

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'Life is Individual': Outline of a Cosmopolitan Civility and its Anthropology

Nigel Rapport

University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland

ABSTRACT

Cosmopolitanism concerns the relation between the most general and the most particular aspects of the human condition. On the one hand there is the human species, representing the universals of human life or 'cosmos'. On the other hand, there is the human individual, embodying all that is unique in time and space: 'polis'. To comprehend the human, according to cosmopolitanism is to see these polar realities always in relation. The human species is only and ever embodied in its individual exemplars; the human individual is to be known always by way of capabilities and liabilities that are species-wide. (Between individual and species there may exist a host of classificatory associations – societies, ethnicities, communities, nations, religions, classes – but these are symbolic constructs only, matters of rhetoric and imagination, epiphenomenal upon the concrete realities of individual and species.) What, then, is the cosmopolitan project of anthropology? I present an outline. Of key importance is validating human life as a form of movement *towards* the future and *away* from conventional cultural categories and collectivities. Futurity might be defined as an individual's birthright: the right continually to author an identity. It is the cosmopolitan project to work out an accommodation between universal individual aspirations and local structures of hospitality and politeness.

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Part I: Tenets

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism represents an increasingly crowded – and diverse – arena of anthropological consideration, as this collection of essays attests. It is further the case that the cosmopolitan overlaps with other concepts and debates that anthropology has considered key, including: the global and universal; identity and belonging; individual agency; alterity and human rights; and queries concerning the appropriate anthropological methodologies (holistic, individualistic, artistic, scientific) for doing justice to these phenomena (Rapport 2014). Is a conventional culturalist (or multiculturalist) paradigm sufficient for

CONTACT Nigel Rapport rapport@st-andrews.ac.uk; njr2@st-andrews.ac.uk Department of Social Anthropology, University of St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AL, Fife, Scotland, UK

comprehending the cosmopolitan, or must a universal humanism prevail (Rapport and Stade 2007; Rapport and Wardle 2010; 2023)? Is there, indeed, a singular phenomenology being indicated in the appellation of 'occupational cosmopolitanism' (Hannerz 2007), 'cosmopolitan borderlands' (Agier 2016), 'pre-modern and modern cosmopolitans' (Stade 2007), 'diasporic Chinese cosmopolitans' (Ong 1998), 'rural Togolese cosmopolitans' (Piot 1999), 'urban Caribbean cosmopolitans' (Wardle 2000), 'heretical cosmopolitan Muslim intellectuals' (Kersten 2011), 'cosmopolitan dancers and choreographers' (Wulff 2009) and 'cosmopolitan civil servants' (Montgomery 2023)?

Amid the 'plural discrepant cosmopolitanisms' (Clifford 1998) in vogue, the argument of this chapter is that cosmopolitanism concerns the relation between the most general and the most particular components of the human condition. On the one hand there is the human species, embodying the universals of human life: 'cosmos'. On the other hand there is the human individual, embodying something unique in time and space: 'polis'. To comprehend the human, according to (this) cosmopolitanism is to see these two polar realities always in relation to one another. The human species is only and ever embodied in its individual exemplars, each a paradigmatic representation; the human individual is to be known always by way of capabilities and liabilities that are species-wide. Between individual and species there may exist a host of classificatory distinctions and associations – societies, communities, nations, religions, status groups – but these are symbolic delineations only, matters of cultural construction and discursive deployment, and they are epiphenomenal upon the concrete realities of individual and species. Only individuals and species possess an abiding reality, an ontology. Cosmopolitanism as a science of the human leads us to attend to the nature of the capabilities and liabilities of the species as a whole, as these are exemplified in the lives of individual human beings; cosmopolitanism as a moral philosophy leads us to attend to the conditions of life of the species as a whole and how each of its individual manifestations might best fulfil its potential to flourish. Cosmopolitanism can thus be described as an emancipatory project (Rapport 2012a). It would improve the conditions of human life, freeing species and individual alike from that which hinders the potential to become, to create a future, on an ongoing basis. One includes here not only the 'despotism' of famine and disease but also the despotism of ignorance, of tyranny, of lives circumscribed by narrow limits of merely local or cultural conventionalism. Cosmopolitanism opens up individual lives to global possibilities, just as it celebrates any freely chosen individual life-project as a rightful manifestation of global potential. Through its comparative catalogue of ethnographic experience, a cosmopolitan anthropology moves from the substance of individual human lives to a deduction of the universal, species-wide capacities underlying that substance.

Kantian Cosmopolitanism and Anthropology

It is Immanuel Kant who gives us the first modern extended discussion of cosmopolitanism – as he did of 'Anthropology' – in the late 1700s (1974; 1993; 1996). Kant begins by identifying three kinds of right. 'Republican right' entails domestic laws within a state; 'international right' entails treaties between nations; and 'cosmopolitan right' entails the relations of persons anywhere – 'global citizens' – to one another and to states. Cosmopolitan rights were held by individuals by virtue of their humanity not their

community memberships, and were to be regarded as superior to those pertaining to states; cosmopolitan right overrode claims of national sovereignty and could bend the will of communities since these latter were intrinsically sentimental manifestations: particularistic, arbitrary and non-rational.

