THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISCRIMINATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN RHODESIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AFRICAN WORKERS, 1940-1973 APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX A

AFRICAN WORKING CLASS CASH WAGE INEQUALITIES 1961-71

The only available data on cash wage inequalities amongst Africans are to be found for 1961 and 1971 in the C.S.O. cash wage distributions for various groups of African employees classified according to industrial sector.[1] The data enable an accurate separation of the industrial proletarian class (so defined) from the African working-class as a whole which would, in addition, include workers in the Agricultural and Forestry sector and the Private Domestic Services sector. These two groups are separated for analytical purposes in Chapter 2 and hence shall be dealt with separately here.

Unfortunately, the C.S.O. cash wage distributions for 1961 and 1971 show the total number of employees in given cash wage ranges but the money values of the cash wage intervals are specified in <u>current</u> prices. Consequently, no legitimate comparison can be directly made without an adjustment of these cash wage intervals and the corresponding numbers of cash wage earners within their respective ranges. To date (1975) the 1971 data available from the Central Statistical Office have not been released in an adjusted form. The adjustment has therefore been made by the author on the basis of the procedure and methodology outlined below.

PROCEDURE FOR MAKING 1971 CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION DATA EQUIVALENT WITH 1961 DATA

A number of techniques are available to make this adjustment. The simple graphical method of plotting the cumulative number of cash wage earners against the wage intervals adjusted to constant prices would be least satisfactory because the line joining the plotted points would be extremely curvilinear, especially in the upper cash wage ranges, and slight inaccuracies in graphing and interpolation could easily lead to considerable margins of error.

Nicholson, in dealing with a similar problem for the British economy, has suggested three other techniques, these being: graphical interpolation from the Lorenz curve; arithmetical proportionate interpolation; and double-log proportionate interpolation.[2] Nicholson discusses the merits of each and concludes that the double-log proportionate method is preferred, primarily because it yields quantitative results in a systematic fashion.[3] Accordingly, this method has been used in this instance for the same reasons.

To make the wage intervals comparable, the intervals for 1961 were inflated by the use of two Consumer Price Indices: the European Consumer Price Index for the period 1961-64; and the African Consumer Price Index for the period 1964-71. The results of this adjustment can be found in Table 1 of the Appendix. Having expressed the 1961 intervals in 1971 prices the next step is to convert the 1971 pattern of cash wage distribution to fit the adjusted wage intervals. The double-log proportionate method was used for this task. The estimates derived from this procedure can be found in Tables 2 and 3 together with, in the latter Table, computed values for the annual logarithmic rates of growth of each cash wage class for the period 1961-71. The estimates in Table 2 are then added on a cumulative basis to show the changes in the percentage of African working class cash wage earners falling below the upper limit of each cash wage band for 1961 and 1971 (see Table 3).

Finally, an adjustment to the data has been made to eliminate the effects of the inclusion of the Agricultural and Forestry and Private Domestic sectors in Tables 2 and 3. The results of these adjustments and estimates for the industrial proletariat cash wage distribution are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Data in Table 6 shows the relationship between the cash and non-cash elements of black wages between 1965 and 1970 while Tables 7 and 8 provide data on the distribution of and proportion of African working class wages paid in cash in each cash wage band.

In Tables 9 and 10 the 1961-71 cash wage distribution for domestic and farm workers respectively are compared, the 1961 and 1971 data having first been made equivalent to enable this task.

DOUBLE LOG PROPORTIONATE METHOD BASED ON NICHOLSON'S FORMULATION

The procedure used here, the double-log proportionate method, is described by Nicholson and an example is given below. In the cash wage intervals provided in the Central Statistical Office tables, the numbers of cash wage earners earning under £10 (1961 prices) are given as 335,060. The 1971 price equivalent of £10 at 1961 prices is £12.26. The task now is to interpolate a value for the number of cash wage earners in 1971 which fell under £12.26 (1971 prices). The calculation is done as follows :-

INCOME	LOG	Full Class	DIFFERENCE To Required Income	CULULATED INCOME	LOG	DIFFERENCE
£10.00	1.00000			460,360	5.67062	
£12.26	1.08849	0.30103	0.08849			0.01942
£20.00	1.30103			299,516	5.47641	

Data are given above to show how the numerical values for income band 1 in Table 2 have been estimated. The logarithm of the total number of incomes greater than £12.26 is estimated by double-log proportionate interpolation as follows:

$$5.67062 + \left\{ \left(\frac{.08849}{.30103}\right) \cdot (-0.1942) \right\} = 5.61353 \text{ (A.log} = 41067)$$

Hence, the total number of wage earners greater than £12.26 is estimated as 410,670. By subtraction from the total number of wage earners of 722,410, the number of wage earners under £12.26 is given as 311,740. This same procedure is adopted for all cash wage intervals required to be estimated.

INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION

The absolute levels of income inequality in the industrial proletariat for 1961 and 1971 are impossible to represent from the available data. The data only relates to cash wage distributions. Since it does not provide full coverage of wages in kind, no unambiguous quantitative statements may be validly made. This does not mean that the cash wage distribution cannot provide an important insight into income inequality amongst the industrial proletariat. It should however be recorded that the observations made are subject to a general qualification that the proportion of total wages in cash to wages in kind will be higher for the upper income groups.

Thus, it is observed from Table 4 that 70,576 industrial workers in 1961, or 24 percent of this group, were in receipt of cash wages under £12.26 per month. Some 60 percent fell under the cash wage level of £24.54 per month and less than 0.5 percent were earning cash wages in excess of £00.00.

Changes in inequality from 1961-71 are significant for this group. These changes can be seen in shifts in the distribution of cash wages given firstly in Tables 2 and 3 for the African working class as a whole and then more specifically for the industrial proletariat in Tables 4 and 5. A first impression given by Table 2 is that there has been rapid growth in the total number of African cash wage earners in the higher cash wage bands. This impression is confirmed by the data calculated for and tabulated in Table 3. In general, the logarithmic rate of growth of numbers of cash wage earners by wage interval has tended to be higher for the upper wage bands, reaching a maximum for cash wage band 7 (£85.00 - £110.42 monthly) of 22.77 percent per annum. Implied by this trend is a movement of cash wage earners away from the lower dash wage bands. This implication is more clearly represented in Table 3 by a

comparison of the percentage distribution of numbers of cash wage earners by wage band. The proportions in the lower two bands dropped whilst the proportions in the top six bands all increased.

Thus in 1961 it is found that only 1.01 percent of the total number of black cash wage earners earned a monthly cash wage in excess of £61.34. By 1971 this proportion had grown to 4.16 percent of the total number of black cash wage earners. At the lower end of the scale 03.02 percent of black cash wage earners in 1961 fell under the £24.54 level while by 1971 this figure had fallen to 67.61 percent.

The cash wage distribution pattern is heavily influenced by the income distribution patterns, wage levels and numbers employed in those two employment sectors not incorporated in the industrial proletariat, i.e. Agriculture and Forestry and Private Domestic Services. To demonstrate the actual pattern of inequality and changes in inequality between 1961-71 for the industrial proletariat, the data in Table 2 must be adjusted to exclude these two sectors. The results of this adjustment are given in Table 4 and measures of shifts in the resultant cash wage distribution pattern are found in Table 5.

It is noted that the percentage of total cash wage earners over £85.03 which in 1961 was 1.01 had by 1971 increased to 4.16 while in the case of the industrial proletariat these respective percentages were 2.03 and 7.98. It is not possible to determine unambiguously the magnitude of the changes in inequality between 1961 and 1971 and whether there was a greater increase of inequality within the industrial proletarian group as opposed to the total African employment structure. The reason for this is that no income data are provided with the data on the distribution of cash wage earners, thereby precluding the construction of Lorentz curves and Lorentz co-efficients.

The only available indicators are the logarithmic growth rates computed for the two classifications. When comparisons are made between these two sets of growth rates it is shown that, in the cash wage bands 1,2,3,4 and 8, higher rates of growth in cash wage earners were experienced in the industrial proletarian group, while for the cash wage bands 5,6 and 7 the opposite held. This still, however, provides no conclusive measure of the differential growth of income inequality between the two alternative classifications.

Also it should be noted that the cash wage distribution discussed above cannot be relied upon as conclusive evidence of changes in inequality of wage incomes because the distributions omit consideration of 'wages in kind'. Table 6 illustrates the relationship between cash and non-cash wage incomes for all African workers for 1965-1970. A strong feature is the relative constancy of the proportion of wage income in kind around the 14.3 percent level. This indicates that the growth of cash wages in this period might provide a useful indicator of the growth of wage incomes.

However, no deductions about the distributional changes in real earnings could be reliably made about the data discussed in Tables 2-6 for it is well known that the proportion of wages in kind in some sectors exceed the proportions earned in others. This influence can be isolated by comparing the proportions of wages paid in cash for total employees with the equivalent proportions for the industrial proletariat. In 1961 an estimated 11.48 percent of total wage incomes consisted solely of payments in cash only. For the industrial proletariat this figure was 19.33 percent. A similar trend existed between these two classifications for 1971; and though the data in Tables 7 and 8 for the two years 1961 and 1971 are not directly comparable it is still possible to conclude that during the period 1961-71 there was an increased tendency for employers to pay employees in cash only. To some extent, the increase in the total numbers of persons falling into the higher income bands, as shown in

Table 2, might be attributed in part to a modification in the methods of remuneration by employers. Accordingly, the shift in the proportion of cash wage earners in upper cash wage brackets may tend to be inflated between 1961 and 1971 on this count.

FARM AND DOMESTIC WORKERS: CASH WAGE INEQUALITIES AMONGST THE SUB-PROLETARIAT

The 1961-71 cash wage distribution for domestic workers is found in Table 9 and the dynamics of change in inequality of cash incomes are indicated in this distribution.

In 1961 some 64,6 percent of domestic workers received a cash wage of less than ƒ12,26 (1971 prices) monthly. By 1971 this proportion had increased to 85,2 percent, at least as shown by the data in the Tables.

This tentative conclusion should be read and amended in the light of the fact that the 1961 and 1971 data are not 100 percent comparable. In the earlier data domestic workers employed on farms are excluded. This would have the effect of decreasing the proportion of workers earning below ƒ10 as shown in the 1961 distribution, since it could reasonably be assumed that domestic workers on farms were, on average, paid less than their counterparts in the urban areas. In the figures for total employment in the sector in 1961 some 94,600 workers are enumerated. This indicates that at that time some 13 540 workers were employed on farms. The effect of adding all these workers to the wage category below ƒ12,26 of monthly cash wages indicates a shift in the proportion paid under that level from 81,5 percent in 1961 to 85,2 percent in 1971. Thus, whilst domestic workers' earnings grew very modestly from 1961-71 for many workers there was no improvement in real cash wages. Indeed, a larger number of domestic workers suffered a decline in real cash wages in this period as indicated in Table 9. It could be argued that real wages for

these workers need not have fallen since payments in kind could have compensated for the fall experienced in cash wages. This may be the case. However, although there has been a slight increase in the proportion of workers paid in cash and kind, from 95,7 percent to 97,3 percent during the period, there is a strong indication that many workers were in a worse economic position in 1971 than a decade before.

Data on the 1961-71 cash distribution of farm workers are found in Table 10. The data for 1971 exclude casual employees (45,550) and contract labourers (35,480). Both these groups would most likely have fallen in the wage bracket below $12.26 monthly. In the Table, the data indicate that the numbers and the proportion of farm workers earning a cash wage below $12.26 (1971 prices) fell between 1961 and 1971. This conclusion must be regarded as tentative, however, because it is not clear the extent to which that data are not 100 percent comparable. In the 1961 distribution it arrears from comparison with published employment figures at the time that almost all workers were accounted for in the distribution.[4] In 1971 some 81,030 workers are excluded. If this latter group were included in the lowest income band - a reasonable assumption - then 285,935 workers or 83 percent of the total would have been in this lowest category in 1971. Hence, it cannot <u>inambiguously</u> be concluded that inequality of cash incomes was reduced within the sector between 1961-71. The data must be tratqd with caution.

NOTES TO APPENDIX A

(1) Rhodesia, Final Report of The September 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965 and an as yet unpublished tabulation of 1971 data in Race Distribution of African Employees, 1971, C.S.O. DI/599/50, December, 1971, (mimeo).

(2) R.J. Nicholson, Economic Statistics and Economic Problems, McGraw-Hill, London, 1969, p.292-297.

(3) Ibid., p.296.

(4) See Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., June, 1970 for comparison.

APPENDIX B

SETTLER IDEOLOGY AND AFRICAN UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN POSTWAR RHODESIA

A largely ignored aspect of underdevelopment in Rhodesia, which has played a crucial role in legitimating the dominance, policies and status of the ruling group in the economic structure, is the conception, construction and transformation of ideology. By ideology is meant what Plamenatz has called the 'sets of ideas or beliefs or attitudes characteristic of a group'.[1] The group whose ideology is being examined here is essentially, though not exclusively, the white community's whose ideas, beliefs about and attitudes towards black economic structures, enterprise and labour have created an ideology, sometimes unsophisticated and in other instances sophisticated, which has been readily expounded to 'explain' African underdevelopment in Rhodesian society.

It will be a thesis advanced here that these ideological tenets have been, and still are, common to most whites in Rhodesia, that they concern economic issues which are important to the white minority, and have served the <u>functional</u> purpose of legitimising privilege and providing an explanation for co-existent development and under-development in an increasingly class stratified socio-economic structure. It will also be argued that the ideology held by whites has in the main been a <u>class</u> ideology, <u>viz</u>., it can be distinguished from the ideology of other classes in significant ways; and that, whilst essentially capitalist in origin, this ideology has important components in its make-up which derive from the specific historical and contemporary settler colonial situation. The contrived ideology has been a necessity to the governing class and has served (at times) various purposes. It has provided a part justification in formulating economic policies, for designing economic structures in a way in which they have been formed and for maintaining various discriminatory

institutional arrangements. The ideology has also provided a pseudo-authoritative rationalization of the status quo and attempts have been made to use these ideological tenets to provide a veneer of quasi-respectability for, in some cases, paternalist capitalism and, in other instances, for maintaining dependency and underdevelopment in various semi-feudal economic structures. An important aspect of this ideology has been its propensity to direct attention away from the institutional structure as a contributory cause of Rhodesian underdevelopment. In particular, this has manifested itself in various forms of racism in attempts to explain black poverty as a result of human-specific characteristics 'peculiar (unfortunately) to the African population'.

Once settler ideological foundations are accepted - as they have been by most whites - a particular view of Rhodesian society is fostered in which under-development comes to be regarded as a result of factors outside the realm of social control and of basically non-materialist origin. In this regard, the 'religion of the market' - with discussion on the forces of supply and demand weighing heavily - conveniently provides the 'magic box' out of which 'causal' explanation is produced. Typically, little or no attention is given to the institutional structure within which these 'forces' must operate, or, if not thus ignored, the institutional framework is invested with the seemingly ordained property of unchangeability; and thus the mystifying picture of the 'forces' of the market, wildly determining all in a vacuum, like the (almost) extra-terrestial 'Invisible Hand' of a vulgarized Smithian economics, is perpetuated.

This particular 'market mentality', together with an ideology which suggests that the real causes of African underdevelopment are predominantly internal to the psyche, make-up, ways, behaviour, tradition

and culture of the African, externalizes the origins of inequality by absolving itself of any responsibility for 'directing and structuring' the alignment of market forces, and it attributes this causal responsibility almost entirely to the subjects of underdevelopment. From this philosophical standpoint, little can be done to alter what is conceived of as an original and endemic state of underdevelopment, which is (mysteriously) unrelated to development elsewhere in the economic structure. Gradualism, long-term evolution, luck and fortuitous circumstance become the watchwords of (hopefully) potential progress in this situation. Little can be done in the interim except wait.

It is the ideological fabric which makes up part of this embracing conceptual scheme that will be examined here, especially in its populist forms, as evidenced through various official, governmental and day-to-day statements taken variously from the 1940-72 period.

This ideology will only be examined in respect of two major classes in black society - workers and peasants - though more encompassing views, or attitudes towards, and beliefs about the African are also relevant.

THE AFRICAN

The crudist form of racist ideology concerned the African - a simple stereotyped individual of easy persuasion, defective mental faculties and slothful indolence. As the Minister of Native Affairs - a man traditionally invested with the wisdom of knowing the African - put it in 1942, in giving a reason why the Compulsory (Native) Labour Act should be introduced and reliance should not be placed on the 'voluntary system' (allowing wages to rise and so attract labour supplies); 'the voluntary system is absolutely inadequate ... one can well understand that that would be the case, because the native is essentially slow to make up his mind'.[2]

In general terms, the African was regarded as being deficient in intelligence, this being rationalized by liberal critics of government into an argument claiming that 'we expect too much intelligence and understanding from the native'.[3] Parliamentarians were reminded regularly about this particular 'fault': 'we must not forget that the mind of the local African with a few exceptions is undeveloped, and I suggest for consideration that he needs a certain amount of direction such as a European child has to have'.[4] Hence this speaker's advocacy of the institution of a government sponsored Native Labour Supply Commission in 1946 to recruit foreign labour - after all, the locals just were not up to it. Also, it was recognized, some locals were more deficient than others: 'in addition to that, there are many natives who are certainly below the normal intelligence and so on, and to them also (as to child labour) the minimum wage (should) not apply'.[5] The African was 'not as far advanced as the European'.[6] He had a low mentality which in part accounted for his weakness of succumbing to 'all sorts of mischief'.[7] Agitators would arouse him, mislead him and spur him on, making trouble where none existed. For this reason, amongst others, African unionization could not be permitted in 1947 and a paternalist, more embracing, control system of Labour Boards was established to 'manage' the African worker's problems. This need for paternalist guidance was even recognized by solid white labourites who thought it proper to give 'sympathetic consideration to those of an inferior race'.[8] On top of this, the inferior African was really alike a wayward child: he needed guidance, supervision and above all discipline. This was convenient. The 'superior', skilled, more advanced whites were (luckily) in a position to provide this 'missing ingredient', though of course selective use would also be made of 'boss boys' to control workers by proxy where white manpower was limited or funds were scarce.

This was all part of the white man's burden, a 'responsibility for the native (to) guide him justly and correctly as far as we can'.[9] To this end forced labour was regarded as 'in no way derogatory'.[10] Nonetheless, at least some saw this as guiding the African 'with a rope around his neck'.[11] Government spokesmen over-rode these chilling complaints through various appeals to the civilizing mission of colonial expansion. 'Possibly we have been sent here by Providence in an endeavour to uplift the black races in this part of the continent'.[11] The mission was also a <u>special</u> one because, after all, 'generally speaking the Mashona in this country is far inferior to the native in that part of Africa' (West Africa)'.[12] Better, then, to have compulsory rather than a voluntary labour system, because one could not get the 'boys' to do in 8 hours work what they were supposed to do in 12 hours between sunrise and sunset. This was 'quite impossible, especially on farms'.[13] With this particularly unfavourable labourer, specific injunctions were required to see that the job was done properly. They had to be told what to do. And, like children, the 'boys' (sometimes referred to as 'adult boys' or 'fully grown boys') needed guidance and constant supervision.[14] Indeed, this was to be 'good' for them: 'The effect of getting them out to work will I believe mean that later on they will come out voluntarily'.[15] Further, the Africans, or some of them, were eventually to see the benefit of forced labour: 'I would point out that a lot of the Africans conscripted under the Act will receive a tremendous benefit by virtue of the fact that they are conscripted'.[16] 'Loafers' would be weaned from their wasteful ways and the 'dignity of labour' would be inculcated into them - for the benefit of all and the satisfaction of the common good. In any event, they too were citizens of Empire and were not only expected to pay allegiance to it, but were willing to do so: 'I believe we are fortunate in the fact that the natives are loyal; they are prepared to give their loyal support to the Empire in her time of need'.[17]

THE AFRICAN WORKER

Whilst general stereotyped views existed about the African, a whole separate but integrated ideology has grown up about the African worker. Whites knew that blacks were intellectually inferior, but that was not sufficient to explain why the African would not work - it only accounted for his inability to advance, to perform particular types of work, and to meet specific occupational requirements.

Another theory was therefore required. It was found conveniently in the moral laxity of African society and in the general propensity for Africans to 'loaf'. Hence, there grew up the theory of the (African) loafer.

The moral backwardness of Africans was something deeply ingrained, perhaps unchangeable. Even economic progress would not raise or change their morals.[18] It was recognized that at root the labour supply shortage experienced continuously in various low-wage industries - particularly plantations - was somehow related to deep psychological propensities within the African himself: 'we will have to get right down and change the native himself before the (labour supply) problem will be solved'.[19] And this was the liberal hope. The rest implicitly accepted that really this was impossible, a daydream. Africans had come from a state of idleness. The mission of the liberal colonist was to rescue him from it: 'it is ... not in the long term interests of our African brethren that they should be left in the state of idleness in which they are today'.[20] This was 1948. Even 58 years of colonization, urging, enticing, persuading and compulsory labour had not apparently fully worked. More was needed. But in the interim foreign labour - which somehow was more willing, indeed better - would be required. The first principle of 'native affairs must be to inculcate into the African the idea that labour is the lot of man and that only by labour can he improve his position and only by labour can he live'.[21] The African must not be

encouraged 'to remain indolent and to live a happy-go-lucky life, no matter how pleasant it sounds, because ultimately it is fatal'.[22]

The theory of the loafer served a variety of purposes: it 'explained' the persistent labour shortage on farms and on mines; it provided a rationalization for importing 'boys' from outside the country; it attempted (not always successfully) to draw attention away from the wage structure and incentives for peasants to seek employment; it provided the basis for influx control policy in the towns and for creating a labour supply mechanism for the plantation economy; it legitimated the idea that many Africans in urban areas were really 'vagrants'. The theory had, and indeed still has, various strands. All Africans had a strong propensity to loaf. Thus the Minister of Labour, Social Welfare and Housing noted in 1959, whilst introducing the so-called 'non-racial' Industrial Conciliation Bill, that 'The indigenous population had never had any real need, desire or interest for work'.[23] They had experienced a 'background of centuries of ignorance and indolence which blunted any incentive to economic betterment'.[24] Hence it was not surprising that there existed many loafers and 'won't works'. Work, after all, was only a recent phenomenon as far as the African was concerned: 'it is historically true that the native really did not get down to doing any work at all until he discarded his skins and put on clothes', noted the Prime Minister in 1948.[25] Work was essentially a post-1890 phenomenon.

But not all would succumb to the various pressures to work or so gladly take up the numerous offers of employment that were available. Whilst such persons were in abundance, they created particular problems when they congregated in the white towns, causing trouble, 'living off their wits', sponging on the 'honest' Africans and indulging in and

promoting all sorts of vices. Indeed, the loafers were often blamed for fomenting the 'General Strike' of 1948. The solution was (relatively) simple: 'I feel that the Government should at this time try to clear out some of the loafers from the towns. It would not only in a small measure alleviate the acute (labour) shortage in the outside districts, but it would help to avoid some of those unpleasant situations which develop from time to time'.[26] In the mid-1940's the farm 'labour shortage' was worrying both farmers and government. The Compulsory Labour Act had been repealed since it had been a war measure and its justification had fallen away. New labour supply mechanisms were needed.

Policy changes also required a new theoretical background perspective and justification. The theory of the (urban) loafer was convenient for this purpose. In 1948 a motion on the labour shortage was introduced into the House of Assembly calling for immediate action by government to rigidly enforce all existing relevant laws in order 'to remove unemployed natives from urban areas'.[27] The motion was put and agreed to. It was claimed that there were several thousand loafers in Salisbury alone, itself evidence of the Africans (by now) well known love of leisure and disinclination to work. Housing controls, pass laws, police surveillance and other measures were suggested to deal with the problem. The liberal perspective was that 'the loafers in the big cities especially should be put away'.[28] The more reactionary viewpoint added another twist to the (popular) theory of the loafer: 'If we are going to enforce laws to remove these (loafers) from the towns, the fact that they are sent back into the country will not change their habits'.[29] In short, once a loafer, always a loafer: 'If a native is a loafer in town he will be a loafer for ever'.[30] Part of the problem was seen to be the ease with which the loafers could loaf: 'It was far too easy for loafers to loaf'.[31]

In more recent times the 'loafer' has been transformed into the 'vagrant'. However, the essential concept has remained the same. Only more sophisticated language has been substituted and a slightly more intellectually presentable case has been propounded for why the 'vagrants' ought to be removed from the urban areas. As a result, the Vagrancy Act of 1960 has been applied, along with other controls, and has been extended in scope and application in the 1973 amendment which widened the definition of a vagrant considerably.

A more sophisticated variant of the theory of the loafer has been the theory of the black 'target worker'. It explains African labour supply responsiveness in terms of a 'limited wants' thesis which argues that Africans only seek jobs for the purpose of securing specific amounts of income, sufficient to cover the costs of particular items or needs. Once this wage or income is obtained, the target becomes satisfied and the worker withdraws from the labour market. This theory is closely linked to, indeed it is part of, the theory of the backward bending supply curve of effort which, it was argued, applied to the African; 'In fact, generally, if you increase the natives wages you get less work'.[32] Optimal labour policy therefore ought to be a low-wage policy, if only to save the African from his own irresponsibility; 'I fear that any increase in native wages will mean that there will be more gambling and more native beer drinking unless there is more control over the native than we have today'.[33] Low wages suitably laced with widespread control was the panacea for development. Moreover, it was a particularly coherent and functional theory. The Africans had few wants or needs. These could be too easily satisfied if wages rose. Keep wages down and ensure that labour supplies are maximized. Some settlers had even calibrated the relationship between increased wages and the ensuing fall off in effort:

'If you pay (the) native double the wages he is accustomed to now he will just work 50 per cent less than he does now'.[34] The reason for this, in part, lay in African arrogance: 'invariably it means that by increasing native wages he does less work because he thinks he is indispensible'.[35] Extra wages would also be disastrous because 'the natives (were) great gamblers and many (spent) practically all their wages in gambling'.[36] It was conveniently overlooked that this was inconsistent with the 'pure' theory of the target worker, except insofar as the target was set by the desire to gamble a certain sum of money. Also, because the employers (generally) were thought to provide for <u>all</u> basic needs, the justification for wage increases simply fell away. 'Rations' were provided, accommodation made available and the cash wage was 'pocket money'. At the end of the month the cash wage was 'clear as all other expenses are paid, bar the clothes he wants to buy, by his employer'.[37] Extra wages would simply be squandered. Indeed, the argument went, wages really did not matter: 'The experience of many farmers is that it does not matter very much the rate of wage as long as the native is fed, housed and treated like a human being'.[38] 'Equitable' treatment would be a sufficient recompense for arduous labour because (you will find he is not so interested in the wages he (receivex)'.[39] Even if extra wages were not spent in drinking, gambling and having a good leisurely time, 'the native (was still) a most wasteful individual. (Even if) he buys a blanket he will not look after it'.[40] Better to save him from his folly. Indeed, remarked one farmer, with regard to housing, 'I find my natives are perfectly satisfied with a well-built kaffir hut'.[41] As regards food, 'many natives (liked) a good feed rather than an increase in wages'.[42] Hence, continuation of the 'rations' system, employer controlled housing and pocket-money-wage-policies would be adequate. There was no need to undermine these semi-feudal, long standing labour policies.

Another variant of the theory of the loafer concerned the reluctance of <u>indigenous</u> Africans to take work on plantations. Various explanations - other than those relating to the inadequate wage policy of the plantation economy - were offered for this. Local Africans were just 'unwilling' to do farm work, to get their hands dirty, even though, strangely enough, similar tasks would be performed by these same 'loafers' in the peasant economy. This was of course overlooked and instead employers cultivated the myth of the well-looked-after-farm-boy: 'on the farms the natives get everything. And the money they get is completely free from all expenditure for themselves except of course luxuries and their annual hut tax'.[43] Some believed natives would not work outside. Others blamed the labour shortage on education, agitators, and the old fall-back, the (local) African's <u>natural</u> reluctance to do farm work.

Proposed solutions to this crisis in labour supplies varied; compulsory, forced labour was introduced, despite objections from a few ardent white socialists about tyranny, exploitation and slavery;[44] a foreign contract labour system was begun; migrant labour agreements were entered into at governmental level; one proposal suggested setting up a central labour agency to handle all labour contracts, to pay all Africans the same wage in order 'to eliminate competition for labour by employers increasing wages';[45] suggestions were mooted to increase the supply of females into domestic work, so releasing males for the rest of the employer needs; farmers 'offered to finance the capital outlays to recruit up to 2 000 "boys" from Nyasaland <u>provided</u> the financiers received 50 per cent of the labour supply';[46] one bizarre proposal was 'to start establishing at once native peasants on the land, breeding up their families to be agricultural workers' - and this from a member of the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission;[47] loafers were to be ferreted out of their urban hiding-places, despite the fact that a 1946 study in Salisbury

showed that the loafer 'element' was a gross exaggeration because of 10 921 Africans examined only 176 were not on their 'lawful business';[48] it was suggested that the period of duration of validity of the urban pass be reduced, so enabling a quicker turnaround of Africans towards plantation employment; a slogan was suggested, to be given wide publicity in order to encourage the dis-hoarding of labour, which said: 'Are the boys you employ really necessary?',[49] farmers were encouraged to 'arrange some scheme of co-operation by sending their boys over to do a spot of work for a neighbour for a day or two';[50] Africans who owed tax but had left the colony, it was suggested, should be given dispensation from liability;[51] and a motion in Parliament to introduce minimum wages, predictably, was defeated, not to reappear again for 25 years; the name of the Labour Supply agency set up by government was cited as the Labour Supply Commission and not Bureau following its predecessor (Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau 1903-33) 'because the word "bureau" (was) so offensive to the natives'.[52]

The ideology concerning African workers, cultivated by settlers and government alike, satisfied advocates of the status quo about the wisdom of their policies, the correctness of the economic structures so established, as well as their general benevolence. Africans had different needs from Europeans, and the latter knew these best. The ethos of the 'civilizing mission' of bringing labour to the indolent African transformed itself into providing the 'guiding hand', exercising 'trusteeship', and, more recently, ensuring 'responsible decision-taking' and providing the skills and 'know-how' for 'modernization'. Whilst some ideologists were conscious of their role, some appear as having been blinded to this

prospect as, for example, the 'liberal' Minister of Labour in the late 1950's who, along with others, continued to speak of the Masters and Servants Act as essentially 'non-racial'.[53] Nonetheless, the ideology that had been built up over decades did not remain static. It changed and adapted itself to new circumstances and economic demands. Thus, following strikes and labour unrest in the late 1940's and political agitation in the 1950's, it was deemed desirable to incorporate Africans in industry under the Industrial Conciliation Act. A new ideological shift became necessary. Not <u>all</u> Africans now were irresponsible or unfit for unionism. Some were; but, to avoid them falling prey to agitators, controls were kept and steadily applied so that the nascent African unionist movement would always be manageable and under State control.

THE AFRICAN PEASANT

Whilst much of the ideology concerning Africans has been about workers, various views about peasants have also held strong sway and have been important in providing the ideological underpinnings of policies <u>towards</u> 'African' agriculture, policies which over the decades have resulted in the (relative) underdevelopment of the peasant economy and its displacement as capitalist penetration has increased. The cruder ideologies about the peasantry basically claimed that the peasants experienced an easy, lazy life, a life of few worries and general indolence. The peasant economy has been regarded as a wasting asset, inhabited by a privileged and pampered section of the society: 'natives are able at this moment (1942) to live at their kraals on land that is reserved for them free of charge'.[54] They too were essentially 'loafers' and had lots of spare time: 'The native could very well do three times as much work without suffering any hardship at all.'[55] It was even believed possible

to <u>forcibly</u> withdraw peasant labour supplies from the peasant economy with such a resource re-allocation having no effect on peasant welfare: 'I do not believe that the calling up of boys during those periods (during the reaping period) would have any real effect on production in their own reserves.'[56] At this time, and late into the 1960's, officials cultivated the view that their existed widespread disguised unemployment in peasant agriculture. Peasants would be better off at real work - in mines and on the plantations, especially. They were also a political threat, of a type: 'We are allowing them to live in a communistic state and they will be ripe for the seeds of the very doctrine we do not want them to espouse.'[57] If only the peasants could be turned into capitalists, with individual ownership of land and property. In the light of more recent, post-1965 community development policies, emphasizing community decision, the turn-around in perspective has been almost complete, though in recent times this has been necessary to establish a low-cost social security policy for the peripheral groups in rural society. Nonetheless, in the 1940's, peasant structures needed to be done away with, at least in so far as they hindered the free flow of labour supplies. Various myths were cultivated to provide justification for this: 'In his life in the reserve there is a minimum of responsibility.'[58] The peqsant male, the labour 'unit' in demand in the capitalist sector, had a life of luxury and ease which he ought to be rescued from: 'They have lived in their kraals and the women have done the work when they have got above the juvenile stage, and actually it will not at all be a bad thing for those natives to be turned out to work for a period.'[59] The rural life of the African, so long idyllic and blissful, could not last in the face of advancement: 'the African cannot expect to go on much longer living in the reserves. It is not in his interests to do so.'[60] Peasants ought to be proletarianized,

for their own good: 'to leave him there and to encourage him to stay there is inimical to his own interests.'[61]

Not only were the peasantry wholly dominated but their status in the periphery-center situation was like that of a child-parent relationship. The creation of labour supplies was thus regarded as an essential part of a maturation process. In order to legitimate this process, and provide a justification for not developing the peasant economy, a theory had to be created. This theory had a number of tenets, many of which still pertain in the 1970's and are applied not only to peasants, but also to African workers in the rural and urban sectors. This theory rested upon notions of a backward bending supply curve of effort in respect of price incentives to peasant producers; on the 'irrationality' of peasant asset-holding policies in respect of cattle, the principal form of stock-holding; and the 'unwillingness' of peasants to seek wage employment on the farms and mines. Belief in these tenets implied various optimal development strategies: if peasant responsiveness was price-neutral, various forms of 'forced' labour were better than price policies to bring about an increase in output or effort; irrational cattle-holding policies could only really be altered through compulsory de-stocking which would therefore be in the peasants' own interest; and foreign labour should be imported to overcome 'labour shortages' created by the indolence of unwilling indigenous peasants. Above all, the true believers judged peasant economic policy by impossible standards, and within the structures of their own creation, ignoring the important differences between the peasantry and plantation producers. This meant penalizing peasants for 'perceived' differential performance in a system which was designed to displace the peasant mode of production and induce a proletarianization process. Denied the means to achieve economic ends, the peasantry were castigated for not being able to meet capitalist desires, objectives and

levels of development. The ideology was well expressed in the Second Report of the Development Co-ordinating Commission in 1949: 'Sudden and substantial raising of price, even of one commodity, may by making it easier to win a subsistence from the land, induce less instead of greater effort. Risk of this is especially great where the Native population has wide freedom to ensure subsistence by various combinations of wage employment and working (or half working) its own land.'[62] Yet even the records of Chief Native Commissioners in the 1940's provided the data to undermine this rationalization. Thus after the 1949 devaluation, which led to an increase in maize prices, the following was reported: 'With the rise in maize prices following devaluation there was a sharp rise in the amount marketed and the figure rose from 388 726 bags in 1949 to 791 488 in 1950 ... It is quite obvious that the price incentive has stimulated maize production.'[63] Yet, when producer levies were introduced for Africans around the same time, the disincentive effects were <u>not</u> considered to be powerful enough to cause a revision of the policy of taxing peasant production.

It was in respect of the 'irrationality' of peasant asset holding policy - 'the Africans inherent love of and attachment to cattle' - that the ideology of Rhodesian development policy was, and still is, strongest.[64] In 1944 the Production and Trade Commission expressed the conventional ideology: 'Natives rarely follow economic principles in raising cattle, being content to sell a beast only when they need some money.'[65] Even in this statement, however, can be found part of the answer to the Commission's problem, <u>viz</u>., that cattle, as wealth or assets, perform an important security function in a low-income society which tends to only release or liquidate these assets in time of need. The rising price of <u>lobola</u>, in terms of cattle, also raised fears in the Commission's eyes: it would reduce marketed supplies, contribute to over-stocking and eventually lead to land deterioration. The Commission's recommendations, aiming at the

limitation of the size of each family's herds and limitation by price control on the value of lobola contracts, struck at the very heart of opportunities for capital accumulation and investment in peasant production. Destocking policies were opposed by peasants for this very reason, especially since cattle, which were in the nature of a producer good, yield future incomes and assets beyond their immediate current output.[66] In practice, of course, peasants were responsive to cattle prices as well as the effects of seasonality on the returns from grain production. Thus the Chief Native Commissioner had to report in 1942 that 'The number (of cattle) sold to Europeans represents an increase of 19 407, and in view of the fact that prices were generally somewhat higher, would seem to refute to some extent the argument held in some quarters that in years of enhanced prices the Native owner sells fewer cattle'.[67] Indeed, the importance of the mix of price and seasonality in influencing asset sales patterns was strongly brought out in the Chief Native Commissioner's report for 1943: 'Natives were freely selling at the current prices, and this, notwithstanding the fact that owing to the shortage of trade goods and the inadequacy of kraal food supplies, there is little incentive at the present time for an owner to turn his cattle into cash.'[68] The comprehension of the peasant's economic problem - income maximization within a context of security maximization, i.e., a weighted mix of economic objectives - was entirely outside the mind of policymakers, even though on occasions this relationship was recognized.[69] Administrators generally ignored the context within which peasant production, marketing and survival had to occur.[70] The holding of assets in the form of cattle was necessary for optimization of peasant output from available factor inputs. It was not a mystical policy pursued for love, passion or anything else.[71] Pecuniary considerations in the long

run played the dominant role. Cattle were important as a form of draught power for ploughing; they provided natural fertilization for crops; they were a low-cost source of meat-supplies; they performed an asset function as a store of value; in one sense they were also an insurance against inflation; and as a producer good, not simply a capital good, cattle were a valuable and lucrative investment. These factors were typically overlooked in the conventional wisdom and invalid comparisons, made between the marketed stock output of European and African agriculture, continued to perform the legitimating role of a policy designed to develop the former and not the latter. The myth of the gross inefficiency of the African peasant persisted.[72]

Ideological perceptions of peasant economic abilities and behaviour have not changed much throughout the 1940-70 period, though the style of approach to the 'management' of the peasant problem did. Inefficiency and laziness was one such theme: 'Early evidence suggested and later evidence fully confirmed that irresponsibility and undiscipline were prevalent among Natives. For reasons which will be given later, practical measures to remove or diminish these undesirable features became a major issue of our inquiry.'[73] The Chief Native Commissioner's report of 1961 spoke of 'a mass apathy or cultural resistance'.[74] In more recent times this has been further legitimized by the 'professionalization' of cultural theoretic interpretations of peasant underdevelopment.[75] Danckwerts, for instance, has argued the immutability of peasant culture to change and to enable people living in it to acquire and effectively utilize modern technology.[76] The culturalist case is also used in genetic terms by influential decision-makers such as the Minister of Finance who in 1968 argued as follows: 'Hereditary characteristics of the rural African - and here I must generalize because there are always exceptions to the rule - intertia, a high leisure preference and a degree of want that is easily

satisfied, are characteristics which can only inhibit efforts made to increase productivity.'[77] Peasant underdevelopment was also thought to be causally connected to 'a record of apathy amongst the tribesmen'.[78] Peasants had limited wants it was believed because 'the degree of felt need in the rural African (was) far lower than in more civilized peoples'.[79] This cultural dualistic model of underdevelopment, with all its ideological trappings, found fertile soil in colonial Rhodesia and its underlying psychology has a long history which has changed little in substance over the 1940-70 period.[80] It imbued in administrators, the class of rural whites most directly in contact with the peasantry, a sense of satisfaction with their efforts and even, as late as 1971, the Secretary for Internal Affairs could report, to his apparent satisfaction and without fear, at least as he saw it, of being contradicted by the historical record: 'A final word of warning to those who continually shout that we must develop the tribal areas. I have heard this story for over forty years and have seen elsewhere the nugatory results of heeding these theorists who have persuaded various governments to pour millions into the bottomless African pit.'[81] The fact of peasant poverty, however, could not be dismissed in reality as it had been in theory. A sufficiently powerful theory was needed to replace the obvious vision of reality - and so the myth of the content, but poor, peasant was assiduously cultivated. African peasants were stereotyped as true 'loyalists' and, in the days of pre-independent settler colonialism, were deemed to have a primary interest in even the royal trappings of Empire. Thus in 1947 the Chief Native Commissioner reported that 'The chief event of the year was the visit of Their Majesties the King and the Queen'.[82] The whole African populace are reported to have been highly appreciative of the 'personal contact with the Royal party throughout the tour'.[83] Only later in the same report it recorded that the second major event of the year was the unprecedented

drought. Not only were peasants intensely loyalist, royalist and cheerful in the eyes of administrators. They were also 'non-political' in inclination and did not take <u>any</u> interest in active politics either during the war period or in the period of Federalization of the economies of Nyasaland with Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Contented with their lot, African peasants were perceived of as essentially 'happy' even - as one Prime Minister has claimed - the 'happiest Africans in the world'. In this fashion, an ideology for under-development contributed to the development of Rhodesian ideology, not only for African workers but also for the peasantry.

NOTES TO APPENDIX B

1. John Plamenatz, Ideology, Macmillan, 1970, p.16.
2. Southern Rhodesia, (L)egislative (A)ssembly (D)ebates, 1942, col.1447.
3. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1943, col.1599.
4. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.241, my italics.
5. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1943, col.1378.
6. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1947, col.2217.
7. ibid., col.2220.
8. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1943, col.1381.
9. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1942, col.1482.
10. ibid.
11. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1942, col.1469.
12. ibid., col.1476.
13. ibid., col.1475.
14. ibid., col.1695.
15. ibid., col.1454.
16. ibid., col.1676.
17. ibid., col.1453.
18. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.256.
19. ibid.
20. ibid., col.264.
21. ibid.
22. ibid., col.265.
23. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1959, col.1538.
24. ibid.
25. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.343
26. ibid., col.250
27. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1946, col.1800.

28. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.260.

29. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1946, col.1805.

30. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.254.

31. ibid.

32. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1943, col.1399.

33. ibid.

34. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1942, col.1703.

35. ibid., col.1705.

36. ibid.

37. ibid., col.1707.

38. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1943, col.1591.

39. ibid., col.1594.

40. ibid., col.1593.

41. ibid., col.1595.

42. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1946, col.1820.

43. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1942, col.1456.

44. See here the speeches of Wing Commander Eastwood in the debates on Compulsory Labour in 1942.

45. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.244.

46. ibid., col.252.

47. ibid., col.254.

48. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1946, col.1833.

49. ibid., col.1818.

50. ibid., col.1819.

51. ibid., col.1820.

52. ibid., col.1946.

53. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1959, col.1545.

54. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1942, col.1460.

55. ibid., col.1463.

56. ibid., col.1454.

57. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.255

58. ibid., col.257.

59. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., col.1469.

60. Southern Rhodesia, L.A.D., 1948, col.265.

61. ibid.

62. Southern Rhodesia, Development Co-ordinating Committee, 1949, p.9-10.

63. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, The Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development for the Year 1956, p.11, hereafter cited as Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D. for the Year (1956). See also Southern Rhodesia Report of the Native Production and Trade Commission, 1944, p.4, hereafter cited as RNPTC, 1944.

64. The term 'love of cattle' is taken from a statement made in RNPTC, 1944, p.29.

65. ibid.

66. There is also an obvious micro/macro conflict here which is often unrecognized by policy-makers. It is to the individual's advantage to keep his cattle, but may be to the community's collective disadvantage if he does so. Each individual will therefore oppose destocking of his stock. One cannot infer from this that the collectivity (of Africans) is "irrational".

67. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1942, p.58.

68. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1943, p.16.

69. See for example the Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1951, p.20.

70. M. Yudelman, Africans on The Land, 1964, points out the differences in factors influencing African and European stock output, p.189-190.

71. See A.J.B. Hughes, Present Western Concepts of Development and Customary Tribal Attitudes, Seminar on African Agriculture Development Marketing Committee, undated,(mimeo).

72. See Report of the SNA, CNC and the DND for the year 1956, p.13, for statements on African farming inefficiency.

73. R.N.P.T.C., 1944, p.10

74. Report of The SNA and CNC for the year 1961, p.9.

75. It is not being argued here that this professionalization process has necessarily been concious.

76. J.P. Danckwerts, Technology and Economic Development of African Agriculture in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 4, 4, December, 1970, p.27.

77. J.J. Wrathall, Developing The Tribal Trust Lands, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 2, 4, Dec., 1968, p.59.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., p.64.

80. Compare present perspectives with those in Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1948, p.10.

81. See W.H. Nicolle, The Development of the Subsistence Sector in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 5, 4, December, 1971, p.8.

82. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1947, p.1.

83. Ibid.

APPENDIX C

PRIVATE CORPORATE LABOUR RECRUITMENT:

AGRICULTURAL NATIVE LABOUR LIMITED

Agricultural Native Labour Limited (A.N.L.L.) operated for 23 years in supplying black contract labour to white farmers. A.N.L.L. was set up in 1942 as a private corporate venture in labour recruitment. Its share-holders were mainly farmers and other farming interest groups, such as the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union (R.N.F.U.).

OBJECTS

The object of A.N.L.L. was to take over, adopt and carry into effect an agreement entered into between the Rhodesian Agricultural Union (R.A.U.) and the Rhodesian Tobacco Association (R.T.A.) with the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (W.N.L.A.). The agreement was concluded on October 21st, 1942. In addition, A.N.L.L. were to carry out another agreement which at the time of formation was 'about to be reduced to writing'[1] between R.A.U./R.T.A. and the Southern Rhodesian government whereby the government agreed to subsidize the R.A.U./R.T.A. 'in respect of Native Labour supplied in terms of the Agreement'.[2] The principal objective, related to the previous ones stated, was to procure, supply and deliver black labour to Southern Rhodesian employers, principally those in the agricultural industry.

