ARISTOTLE’S ESSENCES AS SUBJECT AND ACTUALITY

Paul David Mannick

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews

1984

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Aristotle's Essences as Subject and Actuality

Submitted by Paul David Mannick to Professor I. G. Kidd, Department of Greek, The University of St. Andrews in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Ph. D.

5 September 1983
Aristotle's Essences as Subject and Actuality

(abstract)

The question which seeks the essence of something, τί ἐίναι, according to the argument of this thesis, was fashioned by Aristotle because of ambiguity or 'homonymy' inherent in the nature of universal predicates. However successful the conceptual analysis of universals may be as such, their meaning or significance cannot be fully fixed or determined except as a function of the subjects to which they are applied. The distinction between understanding a universal predicate as such and understanding its application to a particular subject may be roughly expressed as that between the ability to recognize the presence of an attribute in a subject and the knowledge of what the predicate says about the subject. It is in order to transform knowledge of the first kind into knowledge of the second that the 'essence-question' is asked.

It is shown that the Aristotelian notion of an essence (τὸ τί ἐίναι) is explained through the notions of a subject (ὑποκείμενον) and of an actuality (ἐνέργεια). Aristotelian 'essences' express the actuality or activity of a substance conceived from the 'categorial' point of view as the subject of qualities and universal predicates in general. An 'essence', insofar as the term applies to sensible substances, is the being of something as the subject of qualities and material predicates, i.e. universal predicates in general. Entailed is the denial that an essence in Aristotle's sense is constituted by attributes, characteristics, or universal predicates of any sort whatsoever. The argument exploits the distinction drawn by Aristotle on a number of occasions in the Metaphysics between material substrata of a substance and the subjects of qualities. The development of the position hinges on an analysis of matter and form in terms of the relations of potentiality and actuality conceived as contemporaneous modes of existence.
Resolutions

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by me, that the work of which it is a record has been done by myself, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree.

In preparation for its composition I conducted a course of research at the University of St. Andrews having been admitted as a research student under Ordinance General No. 12 in October of 1974, and as a candidate for the Ph. D. in May, 1975.

Paul David Mannick
5 September 1983

I declare that the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations have been fulfilled.

Professor I. G. Kidd,
Department of Greek.
I would like first to express my warm gratitude to Professor I. G. Kidd. His patience and understanding as a teacher, together with the scholarly and philosophical excellence so well known to the academic community, are a testimony to the quality of British higher education. During my residence in St. Andrews he made himself constantly available to work through the morass of my confusions about Aristotle. He was always a source of insight and encouragement.

This past summer I was helped immeasurably by my colleague David Bolotin who pointed out many flaws and obscurities in my argument. Another colleague, Robert Sacks, made a number of suggestions about a former draft. I have also benefited by criticisms from Professor G. B. Kerferd and Christopher Bryant which were conveyed to me by Professor Kidd.

Finally, I wish to make it known that, though I express frequent disagreement with a number of Aristotelian scholars and philosophers, I refer in this thesis only to men and women whose thought I envy and admire. In particular I wish to acknowledge the work of Sir David Ross without whose insight, sensitivity to Aristotle's writing, and feats of scholarship I should have found the composition of this thesis next to impossible. Even when I have disagreed with him most, it has often been remarks and connections pointed out by him which have led to the conclusions represented here.

I hasten to add that the many flaws and obscurities still remaining in this thesis do so despite the efforts of those here acknowledged.
Table of Contents

General Introduction ........................................... i

Introduction to Part I ......................................... 1

1. Do bricks and mortar become a house? ..................... 8

2. Can unwrought material become a statue in actuality? .... 13

3. In what sense are substances predicates of matter? ......... 20

4. Can matter be predicated of substances? .................... 38

5. Is the genesis of substance the equivalent of alterations in a substratum? ........... 50

6. How can a substance be conceived as the cause of its matter? ........... 71

Introduction to Part II ......................................... 103

1. Why did Aristotle devise the formula τὸ πν ὑπὲρ ἑλπικαλ; ? ........... 111

2. What does Aristotle mean by the claim that the πν ὑπὲρ ἑλπικαλ; is said ἀπεξετάσθαι ? ........... 136

3. Are individual substances identical with their essences? 169

Footnotes ......................................................... 181

Bibliography ...................................................... 213
General Introduction

The argument of this thesis is that the question which seeks the essence of something, what I will call the 'essence-question' (τί ἐν εἴναι), was fashioned by Aristotle because of ambiguity or 'homonymy' inherent in the nature of universal predicates. However successful the conceptual analysis of universals as such may be, their meaning or significance cannot be fully fixed or determined except as a function of the subjects to which they are applied. The distinction between understanding a universal predicate as such and understanding its application to a particular subject may be roughly expressed as that between the ability to recognize the presence of an attribute in a subject and the knowledge of what the predicate says about the subject. It is in order to transform knowledge of the first kind into knowledge of the second that the 'essence-question' is asked.

It will be shown that the Aristotelian notion of an essence (τὸ τί ἐν εἴναι) is explained through the notions of a subject (ὑποκείμενον) and of an actuality (ἐνέργεια). Aristotelian essences are shown to express the actuality or activity of a substance conceived from the 'categorial' point of view as the subject of attributes.
and universal predicates in general. According to the argument, an 'essence', insofar as the term applies to sensible substances, is the being of something as the subject of qualities and universal predicates. This view entails the denial that an essence in Aristotle's sense is constituted by attributes, characteristics, or universal predicates of any sort whatsoever. The argument exploits the distinction which Aristotle draws on a number of occasions in the Metaphysics between the material substrata of forms, actualities, substances, and the subjects of qualities.

The distinctive way in which Aristotle conceives the notion of a subject of qualities depends upon the development of the concepts of potentiality and actuality. Misunderstanding and misleading expression of these central Aristotelian concepts, as well as the philosophical problems which it is their job to resolve, has contributed to the perception of deep flaws and inconsistencies at the heart of Aristotle's metaphysical thought concerning the nature of substances. Typical of what I understand to be the 'received' but misleading interpretation of potentiality and actuality are the following remarks by A. L. Peck:

... the agent, or the efficient cause, will set up in the matter a movement of a definite and specific kind, which will result in the matter which is potentially X becoming X in actuality, i.e. in acquiring the form to which the specific movement was proper. (emphasis mine)
Also:

He (the carpenter) then imparts to his hands, and they in turn to his tools, the κυρίοις proper to the form "table," and in this way the matter, the wood, becomes actually the table which to begin with it was potentially.¹(emphasis mine)

In this thesis it is denied that the potentiality of matter either to be or to become a substance expresses the capacity of materials to be or become a substance in actuality. It is shown that 'potentiality' and 'actuality' as these terms are applied to the relations of materials to substances express primarily contemporaneous modes of existence. Peck's view is based on passages like the following from Met., 1050a 15:

Material exists in potentiality (δυναμεία) because it may come into the form; but whenever it exists in actuality (ἐνέργεια), at that point it is in the form.

These remarks need not be understood to indicate that material becomes the form in actuality or that material 'acquires' the form. 'To be in the form' is best understood, according to my argument, to describe the reverse relation, i.e. the acquisition of matter by the form or substance. The material, on the other hand, has become neither the form nor the substance, but itself in actuality. But for materials to be in actuality is always a potential mode of existence. The potentiality or power of materials is most fully displayed when it is in the form as a functioning part.
Misconceptions about Aristotle's use of the terms ἐνέπνευσ and ἐνεργεια result largely from an apparent tautology, i.e. that potentiality expresses the possibility of future fulfilment and that a potency is exhausted when fulfilled. In line with this thinking it is believed that Aristotle developed the notion of potentiality in order to explain the possibility of change. I.e., the possibility of change or movement depends upon precedent powers. This position has a genuine plausibility which it is not my purpose to challenge. But the sense of potentiality which applies to movement or change is the sense which Aristotle in Met., Θ, 1 describes as 'the most authoritative sense, but not the sense most useful to our purposes'. It is the misapplication of this sense of potentiality to the potentiality of materials to become substances that undermines understanding of Aristotle's thought about the relations of matter and form. For it is thought that the notion of potentiality was applied by Aristotle to the materials which constitute substances in order to address the problem of creation ex nihilo. What is argued in this thesis is that Aristotle's difficulty with the genesis of substances is only distantly related to the spectre of creation ex nihilo, a difficulty which in Gen. et Corr. he assigns not to himself but to the fears of earlier philosophers. It is in fact the straightforward assumption that whatever comes-to-be does so from what existed before that gives rise to the Aristotelian problem of how the genesis of substances is to be conceived.
The problem which to Aristotle is 'most puzzling' is how it is possible to respond to the materialist position that all so-called 'genesis' is merely the alteration or modification of a pre-existing substratum. For Aristotle is never tempted to allow that a man, for instance, is modified into existence. Men come to be. Though it is correct to say that Aristotle uses the notions of potentiality and actuality in order to solve this difficulty, he does not use the terms in the same sense to effect this solution. When Aristotle says in Met., Z, at 1039a 3 that it is impossible for substances to be composed of other substances existing in actuality he is talking primarily about contemporaneous relations between substances and their components.

It is shown that the more appropriate model for understanding the notion of potentiality as applied to the components of substances is the sense in which the term applies to the possession of an art by a craftsman. A housebuilder does not cease to possess the power to build a house when he is building the house. On the contrary, his power is most fully displayed when he is building. It is in accordance with the model of a craftsman at work that the relation between matter and form is conceived by Aristotle. This relation is conceived as similar to the relation between professional activity and developed professional capacity. The change from mere possession of an art to its exercise is not regarded by Aristotle as a modification.
Though this kind of model helps to illustrate some of the features of the relation between matter and form, it is not quite a model of genesis. Genesis of a substance, for Aristotle, amounts to the coming-to-be of a new subject. How is genesis possible when the old subject remains? If a house comes-to-be from bricks and timbers, which remain throughout the genesis of the house and persist in their identity throughout the period of its existence, how can it be claimed that a new subject has come-to-be? Does not such a change represent merely the modification of materials which remain perpetually the real subject, and on these grounds remain the substance par excellence? Could not something similar be true for natural substances as well? Could it not be the case that to call someone a man is at bottom simply to ascribe a certain configuration of materials and qualities born by the materials to this ever present substratum? Even if, as Aristotle seems to believe, complete change from one element to another is possible as well as complete change from elements to other materials like flesh and bone, in what sense can such a change be viewed as genesis of, e.g., a man? For in this case the essence of a man may still be nothing more than a conglomerate of qualities and characteristics.

Such difficulties as these, according to this thesis, were seen as unresolvable by Aristotle provided that substances are conceived as the presence of one thing in another,
e. g. as the presence of form in matter. Further, it is shown that to conceive substance in this way involves fundamental incoherence of thought. For such a position about the nature of things undermines the explanatory power with which the position prides itself. Its "ultimate effect is to make it impossible that anyone could ever know with the precision required what he is saying or thinking about anything, especially about materials themselves. Clear understanding of the force, significance or meaning of a statement about something requires knowledge of the subject about which the claim is made, where 'subject' is understood in a distinctive fashion.

A simple example, though not conclusive in itself, will help orient the discussion. Suppose someone makes the following claim: "The timbers are straight." An auditor may ask, "What is it for timbers to be straight?" This question, according to this thesis, is in the form of the 'essence-question'. The question could hardly be asked by someone who did not know what 'straightness' was, or surely the form of the question is misleading. The person asking may be a geometer or an expert with tools which measure straightness. This knowledge, however, does not provide straightness with a precise significance in its application to timbers. For this almost certainly would depend upon what the timbers are for, and especially what subject the timbers will compose. Only with respect to such a subject can an intelligent determination be made of
what is to count as straightness with respect to timbers.
To know a property 'universally' is for Aristotle only the beginning of understanding, however well the property is known in that mode.

The example is helpful for two reasons. First, it is clear that in most instances timbers are not themselves the subject of the claim. Despite the position of the word 'timbers' as the grammatical subject of the sentence, such a claim would in general be about something else, e.g. a house, a woodshed, a merry-go-'round. Despite the fact that timbers bear the property 'straightness' they are in a crucial sense not the subject of the claim. Secondly, the importance of subjects in this other sense is shown by the fact that it is impossible to know, without merely arbitrary imposition of a standard, what will constitute straightness for timbers. The foreman in a lumber yard may point to a pretty twisted-looking sample and say, "This is straight." In no sense does it follow that he is misusing the word. He is saying that, for the purposes at hand, this counts as straight.

Aristotle's position is that no statement about materials is determinate in significance apart from the knowledge of that subject which the materials compose. Through the development of this position he attacks both the Greek materialists and the Platonists. For if precision of understanding is required to explain sensible objects, such precision cannot arise except
for the knowledge of the subject as a determinant of significance. On the one hand, statements about materials are dependent for their precision on the subject composed by them. On the other, the knowledge of universals, however complete such knowledge may be, cannot itself determine the way in which universals will apply to particular subjects. In this sense both universal predicates and statements about materials are 'homonymous'.

For Aristotle the knowledge of universals and of materials constitutes potential knowledge and corresponds to potential being. The view that such knowledge is paradigmatic of human knowledge as well as the corresponding view about the nature of the world that its fundamental principles are either universals or materials entails a resignation to actual ignorance both of our own minds and of the world. In view of such difficulties Aristotle develops the notion of an essence, ἄγερνεῖν, as subject and actuality.

Another way of adumbrating the strain of Aristotelian thought represented above is the following. Human knowledge is constituted by knowledge of the causes of things. By 'cause' Aristotle means, not what is generally construed as a cause in modern speech, but whatever is an answer to some form of the question 'Why?'. The question 'Why?' according to Aristotle always presupposes that one thing has been asserted of 'something else'. This seems fairly clear. What is problematic about Aristotle's position both for us and for his auditors is that he
regards the question 'What is it?' as a form of the question 'Why?'. This difficulty results in part from an ambiguity in the question τι εστιν which in Greek may mean either 'What is?' or 'What is it?'. But there are further ambiguities involved in either way of understanding the question. The former tends, as in English, to ask 'What exists?'. The latter tends to seek a genus, a definition, or criteria according to which something can be identified. If the former question is understood to ask for an enumeration of the things that exist, this hardly seems to be an answer to the question 'Why?'. The latter, on the other hand, would seem to explain nothing more than criteria for the application of a word. Even if the notion of definition is stronger than this (as it surely was for Aristotle) it is not easy to know what sort of 'Why?' question the definition answers. According to this thesis Aristotle devised the question τι ἦν εἶναι in order to focus on one of the meanings which the question τι εστιν may have. The question 'What was the being?' or 'What was it for X to be?' is asked in order to discover the principle, understood as the subject, according to which the precise meaning of universal predicates is to be determined. The essence-question is asked in order to discover what Aristotle calls the 'cause of the matter'.

This notion is not easy to understand. Part of the reason for this is that material and the laws which govern its behaviour as such are regarded both by us
and by the Greek materialists as causes, if not the causes, of the being of sensible substances. A cause, as commonly viewed, is the mechanical power of one set of material conditions to necessitate the next. Though a great deal of time is spent in the thesis which follows on Aristotle's notion of 'the cause of the matter' I do not in any direct way discuss the notion of mechanical causality. By way of introduction, however, the following remarks are appropriate.

First, it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle would have countenanced the view that one material state of affairs can necessitate the next. The view that in Aristotle's philosophy there is no place for necessity of a 'mechanical' sort is forcefully argued by D. M. Balme and Anthony Preus. Preus argues that:

Aristotle does not have a concept which may appropriately be called mechanical necessity, in the modern sense of that word. Balme helpfully refers to P., A., 640a 4; G., A., 734a 25; and Gen. et Corr., 337b 15 all of which seem unequivocally to argue that:

Aristotle denies that there is any necessity by which one event compels the next to happen. When in the Physics (198b 12-14) Aristotle poses the question whether natural things can be explained as follows,

because the hot thing is constituted in such and such a manner and the cold thing as well (and similarly for all such things) these results are and come-to-be by necessity,
his answer is negative.

Though in general convinced by Balme and Preus, I prefer to argue the position in a slightly different way. What is important for my argument is that, even if Aristotle did recognize the existence of some kind of mechanical necessity, it is never to this kind of necessity that he appeals in order to explain anything. Mechanical necessity in the modern sense of the term does not fall comfortably into any of the three kinds of necessity he lists. Simple necessity applies only to eternal things and seems to have, more or less, the force of our 'logical necessity'. The necessity of force or violence is construed by Aristotle as an impediment to a natural process. It is viewed in a teleological framework and is, as such, posterior to nature. Such necessity has no independent explanatory value. Insofar as it explains anything, it explains the failure rather than the success of a natural process. The third kind of necessity is 'necessity by hypothesis' (ἐφ’ ὑποθέσεως). It is in accordance with this kind of necessity that material has an explanatory rôle in natural science, i.e. as a condition necessary in order that something else exists or comes-to-be. In this sense material is necessitated but does not necessitate anything else. The primary thrust of Aristotle's position is that even if there is a mechanical necessity beyond the kinds listed (or presupposed by the kinds listed, as some would have it), it is devoid of explanatory power.
This view is, on one interpretation, precisely what Aristotle argues at G. A., 789b 6:

There is nothing to prevent teeth being formed and being lost in the way (Democritus) says; but it is not on that account that it happens.

Here Aristotle seems to be accusing Democritus of assigning to certain kinds of facts an explanatory role which they cannot perform.

In order to draw a more precise picture of the part 'necessity' plays for Aristotle in natural science it will be helpful to examine in some detail a passage found in the Physics at 200a 15. Here Aristotle suggests that a plausible parallel can be drawn between 'the necessary' in mathematics and in nature. His claim is that the analogy applies, however, in reverse (ἀνάμλυν). As an instance Aristotle cites the demonstration that the sum of the angles of a triangle are equal to the sum of two right angles. The construction Aristotle used for the proof may be gleaned from Met., 1051a 24, where he says:

Why does the triangle make up two right angles? Because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If then the parallel to the side had been drawn up (ἀνάκτο), the fact would at once have been clear from merely looking at the figure.

The figure, then, is the one used by Euclid in the Elements, Book I, Proposition 32, viz.
Apparent from the figure, according to Aristotle, is that, given that CE is a line drawn parallel to line AB, since the angles ACE and ECD are equal respectively to the angles BAC and ABC, and since the angles ECD, ACE, and ACB are together equal to two right angles (being 'angles about one point'), the three angles of the triangle ABC will also be equal to two right angles.

In the passage from the *Physics* quoted above Aristotle says that this proof depends upon the nature of a straight line (ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ εὐθεῖον τοδι' ἔστιν). It is a commonplace of geometry that the proposition depends upon the possibility and the uniqueness of parallel lines to a given line through a given point. If we attempt to work the proposition in reverse, i.e., attempt to prove from the fact that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles that the angles about a point are equal to two right angles, we must again appeal to the theory of parallels, and in turn to the nature of straight lines, especially the fact that the angles standing on a straight line about a point are equal to two right angles. A petitio principii is involved in the converse. The possibility that this fact about triangles could result
even if straight lines had another character cannot be eliminated. This is why Aristotle says that the proposition will not work in reverse (ελλ' οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτο, ἐκέινο). Nevertheless it will follow that if a triangle has angles unequal to two right angles, lines will not have the character supposed (ελλ' εἰ γε τοῦτο μὴ ἐστὶν, οὐδὲ τὸ εὐθὺ ἐστὶν).

Aristotle argues that the same relations hold between ends and materials, but in reverse. If the end is to be, then necessarily certain preconditions (ἐμπροσθεν) will hold. But the existence of the preconditions does not necessitate the end. As in the case of the geometrical instance, the proposition is not convertible. Other ends may require the same preconditions. From this Aristotle concludes that the end is the 'cause of the matter' and not the other way around (ὅτι οὖν γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς καλῆς, ελλ' οὐκ ἀνίση τοῦ τέλους).

Viewed in one way all that Aristotle is here denying about material conditions is that there is a necessary connection between one set and the next. In one sense of the term he would be denying 'determinacy'. There is, however, another sense of determinacy which is stressed in the argument of this thesis, reflected in the determination of the explanatory rôle of a given claim about materials. The importance of this relation between ends, forms, substances and material conditions is brought out in part by the fact that a materialist need not assert that one set of material conditions necessitates only one
future set in order to maintain that the cause of the being of substances is mechanical. One need not deny that an identical set of circumstances could result in more than one effect in order to wield the notion of mechanical causality. Though it is an enormously powerful fact about human thought that when something unexpected happens we look for a difference in the precedent circumstances, the claim (e. g. by Kant) that this demand is at the very basis of the possibility of rational thought and experience is hyperbolic. From Aristotle's viewpoint neither side in this debate has a stronger claim to the explanation of natural phenomena. For him no mere series of material circumstances, whatever their mode of connection, can form a part of the study of natural phenomena unless they can be viewed as necessary ex hypothesi. Aristotle would undoubtedly have been impressed by the development of modern physics, but he need not on this account have been tempted to change his view that substance is the cause of matter.
The terms 'potential' and 'actual' tend, both in modern and ancient usage, to denote mutually exclusive conditions. In part this reflects an evidently valid position that if X is Y actually, it cannot, at the same time and in the same sense, be Y potentially. For if X is Y potentially, this suggests that it is not yet Y. One might, of course, claim that X is Y in actuality at the same time that X is Z potentially. The difficulty arises only with the claim that X is Y in potentiality and actuality simultaneously. Thus Aquinas says:

Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.¹

For this reason, when Aristotle says, e. g., that bricks, stones, and timber are a house potentially, there is an enormously powerful tendency to assume that if the potentiality of the materials is fulfilled in an actual house, these materials would have become a house in actuality. The bricks, stones and timbers would have lost their potentiality by composing an actual house, their potentiality, that is, to be the house they actually compose.
There are occasions, however, in which a potentiality (especially in the sense of a 'power' or 'capacity') can be coherently said to exist simultaneously with the corresponding actuality or activity. When a geometer is actually doing geometry, when a tennis player is actually playing tennis, when a housebuilder is actually building a house, these actual doings reflect a capacity or power on the part of the professional which is not spent by engaging in the activity. A professional plies his craft through a developed capacity. To say that a housebuilder, for example, becomes or changes into a housebuilder when he actually builds would be deeply misleading. though a housebuilder may be regarded as a housebuilder most especially when he is building, this may be explained by the fact that his powers are most fully displayed in the act of housebuilding. A housebuilder continues to be a housebuilder when he builds because the potentiality which the term 'housebuilder' denotes remains fully intact. In the same way, when an eye sees, it does not cease to have the capacity even for the very sight which it sees. Rather, an eye, being a professional seer, as it were, fully displays its nature exactly by seeing.

This analysis suggests an alternative way of understanding Aristotle's use of the expressions δύναμις, δύνασθαι and καθ' ἑαυτὸν δύναμις in contexts in which materials are being related to 'forms' or 'actualities'. These expressions may express the way in which a man's body, for example, is a man, or the way in which timber, mortar and bricks are the house that they compose. A man's body
may be coherently described as being a man 'potentially', not in virtue of something which remains for the body to accomplish, namely becoming a man in actuality, but because the actuality of a man is accomplished through the fully realized capacities of a specially organized body. When Aristotle defines the soul as the actuality, activity, or form of a natural body having life potentially, this can hardly be understood as implying that the body is not yet alive. What Aristotle intends is clarified by the following statement.

It is not what has lost soul which is potentially such as to live, but what possesses it. But the seed and the fruit are potentially such a body.

A seed, then, seems to enjoy a potentiality in relation to a prospective future fulfillment, while the body's power for life seems more like that of a professional. For though it might be said that a seed is not yet alive, there is no time at which it can be said that the body of an animal is not yet alive.

It is not only with respect to the bodies of living things that Aristotle seems content to describe the components of actually existing material things as potentially the things composed. Indeed, Aristotle asserts that not only the parts of animals but also earth, fire and air are potentialities, and not substances. Such uses suggest that the term 'potentiality' characterizes for Aristotle the mode of being for all materials whether or not they compose an actually existing substance.
But in spite of such passages, it is usually held that when Aristotle says, e.g., that such and such materials are a house potentially, he means that these materials may, by gaining the appropriate form, become a house in actuality. That is, when materials are in-formed they become actualities. And certainly it is hard to deny that in some sense these views are true. The question is whether they are true in a sense which reflects the force and intent of Aristotle's usage of these terms.

In the course of Part I of this thesis, I will argue that such a construal tends to undermine the philosophical thrust of Aristotle's usage of the terms 'potentiality' and 'actuality'. I will argue that these terms primarily indicate modes of being which are signalled by the kinds of role played by various sorts of objects in our accounts of things. What is at issue for Aristotle, as I understand him, is the preservation of what might be called the 'logic' of materials and the substances composed by them in the light of the fundamental unity of matter and form. Materials are called potencies because of the way in which materials function in our accounts of things. Forms are actualities, signaling the distinctive role they play in our thoughts. The immediacy of correspondence between potentiality and actuality reflects an ultimate unity between matter and form. Thus, in *De Anima*, for example, while Aristotle is extremely careful to distinguish the logical types of matter and form, he argues that the definition of soul as 'the first actuality of the natural organic body' makes it unnecessary to "seek whether the soul and the body are one."
The difficulty with the view that what is potentially becomes what is actually, i.e., that materials may come-to-be an οὐσία in the full sense of the word, lies in the possible implication that the coming-to-be of a substance is either the equivalent to, or modelled upon, the gaining of certain properties and qualities by matter. Such a view would imply for Aristotle that genesis is simply a special case of alteration, at least in those cases in which the genesis of a substance is conjoined with a persisting substratum. But Aristotle's view is, I think, that however complete is the list one may give of properties, qualities and materials describing an object, one will not have answered the question 'What is it?'. Such a list, unlike the claim, for instance, that Socrates is a man or that this is a statue, fails to locate anything but a heap (σωμάτος) fails, that is, to establish that "some one thing has come-to-be from" the items in the list. It is the job of an ἐνεργεία to establish the role and significance of the various properties and materials in respect to the what to which they belong. And therefore, the genesis of a new what or substance can never be the mere equivalent of alterations. The properties, qualities and materials which compose a substance cannot, taken by themselves, account for their own explanatory value, since the meaning of properties and materials is fully dependent upon the nature of the substance to which they belong. It is in accordance with this indefiniteness of materials, taken by themselves, that they are regarded as mere potentialities.
In the attempt to separate Aristotle’s notion of potentiality from the potentiality of materials to become substances in actuality, a number of philosophical issues arise. The focal issue is the question whether substances are, for Aristotle, predicates of matter, and more generally, the question what sort of predicate the substance of something is -- if it is a predicate at all. Though the more complete discussion of the general question will be the primary focus of Part II, it is important to establish in Part I that matter is not the subject of substance-predicates at least in the way in which substances are the subjects of qualities and properties. This question bears heavily on the issue whether materials can become the substances they compose in actuality for the reason that if materials can be said to gain a substance as a sort of property, then one is hard pressed to distinguish the coming-to-be of a substance from a case in which a material, say, becomes hot. The upshot of my argument is that (1) no substance is a quality-like predicate of matter and (2) materials are quality-like predicates of substances. An actuality is not a qualification of a potentiality. Thus, Joseph Owens’ claim that "the Aristotelian Entity is predicated of the matter" is deeply misleading. That is, it is misleading to conceive a man as the predicate of his flesh and bones.

Since, however, I claim that a proposition in the form 'M is potentially S' (where M is matter and S is a substance) assigns to M a mode of being S, how does S function in the proposition, if not as a predicate?
The general claim of this thesis is that the substance of something is an actuality or activity, an ἔνεργεια. An ἔνεργεια is a normative principle according to which the roles of materials, qualities and properties are determined. That is, to say that M is potentially S, is to assign a principle in the light of which M is to be viewed. Similarly, the term 'housebuilder' ascribes to a man the potentiality to build houses in the light of a certain activity, housebuilding. To say that a man is a housebuilder is to say that he has developed powers to engage in a certain activity. But a man can never be the activity of housebuilding, not because of any failure on his part, but because the activity of housebuilding is of a logically different type than a man is. Housebuilding is nevertheless the form according to which the properties of a man relevant to his being a housebuilder are picked out. The relation of matter and substance is similar to this.

In this context it is extremely important that Aristotle on a number of occasions in the Metaphysics identifies the form (εἶδος) of something with the activity that produces it, e.g., ἁρπακτική is the form of health, and οἰκοδομική is the form of a house. For such passages are meant as a model for the logical relations between the substance or essence of something and that of which it is the essence, e.g., the soul and the natural organic body.
Chapter 1

Do bricks and mortar become a house?

In G. E. M. Anscombe's justly admired essay on Aristotle, she makes the following claim:

... if bricks and mortar, etc., become a house by being put together to make one we can say that such and such bricks and mortar, remaining such, become a house.

The important thing about Ms. Anscombe's account, and also the difficult thing, is the part about 'bricks and mortar remaining such'. It is a difficult saying because it is hard to tell what sort of change the becoming represents. It is an important claim because it points to a fundamental Aristotelian distinction between cases in which something persists throughout a change and cases in which something passes away in the course of becoming something else. Anscombe rightly includes the coming-to-be of a house in the former case, that is, in claiming that bricks and mortar persist in their identity as bricks and mortar when a house is made from them. But difficulties arise when we examine the use Aristotle makes of the distinction between a persistent and non-persistent substratum.

First of all, non-persistence of a substratum is a sign of 'simple' (ειναι) or full-blown genesis (thought to belong strictly only to substances), while persistence
is a sign of alteration or qualitative change. And there is little doubt that the bricks and mortar in the example do undergo alteration in the general sense of the term. But the house composed by the bricks and mortar does not seem to be a new property or quality gained by the bricks and timbers by being put together. For a house seems to be a substance in its own right.

And in the *Physics* (A, 7, 190b5-9), Aristotle includes 'house' in the list of things that 'come-to-be simply' (ἐνέπρονεν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ) through processes of change. But if the genesis of a house is a case of simple genesis, it is inadequately described as the alteration of the material substratum. This is partly reflected in the fact that while 'being made into a house' does not seem to make a distinction among bricks as such, 'being made of brick' does seem to make a distinction among houses. Thus, when the production of a house is considered in the light of persistence of the material substratum, it looks like a case of alteration. When it is considered as a case of 'coming-to-be simply', i.e., since a new substratum for qualities and alterations has come-to-be, it looks as if something should have passed away in the course of the change. That is, the distinction between persistent and non-persistent substrata seems inadequate to differentiate between substantial and non-substantial change.

But Aristotle, while recognizing this difficulty, does not abandon the distinction so easily. For persistence and non-persistence is used also as a criterion for distinguishing the sense in which (a) something comes-to-be
from (ἐκ) a privation (στέρνσις), which Aristotle sometimes calls the ἀντικείμενον, from (b) the sense in which something comes-to-be from matter. In case (a) but not in case (b) 'that from which' (ἐξ ὑπὸ) passes away in the course of the change. At 1033a20-23 of the Metaphysics Aristotle observes that strictly speaking (ἐὰν τις ἐπιβλέπῃ σφῶν), one ought not to say that a house comes-to-be from bricks precisely because the matter remains. According to the passage we say that a substance comes-to-be 'from matter' by default, that is, because the privation of a house, the ἀντικείμενον, is 'obscure and nameless'. Now it is at least curious that Aristotle should deny strict use of the characterization of matter as 'that from which', since this is the very formula used by Aristotle to define the material cause.

It seems that Aristotle is pressed by the following concerns. The genesis of a house from bricks and mortar cannot be treated as a case in which one substance comes-to-be another in the strict sense in which bronze, for example, might be said to become fire or air. But neither can it be regarded as a case of mere qualitative change, e. g., the case in which a man becomes musical or a lump of bronze becomes hot. The somewhat formal alternative is to treat the coming-to-be of a house from bricks as a genesis in the form of substantial change from one substance to another insofar as the στέρνσις of form, or the ἀντικείμενον, passes away when a house, for instance, comes-to-be.
Similar issues are involved in the *Physics* at 190a 25, where Aristotle says, "We say that a statue comes-to-be from bronze, but not that bronze becomes a statue." That is, there are some cases in which, despite the persistence of a substratum, we are dealing not with qualitative change, but with 'simple' coming-to-be. Barrington Jones claims that the traditional translation is misleading here and suggests that the last clause be rendered: "We do not say that the bronze statue comes-to-be." His difference in translation, however, does not represent a departure in philosophical interpretation from the one I propose. For Jones says:

Thus, even though the example of the statue would seem to constitute a counterexample to the general claim about the scope of "from" made on the basis of the example of the musical man, the example of the statue is shown to be different by the fact that even though bronze is present throughout the change in that both the original piece of bronze and the statue are made from bronze, the product is not simply a piece of that stuff with a new property, that of being a statue, but a new thing, a statue. Whether or not the traditional translation is preserved, Aristotle is saying that the case in which a statue comes-to-be is not rightly considered as one in which the bronze gains the statue it composes as a quality-like predicate. This view may have been reflected by Greek usage.

It is extremely rare, in fact, for Aristotle to speak of materials either coming-to-be or being the substance
they compose, except potentially. I believe that Aristotle's resistance to this mode of expression reflects his repudiation of the philosophical stance whereby the coming-to-be even of artificial substances is reduced to modifications in matter. That is, Aristotle repudiates the claim that what a statue 'really is' is a lump of bronze having certain properties. But if it is allowed that for Aristotle a lump of bronze may become a statue as the result of various changes brought about in it by the agency of the craftsman, then the question arises, 'In what sense is the bronze the statue, or the bricks the house, after the 'becoming' is complete?'. I will argue that his answer would be, 'Potentially'.
Chapter 2

Can unwrought material become a statue in actuality?