Kant exemplified cosmopolitan right in terms of hospitality. An individual had the right to present himself or herself before others without harm, both within and across different communities, and to be heard. Whether a local or a stranger, the individual had the right not to be treated with hostility even though s/he placed herself or himself in the home space of another with a view to local interaction (such as commerce). Two duties attached to this right: not to harm the guest; and not to exploit the host. In our own terms, Kant can be seen to foreshadow a critique of identity politics: recognition, social interaction and inclusion, not separation or the preservation of cultural integrity, are to be enshrined as rights.

The logic of Kant's argument derived from the limited space of the globe. We must accommodate one another, put up with being near one another, because as a species we possess in common the surface of the globe – and no other. All human beings were attached equally to the globe. One was a world citizen, a member of the Commonwealth of Nature, and entitled to enter into dialogue with any other human individual in an open and uncoerced fashion.

Kant further envisaged a world where all of humanity would be participants in a global-legal order of civil coexistence. 'Cosmopolitan right' here came to sit alongside 'cosmopolitan law' in a 'cosmopolitan order'. The arbitrarily defined local society or polis gave way to a global polis or 'cosmopolis': a world state, federation or network, with universal law and rational governance. Its practices would be 'enlightened', eschewing dogma and unvindicated authority and practicing the public use of reason to generate critical vantage points from which to scrutinise and improve civil relations. Even the status of states would depend on their behaviour in terms of common human values and democratic and legal principles. The so-called Westphalian political ordering, where states were sovereign over their territories and people, and engaged only in voluntary relations with one another on an ideal basis of equal might, gave way to a notion of liberal internationalism. Here, *cosmopolitan law* guaranteed the rights of every individual human being whether or not these individuals and these rights were originally or traditionally respected by their 'own' communities.

The *cosmopolitan order* provided a matrix within which all the potential capacities of humanity for creative expression might find fulfilment. The global society of equal citizens would represent a 'kingdom of ends' whose fundamental principle could be enunciated thus: 'Always behave so as to treat with equal respect the dignity of reason and of moral judgement in every human being'. Every individual human being is an end in themselves not a means to another's ends. Hence 'cosmo-politanism': *cosmos*, the human species, embodying the universals of human life; and *polis*, the human individual, embodying something unique in time and space.

Kant's writings were co-eval with the rise of nationalism in Europe, and were intended as a critique and antidote. Esteeming the cosmopolitan was not a matter of abstracting human beings from history and society, but of recognising the human capacity, disposition indeed, to transcend present and past in reaching for forms of life better informed by current scientific knowledge and better accommodating of individual needs and desires.

Focus was on the future and the potential for human betterment and individual fulfilment. In this regard it was not true, claimed Kant, that every existing tradition, culture, nation, or society was equally deserving of respect: some were better placed to deliver the 'kingdom of ends', while some were more expressive of human sentimentalism, arbitrariness, cruelty and caprice.

Kant's faith in the possibility of a cosmopolitan order derived from his estimation of the human capacity for reason: a means for humanity to come to an enlightened appreciation of itself and its world. Reason was a universal capability, something inhering in the inner life of every human individual. Reason was the highest and most independent human faculty. It freed human beings both from instinct and from cultural traditions and social structures, and allowed for ends and laws which transcended the particularity of their origins. Moreover, human beings were equally rational, equally capable of directing their lives through reasonable principles, and this commanded respect. One respected the intrinsic potential for reason which all humans possessed even should sickness, slavery or oppressive circumstance limit their practice of it in regard to their own lives. One hoped, nevertheless, for situations where individuals should fully exercise their capacities and realize the deliverances of reason. It was on the basis of reasonable action that the dignity of human beings was most and best espied: the dignity of human beings as absolute and incomparable worth as ends in themselves.

Progress could be slow and painful, notwithstanding, and it was made not by violent revolution but via the spirit of enlightenment. 'Enlightenment' was that stage – an adolescence – when humanity broke free from nature and tradition alike and used reason to deliver law. And here, cosmopolitanism called on 'anthropology' as a progressive discipline to furnish it with data concerning both the nature of the species and the specificities of individual expression. What is it to be human, the capabilities and liabilities of the species? And how is it to be individual human beings, construing world-views and effecting a unique being-in-the-world?

A Cosmopolitan Anthropology

What is the cosmopolitan project of anthropology, precisely? It can be summarised by way of five core principles, I suggest (cf. Rapport 2012b).

(i) A cosmopolitan anthropology recognizes an embodied human individual, an '*Anyone*', the universal individual human being, as the constituent unit of human life and society ('Life is individual' (D. H. Lawrence));
(ii) The human individual is deemed a thing-in-itself, possessed of a natural integrity, a wholeness, distinct from the environing world. Each individual is a being-in-the-world in possession of its own nature, character and force, a world in itself. ('I am different from any man who exists' (Jean-Jacques Rousseau));
(iii) Human expression is the manifesting, the externalising, of this individual identity. Cultural symbologies, social institutions, community traditions are *animated* by their being interpreted and accommodated within individual lives and are *inhabited* by the contents of individual consciousness ('Man lives from within outwards and brings to light his own individuality, a kind of poetry of nature' (J. W. Goethe));

(iv) One recognises individual free expression as an instantiation of human possibility. *Anyone* contains the capacity, the potentiality, to be anything that a human being can be; a *futurity* of absolute potential inheres in the individual body so long as life does. This futurity may be morally understood as the individual's *birthright*: the right continually to author an identity. Whatever the cultures and communities, the religions and pastimes, the desires and expectations of others, it is deemed Anyone's right to become his or her own self as he or she sees fit, and to keep on so becoming throughout life. ('Man is the creature who must constantly overcome himself to live fully. Every single being constitutes the entire process of becoming in its entire course. This is the great significance of the single being' (Friedrich Nietzsche));

(v) The human individual can be described as being intrinsically *free*: a conscious being leading the autonomous existence of making sense by way of his or her own embodied interpretative capacities. *Liberty* can then be defined as the right to manifest this freedom: to be free *for* oneself as well as *in* oneself. Liberty is the right not to be taken as unwilling means towards someone else's ends. Valuing and respecting absolutely the human capacity to be and to become, one configures a *civil society* as that open space in which Anyone's freedom is safeguarded and he or she is at liberty to formulate identities as a continuous practice ('Human persons are objective, independently existing ends, never to be acted against' (Immanuel Kant)).

