ARMY CHAPLAINS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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In 1914, Church leaders assumed that fighting men would require the ministrations of ordained clergymen close to the front line. The War Office Chaplains' Department had few plans for the deployment of chaplains beyond a general expectation that the Churches would be willing to release men for service as required. Army Officers seemed to have little warning about the arrival of chaplains to accompany their units and very few ideas about the role chaplains could be expected to fulfil once they had arrived. The chaplains themselves embarked on overseas service with no special training and very little guidance about the nature of the task ahead of them. They received very little support from the Chaplains' Department or their home church in the first months of the war. Left to carve out a role for themselves, they were exposed to an environment churchmen at home could not begin to comprehend.

Many chaplains left diaries and letters, the majority of which have never been published. They provide a unique insight into life with the troops, seen through the eyes of men who owed their first allegiance to their Church rather than to the Army whose uniform they wore. Post-war criticism of chaplains has obscured the valuable contribution many clergymen made to the well-being of the troops and to the reform movement within the Church of England after the war. The files of the Archbishop of Canterbury also provide important information about the troubled relationships between chaplains and their Department and with Church leaders at home.

In seeking to determine the nature of the chaplains' duties and responsibilities, this study attempts to discover why clergymen faced so much criticism and why even their own churches were sometimes alarmed by the views aired by serving chaplains.
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INTRODUCTION.
The belief in "God on Our Side" has for centuries spurred men on to war and consoled them in defeat. By 1914 there was nothing unusual in the assumption that when troops left the shores of England chaplains would accompany them. The relief of suffering and the provision of spiritual comfort and consolation were widely accepted as the most important functions of the clergy in wartime. Church leaders were expected to offer some ideological interpretation of the conflict. In 1914, the leaders of the Church of England, in common with the leaders of other denominations, depicted the war as a Crusade against an evil enemy and a confrontation which could not be avoided. They preached that the war was a "Just War", and that participation in it was a moral responsibility.

Clergymen, particularly Church of England ministers, confidently expected a religious revival and prepared to encourage and motivate the population to express their patriotism and do their duty. Many responded to the outbreak of war by launching their own personal recruitment campaign. The Bishop of London, Winnington-Ingram, exhorted the troops to kill Germans in order to save civilization and many others took part in recruitment drives.[1] Anticipating a strong demand for their services overseas, many ordained men recognized that the most appropriate contribution they could make to the war effort was to volunteer their services to the Chaplains' Department of the War Office. It was overwhelmed in the first few weeks of the war by the rush of men volunteering to serve as chaplains, regardless of age and fitness.

Sixty-five chaplains embarked with the British Expeditionary Force in August, 1914. By the end of the war there were 3,745 padres serving with the British forces. The majority
of these were temporary appointments, and by far the largest denomination was the Church of England, with 1,985 men serving compared with the second largest group, the Roman Catholics, with 649.[2] Never before had so many chaplains, representing so many denominations, served as uniformed officers anxious to minister to the men under arms. Surprisingly the precise nature of their role in wartime was not enshrined in any handbook or guide.

There can have been few greater contrasts than that between a comfortable vicarage existence and life amongst the men of the British Army. Chaplains had to adapt quickly to conditions their fellow parsons at home could hardly imagine. They strove to provide comfort in the aid posts, the casualty clearing stations and, more controversially, in the front line trenches. Church leaders sent their youngest and most inexperienced men to serve as chaplains. Many helped to provide entertainment for troops resting behind the lines, some ran Confirmation classes and a few established clubs and quiet rooms where the men could read or write letters home. Chaplains were often made uncomfortably aware that their presence was only tolerated because the military authorities anticipated their ability to boost morale or steady nerves.

Chaplains were left to develop their own role. With the exception of individual memoirs, there have been few attempts to chart this development. The most detailed accounts of the work undertaken by chaplains are Alan Wilkinson's *The Church of England and the First World War*, and Sir John Smyth's and A. R. Mowbray's *In This Sign Conquer*. Wilkinson identified the chaplains as some of the most outspoken critics of their Department and of their home Church. Smyth and Mowbray examined the experiences of a number of chaplains, paying particular
attention to the controversy about the location of chaplains when the troops were in line. They also provided some insight into attempts to improve the efficiency of the Chaplains' Department, with criticism of the Chaplain General, Bishop Taylor Smith, and the lack of guidance given to temporary chaplains.

Michael Moynihan's *With God On Our Side* contains records of their experiences left by six chaplains, five Anglicans and one Roman Catholic, four of whom served on the western front, the others in Mesopotamia and at Gallipoli. Moynihan concluded that since the majority of R.C. chaplains were drawn from a working class background, they were bound to be more readily accepted than the Anglican clergy who were identified so closely with the public school ethos and the officer class. In addition he argued that R.C. chaplains were much less prone to morale-boosting exercises, preferring to concentrate on saving souls. He believed that the Anglican chaplains seemed less professional and certainly not as well-equipped to deal with the needs of the soldiers as the R.C. clergy. Robert Graves, in *Goodbye to All That*, came to a similar conclusion, claiming that R.C. chaplains consistently out-performed Church of England chaplains.

Albert Marrin, *The Last Crusade. The Church of England in the First World War* and Roger Lloyd, *The Church of England: 1900-65* investigated the class barrier which segregated chaplains from their flocks and examined the impetus for post-war change provided by some chaplains. With C. E. Montague, *Disenchantment* they shared Moynihan's belief that the failure of the Church of England to train and equip chaplains for wartime service meant that a genuine opportunity to reach out to men serving in the forces was missed. This is a particularly damning indictment since they believed that the soldiers were in a
particularly receptive frame of mind.

Published accounts of life at the front provide some very detailed information about the daily responsibilities undertaken by chaplains. Men like H. Blackburne, F. R. Barry, P. C. B. Clayton and Neville Talbot described the difficulties and dangers involved in service overseas. Some accounts were written as tributes to men who had made a particularly effective contribution to the Chaplaincy service, most notably Canon W. Purcell's biography of Studdert Kennedy: Woodbine Willie, and Dora Pym's Tom Pym. Such accounts provide some insights into the emotional responses of the clergymen to their work, but evidence of a much more personal nature is to be found in the first-hand accounts contained in diaries and letters held by the Imperial War Museum. Some of the most detailed records are contained in the letters and journals of Monty Bere, David Railton, Guy Rogers, Mervyn Evers and R. Bulstrode. These men were provided with very little training or guidance prior to service with the troops. Their experiences were varied but the depth of their commitment was not. Their work was sometimes dangerous and often demoralizing, since fatalism was the prevailing mood at the front. Many chaplains recognised the widespread indifference to their services. Some sought comfort in the notion that men who never attended services or professed allegiance to any particular faith revealed a kind of "unconscious Christianity" by their actions and words. This was first recorded by Donald Hankey in A Student in Arms. Montague noted "moments of religious awareness" amongst the fighting men but perhaps these were akin to the religion of last resort dismissed by Studdert Kennedy as worse than indifference.

The Royal Army Chaplains' Department, Bagshot Park,
holds detailed records for the post-war period only. Official papers concerning the organization of the Department, held by the Public Records Office, are also fragmentary. They reveal the existence of two advisory committees: the first specifically concerning Church of England chaplains, chaired by Lord Salisbury, the second an Interdenominational Advisory Committee on Chaplaincy Services. Some details concerning the pay and promotion of chaplains were also to be found in the P.R.O., but the majority of the information concerned various reviews held after the war.

A major re-organization of the Department in France took place during 1915. This involved the controversial appointment of a Deputy Chaplain General, Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne, whose selection highlighted tensions between the different denominations working in France. Consideration of the involvement of the home Church in these matters led me to Lambeth Palace Library and the papers of Archbishop Randall Davidson, consisting of letters and the minutes of meetings held at Lambeth during the war.

Few memoirs or histories of the war record any mention of the chaplains or their Department. Those which do tend to dismiss the presence of clergymen as little more use than that of an undertaker, unless they were prepared to take on the duties of an entertainments or welfare officer. The Reverend A. Herbert Gray set out to provide some insight into the soldiers' reaction to the presence of chaplains in As Tommy Sees Us. Eighteen months with the New Army taught him some uncomfortable lessons. Gray began to understand why so many of the men had little respect or admiration for the Church. They had not been appreciated or understood before the war; the Church had failed to address the social problems of the period. A small minority remained loyal to the Church; a larger group maintained a loose connection with the
institution by marrying in Church and having their children baptized, but for the majority the Church was irrelevant. To many soldiers the Church seemed remote and censorious. In addition Gray observed a tendency to see religious observance as effeminate, certainly not in keeping with their idea of manliness.

The Chaplain General, Bishop Taylor Smith, was singled out for a great deal of criticism particularly in the early months of the war. The Reverend E. L. Langston's biography, Bishop John Taylor Smith, pays tribute to the Bishop, but does not address the criticisms levelled at him during his period as Chaplain General. Unfortunately few of the Bishop's papers seem to have survived. Lack of any information on his pre-war proposals for the organization of the Chaplains' Department makes it difficult to evaluate some of the criticisms levelled at him when these were rejected by the Army Council. He appears to have been effectively sidelined following the appointment of Bishop Gwynne as his deputy. He is seldom mentioned in chaplains' letters or journals unlike his Deputy.

Many chaplains recorded their gratitude for the guidance Gwynne provided to those serving in France. Printed letters were regularly circulated to chaplains offering advice about sermons and addressing specific issues raised at Chaplains' meetings. But Gwynne never wrote his memoirs. H. C. Jackson, Pastor on the Nile, based his account on the private letters the Bishop wrote to his mother during the war. Unfortunately this does not provide any insight into Gwynne's reaction to the controversy surrounding his appointment as D.C.G. It would have been particularly valuable to know something of his relationship with the Presbyterian Principal Chaplain Dr. Simms, and with Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee.
After the war a number of former chaplains published their views in the hope that lessons could be learned for the future. *The Church in the Furnace*, edited by F. B. Macnutt, Senior chaplain to the forces and Canon of Southwark, was first published in 1917. Seventeen temporary Church of England chaplains who had seen active service in France and Flanders contributed a collection of essays dedicated to chaplains who had been killed in action. They echoed the urgent desire for change expressed by many of their colleagues. The chaplains were dismayed that so many of the soldiers who died in the war did so with no understanding of the Church and all that it represented. They criticized the Church of England for its inadequate and outdated training of ordinands. Macnutt also stressed the need for the Church to win a measure of self-government in order to implement reforms and tackle social problems in greater co-operation with other denominations.

A series of reports, commissioned by Archbishop Davidson following the failure of the National Mission in 1916, were published as a single volume in 1919. *Reports of the Archbishops' Committees of Inquiry*, with a foreword by Archbishop Davidson, provided a great deal of information which was used by pressure groups such as Life and Liberty and The Industrial Christian Fellowship to argue the case for change in the post-war years.

A report by Bishop E. S. Talbot's Committee, which included representatives drawn from eleven different churches, was also published in 1919. *The Army and Religion* was based on 300 responses to a questionnaire sent out by the Committee, which posed the questions: 1] What are the men thinking about Religion, Morality, and Society? 2] Has the war made men more open to a
religious appeal or has it created new difficulties for belief?

3] What proportion of men are vitally connected to any of the Churches, and what do they think of the Churches?

Study of the individual accounts written by chaplains identified the need to determine the structure of the Chaplains' Department in 1914. Existing publications fail to provide a comprehensive description of the Department, and do not indicate the precise relationship between the officials at the War Office and clergymen serving as temporary chaplains. This study also attempts to validate criticism of the Chaplain's Department by examining how it adapted to the wartime needs of temporary chaplains.

Examination of the methods of selection and deployment of chaplains employed by Bishop Taylor Smith led on to the debate about the most appropriate location for a chaplain when his units were in the line. In exploring the duties and responsibilities chaplains faced, this study also sets out to examine the nature of the gulf which developed between chaplains and the home-based clergy, and the barriers which existed between chaplains and troops. An examination of the conditions in which chaplains sought to bring comfort and reassurance to the troops highlighted the feelings of isolation expressed by many clergy. Certainly barriers existed between ministers and the troops they sought to serve. Chaplains fresh from home soon learned the significance of social class, rank, education and their non-combatant status as barriers which divided them from the soldiers. The home clergy were inevitably slower to appreciate the nature of these barriers and, in consequence, the gulf between them and the chaplains widened.

Anglican chaplains faced additional burdens since the
public school ethos of the officer corps was closely linked to
the Church of England. Chaplains were "gentlemen", they could
never be treated as anything other than officers. This served to
emphasize their isolation. Cut off from their home Church, living
and working in an unusual independence, the opportunities for
spiritual work being limited the chaplains desperately needed
retreat facilities and refresher courses to compensate for their
inadequate training. The Chaplains' Department was slow to
introduce such facilities.

As representatives of the national Church, Anglican
chaplains faced further problems. The Church of England was the
only denomination to have its own Chaplain General and, after
1915, its own Deputy Chaplain General. This privileged position
within the Chaplains' Department attracted criticism from other
denominations. The response of many Anglican chaplains was to
develop a more questioning and critical approach to the methods of
their own Church. Their desire to implement changes in services
and in their day-to-day ministry soon developed into more
widespread demands for reform of the home Church. Such demands
generated further unease amongst the home-based clergy who tended
to regard chaplains as dangerously out of control and far too
remote from the calming influence of any diocesan organization.

This study examines the nature of criticisms levelled at
chaplains and seeks to increase our understanding of the complex
conditions in which they performed their duties. It attempts to
evaluate the importance of the chaplains work in the Great War
and explores the link between their wartime experiences and
mounting pressure for reform of the Church of England.
1] THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND THE CHAPLAINCY SERVICE BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR.
The decline in Church membership and attendance in the thirty years before the First World War revealed a lack of confidence in organized religion and particularly in the Church of England. Against a background of unprecedented population growth and industrial upheaval, the inability of clergymen to reach the working classes in order to assert the relevance of religion proved damaging to the Churches. The Church of England had lost ground to the State in the provision of educational opportunities, and to factory and mill-owners in the provision of leisure activities. Other denominations had not fared so badly. The Roman Catholics experienced sustained growth, albeit as a result of Irish immigration, and the Nonconformists made progress in developing urban areas at the expense of the Church of England in declining rural communities. The long-term prospects for the Church of England were not good. Chaplains found themselves segregated by social class from the men they sought to serve. The failure of the Church of England to recruit solid working-class support was not fully recognised until the wartime service of chaplains confirmed the extent of the indifference of the majority of working men, to organized religion in general and towards the Church of England in particular.[1]

The outbreak of war in 1914 was bound to place further strain on the Churches as they sought to maintain membership levels. The situation was complicated by the fact that a measure of interdenominational rivalry continued throughout the war, and War Office officials struggled to coax the various denominations into some sort of harmony in order to minister effectively to the needs of the newly created armies. The war found the Chaplains' Department at the War Office poorly organized under the leadership of the Chaplain General, Bishop John Taylor Smith. There were no
detailed plans for the mobilization of chaplains and no arrangements to cater for the rapid expansion of the service in wartime. The Department was ill-equipped to deal with the numbers of clergy volunteering to serve as chaplains to the Forces.[2]

The clergy had lost much of their power to influence the communities they served during the first half of the nineteenth century. This was due in part to the fact that they were too often associated with secular activities. Many village clergy were often better known to their neighbours as farmers or magistrates.[3] A quarter of all justices were clergymen, and it is difficult to overcome the impression that clergymen spent more time absorbed in secular activities than they did in ministering to their parishioners. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the quality of pastoral care was poor. Absenteeism was still a problem and there were some cases of extreme neglect and drunkenness. The extent of half-hearted ministering was even more alarming. Many clergymen seemed content to fulfil their duties and no more. Few seemed prepared to make any effort to encourage the recruitment of new members or to improve levels of attendance at services.[4]

During the course of the nineteenth century the quality of the Anglican ministry improved dramatically, but the price to be paid for such improvements was high. The Church of England was forced to accept, albeit tacitly, the pluralistic nature of English society and with it the growing realisation that religion was already a voluntary aspect of social behaviour, rather than an integral part of an imposed social order. The initial success of the Nonconformists with the middle classes served to emphasize the Church of England as the resort of the wealthier members of society; and the poor man remained largely untouched by...
religion.\[5\]

Rapid population growth and an increasingly isolated clergy had left the Church of England in a vulnerable position. For many who had moved from rural parishes, where the grip of authoritarian land-owning society remained strong, the move provided a valuable opportunity to escape the confining influence of the Church. Dramatic population growth was not matched by an increase in the resources and manpower of the Church of England; only in the second half of the nineteenth century did the Church, along with all other denominations, make a sustained effort to re-convert England by launching a series of evangelizing missions, in a determined effort to overcome both urban and rural neglect.\[6\] The provision of an adequate number of new churches placed a serious burden on the finances of the Church of England.\[7\] An enormous amount of time and money was devoted to Church building but even this did not keep pace with the inexorable tide of population growth and, by the 1870s, had virtually been abandoned.\[8\] The Church of England seems tacitly to have accepted its inability to reach the unchurched majority.

The work of the "slum priests" did help to restore the reputation of the Church of England in urban areas. The level of pastoral care was improved by a significant increase in the number of assistant curates engaged in parochial duties.\[9\] In 1851 there were 16,194 Anglican clergy; by the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 23,670. These figures represented significant progress and, when combined with stringent measures to eradicate pluralism and non-residence, they reflected a genuine desire to answer the challenge of Nonconformity. Individual priests achieved a great deal but there was no corporate action by the Church of England.\[10\] Church leaders were naturally anxious
not to alienate those whose support they could count on - the wealthy middle classes who had formed the bulk of the Church's congregations for over a century.

At the turn of the century Desmond Bowen believed that "an age of clerical despondency" set in, as the idea that the Church existed to serve the nation was lost, and the Clergy struggled against the odds.[11] Even the early success of the Nonconformists proved to be only transitory.[12] It is clear that a large portion of the expanding population could not perceive any benefits from religion of any denomination. They chose not to attend services at all. The decline in Church membership was not caused by people leaving the Church but by a failure to maintain recruitment.[13]

At the turn of the century, Bethnal Green provided evidence of the failure of organized religion to appeal to the people, with only 6.8% of the adult population attending chapel, and only 13.3% attending any form of religious service.[14] Few explanations were offered at the time, although there was much speculation about the cause of this failure. Andrew Mearns was one of the first to suggest that urban overcrowding was to blame for the lack of interest in religion in 1883.[15] He argued that the Churches had missed a series of opportunities to command the respect and loyalty of the working classes. In failing to take a determined stand against the appalling living conditions in the towns, the Church had failed to win the support of the majority. The health, housing and education of the poor should have been the concerns of the clergy, but too often they were ignored.

The urban problems of the nineteenth century were on a scale unprecedented in English society, and it would be unfair to criticise the churches for failing to cope with every aspect of
them as quickly and as efficiently as they might have wished. The Church of England did seem to be particularly slow to espouse the causes of greatest concern to the poor, leaving the way clear for the Nonconformists and philanthropists with no particular religious affiliation. The Church of England was slow to recognise the needs of urban communities according to David Mole: "By 1870 it was becoming clear that the cities needed a new type of parson, theologically and pastorally trained to work in the new urban culture."[16] Anglican curates often arrived in an urban parish straight from university, without special training, and with little idea of the kind of lives their parishioners were living. The result was an increasing isolation of the clergy which failed to register with many of them until they were confronted by the alarming ignorance of spiritual matters displayed by many wartime recruits. Matters were made worse by the rapid influx of so many newcomers to the towns, many of whom worked in large, impersonal factories. At the same time, the classes were also being segregated: they lived in different parts of the town, out of sight of one another. J. C. Miller of Birmingham told the Church Pastoral Aid Society in 1854: "Our Ministers have not been trained for work among the common people; and the common people have soon discerned their want of adaptation to their wants and tastes."[17] This lack of appropriate training was often referred to by wartime chaplains, who recognised it as one of the most significant problems facing the Church of England.[18]

The social class of the majority of the clergy set them apart from their flocks. Throughout the nineteenth century a large proportion of Anglican livings remained in the gift of landowners, and the incumbent was likely to be related to the
Probably the greatest achievement of the Victorian Church was its continued hold over the upper and middle classes. Their continued support helped to finance the development of a catholic mission to the nation in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the longer term this achievement was to have tragic consequences for the Church. The social class of Church of England congregations was to prove particularly damaging in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Bowen argued:

...by the time of World War One, it was identified almost completely with the middle class in the public mind. When this class slowly lost its influence after the war, the working class, which began to assume political power, was never directly identified with the Church or its mission to society.[20]

The poor response of the Church of England to the problem of poverty was largely responsible for its failure to attract working class support. In the past, the Church had owed much of its influence to the fact that educational opportunities had been limited. In many areas, the Churches provided the only source of help for those seeking to improve their lot through education. The clergy most often reacted to a particularly poor neighbourhood by founding a school, and many were successful in attracting funds and providing a basic form of education. Such efforts became less significant as the State began to improve provisions for education.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the pastoral work of the Church of England seemed to be more effective. Thomas Chamberlain, vicar of St. Thomas's, Oxford, from 1842-92, showed what could be achieved by hard work.[21] He spent much of his time restoring and refurbishing the church. Chamberlain had deliberately selected St. Thomas's for his efforts because it was one of the poorest parishes in Oxford. According to Peter
Cobb's study it had been

sadly neglected by many of the Students of Christ Church (i.e. Fellows) who had been its vicars before him. The baptism registers show that the inhabitants were working class almost to a man, coopers, engineers, wheelwrights, shoemakers, gardeners, bakers, plasterers, saddlers, boatmen, boatbuilders, carpenters, printers, railwaymen, servants, or just plain labourers.[22]

Chamberlain did his best to improve the services on offer to his congregation by introducing a daily service, and, in 1854, he instituted the weekly celebration of the Eucharist, which had previously only been available on a monthly basis. By 1869, matters had improved still further and the Eucharist was celebrated thrice weekly. In spite of Chamberlain's efforts the number of communicants did not show any significant increase.[23] The evidence of clergymen who served as wartime chaplains suggests that many working people regarded Communion as the preserve of the wealthy members of the congregation.

The fact that the reform of the Church of England in the nineteenth century had to be imposed by Parliament created the impression that the Church lacked the will to reform from within. It suggested that clergymen were prepared to tolerate the ridiculous financial inequalities which still existed within the Church. The Bishop of Durham received an income fourteen times that of the Bishop of Oxford.[24] An Act of Parliament was still required to sub-divide parishes or sanction church-building programmes.[25] It was a sad indictment of the state of Anglican organization that there existed no adequate machinery by which the Church could have undertaken to reform itself from within.

The churches could do little to effect growth when confronted with external factors like the development of public education and the popular press, which, combined with the increasingly wide range of leisure activities centred on pubs, clubs
and music halls, counted for far more than the efforts of the clergy.[26] Currie, Gilbert and Horsley's study of patterns of Church membership concluded:

...the appeal of a religious cult largely presumes the absence of secular opportunities for education and entertainment; the attractions of the church as a community rely very much upon the absence of satisfactory alternative social structures, and since 1800, these deficiencies have generally been remedied by the development of new social and cultural forms, forms often based on new industrial techniques.[27]

The churches lost ground in an increasingly materialistic world; they failed to assert convincingly enough the relevance of religion in the newly-emerging industrial towns. The challenge of the Nonconformist chapel movement preoccupied many clergymen and blinded them to their failure to attract new blood into their congregations. In addition, the Salvation Army experienced a steady growth in numbers, from less than 5,000 members in 1877 to over 115,000 in 1911. The Churches of Christ and the Plymouth Brethren experienced their greatest expansion in the decade from 1880.[28]

The perceived value of church membership diminished during the nineteenth century, a factor reflected in the steady increase in the number of civil marriages and the decline in numbers attending Sunday Schools.[29] This decline was caused by a combination of developments. D. C. Marsh concluded that the period from 1870-1914 was: "a period of acute questioning about the nature of society".[30] Such uncertainty culminated in "a general uneasy feeling that Christianity had been disproved by someone".[31] The emergence of the doctrine of evolution in the 1860s and 70s further strengthened the intellectual case against Christianity, and damaging doubts crept in at many levels of society. The emergence of a secular alternative challenged the
traditional social system, in which the Church had been a dominant influence. By the second half of the nineteenth century, employers had begun to provide reading rooms and bath-houses at their mills; by the 1860s, the first works canteens had appeared; by the 1890's, works sports grounds were often available and, in many areas, brass bands were sponsored by employers. Many clubs and societies sprang from workplace origins, with interests ranging from gardening to cycling and pigeon-keeping. Leisure time could easily be filled without reference to a religious community. The paternalistic factory owners did not take over the charitable functions of the Churches, but they often matched them in terms of providing significant improvements in the living conditions of the poor.

The conditions necessary for Church growth did not exist during the nineteenth century. Church growth depended on the existence of a strong, stable community. As the geographical mobility of the population increased, Church membership declined. Evidence shows that moving house often allowed an individual to leave church membership quietly and easily. Many stable church-based communities had been disrupted by the process of industrialization and the growth of towns. It is hardly surprising that when the First World War broke out, it merely continued and accelerated the process of decline. The reluctance of many clergymen to recognise the extent to which their churches had failed to reach the masses in the pre-war years was shattered by the wartime experiences of Army Chaplains. There was some reluctance amongst the clergy to acknowledge that there was a serious problem but by 1920, the decline could not be denied. In the minds of the working classes, the Church of England remained firmly associated with the wealthier sections of society.
The clergy had been reluctant to acknowledge the scale of the problems they faced, and in particular, they had failed to appreciate their growing isolation. A. D. Gilbert argued that...

...it took the illusion-destroying experience of the Great War to bring home to the Churches the full extent of their estrangement from the 'world' of modern English society. Chaplains faced with what The Church Times called 'a microcosm of the nation' were forced to face the reality of how little the religious cultures of either Church or Chapel pervaded the wider secular culture. Victorian fears about the total alienation of the working classes from organized religion were seen to have been amply justified.[35]

The impact of war on the attendance figures for the Church of England was not what the clergy had expected. In the belief that danger of imminent death tends to expose human frailties and prick consciences, the clergy prepared for a religious revival when war came. They anticipated that faith in the hereafter would be strengthened by the uncertainty of war, and that more people would turn to the Church for reassurance. This was not the case. Instead, Currie, Gilbert and Horsley found that...

...contrary to received opinion, there is little evidence of a flight to the churches on the outbreak of war. In 1914-15, Easter Day communicants of the Church of England fell 1.03% in number, and 'active' communicants of the Church of Scotland fell 2.5%.[36]

From the onset of war, recruitment fell in almost all churches, Protestant Church Membership fell by 4% between 1913 and 1919.[37] There was a limited recovery when the war ended, but for many the wartime break in church-going proved permanent.

Wartime attitudes are not easily explained. It seems that the relevance of religion was at such a low ebb that people could no longer see much point in Church membership. The fact that some six million men and women left home for the first time during the war provides a partial explanation, since it has been shown that such moves were likely to result in non-attendance at
church services.[38] In spite of this decline, few people seem to have doubted the wisdom of providing Army Chaplains to cater for the spiritual needs of troops serving overseas. The anticipation of a wartime revival helped to produce a flood of volunteers from Church of England clergy wanting to serve as temporary chaplains to the forces. They were anxious to secure any opportunity to reach the unchurched majority. They seem to have been encouraged by the fact that many soldiers listed their religion as Church of England, although they had no background of Church membership or attendance.[39]

Chaplains had appeared on the payroll of the English army as early as the reign of Edward I, and War Office records indicate that Regimental Chaplains were appointed in Cromwell's army. The practice continued with few changes until 1796, when Garrison, rather than Regimental, chaplains were appointed under a Chaplain General, who was responsible to the Secretary for War.[40] This marked the beginning of the Chaplains' Department. The Department seemed to lose status during the nineteenth century in spite of various attempts to improve the administration.[41] In 1904, the Department formed part of the War Office, with the Chaplain General responsible to the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department. A brief period, from 1870-1904, during which the Chaplain General had come under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, was not judged a success.[42] The Secretary of State assumed ultimate control, but the relationship was never particularly easy, since laymen sometimes felt rather anxious about their involvement in what seemed to be spiritual affairs. Sir Nevil Macready, Adjutant General in 1914, was responsible for the Chaplains' Department and he acknowledged his own feeling of anxiety, even though he found much to admire in the chaplains:
My sympathy with them, and admiration for the work of many of them, was always tinged with a latent feeling of fear, lest by chance I might find myself involved in some doctrinal argument on which a decision might be sought.[43]

The ill-defined nature of the Department’s functions in the event of war contributed to the degree of concern amongst lay officials at the War Office. The situation was further complicated by an apparent lack of confidence in the Chaplain General.

The Chaplain General, Bishop John Taylor Smith, had been in office since 1901. He had not sought the appointment, and the invitation from the War Office to become Chaplain General to His Majesty’s Forces seems to have come as an unwelcome surprise. The invitation was almost certainly made at the behest of King Edward VII, and was, according to Reverend H. C. Tiarks: "in observance of the wishes and intention of his august mother, the late Queen Victoria, whose death had taken place only a few months previously".[44] Taylor Smith was not at first enthusiastic about the idea. He felt he was needed more in Africa, where he had been Bishop of Sierra Leone since 1897, but he was eventually convinced, after lengthy conversations with friends in the church and much careful thought and prayer. He certainly took on a daunting task; even in peacetime, his duties were not light. They involved the spiritual overseeing of 200,000 servicemen, and the direction of just over 100 chaplains from a base in the War Office which was widely acknowledged to be understaffed.[45]

Taylor Smith was not at first generally welcomed. He was known to be a strong Evangelical and had to work hard to establish a good working relationship with the chaplains in his Department. Before the war, he travelled to China, South Africa and Egypt, in an attempt to get to know some of his overseas chaplains personally. His energetic approach indicated his belief
that the Church should make more of an effort to reach men who no longer saw church-going as a regular part of their lives. With this in mind, he established a special section of the Church of England Men's Society for soldiers. The Reverend E. L. Langston believed that Taylor Smith wanted his chaplains "to present the religion of Christ to the soldier as something which was both desirable and attractive, as well as being an absolute necessity to a full, complete manhood".[46] Taylor Smith was not well equipped to deal with the demands of war. The need to increase the provision of chaplains created a serious strain on the Chaplains' Department, which was ill-prepared for war.

The duties and responsibilities of the department had not been clearly defined. The most comprehensive description of the department's remit appeared in a 1907 summary, produced by the War Office, which outlined its constitution and duties.[47] These included dealing with the administration of the Chaplains' Department for all denominations and the Chaplain General's clerical work. The Branch also had to liaise with the Spiritual and Moral Welfare Standing Committee and with Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Presbyterian Chaplains' Advisory Board. Grants from Army funds to churches, schools, hospitals and charitable institutions, and charitable grants from the Naval and Military Tournament Profit Fund were also made by the Branch. The planning for the wartime needs of the Army did not seem to be given a high priority, and it is unlikely that anyone had given serious thought to the training and guidance needed to produce effective temporary chaplains. The decision to provide chaplains for overseas service caused chaos and confusion in the Department.

The staff assigned to the Chaplains' Department by the War Office seems small considering the amount of work involved.
The Permanent Under-Secretary was concerned that the increasing burden of work, caused by the administration of the Army Compassionate Fund, might prove too much. This concern gave rise to a number of changes. In February, 1908, a special sub-division in the Secretariat was created, to co-ordinate work previously shared amongst different sections: "and to undertake certain new duties connected with the various questions relating to the spiritual and moral welfare of the Army". The Sub-division known as Chaplains consisted of an Assistant Principal, answerable to the Secretary of State, but under the direction of the Permanent Under-Secretary. The system did not work efficiently, according to the Permanent Under-Secretary: too many minor problems came to him "in the absence of any intermediate authority". It was clearly felt that the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Assistant Secretary could not give sufficient time to supervise the important work of the Chaplains' sub-division and there was particular concern that adequate resources should be allocated to the work of such an important and influential sub-division: "affecting as it does the morale of the Army with a consequential influence on the recruitment of men of good character". Further appointments were announced in April with the Assistant Principal, E. V. Fleming, assigned to the specific task of administering the Chaplains' department for all denominations other than the Church of England, including the appointment of acting chaplains and officiating clergy. At the same time, a 2nd Division clerk, R. U. Morgan, confidential clerk to the Chaplain General, was allocated to the Department, and A. C. Beckwith and G. Monk became responsible for clerical work, under the control of the Chaplain General for the Church of England.
Much of the work of the Chaplains' sub-division was made necessary by the number of different religious denominations anxious to provide chaplains to the forces in 1914. The Chaplain General had to be dealt with personally, the other denominations expected a similar courtesy, and this inevitably meant much duplication for the civil servants.[53] In 1913, the staff shortage in the War Office seems to have been eased further by the promotion of Mr. A. C. Pedley, I.S.O., from Acting Principal to Principal of the Chaplains' Department. This was at the suggestion of the Secretary of State, who believed that the system would benefit from a more direct approach, since: "The Chaplain General is rather apart from the organization of the Branch inasmuch as he deals only with the Chaplains of the Church of England."[54] The Treasury had originally objected to Pedley's promotion, and the additional increment this entailed. The Army Council had been forced to stress the personal desires of the Secretary of State, and to outline in detail Mr. Pedley's duties, putting great emphasis on the need to relieve the burden on the higher-ranking officials, before Mr. Ward confirmed the appointment.[55] The War Office files detail the initial refusal of the Treasury, in December, 1912, to consider such a change, but persistence seems to have paid off.

Attempts to improve the smooth running of the Chaplaincy service were clearly needed. The war revealed some alarming deficiencies, and efforts to remedy these continued, both during and after the war. The question of dealing with the different denominations had not been satisfactorily resolved when the war broke out, and the existence of a Chaplain General to represent the Church of England chaplains continued to cause problems, as other denominations sought similar status. Relations between the
various denominations were strained. In 1914, when Major Auckland Geddes joined Macready's staff, the Adjutant-General observed that: "the main duties were to regulate the clergy; who were by no means so peaceably inclined towards each other's denominations as one might reasonably expect".[56] Disputes about the number of chaplains needed to serve the forces caused further friction between the different denominations, and between the Churches and the War Office. The Adjutant General was of the opinion that in 1915 there were too many chaplains serving in France:

These increases were invariably due to representations by Church of England laymen at home who seemed oblivious of the fact that once increases were authorized for one denomination all other religions represented in the Army would lay claim to similar concessions. That the Chaplain in the field is a great asset, when he is the right stamp of man, is universally acknowledged, but during the war there was an inclination in certain circles to press for numbers out of proportion to the needs of the troops.[57]

The Roman Catholic Church believed that there were insufficient numbers to cope with the particularly high standards it set for its faithful. Its demands on the War Office led to a proportionately higher allocation of Roman Catholic chaplains than Anglicans, since Catholic soldiers expected regular sacramental ministry. In spite of these efforts, it seems likely that all soldiers, regardless of denomination, suffered periods without regular provision of services, and the Chaplains' Department must shoulder some of the blame. Although much of the British Army was not adequately prepared when war came in 1914, the Chaplains' Department seems to have been particularly badly organized.[58]

Roman Catholic chaplains were often singled out for praise by men of all denominations. They could seem attractive to men brought up with the Church of England, who found much to admire in what was generally regarded as a more professional
system of worship. The Catholic approach was somehow more suited to pastoral work in a crisis. Catholicism was something of a novelty to many, in that Catholic chaplains already had an authorized form of absolution and confession, unlike the Church of England padres. Catholics could recognize the importance of the familiar sacrament of the Last Rites, but there was no parallel in the Church of England that men could readily call to mind. The high regard for Catholic chaplains is particularly interesting in the light of the Catholic Church’s own view that it suffered a serious disadvantage because there was no Catholic Chaplain General to deal directly with the War Office and the Army Chiefs.

Officially, the Roman Catholic chaplains had been the responsibility of the Bishop of Southwark since 1904, but in fact the task had been delegated to the Archbishop of Westminster, who had in turn made Monsignor Bidwell, his chaplain, responsible. In 1906, a proposal from the Vatican, requesting the appointment of a Roman Catholic Chaplain General to the British forces, had reached the Foreign Office. The matter met with little encouragement, and it was dropped, only to reappear in 1915, when the argument in favour of such an appointment was strengthened by the fact that it would be in line with those appointments already made in Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy and Belgium. The question of a Roman Catholic Chaplain General was fraught with difficulties as far as the military authorities were concerned. In an interview between Sir Graham Greene from the Admiralty, Monsignor Bidwell and Sir Reginald Brade from the War Office, in September, 1915, these problems were outlined. The War Office had been reluctant to appoint a second Chaplain General in peacetime. With only 15-20 Roman Catholic chaplains, there would have been little to occupy him. Green
argued that

Apart from the selection of candidates it would be very difficult to assign to the R.C. Chaplain General any of the functions which generally relate to the administration of the chaplains from the point of view of the operations of the Military Forces under the Army Council, and therefore all that he could probably do would be in the nature of correspondence and visitation in religious matters.[61]

They went on to point out that during the war, although the number of Roman Catholic chaplains had increased, they were already serving in Flanders and the Mediterranean, and "adequate arrangements have been made".[62] It was clearly felt that such an appointment would inevitably raise questions from the other religious denominations and increase tension between them. The application from the Vatican was turned down.[63] Throughout the war the Church of England was the only Church to enjoy the privilege of its own Chaplain General at the War Office. In spite of a common aim to provide an adequate chaplaincy service for the forces, it is difficult to see how some resentment from other denominations could be avoided.

The rise of "respectable society" documented by F. M. L. Thompson [64] meant that the provisions made by philanthropic factory and mill owners were beginning to challenge the Church as the central focus for social and recreational activities during the nineteenth century. The Church of England had been slow to recognise this. Most clergymen believed that the outbreak of war would increase their congregations. Church of England clergymen were particularly optimistic in their hopes for a dramatic wartime religious revival. Their optimism may have been prompted by a sense of urgency, a belief that, unless something happened to trigger a revival, they would never recover the ground that had been lost over the previous century.

The extent of the decline in church membership and attendance had
not been fully appreciated by the majority of clergymen. Many chaplains were shocked by the degree of ignorance and indifference they encountered amongst the troops. The inadequacy of the chaplains' training coupled with the shortcomings of their Department meant that they were ill-equipped to deal with the challenge of the wartime ministry. Their optimism about the chances of a religious revival was to be disappointed. The Chaplains' Department was clearly not prepared to cater for the demands of any such revival. There were no detailed plans for expanding the number of temporary chaplains and no provisions for training men for service with the troops. Inter-denominational rivalry, which reflected the tensions that had existed throughout the nineteenth century, hampered the work of the Department. Chaplains in the field were left to carve out a role for themselves in the absence of a training scheme, or any clear definition of the task ahead.
2] THE WARTIME CHAPLAINS' DEPARTMENT: GROWING PAINS.
The initial call for volunteers to serve as temporary Chaplains when war broke out brought an overwhelming response from the clergy.[1] The Chaplains' Department provided a vital outlet for Church of England clergymen who were anxious to serve their country. Frustrated by the Archbishop of Canterbury's advice that they should not enlist as combatants, many men volunteered to serve as chaplains regardless of age and fitness. The Chaplains' Department was plunged into chaos as a result.[2] The Department needed to produce a rapid and effective selection process if the best men were to be chosen. Unfortunately, the Chaplains' Department was in the same situation as every other department of the British Army when the war began in August 1914; it was quite unprepared for a long war on such a gigantic scale. Few people believed Lord Kitchener's warning that the conflict might well last for three years. Most preferred to believe that it would be over by Christmas, and it took some time for attitudes to change. In 1914 the full establishment was 117 chaplains, of whom 89 were Church of England, 17 Roman Catholic, 11 Presbyterians, and 40 classed as temporary.[3] Few plans existed for the movement of chaplains in the event of war; no provision had been made for their transport, accommodation, food or payment, although it was assumed that they would accompany the British Expeditionary Force across the Channel.

The Chaplain General, Bishop Taylor Smith, was responsible for the appointment of regular chaplains to minister to servicemen and their families at military bases around the world. In 1914, he found that instead of ministering to 200,000 professional soldiers, he was suddenly called upon to provide for the spiritual requirements of the vast armies daily being assembled in answer to the country's call, including men of every
social class, religious belief and mental outlook. In a letter to The Times, he urged everyone to remember the men at the front at noon each day and to pray for them, in a gesture of national solidarity.[4] Given the lack of any mobilization plans, the Chaplains’ Department achieved a minor miracle by ensuring that when the British Expeditionary Force crossed the channel in August, 1914, some sixty-five chaplains travelled with them.[5]

The Chaplain General had much to occupy his mind, even before the outbreak of war. His first duty was to serve the interests of his own Church, but at the same time he had to take responsibility for working with several other denominations. The Church of England enjoyed a privileged position as the national Church, but, when war broke out, the Chaplains’ Branch of the War Office did not recognise this position in a manner deemed appropriate by Church leaders. The Chaplain General interviewed all potential Church of England chaplains, but once they reached France, he had very little control over the day-to-day workings of the Chaplaincy service.[6] As the British Army prepared to embark for France, the Presbyterian Regular Chaplain, Dr. J. M. Simms, the senior in the Department, was hastily appointed Principal Chaplain. Born in 1854, Simms had joined the Chaplains’ Department in 1887 and served with the army for more than thirty years in Egypt, the Sudan and South Africa.[7] His duties were not clearly defined and some friction resulted from his attempts to control the deployment of Church of England chaplains in the early months of the war.[8] It was not appropriate, according to opinion in the Church of England, that a Presbyterian should exercise such control over Church of England clergymen. The agitation generated in the home church eventually helped to secure a re-organization of the Department, which included the
appointment of a bishop to assume responsibility for Church of England chaplains in 1915.

Apart from the pressing need to appoint chaplains to accompany the B.E.F., the Chaplains' Department had to select men from the large numbers volunteering for service, to act as chaplains at training camps in England, and base camps and hospitals in France and Belgium. The number of Church volunteers had produced a waiting list of 1,200 names. The Reverend Mervyn Evers recorded in his diary his fear that he might not be accepted as a chaplain. He successfully by-passed the waiting list by writing to remind the Chaplain General of their meeting at one of Taylor Smith's Keswick conferences and requesting a posting.[9] The Chaplain General's personal selection of temporary chaplains soon began to cause concern within the Church of England.