In J. L. Ackrill's article, "Aristotle's Definition of Psuche", he helpfully discusses Aristotle's use of the term 'potentiality'. And despite certain difficulties, Ackrill is willing to attribute the following claim to Aristotle.

Unwrought material is potentially a statue, after the sculptor's work it is actually a statue.  

I will argue (1) that this formulation is not to be found anywhere in Aristotle's work and (2) that Aristotle would not say it. Aristotle does, of course, speak pointedly of change from what is potentially to what is actually. Indeed, it is highly plausible that in the case of qualitative change, what has a certain quality potentially may become something which has it actually. But the question is in what way Aristotle's general claim that "Everything changes from what is potentially to what is actually" applies to substantial change. For closely regarded, Aristotle's statement need not imply that it is what is potentially that comes to exist as the generated substance in the manner of actuality. Also, Aristotle speaks of what is in actuality coming-to-be out of or from what is potentially. But this need not imply that what exists potentially changes its manner of
existence when something comes-to-be from it. I believe that it is only in the very special case of the definition of motion, viz. "the actuality of what is potentially as such," that Aristotle speaks of the actuality or actualization of the potential, or speaks of the potential becoming actual.

Professor Ackrill is acutely aware of difficulties resulting from his formulation. The major problem is that Aristotle seems perfectly content to refer to materials of which something is made as potentially that thing even after the thing has come-to-be. And this is a problem because, as Ackrill puts it, "... to say that something is potentially an X seems to exclude its now being actually an X." Yet Aristotle asserts, for example, that the parts of animals are mistakenly thought to be substances though they are really mere potencies; this on the grounds that they fail the test of separability. Ackrill observes also that Aristotle seem to reserve the term potentiality for the animal body which presently possesses life. For in the passage noted in the Introduction to Part I, two senses of the term potentiality are evoked. A seed is potentially a body which is potentially such as to live. In the first, but not in the second use, potentiality implies the possibility of becoming something. Thus, according to Ackrill,

... 'potentiality' and 'actuality' can come to be used not only for successive phases but also for aspects of the composite which are present simultaneously.
But he adds, "This is only because of a reliance on the idea of the matter as it was before being informed."

The question is, however, whether for matter to be informed involves a change from potential to actual existence in the matter. In the passage quoted from *De Anima*, however, it seems to be precisely 'being informed' which is prerequisite to the valid application of the term potentiality to the body. Therefore, if there is a reliance on the idea of matter as it was before being informed, it is not because sufficient conditions are found in 'this former state' to warrant strict application of the term potentiality. Though one might say of a lump of iron before it is made into an axe that it is a potential cutter, this would not be because of its power to cut *qua* lump of iron. Iron gains this potentiality by being fashioned into an axe. Even if iron were found in nature only as the material of ready-formed axes, it would be legitimate to say that iron is only potentially the actuality of cutting which is the *form* of an axe. Indeed, it is just in this way that the bodies of animals are found. We do not find animal bodies prior to their being the bodies of animals.

Ackrill's attempt to delimit more fully the scope of the term 'potentiality' reveals an important insight, though I think it goes against the grain of his earlier remarks. He observes, namely, that the expression 'potentially an X' is not applied by Aristotle to stuff too
"remote" from the substance in question. The implication is that 'potentiality' does not for Aristotle describe a transitive relation. That is, if A is potentially B, and B is potentially C, it need not follow that A is potentially C. More pointedly stated, if A is material for B, while B is material for C, it does not follow that A is material for C. Aristotle would not say, for example, that air, earth, fire and water are a *man* 'potentially'. As Ackrill puts it, earth is "altogether too remote" to be a man potentially.

Aristotle introduces the issue in *Metaphysics*, Theta, 7.

At what point each thing is potentially and at what point it is not must be defined. For it is not at any point whatsoever (οὐ γὰρ ὅποτε ὁμορραγεῖν). Aristotle's restrictions upon the use of the term are remarkably severe. At 1049a14 Aristotle expresses doubt that even the seed or sperm is properly called a man 'potentially', saying that "... whenever, through a principle in itself it already is such, at that point this is potentially." And the following remarks concerning what is a house potentially are found at 1049a9.

If nothing among these things, that is, the matter, prevents a house from coming-to-be, and there is nothing which must be added or subtracted or changed, this is a house potentially.

It seems that proper use of the expression 'potentially an X' tolerates practically no remoteness at all. To envisage
a case in which the materials for making a house would be in the condition Aristotle seems to demand until the house is actually built requires a feat of imagination. For, when, prior to this, would it be the case that nothing would need to be added, subtracted, or in any way modified? And the requirement, 'when it already is such', applied to the seed, seems equally difficult to satisfy if the potentiality of the seed is to exist before the actuality has come-to-be in an inchoate form at least. Such severe restrictions dampen the assurance that the idea of matter before it is informed plays a very important rôle in Aristotle's development of the idea of potentiality.

Against such difficulties, however, Ackrill points out that Aristotle waxes warm in his argument against those Eleatic logicians who are willing to ascribe potentiality only when the actuality is present. But the context of this argument in Metaphysics, Theta, 3, makes it clear that the issue is not the potentiality of unformed materials to become something but the power of a craftsman, for instance, to ply his craft. If what it is for a housebuilder to be is to be able to build houses, and if this capacity represents a genuine development through learning and practice, then it is absurd to claim that a housebuilder as such vanishes immediately when he ceases to build. For the housebuilding art does not cease to exist when a man ceases to build, and the loss of a man's abilities requires, for
instance, that he forgets them, or is damaged in some way in the passage of time. Aristotle ascribes a similar absurdity to the view that what is cold, hot or sweet is so only when it is being sensed as such. In regarding unperceived \( \pi \alpha \nu \) as potentialities, Aristotle does not here mean that an unperceived X is cold potentially before it has come to be cold, but rather that X is presently cold in virtue of its capacity to produce this sensation. And it is misleading to say that what is cold is altered when it is perceived or that a house-builder is altered when he builds. In this context then, Aristotle seems not to be addressing the question whether unformed materials are potentially the things they may compose, but the question whether informed but inactive things are potentially active.

Even if it is granted that in Theta, 7 Aristotle's restrictions to the scope of the term 'potentiality' are not so severe as to exclude materials prior to the formation of a substance from them, it emerges clearly that although Aristotle provides strict criteria for the point at which a potency begins, he assigns no end, save the destruction of the substance. The conditions under which it makes sense to ascribe the potentiality to be an X are satisfied completely by the materials which compose an actual substance. There is no hint that at some point the materials composing an X are actually but no longer potentially an X, no sign that the potentiality of materials is lost in its fulfilment.
The difficulties raised by Ackrill are created, I think, by the belief that for Aristotle it is the unwrought bronze which, being a statue potentially, later becomes a statue actually. The alternative is to say that it is a statue of bronze which comes-to-be simply, from a previously existing lump of bronze. To say, prior to the genesis of a statue, that bronze is potentially a statue means that bronze is a good material for making statues, without implication that the material mode of its existence would change if, through the agency of a craftsman, a statue came to be.
In what sense are substances predicates of matter?

In an article by Fr. Joseph Owens, entitled "Matter and Predication in Aristotle," Owens undertakes to explain in what sense matter can become a substance. He implies that it does so by gaining a substance as a quality-like predicate. Although Owens recognizes the oddity of the locutions in which substances are predicated of matter, and the scarcity of the instances in which Aristotle countenances such locutions, he maintains that Aristotle held to the view that a substance could be predicated of its matter. There are two interconnected aspects of Owens' interpretation that seem objectionable to me. First is his treatment of 'substance-predicates' as analogous to quality-like predicates. Second is the view that the relation of form to matter is "somewhat" like the relation of a substance to its accidents.

The primary evidence adduced by Owens in support of his interpretation occurs in Metaphysics, Z, 3, 1029a 23. Here Aristotle says, "The other things (sc. all things other than substance) are predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter." The line is awkward
to use as support for any position because of the fact that it occurs in the course of a *reductio ad absurdum* argument. At the conclusion of the argument Aristotle says:

For those examining the issue from this point of view it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible. For separability and 'thisness' (τὸ ἀπὸ ἀπώλείς) seem to belong especially to substance, on which account the form or the compound (τὸ ἐξ ὑμάνων) would seem to be substance rather than matter.

Because the argument is complex, it is difficult to know exactly what it is that gives rise to the absurdity. If Owens is right and the passage supports the view that Aristotle regarded substances as predicates of matter, then this premise must remain unscathed by the absurdity Aristotle ascribes to the argument as a whole. Aristotle's own introduction to the argument, however, leads me to doubt this. For he says:

Now substance is said in a formal way (ἀρνεύς) to be whatever is insofar as it is not *said* of a subject but is that of which other things are *said*. But one must not say this alone, for it is insufficient. For the statement itself is unclear, and moreover it follows that matter becomes substance.

Thus, Aristotle raises two problems with the definition of substance as stated, *obscurity* and *insufficiency*. If the difficulty arose from insufficiency in the definition alone, it would be fairly clear that
what is missing is the criterion of separability. At 1017b 23 of Book Delta, Aristotle says:

It follows that substance is said in two ways, (1) as the ultimate substratum which is no longer said of anything else, and (2) as what is a tode ti and is separable. Such a thing is the shape and form (μορφή καὶ ἔλεος) of each thing.

But it is strange to maintain that these two criteria are logically related in such a way that a carefully developed argument from the first criterion will establish a substance that flatly fails to meet the second criterion, unless there simply were two or more utterly different kinds of substance. If this is the case, Aristotle would be unlikely to conclude the argument in Z, 3 by saying, "... but this is impossible. For separability and thisness seem to belong especially to substance."

The more likely account is that the unreflective use of an obscure criterion has produced a candidate for substantiality which fails to meet the other important criterion. This seems especially right in light of the fact that the candidate being considered is "... in itself neither a 'what' nor a 'how much' nor anything else." 5

The procedure described in Z, 3 of stripping away predicates in order to discover the ultimate subject in its naked reality hinges on two dubious assumptions concerning the relation of subjects and predicates, both of which are challenged in the course of Book Z. For the procedure assumes, first, that in every case in which one thing is predicated of another, the subject and the predicate
are different sorts of things. Secondly, it assumes that matter is a substratum (ὑπόκείμενον) for substances in somewhat the same way as substances are the subjects of qualities. For the argument details a procedure whereby we first strip off all the quality-like predicates, and then, in a similar way, strip away the substance or essence of the subject, leaving behind a characterless, material substratum.

At 1038b 4, however, Aristotle claims that a subject may be said to 'underlie' in two ways, either in being a τόδε τί, as an animal underlies its qualities, or in the way that matter underlies an actuality (ἐντελεχεία). Thus Aristotle distinguishes two modes of being a substratum or subject. This distinction occurs in the context of an argument which attempts to establish that the substance or essence of something cannot belong to its subject as a universal predicate, that is, in a quality-like manner. Aristotle holds to this position despite a number of important difficulties. For instance, there is the problem that, if a substance is said of no subject, while only the universal is always said of some subject, an essence (τὸτί οὐ εἶναι), being non-universal, will not, apparently, belong even to the things of which it is the essence. Yet, Aristotle remains committed to the view "... that nothing among things which belong universally is a substance, and nothing among things predicated in common signifies a τόδε τί." Indeed, his commitment is unshaken even by
the grave difficulty with which Chapter 13 ends, namely, that if substance is neither among universals, nor a synthesis of other substances existing in actuality, then it will not be possible to give an account of a substance.\textsuperscript{13}

Despite this, Chapter 16 ends with the following conclusion:

It is clear that among the things which are said universally none is a substance, nor is any substance composed of substances.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus it would seem that a major burden of Aristotelian philosophy is to develop a sense of substance which avoids regarding it as a common predicate while it allows at the same time for the possibility of definition. A large part of this thesis will be devoted to the sorting out of this dilemma. But the point I am making now is that since qualities are paradeigmatic of 'things predicated universally' or 'things predicated in common', and since substance and essence\textsuperscript{15} are pointedly denied this mode of predication, it follows that either substances are not predicated of any subject at all and\textsuperscript{a fortiori} not predicated of matter, or else they are predicated in a different sense. Owens' argument entails at least the partial assimilation of these distinct modes of predication.

Here, for example, is Owens' account of the way in which matter becomes a substance.

To say that matter is human, equine, lapideous, or that it is a man, a horse, a stone, may be true enough in this context, but with all its linguistic oddity the way of speaking hardly brings out the full import of the situation. It tends to give
the impression that matter is of itself these things. The Aristotelian meaning, on the contrary, is that matter is not of itself any of these things, but becomes them by receiving the appropriate substantial forms. As their real subject it remains really distinct from them, somewhat as a substance remains really distinct from its accidents. (emphasis mine)

I believe that the only direct evidence in support of Owens' view that a substance is in some sense accidentally related to its matter occurs in the course of the argument from Z, 3, where Aristotle says at 1029a 25 that even denials of character would belong accidentally \((\kappaα\tau\alpha \sigmaμ\beta\varepsilon\beta\eta\kappa\varepsilon\)\) to the substratum. However, if my account of this argument is correct, and the resulting concept of a characterless substratum is part of the absurdity revealed by the reductio ad absurdum, then this statement forms very weak evidence for Owens' view. In fact, Aristotle frequently uses the term 'matter', in such a way as to exclude an accidental relationship to the substance composed by it.

In the Physics at 192a 31, for example, Aristotle says:

I mean by the matter the first underlying thing for each thing, from which, belonging not by accident within, something comes-to-be.

Again, in De Anima (414a 19-29) Aristotle argues that though the soul itself is not a kind of body, it nevertheless exists only in a body of a definite sort.
For the actuality of each thing comes-to-be naturally in what belongs to it potentially, that is, in the appropriate matter (Καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα).

Here Aristotle does not find it necessary to describe the soul as an accident of the body in order to preserve the distinct logical characters of soul and body.

There is, however, considerable indirect evidence which may be adduced in support of Owens' position. For instance, in De Anima (412a 8) matter is described as 'what is not in itself (τὰ άπότροπα) τὸ τετοῖο' in contrast to μορφή or εἴδος, 'according to which it is already called τὸ τετοῖο (τὰ άπτόμενα τοῦτο).'

Because the term Καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ is often used in contrast to the term κατὰ οὐσίαν, a possible implication of this line is that matter is an actuality only by accident, or that the soul which is the actuality of the body belongs to it as an accidental attribute.

Though there is evidence weighing against this interpretation, it is counterbalanced by other passages in support of Owens' view. For though Aristotle argues strenuously in Metaphysics, 2, that an essence is the sort of thing which is said ἱκτός, and further that an essence does not belong to things which "... are said by participation, through a quality or through an attribute," these passages may not be conclusive. For it is arguable that in these passages Aristotle is talking about the relation of essences either to universals or to fully formed substances, but not to their matter. Thus, though the essence of Socrates may belong per se to Socrates, it will belong only accidentally to his
matter. This may be the import of, e. g., lines 1037a 33-1037b 8. Here Aristotle argues that in the case of "first substances" each thing and its essence are the same. He adds:

By 'first' I mean what is not said in the way that one thing is in another or in a substratum as matter.

Further, Aristotle claims that

... whatever things exist as matter or as combined with matter, are not the same (sc. as their essences), nor are things which are one by accident, for instance, Socrates and the musical. For these things are the same by accident.

Do these passages imply that Socrates, or a man or an animal is an accidental unity of matter and form? Is a man a case of "one thing in another" or "one thing in a material substratum?"

This is a question which Aristotle raises on a number of occasions in Books Ζ and Η of the Metaphysics. On the one hand, there is evidence from Ζ, 6 which strongly suggests that Socrates is the same as his essence. That is, Socrates is not to be included among things which exist as one thing attributed to another (ΚΑΤΑ ΣΥΜΒΕΒΛΗΜΑ), 17a but per se (ΚΑΤ' ΕΥΤΗΣ), 17b; i. e. as an essential unity.

Regarding the "sophistical refutations" of the view that Socrates and his essence are the same, Aristotle remarks:

There is no difference in the point of view from which the question is asked or in the point of view from which it is resolved.
On the other hand this claim seems to undergo an important qualification in other places. At 1043b 2, for example, Aristotle says:

While a soul and the essence of soul are the same thing, a man and the essence of man is not the same, if, that is, the soul is not said to be the man.

Again, Aristotle says, at 1037a 7:

It is clear that the soul is the primary substance, the body is matter, but man or animal is the compound of the two taken universally. But Socrates and Koriskos, if, that is, Socrates is his soul, have two senses (for some they are regarded as soul, for others as the combination). But if Socrates and Koriskos are simply this soul and this body, then the universal and the particular will be analogous.

Thus the question arises whether a substance is a mere combination of this form and this matter. Is it right to conceive a man as a body + a soul?

This is the sort of question which Aristotle raises, for example, at 1036b 3.

The form of a man, for instance, seems always to be found in flesh and bones and parts such as these. Are these, then, parts of the form and the account? Or are they not anything but matter, though we are unable to separate them because they do not come-to-be with respect to other things?

Again at 1043a 33 Aristotle asks whether an animal is a soul in a body or just soul. For the soul "... is the substance and actuality of a certain body."
It is in the conception of soul as the actuality of a certain body that the key to Aristotle's solution of this dilemma is found.

The evidence that Aristotle sought a solution to problems arising from the treatment of substances as mere compounds of body and soul may be seen in the very passage from De Anima which provoked this discussion. For in that passage, Aristotle lists under the heading of the "single class of things we call substance" first the matter, then the form, and finally the compound. Immediately, he says, "The matter is potentiality, the form actuality." As was mentioned earlier, it is precisely in the light of this distinction that Aristotle deflects the question whether the body and the soul are one thing. The thrust of his argument seems to be that if a form is the fulfilment, the actuality, or the 'being-in-possession-of-its-end' (ἐντελεχέων) of the appropriately constituted body, the question whether form and matter are one is ill conceived.

Considerable evidence is found in the middle books of the Metaphysics in support of this interpretation. There is, for instance, a passage at 1035b.27.

Man and horse and things which are applied in a universal manner to particulars are not substance but a sort of whole composed of this definition and this matter taken universally. But Socrates is already a particular composed of the ultimate matter, and similarly in the other cases.
This passage suggests that there is a mode of speaking of things, namely a 'universal mode', which may misleadingly tend to imply that substances are mere combinations, e. g., of this matter and this form. On this account it seems probable that Aristotle would have denied the antecedent in line 1037a 9-10, which says, "If Socrates and Koriskos are simply this soul and this body, then the universal and the particular will be analogous." In the light of this denial, the thrust of the claim, "... the soul is the primary substance, the body is matter, but man or animal is the compound of the two taken universally," may also be reconsidered. For this compound seems not to be a substance, but to represent a universal mode in which substances are sometimes conceived.

Further, the notions of potentiality and actuality appear in the Metaphysics, just as in De Anima, to suggest ways of conceiving substances as fundamental unities and not as combinations. At 1045a 20, for instance, Aristotle is addressing the question why a man ought not to be conceived as more than one thing, e. g., animal + two-footed. He says:

It is clear that for those who proceed in their typical fashion to define and speak, it is not possible to answer or resolve the difficulty. But if, as we say, there is matter and form, the one being potentially, the other actually, the solution would no longer seem to be a problem.
Similarly directed remarks are found also at 1045b 17, where Aristotle says:

The final (εἰκόνα) matter and the form are one and the same thing, just as was said, the one potentially, the other actually, so that it is like seeking what the cause is of one thing being one thing. For each thing is a sort of unity, and the potentiality and the actuality are somehow one thing.

Aristotle points to a resolution of this kind at 1043b 10. He says:

A man is not animal + two-footed, but it is necessary that there be something apart from these, if these are matter, which is neither an element nor a combination of elements, but the substance is what they say when leaving the matter aside. If this, then, is the cause of the being and the substance, this would be called the substance itself.

And in a similar context at 1043a 5, Aristotle claims that in the case of substances, the actuality itself is what is predicated of the matter.

This, then, appears to be the mode in which a substance may be predicated of its matter, the mode, that is, in which an actuality is predicated of a potentiality. But the relation between an actuality and a potentiality is no more accidental than is the relation of 'housebuilding' to a 'housebuilder', or the actuality of 'sheltering people and their belongings' to appropriately arranged bricks and mortar. Nor, indeed, is this sort of predication 'quality-like'. 'Housebuilding' does not pick out an element of a housebuilder, and neither does
'sheltering' pick out a quality or feature of a house. It does not follow, of course, that just any conglomerate of qualities and elements may satisfy the conditions for being a substance. For there is, as Aristotle says, "a different actuality for different matter." Neither does it follow that the predication of an actuality will not focus on certain characteristics within a conglomerate to the exclusion of others. What does follow, I will argue, is that no feature, characteristic, quality, element, or any combination of these, can become a substance in actuality. It is for this reason that Aristotle says that matter is not in itself a tode ti.

To establish this point I will refer to a passage from Z, 16. The passage is introduced by the claim that among the things most generally thought to be substance, most are mere potencies. Included in Aristotle's list of these merely apparent substances are the parts of animals. These are rejected as true substances on the grounds that when separated they exist as matter. Also included are the primary elements earth, air and fire, which are rejected on the grounds that "... none of them is one thing, but a mere heap, until they are worked up and some one thing comes-to-be from them." This latter remark, especially if it is distributed over the earlier example of the parts of animals, may be held to suggest that at some point these potencies may become actualities. A crucial passage follows, however, which
lays this possibility to rest. Aristotle considers precisely the case of fully formed parts of a living organism. He says:

Especially someone might suppose that the parts of living things and the parts closely related to the soul come-to-be both being in actuality and in potentiality, by possessing a principle of motion from something in their midsts, for which reason some animals live when divided. But nevertheless all will be in potentiality, whenever they are one and naturally continuous, but not by force or growing together. For such a thing is a mutilation.

Thus the distinction between potentiality and actuality seems elegantly absolute. Indeed, a likely implication from what Aristotle says is that it is only when the parts of an animal are properly constituted, i.e., "naturally one and continuous," that they are properly called potential. Apparently, they are never actual.

If this interpretation is correct, then the passage leads directly to the conclusion of Z, 16, that is, to the conclusion that "no substance is found among things predicated universally, nor is any substance composed of substances." And these two denials can be seen to be fundamentally interconnected. For the mode of predication of a substantial predicate is not universal, that is, does not pick out common properties and elements, however focal or essential such properties and elements may be in respect to the being of the substance. For this reason Aristotle says of the Platonists,
Those who speak of the forms rightly regard them as separated, if indeed they are substances, but they do not rightly claim that a form is one over many. The reason why such a view of substantial predication is inadequate is that characteristics picked out in this way can at best form a "sort of whole" which is not a substance. It seems to have been Aristotle's view that only insofar as items picked out in the universal mode are regarded strictly as potencies is the unity of a substance rightly conceived. "For," as Aristotle says, it is impossible that a substance is formed out of substances belonging to it in actuality."

So that, if a substance is one thing, it will not be composed of substances belonging to it, that is, according to this mode.

In this chapter I have argued that substances are not predicates of matter in the manner in which accidents are predicated of substances. I have also attempted to describe the Aristotelian sources of the contrary view. Mainly, as it seems to me, such interpretations involve a confusion on the part of commentators between passages which are 'aporetic' in character and those which truly represent an exposition of Aristotle's position. This seems especially conspicuous in the examination of Metaphysics, Z, 3, which on my interpretation serves to expose important difficulties concerning Aristotle's doctrine of substance. Most especially, these difficulties
result from the treatment of an essence as a mere element in a whole, which can be stripped away leaving matter behind. Such a view of the Aristotelian essence is clearly expressed by Owens in The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, in which he says that the τῇ ἃ ἐστὶν ἐκ νῷ is that element in the thing which is expressed by the definition.31 According to the exposition I have given, this claim would reduce the essence to a mere potency, and would treat an essence as itself a predicate in the universal mode or as an item picked out by this mode of predication.

Though the evidence I have accumulated in this chapter tends very strongly to suggest that an alternate interpretation of an Aristotelian essence should be sought, the argument is by no means complete. Here are some of the difficulties which remain.

First, I have assumed that the two criteria for substance given by Aristotle, that of being an ultimate substratum of predicates, and that of being separable and a θοτε τί, are co-ordinate criteria. Against this view it is possible to maintain that they are separate criteria which are used with respect to utterly different kinds of substance, one for matter, the other for form and, perhaps, the combination of matter and form. The absurdity to which Aristotle refers in Z, 3, might then be the view that prime matter is the only substance. Some evidence is found in support of this view at 1029a 18
where Aristotle concludes, "... so that it is necessary that matter appears as the only substance for those who examine the issue in this way." But I will argue that the criteria are in fact co-ordinate and that a candidate which did not meet both criteria would not be, for Aristotle, a primary substance, i.e. an essence.

Secondly, I have made remarks which strongly suggest that a σύνολον, a compound of form and matter, is not for Aristotle a primary substance, but is rather an expression of the way a substance appears from a certain point of view. This point of view involves a universal mode of conception inadequate for the proper conception of individual substances. This position requires further discussion due to its novelty, though Hartman argues a similar view to mine in "Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence" in which he says:

Now Aristotle has written "if each name means simply this particular soul plus this particular body," then the material object is an instance of the compound universal (1037a8-10). But if there is any view Aristotle firmly rejects, it is precisely that a man is a soul plus a body, which is a corollary of the view that a substance is some matter combined with some form.

Third, a great deal more must be said about the nature of the relation between actualities and potentialities. In particular I have argued that actualities are not predicated in the universal mode which picks out elements and properties of things. But it may
be argued against this interpretation, that use of examples like 'housebuilding' and 'housebuilder' makes a *prima facie* case for the position that actualities are universal predicates. For in such cases a single activity is predicated of many practitioners. I will argue that it is not the fact that an actuality is predicated of many individuals that is at issue here but the mode of predication. But further, I will attempt an argument to the effect that the individual members of a natural species are, for Aristotle, actualities in their own right. This is to say that individual substances are properly said to be rather than have their essences.

Finally, it may be argued that I have played rather fast and loose with diverse types of concept in my association of characteristics, features, qualities, properties, parts of animals, and materials. This is a just criticism. For even the term 'quality' as used by Aristotle represents a 'mixed bag' of logically distinct sorts of things. But I will argue in detail that materials are analogous to certain kinds of qualities in that they are most properly conceived, not merely as the substrata of actualities, but as qualifications of them.
Chapter 4

Can matter be predicated of substances?

The argument found in *Metaphysics*, 2, 3, pointedly illustrates that matter is regarded by Aristotle as a substratum or subject. Because a substance is regarded as something which is predicated of no subject, but of which everything else is predicated, matter appeared as a prime candidate for being substance. Further, in *De Anima*, at 412a 17, Aristotle claims that the soul is not a body on the following grounds.

For the body is not said of a subject, but exists rather as a subject and matter.

In the *Categories*, Aristotle may be viewed as preserving a genuine place as substances for the material parts of things at 1a 24 where he stipulates that parts are not to be included among things present in a subject.

Aristotle, indeed, seems to put his stipulation precisely to this use at 3a 28, where he says:

Let it not worry us that the parts of substances exist in whole subjects, that is, lest we are forced to deny that they are substances. For was it not stipulated that 'things present in a subject' did not mean 'things belonging in something as parts'?
On the other hand, it has been clearly shown that Aristotle was entirely conscious of the slippery nature of the concept of subject or substratum. Two passages showing his consciousness of the difficulty have already been cited, viz. 1038b 4 and 1049a 27. In order to gain a clearer understanding of Aristotle's perception of the difficulty, it will be helpful to examine these passages more closely.

The first passage is introduced by a listing of four candidates for being substance, the substratum or subject, the essence (τὸ τί ἐστὶν), the compound of these, and the universal (τὸ καθόλου). Aristotle notes that the first two have already been discussed.

For concerning the essence and the substratum, they 'underlie' (ὑπόκειται) in two ways, either being a τὸδὲ τί, as an animal underlies or is the subject of his qualities or affections (τοῖς πρόθεσιν), or as matter underlies the actuality. Importantly, Aristotle is not claiming that matter is the only substratum. Rather, his claim is that both the essence and matter may be said to 'underlie', the one, being a τὸδὲ τί, the other, in the relation of matter to actuality. This interpretation is born out by reference to a similar distinction drawn at 1042a 26. There, Aristotle says:

The substratum is a substance. In one way the matter is a substratum, meaning by matter that which, not being a τὸδὲ τί, is a τὸδὲ τί potentially. In another way, the account and the form is a substratum, which, being a τὸδὲ τί is separable in account.
These passages lead to the conclusion that Aristotle regarded an essence as a substratum of qualities. It is this very fact that provokes one of the major dilemmas of Z, 13-16. Precisely because it is asserted that a substance is of no subject, the possibility arises that an essence may not belong to the very thing of which it is the essence, e.g., a man or horse. For 'belonging' suggests predication and universality. Or if the essence does belong to things, this suggests that it is disqualified by failure to meet a major criterion for substances. The philosophical challenge is to understand an essence in such a way that it is the subject of the qualifications of the thing of which it is the essence.

The immediate concern of this chapter, however, is to answer the question whether matter can be predicated of substances. The above observations are relevant to this question because they suggest that matter is not properly regarded as the subject of qualifications, that is, of the qualities and affections of the substances they compose. If this is the case, then whatever kind of substantiality it is which matter enjoys may not be threatened by regarding it as predicatable. In the light of this possibility, I will make one more observation about the sources of the dilemmas raised in Z, 13.

At 1038b 25, Aristotle poses this problem.

Moreover, it would seem impossible or unnatural that a tode ti and a substance, if they are composed by something, should be composed from what are not substances nor from the tode ti,
but from quality (ἐκ τοῦ ὑπο). For this would imply that substance is not prior and that quality is prior to substance and the 'this'.

This problem arises naturally from the claim that the materials which compose substances are not truly substances because they (1) do not underlie in the way that a substance underlies its qualities and (2) are not tode ti's. For if substances are not composed of substances, it seems that they must be composed of things in the other categories, for which 'quality' stands, here, as the representative. As I argued in the last chapter, Aristotle's solution to this problem is suggested in the re-statement of his position found at 1039a 3, in which he says that a substance cannot be composed of substances subsisting in actuality. For this would turn substances into mere conglomerates rather than unities.

Clearly, then, to regard materials as qualities would, from Aristotle's point of view, be unsatisfactory. Though there is a passage in the Physics in which Aristotle claims that matter is a relative (τῶν μορίων τοῦ), this should not be understood as a denial that matter is a substratum, but a reflection of the fact that there are different substrata for different forms. There is no evidence that Aristotle in his maturity abandoned the definition of matter given at Physics, 192a 31, as "... the first substratum for each thing, from which, belonging not by accident within, something comes-to-be."
In the second passage earmarked for closer examination, 1049a 27, a number of these issues come into sharper focus. For in Theta, 7, the issues include (1) the proper delimitation of the term 'potentiality', (2) the distinction among kinds of substratum, and (3) the comparison of quality-predicates and matter-predicates. I will take up the argument at 1049a 18, which is introduced by Aristotle's remark that earth is not properly conceived as a statue potentially until it is changed into bronze.

At this point Aristotle, in what appears at first to be a digression, praises the Greek tongue for the 'paronymous' mode in which materials are predicated of the substances they compose.

What we say is not this (τὸδὲ) but that-en (ἐκείνινον) is appropriate. For example a box is not wood but wooden, nor is wood earth but earthen, and again earth, if the process continues (ἐς οὖτως), is not something else (ἄλλο) but that-en.

Aristotle now uses the observation to illustrate the point that only the immediate or proximate materials are rightly said to be potentially the things they compose. He says,

In every case that is potentially which follows immediately (ἐκ χώς τοῦ υποτετος). For instance, a box is not earthen or earth, but wooden. For this is a box potentially and this is the matter of the box.
But in the procedure of pursuing material qualifications, another signpost to ultimate matter or an ultimate substratum is suggested. There may be some element or group of elements which are neither further qualified by something which is them potentially, nor identical to any other elements. Fire, for instance, might be 'first matter'.

The procedure described by Aristotle differs significantly from the procedure of Z, 3. In Z, 3 the process involved stripping away the predicates in order to locate the true subject. Here, the process is more like stripping away the substance in order to find the ultimate potentiality. If a box is wooden, but wood is earthen, but earth is airy, but air is fiery, while fire is nothing else, fire will be first matter. But there is an absurdity about such a procedure. Does the analysis move toward or away from what is a tode ti and substance? At the beginning the subject of investigation seems to be a subject of qualifications; at the end a substratum of some sort appears which is neither, itself, a subject of qualification, nor a qualification of the original subject, i.e., the box. Has the procedure moved the investigator closer to what really is?

Aristotle addresses this question by appeal to the distinction among kinds of substrata. He says:

That about which (τὸ καθ' ἑαυτῷ) and the substratum differ in this, in being or not being a tode ti. A man, for instance, body and soul, is the subject of his qualities or affections (τὰς ταύτας), but musical and white are quality (τὰ θέασιν).
Now if a man, body and soul, is the subject of his qualities, and this is meant to indicate the kind of unity which 'being a tode ti' entails, then it follows that the true subjects are matter and form, construed not as mere combination, but as the actuality of a body.