Cosmopolitanism Against Culture and for Anyone

In an article entitled 'Natural law at war', Carlos Escudé described the major challenge in contemporary global relations. 'Postmodern humanity', he writes (2002, 27), must:

> solve a dilemma it does not want to face. If all cultures are morally equivalent, then all human individuals are not endowed with the same human rights, because some cultures award some men more rights than are allotted to other men and women. If, on the other hand, all men and women are endowed with the same human rights, then all cultures are not morally equivalent, because cultures that acknowledge that 'all men are created equal' are regarded as 'superior' or 'more advanced' in terms of their civil ethics than those that do not.

The politically correct statement that 'All cultures *and* all individuals are equal' is thus nonsensical. Nor is a claim to difference a route to reasonable compromise. 'Different rights' being allocated to men and women, or rich and poor, or Moslems and Jews, within the larger commonweal, or 'different individualities' (or none) in a cultural array of personhoods, contradicts the intrinsic sameness of individual human beings irrespective of their cultural classification. There is a stark choice: cultural relativism which treats as fundamental the practice of cultural traditions and communities defining the identity of their members and the worlds in which they operate, and their rights to this, as against Enlightenment rationalism which defines the constituent units of human life universally to be embodied individuals with intrinsic capacities for identity and identification and the right freely to fulfil these capacities. Cosmopolitanism I would place firmly in this latter camp: a rationalist and Enlightenment project in 'natural law' (Rapport 2010).

Natural law (lex naturalis), to elaborate in brief, is a theorisation of a kind of propriety whose content is set by nature and which therefore possesses a universal validity. 'Natural

laws' stand in contrast to 'positive laws': customs and norms of given communities, societies and cultures. Indeed, natural laws function as a standard by which to criticize others. Rights are said to inhere in human beings according to their nature; these are inalienable, and should not be made contingent in their expression upon the cosmologies of particular cultural systems or the normative discourses of particular societies or the institutional arrangements of particular polities. Natural rights do not depend on local recognition for their existence and should not depend on local codification for their sanction and conveyance: they are universally applicable. According to natural-law theory, in short, the moral foundations of proper dealings with human beings can be objectively derived from human nature. The endeavour of natural law is to cement together a moral and legal order with a rational understanding of the nature of humanity and the cosmos. (It is to be expected that understandings of 'nature' will evolve, as scientific understandings develop, and so the implications for a fulfilment of the potentials for human development and expression will also evolve.)

It will be apparent the challenge that a tradition of natural law and natural rights presents to a conceptualisation of anthropology whose premises are cultural relativist, and which has fought shy of notions of human nature. Cosmopolitanism, in the words of Ernest Gellner (1995, 26), prescribes 'an anthropology which does not make a fetish of culture'. 'We must', Michael Jackson (2002, 118) urges, 'annul the language of cultural essence and national identity: pursue a pragmatist critique of culture'. More precisely, the cosmopolitan actor, as Ulf Hannerz (1990, 240) describes him or her, is one deemed able and willing to assert a personal autonomy with regard to culture. He or she never surrenders completely to any one, never swears absolute allegiance to any one and always knows where the exit is.

This recognition of a universal 'cosmopolitan' competency of the individual vis-à-vis culture, is particularly important at a time when identity politics is prevalent and is framed in culturalist terms: when, in Unni Wikan's phrasing (1999, 57), 'culture' has run astray, and a modish multiculturalism would see communities as the constituent units of social life. A cosmopolitan anthropology approaches culture not as a thing with an objective existence (not a fixed set of consensual traditions that people share and are shaped by) but as something in the making: a set of symbolic forms, verbal, behavioural, built, whose continuation and animation depends on and derives from a variety of usage, of signification, by particular human beings at particular times. A cosmopolitan anthropology rejects the notion that culture translates as intrinsic difference, lodged in communities: it speaks instead for the sameness of human being.

A cosmopolitan anthropology takes exception likewise to an 'exoticized' view of persons: the culturalist construction of the diversity of personhood can be a dehumanising one. 'Consider all people as *individuals*, agents in their own right', Wikan writes (1999, 63): honour the integrity of each human being. Human rights and cultural rights cannot be advocated at the same time equally, and recognising the integrity of each human being – their capacity to make sense of self and world in their own way – one posits human rights as foundational (Rapport 2013).