The methods employed by the Chaplain General to select men to serve as temporary chaplains were something of a mystery. Taylor Smith selected some 3,030 Church of England chaplains in the course of the war.[10] He interviewed all applicants at the War Office, and this seems to have been the limit of home-based preparation and training for many prospective chaplains. Later in the war, men with experience of working in hospitals and training camps were likely to be selected. According to the Archbishop of Canterbury: "The Chaplain General himself looks upon experience with the Church Army and the Y.M.C.A., coupled with a good report of the man's work, as a considerable qualification for the duties of a chaplain."[11] In the early months of the war, the personal interview with the Chaplain General carried the greatest weight. Canon R. L. Hussey, Rector of Sacred Trinity, Salford, recalled his own experience and included an apocryphal tale about the Chaplain General's technique, which was often repeated amongst the
I had the usual interview with Bishop Taylor Smith and he posed me his invariable conundrum—"A soldier is lying on the field of battle, mortally wounded in the stomach, with 10 minutes to live—What would you say?"

It was Neville Talbot, I think, who answered that he could not imagine, but he would love to hear what the Bishop would say. Taylor Smith was pleased and proceeded to expound. He was interrupted after some time by Talbot, who pointed out that the man would have been dead for more than 5 minutes![12]

On his last day in London, walking in Green Park, Hussey took to his heels in panic when he realised that he did not know how to salute an approaching uniformed figure: hardly an auspicious start to a military career.

Evers was luckier than most would-be chaplains: having successfully by-passed the waiting list of some 1,200 men who had volunteered ahead of him, he was sent to Codford camp on Salisbury Plain, prior to service in France and Belgium.[13] This, at least, meant an opportunity to get to know the men as they trained on home ground prior to leaving for France. Regular chaplains like the Reverend John M. Connor, who had served in Egypt with the British Army, were sent to France with great speed. Connor left Dublin on the 16th August, 1914, with the 13th Field Ambulance. His arrival was marked by utter confusion, with many nights spent in railway huts and open fields in the midst of the retreat from Mons to the Marne. Even by December his diary was still recording a different location almost every day, and grim sleeping conditions continued to be the norm.[14] Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, a temporary chaplain, fared little better, but he freely acknowledged his own ignorance when first in France as a raw newcomer in the "alcoholic and bawdy hell" that was Rouen.[15] He found that his task was undefined and by no means obvious; there was no self-evident place for a parson: "if he is to become necessary, he has first to create the need. The alternative is to
Neither Evers nor Studdert Kennedy refer to any training or guidance from the Chaplains' Department prior to their departure for France.

Canon T. Guy Rogers served on the Western Front from October, 1915. He arrived in St. Omer with no idea of his future destination and after a delay of twenty-four hours he eventually secured a meeting with a Senior Chaplain, who ordered him to the massive Le Havre base camp where some 20,000 men were based. Rogers found several chaplains already present, and this undoubtedly helped him to find his feet. He also mentions regular fortnightly chaplains' conferences, but his conclusion echoes that of Studdert Kennedy: "The Brigade Chaplains are left very much to themselves, and we have to work out our own salvation." Rogers found several chaplains already present, and this undoubtedly helped him to find his feet. He also mentions regular fortnightly chaplains' conferences, but his conclusion echoes that of Studdert Kennedy: "The Brigade Chaplains are left very much to themselves, and we have to work out our own salvation."[18]

Canon William Purcell believed that "they were the first of their kind ever to be involved in a situation of total war, and they went untrained and unprepared from the parochial round, the common task..."[19] Most chaplains, like Studdert Kennedy, probably thought that a hospital posting was the most likely destination when they volunteered for service, and few could have envisaged the life they were to lead.

Criticism of the Chaplain General's selection methods soon reached Lambeth Palace. The Chaplain General was invited to meet the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson, to discuss the matter. Little progress appears to have been made, other than to identify the nature of the criticism: "The Chaplain General is being attacked by the Protestant party for appointing too many High Church Chaplains."[20] The Archbishop cited the example of a number of serving chaplains who were regarded as "High Church", including Father Conran of Cowley, as evidence of the Chaplain...
Generals' preference. Shortly after this meeting Taylor Smith was accused of discriminating against High Church chaplains by the President of the English Church Union, Lord Halifax. Considering that such criticism came in October, 1914, at a very early stage in the expansion of the number of temporary chaplains, it does seem to have been rather hasty.

Much of the criticism of the Chaplain General could have been avoided if he had been willing to accept the many offers of help from diocesan bishops, but he was reluctant to do so. The Bishop of Oxford, Charles Gore, complained to Archbishop Davidson that the Chaplain General was not following the decision of a recent bishops' meeting that he should consult diocesan bishops before accepting men from their dioceses to serve as chaplains.[21] Davidson contacted the Chaplain General, who informed him that he always asked applicants if they had their bishop's permission to volunteer for service. Taylor Smith seemed reluctant to make any direct approach to the bishops.[22] He was anxious to maintain his right to select those clergymen he deemed to be most suited to service as temporary chaplains without interference from the bishops. The Chaplain General was appointed by the War Office, the Archbishop's powers over the Chaplain General were not clearly defined and Davidson seemed reluctant to do more than advise Taylor Smith of the complaints he had received.[23]

The Bishop of Pretoria, Bishop Furse, wrote to Davidson on more than one occasion, to press for changes, and he was particularly critical of the Chaplain General's contribution to the Department. The Army Chaplains' Department suffered, he believed, from "more confusion and less method in the administration of it than there ought to be".[24] Bishop Furse
maintained that the troops deserved better care than the Church of England was providing:

The flower of our manhood has joined the army, and the future of the Church in the country will depend in my opinion very largely upon the question of whether the Church gives the men the help they need at the crisis of their lives.

Both he and the Bishop of London, A. F. Winnington Ingram, stressed the need to ensure the selection of the very best men, but they felt frustrated by the attitude of the Chaplain General, who was not inclined to co-operate with the bishops on this matter. Bishop Furse emphasised that his views were based on information from many sources:

...again and again [he had heard that] according to the present system there seems to be but little method in the choice of applicants for Chaplaincies. We hear of good men who are strongly recommended and not appointed, and young men with hardly any experience appointed almost without enquiry.

The Chaplain General's reluctance to accept any offer of assistance from the bishops might be overcome, suggested Bishop Furse, if he could be approached from the standpoint that he was working too hard. The Bishop urged Davidson to approach Taylor Smith again with the offer of more help from the bishops: "Then if he will allow us to co-operate we might mobilise the clergy in some such way as the whole nation is being mobilised".

Davidson replied: "I am not hopeful of any such complete change of system as you, in rather large terms, indicate".

Davidson clearly recognised the need to change the system in the future. He asked the Bishop of London to work out a new scheme for organizing the Chaplains' Department, although he acknowledged that it would be impractical to try to implement drastic changes during the war.

The Chaplain General was not at odds with the bishops in
The decision to give preference to the younger applicants may have been financially sound but it was not always successful. Dick Sheppard was selected to serve as a Chaplain for three months, prior to his institution at St. Martin's-in-the-Fields in November, 1914. Sheppard was thirty-three at the time and he was assigned to the Australian Hospital run by Lady Dudley in France. He did not remain at the hospital, preferring to share the hardships of the men at the front. Of his first experience of an infantry attack he wrote to Archbishop Lang:

I've sat in the dug-out expecting the Germans at any moment all through the night....I've held a leg and several other limbs while the surgeon amputated them. I've fought a drunken Tommy and protected several German prisoners from a French mob. I've missed a thousand opportunities and lived through a life's experience in five weeks.

In October, 1914, he was ordered home as a result of poor health.

An Army Doctor reported:

He identified himself with every dying man, and in consequence nearly killed himself. He would sit up all night with some soldier, unconscious, kept alive only by natural strength and youth, unable to see or whisper or make any sign, except, as death came closer, to grip Sheppard's hand. Sit there, just because he had promised
The life of an Army Chaplain inevitably involved a brutal education for men accustomed to the sheltered academic side of church life. Those who had experienced life in the slums of industrial England were less shocked by their experiences. Close friends believed that the memory of his war service haunted Sheppard for the rest of his life, marking the beginning of his conversion to Pacifism.

The record of Theodore Hardy tends to support the view that Church of England leaders were unwise in deciding to limit their choice of chaplains to the youngest clergymen. Hardy was one of the most highly regarded chaplains, but at the age of fifty-one he was also one of the oldest. He had bombarded the Chaplaincy Department with requests, only to be told that they had a waiting list of hundreds of younger men. He considered going out to France as a stretcher bearer, and successfully passed an examination to qualify as such, but finally, in the summer of 1916, his persistence paid off and he was summoned to the War Office for an interview. Within weeks he was stationed at the huge camp at Etaples with no mention of any training or guidance from the Chaplains' Department. Hardy was killed three weeks before the Armistice, by which time he had been awarded a V.C., D.S.O., and M.C. He earned the respect of his troops by his regular visits to the front line trenches, and he was the most decorated non-combatant in the war. The many tributes paid to Hardy indicate the value of sending more mature men as chaplains to the young soldiers. A man of Hardy's age, with a wealth of parochial experience and a grown family, could provide valuable support in terms of fatherly affection and advice for "his men" that younger chaplains, who had only recently been ordained, could
Disagreement between the Chaplain General and the Archbishops resurfaced over the deployment of some chaplains. Father Philip Waggett, C.F., was serving unofficially with the 4th Field Ambulance, working with the chaplain who had assured the authorities that there was more than enough work for both men. He appealed directly to the Archbishop of Canterbury when he was faced with the threat of recall by the Chaplains' Department. Waggett argued "that the officers generally are full of desires for more chaplains". He was quite prepared to be regarded as a Scripture Reader rather than a chaplain if it meant he could remain with the Field Ambulance. Davidson told the Chaplain General of his concern:

All these arrangements are rather beyond me, as I do not know the rules and technicalities, but I do feel that if somehow or other a man like Philip Waggett has got to the Front and is among the soldiers, the recalling of him would be a very grave step unless it is required by military exigencies. I fear that the whole Chaplaincy question must be extraordinarily difficult just now... Davidson clearly sympathised with both Waggett and the Chaplain General. He recognised that the deployment of chaplains was rather haphazard in the early months of the war but seemed reluctant to interfere in the attempts to remedy this beyond expressing the hope that the Department should be flexible enough to accommodate the most enthusiastic temporary chaplains who were keen to do their bit.

Chaplains continued to be thrust into service with little preparation and no significant training. An initiation course was established at Woolwich in 1916, according to Mervyn Haigh. He found this a "rough and ready affair" when he attended a course there at the end of 1916, but at least it introduced chaplains to army life and taught them a few basics, such as how
to take a Church Parade.[40] Haigh was particularly fortunate to benefit from such a course; it is not mentioned in the records of the Chaplains' Department and it seems that very few clergymen received any sort of guidance. In August, 1914, Walter Carey applied for a naval chaplaincy one day, and the very next day a telegram arrived asking him to report to ship for duty within twenty-four hours. Studdert Kennedy was appointed as a temporary chaplain on 21 December, 1915, and within four days he found himself taking a service "somewhere in France".[41] This speed must have been particularly alarming for young and inexperienced chaplains.

In 1915, F. R. Barry was commissioned straight from an Oxford chaplaincy. He had been a priest for just a few months and he was only twenty-five when he found himself on board ship, bound for Egypt. He maintained that he was "scared stiff" and lacked any support whatsoever: "I had very little idea what to do; no one had given me any kind of briefing."[42] Once in Egypt, he established a canteen in a tent and began to make friends and to settle into a routine, but the amount of guidance he could have provided in these early days of his ministry is questionable. A later posting to the Somme brought fresh horrors: "I had never seen a dead man before, much less bloody bits and pieces of men, and as near as nothing, turned and ran".[43] Temporary Chaplains had to adapt quickly to such horrors if they were to provide any kind of support for the troops.

Much of the early criticism of the Chaplains' Department concerned the debate about the number of chaplains deemed necessary to minister to the troops in France. The matter was raised when the Chaplain General visited the Archbishop at Lambeth in October, 1914.[44] Davidson was anxious to know if the
shortage of chaplains at the front was caused by lack of money, but the Chaplain General assured him that this was not the case. The real problem was: "to get the War Office to sanction any more non-combatants being sent to the front".[45] Sir Reginald Brade identified the real difficulty when he emphasized that the War Office plans were for an Army on the move, hence the need to restrict the number of non-combatants where possible.[46]

Lord Robert Cecil confirmed the War Office's reluctance to allow more chaplains to go to the front. He had been in touch with Sir Reginald Brade in February, 1915. Brade had told him that the real problem arose because chaplains were treated like Field Officers "and consequently had to be provided with a horse, a groom and a servant".[47] Brade acknowledged that many clergymen were quite prepared to do without such expensive assistance, and in practice many chaplains were never afforded such luxuries, but the situation remained confused as the clergymen struggled to come to terms with Army discipline and War Office regulations.[48] Archbishop Davidson made his own enquiries and found that many chaplains did not have a horse, and although he took the point that luggage and servants would hinder rapid movement by the forces, he felt that his arguments had made some impression on Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, and he was optimistic about the chances of increasing the allocation of chaplains in future.[49] Taylor Smith reassured Davidson that if the War Office could be persuaded, he still had plenty of good men in reserve, able and willing to serve as chaplains.[50]

Davidson believed that the information he had received in many letters to Lambeth revealed that more chaplains were needed in France, but the Chaplain General did not seem to share his certainty or his sense of urgency. He tended to be complacent
about the matter. Davidson had also expressed the concerns of many of the bishops about the provision of chaplains for the New Army.[51] The Chaplain General had informed Lambeth that the New Army "is now well-staffed with Clergy".[52] He claimed to have over a thousand volunteers ready for service and he assured the Archbishop that each Division going overseas would have its full complement of chaplains: "The bishops may rest assured that if they come across any pastorless flocks and report the failure to me, I will immediately take steps to supply a suitable Chaplain". In spite of such assurances, some home bases and camps were still short of chaplains in March, 1915.[53] The comments of both men and chaplains serving in France suggest that the Chaplain General had no grounds for complacency, but not all the blame rested with the Chaplains' Department. Some bishops answered the appeal for their best men to be released for service by taking the opportunity to rid themselves of the "dead wood" in their dioceses, sending forward men who were quite unsuitable.

On more than one occasion, the Archbishop of Canterbury defended Bishop Taylor Smith. Writing to the Headmaster of Rugby, Mr. Selwyn, Davidson emphasised that both he and Taylor Smith were doing their best to persuade the War Office that more chaplains were needed:

It is quite a mistake to regard him as the obstructive person. The difficulty lies in the unwillingness of the generals to allow an increase in the number of non-combatants with the expeditionary force.[54]

The question about the number of chaplains needed in France was considered by a Committee established by Sir John French in March, 1915. The Chaplain General informed Lambeth that the review had produced the response anticipated by Davidson: "the increase of chaplains has been granted, but please do not make this public or
I shall be inundated with undesirables".[55] Such difficulties could have been avoided if a ratio of chaplains to men had been agreed by the Churches and the War Office before the war.

Much of the criticism directed at the Chaplains' Department continued to blame the Chaplain General. Father Paul Bull, one of sixteen Mirfield men to serve as chaplains during the war, complained about the "gross scandal of inefficiency" of the department. Lord Halifax declared that Taylor Smith should be replaced if he did not introduce reforms to increase the number of chaplains.[56] Complaints about the lack of sacramental ministrations and the Chaplain General's dislike of the use of vestments and sacramental confessions were also voiced by Lord Halifax in October 1914. He protested to Lord Kitchener that Anglo-Catholic chaplains were being discriminated against and wrote to Bishop Taylor Smith demanding that soldiers ought to have the opportunity of attending Holy Communion every Sunday. He expressed concern that insufficient chaplains had been deployed to make this possible. In response to the charge of discrimination, Taylor Smith contended that he did appoint Anglo-Catholics, but he was known to dislike the "High Church" practices such men favoured. He also stated his view that such men would not fit in to the chaplaincy service as easily as the more liberal, evangelical clergymen to whom he was accused of giving preference. His comment that: "An Extremist is out of place in the Army" must have discouraged those with "High Church" sympathies who sought to volunteer as chaplains.[57] The Church Times expressed support for Lord Halifax's campaign.[58] Archbishop Davidson found himself under pressure to make changes. Some of his bishops had already voiced similar concerns and Davidson himself had admitted in a memorandum of December, 1914, that the appointment of
chaplains was chaotic. [59]

There can be no doubt that religious ministrations in the army were badly organized in the first months of the war. [60] The fact that matters did not seem to have improved by the summer of 1915 was inexcusable. The criticism of the Chaplain General reinforced the demand that Church leaders should consider the appointment of a bishop to the forces in France. Bishop Furse spent a month with the troops in France in the spring of 1915. [61] His report to the Archbishop of Canterbury was not encouraging. He concluded that, in spite of recent improvements, the number of chaplains at the front was "entirely inadequate. [62] He criticised the poor organization of the Department in general and argued that there was an urgent need for the appointment of a bishop to look after the interests of the chaplains in France:

...it is most important that somebody in the position of a bishop, and with the experience of a bishop, should be able to place men where they are most needed, and to send those who are not equal to the situation, to work where their talents would be more appreciated. [63]

Bishop Furse also advocated the appointment of a second bishop to cover Confirmations, along the lines of communication and at bases. This echoed the concerns expressed by many chaplains, who prepared soldiers for Confirmation with little hope of obtaining the necessary visit from a bishop to conduct the service. [64]

Bishop Furse drew attention to the Bishop of Khartoum, Bishop Gwynne, who was working as an ordinary chaplain to a Brigade in the First Army. Bishop Gwynne was much in demand for Confirmations but his presence in France was no thanks to any forward thinking by the Chaplains' Department: it was simply a matter of chance.

Bishop Furse identified the lack of pastoral care for chaplains as another concern: "The feeling amongst Army
Chaplains... is that they have no-one to back them" and "that they have no-one to look to to give them a helping hand, and that nobody cares".[65] The Archbishop of York voiced similar concerns in a letter to Davidson. He felt that:

\[\text{...since the C-G is almost unavoidably tied to London for the discharge of necessary administrative work, there ought surely to be someone at the front with the authority to supervise the actual working of the whole system, and to be in constant communication with both the Chaplains themselves and the various Commanding Officers.}[66]\]

The combined efforts of the Archbishop Lang and Bishop Furse persuaded Archbishop Davidson to conduct a lengthy interview with the Chaplain General about the need to provide more support for the work of the chaplains in France.[67]

Davidson pressed the point that the Chaplain General had too much to do and he suggested the appointment of a bishop as Deputy Chaplain General to work at the front. He raised many of the criticisms that had reached him about the work of the Department in France, but Taylor Smith denied that there were difficulties in securing the services of a bishop to confirm men:

The C.G. said that this is all based on a misapprehension. There is no need for anything of the kind. As a matter of fact nobody has waited for Confirmation, or need have waited, more than a day or two at any time.[68]

Taylor Smith argued that Bishop Gwynne was available, even at short notice, to carry out Confirmation services anywhere. He also suggested that visiting bishops could help out if there was a problem. Davidson was not reassured by the Chaplain General's comments and he found himself in a difficult position, as pressure mounted for him to appoint a bishop, regardless of the Chaplain General's views on the subject.

The degree of influence exerted by the Chaplain General clearly caused problems for Archbishop Davidson. Criticism of the
Chaplain General from his bishops and worries raised by serving chaplains combined to increase his feelings of unease. How much of the criticism resulted from the internal differences within the Church of England about "High" and "Low" church conventions is difficult to discern. Certainly the complaints about the methods of selection employed by Bishop Taylor Smith seem to have been unfounded. The variety of chaplains appointed suggests such criticism in the early months of the war was premature. "High" or "Low Church" traditions tended to count for little when wartime services were held in ruined buildings or in the mud of the trenches. The significance of vestments and the use of incense were hardly questions to concern chaplains or their congregations in such circumstances. The Chaplains' Department was slow to react to criticism about the inadequate preparation and training given to temporary chaplains and it was many months before any attempt was made to provide any meaningful support for chaplains serving with the troops. This was particularly unfortunate given the decision by Church leaders to give preference to the youngest and therefore least experienced clergy to volunteer for service. Only with the appointment of Bishop Gwynne, in July 1915, as Deputy Chaplain General, did matters begin to improve.
THE APPOINTMENT OF BISHOP GWYNNE AS DEPUTY CHAPLAIN GENERAL.
The controversial appointment of a second Church of England bishop to the Chaplains' Department took place in 1915. Bishop Llewellyn H. Gwynne was made Deputy Chaplain General over all the chaplains in France. His appointment was the result of sustained criticism of the Chaplain General, Bishop Taylor Smith, from both chaplains and bishops. The resentment of many Church of England bishops at the degree of control the Presbyterian Principal Chaplain, Dr. Simms, exercised over the deployment of Church of England chaplains in France also contributed to the decision to appoint a Deputy Chaplain General. In addition, several chaplains had complained about the difficulty of securing the services of a bishop to carry out Confirmations in France. Some bishops expressed their concern about the number of chaplains who had been involved in joint services with other denominations in France. They believed that a bishop in France would be better placed to put an end to such services, but, most significantly, his appointment would reinforce the privileged position of the Church of England within the Chaplains' Department.

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson, was placed in a difficult position by the level of criticism directed against the Chaplain General. Bishop Taylor Smith, as head of the War Office Chaplains' Department, under the personal direction of the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, was in an unassailable position. Bishops were appointed by the monarch, the titular head of the Church of England. Bishop Taylor Smith's appointment as Chaplain General was beyond the control of the Archbishop of Canterbury. In 1901, he had been invited to become Chaplain General by the War Office. The invitation was issued as a result of the intervention of King Edward VII. The Archbishop would surely have been reluctant to press for the
removal of Taylor Smith, however unsuitable he might seem, since the wishes of the monarch had played a significant role in his appointment by the War Office.[5]

Initially Davidson had been reluctant to criticise the Chaplain General but, by spring 1915, he had received so many complaints about the chaotic administration of the Chaplains’ Department that he had been forced to reconsider. In order to try to mitigate the effects of the Chaplain General’s weaknesses, Davidson sought the appointment of an able deputy to take charge of Church of England chaplains in France. A Deputy Chaplain General would reduce the influence of Taylor Smith without the embarrassment of removing him.

Problems had emerged, prior to 1914, when Taylor Smith’s plans for the mobilization of chaplains in wartime had been rejected by the Army Council.[6] This contributed to the early chaos caused by the large number of clergy volunteering to serve as chaplains, and the pressing need to deploy chaplains with the troops. The Chaplain General continued to reject all offers of assistance from the Diocesan bishops.[7] As the wartime shortcomings of the Chaplains’ Department were revealed, pressure on the Archbishop of Canterbury to make changes mounted. Criticism came from a variety of sources, including Lord Halifax, Canon Peter Green, the Bishops of London and Pretoria, Father Bull C.R., and The Church Times.[8]

Bishop Taylor Smith had no university theological training, he was not highly regarded by his brother bishops and, in the opinion of Canon Alan Wilkinson, he had: "neither the theological insight, nor the sophistication that was needed to be a spiritual guide to chaplains or men".[9] Harold Woolley V.C., a Territorial Officer who was later ordained and served as a
chaplain in the Second World War, was one of many to criticize Taylor Smith: "He was an extreme low churchman and not, I think, very well read." Woolley believed that under Taylor Smith's direction "imagination and initiative were liable to be smothered" in the Chaplains' Department.[10]

In addition to the complaints about the Chaplain General, Davidson had received many letters about the difficulty chaplains faced in trying to secure the services of a bishop to carry out confirmation services in France. Taylor Smith claimed that Bishop Gwynne, serving as a temporary chaplain, was readily available to provide for such needs, but a letter from the bishop's brother, the editor of The Morning Post, contradicted his assurances.[11] Mr. Gwynne informed Davidson that he had recently been visited by his brother: "he told me that he experienced some little difficulty in carrying out the duties of Confirmation which fall to him as the only Bishop out there acting as chaplain". The purpose of his letter was to seek the Archbishop's assistance in securing a car to help Bishop Gwynne to carry out his work more effectively. Regulations forbade the provision of a private car and the request for a Government car had been made to G.H.Q. and not to the Chaplains' Department. Gwynne reported that this had caused "trouble" and he asked the Archbishop to help smooth matters. He emphasized that Confirmations were much in demand from all along the line, and Bishop Gwynne was anxious to fulfil the demand.[12] Davidson used this information to persuade the Chaplain General that more support was required by the chaplains in France if opportunities were to be taken.[13]

Concern about the day to day running of the Department in France was the subject of a number of letters to Lambeth
Palace. In a confidential memo, the Bishop of Wakefield passed on the comments of his former chaplain, in the belief that they were typical of the views held by many of the temporary chaplains serving in France. The memo indicated that the Chaplain General had little control over chaplains beyond their original appointment. Church of England chaplains abroad were nominally under the control of the Senior Chaplain at Boulogne, Colonel Macpherson, who was subordinate to the Presbyterian Principal Chaplain. Macpherson had complained to the Bishop of Wakefield that he had little power since

...all moves are settled from Headquarters, ie. Dr. Simms, who has with him as Staff Officers two Church of England Chaplains: Drury, ranking as Colonel and Thorold, ranking as Captain. Dr. Simms has no personal knowledge of a Chaplain's work, for he never visits the Chaplains; and he constantly moves men without any regard for the work which they may be doing.[14]

The Bishop argued that the deployment of chaplains should be undertaken by a Church of England Bishop who would be able to see that each man was doing work that was suitable. The conflict between the representatives of different denominations caused "endless friction" according to the Bishop, and

The relations between Dr. Simms and Colonel Macpherson, while outwardly polite, are most difficult; protests on the part of the latter are simply ignored. It is impossible not to resent the position in which Church of England Chaplains are placed.[15]

The Bishop criticised the Principal Chaplain as being unwilling to delegate power to the Senior Chaplain of the Church of England. He regarded Simms' Chief Staff Officer, Drury, as quite unsuitable and a man "of whom it is impossible to speak with any respect".[16] Davidson could not ignore the view held by the bishops that "Chaplains at the Front needed some more spiritual leadership, especially of an Episcopal kind, than they were at present receiving".[17] The combination of a Chaplain General in
London who no longer enjoyed the full confidence of some senior Clergymen, and a desire to see the direction of Church of England chaplains placed firmly in the control of a senior Church of England clergyman persuaded, Davidson to press for the appointment of a Deputy Chaplain General.

The appointment of a Deputy Chaplain General effectively sidelined Taylor Smith, confining his role to administrative affairs in London, but, in order to secure Bishop Gwynne’s appointment, Davidson had to convince the Chaplain General and the War Office of the need for such a change. Once a bishop had been consecrated, he enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom. It is unlikely that Davidson would have wished to override Taylor Smith by appealing directly to the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, on such a sensitive matter as the appointment of a Deputy. The Chaplain General’s support would also have helped to persuade War Office officials that such an appointment was necessary. The formal offer of the appointment had to come from the War Office.[18]

In July, 1915, Taylor Smith finally agreed that a Bishop should be appointed as Deputy Chaplain General.[19] When he heard that the post had been accepted by his old friend, Bishop Gwynne, Taylor Smith was said to have exclaimed: "Sir, this is an answer to prayer!"[20] Gwynne enjoyed the full confidence of the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, and of the Archbishop of Canterbury, who told Lord Grenfell that Gwynne was going to take "real charge" of the Chaplains' Department in France.[21] His appointment certainly improved communications between Church leaders at home and the chaplains serving overseas. George Bell, chaplain at Lambeth during the war, noted that: "from the date of his [Gwynne’s] appointment to the end, the Archbishop was kept in
the closest touch with the religious and moral needs of the Army". [22]

When war was declared, Gwynne was on leave in London from his post as Bishop of Khartoum. He went to the Sudan Agent in London where he found the Governor General, Sir Reginald Wingate, arranging his return to Sudan. Wingate advised the Bishop to stay for the rest of his leave, since he believed that the war would be short-lived, but Gwynne preferred to see Archbishop Davidson and volunteer for service as a chaplain. [23] Given his experience as acting chaplain to the forces in Sudan, he was accepted by Davidson but the Chaplain General maintained that at fifty Gwynne was too old for such a post. Gwynne did not give up easily:

In spite of frequent visits to the War Office, I could not persuade the Chaplain-General to change his mind. I knew, however, from private sources that there was a grave shortage of Church of England Chaplains and I determined to make one last effort. [24]

Gwynne's persistence finally paid off. Taylor Smith capitulated and Gwynne left for France in late August, 1914, as a 4th class Army Chaplain with no special privileges. For almost a year he was the only Bishop serving in France full-time, and he was much in demand for Confirmation services. [25]

Gwynne was not enthusiastic about the idea of his becoming Deputy Chaplain General when he was initially approached in July, 1915:

I told Kitchener that I had no ambition for this new appointment and that if I were to be taken away from the infantry battalions, some of which had been known to me since the days when I was acting Chaplain in Khartoum, I would prefer to return to Sudan. [26]

His main objection was that he feared too much time would have to be spent on administration, away from the men he sought to serve. Lord Kitchener invited Gwynne to discuss the position at St.
James' Palace. He seems to have convinced the Bishop that his experience as an ordinary chaplain would be vital. He argued that the organization of an efficient Chaplains' Department would not be easy, since there were no pre-war plans which were worthy of consideration.[27]

The frustration of the chaplains with the Department certainly ensured a warm welcome for Gwynne from experienced men like the Reverend Harry Blackburne, serving with the First Army: "A better appointment could not possibly have been made. It really looks as if the Chaplains' Department is at last to be properly organized."[28] The chaplains shared Kitchener's confidence in Gwynne's ability to reorganize the administration; according to one temporary chaplain, F. R. Barry, his appointment:

...at once raised the status of the Department and got it properly recognised by the Top Brass. (He had known some of the Army commanders when they were subalterns serving in the Sudan.) He made himself felt all over the Western Front; what he did for his chaplains can never be told in words.[29]

The Chaplain General's relations with his fellow bishops continued to cause concern. Archbishop Lang warned Davidson of several problems "about which it seems to me impossible to get adequate consideration from the Chaplain General".[30] The Chaplain General seems to have jealously guarded his position and he was inclined to claim powers greater than those to which he was entitled. He managed to infuriate the Archbishop of York by claiming to have jurisdiction over the three million men in the army in 1915. This claim was regarded as "preposterous" by Lang, who was sufficiently distressed by Taylor Smith's attitude to seek reassurance from the Archbishop of Canterbury.[31] Lang also reported that his conversations with chaplains at many home bases had led him to believe that they would prefer to be in more
effective touch with the Diocesan Bishops rather than the Chaplain General. Davidson attempted to clarify Taylor Smith's responsibilities by telling him that "as Chaplain-General he has no more rights than his predecessor Edghill had and cannot possibly supersede the responsibility of Diocesan Bishops".[32] Davidson blamed the War Office for giving the Chaplain General the impression that he was much more powerful than he was. He told the Archbishop of York that he felt Taylor Smith took his criticism and behaved "quite well, though without the insight, or the imagination, or the extended vision which one would like to feel that the occupant of such a place at such a time possessed".[33]

In their efforts to improve the administration of the Chaplains' Department, the War Office decided to create a new office and staff for Bishop Gwynne, entirely distinct from that of the Principal Chaplain's Department.[34] Church of England chaplains were to be supervised by Gwynne; chaplains of all other denominations remained in the care of Dr. Simms. Both offices were placed under the direction of the Adjutant-General.[35] Simms was also an old friend who had visited Khartoum before the war. He and Gwynne remained on good terms in spite of the tensions which emerged as the Chaplains' Department was reorganized. One Senior Chaplain observed that:

...he and Dr. Simms, the Principal Chaplain, get on well, but there has been difficulty at this splitting the Chaplain's Department into two - Church of England and the other denominations. I wish that out here we could forget all our differences and work together. I didn't think like that at first, but now I do.[36]

Many Church of England Bishops believed that Gwynne would halt the "unacceptable" joint services being held in France by some Presbyterian and Methodist chaplains.[37] The Bishops in
England had been alerted to this problem by the Bishop of London. During a visit to the front, Bishop Winnington Ingram had found himself "awkwardly involved" in one such service.[38] The Bishops recognised the need to "restore discipline" amongst the chaplains in France and they had pressured the War Office to appoint a Bishop to a senior position in France to facilitate this. The Bishops hoped that Gwynne would be able to prevent Church of England chaplains from "weakly complying" with the practices of other chaplains. They argued that Church of England chaplains who participated in such services gave a false lead to both officers and men.[39]

Both Presbyterian and Methodist chaplains seemed to see no reason why they should not minister to Church of England men, or take part in joint services with Church of England chaplains, but the Bishops seem to have taken exception to such ideas and particularly to the "indiscriminate preaching" that resulted from such services.[40] The fact that Simms may have encouraged such "disorders" caused a great deal of concern amongst Church of England leaders at home. The "preventive steps" they advocated meant the elevation of Bishop Gwynne to a post which ranked above that of the Principal Chaplain. Their anxiety to restore the Church of England to a more prominent position within the Chaplains' Department seems to have been much greater than their concern about joint services and the inefficiency of the Department's administration.

The appointment of a bishop as Deputy Chaplain General was presented by the Archbishop of Canterbury as one of the most important measures taken to improve the efficiency of the Chaplains' Department. It had the predictable effect of increasing tension between the Church of England and the other
denominations.[41] The bishops' resentment of Simms had been partly responsible for the appointment. The treatment of Simms by the War Office was at best insensitive and at worst insulting. Simms, with the rank of Brigadier-General, was widely perceived to have been slighted by the War Office when an announcement was made that Bishop Gwynne would be promoted from Temporary Chaplain, 4th Class, to Deputy Chaplain General with the rank of Major-General. A great deal of criticism resulted from this decision and even The Church Times condemned the treatment of Simms, who had attained his rank by "long and honourable service".[42]

The most bitter controversy resulted from the publication of an article in The Scotsman in 1915. A Scottish Chaplain, in an article entitled "Sectarianism in the Battlefield", stirred the debate, by accusing the English Episcopacy of a grave injustice to Simms, and at the same time advocating a much greater degree of co-operation between chaplains of different denominations serving in France.[43] In response, the Archbishop of Canterbury claimed that:

...the status given to Bishop Gwynne as Deputy Chaplain-General, and the military rank which, as I understand, is now accorded to him, were matters lying quite outside our request, and intimation of these facts came to me unsought from the War Office.[44]

Davidson was anxious to assure members of other denominations that he and the Bishops had pressed the War Office to appoint Gwynne to a more senior position only in order to facilitate more confirmations amongst the men serving in France. He was being disingenuous, since it was quite clearly a matter of great concern amongst clergymen of the Church of England at this time that chaplains should not be involved in such joint services. The Church Times identified the dangers involved in such close co-operation:
...the intimate association of the chaplains brings with it a certain peril. Being placed on exactly the same footing in the military administration, and being rightly so placed, they may be led to suppose themselves on exactly the same footing in respect of religion as well.[45]

In the course of their daily work many chaplains chose to ignore the strict guidelines they would have been obliged to obey in their home parishes. In November, 1917, the Reverend Monty Bere noted that joint services with Anglican and Presbyterian ministers were "quite common". He indicated that there was so much work to be done that old restrictions were overlooked.[46] On one occasion Bere took a service for a Presbyterian colleague who had been taken ill; neither he nor the congregation seemed to feel any unease about this.[47] The Reverend John M. Connor, a Presbyterian Chaplain, held a service in 1914, at Serches, for a mixture of Presbyterians and Wesleyans.[48] He shared the views of Canon T. Guy Rogers who made frequent mention of the good relations between the chaplains of different denominations. Both were practical men with little time for denominational differences and they often held joint services with clergymen of different faiths.[49] Rogers recalled how glad the men of an Irish unit were to see him: "The Church of England ones (and the Presbyterians who do not seem to get much looked after unless I do it) feel it if no one comes to them."[50] The men Rogers referred to were in training, prior to moving into line on the Somme in September, 1916. He clearly felt that it would be wrong to deny men any support he could offer, regardless of denomination. During one evening service, Rogers administered Communion to thirty men, whilst nearby the Roman Catholic Chaplain, Father Knapp, presided over a large congregation saying the Rosary:
How pathetic in a way, to an onlooker, - two rival 'shrines' and rival 'priests', yet we were all seeking after God, the same God, and seeking Him through Christ. One feels a close link of sympathy with anyone of any communion who stands for strong and definite belief, - over against the kind of tolerant half- patronising, and wholly vague Christianity - which is so characteristic of even a good type of officer.[51]

Denominational differences sometimes confused the men with little or no experience of religion before the war. Many chaplains felt that clergymen should be united in their faith, not divided by petty disagreements, if they were to attract men to their services. Mutual suspicion and distrust between the various denominations at home was clearly not always transferred overseas. In many cases new friendships and greater understanding between clergymen of different faiths resulted. The Reverend C. I. O. Hood, a Church of England Chaplain serving in Gallipoli in 1915, was surprised to learn from the new Wesleyan Padre that the Wesleyan prayer book was very similar to his own and that Wesleyan Ministers had to undergo a rigorous training. He was further surprised when the Wesleyan went on to admire the nature of the Church of England's administrative structure.[52] Like many serving chaplains, Hood concluded that denominational differences meant little in the light of his wartime working conditions. The need to adapt to such conditions was not always perceived as clearly by the home clergy as the chaplains would have liked.

Barry maintained that doctrinal differences meant little to many of the chaplains he met. Barry believed that they were not interested in what the Church had always taught; they preferred to improvise and adapt in ways that would have been considered scandalous at home.[53] In December 1916, the Reverend Bulstrode held a Communion Service at which he invited men from other denominations, who were cut off from their ministrations, to join in. He believed his gesture was one of friendly support, and
as such it was valued by the men who chose to participate.[54] Bulstrode did not intend any great gesture of defiance by his action: it was merely an extension of his common-sense approach to his work. As a senior chaplain in the Ypres area, in July 1916, he regularly visited all the chaplains, regardless of denomination, for "a word of mutual cheer" and to pray together. Such behaviour would probably have been frowned upon by some in the Church of England at home, but for men working in alien surroundings it was regarded as quite unremarkable. Fears about joint services reflected petty rivalries between the denominations rather than the practical Christianity practised by chaplains in France.

Gwynne’s appointment seems to have made very little difference to the spirit of co-operation experienced by serving chaplains. Joint services continued in many areas and the provision of retreat facilities and regular chaplains’ meetings introduced by Gwynne frequently included other denominations. The Deputy Chaplain General broadened recruitment and made the organization of the Chaplains’ Department more efficient. His contribution was particularly highly regarded by both chaplains and soldiers. Gwynne’s sympathies lay with the ordinary chaplains and he took every opportunity to travel throughout the army area to meet the men at their work. The Archbishop of Canterbury’s Chaplain, Bell, recorded the reputation Gwynne quickly earned amongst his fellow churchmen: "Hardly any man in the Army was more welcome than he, wherever he went, and no priest or bishop in the whole Chaplains’ Department was more appreciated in his pastoral ministry."[55] Gwynne was clearly an exceptional man; one of his chaplains, Barry, described him as "a commanding figure" and one who "made it easier to believe in God".[56] His leadership and
support were badly needed by the many chaplains who seemed to lack confidence, not just in the Department, but in the Church itself.

Archbishop Davidson fulfilled his promise, made during a discussion at Lambeth, to let Gwynne know of any complaints circulating with regard to the chaplains in France. Davidson warned Gwynne that he was in no position to judge the accuracy of the complaints, but he passed them on as promised. They were that hospitals at Le Havre suffered from insufficient cover by chaplains; some chaplains had been sent home "on the grounds of unwise teaching and ritual". This had caused much speculation and some false claims that at least two chaplains had been using a "Romish service". Problems arose because many chaplains came to the conclusion that the best way to serve the men was to abandon convention and adapt to their unfamiliar tasks and surroundings as they saw fit.

Gwynne was grateful to Davidson for passing on the complaints; he agreed with the Chaplain General and the Archbishop that there had been many complaints at home about Churchmanship among the chaplains in France being too "high" or too "low". Two chaplains, Kingdon and Peacey, had been forced to return home as a result. Gwynne believed that they were both:

... good men. But people could not understand what service Kingdon took. Even moderately High people at Havre said he was the limit, though he worked hard and well at the Hospital. Besides I was told he could not go to the front, and such men are not so useful to me, as there is so much movement and such a stream of men who cannot stand the strain.

