyens ou Habitans qui ont du bien dans vos Estats, d'en amener chez eux les grains de leur propre creu, sinon soubz des conditions & astrictions rigoureuse. Se plaignans aussy que leurs droits seroyent violes par vos dits officiers en aucunes terres de leur propre jurisdiction, & en la levee des tailles & peages dont les leurs sont exempts; comme pareillement des exces qu'ilz disent estre commis tant es personnes qu'es biens d'aucuns d'eux, sans qu'ilz en puissent tirer aucune justice des vostres, nonobstant toutes toutes les plaintes & instances qu'ilz vous auroyent adressees pour ce regard, & la contravention directe que cela fait a leur Traite; joint a cela l'ombrage que leur donnent les troupes que vous tenez sur pied depuis annees assez pres de la ville; qui leur fait craindre que toutes ces procedures ne tendent qu'a la rupture de leur Paix. Delaquelle en general comme ainsy soit que nous ayons toute notre vie desire & procure en tant qu'en nous a este, l'entretènement public par toute la Chrestiente, nous avons bien voulu, en suite des premieres instances que nous vous avons cy devant faites pour ceux de la dite Ville & Estat, vous prier derechef bien affectueusement de faire pourvoir au plus tost a tous ces griefs dont ilz se deulent, selon que la raison & justice le requerra, & de faire cesser a l'advenir les causes de telles plaintes par la deue observation des Traitez qui sont entre vous & eux etc."

The other matter of interest to both England and Savoy that arose during Gabaleone's embassy was the question of the Valtelline. That strip of territory at the head of the valley of the Adda where a Catholic population was ruled by the

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 10. No.244 January 6th, 1624.

predominantly Protestant Grisons had this great importance at the opening of the Thirty Years War, that through it a direct communication could be established between the Spanish in Milan and the Imperial forces in Austria, and that, in establishing that direct communication, Venice could be cut off from Western Europe. The troubles in the Valtelline between rulers and subjects were, if disturbing, of little more than domestic importance till the Catholics, on July 19th 1620, rose to butcher their masters in the "sacro macello", and Feria in Milan took the Valtelline into Spanish protection.(1) With that action the question of the Valtelline became a European question.(2)

Before that date, however, Savoy had become involved in the disputes of the Valtelline. In July 1618 the Protestant leaguers had seized and executed Rusca, the archpriest of Sondrio, as a man too firmly linked with Spain.(3) The reaction had been a wave of resentment among the Catholics. Among them was a certain de Vic, the French ambassador extraordinary to the Grisons. He left hurriedly for Milan, and there promised to Feria that if a Spanish army would enter the Valtelline to punish the Grisons French arms

(1) Quazza La politica di Carlo Emanuele I durante la guerra dei Trent'anni cit. p.14. (2) See H.F.Brown The Valtelline in Camb. Mod. Hist. Vol.IV. Pp35-63.

(3) Ib. p.46  
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would be used to prevent the Bernese, from intervening to help their fellow Protestants. News of these proposals was sent to Wake from Berne, and the truth of the news was confirmed both by the Baron de la Tournet, the Savoyard ~~and~~ at Lucerne, and by the seven Catholic Cantons who wrote to Carlo Emanuele to inform him of the design and to desire him to join them in the defence of the Catholic faith. The alliance that he had contracted with Berne made Carlo Emanuele directly interested in the events, and through Wake he besought James to make the French government abandon their design:

"The Duke of Savoy is much troubled with this business, fearing least the French king, not being well informed, maye at the instance of some turbulent spirits be indused to make a warre against the Bernesi, whom he is bound to assist in vertu of the Aliyance that he hath lately contracted with them, and he doth doubt that the Spaniards have found this invention to breede some misunderstanding betwixt the French king and him, as must neede insue if he assist those whom the French king shal assayle. Whereuppon he doth humbly desire his Majestie to interpose his credit with the French King for the diverting him from any such designe, and he doth hope, that his Majestie will not refuse him this grace in that he ~~is~~ hath alwayes testified a fervent zeale toward the appointing of differences betwixt Christian Princes, and herein besides the obligation that the Duke of Savoy will owe unto his Majestie all the Protestants of Swisserland and among the Grisons will be bound to praye for his prosperitye, if by his powerfull mediation, they maye be delivered from this storme which is threatned to fall upon them."(1)

(1) S.P.Savoy. Bundie 8. No.63. Wake to Secy. August 24th,1618

James' reply was a promise to assist the Protestant Cantons if they were attacked:

"As soone as I had received your Honors letters of the 21st of September (which did come to my hands the 11th of October St.o Vet.) I did immediately repayre unto the Duke of Savoye and, according to the directions you were pleased to give me I did in his Majesties name give him hartly thanks for his franke and ingenuous dealing with his Ma.tie, and with all I did praye him to continue an intire correspondence with those states in whose confederacy and frendschiipp he shall ever finde himselfe most assured and safe: I did further let him knowe, that if the Popishe Cantons Or others, should under the pretext of Religion undertake a warre against the Protestants in Swisserland, his Ma.tie would not be wanting to assist the reformed Cantons overtly and profess-edlye. But that he had forborne to passe any offices with the French king in this behalfe because Mons.r de Modenne, and some other principal Ministers had disavowed the proceedings of Mons.r de Vic, and his complices, and protested, that they had no such instructions."(1)

After the "sacro macello" Berne became involved in the war that the Grisons were waging to expell the Spanish from the Valtelline by supplying the Grisons with troops.(2) Letters were sent from Berne to both Carlo Emanuele and Wake, seeking from the one assistance and from the other good offices in procuring that assistance. Wake did not need the prompting. Even before the letters came he had represented to Carlo Emanuele the dangers of a Spanish domination of the Valtelline

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 6.No.124. Wake to Secy. 14/24 Oct.

(2) Gaub. Mod. Hist. Vol.IV . P.50

and the need of helping Berne if that canton were to send troops to the Grisons.(1) It appears that his representations were not useless. On September 3rd 1620 Carlo Emanuele wrote to the magistrates of Berne assuring them of his approval of their action and of his resolve to help them;

"Par la vostre du 3 du mois passe qui m'a este rendue par Monsieur l'Agent du Roy de la Grande Bretagne i'ay veu la bonne part en laquelle vous avez receu les discours, que i'avois tenu avec luy sur les troubles survenus aupres des Grisons, & la resolution qu'a este prise a Baden de s'entre-mettre vivement pour les appaiser & conserver la paix, tranquillite, & liberte generale. Cest la plus saine, et assuree que l'on eust sceu prendre, et a la quelle ie ne cesseray de vous conseiller comme vostre bon amy allie & confedre, Vous assurant aussi que de mon coste ie ne faudray d'y contribuer a mesme fin tout ce qui pourra dependre de moy, comme ayant tant d'interest en la bonne union et conservation de toute la nation ~~Helvetique~~ Helvetienne & de la liberte publique, que nous doit tousiours estre en fort grande recommandation."(2)

Wake's action in making these representations was approved by the home government. In a letter of the 24th of October from the secretary his action was commended, and he was authorised to do the like again if the need should arise.(3)

In these negotiations with Savoy over the problem of the Valtelline, however, the lack of resolve

(1) Add. MSS 18,642 ff.29,30. Wake to Secy. 7/17 Aug. 1620  
(2) Lettere di Carlo Emanuele 1.  
(3) Add. MSS 18,642. F. 89. Wake to Secy. 14/24 Jan. 1621

and clear purpose that weakened all James' diplomacy in his latter years is found. Wake had set Savoy forward to intervene in the Valtelline by recommending him to favour the Bernese intervention, and by doing so had tacitly committed the English government to support him. That support was not forthcoming. James wrote to France to point out the interest that France had in the freedom of the valtelline from Spanish control and to urge the need of helping the Grisons in their danger.(1) Carleton was instructed to exhort the States to consider the question of the Grisons and to agree to the propositions put forward by Venice.(2) The king promised to use his offices with the parties to the dispute.(3) But no action was taken in England. Instead to Gabaleone going to convey New Year's greetings he spoke of his impotence in view of the general affairs of Europe:

"He spoke of the Valtelline very earnestly and told me that the ambassador of Venice had treated with him about it at length. It seemed to him that all those princes who care for their liberty have great interest in it, but most of all France and the Republic of Venice should consider it. For himself, he will do what he can. But, since there is at the same time the war in Germany, the war of religion about to begin in France, the Palatinate to recover, the princes of the Union appealing for help, and the truce in Holland about to end, he cannot do very much. He is a king, not God almighty."(4)

- (1) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.XVI no.525. Lando to Doge & Senate  
 Sept. 3rd 1620. (2) Ib. no.640. Surian to same Dec. 1st  
 (3) Ib. no.680. Lando to same. Jan. 8th 1621. (4) Lett. Min.  
(Ingh.) Mazzo 4. Gabaleone to C. Eman. 19th Jan. 1621.