Wilfrid Sellars in "Raw Materials, Subjects and Substrata" suggests this sort of interpretation in arguing that due to the qualification, καὶ τῶν ματιών καὶ τῶν συν. Aristotle is restricting the compass of his remarks to the Aristotelian equivalent of Strawsonian P-predicates. That is, 'musical' and 'white' are a restricted class of predicates, which, like Strawson's beautiful example of 'smiling', belong to persons as a whole. For there is something weird or macabre about the claim that a person's body is smiling, and the claim that a person's soul is smiling has as little meaning as the claim that a person's soul is angry. The problem with Sellars' interpretation is Aristotle's pointed inclusion of 'white' as an example. Sellars meets this objection by suggesting that λευκόν should be translated, following Ross, as 'pale'. Though this is probably a more accurate translation in the context, it is difficult to understand 'pale' as a P-predicate, that is, as more typically applied to a person rather than his body.

A somewhat different interpretation, however, will give a more cohesive, if more radical, sense to the passage in question. Aristotle may be saying that the real subjects of all quality-like predicates are substances, that is, the tode ti, or to borrow Sellars' useful
translation, a 'thing-kind'. Though a man's body may be the cause of a man's attributes, it is not, properly speaking, the subject of them. I believe that in this passage Aristotle is moving toward an understanding of the essence of something, i.e. the actuality of a body, as a genuine subject. Part of the justification for this view is Aristotle's claim that materials, like qualities, are themselves predicated of certain kinds of entity in a paronymous mode.\(^{11}\)

A clearer notion of what Aristotle means in the context by a paronymous or 'derivative' mode of predication is provided in the following lines.

When the musical art comes-to-be in something (\(\Theta\), \(\mu\) \(\sigma\) \(\tau\) \(i\) \(k\) \(u\) \(k\) \(e\) \(v\) \(e\) \(n\) \(\rho\) \(e\) \(r\) \(h\) \(n\) \(s\)), the thing is not called the musical art but musical or skilled in music (\(\mu\) \(\omega\) \(\tau\) \(i\) \(k\) \(o\) \(n\)), and a man is not 'whiteness' (\(\kappa\) \(e\) \(u\) \(k\) \(o\) \(n\)), nor is a man the activity of walking or movement (\(\beta\) \(\alpha\) \(d\) \(i\) \(o\) \(s\) \(\iota\) \(s\) \(\kappa\) \(i\) \(n\) \(\sigma\) \(s\)) but one who walks or moves, i.e. as thaten (\(\epsilon\) \(s\) \(\tau\) \(o\) \(\iota\) \(\kappa\) \(e\) \(i\) \(e\) \(i\) \(n\) \(\kappa\) \(o\) \(n\)). In such cases (\(\epsilon\) \(i\) \(d\) \(o\) \(s\) \(\mu\) \(e\) \(n\) \(\sigma\) \(\iota\)) the ultimate subject is a substance (\(\tau\) \(o\) \(\varepsilon\) \(x\) \(a\) \(t\) \(o\) \(n\) \(\delta\) \(u\) \(d\) \(i\) \(a\)). But in cases which are not like this but some form (\(\varepsilon\) \(i\) \(d\) \(o\) \(s\)) and thing-kind (\(\tau\) \(o\) \(d\) \(e\) \(k\) \(e\) \(r\) \(e\) \(n\)) is the thing predicated, the ultimate substratum is matter and material substance.

The primary mode of predication, that is the non-derivative mode, is the sort that tells what something is. The inflection of the predicate, however, is by no means a certain indication of the type of predication involved. The sentence 'This is white', for instance, is ambiguous both in English and in Greek. The sentence
may be used to say either (1) of a colour that it is white; that is, an instance of whiteness, or (2) of a substance that it is white without the implication that the substance is a white. The latter case is an instance of paronymous predication. Aristotle's claim is that the paronymous mode of predication is a clue that we are dealing with a fully formed substance. His argument is that this substance is the ultimate subject in such cases. For the enterprise which attempts to locate a more ultimate entity, either by material or formal reductionism, fails to produce the actual subject of predication. It is possible that 1049a 24-27 should be read as a parody of material reductionism.

In order to establish that I have correctly described Aristotle's intent in Theta, 7, it would be convenient to argue that the material substratum of a form or tode ti could not be the ultimate subject of paronymous predicates. Yet Aristotle could hardly be saying that a quality cannot be predicated in this mode of a part of a substance. The claim, for instance, that 'his arm is white' could hardly be understood to mean that the arm is a white. In fact Aristotle does not deny but affirms that the material constituents of things are the subjects of paronymous predicates. The point is that such predicates need not apply to the original subject. Whether such a predicate indicates a potency with respect to the subject is judged in accordance with the applicability or relevance of the predicate to the subject. The final line
of Aristotle's argument leads toward a more precise analysis.

At 1049a 36 Aristotle says:

It happens rightly that 'thaten' is said in accordance with matter and the qualities. For both are indeterminates.

Part of Aristotle's meaning here is that qualities and materials as predicates do not, as does the form or tode ti, determine what it is that has the materials and properties. In this sense they are indeterminate because they fail to determine their subject. But there is, I think, another important sense, which is that, taken by themselves, they are undetermined. I mean that, for Aristotle, what counts as matter or as quality depends on what is being talked about. For instance, one could not tell by looking at materials per se that a kidney stone was not part of a kidney.

Aristotle's position seems to be something like this. The problem with an argument that attempts to show that fire, say, is the ultimate subject of a box is that in reaching this substratum, the arguer has continually changed the subject. For the procedure involves the confusion of two senses of substratum, i.e., the substratum as the subject of discourse or investigation with the substratum of the subject of discourse. The original material, e.g. wood, has itself been treated as the subject of discourse in its own right, though it arose in the investigation as a paronymous predicate.

It is for this kind of error that Aristotle criticizes
what is written in the Timaeus. Aristotle says:

He does not speak clearly concerning the rec-
ceptacle, if it is separable from the elements. Nor does he make use of the notion, though he
says that it is a sort of substratum prior to
the so-called elements, as gold is prior to
gold products. Surely even this is not well said when it is said in this case.

Of the subjects of alteration it is so, but of
the subjects of genesis and destruction, it is
impossible to call them the things from which
they come-to-be. Yet indeed he says that it is
truer by far to say that each one is gold.

Aristotle's point is that when something is regarded
as the material substratum of something, it is not,
from this point of view, being regarded as a substance,
that is, as an actuality in its own right, or as the
ultimate subject of discourse.

This analysis gives a clearer content to Aristotle's
claim that no substance is made out of other substances
existing in actuality. At the same time it explains
the sense and the importance of Aristotle's view that
materials may be predicated, though paronymously, of
their subjects. And finally, the analysis is moving
closer to the position that the ultimate subject of
qualities, properties and materials is the essence or
form.

There is one final problem I will touch upon
briefly before reconsidering the same issues under
a different light in the next chapter. For the argument I have so far adumbrated tends to suggest that all instances of material analysis involve the fallacy I have named "changing the subject." Such a view would involve a serious misconstrual of Aristotle's position. In the case of the wooden box, for example, it is entirely possible that a furniture restorer would be very interested in the properties and components of wood precisely because he is interested in the box. That is, it is possible to conduct an analysis of constituent materials without leaving the original subject behind. Aristotle describes such a procedure, for example, in the *Metaphysics, Z, 7.* At 1032b 18 he describes a doctor reasoning about the health of a patient.

If he is healthy, he must be made uniform. What is being uniform? This. And this will be if he is heated. What is this? This. And this belongs potentially and is already under the physician's power.

From this sort of reasoning Aristotle concludes that heat in the body is "... either a part of health or that something follows it which is such a part of health, either straight away or through intermediates." But though heat or some state of affairs nearly related to heat may fall genuinely within the province of the study of man, it does not follow that it is the heat which is healthy, or that heat is the sort of thing that health is, except potentially.
Chapter 6

Is the genesis of a substance the equivalent of alterations in a substratum?

Any beginner in the study of Aristotle will answer 'no' to the title question. The question what the significance of the distinction between alteration and genesis amounts to is more vexed. Indeed, the formulation of the distinction is made impossible by interpretations of Aristotle which treat forms and essences as special sorts of qualities and characteristics. The distinction is obscured, if not obliterated, by claims like Ross' that for Aristotle "... Form is never a substance, always a characteristic,"¹ or his speculation that:

Since one substance cannot contain another actually existing substance (1039a3), it follows that if the form were a substance there could never come into being an individual substance containing it as an element.²

For, if it is the case that the gaining of a characteristic amounts to the genesis of a substance, genesis will simply be a case of alteration. Genesis for Aristotle
always involves the coming-to-be of a new subject and not the modification of an old one. Yet such claims as Ross' cannot be dismissed out of hand. Such readings are a natural result of suggestions like those found in Z, 8, that only a combined substance is capable of genesis and that the essence "... is what comes-to-be in something else, either by art, by nature, or by potentiality." It is natural to suppose that what is "in something else" is a characteristic, attribute, or element. And this reading is further justified by Aristotle's claim at 1034a 5 that Socrates and Kallias are "... such a form in this flesh and bones," and that they differ from one another on account of their matter, but are the same in form. For if Socrates and Kallias share an essence, an essence would seem to be a universal predicate, though perhaps, of a special sort.

Further, Aristotle makes it clear that the means by which things come to be is simply, generally speaking, modification of a substratum.

Of things that come-to-be simply, some come-to-be through change of shape, e.g. a statue, some by addition, e.g. things that grow, some by subtraction, e.g. Hermes out of stone, some by synthesis, e.g. a house, and some by alteration, e.g. a transformation in respect to the matter. Yet it was shown in the last chapter that the new substance which comes-to-be is not the old substratum with a new property. If the old substratum persists
throughout the genesis, it becomes a quality-like predicate of the new substance. That is, when a statue comes-to-be from bronze, the statue is not bronze (or a bronze) but brazen.\footnote{6} But how the shift in subject occurs, that is, how full blown genesis is to be conceived, is a question Aristotle characterizes as a problem of "extraordinary difficulty."\footnote{7}

In this chapter I will examine two passages in which the paronymy of matter-predicates is connected to the problem of simple genesis, and its distinction from mere alteration or modification. The first passage occurs at the beginning of Physics, H, 3. The announced purpose of the chapter is to establish that alteration "... belongs only in things which are \textit{in themselves} said to suffer (change?) through perceptible objects."

For among the other things, one might especially suppose that alteration belongs in shapes and forms, and in states \((\epsilon\varepsilon\epsilon\iota\varsigma)\) and in the acquiring and losing of these things... But there is alteration in neither. (245b6-7)

It is important to notice that Aristotle is not merely claiming that shapes, forms and what, for convenience, I will call 'states', are not \textit{subjects} of alteration. Not even \(\varpi\alpha\theta\eta\) are \textit{subjects} of alteration, even when regarded as different from forms or states. As the argument proceeds, it concentrates on the more problematic assertion that the \textit{gaining} and \textit{losing} \((\alpha\nu\pi\acute{o}\beta\acute{a}l\acute{y})\) of shapes, forms and states by the subject of them is not alteration. This is indicated immediately...
by Aristotle's use of the passive participles ὑμημημήνευν and ρήμημήνευν in the following lines.

For whenever what is shaped and arranged (ὑμημημήνευν καὶ ρήμημήνευν) is completed we do not say that is the thing from which it came, e. g., we do not say 'the statue is bronze' or 'the candle is wax' or 'the bed is wood'. Rather, we say paronymously that the statue is brazen, the candle waxen, the bed wooden. But what has undergone the change and been altered we so designate.

Clearly it is the subject of the shape or arrangement which, at least when completed, is the receiver of paronymous predicates: That Aristotle uses present progressive participles and speaks, literally, of 'what is being shaped or arranged' suggests that his remarks about the paronymy of matter-predicates may also apply prior to completion of the new substance. The question is whether what is being shaped or arranged is the matter or the substance. If, as seems fairly clear, Aristotle is trying to distinguish the process of alteration from the process of genesis, Aristotle could not be arguing that the subject of the change, i. e., what is being made, is the matter until the instant of genesis, when a statue arises in a flash. Thus, Ross' claim that

... that which only comes into being by a certain process cannot be said to be altered by the process, since it did not exist before,

though trivially true, shifts the emphasis away from a distinction between the kinds of subject involved. The distinction in processes hinges, not so much on existence
or non-existence, but, on subject-types.

Thus, the subjects of the present participles, being shaped and arranged', are intended to contrast with the subjects of the perfect participles, 'having undergone and been altered'. In the consequent lines, Aristotle speaks about the latter subjects.

For we call the bronze and the wax the wet, the hot, and the hard; and not only this, but we also call the wet and the hot bronze, designating the matter homonymously with the quality (τὸ πέλατος). In the context of statue making, say, the material is designated in a different manner than is the statue by its properties. Though it was noticed in the last chapter that materials may themselves be the subjects of paronymous predicates, the distinction between what they are as substances and what they are in the sense of what belongs to them is blurred. The sculptor is more interested in the properties of bronze than its essence, if indeed he deigns to distinguish them at all. For what the sculptor is making is a brazen statue. And it is this which is being fashioned, shaped and formed. He is not making an instance of bronze. Thus, the processes of alteration and genesis have to one another the relation of potentiality to actuality, that is, the relation of matter to form. Because alteration of bronze is necessary to the making of a statue, alteration is potential genesis.

This interpretation is consonant with the conclusion drawn by Aristotle at 246a 1.

So that if what has become in which there is shape is not spoken of according to shape and form
but rather according to qualities and alterations, it is clear that geneses would not be alterations.

Here Aristotle is distinguishing the substratum which 'becomes' in the sense of being 'that in which the form resides' from what is spoken of in accordance with the form, i.e., the statue. The argument is that if the genesis of a statue of bronze were the equivalent of a lump of bronze coming to have a shape in it, then the bronze would come-to-be the recipient of attributes predicated in the same mode as they are of the statue, and there would be no distinction between the processes of genesis and alteration. That there is such a distinction is indicated by the fact that statues receive predicates in a different mode than does the bronze which composes them.

Aristotle completes this part of the argument by the following observation.

Moreover it would seem unnatural even to speak in this way, to say that a man or a house or anything among the things that come-to-be have been altered into being. But perhaps when each thing comes-to-be something is necessarily altered, for example, the matter is condensed, rarified, heated or cooled, but surely the things that come-to-be are not altered, nor is their genesis alteration.

These are the lines toward which Ross' remarks are particularly directed. It is possible that in translating Ἐλθοιςθε as "have been altered into being" I have over-read the line. Yet if I am right that 'what is being shaped and arranged' at 245b 9, refers to the product,
then there is some plausibility to this reading. Though it is probably right that a sculptor cannot be said to 'modify' or 'alter' a statue until he has made it, it hardly follows that until the instant when the statue arises, the sculptor is not working on a statue, but rather on bronze or stone. And it would be equally strange to say that, in the process of genesis, the statue is being condensed, rarified, heated or cooled. But indeed, the occasions for applying such terms to a statue would be rare, even if the statue were complete. Nor is it impossible that, insofar as a statue may be altered at all, it may be altered before it is complete.

Thus Aristotle argues not merely that there is no alteration with respect to shape or form, that is, alteration with the shape or form as the subject of new qualities, but also that 'what is said in accordance with shape or form' is a different sort of subject from what comes to have the shape or form in it. Yet it seems that at the time Aristotle wrote the chapter, some of the terms needed to draw the distinction more easily were as yet undeveloped. First of all, the term ὑποκείμενον occurs nowhere in the chapter. Secondly, Aristotle does not apply the term 'potentiality' to materials. The only use Aristotle makes of the term κατὰ δύναμιν is in the discussion of knowledge or skill as a capacity at 247b 4ff. For this reason the argument tends to concentrate on types of property or quality rather than on types of subject, e. g. shape in contrast
to heat.

That Aristotle is nevertheless concerned about different sorts of substrata is evidenced further by the argument with which he opens the discussion of 'states'. It is evident that in this argument Aristotle intends to argue that the gaining or losing of a state by its appropriate subject is ill conceived as a case of alteration. That is, the process of becoming virtuous, for example, is misconceived when treated as a case of alteration. The reason for this is that a virtue is properly understood, according to Aristotle, as a completion or perfection (τελείωσις), i.e. as that state in which something is most in accordance with its nature (μάλιστα τῇ καθ' φύσιν). A vice, on the other hand, involves a destruction (θραύσις) or a distortion (ἐκστοσις). Aristotle says: 246a17

Just as we do not speak of the finishing touches (τελείωμα) of a house as alteration (for it would be strange if the cornice (ἐγκος) and the roofing tile (κεραμῶς) were called 'alteration' and if a house being coped (ἐγκοσμενή) and roofed (κεραμοσύνη) was 'altered' rather than perfected) the argument applies in the same way to virtues and vices, both to what has them and to what is gaining them.

To speak in terms of completing or perfecting something is to be speaking of a subject of a certain kind, namely one which determines the appropriateness or relevance of properties in relation to it.15 The properties relevant to the excellence of something are, that is, regarded
in accordance with the form. The fulfillment of a subject regarded in this way is not a modification of it, though the fulfillment may involve the modification of something, but simply the doing of its proper job, i.e., being in actuality.

Aristotle does not deny, but affirms, that materials may come to possess shape, form, and the qualities in accordance with which something comes-to-be or becomes excellent. Indeed, he strongly suggests by his use of the expression \( \tau o \; \gamma e\, \gamma o\, o s \; \epsilon r \; \varphi \; \epsilon s \, \tau o \; \sigma c h u m e \) to characterize the material, as distinct from what is spoken of in accordance with shape and form, that shape is not properly conceived as being in the statue. But the gaining of appropriate properties by bronze is not the fulfillment of bronze as such, but the fulfillment or genesis of the statue. Thus, that to which the shape or form belongs as a property, cannot be the subject of genesis or perfection.

The doctrine that shape or form is not in the statue is reflected also, I think, in the Categories. First, it is reflected by the denial that secondary substances are in the subject of which they are predicated. Secondly, it is reflected by the denial that differentiae are present in a subject. Thus, though 'footed' and 'two-footed' are predicated of a man, they are not, according to Aristotle, in the man. The function of differentiae is not to ascribe properties, just as shape is not properly conceived as a modification of a statue, but to tell us what something is, or how it
is to be spoken of. That is, any subject about which its shape is a new fact, cannot be a statue. Since shape is a modification of a lump of bronze, bronze does not, by gaining shape, become a statue, at least in actuality. If it did, there would be no distinction between genesis and alteration.

It is a commonplace of Aristotelian scholarship that the distinction between primary and secondary substances is not found in the *Metaphysics*. Equally absent is the distinction between what is present in or not present in a subject. What replaces this sort of distinction is the division between things universally predicable (quality-like) and those things which belong in a different way, i.e., in the manner of essences. Fuller discussion of these matters is beyond the scope of the present chapter. From the argument so far, it seems clear that the question 'What is the essence of a statue?' cannot be answered by saying that it is a shape or form in something else. For such a definition fails to provide a ground according to which a statue, and not bronze, is a genuine subject, and not something like 'white man', the mere combination of a substance with an attribute. Further, the essence belongs, not to something else, but to that of which it is the essence.

Thus, Aristotle's treatment of genesis and its distinction from alteration is closely related to the question of what an essence is. And it seems clear that in order to do its job, a form or essence cannot be a characteristic. For such a view would lead to the unsatisfactory
conclusion that "... art does not make new substances but merely imposes new qualities, quantities, etc. on substances." 

At the end of Z, 7 of the Metaphysics, Aristotle considers the genesis of artificial substances in the light of the persistence of their substrata. The passage appears as a digression introduced by a discussion of the question whether matter is part of the account (λόγος) of things, a question which Aristotle seems to answer in the affirmative. The context is important. Because of the radical distinction Aristotle draws between alteration and genesis, and because of the logical gap such a distinction may suggest between alteration of materials and the genesis of substances, it is important that the distinction be viewed in the light of an affirmation of the intellectual significance of matter.

At 1033a 5, the passage begins with the following observation.

That from which as matter some things come-to-be, when they come-to-be, is not spoken of as that but thereof. For example a statue is not stone but of stone (λίθινος), and a man, one who is healthy, is not spoken of as that from which, i. e. as an invalid. The reason for this is that they come-to-be from a privation and from a substratum, which we call the matter. For instance, both a man and an invalid become healthy, though surely things are said to come-to-be rather from a privation, e. g. a healthy thing from an invalid rather than from man, on which account a healthy thing is not called an invalid but a man, and a man is healthy.
So far the passage is reminiscent of distinctions drawn in *Physics*, A, 7, where the locution Y comes-to-be from X is reserved for cases in which X comes-to-be Y, but does not survive the change.\(^\text{24}\) That is, we do not say, according to Aristotle, that the musical comes-to-be from a man, though a man may become musical. On the other hand, we do say both that the unmusical becomes musical and that the musical comes-to-be from the unmusical. Also, we do say both that the unmusical man becomes a musical man and that a musical man comes-to-be from an unmusical man. For, though the man survives the change, the *synthesis*, i. e., the unmusical man, does not.\(^\text{25}\) The troublesome case is that in which a product comes-to-be from matter. For though it resembles the case in which a man becomes musical insofar as the substratum survives the change, it is not a case of a subject picking up a new attribute.\(^\text{26}\) About this case Aristotle says, "We say that a statue comes-to-be from bronze, but not that bronze becomes a statue."

Curiously, in the passage from Z, 7, Aristotle attacks the mode of speech in which a statue is said to come-to-be from bronze rather than from a privation.\(^\text{27}\) In the case of those things in which the privation is obscure and nameless, for example, whatever is the privation of shape in bronze or the privation of a house in bricks and stones, they seem to come-to-be from these things as in the former case from an invalid. By "these things" Aristotle apparently means the material. But if we were to speak more thoughtfully about such
cases (ἦν τὸς ἐπιβλητὴς σοφὸς), we would not say simply that a statue comes-to-be from wood, or a house from bricks, exactly because they persist throughout the genesis. The privation, on the other hand, disappears. But there is an important disanalogy between the two sorts of cases. For though it is certainly true that an healthy man is not called an invalid, this represents a trivial matter of fact. That we do not call a statue a shapeless lump of bronze (neglecting the use of such an expression in scathing criticism), represents the same trivial fact. The problem is that while the healthy thing may be called a man, a statue is not called a wood. Further, though a man may come-to-be healthy, Aristotle is silent in the passage about whether a lump of bronze may become a statue in the same sense.

There is a possibility, however, that Aristotle intends the particular example of health and illness of a man to reflect upon the conditions of materials designed for a particular purpose, when they are not serving or serving the purpose. This interpretation gains some support from 1044b 29ff. Here Aristotle raises the problem how matter is related to contrary conditions, especially when one condition is ἀρνεται ἐξενεκατσιτικὰ ἄλλοι καὶ τὰ ἔδος and the other κατὰ στέρησιν καὶ φθοράν. For example, he asks, "If the body is potentially healthy, but 'ill' is the contrary of health, is the body therefore potentially both?" His answer seems to be
that matter is properly so called when it is in accordance with the positive state and the form, but is "apart from its nature" when in accordance with the privation and destruction. Indeed, Aristotle argues that it is by a destruction of the matter itself that it becomes the potentiality and matter of a corpse.

Interpreted in this light, the passage from Z, 7 gains a better sense. Aristotle's claim is that the change from 'wood' to 'wooden' reflects a change from material not doing its job to material doing its job, or a change from matter as such to matter in-formed. In the process of genesis the role of matter changes from a heap (σωμίον τὸ τέλος) to a genuine part of the inquiry concerning a substance. Understanding the passage in this way allows a reconciliation of its significance with the important claim in Physics, A, 7 that it is from matter that "... what comes-to-be comes-to-be not by accident; but the privation and the contrary is an accident." For the matter which is a genuine constituent of a substance is matter which is "peculiar" to it. Matter as a constituent is not to be construed either as the heap which exists prior to genesis or as that into which a substance is divided when it is destroyed. Thus in talking about things brazen and wooden at 1036a 4, Aristotle says:

Of these things there is no definition, but they are recognized with thought and perception, though apart from the actuality it is not clear whether they are or are not. But always they are
spoken of and recognized in universal accounts, though matter in itself is unknowable.\textsuperscript{35}

If this analysis is correct, it is clear that genesis is reflected in the 'coming-to-be' of matter. But it does not follow that materials come-to-be in actuality the substance they compose. What materials become in being in-formed is a potentiality. That is, they do not become the source of their own intelligibility but intelligible through the actuality. They become a professional substance.

It is notable that this view of genesis and the role of the material substratum of substances differs significantly from what might be called the traditional or 'received' opinion. The contrast may be illustrated by examining some of Zeller's remarks on the roles of the concepts of matter and form in Aristotle's thought. First, it is thought that the problem of genesis has to do with the problem of how Being can come-to-be from nothing, rather than how genesis is to be distinguished from alteration. Thus Zeller says:\textsuperscript{36}

It might seem that out of Being nothing could come to be, since it is already: and out of Not-Being nothing also, for ex nihilo nihil fit ... The solution to the problem is to posit "... a substratum whose essence it is to be pure possibility, which has not in any relation become actuality." In some ways this corresponds to the position argued in this thesis that a substance cannot be composed of
substances existing in actuality, a view for which Aristotle clearly argues in *Metaphysics*, Z. But Aristotle applies this position to fully in-formed parts of things, including those parts most closely related to the soul, while Zeller apparently has in mind, not the parts of animals or the elements or materials of artificial products, as apparently did Aristotle, but a kind of formless entity, which, because it is in its very nature pure possibility, allows for the genesis of things.

If we abstract entirely from anything which is a product of Becoming — that is to say, if we think ourselves a kind of object which has not yet become anything, then we shall have pure Matter without any determination by Form. This will be that which is nothing, but can become everything — the Subject, namely, or substratum to which no one of all the thinkable predicates belongs, but which precisely on that account is equally receptive to them all.

Thus Zeller construes matter, or prime matter, as "... the substratum which as yet possesses none of the qualities that make the Form of things." Further, Zeller imagines that Aristotle used the term 'potentiality' to indicate this elusive entity. As he says:

... Aristotle understands by Potentiality in general Being as mere susceptibility — indeterminate, undeveloped self-existence, capable, indeed, of becoming a definite reality, but not yet made into one.

This view of Aristotle's concept of matter is combined with a view of form and actuality which would render hopeless any distinction between genesis and
alteration. For according to Zeller, when Aristotle identifies Form with actual, Matter with potential, being, he means to say that the former is the totality of the qualities which the latter does not possess but is capable of acquiring.

If Form is quality and matter is the subject, then the exchange of qualities is coming-to-be and there is no distinction between alteration and genesis. Aristotle's treatment in Generation and Corruption of what he calls a matter of extraordinary difficulty can be shown to stand very much against such an interpretation.

The following claim is, without question, fundamental to Aristotle's position.

If something comes-to-be, it is clear that there will be some substance potentially, but not actually, from which the coming-to-be will be and into which it is necessary that what passes away changes.\(^42\)

'But Aristotle immediately raises the question "... whether something among the other things in actuality belongs to this."

I mean, for instance, will what is only potentially a this and a being be so much, of such a sort, and somewhere, though it is simply not a this or a being?

Three untenable results follow from an affirmative answer. First, if such a substratum were all things only potentially, then the substratum would be separable. Though enthusiasts for prime matter deny that it is separable, Aristotle here suggests that this is implied.
Secondly, what Aristotle calls the special fears of the early philosophers arises, namely, that genesis will take place from a pre-existing nothing. This is implied by the view, and not resolved by the view, that genesis is out of what exists in potentiality only, that is, if what is potentially is conceived as sheer possibility with absolutely no other content. And finally, Aristotle claims that if "being a tode ti and a substance" does not belong, while the other categories do, it follows that qualities are separable from substances. This final objection is the one which seems to reflect Aristotle's special fears, since he introduces it alone with the expression καθιστη ειπομεν. 44

Aristotle's answer to these difficulties is quite clear, namely, that the coming-to-be of one thing involves the destruction of something else. But this is only a solution to the general problem. As Aristotle says:

Concerning the essence of genesis and destruction, insofar as each of the things that are is regarded similarly, everyone must hold that this is a sufficient explanation (εικανης αληθειας). 45

The remaining problem, which might fairly be called the problem, is to account for the fact that some things are said to come-to-be simply (and to pass away simply), while others are not. Aristotle gives two answers and suggests a third which he finds unacceptable. The first is that "... it makes a difference into what the thing that changes changes." 46 That is, some things
signify a **tode ti** and some things do not. It is change into the former that is simple genesis. Secondly, some differences in matter signify more a tode ti than others, which signify a **privation**. **Heat**, for instance signifies a "certain category and a form" while cold signifies a **privation** (**στέρησις**).\(^{47}\) Change into the former may therefore be regarded as a case of simple genesis while change into the latter would not. Finally, the change from what is imperceptible to what is perceptible might be regarded as simple genesis, though Aristotle expresses doubts about the value of this criterion at 318b 19-33.

This initial treatment of the problem is found to be too general by Aristotle, exactly because in this analysis, all things are regarded 'similarly'. The answer has a different significance in different cases because the **categories** of what comes-to-be differ. That is, **... we do not answer similarly** that coming-to-be and passing away is through change into one another.\(^{48}\)

When someone learns something, for instance, he is not said to come-to-be simply but to become wise.\(^{49}\) Here the relevant distinction is between the category of a **tode ti**, and that of a 'such' (**ἡκώδες**) or 'so much' (**ποσόν**).\(^{50}\) From the categorial point of view, only substance can be said to come-to-be simply.\(^{51}\) Only when every sort of thing is divided similarly into columns having substances and positive conditions in one row, privations in the other, can all genesis be treated as formally similar.\(^{52}\)
It is to be observed that at no time in the previous analysis of simple genesis does Aristotle invoke the spectre of a being whose essence is pure possibility. On the contrary, all the problems discussed presume the denial that such a non-substance exists. The success of Aristotle's argument depends on his ability to draw a categorial distinction between substances, strictly conceived, and items found in other categories, unless, that is, there is no distinction to be made between alteration and genesis. It is with respect to this problem that Aristotle raises a question at the end of Chapter 3. Because the passage may be understood to involve a speculation about prime matter, I will examine it briefly.

At 319a 30 Aristotle raises the following question.

With respect to what is not simply, someone might wonder whether it is something different than the contraries. For instance, is earth and the heavy what is not, while fire and the light what is? Or is it rather that earth is what is, while the matter of earth is what is not, and the matter of fire similarly? Is matter therefore something different for each of them, or would they, then, not come-to-be from one another and from contraries? For the contraries belong to these, namely, to fire, earth, water and air. Or is the matter in a sense the same and in another sense different? For whatever it is that underlies is the same, but the being is not the same.

The passage is clearly too 'aporetic' in character to base any firm interpretation upon it. But the passage
strongly suggests that even if there is a matter common to fire, earth, air and water, these, and not the common matter, are the subjects of the contraries. Thus, even if there is an amorphous nothing existing as pure possibility, this could not underlie the properties of things. For in that case, qualities would be separable from substance, as was observed above. And it seems most probable that in distinguishing two senses of matter as 'what underlies', on the one hand, and 'the being' on the other, Aristotle has in mind his distinction between kinds of substrata.

In this respect the passage may be seen as an introduction to A, 4 which deals precisely with the distinction between alteration and genesis. Alteration occurs when the substratum remains; genesis when it does not. Thus, to say that matter is the common substratum of all things, while form is the totality of qualities, obliterates the distinction between genesis and alteration. And insofar as genesis involves a change in the form or essence, it is necessary that the form or essence be conceived both as a 

\textit{tode ti} and as the genuine subject of predication. Even if prime matter exists, it is irrelevant to the problem of genesis as Aristotle conceives it. \textsuperscript{53}
Chapter 6

How can a substance be conceived as the cause of its matter?

Before approaching the problem which is the focus of this chapter I will reiterate briefly the chief points which have been argued so far.

In the first chapter the difficulty of making a clean distinction between alteration and genesis is introduced. The difficulty arises because of cases in which a material substratum persists in its identity during a process of change or alteration which accompanies, supports or brings about the genuine coming-to-be of a new substance. Insofar as the distinction between alteration and genesis seems to turn precisely on the persistence or non-persistence of the substratum, such cases are problematic. If, on the one hand, the genesis simply amounts to the gaining of a new shape or arrangement, this would seem to be a case of alteration. But houses and statues are not properties or characteristics of material substrata. If, on the other hand, a material substratum becomes a new substance, while persisting in its identity, the question arises in what sense the substratum is the new substance after the genesis is complete. It is suggested that this relation between material substratum and substance, i.e. the relation between matter and form,
is expressed in Aristotle's vocabulary as the relation between potential and actual being.

If this is the case, then it is clear that Aristotle's expressions, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, may be used to ascribe contemporaneous modes of being. In Chapter 2 it is argued that in Aristotle's usage ascription of the term potentiality need not imply the possibility of later fulfilment. Bricks and stones are potentially a house, the body of a man potentially a man, even when the house and the man actually exist. It is argued further that the contemporaneous sense of the term potentiality is restricted in its application to the immediate and fully organized material substratum from which a substance is composed. Though living flesh and bone, for example, is a man potentially (in this sense of the term), the components of flesh and bone do not enjoy this highly restricted status. What counts as matter depends upon the form.