CAPITALIZATION

A.N.L.L.'s authorized share capital was of three types: 4 000 A shares of 5/- each, originally issued to R.A.U./R.T.A. jointly, which were transferred to the R.N.F.U. on formation of A.N.L.L.; 8 000 B shares for 'farmers organizations', also of 5/- nominal value; and

63 000 C class shares for 'producers engaged in the Agricultural industry of Southern Rhodesia'.[3] Of the authorized share capital of £20,000 only £4,335 was ever issued, being 4 000, 4 and 13 339 of A, B and C class shares respectively.[4] The holders of C class shares, mainly independent farmers, were obliged to receive not more than five labourers per annum, if required to do so by the Board of Directors of A.N.L.L. Although the A.N.L.L. were empowered to supply labour to secondary industries they were excluded from supplying labour to the mining industry.

LABOUR AGREEMENTS

A.N.L.L.'s activities were founded upon the security of two Labour Agreements, one with W.N.L.A. and the other with the Southern Rhodesian government. The Agreement with W.N.L.A., originally conducted between W.N.L.A. and R.N.F.U. on the 17th March, 1943, was ceded by the R.N.F.U. to the A.N.L.L. for the price of 4 000 fully paid up A class shares in A.N.L.L. The W.N.L.A./A.N.L.L. agreement provided for W.N.L.A. to send workersbeing recruited for the mines in South Africa, who were physically unfit for mine work and who sought employment, to A.N.L.L. in Southern Rhodesia. As part of the above Agreement, W.N.L.A. agreed to give to the recruits full information as to the terms of employment with the A.N.L.L., forwarding those willing to enter A.N.L.L. contracts to the depot at Masasa in Salisbury. W.N.L.A. would also provide 'free' transport, to be charged to the A.N.L.L. and would supply, again at A.N.L.L. expense, 'one cotton blanket, one pair of Khaki "shorts" and one singlet or jumper, at cost price. The cost (to) be recovered from the Natives at the rate of 5/0 per 30 days worked'.[5] The Agreement, furthermore, permitted the W.N.L.A. a share in the financial gains of the labour recruitment endeavours of A.N.L.L., since it provided for a payment of '10/- per native delivered at

Salisbury, with a minimum of £500 per annum'.[6] Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland labourers were specifically excluded from the scheme, hence the concentration of recruits from the Portuguese colonial dependencies of Angola and Mocambique.

The second agreement, originally between the R.N.F.U. and the Southern Rhodesian government, was signed by Godfrey Huggins, then Minister of Native Affairs, in his capacity as Government representative and also in his capacity as a representative of the R.N.F.U. The Agreement had the objective of subsidizing labour recruitment by R.N.F.U./ A.N.L.L. by means of a sum of 25/- per worker contracted under the recruitment scheme. In addition, it stipulated that recipients of labour would pay at least £3 per labourer and that, in the event of costs being less than £4.5.0 per labourer, the government contribution would be reduced according to an agreed formula. As a further safeguard against low levels of recruitment and high costs, the government reserved the right to cancel its obligation under the scheme if recruiting fell below 1 000. Since, under W.N.L.A. contract conditions for employees, the employer was liable for any domestic tax, the Agreement provided that the government would ask Parliament to pass suitable legislation for the exemption of contract labour under the scheme being liable to the Native Tax Act (Chapter 78). This Agreement remained in operation until 1952.

CONDITIONS OF A.N.L.L. CONTRACTS

The standard A.N.L.L. contract contained the following stipulations for workers. The recruit was given the opportunity of performing 11 tickets of 30 working days each during a calendar period of up to 378 days. Extensions for 180 days could be 'negotiated'. Workers were to be guaranteed 22 days work per month and given 1 day rest (unpaid) in seven. This latter provision presumably reflected a 'semi-Christian' ethic.

The rate of pay was 6d per day for the first 120 days (4 tickets) and 7d per day for the remainder (11 tickets). Upon reengagement the wage rate would be 8d daily. No deferred pay was permitted during the first 120 days of contract and thereafter it was allowed at a rate of 7/6d for each 30 days worked. Food, housing and medical treatment were the responsibility of the employer. The weekly minimum food ration, very similar to the 1972 provisions of the R.A.L.S.C. contract was as follows: 14 lb. mealie meal; 1 lb. monkey nuts (kernels) or beans; 2½ lbs. meat (or 5 lbs. fortnightly); and 4 oz of salt with sufficient green vegetables.

Under the prevailing wage rates, and assuming 4½ days of rest per month (thus allowing the completion of 11 tickets in 378 days), a period of 12,4 months of labour yielded a total cash return to the worker of 185/-, or 14/9d monthly, from which A.N.L.L. deducted monies to repay the cost of providing blankets and clothing supplied by W.N.L.A. at the place of recruitment and, after the fourth ticket had been worked, deferred pay up to 7/6d per ticket. Clearly, after deductions, the worker's 'wage in hand' was a exceedingly small sum, indeed the pittance of a vassal.

A.N.L.L. RECRUITMENT AND LABOUR SUPPLIED

There are only <u>incomplete</u> public records of A.N.L.L. available at the present time.[7] Nonetheless, a reasonable estimate of recruitment from 1949 onwards can be made. From 1949-65 A.N.L.L. recruited in excess of 21 936 workers, mainly from Angola and Mocambique, at a profit to itself and its shareholders, as well as to the apparent satisfaction of its clients, most of whom were in fact shareholders. The annual rate of recruitment of around 1,296 made a cohtribution to the supply of labour to agriculture in the region of 10 percent of the labour supplied by the R.A.L.S.C. for the 1946-72 period taken as a whole.

A.N.L.L. PROFITS ON CONTRACT LABOUR

A.N.L.L. made a healthy profit on labour recruitment, data for which are available for 1952-59 and 1963-65. In 1952 the operating profit per recruit was 5/5d. This rose to a peak of 31/10d in 1955, thereafter falling until 1965 during which year an exceedingly low level of recruitment was recorded and a substantial loss of £13.8.0 was incurred on contract labour trading, forcing the A.N.L.L. into liquidation. From 1967 onwards the company was in the process of being wound up and in 1969 A.N.L.L. were struck off the list of registered companies.

IMPLICATIONS OF A.N.L.L.'S OPERATIONS

The A.N.L.L. was similar to the R.A.L.S.C., though it differed in one important respect, viz., it operated with the purpose of making a trading profit on contract labour recruitment. Its impact on the Rhodesian labour market was similar in character to that of the R.N.L.S.C. except that its sole focus in practice was in meeting the labour demands of plantation employers. Hundreds of farmers belonged to the A.N.L.L. in order that they could obtain cheap labour supplies. Their names are recorded in the documents held in the Companies Office in Salisbury and they include some of the most 'respected' of Rhodesia's landed aristocracy.

NOTES TO APPENDIX C

1. Agricultural Native Labour Limited, Memorandum of Association, Companies Office, Salisbury.

2. ibid.

3. ibid.

4. Agricultural Native Labour Limited, Balance Sheet as at Year End, December 31st, 1966, Companies Office, Salisbury.

5. Agreement between the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union and Agricultural Native Labour Limited, Companies Office, Salisbury. Emphasis added.

6. ibid.

7. It has not been possible for the author to obtain full records of A.N.L.L., operations in the field of contract labour recruitment. The data used in this section have been obtained from Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1948, p.14-15; see also various records of Agricultural Native Labour Limited, Companies Office, Salisbury. It is perhaps worthwhile to point out that many of the persons closely associated with the running of A.N.L.L. are still accessible and could usefully be interviewed by historians or social scientists interested in this private corporate contract labour bureau.

APPENDIX D

THE ECONOMICS OF THE MASTERS AND SERVANTS ACT

This section seeks to outline the nature, impact and consequences of the Masters and Servants Act insofar as it governed the conditions of employment of labour in Rhodesia. It will not seek to establish a history of the application of the Act. The analysis is offered as an informative rather than as a comprehensive statement on this legal statute and it is intended to help explain one of the reasons why domestic and plantation workers have a weak bargaining position and are ill-equipped in legal terms to improve their own economic position.

THE ORIGINS OF THE ACT

The principal legislation governing labour contracts in the domestic labour market, as well as in the Agricultural and Forestry Sector, is the Master and Servants Act (Chapter 247). It first came into operation on the 29th of November, 1901, originated out of Ordinance No. 1 of 1899, itself based on legislation originally introduced into the Cape Province of South Africa in 1856.

The Private Domestic Services sector and the Agriculture and Forestry sector were specifically excluded from the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) of 1959, a piece of legislation introduced in the Federal period which became the first legal Act to recognize Blacks as 'employees' for the purposes of collective bargaining and trade union registration. Subsequent amendments to the ICA have not altered this position and, despite a few minor amendments to the Masters and Servants Act, the most recent in 1965, the law governing employment contracts in the sector has been based on a legal construct designed for an economic and social structure now seven decades older, vastly transformed in scope, design and complexity.

THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE ACT

The explicit legal function of the Act is to regulate the rights and duties of Masters and Servants, the specific conditions of each contract being individually worked out between the two contracting parties. There is no provision in the Act for trade unionism, collective bargaining or other wage setting machinery. No wage minimum is established in the Act and no provisions in it regulate any minimum 'rations' level. All these factors, of vital importance to the economic welfare of the worker and his or her dependents, are left to the influences of the market, the employer's discretion, the bargaining power of the individual employee, to custom and historical practice and to the vagaries of the economic tide.

The main aspects of Masters and Servants contracts included in the Act are those affecting the contract of service, its termination and the penal provisions upon a Servant's misconduct. The normal content of labour legislation - hours of work and overtime pay, conditions of employment, rates of remuneration, provisions for leave and related matters - is hardly mentioned, except in certain matters such as the minimum number of free days per year and the maximum hours of work daily. Indeed, so lacking in reference to these considerations is the Masters and Servants legislation that even the casual observer could not fail to identify its archaic design, nineteenth century focus and inappropriateness as a legal protection for the majority of Black workers in the Rhodesian economic structure.

THE ORIGIN OF CONTRACT

The origin of contracts of employment may be written or oral in nature. No oral contract is valid unless it commences within one month of the date it was concluded. Nor are oral contracts valid for more than one year from the date of their commencement (Section 7). In practice, most

contracts are oral in nature and many do, in fact, continue well beyond the one year period of legal validity without a further oral or written contract being re-negotiated. Both employers and employees tend to be unaware of this provision and it is seldom used by employees as an opportunity to bargain for better wages and conditions, the latter being left very much to any original agreement about wage increments or to the benevolence and initiative of the employer. Both written and oral contracts, unless there is express agreement to the contrary, are deemed to be for a term of one month (Section 4). Again many employees are not cognizant that employers have the right to termination of contract after only one month, unless, as is often not the case, there is contrary agreement. Monthly or weekly periods of contract require similar periods of notice unless there is lawful reason for earlier termination.

MINIMUM CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT

There are provisions in the Act for agreed stipulations concerning the minimum number of working days per contract period, the rate of hire for each working day, and the extent of such labour required to constitute a working day (Section 5). Each contract, whether written or oral, must make clear the period of duration of the contract, the rate of wages and 'any other special conditions which the Master and Servant may agree upon' (Section 10).

The only constraints relate to the maximum number of working days per month and the duration of a working day. There is no 'floor' level of wages to be paid. No contract may allow more than 313 workdays in the case of a yearly contract, or a proportionate period if the contract is for any other calendar period, and no one day may consist of more than 10 hours work (Section 5). In terms of an annual contract this works out at exactly 52 free days, or an average of one day rest per week.

No provisions demarcate any leave period, this being of particular importance to employees with close rural connections who need time at certain periods of the agricultural cycle to assist in the rural economy in tasks vital for the subsistence of their families, or who must fulfill kinship obligations in order to retain the right to the 'traditional' form of social security in old age as well as retain land rights. Nonetheless, the limitations placed on working days per calendar period and hours of work per day place an effective legal ceiling on the maximum period of work permitted weekly, this being 60 hours. Hours of work in this context refers to 'hours on the job'. Many employees work considerably longer periods if the definition of 'work' is taken to refer to 'hours on duty' or call.

The employer is not obligated to provide the employee with housing though where the worker lives on the employer's premises the latter must, unless otherwise agreed, 'provide the servant, and such of the servant's family as has been included in the contract, with suitable lodging and sufficient food of good and wholesome quality' (Section 13). In practice, most employees do live on the employer's premises and do receive accommodation and 'rations' as part of the payment in kind; however, the Act also denies the employee entitlement 'to keep his wife and children, if any, on such premises, unless the master has consented thereto' (Section 19); and, if permission is given the employer is 'not entitled to claim the service of such wife or children by reason merely of their residence on such premises' (Section 19). More often than not, the worker's dependents, at least in the Domestic Service sector, though not necessarily in the Agricultural and Forestry sector, do not stay with the worker, but reside elsewhere. On the question of child labour the Act is permissive - children being legally permitted to be entered into contracts of service by the parental guardian whilst the child is under the age of 16 years (Section 17).

The Act also lays down the employee's rights in event of sickness or accident (Section 15). These rights apply only if the accident or sickness 'has not been occasioned by his (the employee's) own fault' (Section 15: brackets included), or if there are no other contractual provisions. The employee is entitled to the wages for the first month of incapacity as well as every other benefit for the employee and his family stipulated in the contract of service.

The vulnerability and social insecurity of the employee is accentuated if his incapacity extends beyond one month and up to two months. Should the incapacity not have terminated by the end of the second month 'the master shall be entitled to terminate the contract of service, upon performance, however, by him of all stipulations, if any mentioned in such contract, up to and inclusive of the day on which he declares the contract of service to be terminated, but the servant shall not be entitled to wages for such second month' (Section 15). Sickness or accidental incapacity beyond two months thus renders the employee liable to loss of livelihood as well as the wages that would in normal circumstances include the month prior to the date at which notice of termination of contract is tendered and the wages for the month in which notice is being worked out; and such a liability falls upon a type of worker at the bottom of the economic scale and in a defenceless economic position.

Needless to say, domestic workers and farm employees are not in wage categories sufficiently high enough to enable them to participate in comprehensive social security and sickness and accident insurance schemes which might help overcome the risks inherent in the small measure of legal protection afforded by the Masters and Servants Act. The employee is thus left to the benevolence of the employer either not to terminate the contract or to terminate the contract under some arrangement beneficial

to the employee in distress. In the event of the employer not terminating the contract there is no entitlement by the employee to 'any further wages or any other benefit stipulated for in the contract, except food and lodging as the master has agreed or is bound to provide for him and any member of his family' (Section 15(2)).

SECURITY OF CONTRACT

The nature of the Masters and Servants contract makes it a particularly vulnerable arrangement not only because of the limited protection it affords the employee, but also because a contract may terminate without the employee reasonably expecting it do so, this arising from *inter alia* the employer changing his address, from the marriage of a female employee, death of the employer and the rigid penal provisions that are enforceable for a wide range of 'offences'.

The death of the employer causes the contract to expire one month from the date of death provided the employee performs service for the deceased employer's legal representative for the final month of employment. This is not such an insignificant cause of contractual severance as it might at first sight seem since it depends on a fairly predictable employer, or 'European', mortality rate. If the employer's legal representative does not claim the employee's services the 'widow of the deceased master shall, if so disposed, be entitled to claim the service of any servant during the stipulated time of service' (Section 22). On the other hand, the employee's death terminates the contract, though remuneration due to the employee up to the date of death is due to the employee's heirs (Section 23).

One of the most archaic sections of the Act makes it illegal for an employee to 'refuse to accompany his master, or any of his family, by

desire of the master, on any journey within Southern Rhodesia ... on which his master orders him to go, or to be in charge of, or to drive, herd, or take care of any carriage, horse, or any kind of cattle, horned or otherwise, the property or in the lawful possession of or under the lawful control of his master, which such servant would by reason of his contract be bound to do at his master's residence or on his premises or farm' (Section 25 (1) and (2)). The consent of the employee is not required, nor may his preference to remain with his family have any legal grounding. The philosophical basis to this provision demonstrates unequivocally the property-status of the worker in the eyes of both the law and the Masters and Servants institution as epitomised by present legislation. It is no surprise then that employees, out of financial necessity and the need to maintain employment as well as avoid the consequences of the law, lead dismembered family lives and are able to give little consideration to familial and personal choices in their work environment and conditions of employment.

Special provisions cover female labour in the event of female employees entering marriage. After marriage the female employee's husband may with 7 days notice terminate the female employee's contract claiming wage and other remuneration due up to the date of removal, but 'shall be liable to the master for all damage sustained by him through such removal, this not to exceed the wages that would have accrued between removal and the expiration of contract'. The employer is given significant legal advantages in the case of a female employee 'bound to reside or perform service in the house or on the premises of the master' who becomes married, he is permitted 'to dissolve the contract and dismiss the servant' (Section 29 (1)). In the case of employees 'not bound to reside or perform service in the house or on the premises of the master', this case being

more applicable to the Agricultural and Forestry Sector, the employer may dismiss the employee whenever 'by reason of her pregnancy or delivery of a child she becomes unfit to perform her service' (Section 29 (2)). In both these cases the dismissed employee is only entitled to 'wages and other remuneration up to the date of such dismissal' (Section 29 (3)), no payment in lieu of a period of notice being due.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL INEQUALITY:

FINAL PROVISIONS

Given the legal structure and composition of the Masters and Servants Act, there are grounds for arguing that the contractual inequality of the law, quite apart from any socio-economic inequalities that may result out of the alignment and operation of forces in the labour market, gives an entrenched status to an inequality favouring employers against employees. This is no more clearly exemplified than in the section (Part III) governing penalties for the misconduct of the employee and the proper conduct of the employer. So pervasive are the provisions, so stringent are their restraints on the employee and so heavily balanced in favour of the employer, that one can only surmise that the original architects of the legislation sought to give legal ratification to an unequal bargain of employment struck between contractees whose political, social and economic status was inherently unequal.

Nearly one half of the sixty provisions of the Act relate to <u>penal provisions</u>, this proportion emphasizing the dimension of contractual inequality, strictness of application and the punitive component represented by the legal status given to the institution of Masters and Servants in Rhodesia. This section will not attempt to itemize and discuss in detail each of the provisions in this regard but will only indicate the overall perspective involved.

On the side of the employee, the following limitations are found. The employee is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding eight dollars, or in default of payment, to imprisonment, with or without spare diet, for up to one month if he: (a) fails to commence his contract on due date; (b) without leave or lawful cause, absents himself from his workplace without the employer's permission; (c) becomes or is intoxicated during working hours or at any time if resident on his employer's premises; (d) carelessly performs or neglects to perform his work; (e) without permission, makes use of his employer's property for his own purposes; (f) refuses to obey any command of his employer or the latter's proxy which it was his duty to obey; (g) makes any brawl or disturbance on his employer's property after being told to desist; (h) is abusive or insulting, in language or conduct, to his employer, his employer's wife and children or any other person placed by his employer in authority over him; (i) by breach of duty or neglect or through drunkenness, causes loss, damage or serious risk to any property placed in his charge by his employer or by any other person in his charge for delivery to or on account of his employer; (j) by breach, or neglect, of duty, or through drunkenness, refuses or omits to perform a lawful act for forwarding in safety any property placed in his charge by his employer for delivery to or on account of his employer; (k) without lawful cause, departs from his employer's service with intent not to return thereto (Section 30 (1)).

The option to take the prison sentence in lieu of the imposing economic penalty of up to eight dollars in the case of (i) or (j) above is not at the employee's discretion, since 'If it appears that the servant is able to pay the loss or damage caused by such act or default ... proceedings shall, whether the master agrees thereto or not, be had as in section forty-nine ... instead of inflicting the punishment' (Section 30(2), viz., through 'instalments out of wages to be yet earned or otherwise,

as seems reasonable and just' (Section 49). Second or subsequent offences make the employee liable for a fine up to 16 dollars or imprisonment of 2 months and he may be liable for this period, or part thereof, 'to be kept in solitary confinement' (Section 31), and on spare diet as the magistrate adjudges.

The extreme severity of the economic penalties are clearly recognized when note is taken that in 1971 some 190 750 of the 242 220 Black workers in the Agriculture and Forestry Sector earned a monthly cash wage of less than 10 dollars, whilst in the Domestic Services Sector approximately 31 percent of the 114 400 employees were similarly remunerated. Offences under the Act do not have the effect of cancelling the worker's contract and the employee is bound to return to his employment after complying with the terms of his punishment to serve out the unexpired period of service (Section 32).

The penalty for refusing to resume service after discharge from prison is imprisonment for a period of up to one month, 'and so on for successive periods ... until he consents to resume service', this process to continue up to a maximum period of 6 months (Section 46). Furthermore, the worker, after having been imprisoned, is obligated to work for his employer 'for a period equal to that of such imprisonment, which shall be added to the stipulated term of service' (Section 47); and in cases where the offence is 'for absenting himself ... from his master's service' this period is likewise added to the stipulated period of service (Section 49). The employer, desirous of cancelling the contract, may request the same of the magistrate who may order such cancellation, this to have no effect on the employee's sentence (Section 50); in the case of a groundless charge preferred by an employer against an employee, or in the case of an employer unlawfully assaulting an employee, the employee may request the magistrate to cancel the contract.

Little more needs to be added to this list of legal restrictions to emphasize that employees are under considerable pressure to accept a great deal of the socio-economic inequality that is found in employment contracts simply because the threat of the employee suffering severe legal redress at the hands of the employer is easily enforceable under a wide range of charges. On the side of the employer, by comparison, both the restraints on the manner of his conduct and the penalties imposed for breaches are few and insignificant. For example, failure to pay, or unlawfully withholding, wages of an employee render the employer liable to a fine of 10 dollars, or if in default of payment to prison for up to one month. Typically, there are no provisions for solitary confinement or spare diet as in the case of an employee's prison sentence. And, of course, given the pattern of income distribution, the fine of 10 dollars on the employer is grossly uneven in comparison to fines levied on the employee in terms of the capacity to pay of the two parties concerned, thereby guaranteeing that employers would almost always have the choice of exercising an effective option to pay the fine (Section 33).

For allowing the employee's property to be removed without the latter's consent the employer is liable to a fine of 20 dollars, or imprisonment of up to one month. For failing to meet contractual commitments in regard to food, bedding or other articles stipulated in the contract, an employer may be liable to a fine of up to 10 dollars, or to imprisonment for up to one month (Section 40).

The balance of contractual arrangements is clearly tipped in favour of employers, thus reinforcing the inequality that is inherent in a bargain of employment between two individuals of widely disparate levels of wealth, education and social status, with differential access to legal and political processes, facing different choices of alternative options governed by the labour surplus in unskilled labour markets.

To ensure that the bargaining remains unequally conducted and the market structure atomistic, with a minimum of countervailing power being developed for the protection and promotion of employee interests, there are legal provisions that make it an offence liable to a fine of 40 dollars, or imprisonment for up to 3 months, for any person who persuades or endeavours to persuade, 'any servant to depart from his service or work, or to return his work to his master before the same is finished' (Section 55 (a)).

Thus, an intended strike action would render its proposer liable to prosecution, even though the Act has weak provisions for the protection of worker interests. There is no legally recognized trade union permitted under the Act, no provisions for collective bargaining are made and no other legislation or regulation exists to set down minimum wages and conditions for domestic service workers.

The Act does, however, permit 'the free and voluntary meeting of any persons to consult and discuss bona fide with each other, or among themselves, all matters arising from the relation of master and servant' (Section 56). However, although this would theoretically allow for an unregistered trade union, such a body would encounter great difficulties in its formation as a result of existing legislation and the problems of organising workers.

UNEQUAL LABOUR CONTRACTS

Whilst the legal provisions of the Masters and Servants Act are overwhelmingly inequalitarian, it is not necessarily correct to state that it is this legal apparatus per se which gives rise to the unequal contracts of employment. Some of the provisions of the Act do work to directly reinforce an unequal balance of bargaining strength between employer and employee in those sectors dominated both by the legal

categories and socio-economic characteristics of the Masters and Servants institution: such is the nature of regulations governing the duration of work, the formulation of contracts, the absence of collective bargaining procedures and wage setting machinery.

Other provisions, notably the penal provisions, do not themselves directly establish and influence the wage levels and conditions of employment of the sector. However, they have a significant indirect impact which is of equal importance, since they act a tone to the legal and institutional framework which reinforces the hierarchical nature of the Masters and Servants bargain. They thereby act as a legal mechanism that makes it exceedingly difficult for the contractees to conduct their bargain on an equal footing.

However, prosecutions under the Act have diminished since the 1940's. The Act does not fulfill the same 'necessary function' in the 1970's as it did in earlier years. For this reason it is not surprising that the Act was 'under review' by the Ministry of Labour in November, 1974. Up to this date the State had resisted all attempts to include farm and domestic workers under the I.C.A. Whether it finally succumbs to pressure to make this change or it introduces a different but 'modernised' system of labour control for workers currently under the Masters and Servants Act, remains to be seen.

CHAPTER 1

1. Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination, University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 1971; Lester C. Thurow, Poverty and Discrimination, Studies in Social Economics, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1969; Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Theory and Racial Discrimination, Marshall Lectures, University of Cambridge, 1970 (mimeo). For related works see A.F. Brimmer and H. Harper, Economists' Perceptions of Minority Economic Problems, Journal of Economic Literature, VIII, 3, September, 1970.

2. On the distinction between dominant and exclusive capitalist modes of production see Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale (Volumes 1 and 2), Monthly Review Press, London, 1974. In relation to the effects on the process of accumulation see also Samir Amin, Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model, Review of African Political Economy, 1, 1974.

3. See particularly Charles van Onselen, Black Labour in Central African History: A Critical Essay on The Historiography and Sociology of Rhodesia, St Antony's College, Oxford, 1974 (mimeo).

4. See for instance Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin, 1967.

5. Gary S. Becker, op.cit., p.30.

6. See here Lester C. Thurow, op.cit., p.113, who has commented partinently on this assertion of Becker's: 'If this deduction is correct, empirical impressions are amazingly false. Do the whites of South Africa or the United States really have a lower standard of living as a result of their discrimination.'

7. See inter alia Anne O. Krueger, The Economics of Discrimination, Journal of Political Economy, LXXI, 5, October, 1963.

8. Kenneth J. Arrow, op.cit., p.15.

9. Arrow comes to the point at the end of his analysis: 'the whole problem is to be interpreted as an exploitative relation ...the values inherent in discrimination uphold a structure which is profitable to those holding those values.' Ibid., p.34, emphasis added.

10. Lester C. Thurow, op.cit., p.117.

11. Ibid., emphasis added.

12. Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, Pelican, 1968, especially Ch.9.

13. Amin has claimed that Rhodesia was one of the 'exceptional cases' (with special features) where the establishment of colonies of settlement resulted 'in the creation of new central formations'. See Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, op.cit., p.378. This view is contradicted by the analysis made in this study. Here it is argued that the process of accumulation has been based on 'primitive accumulation' and that Rhodesia constitutes a peripheral social formation albeit of the settler colonial type.

14. See, for instance, D.H. Reader, African Education and The Rhodesian Employer, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 2, June, 1972; also J.P. Danckwerts, Technology and Economic Development of African Agriculture in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 4, 4, December, 1970.

15. Fuller statements of this ideology and a critique of it are found in Charles van Onselen, op.cit.; D.G. Clarke, Settler Ideology and African Underdevelopment in Postwar Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 8, 1, March, 1974; and B.D. Mothobi, Rhodesian Employment Policy and Practice: A View From Below, A.S.S.A. Annual Conference, Durban, 1974 (mimeo).

16. See here B. Mothobi, Seminar on "The Concept of Cultural Disability": A Contribution, Centre For Inter-Racial Studies, 1973 (mimeo), where the following comment on the theories of Reader and Danckwerts appears: 'the approach grossly misrepresents and fails to analyse the Rhodesian system as it really is, and, it violates the basic requirements of sociological analysis i.e. holism, structuralism and historicity.

17. In the latter respect see B.D. Mothobi, Rhodesian Employment Policy, op.cit., where the following comment is found: 'Because of the conditioning that has occurred during the last seventy-odd years, the African workers in many cases have come to believe the popular image of them and thus help strengthen and perpetuate the image.'

18. Stephen Enke, Western Development of A Sparsely Populated Country: The Rhodesias, American Economic Review, Volume L, 1960, p.396. Emphasis added. See also Stephen Enke, Seven Fallacies About Central Africa, Central African Examiner, 9 April, 1960, especially the section dealing with 'The Myth of Economic Exploitation'.

19. Stephen Enke, Western Development, op.cit., p.389.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., p.394.

22. J.H. Boeke, Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies, New York, 1953.

23. See among others J. Barber, The Road to Rebellion, London, O.U.P., 1967; T. Bull, Rhodesian Perspective, London, Michael Joseph, 1967; P. Keatley, The Politics of Partnership, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963; and T.G. Chidzero, Central Africa: The Race Question and the Franchise, Race, 1, 1, November, 1959.

24. See especially J.C. Mitchell, Race, Class and Status in South Central Africa, in A. Tuden and L. Plotnicov (eds.), Social Stratification in Africa, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1970.

25. Shirley Williams, Central Africa: The Economics of Inequality, Fabian Commonwealth Bureau, Research Series No. 25, London, 1960.

26. Thomas M. Franck, Race and Nationalism: The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia-Nyasaland, Bradford and Dickens, London, 1960, p.276.

27. Ibid., p.289.

28. M.L.O. Faber, Income Distribution by Race in Southern Rhodesia, Race, 2, 2, 1961; also Economic Structuralism and Its Relevance to Southern Rhodesia's Future, Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 36, Manchester University Press, 1965.

29. D.S. Pearson, Employment Trends in a Developing Economy: The Case of Southern Rhodesia, East African Economic Review, 11, 1, June, 1964.

30. Accumulation of capital by African Purchase Area farmers for instance has been based on peasant dispossession and rural proletarianization. See Chapter 5.

31. Consider, for instance, the following forms: capitalist and subsistence sectors; modern and traditional sectors; enclave and hinterland; industrial and agrarian sectors; western and 'tribal' sectors; employed and unemployed; formal and informal sectors.

32. See W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, Manchester School, May, 1954; also Unlimited Labour: Some Further Notes, Manchester School, January, 1958; and Reflections on Unlimited Labour, in L.E.D. Marco (ed.), International Economics and Development, Academic Press, New York, 1972.

33. See, for instance, J.C. Fei and G. Ranis, The Development of the Labour Surplus Economy, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1964; for additional applications in regard to planning, wage policy and agrarian development see the references in W.A. Lewis, Reflections on Unlimited Labour, op.cit. Even neo-classical dual models have been 'inspired' by Lewis. See D.W. Jorgensen, The Development of a Dual Economy, Economic Journal, June, 1961.

34. W.A. Lewis, Reflections on Unlimited Labour, op.cit., p.77.

35. As Lewis puts it: in the second stage of development, 'Classical economics ceases to apply; we are in the world of neo-classical economics, where all factors of production are scarce, in the sense that their supply is inelastic. Wages are no longer constant as accumulation proceeds'. Unlimited Labour, op.cit., p.26.

36. See variously, Keith Griffen, Underdevelopment in Spanish America, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1969; Roger Leys (ed.), Dualism and Rural Development in East Africa, Institute of Development Research, Denmark, 1973; Archie Mafeje, The Fallacy of Dual Economies Revisited, in R. Leys (ed.), op.cit; D.W. Jorgensen, Testing Alternative Theories of the Development of a Dual Economy, in I. Adelman and E. Thorbecke, The Theory and Design of Economic Development John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966; Tamas Szentes, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1973; and Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, Monthly Review Press, 1972.

37. W.A. Lewis, Reflections on Unlimited Labour, op.cit., p.76.

38. See especially chapter 4.

39. The concept of 'primitive accumulation' derives from Marx who used the term primary accumulation. The essence of the process is the transfer of value from non-capitalist modes of production to the capitalist mode. This differs from 'expanded reproduction' of capital where profit - the income from invested capital - is saved and reinvested in order to expand productive capacity. See Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment (Volumes I and II), Monthly Review Press, London, 1974; also Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971 (especially Chapter XXVI).

40. Indeed, in the years since 1965, the significance of direct inflows of foreign private capital has diminished. See details in Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Rhodesia 1973, Government Printer, Salisbury, April, 1974, Table 1, where it is shown that outflows of capital were recorded in 1966 and 1972.

41. W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa: A Case Study of Economic Development in a Dualistic Society, Oxford University Press, 1961.

42. Ibid., p.182. Barber does admit the existence of 'forced labour' pressures resulting from taxation but argues (incorrectly) that the State never employed a regime of conscript labour. Not only was forced labour widespread in the early years of colonization (see J.E.M. Dube, How Extensive was 'Forced Labour' in Matabeleland and How

Significant Was It?, Department of History, University of Rhodesia, 1972 (mimeo)), but it was also resorted to directly under the Compulsory Native Labour Act (1943-46). More importantly, Barber ignores the structural pressures at the systemic level which forced peasants to seek wage-employment as a necessary means to obtain subsistence.

43. See W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.184. In this statement, Barber captures the essence of capitalist/worker relations. However, he does not follow through the implications for accumulation and policies of labour mobilization.

44. Ibid., p.190. Emphasis added. In point of fact, the importation of unskilled labour has been diminished significantly and peasant underdevelopment has become more severe since Barber wrote - yet wages have risen. See Chapters 4, 5 and 8.

45. G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia, Journal of Development Studies, 6, 3, 1970.

46. Lewis refers to Marx's 'primary accumulation' directly. See Economic Development, op.cit., where the following statement appears: 'In actual fact the record of every Imperial power in Africa in modern times is one of impoverishing the subsistence economy, either by taking away the people's land, or by demanding forced labour in the capitalist sector, or by imposing taxes to drive people to work for capitalist employers'. Nonetheless, in his model of accumulation, Lewis ignored this vital point.

47. The characteristics of peripheral or dependent capitalism and their social formations are well discussed in Samir Amin, op.cit. Also see Richard Sandbrook, Proletarians and African Capitalism, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

48. It could of course be argued correctly up to a point that households could 'invest' labour-time in production-for-own-consumption. This aspect is not considered analytically by Barber. However, admittance of this point would not invalidate the criticism made here. On the contrary, it illustrates the fact that the reality for many households is dependence on a low-wage labour system in which (African) households are forced to be located in the reserves in order that subsistence can be obtained by the non-employed members of the household through production-for-own-consumption.

49. This is Barber's own description. See W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.180.

50. Jørgen Rasmussen, op.cit., emphasis in the original.

51. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.68, emphasis added. See also Barber's statement, of relevance here, that 'The policy of the governing minority has encouraged the preservation of traditional institutions'. Ibid., p.173, emphasis added.

52. Ibid., p.73.

53. Ibid., p.97, emphasis added.

54. See especially the discussion on p.182 of Chapter VIII in Barber's text.

55. H.S. Marcussen, The Theory of Modernization and the Notion of Dualism, in Roger Leys (ed.), op.cit., especially the following statement: 'The treatment of dual economies in modern economic theory is only one branch of a whole range of social science theories of the process of modernization.'

56. See W.J. Barber, op.cit., Chapter III, especially, where the myths concerning the limited extent of internal and external exchange, the extent of specialization in production, the degree of systemic efficiency, the size of the disguised unemployed labour force and the 'delayed' response to wage employment are to be compared with the findings of the following more recent works in Rhodesian historiography: I.R. Phimister, Peasant Production and Underdevelopment i Southern Rhodesia 1890-1914, African Affairs, 291, 1974; J. Cobbing, Historical Materialism and the Nineteenth Century Ndebele, Political Economy Research Seminar No. 11 (mimeo), Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974; Nicola Sutherland-Harris, Trade and the Rozwi Mambo, in R. Gray and D. Birmingham, Pre-Colonial African Trade, Oxford University Press, 1970; N.M. Bhebe, The Ndebele Trade in the Nineteenth Century, Henderson Seminar No. 25, Department of History, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo); H.H. Bhila, Some Aspects of Pre-Colonial Trade South of the Zambezi, Henderson Seminar No. 24, Department of History, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo).

57. Samir Amin, Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa, Social and Economic Studies, 22, 1, March, 1973, p.181.

58. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.67. In general terms Barber argues that 'modernization' has 'widened economic horizons...and afforded opportunities for increased real incomes'.

59. G. Arrighi, op.cit., p.199.

60. See Kurt Martin, Archie's Fallacy, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1972, Seminar Note. Mafeje's claim appeared in The Fallacy of Dual Economies, East Africa Journal, 7-9, February, 1972.

61. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.95. The emphasis is added in order to stress the monolithic dimension of African society entertained by Barber in this and many other instances.

62. Ibid., emphasis added.

63. See W.J. Barber, op.cit., especially p.187, including inter alia the following statement: 'The total output of the economic system would be further increased if non-economic restrictions placed upon it did not impede the transfer of indigenous labour into employments where its productivity was higher than in the traditional agriculture, or if African farmers were permitted to bring unutilized land resources into production.' Emphasis added.

64. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.173.

65. Ibid., p.174, emphasis added.

66. Barber's view of the State is typical of the view held by orthodox economics in general. The State is seen in terms of 'public sector' economics and not as a central institution of mediation between modes of production.

67. Ibid., p.40.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid., p.181, emphasis added.

70. Ibid., p.182, emphasis added.

71. Ibid., p.184.

72. For important analytical commentary on a similar debate in the South African case see Harold Wolpe, Capitalism and Cheap Labour-power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid, Economy and Society, 1, 4, November, 1972; and M.L. Morris, Capitalism and Apartheid: A Critique of Some Current Conceptions of Cheap Labour-power, Oxford Workshop on the Social and Economic History of Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1974 (mimeo).

73. For a detailed examination of the crude exploitation and degradation involved in the concrete reality of 'labour transfer', in the case of the mining industry, see Charles van Onselen, Sex and Social Control in the Rhodesian Mine Compounds 1900-1933, Oxford Workshop on the Social and Economic History of Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1974 (mimeo).

74. See here the revealing critique of the Ranis-Fei model (an extension of Lewis') by John Weeks, The Political Economy of Labor Transfer, Science and Society, XXXV, 4, Winter, 1971.

75. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.72. When male labourers are paid low wages - below costs of family subsistence - and rural dependence thus becomes necessary, it is generally women workers who become the primary source of labour in pre-capitalist production structures. Their labour becomes necessary to meet the cost of labour's reproduction and although they are not directly employed by capitalists they are exploited by employers nonetheless.

76. Ibid., p.187.

77. Ibid. It is to be noted that Barber is very unspecific about 'settler supremacy'. In particular, he does not regard it as a particular class structure dominant politically in the Rhodesian system of peripheral capitalism but prefers to conceive of it mostly at the level of values, notions and (racist) ideas.

78. Ibid., p.189, emphasis added. Indeed the operative goals have been to increase the volume of employment as much as possible - to overcome so-called 'labour shortages' - but at as low a wage level as possible.

79. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.17. It is noteworthy that Barber offers no theoretical explanation of why the racial division of society was incomplete.

80. For a discussion on how settler ideology has changed in the postwar period in response to the changing requirements of production see D.G. Clarke, Settler Ideology, op.cit. In particular, note how the introduction of de jure 'non-racialism' has not eroded settler colonialism itself. See also Appendix B.

81. For Barber the acquisition of the means of subsistence (for the peasantry) is a technical problem reduced to the maximization of opportunity from a combination of two choices - income from sale of labour or from exchange of surplus production. The implications for class formation are wholly ignored even though in these implications is to be found the essence of the choice, viz., that, through choosing peasantization or proletarianization, peasants 'elect' the form in which they are to be exploited by the dominant classes.

82. W.J. Barber, op.cit., see especially pp.100-116.

83. Ibid., p.116.

84. Ibid., p.92-93 especially.

85. G. Arrighi, op.cit., p.227.

86. See I.R. Phimister, op.cit; and B. Kosmin, The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe People: A Case Study of the Displacement of a Pre-colonial Economy in Southern Rhodesia, African Social Research, 17, 1974.

87. See also J.M. Mackenzie, African Labour in the Chartered Company Period, Rhodesian History, 1, 1970, for an analysis of labour policy in this early period and the methods used to overcome the 'labour shortage'.

88. G. Arrighi, op.cit., p.226.

89. See Norman Bromberger, Economic Growth and Political Change in South Africa, in Adrian Leftwich (ed.), South Africa: Economic Growth and Political Change, Allison and Busby, London, 1974, p.100, where even the factual basis of Arrighi's argument is wholly mis-represented when Bromberger suggests that Arrighi argued that unlimited labour supplies were available up to the mid-1920's.

90. E. Maclellan Wilson, Theory and Empirical Evidence of the Rhodesian Dual Economy, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 3, September, 1972. Emphasis added. It is indeed incredible to observe, but at no point in Maclellan Wilson's analysis is mention made either of Barber's standard work on Rhodesian dualism or Arrighi's critique; yet his analysis post-dates Barber by over a decade and Arrighi by two years.

91. For a survey of these trends see Chris Allen, Trends and Themes in the Study of Sub-Saharan African Politics, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1974 (mimeo); and also Radical Themes in African Social Studies: A Bibliographical Guide, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 1974 (mimeo).

92. Here reference is made to the following primary works by Arrighi: Labour Supplies, op.cit., The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967; The Political Economy of Rhodesia, in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa, Monthly Review Press, London, 1973 (itself a revised version of a similarly titled essay printed in New Left Review, September-October, 1966). These are to be interpreted in the context of other essays, notably Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, 2, 1968; Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Ralph Miliband and John Saville (eds.), The Socialist Register 1969, Merlin, London, 1969; and Giovanni Arrighi, International Corporations, Labor Aristocracies, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa, in Robert I. Rhodes, Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader, Monthly Review Press, London, 1970. To the literature produced by Arrighi should be

added Mwana Wevu, Partners in Plunder, Monthly Review, 20, 1969; and Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Penguin, 1975. Although Loney attempts a class analysis, his work in this area is derivative (mostly from Arrighi). Many of the criticisms made of Arrighi's analysis thus apply to Loney's. See also Yo N. Cherkasov, The Economic Problems of Southern Rhodesia, Novka Publishing House, Centre of Oriental Literature, Moscow, 1966 (Title translated from Russian). Unfortunately no English translation of Cherkasov's work exists.

93. D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, Clarendon Press, 1970, concerns himself solely with Leys' interpretation of the white polity in Rhodesia and entirely ignores, except for a casual and indifferent reference in a footnote, the analyses by Arrighi. See Murray's Introduction, p.xv, fn.1.

94. A reading of the 'revisionist' historiography and political economy of Southern Africa illustrates how deeply indebted many of the 'new school' are to Arrighi. However, few authors utilize his work with an adequate critique of it.

95. For a survey of the neo-marxist literature and a bibliography see Aiden Foster-Carter, Neo-Marxist Approaches to Development and Underdevelopment, in Emanuel de Kadt and Gavin Williams (eds), Sociology and Development, Tavistock, 1974. Also see Michael Barrat Brown, The Economics of Imperialism, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974.

96. See especially here the works of A.G. Frank, Latin American 'dependency theorists', plantation theorists and French marxist anthropologists, all of which are well discussed in Ivar Oxaal, Tony Barnett, and David Booth (eds.), Beyond The Sociology of Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

97. For a comparative perspective on the treatment of value in economics see Bob Rowthorn, Neo-Classicism, Neo-Ricardianism and Marxism, New Left Review, 86, July-August, 1974. For a treatment of the value question in South Africa see M. Franzman, A Discussion of some Issues Related to the South African Social Formation, University of Sussex, 1975 (mimeo); and M. Williams, An Analysis of South African Capitalism - Neo Ricardianism or Marxism, Bulletin of the Conferenee of Socialist Economists, February, 1975.

98. G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies, op.cit., p.222. Emphasis added.

99. Ibid., Emphasis added.

100. Compare Arrighi with Marx for instance. See Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1 (Part 7), Dent, London, 1974, p.790, where Marx notes that primary accumulation consists of 'an accumulation which is not the outcome of the capitalist method of production, but the starting-point thereof'. For Marx, this process was 'nothing other than the historical process whereby the producer is divorced from the means of production'. In this phase the role of the State is critical, especially to 'regulate' wages so as 'to keep the worker in a proper condition of dependence'. Marx's concept, which he argued was relevant to the pre-history of capital, differs from that used by Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, op.cit., p.22 (Volume 1), where he is explicit that primitive accumulation 'is something permanent, contemporary'. In Amin's opinion, Marx did not provide a fully developed theory of accumulation on a world scale.

101. For definitions of these marxian concepts see O. Lange, Political Economy, Volume 1, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1963; also Emmanuel Terray, Marxism and "Primitive" Societies, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972.

102. It is possible that Arrighi has undertaken further work on the political economy of Rhodesia which remains either unfinished or unpublished. For instance, Ranger notes, in a review of the historiography of Rhodesia, that Arrighi's 'forthcoming economic history of Rhodesia will be a landmark in its historiography'. See T.O. Ranger, Review Article: The Historiography of Southern Rhodesia, Transafrican Journal of History, 1, 2, July, 1971, p.68. This most probably does not refer to Arrighi's 'Labour Supplies' which was published in April, 1970, and was Arrighi's last published work (apart from the reproduction of his essays, with John Saul, in The Political Economy of Africa), at least as far as this writer is aware.

103. G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies, op.cit., p.221.

104. See Chapters 6 and 8.

105. It is rather too readily assumed that settler colonialism cannot 'come to terms' with internal social classes which apparently threaten its legitimacy. See for instance A. Emmanuel, White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism, New Left Review, 73, 1972. However, in many practical ways, Rhodesian settler colonialism has attempted just that - in the case of Asians, Coloureds and now the African bourgeoisie.

106. The fact of Rhodesian industrialization since 1962 is itself evidence enough against Arrighi's argument here. See for instance D.I. Ramsay, Productivity and Capital in Rhodesian Manufacturing 1955-1972, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 8, 2, 1974; also Peter Harris, The Rhodesian Blockade and

Internal Structural Change, Monthly Review (forthcoming). Note that Arrighi is sometimes ambiguous about the prospect of settler colonial industrialization in Rhodesia. Thus in one work (Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays, op.cit., p.364) Arrighi argues that postwar development 'brought about the emergence of manufacturing capitalism which became the new "center of gravity" of the 'class structure'. However Arrighi does not explain this process of emergence. For details on Rhodesian industrialization see Chapter 3.

107. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy, op.cit., p.50.

108. Ibid., p.40.

109. Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays, op.cit., p.364. Arrighi argues that manufacturing capitalism became the 'center of gravity' of the class structure; but this does not explain the significance of the transition to the contemporary situation in which the industrial capitalist mode of production has achieved dominance.

110. For comparative data on this issue see Chapter 3.

111. The need for such market diversification - well appreciated by industrial producers - has been accentuated by the instability of white immigration since 1970.

112. For more extensive discussion see Chapter ;8.

113. See here data in Colin Stoneman, Private Overseas Investment in Southern and Central Africa, University of Hull, 1973 (mimeo); Waddacor Brooking and Company, Rhodesian Company Register Analysis, Salisbury, 1973; and John Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1974, especially Chapter IV.

114. D.J. Murray, op.cit.

115. On the close alliance between domestic and foreign capital however see Mwana Wevu, Partners in Plunder, op.cit. Also note that reductions in capital inflow do not imply necessarily a weakening of links with foreign capital. Indeed in the Rhodesian case the result has been a higher level of domestic re-investment out of profits and an expansion of foreign interests in the economy.

116. Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967. I am aware of the critique of the 'labour-repressive economy' made by Harold Wolpe, Pluralism, Forced Labour and Internal Colonialism in South Africa, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, Conference on South Africa and the Future of Apartheid, 1973 (mimeo). His objection does not apply here since constraints on labour in this analysis are specifically related to mode(s) of production.

117. Compare with other parts of Africa in Samir Amin, Underdevelopment and Dependence, op.cit.

118. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy, op.cit., p.36.

119. Note here that Arrighi's conception of the class coalition of the Rhodesian Front party includes only 'white workers, the national agrarian capitalists and (the) petty bourgeoisie'. See Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays, op.cit., p.364. This is too restrictive a view. Also to be included are the following classes: the bureaucratic 'salariat', resident-settler and smaller-scale manufacturing capitalists, local rentiers, and various elements of the managerial and professional classes.

120. On the significant independent social power of the settlers Emmanuel, op.cit., is undoubtedly correct. For example, the real determining power in Rhodesia since 1965 has been the Rhodesian Front party. This is the group that African nationalism has had to come to terms with - not the British government which, while still attempting to maintain a quasi-imperial presence in black-white 'dialogue', has been steadily eclipsed from serious negotiations.

121. This point is made in reference to Asians, Coloureds and the African bourgeoisie. Since 1940 a number of economic changes have brought prosperity to all these groups. Similarly, political changes have attempted to incorporate these socio-economic elements into the power structure.

122. In the case of Asians and Coloureds a reading of Arrighi's analysis would even suggest that they were wholly unimportant. This has not been the case. Both socio-economic minorities have been 'uplifted' into the category of 'European' under the 1969 Constitution.

123. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy, op.cit., p.22.

124. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy, op.cit., p.43.

125. Ibid., p.37.

126. Ibid.

127. See the discussion in G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies, op.cit., p.221.

128. See Charles van Onselen, Worker Consciousness in Black Miners in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1920, Journal of African History, XIV, 2, 1973.

129. For a fuller account of this period see Duncan Clarke, The Underdevelopment of African Trade Unions in Rhodesia: An Assessment of Working Class Action in Historical Perpsective, Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, Durban, 1974 (mimeo).

130. These issues are fully treated in Duncan Clarke, Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974. See also Chapter 4.

131. On.cit., p.32, fn.11. The issue is given more prominence in G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies, on.cit., but even there the issues are not dealt with analytically.

132. It is possible to consider foreign workers as an 'external labour reserve army'. The threat thus posed to wages is well appreciated by African workers inside Rhodesia.

133. This may appear paradoxical. However, with subsistence consumption needs not met from peasant production, foreign labour inflows reduced wage growth and thus required peasants to allocate more labour time to the labour market and so increase dependence on it in order to receive adequate incomes to meet the costs of subsistence.

134. This is illustrated by the extent to which wages have remained well below the Poverty Datum Level for even moderate sized households. See Chapters 3 and 8.

135. Both plantation and domestic employers, employing more than 50 percent of all African wage-labour, have also relied heavily upon the following kinds of low-cost labour-power: women, children, foreign workers, retainers, seasonal workers, part-time labourers and contract workers. See Chapters 6 and 7.

136. See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion.

137. See E. Laclau, on.cit.

138. Contrary to the approach adopted by Arrighi, plantation owners cannot be treated as an undifferentiated group. Their various strata include: 'absentee landlords' who own land and speculate upon its rising value; unincorporated and incorporated settler-owners, both small-scale and large-scale; foreign owned and multi-national enterprises operated by salaried managers, some with exclusive primary production interests and others more vertically integrated; tenant 'settler' farmers indebted to large private landlords or the State; and smallholding owners.

139. 'Extra-economic' pressures have been easily instituted through employer control of the compound and extensive regimentation of the social life of workers, the liberal use of a harsh labour discipline and violence, the threat

of the Masters and Servants Act (1901), regulation of the supply of educational and health services, the manipulation of indebtedness and farm store pricing and stocking policies, wage-payment systems and the extensive (and often legitimated) use of political authority by plantation owners. See Chapter 6 for details.

140. See G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies, op.cit., p.208.

141. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy, op.cit., p.47. See also p.51.

142. On such competition see D.J. Murray, op.cit.

143. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, July 19, 1974.

144. On the political power of rural constituencies in government, the Rhodesian Front party in Parliament and in the Cabinet, see Larry W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1973, especially Chapter 5.

145. This is a complex issue. However, it could be postulated that settler colonialism has produced certain patterns of social relations (e.g. the Master-Servant 'complex') which have been reproduced in essence in relationships that have taken a different (visible) form (e.g. labour policies of African domestic households employing domestic labour and the 'mini-plantation' labour policies of African agrarian capitalist producers).

146. This view of Arrighi's is most prevalent in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Socialism and Economic Development, op.cit.; also Giovanni Arrighi, International Corporations, op.cit. For a critique of the labour aristocracy thesis in the Rhodesian case see Peter S. Harris, Industrial Workers in Rhodesia: Working Class Elites or Lumpenproletariat? Journal of Southern African Studies (forthcoming).

147. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, op.cit., p.55.

148. See Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974, especially Chapter V, for details on the costs of household subsistence.

149. See Duncan Clarke, The Underdevelopment of African Trade Unions in Rhodesia, op.cit. Also see O.B. Pollak, The Impact of the Second World War on African Labour Organization in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 3, 1973.

150. See here G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies, op.cit., p.224; also The Political Economy, op.cit., p.44.

151. See here Chapter 9.

152. See here Chapter 8 for more detailed discussion.

153. For example Asians act as a fully incorporated employer class in the trading and manufacturing field. They have practised status quo politics since the 1950's even though there have been complaints voiced against 'discrimination'. In the employment field Asian workers have also been a useful element of the labour aristocracy which has helped maintain privileges over lesser skilled African workers. A similar position has held for Coloureds with the exception that being more dependent on wage labour many Coloureds have been more politically critical of the Rhodesian Front. For details on Asians see Hasu H. Patel, Asian Political Activity in Rhodesia: From the End of the Second World War to the Present, Universities Social Science Conference, Makerere, 1971 (mimeo). On Coloureds see I.D. Joseph, The Institutional Basis of a "Coloured Community" in Rhodesia, Political Economy Research Seminar No.10, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo).

154. R. Gray, quoted in G. Arrighi, The Political Economy, op.cit., p.50. See also R. Gray, The Two Nations, O.U.P., 1960.

155. Here one should differentiate strata of the African petty bourgeoisie, some of whom in the 1950's formed the intellectual and organizational cadres of the radical nationalist movement. However, many have been (passive) supporters of the status quo in the sense of taking an active part in 'systems maintenance'. Most obviously in the 1970's, this is found amongst 'Pro-Settlement' groups. See T. Kirk, Pro-Settlement Groups and the Anglo-Rhodesian Constitutional Dispute, Issue, 111, 1, Spring, 1973.

156. For some discussion on this point see C.W. Sherwell, Jawing It Instead of Warring It: Towards an Assessment of the African National Council, Political Economy Research Seminar No. 3, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo). The position 'appears' to have been complicated by the merging of the guerrilla groups into a 'reconstituted A.N.C.'. However, the differences that have divided 'moderates' from 'radicals' have remained, notwithstanding formal 'unification'. In particular the ideological and political position of the ex-Zimbabwe African National Union members remains markedly different from the views held by the 'old' A.N.C.

157. The debate on the white labour aristocracy in Rhodesia is part of a broader debate on white workers in Southern Africa generally.

158. See here M.E. Lee, Politics and Pressure Groups in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1923, Unpublished Ph.D., London, 1974, especially Chapter 8, The Trades Union Movement.

159. The issue here is not simply <u>whether</u> white labour benefits from capitalist exploitation: it almost certainly does. It is also how this process occurs and what impact this class has on capitalism and settler colonialism as the requirements of production change.

160. For an analysis of this point in one instance see Tony Kirk and Chris Sherwell, Rhodesia and the 1974 General Election, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies (forthcoming).

161. cf. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy, <u>op.cit</u>., p.50.

CHAPTER 2

1. W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, London, O.U.P., 1961, especially Chapter 7.

2. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967; also Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia, Journal of Development Studies, 6, 3, 1970.

3. See M.L.O. Faber, Income Distribution By Race in Southern Rhodesia, Race, 2, 2, 1961.

4. R.B. Sutcliffe, Stagnation and Inequality in Rhodesia 1946-1968, Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 33, 1, February, 1971. Sutcliffe defines the 'urban' groups as 'a residual which includes agricultural workers on white farms and their dependents', p.48. Emphasis added. Correctly, in a footnote, Sutcliffe admits that this classification is unsatisfactory. Nonetheless it is confusing. Indeed, it has already been misinterpreted in Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975, p.69, in which it is argued that 'The African population in the urban areas rose from 1 million in 1946 to 1.5 million in 1953'. In this instance Loney cited Sutcliffe's 'urban' population data as the source. In fact by 1975 the African urban area population was still less than 1 million.

5. The major methodological shortcomings of Sutcliffe's analysis are: the assumption about homogeneity in the European population; a lack of specificity in identifying various strata of the black working-class; the misleading use of the rubric and data for groups identified as 'urban'; and the erroneous inclusion of all African income from unincorporated enterprise in the estimates of Rural Household Sector incomes.

6. The term 'Europeans' will be reserved for reference to Whites, Asians and Coloureds collectively (as in the 1969 Republican Constitution of Rhodesia).

7. For details on migration, population, natural increase and birth rates for Whites, Asians and Coloureds see Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury, August, 1974.

8. No unambiguous quantitative statement can be made on the basis of col. 5: hence the tentative nature of this statement about the trend.

9. R.B. Sutcliffe, op.cit., p.44.

10. T.R.C. Curtin, Federal Finance in Central Africa, M.Sc. thesis, London University, 1964, unpublished.

11. See A.D. Hazlewood, The Economics of Federation and Dissolution in Central Africa, in A.D. Hazlewood (ed.), African Integration and Disintegration, London, 1967.

12. See P.S. Harris, Regression and Inertia in the Rhodesian Fiscal Structure - A Comment on the 1972 Budget, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 2, June, 1972.

13. Fuller demographic details can be found in Rhodesia, 1961 Census of The European, Asian and Coloured Population, C.S.O.; and Rhodesia, 1969 Population Census: Interim Report Volume 1: The European, Asian and Coloured Population, C.S.O., 1971.

14. Data and perspectives on Asian economic structures have been taken from Barry A. Kosmin, "Freedom, Justice and Commerce": Some Factors Affecting Asian Trading Patterns in Southern Rhodesia 1897-1942, Department of History, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo); Hasu H. Patel, Asian Political Activity in Rhodesia: From The End of The Second World War To The Present, Universities Social Sciences Council Conference, Makerere, 1971 (mimeo); D.G. Clarke, An Economic Profile of The Asian Minority in Rhodesia, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo). For data on the Coloured minority see I.D. Joseph, The Coloureds of Rhodesia: An Overview, Centre for Inter-Racial Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo); I.D. Joseph, The Institutional Basis of a "Coloured Community" in Rhodesia, Political Economy Research Seminar No.10, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo); D.G. Clarke, An Economic Profile of The Coloured Minority in Rhodesia, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo). On both these minorities also see Southern Rhodesia, Third Report of The Select Committee on Disabilities of Eurafrican, Coloured and Asian Communities, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1960.

15. See here W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.160, where the sole reference to these problems is to mention that the Asian and Coloured minorities 'occupy an intermediate position in the social scale'. The minorities are considered as undifferentiated groups. And their internal stratifications are wholly ignored.

16. There are some Asians and a few Coloureds and Africans included in this data. However, the extent of distortion resulting from their inclusion is insignificant. In 1968-69 only 0.6 percent of income tax paid and 1.3 percent of all income taxpayers were Africans. See Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics: Analysis of Assessments and Loss Statements Issued During The Fiscal Year 1968-1969, C.S.O., 1969.

17. These deficiencies include: the fact that the definition of 'taxable income' is designed for taxation purposes and not to calculate total individual incomes; and the fact that a degree of tax evasion may have occurred, especially in the agricultural sector.

18. Rhodesia, Report on The European Family Budget Survey in Rhodesia 1968, C.S.O., February, 1970, p.6.

19. Market Research Africa, Profile on Rhodesia: Europeans, Salisbury, 1970.

20. Ibid.

21. See D.G. Clarke, Economic and Political Aspects of The Rhodesian Franchise, Journal of Commonwealth and Political Studies, XI, 1, 1973, for details of the white monopoly over the electorate. Since the extension of guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia in the 1970's the State's dependence on white manpower has become more strained.

22. See Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., Table 17.

23. Ibid.

24. For instance, in the Mining and Quarrying, Manufacturing, and Electricity and Water sectors European women numbered 25,409 or 20.5 percent of the total European labour force in these industries in 1971. See Rhodesia, The Census of Production 1971-2, C.S.O., Salisbury, p.3.

25. In 1968 the income of wives from employment boasted white urban household incomes by $45 monthly on average for all households. This amounted to 12 percent of household income at this time. See Rhodesia, Report on The European Family Budget Survey in Rhodesia 1968, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1970, Table 5.

26. Ibid., Table 3. See also C. Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, O.U.P., 1959, p.81, for a comparison with the occupational structure of 1951 when 11.8 percent of Europeans in employment were farmers, 27.4 percent were clerical workers and shop assistants, and 30.4 percent were foremen and skilled workers.

27. Rhodesia, European Budget Survey 1968, op.cit., p.6.

28. See here B. Mothobi, Some Reflections on Management Beliefs About African Workers, South African Labour Bulletin, 2, March, 1975.

29. Peter S. Harris, Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974, p.9, emphasis added.

30. By a conservative estimate these four employer types would account for approximately 100,000 wage labourers in 1972, roughly in the following respective proportions: 15,000; 15,000; 60,000; 10,000.

31. The trend noted here is possibly overstated by use of the pre-1954 data. However, the same general conclusion can be drawn if the post-1954 data only are used.

32. See for instance Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa, The Socialist Register 1969, Merlin, London, 1969.

33. See Percy Ibbotson, Report on a Survey of Urban African Conditions in Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury, August, 1943. Also by the same author The Urban Native Problem, Native Affairs Department Annual, 1945; and Urbanization in Southern Rhodesia, Africa, XVI, 2, 1946. The data extracted are from the Survey Report.

34. Edward Batson, The Povery Line in Salisbury, University of Cape Town, 1944, p.9. This raises the question - how could individuals survive with cash wages under the single individual's P.D.L.? Firstly, the element of 'rations' in remuneration would help offset the deficit, but not for all workers. Secondly, workers would 'enjoy' an enforced level of consumption below even the P.D.L. as defined, i.e., under-consumption would occur, especially in respect of foodstuffs. Thirdly, real net food transfers would be forthcoming from the rural areas.

35. It is often thought by academic economists that the roots of African minimum wage policies stemmed from the 1945 Railway Strike Awards. This is not so. The 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act excluded Africans by its de facto operations, but it allowed white unions and employers to fix wage rates for unskilled and semi-skilled workers, i.e. African workers.

36. See National Native Labour Board, Inquiry Into Wages and Conditions of Employment of Africans, Central Africal Statistical Office, Salisbury, July, 1948, from where the data cited in this section are extracted.

37. See here Southern Rhodesia, Report of The National Native Labour Board on Its Inquiry into the Conditions of Employment in Industry in Bulawayo, Gwelo, Que Que, Salisbury, Umtali, Gatooma and Environs, and within the Area of Jurisdiction of all Town Management Boards, Salisbury, November, 1948, p.23, where the government statistician recorded that the worth to the African in 1948 of the 1939 pound was 9/5d if an African bought his own 'rations' and provided his own accommodation and 8/- if he did not do so.

38. For an excellent commentary on these conditions see Richard Gray, The Two Nations, O.U.P., 1961, especially pp.209-229.

39. See here the 'minimum' P.D.L. standards applicable by the State to whites in Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Social Security Officer; Part I, Salisbury, September 1944, where the urban minimum for single males was given as £9.5.0, three times higher than calculated for blacks by Batson.

40. Southern Rhodesia, Report of The Urban African Affairs Commission 1958, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1958, Appendix N (Plewman Commission).

41. Bettison equated 'single' men with unaccompanied men. The distinction is crucial. See ibid., p.181.

42. For evidence confirming this proposition for 1961 see Rhodesia, Final Report on The September, 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1965, Tables 8 and 9.

43. For instance Bettison excluded provision for post-employment consumption, education and allowance for recreation. Compare the structure of Bettison's components with recent studies in Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974.

44. Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, op.cit.

45. Variations between other towns surveyed (Ft. Victoria and Bulawayo) were not significant.

46. This is a conservative estimate of the situation. Table 28 of the 1974 P.D.L. Report shows that in Harari (a large black township in Salisbury) 54 percent of families were in families of 7 or more.

47. Data on wages in kind were provided to the author by the Central Statistical Office in a personal communication (ref. LS/3/01, 12 January, 1973, C.S.O.).

48. As a reflection of African urban-industrial poverty it was reported in 1970 that 80 percent of black urban householders relied on buses, only 7 percent of households had a car, and only 44 percent owned bicycles. See Market Research Africa, Profile on Rhodesia: African, Salisbury, 1970.

49. R.C. Riddell, Poverty and The Wage Structure in Rhodesia, Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974, p.202.

50. See Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, op.cit., Table 77.

51. Data on the wage structure and problems of class and discrimination in the mining industry are dealt with in Chapter 9.

52. Thus Colgate-Palmolive, Dunlop, Mobil Oil, and several other foreign firms attempted to revise their wage structures in advance of the 1974 P.D.L. Report becoming public.

53. This latter point is reflected also in the constant pressure from the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Rhodesia for 'something to be done about farm wages'.

54. See especially Chapters 6 and 7 for further discussion.

55. On these trends see D.G. Clarke, Farm Workers' Wages and Conditions of Employment From The 1940's to The 1970's, Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974; also consult Chapter 6.

56. See C.S.O., Revision of Statistics Relating To Africans Employed in the Agricultural Sector, DL/614/15 (mimeo).

57. See Duncan Clarke, Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974, Chapter 3, for details on contract wage structures.

58. See Duncan G. Clarke, Domestic Workers in Rhodesia: The Economics of Masters and Servants, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974, p.32, where it is shown that the 1971 real earnings level for domestic workers was approximately 18 percent above the 1920-24 leval.

59. For further details here see Chapter 8.

60. For example see R.J. Davies, The Informal Sector in Rhodesia: How Important? Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974.

61. See here Sources and Notes To The Tables. One of the principal difficulties of rural income measurement relates to the assumption by the C.S.O. of an approximate constant consumption level per head (as shown in the National Accounts data for 1965-70) which tends to build an element of stagnation into estimates of rural household incomes. See the pertinent comment here however in R.B. Sutcliffe, op.cit., p.49, which states: 'People probably attempt to maintain some minimum level of consumption and regard crop sales as an extra source of income if the crop is large enough. In that case the fall in sales per head is an indication that it has become more difficult for people in the countryside to maintain minimum levels of consumption. It may then be evidence that they are getting poorer.'

62. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.172.

63. This is in effect what Sutcliffe has tried to do by attempting to obtain income per head estimates for both a rural and an 'urban' sector.

64. See A.K.H. Weinrich, Race Relations in a Small Rhodesian Town (forthcoming). I am grateful to Dr Weinrich for permitting me to see her manuscript.

65. A.J.B. Hughes, Report on An Experimental Sample Socio-Economic Survey, Department of Conservation and Extension, Salisbury, 1965.

66. A study of C.S.O. urban budget surveys shows little evidence of substantial income transfers to rural areas. Transfers are identified in and out of urban households but do not break down into cash and kind nor is it clear in the C.S.O. data if the transfers recorded are exclusive of intra-family transfers. If so, this would help explain the 'inconsistency' of the C.S.O. data with other studies.

67. See V. Moller, Harare Hostels Study 1973, Research Report No. 6, Institute For Social Research, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo).

68. Ibid,, for details see Table 36.

69. Ibid., for details see Table 36.2.

70. M.F.C. Bourdillon, Korekore Labour Migrants, A.S.S.A., Lesotho, 1973 (mimeo).

71. See Peter S. Harris, op.cit., p.29, where the following statement appears: 'Payments made for the purposes of retaining "membership" of and rights in the rural community represent a low cost form of social security contribution.' And also: 'As the incomes of industrial workers rise, they bring family members previously living in the rural areas back into the towns, thus exhibiting a "revealed preference" for a residentially united family.'

72. Agrarian development has contained two biases in Rhodesia - one favouring settler producers and the other favouring the rural African capitalist class in the Purchase Areas. These development areas have gained at the expense of peasant areas. See Chapters 5 and 6.

73. Little serious analysis has been conducted on inequalities in pre-capitalist social formations. However, see J. Cobbing, Historical Materialism and The Nineteenth Century Ndebele, Political Economy Research Seminar No. 11, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo), for some work in this direction.

74. See Chapter 5.

75. African capitalist incomes derive in the main from unincorporated enterprise. The essential factor here is that the producer group referred to own the means of production. They are an underdeveloped capitalist class nonetheless; and can be differentiated from other strata of the African bourgeoisie who depend on different sources of income.

76. In particular, the coverage of African owned enterprises is incomplete, as is admitted by the C.S.O.

77. Rhodesia, 1969 Population Census: Interim Report: Volume II: African Population, C.S.O., 1971.

78. For more comprehensive data on Purchase Area farmers see Rhodesia, Agricultural Production in African Purchase Areas 1972, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1973.

79. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., p.75.

80. Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics: Analysis of Assessments and Loss Statements issued during the Fiscal Year 1967-68, C.S.O., Salisbury.

81. For further social and economic aspects see A.K. Weinrich, Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia, Manchester University Press, 1973.

82. See H. Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 1, 1972; and R.W.M. Johnson, African Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia 1945-60, Food Research Institute Studies, IV, 1, 1964.

83. The term 'auxiliary bourgeoisie' is here borrowed from Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, Heinemann, 1975.

84. 'Zimbabwe' has long been the African nationalist name for post-settler colonial Rhodesia. Although not a reality (at the time of writing), it reflects an expectation that even international corporations must come to terms with in the long run.

85. The essence of comprador status is an alliance with international capital interests. For discussion on the use of this notion in Africa see Colin Leys, ibid.

86. Central Statistical Office, Wage Distribution of African Employees by Industrial Sector For The Month of June, 1973, DL/830/66, January, 1974 (mimeo).

87. Indeed, African teachers have been 'unionized' for many years through the Rhodesian African Teachers Association, a 'welfare organization' in legal terms, which has traditionally been controlled by the elite of African teachers.

88. For example, if it is assumed (on the basis of income tax data in Table 9) that in 1967 some 5 percent of the European population earned 14.4 percent of European incomes, this would mean that 11,870 Europeans commanded an income of £55.4 million whereas 2.84 million persons in the Rural Household Sector commanded an income of £71.3 million. The ratio of incomes per head of the former group to the latter is greater than 225:1.

89. This is mainly due to the incompleteness of data on government and Public Corporations in the data for the pre-1965 period.

90. See Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1972, C.S.O., Salisbury, Table 19, from where the data used in this section are extracted.

91. Ibid., Table 20, from which all wage data for Africans and Europeans are extracted.

92. No data are available on net profits by sector. However, net profits are shown as having substantially risen in the case of public quoted companies from 1967-71. See M.A. Brooke, A Note on an Index of Profits of Quoted Companies, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 1, 1972.

93. David I. Ramsay, Productivity and Capital in Rhodesian Manufacturing 1955-72, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 8, 2, 1974.

94. Rhodesia, National Accounts 1972, op.cit., Table 42.

95. Southern Rhodesia, National Development Plan 1965, C.S.R. 29-1965, Government Printer, Salisbury.

96. Rhodesia, Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning For the Economic Development of Rhodesia, C.S.R. 35-1967, Government Printer, Salisbury, p.12.

97. The Minister of Finance, Government Policy and Economic Planning, in For The Record, Volume 1, p.2.

98. These four authors are not in the same position in respect of this criticism however. Arrighi has gone furthest in integrating analysis of production and distribution with class structure.

CHAPTER 3

1. See Southern Rhodesia, Report on Industrial Relations in Southern Rhodesia, C.S.R., 3, 1930 (by Professor Henry Clay); also S. Herbert Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, O.U.P., London, 1938, pp. 232-247. These are the branches as noted by Clay and Frankel. Strictly speaking, in terms of the argument developed in Chapter 7, domestic household 'production' should be added. It has been omitted here on the grounds that the domestic mode of 'production' has not been primary in nature.

2. For further details see the Clay Report, ibid., p.29.

3. See the data and analysis in Roy McGregor, Native Segregation in Southern Rhodesia: A Study of Social Policy, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1940, especially Chapter XVIII.

4. D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, Clarendon, Oxford, 1970, especially Chapter VI.

5. For details see Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Protection of Secondary Industries, 1946 (The Margolis Report), especially Annexure C, from where the data used here are taken.

6. See D.J. Murray, op.cit.

7. The Margolis Report, op.cit.

8. See here Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, Clarendon, Oxford, 1959, p.293.

9. See reports for the period in the Bantu Mirror.

10. Arthur Hazlewood, The Economics of Federation and Dissolution in Central Africa, in Arthur Hazlewood (ed.), African Integration and Disintegration, O.U.P., 1967, p.194.

11. Already by 1965 manufacturing exports amounted to £129 million, or 32 percent of gross output of manufacturing. See Rhodesia, Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning for the Economic Development of Rhodesia, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1967, p.8.

12. D.S. Pearson, Industrial Development in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 2, 1, March 1968, p.7. See also Leonard Tow, The Manufacturing Economy of Southern Rhodesia: Problems and Prospects, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, 1960.

13. See data in Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey of Rhodesia, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1974, Table 3; also Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1972, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1973, Table 4.

14. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia, 1945, Table 1, p.70.

15. For data see Timothy Curtin and David Murray, Economic Sanctions and Rhodesia, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1967, Table 6; and Rhodesia, The Census of Production 1971-72, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1972.

16. See Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics: Analysis of Assessments and Loss Statements Issued During the Fiscal Year 1968-1969, C.S.O., 1969, Table 17, where it is shown that 550 of the 596 companies in the manufacturing sector liable for income tax were in the non-food sector in the tax year ending in March, 1968. These companies paid 30 percent of total corporate income tax in that year.

17. N.J. Dickenson, Problems and Prospects in Rhodesian Manufacturing Industry, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 5, 4, December, 1971, p.11.

18. See Rhodesia, Census of Production, op.cit., Table 1, p.5, from where the data are extracted.

19. David I. Ramsay, Productivity and Capital in Rhodesian Manufacturing 1955-72, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 8, 2, 1974.

20. See here M.L. Morris, Capitalism and Apartheid: A Critique of some Current Conceptions of 'Cheap Labour Power, Oxford Workshop in the Social and Economic History of Southern Africa, 1974 (mimeo), for use of this notion in the case of South Africa. Morris also criticizes the use of the word 'cheap' (with reference to Harold Wolpe, Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid, Economy and Society, 1, 4, 1972). He argues that the term is descriptive and 'does not specify any objective structural (i.e. necessary) relations'. This may be a relevant point. It is however one that can be met by restricting the use of the term 'cheap labour power' to labour which is obtained at wages below the cost of reproduction of labour, i.e. to labour employed on the basis of 'primitive' forms of accumulation where value is transferred to employers who do not meet the full costs of subsistence of the worker and dependents. Such an interpretation has been placed on the concept of cheap labour in this study.

21. This type of unevenness is explicitly recognized in State policies of industrial decentralization. See for instance Southern Rhodesia, First Report of the Select Committee on Industrial Development, L.A.S.C., 1958; and Rhodesia, Report of the Select Committee on Decentralization, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1972.

22. This point is elaborated upon in Peter S. Harris, The Rhodesian Blockade and Internal Structural Change, Monthly Review (forthcoming); and in theoretical studies in J.F. Rweyemamu, A Model of Perverse Capitalist Industrialization, Eastern African Economic Review, 4, 1, 1972.

23. W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, O.U.P., 1961, p.139.

24. See here Kenneth Good, Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia, African Affairs, 73, 1, 1974, p.17, where the following comment is made: 'Sutcliffe has given more recent support to Arrighi's earlier conclusion that "virtually throughout Rhodesia's modern history", the racialist framework has been inconsistent with sustained industrialization'. The view expressed here by Good has also been re-iterated in Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975, p.76.

25. See C.S.O., Wage Distribution of African Employees by Industrial Sector for the Month June, 1973, DL/830/66, (mimeo), where it is shown that 102,000 of the 121,000 African manufacturing workers received cash wages below $50 monthly, a level deemed to be below the Poverty Datum Line for a family with two children in the urban areas.

26. See here Arthur Hazlewood, op.cit., p.203, who has made the following comment: 'The concentration of manufacturing in Southern Rhodesia is not readily explicable in terms either of raw material or market orientation.'

27. See W.D. Mills, The Possible Effects of Rhodesian Industrial Growth Upon Agriculture, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 3, 2, June, 1969.

28. See Rhodesia, Report by J.L. Sadie, op.cit., p.18, where it is shown that in manufacturing industries in 1965 imports accounted for 28 percent of gross output and imported capital goods were 71 percent of fixed investment.

29. See Giovanni Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa, Monthly Review Press, London, 1973, for further comment on this point.

30. In the 1970's there have been numerous complaints from businessmen that they were being 'forced' into an apolitical stance by State threats over foreign exchange allocations and industrial projects approval if criticism was directed at government policies. The Rhodesia Party made this one of the issues of the 1974 'general' election.

31. Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Yearbook of Southern Rhodesia, 1938, Salisbury, Tables 53 and 54; also P.S. Harris, Economic Incentives and European Immigration in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 3, September, 1972.

32. W.D. Mills, op.cit., has expressed the cautious position of agriculture in pointing out the need for protection (in the form of subsidies, currency controls and tariffs) for industry to be regularly reviewed in order to ensure the minimization of input costs to farmers.

33. M.J. Britten, The Effects of Industrialization on the Distributive Trade and the Consumer, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 3, 2, 1969, p.21, emphasis added.

34. R.J. Hedley, Industrial Growth and the Mining Industry, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 3, 2, June, 1969, p.33. (The author was General Manager of Rhodesian Vanadium Corporation and a Past President of the Rhodesian Chamber of Mines.)

35. Details on capital interpenetration are found in Waddacor, Brooking and Company, Rhodesian Company Register Analysis 1972, Salisbury, 1973.

36. C.S.O., Report on the Results of the National Income and Balance of Payments Questionnaire sent to Companies Operating in Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia in 1963, Salisbury, 1964. Data for 1963 are taken from this Report.

37. D.S. Pearson, op.cit., p.12. Note that the level of 'South African' interest is probably overstated because many of the firms recorded as based in South Africa would be subsidiaries of British and American companies.

38. For further comment see John Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1974, especially Chapter IV.

39. D.S. Pearson, op.cit., pp.12-13.

40. See Waddacor, Brooking and Company, op.cit., from where all the data on share ownership in quoted companies are extracted.

41. N.J. Dickenson, op.cit., p.11.

42. Ibid, p.12. See also D.S. Pearson, op.cit., p.19.

43. Leonard Tow, op.cit., Table 10, p.16.

44. Rhodesia, Census of Production, op.cit., Table 12, p.114. Note here that the number of firms is less than the number of units because one firm could account for more than one 'production unit'.

45. The net asset value of the 7 mining corporations involved was $11.9 million.

46. The Margolis Report, op.cit.

47. See R.L. Cole, The Tariff Policy of Rhodesia, 1899-1963, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 2, 2, June, 1968; and R.J. Davies, Aspects of Trade Policy in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: The Evolution towards Protection, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 3, September, 1973.

48. See B.H. Musset, Government's Industrial Policy - Its Aims and Objects in Promoting the Development of Secondary Industry, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 3, 2, June, 1969; also Rhodesia, Annual Report of the Secretary for Commerce and Industry for the Year Ended 31st December, 1971, Cmd. R.R. 27-1972, Government Printer, especially Chapter 7.

49. For a comment on policies see Mark Rule, A Policy for Export Promotion, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 2, June, 1972.

50. This has been especially important in respect of low cost power supplies. See W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.78; also Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1974, Table 42, which shows that 50 percent of total electrical consumption in 1973 was accounted for by Manufacturing industries.

51. See N.H.B. Bruce, Finance for Industrial Development, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 3, 2, June, 1969 (the author is the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia).

52. See here a frank admission to this effect and details of State-Industry co-operation in an article by Jimmy Girdlestone (Economist, Association of Rhodesian Industries) in Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 26 July, 1974.

53. Details on these policies are found in Rhodesia, Report of Secretary for Commerce and Industry, 1971, op.cit.

54. In particular, settler (labour) ideology has postulated: the existence of a scarcity of labour; that Africans habitually 'loaf' and are inefficient; that Africans are 'irrational' and have 'limited needs'; and that African workers are not 'responsible'. These notions have been used to justify the following respective policies: the importation of unskilled workers; rigid supervision and on-the-job controls; low wages and employer-controlled 'rations' as a part of earnings; severe controls on unionization and strike actions.

55. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and the Chief Native Commissioner, 1944, p.205. Hereafter cited as Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A. and C.N.C., 1944.

56. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A. and C.N.C., 1941, p.8.

57. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A. and C.N.C., 1944, p.203.

58. See G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry of Rhodesia, Journal of Development Studies, 6, 3, 1970, for data.

59. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A. and C.N.C., 1945, p.258.

60. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, and Director of Native Development for the year ended 1946, C.S.R. 48-1947, Government Printer, Salisbury, p.30. Hereafter cited as Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1946.

61. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1947, p.43.

62. Ibid.

63. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1948, p.53.

64. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1946, p.16.

65. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1948, p.16.

66. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1947, p.39.

67. R.N.F.U., Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Congress, September, 1945,p.72.

68. See Appendix C for details.

69. V.M. Wadsworth, Native Labour in Agriculture, Parts I, II and III, Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, 47, May-June, 1950, pp.234-253; 47, Nov-Dec, 1950, pp.486-493; 48, May-June, 1951, pp.267-275; hereafter referred to as V.M. Wadsworth (Part I).

70. Ibid., emphasis added.

71. V.M. Wadsworth (Part III), op.cit.

72. Ibid.

73. V.M. Wadsworth (Part II), op.cit., reported that 'on no farm was indebtedness absent'. See Chapter 6 for discussion on 'feudal' relations of production on plantations.

74. V.M. Wadsworth,(Part III), op.cit.

75. Ibid.

76. These comments have almost always been applicable to smallworkers because of their low profit margins and volume of production.

77. See Chapter 4.

78. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A. and C.N.C., 1943, p.119.

79. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A. and C.N.C., 1944, p.168.

80. Southern Rhodesia, Report on Employment of Native Female Domestic Labour in European Households in Southern Rhodesia, 1932.

81. Ibid, p.1.

82. Ibid., p.2.

83. Ibid, emphasis added.

84. Various factors influenced the elders in peasant societies, - the knowledge that prostitution was rife in the townships and on the mine and farm compounds; the fact that labour supplies to peasant production would be jeopardized; and the likelihood that domestic social control would be diminished by further fragmentation of the rural household.

85. Southern Rhodesia, Report on Native Female Labour, op.cit., p.5., emphasis added.

86. Ibid., p.6.

87. Ibid.,

88. Ibid., p.7. At this time a number of white women immigrants were domestic workers and many Coloured women were employed in this sector.

89. Ibid. At this time Coloured women on average had a higher level of education and a better command of English - the lingua franca of the settler-colonial household.

90. Ibid.

91. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1947, p.39.

92. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1948, p.50.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., p.51.

95. Ibid.

96. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1950, p.7.

97. Ibid., p.47.

98. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1951, p.48.

99. Ibid., emphasis added.

100. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1952, p.58.

101. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the National Native Labour Board on its Investigation of the Conditions of Employment of Native Women in certain Industries, Trades and Occupations, 1952, p.9, emphasis added.

102. Ibid., p.27.

103. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Southern Rhodesia Department of Labour for the Calendar Year 1957, Salisbury (mimeo), p.25.

104. Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1973, (mimeo).

105. See Rhodesia, Census of Production 1971-72, op.cit., for details. From 1964-71 the proportion of the African labour force in manufacturing who were women increased from 2.5 percent to 3.9 percent.

106. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report on Census of Africans in Employment taken on 8th May 1956, C.A.S.O., 1957, p.1.

107. R.N.F.U., Proceedings of the Annual Congress, 1958, p.84.

108. See V.M. Wadsworth (Parts I, II and II), op.cit.

109. Ibid.

110. R.N.F.U., Proceedings of the Annual Congress, 1948, as reported in Rhodesian Farmer, October 27, 1948, p.15.

111. See Roy McGregor, op.cit., where it is reported that there were 31,470 Africans in jails in 1934 serving 1,010,351 days of sentence, 899,360 of which were for 'hard' labour (p.276). Also see V.M. Wadsworth (Part III), op.cit. The R.N.F.U. have traditionally attempted to divert this labour supply to farms. See, for instance, Rhodesian Farmer, July 25, 1951.

112. The document was authored by G.E. Stent, an adviser to the Labour Department in Salisbury, February 1959.

113. For details see D.G. Clarke, Problems of Family Planning Amongst Africans in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 2, June, 1972.

114. All data are from Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit.

115. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Labour, Social Welfare and Housing for the Year Ended 31st December, 1959, Government Printer, p.1.

116. Ibid., p.4.

117. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Labour, Social Welfare and Housing for the Year Ended 31st December, 1961, Government Printer, p.1.

118. R.N.F.U., Proceedings of the Annual Congress, 1959, p.59.

119. R.N.F.U., Proceedings of the Annual Congress, 1960, p.128.

120. R.N.F.U., Proceedings of the Annual Congress, 1962, p.102.

121. Ibid,, p.105.

122. Ibid., p.107.

123. R.N.F.U., Proceedings of the Annual Congress, 1963, p.32.

124. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Internal Affairs for the Year 1964, CSR 39-1965, Government Printer, Salisbury, p.22.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. For data see Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission 1958, Government Printer, p.16 (Plewman Report); and relevant issues of Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit.

128. Ibid., p.18. The Report noted that in 1958 there were 60,000 'members of families' in the 147,000 strong African urban population of Southern Rhodesia. This should be taken to mean 'members of families resident in the towns'.

129. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Labour, Social Welfare and Houseng for the Year Ended 31st December, 1961, Government Printer, Salisbury.

130. See Roy McGregor, op.cit. The 1936 Act followed on Ordinances from 1901, 1902 and 1918 which required Africans to possess certain documents on entry to towns. The 1936 Act updated these earlier Ordinances. The Act was deeply resented. It gave much authority to Pass Officers. Right of Appeal was restricted to appeal to the Chief Native Commissioner.

131. In Salisbury, for example, one survey showed that out of a labour force of 3,600 Africans only 6 percent had remained in town over 10 years, 6 percent between 5 and 10 years and nearly 60 percent had remained less than 12 months. Records for the City as a whole showed that, to maintain a labour force of 58,000 Africans, employers engaged and discharged 47,500 over one year. The transmission of industrial skills and on-the-job training was extremely difficult under these conditions. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the S.N.A., C.N.C. and D.N.D., 1953, p.14.

132. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Labour, Social Welfare and Housing 1960, Government Printer, Salisbury, p.11.

133. See R.S. Fitzhenry, Social Sources of the Politics of Resistance and Repression: The Case of Southern Rhodesia 1945-1964, unpublished M.Phil., University of Southampton, 1970, p.31.

134. See details on leases, home ownership, service levies and rentals in the Plewman Report, op.cit. Also see Annual Reports of the Secretary For Labour (1959-62).

135. See D.G. Clarke, The Economics of Urban Inequality in Rhodesia: Considerations on the Langley, Whiting and Wright Report, Conference on African Influx and Urbanization, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo).

136. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Labour, Social Welfare and Housing 1961, Government Printer, Salisbury, p.6.

137. G. Arrighi, op.cit.

138. I am grateful to Charles Van Onselen (St Antony's College, Oxford) for allowing me to read his unpublished drafts on social control of labour in the mining industry up to 1935.

139. See Chapter 8.

140. See Chapter 6.

141. See Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 4

1. For discussion on this concept in the case of Africa isee Samir Amin, Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa, Social and Economic Studies, 22, 1, 1973; also Accumulation on a World Scale, Vols. 1 and 2, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974.

2. See F.E. Sanderson, The Development of Labour Migration from Nyasaland, Journal of African History, II, 2, 1961; Peter Scott, Migrant Labour in Southern Rhodesia, Geographical Review, 44, 1954; Robert B. Boeder, The Effects of Labour Migration on Rural Life in Malawi, Rural Africana, Spring, 1973; G. Coleman, International Labour Migration From Malawi 1875-1966, Journal of Social Science (University of Malawi), II, 1972; J.M. McKenzie, African Labour in South-Central Africa 1890-1914 and 19th Century Colonial Labour Theory, unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of British Columbia, 1969. I also used various unpublished works by Charles Van Onselen (St. Antony's College, Oxford), Ian Phimister (Department of History, University of Rhodesia) and Tom Mswaka (Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews). I am grateful to these researchers for allowing me access to their materials.

3. This period refers to the ascendancy stage of peasant development in Southern Rhodesia when surplus land and labour-power were still available to peasants, taxes were relatively low, product markets had not yet been monopolized by plantation producers and there existed a high and growing level of demand for peasant produced products.

4. I have greatly benefited from being able to read Charles Van Onselen's Labour Mobilization in a Colonial Political Economy, Chapter III of his doctoral dissertation for Oxford University, in which details of mining industry labour policy are extensively documented and discussed in an excellent analysis.

5. G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Case Study of The Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia, Journal of Development Studies, 6, 3, April, 1970. Also G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967. In the latter cited work, Arrighi comments as follows: 'Recruitment of labour outside Southern Rhodesia was certainly one of the major factors in determining both the rise and distribution among sectors of the total African labour force. This fact, however, is neither inconsistent with, nor very relevant to, the arguments of the present paper. For this reason I have almost ignored the admittedly important phenomenon.' p.32, footnote 11. Insofar as Arrighi's very valuable analyses were concerned with the political economy and class formation, this analysis would propose that his view was misplaced, particularly because migrant proletarianization had a direct impact on local labour supplies, profitability and income distribution.

6. Duncan Clarke, Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974. Much of the detail on the issues discussed here can be found cited in this source.

7. Act No. 36 of 1946, Section 6.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., Section 7, emphasis added.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. At the outset of the R.N.L.S.C.'s establishment, the Commission also undertook to investigate and report on matters affecting the exodus of labour to South Africa. This was consistent with the basic objectives as set out in the statutes.

13. This theme is re-iterated in numerous places in the R.N.L.S.C.'s Annual Reports. In practice, 'reasonable cost' can be equated with 'lowest cost'.

14. For a study of W.N.L.A.'s activities for South Africa see Francis Wilson, Labour in South African Gold Mines, Cambridge University Press, 1972; also F. Wilson, Migrant Labour in South Africa, Sprocas, Johannesburg, 1972.

15. See Arghiri Emmanuel, White-Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism, New Left Review, 73, 1972, where the following comment appears: 'the motive force proper to colonialism (includes) not only the settlers but a whole import-export world (and) the agents and backers of these interest groups in the parent country'.

16. Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission, Report for the Year Ended 31st December, 1961 (mimeo); herafter, along with other relevant reports, it will be cited as R.N.L.S.C., The Report. A number of quotations used in the text, unless otherwise cited, are taken from the Chairman's Annual Reports over the period. To avoid excessive footnotes these quotations will not be specifically cited.

17. In 1965 the name of the Commission was changed to the Rhodesian African Labour Supply Commission (R.A.L.S.C.).

18. The 'ticket' system was in almost universal usage on Southern Rhodesian farms. It was not, however, common to Mocambique where labour was remunerated monthly. Thus in negotiations for recruiting permits in Mocambique, one of the negotiated points concerned the ticket system, the Portuguese requesting (unsuccessfully) for their recruits to be paid monthly.

19. One exception existed: 'The settlement of ex-soldiers on farms were followed by requests for a large number of Native labourers, and although many of these newcomers to farms elected to make tobacco their main crop, the applications were placed in category 'A' in order to give the young men a start.' R.N.L.S.C., The Report, 1950, p.2.

20. The term 'desertion' was used by the R.N.L.S.C. as it was by the R.N.L.B. It was still in use in 1975.

21. R.N.L.S.C., The Report, 1949, p.8. The Chairman noted that a number of employees were 'very intolerant' and that others were 'confirmed grousers and agitators who are a great nuisance to their masters'.

22. See V.M. Wadsworth, Native Labour in Agriculture, Part III, Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, 48, May-June, 1951.