In its recognition of individuals universally as rights-bearing and the constituent units of a global human society, cosmopolitanism absolutely distinguishes itself from multiculturalism. For multiculturalism subscribes to a collectivist or holist orthodoxy in which the constituent units of humanity are communitarian collectivities, homogeneous,

clearly demarcatable from one another and binding on their members. Here, the individual is dependent on, and reflective of, his or her cultural home, the epiphenomenal product of its language, traditions, conventions and environment. Multiculturalism tends, then, to reproduce rigid notions of culture and group-belonging as zero-sum, either/or and essentialist – as if human cultures represented sub-species of humankind. It envisages cross-cultural communication, and inter-communal interaction, toleration and respect but based on the foundation of supposed cultural homelands, conceived of as closed, sacrosanct, self-sufficient unities of language, land and heritage whose shared traditional cosmologies, normative certainties and hierarchies are deserving of respect due to their very distinctiveness and claims to longevity. By contrast, to recognise individual humanity wherever it is born, and to give its fundamental ingredients of reason and moral capacity one's allegiance and respect, as Martha Nussbaum urged (1996, 7), is to afford Anyone equal membership in a species-wide cosmopolitan human community, a form of global engagement, inclusion and citizenship.

Part II: Practice

Cosmopolitan Politesse

What form might this universal engagement with Anyone take? If cosmopolitanism is a philosophy of emancipation then this entails working towards an end to the legitimacy of category-thinking in regard to human identity: so that the individuality of *Anyone* is never legitimately and publicly confounded by classificatory identifications and collective memberships. The issue becomes to recognise the Other in his or her individual particularity, beyond cultures of symbolic classification.

'Category-thinking', here, does not refer to the professional specialisms according to which any modern complex society will operate – 'doctor', 'lawyer', 'bus-driver', 'teacher', 'social worker', 'laboratory technician' – and the accreditations and normativity in whose terms interactions of citizens with these specialisms are standardised and guaranteed; one refers to collective categories, classes and labels in which the essence of an individual's personal identity is said to inhere. There are no 'Jews', no 'Englishmen', no 'Moslem community', no 'middle class' or 'working class', not even any 'men' or 'women', insofar as these purport to compass the essential characteristics of a person or a group of people. Essentially there is only *Anyone*: the individual as an embodiment of the human. Liberty and justice entail recognising Anyone as the universal actor, in possession of cosmopolitan rights. These rights may include identifications and affiliations (Jew, male, Welsh, British, supporter of Arsenal Football Club, partial to Tuborg Green Label lager), but the identifications and affiliations are to be treated as achievements not ascriptions: they should be seen to be voluntary and situational, and not to equate to or subsume or exhaust the identity of the individual as such. Rights inhere in the individual, in Anyone, not in any particular affiliation: no categorical membership is absolute and one moves between. One cherishes *the human capacity* to create and to go on creating self and world as against *any particular manifestation* of that capacity ('Jew' or 'Jewishness').

How may one go about construing a society beyond the categorical? For Georg Simmel (1971), famously, society is only possible by way of typicalities and common

cultural forms. One cannot know a multitude of individuals in themselves and in movement and therefore one relies on formalism and standardisation and the fixity and expectability these bring. In general society, as opposed to among lovers or friends, the subjectivity of individual consciousness must ever present itself by way of objective categories and classes, of persons, relations, situations and events. In this conclusion, Simmel looked back to Hegelian notions concerning the agonistic nature of the human condition, its contradictoriness; in particular the strictures of statecraft and the necessary opposition between a normative public sphere and the private home of personal exceptionalism (Hegel 2008). Simmel's conclusion also looks forward to what anthropologists have since described as the 'indifference' of modern 'rational' society: the ways in which the bureaucratic structures of large-scale governance translate into a reliance upon stereotype and catchword which are so indiscriminate as to be alienating, even inhumane (Herzfeld 1993; Gupta 1995).

Seeking an end to category-thinking, cosmopolitanism must nevertheless come to terms with the need for a public form of interaction. One aspires to a means and a mode of address and exchange that does not massify or stereotype or fix the members of a polity such that they are overwritten and overwhelmed by a public profile and labels. But this is not to say that the public space is to be privy to the intimacies of personal selfhood: that the radical particularities of individual identity – their 'gratuitousness' (Rapport 2009) – might easily translate into a common code of expression. One anticipates the individual nature of the citizen but one does not expect to *know of* their private selves or to read off private truths from public expressions. This is a balancing act: as a philosophy of liberty, cosmopolitanism dwells in the tension between a public respect for the individual and a public ignorance of the individual.

'*Politesse'* is the term I would employ to figure a kind of cosmopolitan politeness which encompasses both a mannered style of general public exchange and an ethic of individual dignity and liberty. Politesse is a code of public sociability in which Anyone is accorded a place, recognised as a potential interlocutor, on the basis of his or her common humanity and individuality, and not on any other presumed intimacy or required affiliation.

'Politesse' is a French import into English that can imply a superficial politeness. My intention is to raise politesse to the position of a civic virtue: a polite engagement with an Other, with Anyone, at a respectful distance. One does not presume to know or to encompass the Other, one *recognises* Anyone as an actor entrained on a life-course, amid a life-project of his or her own devising. And yet one would afford the Other the *space* to fulfil that life-project, to the extent that it does not prejudice the potential fulfilment of Anyone. Politesse is a proportionate figure. It is a surface *beneath which* individual lives are lead in personally meaningful ways; it is a surface *upon which* the balancing act of social life is carried out. Too little politesse, too dense a social environment or too regimented, and Anyone is threatened by the designs of others, and may not have the space to lead an individually determined life. Too much politesse, too rarefied a social environment or too anomic, and Anyone is not given the support or nurture necessary to lead an individual life and can succumb to the schemes of others by default.