In Chapter 3 I dispute the analysis of the relation of matter and form which holds that form is predicated of matter in a manner similar to that in which qualities are predicated of substances. I argue that this view depends on the failure to take into account the important distinction drawn by Aristotle on a number of occasions between kinds of substrata, i.e. the kind which is a subject of qualities and the kind which is a material substratum of a substance. I hold that the relation of a substance to its matter is unlike the relation of qualities to substances (1) insofar as substances are non-accidentally related to their matter
and cannot be 'stripped away' leaving their matter behind and (2) because the unity of matter and form is inadequately conceived as a σύνθεσις or 'compound'. The 'universal mode' in which substances are conceived as a compound of matter and form is contrasted with the more adequate mode of understanding material substances as the actuality of a body. For an actuality is not predicated in a quality-like way of a potentiality. A man is the actuality of, and not a quality of, his body.

In Chapter 4 it is argued that to regard something as the material substratum of a substance is not to regard it as an actuality in its own right. In this sense the materials composing a substance, though not qualities, are quality-like. It is shown that for Aristotle materials can indeed be predicated of the substances, though they are predicated in a paronymous mode similar to the mode in which qualities are predicated. The attempt to reduce substances to their material constituents is misguided in virtue of an implied insensitivity to the mode in which materials belong to, or are predicated of, the substances they compose. Because the material substratum is the substance composed only potentially, the materials are not, for Aristotle, a subject of investigation in their own right. Only if the composing elements of a substance are treated as such, i.e. as potentialities, can a material investigation maintain the original substance as its subject. This analysis of Aristotle's position leads toward the view that the possessor, both of qualities and materials, is the form or essence.
In Chapter 5 Aristotle's distinction between alteration and genesis is examined in greater detail. It is shown that Aristotle's distinction cannot be maintained if, as Zeller argues, form is 'the totality of qualities' while matter is the possessor, or the potential possessor, of form. A better account is that matter by being in-formed becomes intelligible through the actuality. That is, in the process of genesis materials change from being a 'mere heap' of properties into a genuine part of the inquiry concerning a substance or form. The actuality of matter as such is to be in-formed or 'in the form'. The material substratum is actually itself when it is in the form. But to be 'in the form' for a material is to be in a potential mode. For, though the material substratum is a genuine bearer of qualities, it is the substance which is the possessor of them, i.e. the subject, both of the materials and the qualities.

In the present chapter I will explore the relation between a substance and its materials insofar as a substance, form or essence may be conceived as the 'cause' of its matter. I will examine Aristotle's attempt to explain the 'logic' of this relation through the instance of artificial production. The distinction between artificial and natural substances will be examined in view of the special applicability of the question of 'separate substance' to natural substances. 'Actuality' and 'potentiality' are shown to be concepts through which natural substances are viewed by Aristotle, not as syntheses of matter and form, but as fundamental unities.
At the end of *Met.* Z, 16 Aristotle concludes a long argument the thrust of which is primarily negative. The negative claim is that a substance can neither be a universal predicate (ῥὰ καθολοῦ λογιμοκρ.) nor composed of other more basic substances. In Z, 17 Aristotle makes a new beginning. The starting point of the new examination is the claim that "a substance is a sort of cause and principle (Ἀεὶ καὶ αἰτία)." To seek a cause or principle is, for Aristotle, an instance of seeking an answer to the question 'Why?' or 'On what account?'. For the question 'Why?' to be intelligible, it must be asked in a context in which one thing is assumed to belong to something else. In order to ask 'Why?', the questioner presupposes that something is the case about something else for which an explanation is sought. That is, to ask why something is the case presupposes, at least in the posture of the questioner, that the question whether it is the case has already been decided. The question why the moon is eclipsed, for instance, presupposes that the moon is eclipsed.

Further, though a question may be asked in the form 'Why is the musical man a musical man?', this can not intelligibly be construed as a form of the question 'Why is something itself?'. For in that case, according to Aristotle, there would be a brief and common answer to every question in that form, viz. "... each thing is indivisible from itself, and this is what it was for a single thing to be." Strictly speaking, the search for
the account according to which "... he who is a man is a man" is a search for nothing at all. One may intelligibly ask for the cause of a man's being an animal of a certain sort.6

If, then, the substance of something is a sort of cause, and a cause is an answer to the question 'Why?', then the question which seeks the substance of something is a form of the question 'Why?'. It follows that the question 'What is a man?', insofar as this question seeks the substance of something, is a form of the question 'Why?'. As Aristotle is aware, this is a rather surprising claim. For the question 'What is a man?' seems at first glance not to be asking why one thing belongs to another. Aristotle says:

Especially in those cases in which one thing is not said of something else, this escapes our notice. For instance, (it escapes our notice) when what a man is is sought because a man is said simply (καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον λόγῳ· καὶ·) and it is not designated that 'these things are this' (καὶ ἡ μὴ διορίσειν ἔτσι τάκε τῶν).

According to Aristotle's treatment of such questions, what is being sought by the questioner is 'the cause of the matter' (ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπογείου). This cause is the form and the substance. In the case of material substances, i. e. things which have parts, properties, and elements as opposed to things which are absolutely simple, the form or substance is the cause of the matter, an answer to the question 'Why?'.
The crucial point of Aristotle's analysis is that one who seeks the form or substance of something already knows or assumes the posture of knowing that, e.g., "this is a man or that this body is something possessing this." The questioner is already assured of the fact, but is looking for something else, i.e. the substance or essence. The investigator is not confused about what constitutes criteria for the identity of a man. Rather, he is concerned to discover a principle according to which the elements which constitute a man can form the unity which the ascription of a substance term confers upon those elements. This means, according to my interpretation, that a form, substance, or essence is a principle in accordance with which the rôle of the elements, properties and characteristics which constitute a displayed substantial unity are with respect to that unity as their subject.

In the present chapter Aristotle identifies two sorts of answers or 'causes' to the question 'Why do these things constitute this?'. The first is 'that for the sake of which', or the final cause, which is distinctively applicable in the case of artifical products like houses and beds. The second is 'what moved it first', or what is traditionally called the efficient cause. The latter sort of cause is sought with respect to genesis or destruction. The final cause is sought 'in the case of the being also'. Roughly, what Aristotle has in mind is that the question 'On what account do these materials constitute a house?' may be answered either by
giving the maker, e.g. the architect or builder, as a cause, or by explaining what the materials are for. In the passage at hand, it is unclear to what extent Aristotle intends such answers to be answers to questions seeking the essence or substance of something. The belief that the essence of something is distinct from its final or its efficient cause has led to the editorial seclusion of ἄριστος ὁ ἐστιν τὸ ὁ ἐς ἐναθ. at 1041a.28, precisely because the manuscript, as it stands, identifies final and efficient causes with the essence. The objection to the manuscript is plausible for the reason that one ought to distinguish, it seems, between 'what something is' and 'who made it'. Despite this, I favour the manuscript for two reasons. First, Aristotle's intent in 17.17 is to examine the question what an essence is by describing a particular kind of question. It is possible that questions of the essence type, viz. τι ἐς ἐναθ., or, for instance, 'What was it for these materials to be a house?', may have answers other than the essence itself. Thus, a question of the essence type may have the final or efficient cause as an answer. If this is the case, it may be significant that Aristotle inserts the qualification ἦς ἐς ἐναθ. λογίκας at 1041a 28 as an indication that it is the form of the essence question which concerns him at this point in the argument, and not the status of the answer. Second, the possibility should be left open that final and efficient causes, appropriately construed, may be regarded as genuine answers to the essence-question.
This would be the case whenever the final or efficient cause is a principle in accordance with which the unity of the material elements composing something may be understood. Later in this chapter I will show that Aristotle's frequent assertion in the *Metaphysics* that 'the art is the form' amounts to a claim that efficient causes, understood as arts rather than as artists, are essences. And further, this doctrine allows Aristotle to envisage a unity of formal, final and efficient causality.

The primary thrust of the remainder of Z, 17 is Aristotle's argument that the cause of the matter cannot itself be an element or characteristic of the substance of which the essence is sought. To list a further element of the whole simply provides an additional fact in the same order as those already recognized which it is the job of the answerer to explain. That is, if someone asks why such and such an arrangement of bones, flesh, sinew, heart and lungs constitute a man, it will not suffice to answer that a man also has a liver. Nor will the question be answered by selecting a group of parts or properties essential to the life of a man, as if the question had been 'What are the components necessary to the existence of a man?'. For if there is a group of elements which are essential in this sense, it is precisely the principle according to which they are to be discriminated as such that is being sought.
This position is argued in the passage beginning at 1041b 11. In the argument Aristotle uses conjointly the examples of a syllable and flesh, the former being composed of letters (στοιχεῖα), the latter of fire and earth, or the hot and the cold. The examples are intended as cases which, though extremely limited in complexity, form unified wholes unlike a mere heap or pile (σωρός). The example of a syllable is paradigmatic (μή γὰρ σωρὸς ἀλλὰ στοιχεῖα). By 'elements' of a syllable Aristotle means, not letters of the alphabet, but the elemental sounds represented by the letters. One reason for Aristotle's use of syllables as an example is that letters by themselves do not sound the same as they do when combined. Indeed, some letters are mute (ακοντι) when separated.

Thus, a syllable is not a juxtaposition of discrete entities, but a whole in its own right. When the elementary sounds are separated, there is no syllable. When fire and earth are separated, when, that is, they exist discretely, there is no flesh. From this it follows, according to Aristotle, that flesh and syllables are 'something else' besides what composes them.

What, then, is the nature of the 'something else'? First, it cannot be another element. For in that case flesh, say, will involve another element in addition to the original two. The original question arises again, viz. 'What is it for these things to be flesh?', and an infinite regress is suggested. Second, if the 'something else' is composed of some selection of the elements in
the original whole, then the question 'Why do these elements form a whole?' is left unanswered by listing them. As Aristotle says:

If it is made from an element, it will be made not from one but from many (or it will be that element), so that we will apply the same argument to this as well as to the flesh and the syllable. 22

The question 'What is flesh?' can not be answered by saying that it is something composed of elements. For it is precisely the source of the unity of its elements which is being sought. Thus, Aristotle says at 1041b 25:

It would seem that 'this something' is not an element and that it is the cause of this being flesh and this a syllable. This cause, according to Aristotle, is the substance of each thing:

Though it is fairly clear in the context of the present argument what explanatory role the substance of each thing has, namely to explain the unity of the material elements, the passage is silent about how this role is to be exercised, and about what sort of unity is envisaged for the elements composing a substance. However, a clue to the nature of the 'cause' being sought is given at 1041b 28-31. Here Aristotle says:

Since some things are not substances, but those that are substances are constituted according to nature and by nature, it would seem that this nature is the substance, which is not an element but a principle. 23
What does Aristotle mean by a cause which is not an element but a principle? In Z, 17 three candidates are suggested. First is the moving cause (τι ἐκίνησε πρῶτον), which is especially associated with genesis and destruction. Second is the purpose of final cause. This cause is called 'the cause of the matter' in the Physics. Though the final cause or end is sometimes treated by Aristotle as a purely intellectual principle, i.e. as a source of reasoning but not of action or genesis, it is regarded as a 'cause of the being' in Z, 17. In Met., Delta, 1022a 7 Aristotle warns that though the 'end' is regarded as something toward which, rather than from which, motion or action aims, there are times when the 'end' is both that toward which and that from which (ὅτε δὲ ἄμφως, καὶ ἄφ' οὗ καλε' ὅ). The third 'cause of the matter' given by Aristotle in Z, 17 is the form which he directly associates with the substance. In what follows I will develop an understanding of Aristotelian form or substance as a principle representing the unification of formal, final and efficient causality.

The passages which best illustrate in what sense the form is a principle are those in which Aristotle claims that the art or science (Τέχνη) is the form (ἔδος). The identification of the art with the form occurs in the Metaphysics at 1032b 13, 1034a 24, 1070b 33, and 1075b 10.
The claim that the art is the form, i.e. that the practice of medicine or the medical science is the form of health, and that the practice or science of housebuilding is the form of a house is helpful for a number of reasons. First, it involves an identification of the 'cause of the being' as form and as mover. Secondly, it is an instance of a form, which as mover, is not predicatable of its subject, insofar as the housebuilding art is not predicatable of a house. Thirdly, it names as a form something which is not an image of characteristics and properties of the subjects of which it is the form. Fourthly, if it can be claimed, as Aristotle does, that the practice of medicine is in some way health, then the principle of intelligibility as the end can be identified with the principle as mover. It is with an eye to all four of these reasons that Aristotle claims that the art is the form.

The first passage is found at 1032b 13, where Aristotle says:

The medical art is the form of health, the housebuilding art the form of a house. And I mean by substance the essence without the matter.

The things which come-to-be by art are those of which the form is in the soul (ἐν τῇ φύσι), presumably by contrast to those things of which the form is in them. That Aristotle regards such a form as the substantial or true form of artificial products is clear from 1032b 1 where, speaking about such forms, he says, "I mean by
"form" the essence of each thing; and the primary substance." Thus, the form of artificial products, i.e. the very substance of artificial products, is, in one sense, not present in that of which it is the substance. The form is not, namely, a characteristic of or an element in particular instances of the product. This interpretation is further justified by the view expressed at 1032b 2 ff. that both health and illness have the same form. For, insofar as health and illness do not share the same characteristics and properties, their single form can not be regarded as a definite list of characteristics and properties. Rather, the claim that health and illness have the same form is an indication that it is in accordance with the same principle, i.e. the medical art, that the characteristics, properties, and elements involved in both health and illness are grasped. In other words, the knowledge of health is also the knowledge of what is not health, i.e. the privation.

To say that medical science is the form is to say that the exercise of the knowledge of health determines the parts of health, i.e. determines that such and such elements amount to health in any particular case. The medical art 'determines' the parts in two senses. Aristotle uses the teleological reasonings of the physician to illustrate both the sense in which the active knowledge of a science, the activity or exercise of the science, is the source of health in the patient and the principle according to which materials and properties may be
regarded as elements of the \( \lambda \delta \varepsilon \varphi \). Thus, a single principle may be regarded both as an intellectual and as a productive cause. With reference to the analysis of the question 'What is X?' in Z, 17 as a question seeking the 'cause of the matter', it now seems clear that the principle being sought in the case of artificial products is the science or art. For to tell someone what health is is to explain the role played by the elements which constitute health, that is, to display the way in which various elements and properties are taken into account under the concept of health. Such an account displays the substance of health as end, form and moving principle.

Aristotle appears to be making a similar point at 1075b 10. At b 8 he takes up for criticism a doctrine attributed to Anaxagoras, namely that the good is moving principle. "For mind," as Anaxagoras says, "is the mover." Normally, however, the doctrine that mind is the mover would imply a separation between mind and the good insofar as the good is that at which the mind aims. This separation is not implied, however, by Aristotle's conception of the mover. Thus, Aristotle says:

But it (sc. mind) moves for the sake of something, so that the good must be something different than mind - except, that is, in our way of speaking: For medical practice is somehow health.

Here, the mover and the end are indentified with one another. An analysis like the following is a probable account of Aristotle's meaning. Because the completion
or perfection of the medical art is the health of the
patient, the medical art as mover, has itself, i. e.
its own perfection, as its end.

In three of the four passages in which the claim
that the art is the form is found, reference is made to
a doctrine which expresses, as part of its meaning, the
identity of the source and the product or end. I here
refer to the doctrine expressed at 1032b 11 that 'in a
certain way health comes-to-be from health, and a house
from a house.' In this context Aristotle is stressing
the continuity between the reasoning of a physician and
the production of health. When the teleological mode
of reasoning discovers a constituent of health (or
something which will lead to it) which is in the doctor's power
to produce, "at that point (εἰρην) the movement from this
is already (ἡγη) called production, the motion towards
being healthy." Thus, Aristotle claims that "in a certain
sense . . . what has matter comes-to-be from what is
without matter." The examples of medicine and house-
building illustrate a fundamental continuity between
thought and genesis, form and the source of genesis. For
at the point at which the physician discovers the component
of health in his power to produce, the motion of healing
has already begun.

A similar point with a slightly different thrust is
made at 1034a 21, forming a context in which Aristotle
once again asserts that the art is the form. Here,
Aristotle says:
It is also clear from what has been said that in a certain way all things come-to-be from something having the same name (ἐκ ὁμώνυμου), just as in the case of natural things, or from parts of things having the same name (For example, a house comes-to-be from a house, or through the mind. For the art is the form.), or from a part or what has a certain part, provided that they do not come-to-be incidentally.

Difficulty in understanding this passage has arisen because of the apparent improbability of the example (οἶκια ἐκ ὁικιάς) as an illustration of genesis from 'homonymous parts'. The illustration can be understood as appropriate, however, if, as my translation attempts to stress, 'parts having the same name' refers to parts of the form, i.e. the practice of housebuilding, or to the immediate product of the practitioner's actions. The issue for Aristotle, as I will show, is to establish a continuity between reasoning (ῥήσις) and production (ποιήσις), both of which are sides or aspects of genesis.

This is accomplished by showing the connection, continuity, or identity of parts of the practice and the non-accidental parts of the product.

This interpretation is supported by the explanation which begins at 1034a 26. Aristotle says:

For the heat in the movement (sc. heat produced by the physician) makes heat in the body. And this (sc. heat in the body?) is either health or a part of it, or some part of health or health itself follows it.

This passage is clarified by reference to 1032b 26, where a chain of teleological reasoning has led the physician to make heat by rubbing. Aristotle says, "Accordingly,
heat in the body is either a part of health or something follows it which is such a part." On such grounds, according to Aristotle, heat itself may be said to be productive. He says at 1034a 29;

On this account it (sc. heat) also is said to be productive, because that makes health which heat follows or accompanies.

At this point in the argument Aristotle draws the following conclusion:

So that, just as in reasonings, the substance is the principle of all things. For reasonings proceed from the 'what it is', and in these cases the geneses do as well.

It is the nature of the link between the reasoning process and the production that allows Aristotle to draw this conclusion. By conceiving the form as the practice, that is, by allowing the notion of form to stretch through the procedures of a practitioner, the end product of the reasoning becomes the beginning or source of genesis. That is, to repeat the claim made by Aristotle in the context of the same sort of discussion, "At this point (sc. the point at which the physician has discovered that element of health which it is in his power to produce) the motion from this is already called production."

In the light of this argument it seems probable that what Aristotle has in mind by the use of the terms 'homonym' and 'parts of the homonym' at 1034a 23 is the double aspect of formal elements which are regarded both
as elements of reasoning and of production. It is not as if medical science ends just an instant before a doctor moves his hand, or that the physical practice of a doctor is a mere concomitant of his thinking. It is more in line with Aristotle's thought to say that the whole business of picking out and working upon the elements which constitute bodily health is the form of health.

The final passage mentioned in which the claim is made that the art is the form is found at 1070b 33. I begin at 1070b 30.

Since in the case of natural things the mover is the same in form (τὸ ὁμοῖος) e. g. man is the mover for man, and in the products of thought the form or the contrary is the mover, in one sense there are three causes and in another sense four.

There are three principles in sense that form, privation, and matter, e. g. health, sickness and body, are principles. The 'mover' may be included as a fourth cause, where by 'mover' Aristotle means, e.g. the medical art. Because, however, the form and the moving cause are the same insofar as the medical art or housebuilding is the form, the mover does not count as a fourth cause. For the source of generation and the form are one.

For the medical art is health in a way, and housebuilding is the form of a house, and man begets man.

Now in the preceding argument I have tried to make a case for the view that in claiming that the art is the form Aristotle is advancing the position that the substance of something is a principle which embodies a unification
of formal, final and efficient causality. If this view holds, then it follows that the substance is, in the fullest sense, the cause of the matter, i.e. the answer to the question 'What is it?' when analyzed as a form of the question 'Why?'. In order that an art may be conceived as such a principle, I have found it necessary to describe an art, not as a picture or blueprint in the mind of the practitioner, but as inclusive of the physical practices in which a practitioner engages, e.g. 'rubbing'. Yet, as has been noticed previously, Aristotle says at 1032b 12 that in a certain sense (\textit{physis} \textit{to} \textit{physis}) what has matter comes-to-be from what is without matter. In the context it seems clear that Aristotle is referring to the art, the \textit{lógos} in the soul, and 'the essence', as 'the substance without matter'. Whatever 'certain sense' Aristotle has in mind, it is clear from what has been shown that genesis from the form is an unbroken continuum. Further, it has been argued that the perfection or completion of the art involves, for instance, the physical existence of health in a patient or the concrete existence of a house.

It seems clear that Aristotle uses the analysis of the principles of artistic production in order to illustrate the logic of natural production, and the logic of natural forms. For example, after asserting at 1034a 30-32 that the 'substance' of something is both a source of intelligibility and of genesis (of the products of art), Aristotle says that 'things constituted by nature hold similarly to
these things'. The juxtaposition of natural and artistic production is conspicuous also at 1070b 33 where the ubiquitous dictum 'man begets: man' is conjoined with the claim that the art is the form. In general, the use of the artistic model to illustrate the teleological mode of natural production is a constant (if notorious from the modern perspective) feature of Aristotle's thought. The similarity in the logic of the relations between the form and the product, and between form and matter, in artistic and natural production is reflected primarily in the view that the substance of both artificial and natural products (as well as of those products, e. g. health, in which art and nature collaborate) is a principle which is neither an element of nor a property of the product. The differences between natural and artistic production, as seen by Aristotle, are equally revealing of his notion of substance. This difference is succinctly expressed at line 1070a 7 where Aristotle says:

The art is a principle in something else, while nature is a principle in itself (for man begets man).

Though it has been shown that in the Metaphysics the art, conceived as the form, allows for an avenue of thought in which the formal and final causes are identical, insofar as the art is completed or fulfilled in the product, the art is also seen as a principle which acts upon something else. The disjunction between arts and nature as principles is the focus of Aristotle's remarks in the Physics.
Moreover the 'nature' which is spoken of as genesis is a path leading towards nature. It is not like 'doctoring' which is not spoken of as a way toward the medical art but rather toward health. For doctoring must not proceed from the medical art to the medical art; but nature is not related to nature in this way, rather, what grows proceeds from a certain thing toward a certain thing, insofar as it grows. What is it, then, that grows? Not 'that from which' but 'that toward which'. Therefore, the nature is the form.

It is notable that Aristotle's perspective in the Metaphysics has shifted from what is was in the Physics. In the Metaphysics the precise use of the doctrine that the art is the form is to show the sense in which 'a house comes-to-be from a house'. In the Physics, Aristotle accommodates Antiphon's view that a bed does not come-to-be from a bed. The axis upon which the differentiation of artistic and natural production turns in the Metaphysics is manifested in different terms. There are three especially relevant passages in which Aristotle expresses doubts about the genuine substantiality of artificial products. The issue arises in a context in which, curiously, Aristotle is considering the question of 'separate forms', i.e. whether there are forms separable either from matter or the combinations of matter and form.

The first passage begins at 1043b 18. Aristotle says:
Whether there are separate substances among destructible things is not yet clear, except that in some cases it is clearly impossible, namely in the case of those things which cannot exist apart from certain things, e.g. a house or an implement. Perhaps, then, these are not substances, neither these very things nor anything else which is not constituted by nature. For one might say that only nature is, among destructible things, a substance.

The second passage is found at 1060b 23. Here Aristotle raises the question whether there is something existing beside the composite (οὐσίαν) or not, that is, apart from the matter and 'what goes along with the matter'.

For if not, all destructible things are in matter. In which cases this is possible, and in which cases it is not, is difficult to determine. For in some cases it is clear that the form is not a separable being, e.g. the form of a house.

The third passage begins at 1070a 13. Here Aristotle says:

In some cases there is no tode ti apart from the composite substance, viz. the form of a house, unless the art is separable (there is, however, no genesis or destruction of such things, but in another way a house, i.e. a house without matter, and health, and everything considered as an art are and are not). But if there is (sc. a tode ti apart from the composite), it will be in the case of things by nature.

Why does Aristotle consider the possibility of separate generable and destructible forms for natural things? How does the issue of substantiality involve this question?

In order to clarify the issue I will begin by examining in some detail the context of the last quotation.
At 1070a 7 Aristotle says that 'the art is a principle in something else, while nature is a principle in the thing itself (for man begets man)'. The meaning of this claim seems to be that while both the products of art and the products of nature come-to-be from 'synonyms', they differ in that an art works upon something different in nature from itself while 'nature' works either on itself or on something of the same kind. Aristotle's claim here should be compared to the problem introduced at 1036a 31. At that place he says:

In the case of those things which come-to-be imposed upon things different in form (ἐν ὑπέρ τινας ἑαυτοῦ ὁ ἐντευθεῖν τὸν τὸν εἰς τὸν), a circle, for instance, in bronze, stone, and wood, in these cases it is clear that bronze and stone, on account of their separation, are nothing of the substance of a circle.

Though Aristotle, in this context, raises the question whether it is the mere fact that the form of man is always found in a certain kind of matter that prevents us from separating the form from the matter, Aristotle does not hold that a circle is related to its matter in the way that a man is related to his. This is made clear at 1036b 24 where Aristotle sharply criticizes Socrates the younger for having compared such distinct relations. Such a view, according to Aristotle,

... leads us away from the truth, and makes us understand that a man can exist without parts in the same way that a circle can exist without bronze.
A man, then, is not properly analyzed as one nature found in another. This is Aristotle's point at 1036b 28:

The cases are not similar. For an animal is the sort of thing that is capable of sensation, and cannot be defined without movement, and therefore not without parts having a certain sort of relation. For a hand is not in every sense part of a man, but only a hand capable of exercising its function, so that it must be alive (ζυγον). If it is not alive, it is not a part.

The same point is made about a finger at 1035b 24, where Aristotle claims that a dead finger is a mere 'homonym'. It will be recalled from earlier arguments in this thesis that it is only insofar as a man or horse is taken universally as a compound of form and matter, i. e. as a σύνολον rather than a substance, that it is divisible into parts 'as into matter'. A σύνολον but not a substance can be divided into parts 'as into matter'. For, "A primary substance is what is not spoken of as one thing being in another, that is, in a substratum as matter."

Returning now to the argument which began at 1070a 7, it is found that Aristotle's introduction to the question of 'separate substance' begins with the rather typical three-fold division among substances. The first type is matter, i. e. that which is characterized by contact (σύν) and not by organic growth (μη συγκρύστω). It is this type which is called a 'substratum'. The qualification 'not by organic growth' is important to the course of the argument because it strongly suggests that the sense of 'substratum' here employed by Aristotle would exclude
the body of a natural substance.

The second type of substance is a 'nature'. This Aristotle calls a *tode ti* and 'a sort of state (ἐξίς) into which'. By calling a nature a *tode ti*, Aristotle may already be suggesting separability. The expression 'into which' or 'toward which' is reminiscent of the 'nature' described at 193b 17-18 as the thing that grows (φύεται): "What is it, then, that grows? Not that from which, but that into which (ἐστὶ ε')". In the immediate context, the 'nature' here mentioned is apparently the 'principle in itself' (ἀρχή ἐν αὐτῷ) or what does not work upon some foreign substratum but upon itself. Strictly speaking, the passage does not suggest the *immateriality* of such substances, but the absence of a non-organic substratum, that is, some other thing 'as matter' in which it belongs.

The already difficult division among types of substances is aggravated by Aristotle's description and exemplification of the third type, particular individuals composed of the first two types, e. g. Socrates and Kallias. Here it looks as if Aristotle regards Socrates and Kallias as 'natures' combined with a non-organic substratum. This, however, represents a mode of conception Aristotle's dissatisfaction with which has been amply shown. It is not surprising, therefore, that precisely here he raises the question whether, in the case of natural substances, there is some *tode ti* aside from 'synthetic substance'. What sort of thing is Aristotle looking for?
First, it is found that the kind of separation enjoyed by the art, as form, is not satisfactory. The reason given for this is that there is no genesis or destruction of such a form. Such a form 'is and is not' in some other way than through a process of genesis and destruction. In all three of the passages in which the issue of separate substance arises, Aristotle is looking for forms among generable and destructible beings. Secondly, and at least partially on the same grounds, Aristotle is not considering the possibility of Platonic forms or 'ideas'. Though Aristotle praises the view he ascribes to Plato that only natural products have forms (by which it is understood that 'fire, flesh, head' are excluded), his repudiation of the doctrine of 'ideas' is made clear at 1070a 26:

> It is clear that on account of these things 'ideas' are in no way necessary. For man begets man, a particular man a certain man. It is similar also in the case of the arts. For the medical art is the account (λόγος) of health.

Thus, the question of the existence of 'separate substance' is by no means identical to the question whether there are eternal and ungenerated forms. Thirdly, Aristotle seems not to be considering, at least as the fundamental question, whether the form or soul of a natural substance can survive the death of the organism or is capable of separate existence in this sense. The question whether the soul or some part of it 'remains' is a distinct issue.
If, as seems clear from the argument so far, Aristotle is not, in the passage cited, asking whether the soul can exist separately from the body, then the question is whether the soul can exist separately from a material substratum having a distinct or separable nature. This, it will be recalled, was precisely the question raised at 1037a 8 about Socrates and Koriskos, i. e. whether an individual natural substance is appropriately analyzed in the universal mode as body + soul. It seems, then, that the question whether Socrates is his soul is a species of the question whether there are separable natural substances. If a flesh and blood man is his soul, not in the sense that a universal characteristic attaches to his body, but in being the actuality of a living body, then in this sense there are separable and generable forms. Insofar as the soul is understood, not as one thing in another, but, as a simultaneously efficient, formal and final cause which is neither an element in a whole nor a universal predicate, then the soul is a separable substance or form, i. e. a tode ti apart from 'synthetic substances'. This would be the case whether or not the soul was separable from the body, though it would be separable from any body conceived as its substratum.

By approaching the issue through the notions of potentiality and actuality, either the possibility of separate form arises, i. e. because potential and actual are not 'synthetically' related to one another, or the question itself, because it arises from a point of view
in which natural substances are seen as 'combinations' or 'syntheses' of form and matter, is short circuited. When the substance of natural beings is treated as a universal predicate in its application to material instances, i.e. as quality-like in its relation to matter, then the inclination to seek a separate unifying cause is strong. The arts are causes of this sort for artificial products. But the parts of artificial products are separable from them insofar as bronze, for instance, is still bronze when a statue made from it is destroyed. This is not the case, however, with the proximate or first matter of natural beings. Separated 'flesh' is only equivocally so called. The substance or form of a natural being determines its matter in a stronger sense than does an artificial form. The matter of a natural substance is itself in actuality only when it is in the form. The unity of a natural substance involves matter being itself in a stronger sense than that in which bricks are, by composing a house, themselves.

It was mentioned earlier in this thesis that the notions of potentiality and actuality are used by Aristotle to account for the unity of matter and form, substantial unity. Two instances of this use of the notions are found in Met., H, 6. The question is:

What is it that makes a man one, that is, on account of which he is one and not many, for instance, 'animal' and 'two-footed'.

Aristotle's position is that no account of substantial
unity that involves 'participation' can resolve the difficulty. At 1045a 30, Aristotle says:

What, then, is the cause of this (sc. unity), i. e. of what is potentially being what is actually, apart from the maker, among so many things as have a-genesis? There is no other cause of what is potentially being what is actually but that this was what it was for each of them to be.

The same argument is brought to bear upon the position Aristotle ascribes to Lycophron that 'living', for instance, is a 'synthesis', 'combination', or 'communion' of body and soul. Aristotle says that the cause of the difficulty is that "... they seek a unifying cause, and a difference between, potentiality and actuality." That is, the problem of substantial unity arises because matter and form are treated as having a distinct causality. Aristotle holds the following contrary position:

The final matter and the form are one and the same, the one, potentially, the other actually, so that to seek what is the cause of one thing and its being one is similar. For each thing is a sort of unity, and what is potentially and what is actually are somehow one, so that there is no other cause, unless something acts as a mover from potency to actuality.

From these passages it becomes clear that Aristotle views the notions of 'actuality' and 'potentiality' as providing a unifying mode of conception different in kind than unification by 'synthesis'. It has been shown so far in this chapter that Aristotle regards the substance of something as the 'cause of the matter', i. e. as a sort of conspiracy of causes working on or through matter.
At the same time it has been argued that the notion of separate substance requires an analysis of the unity of substance which does not involve a form predicated of or found in a subject. Part of the force of Aristotle's ubiquitous claim that the ἐνεργεία is the form and the substance is that it leads toward this further unification. It is for this reason that Aristotle stresses both the logical and the substantial priority of 'actuality' to every sort of potentiality, including every sort of principle of change or motion. Thus, at 1049b 10 Aristotle says:

The actuality is prior to every such potentiality both in account and in substance.

The actuality is prior, that is, both to 'the principle of change in something else or in itself qua other' and to 'nature' which is a 'moving principle not in something else but in itself qua itself'. It is the principle 'at work' which is substance in the most fundamental sense. This was brought out, in the case of artificial production, by showing the continuity of thought and genesis implied in the claim that the art is the form. But in the case of artificial products, 'the activity is in the thing being made'. Still, even in such cases, the activity is not a property or characteristic either of the principle or of the material elements which comprise the product. For it is exactly in the activity that the materials are seen in continuity with the form. In the case of natural substances, the activity is not in something else, but in the thing itself qua itself. The activity is not
the 'state' or 'disposition' (έξεστις) which Aristotle calls 'nature' at 1070a 12. Nor is it this principle in something else, i.e. in a separable substratum having a causality of its own. In such cases there is not merely a continuity of matter and form, but a virtual identity. For the potentiality ascribed to the body and the actuality ascribed to the soul are modes of being the same thing.

