


**DESTRUCTION AND REDEMPTION: THE CONDUCT OF
REVEALED RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
ERA**

Angus Muir

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews**



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
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**Destruction and Redemption: The
Conduct of Revealed Religious Violence in
the Contemporary
Era**

Submitted by Angus Muir

For the Degree of PhD. in International Relations


May 21, 2001



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To my parents,
without whom none of this would have been possible

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Abstract

The final quarter of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a variety of security threats, perhaps the most pernicious and least understood of which has been the rise of religiously motivated violence and terrorism. While a great deal has been written on this phenomenon, much has been in the form of individual case studies and those more inclusive examinations which have been offered deal more with the causes of religious violence and not the underlying processes of justification and operational activity. In cases where such an approach has been attempted these have been conducted in a cursory fashion, presenting generalisations which are not necessarily valid across the entire spectrum of religious violence. The purpose of this thesis is to offer a holistic examination of violence within the three revealed religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) in order to establish common features in the conduct of violence across the faiths and to provide a framework whereby the ideological and operational processes and mechanisms can be understood collectively rather than individually. In the process, a number of commonly accepted generalisations regarding religiously motivated violence will be modified or challenged. The method chosen consists of the identification of a number of key components common to all revealed violent groups, ranging from the formation of an ideology which justifies violence to the tactics that are employed, and these key components are then used to examine the behaviour of three distinct group types. The three group types are represented by ten case studies, chosen to reflect the variety of group types that have existed and continue to exist. The objective is to present a broad framework which will enable a greater understanding of how religiously motivated violence is justified both to internal and external audiences, the manner in which this violence is expressed operationally, and the degree to which the course and trajectory of group violence may be anticipated.

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Chapter I

Introduction

One of the most worrying and in many respects unexpected international security threats to arise in the last quarter of the twentieth century has been the emergence and spread of violence motivated by a religious imperative. Although initially confined to Islam, this phenomenon has quickly expanded to include all the world's major religions and to manifest itself across the globe. The 1979 Iranian Revolution marked the beginning of a wave of Shi'ite and Sunni violence both in the Middle East and beyond that continues to the present. This wave has taken many different forms, from the hostage taking and suicide bombings of Lebanese Shi'ite militants in the 1980s, the sporadic activities of Egyptian Islamic militants in the 1980s and 1990s, the activities of Palestinian Islamic groups in Israel, to the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Jewish militants have also been propelled into violent action, in part as a reaction to Palestinian violence but also in reaction to secular Israeli willingness to trade 'land for peace'. This perceived betrayal has led to activities such as the murder of Palestinians, attempts to destroy the Muslim Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and even the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Even in less politically volatile societies with a longer secular tradition such as the United States, religiously motivated violence has reared its head. An amorphous racial and religious ideology and constellation of 'leaderless resistance' has resulted in attacks on Jews and non-whites and the vilification of the US Federal government leading to events such as the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. In many respects this phenomenon was not an historical novelty. Violence motivated by religion has been a constant feature of human relations throughout recorded history, but its contemporary manifestation has appeared to contradict the dominance of secular ideological forms as a motivating force for violence and in significant geographical regions has supplanted them almost entirely.

While the underlying causes, features and motivations of all religiously motivated violence are essentially the same, the various organisations involved, their objectives and their perception of the social, geographical and political contexts within which they operate have shown a high degree of variation. What is required is a means of identifying and understanding these underlying dimensions within the light of these different group forms and differing perceptions. The purpose of this work is to examine the phenomenon of religious violence and terrorism within the contemporary context in a holistic, rather than a piecemeal, fashion, through the construction of a framework of analysis with which organisations may be classified, their beliefs and activities categorised and understood which as a result may offer to make their future behaviour more predictable.

The process whereby a religious group or community becomes violent is a gradual one. In the contemporary period the move to violence, if it is made at all, has been preceded by a general religious revival in reaction to the perceived gradual failure of existing ideologies and political systems. But why does religious revival necessarily lead to violence in some cases and not in others, and how can this phenomenon be usefully explained across the faiths? Throughout history Judaism, Christianity and Islam have all periodically re-asserted themselves as important alternative social and political ideologies and as motivating forces for violent struggle. These revivals, although their root causes are distinguishable, frequently appear to be random occurrences because they often take secular societies by surprise. However, certain historical trends can be observed with regards both to religious resurgence, the turn to violence and the broad spectrum of intensity and extremity this violence might take. Generally speaking violence plays a part when the religious revival is perceived as a threat to the existing political *status quo*, or a religious community sees itself as being acutely threatened by the existing political *status quo*. In either event the resort to violence is seen as *defensive* in nature which provides a major source of legitimacy for their actions.

Following this it makes sense to ask why there has been a revival of religious violence across all faiths at this particular juncture in history. While detailed evidence for previous revivals may be at times scanty due to the absence of records and documents - particularly the further one travels back in time - this is obviously not the case for recent history and the contemporary period. A pattern of political, economic, social and military

factors influence to one degree or another outbreaks of religious violence. The combination of factors may vary considerably between faiths (and in some cases even within them), and depend on historical circumstance. In cases where conditions, such as economic circumstances and political and social freedoms (particularly freedom of religious expression) are least extreme, or insufficient factors are involved, there may be no turn to violence at all. By the same token in cases where conditions are most extreme and repression effective, the violence may adopt an other-worldly, messianic or apocalyptic dimension. It is certain that all religions contain an important violence-reducing aspect, but they also have an equally important violence producing dimension, which is often brought to the fore in times of crisis.¹

If societies have weathered the storm of outbreaks of religious violence in the past then why is the threat so much more severe in the contemporary period? This is mainly because the tools of modernity (as opposed to the ideological term of 'modernist' with its secularist implications) have expanded enormously both in the capacity to disseminate ideology, combined with the cataclysmic destructive power of weapons. Technology is, however, not the sole determinant of destructive capability. A great deal of destruction and slaughter has been achieved in the past despite comparatively low levels of technology by groups, most notably the Sicarii and related groups that operated in the two Jewish revolts in what was then Judea, the medieval Ismaili sect the Assassins and the Hindu Thugs.² In the contemporary period, the potential for destruction (if not the durability of groups) is far greater, not only because the tools of violence have developed dramatically but also because religious justification for violence provides a sacred sanction removed from existing temporal legal norms and a broad category of almost limitless targets.³

While religious violence with a messianic or apocalyptic programme shares much with more mainstream religious violence, it is different in one major regard. Messianic and

¹ D.C. Rapoport, 'Some General Observations on Religion and Violence', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IV, # 1, 1992, p. 118.

² For an interesting analysis of the destructiveness and durability of 'pre-modern' violent religious groups see D.C. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXXVIII, # 3, 1984.

³ This so called 'open-ended' category includes not only members of other religions but co-religionists who have become apostates. Indeed, the latter category is frequently perceived as the greatest threat and which must be treated in a more ruthless fashion. See D.C. Rapoport, op. cit., pp. 660-664, and B. Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Justified by a Religious Imperative", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. XVIII, # 4, pp. 271-273.

apocalyptic based violence does not envisage political or temporal goals. The major goal is active participation in altering the temporal world to a spiritual one - an event predicted by certain scriptural and prophetic traditions - specifically through the methods of violence. At the same time messianic and apocalyptic beliefs form an integral part of all the three revealed religions - it is simply a matter of emphasis and a certain belief in active participation. The messianic can also accompany the religious-political. The attack on the Grand Mosque in 1979, for instance, involved not only demands for the reversal of Saudi modernisation in favour of a fundamentalist Muslim state, but also the declaration of one Mohammed ibn-Abdullah Qahtani as the long awaited Mahdi or Islamic Messiah.⁴ Even when the proposed actions of a group are purely messianic in nature - such as the plot by the Gush Emunim Underground to blow up the Dome of the Rock - the repercussions will be of the severest political and military kind. As one observer put it "I do not know whether the Messiah will come if the Third Temple is built, but I do know that if the Muslim holy sites are blown up catastrophic results could ensue which may indeed put us one step closer to Armageddon."⁵ In this respect it can be said that there are two principal and integrated religious sources used to justify religious violence: what might be called the 'founding myth' and millenarian or messianic expectations. The former reflects a belief that a return to a community's origins will renew its vitality, while the latter refers to divine promises regarding the future of a religious community.⁶

What lies between these two principal sources is a process whereby violence is justified, rationalised and carried out. All manifestations of religious violence are the by-product of specific political, social, economic and historical circumstances but at the same time they all share certain common characteristics. An understanding of these common features and how they are displayed by different groups promises to provide a more inclusive and predictive framework for understanding the dynamics of religiously motivated violence across the three revealed religions.

⁴ E.F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979*, 1980, p. 888. The timing and location of the declaration were also extremely significant. Shi'ite prophecy claims that the Mahdi will appear at the beginning of the Muslim century (although which one is obscure) - 20 November was the first day of the Islamic year 1400 - 'and his manifestation will be accompanied by fighting in the streets of Mecca'.

⁵ D.C. Rapoport, 'Messianic Sanctions for Terror', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 20, # 2, 1988, p. 195.

⁶ D.C. Rapoport, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements', in *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics, and Militance*, (M.E. Marty & R.S. Appleby, eds.), 1993, p. 447. The term 'founding myth' itself is one borrowed from political theory.

1.1 Chapter Structure

This introductory chapter establishes the need to study the phenomenon of religiously motivated violence within the broader contexts of religious revival and violence inspired by religion generally. This will be followed by a definitional section that will delineate important terms, the meanings of which are frequently assumed - and subsequently misused - in much of the literature on the subject. This will lead to an examination of the theoretical apparatus and methodology employed to examine religious violence and an explanation of where this work fits in. Chapter Two will establish the methodological framework that will be used. The methodology lies in two parts, the first of which is the identification of common features to all violent religious groups forming the core of the framework for analysis, thereby deconstructing the components of violence across the faiths. These will include the formation of group ideology and the justification for violence, the importance of leadership as both a sanctioning force and a command and control mechanism, the importance of the timing and location of acts of violence, the choice of targets, and the tactical programmes that violent religious groups embark upon. Each of these six sections will examine internal typologies and will form the basis for the ensuing chapters. The second part of the methodology is an examination of group type. Three specific group types will be identified and represented by ten case studies and they will then be analysed through the lens of the six common features. The group profiles chosen are not intended to be exhaustive in scope, merely illustrative of the broader phenomenon.

Once these common features have been identified Chapter Three will offer a detailed examination of the formation of an ideological justification for violence. Basic sacred sources such as religious texts and traditions are essential in this respect, but also in their connectivity linking present and historic past. Of central importance is the process of interpretation of these texts and events, in the light of contemporary political, military, social, economic and environmental events which may play the role of fulfilling prophetic traditions. Chapter Four will examine the function of group leadership. The relative influence of each leadership type identified in Chapter Two on the formation of ideology is

critical for the direction of the group, but equally so is the relationship between leadership type and the choice of targets and tactics.

Chapters Five and Six will look at the centrality of the timing and location of violent acts and Chapter Seven the targets against whom they are perpetrated. All three of these issues are heavily influenced by scripture, historical anniversaries, religious festivals and religious tradition. Once again there is an important interpretative element involved in relating religious history and tradition to contemporary circumstances. Chapter Eight will consider the actual tactics chosen and employed to serve a programme of religious violence. In particular the desirability of mass violence, how scriptural interpretation and basic texts can justify such violence, and the practicalities of employing various means will be explored. An important element will be the desirability for the religiously violent of employing unconventional weapons - especially those groups with a messianic or apocalyptic programme.

1.2 Scope and Justification for Scope

While this work will centre around what can be called the three revealed religions religious violence is not confined solely to them. Sikhism, Hinduism⁷ and Theravada Buddhism⁸ have all fostered outbreaks of religious violence in both the past and during the contemporary period. The 1984 Indian army attack on the Golden Mosque in the Punjab in order to quash Sikh extremism, the massacre of Sikhs by Hindus in Delhi following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, and the Sinhalese Buddhist-Tamil ethnic violence which swept Sri Lanka in July 1983 are three of the more salient examples from recent history. What the three revealed religions represent however is a set of common traditions and histories and a confluence of their eschatological traditions.

In common with the revealed religions Theravada Buddhism and Sikhism both contain a strong millenarian element. In Sri Lanka the idea that the millenarian promise (leading to the expulsion of the Tamil community) would be fulfilled in the twenty-five

⁷ For discussions of Sikh and Hindu violence see D. Gold, 'Organised Hinduisms: From Vedic Truth to Hindu Nation' and T.N. Madan, 'The Double-Edged Sword: Fundamentalism and the Sikh Religious Tradition', in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, (M.E. Marty & R.S. Appleby, eds.), 1991.

⁸ Theravada Buddhism is one of the three sub-traditions of Buddhism which developed in India after the death of Buddha in 544 B.C.E. through to the first century C.E. The other two are known as Mahayana and Vajrayana.

hundredth year of the Buddhist era (1956) was established by the fifteenth century.⁹ Tibetan Buddhist theology also contains the concept of the semi-mythical kingdom of Shambhala, the final king of which will emerge from his kingdom at the head of a great army, subdue the forces of evil which have brought about a decline in religious values and institute a golden age.¹⁰ Millenarianism is also important for Sikh fundamentalists. As one observer has commented, "of all the indigenous Religious communities in India, Sikhism possesses the most advanced paradigm of millennial thought and practice...Sikhs have opted to deal with social crises...by invoking the millenarian paradigm."¹¹ However, these ideas, whilst conducive to violence and supported by prophetic visions lack the entrenched and clearly defined messianic and apocalyptic traditions possessed by the three revealed religions.

Moreover, the revealed religions have had an enormous influence on each other throughout the centuries. Christianity may be seen as an heretical off-shoot of Judaism, and Islam was influenced by both Christianity and Judaism. All three religions trace their lineage from Abraham, the first prophet to receive a divine revelation from God. While Jews and Christians trace their descent from Abraham and Sarah through Isaac, Muslims do so through Ishmael, the first son of Abraham and his concubine Hagar.¹² All three share a common belief in God, prophets and revelation.¹³ Similar characters also appear across the religions. In both Shi'ite and Sunni theology the return of Jesus as a messianic prophet precedes the return of the Mahdi or Twelfth Imam.¹⁴ Nor has there been any need to reinterpret the figure of Jesus as a central figure in Western Christian Society in recent Islamic theology. In a speech made by the Ayatollah Khomeini which describes the need to kill the infidel as a basic command of Allah, the Imam opines "Had Jesus - blessed be his soul - been allowed to live a little longer, he too would have acted as Moses did and used

⁹ K. Malaboda, 'Millenialism in Relation to Buddhism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. XII, # 4, 1970, p. 438.

¹⁰ This belief system is found in the Kalacakra cycle of tantras. One early Kalacakra text identifies Islam as the force provoking the apocalypse. See E. Birnbaum, *The Way to Shambhala*, 1980.

¹¹ H. Oberoi, 'Sikh Fundamentalism: Translating History Into Theory', in *Fundamentalisms and the State*, p. 267.

¹² F.E. Peters, *Children of Abraham*, 1982.

¹³ For a useful and accessible comparison of the three religions see F.E. Peters, *Judaism, Christianity and Islam: The Classical Texts and Their Interpretation*, 1990.

¹⁴ A.A. Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism*, pp. 171-172.

the sword.”¹⁵ Jesus is mentioned frequently throughout the Qur’an, although his role is more that of ‘Jesus with a sword’, familiar in the New Testament *Book of Revelations* rather than the ‘suffering servant’ more common to orthodox Christianity. Nor is he the only figure common to both or all three religions - David, Elijah, Abraham and Moses are merely four of the more important examples. The figure of Elijah in both Judaism and Christianity is considered a forerunner of the messianic age. In the Old Testament book of Malachi, after a brief discussion of the fire and slaughter that will precede the arrival of the Messiah, “Elijah the Prophet” will be sent before the Messiah himself.¹⁶ Sometimes messianic outbursts within different religions have been heavily interactive, as exemplified by Islamic and Jewish messianism in nineteenth century Yemen.¹⁷

There are many holy places which Jews and Muslims share such as the city of Jerusalem and other parts of the ‘Holy Land’ are sacred to all three religions. Groups representing all three religious communities have conquered and ruled from the city for explicitly religious reasons (and for varied periods of longevity) over the past three thousand years. Of particular note in Jerusalem is the Dome of the Rock or Temple Mount. The Dome of the Rock is Islam’s third most sacred place, purported to be the site where the prophet Mohammed ascended into heaven by ‘a ladder of light’. The Dome of the Rock is also the site of the First, Second and Third (future) Temples - Judaism’s most sacred site. The rebuilding of the Third Temple is critical to the beginning of the Jewish Messianic age, and also the Christian messianic age.

There are also many intersections of conflict between the religions. The fact that the Jews allowed Christ to be crucified (or as some would have it that the Jews crucified Christ) has had a significant influence on the persecution and demonisation of the Jewish people in Christian communities throughout history, particularly during and since the Middle Ages. Nor did the various Wars of the Crusades and their attendant slaughter enhance Islamic-Christian relations, leaving a lingering and rhetorically emphasised legacy to the present.¹⁸ In the contemporary period, the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the

¹⁵ A. Taheri, *Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism*, 1987, p. 113.

¹⁶ Malachi, 4: 5-6.

¹⁷ B.E. Klorman, ‘Jewish and Muslim Messianism in Yemen’, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXII, 1990, p. 216.

¹⁸ P. Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam*, 1997, pp. 241-242, 283-284, 293-294, 297-298.

displacement of Palestinians and the various Arab-Israeli wars have created new and acute friction between Judaism and Islam that had been latent or suppressed for many centuries due to the diasporas. Indeed, all three traditions provide a precedent for the notion of 'Holy War'. The most prominent and frequently discussed is the Islamic concept of *jihad*. The idea of *jihad* is a complex one, open to interpretation and historically largely misunderstood in the Western world. Most educated Muslims see the Holy War as a moral idea concerned with an individual's internal struggle to be good - what is known as the 'greater jihad': The 'lesser jihad' refers to a Muslim's military obligation to defend the faith. Both ideas have existed for over a thousand years, although which one is stressed at any one point in time depends heavily on historical circumstances.¹⁹ Western scholars such as Rudolph Peters²⁰ and Bernard Lewis²¹ believe the moral interpretation of *jihad* arose after the decline of Muslim political power which followed European imperial expansion.²² Not surprisingly the concept of the moral greater *jihad* has been derided by leaders of violent Islamic groups. This outlook relies on a narrow view of history which believes that Islam was always spread by the sword, and that the defensive nature of *jihad* is a fiction. Abdu Faraj, in his seminal book *The Neglected Duty*, states that without *jihad* Islam cannot prosper and that *jihad* has always meant taking up arms against infidels.²³ This interpretation sees the *jihad* as an obligation to defend and propagate Islam as well as to fight the infidel - the moral, peaceful dimension is rejected as an invention.

While both Judaism and Christianity historically contain concepts of Holy War, they have not been as pervasive as *jihad*, nor have they been re-articulated and revived in modern history. The Christian Crusade and the Jewish *herem* (a religious mandate to exterminate enemy populations and to utterly demolish their possessions)²⁴ are in fact

¹⁹ An interesting contemporary Christian example comes from William Fowler's Church of Jesus Christ Christian in Idaho: "We have two wars we are engaged in. One [is] against the antichrist that rules the world; the other is an internal war within ourselves for the purification of our body and mind". See 'Seek the Inner Man', *End Time Revelation Newsletter* 2, (Oct. 1976), p. 1. See also in the same issue 'Conspiracy to Destroy the Christian West', pp. 1-8.

²⁰ R. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*, 1979.

²¹ B. Lewis, *Islam and the West*, 1993.

²² *TransState Islam*, 'Jihad - Holy War or Moral Rearmament', Vol. I, # 2, 1995, p. 21. It is interesting to note that the initial idea of holy war in Christianity was also moral (esoteric). The writings of Origen (c. 183-253 AD), Augustine (354-430 AD) and Jerome (c. 340-420 AD) viewed the struggle as taking place within the soul of each individual.

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ D.C. Rapoport, 'Some General Observations on Religion and Violence', p. 129.

conceptually different to the Islamic view of holy War. From the very beginning, the Crusade depended on the initiative of the papacy, which in turn helped to strengthen the Church's claim to universal leadership - there was never any real scriptural precedent. While the concept of Crusade can be traced to that of the Judaic herem²⁵, neither concept has been used to fulfil a proselytising function to the same extent as has jihad. The concept of Crusade had effectively exhausted itself by the late middle ages with the decline of Church power and the rise of the secular state, and the herem had already ended as a useful concept much earlier in the time of Saul.²⁶ Indeed, some sociologists argue that the herem was fabricated long after the Jews had become a subjugated people. As Weber notes "The utopian phantasies of their [Judaism's] champions were saturated the more with bloody images of Yahweh's heroic feats the more unmilitary they had become in fact."²⁷ Although there are differences in statistics for all religions, Christianity and Islam historically appear to be more warlike than the 'Eastern' religions, while (perhaps) surprisingly Christianity seems the most warlike.²⁸

There has also been much conflict within religions. While the first century Jewish revolts were primarily anti-Roman in nature, groups such as the Zealots and the Sicarii also targeted Jewish apostates and Roman sympathisers.²⁹ Since then the scope for inter-Judaic violence was lessened considerably by the scattered nature of the Jewish people whose sole unifying feature was their religion itself. In the contemporary period, however, it has reappeared with the establishment of the state of Israel, primarily over disagreements concerning the Israeli-Palestinian peace process - the most significant and dangerous act to date being the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995. In contrast, Christianity has seen much more internal violence. Apart from the Crusades against Islam, there was also much internal crusading to suppress heretical or unorthodox Christian groups in order to consolidate the power of the Church and of the emerging states. During

²⁵ D.C. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', p. 675 (fn. 33). The Islamic *jihad* can also be seen as a distant off-shoot of the *herem*, albeit an almost unrecognisable one.

²⁶ C. Roth, (ed.), *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, Vol. VIII, 1971, p. 345.

²⁷ M. Weber, *Ancient Judaism*, 1952, p. 111.

²⁸ D. Wilkinson, *Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F. Richardson and the Statistical Study of Wars*, 1980, pp. 87-91 & 112. Such statistics, however, cover a broad range of history and are hardly complete. There is also no distinction made between state or sub-state conflict.

²⁹ M. Hengel, *The Zealots: Investigations Into the Jewish Freedom Movement in the Period From Herod I Until 70AD*, 1988.

the latter Middle Ages, millenarian and messianic movements such as the Taborites, Hussites and Anabaptists were brutally suppressed, and later still there were the protracted and bloody 'Wars of Religion'.³⁰ Islamic internal violence has frequently centred around the Sunni-Shi'ite divide, but also, like Christianity, around the suppression of messianic off-shoots such as the tenth and eleventh century Qaramitah, and the Khajarites, Wahhabis and nineteenth century Sudanese Mahdi who accused their co-religionists of apostasy and declared jihad against them.

Accordingly it makes sense to examine the three revealed religions in isolation from others. This by no means implies that an incomplete picture of religious violence will be presented. On the contrary, the three faiths are tied by common historical experiences, historical characters and to a certain extent geography, and the eschatological elements are most firmly represented and expressed within Judaism, Christianity and Islam. These religions share much in the way of theology and historical interaction, and this work will in no way be handicapped by concentrating on them alone.

1.3 Underlying Themes

While this study is complicated by the number of religions and the various subtle differences between many of the groups involved, there are two underlying themes which will run consistently throughout. The first and most important of these will be the dynamic interaction between past and present religious belief systems and expressions of religious violence. The traditions and texts of the three revealed religions have remained fairly constant over time though there may be different degrees of emphasis and interpretation. A first century zealot in Judea, for example, would not have been much different in terms of religious ideology than a member of the Israeli Gush Emunim Underground. Religious tradition, however is constantly evolving and so events in the present which mirror events in the past are seen in the context of the past and also form part of an ongoing religious history. The root causes behind religious violence have also remained fairly constant. The effects of economic hardship, social injustice, tyrannical overlordship, domination by a foreign power and military defeat have been consistent features, not only of resurgences in

³⁰ For more on these groups see N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, 1970.

belief, but also in the religious sanctioning of violence to defend a religious community. Throughout history the three revealed religions have interacted and dialectically influenced each other. This is not only an important consideration when examining them in isolation from others, but also provides important insights into the various common features of violence.

Although much would seem to be consistent through history, certain important things have altered with the passage of time, and herein lies the second theme - the actual influence of the contemporary context. History may contain instructive themes but it does not precisely repeat itself. As mentioned above, the resurgence of religious violence in the contemporary period is more dangerous for reasons of societal complexity and advancement in technologies. New technologies contribute not only to the destructiveness of violence but also to the ability to propagate a religious message, to raise funds and acquire new members and to influence target audiences - both internal and external. But there are other factors which relate closely to prophetic tradition and to previous root causes that are unique to the present. Political events and trends, such as the establishment of the state of Israel, advances in weapons technology, potentially disastrous alterations in the environment with global warming, and the approach of various dates which purportedly have eschatological significance of one sort or another, all combined provide a sense of urgency to prophecy. Others are more tangible such as demographic change, precise events (elections, violent acts and so on) and the day-to-day minutiae of specific environments which nurtures social rebellion. In a secular context what might otherwise appear to be random and unconnected historical events for the religious they form important, interconnected and pivotal moments in history.

1.4 Definitions

Before embarking on any detailed analysis it is vitally important to clearly define and understand the terms which will recur throughout. Fundamentalism, for example, is frequently misused, or used to describe an aspect of religious revival without considering its real meaning. Similarly the precise meanings of messianism, and apocalypticism are often confused, and, of course, these terms mean slightly different things to different religions.

1.4.1 Fundamentalism

While the word fundamentalism is used frequently and indiscriminately to describe certain aspects of religious revival in all religions, the term originated in America in 1920 to describe a 'subspecies' of evangelical Protestantism. The term referred to evangelicals who considered it a religious duty to resist 'modernist' theology and elements of secular culture.³¹ One of the features which most closely defined this fundamentalism was 'organised militancy'. However, it is important to realise that violence and fundamentalism are not synonymous, a point frequently misunderstood by mainstream society. As the twentieth century has progressed, the term fundamentalism has come to be applied to all religions which exhibit certain characteristics. In its most basic form, the term is best understood as a defensive reaction to the perceived disappointments of secularism which affirms "the religious authority of scripture as holistic and absolute...admitting neither criticism nor reduction; expressed through a demand that scripture be publicly recognised and legally enforced."³² In this regard fundamentalism as a system for reclaiming or preserving the efficacy of religious life has much in common with religious revivals of the past. However, it does not merely intend a return to ancient practices or some long lost golden age - although such nostalgia is one of the most salient features of fundamentalist rhetoric. Religious identity renewed can be seen as an absolute way of recreating both the social and political realms which looks to the future more than the past.³³

There are of course objections to such a definition of fundamentalism. The most important of these is that the term is derogatory - it is less descriptive than it is accusatory. As one Muslim scholar puts it, fundamentalism refers to those who hold "an intolerant, self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism."³⁴ This, however, is not so much the fault of the term itself but of the way it is interpreted and used. A second

³¹ G.M. Marsden, 'Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity', in *Encyclopaedia of Religion* (M. Eliade, ed.), Vol. V, pp. 190-197.

³² B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age*, 1989, p. 27.

³³ M.E. Marty, & R.S. Appleby, *Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the Family, and Education*, 1993, p. 3.

³⁴ U. F. Abdallah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, 1983, p.23. Quoted also in B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, p. 96, and M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, 1993, p. 4.

criticism is that fundamentalism is too imprecise a term for comparisons across cultures. Much religious activism in the contemporary world is marked by a rejection of modern Western secularism, and consequently a better term would be 'anti-modernism', a term Bruce Lawrence uses to define fundamentalism as a global phenomenon.³⁵ A third criticism, particularly in relation to Islam, is that the term fundamentalism is too laden with "Christian presuppositions and Western stereotypes."³⁶ A fourth objection is that the term does not carry any political meaning - it suggests that a fundamentalist is motivated solely by religious beliefs rather than issues of societal and global concern. With this in mind Juergensmeyer prefers the term 'religious nationalist'.³⁷ Alternative terminology though can be more confused and less accurate than the almost simplistic 'fundamentalism'. Juergensmeyer once suggested the term 'heretical modernism' because religious activists decry the secular principles contained within modernism.³⁸ Even less appealing is the definition offered by John Stratton Hawley of 'militant anti-modern religious activism', a term he soon abandoned in favour of fundamentalism.³⁹

While these objections are understandable, they stem far more from definitional imprecision than they do from actual meaning. When closely defined the term fundamentalism can be a useful category for examining groups and belief systems which have arisen from religious revivalism. There are several other reasons for retaining the term as a useful concept. Fundamentalism serves to create a distinction between other useful but not fully appropriate words such as 'traditionalism' or 'orthodoxy'. Moreover, after much research the editors of *The Fundamentalisms Project* noted, no other term was found to be "as intelligible or serviceable".⁴⁰ Attempts by various authors to provide distinctive alternatives led to confusion and an acknowledgement that they were describing something similar anyway.⁴¹

³⁵ B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, p. 2.

³⁶ J.L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, 1995, p. 8. Esposito prefers the terms 'Islamic revivalism' or 'Islamic activism'. See also Voll, J.O., 'Renewal and reform in Islamic History: *Tajdid* and *Islah*', in J.L. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, 1983.

³⁷ M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?*, p. 6.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 204, fn. 12.

³⁹ J.S. Hawley, 'Introduction', in *Fundamentalism and Gender*, (J.S. Hawley, ed.), 1994, p. 15.

⁴⁰ M.E. Marty, & R.S. Appleby, 'The Fundamentalism Project: A User's Guide', in *Fundamentalisms Observed*, pp. viii.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, pp. viii-ix.

1.4.2 Messianism

The word messianism is derived from messiah, itself a transliteration of the Hebrew word *Mashiah* ('anointed'), originally denoting a king whose reign began with a ritual anointment. In the Old Testament *Mashiah* is used to describe the actual king of Israel, but in the intertestamental period the term came to mean the 'future king' who was expected to "restore the kingdom of Israel and save the people from all evil."⁴² The term messianism denotes either a movement or system of ideas centred upon the advent of a messiah. Each of the three revealed religions contains a messianic tradition and while these traditions vary between and even within religions, there are certain common characteristics. The greatest problem with these traditions is their imprecision which opens up various possibilities for the identity of the messiah and the circumstances under which he (and it is invariably always a he) will reappear. It is important to note that all three religions have seen numerous claimants to this title through the ages even where a tradition proclaims a specific personality. This situation is inextricably linked to the uncertainty and ambiguity of when, where and how messianic figures are expected to manifest themselves. Messianism and messianic beliefs do not necessarily imply a turn to violence - messianism can be either 'active' or 'passive' in nature.

Most orthodox religious messianism is passive, where the messianic vision is not translated into action because this would constitute a perversion of God's will - God has set a timetable and none but God can hasten or retard the process. The active form calls for mortal participation in order to realise the messianic vision. Even where the messianic advent is fixed at an undisclosed point in time, when a sense of imminence - for whatever reason - takes root in a religious community, many believers find it psychologically difficult to regard any action they might take as unnecessary or irrelevant.⁴³ Active participation can easily be portrayed as a religious duty, as exemplified by the Jewish Gush Emunim, a necessary condition for being one of 'the elect'. It is this active form which combines not only a belief that the day of deliverance is 'imminent', but also a belief that mortal activity can help to precipitate the End-time. When the common features of most

⁴² S.W. Crow, 'Messianism', in *Encyclopaedia of Religion, Vol. IX*, (M. Eliade, ed.), 1987, p. 469.

⁴³ D.C. Rapoport, 'Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror', in *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, (P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart, eds.), 1987, p. 77.

messianic visions, such as a cataclysmic battle and the wholesale slaughter of unbelievers, are considered, it is this second point of human agency which provides scope for violence.

1.4.2.1 Messianism on a state level

Apart from being the province of small groups, messianic expectations can also be manifested on a state level. Three prominent, although historically distant examples, are the German Emperor Frederick II the Sudanese Mahdi and most recently the Ayatollah Khomeini. In thirteenth century Europe, the Emperor Frederick II was regarded as a messianic figure, even after his death. Frederick went a long way to realising the messianic expectations placed upon him when he 'liberated' Jerusalem in 1229 and crowned himself king of the city.⁴⁴ Frederick's conflict with the Vatican was also seen by contemporaries as an enactment of the End-time of *Revelations* with the Pope (or Frederick, depending on which side one was on) identified as the Anti-Christ.⁴⁵ In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad, a charismatic Sudanese cleric declared himself to be the Mahdi and in the space of four years his forces had gained control over most of the Sudan. Ahmad himself died in 1885 shortly after the capture of Khartoum but the Mahdist state was perpetuated by his successor the Khalifa Abdullah until 1898 when it was crushed by an Anglo-Egyptian army.⁴⁶ The best contemporary example of messianic expectations at the state level can be seen in Iran. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appropriated the religious title of Imam (*na'ib al-'Imam* or vicar of the hidden Imam) which not only placed him above all other religious authority, but seemed to suggest that his role was analogous to that of the Mahdi in Shi'ite eschatology.⁴⁷ Although Khomeini never acknowledged such claims he seemed content for his more literal adepts to claim he was a mystical emanation issuing directly from the Mahdi and serving in preparation for the Mahdi's return. It is no surprise that the Hidden Imam's birthday is one of the three great national holidays in Iran, and on these days Khomeini praised the return of the Imam-Mahdi during intense speeches which received wide media coverage.⁴⁸ Messianic expectation is also enshrined in the Iranian political

⁴⁴ N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, p. 111.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p. 111-113.

⁴⁶ See P. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins, Development and Overthrow*, 1958.

⁴⁷ F. Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East*, p. 60.

⁴⁸ E. Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, pp. 194-195.

system. The 5th article of the Iranian constitution, for example, states that it will remain in force until the return of the twelfth Imam.⁴⁹ Messianic expectations woven into the fabric of the state could potentially pose a greater danger to international security than the activities of small and marginalised groups.

1.4.2.2 Judaism

The Jewish vision of a messiah in the intertestamental period⁵⁰ moved away from a mortal agent in the form of a wise and righteous king descended from David to a transcendental figure, divine and at present hidden in heaven. At the end of time, the Messiah will appear to judge the world, the pious will be freed from the wicked and he will rule the world “forever in peace and righteousness.”⁵¹ Because of the nature of the messianic promise, messianism develops and flourishes during periods of frustration and suffering. When the present is satisfactory there is no need for redemption. When it is not, messianism emerges as one of the possible answers, based as it is on God’s promise of an ideal future. In times of stress and crisis, messianic pretenders have appeared, frequently as leaders of revolts. Many of these revolts also had disastrous consequences for the Jewish people. The First Jewish Revolt (65-70 AD) resulted not only in wholesale slaughter but also the destruction of much of Jerusalem and the Second Temple. Similarly the Bar Kokhba Revolt (132-135 AD) resulted in what one historian has described as “the effective destruction of Palestinian Jewry.”⁵²

Throughout Jewish history there has been a tension between two types of messianism: an apocalyptic one with its miraculous and supernatural elements and a more rationalist one.⁵³ The second type was at least in part influenced by the fact that too many messianic outbursts had ended in disaster. The great medieval rabbinical authority Moses

⁴⁹ H. Algar (trans.), *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 1980.

⁵⁰ The period relating to the two centuries between the composition of the last book of the Old Testament (Proverbs) and the first book of the New Testament (Mathew).

⁵¹ S.W. Crow, ‘Messianism’, p. 470

⁵² R.J.Z. Werblowsky, ‘Jewish Messianism’, in *Encyclopaedia of Religion*, Vol. IX, (M. Eliade, ed.), 1987, p. 472.

⁵³ The standard works for early Jewish messianism include J.H. Greenstone, *The Messiah Idea in Jewish History*, 1906; S. Mowinckel, *He That Cometh: The Messianic Concept in the Old Testament and Later Judaism*, (G.W. Anderson, trans.), 1956; G. Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays in Jewish Spirituality*, 1971; J. Klausner, *The Messianic Idea in Israel, From its Beginning to the Completion of the Mishnah*, 1955; R.J.Z. Werblowsky, ‘Messianism in Jewish History’, in *Jewish Society Through the Ages*, (H.H. Ben-Sasson & S. Ettinger, eds.), 1971.

Maimonides (Moshe ben Maimon, 1135/8-1204), held the belief in the advent of a messiah as a basic article of faith but was careful to point out that what scripture said on such matters was obscure, and that time should not be wasted on interpreting or computing the date of the messianic advent. Nonetheless, messianic movements, fired by suffering and persecutions, were a consistent part of Jewish history throughout the Middle Ages. The common fate of Jews through history as a despised and persecuted minority forms a general framework for understanding Jewish messianic outbursts, but it is clearly inadequate for explaining specific messianic movements. In the twentieth century, the ideology of Zionism, while more concerned with issues of civil liberties, equality before the law and the emancipation of the Jewish peoples, still contained a messianic element. Indeed, since the Six Day War, the messianic theme in Israeli politics has become noticeable, partly as a result of the teachings of Abraham Isaac Kook (chief rabbi of Palestine from 1921-1935) and his son Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook. Particularly for the younger Kook and other religious ideologues the events since the foundation of Israel, have a profound eschatological significance. One contemporary religious political movement with a messianic vision is the Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful). Inspired by the writings of the younger Kook and the successes of the 1967 war, the Gush Emunim has played a prominent role in Israeli politics. In fact, it was an associated splinter of this group that launched the most credible attempt to destroy the Dome of the Rock.⁵⁴

1.4.2.3 Christianity

Early Christianity borrowed many of the Jewish ideas about the messiah and applied them directly to Jesus Christ. The word *messiah* itself was translated into Greek as *Christos*. While New Testament Christology borrows much from Jewish Messianism, it adds two new dimensions. Firstly, the identity of the Messiah is actually known. Secondly, while Christ has fulfilled the messianic expectations to a certain extent, he will return at an undisclosed point in the future in order to bring them to their final fulfilment. As with Judaism there have been numerous Christian messianic outbursts throughout history, the

⁵⁴ For an excellent overview of modern Jewish messianism see I.S. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, 1988. For the Gush Underground specifically E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground', in *Inside Terrorist Organisations* (D.C. Rapoport, ed.), 1988.

most bloody and well documented occurring in the later Middle Ages.⁵⁵ Since then Christian messianism has seldom manifested itself in an active way. This has largely been due to the relatively rapid secularisation of most Christian societies and the pervasive belief in passive messianism which has been encouraged by all branches of Christianity. This is understandable in light of the inherent instability even mild active messianic visions can cause - a situation the Church was acutely aware of from at least the eighth century AD. The contemporary period has, however, seen a recurrence of active Christian messianism on a small but significant scale. The most notable of these can be seen in the ideology of the American Christian Identity movement⁵⁶ and also in a number of small cults, some of which may not be entirely Christian in theology but which borrow the ideas of the Second Coming and all the trials and tribulations which this entails. As with contemporary Jewish messianism political events in particular are interpreted to create the necessary sense of imminence.

1.4.2.4 Islam

As with Judaism and Christianity the expectation of a divinely sent figure (known generally as the Mahdi) at the end of time has played an important role in Islam.⁵⁷ Messianic expectations were part of the formation of the original Islamic community and contributed to dividing Islam into two great competing branches, Sunni and Shi'a. The basic features of the 'Mahdi myth' have not altered appreciably since its early appearance. The Mahdi will appear during the period of chaos preceding the end of time. Within the Shi'a faith, the identity of the Mahdi is known. As with Christianity it is the reappearance of a specific personality, in this case Mohammed ibn al-Hasan al-Askari, the twelfth Imam who will return (the *raj'a*) after the great 'occultation' or period of hiding (*ghayba*), a state chosen for the Imam by God.⁵⁸ What is not known is the actual time of his return, although

⁵⁵ See N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, 1970.

⁵⁶ Christian identity is frequently considered more millenarian, apocalyptic and racist than messianic, but the messianic dimension is certainly there. See M. Barkun's *Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement*, 1994, p. 112.

⁵⁷ As Douglas Crow notes in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion* "No comprehensive study of the whole range of Mahdi themes and historical movements exists". Important studies of the Mahdi concept include J. Blichfeldt, *Early Mahdism: Politics and Religion in the Formative Period of Islam*, 1985; H. Lazarus-Yafeh, *Some Religious Aspects of Islam*, 1981, pp. 48-57; and A. Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism*.

⁵⁸ A. Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism*, p. 23.

it is generally accepted that this will occur at the beginning of an Islamic century. Some Sunni Muslim scholars argue that the identity of the Mahdi cannot be known until he actually appears (there is no strong tradition as regards when) and makes his claim, while others limit the function of the Mahdi to Jesus alone. For both branches of Islam, Jesus functions as a prophet who precedes the Mahdi at the end of time. Two of the four fundamental collections of Sunni traditions, those of the Bukhari and Muslim make no mention of the Mahdi and some pre-eminent theologians such as the Twelfth century al-Ghazali omit any reference to the Mahdi when discussing the end.⁵⁹ Of greater significance, there is no mention of the Mahdi in the Qur'an, the basic text which underpins both branches of Islam, although the notion of God's guidance is an established principle.⁶⁰ Most Sunnis, however, accept the general Muslim belief in a renewer or reformer (*mujaddid*) who appears each century in some part of the Muslim world and who acts to renew the faith and strength of the community. There are many historical examples of Mahdi claimants who have sought the destruction of an existing political order through violence, the two most recent being the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmad in late nineteenth century Sudan and Mohammed ibn-Abdullah Qahtani during the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979.⁶¹

1.4.3 Apocalypticism

The fourth term which must be discussed, and which is also frequently misused, is that of apocalypticism. Strictly speaking an apocalypse is a revelation of a mysterious nature, usually explained by a supernatural being which discloses "a transcendent world of supernatural powers and an eschatological scenario that includes the judgement of the dead."⁶² However, before a transcendent world and the judgement of the dead can be realised, a cataclysmic battle between the forces of good and the forces of evil must occur. All messianic traditions envisage some form of violent conflagration in which the relevant deity participates in order for good to ultimately triumph. In this sense the modern

⁵⁹ C.S. Crow, 'Islamic Messianism', p. 479.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 477.

⁶¹ see J. A., Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al-Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXX, # 1, pp. 1-16.

⁶² J.J., Collins, 'Apocalypse', in *Encyclopaedia of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 334.

colloquial use of the word to denote a catastrophic disaster is accurate, although it loses the context of revelation that was essential for the original meaning of the word.⁶³ However, it is the modern usage of the word which will be used here because it is the violent dimension rather than the revelatory one which is the most pertinent.

Apocalypticism then can be seen as a rather violent element of religious messianism which is far more concerned with the actual end of the world than with what will come after. As with messianic belief systems, apocalypticism can have an active or passive expression, and it is apocalyptic belief of both kinds which has flourished independently of the revealed religions (although it is heavily influenced by them) for centuries in the form of what might loosely be called 'doomsday cults'. Nor is apocalypticism an entirely religious phenomenon. Since the early 1970s secular apocalyptic literature has grown out of a naturalistic world view, and is couched in terms of social and political crisis, the threat of a nuclear holocaust, technological breakdown and ecological disaster.⁶⁴ Examples of this secular apocalyptic are also to be found in popular culture. Books such as Hal Lindsay's eschatological thriller *The Late Great Planet Earth*⁶⁵ and movies such as Stephen King's *The Stand*⁶⁶ are based around contemporary interpretations of a final apocalyptic confrontation. These events which have influenced the secular apocalyptic also form an important part of the religious apocalyptic as signs of the impending End-time.

1.5 Theoretical Approach and Methodology

The issue of religious violence and religious terrorism⁶⁷, be it political, messianic or apocalyptic is addressed within a variety of different disciplines. Religious historians,

⁶³ Another term which has passed into common parlance is that of 'Armageddon' used to denote a final cataclysmic battle. The term originally appears as the place where the final battle will occur in the book of *Revelations* (16:16).

⁶⁴ For an interesting discussion of the contemporary secular apocalyptic see Barkun, M., 'Divided apocalypse: Thinking About the End in Contemporary America', *Soundings*, Vol. LXVI, # 3, pp. 257-280.

⁶⁵ 1970.

⁶⁶ 1990. *The Stand*, while it can be regarded as 'secular' in the sense that its appeal was not to a solely religious audience, is nonetheless a contemporary remodelling of the Christian apocalyptic.

⁶⁷ Due to the imprecise meaning of the word terrorism, its pejorative meaning and subjective usage, the term 'violence' will be used throughout this work because it is both more accurate and less contentious. As Walter Laqueur has noted, ten years of study of the term terrorism has yet to result in an explanatory and accepted definition, see A.P Schmid, A. Jongman et al, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature*, 1988, p. 3. The pejorative and subjective nature of the term is reflected

theologians, social and political anthropologists, political and social scientists and journalists all seem to have something to offer. Within the discipline of what may loosely be called international relations, religion itself has occupied an awkward and ill-defined position, frequently identified as an intangible force, and perhaps in the past even an irrelevant one, surpassed by secular ideologies. In particular, classical theorists of international relations have focused exclusively on states as the basic unit and 'elite cultures' as determining ideology in global society.⁶⁸ Religion, however, is vital to an understanding of international relations. At its most basic, it can be seen as the oldest form of social organisation and ideology, and the most deeply rooted in the human psyche. As one commentator puts it, religions can be seen as "among the oldest of the transnationals: Sufi orders, Catholic missionaries...carried word and praxis across vast spaces before those places became nation-states or even states."⁶⁹ It is only at the time of the enlightenment and the ascendance of scientific faith over the religious that religion as an ideology (particularly, but not exclusively, in the 'West') has taken a back seat to secular belief systems. Enlightenment rationalism saw religion as false knowledge, and for the modern enlightenment rationalist religion "involves at best the non-rational, transcendental and 'otherworldly', and at worst the irrational, superstitious and magical."⁷⁰

The resurgence of religion in the past twenty years, particularly its political expression and association with extreme violence, has gone some way to changing this.⁷¹ Frequently, however, manifestations of religious violence are examined in isolation, either within a particular state or geographical area such as the Middle East, or within individual religious faiths. This isolated approach is particularly true of messianic or apocalyptic violence.⁷² Such events and movements are often regarded as ephemeral in the extreme,

by the inability of the United Nations to settle on an agreed definition. For an overview of the word's etymology see B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Ch. 1, 1998.

⁶⁸ See for example E. Luard, *Types of International Society*, 1976; H. Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 1977; A. Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, 1992.

⁶⁹ S.H. Rudolph & J. Piscatori, *Transnational Religion and Fading States*, 1997, p. 1.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 246.

⁷¹ For Example R. S. Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion Violence and Reconciliation*, 2000, D. Johnston and C. Sampson (eds.), *Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft*, 1994, and collections such as M. Juergensmeyer, *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, 1992. More recently S.H. Rudolph and J. Piscatori (eds.), *Transnational Religion*, although this work is notable for its failure to address Judaism.

⁷² For example see E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground', in *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, (D.C. Rapoport ed.), 1988. A notable but brief exception is D.C. Rapoport, 'Messianic Sanctions for Terror', pp. 195-213.

despite their historical track record and the very real political, social, economic and military events of the contemporary period which have done so much to inspire them. Far from being aberrations, there is a definite inner logic to manifestations of religious violence, and identifiable influences which cause such phenomena. It is vitally important to examine in detail the different mechanisms which lead to religious resurgence and in some cases religiously motivated violence. It is also important to examine why different religions in different contexts give rise to the use of violence.

Various theoretical structures have been advanced with regards to why a religious resurgence has occurred in the contemporary period, why some religious movements turn to violence and why others do not, and the role played by messianic, apocalyptic and millenarian belief systems in generating religious violence. But there has been a failure to integrate these various disparate analyses into a coherent whole which incorporates both political religious violence and that which is more transcendental. This link is an important one to make because there is frequently a progression from a revival of belief to active involvement in violence which may involve, or lead to, a transcendental - as opposed to a political - agenda. This progression is by no means consistent nor even complete, but the common elements of scripture and context are always present, especially the selective retrieval of sacred passages to fit a particular contemporary context. Some works of this nature also suffer from an historically narrow focus.⁷³ Although this is essential for a thorough examination of religious violence and its motivations at specific points in time, the issue of how these historical experiences interact with each other and how they are reflected in and influence contemporary events is seldom considered. Historical context is important because previous religious events and authorities, near or distant, are constantly drawn upon to justify violence. It shows that even distant events are as important as contemporary ones in terms of justifying actions.

Similarly examinations of the resurgence of religion, most notably Gilles Keppel's *The Revenge of God*⁷⁴, and Bruce Lawrence's *Defenders of God*⁷⁵, fail to introduce a

⁷³ See for example N. Cohn, *Pursuit of the Millennium*, B. McGinn, *Visions of the End: Apocalyptic Traditions in the Middle Ages*, 1979, J. Blichfeldt, *Early Mahdism*.

⁷⁴ A. Braley trans., 1994.

⁷⁵ 1989.

critical comparative element.⁷⁶ While both works contain case studies on each of the revealed religions, for reasons of space few comparisons are made and the case studies themselves are made in fairly broad strokes and barely touch upon the specific issues of how violence is perceived, justified and orchestrated. Comparison is important in order to determine at what point, if there is a specific 'point', political and transcendental religious violence diverge and what they share in common. This is not to deny the value of these two works, both of which are indispensable for understanding the resurgence of the revealed religions and the role played within them by fundamentalist belief systems. Common themes and causes such as political, economic, social and environmental change are identified by both authors, and many of these will be drawn upon in Chapter Two in order to explain why there has been a religious resurgence in the contemporary period and what form, or forms, it has taken.

An interesting theoretical approach to the issue of why violence is so central to religion is posited by Rene Girard⁷⁷, based around the idea that violent symbols and sacrificial rituals evoke and thus vent violent impulses. This idea is explored by a variety of authors in *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*.⁷⁸ While the editor notes that the various essays do not give definitive proof that Girard's theories are 'intrinsically true or consistently useful', certain problems can be identified with Girard's theory in terms of explaining contemporary manifestations of religious violence. Firstly, there is the identification of the uniqueness of Christianity. The figure of Christ can be seen as ending the cycle of sacrifice by allowing himself to be the victim, "as a result Christianity gives to the world an enduring message of pathos and peace."⁷⁹ Such a statement, however, fits awkwardly with the abundant evidence of violence inspired by Christian theology in the ensuing centuries. Indeed, in *Violence and the Sacred*, Girard concerns himself solely with primitive religious systems and concocts his theory around them. Judeo-Christian texts are

⁷⁶ A similar criticism can be levelled at other works dealing with the resurgence of religion and religious violence such as L. Caplan (ed.), *Studies in Religious Fundamentalism*, 1987, and *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity and Judaism*, R.T. Antoun & M.E. Hegland, eds., 1987. As Lawrence also notes, both these are also handicapped by the difficulty of "trying to make a coherent point in an edited work combining several literary hands and often incompatible methodologies", See *Defenders of God*, p. 249, fn. 19.

⁷⁷ *Violence and the Sacred*, 1977.

⁷⁸ M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), 1992.

⁷⁹ M. Juergensmeyer, 'Editors Introduction: Is Symbolic Violence Related to Real Violence?', in *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, p.4.

not examined within his framework, a task which "must be left to a future study"⁸⁰, nor does he consider Islam, and thus his theoretical framework, while still useful in an abstract form, suffers from a kind of myopia. Other social scientists also share this interest in 'primitives' and attempt to create universalist models which can also be applied to other religious communities.⁸¹ Attempts to do so, however, are frequently unsatisfactory due to the vast differences between 'primitive' and 'civilised' societies.⁸²

Samuel Huntington, while examining the future of international relations as a 'clash of civilisations'⁸³, only touches upon the issue of religion. Religion for him represents one of the six reasons that the eight major civilisations⁸⁴ that he identifies will be prone to conflict in the future. Huntington's perspective is an holistic one in the purist sense as he attempts to explain the future of international relations by examining the 'whole' of which religion represents only one contributing element (albeit frequently a defining one) of any civilisation or culture. By contrast Mark Juergensmeyer places heavy emphasis on religion in his *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*. The central thesis of Juergensmeyer's book is that a new cold war will develop between religious and secular nationalism, noting that "what once appeared to many Westerners as an anomaly and an annoyance is now seen as a global foe."⁸⁵ Drawing on the ideas of Reinhold Neibuhr that there can be no easy accommodation on the ideological level between the secular state which represents reason and the religious state, it is possible to "imagine that the current situation could get far worse."⁸⁶ Again this is an holistic approach which regards political religious activism as most heavily influenced by temporal processes while it pays scant attention to the underlying scriptural basis for religious activism and violence, nor to the interrelationship between the selective use of

⁸⁰ R. Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, p. 309.

⁸¹ Perhaps the first and most influential of these is E. Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, 1915.

⁸² An uncomfortable use of the anthropologist A.F.C. Wallace's 'primitivist' theory appears in W. McLoughlin, *Revivals, Awakenings and Reforms: An Essay on Religion and Social Change in America, 1607-1977*, 1978.

⁸³ S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1996.

⁸⁴ These are: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-American and 'possibly African'.

⁸⁵ M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, 1993, p. 193.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p. 201. See also R. Neibuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 1932.

scripture, current and past political, social and economic events, and the form religious activism and violence take.

One important criticism levelled at many of these recent examinations is the failure to develop a theory to explain phenomena such as religious revival and fundamentalism. Gabriel Ben-Dor sees many studies as simply historical discussions of given cases which make an attempt to find what is common to them after the analysis.⁸⁷ The alternative would be 'real' comparative studies which start with common theoretical framework "for the simultaneous study of comparable cases."⁸⁸ Accordingly, Chapter Two presents a framework with which to examine and compare violent religious groups from different religions and those of the same religion but with different motivations and objectives. The framework consists of common features which can be found in all violent religious groups to one extent or another.

The issue of historical continuity is also important for any theoretical understanding of religious violence of whatever kind. As Martha Crenshaw notes "in linking terrorism to historical setting, it is logical to start by asking how social, political, or economic conditions contribute to its emergence."⁸⁹ At the societal level these broad conditions can manifest themselves in different ways and with varying degrees of importance. Although they can be generalised about, they seldom combine in an identical fashion. The influence of socio-economic hardship and the experience of 'relative deprivation' has been a recurrent feature of outbursts of religious violence throughout the centuries, but it cannot be viewed in isolation and its influence is variable.⁹⁰ At the individual level, these conditions are pivotal in shaping the ideas and aspirations of religious ideologues such as Sheikh Hassan al-Banna and the rabbis Kook. The formation of ideology and decisions to act in a violent fashion are doubtless influenced by broader societal events, but the role of the individual, especially charismatic individuals or those with accepted messianic pretensions, is an essential catalyst.⁹¹ This is even more true of

⁸⁷ For example the 'anecdotal' approach to gathering evidence in Juergensmeyer's excellent *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 2000.

⁸⁸ G. Ben-Dor, 'The Uniqueness of Islamic Fundamentalism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VIII, # 2, 1996, p. 249, fn. 5.

⁸⁹ M. Crenshaw (ed.), *Terrorism in Context*, 1995, p. 13.

⁹⁰ T. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, 1970, p. 24.

⁹¹ R.S. Appleby, *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*, 1997, pp. 7-11.

violent religious groups than of the secular ones which Crenshaw concentrates on because the source of ideology and justification is the immutable (although flexible) word of God.

The theoretical approach put forward in this thesis will be a comparative one along two axes. The first will be to compare differences and similarities in the motivation of, justification for and execution of acts of violence between the revealed religions and also within them. Do events in the political sphere, for example, have the same influence on the turn to violence for all the revealed religions or do different events carry different weights in different cultures? Identifying which similarities are most salient and which differences are most important is an essential step towards creating a framework for understanding religious violence in its entirety. Of obvious significance for such a theoretical structure are issues of how violence is justified by scriptural interpretation, the role played by leadership, charismatic and collective, the identification of targets and the means deemed appropriate for dealing with them, and the issues of when and where violent acts should be perpetrated is collectively important. This framework will be outlined in full detail in Chapter Two. It will also be useful to discuss how these common elements are drawn upon, and can be applied to, 'cult' groups which strictly speaking do not belong firmly to any of the three revealed religions but which nonetheless formulate a hybrid theology based upon selected elements of revealed (and other) belief systems.

The second axis will involve comparing different types of violent religious groups. This will be done employing the framework set out in Chapter Two which identifies various processes and structures common to all violent religious movements.⁹² The purpose of this is to highlight similarities and differences once again in the formation of ideology, underlying motivations and scriptural justification. There are also other issues such as the identification and selection of targets, the accepted level of violence and the tactics employed. While there will be many common features, the defining difference will be the ultimate objective. As Raymond Aron has put it, the essence of social science research (or any research for that matter) is to look for similarities in that which appears different, but also to look for differences in that which appears similar. Consequently, while charismatic leadership is one of the common features identified in the framework,

⁹² This is not dissimilar to the 'group type' and 'leadership type' typologies R.H. Dekmejian sets out for Islamist groups in *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, 1995, (2nd. edn.).

not all forms of such leadership are exactly alike and there is scope for vast differences. The key question, as for all the other elements identified in Chapter Two, will be to understand the process of why this is the case. Whereas a violent mainstream religious group sees a political, temporal goal such as the establishment of a religious state (which may or may not see one of its functions as to proselytise beyond its borders), messianic or apocalyptic groups perceive a spiritual, other-worldly objective. This fundamental difference is far from being clearly defined. However, because the basis for activism, the theology of the religion itself, is the same in both cases, it is simply a matter of differences in emphasis, interpretation and selective retrieval brought about by circumstance. In this respect the issues of interpretation and external influences play a major role, with the aim of creating an overall framework for identifying the mechanisms of extreme religious activism across the faiths. Interpretation and external influences will inevitably vary from case to case, sometimes radically, though some general characteristics will be consistent throughout, such as the need to define an ideological programme, the function of leadership, the identification of target enemies, the type of violence that will be engaged in and when and where violent acts will be conducted.

Methodologically the most appropriate approach for this work is one similar to that employed by Bruce Lawrence. It is true that until the first quarter of this century, the study of religion and religious phenomena was the preserve only of those creedally and professionally committed to it. With the advent of the social (or human) sciences the approach to all studies of religion has altered considerably. The distinction Lawrence draws is between 'social scientific' and 'humanist' approaches, the latter being more useful for his investigation of fundamentalism. In its basic form, the humanist approach prefers textual evidence over empirical observation when examining what he calls 'the human condition', a more appropriate approach considering the historical breadth of this study. For this approach, scripture itself becomes "a crucial, defining element."⁹³ The examination of scripture is also bound with references to the past and the important role played by charismatic mediaries, yet the starting point is the examination of scripture itself, how it is selected, emphasised and used to justify violence.

⁹³ B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, p. 15.

This humanist approach is useful for two reasons. Firstly, the primacy of scripture in the move towards and conduct of religious violence cannot be denied. Secondly, scripture for all the revealed religions is an important historical constant. Alongside the selective reading of scripture is the 'partial loyalty' to the past and a highly selective vision of its importance - not all points in time, characters and events are drawn upon with equal passion, and not all come to the fore at particular times of crisis.⁹⁴ For example, when a Jewish settler murdered twenty-nine people in February 1994, the significant site was the Ibrahim (Abraham's) Mosque on the day of the second Muslim sabbath during Islam's holy month of Ramadan. By contrast the attempted bombing of the Al-Aqsa mosque on the Temple Mount by the Jewish Gush Emunim 'Underground', was to involve the destruction of a Muslim shrine to enable the Third Temple to be built and thus a new messianic age to begin.

Scripture does change during the formative period of any religion, and it is always open to varying interpretations and degrees of emphasis. The *Book of Revelations* in the New Testament, the most apocalyptic of all in Christianity is at least in part what can be described as *vaticinium ex eventu* - history described as prophecy. Written during the first century AD, the book itself contained strong anti-Roman inferences which became increasingly embarrassing to Christians living within the empire and was subsequently condemned from the third to the sixth centuries. Subsequently it has become the foremost Christian apocalyptic book, introducing as it does the ideas of a final battle, Antichrist, and the thousand year reign of Christ and the saints. A similar process occurs in Judaism and Islam where historical circumstance and events alter the meaning or emphasis of scripture. These interpretations and emphases are closely related to the political, social, economic and contextual circumstances of any particular age, but the point of origin, that of scripture, remains the same. As Lawrence puts it "religious ideology arises out of scripture...[and] religious ideology is textually based before it is contextually elaborated and enacted."⁹⁵ This does not mean that political and social events and historical context are unimportant. On the contrary, they are pivotal, for it is these factors which help define

⁹⁴ *ibid.*

⁹⁵ B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, p. 15.

and direct scriptural interpretation. But without the scripture, the motivation and justification is lost.

What remains to be done - once the reasoning and processes which underlie religious resurgence are identified - is to examine the relationship between groups motivated by religious messianic imperatives and those which have more specifically political goals in mind. Scriptural eschatology forms part of both group type cosmologies and by developing a framework which encompasses both group types and their common features, more light will be thrown on the subject of religious violence and religious terrorism as a whole.

The most important contribution this study proposes to make is a fuller understanding of the similarities and differences between and within the revealed religions and to place the messianic and apocalyptic imperative firmly within what is broadly examined as religious violence. While there are distinctions between what might be called 'political religious violence' and 'spiritual religious violence' there is a definite overlap between them. Consequently the analytical structure for this work identifies features which are common to most, if not all, violent religious groups across the revealed religions so that that they may be usefully compared, better understood and more easily identified. An important part of this structure is that it will allow for an understanding of why a violent religious group might shift its emphasis in terms of theological justification, choice of targets, timing of acts and choice of means in particular.

While the historical dimension is identified in the existing literature, it is important to look to the future in terms of preventing such violence. Previous historical manifestations can tell us a great deal about motivations and objectives, but the exact nature of the critical influences on activism can only be revealed with the passage of time. While the general area of socio-economic hardship or political events, for example, may be consistent, what exactly these are during any age - particularly their correlation to End-time prophecy - is of vital importance not only for understanding events with the benefit of hindsight, but also for predicting them in the first place. The fact that messianic and apocalyptic groups in particular are often not identified by government agencies as a serious threat until it is too late - despite what would seem to be obvious signs - is

indicative of the low priority given to examining and understanding these organisations outside the scholarly world.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ While the reasons are very different and the choices may seem eclectic, the Gush Emunim Underground and the Aum Shinrikyo cult are two excellent examples in this regard.

Chapter II

Framework of Analysis

Having examined the historical context and fundamental dynamics which lie behind the religious resurgence and the turn to religiously motivated violence it is critical to examine the mechanisms and prominent features which broadly define and regulate the conduct of sub-state religious violence in the contemporary period. These features have been identified by examining the phenomenon of religious violence generally, and the primary and secondary material on ten case studies specifically. The ensuing framework of analysis has been designed to bridge the gap between the broader phenomenon of religious resurgence and group specific analyses, and also to challenge some of the assumptions within the existing orthodoxy on sub-state religious violence. The framework is both instrumental and organisational in structure¹: instrumental in the sense that it addresses the need for a violent group to justify and conduct a deliberate programme of violence, and organisational in the sense that such groups come in a variety of different forms which in turn influences the course of violence. The instrumental dimension consists of six fundamental common elements in the conduct of all religious violence: the formation of an ideology derived from a religious system which justifies the need for violence and its purpose; the role leadership plays in both the formation of this ideology and the conduct of operations; the importance of the timing of violence at both the symbolic and practical levels; the importance of the location of violent acts on the symbolic and practical levels; the targets selected by the groups; and the tactics employed in the pursuit of group objectives. The organisational dimension adopts a categorisation of contemporary violent religious groups into three types. The conduct of these groups is then examined through the lenses of the six instrumental elements. Such a framework enables similarities and differences to be identified both between and within the three revealed religions and also

¹ M. Crenshaw, 'Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational Approaches', in D.C. Rapoport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, 1990.

between different group types. The primary objective is to create a comparative framework (as opposed to a case study approach) for examining the whole phenomenon of religious violence where previously one has not existed, whereby each case may be observed as a part of the whole or in isolation.

Instrumental theories are based on the assumption that violence is "a deliberate choice by a political actor"², where both an extremist group and their adversaries are engaged in a struggle where each attempts to influence the behaviour of the other. In this respect extremist group violence may be seen as a form of coercion based on the capacity of the 'weak' to hurt, rather than overcome through superior military force.³ While most instrumental paradigms have been developed based on secular groups, the basic idea that extremist groups are calculating holds equally true for most religious groups. It is valid, for instance, that few organisations actually attain their long term objectives, that targets are symbolically related to a group's ideological beliefs and that some groups are unwilling to commit acts of violence which might alienate a potential constituency.⁴ The actions of all religious groups cannot, however, be described in terms of calculation, and deviations from a kind of cost benefit approach cannot simply be dismissed as 'miscalculations'.⁵ In the case of religious groups their very perception of the world they live in is often fundamentally different to secular groups from the outset and calculations of action and influence must therefore in many cases be different also. It is therefore important to offer an analysis of the foundations of religious ideological beliefs which are interpreted and used to justify the conduct of violence. In terms of organisational theory, the framework set out below concentrates on leadership and group type rather than sociological and psychological approaches to membership and group dynamics. This approach has been adopted primarily because leadership has by far the greatest influence on the formation of

² *ibid.* p. 13.

³ T.C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 1966, Ch. 1.

⁴ M. Crenshaw, 'Theories of Terrorism', p. 15. Crenshaw adds "On the other hand, organisations which have no desire of an earthly constituency and possess the necessary resources, *such as the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini* (italics added), are unlikely to practice moderation". Such a broad generalisation is singularly uninformative and in the case of Hizballah, incorrect.

⁵ See M. Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice', in W. Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, 1990.

group ideology and the formulation of strategy, and because a detailed examination of group members and group dynamics is beyond the scope of this study.⁶

2.1 Critical Literature Review

As noted in Chapter One, a great wealth of information exists on the subjects of the resurgence of religion and religiously motivated violence. The material which deals with the second area may be divided into two types: those of a holistic variety; and those which concentrate on particular case studies. Works which concern themselves with religious resurgence and religious violence as a whole tend to dwell on the macro considerations of the influence religion plays on politics and society as a whole, and do not generally concentrate on the micro considerations of the actual conduct of violence itself. What is missing is a micro analysis of the justification and conduct of violence itself as it applies to the revealed religions generally, identifying common features and processes and thus filling an analytical gap in the study of religiously motivated violence.

One of the most influential attempts at a systematic, theoretical explanation of the link between violence and religion was offered by Rene Girard in his *Violence and the Sacred*. Girard stresses the fact that the original rite of primitive religion was the sacrifice (what he refers to as "collective murder") and that religion begins as an attempt to cope with limiting 'reciprocal' violence within a community and ultimately to externalise it.⁷ Girard's ideas deal with the broad issues of why religion gives rise to violence, but he does not examine the processes whereby religious violence is conducted in the contemporary era.⁸ By contrast Mark Juergensmeyer⁹ has examined religious violence as an extreme reaction to the primacy of the secular state, identifying religious ideologies as a form of nationalism.¹⁰ The strength of this work is the creation of an overview of the place religious violence occupies in modern international society. However, the major weakness

⁶ There is also the issue of ambiguity when discussing the value of psychological analyses. See A. Schmid & A. Jongman et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature*, 1988, 87-98.

⁷ R. Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, 1977, pp. 55 & 92.

⁸ For an examination of the applicability of Girard's ideas to contemporary cases see M. Juergensmeyer, *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, 1992.

⁹ M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?: Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State*, 1993.

¹⁰ The two forms of religious nationalism are ethnic and ideological. See M. Juergensmeyer, 'The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. L, # 1, 1996.

is that basic processes whereby violence is justified, rationalised and conducted are not examined in a systematic, theoretical fashion applicable to a group of religions.¹¹

An even greater quantity of information is available in the form of case studies. An excellent example are the various studies contained within the Fundamentalisms Project¹² and many others which deal either with specific groups¹³, a specific religion¹⁴ or with a specific scriptural motivation.¹⁵ Specific case studies have the advantage of a narrow focus thus allowing for the development of in depth knowledge through rigorous qualitative analysis.¹⁶ The only draw back arises from their examination in isolation from other groups, religions or motivations. A far more beneficial approach to understanding religious violence as a whole would be a comparative study involving specific case studies. As David Rapoport has noted "the monographs on particular religious movements...are often excellent...But the gap between the specific analyses and the effort to integrate with the terrorist experience in general is enormous."¹⁷ Comparative studies have been conducted before such as David Rapoport's contribution to the Fundamentalism's Project, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Groups', yet this approach is not used in conjunction with a series of clearly defined case studies, and is conducted within the context of state type.¹⁸ It is these extant case studies which can be drawn upon collectively to compose a theoretical framework for examining extremist groups from a variety of religions and within a variety of contexts.

If it can be said that a framework for examining the conduct of religious violence already exists, it is in the form of what might be called trend analysis. The chief exponent

¹¹ A similar criticism may be made of Juergensmeyer's later *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, 2000.

¹² Especially Volume III, *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics and Militance*, 1993.

¹³ E. Sprinzak, 'Kach and Meir Kahane: The Rise of Jewish Quasi-Fascism', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 19, # 4-5, 1985; K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 1990; and M. Ranstorp, *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, 1997.

¹⁴ E. Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, 1991; J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, 1990; and R.H. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, 1995.

¹⁵ D. C. Rapoport, 'Why Does Messianism Produce Terror?', in P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, 1987.

¹⁶ H. Eckstein, 'Case Study Theory in Political Science', in F.I Greenstein & N.W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, 1975, p. 122.

¹⁷ D.C. Rapoport, *Perceptions and Misperceptions of Religious Terror*, 2000, fn. 2.

¹⁸ D.C. Rapoport, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups', in *Fundamentalisms and the State*.

of this trend analysis approach in contemporary literature is Bruce Hoffman. When examining the phenomenon of religious violence Hoffman makes a series of primary assumptions, some valid and others inapplicable to the majority of religious groups. First amongst these is that religious groups regard violence as a 'sacramental act' and because of its transcendental character "its perpetrators are consequently unconstrained by political, moral or practical constraints."¹⁹ Even at a cursory glance constraints, however, do exist at all these levels. Politically, most groups are constrained by a basic need to survive²⁰ and a need not to isolate the broader community from which they have arisen - as Ranstorp notes almost all contemporary religious groups are offshoots of broader movements which are not necessarily exclusively violent, and they are not only constrained but driven by "[p]ractical political considerations."²¹ The absence of moral restraints is a valid feature also identified by Ranstorp²² and Rapoport²³, however this 'absence' is frequently guided by principles of proportionality, and are tempered by those tactics of a practical and political nature.²⁴ The practical constraints faced by religious groups are similar to those experienced by secular organisations. In fact, there are the obvious constraints imposed by religious legal systems and their enforcement mechanisms.

Secondly, Hoffman states that unlike secular terrorists, religious groups "seek to appeal to no other constituency than themselves" and so the constraints imposed by a constituency do not exist.²⁵ Many groups, however, do have a constituency to appeal to, arising as they do not from a vacuum but from a larger community and, in most cases, "[r]epresent growing masses of supporters [who] exemplify currents of thinking that have risen to counter the prevailing modernism."²⁶ The proclivity for some groups to engage in social welfare activities creating a web of cultural, educational and social grassroots

¹⁹ B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 1998, p. 94.

²⁰ As Graham Fuller has noted of Islamist groups a primary tactical requirement is surviving in the face of a hostile enemy, an argument easily extended to Jewish and Christian groups: 'Islamism(s) in the Next Century' in M. Kramer (ed.), *The Islamism Debate*, 1997, p. 141.

²¹ M. Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. L, # 1, 1996, p. 48 & 44.

²² *ibid.*, p. 54-55.

²³ D. Rapoport, 'Messianic Sanctions for Terror', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. XX, # 2, 1988, pp. 204-205.

²⁴ Modern expressions of proportionality have as their biblical root *Lex Talionis* (the law of exact retaliation). Examples of this in the Old Testament such as Exodus 21: 22-25 and Deuteronomy 19: 19-21 have as their likely root the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686 BC).

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 95.

²⁶ M. Juergensmeyer, 'The Worldwide Rise of Religious Nationalism', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. L, # 1, 1996, p. 3.

networks, or even to participate in mainstream politics are instructive. Equally is the perception by all religious groups that they are conducting a primarily *defensive* war in order to preserve a culture and community of believers that are perceived to be or actually are under threat. It is certainly true that the desire of some messianic and apocalyptic groups, such as the Saudi *Ikhwan* or the Jewish Underground, for an imminent end to temporal history alienates them even from their parent community, but these groups merely represent the marginal fringe of religiously motivated groups. However, conversely it is important to note that historically messianic and apocalyptic groups have had significant constituencies, a point illustrated in the contemporary era by the relatively large²⁷, and international character, of Aum Shinrikyo's membership.²⁸

The third assumption made by Hoffman and related to the absence of a constituency, is the "sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a virtually open-ended category of targets."²⁹ This is a sanctioning which is seldom adhered to in reality due to the political, moral and practical constraints enumerated above. It is certainly true of the rhetoric of 'cosmic war' that broad categories of enemies are identified in the form of whole societies such as Israel, America and the West, or forms of society such as the 'secular'. Yet in most instances it does not coincide with the tactical realities which confront all groups (whether they choose to acknowledge them or not). The identity of the enemy in real terms is dependent on the nature of the crisis which threatens a particular religious community and is further shaped by issues of political repression (past and present), political, economic and social inequality, and also by inter-communal conflict.³⁰ The rhetorical dimension serves to convey and to reinforce the totality of the struggle, and except in the case of apocalyptic groups 'open-ended' categories (that is all who are not within the group) are seldom actively engaged.

²⁷ See D. Rapoport, 'Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXXVIII, 1984, pp. 658-677, and N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, Temple Smith, London, 1970.

²⁸ At the organisation's peak Aum was estimated to have 10,000 Japanese members, between 20,000 and 30,000 members in Russia and a further 10,000-15,000 members in six other countries.

²⁹ B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 95. It should be noted that an earlier rendition of these ideas (since modified) stated that "[w]here the secular terrorist sees violence primarily as a means to an end, the religious terrorist tends to view violence as an end in itself", B. Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. XVIII, pp. 271-284.

³⁰ M. Ranstorp, 'Terrorism in the Name of Religion', p. 57.

This critique is far from saying these assumptions are of no utility but rather that they are only true in part while too general to be valid across the spectrum of violent religious groups. Other assumptions are absolutely valid such as the pivotal role of clerical sanction and the deliberate use of dehumanising rhetoric.³¹ The problem here is two-fold. Some assumptions may be true for a certain type of group and not for others, so there is a missing analytical dimension at the group level. The second problem is that there exists a gap between the rhetoric of religious groups and the action they actually take primarily because there are always constraints of one form or another. The mechanisms and processes which moderate the size of this gap are extremely complex and multi-dimensional, and because these assumptions are not contextualised their applicability over the broad range of revealed religious violence is questionable. The framework which is described below is intended to resolve these problems by examining in detail some common, crucial facets of religious violence and how these apply to three distinctly different group types, while in the process it attempts to answer the basic questions of who are these groups, what exactly are their objectives and how do they go about achieving them.

2.2 Framework of Analysis

The six common features selected for this analysis are the ideological justification for violence, the leadership type, the attitude of the groups towards the timing and location of violence, the tactics employed and the targets selected. Each of these six elements will in turn have distinct sub-types, the importance of which lies primarily in examining shifts in attitudes and values within these dynamic social organisms. These particular components have been selected because they cover a spectrum which ranges from the interpretation and reformulation of traditional ideas into a contemporary, functional, militant ideology through the instrumental and operational considerations which define religious violence.

The first element, justification, reflects the reality that the ultimate objectives of religious violence, be they temporal, spiritual, or any combination of the two, must first be rationalised and sanctioned by the formation of an ideological programme. This

³¹ B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 94 & 95.

rationalisation must also take place within a specific temporal context which will govern a group's overall strategy. Such an ideology is primarily derived from religious scripture and tradition, frequently a selective process and one which is profoundly influenced by the relationship between religious systems and contemporary events. The second area to be examined is the role of leadership. Leadership is important not only for planning and sanctioning violence but also in the formulation of group ideology and strategy. In extreme cases, charismatic leadership can assume messianic dimensions where the instructions of the leader are regarded not only as being sanctified but often are seen as divine. Together the first two elements constitute the 'why' of religious violence in the form of rhetorical justification and decision making based on this rhetoric. The timing and location of violence, representing the 'when' and the 'where', are the next to be considered. Once again these elements are dictated by a combination of religious tradition and political circumstance. Certain places and dates have long been regarded as sacred for long-standing religious reasons while others achieve prominence through the influence and medium of more recent historical events. The final two elements are the tactics employed by the group to achieve their objectives and the targets that are selected.

The identification of these six elements themselves, however, tells us only so much about the groups themselves, and little about their objectives and their structures, and the propensity for a group to engage in violent activity. In order to enhance this examination, all the six elements of religious violence will be used to examine three different group types across the three faiths: mainstream, core and messianic/apocalyptic. In order to provide a meaningful cross section of groups ten primary case studies have been selected - Aryan Nations, Kach, Hizballah, Hamas³², Eyal, The Order, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)³³, the Jewish Underground, Aum Shinrikyo³⁴ and the Saudi Ikhwan. These groups have been chosen primarily because they represent a cross section of violent religious groups from the revealed religions active since 1979. Some are progenitors such as Hizballah while others are radical splinter groups such as the Order. Equally they also

³² Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or Islamic resistance movement. The acronym means literally 'zeal' or 'enthusiasm'.

³³ Sometimes referred to as the Movement for Islamic Jihad, MIJ.

³⁴ While the theology of Aum Shinrikyo is of the composite variety the messianic and apocalyptic themes are distinctly Christian. Other parts of the group's belief system, especially those drawn from the 'Cultic Milieu', are common to many (primarily Christian) sects and cults.

represent a cross section of different ideological emphases, group structures, size, tactical orientations, objectives and national milieus. Two prominent Islamic groups have been selected for the mainstream category because one is Shi'ite and the other Sunni, a dichotomy not as apparent in the core or messianic categories, and one which has a bearing on the conduct of mainstream Islamic organisations. Some of these groups are defunct but the majority are extant and all of them are prominent - in the past and for the extant groups for the future. Furthermore, these groups have engaged in violent activity at different levels of persistence, intensity, sophistication and success for vastly different periods of time. Despite these differences they are unified by the fact that all derive their belief systems and justifications from interpretations of scripture and religious lore within their own socio-political context.³⁵ The purpose of such a selection therefore is not to be absolutely exhaustive in each analysis, but illustrative, offering a large number of studies across a range of denominations and contexts to demonstrate both the varied forms religious violence may take and to stress the commonalities both within and between religions. Such a categorisation combined with the six common features will allow an observer to determine more clearly the propensity for a group to engage in violence and the form this violence might take in the future.

2.3 The Formation of Ideology

The logical starting place when discussing the dynamics of religious violence is to examine the process of ideological formation. Human beings, it can be said, inhabit worlds of their own making and the process of ideological formation establishes the parameters of that world.³⁶ The very term 'ideology' itself remains a controversial one and is even more so when applied to religious belief systems rather than secular ones.³⁷ The term ideology in a religious context is useful not least because of its origins. The French Revolutionary

³⁵ For a study of different violent religious groups in two different political contexts (within the 'sectarian state' and the 'nation-state') see D.C. Rapoport, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements and Groups', in *Fundamentalisms and the State*.

³⁶ See P. Berger & T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality*, 1967.

³⁷ See D. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent*, 1964 & C.I. Waxman (ed.), *The End of Ideology Debate*, 1964. Suggested alternatives to the term include 'imagined communities' and 'world views'. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities* and N. Smart, *Worldviews: Cross Cultural Explorations of Human Beliefs*. While interesting the form these terms take is reminiscent of some of the alternative terms offered to replace fundamentalism.

ideologues who coined the term were attempting to create a science of ideas based on enlightenment thinking which would offer a secular alternative to religion.³⁸ This process had two significant consequences. Firstly, nationalism emerged, the first great secular ideology, and by seeking to replace religion, secular ideology had been put on the same plane as that of religion. As such, the secular as a mode of justification for violence supplanted the religious. The added attraction of using the term *religious ideology* for the purposes of this work is that it allows secular and religious belief systems to be contrasted, both being doctrines which claim a complete and universally applicable theory of man and society from which can be derived a programme for political action. As such, both sacred and profane ideologies may more easily be seen as actual or potential rivals and discussed as such on similar terms.³⁹ Both secular and religious ideologies in their current forms are also relatively new historically, although the constituent inspirations are not. As Bruce Lawrence notes "[f]undamentalism has historical antecedents, but no ideological precursors...though the antecedents are varied and distant...fundamentalism as a religious ideology is very recent."⁴⁰

A religious ideology which acts as a justification for violence has many sources. The most important of these are those pertaining directly to the religion itself - scripture and religious traditions. Scripture is interpreted in light of contemporary events and the environment within which a group exists. Religious ideas are critically evaluated and reformulated to explain and offer solutions to a perceived condition or crisis, one which threatens a particular religious community and its divinely promised destiny. The use of religious dogma is often selective, chosen to illustrate the world view of the group and to justify their attempts to alter the existing socio-political *status quo*. Accordingly, the most emphasised elements of revealed traditions are those which concern themselves with struggles against oppression, differentiation of a religious community and eschatological visions of religious destiny. Ideology also has a variety of objectives: it is at once an attempt to differentiate the group from society generally and from other, secular vehicles

³⁸ See R. Cox, *Ideology, Politics and Political Theory*, 1969. The term is attributed to the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy in his *Elements of Ideology*, 1795. See E Kennedy, *Destutt de Tracy and the Origins of Ideology*, 1978.

³⁹ For a discussion of religious and secular ideologies and the formulation of a category of 'religious nationalism' see M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?*, Ch. 2, 'Competing Ideologies of Order', 1993.

⁴⁰ B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 1989, p. 101.

of protest; it may also be aimed at expanding a group's following; and it offers both an alternative vision of reality and a justification for any attempt to bring about this alternative reality. Ideology may also be disseminated in a variety of different ways, such as sermons and printed tracts - both of which can be greatly amplified and spread by using the very tools of modernity such as audio cassettes, radio, television and the internet.

The specific interpretation of religious dogma and its relationship to the contemporary world is the province of a group's leadership, although the extent to which the sources of ideology are older, established, 'fore-father' figures such as Sayid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna or the Rabbis Kook, or 'younger', active ideologues or leaders such as Sheikh Fadlallah or Meir Kahane may vary considerably. Older figures may provide the basis for a belief system and intellectual concepts for following generations, while younger ones tend to relate these visions directly to contemporary religious, political and social circumstances. Whatever the source, religious ideological platforms provide essential objectives and justifications, while playing a pivotal role in decisions regarding the timing and location of acts of violence, along with the choice of tactics and targets. Ideological formation may be seen to be composed of the following five key constituent components: A Golden Age Myth; the perception of a 'theft' of culture; scripturalism; a Manichean world view; and a messianic vision (of varying intensity) based on the imminence of an expected messianic era.⁴¹ Within different groups certain elements may be emphasised more than others, although each element can be considered a constant for all group types.

2.3.1 *Golden Age Myth*

The myth of a 'Golden Age' of harmony and abundance is a common feature of most religious belief systems and certainly of the revealed religions. This universal myth concerns itself with the wholeness and peace that communities throughout the ages have felt to be the 'ideal' human condition.⁴² For Jews it might be the Davidic period when the old Kingdom of Israel was at its zenith.⁴³ In Christianity the early primitive Church is

⁴¹ These variables are a modified version of those set out by Jeffrey Kaplan, see his "The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case of the 'Identity Christian' Church of Israel", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. V, # 1, 1993, pp. 42.-43.

⁴² See M. Eliade (trans. R. Sheed), *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, 1958, pp. 382-385.

⁴³ In preparation for this moment the Temple Institute in Jerusalem (amongst other activities) designs and constructs priestly vestments and other paraphernalia relevant to worship in the Temple of the Davidic era.

frequently an inspiration, as is (for American groups) early Puritan America. For many Muslim intellectuals this is most frequently the formative period of Islam when the community was ruled by Mohammed or the Rightly Guided Caliphs.⁴⁴ For violent groups, however, the perception of a crisis implies that this Golden Age cannot be achieved peacefully, instead it must be brought about through armed struggle. Exactly when the Golden Age will be delivered varies according to group. In the case of some messianic and apocalyptic groups, the advent of the Golden Age and redemption are imminent, while in most cases it lies at a distant, frequently ill-defined point in the future, one that can only be reached through years of steadfast 'cosmic' struggle.⁴⁵ Paradoxically, many violent religious groups see their struggle as ultimately leading to peace, and that violence perpetrated in the contemporary world serves merely to purify that world and ensure that what follows will be a better world devoid of violence.⁴⁶ The specific content of the myth itself can vary widely depending on the precise theological leanings of the group and what the group regards as worthy of reconstruction or emulation, a process determined by the group's environment. Within Judaism and Islam there is less variation, and in both cases the myth has informed actual political programmes. In the case of violent Christian groups, far greater theological variation has led to a situation where "[t]he range of possible utopias of the past to choose from is almost unlimited, and Identity quarters have delved deep into a largely imagined history to reconstruct scenarios of former bliss."⁴⁷

All Golden Age myths, however, share certain common features. Apart from representing an idealised world obtainable through devotion and struggle, they are concerned with a time that ended due to a combination of a 'fall from grace' and the actions of some malevolent 'other'.⁴⁸ Both of these forces endure still in one form or

Apart from private donations the Institute receives funding from the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Jerusalem City Hall. See C. Coughlin, *A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions*, pp. 240-242.