In sum, politesse describes a social-interactional form which recognises and includes any particular interlocutors as exemplars of humanity. One cares sufficiently about such fellow individuals to ensure that they are afforded the space to come into their own and not become mere means to others' individual or collective ends; but one does not

presume to know in any detail, or seek to influence in any substantial way, what another's 'coming into their own' might entail. I want to portray the figure of politesse as that virtuous social state and cosmopolitan network where Anyone is recognised as the 'end' of his or her own life and where norms of social interaction are in place such that a balance is achieved between space and care.

In a lecture he delivered in 1885, which he entitled 'La politesse' (1972), Henri Bergson sought to travel a similar route from politeness as mere formality to politeness as moral conveyance. His point of departure was the question of whether a set of rules and catchwords – etiquette – can possibly serve as a guarantee for civil dealings in a society. Are civility and politeness the same? On the face of it, not. Politeness of manners or 'social politeness', comprising ready-made formulae, formal graces and habits, are not the same as 'politeness of spirit': the empathy and sympathy involved in taking on another's point of view and imagining that unique life. Nor is social politeness the same as 'politeness of heart': the anticipation that another is worthy of trust and will reciprocate one's own trusting engagement. The point for Bergson is that these three politenesses (social, spiritual, hearty), while analytically distinct, could and should be mutually implicated in practice. If one formally practiced social politeness while imbued with a politeness of spirit and heart, then civility might emerge as a social norm from the practice of etiquette.

Bergson's journey around social, spiritual and hearty politenesses is also a traversing of a spectrum between universalism and particularism. Social and hearty politenesses occupy more an end of the spectrum concerned with realising a universal human sameness and equality, while spiritual politeness occupies an end of the spectrum predisposed towards recognising the qualities and quiddities of particular individualities. Politesse is that subtle and supple social practice wherein one moves between the generality of the human and the particularity of the individual as a constant shuttling or zigzag (cf. Rapport 1992). By maintaining a tension between the two, by practicing social, hearty and spiritual politenesses together, one can hope to do *public* justice to Anyone whose phenomenology is yet private.

Politesse is a work: effort is always demanded, as Bergson was aware, if civility is not to become empty habit and mere politeness. And, to repeat, intimacy with the Other is not the presumed endpoint of engagement, nor a necessary liking or even interest in their world-views and life-projects. Notwithstanding, in a politeness which is supple and alive – incorporating good manners alongside sympathy alongside trust – one can hope to preserve a living social space for Anyone.

Part III: Illustration

Playing Dominoes in Wanet

Politesse is a code of public engagement where an apparently superficial politeness embodies a virtuous vagueness or ambiguity that manages to clothe individual 'gratuitousness' or radical difference in the indiscriminate and inclusive garb of universal belonging ('citizenship').

At this point in my talk, however, I want to change voice and explore the possible viability of the above tenets and possible practices ethnographically, in a rural village and

valley in the north of England that I call 'Wanet'. Wanet was the site of a piece of field research that I conducted in the early 1980s, as a neophyte student of anthropology in my mid-twenties.

Famed for its beauty and history, Wanet is part of the Yorkshire Dales National Park; it represents, indeed, a touristic 'hot spot'. In the summer months, the valley's 650 inhabitants (and the 250 residents of the main village) can find themselves outnumbered by 'offcomers' or 'off-comed-uns', those who have come to Wanet from 'off', from outside. These outsiders are both visitors (occupying the valley's pubs and campsites and B&Bs) and they are new residents, buying holiday homes in Wanet or retiring here or simply domiciled while commuting to jobs in the city, or working online. Other, less than wholly polite, terms deployed by Wanet locals for these outsiders – indeed, increasingly pejorative – were 'Herdwicks', a reference to the breed of (shaggy) sheep whose home is the Lake District (an even more touristy area of Britain), also 'long-haired Arabs', and 'Hebrew desert-rats': further monikers for those who did not know their proper place, and who 'trailed' away from where they were born and bred (if they had ever had such a natural affiliation in the first place).

When I first arrived in Wanet (unannounced and uninvited), I explained myself as undertaking a college project on the recent history of the dale: how local lives in Wanet had altered over the past century. But I immediately aroused suspicion, a stranger from the city, hanging round the pubs and the shops and the church hall, trying to join in. I was myself labelled an offcomer, a long-haired Arab and a Hebrew desert-rat. I was also named 'Joshua': a reference to the beard I initially wore, and also a Biblical allusion to the spy sent by Moses to reconnoitre the 'promised land' of Canaan. A local rumour – half believed – was that a member of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist gang had reconnoitered Wanet in years past: maybe my motives were terroristic, or at least as underhand. There was humour in this and the other designations that I first encountered, but also a signalling of threat, and a clear demarcating of boundaries.

Much of the 'teasing' took place in the village pub, The Eagle, where I would park myself in the evening and hope for a game of darts or dominoes with the local regulars. I would hear the latter joking aloud about the need to institute a Wanet Republican Army – modelled on the IRA, and on those militants in Wales who had taken to burning down the holiday homes of English absentee owners – with sentries being placed on the Wanet hilltops, and a chain of command with local 'bigmen' at the helm. There was also an insistence, publicly vented, that sooner or later those from outside who 'plagued' Wanet with their unwanted presence – swamping the pubs and shops, sending up the prices of local property, introducing urban vulgarities and promiscuities – would eventually come to the realisation that the hard work and the rude health and the stamina needed to survive on Wanet land and in Wanet weather and through a Wanet calendar were not things for which offcomers were physically or psychologically or genetically fit.