Through the concept of actuality, Aristotle envisages not only the concrescence of formal, final and efficient causality, but the unification of matter and form. I believe that Aristotle's use of these concepts is developed as an alternative to the 'categorial' approach according to which form may be regarded as a universal predicate of matter, or a man as a combination of soul and body. At the beginning of Met., Theta, Aristotle in fact presents the concepts of 'actuality, potentiality and function' as an alternative mode to the 'categories' with which to think about being. As I have tried to show, it is, from the point of view of the categories, the non-predicable character of substance which gives rise to the development of the notion of actuality. In the second part of this thesis I will move in the direction of a demonstration that the essence or τὸ τὴν ἔννοια is best conceived as the actuality from the categorial viewpoint.
Part II

Introduction

It was shown in the first part of this thesis that Aristotle distinguished two senses of the term subject or substratum, i.e., (1) the sense in which matter underlies the form or actuality and (2) the sense in which something is the subject of qualities, properties and even materials. It was argued further that the two criteria for substantiality used by Aristotle, viz. non-predicability and separability, ought to be viewed as co-ordinate criteria at least insofar as they are applied to natural substances. It has been observed that the form or essence of something is, at least at times, regarded by Aristotle both as separable and as a substratum of qualities. Further, the essence of something, insofar as it is predicatable of individuals at all, is not predicatable universally, that is, in a quality-like way. An essence does not denote sets of common properties. Finally, the conception of form as actuality, i.e. as a principle at work, is offered as a mode of viewing substances, not as 'syntheses' or 'combinations' of form and matter, but as fundamental unities.
By 'fundamental unity' I intend to indicate the unification of causality, i.e. the unification of the various sorts of 'Why' questions which name the four Aristotelian causes. The 'synthetic' account of natural substances opposed by Aristotle has as its basis the view that the investigation of matter and form are distinct and separable studies, or in Aristotelian terms, that there is a division between the investigation of actuality and potentiality. Because, however, the activity of the formal principle in the soul of an artist is shown to exist in continuity with the material elements of the product, and because the materials of natural substances are properly regarded as themselves only when viewed in their functional relation to the activity of the substance composed, such a division can not be maintained. 'Why is this matter a man?' is a form of the question 'What is a man?'. That is, the study of the physics of a man in the Aristotelian sense, is part of the inquiry into the form or essence of man. Thus, a man is improperly regarded as one thing in another. It is not as if, when one is talking about the body of a man, one is talking about a substratum in which a man is found.

It is the being of a subject as the possessor of attributes and quality-like predicates which will be shown in this part of the thesis to be that at which the essence-question, 'What was the being?', aims. That is, the essence is the subject, not as the bearer (material substratum) but as the possessor of qualities. The subject being at
work on its properties amounts to its possession of them. In this sense the essence or 'being' of something is helpfully conceived as the actuality from the 'categorial' viewpoint, i.e. conceived as the subject of predicates which is itself not predicated.

The development of this position requires first that the Aristotelian essence as signified by the formula \( \tau \tau \chi \gamma \eta \varepsilon \nu \zeta \) is properly regarded as the subject of predicates. Second, the logical role played by an Aristotelian essence as the subject must be displayed. That Aristotle regards the essence as the substance of something and therefore as a kind of subject is indicated by the following arguments.

1. As has been noted earlier in this thesis, Aristotle quite clearly identifies the essence or the form in the sense of the essence as a subject in at least three passages. At 1029a 2 'form' is included along with matter and 'the combination' as a substance in the sense of the primary substratum. At 1038b 4 ff. clearly indicates that the \( \tau \tau \chi \gamma \eta \varepsilon \nu \zeta \), used here in apposition with 'substratum', is a subject, not as the material substratum, but as the subject of \( \nu \mu \dot{e} \gamma \). Again at 1042 a 26 'substratum' is given two senses by Aristotle, (1) that of 'matter', which is a \( \tau \text{odo} \tau i \) only potentially, and (2) that of 'form', which being a \( \tau \text{odo} \tau i \) is separable in account (\( \tau \tau \chi \lambda \overset{\circ}{\varphi} \chi \)).

2. The \( \tau \tau \chi \gamma \eta \varepsilon \nu \zeta \) is frequently called the substance of
each thing and 'the primary substance', e. g. at 1032b 2. Since 'primary substance' is defined in the Metaphysics as 'what is not spoken of as one thing being in another, that is, in a substratum as its matter', this amounts to prima facie evidence that the essence is viewed as a subject in its own right, though not, of course, in the way that matter is a subject.

3. The essence is, for Aristotle what is said καθ' αὑτόν or per se. It is not what is said attributively (κατά συμβεβηκός), predicated 'in common', or through a shared attribute. At 1007a 20-23 Aristotle says that to regard everything as an attribute is to do away with the essence altogether. In the context it seems clear that to do away with the essence is to do away with the subject. However, Aristotle uses the expression καθ' αὑτόν in a number of different ways. In order to justify my position it will be necessary to show that the sense of καθ' αὑτόν which Aristotle applies to essences is in accordance with the strict contrast drawn, e. g., at An. Post. 73b 7:

Substance, that is, whatever signifies a tode ti, is not something different than just what it is. Thus, I call καθ' αὑτόν what is not predicated of a subject while what is predicated of a subject I call 'attributēs' (συμβεβηκότα).

4. The class of things which, except in a derivative sense, can be said to have an essence at all is substance and the tode ti. That is, essences belong in the primary sense neither to attributes or common properties nor to
the combination of a substance with an attribute. It does not follow immediately from this claim that an essence is the subject of which it is the essence. Because, however, an essence or form is regarded by Aristotle as a subject of some sort, and because those substances which are not regarded as combinations of form and matter, are identical with their essences, it is a reasonable conclusion that the essence of something is bound up in its being as a subject. Further, if the essence of each thing is the thing itself qua subject in the appropriate sense, it would follow that nothing which is not such a subject would have an essence. Thus, the claim of this thesis that the essence of something is its being qua subject is consonant with Aristotle's denials that the above mentioned types of things have essences.

The general position argued in this thesis is that the essence-question ρι ἧς εἶναι arises in a context of categorial assertion about a subject of a certain kind. In the primary sense of its application, the question seeks the role of a subject in determining the meaning, significance and relevance of the properties and elements it possesses. In viewing the Aristotelian essence in this way three facts about the grammar of the formula τὸ ρι ἧς εἶναι are explained. The presence of the imperfect ἧς is explained by the fact that when the essence question is asked, as in all instances of 'Why?' questions, a categorial assertion is already presupposed by the
questioner. Secondly, the frequent presence of the dative in the formula as in τὸ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι or τὸ τί ἤν εἶναι τὸ ἀνθρώπου is explained as a dative of possession governing the infinitive εἶναι. Thus, the formula τὸ τί ἤν εἶναι τὸ ἀνθρώπου would be translated 'what was a man's being' or 'what was it for a man to be'. This allows an explanation of the third fact about the formula, namely the occasional presence of two datives, one dative as a predicate being attracted into the dative case by the possessive dative. An example is τὶ ἐστὶν ὁμοίως ἐκατερῶν τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι which should be translated 'what each of their being an animal is' or 'what it is for each of them to be an animal'. In all cases εἶναι is regarded as a predicate of τὶ with the finite form of the verb εἶναι, viz. ἤν or ἐστὶν, as the copula. This interpretation of the grammar of the essence-formula is to be contrasted with those which regard the essence-question as a question seeking predicates and characteristics of the subject which determine it as being of a certain kind, i.e. as asking 'what characteristics does X have in order to be X'. On my interpretation the being of a man, or a man's being, is his being as the subject and possessor of his characteristics. The determining characteristics of man may be known or presupposed already by one who seeks a man's essence.

According to this view of an Aristotelian essence, to know what something is in the sense of knowing its essence is to know, not merely that such and such
characteristics belong to it, but how they belong to it. Yet even if this is granted an enormous difficulty for Aristotelian philosophy remains. For it seems impossible that the role of a subject could be defined except in universal terms. How is it possible, then, for the mind to penetrate to the being of a subject without thinking of it in a universal mode? This problem, or some version of it, is by no means unique to my interpretation. Nor is it unique to Aristotelian philosophy. The difficulty may be expressed rather simply in the following way: One does not speak or say tables, chairs, people. Nor does one think them. Rather we 'speak about', 'speak of', 'say something about', 'think about' or 'think of' such things. In what way then are things present to or in the mind taken by themselves or per se? Aristotle's position seems to be that it is the form of things which is in the mind. But is the form merely another thing or the representative of a conglomerate of things 'said about' or 'thought about' other things? What is the status, then, of the things about which we think and speak?

If my interpretation is correct, forms or essences are not 'said about' other things, at least in the sense that they ascribe qualities or properties to subjects. Rather, forms express the actuality of things as subjects. The form of something is that thing as a subject. But this position is incomplete unless there is an absolute
conjunction in actuality between what is thought and what is. It is my intention that what has so far been argued in Part I and what will be argued presently follow Aristotle part of the way down this avenue of his thought. My argument leads in the direction of the claim that for Aristotle the mind is joined with reality not in the realm of universals but in the concrete workings of individual things. This is the sort of thing Aristotle seems to say in the Metaphysics at 1087a 10:

The claim that all knowledge is universal, from which it follows of necessity also that the principles of beings (τὰ ὀνταὶ) are universal and that there are no separable substances, has especial difficulty among the things that have been said. But though this claim is true in one way, it is not true in another. For knowledge, and knowing as well, has two senses, since they are in one sense potential and in another sense actual. The potentiality, like matter, is universal and indefinite and of the universal and the indefinite, while the actuality is determined (ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνταὶ) and of the determined, being itself a tode ti and of a tode ti. It is only incidentally (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) that sight sees universal color, i. e., because this color which sight sees is a color and because what the grammarian studies, this alpha, is an alpha. If principles must be universal, then the things that come from principles must also be universal, just as in demonstrations. And if this is the case, nothing will be separable and there will be no substance. But it is clear that knowledge is in one sense universal and in another sense not.
Chapter I

Why did Aristotle devise the formula τὸ τί ἐστιν?

It is generally held, rightly I think, that the ἦμερα was a formula developed by Aristotle (or, perhaps, non-specifically in the Academy) because of ambiguity in the socratic expression τί ἐστιν. This ambiguity is well attested by the fact that in Plato's works, notably in the Meno, it is not always easy for Socrates to make clear to his interlocutor what sort of answer the question τί ἐστιν seeks. The focus of the question in Plato's hands was to discover a definition composed of the distinguishing characteristics and elements of something. The elements which belong in the definition of something compose the 'what it is'. For Aristotle there is also the substance of something which, as has already been argued, accounts for the unity of the elements in the definition. It is in search of substance in this sense that, according to my thesis, Aristotle devised the locution τί ἐστιν. It is this ambiguity in the
meaning of \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \), i.e. roughly between 'what is' and 'what it is', or what has distinguishing features and the distinguishing features, which gave rise to the new formula. This understanding is to be contrasted with those which view the \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \) as designed to focus only on certain kinds of attribute or universal, namely essential ones, in opposition to the vast range of attributes, including accidents, which may answer the question \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \).

That \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \) by itself can be used in contrast to all other categories than substance, and in apposition to the \( \tau o\delta e \ ti \), is shown by reference to Met., 1028a 11. Here Aristotle has made the familiar point that 'what is' \((\tau \partial \delta \nu)\) has many senses. He explains:

For it signifies, on the one hand, the 'what is' \((\tau \partial \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \nu)\) and the \( \tau o\delta e \ ti \), and on the other hand, quality, quantity, and each of the other things which are predicated in this way.

Ross comments on the passage as follows:

The two phrases \((\tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \kappa a i \tau o\delta e \ \tau \nu)\) indicate the two sides there are to Aristotle's doctrine of substance. A \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \) is the \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \nu \) of something, the answer to the question 'what is it?'; and whether this something be an individual or a universal, its essence can only be stated as a universal or a combination of universals. \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon o\tau \nu \) in fact points to the distinction between essential and accidental predication. A \( \tau o\delta e \ \tau \nu \) on the other hand is not the \( \tau o\delta e \ \tau \nu \) of anything; it is simply an individual; the term points not to the distinction of essential from accidental but to that of substance from attribute.
Ross is certainly right that insofar as \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \) signifies a kind of predicate, or conglomerate of predicates, it is only per se or essential predicates that belong in the \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \). But there is nothing in the present context to indicate that \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \) is not here used to indicate 'what is', i.e. what has such predicates. It is this aspect of the \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \) which Aristotle emphasizes as the passage continues in saying that \( \dot{o}r \) in the primary sense is the \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \) which signifies 'the substance', i.e. the very sort of being which Ross' comment tends to associate with the \( \tau o d e \ \tau i \) rather than with the \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \). It is precisely as predicates of the sort of being represented by the expression \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \) that 'quantity, quality, affections and all other such things are called beings'. For these reasons \( \tau o d e \ \tau i \) should be understood at 1028a 12 as explanatory of the use to which Aristotle in this context puts the expression \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \).

Yet in general Ross is right in his remarks about \( \tau i \varepsilon o r \) and \( \tau o d e \ \tau i \). In support of his position reference will be made to Met., 1022a·25 ff. This passage concerns various senses of the term \( \kappa o h \alpha o t o \), a term crucial in this discussion because of the distinction Ross mentions between essential and accidental attributes. In one sense of this central Aristotelian term, it serves to delimit those characteristics or predicates which are essential to something insofar as they belong in its definition. The passage is important because it involves
a contrast between the sense of this term which applies to the elements of the τι ἐστι and the sense which applies to the τ. ἐ.:

In one sense each thing's τ. ἐ. is καθ' ἑαυτόν. For instance Kallias is καθ' ἑαυτό Kallias and is also Kallias' τ. ἐ. But in another sense, whatever belongs in the τι ἐστι is καθ' ἑαυτόν. For example, Kallias is an animal καθ' ἑαυτό. For 'animal' belongs in the definition of Kallias because Kallias is a sort of animal.

In this passage the sense in which the τ. ἐ. is per se is related to the sense in which a thing is itself, while the τι ἐστι seems to be a composite of essential predicates. A natural conclusion is that the τι ἐστι as here used is the τι ἐστι of something, the τ. ἐ. is not. For Kallias is not the Kallias of himself.

Strong evidence for this interpretation is gained by the comparison of this passage with one found in the Posterior Analytics at 73b 7:

Substance, that is, whatever signifies a τοῦ τί, is not something different than just what it is. Thus, I call καθ' ἑαυτό what is not predicated of a subject while what is predicated of a subject I call 'attributes' (Συμβεβηκότα).

A few lines earlier (73a 34) gives as another meaning of καθ' ἑαυτό the very definition which was seen in the Metaphysics applied to the elements in the τι ἐστι. In this other sense of the term, Aristotle defines καθ' ἑαυτό as 'whatever belongs in the what it is'. This in turn is further clarified as 'whatever belongs in the account given by someone saying what something is'.
The juxtaposition of the passage from the Metaphysics and the one from the Posterior Analytics yields the following conclusion. The \textit{τ. Ἰ. Ἔ.} is the substance and the \textit{tode τί} which is 'not something different than just what it is', while the \textit{τί ἐστὶ} comprises essential attributes which are predicated of something in a universal mode. A plausible supposition, therefore, is that it is precisely \textit{this} ambiguity in the expression \textit{τί ἐστὶ} which the formula \textit{τ. Ἰ. Ἔ.} was invented by Aristotle to obviate. For \textit{τί ἐστὶ} taken by itself may indicate either the elements in a definition or the subject of those elements. Insofar as \textit{τί ἐστὶ} can mean both 'what is' and 'what it is', the \textit{τ. Ἰ. Ἔ.} has the former sense alone. When the \textit{τί ἐστὶ} is the definition, and thus the sort of thing which is universally predicated as one over many, the \textit{τ. Ἰ. Ἔ.} is what is defined. Thus, as Aristotle says at 1017b 21:

The \textit{τ. Ἰ. Ἔ.} that of which the account is a definition, is also said to be the substance of each thing. Immediately following this Aristotle gives the two criteria for substance mentioned already in this thesis, namely being an ultimate subject and being a separable \textit{tode τί}.

If, as I claim, the essence of something is that thing as a subject and, co-ordinately, as a \textit{tode τί}, it is implied that there is something further to be sought, in asking for the essence of something, than a definition, its attributes, and its material constitution. If providing the material substratum together with the distinguishing
characteristics of something adequately delimits a subject of discourse, how is it significant to ask a further question about its essence? If a being has already been defined and identified, how can the question 'What was the being?' elicit any further information?

This further question arises because of the following. First, no universal predicate, which would for Aristotle include everything possessed by a substance including its materials, is determinate of its own meaning. In this sense all universal terms are 'homonymous' and can be fully explained only by reference to the subject to which they are attached. The significance of a predicate depends upon the subject to which it is attributed. Here I mean, for example, that it is not the same thing for Kallias and an ox to be an animal. This I believe to be part of the thrust of three central Aristotelian doctrines: (1) the view that the accounts of all things other than substance involves the account of substance, here understood to mean the very substance to which a property belongs and not substance in general; (2) the indeterminate nature of qualities and matter as well as their universality; (3) the inseparability of both qualities and matter from 'what is' in the primary sense.

The second matter giving rise to the essence question is the problem of unity. The mere fact that something is capable of exhaustive definition does not establish unity of the sort which, according to Aristotle, the presence
of an essence implies. For this reason the very applicability of the essence question is denied to certain sorts of things, at least in the primary sense. The question does not apply, for instance, to a mere congregation of elements, or the mere presence of a property in some substratum, though such 'unities' may be capable of definition and identification. Aristotle's example of 'cloak' as a name applied to 'white man' illustrates this point. About the question 'What is a cloak's being?' Aristotle says, "But surely this is not among the things said per se." Thus, the partial thrust of the essence question is to discover, given that something has criteria of identity, whether there is a principle of unity beyond the presence of 'one thing in another'. For the presence of one thing in another does not constitute a tode tι. The essence-question should be understood in the general context of the problem raised by Aristotle at 1037b 10:

I mean this problem: On what account do we say that that of which the account is a definition is one thing, e.g. of man 'two-footed animal'. For let this be the definition. On what account is this one thing but not many, viz. two-footed and animal?

Here it is important to notice that the expression 'that of which the account is a definition' is precisely the essence as defined at 1017b 21.

Aristotle's position may be expressed in different terms as follows. The statement 'Socrates is a man' may be understood in two ways. The statement may mean
that Socrates has the characteristics which are criteria for his being a man. But the statement may also indicate that Socrates is, as a subject, related to his attributes in a particular way. The former meaning involves the use of the term 'man' to classify or identify Socrates. This use, regarded as such, fails to determine Socrates as the sort of thing which has an essence at all. That is, this use fails to identify Socrates as a subject acting as a principle which determines the meaning of his attributes and characteristics. Such a principle, in activity, is the 'being' sought by the essence-question.

These remarks having provided a philosophical orientation in which to view the essence formula, I will begin the analysis of the formula by reference to the first chapter of the *Categories*. The chapter begins by defining the term 'homonym' as follows:

Those things of which the name alone is common, while the account of the being (τῆς ὑπόστασις) in accordance with the name is different, are called homonyms. For instance, both a man and a drawing are animals.

It is critical to notice that it is not names but things which in Aristotle's use of the term are 'homonyms'. He does not, in this passage, claim that the term ἴδιον is equivocal or homonymous but that a man and a drawing are homonyms. The definition does not, therefore, depend upon equivocity of the word ἴδιον, but on the different
accounts things in accordance with the name ἁμών. Commentators on this passage have been misled, I think, by the fact that in Greek the word ἁμών may be used both of a living animal and of an image in a picture, whether or not the picture is of an animal. Aristotle's definition of 'homonyms' does not depend upon this ambiguity in the sense of the term 'animal', however, a fact which is clearly shown by reference to De Anima, 412b 20-23. For at that place Aristotle says that an eye which has lost its sight is not an eye, except homonymously, just as the eye in a sculpture or painting is an eye homonymously. Here Aristotle does not require a pun in the Greek to make his point. It is not a sheer accident that an eye in a picture is called an eye, yet it is a different thing for an eye in a drawing to be an eye than for a living eye to be one. Homonymy arises here because the account of the thing with respect to the name differs. When a person in a photograph is identified as 'Tom', the name 'Tom' need not mean something different than when it is applied to the person himself.

The argument represented here should not be understood to imply that there can be no ambiguity or equivocity in the names which things are called or in attributes themselves. Aristotle in fact considers this possibility but rejects it as a complete solution to the problem of how comparison is possible with respect to the attributes of different things. My argument is
that Aristotle's definition need not imply equivocity in the name itself. The focus of Aristotle's remarks is the subject and its account with respect to a given name. This emphasis is made clearer by Aristotle's use of the essence-formula in order to explain the definition of 'homonyms'. He says:

For the name only is common, but the account of the being with respect to the name is different. For if someone should say what it is for each of them to be an animal, he would give an account peculiar to each.\textsuperscript{13}

It is by giving an account of a picture's being an animal and a man's being an animal that their homonymy is revealed. Giving an account of the name 'animal' would not necessarily help here. For as Aristotle says in the Physics at 248b 15, even the definitions may be homonymous. Even terms like 'growing', 'sleeping', 'being born', 'dying', 'running' may be intelligibly applied to animals in pictures. Yet it is not the same thing for an animal in a picture to do anything of these things as for a real animal to do them.

These remarks are relevant to the general claim I have made that all universal predicates are indefinite in meaning and that their precise determination depends upon the subject to which they are applied. But the immediate task of the present chapter is to explain the essence-formula. The grammar of the expression \( \tau \varepsilon \varepsilon \sigma \tau \alpha \upsilon \omega \nu \epsilon k\alpha \tau \eta \rho \mu \tau \sigma \varsigma \omega \eta \epsilon i \upsilon \alpha \nu \) as here found in the Categories
should be explained in the following way. The root sentence is  

\( \tau \iota \varepsilon \sigma \tau i \tau o \varepsilon \iota \nu \lambda \iota \), 'what is the being'. The term \( \pi \nu \) has been attracted into the dative case by the dative \( \varepsilon k\alpha\tau e\rho\nu \). The force of the locution can be brought out by imagining the following sequence. Someone claims that a certain subject is an animal. The question is then asked, 'What is it for this thing to be an animal?'. The question need not be understood to imply that the questioner does not know what an animal is. He is trying, rather, to discover the way in which the thing in question manages to be one. If an antecedent is provided for \( \varepsilon k\alpha\tau e\rho\nu \), the question becomes 'What is it for (e.g.) a picture to be an animal?' or, translating the articular infinitive with the English gerund and rendering the dative as a possessive, 'What is a picture's being an animal?', or, 'What is being an animal for a picture?'.

Can  

\( \tau \iota \varepsilon \sigma \tau i \tau o \varepsilon k\alpha\tau e\rho\nu \tau o \varepsilon k\iota \omega \varepsilon \iota \nu \) be taken as a model for understanding  

\( \tau o \tau \iota \eta \nu \varepsilon \iota \nu \),  

\( \tau o \tau \iota \eta \nu \varepsilon \iota \nu \varepsilon k\alpha\tau o\nu \), and  

\( \tau o \tau \iota \eta \nu \alpha \nu \beta \iota \mu \tau \omega \varepsilon \iota \nu \) ? Ross, at least, claims that  

\( \tau o \tau \iota \eta \nu \varepsilon \iota \nu \), which he defines as 'the answer to the question, what was it to be so-and-so', is "... a generalization from such phrases as  

\( \tau \iota \eta \nu \alpha \nu \beta \iota \mu \tau \omega \varepsilon \iota \nu \varepsilon k\alpha\tau o\nu \) (sc. \( \tau \iota \alpha \mu \alpha \tau i \) \( \tau o \varepsilon k\iota \omega \varepsilon \iota \nu \))' (P. A. 649b 22)."

While Aristotle would, I believe, disagree with Ross' insertion of \( \tau \iota \alpha \mu \alpha \tau i \) as the antecedent for \( \alpha \nu \beta \iota \mu \tau \omega \) on the grounds that to seek an account of something being
itself is 'to seek nothing', and while his translation
is misleading insofar as it, as Ross clearly intends
indicates that the essence of something is composed of
universal characteristics, his general claim is correct.
Whether the essence-formula is a generalization from
these more complete expressions or whether, on the contrary,
the essence formula itself as well as these fuller
versions is an expansion from, as E. Buchanan suggests,
the simple expression ιο ἀνθρώπου ἐναλ, is unimportant.
It is desirable, however, that without very strong
evidence to the contrary, the expressions be understood
in such a way that they are compatible with one another.

There are, however, a number of difficulties which
must be overcome if this unified approach is to be
maintained. Most of these may be handled under two
rather pointed headings. First, it is noticed that the
εσμη of the Categories is replaced in nearly all instances
by the imperfect ἤν. Though the formula as it appears
in De Partibus Animalium has the identical syntax with
ἡν as does the formula in the Categories with εσμη, the
use of the imperfect is the subject of much debate. An
account of it should be offered. The second difficulty
is the rarity with which the formula is found with two
datives. Other than the instances already mentioned
only 419a 9-10 of De Anima is without further argument.

It will be shown in the next chapter that τὸ εἰναι ἀτο
ἐναλ ἄσι at 1029b of the Metaphysics ought to be included.
in this list. Other questions are (1) whether in the formula \( \tau \epsilon \varphi \alpha \gamma \alpha \pi \gamma \alpha \omega \varepsilon \tau \nu \tau \), the dative is to be understood as possessive and therefore as the subject of the infinitive (viz. 'what was a man's being') or as a predicate (viz. 'what it was to be a man'), (2) whether \( \varepsilon \tau \nu \) is an existential or copulative 'is'.

The imperfect \( \varepsilon \tau \nu \).

Scholarly views about Aristotle's use of the imperfect in the essence-formula range from the claim that Aristotle preferred the imperfect primarily for reasons of euphony to those which impute metaphysical significance to the imperfect. Buchanan roughly divides this field of interpretation into two camps, namely,

... those which assign a metaphysical significance to it as indicating the timelessness of the essence or form, its logical or temporal priority to the concrete being, or its persistence or duration throughout the existence of things, while their accidents change; and those which take it as the so-called "philosophical imperfect," referring to something already said, meant, or supposed.

The position argued in this thesis falls into the latter camp. The imperfect reflects, on this view, the fact that the essence-question seeks a principle beyond the criteria \( \tau \varphi \rho \) the identity of a subject. Thus the imperfect indicates that a further question is being posed about a characterization which has already been offered, assumed
or supposed. The imperfect signals the fact that in asking what the essence of something is, one is asking for a cause in the Aristotelian sense, that is, in the form of the question 'Why?'. If it is true that nothing said about a subject in a universal mode can determine in advance the significance of its application to a particular subject, then a natural way of asking for the special significance of a predicate or the principal source of its determination is, "What was it for X to be or have that predicate?"

Curt Arpe maintains a similar position in Das τέλος bei Aristoteles. Arpe's claim is that the essence-question most appropriately arises when a predicate has already been attached to a subject in previous conversation. If it has been said already that Socrates is a man, it may be asked, "What was it for Socrates to be a man?" or "What did you mean by calling Socrates a man?" In defense of this position Arpe points out that at 1029b 28 of the Metaphysics Aristotle in a rare instance uses the present tense in asking, "What is it to be a cloak?" The present tense is appropriate here, according to Arpe, because 'cloak' is a new word, the definition of which has just been stipulated as 'white man'. It has not in fact been predicated of any particular. Though Fr. Owens points out that the present tense occurs also in the first chapter of the Categories without the invention of a new word, and though it has been shown in this thesis
that the essence-question as posed in the *Categories* does presuppose an earlier assertion, the particular context of 2, 4 invites the thought that the shift in tense is significant. For there is a shift in tense from the immediately preceding line which has \( \tau \varepsilon \delta \varepsilon \lambda e \varepsilon k \varepsilon \delta \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \rho \varepsilon w \) and from the use of the imperfect five times in the chapter prior to this. The problem with Arpe’s position is that he fails to locate the right reason for the shift in tense. For the issue is not whether or not the made-up word 'cloak' has been predicated of anything, but whether anything can be predicated of 'cloak' as such, i.e. whether 'white man' is as such a subject of qualities. In the context Aristotle is arguing that 'cloak' is not the sort of thing that has an essence at all. It would not matter how many times 'cloak' had been predicated of white men. Thus, insofar as the shift from the imperfect to the present tense is significant, it indicates that the term being asked about has not been used as a subject. 'White man' is not a unity of the kind that having an essence would indicate. Arpe’s view will be considered further in the discussion of the dative(s) later in this chapter.

Whatever the implications may be of the use of the imperfect in the essence-formula, the use of the so-called 'philosophical imperfect' is well attested in Aristotle’s works. Here are a few examples. In the *Categories* at 3b 8 Aristotle says, "Synonyms were the things of which
the name is common and the account is the same." Here the imperfect is used to refer to a definition given earlier.

In the Metaphysics at 1071b 3 Aristotle says, "Since there were three substances . . .," which clearly means that three kinds of substance had been delineated earlier in the work. In De Anima at 419a 9-10 a version of the essence-formula itself appears (viz. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν τὸ γράμματος ἐν τοῖς ὑποθέσεως) which in the context is natural to translate with the philosophical imperfect as 'This is what it was for it to be colour'. While such instances are clear evidence for this use of the imperfect, no instances to my knowledge can be found which, having a clear metaphysical significance, can not be rendered appropriately as philosophical imperfects.

The following instances have been adduced in support of the metaphysical view. These include De Caelo, 278a 11 (τὸ ἀληθείαν ἐπὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιφυσικῷ) which J. L. Stocks renders quite naturally as 'Everything that is perceptible subsists, as we know, in matter'. The Rhetoric at 1363a 8 says, "That at which everyone aims, this was the good. (αὕτη πάντες ἐφιέντες, τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ)". In the Theaetetus at 156 A, Plato writes ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἄνω, ἕστω τὸ πᾶν κίνητος ἢ or, "This principle of theirs was that everything was motion." Nothing metaphysical is contained in the meaning of the imperfect. In all these three instances the imperfect tense seems to indicate only (1) the report of a view previously argued in the text itself,
(2) the report of a view known to be commonly held, or
(3) the report of a view known to be held by an opponent.

In addition to these passages Antisthenes' definition of λόγος, as it is reported by Diogenes Laertius, has been offered, though not very convincingly, as a possible source for Aristotle's essence-formula. But the imperfect in ὅταν τι ἦν ἡ ἐστιν δηλῶν seems to have its ordinary temporal significance. 'That which makes clear what was or is' seems to be a perfectly satisfactory translation. No metaphysical importance can be ascribed to Antisthenes' use of the imperfect and therefore none on this ground to Aristotle's inheritance of it. The more probable view in any case is that the essence-formula was the invention of Aristotle.

Finally, here are two passages in which the essence itself is treated as having temporal or logical priority in that the essence is held by Aristotle to be what is aimed at by a natural process or prior in the explanation of natural processes. They are important because they show that the metaphysical significance of Aristotelian essences is not restricted by a more limited understanding of his use of the imperfect in the essence-formula. The first passage is De Partibus Animalium 640a 33-35. Here Aristotle argues that the presence of bodily parts is best explained by the essence and not the other way around. He says:

Hence it is best to say that since this was a man's being, on account of this these things are (ἐκείνη). For it is not possible for the essence to be without these parts.
The argument is that the parts of man are best explained by 'hypothetical necessity'. That is, because this was given as a man's being, certain bodily constituents are necessary. A passage with similar purport is found in the Physics at 198b 8, a line in which the imperfect occurs twice, viz. τὰ υποτέλεια τοῦ τι καθότι έστιν. Here both imperf. probably indicate the presupposition or priority of the essence in the explanation of natural phenomena. But the imperf. themselves need contain no metaphysical meaning in order to indicate this kind of priority.

The evidence here accumulated indicates that a metaphysically neutral understanding of the imperfect in the essence formula is to be recommended. This, however, in no way prevents a metaphysical interpretation of Aristotelian essences. Nor indeed does my interpretation treat the imperfect as philosophically unimportant, a view which Buchanan seems to hold when he expresses a preference for Dimmler's suggestion that the imperfect was used by Aristotle for reasons of euphony. For the imperfect may, as I claim, signal the fact that in asking 'What was the being?' a cause or explanation is sought for, and therefore beyond, criteria for the identity of a substance. Further, if it is true that nothing said about a subject in a universal mode can determine the significance of its application to a given subject, then the essence-question with the imperfect is a natural way of seeking
such significance. Whether a subject can be so conceived that it acts as a principle determining the significance of its predicates without being itself a universal predicate is a philosophical question of great importance and difficulty.

The Datives.