23. Calculated from the data given.

24. Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook of Southern Rhodesia, 4, 1952, p.209.

25. For the period 1948-52 the subsidy to employers can be calculated at approximately 12 percent of wage costs. See Duncan Clarke, Contract Workers, op.cit., p.45.

26. It is questionable whether the term 'migrant' is of much relevance to a class of workers who remained at their jobs for minimum periods of 2 years.

27. A more specific outline of this kind of contract labour model of farm wage determination can be found in Duncan Clarke, Contract Workers, op.cit., Chapter IV.

28. These calculations do not take any account of 'desertions'. There are incomplete data on desertions in the Annual Reports of the Chairman of the R.N.L.S.C. However, in some years the rate has been as high as 17.4 percent (1957). It has been suggested to the author that allowance for desertions would influence the results of this analysis. This is not the case since not all desertions took place immediately after arrival in Southern Rhodesia and, as this is an attempt to analyse the contract labour system, it would also be appropriate to include in the estimates those contractees who entered Southern Rhodesia with Agricultural Native Labour Limited (see Appendix C). It is estimated that the total supply by A.N.L.L. ran at 10 percent of R.N.L.S.C. supply. The rate of desertion recorded for 1946-71 did not on average exceed this level. Indeed, in 11 of the 17 years for which there are data on desertions, the rate was below the 10 percent level. It can therefore safely be assumed that the data used as an estimate of total contract supply is not only indicative of the supply from the R.N.L.S.C. but is also approximately the real contract supply after allowing for desertions and A.N.L.L. inflows.

29. It may be argued with some legitimacy that the deflation of the contract wage data using urban-budget-based cost of living deflators is inadmissable. Technically this is so, but there is no rural cost of living index available, nor is it to be expected that the general trend and approximate order of magnitude of actual price changes will differ too radically between urban and rural budgets making it wholly unrealistic for the former to be used as a proxy indicator of the latter. Note too that even R.N.F.U. economists adopt the technique used here. See B.H.G. Duncan, The Wage and Labour Supply Position in European Agriculture, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 1, March, 1973.

30. I must thank Gordon Chavunduka for permitting me to examine his survey returns. The results of his study can be found in Farm Labourers in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 4, December, 1972.

31. It was not possible to examine a copy of an R.N.L.S.C. contract for 1947. However, A.N.L.L. contracts have been very similar to R.N.L.S.C. contracts in the postwar period. In many cases the terms of contract as stipulated have been identical with contracts in practice.

32. See G.L. Chavunduka, op.cit.

33. Extracted from Conditions of Contract, Rhodesian African Labour Supply Commission, 1972. I am grateful to the General Manager of the R.A.L.S.C. for providing me with copies of these contracts.

34. For details on the Masters and Servants Act see Appendix D.

35. See Rhodesia, The National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1954-1964, C.S.O., July, 1965.

36. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1974.

37. B.H.G. Duncan, op.cit.

38. In this calculation I have applied C.S.O. estimates of the permanent agricultural labour force to the period under review. The margin of error can be regarded as small.

39. There is a tendency amongst some R.N.F.U. economists to argue that because contract labour is concentrated in (say) Centenary, there are only effects felt in this area, and, if (for argument's sake) there had been no local labour in this area, then there would be no adverse consequences for local labour. This argument is fallacious. It ignores the linkages between labour markets and the interdependence of wage determination, particularly in the same labour market (in this case for farm workers).

40. Rhodesia, National Accounts, op.cit.

41. See Tables 8 and 9 for data on the national origin of African workers in employment in Rhodesia from 1911-1969.

42. See Peter Scott, op.cit., for details for the 1911-1951 period.

43. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report on the Census of Africans in Employment Taken on 8th May, 1956, C.A.S.O., Salisbury, 1957, p.2.

44. The reason for this margin in estimation is that there are no data to ascertain whether the immigrants and emigrants represented the same or different groups of persons. A 1951 survey however does show that 80 percent of migrants transported by Ulere on the Mtoko route had worked previously in Southern Rhodesia for periods longer than 9 months. Only 1.8 percent had never worked in the Colony at all. Another survey at this time showed that 48 percent of all migrants had worked in Rhodesia for longer than 1½ years, 41 percent for longer than 2 years, and 32 percent for longer than 2½ years. Some 10 percent had worked in Rhodesia for longer than 7 years. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development for 1951, Government Printer, p.51.

45. Here the 'internal' migration of foreign workers is ignored, a matter on which no data are available.

46. Data from Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, C.S.O. (mimeo), 1973, Table 15.

47. Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook of Southern Rhodesia 1938, Salisbury, 1938, Table 35.

48. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Labour, Social Welfare and Housing for the Year Ended 31st December 1958, Government Printer, Salisbury, Table III.

49. Rhodesia, 1969, Census of Employees, op.cit., Table 10.

50. Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook 1938, op.cit.

51. Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Yearbook of Southern Rhodesia 1947, Salisbury, 1947, Table 37.

52. Leonard Tow, The Manufacturing Economy of Southern Rhodesia: Problems and Prospects, Washington D.C., 1960, p.96.

53. These 'explanations' are offered by numerous authors, for example Peter Scott, op.cit.

54. Ibid., p.36.

55. Data on Ulere over the 1938-58 period are obtained from the Annual Reports of the Secretary for Native Affairs and the Secretary for Labour for the period.

56. The impact of Ulere should not be underestimated. It overcame many basic difficulties facing migrants: costs of transport, food supply, medical aid, shelter and guarantee of a return journey. Rest camps were provided along all routes. Some provided 'permanent brick and vermin proof compounds'. By 1945 there were 32 Rest Camps in operation. The system was efficient and required the minimum use of white manpower. In 1948 a total of 74,788 migrants were carried at a cost of 14/6d per person, a small sum compared to the gain to employers of extra labour provided and in terms of reducing the price of labour. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development for 1948, p.54.

57. T.E. Mswaka, Controls on Black Immigrant Labour, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews, unpublished manuscript, 1973.

58. Rhodesia, Final Report on the September 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., May, 1965.

59. H. Dunlop, The Development of European Agriculture in Rhodesia 1945-1965, Occasional Paper No. 5, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1971.

60. As per C.S.O. Communication to the author (ref. LS/3/01, 1973).

61. Sunday Mail, 21 October, 1973.

62. The reasons given for the change in policy were threefold: domestic unemployment, the political risks of foreign labour dependence, and the drain of foreign worker remittances on the balance of payments. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 5 April, 1974.

63. The Chamber of Mines argued at the time that it was not looking for an overnight solution: 'rather it is hoping that mine-owners will replace foreign workers with local labour as they leave or fill new vacancies with Rhodesian Africans', ibid. For further details see Chapter 9.

64. Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 5 April, 1974.

65. Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, op.cit.

66. Since 1967 there has been an outflow of foreign African adults, except for 1973 when a net inflow of 3,920 foreign Africans was recorded. This 'inflow' is not inconsistent with the thesis advanced here. Firstly, it marks an increase in registrations of foreign workers in various districts caused by the need to renew and re-register existing certificates permitting residence in Rhodesia. Secondly, it relates in part to new registrations of foreign Africans who have been in Rhodesia some years. Thirdly, it includes the record of juvenile registrations connected with juveniles who originally entered the country with their parents. For details see Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 8 February, 1974.

CHAPTER 5

1. For a definition of the peasantry in the African context see John S. Saul and Roger Woods, African Peasantries, in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies, Penguin, 1971. The concept refers to rural cultivators who not only depend on land and land rights but are forced to do so within a wider socio-economic system. The peasant mode of production is well described in Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, Heinemann, London, 1975, p.170, as being 'characterized by the possession of land (and/or livestock) by households; by the production, on the basis of the labour of the household, of agricultural commodities (i.e. marketed produce); but in which land (or in pastoral areas livestock) remains 'natural' capital - i.e. it is seen as an indispensible means of providing successive generations of households with the basic necessities of life, and not merely one thing among many in which capital may be invested for profit'. Strictly one should talk of peasant modes and not an (assumed homogenous) peasant mode of production. See here the discussion by Emmanuel Terray, Marxism and "Primitive" Societies, Monthly Review, New York, 1972. For convenience the singular is used in this analysis.

2. See Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, Monthly Review, New York, 1974, where the following relevant point is made on p.382: 'There is expanded reproduction when profit - the income from invested capital - is saved and re-invested in order to expand productive capacity. In contrast to this... the income that is originally turned into capital cannot itself be derived from the profit from a previous investment of capital, but must emerge from exploitation of non-capitalist sectors: this is primitive accumulation.' Essentially, then primitive accumulation processes involve a transfer of value, in this case from the peasant mode of production to capitalist producers. For discussion on these processes at the international level see Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, New Left Books, 1968; and at the local level of the periphery in a similar settler-colonial situation to that analysed here, Colin Leys, op.cit., p.192.

3. Rhodesia, Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning for the Economic Development of Rhodesia, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1967, p.7.

4. See here the discussion on the 'blocked transition' and the characteristics of peripheral capitalism in Samir Amin, op.cit., p.38.

5. For analytical discussion of the sense in which the concept of 'costs of labour's reporduction' is used here see C. Meillassoux, From Reproduction to Production, Economy and Society, 1, 1, 1972; and in specific application in the case of South Africa see Harold Wolpe, Capitalism and Cheap Labour power in South Africa: From Segregation to Apartheid, Economy and Society, 1, 4, 1972.

6. See here Martin Franzman, The Role of the Non-Capitalist Mode in the Periphery of Southern Africa, Oxford University Workshop on the Social and Economic History of Southern Africa, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford, 1974 (mimeo).

7. See Tribal Areas of Rhodesia Research Foundation, Annual Report, 1973, in which the Research Officer states, in a revealing passage, that 'the European sector of the farming industry could contribute to the development of the tribal areas through offering increased employment opportunities to Rhodesian tribesmen'. This statement correctly reflects the dominant relationship between peasant and plantation production.

8. There are numerous shortcomings involved. See for instance Montague Yudelman, Africans on the Land, Harvard University Press, 1964, for discussion on the speculative nature of estimates of output. For a critique of the imputed valuations of production for own consumption see R.W.M. Johnson, On the Valuation of Subsistence Production, Occasional Paper No. 1, Department of Economics, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1961. The definition of the 'boundary of subsistence production', used in Rhodesian estimates is also restrictive. See Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1970, C.S.O., 1971, Explanatory Notes to the Tables; and Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, National Income Statistics and Estimates for the Subsistence Economy in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1960.

9. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.237. See also Murray Steele, The Foundations of a "Native" Policy in Southern Rhodesia, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Simon Frazer University, 1972, Table VI, for details of African agricultural production and yields from 1902-1939.

10. Harry Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 1, 1972. Also see Chapter 2.

11. M. Yudelman, op.cit.; Harry Dunlop, op.cit.; A.K.H. Weinrich, Productivity of Peasant Cultivators, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia, 1972 (mimeo); A.A. Le Roux, A Survey of Proposals for the Development of African Agriculture in Rhodesia, in Proceedings No. 3, Geographical Association of Rhodesia, July, 1970; and Norman Reynolds, A Socio-economic Study of an African Development Scheme, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1969.

12. Note that the ability to obtain subsistence consumption from peasant production does not mean that households will not supply labour on the market. Such a case would be qualitatively different from where labour migration was necessary for basic subsistence.

13. For details on marketing channels see M. Yudleman, op.cit.

14. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs and Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Native Development for the Year 1941, C.S.R 10-1947, Salisbury, p.5. Hereafter, for the period 1941-1957 inclusive, these reports will be referred to as Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year (1941).

15. See the data given in A.K.H. Weinrich, Productivity of Peasant Cultivators, op.cit., for example.

16. See Table 5, cols. 37 and 41, Chapter 3, from where data used here are drawn.

17. For data on the concentration of population in the Reserves see P.R.K. Edwards, The Population Explosion in Rhodesia, Proceedings No. 5, Geographical Association of Rhodesia, December, 1972. Note too the statement on peasant surpluses in Harry Dunlop, op.cit., p.15, that 'Even in a good year (1969) the surplus of grains over internal requirements was only 8 percent while in a bad year (1968) the figure was was low as 1.5 percent.

18. See here T.E. Mswaka, African Unemployment and the Rural Areas of Rhodesia, Rural Africana, Spring, 1974; and T.E. Mswaka, Rural Area Subsidies to Wage Employment in Rhodesia, Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974; also Peter S. Harris, Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974.

19. H. Dunlop, Land Policy in Rhodesia 1945-69, Political Economy Research Seminar No. 2, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo).

20. See D.G. Clarke, Land Inequality and Income Distribution in Rhodesia, African Studies Review, December, 1974, for a full discussion of the quantitative and qualitative differences.

21. See Claude Meillassoux, The Social Organization of the Peasantry: The Economic Basis of Kinship, Journal of Peasant Studies, 1, 1, 1973, for an analytical discussion of these issues.

22. See M. Yudelman, op.cit.; K. Brown, Land in Southern Rhodesia, African Bureau, London, 1959; M.L. Rifkind, The Politics of Land in Rhodesia: A Study of Land and Politics in Southern Rhodesia with special Reference to the period ;1930-1968, unpublished M.Sc. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1968; and J.F. Holleman, Chief, Council and Commissioner: Some Problems of Government in Rhodesia, London, Oxford University Press, 1969.

23. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.17. Compare the equilibrium approach of Yudelman to Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971, especially Chapters XXVII and XXIX on the centrality of land alienation in (capitalist) primitive accumulation and the effect of such policies in South Africa.

24. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.73.

25. Ibid., p.74.

26. See Gloria C. Passmore, The National Policy of Community Development in Rhodesia, University of Rhodesia, 1972, pp.32-38 for details on postwar resettlement. Note here that the eviction of 300,000 peasants implied forcible removal of 20 percent of the total African population from lands occupied for many generations, even centuries - a mammoth task.

27. D.G. Clarke, Land Inequality, op.cit.

28. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1946, p.5.

29. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1948, p.3.

30. 'Great difficulty is being experienced in re-settling all the Natives who have to be removed from private land, since development of water supplies and other services can hardly keep pace with the rapid increase in population in the Reserves and Native Areas, let alone provide either in the Reserves or the new occupation areas for all those who have to be removed from alienated land,' Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1948, p.7.

31. See Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1951, p.11, where the following statement is recorded: 'The African people concerned, having been left so long undisturbed, now think the moves result from a new policy, without realizing that they flow from the first Land Apportionment Act of 1931.'

32. Ibid., p.3.

33. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1954, p.7.

34. Gloria C. Passmore, op.cit., p.37.

35. Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Internal Affairs for the Year 1965, Government Printer, Salisbury, p.3, hereafter cited as Report of the S.I.A. for the year 1965, and similarly for all subsequent reports of the Secretary for Internal Affairs from 1965 onwards.

36. For data see Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1941, p.16.

37. Southern Rhodesia, What the Native Land Husbandry Act Means to the Rural African and to Southern Rhodesia, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1955, p.29, hereafter cited as Southern Rhodesia, L.H.A., 1955.

38. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967, p.44.

39. Southern Rhodesia, Report of Native Production and Trade Commission 1944, C.S.R 2-1945, Salisbury, p.31, hereafter referred to as R.N.P.T.C., 1944.

40. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1946, p.50.

41. For instance, in the 40 Reserves which in 1947 had 2 to 4 head of livestock per family, an additional beast per household would have raised the stock level 25 to 50 percent.

42. See A.J.B. Hughes, Tribal Land Tenure: An Obstacle to Progress? South African Journal of African Affairs, 1, 1971; M.E. Bulman, The Native Land Husbandry Act of Southern Rhodesia: A Failure in Land Reform, unpublished M.Sc. thesis, University of London, 1970; also Southern Rhodesia, L.H.A., 1955; and Gloria C. Passmore, op.cit.

43. A.J.B. Hughes, op.cit., p.66.

44. Southern Rhodesia, L.H.A., p.2.

45. Ibid., p.4.

46. For details see R.W.M. Johnson, African Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia 1945-1960, Food Research Institute Studies, IV, 1, 1964; also J.F. Holleman, Chief, Council and Commissioner, O.U.P., London, 1969.

47. A.J.B. Hughes, op.cit., p.66.

48. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1952, p.7.

49. R.W.M. Johnson, African Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia 1945-1960, op.cit., p.210.

50. Southern Rhodesia, Report of Secretary for Native Affairs and the Chief Native Commissioner for the year 1959, Government Printer, Salisbury, hereafter cited as Report of the SNA and CNC for the year 1959 and similarly for all equivalent reports for the period 1958-62 inclusive.

51. Reasons for halting the implementation of the Act are given in Report of the SNA and CNC for the Year 1962, p.10; see also C.S. Davies, Tribalism and Economic Development, NADA, X, 2, 1970.

52. Gloria C. Passmore, op.cit., p.32, emphasis added.

53. See in particular M.E. Bulman, op.cit.

54. A government official made the following remark in 1964: The Act 'has created a landless class. It has created a great deal of ill-feeling among that class towards agents of the government. It has disturbed social stability.' Quoted in A.J.B. Hughes, op.cit., p.67.

55. Ibid., emphasis in the original.

56. Ibid., p.68. Because of this reason, and because the intent of the legislation was known many years before 1967, administrators sought to apply it as best they could without specific legislative backing.

57. A.K.H. Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia, London, Heinemann, 1971, provides an in-depth study of these problems on a micro-level. See also G.K. Garbett, The Rhodesian Chief's Dilemma: Government Officer or Tribal Leader, Race, 8, 1966.

58. A 'tribesman' was defined as a person who, under 'tribal' law and custom, was recognized as a member of a community under the control or leadership of a Chief appointed by the State and holding office under the law.

59. On this point see A.J.B. Hughes, op.cit., p.68, who goes to great lengths to point out the advantages of the 1967 Act in providing for rural stabilization and accounting for the uneven development and differential requirements of peasant communities.

60. Here 'Community Development' is to be regarded in its specific Rhodesian setting, i.e., within a socio-economic framework that divides the poor from the rich. For details on the policy see Gloria C. Passmore, op.cit.

61. For a full discussion on the impact of exchange on dissolution of the pre-capitalist mode, an analysis which is of much relevance to the Rhodesian case, see George Dupre and Pierre-Phillipe Rey, Reflections on the Pertinence of a Theory of the History of Exchange, Economy and Society, 2, 2, 1973.

62. There are no data published on this point. However, I am reliably informed by Mr. E.G. Cross, Economist at the Agricultural Marketing Authority, that the Tribal Trust Lands have been net importers of grain since the early 1960's, a situation in marked contrast to their previous 'food exporting' role.

63. See Chapter 8.

64. See R.N.P.T.C., 1944, for evidence on monopolies and over-pricing. In the 1940's the so-called 'kaffir truck trade' was white and Asian controlled. In 1943 there were 205 retail general dealers' stores situated in the rural areas 49 of which were African owned.

65. See Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1948, p.12, where the C.N.C. comments that rural Africans were coming to 'regard (meat) as a necessity rather than an occasional luxury'. And Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1952, p.16, where it is noted that there had developed 'a tendency to consume bread instead of mealie meal (while there was) a phenomenal increase in the consumption of certain kinds of mineral drinks'.

66. Report of the SNA and CNC for the year 1960, p.6.

67. J.L. Sadie, op.cit., p.20, makes the following statement: 'In fact, it seems desirable that cooperative societies extend the scope of their activities and deal in consumer goods.... The same purpose may be served by inducing changes in their (the peasants') eating habits to include those items normally consumed by urban communities.' See also the comment: 'One possible way of motivating Africans might be through his children and his wife. The shop window could act as an enticement so that the family begin to make demands for products in the shops thereby forcing the head of family to work harder and produce a cash surplus for sale.' In J.D. Cameron, Industrial Growth and the Subsistence Economy, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 3, 3, September, 1969.

68. See R.N.P.T.C., 1944, p.78, which recommended that 'goods shall not be sold to a Native for any consideration save money'. In any event this was common practice in the 1940's and almost universal by the 1970's.

69. For data on purchased inputs see R.W.M. Johnson, African Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia, 1945-60, op.cit., p.184.

70. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 15 November, 1974, where the following statement is found: 'The main objective of the RASS is to promote locally-made products in the TTL's, increase the sales of company products and motivate the tribesmen from a subsistence to a cash economy level by creating a need for the goods exhibited.'

71. In 1974 for instance Munn Marketing and Manufacturing Co. (Pvt.) Ltd., was established. The managing director argued that the Company would undercut its competitors in the rural areas and sell at prices about 10 percent higher than the urban supermarkets. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 3 May, 1974.

72. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 15 November, 1974.

73. See A.K.H. Weinrich, Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia, Manchester University Press, 1973, for data on contemporary business enterprise amongst rural Africans.

74. See the report on 'A Business Community' in People and Projects, 4, March, 1973, Branch of Community Development Training, Salisbury, for an historical case study of an African Business Center in Selvkure Tribal Trust Land.

75. See here R.W.M. Johnson, African Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia 1945-1960, op.cit., p.220. On changes in the pricing of education see R.C. Bone, Educational Development in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 2, 4, 1968.

76. J.L. Sadie, op.cit., p.20. For data on the elasticity of expenditures with respect to education for rural Africans see R.W.M. Johnson, An Analysis of African Family Expenditure: Part Two: The Chiwishe Reserve, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 5, 1, March, 1971.

77. See A.A. Le Roux, op.cit.

78. Ken Brown, Land in Rhodesia, Africa Bureau, London, 1959. Brown calculated that (in 1959) to meet poll, cattle and dog taxes, school fees, the cost of clothing, food, utensils, transport and personal requisites for a man, his wife and three children, a family required £176 in cash annually. Needless to say, few could meet this income level then.

79. A.K.H. Weinrich, Productivity of Peasant Cultivators, op.cit., p.3.

80. A.F. Hunt, Economic Problems within the Tribal Trust Lands, ACCCR TTL Development Symposium, 1969, p.13. An unspecified number of these workers may have been employed outside of agricultural production.

81. Ibid. It is also noteworthy to record that in 1969 there were 563,660 adult males (over 15 years) inside the Tribal Trust Lands and 727,470 outside these areas. See Rhodesia, 1969 Population Census: Interim Report: Volume II: The African Population, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1971.

82. Norman Reynolds, op.cit.

83. Even by 1959-60 Hunt recorded that there existed a substantial hired labour force on Purchase Area farms. Of purchased current inputs from a sample of 227 farms, more than 30 percent of total outlays were for hired labour, the single most important factor input. See A.F. Hunt, Native Purchase Area Farms: An Economic Appraisal, Department of Native Economics and Markets, Salisbury, 1960.

84. Rhodesia, Agricultural Production in African Purchase Areas 1972, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1973, Table 25.

85. Ibid. Own calculation made from Table 26.

86. A.P. Cheater, Modernization and Tradition Among Farmers in Mzingezi Purchase Land, and Their Relevance for Agricultural Development, Political Economy Research Seminar No. 1, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo).

87. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1949, p.7. See also similar Annual Reports for the period.

88. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1955, p.11, provides details on this point.

89. Report of the SNA, and CNC for the year 1959, p.7.

90. See Report of the S.I.A. for the year 1962, p.10.

91. In 1963 it was reported that out of a total of 522,538 African taxpayers, 170,270 were without land and 34,758 were at the time demanding land. See H. Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, op.cit., p.18. Also Report of the S.I.A. for the year 1962, p.4.

92. See G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, op.cit., who has discussed this point in more detail.

93. Ibid.

94. For data on Purchase Areas and the requisite qualifications for Master Farmers see S.M. Makings, Problems on African Agricultural Development, 1964, Salisbury. In general terms Master Farmers had to have trained on experimental farms or have followed rigorous methods of farming prescribed by advisers, as well as have demonstrated an ability to farm well. See M.Yudleman, op.cit., p.140.

95. M. Yudleman, ibid.

96. Ibid., p.141.

97. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1951, p.17; also H. Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, op.cit.

98. Data extracted from H. Dunlop, African Agriculture: Basic Statistics, Seminar on African Agricultural Development, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1972 (mimeo).

99. M. Yudleman, op.cit., Appendix B, p.224.

100. A.A. Le Roux, African Agriculture in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, 66, 4, 1969.

101. Ibid.

102. See Harry Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, op.cit., from where the data are extracted.

103. For data on the African Farmers' Union see H.M.S.O., Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable the Lord Pearce, London, 1972, p.126-30. Also see Murimi (Official Journal of the Rhodesian African Farmers' Union) for the period 1960-1972.

104. Southern Rhodesia, Report to the Minister of Agriculture and Lands on the Agricultural Development of Southern Rhodesia by Professor Sir Frank Engledow, C.S.R 23-1950, Salisbury, hereafter referred to as the Engledow Report, 1950.

105. Engledow Report, 1950, p.24. See also the view expressed in R.N.P.T.C., 1944, p.36: 'fewer but reasonably prosperous Native farmers will be better than a large number of poor farmers'.

106. See R.W.M. Johnson, African Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia 1945-1960, op.cit., p.216.

107. This perspective was explicitly recognized. See R.N.P.T.C., 1944, p.36, where the following statement occurs: 'It is very necessary that the Native should realize that only a very limited number will be able to obtain freehold farms... an increasing number of them in future will have to seek careers in industry or employment.'

108. Rhodesia, Agricultural Production in African Purchase Areas, op.cit., Tables 28 and 29.

109. A.F. Hunt, Native Purchase Area Farms: An Economic Appraisal, op.cit.

110. See Ken Brown, op.cit., on these restraints.

111. See data in H. Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, op.cit.

112. Details are given in A.K.H. Weinrich, Evolution and Revolution in African Agriculture, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia, 1972 (mimeo).

113. See Murimi, op.cit., from 1960 onwards.

114. Murimi, February, 1961.

115. Murimi, July, 1963.

116. See Sunday Mail, 2 June, 1974.

117. This term has been suggested by M. Frantzman, op.cit.

118. See Gloria C.Passmore, op.cit.

119. See contemporary accounts in Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 1972-75.

120. On the necessity for this see George Dupre and Pierre-Phillipe Rey, op.cit.

121. For details on the composition of these authorities see Gloria C. Passmore, op.cit.

122. For instance see the comments of J.D. Cameron in Rhodesia Herald, 16 November, 1974, in which the Tribal Trust Lands are described as 'a heavy drain on the national purse'.

123. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.159.

124. Ibid.

125. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1952, p.3.

126. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.159.

127. See Yudelman, ibid., who records that, for this period, 'the average and marginal returns on expenditures declined rather than increased'.

128. For data see Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, op.cit.; and H. Dunlop, The Development of European Agriculture in Rhodesia 1945-1965, Occasional Paper No.5, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1971.

129. See A.K.H. Weinrich, Agricultural Productivity of Irrigation Schemes, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia, 1972, (mimeo) for data on these schemes.

130. For instance between 1968-69 and 1972-73 a sum of $74.03 million has been allocated to the subsidization of losses incurred by European tobacco producers while funds for Tilcor, the principal State instrument for investment in peasant agriculture, amounted to only $2.8 million - and much of these funds was expended in administrative costs and peri-urban industry. For data on budget allocations see Rhodesia, Budget Statements 1972, Cmd. R.R. 40-1972, Government Printer, Salisbury.

131. See Southern Rhodesia, L.H.A., 1955, p.4.

132. See the comments here of H. Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, op.cit., p.16.

133. The 'problem' was aptly formulated by the C.N.C. in Report of the CNC, SNA and DND for the year 1945, p.207, when he stated: 'one of the problems to which this department will have to provide a solution is that of developing the Native Reserves so that they may accommodate the Native population at present residing in the European areas, without draining too heavily the available labour supply'.

134. Engledow Report, 1950, p.19.

135. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.81.

136. R.N.P.T.C., 1944, p.59.

137. See, for example, such arguments in J.P. Danckwerts, Technology and Economic Development of African Agriculture in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 4, 4, December, 1970.

138. For data on the effects of drought on peasant communities see A.K.H. Weinrich, Productivity of Peasant Cultivators, op.cit.

139. See for instance the allocation of drought aid in the 1973 drought, details of which are given in Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 9 November, 1973; Rhodesia Herald, August 3, 1973; and Rhodesia Herald, 23 April, 1974.

140. In the drought of 1942 for instance peasant survival was ensured only through the consumption of surpluses. See Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1942, p.56.

141. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1944, p.165.

142. Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1951, p.4.

143. See Report of the SNA and CNC for the year 1960, p.1.

144. Report of the S.I.A. for the year 1964, p.12.

145. See Report of the S.I.A. for the year 1966, p.3, where the following statement is found in reference to the drought: 'Additional cattle sales were arranged and for those who could not work and who had no cattle, normal social relief was available.' Emphasis added.

146. See M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.51. Also see Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics, C.S.O., 1965, for details of allowances.

147. See G. Kay, Distribution and Density of Population in Rhodesia, University of Hull, Department of Geography, Miscellaneous Series No. 12, 1971, for details of the effects of land allocation on the relative competitiveness of plantation producers vis-a-vis peasant producers.

148. See Report of the SNA, CNC and DND for the year 1951, p.115, for details.

149. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.182.

150. See Yudelman, ibid., p.183, who comments as follows: 'The fact that growers are not allowed to deliver their own products and those of their neighbours to the marketing board's depots has a peculiar effect on resource use. Carts, bicycles and other means of transport, which are among the major capital investments in African agriculture are often underutilized. Paradoxically there is "excess capacity" of transportation equipment in areas of capital shortage.'

151. See R.N.P.T.C., 1944, p.20, where it is shown that the total outlays on the administration of Native Affairs, the Land Board, the development of the Native Areas and Reserves, the supply of water and dams, soil conservation work and Native Village Settlement and Health came to £331,367 for the financial year ended 31 March, 1945. In the same year the African personal tax contribution, mostly derived from rural areas, was itself £445,435. In addition Africans were reported to have carried 'a large share of indirect taxation'.

152. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.162, provides data to show that for the period 1948-1958 direct taxes on Africans accounted for 60 percent of direct government expenditure on African agriculture. Whilst this is by no means a perfect measure it is indicative of the relatively small net governmental contribution to this sector.

153. M. Yudelman, op.cit., p.165. Emphasis added. Note that this levy as a proportion of producer price would tend to be higher than the figure suggested. For instance in 1957 the average levy on groundnuts was 29 percent of the price received by producers. Calculated from Yudleman, p.185.

154. Report of the SNA and CNC for the year 1962, p.18. Emphasis Added.

155. 'It is an "invisible" tax which has come to be accepted by the producer, and it is quite obvious that it would be most difficult to find a practicable alternative method of financing those services which the Fund now covers.' Report of the S.I.A. for the year 1964, p.11.

156. The labour supplying impact was obvious. See Yudelman, op.cit., p.167, who has commented that the policy 'increases the hardships of the poorest section of the community: as such it can only add to the incentive for males to migrate and to seek wage employment outside the African areas.'

CHAPTER 6

1. For discussion on the difference between the capitalist system and forms of production which are not purely capitalist see Ernesto Laclau, Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America, New Left Review, 67, 1971.

2. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967; and W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, O.U.P., London, 1961.

3. On the components which form and define the mode see Emmanuel Terray, Marxism and "Primitive" Societies, Monthly Review, 1972, pp.97-105. See also O. Lange, Political Economy Vol. 1, Pergammon Press, 1963.

4. Henry Bernstein and Michael Pitt, Review Article: Plantations and Modes of Exploitation, Journal of Peasant Studies, 1, 4, 1974.

5. Jay R. Mandle, The Plantation Economy: An Essay in Definition, Science and Society, 36, 1, 1972, p.62.

6. See here the discussion in Emmanuel Terray, op.cit.

7. On both these assumptions see examples in W.J. Barber, op.cit., pp.126-39.

8. W.O. Jones, Plantations, in David L. Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 12, 1968, p.154.

9. R.T. Smith, Social Stratification, Cultural Pluralism and Integration in West Indian Societies, in S. Lewis and T.G. Matthews :(eds.), Caribbean Integration, Puerto Rico, 1967, p.230.

10. E. Feder, Latifundia and Agricultural Labour in Latin America, in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies, Penguin, 1971.

11. For details see John Sprack, Rhodesia: South Africa's Sixth Province, International Defence and Aid Fund, London, 1974, especially Chapter 4.

12. The size of State investment in agriculture is indicated by the fact that in 1972 the gross operating profits of public corporations (State owned) were only $2.4 million while total gross operating profits were $81.1 million. See Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1972, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1973, Table 5. No breakdown of this figure is provided.

13. This is expressed in various ways in malnutrition, poor medical facilities, educational deprivation, poor clothing, lack of household durable goods, primitive housing, unsanitary conditions in farm villages and other forms of private and social under-consumption. On the 'moral and historical' element' in wage formation see Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, Merlin Press, 1971, p.147: 'The value of labour-power comprises not only the prices of the means of existence needed for its purely physical reconstitution (and the maintenance of the workers' children, i.e. the reproduction of labour-power). It also includes a moral and historical element, i.e. the prices of those commodities (and, later, of certain personal services) which the traditions of a given country have come to include in the subsistence minimum.'

14. See George L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in the Plantation Economies of the Third World, Oxford University Press, 1972, for a discussion on the socio-economic nature of plantations. Although set in a different context, Beckford's work has much relevance to Rhodesia.

15. Data taken from H. Dunlop, The Development of European Agriculture in Rhodesia 1945-1965, Occasional Paper No. 5, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1971, p.12.

16. See Sunday Mail, 18 July, 1971, for example.

17. Data from Rhodesia, Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning for the Economic Development of Rhodesia, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1967, p. 8 and p. 18.

18. See report in Business Herald, 31 October, 1974.

19. H. Dunlop, op.cit., p.9.

20. Ibid., p.12.

21. H. Dunlop, op.cit., p.40.

22. Ibid., p.41. See also B.H.G. Duncan, Agriculture's Debt Load, Probe, 2, 1973, for data on the 1965-72 period.

23. Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1954-1964, C.S.O., July, 1965; and Rhodesia, National Accounts 1972, op.cit.

24. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.132; and Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1974, Table 20.

25. Data from H. Dunlop, op.cit., Table 1.

26. Rhodesia, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Agricultural Input Costs, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1973, Table 1; and Monthly Digest, op.cit., Table 14.

27. Southern Rhodesia, Report on Native Labour Enquiry, C.A.S.O., Salisbury, 1948.

28. See R.N.F.U., Document File No. E/1/18, 1973.

29. C.S.O., Wage Distribution of African Employees by Industrial Sector for the Month of June 1973, DL/830/66, Salisbury, January, 1974 (mimeo).

30. For details see Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics: Income Years 1953/54-1962/63, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1965, especially p.111.

31. Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1965, C.S.O., July, 1966, p.4.

32. Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, C.S.O., October, 1971, p.5.

33. See, for example, Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 9 November, 1973. Also E. Cobban, Commercial Participation, Rhodesian Farmer, 7 December, 1973. On other links through large foreign corporations see John Sprack, op.cit.

34. On the nature of 'total institutions' see Erving Goffman, On the Characteristics of Total Institutions, in Peter Worsley (ed.), Modern Sociology, Penguin, 1970.

35. In 1971 total African earnings in farm employment were $37.7, 32.3 percent of which was paid in kind. For white farm employees only 8 percent of earnings were 'in kind'. See Personal Communication from C.S.O. to Author, LS/3/01, 12 January, 1973.

36. It is common parlance in rural settler society to refer to 'my boys'. The words express the 'property' relationship involved between management and the worker. Often employers 'lend' their boys to other farmers if the need arises.

37. The principal difference between plantation and domestic employment in terms of employment of family labour is the regulating effect of urban areas legislation which precludes this arrangement (at least on a widespread, legal basis) in the domestic labour market. See Chapter 7.

38. See Sidney W. Mintz, The Rural Proletariat and the Problem of Rural Proletarian Consciousness, Journal of Peasant Studies, 1, 3, 1973, for discussion on 'store buying' as a characteristic of plantation labour.

39. See Mintz's comment, ibid., p.309 here: 'The greater the rationalization of production, and the faster the replacement of labour intensive and poorly capitalized agriculture with new systems, the more complete the depersonalization and homogenisation of the labour force itself. Inevitably, workers come to see themselves as undifferentiated in terms of their fates, more and more dependent on enterprises to which they could build no personal attachments.'

40. For instance, see the case of squatter families in Nuanetsi who were offered jobs on Hippo Valley Estates, in Rhodesia Herald, 30 May, 1963. Also note the comment of a prominent ex-Minister of Agriculture that the problem of the 'landless', i.e. squatters, should be 'solved' through development of the European agricultural industry. See Rhodesia Herald, 16 August, 1963.

41. Note that the term 'prisoners' is not used in the literal sense here but expresses a condition in which rural labourers are without an effective choice in employment except to go to other plantations.

42. In 1962 there were 19,850 adult African males in European farm areas who were 'unemployed'. This amounted to 6.9 percent of all adult African males in these areas. See Rhodesia, Final Report of the April/May 1962 Census of Africans in Southern Rhodesia, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1964, p.30.

43. In this sense the unemployed are a 'rural reserve army', but within a system in which 'the agricultural industry serves as a national pool from which most other sectors draw in order to satisfy their needs', Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 11 April, 1974. The sector as a whole thus fulfils a function as a latent 'industrial reserve army' of employed and unemployed.

44. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit.

45. H. Dunlop, op.cit., p.12.

46. See for instance letters to the editor in Rhodesia Herald, 12 October, 1967.

47. In 1959 prior to the Industrial Conciliation Act farm assistants lobbied for 'Agriculture' to be included under the provisions of the Act in order to enable collective bargaining rights to be extended to white farm employees. Their demands abated however after it was pointed out that this would automatically extend the same right (the Act was to be 'non-racial') to black workers. See various Hansard debates on the 1959 Act for comments from M.P.'s, many of them farmers.

48. Since Chibero College has started producing black agriculturists the demand for black farm assistants has exceeded available supply, a result of the lower wage at which these graduates have been prepared to work on European farms. See Rhodesia Herald, 26 July, 1974.

49. See report in Rhodesia Herald, 9 June, 1967; also Rhodesia Herald, 12 October, 1967; and Rhodesia Herald, 28 September, 1967.

50. Rhodesia Herald, 7 May, 1971. There was no date attached to the exact time at which the 'Agreement' was drawn up.

51. See here the lengthy discussion on the benefits received by white employees on farms in Property and Finance, August, 1974.

52. E. Feder, op.cit., p.89.

53. Use of the term 'new entrants' must be qualified by the knowledge that many of these owners are second or third generation farmers.

54. See for instance the comments of the Standard Bank Chairman in Rhodesia Herald, 20 October, 1974; and the Secretary for Agriculture in Rhodesia Herald, 18 April, 1974; also Rhodesia Herald, 12 November, 1974.

55. See Rhodesia Herald, 1 November, 1974, where it is reported that the sale of the Mkwasine (State owned) plantation enterprise was subject to the condition that 40 percent of the land be allocated by the new owners to settler estates. The R.N.F.U. welcomed this State initiative and expressed hope that when the Middle Sabi estate was sold all the land would go to establish settler estates. See Rhodesia Herald, 13 November, 1974.

56. Rhodesia Herald, 25 September, 1974.

57. See the reports on the Plumtree area, in Rhodesia Herald, 20 September, 1974, where in 1974 only 10 of a total of 35 farms were effectively occupied leaving 66 percent of the land vacant. In Marula district only 17 out of 41 farms were occupied. In this latter district there existed a case of a farm owned by one company which accounted for 65,000 hectares of land.

58. See Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report on the Census of Africans in Employment taken on 8th May 1956, C.A.S.O., Salisbury, 1957, Table VI; and Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1973 (mimeo), p.18.

59. For a typical example of such a paternalist policy see L.T. Molam, Agriculture and the Rural Labour Drain, African Urbanization Conference, University of Rhodesia, February, 1973 (mimeo). See also the letter by A. Berry in Rhodesia Herald, 3 April, 1974, in which it is argued that the farm worker is as well off as the urban labourer.

60. See Table 7, Chapter 4.

61. Since 1973 a dispute has emerged over the trend in the level of real wages for farm labour. Up to this time R.N.F.U. economists accepted that wages had fallen in real terms from 1963-72. See B.H.G. Duncan, The Wages and Labour Supply Position in European Agriculture, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 1, 1973, Table 7. However, since 1973 the R.N.F.U. have argued that a rural cost of living index should be applied to farm wages. In principle there can be no

dispute with this argument. However there is no rural C.O.L. in existence in Rhodesia. Even so the R.N.F.U. claim to have constructed one, even taking the index back to 1962. One of their own memorandums, not published as yet, claims that from 1962-71 the 'Rural African Price Index' (base 1962 of 100) rose only 10.9 points, the net effect of which when applied as a deflator to farm wages, results in 1971 wages being 0.5 percent below the 1962 level. See R.N.F.U., Document File No. E/1/18, 1973.

62. B.H.G. Duncan, op.cit., where it is shown that 'Output per Dollar African Labour Cost' rose 42 percent from 1963-71. See also H. Dunlop, Land and Economic Opportunity in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 1, 1972.

63. See B.H.G. Duncan, op.cit., Table 8, where it is shown that from 1963 to 1971 the proportion of earnings paid in kind varied between 33.9 percent and 36.0 percent.

64. Central Statistical Office, Wage Distribution of African Employees, DL/599/500, 1971 (mimeo).

65. Data supplied to the author by R.C. Riddell, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia.

66. See variously V.M. Wadsworth, Native Labour in Agriculture, Parts I, II and III, Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, vol.47, May-June, p.234-53, 1950; vol.47, Nov.-Dec., p.486-93, 1950; vol. 48, May-June, p.267-75, 1951.

67. Ibid., Part I, p.242.

68. Ibid.,

69. Ibid., p.243.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid., p.245.

72. Ibid., Part III.

73. It is not possible to cite written statements on this point. However, in numerous conversations with persons informed of labour conditions on farms, which the author had over a 3-year period from 1971-74, there was not one person who seriously claimed that farm conditions differed in the 1970's from the 1940's.

74. See Rhodesia, 1962 Census, op.cit., p.39, where it is shown that the following conditions applied in 1962: 39.9 percent of the dwellings of African households in European farm areas had one room and 39.2 percent had 2 rooms; 55 percent of the persons in these areas lived in dwellings of 3 or more persons.

75. See Rhodesia Herald, 8 April, 1974; also Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 11 April, 1974, as well as other relevant issues.

76. In 1962 there were 2.1 non-workers per African employee on European farms. See Rhodesia, 1962 Census, op.cit., p.13, and Monthly Digest, op.cit., Table 14. No directly comparable data are available for 1969. However, the 1969 Census of Population and Census of Employees (taken together) show that in 1969 the number of Africans in non-urban areas had risen to 1,080,042, a figure which would indicate that there were 2.6 non-workers per African employee on European farms in 1969. See Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, op.cit., Table 2; and Rhodesia, 1969 Population Census: Interim Report: Volume II: The African Population, C.S.O., 1971, Table 3.

77. In 1974 the school fees for Grade I for Africans were $4.26 (including exam fees, books, etc.) but for Grade 7 were $12.13 for boys and $13.63 for girls. Data supplied by R.C. Riddell, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, February, 1974. See also Rhodesia, 1962 Census, op.cit., pp.25-27, where it is shown that in European farm areas educational provisions and standards for Africans are markedly worse than in urban areas or even the reserves.

78. For example see Sunday Mail, 23 June, 1974, for a report on this practice at Rhod-Tea's Ratelshoek plantation. It was also reported that the practice had the approval of the Ministry of Education.

79. See Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, The Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974, especially Ch. V (An Application of the Poverty Datum Line to a European Farm), (mimeo).

80. M. Gelfand, Diet and Tradition in an African Culture, Livingstone, Edinburgh, 1971, p.194.

81. See Sunday Mail, 12 May, 1974.

82. See here the statements of L.T. Molam (Chairman, R.N.F.U. Labour Committee) in Lomagundi News, 29 March, 1974.

83. This is appreciated by the R.N.F.U. - hence their decision to introduce a pension scheme for farm workers. See Rhodesia Herald, 25 July, 1974, where the following statement from L.T. Molam (R.N.F.U. Labour Committee Chairman) appears: 'The cushion of social security in tribal lands has vanished and the present generation of farm assistants and managers look more often to a pensioned retirement than to owning their own farms.' The Pension Scheme that the R.N.F.U. have attempted to introduce caters for black and white employees.

84. See Rhodesia Herald, 9 August, 1974, for details of the R.N.F.U. pension scheme. It is shown that farm workers who work for 40 years and retire at 60 years of age will receive $100 per annum if their monthly cash wage was $10 at retirement (in June 1973 more than 75 percent of farm workers received a cash wage below $10 monthly). Note that there is no stipulation in the Pension Scheme that farm workers must receive any payments in kind in addition to the cash pension nor that they be allowed to remain on the plantation.

85. Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, op.cit.

86. G.L. Chavunduka, Farm Labourers in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 4, 1972.

87. See particularly P.J. Mpofu, Memorandum of Agricultural and Forestry Workers and the Need for a Rationalization of Industrial Legislation Governing the Agricultural Industry in Rhodesia, Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union, Salisbury, February, 1973 (mimeo).

88. Data supplied to the author by the A.P.W.U. in reference to a strike at a chicken farm near Salisbury in 1972.

89. See especially the comments by Sir Albert Robinson (Chairman of Johannesburg Consolidated Investments) in Rhodesia Herald, 18 January, 1974. Also the rebuke from the R.N.F.U. in Rhodesia Herald, 19 January, 1974.

90. See for instance the editorial in Rhodesia Herald, 29 April, 1974, in which the editor called upon the R.N.F.U. to substantiate its claim that farm wages had discernibly improved: 'Evidence of this should be made public if the charge of exploitation is to be avoided.'

91. See Rhodesia Herald, 24 November, 1973; and Business Herald, 15 August, 1974, for a report on wage revisions on Hippo Valley Estates.

92. See Rhodesia Herald, 19 January, 1974; and Rhodesia Herald, 24 July, 1974.

93. Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 28 June, 1974.

94. Mr Samson Chibi (Secretary General of the African Progressive Party) addressed a meeting of the African Anti-Terrorist Movement near Glendale, a meeting attended mostly by farm workers, and was told that the prime fear was not 'terrorism' or 'communism' but poor wages. See Sunday Mail, 26 April, 1974.