With that refusal James lost any influence he may have had in inducing Carlo Emanuele to intervene actively in the Grisons; and in the league which was later made by France, Venice and Savoy to restore the Valtelline James had no part.

Hope of English action, however, cannot have been dead. There is in a volume of documents styled "Materie politiche (estere in genere)" in Turin a curious document dated 1623. The heading is "Sommario delli Capitoli della lega tra Re di Francia, Inghilterra, Venetia et Savoia", and the whole document has obviously been drafted hopefully by someone as an alternative to the treaty of Paris between France, Venice and Savoy. The document is too long to quote here, and a note of the parts of it that affect England will be sufficient. After defining the objects of the league, the liberation of Italy, the Grisons, the Valtelline and the Palatinate, the document proceeds to set forth the amount of aid to be given by each member. James was to maintain a fleet of one hundred bertonns to cut off Spanish shipping in the Atlantic and to occupy the straits of Gibraltar. He was also to maintain six thousand foot and one thousand horse in the service of the Elector Palatine.(1) Whether the terms

(1) Materie politiche (estere in genere) Vol.IV

of this proposed league were ever made known to James, and what his reply was if they were, is not apparent. It is certain, however, that he had no part in the treaty of Paris between the other three members of the proposed league in the same year.

The ending of James' influence over Carlo Emanuele in the Valtelline question is the snapping of the last thread of the common interests that had bound England and Savoy together. The relations between the two states were still cordial enough, but till the new reign in England there were to be no more active negotiations. The failure to maintain the normal means of diplomatic communication is proof of this. From England Gabaleone was recalled on the 8th of June 1621(1), and he probably left England towards the end of July(2). There was no successor appointed to him. Rowlandson, an Englishman who had entered Savoyard service(3), was sent from Turin in the January of the following year to act as agent in England(4), though his nationality and rank made him unlikely to be entrusted with any matters of importance. No other Savoyard ambassador was at the English court during that reign.

From Turin Wake was recalled on February 10/20 1623(5),

(1) S.P.Savoy Bundle 8. NO.126. Carlo Eman. to James.  
(2) His letter of recedence, Add. MSS 12,485 f.89 is dated July 1621. (3) Supra p. (4) S.P.Savoy Bundle 9. No.1 Wake to Calvert Jan. 3/ 3 1622. (5) Lett. de Gt . 1. No.35

and when he returned, in June 1624(1), it was as English ambassador to Venice travelling in state to take up his residence(2) For the next few years Wake was to be chief English minister in Italy and the charge at Turin was to be filled by secretaries. The instruments in Turin and London were not fitted for delicate work, and their use is proof enough that such work was not intended.

From small beginnings the relations between England and Savoy had grown to a certain closeness during the reign of James. At the end of that reign the king's increasing apathy, among other causes, may have prevented the two states from solving common problems together, but the value of the good relations that had been established was not thereby diminished. And that value was chiefly this, that the practice of maintaining ministers in London and Turin had been accepted as natural by both sides, that regular means of communication and representation had been established. The results that were later to come from these good relations between the two states (and in the middle of the century, for example, or the beginning of the eighteenth century these results were considerable) could not have come but for the work of these early negotiators.

(1) S.P.Venice bundle 25. No.202. Wake to Conway, July 5/15  
(2) Ib. No. 176. Instructions for Wake.

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SIR ANTHONY SHERLEY AND JAMES VI OF SCOTLAND.

Some mystery surrounds the activities of Sir Anthony Sherley in Venice between the years 1601 or 1602 and 1604. Even the latest biographer, Sir E. Denison Ross, in his Life of Sherley(1) does no more than hint at the nature of his business there. A few letters in one of the volumes of the Denmilne collections of manuscripts in the National Library of Scotland (Denmilne 33-1-13, nos 2,7,8,9,11,18,19, and 21) show clearly a short period of one of his occupations there - they show him working as one of those secret agents of James VI in Italy, of whom Balfour of Burley was the prototype(2): and they show him enjoying, apparently, a fair measure of that king's confidence. By doing so they help to establish that, in the autumn of 1602 he was not, as has been alleged(3), in Spanish pay. For the secret diplomacy of the period they have a further interest: they show the ill-will that existed between Sherley, James' agent, and Wilson, Cecil's spy(4) in Venice, both ignorant of the rapprochement between their masters after 1601(5). Although the letters give no indication of the motives or causes that led Sherley into Scottish service, several suggest themselves: as one of Essex' men(6)