⁴⁴ See I.M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 1988, Part 1 & pp. 880-883.

⁴⁵ As Rapoport notes however "Clearly, one can believe that a messianic era is predestined and that the day of deliverance is neither near nor predictable", 'Messianic Sanctions for Terror', p. 198.

⁴⁶ M. Juergensmeyer, 'The Terrorists Who Long For Peace', *The Fletcher Forum*, Winter/Spring, 1996, pp. 1-11.

⁴⁷ J. Kaplan, 'The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology', p. 44.

⁴⁸ For a brief discussion of the 'Other' as it applies to the monotheistic faiths see F. Osman, 'Monotheists and the 'Other': An Islamic Perspective in an era of religious pluralism', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXVIII, # 3-4, 1998, pp. 353-363. For the concept of moral disengagement as it relates to modern terrorism see A. Bandura, 'Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement' in W. Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, 1990. For a secular, 'non-kinship' dichotomy see A. Rapoport, *The*

another and their physical manifestation provides an identifiable source of grievance and thus a focus for violence. The Golden Age myth is also a way of making the history of the various faiths contemporary - a process whereby historical, religious events are recast into contemporary forms. This is done in a variety of ways including the phraseology of the group, the group's nomenclature and the symbols it employs, all of which create a direct and more immediate link between the past and the present.

2.3.2. *Threat to Culture*⁴⁹

Most violent religious groups (and many non-violent ones) have a perception that their traditional culture is under assault, and in certain cases has been actively eroded and threatened for a considerable period of time. The threat to culture itself is shaped by political events both in the distant past and the immediate present - the gap in time is of no consequence because the threat is seen as a constant.⁵⁰ The broader phenomenon of religious radicalism may be defined as the rejection of surrounding cultural norms and values that are not considered authentic to a religious tradition, and the vacuum created by this rejection is filled by intensifying key elements of the religious tradition⁵¹ - an alien, hostile culture is thus 'displaced'. In many cases the perception of a threat thrives not on religious tradition but on complex conspiracy theories which offer an all embracing (if implausible) and systematic explanation of the threat posed to a religious community.⁵²

Origins of Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, 1995, Ch. 4, 'The Attitudinal Perspective: We and They'.

⁴⁹ Culture in this sense refers to the anthropological and sociological meaning of the word which denotes all forms of human activity which are not concerned with biological perpetuation of the species - customs, habits of association and religious observances. A fundamentalist religious system encompasses all these as well as the biological origins of the species. Furthermore, culture here will follow the Anglo-French tradition of regarding 'culture' and 'civilisation' as synonymous.

⁵⁰ This is in line with C. Geertz's thesis that culture is a socially constructed and historically transmitted network of symbol 'systems'. See *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, 1973.

⁵¹ C.S. Liebman, 'Extremism as a Religious Norm', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. XXII, # 7, 1983.

⁵² For an early theoretical examination of conspiracy as part of extremist belief systems see S. Lipset & E. Raab, *The Politics of Unreason*, 1970. For more recent examinations of the phenomenon see D. Pipes, *The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy*, 1996, and M. Fenster, *Conspiracy Theories: Secrecy and Power in American Culture*, 1999. Conspiracy theories are particularly pronounced amongst right wing American Christian groups. As Aho has noted, there are two forms of historical rhetoric, accidentalism and conspiratorialism. Accidentalism is the form favoured by academics, and is well represented by evolutionary theory, where history is decided by chance. By contrast conspiratorial historical rhetoric identifies a grand design or plan. In this sense all religious perceptions of history can be considered 'conspiratorial'. J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, 1990, p. 88.

For Jewish groups, this belief draws on a long history of persecution both during biblical times and during the Diaspora following the destruction of the Second Temple - a persecution that only abated (but did not cease) with the creation of the state of Israel. In the contemporary period, these events are recalled and viewed within the context of the threats posed by Arab states and sub-state groups to the newly re-acquired promised land. For many Christian groups, it is a (comparatively) more recent process involving a Zionist and governmental conspiracy against a white Anglo-Saxon Christendom. For Islamic groups, the threat is largely that of Western imperialism, both cultural and political, and its indigenous proponents throughout the Muslim world. Israel and Judaism are also perceived as both a threat and an insult which is in league with the Christian West. For all denominations there is a belief that traditional values must be defended and propagated lest they be destroyed forever by modern, 'ungodly' actors and processes which were unleashed by the enlightenment and continue unabated in the present.⁵³ This threat of 'secular culture' is perceived as eroding traditional values and also as sanctioning practices which are regarded by religious communities as taboo. In this regard violent groups perceive their struggles as *defensive* in nature unlike their opponents who conversely identify them as an aggressive threat to the existing order.

2.3.3 Scripturalism

Concepts of a Golden Age and theft of culture cannot be formulated in a vacuum as they must be based upon and legitimised by textual sources. The ideologies of all the groups examined is rigorously defined by scripture and religious tradition, and there exists a symbiotic relationship between scripture and reality. Contemporary events are often re-cast into a scriptural reality, bridging the gap between past and present. This re-casting serves both to mobilise the group itself and to place the 'enemy' within a mortal, cosmic struggle which is much greater than mere temporal history. Flexibility in ideology is allowed by the vast scope of these sources, and the degree to which various components are selected, interpreted and emphasised. There are many religious messages which condone violence, and although these are in the minority, once they have been brought to

⁵³ For an example of similar attitudes to 'blasphemy' in different religions see E. Sivan, 'The Mythologies of Religious Radicalism: Judaism and Islam', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. III, # 3, 1991, pp. 71-81.

prominence and related to the present social context they provide a divinely sanctioned justification for action.⁵⁴ This process is driven by the belief of fundamentalists that scripture does not only record the past but is equally relevant to the present and the future. It is not static but a historically constant process.

Certain themes within the various religious traditions are continually employed, such as the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein in Shi'ite theology or the role of the high priest Phineas in Judaism. Similarly the ambiguity of some religious lore means it can be interpreted in a variety of ways or used out of context. One of the myths permeating the Christian Right in America is that of the 'Phineas Priests'. Based on the old testament story of the high Priest Phineas, a myth has been created that there is an unbroken chain of Phineas Priests who have operated throughout time eliminating the enemies of God. While the biblical story exists and is drawn upon by both Jewish and Christian groups, the myth was created in Richard Hoskin's book *Vigilantes of Christendom* (1990), a work contending to be fact.⁵⁵ The common theme here is the need to base ideological perspectives in scripture and the accepted inerrancy of these texts. Each of the revealed religions possesses clearly defined canons of scripture and decisive commentaries where a believer may find immutable doctrines, stories and bodies of law. These scriptural interpretations are then reinforced by related symbolic acts in order to mobilise the group and any prospective constituency. This complex process of scriptural justification makes tradition reality.

2.3.4 Manichaeian World View

Part of the process of ideological formation is the adoption of what might be called a Manichaeian world view which divides humanity dialectically into a righteous 'us' and a non-believing 'them'.⁵⁶ These two groups are all encompassing and they allow for no

⁵⁴ A good example is Sayyid Qutb's revival of the seventh century doctrine of *jahiliyya*. See Qutb, S., *Milestones*, 1978.

⁵⁵ While there is evidence to suggest the existence of a group or groups using such a name the influence of yet another book on the Christian Right is obvious. In an effort to distance his Church of Israel from vigilante violence Pastor Dan Gayman has offered a critique of this idea based on 1 Samuel 15:23. D. Gayman, *Watchman* 3, Summer 1991, p. 7.

⁵⁶ The word Manichaeian (or Manichean) is derived from Manichaeism, a religion established in 3rd century Iran by Mani which was fundamentally dualist in nature. It is interesting to note that throughout its history Manichaeism numbered Augustine as one of its adherents before he converted to Christianity. See G. Widengren, *Mani and Manicheism*, 1965.

exceptions, an individual is either one or the other. Moreover the 'us' represent the followers of God, while the 'them' represents the enemies of God or the friends of Satan, who by scriptural definition must be fought and ultimately converted or destroyed. Because of their association with God, the righteous themselves are ultimately assured of victory. Conflict has thus been elevated to a 'cosmic' level where there exists only "an ultimate good and evil, a divine truth and falsehood"⁵⁷, and it is a conflict which transcends all earthly struggles. The use of such a distinction is primarily to mobilise and radicalise support and to create 'the other' - a process not unique to religious violence but common to all conflicts throughout time.⁵⁸ In the words of Hizballah's Sheikh Fadlallah, for example, "Muslims are to embark on an 'Islamic Revolution' under the guidance of religious officials, the 'ulama', whose knowledge and integrity guarantee the ultimate triumph of Islam over the Satanic force of disbelief."⁵⁹ Similarly, a Hamas communiqué, issued in response to the American military build up in Saudi Arabia following Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, described it as "another episode in the fight between good and evil". The communiqué continues to identify a sectarian threat to culture and described a "hateful Christian plot against our religion, our civilisation and our land."⁶⁰ An Aryan Nations brochure claims that "there is a battle being fought this day between the children of darkness (today known as the Jews) and the children of light (God), the Aryan race, the true Israel of the Bible."⁶¹ Such distinctions are amplified by de-humanising the 'enemy' with titles such as 'mud-people', 'dogs' or 'beasts'.⁶² When the enemy is no longer seen as being human, an important restraining factor on violence is removed. Despite this clear division, certain groups of non-believers are more frequently attacked for reasons of accessibility, symbolism and the degree to which they pose a threat to the group's continued existence and traditional values.

⁵⁷ M. Juergensmeyer, *The New Cold War?*, p.155.

⁵⁸ "The basic aim of a nation at war in establishing an image of the enemy is to distinguish as sharply as possible the act of killing from the act of murder by making the former an act deserving all honour and praise". Quoted in R. Holmes, *Firing Line*, 1985, p. 360.

⁵⁹ *The Middle East*, July 1989, p. 13.

⁶⁰ Hamas communiqué # 64, September 26 1990.

⁶¹ *This is Aryan Nations*, pamphlet distributed by Aryan Nations (also available on the internet), n.d.

⁶² B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, p. 95.

2.3.5 Messianic Expectation

As was shown in Chapter One, all the revealed religions contain a messianic promise and this promise plays an important part in the conduct of violence. For messianic groups the prominence of eschatological traditions as a motive for action is obvious. For other group types, it is both an accepted and essential part of their belief system, and a valuable source of rhetoric. Messianic ideas of renewal play an important part in cosmic time and provide a promise of ultimate victory - regardless of how difficult a struggle may appear at the moment. Ideas of cosmic war between 'good' and 'evil' and the idea that the adherent is the member of a persecuted, righteous few, are most explicitly conveyed in messianic texts and traditions. Messianic ideas, as with other scriptural themes can be brought to prominence by linking them to mortal activity. Rabbi Avraham Isaac Kook, for instance, altered mainstream Jewish messianic perceptions by arguing that the coming of the Messiah and Redemption for the Jewish people could be accelerated through human agency. Such beliefs can become the central feature of a violent programme as it does with the messianic group type. Although it does not form the dominant theme in most group ideologies, messianic expectations are still an important part of the revealed message. The messianic idea is a powerful, if frequently latent, one and may even be found in the only case where a successful violent religious revolution has taken place. Perhaps most important of all, messianic ideas and expectations are flexible, allowing for change according to alterations in political circumstances. If a messianic expectation is disappointed, the belief system itself may even be strengthened and renewed (if a group remains intact) through a process of rationalisation.⁶³

2.3.6 The Legitimisation of Violence

The formation of an ideology which justifies the conduct of violence is a central feature of modern extremist religious groups and one which is related to the concept of 'divine struggle' contained in the revealed religions. Religious groups tend to perceive themselves as 'holy warriors', engaged not in some 'illegal', low intensity struggle, but in a

⁶³ This is a process known as 'cognitive dissonance', a theory first advanced in L. Festinger, W. Riecken & S. Schachter, *When Prophecy Fails: A Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the End of the World*, 1956.

just, cosmic war.⁶⁴ As noted in Chapter One the revealed religions each contain a tradition of Holy War, an important element of which is that a war must be considered 'just' and therefore legitimate. As Aho notes of the military ethic contained in almost all religions: "any complete military ethic...contains the following three components: a vocabulary of acceptable motives for engaging in war and an inventory of legitimate goals toward which violence might be directed; the preferred attitude or response to be assumed toward war; and approved ways of fighting."⁶⁵ This is similar in many respects to the traditional Christian conception of just war theory, the basic elements of which are: a just cause (to regain something wrongfully taken, to punish evil or to defend against actual or planned aggression); a right authority initiating the war; a proportional use of force relevant to the issue; war should be undertaken as a last resort; the purpose should be peace; and it should be undertaken with a reasonable chance of success.⁶⁶ While this conception dates from Ambrose and Augustine it has been revived and related to the twentieth century most notably in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr.⁶⁷

While this model is Christian in origin, Jewish and Islamic traditions contain similar features and these form an implicit feature of the process of legitimating violence employed by contemporary religious groups.⁶⁸ In Judaism, the concept of religious war derived from the Old Testament reflected the early struggles for identity of the Israelites. The various wars which result in the establishment of Judea are waged with the cooperation of God, frequently against overwhelming odds, a situation which resonates with the contemporary era.⁶⁹ The medieval religious scholar Maimonides formalised the

⁶⁴ In a similar fashion secular terrorists such as the IRA regard themselves as soldiers and have consistently argued that they be accorded the same rights as other combatants.

⁶⁵ J. Aho, *Religious Mythology and the Art of War: Comparative Religious Symbolisms of Religious Violence*, 1981, p. 9.

⁶⁶ The primary difference between Christianity and Islam is that while Islam does not consider war as a means of first resort it requires less stringent justification than Christianity. See D. Brown, 'Muslim Ethics in Comparative Perspective', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIX, # 2, p. 189.

⁶⁷ See for example Niebuhr's 1940 essay *Why the Christian Church is Not Pacifist*.

⁶⁸ See for example J. Kelsay & T. Johnson (eds.), *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, 1991, and J. Ferguson, *War and Peace in the World's Religions*, 1977, Chs. 6,7 & 8. For a discussion on the relationship between just war theory and terrorism generally see J. Dugard, 'International Terrorism and the Just War', in D. Rapoport & Y. Alexander (eds.), *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*, 1982. It should be noted that most Islamic scholarship concentrates on the functional aspects of war conduct and not on issues concerned with its commencement. See K. El Fadl, 'The Rules of Killing at War: An Inquiry Into Classical Sources', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXXIX, # 2, 1999, p. 157.

⁶⁹ J Ferguson, *War and Peace*, 1977, pp. 78-83.

concept of a Jewish religious war to include "the war against the seven tribes, the war against Amalek, and a war to deliver Israel from aggression."⁷⁰ As one scholar has noted of war in Islam "[t]echnically there is no 'war' in Islam in the modern sense of the word. It was always 'holy war', a *jihad*. Thus calling of the believers to battle was always just in the name of Allah...The *jihad* in this sense represents in Muslim Law what is known among Western jurists as *just war*."⁷¹

The issue of a just cause is frequently cited by groups in the form of a threat to culture (something wrongfully taken), to punish evil (the Manichaean enemy) or to defend against aggression (defending culture). The right authority is found within the group's leadership in the form of a cleric or a charismatic divine. The proportional use of force often contained in theories of just war is a less applicable feature, although it does manifest itself for some groups in terms of preserving the group, appealing to a constituency or simply for reasons of practical constraints.⁷² War is seen as a last resort because either political methods have been tried and failed, or because the nature of a polity leaves no other course for expressing dissent but violence. As discussed above, the ultimate objective of the Golden Age is peace, not so much dependent on a reasonable chance of success, but actually on a guarantee from God. As with scriptural interpretation attitudes towards just wars and military ethics are highly selective and prone to alteration by environment.

2.4 Leadership

Group leadership is extremely important not only because of its relationship to the formation of group ideology but also because of its subsequent influence on the practical areas of timing, location, targets and tactics. It is in the realm of leadership where scriptural imperatives are confronted by, and adapted to, the practical constraints and problems of the temporal world. It is this dual process of confrontation and adaptation which will determine what form a group will ultimately take and also its propensity to endure and survive. Leadership pronouncements and texts are also a useful barometer of a

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 91.

⁷¹ M. Khadduri, *The Law of War and Peace in Islam: A Study in Muslim International Law*, 1940, p. 20.

⁷² Classical Islamic scholarship tend to view 'proportionality' more in terms of weighing possible evils against potential good. See K. El Fadl, 'The Rules of Killing at War', p. 147.

group's intentions and attitudes towards its environment. The barometric nature may be explicit, such as Hamas's (and other groups) statements that revenge attacks would be carried out following the 1994 Hebron massacre, or more subtle such as the increasingly apocalyptic tone of Aum Shinrikyo's publications following the group's spectacularly poor performance in the 1990 Japanese elections.⁷³ Texts such as Faraj's *Neglected Duty*, Juhayman's 'Seven Letters' and Kahane's *They Must Go* are designed not only to justify violence within the context of a corrupt and failing society but also to offer potential solutions. By contrast the novels *The Turner Diaries* and *Hunter* by William Pierce are intended not only as a critique, but also as a tactical and operational blueprint for conducting a racist religious revolution.⁷⁴ Statements made by leaders (and groups in general) also take advantage of the full panoply of both the media and information technology thus reaching a larger and more varied audience. Most importantly the manipulation of group dynamics by leaders has a profound influence on the manner and degree of violence a group pursues.

Various leadership typologies for religious groups have been advanced. For Islamic groups, H.R. Dekmejian offers four types: *Mahdist*, where a leader claims divine descent according to Sunni or Shi'a eschatology; *Marjaist*, where a dominant political and legal position is adopted by the Shi'a clerical establishment; *Mujaddidist*, where a 'renewer' familiar to Sunni revivalist movements appears (usually every century) to lead the faithful - although without a claim to divinity; and *collegial* or bureaucratic leadership.⁷⁵ While such a categorisation can obviously not be applied directly to Christian and Jewish groups, it does contain certain useful elements which may be seen as common to all the revealed religions. All religions provide examples where a dominant intellectual cleric provides active leadership and/or a blueprint for action. There are also examples where a single charismatic 'divine' leads, and also where leadership is collective as in the collegial or bureaucratic form. These leadership forms are not mutually exclusive, although there is a direct link between the type of leadership and the type of group. Nor do specific leadership

⁷³ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum*, 1996, p. 48.

⁷⁴ It is claimed that the Order derived its strategy from the Turner Diaries. See B. Hoffman, 'Right Wing Terrorism in the United States', *Violence, Aggression and Terrorism*, Vol. I, # 1, 1987, p. 8.

⁷⁵ R.H. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, pp. 60-64. This list actually represents a synthesis of two typologies put forward.

types evolve from a vacuum as there is an evolutionary process determined by the very environment in which they exist. For the purposes of this study then, the leadership of violent religious groups will be divided into three distinct types; ideologues, charismatic leaders and collegial leadership.

2.4.1 Ideologues

Ideologues, or religious authorities, are generally not directly involved with operational matters and may even deny a direct association with a violent group, but they exert significant influences through their sermons, publications and rulings.⁷⁶ Indeed, an ideologue may be unintentional in that his ideas are adopted later by individuals with whom they have no relationship, as exemplified by the influence of Shabtai Ben Dov on the Jewish Underground. Ideologues may even exert a posthumous influence, living on in the form of their published works and influencing succeeding generations of dissent. It may be said they perform the role of 'spiritual' but not 'active' leadership. Many religious movements have a central religious ideologue who is linked to the religious establishment (an easier distinction to make in Judaism and Islam), or they may ignore existing bodies of juridical opinion and draw their inspiration directly from scripture. An illustration of the former is the role played by Sayyid Muhammed Husayn Fadlallah in Lebanon. Despite Fadlallah's apparent connections with Hizballah, he is not part of the leadership, and yet for many Lebanese Shiites by the early 1980s he had become "an infallible moral and political compass"⁷⁷, a position true to this day, even extending far beyond Lebanon itself. By contrast, the 'self-taught' religious leader such as Juhayman Utaybi or Shoko Asahara, are more generally associated with charismatic activism due to their implicit rejection of existing religious judicial opinions on violence.⁷⁸ In fact, ideologues perform the important role of legitimating acts of violence as it is they who explain contemporary events and invest them with religious meaning. Individuals who do not have the sanction of a

⁷⁶ By the same token state actors, particularly in Muslim countries, can also deploy religious ideologues in order to justify policies and to discredit those of violent groups. An interesting example is the fatwa delivered by Egyptian religious authorities against suicide and dissociating the phenomenon from martyrdom.

⁷⁷ M. Kramer, 'The Oracle of Hizballah, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah', in R.S. Appleby (ed.), *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of The Middle East*, 1997, p. 120.

⁷⁸ Utaybi did study for a time at the Islamic University at Medina under the tutelage of Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah al Baz, the two clashed on several issues and Utaybi was expelled in 1974.

government or broader society to engage in violence find it helpful to have access to a higher morality, represented by religion. Clerical sanction is critical for the conduct of religious violence itself, particularly so when none of those directly involved are religious authorities. The proposed Dome of the Rock attack by the Jewish Underground, for example, was shelved in 1982 because none of the rabbis consulted would approve the plan, and without such approval the participants were unwilling to act.⁷⁹

2.4.2 Charismatic

In his *Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, Max Weber stated that the term 'charisma' should be applied to "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he [*sic*] is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."⁸⁰ Charismatic leadership can also be seen as the result of a variety of different factors, including a situation of social crisis, the character of the leader, the leader's ability to alter values, and perceptions of legitimacy.⁸¹ Charismatic leaders set themselves apart through an intimate knowledge of religious scripture and tradition and also by exhibiting personal qualities which command considerable respect and loyalty from followers, reinforced through highly effective communication skills. One observation made of contemporary Islamic leaders, but equally true of all the faiths, is that "they are people who exude a moral authority that is politically persuasive to a great many people in their respective societies, particularly to the 'downtrodden'...who harbour deep resentment over the broken promises of their...regimes."⁸² Once a charismatic 'bond' has been established between a leader and his followers the leader exercises an increasing degree of influence on the normative orientations of his group, and perhaps on those outside the group. Unlike other systems of authority, charismatic leadership can exert a significant (or complete) influence over a person's value systems.⁸³

⁷⁹ E. Sprinzak, 'Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel', in *Fundamentalisms and the State*, p. 476.

⁸⁰ M. Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, 1946, p. 358.

⁸¹ See for example R.H. Dekmejian & M.J. Wyszomirski, 'Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Mahdi of the Sudan', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. XIV, # 2, 1972, pp. 194-199.

⁸² J. Miller, 'The Charismatic Islamists' in M. Kramer (ed.), *Middle East Lectures: Number Two*, 1997, p. 39.

⁸³ A. Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations*, 1961, pp. 203-204.

There is little doubt that prominent ideologues, such as al-Banna, the Kooks and Qutb, fit the charismatic personality type to a certain extent, but they were never the declared instigators of organised, revolutionary religious violence. While an ideologue of prominence may be regarded as 'charismatic' (indeed, most are), they do not fall into this particular category of 'charismatic leadership' because actual control of group activity is not vested in them. Charismatic leadership in the context of religious groups can be an end in itself or eventually lead to a collegial leadership system.⁸⁴ In those cases where leadership remained charismatic, such as those of Utaybi, Kahane or Asahara, the group tends to be set on a direct collision course with the state, endangering the existence of both group and leader. By the same token, once the charismatic leader is removed, the group in most cases can no longer sustain itself. In situations where charismatic leadership gives way to a collegial form the prospects for group security and longevity are increased. Charismatic leadership in the context of violence is arguably a more volatile form of leadership than collegial structures because authority rests with an individual who is the sole interpreter of divine instruction and for this same reason charismatic leadership is also more prone to emphasis on messianic and apocalyptic expectations.

2.4.3 Collegial Leadership

As noted above, collegial leadership frequently grows out of charismatic leadership. The founders of groups are frequently charismatic in nature and if the group is sufficiently large, pragmatic in its beliefs and does not actively court destruction, then the charismatic form will be succeeded by a collective leadership. Collective or collegial leadership tends to be the most common form, resulting in greater flexibility in decision making and recourse to action, and a more sophisticated organisational structure which is difficult for the state to penetrate. Indeed, the nature of a collegial leadership is a key indicator of the breadth of an organisational network. Within various collegial leaderships mechanisms may be established to bridge different views, thus further reinforcing group cohesion and identity.

⁸⁴ In this regard Dekmejian sees the progression for Islamic groups thus: "Generally, the founders of Islamist societies tend to be charismatic while their successors are bureaucrats types operating within a collective leadership", H.R. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, pp. 62-63.

The collective form is also hierarchical in nature, involving at the top a level where decisions on targets are taken and justified according to religious doctrine. This role is frequently adopted by a cleric or groups of clerics such as that which presided over the activities of the Egyptian al-Jihad at the time of the Sadat assassination, headed by the blind Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman. A similar phenomenon can be seen in Judaism and Christianity. Beneath this exist a variety of different sub-departments each charged with responsibility for a certain specific area such as propaganda or operations. Such structures are necessary to co-ordinate and focus the resources and activities of groups with a large membership and relatively broad agenda. The collegial form helps ensure group survival and is also useful for resolving internal dissent. When a prominent leader is killed, for example, the succession must be as quick and uncomplicated as possible in order to ensure group cohesion and operational direction.

2.5 Timing

The timing of religious violence is important for both temporal and spiritual reasons, and so is the group's perception of time itself. There are many dates which hold enormous religious significance which are potentially very propitious times for violence including specific eschatological dates such as the beginning of the Islamic century and the ends of Christian millennia, and anniversaries of martyrdoms or the expected arrival of messianic figures. Other anniversaries may relate to post-scriptural times and include acts of inter-communal violence such as the 1994 Hebron massacre, the assassination of more contemporary 'martyrs', or large scale political events such as the formation of the state of Israel or the Second Gulf War. These are what might be described as reactive or revenge attacks. A related issue is the perception of time held by a group. As has been noted long ago with regards to group violence "[t]he Innermost structure and the mentality of a group can never be clearly grasped as when we attempt to understand its conception of time in the light of its hopes, yearnings and purposes."⁸⁵ Religious perceptions of time identify a continuity between past, present and future, and while there may exist a timetable for action, tactical goals can be suspended in order to ensure group survival. Due to the multiplicity of reasons behind the timing of religious violence, the area will be divided into

⁸⁵ K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, 1991, p. 209.

four different categories. Firstly will be anniversaries of specific events usually celebrated as part of a religious festival. Secondly is the category of political or tactical timing. The third category is reactive or 'tit for tat' violence which follows no predictable pattern and is motivated largely by revenge. Fourth and finally are dates relating specifically to messianic redemption which are derived from revealed eschatology.

2.5.1 Anniversaries

Anniversaries may be dates of long term historical significance, often marked by some form of religious festival, or they may commemorate violent acts perpetrated within living memory of the group.⁸⁶ The most important of these represent a previous experience of oppression or struggle endured by a religious community which holds direct resonance in the present.⁸⁷ These include events such as the anniversary of the martyrdom of al-Hussain, the third Shi'a Imam, at the battle of Karbala in 680 C.E, marked each year by the festival of Ashura. The Ashura festival is often observed with displays of self-inflicted wounds which indicate a willingness to martyrdom, and by martyrdom plays. Religious festivals such as this also provide opportunities for groups to aggravate political and inter-communal discord by striking during festivals of those of another denomination, particularly at places of worship.⁸⁸ What is most significant about long term anniversaries is a widespread experience of religious fervour which enables militant groups to mobilise their followers and potentially other support within their religious community. Anniversaries of more recent events are usually acts of revenge. For example, on November 27 1994, Hamas killed a Jewish settler, Rabbi Ami Ulami, to mark the first anniversary of the death of Khaled Zit, a Hamas commander killed by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The same group was responsible for a dual stabbing and a suicide bombing on the six and twelve month anniversaries respectively of the 1994 Hebron massacre. On April 19, 1995, the Alfred Murrah building in Oklahoma city was bombed, two years after

⁸⁶ For an earlier examination of anniversaries in a secular context see B. Cordes, W. Fowler & G. Petty, *Potentially Significant Dates for Terrorists and Anti-Nuclear Extremists*, N-1865-DOE, 1982.

⁸⁷ M. Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shi'ism*, 1978, pp. 231-234.

⁸⁸ Baruch Goldstein's attack on the Ibrahim mosque for example was conducted during the middle of Ramadan and also during the Jewish festival of Purim, and the FIS hijacking of an Air France plane coincided with Christmas 1995.

the destruction of the Branch Davidian compound at Waco Texas.⁸⁹ As these examples show, the length of time between an original event and the response may vary considerably, either as a result of lengthy preparations or as deliberate attempts to once again reinforce a group's belief system in a calculated, causal fashion. Yet operations may vary over a span of time and geography which target groups find difficult to foresee and prepare against. Anniversaries serve the purpose of reinforcing the importance of the past, both on the group itself and also on the target community.

2.5.2 Political or Tactical Timing

While the concepts of political or tactical timing may appear more familiar to an examination of the conduct of secular violence, they are also of great importance in the religious context. For religious groups, as with others, alterations in the political *status quo*, domestic or international, may be in the form of threats to be countered or opportunities to be taken. Therefore tactical timing may be offensive or defensive in nature. Frequently a group is moved to action in order to forestall a government crack down, or in order to take advantage of propitious circumstances such as glaring evidence of state failure, the conduct of local elections, a military intervention, the visit of a foreign head of state, or the conduct of a 'peace process'. Political processes such as the Camp David accords and the ensuing Israeli-Palestinian peace process may even be interpreted in a religious light and thus engender action.⁹⁰ Decisions regarding tactical timing also reveal much about a group's leadership dynamics and how seriously the leadership regards various changes and events in their environment. Concurrent with this process is the group's desire to strike a balance between survival, and threats to the achievement of their objectives posed by the state.

⁸⁹ It is also significant that the Oklahoma City bombing occurred on the day the American Revolution formally began with the battle of Lexington and Concorde in 1775 and on the day of execution for another right wing extremist Richard Wayne Snell. As Mc Veigh later stated, " Any able-bodied adult male, any patriot, is responsible for defending his liberty. Just like the minutemen of the revolution", *Sunday Times*, April 21, 1996.

⁹⁰ In this regard for Jewish groups any political process involving the 'land of Israel' is inherently religious.

2.5.3 'Reactive' or 'Tit for Tat' Violence

These are by far the most numerous and least predictable for the obvious reason that they are neither date nor location specific. They are conducted in response to political events and acts of violence mostly revolving around revenge. Revenge is a powerful motivation, particularly in cases where a group purports to be the protectors of a religious community. Examples abound, ranging from smaller scale, local attacks, to larger, international incidents. The type of these incident depends upon the degree of group sophistication, the ease with which it can project violence, and the seriousness with which it regards a particular incident. Once again this form of violence is reflected in group nomenclature - the Jewish group 'Terror Against Terror' (TNT), and the label attached to much violence perpetrated by Jewish groups during the 1980s of 'vigilante terrorism'⁹¹ show the importance of revenge as a motive in certain contexts. Similarly many Islamic groups name operational units after members who have been martyred by the enemy, as exemplified by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade of Hamas which is named after a Palestinian hero of the 1935 Arab Revolt. The purpose of such nomenclature is again the reinforcement of group agenda and group outlook, symbolically linking the name of a victim to the response demanded by the group. This pattern of violence can become cyclical when a suicide bomber is employed in a revenge attack, at once avenging previous martyrs and creating a new one who can then be woven into the rhetoric of justified sacrifice and 'sacred war'.⁹²

2.5.4 Endtime Events

A few anniversaries promised by religious tradition, be they specific or open to a variety of interpretations, are of enormous eschatological significance. Unlike the anniversaries mentioned above, Endtime events are forward looking, anticipating a fundamental change from a temporal world order to a spiritual one. Events such as the reappearance of the Mahdi, the reconstruction of the Jewish Temple or the Second Coming

⁹¹ See E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground' in D.C. Rapoport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*.

⁹² As Juergensmeyer notes religious war may be seen as a blend of sacrifice and martyrdom, "where one sacrifices members of the enemy's side and offers up martyrs of one's own", M. Juergensmeyer, 'Sacrifice and Cosmic War', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, 1991, p.111.

form integral parts of redemptive processes and they are open to the involvement of human agency. Messianic expectations have led to large, popular social movements at various times throughout history and frequently these have become violent.⁹³ Each religious tradition possesses its own varied calculations as to when the time of messianic redemption will occur. The attack on the Grand Mosque in 1979, for example, was carried out during the first hour of the first day of the Muslim year 1400, the time in Shi'a theology traditionally associated with the appearance of the Twelfth Imam. The Ayatollah Khomeini was lauded by some of his followers if not as the Mahdi, then as a messenger related to him who heralded the return of the Mahdi.⁹⁴ In Christianity - although there is no strict scriptural basis for such a belief - the millennium is frequently the focus for messianic expectations, as can be seen in the rhetoric and ideology of Aum Shinrikyo and other groups.⁹⁵ Jewish messianic prophecy is concerned with the appearance of the messiah which will be preceded by various prophetic events such as the reconstruction of the Temple.⁹⁶

The significance of violent acts performed in order to hasten Endtime events lies not so much in the physical destruction caused, but in their overwhelming psychological effects and the popular reaction they are capable of unleashing. To members of a religious community, Endtime events represent the culmination of all prophecy and of temporal history itself. And while only a very small percentage of religious violence can be classed as primarily messianic in nature, the significance of messianic redemptive messages in all the revealed religions is enormous. The most dramatic of these acts are those that aim to bring about redemption in a single stroke such as the various plots to clear the Temple Mount, despite the fact the messianic promise itself is seen as an ongoing process. The unifying features are a sensation of imminence combined with pre-existing paradigms which guide the actions of believers. Where these paradigms are ambiguous (as almost all

⁹³ See for example: M. Grant, *The Jews in the Roman World*, Chs. 11-15, 1973; N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, 1970; and P.M. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898*, 1958.

⁹⁴ E. Sivan, 'Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution', *International Journal for Middle Eastern Studies*, 21, p. 12.

⁹⁵ See D. Thompson, *The End of Time: Fear and Faith in the Shadow of the Millennium*, 1996.

⁹⁶ See for example G. Buchanan, *Revelation and Redemption: Jewish Documents of Deliverance From the Fall of Jerusalem to the Death of Nahmanides*, 1978, and J. Frankel (ed.), *Jews and Messianism in the Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning. Vol. 7 of Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 1991.

are) a group must make choices concerning which myths to adopt and how a messianic plan should be implemented.⁹⁷

2.6 Location

The location of acts of religiously inspired violence is also an important consideration, as is the broader concept of 'sacred space'. Two categories of location suggest themselves, that of 'Holy Places', and that of a tactical, temporal variety. Places of religious significance are frequently the scene or even the cause of religious violence.⁹⁸ Indeed, as David Rapoport has noted, ethnic and religious groups have in part gained their identity through the control of particular places over time.⁹⁹ This applies not only to specific sites of enormous scriptural significance such the Grand Mosque or the Temple Mount, but also to more geographically complex areas such as Hebron, Jerusalem or the 'Holy Land'. The situational or geographical overlap in Holy sites between the revealed religions makes this situation more complex and more volatile. The symbolic and ideological motivation of holy places may even be seen in group nomenclature - as exemplified by the 'International Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Islamic Holy Places', which issued a communiqué claimed responsibility for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam.¹⁰⁰ Location may also be governed simply by the nature of the target, defined around tactical value or temporal significance. Religious violence directed against a specific communal group, country or group of countries, may find numerous symbolic locations in the form of embassies, aircraft, military installations and personnel, and civilians. The two categories of location examined here will be those of religious significance, either associated with scripture and religious history or with the cultural history of a particular people, and that of temporal significance, either associated with tactical practicality or as a symbolic component of a secular enemy's society and power.

⁹⁷ D.C. Rapoport, 'Messianic Sanctions for Terror', p. 210.

⁹⁸ Most historians of religion regard devotion to 'sacred space' as one of the oldest and most universal of religious practices. For an examination of the sacredness of 'place' in religion see M. Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, pp. 367-387.

⁹⁹ D.C. Rapoport, 'Observations on the Importance of Space in Violent Ethno-Religious Strife', paper presented at the seminar 'Religious and Ethnic Conflict', University of California, Riverside, April 28, 1995.

¹⁰⁰ Alternatively the 'Army for the Liberation of the Islamic Sanctities'. *Al-Hayat*, 8 Aug. 98 - BBC/SWB, ME/3301, MED/1, August 10, 1998.

2.6.1 *Religious Significance*

The location for certain acts of violence is significant because they are regarded as sacred by one or more of the antagonists in the 'cosmic struggle'. Indeed it is the commonality of many sacred sights to the various revealed religions which makes their combined examination so interesting. The Middle East itself contains all the major sacred sights of Judaism, Christianity and Islam (including the probable locations of all potential messianic events contained in Jewish and Christian eschatology), and what is now called the state of Israel contains all those of significance which are sacred to more than one of the revealed religions, in particular Jerusalem (the important exception being right-wing American groups who regard the U.S. as the new promised land). As well as sites of long term historical import, other locations of religious significance include all places of worship. Attacks on these locations such as the Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron or attacks on synagogues and Jewish cemeteries by American right groups magnify the degree of offence caused to a target group. Historically these symbolic attacks and the reactions they cause are not new. When Jerusalem was conquered at the end of the first crusade in 1099 many Crusaders felt they were avenging the sacking of the Holy Sepulchre by the Fatamid Caliph Al-Hakim ninety years earlier and after the conquest the communal insult was compounded when a cross was erected on the roof of the Dome of the Rock.¹⁰¹ Similar patterns have been repeated in religious conflicts throughout the ages.

2.6.2 *Temporal Significance*

The majority of attacks carried out by religious groups are made against targets which are of an avowedly temporal nature. In many respects this does not effect their symbolic nature or psychological effects, although the sacredness of a target will amplify the effect and reaction to an attack. Temporal locations may be significant because they are the site of concentrations of the enemy, or because they represent the physical embodiment of the cosmic foe such as government facilities, embassies or military installations. Along side these 'high value' temporal locations are other, seemingly more

¹⁰¹ Al-Hakim allegedly renamed the Church *Kanizat al-Qumama* - 'the Church of the Dungheap'. C. Coughlin, *A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions*, p. 169. In a similar vein of insult the Israeli flag was raised above the Dome after its capture in 1967, only to be removed on the orders of the then defence minister, Moshe Dayan.

mundane ones such as transport systems and other basic public infrastructure. A similar process is engaged by secular groups, as typified by left-wing organisations which attack the basis of capitalist society and those which perpetuate that society.¹⁰² In the case of the latter, prediction and prevention are more difficult due to the sheer number of targets to be protected. The symbolic value of such locations cannot be underestimated, representing in many cases the physical embodiment of the power and stability of a society itself.¹⁰³ These are examples of 'cultural centres' in a society which are "concentrated loci of serious acts; they consist in the point or points in a society where its leading ideas come together with its leading institutions to create an arena in which events that most vitally affect its members' lives take place."¹⁰⁴ Attacks on such targets not only have a powerful psychological impact on the general populace but also challenge the claims to legitimacy made by both state and society.

2.7 The Targets

Whatever the mechanisms which compel a group to turn towards violence, one of the first steps is to decide which people will be targeted.¹⁰⁵ Ideology is certainly an important indicator in this regard, but so too are the context within which a group operates, the opportunities that present themselves, the constraints that exist and the group's overall objectives.¹⁰⁶ Target groups may be defined simply along the lines of religious belief, or along those of political significance, but in both cases they are perceived as threatening the true faith. While it is true for some religious groups that the "absence of a constituency in the secular terrorist sense leads to a sanctioning of almost limitless violence against a

¹⁰² Within left-wing groups there has been a similar variation in tactical procedure brought about by ideology, leadership and various constraining forces. See M. Crenshaw, 'The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Strategic Choice', in W. Reich (ed.), *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, 1990.

¹⁰³ M. Juergensmeyer, 'Terror Mandated by God', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1997, p. 19.

¹⁰⁴ C. Geertz, 'Centers, Kings and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power', in C. Geertz (ed.), *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology*, 1993, p. 122-123. See also E. Shils, 'Charisma, Order and Status' *American Sociological Review*, April 1965. Shils states that these cultural centres (unlike symbolic religious locations) have "nothing to do with geometry and little with geography".

¹⁰⁵ Targets in this case refers to people, the other primary category of target type physical targets in the form of locations, having been examined above. Psychological targets are not considered here.

¹⁰⁶ For the role of ideology in target selection see C. Drake, 'The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. X, # 2, 1988.

virtually open ended category of targets"¹⁰⁷, certain group types favour certain types of targets depending upon their capabilities and declared objectives. Target groups may include members of other religions and 'apostates' of the same religion, simple but all embracing distinctions created by a Manichaeian outlook. The latter group frequently includes religious moderates and what may be described as 'co-opted' religious establishments as well as members of the political hierarchy and the repressive apparatus. The 'apostate' label is a powerful rhetorical device for revolutionary groups as deviation from a religion is frequently perceived to be a worse crime than ignorance of it.¹⁰⁸ Scripture provides a rich source for identifying and describing target groups, and in some cases defining appropriate punishments and creating contemporary associations with scriptural enemies. When examining target selection, it is important to recognise the gap between the rhetoric employed by a group to define and demonise a target group and those targets which actually become the victims of violence.

2.7.1 *Other Religions*

As befits a group of religions with a long history of inter-communal violence, other religions are frequently the targets of religious groups. The common feature of such targets is that they are believed to pose a threat - both theological and physical - to the manifest destiny of a 'chosen' people, a threat which frequently transcends time. The most obvious contemporary examples of sub-state group inter-communal violence include: Israeli Jews - especially settlers - and members of the Jewish Diaspora targeted by Islamic groups and also Christian groups; Palestinian Muslims, and to a lesser extent Christians, targeted by Jewish groups; and what might best be referred to as the 'Christian West' - primarily the U.S. and her allies, long a target of Islamic groups. Scriptural and historical identifications of enemies are commonly evoked which establishes a direct continuity between the divine word and contemporary circumstances. Israeli Jewish fundamentalists, for example, have

¹⁰⁷ B. Hoffman, *Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative*, RAND P-7834, RAND, Santa Monica, p. 3. A similar situation can be seen in secular terrorism and violence where it has been noted that "the most accessible targets [in a corrupt society] are human beings and it is all too easy to expand the concept of enemy to encompass anyone who is not actively involved in overthrowing the society." G. Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures*, 2nd. edn., 1989.

¹⁰⁸ In Islam for example there is a hadith transmitted through the Prophet's uncle Al-Abbas which says "Whoever changes his religion, kill him." The death penalty for apostasy is not mentioned in the Quran and opinions vary as to the appropriate punishment. See J.W. Bowker, *Voices of Islam*, 1995, p. 100-105.

likened the Arabs to the biblical Amalekites who were wiped out by the order of God as a punishment for their treachery and cruelty towards the nation of Israel.¹⁰⁹ The Arabs have been identified as similarly 'treacherous and cruel', and, it is claimed, are direct descendants of the Amalekites thus providing a scriptural justification for their extermination.¹¹⁰ Christian groups such as Aryan Nations refer to Jews as 'the children of Satan (or darkness)' that must be destroyed.¹¹¹ Similarly, militant Islamic groups frequently label Christians as 'Crusaders', evoking traditions of the first bloody attempts at oppression by the Christian West of Muslim lands.¹¹²

2.7.2 Apostates

An equally common target group - and in many cases both a more threatening and accessible one - is that of apostates. Again scriptural parallels and justifications are commonly employed to bridge the space between past and present. Shi'a Muslims, for example, evoke the character of Yazid, the 'false' Umayyid caliph, responsible for the martyrdom of Hussain at Karbala, when referring to 'un-Islamic' leaders.¹¹³ In Egypt, the despotic historical figure of the 'pharaoh' has been used to describe the incumbent ruler, and American right-wing Christian groups refer to the federal government as the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG), a manifestation of the 'Jewish Antichrist' - Jews themselves being identified as the first apostates. The label of apostasy is as useful and irrefutable as that of 'non-believer', imbuing the victim, as it does, with qualities offensive to God, thus making the victim's demise an act pleasing in the eyes of God. It is important to note that this group also includes those targeted because they are publicly moderate,

¹⁰⁹ See Exodus 17: 8-16. "Then the Lord said to Moses, 'Write this for a memorial in the book and recount it in the hearing of Joshua, that I will utterly blot out the remembrance of Amalek from under the heaven'". (Exodus 17: 14).

¹¹⁰ See for example the article by Rabbi Israel Hess published in the student magazine of Bar-Ilan University entitled "Genocide: A Commandment of the Torah", *Bar Kol*, February 26, 1980.

¹¹¹ "We believe that there are literal children of Satan in the world today...that the caananite Jew is the natural enemy of our Aryan (White) Race. *This is attested by scripture and all secular history*" (my italics), The Aryan Nations Website, <http://www.nidlink.com>, September 29, 1998. The theological justification offered for this statement comes from Genesis 3:15, 1 John 3:12,

¹¹² See for example K. Armstrong, *Holy Wars: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World*, 1988. A group alliance announced in February 1998, the 'International Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders', illustrates this last example well.

¹¹³ For example, Khomeini's identification of the Shah of Iran as Yazid. See D. Brumberg, 'Khomeini's Legacy: Islamic Rule and Islamic Social Justice' in R.S. Appleby (ed.), *Spokesmen for the Despised*, pp. 22, 30, 38.

because they are key members of the regime which a group finds itself struggling with, or because they are part of the security apparatus which keeps this regime secure or in power.

2.8 Tactics

The actual tactics employed by violent religious groups are, by and large, the same as those employed by violent secular groups. The key determinants are the group's ideological orientation and goals, and the context within which it operates. Consequently the tactics employed might range from those of an almost pacific nature such as the provision of welfare services or participation in a political process, to an array of conventional and unconventional violent activities. The employment of conventional methods such as bombings and shootings by religious groups however, has certainly been more prolific and destructive than that of violent secular groups, reflecting both the nature of their struggle and their world outlook.¹¹⁴ Seen within the mythological context of 'holy war' it has also been noted that "[t]he exact manner in which God's hosts go about subduing the world is relatively unimportant, as long as it is done with sufficient ferocity to effectively communicate the immensity of His rage."¹¹⁵ Once again context and group type are major determinants of the mode and scale of violence employed. The larger and more mature a group then the broader the scope for employing different means. By the same token, group size and organisation are not the sole determinants of sophistication. Some of the larger scale acts of violence perpetrated in the 1980s and 1990s have ostensibly been the work of a small group - the Oklahoma city and World Trade Centre bombings are prime examples.¹¹⁶

The construction of more powerful improvised explosive devices has meant that bombing has remained the most commonly used tool in the religious extremists arsenal. This is tempered by the fact that the area of greatest concern is the possibility that religious groups will acquire and use some form of unconventional weapon. This is worrying primarily because religious groups are widely believed to have fewer normative constraints

¹¹⁴ In 1995 for example while religious terrorists committed only 25 per cent of international terrorist incidents they were responsible for 58 per cent of the fatalities. See B. & D. Hoffman, 'Chronology of International terrorism, 1995', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VIII, # 3, 1996, pp. 87-127.

¹¹⁵ J. Aho, *Religious Mythology and the Art of War*, p. 156.

¹¹⁶ This is the phenomenon of the so-called 'amateur terrorist'. See B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, pp. 185, 302-204.

with regard to violence, because for a variety of reasons unconventional technology is more accessible than before, and also because unconventional weapons possess a unique symbolic, religious value. In the words of the French sociologist Jacques Ellul, the use of unconventional weapons by groups such as Aum Shinrikyo is an example of the 'democratisation of evil': "an increasing number of people among us is acquiring instruments that can hurt our neighbours or unknown people...This is the democratisation of evil. Means that were once reserved for the powerful...and which once constituted their privilege, are now within the reach of all of us."¹¹⁷ Such weapons may be seen as approximating the scriptural felling hand of God, and their effects similar to those brought about by the various cataclysms associated with Endtime myths. Although examples of actual unconventional usage by a religious group are limited to those conducted by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect, there are many other recorded incidents which suggest this is an area of greater concern than it ever was with secular terrorism and violence. What must also be considered when examining the tactics employed is the actual trajectory of the violence. Groups may escalate or de-escalate according to alterations within their operational context. A group might, for example, believe that the degree of persecution which they face or a change in the socio-political balance warrants a rapid escalation in violent activity. These considerations must be made with a view to what a group is attempting to achieve and the timetable by which it is operating.

2.8.1 Conventional

The tools of violent religious groups are virtually the same as those which have been employed by secular groups. Differences, however, exist in the scale and apparently indiscriminate nature of their deployment, and a propensity in a number of cases to accept 'martyrdom' in the process.¹¹⁸ Because the struggle is a sacred one, large scale casualties are desirable, partially contradicting previous adages concerning secular terror such as

¹¹⁷ J. Ellul, *What I Believe*, 1989, p. 60.

¹¹⁸ It is important to note that suicide attacks are not confined to religiously motivated violence. Significant exceptions are the Sri Lankan LTTE and the Turkish PKK. For an analysis of religious and secular suicide bombing see R. Gunaratna, 'Suicide Terrorism: A Global Threat', *Janes Intelligence Review*, Vol. XII, # 4, 2000, pp. 52-55.

"terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."¹¹⁹ Apart from traditions of, and sanctions for violence, all three religions (particularly Christianity and Islam) possess potent traditions of martyrdom, but it is the activist Islamic tradition which has seen the greatest expression in the contemporary era, accounting for all revealed religious suicide bombings. The most common forms of attack are shooting and bombings, the latter representing by far the lions share of fatalities caused by religious violence.¹²⁰ Other modes include kidnappings, hijackings, stabbings, intimidation and bank robberies. While most of these merely borrow the tools of modernity for practicality's sake, others such as stabbings (while obviously less efficient) may have resonance with symbolic, historical precedents such the Shi'ite Assassins or the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii.

The environment within which a group operates is also an important consideration for a tactical programme. A group such as Hizballah which operates in a relatively permissive security environment has been able to employ heavy weapons and extensive large scale guerrilla tactics. Most other groups which do not operate in such contexts tend to employ whatever weaponry is available *en situ* or can be smuggled in from elsewhere under the group's own auspices or with the help of a sympathetic state sponsor. The tactics in such cases are correspondingly subdued, and tend to remain proportional. In this respect groups which have members that belong to the security apparatus of the state may have opportunities to pilfer national armouries. Moreover certain tactics such as extensive, large scale bombing campaigns cannot realistically be pursued in a comparatively non-permissive environment due to limited resources and fears of security crack downs which may even threaten the group's survival.

2.8.2 Unconventional

Religious groups also appear to be the most likely candidate to employ unconventional weapons because of their absolute, Manichaeic world outlook, and

¹¹⁹ B. Jenkins, 'International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict' in D. Carlton & C. Schaerf (eds.), *International Terrorism and World Security*, 1975, p. 16. It should also be noted that the 'warning message', a 'mitigating' device employed in some secular bombings is never used by religious groups.

¹²⁰ See for example the various instalments of the RAND-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism published in *Terrorism and Political Violence*.

because of the scriptural resonance many of these weapons possess.¹²¹ All accounts of the apocalypse offer examples of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, accounts of plague and pestilence, and the cleansing properties of fire and unconventional weapons can be seen to represent these various Endtime disasters foreseen in much scripture. Apocalyptic fire in the form of nuclear weapons which will transform the wicked into ashes under the feet of the righteous¹²², or create the "lake of fire burning with brimstone"¹²³ into which the 'beast' and his armies will be plunged. The mysterious felling power of the hand of God can be identified in the form of radiation devices, nerve and chemical agents, and the ancient scriptural idea of 'plague' could be manifested in the form of biological weapons.¹²⁴ All these weapons have scriptural parallels if interpreted appropriately, and their mere existence and availability for use (whether at the state or sub-state level) can be seen as a partial fulfilment of prophecy.

Whether extremist groups will employ unconventional weapons has been a topic of debate amongst specialists for many years, a debate which intensified following the 1995 Tokyo nerve gas attacks.¹²⁵ The general contention that extremist use of unconventional weapons is of particular concern since 1990 rests on two concurrent trends: the growing availability of unconventional weapons and materials, and the increasing number of groups with extreme ideologies.¹²⁶ Actual incidents, however, have been slow to manifest themselves, and following the Tokyo attack there has been no evidence that the incident has inspired imitative behaviour as other tactics such as

¹²¹ For the purposes of this thesis the term unconventional weapons will include nuclear explosive devices and radiological contaminants, lethal chemical agents and lethal biological agents (toxins and pathogens). It will not include large high explosive devices or attacks on critical infrastructure.

¹²² Malachi 4: 3.

¹²³ Revelation 19: 20.

¹²⁴ The fifth plague from the book of Exodus (9: 1-7) for example is commonly assumed to be Anthrax.

¹²⁵ Some examples of the literature concerned with this debate include: R. Purver, *Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to Open Literature*, 1995; W. Laquer, 'Post-modern Terrorism', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXV, # 5, 1996, pp. 24-36; B. Roberts (ed.), *Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses*, 1997; E. Sprinzak, 'The Great Superterrorism Scare', *Foreign Policy*, # 112, 1998, pp. 110-124; A. Carter, J. Deutch & P. Zelikow, 'Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXXVII, # 6, 1998, pp. 80-94; A. Falkenrath, 'Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism', *Survival*, Vol. XL, # 3, 1998, pp. 43-65; K. Kamp, J. Pilat & J. Stern with a response by R. Falkenrath, 'WMD Terrorism: An Exchange', *Survival*, Vol. XL, # 4, 1999, pp. 168-183; J. Stern, *The Ultimate Terrorists*, 1999; and J. Tucker, *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, 2000.

¹²⁶ W. Laqueur, 'The New Face of Terrorism', *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. XXI, # 4, 1998, p. 171.

hijacking, kidnapping and barricade and hostage taking have in the past.¹²⁷ If there is a consensus on extremist groups employing unconventional weapons it would seem to be that the most likely candidates are religiously motivated groups, especially those with a strong messianic or apocalyptic message, ethnic groups motivated by race hate or revenge and small anti-social groups alienated from society.¹²⁸ While the first of these categories is avowedly religious in orientation, the second could very well have a clear religious affiliation and the third - if not a religious group or splinter - would almost certainly draw upon the secular apocalyptic. The second and third categories would therefore have an ideological structure and justificatory process similar to that laid out above. What this thesis intends to add to the debate is a holistic understanding of the appeal unconventional weapons have to extremist religious organisations and the constraints governing their use and the broader applicability of these observations to organisations which are not specifically religious in orientation.

2.9 Categorisation of Groups

While the identification of these six elements reveals patterns of behaviour and perception, their examination alone does not shed much light on a particular group's objectives and the related issue of the group's propensity to engage in violence. The six elements of religious violence therefore will be used to analyse the behaviour of ten case studies in three different group types, *mainstream*, *core* and *messianic*. Each group type category will include one primary example from each of the revealed religions (except for the mainstream category as outlined above) which will be examined in depth, and these in turn will be supported by the greater body of evidence available from other cases. Various categorisations of violent extremist groups have been offered in the past. James Q. Wilson, for instance, offers three incentive based categorisations: 'issue oriented' or protest groups which pursue a single specific objective; ideological or revolutionary groups which offer a comprehensive rejection of the existing *status quo* and a future replacement; and redemptive, moralistic group which concentrate primarily on changing the lives of group

¹²⁷ B. Jenkins, 'The WMD Terrorist Threat - Is There a Consensus View?', in B. Roberts (ed.), *Hype or Reality? The "New Terrorism" and Mass Casualty Attacks*, 2000, p. 244.

¹²⁸ E. Sprinzak, 'On Not Overstating the Problem', in B. Roberts (ed.), *Hype or Reality?*, pp. 6-7, and K. Campbell, 'On Not Understanding the Problem', in *Hype or Reality?*, pp. 30-34.

members.¹²⁹ Such a categorisation is problematic when considering a broad array of religious groups. While Crenshaw claims that "[r]eligious or sacred terrorism falls into this [redemptive] category"¹³⁰, most religious groups do offer a critique of the temporal polity and posit a religiously based alternative. While there are group typologies offered for specific manifestations of religious violence - most notably that offered by H.R. Dekmejian¹³¹ for Islamic groups, and that by J. Kaplan¹³² with regard to Christian groups - these suffer from the obvious and necessary drawback of communal particularism. An alternative form of typology is offered by E. Sprinzak which examines the *forms* of terrorism. These include revolutionary terrorism, reactive terrorism, vigilante terrorism, racist terrorism, millenarian terrorism and youth culture terrorism. These are not mutually exclusive and encompass both secular and religious violence.¹³³ As will be seen below when the three group types are elaborated upon they represent a synthesis of existing typologies in terms of group and form.

As with all group structures the three chosen are dynamic and adaptive. The space between these categories is thus permeable and a group may move from one form to another in the same way a group may change its leadership structure or the tactics it chooses to employ. Indeed, changes in leadership may lead a group to move from one category to another. Such movements are governed by the environment within which they exist and operate, or more simply by the passage of time. Indeed the significance and impact of contemporary religious violence is largely the result of the passage of time as technological advances have brought rapid developments in the areas of communications, transport and weaponry.¹³⁴ Groups may even interact or co-operate with, or be related to, others in different categories. There is, for example, an undeniable relationship to be found between the mainstream Aryan Nations organisation and various core and messianic right-wing Christian groups, such as the Order, as there is between Kach and its various offshoots, or the broad influence in Muslim groups of the Muslim Brotherhood. While there

¹²⁹ J. Q. Wilson, *Political Organisations*, 1973, pp. 48-51.

¹³⁰ M. Crenshaw, 'Theories of Terrorism', p. 20.

¹³¹ *Islam in Revolution*, 1995.

¹³² 'Right Wing Violence in North America', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VII, # 1, 1995.

¹³³ E. Sprinzak, 'Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VII, # 1, pp. 22-37.

¹³⁴ G. Wardlaw, *Political Terrorism*, p.25. While Wardlaw does not discuss religious terrorism specifically the obvious similarity between the secular and religious here is note-worthy.

are superficial similarities between categories - core groups, for example, are small in size but so are many messianic ones - each is made distinct in its own right, by differing attitudes towards the six parameter elements. The following section will explain in detail the criteria which delineate each group category and also offer some preliminary observations on the relationship between the three group categories and the six primary elements.

2.9.1 *Mainstream Groups*

Mainstream groups tend to possess a larger popular support base than the other two group types, a support base frequently swelled because they offer simple solutions to apparently intractable social, economic and political problems and engage in extensive social welfare activities. The leadership structure of mainstream groups is bureaucratic due to their size and the core premises of the group established by prominent ideologues both past and present. Leadership, however, may have originally begun as a charismatic form, and elements within the leadership structure may well be regarded as charismatic. Due to their size and activities such groups often seek involvement in the mainstream political process if the circumstances are suitable. The four primary cases chosen for the mainstream category are Aryan Nations, Kach and Hizballah and Hamas. Each of these groups arose from vastly different, specific crisis environments and consequently have different relationships to the conduct of violence - Kach and Aryan Nations, for example, have never embarked on declared, systematic violent campaigns, primarily for reasons of group survival, although they have been instrumental in inciting and justifying violence. Similar patterns are discernible in the social relationships of all four groups and their attitudes towards the place of violence in socio-religious change.

The Mainstream group category is important because it represents an *evolutionary* form whereby a mixture of violence and socio-political involvement are employed to achieve objectives. To borrow terminology employed in examinations of political Islam, they embrace both revolutionary and reformist ideological poles.¹³⁵ It is evolutionary in nature because it is a form that groups may move into having exhausted the possibilities of

¹³⁵ See for instance O. Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 1994, pp. 24, 77-80, and G. Keppel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh*, 1985, pp. 16-20.

violent struggle and embraced an opportunity to transform themselves. Such groups frequently find it convenient to conduct violent activities through a 'military wing' or through direct affiliates in order to conceal the involvement of the parent group. In a decentralised example such as that of Aryan Nations violence may be conducted by an 'affiliated' (yet independent) organisation which is acting with no tactical or strategic guidance from the parent group. Mainstream groups in such cases perform the function of providing the ideological raw material for violent splinter groups consisting of disaffected individuals who have rejected the programme of the parent movement as being too quietist.¹³⁶ Generally due to their size, longevity and relatively broad agenda, groups in this category may also have links to other groups through the influence of common beliefs or of common personalities.¹³⁷

2.9.2 Core Groups

Core groups are similar to mainstream groups in terms of a revolutionary approach although they generally eschew political involvement and have a smaller popular support base. This last point is not to say there is no widespread sympathy for their actions, merely that their scope of action, which is basically limited to violence, has a corresponding effect on membership structure and numbers, and on the group's claims for legitimacy. Organisationally such groups do not possess large memberships primarily for security reasons, and also deem structured popular support as unnecessary due to their rejection of mainstream political processes. Leadership may be exclusively charismatic or exhibit a bureaucratic dimension depending on the group's course of action and longevity. The three main cases for the core category are Eyal, the Order and the PIJ. The core group type also covers a spectrum of professionalism - a phenomenon more noticeable in groups which stress the primacy of violent struggle.¹³⁸ Groups such as the primary cases and others may have varying degrees of success (and certainly ambitions) in a limited, domestic context, but they tend not to engage in activities beyond their primary area of geographical concern

¹³⁶ The Order is a good example. As Richard Butler, founder of Aryan Nations explained of them "In their view the program...to reach the masses of our people through truth, logic, and reasonableness would never be allowed because the media are controlled by our enemies." *Washington Post*, December 26, 1984.

¹³⁷ In the case of Jewish groups the relationship between the JDL, Kach, Kahane Chai and Eyal is instructive.

¹³⁸ E. Sprinzak, *From Theory to Practice: Developing Early Warning Indicators for Terrorism*, 1998.

due to their size and capabilities. Others such as those belonging to the so called 'Bin Laden network' may be effective on a large scale (physically and psychologically) in an international context. Generally speaking their relatively small size and cellular structure makes them comparatively more difficult to detect.¹³⁹

2.9.3 Messianic/ Apocalyptic Groups

The last category, messianic groups, is certainly the most radical and also the least common.¹⁴⁰ The primary cases chosen for this category are the Jewish Underground, Aum Shinrikyo and the Saudi Ikhwan. These also tend to be small in size (there are of course exceptions. Aum Shinrikyo for instance had a large international following, although the numbers engaged in, or cognisant of, violence were relatively small) and governed by a charismatic leadership. The elements of mass support and social welfare are almost always absent¹⁴¹ and the activities of the group centre around the conduct of symbolic violent actions which have more to do with actively participating in a redemptive process promised by scriptural prophecy than with instituting a new temporal order. The keys to violent messianism are the perceptions that the messianic age and all the trials and tribulations associated with it are not only imminent but are also subject to human agency. As D.C. Rapoport notes "[o]nce a messianic advent is seen as imminent, particular elements of a messianic doctrine become critical in pulling a believer in the direction of terror."¹⁴² The particular elements centre around the acceptability of extra-normal violence and also that believers need to prove to themselves (and/or their God) that redemption is still relevant. The messianic group type is the most likely to employ specific messianic dating traditions when considering the timing and location of violence. Because of this attitude towards the purpose of violence and their small size, such groups seldom have the

¹³⁹ The logical extreme of this is an act perpetrated by an individual in isolation from a group. While these are the most difficult to detect they should not be dismissed as aberrations as in most cases some form of group affiliation can be observed.

¹⁴⁰ It should be noted that Dekmejian's definition of a messianic group concerns itself more with puritanical revivalism rather than the quest for active messianic redemption. See *Islam in Revolution*, p. 60.

¹⁴¹ The obvious exception is Aum Shinrikyo which at its peak had a membership of about 40,000 people in many different countries and which was responsible for a large business empire. Having said this it is important to note that those responsible for planning and committing violent acts constitute an identifiable central core.

¹⁴² D.C. Rapoport, *Why Does Messianism Produce Terrorism?*, unpublished paper read at the eighty-first meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 1985, abstract.

opportunity to reach maturity - indeed this would be contrary to their belief that the end of the temporal order is not only assured but is also imminent.

At the same time many messianic groups do exhibit a tendency to relate their messianic objectives to the temporal political situation, indeed their perception of a redemptive crisis environment is generally driven, or at least informed by, temporal political events. A quick examination of the three primary cases illustrates this well. Before the plot to destroy the Muslim shrines on the Temple Mount could be carried out, the Jewish Underground concerned itself with bombing and shooting a limited range of 'conventional' targets.¹⁴³ Aum Shinrikyo contested a Japanese general election and had organised a shadow government for after the apocalypse.¹⁴⁴ And despite the Saudi Ikhwan declaring a Mahdi in the Grand Mosque, Juhayman Utaybi's programme of action was as much one of messianic expectation as one which employed religious rhetoric to condemn the perceived iniquities of the Saudi regime and demand the institution of an Islamic government similar to that which existed in seventh century Arabia. Nonetheless, all three were moved to conduct or plan violent acts which transcended those imagined by other group categories.

2.10 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to establish the scope of this thesis and to outline the framework for analysis which will be applied to examine the phenomenon of revealed religious violence. The six key components of this framework span the process of rationalising and justifying violence to the practical considerations governing violent conduct, and it is these six components which will form the basis of the ensuing chapters. The first of these is the formation of an ideological programme, drawing on religious traditions and contextualised within a specific, contemporary crisis environment. This ideological programme defines a group's world view and provides the sanctions for violent activity. The second is the role of leadership which exerts an enormous degree of influence

¹⁴³ In the words of one commentator "a close study of the Underground suggests that while it was mainly shaped by the millenarian theology of Yehuda Etzion, it ended up with rugged vigilante terrorism". E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, p. 207.

¹⁴⁴ Aum's resounding electoral failure certainly contributed to the group's attitude towards extra-normative violence.

on the formation of ideology and in all cases the form that leadership takes will determine a group's programme of action and by extension its course and longevity. The third component is time, both the group's perception of time itself and the role of timing in carrying out violent acts. The fourth factor is the role of location in terms of both sacred spaces and the temporal practicalities of where to strike for maximum effect. The fifth element is the identification of target groups, basically those who pose the contemporary threat or crisis and defined as part of the ideological programme using religious imagery. The final component is the tactics employed to achieve the groups objectives. These may be non-violent in the form of political mobilisation, they may be conventional tactics or, in extreme cases, they may even be unconventional in nature. These six components will be used to examine ten case which represent a cross section of revealed religious extremist groups which have arisen in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The case studies in turn have been divided into three distinct categories, mainstream, core and messianic/apocalyptic which will enable comparisons to be made both within religions and between them. The starting point for understanding any organised violent religious movement is an examination of the processes involved in adapting and interpreting traditional messages within a contemporary crisis milieu and reformulating these messages into an ideology which justifies violence.

Chapter III

The Formation of Ideology

The objective of this chapter is to consider the process whereby violence is deemed necessary in terms of a group's overall strategy and declared objectives, and then is *rationalised* through the selective construction of an ideological programme. All the cases examined spring from belief systems which have similar scriptural messages, an eschatology of some form and justifications for violence against an identifiable other. The process of rationalisation for these groups is therefore dependent upon selectively interpreting existing religious traditions within a contemporary context and selecting those elements which provide clear sanctions for violence, according activism a divine and immutable legitimacy. The degree to which different elements within this justification are emphasised between group categories and also within them depends upon the environmental context in which a group exists and its perception of the historical role it sees itself as playing. These differences, however, are largely a matter of *emphasis* rather than the holistic, fundamental religious message.

As shown in Chapter Two, five common components of religious extremist ideology have been identified but within these five there is much scope for variation. Mainstream groups by virtue of their involvement in mainstream society must ensure that their ideological message, while clearly defining the boundaries of the struggle (both physical and metaphysical), retains a strong temporal relevance. This is certainly true of Kach, even though it has been socially excluded, and of Aryan Nations which represents a relatively limited constituency. In the case of groups like Hizballah and Hamas, this message must also remain sufficiently flexible to allow for participation in mainstream politics in order to bridge their ultimate ideological objectives with day to day reality. For core groups, the issue of flexibility is of less importance and although the temporal dimension is still crucial because these groups identify themselves as 'revolutionary vanguards', the devotion to violent means in a grossly uneven struggle allows for more extreme expressions of religious rhetoric. For messianic and apocalyptic groups, the

ideological emphasis relies heavily on eschatological traditions and the group's role in the fulfilment of End-time prophecy. For these groups the scale and finality of the perceived struggle warrants an even more exclusive and immutable ideological programme

3.1 Mainstream Groups

3.1.1 Kach

In terms of ideology the Kach movement represents the most significant and influential Jewish extremist group to this date. While the organisation itself has suffered from various setbacks - especially the death of its founder and primary ideologue, and proscription by the Israeli and U.S. governments - the ideological justifications for violence embodied in Kach have become highly influential in the contemporary Israeli extreme right. The justifications and rationalisations offered by Kach looked back to a previous era of Jewish militance through the lens of centuries of subjugation and persecution. Militance and extremism functioned as a form of revenge which would ensure the survival and prosperity of the newly recreated Jewish state.

While Meir Kahane drew on a long line of Jewish activists for inspiration and ideas, "his theory of revenge is [both] unprecedented and new."¹ The ideology developed by the Jewish Defence League (JDL), which demanded that Jews be protected wherever they were victimised, was unique. Before he moved to Israel and formed Kach, Kahane initially used his position as an associate editor of the *Brooklyn Jewish Press* to propagate his ideas on Jewish strength and the need to defend the Jewish faith with force in his weekly column. Equally, books based on the ideas expressed in the column further elaborated his ideology, spreading his ideas throughout the Jewish community, initially only in the U.S. but later in Europe, South Africa and Israel. Around the core of his ideas sprang a violently anti-gentile message which fed on the insecurities of Jews in the Diaspora, and especially those in Israel. Kahane's world view situated the Jewish people in

¹ E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, 1991, p. 59. Interestingly Sprinzak notes similarities between the ideology of Kahane and that of the Franz Fanon - primarily the idea that the violence of the oppressed directed against the oppressors can heal the former's psychological wounds. See also B. M. Perinbam, *Holy Violence: The Revolutionary Thought of Franz Fanon*, 1982.

a hostile world where they were assailed by different enemies, but enemies united by their attempts to oppress or destroy the Jewish people and to frustrate the fulfilment of Jewish religious destiny.

Golden Age Myth

The Golden Age as perceived by Kach is both redemptive and traditional. It is redemptive in that, like the Gush Emunim, the organisation saw the establishment of the state of Israel and the 1967 war as direct evidence that the Jewish redemptive process was unfolding. The 1967 war was of particular significance resulting as it did in the conquest of biblical Judea and Samaria and in direct control over the Western Wall. It is traditional in that the core values emphasised by the group rely on obedience to the Halakah. Central to the achievement of this Golden Age is a willingness on the part of the Jewish people to repent. In 1973 and 1974, when he was leader of the JDL, Kahane expressed his redemptive ideas in two essays, *Israel's Eternity and Victory* and *Numbers 23:9*.² The basic idea centres around a relatively obscure biblical passage from Isaiah: "I, the Lord, will hasten it [the redemption] in its time"³, and upon the rabbinical interpretation "[i]f they, the Jews, merit it I will hurry it. If they do not merit it then it will come 'in its time'."⁴ Redemption is inevitable, but the haste and ease with which it comes about depends entirely on the behaviour of the Jewish people.

If there is an historical Golden Age that fits with Kach's theories of revenge and legitimate violence then it is the 'revolutionary' period of the Maccabean and the first and second revolts. While separated by centuries (the Maccabean revolt began in the second century BC and the Bar Khokhba revolt ended in 135 AD) these events have a common thread of a religiously based revolt against gentile oppression: "[i]t was not in the role of Mahatma Ghandi that the Jews fought at Massada; the men of Bar-Kokhba and Judah Maccabee never went to a Quaker meeting."⁵ Like so much of Kach's rhetoric, this

² 1973 and 1984 respectively.

³ Isaiah 60:22.

⁴ Sanhedrin 93.

⁵ M. Kahane, *The Story of the Jewish Defence League*, 1975, p. 99-100. The use of significant historical figures in Kach rhetoric is important. At his funeral for example Baruch Goldstein was compared by Rabbi Ariel to Samson and Judah the Maccabee. See U. Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days That Changed the Middle East*, 1998, p. 120.

contains an explicit rejection of passive resistance and other non-violent strategies which had contributed to the miseries of the Jewish people for so long. The political dimension of this age is akin to that of the Davidic era where the Jewish people are ruled by a divinely sanctioned warrior and scholar king and a powerful priestly, judicial class.

Theft of Culture

While the Arab population of Israel was seen by Kach as the primary enemy and focus of aggression, the greater cultural threat was seen as coming from the liberal West. Judaism and Zionism were identified as being fundamentally different to liberal Western modes of thought and were described in dialectical terms. According to Kahane: "[t]he one represents spiritual life and the other death, the one truth and the other falsehood and delusion, the one blessing and the other curse."⁶ Politically, this idea was extended to claim that while Judaism is based on the idea that the truth is known, democracy is based on the idea that we cannot know the truth. Thus, the clearest political expression of Western liberal democracy is seen as a denial of religious identity and destiny. Kahane assertively called for the removal of gentile culture:

"[c]leanse the Land of Israel of the foreign pollution of gentilized culture. The foreigners vomit their sickness onto us and we swallow it eagerly...Let us vomit them out and purge the Holy Land of any vestiges of impurity."⁷

The adoption of democracy by the state of Israel meant that the fulfilment of the Jewish messianic promise was severely jeopardised. In the words of one Kach leader, Baruch Marzel: "[we] feel God gave us in the six-day war, with a miracle, this country. We are taking this present from God and tossing it away. They are breaking every holy thing in this country, the Government, in a very brutal way."⁸ This disdain, however, did not prevent Kach from actively participating in democratic politics. On the contrary, this was to be the route by which Kach could subvert and reconstitute Israeli society and politics.

Concrete plans to more effectively preserve Jewish culture were enumerated in the group's political programme (one that was to be instituted if Kach ever achieved power). These included: a legal prohibition on marriage and sexual relations between Jews and

⁶ M. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Questions for Comfortable Jews*, 1987, p. 179.

⁷ *Village Voice*, October 2, 1984.

⁸ *The New York Times*, November 19, 1995.

Gentiles, especially between Jews and Arabs which was "[t]he worst of the tragedy and the most dangerous"⁹; a complete overhaul of schooling curricula with a heavy emphasis to be placed on the study of Judaism and the creation of a sense of "Jewish pride"¹⁰; the media, both print and electronic, would play a similar role in promoting Judaism and Jewish nationalism and at the same time pornography would be banned in order to preserve "[t]he purity and sanctity of the Jewish soul"¹¹; missionary work in Israel would be forbidden; and general issues concerning traditional attitudes towards dress, dietary laws, and respect for the Sabbath. This comprehensive idea of cultural theft has survived the death of Kahane, and still retains the same historic resonance. In the words of Benjamin Kahane "[t]oday's cultural war is more intense than the Hasmonean one. The Hellenization has penetrated our lives very deeply and its ideas have influenced even the 'national' and religious public."¹²

Scripturalism

The scriptural underpinnings of Kach ideology are found primarily in the Old Testament, much of which deals with the various struggles of the Jewish people against other religious and tribal enemies and also with the deviations and perfidy of Jews themselves. Examples of the first category include the Amalekites who are likened to contemporary Arabs. Examples of the second are numerous and typified by verses such as Jeremiah 2:13: "[f]or My people have committed two evils; they have forsaken Me, the fountain of living waters, and hewed them out cisterns - broken cisterns - that can hold no water [*sic*]."¹³ Kach even justified the selectivity of their religious rhetoric. Of the ruling "[w]hat is hateful to you do not do unto your fellow people", Kahane urged that such teaching was inappropriate in such difficult and critical times.¹⁴ Kahane went further with reference to 'apostate' Jews by saying "[t]he Torah says to burn out the evil from our midst. Indeed, the Rabbis of the Talmud bring down the verse, "and thou shalt love thy fellow Jew as thyself" in order to explain why we must kill the Jew who is deserving of death in a

⁹ M. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Questions*, p. 206.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

¹¹ M. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Questions*, p. 271.

¹² B. Kahane, 'A Cultural War', in M. Ben Horin (ed.), *Baruch Hagever*, p. 256

¹³ M. Kahane, *Jews and Jews*, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/1651/writings/jew_jew.htm.

¹⁴ R. Mergui & P. Simonnot, *Israel's Ayatollahs: Meir Kahane and the Far Right in Israel*, 1987, p. 87.

humane way."¹⁵ In Kahane's *Listen World, Listen Jew*, the humiliations perpetrated against the Jewish people are described as *hillul hashem* or 'profanation of the name' (of God).¹⁶ Acts such as ending the exile or protecting Jews, this is *Kiddush hashem* or 'sanctification of the divine name'.¹⁷ In the outlook of Kach, injustice and evil are proof that God is absent from the world. By contrast, "God's victory and revenge over His enemies, the evildoers" - through the instruments of his faithful servants - proves that "[v]erily there is a G-d Who judges on earth! (Psalms 58:12)."¹⁸

Manichaeen World View

The primary focus of Kach's Manichean world view are the gentiles, for it is they and their predecessors who are responsible for the sufferings and humiliations of the Jewish people. As one observer notes: "Kahane's hostility to the Gentiles may not be the cardinal presupposition of his political theology, but it is certainly its most dominant emotional and psychological theme."¹⁹ In this way the movement defined the Jewish people as distinct from the other peoples of the world who were not merely ambivalent about the Jews, but were at best hostile to, at worst bent on the destruction of the Jews - a supposition with ample historical evidence to support it. In terms of violence itself, Kahane saw the world simply in terms of good and evil, making the argument that "[v]iolence against evil is not the same as violence against good."²⁰ Violence in the course of protecting Jewish interests was simply 'love of Jewry' (*ahavat Yisroel*) which led Kahane to proclaim that "Jewish violence in defence of Jewish interests is never bad."²¹

The secondary focus is against apostate or irreligious Jews. When referring to secular Israelis, Kahane frequently employed the term 'Hellenist'. It is important to note that in English this term is not a literal translation from the Hebrew, which apart from the

¹⁵ *The Jewish Press*, August 31, 1984.

¹⁶ *Hillul hashem* must be avoided because it breaks the third commandment. The phrase is used to denote anything which might bring disgrace to Judaism or the Jewish people.

¹⁷ In Leviticus 22:32 the Israelites are commanded not to profane God's name, and the rabbis taught that the Lord's name could be sanctified in three ways: prayer, excellent conduct and martyrdom. The last has always been the ultimate expression of *Kiddush hashem*.

¹⁸ M. Kahane, *Revenge - The Jewish Approach*, <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/1651/writings/venge.htm>.

¹⁹ E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe', p. 50.

²⁰ M. Kahane, *The Story of the Jewish Defense League*, p. 141.

²¹ *ibid.* p. 142.

cultural dimension also connotes betrayal.²² At the time of the Maccabean revolt, Jews who conformed to Greek culture and religion were considered traitors and some were executed.²³ The Hellenists in the contemporary world are closely identified with the modernism of Western gentiles. Other references, especially those applied to Arabs, were far less subtle. At assemblies held by Kach at the Hebrew University branches in Haifa and Acre, Kahane would open with the greeting "shalom Jews, shalom dogs", the latter part of the salutation directed at Arabs in the audience.²⁴ The dehumanising process was taken to the extent that Kach ideology denied there were good and bad Arabs, instead there were only 'stupid' and 'clever' ones - the former openly declared their desire for the destruction of Israel and the latter merely disguised their true intentions by talking of compromise and coexistence. The idea of expelling Arabs from Israel was also described in more than secular political terms:

"[t]he Arabs of Israel represent *Hillul Hashem* (defamation of God) in its starkest form...Their transfer from the land of Israel...*is a religious issue, a religious obligation, a commandment to erase Hillul Hashem...*Let us remove the Arabs from Israel and bring the redemption."²⁵

Messianic Vision

The messianic world view of Kach is similar to that held by the Gush Emunim and most of the Israeli religious right both past and present. This world view centred around the sovereignty of the Jewish people over the whole land of Israel, a sovereignty granted "by virtue of the promise of the almighty and the historical fact of tenure and unbroken hope of return based on that promise."²⁶ Territories 'liberated' during the 1967 war were as much a part of this promise as any other, Jewish settlements should be allowed throughout the land of Israel and all the 'liberated' lands should be integrated into Israel proper. Moreover, the capture of the Western Wall, Judaism's holiest site, further identified these

²² R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs)', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IV, # 1, 1992, p. 56, fn. 42.

²³ In 1983 three Kach activists were interviewed by *Ha'aretz* and described a night of violence against Arabs and Arab property in Jerusalem and Hebron. Kahane later expressed approval of their actions and lauded them as 'Maccabees', *Ha'aretz* November 27, 1984.

²⁴ R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism', p. 56.

²⁵ M. Kahane, *They Must Go*, 1981, pp. 275-276.

²⁶ M. Kahane, *Listen World, Listen Jew*, 1983, p. 137.

victories with the Jewish redemptive process. Kahane, however, was to a certain extent more extreme than the Rabbis Kook. For Kahane, Jewish sovereignty solves only the problem of exile and not that of redress for the damage caused to the Jewish people by gentiles over time immemorial. Revenge was thus an integral part of Kahane's ideological message - not just reactive revenge but historical revenge. Kach's vision of history, especially the emphasis on legitimisation of violence in the face of ongoing tragedy, has been described as 'catastrophic messianism'.²⁷ The term implies both the redemptive message of the organisation, as well as the overwhelming role violence and suffering (at the hands of gentiles or at the hands of a disappointed and vengeful God) play in Kach's outlook. While there is no firm messianic programme many of the proposed actions of Kach such as the expulsion of the Arab population, the institution of religious law and the removal of the Muslim presence from the Temple Mount²⁸ may certainly be seen as steps towards the fulfilment of messianic prophecy. Where the Kach ideology can be described as messianic it is certainly activist in orientation. Indeed, Kahane is quoted as saying in 1980:

"[a] horrible world war is coming, tens of millions of people will die. It will be the apocalypse. God will punish us for forsaking him. But we must have faith. The Messiah will come...The amount of suffering we endure will depend upon what we do between now and the end. That's up to us - it's not up to God."²⁹

The formation of Kach's ideology sprang from the belief that the Jewish people have always been oppressed by gentiles and that this has never been more true than in the contemporary period. This belief established a clear dialectic outlook and identified an equally clear threat to Jewish culture. The ideology was amply supported by previous historical experiences which appeared to reflect contemporary events, and by the selective use of Jewish religious tradition, drawing primarily on militant concepts. Of equal

²⁷ E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe', pp. 51-54. Alternatively, as Gershom Scholem notes "Jewish messianism is in its origins and by its nature - and this cannot be sufficiently emphasised - a theory of catastrophe. This theory stresses the revolutionary, cataclysmic element in the transition from every historical present to the messianic future". *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and Other Essays on Jewish Spirituality*, 1971, p. 7.

²⁸ The Muslim Holy sites according to Kahane would be "carefully removed" to another location, presumably outside Israel. Kahane, *Uncomfortable Question*, p. 272-273. This contrasts with Kahane's arrest and detention in 1980 for plotting to bomb the Temple Mount mosques.

²⁹ Quoted in R.I. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', *The New York Review of Books*, 1986, p. 19.

importance was the underlying expectation of Jewish messianic redemption which, it was felt, the establishment of Israel and the Six Day War had done so much to realise. Kach's ideological programme then establishes a pattern common to many of the following groups, that of preserving and embellishing religious identity and aiding in the realisation of religious destiny.

3.1.2 Aryan Nations

The Ideology of the Aryan Nations may best be described as a form of Christian Identity theology but is also heavily influenced by Nazi ideology and symbolism.³⁰ The organisation was originally formed around William Butler's Church of Jesus Christ Christian, one of the several hundred ministries which loosely compose the Christian Identity movement. The basic ideological tenets revolved around the belief that the true chosen people of the twelve tribes of Israel are not Jews but are "Anglo-Saxon, Germanic, Teutonic, Scandinavian [and] Celtic peoples of the earth", that Jews are the literal offspring of Satan, that blacks (and all other non-white "mud peoples") are sub-human, and that the U.S. Government (or Zionist occupation Government, ZOG³¹) is illegal, being tainted by its association with a global, anti-Aryan, Jewish conspiracy, described in one publication as "[t]he Communist Jewry US/UN *de facto* Government."³²

The formation of this 'basic' theology spans two centuries and follows a complicated path, indicative of a process reflected in the lack of a rigid Identity orthodoxy and the decentralised nature of the movement. The primary core of the ideological framework, the idea that 'Aryans' are the direct descendants of the Lost Tribes of Israel, comes from nineteenth century British Israelism. This idea in its original, quietist form was understandably a popular one in late Victorian society, reflecting at the time the self-righteous superiority of what was then the world's greatest imperial power. Many of the

³⁰ The adherence of Aryan Nations and other groups to Nazi ideology is another example of the diversity of American religious militants. Reverend Michael Bray, convicted of bombing abortion clinics, and an ardent and unrepentant supporter of violence against abortion shares the view of a U.S. government conspiracy to subvert moral values, but he has equated President Clinton and the U.S. government to Hitler and the Nazi regime. M. Juergensmeyer, 'Christian Violence in America', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1998, Vol. 558, p. 90.