95. Rhodesia Herald, 22 July, 1971.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid. Emphasis added.

99. Rhodesia Herald, 23 May, 1971.

100. There has also been pressure from local Africans for the expulsion of foreign labour from urban areas. See Rhodesia Herald, 10 November, 1972, for a report on such a request from the Harari Advisory Board.

101. See A.M. Hawkins, African Unemployment in Rhodesia, Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974.

102. For a not untypical white perspective on this issue see a letter to Rhodesia Herald, 30 April, 1971, where the following statement is made: 'round them up, the work shirkers, Andy Capps, dagga smokers, loafers - black and white - and put them into labour camps where they can do an honest day's work for board and lodgings plus, at the same time, ease the burden on an already overworked police'.

103. See Appendix B.

104. Rhodesia Herald, 30 April, 1971.

105. Rhodesia Herald, 29 April, 1972.

106. Rhodesia Herald, 28 October 1971. It was not long after details of this offer were published in the press that various replies from employers sought to illustrate just why he was so unsuccessful in recruiting labour. One calculated the total value of his offer of employment (cash and kind) to be £11.46 monthly, adding that he did not suppose that the employee would be working a 44-hour week but considerably more. Another employer showed the terms to his two African employees who found the offer ridiculous. Yet another pointed to the low real wage offered in the light of this being a permanent job from which the worker was expected 'to clothe himself and his wife and children, to buy his household goods, to pay his children's school fees and clinic fees and generally speaking try to improve the family's standard of living'. See Rhodesia Herald, 3 November, 1971, and Rhodesia Herald, 4 November, 1971.

107. Rhodesia Herald, 3 April, 1971.

108. Hippo Valley Estates, for instance, have on one occasion argued that their wage rates were satisfactory, despite experiencing a 'labour shortage', on the irrelevant grounds that their workers 'earn an average level of pay and benefits substantially higher than that offered to agricultural workers in most independent African countries'. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 21 July, 1972.

109. Rhodesia Herald, 21 July, 1972.

110. Southern Rhodesia, Native Labour Inquiry, op.cit.

111. Ibid., p.7. All quotes in this paragraph are from this source.

112. 'Baaskap' labour policies of this sort are common on plantations. The author has visited a number of farms where incidents of this nature have been personally witnessed. Farm Assistants and managers (as well as farmers) regularly boast of their power in this regard. Few will admit lightly to having taken 'cheek from the kaffirs'.

113. At a meeting of the Rhodesian Economic Society in 1973 one prominent farmer confessed that he refused to provide latrines (which were 'too expensive') and instead had relied on the method of planting 'blue gum' trees near the compound - a policy he strongly recommended to others - which he argued was an adequate surrogate.

114. Typically it is found that particular ethnic concentrations occur in the composition of farm labour forces, a composition which varies from region to region. Also the hierarchy ('boss-boys' etc.) are often deliberately chosen from a selected ethnic group. Or, in other instances, housing patterns are designed to reinforce ethnic divisions.

115. Evidence provided by the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union.

116. It is significant that in Zambia minimum wages were established for farm workers in 1963. See Rhodesia Herald, 20 December, 1963. Even Malawian farm workers were provided with this protection in 1971.

117. See Appendix D on the Masters and Servants Act. Regular breaches of the provisions of the Act have been noted in the records of the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union.

118. Rhodesia Herald, 2 October, 1972.

119. C.S.O., Revision of Statistics Relating to Africans Employed in the Agricultural Sector, LS/1/01, March, 1972 (mimeo).

120. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, vol. 85, no. 10, 5 September, 1973. On the inadequacy of a $30 wage in relation to the farm P.D.L., see Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, op.cit.

121. See African Labour Regulations Act (Chapter 100) (Revised 1971) Section 21(c): 'No person shall...by offering higher wages or greater benefits or other inducements, persuade or attempt to persuade any African to break or repudiate any then existing and binding contract of service, whether or not the contract is in writing.'

122. Data provided in correspondence to the author from P.J.Mpofu, General Secretary of the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union, 1973. For a more detailed analysis see D.G. Clarke, A Note on the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union, South African Labour Bulletin, 2, March, 1975.

123. The A.P.W.U. have shown correspondence to the author on this matter.

124. See Correspondence from the A.P.W.U. to the International Federation of Plantation, Agricultural and Allied Workers, 27 September, 1972, which documents such cases.

125. The most notable political action was the detention of the A.P.W.U. General Secretary (Pollant J. Mpofu) in mid-1973. The R.N.F.U. have acted in concert with the State to repress farm unionism. See the following revealing comments of the R.N.F.U. Labour Committee Chairman in L.T. Molam, Labour Committee Chairman's Address to 'Labour and Productivity' Days, 1973 (mimeo): 'I would like to turn to another warning sign which has very serious implications - that is the threat of trade unionism. We have a very sympathetic Minister of Labour, and you can rest assured that an agricultural trade union will not get official recognition. In addition we have prepared a very well documented case against trade unionism should the time ever arise when it might be needed to fight moves towards it.... Trade unions are willing to exploit any grievances the worker may have. A recent example is the intervention of Mr Mpofu at a chicken farm near Salisbury.' Emphasis added.

126. See for instance comments by P.F. Sithole in Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 26 October, 1973, and also A.T.U.C., Press Release, 29 January, 1974.

127. See P.J. Mpofu, op.cit., for details.

128. Data provided to the author by the General Secretary of the A.P.W.U. The conventional farmer view has been exceedingly hostile to suggestions that the legislation be changed; and Ministers have reflected this hostility - see for example, D.G. Clarke, Agricultural Labour: A Need for New Legislation, Agriculture Today, October, 1973, and note the reply from the Mrewa-Mtoko Farmers' Association, condemning the editor of the journal for allowing the printing of such 'political' views, contained in Agriculture Today, January, 1974.

129. See Correspondence, P.J. Mpofu to the Manager of Arbor Acres (Pvt) Ltd., 29 August, 1972; also see Correspondence P.J. Mpofu to the R.N.F.U., 29 June, 1971, on general employment conditions.

130. Data supplied in an interview with P.J. Mpofu, 1973.

131. For some details see Correspondence, P.J. Mpofu to the IFPAAW, 27 September, 1972.

132. See A.P.W.U., Resolutions Brought Forward by the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union at Gwelo Congress of N.A.F.U. in September, 1968, Which Were Adopted (mimeo), 1968.

133. See A.P.W.U., Memorandum to the Pearce Commission on Behalf of the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union (mimeo).

134. Correspondence, A.P.W.U. to IFPAAW, various, 1968-73.

135. See Correspondence, P.J. Mpofu to IFPAAW, 20 May, 1968, for details.

136. A.P.W.U., Memorandum to the Pearce Commission, op.cit.

137. Correspondence, P.J. Mpofu to IFPAAW, 24 August, 1972.

138. For details see Correspondence, P.J. Mpofu to the IFPAAW, 20 May, 1968.

139. APWU, Official Organ of the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union, Number 16, March, 1970 (mimeo).

140. See for instance Correspondence, P.J. Mpofu to IFPAAW, 11 January, 1973.

141. See A.P.W.U., Plea For Unity: To All Trade Unions in Rhodesia, 25 November, 1972 (mimeo).

142. Rhodesia, Customs and Excise Tariff, 1955, Government Printer, 1972.

143. See Chapter 5.

144. Sunday Mail, 31 March, 1974.

145. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., March, 1974.

146. Ibid. In the early 1950's this proportion was up to 50 percent. See Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, The Input and Output of European Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia 1949-50 to 1955-56, C.S.O., January, 1957 (mimeo).

147. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, op.cit.

148. Some training for workers on irrigated estates has however been introduced. See the case of Triangle Sugar Estate in Rhodesia Herald, 24 November, 1973.

149. B.H.G. Duncan, The Wages and Labour Supply Position in European Agriculture, op.cit.

150. C.S.O., Revision in Statistics, op.cit.

151. See Rhodesia Herald, 25 April, 1972.

152. B.H.G. Duncan, The Wages and Labour Supply Position in European Agriculture, op.cit.

153. See Sunday Mail, 23 June, 1974.

154. These pressures have derived from two sources: the United Kingdom and South Africa.

155. See various comments made and reported in A.K.H. Weinrich, Black and White Elites in Rural Rhodesia, Manchester University Press, 1973.

156. B.A. Danckwerts, A Farmer's View, Major Management Residential Conference, Victoria Falls Hotel, 1962, p.5. (mimeo).

157. Ibid., p.6.

158. See the Minister of Labour's comments in Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 84, 22, 10 August 1973.

159. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 85, 10, 5 September 1973, col. 934.

160. See D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, Clarendon, Oxford, 1970. It was also still important in the 1970's. Thus in 1974 there were 17 white Members of Parliament (out of a total of 50), all of them in the Rhodesian Front party, who were farmers. At the same time 10 of the 18 Cabinet Ministers were farmers. See Michael Holman, Rhodesian Realities, New Statesman, 22 March, 1974.

161. See B.H.G. Duncan, Agriculture's Debt Load, op.cit., in which an index of the value of European farms indicates that, despite pressures on levels of profit in the agricultural industry, the capitalized value of plantations rose by 94 percent between 1965 and 1972.

162. Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1954-1964, C.S.O., 1965, Table 54.

163. Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1971, C.S.O., 1972, Table 13.

164. Ministry of Agriculture, The Seventh Annual Report of Farm Management Data, August, 1973, p.23.

165. In the 1973-74 tax year, for instance, nearly $2.25 million was paid in tax by 1,511 farmers (out of a total $55 million paid by 93,000 income taxpayers), an average tax liability of $1,490 each, nearly 3 times the national average tax liability for individual income taxpayers. Only 500 individual farmers earned a taxable income (i.e. after allowance for items that are not taxable) of less than $5,000 and only 350 of a total of 638 farming companies earned a taxable income of less than $4,000. For details see Rhodesia Herald, 29 December, 1974.

166. See Rhodesia Herald, 20 September, 1974.

167. The frequent protests of this fact were well summed up by an ex-trade unionist Member of Parliament, Mr. E.G. Watungwa, who in 1973 commented on farm conditions to the ruling political party: 'You are going to continue to impoverish these people until the earth ends. Is this the intention of the Government? Is not this a system of feudalism and capitalism which in our days must end?' The motion to which he was speaking was overwhelmingly rejected - it was a proposal to introduce a national minimum wage which would cover all workers, the first time such a proposal has been tabled in the Rhodesian legislative assembly since 1948. See Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 84, 10, 5 September, 1973.

CHAPTER 7

1. See here Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: Volume 1, Monthly Review Press, London, 1974, whose lengthy treatise says nothing specific on domestic employment in the periphery except the following: 'Smith distinguishes productive expenditure (that which is exchanged for capital) from unproductive expenditure (that which is exchanged for income). The shrewd remark by the Scottish economist that a man makes himself richer by engaging workmen but poorer by engaging servants has, alas, been forgotten by the marginalists... (he) who squanders the rents he receives on enlarging his domestic staff undoubtedly provides a livelihood for men who would otherwise be doomed to beggary, but in no way helps the subsequent growth, the true enrichment of society.' Amin is correct in respect of this last point, but the employment of domestic labour in peripheral (settler-colonial) formations does indeed enrich the employers, many of whom are often themselves of the labour aristocracy.

2. Note here that 'settler-colonial' is used in a generic sense and is not restricted to white society, but includes reference to sub-dominant classes that function as appendages to the hegemonic class.

3. The household considered here differs in many ways from that found in advanced capitalist society and in pre-capitalist formations. See respectively Wally Seccombe, The Housewife and Her Labour Under Capitalism, New Left Review, 83, 1973; and Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, Tavistock, London, 1974, for works which discuss these specific household types and labour utilization within the domestic mode of production.

4. Employers will occasionally 'loan' labour to other households. However, this is not typically on a hiring basis but is done ex gratia to satisfy certain social relationships, e.g. on special occasions or for large gatherings where service personnel are needed.

5. On distinctions between 'use' and 'exchange' values see Ernst Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, Merlin Press, London, 1968. The use value of domestic labour has long been appreciated in Rhodesia. See here the comments by Mr. E.J. Mhlanga in Rhodesia Herald, 24 February, 1966, where it is pointed out that 'one could - like Cecil John Rhodes - do without a wife, but like him, could not do without a cook, whom Rhodes valued next to his horse'.

6. For example, the following tasks: gardening, landscaping, tennis court building, repairs and extensions.

7. This structural position of the labour aristocracy in Southern Africa has often been overlooked in the literature on class and political economy.

8. See, for instance, the comments of C.E. Fripp (e.g. 'The importance of domestic service to the State is incontrovertible') in Federation of Women's Institutes of Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Standing Committee on Domestic Service, Bulawayo, 1930, p.66.

9. See here the letter from 'Economist' in Rhodesia Herald, 10 March, 1974. Similar calls have been made in South Africa by the Nationalist Party, also to no avail.

10. See here a lengthy article ('We Cannot Afford To Do Without Our Servants') by Rev. Fred. B. Rea in Sunday Mail, 17 December, 1967, in which the author laments the process whereby domestic service is becoming (though not in Rhodesia) 'a luxury too expensive for the average citizen'. Emphasis added.

11. In the 1890's a number of whites were employed in domestic service. And in 1893 nearly 80 percent of economically active Asians were in domestic employment. See B.A. Kosmin, On the Imperial Frontier: The Pioneer Community of Salisbury in November 1897, Rhodesian History, 2, 1971. By the 1940's there were still many Coloureds (mostly females) in domestic employment. See Jean M. Cobb, General Survey of Living, Working and Housing Conditions of the Coloured Community in the Municipal Area of Bulawayo, Bulawayo, 1939.

12. See here the prohibition placed on a plan to tax employers of African domestic workers so that funds could be raised for the Services Levy Fund. The proposal originated from the Town Clerk of Gwelo in 1963. It was vetoed as 'unconstitutional' by the Constitutional Council. Instead the levy monies had to be raised from commerce and industry. See Rhodesia Herald, 17 July, 1963; and Rhodesia Herald, 20 July 1963.

13. See Vuka, May, 1941, p.49, (One Aspect of the Labour Question by C.E. Fripp), where it is noted that one means (the Prime Minister suggested) 'of meeting the present severe native labour shortage would be the substitution of native women for men in domestic service'.

14. Hereafter the wife of the household head will be referred to as 'the female'.

15. See here Southern Rhodesia, Report on Native Labour Inquiry, C.A.S.O., 1948, which reported on the prospects of 'labour-saving' through mechanization. The inquiry did not even investigate mechanization in the domestic household. Yet at the time 10 percent of all African labour was used in domestic employment.

16. Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook of Southern Rhodesia No.4, Salisbury, 1952; and Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1974.

17. See Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Preliminary Report on the Federal European Family Expenditure Survey, October 1961, C.S.O., 1961; and Rhodesia, Report of the European Family Budget Survey in Rhodesia 1968, C.S.O., 1970.

18. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, op.cit.

19. The following references to 1960 relate to data in Table 7.

20. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Preliminary Report on the Federal European Expenditure Survey, op.cit.

21. The following references to 1968 related to data in Table 8.

22. The inclusion of data on Asian, Coloured and African employers of domestic labour would tend to emphasize the effect of employer class position on household labour policy.

23. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Southern Rhodesia Cost of Living Committee, 1921 (Chairman E.C. Baxter).

24. Southern Rhodesia, Report on Southern Rhodesian Family Expenditure Survey, 1950-1951, C.A.S.O., 1952.

25. Most domestic workers probably have more than two dependents and so the income per head differences between 'Masters and Servants' have probably been greater than recorded. For data on average family sizes of urban workers see P. Stopforth, Survey of Highfield African Township, Occasional Paper No. 6, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia, 1971.

26. See Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit.

27. Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell, The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974, Table 82. Note that the components included here are very limited in quantity, quality and value.

28. There is no evidence available to confirm this proposition.

29. There has been more 'public awareness' on the wage issue in the late 1960's and 1970's than before. On the importance of the 'moral element' in wage determination see Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange, New Left Books, London, 1972; also Ernst Mandel, op.cit.

30. C.S.O., Wage Distribution of African Employees, June, 1971, DL/599/50 (mimeo).

31. It could be argued that real wages for these workers need not have fallen since payments in kind could have compensated. This would be against the general trend in wage practice however.

32. See Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Yearbook of Southern Rhodesia 1947, Salisbury, 1947, Table 56A. Most of the European immigrants in the domestic service category were females. A small number were males however.

33. See Vuka, May, 1941. In 1936 the number of African women in domestic employment was 1,268.

34. See Federation of Women's Institutes of Southern Rhodesia, op.cit. In 1926 there were 187 European domestic workers in Rhodesia. By the 1930's most of these people were in 'managerial' positions in institutions. See also the debate in Southern Rhodesia, Report on Employment of Native Female Domestic Labour in European Households in Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1932.

35. Ibid.

36. Employers recognized the position of African peasant women to be of critical importance. See Federation of Women's Institutes of Southern Rhodesia, op.cit., p.25, for instance the following statement: 'each native girl is part of the economic system of the kraal. Her removal means less food grown for the family and one less pair of hands for the many tasks that native life involves'.

37. Data from Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1973 (mimeo); and Vuka, May, 1941.

38. From 1961 to 1969 the numbers of foreign domestic workers in employment fell from 31,070 to 26,614. Meanwhile employment grew from 80,080 to 105,094 in the sector in the same period. See Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, op.cit.; and Rhodesia, Final Report on the September, 1961, Census of Employees, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1965, Table 5. Most of the 'displaced' foreign workers were males.

39. For an early but typical perspective that is still relevant see Senex, Treatment of Native Servants, Native Affairs Department Annual, 1927, p.49.

40. Employers used 'rations' policies to control workers: 'A weekly ration (one pound per head) of sugar will literally "sweeten" service. The many "leftovers" of the average European household should not be too carefully utilized, but given to the maids. They should not be allowed to help themselves to these'. See Federation of Women's Institutes of Southern Rhodesia, op.cit., p.67, statement by C.E. Fripp.

41. Letter to the author from Director for Census and Statistics, 12 January, 1973, reference LS/3/01, C.S.O.

42. Among various documents issued at different times was Southern Rhodesia Public Relations Department, Your Servant and You: Advice to Housewives on the Treatment of African Domestic Servants, Salisbury, 1950, from which a number of the quotations made in this paragraph are taken.

43. See for comparison Mining Industry: Industrial Agreement (Mineworkers) Government Notice No. 398/64, Appendix III, for a record of the 'rations' scale. The same scale still applied in 1974 to the mining industry.

44. The terms used to describe workers portrayed interesting ideological perceptions. All workers were considered to be 'boys', even by 'liberal' employers (see for instance the references to headboys, cookboys, houseboys, gardenboys, kitchen boys and washboys). Thus to distinguish 'juveniles' from adults the term 'adult garden boys' was often used.

45. Although the 'Pass system' was phased out in the later 1950's, certification has always been used by employers. On hiring, for instance, employers still demand to see the 'Situpa' or Registration Certificate and often a Health Certificate also. See the details set out for instance in University of Rhodesia Women's Club, Information Booklet for Newcomers, Salisbury, 1974. These requirements of employment have altered little since the 1940's.

46. Senex, op.cit., p.49.

47. Nonetheless it was reported by the Minister of Labour in 1966 that in the previous year restitutions voluntarily made (mostly concerning wages owing) totalled £14,190. This amount was equivalent to the monthly earnings for approximately 700 domestic workers. In addition, the number of prosecutions brought before the courts totalled 1,663. To this should be added the many instances where workers feel powerless to challenge employer authority in the courts. See Rhodesia Herald, 24 February, 1966.

48. This is a personal observation. However it is one easily confirmed by observation.

49. Rhodesia Herald, 24 February, 1966.

50. Employers continue to talk about 'their boys' (i.e. as if the workers were their personal property) even in the 1970's. In part this reflects the high degree of control over the rights of domestic workers enjoyed by 'masters'. Africans deeply resent this situation. See for instance the letter from Charles Maromo to Moto, 9 March, 1974: 'I do not know who told the Europeans to call us "their Africans". The Africans in this country do not belong to anybody.'

51. Comment made by Mr Owen Smith, M.P. (Rhodesian Front) as reported in Rhodesia Herald, 24 February, 1966.

52. Ibid. It is correct however that many workers do remain in the same job for decades (for example the worker employed by a white Salisbury family for 41 years, Rhodesia Herald, 12 February, 1968. But often real conditions do not improve much over these long periods. See D.G. Clarke, Domestic

Workers in Rhodesia: The Economics of Masters and Servants, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974, Appendix B, for case studies, especially Case C of a man whose wage rose from $12 to $24 over a 22-year period with the same employer since 1951.

53. Comment by Mr Ryan, M.P. (Rhodesian Front) as reported in Rhodesia Herald, 24 February, 1966.

54. Comments on domestic employment practices in this section are based on A.K.H. Weinrich, A Study of Race, Status and Politics in a Rhodesian Provincial Town, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia, unpublished manuscript, 1974, as well as other observations of the writer. Weinrich's study was based on a survey of Ft. Victoria.

55. Ibid., p.376.

56. The survey was conducted by R.C. Riddell and I. Motsi and covered employers and workers. A dozen of the case studies are written up in D.G. Clarke, Domestic Workers, op.cit., Appendix B. The workers were selected from various socio-economic classes of (employer) households.

57. A 60-hour week is the maximum permitted by the Masters and Servants Act. See here too the recommended policy of the University of Rhodesia Women's Club, Information Booklet, 1972, Section V, in which the authors record that 'the hours of an indoor servant are usually about twleve hours in duration'. This would result in (approximately) a 65-75 hour week.

58. Typically it is found that higher rates of labour turnover are common to gardeners and (unskilled) inside workers. These classes of employee receive the lowest wages. And they tend to be younger than cooks. For a study of the phenomenon in a similar social environment see David G. Bettison, The Private Domestic Servant of Blantyre-Limbe, The Nyasaland Journal, 1958, pp.36-45.

59. See D.G. Clarke, Domestic Workers, op.cit., Appendix B, Case K, for example.

60. So much a part of white households are domestic workers that the C.S.O. estimate the numbers of domestics in employment on the basis of the number of European households. See Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., Explanatory Notes.

61. This process of assimilation is much facilitated by organizations like the 'Welcome To Rhodesia Association' who if requested inform interested parties of 'acceptable' employment policies for domestic work. This serves the function of adjusting newcomers to conventional practice.

62. It is worth noting, for instance, that in August 1973, following a rumour that job vacancies existed at a Salisbury factory, close on 2,000 unemployed persons crowded the factory gate in search of employment. Also see A.M. Hawkins, How Much African Unemployment?, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 3, 1972.

63. See data in M.F.C. Bourdillon, Korekore Labour Migrants, Conference on African Influx and Urbanization, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo), on this point.

64. See for instance the plan of the Highlands Town Management Board to remove 'surplus' Africans from the suburb under the Urban Areas (Registration and Accommodation) Act in Sunday Mail, 15 November, 1970. In 1969 it was reported that there were 8,960 Africans living in this 'white suburb' and only 8,621 Europeans.

65. There has been one 'nominal' association - the Southern Rhodesia Waiters and Domestic Servants Association - an African trade union reported to be in existence in 1957. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Southern Rhodesia Department of Labour for the Calendar Year, 1957 (mimeo), p.14.

66. University of Rhodesia Women's Club, Information Booklet, op.cit. The authors also add: 'Financial adjustment may be made if younger boys are employed.' The recommendations cited do not reflect total earnings. The Booklet also sets out a 'ration scale', based on the 1958 Urban Areas Native Employment Regulations, valued at $2.27 weekly. The scale included 10 lbs. of mealie meal, 3½ lbs. of bread, 3½ lbs. of meat, 1 lb. of fat, 1 lb. of sugar, 4 oz. of vegetables including potatoes and beans, 3½ pints of milk, 4 oz. of tea, 4 oz. of salt, and cooking fuel (usually paraffin). As a qualification the booklet adds: 'The meat must not be more than 25 percent bone, and is usually bolo, or brisket, or what is called "ration" meat or "boy's meat". The latter is not very good value, consisting largely of bone. Bolo has no fat on it, but brisket has both, so copes with (the) meat and fat question simultaneously. Most employers also provide margarine, jam and soap.'

67. In the general propaganda and information advice put out by the Ministry of Immigration, Information and Tourism, there are general statements on the low cost of living in Rhodesia and the advantages of additional cheap service labour that immigrants could make use of in Rhodesia. See also the following statement which reflects a typical white employer attitude: 'nothing should be done to make the conditions of employing domestic labour too difficult or too expensive.' Sunday Mail, 17 December, 1967.

68. O.B. Pollak, The Impact of the Second World War on African Labour Organization in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 3, 1973.

69. See Richard Gray, The Two Nations, O.U.P., London, 1960, for further information.

70. Rhodesia Government Notice No. 604 of 1972: Industrial Agreement: Catering Industry (Unlicensed).

71. For a brief history of the union see Rhodesia Catering and Hotel Workers' Union, Labour News, December, 1971.

72. See further details in D.G. Clarke, Domestic Workers, op.cit., pp.43-45.

73. See C.S.O., Wage Distribution, op.cit.

74. See Appendix A.

75. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 84, 22, 10 August, 1973.

76. It is probably true to state that the average pocket money of a 15 year old white child would form a high proportion of the cash wage of the average domestic worker.

77. Private conversation with a Salisbury housewife, 1973. For other similar views see Rhodesia Herald, 24 February, 1966.

78. See for instance the views expressed in Sheila Macdonald, Sally in Rhodesia, Books of Rhodesia, Bulawayo, 1970, about domestic workers in the 1907-12 period.

79. M.G. Whisson and W. Weil, Domestic Servants: A Microcosm of the Race Problem, Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1971, p.18.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., p.42.

82. In N.F. Simpson's One Way Pendulum, a play in the theatre of the absurd, a woman is hired by the household to come in periodically and consume the household 'leftovers'.

83. African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act (Chapter 110) 1951 as amended. All sections here refer to the amended Act.

84. Licensed premises have usually required that 400 cubic feet of space be available for one adult. See Rhodesia Herald, 24 June, 1966, for details. Few employers have been refused licences for unsatisfactory accommodation. For instance, in Mt. Pleasant in 1970 only 15 employers out of 1,749 were refused licences. See Mt. Pleasant Town Council, Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June 1970, Salisbury, 1970.

85. Usually the fee has been set at between $3 and $5.

86. Most inspections however have been for the purpose of detecting 'illegal' lodgers.

87. This section has been rigorously enforced in some areas. See Rhodesia Herald, 15 February, 1971, for a report on an employer, who was wholly dependent on her domestic worker and his wife, complaining that the authorities would not allow the child of the family to stay on the premises, the result of which would jeopardize the employer's interests.

88. Rhodesia Government Notice No. 288 of 1970, Land Tenure (Section 17 Exemptions) Notice.

89. See Rhodesia Herald, 12 April, 1972, for the report on a white employer who was fined $30 for breaching these regulations by allowing 3 women and 6 children to 'illegally' occupy European owned premises in Salisbury. The person concerned commented: 'For humanitarian reasons I was not going to throw them out.'

90. See the letter in the Rhodesia Herald, 23 July, 1971, by Mr M.E. Mlakah.

91. See for instance the following advertisement which appeared in The Gatooma Mail, 6 December, 1973: 'Special Christmas Offer: 5% Discount: Tired of Shouting For Your Servant: Have a Call System Installed From Kitchen to Kia and Have the Presence of Your Servant at the Touch of a Switch.' Emphasis in the original. The entrepreneur marketing this device was simply 'modernizing' and making more efficient an existing system.

92. See the report in Rhodesia Herald, 3 March, 1970.

93. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette. In Que Que the Town Council decided the following: 'No African child will be permitted to live with its parents on the premises except on humanitarian grounds - and then only for 14 days.' Emphasis added.

94. 'Sanitary lanes' are lanes that separate houses on the same block. The lanes run parallel to the main roads in the area.

95. Other forms of social control have also existed, e.g. allowing neighbours to exercise control over worker behaviour and activities; allowing children of the employer to exercise control over the worker; and the imposition of employer authority through regular verbal reprimand.

CHAPTER 8

1. Data on wage trends and worker stratification are found in Chapter 2. Note that the problem examined here did not arise in Barber's opinion: 'the gap between the highest and lowest paid African members of the labour force is considerably less pronounced than in the labour markets of more developed economies. Indeed the value system of Rhodesian society has tended to check the emergence of substantial differentials.' W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, O.U.P., 1961, p.193. Emphasis added.

2. G. Arrighi, Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia, Journal of Development Studies, 6, 3, 1970. Arrighi's view has also been accepted by Samir Amin, Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa - Their Historical Origins and Contemporary Forms, Social and Economic Studies, 22, 1, 1973, p.189: 'The "economistic" ideological mythology of the "laws of the labour market" under these circumstances (as) formulated by Arthur Lewis, and applied by Barber, cannot be justified.'

3. See here particularly Giovanni Arrighi, International Corporations, Labour Aristocracies, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa, in R.I. Rhodes (ed), Imperialism and Underdevelopment, Monthly Review Press, London, 1970. Arrighi's 'labour aristocracy' consists of the skilled and semi-skilled manual and clerical working class. For criticism of this thesis see Peter Waterman, The Labour Aristocracy in Africa: Introduction to an Unfinished Controversy, in R. Cohen and R. Sandbrook (eds.), Towards an African Working Class (forthcoming, 1975). Arrighi's arguments are also developed in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa, The Socialist Register 1969, Merlin Press, London.

4. This is not to deny a conflict between resident and international capitalist interests or even a history of that conflict. What is important is to determine the nature of the conflict. For data on the collusive and conflicting elements between these two forces, see D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, Clarendon, 1970.

5. Peter S. Harris, Industrial Workers in Rhodesia 1946-1972: Working Class Elites or Lumpenproletariat?, Journal of Southern African Studies (forthcoming, 1975).

6. Harris argues that in 1972 it could be ascertained that there were only 10,000 black workers (2.98 percent of the black industrial labour force) classified as skilled technical, business, administrative and professional personnel, whilst a further 20,000 (or 5.96 percent) could be classified as semi-skilled workers with a tolerable level of job security and 30,000 (8.91 percent) as semi-skilled, but more easily replaced, industrial workers. Ibid.

7. Note that Harris has not used the term lumpen-proletariat in its classical marxian sense but in order to convey the insecurity of employment of African workers and the idea that their status 'is not transitional (i.e. it is not merely a stage of proletarianization that will pass with the ultimate separation of the proletariat from the peasantry)', ibid.

8. In the Chemical and Explosives Workers' Union (in 1974), for instance, sections 2 and 3 - comprised solely of semi-skilled and unskilled workers - separated their meetings on wage policy formulation for the Industrial Council. The semi-skilled workers regarded the lesser skilled as 'unsophisticated', 'adventurous', even 'irresponsible' in their wage claims. Elitism and democracy within Africans have always been issues of conflict between workers. For some comments see the contributions in The South African Labour Bulletin, 2, March, 1975 (a special issue on African Trade Unions and Union Formation in Rhodesia).

9. See for instance the wage claim formulated by the Salisbury Municipal Workers' Union which asked for higher gains for the more skilled workers in the union. See Salisbury Municipal Workers' Union, Chairman's Annual Report, 1969 (mimeo).

10. 'Illegal' fragmentation has been most widespread in the building industry. Partly, this has been because of the boom in residential construction and the skilled labour supply shortage, but also it is related to the multiplicity of construction sites, the small size of the public labour inspectorate, and even tacit acceptance of 'illegality' by the public authorities.

11. Wage rates for artisans in Rhodesia were higher than in London by 100 to 142 percent in the case of Building, Engineering, Printing and Railway employment. See Southern Rhodesia, Report on Industrial Relations in Rhodesia, by Professor Henry Clay, C.S.R. 3, 1930, p.33.

12. For details see Roy McGregor, Native Segregation in Southern Rhodesia: A Study of Social Policy, unpublished Ph.D., University of London, 1940, p.371. See also Chapter XVIII (The Colour Bar in Industry and the Towns) for details on labour legislation for the pre-1940 period.

13. See a later section of this Chapter for a fuller account of the union conflict with the State.

14. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, the Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development, 1946, p.28. Emphasis added.

15. For a fuller account of this Act, see T.E. Mswaka, The Labour Market and the Impact of African Trade Unions on the Economic Development of Southern Rhodesia, 1930-1968, B.Litt., Oxford University, 1974, especially Chapter IV. Also see Richard Gray, The Two Nations, London, O.U.P., 1960; and Southern Rhodesia, Report of Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor to inquire into and report on all matters concerning recent Native Disturbances in the Colony and to recommend action which may seem desirable in the public interest, 1948 (mimeo).

16. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary of Native Affairs, the Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development, 1948, p.47.

17. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary of Native Affairs, the Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development, 1950, p.48.

18. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary of Native Affairs, the Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development, 1953, p.26.

19. See Bantu Mirror, 24.5.1948, for details.

20. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, The Chief Native Commissioner and the Director of Native Development, 1951, p.55.

21. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.227, Table XII.

22. This was the estimate of J.R.H. Shaul, the government statistician. See Bantu Mirror, 17.1.1948.

23. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.223, Table XI.

24. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Select Committee on the Subject of Native Industrial Workers' Union Bill, March, 1956, (Chairman G.S. Todd).

25. See T.E. Mswaka, The Relationship Between Wages and Employment in Rhodesia 1954-1968, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 3, 1972.

26. By the end of 1960 the number of Industrial Boards established was 33; by 1961 54 Boards were constituted. In 1971 there were 60 Boards in operation.

27. See P.S. Harris, The 1973 Amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 3, 1973.

28. Criteria used by Industrial Boards are set out in The Industrial Conciliation Act (Chapter 246) Section 28.

29. See a later section of this Chapter (Employers, The State and The Political Economy of Subsistence Wages).

30. See P.S. Harris, Industrial Relations in Rhodesia, South African Journal of Economics, 42, 1, 1974.

31. See African Labour Regulations Act (Chapter 100), 1911, as amended. The Act makes it an offence to offer Africans higher wages in order to attempt to persuade them to break their existing contract of employment (see Section 21). Many of the provisions of the Act are similar to those in the Masters and Servants Act. Neither Harris nor Arrighi mentions the existence of this Act.

32. See Rhodesia Herald, 18 May, 1963, for instance, where Mr P. Gibbs of ACCORN is reported as saying that the brake on wages should be eased to provide additional domestic spending power.

33. The A.M.W.U. asked for a change towards incorporating small mines under the Agreement in 1963. See Rhodesia Herald, 8 May, 1963. A similar request was made 4 years later. See Associated Mineworkers' Union, The Granite Review, 8, 4, 1967.

34. Associated Mineworkers' Union, The Granite Review, 8, 12, 1971.

35. See Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare for the Year Ended 31 December, 1969, Cmd R.R. 1970, Government Printer, Salisbury.

36. A case in point is the University of Rhodesia. There were 5 grades in the unskilled worker categories. The bottom grade had a range from $30-$37 (1971). Out of 291 workers, 189, or 65 percent, were placed in this bottom grade. See P.S. Harris, D.G. Clarke and R.J. Davies, Memorandum on University Employment Policies, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo).

37. For details on these high salaries see, for instance, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Basic Conditions of Service for Europeans in the Federal Public Service, Salisbury, 1954.

38. See for instance the Memorandum submitted by the Southern Rhodesia Administrative and Clerical Public Servants' Association to the Patterson Commission, in Southern Rhodesia, First Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Organization and Development of the Southern Rhodesia Public Services, 1962, Appendix A.1.

39. See for instance the Salisbury City Council wage award of 1974 in Rhodesia Herald, 9 July, 1974. European staff obtained a 12.5 percent increase and Africans were given 8 percent. The Salisbury Municipal Workers' Union had submitted a claim for 40 percent based on P.D.L. considerations.

40. For details on the growth of this part of the State apparatus see R.S. Fitzhenry, Social Sources of the Politics of Resistance and Repression: The Case of Southern Rhodesia 1945-1964, M.Phil., Southampton University, 1970. See also Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 29 March, 1974, for details on a Rhodesian Army advertisement: 'Irrespective of education, you can earn $160 a month in the Army'. This applied to persons without 'O' level qualifications. It did not apply to Africans, however. Emphasis added.

41. See Rhodesia Herald, 30 March, 1974, for details. Up to this time Coloureds and Asians received less pay than whites. From 1966-67 to 1973-74 the Defence vote rose from $13.1 million to $31.0 million. This excludes expenditures on road construction in the North-East and on the Internal Affairs vote which have been essential to the government's security policy. See Rhodesia, Budget Statements 1973, Government Printer, 1973, Table XVII

42. See Rhodesia Herald, 23 March, 1974; also Moto, 30 March, 1974.

43. T.E. Mswaka, The Industrial Conciliation Act 1959 Ten Years After: A Partial Assessment, in A.J. Dixon and H.H. Patel, Politics and Society in Rhodesia (forthcoming).

44. State minimum wages have been set uniformly below the P.D.L. for even small sized African families. See R.C. Riddell, Poverty and the African Wage Structure, Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974.

45. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 10, 85, 5 September, 1973, col. 941.

46. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 16, 85, 27 November, 1973, col. 1783. This contrasts markedly with the case made out for minimum wages in the Howman Commission. See Southern Rhodesia, Committee of Inquiry to Investigate the Economic, Social and Health Conditions of Africans Employed in Urban Areas, 1944.

47. For an explanation of the beneficial effect of the new formula see Business Herald, 5 December, 1974.

48. For instance, in 1964 the number of Employees covered by Industrial Council Agreements was 134,870. This number fell to 130,431 in 1969. Many of these employees were whites. By contrast, the number of (African) workers covered by Industrial Boards in the same period rose from 72,172 to 119,483. See Rhodesia, Reports of the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare for the years 1965-70 inclusive.

49. See for example the wage rates applicable to Security Guards (ℊ18 monthly, 1972) for a 60-hour week, compared to other unskilled, less dangerous jobs which command a much higher wage. See also Typographical Union of Rhodesia, Annual Review, 11th Year, 1971, p.12, in which it is recorded that an 'Auxiliary (worker) in the printing industry receives ℊ7.35 per week, whilst the minimum for his counterpart in terms of the then Plastics Industry Employment Regulations received ℊ5.25 per week'. The differential is in the vicinity of 40 percent.

50. Ibid. Note that this complaint is made by a white-controlled 'multi-racial' union.

51. Ibid.

52. Once a Board is in existence it is more likely that the employer case that there exists adequate regulation of wages will receive more sympathetic treatment from the Minister of Labour as a ground for not forming an Industrial Council, particularly in the light of government's own policy of control of wages for African workers.

53. Business Herald, 2 May, 1974.

54. Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments for Rhodesia, 1972, C.S.O., 1973, Table 5. Note too that a high portion of European expenditures go towards imports. Import prices have risen rapidly since U.D.I.

55. Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 26 July, 1974.

56. R.C. Riddell, The Salisbury Municipal Workers' Union: A Cast Study, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 1, 1973.

57. This has happened at the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation. It was also a policy unsuccessfully pursued by the management of Rhodesia Railways before the 1945 African railway workers strike.

58. See Associated Mineworkers Union, The Granite Review, October, 1971: 'Lately we had the case of the Building Industry Agreement lapsing and with no document or legislation to take its place. We found that within twenty-four hours of such an Agreement elapsing certain employers immediately reduced the wages of their artisans covered by this agreement by as much as fifty percent. It was a case of take it or leave it and this was a frightening result of having no legislation to control conditions in industries,' p.33.

59. See the case of the 1973 pay claim of the Rhodesian Associated Workers' Union an African union on Rhodesia Railways Industrial Council.

60. See Rhodesia Herald, 8 February, 1974.

61. In actual fact, large corporations operating in both the primary sector and the 'industrial complex' have found it profitable to adopt a 'schizophrenic' corporate wage policy of this kind. It has been one of the more over-emphasized and inaccurate theses of various development economists that foreign and multi-national enterprises have always adopted a high-wage policy. In the Rhodesian case compare Anglo-American Corporation's policy in respect of its plantations in the Lowveld - i.e. Hippo Valley - and its urban wage policy in industries and for its head office bureaucracy.

62. In 1973 a number of foreign controlled subsidiaries in Rhodesia - Mobil Oil and Colgate Palmolive, for instance - received instructions from their parent corporations to increase black wages up to or above the P.D.L. Information obtained from executives in the companies quoted.

63. See the comments of Sir Albert Robinson, Chairman of Johannesburg Consolidated Investments, in Rodesia Herald, 17 June, 1974, where he also 'called on all Rhodesian professions to examine their rules and procedures to see if they inhibited Africans, Asians and Coloureds from qualifying'.

64. This comment was by Mr D. Jackson. See Rhodesia Herald, 20 June, 1974, where he criticizes Rhodesian businessmen for being apathetic and 'reactionary' especially when 'the most critical reality facing Rhodesian businessmen (is) the increasingly high probability of effective black control of Government in the country within the very near future'.

65. See D.S. Pearson, African Advancement in Commerce and Industry, Journal of Modern African Studies, 3, 2, August, 1965.

66. See Business Herald, 23 May, 1974, for details on Van Leer (Rhodesia) (Pvt.) Ltd., who have introduced 'job enrichment' schemes for African workers.

67. Ibid. The company to which this statement applied also said that it had been forced to be labour-intensive because of foreign exchange restrictions.

68. See Salisbury Commercial Employers' Association, Report, March, 1974 (mimeo). Also Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 19 April, 1974.

69. Evidence about the pattern of urban stabilization (for Salisbury) can be obtained in the Annual Reports of The Director of Native (African) Administration for the period 1956-70 inclusive. See especially the Reports for 1956 (p.77-79 and p.84), 1957 (p.127 and p.129-30), 1959 (p.64), 1962 (p.45) and 1970 (p.58), from where the following data are drawn. In 1953-54 the gross turnover of the City's African labour force was 80 percent (61,600 engagements and 57,047 discharges). The peak of labour turnover was reached in 1955-56 with a level of 106.44 percent being recorded.

Thereafter turnover fell, but only gradually. In 1956-57 it was 105.43 percent (discharges fell from a level of 62,357 to 57,549 from the previous year). By 1958-59 the turnover level was 87.09 percent and discharges were down to 54,670. By 1970 the City Council's African labour turnover, which in previous years was on a par with the City average, had fallen to less than 3 percent.

70. Johnson and Fletcher Limited, African Employment Analysis, January, 1973 (mimeo).

71. Rhodesia, National Accounts, op.cit., Tables 8 and 9.

72. See the letter from a night-watchman in Moto, 27 September, 1973, complaining about conditions of employment.

73. The provisions cited here are taken from Industrial Agreement (No. 2): Commercial Undertaking of Bulawayo, Rhodesia Government Notice No. 490 of 1973.

74. In particular, employers have had to comply with the African Juveniles Employment Act (Chapter 99). There were 4,623 African juveniles in manufacturing employment in 1969 (nearly 6 percent of the African manufacturing labour force). See Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1973, Table 10 (mimeo).

75. See the instances cited by B. Mothobi, Some Reflections on Management Beliefs About African Workers, South African Labour Bulletin, 2, March, 1975. Also see Appendix B.

76. An interesting case here has been the switch from white road-gang supervisors (almost universal up until the early 1970's) to African supervisors of roadworkers in State employment. Prior to the 'switch' it was argued that 'Africans had to be supervised (by whites)'.

77. For example, African businessmen have been excluded from 'white areas' and the central business districts in urban areas by the provisions of the Land Tenure Act (1969).

78. The author has interviewed both Asian and African businessmen who have deliberately used this strategy.

79. For details see Rhodesia Herald, 5 March, 1974. See also various issues of Transport Workers' Union, Transport Workers' Newsletter, 1974 (mimeo).

80. Rhodesia Herald, 5 March, 1974. The comments are those of Mr C. Manomano.

81. Moto, 20 April, 1974. These complaints have been made by the Rhodesian Gemstone and Jewellry Workers' Union. The union's attempts to get an Industrial Board established were successful in early 1975. The union still has no collective bargaining rights however.

82. These and other comments of a similar nature can be found in Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 10, 85, 5 September, 1973, col. 907.

83. See for instance the case of an African worker employed as a 'Plumber's Assistant' in the mining industry at $11.00 monthly even though he did all the tasks of a qualified journeyman. Associated Mineworkers' Union, The Granite Review, October, 1971, p.39.

84. See the comments of Mr G. Handover (A.R.N.I.) in Sunday Mail, 24 March, 1974; and Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury, August, 1974, Table 49.

85. The claim was made by employers as a ground for rejecting the use of the P.D.L. in wage-fixing in the industry. The wage claim of the United Textile Workers' Union had been based on the 1974 P.D.L. The author was involved in these negotiations as an advising economist to the U.T.W.U.

86. Compare E. Batson, The Poverty Datum Line in Salisbury, University of Cape Town, 1945; and D.G. Bettison, The Poverty Datum Line in Salisbury, Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, 27, 1960.

87. For instance, the 1944 and 1958 studies do not include a component for post-employment subsistence consumption. The 1974 study does. In part this reflects the fact that the P.D.L. study was conceived of originally by the African Trade Union Congress (after an initiative from the United Textile Workers' Union) and the fact that the Research Advisory Committee was composed not simply of employer interests.

88. See the Minister of Labour's comments on the P.D.L. in Sunday Mail, 24 March, 1963, made at the opening of the Federal Trade Union Congress.

89. Rhodesia Herald, 6 September, 1974.

90. This was part of a reply by the Minister of Finance to the request from the President of the A.T.U.C. for wages to be geared to P.D.L. levels. Rhodesia Herald, 7 September, 1974. The Minister of Labour claimed (Rhodesia Herald, 18 September, 1974) that African workers were not being maintained at below subsistence wages.

91. Rhodesia Herald, 4 October, 1974.

92. Rhodesia Herald, 11 October, 1974.

93. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 18 October, 1974, for comments of the Minister of Labour.