he may have been in touch with James before he left England, it may have been a desire to render some service to the rising sun; or, as a man well-seen in affairs, Sherley may have been employed by Sir William Keith, who had arrived in Venice as Scottish Agent Extraordinary for the second time in May 1598(7), and who, returning to Scotland, carried a message from Sherley to the king(8). That James already set some value on Sherley may be inferred from a letter of his written in 1601 commending Sherley to the Shah Abbas. "Magnanimum," James wrote, "magnanimum itaque Equitem Sherleyum Majestati vestrae ita commendatum esse velimus, ut pote hominem omnis generis armorum et politicae rationis peritissimum, in quo minus valent verba quam fides, manus quam animus, utrisque tamen insignibus praeclarus"(9) This same letter gives as one of the reasons for Sherley's seeking service abroad, "ut posthac, cum corona illius imperii ad nos devoluta fuerit, superiores fructus laborum suorum reportare possit." Whatever were the previous relations between James and Sherley, and whatever were Sherley's motives for entering Scottish service, these Denmilne letters show him engaged in trying to secure the moral, and if possible the financial support of the Republic for James and his claims to the English throne.

The eight letters deal partly with these negotiations, partly with Sherley's relations with Wilson, and partly

with Sir James Lindsay, who, returning to Scotland from Rome, was in Venice in the autumn of 1602(10). The first (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.2) is endorsed "Instructions for Captayne Lawsonne(11) to the Kinges most highe and excellent M.ty", and is dated 14th September 1602; the second (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.7) is from Sherley to Sir James Lindsay of September 10th (N.S.) 1602; the third, also from Sherley to Lindsay, (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.8) is dated September 14th (N.S.) 1602; the fourth (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.9) is from George Craige,(12) to the king of the same date; the fifth (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.11) is a letter, dated September 16th 1602, from Sherley to Bruce of Kinloss, recommending the bearer, a Signor Desiderio; the sixth (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.18), from Sherley to the king, is dated 14th September 1602; the seventh (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.19) is an undated, unsigned letter to Bruce of Kinloss: and the last (Denmilne 33-1-13 no.21) is from Sherley to the king of September 18th 1602. Of these letters the first and seventh give most information about James' aims and hopes - or rather about the interpretation that Sherley and Craige put on them, about his friends in Italy, and about the means to be used to increase his power and prestige there. The second and third, which concern Sir James Lindsay, answer by inference the question whether Sherley was in spanish pay at the time. The first also gives a few details of the conflict between Sherley and Wilson.

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snierley began by instructing Lawson to inform the king who were well-disposed to him in Italy:-

"Then you must declare to his Ma.tie how strongly the Bishop of Vincenza and his brother the Illustrissimo Antonio Priuly have laboured for his Ma.tie in this Signory; how much his name is heere respected and urge his Ma.tie to loose no tyme to sow their heartes with better seed w.ch are already so well plowed to his Ma.ties handes. w.ch good effects they have not only wroughte heere but at Rome also: having bound to his Ma.ties service the Cardinal Inall St. Marseillo and Padre Perichone two so great subiects in that court that they have bene able to moove the pryde of the Pope to that humility as to wryt to his Ma.tie first(13), w.ch could not be effected by no labour of any Prince in any other age."

There followed advice on the best means of increasing the reputation of Scotland in Italy:-

"And since the one great strength of his Ma.ties opposites groweth upon the goode successe and prospering of the present authority w.ch now ruleth Inland under her Ma.tie he must be contented to wash away the vigour of that by some insensible yet powerfull meanes and to suffer the impoverishment of that state for the present: that the particular greivances of the subiects may mak them odious ever w.ch nowe governe them whensoever god shal send an alteration, for w.ch he hath excellent meanes as I declared amply unto him by Mr. Keyth, and part of that purpose is already acted heere by some good meanes w.ch hath been wrought the Venetians having restrayned the Inghlish from trading to any part of their dominion but to the port of Venice only. By w.ch their trade is more than half undon and the commodities of his Ma.ties Merchants made much better, since every man may now have their partes in that w.ch the Inghlish wholly and soly ingrossed befor. And since it is most necessary to mak that state as weak as may be that it may have validity only to stand: his Ma.tie must be pleased to fomentat the warres of Irland in such sort that the Queen may be ever dryven to expense and y.t no necessity oblige the Spainzard againe to intermingle himself in his Ma.ties interest, so y.t he may be kept free for all accidents w.ch may arrive." (14)