³¹ Alternatively there is the Church of the Creator 'JOG' (Jewish Occupation Government) or Identity pastor Paul Hall's 'BOG' (Babylonian Occupation Government).

³² See *Fed/Gov Media Conspiracy*, <http://www.nidlink.com/-aryanvic/anthrax.html>.

adherents of this idea were members of the mobile bourgeoisie of British society and so British-Israelism was disseminated throughout the Empire. It was through Canada, and more specifically the writings of Rev. W.H. Poole, that British Israelism found its way into the United States where it became entwined with a virulent anti-Semitism and transformed itself into what is now called Christian Identity.

Golden Age Myth

While the ideology of Aryan Nations identifies two biblical Golden Age states - those of before the fall from Grace and the time following the Tribulation³³ - the most commonly identified Golden Age effectively concerns itself with racial purity within a more or less familiar social context. As one of the goals of Aryan Nations states:

"[t]o ordain and establish a state representing a voice and will of the Aryan Race as a **DIVINELY ORDAINED, SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT PEOPLE**, separated from all alien, mongrel people in every sphere of their individual and national life."³⁴

The myth is concerned more with circumstances than a desire to return to an identifiable historical period. As one Aryan Nations publication opines "we have but one hope for redemption, that is to return to our own ordained life order as is pointed out in 2 Chr. 7-14 [sic]."³⁵ The Golden Age in reality becomes a more familiar scenario replete with all the trappings of modernity and 'civilisation' but devoid of certain racial groups, corrupt and intrusive government and other destructive influences such as drugs and homosexuality which have contributed so much to the decadence and decay of modern society. In this respect the proposed 'Aryan National State' "permits the participation of governed in government...[and] population has a common racial root, common language and a common understanding of right and wrong."³⁶ If indeed an immediate historical Golden

³³ A third time identified by Identity theology is the era before the Babylonian exile. See for example G. Winrod, 'Killing the Jews', *The Winrod Letter*, # 212, Sept. 1982.

³⁴ R.G. Butler, *The Aryan Warrior*, <http://www.nidlink.com/~aryanvic/1-AryanWarrior.html>.

³⁵ Aryan Nations pamphlet, *Declaration to Regain a National State*, n.d. 2 Chronicles 7:14 reads "If my people who are called by My name will humble themselves, and pray and seek My face, and turn from their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin and heal their land". (NKJV)

³⁶ See R.G. Butler, *The Aryan Warrior*. This web site contains sections that deal with Property, Industry and Finance, Aryan Youth, Aryan Women, Aryan Law, The Army, Constitution and World Outlook, Culture, Agriculture, Education, Christianity and the Aryan Vision of God, Economics, Jewish Communism, Attitude to Other Religions and Citizenship. Each of these is illustrated with a Nazi propaganda poster.

Age is harkened back to, it is the American Revolutionary period, an era of 'great patriots' marked by a religiously defined attempt to reorder society according to the will of God.³⁷

Threat to Culture

The idea of the white Aryan as the bearer of 'true' culture is common throughout white supremacy movements both secular and religious. In the case of Christian Identity ideology generally, and that of Aryan Nations in particular, the notion of cultural theft - in this case of a religious birthright and destiny - is as old as history itself. But the theft is not a single event divorced from the present, it is an ongoing, evolving process, one in which the government is complicit, and resulting in an America where "millions of whites watch in abject dismay and hopelessness as their great culture, heritage and civilisation evaporate in the teaming, stinking, seething milieu of so many alien races, cultures and Gods."³⁸ Proof of this threat is offered in numerous Aryan Nations pamphlets and publications, leading to the common conclusion that "[w]e [the white race] are the most endangered species."³⁹ These ideas have been held constant over time. After an Aryan Nations member's armed assault on a Jewish day care centre in 1999, Richard Butler stated in his defence that "[t]here's a war against the white race. There's a war of extermination against the white male."⁴⁰

There also exists the belief that the white race is the object of a form of genocide through a campaign of deliberate race mixing.⁴¹ The governmental conspiratorial element of Aryan Nations ideology predicts a radical alteration of American society at some undisclosed point in the future "beginning with the slaughter of every good Christian man, woman and child of the Church of Jesus Christ Christian - Aryan Nations."⁴² The number and variety of Aryan Nations declared enemies ensures that few aspects of 'white' culture remain untainted, and that the only way this culture can be reclaimed is through violent struggle. The primary assailant against white Aryan culture is assumed to be the Jew, and

³⁷ See R.G. Butler, *The Aryan Warrior*.

³⁸ Aryan Nations Newsletter, # 42, 1982.

³⁹ Aryan Nations pamphlet, *The Death of the White Race*, 1981.

⁴⁰ *Miami Herald*, August 12, 1999.

⁴¹ See for example *Calling our Nation*, # 25, 1989. By this logic Jewish claims to being victims of genocide are fraudulent.

⁴² See *Fed/Gov Media Conspiracy*, <http://www.nidlink.com/-aryanvic/anthrax.html>.

by extension the Jew's influence throughout government, finance and popular culture. Part of the Aryan Nations creed claims that "[t]he Jew is like a destroying virus that attacks our racial body to destroy our Aryan culture and the purity of our race."⁴³ The perceived influence of Satanic Jewish forces over the American government also implies that the rule of law is redundant: "[t]he ADL-JDL alien mongrel scum openly brag of their aggressive war upon our existence and that the present courts are 'their courts'"⁴⁴, and because of this the secular law of the state must be replaced by "[t]he Law of our God, as given to all the prophets, [which] declares that the murderer forfeits his life before God and men."⁴⁵

Scripturalism

The scriptural dimension of Aryan Nations Ideology is both eclectic and narrow in scope. The primary documents are the Bible and the constitution, both in their original form 'devoid of any and all unlawful amendments and alterations.'⁴⁶ Numerous and disparate examples are employed in order to demonstrate the basic tenets.⁴⁷ Liberal interpretations and textual ambiguities in this respect are important. The idea that Revelations 2:9, "I know your works, tribulation, and poverty (but you are rich); and I know the blasphemy of those who say they are Jews and are not, but are a synagogue of Satan", is proof of the satanic genealogy of the Jewish people is tenuous. However, religious proofs are seldom found in isolation and further evidence is offered of Jews being the 'synagogue of Satan'⁴⁸, and of Cain being the first offspring of Eve and Satan.⁴⁹ Blacks and other non-white races are identified as 'mud peoples' and animals, the usual scriptural basis for this being the creation of animals in Genesis 1:24.⁵⁰ Injunctions against other groups, such as homosexuals, are also identified. Selected passages are used to justify the use of violence against the state, especially Luke 22:36, and Mathew 21:12 where Jesus

⁴³ Aryan Nations 'We Believe', AN website.

⁴⁴ R.G. Butler, *The Aryan Warrior*.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ While the constitution cannot be regarded as 'scripture' in the technical sense, it is a vital document for placing the group within an existing and accepted secular legal and socio-historical tradition.

⁴⁷ One of the options displayed on the Aryan Nations website is "Where to look in the Bible on Negroes and Jews". See <http://www.nidlink.com/%7Earyanvic>. The organisation also provides 'proof of the insidious nature of Jewish beliefs. See *Why Jews are Persecuted for Their Religion*, Aryan Nations Pamphlet, n.d..

⁴⁸ Revelations 3:9.

⁴⁹ Genesis 3:1 & 3:15, John 8:35 and 1 John 3:12. The most coherent theological exposition on this theory is that offered by Dan Gayman in his *The Two Seeds of Genesis 3:15*, 1994.

⁵⁰ V. Larson, 'Christian Identity', *Christian Research Journal*, 1992, pp. 20-24.

physically removes the money changers from the Temple.⁵¹ The relatively tenuous nature of these 'proofs' is disguised by their selective nature and to a certain degree reinforced by the mystical ambiguity of the language used. Their eclectic nature reflects the overarching themes of 'racial origin' and 'final battle'. The most commonly employed books are those at the beginning of the Old Testament and those at the end of the New Testament, Genesis, Exodus and Revelations.⁵²

It is important to note that secular literature plays an equally important role in both promoting this basic ideology and placing it firmly into a contemporary context. When Christian Identity doctrine was initially being formulated, it was secular organs and tracts such as Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent*, and *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* which provided the anti-Semitic emphasis.⁵³ Patriotic texts from the era of the American Revolution are also of great importance. Writers, such as John Locke, are invoked to prove that a state of war exists and that there exists no judge from whom justice can be sought:

"[w]e, the remnant of the Aryan Race, shall again remove the blind fear that binds us in the cesspool of Jewry and acknowledge that we are in a state of war individually and collectively, and that there exists no common judge on earth to whom we can appeal."⁵⁴

Scripturalism may also be used in an inverted form. Aryan Nations publications have shown examples of Jewish scripture which are anti-Christian or heretical in nature.⁵⁵ It is also important to note that Aryan Nation's theology can best be described as shallow, the group relies on other more intellectual examinations and expositions offered by Identity thinkers such as Dan Gayman and concocts almost none of its own.

⁵¹ New York Times Magazine, January 8, 1995.

⁵² The gospels are generally used to show Jesus' disapproval of the Jewish people. More unusually the Dead Sea Scrolls are cited as a validation of 'Christian Israel Identity'. The difficulty in deciphering the scrolls and the restrictive practices placed on them is regarded as a conspiratorial attempt to prevent the 'truth' of the scrolls from being revealed. See <http://www.nidlink/~aryanvic/dss-scrolls.html>.

⁵³ It is interesting to note that the Hamas charter also makes mention of the *Protocols*: "Their plan is embodied in the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion', and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying". Charter of Hamas, 1988, Ch. 5, Art. 32, p. 30. The earliest known conspiratorial anti-Jewish tract dates from 3rd century BC in the form of a book dedication by the Egyptian High Priest at Heliopolis to King Ptolemy Philadelphus. See M. Grant, *The Jews in the Roman World*, 1973, p. 24.

⁵⁴ R.G. Butler, *The Aryan Warrior*, <http://www.nidlink.com/~aryanvic/1-AryanWarrior.html>. This particular web page begins with the injunction 'Graphics intensive; read John Locke while it loads'.

⁵⁵ See for example *Fed/Gov Media Conspiracy*, <http://www.nidlink.com/~aryanvic/anthrax.html>. Two of these purported 'proofs' are Sanhedrin 59 a : "Murdering Goyim is like killing a wild animal" and Gittin 57 a : "Jesus is in hell and is being punished by being boiled in semen. Christians are boiled in dung".

Manichaeian World View

When the nascent ideology of the movement emerged in the 1940s, it stressed the 'two seeds' doctrine to support the contention that whites are the descendants of the lost tribes. By this it is held that Aryans are descended of Adam and are thus the true Israelites, and that Jews are descended of a union between Eve and Satan, the result of which, Cain, becomes the first descendent of the Dark Prince. The Jews are thus transformed from the British-Israeli view of a group of non-believers who will have to be converted at some point along the way to redemption, to the literal descendants of Satan who must be exterminated. Similarly other races and social groups are depicted as 'sub-human'. All non-white races are thus 'mud peoples', and there are similarly derogatory characterisations for homosexuals and those who have deviated from the fundamental precepts of the Bible.⁵⁶ It is, however, the association of Jews as being evil which provides the powerful Manichean dimension - not only are they the cosmic 'other' they are the literal descendants of the forces of darkness themselves - the so called "synagogue of Satan."⁵⁷ The totality of the struggle and the major protagonists in it can be seen by statements such as those made by Thom Robb at the 1986 Aryan World Congress: "There is a war in America today. In one camp is the federal government headed by the Jew. Their goal is to destroy us . Our goal is to destroy them. There is no middle ground. There is only right and wrong."⁵⁸

Messianic Vision

The Apocalyptic and messianic ideas contained within the movement's ideology are an essential element in the scriptural message. The cosmic foe is seen to exist all around in the form of the federal government with all its attendant departments, authorities, rules and regulations, and in the Jewish and non-white communities. The omnipresence of these groups is proof of the immediate threat they pose to the Aryan race:

⁵⁶ For an examination of this demonology see J. Aho, *This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy*, 1994, pp. 108-112.

⁵⁷ Revelations 2:9. See also Revelations 3:9 and John 8:44.

⁵⁸ Thom Robb, keynote address, Aryan World Congress, Hayden Lake, Idaho, July 12, 1986. Cited in J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, p. 76.

"[w]e believe there is a day of reckoning. The Usurper will be thrown out by the terrible might of Yahwah's people, as they return to their roots and their special destiny. We know there is soon to be a day of judgement and a day when Christ's Kingdom will be established on earth as it is in heaven."⁵⁹

The final battle of revelations is seen as a race war. The totality of this struggle is outlined in numerous group publications, although the End is frequently portrayed in more temporal frames of reference: "[w]e will have a national racist state at whatever price is necessary. Just as our forefathers purchased their freedom in blood, so must we. We have to kill the bastards."⁶⁰ Identity then explicitly rejects the quietist fundamentalist Christian belief of the rapture when the faithful are lifted up into thin air to wait out the horrors of the Tribulation. The Identity believer must remain behind in order to ensure the fulfilment of God's will.

The formation of Aryan Nation's ideology has been shaped by a sense of acute threat to the White race. This belief has been bolstered by a highly selective interpretation of the bible which sees the Aryan race as the true chosen people and simultaneously identifies the Jews as the literal offspring of Satan and other races as sub-human. Furthermore, the interrelationships between these groups and the US government is seen in a severely conspiratorial light. As with Kach and other groups, the Golden Age sought is linked to the group's messianic expectations - a cataclysmic final struggle with 'the forces of darkness' defined in the Manichaeic outlook will result in a purified and perfected society. Unlike Kach, Hizballah and Hamas, the Aryan Nations rejection of mainstream societal participation means that the group's ideology relies more heavily on the expectation of the final struggle.

3.1.3 Hizballah

The ideology of Hizballah may best be described as Shi'ite pan-Islamist, one which is informed to a certain extent by religious and political links to the republic of Iran.⁶¹ The

⁵⁹ Aryan Nations Website.

⁶⁰ Aryan Nations Newsletter, # 42, 1982.

⁶¹ The earliest of these links date back to the early sixteenth century when Iran's new Safavid ruler decided to make Shi'ism the official religion of his new state. H. Cobban, 'The Growth of Shi'ite Power in Lebanon and its Implications for the Future' in J. Cole & N. Keddie (eds.), *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, 1986, p. 139.

proximity of Hizballah's ideology to that of Iran is demonstrated by the group's subscription to Khomeini's theory of *al-wali al-faqih* (government by the 'just jurisconsult'), whereby the decisions of the just jurisconsult are to be obeyed in the absence of the twelfth Imam.⁶² Both the ideological lineage and clerical hierarchy of the organisation reflect the principle teachings of Twelver Shi'ism and the centrality of religious jurisprudence. The ideology of the group has also been greatly moulded by its context, primarily the Israeli invasion of 1982 and the subsequent Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, and also the broader historical legacy of Shi'ite political and socio-economic marginalisation within Lebanese politics and society. The pan-Islamic ideology stresses a phased, incremental strategy whereby foreign influence and interference will be removed from Lebanon, an Islamic Republic will be established in Lebanon, Jerusalem will be liberated and ultimately a wider Islamic community (*Ummah*) will be created beyond Lebanon's borders.

Golden Age Myth

In terms of this long term strategy, the ultimate historical Golden Age can be seen as a mixture of the first Muslim community at Medina and the high water marks of various Muslim dynasties through the ages. In the more immediate term, the ideal sought is an Islamic state within Lebanon. As for the community of the oppressed beyond the borders of Lebanon, Hizballah expects "all the oppressed to be able to study the divine message in order to bring justice, peace and tranquillity to the world."⁶³ Thus the Golden Age begins by the gradual expansion of Islamic government, much as it did between the 7th and the 15th centuries, which creates an ever growing zone of justice and liberty, peace and tranquillity. This pan-Islamic ideology is also dependent upon the group's unity with revolutionary Iran, the importance of which can be seen in Sheikh Fadlallah's statement that "we should first defend the Islamic Revolution and Iran before considering the formation of a second Islamic state."⁶⁴ Part of the pan-Islamic mission is the liberation of Jerusalem (*al-Quds*), an objective which adds an eschatological dimension to the group's struggle against Israel. Jerusalem is the only major Islamic Holy place not controlled by

⁶² See A.R. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon*, 1987, pp. 167-187.

⁶³ *ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Al-Haqiqa*, November 3, 1987.

Muslims and as such forms an historical and contemporary symbolic focal point for Hizballah and many other militant Islamic organisations.

Theft of Culture

During the 1970s, three different sets of crises conspired to give rise to a sensation of cultural threat amongst Lebanese Shi'ites. The first was external in the form of secular Western influence (and later direct military interventions in 1958 and 1983) and the intrusions of secular Arab politics. The second and third were domestic - a growing Muslim population in a society where the Maronite-led Christians controlled a disproportionate amount of political power and wealth under the 1943 National Pact. The Shi'a community had always occupied an inferior socio-economic position within the Maronite dominated confessional system, a position reinforced by the static nature of the political system, leading to the adoption of powerful rhetorical tools such as the 'disinherited' and 'dispossessed'. Subsidiary to this was endemic financial corruption within the political system which helped further alienate the Shi'a. In terms of this the Shi'a of Lebanon extended their cultural ties with the Shi'a communities of Iraq and Iran - especially at the level of clerical leadership. From the inception of Hizballah Islamic government has been held to be the only form which "is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all", and of "preventing further...attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country."⁶⁵ The advent of such a political system would certainly ensure the Shi'a cultural identity. Over time the primary threat to culture has varied according to political context and is best seen by examining Hizballah's physical enemies. Initially the Christian militias, Palestinians and rival Muslim militias, then later the foreign elements of the Multi National Force (MNF) and until the present Israel, and always supported by a conservative, anti-western dogma.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ 'An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, # 48, pp. 111-116, 1986.

⁶⁶ The moral and cultural superiority of Islam (and indeed all religions) is a powerful tool in justifying violence. For example the spiritual leader of al-Gamma, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, has spoken against tourist boats and hotels as 'sinful' and claimed that "the lands of the Muslims will not become bordellos for sinners of every race and colour". *Los Angeles Times*, March 5, 1993.

Scripturalism

The centrality of scripture for Hizballah is shown most obviously in the name of the group itself, derived from the Quran and meaning the followers of Allah in contrast to the followers of Satan (*hizb-ush-Shaytan*).⁶⁷ As with all overt symbols employed by religious groups this helps to reinforce both the legitimacy and sanctity of the group. Violent actions carried out by Hizballah are also justified in minute details by Hizballah leaders as being in accordance with Islamic norms of morality and justice. There is no shortage of such justifications, an extreme example being the claim that the ultimate destruction of Israel is a Quranic 'fact'.⁶⁸ Many of these leaders themselves are the foremost Shi'ite scholars in Lebanon respected for their learning and understanding of religious interpretation, even when their interpretations seem to contradict Islamic teachings. Condoning the method of suicide bombing is a good example. Suicide is never mentioned in the Quran, but is strongly condemned in Hadith⁶⁹, and the accepted theological view is that suicide is a great sin. In this instance, suicide is not identified as such but as martyrdom, an experience that is both acceptable and extremely resonant in Shi'ite tradition. Hostage taking is another action which has no obvious precedent in Islamic law and which the Hizballah leadership of the 1980s had great difficulty in justifying.⁷⁰ Scriptural justifications and defence for actions in the case of Hizballah must also be looked at in regard to performance. Justifications for more extreme acts of self-sacrificing operations were more forthcoming than those for hostage taking and kidnapping because it was more scripturally contentious and required justification.⁷¹ One scriptural image and identity, that of the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein at the battle of Karbala in the 7th century, has also helped add popular legitimacy to martyrdom operations. Not only does this example sanctify the role of martyrdom in conflict, it is also a powerful symbol of struggle against tyrants. Annually the martyrdom of Hussein is celebrated by the Shi'ites during the festival of Ashura which is not just a religious

⁶⁷ B. Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, 1988, p. 123.

⁶⁸ Sheikh Abu Al-Waheel Al Ansari, 'The Termination of "Israel": A Quranic Fact', *Nida'ul Islam*, # 20, 1997.

⁶⁹ "Whoever throws himself from a cliff and commits suicide is throwing himself into the fires of hell...Whoever kills himself with a weapon will hold that weapon stabbing himself forever in the fire of hell." Hadith Bukhari 7:670.

⁷⁰ According to Sheikh Fadlallah it was "forbidden to kidnap or kill an innocent person because one has a score to settle with a head of state", FBIS, March 12, 1986.

⁷¹ See M. Kramer, 'The Moral Logic of Hizballah', in W. Reich (ed.) *Origins of Terrorism*, 1990.

occasion but one which practically and symbolically recalls the historical, political status of the Shi'ites as an oppressed and deprived community. The current suffering of the community is thus recast into an ongoing historical persecution. As one commentator has observed, the 'Karbala paradigm' lies at the centre of Shi'a history as it set the Shi'a apart. "Kerbala [*sic*] casts a long shadow; for the faithful it annulled time and distance."⁷² Furthermore in the early 1970s, Musa al Sadr had brought a new interpretation of Karbala, altering it from a sorrowful reminder of Shi'a isolation and defeat to a celebration of defiance in the face of forced submission to injustice.⁷³

Manichean World View

The Manichean dimension of Hizballah ideology divides the world into *mustakbirun* (the oppressors) and *mustad'afun* (the oppressed).⁷⁴ The struggle between these two communities is perceived as one which can only be conducted through revolutionary struggle and activism. This divide is intensified by the view the organisation has of itself. Hizballah does not see itself as a party but rather as a "mission" or "a way of life."⁷⁵ In the words of Abbas al-Musawi "[e]very Muslim is automatically a member of Hizballah, thus it is impossible to list our membership."⁷⁶ Perhaps even more extreme is the statement that "[t]here are two parties, Hizballah's or God's party, and the Devil's party."⁷⁷ Due to Hizballah's pan-Islamic ideology any threat to Islam is also condemned in basic religious terms. Thus the Iran-Iraq war was seen as a struggle between 'truth and falsehood' where an Iranian victory would aid Hizballah in the pursuit of its aims.⁷⁸ In the words of Sheikh Fadlallah: "[the Iran-Iraq war] is a war waged by the entire world of blasphemy against Islam."⁷⁹ Despite this distinction, Fadlallah is careful to explain this dichotomy in a less inflammatory fashion. He claims that jihad is defensive and that its objective is not 'negation of the other' but rather that "Islam recognises the Other. During

⁷² F. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shi'a of Lebanon*, 1986, p. 138.

⁷³ *ibid.* p. 142.

⁷⁴ M. Ranstorp, *Hizb'Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, 1997, p. 46.

⁷⁵ Ibrahim al-Amin in *al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi Lubnan* (Beirut, Dar al-Sanin), 1984, pp. 145-6.

⁷⁶ *La Revue du Liban* (Beirut), 27 July 1985.

⁷⁷ Mahmud Nurani, formerly Iran's charge d'affaires in Beirut, *Monday Morning* (Beirut), 14 January, 1985.

⁷⁸ M. Kramer, 'Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah', in D. Menashri (ed.), 1990, 105-30.

⁷⁹ *Tehran Home Service*, 1030 GMT, 29 Jan. 88 - BBC/SWB, ME/0063, February 1 1988.

the early days of Islam, the Other took religious form, as the 'People of the Book'. So Islam does not negate the Other; it invites the Other to dialogue."⁸⁰

Messianic Vision

The messianic vision of Hizballah is effectively that of traditional Twelver Shi'ism. There is no expectation of imminence and the twelfth Imam will reveal himself in due course. Combined with this expectation is the fate of Imam Musa al Sadr who disappeared on a trip to Libya in 1978. The Imam played a pivotal role in raising Lebanese Shi'ite political consciousness and militance during the 1970s and his as yet unexplained disappearance has led not only to his elevation as an almost saintly figure of martyrdom, but in some circles to suggestions that he has become the hidden Imam with the corresponding messianic expectations surrounding his expected return.⁸¹ Allied to this tradition and combined with the group's violent hostility to Israel is the religious myth that the Jews will ally themselves with Al-Dajjal (Anti-Christ) at the end of time who will then be killed by Eesa bin Maryam (Jesus) and the Muslims during a final battle.⁸² The destruction of Israel is not seen as an immediate goal. As Fadlallah has noted, "we must persecute Israel for a hundred years if necessary"⁸³, and while Jerusalem will be returned "in this connection we think in great periods of time."⁸⁴ The organisation is, however, far more concerned with the more immediate temporal task of gradually establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon by arguing for the end of the confessional system of governance and ultimately the creation of a wider Islamic community beyond Lebanon. The organisation's perception of time is messianic in nature, although this messianism is not considered immediate, merely the expected culmination of history.

The formation of Hizballah's ideological programme has been defined from the outset by the historically subordinate and oppressed status of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. The profound influence of the Iranian revolution on the founders of the

⁸⁰ M. Soueid, 'Islamic Unity and Political Change: Interview With Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXV, # 1, 1995, p. 64.

⁸¹ For more on Musa al Sadr see F. Ajami, *The Vanished Imam*, and A. Norton, 'Musa al-Sadr' in A. Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, 1994.

⁸² Sheikh Abu Al-Waleed Al-Ansari, 'The Termination of "Israel": A Quranic Fact', *Nida'ul Islam*, # 20, 1997.

⁸³ Quoted in M. Kramer, 'Redeeming Jerusalem: The Pan-Islamic Premise of Hizballah', in D. Menashri (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, 1990, p. 125.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

movement and the adoption of revolutionary Iranian ideology have been reinforced by Iranian ideological, material and spiritual support for the organisation on all levels. While they have been reformulated within the specific context of Lebanon, Hizballah's basic ideological components reflect those of contemporary Iran. As Hizballah has developed into a significant military and political force within Lebanon and as the Lebanese security situation alters, certain elements of the group's ideological programme such as the Manichaeian view may have to be altered according to its tactical, political programme.

3.1.4 Hamas

Ideologically, the Islamic resistance movement Hamas owes much to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in that it began as a chapter of it. The Ikhwan established a presence in Palestine during the 1936-39 Palestinian revolt when Al-Rahman al-Banna, Hassan Al-Banna's brother, came to Palestine to aid in the revolt. In 1946, the Ikhwan established their first group in Jerusalem with the avowed purpose of preventing the Zionist enterprise. Soon after, the organisation gained the support of leading nationalist figures such as the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood passed through a period of violent struggle during the 1948 war and then a long period of quietism until the Intifada when Hamas was officially created. In terms of ideology Hamas reflects that of the Ikhwan as the movement declares itself to be the 'political wing of the Brotherhood'.⁸⁵

Hamas has quickly expanded and is now the foremost Islamic fundamentalist movement in the occupied territories, participating in violent actions as well as the provision of social services and, to a lesser degree, indirect involvement in mainstream politics. This extensive involvement in Palestinian society stems from the 1973 establishment of the Mujma al-Islami (the Islamic Centre) in Gaza by Sheikh Yassin.⁸⁶ The ideology is strictly Sunni Muslim but remains flexible:

⁸⁵ See Hamas charter, 1988, Chapter 1, Article 2.

⁸⁶ In 1979, Israel granted a licence to operate the centre and by the early 1980s "it was one of the most powerful institutions in the Gaza Strip, boasting a number of affiliated mosques, libraries, kindergartens and clinics." See Z. Abu Amr, 'Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and the Origins of Hamas' in R. Appleby, *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*, 1997, p. 223.

"[i]ts outlook on all aspects of life is inspired by the principles of Islam, from which it draws its ideas and conceptions. Tapping this huge resource of ideology, however, does not limit the Movement's ability to practice a considerable amount of pragmatism and flexibility without necessarily having to deviate from its basic Principles."⁸⁷

The ideology of Hamas is thus formulated to support the general objective of 'Establishing the Islamic State' and the strategic objective of 'Liberating the Whole Palestinian Land'.⁸⁸

Golden Age Myth

The practical, temporal Golden Age sought by Hamas is the eventual establishment of an Islamic state in Palestine. In this regard, Hamas's programme can be seen as an appropriated and Islamicised version of the PLO's nationalist objectives.⁸⁹ While homage is paid to the example of the first Islamic community: "[b]y adopting Islam as its way of life, the Movement goes back to the time of the birth of the Islamic message...for Allah is its target, the Prophet is its example and the Koran is its constitution"⁹⁰, little is offered in the way of exact detail as to how this might be brought about. This, however, is unimportant, the essence of the message is that Islam is the sole force which can reverse the injustices and evil of the contemporary period by "defeating [the false] and vanquishing it so justice could prevail, homelands be retrieved" until "the state of Islam" is established.⁹¹ The exact details are unnecessary because the religion itself is associated with justice and equality - two of the major requirements of any successful form of governance. The ultimate message of a Golden Age is one familiar to general Sunni eschatology when Islamic history culminates in the Day of Judgement. In terms of realising the immediate temporal objective of an Islamic state in Palestine, Hamas is constrained by its unwillingness to participate in the existing Palestinian Authority (PA) and the peace process, even if this stance at times seems ambiguous.⁹² While the group

⁸⁷ El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi (eds.), *A Study in the Political Ideology of The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), 1987-1996*, 1997, p. 11.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸⁹ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, 2000, p. 43.

⁹⁰ Hamas charter, Chapter 1, Article 7.

⁹¹ *ibid.* Chapter 2, Article 9.

⁹² Z. Abu Amr, 'Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and the Origins of Hamas', pp. 244-245.

regards itself as the most legitimate leader of the Palestinian people it rejects recognition of Israel and the political objectives espoused by the PLO.

Threat to Culture

Similar to the Golden Age myth, the perceived threat to culture is a powerful ideological tool. Hamas believes that Israeli policy in Palestine aims at "ruining the Islamic nation as a whole in a ferocious war that involves all fields of thought, politics, ethics, economy and society and takes as a goal the very spirit and capabilities which enable the nation to stand and face challenges."⁹³ The Hamas charter contains a broader admonition aimed at the Islamic community generally: "[t]he Islamic world is on fire. Each of us should pour some water, no matter how little, to extinguish whatever one can without waiting for the others."⁹⁴ This current threat to culture is also compared to previous ones posed by the Crusaders and the Tartars. The threat to culture is countered not only by the provision of educational programmes and the general task of 'Islamising society', but by direct, selective military action. The threat to culture is also directly associated with deprivations faced by Palestinians in the Occupied territories - a cosmic concept has thus been translated into a day to day reality by the effects of Israeli policies such as inadequate educational facilities and health care. The most striking of these is the fact that many Palestinians living in the occupied territories (especially Gaza) are effectively refugees, or descendants of refugees, for who 'theft of culture' is also directly associated with theft of property and possessions. This is reinforced on a daily level by the visible presence of Jewish settlers and soldiers and the view of Israeli control as 'oppression' is constantly expressed in the group's phraseology and symbolism.

Scripturalism

Hamas like many Islamic organisations defines itself in terms of Islam: "[t]he movement's programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man."⁹⁵ From this basic premise Hamas illustrates its ideas and communiqués with Quranic references, Hadith and the example of prominent

⁹³ El-Hamad & Al-Bargothi (eds.), *A Study in the Political Ideology*, p. 22.

⁹⁴ Hamas charter, Preface.

⁹⁵ *ibid.* Chapter 1, Article 1.

martyrs. Each of the major ideas and themes contained within the charter for example are supported by appropriate scriptural references. Quranic sources are used to prove that certain acts such as the liberation of Palestine, and jihad in the pursuit of this cause, are religious duties for every Muslim. Indeed, the group's attempt to differentiate itself from the secular nationalism of the PLO has led to slogans such as "the Quran is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."⁹⁶ The Hamas charter also refers to Palestine as 'Islamic *waqf* land', regarded as a religious trust given to the Muslims until the end of time, and it is a religious duty of every Muslim to liberate this land through jihad.

Manichaean World View

The Manichean element in Hamas ideology is aimed at both Israelis (and their supporters) and apostates. This ideological stance has been realised through killings of Israelis and also of Palestinians, primarily those considered guilty of collaboration. Hamas identifies itself as in the vanguard of the struggle against the "warmongering Jews", and also declares that "[l]eaving the circle of struggle with Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he who does that."⁹⁷ The Jews are characterised as all powerful:

"[u]sing their wealth they [have] unleashed revolutions all over the world...through their financial resources they have been able to control the imperialist nations...They were behind the First World War, whereby they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate state...and they were behind the Second World War...they established the U.N. and the Security Council...in order to dominate the world."⁹⁸

It is interesting to note that this view of a global and historical Jewish conspiracy is almost identical to that espoused by much of the American extreme right.⁹⁹ The Hamas charter and Hamas's Arabic website for example refer to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as an

⁹⁶ Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*, 1994, p. 78.

⁹⁷ Hamas charter, Chapter 4, Article 32. "For Who so shall turn his back unto them on that Day, unless he turneth away to fight, or retreateth to another party of the faithful, shall draw on himself the indignation of Allah, and his abode shall be hell; an ill journey shall it be thither", (Quran 8:16).

⁹⁸ Hamas charter, Article 22. Other organisations identified by Hamas as carrying out Zionist wishes are Rotary Clubs, Lions Clubs and B'nai B'rith.

⁹⁹ Nor is this view new to modern political Islam. Sayid Qutb referred to a Jewish conspiracy which dated back to the time of the Prophet, a conspiracy linked to a broader design which reflects the 'solidarity of unbelievers'. See D. Pipes, *The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy*, 1996, pp. 125 & 186.

historical reference.¹⁰⁰ The Hamas charter also contains a traditional note on inter-communal relations which significantly modifies any instinctive Manichean stance: "under the wing of Islam it is possible for the followers of the three religions...to coexist in peace and quiet with each other. Peace and quiet would not be possible except under the wing of Islam. Past and present history are the best witness to that."¹⁰¹ While milder than some expressions which advocate only extermination, this scripturally based tradition still assumes a second class citizen status for other peoples of the book and the primacy of Islamic religion and legal systems.¹⁰²

Messianic Dimension

Hamas ideology contains a messianic message to the extent that Sunni Islam itself may be said to contain one. The messianic age is not to be precipitated and the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state is not part of a messianic process. To the extent that a messianic vision exists it is merely employed to add a sense of the eternity of the struggle with the Zionist oppressor expressed in the idea that Palestine is an 'Islamic *waqf* land' given to Muslim generations 'until judgement day'.¹⁰³ As with so many religious groups the emphasis on messianic beliefs places the organisation in a confrontational, time constrained position, largely out of step with temporal reality. The events of Sunni messianic fulfilment will unfold according to Allah's timetable, an attitude common amongst core Sunni Islamic groups. For the Egyptian al-Gamma, for instance, the ideal form of government is also the Caliphate, a system which embodies both religious belief and the conduct of politics, this is seen as the only hope of approximating God's will on earth in a largely secular world.¹⁰⁴ The only possible exception is martyrdom achieved through suicide bombing, although in these cases the revelatory experience is purely a personal one and the implications for the group's overall ideology are negligible.

¹⁰⁰ It is interesting to note that *The Protocols* have been produced in more different editions in Arabic than any other language including English, and no refutation, unlike many other languages, has yet been published in Arabic.

¹⁰¹ Hamas charter, Chapter 4, Article 32, "The Islamic Resistance Movement is a Humanist Movement".

¹⁰² Ironically the application of such a system would simply result in a reversal of the current situation.

¹⁰³ Hamas charter, Chapter 2, Article 11.

¹⁰⁴ Ansari, H.N., 'The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XVI, 1984, p. 136.

The ideological programme of Hamas is based on the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood within the Palestinian context. Resistance to the Israeli 'occupation' is justified as a religious obligation reinforced using Islamic religious traditions. The Golden Age sought is an Islamic Palestinian state, similar in most respects to the expectations of the other mainstream Islamist groups. The uncertain nature of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the acknowledged inability of Hamas to achieve its objectives through violence alone may require the group to alter its ideological emphasis to allow it to (for example) participate directly in mainstream politics, a potential shift which will be made easier by the group's flexibility and pragmatism. Yet Hamas works in an incremental and patient fashion to re-Islamise Palestinian society and make it ripe ultimately for religious revolution.

3.2 Core Groups

3.2.1 Eyal

The short life span and relative youth of Eyal mitigated against the group developing a detailed ideological framework. To the extent that the members of Eyal were drawn from the same milieu as most of the Israeli extreme right and that their ideological influences were Kahanist, there exist a great many ideological similarities with Kach, and a radical departure from this outlook was unnecessary. The founder of Eyal, Avishai Raviv, was not merely a disciple of Kahane but was one of the rabbi's favourites¹⁰⁵, and the group may be seen as merely a violent splinter of the parent organisation - indeed Eyal claimed to be "more militant and radical than the original Kahane movement."¹⁰⁶ But Eyal also represents a deeper, messianic trend of the Jewish extreme right which combined Jewish messianic belief and Jewish nationalism in the light of the most recent threat to these historical processes - peace agreement and land settlement with the Palestinians and surrounding Arab states. The assassination of Rabin was therefore an attempt to smooth the path of the long-standing promised messianic process.

¹⁰⁵ A fact which helped divert suspicion from Raviv's involvement with the Shin Bet.

¹⁰⁶ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*, 1999, p. 266.

Golden Age Myth

In line with most of the Jewish extreme right, Eyal envisaged a Davidic era Golden Age where a complete Eretz Yisrael has been realised and the rule of Jewish law instituted. Due to the group's immaturity and limited intellectual concerns, however, the more realistic and achievable Golden Age was identified as being an Israeli state devoid of Arabs and left-wing Jews, or at the very least a reversal of the concessions thus far granted to the Palestinians by the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the reimposition of direct Israeli rule over the occupied territories or their outright annexation. To this end harassment of these parties (primarily the Palestinians) and any activity which promised to thwart the peace process were regarded as righteous activities which would help lead ultimately to an 'ideal' society.

Theft of Culture

As a group drawn from the Kahanist movement, Eyal's perception of a threat to culture was almost identical to that of Kach, defined by an external, usurping threat in the form of the Palestinians and by an internal threat (either malicious or merely misguided was unimportant) posed by liberal 'hellenists'. The primary threat which inspired the movement's formation was a collective one in the form of the progressive Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This involved both the external and internal threats in equal measure and posed the gravest danger to Jewish culture and so its disruption was regarded as of paramount importance. Attacks on, and harassment of, Arabs was certainly a constant of Kahanist ideology, as were confrontation with the Israeli liberal left and, at times, the secular state. However, Eyal represented a current within the radical Jewish right that felt the stakes had been raised to such an extent that the only way Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement could be halted was incitement and possibly direct action against the Israeli leadership.

Scripturalism

As part of the Kahanist milieu Eyal's ideological basis in scripture - to the extent that it can be identified - lies in the Torah, the Halakah and Meir Kahane's interpretations

of them. Apart from these scriptural sources, Eyal was also influenced by two obsolete Halakic concepts that had not previously been advocated and which were revived in 1994 by rabbis in Israel and abroad: *din rodef* ('law of the pursuer') and *din moser* ('law of the informer').¹⁰⁷ *Din Rodef* is the duty to kill a Jew who endangers the life or property of another Jew and *din moser* is the duty to eliminate a Jew who intends to turn another Jew over to non-Jewish authorities. It was debated by the group that these concepts could be applied to the Prime Minister (and deputy Prime Minister) because their policies would endanger Jewish lives and property. While these concepts were once obscure, their revival brought them fully into public consciousness and their relevance and applicability were debated extensively.¹⁰⁸ It is clear that Yigal Amir subscribed to this tradition. When asked in court by a judge if he had heard of the ten commandments Amir replied "[t]here is an admonition more important than 'Thou shalt not kill' and it's 'the saving of souls'. If someone goes to kill your friend, you are duty bound to kill that person first."¹⁰⁹

Manichaeian World View

The Manichaeian world view of Eyal is two dimensional, seeing Arabs as the clear and obvious enemy but also those Jews who are an 'enemy to the Jewish people'. In a leaflet disseminated by Avishai Raviv, which exhorted Israeli Defence Force (IDF) soldiers to disobey orders calling for the removal of settlers, he states "[a] soldier who does not do so is, in our eyes, like a *Kapo*, those who collaborated with the Nazis, and his sentence is death."¹¹⁰ It was precisely this line of thought, supported by Halakic rulings, which led to the atmosphere of extreme incitement and which clearly motivated Amir and his actions. Demonisation of the Arab population followed the established Kahanist reasoning that they represented a security and demographic threat. The course of the peace process simply made this threat more severe and the establishment of a Palestinian state - because of the innate hostility of the Palestinian for the Jews - would inevitably lead to the destruction of Israel. As Amir stated at his trial:

¹⁰⁷ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 253-258.

¹⁰⁸ See M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin*, 1998, Ch. 4.

¹⁰⁹ *U.S. News and World Report*, 20/11/95, Vol. CXIX, # 20, p. 70.

¹¹⁰ See M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, p. 218.

"[i]t is very interesting that an entire nation did not at all notice that a Palestinian state was being established with an army of terrorists, with whom we will have to fight in less than half a year or a year".¹¹¹

Messianic Vision

Once again the messianic vision of Eyal is tied intimately to that of the Jewish extreme right generally. The peace process as pursued by Rabin was seen as a direct threat to the sanctity of a greater Israel which had been promised by God to the Jewish people. In much the same way as the Jewish Underground would later see the destruction of the Dome of the Rock as a way of getting the messianic process back on track, Eyal identified the disruption of the Peace process and ultimately the assassination of Rabin as essential steps to fulfilling messianic destiny. It has been rightly observed that Amir represented the direct off-spring of Gush Emunim and the Jewish Underground and to him Rabin "was the ultimate sacrifice to save the Jewish nation from collapse and the aspired messianic redemption from demise."¹¹²

The ideological programme developed by Eyal was basically directly adopted from Kach, although the group planned to operate as a militant splinter not as mainstream organisation. There were, however, two important differences. The first - which affected the extreme right generally - was the revival of the Halakic concepts of *din rodef* and *din moser* which provided Jewish extremists with a scriptural rationalisation for killing other Jews. The second was the greater messianic emphasis of Eyal which identified the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as perhaps the greatest impediment since the establishment of Israel to the realisation of the Jewish messianic promise. In this respect Eyal, like the Order, is a good example of the more extreme - if less articulated - ideological interpretations of a splinter group.

¹¹¹ *Voice of Israel*, Jerusalem, 0800 gmt, 6 Nov 95 - BBC/SWB, ME/2454, MED/4, November 7 1995.

¹¹² S. Peleg, 'They Shoot Prime Ministers Too, Don't They? Religious Violence in Israel: Premises, Dynamics and Prospects', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 20, # 3, 1997, p. 243.

3.2.2 The Order

The Order provides an interesting example of the eclectic nature of ideological formation within American Christian groups.¹¹³ A clue to this eclecticism is provided by the varied backgrounds and group affiliations of The Order's members. The founder and leader of the group, Robert Mathews, for example, was a recruiter for the neo-Nazi National Alliance and also an activist within the Identity-affiliated Aryan Nations. Other members came from both the National Alliance, Aryan Nations and various Klan splinter groups. The ideological influences then contained the essential ingredients of a belief in White, Anglo-Saxon Christian supremacy and a conspiratorial and paranoid view of the U.S. Federal government. The ideology of the Order could in broad terms be defined as Christian Identity. This categorisation does, however, require serious qualification, for as Jeffrey Kaplan has stated: "Identity theology today is highly decentralised. There is no centre of orthodoxy, and in the Post-Wesley Smith era, no pre-eminent figure to tie together the fractious world of independent Identity churches."¹¹⁴

Golden Age Myth

According to Mathews, the Order was founded in order to "pursue a more violent approach toward making the U.S. a pure white Christian country."¹¹⁵ This, it was reasoned, would be achieved through the violent overthrow of the Government which has been completely subverted by Jews who are described as the sons of Satan who must be exterminated in a "racial and religious Armageddon."¹¹⁶ The original objective was to establish what Mathews referred to as the 'White American Bastion'. This was the less radical idea whereby white Americans would be persuaded to move to the Pacific Northwest and through sheer weight of numbers, white's would (legally) command control

¹¹³ The name the Order was conferred on the group by the FBI. The group members themselves variously referred to themselves as 'the company', 'the organisation' or 'the Order', but for most of its existence the group had no official name. Mathews was inspired to give the group a German name, *der Bruder Schweigen*, a title borrowed from an old German soldiers poem. Mathews translated this as the silent brotherhood and the name was adopted comparatively late in the day.

¹¹⁴ J. Kaplan, 'Right Wing Violence in North America', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VII, # 1, 1995, p. 53.

¹¹⁵ *Washington Post*, December 26, 1984.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*

of political, social and economic institutions.¹¹⁷ This is similar in many ways to Butler's vision of an 'Aryan Nation'. Despite Mathew's efforts, the response to his call for migration was poor, and as time passed his frustrations with the state of American society persuaded him that a more radical programme was required in order to achieve a racially and morally pure America.

Theft of Culture

As with Aryan Nations the Order's belief in a theft of culture centres around the racial dilution of America and the consequent erosion of white, Christian values. This process, according to the Order, was orchestrated in Washington at the instigation of a global Jewish conspiracy. As Mathews stated in his 'declaration of war', "[o]ur heroes and our culture have been insulted and degraded. The mongrel hordes clamour to sever us from our inheritance, yet our people do not care."¹¹⁸ The theft believed to be orchestrated by many parties. Many members for example believed they were the victims of discrimination through affirmative action programmes - programmes which favoured racial groups they despised and that were orchestrated in Washington, indicating a widespread belief of betrayal by their own government. As with many other elements of the racist right white culture is seen to be threatened by deliberate policies of race mixing instigated and encouraged by the Federal government and the media. This threat is not static but one which is seen as worsening with every passing day:

"[s]uffice it to say this is not a white country and if something does not change soon, then before long Whites will be a very small minority in America...the day is coming when [our enemies] will attempt to murder the last true white man and carry the last true white woman and girls off for integration and sport."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 1990, pp. 109-110. As the authors note this was already the case, simply that the population was not 'racially aware'.

¹¹⁸ Reproduced in K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 422-423. On the reverse of the declaration Mathews attached a copy of an 'Open Letter to Congress' distributed by the National Alliance. The letter warns of revenge against Congress for wrongs perpetrated against the American people. The letter end with the lines "When the day comes we will not ask whether you swung to the right or whether you swung to the left; we will simply swing you by the neck".

¹¹⁹ D. Lane, *Tie-Coloured Treason*, n.p., n.d. One Order training manual advised that no kinsman "raise his sword against ZOG until he has planted his seed in the belly of a woman...kinswomen ...should bear at least one warrior before putting their own life on the line". Quoted in J. Coates, *Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right*, 1987, p. 44.

Scripturalism

The scriptural basis of the Order was similar in content to that of Aryan Nations and many other Identity oriented groups. The primary emphases were on those verses which dealt with the satanic lineage of the Jews, the inferiority of other non-white races, and the permissibility, indeed the necessity, for white Christians to engage in armed struggle. As with many other elements of the extreme right, the second amendment was not only seen as a legal right but also as a biblical precedent - "[a]nd he that has no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one."¹²⁰ Evidence of direct references by the group to the Bible are rare, although some do exist. It is reputed, for example, that before the July 1984 Brinks armoured car robbery Richard Scutari recited the 91st Psalm.¹²¹ This absence of scriptural exploration is largely because the group itself did not contain any members with a deep scriptural knowledge or interest in biblical exegesis, because the group's rapid move into activism left little time or desire for such pursuits, and also because individual members belief systems varied - Odinism played as much a role as Christian Identity in group teleology and ritual.

Apart from these broad beliefs in Christianity and its Identity interpretation the group (and Mathews in particular) were profoundly influenced by William Pierce's novel *The Turner Diaries* which functioned more or less as a blueprint for action.¹²² Many of the crimes committed by the Order, such as bank robberies and assassination of perceived enemies (including its own members), closely resembled some of the acts perpetrated in the novel. Mathews even structured the Order along the same lines as the 'guerrilla' force in the book, recreating a similar structure, similar tactics and even similar ordination rituals.¹²³ Indeed, it is frequently claimed that *The Turner Diaries* is a form of 'bible' for

¹²⁰ Luke 22:36. This verse is a good illustration of the selective nature of scriptural justification. Also in the New Testament is the verse "Put your sword in its place, for all who take the sword will perish by the sword", Mathew 26:52.

¹²¹ Legend has it that the British 91st infantry recited this Psalm before the First World War battle of Bellau Wood and emerged from the engagement without a single casualty. See K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 277.

¹²² Pierce denies any connection with the Order and maintains that (unproved) allegations that the Order provided him with funds to buy property are false. Other, 'operational' literary influences included: *The Road Back*, an instruction manual for establishing a terrorist group and ; Louis Beam's *Essays of a Klansman* which included a point system for Aryan warriors which assigned values to different targets and criminal acts.

¹²³ Mathews issued new members with copies of the book if they had not already read it. See K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 235.

the American Christian Patriots.¹²⁴ The book, however, is far more an operational blueprint than an ideological tome - what ideological content it contains is presented in a crude and emotive way concerning itself almost entirely with White supremacy and the inferiority and perfidy of other races - especially blacks and Jews. In this sense, it is unlike most influential works which are either religious texts or intellectual analyses of certain religious texts or obligations. On the other hand, the book is eminently accessible to the lay reader and both the plot and the setting create a sensation of the everyday. In this respect then *The Turner Diaries* is a populist work of fiction that contains a broad appeal to most of the far-right-wing religious spectrum in America (and beyond) without being lumbered with complex theological argument and rhetoric.¹²⁵ Indeed Pierce chose this format because he believes that "modern American society finds the action novel more approachable than serious literature."¹²⁶ Nor is the Order the only group to draw inspiration from this book which has been cited as a major influence on Timothy McVeigh when he planned the Oklahoma city bombing.¹²⁷ It is also claimed that John William King, convicted in 1999 of dragging a black man to his death behind his pick-up truck, is reported to have said before he drove off "[w]e're going to start the Turner Diaries early."¹²⁸ While not as important as the *Turner Diaries*, other novels which outlined terror campaigns in the U.S. are popular amongst right-wing extremists. For example, when the FBI raided Gary Yarborough's house they found a copy of *Balefire* by Kenneth Goddard - a novel about a terrorist assault on the 1984 Olympics - which had several passages underlined.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Amongst others see B. Hoffman, *Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Terrorism in the United States*, R-3618, 1986, p.42.

¹²⁵ The inside page of a 1995 second edition claims that 198,000 copies have been sold since the book was first published in 1978.

¹²⁶ B. Whitsel, 'Aryan Visions for the Future in the West Virginia Mountains', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VII, # 4, 1995, p. 121.

¹²⁷ *Sunday Times*, , 21 April, 1996, and *Time*, 15 April, 1996. Ten days after the bombing itself Pierce predicted in a radio interview that "resentment generated amongst 'normal Americans' by Jews, politicians, homosexuals, minorities and 'female executives' would lead to more terrorism 'on a scale that the world has never seen before'". ADL, *Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far-Right Fringe*, 1996, p. 110. Judge Matsch who presided over the Order trial also presided over McVeigh's.

¹²⁸ *The Washington Post*, February 16, 1999.

¹²⁹ J. Gibson, *Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America*, 1994, p. 229.

Manichaeen World View

The Manichean world view of the Order is similar to that of most Identity adherents in that it dialectically divides the white, true people of God from all others. The typical enemies are the Jews, all other races (the ubiquitous mud people), and the US government which is identified as part of a global conspiracy against the white Christian peoples of the world. At the same time Mathews further divided his group and a smaller number of similarly minded individuals from the rest of the white race. Indeed, Mathews had little respect for the bulk of the American people because they had either connived in the decline of their race or they had done nothing about it, referring to the general white population as the 'sheeple'. In his last letter, Roberts explained that his original reason for seeking solitude in Metaline Falls was "because I was thoroughly disgusted with the American people. I maintained then as I do now that our people have devolved into some of the most cowardly, sheepish degenerates that have ever littered the face of the planet."¹³⁰ In response to a question about people who claim to believe in the 'White people's movement' but fail to support it in any way, Richard Scutari has stated that a war for the very existence of the white race "calls for total compassion and protection for our Folk who support our cause and total ruthlessness towards those who do not. When the time is right, these people will be given a choice of either supporting the movement in all ways or being eliminated."¹³¹

Messianic Vision

The apocalyptic element within the Order's teleology accorded with radical right eschatology, and like so many like minded people during the warmer parts of the Cold War, this view was reinforced by the ever present possibility of an imminent nuclear apocalypse.¹³² The apocalyptic element was also characteristically racist in orientation. In line with much Identity thinking and certainly in accord with the scenario which unfolds in *The Turner Diaries* the final apocalyptic struggle would occur between the chosen white

¹³⁰ 'Robert Mathew Last Letter' reproduced in J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, 1990, p. 247.

¹³¹ 'An Interview With Bruder Schweigen P.O.W. Richard Scutari', n.p., n.d.

¹³² It is reputed that on one occasion when Mathews saw a CNN test announcement claiming that WW III had begun he shouted at the television "We're not ready yet...The commies can't do this now! We're not in place yet! Just a few more months!". See K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 382-383.

elect and a non-white horde led by a Jewish antichrist.¹³³ This battle itself would be the climactic moment in the Jewish conspiracy's attempt to take over the world, and as in the novel, would involve nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. While there was no specific timetable for the culmination of history (the *Turner Diaries* mentions the year 1999 as the time when "the dream of a White world finally became a certainty")¹³⁴ it was certainly a firmly held belief of most hard-core members. As one unrepentant member has stated "[t]hey [our children] will emulate the Warrior Archetypes...and then perhaps we will have enough warriors for the final battle, which is most assuredly heading our way."¹³⁵

For reasons outlined above the ideological programme of the Order, like Eyal, can only really be understood by inference, especially as the group at no stage seems to systematically developed nor recorded its ideological belief system. What can be inferred is that the group inherited most of its beliefs from Identity thought, especially that espoused by Aryan Nations, adding an activist dimension. This activism meant that the group would perform the function of a revolutionary vanguard, a self perception reinforced by the overwhelming strength and resources of the American state and the apathetic nature of the American population.

3.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Like Hamas, the PIJ began life as an offshoot of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike Hamas, however, the PIJ rejected the course of participating in social and political activities and developed a programme strongly centred on armed resistance, a programme which emphasised traditional ideas such as the desire for an independent, Islamic Palestine and a complete rejection of the Israeli state. The ideology of the PIJ thus stresses an uncompromising stance towards its enemies which is less susceptible to moderation because of the focus on armed struggle and external aid and influences - as exemplified by Iranian support. The ideological programme is also less flexible than that espoused by Hamas, although on a superficial level they might seem very close, if not similar.

¹³³ M. Barkun, 'Millenarians and Violence: The Case of the Christian Identity Movement', in T. Robbins & S. Palmer (eds.), *Millennium, Messiahs and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements*, pp. 253-254.

¹³⁴ A. Macdonald, *The Turner Diaries*, 1978, p. 210.

¹³⁵ 'An Interview With Bruder Schweigen P.O.W. Richard Scutari'.

Golden Age Myth

Similar to Hamas, the immediate Golden Age sought by the PIJ is the destruction of Israel through a popular armed jihad and in its place the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state.¹³⁶ The vision of a liberated Palestine also includes all areas of Israeli influence. Unlike the declared objectives of Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat, the PIJ is "not fighting for an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital but to liberate the whole of Palestine, the Golan and south Lebanon...by resistance and not by conferences."¹³⁷ As with other Islamic groups, the PIJ views the Islamic religious tradition as the basis for a revitalised community of believers, not just within Palestine but throughout the Muslim world. In the words of Ramadan Abdullah Shallah "from the beginning...I knew Islam as ideological belonging and as a path for civilizational renaissance for the Muslim nation."¹³⁸ This pan-Islamic goal is of course the most distant but is intimately related to the Iranian revolution which inspired and activated it.

Threat to Culture

The PIJ views the Israeli state as the primary and direct threat to Palestinian culture and any potential Palestinian state. The consolidation of the Israeli state after the 1948 war and its further enlargement after the Six-Day war are seen as the two most serious and immediate events which threatened Palestinian and Islamic culture. In 1968, the Islamist author Tawfiq al-Tayyib wrote that while the 1948 war was a defeat for liberal Arab thought the 1967 disaster was a defeat for Arab socialist and revolutionary ideas.¹³⁹ According to al-Tayyib, Israel represents a modern Western threat which can only be countered by Islam.¹⁴⁰ Fathi Shiqaqi and the leadership considered al-Tayyib's book to be one of the most important texts to be written after the 1967 defeat and an accurate

¹³⁶ E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', 1988, p. 11.

¹³⁷ *AFP*, October 24, 1997. This quote was made by Ramadan Abdullah Shallah when addressing Palestinian refugees in the Yarmouk camp, Syria.

¹³⁸ 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXVIII, # 4, p. 63.

¹³⁹ Tawfiq al-Tayyib, *Al-Hall al-Islami ma ba'd al-Nakbatayn [The Islamic Solution After Two Disasters]*, 1979.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 13.

assessment of the cultural threat faced by Islamic Palestine.¹⁴¹ However, the organisation also views Israeli and Jewish 'corruption' as a threat to the greater *umma* beyond Palestine "to westernise it, to subjugate it, to enslave it, to paralyse its will, and to cast an eternal yoke over its neck."¹⁴² According to Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Auda, the PIJ has a long term goal of "overcoming the crisis of the modern Western challenge" and a short term goal of "establishing the Islamic state and establishing the Islamic political power."¹⁴³ The PIJ also regards democracy as against the nature of Islam. Thus, while the organisation has, at times, enjoyed an ambiguous relationship with the PLO and then the PA, The PIJ does not regard the goal of establishing a secular Palestinian state as in accord with the Islamic view of history.¹⁴⁴

Scripturalism

The religious sources of the PIJ's ideology are similar to most other groups being drawn primarily from the Quran, Hadith and the Sunna. The use of these sources is also selective and geared around justifying violence against the oppressors of Islam and the Palestinian people in particular, in this context the Jews and their supporters, principally the U.S. administration. According to the PIJ, the waging of jihad is interpreted along the lines of the 'new' Shi'a doctrine propagated by Khomeini whereby there is a constant emphasis on holy war as an offensive symbol of activism.¹⁴⁵ Beyond these obvious and accepted scriptural messages, attempts have also been made to reinterpret scripture and religious tradition. In 1984, for example, Sheikh Tamimi wrote a book called *The Disappearance of Israel: A Ruling of the Koran*.¹⁴⁶ This work attempted to prove the importance accorded to Palestine in the Quran and that jihad would bring the Holy Land back under Islamic control and that the Jews would be banished from there.¹⁴⁷ In this way,

¹⁴¹ Fathi 'Abd-al-'Aziz (al-Shaqiqi), *Al Khomeini: al-Hall al-'Islami wal-Badil [Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative]*, 1979, p. 28.

¹⁴² Cited in Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 102.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 103.

¹⁴⁴ E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', in D. Menashri, ed., *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, 1990, p. 12.

¹⁴⁵ E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact', p. 194.

¹⁴⁶ Aman, n.p., 1984.

¹⁴⁷ <http://www.ict.org.il/>, For a more recent rationalisation see A. Al-Ansari, 'The Termination of "Israel": A Qur'anic Fact', *Nida' ul Islam*, Issue ~ 20, September-October, 1997. Shiqaqi also spoke of a fatwa issued by the Ayatollah Khomeini which referred to the religious duty of bringing about the 'elimination' of the 'Zionist entity'.

both the day-to-day mechanics of the struggle and the ultimate objective form part of divine obligation and promise.

While the leaders of movements, such as the PIJ, are well versed in scripture and capable of using it selectively, their members are frequently unaware of other, passive religious messages. During an interview a PIJ suicide bomber was asked if he had ever in the course of his life heard of a Quranic sentence forbidding the killing of woman, children and the elderly. The reply was "[t]here is no such sentence". The bomber continued his justification thus:

"The prophet, what did he say? There is no way that when a Jew meets a Muslim he doesn't think of killing him...Other than that the Prophet, may he rest in peace, said that not even one hour should pass when a Muslim does not fight a heretic. We should not be idle for even one hour."¹⁴⁸

In this way the selective interpretation of scriptural messages becomes a new, extremist orthodoxy for the ill-educated rank and file of the organisation.

Manichaeian World View

The Manichaeian world view of the PIJ is derived from the obvious distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim, but more specifically between Muslims and Jews. Sheikh al-Tamimi has called for "the destruction of the Jewish state" and for Muslims to fight Jews "in an Islamic battle that will end your state so that it becomes part of history's residue."¹⁴⁹ In the view of the PIJ, there is no room for coexistence between Arabs and Jews within the geographical bounds of Palestine. At a convention held in Chicago in December 1990 entitled 'Islam: The Road to Victory', Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Odeh described the Intifada as "the turning point in the struggle between good and evil."¹⁵⁰ Using such rhetoric, the Israelis are elevated from a malevolent occupying force to a cosmic evil which it is a religious obligation to fight. In a similar vein, Fathi Shiqaqi has described the struggle between Islam and the West as one between divine and satanic forces. The

¹⁴⁸ *Harper's Magazine*, 'A Terrorist Moves the Goalposts', Vol. CCXCV, # 1767, 1997, p. 19.

¹⁴⁹ Cited in Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 1994, p. 92.

¹⁵⁰ *Palestine Monitor*, May-June, 1992.

vanguard of these satanic forces was Israel which in turn serves the global interests of the 'great Satan', the U.S.¹⁵¹

Messianic Vision

No element within the PIJ holds an imminent messianic expectation and to the extent that one exists it is based loosely upon the expectations of Twelver-Shi'ism. This may appear surprising for a group which is Sunni in orientation but the derivation, as with other theological justifications, is a direct result of the influence of the Iranian revolution and Iranian clerical tradition. Since 1980 there has been a growth in the number of Sunni expositions on messianic expectation, and these will have had some influence on the eschatological beliefs of the PIJ members. Thus there is a non-time specific belief in the return of the twelfth Imam but this does not form an important part of group ideology.

The ideological programme of the PIJ exhibits familiar themes to Hamas relating to the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state and the scriptural justifications for violent struggle against Israel, an enemy seen in dualistic terms. The PIJ, however, has been far more influenced by the Iranian revolutionary model than that of the Muslim Brotherhood and the organisation sees itself as a form of militant revolutionary vanguard. This concentration on armed struggle which is reinforced by ideological exegesis has denied the group a degree of flexibility and this could prove problematic as the PIJ's capabilities decline. If the group denies itself the opportunity to engage in mainstream activities and its military capabilities are degraded then its very purpose and existence are threatened.

3.3 Messianic/ Apocalyptic

3.3.1 Jewish Underground

The Jewish Underground represents one of the most extreme manifestations of contemporary, active, Jewish messianism to date. While the group was an off-shoot of the more mainstream Gush Emunim settler movement and shared the same ideological roots, the Underground's interpretation of this ideology in light of political events was entirely more radical. The primary difference lay in the Underground's belief that the imminent

¹⁵¹ Shiqaqi, *Khomeini*, pp. 46-47.

messianic redemption could be hastened (or at least put back on course) by a significant and highly symbolic act of violence rather than a more gradualist approach. Motivated by the messianic implications of Israel's gains in the 1967 war, and later by the apparent divine rebuffs of the 1973 war and the 1979 Camp David agreement, the Underground sought to bring the messianic process back on track through human agency.

Golden Age Myth

The Golden Age sought by the Jewish Underground was a redemptive and ultimately transcendental one. The process is identical to that expounded by Rabbi Kook the younger. According to Kook, the sacredness of the Land of Israel requires Jews to fulfil the 'commandment of conquest' whereby the land promised by God to the Jewish people must be settled and ruled.¹⁵² This settlement is also considered a vital element in the messianic process and the inception of a transcendental Golden Age. After the phenomenal success of the 1967 war, Kook defined the state of Israel as a holy land, the entire nation, religious and not, were to recognise this fact, and the government was to conduct its affairs according to the Maimonides's 'rules of kings' and by the Torah.¹⁵³ For the Underground, the extension of this vision was provided by Shabtai Ben Dov who raised the possibility of re-establishing the biblical kingdom of Israel. In the words of Yehuda Etzion, the group's ideological leader:

"[t]his is...the proper kingdom of Israel that we have to establish here between the two rivers [the Euphrates and the Nile]. This kingdom will be directed by the supreme court, which is bound to sit on the place, chosen by God, to emit his inspiration, a site which will have a temple, an alter, and a king chosen by God."¹⁵⁴

Threat to Culture

In the long term view of the Underground, Jewish culture had been under constant threat since the destruction of the Second Temple, the suppression of the second revolt and

¹⁵² E. Don-Yehiya, 'Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim', *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXIII, # 2, 1987, p. 226. For the covenant between God and Abraham see Genesis 15:18-21.

¹⁵³ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 153.

¹⁵⁴ Yehuda Etzion quoted in E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 163.

the beginning of the Diaspora. Since that time the gentiles had periodically victimised the Jewish people, culminating in the most recent attempt during the Second World War. With the establishment of the state of Israel, Jewish culture, as far as Etzion and his colleagues were concerned, was once again consolidated and allowed to develop independently. Despite the various attempts by Arab states to extinguish the new state, it continued to thrive and even appeared to be moving towards fulfilling its messianic promise. Hence the primary threats were identified as being those posed by the presence of Arabs within Israel, the existence of Arab states around Israel, and gentile intransigence. However, with the signing of the 1979 Camp David accords, the secular government of Israel was identified as also posing a threat, albeit not one that warranted a violent response as later manifestations of the Jewish extreme right would believe. One of the defining features of the Underground ideology was Etzion's rejection of the Gush's sanctification of the secular Zionist state. As the parent group itself degenerated in the face of the Camp David accords, its ideological shortcomings were addressed by Etzion. To his mind the Israeli state was illegitimate because it had failed to become completely Jewish, to establish biblical Eretz Israel, to completely control the Arab population and to re-build the Third Temple.¹⁵⁵ It therefore posed an indirect threat to the fulfilment of the Jewish people's destiny. Culture in this case is associated directly with historical promise - culture is not merely a series of socio-religious and socio-political constructs but it is ultimately concerned with the realisation of divinely promised ethno-religious destiny.

Scripturalism

The Jewish messianic promise has various scriptural sources, and it was the interpretation of these sources especially by Kook the younger which formed the core of the Underground's belief system. Kook interpreted the establishment of the Jewish state as the beginning of a promised messianic era, an interpretation apparently confirmed and reinforced by the territorial gains of the Six Day war.¹⁵⁶ Both the primary leaders of the group, but particularly Yehuda Etzion, were also influenced by the writings of a hitherto unknown ultra-nationalist thinker Shabtai Ben Dov who wrote of the possibility of re-

¹⁵⁵ Yehuda Etzion, 'To Fly at Last the Flag of Jerusalem', *Nekuda*, # 93, No. 22, 1985.

¹⁵⁶ See Isaiah 11:12, "He will set up a banner for the nations, And will assemble the outcasts of Israel, and gather together the dispersed of Judah, From the four corners of the earth". See also Deuteronomy 28: 64.

establishing a biblical kingdom of Israel, the building of the Third Temple and the "institutionalisation of Jewish theocracy on earth."¹⁵⁷ What was unique about the writings of Ben Dov was that they spelled out a programme of active redemption - there was no need to await another 'miracle' such as the 1967 war, all the conditions for redemption were in place, all that was required was action. After the biblical Davidic kingdom had been established government, religious practice and law would be governed at least in part by the proscriptions laid down by the medieval rabbi Moses Maomonides in works such as the 'Rule of Kings'.

Manichaeen World View

Influenced by ideas of active redemption the Underground's Manichean outlook was obviously strong. The Jews are regarded as the chosen people, the gentiles are not, and this is what defined the Underground's dualist world view. For the Jewish Underground this belief has its origins in the teachings of Rabbi Kook the Elder, stating that "[t]he difference between a Jewish soul and souls of non-Jews - all of them in all different levels - is greater and deeper than the difference between a human soul and the souls of cattle."¹⁵⁸ This is one of the principal tenets of the Lurianic Cabbala, the school of Jewish mysticism which dominated Judaism from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries and upon which Kook's entire teaching was based.¹⁵⁹ In Etzion's own view:

"[b]ut as for ourselves 'our God is not theirs'. Not only is our existential experience different from theirs but also from their very definition. For the Gentiles, life is mainly a *life of existence, while ours is a life of destiny*, the life of a kingdom of priests and a holy people. We exist in a world in order to actualise destiny."¹⁶⁰

As Ehud Sprinzak has noted Etzion believed that the distinction between the 'laws of existence and the laws of destiny' would have been made real by the destruction of the Dome of the Rock, elevating a secular nation state to a divine kingdom on earth.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁷ Sprinzak, E., 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 205.

¹⁵⁸ I. Shahak & N. Mezvinsky, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, 1999, p. ix.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.* According to this Cabbala the world was created for the sake of Jews and the existence of non-Jews was 'subsidiary'.

¹⁶⁰ Yehuda Etzion, 'To Fly at Last', p. 165.

¹⁶¹ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 165.

Messianic Vision

The messianic theme is the dominant one for the Underground. All the members of the group and the broader milieu from which they came believed themselves to be living in the era of Jewish redemption, the clearest proof of which was the establishment of the state of Israel and then the territorial gains made during the Six Day War, especially gaining control over the Western Wall. The members of the Underground furthermore identified themselves as in a position to dictate the pace of redemption through temporal activity - namely the destruction of the Dome of the Rock. The objective of the bombing was twofold: to clear the Temple Mount in preparation for the re-building of the Temple¹⁶², and to precipitate another Arab-Israeli war, and hopefully a superpower conflict which would force the Jewish Messiah to intervene to save his chosen people.¹⁶³ Leaving the veracity of messianic expectations aside, there can be little doubt that if the attack had proceeded as planned the results would certainly have been catastrophic and may indeed have "put us one step closer to an Armageddon".¹⁶⁴ The attack itself did not envisage immediate enormous casualties, but rather a divine transformation of temporal history. The aim was to perpetrate a symbolic act at a place of great religious significance for Judaism and Islam in the belief that an expected apocalyptic struggle between Jews and Muslims would begin and messianic redemption would rapidly unfold as a result.

The Jewish Underground can be seen as a radical offshoot of the Gush Emunim movement and the group's ideological programme certainly reflects this. The apparent shortcomings of Gush's ideology which arose after the Camp David accords were addressed by the Underground which assigned greater importance to the direct role of human agency in the Jewish redemptive process and simultaneously rejected the belief that

¹⁶² The idea that the re-construction of the Temple is an important part of the Jewish messianic age has been a common one since the end of the first revolt, and has received added attention since 1948. See for example G. W. Buchanan, *Revelation and Redemption: Jewish Documents of Deliverance From the Fall of Jerusalem to the Death of Nahmanides*, 1978 and J. Frankel, ed., *Jews and Messianism in the Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning*, Vol. VII of *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 1991, especially pp. 34-67 and 197-216. Many Evangelical Christians believe that the re-construction of the Temple will be the catalyst for the final struggle predicted in revelations. See for example: Hal Lindsay, *The Late Great Planet Earth*, 1970, pp. 55-57; and Jerry Falwell, *Nuclear War and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ*, 1983.

¹⁶³ See Bruce Hoffman's 'Holy Terror', p. 283 (fn. 21). The information that the Underground wished to provoke a cataclysmic Muslim-Jewish war was provided to Dr. Hoffman by an American law enforcement officer knowledgeable of the incident.

¹⁶⁴ Rapoport, D.C., 'Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?', in P. Wilkinson & A. Stewart (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, 1987, p. 72.

the secular Israeli state was an essential component of this process. The result was an ideology which emphasised the imminence of the expected messianic era and simultaneously differentiated itself from the broader movement which held this belief by identifying a potential impediment to this process and planning its destruction.

3.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo

Aum Shinrikyo represents perhaps the most bizarre manifestation of an apocalyptic/messianic group in recent history. Although classified here as Christian because of the heavy influence of the Christian apocalyptic in Aum's theology, the group's belief system could best be described as composite, drawing as it does on other sources, primarily Tibetan Buddhism and Hinduism.¹⁶⁵ As the group became more isolated from society so the group's ideology became increasingly imbued with violent traditions and those which necessitated preparations for a 'final battle'. A series of ideological justifications for extreme violence were thus created, centred on the central messianic figure of the group's leader, Shoko Asahara, whose position as a self-proclaimed deity allowed a certain latitude in adopting new ideas. Like so many other organisations, clues to the group's perception of itself can be found in its name. Aum Shinrikyo is usually translated roughly into English as 'Aum supreme truth'. There are, however, more subtle interpretations. According to Shoko Asahara, *Aum* is a Sanskrit term which refers to "the creation, preservation and destruction of the universe."¹⁶⁶ *Shinri* is the Japanese word for truth and *kyo* that of teaching. The name of the group thus suggests it is in a position to teach the truth about the creation and destruction of the universe and all that passes between the two.

¹⁶⁵ It has been suggested that Tibetan Buddhism was chosen as the basis for Asahara's own form of Buddhism, *Tantra Vajrayana*, because he wanted to differentiate it from that of a rival group, Agonshu.

¹⁶⁶ M. Mullins, 'Aum Shinrikyo as an Apocalyptic Movement', in T. Robbins & S. Palmer (eds.), *Millennium, Messiahs and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements*, 1997, p. 315. The *Aum* or *Om* is regarded as the most sacred syllable in Hinduism, and is often regarded as the *bija* (seed) of all mantras because it contains all origination and dissolution. It is known as the *pranava* (reverberation), and it is the supreme *aksara* (syllable).

Golden Age Myth

The Golden Age perceived by Aum Shinrikyo was revealed to Shoko Asahara in 1985. The guru allegedly had been visited by the god Shiva who told him that he would be the 'god of light that leads the armies of the gods' and charged him with establishing the kingdom of Shambala, a mythical kingdom appearing in Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam. Shambala is the archetypal ideal society consisting of people who have achieved psychic powers. His role as 'the god of light' within the myth is that of a messianic figure destined to defeat the armies of the infidel in a final war and then to establish the universal reign of Buddhism.¹⁶⁷ Asahara's short term Golden Age was to convert Japan into a state where Asahara reigned according to the principal of a unified state and religion. This was also known as the 'vision of Lotus villages' where peace and justice would reign supreme.¹⁶⁸ The condition for these short and long term Golden Ages was that they should be inhabited solely by Aum believers through either a process of conversion or elimination. Although Asahara's teaching suggests that killing those opposed to Aum is both meritorious and necessary for the victim's salvation, most Aum publications suggest that non-believers will be removed through a series of cataclysmic wars and natural disasters to which Aum believers would be immune due to their higher level of consciousness and enlightenment.

Threat to Culture

The threat perceived by Aum differs from most other organisations because the group itself did not (and does not) represent a large community with a centuries old history and a clearly defined religious tradition. The 'culture' which was under threat then was that manufactured by the group itself, and one which they saw as the blueprint for human society post-Armageddon. In 1989, Aum was granted religious corporation status by the Tokyo metropolitan government which allowed the group a high degree of autonomy and helped to enhance its separate identity.¹⁶⁹ As time progressed and the group became more inward looking Aum believers increasingly felt that they were oppressed and persecuted

¹⁶⁷ M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronological and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. X,# 4, 1998, p. 83, & D. W. Brackett, *Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo*, 1996,p. 66.

¹⁶⁸ M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today', p. 86.

¹⁶⁹ It is estimated that there are about one 185,000 legally registered religious groups in Japan.

because they knew the 'supreme truth'. Obvious and well defined threats to the group came from critical journalists and also from the 'Association of Victims of Aum Shinrikyo', a body established by parents whose children were involved with the organisation. The Association's first lawyer, Tsutsumi Sakamoto and his family were also the first external victims of Aum Shinrikyo. Similarly the group's first successful sarin attack in the town of Matsumoto in 1994 was aimed at eliminating the judges presiding over a land fraud case which Aum was destined to lose.¹⁷⁰ As the Japanese state began to probe the illegal activities of the group it too became identified as a threat. While the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway can be interpreted as the first strike of Armageddon it can also be seen as a direct attempt to disrupt the investigations of the central government and its security apparatus by striking at the centres of state power.

Scripturalism

Of all the messianic groups examined here Aum's scriptural base is by far the most eclectic, a phenomenon associated most closely with Christian groups rather than their Islamic or Jewish counterparts. Aum engages in what Michael Barkun has called an 'improvisational' style of messianism and apocalypticism.¹⁷¹ This means that a group draws upon eschatological traditions from different religions, secular lore and what is termed the cultic milieu¹⁷², resulting in what can be termed a *composite* belief system. As noted above Shoko Asahara's first influence was that of Tibetan Buddhism which he developed into his own esoteric form known as Tantra Vajrayana. Asahara later reinterpreted the Tibetan Buddhist concept of *phowa*, or transference of consciousness into legitimised murder at the bidding of the Guru himself.¹⁷³ In the early stages, when Aum was based around yoga and meditation, Asahara stressed enlightenment (*gadatsu*) and self-realisation (*satori*).

¹⁷⁰ The first attempt to use the gas was earlier that year when Aum members attempted to spray sarin into a hall where Daisaku Ikeda, leader of the rival sect Soko Gakkai, was delivering a lecture. The attack backfired and nearly killed one of the perpetrators.

¹⁷¹ M. Barkun, 'Politics and Apocalypticism', in S.J. Stein (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of Apocalypticism*, Vol. III, 1998, pp. 442-460.

¹⁷² The cultic milieu is a large body of information composed of information rejected or not taken seriously by society at large. There is something about the rejection of this information which leads to questions about why it is accessible only to the chosen few. For early discussions of this concept see C. Campbell, 'The Cult, the Cultic Milieu and Secularisation', in *A Sociological Yearbook of Britain 5*, 1972, and M.E. Marty, *A Nation of Believers*, 1976.

¹⁷³ M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today', p. 84-85.

Publications at that time such as *Psychic Power: The Secret Way of Its Development* (1986), and *Psychic Power: Its Secret Curriculum* (1987) concentrated on the development of psychic power through yoga.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s Asahara embroidered his Buddhist traditions with ideas drawn from the Christian Apocalyptic tradition. The ideological shift was apocalyptic in tone as expressed by many of the group's publications of the time: *Doomsday*¹⁷⁴ (1989), *From Annihilation to emptiness* (1989), *The Truth of the Annihilation of Mankind*, *Declaring Myself the Christ* (1991 and 1992), and *Shoko Asahara: His Shivering Prophecy* (1993). Predictions made in these publications and others predicted an increasingly imminent Armageddon in greater detail. Various prophetic traditions were also integrated to verify the timing of the Endtime such as those of St. Malachy and the sixteenth century French astrologer Nostradamus (*Nostradamus: The Great Secret Prophecy*, 1991). One of the stranger imponderables about Armageddon for Shoko Asahara was whether or not mankind could benefit from extraterrestrials. He believed UFO visits were a common occurrence, but they were not necessarily 'of benefit' to the human race.¹⁷⁵ While the eclectic nature of this ideological construct is clear, equally is the way in which eschatological themes - especially Christian ones - are emphasised as the organisation detached itself from the mainstream society and embarked on a direct collision course with the Japanese state.

Manichaeian World View

In accordance with other extreme religious groups Aum viewed non-members as the 'other'. While this otherness was initially perceived in a patronising and benign way as the group became more violent and its belief system more apocalyptic, so the view of non-Aum members became one of non-believers who will not survive the day of destruction. While the specific enemies of the group (both real and rhetorical) will be fully examined in Chapter Seven, it is appropriate to note here that Aum regarded the U.S. government and elements of Japanese officialdom, politics, religion and royal family as near satanic foes. Similarly the Jews and Freemasons are held to be 'agents of darkness'. Conversion to the

¹⁷⁴ S. Asahara, *Doomsday*, 1989.

¹⁷⁵ D.E. Kaplan and A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum Shinrikyo*, 1996, p. 66.

group was regarded as the only way to move from the dark to the light and in light of the group's global outlook it is significant to note that Aum had offices and interests in eight different countries and an estimated 35,000 members in Russia alone¹⁷⁶. Thus while the group possessed a Manichaeian outlook, which intensified with the passage of time, movement into the elect was encouraged and relatively easy.

Messianic Vision

Although apocalyptic ideas are unusual in Buddhism, as has been noted above, this eschatological gap was filled by the adoption of (predominantly) Christian end-time ideas. The 1989 *Doomsday* was essentially Asahara's commentary on the book of revelation. As the group grew and matured, this final struggle became both more vivid and more immediate. Moreover it had become unavoidable. In Aum's early stages the Golden Age could be achieved by enough people joining the group. Even though Asahara was writing about nuclear war in the late 1980s, he still claimed that such a conflagration could be avoided by the development of Aum.¹⁷⁷ These earlier theological emphasis on preventing the apocalypse were replaced by more dire apocalyptic visions, a result of a failure to enter mainstream politics and the increasingly inward looking nature of the group. The theological result is a vision which concerns itself with the survival of a small number of chosen people who will rebuild human civilisation according to the plan of Aum Shinrikyo. As time passed the sense of crisis became more intense for Asahara, as did his view of the apocalypse and his own role in it. In 1994, he told his followers of a vision in which he would become king and reign over Japan in three years time and not only that 1997 would be *shinri gannen*, year one of 'the Age of Supreme Truth', but all those who opposed the Supreme Truth were to be killed.¹⁷⁸ Finally, in March 1995, Asahara released *Disaster is Approaching the Land of the Rising Sun*¹⁷⁹ which predicted a great disaster to follow the Hanshin earthquake (which of course Asahara claimed to have predicted), setting the stage for an almost imminent apocalypse.

¹⁷⁶ U.S. Congress, *Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo*, Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, October 31, 1995, p. 21.

¹⁷⁷ S. Asahara, *Initiation*, 1988.

¹⁷⁸ M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today', p. 91.

¹⁷⁹ Sometimes 'A Doom is nearing the Land of the Rising Sun'.

The formation of Aum Shinrikyo's ideology exhibited a propensity to evolve over time in reaction to changing circumstances, a process made possible by the eclectic nature of the group's belief system and the centrality of Shoko Asahara to its formation. As the group rejected mainstream society so the world beyond the group was seen in an increasingly Manichaean light and the messianic and apocalyptic elements of the group's ideology were developed and refined. Over time then Aum's ideology changed a great deal, a process less likely in an organisation based solely in a single, orthodox revealed tradition such as the Jewish Underground or the Saudi Ikhwan.

3.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan

The Saudi Ikhwan represents the only significant example of a contemporary Islamic extremist group motivated primarily by an active messianic programme.¹⁸⁰ Although there had been numerous messianic Islamic movements in the past, the Saudi Ikhwan arose precisely at a time when revolutionary, militant Islam, especially in Iran, was emerging as a political force in the Middle East. The formation of the Saudi Ikhwan's ideology was to a certain extent context-specific, but the underlying causes of militance and the heavy eschatological content of the Ikhwan's message was far from confined to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and resonated throughout the entire Muslim world.¹⁸¹

Golden Age Myth

The Golden Age sought by the Saudi Ikhwan conforms to the ideal type of puritanical, religious society similar to that of the first Islamic communities in seventh century Arabia, and common to many contemporary Islamic groups. The political dimension of this age, however, could be identified as existing as recently as the twentieth

¹⁸⁰ Dekmejian notes that there are two other contemporary Sunni claimants to Mahdship: Shukri Mustafa of al-Takfir wal-Hijra and Taha al-Samawa of Jama'at al-Muslimin lil-Takfir. See his *Islam in Revolution*, 1994, p. 62.

¹⁸¹ It is interesting to note that in the immediate aftermath of the Grand Mosque take-over Sunni literature on the subject of the Mahdi condemned it as a Shi'a heresy (for example Abd al-Karim al-Khatib *The Awaited Mahdi and Those Who Await Him*, 1980, and Abd al-Qadir Ahmad Ata, *The Awaited Mahdi: Between Truth and Superstition*, 1980. In recent years however Sunni works have begun to appear which accept the Mahdi's validity and the imminence of his return to a world which has embraced ignorance. See for example Hamzah al-Faqir, *Three Whom the World Awaits: The Expected Mahdi, the False Messiah, Messiah Jesus*, 1995, and Amin Muhammad Jamal al-Din, *The Life-span of the Islamic Community and the Nearness of the Appearance of the Mahdi*, 1996.

century. Before the establishment of the Kingdom of Saud in 1932, the Ikhwan provided the military force needed to overcome opposition to a unified kingdom. The Ikhwan portrayed themselves as defenders of the faith and supporters of the Sharia and, as such, they soon found themselves in conflict with the comparatively tolerant and modernising royal regime.¹⁸² The contest was an unequal, if prolonged one, and resulted in the triumph of the new regime. It has been suggested then that while doubtless a totally devoted believer and while using religious rhetoric and imagery to convey his message, what Juhayman was really doing "was fighting to restore the Ikhwan's position in the country's polity...Their message was one of opposition to the House of Saud and the ruling elite's alliance system, as well as the proclamation of the long-awaited Mahdi."¹⁸³ For Juhayman, the revival of this Golden Age would be achieved through the appearance of the Mahdi who would rule over this idealised society.