94. This was made very clear at the regular meetings of the P.D.L. Advisory Committee (of which the author was a member). The items which employers wanted eliminated were education and post-employment subsistence consumption. A heated debate also occurred over the 'appropriate' title for the study. Employers favoured the concept of Minimum Level of Subsistence rather than Poverty Datum Line.

95. See the comments of the ACCOR General Secretary in Business Herald, 26 September, 1974.

96. Rhodesia Herald, 10 October, 1974. A.R.N.I. opposition to the P.D.L. had been strong from the start of the project.

97. In this case wage policy was decided upon in Johannesburg, the headquarters of the parent company.

98. Information from Verity S. Cubitt and Roger C. Riddell (authors of the P.D.L. report).

99. See Salisbury Municipality, Poverty Datum Line Report, 1974 (mimeo). Also Salisbury Municipality, Poverty Datum Lines vis-a-vis Salisbury Municipality as Employer 1974 (mimeo).

100. Rhodesia Herald, 11 October, 1974. See also the article by Henry Maasdorp (Serious Flaws in Minister's Argument) in Sunday Mail, 20 October, 1974.

101. These arguments are dealt with more fully in Peter S. Harris, Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia: The General Problems of Low Pay, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974.

102. See the comments by R. Harris and E. Holfe in Rhodesia Herald, 3 March, 1973.

103. These factors have been well appreciated by settler-colonial labour interests. See Property and Finance, November, 1974.

104. Attention is drawn to this 'anomaly' of Anglo-American Corporation's wage policy in Property and Finance, ibid. Their observation was all the more pertinent following a large strike over inadequate pay at Wankie Colliery in 1974.

105. See H.M.S.O., Rhodesia: Report of the Commission on Rhodesian Opinion under the Chairmanship of The Right Honourable the Lord Pearce, Cmnd. 4964, 1972.

106. Rhodesia Herald, 3 April, 1974.

107. Rhodesia Herald, 14 April, 1974.

108. Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 11 April, 1974.

109. Moto, 13 April, 1974; also Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 19 April, 1974.

110. Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 15 September, 1972.

111. Ibid.

112. See Reports of British South African Company Administration 1898-1902 for details on European occupations at the turn of the century.

113. The concept of the 'white job', like the 'white wage', had its counterpart in the concept of the 'African job' and the 'African rate of pay': 'You can see now that the jobs of work that are semi-skilled that people at the wage rate of 1 dollar 50 cents a day do should they perform that work in other industries under other (white) trade unions, they would be getting that rate almost per hour, and not per day. I will advise members of the Chamber of Mines and Mine Managements to take a long hard look at that work that is being performed officially under Trade Agreement by the African B. categories. When it is an African's job of work I make no bones about it and see the latitude that they have in comparison to the rest of Rhodesian industries.' Associated Mineworkers' Union, The Granite Review, October, 1971, p.40.

114. In 1971, for instance, the General Secretary of the Associated Mineworkers' Union argued: 'Right from the start of our multi-racial or non-racial union as we prefer to call it, as a trade union, we have informed our African members that advancement will not be at the expense of the European and the phrase that the European must make way for the African in doing his job of work and that he himself should then become the supervisor, finds no support in this trade union.' Ibid., p.38.

115. See here Rhodesia Herald, November 24, 1973.

116. Business and Financial Review, 6 December, 1973.

117. These are the comments of Sir Albert Robinson, Chairman of Johannesburg Consolidated Investments. See Rhodesia Herald, 18 January, 1974.

118. Rhodesia Herald, 19 January, 1974.

119. Comments are made on these policies in Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 10, 85, 5 September, 1973.

120. See Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 21, 85, 5 December, 1973.

121. Ibid., col. 2078. Emphasis added.

122. Ibid., col. 2079.

123. See here The Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 12 October, 1973. These policies are confirmed by P.B. Gibbs, Opportunities for Secondary School Leavers: Enquiry Carried Out on Behalf of the Beit Trustees: First Interim Report, March, 1971 (mimeo).

124. 'Our Railways, with some 20,000 employees, are the largest employer in the country outside the Government itself. Moreover, the proportion of skilled jobs - where the employment is predominantly European - is exceptionally high. There are about 8,000 such jobs on the Railways.' R.T.R. Hawkins, Transport in Relation to Exports, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 4, December, 1972.

125. Ibid. Emphasis added.

126. Some data on these practices are detailed in G.E. Cheater, Management Policies and Practices and their Effect on Employment, Centre for Inter-Racial Studies, 1973 (mimeo); also G.E. Cheater, Cultural Disability: Data on the Role of Management in Industry in Southern Africa, Centre for Inter-Racial Studies, 1973 (mimeo).

127. See here the comments of the President of the African Trade Union Congress (Mr P. Sithole) as reported in Moto, 16 February, 1974.

128. The introduction of 'artisans' aides' on the railways in 1974 required 'tremendous safeguards' and higher payment for journeymen. Business and Financial Review, 31 January, 1974.

129. Provisions have been provided for Africans under the Workmen's Compensation Act. They were based on the assumption that disabled Africans could and would 'return' to the reserves. Hence compensation was in the form of a small lump sum. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Social Security Officer: Part I: Social Security, September, 1944, p.53. Other workers received pension payments as compensation. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Chapter 248), applicable in the 1970's, did not differentiate by race, but it excluded certain classes of worker (casual employees, 'outworkers' and domestic workers) from its provisions. However, since pension and compensation benefits have been geared to the earnings structure, the application of the Act has been of greater benefit to highly-paid workers. European workers have obtained greater benefit from the Act than Africans. For 1942, for instance, the claims paid to Europeans totalled £31,681 (or 0.763 percent of European wages) while Africans received £22,5000 (or 0.521 percent of African wages). See Southern Rhodesia, Report on Workmen's Compensation Act Statistics for 1942, October, 1944, Table X. Similarly, in 1968 2,607 white claimants obtained £165,488 in

compensation while 15,149 African claimants obtained £288,837. The largest number of injuries occurred in the unskilled labouring grades (71 percent). Only 6 percent of injuries were for persons in the Administrative, Clerical and Commercial grades. Data extracted from Rhodesia, Analysis of Industrial Accidents, Salisbury, 1968.

130. The Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association began asking for a pension scheme before 1945. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of Commission Appointed by His Excellency The Governor to Investigate the Grievances which gave rise to the Strike amongst African Employees on the Rhodesia Railways, Salisbury, 1946.

131. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967, p.39.

132. Southern Rhodesia, Part I: Social Security, op.cit., p.28. Asians and Coloureds received less than whites.

133. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Social Security Officer: Part II: Social Services, October, 1944, p.18-19. See here the differences between European and African 'ration scales'. European benefits were greater than African. The African scale followed that laid down in the Mine and Minerals Act, a scale which had been originally formulated for the needs of single migrant mineworkers in 1911.

134. Southern Rhodesia, Part I: Social Security, op.cit., p.46.

135. Ibid., p.53.

136. Ibid., p.56. 'The years he spends in the town are merely an interlude. Consequently, natives who are too old to work, or too sick, or unable to find work in European areas, will return to their homes, to live out their declining days, to regain health, or to maintain life in their traditional manner.'

137. Ibid., p.57.

138. Ibid., p.60.

139. This practice was still widespread in the 1970's. See Moto, 31 August, 1974.

140. Industrial Agreement: Air Transport Industry, Rhodesia Government Notice No. 717 of 1974.

141. Industrial Agreement: Engineering and Iron and Steel Industry, Rhodesia Government Notice No. 1,072 of 1973.

142. In some industries (private security guards) the benefit after 10 years for most employees has been $21.33. See Private Security Employment Regulations, 1973, Rhodesia Government Notice No. 964 of 1973.

143. Rhodesia Herald, 10 January, 1973.

144. See Rhodesia Herald, 2 April, 1971; and Rhodesia Herald, 11 June, 1971.

145. Rhodesia Herald, 12 June, 1971. These calculations can also be useful to throw light on the extent to which the peasant economy has had to bear a financial burden in meeting the costs of post-employment subsistence consumption.

146. Rhodesia Herald, 2 April, 1971.

147. ACCOR, Annual Report, 1974; Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 26 July, 1974.

148. Rhodesia Herald, 29 March, 1973.

149. Rhodesia Herald, 15 September, 1973; also Rhodesia Herald, 28 August, 1974.

150. Consider here a recent comment by Sir Roy Welensky (once Prime Minister of the Federation): 'I can remember the day when every lorry driver had to be white.... Tell me where do you see white lorry drivers in this country today? And are the wages of the African driver you do see in any way comparable to what a white man would be earning today?' Rhodesia Herald, 29 March, 1974. At the same time, however, there are some jobs done by both black and white at equivalent rates of pay.

151. In 1972 it was estimated that out of a total of 48,000 jobs in the 'Government Service', 17,000 were skilled jobs. See R.T.R. Hawkins, op.cit.

152. See Rhodesia, Final Report of the September 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., May, 1965, Table 4; and Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, op.cit.

153. See Rhodesia, Reports of the Commissioner for Taxes for the Years 1965-68 inclusive.

154. Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, C.S.O., 1970, Table 7.

155. See C. Palley, Law and the Unequal Society, Part II, Race, XII, 2, 1970, p.25.

156. This has even caused conservatives to criticize State policy; 'By way of example there is presently a ceiling on African promotion in the army and the police, and there is not a single African employed by the Ministries of Justice and of Law and Order as a magistrate, prosecutor or even clerk of the Court, although there are a number of law graduates who would more than welcome such employment.' (Professor R. Christie, University of Rhodesia), Rhodesia Herald, 1 July, 1974.

157. Rhodesia Herald, 18 November, 1974.

158. See for instance the critical comments of the white-controlled National Association of Local Government Officers after the State 'Africanized' certain posts in the Liquor Undertaking and African Affairs departments of some municipalities. Sunday Mail, 8 December, 1974.

159. The appointee was Mr J.Z. Gumede. Rhodesia Herald, 19 November, 1974. Tilcor was also reported as having made other African appointments to its operational staff.

160. See the comments made in the 1974 Annual Report of the Public Services Board quoted in Sunday Mail, 23 June, 1974.

161. P.S. Harris, The Wage and Occupational Structure of the Rhodesian Economy, Labour Research Seminar No. 5, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo).

162. State 'remedies' have been left very much at the level of exhortation, e.g. in the condemnation of 'poaching' by the private sector. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 25 August, 1974. This lack of action to train Africans has even astounded 'progressive' State officials: 'There are practically no African engineers, mechanics, architects, town planners or surveyors.... Why aren't there enough African artisans and contractors?' (Dr E.H. Ashton, Director, Bulawayo Municipal Housing and Amenities Department), Rhodesia Herald, 19 April, 1974.

163. Estimate as made by the Rhodesian Confederation of Employers in Business Herald, 2 May, 1974.

164. See for instance the comments of the President of ACCOR and employers in the mining industry in Business Herald, 11 April, 1974.

165. See the advertisement inserted by A.R.N.I. in the (Johannesburg) Sunday Times on a number of occasions in 1974. It asked for bricklayers, supervisors, upholsterers, carpenters and many other persons in occupations that could have been supplied from local resources.

166. See Rhodesia Herald, 30 October, 1974; also Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 1 November, 1974.

167. In 1962 the Phillips Commission reported that 'Since 1946 the number of Europeans in employment has increased from 27,500 to 80,900 - or by an annual compound rate of increase of 7.5 percent - mainly as a result of rapid immigration', Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Development of the Economic Resources of Southern Rhodesia with particular Reference to the Role of African Agriculture, C.S.R. 15 - 1962, p.383 (Chairman J.V.L. Phillips). Since 1962 the rate of immigration has been above the rate of natural increase, Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., December, 1971.

168. Not all employers have been fully satisfied by immigration as a source of skilled labour, however. See for instance comments by Sir Keith Acutt (Anglo-American Corporation), Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 7 December, 1973.

169. For an evaluation of immigration and its effect on the labour market see P.S. Harris, Economic Incentives and European Immigration in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 3, 1972; and D.G. Clarke, The Assumed Employment Generating Capacity of European Immigration in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 4, 2, 1970.

170. Rhodesia, Report of the Under-Secretary for Immigration and Tourism for the Year ending 31st December, 1964, C.S.R., 23-1965, p.1.

171. The Under-Secretary for Immigration and Tourism's Report for 1964 underscores this point: 'In accordance with Government policy the selection of immigrants is not as restrictive as in the Federal era, and several borderline cases, which would have been refused entry by the Federal Board, were granted resident permits. More aliens were accepted than for many years, largely because of this relaxation.' One effect of this has been to reduce the average level of capital per immigrant. For example, the average amount of capital accompanying each immigrant to Rhodesia in 1964 was £323; for British immigrants this figure was £379, and for aliens (i.e. non-British) it was £123 per person. Ibid, p.9.

172. Ibid., p.2. Reasonably detailed information on immigrants' occupations can be obtained from Rhodesia, Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics for January, 1970, C.S.O., Tables 9, 10 and 11. For example, between 1966-69 the annual average gain in employees in the 'Professional, Technical and Related' workers category (representing the upper levels of high level immigrant manpower) was 6.5 percent of the net inflow over the ages of 16 years. Thus a large percentage of the immigrant inflow were in categories for which local or African supplies were likely to be available.

173. Under the 1969 Constitution the government has had an incentive to maintain the white share of individual income tax contributions to the exchequer, because the basis of allocation of parliamentary seats between blacks and whites has rested on relative racial group income tax contributions. See D.G. Clarke, The Political Economy of the Republican Constitution of Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 4, 3, September, 1970. And also under the 1972 Anglo-Rhodesian Proposals for Settlement, government have been given an incentive to increase the numbers of white citizens and voters. The Prime Minister, amongst others, has called for rapid white immigration and even for white Rhodesians to adopt a policy of promoting 'immigration via the cradle', Rhodesia Herald, 2 June, 1970.

174. In 1974 the State introduced a 10 percent surcharge on income taxpayers, applied retrospectively (to help finance the guerrilla war). Many observers believed the main effect of the tax would be to make the skilled manpower situation worse. See Rhodesia Herald, 30 August, 1974; and Rhodesia Herald, 18 September, 1974.

175. See here the comments on the skilled manpower shortage in P.S. Harris, Manpower Requirements and Existing Vacancies - A Note on the Central Statistical Office Survey, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 2, June, 1972.

176. The Settlers '74 Campaign set out to recruit inter alia artisans, office workers and persons in many other occupations that could have been locally supplied. For details see Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 8 February, 1974. By March, the Ministry of Information claimed that 5,000 had applied to come to Rhodesia, Rhodesia Herald, 20 March, 1974. The Campaign was attacked by the A.N.C. and the Catholic Bishops. See Sunday Mail, 20 January, 1974.

177. H.M.S.O. Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Report: Appendix IV: Survey and Developments Since 1953, 1960, p.342.

178. See the report on the passage of the Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Act in Rhodesia Herald, 2 February, 1968.

179. See details in Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Apprenticeship and Technical Training, Government Printer, Salisbury, 1964.

180. See also F.M. Newhati, The Effects of Racial Discrimination on the African Worker in Rhodesia, Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, 1967 (mimeo), p.8., where it is noted that students qualifying at the only two available technical training schools for Africans could only work for the State in rural areas at low wages because their training was not recognized by employers (e.g. the Chamber of Industries and the Master Builders' Association).

181. P.S. Harris, Some Aspects of Apprenticeship Training in Rhodesia, Society, 3, July, 1970, University of Rhodesia.

182. P.S.Harris, Vocational Training for Improving the Employment Prospects of Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia, Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974.

183. See C.W. Dewhurst, The Management of Critical Resources, A.R.N.I. Congress, Victoria Falls, 1974 (mimeo), p.4, where it is noted that an advertisement calling for apprentices produced 241 replies in 1973. Those under 19 years (120) were interviewed. There were 18.5 African applicants and 4.6 Coloured and Asian Applicants per white applicant. Four Africans and 1 white were selected. The top applicants had excellent academic grades.

184. See the comments of the Judges Commission (Southern Rhodesia Education Commission, 1962): 'The Apprenticeship Act made it possible for Africans to become journeymen tradesmen by way of industrial craft training. But it is no secret that trade practices and workshop custom still impose hindrances upon non-Europeans, and that in fact few are going forward to become masters in their trade by this route.' Emphasis added. Quoted in F.M. Newhati, op.cit., p.8.

185. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Apprenticeship, op.cit. Also see Rhodesia Herald, 9 December, 1964.

186. See the Minister of Labour's comments in Rhodesia Herald, 24 January, 1968: 'If we leave the matter on a laissez-faire basis we shall find ourselves hopelessly short of skilled manpower - with all the undesirable consequences of such a shortage.'

187. Ibid. See for instance the comments of Mr R.H. James (R.F. Salisbury City).

188. P.S. Harris, Vocational Training, op.cit.

189. For details, given by the Registrar of Apprenticeship, see Rhodesia Herald, 23 April, 1971.

190. See Business and Financial Review, 28 February, 1974, for details.

191. Thus in 1973 the Minister of Labour reported that only 10 percent of employers paying the journeyman's levy had actually taken on apprentices. See Rhodesia Herald, 20 December, 1973.

192. P.B. Gibbs, op.cit., p.15.

193. A.G. Paterson, Waste Not, Want Not - Manpower, A.R.N.I. Congress, Victoria Falls, 1974: 'If we are wise we will forget immigration as a major source of manpower supply in the future.' The writer was Chairman of the Apprenticeship Training and Skilled Manpower Development Authority at the time.

194. For details see Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 17 May, 1974. See also C.W. Dewhurst, op.cit.

195. Rhodesia Herald, 12 August, 1974.

196. See A.G. Paterson, op.cit.: 'It could be said that in fact we are adopting this "modular" system at the present time.'

197. The actual Rhodesian Front Policy on this question reads as follows: the Front will ensure that 'the principles of "Rate for the Job" and "No Fragmentation of Labour" are firmly entrenched in practice as well as principle and that the skilled worker is protected from discriminatory wage practices and from unfair competition arising from a lowering of standards and the exploitation of cheap labour'. Rhodesian Front, Policies, 1971, p.5 (mimeo).

198. Rhodesia, Government Policy on Labour: Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 30 April, 1971, p.6-7.

199. See here Associated Mineworkers' Union, The Granite Review, October, 1971, p.42.

200. See here the demonstration of this point with reference to Rhodesia in J.L. Simon, The Effect of Fixed Wage Rises on Discriminated-Against Minorities, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 21, October, 1967.

201. See Associated Mineworkers' Union, The Granite Review, October, 1871, p.30.

202. Ibid.

203. Ibid. Emphasis added.

204. See Rhodesia Herald, 16 November, 1973.

205. See Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 16 November, 1973.

206. Ibid.

207. Association of Rhodesian Industries, Annual Report, 1970.

208. Ibid.

209. Commerce, November, 1971, p.7.

210. Commerce, December, 1971, p.8. Emphasis added.

211. Commerce, November, 1973, p.5.

212. Business Herald, July 18, 1974.

213. See the case reported by Cllr. M.A. Hunt to the Rhodesian Institute of Management about the factory he visited where Africans have taken charge of primary supervisory jobs: 'There is no redundancy - the previous supervisors moved upwards to more senior posts.' Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 9 August, 1974.

214. Sunday Mail, 7 December, 1974. The T.U.C. President accused the Rhodesian government and 'big business' of trying to introduce modular training behind the backs of the skilled unions.

215. See Rhodesia Herald, 14 May, 1974. The A.T.U.C. President criticized 'pious appeals' however, and called for independent employer action.

216. Business and Financial Review, 16 November, 1973. Employers have had to obtain State approval for 'rationalization' schemes because the State has controlled Industrial Board regulations.

217. The Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 23 November, 1973.

218. B.B. Gibbs, op.cit., p.8.

219. Ibid., p.9.

220. Ibid., p.21.

221. See here the basic principles upon which the Triennial Review Commission for the University of Rhodesia (1972) made its recommendations. The vocationalization of academic courses has also taken place extensively within the University in the post-1968 period. Since 1972 greater attempts have been made to gear the output of graduates to employment needs of the State.

222. In the case of the Law Department other constraints have also applied. See R. Christie, African Law Graduates, Rhodesian Law Journal, 1970.

223. In 1973 only 4 blacks were on the lecturing staff of the University out of a staff complement in excess of 150. In addition, all were in relatively junior appointments. Black academic staff have submitted memoranda on discrimination against them to both the A.U.T. and the Principal since mid-1973.

224. This statement is based on the author's close experience of this problem whilst at the University of Rhodesia and on the basis of several attempts to secure employment for black graduates in various sectors.

225. J.P. Danckwerts, University Graduate Manpower Survey 1971/1973, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo).

226. Based on discussions with the Rhodesian Society of Accountants in April, 1972. The data were provided to the author by the Society.

227. Data used here are based on communications with the Law Society of Rhodesia. See also R. Christie, op.cit.

228. Rhodesia Herald, 13 March, 1974.

229. See for example the comments of Sir Albert Robinson (Chairman of Johannesburg Consolidated Investments) in Commerce, July 1974, p.21.

230. (London) Financial Times, June 3, 1971.

231. Mashonaland and Manicaland Motor Trade Employers' Association, Chairman's Report, 1969 (mimeo).

232. Mashonaland and Manicaland Motor Trade Employers' Association, Chairman's Report, 1971 (mimeo).

233. Ibid.

234. Salisbury Commercial Employers' Association, Chairman's Report, 1969 (mimeo).

235. K.B. Crookes, Labour Problems in Rhodesia: An Employer's Viewpoint, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 4, 1972.

236. On anti-RF groups, inside and outside business, see Larry W, Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State, Harvard University Press, 1973.

237. On the pre-1940's unionism and working-class organization amongst African workers see Charles van Onselen, Worker Consciousness in Black Miners: Southern Rhodesia 1900-1920, Journal of African History, XIV, 2, 1973; I.R. Phimister, The Shamva Mine Strike of 1927: An Emerging African Proletariat, Rhodesian History, 2, 1971; T.O. Ranger, African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, Heinemann, London, 1970; and D.G. Clarke, The Underdevelopment of African Trade Unions in Rhodesia: An Assessment of Working-Class Action in Historical Perspective, Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, Annual Conference, Durban, 1974 (mimeo). This last work deals extensively with many issues not examined explicitly here: the basis of liberal historiography about African unions; worker consciousness in the phase of industrial capital accumulation; union organization amongst the labour aristocracy; and the internal weaknesses of the African trade union movement.

238. The ameliorative element of labour policy was well reflected in the fact that the Labour Boards Act excluded sectors where unionization or strike action had not extensively taken place.

239. See Southern Rhodesia, Abridged Report of Commission Appointed by His Excellency the Governor to Inquire into and Report on all Matters Concerning Native Disturbances in the Colony and to Recommend any Action which may seem Desirable in the Public Interest, Salisbury, 1948 (mimeo); and Bantu Mirror, 1 July, 1950.

240. For details see Bantu Mirror (weekly) for the period 1950-60 where extensive coverage of union activities is to be found. Also Letter from Rolek M. Bango (General Secretary, Confederation of African Labour) to Mr Duignan, 29.1.1959; E. Muchenje, Brief African Trade Union History in Southern Rhodesia, Silveira House, c. 1970 (mimeo); C.M. Brand, Politics and African Trade Unionism Since Federation, Rhodesian History, 2, 1971; and J. van Velsen, Trends in African Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia, Kroniek van Afrika, 4, 1964.

241. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Select Committee on Subject of Native Industrial Workers' Union Bill (AB 50, 1954), Government Printer, Salisbury, 1956.

242. Ibid., p.5.

243. Ibid., p.6. Emphasis added.

244. Ibid. Emphasis added.

245. Ibid., p.7. Emphasis added.

246. Ibid.

247. Ibid., p.10. Emphasis added. See also p.11 for the devices recommended to protect the interests of the labour aristocracy.

248. Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, House of Assembly, 1959, col. 1547. Emphasis added.

249. Ibid., col. 2064.

250. Ibid., col. 2096.

251. Ibid., col. 2073. Emphasis added.

252. Ibid. Emphasis added.

253. See S.M. Grant, Skilled Workers Will Keep Power, Rhodesia Herald, 8 October, 1959. For example, in 1974 in the Chemical and Explosive Workers' Union there were 25 skilled journeymen in Grade I with power to vote 4 members on to the Union Council, whilst 500 semi-skilled and skilled workers (Grades II and III) were only similarly provided.

254. Industrial Council decisions have to be earned by a majority of votes. Since there are equal numbers of employer and union representative any split in the union side works to the advantage of management.

255. See Business and Financial Review, 31 January, 1974, in which A.R.N.I.'s Industrial Relations department noted that 'the vertical structure helps to contain labour unrest'.

256. One important function of the State has been to ensure a degree of uniformity in employer wage policies in order to avoid division within the producer class.

257. For example, the Commercial and Allied Workers' Union (1974) and the Rhodesian Municipal Workers' Union. As a result of the latter, municipal workers' unions have had to bargain separately with local authorities.

258. In 1972 there were 17 unregistered unions in all. Most of the non-African ones were 'Staff Associations'. Letter from Industrial Registrar to the Author, 21 July 1972.

259. Records of de-registrations are given in the Annual Reports of the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare (1960-1973 inclusive).

260. Interview with P.F. Sithole, President, African Trade Union Congress, 1974.

261. See Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, House of Assembly, 1964, col. 860.

262. Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, House of Assembly, 1967, cols. 1052-1235.

263. Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, House of Assembly, 1971, cols. 680-967.

264. See A.T.U.C., The Industrial Conciliation Act: The Proposed Amendments 1973, Bulawayo, 1973. Also P.S. Harris, The 1973 Amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 7, 3, 1973.

265. See A.R.N.I., Annual Report for the Presidential Year 1965/66, March, 1966, p.13-14.

266. See Rhodesia, Reports of the Secretary for Labour and Social Welfare (1961-71 inclusive). In 1961 the number of stoppages was 172, involving 21,282 workers with 26,763 mandays lost. In 1971 there were 11 stoppages, involving 832 workers with 599 mandays lost.

267. Reports on the number of unionists in detention and restriction (some for as long as 10 years) have varied. See I.C.F.T.U., Rhodesia: Joint Project, Salisbury, 1974 (mimeo), where Mr W.G. Lawrence (the local I.C.F.T.U. representative) notes that at one time there were 'hundreds in detention'. In 1974 he estimate the figure at about 50.

268. For details on these controls and special instances see Zimbabwe Labour News (1961-62); Workers Voice (1962-63).

269. See C.M. Brand, op.cit.; also C.M. Brand, The Political Role of Unions in Rhodesia, South African Labour Bulletin, 2, March, 1975; also see ZANU Times No. 1, September, 1963; and The Zimbabwe Times (March-June 1964). The important Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions was also banned in 1965.

270. Letter from the Industrial Registrar to the Author, op.cit. The unions are not listed by race, but it can be discerned which have African control.

271. See C.M. Brand, Constraints on Trade Union Organization in Rhodesia, Political Economy Research Seminar No. 5, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo).

272. Data supplied to the author by Mr W.G. Lawrence, I.C.F.T.U. Representative for Central Africa, 1974.

273. See here the Rhodesia Transport Workers' Union for instance, in Transport Workers' News Letter, June, 1974 (mimeo).

274. See D.G. Clarke, The Underdevelopment of African Trade Unions, op.cit., for details of union distribution.

275. The author has collected evidence on the union formation process in Rhodesia since 1945 which indicates that at least 80 different unions (of semi-skilled and unskilled workers), initiated by Africans, have been formed.

276. See various issues of Zimbabwe Labour News; Workers Voice; The Zimbabwe Times.

277. The case that unions have been 'ineffective' is argued in C.M. Brand, Constraints, op.cit. It is dealt with at length in D.G. Clarke, The Underdevelopment of African Trade Unions in Rhodesia, op.cit.

278. In the 1970's a 'new dualism' has emerged in the development economics literature based on the informal/formal sector dichotomy. The stress in this analysis is not on the discreteness of the two sectors but on the integration of the 'informal' (petty commodity mode of production) and the 'formal' (capitalist mode of production) under conditions where the latter has dominated the former. For a critique of the 'informal sector' theory see Chris Gerry, Petty

Producers and the Urban Economy: A Case Study of Dakar, World Employment Programme Research Working Paper, Geneva, September, 1974. Also see Oliver Le Brun and Chris Gerry, Petty Producers in Urban Senegal: A Preliminary Theoretical Framework, Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, February, 1975 (mimeo); Gavin Williams, Class, Politics and State in Nigeria, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1973 (mimeo); and Colin Leys, Interpreting African Underdevelopment, African Affairs, 72, 289, 1973.

279. W.J. Barber, op.cit.; G. Arrighi, Political Economy, op.cit.; and Martin Loney, Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975.

280. On urban growth see Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission, Salisbury, 1958, p.16, where it is shown that from 1936-56 the number of African adult males in employment in the largest 7 municipalities in Southern Rhodesia increased from 45,638 to 198,542. For comments on the growth of petty producers over the period (in Salisbury) see City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration, 1956-73, inclusive. Note especially the growth in the numbers of 'illegal' traders, e.g. in City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration, 1957, p.121.

281. Data here taken from W. Margolis, The Position of the Native Population in the Economic Life of Southern Rhodesia, M.A., University of South Africa, 1938, Chapter XVIII; W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.218.

282. For details on these classes in Rhodesia see R.J. Davies, The Informal Sector in Rhodesia - How Important? Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974; R.J. Davies, Notes on the theory of the Informal Sector with Reference to Rhodesia, Association for Sociology in Southern Africa, Annual Conference, 1974 (mimeo); A.V. Seeber, Income and Employment Generation in the Informal Sector: A Case Study of Bulawayo, Bulawayo Municipality, 1974 (mimeo); and D.G. Clarke, Informal Employment: Grass Roots Development Problems in Urban Rhodesia: Appendix: Selected Case Studies, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia, 1973 (mimeo).

283. Costs of State assistance have often been set off against rentals for stalls, income from licences and revenues from fines. See also City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration 1959, p.58, for policy towards encouraging households to supply some of their own needs: 'the Department has left no stone unturned to encourage Africans to grow their own produce for retail sale in the Townships.' Emphasis added. Most township dwellings do not have large gardens and most gardens are wholly devoted to vegetables, fruit and mealies. The result is that black urban areas have come to partly resemble intensive (urban)

agricultural settlements. Other assistance has taken the form of providing trading premises, market stalls and ecnouraging cooperative societies. See City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration, 1956, pp.71-74.

284. Various controls have applied. Some persons have been ordered to leave (proclaimed) urban areas whilst much fewer have been allowed to return. See City of Salisbury, Annual Report of The Director of Native Administration 1956, p.91. Others have been arrested by the Police: 'The Police have been actively engaged throughout the year in arresting those selling illegally from the pavements, but unfortunately fines, when related to the profits that are made from these illegal activities, appear too small a deterrent, and the illegal selling continues, but fortunately, on a reduced scale.' City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of African Administration 1968, p.45. In other instances, licences have been refused. For example see City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration, 1957, p.120. In 1955-56, 174 licences were refused and 428 issued in Salisbury.

285. Roy McGregor, op.cit., p.397-99.

286. R.S. Fitzhenry, op.cit., p.31.

287. On the exemptions to the 'Situpa Law' see Rhodesia Herald, 24 February, 1974; also African (Registration and Identification) Amendment Act (1972).

288. See Rhodesia Herald, 11 October, 1974, for details of debate on the Vagrancy Act in the House of Assembly, especially the statement by Dr C. Barlow (R.F. Avondale): 'a vagrant is a vagrant, regardless of race'.

289. See City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of African Administration 1962, p.25, where details are given of State attempts to break up monopolies in the vegetable selling business in the African township.

290. Data used in this paragraph on squatters in Salisbury have been extracted from the Rhodesia Herald (March, 1972 - November, 1972).

291. See D.G. Clarke, Informal Employment, op.cit., Case A, Hawker and Illegal Landlord, where details are given of a hawker who owns two houses (one in Bulawayo and another in Salisbury) from which he received $32.50 monthly in 1973.

292. See City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of African Administration 1961, p.5, where it is shown that the basic rental for accommodation rose from 8/- monthly in July, 1951 to 29/- monthly in April 1960. By 1972 the lowest rental was $5.00 in Salisbury. See Salisbury (African Residential Areas)(Reut)(Amendment) Regulation, 1972 (No.2),

Rhodesia Government Notice No. 1010 of 1972. See also R.C. Riddell, Rents for African Housing: Salisbury Municipal Area, Department of Economics, University of Rhodesia 1972 (mimeo).

293. See a clear statement on this in E.H. Ashton, Finance and Administration, in Rhodesia Council of Social Service, Report of the National Conference, 1968, p. 9-10, where the author (Director of Housing in Bulawayo) notes that 4 means have been used to cope with the shortage of funds and the high demand for accommodation: (a) reducing the size of all rented accommodation to two rooms without a kitchen; (b) providing accommodation too small for a family; (c) compelling overcrowding by either insisting that two families share the accommodation or recognizing that it can only be paid for by taking in lodgers (this applied to almost all homes in private ownership); (d) 'rachmanism' - by charging supra-economic rents for poor accommodation that is known to be (already) overcrowded (5.28 per room).

294. For details on how municipal accounts have been 'segregated', thereby requiring the African Revenue Account to be self-financing, see E.H. Ashton, op.cit., p.5; also Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission, op.cit., Chapter VI.

295. See for example the reaction of ACCOR and ARNI to State initiatives to raise a capital levy on employers for urban African housing, in Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 17 May, 1974; Rhodesia Herald, 14 May, 1974; Business Herald, 16 May, 1974.

296. For example see the description of conditions of rondavels, tin huts, barracks, female hostels, home ownership schemes, Police camps and railway compounds in A.K.H. Weinrich, A Study of Race, Status and Politics in a Rhodesian Provinical Town, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo). Note here too the term used for much batchelor accommodation in the urban areas - 'coffin space'. The term is used by E.H. Ashton, op.cit., p.8.

297. See City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of African Administration 1972, Appendix C, p.48, for details on the growth of the housing shortage from 1961-62 to 1971-72. The numbers on the waiting list more than doubled over this period to 12,393 families.

298. See the following comment for example in City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of Native Administration 1957, p.21: 'In New Highfield the introduction of lodgers has been deliberately fostered on a basis which appears to be out of balance.'

299. The urban African working-class (except for a select few) have not been allowed to accumulate wealth, however. 'In Southern Rhodesia, however, neither the land nor the buildings in African urban areas belong to the occupiers of these buildings so that no site value accrues to them,' Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Urban African Affairs Commission, op.cit., p.60.

300. See P. Stopforth, Survey of Highfield African Township, Occasional Paper No. 6, Department of Sociology, University of Rhodesia, 1971, p.16-18, which shows that lodging has been at a very high level. In Highfields 28.7 percent of Stopforth's sample of households had lodgers.

301. Data used here are taken from the questionnaires used in Department of African Administration, Squatters in Salisbury: Survey, March, 1973. For a brief report on the data also see Rhodesia Herald, 20 November, 1974.

302. City of Salisbury, Annual Report of the Director of African Administration 1972, Appendix D, p.49, shows that of the 10,326 families waiting (on the list) for accommodation in Salisbury, only 472 were childless. The average number of children per family was 3.262. Nearly three-quarters of all the 33,690 children declared by the persons waiting for accommodation were in families of 3 children or more.

303. R. Dawson, Towards a Better Understanding of Manpower Supply in Rhodesia, Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 3 September, 1972.

304. A.M. Hawkins, How Much African Unemployment? Rhodesian Journal of Economics, 6, 3, September, 1972.

305. A.M. Hawkins, African Unemployment in Rhodesia, Rhodesia Science News, 8, 7, 1974.

306. The statement was made by a Cabinet Minister (Mr P.K. Van Der Byl), Rhodesia Herald, 11 January, 1974.

307. Ibid. See also the letter by Mr F. Alexander (R.F., M.P.) in Sunday Mail, 12 January, 1969, which argues a similar case.

308. Details from research by Mrs J. May (University of Rhodesia) as reported in Sunday Mail, 20 January, 1974.

309. Rhodesia Herald, 28 November, 1968. See also the Director of African Administration's Annual Reports (especially 1957 and 1959) for details on growing African female unemployment in urban areas.

310. For details in the case of Bulawayo see E.S. Gargett, Welfare Services in An African Urban Area, Ph.D., University of London, 1971, pp.205-07.

311. R.J. Davies, The Informal Sector in Rhodesia, op.cit.

312. See variously Rhodesia Herald, 19 January, 1974; and Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 5 April, 1974, for instances of applications per job reaching the ratio of 10:1 in cases.

313. See Rhodesia Herald, 25 January, 1974, for details of government initiatives to reserve all jobs in the Seki Industrial Complex for Rhodesian Africans.

314. Political limits have been uppermost in priorities to keep urban African unemployment low: 'At the present time, unemployment is a factor to be reckoned with in African townships and the familar patterns and results of "Evil work for evil hands to do" are known to us all - husbands drink to forget, join subversive movements in their frustration, desperation and depression etcetera,' City of Salisbury, Director of Africnn Administration 1963, p.25.

315. See details in Rhodesia Herald, 8 August, 1963, and other editions in the last half of the year.

316. R.S. Fitzhenry, op.cit., p.126.

317. Rhodesia Herald, 15 June, 1973.

318. See A.V. Seeber, op.cit.; also D.G. Clarke, Informal Employment, op.cit.

319. For data on pirate taxis see A.V. Seeber, op.cit; also Moto, 2 February, 1974; Rhodesia Herald, 12 September, 1972; Rhodesia Herald, 15 March, 1973; Rhodesia Herald, 11 March, 1974.

320. See Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1968, p.138.

321. See details in Rhodesia Herald, 5 December, 1974, and Moto, 2 February, 1974.

322. Moto, 15 September, 1973.

323. See Salisbury Hawkers and Street Vendors' Bye-Laws, 1952 (as amended 1953, 1955, 1958).

324. See also A.V. Seeber, op.cit., who agrees that control has been the essential function served by the hawking laws. Seeber was an employee of the Bulawayo City Council when he wrote his report on the informal sector in Bulawayo.

325. See exemption details in the Licence Control Act (Chapter 233) (Section 42).

326. Correspondence with the City of Salisbury Medical Officer of Health (Ref L/51, 4 April, 1974).

327. Ibid.

328. Que Que Rural Council (Hawkers and Street Vendors) (Adoption) Bye-Laws, 1973, Rhodesian Government Notice No. 176 of 1973.

329. In one short period in Bulawayo, for example, fines worth $3,000 were imposed. See Rhodesia Herald, 11 February, 1973. See also Sunday Mail, 23 April, 1973, for details of raids on 'illegal' producers.

330. Stricter influx controls were proposed at the Local Government Association conference in 1970 (see Rhodesia Herald, 20 May, 1970) in order to evict loafers, stop persons sneaking into kias, evict squatters from the dumps and control 'illegal' lodgers. An Urban Influx Control Committee was set up (Rhodesia Herald, 16 September, 1970).

331. Rhodesia Herald, 16 September, 1970. The point was made by a spokesman of the Local Government Association.

332. For instance, it was criticized by the General Secretary of the Agricultural and Plantation Workers' Union (Mr P.J. Mpofu) since it would be used to meet the farm 'labour shortage' without wage adjustment and a change in the low wage system on plantations. See Rhodesia Herald, 1 December, 1972.

333. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 8, 83, 1 December, 1972, col. 654.

334. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 1, 83, 21 November, 1973, col. 36.

335. Ibid.

336. Rhodesia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 3, 83, 23 November, 1973, col. 191.

337. For details see Rhodesia Herald, 29 June, 1974.

338. Africans (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration (Employment Bureaux) Regulations 1973, Rhodesia Government Notice No. 134 of 1973. For a report on this law see Rhodesian Financial Gazette, 9 February, 1973.

CHAPTER 9

1. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry of Southern Rhodesia, Salisbury, 1945, Appendix A, Table, p.70. Data are also extracted from Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1972, C.S.O., 1973, Table 4; and Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1954-1964, C.S.O., 1965.

2. G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia, Mouton, The Hague, 1967, p.47.

3. A.M.W.U., Production of Smallworker Mines: Compiled from Mines Department Returns for 1962 (mimeo).

4. For data see W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, O.U.P., 1961, p.256; and Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1974, Table 14.

5. 'As wages of unskilled labour increase the labourer who is doing the work of a bulldozer or a power shovel is replaced.... Consequently hundreds of unskilled Africans are being thrown out of jobs even though the operator of the machine is an African, but skilled artisans must be engaged to maintain the machines.' Chamber of Mines, 23rd Annual Report for the Year 1961, p.23 (hereafter cited as C.M., Annual Report, 1961). Emphasis added.

6. W. Margolis, The Position of the Native Population in the Economic Life of Southern Rhodesia, M.A., University of South Africa, 1938, p.108.

7. I.R. Phimister, Decline of Gold and the Changing Composition of the Mining Industry 1919-1953, Department of History, University of Rhodesia, unpublished, 1975.

8. Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, 1973, Table 10 (mimeo).

9. Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Year Book 1947, Government Stationery Office, 1947, Table 121.

10. A.M.W.U., Numbers of Mines in Southern Rhodesia Classified by Size of African Labour Force, 1962 (mimeo).

11. A.M.W.U., Production of Smallworker Mines, op.cit.

12. D.J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, Clarendon, Oxford, 1970, pp.118-43.

13. A.M.W.U., Mines Coming Under Part II of the Industrial Agreement (Mineworkers), 1974, (mimeo).

14. Waddacor, Brooking and Company, Rhodesia Company Register Analysis, 1972.

15. In 1972 the Chairman of Rio Tinto claimed that 80-90 percent of the Rhodesian mining industry was 'overseas owned'. See Chamber of Mines Journal, May, 1972, p.30 (hereafter cited as C.M.J., May, 1972).

16. See Waddacor, Brooking and Company, op.cit., for details on Wankie Colliery, Rio Tinto, Rhodesian Nickel Corporation and M.T.D. (Mangula). In these corporations the top 10 shareholders accounted for more than 63 percent of all shareholdings.

17. See C.S.O., Report on the Results of the National Income and Balance of Payments Questionnaire sent to Companies Operating in Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia in 1963, Salisbury, 1964.

18. See the statements of Mr R.S. Walker in C.M.J., May, 1972, in which it is suggested that 25 percent of the equity of foreign mining companies should be held by 'Rhodesian investors'.

19. Ibid. Emphasis added.

20. The 'tests' were: the majority of directors would have to be Rhodesian citizens (citizenship can be obtained after 2 years residence); three-quarters of the directors would have to be resident in Rhodesia; the company would have to be quoted on the Rhodesian Stock Exchange (a number are already); 25 percent of the equity should be held by Rhodesian investors.

21. C.M., Annual Report, 1970, p.3. Also see C.M., Annual Report, 1971, p.3. Companies with the largest (combined) volume and level of employment have been given the largest voting power (under a specially devised formula).

22. Ibid. In 1971 the 5 'A' class members elected one-half of the Executive. There were 10 classes of membership (A was the largest producer class) and 100 different members.

23. See Colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia, Oxford, 1959, pp.103-05.

24. See C.M., Annual Report, 1966; C.M., Annual Report, 1967.

25. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., Table 27.

26. See Rhodesia, National Accounts 1972, op.cit., Table 15, where it is shown that the 'Work Given Out' by mining producers has risen by more than fourfold to £12.7 million in 1972 compared to 1963. Also see Rhodesia, Report by J.L. Sadie on Planning for the Economic Development of Rhodesia, Salisbury Government Printer, 1967, p.18, where it is shown that in 1965 the backward and forward linkages for mining were 25 percent and 10 percent respectively.

27. For instance, royalties have been low. See Rhodesia, National Accounts, op.cit., Table 23, where it is shown that royalties accruing to the State only rose 25 percent in the 1965-72 period up to a level of $1.5 million (less than 5 percent of Gross Operating Profits).

28. For example, see C.M., Annual Report, 1971, in regard to amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act.

29. For details see C.M., Annual Report, 1969; and C.M., Annual Report, 1970.

30. Data from Rhodesia, National Accounts, op.cit., Table 5, Table 15, Table 41 and Table 42.

31. W. Margolis, op.cit., p.144.

32. W.J. Barber, op.cit., p.227. Nonetheless, Barber is still able to describe African mineworkers as 'the aristocracy of the African labour force'. (p.202)

33. I.R. Phimister, Decline of Gold, op.cit., p.139.

34. See 'Resume of the History of the Association' (A.M.W.U.) in A.M.W.U., The Granite Review, October, 1967, p.14 (hereafter cited as A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1967).

35. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, Department of Mines and Public Works on Mines for the Year Ended 31 December 1943, p.36 (hereafter cited as Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, 1943).

36. See Southern Rhodesia, Annual Report of the Chief Government Mining Engineer for the Year 1939, Salisbury, p.5 (hereafter cited as Southern Rhodesia, C.G.M.E., 1939).

37. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, 1946, p.11. Shabanie Asbestos Mine were reported to be short of 1,000 labourers. See Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1946,p.58.

38. R.N.L.S.C. supplied contractees were first allocated to mines in 1950. From 1950-60, 23,587 two-year contract workers were allocated to the mining industry. Many of these workers went to Wankie Colliery. See Annual Reports of the Chairman of the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission 1947-61 (inclusive).

39. See Duncan Clarke, Contract Workers and Underdevelopment in Rhodesia, Mambo Press, Gwelo, 1974, where it is shown that the 'capitation fee' on 2-year contractees rose from $17.3 to $52 from 1947-53.

40. On the rise and fall of the I.C.U. see T.O. Ranger, African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, Heinemann, 1970.

41. Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1947, p.8.

42. Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1947, p.8.

43. See W.J. Barber, op.cit.

44. Data from Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Year Book, 1938, p.81; Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Year Book, 1947, p.105; Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook 1952, op.cit., p.523; and Southern Rhodesia, C.M.G.E., 1955, p.17.

45. National Industrial Council for the Mining Industry (Mineworkers), Agreement 5th May, 1961 - 3rd May, 1963, S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961; and Industrial Agreement: Mining Industry (Mineworkers), R.G.N. No. 488 of 1970.

46. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., Tables 18 and 19.