Sid Askrig, a local builder, odd-job man (and ex-boxer), middle-aged and a 'big' local character, was acting as something of a local gatekeeper, then, when he cornered me behind a table in an alcove of the Eagle one evening, and subjected me to an interrogation. While his local companions looked on from a respectful distance and grinned, Sid informed me that he had made phone calls about me and had seen through my lies: he had my measure, and my continuing presence in Wanet was on sufferance only. When he and his fellows had had enough of me, he would be happy personally

to supervise my being kicked out again. Interspersed by my frail responses, Sid interrogated me as an alien other: 'So tell me, Nigel. What's your aim in life? what right have you got to exist? … ' 'I mean don't you feel a parasite living off society? living off the backs of other people, like me? I know I would … ' 'So, are you gonna tell all those townies what you learn about country life? … '

But Tony Harvey's attitude had been different from the start. 'Care for a game?', Tony had asked me one evening as I stood at the bar in the Eagle. He had sauntered up to replenish his beer, from the 'dominoes' table'. Tony was a skilled dominoes' player and his pleasure was plain to see as, to the accompaniment of the clicking counters, he would chuckle, and suck on his cigarette, and makes drole comments. Seated at the dominoes' table was, I came to realize, Tony's usual location in the Eagle during the many hours and evenings he would spend at the pub after work; everyone knew 'Tony's seat' (Figure 1).

Tony was in his mid-fifties, a widower, and owner of a small hill-farm up one of the dale's narrower and more remote tracks. Here he lived with his grown-up daughter, and catered to his flock of sheep. House and farm had both seen better days, however, and Tony's emotional investments seemed lodged in the Eagle where he came for company and warmth. Where he was most at home and where he expressed himself most unreservedly connected entirely to the dominoes' table: chatting, before, during or after a game of dominoes, taking regular trips to the bar for more drinks, and then to the toilet.

The 'dominoes' table' was a large rectangular table, with a small wooden lip so that the dominoes would not fall off when shuffled, or when slammed down in joy or exasperation. Eight people could be accommodated with ease on the benches and wall-seat that encircled it. Situated adjacent to the main door, the table also commanded a view of most of the rest of the pub: not just of whoever would enter by the main door (and would 'squeeze' past Tony and the table's occupants as they proceeded in), but also of those who were playing darts and those getting served at the bar, those warming themselves by the open fire and those (episodically) going out the back door to the toilets. Tony's seat represented something of a focal point in the pub. From here he might orchestrate the evening's proceedings:

> TONY [sauntering up to the bar and finding Robby waiting for a refill]: Now, here's my mate! Game of 'bones', Robby? Fancy a draw-in? Heather and me, and Doris, were thinking of having a draw.
> ROBBY [receiving his pint of bitter from Maggie, the barmaid]: Aye, Tony! Don't mind if I do, don't mind if I do.
> TONY: Nigel? Sid? What about you? Up for a game? [Tony raises his eyebrows quizzically, to which Sid nods and I grin. Tony then slaps Robby on the back and walks with him over to the dominoes' table. Heather is already seated there, chatting to Doris; and Walter is perched on the end wall-seat].
> WALTER: God, I'm in the dominoes' place! [Walter looks about him in feigned shock]
> SID: Aye! So why don't you bugger-off out of it, Walter Brownlea? This is the dominoes' table. Go and sit somewhere else!
> HEATHER: Draw-in if you like, Walter?
> TONY: Aye! Do you want to draw-in, Walter? You'll have to get a partner, mind, 'cos there are about six of us already [Tony looks about him].

Figure 1. Tony Harvey at the dominoes table in the Eagle pub (Author photograph).

> WALTER: No. Thanks, but I think I'll go over to darts … You've some courage, Nigel, playing dominoes with these sharks! I admire you [he grins].
> SID: Yeah: 'Bite yer legs off'! Nay: be off with you, Brownlea!
> DORIS: Sorry, I'm facing the wrong way now we're starting. I like to watch everything that's happening. Like: who's chatting to who. Or who's looking stressed! [Doris laughs and pushes her way round the table to sit facing into the pub]

For Tony and others alike, playing dominoes was a pleasant and 'legitimate' way to be in the pub of an evening, offering a conventional focus to local socialising. It was also to provide me with a route into local relations. Largely through Tony's politeness – his invitation to draw-in – I found a way to be in the Eagle that was locally acceptable. Seated at the dominoes' table, I was party to the gossiping even when I was otherwise not versed in a language of topical and public debate. It felt like a welcome form of belonging, a haven even. Moreover, I found that it was a deliberate practice on Tony's part to recognize people in this way and to include them in his social life at the Eagle, as he was to explain to me as our relationship developed:

TONY: I'll play 'doms' with anyone. And let anyone join in the draw. Not like some people who'll just play with old friends and refuse to play with anyone new. No: I'll play with anyone.'

Tony's 'politeness' was to practice an inclusive ethos. As he elaborated:

> I like doms because you can sit and talk and be sociable at the same time.

And:

> Have you enjoyed the evening, lad? I like just sitting quiet and I often need a sit-down after standing working all day, eh? And it's the playing not the winning which is the important part of an enjoyable evening.

And again:

> When was that night we were playing here, Nigel? With Henry and all? That was a super night! I really enjoyed myself. More than ever … Just a quiet night and no-one in the pub … You know, Nigel: I thought later that was one of the best nights of my life! Really! One of the best nights of my life … A quiet evening of dominoes. Just great. Right?