Threat to Culture

The cultural threat perceived by the Ikhwan was the spiritual pollution of Islamic society in Saudi Arabia by the West, and the associated decline in standards of religious practice and observance by Saudis themselves. The themes contained in the 'seven letters', the Ikhwan's primary polemic, include the necessity for Muslims to overthrow corrupt rulers, the need to establish a puritanical society based on the Quran and the Sunnah, and to protect the community from unbelievers and foreign influence.¹⁸⁴ When the Grand Mosque was seized, Utaybi allegedly accused the royal family of corruption, excessive travel abroad and the consumption of alcohol. He also demanded that the kingdom reject the corruption of 'foreign ways' which had been imposed on Saudi society by the modernising policies of the House of Saud.¹⁸⁵ Juhayman also expressed opposition to foreign interference, and Western influence also has a historical parallel with the earlier Ikhwan. In fact, Juhayman believed ibn Saud had 'deceived' the Ikhwan by not leading them on a jihad into surrounding countries but instead made an alliance with the

¹⁸² See D. Holden & R. Johns, *The House of Saud*, 1981, Chs. 6 & 7.

¹⁸³ J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman al Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXX, # 1, p. 8-9.

¹⁸⁴ H. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, p. 135.

¹⁸⁵ S. Mackey, *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom*, p. 231.

'Christians'¹⁸⁶. The growth of the Saudi oil economy during the 1960-1970 period and the Saudi regime's unwavering opposition to communism strengthened these relationships, especially with the U.S. and Britain. The self-proclaimed Mahdi, al-Qhatani, is also reputed to have preached against modernisation during the siege of the mosque, demanding the elimination of television, the broadcasting of music on radio, the disbanding of all football teams, the banning of women from all public work places and the expulsion of foreigners.¹⁸⁷ The threat to culture is an interesting one in a country where religion plays such a pivotal role within the state itself. Since the house of Saud was established, Saudi Arabia has never embraced any political ideology other than religious monarchy.¹⁸⁸ Compared with other Muslim countries such as Syria and Egypt the cultural threat would seem less. Utaybi though was adamant in his condemnation of both the regime and the state ulema:

"[d]o not seek the law from those who have no beards or the state *ulema*. They will only make matters more difficult for you. They will not tell you the truth. They will only tell you what the government wants."¹⁸⁹

Scripturalism

What makes the scripturalism of the Ikhwan uprising appear so extreme is the degree to which religion was already imbued within Saudi Arabia. The Saudi constitution and Saudi jurisprudence are based on Wahabi religious scripture and lore. As one commentator noted soon after the uprising at Mecca:

"Islam is far more than a mere rhetorical subject for the ruling elite. It pervades social customs and interactions. It dominates images and attitudes. It motivates policies and is used to justify them. And it embodies the system of values upon which the legitimacy of the regime rests."¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ J. Kostiner, 'State, Islam and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The Post Desert Storm Phase', *MERIA Journal*, # 2, July, 1997, p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ W. Dietl, *Holy War*, 1983, p. 222.

¹⁸⁸ F. A. Sankari, 'Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia' in A.E.H. Dessouki (ed.), *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, 1982.

¹⁸⁹ From *The Call of the Brethren*, cited in *The Financial Times*, April 28, 1980.

¹⁹⁰ A. Dawisha, *Saudi Arabia's Search for Security*, 1980, p. 10

While Juhayman's vision of a perfect Muslim society rested upon conventional interpretations of the Quran and the Sunnah, his belief in the identity of the Mahdi and the circumstances surrounding his manifestation were drawn from various Hadith. Two in particular are of note. The first concerns the identity of the Mahdi: "[i]f there were but one day remaining for the world, God would lengthen that day until he sends to it a man from my [Muhammad's] house and community. His name will be the same as mine."¹⁹¹ Al-Qhatani apparently satisfied this prediction. The second, which concerned the circumstances of the Mahdi's manifestation, viewed Muslim history as a degenerative cycle which moved from Prophethood to the Caliphate, to illegitimate kingship and then to tyrannical kingship and finally returning to the Caliphate. The transition from one era to the next is decided by God and the Mahdi will appear at the end of the period of tyrannical kingship. Once the Mahdi appears all Muslims will pay him allegiance while the unbeliever's army would vanish. According to the same Hadith "the earth would open to engulf the army of unbelievers who will come to dislodge the Mahdi."¹⁹² The messianic significance of these traditions will be further examined below.

Manichaeon World View

The Saudi Ikhwan's world view was clear, literalist and extreme. It is perhaps best expressed in elements contained in the seven letters, themselves a contextualised and selective interpretation of Islamic traditions. One of the aims of the Ikhwan was to establish a "puritanical Islamic community that protects Islam from unbelievers and does not court foreigners."¹⁹³ In this light foreigners (primarily identified as 'Christians' in the form of Americans and British), obviously fall into the category of 'infidel' from the *dar al-harb* (house of war) who are to be opposed and destroyed by the faithful themselves or through the divine agency of the Mahdi. The second category of peoples to be opposed is that of apostates. The seven letters proclaims that there is a "duty to reject all *mushrikun* - worshipers of the partners of God, including worshipers of Ali, Fatimah and Muhammad, the Khawarij, and even music and technology."¹⁹⁴ The Ikhwan thus rejected not only other

¹⁹¹ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, 1967, Vol. 2, pp. 159-165.

¹⁹² A. Al-Yassini, *Religion and the State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, p. 126.

¹⁹³ Quoted in H. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, p. 135.

¹⁹⁴ *ibid.*

faiths and schismatics within their own faith, but also any Muslim who wholeheartedly embraced the tools and chattels of modernity. Victory against such varied and numerous forces could only be guaranteed by a dramatic and overwhelming divine intervention such as that promised by the Mahdi.

Messianic Vision

Utaybi alluded to the Mahdi in the group's first publication, and these ideas were developed more fully in a third numbered pamphlet which appeared during Ramadan 1979, entitled 'Call of the Ikhwan'. In this pamphlet, various traditions of variable credibility and historical similarities are examined and the imminence of the Mahdi's arrival confirmed. Notable amongst these is a selection from Ibn Khaldun's social history, the *Muqaddimah*, which states

"a man of the people will go forth, fleeing to Mecca. then some of the people of Mecca will come to him ... and they will swear allegiance to him...And an army will be sent against him from Syria but will be swallowed up in the earth in the desert between Mecca and Al-Madina."¹⁹⁵

The Hadith mentioned above concerning the evolution of Islamic history, the appearance of the Mahdi and the destruction of an invader's army was also of pivotal importance. A review of the writings of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahhabi doctrine, shows that he accepted this Hadith. Moreover, Sheikh al-Wahhab devoted an entire chapter in one of his major works to the Mahdi and his awaited appearance.¹⁹⁶

Another tradition claims that the Mahdi will bear:

"the name and patronymic of the prophet (Muhammed bin Abdullah), will be of his tribe (the Quraish) and will appear some six to ten years before the Anti-Mahdi or Antichrist, who will be destroyed by Jesus Christ when he descends to restore the peace of Muhammed."¹⁹⁷

As obvious (if archaic) as they might seem, the Saudi security services did not detect (or take seriously) this specific geographical reference nor the heavy overtones of violent opposition with which it was combined.

¹⁹⁵ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, 1958, Vol. 2, pp. 165-166.

¹⁹⁶ A. Al-Yassini, *Religion and the State*, p. 127.

¹⁹⁷ D. Holden & R. Johns, *The House of Saud*, p. 520.

The ideology of the Saudi Ikhwan was developed in opposition to the perceived apostasy of the Saudi regime. The extreme nature of this ideology however, one which placed the burden of reform on the acceptance of the Saudi people (and all Muslims generally) of one of the group's members as the expected Mahdi. This messianic emphasis reflected both Juhayman Utaybi's assessment of the degenerative state of Saudi society and the ripeness for messianic redemption, and also his inability or unwillingness to consider an ideological programme which placed less emphasis on redemption and more on addressing the various cultural threats through a form of revolutionary vanguard or a broader organisation.

3.4 Conclusion

While this chapter has examined a seemingly disparate collection of groups from three separate religious traditions certain patterns suggest themselves. At a basic level all of them are striving for a 'better' world, often one which is achieved by stages, and one which depends simultaneously upon a group's relationship to the society within which it exists and the degree to which secular life and society are rejected. This Golden Age is a reformulation of an idealised past, derived from religious history which it is believed can be transposed onto contemporary society and which will transform that society into a more just and equitable environment conforming with divine law. In all cases the perception of a theft of culture is extreme and the group sees itself in state of siege in opposition to some collective 'other'. The extent to which a cultural system is seen to have been eroded and the breadth of the category of 'other' both depend upon the extremity of the group's perception of isolation and the relevance of temporal existence. The scriptural sources and religious traditions used to construct a group's ideology are at once potentially very broad and at the same time limited in terms of what is actually chosen. All groups are highly selective in their use of religious tradition and this selectivity depends heavily on the group's world view. An organisation of the messianic/apocalyptic type will concentrate on those sources of religious lore which deal with eschatology. For another group such as one from the core or mainstream categories eschatology is still an important part of religious tradition but it is far from being central, and so other sources are drawn upon - albeit in a selective fashion which emphasises the justice and permissibility of engaging in violence. The development

of a Manichaeian world view clearly defines the identity of the true believers and the malign other which must be removed in order for the ultimate success of the struggle. This dichotomy is again reinforced by the reinterpretation of religious history which directly links past struggles to those of the present. As noted above the messianic vision of a group and the degree to which it is emphasised varies according to group type but is present throughout, offering a final and divinely promised triumph over both temporal and spiritual iniquity. The formulation of violent religious ideologies is dynamic and dependant on the crisis environment. Changing political, military and social circumstances may dictate the need for a group to alter its ideological programme to cope with new constraints or crises or to take advantage of some new opportunity. And both the development and adaptation of an ideological system as well as the operational activities it is used to justify is the province of a group's leadership.

Chapter IV

Leadership

While the basic elements of group ideology already exist in the form of religious traditions and texts, it is their actual selection and interpretation by the leaders of these groups which gives them their specific message and agenda. As Scott Appleby has described this process, an extremist religious leader is one who "reaches into the past, selects and develops politically useful (if sometimes obscure) teachings or traditions, and builds around these...an ideology of and a program of action."¹ Although this chapter identifies three distinct types of leadership - ideologues, bureaucratic and charismatic - these types may overlap and combine in different ways. For example, a group may have influential ideologues, both living and dead, and settle on a bureaucratic operational leadership. By contrast a group may have a primary ideologue who is simultaneously the group's charismatic leader. While these relationships will be explored further below several themes appear to remain constant. The first is that ideologues provide an in-depth and contemporary religious critique of secular society - and in many cases justifications for violence - and as such provide the essential re-examination of religious tradition in the light of contemporary crises. The second theme is that charismatic leadership is essentially more radical because authority is limited to a single individual. By contrast bureaucratic leadership is more likely to be more moderate due to the variety of views represented. The third theme is that radicalism in leadership contributes to the early demise of a group while the opposite is true of bureaucratic structures. The exact combination of leadership forms determines how these themes interact.

While the above themes suggest rigid patterns within group types this is not necessarily always so. The functions and activities of mainstream would suggest both the role of ideologues and bureaucratic leadership and that is certainly the case with all the mainstream case studies. The importance of a charismatic ideologue varies greatly, for

¹ R.S. Appleby, *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*, 1997, p. 4.

example the death of Meir Kahane was a far more severe blow to the organisation than would be the death of Sheikh Fadlallah or Ahmad Yassin. By contrast the death of an ageing and seemingly ineffectual ideologue such as Richard Butler could severely diminish the influence of Aryan Nations or his replacement by a young charismatic successor could revive the fortunes of the organisation. The small size and violent orientation of core groups would seem to require a bureaucratic structure to ensure group survival and this is certainly true of the PIJ. Where the leadership is basically charismatic, as in the case of the Order, destruction is invited, and although Eyal is an atypical case in part because it failed to develop, the failure to develop a bureaucratic structure would certainly have proved costly. In all the cases where a bureaucratic structure is adopted, the existence of an internal and external leadership as manifested by Hamas and the PIJ ensures a degree of security but also allows for internal dissent. Messianic and apocalyptic groups generally have charismatic leadership types often with a divine or semi-divine identification, although in the case of the Jewish Underground this did not prove to be the case, and the sheer size of Aum Shinrikyo necessitated a degree of bureaucracy.

4.1 Mainstream

4.1.1 Kach

The primary ideologue and active leader of the Kach movement (until his death in 1990) was rabbi Meir Kahane. It was Kahane's writings which established the ideological foundations of the movement and his charismatic leadership, first of the Jewish Defence League (JDL), then of Kach and later posthumously through a variety of Kach off-shoots, which has helped define much of the political activity of the radical Jewish right in Israel and the U.S. since 1990. Before examining Kahane himself, it must be noted that many of Kahane's ideas have prominent modern intellectual forebears. Theoreticians, such as Leo Pinsker and Theodor Herzl, developed the idea that Zionism and a separate Jewish state was the only alternative to the growing anti-Semitism of their time, an anti-Semitism which would only lead to the end of Judaism. This catastrophic element of Jewish ideological thought declined with the Zionist enterprise in Palestine during the 1930s and was almost entirely absent after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Kahane's

catastrophic ideas were not new, they were simply reformulated to explain the most recent threat to Judaism as Kahane saw it.

Kahane's ideological roots follow quite closely the development of Zionism itself. Kahane had grown up within the Revisionist movement as he was a Betar² member and his father, Rabbi Charles Kahane, was active within American Jewish revisionism. Kahane had even met Vladimir Jabotinsky once in the late 1930s when he visited the Kahane's home. In 1947, Kahane was arrested for the first time after picketing the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, over Britain's pro-Arab policies.³ In 1968, Kahane began his political career when he formed the JDL in New York, and when he moved to Israel in 1971 his support for influential political Zionists continued, as did his virulent opposition to the religious Zionist agenda. Perhaps Kahane's greatest political hero was Menachem Begin, former commander of the Irgun and later Israeli Prime Minister, and like many in the Jewish religious right Kahane was elated when Begin won the 1977 election. But this elation lasted only until the signing of the Camp David Accords: "[t]he heart of the Begin tragedy is that a man who was a symbol, for half a century, of Jewish pride and strength, surrendered Jewish rights, sovereignty and land out of fear of Gentile Pressure."⁴ The event transformed Kahane, discrediting his major favourites within mainstream Israeli politics and by extension Israel's democratic government itself. After 1978, Kahane became even more extreme in his rhetoric and calls for action than before, stung by what he saw as a betrayal of the Zionist enterprise and the possibilities this held for a new catastrophic phase in Jewish history.

Before 1984, Kahane's personality was a stumbling block to political success. Although his writings were incisive and contained a definite appeal to a growing segment of the Israeli electorate, Kahane's public image was of a blustering, emotive and publicity hungry demagogue.⁵ The introduction of ethnic issues into Israeli politics in the early 1980s and the social cleavages created by the Lebanon war both helped to radicalise Israeli politics and to make Kahane's ideas more acceptable. Kahane, as a demagogue,

² An acronym of 'Berit Trumpeldor': Covenant with Trumpeldor. Betar was a youth organisation founded by Jabotinsky.

³ R. Friedman, *The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane - From FBI Informant to Knesset Member*, 1990, p. 9.

⁴ *The Jewish Press*, October 20, 1978.

⁵ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*, 1999, p. 200.

consistently incited violence through various publications and mass rallies (as mainstream public opinion turned against the organisation though, access to media outlets became increasingly difficult).⁶ In June 1980, Kahane wrote in his *Jewish Press* weekly column that:

"[h]undreds of Jewish lives will be lost, G_d forbid, unless the government immediately moves to ... create a terror-against-terror group that will spread fear and shatter the souls of the Arabs in Eretz Yisrael".

Although complicit in the creation of a Jewish Terror Against Terror (TNT) network, Kahane was always careful to distance himself from direct involvement. As one Israeli police official has stated "[h]e created the climate for his supporters to act in."⁷ Indeed, in 1987 at the onset of the Intifada, it seemed to many that Kahane's warnings about the Arabs had been proved to be accurate, and that yet another attempt was being made to destroy the Jewish state. To some Kach followers, it was also a sign that the catastrophic redemptive process of 'forty years' was about to be fulfilled.

Meir Kahane derived his justifications for violence from scripture and his familiarity with Jewish religious tradition allowed him to be both selective and exhaustive in his reasoning.⁸ Kahane professed to believe in a literal reading of the Halakah, and despite the fact that there are thousands of orthodox rabbis and scholars to read the Halakah and explain them, he asserted that only he knew 'the truth'. This certainty in part explains why he did not refer to other Halakic authorities either living or dead.⁹ Such a belief led him to make statements such as:

"[w]hy is it that we do not comprehend that it is precisely our refusal to deal with the Arabs according to Halakic obligation that will bring down on our heads terrible

⁶ When Kahane became a member of parliament after the 1984 elections an unofficial ban by media directors resulted from a broadly held desire to prevent him from disseminating his views. Kahane was not permitted to appear on television or radio programmes, newspapers would not allow him to express (or defend) his views, his statements were not reported and press conferences and events organised by Kach were not covered.

⁷ R. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', *New York Review of Books*, 1986, p. 18.

⁸ In 1975 Kahane was sentenced to one year in prison. Of this experience he has been quoted as saying: "Prison was a real joy, I read the Torah all day". R. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', p. 18.

⁹ More specifically Kahane saw himself as the ultimate authority on political issues. There were of course rabbis that agreed with him but not in an open, political fashion. See E. Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, 1991, p. 216.

sufferings, whereas our courage in removing them will be one of the major factors in the hurrying of the final redemption?"¹⁰

Like all ideologues and religious leaders Kahane possessed the ability to invoke ancient scriptural and historical concepts to describe contemporary phenomena. 'Apostate' Jews thus became 'Hellenists', Arabs become modern versions of the biblical Amalekites, drugs were likened to a social 'locust plague', and the death camps of the holocaust and the policies of the Israeli Ministry of Education identified as the "twin fires of Molech."¹¹

One of the key concepts Kahane derived from scripture was the revival of Jewish strength and the associated need for Jewish revenge. His much vaunted popular cry for a 'fist in the face of the gentile' is symbolised through the organisation's emblem - a clenched fist within a star of David. To Kahane, the Holocaust and all the anti-Jewish pogroms which preceded it, had not only seriously damaged the Jewish people, but they were the direct result of Jewish weakness and submission. While the establishment of the state of Israel was an important step towards redressing these historical injustices, only revenge upon the gentiles could fully restore the pride and mission of Judaism. For Kahane, the purpose of Jewish violence was to:

"destroy the Jewish neuroses and fears that contribute so much encouragement to the anti-Semite as well as Jewish belief in its own worthlessness. We want to instil self-respect and self-pride in a Jew who is ashamed of himself for running away."¹²

Pride and identity could thus be generated through violence against a world which had habitually sought the persecution or destruction of the Jewish people since the earliest biblical times.

Kahane was certainly a leader in the charismatic mould - as well as being the architect of 'Kahanist' ideology - although he did not have any pretensions as a divine figure. He did, however, see himself in the role of a prophet. This is especially so after 1980 when his books and interviews are replete with warnings of 'the coming catastrophe'. The extent to which these were heart felt beliefs rather than mere political rhetoric born of

¹⁰ M. Kahane, *They Must Go*, 1981, p. 272.

¹¹ Molech was a deity worshipped by the biblical Ammonites, one feature of his worship being the burning of children.

¹² M. Kahane, *The Story of the Jewish Defense League*, 1975, p. 142.

an increasingly frustrated situation is difficult to tell. As one observer of the group has commented:

"[i]t is very hard to tell how deeply the leader of Kach believed in his own predictions, and whether we had here an article of faith of a prophet in the tradition of Jeremiah, or an expression of a troubled person who knew no one took his theories seriously."¹³

Kahane was also a charismatic figure of the media age. He understood how to use the press and electronic media to raise the public profile of himself and mobilise around his cause. In 1981, when Gush Emunim supporters were being removed from the Yamit area by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), various delaying tactics were employed. A group of Kach activists locked themselves in an air raid shelter with weapons, explosives and poisons and threatened to kill themselves. In a high media drama, Kahane, at the request of Menachem Begin, personally convinced them to leave peacefully.¹⁴ Following 1984, curbs on his access to the media diluted this effect for potential new supporters, but his appeal to existing supporters altered little because of effective internal communications channels within the movement itself.

While Kahane certainly had an important (if narrow) popular appeal for a certain period of time, his political future was severely curtailed by legislation and Israeli popular opinion. Kahane's inflammatory rhetoric was most potent in periods of political and military crisis when his dire predictions proved to be on the verge of coming to pass. Crisis, however, cannot be sustained indefinitely and prophecies and predictions must be realised to have any real credence. Furthermore, the prevailing mood of the majority of the Israeli population has been one in favour of the rule of law, and if not a high sensitivity to attacks upon and murders of Palestinians, then certainly one to those committed against Israelis. Moreover the Israeli police, the IDF, and the security services were seen by the Israeli public as effective in curtailing Arab terrorism, further delegitimising vigilantism. As Sprinzak notes of Kahane's end "[a]t the time of his New York assassination, on

¹³ E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Meir Kahane' in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, 1991, p. 54.

¹⁴ G. Wolsfeld, 'Collective Political Action and Media Research Report', *Jerusalem Quarterly*, # 31, 1984, pp. 140-141. In 1984 however, after the discovery of the Jewish Underground, the majority of Gush Emunim members and leaders dissociated themselves from the use of vigilante justice. In particular efforts were made to distance the group from Meir Kahane and Kach.

November 5, 1990...Kahane was a marginal figure with little national appeal."¹⁵ The assassination, however, did not remove the violent core of Kahane followers, nor Kahane's posthumous influence. The teachings of the rabbi have influenced a broad array of right-wing rabbis, even if they have had no direct association with Kach. These have sanctioned violent acts, primarily against Arabs, and praised acts of anti-Arab violence.¹⁶

Following Kahane's assassination the organisation began to fracture. The split between Kach and Kahane Chai (Kahane lives) was largely an issue of leadership personalities and not one of ideology or political direction. Rabbi Abraham Toledano succeeded Kahane as the leader of Kach, but he had never been selected as a successor by Kahane (indeed, no-one had) and some American immigrants were unhappy about having a Sephardic (Moroccan) leader.¹⁷ Most of these left to form Kahane Chai under the leadership of Kahane's son Binyamin, who is reported as claiming that under Toledano "the movement's institutions no longer have any legal authority."¹⁸ The 1994 Hebron massacre and the ensuing ban of Kach and Kahane Chai had major consequences for the leadership of both groups. Within days of the ban most of the senior leaders of the two groups had been arrested with the exception of Baruch Marzel, leader of Kach, who was not taken into custody until early April 1994.¹⁹ Some were placed under administrative detention, many more had their weapons confiscated, while others had their physical movements restricted. Such actions paralysed the entire leadership at a stroke. Other measures included the dismissal of individuals from military service, increased surveillance of individuals, confiscation of property owned by the organisation, closing

¹⁵ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 216.

¹⁶ At the funeral of Baruch Goldstein, for example, Rabbi Ariel Yisrael commended the Doctor's actions comparing him to Judas Maccabeus and Samson describing him as a martyr. *Yehudiot Ahronot*, March 18, 1994. It is also interesting to note that during his trial Yigal Amir said that his way of befriending women was led by the question 'what do you think of Baruch Goldstein?'. The girls answer would determine whether Amir would pursue a relationship. See R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: Critical Appraisal', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IX, # 4, 1997, p. 101.

¹⁷ See E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 234. Toledano was arrested in November 1993 when he was caught smuggling military equipment into Israel from the U.S. Investigators decided that this equipment was intended for use when the movement would 'go underground'. *ibid.* p. 235.

¹⁸ *Voice of Israel*, 1400 gmt, 24 Mar. 91 - BBC/SWB, ME/1030, A/10, March 26, 1991. Binyamin was himself assassinated by Palestinian gun men near the Jewish settlement of Ofra on December 31, 2000.

¹⁹ *New York Times*, April 4, 1994.

meeting places, prohibiting the distribution of organisation literature and the prohibition of fund-raising or public displays.²⁰

Violent acts such as that committed in Hebron resulted in state repression, something Kahane and most other leaders acknowledged. As Kahane said shortly after his election to the Knesset:

"[t]he Attacks by Arabs against Jews constantly are a thing against which revenge must be taken. I have pleaded with members of Kach not to take such actions not because it is a bad thing but because they have no support. It's a suicidal thing. But whoever does it certainly is committing an act of sanctification of God's name."²¹

It would be impossible to mount an overt violent campaign through an above ground organisation such as Kach, and while Goldstein's action was far from being ordered by the group he belonged to, the nature of Kach and its rhetoric, his affiliation with Kach and the obvious approval the group showed for his actions, were all sufficient to justify the banning of Kach and its offshoots. However, Kahane's ideas live on in a hard core of right-wing Jewish settlers, through the (albeit banned) various off-shoots of Kach and also in institutions such as the Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea in Jerusalem.

The leadership of the Kach movement crossed over several categories. Meir Kahane can simultaneously be labelled the chief ideologue of the group and also a popular and effective charismatic leader. The size of the organisation and its range of activities necessitated a bureaucratic leadership structure, but this was subordinate to Kahane. The assassination of Kahane produced a serious leadership crisis within the organisation, exemplified by the split which followed soon after, and the vacuum which was created has yet to be filled by an individual of Kahane's charismatic appeal. His legacy, however, has certainly endured as it is possible to identify a Kahanist ideology which dominates and permeates the contemporary Jewish extreme right.

²⁰ The Israeli government also considered refusing entry to foreign members of the organisation. *Jerusalem Report*, March 24, 1994.

²¹ *Washington Post*, March 8, 1984.

4.1.2 Aryan Nations

The current leader of Aryan Nations and head of the related Church of Jesus Christ Christian is Reverend Richard Butler.²² Butler was educated at Los Angeles City College in aeronautical engineering and eventually worked for the Lockheed aircraft company as a senior manufacturing engineer.²³ Butler was a disciple of Wesley Smith, an influential identity leader in California, and Butler claims that his church is a continuation of that established by Smith.²⁴ What Butler added to Swift's theology were his own personal wartime experiences in India which led him to believe in a mythical, superior, Aryan diaspora, and his perception of government failure. In 1973, Butler moved to Hayden Lake, Idaho, and there established his ministry and the Aryan Nations compound. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Hayden Lake compound became a focal point for the radical right in the US, especially the annual 'open house' gatherings which involved weapons and survival training as well as exchanges of ideas and debate over ideology and strategy. Such gatherings, however, failed to provide the Identity movement (specifically) with any sense of orthodoxy or centralised structure, nor did they enable Butler to establish himself as the overall leader of a united Identity movement.²⁵ Leadership of Aryan Nations in the form of Butler and his lieutenants can be said to exist somewhere between the charismatic and the collegial form - Butler retains an overall position of authority as figurehead of the group but due to the breadth of activities and to a certain degree Butler's advanced age, many responsibilities have been devolved to senior members of the group.

The distinguishing feature of leadership throughout the Christian Identity movement generally is its fragmentary nature. While there are populist figures which loosely fit the role of the ideologue such as Pete Peters, Louis Beam²⁶ and Dan Gayman,

²² The titles 'Reverend' and 'Pastor' as used by figures in America's extreme racist right add a veneer of legitimacy but are frequently unrelated to their depth of scriptural knowledge or to actual religious qualifications.

²³ The apparent normality of Butler's career until he devoted himself exclusively to Aryan Nations is not uncommon in the American extreme right, and in many cases this superficial normality has allowed believers to proceed to acts of violence undetected by the authorities or the community within which they live.

²⁴ "We are the continuing direct-line Church of Jesus Christ Christian as originally founded by Dr. Wesley Smith of Lancaster, California. After Dr. Swift's death, the church has been carried on by Richard G. Butler". Aryan Nations Website, 'Foundation Biography of Aryan Nations'.

²⁵ Two other significant (and representative) Identity leaders are Pete Peters, head of the LaPorte Church of Christ in LaPorte, Colorado and Pastor Dan Gayman, head of the Church of Israel in Schell City Missouri.

²⁶ Beam has served as Aryan Nations 'ambassador at large' and was responsible for setting up the 'Aryan Nation Liberty Net' in the 1980s.

these cover the spectrum of Identity thought and none seek to establish themselves as an ideological figurehead for violent action.²⁷ Aryan Nations can be seen in this light. While Butler was certainly the organisational and ideological force behind the movement, he has failed to maintain and strengthen this position by not 'delivering the goods' - a common criticism levelled at those who preach struggle but fail to act. While the administrative leadership structure could be described as collegial, this dimension has been plagued by disloyalty, personal conflict and greed.²⁸ Aryan Nations has produced one of the radical right's most potent populist martyrs²⁹ in the form of Robert Mathews, although he rejected Aryan Nations for its passive stance. While such figures do appear from time to time in the American religious right, there is a total absence of characters which can be described as charismatic in the true sense.³⁰ As one unrepentant member of the Order has opined:

"[t]he cause of this malady [within the movement] is the inadequacy and incompetencies [*sic*] of our so-called leaders. Or more accurately, the lack of competent leaders. The conventional methods and courses our diverse factions have utilised for the past few decades have proven to be a failure."³¹

In the 1990s, Butler's popularity and fortunes have declined considerably. This is mainly because of the caution he has always shown towards violence. As Jeffrey Kaplan notes: "he preached a violent message while refusing to sanction - or even discuss - the possibility of acting on his words."³² Butler's closest brush with the law came when he was one of the star defendants at the 1989 Fort Smith conspiracy trial. During the trial Butler's legal position as head of the group was far from secure - several members of the Order, including Robert Mathews had been members of Aryan Nations and the printing press used in the Order's first counterfeiting operation allegedly belonged to Aryan Nations. At the

²⁷ Dan Gayman for instance represents the more passive end of the Identity spectrum. Since 1987 Gayman has preached accommodation with the state, based upon the ideas of submission to secular authority contained in Romans 13, and a rejection of violence. See Church of Israel, 'Articles of Faith and Doctrine', pamphlet published by the Church of Israel, January 10, 1987.

²⁸ After Carl Franklin and Wayne Jones resigned in 1993 Franklin stated in a letter that he and Jones left because they hadn't received a paycheque in over two years. ADL, *Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far Right Fringe*, 1996, p. 19.

²⁹ Gordon Kahl, David Koresh and Vicky Weaver may also be seen in this light.

³⁰ The obvious exceptions are those associated with cults such as David Koresh of the Branch Davidians and Jim Jones of the People's Temple. The violence of such groups however is almost exclusively internalised.

³¹ G. Yarborough, *Alert Update and Advisory*, n.p., 1993.

³² J. Kaplan, 'Right-Wing Violence in North America', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VII, # 1, 1995, p. 53.

end of the trial, however, Butler was acquitted of all charges. The acquittal seemed to reinforce the opinion of many right-wing militants that Butler was a paper tiger, unwilling to dirty his hands in conducting the Lord's work. While Robert Mathews and the Order were engaging in activism, claims by Butler that "[i]t's possible that Aryan nations were behind those bombings [in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho in Fall 1986]. I don't know the name and face of every Aryan Nations member in the country and what they do"³³, showed a determination to remain within the law. In light of this it is notable that Aryan Nations was not a major recipient of the Order's 'fund transfers' acquired in various bank robberies and there is evidence that Mathews did not hold Butler in particularly high regard.³⁴

As Butler's popularity continued to wane through the 1990s, likely successors to his position and other leadership figures also began leaving the movement. In the summer of 1993, security head Wayne Jones and chief of staff Carl Franklin (Butler's nominated successor) resigned from the organisation.³⁵ In January the following year, Butler's new deputy Charles Tate and his wife Betty (Butler's secretary) also left.³⁶ Louis Beam, former Texas Klan Grand Dragon and Aryan Nation 'ambassador at large', had been mooted as a replacement for Butler but he has shown a corresponding lack of interest in adopting such a role. Butler himself is now in his early eighties and as one commentator of the U.S. extreme right has noted "[t]here appear to be few realistic prospects for the movement to long survive Butler's demise."³⁷ Despite this fact only recently Butler has been given the sobriquet "the elder statesman of American hate."³⁸ During the summer of 1998, at a gathering of Identity followers at Hayden Lake called the 'Hitler Congress', the hitherto little known figure of Pastor Newman Britton was named Butler's successor³⁹ but it is still unclear, however, what form of leadership role he wishes to adopt and whether he wishes

³³ Cited in ADL, *Danger: Extremism*, p. 19.

³⁴ T. Martinez & J. Gunther, *Brotherhood of Murder*, 1988, pp. 270-271, fn. 22.

³⁵ Carl Franklin is an interesting example of the relationship between Aryan Nations and the Order, and the importance of inter-personal relationships between the extreme right in the U.S. generally. Franklin was married to Davis Lane's sister and together the Franklins aided Lane before and after he became a fugitive.

³⁶ The Tate's left to join their son-in-law, Kirk Lyons who runs a non-profit legal foundation called CAUSE which provides legal assistance to white supremacists. CAUSE is an acronym for Canada, Australia, United States, South Africa and Europe, all places where Lyons believes the civil liberties of whites is under threat.

³⁷ J. Kaplan, 'Right-Wing Violence in North America', p. 54.

³⁸ *Los Angeles Times*, January 10, 1999.

³⁹ *Heart of Darkness*, BBC-Discovery Channel production.

to preserve the organisation as it is, or guide it more firmly into the mainstream (or, less likely, away from it).

The leadership structure of Aryan Nations can be seen as similar to that of Kach. There exists a central figure who performs the function of both ideologue and charismatic leader. Once again to the extent that a bureaucratic structure exists, it is primarily because of organisational necessity. Although Richard Butler is still the indisputable leader of Aryan Nations and a powerful voice within the right-wing extremist community, Butler's failure to unite the disparate elements of this community and his unwillingness to actively condone or organise violent activities has led to doubts regarding his fitness to lead the group. Such a course would inevitably lead to the group's destruction and the most likely course is that Butler will be succeeded by a younger leader who will have to prove sufficiently charismatic and erudite to ensure that the group does not fracture and continues (or expands) its levels of activity, and that the organisation's ideology does not stagnate.

4.1.3 Hizballah

The leadership structure of Hizballah can be described as collegial, although there are significant ideologues who are not directly involved with operational matters. The most widely acknowledged senior ideologue of Hizballah is Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah. The Sheikh's popularity is not limited to the Shi'a community of Lebanon and his religious stature extends far beyond Lebanon. In the mid-1980s tape recordings of the Sheikh's sermons were being ordered from throughout the Lebanese Shi'ite diaspora and beyond.⁴⁰ Today the sheikh's sermons may be accessed on the internet. Fadlallah's position as an ideologue within the Lebanese Shi'ite community is further reinforced by his declared detachment from Hizballah, his high standing as a clerical authority and his relatively moderate stand within Lebanese politics and communal relations.⁴¹ These characteristics enable him to maintain a high public profile and to function as a conduit for the ideas and rationales of the movement to the outside world. In this respect Fadlallah does not identify Hizballah as a specific and closed organisation:

⁴⁰ M. Kramer, 'The Oracle of Hizballah' in R.S. Appleby (ed.), *Spokesmen for the despised*, p. 83.

⁴¹ See for example Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, 'An Islamic Perspective on the Lebanese Experience', *Middle East Insight*, Vol. VI, # 1&2, pp. 18-26.

"we do not constitute an organised and closed party in Lebanon, nor are we a tight political cadre. We are an *umma* linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam."⁴²

Because of his detachment, Sheikh Fadlallah does not represent a single point of ideological orthodoxy, nor a significant operational leader. Hizbollah possesses an almost exclusively clerical leadership which is heavily influenced, both in terms of theology and decision making, by Iran, the Iranian clerical leadership and the legacy of the Iranian revolution.⁴³ The influence of Ruhollah Khomeini as an ideological figurehead has been a feature of the group since its inception, and many leaders within the group have received their religious training in Qom in Iran and earlier Najaf in Iraq. Iranian support of all kinds has also been essential from the inception of the group, resulting in an organisation which closely is aligned to Iran in material, ideological and spiritual terms, and has at times appeared to be no more than an Iranian proxy. As Husayn al Musawi stated in 1984:

"[w]e are faithful to Imam Khomeini politically, religiously and ideologically. In accordance with Khomeini's teaching...Our struggle is in the East and the West...Our goal is to lay the groundwork for the reign of the Mahdi on earth, the reign of truth and justice."⁴⁴

Such a statement encapsulates the general programme of the organisation without shackling it to specifics - a necessary state of ambiguity given the constantly changing political situation within Lebanon. The acknowledgement of the importance of Khomeini and the Iranian revolution was soon after echoed in the open letter describing the Hizballah program:

"[w]e are the sons of the *umma* [Muslim community] - the party of God [HizbAllah] the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran...We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and *faqih* [jurist] who fulfils all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini. God save him!"⁴⁵

⁴² 'An Open Letter: The Hizballah Programme', *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, # 48, Fall 1988, p. 114.

⁴³ See for example Ranstorp, M., 'Hizbollah's Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision Making and Relationship with Iranian Clergy and Institutions', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VI, # 3, 1994, 303-339.

⁴⁴ *Al Kifah al-Arabi*, January 9, 1984.

⁴⁵ 'An Open Letter: The Hizballah Programme', pp. 113.

The current leader of Hizballah, Hassan Nasrallah, has proved to be adept at steering the organisation through a highly fluid political situation in Lebanon. Between 1992 and 1996, he had already pragmatically changed his stance from wanting to continue the political struggle against Amal and tension with Syria's Lebanese agenda, to an understanding that he must co-operate more closely with Syria and occasionally with Amal. As Martin Kramer noted: "[h]e is capable, knows how to make very deep strategic analysis and he understands the Israeli political set-up. He definitely follows what goes on here, knows how to bore into the weak spots."⁴⁶ Nasrallah began his involvement with Lebanese militance when he joined Amal at the age of fifteen. A year later he travelled to Najaf in Iraq where he began his religious studies, although these were cut short two years later when Iraq cracked down on Najaf's Shi'ite seminaries and expelled its Lebanese students. When he returned to Lebanon he became part of a small group called *El Rava* ('the Mission'), whose spiritual leader was Sheikh Fadlallah.⁴⁷

By 1982, when Iranian diplomats began co-ordinating the various Shi'ite militias into what became Hizballah by causing defections from Amal and merging existing loose organisations, Nasrallah had already established himself as a military commander. Following the end of the internecine conflict between Hizballah and Amal in late 1988 and early 1989, Nasrallah left Lebanon for the Iranian city of Qom. His studies there are widely believed to have been a superficial attempt to accord him religious as well as military authority:

"[w]estern experts express doubts about the depth of his religious studies...Nasrallah is an extremely religious figure, but is not considered a man of religion in the full sense of the word. He knows how to use religion as a political lever. But for example, he does not establish rulings of Islamic law."⁴⁸

By the early 1990s Nasrallah was appointed to a senior position on the organisation's *Majlis al-Shura*, and when the secretary-general's position became vacant following Hussein Musawi's assassination by the Israelis in 1992, he was a logical candidate. Nasrallah has proved a popular and effective Secretary-General, having been re-elected to the position three times. His status was further enhanced when his son Hadi was killed

⁴⁶ Quoted in *Yediot Ahronot*, April 19, 1996.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Yediot Ahronot*, April 19, 1996.

while participating in an Islamic Resistance guerrilla operation against the Israelis in September 1997, a sacrifice for the movement that few other senior leaders have made. In July 2000 Nasrallah was elected man of the year in Lebanon and Syria "for his courage and wisdom which led to the historic victory over the Zionist regime in the south of Lebanon."⁴⁹

The leadership of Hizaballah is certainly collegial in orientation, reflecting the Iranian structure of a *Majlis al-Shura*, with significant ideologues, living and dead, who provide the group's overall religious world view. This system came about largely as a result of Iranian influence but also reflected the needs of an extensive organisation that has become involved in an increasing number of activities over time. This expansion of the group, and especially the leadership restructuring of 1989, has resulted in decentralisation of decision making. The position of Secretary-General is certainly one of 'first among equals' and the personality and beliefs of successful candidates for the position provide a good indication of the group's world view and strategy at any point in time. In this light the biannual election process for the Consultative and Executive Shura can be seen as not merely a rotation of responsibility amongst senior members but also reflects internal struggles between more moderate and extreme factions, especially how to safeguard its hard won political, social and military gains and exploit the post-Taif Lebanese environment in alignment with its own ideological agenda and Iranian political interests.

4.1.4 Hamas

The leadership of Hamas is a direct outgrowth of the leadership of the Palestinian Muslim brotherhood. While the Brotherhood followed policies of active resistance during the Palestinian revolt, the 1948 war and the 1956 war, the rise of secular nationalist and Baathist parties during the 1950s led to a change in agenda. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the organisation maintained cordial relations with both the Israeli government and the Jordanian authorities, and under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, concentrated on building its infrastructure - in particular the Islamic centre founded in 1973 - and expanding its social base through mosques, schools and universities. The outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987 presented the Brotherhood with a dilemma, and it became

⁴⁹ IRNA, 0017 gmt, 6 July 2000.

obvious that a programme of non-violence was not tenable in the face of widespread and spontaneous Palestinian resistance, the expectations of the younger generations of the movement, and the advent of rival Islamist resistance movement, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

In December 1987, a meeting took place of what would become the first leadership of Hamas, led by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and including other notables such as Abd-al-Aziz al-Rantisi and Ibrahim al-Yazuri. Yassin had already done much in the preceding two decades to create Islamic socio-economic structures in the Gaza strip and worked hard to instil in Palestinian society *da'wa*, or religious preaching and education.⁵⁰ Yassin was both a charismatic figure and had long been the senior Muslim Brotherhood leader in the Gaza Strip and this background informed his political and religious discourse, influenced by Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and the Palestinian example of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Yassin's prominence, however, does not come from any new theological or doctrinal vision but rather "from his role within the political context of the Palestinian issue."⁵¹ Although Yassin's arrest in 1989 severely limited the Sheikh's capacity to issue instructions and manage the day to day running of the group, he has remained a powerful symbolic leader.

Yassin's ideology was inspired by traditional Muslim Brotherhood thinkers, especially justifications for the use of violence and the importance of nationalism. Yassin's view on the first issue is traditional in that he believes violence should be employed to end oppression and corruption and to establish justice. His views on nationalism, inspired by those of al-Banna, held that the issue of Palestine is essential to the broader Islamic struggle and that without an Islamic basis any attempt to liberate Palestine or to defeat the forces of unbelief generally were doomed to failure.⁵² While Yassin remains one of the most significant, derivative ideologue's for Hamas, other externally based religious figures have served to justify subsequent developments in Hamas doctrine and dogma. First amongst these is the Egyptian Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is based in Qatar, and has been labelled the supreme Mufti of Hamas. Qaradawi, for example, has rejected the

⁵⁰ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, 2000, p. 19.

⁵¹ Z. Abu-Amr, 'Shaykh Ahmad Yassin and the Origins of Hamas', in R.S. Appleby (ed.), *Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*, 1997, p. 252.

⁵² *ibid.* pp. 243-244.

religious ruling that Arab states could make peace with Israel if it served Muslim interests and claimed instead that as long as Israel continued to occupy Muslim land and to shed Muslim blood then it could not be regarded as having peaceful intentions.⁵³ He also provided the fatwas for the 1996 suicide bombings and the March 2000 decree legitimising the kidnapping of Israeli civilians.

Although Hamas would reconstruct its leadership bodies because of arrests and deaths, the initial collegial form of a consultative council (*Majlis al-Shura*), whose members reside not only within Gaza and the West Bank but also beyond the geographical confines of Palestine, has persisted in one form or another. The most important of these reconstructions occurred in 1989 when Yassin and other Hamas leaders were arrested, creating an internal leadership crisis. The crisis was resolved through co-operation between Hamas activists from the U.S. led by Musa Abu Marzuq, and activists in Jordan, and the ensuing detailed and complex organisational restructuring meant the end of Yassin's position as a the supreme authority.⁵⁴ This new structure stressed the supremacy (and corresponding security) of the external over the internal leadership. Thus, while there are ideologues, both past and present which inform the religious dimension of the group's programme, the operational and functional leadership element is fundamentally collegial, divided between those inside Palestinian territories and those outside.⁵⁵

With the advent of Palestinian self-rule a new generation of younger Hamas leaders has emerged. These are the so called 'Intifada graduates', who were in their thirties and forties at the outbreak of the uprising, were familiar with the secular nationalist discourse and often enjoyed direct links to Palestinian Authority (PA) officials.⁵⁶ This moderation was born of a pragmatic realisation by the Gazan and West Bank leaderships that the movement would have to participate with the PA if it wished to preserve itself and pursue its ideological goals, unlike the external Hamas leaderships that did not have to contend

⁵³ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p. 109.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p. 58.

⁵⁵ It should be noted that an influential ideologue in this case may not be associated with the group. For example in April 1997 the Imam of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi said that "[M]artyrdom seeking (suicide) operations which the Palestinians carry out against Zionist targets are religiously sanctioned". *Radio of Islam - Voice of the Oppressed*, 0530 gmt, 10 Apr. 97 - BBC/SWB, ME/2890, MED/4, April 11, 1997.

⁵⁶ W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and CounterChallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo', *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, p. 26.

with the daily reality of PA control. The Gaza leadership hoped to play roles in health and education and even proposed the establishment of a political party through which Hamas could run in the Palestinian legislative elections proposed under Oslo.⁵⁷ Significantly this moderation did not extend to the group's perception of jihad which maintained that armed resistance would continue against Israel until the occupied territories (including East Jerusalem) were evacuated, settlements dismantled, and a Palestinian state established in these areas. Although the Gaza leadership would later concede to limited cessations of hostilities in order to maintain good relations with the PA, the public, uncompromising stance ensured broad support.⁵⁸

Differences between the Gaza leadership and the external leadership grew following the signing of Oslo II. The PA was eager to involve Hamas in the legislative elections set for January 1996 and eased various restrictions which had been placed on the group. The PA and Hamas also negotiated a sixteen point agreement (made public by the PA but denied by Hamas), the essence of which was that the PA would accept Hamas as a legitimate political participant if the organisation refrained from armed action. From September 1995 to February 1996, Hamas (and the PIJ) observed an undeclared cease-fire. Differences in opinion between internal and external leaderships pose problems for a group as a whole, but do not necessarily imply a split or serious divisions. In response to the questions about these differences in opinion during early 1996, one Jordanian based Hamas leader tactfully claimed that:

"[t]he differences of opinion are a healthy sign reflecting the movement's vitality. A movement whose members are educated and politically enlightened cannot be expected to operate within rigid frameworks, but the rule we follow is that the movement's members abide by its positions and policies."⁵⁹

In an attempt to reach consensus within the movement, Gaza moderates met members of the outside leadership in Khartoum in October 1995. No agreement was reached at this meeting or during a second also held in Khartoum, although the arrangement with the PA continued. Before the elections were conducted discussions

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and CounterChallenge', p. 26.

⁵⁹ *Al-Hayat*, 11 Mar. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2559, MED/7, March 13, 1996. In this case the official was Muhammad Nazal.

about a Hamas political party, Hizb al-Kalās al-Islami, were postponed and the Gaza moderates pulled out of the race.⁶⁰ The indecisive manner in which the movement approached the elections did little in terms of group support, which polls revealed had reached a low point of about ten per cent.⁶¹ The whole episode, however, showed rifts between the group's internal and external leaderships and a corresponding rift amongst the membership. Around half the movement's supporters voted against the wishes of the external leadership, and as a reward for observing the terms of their unofficial agreement with the PA, Hamas was granted permission to open a public bureau in Gaza City.

This leadership crisis was further effected by the status of specific individuals. Sheikh Yassin and Abd al-Aziz Rantisi remained in Israeli jails and Abu Marzuq was imprisoned in the U.S. In the West Bank, there was no common consensus at all, neither moderate like the Gaza one, or more hard-line like that in Amman. In the words of Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, one of the West Bank's leading Islamist thinkers, there was at the time "no centralised leadership in the West Bank, and no decisions common to the West Bank and Gaza. Here it's a case of everyone deciding for himself."⁶² The position of the various leaderships was further complicated by the assassination in Gaza of the Qassam brigade's chief bomb maker, Yahya Ayyash, on January 5 1996. Two suicide bombings were conducted in Jerusalem on 25 February and 3 March 1996 in retaliation, killing forty-five people and wounding eighty-six. The attacks put Arafat and the PA under enormous pressure to destroy Hamas (and the PIJ who also conducted operations at this time). They also revealed a degree of factionalism within the organisation itself. The attacks were claimed by a group calling itself the 'squads of the new disciples of the martyr Yahya Ayyash'⁶³, and after the March 1996 attack they issued a leaflet announcing that they had completed their retaliation in response to the killing of Ayyash but urging the al-Qassam not to issue any statements regarding the end of military operations, thus implying that

⁶⁰ One member, Imad al-Faluji, who was allegedly expelled from the movement for his close relations with the PA, ran as an independent Islamist. He was elected as a member of the PLC for Gaza (Jabalia district). Six other seats were won by Hamas sympathisers.

⁶¹ Support at this time was usually about thirteen per cent. Some observers believe this figure could be considerably higher considering the group has pulled 30-40 per cent of the vote within professional and student organisations in the period 1994-6.

⁶² W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and Counterchallenge', p. 28.

⁶³ *Voice of Israel*, 1325 gmt, 25 Feb. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/254, MED/1, 26 February, 1996.

they were a splinter acting independently of the main organisation.⁶⁴ On March 5, 1996 two founding Gaza members, Ibrahim Yazuri and Muhammad Shamma'a, called for an end to the attacks and shortly before his arrest later in the month Hamas' Gaza spokesman, Mahmud Zahhar, denied the responsibility of Gaza's leadership and hinted that the external leadership was responsible.⁶⁵ Following these pressures the Hamas representative in Jordan issued a statement to the effect that Hamas had not ceased or suspended operations and that appeals made to the military wing by the Gaza leadership "do not express the collective view of the movement's leadership."⁶⁶ These actions revealed a major difference in approach by the internal and external leaderships and also the loyalties of various segments within the al-Qassam itself.

The rifts between the internal and external leaderships were mended somewhat in early 1997. In April, Abd-al Aziz Rantisi was released from jail and returned to Gaza and in May Abu Marzuq returned to Amman. Both were influential leaders and together they were able to forge a consensus on three primary issues. Firstly, there would be no conflict with the PA. Secondly, armed operations would only be conducted in retaliation and would be directed primarily against soldiers and settlers. Thirdly, Hamas would work hard to become a player in the peace process seeking financial and diplomatic support from Arab and Muslim states. The agreement was given an unexpected and added impetus by the bungled assassination by Mossad on the head of Hamas's political bureau in Amman, Khalid Mishal in September 1997. As a consequence Israel was obliged to release Sheikh Yassin to Jordan.

After returning in triumph to Gaza the Sheikh embarked on a four month tour of the region to strengthen support for Hamas. He visited Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, the UAE and Yemen. Yassin was warmly received by heads of state and in some cases donations were forthcoming. This approval was mirrored in extensive media coverage and indicated the degree of frustration with the stalled peace process throughout the Muslim world. In Gaza, Yassin reaffirmed the three main priorities noted above. Of the PA he noted that "we are one nation. We're fighting the same goal, and

⁶⁴ *IDF Radio*, 0935 gmt, 3 Mar. 96 - *BBC/SWB*, ME/2551, MED/2, March 4, 1996.

⁶⁵ *Sunday Times*, March 10, 1996.

⁶⁶ *Al Hayat*, 11 Mar. 96 - *BBC/SWB*, ME/2559, MED/7, March 13, 1996.

we have one enemy so we have no choice but to unite."⁶⁷ In relation to operational resistance, he noted that Israel had been the first to attack civilians and so Hamas could retaliate in kind. He also stated that Islam and international law both have prohibitions against attacks on civilians and stated that "I'm asking the whole world to call on Israel to stop attacking our civilians, and, if they do, we'll reciprocate. It's their decision."⁶⁸ While Yassin noted that the military wing of the group makes its own decisions he also noted that the political leadership laid down the general parameters for action.⁶⁹ The Sheikh's role is largely that of a figurehead and unifying force. In the words of one founding member:

"[t]he sheikh is very popular and he is widely admired by his supporters...if there is a difference of opinion and the sheikh indicates that he sides with a particular stance, the second party will agree and accept the outcome."⁷⁰

The conditions for ending violent action, however, remained fundamentally the same - the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state. Specifically this meant Israeli withdrawal from all the areas it had occupied since the 1967 war, the release of all Palestinian prisoners, the dismantling of all settlements, the establishment of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem and a guarantee from Israel of non-interference in the affairs of the Palestinian state. Israeli refusal of these conditions would make Israel solely responsible for the consequences.

While the leadership of Hamas was reasserting itself, other events were compelling them to reassess their approach. In March and September 1998, three top ranking operational leaders were killed in Ramallah and Hebron. Although the Israelis were directly responsible, suspicions of PA collusion and intense Israeli and PA crackdowns limited the ability of the group to respond. The signing of the Wye memorandum on October 23, 1998, seemed to end the hopes for Hamas inclusion in a broad based Palestinian leadership and further Israeli redeployments were made conditional on the PA's ability to curb 'terrorist' groups and their infrastructure. The imprisonment of Hamas members and leaders certainly weakened the organisation, but there still remain significant elements of the Palestinian population which sympathise with the movement and its

⁶⁷ W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and Counterchallenge', p. 31.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ W. Kristianasen, 'Challenge and Counterchallenge', p. 31.

⁷⁰ R. Gaess, 'Interview: Ismail Abu Shanab', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. VI, # 1, 1998, p. 116.

opposition to the Oslo agreement. As both the internal and external leaderships are aware, while there is little or no progress in the peace process Hamas remains the only viable voice of opposition and as long as the two leaderships maintain a common agenda, Hamas will remain an effective opposition. The external leadership, however, controls the internal and it is the external that more clearly represents the group's proclaimed goals, thus providing scope not only for further division within the group but also escalation of the struggle.

The leadership structure of Hamas is predominantly collegial with important roles played by charismatic ideologues. The collegial structure arose from a need to manage a large organisation with disparate activities ranging from social welfare activities to resistance operations. This collegial structure is further complicated by the existence of both an internal and external leaderships - the former operating at the centre of the struggle with all the attendant security risks this brings and the latter outside, where there is a far lower risk and more direct access to sympathetic governments where they are based. While this dual leadership system helps ensure group survival and external support, the different circumstances within which each exists has led to differences of opinion, and it is the maintenance of this fluid consensus which will determine the success of the group in the future and its incremental strategy of resisting on the social, political and military fronts.

4.2 Core

4.2.1 Eyal

The leadership structure of Eyal is made problematic by the short life span of the organisation and its relatively small membership. Any examination of the group's founder and leader, Avashai Raviv, is further compounded by the fact that from 1987 he was a Shin Bet informer. Avashai Raviv's position as leader of Eyal and security service informer is certainly unusual, however, his beliefs and activities make his position far less easy to categorise than they might appear. Raviv had been actively involved in the Jewish extreme right before he started working for the Israeli security services, indeed it was these activities which gave the Shin Bet the leverage necessary to make Raviv an agent. However, even after he had been recruited, Raviv maintained his own personal agenda and

frequently acted without orders or in contradiction to given orders. The leadership of Eyal then seems to have aspired to become a collegial one, but in the short term Raviv was the sole organiser and instigator of action. Eyal was certainly influenced by past ideologues of the Israeli extreme right, most notably Meir Kahane.⁷¹

Avashai Raviv began his involvement with the radical right in his early teens, spurred to involvement by the Israeli withdrawal from the eastern part of the Sinai peninsula in 1981.⁷² He took part in Gush Emunim marches, distributed literature, harassed left-wing Israelis and by the age of seventeen he had been arrested on suspicion of assaulting Arabs. In 1987, he was approached by Shin Bet while he was being held in a cell following his arrest at a Kach demonstration. While Raviv was still a student at Tel Aviv university, he attracted attention to himself in 1993 by demanding that the Arab president of the university student association resign because an 'Arab cannot be trusted'.⁷³ Raviv was eventually expelled after which he moved to Kiryat Arba and continued his studies at Bar-Ilan University, a renowned more right-wing centre of learning. Raviv was also a considered self publicist, organising events with an eye to maximising media exposure. As one commentator has noted:

"Raviv's main task was the promotion of an image, the image of a wild, anti-democratic, felonious and outlaw ideology. And, with GSS prodding, and the willing co-operation of key Israeli media personnel, that image took hold."⁷⁴

Although he served as a Shin Bet informer, Raviv was hardly an easily controllable source. The Shamgar commission report noted that he was 'insufficiently restrained' by his handlers who often helped him organise provocative acts designed to enhance his credibility within the extreme right.⁷⁵ Raviv frequently disobeyed his handlers, ignoring warnings to tone down his incitement and violent activities, reported late and was generally undisciplined. Despite this unpredictability Raviv was a very valuable source that the GSS felt it could not do without in the increasingly volatile Israeli political climate,

⁷¹ While undoubtedly part of the Kahanist milieu, the author rejects the assertions made in the immediate aftermath of the Rabin assassination that Eyal was the operational arm of Kach. See for example *Israel TV, Channel 1*, 1800 gmt, 9 Nov. 95 - BBC/SWB, EE/D2458/ME, November 10, 1995.

⁷² M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin*, 1998, p. 215.

⁷³ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 265.

⁷⁴ *Jerusalem Post*, December 15, 1998.

⁷⁵ *Jerusalem Post*, November 14, 1997.

noting that "the benefits of his actions outweighed the harm."⁷⁶ As noted, Raviv even formed Eyal without consulting his handlers and they were suitably unimpressed.⁷⁷ Quoting a Shabak agent's report: "The 'subject' reported on the formation of 'Eyal' after the fact. Given his background and habit of post facto reporting, he was given a tough talking to."⁷⁸

Beyond the leadership of Raviv, there exists the disparate ideological leadership of the Jewish radical right. The revival during the early 1990s of the 'obsolete' Halakic precepts of *din rodef* and *din moser* by certain rabbis can be seen as creating a general climate of rabbinical sanction for violence against Jews. On the eve of Yom Kippur, a few days before Rabin was shot, a group of Meir Kahane's disciples gathered outside the Prime Minister's official residence and chanted an ancient curse known as the *Pulsa da-Nura*. According to Jewish lore if ten rabbis so cursed a man he would die within thirty days. A Jerusalem rabbi, embellished the curse by shouting:

"[a]nd on him, Yitzhak son of Rosa, known as Rabin, we have permission to demand from the angels of destruction that they take a sword to this wicked man to kill him for handing over the Land of Israel to our enemies, the sons of Ishmael."⁷⁹

Although Amir was almost certainly ignorant of the curse, the assassination was to some proof that divine retribution for perceived wrongs could be requested and granted. This particular call for Rabin's death and the judgement that he was *din rodef* was not limited to Israel. In June 1995, Rabbi Abraham Hecht of Brooklyn stated that according to Halakah it was allowed to kill Rabin because the policies he was pursuing were endangering Jewish lives.⁸⁰ Although Hecht later retracted his statement and sent a letter of apology to Rabin,

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

⁷⁷ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, p. 221.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*

⁷⁹ C. Coughlin, *A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions: The Quest for Modern Jerusalem*, 1997, p. 147. For another account see M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, pp. 90-91. The alleged leader of the group, Avigdor Eskin, was later charged under the prevention of terrorism Act for expressing his satisfaction with the effectiveness of the curse and was sentenced to four months imprisonment. In December 1997 he was arrested again on suspicion of a plot to throw a pig's head into the Temple Mount during Ramadan.

⁸⁰ ADL, *Extremism in the Name of Religion: The Violent Record of the Kahane Movement and Its Offshoots*, p. 2.

his statement can only be seen as incitement within a Jewish community with close ties to the Israeli extreme right.⁸¹

The issue of rabbinical sanction was of vital importance to Amir. When interviewed by the state investigators following the assassination Amir stated:

"[i]f not for a Halakic ruling of *din rodef* against Rabin by a few rabbis I knew about, it would have been very difficult for me to murder. Such a murder must be backed up. If I did not get the backing and I had not been representing many more people, I would not have acted."⁸²

This, however, is not quite the same as having a direct command. Although he told investigators that he had discussed the issue of *din rodef* with several rabbis none had given him unequivocal permission. Dror Adani, Yigal Amir's friend and one of the three primary conspirators in the assassination claimed during interrogations that Amir had sent him to obtain Halakic approval from Rabbi Moshe Tzuriel at the Sha'alvim Yeshiva. Rabbi Tzuriel denied that he spoke with Adani or anybody else about the issue although he had written an essay in the past which condemned those Israeli leaders responsible for the peace process.⁸³ Amir even stated that he was disappointed with these rabbis and that he did not admire any prominent rabbi of his generation.⁸⁴ He did, however, go on to discuss with the investigators the biblical precedent of the high priest Phineas and he told them that on the day of the assassination he had been reading this particular story. While Yigal and Haggai Amir apparently willingly confessed their crimes and revealed the names of co-conspirators during the first two days of their arrest they were unwilling to reveal the names of Rabbis who had ruled that the Halakah allowed the murder of Rabin.⁸⁵

Although it is difficult to prove that specific rabbis, both within Israel and without, actually condemned Rabin (and Peres) to death, the language used by many was unambiguous. In such an environment of Halakic judgement and provocative rhetoric, it now seems obvious that it would only be a matter of time before a religious student, a

⁸¹ More recently it has been reported that extremist settler youths have sought a sanction of *din rodef* against Prime Minister Barak. See *Israel TV, Channel 2*, 1930 gmt, 8 Nov. 99 - *BBC/SWB*, ME/3689, MED/4, November 11, 1999.

⁸² Quoted in Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 277.

⁸³ FBIS, FBIS-NES-95-226, November 23, 1995.

⁸⁴ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 280.

⁸⁵ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, p. 178.

member of one of Israel's extremist groups, or some other individual drew his own conclusions and decided to act - in much the same vengeful way that Baruch Goldstein acted. Many more examples of rabbinical incitement have followed Rabin's assassination. In January 1996, the Shin Bet arrested an ultra-orthodox Rabbi, Arye Friedman, who had repeatedly stressed the need to kill Shimon Peres at the earliest possible opportunity and "that the only reason he had not assassinated Peres is his obligation to his family."⁸⁶

Although Yigal Amir apparently acted on his own accord, Avishai Raviv's opinion of Amir's action is instructive:

"[w]e admire this lad for his sincerity, for standing behind his words...This man Rabin is responsible for the murder of hundreds of Jews and is another victim of peace. Therefore there must be an end put to this destructive process which is causing a great deal of tension and has now led to the assassination of Rabin."⁸⁷

Following the assassination, Raviv escaped prosecution and disappeared into relative obscurity, at once shunned by the extreme right after his exposure, no longer of any use to the GSS, and reviled by most Israelis as an important element within the incitement campaign that led to the assassination of Rabin. After a long period of relative obscurity however, Avishai Raviv was charged in April 1999 with 'failing to prevent a crime' and 'support for a terrorist organisation.'⁸⁸ What is perhaps most important about this particular example is the existence of young men, frustrated by the course of the peace process and imbued with the Kahanist ideology who are willing to act upon their beliefs. Certainly Raviv survived as long as he did because of GSS patronage, escaping prosecution on numerous occasions and receiving funds and encouragement. However, his ideological leanings, contacts and training had little if anything to do with the security services and it is not inconceivable that with greater security precautions a similar group might evolve and flourish (however briefly) in response to some new and inevitable crisis spawned by the floundering peace process.

The leadership of Eyal rested with a single individual, although he could not be described as an ideologue in his own right and can only tenuously be described as a charismatic personality. The short life span of Eyal meant that no leadership structures had

⁸⁶ FBIS, FBIS-TOT-96-010-L, February 16, 1996.

⁸⁷ FBIS, FBIS-NES-95-215-S, November 6, 1995.

⁸⁸ *Ha'aretz*, April 30, 1999. It is unclear why the charges did not include 'establishing a terrorist organisation'.

been established and Avashai Raviv functioned as an organiser and strategist. The group's ideology was Kahanist and the only variation of this belief system was the adoption of the Halakic concepts of *din rodef* and *din moser*. If the group had been allowed to grow and mature, however, it is likely that a collegial structure would have been adopted, controlling the activities of cellular groups.

4.2.2 The Order

As with Eyal, the Order was a short-lived organisation with a small membership and a barely codified, largely adopted ideology. The founder of the group, Robert Mathews, possessed a charismatic personality and a plan of action (albeit one which varied over time) which formed the nucleus around which the group coalesced and as such was a popular leader with tactical and strategic vision. Although some of Mathew's plans of actions were challenged on occasion, and a degree of collegial leadership was introduced when various activities and responsibilities, such as paramilitary training, were organised and conducted by those deemed best qualified for the task, at no stage was his position as paramount leader seriously disputed. Furthermore, after his death during a siege in 1984, Mathew's position as one of the more prominent martyrs for the right-wing white supremacist cause was assured.

Unlike some of the older ideologues and leaders amongst the American right-wing milieu, Robert Mathew's puritan streak and ideological formation began early. As a young man he became active in right-wing circles and joined the avowedly anti-Communist John Birch Society. At the age of fifteen, Mathews joined an Arizona tax protest unit, a move which he later claimed led to his West Point application being rejected.⁸⁹ Later, while still at high school, he discovered Mormonism which provided him with the basis of a millenarian belief system centred on the North American continent, and when he was seventeen, to the increasing distress of his parents, he converted to the Mormon church.⁹⁰ Four years later, Mathews had his first organisational experience of the racist survivalist right when he formed the 'Sons of Liberty', a paramilitary organisation established in Phoenix Arizona, an experience which deepened his involvement in militant resistance to a

⁸⁹ J. Coates, *Armed and Dangerous: The Rise of the Survivalist Right*, 1987, p.47.

⁹⁰ For coverage of Mathew's formative years see K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 1990, Chapter 1.

perceived programme of world domination.⁹¹ In 1973, while still involved with a revived form of the Sons of Liberty, Mathews was prosecuted for tax evasion, and the following year he first explored the Pacific north-west resolving to move to this 'promised land' as soon as possible, far from the prying eyes of an intrusive government and the depredations of urban American life.

Mathew's ideological influences were varied and adopted over a long period of time. His initial political beliefs were chiefly anti-Communist, guided by the John Birch society. In 1980, his views were altered when he encountered a book entitled *Which Way Western Man?* by William Gayley Simpson.⁹² Simpson had adapted Nietzsche's ideas of natural selection and racial superiority and applied them to modern society. He believed that the white, Christian race was in danger of extinction because of integration with other races and the book outlined ways which preserve the sanctity of the white race such as segregation and Jewish deportation. *Which Way Western Man* was a thoroughly documented, more scholarly work than most others on the subject and the book had a profound influence on the development of Mathew's belief system.⁹³ While Mathews had visited Hayden Lake and knew Richard Butler and many of the other members of the congregation (some of whom would later join the Order), he did not adopt the precise strand of Christian Identity belief which Butler espoused. Mathews did, however, adopt much of the racist doctrine from the movement and its predecessors as well as dabbling in Odinism.⁹⁴ The ideological strands which inspired action were thus extremely close to mainstream Identity beliefs.

Perhaps the greatest literary influence on Mathews was William Pierce's *The Turner Diaries*. And as some commentators have claimed, the history of the organisation may be seen as an attempt to recreate the events depicted in the book.⁹⁵ James Aho has even drawn an interesting parallel between the personalities of Mathews and the lead

⁹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 46-50. Mathews was also an active member of the Young Republicans at this time and was deeply concerned at the accession of the Peoples Republic of China to the U.N. Security Council in 1971.

⁹² 1978. The book was published by William Pierce's National Alliance. Another influential text in the same vein and also published by the National Alliance was Wilmott Robertson's *Dispossessed Majority*.

⁹³ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 105-106. Simpson's book and Spengler's *Decline of the West* are the two books Mathews mentions in his final letter.

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 109. See also J. Kaplan, 'The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case of the "Identity Christian" Church of Israel', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. V, # 1, fn. 45.

⁹⁵ M. D. Wiggins, *The Turner Diaries: Blueprint for Right-Wing Extremist Violence*, 1986.

character of the book, Earl Turner.⁹⁶ While Pierce can be seen as a form of ideologue, his position as such is problematic. His book is a novel, not a religious tract or interpretation, and while regarded as a seminal text for the extreme right in general, it is not part of an on-going religious tradition or the central text for a specific religious movement. Indeed, the ideological complexity of the American Christian Right is well illustrated by the fact that William Pierce himself is not an Identity adherent.⁹⁷ Pierce instead subscribes to his own creation of 'Cosmostheism' which explicitly rejects Christianity and other revealed belief systems, and is instead a basically secular philosophy which lauds the advancement and primacy of the white race. While on the surface Cosmotheism is a secular hybrid of Darwinism, Nietzsche, Spengler, Nazi ideology and Teutonic mythology, Pierce maintains that all these ideas and sources are integral parts of a 'single great truth' which transcends secular philosophy and provides "a spiritual understanding of its mission."⁹⁸ Pierce is dismissive of Christian Identity's adherence to conspiracy theories which suggest Jewish plots to rule the world, beliefs which he ridicules as 'paranoiac' and 'low-brow'. Indeed, in the novel which follows *The Turner Diaries, Hunter*, the Christian Identity movement is portrayed as a collection of ill-educated country hicks who are obsessed with the idea that Jews are the agents of Satan.⁹⁹

Beneath the charismatic guiding figure of Mathews, the leadership structure of the Order was reasonably fluid and the group's short life span did not allow for greater complexity or for a rigid hierarchy with delineation of function. As the driving force behind the organisation, Robert Mathews remained the undisputed figurehead throughout the group's existence, and almost all challenges to this leadership were made for operational reasons. Some members, for example, criticised Mathew's implicit trust of certain initiates (in many cases a criticism which was well warranted) and his lack of strategic caution (especially when assassinations were seriously discussed). Perhaps a more

⁹⁶ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, 1990, pp. 63-64.

⁹⁷ Mistakes in this regard are made even in academic literature. See for example H. Kushner, *Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach to Understanding the Terrorist Threat*, 1998. "[t]he anti-government extremists of today have become known to each other through the efforts of an outspoken, notwithstanding articulate, *Identity adherent*, William Pierce" (my italics), p. 68.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 122.

⁹⁹ There are, however, points of agreement which even Pierce concedes. These include the belief that Jews control American society through media ownership, that American society is handicapped by liberal 'white guilt' and that immigration policies are undermining 'white' America.

serious threat to Mathew's leadership came from a hoax. In October 1984, three men disaffected with Butler's inactivity left Hayden Lake to embark on a crime spree of their own. When they left they obtained a copy of the Aryan Nations mailing list and circulated a letter claiming that an FBI operation was in progress to entrap right-wing leaders. The air of suspicion which this generated meant that some prospective beneficiaries of the Order's largesse refused to meet Mathews and "some who did meet walked away convinced, ironically because of his unusual depth of fervour, that Mathews was indeed an FBI plant."¹⁰⁰

In the case of the Order the concentration of leadership responsibilities in a specific individual contributed both to the success and ultimately the demise of the organisation. Mathew's personality and personal good fortune had much to do with the degree of respect members had for him and the extent to which they were willing to become operationally involved. By the same token, Mathew's occasional acts of operational carelessness and his faith in friends and acquaintances provided the FBI with invaluable leads and informants which ultimately led to the demise of the group. To a certain extent Mathew's death made him into a martyr figure, but Pierce's questions "how will the Jews cope with a man who does not fear them and is willing, even glad, to give his life in order to hurt them? What will they do when a hundred good men rise to take Robert Mathew's place?"¹⁰¹, which echoed feeling throughout the right-wing milieu were never answered because the 'revolution' did not continue. While Mathews was doubtless a natural leader, his lack of experience and miscalculation of his adversaries meant that the Order could not hope to mature or expect a longer life-span.

The leadership of the Order was concentrated in a charismatic individual. Although tasks were delegated for complex operations and there was occasionally dissent amongst members over Mathew's style and strategy, no clear leadership challenge was made during the short history of the group. It is unlikely that the group would have survived long enough to establish a functional, collegial leadership system, the most probable course being a strategy of 'leaderless resistance'. While it is certain that Mathew's personality was crucial to recruitment, group cohesion and operational planning, it is also clear that his acts

¹⁰⁰ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 382.

¹⁰¹ ADL, Research Report, *William Pierce: Novelist of Hate*, 1995, p. 5.

of carelessness and implicit faith in group members were serious contributing factors to the group's demise.

4.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

The PIJ arose from the same social crisis milieu as Hamas although its strategy and ideological allegiances were different from the outset. The first generation of the PIJ's leaders were Palestinian students in Egypt who had rejected the ideology of the Palestinian Muslim brotherhood and were profoundly influenced by both the Iranian revolution and the militancy of Egyptian Islamic organisations, especially the *Tanzim al-Jihad* (Jihad Organisation) and *Takfir wal-Hijra* (Repentance and Holy Flight).¹⁰² These founding members, Fathi Shiqaqi, Abd al-Aziz Odah and Bashir Musa proposed a new ideological programme whereby the liberation of Palestine was a precondition of Islamic unity and not the other way around. Their admiration for the Iranian revolution was at the time unique for an Islamic Sunni movement, as was their belief that the revolution provided a model for the entire Arab world. Although it was a Shi'ite concept, the group also accepted the principle of 'the leadership of the men of religion' (*vilayet-i-faqih*), and it is these, especially Khomeini, which became the group's primary ideologues.¹⁰³ In 1988, in response to the group's initial activities, Shiqaqi and Odah were expelled to Lebanon where they moved further into the Iranian orbit by developing close ties with the Iranian Pasdaran contingent based there and with Hizballah.

The chief ideologues of the PIJ are drawn from the usual panoply of Islamist thinkers. The literature and experiences of al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, Muhammad al-Ghazali, Malik Bin Nabi, Tawfiq al-Tayyib, Muhammed Baqir al-Sadir, Ruhollah Khomeini, Ali Shariati, Hassan Turabi and Muhammad Fadlallah are all mentioned as being influential by the leaders of the PIJ.¹⁰⁴ These ideas and influences were absorbed and reformulated by Fathi Shiqaqi in

¹⁰² Both these groups emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1970s. Also of influence was the Salih Sirriyya group which launched the 1974 attack on the Egyptian technical military academy.

¹⁰³ In March 1979 Shiqaqi wrote a book entitled *Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative* which lauded Khomeini and the revolution and which was banned by the Egyptian authorities. Shiqaqi himself was arrested and detained for three months.

¹⁰⁴ 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Peace Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXVIII, # 4, 62. Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Shami, Gaza, March 25, 1999.

light of the particular circumstances of the Palestinian Islamic struggle and reproduced as a coherent, contextualised ideological programme. Three of these, Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Izz-al-Din al-Qassam, can be regarded as the most influential.

Hassan al-Banna is viewed as the leader who founded the modern Islamic renaissance movement. His importance for the PIJ (and many other Islamist groups) lies in three areas: revival, organisation and upbringing. Not only did al-Banna found the Muslim Brotherhood from which so many Islamist groups have come from, but he was also responsible for the content of the organisation's ideology, goals and means. Sayyid Qutb's influence lies in identifying the challenges to Islam and proposing ways of meeting these challenges. Unlike al-Banna, Qutb developed the ideas of non co-operation with, and active opposition to existing regimes. It was Qutb who first formulated ideas of revolutionary Islam and, of greater importance to the PIJ, the concept of the Islamic vanguard'.¹⁰⁵ Qutb's works, especially *Milestones*, written in prison, provide the long term ideological basis for the PIJ, articulating as it does the idea that change cannot be brought about except through the overthrow of authority and the replacement of the 'Imams of non-belief'. Qutb equated the state of the modern world with that of the *Jahaliyyah*, or state of ignorance which existed prior to Islam, except this new jahaliyyah is based on the rejection of God's sovereignty on earth and the adoption by men of elements of God's authority.¹⁰⁶ Changing this state cannot be gradual or a long term process and the medium of change shall be a "'believing elite', a new Koranic [*sic*] generation (such as the generation of the first companions of the prophet Muhammad) that is capable of leading the society of belief against the society of nonbelief."¹⁰⁷ This believing elite is also referred to by Qutb as 'the vanguard', and it is the model espoused by him which has been adopted by many Islamic revolutionary groups including the PIJ.¹⁰⁸

The primary source of inspiration for the movement, and the character which places the Islamic struggle within the Palestinian context, is Sheikh Izz-al-Din al-Qassam.¹⁰⁹ Al-Qassam was actively involved in resisting French colonisation in the mid-

¹⁰⁵ Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 1994, p. 97.

¹⁰⁶ S. Qutb, *Milestones*, 1978, Introduction.

¹⁰⁷ H. Hanafi, *Al-Usuliyya al-Islamiyya [Islamic Fundamentalism]*, 1989, p. 50.

¹⁰⁸ S. Qutb, *Milestones*, 1978, Introduction.

¹⁰⁹ For a full history of Al-Qassam see B.M. Nafi, 'Shaykh 'Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam: A Reformist and a Rebel Leader', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. VIII, # 2, 1997, pp. 185-215.

1920s (where he was sentenced to death in absentia) after which he fled to Haifa in Palestine. In Haifa, he preached in a mosque and from the very beginning advocated resistance to British colonialism and Zionist settlements - "Jihad against Britain and its Zionist agents."¹¹⁰ Al-Qassam saw Britain and Zionism as two halves of the same enemy - in much the same way that the PIJ sees Israel and America. He believed that violent struggle, and not passive resistance, was the only way to achieve freedom and independence, and this was epitomised by his slogan 'God's book in one hand and the rifle in the other'. In late 1935, al-Qassam led a force of about 800 men towards the hills of the West Bank and at the battle of Yaabad near Jenin his force was routed and al-Qassam himself martyred. This confrontation became the catalyst for the Arab revolt which erupted in 1936. In a similar way, the PIJ saw its operations shortly before the Intifada as the catalyst which began the uprising, and more symbolically as an example of a 'revolutionary vanguard'. The PIJ is also similar to al-Qassam's organisation in the secrecy with which both organisations conduct their activities and in their rejection of direct dialogue with the powers to which they are opposed.¹¹¹ As with Hamas, al-Qassam has become a revered symbol for the PIJ, being elevated to almost saintly status.

The leadership of the PIJ can best be described as collegial. The organisation itself is more a series of loosely affiliated factions rather than a single, cohesive group. Of these the Shiqaqi faction has been the most active and has maintained the higher profile. Fathi Shiqaqi was profoundly influenced by the Iranian revolution and by the writings and teachings of Ruhollah Khomeini himself. Until 1967, Shiqaqi was a Nasserite. The Six Day War pushed him out of the orbit of secular nationalism, however, and towards the religiously oriented Muslim Brotherhood. By the mid-1970s Shiqaqi was disillusioned by the shortcomings of the Brotherhood, and at the same time his ideological thinking was becoming heavily influenced by the writings and sermons of Khomeini and these beliefs were expressed in his book *Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and Alternative*. Shiqaqi was particularly impressed by Khomeini's illumination of the cultural clash between the 'nation of Islam' on the one hand, and on the other the "satanic forces of the West represented by

¹¹⁰ N. Johnson, *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism*, 1982, p. 40.

¹¹¹ Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, p. 100.

Israel."¹¹² Shiqaqi spoke of the fatwa issued by Khomeini which declared the elimination of the 'Zionist entity' as a religious duty for which money generated by alms should be allocated.¹¹³ Parallel to this was the adoption by the group as a whole of one of Khomeini's central tenets which was the constant emphasis on jihad as a symbol of activism.¹¹⁴ Nor did Shiqaqi regard military actions as regrettable. In an interview following the January 1995 Beit Lid bombing, which killed twenty-one Israelis (twenty of them soldiers), he allegedly chuckled when he called the operation "the biggest military attack ever inside Palestine", and part of a defensive war: "[w]e are only defending our right to live in our homeland."¹¹⁵ According to Sheikh Tamimi, the Iranian revolution reinforced the adage that "Islam was the solution and jihad was the proper means."¹¹⁶ In a similar fashion, the experience of the Egyptian Jihad Organisation has influenced the PIJ's perception of jihad, especially that articulated in Muhammad al-Faraj's *The Neglected Duty*. Fathi Shiqaqi was assassinated in Malta by Israeli intelligence in October 1995. He was succeeded by Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who was educated in the West, obtaining a doctorate in Islamic economics from Durham University and later teaching courses on the Middle East at the University of South Florida in the U.S.¹¹⁷

The stance of the PIJ in the 1990s towards Israel and the peace process, and the group's close connection with Iran, can be demonstrated by statements made by Shallah following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Most notably, Shallah stated "I am not sorry for the killing of Rabin who is the world's number one terrorist...It is the blessing of the martyr leader Fathi Shiqaqi's blood."¹¹⁸ Shallah, however, does not appear to possess the same degree of influence as Shiqaqi and this has had a corresponding effect on the potential for unified leadership. As noted of Shallah "[h]e has not the charisma and intellectual or organisational skills as Fathi Shiqaqi and this has influenced the

¹¹² E. Rekhess, 'The Terrorist Connection - Iran, The Islamic Jihad and Hamas', *Justice*, Vol. V, May 1995, p. 2. This view is shared by current members of the group's leadership that I have interviewed more recently.

¹¹³ E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', in D. Menashri (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, 1990, p. 195.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹¹⁵ G. Robinson, 'Doctor Jihad', *World Press Review*, Vol. XLII, # 4, p. 46.

¹¹⁶ E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact', p. 196.

¹¹⁷ While at South Florida he was also director of the World and Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think tank on Muslim religious and political issues connected to the PIJ.

¹¹⁸ *Reuters*, November 5, 1995.

organisation's position and activity."¹¹⁹ The position of the PIJ's internal leadership, like that of Hamas, also depends upon the attitudes of the PA and Israel. At the same time, the external leadership is also concerned with the attitudes and influence of those countries in which the PIJ is based, especially Syria which exerts a considerable degree of control over the PIJ leadership in Damascus, and Iran which also exerts a great deal of ideological and financial influence. Either way, unless there is a radical alteration in the group's leadership strategy, the organisation will remain a politically marginal group.

The leadership of the PIJ can best be described as collegial with an elected secretary general as figurehead. The relationship and structure of the leadership is further complicated by the factional nature of the group (although this case study is primarily concerned with the Shiqaqi faction), and by the existence of internal and external leaderships. The internal and external division is primarily a function of group survival although, like Hamas, there are disagreements between them because of differing circumstances and pressures. If the group is to venture into mainstream politics, the decision will be made by the internal leadership and could result in a split between those favouring a softening of the organisations strategy and those committed solely to violent struggle.

4.3 Messianic/Apocalyptic

4.3.1 Jewish Underground

The leadership of the Jewish Underground is most accurately described as collegial, although the decision to attack the mosques on the Dome of the Rock can be ascribed to two individuals who dominated the processes of rationalisation. The Underground had two primary ideologues, one - Rabbi Kook the younger - was the spiritual figurehead of Gush Emunim from which the organisation split, but his redemptive ideas were further radicalised by the adoption of the more imminent redemptive writings of a little known author, Shabtai Ben Dov. While one of the leading figures of the group, Yehuda Etzion, can certainly be described as charismatic, no member of the organisation

¹¹⁹ *Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini*, <http://www.ict.org.il>

assumed a divine or prophetic authority and consequently none felt sufficiently qualified to unilaterally authorise the operation, and so the issue of rabbinical sanction became a pivotal one.¹²⁰

The members of the Jewish Underground came from Gush Emunim and it is therefore unsurprising that the central ideologue of the group should be the Gush's primary thinker Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook. Kook had succeeded his father, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, and further developed his ideas which centred around the belief that the contemporary age was a messianic one, and that the entire biblical Eretz Israel would be incorporated into the state of Israel. The establishment of the state of Israel was an important step towards this goal, but for almost two decades following 1948 the fulfilment of messianic prophecy was not merely incomplete but constantly under threat. The Six Day War radically altered this perception and provided both the spiritual inspiration for Gush Emunim and a general sense of the otherworldly in Israeli society. Rabbi Kook's position as a form of prophet was entrenched by this event. A short time before the 1967 war, the rabbi addressed his students at the Merkaz ha-Rav Yeshiva in Jerusalem and berated the sins of the nation for abandoning Hebron and Bethlehem to Arab control, and the partition of 'Eretz Israel'. In the light of the Israeli victories some four weeks later, the Rabbis' words appeared almost prophetic, bolstering his position even further and reinforcing the Gush's message of redemption.¹²¹

Although the ideas of both the rabbis Kook were extremely influential on all the members of the Underground, the crucial concept of active national redemption was discovered by Yehuda Etzion in the writings of Shabtai Ben Dov.¹²² Ben Dov, who was a minor civil servant in the department of Industry and Commerce, not a rabbi, had developed an all-inclusive theory of active redemption for the state of Israel which openly considered the possibility of re-establishing the biblical kingdom and constructing the

¹²⁰ One of the important reasons for the de-radicalisation of the Gush Emunim itself was the decline of charismatic leadership following the death of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook in 1982. The other two reasons were the 'materialisation' of the movement's members and the rise of 'technocrats' within the organisation. See E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, pp. 219-220.

¹²¹ Rabbi Zvi Yehuda ha-Cohen Kook, 'This is the State the Prophets Had Envisaged', *Nekuda*, # 86, April 26, 1985, pp. 6-7. [Cited in E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 148, fn. 3.]

¹²² Inter-personal relations are interesting in this regard. According to Coughlin Etzion's uncle was secretary to Yitzhak Shamir when Shamir was commander of the Stern gang and Ben Dov was also a member. C. Coughlin, *A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions*, p. 236.