The essence-formula very rarely contains two datives. Nevertheless, it is, as has been said, desirable to translate the formula in such a way that it can accommodate two datives. This is possible only if one of the datives is allowed to be the subject of εἰναι, the second dative being thus 'attracted' into the dative case as a predicate. If the dative is translated as a possessive then it is always possible for εἰναι to connect this term to a predicate by rendering εἰναι as an English gerund, a grammatical function which only the Greek infinitive can accomplish. The criterion that the formula be interpreted in such a way as to allow two datives, despite their rarity, excludes certain translations. Thus Buchanan, invoking this criterion, comments as follows on Léon Robin's renderings, viz. 'ce qu'il a été donné a chaque chose, d'etre' and 'ce qu'il lui appartient et lui a dans le passe toujours appartenu, d'etre'.

η δ' τι η εἰναι with two datives cannot be construed after this pattern; for in Robin's interpretation τι is the predicate with εἰναι, but where there are two datives one of these is the predicate.
However, Buchanan observes:

To this objection one may reply that the examples with two datives are rare and do not conform strictly to the pattern of τὸ τί ἔστω ἔπειτα.

Therefore, Buchanan raises another objection to translations in the Robin style, namely the improbability of taking τί ἔστω ἔπειτα, to mean 'what belongs to each thing' which Robin's translation requires. Though Buchanan's criticisms are strictly correct, it is less clear that Robin's rendering cannot be understood as an interpretation of the formula, even when two datives are present. For instance τὰ χρήματα τοῦ νομοῦ τὸ μήναν ἔπειτα which Buchanan would correctly translate 'This is what it was for it to be colour' can be understood to mean 'This is what belonged to it to be colour'. This same point may be made about the translation of the formula in its general form as 'what it was for each thing to be', which may be understood to indicate those features which belong to something in such a way as to determine its being what it is, either as a kind or as an individual. The disadvantage of this interpretation is that it makes it difficult to distinguish the τί ἔστω from the τ. γ. ἐ. The advantage of Buchanan's translation is that, by diminishing the emphasis on the relation of belonging and by placing the emphasis more squarely on the being, interpretation more consonant with Aristotle's distinction between the τί ἔστω and τ. γ. ἐ. becomes more viable. But it cannot be expected that a grammatical analysis will do a philosophical job.
The most extreme position regarding the datives was advanced by Kurt Arpe who claims that when the second dative is missing in the formula, it should be mentally supplied. It is unclear, however, which dative is to be supplied, the subject or the predicate. Only this much is clear on grammatical grounds, that the term represented by a single dative (e.g. τὸ τί ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ) should not be taken as a predicate without an assumed subject. Otherwise there is no reason for the predicate to be in the dative case. This fact of grammar is used by Aristotle to make a distinction at 1031b 4 of the Metaphysics where he says:

By 'being separated' I mean, for instance, if the being of good (τὸ ἐνελκαγαθῶ) does not belong to the good itself, nor being good (τὸ ἐνελκαγαθῶν) to this.

Arpe's position is that in such cases as τὸ τί ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ 'man' should be regarded as a predicate and that some particular subject like Socrates or Kallias should be mentally supplied. What this achieves, according to Arpe, is a special emphasis on the search for a definition, i.e. the specific criteria according to which some particular thing qualifies as being a man. The question τί ἐστι is thus distinguished from τί ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ insofar as the latter seeks more specific or definitive criteria while the former may be answered by the ascription of any general characteristic or the genus alone. Thus, while the question 'What is a man?' may be answered by
providing the genus 'animal' and in a more distended sense even by providing an accidental characteristic of man, the question 'What was it for Socrates to be a man?' or also 'What was it for a man to be (a man)?' can not. Thus, the ambiguity which the essence-formula was designed to remove on this account is not that between subject and predicate, but the degree of specificity involved. The question, then, is whether the essence-question seeks a different kind of answer than does 'What is it?' or a more definitive answer of the same kind. My preference for the former position, and reasons for it, have already been given. Further argument will be given in the next chapter.

Buchanan argues forcefully against Arpe and for the view that, most of the time, the single dative should be understood as possessive, εἶναι as absolute. When it is convenient or natural to translate the dative as a predicate, Buchanan suggests that the predicate should in such cases be regarded as an 'interior' predicate on the model of a cognate accusative. Is there a case in which this is necessary? Buchanan cites only Μετ., 1046b 34-35 as an instance in which the single dative is "most naturally taken as a predicate." The line reads, τὸ γὰρ ὁικοδομῆς εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναι ἐστὶν ὁικοδομεῖν. But even here there is no reason not to translate the line as 'For a builder to be is for him to be able to build' where 'for him' is understood in the context.
The meaning of the claim is that the very being of a builder is his capacity to build.

The argument, as so far adumbrated in this thesis, suggests that it is necessary to supply a subject only when the essence of a non-substance, i.e. either a universal term or a combination of such a predicate with a subject, is the focus of the question. The doctrine that essences belong simply or absolutely (ἀνιῶσι) to substances alone may, in part, be reflected in the grammar of the essence-formula, which, as I understand it, applies primarily to the subjects of universal predicates and only derivatively to the predicates. All categories and predicates other than substance presuppose a certain subject. To give an account of them involves the account of the subject to which they are applied. The question 'What was the being of such-and-such a universal?' has, therefore, a derivative application to such things.

Aristotle expresses this position exactly by attention to the word 'being' or 'is'. He says (1) that 'is' does not belong to the other categories than substance primarily but ἐπωμένοις or derivatively and (2) that items in the categories other than substance are called 'beings' (ὄντα) not 'in accordance with one thing' (κατά τὸν) but 'in relation to one thing' (ἐπόσι ὑπ''). His remarks at 1030a 29 are in a similar vein:

The ἄνθρωπον will belong similarly (sc. in reality to the way it belongs in speech) primarily and simply to substance, but if to other things as well,
just as the ἐστὶν does, the what was the being (τ. ἦν) will not belong simply but rather what was the being such and such a quality or so much.

Here Aristotle has in mind the fact that quantities and qualities exist as predicates, just as they are defined, in relation to subjects. The comparison to the 'what it is' reflects the ambiguity pointed out at 1030a 18 where Aristotle says:

For the ἐστὶ in one way signifies the substance and the tode τι, but in another way, each of the things predicated, viz. quantity, quality and other things of that sort.

In conclusion, the evidence discussed supports the view that insofar as ἐστὶ ambiguously indicates either a subject or universal predicates, the τ. ἦν was regarded by Aristotle either as a subject in its own right or as belonging to a subject in the way that something belongs to itself. In his use of the essence-formula his attention is focused primarily on the being of something which in the fundamental sense is its being as a subject. Insofar as the τ. ἦν may be said to belong to something, it does not belong in the way that a quality or a quality-like predicate does. In accordance with this line of thought Aristotle says in De Anima at 430b 26:

An assertion says something about something, just as a denial does, and they are all either true or false. This, however, is not true of every thought, but the ἐστὶ of something in the sense of (καὶ ἐστὶ) the τ. ἦν is true even though it is not something about something.
Here, as elsewhere in my interpretation, the essence-formula specifies the sense of \( \epsilon \sigma \epsilon \sigma \) which does not involve predication, at least in the ordinary sense.

In the following chapter the view of the essence here advanced will be tested in the context of certain passages in Met., Z and also against contrary positions represented by some modern commentators. The ultimate goal is to capture at least part of the philosophical thrust of Aristotle's thoughts about essences. This thrust may be illustrated against a modern background by considering the Russelian formula \( \exists x \phi(x) \), which Aristotle would have regarded as incomplete. For if someone says, "There is an \( X \) such that \( X \) has quality \( \phi \)," the statement would be regarded as obscure and indefinite by Aristotle until it is known what \( X \) is. The quality \( \phi \), insofar as it is known by itself or only as belonging indifferently to any subject, is known in a universal mode which amounts only to potential knowledge. It is known in actuality only with respect to an essence which determines the meaning of the quality. To such a formula Aristotle would need to ask, "There is a what such that what is \( \phi \) ?" Knowledge of the essences of things is that knowledge which determines the meaning of those things which, in terms of the Physics, A, l, are initially 'clear to us' but not 'clear by nature', i. e. things which are, puzzlingly on other accounts, called \textit{universal} and \textit{indefinite} by Aristotle.
Chapter 2

What does Aristotle mean by the claim that the \( \tau \eta \varepsilon \eta \iota \nu \varepsilon \) is said \( \kappa \alpha \theta \alpha \iota \nu \iota \)?

Pierre Aubenque in *Le Probleme de l'Être chez Aristote* (pp. 458-472) proposes an interpretation which differs significantly from the one offered in the last chapter. This difference rests primarily on a disagreement about Aristotle's use of the expression \( \kappa \alpha \theta \alpha \iota \nu \iota \) as it applies to the \( \tau \eta \varepsilon \eta \iota \nu \varepsilon \). According to Aubenque the essence of something is \( \kappa \alpha \theta \alpha \iota \nu \iota \), and in this respect differs from the \( \tau \varepsilon \eta \nu \varepsilon \), insofar as it excludes all accidents of a subject except \textit{per se} accidents and includes all \textit{per se} predicates, especially \textit{per se} accidents. While the formula \( \tau \varepsilon \eta \nu \varepsilon \) can be answered by accidents in the strict sense or by providing a genus alone, the \( \tau \eta \varepsilon \eta \iota \nu \varepsilon \) has greater specificity. Aubenque comments as follows on Aristotle's definition of \( \tau \eta \varepsilon \eta \iota \nu \varepsilon \) found at *Met.* Z, 1029b 13, which he translates 'ce que chaque être est dit être par soi':
Elle se réfère d'abord au langage: la quiddité s'exprime dans un discours par lequel nous disons ce que la chose est. Mais, d'autre part, tout ce que la chose est n'appartient pas à la quiddité, mais seulement ce qu'elle est par soi, ce qui exclut les accidents ou du moins ceux des accidents qui ne sont pas par soi (συμβεβηκότα καθ'αὑτήν).

It was not solely to restrict the class of attributes which may function as a response to the question τί ἐστι; that the essence formula was devised, according to Aubenque. For even a strict interpretation of the question τί ἐστι; which would exclude accidents as appropriate responses allows responses too general to capture the fundamental individuality and concreteness of things. For, as Aubenque says, "Le τί ἐστι; de Socrate est son humanité." And the question τί ἐστι; even in the strict sense may be answered by providing the genus. According to Aubenque:

... Aristote ne se contente pas des discours universels et des définitions génériques: puisque les choses sont singulières, c'est dans leur singularité qu'il faut les saisir. Le τί ἐστι; socratique ou platonicien n'épuise pas la richesse de déterminations du τὸ ὑπό τι, c'est-à-dire de l'être individuel et concret.

The solution is found by distinguishing between 'accidents properly speaking' and accidents per se, that is, συμβεβηκότα καθ'αὑτήν. Accidents per se belong in the answer to the question τί ἐστι; but not to the question τί ἐστι;.

The sort of attribute Aubenque has in mind is, for example, 'la sagesse de Socrate, la richesse de Crésus,
ou la propriété des angles d'un triangle d'être égaux à deux droits'. Though such properties would be given improperly in answer to the question 'What is it?' when strictly understood, they are appropriate in answer to the essence-question. In view of this interpretation the imperfect in the formula signifies 'un état habituel' with respect to those attributes determinative of an individual.

Aubenque divides types of position with respect to the formulation of the τι ἐστι into two camps, (1) those which regard the formula as a 'complication de la question τι ἐστι' and (2) those which view it as 'une application particulière de l'expression το... ἐναι, avec un datif intercalé'. Aubenque favours the former type of interpretation on the ground that the latter turns the essence-formula into an answer to the question τι ἐστι:

'A la question, qu'est-ce? on répondrait: l'être de ce que la chose était.'

Since the two questions are 'symmetrical', they should not be understood in this way. Therefore Aubenque regards τι ἐστι as the interrogative τι ἐστι with the verb in the imperfect tense, the whole formula being translated 'ce que c'était que d'être' rather than 'l'être de ce que c'était'. And the question τι ἐστι looks for those properties which are distinctive of an individual and habitually present in him just in being, presumably, who he is.
Aubenque fails to consider the possibility presented in this thesis, i.e. that the essence-question seeks the role of a subject with respect to the universals which belong to it, even essentially. For if this is the case, the question 'What was being?' or 'What was the being?' asks a further question beyond 'What is it?' insofar as that question invites universal predicates. Insofar as the question, so understood, seeks a clarification of attributes applied to a subject, the sorts of answer to the essence-question suggested by Aubenque, e.g. 'the wisdom of Socrates', would be exactly the sort of predicate the clarification of which is sought by one who asks the essence-question. For the question 'What was Socrates' being?' is asked in order to discover the rôle of Socrates as a principle determining the significance of his characteristics. It is precisely in this way that the concrete individuality sought by Aubenque in the essence-formula is in fact revealed. The possibility not considered by Aubenque as a translation of the formula is 'l'être que c'était'.

In whichever manner the formula is rendered, however, Aubenque's crucial claim is that per se accidents are included in the essence (or quiddité as he puts it). A fundamental question to ask, then, concerning this position is whether Aristotle ever speaks of ὁμολογία in the sense required by Aubenque. One of the instances used by Aubenque to illustrate this type of
essential accident is 'the property of the angles of a triangle of being equal to two rights'. The passage in the *Metaphysics* in which Aristotle characterizes this property as accidental *per se* can barely be construed to support Aubenque's position. Aristotle says:

An accident is also spoken of in another way, e. g. as so many things as belong to each thing *per se* though they are not included in the substance, for instance a triangle's possessing two right angles. Here Aristotle denies that such an attribute, though *per se*, is included in the *substance*. Thus, in order to maintain that such *per se* accidents belong in the 7.7.ε. it is required that Aristotle be using 'substance' in the passage in such a way that his remark would not apply to the 7.7.ε.. If Aristotle means merely that this fact about triangles is not a part of their definition, he could have said so. It is at least awkward to understand the word 'substance' as referring to the general rather than the specific nature of something.

A use of the expression 7α συμβεβηκότα καίδιον found to have some frequency in the *Metaphysics* arises in contexts in which Aristotle is asking whether, or claiming that, a single science should study both substances and the accidents which belong *per se* to substances (7α συμβεβηκότα καθ' άλλα ταίς οὖσίαις). The sorts of things Aristotle gives as examples are 'same' and 'other', 'like' and 'unlike', 'before' and 'after', i. e. terms which, despite the fact that they may be said to belong to
substances per se, are notorious for their ambiguity. They are hardly terms which could specify the concrete individuality of anything, however certain it is that something to which such terms did not apply would not be a substance.

Another expression used by Aristotle in a sense very similar to the one required by Aubenque is ἀπὸ τὸν ὅπως which occurs at Met., 1004b.11. Here Aristotle lists as examples 'oddness' and 'evenness', 'comparability' and 'equality', 'excess' and 'deficiency', i.e. properties which numbers have ἀπὸ τὸν ὅπως. Such attributes are defined in the Posterior Analytics as those the definition of which involves the subject to which they belong. His examples are 'straight' and 'curved' with respect to lines, 'odd' and 'even', 'prime' and 'compound', 'square' and 'oblong' with respect to numbers. Such terms seem to be those which either apply uniquely to a certain subject or have a distinctive or peculiar application to a given subject. Are such attributes what is sought when the essence-question is asked? Is 'oddness' for instance included in the answer to the essence-question as applied to the number three? Or is it rather that the knowledge of the essence is the knowledge which allows one to know the special mode with which 'oddness' applies to the number? In the passages here cited Aristotle says nothing which determines an answer.

Another class of per se accidents are those which
belong of necessity to a certain kind of thing, either absolutely (ἐνλύσ) or in the manner of opposites. In the latter group is included, e.g., evenness or oddness as applied to number. For if a number is not even it must be odd. Are such necessary attributes ἀδελφότητι in the sense which the T.η.ε. is? Again, the text is silent. Though it follows from the nature of numbers that evenness is an inference from non-oddness, though as far as number goes such qualities are 'inénérentes à sa nature', it need not follow that such qualities are, themselves, included in the essence except as a special sort of universal predicate of it.

A final instance of the sort of attribute which Aristotle regards as ἀδελφότητι, though it falls formally within the class mentioned at Po. An., 73a 38-b3 cited above, is 'snub' in relation to nose or 'white' in relation to surface. I list this sort of attribute separately because it seems most pointedly to serve as the sort of example which is friendly to Aubenque's position. Also, the instances listed above from the Posterior Analytics seem to be applied especially to things which Aristotle says are 'knowable absolutely'. Aubenque believes, however, that the T.η.ε., at least as it applies to sensible substances, is responsive to 'la précarité fondamentale du pouvoir-être-autre' or the contingency of such substances. As Aubenque puts it:

L'imagination et l'intellect figent le devenir de la chose, interrompent le flux indéfini de ses
'Snub' in relation to nose is a good example partly because of the formal criterion that it belongs only to noses and partly because a particular nose may be especially memorable because of its snubness, despite the fact that this attribute may change. In the same way the essence of Socrates may be manifested or revealed by the attachment of the property 'wisdom' to him, partly for the reason that this property has a distinctive application to men (neglecting its application to gods) and partly because Socrates is especially memorable as a paradigmatic representative of this quality. We do not think of Socrates not being wise even if, at some time in his life, he was not. Further, it is with respect to Socrates' wisdom that we are inclined to view all the events and characteristics of Socrates' life. In this respect wisdom plays a very special rôle in the notion we have of Socrates.

It is in the recognition of this sort of attribute that the strength of Aubenque's position lies. Further, it is the recognition of this sort of attribute which may furnish Aubenque with a serious objection to the view represented in this thesis. For Aubenque's position is that it is precisely through the recognition of essential attributes that the essence of an individual is revealed. This objection is virtually raised in his criticism of
Plus proche de la vérité nous paraît être l'interprétation récemment proposée par M. Tugendhat: remarquant que le τέλειον εἶναι est à plusieurs reprises opposé au ἐπιστήμη, il en conclut que le τέλειον εἶναι désigne ce que la chose était avant l'adjonction des prédicats accidentels, c'est-à-dire ce que la chose est par soi, dans sa suffisance essentielle, dans sa pureté initiale. Mais on lui objectera que si le κατὰ συμβεβηκός évoque bien l'idée d'une adjonction s'opposant au dépouillement du καθαύτω, l'opposition disparaît dans la notion si proprement aristotélicienne du συμβεβηκός καθαύτω.

The reason why this characterization does not apply to the position proposed in this thesis that the essence is the subject as a principle determining the meaning of universal predicates is that the subject so viewed is not conceived as a subject without attributes or prior to their attachment, but as the subject of them.

The essence so conceived is not an independent and ideal entity revealed when all the characteristics of something have been stripped away, but the actuality of the material. The independence or separation of the form or essence is construed in this thesis, not as the abstraction, even in thought, of an ideal entity from matter or qualities, but as the being (τέλειον) of something which cannot be conceived as a presence of one thing in a substratum, which is other. In short, the fact that something has qualities is not a reason for claiming that it lacks them.
The issue is not whether the subject has properties but how it has them. The essence-question presumes their presence.

This, however, does not constitute a refutation of Aubenque's position. For his view is that it is precisely certain types of accidental predicate which by their inclusion in the essence reveal it. Wisdom, for instance, reveals the socrateité of Socrates. The problem with this view is that the mere presence of wisdom in Socrates, even as a criterion of his identity, does not itself determine how it belongs to Socrates. And though it may be claimed that the locution ἀλήθεια could be used to indicate that a certain characteristic determines the nature of something as a subject, Aristotle's usual use of the locution is the reverse of this, i.e. it indicates that the subject is distinctively in the account of the predicate. Even if wisdom is always a very special predicate of a man, i.e. insofar as it does not represent a mere qualification but a fulfilment of his nature, in which sense wisdom may be regarded as a καθήκον predicate of a man, this would establish only that its meaning is most especially dependent upon the nature of man. If Socrates is wise καθήκον, the knowledge of this indicates, but does not constitute, knowledge of Socrates' being. This is not a denial that Socrates was a paradigmatic instance of a wise man, but constitutes an assertion that it is with respect to the fulfilment (ἐνέργεια) of something or the ἐνέργεια which 'stretches toward' this fulfilment that the
things predicated in a universal mode are most fully significant.

The primary ground upon which judgment about Aristotle's use of the expression \( \kappa \alpha \theta ^{\acute{a}} \nu \tau \omicron \) with respect to the \( \tau . \eta . \epsilon . \) must be based is \textit{Metaphysics}, \( Z, 4. \) It is in fact line 1029b 13 upon which Aubenque bases his opinion that things attributed \( \kappa \alpha \theta ^{\acute{a}} \nu \tau \omicron \) to a subject are included in the \( \tau . \eta . \epsilon . . \) Aubenque translates the definition given of \( \tau o \) \( \tau . \eta . \epsilon . . \), as has been mentioned, 'ce que chaque \( \acute{e} \)tre est dit \( \acute{e} \)tre par soi', or 'that which each being is said to be by itself'. While this is a possible reading of the line, 'to be' is supplied by Aubenque. Even if, as does Aubenque, we follow Bonitz' emendation of the text and read \( \varepsilon \kappa \alpha \omega \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \) for the manuscripts' \( \varepsilon \kappa \alpha \omega \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \), it is unnecessary to supply 'to be'. For \( \varepsilon \sigma \tau \omicron \tau \omicron \tau \nu \ \tau \omicron \ \gamma \nu \ \varepsilon \iota \nu \kappa \) \( \varepsilon \kappa \alpha \omega \omicron \nu \tau \omicron \ \delta \ \lambda \varepsilon \gamma \varepsilon \tau \omicron \nu \ \kappa \alpha \theta ^{\acute{a}} \nu \tau \omicron \) may be rendered 'the essence of each thing is what is spoken of by itself'. But if the manuscripts are followed, the line may read, 'the essence is each thing which is spoken of by itself'. Though I favour preservation of the manuscripts' text in this instance, I will defer, for the sake of argument, to the enviable philological judgement of Bonitz, Jaeger, Ross, and Aubenque. There are, however, philosophical motives for the manuscript change which may be gleaned from Ross' comment on the emendation and which are fully evident in Aubenque's translation.

Ross comments as follows:
There is no other case in Aristotle of the accusative with τι ἡν εἶναι (in Δ. 1016a 34 τι ἡν εἶναι is probably a gloss, cf. n. ad loc.), so that the manuscript reading ἔκκατον διάγεται will not stand (unless, which is unlikely, the meaning is 'the τι ἡν εἶναι is each thing, viz. what it is said per se to be', or 'the τι ἡν εἶναι is what each thing is said per se to be').

It will be noticed that the former translation of the manuscript is mine except for the explanatory clause, the latter is Aubenque's. Why does Ross reject these readings? The answer is discovered in his comment on 1029b 16:

Aristotle rules out, as not the τι ἐστι of A, a term B which is καθότι to A in the second sense recognized in An. Post. (73a 37), viz. that (1) it ἐνυπορεύει in A, is an attribute of A, and (2) A ἐνυπορεύει in the definition of it. For this sense and the instance cf. Δ. 1022a 30. He thus in effect implies that the τι ἡν εἶναι of A is that which is καθότι to it in the first sense (73a 34), viz. that it is present in the τι ἐστι and definition of A.

That Aristotle does intend to rule out καθότι predicates of the sort Ross calls 'the second sense' seems clearly right, a fact which is awkward for Aubenque since this happens to be the normal way in which Aristotle uses the expression συμβεβηκὸν καθότι. But that he intends instead to ascribe the sense of καθότι which applies to the elements of the τι ἐστι also to the τ. ἡ. ἐ. is false. That Aristotle distinguishes even the 'first sense' of καθότι from that which applies to the τ. ἡ. ἐ. has been established both by reference to the Posterior Analytics
and by reference to the lines immediately preceding those
to which Ross refers in Metaphysics 4. The sense in which
the τ.τ.ε. is καθευδό is the sense in which Kallias is
Kallias as opposed to the sense in which Kallias is a
sort of animal. But it is this latter sense which Aristotle
ascribes to the elements of the τζέτατι. In recognizing
this distinction Aubenque is closer to the truth than is
Ross. The question is whether Aristotle in defining the
essence as what is said καθευδό means to include some
things said about a subject, or only what, though not said
of a subject, is (something), which in the primary sense
characterizes only substance.

The argument of Z, 4 supports the latter interpretation.
Aristotle begins the argument by eliminating sheer
accidents like 'your being musical'. This, however, is
insufficient to delimit the sense of καθευδό Aristotle
has in mind. He next rules out the sort of predicate that
belongs archetypically to a particular sort of subject,
that is, as 'white' belongs to surface. This is ruled
out as καθευδό in the appropriate sense probably because
'for a surface to be is not for it to be white', where 'for
it' is understood in the context. He may also mean that
the mode of being for a surface (ά surface's being) is
not the same as the mode of being for white (white's being).
Aristotle next notes that it will not suffice to say that
for a white surface to be is for a white surface to be,
for the obvious reason that the thing itself is thus
included in its account. It is required of the account
of the \( \tau \eta \varepsilon \), that what is defined not be included in the definition. It is Ross' view that having reached this point in the argument, Aristotle has already delimited the sense of \( \kappa \alpha \theta \acute{\alpha} \acute{\iota} \) which applies to an essence, namely the sense which applies to the elements of a definition. This, however, is only a stage in the argument. For this difficulty in the definition of 'white surface' is circumvented, however tentatively, at 1029b 21, where Aristotle says, "... so that if for a white surface to be is for a surface to be smooth, for white to be and for smooth to be will be one and the same thing." Ross, of course, argues that even this fails as a definition of white surface, however well it succeeds in defining white. 23 But even if Aristotle does not regard this 'last' attempt at definition as successful, as far as it goes, he moves on immediately to consider a similar case in which success in definition is stipulated.

The general question is introduced at 1029b 22. Since there are also combinations in accordance with the other categories (for there is a certain subject for each of them, e.g. for quality, quantity, time, place, and movement) we must examine whether there is an account of the \( \tau \eta \varepsilon \) for each of them, that is, whether the \( \tau \eta \varepsilon \) belongs even to these things, viz. for a white man what it was for a white man to be. 24 Aristotle now stipulates that the name for 'white man' will be 'cloak'. Now that cloak has been defined as one thing in another, viz. white in man, does a cloak have an essence?
Aristotle denies that it does. He asks, "What is a cloak's being?" His answer indicates that the question is inapplicable to this sort of thing, viz., "But surely this is in no sense among the things which are said per se." In what sense does a 'cloak' fail the test of being ἱκανόν ἐστιν?

The argument which follows (1029b 29-30a 2) is a tentative one which does not entirely express Aristotle's intent. This is indicated in part by his use of the particle ἢ at 1029b 29, which Apostle translates 'perhaps', and the strong ἕνα at 1030a 2, where Aristotle begins to express what is emphatically his final position. At the beginning of the argument he says,

The expression 'not per se' may be said in two ways, one being because of addition, the other not. Ross mistakenly assumes that τό δὲ οὐ means 'by omission'. Aristotle now gives two senses in which something can fail to be ἱκανόν by addition. The first is by the addition of the thing being defined to something else, e. g. if someone should offer 'white man' as a definition of white. The second is by the addition of something else to the thing itself, e. g. if 'cloak' is used to signify a white man, and cloak is defined as 'white'. It is the latter instance which is problematic. For it might be said that insofar as 'cloak' means 'white man' white does not add something else to 'cloak'. This, however, misses Aristotle's point, which is that 'white' insofar as it is
an addition to man fails to define the fundamental entity involved. But now it might be objected that, if cloak is not a fundamental entity, this has not been established by the argument so far. Even if it is admitted that, as Aristotle says, 'a white man is white indeed, but surely not what it was for him to be white', the relevance of this to the question whether a cloak is an entity καθ'αυτό is still in doubt.

This Aristotle knows, and responds accordingly:

But is a cloak's being a certain π.η.ε. generally speaking? Or, rather, is it not one? For the π.η.ε. is whatever is something. But whenever one thing is said of another, there is not whatever is a definite something (τόθε τι), For instance a white man is not whatever is a definite something, if indeed the definite (τόθε) belongs to substances alone. It is these remarks which apply to the sense in which something fails to be καθ'αυτό without addition. This interpretation is supported by what follows. Aristotle says, as a conclusion from the last sentence quoted, that the π.η.ε. will be among so many things of which the account is a definition (δριγμός). Aristotle places a lot of stress on the word δριγμός. To establish that something is a definition, it is insufficient that there be a name which signifies a certain account. In that case, as in the case of white man, all that would be needed to make any account a definition is a name for it. The Iliad, for instance, would be defined by the set of words which compose it. Thus, despite the fact that 'white' does not
fail by addition to define white man, a cloak fails to be per se, because its account is not of something primary (πρώτος τινός), i.e. something which is not 'one thing said of something else'.

What, then, is the sense of ἄρα which applies to an essence? Aristotle is explicit about this at 1030a 13, namely, essences will belong to those things 'which are not said according to participation and a quality, and are not said as an attribute'. Evident from this is that if the essence itself belonged to that of which it is the essence in such a way that the thing could be said to 'participate' in it, the whole point of talking about essences would be undermined. It follows, therefore, that the τί, i.e. is the being of something as the subject and the definite something which underlies all the other categories as their determinant. That is, the essence of something is ἄρα in the sense described in the Posterior Analytics (73b 7) as 'what is not predicated of a subject', i.e. as substance. As Aristotle says at 1037a 34 of the Metaphysics,

... the τί and each thing are in some cases the same, as indeed they are in the case of primary substances...and I mean by primary what is not spoken of as one thing being in another, that is, in a substratum as its matter.

It will be noticed, however, that Aristotle moves too quickly to this conclusion. For according to the criterion of definability, an essence will belong to no form or species which is not of a genus. But does not
this very criterion commit Aristotle to the very position he is striving to avoid? And this for two reasons: First, every definition comprises universal terms which, for this very reason, suffer from homonymy and indefiniteness; and (2) every definition is of a universal which is not, therefore, a definite thing or a subject. Though the former difficulty may be avoidable by claiming that the elements of a definition do not apply to the definiendum in a quality-like way, the latter difficulty cannot. For it would seem that universals are not subjects.

Aristotle was as thoroughly aware of this problem as any philosopher who ever came to test his own insight. Z, 13 is a paradigm of such self examination. Here Aristotle sets out the position which has been shown in this thesis to be his, namely that the π.γ.ε. is primary substance precisely insofar as it underlies qualities, not as a material substratum, but as a definite something (τόδε τι). But the role of the essence as the fundamental principle which gives significance to its universal predicates is challenged by the universals themselves. So formidable is this challenge that many commentators have, in one way or another, come to hold the view that there is fundamental inconsistency at the very heart of Aristotle's metaphysical thought.

The argument begins at 1038b 6 in which Aristotle entertains the claim of a universal as a candidate for substance on the grounds that it may be regarded as a cause and a principle. He immediately expresses what,
from his own point of view is an objection to this candidacy:

For it would seem impossible that anything said universally is substance. For in the first place the substance of each thing is peculiar to it, that which belongs to nothing else, but the universal is common. For the universal is said to be that which, by its very nature, belongs to many. Of what, then, will this be the substance? Either of all (sc. of those things of which it is the substance) or of none, but it cannot be the substance of them all, since if it is the substance of just one, the others will be this very thing. For things of which the substance is one and the essence is one, are themselves one thing. Moreover, substance is what is not said of a subject, but the universal is always said of some subject.\textsuperscript{32}

Aristotle's objections, then, to the claim that universals are substances is based on (1) the peculiarity of substance to the individual of which it is the substance and (2) the non-predicability of substances.

Here the problems begin. First of all, the two positions enunciated seem to be incompatible. For the latter criterion seems to imply that an essence cannot belong to that of which it is the essence in the way that 'animal', for instance, belongs both in man and horse. But this must be accounted for in some way, presumably through the causality of universals. Further, it makes no difference if Aristotle's position does not apply to everything which is in a substance so that, e.g., terms like 'animal' may be eliminated. For in any case the essence will be the
essence of something, so that man, say, will be the essence of the man in which it belongs. "For it will be the substance of that in which form it peculiarly belongs." Thus, it is objected that the sheer relation of 'belonging' which Aristotle has attributed to essences, violates the criterion that a substance is not predicated. This has been offered as an interpretation of lines 16-23. A second objection begins at l. 23.

Here Aristotle says the following in objection to his own position:

Moreover, it is both impossible and absurd to suppose that the this and substance, if they are composed of certain things, would be composed neither from substances nor from a definite something, but from quality.

For, from this it would result that quality is prior to substance and the definite something. But this contradicts one of Aristotle's most firmly espoused doctrines, namely, that qualities are not prior to substance 'in time, thought, or genesis'. This is an extremely subtle attack on Aristotle's position and one which, like the first, uses Aristotle's own doctrines against themselves. The argument goes something like this. Aristotle has himself, as a fundamental tenet of his thought, distinguished radically between kinds and qualities. It is only terms expressing kinds which truly say what something is. But if even these terms, in virtue of being universal predicates, do not represent substantial
entities, then there is no ground for the distinction between substance and quality. Since there is, then, nothing to underlie the qualities, they are 'separable' and therefore prior to substances.

That this is an attack on Aristotle's position is clear from the fact that Aristotle, later in Chapter 13 and at the end of Chapter 16, holds to the view that substances are not composed of substances. The significance of this doctrine has been discussed in Part I and may be expressed now in slightly different terms by saying that nothing which comprises a substance is said ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῷ in the sense in which that term applies to substances. Though there are parts of substances which belong to them ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν, this expresses the fact that their account is dependent upon that of the substance to which they belong. They are, in this respect, like qualities. Whatever explanatory value the components of substances have, they have this in virtue of the substance they compose. In this respect they are, as has been said, potentialities. As Aristotle says in his own voice:

If a substance is one thing, it will not be composed of substances belonging to it and in this respect what Democritus says is right. For he says that the number one cannot come-to-be from two, nor two from one.