The second of the two chaplains, Peacey: "got into trouble with the R.C.s" over confession. Gwynne had not made any specific charge against these men; he had simply advised the Chaplain General to transfer them to England. In all, a dozen men had been sent home by Gwynne following his review of the Department in
1915: "I have never hesitated to have men recalled to England" he told Davidson.[59] Much of the speculation came as a result of Gwynne's enquiries; he asked a Senior Chaplain to make some private enquiries into the two men and "he foolishly made public enquiries". Such errors were mercifully rare and Gwynne was grateful for the support he received from the majority of chaplains serving in France: "Thank God the great bulk of our chaplains are common-sense, moderate English Parsons."[60]

Bishop Gwynne enjoyed a good relationship with the military: many senior officers gave him much needed support and encouragement.[61] Gwynne was initially troubled by the heavy responsibilities facing him. He was particularly grateful for the support of General Horne, Commander of the First Army and General Plumer, of whom he wrote: "His transparent kindliness and goodness attracted me at once and I was soon convinced that he would give me good counsel and advice".[62] Gwynne also enjoyed the support of the British Commander-in-Chief, Douglas Haig; both shared a genuine belief in the power of prayer and they seem to have enjoyed a good relationship: Haig was so impressed by the Bishop's Christmas address that he had copies circulated to the troops.[63]

Haig told Gwynne that he considered the Chaplains' Department to be:

...one of the most valuable departments in the army as no-one could do more than a chaplain to sustain morale and explain what the Empire is fighting for. We are not fighting only for our country. We are fighting for Christ and the freedom of mankind.[64]

Haig gained a great deal of comfort and support from the ministry of his own Church of Scotland chaplain, the Reverend George Duncan.[65]

Rogers commented on the fact that many chaplains were attached to Gwynne to the exclusion of Bishop Taylor Smith.[66] Since Gwynne was based in France and was widely acknowledged to be
more tolerant of all shades of opinion in the Church of England, this was not surprising. Gwynne described the Church of England chaplains as a magnificent team: "many of whom afterwards held high rank in the Church of England or became leaders of the community". [67] Gwynne enjoyed an excellent relationship with his chaplains and many of them paid tribute to his qualities of leadership and loyalty. Tubby Clayton, Neville and Ted Talbot, Barry, Linton Smith (the future bishop of Rochester) Mervyn Haigh, Blackburne and Charles Raven were all men of ability and vision. In later years Gwynne recalled that: "no less than 40% of the Bishops in this country had served under me as Chaplains in the First World War". [68]

Gwynne’s appointment had been welcomed in most quarters, but he did acknowledge that there had been some initial resentment about the fact that an outsider had been appointed to such an important post in the Chaplains’ Department: during his review in July, 1915, Gwynne consulted all the senior chaplains he could and found that some of the regulars were disappointed that after twenty or thirty years’ service, no Regular Chaplain had been selected. [69]

The chaplains were not always an easy team to handle. The enormous variety of characters, from Theodore Hardy to Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, presented Gwynne with many worries. Studdert Kennedy often gave offence by his language and his habit of preaching sermons whilst sitting astride the pulpit in a convivial manner which some officers found too informal, if not irreverent. Gwynne proved willing to tolerate such idiosyncrasies, on the grounds that Studdert Kennedy could reach the ordinary men in a way few other clergymen could:

...he understood the men and they loved and understood
him. Many of his critics regarded him as impossible and said that he swore like a trooper. Certainly some of his sermons would not have been appropriate in a cathedral setting, but he gripped his audience as no one whom I have ever known before or since could have done. His methods may have been unconventional and his manner of address unusual, but he had a flaming spirit and love of God which brought many to mend their ways and draw near to Christ.[70]

The D.C.G.'s decision to allow 53 year old Hardy his chance at the front was surely vindicated by the reputation he earned amongst the men he served there.[71] The fact that Gwynne was prepared to tolerate the more unorthodox chaplains, because he saw at first hand the quality of the work they were able to achieve, earned him a great deal of respect. Such chaplains seemed to appeal to the men, and it was their opinion that mattered most. The Reverend Kenneth Anderson, M.A., C.F., serving in France in 1916, commented on his fellow clergymen:

The Church has failed quantitatively—there is no room for argument there. But there is as little doubt in my mind that she is succeeding qualitatively—turning out the men that Christ can use—humble-minded, sane, devoted—too shy, maybe, and inarticulate—but solid. The Church, too, must realize that she is being challenged and questioned on the basis of her own claims to represent the will of God and express the inmost life of the people by awakening national consciousness. We must lead. There is no alternative.[72]

Bishop Gwynne was prepared to risk deploying unorthodox men as chaplains if he felt confident in their ability to provide such a lead.

It was particularly unfortunate that Gwynne's promotion should have been the cause of greater tension between some serving chaplains and their Department and between the Church of England and other denominations. The War Office needed to be particularly tactful; the post of Deputy Chaplain General had by tradition tended to be given to a representative of one of the nonconformist churches, in an effort to inspire the confidence of all denominations in the Chaplains' Department. Fortunately, in
wartime, the personal qualities of the individual often counted for more than his denomination. The insensitivity of the War Office was largely overcome by the calibre of the new Deputy Chaplain General but the manner of his promotion clearly cast a shadow over his appointment.

The inadequacy of pre-war plans for the selection, training and deployment of temporary chaplains had become painfully clear when the war broke out. The chaotic attempts to remedy the situation in the first months of the war were well-intentioned but not very successful. The fact that the Chaplains' Department had to effect a major re-organization during the war confirmed the extent of past failings and the breakdown of the War Office Department's administration. The decision to appoint Bishop Gwynne, in spite of early difficulties with some Presbyterians, was a sound one. The warmth and affection contained in the many appreciative comments about Gwynne from serving chaplains bear witness to the high regard in which he was held.
REORGANIZATION AND RIVALRY.
Efforts to reorganize the Chaplains' Department in 1915 were necessary because the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England recognized that the Department at the War Office had in effect broken down.[1] The Army Chaplains who were required to serve the needs of the wartime forces could not be properly served by a system which had struggled to cope with the administration of the peacetime complement of 117 chaplains.[2] Once the decision to appoint a Deputy Chaplain General had been taken by Lord Kitchener, Archbishop Davidson found it easier to propose a review of the organization of the Chaplains' Department with a view to making substantial changes if necessary. Recognition of the fact that the war would not be over in a matter of months prompted a thorough review of the administration of the Chaplains' Department. The needs of temporary chaplains were reassessed, and consideration was given to the existence of interdenominational tension and the inadequacy of pre-war planning by the Department.

The aim of the War Office and the various denominations was the same: to improve the provision of services for the troops by making the appointment and deployment of chaplains more efficient. Unfortunately the competition between different denominations to secure recognition of their efforts by the War Office hindered attempts to improve the efficiency of the Chaplains' Department.[3] The desire of all denominations to increase the number of chaplains regardless of the demand for their services revealed how anxious they were to prove their willingness to serve the nation in time of war.

Early attempts to improve the running of the Chaplains' Department in France had met with little success. Prior to Bishop Gwynne's appointment, the Adjutant-General called a meeting of Dr.
Simms the Principal Chaplain, and the Senior Chaplains of the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, at which he outlined his plans.[4] Simms, as Principal Chaplain, was based first at Rouen and after May, 1915, with G.H.Q. 1st Echelon at St. Omer. The senior Church of England Chaplain, E. G. F. Macpherson, and the senior Roman Catholic Chaplain, Father W. Keatinge, acted as advisers to Simms. The Adjutant-General wanted to station both men on the lines of communication, as this was reckoned to be the best place from which to visit as much of the field as possible. Both chaplains were to secure the services of an assistant to maintain an office whilst they travelled as much as they could. Simms and the Adjutant-General or his Assistant henceforward met daily to maintain close contact.[5] In an effort to give greater responsibility to the chaplains in the field, senior chaplains were appointed to the Headquarters of Army, Corps and Divisions with the titles of Assistant Chaplain General, Deputy Assistant Chaplain General and Senior Chaplain. The four major base camps at Calais, Boulogne, Le Havre and Rouen were also assigned an Assistant Chaplain General.[6] In spite of such efforts, interdenominational rivalry continued to sour relations between the most senior churchmen serving in France.

As part of the continuing process of reorganization, a conference was held at Lambeth in July, 1915, to discuss criticism of the Chaplains' Department.[7] Archbishop Davidson was relieved that the Chaplain General had agreed to attend. He was also reassured by Taylor Smith's reaction to the changes suggested at the conference: "The ice was thin, but I think we crossed the dangerous parts successfully, though I am not sure that we should do so if our numbers were multiplied." [8] The result of this conference was the decision to set up the Advisory Committee on
Church of England Chaplains.

The conference revealed the nature of the problems that had arisen since the outbreak of war; the relationship between the Chaplains' Department and the Bishops had not been good. Archbishop Lang felt that many bishops had been under a "great deal of pressure" to approach the War Office with demands for more Church of England chaplains. He was particularly anxious to secure a ratio of chaplains to men on the same level as that enjoyed by the Roman Catholic and Presbyterian Churches, since he felt very strongly that the national Church should not be the subject of discrimination.[9] Lang felt that the proportion of chaplains should reflect the fact that seventy-five percent of soldiers were nominally Church of England.[10]

An Advisory Committee was appointed by the Army Council in August, 1915, in order to provide the War Office with information and advice. It was welcomed by the Archbishop of Canterbury as: "a wholesome channel of communication between the War Office and the Church outside". [11] Chaired by Lord Salisbury, the Committee brought about a significant improvement in the running of the Chaplains' Department.[12] Unfortunately it also increased tension between the different denominations ministering to the armies overseas. The establishment of an advisory committee to deal exclusively with Church of England chaplains confirmed that the Church of England was singled out for a privileged position in its relations with the War Office. Alone among the denominations who supplied chaplains to the forces, the Church of England enjoyed the privilege of its own Chaplain General and Deputy. The Church of England and the War Office were clearly sensitive to charges of favouritism: the formation of the committee was not announced until two months after the event, when
two of its members were about to visit the Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F. in France.[13] In a private note to Lord Salisbury, Sir Reginald Brade, the War Office representative on the committee, commented on the announcement he had prepared: "I have not included anything to show what or what sort of recommendations we have made. I think that might lead to unnecessary controversy."[14]

Prior to the first committee meeting on August 13, 1915, Lord Salisbury wrote to Brade volunteering to visit France, if necessary, to research the nature of the chaplain’s work.[15] As a result Salisbury and Lord Grenfell visited Bishop Gwynne in September, 1915. Gwynne had recently returned to G.H.Q. St. Omer from a series of visits to confirm men, and he had come to the conclusion that: "our churchmen were worse served than any other Communion". [16] He remarked on the presence of Roman Catholic chaplains "in almost overwhelming numbers" and he felt that much more needed to be done by the Church of England to ensure:

... that the deep spiritual experiences through which our men are passing should be permanently fixed on their lives through the ministrations of an adequate number of good and holy chaplains of our Church.[17]

Many Church of England chaplains acknowledged that the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed several advantages when it came to ministering to the needs of the soldiers. Recognised forms of prayers for the dead, the familiar sacrament of the "Last Rites" and the predominant role of Holy Communion in their services contrasted with the inadequate provision made by the Church of England for wartime.[18]

Relations between the Advisory Committee and Gwynne suffered a serious setback as a result of a misunderstanding which occurred about the methods employed by the Committee to obtain information from serving chaplains.[19] The Bishop of Birmingham
had just returned from the front. Visiting the trenches and the main bases, as well as attending a number of chaplains' gatherings, he was impressed by the quality of ministry he had witnessed. [20] But he was concerned that the Committee had seriously undermined the authority of Bishop Gwynne by taking statements from chaplains on home leave. In the reply, dated 26 August, 1915, the Bishop of Winchester refuted the charge, complaining that the committee had seen only one chaplain, who happened to be home on leave, and explaining that the Chaplain General had been present at the interview in any case. Both the Bishops expressed support for Gwynne as "emphatically the right man in the right place". [21] Speculation among some committee members suggested that the complaint might have originated from Bishop Gwynne himself, since the Committee might seem to be interfering with Gwynne's own attempts to improve the work of the Department in France, but there is no evidence to support this speculation. In order to prevent any further friction, Sir Reginald Brade wrote to Gwynne, with Salisbury's approval, requesting a personal report from Gwynne to the Committee. [22]

In addition to the demands of the Western Front, the Chaplains' Department also had to minister to troops in Egypt, India and on the Gallipoli peninsula. Although a flood of volunteers had reached the War Office, strenuous efforts were needed to equip and mobilize chaplains in sufficient numbers. Brade was anxious to discover from Gwynne if the supply of chaplains was adequate. He also enquired about the idea of a pool of chaplains in reserve, to facilitate rapid deployment. The relationship between Gwynne and the Committee suffered another setback when Gwynne travelled to London to report personally to
Brade; his unexpected arrival had thrown Sir Reginald into confusion, as he reported in a letter to the Adjutant-General, Macready: "his coming was rather an embarrassment. I dictated the letter to him hurriedly and with insufficient care".[23] The rather strained relations between Bishop Gwynne and the Advisory Committee were particularly unfortunate since the Committee members and the Bishop shared a conviction that much could be done to improve the quality of the ministry to the troops serving in France.

In spite of this rather uncertain start, the Committee did produce two valuable reports about the functioning of the Department in France; in an interim report on the home administration of the Chaplains' Department, the Committee found much to criticise:

The control of the spiritual ministrations to this nation in arms (preponderantly Church of England in religious complexion) cannot be exercised satisfactorily unless much of it is decentralised. This indeed is the principle underlying all military administration, and there is no reason, in the Committee's opinion, why it should not be followed also in regard to matters under their consideration, and every reason why it should.[24]

The committee felt that the Chaplain General's Department was "unduly centralized"; they hoped that new Assistant Chaplain Generals would be able to take over more of the work of selection, recruiting and deployment of chaplains. They recommended that these staff officers should be "chosen with a special view to their capacity for working in close co-operation with the Diocesan and parochial authorities in the commands". The first detailed report produced by the Advisory Committee, in August, 1915, recommended the appointment of an Assistant Chaplain General to each Military Command and Training Centre: "who should have, as far as possible, the selection, distribution and direction of the
chaplains serving within his area".[25] This was deemed necessary because of the confusion caused by the lack of any central control over such appointments. This had resulted in a particularly uneven distribution of chaplains.

In the hope that men of the best calibre would come forward to serve as chaplains, Church authorities were to be asked for help in order to release such men in adequate numbers.[26] The number of willing volunteers had not fallen off, but many were unfit through age or health, and some simply could not be spared from their parishes. The report of the Advisory Committee suggested that Bishops at home might nominate their best men for service, since it was felt that:

Only the best men and the best qualified for this particular work ought to be taken. This has not been the case. Territorial Chaplains are of too great an age - others are curates, who have only been in orders a year or two. Men of experience are needed - it is impossible, at the front, to learn the job - they should, if possible, be men of education and breeding.[27]

Members of the Committee clearly sought chaplains with a spiritual and a social authority over the men. The Committee members were, perhaps, mindful of the Chaplain's role as an Army Officer and the contribution he would be expected to make towards maintaining morale and discipline amongst the men he sought to serve. Perhaps they anticipated a more fatherly role for chaplains steering their charges away from the temptations of gambling and drink and helping to maintain standards.

Some insight into the nature of the qualities deemed desirable in a chaplain is gained by a reference to the work of three chaplains during the Battle of Messines, recorded in one Divisional Diary. The chaplains:

...remained with their troops...throughout battle, moving freely amongst their men in the front line, wherever they felt their presence was giving assistance.
The C.O.'s spoke in the highest terms of their courage, calmness and helpfulness. On many occasions during this long and strenuous day, their presence gave encouragement to both officers and men.[28]

The Generals in the field recognized the potential value of chaplains in maintaining the morale of the fighting men, according to Smyth and Mowbray's history of the Chaplains' Department:

The Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders were of the opinion that chaplains of the right sort were invaluable in inspiring the fighting men but if they were not of the right sort they were worse than useless.[29]

The Reverend Mervyn Evers was one of the chaplains referred to in the Diary entry concerning the Battle of Messines; he was clearly one of the "right sort" of men serving as a temporary chaplain. His approach to discipline must surely have earned the approval of his Commanding Officer; in April, 1917, Evers was clearly in the thick of things when: "one of our men started to move back without orders, so I borrowed a rifle and told him to stay put or I should shoot [over his head by way of warning] i.e. to avoid panic".[30]

Members of the Advisory Committee perhaps did not envisage such direct action on the part of chaplains, but such action was the logical consequence of their preferences.

Lord Salisbury had been anxious to make enquiries about the quality of chaplains serving in France since the establishment of the Committee. During his visit he had:

...found no trace of thoroughly bad men as Chaplains, but undoubtedly there have been instances of men who in respect of zeal or temperament are unfitted for the severe duties which in this war they are called upon to perform. A high standard of devotion, energy, courage, and spiritual sympathy is absolutely essential, and to this must be added physical strength sufficient to bear the fatigues of a campaign.[31]

The calibre of the volunteers held in reserve by the Chaplain General continued to cause concern. Salisbury and Davidson were not convinced that the Chaplain General had built up an adequate
list of suitable candidates. They believed that the list would soon dwindle when the quality of the men was examined more carefully.[32] The list was to be sorted by Diocese to enable the Bishops to carry out their own investigation as soon as possible, according to Davidson. This was no easy task, as any effort to improve the quality of chaplains was hampered by the inadequacy of existing diocesan records.

The task of selecting the very best chaplains seemed to be impossible. It was Gwynne's job to ensure that the "right sort" were available when and where they were needed, but he had to rely on the Chaplain General to maintain the supply of men for him to deploy as chaplains. Gwynne's needs were clearly not being met in October, 1915, and his patience was almost exhausted.[33] He expressed the belief that clergy should be conscripted for service as chaplains, with the Bishops providing lists of the most suitable candidates in each diocese. Archbishop Davidson disliked the idea of conscription and instead worked with the assistance of the Archbishop of York to improve communications between the Diocesan Bishops and the Chaplains' Department. Bishops were again requested to supply lists of likely candidates who would be prepared to serve as chaplains if they were needed.[34] Thanks to Davidson's efforts, vacancies were filled more quickly as Lambeth Palace produced a master list of names of those available, should the Chaplain General require them.[35]

Suggestions to reduce the duration of service for chaplains to six months had been discussed by the Advisory Committee as a means of increasing the number of clergymen able and willing to serve as temporary chaplains.[36] The idea was dropped on the advice of the Chaplain General who suggested that the minimum length of service for home chaplains should be one
year and for foreign service a year from embarkation. His conclusions were the result of comments from Bishop Gwynne, who had recently informed the Chaplain General that he believed that men were no use for less than a year. Bishop Taylor Smith was inclined to agree that: "a man takes some time to learn his work".[37]

Bishop Gwynne continued to enjoy the confidence of the Archbishop of Canterbury, who visited the Somme area in May, 1916. In his Diary, the Archbishop expressed his gratitude for the work undertaken by the Deputy Chaplain General:

To Bishop Gwynne I owe more than I can easily express. Unfailing in kindness, inspiring in work and good spirits, and above all, continuing constant in prayer, he has impressed me more and more each day.... I trust I may find it possible to do my work a little less inadequately in consequence.[38]

Davidson met many Generals on his visit and anxiously questioned them all about their experience of chaplains. He was pleased by the responses he gained and acknowledged the courage and perseverance of the Chaplains in France.[39]

The Advisory Committee continued to collect information about the day-to-day running of the Chaplains' Department in France. There were seven Senior Chaplains - one with each army (3) and one at each main base (4). Troops at the front came under thirty-five Senior Divisional Chaplains, who dealt directly with the Deputy Chaplain General, but so did the Senior Chaplains with the three armies, who had nothing to do with the men at the front. Not unreasonably, the Committee concluded that:

It does not seem possible for the Deputy Chaplain-General to exercise personal supervision over the Divisional Chaplains through as many as 35 Divisional Senior Chaplains, carrying on their work under specially arduous circumstances, even if he had not at the same time to superintend the Senior Chaplains of the armies and the Senior Chaplains at the Bases.[40]
In order to simplify matters, the Committee recommended that the Senior Chaplain of each army should supervise the Divisional Chaplains as well as those with the troops in the rear. They were particularly critical of the lack of authority given to both Senior and Senior Divisional Chaplains who were generally regarded as channels of communication with the Deputy Chaplain General, with no authority of their own.

The committee recommended that in future the Senior Chaplain with each army should have "a substantial measure of authority" where the deployment of chaplains was concerned. In accordance with this newly acquired authority, the Committee recommended corresponding changes in rank. Those chaplains serving with the Armies and those stationed at the large bases should become First Class Chaplains. The Assistant of the Deputy Chaplain General should be made a temporary Second Class Chaplain and the principal assistant to each senior chaplain of an army should be a temporary third class chaplain. The status of chaplains gave rise to concern and Lord Salisbury and his colleagues were particularly critical of army organization which allowed every junior Staff Officer to have a car, whilst chaplains suffered enormous transport problems— even when called to minister to wounded and dying men. They recommended that, in future, senior chaplains at Bases and in charge of Armies should have a car at their disposal. The report of the Advisory Committee met with general approval at the War Office.

The establishment of a second advisory committee in 1916 provides evidence that the War Office was becoming more sensitive to the problem of interdenominational rivalry. In a letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, dated July 18, 1916, the Secretary of State for War, David Lloyd George, stated his intention to avoid...
inequalities of treatment between denominations by the War Office:
"I am anxious to bring these different authorities into closer

touch."[43] He proposed the establishment of "an
interdenominational committee" to meet at regular intervals at the

War Office.[44] J. Campbell believed that Lloyd George's

upbringing as a: "Chapel-going Welshman, brought up on the tide

of the late nineteenth century Welsh renaissance to hate the

English-speaking landowners and the English Church in Wales as the

embodiments of an alien occupation" would have made him

particularly receptive to criticism of the Church of England.[45]

The Interdenominational Advisory Committee on the Army

Chaplaincy Service was designed to foster an atmosphere of

co-operation between the different religious groups ministering to

the forces. The Committee met quarterly. It included chaplains

from English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh Churches of various
denominations, as well as Roman Catholic and Church of England

bishops, and it became a permanent feature of the War Office

Chaplain General's Department. The Committee held monthly

meetings at the War Office. [46]

The formation of the committee was welcomed by Cardinal

Bourne who nominated the Reverend Monsignor Manuel Bidwell, R.C.,
as the Catholic representative.[47] But the prospects for the

Committee received a blow in the form of the reply from the United
Army and Navy Board. The Reverend J. H. Shakespeare wrote that:

The inequalities of treatment have become so serious in
the case of non-Anglican churches that there would be no
hope of the Interdenominational Committee working

harmoniously for the welfare of the troops unless these

were put right to begin with.[48]

The preferential treatment enjoyed by the Church of England

was the cause of a great deal of resentment but the Archbishop of

Canterbury was anxious to maintain the privileged position
obtained by his Church. Before he was prepared to nominate a
Church of England representative to serve on the committee
Archbishop Davidson anxiously requested clarification that the
War Office was not planning to abolish the existing Advisory
Committee, which dealt with matters affecting Church of England
chaplains alone. Davidson felt that its work concerning the
internal administration of the Church of England's chaplains
"would be in every way unsuited for an Interdenominational
Committee". Only when Lloyd George had replied that Lord
Salisbury's Committee would remain did Davidson then nominate
Bishop Taylor Smith to serve on the Interdenominational Committee.

The Secretary of the leaders of the Wesleyan Methodist
Church, Reverend J. H. Bateson, indicated the nature of the
problems faced by other religious denominations, who did not enjoy
the privilege of their own Chaplain General in the War Office.
They asked for information concerning troop movements and the
opening of hospitals, which were already given to the Chaplain
General as a matter of course, to be made available to other
denominations by the War Office "precisely as the C.G. of the
Church of England is recognized". Clearly some sensitive
issues had been raised.

The privileged position of the Established Church was
resented where it was felt that a genuine injustice had been
committed, and the Interdenominational Committee was not the only
committee to suffer from the inevitable tension. In July, Lord
Balfour had resigned from the Chair of the Advisory Committee on
Presbyterian Chaplains, primarily because he felt that:
"Differential treatment as regards the chaplaincy service with the
English and Scottish Divisions respectively has been introduced."
[51] Lord Balfour felt that his letters to the War Office had
not brought a satisfactory response to this "National Injustice" and he continued: "It is beyond question that Divisions of the Expeditionary Force which are distinctly English have been accorded better treatment than those which are distinctively Scottish."[52] His opinion contrasts with the findings of Bishop Gwynne during his review of 1915.[53] Perhaps it was inevitable that every denomination regarded its own interests as of vital importance and saw prejudice where none was intended. Balfour continued to work for the committee until a new appointment could be made, but a meeting with Lloyd George on August 4, 1916, seems to have calmed his fears. It was agreed that two Scots representatives should be appointed to the Interdenominational Committee, one Church of Scotland and one Free Church.[54]

After the first meeting of the Interdenominational Committee, no further minutes were kept, but some insight into the task before the Committee members can be gained from the Church of Scotland General Assembly's Committee on Army and Navy Chaplains. The Scots stressed the need for Interdenominational Committee members:

...to share in all the information and advantages which the Chaplain General enjoys in providing for the spiritual wants of the Army, in order to meet the desire felt by the Non-Anglican Churches for official representation in the War Office.[55]

The War Office must have felt that however many denominations were invited to send representatives to the Advisory Committees, they would never satisfy the demands of all religious interests. The Jewish War Services Committee protested that no Jewish member had been invited to attend the Committee meetings, and nominated the Reverend Dr. Joseph Hertz, Chief Rabbi, as their representative, but their request was refused on the grounds that the numbers were too small to justify it.[56] On a purely practical basis, the
system of a Chaplain General representing the Established Church and reporting to leaders of all other religious denominations appears to have been a sensible one. In practice, the singling out of the Church of England in this way produced resentment and misunderstandings that a more sensitive Chaplain General might have been able to avoid. The comments of the Scottish delegates at the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and the repeated request by the Roman Catholic Church for their own Chaplain General indicate their dissatisfaction with the means of communication between the War Office and the non-Church of England religious bodies, which reflected badly on Bishop Taylor Smith.

Chaplains needed to feel confident of the support of their Department if they were to function effectively. Relations between the chaplains serving in France and those running the Department did improve steadily after the initial unease following the appointment of Bishop Gwynne. The setting up of the Advisory Committee and the Interdenominational Committee helped to provide the Chaplains' Department with much-needed information and support. The changes introduced in 1915 and 1916 meant that the Department was more efficiently organized, with much greater powers being delegated to senior chaplains in the field. Relations between denominations were sometimes strained, and the precedence given to the Church of England did give rise to some resentment at home, but in the field most chaplains worked in a spirit of co-operation with men from other faiths.
DEPLOYMENT OF CHAPLAINS.
Attempts to assess the number of chaplains required to minister to the troops continued throughout the war. Conflicting evidence reached Church leaders about the situation in France; rumours persisted of men who had gone for months without a religious service, while others complained that there were far too many chaplains, with too little to occupy their time. Church leaders were anxious to emphasize the contribution made by their chaplains to the national effort. They were too anxious to press the War Office to allow them to deploy more clergymen in the absence of any clearly identifiable need.[1] The evidence of serving chaplains suggested that improved transport facilities would have been more effective. The location of chaplains assigned to front line troops caused a great deal of discussion amongst Churchmen in the early months of the war. An order prohibiting Church of England chaplains from going into the line with their units caused concern at a time when clergymen of other denominations seemed to face no such restriction. Church of England leaders tended to assume that because 75% of the men were nominally Church of England, they should be permitted to deploy a proportionate number of chaplains. Senior Roman Catholic chaplains argued that their men would expect a higher level of sacramental ministry than men of other denominations and therefore they should be allowed to appoint a proportionately larger number of clergymen to allow for this. No final ratio of chaplains to men had been agreed before the war, and War Office officials struggled to appear even-handed.

The pressure on the War Office to increase the number of chaplains came not from the ordinary soldiers but from Church leaders at home and from Army Commanders who believed that chaplains had an important role to play in maintaining morale and
discipline amongst the troops.[2] Church leaders shared the view that the war presented a unique opportunity for the Churches to minister to men in a particularly receptive frame of mind. Anxious not to miss their chance, they continually pressed for further increases in the number of chaplains. Senior officers including Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig recognized the contribution chaplains could make. French encouraged members of the Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee to visit his headquarters in 1915 to see for themselves the work being undertaken by chaplains.[3] Haig, shortly after his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, summoned Bishop Gwynne to his H.Q. and told him that he attached a great deal of importance to the chaplains serving in France. Haig clearly had definite views on the role of chaplains. He told Gwynne that he felt their most valuable contribution was to help to sustain morale and to explain that the war was being waged for the freedom of mankind.[4] He urged Gwynne to send home any unsuitable clergymen since he believed that a chaplain "if he is not the right sort and cannot inspire the men at a time like this, will do more harm in a few weeks than can be put right by another man after many months".[5] The need to maintain discipline and morale led many officers to take a more positive approach to the presence of a chaplain. Many of them tended to share the view of Dick Sheppard that "men who live constantly in the shadow of sudden death are more apt to turn to the Devil than to God".[6] They seemed to feel that the presence of a clergyman might discourage drunkenness and raise morale. The value of a chaplain's presence could not easily be measured. Alan Hanbury Sparrow, Father John Groser's C.O., believed that morale would not have held out without the presence of the padres serving with the troops.[7]
Officers praised the work of the chaplains to Archbishop Davidson when he spent eight days touring the various formations in France and Belgium just prior to the Somme offensive. The visit, Davidson's first, had been arranged at the urgent request of the Deputy Chaplain General, with the approval of the Commander-in-Chief. Davidson commented on the generals' "keen appreciation" of the chaplains' character and courage, and in particular their perseverance. At a meeting with Haig during his visit, Davidson pressed him for criticism about the work of the chaplains, "but I could not elicit anything except laudation". Others were not convinced of the value of the "abundant shower of curates" which fell on the Western front after the first battle of the Marne. One critic observed that: "Sunday seldom came across the Channel during the war. A man in the ranks might be six months in France and not find a religious service of any kind coming his way, whether he dreaded or sought it."

Christopher Stone, a distinguished signalling officer with the 22nd Royal Fusiliers, was critical of the prayers for peace introduced by the Church of England in 1915. He argued that the only prayers worth saying were:

Thy will be done: and forgive us our trespasses etc. I have argued with the Chaplain out here about Christianity and the War, and have maintained that the war is not Christianity's chance at all, as some thought it would be. It is opposed to war and no juggling with the texts will make it approve of war. If it means anything, it means peace on earth, good will towards men; it means war on evil things, on the Devil; but it doesn't mean stick that man with a bayonet because he's wearing a German uniform.

Stone disagreed with the majority of churchmen in his assertion that the war did not present a great opportunity for the Church of England to revive its fortunes. He had been a regular churchgoer before the war and he seems to have taken every opportunity to
attend services and take Communion during his time in France. He clearly appreciated the work of the chaplains who struggled to provide such services but he acknowledged that even officers who were regular churchgoers seldom discussed religion during the war.

The Chaplains' Department struggled to keep up with the demand for chaplains perceived by Church leaders to be necessary. Some 3,030 Church of England chaplains were appointed during the war but the Chaplain General's office in London and Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee had not arrived at an agreed ratio of chaplains to men by the end of the war. [12] Prior to the appointment of Bishop Gwynne, in 1915, the Adjutant-General, Macready, had expressed the view that the number of chaplains needed to be increased so that each major formation could have at least one centrally located chaplain. Chaplains closer to the front were attached to Field Ambulances. Those who had found their own position were often left undisturbed if it was felt that they were performing well. Army and Corps Headquarters, and even Divisional Headquarters, had no chaplain. [13]

In September, 1915, Sir Reginald Brade, a member of the Advisory Committee on Chaplains, expressed concern about the ratio of chaplains to men. He had been told that 1:2,000 was too many and in fact a ratio of 1:4,000 for Divisional troops was about right, but he did not believe that this information was reliable and he continued to seek information and opinions to present to Lord Salisbury's Committee. [14] From G.H.Q. Macready expressed his view that:

...the general opinion out here among Generals commanding is, I think, that there are too many clergy already, and that probably if greater facilities for locomotion, in the way of motors, were given, it would be possible to reduce the number and the work be better
Members of the Advisory Committee were confused by the absence of any clearly defined method of deploying chaplains. Braude received a letter from Lord Grenfell, in September, 1915, describing a recent meeting with Bishop Furse, the Bishop of Pretoria, who had spent a month at the front confirming over two hundred soldiers. He noted the Bishop’s opinion that there were not enough chaplains in the field: “He had constant complaints of the want of services being held, and he thinks it quite impossible for one man to do personal work for more than 1,000 men.” [16] Furse felt that at the very minimum there should be one chaplain for every thousand men, or each battalion. He believed that the more urgent priority of the troops abroad, and particularly those in hospital, had not yet been fully recognized by the authorities at home:

When at the Front, Officers of all ranks, from Generals downwards, spoke to him [Furse] of the inadequacy of the supply of chaplains. He considers this an unique occasion, where men who are risking their lives daily are much more susceptible to religious influence. He found a strong desire for confirmation existing...[17]

In answer to a question from the Archbishop about the ratio of chaplains to men, in 1915, the Chaplain General informed Lambeth that there were at least thirteen chaplains of various denominations for a Division of eighteen thousand men in the field. A further three chaplains were assigned to each General Stationary hospital and Casualty Clearing Station. The chaplain General estimated that there were at least two chaplains to every two thousand two hundred and fifty Church of England men in an Infantry Brigade, but Bishop Furse felt that even this was inadequate, following his visit to front line troops.[18]

Lord Salisbury and Field-Marshall Lord Grenfell visited
the B.E.F., as representatives of the Advisory Committee, at the invitation of Sir John French, in September, 1915. They remarked on "the impression of most admirable vigour amongst chaplains at the Front - good men with a first-rate spirit". In general, they were encouraged by their findings, although they recognised that the standard of seven Church of England chaplains per division set in March 1915 was still insufficient to cater for the needs of the Armies in France.[19] Salisbury and Grenfell informed the Advisory Committee that most officers questioned during their visit would welcome an increase in the number of chaplains in the field with the usual proviso that they were men of the "right sort". The Deputy Chaplain-General, Bishop Gwynne, had reported to the Committee that one Church of England chaplain for every English Battalion or Cavalry regiment would be adequate, and the report also noted that Sir John French was in favour of such an increase. Sir William Robertson was also anxious about the inadequate number of services provided for the troops and was reported as thinking that "the present Chaplains are overworked, and he knows that there are scattered formations who never get any religious services at all".[20]

A more optimistic view of the situation was taken by Gwynne. He felt able to reassure the Archbishops that the situation, with regard to the number of chaplains permitted by the War Office, had begun to improve and seemed likely to continue so to do, since the authorities "are much more willing to increase the present meagre establishment".[21] The situation was further eased as new divisions began to arrive with their own chaplains: By the end of 1915, seven Territorial Divisions and thirteen Divisions of Kitchener's New Army had reached the Western Front, and the Guards Division had been re-organized.[27]
The experiences of individual chaplains reflect the confused situation identified by members of the Advisory Committee. Many chaplains felt frustrated by the chaotic system which often failed to deploy them where they were most needed.

Ted Talbot spent his first five months in France "connected with more or less empty hospitals", yet during this time many units passed through Hazebrouck without a chaplain. Ted's requests to be allowed to join one of these units were turned down by the two senior Church of England chaplains in France: Drury and Macpherson. His mother appealed to Archbishop Davidson to intervene; she referred to the experiences of a family friend serving as a combatant: Charlie Chavasse had expressed the view that: "There is one thing wanted in this war, and that is parsons. I have not seen a chaplain since Christmas Day. It is scandalous, as we all look for it so much".[23] Although Davidson declined to intervene in individual cases, he did express concern about the number and deployment of chaplains to the Chaplain General.[24]

Some of the most able chaplains were reluctant to accept promotion because they did not want to distance themselves from the troops. Senior chaplains urged them to reconsider in order to improve the efficiency of the service. Harry Blackburne and Tom Pym were both persuaded to accept moves against their wishes. Blackburne left his post at a Casualty Clearing Station in 1915. The move was demanded by General Butler at Brigade H.Q. The Reverend E. G. F. Macpherson, the Senior Church of England chaplain at Boulogne, visited Bethune to explain the move to Blackburne:

Apparently each Corps is to have a chaplain, C of E, as well as a chaplain for each Brigade. This will make seven chaplains for an Army Corps of two Divisions. I urged strongly the necessity for four chaplains for each Division, but apparently it can't be done.[25]
Blackburne was reluctant to accept further promotions, since he wished to remain with the Brigade, serving the men he knew. He turned down at least one offer before being ordered to take over as Senior Chaplain with the 1st Army under Sir Charles Monro. His remit included the instruction: "to visit all Corps, Divisions, and Brigades in the First Army, and to consult with the G.O.C.s concerning the work of all C of E Chaplains in the First Army".[26] Blackburne's first meeting for Senior Chaplains of Divisions proved useful. The padres seemed to be encouraged by the improvements made to the Chaplains' Department and by Blackburne's attempts to improve their distribution by assigning each Casualty Clearing Station-based chaplain to several other nearby units as well. Pym was also anxious to improve the efficiency of the chaplains' work in France and he accepted that higher office would facilitate his campaign. He was one of the comparatively few temporary chaplains to achieve high administrative rank during the war. In 1918 he was sent to a Base and became D.A.C.G. of Calais at 13th Corps H.Q., as a Lieutenant-Colonel. Pym was promoted to A.C.G. 3rd Army, in charge of almost 150 chaplains. He was anxious about the increased responsibilities he faced, but thankful to be away from the base: "Thank God I'm going to get near the fellows who are fighting and dying, and be given another chance of justifying my existence as a man."[27]

The Reverend Monty Bere was puzzled by the Department's allocation of chaplains. In April, 1916, he commented that: "The R.C. chaplain and I are to undertake the gardening between us. A Presbyterian padre is to come, rather absurd as all the men are C. of E. Perhaps he will garden, too."[28] Such cases must have helped to encourage criticism of the clergy just as much as the
shortage of chaplains in other areas: constant gaps in the ranks of chaplains gave a poor impression of the efforts of the home churches and the Chaplains' Department to organize themselves effectively. Canon T. Guy Rogers reported in January, 1916, that he had taken Holy Communion to an Artillery Battery that he had come across by chance. He was sad to note that "some of them had not had a chance of communicating for 6 months".[29] Further evidence that some areas were still experiencing a shortage of chaplains came from Sir Charles Monro, who commanded the 1st Army at the time of Blackburne's appointment. He was sufficiently impressed by the work of the chaplains in the winter of 1916 to sign a letter requesting an increase in their numbers.[30] Concern about the deployment of chaplains was not confined to units in France. The situation at many camps and hospitals in England revealed some alarming deficiencies in the provision of clergy. The Reverend Thomas B. Strong told Davidson of many units in England: "who are entirely without a chaplain or any arrangements of any kind for spiritual work".[31] Strong was particularly concerned about the New Army where a majority claimed to be Church of England. He identified "a disposition in the higher quarters of the Army to regard the Chaplain-General's department as something less than a necessity, very much as the half-informed laymen throughout the country regard religion in general".[32] A number of disturbing reports reached the Archbishop at Lambeth: The Bishop of Gloucester complained of poor organization. With many troops in the town, he had only recently discovered that a Red Cross Hospital had not had any ministerial visits. Davidson acknowledged that the problems at home were: "quite as serious as the difficulties at the front".[33] One camp at Sandling, in Kent, lacked any residential
chaplain and Davidson was: "rather appalled to find that the vast number of naval men or temporarily naval men who are now concentrated at Dover are almost entirely without suitable religious ministration".[34] The local clergy were reported to be doing their best, but the situation was hardly satisfactory. In an interim report, in September, 1915, Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee expressed concern about the large number of hospitals and convalescent homes which had sprung up, and commented that: "there is reason to fear that in some of them the religious provision is extremely slender".[35] The Committee again stressed the value of delegating control of chaplains within an area to a Senior Chaplain, in order to improve the provision of chaplaincy services as well as making liaisons with local parish clergy easier to maintain.

The Advisory Committee, in its second report, published in October, 1915, recommended a figure of nine chaplains per division as the minimum number required, but the members felt that a goal of twelve in the future would be more appropriate.[36] The Committee expressed the view that chaplains should be deployed on the basis of one Church of England chaplain to every hospital, one to every two Base Hospitals and one to every 3000 men, other than those included in the first two categories. If all the Committee's suggestions were adopted in France alone, a further seventy-four Church of England chaplains would have been needed for divisions, with another eighteen for H.Q. and thirty-seven for the lines of communication. These recommendations were approved by the War Office in October, 1915.

In spite of the combined efforts of the Advisory Committee and the War Office, the deployment of chaplains continued to cause concern for the rest of the war. Contrary to
the assurances of the Chaplain General that matters had improved, in July, 1917, Bere recorded that: "There appears to be a great scarcity of chaplains here....the chaplain responsible for the organization of some of my present jobs has not been near me. I don't know even who he is!"[37] Bere expressed concern about the number of men entrusted to his care. He was solely responsible for ministering to two Casualty Clearing Stations, a labour battalion and an aerodrome. In addition, a Church Army tent had to be manned when he could spare the time. Blackburne was still worried by the same problem: "I keep finding units which are outside Divisions, and have never had the chance of a service" he wrote in 1918.[38] The rapid expansion of the Armed Forces created, as far as clergymen were concerned, a greater need for chaplains. Answering this perceived need represented a daunting task for the slowly developing Chaplains' Department; both at home and overseas, new military camps and garrisons were appearing with great rapidity. The large population of soldiers was constantly moving and this presented problems for those seeking to provide chaplaincy services. The problem of units without a padre of their own was never fully resolved; there was so much movement that even the best laid plans proved to be unworkable.

It is difficult to determine whether or not there was a genuine demand for chaplains from the men serving in France. Many clergymen at home believed that the demand was strong but a number of serving chaplains, including Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy, recognised that they had to work hard to create a demand for their services: "The alternative is to shelter behind such protection as rank and privilege afford, an alternative more easily acceptable in proportion as the man concerned is not of a thoughtful or a sensitive kind."[39] Some soldiers were puzzled by the presence
of chaplains. Frank Richards, a private soldier, described the clergy on both sides as "a funny crowd: they prayed for victory and thundered from their pulpits for the enemy to be smitten hip and thigh, but did not believe in doing any of the smiting themselves".\[40\] The Reverend A. Herbert Gray spent eighteen months with the New Army. He considered that the majority of the men were indifferent to the Church, if not openly contemptuous of it. Gray was convinced that the ordinary soldier:

...has little respect or admiration for the Church, does not belong to it and on the whole does not want to, he neither fears nor loves it... It has for him no voice of authority... It makes no impressive appeal.\[41\]

Bere felt that the chaplains had not made much impression on the men. He concentrated his spiritual efforts on the men who were already committed Christians, whilst acknowledging that the majority of his work was not of a religious nature.\[42\] Chaplains had to face the indifference of the majority of the men. They came to recognise that the opportunity offered to clergymen in the Sunday School situation before the war had been lost. F. R. Barry believed that the "sadly anaemic" sermons of the clergy had a great deal to answer for.\[43\] Barry shared Gray's feeling that he had to face daily the sense of humiliation that resulted from the knowledge that the Church meant nothing to so many of the troops.\[44\] Churchmen at home had yet to come to terms with this knowledge. According to Macready they continued to press for chaplains in "numbers out of proportion to the needs of the troops".\[45\]

The demand for services was small, according to Gray. In some battalions, fewer than 10% attended services. On one occasion, he recalled that half a battalion had been present but he could not remember hearing of any battalion where a majority of
the men were willing to profess faith. He believed that: "they do not like religious services, and do not respond to the definitely religious part of a chaplain's work".[46] Oswin Creighton served as an Anglican chaplain in France for three and a half years. He blamed poor attendance at services on the fact that most men saw the Chaplain as a remote figure belonging to the officer class.[47] Through their conversation with men at the front, chaplains learned that few had had much time for parsons in pre-war days, regarding them as a class apart, in a soft job, well-paid for working one day each week. Gray also identified "an instinctive feeling that there is something unseemly in taking pay at all for religious services" when laymen were expected to give freely of both time and money.[48] Wartime chaplains could only hope to overcome such prejudices by their ministry.