"his Ma.tie must also be pleased to animat  
 "his merchants coming this way: their owne great profitts  
 "being most assured and to his Ma.tie their trafiking in  
 "these partes will bring neere great reputation and credit,  
 "impugne the ordinary imposition of his countries poverty,  
 "strengthen his state at home in tyme with expert men and  
 "goode snippes, add to his revenues, inrich his particular  
 "subjects and though the last be litle amongst so many great  
 "effects yet at this tyme it importeth much, that by that  
 "trade there will be a safe intercourse of letters w.ch now  
 "is found ether not at all or with great difficulty.  
 "I will promise assuredly no thing nether will I ingage his  
 "Ma.ties honour if he please to trust me upon anything but  
 "that w.ch is most assured: but I dare pawne my lyf that if  
 "his Ma.tie voutensafe to be confident of me and soundly I  
 "will not only prevent all the purposes w.ch are and shalbe  
 "complotted against his Ma.tie in these partes but also pro-  
 "cure him strong frendes and that meanes w.ch he wanteth  
 "most w.ch is money abundantly, the enterest of all these  
 "princes estates binding them (being well understood of them)  
 "to procure his Ma.ties safety and iustice."(15)

The last of these letters is much more scrappy, indeed it is rather  
 a collection of notes for a letter than a letter, out these notes  
 are interesting and expand the first letter:-

"The Bisshope of Vincenza his undertaking his Maiesties Caus:  
 "whatt Cardinall st. Marcello yss: and the maens tu assure  
 "him of a pension: the lyk of father peritchione: partic-  
 "uler letters must bee sentt to all thes of necessity: If  
 "the kings Ma.tie daer trust me att all he must trust me  
 "amply: withe blankes with a secreters seall and with a  
 "lardg Commission: thatt I may be able tu ansuer all tymes:  
 "all occations: all humours, and bee redy tu meett with all  
 "artifises and oposite desyns.  
 "My artifysse with the secretary by maens of Mr. Antony Tracy:  
 "Sir Edward Mithchilburnn his being most assurytt tu his Ma.tie  
 "the reasonn of my electing Wennis to lye in: ass the fayer  
 "of the world and most propre for me: wher I may freelye  
 "woork his Ma.ties businesse and aunsuer my negociatione in  
 "persia: tu animatt summe of his Ma.ties marchants tu coom  
 "hither, and tu Ligorne yf ytt wear butt with 2 ships w.ch  
 "woould give a mightye reputation tu his presentt statt: and  
 "in the maen tyme increase his Ma.ties customs and the

"particular wealth of his subjects being a place to utter  
 "divers commodities with w.ch yf I mistak ytt nott his  
 "Contrye doos abound . . . .  
 "Yf ytt pleas his Ma.tie to bestow uppon me a particular  
 "lettir to this signorye besyds the other in w.ch he will  
 "woutchief to promis for me in all tymes of their neide the  
 "levy of 5000 menne in his kingdome for ther mony: his  
 "Ma.tie shall not only doo to myself a most gracious favore,  
 "bothe in establishing me in a graett and honorable reput-  
 "atione: butt doo himself ane inestimable good in his  
 "arffayres."(16)

The argument which can be used to prove that Sherley was not at the time in Spanish pay is this: Sir James Lindsay was in Venice in the autumn of 1602(17); it is fairly clear that he was then in Spanish pay(18); since Sherley sought to discredit him with James on this very ground it is probable that he was not himself a Spanish agent. It is an argument of probability rather than of necessity, but the probability is fairly great. The two letters which Sherley wrote to Lindsay were enclosed later in that of Craige to the king, and with them Craige sent a very full account of his own and Sherley's opinions of Lindsay. The grounds for suspecting Lindsay of dealings with the Spaniards he set down as these:-

"First inconstancy in his determinations now saying he will  
 "goe home and overcome all difficulties to serve your Ma.tie  
 "and a litle while after he can not be perswaded that he shal  
 "stay long in the country. Secondly his finding out and  
 "counselling with an Orientall Jew neere in Venice who he con-  
 "ressed at unawares to me and (to use his owne words) said  
 "could tell as much as the divell himself, of whom he was  
 "curious to know what should become of your Ma.tie and the  
 "Queen, but what the Jew answered more then concerned the  
 "description of both your highnes personnes he would not tell

"me. Thirdly by a poor fellow who had served him at Rome  
"being reiected heere at Venice (w.ch may be thought to be  
"done in a guilty mynd fearing by him the anatomizing of his  
"cariadge at Rome or elsewhere) sayeth he is perswaded that  
"some wicked end abydeth him for diverse respectes and there-  
"for tñanks god who hath drawn him from his service betymes,  
"tne fellow sayth he hath no good affection to any but to  
"Spanzardes and Jesuits. Lastly he was most glade to be  
"left alone in his way to Milan wher he thought to talk  
"with the Counte de Fuentes one of the greatest manadgers  
"of Spanish affayres in all Italy."(19)

The reasons are trivial; that Craige should advance them at all  
is the interesting thing.