47. Ibid., Table 16.

48. S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961, pp.16-17.

49. As per R.G.N. No. 488 of 1970 extended to 1974.

50. See N.I.C., Number of Employees 1961 (mimeo); and N.I.C., Number of Employees on Contributing Mines, March 1974 (mimeo).

51. C.S.O., Wage Distribution of African Employees by Industrial Sector for the Month of June 1973, DL/830/66, 1974 (mimeo).

52. Rhodesia, Final Report on the September, 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965, Table 8.

53. See V. Cubitt and R.C. Riddell, The Urban Poverty Datum Line in Rhodesia, Faculty of Social Studies, University of Rhodesia, 1974. If compared against the real wages for mine labourers in 1901-04, it would probably be true to say that workers were little or no better off in 1974.

54. See Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Secretary, 1945, p.74; also C.M., Annual Report, 1967.

55. See A.M.W.U., Submission on Reasons for Raising the Minimum Wage Rates for Workers in Labouring Grades in the Mining Industry Under the N.I.C. Agreement, 1974 (mimeo), for details on the 1974 negotiations. The Chamber of Mines offered 28 cents per shift for labourers.

56. African Labour Regulations Act (Chapter 100) 1911, Section 21.

57. C.M. Annual Report, 1961, p.11.

58. C.M. Annual Report, 1962, p.12.

59. See C.M.J., November 1964, p.25.

60. C.M. Annual Report, 1965.

61. For details on other reasons for this pressure, see C.M.J., March, 1971, p.31.

62. C.M., Annual Report, 1971, p.6.

63. See C.M.J., March, 1974, p.21, where it is noted that there were 'still a number of mines with an alien "content" in excess of 75 percent'.

64. See the following sources as well as Chapter 4: Rhodesia Herald, 16 November, 1974; Rhodesia Herald, 6 November, 1974; Rhodesia Herald, 7 November 1974; and Business Herald, 14 November, 1974.

65. Communication to the author from C.S.O. (LS/3/01), 12 January, 1973.

66. See Industrial Agreement: Mining Industry (Staff Employees), Government Notice No. 68 of 1972.

67. See N.I.C., Rhodesian Mines Benefit Fund, 1974.

68. See Workmen's Compensation Act (Chapter 248) 1959.

69. See I.R. Phimister, African Labour Conditions, Department of History, University of Rhodesia, unpublished, 1975; and C. Van Onselen, Conditions in the Mine Compounds, St Antony's College, Oxford University, unpublished, 1974, for details on the period up to 1934.

70. Data extracted from Southern Rhodesia, Statistical Year Book 1947, Tables 123, 124 and 125.

71. For details see A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1973; also C.M., Annual Report, 1972, p.5, where it is noted that there was no difficulty in meeting the 'shortage' created by the disaster.

72. The Unemployment Insurance Bill was opposed by the Chamber of Mines. See C.M., Annual Report, 1962, p.12.

73. The supply of rudimentary education has been an important attraction. Not all mine owners have been enthusiastic about supplying education, however. See Bikita Minerals Newsletter, January, 1967: 'The Company is here to mine minerals, not to build schools for children.'

74. See Bantu Mirror, 11 June, 1938; Bantu Mirror, 16 July, 1938; Bantu Mirror, 13 August, 1938; Bantu Mirror, 22 October, 1939; Bantu Mirror, 10 June, 1939, for details.

75. Edgar Moyo, Shabanie and the Outbreak of Violence, in S.E. Wilmer (ed.), Zimbabwe Now, Rex Collings, 1973.

76. Ibid., p.109.

77. Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook 1952, op.cit., p.525.

78. See A.M.W.U., Minutes of the 32nd Annual General Meeting, 1973, p.16 (mimeo), for complaints about this aspect of housing policy.

79. See Edgar Moyo, op.cit., for details. Also see Charles Van Onselen, Sex and Social Control in the Rhodesian Mine Compounds, 1900-1933, Workshop on the Economic and Social History of Southern Africa, Oxford University, 1974 (mimeo), for a useful historical perspective.

80. The phrase is that of the President of the A.M.W.U. (Mr H.B. Bloomfield) in Rhodesia Herald, 3 December, 1974.

81. C.M., Annual Report, 1961, p.23.

82. Southern Rhodesia, Official Yearbook of the Colony of Southern Rhodesia No. 3 1932, Salisbury, p.665.

83. S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961. The alternative provisions allowed for rupoko, mabele, inyouti or rice to be substituted for mealie meal, fish for meat in the case of 'the non-meat-eating races', and extra meat in lieu of vegetables where the latter were not available.

84. Mining Industry: Industrial Agreement (Mineworkers), Government Notice No. 398 of 1964.

85. See Edgar Moyo, op.cit., for example. This was also one reason why the State regulations provided that mealie meal given as 'rations' should be well ground and sifted and 'at least 75 percent of any sample must pass through a sieve of a 30-inch mesh'. RGN No. 488 of 1970.

86. There are some technical objections which could be raised about using an urban cost of living index to deflate money wages in mining employment. It is not thought that these would seriously invalidate the use of the index, however.

87. See Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit., for details of the composition of the African consumer price index.

88. V. Cubitt and R.C. Riddell, op.cit. Of the 2,740 African mineworkers in 1973 who were paid in cash only, 6.6 percent received less than $10 monthly, 35.4 percent received between $10 and $20 monthly and only 13.5 percent were paid in excess of $30. See C.S.O., Cash Wage Distribution, op.cit.

89. R.G.N. No. 68 of 1972.

90. C.M., Annual Report, 1963, p.9. Controls have also been applied, e.g. hawkers at Bikita mine have had to have written permission to pursue their trade in the mine village. Bikita Minerals Newsletter, September, 1967.

91. At Bikita Mine 3/4 acres were provided to each married family unit; this amounted to 120 acres in toto. Maize seed was bought for workers by the management. African workers were exhorted to work as a 'community'. The Company ploughed the fields in 1966 but required the workers to do so subsequently. The Company promised workers land as long as they worked on the mine. See Bikita Minerals Newsletter, November, 1966.

92. Compound police for the mining industry as a whole have been specially trained by Anglo-American Corporation. See C.M., Annual Report, 1959. Among their tasks has been the job of regulating 'beer privileges'. At Bikita mine, for instance, married workers have been allowed to take 1 gallon of beer weekly out of the mine compound. This benefit has not been available to single workers. See Bikita Minerals Newsletter, November, 1966.

93. C.M. Annual Report, 1959, p.v.

94. C.M. Annual Report, 1960, p.9.

95. See, for example, Native Labour Adviser, A Report upon the Native Labour Position in the Central African Colonies with Special Reference to Southern Rhodesia, 1950 (mimeo): 'The Mashona is not a mining type, the Ndebele is kin to the Zulu and the foreign Natives are all Natives employed in the South.' p.34.

96. See Bikita Minerals Newsletter (Nov. 1966 - July 1969 inclusive).

97. Data are taken from A.M.W.U., G.R., May 1964; and A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1964; and Rhodesia Herald (June 1964).

98. See the letters from and replies to T.E. Mswaka, General Secretary, Southern Rhodesian African Trade Union Congress, in A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1964.

99. A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1965, p.15.

100. For an appreciation of the A.M.W.U.'s 'responsible role' see R.C.J., November, 1971, where the Minister of Labour, who castigated unionists who advocated strike action, held up the A.M.W.U. as an exemplary union.

101. For a statement on the A.M.W.U.'s anti-strike policy and viewpoints, see A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1960.

102. It may have been wholly co-incidental, but within a few months of the strike pay increases were announced for skilled workers at Wankie. Even the A.M.W.U. officials expressed surprise at the 'sudden' pay award. See Rhodesia Herald, 10 December, 1974.

103. For an example of this perspective see C.M., Annual Report, 1972, p.5; also see the comments of the Secretary of the Chamber of Mines (Mr K. Van der Plank) in Rhodesia Herald, 18 February, 1972.

104. The A.M.W.U., for instance, has strenuously attempted to limit the size of the semi-skilled African working class. In the January, 1963 negotiations with the Chamber of Mines, for example, the A.M.W.U. agreed to permit 1,587 workers into Grade II; the Chamber wanted 4,418 workers so classified. See A.M.W.U., Annual Costs of Proposals of the Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia (Inc.) and Annual Costs of Proposals of the Associated Mineworkers' Union, 1963 (mimeo).

105. I.R. Phimister, White Labour, Department of History, University of Rhodesia (mimeo), p.174. Phimister's point has relevance also to the post-1940 position. See also the history of the A.M.W.U. (as published by the union) in A.M.W.U., G.R., March, 1959; and A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1967.

106. I.R. Phimister, White Labour, op.cit.

107. The A.M.W.U. has always sought international recognition, however. For details of its international connections see A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1960. Nonetheless, at least since 1964, after the Wankie strike, the A.M.W.U. has been critical of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, see A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1964.

108. A.M.W.U., Membership as at March 1974 (mimeo).

109. See A.M.W.U., Annual General Meeting 1973, op.cit.

110. N.I.C., Number of Employees on Contributing Mines: Number of Associated Mineworker Members on these Mines, May, 1968 (mimeo).

111. See A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1940.

112. See A.M.W.U., Industrial Agreement: Mineworkers, Draft of Agreement as Proposed by Associated Mineworkers of Rhodesia, 1974 (mimeo).

113. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest, op.cit.

114. Management has regularly argued that 'displaced' workers would be absorbed into higher grades as 'supervisors'. See C.M., Annual Report, 1960, for example.

115. See A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1960, p.4.

116. A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1959.

117. A.M.W.U., Industrial Agreement: Mineworkers, Draft of Agreement, op.cit.

118. See R.C.J., April, 1964, p.25; and R.C.J., April, 1970 (notably the comments of Mr R.S. Walker).

119. See S.R.G.N. No. 181 of 1961; and R.G.N. No. 488 of 1970; also R.G.N. No. 398 of 1964.

120. Calculated on the basis of the 1970 breakdown of workers by Grade in A.M.W.U., Analysis of Labour by Sub-Categories as Contained in the Industrial Agreement (Mineworkers), Government Notice No. 488 of 1970, November 1972 (mimeo).

121. See C.M., Annual Report, 1960, p.9. On the reasons why the union wanted 'open shop' arrangements see A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1960, p.6.

122. A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1964, p.8.

123. C.M., Annual Report, 1961, p.10.

124. See A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1940, p.5.

125. See the criticisms of 'big finance' in A.M.W.U., G.R., January, 1962, p.1; and A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1969, where criticisms are also made of 'Northern Rhodesian financial capital'.

126. For details on the A.M.W.U.'s position see A.M.W.U., G.R., June, 1965, p.13; and A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1963. See also R.C.J., April, 1963; and R.C.J., November, 1963.

127. For A.M.W.U. Criticisms of the M.O.S.S.A. see A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1963.

128. C.M., Annual Report, 1961, p.10.

129. The Chamber of Mines has consistently talked of 'excellent relations' with the M.O.S.S.A. in the Annual Reports in the 1970-74 period, but only of 'strained' relations with the A.M.W.U. See especially, C.M., Annual Report, 1971, pp.6-7.

130. N.I.C. Number of Employees on Contributing Mines: March 1974, op.cit.

131. See here correspondence between the President (A.M.W.U.) and the President (M.O.S.S.A.), February, 1963. I am grateful to Mr. H. Bloomfield for allowing me to consult the archives of the A.M.W.U.

132. See details in A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1963, p.14.

133. Ibid.

134. A.M.W.U., G.R., October, 1967, p.10.

135. A.M.W.U., G.R., November, 1963, p.12.

136. See C.M.J., August, 1963.

137. See especially the union's complaints in A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1965, p.18.

138. For details of the changing basis of exemptions see A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1965, p.11. From 1940-48 mines producing below £800 in value per mensem were exempted; from 1948-59 mines employing less than 3 'journeymen' were exempted; and from 1959-74 exemption applied to mines with less than 150 employees.

139. A.M.W.U., G.R., September, 1965, p.19.

140. Ibid.

141. R.G.N. No. 68 of 1972. This position was slightly amended in 1971. See C.M., Annual Report, 1971, p.7.

142. In March 1974 there were 120 apprentices in foreign controlled mines in Rhodesia. All these apprentices were on 14 mines. There were 211 apprentices on 20 mines in the whole industry at this time. See N.I.C., Number of Employees on Contributing Mines: March 1974 (mimeo). For employer views on apprenticeship see C.M., Annual Report, 1971, pp.5-6.

143. See C.M., Annual Report, 1969. The Chamber had been stressing the skilled manpower shortage since 1959. See C.M.J., December 1959.

144. See C.M., Annual Report, 1973, p.5. In 1961, however, the industry only trained 108 apprentices. See N.I.C., Number of Employees, January, 1961, (mimeo).

145. C.M. Annual Report, 1973, p.6.

TABLES TO CHAPTER 2

TABLE I

WHITE, ASIAN AND COLOURED PERSONAL INCOMES

1946 - 1970

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1946	91.0	30.6	1.0	19.2	1103	1.6	10.1	-	-	-	-	-	1357
1947	97.0	36.6	1.4	21.8	1183	2.0	15.8	-	-	-	-	-	1534
1948	111.0	44.8	1.6	28.0	1193	2.4	17.2	-	-	-	-	-	1507
1949	122.0	53.6	2.0	27.6	1152	2.8	15.8	-	-	-	-	-	1409
1950	134.0	60.0	2.4	35.0	1229	3.6	16.0	-	-	-	-	-	1462
1951	148.0	77.0	3.0	28.8	1070	4.4	17.8	-	-	-	-	-	1263
1952	162.9	89.0	5.0	31.0	1070	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1953	169.9	100.4	7.0	33.0	1099	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1954	170.0	113.8	9.6	36.6	1222	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1955	177.5	127.6	10.8	39.8	1275	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1956	193.3	143.6	12.8	45.4	1279	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1957	205.0	160.2	14.2	47.8	1334	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1958	217.9	186.6	15.8	45.8	1292	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1959	225.7	193.6	16.6	49.8	1287	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1960	234.6	202.6	17.2	47.8	1244	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961	233.5	209.0	18.8	63.0	1271	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1962	240.3	210.4	19.6	58.4	1246	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1963	239.2	215.4	20.6	58.2	1264	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1964	223.9	216.8	20.6	56.0	1282	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1965	230.6	231.3	8.2	44.1	1209	-	-	12.4	25.9	0.4	1.1	28.7	1501
1966	234.6	240.2	8.2	46.6	1205	-	-	12.6	21.0	0.4	1.1	33.8	1406
1967	237.5	249.4	9.3	48.9	1217	-	-	13.9	23.4	0.5	1.0	39.9	1528
1968	246.4	269.7	10.5	51.1	1236	-	-	15.9	21.7	0.5	1.0	37.4	1523
1969	254.3	295.6	12.3	60.4	1297	-	-	17.6	24.3	0.5	1.1	42.8	1601
1970	264.3	321.4	13.9	57.2	1285	-	-	20.3	31.3	0.6	1.7	46.7	1613

Note: Due to revised classifications figures prior to the horizontal line are not <u>strictly</u> comparable with those after it - (See Sources and Notes to Tables).

INDICATORS

1. White, Asian and Coloured population in thousands as at 30 June.
2. Wages and Salaries in cash and kind (£ millions; current prices).
3. Personal Income from Property (£ millions; current prices).
4. Gross income from unincorporated enterprise (£ millions; current prices
5. Sub-total of 'European' personal income <u>per capita</u> (1964 prices).
6. Interest, Dividends and Profits paid by companies (£ millions; current prices).
7. Transfer incomes from Central govt., Local govt., and Abroad. (£ millions; current prices).
8. Interest from Companies, Central govt., Local govt., Public Corp., Central govt., enterprise and Abroad (£ millions; current prices).

9. Dividends and Profits from Companies and Abroad (£ millions; current prices).

10. Rent from Companies (£ millions; current prices).

11. Workmen Compensation Claims (£ millions; current prices).

12. Transfers, n.e.s., from Companies, Central govt., Local govt., and Abroad (£ millions; current prices).

13. Total Personal 'European' personal income <u>per capita</u> (1964 prices).

TABLE 2

AFRICAN POPULATION AND WAGE EMPLOYMENT

1946 - 1970

	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
1946	2,33	1,10	1,23	142	43	185	183	368
1947	2,40	1,14	1,26	150	51	201	185	286
1948	2,48	1,17	1,31	156	54	210	198	408
1949	2,56	1,21	1,35	166	58	224	214	438
1950	2,64	1,25	1,39	177	62	239	230	469
1951	2,72	1,29	1,43	184	67	251	249	500
1952	2,81	1,33	1,48	183	70	253	265	518
1953	2,91	1,38	1,53	200	73	273	263	536
1954	3,00	1,42	1,58	218	76	294	261	555
1955	3,09	1,45	1,64	225	79	304	270	574
1956	3,19	1,47	1,72	228	85	313	289	602
1957	3,29	1,52	1,77	245	88	333	287	620
1958	3,39	1,60	1,79	253	91	344	308	652
1959	3,50	1,70	1,80	259	93	352	305	657
1960	3,61	1,78	1,83	270	94	364	307	671
1961	3,73	1,93	1,80	270	95	365	294	658
1962	3,86	2,08	1,78	272	95	367	279	646
1963	3,99	2,24	1,75	282	95	377	259	636
1964	4,12	2,33	1,79	293	94	387	260	647
1965	4,26	2,50	1,76	289	95	384	272	656
1966	4,40	2,64	1,74	272	96	368	276	664
1967	4,55	2,84	1,71	271	98	369	289	658
1968	4,71	2,98	1,73	282	102	384	309	693
1969	4,83	3,09	1,79	300	106	406	330	735
1970	5,05	3,15	1,90	290	108	398	349	747

Note: Due to revised classifications figures prior to the horizontal line are not <u>strictly</u> comparable with those after it - (see Sources and Notes to Tables).

INDICATORS

14. Total African population as at June 30th in millions.
15. Rural household sector population in millions.
16. Non-Rural household African population in millions.
17. Farm workers in thousands.
18. Domestic workers in thousands.
19. Farm and domestic workers in thousands.
20. Industrial workers in thousands.
21. Total number of African workers in thousands.

TABLE 3

FARM AND DOMESTIC WORKERS' WAGES AND EARNINGS

1946 - 1970

	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1946	19.4	7.9*	2.3	10.2	55.6*	53.4*	109.8*	104.1*	52.6
1947	22.0	8.3*	2.6	11.1	55.3*	50.9*	106.1*	109.2*	50.4
1948	25.2	8.7	3.0	11.7	55.7	55.5	99.1	109.7	46.4
1949	30.8	9.6	3.8	13.4	57.8	65.5	97.6	118.7	43.5
1950	37.2	10.6	4.0	14.6	60.0	64.5	95.5	126.2	39.2
1951	43.4	11.2	5.0	16.2	60.9	74.6	88.6	126.3	37.3
1952	50.0	12.8	6.5	19.3	69.9	92.8	97.5	134.6	38.6
1953	53.6	14.0	8.3	22.3	70.0	113.7	93.1	133.0	41.7
1954	71.2	21.0	10.8	31.8	96.3	142.2	125.0	166.5	44.6
1955	80.0	22.6	12.0	34.6	100.4	151.8	128.2	177.9	43.2
1956	89.8	23.8	13.8	37.6	104.3	162.4	127.7	182.4	41.8
1957	100.8	24.4	14.8	39.2	99.6	168.8	118.2	193.1	38.9
1958	110.2	26.4	16.0	42.4	104.3	175.8	119.7	194.0	38.5
1959	115.4	27.0	16.9	43.9	104.2	181.7	116.4	196.2	38.0
1960	121.8	28.6	17.8	46.4	105.9	189.3	115.5	197.9	38.1
1961	130.1	29.2	18.8	48.0	108.1	197.8	114.6	209.6	36.9
1962	137.2	30.2	19.7	49.9	111.0	207.4	115.4	220.5	36.4
1963	144.2	34.4	20.3	54.7	121.9	213.7	125.2	233.0	37.9
1964	153.8	36.2	21.0	57.2	123.5	223.4	123.5	237.7	37.2
1965	163.6	35.7	21.6	57.3	123.5	227.3	120.4	243.3	35.0
1966	166.8	33.9	22.0	55.9	124.6	229.1	117.8	237.6	33.5
1967	175.6	33.2	23.2	56.4	122.5	236.7	114.2	248.9	32.1
1968	192.4	34.6	25.2	59.8	122.6	247.0	111.7	253.0	31.1
1969	210.8	36.9	26.3	63.2	123.0	248.1	111.7	260.5	30.0
1970	228.2	36.8	28.3	65.1	126.8	262.0	112.8	271.7	29.5

Notes: 1. Data with an asterisk are not real but are crude nominal estimates.

2. Due to revised classifications figures prior to the horizontal line are not strictly comparable with those after it - (see Sources and Notes to the Tables).

INDICATORS

22. African workers' wage bill in current prices; millions of dollars.
23. Farm workers' wage bill in current prices; millions of dollars.
24. Domestic workers' wage bill in current prices; millions of dollars.
25. Farm and Domestic workers' wage bill in current prices; millions of dollars.
26. Average farm workers' earnings in current prices; dollars per annum.
27. Average domestic workers' earnings in current prices; dollars per annum.

28. Average farm workers' earnings in constant 1964 prices; dollars per annum.

29. Average domestic workers' earnings in constant 1964 prices; dollars per annum.

30. Farm and domestic workers' wage bill as a percentage of the total African wage bill.

TABLE 4

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS' WAGES AND EARNINGS

1946 - 1970

	31	32	33	34	35
1946	9.2	50.3*	99.4	15.7	31.0
1947	10.9	58.9*	113.0	17.5	33.5
1948	13.5	68.1	121.1	19.2	34.2
1949	17.4	81.3	137.3	22.8	38.2
1950	22.6	98.2	156.3	26.8	42.6
1951	27.2	109.2	158.9	30.3	44.1
1952	30.7	115.8	161.5	33.8	47.1
1953	31.3	119.0	158.2	35.0	46.5
1954	39.4	150.9	195.9	45.0	58.4
1955	45.4	168.1	214.6	48.8	62.3
1956	51.2	177.1	216.7	52.2	63.8
1957	61.6	214.6	254.5	56.9	67.5
1958	67.8	220.1	252.6	61.5	70.6
1959	71.5	234.4	261.8	64.0	71.5
1960	75.4	245.6	267.8	66.5	72.5
1961	82.1	279.2	296.1	72.2	76.5
1962	87.3	312.9	325.3	76.9	80.0
1963	89.5	345.5	355.1	82.4	84.6
1964	96.6	371.5	371.5	85.9	85.9
1965	106.3	390.8	381.3	92.9	91.3
1966	110.9	401.8	380.1	95.8	91.8
1967	119.2	412.4	384.7	102.6	96.4
1968	132.6	429.1	391.7	111.2	102.2
1969	147.6	447.3	406.2	117.7	105.3
1970	163.1	467.3	415.7	120.1	103.9

Notes: 1. Data with an asterisk are not real but are crude nominal estimates.

2. Due to revised classifications figures prior to the horizontal line are not strictly comparable with those after it - (see Sources and Notes to the Tables).

INDICATORS

31. Industrial workers' wage bill in current prices; millions of dollars.

32. Industrial workers' average earnings in current prices; dollars per annum.

33. Industrial workers' average earnings in constant 1964 prices; dollars per annum.

34. Africal workers' incomes per head in current prices; dollars per annum.

35. Africal workers' incomes per head in constant 1964 prices; dollars per annum.

TABLE 5

RURAL HOUSEHOLD SECTOR INCOMES

1946 - 1970

	36	37	38	39	40	41	42
1946	19.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1947	20.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1948	21.1	3.8	24.9	21.3	37.9	3.3	15.3
1949	21.8	3.4	25.2	20.8	35.1	2.8	13.5
1950	22.5	4.1	26.6	21.3	33.9	3.3	15.4
1951	23.2	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1952	23.9	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1953	24.8	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1954	26.8	7.4	34.2	24.1	31.3	5.2	21.6
1955	28.6	7.0	35.6	24.5	31.2	4.8	19.7
1956	29.4	11.2	40.6	27.6	33.8	7.6	27.5
1957	30.2	9.8	40.0	26.3	31.2	6.5	24.5
1958	31.6	7.4	37.0	24.4	28.0	4.6	19.0
1959	31.4	8.2	39.6	23.3	26.0	4.8	20.7
1960	33.7	9.0	42.7	24.0	26.1	5.1	21.1
1961	38.3	8.0	46.3	23.9	25.3	4.2	17.3
1962	40.1	7.7	47.8	23.0	23.9	3.7	16.1
1963	41.8	6.8	48.6	21.7	22.3	3.0	14.0
1964	46.1	6.8	52.9	22.7	22.7	2.9	12.9
1965	43.7	6.7	50.4	20.2	19.7	2.7	13.3
1966	50.1	8.0	57.4	21.7	20.5	3.0	13.9
1967	61.3	10.0	71.3	25.1	23.4	3.5	14.0
1968	60.8	5.3	66.1	22.2	20.2	1.8	8.0
1969	63.9	11.1	75.0	24.3	22.1	3.6	14.8
1970	70.6	8.6	79.2	25.1	22.3	2.7	10.9

Note: Due to revised classifications figures prior to the horizontal line are not strictly comparable with those after it (see Sources and Notes to the Tables).

INDICATORS

36. Rural household sector production for own consumption in current prices; millions of dollars.

37. Rural household sector sales in current prices; millions of dollars.

38. Rural household sector incomes in current prices; millions of dollars.

39. Rural household sector incomes per head in current prices; dollars per annum.

40. Rural household sector incomes per head in constant 1964 prices; dollars per annum.

41. Cash Sales per head of rural household sector population in current prices; dollars per annum.

42. Rural household sector sales as a percentage of rural household sector incomes.

TABLE 6

RACIAL AND STRUCTURAL WAGE/INCOME RELATIONSHIPS

1946 - 1970

	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51
1946	n/a	n/a	42.6	18.3	36.1	n/a	n/a	37.6	n/a
1947	n/a	n/a	47.3	19.7	37.8	n/a	n/a	40.6	n/a
1948	1.0	2.0	51.1	20.6	36.6	2.0	40.7	41.2	39.7
1949	1.2	2.3	57.2	22.3	37.6	2.1	44.0	37.5	40.1
1950	1.4	2.5	65.2	24.7	39.3	2.1	40.0	37.2	43.1
1951	n/a	n/a	71.2	26.2	38.1	n/a	n/a	33.2	-
1952	n/a	n/a	79.9	28.4	39.6	n/a	n/a	-	-
1953	n/a	n/a	85.4	29.3	39.9	n/a	n/a	-	-
1954	1.4	1.8	106.8	35.6	46.2	1.3	32.2	-	-
1955	1.8	2.3	117.4	37.9	48.4	1.5	30.3	-	-
1956	2.2	2.7	132.6	41.5	50.7	1.7	30.6	-	-
1957	2.6	3.1	143.4	43.5	51.6	1.8	27.9	-	-
1958	3.0	3.4	152.2	44.9	51.5	2.0	25.6	-	-
1959	3.6	4.0	150.6	45.3	50.6	2.3	25.0	-	-
1960	4.0	4.4	160.5	46.7	50.9	2.4	25.3	-	-
1961	5.0	5.3	181.4	48.6	51.5	2.8	25.5	-	-
1962	6.2	6.4	191.2	49.5	51.4	3.2	25.0	-	-
1963	7.2	7.4	200.0	50.1	51.4	3.6	24.3	-	-
1964	7.4	7.4	214.1	51.9	51.9	3.5	24.7	-	-
1965	7.7	7.5	221.7	52.0	50.7	3.5	22.7	29.6	76.1
1966	7.3	6.9	231.7	52.7	49.9	3.3	24.8	29.7	72.4
1967	7.8	7.3	254.7	56.0	52.2	3.1	27.9	29.2	65.2
1968	9.2	8.4	267.7	56.8	51.8	3.4	24.7	29.4	75.3
1969	9.7	8.8	295.5	60.5	54.9	3.3	25.4	29.1	72.4
1970	10.3	9.2	317.7	62.9	56.0	3.2	24.9	28.8	72.2

Note: Due to revised classifications figures prior to the horizontal line are not strictly comparable with those after it (see Sources and Notes to the Tables).

INDICATORS

43. African capitalist incomes from unincorporated enterprise in current prices; millions of dollars.

44. African capitalist incomes from unincorporated enterprise in constant 1964 prices; millions of dollars.

45. Total African personal incomes in current prices; millions of dollars.

46. African personal incomes per head in current prices; dollars per annum.

47. African personal incomes per head in constant 1964 prices; dollars per annum.

48. African capitalist incomes as a percent of total African incomes.

49. Rural household sector incomes as a percent of total African incomes.

50. Ratio of European to African personal incomes per head (constant prices).

51. Ratio of European to African rural household sector incomes per head (constant prices).

TABLE 7

CASH EARNINGS OF EMPLOYEES BY RACE AND INDUSTRY

1961

	52	53	54	55	56	57
Agriculture & Forestry	3.2	61.7	34.8	19.3	1.8	10.9
Mining & Quarrying	5.6	105.8	41.0	18.9	2.6	7.3
Manufacturing						
Food, Drink & Tobacco	8.4	99.8	41.1	11.9	2.4	4.9
Textiles, Clothing	9.8	101.9	60.4	10.3	1.7	6.2
Wood & Furniture	8.6	101.9	58.1	11.8	1.7	6.8
Paper Products, Printing	12.7	78.2	41.6	6.2	1.9	3.3
Chemical products	11.1	105.1	28.6	9.5	3.7	2.6
Non-metallic Mineral Products	10.2	104.7	54.4	10.3	1.9	5.3
Metal Industries	11.4	97.9	56.5	8.6	1.7	4.9
Other	14.0	98.8	47.1	7.1	2.1	3.4
Total Manufacturing	9.8	98.8	51.5	10.1	1.9	5.3
Construction	8.7	102.1	63.7	11.7	1.6	7.3
Electricity and Water	9.5	102.3	58.5	10.8	1.7	6.2
Commerce and Finance	9.6	80.5	38.1	8.4	2.1	3.9
Transport & Communications						
Rail Transport	17.1	88.2	70.3	5.2	1.3	4.1
Road Transport	15.3	92.4	59.8	6.0	1.5	3.9
Other Transport	10.3	86.9	51.1	8.4	1.7	4.9
Total Transport & Communicat.	14.8	88.1	60.3	5.9	1.5	4.1
Services						
Private Domestic	4.3	-	-	-	-	-
Other	10.3	80.0	29.9	7.7	2.7	2.9
Total Services	7.0	80.0	29.9	11.4	2.7	4.3
Activities not adequately described	6.9	71.7	-	10.4	-	-
Total	6.3	86.4	44.9	13.7	1.9	7.1

Note: The data are based on average cash earnings of employees during the 31 days ended 26th September, 1961, excluding annual or less frequent bonuses and allowances.

Source: Rhodesia, Final Report on the September, 1961 Census of Employees, Central Statistical Office, Salisbury, May, 1965, Table 7.

INDICATORS:

52. African average cash earnings per head in pounds per month.
53. European average cash earnings per head in pounds per month.
54. 'Other Races' average cash earnings per head in pounds per month.
55. Ratio of European to African average cash earnings per month.
56. Ratio of European to 'Other Races' average cash earnings per month.
57. Ratio of 'Other Races' to African average cash earnings per month.

TABLE 8

EUROPEAN INCOME DISTRIBUTION BASED ON TAX RETURNS

1955/56 - 1966/67

Income Band £	PROPORTION OF NO. OF INCOMES BELOW UPPER LEVEL OF INCOME BAND				PROPORTION OF VALUE OF INCOMES BELOW UPPER LEVEL OF INCOME BAND			
	1955/6	1959/60	1963/4	1966/7	1955/6	1959/60	1963/4	1966/7
1-400	2.51	2.38	2.40	4.75	0.29	0.26	0.26	0.58
401-500	7.95	6.68	4.61	7.44	1.86	1.44	0.87	1.29
501-600	14.52	12.28	10.85	12.14	4.14	3.27	2.87	2.78
601-800	25.29	20.94	19.35	20.21	8.85	6.84	6.33	6.00
801-1000	36.08	29.25	25.56	26.62	14.98	11.29	9.60	9.30
1001-1200	45.34	37.76	32.72	33.11	21.41	16.84	14.27	13.41
1201-1500	60.60	51.48	46.47	45.52	34.42	27.85	25.13	23.08
1501-2000	80.82	75.47	71.02	67.11	56.27	52.61	50.16	44.69
2001-2500	88.63	87.03	85.45	82.41	67.14	67.78	68.94	63.27
2501-3000	92.19	91.88	91.93	90.66	73.26	75.60	79.18	77.14
3001-4000	95.91	95.89	96.76	96.43	80.60	83.73	88.87	88.40
4001-5000	97.16	97.55	98.39	98.35	84.95	88.08	93.09	93.22
5001-6000	98.13	98.36	99.07	99.01	88.29	90.71	95.24	95.48
6001-8000	99.00	99.22	99.64	99.66	92.08	94.16	97.55	97.78
8001-9000	99.25	99.42	99.76	99.75	93.39	95.16	98.10	98.24
9001-10,000	99.45	99.55	99.81	99.82	94.58	95.92	98.43	98.62
10,001 +	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Sources:

1. Rhodesia, Income Tax Statistics, Income Tax years 1953/4 - 1962/3, C.S.O., January, 1965.
2. Rhodesia, Report of The Commissioner of Taxes for the Year Ended 30th June 1964, Government Printer, Salisbury.
3. Rhodesia, Report of the Commissioner of Taxes for the Year Ended 30th June 1968, Government Printer, Salisbury.

TABLE 9

PROPORTION OF INCOME ACCRUING TO TOP EUROPEAN INCOME GROUPS

1955/56 - 1966/67

Year	Top 1 Percent	Top 5 Percent
1955/56	7.92	25.15
1959/60	6.73	18.80
1963/64	4.99	14.67
1966/67	6.86	14.40

Source: Calculated by arithmetic interpolation from data in Table 8.

TABLE 10

BLACK TO EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT RATIOS BY SECTOR

1946 - 1970

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1946	78.9	29.1	7.1	10.2	5.3	2.9	0.1	2.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1947	77.2	28.7	6.5	9.4	5.2	2.9	0.2	2.6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1948	70.6	27.0	6.2	6.8	4.8	2.8	0.2	2.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1949	64.6	25.7	6.2	6.5	4.5	2.8	0.2	2.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1950	62.4	24.8	5.3	6.7	4.8	2.6	0.1	2.5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1951	57.5	25.2	5.4	7.6	3.8	2.5	0.1	2.4	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1952	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1953	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1954	67.7	21.8	5.6	6.8	4.4	1.7	0.2	1.8	2.2	4.4	1.6	19.7
1955	68.1	20.3	5.6	6.5	4.4	1.7	0.2	1.7	2.2	4.4	1.5	19.5
1956	66.6	19.9	5.7	6.7	3.9	1.9	0.2	1.7	2.2	4.6	1.6	19.5
1957	61.2	20.1	5.4	6.5	4.2	1.9	0.2	1.7	2.4	3.8	1.6	17.3
1958	60.2	19.5	4.9	6.7	4.1	1.8	0.2	1.7	2.3	3.9	1.8	16.4
1959	55.4	18.5	4.9	6.7	3.8	1.8	0.2	1.7	2.3	3.6	2.1	16.4
1960	54.5	18.7	4.9	6.6	4.3	1.7	0.2	1.7	2.3	3.4	2.3	16.1
1961	54.6	18.0	4.7	6.7	3.9	1.7	0.3	1.7	2.2	3.6	2.5	16.3
1962	54.2	16.5	4.6	6.1	4.3	1.7	0.3	1.6	2.2	3.6	2.5	15.0
1963	56.0	15.5	4.3	5.7	3.4	1.6	0.3	1.6	2.1	3.7	2.2	15.5
1964	60.5	15.1	4.4	5.8	3.4	1.7	0.3	1.5	1.9	3.8	2.3	15.3
1965	60.8	14.7	4.4	5.8	3.4	1.7	0.4	1.5	2.0	3.9	2.2	15.4
1966	59.9	14.5	4.3	5.8	3.4	1.7	0.4	1.5	2.0	3.9	2.3	15.1
1967	60.1	14.6	4.6	5.8	3.3	1.8	0.4	1.5	2.1	3.8	2.3	14.7
1968	60.9	14.4	4.7	6.1	3.4	1.9	0.4	1.5	2.2	3.6	2.3	14.5
1969	57.1	14.6	4.9	6.2	3.3	1.9	0.4	1.5	2.2	3.3	2.3	14.6
1970	59.2	14.7	5.3	5.6	2.9	2.3	0.4	1.6	2.3	3.0	2.3	13.5

Notes:
1. Data for 1946-51 in respect of Government and Public Administration, Education, Health and Other Services are not available in a form sufficiently comparable to data for these sectors for the period 1954-70.
2. Other Services for Africans include Private Domestic Services employees.
3. Data for the period 1946-51 only relate to male African employees.

Sources: Data for 1946-51 are extracted from The National Income and Social Accounts of Southern Rhodesia, 1946-1951, C.S.O., and for 1954-70 from Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury.

INDICATORS:

1. Agriculture and Forestry
2. Mining and Quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Construction
5. Electricity and Water
6. Wholesale and Retail Trades
7. Banking, Finance and Insurance
8. Transport and Communications
9. Government and Public Administration
10. Education
11. Health
12. Other Services.

TABLE II

RATIOS OF EUROPEAN TO BLACK EARNINGS FROM EMPLOYMENT BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

1955 - 1969

Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1955	17.1	13.4	13.0	14.4	16.1	7.2	9.8	10.1	10.5	9.2	10.5	10.2	13.2
1956	18.7	13.5	13.2	12.9	15.0	7.7	9.3	9.7	11.5	8.9	0.4	11.5	13.1
1957	18.1	13.2	11.6	13.3	13.3	8.3	9.3	9.0	10.8	9.3	6.7	11.0	12.8
1958	16.8	13.3	10.8	11.6	13.2	8.4	9.1	8.2	9.3	8.2	7.1	10.0	12.3
1959	19.0	13.4	10.2	11.3	10.3	8.1	8.8	7.8	9.4	7.1	7.2	9.8	12.1
1960	19.3	13.2	9.6	12.1	10.6	7.9	8.4	7.5	9.8	7.4	7.3	9.7	12.0
1961	18.8	13.7	8.9	10.8	10.4	7.7	7.7	6.3	8.9	5.6	6.6	9.0	11.3
1962	18.8	12.8	7.9	10.5	9.7	6.4	6.6	6.2	8.0	5.3	5.5	8.8	10.7
1963	18.4	12.3	7.4	9.1	9.6	6.2	5.7	5.2	8.0	5.2	5.4	8.7	10.4
1964	19.0	11.5	7.0	8.2	9.4	6.0	5.2	4.9	7.6	4.7	5.1	8.3	10.1
1965	19.7	11.5	6.9	8.2	8.9	5.8	4.9	4.7	7.8	4.8	4.3	8.2	10.0
1966	17.9	11.6	6.9	8.5	9.0	5.9	4.5	5.0	7.6	4.6	4.2	8.0	10.0
1967	18.3	11.3	7.0	8.3	8.7	5.7	4.7	5.0	7.7	4.6	4.1	7.8	9.8
1968	17.8	11.3	7.1	7.7	9.0	5.7	4.7	5.0	7.7	4.6	4.0	8.0	9.9
1969	18.1	12.6	7.0	8.6	9.0	5.8	4.7	5.3	7.5	4.9	4.1	8.0	10.0

Note: 'Other Services' data include data pertaining to African private domestic employees.

Source: Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1970.

INDICATORS:

1. Agriculture and Forestry
2. Mining and Quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Construction
5. Electricity and Water
6. Wholesale and Retail Trades
7. Banking, Insurance and Finance
8. Transport and Communication
9. Government and Public Administration
10. Education
11. Health
12. Other Services
13. Total (all Sectors)

SOURCES AND NOTES TO TABLES FOR CHAPTER 2

SOURCES:

(a) Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury 1954-1973.

(b) Southern Rhodesia, The Economic Outlook 1951-1956, Treasury, Oct.1951.

(c) Southern Rhodesia, Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia, February, 1954.

(d) Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1970, C.S.O., 1971.

(e) Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1954-1964, C.S.O., 1965

(f) Southern Rhodesia, National Income and Social Accounts of Southern Rhodesia, 1946-1951, C.S.O.

(g) R.B. Sutcliffe, Stagnation and Inequality in Rhodesia 1946-1968, Bulletin of Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 33, 1, Feb, 1971.

(h) Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Monthly Digest of Statistics, Central African Statistical Office, April, 1954.

(i) H.W. Woodruff, Overseas Economic Surveys: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. H.M.S.O., London, 1954.

(j) J.R.H. Shaul and A.G. Irvine, The National Income of Southern Rhodesia, 1946-1948, South Africa Journal of Economics, 17, 1949.

(k) Central Statistical Office, Revision of Statistics Relating to Africans Employed in the Agricultural Sector, DL/614/15, March, 1972. (mimeo).

(l) W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, Oxford University Press, 1961.

(m) Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1971, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1972.

(n) Rhodesia, National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1965, C.S.O., 1966.

NOTES:

TABLE I

col.(1): The 1946-1951 figures are taken from source(b). The 1952-3 figures are from source(c). The 1954-1970 data are from source(a).

col.(2): The 1950-51 figures are estimates. The 1952-53 figures are taken from source(g).

col.(3): The 1952-53 estimates are interpolated. The 1946-51 data were classified as 'Miscellaneous Income from Property' in source(f). The 1954-64 data are 'Personal Income from Property' from source(e). The 1965-70 data are not strictly comparable with data before 1965 because of a revision of figures. It thus represents 'Imputed Rent for Owner Occupied Dwellings', an item that was formerly incorporated in 'Personal Income from Property' (which is regarded by the C.S.O. as an over-estimate).

col.(4): The 1952-53 figures are estimated by interpolation. Data from 1965-70 represent 'Gross Operating Profit of Unincorporated Enterprise'. These are not strictly comparable with pre 1965 data.

col.(5): Derived by aggregating cols.(2)(3) and (4), dividing by col.(1) and deflating by the Consumer Price Index for European (base 1964 = 100). An index based on 1964 weights is available as far back as 1954 (see Central Statistical Office CT1/2/02, August, 1971). From 1946-1953 the Consumer Price Index for 1949 was used. Hence the abrupt change of weights causes an uneven transition in the income per capita figures between 1953-54. See the short note on deflation procedures accompanying these Notes.

col.(6): Data from source (f). The 1950 figure is provisional and the 1951 figure is an estimate.

col.(7): Source(f) provides a breakdown of these figures. Transfer incomes from Central Govt. include Debt interest, pensions and other income. Transfer income from Local Govt. is entirely debt interest. Transfer income from abroad consists of Insurance Funds, emigrants remittances and others. By comparison with cols.(8),(9),(10),(11) and (12) the figures in col.(7) appear incomplete. Hence they are put in seperate columns. There is no data on comparable items from 1952-1963. An appropriation account of the personal sector is available for 1964 but this is regarded as unreliable by the C.S.O.

cols.(8) to (12): These are from source(d) and fuller notes on the items can be obtained in the 'Explanatory Notes To The Tables', contained therein.

col.(13): For 1946-51 this is a summation of col.(5) and the deflated aggregate of cols.(6) and (7) divided by col.(1). No published data are available for the periods 1952-1964. Data for 1965-70 are obtained in similar manner to data for 1946-51.

TABLE 2

col.(14): Figures for 1954-70 are from source(a). Data prior to 1954 have been obtained by assuming the annual rate of growth of population in this period at 3.2 percent. See also a similar approach adopted in source(g).

col.(15): The rural household sector population is defined as in the C.S.O. definition, viz.,'the total de facto African population less all Africans living in urban areas, all Africans and dependants living on mines, all Africans living on European occupied farming land and all male employees living in tribal areas other than those working for African employers', see Source (c), P.14. Data for 1946-53 are estimated by the author on the basis that the rural household sector proportion of the total African population remained the same in the pre-1954 period as in the 1954-56 period.

Data for 1954-64 are from Table 24 in source(n). Data for 1965-70 are extracted from Table 23 in source (d).

col.(16): Arrived at by deducting col.(15) from col.(14).

col.(17): Data for 1946-51 from source(f). Data for 1952-54 are based on data given in source(1), P.222. The past 1954 data come from source(k).

col.(18): The figures for 1946-51 consist of an aggregation of male employees and female employees. Female figures are available for 1946 and 1951. For 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 estimates have been made. Data for 1952-53 has been derived by interpolation.

col.(19): Derived from the summation of cols. (17) and (18).

col.(20): Derived by subtracting col.(19) from col.(21).

col.(21): Obtained from sources (a),(f) and (1).

TABLE 3

col.(22): For 1946-51 data are from source(f) and for 1952-70 from (a).

col.(23): The 1946-47 figures are estimates derived by multiplying the 1948 average wage by the relevant employment figures for 1946-47. Data for 1948-50 are from P.20 in source(f). Data for 1951-53 are from P.223 in source(1). Post-1954 data are from source(a).

col.(24): Data are taken from source(f) for the period 1948-50. Data for 1946-47 and 1951-53 are estimates. Post-1954 data are from source(a).

col.(25): Derived by adding data in cols.(23) and (24).

col.(26): Derived from cols.(17) and (23).

col.(27): Derived from cols.(18) and (24).

col.(28): Derived from col.(26) as per deflation procedures on the attached note.

col.(29): Derived from col.(27) as per deflation procedures in the attached note.

col.(30): Derived from cols.(22) and (25).

TABLE 4

col.(31): Derived from cols.(22) and (25).

col.(32): Derived from cols.(20) and (31).

col.(33): Derived from col.(32) as per deflation procedure in the attached note.

col.(34): Derived from cols.(16) and (22).

col.(35): Derived from col.(34) as per deflation procedure in the attached note.