Neville Talbot suggested one reason for the poor attendances at services: he believed that religion was too often associated with fear, and:

the notion that active service constitutes the parson's chance and puts into his hands the weapon of anxiety. This has been resented at the front, and many men have made up their minds that they will not be scared into religion.[49]

The attitude of J. B. Herbert, 2/4 Queen's Royal West Surrey's, confirms Talbot's view. In describing an intense infantry action, he revealed that: "Personally I held it my one form of true courage, that I never once called upon God for help".[50] Herbert's comment implies that to have done so would have been to betray a sign of weakness. This was a particularly damaging trait given the emphasis on "manliness" in pre-war society. Gray encountered many soldiers who felt that there was "a suspicion of effeminacy" about religious people. The Church was frequently portrayed as a refuge for the weary, but Gray believed this led to
a perception of Christ as "an effeminate and almost weak figure". Instead, he argued, Christ should be seen as "magnificent robust humanity" if religion was to appeal to the vigorous and the young. He expressed doubts about the type of godliness he and the other chaplains were preaching:

The two best chaplains I met at the front both, on separate occasions, made to me the same interesting confession. They said that while they worked among the young and strong men of their acquaintance, of the 'varsity and army type, they had again and again been haunted by the feeling that if these men did someday give in and conform to what the Church was asking of them, they would be in some ways spoilt. [51]

Even Gray, an ordained minister, sensed that religion would cause such men to lose the vigour and independence of spirit which had singled them out for praise. He concluded that "the church does not yet understand what a young male Christian ought to be, nor how to find full scope for him within her borders". [52]

Gray's comments were unusually frank. They provide an insight into the attitudes of the ordinary soldier that few chaplains attempted. Evidence from the soldier's point of view is difficult to come by, since few of them recorded their opinions of chaplains. Those who did so tended to be officers, churchgoers in civilian life, sons of clergy, or potential candidates for ordination when the war ended. [53] Amongst the majority it seems that there was a strong sense that religion had no place in war and must be set aside for the duration. Fr. Keble Talbot became more and more aware of "an instinctive sense of incongruity in the minds of people out here between the occupation of fighting and their Christian profession". He came across officers who declined to receive communion in France, but would do so happily at home and concluded: "I think a good number of people are holding their religious convictions and habits in suspense during the war." [54]
This view was shared by Mr. Jackson Page when he joined up in 1914. He put aside part of his religion as impossible for a soldier:

Can one ask Jesus Christ to help one fire a machine gun? No. Then, as I did in November 1915, with regret, but with resolution, one must remove J.C. from one’s conscious mind and conscience. Now, once you do this, you get on with the war, and you have finished with your religious core for a long time.\[55\]

Chaplains had to face the fact that demand for their services was low and hard work would be required if they were to make any progress in their spiritual work. There is no doubt that some chaplains, like the Reverend J. M. Stanhope Walker, chose to concentrate on practical ways of helping the men they sought to serve in the hope that by their example they would attract men to their services.\[56\] Only the most optimistic clergymen like Studdert Kennedy and Neville Talbot anticipated that significant numbers could be attracted to their services.\[57\]

The precise location of chaplains assigned to the front line forces was a controversial subject during the early months of the war. A variety of opinions was aired and it was clear that little thought had been given to the matter until it was raised by chaplains and commanding officers after the outbreak of war. Barry observed the early reaction of officers to chaplains:

When the padres first went out with the B.E.F., the army had little idea what to do with them. In battle, they were left behind at the base and were not allowed to go up to the fighting front. What on earth, it was asked, could they do up there?\[58\]

Senior Officers were at first reluctant to allow chaplains to remain in the trenches or even to visit the front line. They argued that chaplains would be in the way and if they were wounded the effect on the morale of the troops would surely suffer:

The C.O.’s maintained that there was quite enough danger for the padre at the dressing station and he would be able to see all the wounded passing through and have
Blackburne, in his capacity as Senior Chaplain with the First Army, attempted to provide some guidance for the chaplains in his area in 1915: "It is important to be as close up as possible; but I pointed out that all reasonable care should be taken, for though we aren't much use alive, we are a positive nuisance dead!"

Chaplains were anxious not to get in the way, yet they were keen to minister to the front line troops. Rogers, working in the vicinity of the Ypres Canal in 1916, found that the closer he got to the firing line, the more men demanded his time and support in a spiritual sense. Roman Catholic chaplains were particularly anxious to be close to the action, in order to administer the Last Rites to dying men. Church of England chaplains had no comparable service to perform and, in the eyes of some officers, could not justify the danger of a front line position when they could be so much more useful at a casualty clearing station or an advanced dressing post. Church of England liturgy did not even include prayers for the departed in the official form until 1917 (although Davidson made it clear as early as 1914 that such prayers were permissible).

The chaplains' presence in the trenches could be reassuring. On one occasion, Father Doyle was surprised by the impact of his arrival amongst rather quiet and demoralized troops in the trenches. Within minutes he noticed a change; the men were soon cheerfully talking again. Father Doyle realised he had, quite unintentionally, given them confidence: "I had given them courage by walking along without my gas mask or steel helmet, both of which I had forgotten in my hurry."

Some chaplains felt that they were being prevented from serving the men where and when they were most needed. Others felt that there was no role for a
chaplain in the trenches. Second Lieutenant G. H. Woolley, the son of a clergyman, who was himself ordained after the war, argued that: "There should be no intention of expecting chaplains to be in the front line; that is not their place. In emergencies chaplains may find themselves there and have to act as they think best."[64] Woolley, who served as a chaplain in World War Two, believed that chaplains could be much more useful behind the line. Often the chaplain would know the route to the nearest aid post and he could direct the walking wounded, providing comfort and reassurance on the way.

When his men were preparing for an attack, the Reverend R. Bulstrode felt that:

An aid post or Advanced Dressing Station would be a Brigade Chaplain's natural place at such a time, but an hour or so before zero I thought I would take a walk along the firing line, if only for a friendly word with men in a state of unnatural and horrible tension.[65]

Bulstrode did not feel that he could serve his men better by going up the line with his Battalion. As a Brigade Chaplain, he had more than one Battalion to minister to, and often they would not be in the line at the same time. In addition, he also had charge of "endless units, Transport lines, Gunners, R.A.S.C., Sappers, Corps and Army Troops, scattered over a wide area".[66] He felt that a dugout just behind the line provided the best base from which to visit the scattered troops by day, and at night he visited the trenches.

Several Church of England chaplains referred to an Army Order restricting their movement, but the origins of such an order are not clear. The local Commanding Officer seems to have been the most likely source, according to the experiences of Kenneth Anderson:

It is safe to say that it would be difficult for a chaplain who realizes what his presence in the line
means to the men not to go up. But sometimes there are obstacles. In many brigades chaplains are not permitted to enter the 'line' unless they are definitely sent for. Those brigadiers say that a chaplain's work lies at the aid - posts, coffee stalls for walking wounded, etc., in the immediate rear of the trenches. It should not be assumed that because a chaplain does not go into the line that it is his fault. I felt very pessimistic and 'blue' about my work at first but grew more and more optimistic as time went on.[67]

Anderson served as chaplain to the 12th Australian Brigade.

Reports reaching Church leaders at home seemed to support those chaplains who felt that their efforts were being hampered by attempts to restrict their movements. One London clergyman told Archbishop Davidson about his curate, Maclean, who had served as a combatant before being wounded and sent home: "what has saddened him is the absence of our Chaplains. None in the trenches... none in the dressing stations".[68] For the first three months of the war, Maclean had been looking out for an opportunity to take Communion, but he had not found one. Maclean also reported that the Chaplain General had refused to allow chaplains to go anywhere near the firing line: "the Church is wanted at the front, and is losing a wonderful opportunity". The Archbishop was distressed to hear of Maclean's experiences but he was inclined to blame the War Office rather than the Chaplain General for any shortage of chaplains. Davidson made no comment on the desired location for a chaplain assigned to front line units.[69]

The argument in favour of chaplains in the trenches was a powerful one. The chaplains themselves were soon made aware that their credibility depended on their physical bravery as much as on their ability to preach an interesting sermon. Kenneth Anderson argued that:

"Everyone can value courage, for all know the meaning of fear. All things may be forgiven to the chaplain who shows himself prepared to share their dangers; nothing can mitigate the failure of the man who is not.[70]"
In March, 1916, Rogers, serving with the Guards Division, chose to live in a dug-out on the canal bank near Ypres. His Brigadier tried to persuade him to base himself in the relative safety of H.Q. but he would not be moved because he believed that his presence was welcomed by the troops.[71] The Reverend Noel Mellish was commended by his Colonel when he chose to go up the line with his men rather than remain at an ambulance post. The Colonel singled out Mellish's work with the wounded, and another chaplain praised his work noting that: "the men simply love him; he doesn't mind where he goes, or what he does".[72]

Not all chaplains were so well-received; Gray spent eighteen months with the new army as a chaplain and observed that:

...most men don't like ministers or clergymen. The younger men fight shy of them, and the older men are courteous but distant. Their presence in a mess room is felt as a constraint. Their conversation is not a source of pleasure to others. Men breathe more freely when they have left.[73]

His views were echoed by Robert Graves, who believed that Anglican chaplains were particularly disliked because of their reluctance to go into the forward areas. Graves recognised that chaplains were under orders: "to avoid getting mixed up with the fighting and to stay behind with the transport". He felt that chaplains who obeyed these orders were not worthy of respect: "yet not one in 50 seemed sorry to obey them".[74] Not for the first time, Anglican chaplains seemed to be found wanting when compared with the Roman Catholic chaplains, who were permitted to move freely.

Church of England chaplains resented the criticism they received and many argued against the restrictions imposed on them. The Reverend D. Railton told his wife that he had complained to his Senior Chaplain, Blackburne:

There is only one front here and few of the chaplains ever get there, and not during engagements. It is a mistake on the part of the authorities which will cost
the Church dearly. I have told my seniors so, but law is law; in the army as well as out of it. I suppose we are of some use.[75]

When Bishop Gwynne, then serving as a 4th Class Chaplain with no special privileges, arrived in Rouen in August, 1914, he was "much taken aback when a Senior Army chaplain who had served in the South African War....told us that none of us would be allowed within forty miles of the front line".[76] Gwynne felt strongly that chaplains should face the same risks as the men they served. He announced that he had: "no intention of being marooned somewhere far from the actual fighting".[77] Neville Talbot shared this concern; he wrote to his mother in November, 1915: "I hope, please God, to find better work to do than mere parades and funerals."[78] Pressure from such men was vital if the military authorities were to be persuaded to lift the restriction on chaplains' movements.

Clergymen who had volunteered to serve the troops overseas had envisaged a much closer involvement with the fighting men. They were anxious to be seen to be shouldering some of the burdens of hardship suffered by the front line troops. Neville Talbot argued the case in a letter to his Senior Chaplain:

May I say as strongly as I can that experience has shown me, what I believed to be true before, that there is much scope and work to be done with a unit as a whole and with fighting troops. One can get to know them, see them in the trenches, help them about daily prayers, have services for them when they are in billets (I have had three running for different Companies this week), and be available for help in other ways, e.g. postal arrangements and comfort distribution.[79]

Talbot was anxious to secure a complete change in attitudes to chaplains: "It is just a sort of stupid convention that the Padre is next door to an undertaker." He was often to be found in the front line against advice. In December, 1914, he refused to obey an order that he should remain behind with a rear section of
the Brigade Field Ambulance. Tubby Clayton recalled that:

Neville broke through this obsolete confinement... he rejoined as the first chaplain in the line itself, with the 3rd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade; he had been with them in South Africa. To that deliberate indiscipline all chaplains owe their freedom to accompany troops into the fighting line. Over one hundred chaplains paid for this privilege, gladly, with their lives.[80]

Talbot himself denied that he was responsible for the lifting of restrictions on chaplains' movements. He argued that it was the result of continued pressure from many of the chaplains in France, including Gwynne and Blackburne.[81]

The second report by Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee gave chaplains much greater freedom of movement. The Committee had drawn attention to the change in attitude of military commanders to the presence of chaplains in the field:

The truth is that the point of view from which Chaplains are regarded by the combatant officers has undergone a remarkable change....from the personal standpoint, the arduous character of the war has led men to look at the spiritual side of human nature with much deeper attention than heretofore, and that from the military standpoint officers have come to the conclusion that the spiritual influence of a good Chaplain renders the troops far more efficient in the field.[82]

An Army Order, issued after Gwynne's appointment as Deputy Chaplain General in 1915, combined with a further Army Council Instruction (223) in 1916 to give all chaplains the freedom they desired:

Army Commanders issued orders that chaplains were to be allowed to go anywhere they liked with their troops. Later still it was left to Assistant Chaplains-General to give detailed instructions in this matter to suit each particular operation or situation; and of course conditions varied a great deal.[83]

The change was welcomed by Haig who told the visiting Archbishop of Canterbury in May, 1915, that:

...he was strong on the great value of the changed administrative order which now encourages the chaplains to go forward into the trenches, if they will do so, instead of being, as formerly, kept behind at the casualty clearing stations, or even further back.[84]
By the time Barry arrived in France, in 1916

...the chaplains were allowed to move freely everywhere and when the units 'went up' we went with them.....We would give Holy Communion in the dugouts, minister to the wounded and dying, share, so far as we might, in what the troops endured.[85]

Mutual respect and understanding between chaplains and officers gave a real boost to those clergymen who had been working with the troops from the early days of the war. Planning a winter campaign for 1918, called Victory and After, Blackburne attended a conference of Corps and Divisional Generals to discuss the initiative:

I nearly wept for joy when one General said that the Chaplains were more trusted than anyone, and that in many cases they were more in touch with the N.C.O.s and men than some of the Officers.[86]

The reorganization of the Chaplains' Department in 1915, and the improvements which followed, led some previously sceptical officers to accept the value of the chaplains' presence in France. One officer wrote to G.H.Q. in July, 1916, praising the chaplains for the contribution they were making:

These clergymen have now, very rightly, come to be regarded as a necessary part of the British Army on active service, and not as individuals merely attached to it for sentimental reasons. Our chaplains are doing splendid work, and I consider we should do anything in our power to make their position fully recognized and their path smooth.[87]

The new freedom of movement granted to chaplains did not put an end to the criticism of Anglican chaplains. Graves continued to believe that they were "remarkably out of touch with their troops". He cited the example of a chaplain with the Second Battalion just prior to the battle of Loos. He had preached a violent sermon on the Battle against Sin. By contrast, the R.C. Chaplain had simply given his men a blessing: "and told them that if they died fighting for the good cause, they would go straight
to Heaven or, at any rate, be excused a great many years in Purgatory". [88] Graves had also heard of a Chaplain preaching on the Commutation of Tithes just before a battle in Mesopotamia: his motives might be questionable, but the man who recounted the story noted that although the sermon had been "Quite up in the air", it had succeeded in taking the men's minds off the fighting. [89] This was certainly a good diversionary tactic to distract the men.

It is difficult to establish how many of the men really valued the opportunity to attend services or talk to a clergyman. A 1919 Report prepared by an Interdenominational Committee recognised that only about 20% of men were in touch with the Churches in England. [90] Some soldiers' accounts speak of months in France with no sign of a chaplain, let alone a service. [91] These comments tended to be made by men like Woolley, who was a regular churchgoer before the war. In November, 1914, he noted that his unit had not seen a Chaplain for over a month. He also commented that "The men felt the need of Chaplains very much." [92] Similarly, Father Northcott, serving as a private in the Artillery, missed the daily worship he had been accustomed to at Mirfield. He was saddened to note that his unit had received only one visit from a Chaplain within a month. [93] Soldiers who clearly believed in God and continued to pray during their service in France sometimes made little or no reference to the presence of a Chaplain or the opportunity to attend a service in their accounts. [94]

George Coppard noted his colleagues' appreciation of Talbot House as a "haven of peace". The House had been established in December, 1915, by Neville Talbot and Tubby Clayton. [95] It was a resting place for officers and men passing through the Ypres area in transit. Based at Poperinghe, west of
Ypres, the house was welcomed for its tranquil and homely atmosphere. An attic chapel provided an opportunity to attend services but whether the House was valued specifically as a religious centre by the men is much less clear. The good attendances at Talbot House might have encouraged the idea of "unconscious Christianity" which some chaplains felt provided some room for optimism. On some occasions men did go to great lengths to secure the services of a Chaplain. Bombardier William Shaw, serving with the Royal Garrison Artillery / 151st Siege Battery, recalled his experience on Christmas Day, 1916, when fifty men trudged to a dense wood where a Minister was known to be staying. They searched for an hour before they found the clergyman: "He graciously told us that he was very sorry but he would not hold a service because he was too tired. The comments of the men as we trudged home, were not very complimentary to the tired Padre." Such incidents served to damage the already tarnished image of clergymen in the eyes of the soldiers.

The rapid expansion of the Army after August, 1914, brought chaos to those seeking to determine how many chaplains were needed to minister to the troops. Church leaders received conflicting evidence about the situation in France. They continued to press for the appointment of more chaplains when a reassessment of the transport facilities for existing chaplains might have proved more productive. Church of England chaplains were initially hampered by efforts to restrict their movement in contrast to chaplains of other denominations. The location of chaplains in wartime had not been considered in any detail, and the resulting confusion did much to damage the reputation of the Church of England chaplains in the early months of the war. Church leaders were reluctant to recognise that there might not be
a significant demand for the services of chaplains from the soldiers serving overseas. It was left to the clergymen sent out as chaplains to come to terms with the widespread indifference to their presence. They had to attempt to stimulate demand for their services. Their attempts must have been hampered by the insistence of Church leaders, through the Chaplains' Department, that still more clergymen were required in order to minister to the troops when, in fact, many services were cancelled because of unforeseen troop movements, rather than a shortage of chaplains.
6] THE CHAPLAINS' CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.
The poor quality of leadership provided by the home Churches meant that temporary chaplains faced a daunting task. In strange surroundings and ill at ease with the conflicting demands of Church and Army, chaplains were often forced by pressure of circumstance into unfamiliar roles. Their duties and responsibilities were ill-defined. It soon became apparent that they were expected to fulfil a wide variety of functions, few of which had anything to do with religion. No scheme of work existed for these men to follow, since the scheme proposed by the Chaplain General, Bishop Taylor Smith, had been rejected by the Army Council before the war. No other suggestions had been forthcoming before 1914. Chaplains arrived in France with no manual, no regular system of reporting to a superior in the Church and no regular meetings arranged for clergymen to exchange ideas. Most chaplains anticipated a level of demand for spiritual guidance which failed to materialise. Frustrated by the lack of opportunity for spiritual work and the indifference of the troops, many chaplains took on secular duties at the request of over-worked Officers. This diminished their spiritual role in the eyes of the troops as they came to be regarded primarily as Welfare or Entertainments Officers.

Inexperienced clergymen needed to be reassured that they were following an appropriate course of action. With little or no guidance from higher authorities, they had to rely on sporadic contacts with other men serving in similar circumstances. Links with the home parish were usually limited to informal correspondence with family and friends and there was seldom any detailed discussion of the chaplain's work. The contrast to the rigidly controlled confines of parish life must have been great.
Many men went out to France with very little idea of the posting they would be assigned to or the work they would be called upon to do. Most assumed that they would be sent to a hospital or to a casualty clearing station, but they were just as likely to find themselves assigned to a hut on a railway line providing hot drinks and encouragement to men in transit.\[3\] Chaplains had to find a role for themselves in an environment that was hardly conducive to spiritual work; there was no self-evident place for them. The men were frequently on the move and the activity tended to come in frantic bursts, with longer periods behind the line when boredom and frustration brought their own problems. Many chaplains felt keenly the sense of drifting; they could scarcely avoid giving the impression of being men out of their depth.

In 1914, the Chaplains' Department consisted of 117 chaplains, including 40 temporary appointments. In 1918, the total had risen to 3,480; the majority of these were temporary appointments, with chaplains being recruited for a one year contract, which could be renewed if both parties agreed.\[4\] Many successful chaplains had to face an agonizing decision at the end of their year's service. Those who chose to return to their parishes attracted a great deal of criticism.

The Reverend D. Railton clearly felt uneasy at the way chaplains were singled out by the system of temporary appointments: "It is simply scandalous that all officers here have to stick it for the duration of the war—and then a chaplain who has got to know the men well goes off, as he has had enough of it and as his year is up."\[5\] Railton's comments implied that he had already encountered resentment at the privileged position enjoyed by temporary chaplains. This lack of compulsion was the subject of much discussion among churchmen at home.\[6\] Pressure
was exerted by the Department to ensure that chaplains did renew their contracts; in practice many did stay on for a second or third term. The Reverend Monty Bere, serving with 43 Casualty Clearing Station for much of the war at Frevent near Arras, was anxious to learn when he might be allowed home on leave. He had served for five months without a break when he told his wife:

To believe the fair words of the people at the War Office was an error....circular from the acting Chaplain-General of our Army to say that I can have a fortnight’s leave when and if I sign on for a second year if I have not had leave during the previous three months. [7]

The advantage of temporary contracts was that it provided a means of weeding out unsuitable men after a year’s service. Men who could not adjust to the demands of life with the troops were of no value to the Chaplains’ Department, and any lack of enthusiasm on their part would damage the standing of all Padres.[8] Left to their own devices, some chaplains coped well and made a real impact on the men they served. There were certainly some who failed, but it is difficult to find detailed evidence about them, beyond the fact that they were sent home.[9] The main disadvantage of temporary appointments was that it took time for clergymen to learn their new task and only after several months did they begin to adjust to their new surroundings sufficiently to prove useful, in the opinion of their superiors.[10]

Some chaplains endured serious financial hardship by choosing to renew their contracts, but this does not seem to have been fully appreciated by Church leaders at home. The Archbishop of York felt that a clergyman’s primary duty was to his own parish if he chose to volunteer for service as a chaplain. He asked Davidson to consider whether a chaplain “ought not to devote at
any rate some portion of the pay which he receives from the
Government to provide for the duty taken in his parish?" [11]
The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Chaplain General were in full
agreement with Archbishop Lang. The Chaplain General noted that
he had already refused to appoint some good men as chaplains:
"because he could not take the responsibility of encouraging them
to leave their incumbencies".[12] In addition to meeting the
cost of his own replacement, an incumbent who was appointed as a
temporary chaplain had also to find a replacement who would meet
with his Bishop's approval.[13] This could mean a considerable
financial penalty for some incumbents. Bere considered returning
home at the end of his one year contract, because he found the
financial burden of paying for the cost of a substitute vicar for
his own parish: "too tall for continuance".[14] Bere was paid by
the army but by the time he had met the cost of his replacement at
home he had only £40 p.a. left to pay his tax. His son's school
fees had to be met from "private funds". In spite of his
reservations, Bere did decide to stay on for another year.[15]
The pay awarded to chaplains by the Army Council was low.
According to Lord Salisbury it had not changed since 1873 and did
not provide a living wage. Efforts to secure an improvement were
unsuccessful until 1919 when Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee
conducted a detailed review.[16]

In his daily work, the chaplain's chief enemy was the
level of spiritual ignorance amongst the soldiers, which resulted
from years of poor communication between Church and community;
this was particularly true between the Church and the working
classes. In order to reach the men in his spiritual care, a
chaplain had to overcome the failures of the past. He would often
find no religious background upon which to build. His efforts to
recruit men for confirmation classes and services were regularly frustrated because of the almost constant mobility of his flock. The frequently-voiced conviction among the troops that religion, and Holy Communion in particular, were for Officers and women did not help. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that the majority of soldiers belonged to a particular religious faith, even if they paid minimal attention to religion in civilian life. They still regarded the church as an important part of the familiar rituals of family life and as the ultimate refuge in times of danger.

Some chaplains struggled to reconcile the actions of the Allied forces with Christian standards of behaviour. Many harboured serious doubts and misgivings when they witnessed such wholesale slaughter at close quarters. They frequently modified their views once they had been close to the action and had seen for themselves the conditions in which the men lived and died. Chaplains who arrived at the front fresh from the more bloodthirsty atmosphere of the Press and public at home were quickly divested of any notion that the average Tommy was inspired by feelings of hatred for the enemy. The most commonly expressed view among soldiers was a sympathy with "Fritz" for sharing similar hardships, coupled with a suspicion that the German officers might be better organized than their own, and the knowledge that German dug-outs were better constructed than theirs.[17]

There were many causes of tension for the military chaplain. The natural aversion of a holy man to such a violent environment, in which slaughter and degradation became almost mundane, and sensitivity to human suffering was inevitably dulled, was bound to impose a strain. Certainly many chaplains expressed
a feeling of helplessness and frustration at their inability to
prevent so many deaths.[18] The men required endurance and the
moral conviction that what they were doing was right. Something
akin to a crisis of conscience must have been experienced by all
Christians, but particularly by the chaplains, to whom so many
people might turn for moral guidance, as they questioned the
justice of the cause for which they were fighting.[19]

Chaplains were dismayed by the obvious lack of religion
in the lives of so many of the soldiers, both before and during
the war. Seeing so many men in such constant danger, and knowing
how few of them had any experience of the comfort that religious
belief might have brought, could in itself cause distress to a
chaplain. This was sometimes tempered by the chaplains'
appreciation of the integrity of the men alongside whom they
worked, although some chaplains found it difficult to reconcile
the indifference to religion that they witnessed with the
character of the men they knew. They often referred to a kind of
"unconscious Christianity" among the soldiers. The Venerable
Henry Southwell believed that: "every hour of the day and night
men at the front are showing qualities which are absolutely
Christ-like in their character and in their influence on other
men, little though they recognise it themselves".[20] Southwell
must have found his experiences frustrating; he felt that the
Church had failed to meet the needs of the men and it seemed that
the "spiritual fight" was being lost.

F. R. Barry regretted the failure of the Church to
convince men that religion was not a one-day-a-week affair; he
believed that the average congregation: "keeps its religion, as it
keeps its Sunday, side by side with and carefully fenced off from
the other interests of the week. Men fail to realize how central
is religion in experience."[21] Such was the level of ignorance among the men that some even expressed the view that since it was against the ten Commandments to fight on the Sabbath, there was little point in even considering religion whilst the conflict lasted.[22] Chaplains must have wondered how they could make a start in the face of such indifference.

Some consolation was to be found in providing comfort and reassurance to the injured, and in writing to their families. The difficult task of writing to inform next of kin of the death of one of the men often fell to the chaplain. It never seemed to get any easier and the sheer weight of numbers must have been particularly depressing. Some expressed alarm when letters they had written to bereaved relatives were published by local newspapers at home. Berne felt that it made his task even harder: "I wish relations would not do such stupid things. It is impossible to write a natural letter when one feels that it may become 'copy' in some newspaper. I wonder what I said?" [23]

Chaplains often seem to have felt vulnerable to criticism at home. They experienced a particular form of loneliness, away from the comforting support and organization of their parishes, and, with only sporadic contact with other padres in the early months of the war, it was easy to become demoralised. Worry about the state of their home parish, where many families were no doubt struggling to come to terms with absent fathers, husbands and sons (not to mention bereavements) also seems likely to have produced conflict in the chaplains' sense of loyalty. Many temporary chaplains must have thought long and hard about the wisdom of renewing their contracts, given the pay and conditions they had encountered.

Chaplains made a significant contribution to attempts to
uphold military discipline. They found no difficulty in reinforcing discipline by warning against the dangers of drink, gambling and loose morals, since this complemented their spiritual role as moral guides. Clergymen led the criticism of "treating" by civilians who were anxious to buy drinks for any man in uniform home on leave. Some areas reported serious problems of drunkenness caused by this practice.[24] At the front many chaplains were shocked by the standards of behaviour considered acceptable by the majority of the men they served. The amount of swearing was worthy of comment in the first instance, but they quickly adjusted to hearing things on a frequent basis that, at home, they would have considered shocking. Canon Guy Rogers looked back with satisfaction on a concert he had helped to organise: "it was a clean and decent concert, which is not always easy to ensure".[25] Padres did their best to prevent gambling where men might lose heavily, but they fought a losing battle, since most ordinary soldiers were far better off in terms of disposable cash than they had been before the war and there were limited opportunities for spending behind the lines. Drink seems to have been plentiful and relatively cheap, and for the most part it was tolerated by the military authorities, although over-indulgence was treated severely.[26]

Boredom was a serious problem. Anything the chaplains could provide in the way of entertainment was welcomed as a pleasant diversion from other less savoury alternatives. One chaplain reprimanded a local shopkeeper about the reading material on sale to the troops in France. Chaplains argued for the closure of "Maisons tolerees" to which many Commanding Officers seemed content to turn a blind eye.[27] Travelling through some of the main transport depots on their way to postings in France,
chaplains were horrified to see lengthy queues outside the brothels and more than one chaplain spent nights walking the streets trying to dissuade young men from seeking out such places.[28] The Army authorities tended to turn a blind eye until the level of V.D. began to arouse concern. Bere was alarmed at the number of V.D. patients he found in hospital, but the Doctor assured him that the level was "normal": "if true that is not a comforting thought".[29] Chaplains had to tread a fine line if they did not wish to alienate the men, and Railton seemed weary of the effort. He noticed that any sign of reproof from him, when someone said or did wrong, produced the feeling that he was sanctimonious and superior.[30] Chaplains seem to have been inclined to limit their responsibility to personal morality and family problems; they clearly felt more at home dealing with individual misconduct rather than the wider issues of military policy.

Dealing with deserters must have been one of the hardest tasks for chaplains. Mellish described how a man who had deserted was tried by Court Martial and sentenced to be shot:

I had to prepare him for this tragic end which he seemed not to realise himself. Whether his mind was deficient I do not know, but he seemed benumbed showing no sign of fear or any emotion.[31]

Chaplains were expected to remain with these men until the moment of execution, and the burial followed immediately. Many death sentences were commuted, but on average one a week took place in France.[32] Chaplains were sometimes called upon to defend soldiers at Courts-Martial. Acting as the "Prisoner's Friend", Mervyn Haigh successfully defended three sergeants charged with fiddling the rum ration. By showing that the King's regulations had not been properly observed, Haigh argued that the three men
were not therefore liable. After two more successful defences, Haigh was uncomfortably aware that he was threatening to embarrass G.H.Q. and decided that it would be prudent to refuse further requests for his services if he wished to remain with the troops in Africa.[33]

Chaplains did not set out to pass judgment, they simply tried to serve the soldiers as well as they could. For the most part they were so pre-occupied with their daily duties that they had little time to devote to more abstract matters, unless specific doubts were raised by individuals. At first sight, this might be regarded as moral cowardice on the part of the chaplain, but he had to look to the best interests of the men at all times. Personal feelings had to be set aside on many occasions, and even in diaries and letters, chaplains rarely expressed their feelings clearly. This reluctance stemmed in part from censorship and a desire not to alarm those at home, and in part from the need to maintain their own morale in the face of such degrading surroundings. The son of a First World War chaplain read his father’s diaries and found that they did not express personal feelings in the way that he had expected. Rennie Bere concluded that his father had felt frustrated by the waste of life and, although troubled by the moral havoc caused by the war, he believed his father had tried to avoid being judgmental. Instead he had been content to offer spiritual comfort where he could, whilst admitting that, for the most part, he was concerned with maintaining the physical well-being of the men he sought to serve.

My father gradually came to realise that his most important pastoral function was with distressed individuals who were committed Christians already. These he could help. For the rest: ‘How to teach a man what the Christian faith is in a few minutes, I do not know. [34]
This attitude was not untypical of the main body of chaplains who simply did their best, in the worst possible circumstances, knowing that they were unlikely to achieve significant changes in the behaviour or beliefs of the troops. This in itself could produce tension for the clergyman isolated, as he invariably was, from any close colleague with whom he could have discussed his concerns.

Many of the chaplain's tasks helped to boost morale: acting in a way which might leave them open to accusations that they were seeking to encourage the aggressive fighting spirit of the men and in some way contributing in an improper manner to the evil of the war. The chaplains must have felt that they were under a great deal of pressure to conform to the standards expected of them by the army, and in particular by their Commanding Officer. The proximity of the Commanding Officer and the distance of any Church authority must have increased the pressure and caused the chaplains much unease. The inexperienced and youthful chaplains were in the most vulnerable position, as Major-General Sir William Thwaites acknowledged after the war:

I told them [chaplains] on one occasion that I wanted a bloodthirsty sermon next Sunday, and would not have any texts from the New Testament.....On that Sunday I got hold by accident of a blushing young curate straight out from England- but he preached the most bloodthirsty sermon I had ever listened to.[35]

Few could blame one young chaplain, the Reverend L. L. Jeeves, who sought to reassure a frightened Private by insisting that the Germans were unlikely to be attending similar religious services in their trenches. Jeeves was undoubtedly in the thick of things when he sought to reassure the frightened man; he believed that faith was "a very present help in this time of trouble" but he would clearly have appreciated more guidance from his Church
on how best to deal with such queries.[36]

Chaplains like Bere and Rogers covered many miles each Sunday in order to provide services for units who had no chaplain of their own. Unfortunately they were not always well-equipped to minister to the men in their care. Church of England chaplains seem to have been particularly badly served by the reluctance of their leaders to sanction prayers for the dead.[37] (see chapter 4) Church leaders were slow to provide suitable texts for use in the field.[38] Hymn singing proved popular with the men: many a camp echoed to the sounds of Sunday School favourites, reminding soldiers of home and family. There was still cause for concern as the Reverend A. Herbert Gray recalled: many hymns were outdated and unsuitable for use in the field e.g. "weary of earth.... I look at heaven and long to enter in" was a symptom of the need for a new Hymn Book.[39] Chaplains needed much better material from their home churches if they were to do their job effectively.

Chaplains faced a difficult task in seeking to maintain the spirit of the men in their care. Their task became more difficult as the war continued and casualties deprived men of the friends with whom they had enlisted. The appearance of a chaplain in the trenches at night with a flask of tea or a pack of cigarettes was often enough to raise the spirits of the men. Some relaxation of Army discipline and hierarchy could achieve the same result, according to the Senior Chaplain to the Second Army, Anderson. He wrote to the Deputy C.I.G.S. in 1920:

Nearly every day for three years I shared my sandwiches for lunch with two private soldiers- my chauffeur and orderly- in the forward area or in the trenches, and I am not aware of having lost my position in any way by doing so.[40]

Anderson argued that such small gestures helped to maintain morale; he believed that Officers could not afford to be too proud
to share the dangers and discomforts of their men as comrades. 
He was of the opinion that the Army chaplains had worked harder 
than anyone to maintain morale, and certainly the value of their 
work was recognised at the highest level.[41]

Many chaplains suffered from a serious emotional strain, 
which Commanders were initially slow to recognise. Each man 
relied heavily on his own resources of strength and courage. 
Isolation was particularly unfortunate in the early months of the 
war before the Chaplains' Department had been reorganised. 
Officers could be assigned to training schools for a week, where 
colleagues could provide useful advice and moral support away from 
the daily routine, but the chaplains had few opportunities to mix 
with their counterparts in other units. Rogers had fared better 
than most, by being sent first to the busy base at Le Havre, where 
a team of chaplains had provided some support. Regular meetings 
had been established there by February, 1916: "Today's conference 
of chaplains went very happily. There was nothing official or 
chilling about it and a real sense of comradeship is growing up, I 
believe, among us." [42] Chaplains needed to meet their 
colleagues from time to time, to discuss how each one was coping 
with his lot.

The need for some kind of retreat facility was first 
raised in the Second Army area.[43] Generals Plumer and Horne 
seemed to appreciate the extreme difficulty of the work undertaken 
by the chaplains. Plumer was particularly helpful when Bishop 
Gwynne decided to set up a school to run courses for war-weary 
chaplains. Blackburne had warned Gwynne that some chaplains 
were particularly tired and rather envious of officers who had a 
clearly defined role to fulfil. He had experienced the loneliness 
of life as an ordinary chaplain in 1914, when he had written: "I
hardly ever meet any other chaplains. There are so few of us, and
we have to stick to our own troops."[44] Canon Cunningham
believed that padres deliberating on how "to reconcile the
seemingly awful contradiction of warfare and Christianity" found
the emotional strain more wearing than the physical discomforts
and dangers they experienced.[45] They were also highly critical
of their own efforts to minister to the troops in their care.
Visiting the various units of the 1st Army, meeting the chaplains
under his care, led Blackburne to conclude that:

In the main it is clear that the chaplains are trying
hard to do their job well, and the criticism of
chaplains on the part of the Generals is much less
severe than the criticism we make of each other.[46]

Bishop Gwynne blamed the loneliness experienced by many
chaplains for the feelings of war-weariness and disillusionment he
encountered. He too concluded that some kind of refresher course
was needed. He approached General Plumer who was known to
appreciate both the difficulties faced by chaplains and the real
value of their work. Gwynne felt that "being a deeply religious
man himself he (Plumer) knew that for the re-inforcement of
morale and endurance there was nothing that kept up the hearts of
men as did religion.[47] Gwynne told Plumer that he was concerned
about the well-being of some of his chaplains who were badly in
need of a chance to escape from their daily responsibilities if
they were to function effectively:

It occurred to me that while combatants were brought back
for refresher courses, it would be beneficial for the
chaplains to have a place where they might have special
instruction and deepening of spiritual life for their
difficult task of ministering to the troops.[48]

General Plumer was sufficiently impressed by Gwynne's arguments to
provide a suitable building for use as a retreat centre which
became known as the "bombing school for padres".[49]

In February, 1917, this badly needed facility opened its
doors in a house in Place de Victor Hugo, St. Omer. Operating as a retreat house it was made as homely as possible to provide a calm and prayerful atmosphere for war-weary chaplains. In March B. K. Cunningham arrived from England to act as Warden for the 15-20 chaplains seconded there each week by their Commanding Officers. Cunningham believed it was inevitable that the emotional strain of their work should prove "wearing" for conscientious chaplains. He wrote of the need for "recreation of the spiritual life" of chaplains, the need for a quiet time to allow chaplains to talk to fellow clergymen away from the noise and crowded wartime living conditions so alien to these men. He may well have been surprised by the initial reaction of some of the chaplains who attended the School. They expressed resentment that they were ordered to attend the courses by their Commanding Officers, but Cunningham's tact and humour usually managed to weld the assembled padres into some kind of fellowship for the week-long courses. Many came to appreciate the time to talk and argue and listen to lectures on a wide variety of subjects from "Compulsory Church Parades" to "Spiritualism" and "Reprisals". Staff told of men getting their worries off their chests "amid explosions of common relief" and recovering their sense of proportion. Attending the courses helped to restore flagging morale, presenting new opportunities for prayer and meditation away from the pressures of daily chores. The School also provided an opportunity for discussion of theological issues with fellow clergymen, an opportunity seldom afforded to chaplains serving the troops. The relief of returning to a proper chapel with an altar and an uninterrupted service gave reassurance to many chaplains in a similar way to the Chapel at Talbot House, Poperinghe, which was also supported by General Plumer.
Cunningham was surprised and humiliated by the astonishment many officers expressed on learning of the School's existence:

That theology should be a living and progressive science; that the circumstances of war had supplied fresh material which added to our knowledge of the will and character of God....that the influence of a good padre, which the officer was so quick to recognise and appreciate, required, for its source, times of conscious fellowship with God-seems never to have occurred to the average Englishman. [55]

Fortunately for Cunningham, Bishop Gwynne had chosen the location for his experiment well. General Plumer continued to provide much needed support and encouragement for the School. He frequently addressed the padres, giving practical advice and support when he could:

Identify yourself with your units as much as possible, do what they do; if you can, play games with them. March when they march; make them your friends and let them feel you are their own padre. [56]

On preaching, he advised chaplains to "Prepare carefully" and "be brief". Nearly 900 chaplains passed through the school. Many recorded their appreciation of the peaceful interlude and spiritual refreshment provided by Cunningham and his staff.[57]

Some of the most influential chaplains recalled their gratitude for the work of the school in St. Omer. Barry believed "it saved many (chaplains) from mental or moral breakdown, and sustained us all in our dangers and adversities". [58] He spent his first period as a temporary chaplain in Egypt with the Territorials. He had little guidance and with no parochial experience to fall back on, he was left to his own devices.[59] Reassurance from other chaplains that he was fulfilling a useful role would have reduced his anxieties considerably. Neville Talbot also welcomed the school; like
Barry, he was one of the most determined supporters of chaplains. Keenly aware of the difficulties facing clergymen in unfamiliar surroundings, his efforts to improve conditions for them continued until his death in 1943.[60]

In view of the financial hardships, the poor organization of the Chaplains' Department in the early months of the war and the disadvantageous pay, it is worth considering why so many clergymen volunteered their services as chaplains. In July, 1916, Bere told his wife: "I do not feel that any Englishman who can be here (France) ought to be anywhere else" and in December, 1917, he wrote: "it is difficult to do a more religious thing than to share the life of the men. Though it is not sharing the front line dangers, it is sharing the back area hardships..." [61] This desire to share in the privations and hardships of the ordinary Tommy took Bere to the Western Front, in much the same way as earlier he had chosen to leave the comforts of a quiet country parish in order to spend sixteen years sharing the lives of his parishioners in London's East End, around Victoria Docks, West Ham and Leytonstone. He had no need to volunteer for either the East End or the Western Front, and at the age of 48, in 1914, he was considered by many to be a veteran. But when others might have been considering taking life a little more easily, Bere was anxious to "make himself useful" in any way that he could and this spirit is typical of many of the chaplains who volunteered for service. The magnitude of the task facing the Church left chaplains in no doubt that their services were badly needed but whether or not they would be appreciated by the men was by no means clear. Even before he left Aldershot, in 1914, Tom Pym had recorded that the huge army being assembled seemed "shepherdless" and he wrote: "one is almost frightened of the
immense opportunity that is being lost, and one wants to be in a hundred places at once".[62]

Some of the most outstanding chaplains were men who had already experienced army life for themselves in South Africa. Men like Harry Blackburne, who had served as a Private in the South African war with the West Kent Yeomanry, were particularly well-placed to judge the needs of the fighting men.[63] Neville Talbot had also seen action in South Africa. After joining the army in 1899, he had served with the Rifle Brigade. He had never entirely abandoned the idea of ordination, and his experiences as a soldier surely helped him to become one of the most respected and admired chaplains in France during the First World War. He and his brother Ted travelled to France in August, 1914, as temporary chaplains and, after a short spell visiting base hospitals, Neville was attached to 17th Field Ambulance, 3rd Rifle Brigade, close to the fighting line.[64] In October, 1916, he was appointed Assistant Chaplain General to the Fifth Army, commanded by General Hubert Gough. He did not feel comfortable at being so far from the line, but his qualities as a leader earned him respect and attention. Neville Talbot always made a point of talking to officers about chaplains: "I try to show them the chaplain's job from within, and how they can help and hinder. I let fly on Padres and what they represent- a treasure hid under queer surfaces." [65] These clergymen were fortunate in their experience of Army life prior to ordination; they were better equipped to deal with the lack of training and the problems and pressures of a chaplain's post than men straight from their home parishes.