Third Temple.¹²³ His ideas covered many aspects of this reformed society including the need for territorial expansion in order to fulfil Abraham's covenant with God, the establishment of Jewish law in Israel and the need for moral and spiritual purification - in short the transformation of Israel into "a holy people and a holy state."¹²⁴ Such thinking represented a radical and extreme departure from accepted Gush Emunim ideology which accepted the role played by the secular Israeli state and rejected interference with the messianic timetable. Ben Dov would have remained in obscurity if his writings had not been discovered by one of the founding members of the Underground, Yehuda Etzion, who was not only profoundly influenced by them but devoted a considerable amount of time to their publication.¹²⁵

The signing of the Camp David accords in 1978 was a major setback for Gush Emunim, representing as it did a reversal of the messianic process and a perceived betrayal of the process by the Israeli government. While most members and leaders of the organisation were left confused, two - Yehuda Etzion and Yeshua Ben Shoshan - interpreted the Accords in a purely messianic fashion. These two men reasoned that the Accords were not merely the result of Menachem Begin's personal weakness, they were a sign from God that something more symbolic was obstructing the redemptive process and reasoned that this was the presence on the Temple Mount of the Muslim Dome of the Rock. It is reported that at the meeting when the Dome of the Rock attack was outlined in detail Yehuda Etzion adopted a "tone and spirit [which] were prophetic and messianic."¹²⁶ Throughout history there have been Jewish militant leaders with messianic pretensions. The leader of the second Jewish revolt which began in 132 AD, Simeon Bar Kokhba, was proclaimed by certain rabbinical authorities to be the awaited messiah, a title that he exploited to the full and which no doubt influenced the revolt's ferocity and determination.¹²⁷ Indeed, Etzion has drawn a parallel between himself and Simon Bar

¹²³ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground', in D.C. Rapoport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, 1988, p. 198.

¹²⁴ *ibid.* Sprinzak notes that Ben Dov's writings were in 'the tradition of' the ultra-nationalist poet Uri Zev Greenberg (1896-1981).

¹²⁵ *ibid.* Ben Dov died in 1979.

¹²⁶ Sprinzak, E., 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 199. This information comes from the court documents of Etzion's trial.

¹²⁷ Grant, M., *The Jews in the Roman World*, 1973, p. 248.

Kokhba¹²⁸, although this is quite different from claiming to be the Messiah as Bar Kokhba did, or claiming to be some other form of divine messenger (as opposed to instrument). But Etzion was never sufficiently charismatic to substitute for a rabbinical authority and the other members of the group who were more cautious never considered him a sanctioning authority. Nevertheless, at the beginning, because the process was still regarded as inevitable, planning for the operation (which would take some time anyway) proceeded.

While Etzion and Ben Shoshan were key figures in the group and the prime instigators of the Temple Mount plot it is also interesting to note that their operational input into revenge attacks such as that on the Islamic college in Hebron in 1983 was minimal. Their primary concern was with their messianic plan and when this was indefinitely shelved in 1982 their expectations were challenged. Although Etzion was involved in the planning of the Underground's first terrorist operation, the revenge attack on five Arab mayors in June 1981, neither he nor Ben Shoshan played major roles in the group's next attack on the Islamic College in Hebron. Nor were they significantly involved in proposing or planning the aborted bombing of the men's dormitory at Bir Zeit University in Ramallah, or the attempt to blow up five Arab buses in April 1984 which ultimately led to the group's complete arrest. The leading figure in these operations was Menachem Livni, an engineer and captain in the army reserve, a friend of Etzion whom Ehud Sprinzak has described as the most 'balanced' member of the group.¹²⁹ What emerged was a form of collegial leadership, one which had both messianic and vigilante proponents who involved themselves in planning according to their preferences and their perceptions of the crisis environment.

The other dimension to leadership arose from the fact that none of the group were rabbis, and clerical sanction was considered essential. The Dome of the Rock attack was shelved in 1982 primarily because none of the rabbis consulted would approve the plan and without such approval the participants were unwilling to act.¹³⁰ While it is unclear

¹²⁸ C. Coughlin, *A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions*, p. 237.

¹²⁹ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 199.

¹³⁰ Sprinzak, E., 'Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel' in M.E. Marty & R.S. Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies and Militance*, 1993, p. 476.

how much of the plot was known by the Gush's rabbis, all the other operations carried out by the Underground were blessed by them.¹³¹ According to Etzion, one rabbi, Eliezer Waldman even volunteered to participate in the first operation.¹³² None of the members of the Gush Emunim Underground were authoritative rabbis, and most members had made it clear from the outset that they would not act without the approval of a recognised rabbi. It is indicative of the group's marginalisation that none of the religious authorities approached, including Gush Emunim's mentor, rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, would bless the Temple Mount operation despite their approval of smaller scale acts of terrorism. The only members willing to proceed regardless were the instigators, Etzion and Ben Shoshan, but it was not an operation that only two men could realistically conduct.

Rabbinical sanction with regard to the Temple Mount does, however, have a disturbing precedent. When Israeli troops captured the Temple Mount in 1967 it has been reported that the Army's chief Rabbi, Schlomo Goren, suggested to the senior officer present that the Dome of the Rock should be blown up forthwith. He allegedly told Major General Uzi Narkiss "[y]ou don't grasp what tremendous significance this would have. This is an opportunity that can be taken advantage of now, at this moment. Tomorrow it will be too late."¹³³ Although other sources deny this ever happened, it is what the Rabbi said, in a taped speech at a military convention:

"[c]ertainly we should have blown it up...It is a tragedy for generations that we did not do so...I myself would have gone up there and wiped it off the ground completely so that there was no trace that there was ever a Mosque of Omar."¹³⁴

Many leading clerics in the redemptionist camp condemned the Underground's plot. One of these, Rabbi Zvi Tau, stated of the Underground:

"[t]hey have the blatantly idolatrous idea that by blowing up the mosques they will force the Master of the Universe to redeem Israel. This is the thinking of small-minded, superficial students of Kabbalah who...are led by curiosity into the sacred precincts and cause great pain."¹³⁵

¹³¹ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 171.

¹³² *ibid.*

¹³³ *AP*, December 31, 1997.

¹³⁴ *ibid.*

¹³⁵ A. Ravitsky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Religious Radicalism*, 1996, p. 134.

Such condemnation, however, was not universal as indicated by Schlomo Goren and the willingness of rabbis to sanction other violent acts. Faced with a crisis, even comparatively moderate rabbis have been prepared to sanction violence. Following the brutal murder of a Beit El settler in 1993, for example, members of Yesha's rabbinical council ruled that shooting Palestinian attackers was justified and that no legal barriers should constrain their legitimate actions.¹³⁶ Nor was the religious establishment entirely unsympathetic to the messianic dimension of the Underground - in the mid-1980s the Chief Sephardic Rabbi, Mordechai Eliyahu, allegedly visited members of the Jewish Underground and wrote an official letter supporting the demand to build a synagogue on the Temple Mount.¹³⁷

Since their release from prison the leaders of the Underground are unrepentant, but the active messianic message appears to have been discarded. After serving seven years for his activities in the Underground, Etzion established a new organisation, Chai Ve-Kayam. While Etzion has expressed no remorse for his part in the violent operations of the Underground, he does not advocate violence in the 1990s. Violence should only be resorted to when the Jewish people are 'psychologically ready'.¹³⁸ Chai Ve-Kayam is thus intended to be a mass revival movement which will prepare the Jewish people for redemption. This does not mean, however, that active messianism has been utterly discredited - on the contrary it is courted by organisations such as the Temple Institute - and there may be further significant reversals of the messianic process resulting from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process which are regarded as warranting active messianism. In this regard one of the most important features of the Underground was that the plot existed for more than four years and was only revealed by accident.

The leadership of the Jewish Underground can be described as loosely collegial. While Yehuda Etzion was the driving force behind forming the organisation and planning the attack on the Dome of the Rock, the indefinite postponement of which led to other members assuming the leadership of vigilante operations. Neither Etzion nor any other member of the group was sufficiently charismatic to assume total control of the

¹³⁶ See E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 230.

¹³⁷ E. Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, 1991, p. 352, fn. 25. Sprinzak noted that Meir Kahane confided to him that Eliyahu was one of the only rabbis he 'really respected' and that Eliyahu had read and approved of all Kahane's books.

¹³⁸ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 224.

organisation and none harboured messianic or divine pretensions, a situation which necessitated rabbinic approval in operational matters. While the basis of the group's ideology lay in the teachings of the rabbis Kook, the radical element was derived from a contemporary, Ben Dov, who explored the idea of active messianic redemption and the possibility of realising this imminently.

4.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo

At a basic level the leadership of Aum Shinrikyo can be seen as being embodied in one man, Shoko Asahara, who was both a charismatic figure and chief ideologue and who functioned as a self-deified guru. Partly due to the size of the organisation and the variety of its activities, there also existed a bureaucratic dimension whereby various 'ministries', headed by the members of Asahara's inner circle, performed specific functions according to the whims and dictates of the leader. As Asahara became increasingly convinced of his divinity so his rhetoric became more extreme and the group was willing to engage in a greater number of violent activities. The progression of the group itself to increasingly extra-normative activities had a direct relationship to Asahara's perception of himself and his own role in history.

Shoko Asahara was born as Chizou Matsumoto in 1955. Plagued from birth by almost total blindness, Asahara attended a school for the blind where he enjoyed the obvious advantage of partial sight over the other pupils, and where a domineering and bullying personality type first manifested itself. After school he became an acupuncturist and in 1977 he experienced his first alienation from a society in which he sought to play a leading part when he failed the Tokyo University entrance exams.¹³⁹ In 1978, he married and started a business selling Chinese herbal medicine and in 1982 he was charged with selling fake medicine which proved disastrous for his business.¹⁴⁰ A year before this, he had joined a Buddhist Yogic new religious movement called Agonshu which he left in 1984 to found his own yoga circle.¹⁴¹ Soon after, Asahara adopted the mantle of a

¹³⁹ Asahara had claimed that he wanted to be Prime Minister. See M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronology and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. X, # 4, p. 82.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.* In 1976 Asahara had been charged and fined for bodily injury when an acupuncturist.

¹⁴¹ D., Thompson, *The End of Time: Faith and Fear in the Shadow of the Millennium*, p. 255.

charismatic leader when he claimed he had a vision in which he was a messianic figure from an apocalyptic Buddhist tradition, 'the god of light who leads the armies of the gods'. The initial aim of Aum was withdrawal from society but by 1988 Asahara was preaching that the world had reached a 'final degenerative stage' and he began drawing heavily on Western apocalyptic traditions, primarily because the Eastern traditions which had hitherto been dominant could not provide the theological underpinnings of impending doom offered by Christianity. This culminated in the 1989 publication of an interpretation of the Book of Revelations which predicted Armageddon within a few years.¹⁴² These ideological shifts were closely associated with the course of Asahara's life. There is evidence that he led a largely failed existence until the formation of Aum, although even then failure dogged him. In the 1990 Diet elections, Aum ran twenty-five candidates including Asahara, and contrary to expectations all were heavily defeated. For a man who had always found failure difficult to deal with, public humiliation on this scale must have been particularly galling.¹⁴³ Many observers believe that it was this defeat which effectively placed the sect at war with the world.

As Aum Shinrikyo developed, Asahara's perception of himself (and therefore that imposed upon the group) became more and more messianic. In 1991, the group published Asahara's book *Kirisuto sengen* (Declaring myself the Christ) and in 1991 the successor volume *Kirisuto sengen Part 2* (Declaring myself the Christ Part 2).¹⁴⁴ These texts and related articles likened Asahara's life to that of Christ and his disciples. As with Christ, Asahara felt himself persecuted : "[a]s you know, Aum has received illegal and unfair bashing from the state and society because of the false image created by the mass media's fabricated articles and reports"¹⁴⁵, and the perception of persecution became a defining feature of Aum's relations with the outside world. Asahara drew other parallels between

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 260.

¹⁴³ This failure may also have had particular resonance with Asahara's childhood when he unsuccessfully ran for class head on several occasions. See R. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save it: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism*, 1999, p. 15.

¹⁴⁴ Aum Shinrikyo offers, amongst other proofs Shoko Asahara's messianic promise, a message from a 'non-believer' (i.e. non-member of the group) who claims his semi-mystic grandfather identified Asahara as the 'He' who will appear in order to "change the world". This prophecy was told to the grandfather before the second world war by the leader of the Omoto sect, Onisaburo Deguchi. See 'The Person Who Was Prophesied' on Aum's website - <http://www.aum-shinrikyo.com/english/masons/deguti.htm>.

¹⁴⁵ S. Asahara, *Declaring Myself the Christ*, <http://Aum-shinrikyo.com/english/christ/04.html>. This claim was supported by quoting John 15: 18-27, "If the world hates you, you know that it hated me before *it hated you*".

himself and Jesus, relating his own version of turning water into wine, healing the sick and 'carrying diseases' whereby he absorbs the ailments of others and gives them his energy.¹⁴⁶

The near or actual deification of cult leaders or 'gurus' is certainly not new. Recruits to Aum Shinrikyo were forced to watch Shoko Asahara's talks on video for hours in solitary confinement, his hair and nail clippings were revered and they also reported to have drunk his bath water.¹⁴⁷ This latter practice has numerous historical parallels and Norman Cohn presents similar examples from dark and early middle Age Europe. In the eighth century, St. Boniface recorded a messianic figure called Aldebert whose followers treasured his nail parings and hair clippings as "miracle-working talismans."¹⁴⁸ The eleventh century Messianic figure Tanchelm distributing his bath water amongst his followers "some of whom drank it as a substitute for the Eucharist, while others treasured it as a Holy relic."¹⁴⁹ Asahara's development of this practice was to charge large amounts of money for these miraculous curatives, turning them (along with other treatments and 'medicines') into a major source of revenue for the group. As distasteful or comic as this may seem such devotion to a messianic leader is of particular concern when the group turns to violence.¹⁵⁰

The 'self-fulfilling' nature of Asahara's increasingly apocalyptic prophecies was an important factor in directing the course of group violence. As one commentator has suggested these prophecies:

"locked the religion into a scenario from which it had little way out unless something drastic happened in the period leading up to 1997, and specifically 1995 which Asahara had marked out as the year when the slide to destruction would begin."¹⁵¹

Towards this late stage Aum was faced with a choice of either rescheduling the apocalypse (problematic because of the increased interest the Japanese police were taking in the group, and for reasons of legitimacy), suffering a form of 'great disappointment' (which

¹⁴⁶ S. Asahara, *Declaring Myself the Christ*.

¹⁴⁷ D. Thompson, *The End of Time*, p.266. It has also been reported that Aum procured a DNA/RNA synthesiser so that Asahara's DNA and lymphocytes could be replicated and sold as part of another ritual. See M. Leitenberg, 'The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents', in B. Roberts (ed.), *Hype or Reality: The "New Terrorism" and Mass Casualty Attacks*, 2000, p. 167 & fn. 24.

¹⁴⁸ N., Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, p. 43.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹⁵⁰ It is important to note that the first external murders committed by Aum were of a lawyer, who was suing the group for false advertising over claims made about the gurus by-products, his wife and child.

¹⁵¹ I. Reader, *A poisonous cocktail? Aum Shinrikyo's Path to Violence*, 1996, p. 93.

would certainly have deprived the group of some legitimacy and would require an alteration in ideology) or the group could act to precipitate the end. The guru gave his blessing for this last option, one in which the group already had a measure of experience. Aum had previously shown itself willing to murder opponents and uncooperative members, the group had long been experimenting with various biological and chemical agents, and at Matsumoto in June 1994 the group had already deployed sarin.

While Asahara existed as the divine leader of Aum Shinrikyo, the rest of the group's leadership structure was effectively a mirror image of Japan's national government.¹⁵² Aum's shadow government structure contained twenty-one different ministries and agencies under the Supreme leadership of Shoko Asahara.¹⁵³ The group clearly saw itself as the sole inheritor of a post-apocalyptic world and the organisational structure of the group would provide a blueprint for an entirely new society, although one which was not radically unfamiliar in terms of its format, merely different in terms of ideology and practice. The illegal activities of the group were conducted according to ministerial responsibility, and the selection of ministers was made by Asahara according to their skills and their loyalty to the guru. For example, Hideo Murai, a trained physicist became Aum's Minister of Science and Technology; Kiyohide Hayakawa, an environmental architect, became Aum's Construction minister and his closeness to Asahara led to develop contacts in Russia for the group's militarization programme; Tomomasa Nakagawa, a physician, became head of the Household Agency where one of his roles was to act as personal doctor to the guru and his family; and Tomomitsu Niimi, who headed the Ministry of Home Affairs. Parallel to this quasi-government structure was a spiritual one, again headed by Asahara. Members on this level were classified according to seven ranks of enlightenment and all pledged complete allegiance to Asahara. The structure was pyramidal in composition with the six layers below Asahara composed of monastic

¹⁵² One Japanese commentator believes this was a result both of the group's utopianism and also its inward looking paranoia generated in part by a hostile media and at times by hostile communities. See N. Inoue, cited in M. Mullins, 'Aum Shinrikyo as an Apocalyptic Movement' in T. Robbins and S. Palmer (eds.), *Millennium, Messiahs and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements*, 1997, p. 317, fn. 3.

¹⁵³ These were the Household Agency, the Secretariat, the ministries of Defence, Science and Technology, Health and Welfare, Home Affairs, Healing, Construction, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Intelligence, Distribution Supervision, Vehicles, Justice, Post and Telecommunications, Labour, Commerce, Justice, the Eastern Followers Agency, the Western Followers Agency and the New Followers Agency.

members and the bottom layer of lay members only.¹⁵⁴ This structure provides a more accurate representation of the group hierarchy than the political one with various ministers existing at different levels of enlightenment according to their proximity to Asahara.

Of the various ministers and other high ranking disciples some have managed to keep their faith in Asahara and his teachings while others have not. Aum's former 'Minister of Internal Affairs', Tomomitsu Niimi, Aum's chief chemist, Masami Tsuchiya, and the group's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fumihiro Joyu, have remained devout.¹⁵⁵ On the other hand the man who ran Aum's clinics, Ikuo Hayashi, and the group's 'Minister of Intelligence', Yoshihiro Inoue, have recanted and co-operated with the Japanese authorities in the hope of a more lenient sentence or at least to avoid the death penalty. In December 1999, the charismatic Joyu was released from a Hiroshima prison after serving a three year sentence for perjury over a land purchase by the sect. Joyu was, and still is, one of Asahara's most loyal lieutenants and regards the guru as a messiah.¹⁵⁶ Since Asahara's arrest, decision making in the group has been managed by a group of six, including Joyu and one of Asahara's favourite daughters, Rika. It is assumed by many Aum experts that Joyu will assume the leadership role and that using his charismatic personality and leadership position will reinvent the organisation (perhaps by changing its name and altering the focus of its teachings and activities) thus allowing it to survive new legislation aimed at curbing the group's activities.¹⁵⁷

The leadership structure of Aum Shinrikyo was composed of a divine charismatic leader beneath which lay a collegial structure to manage the group's wide range of activities and to function as a government in waiting for a post-apocalyptic world. This ministerial system was also a means for Asahara to reward favourites and to maintain a low level of inter-agency rivalry. Asahara's unquestioned position and divine status meant that he was in a position to sanction a wide range of violent activities, and his apocalyptic belief system meant that he considered violent activity on a large scale. Asahara's position

¹⁵⁴ D.W. Brackett, *Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo*, 1996, 102-103.

¹⁵⁵ Joyu represents an unusual development in charismatic leadership having developed a devoted following of young woman outside the cult. See Brackett, *Holy Terror*, p. 168. A similar phenomenon, albeit on a lesser scale has occurred to Yigal Amir, see *The Seattle Times*, August 12, 1996.

¹⁵⁶ *S.M.H.*, December 29, 1999.

¹⁵⁷ *S.M.H.*, December 30, 1999.

as chief ideologue further cemented his position as paramount leader and also played a personally pivotal role in governing the group's violent activities.

4.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan

The leadership of the Saudi Ikhwan was charismatic in nature, confined to a primary activist ideologue, and a secondary one, who was accorded messianic status by being declared the expected Mahdi. What makes this case of interest is that the primary leadership figure, Juhayman ibn Saif al-Utaybi, did not feel compelled to adopt the position of Mahdi himself, but seemed content to apply traditional indicators of the Mahdi's identity which accorded more closely with another, Muhammed ibn Abdullah al Qahtani. The small size of the group, its short life span and somewhat limited objectives ensured that no collegial form of leadership would develop.

The paramount leader and primary ideologue of the Saudi Ikhwan was Juhayman Utaybi. Utaybi was the grandson of an earlier Saudi Ikhwan militant killed at the battle of Sabalah in 1929 by the forces of Abdul Al Saud, thus disposing him to oppose the Saudi regime by descent judged by the customs of tribal vengeance. As a young man he joined the Saudi National Guard, rising to the rank of corporal before he left in 1972 after eighteen years of service, having discovered that his religious beliefs and practices were incompatible with military life. It is also at this stage that his resentment of foreign involvement in the Saudi kingdom arose. After his service with National Guard he enrolled at the Islamic University of Medina where he became a student of Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah al Baz. Al-Baz represents the most immediate and powerful influence over the formation of Juhayman's socio-religious outlook, and he also represents the point of departure between the official doctrine of the state *ulema*, and the ideas formulated by Juhayman. In one of his pamphlets, entitled *The Ikhwan*, Juhayman laments the marginalisation of 'true' Muslims in Saudi Arabia:

"[t]hey slander us from all quarters and tell lies about us. We are Muslims who wanted to learn the Shari'ah [*sic*] and quickly realised that it could not be learned in

government controlled institutions...We have broken with the opportunists and the bureaucrats."¹⁵⁸

Al-Baz was by no means a moderate, advocating a return to the letter of the Quran and the *sunna*.¹⁵⁹ The deviation arose because Juhayman applied purist teachings of al-Baz rigorously to the Saudi regime and found that it had deviated from the true path of Islam. Al-Baz is also instrumental at two later stages of the life of the Ikhwan. In 1978, following the publication of the group's first important pamphlet,¹⁶⁰ Juhayman and ninety-six others were arrested in Riyadh for disseminating treasonable materials. Instead of a public trial they were questioned closely by al-Baz, and in his capacity as President of the Council of *Ulema* Al-Baz concluded that the views held by Utaybi and his followers were not treasonous and they were released on the understanding that they would engage in no more public activism. After the Grand Mosque had been seized the following year Al-Baz led the general clerical decision granting the King a *fatwa* which permitted him to clear the mosque by force.¹⁶¹ Within the political environment of Saudi Arabia, it is not difficult to understand that many of the ulema and other elements were sympathetic to some of Juhayman's beliefs and were happy to "use him as a stick to beat the Al-Saud."¹⁶² Juhayman's opinion of Al-Baz was that he had failed Islam by serving the regime: "Bin Baz may know his Sunna well enough, but he uses it to support corrupt rulers."¹⁶³

Juhayman certainly fits the charismatic leader type. It is claimed that he "possessed a magnetic personality, piercing eyes and great courage," all of which brought him tribal respect and obedience from his young followers.¹⁶⁴ Juhayman was also responsible for writing three of the 'seven letters', the pamphlets which outlined the group's religious

¹⁵⁸ Juhayman Utaybi, *Da'wat Ikhwan, Kafya Bada'at wa Ila Ayna Tasir*, reproduced in A. Al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, 1983, p. 126.

¹⁵⁹ In 1965 al-Baz claimed that the sun moved in orbit, and that the earth was stationary and spread out by God. He later denied claiming that the earth is flat, merely 'static'.

¹⁶⁰ 'Rules of Allegiance and Obedience: The Misconduct of Rulers', Kuwait City, n.d.

¹⁶¹ Authority was found in the verse "Do not fight them in the Holy Mosque until they fight you inside it, and if you fight them you must kill them for that is the punishment of the unbelievers". J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan - 1979' in D. Holden & R. Johns, *The House of Saud*, 1981, p. 522.

¹⁶² J. Buchan, p. 519.

¹⁶³ *The Financial Times*, April 28, 1980.

¹⁶⁴ H. Dekmejian. *Islam and Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, 1995, p. 135, from an anonymous Arabic tract, "Ahdath al-Haram Bayn al-Haqa'iq wal-Abatil" (The events of the Grand Mosque between truth and lies), *Sawt al-Tali'ah*, May 1980, pp. 120-122.

objections to Saudi rule, as well as a concluding commentary and poetry.¹⁶⁵ However, while Juhayman was undoubtedly a charismatic figure in his own right, he did not declare himself Mahdi but assigned this mantle to his brother-in-law, Muhammad bin Abdullah Qahtani. Qahtani was a twenty-seven year old theology student and his name resonated with the messianic traditions employed by the group mentioned in Chapter Three. Apparently a female member of the group dreamed one night that the Mahdi was among them and that it was Qahtani.¹⁶⁶ His exact role in the attack on the Grand Mosque remains confused, although it is certain that Juhayman addressed the assembled masses and enjoined them (and the rest of the Muslim world) to recognise Muhammed as the Mahdi before listing the group's other demands. According to the 'seven letters manuscript', Qahtani is the author of letter number seven and it is certain that Qahtani was a central member of the group and that the belief of other followers, including Juhayman, that he was the Mahdi, was very real. Indeed, even Sheikh ibn Baz noted after the attack that Qahtani exhibited enough of the expected signs for impressionable believers to be taken in. These included his and his father's names (both the same as the prophet's), his tribe, and the fact that he proclaimed himself a descendant of the prophet.¹⁶⁷ What is most important to note is that his claim fell so immediately on deaf ears throughout the Muslim world. This is easily attributable to his sudden appearance (no period of expectation), his anonymity beyond his own organisation and the violent, almost secular and heretical way he chose to announce his arrival.¹⁶⁸ The Saudi ulema's *fatwa* sanctioning the use of force to clear the mosque contained as its second element a discrediting of Qatahani's claim. This rested on a hadith which states "[h]e who comes to you while you are unanimous in your opinions and wants to divide you and disperse you, strike off his neck."¹⁶⁹ Any members of the Ikhwan who still believed in his divinity were ultimately to be disappointed when his body was found amongst the dead at the end of the siege.

¹⁶⁵ H.R. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 1995, p. 135. Translations of these letters have appeared in a variety of sources. For the best English version see J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in the Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', *Muslim World*, Vol. LXXX, # 1, 1990, pp. 9-15.

¹⁶⁶ J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan', p. 520.

¹⁶⁷ J. Kechichian, 'The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, # 18, , 1986, p. 60.

¹⁶⁸ As early as the eleventh century the Fatamid Caliph Al-Hakim declared himself Mahdi. Al-Hakim disappeared under mysterious circumstances and his return is still expected by the Lebanese Druzes. See S. Runciman, *The History of the Crusades, Vol. I*, 1951, pp. 35-36.

¹⁶⁹ FBIS, 'Ulama Issued Fatwa', November 26, 1979, p. C4.

Although examples of Sunni messianism are rare (two of the four fundamental collections of Sunni traditions make no mention of the Mahdi at all, and the Sunni faith generally treats the concept of Mahdi much less specifically than the Shi'a) there is a twentieth century precedent from 1977 when the Egyptian Group Takfir wal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight) declared its leader, Shukri Mustafa, to be the Mahdi.¹⁷⁰ Mustafa was executed in the same year and although other imprisoned members of his group do not believe him to be immortal, they do believe that "because God had ordained him and his group to restore Islam, he would not die before accomplishing this 'divine mission'."¹⁷¹ Interestingly both Shukri and Juhayman's groups were labelled as *khawarij*, a derogatory term referring to the Kharajites, early schismatics in the Muslim community. Juhayman survived the siege of the Grand Mosque and along with sixty-two other activists he was executed on January 9, 1980. While ultimately an isolated incident primarily of concern for the Saudi regime, the emergence in the late twentieth century of a puritanical Sunni group with a leader claiming to be the awaited Mahdi not only reinforces the durability of redemptive religious ideology in Islam, but also poses as the most recent precedent for messianic protest against what is perceived to be a corrupt and deviant society.

The leadership of the Saudi Ikhwan centred on two individuals, one the chief ideologue and strategist and the other, the declared Mahdi. Of these two the ideologue and strategist, Juhayman, was the most influential, responsible for founding the organisation and for the majority of ideological output and strategic planning. The relatively small size of the group and its short life span militated against the development of any more sophisticated leadership structure, as did the group's messianic belief system which anticipated a divine transformation of temporal society rather than a political one.

4.4 Conclusion

The function of leadership in extremist religious groups is primarily that of defining and refining the group's ideological programme and strategy within a particular

¹⁷⁰ D.C Rapoport, 'Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements' in M.E. Marty & R.S. Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics and Militance*, 1993, p. 449.

¹⁷¹ Ibrahim, S., 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. XII, 1980, p. 437.

crisis milieu. For all groups the basic ideological content is drawn from ideologues, either past or present, who establish the basic links between religious justifications for violence and contemporary socio-political environments. For all ideologues personal biography functions as an indicator of ideological inclinations. In the case of present ideologues these may serve as a form of ideological compass for a collegiate leadership, or the role of ideologue may be assumed by a charismatic leader. A collegial system of leadership better serves the complex activities of a large organisation and is also less prone to becoming radicalised and also helps insulate a group from attacks upon the leadership. Typically as a programme of action is radicalised so the longevity of a group is constrained, thus a general observation is that the more complex a leadership structure both in terms of its ideological influences and operational responsibility, the greater the group's chances of survival and of ultimately diversifying its activities. In cases where a collegial leadership system is split between one that is internally based and one which is external there is scope for disagreement based on differing perceptions of the operational environment and obligations to sponsors. In the case of charismatic leadership where the various functions of leadership are concentrated in a single individual the propensity for that individual to adopt a more radical course of action is higher, but conversely the removal of such individuals is bound to have a more dramatic effect on the group itself, generally resulting in its demise. The life experience and personality of a leader is also important in influencing the development of ideology and strategy, and once again where the leadership is concentrated in a single individual the effects of life experience on group activity are magnified. An important part of leadership is defining the time frame within which group objectives are to be achieved and when exactly operational activity is to occur, both according to traditional religious calendars and timetables, and in reaction to events within the crisis environment.

Chapter V

Timing

Once the leadership of an extremist religious group has defined its strategy in light of ideological beliefs, a decision must be made regarding *when* the group will act. As outlined in Chapter Two there are four primary categories of timing which will be considered. While each group shows a tendency to favour a particular kind of timing rationale, all exhibit a propensity to employ a variety of timings and in some cases the timing motivations may even overlap for a single action. Furthermore, all groups possess a perception of time itself and how this relates to, and similarly governs, their struggle. Time, in this case, is seen in cosmic terms with an identifiable beginning, middle and end, and where exactly, on this linear spectrum, a group sees itself as being at will in many respects determine its course of action. This may range from an imminentist messianic perception, which decries the need for long term planning and political activity, to one which is gradualist and sees the struggle as one of centuries, not merely in the military sphere but also in the social, political and even economic arenas.

The relationship of mainstream groups to time is governed by their overt participation in society. They are, therefore, inclined to emphasise anniversaries of specific events, and to engage in politically timed actions. Reactive actions are also employed dependent on the environmental context but while Endtime messages form part of their ideological system, these are not emphasised. Environmental variations are important. Whereas Kach and Hizballah have engaged in politically timed activities, Aryan Nations (due to the absence of a politically motivated and mobilised constituency) has abstained. Similarly, because of the environment in which it operates, Hizballah's activities have provided the group with a large number of short term anniversaries and a wider range of events to react against. Core groups engage in the first three types of timing but their desire to alter the existing socio-political order precludes acts timed to precipitate the Endtime. Both Eyal and the PIJ, however, exploited the symbolic nature of time, especially

anniversaries and political tactical timing, to a far greater extent than the Order. The short life span of Eyal, however, mitigated against the group fully exploiting anniversaries or reactive timing in the same way that the PIJ has. While messianic and apocalyptic groups are concerned primarily with Endtime events and the timing of their action to coincide with or precipitate these events, circumstance and environment may lead to a certain degree of variation. The Saudi Ikhwan certainly expended effort to time its actions to coincide with Islamic eschatology but both the Jewish Underground and Aum Shinrikyo - for different reasons however - deviated from focusing solely on eschatological timing and timed some of their acts for tactical or reactive reasons.

5.1 Mainstream

5.1.1 Kach

The timing of the majority of Kach's violent, group actions was largely political and tactical in nature, although there was certainly a heavy element of reactive violence and other timing types perpetrated by individuals affiliated with the group. Underlying this was an imminentist, catastrophic view of time itself, although in hindsight this can be seen, in most cases, less as a core messianic belief, and more as tool for encouraging political support for the group. The distinction between specific timing categories for Kach is frequently blurred. While those activities organised and orchestrated by the group such as provocative marches through Arab areas and political rallies can be seen as political and tactical in nature, they were often in response to specific acts of Arab violence. While Kahane advocated revenge as an underlying ideological concept, when employed by Kach members as a motive for timing attacks, there is no clear evidence that this activity was organised or condoned by the leadership. Other acts of violence committed by individual members or small groups, apparently without the direct assent of the group's leadership, were carried out at times of specific anniversaries or as a part of a messianic timetable, however, these were in the minority.

The perception of time developed by Meir Kahane centred around the imminence of crisis and the idea of catastrophic messianism. The idea that time was running out for the Jewish people was developed while Kahane was still in the U.S. during the late 1960s.

In 1968, while most Jews were still reeling from the successes of the Six Day War, Kahane was discussing the disaster he saw looming before the Jewish people. He reasoned that as economic recession took hold in the U.S. and as moral and social mores declined, it was only a matter of time before the Jews once again became the scapegoat of a failing society.¹ Jewish survival, according to Kahane, while difficult throughout history, had now become impossible outside the state of Israel because only there could the Jews be assured that they were a majority that could not be blamed for the traditional woes of Western society.² The messianic idea, however, was not date specific and did not cope well when economic, social and political crises both in the U.S. and in the world at large failed to materialise. And during the 1980s, the idea of catastrophe was expressed in terms of the security and demographic threats posed by the Arab Israeli and Palestinian populations, as well as the more accepted security threat posed by the Arab world at large. Those exceptional cases where the idea of a messianic timetable were given an operational form will be discussed below.

The timing of most mainstream acts conducted by Kach, such as demonstrations and marches, can be seen as political and tactical in nature, although there was frequently a reactive dimension. As noted earlier, electoral support for Kach rose as the security situation in Israel deteriorated, a situation which Kahane was acutely aware of and which he readily exploited. A Kach demonstration, calling for the exclusion of the Arabs during a climate of general public security concern, could garner a certain degree of support. For example, a demonstration in the northern Israeli town of Afula after the double murder of two Israeli teachers in July 1984 helped to dramatically increase support for Kach - the success of such actions depended on a deteriorating security environment. In the absence of such a situation, the street politics of Kach - especially provocative visits to Arab villages - were marginalised until the official ban of the party effectively made them illegal.

Even before Kahane was preaching 'terror against terror', revenge had long been a central message of Kahane's ideology. Kahane was moved to write that:

¹ M. Kahane, *Never Again, A program for Jewish Survival*, 1972, pp. 74-100.

² *ibid.* pp. 101-104.

"[n]o trait is more justified than revenge in the right time and place. G-d himself is called Nokem, Avenger: 'The Lord is a zealous and avenging G-d. The Lord avenges and is full of wrath. He takes revenge on his adversaries and reserves wrath for his enemies' (Nachum [sic] 1:2)."³

Most interesting is the historical role which revenge itself plays in Kahane's ideology, the need not only to avenge current acts of violence but to seek a wider vengeance for centuries of wrongs committed against the Jewish people. Kahane's operational logic for this theory found expression early, especially following the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics when Kahane planned an unsuccessful attack on the Libyan embassy in Brussels.⁴ Kahane first expounded his theory of 'terror against terror' in 1974, whereby an anti-terrorist group would be established which would retaliate after every incident. In this process the rabbi was influenced by one of his historical heroes, David Raziel, the first commander of the Etzel Underground during the late 1930s. Raziel was responsible for the introduction of Jewish counter-terror in 1937, and his strategy was to make Arab civilians pay for the deaths of Jewish civilians.⁵ Kahane also suggested two possible relationships such a group could have to the government: "the [Israeli] government should never acknowledge its existence or it can deal with it on the same basis as the relationship between the PLO and the Arab host governments."⁶ Kahane also extended his call for revenge to include attacks on those Arab states which harboured or offered support to the PLO.⁷ Kahane's ideas did not change much over time and in one of his later books, *Uncomfortable Questions for Comfortable Jews*⁸, he promised that if he was elected as Israel's leader he would establish anti-terror groups which would operate globally in defence of Jewish interests - a kind of vigilante Mossad. In 1979, the Jewish

³ M. Kahane, *Revenge - The Jewish Approach*, <http://www.geocities.com/Athens/1651/writings/venge.htm>. Kahane also cites Psalms 94: 1 - "A G-d of vengeance is the Lord".

⁴ Friedman, *The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane - From FBI Informant to Knesset Member*, 1990, pp. 149-153. The plot was exposed at Ben Gurion airport when weapons and explosives were discovered by Israeli security.

⁵ Kahane tactfully ignored the fact that Raziel's successors, including Menachem Begin, had renounced indiscriminate violence by the early 1940s.

⁶ M. Kahane, *The Jewish Idea*, 1974, p. 14. In November 1974 Kahane and three other defendants were convicted, and awarded two year suspended sentences, for attempted arms smuggling. The arms were part of a plan to establish a counter terror group in Europe to fight Arab terrorists, *New York Post*, November 22, 1974.

⁷ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*, p. 209.

⁸ M. Kahane, 1987, p. 269.

Defence League (JDL) issued a similar call in the United States.⁹ It is therefore unsurprising that it was Kach activists which composed the group 'Terror Neged Terror' (Terror Against Terror, TNT), an organisation that operated in the early 1980s and personified the reactive form.¹⁰

Although violence perpetrated by Kach or Kach members on specific long term religious anniversaries was rare, the case of Baruch Goldstein in this context is highly significant. Goldstein opened fire on Muslim worshippers gathered for Friday prayers on February 25 1994, at the Ibrahim mosque in Hebron during Ramadan. The attack was also timed to coincide with the middle of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and during the Jewish festival of Purim which celebrates the fifth century deliverance of the Jewish people by Mordechai and Esther from their Persian enemy Haman.¹¹ Alone and without orders, Goldstein perpetrated the most damaging act of any Kach activist, the net results of which were the outlawing of the group and a major Palestinian terror backlash. Despite this, Goldstein remains a hero (indeed, to many a saint) to the Israeli extreme right, and the date of the massacre has become an important part of their calendar. Although rare within Kach, mystical associations of specific short term anniversaries have taken on new meaning since the death of Kahane himself. In November 1990, a gunman killed two Palestinians after receiving news that the rabbi had been killed, and in November 1992, four teenage members of Kahane Chai killed one Palestinian and wounded seven others in a grenade attack in Jerusalem.¹² Perhaps of greater note after Yitzhak Rabin's assassination Herbert Sunstein, Kach's then fund raising officer, commented that:

"Rabin's death proves that God is in the world. You know how it proves that He is in the world? Today, is 5 November? On 4 November, when Rabin was shot, at the

⁹ In the words of a JDL document: "...what is needed is a secret, underground strike-force which will eliminate those very individuals that threaten our very existence. The time is long overdue for the birth of such a group". See ADL, *Report on Kahane Movement and its Off shoots*, Nov. 21, 1995, p. 47.

¹⁰ TNT's motivation was remarkably similar to the vigilante beginnings of the Jewish Underground.

¹¹ B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 1998, pp. 103-104. Hoffman further suggests that Goldstein saw himself in the mould of a 'modern day saviour' within the context of the Purim myth. A Kahane Chai statement after the event called the massacre a 'Purim deed' and mourned the death of the 'martyr Barukh [sic] Goldstein who consecrated the name of God by his death as Samson did at the time', See *IDF Radio*, 1105 gmt, 25 Feb. 94 - *BBC/SWB*, ME/1932, MED/2, February 26, 1994.

¹² R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: Critical Appraisal', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IX, # 4, 1997, fn. 5, p. 103.

same time, at 10.00pm (2000 GMT), on the Western calendar Me'ir [*sic*] Kahane was assassinated. God's hand is in the world."¹³

Considering the concept of catastrophic messianism, the mainstream nature of Kach made participation in acts of active messianism problematic, and, considering the political nature of the organisation, to a certain extent contradictory. Nonetheless there are significant examples. In 1980, Kahane spent nine months in administrative detention in Ramla prison for participating in a plot to destroy the Dome of the Rock - nor was he the only Kach member to consider forcing the culmination of the messianic timetable. In 1982, Yoel Lerner, a senior figure within the Kach movement, planned to bomb the Dome of the Rock but was arrested by Israeli security services. During his incarceration, Kahane wrote an essay entitled *Forty Years*¹⁴ which outlines a redemptive timetable becoming the ideological basis for his concept of catastrophic messianism. According to Kahane's reasoning, after the nation of Israel had been established in 1948, the nation would have forty years in which to repent and precipitate the redemption. The 1967 war could be regarded as proof that God was prepared to assist in the project, while the various set backs of the 1970s showed that the Jewish people were prepared to sabotage their own destiny. The importance of the task was reinforced by suggesting extreme penalties for failure in fulfilling it:

"My people; my dear and foolish people! We speak of your life and those of your seed...Choose wisely! The magnificence is there for the asking. The horror will be yours for the blindness. Choose life, but quickly; there is little time. The forty years tick away."¹⁵

From 1980, Kahane's works referred increasingly to the coming 'catastrophe'. How seriously the organisation (and Kahane himself for that matter) took these warnings is unclear, but the passing of this date does not seem to have caused major ideological problems for the group. Perhaps of greater concern is the messianic element in the timing of the Hebron massacre. The death of Kahane in 1990 represented a major point of crisis to Kach members and this sense of crisis was compounded by the 1993 Oslo accords. For Baruch Goldstein, the affect of these crises was to demand of him a dramatic, redemptive

¹³ FBIS-TOT-96-001-L, November 9, 1995.

¹⁴ M. Kahane, *Forty Years*, 1983.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 7.

act. The Hebron massacre has been described as "an expression of messianism in crisis,"¹⁶ and while Goldstein's action were atypical in an organisational sense, from the point of view of a messianic individual imbued with Kahane's teachings they made perfect sense, fulfilling the need to 'kick start' a promised messianic process.

5.1.2 Aryan Nations

The most important element of timing for Aryan Nations is that of a perception of time itself. The group itself has not been directly responsible for violent acts which exploit the symbolic dimension of either short or long term anniversaries, and while Aryan Nations does contain a strong millenarian dimension, this is not date specific and has occasioned no acts of violence designed to hasten this process. Despite this an examination of the relationship between timing and action within the wider American extreme right milieu - of which Aryan Nations is an important mainstream representative - is appropriate. This is largely because of the heterodox nature of (especially) Christian Identity belief and also the decentralised nature of organisations such as Aryan Nations and the belief systems which they espouse.

The use of anniversaries by the Christian Identity movement concerns those of a long term nature rather than long standing religious festivals.¹⁷ This is basically because of the eclectic nature of the movement, and in the case of Aryan Nations and other elements which extol neo-nazism, the importance of the Third Reich alongside the selective interpretation of Christianity. The importance of heterodoxy is well illustrated by the example of the Oklahoma bombing which occurred on the anniversary of the destruction of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco Texas. The bombing was also on the 220th anniversary of the American Revolutionary War battle of Lexington, harkening back to the original struggle against tyranny and the perceived purity of the immediate revolutionary

¹⁶ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 241.

¹⁷ It should be noted however that Kerry Noble an 'elder and ordained minister' of the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord has warned the Federal Government that they should not provoke organisations associated with the Identity movement during three times of the year: Mid-April with the association with Easter and the resurrection; mid-August, historically a time of persecution for Jews and thus of the 'real Jews'; and September and October during the feast of Tabernacles, regarded as a time of miracles. See K. Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate: Why They Bombed Oklahoma City*, 1998, p. 225.

period¹⁸. There are similar anniversaries to Waco, all of which centre around the death of people 'resisting' ZOG, such as Gordon Kahl in 1983, Robert Mathews in 1984 and the Weaver family in 1992. These become the martyrs for the cause and provide conspicuous, if largely untested anniversaries for violence. While the adoption of neo-Nazi ideology provides less scope for anniversaries, there are a couple in the form of the dates for the birth¹⁹ and death of Adolf Hitler.²⁰

One of the defining features of Identity theology is that the Last Days are imminent and the Aryan Nations certainly subscribes to this view. The Endtime, however, is not date specific, instead it is thematic, relating more to the decay of society, and the increasing power of the perceived enemies, especially the Jews and by extension the US federal government. The Endtime itself is seen in racial terms with the Aryan elect pitted against their various non-Aryan enemies and their misguided Aryan accomplices. Preparations for this process are largely defensive involving a withdrawal from society and preparation for armed conflict. Like most groups, Aryan Nations realises that any action taken by the group would be a form of organisational suicide and inaction is justified by arguments about the strength of the enemy and that the Last Days, while imminent, are not yet arrived. Action in these cases falls to groups or individuals such as the Order and Timothy McVeigh, who are dissatisfied with what they perceive as passivity and a betrayal of their ideals, regarding the time as ripe for action.

Due to the ideologically fragmentary nature of the Christian Identity movement it is worth noting that the U.S. extreme right-wing contains other millenarian traditions. Within Odinism, for example, there exists an historical myth cycle centred on Ragnarok, an event in which the old world is destroyed and the new created²¹. The marked similarity between

¹⁸ The bombing also occurred on the day of the scheduled execution of Richard Snell, a member of the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord who had been tried and convicted of the murder of an Arkansas state trooper in 1984 and the execution style murder of pawn broker who he mistakenly identified as Jewish in 1983. The death sentence was given for the second of these crimes in 1985.

¹⁹ *The Turner Diaries* describes the 'dream of a White world' coming true in 1999, 110 years (according to the 'chronology of the old era) after the birth of the 'Great One'.

²⁰ Hitler has also been identified as the prophet Elijah, the return of whom plays a part in Judeo-Christian eschatology. See J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, 1990, Appendix I, 'Adolf Hitler Was Elijah', pp. 234-235.

²¹ See R.B. Anderson, *Norse Mythology*. A different version of Ragnarok contains elements of the rebirth of the dead God, Baldur, an event which has a strong correlation with Christian eschatology. See R.B. Anderson, *The Religion of our Forefathers, containing all of the myths of the Eddas, Systematised and Interpreted*, pp. 413-38.

Ragnarok and Judeo-Christian apocalyptic visions means that it is compatible with traditional Christian apocalyptic beliefs held by the extreme Christian right. An example of an individual subscribing to this is David Lane, at various times Colorado state organiser of Aryan Nations (1981) and later as Aryan Nations 'propaganda minister'. Lane later joined the Order, and although he would later claim that his Odinism and the Christian Identity beliefs of most other Order members were 'incompatible'²², this did not prevent him from being an important member of the group, nor from being an influential figure in Identity circles despite being incarcerated. Again, concepts like Ragnarok are not time specific and rely on the interpretation of current events in view of religious tradition.²³ The acceptance of such belief systems at once requires a broader understanding of Identity eschatology and further illustrates the unorthodox nature of Identity belief systems.

5.1.3 Hizballah

The timing of the violence of Hizballah differs from the more pacifist Aryan Nations in that the group advocates and actively pursues a programme of armed struggle parallel to participation in mainstream Lebanese politics. Symbolic actions carried out on religious anniversaries help reinforce the group's message both to its own constituents and to outsiders as does the conduct of reactive violence. Coexisting with these timing attributes is the general strategy of resisting the Zionist presence in the region and supporting Islamic resistance movements within Palestine, and so the tactical and political dimensions of timing are essential for promoting the multi-tracked political agenda of the organisation. While the group is Shi'ite and so subscribes to Shi'ite eschatology, Hizballah's gradualist perception of time means that messianic timing is not a motivating factor in the immediate sense.

The use of symbolic anniversaries has been an important feature of Hizballah's existence serving to reinforce both internal and external loyalties. When the group officially announced its existence in September 1984, the date chosen was the second

²² D. Lane, 'Divided Loyalties', *NSV Report*, Vol. VIII, # 3, (July/ September. 1990), pp. 1-2. See also D. Land, '88 Precepts', *WAR* 11/1, (n.d.), pp. 22-23.

²³ Despite this non-specificity the FBI has claimed in a 1999 report that "Extremists from various ideological perspectives [including Identity adherents and Odinists] attach significance to the arrival of the year 2000, and there are some signs of preparations for violence". *Project Megiddo*, <http://www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/publicmegiddo.pdf>.

anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, a public recognition of Hizballah's solidarity with the Palestinian cause²⁴. Other contemporary anniversaries such as Martyr's Day and Jerusalem (*al-Quds*) Day have been constructed by the group to serve as a locus of attention for broader concepts. Martyr's day marks the 1982 suicide bombing of the Israeli army's Tyre headquarters²⁵, while Jerusalem day - fixed by Khomeini on the last Friday of Ramadan - is a protest at Israel's unification of the Holy City. Both are marked by public rallies and speeches urging Muslims to prepare themselves for the confrontation with Israel. The most significant religious anniversary is that of the Ashura festival which commemorates the seventh-century martyrdom of the Imam Husayn.²⁶ Ashura commemorates the major features which define Shi'ism, those of struggling against tyranny and oppression, ideas which translated especially well in the context of the Lebanese Shi'ite community. The Ashura festival has been appropriated by Hizballah as an expression of sectarian and group loyalty, and as a vehicle for stressing the traditional religious antipathy for the current primary enemies of Islam, the United States and Israel.²⁷

The political and tactical timing of Hizballah militance has been oriented around the strategic objectives of removing foreign influence from Lebanon, establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon, resisting Israel (commonly expressed through the objective of liberating Jerusalem), and participation in realising a wider Islamic community outside Lebanon. To this end, the first Hizballah operations, the suicide bombings against American, French and Israeli targets were directed at removing the presence of the Multi National Force (MNF), and at ending Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon. These attacks forced the U.S. and France to withdraw from Lebanon, and Israel to withdraw to a small, self-declared 'security zone' in the south. Similarly the taking of Western hostages in the 1980s was conducted to bring pressure to bear on Western governments serving Hizballah and Iranian interest. When hostage taking no longer served these interests their release was both part of Iranian attempts to rehabilitate its international reputation and

²⁴ M. Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, 1997, p. 50.

²⁵ Hizballah's martyr's day is not to be confused with Lebanon's martyr's day which falls on May 6.

²⁶ On the traditional significance of the martyrdom of Husayn see M. Ayoub, *Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the Devotional Aspects of Ashura in Twelver Shi'ism*, 1978.

²⁷ During the October 1983 Ashura celebrations in the town of Nabatiyeh an Israeli convoy disrupted the procession causing severe offence and in the ensuing riot two Shi'ites were killed marking what one observer has called the 'final provocation' of the Israeli presence in Lebanon. See H. Jaber, *Hizballah: Born With a Vengeance*, 1997, p. 18.

made conditional by Hizballah to maximise political and military leverage within Lebanon.²⁸ With the stabilisation of Lebanese politics during the 1980s culminating in the 1989 Ta'if Accord, Hizballah activity re-focused on Israel, primarily in the area of the 'security zone', and simultaneously replacing the then discredited expectation of Iranian victory in the Gulf War with support for Islamic movements in Palestine. The constant guerrilla operations against Israeli forces in the security zone (while also serving Syrian and Iranian interests) were not only tangible evidence of Hizballah's claim to liberate Lebanon from the Israeli occupier, but in the face of Israeli retaliation (usually in the form of air strikes) to serve the political objective of Hizballah being the protector and provider of the Shi'a population of Lebanon.

Reactive attacks for Hizballah are important not only as a means of displaying the group's vitality after any setback, but also reinforce the message that jihad is fundamentally *defensive* in nature. Within the context of the guerrilla campaign conducted in the security zone, Israeli operations - especially those that harm Lebanese civilians - are responded to vigorously, not only by strikes against Israeli military personnel but also by rocket attacks against Israeli civilian centres in the Northern Galilee. Hassan Nasrallah has justified these last actions by stating:

"[a]fter the enemy targets villages and civilians, the Islamic Resistance fires rockets at settlements in occupied northern Palestine according to the Koran [*sic*] verse: If then anyone transgresses the prohibition against you, transgress ye likewise against him."²⁹

The scale of revenge attacks by Hizballah, as with most other organisations, is proportional to the damage caused. As such, the assassination of the group's Secretary-General, Abbas Musawi, in 1992 not only resulted in escalated attacks in the security zone and artillery attacks on Israeli communities, but also in the alleged bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires the following month.³⁰ In 1994, heavy Israeli strikes against a Hizballah

²⁸ M. Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon*, p. 191.

²⁹ *Voice of the Oppressed*, 1315 gmt, 30 Jul. 93 - BBC/SWB, ME/1756, A/5, April 2, 1993.

³⁰ E. Inbar & E. Rekhess, 'Israel', in A. Ayalon (ed.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 16 (1992), 1994, pp. 517-518. The Operation was called 'Child Martyr Husayn' after the son of Hasan Musawi who died with his father.

training camp at Ayn Dardara resulted in an attack on the Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires.

Like other mainstream groups, Hizballah believes in the ultimate success and justice of the organisation's goals but at the same time remains pragmatically flexible as to when these goals might be fulfilled. In this respect one of the keys to the group's survival has been its gradualist approach and its strategic flexibility in the face of new constraints and opportunities. Hizballah's perception of time is thus a relatively open one determined by historical inevitability, on one hand, and by political circumstances on the other. Hizballah has always realised that the achievement of its goals will be a protracted process and that many travails will have to be endured before they are realised. In the words of the former Secretary-General, Sheikh al-Tufayli, "we know that we will not triumph in one or even several years but have prepared for a battle of centuries."³¹ As Sheikh Fadlallah has noted of the more esoteric objectives of the group such as the liberation of Palestine "in this connection we think of great periods of time."³² The shift away from violence towards political participation has served to emphasise the gradualist approach, as Nasrallah has commented on the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon:

"we must [not] be hasty and impose such a solution by force. We prefer to wait for the day that we succeed in convincing our countrymen by means of dialogue...that the only alternative is the founding of an Islamic state."³³

5.1.4 Hamas

Hamas's perception of time and the timing of its acts of violence is similar to that of Hizballah, albeit within a different context which accounts for certain subtle differences. Hamas has a gradual approach to their struggle which has been expressed consistently since the founding of the organisation. Developments within the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, however, have meant that a trend has begun to specify when the goals of the organisation will be achieved, significantly within the life time of the post-Intifada generation of leaders. The timing of many of the group's acts of violence are tactical and political in nature, driven by precise political imperatives. On a parallel path to

³¹ *Voice of the Oppressed*, 0630 GMT, 19 Feb. 1992, BBC/SWB, ME/1309, 20 Feb., 1992.

³² *Der Spiegel*, April 1, 1985.

³³ E. Zisser, 'Hizballah in Lebanon: at the Crossroads', *MERIA Journal*, # 3, September 1997, p. 4.

these motivations exists reactive events which are designed to avenge violence against the organisation and the Palestinian community as a whole, and it is often these events which become anniversaries that occasion further acts of violence in the future.

As with many religious groups that are not governed by imminent messianic expectations, Hamas has a gradual perception of the struggle in which it is engaged. The Hamas Charter states that:

"[f]ighters...will come forward in response to the call of duty while loudly proclaiming: Hail to Jihad. Their cry will reach the heavens and will go on being resounded until liberation is achieved, the invaders vanquished and Allah's victory comes about."³⁴

This sentiment has frequently been reiterated by leaders of Hamas - patience (*sabr*) and the inevitability of victory are repeatedly stressed. In terms of waiting for the decline of the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a political force it has been noted that:

"[t]hose who are in a hurry try to eliminate their rivals so they can monopolise the stage. Hamas is not in a hurry. We know that the PLO's practice will inevitably lead to its downfall. There is no need...[for] confrontation. It is enough to wait."³⁵

The analogy used to illustrate this is the collapse of communism, destroyed not through direct military confrontation but by allowing it to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. In a similar vein, the struggle against Israel is seen as flexible: "We will never recognise Israel, but it is possible that a truce could prevail between us for days, months, or years."³⁶

Despite this, Hamas clerics have made attempts to predict the year when an Islamic state will be created using scriptural sources. According to one senior Hamas official, there is no text in the Koran which suggests when an Islamic state will be created but there are two clues, one lies in the Hadiths and the other in a verse from the Quran. The Hadith says that every century a man will appear who renews the 'life of the religion'. The second clue comes from a study made by the Islamic scholar Bassam Jarrar, who based his ideas on the Sura Isra (the night journey) and the 'miracle' of the number nineteen. Jarrar's book says the

³⁴ Hamas Charter, Ch. 4, Art. 33, pp. 31-32.

³⁵ H. Hijazi, 'Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct. An Interview With Mahmud Zahhar', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIV, # 3, 1995, 83.

³⁶ *Al Quds*, October 12, 1995.

abolition of the state of Israel is a Quranic necessity and that it will be abolished in 2022 or 2023. This will mark the beginning of the Islamic state.³⁷ The underlying dynamic for specific date setting is an attempt to add momentum to the struggle by setting a precise goal to work towards in the not too distant future. While the passing of this date without the expected establishment of an Islamic state can be rationalised, date setting within a religious context provides a powerful incentive for escalating violence, especially in the context of life after Arafat and imminent Islamic revolution in adjacent lands.

The timing of Hamas's programme of violent action is generally determined by the unacceptability of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands and to a lesser extent, the conduct of the Israel-Palestinian peace process which potentially offers a permanent political solution to this injustice. Violence can be seen as a means of expressing extreme displeasure at the course of political events, especially the expansion of Israeli settlements. While these imperatives guide the political and tactical timing of violence it is still subject to various imponderables. In November 1993, for example, Sheikh Yassin issued an open letter from prison which raised the possibility of a temporary cease-fire with Israel of ten or even twenty years. He also suggested the idea of challenging the existing political *status quo* from within by participating in the political process. Any chance of such an approach being adopted was seriously threatened, however, by the Hebron massacre³⁸. On the other extreme, the assassination of important operational figures, such as Yahya Ayyash, while providing incentives for revenge, curtails the ability to engage in violence as does (on a less dramatic level) a general tightening of the security environment.

Some of the most extreme actions of Hamas have been reactive in nature, providing a series of short term anniversaries to be observed and escalating the violence employed in the struggle. The Hebron massacre of 1994 is perhaps the most serious trigger for revenge attacks by Hamas in the group's history. The attack was made during the Muslim Id celebrations and the symbolism of the date was expressed in the al-Qassam units' official communiqué: "[y]ou turned the Id al-Fitr holiday into a black day so we

³⁷ Interview conducted by Dr. M. Ranstorp with a senior Hamas leader, Hebron, May 1999. See also 'The Destruction of Israel by the Year 2022', Bassam Jarrar's website, <http://www.bailasan.com/interview/bassam.htm>.

³⁸ Even so, after the first revenge attacks had been conducted Musa Abu Marzuq echoed Yassin's moderate stance, although the preconditions for peace were the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and the dismantling of all settlements.

[have] vowed to turn your independence day onto hell."³⁹ While it is clear that Hamas (and the PIJ) were engaged in operational planning for terrorist attacks across Israel before the Hebron massacre, the massacre itself brought all this planning forward. Not only this but the nature of Goldstein's attack, against unarmed civilians in a place of worship, ensured that Hamas would observe fewer constraints in future attacks. In a pamphlet entitled "The settlers will pay for the massacre with the blood of their hearts" Hamas vowed to take revenge by taking "a life for a life."⁴⁰ Five suicide bombings followed in the next eight months, killing thirty-five Israelis and wounding more than a hundred and thirty-five. The Tomb of the Patriarchs attack also provided a potent anniversary for Hamas. On February 25, 1996, Hamas claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Jerusalem, two years to the day after the Tomb of the Patriarchs attack and fifty days after the assassination of Yahya Ayyash.⁴¹ The killing of Ayyash by Israeli intelligence provided another powerful motive for revenge and became the catalyst for a series of Hamas attacks. In a leaflet issued following the Jerusalem bombing (and a simultaneous bombing in Ashqelon), the bombers claimed that "[t]he attacks were carried out in loyalty to the Engineer who fell fifty days ago...we consider it a strike at those who stood behind the decision to exterminate the Engineer."⁴² Another attack in Jerusalem on March 3 was also claimed by the same group "in loyalty to the blood of the martyr Engineer Yahya Ayyash", and in the same communiqué announced "[w]ith this operation our response to the killing of the Engineer ends", and unilaterally declared a three month cease-fire.⁴³

The general programme of Hamas violence itself can be seen in a reactive context to the extent that Hamas perceives its struggle as a defensive one. In response to a question concerning how the decision to employ suicide bombings was made, a senior Hamas figure has stated that "[t]he goals and objectives are to stop the occupation and it began by using simple methods, but the spark came from the Israeli side. The more violent the Israeli side

³⁹ Al-Qassam communiqué distributed in the Occupied Territories, April 7th, 1994.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ *Voice of Israel*, 0730 gmt, 25 Feb. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2545, MED/1, February 26, 1996.

⁴² *Jerusalem Media and Communications Press Service*, 1310 gmt, 25 Feb. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2546, MED/1, February 27, 1996. Other experts claim the attacks were also in response to reports of a deal with the PA, revenge for the assassination of Fathi Shiqaqi and were "also a response to all Israel's actions against our people's struggles inside and outside of our homeland", see *MBC TV*, 1800 gmt, 26 Feb. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2547, MED/1, February 28, 1996.

⁴³ *Jerusalem Media and Communications Press Service*, 100 gmt, 3 Mar. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2551, MED/1, March 4, 1996.

was, the more stronger Hamas reacted."⁴⁴ The response to the killing of senior members of Hamas or Palestinian civilians in particular have been presented by the group as legitimate acts of self defence which, in turn, clears the group of any responsibility for Israeli reprisals for its actions.⁴⁵ This fits with the general perception of jihad as primarily defensive in nature, a struggle against injustice and oppression, which is a defining feature of many Islamic groups.⁴⁶

5.2 Core

5.2.1 Eyal

Although responsible for few overt violent acts the dimension of time is important for both Eyal's short history, and for the most significant act perpetrated by one of its members, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. While the majority of Eyal's activities, such as demonstrations against a left-wing Israeli government and harassment of Arabs can be seen as tactical and political in nature, the Rabin assassination and the incitement which underpins it conforms to the concept of messianic time, the fulfilment of which is seen as being frustrated whenever the integrity of the 'Land of Israel' is threatened. Again, the short life span of the group and its penetration by the General Security Services (GSS) were factors in determining when Eyal conducted its activities, but this second consideration was minimised by Avashai Raviv's unpredictable and independent nature.

The political nature of many of Eyal's actions was revealed by the extent of media attention which the group not only received but actively courted. Had the group existed longer perhaps significant anniversaries such as the date of the Hebron massacre may have become part of the groups ceremonial reinforcement activities, but as it was the organisation did not last long enough or develop the structural depth required to elaborate its mythology.⁴⁷ Not unlike Kach, Eyal, and especially its leader Avashai Raviv, engaged

⁴⁴ Interview with senior Hamas leader in Hebron conducted by Dr. M. Ranstorp, May, 1999.

⁴⁵ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence*, 2000, p. 66.

⁴⁶ In the words of Sheikh Fadlallah: "when Islam fights a war it fights like any other power in the world, defending itself in order to preserve its existence and its liberty, forced to undertake preventative operations when it is in danger", *Washington Post*, June 4, 1986.

⁴⁷ A possible exception to this has arisen since Amir's incarceration. On his 27th birthday a group of extremists led by Avigdor Eskin were involved in minor scuffles with the police as they gathered outside Bersheeba prison to celebrate, *The Jerusalem Post*, May 23, 1997.

in provocative anti-Arab and anti-left-wing rhetoric, participating in, and contributing to the general climate of incitement to violence which many commentators believe responsible for the assassination of Rabin and the political backlash against the Israeli political left. One such action were the induction ceremonies for new Eyal recruits which Raviv held at the grave of Abraham Stern, leader of the 1940s right-wing group which bore his name. These events (and one in particular attended by a documentary crew) and others such as the presentation of the Rabin/Himmler collage by Raviv to a television crew at a demonstration in October 1995, were all designed to further aggravate a volatile political environment.

With respect to the Rabin assassination, the perception of time was that it was running out. Rabin was identified as the chief architect of a peace process which, in the eyes of Israeli extremists, was grinding relentlessly on and would soon pass the point of no return, destroying all the gains made since 1948 and leaving what remained of Israel vulnerable as never before. As Amir himself said "[i]t wasn't a matter of revenge, or punishment or anger, Heaven forbid, but what would stop [the Oslo process]."⁴⁸ This is a similar line of thought to that followed by the Jewish Underground following the last major peace process engaged in by the Israeli government. In that earlier case, the solution was deemed to be an act of desecration aimed at the Palestinian Muslim community (and by extension Islam as a whole). The case of the Jewish Underground will be discussed at greater depth below but the perception of time running out for the successful conclusion of a messianic process is a common theme, the major difference in these two cases was the nature of the target chosen to reverse the process.

5.2.2 The Order

The timing of the Order's activities are best categorised as tactical in that they established an activist programme for the group and enhanced their operational capabilities, and apocalyptic in the sense that they wished to trigger a racist and religious revolution similar to that envisaged in the *Turner Diaries*. Actions arranged around anniversaries do not seem to have had much appeal to the group, and in any event there are practically none at this stage in history with sufficient resonance for Identity believers to

⁴⁸ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin*, 1998, p. 27.

warrant action.⁴⁹ The general perception of the Order was that they were laying the groundwork for resistance in a cataclysmic struggle which lay in the not too distant future.

The tactical timing of the Order's actions manifested itself in an *ad hoc* fashion as the group experimented with various forms of activities. Fairly early it was decided that the primary objective was to raise funds for a war chest through bank robberies and counterfeiting operations. The longer term plan then called for an escalation in group activities which would ultimately include attacks on the federal government. The two killings in which the group were involved were also timed to fulfil certain functions, albeit different ones. The first, the murder of Walter West, an Aryan Nations member, was carried out because the talkative West was regarded as security risk and the sooner he was eliminated the better. The second, the assassination of the Denver talk show host Alan Berg, was planned and carried out to prove that the "right-wing was not toothless", despite the objections of some Order members⁵⁰. The gradualist timing of these operations was to give the organisation time to mature and not to carry out any action which might bring too much 'heat' down upon it.

The Order's perception of time was that white Christian society had degenerated to such an extent that there was no viable course of action other than armed struggle. In keeping with the group's perception of itself as a form of revolutionary vanguard, the Order did not expect, nor court, widespread public sympathy. As Mathews said: "I am proud that we had the courage and the determination to stand up and fight for our race and our heritage at a time in our history when such a deed is called a crime and not an act of valour."⁵¹ The apocalyptic perception of time was not only caused by the degeneration of American society but also by external events such as the establishment and prosperity of the state of Israel and the seemingly ever present threat of nuclear war. The idea that the final struggle is at hand is strikingly similar to that contained in *The Turner Diaries*. The book envisages the year 1999 (110 years after the birth of the 'Great One') as the point where the forces of white Christianity eventually 'triumph' and the apocalyptic vision of a

⁴⁹ Although Gordon Kahl had been killed as recently as February 1984 the Order does not seem to have sufficient empathy with him to act in revenge. While Kahl remains prominent in Identity and right-wing martyrology there are no examples of revenge actions on the anniversary of his death.

⁵⁰ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 1990, pp. 233-234.

⁵¹ Robert Mathew's Last Letter, J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, Appendix I, 1990, p. 250.

world cleansed by flame and poison becomes a reality.⁵² While the short life span of the Order and its apparently limited impact seem at odds with grandiose plans for establishing a racial religious state, the group was infused with a belief in the inevitability and imminence of Armageddon and this expectation played an important part in the decision to turn to violence.⁵³

5.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

The timing employed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad since its inception has been a mixture of tactical, political and reactive. The combination of these has been designed to weaken the state of Israel and to prove to the Palestinian populace that the organisation is not merely capable of resisting the occupation but also of protecting and avenging. In this respect, its actions are very similar to those of Hamas, indeed certain operations have involved a degree of co-operation. While there is no messianic dimension to the timing of attacks by the PIJ, as with most groups the entire strategy is geared towards the realisation of a temporal golden age, a realisation which is helped by the group's perception of time.

Like many religious organisations, the PIJ's perception of time is an open ended one. While concrete objectives are sought and tactical alterations might be called for due to changes in political circumstances, the primary objective remains the same. Thus the group sees its role as destroying and replacing Israel, a state built "on the ruins of a people who will chase them back with resistance and jihad until the end of time."⁵⁴ In a similar vein, the struggle is often seen in an historical light when victory, while assured, was slow in coming: "[t]he struggle, the fight between civilisations, and peoples, and nations doesn't finish in days and years you know, when the crusades were here it was two hundred years...we are not pressured to finish the struggle."⁵⁵ Such a belief serves both to reinforce the link between the present and noble, symbolic events of the past, and to avoid the

⁵² MacDonald, A., *The Turner Diaries*, 1978, p.210.

⁵³ A more extreme example of this logic may be found in the belief of members of the Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord, one of whose members stated: "I'm tired of waiting. If God doesn't start the riots soon and the collapse of our government, then I will". Quoted in K. Noble, *Tabernacle of Hate*, p. 85.

⁵⁴ 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXVIII, # 4, p. 70.

⁵⁵ Interview with Sheikh Abdullah Shami, the PIJ, Gaza, 25 March, 1999.

disappointment of failing to fulfil their objectives within a given time frame by placing the struggle in a cosmic context.

The most significant and damaging political and tactical timing's of the PIJ have been those aimed at disrupting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The first major operation of the group (and the only one of significance carried out beyond the borders of Israel) which involved a shooting attack on an Israeli tour bus travelling from Rafah to Cairo, was carried out in response to embryonic developments in the peace process and especially attempts at "establishing a state for the Arabs through talks with the enemies of God."⁵⁶ In numerous addresses and publications, the PIJ leadership have condemned the various stages of the peace process and threatened further actions to try to disrupt it. At an address in the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk, south of Damascus in October 1997, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah stated that the PIJ would continue its suicide attacks on Israeli objectives "without respite" in order to liberate "the whole of Palestine, the Golan and south Lebanon", and that these areas would be liberated "by resistance and not by conferences."⁵⁷ The timing of attacks has also been governed by specific elements of the peace process. In November 1998, a car bombing near a market in Jerusalem was carried out according to Shallah "in retaliation for the Zionist enemy's crimes of continued settlement construction and Judaization going on in our occupied land."⁵⁸ In this regard, the group's objectives and those of its patron Iran coincide. In late July 1997, for example, it was reported that Iran would offer additional payments to the PIJ, above its existing budget, for each attack the group launched.⁵⁹

Although religious festivals have not been used by the PIJ as occasions for violence, they are useful times to reinforce the religious message of the group and to relocate past myths firmly in the present context. For example, during the period of founding and deployment of the organisation in the occupied territories, public prayers and festivals were held in the Al-Aqsa mosque during the Night of Destiny (*Laylat al-Qadr*).

⁵⁶ *Al-Quds Radio*, 1121 gmt, 5 Feb. 90 - BBC/ SWB, ME/0682, A/1, February 7, 1990.

⁵⁷ *AFP*, Damascus, October 24, 1997.

⁵⁸ *Radio Monte Carlo*, 1031 gmt, 7 Nov. 98 - BBC/SWB, ME/3379, MED/1, November 9, 1998.

⁵⁹ *Ha'aretz*, July 31, 1997.

The object of these activities was 'to familiarise people with the idea of jihad, rooting it in people's souls'.⁶⁰

Like Hamas and Hizballah the PIJ has engaged in reactive operations either in response to an anti-Palestinian atrocity or the killing of a PIJ member. While this is a powerful motivating factor the rhetoric associated with it far exceeds the operational response. In November 1994, a journalist and the PIJ activist Hani Abed was killed (probably by Israeli security services) in a car bombing in Gaza. In response the PIJ employed a suicide bomber on a bicycle at an Israeli Defence Force (IDF) checkpoint in Gaza killing two soldiers. At a rally in southern Beirut a few days later, attended by members of the PIJ, Hamas and Hizballah, Fathi Shiqaqi praised both Abed and the suicide bomber and promised further suicide attacks in response to the elimination of Abed.⁶¹ Timing of an attack may also be due to a multiplicity of events. In January 1995, the PIJ detonated two suicide bombs at a bus stop where soldiers were waiting for rides killing nineteen people and injuring over sixty. The reasons included not just revenge for the killing of Hani Abed (and all the PIJ and Hamas martyrs), but also for the deaths of three Palestinian policemen at the Erez junction in Gaza, for Israeli policies of 'ethnic cleansing' and for the expansion of the settlements.⁶² The motivation for revenge however is certainly constrained by the capabilities of the group and by the security environment in which it is operating. Following the assassination of Fathi Shiqaqi in Malta his successor announced that the movement would take revenge "for the blood of Shiqaqi."⁶³ However, no revenge operation took place primarily because of the operational leadership vacuum caused by Shiqaqi's death and by increased Israeli and Palestinian security measures. This does not mean that the date of the assassination will not continue to retain significance but it does reflect the decline in operational leadership caused by Shiqaqi's death.

⁶⁰ 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', , p. 62.

⁶¹ *Ma'ariv*, November 13, 1994.

⁶² *Al-Quds Radio*, 1002 gmt, 22 Jan. 95 - BBC/*SWB*, ME/2208, MED/1, January 23, 1995 & *Al-Quds Radio*, 1415 gmt, 22 Jan. 95 - BBC/*SWB*, ME/2209, MED/1, January 24, 1995.

⁶³ *IRNA*, 1040 gmt, 30 Oct. 95 - BBC/*SWB*, ME/2448, MED/14, October 31, 1995.

5.3 Messianic /Apocalyptic

5.3.1 Jewish Underground

While the Jewish Underground was initially established around the idea of reanimating the Jewish messianic process by clearing the Temple Mount, the group settled into a pattern of 'vigilante' reactive operations. This does not mean the Underground lost sight of its messianic roots but rather could not cope with the more immediate concerns of Palestinian violence which the Israeli state appeared unable, or unwilling, to combat. As noted earlier, the issue of rabbinic sanction was not a problem for such operations as it was for the Temple Mount plot, and even while the broad issue of messianic redemption remained paramount, the necessity to act at any level was found to be overwhelming because of a sense of imminent threat.

While the drawn out process of planning the attack on the Dome of the Rock was continuing, the group decided to act in a more conventional form in response to growing anti-Jewish violence in Hebron and, in particular, the May 3 1980 machine-gun and grenade attack by Arab gunmen on Hadassah House in Hebron which left six Yeshiva students dead. The revenge plan was to blow up five leaders in the Palestinian National Guidance committee.⁶⁴ The victims were deliberately not to be killed, however, they were to be maimed in order remain a living lesson 'to the others'. The following actions of the group were likewise reactive in nature. In July 1983, in response to the murder of a Yeshiva student, three Underground members conducted a grenade and machine-gun attack on the Islamic college of Hebron, killing three and wounding thirty-three.⁶⁵ The final operation of the group, the planned simultaneous bombing of five Arab buses, was a general response to an increased Arab terrorism in Jerusalem and Ashkelon which included attacks on Jewish buses.⁶⁶

By far the most significant action of the group and the one which caused most alarm amongst the Israeli security establishment was the proposed attack on the Dome of the Rock. The group was formed in reaction to the 1978 Camp David accords with -

⁶⁴ It was widely believed that the PNGC had masterminded the Haddasah House attack. The attack itself was claimed by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's Unit of the Martyr Abu Safwat.

⁶⁵ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', in *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, p. 201.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 201.

according to Menachem Livni, the operational leader of the group - the express purpose of destroying the Dome of the Rock, "and had nothing to do with revenge against Arab terrorism."⁶⁷ While the attack did not have an exact programme to follow as with some Christian and Islamic messianic dating traditions, it was certainly guided by events in immediate living memory which made redemption a thing of 'the here and now' if not of a specific point in time.⁶⁸ The perception that messianic prophecy was being fulfilled and then reversed inspired the group into active messianism. However, it was active messianism that was both moderated by elements of the religious establishment and - despite the charisma of Yehuda Etzion - was never led or heavily influenced by a prophetic charismatic figure who claimed divine instruction.

While there may appear to be a contradiction between the messianic objective and the vigilante practice of the group, those operationally involved did not see it as so. Yehuda Etzion was the instigator and main force behind the proposed attack on the Dome of the Rock, which would have brought redemption to the Jewish people, and was also involved in revenge attacks against the Arab population. When explaining his role in the mayor's bombing, Etzion stated: "[p]lanning and executing the attack on the murder chieftains took only one month of my life, one month that started with the assassination of six boys in Hebron, and ended up in conducting this operation."⁶⁹ Etzion's life by this stage was devoted to planning redemption and yet he found the time and the desire to set one month aside to engage in a highly symbolic revenge attack. This underlines the reality that the group did not have a specific timetable⁷⁰, and even though the Temple Mount operation was of enormous messianic significance it had yet to be approved and was in any event a step towards redemption and not the single event which would trigger an imminent apocalypse.

⁶⁷ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 198.

⁶⁸ It should be noted, however, that a possible specific date exists in the annual 'day of sorrows' which commemorates the destruction of the First and Second Temples. According to Jewish tradition the First and Second Temples were destroyed on the ninth day of the Jewish month of Av.

⁶⁹ Yehuda Etzion, 'I Felt an Obligation to Purify the Temple Mount', *Nekuda*, # 88, June 24, 1985, p. 24.

⁷⁰ As with Christianity Judaism contains prohibitions on predicting the time of the End: "May the curse of Heaven fall upon those who calculate the advent of the Messiah and thus create political and social unrest among the people", Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 97a.

5.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo

The timing of attacks by Aum Shinrikyo fall almost exclusively into the categories of political or tactical timing, and of anticipating messianic redemption, and in some cases the two proved complimentary. Although the motivation of revenge was also present in the tactical timing, it is almost entirely anticipatory in nature - that is, actions were sanctioned and carried out before an anticipated event had resulted in harm being caused to the organisation. Of all these, the timing of violence to accord with eschatological expectations is of the greatest concern, according as they did to a variety of different end-time dating traditions, in conjunction with both the specific and variable prophecies made by Shoko Asahara.

Despite the apocalyptic nature of Aum Shinrikyo, the group engaged in acts of violence that were governed by tactical or political timing in reaction to threats, both real and imagined. The first murders committed by the group were of a lawyer, Tsutsumi Sakamoto, and his family because he was about to commence a law suit against the group on behalf of the Association of Victims of Aum Shinrikyo. Similarly the attempted nerve gassing of six judges at the city of Matsumoto in 1994 was carried about because they were about to hand down an unfavourable ruling in a land dispute in which Aum was involved⁷¹. In both these cases, as with the execution of dissenting sect members, action was decreed because the cult was about to face imminent legal problems. Certainly the most startling example of this practice were the Tokyo subway nerve gassings in March 1995, carried out in an attempt to forestall raids planned by the Japanese National Police⁷². News of the raids conformed to the perception (and Asahara's predictions) that the group were about to be persecuted directly by the 'forces of evil'.

The most worrying aspect of Aum's perception of time was its intense millenarianism. Aum Shinrikyo never produced a precise timetable for Armageddon, and variable predictions were constantly made right up until the subway attack. All the predictions, however, contain the element of imminence - in a series of lectures in 1992

⁷¹ D. Brackett, *Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo*, 1996, p. 28.

⁷² D. Brackett, *Holy Terror*, Ch. 7. Brackett alleges that the first hint of the raids was picked by two Aum members of the Japanese Defence Force who discovered that the JNP had requested three hundred gas masks and protective suits from the Army. They asked some questions and were then able to inform the Aum leadership of the planned raids.

Shoko Asahara predicted that Armageddon would occur by the year 2000 and that atomic, chemical and biological weapons would destroy 90 percent of the world's population.⁷³ In the 1995 book produced by Aum, *A Doom is Nearing the Land of the Rising Sun*, predictions of a third world war or enormous natural disaster are concentrated in the late 1990s. The predictions in this book are occasionally confused. At one point Asahara suggests the 'final war' is imminent and at another he suggests that it will not break out until the 2040s. More specifically he predicts the demise of Japan which will either be 'gulped down by the sea' and/or destroyed in a nuclear attack launched by the U.S. or U.N. some time between 1996 and January 1998.⁷⁴ To quote one extract from an Aum pamphlet "[a]s we move toward the year 2000, there will be a series of events of inexpressible ferocity and terror...the lands of Japan will be transformed into a nuclear wasteland."⁷⁵ Despite the discrepancies, the general theme was clear - the old world would be destroyed and the new one would take shape around the turn of the millennium.

The significance of the Millennium in Christianity has a profound eschatological significance - Jesus for example will rule for a period of a thousand years after the cataclysmic battles of the End-time predicted in the book of Revelation.⁷⁶ There also seemed to be a widespread but irrational belief that the year 2000 represented what Michael Barkun calls a "critical dividing point between two eras,"⁷⁷ a belief inspired by changes in society, technology and politics, and propagated by advances in communications.⁷⁸ The end of the millennium also has enormous psychological ramifications for many people who are not necessarily affiliated with any particular religion causing an excitement and anxiety which has been dubbed 'Pre-Millennial Tension'.⁷⁹ There seems to be no logical reasoning behind this, it is an accepted historical fact that the nativity did not occur in the year zero AD, nor do millennia have any scriptural significance leading up to the End-time - the Christian concept of Jesus'

⁷³ Thompson, D., *The End of Time*, 1996, p. 262. This exceeds the initial tribulation of the book of Revelations when 'a fourth of the earth' will be accounted for (rev. 6: 9).

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p. 264.

⁷⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, March 27, 1995.

⁷⁶ Revelation 20: 4-6.

⁷⁷ M. Barkun, 'Understanding Millennialism', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. VII, # 3, 1995, p. 3.

⁷⁸ Most contemporary historians such as Richard Landes dismiss theories of messianic expectations occurring at the end of the first millennium, despite the work of revisionist scholars to say otherwise. See R Landes, *Giant With Feet of Clay: Arguments against an Apocalyptic Year 1000*, 1996.

⁷⁹ Thompson, D., *The End of Time*, p. xi.

thousand year reign for example occurs *after* his return. The common acceptance of such ideas however, especially in secular society, made this perception of time an attractive and persuasive ideological tool.

Aum further embroidered this millenarian idea with other dating traditions. Most prominent amongst these were the apocalyptic prophecies of Michel de Nostradamus, a sixteenth century French mystic whose cryptic verses purport to predict important events in history. First translated into Japanese in the 1970s, Nostradamus's works had become best sellers and their incorporation into Aum's perception of time resonated with many potential recruits.⁸⁰ Nostradamus's predictions (or interpretations of them) were used as a partial justification for the attack on the judges in Matsumoto for the late twentieth century was a time when the world's judicial authorities would be 'out of control' which led Asahara to claim that judges who did not know right from wrong would "suffer a chemical change unthinkable in normal circumstances."⁸¹ Shoko Asahara also quoted the prophecies of St. Malachi as proof that the End-time was nigh.⁸² These prophecies are a list of 112 Popes from 1143 until the end of time, each identified by a motto and in most cases a year. While attributed to Malachi, archbishop of Armagh from 1132 until 1148, the list was long ago exposed as the work of a sixteenth century Flemish Benedictine, Dom Arnold de Wyon.⁸³ Yet the popularity of the prophecies has if anything increased as the list shows a good sign of running out before the end of the twentieth century or soon after, thus bringing it into accord with Endtime beliefs centred on the turn of the millennium. According to current interpretations there will be only two more popes after John Paul II. The Vatican needless to say shows no interest in the prophecies but they do buttress an important psychological link between an observable earthly institution, the papacy, and the end of time.⁸⁴ The combination of these traditions and 'proofs' formed for many Aum members an indisputable body of evidence predicting Armageddon.

⁸⁰ A. Marshall & D. Kaplan, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum*, 1996, p. 16.

⁸¹ *ibid.*, p. 138.

⁸² D. Thompson, *The End of Time*, p. 271.

⁸³ For a translation of the list see Nicholas O'Kearney, *The Prophecies of Saints Colum-Cille, Maeltamlacht, Ultan, Senan, Bearcan and Malchy*, 1932, pp. 116-137. Evidence that the prophecies are a later creation can be found in translations of contemporary accounts of the life of St. Malachi which make no mention of them. See for example Lawlor, H.J. (trans.), *St. Bernard of Clairvaux's Life of St. Malachi of Armagh*, 1920.

⁸⁴ The Papacy has long played a role as a character in Christian eschatology. See F.J. Baumgartner, *Longing for the End: A History of Millennialism in Western Civilisation*, 1999, and D.S. Katz & R.H. Popkin, *Radical Religious Politics to the End of the Second Millennium*, 1999.

5.3.3 The Saudi Ikhwan

The timing of the sole violent act of the Saudi Ikhwan was overwhelmingly messianic in nature, according to accepted traditions of Islamic eschatology. In a sense however, there is also a political dimension to this attempt at redemption - expressed through the seven letters published by the Ikhwan - an element common to many messianic movements and which is concerned with renewal of a decaying and decadent society. While the Ikhwan failed and their promise of messianic fulfilment was universally rejected by the Muslim world, theirs was merely the most recent example of an ongoing historical phenomenon of religious revolt based around the Islamic eschatological calendar.