Before pursuing this further, there is one more objection to be considered as well as the ultimate difficulty with which Chapter 13 concludes. The third and final
objection in the series beginning at 1. 16 is found at 1. 29: "Substance will belong to Socrates, so that substance will exist in two ways." Possibly the primary force of this objection is that if substance is a subject but also belongs to something (both claims having been made by Aristotle), then substance has two aspects, i.e. as predicate and as subject. The objection may also be that if a substance belongs to Socrates, then both Socrates and the substance which belongs to him are substances. The former reading has the advantage of attributing to Aristotle the very fault which he ascribes to the platonists at 1040b 27:

Those who speak of the Forms speak rightly in claiming that they are separable, if indeed they are substances, but not rightly in claiming that there is one Form over many.

The disadvantage of this interpretation is the particular reference to Socrates. It may be that Aristotle has more in mind the nature of the relation between a particular soul and a particular man. If a particular essence belongs to a particular thing in the manner of 'one thing in another' this would be as devastating an admission on Aristotle's part as the admission that universals are substances. Notably, it is tantamount to the claim that both Socrates, the composite of body and soul, and Socrates, the soul, are substances in the full sense. In this respect this objection should be regarded as a genuine criticism of a view which Aristotle
often seems to express, as was shown in Part I.

Before moving on to the final difficulty raised by Aristotle against his own doctrines at the end of Chapter 13, it is important to examine what, according to the interpretation here presented, is his response to these objections. This is especially important because it is precisely this response which gives rise to the ultimate difficulty. The response begins at 1038b 30:

On the whole (ὅλως) it follows that, if a man and so many things as are spoken of in this way are substances, then none of the things found in their account is the substance of anything, whether they exist (ὑπάρχειν) separately from them or are in something else. And I mean as an example that the sort of 'animal' that is apart from certain instances is not (sc. a substance), and that anything else found in their accounts is in no way (sc. a substance). From this viewpoint it is clear that nothing among the things predicated in common is a definite something (τóδε τι), but a such (τοιόνδε).

If this were not the case, the third man and many other absurdities would follow. Moreover, this also is clear, that it is indeed impossible that a substance should be composed of substances belonging within them in actuality.34

One way of understanding these remarks is to hold that Aristotle preserves as substance-terms only the species, viz. man, but that he rejects as substance anything found in the definition of the species. If this is the case, then it follows that species are not predicated universally of individuals. That is, such terms, though surely predicated of many, are not predicated in a universal
mode, i.e., in such a way as to ascribe common properties to the individuals falling under the species-term. Woods goes so far as to claim that the statement 'Socrates is a man' is an identity statement. The difficulty which follows from this, namely it seems to entail that Socrates and Kallias are the same man, is handled by pointing to such statements as 'The same word occurs three times on one page'. It is this kind of model which Modrak has in view when he speaks of the relation between 'types' and 'tokens' as illustrative of the mode in which a kind is predicated of something. That Aristotle distinguished between the predication of kinds and the predication of qualities seems beyond dispute. What is at issue is whether Aristotle appeals to this distinction in order to resolve the problems which arise in Z, 13. Some help may be gained by viewing the dilemma which follows from the response quoted.

At 1039a 14 Aristotle says:

The result involves a difficulty. For if it is impossible that a substance is composed of things universal because they signify a such but not a definite thing, and if it is impossible that any substance be a combination composed of substances existing in actuality, every substance would be non-synthetic, so that there would be an account of no substance. But it seems to everyone and was said long ago that either definition is of substance alone or especially of substance.

The problem seems no less severe than this. How can it be maintained that what cannot be defined is the most
definite thing there is? If the terms used to define
definite things refer either to universals or to elements
held in common by the definitiendum, i.e. if it is possible
only to say and think things about subjects, then the
essences of things will remain logically inaccessible to
speech and to thought. In this case it makes no difference
whether the essence is a species or an individual. For
neither the mind nor speech has direct contact with
what is, i.e. the subjects of discourse. Though the
platonist may claim that only the Forms are accessible
in this way, the instant an attempt is made to use a
Form as a predicate of something else, logical difficulties
arise. If the ultimate realities are the atoms of
Democritus, then the instant they are used to explain
something else, their own claim to be real in the fundamental
sense is violated.

Does Aristotle have a solution to this problem?
The claim at the end of Z, 13 is frustratingly Aristotelian,
viz.:

Therefore there will be definition of nothing. Or
rather, this will be the case in one way, but in
another it will not. What this means will be more
clear from what follows.

Ross refers to Z, 15 and H, 6 and then remarks, "Aristotle
is not very successful in solving the problem." But in
fact the solution, however successful, has already been
offered in Z, 13. Woods notices this but is unable to
make anything of it. Woods says, "Aristotle's own solution,
which is admittedly not easy to understand, is to invoke the notion of potentiality." Since Woods refers to this solution nowhere else in his article, one wonders to what extent the solution he offers is meant to be Aristotle's. Aristotle's position is that the components of a substance, whether these be the material elements of Democritus or the universals of Plato, are substances only potentially. For if their reality is complete, that is, if they exist in actuality, there will be no resolution of the difficulty posed by Aristotle. That is, 'a man and so many things as are spoken of in this way' will not be substances at all. This would be a strict and unavoidable logical consequence of the claim that anything in the account of a substance is itself a substance, whether these are elements capable of separate existence or not. But it is not implied that the elements in the account of a substance have no existence whatsoever. Their existence is as a potency, which is, according to the argument of Part I, a genuine mode of existence and not to be confused with a disposition toward a future fulfilment. Insofar as an essence may be said to belong to something, it belongs in the way that an actuality belongs to a potentiality, i.e. not as an attribute of it but as the possessor of the attributes, as the subject of potentialities, as what is said \( \text{περίπλοκος} \).

Before attempting to draw these threads more firmly together, it will be worth following Ross' references to Z, 15 and H, 6. Ross is surely right that no solution to the problem of definition is found in Z, 15. What
goes on in Z, 15 is an exacerbation of the problem. The thrust of the chapter is that it is impossible to define particulars and that, therefore, there is no demonstration concerning them. Part of the argument depends upon the destructibility of sensible particulars, i.e., the fact that 'they have matter of which the nature is such that it is possible to be and not be'. Aristotle says:

If then demonstration is of the necessary and definition is productive of knowledge in this sense, and it is not possible that knowledge be knowledge at one time but ignorance at another, such a thing being opinion, and in this way neither can demonstration or definition, but opinion is of what is capable of being otherwise, it is clear that there is neither demonstration nor definition of them (sensible particulars).

Nor, according to the argument of the chapter, will the abiding presence of a particular nullify the force of the argument. For if the sun, say, is eternal and was defined as 'going around the earth' or 'hiding at night', it would not cease to be the sun if it ceased to do these things 'for the sun is a certain substance'. Further, no definition can be framed in such a way as to apply only to a single individual, e.g. the sun, or Kleon, or Socrates, because something else may always come along having the same characteristics.

Several points about this chapter are worthy of notice. First, the argument hinges on the premise that
there are two kinds of substance, viz. \( \lambda \delta \gamma Os \) combined with matter, or the \( \sigma \omega \nu o \nu o \gamma \) and \( \lambda \delta \gamma Os \) simpliciter (\( \varepsilon \rho \iota \nu \lambda \omega \sigma \)).

Second, it is assumed that all generable and destructible substances are 'combination' substances. Third, it is assumed that knowledge and ignorance are incompatible even when separated in time. Fourth, definition is regarded as the fundamental producer of knowledge, rather than, say, the individual essence of a house whose existence is nevertheless affirmed. Finally, the argument is directed primarily against the theory of Ideas.

Of these premises it has already been shown that Aristotle would either have denied the first three or, at least, cherished grave doubts about them. In Chapter 6 of Part I it was shown that the possibility of separable generable forms, i. e. forms which are not adequately described as 'one thing in another' or \( \lambda \delta \gamma Os \) in matter is seriously considered by Aristotle on several occasions. And this consideration was shown to occur precisely in the light of the inadequacy of the description of substances as a \( \lambda \delta \gamma Os \) in a material substratum, i. e. as one nature in another. Further, the view that knowledge and ignorance are incompatible even when separated in time is a position Aristotle is unlikely to have held. That he could not have held it is shown by the fact that he regarded even simultaneous knowledge and ignorance of the same object as possible, this in the sense that potential and actual knowledge have the same content. More will be said about this.
Finally, does Aristotle regard the definition of something as the ultimate ground of human knowledge? Here the question itself is too ambiguous to give a very definite answer. Surely it would be wrong to deny that the proper formulation of definitions was a primary concern for Aristotle or that apodeictic knowledge, i.e. of demonstrable and universal truths, depends upon definition. But the fact that definitions are composed of universals constitutes a challenge to their primacy. For universals gain a definite significance only in relation to subjects which are, on this account, primary. These considerations lead me to the view that Z, 15 was not intended by Aristotle to solve the problem with which Z, 13 ends.  

H, 6 is more auspicious. But though the unity of substances is here shown to be properly conceived through the notions of potentiality and actuality, the relevance of this viewpoint to the problem of defining them is left unclear. About definition Aristotle says the following things. First, the unity of a definition is not constituted by the way in which it is put together, but by its being of one thing. This, of course, is not to deny that definitions must be constructed according to certain principles, but only that their unity, even when properly so constructed, depends upon the thing defined. Secondly, Aristotle claims that the unity of a substance cannot be accounted for by its participation in the elements of a definition. From these arguments it would seem to follow
that the difficulty with which Z, 13 concludes results from the expectation that a definition can perform an intellectual function which it cannot and is not even intended to perform, i.e. explain the definiteness of the thing defined. In terms of the argument of this thesis, this false expectation amounts to a confusion between the \( \tau \epsilon \delta \epsilon o\tau e \) and the \( \pi \eta \epsilon . \), i.e. between what something is and what is. The view that to ask the essence-question is to seek a definition is a red herring.

In the Introduction to Part II a passage from M, 10 is quoted in which Aristotle says that if the principles of things must be universal, it follows that nothing will be separable and there will be no substance. Aristotle claims further that potential knowledge is like matter in that it is universal and indefinite, its objects being universal and indefinite as well. Actual knowledge, on the other hand, is itself determined and a tode ti, the same being true of its objects. Indeed, Aristotle goes so far as to say that the study of universals is incidental to the study of particulars. Returning to Z, 4, it is found that it is precisely this sort of consideration, i.e. the change or transformation (\( \tau \delta \) menp\( \iota \epsilon \nu e \mu e \)) of knowledge which introduces the candidacy of the \( \pi \eta \epsilon . \) as substance. In fact the passage to which I refer (1029b 3-12) is found in all manuscripts to follow the introduction of the essence as a candidate for substance. Though the editors are right that the passage cannot fit grammatically as it is placed in Z, 4, the
probability that it was intended as an introduction to
the topic is extremely high.

Assuming, then, that the passage is properly located
at the end of 2, 3, the following fact is extremely
illuminating. It is precisely the study of the third
type of substance, viz. the combination of matter and
form, the kind which Aristotle claims is 'most problematic',
that introduces the notion of the transformation of
knowledge from what is less knowable by nature, but more
knowable to us, to what is more knowable by nature.
But it was shown in Part I that to conceive sensible
substances as a combination of matter and form is to
conceive them in a universal mode. In terms of the analysis
of the essence-formula given in Part II, it becomes
possible to state more precisely what is wrong with this
view.

The problem is this. A sensible particular regarded
as the subject of universal predicates cannot be viewed as
'one thing in another'. This is clearly true of accidental
predicates. If, for example, it is claimed that white
men burn easily in the sun, 'white man' is the subject
of the claim in a merely grammatical sense. I.e. it is
men who burn easily when they happen to be white. This
can be stated by direct appeal to the essence formula, i.e.
'A white man and a man's being white are two different
things'. One may also say that that a man's being is not
his being white or even that a white man's being is not
his being white. Furthermore, it is because of a man's
essence, i.e. his being as a subject, that whiteness may count as a significant characteristic of a man. It is not, that is, the mere presence of a characteristic that makes it count.

The same argument may be applied to every universal when predicated in a universal mode. For the presence even of essential characteristics in a subject is not the subject. I mean, for instance, that a man's being a rational animal is not the subject of qualities. And further the significance of both the genus and the differentia is determined with reference to men. This is not to say, of course, that such terms as 'animal' and 'rational' are not vastly different in kind from accidental predicates. The claim is that the analysis of such terms cannot be carried out save by reference to the subjects to which they belong.

Finally, it cannot be the presence of a form in matter which is the subject of universal predicates. From this it does not follow that material objects are not subjects in the required sense, but that the analysis of sensible substances as 'combinations' of matter and form, i.e. as the presence of one nature in another, does not furnish an adequate notion of sensible substances as subjects. It is the man, body and soul, which is the subject of qualities as their possessor. Insofar as such a claim indicates a 'relation' between body and soul, this 'relation' is analyzed as that between potency and actuality conceived contemporaneously. The actuality of a particular sort
of body is the subject of universal predicates insofar as it is with reference to this that their significance is determined. For this reason whatever can be said to compose a substance is not a substance, whether the components be properties and attributes or materials. The actuality is not a property or attribute of a potentiality any more than the art of housebuilding is a property of the capacity to build houses.

The essence-question arises because, though we know things about sensible objects, they are not known very clearly. It arises not primarily to discover new facts, but in order to make 'from things more known to someone things known by nature known to him'. The major thrust of Aristotle's argument against platonism and materialism is that both perceive the advance to greater knowledge in terms of the analysis of things said about others without reference to the things about which they are said. Aristotle's view is that it is through knowledge of the things about which universals are predicated that the knowledge, even of universals, becomes definite. For this reason the essence-question arises primarily in the context of categorial inquiry and is treated as a form of the question 'why'. Τὸ ἅπαξ ἐπιτὸς is with respect to sensible substances the expression of ἕν ήπ' or 'what is as being' from the categorial point of view.
Chapter 3

Are individual substances identical with their essences?

In *Met.*, Z, 6 Aristotle argues strenuously for the view that 'in the case of primary things and things said ἕνεκεν to each thing is one and the same as its essence'. He argues that only those things which are not said of something else are identical with their essences and rather strongly suggests that this is only true of subjects. From previous argument it is clear that by 'subject' Aristotle cannot mean the material substratum which is known only in a universal mode and not ἔνεκεν. At the end of the chapter Aristotle makes the following claim:

The sophistical arguments concerning this position, i.e. whether Socrates and Socrates' being are the same, are clearly resolved by the same analysis. For there is no difference either in the point of view from which someone asks the question or in the point of view from which one approaches its resolution. This passage is a clear indication that in some way or other Aristotle regards Socrates as identical with his essence. That sense is made clear elsewhere: Socrates is identical with his essence in the sense in which Socrates is his soul. As a combination of soul and body he is not identical with his essence.
It has been shown by the argument so far that a subject is conceived inadequately as the presence of one thing in another, e.g. as soul in body. Only insofar as it is possible to conceive a substance as a fundamental unity is it a subject in the fullest sense and a definite thing. But the following problem arises. Though it has been established that the conception of substances as 'combinations' is a problematic mode of conceiving them, Aristotle never abandons the three-fold classification of substances, viz. as matter, as form, and as the combination.

It has been established that the unity of matter and form is understood by Aristotle through the notions of actuality and potentiality. Why does Aristotle continue to refer to individual substances as combinations of form and matter in those very contexts in which, according to my argument, the possibility of separable form is considered in the light of the difficulties stemming from the third class of substances? In this chapter I will speculate about a possible answer to this question.

In order to outline the position I will return to Book II, Chapter 1 of *De Anima*. At 412a 15 Aristotle says:

> ... every natural body having a share of life would be a substance, but a substance as a combination (συνθένη). Since it is indeed such a body, for it possesses life, the soul would not be a body. For the body is not among things predicatable of a subject but exists rather as the subject and as material.

This passage seems to argue that the soul is not a body because it, unlike the body, is predicatable of a subject,
namely the body to which it belongs. From this Aristotle concludes that the soul is a substance, but as the form of a certain kind of body, i.e. an organic body which has life potentially. The connection of the two views would seem to lead inevitably to the conclusion that to be 'substance as form' is to be a predicate of some sort. To this view, however, an Aristotelian should protest immediately: "To be a predicate is not to be a substance." No one is more familiar with this objection than Aristotle. It is as if in response to the protest that he asserts at 412a 20 that substance is actuality (ἐντελέχεια). As was shown earlier in this thesis, it is in view of the analysis of form and matter as actuality and potentiality that, according to Aristotle, the issue of the unity of soul and body is laid to rest. But can the problem be resolved with such glib facility?

A closer look at the passage suggests that Aristotle is only sketching his position. First, the definition of soul given at 412b 4 is prefaced by a conditional antecedent. Aristotle says:

*If it is required that we ascribe something common to every soul, it would be that it is the first actuality of a natural organic body.* (my emphasis)

Secondly, as my emphasis is meant to bring out, what is common to every soul, if one is required to speak in that way, is actuality of one sort only. Third, Aristotle's statement at 412b 6 is very rough indeed. He says:
On this account it is unnecessary to seek whether the soul and the body are one thing, just as it is unnecessary in the case of wax and an impression (σχήμα), nor whether the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one thing. The roughness to which I refer is indicated by Aristotle's use of wax and shape as an example. For shape is surely a universal predicate of wax. Though this objection is obviated to some degree by the consideration that Aristotle probably has in mind a wax tablet whose purpose is realized by the impression made in it, it is extremely unlikely that Aristotle is very serious about the precision of the analogy. Finally, the question of separable soul intrudes surprisingly at the end of the chapter. At 413a 3 Aristotle says:

That the soul is not separable from the body, or some part of it, if it is divisible into parts, is quite clear. For in some cases soul is the actuality of these very parts. But nothing prevents some parts from being separable because they are the actuality of no body.

I suggest that all these 'deficiencies' are intentional and of a piece. First, what is ascribed in common to every soul is in terms of the argument of this thesis a potential ascription corresponding to a potential condition in the thing described. Indeed, the level of actuality which Aristotle calls 'first' in the passage under consideration is itself a potentiality. It is compared to the possession of knowledge and being asleep rather than to the exercise of knowledge and being awake.
Secondly, the neglect, except in its mere mention, of the second sort of actuality becomes conspicuous just prior to the introduction of the question of the soul's separability. At 412b 27 Aristotle says:

As the acts of cutting and seeing (ἡ δύτεις καὶ ἡ ὅρωσις), so also is being awake actuality, while the soul is like sight and the power of an instrument. The body is what is potentially. But just as an eye is a pupil and sight (ὁφταλμός) so also is an animal soul and body.

What, then, corresponds to the actuality of an animal? So far an animal is defined as the combination of two potentialities, soul and body. But this is a universal mode of description which appropriately represents the beginning of a study and not actual understanding. It is, as Aristotle says at 413a 9, a sketch or a drawing in outline.

Given this it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of the relevance of the question about the soul's separability. For the description of the soul as given represents it as a conglomeration of faculties tied to the presence of particular organs. The problem with this view is that the exercise of the faculties belongs, not to the organ, but to the substance as a whole. It is animals who see. Neither the eye nor the power of sight sees in the full sense of the term. Seeing is an act of the animal as a whole which, in terms of the argument as presented, may be regarded as the actuality of no body. "If the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul." But the eye is not an animal. Nor indeed is it the possessor of sight.
What kind of actuality, then, is the possessor of sight? If my speculations are correct Aristotle suggests his answer to this question at the end of the chapter:

Moreover it is unclear if the soul is the actuality of a body in the way that a pilot is the actuality of a ship.

About this passage Hamlyn remarks as follows:

The remark about the possible analogy between the soul and a sailor in a ship (with which cf. Descartes, Meditation VI) is also puzzling, since the argument up to this point has tended completely in the opposite direction. It can be set down only as a lecturer's aside.  

Probably Hamlyn has in mind the sort of separability which a sailor has from his ship. But a much more probable reading is that Aristotle is here introducing the notion of actuality in the sense of a director or efficient cause. This view is argued by H. J. Easterling, who says,

... in this sentence Aristotle is not introducing an alternative to the doctrine. Rather he is suggesting that this doctrine does not entail the rejection of the familiar idea of the as the controlling element and efficient cause, but that the latter can be re-interpreted in terms of the doctrine.  

In Chapter 6, Part I of this thesis it was argued in some detail that the unification of formal and efficient causality was central to Aristotle's position that form or substance is the cause of its matter. But it was argued further that the concrescence of these sorts
of causality cannot be adequately conceived as the presence of a controlling element in a material substratum. In Met., \( \theta \), 1049b 10 Aristotle says, as will be recalled from previous argument, that actuality is prior to every sort of principle of movement including 'nature' regarded as a principle of movement 'in itself as itself'. The similarity between this language and that of Aristotle's statement in De Anima, 412b 16 is striking. There the soul is described as the essence and the \( \lambda \beta \gamma \alpha \zeta \) of 'a natural body having a principle of motion and rest within it'. The combination of these passages makes it plausible that, while the analogy of a pilot in a ship is itself imprecise, Aristotle is nevertheless suggesting that the notion of actuality can be understood in such a way as to include or accommodate the self-directing aspect of natural substances. The presence of a principle of movement within a body, from the viewpoint of actuality in this sense, would be a potentiality analogous to the possession rather than the exercise of knowledge, to being asleep rather than being awake.

Why is the notion of actuality as the exercise of the natural principle of motion within a body insufficient to comprehend Aristotle's concept of the soul? There is a straightforward answer to this question. The actuality of a principle of motion as such is motion. But actuality in this sense, as Aristotle clearly asserts in the Physics and states explicitly in Met. \( \theta \), 1048b 29 is
incomplete. It will also be observed that 'actuality of the potential as such' has, for Aristotle, the explicit force of excluding material as such from the definition of motion. As Aristotle says in the *Physics*, 200b 30:

Bronze is a statue potentially, but nevertheless movement is not the actuality of bronze, as bronze. That is, the actuality of bronze as bronze is expressed in its composition of a substance. It would seem to follow that the actuality of a natural body qua containing a principle of motion is inadequate even as an account of the material of a natural substance.

These arguments lead to the conclusion that an important part of *De Anima* II, 1 is sketchy because the notion of actuality, though forcefully employed in the chapter, is insufficiently developed. The problems raised at the end of the chapter, i.e. whether there is an actuality of no body and thereby a viable notion of separate form for natural beings, and whether the soul is an actuality in the sense of an efficient cause, reflect this insufficiency. It is also fairly clear which sense of actuality remains undeveloped, namely actuality as the exercise rather than the possession of knowledge. But as was argued in Part I of this thesis it is this neglected sense, of which neglect Aristotle continually reminds his reader, in terms of which materials and material processes are drawn into the form, obviating the distinction between matter and form.
The dilemma with which this chapter began concerned the fact that Aristotle retains as a kind of substance the combination of matter and form despite the fact that his arguments tend to show the inadequacy of this notion of substance. For if individual substances are identical with their essences, while combinations of form and matter are not, then individuals should not be conceived as such combinations. I propose the following solution: The right question is not whether individuals are identical with their essences but when. I mean that it may be only at certain times and in certain activities that individuals are subjects, in the full sense, of their materials, properties, movements and acts. Most of the time individual substances (except for eternal ones) are composite, i. e. this in that. When their state of being is such they are inadequately understood, not because of a failure on the part of the mind, but because they can be known in such a state only in a universal mode, i. e. because the object of knowledge is not ἐν τηλεκευτι, 'in possession of its end'. It is also possible that in the case of some kinds of individual, e. g. artificial substances, they are never subjects in the full sense of the term.

Whether plants, animals, and men ever exist in a state of complete actuality is a hard question. Because Aristotle himself never answers the question whether separable generable forms can exist, but only asks it in pointed contexts, it is not entirely clear.
what his answer to this question would be. That men, at least, and probably other natural substances as well, are more coherent and less 'composite' when they are at work in some ways rather than others seems both true and Aristotelian. In Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle praises the contemplative life exactly in proportion to the extent that it differs from 'composite' existence. He says at 1177b 27:

\[
\text{By so much as this (sc. contemplative life) differs from the composite (συνθέτων), by so much also does the activity (ἐρετική) differ from the activity corresponding to the other virtues.}
\]

But Aristotle is not at all certain that, in this respect, contemplation is properly regarded as a human virtue. He suggests that such activity may be regarded as that of a god belonging within a man. Though he also says at 1178a 2 that each may be this part of him insofar as it is more authoritative (τὸ κύριον) and better, this passage is difficult to reconcile with the strain of Aristotle's thought I have attempted to develop in this thesis. It supports my position only in making it clear that Aristotle sought a notion of self beyond that of a composite of matter and form. In this respect it may be said that I have expressed the philosophical demands placed by Aristotle upon the notion of essence and substance better than their fulfilment.

Contemplation, as understood by Aristotle in *N. E.*, 10, suggests transcendence of material and individual existence rather than its transformation. It represents
an independence from the connections of one human being with another and from virtues of character in general, just as it represents independence from or transcendence of material existence. It is not, as described, the sort of actuality which draws or transforms matter into form. It is analogous to this sort of actuality only insofar as it stands in contrast to 'composite' existence. But a philosopher's praise of the contemplative life before auditors whose relation to it is in doubt should probably be regarded with some suspicion.

I therefore propose another solution to the question when individuals are identical with their essences, viz. when, in Aristotle's sense of the term, they are happy. It is important, of course, that Aristotle's view of 'happiness' is distinctive. Happiness is not, for Aristotle, a state of mind, a result of activity, a quality or a process, but the very activity of a certain kind of life. The activity of ἵστομαι is neither so paltry as to exclude from the life of the happy man pain and misfortune, nor so exalted as to be able to survive any pain or misfortune. The activity is neither a ἔξω, nor a motion but the exercise of a completed life. In this sense happiness may be said to correspond to being awake or the exercise of knowledge in the analogy to being asleep or mere possession of knowledge.

The exploration of Aristotle's notion of happiness is beyond the scope of this thesis. I wish only to suggest its relevance to the question of individual
essences in the light of the extremely general remarks made in the last paragraph, and the following rather general claim: Of all the things which might be said about a man, the claim that he is happy is as close to a unique qualification as one could find. I mean that we are less tempted to regard happiness as a universal predicate than, perhaps, any other predicate. Conceived as an actuality, it would not be a universal predicate at all, but the exercise of a man's being and in no sense an attribute of his being. An essence, as will be recalled, belongs to its subject uniquely, i.e. in a sense comparable to that in which Kallias is Kallias. Further, it expresses the being of something as the subject of its qualities, i.e. as the principle determining their significance but as a principle which is inadequately conceived as belonging within the subject as an element. I suggest that Aristotle's thoughts about 'happiness' and the good for man may be profitably viewed in their relation to his thoughts about essences. In particular I am struck by the possibility that the desire to know oneself and the desire for happiness as the particular exercise of one's being may be, for Aristotle, identical.
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FOOTNOTES

General Introduction

7. Met., 5.
9. P. A., 639b 25
10. Ibid, 642a 33. Such necessity may be suggested here.
12. Physics, 200a 19.
Introduction to Part I

1. Summa Theologica, Question 2, Article 3.
2. E. g. De Anima, 417b 8.
3. De Anima, 412b 17
7. Met., 1040b 5-8.
8. E. g., at 412a 16-22 in De Anima.
10. Met., 1040b 9. See also, 1041b 12, 1044a 4, 1045a 9, 1084b 22.
11. Met., 1049b 1; and cf. also 1007b 29, 1037a 27.
13. E. g. Met., 1070b 33, 1032b 13, 1034a 24, 1075b 7.

Chapter 1

3. Gen. et Corr., 319b 25-31, 319b5ff.; Physics, 190a 9-13, 17-28, 31-b 1, though the account in the Physics involves a restricted use of the term 'alteration' cf. 190b 8. For γένεσις ἁλη, see, e.g., Met., 1069b 10, 1088a 33.
Chapter 1 (cont.)

4. Though Aristotle may be understood to express doubts, on a number of occasions, that the products of art are genuine substances insofar as their forms are inseparable (e.g., Met., 1033b 20, 1043b 21, 1060b 27, 1070a 15), he constantly uses artificial products to illustrate the relations of matter and form, and to illustrate the distinction between genesis and alteration. E.g., 1033a 13-22, 1041b 16, 1041b 4, 1043a 7-20, 1043b 4; Physics, 246a 4, etc..

5. Physics, H, 3.

6. Met., 1033a 16-23. For various senses of 'from' cf. G. A., 724a 20ff. For δύναμις see Physics, 190b 10-17 and Met., 1032b 4, 1069b 4.


8. Physics, 194b 24, 195a 19.

9. Physics, 190a 24, 190a 28, 190a 31-33, Gen. et Corr., 319b 25.


11. Physics, 190a 24.


14. The only examples I can find are rather elliptical, e.g. Met., 1041a 26, 1032b 32.


Chapter 2


2. Ibid, p. 125.

Chapter 2 (cont.)

4. E. g. Gen. et Corr., 317b 23, Physics, 191b 28, 
   Met., 1069b 15, 1089a 28.

5. Physics, 201a 11.
8. Met., 1048b 37.

9. Though Aristotle did not in fact believe that the 
sperm is 'matter' for an organism, he adopts this 
posture in the present passage. However, cf. G. A., 
724a 20ff.

10. Met., 1046b 30-36.
11. 1046b 36-47a 4.

Chapter 3

1. Originally published in The Concept of Matter in 
Greek and Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame 1963), 
but reprinted in Moravcsik, ed., Aristotle, a 

2. I am in general agreement with William Charlton 
that the notion of prime matter is an import from 
medieval philosophy (see his appendix, "Did Aristotle 
Believe in Prime Matter?", in Aristotle's Physics, 
Books I and II (Oxford, 1970)). Some of Robinson's 
criticisms of Charlton are dealt with in passing 
in my treatment of the argument from Z, 3 in this 
chapter. Other objections are addressed in chapters 
4 and 5. See Robinson's "Prime Matter in Aristotle", 
Phronesis, V. XIX, 1974. Other important articles 
on the subject are H. R. King's "Aristotle without
Chapter 3 (cont.)


3. Ibid, Charlton and Robinson.

4. 1029a 7.

5. 1029a 24.

6. 1029a 11-12.


8. 1029a 12-16.

9. Cf. 1049a 27-34 for a similar distinction.


11. 1038b 15-18.

12. 1038b 35-36.

13. 1039a 14-19.

14. 1041a 3-5.

15. E. g. 1029a 1-2, 13-16 which, allowing Jaeger's removal of the apparently intrusive lines 3-13, is a continuous passage. Aristotle in a number
of passages either connects intimately or positively identifies the substance and the essence, e. g., 1031a 18, 1032b 2, 1032b 14, 1035b 14, 1017b 21, 1007a 21. The interpretative error of treating Aristotelian essences as a special sort of attribute or quality-like entity may be seen to infect Ross' translation of, e. g., 1007a 21-22. The Greek is

εὐλογία καὶ συμβεβηκέναι φάσκειν αὐτοῖς,
καὶ τὸ ὅπερ ἀναρίθμηται εἶναι η ἓ σῶμα εἶναι μὴ ἐτελεῖ.

Ross translates:

"For they must say that all attributes are accidents and there is no such thing as 'being essentially a man' or 'an animal'."

This translation pointedly suggests that Aristotle here means to criticize his opponents for the failure to distinguish from among attributes essences from other sorts. Strictly, however, Aristotle is accusing his opponents of treating all things as attributes, while failing to recognize essences at all. Thus, Aristotle says, starting at 1007a 20, "In general those who say this do away with substance and essence. For it is necessary for them to say that all things are attributed (συμβεβηκέναι) and that whatever it is for a man to be or for an animal to be does not exist." The effect of this sort of misinterpretation has consequences even more devastating to the understanding of the middle books of the Metaphysics, as will be shown later.

17. 1030a 13-14.
17a. 1031a 19. Cf. 1030a 3-5.
17b. 1031a 28.
18. 412a 8.
Chapter 3 (cont.)

19a. The Platonists.

20. Or, "... the substance is what those who ignore the matter say." I prefer the other translation because it seems that Aristotle is talking about those who investigate the elements of things. Here he is saying that a man is what they say when they are not talking about composing materials or, e. g., the letters which form a syllable. Cf. 1041b 11ff.


22. 1043a 12, cf. 1044b 2.

23. 1040b 5.


25. Here my translation of τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάρεγγυς differs from Ross'. Though it is not crucial to my interpretation, the bodily parts I think Aristotle has in mind by 'parts closely related to soul' are the κορδία ἡ ἐγκεφάλος mentioned at 1035b 25-27. In this passage David Wiggins sees a suggestion of brain/soul or heart/soul identity theory in Aristotle. See his *Identity and Spatio-temporal Continuity* (New Jersey 1971).

26. 1041a 3.

27. 1040b 27.

28. 1035b 27ff.

29. 1039a 3.

30. 1039a 7.