The rapid expansion of the Chaplains' Department brought administrative chaos and led to the majority of temporary
chaplains being sent to serve overseas with no formal preparation. Poor pastoral care during the early months of the war consisted of little more than occasional visits by a Bishop to encourage clergymen and carry out Confirmations. Many chaplains recorded feelings of isolation. Their temporary contracts left chaplains open to accusations of preferential treatment which must have hindered their efforts to befriend soldiers. Working in difficult circumstances, concerned about leaving their home parishes, and often worried by the financial burden their absence imposed on family and parish, they would have welcomed the opportunity to meet their colleagues on a regular basis. The provision of regular meetings for clergymen in some areas, during 1916-1917, helped to develop a real sense of comradeship amongst the chaplains that had been lacking in the early years of the war, but such efforts were confined to one or two locations and could not hope to reach all the chaplains. The lack of vigorous support and specific guidance from their home Churches left young, inexperienced temporary chaplains to carve out a role for themselves. The Church of England was particularly slow to react to the needs of chaplains serving overseas. Other denominations, especially the Roman Catholic Church, seemed better prepared, with recognised forms of service and prayers already familiar to churchgoers.

The chaplains' willingness to volunteer to share in the hardships endured by the troops stemmed from their belief in the existence of a strong desire for spiritual guidance. Recognition that no such demand existed must have come as a serious blow to chaplains already shocked by the brutality of their surroundings. Their isolation placed the chaplains in a particularly vulnerable position; they were aware that their presence would only be
tolerated by the military authorities so long as they were prepared to make a contribution to the maintenance of military discipline and morale. They were also conscious of their duty to minister to the troops. When forced to recognise that their spiritual aspirations were unlikely to be achieved, many chaplains found fulfilment in a practical role undertaking many welfare duties.
TENSION AND CO-OPERATION.
Leading clergymen in the Church of England were anxious to uphold the importance of their church as the national church. This tended to alienate other denominations and served to emphasize differences between them. In contrast, chaplains reacted to the alarming level of ignorance they encountered amongst the troops, and the bewildering lack of guidance from the Chaplains' Department, by developing a greater degree of tolerance for men from other religious denominations. New friendships helped to push forward the development of ecumenism. Chaplains shared the same problems and dangers regardless of denomination. Shared concerns about the quality of ministry on offer to the troops drew clergymen from very different backgrounds together, sometimes in joint services, but more often in the provision of entertainment and recreational facilities. Apart from seeking ways to alleviate the squalid conditions in which the men were forced to live and work, the main concern of the chaplains of the Church of England was how to overcome the past failings of the Church, in order to minister more effectively in future. They demanded changes to remedy the weakness of religious teaching in the past. By doing so, they revealed the distance that had developed between clergymen serving overseas and those who remained in their parishes at home. This distance developed into a serious gulf between chaplains and the home Church, which would require a considerable degree of compromise when the war ended.

The need to maintain close links between the home Churches and the chaplains was something that many individual chaplains stressed in their letters and diaries. The home Church and the Chaplains' Department at the War Office must have seemed to be increasingly remote to the men ministering in France. The quiet, organized lives clergymen had left behind could still
shed some light on their chaotic circumstances in wartime, and it was sometimes reassuring to know that life at home was continuing, if not unchanged, at least in some recognizable way. Many chaplains serving overseas expressed disappointment at how few of the soldiers brought letters of introduction from their home clergy to their chaplains, but the few who did so were made particularly welcome.[2]

The preoccupations of the home-based clergy were very different from those of the chaplains. Clergymen at home had to contend with Government pressure to endorse recruiting campaigns and later conscription. They had to try to balance the many requests for help that they received, from conscientious objectors and pacifists, with their roles as Ministers in the national Church, expected to preach the justice of the nation's cause. Church leaders clearly felt that the privileges of the Church of England as the national Church had to be defended. Interdenominational rivalry was not unknown amongst the chaplains but the shared hardships of their wartime situation tended to result in cooperation rather than competition.

The Reverend L. L. Jeeves found himself billeted in the local Cure's house in 1915 shortly after he had arrived in France. The Cure's mother cared for him with kindness although she would not allow him to hold a communion service in her home for fear of her neighbours' comments. Instead Jeeves was relegated to a derelict house nearby, but he did record the harmony which existed between himself and two other non-Anglican chaplains: "each trying to help the men who claim to belong to the church we serve. It is indeed good to get away from controversy for a while."[3] Many chaplains seemed to enjoy the idea of leaving old prejudices behind when they served overseas. Noel Mellish recalled sharing a
shelter as a makeshift church with a Roman Catholic chaplain with whom he became friends. [4] In the early months of the war, there were some instances of Catholic co-operation at a high level. The Archbishop of Rouen, Mgr. Fuzet, gave his permission for Church of England services to be held in the Roman Catholic chapels attached to two buildings then being used as Military Hospitals. [5] In September, 1914, at Fere-en-Tardenois, the only accommodation available for the large number of wounded men proved to be inadequate "and the village Church was placed at our disposal by the cure, who was a splendid example of practical Christianity". [6]

Unfortunately such goodwill was not always forthcoming. Some chaplains had to contend with a hostile reception. In a letter to his wife, Monty Bere revealed his frustration with the local Bishop who refused to allow Anglican services in the village church. The local priest proved much more helpful, and lent an altar and a room in the village school, but it was a poor substitute for a church. [7] The Reverend Bulstrode was happy to administer Communion to men of other denominations in 1917, but his attempts at conciliation were not reciprocated. [8] After holding several Church of England Missionary Society meetings in a ruined Roman Catholic Church, he was ordered to find another location, since the Archbishop of Amiens had decreed that no Roman Catholic place of worship might be used by Protestants "even when in ruins". The same attitude had existed in 1915, when the bombed church at Nieppe was being used as a drill hall without complaint, but when Evers asked permission to hold a Church of England service there, his request was refused. [9] After the war, Bishop Gwynne recorded his disappointment that greater progress had not been made:
I was deeply grieved that I could never bring about a better understanding with the Roman Catholic Church. I have many happy memories of individual friendships with members of the R.C. community.[10]

If progress was to be made in the future, such friendships might provide a valuable base on which to build.

Wartime produced some unusual friendships. The Jesuit chaplain beloved by Irish Protestants must surely rank amongst the most unexpected. Father Willie Doyle, S.J., was highly regarded by those he served so unselfishly before his death in a shell explosion. The tribute paid by the Belfast Orangemen among whom he had lived was remarkable:

Fr. Doyle was a good deal among us. We couldn’t possibly agree with his religious opinions, but we simply worshipped him for other things. He didn’t know the meaning of fear, and he didn’t know what bigotry was... If he risked his life in looking after Ulster Protestant soldiers once, he did it a hundred times in the last few days.[11]

The experience of living alongside men of different faiths proved particularly valuable, according to the Free Church chaplain, J. Esslemont Adams, who believed that the war had provided a unique opportunity to further the Ecumenical cause:

Overseas there is neither Established Church, United Free Church, Free Church, nor Free Presbyterian Church, but a great Union embracing in a solid spiritual friendship all who worship Jesus Christ and Him only. Chaplains exalt the things which unite. They share services, take services in turn, do services for one another, as if sect were forgotten, and their hearers are as representative and content with the situation as the speakers.[12]

Criticism of the chaplains was not confined to the home clergy.

The Reverend H. W. Blackburne recalled a letter from a retired officer at home, criticising the use of private confession by some chaplains. Blackburne was "stung to fury" by the criticism and in a reply noted: "How pitiful all this narrow-mindedness is."[13] Blackburne acknowledged that his own
attitude had changed dramatically since he had been serving as a
temporary chaplain. He was anxious to work towards "Reunion" in
the future and expressed the hope, in 1916, that greater
co-operation could be achieved amongst the clergy serving in
France: "I wish that out here we could forget all our differences
and work together. I didn't think like that at first, but now I
do."[14] Blackburne was fortunate in that as a Senior Chaplain he
was in a position to arrange interdenominational services and
conferences which were well-received by those who attended.
Blackburne concluded that such conferences brought the men of
different faiths much closer, but he regretted the fact that the
Roman Catholic chaplains had declined an invitation to attend.
Throughout the war the Roman Catholic chaplains tended to keep
apart from any joint ventures, but the other denominations seemed
to be more than willing to participate.

Evidence of a widening gulf between Chaplains and the
home clergy was witnessed by Blackburne in 1918:

There is something quite new out here, which I have only
rarely struck before. A few of the chaplains who are
fresh from home do not approve of conferences for
chaplains of all denominations; while, on the other
hand, others who have been out here longer think we
should go much farther than we do—such as having a
united communion service: I should love to have a united
communion service, but I am determined to do nothing out
here that would not be absolutely loyal to our own
Churches at home.[15]

Neville Talbot also recognised the existence of such a gulf; in
February, 1918, he warned his father that the Church of England
could not afford to dismiss the concerns being voiced by many of
his fellow Chaplains:

We are in temporary independence. Are we going to be
absorbed again under the old dead weight and the old
entails, into the position of talking and discussing and
confering about vital problems without the power to
translate the results into corporate action? [16]

The Chaplains had a wealth of experience behind them; the lessons
they had learned meant that a return to their pre-war ministry would be difficult.

Both Neville and his brother Father Keble Talbot expressed their admiration for the Roman Catholic Church as they witnessed it in action during the war. Father Keble Talbot observed the Roman Catholic soldiers with their basic knowledge of prayer and sacraments and at the same time noted the ignorance of these things among soldiers who described themselves as Church of England. Neville recalled how he had envied the R.C.s' religious teaching:

Many a time in hospitals in the War did I long that there had been in the hazy muddled souls of C of E men the familiarity with and knowledge of their religion to be found in Roman Catholics.[17]

It would be difficult to find Church of England clergymen at home who would have shared their admiration.[18]

The "temporary independence" enjoyed by the Chaplains enabled men like Blackburne to hold interdenominational conferences with little control being exercised over the content of individual addresses and group discussions. At one such conference, talks were given by Blackburne, Church of England, the Reverend Herbert Gray, United Free Church of Scotland, R. Barber, United Board, and by Wesleyan and Presbyterian Chaplains. The conference debated a wide range of issues and Blackburne was overwhelmed by letters thanking him and asking for another such conference.[19] It is difficult to imagine the Church of England Bishops giving their approval to such free and frank discussions between men of different denominations, given their horrified reaction to the idea of joint services.[20] Home-based clergy would have been surprised by Blackburne's admission that although he knew the 250 chaplains who had come under his administration in
the 1st Army area well: "I could not say whether they are High, Low, or Broad in their Church views. At none of our chaplains' meetings do those controversies arise."[21]

Experienced clergymen like Barry recognised that tired and frustrated chaplains became increasingly distanced from the home Church, developing their own sense of "us and them", blaming "the system" and the Bishops for any shortcomings they experienced:

It cannot be said that the Church officially was presenting a very convincing image. Convocation's contribution to the war effort was to spend these years in prolonged debates about reservation and the use of vestments.[22]

Chaplains could not feel that they had much in common with the home clergy when the vacant See of Hereford was the issue which dominated discussions amongst Church of England clergy at home for much of 1917.[23] The appointment of a new Bishop of Hereford produced a bitter controversy. It was the first time that Lloyd George had to make such an appointment and his choice did not accord with that of the Archbishop of Canterbury. The Prime Minister proposed to appoint Hensley Henson to the post. Archbishop Davidson was under pressure to prevent this because of controversial comments Henson had made years before, which had resulted in accusations of "heresy".[24] Throughout the summer of 1917, rumour and criticism circulated concerning Dr. Henson's beliefs and his interpretation of certain fundamental parts of the Bible. Letters and meetings between leading clergymen were dominated by the issue and "the threat of schism was very real", according to Owen Chadwick, Henson's biographer.[25] That the Church of England should have devoted so much time to such a public controversy in 1917-18, when news from the war was causing
grave concern alarmed many churchmen. The fact that the Prime Minister was able to ignore the advice of Archbishop Davidson and appoint Henson served to highlight the disadvantages faced by the Established Church. The affair gave a new dimension to those who urged the Archbishops to seek ways of securing greater freedom for the Church of England to organize its own affairs without recourse to Parliament. It also gave new impetus to the demands for change which came from many serving chaplains.

The Church of England urgently needed to sort out its priorities in order to concentrate on the issues of real importance to potential Church members. The Free Church Council clearly experienced similar worries. In 1918, they heard from one chaplain about soldiers swearing and gambling. The Council considered banning playing cards but concluded that it would be best left alone, since "debates about ethically trivial matters astonished and alienated those at the front". The Church of England clergy might have been better advised to do the same when the troubled issue of Reservation was raised during the war.

Reservation, holding a quantity of consecrated bread back for later use, was only permitted by the Church of England in exceptional cases, and under strictly controlled conditions, to allow the sick to take Communion. The issue had been a cause for concern for some time, with clergymen holding conflicting views on the role of the Eucharist in services. Bread and wine were consecrated and consumed during a single service according to Church of England teaching. The Bishops were anxious to discourage its use for devotional purposes, as used by the Roman Catholic Church. Most chaplains chose to ignore the strict rules governing Reservation in favour of a common-sense approach. Bere decided to keep the reserved Sacrament available at all times.
for a unit of the R.F.C., so that men could receive Communion prior to dangerous missions.[30] Blackburne acknowledged that: "out here, one's ideas and theories have to go by the board, and we have celebrations of communion at all hours of the day".[31] Lengthy debates in the home Church resulted from such actions.

Henson condemned the practice.[32] Tubby Clayton made a powerful case in support of the actions of his fellow Chaplains.

Initially, Talbot House had been biased against Reservation and in favour of Fasting Communion, but in time reversed the view. Clayton argued that Reservation "links the tired and lonely worshipper, deterred from attendance in the morning by duty, to those who then remembered their brotherhood with him".[33] The debate about Reservation continued throughout the war. Many chaplains recognised that their duty was to minister to men serving under extreme conditions even if that involved ignoring traditional peace-time practices in favour of a more practical approach. In 1917, the Reverend F. B. Macnutt argued the need to restore the Eucharist to "a central role in worship". His arguments gave voice to the conclusions reached by many Chaplains, including Father Frere.[34] If the home-based clergy had adopted a more flexible approach, much time and energy could have been saved and the distance between the chaplains and their fellow clergymen at home might not have seemed so great.

Church of England clergymen at home spent many months discussing the most appropriate role for the national Church in wartime. The nature of clerical involvement in recruiting campaigns, and later in endorsing conscription, attracted a great deal of criticism and provoked lengthy arguments, reflected in the press and in the correspondence at Lambeth Palace.[35] Such matters rarely attracted comment from serving chaplains, who
seemed content to leave the debates to the home Church. The heightened patriotism of wartime threatened the ability of the Church of England to fulfil its traditional role as the conscience of the nation. The Clergy had a clear duty to minister to men under arms. In order to fulfil this obligation, they had to secure the co-operation of the military authorities. Church leaders might all too easily alienate the same military authorities if for instance they spoke out against the use of particular weapons or tactics employed in the fighting. Yet they had a moral obligation to do so.[36]

Few home-based Clergymen seem to have been troubled by doubts as to whether it was appropriate for Church of England Clergy to endorse recruiting campaigns and to encourage investment in Government bonds. Pressure to endorse recruiting campaigns at home produced an enthusiastic response in the early months of the war. Clergymen were not immune to the tide of outrage and emotion that the events of 1914 provoked throughout the country. Many clergymen made statements that they would later regret as naive expressions of a less than balanced view. The temptation to act as recruiting agents was too much for some clergy. The Bishop of London, in particular, took up the cause with enthusiasm.[37] Others seriously considered the question of enlisting, either as non-combatants or, more controversially, as combatants.[38] The War Office thanked the Bishop of London for making a recruiting speech which declared the war to be "the greatest fight ever made for the Christian religion", and they estimated that it resulted in some ten thousand men coming forward.[39] Another clergyman who welcomed the opportunity to speak out in favour of enlistment in his Parish Magazine was Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy:

I cannot say too strongly that I believe every able-bodied man ought to volunteer for service anywhere.
There ought to be no shirking of that duty. Those who cannot volunteer for military service can pray.[40] Working as a Chaplain in France, Studdert Kennedy came to regret the naivete of his initial response. He came to believe that it was particularly inappropriate for the Church to have encouraged men to volunteer for service. He was not alone in his change of heart; many clergy later came to regret their sermons encouraging young men to do their duty and enlist. Others continued to support recruitment, making speeches and preaching sermons encouraging "shirkers" to reconsider their position. Officially, Archbishop Davidson resisted efforts to encourage the clergy to use their pulpits to issue calls for recruits, but he made it clear that he believed it to be a man's Christian duty to enlist in answer to his country's call.[41]

Taylor Smith clearly had no objection to using the clergy to bolster recruitment. He approached Archbishop Davidson for his approval of a letter to be issued by the War Office in October, 1914. It was an appeal to the parish clergy "to assist in inducing ex-N.C.O.s to rejoin the service". The intention was to send a copy to every clergyman in the country: vicar, R.C., Wesleyan, Presbyterian, Baptist, and Jew. Davidson readily granted his approval. Taylor Smith shared the belief of the Army Council that "the Clergy are often able from their knowledge of and personal influence with their parishioners to appeal successfully to them where an official letter would have no effect".[42] Chaplains serving overseas might have questioned the faith of the Army Council in the power of the clergy to exert any influence over the laity in such a matter, but, in the event, the campaign was considered a success.[43]

Davidson also wrote to the Press in December, 1914, stressing the need for more recruits, but there were limits which
he was reluctant to breach. Although not against the idea of a poster depicting the two Archbishops, and various quotations urging the need for men to enlist immediately, Davidson and Lang were both firmly against suggesting to their clergy that such posters should be displayed in their Churches or even in their Church porches.[44] The Dean of Westminster, Bishop Ryle, had urged a "swift and enthusiastic response" to the calls made upon the Church in the early weeks of the war, but this was not always forthcoming, since the opinions of the Bishops were clearly divided on some important issues.[45] Davidson attempted to clarify the situation in The Times Recruiting Supplement of October, 1915:

...certainly not the least important and urgent of our duties as clergy is the reiteration of the call which this crisis hour makes upon every man and woman for a whole-hearted and ungrudging offering of all that we can bring in support of the Empire's contribution to securing victory for a great and sacred cause.[46]

Lord Derby urged the Archbishop to sanction an appeal for recruits from every pulpit on the last Sunday in November, 1915. Davidson refused to make such an official appeal, although he assured Derby that he and his clergy were working hard to encourage recruits.[47]

Many diocesan publications and provincial newspapers revealed the extent of the Clergy's involvement in promoting recruitment. Bishop Moule of Durham told his clergy to "take frequent opportunities of reminding your people, your young men of all ranks, and their friends, of the real nature of the call of King and Country".[48] Henson toured the Durham area with Lord Derby and appeared at many recruiting rallies. Archbishop Lang told the Church of England Missionary Society, in 1915, that enlistment was: "the plain and straight thing to do".[49] The
most vigorous stand in favour of encouraging enlistment was taken by the Bishop of London. The K.C.V.O. awarded after the war was widely regarded as a reward for his contribution to recruitment drives. The Minister of St. Giles' Cathedral, Edinburgh, Reverend C. L. L. Warr recalled that the Church had: "to an unfortunate degree, become an instrument of the State and in too many pulpits the preacher had assumed the role of a recruiting sergeant". [50] The Minister noted that he deeply regretted many things he had himself said from the pulpit. Clergymen were anxious to be seen to be making a contribution to the national effort and few seem to have questioned the wisdom of encouraging enlistment in the early months of the war.

The question of conscription preoccupied the home clergy: many felt that it was necessary to prevent men from shirking their duty; they felt particularly concerned about the fact that many married men were enlisting while single men remained at home. In the interests of fairness, some advocated conscription as the only answer - they included the Vicar of a London parish, Reverend W. Matthews, who wrote:

A spiritual and moral problem demanded some action from the moment when I took over the responsibilities of vicar: the question, 'Ought I to volunteer and fight?' was haunting, and torturing, many young men. In my opinion, conscription ought to have been enacted from the day war was declared. [51]

Matthews believed that no one had the right to accept the protection of the state unless he was prepared to uphold it against an enemy, but he refused to use his pulpit as a platform for recruitment, even though his bishop was prepared to do so.

Many leading churchmen argued that the national effort needed to win the war was so great as to justify sacrificing certain principles, and that the loss of freedom that conscription meant was a small price to pay. [52] The Bishop of Pretoria,
Michael Furse, visited the front in 1915. His discussions with chaplains and his own experiences led him to urge the authorities to introduce conscription and take measures to ensure an adequate supply of munitions. He does not seem to have considered whether it was appropriate for a Bishop to act in this manner, and he happily addressed a meeting of bishops and encouraged Lloyd George to speak in industrial areas, to highlight the need for a greater effort to provide the badly needed supplies.[53] Feelings ran high and few clergymen felt able to take a stand against conscription. The No Conscription Fellowship, founded in November, 1914, failed to attract support from any of the leading clergy. Some did protest when membership of the Fellowship cost Bertrand Russell his lectureship at Cambridge in 1916, and, in 1918, his freedom. E. W. Barnes, later Bishop of Birmingham and a convinced and vociferous pacifist, was a tutor at Trinity, where he opposed the action against Russell. Others, like the Reverend Basil Bourchier, deplored the fact that conscription was needed.[54] Chaplains were more aware than anyone of the need for fresh recruits if the war effort was to be sustained, and they were not immune to the shortage of manpower themselves.

Canon Peter Green, writing in 1928, considered that the real tragedy for the Church was that so many of those who had earlier opposed the idea of war expressed the belief, in 1914, that England was morally bound to fight.[55] He acknowledged that he had been one of those who had changed his views and he still felt that this had been the right decision at the time. Green felt that the country faced a choice between a bad decision and a worse one in August, 1914, and she chose the "bad". Green admitted the pre-war failure of the clerics more clearly than most
would be prepared to do. By no means everyone changed course when war broke out in 1914. Bernard Shaw argued that it was the duty of religious leaders to take a firm stand against war:

If all the Churches of Europe closed their doors until the drums ceased rolling they would act as a most powerful reminder that though the glory of war is a famous and ancient glory, it is not the final glory of God. [56]

There was certainly a pressing need for some form of corporate action by the Church of England, to demonstrate clearly the stand Church leaders had chosen to take over the war. At best some form of interdenominational gesture might have provoked a more questioning attitude, but the chances of achieving any such agreement were slim.

Few doubts had been raised about the justice of the nation's cause in 1914. The majority of clergymen who had been attracted by various pacifist movements before the war quickly abandoned them. [57] In order to present a united front, and as members of the established Church, they seem to have felt that it was their duty to preach the justice of the nation's cause. The status of the Church of England as the national Church ensured an attitude of complete acceptance from laity and clergy, according to the Archbishop of York: "every man who respected his conscience must stand to his place until the war is ended". [58] Marrin argued that when war broke out:

...clergy and laity alike took it for granted that, as a servant of the state, the Church would contribute directly to the Allied cause by explaining to the people the causes and the meaning of the war, maintaining on the home front a high level of morale.[59]

Archbishop Lang voiced the feelings of many clergymen when he argued that peace was impossible until German militarism had been crushed. [60] As the fighting continued, the Church of England fulfilled a valuable role in the eyes of the Government and the
Army by seeking to distinguish between the act of killing and the act of murder. By so doing the Church provided the reassurance needed by men brought up in a Christian society to convince them of the justice of their cause.

Much was made of the "just war" theory and the need to fight the evil aggressor. Dr. J. D. Crozier, Primate of All Ireland, addressing the U.V.F. in September, 1914, spoke of the justice of the nation's cause, and he argued that the war was just, because Great Britain "was forced into the present war, utterly against her will, by the paramount obligation of fidelity to plighted faith, and the duty of defending weaker nations against violence and wrong". Crozier denounced the destruction of all Christian ideals in pre-war Germany and blamed "the gross materialism of German philosophy" and "the ever-growing Rationalism and Atheism of a once Christian nation" for the war. He quoted Joel 3:9 in support of his views; he was particularly attached to the phrase: "Prepare war, wake up the mighty men" which he interpreted as meaning: "that war is to be undertaken as in God's sight and to be carried on under His direction".[61] If such was the case, there could be no argument against involvement in the war from the national Church.

As the war continued beyond the first year, the Church of England experienced several significant shifts in attitude. Doubts began to surface. The shattering disappointment when the war did not come to an end by Christmas, 1914, led to an increasing feeling of unease amongst clergymen. By May, 1915, the execution of Edith Cavell heralded a shift in preaching to a more crusading spirit.[62] Towards the end of 1916, another significant shift in opinion occurred. The scale of destruction and the number of lives lost had reached levels unimagined in
1914. This led to some serious moral doubts being expressed for the first time by the religious press. The Chaplains carried a heavy burden of responsibility. If they failed to impress the men to whom they sought to minister, they could do irreparable damage to the Church, which was already in a vulnerable position.

As Clergymen sought a meaningful explanation of events, they tended to concentrate their preaching on the need to conquer such an evil enemy. The previously comforting "Just War" theory did not seem to answer in the days of "Total war". A mood of despair grew as the casualty lists lengthened. Marrin argued that the reaction of the clergy was to put forward the idea that Britain was involved in a "holy war" to rid the world of the evil that Germany was perceived to represent: "God’s hand was discerned as the guiding force behind the disastrous war needed to bring humanity to its senses and create a lasting peace".

Leading Churchmen, including the Bishop of London, emphasised the point that this was the war to end wars. The bishops recognised that a much more determined effort was needed if the Church was to stand any chance of retaining or increasing its congregations. Their deliberations eventually produced the National Mission of Repentance and Hope, an initiative by which the bishops hoped to raise public awareness of the teachings of the Church of England.

New weapons raised new issues for all clergymen. Their role as moral guide could lead to conflicts with the military authorities. The nature of the fighting and the development of new methods of killing gave rise to a debate about the morality of using poison gas. Many clergymen, at home and serving with the troops, were uneasy about this. Gas was widely regarded as a "dirty weapon".

Archbishop Davidson believed that the
dishonour of sinking to Germany's level and using gas should be avoided. He wrote to the Prime Minister, Asquith, and to Lord Stamfordham, the King's Private Secretary, warning against the dangers of retaliation. He was widely criticised for his remarks, although he did receive many letters thanking him for his stand.[67] Lord Kitchener announced that the use of gas would begin. (18 May 1915) Its use was soon widely accepted as a necessary evil and the protests all but ceased. Moral indignation, in this case, seems to have been dulled by the ever-increasing length of the casualty lists in the papers.

The Allied bombing of civilian targets, most notably Freiburg, drew condemnation from many leading churchmen. It gave rise to a lively debate in the home Church and press. Both Archbishop Davidson and Bishop Talbot denounced the action in the House of Lords.[68] As a result of these comments, a great deal of correspondence reached Lambeth, demanding the slaughter of German civilians and criticising the clergy for their non-combatant status.[69] Attitudes seemed to be hardening and the Church appeared to be out of step with popular opinion until, on the fourth anniversary of the war, Marrin believed "the depths were finally reached when The Church Times (2 August 1918) advocated the use of dum-dum bullets on the Western Front".[70] Perhaps the Churches should have chosen to remain aloof as Shaw had suggested; closing the Church doors until reason returned to the conduct of international affairs might have been preferable to this sort of involvement.

Very little attention was devoted by Churchmen to promoting the idea of a negotiated peace settlement, which many openly described as treachery. Chaplains seem to have shared the view of the Archbishop of Canterbury on this matter. Randall
Davidson argued that the pursuit of a negotiated peace, before the evil of the enemy had been fully exposed, would be unacceptable:

So long as the enemy assure us that they are committed irrevocably to principles which I regard as absolutely fatal to what Christ has taught us – fatal to the very principles, surely, on which all sound national or international life must stand – I should look on it as flimsy sentimentalism were I to say that I wanted immediate peace. [71]

Chaplains might be sickened by the daily toll of dead, and the wounded might long for peace, but many of them still condemned those who sought peace at any price. Mellish believed that "the 'peace at any price' is the work of the devil, who wants men to fight and grab and hate. God hates war, but He still more hates a sham peace." [72] It is unlikely that all clergymen shared the view that an acceptable negotiated peace would be impossible to achieve but the chances of any public debate by members of the established Church on the subject were slim. Albert Marrin’s study (1974) found nothing in the wartime Anglican Press or theological journals to suggest opposition to the continuation of the war. [73] The few organizations opposed to war would certainly have welcomed any endorsement from Church of England Clergy, but none came. The only religious group to argue consistently against the use of force was the Society of Friends. [74]

In 1915, the Fellowship of Reconciliation was established. This was a specifically Christian Pacifist group founded by George Lansbury and Maude Royden, both Anglican, with the Presbyterian, W. E. Orchard. The fellowship attempted to promote a more forgiving attitude, but progress was slow. [75] In spite of their efforts, the rejection of the pacifist stand taken by Conscientious Objectors was almost unanimous. Some Clergymen spoke out about the poor treatment of imprisoned objectors, but
hardly a voice was raised in support of their cause. No leading Churchman was prepared to declare his support for the cause in 1914. Some condemned the "well-intentioned but wrong-headed action of pacifists" as a cause of the war.

Father Paul Bull, chaplain in the Boer war and in the First World War, denounced the "false teaching of Pacifism" and claimed that pacifists were the enemies of peace.

Chaplains and the clergy at home shared concern about the damage that could be done by pacifists and Conscientious Objectors. Barry echoed the views of the Archbishop of Canterbury, when he urged all pacifists to examine carefully the reasons behind their conviction. Barry seems to have suspected the pacifists' motives:

We must be sure that we object to War because it is an outrage on humanity, not because it is expensive, or because we shrink from pain and hard realities and suffering, or the responsibilities of service.

The Church of England faced a particularly difficult dilemma. Most clergymen agreed that objectors had a moral right to state their case, but for the Church to be seen to be encouraging such unpatriotic opinions in wartime was unthinkable. Archbishop Davidson was closely involved with many tribunals; he commented in a letter to Viscount Milner that a more sensible approach all round could have avoided some of the problems created by imprisoning men.

The clergy themselves did not always take a balanced view; many served on tribunals but they seldom seemed to have much sympathy for those who appeared before them. On one occasion a clergyman asked an applicant: "Since when has the spirit of God prevented a young man like you doing his duty to help his country and his friends?"

Chaplains revealed a much more sympathetic side of the
Church in their dealings with deserters. On the whole, they seemed to be more tolerant than the home clergy. During the third battle of Ypres, the Reverend Leonard Pearson recognised a young officer from his work with the Boys' Brigade before the war. The man was wandering around, away from his unit and clearly in distress. Pearson talked to him for some time and eventually persuaded him to rejoin his unit. In the course of the conversation, Pearson learned that the officer's unit had fifteen men awaiting execution. He later learned that the officer had been killed the following day, presumably in action, and noted:

I was very upset about it. I think it was simply disgraceful that there should have been a death penalty. How does the average man, in the heat of battle, tell the difference between a real nervous breakdown and cowardice? I don't think it should have any place in battle at all.

Captain Harold Dardon, R.A.M.C. successfully defended one of his men who was court-martialled for desertion: "They tell me he'll probably get shot by his own mates the next time we go over the top". Deardon's reaction to the individual was a mixture of sympathy and contempt, and there is little evidence to suggest that the attitude of the men was likely to be any different. Tom Pym was called upon to deal with at least four cases of execution for desertion during his time in France. He felt that such a harsh sentence was necessary to prevent desertions which "would mean in the end more suffering and bloodshed than need be before victory were won".

The gulf between Chaplains and the home clergy was partly the result of the general division between those at home and those at the front but it was also the result of the deliberate policy of the Church of England to send out some of the youngest and least experienced clergymen to serve as temporary
Chaplains. Away from the confines of parochial life they made the most of their "temporary independence" to learn about the needs of the men they sought to serve. In doing so they developed a new sympathy and understanding with clergymen from other denominations, which gave rise to a new respect with which the home-based clergy struggled to come to terms. Chaplains were the first to recognise that wartime required a much greater degree of tolerance from the clergy if they were to avoid seeming petty and divisive. The conclusion reached by an Interdenominational Commission enquiring into the state of religion in the Army vindicated their opinions. The Commission concluded that "divisions within and between Churches gave an impression of confusion and rivalry".[86]

In 1918 the final interdenominational conference of the war was held at Blandeques.[87] Attended by Bishop Gwynne, Dr. Simms and representatives from many different denominations, the conference reflected the genuine desire amongst many Chaplains for wartime co-operation to continue. Such hopes were likely to run into problems, since the gulf which had developed between the home clergy and Chaplains meant that, in terms of ecumenism, the Chaplains would find it difficult to readjust to home Church attitudes and prejudices. The many examples of co-operation between Chaplains of different denominations during wartime service overseas might make life uncomfortable for the clergy and the laity after the war. During the war, common ground shared by Chaplains and the home-based clergy was limited to the abandonment of pre-war pacifism and initial support for Britain's involvement in the conflict. Later, support from both chaplains and home clergy was modified by genuine moral doubts about the development of new weapons and military tactics. At the same time, clergymen
sought to demonstrate their contribution to the national sacrifice by some form of corporate action on behalf of the Church of England. Their restlessness contributed to a fresh debate on the subject of clerical exemption from military service.
THE CONTROVERSY OVER CLERICAL EXEMPTION.
The question of whether clergymen should be allowed to enlist for combatant service presented Church leaders with a dilemma when war broke out, a problem which increased in intensity as the war progressed. Clerical exemption from military service was widely recognised before the First World War, but clergymen struggled to justify their exemption as the nature of the national emergency became clear. This was, after all, a war like no other and it made demands on the population that were unprecedented in modern history. Deep divisions existed within the Church of England. The bishops seemed content to support Archbishop Davidson's view that a combatant role would be inappropriate for ordained men and chaplains like Mervyn Evers and Noel Mellish agreed. Some, like R. F. Calloway and Charles Raven, sought to enlist as combatants. 

As the manpower shortage worsened, some chaplains questioned the contribution that the clergy were perceived to be making to the war effort. The Archbishop came under pressure to review his stand against clerical enlistment. Pressure came from the attitude of the public, from serving chaplains and from restless young clergymen who felt the same pull of patriotism and duty that encouraged so many of their parishioners to enlist in the first months of the war.

The most desirable form of service, as far as most clergymen were concerned, was that of chaplain to the forces. But the Chaplains' Department was rapidly swamped by an enormous number of volunteers in the opening weeks of the war. The Archbishops had to look elsewhere for alternative forms of service for their restless clergy. In November, 1914, both the C.E.M.S. and the Y.M.C.A. were planning a series of evangelical addresses, and many clergy became involved. The Reverend Richard Brooks, Dean of Merton, had some success when he wrote to Davidson...
urging more efforts to promote the work of the Y.M.C.A. as a suitable form of service for Anglican clergy who could not be offered chaplain's posts. Some clergymen found that work in the huts could provide them with useful experience, but it did not satisfy their need to take a more active role in the national effort.

Church leaders sought to contain the desires of young clergymen by a variety of methods. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson, writing to the Clergy and Diocese of Canterbury within days of the outbreak of war, made it clear that he understood the pressures already building among Churchmen who were anxious to make a contribution to the nation’s effort. From the outset, he indicated that for many clergymen the most positive contribution they could make would be to continue to minister to their parishioners, in what would no doubt be the difficult days ahead. Davidson recognised that his advice would not be well-received, particularly by the younger clergy. He knew that they might feel obliged to enlist to provide an example to their parishioners.

Davidson's efforts failed to stem the tide of requests for special dispensation to enlist, which continued to reach the bishops in the early months of the war. He took a stand against clergymen enlisting for combatant duties, but he stopped short of condemning men who chose to do so. He felt keenly that it was a matter for a man and his conscience, even though he personally regarded such service as incompatible with his Ordination vows. Davidson hesitated before making a public statement to this effect. In a private letter to the Bishop of Salisbury, Davidson made it clear that unless clergymen were faced with "a moment of supreme emergency in the Nation's life", for instance if
the country was invaded or the parish was under attack, he would consider it a grave mistake for any to go as combatants:

I do not believe that an ordained man ought to be a combatant in the Army. For the Minister of Christ to serve as a fighting soldier is to my mind to disregard unduly the special commission which is his.[7]

In August, 1914, B. K. Cunningham, working at the Bishop’s Hostel, Farnham, had drawn Davidson’s attention to the "considerable unrest" amongst the young clergymen particularly in rural areas, where the enlistment of civilians was very low and the temptation for clergy to enlist "for example’s sake" was much greater.[8] In spite of Cunningham’s warnings, Church leaders failed to appreciate the level of frustration that existed amongst some of the clergy.[9]

The Archbishop was finally persuaded to make a statement on clerical exemption when he found that the press had been in receipt of a number of letters on the subject. Geoffrey Robinson of The Times told Davidson that he had received letters from "high quarters" in the Church. "I gather controversy is raging about the lawfulness of the younger clergy volunteering for active service." Robinson also noted that many letters asked for "an authoritative statement" from the Archbishop.[10] Writing in September, 1914, Davidson maintained that "the position of an actual combatant in our Army is incompatible with the position of one who has sought and received Holy Orders".[11] His comments were welcomed by the bishops, the Chaplain General, Bishop Taylor Smith, was particularly appreciative. The letter to the bishops was

...excellent, and it has already toned down a few fiery spirits.  
If only our brethren would rise to this unique opportunity of winning men for Christ. The soil is just now soft and deep. You greatly strengthen my hands.[12]

Davidson’s statement did little to quell the demands from the
other ranks of the clergy for a more active role and the issue continued to provoke widespread discussion amongst both the home clergy and the chaplains serving overseas throughout the war. [13] He continued to receive many requests for clarification and letters pleading exceptional circumstances, but, with one brief exception, in 1918, he never wavered in his conviction that the clergy should not engage in combatant service, a conviction for which there was a clear historical precedent. [14]

Davidson did encourage the enlistment of ordination candidates. He wrote to all the Principals of Theological Colleges encouraging their students to enlist as combatants just like any other student. The importance of the ordination vows was always emphasized by Davidson as the main argument against combatant clergy and since the students had not yet been ordained, he had no objection to their enlistment:

I have no feeling at all that vocation to the Ministry is really impaired or interrupted by a man’s going for a time to serve as a combatant on his country’s behalf in a just cause. To mix up the ordinand and the ordained man is, I think, to confuse the issues. [15]

The 32 English Theological Colleges reported a steady fall in the number of ordinations throughout the war as students responded to the call. [16] The Bishops of London, Carlisle, Chester and Manchester flatly refused to ordain men who were in a condition to serve in the Army. [17] Many ordinands needed no encouragement. One student close to ordination applied for a commission in the 3/9th London Regiment. He acknowledged that it was a terrible wrench to leave his approaching ministry, but he felt compelled by a strong sense of duty to enlist. [18] As the war continued, the need for new recruits became more urgent and the younger clergy pressed vigorously for a change in the attitude of church leaders to clerical enlistment. Some of them argued that the Church could
not retain any credibility if clergymen refused to make the sacrifice demanded from the rest of the population, in service to King and Country. The Archbishops and bishops began to look for a compromise.