On the first day of Hijra year 1400, November 20 1979, just before the dawn prayers Juhayman Utaybi and his followers seized control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Apparently Utaybi's first act was to address the crowd and call upon them to recognise his brother-in-law, Muhammed al-Qahtani, as the expected Mahdi. The timing of the declaration was of enormous significance. In Islam, there is a widespread belief that the Twelfth Imam, who went into occultation (hiding) in the ninth century, will reveal himself at the beginning of the century according to the Islamic calendar.⁸⁵ Appointing the day of redemption has proved easier for Shi'ite theologians than the actual year because the Imam will remain hidden "for as long as God deems it necessary"⁸⁶ - Islamic tradition expects the Mahdi at the beginning of a century, but which century is unclear.⁸⁷ The tradition itself is not however strictly adhered to, the messianic revolts in Yemen in 1836 and 1840⁸⁸ are just two examples, as are the Mahdist type uprisings in Sudan following 1898⁸⁹ - as with other religious groups circumstances such as poverty, oppression or radical political events may cause deviation from accepted scriptural timetables.⁹⁰ In previous centuries, the turn

⁸⁵ The Islamic year is based on a purely lunar year of twelve months of twenty-nine or thirty days. Because this is not adjusted to the solar calendar religious festivals and holidays advance around the seasons and so there is no fixed relationship between it and the solar year of the Christian or Gregorian calendar. Intercalation is forbidden in the Quran, 9: 37.

⁸⁶ Sachedina, A., *Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdi in Twelver Shi'ism*, 1981, p. 23.

⁸⁷ The Most commonly accepted day is that of Ashura, the anniversary of the Martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali (AD 680), grandson of the Prophet and third Imam. See Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism*, p.157-158.

⁸⁸ See B. Klorman, 'Jewish and Muslim Messianism in Yemen', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22, 1990, pp 201-228.

⁸⁹ G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, 1979, p. 101.

⁹⁰ For other, especially anti-colonial, Mahdist revolts see P. Partner, *God of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam*, 1997, pp. 219-223, 295-296.

of the century advent of Mahdia has been common, the most recent and spectacular example of which was the nineteenth century Mahdist revolt in the Sudan. The Sudanese Mahdia lasted from 1882 till 1898 and its origins, religious puritanism in the face of corrupt and inept central rule and clerical leadership, were very similar to those of the Saudi Ikhwan.⁹¹ Like the Ikhwan, the forces of the Mahdia portrayed accepted eschatological imagery when the revolt reached its climax - the final battle which saw the defeat of the Mahdist forces at Omdurman was also seen in an extreme apocalyptic light with the British commander in chief, Lord Kitchener, identified as *al-Dajjal*, or the 'Anti-Christ'.⁹²

The political dimension of the seizure of the Grand Mosque and subsequent events in other parts of Saudi Arabia differed. The Ikhwan revolt itself appears to have little to do with economic conditions - both the seizure of the Grand Mosque and the Shi'a riots in the Eastern province which followed it took place against a background of rising oil prices and expanding public revenue outlays.⁹³ Although these two events were not co-ordinated and were conducted for different reasons, by different branches of the faith, the underlying causes were the same. As one commentator has noted: "[t]hese Sunni and Shi'ite insurrections reflected the ideological and social cleavages in a traditional society increasingly suffering from the culture shock of haphazard and rapid modernisation."⁹⁴ The Sunni Ikhwan acted because they believed Islam had been defiled by corruption, apostasy and foreign influence and that the time for an eschatological renewal had arrived. The Shi'a riots were largely a reaction to the low social status and social provisions accorded to the Shi'a minority. The Ikhwan's political programme outlined in the seven letters, of which the advent of the Mahdi was a feature,⁹⁵ articulated many features associated with preparation for messianic renewal and therefore while the timing of the Ikhwan's activities was political to the extent that they offered a critique and physical challenge to the Saudi

⁹¹ For an overview of the Sudanese Mahdi see P. Holt, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins, Development and Overthrow*, 1958.

⁹² G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam*, p. 101.

⁹³ M. Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*, 1999, p. 26.

⁹⁴ R.H. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, 1995, p. 130. There is even the suggestion that the timing of the Sunni insurrection and the Shi'ite revolts was not a coincidence as Juhayman makes clear references to Shi'a grievances and activities. See J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXX, # 1, 1990, p. 5, fn. 22.

⁹⁵ R.H. Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, p. 135.

state, it was eschatological in their expectation of a return to a pre-modern golden age made possible by a semi-divine figure.

5.4 Conclusion

The component of time for violent religious movement may be divided into two functions, that of perception and that of the role time plays in operational activity. All groups derive their perception of time from religious tradition and see the particular conflict that they are engaged in as part of an ongoing historical struggle. The belief in precisely when this contemporary struggle will be brought to a successful conclusion varies according to group type. Mainstream and core groups are reluctant to be precise in this regard because of the enormity of the opposition ranged against them and the incremental approach adopted (in the case of mainstream groups), or the partial nature of their contribution to the greater struggle (in the case of core groups). Messianic/apocalyptic groups are more likely to identify a precise end, usually one gleaned from religious tradition and interpreted in a contemporary context by the group's leader. In terms of the operational sense of time, the decision of when a group should act is determined by the organisation's belief system and the presence of both internal and external forces. In the case of violent religious groups, the timing of action to serve established political or tactical goals is similar to that employed by violent secular groups, as are those conducted for revenge. What is different is the symbolic resonance such timing has for a particular religious tradition and the possibility that new events will be embroidered into those traditions. The rhetoric which accompanies these actions establishes this link between past and present, and between the group itself and the community they see themselves as protecting. While the rhetoric is not always acted upon, it becomes an important part of a group's historical narrative. In cases where the motivation is to fulfil an eschatological process time is seen as finite and the need for action determined by the perceived correlation of degenerative events of the present and the eschatological prophecies of the past. The issue of time for religiously motivated group's is also intimately related to that of space. In much the same way as a group develops a timetable for action that is influenced by the past and the present, they develop

attitudes towards locations both as sacred spaces defined by scripture and religious tradition, and as pragmatic, operational spheres.

Chapter VI

Location

While the timing of an act of religiously motivated violence may be governed by different considerations this is equally the case for the location of these acts. Large areas are frequently regarded as having religious significance and while these accord with secular ideas of nationalist territoriality, the significance of the land in the religious context lies in some form of ancient religious promise - the concept of 'sacred geography' - combined with values identical to the secular notions of continuous habitation and common culture. The concept of sacred geography itself has a number of different components. A particular area may have been promised to a group by God or through a prophet. Within the context of a contemporary crisis environment this promise makes particular places convenient and resonant political rallying points and where they have been the scene of violence transforms them into 'blood icons'. On a more specific level, places of religious significance, especially 'holy sites' have a high symbolic value for entire faiths, and this symbolic value is frequently a messianic one making them even more sensitive both for the groups themselves and the wider community from which they have emerged. A religiously significant location may precipitate violence, for example, where there is a conflict of interests where one site is regarded as an affront to a particular religious community, or religious locations may be targeted as a defensive response to other events or activities. In either event such choices invariably inspire severe reactions and repercussions which are out of all proportion to the actual act of violence committed because the symbolic value of the location acts as an amplifier. Temporal locations offer a far greater variety of targets which also possess enormous psychological value and concurrently allow a group to wage a 'legitimate' campaign of 'resistance' which avoids conducting a purely religious conflict against a people and its religious culture - despite the rhetorical messages a group may use.

The favoured locations for mainstream groups tend to be places of temporal significance, reinforcing their opposition to a specific political authority or target group.

Religious locations are seldom targeted except as part of a demonstration aimed at incitement due to their inflammatory, sacred nature. For Hizballah, attacks on religious sites would certainly be counterproductive and in any event the struggle against Israel has always been characterised as one of national liberation and within Lebanon emphasis has latterly been placed on inter-communal harmony in the face of external hostility.¹ In the case of Kach and Aryan Nations, where a site of religious significance is directly attacked, it has been by a splinter group or a lone actor. Core groups similarly avoid the inflammatory results of attacking religious locations, concentrating instead on those temporal sites which represent the authority their revolutionary programme is aimed at destroying. The stunted development of Eyal meant that these locations were basically selected for the purposes of incitement and harassment whereas those chosen by the PIJ have represented a more concerted assault on the socio-political order. The absence of major holy sites in the American context proved not to be a determinant in activity (America in this context is regarded as the new holy land) and again locations were dictated by revolutionary activity conducted within geographical constraints. Messianic and apocalyptic groups have a far greater concern with the symbolic value of religious locations, a fact born out by the plans of the Jewish Underground and the Saudi Ikhwan, although not by Aum Shinrikyo who operated in an environment devoid of relevant symbolic religious locations. For Aum, however, the symbolism was key on a temporal level - the attack on the Tokyo subway system undermined the legitimacy of the Japanese government's ability to protect its citizens.

6.1 Mainstream

6.1.1 Kach

The location of violent activity for Kach and most other extremist Jewish organisations centres around the sacredness of the land of Israel. This sacredness is defined in the Torah and the partial realisation of this biblical promise through the establishment of the Israeli state has led to calls for its absolute fulfilment. Within this larger sacred area

¹ See for example 'Hizballah Commentary Urges Muslim Christian Coexistence', *Voice of the Oppressed*, 0550 gmt, 12 Sept. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1485, A/12, September 14, 1992.

exist highly symbolic holy sites such as the Temple Mount (and Jerusalem generally) and Hebron² which have provided specific focuses of protest. Although it is difficult to assign the label 'temporal' to anything within a whole that is regarded as sacred, certain locations such as settlements, Arab villages, and other locales devoid of overt religious significance, have been the site of Kach activities that were more political in nature. Indeed, the selection of specific locations due to their religious sensitivity was a hall mark of Kach's ability to exploit tense security environments in order to garner popular support.

While the concept of the Promised Land has been an important feature of Judaism for centuries, the realisation of a Jewish state has made the idea of territory the central element in Jewish fundamentalist ideology. The land has become the most important symbol of Jewish nationhood, something so essential that it is "the land of Israel, *Eretz Israel*, that assures modern Jewry of its identity and separation [as the Chosen People]."³ The very state of Israel denotes enormous religious significance, as quoted by Kahane: "[t]he state of Israel is not 'political' creation, it is a religious creation" the purpose of which is to fulfil the Jewish messianic promise.⁴ The land itself was promised to the Jewish people through the covenant made between God and Abraham "[t]o your descendants I have given this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates...Also I give to you and your descendants after you the land in which you are a stranger, all the land of Canaan, as an everlasting possession."⁵ Kahane developed for the Palestinians the same choices that Joshua offered the Canaanites: leave the land, surrender and become second class citizens, or resist and face the inevitable consequences. Kahane developed this further claiming that Arabs would never accept inferior status and so the only options were expulsion or genocide.⁶ He also saw the expulsion of the Arabs as having a messianic significance - until they left, redemption would be delayed. For Kach

² Hebron is sacred to both Jews and Muslims cause of its association with the prophet Abraham. Tradition has it that Abraham, founder of Judaism, lived in Hebron and there bought the cave of Machpelah which became the burial place of Abraham and his wife Sara, their son Isaac and his wife Rebecca and their son Jacob and his wife Leah.

³ G. Rowley, 'The Land of Israel: A Reconstructionist Approach' in D. Newman (ed.), *The Impact of Gush Emunim: Politics and Settlement in the West Bank*, 1985, p. 133.

⁴ A. Ravitsky, 'Roots of Kahanism: Consciousness and Political Reality', *Jerusalem Quarterly*, # 39, 1986, pp. 93-94.

⁵ Genesis 15: 18 & 17: 8. See also Numbers 33: 53 "You shall dispossess the inhabitants of the land and dwell on it, for I have given you the land to possess".

⁶ E. Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, 1991, p. 225.

and its various offshoots, the Land of Israel is sacred, the Palestinians are identified as the arch-enemy and as such their removal from the land is essential. In the words of Binyamin Kahane "[t]hey do not grasp that as long as Arabs live in Hebron or the Land of Israel, there is no chance for peace or for Jewish settlements - not in Hebron, and not in Tel Aviv."⁷ He underpins this claim by quoting a Torah ruling "[a]nd if you do not disinherit the inhabitants of the land before you, then those whom you leave will be thorns in your eyes and thickets in your sides, and they will distress you in the land in which you dwell."⁸

Within this all encompassing Holy Land exist specific sites that are imbued with particular political or religious significance. Following the Camp David Accords, Kach became an instrumental part of protests against withdrawal from conquered territories such as Yamit in 1982 and at the locations of Palestinian terrorism such as Afula in 1984. The symbolic importance of locations such as these served to bolster Kach's primary arguments that the government of Israel was comprehensively 'selling out' the settler movement and ultimately the people of Israel, and that the very presence of the Arab population was a threat to the existence of the Jewish state. Even when not reacting to specific incidents, Kach frequently organised provocative demonstrations into Arab towns and villages, and Kach members would engage in clandestine raids on Arab population centres, committing assaults and destroying property. Similar attacks, although on a lesser scale would be made against Christians and Christian property, especially those engaging in missionary activity.

The exploitation of symbolic religious locations was also a feature of Kach's activities. Three events in the late 1970s alone serve to illustrate this. In October 1978 Kach activists occupied the restricted Abraham Avinu' synagogue in the centre of Hebron and violently resisted attempts to remove them; in January 1979 the General Secretary of the movement illegally entered the Cave of Machpelah⁹ in Hebron and harassed the guards; and in March 1979, Kach activists conducted a violent demonstration at the Temple Mount.¹⁰ While such incidents did not result in any loss of life, their symbolic value was extremely potent, affirming to group members and sympathisers alike the

⁷ B. Kahane, 'On Hebron', <http://kahane.org/political/32.html>.

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ The burial place of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

¹⁰ R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or "Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs")', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IV, # 1, 1992, p. 48.

willingness of Kach to resist the organs of the Israeli state in expressing their beliefs. Although ultimately unsuccessful, Kach members have also attempted to desecrate Muslim holy sites. In May 1980, for example, police uncovered a plot to destroy the Dome of the Rock. A large quantity of explosives was found on the roof of a yeshiva in the Old City of Jerusalem and two Israeli soldiers were arrested who had links to Kach and Gush Emunim. At this time, Kahane and one of his lieutenants, Baruch Green, were also arrested for alleged complicity in the plot and for planning assaults on Arabs.¹¹ The full impact of a successful operation against an Islamic holy site is well illustrated by the 1994 attack on the Cave of the Patriarchs. Indeed the martyrdom of Baruch Goldstein has created another focus for galvanising anti-Arab sentiment. In 1995, amid widespread security fears, members of the settler community held a memorial service for Baruch Goldstein. Indeed, since his funeral Goldstein's grave has become a site of pilgrimage for members of the Jewish extreme right.¹²

6.1.2 Aryan Nations

Locations for the Aryan Nations centre upon the United States, and more specifically the Pacific Northwest, the function of a Holy Land - or at least promised land - being assumed by the continental United States. This is in part due to the peculiarities of American Protestant millenarianism, the limited appeal of the organisation and also to the idealised nature of that particular region. Despite the fact that the group has not engaged in overt violence, its activities centre principally around its Idaho base, although other sites which have seen the persecution of elements within the radical religious right may be lauded as 'blood icons' and the group has developed a capacity to proselytise both nationally and internationally via the internet, providing scope for the creation of like-minded groups elsewhere imbued with the Aryan Nations ideology.

¹¹ I. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, 1988, pp. 67-68.

¹² *Voice of Israel*, 1800 gmt, 27 Feb. 94 - BBC/SWB, ME/1934, MED/8, March 1, 1994. Also of significance in this regard was the publication of *Baruch Hagever [Baruch the Man] : A Memorial Volume for Dr. Baruch Goldstein, the Saint, May God Avenge His Blood*, in March 1995. The book is a collection of commemorative essays and testimonies and a tribute to the survivability of Kahane supporters within Kiryat Arba. Yigal Amir was known as a great Goldstein admirer, and *Baruch Hegevar* was one of the books found in Amir's room after the assassination. The opulence of the grave site and its potential to incite violence has since moved the Israeli government to order its destruction. See *Voice of Israel*, 0900 gmt, 14 Nov. 99 - BBC/SWB, ME/3693, MED/10, November 16, 1999.

In 1980, Richard Butler first raised the Aryan Nations flag in Hays, Kansas and announced the foundation of a "racially clean homeland, bounded by the Rocky Mountains, the Mississippi river, the Northern Canada plains and the Mexican border."¹³ By the time of the 1986 Aryan Congress, this ambitious proclamation had shrunk to include just the states of Washington, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. While the precise boundaries vary, the Pacific Northwest is the most commonly cited location for an 'Aryan homeland', a reflection of practical features such as low population density, the absence of large non-white communities, and cheap land(at least during the seventies and eighties), and a reflection of the historical identification of the Northwest as an area free from the corrupting influences of the Eastern cities.¹⁴ For Aryan Nations, in line with most Christian Identity thinking, the location of the coming final struggle has been moved from Palestine to the United States.¹⁵ In direct contrast to most mainstream Protestant fundamentalists America is Israel, the true promised land and the historical Israel is destined for destruction primarily because it is a Jewish state and therefore has a direct association with the forces of evil. The defence of racially pure areas of the American heartland lies at the centre of Aryan Nations eschatological view of geography, a radical departure from traditional Christian fundamentalist interpretations of the End which concentrate on Israel and afford some role in the process to the Jewish people.¹⁶

While Aryan Nations has never engaged in a systematically overt programme of violence, the location of its activities accords with the idea of the Aryan homeland. The group's congresses, conferences and summer youth gatherings (timed to coincide with Hitler's birthday) are all conducted at the Aryan Nations compound near Hayden Lake, Idaho. Similarly the group's proselytising activities in terms of rallies and the distribution of literature are confined to the Northwest and the immediate environs of Hayden Lake. The group thus remains isolated from mainstream society and because its activities are not

¹³ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, 1990, p 58. The genesis of Identity thought of territorial separation is further explored in M. Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement*, 1994, pp. 233-239.

¹⁴ M. Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right: The Origins of the Christian Identity Movement*, 1994, p. 233-244.

¹⁵ M. Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right*, 1994, p. 109.

¹⁶ See for example H. Lindsay, *The Late Great Planet Earth*, 1971, and *The Final Battle*, 1995. While Lindsay has adapted his predictions over time to account for the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the US retains a special place, but not at the expense of the centrality of the Holy Land.

overtly extra-legal, there is little or no interference from local or Federal authorities. Two examples of the group extending its reach are the conduct of a prison outreach programme in the form of the Aryan Brotherhood, and the group's distribution of literature, most notably via the internet. Although the Aryan Brotherhood is sometimes cited as a worrying extension of recruitment¹⁷, more balanced assessments suggest the prison outreach programme has met with only limited success, failing to create the hoped for cadres of hardened, disciplined members.¹⁸ A different matter is the Aryan Nations internet presence which not only provides various tracts and polemics by the group but also an extensive list of publications which can be ordered, and an on-line membership form.¹⁹ This is of concern not only within the US but also throughout the world where these ideas have a particular resonance for right-wing, Christian white supremacists.

As with other religious groups, Aryan Nations and the extreme right generally possess various blood icons. While the ideological linkages vary, these icons possess similar themes of an over-bearing state persecuting elements of the righteous remnant. The locations of the Randy Weaver siege and the Branch Davidian compound are two notable examples. At the Mount Carmel compound site in Waco Texas a Texan militia have paid for a series of trees to commemorate the dead. Amongst the memorials is a plaque carrying the epithet "[h]ow long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on earth" (Revelations 6: 9, 10).²⁰ Among those of the extreme right who have made the pilgrimage to the compound is Timothy McVeigh, yet another illustration of the diverse nature and links between the American extreme religious right. Before locations become blood icons they may also serve as useful political rallying points. During the Ruby ridge siege, for example, there was a sizeable Aryan Nations presence beyond the police lines (many other group were also represented) who expressed support for the Weaver family and condemnation of the federal government's actions.

¹⁷ ADL, *Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far Right Fringe*, 1996, p. 189.

¹⁸ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, 1990, p. 60-61. This does not mean they are irrelevant or that they pose no threat. Two of the three men charged with dragging a black man to death in Jasper Texas in 1998 claimed Aryan Brotherhood membership. See ADL, *Background*, 'Aryan Brotherhood and the Turner Diaries: Hate Crime in Jasper, Texas', June 10, 1998.

¹⁹ See <http://www.nidlink.com/~aryanvic/>.

²⁰ *The Economist*, May 2, 1998, p. 52. For another memorial and conspiratorial theories about the assault on the Mount Carmel site see the 'Waco Holocaust Museum', <http://www.monumental.com/Skywriter/WacoMuseum/>.

6.1.3 Hizballah

While Hizballah includes locations of both religious and temporal significance in its rhetoric, the physical targets chosen are almost entirely temporal in nature, reflecting the group's broad political and social agenda, its fostering of inter-confessional dialogue and alliances and the gradualist nature of Hizballah's guerrilla and terrorist strategies. While the group has located its activities largely within the confines of the Lebanese state and the Israeli security zone, as befits a group born to protect the Lebanese Shi'ite minority and expel foreign influence in Lebanon, Hizballah has not hesitated to act abroad when such activity has proved to serve the group's interests. This decision has illustrated, at different times, both the tactical and strategic sophistication of the organisation, and also its useful position as an Iranian client, sometimes advancing its foreign policy agenda through violence.

While locations of religious significance are largely rhetorical tools for Hizballah, they are important for propaganda purposes and for the organisation's underlying pan-Islamic premise. Central to these is Jerusalem, or *Al-Quds*, which has served at once to symbolise the struggle against the state of Israel, to function as a common theme in the struggles of the similarly oppressed Palestinian peoples and Lebanese Shiites (and the co-operation between Hizballah and Palestinian Islamic groups such as Hamas and the PIJ), and to reflect and bolster the importance to Iranian revolutionary doctrine of the liberation of Palestine.²¹ The liberation of Jerusalem as a tactical goal, however, is dependent on the achievement of more immediate objectives, not least of which is the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. In terms of Hizballah's conflicts within Lebanon itself, both against foreigners and fellow Lebanese, religious locations such as places of worship have never really been a priority, reflecting the socio-political dimension of the group's struggle rather than the religious. Similarly the areas of operation within Lebanon, the Bekaa valley, the southern suburbs of Beirut and the south of the country reflect areas where there is a strong Shi'ite presence and where the social policies of the group best compliment its military activities.

²¹ M. Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, 1997, p. 50.

As noted above, Hizballah has largely eschewed locations of religious significance in an operational sense because far greater political leverage lies in those of a temporal nature. The early and spectacular operations mounted by Hizballah against foreign forces in Lebanon, including embassies and military centres, such as the US marine and French paratroop bases, are excellent examples of high value temporal locations. Control of, and familiarity with, certain lawless zones within Lebanon also benefited the group enormously in the conduct of taking Western hostages between the early 1980s and early 1990s, and in the continuing guerrilla campaign waged by the group against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in and around the self-proclaimed Israeli security zone. The temporal locations chosen by Hizballah (combined with the human targets these involve) are indicative of the group's objective of both inflicting physical damage, and simultaneously (and more importantly) testing the resolve and exposing the vulnerabilities of their opponents. In this light, the symbolic value of embassies, military headquarters, Israeli settlements in the Galilee and similar 'high value' temporal locations far outweighs their military or political significance, thus amplifying the effects of any violent act.

While Hizballah has operated within an almost exclusively domestic capacity there have been notable exceptions. Between December 1985 and December 1986, Hizballah conducted a terrorist campaign in France which resulted in thirteen deaths and over three hundred injuries. The campaign was motivated partly by the expulsion of Hizballah members from France, the presence of the French UNIFIL contingent in Lebanon, and Iran's desire to pressure France into repaying outstanding pre-revolutionary debts and to halt French arms transfers to Iraq.²² In March 1992, the group was allegedly responsible for the bombing of Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires which caused thirty deaths and two hundred and fifty-two injuries. One Lebanese authority on the group when asked why Jews had been targeted in Argentina and not Israel replied "[t]he Jews of Israel come from Poland, from Russia, from Europe or from Latin America...What is the difference? It is all the same."²³ The choice of Argentina did not necessarily imply an expansion of Hizballah's targets or general level of violence, but it certainly did demonstrate an extended

²² M. Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon*, pp. 119-120.

²³ *The Independent*, 20 July 1994.

proficiency and reach.²⁴ The period following the death of Sheikh al-Musawi was also a period of consolidation for the group. Under the leadership of Sheikh Nasrallah, Hizballah pursued a strategy which involved continued, deepened participation in Lebanese politics and the focusing of violent actions against Israel exclusively in line with changes in Iranian foreign policy.²⁵ In this particular context then, a move overseas does not imply an expansion of violent activity or target groups, rather it reflects a change in overall strategy in which the geographical base of Lebanon and also Lebanon as a 'homeland' (as opposed to battlefield) have gained a greater significance.

6.1.4 Hamas

While Hamas is similar to Hizballah in that the group is involved in a liberation struggle and aims to achieve an Islamic state as a result of that struggle, ideological differences over geography remain. Despite co-operation between the two groups, however, Hamas's pan-Islamic premise results from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and not from the revolutionary Iranian Shi'ite model. The result is a solely inward looking 'resistance' movement albeit with extensive leadership and support contacts around the world. Hamas has avoided obvious religious locations regarding them as reckless and unnecessary when more immediate and softer targets such as exposed public places are available in abundance and offer a commensurate psychological reaction.

Hamas subscribes to a pan-Islamic ideology, although the most important task is the liberation of Palestine which in itself is seen as sacred. As article eleven of the Hamas charter states "[t]he land of Palestine is an Islamic *Waqf* (holy possession) consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgement Day. No one can renounce it or any part, or abandon it or any part", not least because "the first Quibla and the third holiest site are located [there]."²⁶ The idea of the land of Palestine itself is inherited from early Palestinian nationalist thinking which looked to the territorial boundaries demarcated by the British Mandate from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean (hence the slogan 'from the river to

²⁴ It should also be noted that Hizballah maintains representatives in many countries both in the Middle East and Western Europe, and has been accused of conducting training operations in the US See C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today*, 2000, p. 147, fn. 33.

²⁵ M. Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon*, p. 107. Iran was heavily implicated in both the Buenos Aires attacks.

²⁶ Article 14.

the sea'). The pan-Islamic vision, however, from which the organisation arose was the pacifist one, espoused by the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood who advocated the 'internal jihad' within the Muslim community over 'external jihad' against Israel and the West.²⁷ The advent of Hamas shifted this approach to one of political activism and violence against Israel in the pursuit of a nationalist goal.²⁸ While Hamas is aware of the sensitivity of Islamic holy places in Israel and the occupied territories, these are exploited as rhetorical devices and are the locations for demonstrations rather than constant confrontation. Again the primary value of religious locations such as mosques is as a vehicle for mass mobilisation and entrenchment of support.²⁹ Despite the anger and revulsion caused by the 1994 Hebron massacre, Hamas have not felt compelled to attack Jewish holy sites, probably reasoning that this would incur too severe and unpredictable a backlash, and because attacks on public places offer a less reckless and more effective alternative.

The land of Palestine itself is not only discussed in sacred and religious terms but also in nationalist ones, as one Hamas leader has said:

"[t]he destruction of Israel is not an issue...We know that the land that is now occupied by Israel and on which they are building their state is our land. They took it by force, and they forced us to leave. No one amongst the Palestinians...doubts that this land belongs to us."³⁰

The land is thus also a temporal, nationalist object, making real the divine struggle. On the minutiae of temporal locations, Hamas shows a heavy preference for softer cultural centres. The apparently indiscriminate nature of attacks at such places is justified either by identifying Jews as the scriptural 'other', which must be eliminated, or more subtly by rationalisations such as the culpability of all Israelis as 'soldiers' and legitimate military targets, especially as all Israelis serve in the IDF at some stage in their lives.

²⁷ Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, 1994, pp. 10-22.

²⁸ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *Hamas a Behavioural Profile*, 1997, p. 2.

²⁹ It should be noted however that secular Palestinian factions have desecrated mosques when conflict has arisen between them and Hamas. See S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, 2000, p. 95.

³⁰ R. Gaess, 'Interview: Ismail Abu Shanab', *Middle East Policy*, Vol. VI, # 1, 1999, p. 117.

6.2 Core

6.2.1 Eyal

The locations chosen by Eyal for their actions were similar to those of Kach in that they were largely temporal and domestic and chosen to create maximum political impact, but at the same time being conducted within the larger arena of what is regarded as a divinely promised land which is perceived to be under imminent threat. Eyal's ideological lineage was linked directly to that of Kach and so the group's actions can be seen as an attempt to preserve the divinely promised state of Israel, and to thwart any attempt at territorial compromise. Once again the group's short life and other idiosyncrasies do not mean that the group's choices would have altered or expanded, but they did closely follow the patterns established by other Kahanist group's.

Little more need be added to the description of the sacredness of the land of Israel given above for Kach. Eyal leaders and members were all part of the broad Kahanist milieu and their perceptions and understanding were the same, continually reinforced by the orthodox educational milieu of Bar Ilan University. The divinely promised land of Israel were seen to be threatened by the Israeli political left and a nascent Palestinian state, and Eyal's ideology demanded that both these threats be resisted, violently if necessary. Eyal did not deliberately attack Palestinian places of worship or Holy sites, although demonstrations at these were a standard part of the right-wing repertoire. These locations were probably eschewed because of heightened security around Muslim holy sites following the Hebron massacre and because places of worship were considered too risky or difficult for a nascent group to tackle. Jewish religious locations are not a consideration as there was no major animosity by the group against the Jewish religious establishment, and the fundamentally political nature of the implementation of the peace process which precluded their active involvement and therefore culpability.

The temporal locations chosen by Eyal for acts of violence and incitement reflect the group's double objectives of eliminating the Palestinian population either through expulsion or violence, and engaging in political activism against those elements within Israeli society who proposed and supported the peace process. Fulfilling the former involved expeditions into Arab areas - not difficult for a settler community such as that

based at Kiryat Arba³¹ - causing damage and committing assaults. The significance of these raids was a demonstration of the ease with which the Arabs could be attacked within their own communities and of the ease with which right-wing groups could mount such attacks with seeming impunity. The locations of demonstrations against the peace process were obviously political in nature, such as the anti-government demonstration held in Jerusalem's Zion square when the Knesset was set to vote on the ratification of the Oslo II interim agreement, and counter demonstrations such as the one held the same month in Kings of Israel Square.³² Other locations such as those of the intimidation of and assaults against fellow Jews were determined solely by the location of the target at the time.

As noted above, Eyal failed to develop an operational capability to operate outside the sacred confines of Israel, not even in the traditional Kahanist environment of the United States, especially New York. Large segments of the New York orthodox Jewish community however represented and championed the causes and core values which lay behind Eyal and all other right-wing extremist groups - a fundamental opposition to the peace process and a vitriolic hatred of the left-wing political establishment guiding the process, especially Yitzhak Rabin.³³ Following the assassination there was still a small but noticeable group in the US who applauded Amir's action and raised money for his defence - the answering service for one such group included as part of their recorded message the line "Yigal Amir is a young religious hero who assassinated the evil Rabin."³⁴ It therefore seems likely that had the group survived it would have found an ideal location for expanding and supplementing its activities in the US

6.2.2 The Order

The location of the Order's activities fitted with the Identity vision of the US as 'a promised land' and even more so by the group's racially influenced patriotism and a strong desire for territorial separation. The group's perception of itself as a vehicle for

³¹ For weeks after the Hebron massacre the 80,000 Palestinian inhabitants of Hebron were kept under twenty four hour military curfew for fear of violent retaliation against the cities 450 Jewish residents.

³² Avashai Raviv was at the demonstration in Kings of Israel Square when he received news of Rabin's assassination.

³³ See for example M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin*, 1998, Ch. 5.

³⁴ *US New and World Report*, 20/11/95, Vol. XIX, # 20, p. 70.

revolutionary change determined the location of the organisation's operational targets, as did considerations of local knowledge and group 'reach'. While the group acknowledged the 'global' threat to the Aryan race, no attempt was made to establish links with groups outside the US and Mathew's philanthropic activities made possible by robbery proceeds throughout the US did not lead to the expansion of right-wing militant activism which he initially expected.

As with Aryan Nations, Robert Mathews sought a refuge from what he considered a degenerate and decaying society, and he found this refuge near the town of Metaline Falls, in the far North East corner of Washington state, not far from the Canadian border. Mathews reasoning for moving was typical of many within the far right, motivated by a desire to escape the 'cesspools' of large cities and to be 'left alone'. Although Mathews moved to Metaline Falls in the early 1970s, it was not until 1982 that he formulated the idea of a 'White American Bastion' - similar to Butler's idea of an 'Aryan Nation' - which he advertised in *The Spotlight* encouraging like minded whites to move to the Northwest where he hoped they would establish political and economic hegemony through weight of numbers.³⁵ As Mathews would later describe it:

"[t]he idea is to get enough kinfolk who believe as we do to move up here and take over towns, then counties, and finally states...Once we have a majority here, we create laws banning Jews, mud people, and other minorities...Once we've secured Metaline Falls, we keep expanding until we are strong enough to create a white nation."³⁶

The brochure he despatched to interested replies described an idealised, almost mythical community depicted by the figures of a Viking and a caped pioneer facing each other in a forest.³⁷ The response, however, was poor and this was one of a series of frustrations which led Mathews in the direction of violent activism. As Mathews stated in his last letter:

"[w]hen I first arrived at Metaline Falls I had only \$25 to my name, a desire to work hard and be left alone...I had hoped to start a new life in the state of Washington, but

³⁵ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 109-110.

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 110. The brochure was printed by Richard Butler at the Aryan Nations Press.

the ruling powers had other plans for me...By the time my son had arrived I realised that white America...was headed for oblivion unless white men rose and turned the tide."³⁸

The important role of establishing racially and religiously pure enclaves was an important theme borrowed from mainstream Identity, and also one which served to highlight the machinations of the Zionist Occupation Government (ZOG). As David Lane has stated:

"[t]he political entity known as the United States of America has attempted with near single-minded determination, almost from its inception, to destroy any White territorial imperative, of any size and on any continent where such a state could be found. Genocide of the White Race has been the aim and the result of the American political entity."³⁹

While Mathews had failed in his initial plan of establishing an Aryan homeland, the group's operations were planned and carried out away from the base area for security rather than ideological reasons. All the targets were temporal in nature, reflecting the character of the group as a form of revolutionary vanguard and the absence of any specific traditional holy sites.⁴⁰ The only exception being the single bombing attack made on a synagogue in Boise Idaho in April 1984. The location of the Order's violent activities, however, were largely constrained by geography and to a certain extent the local knowledge of the group members. All the Order's major activities for example were carried in the Pacific Northwest area.

While there are no overt proclamations by Aryan Nations that the United States is the new Holy Land, there is every indication that Mathews subscribed at least in part to the Identity notion that the US had a special role to play in religious history by virtue of it containing a vast swathe of the planet's Aryan elect. The sacredness of the land is made evident in Mathew's final letter when he states that a secret war has been developing "between the regime in Washington and an ever growing number of white people who are determined to regain what our forefathers discovered, explored, conquered, settled, built

³⁸ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, 1990, pp. 246-247.

³⁹ Cited in M. Barkun, *Religion and the Racist Right*, p. 111-112.

⁴⁰ The importance of such traditional sites may have been further affected by the Odinist beliefs of some members.

and died for."⁴¹ The domestic revolutionary nature of the Order is apparent here, identifying the persecuted and deserving white population as the unrightfully oppressed. The 'homeland' where the group's members had chosen to settle was the critical location, resembling as it did an idealised and lush world, for which the biblical geographical citations were irrelevant or were interpreted as allegories within the American context. While the Order recognised and identified with other kindred Aryan peoples around the world, their immediate struggle was paramount.

6.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Like Hamas, the PIJ operates in a small geographical context motivated by the same liberation ideals. Ideological similarities and operational co-operation have meant that the two groups remain similar in their violent activities, and the ideological and tactical significance of location are no exception. The PIJ shows a similar attitude towards external operating environments although the PIJ is inferior to Hamas in terms of funding and support bases. Palestine is the sacred site of the confrontation and also the physical basis for any future Palestinian state. The locations chosen for violent actions have been influenced by events but represent no deviation from an ideological programme which in its extreme form identifies the entire state of Israel and all Israelis as illegitimate heretics which deserve destruction.

While the PIJ subscribes to a broad pan-Islamic ideology, its immediate geographical concern is more limited. During the formative stages of the group, Fathi Shiqaqi and Bashir Musa decided that the unity of the Islamic world was not essential for the liberation of Palestine, but conversely the liberation of Palestine was essential for the unification of the Islamic world, thus narrowing the pan-Islamic premise to a specific, but extremely important, context. The PIJ, like Hamas (and other Islamic and Jewish movements) regards not only Jerusalem but the entire land of Palestine as sacred. In the words of Sheikh Tamimi "[f]rom the point of view of Islam, Palestine is not [just] a stretch of land, not [just its] trees and springs, but a country blessed because Allah blessed it in the Qu'ran."⁴² Palestine was not just important for nationalist and secular strategic reasons but

⁴¹ Cited in J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, Appendix I, p. 248.

⁴² Quoted in E. Rekhess, 'The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip', in D. Menashri (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World*, p. 195.

because the land was "in the heart of the Islamic body; it is the soul of Islam."⁴³ One of the slogans of the group, "Islam, Jihad and Palestine", underscores in the popular consciousness the important link between religion and nationalism - "Islam as the point of departure, Jihad as the means, and Palestine as the object of liberation."⁴⁴ On a more immediate and practical level, Muslim religious establishments have been used ranging from personal contacts within local mosques to more extravagant attempts to 'familiarise the people with the idea of Jihad' by holding open air prayer meetings and "celebrating the Night of Destiny with festivals in the Al-Aqsa mosque's plaza."⁴⁵ On the whole, Jewish holy sites are not chosen locations for operational activity, reflecting the identification of the state of Israel as a Jewish state, thus making the need to separate the religious establishments from broader society an unnecessary one, and underscored by the realisation that such a strategy would incur an unacceptably high degree of opprobrium for practically no political return.

The temporal locations chosen for violent acts are again examples of the 'softer' cultural centres. Hard (although potentially) higher value targets are eschewed in favour of public, everyday places.⁴⁶ As with Hamas, the choice of these locations was in part influenced by the Hebron massacre and has been easily justified by an ideology which follows the example of the prophet that "not even one hour should pass when a Muslim does not fight a heretic"⁴⁷, and by the nature of the Israeli military service system whereby most of the Israeli population has been, is, or one day will be a member of a repressive occupation force. While other attacks have been governed by the location of a specific individual or have been opportunistic, the temporal locations chosen by the PIJ have been low risk and yet high value, creating the security dilemma of coping with a choice of location that potentially threatens the physical structure of Israeli civil society.

In a similar way to other Islamist groups, the PIJ sees its struggle in 'global' terms, even though the struggle is conducted in a purely limited geographical area. The PIJ's

⁴³ *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Interview: 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process, An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, # 4, p. 62.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

⁴⁶ In an unusual aside a PIJ suicide bomber, narrowly prevented from blowing himself up on an Israeli bus, has stated that his passion for football would prevent him from blowing himself up at a football stadium even if it were full of 'unbelievers'. *Harper's Magazine*, Vol. CCXCV, Issue 1767, August 1997.

⁴⁷ *Harper's Magazine*, August 1997, Vol. CCXCV, Issue 1767.

operational activities have been confined strictly to the Occupied Territories and Israel proper - paradoxically an environment in which they are vulnerable due to a small operational membership and support base, and as a result of being the target of both Israeli and Palestinian Authority (PA) security crack downs. The only important exceptions are foreign states, especially Iran and Syria where leadership structures and representatives are based, and from where financial support and training are forthcoming. Although on a smaller scale than Hamas, the PIJ has also conducted training in Lebanon in conjunction with Hizballah.⁴⁸ Similarly to Hizballah Iran holds a special place in the PIJ world view. Iran not only represented the ideological source of the PIJ's revolutionary ideas, but was seen as "the only country which truly took upon itself the Palestinian cause by forming the Jerusalem Army, a force capable of waging a popular Islamic liberation war."⁴⁹ While such fervour may have been tempered by the group's recent decline, the PIJ has long received support from Iran and remains politically close.⁵⁰

6.3 Messianic/ Apocalyptic

6.3.1 Jewish Underground

In a similar fashion to Kach, and most other Jewish extremist groups, the members of the Jewish Underground subscribed to the idea of the sacredness of the land of Israel. The sacredness of the land has come to dominate the traditional triadic relationship of God, people and land - by contrast during the diaspora the land was eclipsed by God and people.⁵¹ This emphasis is common throughout the spectrum of extremist Jewish groups and for the members of the Underground this idea was taken directly from their ideological roots in the Gush Emunim movement. The divergence lies between the Gush's mission to settle as much of the Land of Israel as possible and so to make the biblical Israel a reality,

⁴⁸ PIJ have also been implicated in training activities in Yemen. See US State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, 1998*, p. 28.

⁴⁹ E. Rekhess, 'The Terrorist Connection', *Justice*, Vol. V, May 1995, p. 3.

⁵⁰ PIJ for instance over the years has expressed unqualified support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and followed Iran's lead in negating the Madrid conference, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Oslo agreement and the Declaration of Principles.

⁵¹ L. Hanauer, 'The Path to Redemption: Fundamentalist Judaism, Territory, and Jewish Settler Violence in the West Bank', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. XVIII, # 4, p. 254.

and the Underground's attempts to force the messianic process via the Temple on one hand, and to protect those gains made from settlement through vigilante terrorism on the other. While the Underground regarded the entire Land of Israel as holy, Etzion regarded the centre of this holiness to stem from the Temple Mount:

"I have seen myself as responsible to carry out actions which I would characterise as the purification of the Temple Mount, the only holy place of the people of Israel, from the structure now located upon it, on the site of the holy of holies, the building known as the Dome of the Rock."⁵²

The messianic objective of the planned bombing of the Dome of the Rock was to precipitate another Arab-Israeli war, and hopefully a superpower conflict, which would force the Jewish Messiah to intervene to save his chosen people.⁵³ Even if such an extreme messianic scenario did not unfold, with the demolition of the Dome of the Rock the third Temple could be re-constructed, and it is the reconstruction of the Third Temple which is a vital portent immediately preceding the arrival of the Jewish Messiah. Messianic expectations aside there can be little doubt that if the attack had proceeded as planned, the results would certainly have been catastrophic which may indeed have "put us one step closer to an Armageddon."⁵⁴ The attack itself did not envisage immediate enormous casualties - the aim was to perpetrate a symbolic act at a place of great religious significance for Judaism and Islam in the belief that an apocalyptic struggle between Jews and Muslims and messianic redemption would result.

The importance of the Temple Mount has long been held but it was not until the capture of Jerusalem during the Six Day War that its reconstruction was a realistic possibility. In Etzion's view there could be no possible compromise:

"[t]he purified Mount shall be - if God wishes - the ground and anvil for progress toward the next stage of holiness. As long as the Muslim Waqf is not removed from

⁵² *Nekuda*, # 88, June 24, 1985, p. 24.

⁵³ See Bruce Hoffman's "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. XVIII, # 4, 1995, p. 283 (fn. 21). The information that the underground wished to provoke a cataclysmic Muslim-Jewish war was provided to Dr. Hoffman by an American law enforcement officer knowledgeable of the incident.

⁵⁴ Rapoport, D.C., 'Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?', in P. Wilkinson, A.M. & Stewart, (eds.), *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, 1987, p. 72.

the Mount, it is as if the Jebusite king, Araunah, rules alongside the Kingdom of David, and this is an unforgivable flaw in our sovereignty."⁵⁵

Etzion had thus made the Temple Mount the central point of the redemptive process and the presence on that place of Muslim holy places was preventing redemption from proceeding. The nationalist and religious dimensions in this case intersect, ascribing to the Temple Mount both political and redemptive significance. As the nationalist poet, Uri Zvi Greenberg wrote "[h]e who controls the Temple Mount, controls Jerusalem. And he who controls Jerusalem, controls the land of Israel."⁵⁶ In a similar vein religious leaders, such as Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, have expressed the sentiment "that the supreme purpose of the in gathering of the exiles and the establishment of our state is the building of the Temple."⁵⁷ While Aviner and others believed that the Temple would be rebuilt in 'mystical' fashion the Underground posed a peculiar threat by proposing to fulfil a redemptive process through violent human agency.

When the plot to blow up the Dome of the Rock was indefinitely postponed the Underground turned to temporal locations of violence. As noted previously the primary motivation for these attacks was not redemptive but reactionary, a response to Arab violence against Jewish settlers. The sites chosen for these revenge attacks were regarded as commensurate to the act which had triggered them. Thus the partially successful attack on the Arab mayors was an attack on the Arab political leadership believed to have inspired anti-settler violence.⁵⁸ The ensuing attack on the Islamic college in Hebron and the abortive attempt to blow up five Arab buses in Jerusalem, were both intended to mirror the effect and methods of Palestinian terrorism - namely to attack vulnerable civilian locations which would maximise the sense of fear throughout the target community. In this sense, it is interesting to note that other religious locations such as mosques were not considered by the Underground, although this would have marked a serious diversion from proportional, reactive attacks with the corresponding and unwelcome potential for escalation.

⁵⁵ cited in J. Aviad, 'The Messianism of Gush Emunim', in J. Frankel (ed.), *Jews and Messianism in the Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning. Studies in Contemporary Jewry Vol. VII*, 1991, p. 212.

⁵⁶ E. Ronel, 'Inside Israel: The Battle Over Temple Mount', *New Outlook*, Vol. XXVII, # 2, p.12.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Jewish Underground', in D.C. Rapoport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, 1988, p. 199.

6.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo

Unlike the Jewish Underground, Aum Shinrikyo's chosen locations were entirely temporal in nature, reflecting both the eclectic ideological structure of the group and its distance - both literal and metaphorical - from the geographical centres of the major traditions from which it drew its inspirations. Locations of religious significance played no role in Aum's activities because, as a by-product of a composite ideology, it recognised none as being of pivotal importance for the coming end. Instead Japan became the central location for Aum's prediction of Armageddon, both as a state destined for destruction but also as the site of the regeneration of worldly civilisation through Aum. Indeed, there are elements of Aum's cosmology and structure which are peculiarly Japanese, further emphasising the centrality of Japan. Aum conducted extensive activities around the world, most notably in Japan, and while recruitment was certainly a feature (in line with the superficially global message of the group), the primary emphasis seems to have been on acquiring weapons technologies and expanded the group's financial base.

Despite the extreme and eclectic ideology of Aum Shinrikyo, the location of their attacks (primarily but not exclusively the two major sarin gas attacks) can only be described as of avowedly temporal significance. The location of the earlier sarin attack at the village of Matsumoto is easily explained because it was the site of a land trial (more specifically the judges hearing the case) in which Aum was involved and bound to lose. The subway attacks were intended to cripple the central nervous system of the state by gassing the main underground lines which led to Kasumigaseki station - one used by Tokyo police, National Police and countless other bureaucrats. Interestingly when discussing the peril of the coming apocalypse Asahara had stated that the Japanese government was largely unprepared, and "[o]nly the Kasumigaseki subway station...can be used as a shelter."⁵⁹ The subway attacks were therefore of enormous symbolic importance to Aum followers when they occurred. Although they were too isolated and ultimately ineffective to be realistically seen as the beginning of the Endtimes by the majority of the

⁵⁹ Shoko Asahara, *Disaster Approaches the Land of the Rising Sun: Shoko Asahara's Apocalyptic Predictions*, 1995, p. 190.

population, to most Aum followers they were at the very least proof of the conspiracy being orchestrated against the group.

The communal aspect of Aum's organisation provides another dimension to the concept of temporal location. In common with some other illegal or clandestine religious groups, Aum advocated a rejection of mainstream society and expressed this through the establishment of visible yet closed group facilities. While Aum maintained both lay and monastic memberships as time progressed and the group became more inward looking, the various Aum compounds became the focal points for salvation. In the early 1990s, Asahara wrote that "we have to secure a place where we can protect ourselves from bodily harm, where we can live and continue our ascetic practice no matter what kind of weapon...is thrown against us."⁶⁰ While this idea accorded with earlier Aum teaching which advocated the establishment of 'lotus villages' to preserve the faithful from disaster, the rhetoric had moved away from the possibility of a peaceful avoidance of disaster to an acceptance that it was inevitable, a withdrawal made more necessary by the increasingly illegal activities which the group became involved in such as the development of chemical and biological agents and the abuse and murder of dissenting sect members. Indeed, the two processes fed on each other, a withdrawal from society enhanced conflict with society, necessitating the development of weapons for the impending confrontation which entailed greater secrecy and further withdrawal.

Despite drawing on Hindu Buddhist and Christian Endtime traditions, Aum's predictions for Armageddon centred on Japan. Early in 1995 Aum published a series of conversations between Asahara and his 'leading disciples' entitled *A Doom is Nearing the Land of the Rising Sun*. In the book Asahara frequently discusses the possibility of the end of the world and settles on the last years of the 1990s. One of his visions includes Tokyo sinking into the sea, and another where Japan turns into "burned earth" following a nuclear attack by the US and the U.N. "between 1996 and 1998."⁶¹ These great disasters were to be preceded by other, lesser ones which Asahara had been predicting since 1987, such as a decline in Japanese living conditions caused by trade friction with the US, leading to the institution of a police state. Beyond Japan, Russia, China, Europe and the US would

⁶⁰ Cited in D.W. Brackett, *Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo*, 1996, p. 84.

⁶¹ Shoko Asahara, *Disaster Approaches*, p. 71.

collapse and in the year 2003 (according to one of Asahara's predictions) nuclear war would lay waste to all civilisation.⁶² From the remnants of this apocalyptic struggle would rise Aum Shinrikyo which had escaped death through a combination of spiritual and physical preparedness, and this 'righteous remnant' would be ruled by Asahara and his government in waiting. The absence of specific, traditional locations such as those in Israel associated with the Christian apocalyptic did not pose major challenges to Aum's ideology. The composite nature of the group's beliefs, the deification of Asahara, and the origins of the group ascribed a new and central role to Japan at the end of time, a role which appealed to susceptible segments of Japanese society and became an important vehicle for recruitment.⁶³

As well as activities in Japan, Aum had numerous interests abroad - largely made possible by the group's extensive financial resources - making the group virtually global in nature. Aum operated in six countries outside Japan, pursuing a variety of different activities ranging from recruitment and training to establishing purchasing companies and weapons procurement. The country where Aum was most actively involved was Russia where membership peaked at about 35,000 with up to 55,000 people visiting Aum seminars on a casual basis.⁶⁴ The group maintained seven facilities inside Moscow, a further eleven around the country and broadcast daily programmes from the state run Mayak Radio and occasionally Aum programmes were televised on Russia's '2X2' television station.⁶⁵ There is evidence that Aum attempted to recruit nuclear experts and explored the possibility of buying either a nuclear weapon or a chemical or biological one, and there is also evidence that Aum members received military training in Russia and procured various equipment from there including a Mil helicopter.⁶⁶ Aum's activities in the US by contrast were centred more around acquisition attempts of high technology equipment, many of which had dual use capabilities such as an interferometer (which can be used to measure plutonium), air filtration media, molecular modelling software and an

⁶² D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum*, 1996, pp. 16-17.

⁶³ *ibid.*, pp. 21-31.

⁶⁴ By contrast the Japanese figures were 18,000 and 35,000 respectively. It is interesting to note that attempt to establish an Aum presence in two other CIS states, Ukraine and Belarus, were rebuffed by local authorities.

⁶⁵ US Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, *Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo*, October 31, 1995, p. 19. The radio broadcasts were also relayed via an Aum radio tower in Vladivostok to Japan every evening.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

industrial laser.⁶⁷ Aum also engaged in unsuccessful recruitment in Germany, maintained extensive financial interests in Taiwan, and operated a tea plantation in Sri Lanka.⁶⁸ The group also purchased a five thousand acre sheep station in a remote part of Western Australia. The area of the sheep station is known to contain uranium deposits and the group prospected for the mineral and consulted an Australian geologist about mining and transporting uranium by ship to Japan. Most worrying of all, there is conclusive evidence that the group developed and tested sarin on the station using sheep as the test subjects.⁶⁹ On a more bizarre level there is some evidence that the group attempted to cultivate the Ebola virus following a 'humanitarian' trip to the Congo, and visited Belgrade to explore the work of Nikola Tesla who examined the possibility of generating wave amplifications that could cause seismological disturbances.⁷⁰

6.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan

The activities of the Saudi Ikhwan centre around a single religious location, the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The group had participated in no attacks on temporal locations, or any other religious sites for that matter, and was denied the opportunity for further action when it was crushed at Mecca. The importance of the Grand Mosque meant that the Ikhwan had produced widespread disquiet in the Muslim umma and created a crisis of legitimacy for the Saudi regime. While the location was of enormous Islamic significance, the message of the Ikhwan was too radical (many would say even heretical) to garner any semblance of widespread support.

The Grand Mosque of Mecca, is of course of profound religious significance. At the centre of the Grand Mosque lies the Kaabah, the holiest shrine in Islam, which contains the sacred Black Stone and reputedly the graves of Ismail and his mother Hagar.⁷¹ The messianic dimension to the occupation of the Grand Mosque was emphasised by Qahtani who claimed that "[t]he Mahdi and his men will seek shelter and protection in the Holy Mosque because they are persecuted everywhere until they have no recourse but the Holy

⁶⁷ US Senate, *Global Proliferation*, p. 26.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p. 29.

⁶⁹ D.W. Brackett, *Holy Terror*, pp. 92-93.

⁷⁰ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 96-97 & 224-225.

⁷¹ Embedded in the Eastern corner of the Ka'aba is the Black Stone and as the Ka'aba is the focus of Muslim devotions so the Stone is the holiest object.

Mosque."⁷² The location was not merely of traditional religious significance but also (according to some passages in Muslim scripture) was meant to play a role in the final battle. The choice of the Grand Mosque as a target may be considered a key cause of the Ikhwan's failure. The Saudi regime had little trouble portraying the seizure as an act of sacrilege and in receiving support for a military solution from the ulama. The revolt itself received little sympathy either within the kingdom or throughout the Muslim world.⁷³ Even contemporary Saudi Islamists such as Sa'd al-Faqih, director of the Movement for Islamic Reform (MIRA), condemned the take-over of the Grand Mosque as stupid as well as religiously wrong. Al-Faqih argues however that if Juhayman had chosen a different target (by which he presumably means a significant secular one) he could have been more successful.⁷⁴

At the time, the sacredness of the Grand Mosque had several implications both for Utaybi's rebels and for the Saudi authorities. Tactically the Ikhwan had the advantage, occupying the various buildings of the complex and still in the company of innocent pilgrims who were effectively hostages, and the Saudi government initially proved to be psychologically and operationally ill-prepared for this sort of insurrection.⁷⁵ The Saudi authorities also exercised (at least in the early stages) a great deal of restraint because of the Grand Mosque's religious importance and also because the state the mosque was left in would reflect heavily upon the Saudi regime's role as 'protector of the mosques'.⁷⁶ The religious importance of the mosque has meant that Iran has frequently used it as a vehicle for criticising the Saudi regime, and in the years following the attack Iran has been directly implicated in orchestrating further attacks and disturbances in Mecca during the Haj. During the late 1980s, at low points in Iranian-Saudi relations, Ayatollah Khomeini made pronouncements such as "by liberating the Ka'aba from the claws of the infidels we will

⁷² J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan, 1979', in D. Holden & R. Johns (eds.), *The House of Saud*, 1981, p. 512.

⁷³ In Iran the Ayatollah Khomeini went so far as to blame the entire incident on the US and 'its corrupt colony Israel'. His accusations did not go unheeded and there were a series of anti-American protests across much of the Muslim world. See D. Pipes, *The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy*, 1996, pp. 14 & 181.

⁷⁴ M. Fandy, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*, 1999, p. 154.

⁷⁵ J. Paul, 'Insurrection at Mecca', *MERIP Reports*, # 91, 1980, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁶ In October 1986 King Fahd changed his title from 'Your Majesty' to 'Custodian of the Two Holy Places', a change meant to give the king greater standing amongst Muslims. See *The Economist*, November 8, 1986.

enter the Holy Mosque"⁷⁷, and threats had also been made by a group identified as the Saudi Hizballah to 'liberate the Holy Ka'aba in Mecca from the Saudis'⁷⁸.

Iran's willingness to use the Grand Mosque to de-legitimise the Saudi regime was shown in July 1989 during the *Haj* when two bombs exploded just outside the Holy Mosque. One pilgrim was killed and about sixteen injured. A group of Shi'a Kuwaiti nationals who claimed to have been assisted by Iran were found responsible.⁷⁹ Twenty were arrested and in September four were imprisoned for varying terms, and sixteen were executed. At their trial, it was stated that the leader, Mansur al-Mihaymid, had informed his cohorts that the objectives of the attack were to:

"instigate fear, confusion and terror amongst the pilgrims, hamper the pilgrimage rites, prove the weakness of the Kingdom's security apparatus and that the Kingdom is not capable of protecting the holy places, and that this action was to be in the interests of Iran."⁸⁰

These charges, especially those related to the inability of the Saudi regime to protect the holy places, were similar to those levelled at the Saudi monarchy by Iran during the Grand Mosque attack. While the basic purpose of this operation was in a sense religious, it was carried out by a religious, Shi'a state (using proxies which sympathised with that state's ideology) to destabilise a neighbouring state (also a religious state, merely of a different sort) for ideological and geo-political reasons.⁸¹

The symbolism of the location was also of profound political importance for the Saudi regime, and on a broader scale the entire Muslim world. Even though the attack was unsuccessful it did cast doubt over the legitimacy of the Saudi regime's custodianship of the Ka'aba, and as one scholar noted at the time "[i]f the Saudi government could be accused of a lack of religious fervour...then other Muslim states might well be liable to even more severe challenges."⁸² The very location of a small scale and, in so many ways,

⁷⁷ CIA, October 19, 1988, p. 4.

⁷⁸ *ibid.*

⁷⁹ The then speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Akhbar Rafsanjani suggested that the Saudis themselves were responsible. See D. Pipes, *The Hidden Hand*, p. 272.

⁸⁰ *Kingdom of Saudi Arabia TV*, 1855 gmt, 21 Sept. 89 - SWB, ME/0569, A/7, 23 September, 1989.

⁸¹ Iranian instigated religio-political violence in Mecca has been a feature during the Haj since 1979. In 1986 for example a group of Iranians was arrested in Saudi Arabia in possession of explosives, and in a July 1987 riot 402 persons died when Saudi police confronted an Iranian demonstration. See M. Kramer, 'Tragedy in Mecca', *Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. XXXII, # 2, 1988, pp. 231 & 239.

⁸² W. Ochsenswald, 'Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival', *IJMES*, Vol. 13, p. 271.

quite obviously doomed rebellion (and on a far lesser scale its messianic message) was enough to cause a ripple of concern far beyond the borders of the Saudi state, within a world rife with political tensions where activist religion was becoming a political, and frequently militant, force. The 1979 attack, unlike previous operations by Islamic militants, raised the issues of religious revival and religious destiny in the symbolic birthplace of Islam.

6.4 Conclusion

All violent religious groups possess a understanding of what might be called sacred geography, the perception of physical geography as it is related to their ideology. Within this sacred space, groups must identify specific locations for acts of violence. While the locations chosen for acts of religiously motivated violence are sometimes 'holy sites' or places of religious significance, they are more frequently temporal in nature, functional manifestations of the perceived foe's society. In those cases where holy sites are deliberately chosen, by an individual or an organisation, the backlash (or potential backlash) from a target society has a major impact out of proportion to the material damage caused. The scale of outrage caused by attacks on Holy sites is commensurate with their religious significance and attacks on 'lesser' religious locations, such as ordinary places of worship, while emotive ones do not have the same psychological resonance. Sites of extreme religious importance tend to be the chosen locations for groups of a messianic or apocalyptic orientation for whom such an action at a particular place is an important step in the fulfilment of an eschatological process. Mainstream and core groups, however, eschew these targets almost entirely because of their lack of long term tactical value. Mainstream and core groups do use their own religious sites but merely as focal points for popular demonstrations. In the case of North American Christian groups, where such traditional, scriptural targets are unimportant (indeed, in terms of scriptural geography, they are absent - a qualification which applies equally to Aum Shinrikyo), the locations chosen reflect those of any revolutionary organisation, merely with a certain bias determined by the racist dimension of their ideology. It is temporal locations which form the basis for mainstream and core group's tactical programmes, for it is with these, the cultural centres of a society, that the greatest political impact is made. Within the wider

perception of sacred geography the two target locations areas of holy sites and temporal ones share a common feature. Both represent the physical embodiment of the Manichean enemy which both threatens a religious culture and prevents the fulfilment of its divinely promised destiny. It is the identification of these human enemies as target groups that directs religious violence towards the specific act of causing casualties.

Chapter VII

Targets

While the location of violent acts encompasses both the concept of sacred geography, sacred space and the physical infrastructure of religious communities, the category of targets refers to the members of religious communities who have been defined by an ideological belief system as being legitimate enemies and worthy of death. At the ideological and rhetorical levels, target groups may represent entire 'other' religious communities or those apostate elements within a community which are regarded as having abandoned the faith, and it is these broad categories which give rise to the often cited claim that violent religious groups identify a 'virtually open ended category of targets'.¹ The targets chosen by violent religious extremist groups reflect both the nature of the group's struggle and its Manichaean world view, but, at the same time it is crucial to recognise that the choices are tempered simultaneously by opportunity, environmental constraints and group capability. Opportunity and constraints also lead to a marked disparity between a totalistic rhetoric espoused and projected by a group, and the targets actually chosen as the focus of violence. This chapter seeks to explore this relationship between rhetoric and action in target selection seeking to establish a link between ideological statements and beliefs, and the actual pursuit of strategic objectives.

For groups in the mainstream category, the gap between rhetoric and reality is a large one governed by the need for these groups to survive in open society and, in some cases, within the political system itself. The environment certainly has an influence on the size of this gap as Hizballah, for example, was able to maintain its vitriolic anti-Israeli stance with a correspondingly effective military campaign against Israel while participating in the Lebanese parliamentary elections and social fabric. Hamas has certainly matched operational activity to target group rhetoric but issues of group survival dictate that the Jewish targets be attacked in a proportional fashion, especially when faced

¹ B. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 1998, p. 95.

with pressure from both Israel and the PA, and that many apostates within the Palestinian Authority not be physically targeted at all. By contrast, Kach maintained an extreme level of rhetoric against target groups but did not act in a concerted, centralised fashion for fear of jeopardising its participation in Israeli politics, a programme similar to that of Aryan Nations except that the latter has abstained from political participation altogether. For core groups, the gap between rhetoric and reality is narrower, but there are still considerable constraints imposed by opportunity and capability - Eyal, the Order and the PIJ have all experienced these practical constraints despite the clear identification of both target types and the absence of considerations of political system and constituency. While the rhetorical definition of target types by messianic and apocalyptic organisations may be the most totalistic, this creates a corresponding need for acts of particular severity. This expectation is mitigated somewhat by the expected participation of divine forces as in the case of the Jewish Underground, an expectation that is further intensified when the leadership of a group considers itself to be divine as the case of Aum Shinrikyo and the Saudi Ikhwan.

7.1 Mainstream

7.1.1 Kach

Although conducted at different levels of intensity, Kach has targeted political groups, other religions and co-religionists. The choice of targets have been heavily influenced by environmental political context and (before his assassination) by Kahane's own shrewd perception of popular sympathy with his ideas. Thus, for example, while the basic rhetorical ideas of the group remained unchanged from JDL operations in the US to the formation of Kach in Israel, the targets actually selected varied enormously. All, however, fell under the category of 'gentiles' and to this broad spectrum of non-Jewish enemies, there is an equally despised group of Jews who are deemed to be in league with the gentiles, propagating their beliefs and betraying the true destiny of Judaism. These are the so called 'Hellenisers', most immediately associated with the Israeli political left. While the group's rhetoric was not matched by activity for reasons of political survival, the targets

identified by Kach became powerful tools for incitement and violence perpetrated by splinter groups and individuals.

The various targets from other religions that Kach selected originated from the ideological premise of revenge. Although the establishment of a Jewish state and the gathering in of the exiles was an important step towards Jewish redemption (both temporal and spiritual) for Kach, it only really solved the problem of exile. Kahane reasoned that the only way for the Jewish people to redress the damage caused by two millennia of persecution and humiliation was "a concrete revenge, a physical humiliation of the Gentiles."² In fact, this was the basis of Kahane's often repeated 'fist in the face of the gentile'. While the gentile identified has not always been the same - at various times encompassing the Romans, the Catholic Church, the Russians, the Nazis, blacks and the Arabs - this character has been a historical constant for the Jewish people. Following the establishment of the Jewish state and the perceived connivance of some Jews with their gentile oppressors, the concept of revenge, backed by Halakhic rulings, has been extended to Jews who impede Jewish redemption.

The context in which targets are chosen is extremely important for Kach. When the JDL was operating in the US it concentrated its activities against those groups that were seen to pose a threat against the Jewish community such as black militants.³ Later, the Soviet Union became a prime target because of official Soviet policies towards its Jewish population. From the late 1960s, the Soviet Union's persecution of Jews and refusal to let Jews emigrate (especially to Israel) became the primary motivations for JDL actions.⁴ Legal demonstrations and protests soon gave way in the early 1970s to assaults and bombings of Soviet diplomats and diplomatic missions, Soviet cultural offices and official agencies, American firms conducting business with the Soviet Union and institutions involved in US-Soviet cultural exchanges.⁵ When Kahane emigrated to Israel, his ideology quickly adjusted to deal with the new environment. He moved away from the idea which

² E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane: The Ideologization of Mimetic Desire', in M. Juergensmeyer (ed.), *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, 1991, p. 51.

³ R. Friedman, *The False Prophet: Rabbi Meir Kahane - From FBI Informant to Knesset Member*, 1990, pp. 83-92. These confrontations were encouraged by the FBI, *ibid.*, pp. 93-98.

⁴ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*, 1999, pp. 187-188.

⁵ R. Friedman, *The False Prophet*, pp. 114-115.

he had developed in the US that Jews could be saved simply by moving to the Jewish state. Rather he simply transposed his Jewish and Gentile enemies from the American context onto the Israeli one. His continued calls for vigilante justice were the same, they were - after a period of acclimatisation - primarily directed towards the Arabs and liberal Israelis.⁶

When Kahane emigrated to Israel, demonstrations were still organised against the Soviet Union, and towards this cause his initially small band of American followers found a willing support base amongst Soviet émigrés. The Holy Land itself, however, provided him with an entirely new array of potential targets. The first of these were in many respects peripheral, such as Christian missionaries and the small and obscure sect of American blacks in the southern town of Dimona.⁷ While Israelis generally disapproved of Christian missionary activity, there was seldom trouble over their presence and activities.⁸ Similarly the small sect in Dimona, which claimed to be Jewish (but was not), was at best of marginal interest to the majority of Israelis, if indeed they were aware of the sect at all.⁹ Kahane, however, chose to apply literal Halakic interpretations to both groups, conducted demonstrations and succeeded in elevating both issues in the public consciousness as well as raising his own public persona. The choice of these targets is interesting. Both were fairly obscure and unlikely to arouse any degree of sympathy within Israeli society (the same could be said of the Soviet Union) and Kahane, as a new immigrant with a narrow support base, may have reasoned that a direct confrontation with either the Arab community or the Israeli state would at this early stage be unwise.

Despite his 'outsider' status, Kahane began less than a year after his arrival to focus on the Arab community as the prime obstacle to the survival of the state of Israel and eventual Jewish redemption.¹⁰ To Kahane, the Arab states, the Palestinians in the occupied territories, the Palestinian diaspora and those Arabs who remained in Israel proper as

⁶ It should be noted that JDL and JDL splinter groups continued their parallel activities in the US after Kahane's emigration, and he was certainly involved with his followers there despite officially resigning as head of the JDL on April 17 1974.

⁷ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, pp. 189-190.

⁸ A marginal exception is Yad LeAchim ('a hand for our brethren'), established in the 1970s to combat 'alien' proselytization.

⁹ The 'Black Jews' emerged from Harlem, New York city after the First World War. One of the first leaders, Prophet F.S. Cherry claimed that his followers were the true Israelites of the Bible and that Jesus was black. There are a number of different sects that all claim to be descendants of Ethiopian Hebrews.

¹⁰ Sprinzak rightly points to the facts that Kahane had never served in the IDF nor fought in Israel's wars as potentially undermining Kahane's popularity.

Israeli citizens were one and the same. Kahane stated of the Arabs who lived within the pre-Six Day War boundaries of the Jewish state, that:

"[he] feels no loyalty to his government...He is hostile and is full of hate for the Jewish majority, for in his heart he is a 'Palestinian' and an Arab Nationalist...But since he suffers from a guilt feeling, for his Israeli citizenship, he is a much more dangerous enemy."¹¹

Palestinians were dehumanised in Kach rhetoric, referred to as 'dogs' who, when they paid lip service to making peace with Israel, were merely showing their capacity for deviousness. Indeed, it is the untrustworthiness of the gentiles generally and the Arabs in particular that precludes any form of agreement between them and the Jews and defines Kach's Manichean attitude towards them. As Kahane wrote in 1983, "[t]he enemies of Israel will never make peace; they will never seek less than the total elimination of the Jewish State; they do not want compromise because they look upon us as robbers and bandits."¹²

By identifying liberal Western secularism as a root cause of the plight of the Jewish people, Kach automatically set itself in opposition to certain segments of Israeli society. Kach members targeted anti-war demonstrators, attacked homosexuals and Jewish women suspected of relations with Arab men, and threatened various members of the 'liberal left' including journalists, artists, intellectuals and politicians. In the words of Kahane:

"[i]t takes great strength to love Jews so much that one fights for them. It takes, perhaps, even more strength to love Jews so much that one fights Jews who would destroy them. The pity is that most Jews are so weak and apathetic that they neither love nor hate enough."¹³

The term 'Hellenist' examined in Chapter Three is a particularly damning label to apply to these apostates. In a 1987 paper, entitled *Jews and Jews*, Kahane stated that:

¹¹ M. Kahane, *The Challenge: The Chosen Land*, p. 39-47, cited in E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 199.

¹² M. Kahane, *Listen World, Listen Jew*, 1983, p. 139.

¹³ R. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', *New York Review of Books*, 1986, p. 19.

"[t]he Jews against the Hellenists, far more than the Jews against the Arabs, is the real struggle. And the Hellenists, with their destructive anarchy of worthless values, have already created a spiritual holocaust within the Holy Land."¹⁴

Hellenists are thus seen as a worse enemy than the Arabs because they form an enemy from within, eroding Jewish culture, and the term defines them in such a way that they become not truly Jewish but agents of Judaism's destruction.

Although the rhetorical definition of Kach's targets is extreme and all embracing in nature, the reality is somewhat different. Obviously for a mainstream group, which has actively sought involvement in the political process, extensive violent activity would not be rewarded with success. While Kach has engaged in low level violence against its declared targets, these activities have been of a sufficient magnitude to ensure no massive response by the state. Where the totalist attitude towards target groups has been pursued literally, it has been primarily by splinter groups associated with Kach, such as TNT, or by individuals, such as Baruch Goldstein. In this last instance, the role of target rhetoric as a vehicle for incitement actually resulted in the repression and legal prohibition which the organisation had so long sought to avoid.

7.1.2 Aryan Nations

When discussing the targets of Aryan Nations, it is important to note that they exist almost exclusively as rhetorical targets and not physical ones. This is primarily for reasons of group survival. In the instances where targets identified in the group's rhetoric have been physically attacked, these attacks have been conducted by members acting individually or by splinter groups imbued with the group's ideology such as the Order. The targets identified by Aryan Nations loosely follow the dichotomy of other religions and apostates, although the distinction is complicated by the issues of race and scriptural deviation, and by the dominant and pervasive role of the Jewish people who are identified as the literal offspring of Satan who are believed to orchestrate a plot to enslave and destroy the Aryan people. An integral part of this plot is the federal government which is seen as being directed by Jewish interests. Non-Aryans, such as blacks and other 'mud peoples', despite their religious orientation, are comprehensively demonised as are those who deviate from

¹⁴ M. Kahane, *Jews and Jews*, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/1651/writings/jew_jew.htm.

scriptural rulings, such as homosexuals. Aryans, who are accused of 'race mixing', collaboration or sympathy with or membership of the aforementioned 'out groups', form the largest and most amorphous target group.

In fact, the primary object of Aryan Nations ire is the Jewish people. For Aryan Nations, as distinct from some other Identity adherents, this is the racial Jew descended from Satan through Cain, an identification which serves to bolster the religious racist dimension of the group's belief system.¹⁵ The demonic dimension of the Jewish people not only arouses communal enmity but also positions them as the "natural enemy of our Aryan (White) Race."¹⁶ Aryan Nations literature offers a large quantity of pseudo-historical and scriptural proofs that the Jews are some form of cosmic foe, and this is related in turn to the presence of people of Jewish descent within American society.¹⁷ The cosmic nature of the Jewish enemy is further amplified through the perception of a global Jewish plot to prevent the realisation of the Aryan peoples destiny, a plot manifested through financial institutions, the media and ultimately ZOG.

It is this last manifestation of Jewish control, through the US federal government, which provides Aryan Nations with an all pervasive temporal enemy and a powerful disincentive for participating in mainstream society. This rejection of government in turn poses a threat to the group: "Christian Aryan Nations has separated itself from this evil and corrupt tyranny and therefore must be destroyed."¹⁸ This acute sense of threat, in turn, makes the government a more urgent target, either in a defensive or offensive capacity. The urgency of the threat posed by the government is exemplified by events such as Ruby Ridge and Waco which imply at the very least the need for accelerated defensive preparations to prevent their reoccurrence. This defensive stance, however, is frequently reversed with suggestions that the only real solution is a 'race war' similar in course and format to the one described in *The Turner Diaries*, a powerful rhetorical device which accords with the messianic precepts of a final battle. The interesting dimension of ZOG as a target group is that it represents a broad array of confessional components and racial

¹⁵ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, 1990, p. 93.

¹⁶ Aryan Nations Website.

¹⁷ See for instance 'Where to look in the Bible for Jews', <http://www.nidlink.com/%7Bwheretolookforniggers.html>., and 'Why Jews are Persecuted for Their Religion', <http://www.nidlink.com/~aryanvic/jewper.html>.

¹⁸ See Aryan Nations Website, <http://www.nidlink.com/~aryanvic/anthrax.html>.

groups but its overriding significance is its function as a tool of the primary, other religious target group, the Jews.

Beyond the scope of other religions or apostates as target groups, there exists the racist dimension of Aryan Nations ideology. The identification of these targets is derived from selective readings of scripture, but the most blatant and simplistic identifications come in the form of Aryan Nations pamphlets and propaganda.¹⁹ Some examples include the "Official Runnin' [*sic*] Nigger Target"²⁰, the "Aryan Nation District of Idaho Nigger Hunting Licence"²¹, and the flyer for the 1981 convocation at Hayden Lake entitled "Summer Conference and Nigger Shoot."²² The latter contains the line: "[c]ivil Right comes out of the barrel of a gun and we mean to give the Niggers and Jews all the Civil Rights they can handle"²³, linking the areas of race and liberal activism. By extension, this target category includes Aryans who have relations with other races. One such publication covers the issue of 'race traitors', claiming that "[m]iscegenation is race treason; Race treason is a capital offense [*sic*]; It will be punished by death, automatic, by Public Hanging. Negroes involved in miscegenation will be shot as they are apprehended."²⁴

A related target group which partly transcends the religious dimension but largely falls under the category of apostate is that of 'liberals'. As with other extremist religious groups, Aryan Nations identifies liberalism with the moral decay of contemporary society and its irreligious nature. Liberal toleration of all things which Aryan Nations is opposed to, such as race mixing, abortion, homosexuality²⁵, immigration of non-whites and the successors to the civil right movement, is a reflection of the group's inherent fundamentalism. Liberals are seen as a dominating force within ZOG, encouraging and institutionalising those practices which the groups finds abhorrent through programmes exemplified by affirmative action and legislation such as the seventeenth amendment and

¹⁹ For some scriptural proofs see "Beast-Chaya-Negro", <http://www.nidlink.com/%7Earyanvic/wheretolookforniggers.html>.

²⁰ Aryan Nations pamphlet A, n.d.

²¹ Aryan Nations pamphlet B, n.d.

²² Aryan Nations, 'Subject Residents of the Aryan Empire: Summer Conference and Nigger Shoot', 1981.

²³ *ibid.*

²⁴ Aryan Nations pamphlet C, n.d.

²⁵ "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is an abomination." Leviticus 18:22. For an Identity treatise on homosexuality see P. Peters, *Intolerance of, Discrimination Against and the Death Penalty for Homosexuals is Prescribed in the Bible*, 1992.

anti-discrimination laws. Thus all target groups - the Jews, government, non-whites, liberals and homosexuals - are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.

Although there is a pronounced gap between the rhetoric and activity of Aryan Nations, instances where individuals or splinters have turned to violence are illustrative of the target types selected. Where individuals have acted, their chosen targets have tended to be Jews, blacks or homosexuals. When a law enforcement official has been targeted, this has been usually in reaction to an impending arrest or similar threat. As will be noted below, the activities of the Order followed a similar pattern. The failure to pursue 'high value' members of these target groups such as prominent members of a community, public persons or high ranking personnel is basically a function of capabilities. From a strictly group perspective, however, rhetoric has not been matched by activity primarily because of fears for group survival in a largely law abiding society with an effective law enforcement apparatus.

7.1.3 Hizballah

The targets identified by Hizballah are familiar to those of most Islamic extremist organisations although, as with all others, they are profoundly influenced by the environmental context. Thus, over time, Hizballah has found itself at various instances targeting foreign intervention forces - primarily the Israelis, rival Islamic organisations and Israel's proxies. The selections of these target groups have been designed for maximum political gain and effect whilst they have reflected both the group's growing sophistication and at times the immediate political imperatives of their chief sponsor Iran. The environmental context within which the group has operated, fundamentally one of a 'lawless zone' during 1982-1990, enabled Hizballah to narrow the gap between rhetoric and activity.

The primary target group for Hizballah has naturally been Israel. In fact Israel is identified not only as an unacceptable foreign influence within Lebanon but also as an illegitimate state entity and therefore an enemy of Islam. The primary objection Fadlallah levels at the 'beast' of Zionism is its claim to Israel:

"[i]t is uncivilised for a people that [once] lived in a certain country to return after thousands of years, demand that country and deport its inhabitants, in order to revive

its [ancient] identity. Additionally, the Israeli claim that Palestine was Jewish is historically inaccurate...Isaac, for example, did not start as a Jew but as prophet and it is not true that everybody is from the seed of Isaac...Their racism, reflected in the phrase 'the chosen people', is a starting point that is condescending and hostile to the world.²⁶

The struggle is defined by emphasising the spiritual superiority and moral righteousness of Hizballah over the Israelis. As Sheikh Nasrallah has described the nature of the conflict:

"[t]wo parties are fighting in Southern Lebanon, the highest hope of a soldier or an officer in one of the parties [the IDF] is to return to his family and home, while the highest hope of an individual of the other party [Hizballah] is to achieve martyrdom. We have a great[er] spiritual superiority."²⁷

In the original Hizballah programme, Israel is identified as the greatest enemy:

"[o]ur primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of Muslim peoples. Therefore our struggle will only end when this entity is obliterated."²⁸

Despite this rhetorical militancy, Hizballah changed progressively in emphasis from a resistance organisation to a stable and unifying political force. Moreover, the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon has resulted in a cessation (or at least tactical suspension) of anti-Israeli activity rather than the pursuit of Israel's elimination, further reflecting the temporal political pragmatism of the group.

Although Israel has represented the primary target of physical violence, it is the Western world and the US in particular which are blamed for many of the problems in the Middle East. The Hizballah manifesto outlines that:

"[w]e shall proceed to fight the vice at its very roots...the first roots of such vice being the United States...Imam Khomeini emphasised on many occasions that America is the cause of all our calamities and that she is the mother of all malice."²⁹

²⁶ MEMRI, Special Dispatch # 35, June 17, 1999.

²⁷ MEMRI, Special Dispatch # 36, June 23, 1999.

²⁸ An open letter "To all the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World", Feb. 26th, 1985. The programme was originally read by Hizballah's then spokesman, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin, at the al-Ouzai mosque in West Beirut.

²⁹ Cited in H. Jaber, *Hizballah: Born With a Vengeance*, 1997, p. 57.

The basis of this hatred is the group's perception that the US supported Israel's 1982 invasion and continued to support the 'alien' Israeli presence in the region and operations in Lebanon since then. The United States and other Western powers have only been physical targets for Hizballah when they have been directly involved in Lebanon as with the French and American contingents of the MNF in 1983, and Western nationals during Hizballah's hostage taking campaign during the 1980s. Following the withdrawal of these contingents and the effective end of the hostage campaign, the West has reverted to being a collective rhetorical target, albeit an extremely potent one, defined primarily by the close association of the US with Israel and, on occasion, by popular perceptions in the West. Statements by Western leaders in the early 1990s, for example, that Islamic fundamentalism posed the next major security threat for the West had the corresponding effect of hardening anti-Western perceptions, especially amongst organisations such as Hizballah. In early 1995, Sheikh Fadlallah reacted to such statements by accusing the US of declaring 'World War' against Islam and that "[t]hey consider that Islam...is a danger to US interests...and the US is mobilising the world, including NATO, against Islam."³⁰ Fadlallah's assessment of Christianity in the modern Western world is that it has failed as a moral force in terms of historical perspective and theological basis, highlighting Hizballah's moral and spiritual superiority. Fadlallah believes that most Westerners:

"have no bias toward religion anymore. There is a reasonable chance that Christianity would penetrate the consciousness of the westerner using his historical baggage and the state of spiritual vacuum in which he finds himself...the West however, is still secular and thus separates religion from the state...the Westerner is not Christian in the profound sense of the word."³¹

While the West, as a target group, has rarely been presented as 'Christian', the sectarian dimension of the Lebanese civil wars provided a more tangible basis for targeting other religious groups. The conflict between Hizballah and the Christian militias during the civil war was partly the result of centuries of second class citizenship of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon, institutionalised through the 1943 National Pact, and partly the result of the close relationship between the Christian community and Israel. Following the

³⁰ *FBIS-NES-95-034*, 21 February, 1995, p. 70.

³¹ *MEMRI*, Special Dispatch # 35, June 17, 1999.

Israeli withdrawal to the southern security zone in 1985, and the eventual prospect of involvement in mainstream politics in 1992 major attempts were made to bridge gaps between the two communities by identifying a common enemy: "Muslims are not your enemies in this country and you are not ours. We both have a common enemy: Israel."³² At a previous ceremony, commemorating a suicide bomber and a martyr, the Deputy-Secretary-General Sheikh Qasim stated:

"[w]e believe in Christ and Christianity, which is part of Islam and interacts with it...But for some people to hide behind a cross, make themselves enemies of the people, and bring Israel once again into our territories, such a comparison is of no use...We are against both the Zionised Maronite and the Zionised Shi'ite."³³

Allegiance to Israel is thus the primary cause of condemnation and hostility.

By the same token, conflict between Hizballah and apostates within Lebanon is also seen in more nationalist terms. During the period of confrontation between Hizballah and Amal in 1988, which was effectively an internecine power struggle for control of Southern Lebanon and southern Beirut, Hizballah adopted a tone of regret. As Sheikh Fadlallah stated, "we consider any internecine fighting in the arena that is sincerely confronting Israel a loss to all sides."³⁴ Again, a different tone is taken regarding those collaborating with Israel, in this case the South Lebanon Army (SLA) many of whose rank and file are Shi'ites. Hizballah identifies members of the SLA as traitors who "should be tried and punished according to the law", an attitude supported by the Lebanese government. In 1996, the government charged more than ninety SLA officers with collaborating with Israel and sentenced them to life imprisonment *in absentia*. The last leader of the SLA, Antoine Lahad, was sentenced to death *in absentia* in December 1996. Despite this condemnation, Hizballah had repeatedly called for militia members to defect and over the years a number did indeed desert.³⁵ Despite these threats of action to be taken against SLA members Hizballah acted with remarkable restraint following Israel's withdrawal in May 2000 as it refrained from punishing SLA members.

³² *Voice of the Oppressed*, 0550 gmt, 12 Sep. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1485, A/12-13, September 14, 1992.

³³ *Radio Lebanon*, 1530 gmt, 29 Aug. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1473, A/13-14, August 31, 1992.

³⁴ *Radio Monte Carlo*, 1750 gmt, 13 May 88 - BBC/SWB, ME/0152, A/6, May 16, 1988.

³⁵ H. Jaber, *Hizballah*, 1997, p. 206-207.

The target groups selected by Hizballah reflect the nature of the group's struggle as a nationalist religious conflict inspired largely by the primarily Islamic Iranian revolution. Hizballah, in common with most Islamic groups, perceives its struggle as a defensive one against the encroachments of the 'illegitimate' Zionist state and those elements of the secular West (primarily the US) which support it.³⁶ Thus the targets chosen have reflected the group's desire to defend the Shi'ite community and the state of Lebanon from external assault and external sponsorship of domestic elements. Despite the activism of Hizballah, a gap remains between the rhetoric concerning Israel (and to a lesser extent the United States) and military activity against Israel. While the totalist version calls for the elimination of the Israeli state, practical considerations militate against pursuing such a course in the immediate future, although the broad time frame within which Hizballah sees itself as operating allows the group a certain degree of flexibility in the pursuit of its long term objectives.