The references to Wilson occur in a post-  
script to the first letter where Sherley wrote:-

"Wilsonne to every man continueth by himself and his inst-  
"ruments those practises and voyces w.ch I wrote to your  
"Ma.tie of by Mr. Keyth, and hath added this new devise to  
"spred that your Ma.tie is now ioyning yourself with the  
"spainezard, only to remoove tne affection of this Signory  
"(w.ch beginneth to show so much to your Ma.tie) from you,  
"and by bringing up such a scandale to have the iuster  
"colour for any impious and scelerat act w.ch may be  
"committed against your personne. . . . .  
"And though for that only good cause(20) I have scaped  
"hardly with my lyf many times, since Mr. Keythes departure  
"also, as tne danger of a harquebuze and an arrow shott  
"in at my window and missed me narrowly."(21)

Writing to Cecil on September 6th of the same year Wilson mentioned  
two of the murderous attacks which Sherley alleged were made on  
him because of his loyalty to James.(22) The narquebus shot he  
described as a clay pellet snot by a boy from his bow in sport;  
the real attack on Sherley was made by one of his creditors, "a  
fellow which had let him have for 40 or 50 ducats in wine, and  
finding no means to get his money, vowed to have his blood and the

rest which had nourished their blood with his wine." The words which Wilson used to dismiss the rumours of his attacks on Sherley show best how bitter the feeling was between them. "These are the two plots which I have laid for the life of this great man, whose life or death in my conceit imports as much as that of a scarabe fly." Yet Sherley had cause to be wary of Wilson's activities. On the 9th of August of that year Wilson had been writing to Cecil about the need for intercepting some of Sherley's messengers:

"It wer verey good ther were dilligent care had to fynd that gent. w.on he hath last sent to the king of Scotts eyther coming or going, for I doubt he hath a good-will to worke some pestilent practise therin, though I am apt to thinke that the other will credit him noe further than he sees cause."

In the margin here is written, "his father's servant which came in his company towards England can tell some newes of him."(23) It is enough to show that Wilson was none too scrupulous of the means to be used to undo Sherley's work.

- (1) Sir E. Denison Ross Sir Anthony Sherley London, 1933.
- (2) See J.D.Mackie James VI and I and Ferdinand I of Tuscany Oxford, 1927.
- (3) Ross Op. cit. p.56
- (4) Sir Thomas Wilson. See D.N.B. & C.S.P.Dom. 1598-1601 p.600
- (5) Sir D. Dalrymple Secret Correspondance of Sir Robert Cecil Edinburgh, 1766.
- (6) Ross Op. cit. p.12
- (7) C.S.P.Ven. Vol.1 p.cxlvi
- (8) Denmilne MSS 33, 1. 13. no.2.
- (9) Abbotsford Club Letters and State Papers of the Reign of James VI. Edinburgh, 1838. p.41
- (10) H.M.C. Salisbury MSS Pt.XII (1910) p.322 .
- (11) The presence of a certain Lawson in Essex' Cadiz expedition under the date 30th may 1596 is noted in T. Birch Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth London 1754 Vol.2 p.15.  
The connection with Essex makes it possible that this was Sherley's associate.
- (12) A certain Craig was in Geneva, apparently sent there by the king, in July 1603.( S.P.Switzerland, Bundle 1 no.110.)
- (13) A reference to the letter that Lindsay carried. C.S.P.Ven. vol.X no.353.
- (14) This extract is quoted in Sir D. Dalrymple Op. cit. p.155n.
- (15) Denmilne MSS 33. 1. 13 no.2
- (16) Ib. no.19
- (17) H.M.C. Salisbury MSS pt. XII (1910) p.322
- (18) Ib.
- (19) Denmilne MSS 33. 1. 13 no.9.
- (20) i.e. loyalty to James.
- (21) Denmilne MSS 33. 1. 13 no.2
- (22) H.M.C.Salisbury MSS pt.XII (1910) pp. 322, 323.
- (23) S.P.Venice Bundle 2 no.145.