Lengthy discussions took place at all levels of the church and amongst the laity, considering whether the more impatient clergy should be allowed to enlist for non-combatant service. The question of some form of "corporate action" by the church was raised in many circles as an answer to those who criticised the lack of any real commitment by the church to the national effort.[19] The views of the Reverend F. O. T. Hawkes were typical of many letters reaching Lambeth in the summer of 1915. Hawkes felt that the Church was failing to present its case. "It has not been made clear to people at large that the Church has made and is ready to make a Corporate sacrifice for the sake of the country".[20] Whilst recognising that many individual sacrifices had been made, he complained that poor communication was hampering efforts to improve the public face of the Church. He wanted to know why no statement had been made to the effect that the majority of theological students had enlisted. The country and the Church as a whole were "quite ignorant of the fact" because it had not been done in a corporate manner, and Hawkes felt strongly that many clergymen would struggle to answer the question "What has the Church done?" when in fact she had told all her students to enlist. The younger clergy who obeyed their bishops and stayed at their posts suffered "almost intolerable" abuse: taunts and jeering children followed them as they moved about their parishes. Many of them had petitioned their bishops to no avail, and the indignity of receiving a white feather must have been particularly hurtful for men like Father Warren who were
eager to serve.[21] Hawkes felt they would be better off joining the R.A.M.C. as an example, as an offering to the country, and, most importantly, as a corporate act revealing to the public a more generous spirit in the Church.[22]

The question of clerical exemption was raised again by the 1915 National Registration Act, the Derby scheme, which sought to register all men between the ages of 15 and 65 with a view to assigning them to work of national importance.[23] The Archbishops continued to stress that the prime concern of the clergy should be to pursue their work in the home parishes and to see this as the best and most appropriate form of national service they could undertake.[24] They advocated additional services in all churches, although this was not always practical, given the number of clergy already serving away from their home parishes. They also stressed the need to continue to provide chaplains for service at home and overseas, but on the question of combatant service they refused to move. In November, 1915, Davidson was still adamant that it would be wrong for clergy to enlist, he explained his concerns to the Bishop of Southwark:

I have seldom known a more anxious or difficult question. I am quite clear that if men do feel it to be their duty to enlist, in spite of the advice we have given, we ought not to regard them as black sheep in consequence. I do not think, however, that we could rightly let a man retain an incumbency while serving as a combatant.[25]

There seems to have been very little dissent in the higher ranks of the clergy. Davidson made an astute move when he refused to prevent clergy from enlisting for combatant service. His decision merely to advise against this and his refusal to penalise those who, in all conscience, could not refrain from enlisting probably did much to mitigate the stance he had taken in the eyes of some of the most restless churchmen.
When the Derby Scheme failed to produce the optimistic numbers anticipated the likelihood of some form of compulsion increased.[26] The start of 1916 saw pressure mounting on Church leaders. On the one hand, the number of clergy now serving away from their home parish had created problems in maintaining an appropriate level of care for parishioners, and on the other, pressure was growing for a review of the church's stance against clergy enlisting as combatants.[27] The Archbishop of Canterbury was slow to appreciate the growing criticism of the clergy and the effect that it had on the young curates scattered in parishes across the country. When he did begin to appreciate the level of their discomfort, he sought a solution in the form of some sort of organized national service appropriate to ordained men. This produced some strange anomalies. The Bishop of Birmingham, in a private note to the Archbishop of Canterbury, told of one of his clergy who was a "distinguished experimental chemist". On volunteering for national service in preference to combatant service, he became "the leading research worker at the greatest gas [poisonous] factory we have, and has, I suppose, more German victims of his brain than any other ordained man in the world!"[28] The bishop did not seem to be particularly perturbed by the moral implications of this; he simply noted it as interesting. On the other hand, many chaplains took a dim view of young clergy being employed in munitions work when there were so many opportunities for spiritual work in such areas.[29]

The arguments for staying at home and continuing with parish duties did weigh heavily with the bishops. The Bishop of Bristol argued that although the motives of those who stayed at home were likely to be questioned, any misunderstandings would simply add to their sacrifice, since it was clearly their duty to
strive to maintain the "spirit of the Nation" at whatever personal cost.[30] These views were echoed time and again by church leaders seeking to pacify restless clergy, who resented the criticism they received by remaining at home.[31] Davidson believed that a change of opinion had occurred among lay people. Many now voiced the opinion that clergy should bear arms and share in the national sacrifice. Lord Derby informed the Archbishops that feelings were running high from both anti and pro-church people: "They feel the Church is being very much weakened by this exceptional treatment that is being meted out to the clergy."[32] Some senior chaplains serving in France criticised the decision of the Archbishops to continue to discourage clerical combatancy when

...considerable numbers of clergy have enlisted with the approval, tacit or expressed, of their diocesans. Of late also there has been a growing impression that the Bishops as a body are less definite in their attitude to this question, and among some chaplains and combatant officers there is a deepening impression that it is suggested that what is right for a Christian layman is wrong for a clergyman: consequently a new pronouncement by the Archbishops would be greatly valued.[33]

Attempts to find an appropriate alternative to clerical enlistment proved frustrating. Davidson considered "the possibility of clergy being enlisted or attested for non-combatant service either at home or abroad" in a more formal way than the rather haphazard volunteer system already operating. He envisaged a variety of work for such men from clerical to R.A.M.C., but the scheme proved to be less straightforward than Davidson had imagined. He found that existing clergy volunteers working as stretcher bearers or hospital orderlies had proved unsatisfactory to both the medical staff involved and to the clergy themselves. Davidson was in a particularly difficult position: he had no objection to clergy undertaking non-combatant service, but no-one seemed to have the facility to cope with a large number of willing
but usually untrained and inexperienced volunteers.[34]

Whilst Church leaders sought to establish schemes for
volunteers, the younger clergy became ever more restless and
anxious to be seen to be doing their bit. Five curates from the
Canterbury Diocese approached Davidson, expressing their anxiety
and asking to become involved in non-combatant service. They
referred to the strong feelings among laymen: "They think and say
that the only Profession that has not altered its usual course is
that of the clergy."[35] They argued that the enlisting of clergy
for non-combatant service "would greatly raise the standard of
self-sacrifice, both amongst the clergy and in the Church and
country at large". The clergy in the parishes had been first to
appreciate the damage done to the reputation of the church by the
lack of some kind of Corporate act. The five curates asked that
"some general scheme should be authorised, by which the country
shall know that all clergy who can possibly be spared have been
selected by their Supreme Authorities and urged to enlist as non-
combatants". Their request found an echo in a petition from some
London curates to their bishop.[36] One thousand junior clergy
petitioned Winnington-Ingram, emphasizing the need to re-organize
the home church in order to free more men for service. They also
asked church leaders to reconsider the question of combatant
service for the clergy, but the bishop refused on the grounds that
they were needed at home.[37] This clear demand for some form of
corporate act to absolve the Church of the sense of guilt that
many young clergy were experiencing made sense to the Church
leaders. Davidson hoped that it would take the heat out of the
vociferous criticism of many of the younger clergy at home and
help to pacify lay critics of the church.

The Military Service Bill of January, 1916 introduced
conscription for single men. There can be no doubting the serious nature of the manpower shortage at this time. The position of the few young clergymen who remained at their posts must have been very difficult. The manpower shortage did not seem to have improved by April, when Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, wrote to the Duke of Connaught: "We are in great trouble at present because we cannot get the number of men we want. I am giving the Government no peace on the subject and intend to give them none." [38] The measure produced only 545,000 men between January and June 1916, instead of the anticipated 967,000. [39] The pressure increased on the Government to find more men.

The new Military Service Bill revived the impatience and frustration of the younger clergymen who had so far been willing to follow the advice of their bishops and remain at their posts. Widespread speculation about the ending of clerical exemption caused Davidson and his colleagues much unease. [40] The legislation which extended compulsory enlistment to married men, in May, 1916, created more problems for Church leaders. In private Davidson and his bishops worried that clerical exemption was under threat from a shift in public opinion. [41] In October, 1916, the Reverend R. Aubrey Aitken told the Archbishops that there was amongst his parishioners "a very strong feeling......the time has come now when the Church must make bigger sacrifices if she deserves to maintain the respect of the country". [42]

Davidson sought to settle the question of clerical exemption once and for all by issuing a memo on the subject of "The Clergy and National Service" at Christmas, 1916. [43] This indicated that a plan for the enrolment of clergy had been agreed
between the two Archbishops and the Director General of the Government’s National Service Scheme, Neville Chamberlain. The precise plan troubled Davidson throughout January, 1917. He told Chamberlain "I want the Clergy to be called in and bear their part: the question is how!" Davidson must have been relieved to find that Chamberlain was sympathetic to his views.

Chamberlain asked the bishops to enrol the clergy for work either as chaplains to the Navy or the Army, or to hospitals and munitions areas where many temporary huts had been established. Some clergy were assigned to General Service which was likely to mean munitions work, office work or agricultural work, replacing men who had enlisted for military service. Others would be directed to work in large under-staffed parishes. Moves to release more men for service included an amendment to the rules of the Board of Education. This measure, taken in March, 1917, enabled more clergymen to go into schools to free others for national service or enlistment. It was surely something that the Church leaders should have pressed for earlier.

The recruitment of clergy for non-military national service still rested solely with the bishops, who could continue to restrict the number of men freed from parish responsibilities, and for this it was much criticised by clergymen who felt that they were still being singled out for special treatment.

It did not represent the much talked-about "corporate gesture" and even if it was a step in the right direction, the message had failed to reach many of the church's critics. A letter from Wilson Carlile at Church Army Headquarters argued that the national mobilization was there for all to see, but "there is no indication that the forces of the Church are being mobilized to any extent to meet the new conditions, parochial and otherwise,
created by the War".[49] Carlile cited the example of migrant workers in the main munitions centres where many thousands of souls were left with no support from the Church of England. He also maintained that the Church Army could use a further 160 clergy at once to help in their huts at home and abroad, and he urged the bishops to mobilize the lay forces of the Church in order to release more clergy for such work.

Many parishes did encourage the laity to take a more active role in Church life to ease the burden on over-stretched ministers. This did not always meet with success. Canon T. Guy Rogers was particularly disheartened to learn that some parishioners at home had objected to women speaking in Church.[50] He had been impressed to see women leading prayer meetings in the church at St. Omer, observing that such a sight would have shocked his own congregation: "we are all so hide-bound in the Anglican Church".[51] Bere observed that the chaplains were on the whole much more open to the notion of women taking a more active role in parish life and, like Rogers, he believed that women priests would be ordained in the future.[52] Chaplains like Barry, Bere and Rogers reviewed their experience of parish life and noted how incumbents were too often tied down by administrative duties to be able to exploit opportunities for spiritual work.[53] The pressure for change in the post war Church grew steadily.

During the war, the Archbishop of Canterbury was asked to consider many suggestions for reducing the burden on parochial clergy, to facilitate further combing out of men who might be spared for national service. Davidson was not prepared to license lay readers to take funeral services in order to free clergy for other duties, as the Bishop of Llandaff had suggested.[54] In March, 1917, he urged the clergy to "direct the attention of
congregations, both urban and rural, to the urgency of the call".[55] Davidson seemed oblivious of the fact that it was becoming increasingly embarrassing, particularly for the younger clergy, to do so. By 1917, the credibility of young clergy encouraging further sacrifices from their congregations, whilst seemingly unable to contribute in any meaningful way themselves, must surely have been undermined by. Aitken told Davidson that the Church risked losing the respect of the country if action was not taken to allow some of the younger clergy to enlist. He reported that "the sight of able-bodied curates working at home is at present infuriating many men".[56] Davidson had received similar warnings from laymen. Mr. Joseph Neves, of Sheffield, had demanded to know why the clergy were not fighting in "God's war".[57] Mr. T. Moffet, of Oxhey, Watford, sent the Archbishop a copy of the letter he had written to a local newspaper, which demanded to know why clergymen should not enlist. "Why has the clergyman not the moral courage to give up his job?"[58] Davidson's secretary referred Mr. Moffet to the words of the Ordination service. He pointed out that the clergymen who remained at their posts often required greater courage than those who left to perform other duties.

In their anxiety to avoid being labelled as unpatriotic for refusing to allow clergymen to enlist for military service, Church leaders sought to emphasize the contribution of clergymen involved in non-military national service. Their contribution by March, 1917, was considerable. The Clergy National Service Committee reported to Davidson that 2,175 clergy had registered so far and the bishops had found "special service" for 998 of these. A total of 338 remained available for the committee to use and some 839 had offered "general service": "The bishops have
been taking an immense amount of trouble, as is shown by the fact that nearly 1,000 men have already been placed and we have not yet got the papers in from more than half the Dioceses", the Committee reported. The work of many parish clergy had been increased by the presence of large numbers of wounded men in local hospitals. The need for family visitation was even greater in wartime and, according to the Bishop of Chester, "the call and opportunity for intensive work is greater". The effort required to overcome such shortages and satisfy the need for spiritual guidance placed a serious burden on the Church.\[59\] There was no new blood coming through, as ordinations had all but ceased.\[60\] Many chaplains felt that further efforts to free men from their parish responsibilities endangered the principle that continuance of their spiritual work was the best contribution they could make to the national effort. To surrender this principle, they argued, would remove the justification for clerical exemption from military service.\[61\]

Geoffrey Gordon, a senior chaplain serving in France in August, 1917, was sufficiently alarmed by the unrest amongst the chaplains in France to write to George Bell at Lambeth. Gordon's approach to Bell (and indirectly through him to Davidson) reflected the chaplains' concern about the contribution the clergy were perceived to be making to the national effort. Chaplains already faced difficulties defending their own temporary contracts when the men they ministered to were under compulsion for the duration.\[62\] The recent publication of the numbers of clergymen placed at the disposal of Chamberlain for non-military service had produced a fresh wave of criticism from the chaplains Gordon encountered at the Chaplains' School:

Some chaplains draw from these figures the conclusion that such men ought to be serving as soldiers, or in the
R.A.M.C. and other non-combatant branches of the Army; others would sooner see them employed at the work for which they were ordained regardless of popular clamour.[63]

A recent increase in the numbers of clergy serving in Y.M.C.A. and C.A. huts along the western front had provoked "much sarcastic comment" from the troops according to Gordon. He believed that the news of clergymen working on national service for six days and returning to their parish duties each Sunday caused "very great anxiety as it looks like a reversion to the idea of religion as a purely Sunday affair which we chaplains hoped we were largely succeeding in killing". The points Gordon raised were, he argued...

...typical of the subjects which are causing unrest and uneasiness. There is much discussion at the Chaplains' school and up and down the Front but I can not but feel that much of its value is impaired by the scantiness of our knowledge as to what is really being done at home.[64]

In reply Bell acknowledged that it might have been a popular gesture to allow clergy to enlist as combatants, but he argued that support for the stand taken by the Archbishop came from the highest ranks of military and naval authorities.[65] The Bishop of Carlisle argued that the presence of combatant clergy would be unsettling for their fellow soldiers, acting as a hindrance rather than a help.[66] The majority of men in the trenches opposed the idea of the fighting parson according to Tubby Clayton. He had chaired a debate on the issue from which he concluded that "the soldiers' sentiment seems strongly against it - eg., a debate in which only 2 padres and 2 men voted for it, and 200 against it".[67]

Bell argued that the clergy were already making an appropriate and significant contribution to the national sacrifice.[68] Most opportunities were for part time service, and this could be combined reasonably well with existing parish
The Clergy National Service Committee found that:

After a most rigorous sifting, in many cases by means of a specially appointed Board, including laymen as well as clergy, it was found that very few (comparatively speaking) could be released for whole time work.[69]

Some 1,949 clergy had been offered to the Director General of National Service for service in agricultural, munitions, engineering, secretarial or teaching work. The majority of these men worked for weekdays only, with Sundays spent in their own parishes. Bell acknowledged that the chaplains would take exception to this arrangement, but he argued that munitions work brought clergy into contact with people and enabled them to learn, "which will make them better parsons". He used the same line to justify the work of the younger clergy in the huts. They might well have been doing women's work but, he argued: "these clergy are not sent out with their entire ministry suspended to do work of a purely secular character". Bell argued that their main, though less conspicuous work, was entirely spiritual.

Many of the points raised by Gordon were again the subject of criticism from serving chaplains following the Archbishop of York's visit to the Chaplains' School. The most outspoken critic among the chaplains was Tom Pym. In his Memo of 11 July, 1917, Pym argued that the number of clergy working in the huts or at home in their parishes was simply "freeing the laity for the firing line" and by so doing "giving rise to a misunderstanding which seriously injures the church's influence at this time". Pym urged Church leaders to reconsider the whole question of exemption, but this was not his main complaint. His prime concern was with the reorganization of parishes to cut work and free men for service elsewhere. He was particularly worried about inconsistency between the dioceses. Pym also argued that
the freedom of choice given to clergy, when denied to almost
everyone else, was more of a barrier than Church leaders realised:

"We consider that the liberty of choice allowed to us as
clergy and our exceptional treatment by exemption--
misunderstood as they are--are becoming disastrous
hindrances to the Church’s influence. There is already
evidence that clergy of military age who have not been
allowed to take part in the national sacrifice will not
be listened to after the war." [70]

He believed the need for change was so urgent that chaplains were
even considering resigning their commissions in order to enlist
for non-combatant duties, which would "force into the service
fellow-priests, no less eager than ourselves but hitherto bound at
home". Pym clearly felt that the leaders of the Church were not
responding well to the situation.

Pym was a widely respected chaplain and his comments
were not isolated; they contained many of the points raised
earlier by Gordon, and a more decisive reaction was clearly
required if the credibility of the Church was not to be further
damaged. Bishop Gwynne’s office was particularly anxious to
secure a speedy response from the Archbishops. [71] Pym’s Memo was
supported by a full page of signatures including those of
Blackburne, Gordon, Raven and Neville Talbot. [72] The Senior
Chaplain at Le Havre, F. R. Girdlestone produced an alternative
memo raising the additional question about the combing-out of the
University and Cathedral towns. [73] Yet again, the need for some
form of corporate action was expressed by an experienced chaplain
serving overseas. The lack of communication between church
leaders and the clergy serving in France continued to give rise to
many problems and misunderstandings. [74]

In a fresh attempt to quell criticism from some of their
clergy, the Archbishops issued a document entitled Points Arising
out of the Archbishop of York's visit to France. On the question of combatant status, Davidson stated that

...those who have been ordained to the Ministry of Word and Sacrament ought, even in time of actual warfare, to regard that Ministry, whether at home or in the field, as their special contribution to the country's service. [75]

Lang argued that the majority of the clergy and laity agreed and accepted this as right. Individuals who felt they must enlist were not prevented from doing so and it was felt that they would be given a sympathetic hearing when they returned from military service. The variety of work open to the clergy was emphasized: the number of serving chaplains had expanded rapidly in answer to the call, and all manner of work was being undertaken as part of the Church's contribution to the national effort. Lang urged that "every possible effort should be made to get the action of the Church more definitely stated in the public press". He recognised that a much more open approach was required if the Church was to improve the chaplains' perception of the contribution being made by the home clergy. He believed that "chaplains who have grown accustomed to the discipline of the Army feel strongly that the authority which decides whether or no a man should stay in his parish should be publicly known and stated". [76] In order to combat this, Lang called for more lay involvement in the selection of clergy for service outside their own parishes.

The information reaching Lambeth in August, 1917, coupled with the criticisms raised by the chaplains, led to some important changes. Pym's proposals led Davidson to appoint a Committee of Bishops, clergy and laity to "consider defects in the full use of the resources of the Church". The Archbishop also expressed some concern that Gwynne needed the help of an assistant bishop in France and he proposed to discuss the matter with Gwynne.
at the forthcoming meeting at Lambeth. Another item on the agenda for this meeting concerned the future and the problems demobilization would bring. It was also one of the subjects raised by the chaplains in France and it addressed the need to establish a fund for ordination candidates when the war ended. As a result of the meeting between Gwynne and Davidson, a fund was established which eventually financed the Knutsford Ordination School.

In February, 1918, the urgent need for manpower to replace casualties on the Western Front resulted in a change being made in the classification of recruits who had previously been rejected. This increased pressure on the Church leaders to justify the continued exemption of clergymen and put all other issues aside for a time. The Ministry of National Service requested that bishops should refrain from ordaining men of military age who were fit enough to serve under the new, less rigid, guidelines. In future, the Ministry asked the bishops to refer such men to the Ministry before ordination. This would safeguard the bishops against the accusations of chaplains and others that they had deliberately obstructed the conscription of such individuals in the past, but it also sounded a note of alarm at Lambeth, as it indicated the desperate need for more men to serve in the Army. In March, 1918, Lord Derby acknowledged that new drafts could only be sent to France by the most ruthless "combing-out" process. He told the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Bonar Law: "We are breaking every pledge; we are sending out men with five and six wound stripes; we are sending out boys of eighteen and a half, although we promised not to send them out under nineteen." It seemed that Church leaders would not be able to resist any Government move to end
clerical exemption.

The new Military Service (Manpower) Bill of April, 1918, was the Government's response to the alarming casualty figures brought about by the German offensive. Clerical exemption was expected to go. Seemingly prepared to bow to the inevitable and accept some form of compulsion for the clergy, Davidson still hesitated to accept that combatant service should be forced upon them. He seems to have felt that, even at this late stage, some form of compromise would be possible. Sir George Cave, the Home Secretary, expressed a personal view, to Davidson, that the opportunity to specify non-combatant service would remain and in any case "unless we have some such provision, there will be very many applications for exemption". [81]

The manpower crisis dominated cabinet discussions in March, 1918. [82] By 25 March, the Government had reached its decision. The new Manpower Bill recognised the principle that "every Minister of religion under 50 years of age is liable to military service". [83] This gave rise to an upsurge of feeling among some of the clergy who had resented the bishops' stand against combatant service for ordained men. They felt that the opportunity had now come for the clergy to go and fight. In spite of his misgivings, Davidson accepted that the increased urgency of the manpower situation was such that the clergy should no longer be exempt from military service. He informed the Prime Minister that he could count on the support of the clergy. He did not specify whether this would include combatant service, but the implication was that it would:

We clergy, in face of an emergency so great, are ready, I firmly believe, to answer with whole-hearted loyalty to any new call that the Nation through its responsible spokesmen makes upon us. [84]

He assured Lloyd George that "The hour is too grave for any reply
but one". The Bill was introduced on 9 April.

Six days later, the Government's decision was reversed.

When he learned that the Government was likely to withdraw the clause conscripting the clergy, Davidson told the Bishops of London, Winchester and Southwark:

I should feel bound, I think, to make it very clear that it was not being done by our wish, and possibly should feel bound to say that we ought to bid the clergy who are willing to do so, volunteer for service, preferably non-combatant, but not exclusively so.[85]

The appeals from some clergy to be allowed to serve were renewed, amidst general disbelief that the clause including ministers of religion had been dropped. The letter sent to Davidson by Bishop B. F. Browne was typical of the response to the Manpower Bill.[86] Browne was over fifty; he recognised that age would bar him from service, but he pleaded on behalf of the younger clergy who had been restrained only by their knowledge of the Archbishop's views. Browne now asked the Archbishop of Canterbury to relent and to issue a dispensation to allow clergy to serve as combatants. He argued that such a move would have "a great effect on the country". In reply, Davidson referred to his own "distress" that the clause had been dropped, and his intention to make known to the House of Lords "that our clergy are eager to do whatever is to the national advantage".[87] He declined to make a more specific announcement on the lines suggested by Browne.

Seeking to minimise any further damage, Davidson told the House of Lords that the original exemption of the clergy had not been sought by the bishops or the clergy of the Church of England "although at the time he had emphatically supported it".[88] He took the opportunity to outline the contribution made by the clergy at home in the parishes and at war as chaplains, but he
must have been aware that the news that the clergy were, after all, to be exempt from the Manpower Services Bill would do the Church no good at all. The fever of doubt that the Bill had stirred up amongst clergymen had renewed discussion of issues with which church leaders felt they had already dealt. The prevarication of the Government cost the church dearly, as the fresh tide of letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury revealed.[89]

Canon T. Guy Rogers had served as a chaplain from October, 1915 until December, 1916.[90] He wrote to Davidson in despair, hearing that clergy exemption was to remain:

That the whole of the nation—except the clergy—should be under discipline and subject to authority is going to damage our influence very seriously. The unjust suspicion against which we have always to fight will once again accuse us of baseless intrigue.[91]

Rogers urged the Archbishops to snatch "victory from defeat" by placing all clergy under strict control and directing their work "in accordance with a strategic plan devised by our ecclesiastical authorities. Our 'rights' ought to go into the melting pot. At least as far as the rights of other people." This plea for corporate action reflects the long-standing failure of Church leaders to recognise the need to restore the credibility of the Church in the eyes of churchmen, serving chaplains and the general public.

The problem of securing a satisfactory balance between the number of clergy released for work outside their parishes and the need to maintain the level of services in the parishes continued to cause Davidson much unease in the spring of 1918. The Government was not without sympathy. The Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, shared the Archbishop's concern that religious ministrations throughout the country should not be neglected.[92]
Cave seemed to feel that the general consensus was that, in most areas, all those who could be spared had already been used and further reductions in the number of clergy available in the home parishes would be unwise. This point had not been accepted by the majority of chaplains serving abroad. Bishop Gwynne sought to convey to Davidson the dilemma facing those serving as chaplains who were coming to the end of their temporary contracts. Some of them had served for two or three years and the pull of their home parishes was strong, but Gwynne reported that they also felt it to be "now more than ever morally binding upon them to refuse to take advantage of their position as the one class in the whole B.E.F. who have choice to withdraw in this time of danger". It was not enough, according to Gwynne, to hide behind the argument that the ultimate decision rested with the bishops rather than with individual chaplains. Gwynne believed that: "In effect, the decision of the Government will mean that many chaplains, faced with the question of renewal of contract, will feel practically compelled to resign their parishes. This is hardly fair to them."

Gwynne was concerned that the clergy remained

...the one class in the community outside conscription; and in the mind of men in the Army, the majority of whom have been required to give up position and wealth and comfort, this cannot but be prejudicial to the Church. It is not easy for example for chaplains under such circumstances to speak upon the glory of sacrifice; unless it should be made far clearer that those who remain in their parishes are remaining there under direct orders both from Church and State.[93]

Gwynne was particularly anxious that the public should be made aware that it was not merely a church matter but something that the state had decided.[94]

Churchmen at home shared Gwynne's concerns. The Bishop of Manchester told Davidson that the Church in Lancashire had been damaged, since: "Their parishioners cannot understand the clergy
staying at home, and I am informed by the most trustworthy of my
clergy that the Church in Lancashire has suffered seriously in
consequence of the exemption of its ministers."[95] The Bishop
of Birmingham felt particularly aggrieved by the bad press given
to the clergy, since he felt that the majority of men had
volunteered for some kind of service and "our list of clergy
killed at the front grows constantly". He felt that his own work
with the laity and with soldiers had been seriously hampered by
"the incredibly stupid decision of the Government to exempt clergy
from the Bill. I should like a formal protest made upon that
subject."

[96] Hudson, the Mayor of Chelsea, told Davidson
that the

...general feeling is that the young clergy ought to
have taken their place with the rest of the young
manhood of the country, in combatant service. This is
the feeling too of practically all the young clergy that
I have met from time to time."

Hudson felt that the decision to discourage clergy from serving as
combatants had been a bad one: "as time went on, it became evident
to me that the Church was laying up for Herself a heritage of
misunderstanding that it would be very difficult to live down". Hudson voiced the arguments that many young clergy had been
advancing since the early days of the war. The clergy were seen
as holding back, not as being held back.[98] Barry believed that
an important opportunity had been lost. "Why oh why has the clause
about Clergy been withdrawn? A fresh chance missed."

Throughout the war, Davidson stood by his initial
response to the idea of combatant clergy. In a Recruiting
Supplement published by The Times, he had argued that "a true
instinct in the Church has throughout the centuries bid the clergy
not offer themselves as combatants in the field". [100] He argued
that "the deprivation is keenly felt" and the correspondence
received at Lambeth showed that many clergy would have enlisted, but for the advice of the Archbishop and his bishops. In spite of holding such strong personal views, the Archbishop of Canterbury refused to forbid clergymen to enlist for combatant service, as he explained in 1916:

I am not at all prepared to regard it as a matter of fundamental right and wrong to such an extent as to make it the duty of a conscientious priest to refuse to serve if his country calls for his service.[101]

Perhaps it would have been easier on the clergy who remained at home if Davidson had been prepared to take a firmer line, but for the long-term future of the Church, it was important that he should at least leave the option open.[102] The Bishop of Wakefield, writing to the Archbishop of York, was concerned that the Church was continuing to suffer because of the stand taken by Church leaders against the clergy serving as combatants. He reported that "The old feeling of resentment against our younger clergy has not decreased here" and he had noticed a resurgence in such feelings when the married men had been conscripted.[103] The decision of the Archbishop of Canterbury to accept the ending of clerical exemption in April, 1917 did nothing to mitigate this resentment. When the Government changed its mind, some chaplains were reluctant to accept that it had done so without the intervention of Church leaders. Davidson's speech to the House of Lords, protesting at the exemption of the clergy from the recent bill, failed to reassure them. The suspicion that he was simply going through the motions, when in fact he was relieved by the Government's decision, remained.[104] Davidson's failure to convince serving chaplains that the leadership of the Church of England had made the most effective use of its resources during the war fuelled their anxieties about the future of the Church.
9] THE NATIONAL MISSION OF REPENTANCE AND HOPE.
The National Mission of Repentance and Hope was an attempt by the leaders of the Church of England to raise public awareness of the teachings of the Church. It represented an effort to improve the relationship between church and people, in order to overcome the shortcomings of the Church which had been exposed by the war. The failure of the anticipated religious revival caused many clergymen to consider their position carefully; they felt that the Church must make some new effort to respond to the wartime needs of the population. The idea of launching any new initiative by the Church of England was certainly ambitious; it involved placing new demands upon clergymen who were already badly over-stretched. Army chaplains seized a rare opportunity to co-operate closely with the home church, and a limited initiative was mounted in France. This stimulated discussion among the chaplains about the future of the Church of England and brought forward many suggestions for change. Several committees were set up by the Archbishops to assess the impact of the Mission and to suggest new strategies for the Church. A fundamental reappraisal of teaching methods, services and Church administration was carried out. Unfortunately, Church leaders did not always welcome the criticism implied by suggestions for change. They were inclined to believe that chaplains serving overseas did not appreciate the difficulties faced by the home Church.

Alarmed by criticism of the Church of England, and faced with the failure of the revival to materialise, Archbishop Davidson sought the advice of his Bishops. He initiated discussions, in 1915, with a view to finding a more positive role for the Church. Dr. Arthur Robinson, of the College of All Hallowes, Barking, was asked to co-ordinate the discussions.
which took place between October, 1915 and January, 1916. The Bishops' response led to the launching of the National Mission of Repentance and Hope.[1] A great deal of time and energy was devoted to discussing the aims, title and duration of the proposed mission. The result was an over-ambitious scheme which paid little attention to the warnings from some clergymen that the timing of the Mission (October-November, 1916) was inappropriate, the title was misleading and the available manpower inadequate. In failing to mount a clearly defined campaign, the leaders of the Church of England seemed to confirm the extent to which they had lost touch with the needs of the population.

Robinson's group initially suggested that the Mission should be planned for the months following an armistice, with its aim "the spiritual uplift of the Nation". Contrary to this advice, Davidson decided to launch the Mission before the end of the war.[2] His decision was no doubt influenced by the growing anxiety of some of his clergymen, who felt that the Church should act swiftly to refute the charges of critics like Horatio Bottomley. Writing in John Bull, Bottomley argued that the Church of England had not risen to the needs of wartime. He was particularly critical of the Mission's title and the notion of repentance.[3]

Dr. Robinson told Davidson, in November, 1915, that the discussions about the Church of England's proposed Mission were disappointingly slow:

It was extremely difficult to make any progress in face of the determined pessimism of the Bishop of Oxford and Peter Green. The Bishop maintained that there was 'a rot amongst the clergy', who chiefly desired to flee from their spiritual duties; and that the Church was in such a state that any talk of a Mission to the Nation was quite out of the question. Peter Green was sure that the influence of the clergy in the community was nil.[4]
Canon Peter Green and the Bishops of Chelmsford and Oxford were also pessimistic about the chances of a successful Mission. [5] The Bishop of Oxford had joined the discussion group "with great hesitation"; he was convinced that the National Mission was a mistake, and:

...that the clergy were apathetic, that they were eager to leave their parishes for Army work, that there was a 'rot' among them, that we should do no good unless we declared for social and temperance reforms. [6]

Serious problems at an early stage in the planning of the Mission did not augur well for its chances overseas, where communication with Church leaders was even more tenuous.

One of the first aspects of the Mission considered by Church leaders had been the question of co-operation with other denominations. Davidson had not envisaged an interdenominational effort, although it seems likely that many chaplains would have welcomed any opportunity for further co-operation between the Churches. Davidson's decision received widespread support from his fellow churchmen at home. Both Canon Peter Green, writing a regular newspaper column, and William Temple, of St. James's Piccadilly (a future Archbishop of Canterbury), suggested the possibility of simultaneous missions by other denominations, rather than any joint initiative which might give rise to disagreements and opposition. [7] The Roman Catholic Church did not express any great interest in such a venture and the leaders of the Free Church Council agreed that any attempt at an interdenominational Mission would have been unwise. [8] The Reverend J. Shakespeare, President of the Free Church Council, expressed the view that any such attempt would have caused "confusion" on both sides. Shakespeare did criticise the use of the word "National" in the title of the Mission, since he felt
that it implied a claim by the Church of England "to be co-extensive with the Nation". It threatened to overshadow the initiative and provoke fresh difficulties in interdenominational relations already strained by the special privileges enjoyed by the national Church.

The National Mission began to take shape in February, 1916, with the establishment of the National Mission Council. The Bishop of London, Winnington-Ingram, acted as Chairman, with William Temple as Secretary. Bishop Winnington-Ingram was a curious choice, since his participation in recruiting campaigns had attracted widespread criticism. Hensley Henson felt that he was: "unfitted, both by temperament and by habit, to direct a mission which was designed to break with convention". The Council consisted of seventy Bishops, Clergy, laymen and women. Davidson expressed his personal view of their task as:

... the consideration of ways in which we can effectively 'buy up the opportunity' which the War affords, and by the help of God bring good out of its manifold evil. We want thought to be given to our sins and shortcomings and to the best mode of overcoming them: we want fresh modes of prayerfulness, both public and private.

An immense organization developed with a large volume of literature in preparation.

Plans were made to appoint a special panel of Archbishop's Messengers to supplement the work of Diocesan Committees. Bishop Winnington-Ingram visited every diocese in the country, carrying with him the message that the nation was fighting the war to end wars, and promising that the comradeship of the trenches would continue in the post-war world. He preached that class divisions would lessen and the new Church would be better adapted to the needs of the people. Judging from the
letters reaching Lambeth Palace, it seems that many Dioceses had
begun to hold meetings to discuss the Mission, but there seems to
have been much confusion about its scope and aims.[14] Some
parish clergy felt that insufficient guidance had been given to
them, and they were at a loss as to where to begin; their
confusion did not inspire confidence in the attempt to launch the
Mission amongst troops serving overseas.[15]

In its final form, the National Mission consisted of a
series of initiatives planned throughout the country for a
two-month period in autumn, 1916. The same theme of Repentance
and Hope was followed by all clergymen in a concerted effort to
present a clear message to people who did not attend Church
services on a regular basis. In most parishes the Mission
consisted of a series of services held away from the formal
setting of Church buildings. Meetings held outside factory gates
encouraged workers to attend services held in schools, village
halls and out of doors. Special services of Intercession were
combined with group discussions of Mission literature. The
challenge of the Mission was for churchmen to re-assert the
relevance of the Gospel to the daily life of ordinary men and
women.[16] By calling individuals to strive to overcome their own
sins and shortcomings, to repent, they hoped to promote the ideal
of Christian brotherhood, a regeneration of the Church and "a
healthy moral and spiritual life in the nation at large".[17]
Church leaders had high expectations of the Mission, but many
clergymen, including Chaplains, seem to have felt that more
radical changes would be required in order to improve Church
membership and attendance. Monty Bere felt:

...the National Mission will do very little unless it
delivers the Church from bad imitations of cathedral
Matins, and unless it manages to extricate the clergy
from the secular toils in which they are at present
caught.[18]

If the Mission was to be successful, the doubters amongst the clergy would first have to be convinced that its message was worth passing on. It would also be necessary to convince clergymen that they were capable of launching such an effort in wartime.

The Mission at home was aimed primarily at churchgoers, since any more ambitious campaign was held to be impractical during the war, but at the front it was hoped to reach as many of the troops as possible. The National Mission Council produced a Message to the Church in May, 1916. A copy was forwarded to Bishop Gwynne.[19] In spite of the many demands on his time, Gwynne seems to have welcomed the idea of the Mission. The idea of running some kind of campaign amongst the fighting men, at the same time as the Mission was in progress in the home parishes, was expected to prove particularly appealing to those who felt isolated in their efforts to promote religion under such difficult circumstances.

The Chaplains' Department was anxious to participate in the Mission, in spite of the enormous practical problems it posed. Any effort to co-ordinate the message of the clergy at home with the message preached by the chaplains was welcome. The question of literature posed serious difficulties. Davidson had ensured that the senior chaplains at the front received all the National Mission publications; in a note to the Central Secretary of the Mission Council, he asked for confirmation that the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge had instructions to forward all published material direct. Davidson felt that chaplains should be kept fully informed of every aspect of the Mission: "It is of real importance that the chaplains serving with the troops should be in touch with the whole work of the National Mission."[20] Bulstrode
was critical of the literature produced by the Mission Council, he felt that it was inappropriate for the troops. He produced his own pamphlet, which Bishop Gwynne approved, and it was subsequently adopted for the whole Expeditionary Force. Bulstrode regarded the National Mission as

...an effort to rally the moral and spiritual forces of the nation...a great spiritual offensive against the powers of evil, planned with earnest care and forethought during many past months by the leaders in our church, on whose hearts the burden of our national sin has been heavily laid.[21]

Many chaplains welcomed the opportunity to debate the issues concerning them, and many lively meetings were recorded behind the lines. Probably the most important lesson learned by chaplains was that the traditional religious teaching provided by the church was totally inadequate; the extent of its failure could not be ignored. If the National Mission was to stand any chance of success with the men in France, it had to be presented in an easily digestible form. Given the confusion at home about the precise aims of the Mission, it was a tall order, and Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy did not seem to relish the task he had been given:

...to wander through the whole army area speaking on behalf of one of the most curious enterprises ever undertaken by a Church in the middle of a war, the National Mission of Repentance and Hope.[22]

Studdert Kennedy was reluctant to leave his regular post for what he regarded as a "soft job", and he complained bitterly to Gwynne, who had personally selected him to carry the Mission's message to the troops. In fact it was in no sense a soft job; his schedule proved to be exhausting: "for ten days I preached three times a day to an audience varying from 500 to 1500", he recorded.[23]

Following an asthma attack, brought on by stress and overwork, Studdert Kennedy was forced to spend several weeks in hospital.
In the winter of 1916, he returned to the round of visits to bases, preaching the National Mission. Studdert Kennedy's message was essentially that there was a need to re-convert the people of England when the war ended, but it seems to have provoked little in the way of lasting enthusiasm. Studdert Kennedy seemed relieved when he was allowed to return to his men.[24]

Gwynne had been particularly anxious to achieve a real breakthrough in communication, and his choice of Studdert Kennedy for a series of special postings to training camps and schools reflected this. Gwynne believed that Studdert Kennedy was one of the few chaplains to communicate successfully with the troops. Some of his early poems were printed and distributed in the trenches at the request of Bishop Gwynne.[25] With their unashamed sentimentality and a recurring theme of the involvement of God in the sufferings of man, these verses appealed to many. Pocket editions of his verses sold well at home and overseas: Rough Rhymes of a Padre sold 30,000 copies in a few weeks and by 1924 sales had reached 70,000. By the end of the war Studdert Kennedy was well known to many ordinary people as a great speaker who could readily communicate his views.[26]

The problem of poor communication was at last beginning to provoke discussion amongst the home clergy. Lengthy and incomprehensible church services were criticised by the Bishop of Worcester in January, 1916. He felt that the Church must make an effort to attract those who did not feel sufficiently motivated to attend Church services:

I think the course of the war has prepared many but by no means all men to turn to God and that a further period of the present trial may find us more ready to listen but that we must not delay to call their attention.[27]
The need to improve the standard of services and sermons was widely recognised by chaplains serving the troops. Many had already begun to modify prayers and practices to suit their war-time congregations. They welcomed the National Mission as an opportunity for further change. Neville Talbot, a senior chaplain in France, had heard some criticism of the National Mission at home but he still wanted "to do something of the sort out here".[28]

Some chaplains were less than enthusiastic about the Mission. They felt that they were already overburdened, and the confusion about the specific aims of the Mission which existed in the home church did nothing to encourage them. Bare voiced his concerns in his diary:

Personally I do not quite understand what the National Mission is going to effect. If it was going to get rid of glorified matins and uncongregational evensong and if it were going to spread sound doctrinal teaching and introduce some simple form of popular devotion, I should have hope for it. But if we are going to try to draw people to Christ through the Church working as she does now, I cannot look forward with any hope. I feel in despair as to how to work with very ill men with no formal religious habits or convictions.[29]

In an effort to counter this lack of enthusiasm, Bishop Gwynne selected Canon Cunningham to tour the armies in France to inform the Chaplains about the Mission. The former head of the Bishop's Hostel at Farnham, B. K. Cunningham was widely respected by the chaplains. Following a trip to one of his briefings, Bere reported that it had been both enjoyable and profitable.[30] He felt that an effort must be made to capitalize on the national effort being made by people at home when the war did finally come to an end:

Into what channel is all the energy at home -- now used in the service of King and Country -- going to be directed? Can the Church catch it for good uses, or will
it be directed again into useless and harmful channels?[31]

Bere's comments seem to suggest that a Mission timed for the period immediately after the end of the war would have proved more successful.