7.1.4 Hamas

Similarly to Hizballah, Hamas sees itself as engaged in a struggle for national liberation and so the targets selected by the group reflect the fundamentally internal nature of the struggle to create a Palestinian state. The primary other religious target group are the Israelis and there is also a rhetorical targeting of those Western states, primarily the US, which supports and arms the state of Israel. The category of apostates is filled by those who have collaborated with the Israelis and, on a more rhetorical level, the PA for attempting to achieve a negotiated peace with the 'Zionist enemy'. The circumstances within which Hamas exists, however, ensure that target selection is justified well beyond mere demonisation and that most apostate targets within the PA are not acted against because not only would this limit the group's appeal to the Palestinian people but divisions within the Palestinian community are blamed on the schemes by Israel undermining Palestinian unity. Therefore, Hamas emphasises its restraint in turning Palestinian brother against brother, deflecting away from the true mission of liberating Palestine from Israeli control.

³⁶ See for example statements such as made by the pro-Hizballah radio station *Voice of the Oppressed*, 0530 gmt, 1 Jun. 92 - BBC/SWB, ME/1397, A/9, June 3, 1992.

In common with all extremist groups, Hamas has frequently used the rhetorical instrument of dehumanising their enemies, primarily the Israelis. One of the more extreme examples refers to the Jews as "brothers of the apes, assassins of the prophets, bloodsuckers, warmongers...Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream."³⁷ Such comments, however, must be seen in the light of the group's image of itself as engaged in a defensive struggle. The Hamas charter, for example, states that the movement is a 'humane' one which "cares for human rights and is committed to the tolerance inherent in Islam as regards attitudes towards other religions. It is only hostile to those who are hostile towards it, or stand in its way in order to disturb its moves or frustrate its efforts."³⁸ With the escalation in the scale of Hamas attacks during the 1990s, the group began to discuss the selection of Israeli targets in reactive and proportional terms. In response to questions about whether killing civilians is justified, one Hamas leader responded:

"[t]hat is the basis but the Israelis never respected that principle and civilian members of our people are killed...Hamas has been and still is anxious not to harm children, woman or elderly people...but mistakes occur sometimes and some members of these groups fall victim, but unintentionally."³⁹

Nonetheless, the continuing justice of the struggle and the legitimacy of attacking Israeli civilians have remained constant themes. In a *fatwa* issued by Sheikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, the legitimacy of targeting Israelis - both military and civilian is clearly outlined:

"[t]he Israeli usurped Palestine, killed its people, and displaced those who stayed...therefore fighting them is a must to protect land and honour...[furthermore] all the Israeli society is a military society because both men and women are soldiers in the [IDF] who are summoned when they are needed. Therefore they are not civilians and killing them is permitted by Islamic law."⁴⁰

While the label of apostate may be attached to Hamas's perceived Islamic foes, this may encompass 'collaborators' who have co-operated with the Israelis, and also the secular PA which has deviated from resistance as a strategy and engaged in negotiated settlement

³⁷ January 1988, cited in Cited in S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, 2000, p. 52.

³⁸ Article 31 of the Hamas Charter.

³⁹ *Al-Hayat*, London, 11 Mar. 96 - BBC/SWB, ME/2559, MED/7, March 13, 1996.

⁴⁰ *Al-Sabil*, March 19-25, 1996.

which will mean territorial compromise with Israel. Targeting collaborators serves the dual purpose of punishing those in league with the enemy and also reduces the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence gathering. With the establishment of the Palestinian autonomous areas, however, this target group has declined considerably. The attitude towards those Palestinians engaged in the peace process is clear. One Hamas leaflet outlines that "[l]et any hand be cut off that signs [away] a grain of sand in Palestine in favour of the enemies of God...who have seized...the blessed land."⁴¹ Despite disputes with the PA, as well as PA repression of Hamas, the group has never risked an open declaration that the Authority itself is an enemy and conducted operations against it. Such a course would invite further repression which would threaten the very existence of the group, further alienate the majority of Palestinians who support the peace process, and also ignore the fact that despite their differences Hamas and the PA have frequently found much common ground.⁴² A good example of this was the muted response to the March 1998 killing of Muhiya al-Din al-Sharif, a senior Izz al-Din al-Qassam leader. While Hamas openly accused the PA of complicity in his death, the group was careful not to let this lead to full-scale protest which would have incurred severe reprisals.⁴³

The identification of target groups by Hamas reflects the group's orientation as both a resistor of occupation and the true successor to the leadership of the Palestinian people in a complete Palestinian state. The rhetoric used to identify targets and legitimise violence against them, however, is severely moderated by pragmatic considerations. Even though the Israeli people are the primary target, much of the organisation's Manichean rhetoric is tempered by claims that Hamas is waging a defensive struggle and that this struggle is primarily proportional in nature. Those countries which have aided Israel are also vilified, but, because they lie beyond Hamas's operational environment, they remain rhetorical targets which help place the Palestinian struggle in a wider, global context. Palestinians, who have collaborated with the Israelis, have formed an obvious target category and yet the Palestinian Authority which dares to compromise with Israel and has at times actively

⁴¹ March 13, 1988. Cited in S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p. 51.

⁴² Hamas has encouraged its members not to antagonise members of the Palestinian police, and even to cultivate them as possible resources in the struggle against Israel. *ibid.*, p. 140.

⁴³ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p. 110.

suppressed Hamas, is not targeted in an active fashion because the onus of blame for a divided Palestinian community is placed with Israel.

7.2 Core

7.2.1 Eyal

Like Kach (the parent movement which inspired it), Eyal targeted both Palestinian Arabs and liberal Jews, especially those who actively supported the peace process. Due to the small size of the group and the unusual circumstances behind its formation, there was a large gap between the rhetoric directed at these groups and the action taken against them. The much publicised vow taken by Eyal activists involved a commitment to do injury to Arabs and to oppose with violence any withdrawal from the territories is illustrative of this. It is important to note that had the group been better organised and not so thoroughly penetrated by the GSS, this gap could have been narrowed considerably.

Most of the actions taken against both Arabs and Jews were of a relatively low order, expressing the group's militant orientation without attracting unwanted attention from the Israeli security services. When Raviv moved to Kiryat Arba in 1994, he frequently organised attacks on Arabs and Arab property in the alleyways of Hebron in which he frequently participated.⁴⁴ The objective was not so much to kill Arabs but to inflict a degree of physical and psychological harm in a reasonably permissive environment, an approach which reflected the tactics of Kach. While conducted on a lesser scale, left-wing and liberal Jews were also targeted by Eyal, most commonly through abuse, threats and assaults. In this light, it is not surprising that some of Avashai Raviv's early activities included beating up activists of the left-wing group Yesha Gvul ('There's a Limit') who advocated the refusal of military service in Lebanon or the occupied territories. The only crime for which Raviv served any time (nine months) was the assault on Tamar Gozansky, a Knesset member for the leftist Democratic Front for Peace⁴⁵. Despite the low level of these actions, the rhetoric and ideology of the group certainly

⁴⁴ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin*, 1998, pp. 218-219.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 215 & 218-219.

allowed for an expansion of these activities. An Israel television Channel One interview, with an unidentified Eyal activist, is instructive in this regard:

Interviewer: "Who [would you kill]?"

Activist: "Whoever I am told"

Interviewer: "Arabs?"

Activist: "Whether it is a terrorist or just an Arab, everybody"

Interviewer: "If you were told to kill Jews?"

Activist: "There are Jews who are not Jews, in my view"

Interviewer: "If you were told to kill Jews, will you kill them too?"

Activist: "If it is a Jew who is not a Jew, and people can understand to whom I am referring, then yes."⁴⁶

It was the latter category of Jewish targets which brought Eyal to international infamy when the group was associated with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. The targeting of Jews with the intent to kill is a disturbing feature of Jewish extremism in the 1990s and is directly linked to the peace process. Tension between the Israeli left and right had existed for some time, sometimes in the form of violent demonstrations and provocative counter-demonstrations. In 1983, Emil Greentzweig, a peace now demonstrator, became the first fatality of this societal conflict when a grenade was thrown into a Peace Now rally.⁴⁷ The difference, after the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993, was the perception that a leftist, liberal government had betrayed the redemptive vision of a greater Israel and the concurrent revival by orthodox rabbis of the obsolete Halakhic concepts of *din rodef* (the duty to kill a Jew who endangers another Jew's life or property) and *din moser* (the duty to kill a Jew who intends to turn another Jew over to gentile authorities)⁴⁸.

While there were many individuals responsible for the creation and progress of the peace process, and an even greater number which supported it, the ire of Eyal and other extremist Jewish groups was generally directed primarily at Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon

⁴⁶ FBIS-TOT-96-01-L, 'Profile of Extreme Jewish Right-Wing Movements', November 9, 1995.

⁴⁷ The perpetrator, Yonah Abrushmi, while inspired by right wing rhetoric appears to have no identifiable group affiliation and was motivated by personal reasons.

⁴⁸ I. Shahak & N. Mezvinsky, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, 1999, pp. 137-149.

Peres. The two were seen as almost equally culpable. As one Eyal member, Dror Adani, stated:

"Let us say that both should be defined as murderers who should be sentenced to death; however we did not decide who was to go first. It is possible that seeing Rabin was easy to get, we might have gone after Peres as well."⁴⁹

Indeed, on the night of the assassination, Yigal Amir saw Shimon Peres first and he was guarded even more loosely than Rabin, but Amir waited for the target he regarded as primarily culpable for the 'murder' of Jews.⁵⁰ In the sense that the assassination of Rabin alone was regarded as sufficient to alter the Israeli political *status quo*, a millenarian comparison can be made with the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 when the act was less part of a concerted strategy and more an attempt to restore the political process to the path of divine fulfilment through a single, symbolic act.⁵¹

The gap between rhetoric and action in Eyal's case was a function of the group's small size, its short life span and its penetration by the GSS. In light of this gap, it is, however, important to note that it was the rhetoric of the group (and those themes espoused by the group which were reflected throughout the Israeli extreme right) which inspired the assassination of Rabin. In terms of its world outlook, Eyal represented a militant development of Kahanist ideology in light of the advancing Israeli-Palestinian peace process and as such traditional target priorities had altered. Targeting the Palestinian community remained a constant, but the danger posed by the apostate elements within Israeli society and Israeli politics was perceived to have grown to such an extent that more extreme action than any considered in the past was required.

7.2.2 The Order

The rhetorical targets of the Order were very similar in content to those of most other extreme right-wing groups. The major difference being that the Order decided to act and once this decision had been made, target selection became driven by circumstance and expedience. Practical constraints, such as the size and capabilities of the group, overall strategy and the security environment within which they operated, meant that the targets

⁴⁹ FBIS-NES-95-226, 'Suspect Names Rabbi Consulted on Assassination Plan', November 23, 1995.

⁵⁰ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, p. 176-177.

⁵¹ M. Taylor & E. Quayle, *Terrorist Lives*, 1994, p. 216.

selected differed appreciably from the rhetorical ones. There were, for example, no attempts to kill blacks and other 'mud peoples', nor was any concerted effort made to attack the federal government and its agents: despite the fact that America was (and still is by unrepentant members) seen as "the murderer of the White Race."⁵²

Considering the racial and anti-government beliefs and rhetoric of the group it is perhaps surprising that the first death the group was responsible for was a member of Aryan Nations, Walter West. West was a member of Aryan Nations and soon after the Order began committing armed robberies, it was reported to Mathews that West had been getting drunk in bars around Hayden Lake and talking loudly about a group of 'religiously motivated men' robbing banks. In May 1984, West was lured to the Kaniksu national forest and murdered.⁵³ West no doubt falls under the category of a 'traitor' for the extreme right, but he might be more accurately described as a security risk - the label of 'apostate' seems wholly inappropriate.⁵⁴ The killing was not surprising because of the group's obsessive need for secrecy in its embryonic stage, and the example of eliminating untrustworthy fellow Aryans offered by the *Turner Diaries*.

When Mathews began to think of specific targets for assassination, the actual list reflected both the group's ideology and his own preferences. At the top was Morris Dees, head of the Southern Poverty Law Centre and the Klanwatch project.⁵⁵ Next was the television producer Norman Lear, who was held responsible for debasing popular culture, and third was the controversial Jewish talk radio host Alan Berg. There was a so-called 'doomsday assassination plan' which was to be enacted if the group was discovered, and this included Henry Kissinger, and the Rothschild and Rockefeller families, members of Congress and various other public figures.⁵⁶ In the end, the only assassination the group carried out was that of Alan Berg, mainly because the circumstances were fortuitous. The fact that Berg was actually Jewish, however, was not the primary consideration (merely an added bonus). Berg - like all the others the group considered as targets - was symbolic of

⁵² D. Lane, *Tri-Coloured Treason*, n.p., n.d.

⁵³ See K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, 1990, pp. 203-208.

⁵⁴ Claims that West beat his wife, drank heavily and was generally not a true, wholesome Aryan possibly made the decision to end his life easier.

⁵⁵ According to Dees Mathews intended to kidnap him, torture him to extract as much information as possible and then kill him. See M. Dees & J. Corcoran, *Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat*, 1996, p. 144.

⁵⁶ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 233-235.

the 'great sickness' which the Order felt had fallen across America, a sickness involving many but orchestrated by the Jews: "[i]t is self evident to all those who have eyes to see that an evil shadow has fallen across our once fair land" stated Mathews in his declaration of war against ZOG:

"evidence abounds that a certain alien people have taken control of our people...Our cities swarm with dusky hordes...[and] the capitalists and communists pick gleefully at our bones while the vile hook-nosed masters of usury orchestrate our destruction."⁵⁷

The targets chosen to be killed were intended both to disconcert their broad array of enemies and to show Americans that the extreme right was not toothless.

It is indicative of the short life span of the group that no concerted efforts were made to attack individuals associated with the federal government. The only examples where individuals in the employ of the federal government were targeted were purely defensive. Mathews shot at federal agents when they attempted to arrest him in Portland, Oregon, and again when he was besieged in the house on Whidbey Island. Another member, David Tate, killed one Missouri state trooper and wounded another when they tried to arrest him in April 1985.⁵⁸ All these examples, however, represent self-defence and not intentional targeting. This does not mean that the group was not prepared for a confrontation with the state. When the FBI and local law enforcement raided Gary Yarborough's house in October 1983, apart from an assortment of weapons and explosives, they found a list of local law enforcement officers which included names, addresses, photographs and licence plate numbers.⁵⁹

The rhetorical target groups reflected the origins of the Order as a militant splinter of the racist extreme right but those that were actually attacked, or that the group planned to attack, reflected the self-styled nature of the group as a revolutionary vanguard. This explains why there were practically no random or indiscriminate attacks on the group's racial enemies or on the federal government. Such attacks would certainly have come later had the Order had a chance to mature and the group expected wide spread attacks of this sort to result from the revolution they had begun.

⁵⁷ Cited in M. Dees and J. Corcoran, *Gathering Storm*, pp. 141-142.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 24.

⁵⁹ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 374.

7.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

At the most obvious level the primary rhetorical and physical targets of the PIJ are Jews and the 'Zionist entity'. The PIJ identifies itself, like Hamas, as waging a war to liberate the Palestinian lands annexed by Israel in the immediate context and also as part of a broader struggle to liberate the entire Muslim community from Western cultural dominance. The two struggles are ideologically twinned, the West being identified as pro-Israeli and anti-Muslim and therefore anti-Palestinian. As far as apostates are concerned, the PIJ has physically attacked collaborators although its opposition to the PA remains largely rhetorical. The gap between the rhetoric directed at all target groups and the action taken against them is indicative of the group's small size and limited resources, and the group's awareness both of these shortcomings and the need to clearly define itself as an Islamic revolutionary organisation.

Within Israel, the targets selected once again reflect the capabilities of the group and the security environment within which it operates. Stabbings and shootings of individual Israeli citizens attack the primary target group in a cost effective and operationally basic way. By contrast, the PIJ bombings have been directed at larger scale civilian targets such as buses and market places, and in the rare instances where they have been directed at military targets these have been of the 'soft' variety such as military check points or small concentrations of soldiers outside military installations and at low state of readiness targets such as bus stops. All such attacks were tempered by the operational resources at the group's disposal, while the rhetoric is essential to reaffirm the groups beliefs and objectives. For example, following the assassination of the PIJ's leader Fathi Shiqaqi in October 1995 the group vowed revenge: "[w]e will take revenge wherever it is in the world. We assure the Zionists and their leader Rabin that this repugnant crime has turned every Zionist wherever he is on earth into a target for our fighters and our suicide bombers."⁶⁰ In this case the threat was basically a rhetorical one due to the limited capabilities of the group.

The PIJ also targets on the rhetorical level those states and interests which are sympathetic to Israel according to the group's perception of the regional political context

⁶⁰ *AFP*, 29 October, 1995.

and dynamics. The primary target is the United States because of its long term support for Israel and its role in brokering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The scope of this rhetoric, however, can be expanded to encompass any state which supports the 'American-Zionist' cause. During the second Gulf War, for example, the PIJ leaders in Amman declared a jihad against the interests of all the twenty-nine countries making up the coalition and Israel. One of the organisation's leaders, Sheikh Asad Tamini, told the press that he had issued a religious edict permitting strikes saying "[w]e have issued instructions about suicide attacks against these interests."⁶¹ No attacks, however, ensued and it is unlikely that the group would have been able to make any outside Israel proper because of the concentration of the group's limited resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such rhetorical identification of enemies merely serves the purpose of situating the group within the broader regional political context and appealing to a sympathetic constituency.

Like Hamas the PIJ has had difficult relations with secular Palestinian groups, although before the establishment of the PA these relations were better than that of Hamas because the PIJ was not providing a political and social alternative to the PLO in the occupied territories.⁶² By the same token, the major criticism the PIJ made against Fatah was their abandonment of Islamic values, and although calls were made to reject secularism and return to Islam these were not threatening in nature.⁶³ Since the establishment of the PA, however, this situation has changed. There have been occasions nevertheless when PA activities, especially security clamp downs on the PIJ and Hamas, have led to an intensification of hostile rhetoric against the PA and in some cases sporadic violence. In the wake of the 1994 killing of Hani Abed, angry mourners blamed Yasser Arafat (despite agreement that the Israelis were responsible), and Ramadan Abdullah Shallah warned that in future "the guns of Jihad will not be able to distinguish between an Israeli soldier and the Palestinian police."⁶⁴ The PIJ, however, has always found itself in such an inferior position - even more so than Hamas - that openly declaring hostilities and acting upon such a declaration would pose a major threat to group survival.

⁶¹ *INA*, 2017 gmt, 21 Jan. 91 - *BBC/SWB*, ME/0977, A/8, 23 January, 1991. This statement was made on 21 January, a day after a speech by Sadaam Hussein calling for all Muslims to declare jihad.

⁶² Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, p. 114.

⁶³ *ibid.*, p. 111-114.

⁶⁴ *Time*, November 21, 1994.

The target groups selected by the PIJ are very similar to Hamas, being Israeli (Jewish) citizens with constant rhetorical attacks made on Israel's supporters and on the PA. The rhetoric against all types is essential for defining the group's cause and objectives especially in religious opposition to the Israeli state. This rhetoric is frequently not translated into action. The PIJ is a much smaller group than Hamas, without a considerable popular support base and so fear of repression is correspondingly higher. Being relatively smaller the PIJ is also more prone to the constraints posed by lack of resources and trained personnel, further limiting the degree to which operations can be matched to group pronouncements.

7.3 Messianic/Apocalyptic

7.3.1 Jewish Underground

The Jewish Underground showed its concentration on targets to be a mixture of other religions in the form of Palestinian Muslims and a symbolic place in the form of the Dome of the Rock. The two major attacks conducted against Palestinians and two other planned attacks reflected a desire for revenge - a defensive reaction to Palestinian violence. The proposed attack on the Dome of the Rock, not only represented a symbolic attack on Muslims generally, but was also meant as a practical step towards achieving Jewish messianic redemption. It is significant that the group did not engage in significant acts of violence against other Jews, a function of priority, the group's relatively short life span, its nationalist origins and the absence of direct political dialogue between the Israeli government and the PLO, or serious public consideration of allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Although the Jewish Underground began as a messianic organisation concerned not so much with targeting specific groups but with fulfilling religious destiny, the only operations the group was able to carry out involved the targeting of the Palestinian population. This temporal side-track was motivated by a desire for revenge in the wake of Palestinian attacks on the Jewish population in Hebron. The targets selected in the first two cases were proportional and symbolic - Arab mayors were targeted in response to the murder of six Yeshiva students and the Islamic college was attacked in response to the

murder of another Yeshiva student. The plan to blow up five Palestinian buses marked a departure from proportional reactive acts of violence to indiscriminate ones.⁶⁵ Palestinians in this case were identified as an unacceptable 'other' against whom extra-legal activities could be directed. During the Jewish Underground trial the accused remained unrepentant and Yehuda Etzion told the court that he was 'privileged' to have participated in the attack on the Arab mayors which he referred to as "the action of cutting off the legs of some of the murderers" while emphatically denying that these attacks could be presented as criminal acts.

While the significance of the Dome of the Rock as a physical target has been examined in Chapter Six, the proposed attack was indicative of the group's attitude to the broader potential target group of gentiles generally of which the Palestinians were merely the most obvious and immediate threat. The destruction of the Dome of the Rock was supposed to trigger a transformation of the state of Israel to the kingdom of Israel, "a kingdom of priests capable of actualising the laws of destiny and changing the nature of the world."⁶⁶ This transformation relied on the religious precept that the Jewish people lead a life of *destiny* while the gentiles merely lead a life of *existence*.⁶⁷ Once this destiny began to be realised all gentiles, not just those Arabs within the territorial confines of the state of Israel, would be subject to the Torah law of 'stranger aliens' where non-Jews must recognise Jewish hegemony and a failure to do so would lead to subjugation. While this was certainly true of the biblical land of Israel⁶⁸, the messianic message (implicit to all the revealed religions) is that Judaism will triumph over the other faiths and dominate the temporal and spiritual realms by whatever means.

Given the Jewish Underground's rejection of mainstream Gush Emunim ideology of subservience to the temporal government of Israel it is perhaps surprising that the group did not target elements within the government or other 'apostate Jews' whose activities threatened the Jewish messianic process.⁶⁹ The formation of the group itself was a reaction

⁶⁵ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Jewish Underground', in D.C. Rapoport (ed.), *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, 1988, p. 210.

⁶⁶ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 207.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Etzion's biblical Israel would have included the Sinai, Jordan, Syria and parts of Lebanon and Iraq.

⁶⁹ It has been suggested however that the timing of the plot to blow up Arab buses (which before the *Intifada* Jews used), after the Jewish Sabbath had begun would by definition kill only non-religious Jews and that this

to the 1978 Camp David Accords, an event which was identified as reversing the messianic process that had received a spectacular impetus with the gains of the Six Day War. Although Menachim Begin's actions were regarded in some circles as treacherous and Etzion himself did not see the secular leaders as legitimate, he did not place the blame with them as would later manifestations of the Jewish extreme right.⁷⁰ The primary reason for this was Etzion's essentially otherworldly interpretation of historical events. Camp David was seen as merely a set-back (albeit a major one) and not a disaster. The secular government of Israel had not betrayed the Jewish people it had simply not come to the same conclusions about messianic destiny at the same time as the settler movement. Blame therefore lay elsewhere, beyond the Jewish community - both secular and religious.

The secretive nature of the Jewish Underground means that it is difficult to say that there was a gap between the rhetoric of the group and its actions. Even in the case of the proposed bombing of the Dome of the Rock, the reason for postponing the operation indefinitely was the failure to obtain clerical sanction. The clearest features of the Underground's targets were the group's identification of traditional target groups centred around ancient scriptural guarantees concerning the possession of land and the importance of this possession for the fulfilment of a messianic promise, and the placement of blame - and therefore the selection of targets - clearly outside the Jewish community.

7.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo

As an avowedly apocalyptic group, Aum was by definition opposed to all other religious groups, although special note was made of other Japanese new age religious movements and Judaism. All those outside the immediate Aum belief system could therefore be called other religious. As a composite religion, the group possessed no firmly entrenched inherited animosities as the revealed religions (and others) do, although hatred of the Jews was adopted from the inherited Christian tradition. The number of victims of Aum's acts, arranged in decreasing order, were members of the group itself, innocent bystanders, lawyers and other individuals such as relatives of members who opposed the group. This first category could be described as apostates being largely composed of

was approved by the rabbis who sanctioned the operation. See I. Shahak & N. Mezvinsky, *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, pp. 138-139.

⁷⁰ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism', p. 205.

members who wanted to leave the organisation. With the exception of the innocent bystanders who are the inevitable outcome of indiscriminate acts of terrorism, all the other individuals represented a clear and immediate threat to the organisation (real or imagined) and were dealt with accordingly. Aum's apocalyptic belief system and rejection of mainstream society ensured that the scope of potential targets was almost boundless although attacking these targets was dictated by capability and circumstance.

The religious organisations which Aum vilified the most were the Moonies Unification Church and the Japanese sect Soka Gakkai. The interesting point here is that all three organisations resembled each other in terms of being (to one degree or another) aggressive proselytisers, possessing extensive financial interests and holding unorthodox ideologies centred around an eschatological promise. Asahara himself had been a member of another new religious movement, Agonshu, in the early 1980s from where he drew many of his later religious principles.⁷¹ Aum employed both groups as scapegoats on a frequent basis. During the uproar following the Sakamoto killings Asahara suggested that Soka Gakkai were responsible, and the group's leader, Daisaku Ikeda, appeared on Aum's 1995 list of "black-hearted aristocrats who have sold their souls to the devil."⁷² Ikeda was also the target of Aum's first attempt to use sarin in 1994. These groups were targeted mainly because they were perceived as competitors in the crowded market place of Japanese new religious movements.

Aum also adopted the Jews as a rhetorical target group, a decision influenced by the large literature on Jewish conspiracy theories.⁷³ In 1995, the sect embraced anti-Semitism by officially declaring war on the Jewish people and acknowledging ideas of a world Jewish conspiracy bent on engineering a series of massacres which would severely reduce the earth's population.⁷⁴ In a special edition of *Vajrayana Sacca*, entitled 'Manual of Fear', an article claimed that:

⁷¹ R.J. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save it: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism*, 1999, p. 18-19.

⁷² D. Brackett, *Holy War: Armageddon in Tokyo*, 1996, pp. 25 & 106.

⁷³ Together with the Jews and sometimes used interchangeably were the ubiquitous freemasons. Asahara believed the Freemasons were plotting Armageddon because "they believe the reign of Christ will not come unless the final war is fought", *A Doom is Approaching the Land of the Rising Sun*.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, p. 107-108.

"[o]n behalf of the world's 5.5 billion people, *Vajrayana Sacca* hereby formally declares war on the 'world shadow government' that murders untold numbers of people and, while hiding behind sonorous phrases and high-sounding principles, plans to brainwash and control the rest. Japanese awake! The hidden enemy's plot has long since torn our lives to shreds."⁷⁵

The term 'Jewish' was also extended to encompass groups like the Moonies and Soka Gakkai, not as a form of religious identification but as part of the process of creating a monolithic, conspiratorial other.⁷⁶ Interestingly enough, despite this rhetoric Jewish interests or Jews themselves were never actually targeted.

The primary rhetorical target identified by Aum was the US but again this group was never specifically attacked.⁷⁷ The United States featured consistently as a major participant in Aum's apocalyptic scenarios of a cataclysmic world war and was frequently blamed for trying to poison Aum compounds by spraying them with chemical and biological agents from the air. In early 1995, Aum called a press conference to announce that they had been attacked by American or Japanese aircraft, referring specifically to the use of sarin against Aum.⁷⁸ Aum perceived the links between the US and Japan as sufficiently close to regard the two entities as synonymous, or Japan as subservient to US interests. As a consequence members of the Japanese royal family, government, police and intelligence services were frequently referred to as the 'lackeys' of the US and in many cases featured on an Aum 'hit list'.⁷⁹

The largest target category in terms of fatalities were apostates - members and former members of Aum itself. In 1989, Aum reached a crisis point regarding violence.⁸⁰ A young follower Shuji Taguchi had witnessed the death of another Aum member

⁷⁵ Cited in D.W. Brackett, *Holy Terror*, pp. 107-108. The Aum Shinrikyo website contains a copy of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as 'proof' (<http://Aum-shinrikyo.com/english/masons/masons.htm>).

⁷⁶ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum*, 1996, p. 220.

⁷⁷ D.W. Brackett has suggested that the group planned to assassinate President Clinton when he attended the November 1995 APEC conference in Osaka and to mail sarin packages to the US in the hope of employing the agent there. See *Holy Terror*, pp. 105-107. The group also allegedly released botulinus toxin near American naval installations at Yokohama and Yokosuka without any effect, see R.J. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save it*, p. 187.

⁷⁸ R.J. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save it*, p. 42-43.

⁷⁹ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 218-219.

⁸⁰ It is worth noting that Aum Shinrikyo was applied for official religious status under Japan's Religious Corporation Law in spring of 1989 and it was granted in August that year. The primary purpose was to avoid taxes.

receiving 'treatment'.⁸¹ Taguchi sought to leave and when his intentions were discovered he received various 'treatments' and was then murdered. Both the deaths were kept secret and the bodies cremated at the Aum Mount Fuji compound. It is estimated that up to fifty-six ordained members of the group were murdered or considered 'missing'. It is also reported that there were twenty-one deaths in the Aum Shinrikyo hospital which catered both for group members and their families.⁸² Many of the former group of victims were killed because they wished to leave the cult and might expose its activities to the outside world, and the remainder were 'accidental' deaths caused by experimentation with various 'treatments' or 'training sessions'.⁸³ In some cases members or members relatives were subjected to harmful treatments or disposed of for financial gain.⁸⁴

The next major target category was composed of those that posed a direct threat to the operations or survival of the group. In November 1989, a further escalation of violence was taken when a human rights lawyer, Tsutsumi Sakamoto, his wife and child were murdered and their bodies disposed of. Sakamoto had formed an organisation called the Society of Aum Supreme Truth Victims which was composed primarily of parents anxious for the cult to return their children. Sakamoto had decided to sue Aum for fraud and false advertising in connection with activities such as the 'initiation of blood', an action which would have seriously damaged the reputation of the group and discredited the guru himself.⁸⁵ Further attacks were conducted against members of the Victims Association and journalists such as Shoko Egawa who were investigating the group.⁸⁶ In 1994, the group launched its first sarin attack in the town of Matsumoto. The target was a group of three judges who were due to hand down a ruling in a land dispute involving Aum. Asahara decided to kill the judges in order to delay the judgement and to preserve the group's Matsumoto branch. The judges survived but seven people died and 144 were

⁸¹ The man had wanted to leave the cult and the 'treatment' of repeated dunking in ice cold water was meant to cure what the guru diagnosed as 'mental instability'. See D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of The World*, p. 35.

⁸² M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. X, # 4, 1998, p. 89.

⁸³ Treatments and training sessions for Aum members included the extensive use of hallucinogenic drugs, immersion in extremely hot and cold water and confinement in small dark spaces for several days.

⁸⁴ R.J. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save it*, p. 140.

⁸⁵ The cult claimed that the gurus blood contained magical powers and if consumed would grant 'supernatural' powers. Sakamotos action was inspired by a disappointed former member who had been left untransformed by the 'initiation'. See D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, p. 33 & 38.

⁸⁶ R.J. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save it*, p. 40.

hospitalised.⁸⁷ After the subway attacks there were two more significant events perpetrated by Aum. The first was the near fatal shooting of the head of the National Police Agency on March 30, and the second was the explosion of a letter bomb intended for the newly elected mayor of Tokyo on May 16.⁸⁸

Beyond specific target groups, both rhetorical and actual, Aum's perception of potential targets were theoretically extended to all non-group members. Yoshihiro Inoue, the group's 'Intelligence Minister', stated at Asahara's trial that "[w]e regarded the world outside as evil, and destroying evil was salvation."⁸⁹ The group's historical expectation was that some form of apocalypse was imminent, and all those that did not subscribe wholeheartedly to Aum's belief system were destined to perish. This attitude is reflected in the indiscriminate nerve gas attacks the group conducted. While these and other attacks were tactical in nature, designed to preserve the group's security, the expectation and preparations for an inevitable 'final battle' were very real, as was the expectation that Aum as a movement or most of it would prevail and reign supreme in a post-apocalyptic order.

The targets selected by Aum Shinrikyo represented both the group's world view and were in turn influenced by the many sources from which the group derived its ideological framework. The targets identified may be divided into rhetorical ones such as the US or the Jews which were not actually attacked but helped define the magnitude of the opposition the group faced, other new religious movements which posed a threat to Aum as competitors and who were occasionally attacked, and those who openly opposed the group either from within or without. While the group expected an apocalyptic war in the near future and considered all outside the group as damned, indiscriminate violence on a massive scale according to the group itself would not begin until the apocalypse. In this respect then the groups targeting (and many of its activities), at least until the end, more closely represent those of an introverted and paranoid criminal organisation.

7.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan

The primary target group of the Ikhwan throughout its short existence was the Saudi regime. The rhetoric of the Ikhwan condemned the government and the clerical

⁸⁷ M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today', p. 91.

⁸⁸ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 261 & 282.

⁸⁹ *The Times*, March 29, 1997.

establishment as illegitimate and for deviating from the 'true path' of Islam. The Ikhwan also denounced the West for supporting the Saudi regime, for exploiting the region generally and for debasing Islam by introducing secular ideologies and practices. While these themes identified apostate enemies in the form of the regime, its supporters and agents, and other religions (the West was invariably referred to as 'Christian') the group by virtue of its messianic beliefs was also universalistic in its outlook. The definition of corrupt rulers was extended to all regimes and the presence and machinations of the West in the Middle East were a threat to Islam itself, not merely the Saudi kingdom. The attack on the Grand Mosque thus represented an attempt to destabilise the Saudi regime but was also intended as a major step towards renewing Islam and continuing the jihad against Islam's enemies.

The primary target of the Ikhwan was the Al-Saud family and the religious authorities which supported them. In a series of letters published in 1978 and 1979, Juhayman Utaybi blamed Saudi Arabia's economic, social, religious and political problems and fractures on the adoption of Western, modern ideas and methods, and on the 1744 religio-political alliance between the Muhammad al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud.⁹⁰ The Saudi regime was viewed as illegitimate, subservient to Western interests and guilty of apostasy.⁹¹ Utaybi said of the regime "[o]ur belief is that the continued rule [of these leaders] is a destruction of God's religion even if they pretend to uphold Islam. We ask God to relieve us of them all."⁹² Apart from the Royal family, the Ikhwan also heavily criticised the Saudi religious establishment which was regarded as legitimising a corrupt government. Most significant of those theologians specifically named was Sheikh Abdul Aziz ibn Baz, Chairman of the Supreme Religious Council. Utaybi claimed that Ibn Baz was "in the pay of the al-Sauds, little better than a tool for the family's manipulation of the people...[he] may know his Sunna well enough, but he uses it to bolster corrupt rulers."⁹³

⁹⁰ J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi's "Letters" to the Saudi People', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXX, # 1, 1990, p. 2

⁹¹ It is interesting to note that both the Ikhwan and the Egyptian Takfir wal Hijra were labelled by the authorities as *khawarij*, a derogatory term drawn from the Kharajites, early schismatics in the Muslim community.

⁹² Cited in J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 13.

⁹³ Cited in J. Kechichian, 'The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. XVIII, p. 59.

The secondary rhetorical target was the West, primarily the United States. This target group was held responsible for corrupting Saudi society in alliance with the Saudi regime, exploiting Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Persian Gulf and for rejecting the true faith. During the Ikhwan's occupation of the mosque the core of the group's political message was delivered over the public loudspeaker system. The five main points called for a cessation of diplomatic relations with 'exploitative' Western states, the end of petroleum exports to the United States because of its hostility to Islam and the expulsion of all military and civilian experts from the Arabian Peninsula.⁹⁴ This hostility was held to be a constant since the formation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932 when King Abdul Aziz "allied himself with the Christians [the British and Americans] and stopped the Jihad outside the Peninsula."⁹⁵

While most of the pronouncements made by the Ikhwan were directed at the Saudi regime and Western influence within Saudi Arabia there was also a universalist dimension addressed to the entire Islamic community. In his first letter Utaybi stated that "[a]ll Muslims are living under imposed rulers who do not uphold the religion. We owe obedience only to those who lead by God's book. Those who lead the Muslims with differing laws and systems...their mandate to rule is nil."⁹⁶ The Ikhwan also looked to the broader threats to Islam such as the Christian West and in this light the group saw itself as continuing the original Ikhwan's jihad in an attempt to bring about a promised messianic order.⁹⁷ While the actual targets of the Ikhwan when they defended the Grand Mosque were members of the Saudi armed forces, it remains unclear to what extent members of the group saw their enemies in a messianic light as servants of the forces of darkness. It is, however, reported that as the surviving members of the Ikhwan were led away into captivity, one of their number asked a National Guardsman "[w]hat of the army of the North?" in reference to the prophecy described by Ibn Khaldun, implying that the expected messianic foe had failed to materialise.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 12.

⁹⁵ Utaybi cited in Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism', p. 13.

⁹⁶ Cited in Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism', pp. 12-13.

⁹⁷ M. Faksh, *The Future of Islam in the Middle East: Fundamentalism in Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia*, 1997, pp. 91-93.

⁹⁸ J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan', in D. Holden & R. Johns (eds.), *The House of Saud*, 1981, p. 526. It is interesting to note that the concept of an 'army from the north' is adopted by Hal Lindsay in his *Late*

The primary target group of the Saudi Ikhwan was the Saudi regime whose decadence, corruption and alliances with the West had led to abandoning Islam. Thus the group represented a classic fundamentalist critique of an Arab government, couched within a belief in the imminent fulfilment of the Islamic messianic promise. The Saudi regime, however, denied that the group had any political demands and placed great emphasis on the (illegitimate) messianic expectations. In the words of (then) Crown Prince Fahd, "the insurgents had no demands or objectives other than [those of] the proclaimed Mahdi, and the whole matter does not exceed an empty dream and empty words."⁹⁹ The target groups, however, were seen as immediate impediments to the expected messianic era and in the event that the insurrection had succeeded, the messianic era would have been expressed in a caliphate type rulership.

7.4 Conclusion

The selection of targets by a group depends upon the ideology of a particular organisation which in turn is influenced by the history and conditions of the environment within which the group exists. Due to various constraining factors, however, there will always exist a gap between the rhetoric directed at a target group and actual violent acts perpetrated against such a group. All groups face constraints imposed by capabilities and opportunity as must be the case in an uneven struggle against an overwhelmingly stronger enemy. In the case of mainstream organisations these constraints are bolstered by the need to avoid actions which will endanger their political and social activities, and in many cases the rhetoric itself must remain flexible to enable political opportunities to be exploited. For core organisations the gap between rhetoric and activity is potentially larger because these groups tend to be smaller and yet more violent due to their rejection of mainstream activities. Even in cases where a group's ideology does sanction an almost limitless array of targets - that is anyone outside the group itself - as is the case with some messianic and apocalyptic groups, there are always constraints imposed by capabilities and opportunities. In many cases, the gap between rhetoric and reality is often a function of psychological

Great Planet Earth (1970, Ch. 5), as the opposing force in the Christian Apocalyptic (in his case identified as Russia not Syria) which will invade Israel for the final battle. The reference is derived from Ezekiel 38: 15-16.

⁹⁹ A. Al-Yasini, *Religion and the State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, 1983, p. 127. One of the official theses offered likened Utaybi's Ikhwan to the Jim Jones cult which committed mass suicide in Guyana in 1978.

warfare, inducing and inspiring fear in the enemy target. Indeed, for the messianic groups examined here - particularly groups from orthodox traditions - the sanctioning of limitless target groups does not necessarily mean they will actually be attacked because the group considers or conducts a spectacular and symbolic act intended to trigger the final stages of a messianic process, a process which will culminate in the destruction of these groups through agents other than the group itself, both temporal and spiritual.

Chapter VIII

Tactics

The tactics employed by violent religious groups are superficially similar to those used by extremist secular organisations. The primary differences lie in the scale and scope with which these tactics are employed, and - according to some scholars - due to the totalist and dualistic nature of extreme religious ideology, the possibility of such groups employing some form of unconventional weapon. The tactical programme pursued by a group depends of course on the type of the organisation and the environment in which they operate. Most scholars ignore the fact that most groups operate within so-called 'red lines', conditioned by environment and the internal dynamics within groups, that often serve to actually constrain the conduct of violence. Mainstream groups will primarily engage in political (and also perhaps social) activity, and - depending on the context within which they operate - some form of violent activity. By contrast both core and messianic/apocalyptic groups will pursue almost exclusively violent tactical programmes, the minutiae of which are determined by the extent to which the group sees itself as fulfilling the role of a revolutionary vanguard or playing an immediate role in messianic redemption. Most tactical approaches are tempered by issues of politics, justification, proportionality and group survival. Conversely, this is less of a concern for messianic/apocalyptic groups and does not apply to radical splinters or individuals imbued with a particular group ideology who may decide to act independently of the main organisation. This chapter seeks to explore the dimensions of what means are employed by groups to achieve their objectives, what governs and constrains the use of such means and how tactical programmes can be adapted and augmented to cope with alterations within a group's operational environment.

Variations in operating environments and group evolution mean that there can be a great deal of scope for flexibility in a group's tactical programme, even within the same category. Until Kach was outlawed, the movement exhibited a willingness to be involved with mainstream Israeli politics and distanced itself from extreme, large scale acts of

violence. Those acts which were perpetrated were done so by individuals imbued with the group's ideology or splinters disappointed with the gap between rhetoric and action. Aryan Nations has followed a similar pattern with regards to violent activity, although it has never seriously engaged in mainstream politics. Operating in a different environment, Hizballah has been able to conduct centrally-controlled military, social and political activities with the emphasis on each dependant on changes within both internal and external environments. While Hamas has also pursued social, military and political means, the group's leadership and ideology and the tight security environment in which the group operates have constrained the group's tactical programme. While core groups tend to see themselves as revolutionary vanguards, this stance frequently leads them into a confrontation with the state that in turn threatens their existence. This was certainly the case with Eyal and the Order, although the PIJ has thus far avoided extermination primarily through a comparatively higher degree of sophistication, and a more pragmatic tactical programme. The tactical programmes of messianic and apocalyptic groups while oriented around precipitating an expected Endtime may not immediately pursue such an aim. The Saudi Ikhwan did take this approach with swift and disastrous consequences for the group. The Jewish Underground, however, engaged in activities very similar to a core group when the group's messianic plan was suspended, while Aum Shinrikyo engaged in a wide variety of activities, some related to the expected end, many were basically criminal activities aimed at protecting and strengthening the group.

8.1 Mainstream

8.1.1 Kach

The tactics employed by Kach ranged from direct participation in the Israeli political process to an assortment of illegal activities. However, due to the nature of the environment within which the organisation operated, a programme of systematic violence orchestrated and condoned by the Kach leadership was considered unrealistic, inviting as it would repression which would threaten the group's very existence. This justifiable fear of heavy reprisals by the Israeli authorities was realised after the Hebron massacre when both Kach and Kahane Chai were officially outlawed by the Israeli government as illegal

terrorist organisations.¹ It is undeniable, however, that the ideology of the group motivated individuals and small groups to act independently and engage in 'high level' acts of violence, not at the direct behest of the group although certainly with its implicit blessing. The gap here between the extreme rhetoric of the organisation and its activities can be seen to be breached by members who were not so much disaffected with the organisation itself but were merely frustrated by certain political events within Israel, and motivated in turn by the group's aggressive calls for activism.

Electoral participation and success for Kach were directly linked to the security situation of the Israeli state, both internal and external. The first time Kahane and Kach contested seats for the Knesset in 1973 Kahane missed out narrowly². Conversely, during the next two elections of 1977 and 1981 he lost by wide margins³. In 1984, however, Kach gained a sufficient number of votes and Kahane became an official member of the Knesset⁴. The peaks in Kach voting patterns are easily identified as 1973 and 1984 and are intimately related to the wars fought in these years⁵. The more difficult the security situation and the more disillusioned Israeli voters were with the political establishment - especially over security issues, both internal and external - the greater the support for the movement. For example in mid-1985, after a series of brutal murders of Israeli civilians by Palestinians, support for Kahane and his movement soared. One poll in August 1985 showed that support for Kach had risen to nine per cent, from just over one per cent at the

¹ The Israeli cabinet outlawed both groups on March 13 1994. The decree also applied to "any group of people acting to attain the same goals...with the [same] means...even if they are called by other names" and "to splinter groups or combinations of the aforementioned organisations", *Voice of Israel*, 1120 gmt, 13 Mar. 94 - BBC/SWB, ME/1945, MED/1, March 14, 1994.

² To be elected it was necessary to gain one percent of the electorate. Kahane received 12,811 votes or 0.81% of the votes. Cited in R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or "Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs")', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IV, # 1, 1992, p. 47.

³ In 1977 Kahane received 4,396 votes or 0.25% of those cast, and in 1981 he received 5,128 or 0.26%. *ibid.*, pp. 47 & 51. The first Likud electoral victory after thirty years of labour rule was in large part due to the political mobilisation of the growing Sephardic Jewish population and their perception of neglect in an Ashkenazi dominated society.

⁴ Kach captured 25,907 votes which represented 1.2% of votes cast. Kach and a party from the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Progressive list for Peace, were banned by the Central Elections Committee before the election for their 'extremist views', but this decision was overruled by the High Court. It is noteworthy that the Progressive List advocated equal rights for Jews and Palestinians and the establishment of a Palestinian state. They won two seats. R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism', p. 52.

⁵ There is a discernible socio-economic dimension as well as a security one. See A. Pedahzur, 'The Extreme Right in Israel Approaching a Time of Peace - Features and Prospects', Unpublished paper, 1999, pp. 18-19.

time of the 1984 election⁶. It is interesting to note that electoral failure did not result in the group turning inwards (as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo) and abstaining from mainstream politics. On the contrary, Kahane realised that his ideas were well received by (an albeit small) section of Israeli society and that as circumstances became less stable the popularity of the movement would increase. In his own words "[t]he worse it gets for Israel, the better it is for me!"⁷

After Kahane's death, the issue of parliamentary participation was the nominal cause of the split between Kach and Kahane Chai, led by Kahane's own son Benjamin. The splinter group's leader felt that the movement would betray the ideals of its founder if it altered its programme of uncompromising resistance to territorial compromise with the Palestinians or the presence of Arabs within the borders of Israel. The split, however, was seemingly more about personalities than ideology, which was made clear when Kach failed to qualify for participation in the 1992 elections because its platform remained little altered.⁸ Following the ban placed on Kach and its various offshoots in 1994, actual electoral participation became a moot point. Prior to this, however, the Knesset passed a resolution authorising the police to prevent Kahane's demonstrations in Arab villages, a tactic the movement regarded as one of their most effective.⁹ Equally in August 1985, a Knesset law prohibited parties from incitement of racism and endangering security and democracy which effectively ended Kach's political future.

From the very origins of the Jewish Defence League (JDL) in America, Kahane had emphasised the importance of using physical force.¹⁰ Kahane's idea of 'Jewish Iron' was directly borrowed from Jabotinsky's *Barzel Yisrael* (Iron Israel), an idea which called upon Jews to resist their oppressors by physical force if necessary.¹¹ Acting out such a programme, however, within a relatively stable democratic society, such as the United

⁶ *The Guardian*, August 3, 1985. The poll, published in *Ha'aretz* also showed a rise in support for the right wing Tehiya party. The figures show that this degree of support would have given a Kach-Tehiya coalition nineteen seats making them the third largest political grouping in the Knesset.

⁷ R. Friedman, 'The Sayings of Meir Kahane', *The New York Review of Books*, February 13, 1986, p. 20.

⁸ *Voice of Israel*, 1400 gmt, 24 Mar. 91 - BBC/SWB, ME/1030, A/10, March 26, 1991. On the decision to ban the groups itself see R. Cohen-Almagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism in Israel: Critical Appraisal', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IX, # 4, 1997, pp. 82-105.

⁹ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics From Altalena to the Rabin Assassination*, p. 215.

¹⁰ By the mid 1970s the JDL was labelled a terrorist organisation by the FBI.

¹¹ E. Sprinzak, 'Violence and Catastrophe in the Theology of Rabbi Meir Kahane: The Ideologization of Mimetic Desire', in M. Juergensmeyer, *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World*, 1992, p. 55.

States or Israel, was bound to invite repression and the broader movement was always careful not to directly invite it.

The violent means employed by Kach can be divided into two, albeit overlapping, categories. The first concerned that committed by identifiable members of the organisation and usually at a relatively low level, including general harassment, beatings, attacks on property and arson. The second category is that committed by members who are acting on their own, as in the case of Baruch Goldstein, or small splinter groups such as TNT, and represent a much higher propensity for unconstrained violence. This second category should be regarded as nominally and operationally - but certainly not ideologically - independent from Kach proper. Their motivations and ideology, however, are identical and in some cases there is evidence of the complicity of the Kach leadership. In November 1974, for example, Kahane himself was convicted of arms smuggling after an abortive attempt to establish an anti-Arab counter-terror group in Europe.¹² Similarly in December 1993, Rabbi Abraham Toledano, then leader of Kach, was jailed for attempting to smuggle military equipment and money into Israel from the U.S.¹³ In October 1982, an American born Kach leader was sentenced to two and a half years prison for conspiring to plant a bomb in the Al Aqsa mosque, a crime Kahane was accused of complicity in but was subsequently acquitted of.¹⁴ This division is an important one from the point of group survival. Although the group was eventually banned in 1994 and various members, including much of the leadership, had been imprisoned for a variety of offences, it pursued a quasi-political approach within the prescribed legal norms of mainstream society.

The tactics employed by Kach were different to other groups on the extreme right wing of Israeli politics. Whereas Gush Emunim, when it acted, did so primarily in response to some form of Arab violence, Kach was more proactive. From the very origins of the organisation, provocative demonstrations and harassment of the Arab population (both within the Green line and without) were standard behaviour. The primary purpose of these activities was to scare Arabs and to cultivate within them a feeling that they were not safe

¹² *Washington Post*, December 19, 1974.

¹³ ADL, *Extremism in the Name of Religion: The Violent Record of the Kahane Movement and its Offshoots*, 1995, p. 40. Toledano's suitcase contained telescopic sights, silencers, reloading equipment and instruction manuals for bomb making.

¹⁴ *Daily News*, October 29, 1982.

in Israel.¹⁵ While Gush Emunim were prepared to accept a Palestinian presence in Eretz Israel, albeit in a completely subservient form, Kach from the outset vocally proclaimed the need to expel the entire Arab population, by force if necessary.¹⁶ The greatest constraint to a large scale and organised violent campaign was fear of the Israeli security forces. Yet due to the position of Palestinians within Israeli society (especially in the occupied territories) certain levels of violent activity were almost tolerable. For example in 1986, an offshoot of Kach, the Committee for Road Safety, was established as a defensive measure against increased levels of Palestinian violence. During the Intifada, the group became increasingly aggressive and its leader Shmuel Ben Yishai claimed that he would 'shoot to kill without warning' any Palestinian interfering with Jewish traffic.¹⁷ Other actions carried out by Kach members, such as armed forays into Arab villages, the shooting by Kach members of Palestinians during riots in Hebron in December 1993 and the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein, were all made possible by the prominent place firearms hold in Israeli settler society and the high proportion of people trained in their use and who carry them at all times.¹⁸

In terms of the permissiveness of environment - that is the degree to which unlawful activity was made possible or even tolerated - it is interesting to note that Kahane Chai in the U.S., during the early 1990s, conducted training camps where instruction was given in weapons training, guerrilla tactics and unarmed combat¹⁹. Benjamin Kahane claimed at the time that officers of the IDF reserve and U.S. Army were conducting much of the training.²⁰ Kahane further added:

"[i]f we in Kahana Hay [*sic.*] feel that the [Israeli] government or the authorities are preventing us from operating...we will have to do something we very much wish to

¹⁵ R. Megui & P. Simonnot, *Israel's Ayatollahs: Meir Kahane and the Far Right in Israel*, 1987, p. 50.

¹⁶ The attitude of the Gush is continued today by the Yesha Council: "[w]e as Jews and Muslims share many things but don't cut me out. The only time there is peaceful sharing [and history shows this] is when the Israelis are in charge. The only way to get mutual respect and to teach understanding - Christians, Muslims & Jews are only free to visit holy sites because Israel is in charge". Interview with Judith Tayar, Director of Public Relations, Yesha Council Foreign Desk, March 23, 1999.

¹⁷ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 212.

¹⁸ For example, the commission of enquiry established after the Hebron massacre excluded the issue of settlers carrying arms, and did little to change existing regulations governing opening fire. See 'Commission of Enquiry into the Massacre at the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Report, Jerusalem, 26 June 1994 (Excerpts)', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIV, # 1, 1994, p. 144.

¹⁹ ADL, *Extremism in the Name of Religion*, p. 37.

²⁰ *IDF Radio*, 1400 gmt, 6 Jun. 93 - BBC/SWB, ME/1709, A/5, June 8, 1993.

avoid. We will have to bring these guys over and begin operating in a different manner."²¹

The tactical vision here is of the creation of trained cadre outside the constrained security environment of Israel to be re-inserted into the country as operational needs required them.

8.1.2 Aryan Nations

Similar to the Kach movement, Aryan Nations is an 'above ground' organisation which cannot risk large scale involvement in organised violence, although there are acts of violence perpetrated by individual members who have acted on their own accord or who have formed separate organisations such as the Order. What differentiates Aryan Nations from Kach is the absence of a serious and well supported plan to participate in mainstream politics even at the local level. However, it should be noted that Identity adherents and other members of the extreme right have attempted electoral participation.²² The rhetoric and avowed objectives of Aryan Nations are simply too extreme and divorced from reality for most Americans, and the group itself is fundamentally opposed to the American government and both the structure and form of the American political system. The primary tactics that can be ascribed to Aryan Nations are those of mobilisation and incitement, while violent acts are the province of splinter groups and lone actors conducted by members imbued with the group's ideology.

The very name of the group itself refers to Butler's objective of creating a white Christian enclave, the so-called 'Aryan Nations'. The Pacific Northwest was seen by many members of the Christian Right as a symbolic Aryan homeland, replete with Nordic scenery and isolated from the perceived degenerate nature of urban society. Butler envisaged a large Aryan community centred on Hayden Lake Idaho. The number of people he suggested was the 144,000 of the book of revelations, the righteous remnant from the book of Revelations which would defeat the forces of darkness.²³ Such large numbers in a

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Most prominent of these was former Klansman David Duke who competed in the 1988 and 1992 presidential primaries and at various times since in senatorial and gubernatorial elections. Other include Tom Metzger and Ralph P. Forbes. Despite their disquieting appearance on the American political scene none has met with real success. See ADL, *Danger: Extremism. The Major Vehicles and Voices on America's Far Right Fringe*, pp. 36-40, 46-49 & 77-81.

²³ Revelations 14:1.

low population area it was initially hoped would also help gain political control of the region. By 1986, Butler's plan envisaged an Aryan homeland which would encompass the states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming, the so called "10 percent solution" - a sober modification of his stance in 1980 which foresaw an area bounded by the Rocky Mountains, the Mississippi River, the Northern Canadian plains and the Mexican border.²⁴ The idea of withdrawal from society is common throughout the American extreme right, motivated alternatively by fears of an impending nuclear holocaust and an apocalyptic race war. Butler's original idea was inspired by Donald Clerkin, head of the Euro-American Alliance who suggested the creation of a 'Europolis', an armed reservation to preserve the Aryan people.²⁵

The primary tactic employed by Butler when he founded Aryan Nations was fundamentally one designed to mobilise the disparate elements of the extreme right in the United States and for the group to become a kind of umbrella organisation. Butler himself describes his efforts as an attempt to build "an interrelationship of people with the same ideas and beliefs."²⁶ Butler planned to sponsor an annual international Aryan Congress or 'Aryan World Congress' which would feature well-known speakers, weapons and survival training, religious ceremonies and cross burnings. Although Butler nor any of the group's members were prosecuted as a result a federal indictment relating to the 1983 congress claimed that attendees planned to "carry out assassinations of federal officials, politicians and Jews, as well as bombings and polluting of municipal water supplies".²⁷ Propagation of the group's message to other like minded organisations was considered important as was exposure to the mainstream media. James Aho estimates, for instance, that a quarter of Congress attendees in 1986 were "representatives of the media."²⁸ Butler also spoke at other, similar gatherings organised by the CSAL. Perhaps the most important group

²⁴ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness: Idaho Christian Patriotism*, 1990, p. 58 & K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 82-83.

²⁵ ADL, *Extremism on the Right: A Handbook*, 1983, p. 9. Butler went some way to according his ideas quasi-legal status in 1982 when he filed the 'Nehemiah Township Charter' with the Kootenai County Clark's office. This document decreed the area surrounding Hayden Lake to be a 'Christian Aryan Township'. Idaho, County of Kootenai, *Nehemiah Township Charter and Common Law Contract*, July 12, 1982, Book 120, p. 387.

²⁶ Quoted in ADL, *Extremist Groups In the United States: A Record of Bigotry and Violence*, 1982, p. 57.

²⁷ Cited in B. Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative", *RAND P-7834*, 1993, p. 8.

²⁸ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, p. 59.

connections generated by these annual convocations were those with overseas right wing groups, especially in Canada and Germany²⁹, and with the Alabama based Knights of the Klu Klux Klan.³⁰ Support for the group was also sought amongst the wider right wing milieu of survivalists, tax resisters, gun enthusiasts and Christian home educators through publications such as *The Spotlight* and *Justice Times*.³¹ Since 1979, the group has also conducted a prison outreach programme which has led to the creation of an affiliated organisation within the prison system, the Aryan Brotherhood.

Although the Aryan Nations annual congresses and others which Butler addressed helped cement his position and that of the group as the 'leaders' of the racist right in the 1980s, this situation did not last. Throughout the second half of the 1980s disaffection grew with the absence of action from the group - a situation typified by the earlier defection of Robert Mathews and the formation of the Order. In July 1992, the turnout at the Aryan Nations World Congress was estimated at around one hundred people, and in July 1995 about one hundred and twenty five.³² Butler attempted to draw attention to the group during the August 1992 siege of Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge and while the coverage was good, the turn out was small.³³ The 1995 congress was also marred by scuffles arising from allegations of embezzlement by the wife of the group's staff leader Tom Bishop. Like other elements of the Aryan Nations leadership structure noted above in Chapter Four, Bishop left soon afterwards. The mobilisation drive was further affected later in this year by Butler's declining health and the death of his wife. By contrast, the ideology of Aryan Nations has been successfully disseminated throughout the U.S. extreme right by individuals associated with the group and by the group itself. In 1994, a Klanwatch report on militia movements noted that "[m]ilitia strategists John Trochmann, Tom

²⁹ For an analysis of the Canadian right wing including links to the American right see S.R. Barrett, *Is God A Racist?*, 1987. For an analysis of the European right wing including American association see B. Hoffman, *Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe Since 1980*, 1984. See also T. Bjorgo, 'Terror From the Extreme Right', *TPV Special Edition*, Vol. VII, # 1, 1995 & L. Weinberg, 'The American Radical Right in Comparative Perspective' in P. Merkl & L. Weinberg (eds.), *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, 1997.

³⁰ In 1981 the Alabama Knight of the Klu Klux Klan (KKKK) leader Don Black was arrested for participation in an attempt to overthrow the government of the Caribbean island of Dominica. During his incarceration the KKKK split in to factions, one led by Stanley McCollum of Alabama, and the other by the Arkansas based Thom Robb.

³¹ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, p. 59.

³² *ibid.*, p. 20.

³³ Weaver had reportedly visited the Aryan Nations compound in the past and he quickly became a symbol (and his wife and son martyrs) for the extreme right.

Stetson, Pete Peters, Jim Wickstrom and Louis Beam are Identity adherents who have long standing ties to the Aryan Nations and its leader, Richard Butler."³⁴ The report further notes that "[t]hese and other racist extremists, are actively involved or associated with militia organisations in at least nine states."³⁵

While Aryan Nations and similar organisations have not embarked on an open, declared violent programme as did the Order, violence is still pursued by individuals and splinters imbued with the group's ideology. In August 1983, Frank Spisak was sentenced to death by electrocution after murdering two Blacks and a Caucasian he mistook for a Jew in 1982. Spisak was defiantly unrepentant. When he was sentenced he stated "[e]ven though this court may pronounce me guilty a thousand times, the higher court of our great Aryan warrior god pronounces me innocent...I do hereby set the example of our loyal Aryan Nation. Many more will come after me...Heil Hitler."³⁶ In 1985, a Missouri state trooper was shot and killed by a member of Aryan Nations. This incident led to a multi-agency raid on a CSAL training compound on the Missouri-Arkansas border.³⁷ In 1987, another Missouri state trooper was shot and while the assailant had no direct affiliation with any particular extremist group, he was an adherent of white supremacist beliefs and collected Aryan Nations literature and paraphernalia.³⁸ More recently Richard Guthrie, a self-proclaimed member of the Aryan Republican Army, convicted for a series of diversionary bombings and robberies in the early nineties, had made several trips to the Aryan Nations compound in the late 1980s³⁹, and in mid-1999 Buford Furrow Jr. was convicted of a shooting attack on a Jewish day care centre in Los Angeles. He had been a one time resident of, and security guard at, the Hayden Lake compound and at his trial stated that "[i]t's time for America to wake up and kill the Jews."⁴⁰ In July 1998, two guards at the Aryan Nations compound pursued, shot at and then harassed the occupants of a car whom

³⁴ Klanwatch, *Intelligence Report*, 'Racist Extremists Exploit Nation-wide Militia Movement', # 76, December 1994.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ *People*, 29 August 1983. Spisak was a Lieutenant in an Aryan Nations splinter known as the Socialist Nationalist People's Party, founded by Keith Gilbert in 1979.

³⁷ Fred M. Mills, Superintendent, Missouri State Highway Patrol. From the hearing before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States, *The Militia Movement in the United States*, June 15, 1995.

³⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹ *Chicago Tribune*, April 22, 1996.

⁴⁰ FBI and U.S. Dept. of Justice, *Project Megiddo*, <http://www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/publicmegiddo.pdf>.

they mistakenly thought had fired upon the compound. While not a significant act of violence the incident was pursued by the Southern Poverty Law Centre and in September 2000 a court awarded \$6.3m punitive damages against the group, effectively bankrupting the organisation and raising questions about its ability to continue functioning.

Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the American extreme right, including members of Aryan Nations is their alleged propensity to consider the employment of poisons and biological agents. In 1998 the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-proliferation Project (CBWNP) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies compiled a list of fifty two terrorist incidents in the U.S.⁴¹ involving chemical, biological or radiological materials from 1960 to the (then) present.⁴² Twenty seven of these were classified as "unconfirmed, hoax or 'intended' use", twelve as "possession/acquisition of material", and thirteen as "actual use of material".⁴³ The second and third categories accounted for seven hundred and seventy seven injuries and one fatality.⁴⁴ Where the group is known in the second and third categories the largest identifiable bloc has some form of religious motivation. Two particular incidents involving biological agents have been ascribed to one Larry Wayne Harris, an Identity adherent with links to Aryan Nations.⁴⁵ Similarly in 1985, when the compound of the CSAL was raided by federal authorities, a large quantity of sodium cyanide was found which was allegedly to be used to poison the water supply of Washington D.C.⁴⁶

⁴¹ *Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*, A publication of the chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation project of the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 1998.

⁴² The fifty two cases were drawn from a database of nearly 350 incidents kept by the CBWNP.

⁴³ While the FBI has measured a steady increase in WMD criminal cases (from 37 in 1996 to 181 in 1998), the vast proportion were hoaxes. As Deputy Assistant Dale Watson put it "yesterday's bomb threat has been replaced with a more exotic biological or chemical threat". Testimony before the Commission to Assess the Organisation of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, April 29, 1999.

⁴⁴ In order to put these figures in perspective it should be mentioned that seven hundred and fifty one of the injuries were accounted for by the 1984 Salmonella poisoning conducted by the followers of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh in order to influence a local election, and the fatality occurred in 1973 when a Symbionese Liberation Army member shot a school superintendent with cyanide tipped bullets from a .38 calibre hand gun.

⁴⁵ For a refutation offered by the group of the whole anthrax procurement case see *Gov. Media Conspiracy/ Aryan Nations*, <http://www.nidlink.com/-aryanvic/anthrax.html>.

⁴⁶ B. Hoffman, "Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative', *RAND Paper P-7834*, 1993, p. 8.

8.1.3 Hizballah

What distinguishes Hizballah from the previous two examples is its existence within a relatively lawless environment and its sponsorship by, and operational links with, Iran.⁴⁷ The group has employed a variety of tactics including suicide bombings, bombings generally, hostage taking, an on-going guerrilla insurgency in Southern Lebanon, establishing social infrastructure and more recently participation in mainstream Lebanese politics. In 1995, Eyal Zisser argued that Hizballah was a 'pragmatic' organisation more interested in survival than in attaining its pan-Islamic goals and the organisation's tactical programme reflects this clearly. As shown in the preceding sections on location, timing and targets, each tactic employed can be seen to serve either the objectives of attaining the organisation's pan-Islamic goals (at least rhetorically) or group survival, and collectively they should be seen as an array of modes employed in a co-ordinated fashion, influenced and directed by Syria and Iran.

Hizballah rose to international prominence when it conducted a series of large scale suicide bombing attacks against Israel and elements of the Multi National Force (MNF) in 1983. In April, a suicide bomb was used against the U.S. embassy in Beirut killing 49 and wounding 120. In October, twin suicide bombs were employed simultaneously against the French paratroop HQ and American Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 56 French and 241 Americans. In November 1985, a suicide bomber attacked the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) HQ in Tyre, South Lebanon killing 59. While this section is not meant as a catalogue of Hizballah operations, these early attacks reflect the strategic objectives of removing foreign influence from Lebanon, and to raising the group's prestige within the Lebanese Shi'ite community.⁴⁸ The tactic of suicide bombing has been used consistently throughout the group's life span in both domestic and international arenas, and can be seen to serve two important functions for Hizballah (and other groups which employ this tactic). Firstly, it is a way of ensuring delivery of a device in a spectacular

⁴⁷ The apparent contradiction of a Lebanese party with such close ties to a foreign power has been rationalised by the group's Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah who claims such ties are no different to those of "every party operating in Lebanon...yet no-one casts doubt on their Lebanese identity", *Al-Ahd* (Beirut), August 26, 1996.

⁴⁸ For an overview of the competition between Hizballah and its main rival Amal for support within the Shi'ite community see M. Kramer, 'Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shi'ite Lebanon', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 3, # 3, 1991, pp. 23-46.

fashion to a precise location, at times coinciding with a specific political event, that pre-empt any security precautions taken by the target. Secondly, it provides martyrs for the cause which in turn fuels an organisation's mythology. They also display to the 'other' the group's degree of dedication by members accepting martyrdom, an act which has profound resonance in Shi'ite religious lore, most notably during the Ashura festival.⁴⁹ Suicide bombing is a powerful psychological weapon which Hizballah exploits very effectively. In April 1996, the group released a film clip entitled "Ali Baba and the Seventy Suicide Bombers" which purported to show a team of suicide bombers organised like a military unit. What was actually shown was a Hizballah commando unit - the organisation does not possess a dedicated suicide unit, instead individual candidates are identified within the Shi'ite community, indoctrinated, trained and then employed.⁵⁰

The tactic of hostage taking by Hizballah during the 1980s and early 1990s should not be seen as monolithic or mono-causal, and unlike suicide bombing was conducted over a relatively brief period of time until its political utility waned. Magnus Ranstorp has identified nine distinct phases of Hizballah hostage taking each with slightly different motivations and objectives - often in alignment with Iranian objectives.⁵¹ Hostage taking by Hizballah was intimately related to the civil war environment in Lebanon and to Iranian influence over the group. Changes within the Iranian clerical hierarchy following the death of Ruhollah Khomeini produced intense clerical factionalism, reverberating within the Hizballah, and the Ta'if accord, disarming all Lebanese militias, produced a 1991 agreement over Hizballah's future status as a resistance organisation. This led to the realisation by Hizballah, Iran and Syria that the retention of Western hostages was less of a necessity. Hizballah was quick to point out, however, that the release of the last hostages did not signify an end to its resistance campaign: "[t]he release of one or all of the hostages should not be seen as an end of extremism and fundamentalism. The confrontation is continuing."⁵²

⁴⁹ See M. Ranstorp, 'Hizballah's Political and Military Strategy in the 1990s: From Revolutionary Dogma to "Lebanonization"', paper presented at the British Middle East Studies Association Conference, Oxford, July 6-9, 1997.

⁵⁰ *Yediot Ahronot*, April 19, 1996.

⁵¹ M. Ranstorp, *Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*, 1997, pp. 86-108.

⁵² *Voice of the Oppressed*, 0630 gmt, 25 Apr. 90 - BBC/SWB, ME/0749, A/1, April 27, 1990.

It should also be noted that tactical linkage is another feature of Hizballah operations. For example the kidnappings of French citizens in Lebanon was complemented by bombing campaigns in Paris in December 1985 and September 1986, and attacks on the French UNIFIL contingent in Southern Lebanon. Such links magnify the effects of apparently disparate and separate actions, providing the group with maximum leverage.

The tactical shift by Hizballah toward participation in Lebanese politics was inspired by three primary factors. The first of these was the October 1989 Ta'if accords which effectively ended the civil war, and under Syrian patronage based the new Lebanese polity on a Maronite/Sunni order. The second was progress in the Middle East Peace process which threatened to erode the corner stone of the group's ideology, its struggle against Israel. Thirdly was the declining influence of Iran brought about by Iranian political and economic difficulties which manifested themselves at the conclusion of the Gulf War. Participation in the 1992 elections resulted in the organisation winning eight seats in the Parliament and gaining the support of another four candidates. These parliamentary candidates, operating under the auspices of Hizballah's 'Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc' (*Kutlat al Wafa lil-Muqawama*) have been involved in setting or criticising national policy on social, economic and political affairs.⁵³ Participation can thus be seen as an attempt by Hizballah to gradually undermine the new government without having to physically resist it, a possible course reflected by Sheikh Fadlallah who has commented that he does not regard Lebanon as a state but as a "banana republic"⁵⁴, and certainly by Sheikh Nasrallah who has stated that participation in the political process was "trying to topple the government through peaceful means."⁵⁵ However, as one commentator observes "by acting within the agreement's framework Hizballah actually strengthens and legitimises the new arrangement...[and] The long-run effect of Hizballah's participation in Lebanese politics may co-opt it more than the group's leaders expect."⁵⁶

In line with this political participation has been an intensification of Hizballah's social welfare activities in the form of schools, mosques, clinics and in some cases shops

⁵³ W. Harris, 'Lebanon' in A. Ayalon (ed.), *Middle East Contemporary Survey 16*, (1992), 1994, pp. 598-608.

⁵⁴ *Al-Ahd*, April 8, 1994.

⁵⁵ *AFP*, February 24, 1994.

⁵⁶ E. Zisser, 'Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Cross-roads', *MERIA Journal*, # 3, September, 1997, p. 3.

in urban areas.⁵⁷ Since its inception Hizballah has been concerned with the plight of the Lebanese Shi'ite community, a concern motivated in part by philanthropy and also by the knowledge that such activity would help to secure the allegiance of the Shi'ite community. In 1984 the Jihad al-Binaa (JAB), construction Jihad, was opened as was the Islamic health committee. Three years later the Iranian Relief Committee of Imam Khomeini (RCIK) opened a branch in Beirut and has grown steadily since its services competing today with the efforts of the Lebanese government to aid the Shi'ite community.⁵⁸ These organisations and others, financed by Iran and also by Hizballah's own financial activities, have penetrated every facet of life within the Shi'ite community, addressing the needs of the most destitute and strengthening the organisation's claim as 'defender of the oppressed'. While the Lebanese political establishment may conspire to limit Hizballah's power and the possibility of establishing an Islamic Republic, Hizballah has effectively spread its religious message at the grass roots level through its schools and most importantly through the mosques. It was through the mosques that the organisation became known and they still perform a vital function for recruitment and dissemination of group ideology.⁵⁹ The provision of all levels of social welfare services in effect amounts to a social infrastructure which parallels that of the Lebanese government - and in many cases over a period of decades has surpassed it - ensuring widespread popular support for Hizballah.

The guerrilla campaign against Israel has long been regarded as central to the group's activities, reflecting one of its limited objectives of removing foreign influence from Lebanon, and the effectiveness of Hizballah's guerrilla activities was the primary reason it remained the only militia not disarmed after the Ta'if accords. As Martin Kramer has noted Hizballah owes its high profile both within Israel and without to violence, and this profile has been constantly reinforced by the group's ongoing campaign.⁶⁰ Hizballah has effectively fought (and won) a successful and highly skilled guerrilla war against one of the most experienced, well equipped and highly motivated militaries anywhere in the

⁵⁷ *Al-Hayat*, February 23, 1994. See also *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1*, 1630 gmt, 28 Sept. 93 - BBC/SWB ME/1808, MED/12, October 1, 1993.

⁵⁸ H. Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance*, 1997, pp. 147-148.

⁵⁹ Although Qom in Iran and Najaf in Iraq have historically been the centres for Shiite theological studies, Hizballah has constructed several theological schools in Lebanon. H. Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance*, 1997, p. 166.

⁶⁰ M. Kramer, 'The Calculus of Jihad', in M.E. Marty & R.S. Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics and Militance*, 1993, p. 547.

world, and it is this achievement which has given the organisation such high standing in Lebanon. The bilateral approach of continuing struggle against Israel and participation in Lebanese politics will depend on further developments in the Peace Process - specifically if the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon is seen as sufficient to warrant a long term suspension of operations against Israel - and the degree to which the organisation can rationalise the suspension of its long term objectives. History would seem to suggest that large hierarchical organisations that have been engaged in violence for a long period that do not achieve all their goals produce splinters which are determined to continue the struggle, and so loyalty to the central leadership will be increasingly important in the future.

8.1.4 Hamas

In contrast to Hizballah, the tactics employed by Hamas are constrained by an extremely tight security environment. Not only do Israel and the occupied territories comprise a small and fragmented geographical area, but since 1993 the organisation has had to face the dual threat of both Israeli security activity and that of the Palestinian Authority and its myriad security services. Countering such problems has certainly led to an increase in tactical sophistication over time, an essential development for ensuring group survival and operational viability. Indeed this growth in tactical sophistication has been in part inspired by Hizballah, either through example or through direct contact, especially following the Israeli expulsion of 415 Hamas and PIJ activists to Southern Lebanon in 1992. Hamas's tactical programme exhibits traits consistent with a mainstream extreme Islamic organisation, both violent and non-violent.

As with almost all other groups, both religious and secular, Hamas regards itself as conducting a war of resistance and ultimately liberation. The tactics employed are thus commensurate with the security situation and yet flexible enough to cope with alterations in the political context. As one senior Hamas figure has noted:

"[i]n war time it is permissible to use all means...remember that Hamas has its own clear visions of its goals, brothers in the military wing have their own clear timetable

in facing the occupation according to the environment and the conditions that surround them."⁶¹

Hamas's attitude towards violence is entirely a pragmatic one. As Mahmud al-Zahar has stated:

"[w]e must calculate the benefit and cost of continued armed operations. If we can fulfil our goals without violence, we will do so. Violence is a means not a goal. Hamas's decision to adopt self-restraint does not contradict our aims, including the establishment of an Islamic state instead of Israel."⁶²

The early activities of Hamas were random and limited in nature, reflecting the group's vulnerability in its nascent form. The first significant wave of these, conducted in the first year of the Intifada, consisted of shooting attacks on Israeli patrols and civilian vehicles in the Gaza strip, and the use of roadside anti-vehicle devices against Israeli traffic. In April 1989, the group kidnapped and murdered two Israeli soldiers, an action notable for the absence of demands or bargaining typical of such an operation.⁶³ The organisation came to widespread public notice, however, during the so called 'war of the knives' against Israeli settlers and soldiers following the Al-Aqsa mosque massacre of October 1990.⁶⁴ It is interesting to note that many of these attacks were not directed by Hamas, although the group presented them as examples of Palestinians performing their Islamic duty in line with the pronouncements and 'action calls' of Hamas.⁶⁵

The direction and conduct of violent tactics was altered after the Israeli crackdowns of late 1990 and early 1991. The response was the establishment of an official military structure, the 'battalions of Izz al-Din al-Qassam'. The al-Qassam squads began by assassinating Palestinians within the Gaza Strip who were suspected of collaborating with the Israeli security services - severely disrupting Israeli intelligence gathering - and then attacked more Israeli civilians, a course of action which again spawned emulation within the Palestinian community unconnected to Hamas. The general escalation in violence by

⁶¹ Interview with senior Hamas leader in Hebron conducted by Dr. M. Ranstorp, May, 1999.

⁶² *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, October 12, 1995.

⁶³ Kidnapping is a tactic unique to Hamas within the Palestinian context. According to the group itself Sheikh Yassin ordered the first kidnapping which was meant as "a challenge to Rabin (then defence minister and responsible for the so-called 'fist of iron' policy towards the uprising).

⁶⁴ Hamas also engaged in the burning of forests as a disruptive and economic tactic.

⁶⁵ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence*, 2000, pp. 57-58. In the five months following the Temple Mount massacre thirteen Israelis were killed in stabbing attacks.

Hamas, driven in large part by progress in talks between the PLO and Israel led in December 1992 to the group's first concerted campaign when, in three separate attacks in the space of a week, five Israeli soldiers were killed. The Israeli response, to expel 415 Islamists into southern Lebanon was a major boost for Hamas and a public relations disaster for the Israelis.⁶⁶ Moreover the expulsion was an important turning point in the employment of car bombs by the group, with many being employed in response to the expulsions, and those that had been expelled found themselves in close contact with members of Hizballah from whom they learned a great deal about the employment of suicide bombs and the construction of vehicle bombs.⁶⁷

Throughout its existence Hamas has shown a high degree of tactical adaptability, revising tried methods in reaction to security threats. This capacity to refine existing means is perhaps best shown by developments in the tactic of suicide bombing. In the July and September 1997 bombings, the group made a number of innovations, firstly by employing multiple suicide bombers to attack the same targets (two at the July 30 Mahane Yehuda bombing in Jerusalem and three in Rehov Ben-Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem), the bombers detonating themselves near simultaneously at different points to maximise casualties. These bombings were more developed in other respects. The bombers did not leave behind the usual farewell videos, clothing labels were removed and the explosives placed near the heads of the bombers in a concerted effort to disguise their identities. There are numerous other examples of more refined tactics and operational sophistication. In July 1997, for instance, Palestinian security services raided a Hamas bomb factory near Bethlehem. As well as explosives other items included IDF uniforms, skull caps and Jewish prayer shawls suggesting the use of disguises to more effectively place bombs or suicide bombers.⁶⁸

Another crucial feature of Hamas's tactics which at once put it into competition with the PA and contrast it from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad is the development of a social infrastructure and a social welfare system. Indeed some commentators have been moved to observe that despite its violent activities Hamas is "essentially a social

⁶⁶ Not only did the expulsion outrage the Palestinian population but there was no appreciable effect on Hamas activities. The international pressure forced the Israelis to return the exiles in December 1993.

⁶⁷ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p. 66.

⁶⁸ *Voice of Israel*, 0400 gmt, 21 Jul. 97 - BBC/SWB, ME/2977, MED/6, July 22, 1997.

movement."⁶⁹ Since its inception Hamas has maintained a broad range of social activities and institutions, initially in competition with those provided by Israel and later with those established by the PA. Hamas runs educational institutions at all levels, maintains libraries, recreational clubs, and like Hizballah and other Muslim Brotherhood organisations the group runs hospitals and provides assistance to the needy. When resistance activities began, these welfare activities encompassed those injured in the fighting or the relatives of those that lost their lives. Hamas also maintains a significant presence from the mosques in the occupied territories which are at once places for dissemination the group's message, recruitment and logistical nodes for violent operations. While these overt activities remain vulnerable to disruption, this pervasive social presence has done much for the group's popularity and has ensured support across Palestinian social strata.

A different form of social tool employed since the organisation's beginnings has been the encouragement of civil disobedience, calls for strikes, boycotts of Israeli products where local alternatives were available and discouraging Palestinians from working for Israelis. Open calls for such activities, however, declined or were tempered when it was realised that such tactics merely created hardships for the general Palestinian population and a corresponding decline in support for Hamas.⁷⁰ A similarly negative popular reaction can be seen in the wake of Hamas bombings in Israel proper where the security response has been a closure of the occupied territories, severely impairing the movement of Palestinian goods and labour.

Hamas' attitude to participation in mainstream politics is defined by the fact that Palestine is occupied, there can therefore be no comparison between Palestinian politics and the example proffered by Islamist parties in Algeria, Egypt and Jordan. In the words of Sheikh Yassin "[Hamas] sees holy war as a means to liberate Palestine - all of Palestine. Muslims may not cease from holy war so long as the land of Muslims remains occupied."⁷¹ Resistance, however, exists on all levels, both violent and non-violent. As a senior spokesman for Hamas has noted, in the past the group has identified three different types of election. The first are 'non-political, popular' elections such as those for municipalities, trade unions, professional associations, university bodies and so on. Hamas has always

⁶⁹ S. Mishal & A. Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p. vii.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 63-63.

⁷¹ FBIS-NES-95-039, 28 February, 1995, p. 10.

participated in this kind of elections from where it derives a great deal of its popular support. The second are elections for the Palestinian National Council which the group regards as important and should be extended to Palestinians in the occupied territories and those in exile. The third are elections which relate to autonomy; legislative, executive and administrative. Hamas has categorically rejected participation in these because they are a function of 'autonomy status'. As a Hamas spokesman has stated, autonomy is rejected "Because if we won the majority of seats, we would be forced to respect the autonomy policy...even if we were a minority our presence in the chamber would only legitimise the autonomy."⁷² Despite previous disagreements between the internal and external leadership regarding participation in this third category, the movement's stance remains one of fundamental rejection, although participation has been a serious consideration periodically since 1992. For example, shortly after his release from prison in September 1997, Sheikh Yassin outlined the conditions for a cease-fire agreement with the Israelis. These included the withdrawal of all Israeli troops to within the pre-1967 borders, the dismantling of all Jewish settlements built on 'Palestinian soil' since 1967, the release of all Palestinian prisoners held in detention centres. The cease-fire would be for a given period of time during which Hamas would agree to halt all military operations and would not entail recognition of the state of Israel.⁷³

8.2 Core

8.2.1 Eyal

Due to the embryonic nature of Eyal and the fact that its leader, Avishai Raviv was a Shin Bet informant, the tactics employed by the group were of a lower violent order, or of a purely symbolic nature. Despite Raviv's status, he was, as noted earlier, far from a totally compliant tool of the GSS. As Karpin and Friedman note "[t]here is substantial evidence to suggest he had his own agenda, unrelated to the needs of the Shabak [GSS]."⁷⁴ The most obvious example of this agenda is of course his decision to establish Eyal in the

⁷² H. Hijazi, 'Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct. An Interview With Mahmud Zahhar', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXIV, # 3, 1995, p. 82.

⁷³ Article by Dr. Azzam Tamimi, *Palestine Times*, October, 1998.

⁷⁴ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God: The Plot to Kill Yitzhak Rabin*, 1998, p. 221.

first place. The primary problem of establishing what means Eyal employed stems not so much from the issue of Raviv but more from which acts exactly were perpetrated by members of the group, and which ones were perpetrated by individuals associated with Raviv in fact, or associated with him or Eyal by conjecture, following the Rabin assassination in order to establish a neat, group oriented explanation.

Without a doubt the most obvious tactic that can be ascribed to Eyal with any certainty is that of incitement. To this end Raviv was adept at using the media. The swearing in ceremonies conducted over the grave of Abraham Stern are a good example.⁷⁵ At one of these in September 1995, a television crew from Israel's Channel One was present and recorded the proceedings. The Shamgar commission concluded, however, that far from this functioning as an integral part of Eyal's indoctrination process, Raviv had staged this particular ceremony for the benefit of group publicity.⁷⁶ The report noted that "[the clip] was a performance, for anybody who was present at the site must have been aware that it was a fake."⁷⁷ In a similar fashion the photomontage of Yitzhak Rabin in the uniform of an SS officer, which was circulated at the right wing demonstration in Jerusalem's Zion square on October 5 1995, while not the creation of Raviv as has been claimed, was certainly deliberately brought to the attention of a television correspondent by Raviv.⁷⁸ Courting the media to publicise his group also had the potential to backfire quite seriously as it did when Raviv claimed responsibility for the murder of a Palestinian in Halhul. The ensuing police investigation found that the man had been killed by fellow Palestinians during a robbery, a fact which further discredited Raviv in the eyes of the extreme right, some members of which had harboured suspicions that he was an informer since February that year.⁷⁹

Allied to this range of incitement, Eyal also engaged in various violent activities against Arabs. The Shamgar Commission report stated that amongst other things Raviv had

⁷⁵ One commentator has claimed (erroneously) that Eyal members swore allegiance over Baruch Goldstein's grave. See L. Joffe, *Keesings Guide to the Middle East Peace Process*, 1996, p. 153.

⁷⁶ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, p. 221.

⁷⁷ *Jerusalem Post*, December 16, 1998. Channel 1 was also involved in a previous 'staged' performance by Kach in summer 1994 where youths were shown training, being indoctrinated and then conducting an aggressive and violent raid on a Palestinian village. See R. Cohen-Alamagor, 'Combating Right-Wing Political Extremism', p. 92.