TABLE 5

col.(36): The 1946-53 estimates are imputed by multiplying the rural household population by a factor representing the per capita value of rural household production for own consumption. This latter variable includes output 'produced either directly, consumed by the producing household or sold or bartered within the rural household sector including the increase in stocks, own account capital formation and the value of rural household services', see Table 3, source(n). For 1946-53 estimates are based on the average value of estimates for the 1954-61 period in which the average production for own consumption figure varied between ₵16 (1960) and ₵20 (1956). The average (₵18) was taken and used. Data for 1955-59 are from source(n) and for 1960-70 from source(d).

col.(37): Data from 1948-50 are from source(f). The 1947 figure is an estimate. Data from 1951-53 are from source(i). Data for 1954-59 are from source(e) and for 1960-70 from Table 3 in source(m).

col.(38): Derived from adding cols.(36) and (37).

col.(39): Derived from cols.(15) and (38).

col.(40): Derived from col.(39) as per deflation procedure in the attached note.

col.(41): Derived from cols.(15) and (37).

col.(42): Derived from cols.(37) and (38).

TABLE 6

col.(43): Data for 1948-50 from source(f). The 1954-59 data are from source(e) and the post-1959 data are from the September, 1971 edition of source(a).

col.(44): Derived from col.(43) as per deflation procedure in the attached note.

col.(45): Derived from adding together cols.(38),(22) and (43).

col.(46): Derived from cols.(14) and (45).

col.(47): Derived from col.(46) as per deflation procedure in the attached note.

col.(48): Derived from cols.(43) and (45).

col.(49): Derived from cols.(33) and (45).

col.(50): Derived from cols.(13) and (47).

col.(51): Derived from cols.(13) and (39).

TABLES 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 - See bottom of the Tables.

DEFLATION PROCEDURES USED IN THE ANALYSIS

There are no consistent long-term consumer price indices for 1946-71 for both Africans and Europeans, or for rural and urban Africans. Use has therefore had to be made of available price indices to adjust wage and income data for price changes. The adjustment made must therefore be regarded as indicating the approximate order of price change for the income group concerned. All deflated data are expressed in terms of the 1964 price level. In the case of post-1964 data for Africans deflation was based on the African consumer price index. In the case of Europeans deflation was based on the European consumer price index for the period 1954-70. For Africans in the period 1954-64 the European consumer price index has been used as a proxy. Two price indices (found in sources (b) and (c)) are used for the 1946-53 periods. These have been linked up to the European price index (base 1964). No adjustment has been made for any differences in weighting. If the linked 1946-70 series used in this study is compared for the rate of price changes with a 1939-71 index (base 1939), given to the author by the Central Statistical Office (see C.S.O., private communication CPI/2/02), it can be observed that the index used here is a marginally more conservative indicator of price changes. The margin of difference is insignificant, however, and so can be discounted.

THE NATURE AND RELIABILITY OF INCOME DATA USED IN THE TABLES.

The data can best be regarded as having different orders of reliability corresponding to the periods to which the data relate. Data for the period 1946-53 are weak in a number of respects: figures are sometimes incomplete; estimates have had to be made in certain places and certain data are not available to enable a detailed and reliable breakdown of the income structure. Post-1953 data are generally more reliable than pre-1953 data, especially after 1958, since which time there have been revisions to the earnings data for the African employment sector. Comprehensive data on the personal incomes of the European sector are to be found only for the 1965-70 period. Prior to this the data are incomplete.

Europeans earnings from employment can be regarded as a good indicator of earnings in the non-black labour market. European 'Gross Income from Unincorporated Enterprise' for the pre-1964 period includes income in cash and kind accruing to individual employers and persons working on own account, calculated before deduction of depreciation. Income from owner-occupied and rented dwellings and receipts of interest and dividends are excluded. Current losses have been deducted where recorded.

For 1965-70 European Gross Income from Unincorporated Enterprise is reclassified as 'gross operating profit of unincorporated enterprises' and is not strictly comparable with earlier estimates (see source (d) P.41).

Similar comments apply to estimates for Personal Income From Property for the same period, with the effect that pre-1965 figures are probably over-estimates of the real value of 'income from property'. Values for Interest, Dividends, Profits, Rents and other transfers are available for 1965-70 and more detailed information on these items can be found in the Appropriation Account of the Personal Sector in the National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia 1970. The population data for Europeans may be regarded as very reliable. Census enumerations of the European population are regular and comprehensive and any errors can be regarded as marginal.

The estimates for African wages and salaries can be considered to be fairly reliable and comprehensive especially for the post-1958 period. Some increase in coverage has taken place during the period, noticeably between 1961 and 1971. The data for wages and salaries include: (a) all cash wages, salaries, allowances, commissions and bonuses; (b) employers contribution to pension funds, provident funds, holiday funds and medical aid societies; (c) the cash value of all income received in kind (e.g. free rations, housing, etc.).

The estimates for farm and domestic workers' wages can be regarded as less reliable than the wage and salary estimates for the industrial proletariat. A greater portion of the real wages of employees in the two former sectors derive from payments in kind. For instance, in 1971 only 0.6 percent of all employees in the Agriculture and Forestry sector were paid in cash only. The comparable figure for the Private Domestic Services sector was 2.7 percent and for all wage employed persons the figure was 23.4 percent. Since these payments in kind must be imputed the possibility of error in estimation is higher. Indeed, a recent re-appraisal by the Central Statistical Office of the earnings of black employees in the Agriculture and Forestry sector has resulted in a downward revision of previous estimates, while for the Private Domestic Services sector the estimates have been adjusted upwards recently.

Farm and domestic workers' wages and salaries estimates are indicative of real earnings and may be regarded as reasonably reliable subject to the reservation cited earlier except for the fact that: (1) casual labour in agriculture is no longer included in estimates of the total number of black employees; this is however an advantage in indicating the earnings of permanent workers; (2) the number of domestic workers are based on estimates of the Asian, Coloured and White population and this procedure may introduce some slight error into estimates of the size of Domestic Services wages and salaries; (3) employees of blacks in rural areas are not covered in estimates of African wage-earners. This would tend to cause an underestimate of wages since in 1969 some 15,120 Blacks were employees of black farmers (see source(a) September, 1971, P.73).

'Other Income from Unincorporated Enterprise' is a composite figure and cannot be allocated to the rural household sector in toto. However, a significant portion (some 85-90 percent of African income from unincorporated enterprise) is derived in the rural sector.

Estimates of non-rural household African income from unincorporated enterprise probably underestimate the full level of incomes received by African capitalist groups because coverage is not one hundred percent.

The value of rural household sector sales consists of the net selling value at producer prices of that part of primary output sold to the market economy. The price used or valuation is that obtained after deducting transport charges and handling charges as scheduled, but before deducting levies. These data for sales contain a moderate measure of error in estimation. They do not include sales made by rural households which do not go through the marketing authorities or which are 'illegal'.

The most difficult income flow to measure is the value for rural household production for own consumption. Here national accounts data and definitions are used without modification. The value of African consumption from own production of food, fuel and housing equals the value at producer prices of production for own consumption plus the value added by rural household services. Producer prices are the average of scheduled prices to the grower in the principal marketing centres and exclude the cost of carriage and transport to those centres. No definite information is available on rural household production and so assumed, per capita consumption figures for various products are used. These include grains, beans, fruit, vegetables, groundnuts, milk, meat and firewood. In addition, it is assumed that on average one pole and dagga hut per person is built every five years. African rural household services are valued at 25 percent of Africal rural household consumption estimates. It should be noted that the composite figure for rural household incomes does not record total rural welfare levels. The latter measure would at least need to include additional adjustments for receipts of incomes by rural households from the industrial proletariat. No reliable data on a macro-economic scale are available on these (essentially) intra-household urban-rural remittance flows through various micro studies suggest that these cash flows may not be insignificant.

TABLES TO CHAPTER 4

TABLE I

BLACK WORKERS CONTRACTED BY THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN LABOUR SUPPLY COMMISSION

1946 - 1971

Year Ending	Annual Recruitment on 2 year constracts	Annual Contract Labour Supply[3]	Contract Supply as percent of black immigration[4]	Contract Supply as percent of Primary Sector Employees[5]	
				Agric.& Mining[6]	Agric. only[7]
March 1947	334	334			
March 1948	2 000	2 334			
March 1949	2 009	4 009			
March 1950	8 311	10 320			
March 1951	5 358	13 669			
March 1952	9 179	14 537			
March 1953	10 695	19 864			
March 1954	13 405	24 100		8,6	
March 1955	10 817	24 222	21,7	8,5	
Apr.-Dec. 1955	9 581	20 398	21,8	7,2	
Dec. 1956	16 234	25 815	17,9	8,9	
Dec. 1957	12 514	28 748	24,8	10,0	
Dec. 1958	13 541	26 055	24,3	8,4	
Dec. 1959	8 214	21 755	25,3	7,0	
Dec. 1960	6 207	14 421	18,2	4,5	
Dec. 1961	5 705	11 282	16,4	3,5	4,2
Dec. 1962	2 915	7 990	14,9	2,5	2,9
Dec. 1963	5 723	8 638	19,1	2,7	3,1
Dec. 1964	4 831	10 604	26,3	3,2	3,6
Dec. 1965	4 234[1]	9 115	32,6	2,7	3,2
Dec. 1966	3 614[2]	7 848	45,0	2,5	2,9
Dec. 1967	3 183	6 797	41,7	2,1	2,5
Dec. 1968	3 706	6 889	35,6	2,1	2,4
Dec. 1969	3 868	7 574	47,6	2,2	2,5
Dec. 1970	3 520	7 388	56,8	2,1	2,5
Dec. 1971	1 978	5 498	52,4	1,5	1,8

Sources: Calculated from Annual Reports of the Chairman of the Rhodesian Native (African) Labour Supply Commission 1947-71 inclusive; Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury, August, 1972, Table 14 and 5, and March, 1969, Table 11.

Notes: 1. This figure includes 205 workers on one year contracts who have been added in on the basis of being equivalent to 102 two year contract workers.

2. This figure includes 7 one year contract workers who have been added into the figure on the basis of being equivalent to 3 two year contract workers.

3. Calculated on the basis that the total of labour supplied in any year is equivalent to the labour recruited in the year and the labour recruited in the previous year which would be completing the second year of contract.

4. This is adult male immigration as reflected in the Monthly Digest of Statistics, op. cit. Up to and including 1965, the immigration inflows include 'some juveniles who are excluded from ... subsequent years'. Thus the ratios as shown from 1955-1965 should be higher than shown, if only adult males are considered.

5. The 'primary sector' is defined here to include Agriculture and Forestry and Mining, these being the principal sectors to which RNLSC contract workers were assigned.

6. The figures prior to 1953 are not directly comparable with post 1953 data since the latter estimates of employees in the 'primary sector' are based on adjusted estimates, data for which is only available back to 1953.

7. From 1961 the Mining sector no longer took RNLSC recruits and all labour went to the Agricultural sector.

TABLE 2

RHODESIAN AFRICAN LABOUR SUPPLY COMMISSION
CONTRACT LABOUR AND AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT
1958 - 1971

Year	African Employment in European Agriculture		Annual Growth in Agricultural Employment		Contract Labour Supply to Agriculture
	Thousands	Index	Thousands	Percent	Thousands
1958	253,0	100,0			
1959	259,0	102,3	+ 6	+2,3	12 728
1960	270,0	106,7	+11	+4,3	12 210
1961	270,0	106,7	0	0	9 946
1962	272,0	107,5	+ 2	+0,7	5 830
1963	282,0	111,4	+10	+3,6	8 638
1964	293,0	115,8	+11	+3,9	10 604
1965	289,0	114,2	- 4	-1,4	9 114
1966	272,0	107,5	-17	16,2	7 848
1967	271,0	107,1	- 1	-0,3	6 797
1968	282,0	111,4	+11	+4,0	6 809
1969	300,5	118,7	+18,5	+6,5	7 545
1970	290,5	114,8	-10	-3,3	7 308
1971	303,4	119,9	+13,1	+4,4	5 498

Sources: 1. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury, August, 1972.

2. Annual Reports of the Chairman of the Rhodesian African Labour Supply Commission for 1959-71 inclusive.

TABLE 3

RHODESIAN AFRICAN LABOUR SUPPLY COMMISSION

CONTRACT LABOUR WAGE RATES

1947 - 1972

AVERAGE WAGE PER TICKET ON 2 YR. CONTRACTS

Year	At Current Prices Shillings	Index	Year	At Constant 1964 prices Shillings	Index
1947	28,75[1]	100,0	1947	55,1	100,0
1949	33,12[2]	115,2	1948	55,1	92,7
1954	53,12[3]	134,8	1949	55,9	101,4
1958 (a)	65,0		1953	44,0	79,8
(b)	60,0		1954	60,9	125,0
(c)	55,0		1957	63,1	114,5
(d)	50,0		1958(Av.)	64,4	116,8
Av.	56,15[4]	195,2	1962	59,5	107,9
1963	60,05	208,6	1963	62,9	114,1
1972	75,06	260,8	1970	53,4	96,9
			1972	64,8	117,6

Source and Notes :

1. Annual Report of the Chairman of the RNLSC for the year, ended 31st March, 1948.

2. Annual Report of the Chairman of the RNLSC for the year ended 31st March, 1949. This figure is for farm labour. Similar rates applied to mine surface labour. Mine underground labour received 35/- per ticket with an increase of 5/- after 12 tickets.

3. It is believed that this wage rate became operative around 1954. There is no record on this question in the Chairman's Annual Reports. The wage rate structure is referred to in the Annual Report of the Chairman of the RNLSC for the year ended 31st December, 1957. An assumption is also made that the rate of increase over the basic wage rate of 50/- per ticket followed the structure of wage increases set out in the 1949 wage structure. Thus increments of 2/6d. followed the 6th and 12th tickets being completed.

4. The wage rates for grade A, B, C and D class workers are set out in the Annual Report of the Chairman of the RNLSC for the year ended 31st December, 1957. The average is deduced on the basis of the average percentage of workers recruited in each of the four categories for 1959 and 1960. The percentage of recruits by grade, as used in the calculation, was 6, 35, 35 and 24 respectively.

5. This wage rate is referred to in the Annual Report of the Chairman of the RALSC for the year ended 31st December, 1971. It is assumed to have come into effect around 1963. This assumption is based on an interview the author had with the General Manager of the RALSC on November 14, 1972.

6. Annual Report of the Chairman of the RALSC for the year ended December 31, 1971.

7. The data in current prices have been deflated by use of the African Consumer Price Index (base year 1964 = 100) for the period 1962-1972 and by means of the European Consumer Price Index (base year 1964 = 100) for 1954-61. For the period 1947-53 the 1949 consumer index was used, after having been converted to a series linked to the European Consumer Price Index (base 1964). The sources of the indices can be found in Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury August, 1972 and Southern Rhodesia, Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia, February, 1954.

TABLE 4

CONTRACT LABOUR AND AGRICULTURAL WAGE RATES

1963 - 1972
(dollars)

Year	Black Agric. Earnings Current Prices	Black Agric. Earnings Constant 1964 Prices	Black Agric. Wage Rate Constant 1964 Prices	Contract Wage Rate Constant 1964 Prices	Contract Wage Rate Constant 1964 Prices
	Monthly[1]	Monthly[2]	Monthly[3]	Ticket[4]	Monthly[5]
1963	10,17	10,67	6,78	6,29	5,45
1964	10,25	10,25	6,51	6,00	5,20
1965	10,25	10,00	6,35	5,85	5,07
1966	10,33	9,77	6,20	5,68	4,92
1967	10,17	9,49	6,03	5,59	4,85
1968	10,17	9,27	5,86	5,47	4,74
1969	10,17	9,23	5,93	5,45	4,72
1970	10,50	9,34	6,07	5,34	4,63
1971	10,30	8,92	5,65	5,18	4,49
1972	N/A	N/A	N/A	6,42	5,62

Notes:

1. Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., Salisbury, August, 1972, Table 14. The data is the revised assessment of wages and earnings in agriculture according to a C.S.O survey of the agricultural sector. See C.S.O., DL/614/15 (Mimeo).

2. All data given in constant prices have been deflated by means of the African Consumer Price Index (base year 1964 = 100).

3. Data on wage rates for 1969-71 are taken from the only available source, C.S.O., DL/614/15, March, 1972, (Mimeo). The wage rates for 1963-68 have been estimated on the basis that the proportion of 'wages in kind' paid in the 1969-71 period held true for the 1963-68 period as a constant proportion of 26,5 per cent of total earnings.

4. The data on wage rates per ticket are taken from the Annual Reports of the Chairman of the RALOC 1963-71 inclusive. See sources and notes to Table 3.

5. The monthly wage rates of contract workers are estimated on the basis that 4,5 days of each average 30,5 day month are not worked and hence do not qualify for remuneration. The result is that monthly wage rates are 86,7 percent of wage rates per ticket.

TABLE 5

NET COSTS OF RAISC CONTRACT LABOUR

MONTHLY IN DOLLARS

1963 - 1972

Year	Capitation Fee Constant 1964 Prices	Wage and Capitation Costs Constant 1964 Prices	Index of Contract Labour Cost over Agric. Wage Rate	Contract Wage as percent of Agric. Wage Rate
1963	1,36	6,81	100,44	80,4
1964	1,42	6,62	101,68	79,9
1965	1,23	6,30	99,21	79,8
1966	1,28	6,20	100,00	79,3
1967	1,25	6,10	101,16	80,4
1968	1,36	6,10	104,09	80,9
1969	1,30	6,02	101,51	79,5
1970	1,44	6,07	100,00	76,3
1971	1,64	6,13	103,49	79,4
1972	1,67	7,29	N/A	N/A

Sources and Notes: Data derived and calculations made from Table 4.

TABLE 6

CAPITATION COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CONTRACT LABOUR

1946 - 1971

(dollars)

Year Ending	Capitation Fees on 2 yr. Contracts Rebates percent	Net fee current prices	Net fee Constant 1964 prices[3]
March 1947	-	17,3[1]	33,2
March 1948	-	26,0	46,2
March 1949	-	26,0	43,9
March 1950	-	26,0	41,4
March 1951	-	26,0	37,8
March 1952	-	30,0	41,8
March 1953	-	52,0	69,1
March 1954	-	48,0	62,3
March 1955	-	48,0	61,3
Apr./Dec. 1955	-	48,0	61,3
Dec. 1956	-	44,0	53,8
Dec. 1957	-	42,0[2]	49,8
Dec. 1958	-	48,0	55,1
Dec. 1959	-	48,0	53,6
Dec. 1960	-	42,0	45,8
Dec. 1961	-	42,0	44,5
Dec. 1962	-	42,0	43,6
Dec. 1963	20	32,0	32,9
Dec. 1964	15	34,0	34,0
Dec. 1965	25	30,0	29,5
Dec. 1966	20	32,0	30,7
Dec. 1967	20	32,0	30,1
Dec. 1968	11	35,6	32,7
Dec. 1969	12,5	35,0	31,3
Dec. 1970	-	40,0	34,6
Dec. 1971	-	47,0	39,5

Source: Annual Reports of the Chairman of the Rhodesian Native (African) Labour Supply Commission 1946-1971 inclusive.

Notes: 1. In 1946 the capitation fee was £6.10.0 for an 18 month contract. This converts to £17,3 for an equivalent two year contract.

2. The yearly average of two prevailing prices is shown for 1957.

3. The net current price contract fee has been deflated to 1964 prices by use of the European Consumer price index for 1954-1971 (base 1964 = 100).
For 1947-1954 the 1949 consumer price index has been converted to link up with the 1954-1971 series. The result of this adjustment is to make the data for the early period a little weaker than for the later period.

TABLE 7

AGRICULTURAL AND FORESTRY WORKERS

REAL EARNINGS 1948 - 1972

Year	Numbers Thousands	Av. Ann. Current Prices £	Av. Ann. Constant 1964 Prices £	Index of Real Wages Base 1948	Base 1954
1948	156	55,7	99,1	100,0	
1950	177	60,0	95,5	96,3	
1953	200	70,0	93,1	93,9	
1954	218	96,3	125,0		100,0
1958	253	104,3	119,7		95,7
1962	272	111,0	115,4		92,3
1963	282	121,9	125,2		100,1
1967	271	122,5	114,2		91,4
1970	290	126,8	112,8		89,6
1972	338	135,0	113,3		90,7

Sources: Data for the period 1948-50 are taken from Southern Rhodesia, National Income and Social Accounts of Southern Rhodesia, 1946-51, C.S.O., and for the 1951-53 period from W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, O.U.P., 1961, p.223, while post 1954 data are based on Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., September, 1973, in which revised wage data for agricultural workers are given. Current price wage rates have been deflated by use of a linked consumer price index based on price series given in Southern Rhodesia, The Economic Outlook 1951-56, Treasury, October, 1951; Southern Rhodesia, The Economic and Statistical Bulletin of Southern Rhodesia, February, 1954; and Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., September, 1973.

TABLE 8

NATIONAL ORIGIN OF AFRICAN MALE WORKERS

1911 - 1951

Year	Southern Rhodesia	Total Employment
1911	35,933	84,155
1921	52,691	147,316
1926	78,233	171,970
1931	76,184	179,092
1936	107,581	252,482
1941	131,404	299,510
1946	160,932	363,344
1951	241,683	408,455

Source: Pater, Scott, Migrant Labor in Southern Rhodesia, Geographical Review, 44, 1954, Table 1. Original data have been taken from official Southern Rhodesian Census Reports over the period.

TABLE 9

NATIONAL ORIGIN OF AFRICAN WORKERS

1956 - 1969

Year	Rhodesian	Total Employment
1956	300,178	609,953
1961	334,200	612,573
1969	448,744	677,893

Sources:

1. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Report on The Census of Africans in Employment taken on 8th May, 1956, C.A.S.O., 1957.
2. Rhodesia, Final Report on The September, 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., Salisbury, 1965.
3. Rhodesia, 1969 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1973 (mimeo).

TABLE 10

MIGRATION OF FOREIGN AFRICAN MEN

1954 - 1973

Year	Immigrants	Emigrants	Net Migration
1954	111,070	110,500	+ 10,600
1955	110,970	112,000	- 1,800
1956	114,200	116,800	- 2,600
1957	115,700	114,300	+ 1,400
1958	107,000	109,000	- 1,600
1959	86,070	98,500	- 12,400
1960	79,000	85,300	- 6,200
1961	68,690	75,000	- 6,300
1962	53,820	65,200	- 11,400
1963	45,220	51,300	- 6,100
1964	40,370	48,600	- 8,200
1965	26,920	30,300	- 3,380
1966	17,430	33,630	- 16,200
1967	16,200	20,690	- 4,680
1968	19,350	21,910	- 2,560
1969	15,580	18,020	- 2,140
1970	13,000	22,270	- 9,270
1971	10,500	20,250	- 9,750
1972	8,640	16,290	- 7,650
1973	11,310	7,360	+ 3,950

Source: Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1974, Table 5.

Notes: 1. Up to 1965, the table includes juveniles who are excluded from subsequent years.

2. Immigration figures only refer to foreign African men registering at District Commissioners' offices.

TABLES TO CHAPTER 7

TABLE I

DOMESTIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT

1954 - 1971

YEAR	EMPLOYMENT THOUSANDS	AS PERCENT OF BLACK EMPLOYMENT	AS PERCENT OF BLACK NON-AGRIC. EMPLOYMENT	SECTORAL RANKING AS EMPLOYER OF BLACK LABOUR
1954	76.1	13.7	22.6	2
1955	79.2	13.8	22.7	2
1956	85.4	14.2	22.8	2
1957	88.0	14.2	22.3	2
1958	90.9	13.9	22.8	2
1959	92.7	14.1	23.3	2
1960	94.1	14.0	23.5	2
1961	94.6	14.4	24.4	2
1962	94.7	14.6	25.3	2
1963	94.7	14.9	26.8	2
1964	93.7	14.5	26.5	2
1965	94.7	14.5	25.9	2
1966	95.7	14.9	25.9	2
1967	97.8	14.9	25.3	2
1968	102.0	14.7	25.0	2
1969	105.8	14.5	24.6	2
1970	103.4	14.6	23.9	2
1971	114.2	14.6	23.8	2

Sources: Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1972 and March, 1969, Salisbury.

TABLE 2

DOMESTIC WORKERS[1]

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND SEX

1961

Country	Males Adults	Males Juveniles	Females Number	Total	Percent Distribution
Rhodesia	32,120	7,220	9,670	49,010	61.2
Zambia	2,740	210	160	3,110	3.9
Malawi	14,970	570	280	15,820	19.7
Mocambique	9,630	1,750	90	11,470	14.3
Angola	50	20	10	80	0.1
Zaire	10	-	-	10	0.05
Tanzania	70	10	-	80	0.1
Botswana	120	10	230	360	0.4
South Africa	40	-	90	130	0.2
S.W.A.	-	-	-	-	0
Lesotho	-	-	-	-	0
Swaziland	-	-	-	-	0
East Africa	-	-	-	-	0
Not Stated	10			10	0.05
TOTAL	59,760	9,760	10,530	80,000	100
PERCENT	74.6	12.2	13.2	100	-

Source: Rhodesia, Final Report on The September, 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., Salisbury, May, 1965, Table 5.

Note 1: The total covered in this breakdown excludes domestic workers on farms; hence it differs from the sectoral employment figure of 94,600 in Table 1.

TABLE 3

DOMESTIC WORKERS EARNINGS

1955 - 1971

YEAR	AVERAGE EARNINGS CURRENT PRICES	AVERAGE EARNINGS CONSTANT 1964 PRICES[1]	SECTORAL RANKING IN AV. EARNINGS
1955	152	194.1	10
1956	162	190.2	9 - 11
1957	168	199.5	13
1958	176	202.1	12
1959	182	203.3	12
1960	188	205.0	12
1961	196	207.8	12
1962	204	211.8	12
1963	212	217.8	12
1964	220	220.0	12
1965	224	218.5	12
1966	226	213.8	12
1967	234	218.2	12
1968	242	220.6	12
1969	244	221.6	12
1970	256	227.7	12
1971	260	224.5	12

Sources: Rhodesia, Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., August, 1972 and March, 1969, Salisbury.

Note 1: The earnings data have been reduced to constant prices by use of the African consumer price index for the period 1964-1971 and by the European Consumer Price Index for the period 1955-1964.

TABLE 4

DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS

GROWTH RATES

1954 - 1971

	EMPLOYMENT		AVERAGE EARNINGS CURRENT PRICES		AVERAGE EARNINGS CONSTANT 1964 PRICES	
	TOTAL	ANNUAL	TOTAL	ANNUAL	TOTAL	ANNUAL
1954-1971	50.1	2.95	-	-	-	-
1955-1971	-	-	71.1	4.4	15.7	0.93
1954-1963	24.4	2.71	-	-	-	-
1955-1963	-	-	39.5	4.9	12.2	1.53
1964 - 1971	21.9	3.12	18.2	2.6	2.0	0.28

Source: Calculated from data shown in Tables 1 and 3.

TABLE 5

WHITE DOMESTIC HOUSEHOLDS
'MASTERS AND SERVANTS'
INCOME DIFFERENTIALS
1964 PRICES

YEAR	1 $(\frac{Y}{P})^c$	2 $(\frac{W}{P})^b$	3 $(\frac{Y}{P})^c$ / $(\frac{W}{P})^b$	4 $(\frac{Y}{P})^c$ - $(\frac{W}{P})^b$
		d = 2	d = 2	d = 2
1965	1501	72.8	20.6 : 1	1428
66	1486	71.2	20.8 : 1	1415
67	1528	72.7	21.0 : 1	1445
68	1523	73.5	20.7 : 1	1450
69	1601	73.9	21.6 : 1	1520
70	1613	75.9	21.2 : 1	1537

KEY TO INDICATORS

1. European personal income <u>per capita</u> in 1964 prices as given by :

$$(\frac{Y}{P})^e = \frac{We + EGYUE + Qe + X}{A + C + W}$$

where We represents Wages and Salaries, EGYUE is European Gross Income from Unincorporated Enterprise, Qe specifies Personal Income from Property and X is a single variable for a number of income flows including Interest, Dividends and Profits, Rents, Workmen's Compensation Claims and other Transfers from Companies, Central and Local Government and Abroad. The European population (P) consists of Asians (A), Coloureds (C) and Whites (W).

2. Domestic Workers' earnings <u>per capita</u> in 1964 prices assuming two dependants (d) per worker.

3. The ratio of incomes <u>per capita</u> of 'Masters and Servants'.

4. The absolute income gap between 'Masters and Servants'.

Sources: 1. Rhodesia, <u>Monthly Digest of Statistics</u>, August, 1972, C.S.O., Salisbury.
2. Rhodesia, <u>National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia</u>, 1970, C.S.O.

Notes: 1. The assumption of d = 2 is a highly conservative estimate of dependency ratios pertaining to domestic labour.

2. The ratios expressed in col. 3 and the absolute income gap expressed in col. 4 are not strictly related to 'Masters and Servants' since some Europeans do not employ domestic labour. Nonetheless, a high proportion do and hence the <u>average</u> of European incomes may be taken as a good estimator of Masters' incomes.

TABLE 6

WHITE DOMESTIC HOUSEHOLDS

'MASTERS AND SERVANTS'

ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

1965 - 1970

CONSTANT 1964 PRICES

1.	Growth in 'Masters' real per capita income	£ 112
2.	Growth in 'Servants' real per capita income[1]	£ 3.1
3.	Rate of growth of (1) per annum	1.49%
4.	Rate of growth of (2) per annum	0.85%
5.	Growth of income gap between 'Masters & Servants'	£ 109
6.	Ratio of (1)/(2)	36:1
7.	Ratioof (3)/(4)	1.75:1

Source: Calculated from data in Table 5.

Note 1: Assuming (d), the number of dependants per worker, equals two.

TABLE 7

EUROPEAN URBAN BUDGETS
SALISBURY, OCTOBER 1960
INCOME IN DOLLARS MONTHLY
QUINTILE INCOME GROUPS

	1 Under £240	2 £240-£290	3 £290-£330	4 £330-£402	5 £402+	Average
1. Av. Household Income	202.09	265.33	310.32	360.63	486.23	325.12
2. Female Income	5.68	28.09	50.24	64.69	53.36	40.42
3. Domestic Labour Outlays	11.60	17.01	20.14	21.44	38.37	20.72
4. Total Cash Wage Outlays	7.95	12.07	13.55	15.01	22.66	14.25
5. Total Rations Outlays	3.47	4.43	5.92	6.01	9.54	5.87
6. Total Other Outlays	0.26	0.51	0.67	0.42	1.17	0.60
7. Est. No. of Domestic Workers	1.4	1.8	1.7	2.2	2.7	1.70
8. Est. Labour Cost per worker	8.34	9.45	11.84	9.74	12.36	12.18
9. (3)/(1) percent	5.77	6.41	6.49	5.94	6.86	5.83
10. Percent Outlays in Cash	68.1	70.9	67.2	70.0	67.9	68.7
11. (2)/(1) percent	2.81	10.6	16.2	17.9	10.97	12.43
12. (2)/(3) ratio	0.49	1.65	2.49	3.02	1.60	1.95

Source: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Preliminary Report on The Federal European Family Expenditure Survey, October, 1960, C.S.O., August 1961, Table 16 and Appendix Table III p.iv.

TABLE 8

RHODESIA

EUROPEAN URBAN BUDGETS

1960

INCOME IN DOLLARS MONTHLY

QUINTILE INCOME GROUPS

	1 Under £254	2 £254-£310	3 £310-£374	4 £374-£470	5 £470+	Average
1. Av. Gross Income	202.04	278.69	351.98	418.97	621.07	374.61
2. Est. Income Tax	1.71	6.62	19.47	34.63	94.53	24.10
3. Income After Tax	201.13	272.07	332.51	384.34	527.54	352.51
4. Domestic Labour Outlays	15.43	20.33	21.43	25.58	30.82	24.31
5. Female Income	8.06	10.08	51.08	70.14	78.26	45.31
6. No. of Domestic Workers	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.8	2.2	1.4
7. Full Time Domestic Workers	1.0	1.3	1.3	1.5	2.1	1.2
8. Labour Cost per Worker	12.85	13.55	15.30	14.21	17.64	17.36
9. (4)/(1) percent	7.61	7.29	6.08	6.10	6.25	6.48
10. (5)/(1) percent	4.0	3.6	14.5	16.7	12.6	12.1
11. (5)/(3) percent	4.0	3.7	15.4	18.2	14.8	12.8
12. (5)/(4) ratio	0.52	0.49	2.39	2.74	2.02	1.86
13. (7)/(6) percent	83.3	86.6	92.8	83.3	95.5	85.7
14. (5)/(8) percent	0.63	0.74	3.3	4.9	4.4	2.6
15. Percent Wages in kind	26.1	28.9	29.4	26.6	32.7	29.4
16. (8)/(1) percent	6133	4.86	4.35	3.39	2.84	4.63
17. (2)/(1) percent	0.8	2.4	5.5	8.3	15.2	6.4

Source: Rhodesia, Report on The European Family Budget Survey in Rhodesia, 1968, C.S.O., 1970, Table 8 and 11.

TABLE 9

DOMESTIC WORKERS
MONTHLY EARNINGS[1]
1920 - 1950

	1920 Current prices	1950 Current prices	1920-24 Constant 1939 prices	1950 Constant 1939 prices
Cash Wage	24/-	35/2	27/10	21/5
Rations/Food	15/-	24/7	17/4	14/9
Earnings	39/-	59/9	45/3	36/2

Source: 1. Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Southern Rhodesia Cost of Living Committee, 1921. (Chairman E.C. Baxter), p.28.

2. Southern Rhodesia, Report on Southern Rhodesia Family Expenditure Survey, 1950-1951, C.A.S.O., 1952. Tables 40, 41 and 42.

Note 1: Real earnings have been drived by deflating the 1950 data in current prices to 1939 prices as per Index of Consumer Prices 1939-1971 supplied to the author by the Director of Census and Statistics in a personal communication, Ref: C.S.O., CPI/2/02. In the case of the data for 1920 it has been assumed that this data is equivalent to the 1924 level since no deflator for 1920-24 is available. An index of price changes for 1924-1939 has been constructed from the data given in W.J. Barber, The Economy of British Central Africa, Oxford University Press, 1961, Table IV, p.104. Adjustments have been made on the basis of this index.

TABLE 10

RHODESIA

CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION

DOMESTIC LABOUR[1]

JUNE 1971

1971 Prices	(1)	2(a)	2(b)	2(c)	Total
Under £10	870	30 210	1 680	3 360	36 120
£10-£20	1 770	56 650	4 770	4 920	68 100
£20-£30	390	7 470	630	930	9 420
£30-£40	60	510	-	30	600
£40-£50	30	90	-	-	120
£50-£70	-	30	-	-	30
£70 +	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS	3 120	94 960	7 080	9 240	114 400

KEY TO INDICATORS:

1. Employees Paid in Cash Only
2. Employees paid in Cash and supplied with:
   (a) Both free housing and free rations and/or meals
   (b) Free Housing only
   (c) Free rations and/or free meals only

Source: C.S.O., Wage Distribution of African Employees, June, 1971 DL/599/50 (mimeo).

Note 1: The data is drawn from a June, 1971 10 percent sample of employees in the six main urban areas.

TABLE II

RHODESIA

CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION

DOMESTIC LABOUR[1]

1961

1961 Prices	(1)	2(a)	2(b)	2(c)	Total
Under £10	1 450	44 460	1 890	2 910	51 720
£10-£20	1 850	21 990	2 410	950	27 200
£20-£30	110	610	200	50	970
£30-£40	30	50	40	10	130
£40-£50	20	10	10	-	40
£50-£70	-	-	-	-	-
£70 +	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS	3 460	67 120	4 550	3 920	80 060

KEY TO INDICATORS

1. Employees paid in Cash Only
2. Employees paid in Cash and supplied with:
   (a) Both free housing and free rations and/or meals
   (b) Free housing only
   (c) Free rations and/or free meals only

Source: Rhodesia, Final Report on The September 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., May, 1965, Table 8.

Note 1: The data in this table do not include domestic labour employed on farms. Hence the 1961 employment figure shown in Table 1 differs with the total figure for employment shown here.

TABLE 12

HOTEL AND CATERING INDUSTRY

MONTHLY MINIMUM WAGES[1]

1972

Grade	Occupation	Class 1	2	3	4
I	General Duties Hand	25,40	22,20	20,40	18,60
II	Grounds and Garden Hand	26,60	23,40	21,40	19,60
III	Bedroom Hand Waiter	26,00	24,00	21,80	20,20
III	Commis Waiter	27,20	25,20	22,80	21,20
IV	Commis Cook	28,40	26,00	24,00	22,00
IV	Waiter	34,40	31,40	29,20	26,60
V	Junior Section Cook	37,00	33,00	30,80	28,40
VI	Junior Head Waiter	41,80	37,40	35,20	33,80
VII	Senior Section Cook	46,00	41,20	38,80	37,20
VIII	Head Cook	74,00	67,40	61,80	57,20
IX	Head Waiter	77,60	70,80	64,80	60,00

Source: Industrial Agreement (Catering Industry) as in Rhodesia Government Notice No. 604 of 1972.

Note 1: Wage means 'the earnings of an employee but does <u>not</u> include an accommodation allowance or any payment in respect of overtime, service charge, or any bonus, tips or other like benefits'. Class 1 refers to rates applicable to Bulawayo and Salisbury, Class 2 to Fort Victoria, Gwelo, Gatooma, Umtali and Que Que, Class 3 to 14 other smaller towns and Class 4 to places not specified in Classes 1 to 3.

TABLES TO APPENDIX . A

TABLE I

1961 CASH WAGE INTERVALS IN 1971 PRICES

At 1961 Prices	At 1964 Prices	At 1971 Prices
Under £10.00	Under £10.60	Under £12.26
£ 10 - £20	£ 10.60 - £ 21.21	£ 12.26 - £ 24.54
£ 20 - £30	£ 21.21 - £ 31.81	£ 24.54 - £ 36.80
£ 30 - £ 40	£ 31.81 - £ 42.42	£ 36.80 - £ 49.08
£ 40 - £50	£ 42.42 - £ 53.02	£ 49.08 - £ 61.34
£ 50 - £70	£ 53.02 - £ 74.23	£ 61.34 - £ 85.88
£ 70 - £90	£ 74.23 - £ 95.44	£ 85.88 - £110.42
£ 90 - £110	£ 95.44 - £116.44	£110.42 - £134.95
£110 +	£116.44 +	£134.95 +

Source: Calculated from Monthly Digest of Statistics, C.S.O., September, 1971. The 1961-64 conversion is based on the European Consumer Price Index while the 1964-71 conversion is based on the African Consumer Price Index.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF AFRICAN WORKING CLASS CASH WAGE INCOMES BY WAGE INTERVAL

1961 - 1971

INCOME BAND	CASH WAGE GROUP	NO. IN 1961	NO. IN 1971
1	Under £12.26	335,060	311,740
2	£12.26 - £24.54	172,190	176,600
3	£24.54 - £36.80	65,070	115,270
4	£36.80 - £49.08	20,940	61,493
5	£49.08 - £61.34	11,500	27,173
6	£61.34 - £88.83	4,630	19,336
7	£88.83 - £110.42	720	5,362
8	£110.42 +	780	5,356
	TOTALS	610,970	722,410

Source: Rhodesia, Wage Distribution of African Employees, June 1971, C.S.O., DL/599/50, December, 1971, Table I.

Note: 1971 data derived as per methodology in Appendix A.

TABLE 3

SHIFTS IN AFRICAN WORKING CLASS CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION

1961 - 1971

INCOME BAND NO.	LOGARITHMIC GROWTH RATES OF INCOME BANDS PERCENT PER ANNUM	PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME BAND		CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME BAND	
		1961	1971	1961	1971
1	- 0.07	54.8	43.15	54.84	43.15
2	0.25	28.2	24.46	83.02	67.61
3	5.78	10.7	15.96	93.67	83.57
4	11.37	3.4	8.51	97.10	92.08
5	8.87	1.9	3.76	98.99	95.84
6	15.38	0.8	2.68	99.75	98.52
7	22.77	0.1	0.74	99.86	99.26
8	21.26	0.1	0.74	100.00	100.00

Source: Calculated from Table 2.

TABLE 4

DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS CASH WAGE INCOMES

1961 - 1971

INCOME BAND NO.	NO. IN 1961	NO. IN 1971
1	70,576	46,600
2	123,480	96,280
3	62,384	107,340
4	20,317	62,605
5	11,179	24,423
6	4,526	10,732
7	692	2,067
8	749	8,443
TOTALS	293,910	366,570

Source: Calculated from Rhodesia, Final Report of The September 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965 and Wage Distribution of African Employees, June, 1971, C.S.O., DL/599/50, December, 1971, unpublished.

Note: The numbers of income earners in each income band for the Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing and Private Domestic Sectors were subtracted from the corresponding data for the total numbers of employees. The 1971 figures were then adjusted as per Appendix A.

TABLE 5

SHIFTS IN INDUSTRIAL WORKERS CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION

1961 - 1971

INCOME BAND NO.	LOGARITHMIC GROWTH RATES OF INCOME BANDS PERCENT PER ANNUM	PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME BAND		CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY INCOME BAND	
		1961	1971	1961	1971
1	- 4.20	24.01	12.73	24.01	12.73
2	- 2.94	42.01	26.26	66.03	38.99
3	5.49	21.72	29.29	87.25	68.28
4	11.89	6.91	17.08	94.17	85.36
5	8.12	3.80	6.66	97.97	92.02
6	15.27	1.54	5.11	99.51	99.13
7	14.15	0.23	0.56	99.74	97.69
8	27.45	0.25	2.30	100.00	100.00

Source: Calculated from data in Table 4.

TABLE 6

AFRICAN WORKING CLASS WAGES IN CASH AND KIND

1965 - 1970

£ Millions

YEAR	WAGE IN CASH	WAGE IN KIND	TOTAL WAGES	PERCENTAGE IN KIND
1965	139.4	24.2	163.6	14.79
1966	143.4	24.9	168.2	14.80
1967	148.9	25.9	174.8	14.82
1968	161.7	28.1	189.7	14.81
1969	175.5	31.6	207.1	15.23
1970	193.9	32.5	226.4	14.36

Source: Rhodesia, The National Accounts and Balance of Payments of Rhodesia, 1970. C.S.O., Table 20.

TABLE 7

PROPORTION OF WAGES IN CASH IN 1961

BY INCOME BAND

(1961 Prices)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Income Band	Total No. of workers paid in cash only	Total No. of workers	(3)/(4) Percent	No. of Industrial workers paid in cash only	No. of Industrial workers	(5)/(6) Per cent
Under £10	16,430	335,060	4.90	8,979	70,576	22.72
£10 - £20	28,480	172,190	16.51	24,749	123,408	20.04
£20 - £30	14,300	65,070	22.09	14,028	62,384	22.48
£30 - £40	4,690	20,940	22.39	4,520	20,317	22.25
£40 - £50	3,630	11,580	31.34	3,538	11,179	31.64
£50 - £70	1,760	4,630	38.01	1,614	4,526	35.66
£70 - £90	300	720	52.77	483	692	69.80
£90 +	370	700	47.43	305	740	51.47
TOTAL	70,120	610,970	11.48	58,296	293,910	19.83

Source: Calculated from Rhodesia, Final Report of the September, 1961, Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965 and Wage Distribution of African Employees, June, 1971, C.S.O., DL/599/50, Dec., 1971, unpublished.

TABLE 8

PROPORTION OF WAGES IN CASH IN 1971

BY INCOME BAND

(1971 Prices)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Income Band	Total No. of workers paid in cash only	Total No. of workers	(3)/(4) Percent	No. of Industrial workers paid in cash only	No. of Industrial workers	(5)/(6) Per Cent
Under £10	6,850	254,050	2.67	5,850	27,980	20.90
£10 - £20	16,230	168,850	9.64	14,060	59,590	23.59
£20 - £30	48,640	115,040	41.93	47,890	99,800	47.93
£30 - £40	35.840	84,250	42.54	35.620	81,940	43.47
£40 - £50	22,200	45,990	48.44	22,170	45,120	49.14
£50 - £70	21,870	33,140	65.99	21,760	32,440	67.07
£70 - £90	8,150	11,020	83.03	8,930	10,600	84.24
£90 +	8,250	9,270	88.99	8,190	9,100	90.66
TOTAL	169,160	722,410	23.42	164,470	366,570	44.86

Sources: Calculated from Rhodesia, Final Report of The September, 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965 and Wage Distribution of African Employees, June 1971, C.S.O., DL/599/50, Dec. 1971, unpublished.

TABLE 9

DOMESTIC LABOURERS

INTER-TERRITORIAL CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION (CONSTANT 1971 PRICES)

1961 - 1971

GROUP	WAGE BAND	1961		1971	
		NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
1	Under £12.26	51 720	64.6	97 500	85.2
2	£12.26 - £24.54	27 200	33.9	14 170	12.4
3	£24.54 - £36.00	970	1.2	2 490	2.2
4	£36.00 - £49.00	130	0.2	215	0.1
5	£49.00 - £61.34	40	0.1	21	0.1
6	£61.34 +	-		4	0.0
TOTALS		80 060	100.0	114 400	100.0

Source: Rhodesia, Wage Distribution of African Employees, June, 1971, C.S.O., DL/599/50, Dec. 1971; Final Report on The September Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965.

TABLE 10

FARM LABOURERS

INTER-TEMPORAL CASH WAGE DISTRIBUTION (CONSTANT 1971 PRICES)

1961 - 1971

GROUP	WAGE PAID	1961		1971	
		NUMBER	PERCENT	NUMBER	PERCENT
1	Under $12.26	212,767	89.4	204,955	84.6
2	$12.26 - $24.54	21,484	9.0	30,315	12.5
3	$24.54 +	3,645	1.6	6,930	2.9
	TOTALS	237,897	100.0	242,200	100.0

Sources: Rhodesia, Cash Wage Distribution of African Employees, June, 1971, C.S.O., DL/599/50, Dec., 1971; Final Report on The September, 1961 Census of Employees, C.S.O., 1965.