One cause of resentment among some of the chaplains was that the Church at home did not seem to realise the extra burden that any attempt to run the Mission in the Army would involve. Blackburne was one of the most senior chaplains in France. He was particularly indignant about the extra burden the Mission would place on his men: "I don't think the powers that be at home have any idea of our exhaustion".[32] Against the wishes of the Army Commander and Blackburne, a Missioner was sent from England to address the men of the First Army in 1917. Blackburne admitted that the man was well-meaning, but he felt that the timing was wrong and the message was inappropriate: "He told us to get ready for the next war, a war for the kingdom of God, which would be a much harder war than this had been! That did for most of us!".[33] Blackburne felt that the chaplains serving abroad were in a much better position to gauge the mood of the men and he believed "that the men will listen more to the chaplains, who have been through the mill with them, than to a stranger, however good".[34]

In spite of the many calls on their time and energy, Army Chaplains were often prepared to take on extra duties associated with the National Mission. In acknowledging his appointment as an Archbishop's Messenger, E. A. Burroughs took the opportunity to put some suggestions to the Archbishop of Canterbury. He was serving with the B.E.F. but he was due back in England within days. He felt that the release of some of the chaplains for a week or ten days might provide a useful addition
to the Mission at home. Burroughs believed that the chaplains could speak "with a new sort of authority", and at the same time

...it would stimulate the clergy out here to take a keener interest than they do in the Mission to feel that they were directly represented in it, and that their being away from home does not exclude them from sharing in the movement. Those who came to England and returned feeling that there is 'movement' among us at home, could do so much to 'strengthen their brethren'.[35]

Davidson felt there was much to recommend Burroughs' suggestions but he was also aware that the technical difficulties involved in such a scheme might prove insurmountable. He did forward Burroughs' letter to the Chaplain General, who agreed that the dislocation involved in the suggested scheme would be considerable, but he did not condemn it completely.[36] The office of the Deputy Chaplain General explained that some chaplains were trying to arrange their leave so that they could act as Archbishop's Messengers during the Mission, but it was felt that it would be impossible to send over any significant number.[37]

The willingness of chaplains to undertake extra duties in line with the preaching of the National Mission was tempered by their worries about continuing with the daily visits to hospital wards and camps, which they felt to be an essential part of their work. A circular issued by Bishop Gwynne in December, 1916, urged chaplains to improve the quality of their sermons, but conditions were often against devoting time to preparing sermons.[38] Chaplains often faced problems in trying to plan services in advance. Bere felt that the practical difficulties involved would be considerable, and his initial reaction to the idea of a National Mission was to hope that "the authorities won't try to run it in my units. There is no chance of getting together a decent number of men."[39] The specially appointed chaplains who
toured the army area met with more success. Father Keble Talbot addressed troops on behalf of the National Mission. He attempted:

...to challenge men, in the light of war’s apocalypse at once of true and of false values, to recognise the Kingship of our Lord, to ask whether there was any rival, and if not to make devotedness to His Kingdom the core of their religion....I tried to meet the prophet of thousands, Bottomley, in his denunciation of repentance.[40]

The problems faced by those running the Mission at home were magnified for the chaplains in France. The message which Church leaders had chosen as the focus for their initiative was hardly likely to prove a popular notion. The concept of repentance was not readily understood; the official explanation was that the "great social cleavages and industrial strifes show that something is fundamentally wrong in our national life".[41] Churchmen argued that the nation must repent, by putting aside political and class interests, and return to God. The National Mission must shock the nation into better ways if future wars were to be avoided.[42] Horatio Bottomley was among those who publicly criticised the call for repentance, since he felt that the men who were serving in the forces were in his eyes "saints" already. This was a popular view: the clergy would have been foolish to ignore the dangers involved in any criticism of those serving in the forces. Bottomley's simplistic interpretation was never completely overcome by the clergy.[43]

Many clergymen shared the same background and education as the officers serving in the Armies overseas and they must have felt considerable sympathy with the views of the volunteers. Any attempt by the Church to promote a more rational view of the events leading up to the conflict would run into the widely-voiced opinion that the war provided a welcome opportunity to rid the world of an evil hitherto unimagined. The clergy certainly faced
an uphill task in trying to put forward the idea that society as a whole should repent and accept some responsibility for the conditions which had failed to prevent the outbreak of war. Such an argument was not likely to commend itself to a public fed on a diet of press propaganda and Government-exploited tales of German atrocities.

Some sections of society continued to regard war as a vital cleansing agent. Many expressed the view that war alone could help to counteract the materialistic pursuit of wealth which had come to dominate the pre-war world. Michael Adams, in *The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War 1*, likened it to the way Victorian doctors believed that blood-letting purged their patients, and he argued that

...some military leaders seemed to regard the prospect with an alarming degree of enthusiasm, which found an echo in the halls of many public schools, eager to continue their pre-occupation with the sporting life and the thrill of the chase.[44]

War was sometimes presented as a romantic interruption to the tedium of everyday life. It was seen as a "natural progression" and a welcome diversion to the monotonous comfort of life as it was lived by the officer class, yet it was also seemingly classless in its appeal.[45] Many working men rushed to enlist in the early months of the war, to escape from the drudgery of their daily lives. They saw war as the ideal opportunity to escape from their surroundings in search of adventure and foreign travel. Their naivety is shocking, and it presented a powerful barrier for the Church to overcome, if men were to be convinced of the need for repentance. It is doubtful whether Church leaders could find the strength to preach such an unpopular message. It was surely their responsibility to do so, but this would involve a serious conflict of interests, since it was also the duty of the national
Church to support the patriotic endeavours of the population in what was widely recognised as a just cause. The poor attendance at church services in the years before the war left many clergymen feeling the need to adopt attitudes that would be inclined to appeal to the population rather than to alienate them still further.

Bishop Gwynne praised the work undertaken by the chaplains as part of the National Mission. He particularly mentioned Cunningham's visits, which had provided "a real uplift for many of our chaplains", but he was also anxious to secure a message from the Archbishop. He felt that a personal appeal "to our missioners and the troops on the occasion of our effort to hold a mission of repentance and hope" would be particularly welcomed. He suggested a letter from Davidson, and the Archbishop was happy to oblige, commending the efforts being made to find time for the Mission in such difficult circumstances and stressing the importance of giving the men the chance to share in the opportunities being given to their families at home.

Gwynne thanked Davidson: the letter was "just what we wanted" and he was able to report that "two remarkable Missions" had already been held at Etaples and in the Second Army (21 December 1916). He felt that "both Officers and men shewed more than interest in the Missions". This he attributed to the news of the Mission contained in letters from their families and friends at home.

In truth, the boredom of men at base camps or waiting behind the lines, combined with a degree of curiosity if the Messenger was one of the better known chaplains like Studdert Kennedy, was more likely to have been responsible for the good attendances recorded at special meetings. Regular services do not seem to have benefited from any significant improvement.
In a further letter Gwynne continued to report an enthusiastic response from the men. At some bases he told of meetings with "large crowds of men for eight successive nights". He informed Davidson that Messengers to the Armies reported "good attendances and real keenness shown both among officers and men" and "a real willingness to hear, provided the Message is given by large-minded men who are also good speakers". Gwynne seemed anxious to stress the success of the Mission in France in spite of the misgivings of men like Neville Talbot. He may have been hoping to encourage more efforts by the home Church to provide literature and guidance to support the work of the chaplains. 

Church leaders were conscious that the discussions about the future of the Church, provoked by the Mission, needed to be given direction. Five committees were set up by the Archbishops to assess the implications of the National Mission for the future of the Church. The committees were specifically asked to assess the current teaching methods of the Church, the need for revision of the Prayer Book, the existing administration of the Church and the contribution the Church should seek to make in improving industrial life in the post-war years. The intention was that each committee would submit a report to the National Mission Council and a final report would be produced for publication. In addition fresh initiatives designed to secure new recruits for the ministry after the war were launched. These included the establishment of a Service Candidates' Committee, in February, 1917.

Davidson felt that the chaplains should be kept fully informed of the discussions at home and he encouraged their involvement whenever possible. Bishop Gwynne was invited to write
the introduction to an account of the Mission at the front, published in 1917.[54] The Committee on Worship was organised by the Dean of Christ Church, Francis B. Strong. Members included Archdeacon Southwell and Neville Talbot, both serving as Chaplains in France. Even though it was unlikely that they would be able to attend meetings...

...the Archbishop thought it would be well if they were kept in touch with what was going on, receiving Agenda and Minutes, and having a chance of making a communication whenever they liked for a particular meeting, or on a particular subject.[55]

The discussions of the Committee on Worship led Strong to conclude that much needed to be changed within the Church if the returning troops were to be attracted to services when the war ended.[56]

The National Mission Council reported to the Archbishops in 1918. Their conclusion indicated that the Mission had produced little impact. The members, predictably, urged that it was the "primary duty of the Church to evangelise England".[57] Men had been saying much the same since the early Nineteenth Century and at the end of the Second World War they continued to say it. The National Mission confirmed the findings of the chaplains about the levels of ignorance and indifference amongst many people as far as the Church was concerned. Few clergymen had attempted to explain how they might overcome the inability of the Church to reach the ordinary soldier.[58] Individual chaplains, like Studdert Kennedy, had shown that services had to be more welcoming and clergy more approachable than they had been in the years before the war if they were to attract new worshippers.[59]

The Bishop of Kensington, on behalf of the National Mission Council, provoked a storm of controversy by submitting a list of questions to all Army Chaplains. The Bishop's enquiries concerned the future, rather than the present, state of the Church
...the object of the questions was that we should find out by means of what the chaplains learn by their intercourse with the men what we are to plan or to do at home in our civilian parishes when the war is over.[60]

The response to the Bishop's questions had been rather patchy but, in all, over five hundred had written, including some of the leading chaplains: Pym, Clayton and the Talbot brothers.[61] The Bishop had set out to investigate "what the great masses of men think and feel on the vital subject of religion".[62]

A summary of the chaplains' replies was prepared by George Bell. It indicated widespread concern amongst the chaplains about the level of ignorance and indifference to religion which they had encountered. They emphasized the need to make Holy Communion more accessible by introducing a more flexible approach to services; the need for better transport facilities to enable chaplains to reach more units and provide regular services; the need for Church reform, particularly in the matter of clerical incomes which were acknowledged to be "scandalous and hopelessly unbusinesslike"; and the need for greater lay involvement in Church affairs.[63]

Davidson was uneasy about some of the opinions expressed by the chaplains who had contributed to the inquiry; he believed that "chaplains have, in their wholesome desire for honesty, seen our faults and failures somewhat out of proportion to their view of what the Church has been enabled to do".[64] Bishop Taylor Smith shared Davidson's concerns; he was not impressed by some of the suggestions put forward by the chaplains, and he was particularly dismissive about their idea for changing the Morning Service to a Holy Communion service. This was "not the antidote for (80%) ignorance" and "indifference".[65] Instead he argued
that much more emphasis should be placed on preaching to "bring men to a saving knowledge of God through obedience to his Holy Will and Word before we can encourage them to come to the Lord's supper".

The criticisms raised by chaplains in their responses caused concern throughout the Chaplains' Department. Macmillan reported that the Deputy Chaplain General was worried that if Bell's summary of their answers was widely circulated, it would give "a misleading picture about what the men of the Army feel".[66] Gwynne was anxious to discuss the matter further with Davidson, and he asked that the report should not be given wider circulation until he was able to comment fully. Gwynne was also disturbed by the way in which Bell's report had been circulated to the chaplains who had contributed to the Bishop's survey before either he or Taylor Smith had received copies. He acknowledged that it was a valuable document and he felt that Bell had compiled it with skill, but he still felt uneasy:

...the method of entrusting the sifting of the replies to anyone at home, however skilful, without any consultation with the leading men out here as to whose replies were really of value, was almost bound to lead to mistakes.[67]

Gwynne's concern revealed the distance between clergymen serving in France and their home Church. He clearly felt that the opinions expressed by chaplains could not be interpreted accurately by someone without first-hand knowledge of their working conditions.

Gwynne believed that rather than representing the views of the men on religion, Bell's report simply stated the views of the chaplains themselves. He drew attention to some "curious omissions", like "the widespread adoption of Evening Communion by men of all schools of thought with apparently most striking
results". The chaplains who had responded were not, in Gwynne’s opinion, the best men. He felt that the idea of approaching a selected group of chaplains would have been more useful, that men “really entitled to be heard should be invited to state their experience”. [68] Gwynne’s conclusion is surprising, considering that 505 men had responded, including the highly-regarded Talbot brothers. His knowledge of the chaplains led him to take a more cautious view of their assessment of the state of religion in the army. Gwynne must have been aware of the strength of feeling amongst chaplains which caused such controversy when it surfaced, in 1917, in memos from three senior chaplains, Gordon, Pym and Girdlestone. [69] He may have been anxious to shield his more impetuous chaplains from any reaction in the home Church to comments made in the extreme conditions they were forced to live and work in because they were also some of his most able men.

Davidson was anxious to reassure Gwynne that Bell’s report had never been intended for widespread publication, and he had asked the Bishop of London to restrict its circulation further until it had been discussed in more detail. He also told the Bishop of London that he favoured Gwynne’s idea of approaching selected chaplains to report their views more fully: "a few men of different schools whose opinion would be of special weight owing to their capacity and experience". Davidson felt that a draft copy of the report should have been shown to Gwynne and Taylor Smith before it was circulated to the chaplains. He was also critical of the Bishop of Kensington’s preface which, he felt, rather overshadowed the whole report and took "too dark a view". [70]

In his defence, the Bishop of Kensington emphasized that the report was never intended for wide circulation. It was
designed as "an aid...to the removal of widespread misconception, and an appreciation of what those who have been alienated from the outward fellowship of Christ think and feel". He felt that those chaplains who had taken the time to reply to his approach were "probably the keenest men". He was against the idea of selecting chaplains to comment, since they had already been given their chance to do so. He also denied the accusation that he had taken an overly pessimistic view of the situation, since

I find the strongest grounds for hope in the evident desire among so many clergy and laity today to deal courageously with our evident defects and failures. I have found in the many conferences I have had this summer with clergy in retreat that they entirely endorse the general conclusions of the chaplains as to our state.[71]

Davidson was not entirely reassured by the Bishop of Kensington's statement that the report would not be given wider circulation. He continued to press the Bishop for details of the destination of the 1,160 copies he knew had been printed.[72] Copies had been made available to some Diocesan Committees to help them to plan for the National Mission and for the future.[73] Following the concern expressed by the Archbishop, efforts were made to restrict the circulation of the report.

When the Mission ended, some clergymen were anxious to embark on grand schemes of improvement, but Davidson felt that a period of consolidation was required: "What we want now is not hustling but quiet departmental preparation and the shaping of plans".[74] The Bishop of Southwark sympathised with this view: "with us nothing could be more distracting than to start off now on some new enterprise".[75] Others felt that the National Mission had raised many new problems: Church leaders had been forced to question the precise nature of the Church's role in
wartime. This had stimulated much discussion about the future role of the Clergy in the post-war world.

One of the most positive results of the Mission was that the campaign for church reform was strengthened. No matter how much Davidson might have wished for a period of quiet preparation, the discussions could not be confined to a review of the Mission. Dick Sheppard had expressed his anxiety to Davidson during an interview at Lambeth. He was concerned that the National Mission had "fizzled"; he felt that those who had been particularly disappointed by the failure of the Mission would continue to press for Church reform in a disruptive manner. Davidson noted

Sheppard feels that some strong central organization should be started for the purpose of gathering reasonable and loyal churchmen who are dissatisfied and discontented and anxious for church reform. [76]

As a first step, in January, 1917, Sheppard suggested a meeting in the Albert Hall to talk about "the necessity of the Church awakening". He felt that such a move would help to contain the demands for reform "on loyal but strong and enthusiastic lines". Sheppard and William Temple envisaged the formation of a Committee of ten or so to make recommendations for a further meeting, and, if all agreed, these could then be put to the Archbishop. [77]

Sheppard was anxious not to "displease" the Archbishop, but he was convinced that "strong action was necessary". He was anxious to press on with plans for a "ginger group". The Life and Liberty movement was founded, in March, 1917, to press for church reform as a matter of urgency. [78]

The National Mission of Repentance and Hope was an ambitious scheme for the Church to launch at any time, but in the middle of the war it proved to be particularly unsettling for both clergy and laity. Everyone involved in planning the National
Mission was aware that one of the most serious problems they faced was in finding enough suitable missioners. Peter Green acknowledged that many of the best men were serving at the front as chaplains and: "many parish priests accustomed to taking missions are much too short-handed in their parishes to be able to go as missioners to other places".[79] Church leaders failed to take proper account of the acute shortage of manpower in many parishes and the exhaustion of Army Chaplains in France. The Mission's failure provided further evidence that the Church of England had lost touch with the needs of the people. The choice of title offended other denominations; the choice of Winnington-Ingram to lead the Mission disturbed many who felt that his recruiting activities were inappropriate for a clergyman; opinion within the Church was deeply divided on the question of the timing of the Mission; the aims of the initiative were confusing to clergy and laity alike; and literature for the Mission was a serious problem. The use of the word Mission alienated some because of its association with the pre-war efforts, although it was never the intention of Church leaders to emulate these.[80]

The Mission provoked discussion within the Church of England about the future of the Church but the impatience of chaplains who were eager to implement changes was met by a Church leadership anxious to take stock and consolidate the findings of the five reports commissioned by Davidson.[81] These reports provided a great deal of material and stimulated discussion about the future of the Church and the role of the clergy in the post-war world. The report of one committee became the charter document of the Industrial Christian Fellowship, in 1919, and the report of another provided the Life and Liberty movement with much
useful information in 1918.[82]

A period of self-examination and re-assessment was disturbed by the controversial survey of chaplains' opinions, by the National Mission Council, which threatened to overshadow any benefit derived from attempts at co-operation between home clergy and chaplains in France.[83] Their experiences serving with the troops convinced chaplains of the widespread ignorance of, and indifference to, religious matters. The clergy at home were reluctant to accept such a damning indictment of the Church of England, but they could hardly deny the failure of the Mission to reconvert the non-churchgoing public.
10] CHAPLAINS' POST-WAR INITIATIVES.
Temporary Chaplains returned home with a sense of corporate identity and a strong desire to tackle the shortcomings of the Church. Full of anger and enthusiasm, they demanded changes. They had been humbled by the inadequacy of their own training, they had shared hardships and formed extensive links with clergymen from different faiths, and they had enjoyed a "temporary independence" with freedom to discuss many issues away from the confines of diocesan meetings. Chaplains had been forced to carve out an effective role for themselves, with little guidance from Church leaders. This had allowed the development of a significant gulf, which became even more apparent when chaplains returned home eager for change, at a pace many home-based clergymen found difficult to accept.

It would have been understandable if chaplains had returned home feeling defeated by the lack of demand for their spiritual guidance, but, instead, many seemed to have been inspired by their experiences, intent upon injecting a new vigour into the home Church. Their enthusiasm gave rise to the successful Life and Liberty movement, the founding of an Ordination Test School for service candidates for the ministry, the launch of the Industrial Christian Fellowship, and the re-launch of Toc H in London (a fellowship which grew from the retreat facility and "homely club" established in Poperinge by Neville Talbot and Tubby Clayton during the war). Several former chaplains led the pacifist movement in the 1920s; many produced influential books and articles which helped to stimulate discussion about the future of the Church of England. An interdenominational group, chaired by the Bishop of Winchester, produced a report in 1919 entitled The Army and Religion. It confirmed the findings of many chaplains about
the level of ignorance and indifference to religion amongst the troops. The report revealed that four-fifths of the young men of the country were not attracted by the Churches. Inadequate religious teaching and the failure of the Churches to tackle social problems combined to create an image of ineffective churches, out of touch with reality and overly concerned by internal divisions and external rivalries. The report ended with expressions of optimism, its authors forecasting future changes with no evidence of how these might be expected to occur.[5] In contrast The Church in the Furnace, written by some of the most influential chaplains, presented a much more practical approach to the Church of England's problems. Chaplains argued the case for a thorough reform of the preparation and training that clergymen received: they urged a fundamental review of the language used in services and sermons; endorsed demands for a complete revision of the Prayer Book and commended the degree of co-operation which they had experienced between clergy of different faiths ministering to the troops.[6] According to Dick Sheppard, wartime chaplains:

...spoke passionate words about organized Christianity which were not comfortable hearing for Authority. Those were times when a delightful and amiable anarchy in matters of religion fell upon the battlefront, causing many Chaplains to forget for the moment to which denomination they belonged: alas, that the phase passed too soon! It was found much more convenient and much less embarrassing at home to treat those chaplains as patients suffering from over-strain and shell-shock rather than as prophets suffering from vision.[7]

The most questioning chaplains were Church of England. They were the largest single denomination, with 1,985 of 3,475 serving chaplains in 1918.[8] A sense of unease about their wartime role led to post-war demands for reform. Former chaplains argued that clergymen should be encouraged to act as interpreters between the classes in the battle to secure better working and
living conditions for the poor. Until Christians chose to live by the creed in which they professed to believe, little progress would be achieved, according to Sheppard:

...there is no getting away from the fact that a vast number of our social ills are permitted solely because professing Christians have never yet placed the horror of them on their conscience. [9]

In order to pursue their goals, discontented chaplains became leaders of some of the most influential pressure-groups in the post-war world. Sheppard founded Life and Liberty with William Temple, leading to the 1919 Enabling Act. [10] Clayton and Neville Talbot formed Toc H during the war and, with the help of former chaplains like Barry and Haigh, worked for the post-war establishment of an Ordination Test School for service candidates. [11] Studdert Kennedy became the main attraction of the Industrial Christian Fellowship, touring the country as an itinerant Messenger for the movement. [12] These men were some of the most able and inspiring figures in the post-war Church, just as they had been some of the most outspoken critics of the Church of England during their wartime service as temporary chaplains. Their experiences in uniform had alerted them to the past failure of the Church to reach the ordinary working man. They had seen cause for optimism in the "unconscious Christianity" so many of them had witnessed amongst the fighting men, and in the years after the war they sought to reach out to those who had so far resisted all attempts at evangelisation. [13] They questioned the choice of language used in Church services, which few members of an average congregation could be expected to understand. In the same spirit that had produced the wartime "bombing school" for chaplains and the retreat house at Poperinge, former chaplains were not prepared to wait for the Church authorities to act. [14]
Life and Liberty, a movement referred to by Sheppard as "a ginger group in the Church" and "the Gale of God", pressed for immediate change.[15] Temple, Sheppard and F. A. Iremonger had first come together as a consequence of the National Mission. Meeting in March, 1917, they drew up a "scandal sheet" which condemned the sale of the right to appoint clergymen and the lack of parishioners' influence on such appointments. They criticised the fact that there was no place for women in the Councils of the Church, but their main complaint was the fact that the Church still had no power to alter her forms of service or re-adjust her finances without recourse to Parliament.[16] They argued that the work of the Church in the post-war world could not be carried out effectively until the Church had secured legislative freedom. Temple outlined the key issue in a letter to The Times...

...as soon as we can consider the changes that are needed to make the Church a living force in the nation, we find ourselves hampered at every turn by an anticipated machinery which we are powerless to change except by a series of Acts of Parliament...If the Church is to have new life, even if to maintain the life it has, it must have liberty.[17] Life and Liberty sought the introduction of an Enabling Act which would stop short of disestablishment. The chaplains were hardly breaking new ground, since the need for such an act had been acknowledged as early as 1899.[18] In 1917, an Archbishops' Commission on the relationship between Church and State proposed a scheme for passing church legislation through Parliament that was very like the one adopted after the 1919 Act.[19] Davidson welcomed the scheme but noted that "it is obvious to anyone that it is impossible to make this a fait accompli during the war".[20] It was not so obvious to the members of Life and Liberty. They refused to accept that change must wait for peacetime. Former chaplains injected a real sense of urgency into proceedings.
Prompted by shame for an inadequate Church, disillusion with the National Mission and a conviction that the time had come for Christians to "stand up and be counted"[21], Life and Liberty enjoyed strong support from many chaplains. In February, 1918, Neville Talbot wrote to his father urging the Church to act on the movement's appeal.[22] Archbishop Lang acknowledged that during a visit to the chaplains in France, in June 1917, he had found "strong support" for the movement.[23] Speakers at the inaugural meeting of the movement (held in Queen's Hall, 16 July 1917) included several clergymen who had served, or were still serving, as temporary Chaplains. Blackburne, A.C.G. 1st Army, managed to secure leave in order to address the meeting. Walter Carey, who had served as a naval chaplain, "pulverised the bishops" for their failure to press for change, and Sheppard spoke of "the inarticulate mass of church people, most of them communicants, who took no part or interest in church affairs, and of the need to show them the romance, the adventure, the love and the courtesy of Christianity".[24] Pym sat on the platform as one member and "felt a passionately enthusiastic response to Temple's challenge that 'Privileges which are abused are forfeit'".[25] The packed meeting passed a resolution to approach the two Archbishops for their support.[26]

Sheppard published a pamphlet citing chaplains and churchmen at the front who believed that "the church is too timid to face her real problems. Those of us who are in the parochial groove know this to be true."[27] Davidson was sympathetic to the mood of the meeting, but worried by the impression it might create. He felt that "the speeches at the meeting reflected an unjust view of contemporary episcopacy" and made the task of the bishops more difficult by demanding that Parliament be forced to
pass an Enabling Act or disestablish the Church.[28] Davidson’s support was essential if Life and Liberty was to succeed. In two vital areas, he could find little to fault in the Movement. Firstly, the proposals made by its members were recognized as necessary by clergymen and politicians.[29] Secondly, in Temple, the Movement had an outstanding leader, a future Archbishop of Canterbury, and a man for whom Davidson had a great deal of respect.[30] By the summer of 1919, Davidson felt unable to ignore the clamour for change. He urged the Representative Church Council to pass a resolution which allowed him to pilot the Enabling Act through Parliament.[31] Before the year ended, the Church of England had a new Church Assembly, and Life and Liberty had achieved its aim.

The Act re-defined the relationship between Church and Parliament, it had an impact on every parish and the way was left open for the reform of the Church’s organization. It was inconceivable that such progress could have been achieved so rapidly without the war and the dramatic impetus that their wartime experiences had provided for men like Sheppard.

In June, 1920, the first sittings of the National Assembly of the Church of England took place. According to Sheppard most of its time was wasted on trivia.[32] He and the other members of Life and Liberty regarded the Enabling Act as a preliminary step to facilitate a spiritual advance and not therefore an end in itself but the evidence suggests that the initial burst of energy that had produced Life and Liberty had faded. The National Assembly did not reflect the sense of urgency that former chaplains had brought to the original campaign. Members of Life and Liberty voted to continue for a further two years but there was no significant progress. The more conservative home-based clergy
seem to have reasserted their influence on the leadership of the Church.

The leaders of the Church of England were uneasy about the pace of change. They were still reluctant to accept the conclusions of the chaplains about the extent of the ignorance and indifference to religion amongst the soldiers. Bishop Talbot's Committee concluded that the Churches were "living in a fool's paradise": even after four years of war they had not come to terms with the need for change.[33] They were prepared to acknowledge the need to answer some of their most vocal critics in the immediate post-war period but, once the initial impact of their support had been felt, they seemed reluctant to encourage the development of ideas and actions any further. This was true of Life and Liberty and it also applied to the attempt to broaden recruitment to the ministry.

Pre-war concern at the number of candidates for Holy Orders had led many Churchmen to blame the poor pay of the majority of incumbents and the narrow class basis from which ordinands were drawn. They were concerned that the thousands of young officers who had gone from the parsonages to their deaths would have an alarming impact on the number of ordinands in the post-war years.[34] The wartime closure of many of the Theological Colleges had halted the stream of around 500 ordained men each year, and the Church of England needed to take action to overcome this shortfall. Some chaplains hoped to recruit former servicemen to the priesthood. At Talbot House, the club established in Poperinghe by Neville Talbot and Clayton, a record was kept of the names of "servicemen whose war-time experience had led them to turn their thoughts towards Holy Orders".[35] Clayton forwarded 200 names to Bishop Gwynne who had collected a total of
2,000 names by 1918.[36] He and Talbot were determined that the offer of service from such men should not be wasted. Soldiers who used Talbot House contributed to the Service Candidates' Fund, established to help meet the costs of training.

With the encouragement of Bishop Gwynne and the endorsement of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Clayton set about planning an Ordination Test School, to see how many men might continue their training in order to secure acceptance by one of the Theological Colleges. He attempted to draft a scheme of training which he sent to John MacMillan, on the staff of the D.C.G., Bishop Gwynne.[37] Clayton regarded the scheme as vitally important for the future of the Church of England. He believed that the endeavour needed to be led:

...with vision and practical wisdom. On the other hand, if through lack of these, through class prejudice or inadequate financial support, the movement is paralysed, then the church will lose its hold on the loyalty of men confident in the sincerity of its attitude towards them; and the memory of the failure will darken all our days.[38]

Clayton was keenly aware that the failure of the scheme would mean that the Church had betrayed the trust of loyal men who were eager to contribute fully to the post-war rebuilding of the Church.

The Chaplains' Department clearly accepted the importance of the work in which Clayton was engaged. Barry was seconded to the D.C.G.'s office to begin the work of gathering the men together as soon as the Armistice had been signed.[39] The lack of any immediate plans for demobilization created a restless atmosphere, which the Army attempted to counter by launching an educational scheme amongst the troops in France. The chaplains seized this opportunity; they had developed an extensive educational programme: "a sort of secular version of padres' hours
- on social and economic affairs with a candour and openness of speech such as as no army had been allowed before". [40] Pym had first introduced this programme, which represented a useful safety-valve, and it provided an opportunity for the Church to be presented to the troops as a possible ally. This was vital if any progress was to be made after the war. Barry worked with speed and efficiency

...to the amazement of G.H.Q., the Church's two camps were ready, while all other parts of the Army Education Scheme were still merely on paper. The officers were sent to the charge of Ted Talbot at a school in the old chateau at Radingham and the men...reported at the old Machine Gun school at Le Touquet.[41]

The segregation of Officers and men was presumably necessitated by the fact that the Army would frown on any joint exercise whilst the men remained in uniform. Once a base had been found in England, this segregation ended and every effort was made to treat all students in the same manner. Barry, Clayton and a staff of around ten Chaplains improvised lectures, although books and fuel were scarce.

The challenge facing the chaplains was how to make the priesthood more accessible to men from less privileged social backgrounds.[42] The Service Candidates' Fund which had been started by Clayton during the war was not sufficient to support the scheme to establish an Ordination Test School in England, but the promise of regular finance from Archbishop Davidson made the venture possible. Davidson's pledge to finance the ordination candidates cost £250,000 and was regarded, by Barry, as "a startling innovation" and a very courageous venture. He believed that it marked "the beginning of the end of a class-ministry in the Church of England".[43]

The work of the Ordination Test School assumed a vital
importance for many former chaplains like Clayton, Barry, Haigh and Cunningham, who had all recognised the shortcomings of their own training. Cunningham reviewed the situation in 1919:

...the pre-war theological college system, as judged by the Padres it produced, did not come well out of the experience of war; devotional training had been all along too narrow lines and depended too much on favourable environment, and when that was no longer given the padre was apt to lose his bearings.[44]

The School at Knutsford, with Barry as Principal, received its first batch of 150 candidates in March, 1919. One of the School’s best friends and supporters was Cunningham, who described it as

...quite a new experiment which had an immediate effect upon the Ministry...For the first time the Church acting as a corporate body officially provided and financed a scheme of training for its ordination candidates.[45]

For the first time those without a lengthy formal education and independent means were given the chance to show that, with some preliminary training, they could be prepared to undertake the theological training required for ordination.[46]

Between 1919 and 1922, 675 candidates were trained at Knutsford; 435 were subsequently ordained.[47] By January, 1920, the stream of service candidates had slowed down and the number of residents had fallen, from a peak of 350 in 1919, to 287. The School faced an uncertain future until the summer of 1920, when the National Assembly of the Church granted funds for another year, to enable the admission of civilian candidates. This marked "a real turning point in the official policy of the Church of England" according to R. V. H. Burne, Archdeacon of Chester and a senior tutor at Knutsford, but his enthusiasm was shortlived. The School was threatened with closure in 1922 by the National Assembly’s reluctance to continue to provide financial support. Barry was anxious to continue his work and with the
support of the Mirfield fathers, the School continued to survive, on a reduced scale, at Kilrie. The venture was no longer a Church of England organization, but a voluntary body, which had to raise its own funds if it was to survive. The combination of the shortage of money and the Second World War caused the closure of the School. [48] The lack of continued financial support from the Church of England was particularly disappointing, and confirmed the fears voiced by Clayton and Barry in the early days of the schools' existence, that Church leaders might not continue to value their commitment to broadening the social class of the clergy. [49]

Further evidence of resistance to efforts to remove class bias was provided by the lack of support for Pym's protest against the inequality of clerical incomes. [50] He had suggested a system known as the "Plus and Minus" scheme, by which clergymen would pool their financial resources, sharing according to needs and refusing to touch church endowments until the Church of England was either completely disestablished or at least free to put her own house in order. This proved to be too extreme for many clergymen, and Pym was alone, amongst former chaplains, in refusing to accept a stipend from the Church as a form of protest against the inequality of clerical incomes. [51] In 1920 Canon Peter Green made a similar statement by refusing to accept the See of Lincoln in protest at the size of episcopal residences and incomes. In a wartime article entitled The Total Failure of the Churches, Green had criticised Bishops who lived in palaces, since they were identified as members of the upper classes. He argued that the Church would not attract the support of the working classes while "men look to her and see not a nation on its knees seeking its God, but a corporation on its defence taking care of
its endowments". Gestures like those from Pym and Green were rare.

One of the more successful ventures attempted by former chaplains was the campaign to establish Toc H in London, to continue the old traditions of the wartime club. Launched at Christmas, 1918, with no financial support from the Church, it involved many former friends and colleagues from the war. Talbot House had been established in memory of Neville Talbot's brother Gilbert, to provide a resting place for men passing through the Ypres area. Thanks to the innovative and demanding work undertaken by Clayton, who ran the club, it became much more. It provided a relaxed and friendly atmosphere where carpets and curtains, books, and a piano had a considerable psychological impact on men back from the line. Part of its appeal was as a haven where everyone was welcome, from high-ranking officers to ordinary soldiers, the emphasis was always on fellowship. Talbot House provided a venue for chaplains' meetings, Confirmation services and parties for the children of Belgian refugees. One of its most valuable functions was to act as a forum for a series of meetings held during the winter of 1917-18. Men were able to express their grievances in an informal environment and take advice from officers on a wide range of issues. The club elicited a tremendous response from the soldiers who visited. Their comparative wealth led to many generous gifts and donations for the upkeep of the house and for charitable contributions including the Service Candidates Fund.

Clayton and his supporters shared the belief that the fellowship that had existed in Poperinghe was too precious to lose. They hoped to preserve this, but at the same time to appeal
to younger members by promoting ideas of comradeship and service. Toc H, in London alone, had a thousand B.E.F. members just after the war. The organization eventually opened branches throughout the U.K. and in the U.S.A., Africa, Australia and New Zealand.\[59\]

Money was particularly tight and the needs were many. The launch of the London venture was only possible thanks to the gift of £10,000 from two of Sheppard's parishioners; there was no official grant from the Church.\[60\]

Many clergymen did feel that the post-war slump required an active, organized response on the part of the Church of England. Some seized upon The Industrial Christian Fellowship (I.C.F.) as the ideal vehicle for the Church of England's response. The aim of the I.C.F. was to present a "vision of social obligation and commitment" to post-war society. It was pursued with a real sense of urgency.\[61\] In a bid to end the inadequacies that the war had revealed, many clergymen were happy to lend their support to a movement which set out to promote the ideals of conciliation, arbitration and class harmony. The I.C.F. attracted some of the most outspoken critics of the wartime ministry of the Church of England: Barry, Chavasse, Frere, Kirk, Macnutt, Pym, Raven, Rogers, Sheppard, Studdert Kennedy and Neville Talbot.\[62\] Former chaplains gave their support to what was, in its early years, a very ambitious form of evangelism.

The I.C.F. aimed "to break through with the Gospel into the Industrial hinterland".\[63\] They expressed a fervent belief that the Church had failed the ordinary working man in the past by refusing to take a stand on poor living and working conditions. The need to redress the balance prompted their calls for action, and led many former chaplains to take a leading part in groups pressing for reform. Some, like Clayton, expressed naive hopes
that the conflicts within society would not re-emerge after the war. Others, like Pym, a member of the I.C.F. Council, believed that, without the work of the I.C.F., the hostility between the classes would intensify "in a society that would not reproduce the sense of common purpose and common danger informing the army".[64]

The emergence of a Christian social conscience was not new in the 1920s [65], but the sense of urgency with which many former chaplains tackled postwar problems was. Their mood found expression in The Church in the Furnace. Contributions from seventeen chaplains included an article by Barry which criticised the Church of England for having been "the private preserve of one social class, taking its moral attitude far too clearly from the predilections of that circle". The failure of the Church to stand up to the social evils of the past prompted charges of moral cowardice from many Tommies, leading Barry to conclude that in the crucial post-war decade, "traditional Christianity" would be on trial. In his contribution, Kirk argued that the Church must act as "the interpreter between social classes, the mediator between master and men, the peacemaker between capital and labour" if men were to be attracted back to Church membership. Another Senior Chaplain, the Reverend Geoffrey Gordon, argued that in future the Church must be seen as "an army, a militant society pledged to get things done".[66] The I.C.F. was the best organized attempt to provide such an army.

Archbishop Davidson appointed a Committee on Christianity and Industrial Problems following the failure of the National Mission. The Committee's report became the charter document of the I.C.F. in 1919.[67] The I.C.F., formed by Kirk, assembled a team of travelling speakers to tour the
country in support of local initiatives. District Missions known as Crusades were launched in many areas, in order to recruit as many members as possible.[68] Weeks of preparation culminated in a long procession to the parish church for a service at which the crusaders would be commissioned by the Bishop of the Diocese:

... for six nights or ten, the crusaders would divide into little teams of three or four and speak on a pitch in the open air, and all would be brought to an end on the last night with a mass meeting in the market place or in some large hall. The crusaders met every morning for the Eucharist, for prayer, and to compare notes. The course of addresses they took was planned for them by the I.C.F., and the outlines were printed as a pamphlet, and all crusaders were expected not to deviate from it.[69]

Studdert Kennedy began to appear on I.C.F. platforms immediately after the war, and in May, 1921, he was appointed Fellowship Messenger.[70] He campaigned relentlessly all over the country. The popular appeal of his sermons and lectures in wartime continued.

Initially the I.C.F. attracted support from politicians in all three parties, from leading trade unionists and industrialists.[71] The active membership of the Church of England provided much of the support for the I.C.F. A number of Bishops gave their support and the Archbishop of Canterbury regularly addressed Fellowship meetings.[72] The simple language and avoidance of conventional religious phrases in these campaigns certainly marked an improvement on previous attempts to preach the gospel to a wider audience.[73] Crusades and mass meetings were always well-covered by the provincial press, but how many men and women were brought into active membership of the Church as a result is impossible to judge. The Director, Kirk, worked tirelessly to raise money and publicise the Fellowship, but its financial resources never matched the ambitions of the leadership.[74] Given its limited resources and its wide-ranging
objectives, the I.C.F. did achieve a great deal. It attracted enthusiastic support and press coverage in many areas and it provided an important outlet for the talents of some of the most gifted former chaplains. Ultimately it failed because it did not attract sustained financial support from the Churches or from prosperous industrialists, particularly after its controversial involvement in the trade disputes of the 1920s.[75]

The early success of Life and Liberty and the establishment of the Knutsford Ordination Test School had combined to create a false dawn. Sheppard had hoped that the Enabling Act would be the beginning of a lengthy process of reform, but he was reckoning without the complacent attitude of some clergymen, and the lack of finance which even the most enthusiastic optimism proved unable to conquer. The Church of England did not have the necessary financial resources or commitment to sustain progress. The Ordination Test School and the I.C.F. both failed as a result of lack of funds. After an initial flurry of activity, the Church seemed to have betrayed the common cause espoused by so many of the returning chaplains. In the end, it failed to recruit a significant number of new members to the Church, to the dismay of many clergymen.[76]
CONCLUSION.
Frederic Manning in *The Middle Parts of Fortune* identified "a gulf between men just returned from action, and those who had not been in the show as unbridgeable as that between the sober and the drunk".[1] This "gulf" is clearly evident in photographs of men on their way to the line when compared to the blank expressions on the faces of survivors returning for rest. The challenge posed by this gulf provided an additional burden for recently arrived chaplains who encountered widespread ignorance of spiritual matters amongst the troops.

Chaplains were expected to minister to the dying and to give the dead a decent burial but few people seriously considered whether they should also provide spiritual guidance to those involved in fighting and killing. Army officers were wary of the impact such guidance might have on the fighting spirit of the men they commanded. Newly appointed chaplains were often met with indifference and regarded with suspicion until they had proved that they were the 'right sort', happy to conform to the view that they could best serve the troops by acting as unofficial welfare officers.

The efforts of even the most exceptionally talented chaplains could not counter the overwhelming indifference of the troops to organized religion. Years of neglect by Church leaders could not be overcome in a matter of months. By their own admission, clergymen were given inadequate training. Church of England chaplains felt that they were particularly badly served by the outdated language used in services and the inappropriate Prayer and Hymn Books - both of which were in need of modernization. They criticised the failure of Church leaders to take some form of corporate action to demonstrate the relevance of religion in wartime. To compound their problems, chaplains were
badly served by an understaffed War Office Chaplains' Department during the early months of the war. The Chaplain General did not enjoy the full confidence of the Bishops and his methods of selecting and deploying temporary chaplains drew widespread criticism, some of which was justified.

Young clergymen were most frequently selected to serve as chaplains. With no specialist training, and often with little parochial experience to fall back on, they were forced to work in an environment beyond the understanding of those who had not experienced it for themselves. Because Church leaders were content to deploy men with no previous knowledge of the army enthusiasm and ignorance of military life led to confusion and misunderstanding.

Church leaders seemed to be completely out of touch with the needs of the chaplains. They spent much of their time seeking to justify clerical exemption and debating the restrictions on the use of the Reserved Sacrament, which many chaplains found it necessary to circumvent if they were to provide an effective ministry to the fighting men. Some of the home-based clergy responded to the outbreak of war by launching their own personal recruitment campaigns. Bishop Winnington-Ingram, Fr. Paul Bull and Hensley Henson delivered sermons designed to boost recruitment.[2] The clergy, particularly in rural areas, were still regarded as leaders of the community. As representatives of the national Church, they were perceived as having a patriotic duty to support the government's decision to go to war, but the vigour with which some Anglican clergymen pursued their pro-recruiting aims was the cause of great regret in the post-war years.[3] The chaplains' diaries and letters do not echo the views of men like the Bishop of London; they were soon made aware
that the "hun-hating" attitude of the popular press would not be welcome in the trenches. The enemy was more frequently regarded as a fellow sufferer at the hands of incompetent superiors and foul conditions. For chaplains, caught in the emotional gulf between combatants and those who remained at home, there was a need for better guidance on how to pursue spiritual goals in the face of ignorance and indifference. The provision of a variety of rest and retreat facilities, including Talbot House and Cunningham's "bombing school", were important measures which helped to alleviate the strain of life at the front. The widespread acceptance, by the military authorities, of the need for such facilities was a significant step forward.

The fact that 70% of men in the forces listed their religion as Church of England continued to provide reassurance to clergymen who had not witnessed for themselves the ignorance and indifference hidden by this statistic. Chaplains soon came to see that many of those who professed allegiance to the Church had not been near a service since Sunday School days. When the anticipated wartime religious revival did not materialize, chaplains suggested that the reason so many men stayed away was because they felt alienated by the language and customs of the Church. Many of the men listed as Church of England were not Communicants, believing that this was reserved for Officers only. Grey observed that most men did not like clergymen:

The younger men fight shy of them, and the older men are courteous but distant. Their presence in a mess room is felt as a constraint. Their conversation is not a source of pleasure to others. Men breathe more freely when they have left.