31. P. 185, note 85.


34. Four kinds are listed in Chapter VIII of the *Categories*. 
Chapter 4

1. Relevant and helpful remarks on this passage are found in Ross' note on 1029a 2, Vol. II of his commentary, p. 164.

2. The passage continues as follows: τρίτον δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ὃ ἡ γένεσις μόνως καὶ διάφορα ἐστὶ, καὶ χαριστὸν ἀπειλᾶς. It is notable that the Greek makes it less clear whether the compound is to be considered as a substratum than whether the form is so considered. Conspicuously, the claim is not made that the compound of matter and essence is a tode ti. Possibly, Aristotle regarded this as too obvious to be worth stating since the compound is χαριστὸν ἀπειλᾶς.

3. Physics, 194b 9. The following passages from the Metaphysics are probably relevant: 1042b 6, 1069b 26, 1042a 32-b 1, 1044b 7, 1050b 22.

4. Cf. also Physics, 193a 29.

5. Aristotle does not use the term 'paronymous' in this passage. He uses παρώνιμον in making a similar observation at 245b 11-12 of the Physics, and παρώνιμος in the Metaphysics, 1033a 16ff. For a definition of παρώνιμος, see Categories, 1a 12. An interesting use occurs at Physics, 207b 9, not involving a verbal change.

6. There is a textual question whether Aristotle wrote at 1049a 27 that first matter (in this case 'fire') was or was not a tode ti. If, however, the passage is meant as a parody of the materialist search for the ultimate reality, it is entirely possible that Aristotle did not include the negative. Perhaps Jaeger failed to get the joke. Another passage doubted by editors in which Aristotle seems to call matter a tode ti is Met., 1070a 10. There Aristotle adds that "... whatever is characterized by contact and not by organic nature is matter and substratum." This sounds like a hedge against a materialist claim that matter is a tode ti.
7. Here I am following the Apelt, Ross emendation which reads τὸ καθόδου at 1049a 28 instead of the manuscripts' reading of τὸ καθόδου. There is, however, in the light of my argument, some plausibility to the view that Aristotle wrote τὸ καθόδου and that he wished to distinguish what, like qualities, is predicated in the universal mode from the τοῦ τί which is the subject of qualification. Ross mentions that it is rare for Aristotle to connect two terms by καί when he wishes to distinguish them. However, he himself provides two examples: An. Pr. 57a 33 and An. Post. 77a 14. Further, the emendation does not remove this ambiguity. Aristotle may still be distinguishing τὸ καθόδου from τὸ ἐποκείμενον, that is, the subject of properties (τὸ καθόδου) from the material substratum (τὸ ἐποκείμενον). Compare Modrak's argument with reference to καθ' ἐποκείμενον at 1038b 15: "Since Aristotle allows matter to be the substratum of substance, the import of the phrase kath' hupokeimenon here must be 'of the substratum of properties.'" "Forms, Types and Tokens in Aristotle's Metaphysics", JHPh, XVII, 1979, p. 373.

8. Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield 1967), p 146.


10. Cf. De Anima, 408b 11-15, where Aristotle argues not only that souls do not get angry but that it is not even right to say that they think. Rather, it is a man who thinks.

11. Ross helpfully observes (Metaphysics, Vol. II, p. 257) that Aristotle could hardly have believed that the word λευκόν was derived from the word λευκώτυς. It is a difference in roles rather than a difference in spelling that Aristotle is interested in. This observation may have important consequences with reference to Chapter I of the Categories. For
Chapter 4 (cont.)

though it is clear that Aristotle uses the terms ἔννομα and ἀναφύγα to denote things, not terms, this view is normally abandoned when it comes to τὸ πρᾶγμα. It is possible that Aristotle believed that one is not considering the same thing when considering something as a predicate rather than as a subject.

12. In the Categories Aristotle might have been more inclined to call quality-like predicates 'homonymous' rather than 'paronymous' on the grounds that in such cases the name but not the definition is predicated. Compare, for instance, 1a 1-3 with 3a 15-17.


14. The Greek is ambiguous here and I have translated it ambiguously.

15. 1032b 26.

Chapter 5

1. Ross' commentary on the Metaphysics, Vol. II, p. 188.

2. Ibid, p. 189.


4. 1033b 7.

5. Physics, 190b 5. Cf. Met., 1042b 15-25, where Aristotle indicates the vast list of properties and changes that may, in different cases, count as differentiae.

6. English does not usually reflect this difference by a verbal change. As Barrington Jones remarks on p. 485 of "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter": "Now, of course, in English we do readily use mass-words as adjectives. We talk of bronze statues and stone houses. Were we to speak of a brazen statue..."
we would either be using an archaism or else referring to a rather risqué statue." He points out, however, that while a woodshed need not be made of wood a wooden shed must be.

8. Commentary on the Physics, p. 675.
9. It is not clear whether Aristotle here has in mind the further distinction between ἐνεργός and ἐνεργός as in Categories, Chapter I.
10. Cf. 1049a 18ff.
11. Similarly, when movement is defined as the 'activity of the potential as such', one of the things Aristotle means is that bronze, as potentially moved, is not regarded as bronze per se, but as what has certain capacities and susceptibilities (Physics, 201a 9-15, 201a 29ff.). This is in line with my view that what is regarded as a component is not regarded as an actuality.

It is notable, however, that in Physics, H, 3, Aristotle does not speak of matter as a ὑφή. He introduces the term only in the context of 'states' of the intellectual part of the soul at 247b 4. His claim is that when one who knows (κατὰ ὑφήν) comes to use his knowledge, this transition is rightly called neither alteration nor genesis.

12. Aristotle often uses the term 'becoming' in a general sense which covers both cases of simple genesis and alteration, e. g., throughout Physics, A, 7. This partly reflects the fact that 'alteration' was used in a special sense, e. g., at 190b 8. In A, 7, however, Aristotle distinguishes between ἀρνῶς ἐνεργοῦ and ἐνεργοῦ ἄρνος, though the latter expression is awkwardly ambiguous, e. g., at 190a 21 and 190a 32.
Chapter 5 (cont.)


14. Ross mentions that Aristotle "... ignores the fourth kind of ποιητῆς recognized in the Categories ... probably because the fourfold division of ποιητῆς had not yet been worked out by him."

15. Cf. 246b 16-17.


17. Ibid, 3a 22. Ackrill in Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford 1963), p. 85, objects to Aristotle's claim. He says, "If the differentia of a genus is not a substance (secondary substances being just the species and genera of substance), it ought to belong to some other category and hence be in a substance." Though I think my explanation is valid, Aristotle's claim is indeed an awkward one. The distinction is apparently abandoned in the Metaphysics.

18. Aristotle's denial in the Physics at 190a 25 that bronze can be said to become a statue (pace Jones in "Aristotle's Introduction to Matter") has the same significance. A statue is not a modification of bronze.

19. Aristotle probably holds that certain kinds of properties can never differentiate between substances, e.g., the properties white and black (cf. 1058a 32-36). Only καθ' ἑαυτῷ divisions of a genus, or όικεῖα ποιήσεως are differentiae. But not every καθ' ἑαυτῷ division of a genus differentiates a species. 'Male' and 'female' are καθ' ἑαυτῷ divisions among animals, but 'man' and 'woman' are not species.

20. Cf. 1030a 3-6, Met.

Chapter 5 (cont.)

22. Ross' *Metaphysics*, Vol. II, p. 225. The comment is very strange considering that throughout the chapter (Z, 17) Aristotle is using the example of a syllable to make his point, i.e. that the substance of something is not an element or something composed of elements but something else. Cf. Met. 1045a 10 and 25ff.

23. 1032b 28-1033a 1, 1033a 4-5.


26. 190a 31.

27. This is foreshadowed in *Physics*, A, 7 by the distinction drawn at 190b 13-17 between an ἀύτι κέιμενος and a ὑποκέιμενος. Shapelessness, amorphism and disorder are called ἀύτικεῖμενα while bronze, stone and gold are ὑποκέιμενα.


29. Here I shift from the example of bronze because 'a bronze' is an English expression for a statue.


31. 190b 25. It is not exactly clear what Aristotle means by ἔλαχιστη or 'countable matter' here. He may mean matter of a certain kind, or matter in a unified lump, or both. Probably he at least wishes to distinguish from matter in general or en masse.

32. Cf. 1044b 2 (*Met.*), where Aristotle asks: "What is matter? Not fire or earth but what is peculiar to it."


34. *Met.*, 1035a 31-35, 1035b 11-12, 1036a 34.

35. My reading here diverges significantly from Ross'. While Ross takes these remarks to apply to particulars
Chapter 5 (cont.)

or 'the concrete thing' (as he translates σύνολον), I take them to apply to parts and materials. τοῦ δὲ σύνολον γεν, though elliptical, is already a complete sentence and is comparable in significance to καθ' ἐξαίτων δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐσσαίας ἐλης ἐς εὐχαίρησιν γεν, καθ' ἐστὶν at 1035b 31. I. e. τοῦ δὲ σύνολον γεν means 'The parts of the combined substance are already present'. My translation makes good sense of ἐξαίτως καθ' ἐστὶν at 1036a 8 which in Ross' reading is an irrelevant aside.

37. E. g. Met. 1040b 11.
41. Ibid, p. 349.
44. Cf. also Gen. et Corr., 317b 9.
46. Ibid, 318b 3.
47. Ibid, 318b 15-19.
49. Ibid, 319a 9.
50. Ibid, 319a 12.
52. 319a 14-17.
53. I have been influenced throughout this argument by Charlton’s "Did Aristotle Believe in Prime Matter?"
Chapter 6

1. Met., 1050a 15.
2. Ibid, 1041a 9.
4. Ibid, 1041a 15, 1041a 23.
5. Ibid, 1041a 18.
6. Ibid, 1041a 20. It is notable that ἰδόν ἀνινονετε has the form of a definition. I incline to the view that Aristotle would allow, for instance, the question 'Why is a man a rational animal?'. In this case the questioner would be seeking an account of the unity of the definition's elements, 'rational' and 'animal'. This would indicate that, however good a definition may be, the essence-question may still be asked. That is, one may ask both 'What is it for a man to be a rational animal?' and 'What is it for an animal to be rational?'.
7. Ibid., 1041a 32.
10. Ibid, 1041b 10. Here I follow Ross who takes ἰθος ἰτιτεσσως as a genitive of comparison.
13. Ibid, 1041a 28-30. These two causes are often the same. Cf. 1050a 8.
14. Ross moves in this direction when he says, "In other words the formal cause is not a distinct cause over and above the final or efficient, but is either of those when considered as forming the definition of the thing in question."
15. Met., 1032b 13, 1034a 24, 1070b 33, 1075b 10, 1070a 29.
16. Met., 1041a 31 may be understood to limit the explanatory power of efficient causes to the genesis and destruction of things. But ἐντερον δέ ἀκιλ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνέκρει at a 32
probably means that the final cause as well as the efficient cause applies to the 'being'.

17. οτόκειον is also the Greek word for 'element'. Aristotle frequently uses οτόκειον in apparent apposition with ἀρχά and αἰτία, e. g. in A,1 of the Physics (see Bonitz' Index, 702a 26 ff.). However, ἀρχά and οτόκειον are pointedly distinguished at, e. g., Met., 1070b 23. 'Element' is often used by Aristotle in the restricted sense of the matter from which something is made or into which something is divided when it is destroyed as in Z, 17, 1041b 31. Of course, the term is also used of the four 'elements' or τὰ ἀτομικὰ σύματα (Met. 1042a 8), fire, earth, water and air. The use of 'letters' and 'simple bodies' together in Z, 17 combines under one umbrella two types of element, i.e. those which, though divisible, have parts which are of the same kind as the wholes (e. g. water) and those which are either indivisible themselves or are not divisible into parts of the same kind as the wholes, e. g. letters (see Met., 1014a 26-30).

At 1035a 11 Aristotle claims that the letters of a syllable are parts of the account and the form, and not matter, in contrast to segments of a circle.

19. Ibid, 1041b 11-12. See also 1040b 10, 1044a 4, 1045a 9.
20. Poetics, 1456 b 22, where a 'letter' is defined as 'an indivisible sound, not of every sort, but the sort from which an intelligible sound is naturally produced'.
21. Ibid, 1456b 28; Met., 1041b 17.
22. Met., 1041b 22.
23. Ross understands Aristotle here to be introducing a distinction between natural and artificial substances. There are, however, other plausible interpretations. He may, for instance, have in mind the distinction between simple things (1041b 9) and wholes which are constituted in accordance with nature, i. e. put together out of parts.
Chapter 6 (cont.)
in an intelligible or natural order like the syllable (see footnote 20). Ross says, "The statue retains the substantial or essential nature of wood, house, &c. And qua wooden it is a natural substance; it is only qua having such and such a shape that it is artificial, and in this respect it is not a substance." But why would Aristotle in this context suddenly want to assert that artificial products are mere combinations of characteristics with real substances? Is a syllable artificial or natural in this sense? The sheer fact that something is the product of art need not imply that it is unnatural as is evidenced by Aristotle's ubiquitous use of 'health' as an instance of such a product, i.e. of the art of medicine. Mainly, what Aristotle seems to have in mind by speaking of things constituted ἔντεκα φύσιν καὶ φύσει, is the distinction between a σώμος and a ἐρ. Though Aristotle does in a number of passages express doubts that artificial products are genuine substances, this has to do with the kind of 'separability' their substances have (see, e.g., 1043b 18-23). This issue will be discussed later in this chapter. 24. Met., 1041a 3; see also 1033a 25.
25. 200a 33.
27. Met., 1041a 8.
28. Met., 1017b 14-16 tends to suggest that while the soul is 'the cause of the being' of an animal, it is not predicable.
29. Met. 1032b 1, 23.
30. See also, Met., 1046b 7. On similar grounds, P. T. Geach in Mental Acts argues that no concept may be abstracted from a recognition of sameness of characteristics. For if the concept of, e.g. health, involves recognition of illness, and it is through the action of one and the same concept that both states are recognized, this single concept cannot be built out of common characteristics.
31. Met., 1032b 6, 1032b 26-30, 1033a 4, 1035a 11.
32. The elements which constitute health will be different for different beings, possibly even for members of the
same species. This is a further indication that the term 'health', though by no means equivocal on this account, cannot simply denote a common set of characteristics.

33. Christ secludes η ἐκ μέρους Ἰσμών at 1034a 23, adding Ἰσμών after ἐκ μέρους at a 24. Ross preserves the manuscripts, and paraphrases,

All artefacta are produced from a thing having the same name as themselves, as are natural products, or (more exactly) from an element in themselves which has the same name as themselves (e. g. a house is produced from a house, inasmuch as it is produced by reason, for the art of building is identical with the formal element in a house), or from something involving an element in them (and having the same name as it).

This interpretation seems to me to be on the right track, though it is coloured by the view that the form of something is an element in it. About the use of the term 'homonym' Ross helpfully points out:

Τὰ φύσει are actually produced ἐκ Ἰσμών (Ἀ. 1070a 5), from that which shares their nature as well as their name, but Aristotle occasionally ignores the distinction between Ἰσμών and Ἰσμών, which did not exist in ordinary Greek usage; cf. Ἀ. 987b 9 n., De Gen. et Corr. 328b 21.

In fact, however, Aristotle rarely, if ever, uses the term 'homonym' to describe things which have the same name but share no more than the name, i. e. as the English term 'homonym' suggests, e. g. 'hear' and 'here'. The science of medicine and a certain state of the body are both, according to Aristotle, called 'health'. Though this is by no means a matter of sheer equivocation, they need not on this account be regarded as strict 'synonyms'. More will be said about Aristotelian homonymy in the next chapter.

34. Met., 1032b 15.
35. E. g. the καθ'εὐτον ὕπος which Aristotle calls a 'primary cause of production' at 1034a 26. In this connection Aristotle's claim at 1032b 25 that 'heating' is a principle in doctoring is important because it implies that one and the same thing is part both of the practice of medicine and of the bodily process.
36. Met., 1032b 15-17.
37. See note 35.
38. τὸ εὐμοεῖδὲς is supplied here by Christ. Zeller's emendation is also satisfactory, viz. ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρωπός for ἀνθρώποις ἄνθρωπος. For the use of εὐμοεῖδὲς in similar contexts see 1071a 16-17, 1032a 24.
40. Ibid, 1070b 28.
41. Ibid, 1032b 5.
42. Ibid, 1032b 14.
43. Physics, 199a 18, b 30; De Part. An., 639b 30.
44. Just as the soul is the 'cause of the being' for an animal without being a characteristic of it.
45. This appears to be Aristotle's point at 1050a 16 ff.
46. I am not claiming that there is a change in doctrine. Aristotle in the Physics accommodates Antiphon's position because he is interested in a different problem.
47. Physics, 193a 12, 193b 8. Aristotle elegantly uses the very same example which establishes matter as substance to show that the form is substance - even on the materialist account, i.e. at 193b 11-12.
48. Compare the similar point made at 1035b 16-18.
50. Ibid, 1035b 21.
51. The form as opposed to the substratum is described as 'that which being a tode ti is also separable' at 1017b 25.
52. Cf. 1049b 8 where χρ. is described as 'a kinetic principle, not in something else, but in itself as itself'. In this context such a principle is construed as a potentiality. The actuality is prior to all such principles both in account (λόγῳ) and in substance (τῇ οὐσίᾳ).
53. Met., 1043b 18, 1060b 23. Ross, following Alexander, understands the non-generability of the art as reflecting the instantaneousness with which the artist thinks of forms and ceases to think of them. He regards it as a general fact about forms of all kinds that 'they come into being not by a process but instantaneously'.
Chapter 6 (cont.)

A more probable account is that, in Aristotle's view, the artist does not create the art when he comes to practice it. Instead, he engages in the practice. The 'change' from the mere possession of an art to its exercise is not a case of genesis but the fulfilment of a practitioner as such. Nor is it a case of destruction when the artist ceases to practice. Aristotle makes a comparable point in De Anima at 417b 6:

For one who has knowledge comes to contemplate, which either is not alteration (for it is an advance toward himself and toward actuality) or it is a different kind of alteration.

Similarly, the existence at one point of an art, and the non-existence of it at another, should not be regarded as a case of genesis and destruction. Cf. Physics, 247b 9, where Aristotle says that the gaining of knowledge is neither genesis nor alteration. Further, the more plausible account of Aristotle's view that there is no genesis of forms is given simply by the claim that when a housebuilder makes a house, he does not make what a house is. Instantaneousness is not at issue.

55. Ibid, 1045a 20.
56. Ibid, 1042b 10, 1043a 20, 23, 25, 28, 1050b 2, 10, 1043b 1, 1050a 16, 1074a 35; De Anima, 412a 21, 412b 9.
57. Met., 1049b 5-10.
58. Ibid, 1050a 28.
Introduction to Part II

1. Met., 1029b 14, 1032a 5.
2. Ibid, 1030a 13-14.
3. Ibid, 1038b 35.
4. See footnote 2.
5. Met., 1030a 3-6, 1030a 11-14, 1030a 28, 1030b 26, 1031a 10.
6. Categories, 1a 4, 11.
Part II, Chapter 1.

1. Met., 1022a 27-29.

2. An important version of the position I oppose here is argued by Pierre Aubenque in *Le Problème de l'Être chez Aristote* (Paris, 1962). Aubenque's claim is that the *τ. η. ε.* includes everything attributed to a subject *per se* including *per se* accidents. I will attempt to refute this position in the next chapter.

3. M. J. Woods argues persuasively that in *Met.*, 2 genera, but not species, are regarded not as substance-terms but as analogous to common predicates in their mode of predication ("Problems in *Metaphysics* Z, 13" in Moravcsik's *Aristotle*). A genus is not, that is, a *tode ti* but a *such* (τοιοδή) as at 1039a 1. This view is supported further by reference to *Met.*, 1014b 9-15, 1038b 16-18, 1042a 21, *De Anima* 402b 8; as well as to the *Physics* at 249a 21 where Aristotle says that a genus is not a unity but a plurality. My claim here may seem to parallel what appears to be a shift in doctrine from that of the *Categories* in which genera are treated as differing from species terms only in their distance from primary substances. For my argument goes against Aristotle's claim in the *Categories* (1a 6-8) that a man and an ox are *synonyms* with respect to the name animal. This, however, turns out to be a separate issue, as will be shown later. One need not hold that genera are exactly analogous to quality-predicates in order to say that they are insufficiently determinate to be classed as substances according to Aristotle's mature view.


5. Ibid, 1049b 1, 1087a 16 ff.


7. Though other things than substances have essences, they have them in a derivative sense. See, e. g., *Met.* 1030a 28-32.


10. A slightly different issue is involved here than the non-substantiality of 'one thing in another', for differentiae are not predicates of genera (Met. 1037b 18, Po. An., 90b 34). But Aristotle goes on to argue that even if this were allowed, the same problem would remain. In this context the analogy occasionally drawn by Aristotle between genera and matter has some importance (Met., 1024b 6-9, 1038a 5-8). A genus is in a sense determined by differentiae in the way that matter is determined by qualities.

11. E. g., Cooke notes in the Loeb edition:

\[ \text{Zwov in Greek had two meanings, that is to say, living creature, and, secondly, a figure or image in painting, embroidery, sculpture.} \]

Ackrill, too, remarks (Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione* (Oxford, 1963), p. 71):

The word translated 'animal' originally meant just that; but it had come to be used also of pictures or other artistic representations (whether representations of animals or not).

The probability that Aristotle did not have this in mind when he wrote the passage is supported by reference to *De Partibus Animalium*, 641a 1, where Aristotle speaks of a doctor in a picture as so called homonymously, and to the passage I note from *De Anima*, where a painted eye is used as the example. Neither the word 'eye' nor the word 'doctor' are regarded in their contexts as puns.

12. 'Homonyms' may be related to one another in a broad range of fashions for Aristotle. In the *Physics* at 249a 23, Aristotle says,

Among homonyms, some are far removed from one another, some have a certain likeness, and some are near one another either in genus or by analogy, on which account they seem not to be homonyms at all.

In *N. E.*, 1096b 27, Aristotle suggests that the term
Part II, Chapter 1 (cont.)

'good' may not be homonymous if goods are related by analogy or are so called in relation to one thing. In the Metaphysics at 1003a 33, Aristotle says that τὸ ὁὖν, though πολλὰς ἥκσες, is nevertheless πρὸς ἑαυτῷ καὶ μὲν τῷ γενετῷ καὶ ὧν ἐσεμνύομαι. A similar claim is found at 1030a 32-b3 about 'beings' insofar as they may be, like medical things, related to one another not καθ' ἑαυτῷ ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἑαυτῷ. For discussion of 'homonymy' in relation to the Metaphysics, see Fr. Owens' The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, pp. 107-135, and Leszl's Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle: Aristotle's treatment of types of equivocity and its relevance to metaphysical theories (Padova, 1970).

13. Categories, 1a 11.
18. Aristotle's Theory of Being, pp. 30-31. Buchanan follows Ross in this division. Though Ross divides the field of interpretation into three camps (see footnote 14), he says that the last two, i.e., those which take the imperfect as indicating duration and those which take it as indicating the pre-existence of the form, differ only in that the latter interpretation "takes more explicit account of Aristotelian doctrine ..." Fr. Owens' The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 181-188 has extensive references.
20. In the context Aristotle seems to draw, perhaps invalidly, the conclusion that when both the name and the definition of the name are predicatable of a subject, the subjects are 'synonyms'. This is inconvenient for
my interpretation of 'homonymy', though it is important to notice that in the *Physics* at 248b 16 Aristotle even definitions can be homonymous. I believe that in this part of the *Categories* Aristotle makes a philosophical slip in view of other interests, namely, his interest in the distinctive way in which words for kinds, as opposed to properties, apply to subjects.


22. This view is refuted by Arpe in *Das τέθεν ἤτοι* bei Aristoteles, pp. 14-15.

23. However fortunate in this instance, one ought to avoid translating the phrase as 'This was what was to be' which imputes to the Greek the English idiom 'what was to be' in the sense of what is planned, designed or fated.


27. Ibid, 1030a 22.

28. Ibid, 1030a 32.

29. Ross 'puzzles helpfully over the passage in his commentary on the *Physics*, pp. 457-458. His comment on the use of Τὰ καθ' ἐξήγησιν is especially notable:

Τὰ καθ' ἐξήγησιν seems to have here an unusual meaning; i. e. to mean the various senses of an ambiguous term. Though it is essentially the business of definition to state the logical elements of a complex term, incidentally in doing this it will distinguish the various meanings of the term if this happens to be ambiguous. Only on this interpretation, apparently, will the remark about definition serve to illustrate, even remotely, what it is put forward as illustrating, viz. the transition from the recognition of the generic nature of an object to the recognition of its specific nature (a 23-26).
Chapter 2, Part II

1. P. 462.
2. P. 463.

La question τὰ ἡμερῶν, entendue au sens strict, d'une question portant sur le genre, ne suffit pas à satisfaire notre curiosité concernant l'essence.
4. P. 463.
5. P. 466.
8. P. 461.
10. E. g. Met., 995b 20, 25, 997a 20, 1003a 21.
12. Ibid, 73b 20.
13. Met., 1022a 31 and 2, 5. Aristotle often treats colour as primarily a surface phenomenon, a view which he attributes to the Pythagoreans in De Sensu, 439a 30. In that passage Aristotle raises objections to the doctrine based on transparent but coloured things like water and air. But cf. Physics 248b 23, where white is said to belong primarily to surface and 249a 3 where it is claimed that every attribute belongs primarily to one subject. The extent to which Aristotle held to this view in the Metaphysics is less than clear. Passages like 1049a 29-30 incline me to think that he largely abandoned the notion. There, as will be recalled from earlier discussion, Aristotle claims that it is the man, body and soul, which is the subject of qualities like white.
15. P. 467.
16. P. 465. Reference is to Τί ΚΑΤΑ ΤΙΝΟΣ ... (Freiburg, 1958).
Chapter 2. Part II (cont.)

17. Relevant to this position would be Aristotle's use of κανά φύσιν in the Physics at 246a 15 and εὖς αὐτῷ in De Anima at 417b 6. Cf. EN, 1177b 27.

18. On the relation between these terms see Chung-Hwan Chen's "The Relation between the Terms ἐνέργεια and ἐνεργεία in the Philosophy of Aristotle," CQ, Vol. LII, 1958. G. B. Kerferd in his article on Aristotle in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy remarks: "Strictly speaking, 'actuality' refers primarily to the process which reaches its termination in the 'entelechy'." However, Aristotle frequently uses the terms with no distinction apparently in mind.

19. Ross favours ἔνοτος rather than the dative solely on palaeographic grounds.

20. A possible support for Aubenque's position is the fact that Aristotle uses not only the relation of white to surface but the relation of living to man at 1022a 3. Though 'living' may not define a man, it is a property without which a man is a man only homonymously, a fact which Aubenque emphasizes, e.g. on p. 470. However, Aubenque mistakenly denies that white belongs χρῶνατό to surface on p. 473.

21. Perhaps this is what G. B. Kerferd has in mind by rendering the essence-formula as 'the what it was to be (something)' in "Aristotle" (The Encyclopedia of Philosophy). This reading is supported by 1030a 3, especially if Bonitz' insertion of τοῦ is disregarded. This would make τοῦ at lines 4 and 5 explanatory of the primary sense in which something is (something).

22. 1029b 15. It is a little surprising that Aristotle constantly treats musicality or culture as a sheer accident. Wouldn't this attribute belong primarily to men? Mightn't it be in Aubenque's sense a χρῶνατό predicate of Pablo Casals?

23. The contrary position about the success of this 'definition' is maintained by M. J. Woods in "Substance and Essence in Aristotle," PAS, 1975.
Chapter 2, Part II (cont.)

24. Seclusion of περὶ λευκὸν αὐτόματος at 1029b 27 is unnecessary. If εἴπτει is to be supplied mentally, then the phrase may mean 'what was a white man's being white'. In that case Aristotle may be asking whether there is an essence for a man's relation to the property white or an essence of white in relation to man. I am placing no special importance on the phrase.

25. Ross' translation of ἀρέσκομεν at 1029b 28 as 'but, it may be said that' is hard to defend. See Smyth's Greek Grammar, revised by Gordon M. Messing (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), articles 2786, 2921. 'We reply that' is equally dubious for η at 1029b 29. I suspect that his philosophical position causes him to reverse the force of the Greek particles.

26. This, however, is not required for my argument. My translation makes it ambiguous, as I believe the Greek to be.

27. Here I offer 'definite something' as a translation of τὸ ἔτος περὶ. The translation is justified, I think, both in the context and in light of the argument up to this point. I believe that at 1030a 3 'whatever is something' should be understood to mean 'whatever is something as its subject'. This, however, is not required for the present argument. Aristotle goes on to clarify his meaning at 1030a 18 ff., a passage which has already been discussed in the last chapter.


29. Met., 1017b 12, 1019a 6, 1025a 8, 1038b 15, 1037b 3.

30. Ibid, 1030a 11-12.

31. A good account of the difficulty is given by Lesher in "Aristotle on Form, Substance and Universals: A Dilemma," Phronesis, Vol. XVI, 1971. As Lesher puts it the following three fundamental Aristotelian views form an inconsistent triad:
(A) No universal can be a substance.
(B) The form is a universal.
(C) The form is that which is most truly substance.
Chapter 2, Part II (cont.)

31 (cont.). Lesher says: What Aristotle says in 1038b 9 is that nothing predicated universally is substance. He says elsewhere that the species form is substance, and thus he ought to say that the species is not predicated universally. But what he does say, repeatedly, is that it is predicated universally.

At the very least it is shown in this chapter that Lesher underestimates Aristotle's sensitivity to this problem.

32. I have paraphrased or expanded the text in some instances, but not in such a way, I hope, as to violate the sense of the argument. Rather different interpretations are given by Ross and by Cherniss (in Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, p. 318, n. 220).

33. I am in agreement with Woods that lines 16-30 constitute objections to Aristotle's position, but I doubt his claim that they are all platonic objections.

34. A few notes on the translation of this passage are required. First, it is clear from the translations of Ross and Creed (in Bambrough's The Philosophy of Aristotle) that \( \delta \varepsilon \nu \eta \omega \nu \tau \sigma s \) at 1038b 30 is taken by them to refer to the species 'man' rather than to a man. The use of quotes in Apostle's translation suggests a similar line of thought, but is more ambiguous. I see no reason to follow either alternative. My way of translating the term is less friendly to Woods' position since he believes that Aristotle preserves a special mode of predication for species as opposed to genera. By translating the term otherwise than Woods in this instance I am not expressing a disagreement with Woods' general position. But I do think, as will become evident, that Woods does not develop what Aristotle views as the solution to the problems posed.

A more important disagreement in translation involves lines 1038b 33-34. Here all the translations I have seen take Aristotle to be saying that no animal exists apart from particular instances. I take him to mean that no such animal is a substance. I see no evidence to support the view that Aristotle would have denied that to be a such
Chapter 2, Part II (cont.)

rather than a tode ti is not to exist (1039a 1-2, 1030a 33-b 3).

Aristotle's shift to an absolute or intransitive sense of ὑποκείμενον at 1038b 32 is rather elegant insofar as it is this term which has in part given rise to the difficulty.

35. M. J. Woods in "Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13."


37. Modrak distinguishes two sorts of universal predication, one as type to token, the other as property to thing.

38. An important article on the difference between quality-predicates and kind-predicates is Sellars' Substance and Form in Aristotle," JP, Vol. 54, 1957. Also relevant is "Raw Materials, Subjects and Substrata," The Concept of Matter in Greek and Medieval Philosophy, McMullin, ed.

39. Lesher denies this in "Aristotle on Form, Substance and Universals: A Dilemma."

40. Especially the 'third man'. This is not the only problem. In this thesis I emphasize the view that a universal predicate is not fixed in its meaning unless it exists ἄθροισθαι. But this sort of existence is incompatible with universal predication.

41. According to Aristotle, Democritus would admit this. See 1030a 9.

42. Met., 1030b 30.

43. Ibid, 1030b 29.

44. Ibid, 1040a 33.

45. Aristotle seems to ignore the possibility that spatio-temporal characteristics may serve to isolate an individual. Whether they could or not is an extremely complex philosophical question beyond the scope of this thesis.
46. Met., 1039b 20-22.
47. Ibid, 1039b 22-25.
48. Ibid, 1030b 31-40a 2.
49. Ibid, 1039b 25.
50. W. Leszl in "Knowledge of the Universal and Knowledge of the particular in Aristotle" says:

On this account, then, potential and actual knowledge have the same contents, namely the rule or connection expressed by the mentioned hypothetical proposition. The difference between them lies in the fact that potential knowledge is the unactualized capacity to apply the general rule to any particular case which falls under it, and actual knowledge is the actualization of this capacity by application of that rule to a given particular case.

The Meno paradox results from the view that there is no middle ground between knowledge and ignorance. For Aristotle's approach to this paradox see Po. An., 71a 27-30 where he claims that the paradox is irresolvable unless one can know something knowledge but not knowledge. The use of the word knowledge in such contexts is in keeping with my argument.

51. A better reference than Z, 15 for Aristotle's resolution of the problem would have been to Z, 16-17.
52. Met., 1045a 12.
53. Ibid, 1045a 20.
54. This is what Aristotle probably means at 1031a 20.
55. Met., 1020b 7. See also, 1040b 19-21.
Chapter 3, Part II

1. Met., 1032a 5.
2. Ibid, 1031b 13.
9. 257b 8, 201b 32.
10. Physics, 201a 10.
11. Met., 1050a 16.