I could share this sentiment with and through Tony. I came to experience a being-in-Wanet as a kind of beneficent recognition and beneficial inclusion: a cosmopolitan politesse. While for others, such as Sid, belonging entailed placement in a local classificatory schema of symbolic positions – me as a builder's mate, a farm-labourer, an offcomer, a resident of Cedar High Farm, a 'young buck', a client and so on – for Tony it was different. He seemed secure in a life that graciously and casually included others in the circle of what he most cherished: relaxing at the pub over a game and a drink and a smoke. Anyone might be thus included. This was a lesson, indeed, that Tony was keen that I should learn explicitly:

> TONY: Nigel and Molly win again … Why did we ever teach Nigel the 'bones'!
> NIGEL: It's a rum do!
> TREVOR: What's that! A 'rum do'? [he chuckles] You picking up the local talk, Nigel! … [laughing] Nay, what a Sadducee and a Pharisee you are Nigel, for sure! A Sadducee and a Pharisee.
> SID: 'Parasite' you mean!
> DAVE [wandering over from the dartboard]: Don't wear Nigel out with dominoes. He's got a hard day again tomorrow on the farm! … God! Tony and Heather and Trevor and Sid – that's a dominoes' super-league you're playing with, Nigel! Watch out!
> SID: So you'll have had another 'hard' day today on the farm, Nigel, eh? …
> NIGEL: Not too bad.
> TONY: You know, Nigel isn't asked often enough to draw in for a game. People forget too often to ask you, Nigel. But you should just come and barge in if you want a game, eh? Like old Mick Blythe did last night. Just come over and say you want a game. Okay? [I grin appreciatively]

A year later, as I prepared now to leave Wanet, Tony and I reprised our initial meeting, leaning beside one another at the Eagle bar – refilling our glasses before another round at the dominoes' table. Tony now took the opportunity to make plain to me the kind of 'life philosophy' that he espoused, and the kind of relationality he felt we had shared:

"You seem to like Wanet, Nigel, and I've enjoyed your company. You look like you could be here for good: people either love it here or hate it, and you seem to love it. You're not as daft as you look! … Maybe this is a stupid speech and I'm not saying it the right way, but I think you and I share a philosophy of life. I mean some people come here and understand nothing of our way of life but you've kept your eyes open: you know, you've been privileged in being allowed to see these aspects of village life … My recipe of life has always been to give and to help others. I'm not religious and I'd help

someone of any religion – Protestant, Jewish, whatever – as a fellow human being; religious differences are no big problem, see. Because most folks are good; you get a few bad buggers, but most are good; and from them you'll get a return, some time and in some form, even if at first you don't recognize it as such … Always sow a seed. It's pleasant in itself, it makes you feel good, whatever else might come of it … Now you know I'm an honest man and I speak my mind and this is just what I feel … Anyway, back to the 'bones', lad? Doris and Fred next. These two might be hard to shift! What do you think?"

I do not mean to sentimentalize Tony Harvey, or my relationship with him. I did, however, experience his behaviour in Wanet as distinct: him practicing a moral inclusiveness that entailed a 'polite' recognition of individual others. I found myself included within the society of the dominoes' game simply as 'Nigel'.

I have intimated that playing dominoes provided something of a foundation for sociality at the Eagle: recognized as an appropriate way of spending time in the pub while also drinking and chatting. But more than this, the games of dominoes gave a specific form to social interaction, a certain grammar of exchange: playing dominoes at the dominoes' table possessed a rhythm and a setting that framed and situated whatever else (chatting, drinking, observing neighbours) one may be doing. Needless to say, such a foundation of sociality was so routine to pub regulars as to go largely unremarked. Nevertheless, the playing ushered in a social space with an assured ethos of its own: bounded, small-scale, tranquil, mannered, cordial – and exciting. It was a space safely removed from the bustle of the rest of the pub and also, to an extent at least, from the conventions (the complexities and limitations) of the social worlds beyond the game. Playing dominoes had its own form of politeness in which other kinds of social contest – other alliances and other disputes, other likes and dislikes – did not intrude.

One might characterize this as a kind of silence. As a grammar of exchange, playing dominoes provided a silent environment in the sense that it negated a workaday world of social relations, histories and associations. These were rendered irrelevant. Comfortable and comforting, able to accommodate newness and difference, dominoes as practiced by Tony Harvey enabled relative strangers to be approached and included politely and *in silence*, distracted by the rules and rhythms of play (including the routine clacking of 'the bones' on the table surface). Moreover, Tony extended such invitations – and attention, and recognition – to Anyone, including strangers such as myself.

Dominoes, Politesse and Love

It would not be inappropriate, I have argued, to describe the playing dominoes in the Eagle pub in Wanet as a form of cosmopolitan politesse. The protagonists come together, but with integrity and privacy. They are physically assembled around the table, they are intellectually and emotionally invested in playing out the game in a skilful and winning way, and in the process they provide one another with individual spaces in which to be, spaces in which to maintain individual identities. Games of dominoes provided a conventional form – a polite, ambiguous, even anodyne surface – upon which strangers and locals alike might approach one another without compromising their integrity: without having to say too much; without extraneous knowledge; without presumptions of external identities. Dominoes was merely a game; but it was also a *loving* device.

Love is the final concept I want to introduce into my argument.