Segregated from the men by background, education and even their use of language, most chaplains had more in common with political and military leaders than with the ordinary Tommy. Unfortunately,
the Army seemed to be less inclined to break down the barriers than the chaplains. Compulsory Church parades caused resentment and the Sunday Church Services were associated with military discipline in the minds of the men.[7] They were detrimental to the chaplains' attempts to present the Church in a more approachable and welcoming manner. Yet they were highly regarded by the Army as opportunities to reinforce military discipline and order. Many Chaplains expressed their dislike of these formal occasions and it seems that little spiritual benefit was derived from them, yet they remained powerless to change the situation. Chaplains rarely passed comment on the pressures they faced from the military authorities who tolerated their presence with some misgivings.

Officers may have been happy to assert that God was "on their side" but the Army clearly did not know what to make of uniformed chaplains on active service. Many chaplains found that they were expected to fulfil the combined role of Welfare Officer and undertaker. Some found that they were expected to provide morale-boosting sermons at the behest of their Commanding Officers. The need to alert young and inexperienced clergymen to the dangers involved in ministering to men in a military setting had not been fully understood by the Chaplains' Department or by Church leaders at home. Few chaplains expressed awareness of any conflict between their religious duties and their role as uniformed officers, yet military leaders had clear expectations about the role chaplains should perform. Haig outlined his ideas in meetings with both Gwynne and Davidson. He complained to Davidson, during his visit to H.Q. in 1917, that many chaplains were not fulfilling the two expectations he had of them:

Firstly that the chaplains should preach to the troops about the objects of Great Britain in carrying on this
war. We have no selfish motive, but are fighting for the good of humanity.

Secondly, the chaplains of the Church of England must cease quarrelling amongst themselves. In the field we cannot tolerate any narrow sectarian ideas. We must all be united whether we are clerics or ordinary troops. The Archbishop thought his people were very united now, but 'possibly six months ago some were troublesome'.

The evidence of the chaplains' own diaries and letters suggests that the war was not the most frequent topic covered by their sermons. If Haig required regular sermons on the justice of the nation's cause, then he would have been disappointed by the preaching of chaplains like Canon T. Guy Rogers and Monty Bere.

The Churches had a poor image in the eyes of many of the troops who regarded interdenominational rivalry and internal differences of opinion as something on which to focus criticism. Chaplains sought to improve matters by holding joint services and retreats and by making their services more welcoming. The degree of interdenominational co-operation they achieved was the cause of great pleasure amongst the clergy serving overseas although many in the home Churches were alarmed by it. The chaplains' efforts encountered the hostility of both the Roman Catholic and Church of England authorities. Competition between the various denominations surfaced over the number of chaplains each deemed necessary to minister to the troops. Discussions between the leaders of the Church of England and the War Office were dominated by the issue of numbers. War Office staff struggled to appear even-handed, but every time one Church negotiated an increase in strength, another increased its demands proportionately. Within the Church of England, divisions created a poor impression and served to widen the gulf between chaplains and the home Church. Differences about the future of the Church concerning salaries, the use of the Reserved Sacrament
and the vacant See of Hereford combined to create an impression of a deeply divided Church.[12]

Chaplains faced many practical problems which their Department and Church leaders at home seem to have been slow to recognise. Much of the bad publicity directed against Anglican chaplains stemmed from the Army Order which sought to restrict their movements during the early months of the war. Unfavourable comparisons were made with R.C. clergy who regularly went into the trenches. Even though the Order was overturned and Anglican chaplains became frequent visitors to the trenches, holding informal services before attacks and attending to the wounded during the fighting, lasting damage had been done to their reputation.

Service overseas imposed a serious financial burden on some clergymen, who struggled to meet the costs of providing adequate cover for their home parishes. The poor rate of pay awarded to temporary chaplains and the fact that promotion depended on length of service rather than expertise must have prompted many temporary chaplains to consider returning home at the end of their contracts.[13] Some chaplains expressed fears that their absence on service abroad would mean that they would miss out on new appointments made during the war. Although anxious to "see the job through", men like Pym felt that their interests at home should be protected.[14] Pym believed that all appointments to livings should be temporary during the war. Such anxieties do not seem to have been addressed by Church leaders or by the Chaplains' Department. Their indifference is particularly alarming in view of the financial hardship suffered by some chaplains.[15] Only in 1920 did Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee persuade the Army Council to accept the principle of
parity with Infantry rates of pay.[16]

The Chaplain General was not always as supportive as the chaplains might have wished; he refused to believe the chaplains' arguments that greater mobility would help to improve the number of services and visits any one chaplain could hope to perform. Taylor Smith dismissed the suggestion that the provision of motor cars would have been helpful: "I am sure you will agree with me that if a Chaplain is unable to win men to Christ by preaching: no amount of mechanical transport will avail".[17] He failed to appreciate the practical problems for chaplains who often had to cover large areas.

Chaplains were isolated from the men they sought to serve by class, wealth and education. Their status as Officers in uniform emphasized their segregation by allowing them private quarters and a batman. Many chose to forego such privileges but however hard a chaplain tried he could never be perceived as one of the "Tommies". Lord Salisbury raised an interesting point when he suggested that chaplains could not be treated as ordinary soldiers because they were gentlemen.[18] However much chaplains might seek to share the hardships of their men, the fact remained that many of them came from a social background far removed from that of the ordinary soldier. Oswin Creighton spent three and a half years as a chaplain. He was depressed by the lack of progress made by the Church:

The war is really breaking no barriers down. The hardest line ever drawn in human society is that between officers and men. Do what you will, you cannot destroy or even lessen it....they live in two different worlds, and the chaplain lives in the officers' world.[19]

As officers in uniform, the chaplains were in authority over the men but it was their social class which presented the most serious barrier, according to Chaplain James O'Hannay: "Most men do not
come to us at all and we find it very difficult to get at them."[20] O'Hannay believed that the chaplain's status as an officer had only been a problem in the old army in the early months of the war. He argued that the influx of large numbers of civilian men had changed the situation. The chaplain was remote not because he was an officer, but because he was regarded as being from another class, and he seemed unable or unwilling to discuss the questions closest to men's hearts in a manner that could be comprehended by the ordinary Tommy. Studdert Kennedy was of the same opinion; he felt that one of the main problems for the private soldier was the Padre's affected speech, and he urged the Church in the post war world to "ban the parsonic manner, and all forms of affectation - they come between the men and Christ".[21]

The social barrier was not recognized by many clergymen until they served as chaplains. Gradually they began to appreciate the effects of years of poor communication between Church and people. The war brought clergymen into a closer relationship with the people. Through the work of chaplains at the front, and particularly through the sharing of privations, bereavement and a common cause, chaplains believed they could create new bonds which might promote churchgoing in the future. Their work counted for something, but the fact remained that chaplains were treated as Officers because their social status demanded that they should be regarded as gentlemen.

Chaplains faced great difficulties when they attempted to break down barriers between minister and men; military convention helped to preserve and exaggerate the differences between them. The fact that clergymen did not fight, and were not conscripted, reinforced the idea that they were a class apart. Clerical exemption from military service was widely accepted.
amongst the laity although many of the younger clergy bombarded Archbishop Davidson with requests to be allowed to serve. The fact that many chaplains could choose how long they stayed in service was the cause of much wider criticism and clearly served to emphasize their segregation from their flocks.

Chaplains struggled to retain their confidence in their ability to reach out to the men who had survived the horrors of front-line service. Probably the most useful advice on how best to minister to the men was that given to Theodore Hardy, in 1916, by Studdert Kennedy, when the two met briefly at Etaples: "laugh with them, joke with them. You can pray with them sometimes; but pray for them always". The chaplain might not be able to attract men to formal services, he might not be able to persuade them to attend informal talks or discussions, but he could make sure that he was available and approachable if they wanted to talk to him.

Isolated from their home Churches and anxious to give of their best to the men they came to respect and admire, chaplains seem to have experienced grave doubts about their own faith and about the nature of the appeal they could make to such men. They often questioned their own abilities in the early days of their deployment. Serving in such an inhospitable environment, many harboured serious misgivings about the nature of the religion they had to offer. Chaplains like Pym, Gray and Neville Talbot questioned the likely impact of a religious conversion on some of the officers and men they met and came to some disturbing conclusions. Gray recalled two of the best chaplains he had met at the front. Both had made the same confession to him:

They said that while they worked among the young and
strong men of their acquaintance, of the varsity and army type, they had again and again been haunted by the feeling that if these men did someday give in and conform to what the Church was asking of them, they would be in some ways spoilt. [24]

Gray came to the conclusion that "the church does not yet understand what a young male Christian ought to be, nor how to find full scope for him within her borders". This dilemma was highlighted by the war but the chaplains seem to have been offered little guidance from church leaders.

Neville Talbot recognized the same problem. In a paper sent to all chaplains following the failure of the National Mission to generate any significant increase in attendance at services, he suggested that the Church's approach had been wrong:

...there is the one-sided idea, which associates religion mainly with fear. It is shown in the notion that active service constitutes the parson's chance and puts into his hands the weapon of anxiety. This has been resented at the front, and many men have made up their minds that they will not be scared into Religion. [25]

Talbot condemned the way religion so often appeared to be unmanly, he believed that this notion had damaged the chances of a wartime religious revival particularly amongst the troops. He shared the view of Gray that a far-reaching change in attitudes was called for. Gray argued that, in future, Christ would have to be portrayed as a vigorous humanitarian figure rather than the more usual "effeminate almost weak figure" if the fighting men were to be won over to the Church.

The most important lessons learned by serving chaplains were those which resulted from living in close proximity to the troops. Their implications for the future of the Church in the post-war years were not lost on chaplains like Pym, Gray and Talbot. Such men took advantage of their "temporary independence" to discuss ideas and reforms which alarmed the authorities at home.
The most damning factor concerning the Church in the eyes of most of the troops was the inadequate response by organized religion to the social problems before the war. A handful of priests had worked in the worst slums at the turn of the century, but Gray observed

...those who walk the ordinary paths of our national life, knowing the business world, the political world, and the industrial world, do not ever now and then come across the Church as a great body attacking current evils, and establishing justice.[26]

The Reverend J. A. Castle, a former chaplain, was convinced that the Church had alienated the masses by its unwillingness to champion the cause of the working classes. He believed that: "the Church betrayed Christianity by permitting such poverty and exploitation".[27] Many chaplains determined to take action in the post-war years; they became leaders of a number of controversial movements including Life and Liberty, the Industrial Christian Fellowship, and the pacifist movement of the 1920s and 30s. Many rose to become influential figures within the Church of England.[28]

The progress made in producing a more efficient and effective chaplaincy service during the war is often overlooked as attention is focussed on the poor press given to chaplains after the war by writers like Graves and Montague. The deployment of such a significant number of chaplains, in spite of the lack of an adequate organizational framework, was in itself a considerable achievement for the Department. In recognition of its services, the Department was awarded the prefix 'Royal' by the King and strenuous efforts to improve the service provided to chaplains continued after the war.

Between 1919 and 1920 a thorough revision of the conditions of service for chaplains was carried out.[29]
Proposals were submitted by Lord Salisbury's Advisory Committee and a number of changes were made by the Army Council. Service for all Temporary chaplains was limited to 3 years. According to Lord Salisbury this had

... an incidental, but very substantial, advantage of creating amongst the civilian clergy a reserve of men who have had some experience of service amongst troops, and who might be looked to come forward for further temporary duty in the event of another war.[30]

The minimum age for temporary chaplains was fixed at 25, with the proviso that the candidate should have been in Priests' Orders for one year. This confirmed the wartime view of the Chaplains' Department that younger ministers would be better able to cope with the demands of military service. The post of Chaplain General was also reviewed, with some Committee members expressing the hope that, in future, a younger man might be appointed for a five-year period. This proposal was also adopted by the Council.

It is clear from the recommendations put forward by the Committee that some important lessons had been learned during the war. The emphasis on weeding out unsuitable chaplains and promoting men on merit rather than length of service speaks for itself.

Second Lieutenant G. H. Woolley believed that the strongest evidence of the value put by the men on the work of the chaplains in the First World War lay in the high regard which Ex-Service Associations had for them. Every branch of the Old Contemptibles Association requested an annual Church Parade arranged so that members of branches in the same area could attend one another's services. In 1927 Woolley observed:

...it is a tribute to the Royal Army Chaplains' Department, and to the respect which the men themselves had for the Christian Faith, that there should have been such a demand for these Services. The motto of the Old Contemptibles is 'God, King and Country' and they have never had any hesitation in standing up for it.[31]
Many other organizations held their own church parades, including The Ypres League, The Royal Artillery Association and The British Legion. Former chaplains helped to plan Remembrance Day services and appeals for Memorials to commemorate the fallen. Many retained links with the men they had ministered to in wartime.[32]

The home clergy seemed unwilling to accept the judgment of chaplains whose ecumenism they disliked. They resented the many calls for change from chaplains which implied criticism of the home-based clergy. In spite of this, Archbishop Davidson was able to harness some of the enthusiasm generated by former chaplains and their desire for change. The successful passage of the Enabling Act in 1919 owed a great deal to the Life and Liberty movement inspired by former chaplains. In later years Bishop Gwynne observed that nearly half the Church of England Bishops had once served as chaplains in his Department. Many were men of talent and vision who had served their Church well. However, the transitory success of the Knutsford Ordination Test School and the Industrial Christian Fellowship revealed that the Church of England did not have the finances or the level of commitment to generate the kind of sustained progress that many former chaplains had hoped to achieve. The failure to produce any significant growth in Church membership and attendance was the predictable result.
INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER 1 THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND THE CHAPLAINCY SERVICE BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR.

Randall Davidson's speech during a debate in the House of Lords, 16 June 1915.
The Reverend Mr. Huxtable, Rector of Sutton Waldron, designed a system for housing stock which evoked far more interest than his spiritual work. The Reverend S. Smith of Lois Weedon near Towcester was noted for his novel approach to the cultivation of wheat.
In 1812, a survey of over a thousand parishes showed that almost one in ten "had no pastoral supervision at all".
Gilbert, Religion and Society. 1830-1914 Population rose from just over 13 million to over 34 million.
1835-1841 the number of assistant curates more than doubled, to 2,032, by 1853 there were 3,437.
Thomas Pearce, vicar of Mordern in Dorset, sank wells at his own expense in an attempt to improve the health of his flock.
Bethnal Green population of 90,193 but only 6,024 attended Church according to the 1851 Census.
1851-81 population of London increased by 1/2 million approximately. Only 180,000 houses built in this period.
The number of communicants on an ordinary Sunday hovered between 40 and 50.

1836 Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act.
1871 Act for Abolition of Religious Tests at the Universities.
1891 Tithe Rent-Charge Recovery Act.

Currie, Gilbert and Horsley. pp. 28-9
Ibid. p. 32
Gilbert, Religious Adherence and Behaviour in Patterns of Religious Practice. p. 43.
Currie, Gilbert and Horsley. p. 58
1880-1920 very small increase in numbers attending Sunday School but population rising. Civil Marriages increased before 1914 and continued to do so after the war.


Currie, Gilbert and Horsley. p. 63
F. M. L. Thompson, The Rise of Respectable Society: A Social History of Victorian Britain, 1830-1900. (Fontana) p. 28

Currie, Gilbert and Horsley. p. 30

Gilbert. p.190
Currie, Gilbert and Horsley. p.30
Ibid. p.29

War Office Memos. 1796-1912. W. O. 32 704 32

Ibid. p.29
Ibid.


Langston. p.121
War Office List: Chaplains' Department Duties and Staff of the new subdivision C. 5. 1907. P.R.O. W.O. 32 9322.

Ibid.


Series of memos referring to the administration of the Chaplains' Department. 1908-1914. P.R.O. W.O. 32 9323.

Ibid.

Their work also included the administration of the South African War Fund.


In 1914 there were 117 chaplains including 89 Anglicans.

Memo from the Secretary of State, War Office. 23 December, 1913. P.R.O. W.O. 32 9323.

Ibid.

Macready. Volume 1. p.229

Ibid. p.230


Memo from Bishop of Southwark. 1904. P.R.O. W.O. 32 5634

Letter from Father Girolamo M.A., Cardinal Gotti Prefetto, and Luigi Veccia, Secretary, to Sir Henry Howard. 28 August, 1915. P.R.O. W.O. 32 5634

Memo from Sir Graham Green to Foreign Office. 9 September 1915. P.R.O. W.O. 32 5634

Ibid.

Ibid.

F. M. L. Thompson, The Rise of Respectable Society: A Social History of Victorian Britain, 1830-1900. (Fontana) p. 73
CHAPTER 2  THE WARTIME CHAPLAINS’ DEPARTMENT: GROWING PAINS.

[1] Evers, M. Diary. September 1914. Imperial War Museum. 1,200 names collected by the Chaplain General within days of the call for the clergy to volunteer as Chaplains.


[9] Evers, M. Diary. September-December 1914. Imperial War Museum. December 1914 Evers was Chaplain to the 74th Brigade stationed south of Ypres.


[16] Purcell, p.100


[18] Purcell, pp.104-5

[19] Ibid. p.100

[20] Memo of meeting between Davidson and the Chaplain General at Lambeth. 14 October 1914. Davidson Papers Vol. 343. The examples of Father Conran of Cowley out at the front and Green, Wilkinson and Kingdon were cited as evidence of the complaint.


[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

Bere cited the example of a number of letters, published in The Chaplains' Bulletin, requesting monthly visits by a Bishop to confirm men. Noted that one Bishop to serve the whole B.E.F. was "absolutely inadequate".

Harry W. Blackburne D.S.O., M.C. This Also Happened on the Western Front. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1932) p.54

The Bishop of London, visiting troops at Easter 1915, was called upon to perform several Confirmation services.
CHAPTER 3 THE APPOINTMENT OF BISHOP GWYNNE AS DEPUTY CHAPLAIN GENERAL.


In practice the appointments were usually delegated to the Prime Minister who consulted with the Archbishop of Canterbury before drawing up a list of candidates. The Prime Minister was under no obligation to act in accordance with the stated preferences of the Archbishop when making his choice. In 1917, Lloyd George highlighted the disadvantages faced by the Established Church when he acted against the advice of Randall Davidson and appointed Hensley Henson to the vacant see of Hereford.


Taylor Smith had been bishop of Sierra Leone since 1897.


Bishop of Oxford to Davidson. 10 March 1915.

Davidson Papers. Vol. 343


P. Green, Manchester Guardian. 14 August 1915.


Bishop of Pretoria, Guardian 17 June and 8 July 1915.

Father Bull C.R. Peace and War: Notes of Sermons and Addresses. (Longmans 1917)


[11] Mr. Gwynne to Davidson. 5 July 1915

Davidson Papers. Vol.343

[12] Ibid.


Davidson Papers. Vol.343


[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.


Davidson Papers. Vol.343


Davidson Papers. Vol.343

Jackson. pp.149-150.


Davidson Papers. Vol.343
The Chaplain urged clergymen to participate in joint services and when possible to minister to men from other denominations.
Harington served with Plumer as Major-General, General Staff of the 2nd Army. He spent much of the war in defence of the Ypres Salient.

Anderson was serving with 12th Australian Infantry Brigade in France in 1916.
CHAPTER 4 REORGANIZATION AND RIVALRY.


The full establishment was:
117 Chaplains
89 Church of England
17 Roman Catholic
11 Presbyterian
40 Temporary.


[5] Ibid, p.163

[6] Ibid.

Davidson Papers. Vol.343

[8] Ibid.

[9] Minutes of Conference held at Lambeth attended by the Chaplain General, R. Brade, the Bishops of London and Winchester and Archbishop Lang.
19 July 1915. Davidson Papers. Vol.343


W.O. 32 56 36.

MEMBERSHIP:
Marquess of Salisbury.
R. Brade.
Chaplain General Bishop Taylor Smith.
Lord F.M. Grenfell.
Viscount Midleton.
Bishop of Ripon.
Bishop of Winchester.

[13] Brade to Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. Salisbury and Grenfell to visit G.H.Q., at the invitation of French, on 17 September. 15 September 1915
W.O. 32 56 36.

W.O. 32 56 36.

W.O. 37 71 3.

[16] Gwynne to Davidson. 18 September, 1915.
Davidson Papers. Vol. 343
C. E. Montague, Disenchantment. Chapter 2.

Davidson Papers. Vol. 343


Brade to Gwynne. 27 August 1915.  
W. O. 32 56 36

Ibid.

Brade to Macready. 2 September 1915  
W. O. 32 56 36.

Interim Report of the Advisory Committee.  

Ibid.

Davidson to Lord Salisbury. 27 September 1915.  

Brade to Lord Grenfell. 8 September 1915.  
W. O. 37 7 13.

Evers, M. Diary. June 1917. Imperial War Museum.

Smyth and Mowbray. p.164

Evers, M. Diary. 28 April 1918. Imperial War Museum.

Second Report of Committee on Chaplains.  
October 1915. W. O. 32 56 36.

Letters between Lord Salisbury and Lambeth.  
September-October, 1915. Davidson Papers. Vol 344

Taylor Smith to Davidson. 25 September 1915.  
Davidson Papers. Vol.343

Salisbury to Davidson. 5 October 1915.  
Wilkinson. p.81

Provisional Conclusions of the Advisory Committee.  

Taylor Smith to Davidson. 27 October 1915.  

Davidson, R. Diary. May, 1916 in G. K. Bell,  
Randall Davidson. Vol. 2. (London: Oxford University  
Press.) pp.782-3

Ibid. pp.782-3

Second Report of Committee on Chaplains.  
October 1915. W. O. 32 56 36.

Taylor Smith to Davidson.  27 October 1915.  

Lloyd George to Davidson. 18 July 1916.  
Copies to Cardinal Bourne R.C., the Joint Secretaries of  
the United Army and Navy Board, Lord Balfour,  
W. O. 32 14 826.

J. Campbell. Lloyd George. p.78

INTERDENOMINATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CHAPLAINCY  
SERVICES.

Chairman The Right Honourable Ian Macpherson, M.P.  
February, 1919 Viscount Peel.

Vice-Chairman Sir Reginald Brade, K.C.B.

Secretary Mr. G. Monk of the Chaplains Dept. War  
Office.

Members  
Rev. J. H. Bateson.  
The Chaplain General.  
Rev. J. Grierson.B.D.  
Rev. D. H. Hanson.B.A.  
Rt. Reverend Bishop Keatinge, C.M.G.  
Rev. H. Elvet Lewis. M.A.  
Rev. J. A. McClymontt, D.D., V.D.  
Rev. P. R. Mackay, D.D.  
Rev. J. H. Shakespeare, M.A.
W.O. 23 7 2.
Record of meetings held from August 1916 until 1919.
W.O. 32 14 826.

W.O. 23 7 2.


[49] Davidson to Lloyd George. 21 July 1916
W.O. 23 7 2.

[50] Secretary, the Reverend J. H. Bateson, to Lloyd George. 27 July 1916. W.O. 23 7 2.

[51] Lord Balfour to Lloyd George. 15 July 1916.
W.O. 23 7 2.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Gwynne to Davidson 18 September 1915.
Davidson Papers. Vol.343


W.O. 23 7 2.

[56] Jewish War Services Committee to Lloyd George. 27 November 1916. W.O. 23 7 2.
CHAPTER 5  DEPLOYMENT OF CHAPLAINS.


[2] H. W. Blackburne, This Also Happened on the Western Front. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932) p.8


Ibid. Haig's appointment as Commander-in-Chief was confirmed by Asquith on 10 December, 1915. The meeting with Gwynne took place on 19 December, 1915.


[9] Ibid.


[16] Bishop of Pretoria to Brade. 4 July 1915. W.O. 32 56 36

[17] Ibid.

[18] Taylor Smith to Davidson.
Davidson to Furse and Furse to Davidson. 8 June 1915. Davidson Papers. Vol.343


[20] Ibid.


[25] H. W. Blackburne, This Also Happened on the Western Front. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932) pp.73-74

[26] Ibid. p.77


[28] Bere to Mrs. Bere. 2 April 1916. Imperial War Museum.

[32] Ibid.
[33] Davidson to Frodsham and Frodsham to Davidson. 3-6 July 1915. Davidson Papers. Vol.343
[34] Davidson to Chaplain of the Fleet. 16 November 1915. Davidson Papers. Vol.342
[37] Bere to Mrs. Bere. 5 July 1917. Imperial War Museum.
[38] Blackburne. P.122. Rogers to Hornan. 10 April 1916. Imperial War Museum.
[40] Wilkinson. p.39
[41] A. H. Gray, As Tommy Sees Us. (London: Edward Arnold, 1918) p.6
[42] Bere to Mrs. Bere. 5 August 1916. Imperial War Museum.
[44] Ibid.
Comments included in a paper Talbot circulated to all chaplains after the National Mission.
Page believed that the chaplains were unjustly criticised, his own Church of England chaplain was "a loved and Christ-like figure". Chavasse, son of the Bishop of Liverpool, served as a combatant.
Smyth and Mowbray. p.168
Woolley served as a 2nd Lieutenant 9th Battalion London Regiment. The son of a clergyman, he was ordained in 1920 and served as a chaplain during the Second World War.
[55] Ibid.
Page was educated at Shebbear College, founded by a small Methodist group (Bible Christians) he enlisted in 1914 and after the war returned to the college as a teacher.
[56] Wilkinson. p.52
[57] W. Purcell, Woodbine Willie. p.75
[58] F. R. Barry, Period of My Life. p.60
Davidson made it clear as early as 1914 that such prayers were permissible.

Rogers to Hornan. 28 March 1916. Imperial War Museum.

Reverend P. A. L. Johnson to Mellish’s father. 24 April 1916. Imperial War Museum.

Gray. p.34


Railton to Mrs. Railton. 25 September 1916. Imperial War Museum.


Ibid.


F. H. Brabant, Neville Stuart Talbot 1879-1943, A Memoir. (S.C.M. Press) p.84

Ibid. April 1943 Clayton’s address following death of N. Talbot

Ibid.


Smyth and Mowbray. pp. 164-5

Bell. p.783

F. R. Barry, Period of My Life. p.74

Purcell. p.83

Blacket. p.8.

Graves. p.159

Ibid.

D. S. Cairns, The Army and Religion. p.39

Mrs Talbot to Davidson. 25 January, 1915. Davidson Papers. Vol.343

Smyth and Mowbray. pp.168-9

J. Glubb, Into Battle: A Soldier’s Diary of the Great War. p.31 Glubb was only 21 when the war ended. He came to believe in "some form of after-life" as a result of seeing so many shattered bodies. His account includes references to St. Francis and private prayers but he seldom mentions any Chaplain.

Sir T. Lever, Clayton of Tor H. p. 19
Clayton had been working as a 4th Class chaplain based at a hospital in Le Treport but he had persuaded Bishop Gwynne to allow him to help Talbot.


Gray. pp.13-20
Montague. p. 25

Reid. p.122
CHAPTER 6 THE CHAPLAINS' CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.


[14] Bere to Mrs. Bere. 1 September 1917. *Imperial War Museum.*

[15] Bere, M. A. *Diary.* 7 February 1918. *Imperial War Museum.* From 10 January 1918 Bere paid his replacement at home £252 p.a. This left him just £40 of his Army pay; his tax and the cost of his son's education had to be met from "private funds".

[16] *Revision of terms of Regular Service in the Army Chaplains' Department 1919.* War Office 32 104 79


[18] Ibid. November 1918.


[20] Jeeves, L. L. *Diary.* November 1916. *Imperial War Museum.* 80/22/1


[29] Bere to Mrs. Bere. 4 April 1918. *Imperial War Museum.*

Mellish, N. Diary. 29 March 1916. Imperial War Museum.


Rogers, T. G. Diary. 28 May 1916. Imperial War Museum.

F. R. Barry, Mervyn Haigh 1887-1962. (S.P.C.K. 1964) p.113

Introduction to 1000 letters from Rev. M. Bere, ed. R. Bere 1978. Imperial War Museum.


According to Davidson's Chaplain it was only in 1917 that such prayers were officially sanctioned.

Bere to Mrs. Bere. 23 October 1917. Imperial War Museum.


A. H. Gray, As Tommy Sees Us. (London: Edward Arnold, 1918) pp.69-70

Anderson to Deputy C.I.G.S. 4 June 1920.


Ibid. pp.164-165

Rogers, T. G. Diary. 14 February 1916. Imperial War Museum.

Blackburne, Talbot and Clayton all helped to raise awareness of the problems facing Chaplains.

H. W. Blackburne D.S.O., M.C. This Also Happened on the Western Front. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932) p.34.

J. H. Moorman, B. K. Cunningham: a Memoir. (1947) p.83

Blackburne. p.82.

Jackson. p.167

Sir C. Harington, Plumer of Messines. (John Murray, 1935) p.132

Moorman. p.83

Ibid.

Ibid. p.84


Sir T. Lever, Clayton of Toc H. p.61

Sir C. Harington, Plumer of Messines.


Jackson. p.168


Ibid. p.52-53

Barry transferred to France in 1916 and served with the 11th Division, the 20th Division and finally became D.A.C.G. to the 13th Corps in 1918. He became one of the most well-known and widely respected Chaplains.

F. H. Brabant, Neville Stuart Talbot 1879-1943 A Memoir. (London: S.C.M. Press, 1949) Talbot was one of seven men appointed in November, 1942, to visit Air Force centres to improve facilities for chaplains. pp.136-137
[61] Bere to Mrs. Bere. 22 July 1916 and December 1917. Imperial War Museum.


[64] Brabant. p.59
CHAPTER 7  TENSION AND CO-OPERATION.

Glasgow Weekly News. 1 September 1917.
[17] Ibid. p.154
One Cowley novice was cashiered for hearing confessions. Father Frere C.R. criticised the reluctance of Church of England leaders to incorporate prayers for the dead into services.
Frere complained in October,1915, “Prayer for the dead is one of our greatest levers and our neglect of it one of our worst faults”.
[20] See Chapter 3 p.49
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[27] Life and Liberty Movement begun by former Chaplain Reverend H. R. L. Sheppard. Brabant. p.71
Reservation was only permitted for taking Communion to the sick.

Frere complained, in October, 1915, of the "neglect of the Holy Eucharist" and an over-emphasis on preaching.

Raven tried to enlist as a combatant on four occasions before accepting a chaplain's post.

Lord Kitchener personally thanked the Bishop.


Chaplain General to Davidson. 5 October 1914. Davidson Papers. Vol.339


Bell to Mr. Davis, Clerk of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. 16 January 1915. Davidson Papers. Vol.341


The Bishop's brother was G.S.O.1 to the General commanding the Second Army Corps in Flanders.

Bourchier was Vicar of St. Jude's Hampstead.

G. B. Shaw, Common Sense about the War, p.42

The Church of England Peace League was formed in 1913, by 1910 it had 100 members including six bishops.


P. Liddle, Voices of War 1914-18. (London: Leo Cooper, 1988) pp.182-183

Crozier spoke to the 7th Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers 20 September 1914.

Challenge, 21 May 1915.

Archdeacon Blakeway of Stafford argued that the war had changed into a crusade.

The Record 10 June 1915.

Guardian 1 July 1915.

C. E. Playne, Society at War. (Allen and Unwin, 1931)

Challenge, December, 1916, urged all Christians to reconsider their attitude to the war as the "ethical situation" had changed since 1914. p.45


Ibid. See Chapter 9 National Mission.

21 May 1915. Challenge

A. Wilkinson, The Church of England and The First World War. p.64


Freiburg was bombed on April 14, 1917.

Ibid.

Davidson's letters to Sir T. Barlow, 21 June, 1917, and to Dr. R. F. Horton, 11 October, 1917, referred to the amount of correspondence he had received about his remarks against calls for reprisals to be taken against German civilian targets.


C. E. Playne, Society at War. (Allen and Unwin, 1931) p.79

Mellish, N. Diary. Christmas 1917

Imperial War Museum.


C. E. Playne, Society at War. (Allen and Unwin, 1931) p.31 7 August 1914 message from the Religious Society of Friends argued against the use of force urged men to prepare for peace.
The Quakers represented the largest contingent of religious conscientious objectors. They alone maintained a corporate witness to peace, although 33% of those of military age did in fact enlist.


Bishop Gore was a frequent critic of their treatment regularly raised the matter in the House of Lords.


21 May, 1917.


[82] Pearson served as a Chaplain with No.44 Casualty Clearing Station in July, 1916.


[84] Ibid.


[87] Blackburne pp.187-188.
CHAPTER 8  THE CONTROVERSY OVER CLERICAL EXEMPTION.

Lieutenant R. F. Calloway served as a chaplain before taking a combatant commission. Killed in action on the Somme September, 1916 at the age of 44.
F. W. Dillistone, Charles Raven, Naturalist, Historian and Theologian. Raven attempted to enlist four times, rejected on health grounds he secured a post as a temporary chaplain.

In spite of the hopes raised by the early news from Cambrai in December, 1917, it seemed that future drafts for France could only be maintained by reducing shipbuilding, food production or munitions programmes.

List of 1,200 names collected by the Chaplain General within days of the call for clergy to volunteer as chaplains.

The Y.M.C.A. were particularly short of volunteers, as 80% of their members had enlisted.


[7] Ibid.


Compulsory military service was not, at first, deemed to be necessary by Kitchener who was only convinced of its necessity in Autumn, 1915.


Ordination
1914 610
1915 453
1916 330
1917 167
1918 114
1919 161

Some 362 students withdrew on the outbreak of war on order to join up.


Mr. T. Moffet, of Oxhey, Watford, to Davidson. Davidson Papers January 1915.


Warren, C. B. *Diary*. April 1918. Imperial War Museum. 83/31/1

Aged 35, sent to Mesopotamia as an Army Chaplain. Given a white feather by a lady at home. Particularly inappropriate since he was one of the few Chaplains who always carried a weapon and he had killed a Turk when threatened with a bayonet.


Bishop of Birmingham to Davidson. 16 July 1918. Davidson Papers. Vol.341

Possibly the Reverend H. H. Hurwood, Curate at Finsbury, who worked as an Analytic Chemist with Curtiss and Harveys.


The Church Times, 21 December 1915.


Public Records Office. CAB 27/4


Lloyd George, 19 December, 1916.

88 H.C. Deb. 5s, Col. 1350, 19.

Following Chamberlain's visit to Lambeth, Davidson noted that the Director General "clearly recognises that the work of the clergy in the ordinary duties of their calling is itself National Service".

The Clergy National Service Committee, under Reverend John Ellison, would be the channel between the Bishops and Chamberlain.

The number of teachers in Church of England elementary schools who had volunteered had reached 2,700 by 1915.

Prebendary Wilson Carlile of the Church Army, to the Bishop of Kensington quoted the example of Hayes. 8 January 1917.

Rogers, T. G. Diary. September 1916. Imperial War Museum.

Ibid. 13 October 1915.

Bere to Mrs. Bere. 20 March 1919. Imperial War Museum.

Ibid.

Rogers, T. G. Diary. 28 May 1916. Imperial War Museum.


Davidson to the Bishop of Llandaff. 2 March 1917. Davidson Papers. Vol.340


Bishop of Chester to Davidson. 31 March 1917. Davidson Papers. Vol.340

Ellison to Davidson. 9 April 1917. Davidson Papers. Vol.340


See Chapter 6

Ibid.


Bell named some supporters of Davidson's view as Asquith, Chamberlain, Robertson, Jellicoe and Kitchener.

Ibid


See Chapter 6

Ibid.
Pym's memo contained a full page of signatures from serving Chaplains, including those of H. W. Blackburne, G. Gordon S.C.F., W. K. Griffin D.A.C.G., T. A. Lee, C. E. Raven, and N. S. Talbot A.C.G. - some of the most highly regarded men serving with the Army.

Clergy involved in National Service:
- Agriculture: 653
- Munitions: 291
- Teaching: 333
- Office work: 372
- Other and General work: 444
- Total: 2,093

617 under military age.
91 of these giving full time national service.

5,076 names had been provided by the Bishops for the Director General of National Service and 2,000 clergymen were already serving with the forces. A further 3,127 were doing work assigned by the Bishops as work of a special "moral and spiritual" kind leaving just 1,949 available for general service, to be allocated by the Director General.
After two months at Havre base camp, under the Senior Chaplain Girdlestone, Rogers had been posted to the 2nd Guards Brigade at Estaires and in March, 1916, he was moved to Ypres where he had lived in a dug-out on the canal bank.

Much of the criticism about the Church was unjustified, but criticism from serving chaplains was particularly valuable. They were working in the front line in every sense. In closest proximity to the fighting men, they were best placed to experience at first hand the enormous gulf between church and people that had been highlighted beyond even the most pessimistic expectations during the war.
CHAPTER 9 THE NATIONAL MISSION OF REPENTANCE AND HOPE.

[5] Ibid.
[24] Ibid. October 1915
[26] Ibid.
Ibid. November 1916.
Ibid. 2 December 1916.
H. W. Blackburne D.S.O., M.C. This Also Happened on the Western Front. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932) p.182.
Ibid. p.183.
Ibid. p.183.
E. A. Burroughs to Davidson. 18 August 1916. Davidson Papers. Vol.360
Chaplain General to Davidson. 25 August 1916. Davidson Papers. Vol.360
Macmillan to Davidson. 6 October 1916. Davidson Papers. Vol.361
Bere, M. A. Diary. 6 December 1916. Imperial War Museum.
Ibid.
Ibid. p.76
E. A. Burroughs, The Valley of Decision. (1916) p.81
“What right has the Church to talk to our splendid men about repentance.....they don't need repentance; they are saints, every one of them. To preach repentance to them is an insult.”
D. Newsome, Godliness and Good Learning.
F. H. Brabant, Neville Stuart Talbot 1879-1943 A Memoir. (S.C.M. Press) p.65
Talbot circulated a paper to his fellow chaplains in France when the Mission ended.
Committees set up to discuss a wide range of issues:
1] Teaching methods of the Church
2] Public Worship--Prayer Book Revision
   --Opinions of Army and Navy Chaplains.
3] Improving on National Mission's methods.
4] i) Existing Administration of Church
   ii) Possible reform of above.
5] Industrial Life- help of Church to improve this?
By 27 February 1917 the Service Candidates' Committee was already up and running. The Archbishop of Canterbury's Committee on The Church and Rural Life first met 2 July, 1919.

Religion and Morale -- The National Mission at the Front. (1917)


F. H. Brabant, Neville Stuart Talbot 1879-1943 A Memoir. (S.C.M. Press) p.74


Macmillan to Davidson. 25 September, 1916.


Ibid.

Gordon to Bell. 9 July 1917

Girdlestone to Bell. 13 August 1917.


Ibid.
A group of 40 people met in March, 1917, at St. Martin's Vicarage and as a result Life and Liberty was officially launched at Queen's Hall 16 July 1917.

Reports were produced by each of the Committees:
1] Teaching methods of the Church
2] Public Worship--Prayer Book Revision
3] Improving on National Mission's methods.
4] i) Existing Administration of Church
   ii) Possible reform of above.
5] Industrial Life- help of Church to improve this?
CHAPTER 10  CHAPLAINS' POST-WAR INITIATIVES.

Talbot had served as a soldier in the Boer War prior to his ordination. He served as a temporary chaplain in France rising to A.C.G. 5th Army in 1916.

Talbot House was named Toc H by the Signallers to distinguish it from another Talbot House.

G. Gordon & T. Pym, Papers from Picardy. No 6 Postscript: Epitome of War. (1917)
A. H. Gray, As Tommy Sees Us.
C. Raven, The Religious Basis of Pacifism. (Essay by for The Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State July 1937.)


[10]  Ibid. pp.95-103


[14]  Ibid.


[16]  Ibid. p.93


[18]  C. Gore, Essays on Church Reform. (1899)
C. Sturje, a barrister, attacked the practice of selling benefices as if they were simply pieces of property.
The Commission had been appointed in 1913 at the request of the Representative Church Council.

Carey served as a senior Chaplain in France. Sheppard had spent three months as a temporary Chaplain prior to his induction at St. Martin's.

The proposals sought to convert the voluntary Representative Church Council into a recognised body with increased powers, along the lines suggested by the report of the Archbishops Commission.

Ultimately some 200 of the original intake of candidates for the Knutsford School had enrolled in this way at Talbot House. Later lists transferred to HQ and Bishop Gwynne by 1918 had 2000 men listed.


Sir T. Lever, Clayton of Toc H. (1971) p.76
December 1918 two temporary schools set up in France under E. Talbot and Barry.

Preliminary selection carried out by G. V. Smith, later Bishop of Leicester. 26 March, 1919, The first batch of men from the 2 schools in France numbered 150. 17 May, 1919, Second intake followed.

The test examination was accepted for University entrance and Theological College. Students studied five subjects, English Literature, Outlines of European History, Latin, New Testament Greek, Elementary Physics. The original Syllabus was drawn up by Father Frere C.R., later Bishop of Truro.

In March 1918 at a week long conference for chaplains at Blandeques Pym's scheme was rejected.

In 3 years, donations had more than paid for an adopted child of the Waifs and Strays Society.

4.10,000 from two St. Martins worshippers, made possible the foundation of Talbot House in London.

Ibid. Fr. Frere, N. Talbot, Pym, Barry, Macnutt, Rogers, C. M. Chavasse M.C., Croix de Guerre, C. S. Woodward, Railton. Sheppard and Raven served on the I.C.F. Committee, the Director was the Reverend P. T. R. Kirk.


Studdert Kennedy, Gore and Tawney were members of the Committee. The I.C.F. resulted from the amalgamation of the Christian Social Union and the Navvy Mission Society in 1919-20.


Ibid. p.123.

G. Studdert Kennedy, *The Wicket Gate and The Word and the Work*.


An initial appeal for £15,000 was made in 1920. In 1923, a further appeal was launched for £6,000 supported by a letter signed by 34 Bishops.


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[16] Revision of the terms of Regular Service in the Army Chaplains Department. W. O. 32 104 79 (P.R.O.)


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