⁷⁸ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, p. 224.

⁷⁹ *ibid.* p. 222-223.

"organised 'night patrols' on the Jerusalem-Hebron road, during which he and his friends masqueraded as policemen, struck Arab residents...[he also] initiated acts of violence in Hebron, published fliers - including one which called for refusing to serve in the IDF, intimidated the Kiryat Arbor head and his sons who appeared too moderate."⁸⁰ Raviv had personally noted that he had "badly beaten up many Arabs"⁸¹. Such activities are strikingly similar to those employed by members of Kach, adopting a programme of physical harassment which did not necessarily result in fatalities, thus being seen to be 'doing something' while avoiding the risks of suppression which would have followed in the wake of a campaign of bombings or shootings. Although there is evidence that the group was considering moving rapidly to higher order acts such as serious bombing⁸², as is usually the case with such a rapid transition (and in this case proved by Amir's assassination of Rabin) the group risks raising its profile without a corresponding development of structural depth and thus invites destruction.⁸³ Eyal certainly had access to an array of weaponry and the decision not to employ it in a more systematic and lethal capacity appears to have been motivated by the knowledge that a security crack-down would be inevitable, combined with Raviv's knowledge that not only would such a crack-down be total and inclusive, but that it would spell the end of his lifestyle and freedom of action as he had known it since the late 1980s.

Undoubtedly the most serious act perpetrated by an individual associated with Eyal, and the one which brought the group to prominence, was the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir.⁸⁴ Although some reports blandly state that Amir was a member of the group⁸⁵, it would be more accurate to claim he was associated with it through his close friendship with Avishai Raviv.⁸⁶ The Shamgar Commission report claims that:

"Avishai Raviv was closer to him than any other person regarding everything related to organising student demonstrations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza...[he] made strong

⁸⁰ *Jerusalem Post*, November 14, 1997.

⁸¹ *ibid.*

⁸² *U.S. News and World Report*, 11/20/95, Vol. XIX, # 20, p. 70.

⁸³ Size is not necessarily an impediment to success, for example the secular Greek November 17 organisation.

⁸⁴ For a breathtaking conspiratorial version of the assassination see B. Chamish, *Who Murdered Yitzhak Rabin?*, 1998. Chamish has also offered a conspiratorial version of the 1994 Hebron massacre, see his 'Was Baruch Goldstein Completely Innocent?', <http://members.tripod.com/~VaAm/Aug2198.html>.

⁸⁵ See for example: *U.S. News and World Report*, November 11, 1995, Vol. CXIX, # 20, p.70, & L. Joffe, *Keesing's Guide to the Middle East Peace Process*, p. 95.

⁸⁶ M. Karpin & I. Friedman, *Murder in the Name of God*, p. 224-225.

statements against the prime minister and claimed that he was subject to 'din rodef' and that it was permissible to harm him...It is therefore astonishing that in his reports on Amir he did not mention or even hint at Amir's known statements on his intentions to harm the prime minister, which Amir made more than once to members of his close circle of friends."⁸⁷

The assassination of the Prime Minister, shocking as it has been, has in large part been a tactic inspired by the peace process and has been interpreted by elements within the extreme right as being the most dramatic and direct way of forestalling that process. It is significant that with the election of Ehud Barak and the continuation of negotiations with the PA, Israeli security forces are warning of plots by disaffected young right wing extremists to assassinate the Prime minister citing the Halakhic ruling of *din rodef*.⁸⁸

8.2.2 The Order

While the Order shared isolationist visions of a pure community like most of the American extreme right, the activist programme of the group was revolutionary in nature. The Seattle trial of the group which concluded nearly a year after Robert Mathew's death investigated sixty-seven separate crimes which included robberies, arson, bombings, counterfeiting schemes and murders across the United States. The driving force behind this revolutionary strategy was impatience and frustration with the gap between the rhetoric and activities of organisations such as Aryan Nations (of which Robert Mathews and Bruce Pierce amongst others had been members). The tactical programme which the group developed was designed to lay the foundations for a more widespread revolution, isolating the group from mainstream society, securing resources for future actions and striking at the group's perceived enemies.

Similarly to Aryan Nations, Mathews envisaged a community of believers living in the same area which could be motivated as a political or revolutionary force. In 1982, Mathews created the idea of the 'White American Bastion', whereby whites would move to the Northwest, form a majority and gradually exert increasing social, political and

⁸⁷ *Jerusalem Post*, November 14, 1997.

⁸⁸ *Israel TV, Channel 2*, 1930 gmt, 8 Nov. 99 - BBC/SWB, ME/3689, MED/4, November 11, 1999.

economic influence.⁸⁹ He placed an advertisement in the right wing paper *The Spotlight* encouraging like minded people to move to the Pacific Northwest. The response to his advertisement was good, although very few people actually took the drastic step of leaving their old lives and moving into the 'bastion'.⁹⁰ In Mathew's words:

"once we have a majority here, we create laws banning Jews, mud people and other minorities from living here...Once we've secured Metaline Falls, we keep expanding until we are strong enough to create a white nation, separate from the Jew-nited States."⁹¹

The poor response to such appeals, however, further convinced Mathews that militance was the only route to success.

Mathews believed that the Order would function as a symbolic revolutionary vanguard which would probably not survive confrontation with the overwhelming forces of evil, but would show the way to fellow 'kinsmen'. Despite the optimistic claims by Pierce's periodical *National Vanguard* that the Order "set its sights on a full scale armed revolution, ending with the purification of the U.S. population and the institution of a race based authoritarian government"⁹², the group did not overestimate their chances or expect to survive to be part of a racially purified state. Mathews is reputed to have said:

"[t]he chances of any of us coming out of this alive or free from prison for the rest of our lives are pretty slim. But somebody has to start it. Once others see us, more kinsmen will be inspired to follow...Cattle die, kinsmen die, and I too shall die. The only thing I know that doesn't die is the fame of dead men's deeds."⁹³

This is an extreme example of a phenomenon James Aho calls 'Christian Heroism', where individuals identify themselves as essential components of a struggle against an opposition force.⁹⁴ In the ultimate expression of this heroism, martyrdom is actively sought in the face

⁸⁹ Although whites already formed an overwhelming majority in the area, they were not a 'racially aware' population.

⁹⁰ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 109-112. People who responded to the advertisement were sent a brochure printed at the Aryan Nations compound the cover of which alluded to the Viking and American pioneering ethos.

⁹¹ *ibid.*, p. 225. Mathews was further incensed by the fact that the local mayor was Chinese.

⁹² Cited in ADL Research Report, *William Pierce: Novelist of Hate*, 1995, p. 5.

⁹³ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 225. These remarks were allegedly made to Richard Scutari, a martial arts expert who became the Order's chief of security.

⁹⁴ J. Aho, *The Politics of Righteousness*, p. 79.

of acknowledged and overwhelming odds, identifying with Christ who also foresaw his own death and embraced it willingly.⁹⁵

The overall strategy Mathews articulated at the group's first initiation ceremony consisted of six steps. The first was to form the group itself, the second to set goals, the third was to procure funds, and the fourth recruitment.⁹⁶ Although legal methods were considered for step three (primarily through the logging of forest concessions) it was quickly discovered that these would not furnish sufficiently large quantities of money quickly enough. The two illegal modes settled on were a counterfeiting operation and the more immediate option of armed robbery. Although counterfeiting did not make the Order nearly as much money as armed robberies and also helped give the FBI some of its more valuable leads when investigating the group, this method warrants some mention. The rationale for counterfeiting was obviously to provide funds, but there was the added attraction perceived by the group that it would help de-value the currency of 'ZOG', and cause wider economic disruption. The first operation was carried out at the Aryan Nations compound, apparently without the knowledge of Richard Butler. When Butler discovered what was going on he had the two individuals responsible suspended - further evidence to the Order of how far Aryan Nations was from acting upon its rhetoric.⁹⁷ All following operations were conducted elsewhere and must ultimately be seen as a liability - it is through counterfeiting that the FBI acquired their first informant. Initially at least the Order decided to target a narrow section of their ideological enemies for funds - drug dealers and pornographers. Indeed, the first robbery perpetrated by the group was of an adult video store in Spokane (the only one in the town). The robbery itself was a success, marking a major tuning point for most members of the group, but the results were disappointing. As a result, the group decided to consider more lucrative targets such as banks and armoured cars which would net substantially more money, and also disrupt the economy of the ZOG. In December 1983, Mathews robbed a bank alone in the Puget Sound area of \$25,000, but this was a rare instance and the bulk of the funds obtained by

⁹⁵ A similar willingness to accept martyrdom was expressed by Gordon Kahl. *ibid.*, 'Appendix 1. Documents', pp. 242-246.

⁹⁶ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 124.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 161. Butler is reported to have asked one of the counterfeiters, Bruce Pierce, 'Why are you doing this?', to which Pierce replied 'We're all building the same house. It's just that you have one function and we have another'.

the Order were from organised attacks on armoured cars. The first such robbery in March 1984 netted the group almost \$50,000, and a robbery in the April almost \$250,000. The largest haul, however, was made in July 1984 when twelve Order members ambushed an armoured car near Ukiah California, escaping with \$3.8 million. Robberies such as those in March 16 and April 23 1984 were accompanied by bombings or bomb threats designed to distract local law enforcement. These bombings also had an ideological undercurrent, as in the case of the April 1984 when the target was a pornographic theatre.

Assassination was step five in the Order's revolutionary programme. Mathews talked frequently about a hit list of prominent 'racial enemies' which were to be assassinated. Mathews, however, added a new twist to the idea of assassinations with a so-called 'doomsday plan'. If the group was detected and persecuted by the authorities then each member who remained at liberty was to track and kill his assigned target.⁹⁸ This desperate last possibility is similar to the idea of 'Leaderless Resistance' propagated by Louis Beam, whereby highly motivated individuals with no group affiliation act on their own (or in small groups), thus minimising the chances of discovery or penetration by the state.⁹⁹ It is widely believed that Timothy McVeigh was following such a programme when he conducted the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.¹⁰⁰

Ironically the first person assassinated by the group was Walter West, an Aryan Nations member who was talking freely in bars around the Hayden Lake area about the activities of the Order. West was executed in May 1984. The first 'ideological' target was a Jewish Denver talk show host, Alan Berg who was gunned down outside his home a month after West. Berg was targeted because he had a history of goading (and frequently humiliating) right wing figures on his show. Berg was actually the third name on a list drawn up by Mathews. The first two were Morris Dees, head of the Southern Poverty Law Centre and the Klanwatch project in Montgomery Alabama, an obvious enemy of the

⁹⁸ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 126.

⁹⁹ L. Beam, 'Leaderless Resistance', *The Seditonist*, # 12, February 1992. The original essay was published in 1983. Barkun argues that such 'uncoordinated violence' within the U.S. has become the norm, replacing revolutionary models based on military hierarchy and the leftist cellular model (with the exception of PIRA). See his 'Leaderless Resistance and Phineas Priests: Strategies of Uncoordinated Violence on the Far Right', Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Diego, California, 1997.

¹⁰⁰ For an examination of the history of leaderless resistance and the motivations of McVeigh see J. Kaplan, 'Leaderless Resistance', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. IX, # 3, 1997, pp. 80-95. David Lane, an Order member, has offered his own Odinist interpretation of leaderless resistance in 'Wotan is Coming', *WAR*, April, 1993.

extreme right, and Norman Lear, a television producer who Mathews felt was responsible for changing television programmes into "race mixing free-sex garbage."¹⁰¹ Another target of opportunity considered for assassination was Baron Rothschild who visited Seattle in 1983 but the plot was shelved due to a lack of explosives and Mathew's conviction that it was too early to consider planning assassinations.¹⁰²

Step six was to be the formation of a guerrilla army which would conduct operations in urban areas¹⁰³. It was for this purpose that Mathews property contained a barracks and training areas. One member of the group, Randall Rader, was in charge of the guerrilla training. Rader had previously been 'minister of defence' at the CSA compound and was in charge of survivalist training there. Step six was, however, cut short as federal authorities came closer to making arrests. Although it has been noted the Order's robberies were executed in a sophisticated 'paramilitary style', it was the group's lack of professionalism which provided the authorities with their most valuable intelligence - during the Ukiah robbery Mathews left a handgun at the scene which was traced back to another member of the group, and soon after a member was arrested in Philadelphia for passing counterfeit money and quickly agreed to become a government informant.

After the first armoured car robbery Mathews began to send out group members to see which organisations within the extreme right warranted a 'donation'. This was another important part of Mathew's strategy. The Order would function merely as a vanguard which would breathe new, militant life into Christian extremists throughout the country. Robberies were meant not only to fund the activities of the Order but also those of other organisations - a form of revolutionary philanthropy. The major recipients were: Glen Miller, a North Carolina Klan leader (\$300,000); Thomas Metzger, leader of the White Aryan Resistance¹⁰⁴ (\$250,000); William Pierce's National Alliance (\$50,000); and Butler's Aryan Nations (\$40,000). When the 'war chest' was established, each member of the organisation was paid a wage of \$400 a week and those that had participated in the \$3.8 million Brinks heist were paid \$20,000 each.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰¹ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 234. Another contender for assassination was a federal judge in Texas who had ordered the eviction of elderly whites to make room for poor blacks.

¹⁰² *The New York Times*, September 14, 1985.

¹⁰³ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 126.

¹⁰⁴ Formerly the White Aryan Political Association.

¹⁰⁵ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, p. 296.

The tactic of engaging in robberies to fund revolutionary activity (sometimes in conjunction with diversionary bombings) was copied from earlier leftist organisations, and by extreme right groups which followed the Order. In 1968, Robert De Pugh, a man Mathews greatly admired, was indicted along with other Minutemen, for blowing up a Washington police station and attempting to rob a number of banks. Diversions for bank robberies which would fund an insurrection were also employed by the Minutemen.¹⁰⁶ In October 1981, a group of individuals affiliated with the May 19th Communist organisation and the Weather Underground robbed a Brink's armoured car, taking \$1.6m.¹⁰⁷ In September 1983, Los Machateros, a pro-Puerto Rican independence group, robbed the Wells Fargo depot in Hartford Connecticut netting \$7.2m.¹⁰⁸ The perpetrators of the 1981 robbery saw themselves as revolutionaries in a battle to establish a separate black nation in the Southern United States and regarded the Brink's heist as a 'justified expropriation'.¹⁰⁹ These tactics did not go unnoticed by the religious right. It has been suggested that the Order were inspired to target armoured cars at a July 1983 convention at Hayden Lake. At one of the assemblies held there Reverend Robert Miles, an Identity preacher, is reputed to have said "[i]f we were half the men the leftists were, we'd be hitting armoured cars too."¹¹⁰ There are many examples since the Order. An unrelated group calling itself the 'Bruders Schweigen Strike Force II' emerged in September 1986. The members also had Aryan Nations ties and engaged in counterfeiting and bombings which were meant as diversions for planned bank robberies. The group also planned to kill judges, prosecutors and federal agents.¹¹¹ Similarly an FBI raid in December 1986 on an Arizona Patriots camp revealed evidence of planned armoured car robberies which would help finance a right wing revolution. The investigation also revealed plans to bomb the Phoenix ADL regional office, a Phoenix synagogue and the Simon Weisenthal centre in Los Angeles. Perhaps most seriously the group was in possession of blueprints for three major dams on the

¹⁰⁶ See H. Jones, *The Minutemen*, 1968.

¹⁰⁷ E. Micklaus et al., *International Terrorism in the 1980s*, p. 212-215.

¹⁰⁸ J. Builta, *Extremist Groups: An International Compilation of Terrorist Organisations, Violent Political Groups and Issue-Oriented Militant Movements*, 1996, p. 916.

¹⁰⁹ *AP*, October 6, 1983. The defendants boycotted most of the trial on the grounds that the state had no right to try them, and one of the defendants told *AP* that his sentence didn't matter because he did not recognise the U.S. judicial system.

¹¹⁰ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 90-91.

¹¹¹ *AP*, October 9, 1986.

Colorado and Missouri rivers.¹¹² In April 1997, three members of the True Knights of the Klu Klux Klan were arrested and found guilty of planning to blow up a natural gas storage area as a diversionary tactic before robbing an armoured car. At about the same time four individuals associated by the 'Phineas Priesthood' were convicted of, amongst other things, at least two bombing/bank robbery incidents.¹¹³

While the Order applied only conventional methods, the sudden influx of funds and growing confidence within the group led to unconventional ideas being mooted. This is symbolic both of the group's inexperience in the conduct of political violence and their at times tenuous relationship to political reality. Perhaps the strangest was that suggested to Mathews by Daniel Bauer in September 1984. Bauer claimed to know two right wing scientists engaged in research on laser beam and microwave weapons and he proposed to put them on a grant from the group. The contacts were false but this incident does give a glimpse of the potential for groups to drift from reality when immediate successes cannot be easily digested.¹¹⁴ Such a course of action is reminiscent of some of Aum Shinrikyo's more unusual weapons programmes. Days before Mathew's death and the effective end of the Order Bruce Pierce was elaborating plans for fomenting social unrest to Mathews. Pierce proposed disrupting power and phone lines in Los Angeles, and even to poison an aqueduct with cyanide. It was expected that the cyanide would be detected at the filtration plant, but the disruption and fear caused would be immense, hopefully resulting in urban rioting like that which erupted during the 1960s.¹¹⁵

Robert Mathews was the first to practically apply the idea that in order to succeed the White Patriot movement must engage in militant activism. Unrepentant members of the Order still espouse such a belief, embellished by their own experiences and the lack of co-ordinated militant activity since Mathews' death. As Gary Yarborough has noted:

"[c]onventional tactics such as: recruiting members and associates from the populace, mass gatherings and meetings, rallies, protests etc. are no longer

¹¹² ADL, *Danger: Extremism*, p. 184.

¹¹³, Prepared Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence: 'Threats to National Security', *U.S. Federal News Service*, January 28, 1998.

¹¹⁴ K. Flynn & G. Gerhardt, *The Silent Brotherhood*, pp. 353-354.

¹¹⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 420-421. It should also be noted that the diversionary bombing of a natural gas refinery mentioned above would have resulted in the release of a cloud of poisonous Hydrogen Sulphide. See Federal News Service, 'Prepared Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, Before the Senate Committee on Intelligence: Threats to National Security', January 28, 1998.

profitable, viable, or judicious to employ...The only way to triumph and triumph over such an eminent adversary is via covert, clandestine, irregular and guerrilla tactics."¹¹⁶

8.2.3 The Palestinian Islamic Jihad

While the PIJ operates within the same geographical area as Hamas, the issue of balancing tactics and operations with the issue of self preservation is even more pressing because the PIJ is smaller and eschews mainstream political and social activities. The comparatively smaller size of the group and its lower degree of social penetration are further factors influencing the balance between militant action and organisational survival. These issues aside, the tactical programme employed by the PIJ has been markedly similar to that of Hamas - albeit on a lesser scale - not surprising given the similar tactical origins and influences of the groups and the instances of operational co-operation.

The strategy of the PIJ is revolutionary in nature. As one commentator has put it the liberation of Palestine:

"is to be accomplished by guerrilla groups, led by a revolutionary vanguard, which carry out terrorist attacks aimed at weakening Israel. Its militants see themselves as those who lay the groundwork for the day when the great Islamic Arabic army will be able to destroy Israel in a military confrontation."¹¹⁷

The group focuses solely on armed struggle and has no social welfare programme as does Hamas. In the words of one of the group's leadership, the overall strategy is to "Kill so many Jews that they will eventually abandon Palestine."¹¹⁸ At a Gaza rally in July 1998 Sheikh Abdullah Al-Shami elaborated this theme by stating:

"the goal of the 'Jihad' movement is to sow belief and revolution, to launch from the heart of defeat and to carry renewed blessings for the nation through knife-stabbings, bombs and car bombs in order to turn the region into a flaming torch ... in the face of the occupier."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ G. Yarborough, *Alert Update and Advisory*, n.p., 1993.

¹¹⁷ ICT, *Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini*, <http://www.ict.org.il>.

¹¹⁸ Ibrahim Sarbal, head of the Al-Aqsa brigades in Palestine, *Jerusalem Post*, December 19, 1990.

¹¹⁹ Quoted in MEMRI, *Leaders of Islamic Jihad and Hamas Call for Renewed Bombings*, Special dispatch # 2, July 20, 1998.

The gap between this totalist rhetoric and actual activity, however, is shown by the (comparatively) small number of the PIJ's operations amidst the constraints posed by the Israeli security forces and in the wake of the Oslo agreement those of the PA as well.

While the organisation does not oppose social welfare activities the emphasis is on militance. As Shallah has noted:

"[f]or the traditional Islamist movement, charitable or associational work has been a priority. MIJ [PIJ] did not come about to compete with anyone in this domain. Had we followed this path, there would have been no need to form MIJ and there would have been nothing new in the Islamist movement."¹²⁰

While the organisation has concentrated on jihad at the expense of 'satisfying people's material interests and needs' Shallah does not feel that this has marginalised or isolated the group, but rather is "present in all corners of Palestinian society, as a political and vital part of the fabric of this society."¹²¹ The fact remains though that the absence of social and welfare structures have effectively denied the PIJ not only the social depth that these have given Hamas but would represent a significant shortfall should the group ever wish to become involved in mainstream politics perhaps following a concerted Israeli/PA effort to extinguish the group.

Over time, the PIJ's tactics have developed partly in response to security threats and also as a result of external influences and support. At times the PIJ's tactical programme has involved launching operations which complement those of Hamas or have been directly co-ordinated with them. The initial low level tactics employed during the Intifada have gradually led to more sophisticated uses, especially of explosives in the form of suicide bombers. Some tactics have been used because they are simple and offer a disproportionate psychological impact. For example, the PIJ has employed a method developed by Hamas in 1992 for road shootings (as does the PFLP). This involves travelling after an Israeli vehicle usually on a dark and deserted road, approaching or overtaking the car and opening fire. Afterwards the shooters drive to an Arab population area and burn the car.¹²² Such a method is uncomplicated from an operational viewpoint,

¹²⁰ 'The Movement of Islamic Jihad and the Oslo Process: An Interview With Ramadan Abdullah Shallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXVIII, # 4, p. 64.

¹²¹ *ibid.*

¹²² *Yediot Ahronot*, December 12, 1996.

inexpensive and has an enormous psychological impact on the target population. The viability of such operations has been lessened in the face of more stringent Israeli and Palestinian security. The most dramatic tactical adaptation, however, was the adoption of suicide bombing, a method adopted from Hizballah during the 1992 expulsion of Islamic activists. In a January 1995 interview Fathi Shiqaqi described the development of the PIJ's tactics:

"[a] few years ago we used knives. Three months ago we used a bicycle bomb after Hani Abid [the Islamic Jihad journalist allegedly blown up by Israeli agents] was killed by Mossad. Now we have changed our style. We know the Israelis are very sophisticated too. It's more difficult for us to get explosives than for anyone else in the world, but if you want to you can do it."¹²³

The use of certain tactics such as suicide bombing by a relatively small group, however, can result in a counter response directed at the operational core of the organisation. Such attacks are carried out by 'al-Qasam' units, groups tasked solely with attacks similar to Hamas's Izz a-Din al-Qassam battalions.¹²⁴ These are small in number - in late 1994 it was estimated that there were about thirty operating in the Occupied Territories.¹²⁵ Initial suicide attacks were conducted against Israeli military personnel, however, the targeting priorities were radically altered after the 1994 Ibrahimi mosque attack.¹²⁶ Due to their small size, such units are difficult to neutralise but when they are the effects can be highly disruptive. Hani Abed, for example, was alleged to have been a suicide bomber operator and this is what inspired the Israeli security services to kill him. It was noted at the time that Abed's death hurt the organisation, although not enough to prevent a revenge attack soon after his death and another even more destructive one two months later.¹²⁷ Further degradation of the group's capabilities has been reflected in subsequent operations. In 1998, two of the PIJ's suicide bombers were killed when their devices exploded prematurely. Their target was presumed to be the crowded Mahane

¹²³ *The Independent*, January 30, 1995.

¹²⁴ The word 'al-Kassam' is an acronym for 'forces of the Islamic Jihad' (kuwa Islamiya Mujahidah), and may also mean 'the oath'.

¹²⁵ *Yediot Ahronot*, November 18, 1994.

¹²⁶ For a profile of the bombers involved in these attacks see L. Adoni, 'Searching for Answers: Gaza's Suicide Bombers', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. XXVI, # 4, 1997, pp. 33-45.

¹²⁷ *Ma'ariv*, November 13, 1994.

Yehuda market in Jerusalem on a busy Friday and was significant because it was the first major attempted bombing by the organisation since the assassination of Shaqaqi in October 1995. Ya'akov Perry, former head of the GSS, noted that the PIJ's activities had been severely curtailed by Israeli and Palestinian authority operations against leaders and bomb makers: "There is a weakness both in the explosives used and in the engineers - the experts capable of building the bombs - and there is also the problem of the quality of the terrorists themselves."¹²⁸

8.3 Messianic/Apocalyptic

8.3.1 Jewish Underground

Although the Jewish underground is most notable for its plot to destroy the Dome of the Rock, the tactical origins of the group lay in revenge attacks which took the form of shootings and bombings (actual or proposed). Thus while the group began by planning a conventional bombing which they felt would have profound consequences for the Jewish messianic redemptive process, it quite quickly settled on a tactical programme of bombings and shootings in response to Arab acts of terrorism against Jews. This parallel pursuit of vengeance and messianism can be seen as protecting and avenging the Jewish community while simultaneously pursuing a course which would lead to the establishment of a Jewish religious state, albeit through the medium of prophetic fulfilment.

The first operation perpetrated by the Jewish Underground was aimed at the Arab mayors of five Palestinian towns in June 1980. The attack was intended as a response to an Arab shooting of six yeshiva students in Hebron the month before. The objective was not to kill the mayors but to permanently maim them so that they would remain "living symbols of the consequences of anti-Jewish terrorism."¹²⁹ Two of the mayors were crippled, two survived because their bombs were not wired properly, and at the home of the fifth, an Israeli bomb disposal officer accidentally detonated the device which left him severely wounded and blind. In 1982, the messianic direction of the group was further

¹²⁸ AP, *Reuters*, November 8, 1998.

¹²⁹ E. Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, 1991, p. 97.

altered when the Temple Mount plot was indefinitely postponed. Consequently the next series of actions were conventional shootings and bombings. In July 1983, a shooting attack was launched against the Islamic College of Hebron resulting in the death of three students and the wounding of thirty-three. The next proposed attack was the bombing of the men's dormitory at Bir Zeit University in Ramallah. This plan was suspended owing to a government closure of the university. The plan which succeeded this one was to blow up five Palestinian passenger buses. This was to be done on a Friday afternoon thus limiting the possibility of Israeli casualties. Just before the operation was to be carried out the Israeli security services arrested the entire group.¹³⁰

The apparent paradox of the Underground planning a redemptive messianic action and then engaging in vigilante operations can be explained in part by looking at the group's membership. All were settlers used to conflict with both the Israeli government and the Arabs. Many were serving soldiers of reserve officers and all shared a close sense of mission and community. The settlers as a body were also aware that reprisals by the state for revenge attacks conducted by settlers were mild. In 1982, for example, a committee headed by the deputy Attorney General of Israel, Yehudit Carp, examined seventy cases of violence and threat against Arabs by Jews. Over two thirds of the cases ended in no action.¹³¹ Furthermore, a 1983 study of the settler community revealed that twenty-eight percent of males and five percent of females admitted to having participated in some form of vigilante activity, and only thirteen percent disapproved of vigilantism.¹³² The study concluded that "[t]hough a minority of settlers actually participate in vigilante acts, they are not isolated deviant figures in this settlement movement."¹³³ Vigilantism was thus the accepted order of the day, while the concept of preparing a complex single event which would have redemptive consequences was not, and nor did it offer the sort of immediate (and proportional) gratification of a revenge attack. When the members of the Jewish Underground were put on trial, opinion polls at the time revealed that while a majority of Israelis opposed any sort of Jewish terrorist organisation almost a third thought attacks on

¹³⁰ E. Sprinzak, 'From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case of the Gush Emunim Underground', in D.C. Rapoport, *Inside Terrorist Organisations*, 1988, p. 210.

¹³¹ E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 169.

¹³² D. Weisburd & V. Vinitzky, 'Vigilantism as Radical Social Control: The Case of Gush Emunim Settlers', in M. Aronoff (ed.), *Religion and Politics, Social Anthropology*, Vol. 3, 1993.

¹³³ *ibid.* p. 82.

Arabs could be 'partly or wholly justifiable'. Furthermore over a third of people polled felt that if the Underground members were sentenced they should receive "light to nominal sentences or should get off scot-free."¹³⁴

With the arrest of the Underground members came the knowledge that the group had been planning to blow up the Dome of the Rock in order to pave the way for the construction of the Third Temple. Unlike the previous operations this was intended solely as an attempt to aid in the fulfilment of the Jewish messianic promise. Yehuda Etzion himself felt that the Jewish state carried the responsibility for removing the mosques on the Temple Mount: "[i]t [the Temple Mount] is the possession of David, the possession of David that we are commanded to take over today. And the nation's instrument for this is, of course, is the state of Israel."¹³⁵ Because the state would not act and appeared disinterested in the fulfilment of messianic destiny Etzion decided to act himself. While there can be little doubt that the response to the bombing - particularly in the Islamic world - would have been catastrophic and the subsequent prospects for the Underground' survival would have been slim, these were not the immediate issues. Although some group members expressed apprehension concerning the possible consequences¹³⁶, the rationale was not temporal but spiritual and therefore temporal issues such as security backlashes, group survival and conflict escalation were not of primary relevance.

While the means that were to be employed by the Jewish Underground in the Dome of the Rock attack were conventional, it is important to examine the way in which they were to be used.¹³⁷ Twenty-eight different bombs were manufactured for the attack. Three were to be placed at the foot of three of the four pillars supporting the Dome. The other smaller charges would be placed at the foot of the smaller pillar supporting the rest of the building. This intricate plan was designed to preserve the Rock of Foundation, believed to be the site of the Jewish Temple's inner sanctum. In the words of Yehuda Etzion:

¹³⁴ *The Economist*, June 23, 1984.

¹³⁵ Cited in J. Aviad, 'The Messianism of Gush Emunim', in J. Frankel (ed.), *Jews and Messianism in the Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning. Studies in Contemporary Jewry Vol. VII*, 1991, p. 211.

¹³⁶ E. Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, 1991, p. 96.

¹³⁷ One member of the group, Chaim Ben David claimed that the idea of bombing the mosque from the air had been floated at one of the group's meetings (he was unsure if this was a serious suggestion). See E. Sprinzak, *Brother Against Brother*, p. 159.

"[t]he whole operation was carefully planned because we had to be careful not to touch the rock inside...we planned it in such a way that only three columns would be destroyed. This would cause the Dome itself to fall onto the rock, and protect it from all the other masonry."¹³⁸

This description highlights further the religious significance of the bombing, ensuring that what was sacred to Jewish traditions would be preserved while the Islamic edifice was removed. Had the operation proceeded as planned the group assumed that construction of the Third Temple, centred around the inner sanctum of the second, could proceed as soon as possible.

8.3.2 Aum Shinrikyo

The tactics employed by Aum Shinrikyo were many and varied and the emphasis on which were used reflected both the increasing paranoia of the group and also its obsession with the end-time. It is significant to note that Aum Shinrikyo did not begin as a militant movement and its initial activities centred around recruitment and fund raising. Investigations, primarily by journalists, into the legality of the groups activities - especially the treatment of group members - led to the first murders being perpetrated, but it was the complete failure of Aum's foray into mainstream politics which appear to have moved the group into a confrontational situation with Japanese society, intensified the messianic rhetoric of the group and led it to consider, and then engage in, acts of mass violence. This progression was made easier by the legal standing of the group within Japanese society and the reluctance of Japanese law enforcement to interfere with religious organisations. The violent tactics considered and employed by the group varied from a variety of conventional means to an even more bizarre variety of unconventional means, most notably the use of chemical agents, and many of these were made possible by the broad membership of the group and the substantial funds which the group managed to accumulate.

Before examining the extra legal activities of Aum it is important to explore the process whereby the group was initially established as a legal and accepted part of Japanese society. The most important step in this direction occurred in August 1989 when

¹³⁸ Yehuda Etzion, cited in C. Coughlin, *A Golden Basin Full of Scorpions: The Quest for Modern Jerusalem*, 1997, p. 234.

the Tokyo Metropolitan Government granted Aum official religious corporation status. This law provided Aum privileges such as large tax concessions and 'de facto immunity from official oversight and prosecution'. Under the law authorities are not permitted to investigate an organisation's 'religious activities and doctrines' and it appears that this was an important event in the development of the group's illegal activities.¹³⁹ These concessions and lack of oversight enabled Aum to accumulate a considerable fortune with which expensive projects such as weapons procurement and development could be financed. The second murder perpetrated by the group (of a member threatening to leave and reveal details of the first murder) in early 1989 can be seen as a desperate, if calculated, attempt to ensure that religious corporation status was granted. The murder of members threatening to leave the group, those conniving in their escape or the murder or attempted murder of outsiders investigating Aum became common place, and it is important to note that at this very early stage murder was considered a viable and justifiable manner of ensuring the group's future survival and prosperity.

Although some of Aum's extra-legal activities predated the group's foray into mainstream Japanese politics, the result of this experiment was an intensification of extra-legal activities and an abandonment of legitimate political means. In the 1990 general election Asahara and twenty-four of his followers stood for seats in the Lower House of parliament. The effort was a serious one with millions of dollars being spent on an unorthodox campaign. Aum held rallies where followers wore oversized papier-mâché masks of Shoko Asahara and sang Aum songs. Aum also intentionally broke electoral rules by destroying other parties posters, campaigning past accepted times and so on.¹⁴⁰ The campaign and Aum's political platform however were not to the taste of the Japanese public and the elections were a humiliating failure.¹⁴¹ Not a single Aum candidate came anywhere near being elected, and the entire slate gathered only 1,783 votes. The campaign had caused severe financial loss to the group as well as a drop in membership and in response Asahara further radicalised Aum's belief system by making a doomsday

¹³⁹ U.S. Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Statement, *Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo*, 1996.

¹⁴⁰ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum*, 1996, p. 47. One ex-member claimed afterwards that the phone of an opponent had been tapped.

¹⁴¹ Another sect, Soka Gakkai, had run in previous elections and done well, although their methods and ideology were more conservative.

prediction linked to the approach of the comet Austin¹⁴². From this point on Aum's apocalyptic rhetoric intensified as did the group's attempts to raise more money and increase its membership.¹⁴³

Apart from Aum's attempts at entering mainstream Japanese politics the group also sought to participate in Japanese society through various business interests - both legal and illegal - the primary aim of which was to raise revenue. Aum operated various open business concerns ranging from noodle shops to chemical wholesalers.¹⁴⁴ The group also owned and ran computer shops and competed for tenders for installing computer systems. It is this last activity which provided the group with intelligence on Japanese law enforcement activities even after the nerve gas attacks. It has been revealed that cult members worked on computer systems at the ministries of education, construction and telecommunications, as well as at large corporations such as NTT, Kiyoo Bank and East Japan Railway.¹⁴⁵ There has also been the revelation that a company affiliated with Aum helped the Japanese metropolitan police department set up a system to manage its patrol cars, some of which were likely to have been used to monitor the group. The identity of the software provider was discovered only a month before the system was to go on line in early 1998 and after the group had been paid two million yen by the police for the job.¹⁴⁶ Perhaps most worrying of all Japanese police revealed in March 2000 that "software developers of the Aum Shinrikyo cult [had] apparently siphoned off information about Japan's nuclear programme...including nuclear fuel suppliers, research and transportation of nuclear materials."¹⁴⁷

Although they never reached fruition Aum's attitude towards, and construction of, conventional weaponry is important for understanding the mind-set of the group. After obtaining a prototype and blueprints for the Russian AK-47 assault rifle Aum set up a full scale, computerised machine shop for their manufacture at the 'Clear Stream Temple' a few

¹⁴² It was predicted that following the passing of Austin there would be a catastrophe in 'the near future'. The prophecy was made at a seminar held on the island of Ishigakijima near Okinawa. The seminar was designed to attract more members and to raise more funds.

¹⁴³ D. Brackett, *Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo*, 1996, 82-83.

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.* pp. 89-90.

¹⁴⁵ *The Guardian*, March 13, 2000. Raids by police following these revelation discovered a database with information on thousands of officials working at Japanese corporations.

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ *Asahi Shimbun*, March 29, 2000.

miles from the Mount Fuji compounds.¹⁴⁸ The plan was to arm a large number of Aum members for the coming confrontation with the state, although it does not appear to have occurred to the group to use these or other weapons the group procured before that time. In parallel with this some cult members were provided with training in all forms of military equipment at a Russian military base outside Moscow and later training camps were run in Japan by three men who were serving members of the JDF.¹⁴⁹ As well as manufacturing toxic chemical compounds Aum also experimented with making various forms of high explosive, most notably RDX and TNT.¹⁵⁰ Despite this investment of money and effort the group did not engage in shooting or bombings and apparently did not consider some combination of explosives and chemical or biological agents for a CB 'bomb'. This is largely due to the mind set of the group and the fascination with more destructive and symbolically appropriate weapons.

The most disturbing element of Aum's tactical programme was undoubtedly the group's almost obsessive experiments in developing and employing unconventional weapons. Aum first began experimenting with biological agents in early 1990 and despite repeated attempts at releasing botulinus toxin and anthrax over a period of five years using a variety of delivery systems there were no discernible results. When considering Aum's experiments with biological weapons it is well worth noting the many problems encountered by the group along the way despite the resources devoted to the task. Aum initially developed biological agents (botulinum toxin and Anthrax) and carried out a series of abortive attacks. Further investigation revealed however that the botulinum toxin was not completed to culture and therefore harmless and the anthrax developed by the group was from a vaccine strain which meant that however it was cultured it would always remain harmless.¹⁵¹ No casualties resulted in any of the above examples and in most cases the incidents were not noticed by anyone. Despite alarming reports to the contrary there is

¹⁴⁸ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, p. 88.

¹⁴⁹ R.J. Lifton, *Destroying the World to Save it: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence and the New Global Terrorism*, 1999, p. 192

¹⁵⁰ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, p. 151.

¹⁵¹ M. Leitenberg, 'The Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo Group and Biological Agents', in B. Roberts (ed.), *Hype or Reality: The "New Terrorism" and Mass Casualty Attacks*, 2000, pp. 161-164.

no evidence that Aum experimented with Q fever or Ebola, or engaged in genetic engineering of toxins or pathogens.¹⁵²

After the disappointing results of biological weaponry Aum turned in 1993 to the development of chemical agents. Aum produced sarin gas on three separate occasions in November and December 1993 at the Satyam No. 7 facility at the group's Kamikuishiki compound which had been specifically designed for the purpose. Further quantities were produced there in February 1994 and it was this batch which was used at the Matsumoto nerve gas attack which killed seven people.¹⁵³ The sarin used in the 1995 subway attacks was manufactured at a smaller facility within the compound. As well as sarin, Aum experimented with other chemical agents including soman, tabun, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene and VX. Hydrogen cyanide was used in two known incidents in Tokyo subway stations during May and July 1995, but they resulted in no casualties largely due to the quick thinking of railway staff. VX was employed on at least three other occasions, but as an assassination weapon rather for generating mass casualties.¹⁵⁴

Apart from their chemical and biological programmes Aum also explored the possibility of manufacturing or acquiring a nuclear device and investigated an array of other more bizarre unconventional weapons. For the purpose of developing a nuclear capability Aum took the following steps: purchase of a property in Australia where they hoped to mine Uranium which they intended to enrich (and where they conducted a successful sarin test on sheep); attempted to purchase dual use equipment for the manufacture of nuclear devices from the U.S.; actively recruited members of a Russian nuclear research facility, the I.V. Kurchatov Institute as well as physicists from Moscow State University¹⁵⁵; and in 1993 sought (but were denied) a meeting with the Russian Energy Minister to discuss the purchase of a nuclear warhead.¹⁵⁶ Aum's attempts to construct a nuclear device however were haphazard. The actual and attempted procurement of various components and equipment do not suggest a coherent plan aimed at constructing a particular type of device and this lack of focus contributed to emphasis

¹⁵² *ibid.* pp. 164-166.

¹⁵³ U.S. Senate, *Global Proliferation*, p. 62, 68-69.

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p. 62, 68-69.

¹⁵⁵ *ITAR-TASS*, 1541 gmt, 23 May 95 - *BBC/SWB*, SU/2312/B, May 25, 1995.

¹⁵⁶ Marshall & Kaplan, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 112, 190-192, 208, and D.W. Brackett, *Holy Terror*, pp. 92-93.

being placed on the development of chemical and biological weapons.¹⁵⁷ Aum's obsession with science fiction also led the group to experiment with laser weaponry (including the enrichment of Uranium with lasers), railguns and to examine the work of the Yugoslav scientist Nikola whose theories of resonating frequencies and seismology led Aum to consider the development of 'earthquake weaponry'.¹⁵⁸

With the decision to develop nerve gas taken and production going ahead major problems still remained with regard to dispersal systems. The first attempt to use the agent, against Daisaku Ikeda, leader of Soka Gakkai. The plan was to pump the gas into a building where Ikeda would be giving a talk, but the spraying mechanism failed on two attempts, the second incapacitating one of the Aum perpetrators.¹⁵⁹ A new system was devised for the Matsumoto attack with greater success, although the wind did interfere. Following the Matsumoto attack little consideration seems to have been given by the group to methods of dispersal and the method used during the Tokyo subway attacks, that of piercing bags of sarin with sharpened umbrellas represented a technical regression at the very least. Moreover, the haste with which these final operations were organised and carried out is indicative of their defensive and tactical nature. The final and most appalling violent acts of Aum, the Tokyo subway gassings were made in response to intensified police operations. The decision to use sarin thus appears to be much more tactical than redemptive.¹⁶⁰ Asahara also apparently sanctioned further acts of this nature before his arrest. Following the assassination of Hideo Murai, Aum's 'Minister of Science' Asahara is reputed to have order his disciples to engage "in a campaign of terror to overthrow the government and to thwart his arrest."¹⁶¹ A document discovered by Japanese police shortly after Murai's murder stated that if Asahara was arrested "we will use sarin to launch a suicide attack on police investigators."¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ G. Cameron, 'Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons From Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaida', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. XXII, # 4, p. 287.

¹⁵⁸ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, pp. 207-208, 220-221 & 224-225.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p. 132-133.

¹⁶⁰ M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronological and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo', *TPV*, Vol. X, # 4, 1998, p. 92.

¹⁶¹ *ibid.*, p. 93.

¹⁶² JPRS-TOT-95-011-L, June 26, 1995. The document dated April 27 was the first documentary admission that the group had developed sarin.

While some of the previous cases have employed allusions to unconventional weapons as a rhetorical tool in the case of Aum Shoko Asahara's pronouncement's provided clues -sometimes quite ominous ones and nearly all of which were universally ignored by the Japanese authorities - as to the group's intended activities. During the court action over the Matsumoto land deal for instance Asahara delivered a sermon heavily criticising the court and invoking a prophecy of Nostradamus which claims that by the end of the twentieth century will be "out of control" as Asahara explained, "I mean they will not be able to tell right from wrong" and such judges would suffer "a chemical change unthinkable in normal circumstances."¹⁶³ Other examples from Aum publications and even forensic evidence of sarin production by Aum failed to generate a thorough and decisive law enforcement response, and in this regard while the activities of Aum are alarming in the extreme there was certainly scope for circumvention, although these drawbacks should be seen in the light of the haphazard and uncoordinated way that the group developed and used unconventional weapons.

8.3.3 Saudi Ikhwan

The tactical programme of the Saudi Ikhwan was straightforward in nature and short-lived primarily because of its messianic underpinnings. After a period of ideological formation and recruitment the Ikhwan did develop and disseminate a religiously based political agenda, but the nature of Saudi society and the extremity of the Ikhwan's views meant that participation in, or influence on, Saudi politics was negligible. Following this inevitable disappointment the group engaged in a period of more radical ideological development, membership consolidation and arms procurement which culminated in the conventional military assault on and occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The total commitment of the group to this operation and the overwhelming force arrayed against it ensured that it would be their last.

Juhayman Utaybi's Ikhwan made no attempt at mainstream political activity. Although Utaybi's 'seven letters' could be considered the basis for one, their radical form and the absolutist, conservative nature of the Saudi regime ensured that their very appearance could only lead to the repression of the group. The option decided upon was a

¹⁶³ D. Kaplan & A. Marshall, *The Cult at the End of the World*, p. 138.

direct confrontation with the state. This tactic is not necessarily the only possible one as was demonstrated by the other significant contemporary Mahdist movement, the Egyptian Takfir wal-Hijra.¹⁶⁴ In this case the decision that not only the regime but also the society in which they existed were illegitimate led the group to withdraw from mainstream society and to postpone military action.¹⁶⁵ Takfir was thus not revolutionary in the immediate sense and a combination of the group's provocative stance towards society and its decision to abandon isolation and engage in violence led to the group's destruction. Similarly to the Ikhwan Takfir wal-Hijra saw the end of the world as imminent and considered its leader, Shukri Mustapha to be the Mahdi.¹⁶⁶

The Ikhwan financed its activities by selling religious pamphlets and by soliciting donations. One member of the group, the son of a wealthy merchant, also sold a property in Jeddah to help cover the cost of the weapons.¹⁶⁷ The acquisition of arms posed no major difficulties for the group. As members of a tribal society that takes pride in the possession of arms many Saudis own them and before the insurrection there was a flourishing arms trade within the kingdom. Arms were also smuggled from Syria, Jordan and Iraq, and it is believed that shortly before the occupation of the Grand Mosque a group of Ikhwan members attacked a National Guard base near Jeddah and stole some light weapons.¹⁶⁸ The weaponry of the Saudi Ikhwan was varied but accorded with tribal tradition as much as tactical practicality. In the main it consisted of automatic weapons which were apparently used with devastating effect during the initial phase of frontal assaults by the Saudi National Guard and Army. The contention that National Guard units may have deserted out of sympathy and or provided the group with ammunition, machine guns, gas masks, food and medical supplies seems unrealistic¹⁶⁹. While the exact number of the

¹⁶⁴ It has been suggested that the Egyptian members of the Ikhwan were members of Takfir wal Hijra. See W. Dietl, *Holy War*, 1983, p. 217.

¹⁶⁵ W. M., Abdelnassar, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations, 1967-1981*, 1994, pp. 204-205.

¹⁶⁶ D. Zeidan, 'Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups', *MERIA Journal*, Vol. III, # 3, 1999, p. 6.

¹⁶⁷ J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan - 1979', in D. Holden & R. Johns (eds.), *The House of Saud*, 1981, p. 521.

¹⁶⁸ A. Al-Yassini, *Religion and the State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, p. 125

¹⁶⁹ For allegations of National Guard complicity see S. Mackey, *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom*, p. 231. See also Arabic sources cited in J. Kechichian, 'Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia', *The Muslim World*, Vol. LXXX, # 1, 1990, p. 7. A more likely explanation for the desertions is that in the initial organisational chaos national guardsmen refused to take orders from non-tribal officers appointed to their units (indeed, by most accounts the Saudi forces were eager to do their job). This is indicative of the quality of

insurgents is difficult to calculate it is estimated to be around four hundred.¹⁷⁰ This figure may have been even greater because a number of insurgents were arrested by Saudi security services en route to the Mosque.

The occupation of the Grand Mosque appears to be a desperate militant act inspired more by messianic objectives than political ones. Prior to this attack the Grand Mosque's sanctity had been violated only twice before. The first occurred in 693 AD when Allah al-Zubair led a revolt against the Umayyid dynasty and sought sanctuary in the mosque with a group of followers. The ensuing siege lasted eight months and when they capitulated al-Zubair and his followers were executed. The second was in 930 AD when the Qarmatians (a sect which emerged from the Ismaili Seveners) occupied Mecca and allegedly carried off the black stone housed within the Kaaba.¹⁷¹ The occupation of the Grand Mosque was an attempt to alter the existing political and social status quo by fulfilling messianic prophecy. At the very outset of the take-over Muhammed al-Qahtani shouted into the Imam's microphone that he was the Mahdi, claiming that "The Mahdi and his men will seek shelter and protection in the Holy Mosque because they are persecuted everywhere until they have no recourse but the Holy Mosque."¹⁷²

Although the Saudi regime was keen to implicate hostile foreign intelligence services (specifically Syria or the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)¹⁷³, there was no proof. Similarly, attempts were made to find a link between the attack on the Grand Mosque and the Shi'a riots in the Eastern provinces at the same time. By January 1980 both these suspicions had been officially quashed by the Saudi interior minister, Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz.¹⁷⁴ The first allegations were easily disproved. Weapons in Saudi Arabia were fairly easily procured as was training, either through traditional tribal life or through service in the national guard, as Prince Nayef commented "weapons were easily to be found amongst the Bedouin and they are good shots anyway."¹⁷⁵ The Ikhwan itself was a

the Saudi military response to the attack. See *The Financial Times*, 'Areas of Military Weakness Revealed', April 28, 1980.

¹⁷⁰ A. Al-Yassini, *Religion and the State*, p. 150, fn. 41.

¹⁷¹ P. Holt, A. Lambton & B. Lewis, *The Cambridge History of Islam: Volume 1A, The Central Islamic Lands From Pre-Islamic Times to the First World War*, 1970, pp. 84 & 136.

¹⁷² J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan', p. 512.

¹⁷³ There was also the suggestion that George Habash's PFLP was involved. *The Observer*, January 27, 1980.

¹⁷⁴ *The Guardian*, January 14, 1980.

¹⁷⁵ J. Buchan, 'The Return of the Ikhwan', p. 521.

Sunni sect and the Shi'a riots were mainly evidence of the wide range of opposition (and ways in which this opposition manifested itself) the Saudi regime faced. It has been suggested that the attack was also meant to involve the capture of King Khaled who it was thought would be attending the Mosque that day, but the overwhelming motivation appears to have been messianic not least because of the ultimate futility of such a tactic motivated by temporal considerations of group survival and political success.

8.4 Conclusion

The tactics employed by violent religious groups are not only defined by a group's ideological programme and objectives but also by a variety of environmental and practical constraints. Mainstream organisations engage in the broadest variety of activities including participation in political processes, social welfare activities and violence and it is a combination of these which is intended to bring about a complete alteration of a particular socio-political order with the select applications of violence at critical sacred or political moments. The environmental context in terms of potential popular support for a group's ideas and methods and the presence (or absence) of an effective law enforcement apparatus and judiciary will determine the tactical programme. Once this programme has been adopted it will then be subject to various practical constraints such as organisation and procurement. In situations where there is effective legal control as in Israel and the U.S., groups such as Kach and Aryan Nations must moderate the violent dimension of their activities, the result of which is that most violent activity is not orchestrated by the group but is conducted by individuals or splinter groups related to the group. In the case of Aryan Nations where there is limited popular support for the group's ideas, participation in mainstream politics is also rejected. In different environments such as Lebanon Hizballah has been able to formulate and conduct a far more robust programme of violence in combination with social and political activities. While core groups concentrate on violence, they too face environmental and practical constraints, and like mainstream organisations the environmental constraints are fully taken into account and worked around in the interests of group survival, while practical constraints govern the level of violence. Messianic and apocalyptic organisations are far less constrained than other group types because their desire to alter the socio-political *status quo* is driven by a desire to

fulfil an eschatological promise which will end temporal history. There is thus little point in engaging in political or welfare activities and the emphasis lies in both extreme and highly symbolic violent actions.

Chapter IX

Conclusion

The preceding chapters have served to demonstrate that the conventional assumptions made about religiously motivated violence are not necessarily accurate when one correlates these within specific cases and contexts. The phenomenon of religious violence has been treated with assumptions about degrees of militancy and the propensity for violence, treating it largely in a monolithic fashion, especially in the way that these assumptions have linked the dialectic of militant rhetoric to seemingly unconstrained levels and forms of violence. Perhaps the most prominent exemplar of these assumptions has been Bruce Hoffman, although he is certainly not the only exponent. The main purpose of this thesis has been to provide a composite picture of the mechanisms and complex processes that define and govern religiously motivated violence. In particular the identification of the 'other', processes of legitimising violence and how group dynamics and other environmental factors serve to influence (and at times constrain) the actual and practical conduct of violence across faiths, group styles and contexts.

This study has revealed many similarities in these complex processes as they apply to a diverse collection of case studies. The purpose was not to be conclusive but illustrative of the need to apply a consistent framework in order to understand this composite picture. While the actual contexts within which each of the groups examined exists differs greatly, especially how the groups interact with their environments, these similarities hold true. This thesis has sought to demonstrate that it is possible to systematically and comparatively draw out the framework for a more nuanced analytical understanding of the mechanisms and processes governing religious violence.

The preceding chapters have sought to address in a holistic fashion the significant features and processes which underlie the conduct of religiously motivated violence in the contemporary era. Religious violence is an extremely complex phenomenon, manifesting itself in a variety of different forms across many different societies and faiths. This does

not mean, however, that there do not exist certain constant features and attitudes which transcend the revealed religions, and it is through identifying these and applying them to specific case studies that an objective understanding of religious violence becomes possible. It is, after all, through a fuller understanding of a problematic phenomenon that more effective solutions suggest themselves. In this final chapter a number of conclusions will be drawn concerning the veracity of the framework of analysis as a whole, particularly its predictive value, and more specific observations will be made regarding the categorisation of group types and the six primary elements. Following this will be a discussion of the additions this thesis has made to the examination of religiously motivated violence, and the challenges it poses to some existing, widely held observations regarding the phenomenon.

9.1 The Utility of Group Categorisation

The creation of three distinct group types allows us to establish the propensity for groups to engage in violence and also to explore the permeable nature of the boundaries which lie between group types. The major differences between groups within the same category are basically a function of the environment within which they exist. Hizballah, for example, has been able to engage in large scale organised violence since its inception because of the fragmentary (and for the most part lawless) nature of Lebanese society. A similar observation can be made of Hamas whose militant activities began and flourished in Gaza and the West Bank - those areas beyond effective Israeli control and latterly under the less effective control of the PA. Such a course of action for Kach or Aryan Nations would have been unthinkable because of the certainty that such a course would lead to the group's destruction. All groups of the mainstream type possess a significant constituency. In the cases of Hizballah and Kach this has most clearly been shown in electoral success and in the case of Hamas a latent form of electoral support, unrealised because of the group's current unwillingness to participate in PA elections (especially as this would entail tacit recognition of Israel's right to exist). The extremity of Aryan Nation's ideological programme precludes electoral participation but the group embodies right-wing racist Identity beliefs and has attracted a significant number of members and sympathisers throughout the United States and beyond.

For all the group types the fundamental spur to action however is the same. It is a reaction to socio-political circumstances which are regarded as acutely offensive. Most of the groups experience a sensation of crisis akin to historical ones, linking the past and the present. For mainstream groups, the perceived solution to this crisis is an attempt at mass mobilisation involving a call to arms which, depending on the individual context, is acted upon to one degree or another. For core groups, the solution, or at least the beginning of the solution, lies with the militant actions of a revolutionary vanguard whose violent activities will ignite a broader struggle. For messianic and apocalyptic groups the solution lies with a particular act or series of acts of eschatological significance which will cause a divine transformation of the existing order.

The most dangerous and devastating attacks (not least because of their unpredictability) are those conducted by small, radical groups, or small splinters within a large group. Michael Wieviorka has claimed that violence comes only when a splinter group alienates itself from a larger organisation and it has rejected the original ideology as insufficient for dealing with the perceived crisis.¹ While ignoring the fact that mainstream religious organisations do engage in violence it should be observed that individuals or splinter groups such as the Order, Eyal or the Jewish Underground do not reject the original ideology, they wish to give it truer substance by acting according to its fundamental precepts.

9.2 Establishing the Necessity for Violence

As with violent secular groups all the case studies examined here expect to realise some form of articulated, idealised future or Golden Age. The expectation of this Golden Age is a powerful determinant in the justification of violent struggle in that, despite the horrors and privations of the struggle itself, society as a whole will emerge purified, just and pleasing in the eyes of the Almighty. While this may be seen as similar to secular expectations furnished by ideologies such as Marxism-Leninism or nationalism it is more fundamental both in terms of its historical lineage and the signifying transcendent elements which make both the cause unarguable, and make it virtually impossible for the ideology

¹ M. Wieviorka, *The Making of Terrorism*, 1993, p. 291.

to be tried in practice and found wanting. The Golden Age is both forward and backward looking. It seeks to replace the current socio-political *status quo* with something better, but a something better derived from the past, in the case of Jewish groups a society akin to that of the Davidic era, for Islamic groups the first Islamic communities and for Christian groups the loose idea of a 'Christian Republic' which has no real scriptural or historical precedent.² The religious concept of a Golden Age is, after all, an elastic one - an ideal community similar to those described in scriptural times may be achieved on earth, but the ultimate Golden Age is an eschatological one. Moreover, the almost overwhelming resistance that all the groups examined here have faced means that even the partial achievement of an earthly 'ideal community' would represent such a profound success that the achievement of even more remains merely a constant ideal of the distant future. What is important is not so much the full realisation of the Golden Age, but the fervence with which the justice of its ultimate realisation is believed.

The need to achieve the Golden Age is driven by a perception that a religious culture is under threat both from within and without. Culture, for all the groups, rests in a religious tradition but is also informed and embroidered by a common language, an attachment to a particular geographical area, and a shared history with its emotive symbols and significant events. A threat to culture is thus an assault on all aspects of life and identity. Much of this cultural identity may be embroidered, misinterpreted or even manufactured over time, but to the community of believers themselves the veracity of the identity cannot be doubted - influenced and guided as it has been by divine forces. Indeed, the process of outlining which traits of a culture are under greatest threat and which are worthiest of emulation in a modern context, unwittingly prove to be selective in nature and serve to reinforce a violent group's programme of confrontation. Long established cultural traditions of inter-communal tolerance, dialogue and co-operation are pushed aside by their opposites, a process generally rationalised by the former's inappropriate nature (however laudable they might be) in a struggle of such magnitude.

All groups showed the centrality of a particular religious message in the form of scripturalism. This scripturalism is governed by a process of selective retrieval guided by

² L. Zeskind, *The "Christian Identity" Movement: Analyzing its Theological Rationalization for Racist and Anti-Semitic Violence*, 1986, pp. 35-42.

contemporary events and augmented by historical accumulation. The most important part of this message is the narrative of struggle against an evil force which threatens a community of believers. This may be a historical narrative such as the persecution of Hussein or early Hebraic struggles against societies such as the Amelakites which has been transposed onto the present and redirected against contemporary enemies. The historical narrative may be an explicitly apocalyptic or messianic one which will transform human existence, or more commonly it may be one which has defined the religion and the community that subscribes to it. The historical narratives tend to be drawn from scriptural sources and while their interpretation may be at odds with traditional orthodoxy it nonetheless represents a historically constant interpretation by radical religious organisations in time of crisis. While motivating texts such as *The Turner Diaries* do not qualify as strictly 'scriptural' sources they perform the same role of providing a historical narrative and become what Michael Barkun calls "a philosophical centre of gravity" to the disparate and loosely linked groups which subscribe to Identity thought.³ A similar, but more specific observation, may be made of cultic groups such as Aum which formulate a composite ideology - while the influences and sources may be many and varied - a discernible theme (or themes) appears in the narrative which is constructed.

Although there is some variation in the balance between them, the process of ideological formation shows the importance to all groups of both internal and external enemies. Once again this outlook is consistent with religious, historical narratives. An external enemy exists which threatens the realisation of, or return to, a Golden Age and poses a direct threat to the culture of a religious community. By the same token, an equally (and occasionally even more) insidious enemy exists within the religious community itself that threatens the group by colluding with the external enemy or by flouting accepted religious laws and thus defiling the community as a whole. Both these groups, despite their distinctions, are melded together to form the monolithic 'other'.

All the three revealed religions contain powerful eschatological traditions and the degree to which these traditions were emphasised as ideological components in some cases determined their group categorisation. Eschatological expectations, whether they be active

³ M. Barkun, 'Racist Apocalypse: Millennialism on the Far Right' in C. Strozier & M. Flynn (eds.), *The Year 2000: Essays on the End*, 1997, p. 200.

or passive, allow all revealed religious believers to place themselves on a religio-historical continuum which has an identifiable (because they are recorded - however vague) beginning and end. The precise location of the group on this continuum is in large part determined by the pre-eminence of eschatological traditions in their ideology, and this in turn influences the extent to which a group interacts with the society of which it is a part. Those groups which became messianic or apocalyptic did so as a response to a particular crisis environment, either discernible to a scholar of such groups, or largely manufactured as a response to disparate events of no overt scriptural significance. All shared the common features of having a relatively small membership, a high degree of isolation from mainstream society and its various discourses, and an express desire to participate in, or precipitate, an expected Endtime.

9.3 Leading Religious Militance

The analysis of the role and purpose of leadership underscored several broadly accepted observations regarding violent religious groups and also revealed some other, less well understood ones. The division of leadership types into ideologues, charismatic and bureaucratic effectively encompassed all the groups examined and displayed a degree of flexibility and interactivity which would lend the typology to any other form of violent religious group. For example, a charismatic leader might be the single, deified leader of a group, or he might co-exist alongside a bureaucratic leadership structure, he may also be the sole ideologue of the group or merely a contemporary mouth piece of earlier ideologues. Leaders of violent religious groups (like their activist members) are also exclusively men, a reflection of what Martin Reischbrodt has called 'radical patriarchalism'.⁴

Leadership structure showed a close correlation with group types and group life cycle. All religious group types had some form of ideologue, either living or dead, who interpreted religious traditions in the light of a contemporary crisis environment and selectively manufactured an explanation of the crisis itself and justified the necessity of violent struggle for its resolution. Living ideologues, however, do not always involve themselves in operational planning and direction, or in operational participation. In those

⁴ M. Reischbrodt, *Pious Passions: The Emergence of Modern Fundamentalism in the United States and Iran*, 1993, p. 176.

cases where they do - particularly where they participate - the group is certain to be core or even more likely messianic. Mainstream ideologues tend to formulate a general ideology of militant struggle but tend not to be directly involved in its implementation in order to insulate themselves from the conduct of violence.⁵ Charismatic leaders abound in all group types, although they exist in different degrees of intensity and are governed to a certain extent by the group structure within which they exist. At times of political and social crisis fundamentalist charismatics perform the critical role of mobilising previously unrealised networks of discontent. Mainstream charismatic leaders may achieve saintly status and in some cases (Meir Kahane and potentially Richard Butler) their demise may cause a major crisis for the group itself, but they seldom achieve divine status. A similar observation may be made of core groups, although in this case the demise of the charismatic leader more often causes the demise of the group itself, or results in a crisis marked by a decline in militance. The most common examples of divine charismatic leadership exist in messianic and apocalyptic groups where the leader assumes the role of an expected deity. This is not always the case, however, as the claim to divinity rests upon the acceptability of the individual's claim (if indeed one is made - no member of the Jewish Underground for example, ever made such a claim) and must be bolstered by both the individual's physical and psychological qualities and their ability to place themselves within understood messianic and apocalyptic scenarios. Bureaucratic leadership structures are a reflection of both group size and the range of group activities. The determinants of group size and operational portfolio, however, must be complemented by the consideration of whether the bureaucratic form is dominant, or whether it is merely a way for a charismatic leader to delegate an overwhelming number of activities and perhaps also to maintain tighter control over his immediate subordinates. When this consideration is made, genuine bureaucratic structures tend to be the province of mainstream and longer established core groups.

As noted above, the elimination of a leader may seriously effect the operational capacity of a group - particularly core and messianic groups - but their elimination also makes them powerful martyr figures. All the monotheistic faiths have powerful martyr images at the core of their traditions, the crucifixion of Christ, the death of Hussein at

⁵ While Meir Kahane was complicit in some of Kach's violent activities he was always careful to avoid direct and intensive involvement in organised violence and was never the centre piece of a militant bureaucratic leadership structure.

Karbala and so on. This applies not only to leaders but also to the foot soldiers as a mechanism for providing a pool of martyrs, catapulting servants into the unfolding catalogue of martyrology. The ideological messages of martyred leaders takes on a new, more symbolic meaning and their death creates a symbolically powerful reason and time for revenge. The elimination of a leader may also seriously effect the longevity of a group. This is particularly so of core and messianic groups. Longevity is also a major factor in shaping the leadership structures of mainstream and core groups. As time passes leaderships learn to become acutely aware of their vulnerabilities and shortcomings and adjust themselves accordingly.

9.4 Violence and the Passage of Time

All religious groups harbour a long view of time, seeing their activities as the continuation of a struggle which is as old as history itself. Their success against the virtually overwhelming forces of the enemy is important (but not essential) to the resolution of their religious struggle. If they should fail, or be overwhelmed in this current phase of the conflict, others will come after them just as they themselves followed their predecessors. The historical religious mission is thus inextricably linked to the present. In the case of some core groups, fulfilling the role of a revolutionary vanguard, the destruction of their group may be viewed as a necessary sacrifice to set an example for the masses and to show the way for a broad based future struggle. For messianic and apocalyptic groups, this perception of time holds true but they also see themselves at the end of the religio-historical continuum. Their acts are designed to compliment, precipitate, or fulfil acts foreseen in eschatological prophecy and it is hoped their actions will usher in the next stage of spiritual transformation.

Action timed to coincide with anniversaries and religious festivals is significant because it helps to bridge the gap between past and present. Festivals recall previous communal struggles and recast them in a contemporary environment, while anniversaries elaborate the martyrology of a group and embellish existing historical traditions, reinforcing historical messages of the past in the present. The significance of this recasting process should not be underestimated and has no real equivalent in secular violence. By seamlessly linking events which occurred many hundreds (or even thousands) of years ago

not only are the beliefs and experiences of a religious community held to be constant, but so is the centrality of struggle to the fulfilment of that particular religious community's destiny. More immediate events which become anniversaries such as the martyrdom of leaders or followers fit this pattern and further underscore the continuity of the struggle in the eyes of the protagonists and their constituency.

Alongside the highly symbolic and evocative categories of religiously significant dates, anniversaries and revenge, religiously motivated groups also time violence along a tactical plane. This is most obviously true with regards to mainstream and core groups where well chosen acts may have a disproportionate influence over political events. The employment of violence by Islamic groups, for example, as a means of influencing Israeli elections is obvious. A grasp of tactical timing in this sense shows a shrewd understanding of the group's religious struggle and how it relates to the social and political processes of the larger secular world in which they exist and the symbolic importance of cultural centres in all societies. It shows an understanding also of the relationship between the group and the overwhelmingly powerful enemy it faces and how the judicious timing of violence may amplify their (relatively) physically insignificant acts of violence. Tactical timing may also have a more desperate dimension whereby the group acts to forestall some impending disaster or fresh onslaught by their enemies. This is certainly true of mainstream and core groups but it may also be a feature of messianic groups. Aum Shinrikyo's subway attacks, after all, were a means of pre-empting expected action by the Japanese authorities and although the Saudi Ikhwan's take over of the Grand Mosque was perfectly timed to coincide with a date of great messianic significance, there is evidence to suggest the take-over was hastily arranged and that the group's ability to effectively survive beyond November 1979 was in doubt.

Violence timed as a reaction serves many purposes for a group and has been shown to be a powerful motivating force. The act of revenge at once heightens the sense of threat to a group, shows a group's capacity to 'protect' its constituency and itself, and also helps to reinforce significant milestones in the group's struggle. These various purposes can be observed in all the group categories, although the issue of constituency is less important for messianic and apocalyptic groups.

While specific eschatological times can act as a guide for potential acts of violence, perceptions of time remain elastic and are heavily influenced by the crisis environment in which a group exists. Although the beginning of the year 2000, for example, passed without any major violent incidents (despite many predictions to the contrary) it is important to realise the fluidity of the perception of time as it relates to all the revealed religions. The conduct of violence may not follow specific and popular predicted dates - the convenience of selective dating may draw on the accepted date of 4 AD for Christ's date of birth for example - the perception of time, even when governed by specific dating traditions is elastic, dictated primarily by circumstance and the perception of crisis. This is especially so with a group whose ideology has moved away from strict orthodox traditions, making the significance of dates almost irrelevant and placing the onus of significance with the leader of a group and his interpretation of contemporary events. This is further complicated by the fact that dating in some religious traditions such as Judaism and Sunni Islam are determined more by signs rather than specific dates.

9.5 Violence and Sacred Space

The importance of location for violent religious groups has been shown on three different levels. Firstly, how a group perceives physical geography itself as part of their cultural make-up. Secondly, there is an obvious and intense devotion and loyalty to their own specific holy places. And thirdly, there is an awareness of those holy sites which are of importance to their enemies (in some cases these sites may be common) and those places which are generally representative of an enemy's society and cultural base. This last category has a different weighting for different group types. Cultural centres are important for mainstream and core groups because of their desire for widespread socio-political change, while locations of solely religious significance tend to be of paramount importance for messianic groups because they envisage a spiritual transformation of temporal society.

As with the other key elements all the groups exhibited a wide gap between rhetoric and reality when expressing their attitude towards location. Although the geographical reach of the groups examined varied, almost all their activities were confined to a specific geographical area. Almost all, however, engaged in rhetoric of the kind 'we

will strike the enemy wherever he may be' which suggests the group's capabilities are far greater than they are. The reason for this is two fold. Firstly, statements such as these are intended for other members of a particular religious community who identify with the significance of locations at a religious communal level and who may be moved to express a reaction, whether it be open sympathy with the cause or actual activism. Secondly, such rhetoric elevates what might appear to be a localised struggle to one which is of global significance. Each of the revealed religions in their extreme forms regard themselves as the one true faith, the successful fulfilment of whose prophecies will ultimately decide the fate of mankind and the end of temporal history. The struggle is therefore total in nature and this totality pervades the realm of physical space.

The extreme volatility of religious locations manages to amplify acts of violence far beyond the mere physical damage caused. For example, even though the quantities of explosives to be used and the potential casualties caused in the proposed bombing of the Dome of the Rock would have been far less than the corresponding quantity and number which resulted from the 1983 bombing of the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, the consequences would have far more significant. In many cases of mainstream and core group violence, attacks on religious sites are avoided because of their highly inflammatory nature and the negative side effects, in terms of popular support and repressive reaction. These constraints are obviously far less for messianic and apocalyptic groups whose catalytic and symbolic acts of violence often centre around a religious site of profound significance and eschatological importance. There are notable exceptions however, most notably displayed by the US extreme right and Aum Shinrikyo. In the first case geographical removal from traditional religious locations has led over time to a new importance being imbued in the territory of the United States as a substitute 'promised land' bereft of specific sites. In the second case a similar process has occurred whereby a composite belief system has taken specific religious locations, imbued them with a metaphoric value and transposed them onto the central locality where the group develops and operates.

In terms of the space within which a violent religious group operates, withdrawal is a common feature and also one which contributes to the fomentation of violence. Mainstream groups are less prone to this process, requiring in most cases direct interaction

with a broader constituency. While Aryan Nations does not fit this pattern closely because the extremity of the group's views preclude realistic expectations of involvement within society, there is still an important externalised dimension in the form of proselytisation. By the same token elements within Kach, Hizballah and Hamas have also exhibited a propensity for withdrawal to preserve activist cells or to establish a closer bond with their perceived 'sacred geography'. Core and messianic/apocalyptic groups are more prone to withdrawal. In the case of core groups this withdrawal is in part a rejection of society (including elements within their own communities) and in part a tactical procedure which will ensure a more effective operational basis. For messianic and apocalyptic groups withdrawal is a central element reflecting their rejection of society and frequently the expectation that they are the righteous remnant that will be saved following the Endtime.

The existence of a 'permissive environment' is an important consideration for a group's tactical programme. A more permissive environment where security constraints are weak allows a group to engage in violence more freely and at a higher level of magnitude. The best example contained in this study is that of Hizballah which over the years has been able to develop what amounts to an effective guerrilla army employing large numbers of men in co-ordinated activities in the field (not merely in an urban environment) with both light and heavy weapons. By contrast, most groups are confined to the employment of light weapons only and explosive devices in brief and limited actions. Environmental permissiveness does not only apply to the conduct of violence. Such a situation allows a group greater contact with the local populous, the opportunity to spread its message and to provide social services (frequently of a better, cheaper kind than the regime that simultaneously undermines the legitimacy of the regime) and so to expand its power base.

9.6 The Victims of Religious Violence

The selection of targets by religious groups has been shown to have two distinct elements, those external to that particular group of believers and 'apostates' within their community. The mixture and size of these groups varies depending on the group type but the uniting feature is the transformation of these enemies into an evil 'other' whose destruction is not merely necessary, but favoured in the eyes of God. In some cases the targets are a group that have historically been seen as oppressors, or an enemy of the true

faith, and in others they are identified with a scriptural enemy. As in other areas, the disparity between a totalist outlook and the resources available mean that there is frequently a wide gap between target rhetoric and the reality of attacks.

While the targets of other religions and apostates are constants, as is the process of the 'satanisation' of enemies, important differences in emphasis are created by group type and group circumstance. Mainstream groups tend to have an identifiable constituency with clearly defined external and internal enemies. Practical political considerations may lead them to co-operate with secular rivals when circumstances are propitious, as in the case of Hamas, or to espouse inter-faith co-operation as in the case of Hizballah. Core groups have less need to enter the mainstream and so their attitude towards targets is often more extreme. In the case of most messianic and apocalyptic groups virtually all those outside the group are regarded as a non-believing other. As has been shown, the process of identifying enemies as part of religious history is important. The enemy may be symbolically cast as historical foes such as the Amalekites, the Crusaders, the Hellenisers and so on.

The identification of target groups is an important part of what Berger has referred to as the 'social construction of reality'. This construction is reinforced by the day to day evidence of suffering at the hands of a target group, or is reinforced by an isolation where there is no corresponding experience to contradict what are often outlandish beliefs about a target group. The extent to which an enemy is dehumanised depends upon how many ideological concessions a group is willing to make in order to sanction coexistence on whatever level. The number of internal targets is governed by the need both to maintain group secrecy and to punish those of a community who have 'deviated'. The number and diversity of external targets reflects the extent to which the group rejects society.

9.7 The Conduct of Violence

One of the important underlying features of the tactical programmes of violent religious groups is the perception that their struggle is primarily *defensive* in nature. They see themselves as defending a righteous and sanctified culture from an evil and more powerful enemy. The very use of extra normative violence is justified both because it is the weapon of the weak and because of the catalogue of evil acts perpetrated by the enemies

and their very existence as a demonised other. This does not, however, mean that the weaponry and tactics which can potentially be used are open ended in nature. There exists once again a gap between rhetoric and reality, created by capabilities, constraints and the need for group survival. In terms of capabilities, whatever a group is willing to do will always be constrained by the availability of the tools at hand and the number (and skill) of those that can use them. Other less tangible constraints will also be at work, such as the need to preserve the sympathy of a constituency or to obey the wishes of a state sponsor. Finally there is the consideration of group survival, whereby a group cannot expose itself by engaging in intensive, high visibility operations, or by threatening the use of unconventional weapons which would doubtless intensify the repressive measures taken against it. By the same token, groups must satisfy the expectations of their internal and external audiences by engaging in a rhetorical discourse that threatens massive retaliation for the transgressions of the enemy, speaks of endless resources, and exaggerating the results of its operations.

In terms of the tactical programme of a group this gap may well engender a sense of frustration and dissatisfaction which leads to the emergence of splinter groups and lone actors. This is most apparent with groups in the mainstream category where the need to operate within the law much of the time means that the rhetoric cannot realistically be acted upon. The leadership of the mainstream group may not disapprove of the splinter or lone actors' activities - in many cases they applaud it - but cannot afford the potential backlash of having organised or directed them. In this sense both Hizballah and Hamas are different but their more direct relations with the organs of violence are governed by the permissiveness of the environment in which they operate, and in both these cases the spiritual and political leaderships have found tactical advantages in being a stage removed from the actual conduct of violence. Despite the totality of rhetoric much religious violence is proportional and when there is an escalation it is usually reactive, in line with the perception of a defensive struggle. This concept of proportionality is sometimes expressed in terms of 'red lines' within which a group operates. It is therefore critical to understand the context rather than looking merely at violence in a vacuum.

Participation in mainstream politics by religious groups provides the obvious opportunity of subverting a political system. The frailties of democracy, it may be argued

within societies that are insufficiently democratised, are revealed when a party such as Kach enters mainstream power legally, backed by a real - if somewhat limited - popular mandate. The reaction of a democratic system to these subversive interlopers then is a crucial element in the future of these groups. If new legislation is created to remove the interloper, then the charge that the system has altered the rules to forestall an expression of democratic rights sits uncomfortably with the nature of the system itself. By the same token, efforts to remove an extremist individual or party by outlawing them runs the risk of making the group even more extreme and driving them away from political participation to the underground and towards violence. In certain circumstances a relaxation in a crisis environment, as it proved for Kach, will undermine support for these groups and deny them popular representation. In many other cases such as Algeria or Egypt the success of subversive religious parties is more a comment on the broad failures of society generally and of the form of democracy which has developed there in particular.

While religiously motivated violent groups have displayed a high degree of tactical innovation, they are largely conservative in the destructive methods they choose to employ. Conventional weaponry has consistently displayed its utility over time and while its employment is constantly governed by constraints of availability and practicality, it forms the backbone of violent religious tactical programmes. Alongside this inherent conservatism is an appreciation and exploitation of globalisation's new information technologies as an important tool in psychological warfare, establishing a vehicle for uncontested propaganda and a window to the outside world. Although beyond the scope of this study an examination of the use of these windows can not only enhance our understanding but also serve as a mechanism to exploit or even engage these groups. As with all tactical programmes, be they secular or religious, the co-ordination of activities serves to amplify the effect of the violence. In the case of religious groups co-ordination of tactics is largely the province of larger groups with a developed tactical programme, a well organised apparatus for conducting violence and a structured leadership apparatus. The longer a group exists the greater the scope for increased tactical sophistication and innovation.

The repression of group may also have a hand in intensifying a group's tactical programme. In the case of a mainstream group which is not actively engaging in organised

violence, a judicial ban on the organisation and its activities may drive it underground and make it more extreme. Following the banning of Kach and Kahana Chai in Israel in 1994, Mike Gusovsky (then spokesman for the U.S. chapter of Kahane Chai) stated that "Yitzhaq [sic] Rabin and the fools in government are preventing Kahana Hay [sic] and Kakh [sic] from operating legally and democratically. So they should not be surprised afterwards...when a regime prevents its people from electing freely, and when it prevents the Kahana Hay [sic] and Kakh [sic] people from being elected, they should not ask afterwards why we act undemocratically."⁶ This rhetoric was also matched by the concerns of Israel's security apparatus. In 1996 the Israeli Public Security Minister Moshe Shahal stated that "the radical elements who brought about Rabin's assassin have not moderated their positions, the danger is real. It has not passed. On the contrary, it may have increased."⁷ In the Christian context, legal, juridical repression may alter the future course of Aryan Nations. The action brought against the group by the Southern Poverty Law Centre (SPLC) with the avowed purpose of putting the group in a vulnerable financial position. As Morris Dees stated "we intend to take every single asset from the Aryan Nations now and forever...we intend to even take the name Aryan Nations."⁸ This is the financial equivalent of outlawing an organisation but brings in train similar effects - the group is pushed further to the fringes of society and the process intensifies its hatreds, in this case of the government, the judiciary, 'mud peoples' (the plaintiffs were American Indians) and the SPLC.

By the same token the relatively lenient treatment of a group (where its legal position is slightly ambiguous) is not necessarily the right solution. When the Japanese government decided not to apply Japanese anti-subversive laws to Aum the group became active again. Aum has at least twenty offices open today and has significant earnings from Aum related computer stores. Although the group has changed its name, its current leadership is heavily associated with the original one and the philosophical programme - if not the coercive, fraudulent and violent practices - have been largely repackaged. As one

⁶ *IDF Radio*, 100 gmt, 2 Mar. 94 - BBC/SWB/ME/1937, MED/7, 4 March, 1994.

⁷ FBIS, FBIS-TOT-96-010-L, 'Israel: Article Views Danger of More Political Assassinations', February 16, 1996.

⁸ *Washington Post*, September 7, 2000.

Aum observer has noted the Japanese police "strongly suggest that there is still potential danger in the group ...which still holds anti-social doctrines."⁹

As one study has noted "terrorists with a vague, undefined constituency are among the most likely candidates for acquiring and using CBW agents".¹⁰ In these cases there is no outside constituency that must be considered or that cannot risk being offended, a state of affairs commensurate with Hoffman's observations but one which is confined to the extreme, messianic and apocalyptic end of the religious violence spectrum. The only example in this study of a group developing and using unconventional weaponry is Aum Shinrikyo - a messianic group with something of a technology obsession. By and large religious groups conform to the idea of a conservative mindset in their tactical programmes. Even so, the sinister nature of unconventional weaponry adds an important psychological dimension to even the very thought of their acquisition or use. Even in the case of the only known example of unconventional weapon use by a religious group, that of Aum Shinrikyo, the social and psychological impact of the nerve gas attack was in a way out of proportion to the actual damage done. The earthquake which shook Japan in January 1995 (which Asahara claimed to have predicted) killed more than 5,000 people and caused enormous infrastructural damage. The earthquake however was an accepted, natural phenomenon (even if its meaning could be seen in the light of apocalyptic prophecy by groups such as Aum) while the nerve gas attack exploded certain social myths in Japan about public safety and religious practice.

It is logical to suggest that purely messianic or apocalyptic terror envisages even greater casualties through its acts than does mainstream or core religious terror because secular, temporal objectives and considerations are rejected. Unconventional weapons thus possess a certain appeal in the absence of moral constraints against their use, however, there still exist considerable constraints on their development and use, some practical and technical and others, as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, organisational. The utility of such tactics for mainstream and core groups are dubious and the risks associated with them are severe. Thus the employment of conventional violent tactics offers a far greater degree of

⁹ M. Watanabe, 'Religion and Violence in Japan Today: A Chronological and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo', *TPV*, Vol. X, # 4, p. 96.

¹⁰ J. Tucker, *Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, 2000, p. 259.

variety, adaptability and security for any group pursuing a programme which has discernible political or nationalist objectives.

Statements such as those made by groups which are not fundamentally messianic or apocalyptic in orientation which suggest that they are considering unconventional weapons are not common, although they do bolster the official view (especially in the United States) that terrorist group use of unconventional weapons is not a matter of 'if' but of 'when'.¹¹ They are also deliberately ambiguous and directed at both an internal and an external audience. The questions remains why have they not already done so, and why should they? While enormous resources have been devoted to countering this threat these questions remain largely unanswered. As one article on the subject has suggested "The only way to truly understand the thinking and intentions of terrorists concerning the weapons of mass destruction is to ask them".¹² It is too early to say whether or not the Aum nerve gas attack has eroded extremist group taboos on the use of CBW. The idea that "once political terrorists used mass destruction weapons the whole concept of the rules of the game would change"¹³ does suffer from certain inconsistencies in this respect.

9.8 Broader Conclusions

This thesis has broken down into its constituent components the common features of religiously motivated violence and applied group type across the revealed faiths to illustrate diversity and similarity. As such it has created a composite analytical structure rather than presenting individual case studies side-by-side, therefore providing a more comprehensive framework of the mechanisms and processes governing religious violence - both for individual groups and relationally. It is therefore possible to examine both the whole and individual case studies in this study. By deconstructing the similar mechanisms

¹¹ For example the findings of the 1998 National Defence Panel Report. The greatest threats identified were those posed by 'rogue' states and clandestine organisations employing weapons of mass destruction - the danger of so called 'superterrorism'.

¹² J. Post & E. Sprinzak, 'Why Haven't Terrorists Used Weapons of Mass Destruction?', *Armed Forces Journal International*, April, 1998, p. 17. For further evidence see R. Purver's 'Understanding Past Non-Use of CBW' in B. Roberts (ed.), *Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses*. Purver's piece examines the academic literature but does not contain any statements by potential or actual CBW users.

¹³ B. David, 'The Capability and Motivation of Terrorist Organisations to Use Mass Destruction Weapons' in A. Merari (ed.), *On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism*, pp. 150-151.

at work and gradually superimposing them through interactive analysis, the actual nodes where militant religion and contexts intersect have been established.

Legitimacy is at the core of these religious 'warriors' which is simultaneously a strength and a weakness. Violence may be de-legitimised using mainstream clergy, religious scholars and inter-faith dialogues as auxiliary tools to creative political (as opposed to coercive) pathways out of violence while addressing the strategic, systemic causes of violence that extremist groups thrive upon and exploit. The coherence and appeal of a group's ideology is also in part determined by its proximity to accepted orthodoxy (hence the limited appeal of messianic groups) and this may provide a valuable starting point in challenging the legitimacy of religious extremists.

To fully understand the phenomenon of religious violence one must simultaneously appreciate the religio-historical process, processes of legitimisation, organisational dynamics and the political, social and economic dynamics of specific contexts. One must also understand the centrality of history, rhetoric and symbolism which permeate and govern religious violence. All too often specialists on extremist groups focus exclusively on the conduct of violence rather than the processes involved and the contexts within which violence erupts. As ethno-religious violence continues to permeate the post Cold War environment, old and new violent sub-state entities will proliferate and exploit the sacred to their own ends, using faith to explain and challenge the shortcomings and cleavages within secular society. This study has provided a beginning to a fuller understanding of the complex mechanisms which underpin this important religious phenomenon.

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