In *The Way of Love*, Luce Irigaray argues that human history has seen us exist as 'eunuchs of the heart and the flesh' (2002, 3). We have encountered difference but not been sufficiently attentive or respectful; we have always sought to incorporate otherness in one comprehensive social order: one meaning, one community, one culture, one country, and not really appreciated the need to 'dialogue in difference' in order truly to meet, speak with and love the Other. There is a core to human being – the individual in all his or her diverse subjective dimensions – that is irreducible to a collective form. Yet, no culture and no language to date has done more than veil this, moving human being away from itself. Cultures have claimed to apprehend and legislate for nature through ideas, concepts, words and things, but this forgets 'the initial being of each human' (Irigaray 2002, 140). Culture 'remain[s] outside the most intimate and the most nuclear of subjectivity' (Irigaray 2002, 47)

Irigaray elaborates. To love, as she would define it – and I would agree – is to reach out to, recognise and include, another individual human being who is, inevitably, irreducibly different. The conventional forms and practices from *ego*'s habitual culture will not manage this. In order to even hope to accommodate the unique encounter with an Other, *ego* must therefore transgress any forms of engaging the world that he or she has learned: to perceive in ways that do not simply reproduce the same and 'know' the Other in a pre-determined way. To encompass the experience of individual otherness it is necessary to cultivate a new language and new interactional practices. In our freedom, moreover, 'we live before speaking', Irigaray insists (2002, 84–85): we are not prisoners within the horizons of our languages and we *can* 'transgress' already learned forms. To attend to another being virtuously it is necessary to open oneself up to the specificity of the moment of meeting and to create new forms of the sensible and the intellectual that accord with that momentary specificity – and so do justice to new, real and unknown meanings. One must determine to be – to feel, to know, to listen, to speak, to act – fully in the moment of the encounter and overcome one's instincts for cultural habits.

What one is attempting to do justice to is a 'touching' of the senses (visual, acoustic, skinny) of distinct individual human bodies. This touching encounter has a spatiality and a temporality of its own. One might imagine it as a form of politeness that does not approach aggressively or enfold but is a kind of dialectic: give and take, a tentative, ongoing approach and withdrawal that may culminate in a standstill. The key characteristic of this new polite relation may be silence. This is a kind of loving recognition that endures the difference of Being, Irigaray concludes, and whose inclusiveness does not classify or designate and does not need or expect fusion.

The formulation 'I love to you' is probably better, more respectful, than 'I love you', Irigaray considers (2002, 60), a latter phrasing that appears to reduce the Other to an object of *ego's* love. Nor should the limits of a loving relationship be forgotten. The gap between Self and Other can never be finally overcome, and we should not believe ourselves to be absolutely near or the same merely because physically we are lovers – or neighbours, or fellow members of a culture or nation or church. Another individual human being remains strange, an elusive mystery; and each drawing near indeed amounts to an insurmountable, irreducible distancing! The approach and the meeting at best imply 'becoming aware of the diversity of our worlds and creating paths which, with respect for this diversity, allow holding dialogs' (Irigaray 2002, 68). This is why

the relationship of love may be said to be characterized by silence and reserve. Self consciousness also remains vital: ego recognising the partiality and differentiation of his or her perspective, knowing each moment what belongs to itself and what to the world beyond. Finally, any human interlocutors must withdraw into themselves to negate subjecting the Other to an alien order. The loving relationship may be a 'conjoin[ing of] two ways of (…) cultivating the truth' but the virtuous task, 'the most human task', must remain the attempt to 'lead the relation with the Other from nature to culture without abolishing the duality of subjectivities' (Irigaray 2002, 124–127).

I admire Luce Irigaray's 'programme' of love (cf. Rapport 2019). Her vision imagines how, in their freedom, human beings may cultivate a kind of action and interaction that does justice to individuality and the moments in which it is encountered through social forms that transcend extant cultural systems of symbolic classification. Such 'loving speech', that is not confined or imposed upon by the paralyzing traditions of collective exchange, is not an easy prospect, Irigaray admits. Indeed, it is a constant work: something that cannot be invented only once. But it is possible. Irigaray's 'loving speech' is a version of cosmopolitan politesse as I have imagined it. It entails recognising an Other's individuality while not presuming to reach an intersubjective communion with it, or anticipating incorporating it within a cultural world of classes and categories, within one's own world-views or life-projects.

Envoi

It is the case that globalism necessarily entails neither simply the migration of enlightened people nor enlightened attitudes to movement, becoming or futurity. It was Ernest Gellner's judgement, nevertheless, that 'mobility, egalitarianism and free choice of identity have better prospects in the modern world than they had in the past' (1993, 3). The value of cosmopolitanism as an anthropological project is that it returns us to an Enlightenment humanism which sponsored the universal sameness of the human condition as against the constructed differences of cultural categories and collectivities (Rapport and Wardle 2018). The cosmopolitan project for anthropology entails recognising and respecting *Anyone* as a universal human actor. It does so by promoting (its versions of) *scientific* methods – ethnography, microsocial analysis, universal comparison – by which the capabilities and liabilities of human being become better understood; by promoting *aesthetic forms* by which our common humanity and our unique individuality may both be represented; and by promoting those *moral and political arrangements* by which *Anyone*'s birthright of an individually authored future is enabled. Cosmopolitan politesse I have urged as a 'loving' device of such global recognition and inclusion.

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ORCID

Nigel Rapport http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2803-0212

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